Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01035/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01035-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1

 “Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s Electronic Case File (ECF). “RT”

refers to reporter’s transcript; “ROA” refers to the trial court record prepared for Petitioner’s

direct appeal (Case No. CR-99-0438-AP). The original reporter’s transcripts and a certified

paper copy of the record on appeal were provided to this Court by the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Doc. 63.) Additional state court records have been filed electronically by the parties.

(Docs. 37-44, 46, 52.) Citation to these records is to the ECF docket and page number.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Edward Sansing, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-11-1035-PHX-SRB

DEATH PENALTY CASE

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

AND ORDER

Petitioner John Edward Sansing, a state prisoner under sentence of death, has filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that he is imprisoned and sentenced in violation

of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 35.)1

 The petition raises 29 claims. Pursuant to the

Court’s general procedures governing resolution of capital habeas proceedings, the parties

have briefed both the procedural status and merits of Petitioner’s claims. (Docs. 37, 51.)

Petitioner has also filed a Motion for Evidentiary Development regarding four of his claims.

(Doc. 53.) As set forth below, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to either

evidentiary development or federal habeas relief. 

BACKGROUND

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In September 1998, Petitioner pled guilty to the first-degree murder, kidnapping,

armed robbery, and sexual assault of Trudy Calabrese. The Arizona Supreme Court

summarized the facts as follows:

On February 24, 1998, the defendant called the Living Springs Church

and requested delivery of a food box for his family. He gave the church

secretary his name and home address for the delivery. The defendant then

telephoned his wife, Kara Sansing, at work several times, primarily to discuss

how to obtain more crack cocaine for the two of them to smoke. During these

calls, the defendant informed his wife that he had obtained some crack

cocaine, that he had smoked some of it and was saving the rest for her. He also

told her that he had called a church and arranged for delivery of some food.

When Kara Sansing returned home at approximately 3:20 p.m., the couple

smoked the remaining crack cocaine. The defendant, in the presence of his

four children, informed Kara of his plan to rob the person who came from the

church with the food boxes so he could purchase more crack cocaine.

Trudy Calabrese left the Living Springs Church in her truck at

approximately 4:00 p.m. She arrived at the Sansing home shortly thereafter,

parked in front of the house, and delivered two boxes of food. Ms. Calabrese

chatted with Kara Sansing in the kitchen while the defendant signed a receipt

for the delivery. Before Ms. Calabrese could leave, the defendant grabbed her

from behind and threw her to the dining room floor. Aided by his wife and

with his children watching, the defendant bound her wrists while she cried,

“Lord, please help me” and, “I don’t want to die, but if this is the way you

want me to come home, I am ready,” and repeatedly asked the defendant’s

children to call the police. The defendant instructed his children to go into the

living room and watch television.

Using a club, the defendant struck Ms. Calabrese in the head several

times with force sufficient to break the club into two pieces and render her

temporarily unconscious. Leaving her on the dining room floor, the defendant

took her keys and moved her truck to a business parking lot nearby. At some

point before he returned, Ms. Calabrese regained consciousness. Upon his

return, the defendant dragged her into his bedroom and sexually assaulted her.

Kara Sansing, who witnessed the rape, testified that she heard the defendant

and Ms. Calabrese speaking during the rape. The defendant then fatally

stabbed her in the abdomen three times with a kitchen knife. During the attack,

the defendant placed a sock in Ms. Calabrese’s mouth and secured two plastic

bags over her head with additional cords and a necktie. According to the

medical examiner, she lived several minutes after being stabbed. After the

murder, the defendant left the bedroom and went to look out the dining room

window to make certain no one had observed his actions.

The defendant then removed Ms. Calabrese’s jewelry and left her body

in his bedroom, covered with laundry, for several hours. The defendant

engaged in two separate drug transactions shortly after the murder. First, he

telephoned a drug dealer and arranged to trade the victim’s rings for crack

cocaine. Later, he arranged to trade her necklace for more crack cocaine.

Later in the evening, Pastor Becker from Living Springs Church called

the Sansing home looking for Ms. Calabrese and spoke to the defendant. The

defendant, giving a false address, told the pastor that she had never arrived.

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2

 Section 13-703 has since been transferred and renumbered as A.R.S. § 13-751

(2011).

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Late that night, the defendant dragged Ms. Calabrese from the bedroom

to the backyard and placed her body in a narrow space between the back of his

shed and the fence. He covered her with a piece of old carpeting and other

debris. At least three of the four Sansing children saw the body behind the

shed. At some point, the defendant washed the bloody club and hid the clothes

he had used to cover her body in a box in the bedroom.

The next day, searchers found Ms. Calabrese’s truck in a parking lot

near the Sansing home. Inside, they found a piece of paper with the Sansings’

correct address. The police went to the Sansing home and discovered the

victim’s body behind the shed. The defendant, who had driven to his sister’s

house, admitted to her that he and his wife had killed Ms. Calabrese.

Eventually, the defendant’s father telephoned the police and reported the

defendant’s location. The defendant knew the police were coming and did not

attempt to flee. When the police arrived, he submitted to custody peaceably

and without resistance.

State v. Sansing, 200 Ariz. 347, 351-52, 26 P.3d 1118, 1122-23 (2001) (Sansing I).

In September 1999, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Ronald S. Reinstein held

a sentencing hearing to determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

The court found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner

committed the crime in the expectation of pecuniary gain, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5),2

 and that

Petitioner committed the murder in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner, A.R.S.

§ 13-703(F)(6). The court further found that Petitioner had failed to prove any statutory

mitigating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13-703(G), but that he had established five nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) impairment from the use of crack cocaine; (2) a

difficult childhood; (3) acceptance of responsibility and remorse; (4) lack of education; and

(5) family support. Weighing the sentencing factors, the court determined that the proven

mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravation and sentenced

Petitioner to death. 

On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court struck the pecuniary gain aggravating factor

but nonetheless affirmed. Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 355-56, 26 P.3d at 1126-27. Subsequently,

the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), holding that

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3

 Petitioner complains that he was directed to file his habeas petition prior to

expiration of the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and that he therefore

“reserves the right to amend this petition any time before the one year statutory deadline

expires without being required to meet the strict requirements for amendment imposed by

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 657.” (Doc. 35 at 10.) Because Petitioner did not seek to amend

his petition, either before expiration of the limitations period or after, this issue is moot. 

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Arizona’s aggravating factors are an element of the offense of capital murder and therefore

must be found by a jury. The Court granted Petitioner’s petition for certiorari, vacated the

Arizona Supreme Court’s judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Ring.

Sansing v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 954 (2002) (mem.). On remand, the state court determined that

the lack of jury findings as to aggravation constituted harmless error in Petitioner’s case.

State v. Sansing, 206 Ariz. 232, 77 P.3d 30 (2003) (Sansing II). The Supreme Court denied

a petition for certiorari. Sansing v. Arizona, 542 U.S. 939 (2004).

Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief in state court, raising six claims for relief.

In July 2008, the trial court dismissed five of the claims as meritless or procedurally

precluded. It held a four-day evidentiary hearing on the remaining claim, which alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, and ultimately denied relief in July 2010. The

Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied a petition for review in May 2011, and Petitioner

thereafter initiated these habeas corpus proceedings.3

APPLICABLE LAW

Because it was filed after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (AEDPA). Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 336 (1997); see also Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003). The

following provisions of the AEDPA will guide the Court’s consideration of Petitioner’s

claims.

I. Principles of Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Under the AEDPA, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted unless it appears that

the petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see

also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).

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To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims to the state’s highest

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999).

 A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78

(1971). Unless the petitioner clearly alerts the state court that he is alleging a specific federal

constitutional violation, he has not fairly presented the claim. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d

896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either

by citing specific provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of

a claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), or by citing

state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert,

319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to

exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and post-conviction relief (PCR)

proceedings. Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings

and provides that a petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been

raised on appeal or in a prior PCR petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive

effect of Rule 32.2(a) may be avoided only if a claim falls within certain exceptions

(subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was

omitted from a prior petition or not presented in a timely manner. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b), 32.4(a).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways.

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state

court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present

it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims

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in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”

Id. at 735 n.1. If no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is

“technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; see

also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross,

468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not review the merits of a

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure

to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional

violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were

not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Ordinarily, “cause” to

excuse a default exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that “some objective factor external

to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Id. at

753; see also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional error or violation. Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th

Cir. 1998). 

II. Standard for Habeas Relief

The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas relief” with the

“acknowledged purpose of ‘reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal

sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 475 (2007) (quoting Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings’ . . . demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of

the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In conducting review under § 2254(d)(1), this Court “is limited to the

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v.

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398-99 (2011).

 DISCUSSION

I. DENIAL OF JURY TRIAL

Petitioner contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury

determination on the factors that rendered him eligible for capital punishment, in violation

of Ring v. Arizona. He argues that this denial amounted to structural error and, therefore, the

Arizona Supreme Court’s decision to review for harmless error was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of controlling federal law. Petitioner further contends that, even

if subject to harmless error review, the Arizona Supreme Court’s finding of harmlessness was

contrary to federal law and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

A. Harmless Error Standard

In Ring, the United States Supreme Court invalidated Arizona’s judge-only capital

sentencing scheme by holding that a jury must determine the existence of facts rendering a

defendant eligible for the death penalty. 536 U.S. at 609. Subsequently, the Arizona

Supreme Court, in State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 552, 65 P.3d 915, 933 (2003) (“Ring III”),

held that the Sixth Amendment “does not require automatic reversal of a death sentence

imposed under [Arizona’s] former sentencing statutes.” Instead, relying on Neder v. United

States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999), and Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1991), the

court held that it would review capital sentences under the harmless error standard. Id. at

552-53, 65 P.3d at 933-34. Having rejected the argument that Ring error is structural, the

Arizona Supreme Court applied the harmless error test in evaluating Petitioner’s death

sentence. Sansing II, 206 Ariz. at 235, 77 P.3d at 33. This was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

A structural error is a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds,

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rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.

Structural error affects “the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end.” Id. at 309.

The “very limited class of cases” in which structural error has been found feature “such

defects as the complete deprivation of counsel or trial before a biased judge,” which

“necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for

determining guilt or innocence.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (finding that a jury instruction

omitting an element of the offense does not constitute structural error). 

The United States Supreme Court has never held that Ring error is included in that

limited class of cases. In Ring itself, the Court declined to “reach the State’s assertion that

any error was harmless because a pecuniary gain finding was implicit in the jury’s guilty

verdict.” 536 U.S. at 609 n.7; see id. at 621 (Justice O’Connor dissenting) (“I believe many

of these challenges will ultimately be unsuccessful . . . because the prisoners will be unable

to satisfy the standards of harmless error.”). Subsequently, in Schriro v. Summerlin, holding

that Ring did not apply retroactively, the Court rejected claims that Ring was either a

substantive ruling or a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental

fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding,” explaining that it could not “confidently

say that judicial factfinding so seriously diminishe[s] accuracy that there is a large risk of

punishing conduct the law does not reach.” 542 U.S. 348, 355-356 (2004) (internal

quotations omitted).

As the Arizona Supreme Court explained in Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 545, 554-55, 65

P.3d at 926, 935-36, the holding in Ring was preceded by, and premised on, the ruling in

Apprendi v. New Jersey, which held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond

a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). There is no question that Apprendi errors

are subject to harmless error analysis. See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218-22

(2006) (holding that Apprendi errors are reviewed for harmlessness using the framework of

Neder); see also United States v. Zepeda-Martinez, 470 F.3d 909, 910 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The Arizona Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent

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when it determined that harmless error was the appropriate standard of review. Ring error

does not affect the framework within which the trial proceeds or the entire conduct of the

trial, but only the trial process itself. The state court properly found that Ring error, like the

failure to instruct a jury on an element of the offense, was not so fundamental that it

necessarily rendered Petitioner’s capital sentence unfair or unreliable.

B. Harmless Error Analysis

On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that it

could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that no jury would find the mitigating

circumstances sufficient to call for leniency. Sansing, 206 Ariz. at 241, 77 P.3d at 39.

Petitioner argues that the state court’s harmless error analysis was unreasonable and contrary

to Supreme Court law. 

Relevant Facts

Petitioner pled guilty on September 18, 1998, to all of the charged offenses. The plea

agreement provided that Petitioner could be sentenced on the first-degree murder count to

life imprisonment for a minimum of 25 years, life imprisonment without the possibility of

release, or death. (ROA doc. 61.) In a written factual basis statement accompanying the

plea, Petitioner admitted that he planned to rob the victim before her arrival and that he

struck her in the head with a wooden stick after detaining her in his home. (ROA doc. 60.)

He also admitted that the victim was conscious after he returned from moving her vehicle and

that he “knowingly engaged” in sexual intercourse with her without her consent while she

was bound and tied. Petitioner further stated that the victim was blindfolded, gagged, and

had two plastic bags placed over her head, and that he stabbed her in the abdomen.

Sentencing Proceedings

Sentencing took place one year after entry of the guilty plea. In its presentencing

memorandum, the State urged the trial court to find three aggravating factors: the (F)(5)

pecuniary gain factor, the (F)(6) heinous, cruel, or depraved factor, and the (F)(2) prior

serious offense factor. (ROA doc. 96 at 7-31.) At the aggravation/mitigation hearing, the

State proffered testimony from Detective Joseph Petrosino, Dr. Mark Fischione, and Kara

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Sansing, Petitioner’s wife. In addition, the parties jointly stipulated to admission of

audio/video taped interviews of Petitioner’s four children as well as statements made by the

children to a counselor, Dr. Carol Ainley, in lieu of calling the children as witnesses. (Doc.

38-7 at 5.) The parties also stipulated to the admission of statements made by Petitioner to

a reporter, Victoria Harker, as well as DNA test results from (1) a vaginal swab of the victim

indicating the presence of Petitioner’s semen, and (2) a carpet swatch from Petitioner’s home

indicating the presence of the victim’s blood. (Id. at 7-8.)

Det. Petrosino described the crime scene, including the numerous items that covered

the victim’s body when it was found behind a shed in Petitioner’s backyard. (RT 8/2/99 at

25-29.) He also described discovering in Petitioner’s home a broken piece of a wooden club

in a sink cabinet and a rusty boning knife later identified by Kara Sansing as the one used by

Petitioner to stab Trudy Calabrese. (Id. at 45-49.) Dr. Fischione testified concerning the

victim’s numerous injuries. He opined that she died as a result of multiple stab wounds to

her abdomen and blunt force head trauma. (RT 8/3/99 at 55.) He further testified that it was

possible Calabrese regained consciousness after receiving the head injuries but he “doubt[ed]

it.” (Id. at 34.)

Kara Sansing, who pled guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for a life sentence

with the possibility of release after 25 years, testified to the events surrounding Calabrese’s

death. On the day of the murder, Petitioner called her at work several times and at one point

said he had obtained and smoked some crack cocaine. (RT 8/2/99 at 55.) After returning

home from work, Kara smoked crack and waited with her husband for Calabrese to arrive

less than an hour later. She testified that her children could see her and Petitioner tie up the

victim, who kicked and struggled against the bindings and pleaded not to be hurt. (Id. at 64-

69.) Calabrese also repeatedly asked the Sansing children to call 911 and became

unconscious when Petitioner struck her in the head with a wooden club. Petitioner then

moved Calabrese’s truck and upon returning dragged her to a bedroom and raped her. Kara

also testified that she heard Calabrese speak with Petitioner during the sexual assault. (Id.

at 78-79.) Afterward, Petitioner stabbed Calabrese with a knife and then used her jewelry

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to twice buy crack from dealers who came to the house in the hours following the murder.

Kara also testified that she had been married to Petitioner for 14 years and that he was not

acting normal that day compared to previous times he took drugs. (RT 8/3/99 at 6-7.)

Each of Petitioner’s children reported to investigators that their father grabbed the

victim from behind and held her down while their mother helped tie her up. (Doc. 38-5 at

6, 17-19; Doc. 38-6 at 9-10, 21.) In her report, Dr. Ainley stated that Petitioner’s 12-year-old

son saw his father hit Calabrese with a wooden pole and that his parents would not let him

help her. (Doc. 38-7 at 5-6.) Dr. Ainley further stated that this son suffers from severe guilt

at having followed his father’s direction to find an extension cord to bind the victim. (Id. at

7.) Petitioner’s ten-year-old son described seeing his father break a stick on Calabrese’s head

and wash one of the pieces before stashing it under the sink. (Doc. 38-6 at 6-7, 11.) The

children further told investigators that the victim prayed to God for help and asked them to

call 911. Dr. Ainley also relayed that each of the children reported seeing the victim in the

bedroom under a pile of clothes and again the next day behind the shed. (Doc. 38-7 at 7.)

In addition, two of the children told Dr. Ainley that their parents regularly used drugs. (Id.)

The parties stipulated that Victoria Harker, a reporter for the Arizona Republic, would

testify that Petitioner told her in January 1999 that he had not planned to rob or harm the

victim prior to her arrival at his house but decided to end her suffering after raping and

beating her so badly. (Doc. 38-7 at 8.) Petitioner also denied to Harker that his children

witnessed the attack but conceded that they may have seen Calabrese tied up and that she had

regained consciousness after he moved her truck. (Id.) Petitioner told Harker that once he

attacked the victim he “had to finish it up because I was going to jail anyway. . . . Once you

start something, you just can’t stop.” (Id. at 9.) 

During the mitigation portion of the presentencing hearing, Petitioner proffered

statements and testimony from four witnesses: his wife Kara, his sister Patsy Hooper, his

mother Glenda Singh, and his brother Allan Sansing. Petitioner also made a statement, and

the parties stipulated that Petitioner was arrested peaceably at his sister’s house after their

father called the police. (ROA doc. 90.) 

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Kara Sansing pleaded with the court to spare her husband’s life. (RT 8/31/99 at 4.)

