Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03644/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03644-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alan Greer, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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CIV 05-3644-PHX-MHB

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Alan Greer's appeal from the Social Security

Administration's final decision to deny his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Security Income. After reviewing the administrative record and the arguments

of the parties, the Court now issues the following ruling.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 1, 2003, Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Security Income pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 416, 423, 1381(a) and 1382(c) alleging disability since October 15, 2001.

(Transcript of Administrative Record ("Tr.") at 81-83.) His application was denied both

initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. at 45-48; 55-58.) Following a timely request from

Plaintiff (Tr. at 59-60), a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Joan

G. Knight on January 19, 2005. (Tr. at 459-97.) After taking the matter under advisement,

the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claims on February 25, 2005, finding Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr.

at 16-25.)

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Plaintiff subsequently requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council.

(Tr. at 15.) On September 15, 2005, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for

review, thereby rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr.

at 11-14.) Plaintiff then commenced the instant action for judicial review pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). On August 14, 2006, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment.

Defendant filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment on September 18, 2006.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must affirm the ALJ's findings if the findings are supported by substantial

evidence and are free from reversible legal error. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720

(9th Cir. 1998); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence

means "more than a mere scintilla" and "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); see Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720.

In determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court considers

the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. "The ALJ

is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for

resolving ambiguities." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); see

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). "If the evidence can reasonably

support either affirming or reversing the [Commissioner's] conclusion, the court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21.

III. THE ALJ'S FINDINGS

In order to be eligible for disability or social security benefits, a claimant must

demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

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1

 "Residual functional capacity" is defined as the most a claimant can do after

considering the effects of physical and/or mental limitations that affect the ability to perform

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12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An ALJ determines a claimant's eligibility for

benefits by following a five-step sequential evaluation:

(1) determine whether the applicant is engaged in "substantial gainful

activity";

(2) determine whether the applicant has a medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments;

(3) determine whether the applicant's impairment equals one of a number of

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges as so severe as to

preclude the applicant from engaging in substantial gainful activity;

(4) if the applicant's impairment does not equal one of the listed impairments,

determine whether the applicant is capable of performing his or her past

relevant work;

(5) if the applicant is not capable of performing his or her past relevant work,

determine whether the applicant is able to perform other work in the national

economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.

See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). At the

fifth stage, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can

perform other substantial gainful work. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.

1993).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" since

his alleged onset date. (Tr. at 24.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a history of

recurrent right shoulder dislocation with hemiarthroplasty, major depressive disorder, and

low-to-borderline intellectual functioning, which were severe impairments, but did not, alone

or in combination, meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Commissioner's regulations. (Tr. at 24.) The ALJ

concluded that, notwithstanding these impairments, Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity to lift/carry ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally; sit, stand, and

walk without restriction; perform repetitive maneuvers with the lower extremities; and

perform no more than occasional pushing and pulling with the upper extremities.1

 (Tr. at 22-

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28 work-related tasks. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).

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23.) Plaintiff could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but could balance, kneel, crouch,

and climb ramps/stairs. (Tr. at 23.) Plaintiff had limited reaching capacity in all directions

with the right upper extremity including no overhead reaching, but he could reach in all

directions with the left upper extremity. (Tr. at 23.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was

unlimited in his abilities to feel, fine finger, and perform gross manipulations with both

hands, but should avoid concentrated exposure to hazardous heights and moving machinery.

(Tr. at 23.) The ALJ also stated that Plaintiff retained the mental capacity to understand,

remember, and carry out simple, repetitive instructions in a low-stress environment. (Tr. at

23.) He maintained satisfactory pace and persistence, attendance, and productivity, and his

social skills and adaptive functioning were adequate. (Tr. at 23.)

Based on the foregoing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's residual functional capacity

prevented him from performing his past relevant work as a car detailer, but did not prevent

him from performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy

including work as an unarmed security guard, parking lot attendant, and ticket taker. (Tr. at

23-24.) Accordingly, because Plaintiff's capacity for light work was substantially intact, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. at 25.)

IV. DISCUSSION

In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ (1) erred at step

five of the five-step sequential evaluation by failing to set forth a detailed decision describing

Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. With regard to step five, Plaintiff also alleges that the

ALJ (2) failed to properly assess the weight afforded to the opinions of treating and

consulting physicians, (3) failed to properly assess his subjective complaints, and (4) failed

to properly consider vocational issues and job descriptions as set forth in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles.