She reiterated her previous testimony that Petitioner was not acting normal, even under the

influence of drugs, on the day of the murder. (Id. at 8.) Patsy Hooper testified about the

close bond she shared with Petitioner, whom she said was the baby of the family and loved

by all. (Id. at 9.) She described the struggles he and his wife endured trying to raise four

children and how Petitioner visited her to confess the crime and wait to be arrested after she

asked their father to call the police. (Id. at 10-11.) She begged the court to spare his life,

noting that her brother was willing to take responsibility for what he had done while on drugs

and that his children would suffer if he was sentenced to death. (Id. at 11-12.)

Petitioner’s mother stated that she had been a single mother, who worked hard as a

waitress to make enough money to feed and house her family. (Id. at 20.) She said her son

and his wife had been going to church and were doing well until drugs took over Petitioner’s

life. (Id.) She acknowledged the wrongfulness of Petitioner’s conduct, but asked that his life

be spared for the sake of his children. (Id. at 20-21.) Petitioner’s brother told the court that

despite not being a close family, he loved his brother and hoped his life would be spared. (Id.

at 22.) He said that Petitioner was not a monster, that drugs led Petitioner to commit such

a horrific crime, and that life imprisonment would be sufficient punishment because

Petitioner was tormented daily by the knowledge of what he did to the victim and her family.

(Id. at 22-23.) He further said that he lived in the same room with Petitioner from age five

to 15 and that Petitioner did not have a violent side despite their hard life. (Id.)

Petitioner concluded the presentence hearing with a lengthy statement. He began with

an apology to the victim’s family for his “really terrible” and “awful” acts. (Id. at 24-25.)

“[A]s I have said many times before to the media and also to the Court, that what I have done

deserves the death penalty but I ask for mercy from the Court to spare my life and give me

a chance to prove myself as a human being, not as a monster that people make me out to be.”

(Id. at 25.) Petitioner acknowledged essentially asking for the death penalty at one point in

the process but realized after speaking with a jail psychiatrist that it would be better for his

wife and children if his life was spared. (Id. at 26.) Next, Petitioner addressed the victim’s

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husband directly and again apologized for the nightmare he created. (Id. at 27.) Petitioner

said he had been praying for the Calabrese family and that he pled guilty to spare them

additional pain. (Id. at 27-28.) Petitioner then addressed his own family, saying he did not

“blame no one or nothing in my past to lead to what I had done.” (Id. at 29.) He remarked

that everyone knew he had problems with drugs and wished the family “could have taken

some actions to get me the help I needed.” (Id.) However, he also acknowledged he “would

have refused it because drugs meant the world” to him. (Id.) Petitioner apologized for the

pain he caused his family, emphasized his love for them, and asked them to go along with

his desire to donate his organs should he be sentenced to death. (Id. at 30-31.) Finally,

Petitioner addressed his wife, stating that he probably would have hurt her had she not gone

along with his attack on the victim, that he was to blame for letting drugs take over his life,

and that he loved her deeply. (Id. at 32-33.) In conclusion, Petitioner told the judge he was

a new person now that he was off of drugs and asked that his life be spared for the sake of

his loved ones. (Id. at 34-35.) 

Prior to sentencing, a mitigation specialist employed by the defense provided a

notebook of materials to the judge. These included a letter reporting Petitioner’s social

history, numerous photographs, school records, and articles about crack cocaine and

marijuana. (Doc. 44-3.) The report provided details of Petitioner’s genetic background,

developmental years, and criminal background. It stated that between the ages of six and ten,

Petitioner was exposed to weekly domestic abuse, fueled by his mother’s and stepfather’s

alcohol abuse. It further stated that at age 14 Petitioner was sent to a juvenile corrections

facility for breaking into a school while on probation and that testing there found him to be

functioning in the borderline IQ range. Available school records indicated that Petitioner

failed classes and quit school shortly after ninth grade. The report described Petitioner’s

abusive relationship with his wife and their drug addiction, asserting that they attempted to

quit and sought help from family members and their church but relapsed shortly before the

offense. According to the mitigation specialist, at the time of the murder, Petitioner and his

wife had been on a four-day crack cocaine binge. In conclusion, the report asked the court

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to sentence Petitioner to life without the possibility of parole based on his genetics, childhood

environment, cooperation with authorities, genuine remorse, and the influence of drugs

during the offense. 

In a presentencing memorandum, defense counsel refuted application of the State’s

alleged aggravating factors and urged the trial court to find that the proffered mitigation

outweighed any aggravation. (ROA doc. 97.) With regard to statutory mitigating factors,

counsel argued that Petitioner’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to

conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired by the abuse of

alcohol and crack cocaine. See A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). Counsel also argued that Petitioner’s

31 years of age was a mitigating factor under § 13-703(G)(5) because he lacked intelligence,

as indicated by his poor academic history and the “lack of planning” and “unsophisticated

approach” to the crime. (ROA doc. 97 at 15.) In the event the court did not find the

existence of significant impairment and age under (G)(1) and (G)(5), counsel asked the court

to nonetheless find them to be non-statutory mitigating factors.

Defense counsel also urged numerous other non-statutory mitigating factors, asserting

that Petitioner had a difficult childhood, grew up in a dysfunctional family, and witnessed

significant abuse during his formative years. (ROA doc. 97 at 15.) Counsel noted

Petitioner’s low intelligence and lack of education. (Id. at 16.) Counsel argued that

Petitioner did not have a violent character or history and would not likely be a future danger,

especially in the controlled setting of a prison; that Petitioner’s pleading guilty and accepting

responsibility demonstrated that he had potential for rehabilitation; and that as a result of

Petitioner’s reflection on his actions he was committed to changing his behavior for the

better. (Id. at 16-17.) Counsel emphasized that Petitioner’s family loved and supported him,

despite what he had done, and that Petitioner’s children in particular would be devastated if

he were sentenced to death. (Id. at 17-18.) Counsel also noted that the victim’s husband had

not requested the death penalty and that her ten-year-old daughter expressly asked that

Petitioner not be sentenced to death. (Id. at 18.) 

Finally, counsel addressed Petitioner’s remorse, observing that Petitioner “has

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accepted full responsibility for his conduct and expressed deep and genuine remorse for his

actions almost from the beginning of this litigation.” (Id. at 18.) Counsel continued:

This was never a part of any strategy to seek leniency from this Court. As

counsel told the Court at the time of the change of plea in September of 1998,

John Sansing told his lawyers at their second visit, just a few days after his

arrest, that “There isn’t going to be a trial . . . I am responsible for what I have

done . . . I’m not going to put the victim’s family or my children through a

trial.”

From that day forward, John Sansing expressed a desire to public [sic]

apologize to the victim’s family and plead guilty to what he had done. It was

counsel undersigned who delayed the process until September of 1998, so that

they could investigate the case and properly advise the defendant of his

options. John Sansing on numerous occasions expressed his frustration with

his counsel about the delay in going to court and pleading guilty.

Counsel undersigned has had numerous conversations with John

Sansing since February of 1998. We believe that his remorse and acceptance

of responsibility are complete and absolutely genuine. He has spoken with

deep regret about the pain and suffering that he has caused the Calabrese

family and the trauma that he has caused to his own children.

(Id. at 18-19.) In support, counsel appended to their memorandum the transcript from a

November 1998 sentencing status conference during which Petitioner apologized for his

actions, explained why he pled guilty, minimized his wife’s involvement, and stated that he

was willing to accept the death penalty. (RT 11/24/98 at 3-7.) Counsel concluded by noting

that Petitioner’s level of remorse and acceptance of responsibility were, in their experience,

unique for this type of case and asked that these factors be given substantial mitigating

weight. (Id. at 19-20.) 

Prior to sentencing Petitioner sent two letters to the trial judge. In the first, Petitioner

requested an opportunity to speak with his wife about their children and to physically say

goodbye to her and other family members. He also noted his willingness to accept the death

penalty if the court believed that to be the appropriate punishment. In the second, Petitioner

requested that his sentencing be postponed a few days while he figured out how to donate his

organs. 

A presentence report (PSR) was also prepared by the court’s probation department.

(ROA doc. 101.) On the advice of counsel, Petitioner declined to discuss his background,

substance abuse issues, or the offense, and the PSR writer noted that defense counsel would

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be providing that information directly to the court. The PSR did include a statement from

Petitioner’s sister, Patsy Hooper, who opined that drugs influenced Petitioner’s actions and

that he was remorseful. In addition, the victim’s husband stated that he would agree with any

sentence the judge chose to hand down.

Sentencing took place on September 30, 1999. Prior to imposition of sentence,

Petitioner made another statement, again apologizing, expressing remorse, and asking that

his organs be donated if sentenced to death. (RT 9/30/99 at 3-5.) The court indicated that

it had considered the evidence presented at the aggravation/mitigation hearing, the parties’

written memoranda, and the written mitigation materials proffered by the defense. (Id. at 6-

7.) The court also indicated that it had not considered any information contained in the PSR

or any victim impact statements in determining the existence or nonexistence of aggravating

factors, but did consider the PSR to determine the existence of mitigating circumstances. (Id.

at 7.)

Regarding aggravation, the trial court rejected the State’s argument that Petitioner’s

contemporaneous convictions for kidnapping, sexual assault, and robbery of the victim

constituted a prior “serious offense” for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). However, the

court agreed with the State that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner committed the offense for pecuniary gain under § 13-703(F)(5) and that the murder

was committed in an “especially heinous, cruel, or depraved” manner under § 13-703(F)(6).

For the latter, the court found both (F)(6) prongs—that the killing was cruel as well as

heinous and depraved.

In finding that the murder was especially cruel, the court first determined that the

victim “suffered unimaginable mental anguish during the approximately one hour or more

that she was held hostage prior to her death.” (RT 9/30/99 at 11.) Citing the testimony of

Kara Sansing, as well as the Sansing children’s statements to the police and Dr. Ainley, the

court found that the victim had prayed to God and pleaded with them to call 911. (Id. at 11-

12.) The court further noted that both Petitioner, in an interview with a newspaper reporter,

and his wife stated that the victim had regained consciousness before Petitioner raped her.

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This also established “beyond a reasonable doubt that Trudy Calabrese suffered

extraordinary mental anguish, including uncertainty as to her ultimate fate.” (Id. at 13.) 

Second, the court found cruelty based on its determination that the victim consciously

suffered severe physical pain prior to her death and that the defendant knew or should have

known she would suffer. In support, the court referenced ligature wounds and bruises on the

victim’s wrists and ankles, defensive wounds to her hands, trauma to her face, and “two deep

blows to the back her head, which caused bruising of the brain and hemorrhaging.” (Id.)

Although the court agreed the victim likely passed out from the head blows, it found that she

regained consciousness before the rape and was then stabbed three times in the abdomen with

a rusty knife. (Id.) Citing the medical examiner’s testimony, the court found that it would

have taken several minutes to die from the loss of blood caused by the stab wounds. (Id. at

14.) Finally, the court referenced Petitioner’s own statement to a reporter that he killed the

victim to end her suffering as proof she was consciously suffering severe physical pain. (Id.)

In finding that the murder was committed in an especially heinous or depraved

manner, the court determined that Petitioner inflicted gratuitous violence, that the victim was

helpless, and that the killing was senseless. See State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1

(1983) (identifying factors to be considered in determining whether a killing is heinous or

depraved). In finding gratuitous violence, the court stated that Petitioner hit the victim “so

hard with the club that it broke in two pieces. He hogtied her ankles and wrists and brutally

sexually assaulted her. Finally, he stabbed her, not once but three times, even grinding the

rusty butcher knife into her as witnessed by Kara Sansing.” (RT 9/30/99 at 15.) As to the

other factors, the court stated that the victim “was rendered utterly and completely helpless

by the defendant’s surprise attack” and that the killing was senseless because it “was

completely unnecessary in order for the defendant to accomplish his goal of robbing Trudy.”

(Id. at 16.)

Turning to mitigation, the court found it likely that Petitioner was impaired or affected

by his crack cocaine usage at the time of the murder. However, it did not find that this

established by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner’s capacity to appreciate the

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wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was

significantly impaired, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). (RT 9/30/99 at 17-18.) In making

this determination, the court noted that Petitioner “devised and carried out a plan to lure a

Good Samaritan to his home and then rob her,” consciously sought to hide her truck, and

concealed her body to avoid detection. (Id. at 18.) The court also rejected the (G)(5) age

factor, finding that Petitioner was a 31-year-old married father of four who had been living

an adult lifestyle for many years. (Id. at 19.)

With regard to non-statutory mitigating factors, the court again declined to find that

Petitioner had established age as a mitigator and ruled that the victim’s daughter’s

recommendation of leniency was not a mitigating circumstance. (Id. at 20, 23.) The court

also found that Petitioner had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had

changed his life, would not be a future danger, or had potential for rehabilitation. (Id. at 22.)

In support of mitigation, the court determined that although Petitioner did not establish

significant impairment under (G)(1), Petitioner’s capacity to conform his conduct to the law’s

requirements was somewhat impaired by his use of crack cocaine. The court also found that

Petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a difficult childhood

and family background. In support, the court noted that Petitioner’s parents were divorced

shortly after his birth, he had virtually no relationship with his father, his early developmental

years were chaotic, his mother married three more times, and when he was six to ten years

of age, his mother and stepfather abused alcohol and he was exposed to weekly episodes of

domestic abuse by his stepfather upon his mother. (Id. at 20-21.) Although the court found

the existence of a difficult childhood as a mitigating factor, it determined this circumstance

was not entitled to significant mitigating weight due to the lack of a causal link between

Petitioner’s background and the crime. (Id. at 21.)

The court further found as mitigating that Petitioner had accepted responsibility for

his actions, was genuinely remorseful, and entered a guilty plea to avoid putting the victim’s

family and his children through a trial. (Id.) In addition, the court found that Petitioner

presented sufficient evidence to establish a lack of education, but determined this had only

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minimal mitigating weight. (Id. at 22.) Finally, the court found that Petitioner established

by a preponderance of the evidence that he had the love and support of his family but

assigned it only minimal weight because it did not prevent Petitioner from committing the

crime or victimizing his own children. (Id.) 

In determining that the proven mitigation did not outweigh the aggravation, the court

considered the mitigating circumstances both individually and cumulatively. (Id. at 23.) It

further found that even considering all of the proposed mitigating factors, they would be

insufficient to call for leniency “when balanced against the especially cruel manner in which

defendant murdered Trudy Calabrese.” (Id. at 24.) The court explained:

The infliction of such grotesque, emotional and physical pain to a

woman who, with all the hate, violence and lack of compassion we see, stood

out like a shining light, as a true Samaritan, is shockingly evil. Throughout her

ordeal, enveloped in defendant’s drugged out and twisted plan of greed and

violence, Trudy Calabrese kept her faith in God to the end.

The surprise attack on this good woman, followed by being beaten with

a club defendant eventually broke in two on her head, then brutally stripped of

her dignity as she was raped, and finally being stabbed three times, all together

resulted in a terror-filled and horrible murder.

(Id.)

On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to establish that

the murder was committed “to facilitate the taking of or ability to retain items of pecuniary

value.” Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 354, 26 P.3d at 1125. However, on independent review after

striking the pecuniary gain aggravating factor, it found that the murder was especially cruel

and that the mitigation was insufficient to call for leniency. 

Harmless Error Review

In conducting its harmless error review following Ring, the Arizona Supreme Court

considered the (F)(6) aggravating factor found at sentencing and upheld on appeal—that the

murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. The court

explained that the State needed to prove only one of the (F)(6) elements. Sansing II, 206

Ariz. at 235, 77 P.3d at 33. 

The court first determined that cruelty was established in three independent ways: (1)

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the victim suffered mental anguish, as evidenced by the victim’s defensive wounds, pleas for

help, and attempts to resist the attack; (2) the victim suffered both mental and physical

suffering when she was raped while her arms and legs were bound; and (3) the victim

endured physical pain, as demonstrated by the multiple injuries to her head and abdomen,

none of which caused immediate death. Id. at 235-36, 77 P.3d at 33-34. The court rejected

Petitioner’s argument that the evidence was inconclusive as to whether the victim was

conscious during all portions of the attack, citing Petitioner’s own admissions, including to

a reporter, as well as his wife’s testimony. Id. at 237, 77 P.3d at 35. The court concluded

beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have found that the murder was

committed in an especially cruel manner, and it was thus harmless error for the trial court to

have determined the existence of this aggravating factor.

The court then determined that heinousness and depravity were established by

“[o]verwhelming and uncontroverted evidence” that Petitioner inflicted gratuitous violence

upon a helpless victim. Id. It concluded that the “rape, facial wounds, neck ligatures,

gagging, blind-folding, and grinding of the knife constitute[d] violence beyond that necessary

to kill,” and that the victim, having been bound by both her wrists and ankles, which were

then tied together, was helpless to defend herself. Id. at 238, 77 P.3d at 36. The court found

beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have concluded that Petitioner

inflicted gratuitous violence upon a helpless victim and that consequently the murder was

especially heinous. Id.

Next, the court considered whether the mitigating evidence was sufficiently

substantial to call for leniency. The court first assessed the evidence concerning A.R.S. § 13-

703(G)(1), which provides a mitigating circumstance where “[t]he defendant’s capacity to

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of

law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”

Id. at 239, 77 P.3d at 37. Like the trial court, the supreme court found that this factor had not

been proved:

No reasonable jury would have concluded that Sansing met his burden

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to establish that his ability to control his behavior or his capacity to appreciate

the wrongfulness of his conduct was significantly impaired. Sansing presented

no expert testimony to support his assertion that his use of cocaine impaired

either his capacity to control his conduct or his capacity to appreciate the

wrongfulness of his actions. He therefore failed entirely to show any causal

nexus between his alleged drug use and impairment.

Sansing also presented only minimal testimony about his drug use on

the day of the murder. Kara testified that Sansing telephoned her while she

was work at approximately 1:30 p.m. During this conversation, Sansing

informed her that he had purchased some crack cocaine. He told her that he

had smoked some of the crack but was saving the rest for her. Kara testified

that she could tell he had ingested the crack from the sound of his voice. She

testified that when she returned home from work several hours later, Sansing

was not “acting normal.” However, she also testified that Sansing’s actions

were thought out and that he was not acting as if he were in a trance.

That evidence is insufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that Sansing’s capacity to control his behavior was significantly

impaired. First, Kara did not quantify how much crack Sansing used.

Moreover, no reasonable jury would conclude that Kara’s testimony that

Sansing was not acting himself was sufficient to establish that his capacity was

significantly impaired.

Furthermore, Sansing’s deliberate actions refute his impairment claim

and establish that the drug use did not overwhelm Sansing’s ability to control

his conduct. Kara testified that Sansing planned to rob the person who

delivered the food. Additionally, Sansing contacted two different churches in

his attempt to lure an unsuspecting victim to his home.

Sansing’s impairment argument fails on yet another basis. Sansing

admitted and stipulated to facts that leave no doubt that he attempted to avoid

detection. After beating and hog-tying Trudy, Sansing left and moved her

truck away from the apartment. When Pastor Becker called the Sansing home,

inquiring about Trudy’s whereabouts, Sansing gave him a false address and

told him that Trudy never arrived. Additionally, Sansing’s ten-year-old son

told the police Sansing washed blood from the club that he used to strike

Trudy. These steps, which can only be regarded as part of an attempt to avoid

detection, negate any possibility that a reasonable jury would find that

Sansing’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was

significantly impaired. 

Id. at 239-40, 77 P.3d at 37-38 (citations omitted). The court further found beyond a

reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have rejected Petitioner’s age as a statutory

mitigating circumstance.

The court then proceeded to examine the non-statutory mitigating circumstances

found by the trial court. For the same reasons the court determined that the (G)(1)

impairment factor would not have been found, the court reasoned that no reasonable jury

could have accorded Petitioner’s impairment more than minimal weight as a non-statutory

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mitigating factor. Id. at 240-41, 77 P.3d at 38-39. The court further concluded that although

a jury “might have concluded that Sansing established a difficult, although not abusive,

childhood and lack of education,” it would have accorded these factors only minimal weight

because Petitioner had failed to demonstrate any causal link between them and the crime.

Id. at 241, 77 P.3d at 39. Next, the court assumed that “a reasonable jury would have

accorded some weight to Sansing’s family’s love and support and to the fact that he accepted

responsibility for his crime.” Id. Lastly, the court determined that no reasonable jury could

have given more than minimal weight to Petitioner’s claim that he presents no future threat

and that a jury could not have considered the victim’s daughter’s request that he be given a

life sentence because such evidence is not proper mitigation. Id.

The Arizona Supreme Court concluded its harmless error review as follows:

The evidence leaves no doubt that Sansing murdered Trudy Calabrese

in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner. The brutality of this

murder clearly sets it apart from the norm of first degree murders.

Collectively, the mitigating evidence is minimal at most. We conclude beyond

a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have concluded that the

mitigating evidence was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.

Accordingly, we hold the [Ring] violation constituted harmless error. 

Id. 

Analysis

Petitioner is entitled to relief on this aspect of Claim 1 only if the Arizona Supreme

Court’s ruling was “in conflict with the reasoning or the holdings of [Supreme Court]

precedent” or if it “applied harmless-error review in an ‘objectively unreasonable’ manner.”

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17, 18 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75-77 (2003)); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007) (“In Mitchell

v. Esparza, we held that, when a state court determines that a constitutional violation is

harmless, a federal court may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness

determination itself was unreasonable.”). He is not entitled to relief if the state court “simply

erred” in concluding that the Ring error was harmless. Esparza, 540 U.S. at 18.

Petitioner first argues that the Arizona Supreme Court’s determination that the victim

was conscious, upon which he asserts its finding of cruelty rests, was based upon an

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unreasonable determination of the facts. (Doc. 35 at 42-44.) He contends that the evidence

was inconclusive in light of the medical examiner’s doubt about the victim regaining

consciousness after the head injuries, the alleged unreliability of Kara Sansing’s statements,

and questions concerning the voluntariness of the written factual basis supporting Petitioner’s

plea. (Id.) However, the latter two allegations are based on evidence that was not part of the

record on appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court. Under AEDPA, this Court must consider

whether the state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)

(emphasis added); see also Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398-99 (limiting review under §

2254(d)(1) “to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the

merits”). 

Petitioner alleges that Kara Sansing’s statement to police regarding an exchange

between Petitioner and the victim during the rape is “completely unbelievable.” (Doc. 35 at

43.) He acknowledges, however, that evidence of the actual exchange was not admitted

during the sentencing proceeding. During her testimony, Kara initially denied hearing the

victim speak and was then impeached with her statement to police concerning the fact the

victim had spoken. However, in doing so, the prosecutor directed her not to repeat the

content of the conversation she overheard. (RT 8/2/99 at 78.) That this evidence was not

before the state court is confirmed by Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary development, in

which he seeks to expand the record to include Kara Sansing’s statement to police, arguing

it is relevant to demonstrate the unreliability of her testimony regarding consciousness. (Doc.

53 at 21.) Similarly, Petitioner’s allegation concerning involuntariness of the factual basis

of his plea was not developed until his state PCR proceedings and thus was not before the

Arizona Supreme Court when it conducted its harmless error review. Accordingly, the Court

does not consider either of these allegations in determining under AEDPA the reasonableness

of the state court’s ruling.

Looking at the record that was before the state court, this Court cannot say that its

finding of fact as to consciousness was objectively unreasonable. Petitioner admitted in the

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factual basis for the plea that the victim was conscious when he raped her and also stipulated

that he told a reporter the victim had regained consciousness when he returned from moving

her truck. Petitioner’s wife also testified that she heard the victim speak during the rape, and

Petitioner told the reporter that he decided to kill the victim because she was suffering. The

Arizona Supreme Court considered the medical examiner’s speculation about the victim’s

consciousness but found the direct evidence uncontroverted. This was not an unreasonable

determination of fact.

 Moreover, Arizona law provides that a victim need not be conscious for “each and

every wound” inflicted for cruelty to apply. Sansing, 206 Ariz. at 235, 77 P.3d at 33 (citation

omitted). There is no dispute that Trudy Calabrese was conscious when she was grabbed

from behind, thrown to the ground, and hogtied. She sustained numerous defensive wounds

and other injuries during her struggle, pleaded for help, and prayed to God. The Arizona

Supreme Court’s finding of cruelty based on the victim’s mental anguish as to her fate while

she struggled with her attackers was not objectively unreasonable. This alone was sufficient

under state law to sustain the cruelty factor, regardless of whether the victim was conscious

during the rape and stabbing.

Petitioner further contends that the court’s cruelty analysis is unreasonable when

compared with its decisions in other Ring-remand cases. However, to the extent that his

argument is based on a comparison with the analyses undertaken in other cases, Petitioner’s

critique of the Arizona Supreme Court’s cruelty finding in his case is unavailing. The fact

that the court did not find cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt in other cases, each of which

involved distinct facts and circumstances, does not demonstrate that the same court’s ruling

in Petitioner’s case was objectively unreasonable. 

Petitioner next argues that the Arizona Supreme Court unreasonably found that the

murder was especially heinous. He asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner inflicted gratuitous violence because “it was

impossible to determine which of the three stab wounds were fatal.” (Doc. 35 at 47.)

However, the state court’s determination was not based solely on the stab wounds. Rather,

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it cited the numerous injuries sustained by the victim, including to her forehead, left orbital

region, and mouth, as well as the rape, neck ligatures, gagging, blindfolding, and grinding

of the knife as constituting violence beyond that necessary to kill. Sansing, 206 Ariz. at 238,

77 P.3d at 36. The state court’s finding as to gratuitous violence was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.

Lastly, Petitioner criticizes the court’s assessment of the mitigating evidence. This

criticism is unwarranted. The Supreme Court in Ring held only that a jury must determine

the aggravating factors in a capital case that render a person eligible for the death penalty;

it did not require jury determination of the ultimate sentence. Therefore, the Arizona

Supreme Court’s review of Ring error was complete when it determined beyond a reasonable

doubt that no rational jury would have found that the (F)(6) aggravating factor had not been

proved. Cf. Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 648-49 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing Apprendi

violation for harmless error by asking whether jury would have found aggravating factor

rendering defendant eligible for increased sentence). To the extent the Arizona Supreme

Court chose to include review of mitigation as part of its harmless error analysis, it did so as

a matter of state law. Furthermore, the court’s review of the mitigating evidence, while not

required by Ring, was thorough, and its assessment of the evidence was not objectively

unreasonable. Petitioner’s argument that the court improperly imposed a causal nexus on its

consideration of the mitigating evidence is discussed as part of Claim 7 in Section IV.A

below.

C. Conclusion

The Arizona Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply United States Supreme Court

precedent when it determined that harmless error was the appropriate standard of review for

Ring error. In addition, the state court’s harmless error analysis in this case neither conflicted

with controlling Supreme Court law nor was applied in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Because Petitioner is precluded from relief by § 2254(d), the Court declines to expand the

record to include new evidence allegedly refuting the state court’s finding as to the

consciousness of the victim when she was sexually assaulted and stabbed. 

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4

 Although not apparent on the face of the agreement, Respondents assert that this

separate matter involved four counts of child abuse. 

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II. VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

In Claim 8, Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or

voluntary because the written factual basis established an aggravating factor and he did not

waive his privilege against self-incrimination for the penalty phase. He asserts that he was

unaware his admission concerning the victim’s consciousness would be used to establish

cruelty under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) and that the trial court failed to explain the

consequences this admission would have at sentencing.

Relevant Facts

Petitioner’s written plea agreement included a summary of the rights waived by

pleading guilty, including the privilege against self-incrimination. (ROA doc. 61.) The

signed plea agreement did not give Petitioner any benefits in terms of sentencing, but did

provide that the State would dismiss charges filed against Petitioner in a separate action.4

(Id.) Before accepting Petitioner’s plea, the court first determined that Petitioner was

mentally competent. (RT 9/18/08 at 2-3). The court then engaged Petitioner in a personal

colloquy that included ascertaining whether Petitioner had read and understood the plea

agreement, including the paragraph setting forth the constitutional rights he was giving up

by pleading guilty. (Id. at 6-7.) 

After Petitioner entered his guilty plea, the court read the factual basis signed by

Petitioner and counsel, asking if the facts were true and if the statement accurately recounted

the offense; Petitioner replied affirmatively to both inquiries. (Id. at 8-11.) The prosecutor

then sought to orally add several additional facts, including that the victim suffered severe

blows to the head, that semen found inside the victim was determined to contain DNA

matching Petitioner, and that a different charitable organization had delivered a food box to

Petitioner’s home the day before the offense. (Id. at 11.) Petitioner disputed only the latter

assertion that he had received an earlier food box. (Id. at 11-12.)

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In his PCR petition, Petitioner argued that he would not have pled guilty had he

understood the sentencing consequences of the factual admissions accompanying the plea.

(Doc. 38-10 at 24-27.) In support, he appended an affidavit attesting that at the time of the

plea he was unaware that (1) the State would have to prove aggravating factors to render him

eligible for the death penalty; (2) the victim’s consciousness would be relevant to a finding

of cruelty; and (3) the admission regarding consciousness was not a necessary component

of the guilty plea. (Doc. 39-7 at 14-15.) Petitioner also denied that the victim was in fact

conscious after he moved her truck and claimed that he lied about this fact because he feared

being attacked by other inmates for having sexually assaulted the victim and thought “it

would be better if she was conscious during my assault.” (Id. at 15-16.) 

The state PCR court denied relief without explanation, stating that the claim failed to

present “a material issue of fact or law.” (Doc. 38-9 at 29.) The Arizona Supreme Court

summarily denied review. 

Analysis

When a state court does not explain its reasons for denying relief, a reviewing habeas

court must determine what arguments or theories could have supported the state court’s

decision and “then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that

those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of the

Supreme Court. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). The burden is on

Petitioner to show “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Id. at

784. 

Due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent.

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Because a guilty plea waives the rights

against self-incrimination, to trial by jury, and to confront one’s accusers, its acceptance

requires that the accused “has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its

consequence.” Id. at 244. “Among other circumstances, a plea of guilty can be voluntary

only if it is ‘entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences’ of his plea.” Carter v.

McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.

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742, 755 (1970)) (emphasis in original). This includes being advised of the “range of

allowable punishment” that will result from the plea. U.S. ex rel. Pebworth v. Conte, 489

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1974).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “although a defendant is entitled to be informed of the

direct consequences of the plea, the court need not advise him of all the possible collateral

consequences.” Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation

omitted). “The distinction between a direct and collateral consequence of a plea turns on

whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range

of the defendant’s punishment.” Id. at 236 (internal quotation omitted). Under this standard,

direct consequences include a mandatory parole term, ineligibility for parole, and the

maximum punishment provided by law. Id. A consequence is generally “collateral” if it

does not derive automatically as a result of the plea, but rather results from some

discretionary decisionmaking proceeding, such as whether a defendant’s sentences may run

consecutively or the possibility of parole revocation. Id. 

Petitioner argues that the failure to inform him of the sentencing-related consequences

attendant to his admission in the plea’s factual basis renders the plea involuntary. However,

the trial court’s aggravation findings were not a direct consequence of the plea, but rather the

result of a separate, discretionary proceeding during which Petitioner retained all his

constitutional rights and the burden was on the prosecution to establish aggravating factors

beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner did not admit the existence of the (F)(6) aggravating

factor in his plea, and the trial court was under no obligation to find this factor proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. That Petitioner admitted facts from which the judge ultimately

found the (F)(6) factor is not the same as stipulating to the existence of the factor. Cf. Adams

v. Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 839 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“A stipulation to facts from which

a judge or jury may infer guilt is simply not the same as a stipulation to guilt, or a guilty

plea.”). Because Petitioner’s plea had only collateral consequences on the aggravation phase

of sentencing, no constitutional violation arose out of the court’s failure to advise Petitioner

of the possibility he would be found eligible for the death penalty as a result of the

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admissions contained in the plea’s factual basis. Petitioner has failed to show that there was

no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief on this claim.

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Petitioner contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of counsel when counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence

(Claim 2), investigate and rebut the (F)(6) “heinous, cruel, or depraved” aggravating factor

(Claim 3), and properly advise him about the consequences of his plea, stipulated factual

basis, and sentencing stipulation (Claim 4). Petitioner also asserts cumulative prejudice from

counsel’s alleged deficient performance (Claim 5). 

A. Failure to Investigate and Present Mitigating Evidence

Petitioner alleges that sentencing counsel failed to competently investigate and present

substantial mitigating evidence. He further alleges that counsel failed to select competent

mental health and substance abuse experts and provide them with his social history.

Petitioner argues that competent experts would have explained how mental disorders and

substance abuse played a role in the commission of the offense and, consequently, would

have established the (G)(1) substantial impairment mitigating factor. (Doc. 35 at 53.)

Respondents concede exhaustion except to the extent Petitioner alleges that counsel was

ineffective for failing to retain a neuropsychologist. It appears to this Court from its review

of the PCR record, including the evidence and arguments presented during the state court

evidentiary hearing, that the entirety of Claim 2 was exhausted.

Relevant Facts

Petitioner was represented at sentencing by Maricopa County Deputy Public

Defenders Emmet Ronan and Sylvina Cotto. During PCR proceedings, Petitioner alleged

that counsel provided constitutionally ineffective representation by failing to investigate and

present substantial mitigating evidence and failing to provide Petitioner’s social history to

competent mental health and substance abuse experts. (Doc. 38-10 at 11.) The PCR court

found this to be a colorable claim and held a four-day evidentiary hearing in January 2010.

At the hearing, Petitioner called as witnesses two of his siblings, four experts, trial

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counsel Ronan, and mitigation specialist Pamela Davis. The State presented testimony from

a psychologist. In addition, the parties stipulated to admission of deposition transcripts, in

lieu of live testimony, from co-counsel Cotto and a mental health expert who evaluated

Petitioner before sentencing. (Doc. 43-10 at 21.) The parties also agreed to the admission

of numerous exhibits, including the 1989 American Bar Association Guidelines for the

Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (ABA Guidelines), presentencing psychological reports, post-conviction expert reports, and a 1986 psychological

evaluation. (Doc. 43-9 at 2-3.)

Evidence Regarding Counsel’s Investigation

Mitigation specialist Davis testified that she began working as a non-capital mitigation

specialist for the Maricopa County Public Defender in 1991, after having worked more than

five years in adult probation departments. (Doc. 39-9 at 12.) Before being recruited by

Ronan to assist in Petitioner’s case, she had worked on only one capital case. Davis recalled

meeting frequently with Petitioner at the jail and traveling to Alabama, Nevada, and Utah to

interview family members and obtain records. Davis said she did not meet with any of the

experts retained by counsel to evaluate Petitioner and did not know whether they were given

any of the background information she had compiled. (Id. at 20-21.) However, Davis also

testified that at the time she began working on Petitioner’s case in 1998, mitigation

specialists were not commonly used in capital cases and she believed her role was to compile

a written social history for presentation to the court, not to recommend experts to counsel.

(Id. at 37-38.) Trial counsel Ronan also testified that in 1999 the concept of a capital

mitigation specialist was new in his public defender office. (Doc. 40-6 at 11-12.)

Petitioner’s brother, Allen Sansing, and one of his sisters, Susan Mitchell, testified

that they recalled meeting jointly with Davis in Alabama prior to Petitioner’s sentencing.

Allen told Davis about his mother’s alcohol abuse, methods of discipline, husbands, and

problems the children encountered with their stepfathers. (Doc. 39-8 at 55-56.) Likewise,

Susan told Davis everything she believed was important about their upbringing, including

Petitioner’s drug use and their mother’s neglect and beatings. (Doc. 39-9 at 1-3.) 

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In addition to investigating Petitioner’s social history, trial counsel consulted three

mental health experts. Dr. Sara Hill, a clinical psychologist, was asked to determine

Petitioner’s competency to stand trial or plead guilty. In her report, Dr. Hill noted that

Petitioner said he had a long history of using marijuana, was on probation for a drug charge

prior to the murder, and went from smoking marijuana to smoking crack cocaine, which he

was doing “all day long at the time of his arrest.” (Doc. 41-8 at 12.) She found Petitioner

to be “quite conversant in discussing legal matters” and “unequivocally competent to stand

trial.” (Id. at 13.) She further found that Petitioner had a history of antisocial behaviors, but

required more background information to make a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.

(Id.)

Dr. Katherine Menendez, a psychologist, evaluated Petitioner “for the purpose of

establishing learning capacity and the presence of a learning disorder.” (Doc. 41-8 at 15.)

In the background section of her report, Dr. Menendez described Petitioner as saying that his

mother had “treated him well,” that he recalled only one incident of harsh physical discipline

from his first stepfather, that he had a “normal” early family life, and that he had been an

“average” student. (Id. at 15-16.) Petitioner reported that he began smoking crack cocaine

at age 28 and became “very paranoid, violent and hypersexual.” (Id. at 17.) Dr. Menendez

determined that Petitioner had a full scale IQ of 80, which is below average, but that he did

not appear to have a “pronounced, significant learning disorder.” (Id. at 20.) She also

diagnosed Petitioner with cocaine abuse in remission and an antisocial personality disorder.

Lastly, defense counsel enlisted the assistance of Dr. Susan Parrish, a psychologist

specializing in neuropsychological testing and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Doc. 40-7 at

30.) Dr. Parrish retained notes from her presentence interview with Petitioner, but could not

recall whether she performed any tests, made a diagnosis, or prepared a report. (Id. at 8.)

However, she believed she was asked to meet with Petitioner to determine whether he

displayed any obvious psychological difficulties and that “nothing jumped out at me that he

had any difficulties” such as an “obvious neuropsychological symptom” that would have

justified more testing or that needed to be pursued. (Id. at 17-18, 26-27.) 

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Trial counsel Ronan had few specific recollections of his conversations with the

experts and did not know whether he had provided Petitioner’s social history to Dr. Hill or

school records to Dr. Menendez. (Doc. 40-5 at 63, 68, 71.) He testified that it was his usual

custom and practice to provide background information to consulting experts, but

acknowledged statements in Dr. Menendez’s report about Petitioner’s upbringing, such as

being an average student and getting along well with his mother, that contradicted

information compiled by Davis. (Doc. 40-6 at 7, 17-18.) Although he had no recall of

speaking with Dr. Menendez, Ronan testified that he did not consider a diagnosis of

antisocial personality disorder to be mitigating and “[b]ased on the report as I have now seen

it, I would not see any reason to call her.” (Id. at 8.) He also acknowledged that evidence

concerning an antisocial personality disorder generally opens the door for prosecutors to

proffer evidence of bad acts consistent with that diagnosis. (Id. at 30.) Regarding Dr.

Parrish, Ronan believed it likely she found nothing helpful after meeting with Petitioner

because otherwise he would have had her prepare a report and testify at the sentencing

hearing. (Id. at 9.) He also would have consulted with others types of experts if Dr. Parrish

had made such a recommendation. (Id. at 9-10.)

Regarding Petitioner’s drug use, Ronan believed the information that Petitioner had

purchased $750 of crack cocaine in the four days prior to the offense was presented to the

sentencing judge in Davis’s mitigation report. (Doc. 40-5 at 82-83.) Ronan did not know

whether Dr. Parrish had relayed to counsel that Petitioner told her he had spent $2,000 during

the same time period, as reflected in her interview notes. (Id. at 73-74.) In response to a

question as to why he did not enlist and present testimony from experts in child development

and pharmacology, Ronan said he had no recollection of why those types of experts were not

utilized:

[M]y best guess is that I felt that Judge Reinstein, with his background and

experience would understand the information that was going to be presented

in Pam Davis’s letter, that with his background and experience he understood

the nexus between substance abuse and the commission of crimes, substance

abuse and dysfunctional childhood, and those types of things, and that it was

simply going to be a question of whether he found that significant enough as

a mitigating factor to outweigh the aggravate [sic] factors.

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(Id. at 84; Doc. 40-6 at 1.) In hindsight, he would not have made the same decisions on how

mitigation evidence was presented to the sentencing judge. (Doc. 40-6 at 5.)

In her deposition, co-counsel Cotto said that her representation was limited to drafting

the aggravation section of the presentencing memorandum and that Ronan was teaching her

how to handle a capital case. (Doc. 40-6 at 46.) She recalled that Ronan was “very clear”

that the mitigation investigation “needed to begin from the very onset.” (Id.) Cotto had no

recollection of meeting with experts but, after reviewing Dr. Menendez’s report, did not

believe her diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder was mitigating. (Id. at 50.) She

recalled meeting with Ronan to “discuss things as they developed and trying to figure out

what could be useful or not” and also recalled discussing Dr. Parrish, but had no specific

recollection of what was said. (Id. at 50-51.)

Petitioner’s Strickland expert, Vicki Liles, testified that counsel’s failure to provide

experts with background information, retain a substance abuse expert, and engage a

psychologist to “pull all [the background information] together” fell below the standard of

care for a capital defense attorney at the time of Petitioner’s sentencing. (Doc. 40-4 at 3-8.)

She further opined that antisocial personality disorder is mitigating and that counsel was

ineffective for failing to present that diagnosis at sentencing. (Id. at 15.) In addition, Liles

suggested that counsel was ineffective for failing, in light of Petitioner’s substance abuse, to

obtain a neuropsychological examination at the start of the case because a brain can “heal and

can repair itself.” (Id. at 21.)

At the time of Petitioner’s offense, Liles was employed by the Maricopa County

Public Defender but had no involvement in Petitioner’s case because she had a “more

generalized caseload at that time.” (Doc. 40-3 at 53.) She recalled that sometime in 1998

or 1999, her office formed a major felony unit comprised of three attorneys, including Ronan.

When Petitioner was sentenced in 1999, Liles had tried only one capital case through

sentencing and that was as second chair in an effort to become qualified to serve as lead

counsel in a capital case. (Doc. 40-4 at 88-89.) In a declaration proffered to the PCR court,

Liles opined that “it was standard practice to use the services of a mitigation specialist in

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capital representation in 1998 and 1999” and that the “specialist would then locate and

suggest the participation of necessary experts.” (Doc. 43-4 at 4.) However, at the PCR

hearing, she acknowledged that under the 1989 ABA Guidelines in effect at the time a

“mitigation specialist wasn’t really required as part of the defense team.” (Doc. 40-3 at 71-

72.) 

Mitigation Evidence

Petitioner’s brother Allen and sister Susan testified at the PCR hearing. Each

described their mother as a self-centered woman, who showed no love or affection, who on

occasion abandoned and regularly neglected their basic needs, and who routinely hit them

with belts and sticks for perceived infractions. (Doc. 39-8 at 14-86.) They also reported that

their mother drank heavily, had numerous failed marriages, and frequently fought with her

husbands. One of their stepfathers liked to pick fights and beat up on Allen and Petitioner.

Each saw Petitioner begin to use marijuana and inhalants when he was around 10 or 11 years

of age. Allen left home at age 17, when Petitioner was about 11, and Susan left home and

moved in with Allen when she was 14 and Petitioner was 13. 

Petitioner also presented testimony from three new experts. Dr. Paul Miller, a

developmental psychologist, interviewed Petitioner, Allen, and Petitioner’s sister Patsy.

Based on these interviews as well as Davis’s mitigation report, Davis’s notes, and

Petitioner’s school records, Miller prepared a 60-page developmental assessment report that

examined the nature of the risk factors to which Petitioner was exposed as a child and the

relationship of those factors to later negative outcomes, such as conduct disorders and drug

abuse. (Doc. 39-9 at 63-64.) In summary, Dr. Miller opined that various life stressors,

including parental neglect, harsh discipline, exposure to domestic violence, maternal alcohol

abuse, frequent changes in residences and maternal marital relationships, and extreme

poverty led Petitioner to use drugs as a coping mechanism. (Doc. 39-6 at 17-20.) Because

he focused only on Petitioner’s adolescent development, Dr. Miller had no opinion on the

role Petitioner’s risk factors played in the offense. (Doc. 40-1 at 11.)

Dr. Edward French, a pharmacologist, testified regarding the physiological effects of

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cocaine. Although Petitioner did not tell him the amount of crack cocaine he consumed prior

to the offense, Dr. French opined that Petitioner was in a cocaine-induced psychosis when

he attacked and killed the victim. (Doc. 40-3 at 26-27.) As support for this conclusion, Dr.

French cited statements made by Petitioner that (1) his heart was racing so fast during the

offense that he thought he would die (classic physiological effect of cocaine); (2) he believed

the victim knew his intentions based on an innocuous gesture to his wife (evidence of

paranoia); and (3) he had “no conscious there” during the attack (indicating a break in

reality). (Id. at 30-33.) In conclusion, Dr. French stated that drugs “hijack the brain,” cause

“pronounced behavioral and cognitive changes,” take over the behavior of an individual, and

diminish the ability “to process information correctly.” (Id. at 33-34.) On crossexamination, Dr. French acknowledged that he was not qualified to diagnose mental disease

or defects and that the information about the effects of cocaine included in the mitigation

specialist’s report to the sentencing judge was accurate. (Id. at 35, 39.)

Dr. Richard Lanyon, a forensic and clinical psychologist, also testified. (Doc. 40-4

at 36-84; Doc. 40-5 at 1-43.) On the basis of record review, interviews, and psychological

testing, Dr. Lanyon prepared a lengthy report in which he concluded that Petitioner’s profile

“suggests the likelihood of a significant anxiety disorder, depression, and thought disorder”

but “does not indicate antisocial characteristics or the likelihood of impulsive acting-out.”

(Doc. 39-6 at 43.) He determined that Petitioner has a full scale IQ of 87, placing him in the

low-average range of intelligence. (Id. at 43-44.) He also found no suggestion of impaired

functioning due to brain damage. (Id. at 44.)

With regard to the offense, Dr. Lanyon opined it was highly probable that, as a result

of a cocaine-induced delusional psychotic state as well as a paranoid personality disorder,

Petitioner’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct

to the requirements of the law was significantly diminished. (Id. at 45.) Similar to Dr.

French, Dr. Lanyon based this opinion on the “serious and pivotal cognitive distortion” that

the victim knew he was going to do something to her. (Id.) According to Petitioner’s

account to Dr. Lanyon, he made a hand gesture to his wife signifying that the victim’s purse

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was not in her truck, that there was “no way anyone could read that to mean anything,” but

nonetheless he “became convinced that the [victim] somehow knew what it was and was

going to, therefore, turn him in.” (Doc. 40-4 at 56-57.)

He has a delusion she knows exactly what he intends to do, and, in fact, these

thoughts are in his mind and it suggests that he feels very guilty about them,

then he becomes delusional that she knows exactly what’s going on, it’s in her

mind, too, and he then finds himself in these unusual physiological reactions

which signal, to me, are a likelihood of a cocaine induced psychosis, which a

major aspect of that is delusions.

(Id. at 74-75.) 

Dr. Lanyon opined that this paranoid delusion caused Petitioner to enter into a

severely abnormal mental state, as evidenced by Petitioner’s statements that “[i]t was not me”

and that he had no thoughts or feelings when he attacked her. Rather, there was “[c]omplete

blackness. I stepped into a hole . . . everything’s dark.” (Doc. 39-6 at 41.) Petitioner told

Dr. Lanyon that he had no control over the initial attack and that his subsequent actions were

done out of panic. (Id. at 42.) In Dr. Lanyon’s opinion, Petitioner remained in a psychotic

state while taking deliberate actions not to get caught. (Doc. 40-5 at 8-10.) Regarding

antisocial personality disorder, Dr. Lanyon declined to make such a diagnosis, but

acknowledged there were “enough symptoms or characteristics” to put him into that

category. (Id. at 19-20.) Finally, Dr. Lanyon concluded that Petitioner’s cocaine use was a

product of the extreme dysfunction in his childhood environment and thus “the effects of his

childhood environment can also be considered to be a causal factor in significantly

diminishing his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of law.” (Doc. 39-6 at 46.)

The State presented Dr. Michael Bayless in rebuttal. Dr. Bayless determined that

Petitioner has a full scale IQ of 88 and found no indication of neurological impairment.

(Doc. 43-9 at 11.) In his report, Dr. Bayless concluded that Petitioner has a personality

disorder not otherwise specified, with antisocial and obsessive compulsive traits. He

changed his diagnosis to an antisocial personality disorder after reviewing a 1986

psychological evaluation conducted as part of a diagnostic evaluation for the Utah

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Department of Corrections. (Doc. 40-1 at 29.) In that report, clinical psychologist Dr.

Donald Long diagnosed Petitioner, then 18 years old, with a conduct disorder and extreme

emotional immaturity. (Doc. 44-2 at 20.) He also derived an abstract IQ of 89. (Id. at 19.)

Dr. Bayless’s interview notes reveal that Petitioner relayed essentially the same story

regarding the offense as he told to Drs. French and Lanyon, namely that he made a motion

to his wife to indicate “there’s nothing [in the victim’s truck],” that the victim “saw and got

spooked and said I’ve got to go,” and that when she turned toward the door, “the darkness

came over me, heart racing, and I grabbed her in bear hug.” (Doc. 44-2 at 9; Doc. 40-2 at

10.) The notes also reported Petitioner as saying that he “crossed line—blackness

clearing—on probation, hit her with wooden pole.” (Doc. 44-2 at 9; Doc. 40-2 at 13.) Dr.

Bayless testified that when he asked Petitioner why he raped her, Petitioner smiled and

gestured in a way that angered Dr. Bayless, who interpreted the gesture to mean “seeing a

vaginal area would make me do such a thing.” (Doc. 40-1 at 45.) In relaying this

impression, Dr. Bayless stated that the victim’s dress had flown up. (Id.) On crossexamination, Dr. Bayless acknowledged that the victim had not been wearing a dress and that

his notes did not include this aspect of Petitioner’s statement, but that he remembered it

“precisely” and despite the inaccuracy concerning her clothing was “what [Petitioner] said

to me.” (Doc. 40-2 at 15-16.)

 Addressing antisocial personality disorders, Dr. Bayless testified that such a disorder

would not render a person incapable of knowing right from wrong or from having the ability

to control his or her conduct. (Doc. 40-1 at 53.) Rather, “it’s choice issues”—such

individuals know what’s right, know what is acceptable, but choose not to act appropriately.

(Id.) He further testified that the “central feature of a substance induced psychotic disorder

are hallucinations and delusions that are due to the direct physiologic effects of [the]

substance” and that in this case Petitioner “knew exactly what was going on. He was not

seeing things. He was not hearing voices. He was not delusional.” (Id. at 48.) Dr. Bayless

concluded that Petitioner was “fully aware of what he was doing” when he committed the

offense and “knew it was wrong.” (Id. at 46.) 

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He explained to me, he talked about it very clearly. He remembered the

essence of what had taken place. He was very much focused. He was very

much in reality when we talked about what happened on the day of the offense.

Look, there is no indication that he was suffering from any psychosis.

There is no indication that he did not know what he was doing. There is no

indication that cocaine played a role in his behavior, his choices at the time.

Was he high on cocaine? He had done some cocaine. But was he at a point

where now he did not know what he was doing? No.

His voluntary intoxication at that time was voluntary intoxication, but

he was not at a level that he did not know what he was doing. Pure and

simple. He knew why he moved the car. He knew why he put a blanket over

her stomach when he stabbed her. He knew what he was doing when he raped

her. He said to me specifically: I’m going to make this look—I wanted to

make this look like she was raped in a robbery. He said that to us specifically,

that he thought that before he did it. I don’t know what all the fight is about.

(Doc. 40-2 at 29.) 

State Court Ruling

Following the hearing and submission of post-hearing memoranda, the state PCR

court denied relief in a 15-page ruling. (Doc. 38-9.) After setting forth in detail the standard

for relief under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the court addressed the

credibility of the expert opinions. It found that much of “Dr. French’s opinions were based

on speculation about the quantity of cocaine that was used by the Defendant.” (Doc. 38-9

at 35-36.) It further found that Dr. Lanyon’s opinions “were less than persuasive.” (Id. at

36.) Specifically the court wrote:

Dr. Lanyon believed that Sansing’s statement to him that everything went

black and blank was a strong indication of psychosis. [Footnote 20: Sansing’s

trial attorney testified at the evidentiary hearing that he does not ever recall

Sansing saying this to him. If Sansing had said this to him, he would have

followed up on these statements.] However, Dr. Lanyon’s opinions were

contradicted by Dr. Michael Bayless (a psychologist called by the state) and

several versions of the facts of the crime provided by Sansing in which he

remembers many details after the alleged “going black” episode. Dr. Bayless

opined that the Defendant suffered from a classic anti-social personality

disorder, that Sansing was high on cocaine at the time of the crime, but that he

knew what he was doing was wrong. Significantly, Sansing smiled as he

described to Dr. Bayless the reason why he committed the rape: he saw Trudy

Calabrese’s vaginal area. Sansing also described that he placed a blanket over

Trudy to stab her so as to avoid blood splatter. This court finds the testimony

of Dr. Bayless to be the more credible and more persuasive.

(Id. at 36-37.) 

Addressing Strickland’s performance prong, the PCR court noted that trial counsel

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had consulted with three different mental health experts, one of whom diagnosed Petitioner

with an antisocial personality disorder and another who recalled no issues that required

further testing. The court noted that although Ronan could not recall what information he

supplied to Dr. Menendez, he did not doubt supplying her with any available records, as was

his standard practice. The court further noted Ronan’s belief that proffering evidence of an

antisocial personality disorder as mitigation would have opened the door to the prosecution

submitting evidence of Petitioner’s other violent, antisocial acts. “This type of ‘doubleedged’ mitigation evidence would be more detrimental than helpful, and making a strategic

decision to avoid damaging a case for mitigation despite losing a slim advantage cannot be

unreasonable.” (Id. at 38-39.) Regarding counsel’s failure to utilize expert witnesses, the

court credited Ronan’s belief that the trial judge’s background and experience would allow

him to understand the nexus between Petitioner’s difficult childhood, his drug use, and the

murder. 

In conclusion, the court stated:

[T]he issue presented is whether Sansing’s counsel performed deficiently, or

rather, unreasonably based on the information he knew at the time, and based

on the extent of his investigations and reliance on medical and mental health

experts. Based on the factual accounts from the evidentiary hearing, counsel

appears to have acted reasonably, even though no expert witnesses were called

during the mitigation phase to attempt to create a causal nexus between

Sansing’s drug usage, tough childhood and antisocial personality disorder and

the crime. This court finds that the testimony of Dr. Paul Miller regarding the

Defendant’s abusive childhood was duplicative of the investigation of Pamela

Davis. The court further finds that the proposed expert testimony such as that

offered by Drs. French and Lanyon regarding the effects and nexus between

Defendant’s cocaine use and the commission of the crime to be speculative

and unpersuasive. The evidence of a “cocaine-induced psychosis” is

speculative at best. Many of the facts upon which Dr. Lanyon based his

testimony were quite effectively disputed by Dr. Michael Bayless. Dr.

Bayless’ opinions (including those disputing that any psychosis existed at the

time of the crime given Sansing’s detailed memory of what had occurred) were

far more credible and reasonable. More importantly, [trial counsel] did not call

expert witnesses for strategic or tactical reasons. I find no deficient

performance by trial counsel.

(Id. at 39-40.)

Turning to Strickland’s prejudice prong, the court found that, even assuming counsel

performed deficiently in failing to investigate and call experts, Petitioner had failed to

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demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome. First, it concluded that, in light

of his attempts to avoid prosecution, expert testimony connecting his dysfunctional

upbringing to the offense would not have established that he was unable to appreciate the

wrongfulness of his actions or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

Specifically, the court noted that Petitioner moved the victim’s truck, lied and gave false

information when asked about the victim’s whereabouts, and hid the body. Analogizing to

decisions by the Arizona Supreme Court in other capital cases, the PCR court concluded that

each of these actions “was performed in order to elude suspicion and avoid prosecution” and

“clearly demonstrated that he fully appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct.” (Id. at 41-

42.)

Similarly, the court found that expert testimony concerning cocaine intoxication

would not have established that he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements

of the law due to drug impairment at the time of the offense. Again referencing a state

supreme court case, the court noted that most of the testimony about Petitioner’s drug use

was derived from Petitioner himself. Because of Petitioner’s “motive to fabricate selfserving testimony,” this evidence would have been met with skepticism. (Id. at 42-43.) The

court also observed that although “no expert testified about Sansing’s tough childhood, drug

use, anti-social personality disorders or a causal nexus between his personality disorder and

the crime, the factual information regarding Sansing’s difficult childhood, his drug use, and

the crime was presented to the sentencing judge.” (Id. at 43.) Finally, the court found that

the murder was “horribly cruel” and that even if all of the proffered mitigating circumstances

were proven, no reasonable jury would find the mitigation sufficiently substantial to

outweigh the aggravation. (Id. at 43-44.)

Controlling Law

As recognized by the state court, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

governed by the principles set forth in Strickland. To prevail, a petitioner must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the

deficiency prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

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The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential and “every effort [must] be made

to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id.

at 689; see Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 384 (2009) (per curiam); Bobby v. Van Hook,

130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009) (per curiam). Thus, to satisfy Strickland’s first prong, a defendant

must overcome “the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might

be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. “The test has nothing to do with what the best

lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done.

We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the

circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.” Id. at 687-88.

With respect to Strickland’s second prong, a petitioner must affirmatively prove

prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. “When a defendant challenges a death sentence . . . the question is whether

there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have

concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant

death.” 466 U.S. at 695. In Wiggins v. Smith, the Court further noted that “[i]n assessing

prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating

evidence.” 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003); see also Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d at 928. The

“totality of the available evidence” includes “both that adduced at trial, and the evidence

adduced” in subsequent proceedings. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536 (quoting Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000)). 

Under the AEDPA, this Court’s already-deferential review of trial counsel’s

performance is subject to another level of deference under § 2244(d) and is thus “doubly”

deferential. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411,

1420 (2009)). Therefore, to establish entitlement to relief, Petitioner must make the

additional showing that the PCR court, in ruling that trial counsel was not ineffective, applied

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 The court also described Petitioner’s claim as failing “to fully investigate and

develop possible mitigating factors, because expert witnesses were not presented,” failing

“to utilize an expert to explain his difficult childhood and polysubstance abuse,” failing “to

establish a causal nexus between Sansing’s upbringing, antisocial personality disorder and

the crime,” failing to consult “with an expert in cocaine addiction,” and failing “to produce

an expert to develop the causal nexus between his substance abuse and the crime.” (Doc. 38-

9 at 35.)

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Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner. In making this determination, “the

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable,” but “whether there is any

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. Because

the Strickland standard is a general one, “the range of reasonable applications is substantial.”

Id.

Analysis

Petitioner first asserts that the PCR court made no findings of fact nor reached any

conclusions of law on his allegations concerning counsel’s failure to investigate and to

present Petitioner’s social history to the experts, and that he is thus entitled to de novo review

on these claims. However, it is apparent from the record that the court at least implicitly

ruled on these allegations when it stated that “the issue presented is whether Sansing’s

counsel performed deficiently, or rather, unreasonably based on the information he knew at

the time, and based on the extent of his investigations and reliance on medical and mental

health experts.”5

 (Doc. 38-9 at 39.) In addition, the court described the extent of counsel’s

investigation and noted counsel’s testimony regarding his standard practice with respect to

providing background information to experts. In the absence of a clear indication that the

state court declined to reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim, this court “must assume that the

state court has decided all the issues.” Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 990 n.6 (9th Cir.

2010) (en banc) (plurality opinion); see Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“An adjudication on the merits is perhaps best understood by stating what it is not: it is not

the resolution of a claim on procedural grounds.”); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 347 (2003) (noting that “a state court need not make detailed findings addressing all the

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evidence before it”); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that

“Federal habeas review is not de novo when the state court does not supply reasoning for its

decision”).

Addressing review under § 2254(d), Petitioner argues that the PCR court unreasonably

applied Strickland in finding neither deficient performance nor prejudice. He further asserts

that the state court’s decision was based on the following seven instances of “unreasonable”

factual determinations:

(1) The court’s implicit determination that Ronan provided background

information to Dr. Menendez, despite the discrepancies between her report and

the available information concerning Petitioner’s academic performance and

relationship with his mother;

(2) The court’s adoption of Dr. Bayless’s account that Petitioner raped the

victim because he saw her vaginal area when her dress flew up, despite the fact

the victim had not been wearing a dress, Petitioner had not relayed seeing her

vaginal area in any of his previous statements about the offense, and the

absence of this alleged statement in Dr. Bayless’s report and interview notes.

(3) The court’s determination that Dr. Bayless was more credible than

Petitioner’s experts, in light of Dr. Bayless’s testimony the victim was wearing

a dress, his assertion that Petitioner suffered from no mental illness despite

antisocial personality disorder being identified in the DSM as a mental illness,

his unfounded assertions concerning the cost and amount of cocaine used by

Petitioner, and his unprofessional personal feelings against Petitioner;

(4) The court’s determination that Dr. French’s opinion was based upon

speculation about the quantity of cocaine used by Petitioner, despite Dr.

French testifying that his opinion was not based on the amount of drugs

Petitioner consumed;

(5) The court’s finding that trial counsel chose to not offer the diagnosis of

antisocial personality disorder as a mitigating factor because it could have

opened the door to damaging rebuttal evidence, given that Ronan did not

expressly testify he made such a decision in Petitioner’s case, only that he

agreed generally that prior bad acts would be part of the calculus an attorney

would consider in deciding whether to present evidence of an antisocial

personality disorder;

(6) The court’s finding that Dr. Miller’s report was duplicative of that

prepared by the mitigation specialist, given that as a developmental

psychologist Dr. Miller’s report “goes much further” than Davis’s

investigation and had a different purpose; and

(7) The court’s finding that trial counsel made a tactical decision not to

present expert witnesses, given that Ronan had no recollection of why he did

not do so.

(Doc. 35 at 58-67.)

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Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340

(2003); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] federal court may not

second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record,

it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.”). A state

court’s factual determination “is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court

would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct.

841, 849 (2010). “This is a daunting standard—one that will be satisfied in relatively few

cases.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000.

Counsel’s Performance

After reviewing the entirety of the record, this Court concludes that the state court

reasonably determined that Ronan made a tactical decision, after conducting a reasonable

investigation, not to present evidence of an antisocial personality disorder or to utilize expert

witnesses to testify concerning Petitioner’s difficult childhood, drug addiction, and cocaine

intoxication at the time of the offense. 

The evidence at the PCR hearing established that counsel consulted three different

experts. Dr. Hill’s report indicated that she was retained to determine Petitioner’s

competency to stand trial or plead guilty. Dr. Menendez’s report stated that she was asked

to determine whether Petitioner suffered from a learning disability. Neither counsel nor Dr.

Parrish could recall her role in the case, but given her specialization in neuropsychology and

post-traumatic stress disorder, it is not unreasonable to conclude that she was on the lookout

for problems in these areas. 

In addition, counsel enlisted a mitigation specialist to investigate and prepare a

detailed social history report. According to Davis’s report, she had extensive personal

interviews with Petitioner and his wife, mother, father, stepmother, brother, three sisters, and

several aunts and uncles. She described Petitioner’s positive relationship with the only

significant male figure in his life—a maternal grandfather who died unexpectedly when

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Petitioner was seven years old. She relayed that between the ages of six and 14, Petitioner

lived in a very unstable home, that his mother went through a succession of relationships

with men, none of which were positive or supportive, that they lived in poverty, and that

Petitioner’s mother did not permit his father to have contact with Petitioner and his siblings.

Davis recounted that Petitioner’s mother “forbid her children to play outside or have friends

in their home” and that there was one instance when a welfare worker arrived unannounced

and found their living conditions to be “unacceptable.” Describing Petitioner’s mother’s

marriage to her second husband, when Petitioner was between the ages of six and ten, Davis

reported that Petitioner’s stepfather was an extremely abusive alcoholic, who would spend

the weekends drinking and fighting with his wife. During these times, Petitioner and his

siblings would be denied food and sleep until the fighting ended for the night, and

Petitioner’s mother would forbid her children from eating or going to bed until a fight was

resolved. The mitigation report also detailed Petitioner’s juvenile criminal history, poor

academic record, drug use beginning in the fifth grade, relationship with Kara Sansing, adult

criminal history, and crack cocaine addiction.

Petitioner argues it was unreasonable for the court to implicitly find that Ronan

provided this background information to Dr. Menendez. However, while Dr. Menendez’s

report contains some factual discrepancies compared to the information gathered by

mitigation specialist Davis, this Court cannot say that the state court’s finding was

objectively unreasonable in light of Ronan’s testimony concerning his standard practice of

providing available background materials to experts and his having no reason to believe he

did not follow this practice in this case. Because Dr. Menendez did not testify at the PCR

hearing, there is no way to know whether she was given background materials but for

whatever reason neglected to review them. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that

counsel failed to provide Petitioner’s social history to Drs. Hill and Parrish; Dr. Hill did not

testify and Dr. Parrish had no specific recollection. 

In addition, Petitioner does not allege that any of the experts requested additional

information, see Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that

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counsel does not have a duty to provide an expert with information necessary to reach a

mental health diagnosis in the absence of a specific request to do so), or that the absence of

any particular information precluded an accurate evaluation of Petitioner’s mental state, see

Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 965 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that none of the experts

suggested that additional background information or testing was necessary to accurately

evaluate the defendant’s mental health). Nor does Petitioner assert how additional

background information would have affected any of the expert’s conclusions.

Petitioner argues that it was unreasonable for the court to find that Ronan made a

strategic decision not to offer the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder as a mitigating

factor. However, the record supports the state court’s finding that Ronan likely concluded

that the antisocial personality disorder diagnosed by Dr. Menendez would have harmed more

than helped the mitigation case. Although Ronan could not recall whether he considered

presenting evidence of Petitioner’s antisocial personality disorder, he testified that in his

opinion such a diagnosis is not mitigating. He also testified that evidence of an antisocial

personality disorder generally opens the door for prosecutors to present evidence of prior bad

acts consistent with that diagnosis. Based on this testimony, it was not unreasonable for the

state court to conclude that Ronan made a strategic decision in Petitioner’s case not to call

Dr. Menendez as a witness at sentencing. 

Nor was it unreasonable for the state court to determine that the strategy itself was

reasonable. Cf. Crittenden, 624 F.3d at 968 n.15 (finding that counsel made tactical decision

supported by adequate investigation to keep evidence of antisocial personality disorder away

from sentencing jury). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly observed that evidence of an

antisocial personality disorder may be potentially more harmful than helpful. See, e.g.,

Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that evidence

the defendant may have been a sociopath was aggravating); Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d

560, 583 (9th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that an antisocial personality diagnosis can be

damaging); Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that mental

health records omitted from the sentencing hearing “hardly turned out to be helpful” because

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they indicated that the defendant had an antisocial personality, not a thought disorder). Here,

evidence of Petitioner’s antisocial personality disorder would have opened the door to

Petitioner’s history of antisocial behavior, including violence against his wife, involvement

of his children in other illegal activities, and other past crimes. Thus, this case differs from

Stankewitz v. Wong, 698 F.3d 1163, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012), where the court found that

evidence of an antisocial personality would not have had a significant adverse impact

because the prosecution had “already painted a grim picture of Stankewitz’s violent,

antisocial tendencies” and the jury had “heard next to nothing about Stankewitz’s traumatic

childhood.” 

Petitioner also argues that the state court unreasonably determined that Ronan made

a strategic decision not to present expert witnesses to establish a nexus between Petitioner’s

commission of the offense and his substance abuse and dysfunctional upbringing.

Information about Petitioner’s dysfunctional upbringing, past substance abuse, and cocaine

use at the time of the crime were presented to the judge through the mitigation specialist’s

report. Although Ronan had difficulty remembering his exact thought process, he speculated

that he presented the mitigation case without experts because he believed the sentencing

judge had the background and experience to understand the connection between Petitioner’s

background, drug abuse, and the crime. This was sufficient evidence from which the state

court could reasonably conclude that counsel made a strategic decision. 

Moreover, it was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to find that Ronan

acted reasonably in not utilizing expert witnesses to establish a nexus between Petitioner’s

dysfunctional upbringing, drug abuse, and the crime. See Hurles v. Ryan, No. 08-99032,

2013 WL 219222 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2013) (finding that “counsel did not perform below the

objective standard of care when she did not establish a causal nexus between Hurles’s mental

conditions and the crime” because Supreme Court precedent did not require such a showing).

The connection between Petitioner’s difficult childhood and drug addiction “was neither

complex nor technical. It required only that the [judge] make logical connections of the kind

a layperson is well equipped to make.” Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 388 (2009); see

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Fairbank v. Ayers, 650 F.3d 1243, 1253 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding no ineffectiveness from

counsel’s failure to utilize an expert to link substance abuse and abusive childhood to the

defendant’s behavior during the crime); see also Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir.

2006) (noting that “the link between suffering abuse as a child and later committing abusive

acts is not so esoteric as to be beyond the understanding of a lay jury”); Nields v. Bradshaw,

482 F.3d 442, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no ineffectiveness from counsel’s failure to

have an expert testify about the causal relationship between the defendant’s alcoholism and

his behavior on the night of the murder). In hindsight Ronan questioned whether he made

the right decision on how the mitigation evidence was presented. However, this is

insufficient to establish deficient performance under Strickland’s highly deferential standard.

In light of the record developed in state court, the Court concludes that the state

court’s finding of no deficient performance was based on neither an unreasonable application

of Strickland nor an unreasonable determination of fact. Ronan could not recall many of the

specifics of his decision-making process; however, there was sufficient other evidence in the

record to support the state court’s findings. See Greiner v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305, 326 (2nd

Cir. 2005) (“Time inevitably fogs the memory of busy attorneys. That inevitability does not

reverse the Strickland presumption of effective performance.”); see also Richter, 131 S. Ct.

at 790 (“Although courts may not indulge post hoc rationalization for counsel’s

decisionmaking that contradicts the available evidence of counsel’s actions, neither may they

insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions.”) (internal

quotation omitted). Counsel undertook a reasonable investigation and made strategic

decisions about the evidence to proffer in mitigation and how that evidence would be

presented. “A disagreement with counsel’s tactical decisions does not prove that the

representation was constitutionally deficient.” Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir.

2010). 

Prejudice

In ultimately concluding that Petitioner was not prejudiced by any of counsel’s alleged

deficiencies, the state court made numerous findings, including that Dr. Bayless was more

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credible than Dr. Lanyon, that the opinions of Drs. French and Lanyon regarding a cocaineinduced psychosis were speculative and unpersuasive, that the proposed expert testimony

would not have established that Petitioner’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his

actions or to conform his conduct to the law’s requirements was substantially impaired, that

Dr. Miller’s report was duplicative of that prepared by the mitigation specialist, and that the

factual information regarding Petitioner’s difficult childhood and drug abuse was before the

sentencing judge.

Petitioner takes issue with the state court’s credibility determinations concerning the

experts, but federal courts have “no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose

demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them.” Marshall v.

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). Even if reasonable minds reviewing a record might

disagree about a witness’s credibility, “on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede

the trial court’s credibility determination.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006).

Rather, “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness” of the state court’s

credibility findings, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that these findings were objectively

unreasonable. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664

(2004)). 

Petitioner argues that it was objectively unreasonable for the PCR court to find that

Petitioner committed the rape after seeing the victim’s vaginal area because Dr. Bayless

failed to document this alleged statement in his report or notes, Petitioner never made such

an assertion in his other numerous statements about the offense, and the victim was not

wearing a dress. In making this finding, the state court concluded that Dr. Bayless was a

credible witness. Because as discussed next it was not objectively unreasonable for the state

court to credit Dr. Bayless’s testimony, none of Petitioner’s alleged grounds are sufficient

to overturn the state court’s determination that Petitioner raped the victim after seeing her

vaginal area. Moreover, the state court’s reference to Petitioner’s alleged sexual arousal

played no significant role in its ultimate findings concerning counsel’s representation.

Petitioner had also reported both to Dr. Bayless and other experts that he raped the victim in

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order to make it look like she had been raped during a robbery. And it was this fact, separate

from Petitioner’s alleged arousal, that formed the basis of Dr. Bayless’s opinion that

Petitioner was fully aware of his actions when he committed the offense.

In a related argument, Petitioner asserts that it was objectively unreasonable for the

state court to find Dr. Bayless more credible than Drs. Lanyon and French. However, this

is a classic credibility determination to which this Court must defer so long as “fairminded

jurists could disagree.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. The essence of Petitioner’s experts’

testimony was that Petitioner entered a cocaine-induced psychotic state when Petitioner

irrationally concluded that the victim could read his mind and was going to report him to the

police. They based their conclusion on not only Petitioner having been on a crack binge for

days, but also on his describing having “no conscious there” and experiencing “blackness”

when he initiated the attack on Calabrese. However, as noted by the state court, trial counsel

did not recall Petitioner ever telling him that he had no control over his actions and that

counsel would have followed up on such a statement. (Doc. 38-9 at 36 n.20; Doc. 40-6 at

10.) It is also noteworthy that in interviews with the post-conviction experts Petitioner said

the victim never regained consciousness. This change in narrative, in the face of his

stipulated plea, his wife’s testimony, and his statement to a reporter concerning the victim’s

consciousness, casts some doubt on the veracity of his newly-claimed lack of control.

Regardless, Dr. Bayless testified that a cocaine-induced psychosis requires hallucinations and

delusions and that in this case Petitioner was not delusional but knew exactly what he was

doing as evidenced by Petitioner’s logical and deliberate actions. In light of the competing

experts’ opinions and the evidentiary record, it was not objectively unreasonable for the state

court to credit Dr. Bayless’s testimony over that of Drs. Lanyon and French. 

Petitioner also complains that the state court unreasonably determined that the

testimony of Dr. Miller regarding Petitioner’s difficult childhood was duplicative of that

reported by mitigation specialist Davis because Dr. Miller’s report examined the nature of

the risk factors that Petitioner was exposed to as a child, “such as abuse, neglect, parental

alcoholism, multiple marriages and divorces, and violent, aggressive behavior between adults

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in the home.” (Doc. 35 at 58.) He further asserts that Davis was unqualified to opine

whether Petitioner’s “background contributed to psychological conditions or was a causal

factor in the commission of the offense.” (Id.) However, Dr. Miller rendered no such

opinion, testifying only that the identified risk factors increase the probability a child will

someday engage in criminal activity. He expressly declined to offer an opinion about what

role Petitioner’s risk factors may have played in the offense or to assess Petitioner’s

psychological condition. (Doc. 40-1 at 11.) In addition, Dr. Miller’s report is based in large

measure on Davis’s mitigation report and her interview notes. It was not objectively

unreasonable for the state court to find that Dr. Miller’s contributions were largely

duplicative of mitigation specialist Davis.

After careful review of the record, the Court concludes that it was not objectively

unreasonable for the PCR court to find no reasonable probability of a different outcome had

counsel presented expert testimony concerning cocaine intoxication and connecting

Petitioner’s dysfunctional upbringing to his drug addiction and to the offense. The testimony

at the PCR hearing of Petitioner’s siblings and Dr. Miller was largely duplicative and

cumulative of the information contained in the mitigation specialist’s report. The sentencing

judge found, based on Davis’s report, that Petitioner had established a difficult childhood as

a mitigating factor. Similarly, the sentencing judge found as a nonstatutory mitigating factor

that Petitioner was somewhat impaired by crack cocaine at the time of the offense. Petitioner

argues that expert testimony would have shown that he was in a cocaine-induced psychosis

and thus substantially impaired under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1), but the PCR court found

otherwise. This was not an unreasonable determination in light of the evidence of

Petitioner’s planning, deliberate actions to conceal the crime, and his detailed memory of

what occurred. Specifically, it was not unreasonable to find that Petitioner had the ability

to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions based on his discussing a plan to rob the victim

before she arrived at the house, moving the victim’s truck, lying to her church about her

whereabouts and his home address, washing the stick used to bludgeon her head, and hiding

the body. 

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Conclusion

In determining that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of

counsel was not violated by counsel’s alleged deficiencies in investigating and presenting

mitigating evidence, the PCR court neither unreasonably applied Strickland nor unreasonably

determined the facts in light of the evidence developed in state court. Because Petitioner is

precluded from relief by § 2254(d), the Court declines to permit discovery, expansion of the

record, and an evidentiary hearing on Claim 2. 

B. Failure to Investigate and to Rebut Aggravation

In Claim 3, Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate

generally and failing to present evidence to rebut the cruelty prong of the (F)(6) aggravating

factor. Specifically, he asserts counsel should have interviewed Petitioner’s wife and

children, and hired an independent forensic pathologist to offer an opinion on whether the

victim was conscious at the time of the sexual assault and stabbing.

Respondents contend that Claim 3 was never fairly presented in state court and is now

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner counters that the claim was raised in Claim Three of his

second amended PCR petition, which alleged that Petitioner’s plea and sentencing were the

product of ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to inform Petitioner of the

effects of his plea and sentencing stipulations. (Doc. 38-10 at 27-28.) Within the body of

this claim, counsel asserted that the defense had not interviewed Petitioner’s children. In

support, he appended declarations from Petitioner, asserting that counsel did not interview

the children, and his Strickland expert, asserting that counsel should not have permitted the

sentencing stipulation “without first having interviewed the children and explaining the

severe consequences of the stipulation.” (Doc. 43-10 at 13; Doc. 43-4 at 6.)

The Court finds that Claim 3 was not fairly presented in state court. While the PCR

petition mentions an alleged failure to interview Petitioner’s children, it does so in the

context of arguing counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to properly advise Petitioner of the

consequences of signing a stipulation summarizing the children’s statements to police and

a counselor (which forms the basis of Claim 4 below), not as part of a claim asserting

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ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and uncover evidence necessary to rebut the (F)(6)

aggravating factor. Petitioner’s PCR petition did not alert the state court to either the legal

theory or operative facts underlying Claim 3. See Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1120 (9th

Cir. 2012) (“[A] general allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is not sufficient to

alert a state court to separate specific instances of ineffective assistance.”); Moormann v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a petitioner cannot add unrelated

alleged instances of ineffectiveness to any ineffectiveness claim raised in state court).

Because he has no available state court remedies, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) and 32.1(d)-

(h), Claim 3 is procedurally barred absent a showing of cause and prejudice or fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1.

Cause and Prejudice

Petitioner argues that the ineffective assistance of PCR counsel constitutes cause for

the procedural default. In states like Arizona, which require that ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claims be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, failure of counsel in

an initial-review collateral proceeding to raise a substantial trial ineffectiveness claim may

provide cause to excuse the procedural default of such a claim. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.

1309, 1315 (2012). To establish cause under Martinez, Petitioner must demonstrate that PCR

counsel was ineffective under the standards of Strickland for not raising a substantial

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. This requires showing that the underlying

ineffectiveness claim is “rooted in ‘a potentially legitimate claim of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel.’” Lopez v. Ryan, 678 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Martinez, 132 S.

Ct. at 1318). “To have a legitimate IAC claim a petitioner must be able to establish both

deficient representation and prejudice.” Id.; see also Leavitt v. Arave, 682 F.3d 1138, 1140

(9th Cir. 2012); Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012). Because the Court

concludes that Petitioner “fails to meet the Martinez test of substantiality as to prejudice,”

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 Nonetheless, the Court notes that the state court record reflects that defense counsel

did, in fact, interview Petitioner’s wife before the aggravation/mitigation hearing. At the

hearing, Kara Sansing acknowledged a previous interview with Ronan and testified to

statements she made at that time. (RT 8/2/99 at 78-79.) 

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it does not address substantiality of the deficiency prong.6

 Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1138; see also

Leavitt, 682 F.3d at 1140 (finding no substantial ineffectiveness claims where record

demonstrated no prejudice from alleged ineffectiveness).

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to interview

Petitioner’s children, interview Petitioner’s wife, and enlist a forensic pathologist to opine

about the unlikelihood the victim regained consciousness after being bludgeoned in the head.

He asserts this investigation would have led him to discover that the victim was not

conscious at the time of the rape or stabbing and, consequently, the sentencer would not have

found that the murder was committed in an especially cruel manner under A.R.S. § 13-

703(F)(6). 

Petitioner does not specifically allege what would have been gained by counsel

interviewing his children. With regard to his wife, Petitioner argues that on crossexamination counsel could have demonstrated the unreliability of Kara Sansing’s testimony

by eliciting the details of her statement to the police, which he describes as “unbelievable.”

(Doc. 35 at 88.) In support, he proffers a transcript of Kara’s police interview, which

contains the following exchange:

INT: Okay, you saw him having sex with her?

KS: Yes.

INT: Okay, were her pants down or just off or—?

KS: Pants down to her knees.

INT: Just down to her knees, okay. What was she saying?

KS: She asked him how it feels, and he says, well my wife’s better. And

hear what I’m saying, when I walked in when I heard her say that, and

I just, looked at him Johnny, I says, you know, I can’t believe you

would say that to her, I mean, I want to say, say something like well,

how would you feel if I was doing it to a guy, and asking a guy, or guy

asking me, so what my husband’s feels better, when you (inaudible)

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making uncomfortable to hear you’re wife’s in another room and you’re

doing it with another woman and you’re murdering her?

. . . .

INT: Okay. So he stabs her with this knife, uh, what does she do?

KS: She would just say, please don’t, please don’t, just let me go, I won’t

call the cops. I won’t do nothing, and he’s like yes you will, yes you

will, as soon as you walk out of this house, you will call the cops.

(Doc. 53-2 at 14-15.) 

Petitioner also points to declarations from Kara and Petitioner admitted during the

state PCR hearing and proffers a newly-obtained report from a forensic pathologist.

Petitioner’s declaration states that he made false statements about the victim speaking during

the sexual assault so as to minimize risk of a jail assault and that Calabrese was not in fact

conscious when he returned from moving her truck. (Doc. 43-10 at 11-12.) In her

declaration, Kara denies hearing the victim speak during the sexual assault and says the “only

time she spoke was when she was being tied up in the kitchen area.” (Id. at 5.) The forensic

pathologist opines that if the victim did regain consciousness, it likely would have been for

no more than five to ten minutes, during which her perception of pain and her ability to speak

cognitively likely would have been impaired given the brain damage she had sustained.

(Doc. 53-2 at 25.)

To establish prejudice from counsel’s alleged deficiencies, Petitioner must show a

reasonable probability of a different outcome. For several reasons, there is no reasonable

probability the sentencer would not have found the (F)(6) “especially heinous, cruel or

depraved” aggravating factor. First, the new evidence Petitioner alleges counsel could have

presented is not significant. The new pathologist’s report is not appreciably different from

the testimony of the medical examiner, who opined it was possible but doubtful the victim

regained consciousness. In addition, Petitioner’s and Kara’s post-conviction declarations

lack credibility in light of their self-serving nature and Petitioner’s previous admissions to

the court and a newspaper reporter. 

Second, even if Petitioner’s new evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the

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victim regained consciousness, he cannot show prejudice because the sentencing judge found

beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in an especially heinous or

depraved manner. This finding alone, separate from cruelty, was sufficient to establish the

(F)(6) factor. Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 356, 26 P.3d at 1127 (“Because the statute is written

in the disjunctive, the sentencing judge need find only one of the factors to establish an F.6

aggravating factor.”); see also Sansing II, 206 Ariz. at 237-38, 77 P.3d at 35-36 (concluding

that no reasonable jury would have failed to find that Calabrese’s murder was especially

heinous). 

Third, in finding cruelty, the sentencing judge did not rely solely on the victim’s

physical pain and mental suffering during the rape and stabbing. The court found that

Calabrese consciously experienced physical pain during the initial attack, as indicated by the

ligature wounds and bruises on her wrists and ankles, the defensive wounds to her hands, the

trauma to her face, and the “two deep blows to the back of her head, which caused bruising

of the brain and hemorrhaging.” (RT 9/30/99 at 13.) It further found that Calabrese suffered

mental anguish, as demonstrated by her praying to God and pleading with Petitioner’s

children to summon help. There is no dispute that the victim was conscious throughout the

initial attack when she struggled against being tied up. Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court

also found during its independent review that the cruelty prong had been established based

on the mental suffering that occurred between the beginning of the attack and the victim’s

loss of consciousness. Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 358, 26 P.3d at 1128 (“The evidence shows

beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was aware and had sufficient time to contemplate

her fate.”) Moreover, in reviewing the Ring violation for harmless error, the Arizona

Supreme Court expressly stated that cruelty had been established in three independent ways,

one being mental anguish during the initial attack. Sansing II, 206 Ariz. at 235-36, 77 P.3d

at 33-34. 

Because Petitioner has not alleged facts that, even if true, support a finding of

prejudice from counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence to rebut the (F)(6) factor,

the Court finds that it is not a substantial ineffectiveness claim. Therefore, PCR counsel’s

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failure to raise Claim 3 in the PCR petition was not ineffective and does not provide cause

for its procedural default. 

Miscarriage of Justice

Petitioner contends that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if Claim 3 is

not heard on the merits because he is actually innocent of the death penalty. To satisfy this

exception to procedural default, Petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that,

but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the existence of any

aggravating circumstance or some other condition of eligibility for the death sentence under

the applicable state law. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 335-36.

Petitioner argues that the (F)(6) aggravating factor would not have been established,

and thus Petitioner would not be eligible for the death penalty, if counsel had conducted a

proper investigation and rebutted the finding of consciousness. However, as already

explained, the state court’s (F)(6) finding rested on both the cruelty and “heinous or

depraved” prongs, either of which rendered Petitioner eligible for the death penalty.

Accordingly, Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that he is

actually innocent of the death penalty.

Evidentiary Development

Because Claim 3 is procedurally barred, Petitioner’s requests for discovery, expansion

of the record, and an evidentiary hearing are denied.

C. Failure to Properly Advise

In Claim 4, Petitioner alleges that had counsel properly advised him about the

consequences of his plea’s stipulated factual basis and the sentencing stipulation, he would

not have signed these documents and the admissions contained therein would not have been

used by the prosecution to establish the cruelty prong of the (F)(6) aggravating factor.

Respondents acknowledge that Claim 4 was raised in Petitioner’s PCR petition, but argue it

is procedurally defaulted because in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court

Petitioner merely incorporated the arguments and authorities set forth in his PCR petition,

which he appended to his petition for review in lieu of restating the argument in the body of

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the petition. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that this is sufficient to fairly present a

claim to an appellate court. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582-83 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The state PCR court denied relief on Claim 4 without explanation, stating that the

claim failed to present “a material issue of fact or law.” (Doc. 38-9 at 29.) The Arizona

Supreme Court summarily denied review. “Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied

by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. In addition,

this Court must apply the “doubly deferential” standard of review under Strickland and

§ 2254(d). Id. at 788. Doing so, and in light of the record that was before the state court, the

Court finds that the state court’s denial was not objectively unreasonable because

“fairminded jurists could disagree” on whether counsel’s performance was deficient or

Petitioner suffered prejudice. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

First, Petitioner stated during his change-of-plea hearing that he reviewed the factual

basis with counsel. Although Petitioner now asserts in his declaration that counsel did not

advise him of all the potential sentencing consequences from his admissions, it would not be

unreasonable to discount this evidence, especially in the absence (as here) of any evidence

relating to counsel’s recollections of their pre-plea discussions and in light of Petitioner’s

own admission in his declaration that he is not a truthful person. Second, the record suggests

that Petitioner did not want his children to be called as witnesses and therefore agreed to the

sentencing stipulation to minimize their involvement in the proceedings. Third, even if

Petitioner had refused to sign the factual basis or agreed to the sentencing stipulation, there

is no reasonable probability of a different outcome. 

Kara Sansing testified at sentencing that she heard the victim speak during the sexual

assault. Had the parties not agreed to the sentencing stipulation, the prosecution likely would

have called as witnesses the reporter to whom Petitioner admitted that the victim had

regained consciousness, as well as Petitioner’s children. Moreover, as just discussed with

respect to Claim 3, the sentencing court determined that the (F)(6) factor was established

both because the crime was committed in a heinous and depraved manner and because it was

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especially cruel. Either one of these prongs was sufficient to sustain the factor. In addition,

the court found cruelty based on the mental anguish and physical pain suffered by the victim

prior to losing consciousness.

D. Cumulative Prejudice

In Claim 5, Petitioner contends that trial counsel’s errors resulted in cumulative

prejudice. Respondents assert that this claim was never presented in state court. Regardless,

because Petitioner has not established any constitutional deficiencies in counsel’s

representation, his claim of cumulative prejudice fails.

IV. SENTENCING ERRORS

A. Causal Nexus

In Claim 7, Petitioner alleges that his right to an individualized sentencing

determination was violated when the trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court employed

a causal nexus test to avoid giving effect to his mitigating evidence. Citing Tennard v.

Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 289 (2004), Petitioner asserts that the trial court improperly refused

to give weight to his difficult childhood, dysfunctional family background, and family

support, and that the Arizona Supreme Court similarly refused to give any weight to his

alleged drug impairment, background, and lack of education when it reviewed the Ring

violation for harmless error. Respondents assert that Petitioner did not properly exhaust all

aspects of this claim. However, because the claim lacks merit, the Court declines to reach

the exhaustion issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State.”); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277

(2005) (noting that a district could would abuse its discretion if it were to grant a stay so that

a petitioner could attempt to exhaust “plainly meritless” claims).

Relevant Facts

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court violated his constitutional rights

by refusing to consider his difficult childhood and dysfunctional family background absent

a causal link to the offense. (Doc. 37-2 at 50-56.) The Arizona Supreme Court addressed

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this claim as follows:

The defendant proffered his difficult childhood and family background

as non-statutory mitigating circumstances. At sentencing, the judge held that

the defendant had established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had

a difficult childhood and family background but declined to give the evidence

“significant mitigating weight” because “there [was] nothing in the defendant’s

childhood or family background that provides a causal link to the horrific

crime committed.” The defendant argues the judge’s refusal to give the

evidence significant weight due to a lack of a causal nexus violates his due

process and Eighth Amendment rights under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,

109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869

(1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).

We have previously considered and rejected this argument. We have

interpreted Penry, Eddings, and Lockett as directing the sentencing judge to

“consider evidence proffered for mitigation.” State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583,

598 ¶ 61, 959 P.2d 1274, 1289 ¶ 61 (1998) (with respect to mitigating

evidence, the sentencing judge is “entitled to give it the weight it deserves”);

see also State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 189, 920 P.2d 290, 311 (1996) (“The

sentencer therefore must consider the defendant’s upbringing if proffered but

is not required to give it significant mitigating weight.”). However, “[h]ow

much weight should be given proffered mitigating factors is a matter within

the sound discretion of the sentencing judge.” Towery, 186 Ariz. at 189, 920

P.2d at 311.

“Arizona law states that a difficult family background is not relevant

unless the defendant can establish that his family experience is linked to his

criminal behavior.” Djerf, 191 Ariz. at 598 ¶ 61, 959 P.2d at 1289 ¶ 61; see

also State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 151 ¶ 110, 14 P.3d 997, 1021 ¶ 110

(2000) (Family dysfunction “can be mitigating only when actual causation is

demonstrated between early abuses suffered and the defendant’s subsequent

acts.”); Towery, 186 Ariz. at 189, 920 P.2d at 311 (“family background may

be a substantial mitigating circumstance when it is shown to have some

connection with the defendant’s offense-related conduct”); State v. Wallace,

160 Ariz. 424, 427, 773 P.2d 983, 986 (1989) (“A difficult family background

is a relevant mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show that something

in that background had an effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond the

defendant’s control.”). No testimony suggested that the defendant’s childhood

affected his behavior on the day of the murder. The evidence on this subject

did not “prove a loss of impulse control or explain what caused him to kill.”

Towery, 186 Ariz. at 189, 920 P.2d at 311. The sentencing judge properly

considered the defendant’s difficult childhood as a non-statutory mitigating

circumstance and gave the evidence appropriate weight.

Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 358-59, 26 P.3d at 1129-30.

As discussed above, in reviewing for harmless error following Ring, the Arizona

Supreme Court, assessed the evidence and agreed with the trial court that the (G)(1) factor

was not proved and that the non-statutory mitigating evidence was entitled to little weight.

Sansing II, 206 Ariz. at 238-41, 77 P.3d at 36-39. In making these determinations the court

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noted that Petitioner “failed entirely to show any causal nexus between his alleged drug use

and impairment.” Id. at 239, 77 P.3d at 37. This, combined with Petitioner’s failure to

quantify how much crack he had used along with evidence of planning and taking steps to

avoid detection, led the court to conclude that Petitioner had failed to prove the existence of

the (G)(1) substantial impairment factor. When the court later discussed impairment as a

non-statutory mitigating circumstance, it found based on its previous discussion of (G)(1)

that “no reasonable jury could have accorded the impairment claim more than minimal

weight.” Id. at 240-41, 77 P.3d at 38-39. The court also noted that Petitioner had failed to

“demonstrate any causal link between his crimes and his childhood and lack of education.”

Id. at 241, 77 P.3d at 39. Therefore, “a reasonable jury could have accorded these two

factors only minimal weight.” Id. Petitioner sought rehearing, arguing inter alia that a

causal nexus is not required to establish mitigation. (Doc. 38-3 at 54.) The Arizona Supreme

Court, evenly divided on a 2-2 vote, summarily denied the motion. (Doc. 38-4 at 2.) 

Analysis

Once a determination is made that a person is eligible for the death penalty, the

sentencer must consider relevant mitigating evidence, allowing for “an individualized

determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the

crime.” Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994). The Supreme Court has explained

that “evidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the

belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are

attributable to a disadvantaged background may be less culpable than defendants who have

no such excuse.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,

492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)). Therefore, the sentencer in a capital case is required to consider

any mitigating information offered by a defendant, including non-statutory mitigation. See

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (right to individualized sentencing in capital cases

violated by Ohio statute that permitted consideration of only three mitigating factors);

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (Lockett violated where state courts

refused as a matter of law to consider mitigating evidence that did not excuse the crime). 

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In Lockett and Eddings, the Court held that under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments the sentencer must be allowed to consider, and may not refuse to consider, “any

aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that

the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.

However, while the sentencer must not be foreclosed from considering relevant mitigation,

“it is free to assess how much weight to assign such evidence.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 943 (9th Cir. 1998). As the Eddings court explained: “The sentencer . . . may determine

the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by

excluding such evidence from their consideration.” 455 U.S. at 114-15. 

In Tennard v. Dretke, the Court reiterated the general principle that it is not enough

simply to allow a defendant to present mitigating evidence, the sentencer must be able to

consider and give effect to that evidence. 542 U.S. 274, 283 (2004). In that case, involving

a prisoner’s low IQ, the Court invalidated a “screening test” applied by the Fifth Circuit that

required the defendant to prove a “nexus” between mitigating evidence and the offense in

order for the evidence to be considered by the sentencer.

In Schad v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit observed that prior to Tennard Arizona courts

recognized a nexus test to preclude consideration of evidence of childhood abuse unless the

abuse bore a casual connection to the offense. 671 F.3d 708, 723 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 432 (2012). “After Tennard, however, the Arizona Supreme Court has

clarified that the nexus test affects only the weight of mitigating evidence, not its

admissibility.” Id. (citing State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 405, 132 P.3d 833, 849 (2006)).

The Schad court further observed that the “United States Supreme Court has said that the use

of the nexus test in this manner is not unconstitutional because state courts are free to assess

the weight to be given to particular mitigating evidence.” 671 F.3d at 723. Indeed, the

Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional requirement of unfettered discretion

in the sentencer, noting that “States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating

evidence ‘in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death

penalty.’” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487

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U.S. 164, 181 (1988) (plurality opinion)). It has further explained that “Lockett and its

progeny stand only for the proposition that a State may not cut off in an absolute manner the

presentation of mitigating evidence, either by statute or judicial instruction, or by limiting

the inquiries to which it is relevant so severely that the evidence could never be part of the

sentencing decision at all.” Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.350, 361-62 (1993) (quoting McKoy

v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 456 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). Thus,

“[a]lthough Lockett and Eddings prevent a State from placing relevant mitigating evidence

‘beyond the effective reach of the sentencer,’ Graham v. Collins, [506 U.S. 461, 475 (1993)],

those cases and others in that decisional line do not bar a State from guiding the sentencer’s

consideration of mitigating evidence.” Id. at 362; see Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492-93

(1990) (holding that an instruction directing the jury to avoid any influence of sympathy

when imposing sentence did not violate Lockett and Eddings and noting the “distinction

between allowing the jury to consider mitigating evidence and guiding their consideration”).

 Applying these principles, it is apparent in Petitioner’s case that the trial court fulfilled

its constitutional obligation by allowing and considering all of the mitigating evidence, and

that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary

was neither contrary to, nor based on an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law.

The record supports the conclusion that the state courts gave Petitioner’s drug impairment,

difficult childhood, lack of education, and family support “little or no weight as a matter of

fact, after giving individualized consideration to the evidence, rather than treating the

evidence as irrelevant or nonmitigating as a matter of law.” Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933,

946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012); see also Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198,

1203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 577 (2011) (reviewing record to determine whether

state court applied impermissible casual nexus requirement). The trial court thoroughly

discussed the mitigating circumstances presented at sentencing and did not exclude or refuse

to consider any mitigating evidence. The court did not state that the lack of a causal

connection foreclosed consideration of the evidence or that such evidence could not

“constitute” mitigation. Rather, it chose to not to give “significant mitigating weight to the

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defendant’s childhood and family background.” (RT 9/30/99 at 21.) Similarly, the court

found family love and support to be a non-statutory mitigating circumstance, but gave it

“only minimal weight because it did not prevent the defendant from committing” the offense

or victimizing his children. (Id. at 22.) 

On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court correctly recognized that the sentencing court

was required to “consider evidence proffered for mitigation” but further noted that the

amount of weight that should be given to such evidence “is a matter within the sound

discretion of the sentencing judge.” Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 358, 26 P.3d at 1129. It

concluded that the “sentencing judge properly considered the defendant’s difficult childhood

as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance and gave the evidence appropriate weight.” Id.

at 359, 26 P.3d at 1130. This was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See Lopez, 673

F.3d at 944-45. 

In conducting its own independent review of Petitioner’s sentence, the supreme court

disagreed with the trial court’s finding of pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor but

nonetheless concluded that the mitigation failed to outweigh the especially cruel aggravating

factor because of the “minimal value of the mitigating evidence.” Sansing II, 200 Ariz. at

360, 26 P.3d at 1132. In doing so, the court again noted that the trial judge “gave the

defendant’s difficult family background little mitigating weight because the defendant failed

to establish the required causal link.” Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, in carrying out its

harmless error review of Petitioner’s sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court considered and

evaluated all of the proffered mitigating circumstances to determine whether a jury would

have reached a different sentencing decision than the trial judge. The court cited the lack of

a nexus between the mitigating circumstances and the crime simply as one of the criteria by

which a jury would have weighed the mitigating information. Sansing II, 206 Ariz. at 240-

41, 77 P.3d at 38-39.

It is evident from the record that both the trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court

considered all of Petitioner’s proffered mitigation. The fact that some of the proven

circumstances were not accorded significant weight does not amount to a constitutional

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violation under Lockett and Eddings. Towery, 673 F.3d at 945; Schad, 671 F.3d at 724;

Lopez, 630 F.3d at 1204; see also Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 962 (11th Cir. 1992)

(“Although Atkins argues that the trial judge did not consider non-statutory factors, it is more

correct to say that the trial judge did not accept—that is, give much weight to—Atkins’ nonstatutory factors. Acceptance of non-statutory mitigating factors is not constitutionally

required; the Constitution only requires that the sentencer consider the factors.”); State v.

Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 331 n.6, 916 P.2d 1035, 1047 (1996) (“Defendant seems to believe that

a trial court only ‘considers’ mitigating evidence if it imposes a mitigated sentence. The law

is to the contrary. So long as the trial court considers the evidence, the judge is not bound

to conclude that the evidence calls for leniency.”). 

B. (F)(6) Finding

In Claim 9, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding the especially

heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravating factor under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6), in violation of

his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Respondents contend that

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment aspects of this claim are procedurally barred because

Petitioner did not cite these provisions when raising the claim on direct appeal. Regardless,

the Court will address the entirety of the claim because it is plainly meritless. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 277.

Whether a state court correctly applied an aggravating factor to the facts is a question

of state law. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Federal habeas review is

limited to determining whether the state court’s finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to

constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation. Id. A state court’s

finding of an aggravating factor is arbitrary or capricious only if no reasonable sentencer

could have reached the same conclusion. Id. at 783. In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence under this “rational factfinder” standard, the question is “whether after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact” could have

made the finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

A habeas court faced with a record of historical facts which supports conflicting inferences

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must presume (even if it does not appear in the record) that the trier of fact resolved any such

conflicts in favor of the prosecution. Id. at 326.

Arizona’s (F)(6) aggravating factor, phrased in the disjunctive, is satisfied if the

murder is either especially heinous, or cruel, or depraved. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 37,

906 P.2d 542, 570 (1995). The especially cruel prong is satisfied “if the victim consciously

experienced physical or mental pain and suffering prior to dying.” State v. Lopez, 174 Ariz.

131, 143, 847 P.2d 1078, 1090 (1992). Evidence about “[a] victim’s certainty or uncertainty

as to his or her ultimate fate can be indicative of cruelty and heinousness.” State v. Gillies,

142 Ariz. 564, 569, 691 P.2d 655, 660 (1984); see also State v. Kemp, 185 Ariz. 52, 65, 912

P.2d 1281, 1294 (1996). Heinousness and depravity focus the defendant’s state of mind.

State v. Ceja, 126 Ariz. 35, 39, 612 P.2d 491, 495 (1980). Factors supporting a finding that

a murder was heinous and depraved include the infliction of gratuitous violence and

helplessness of the victim. See Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52, 659 P.2d at 11.

As set forth above, the trial court found that the State had proven both cruelty and

heinousness/depravity beyond a reasonable doubt. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme

Court concurred with the trial court’s cruelty findings and rejected Petitioner’s argument that

the victim had not been conscious long enough to suffer within the meaning of (F)(6).

Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 357, 26 P.3d at 1128. The court also rejected Petitioner’s argument

that the time frame between the beginning of the attack and the victim’s initial loss of

consciousness was too short to support a finding of cruelty. Id. Because it concurred in the

trial court’s cruelty findings, the supreme court declined to address the question of

heinousness or depravity. Id. However, it did address this aspect of the (F)(6) finding when

it reviewed the Ring violation for harmless error, finding that the rape, facial wounds, neck

ligatures, gagging, blindfolding, and grinding of the knife in the victim’s abdomen all

constituted violence beyond that necessary to kill. Sansing II, 206 Ariz. at 238, 77 P.3d at

36. 

Petitioner argues that the facts do not support a conclusion that the victim regained

consciousness after being hit in the head. Similar to his arguments in Claim 1, Petitioner

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argues that Kara Sansing’s statements to police are unreliable and that Petitioner did not

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily make the admissions contained within the factual

basis of his plea. He further argues that a finding of cruelty could not be based on the limited

time the victim was known to be conscious before the first blow to her head, asserting that

under Arizona law the suffering had to have occurred at the time of death. 

To the extent Petitioner relies on new evidence regarding the victim’s consciousness,

the Court does not consider it because a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is necessarily

limited to the state court record. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 322 (this type of claim almost

never necessitates an evidentiary hearing); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir.

1984) (“Whether the evidence was sufficient . . . must be determined from a review of the

evidence in the record in the state proceedings.”).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence to

establish cruelty. Based upon the evidence admitted at the sentencing hearing, a rational

factfinder could have determined from the numerous injuries sustained during the initial

struggle and from her pleas for help that the victim suffered mental anguish and uncertainty

as to her fate when she was attacked, pinned to the floor, and bound at her hands and wrists.

Moreover, given the uncontradicted testimony of Kara Sansing and Petitioner’s admissions

that the victim regained consciousness, a rational factfinder could have determined that the

victim suffered both mentally and physically when she was sexually assaulted and repeatedly

stabbed. The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision upholding the cruelty finding was not

objectively unreasonable. See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (applying deference

required by § 2254(d) to already deferential review of state court’s resolution of sufficiencyof-evidence claim). 

Petitioner also challenges the trial court’s finding that the murder was committed in

an especially heinous or depraved manner, arguing there was insufficient evidence that

gratuitous violence was inflicted. However, a rational trier of fact could have found

gratuitous violence based on the numerous injuries to the victim beyond the stab wounds.

The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision upholding this aspect of the (F)(6) factor was not

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objectively unreasonable. 

C. (G)(1) Finding

In Claim 10, Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in not finding as mitigation

that his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the

law was significantly impaired under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1), in violation of his rights under

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 35 at 117.) However, in his reply, Petitioner

asserts that this claim is based on the mitigating weight accorded by the state court to the

evidence of his impaired capacity. (Doc. 51 at 55.) Regardless of how the claim is

characterized, it is plainly meritless.

The Supreme Court has reiterated that its “precedents confer upon defendants the right

to present sentencers with information relevant to the sentencing decision and oblige

sentencers to consider that information in determining the appropriate sentence,” but that the

“thrust of our mitigation jurisprudence ends here.” Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 175

(2006). “Once mitigating evidence is allowed in, a finding that there are “no mitigating

circumstances” does not violate the Constitution.” Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1057

(9th Cir. 2006). 

Applying the rule of Lockett and its progeny to the case at bar, it is clear that the

sentencing court complied with its federal constitutional duties by considering in a thorough

manner Petitioner’s impairment-related mitigating evidence. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113. The

court specifically stated that it gave some mitigating weight to Petitioner’s claim that he was

impaired by crack cocaine at the time of the crime. That the court found the evidence

insufficient to establish significant impairment under (G)(1) is not problematic in light of the

settled principle that a sentencer is not required to find proffered evidence mitigating, nor

must it accord the evidence the weight which a defendant believes is appropriate. Harris v.

Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512 (1995). 

D. Victim’s Character

In Claim 11, Petitioner asserts that the trial court improperly considered the victim’s

good character in imposing the death penalty, in violation of his rights under the Eighth and

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Fourteenth Amendments. The Arizona Supreme Court addressed this claim on direct appeal:

The defendant asserts that the judge improperly based his sentencing

decision on Ms. Calabrese’s good character. In his special verdict, the judge

referred to the victim as a “Good Samaritan” and as a person who “took great

joy in helping people in need.” The judge’s concluding remarks, after

considering all aggravating and mitigating factors, described Ms. Calabrese as

a person who “stood out like a shining light, as a true Samaritan” and who

“kept her faith in God to the end.” The defendant argues that the judge

imposed the death sentence because he viewed the victim as a person above

the norm of other murder victims. That approach, he argues, violates A.R.S.

section 13-703, which does not define the character of the victim as an

aggravating factor, and discriminates on the basis of the victim’s status.

A.R.S. § 13-703.A H (2001).

We agree with the State that the judge’s comments, taken in context, do

not show that the trial judge relied upon the victim’s good character in

imposing the sentence. Taken in context, the comments merely state the

judge’s summary of the aggravating factors, particularly the senselessness of

the crime and the helplessness of the victim. The fact that the victim was

delivering food when attacked is related to the senselessness of the crime; the

judge’s comments related to “resorting to prayer for comfort” describe the

helplessness of the victim after she had been beaten and bound.

The defendant relies on Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F.Supp. 1388

(D.Ariz.1995), aff'd 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir.1997), to support his argument that

imposing a death sentence based on the social or economic background of the

victim or defendant supports a claim of discrimination. In Gerlaugh, the

habeas petitioner alleged that Arizona’s death sentence is “discriminately

applied because the death penalty is more likely to be imposed if the victim is

white and the defendant is a young male from a lower socio-economic

background.” Gerlaugh, 898 F.Supp. at 1416. The court stated that “[t]o

prevail on an equal protection claim, Petitioner must prove ‘that the

decision-makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.’” Id. (citing

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987)). The

defendant points to no facts that support a finding that the trial judge acted

with discriminatory purpose, and nothing in the special verdict suggests that

the victim’s social or economic background affected the judge’s decision. 

Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 352-53, 26 P.3d at 1123-24.

Petitioner asserts summarily that the state court’s ruling was both contrary to and an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. He argues that the trial court’s reliance on the

victim’s character “so infected the sentence hearing with unfairness as to make the resulting

death sentence a denial of due process.” (Doc. 35 at 121; internal quote and alteration marks

omitted.) He further asserts that the trial court’s consideration of the victim’s character and

status in the community resulted in the death penalty being imposed in a discriminatory

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manner.

The Arizona Supreme Court’s resolution of this claim was neither objectively

unreasonable nor contrary to controlling Supreme Court law. The supreme court reasonably

concluded based on the record that the trial court’s comments regarding the victim’s good

character reflected the judge’s determination that the murder was committed in an especially

heinous, cruel, or depraved manner under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) because the victim was

helpless and the crime was senseless. The fact that the victim went to Petitioner’s home to

deliver food from her church underscored both of these factors—she simply had no reason

to suspect Petitioner would attack, rob, and rape her. Additionally, the state supreme court

reasonably concluded that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate purposeful discriminatory

intent.

E. Request for Leniency

In Claim 12, Petitioner contends that his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments were violated when the trial court failed to find and consider as mitigation the

victim’s daughter’s request that Petitioner not be sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme

Court addressed this claim on direct appeal:

At sentencing, the judge considered and rejected the request of the

victim’s ten-year-old daughter for mercy as a mitigating circumstance. The

defendant asserts the judge thereby violated the rights of a victim to be heard,

as guaranteed by Article 2, Section 2.1.(A)4 of the Arizona Constitution,

A.R.S. section 13-4426.A, and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 39.b.7.

The State responds that a victim’s rights are satisfied when the court gives the

victim a chance to speak, orally or in writing, at sentencing. See Gulbrandson,

184 Ariz. at 66, 906 P.2d at 599 (“The Victims’ Bill of Rights of the Arizona

Constitution, however, guarantees victims of crime the right ‘[t]o be heard at

... sentencing.’ [Citation omitted.] Here, the victim’s family made statements

at the sentencing hearing and in letters and statements attached to the

presentence report.”).

In State v. Trostle, we rejected the defendant’s argument. There, the

defendant “claim[ed] that the judge should have considered requests from the

victim’s family that he be sentenced to life imprisonment [rather than death].”

191 Ariz. 4, 22, 951 P.2d 869, 887 (1997). We disagreed, stating “such

evidence is irrelevant to either the defendant’s character or the circumstances

of the crime and is therefore not proper mitigation.” Id. (citing State v.

Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 385, 904 P.2d 437, 454 (1995)). Moreover, A.R.S.

section 13-703.D expressly forbids the consideration of “any recommendation

made by the victim regarding the sentence to be imposed.”

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In this case, the victim’s rights were satisfied by the presence of Mr.

Calabrese at the sentencing hearing and the court’s acceptance of documents

submitted by the victim’s daughter. The judge correctly refused to consider

the daughter’s sentencing recommendation when imposing the sentence. 

Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 358, 26 P.3d at 1129. 

In reviewing the Ring error for harmless error, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that

no reasonable jury could have accorded mitigating weight to the request for leniency because

a “victim’s sentencing request is not proper mitigation evidence.” Sansing II, 206 Ariz. at

241, 77 P.3d at 39. The court cited its earlier decision in Lynn v. Reinstein, 205 Ariz. 186,

68 P.3d 412, (2003), in which a murder victim’s husband asserted a right under Arizona’s

Victims’ Bill of Rights to recommend life imprisonment over the death penalty during the

sentencing phase of a defendant’s trial. Citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987),

and Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 827 (1991), the court in Lynn held that the

Eighth Amendment prohibits victims’ recommendations regarding the appropriate sentence

for a capital defendant. 205 Ariz. at 191, 68 P.3d at 417. It further held that [v]ictims’

recommendations to the jury regarding the appropriate sentence a capital defendant should

receive are not constitutionally relevant to the harm caused by the defendant’s criminal acts

or to the defendant’s blameworthiness or culpability.” Id.

Petitioner argues that the state court’s ruling was contrary to, and based on an

unreasonable application of, Lockett, Eddings, and Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,

4 (1986), because the recommendation of a life sentence from the victim’s daughter was

relevant mitigating evidence. He further asserts, citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

623 (1993), that this error had a substantial and injurious effect on his sentence.

In Skipper, the Court restated the well-settled rule of Eddings that a sentencer must

consider as a mitigating factor “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of

the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than

death.” 476 U.S. at 4. “Equally clear is the corollary rule that the sentencer may not refuse

to consider or be precluded from considering ‘any relevant mitigating evidence.’” Id. (citing

Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114). 

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Petitioner here argues that a victim’s favorable sentencing recommendation is relevant

because it has mitigating value and could be found by a sentencer to warrant a sentence less

than death. The Arizona Supreme Court determined that such evidence is not relevant as

mitigation. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue or ever held that

a victim’s recommendation of leniency constitutes relevant mitigation. Thus, Petitioner

cannot show that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to or based on an

unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law,” as determined by the Supreme

Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see, e.g., Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1174 (2010)

(finding that no decision of the Court clearly established “that a demeanor-based explanation

for a peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally observed and recalls

the relevant aspect of the prospective juror’s demeanor”); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70,

77 (2006) (finding that no decision of the Court clearly established “the potential prejudicial

effect of spectators’ courtroom conduct”); see also Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. at 1413-14 (“[I]t

is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to

decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment bars the

admission of a victim’s family members’ opinions about the appropriate sentence in a capital

case. In Booth, the Court held that introduction of a victim impact statement during the

sentencing phase of a capital case violated the Eighth Amendment. 482 U.S. at 509. In

Payne, the Court overruled Booth, in part, holding that the Eighth Amendment does not erect

a per se barrier to the admission of all victim impact evidence. 501 U.S. at 827. However,

the Payne decision retained Booth’s prohibition on admitting “characterizations and

opinions” from the victim’s family “about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate

sentence.” Id. at 830 n.2; see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09 (“The admissions of these

emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions the jury should draw from the evidence

clearly is inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking we require in capital cases.”).

Given this general prohibition on victim testimony regarding the “appropriate sentence” for

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a capital defendant, the Court cannot say that the Arizona Supreme Court’s failure to

recognize an exception for “favorable” sentencing recommendations constituted an

unreasonable application of Booth and Payne.

F. Cumulative Error

In Claim 13, Petitioner alleges that was he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect

of errors committed during his guilty plea and sentencing hearings. Respondents contend

that the claim was never presented in state court and therefore is procedurally defaulted

because Petitioner has no available state court remedies. Petitioner counters that he

exhausted the claim by identifying the individual errors in state court, thereby affording the

court an opportunity to consider his claim of cumulative error. The Court disagrees and

concludes that Petitioner failed to fairly present his cumulative error claim in state court.

See, e.g., Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding cumulative error

claim not properly exhausted). Petitioner alleges neither cause and prejudice nor a

fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default. Therefore, the claim is barred.

The claim is also meritless. “Because there is no single constitutional error in this

case, there is nothing to accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation.” Mancuso v.

Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).

V. REMAINING CLAIMS

A. Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel

In Claim 6, Petitioner alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel

during his state post-conviction proceedings. However, there is no constitutional right to

counsel in state collateral review proceedings. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (citing

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)); see also Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315

(declining to decide whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral

proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial).

Where there is no right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of

counsel. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982). Consequently, Petitioner cannot

claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction collateral

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proceedings. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752; Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 677 (9th Cir.

1994) (en banc). Further, this claim is not cognizable: “The ineffectiveness or incompetence

of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a

ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(I). For these

reasons, Petitioner’s request for evidentiary development of Claim 6 is denied.

B. Challenges to Arizona’s Death Penalty

In Claims 14-26, Petitioner asserts various challenges to Arizona’s capital sentencing

statutory scheme. Respondents assert that some were not properly exhausted in state court

and are now procedurally barred. Regardless, the Court will address the claims because each

is plainly meritless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 277.

Petitioner asserts that the death penalty is categorically cruel and unusual punishment

(Claim 15), but acknowledges that the Supreme Court held otherwise in Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).

Petitioner contends that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme fails to sufficiently

channel the sentencer’s discretion (Claim 14), provide an opportunity to “death qualify” the

sentencing judge (Claim 17), provide objective standards for weighing aggravation and

mitigation (Claim 18), require the cumulative consideration of all mitigating evidence (Claim

20) and proportionality review (Claim 25), and require the prosecution to obtain probable

cause findings for aggravating factors at the indictment stage (Claim 26) and to prove that

death is the appropriate sentence (Claim 21). He further argues that Arizona law

unconstitutionally requires a death sentence if no mitigating circumstances are found (Claim

16), requires a defendant to affirmatively prove that his life should be spared (Claim 19),

requires that mitigating factors be proven by a preponderance of the evidence (Claim 23), and

provides unbridled discretion for prosecutors to seek the death penalty (Claim 24). In

addition, he asserts that the (F)(6) “heinous, cruel, or depraved” aggravating factor fails to

genuinely narrow the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty (Claim 22).

Rulings of both the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court have upheld

Arizona’s death penalty statute against allegations that particular aggravating factors,

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including the (F)(6) factor, do not adequately narrow the sentencer’s discretion. See Jeffers,

497 U.S. at 774-77; Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652-56 (1990), overruled on other

grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329, 334-35

(9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has also explicitly rejected the contention that Arizona’s

death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it “does not properly narrow the class of

death penalty recipients.” Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1272 (9th Cir. 1998).

In Walton, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that “Arizona’s allocation of the

burdens of proof in a capital sentencing proceeding violates the Constitution.” 497 U.S. at

651. Walton also rejected the claim that Arizona’s death penalty statute is impermissibly

mandatory and creates a presumption in favor of the death penalty because it provides that

the death penalty “shall” be imposed if one or more aggravating factors are found and

mitigating circumstances are insufficient to call for leniency. Id. at 651-52 (citing Blystone

v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990), and Boyde, 494 U.S. at 370); see also Marsh, 548 U.S.

at 173-74 (relying on Walton to uphold Kansas’s death penalty statute, which directs

imposition of the death penalty when the state has proved that mitigating factors do not

outweigh aggravators); Smith, 140 F.3d at 1272 (summarily rejecting challenges to the

“mandatory” quality of Arizona’s death penalty statute and its failure to apply a beyond-areasonable-doubt standard). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that a capital sentencer

“need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision.”

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. at 979. 

Prosecutors have wide discretion in making the decision whether to seek the death

penalty. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296-97 (1987); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199

(pre-sentencing decisions by actors in the criminal justice system that may remove an

accused from consideration for the death penalty are not unconstitutional). In Smith, the

Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that Arizona’s death penalty statute is constitutionally

infirm because “the prosecutor can decide whether to seek the death penalty.” 140 F.3d at

1272.

With regard to probable cause for aggravating factors, the Supreme Court has held

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that facts constituting the elements of an offense rather than just a sentencing enhancement

must be charged in a federal indictment. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252

(1999). However, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not incorporate the same

requirements upon state criminal prosecutions by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688

n.25 (1972). And the Arizona Supreme Court has expressly rejected the argument that Ring

requires that aggravating factors be alleged in an indictment and be supported by probable

cause. McKaney v. Foreman, 209 Ariz. 268, 270, 100 P.3d 18, 20 (2004). Petitioner cites

no authority to the contrary. 

Nor has Petitioner cited authority that he was entitled to voir dire the sentencing

judge. Although the Constitution requires that a defendant receive a fair trial before a fair

and impartial judge with no bias or interest in the outcome, see Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S.

899, 904-05 (1997), trial judges, like other public officials, operate under a presumption that

they properly discharge their official duties. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,

464 (1996); see also State v. Perkins, 141 Ariz. 278, 286, 686 P.2d 1248, 1256 (1984) (trial

judge is presumed to be free of bias and prejudice). The presumption of regularity applies

absent clear evidence to the contrary. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464; see also State v.

Rossi, 154 Ariz. 245, 248, 741 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1987) (mere possibility of bias or prejudice

does not entitle a criminal defendant to voir dire the trial judge at sentencing). Petitioner

made no allegation of bias or prejudice when he raised this issue before the Arizona Supreme

Court and makes no such allegation here. 

Finally, there is no federal constitutional right to proportionality review of a death

sentence, McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306 (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1984)),

and the Arizona Supreme Court discontinued the practice in 1992, State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz.

399, 417, 844 P.2d 566, 584 (1992). The Ninth Circuit has explained that the interest

implicated by proportionality review—the “substantive right to be free from a

disproportionate sentence”—is protected by the application of “adequately narrowed

aggravating circumstance[s].” Ceja, 97 F.3d at 1252. 

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C. Lethal Injection Protocol

In Claim 27, Petitioner alleges that Arizona’s lethal injection protocol constitutes cruel

and unusual punishment. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this claim. Sansing I, 200

Ariz. at 361, 26 P.3d at 1132. Petitioner does not assert how this ruling conflicts with or

unreasonably applies controlling Supreme Court law. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that Arizona’s lethal injection protocol does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. Dickens v. Brewer, 631 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2011). 

D. Length of Time on Death Row

In Claim 28, Petitioner asserts that inordinate delay in carrying out his sentence

violates his rights under the Eighth Amendment. However, the United States Supreme Court

has never held that lengthy incarceration prior to execution constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J. & Breyer, J.,

discussing denial of certiorari and noting the claim has not been addressed); Thompson v.

McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299 (2009) (mem.) (Stevens, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari; Thomas, J., concurring, discussing Lackey issue). Circuit courts, including the

Ninth Circuit, have also held that prolonged incarceration under a sentence of death does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493, 1493-94 (9th Cir. 1995)

(en banc); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1996); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d

1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995). 

E. Clemency Proceeding

In Claim 29, Petitioner alleges that his constitutional rights will be violated because

he will not receive a fair clemency proceeding. In particular, he alleges the proceeding will

not be fair and impartial based on the Clemency Board’s selection process, composition,

training and procedures, and because the Attorney General will act as the Board’s legal

advisor and as an advocate against Petitioner.

This claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Habeas relief can only be

granted on claims that a prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner’s challenge to state clemency

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procedures and proceedings does not represent an attack on his detention—i.e., his

conviction or sentence—and thus does not constitute a proper ground for relief. See Franzen

v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); see also Woratzeck v. Stewart,

118 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (clemency claims are not cognizable under

federal habeas law). 

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has failed to show entitlement to habeas relief on any of his claims. In

addition, the requested evidentiary development of Claims 1, 2, 3, and 6 is neither required

nor warranted.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that an applicant

cannot take an appeal unless a certificate of appealability has been issued by an appropriate

judicial officer. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that the

district judge must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final

order adverse to the applicant. If a certificate is issued, the court must state the specific issue

or issues that satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA

may issue only when the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” This showing can be established by demonstrating that “reasonable

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner” or that the issues were “adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle,

463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)).

The Court finds that reasonable jurists could debate its resolution of Claims 1, 2, 7,

8, and 12. For the reasons stated in this order, the Court declines to issue a COA with respect

to any other claims or procedural issues.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 35) is

DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary Development

(Doc. 53) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay of execution entered by the Court on May

26, 2011 (Doc. 7) is VACATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is GRANTED as

to the following issues:

Whether Claim 1—alleging that Petitioner is entitled to relief based on Ring

error—is without merit;

Whether Claim 2—alleging that trial counsel performed ineffectively with

respect to the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence—is

without merit;

Whether Claim 7—alleging that the state courts violated Petitioner’s rights by

applying a “causal nexus” test to his mitigating evidence—is without merit; 

Whether Claim 8—alleging that Petitioner’s plea was not knowing, intelligent,

or voluntary—is without merit; and

Whether Claim 12—alleging that the state court violated Petitioner’s rights by

refusing to consider the victim’s daughter’s recommendation of leniency as a

mitigating factor—is without merit.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a courtesy copy of

this Order to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ

85007-3329.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2013.

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