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A. Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to set forth a detailed decision describing

his residual functional capacity. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the residual functional

capacity assessment fails to contain detailed findings regarding his right arm restrictions.

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ failed to address conflicting opinions regarding his ability

to feel, fine finger, and perform gross manipulations, and failed to provide a detailed

rationale regarding his mental impairments.

The RFC assessment must be based on all of the relevant evidence in the record,

including the effects of symptoms that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable

impairment. See Social Security Ruling 96-8p. In addition, the ALJ "must consider

limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual's impairments, even those that are

not 'severe,'" because such limitations may be outcome determinative when considered in

conjunction with limitations or restrictions resulting from other impairments. Id. SSR 96-8p

provides a blueprint for what an RFC assessment must contain in all cases in which

symptoms are alleged: (1) a thorough discussion and analysis of the objective medical and

other evidence, including the individual's complaints of pain and other symptoms and the

ALJ's personal observations, if appropriate; (2) a resolution of any inconsistencies in the

evidence as a whole; and (3) a logical explanation of the effects of symptoms, including pain,

on the individual's ability to work.

The ALJ, after conducting a detailed review of the record, concluded that Plaintiff was

capable of performing a range of light work with no more than occasional pushing and

pulling with both upper extremities; limited reaching in all directions with the right upper

extremity including no overhead reaching, but reaching in all directions with the left upper

extremity; unlimited feeling, fine fingering, and gross manipulations with both hands; and

no restrictions in sitting, standing, walking, or performing repetitive maneuvers with the

lower extremities. (Tr. at 23.) The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff retained the mental

capacity to understand, remember, and carry out simple, repetitive instructions in a low stress

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environment, and could maintain satisfactory pace, persistence, attendance, and productivity.

(Tr. at 23.)

In considering Plaintiff's right arm restrictions as part of the residual functional

capacity assessment, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff's subjective allegations and found them

partially credible. (Tr. at 21.) The ALJ found Plaintiff "somewhat credible in stating that

since his right shoulder surgery, he has had decreased range of motion as well as less pain

in that shoulder." (Tr. at 21.) However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's "subjective

complaints of disabling pain" were not supported by the greater objective record or Plaintiff's

own testimony. (Tr. at 21.) The ALJ stated that on August 11, 2003, Plaintiff rated his pain

at 3 on a scale of 1 to 10 – 10 being the greatest. (Tr. at 21.) Plaintiff also described his pain

as a chronic, continuous, dull ache, but that his pain level as described was acceptable. (Tr.

at 21.) Plaintiff testified that he uses only one Vicodin per day, if he needs it, and that it

provides full relief of his pain. (Tr. at 21.)

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff uses his right hand on a limited basis for eating

and occasional writing, and that despite persistent right hand palmar numbness, he can hold

onto his keys with the right hand. (Tr. at 21) Plaintiff also testified that he cannot lift his

right arm overhead, but that he helps with housework, including washing the dishes and

vacuuming the floors. (Tr. at 21.)

The ALJ also considered the medical opinion of Wayne S. Broky, M.D. (Tr. at 258-

263), and the opinions of the State agency's reviewing physicians (Tr. at 188-195; 201-208;

250-257; 411-418) in addressing Plaintiff's right arm restrictions. (Tr. at 21-22.) In her

decision, the ALJ detailed Dr. Broky's opinion, stating that Plaintiff could lift and carry less

than five pounds with the right upper extremity at any time, and that he could lift and carry

up to one hundred pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently with the left upper

extremity. (Tr. at 21.) Dr. Broky opined that Plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk for six hours

a day, frequently climb stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch, occasionally crawl, but

never climb ladders, with limited right arm for reaching, handling, and fingering. (Tr. at 21.)

The ALJ stated that she gave the opinions of Dr. Broky and the State agency's reviewing

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physicians greater weight based on their consistency with the greater objective record. (Tr.

at 22.)

Despite the ALJ's account of Plaintiff's right arm restrictions, Plaintiff asserts that

ALJ's decision fails to contain detailed findings. Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to

specify how much weight he could lift with his right arm and claims that two physicians –

a State agency reviewing physician and Plaintiff's treating physician – opined that he could

not use his right arm in a work environment. The Court, however, disagrees and finds that

none of the evidence that Plaintiff cites undermines the ALJ's conclusion.

For example, the State agency reviewing physician to which Plaintiff refers (and the

ALJ cites to in her decision – Tr. at 22) opined that Plaintiff was limited to lifting with his

left arm but nonetheless concluded that Plaintiff was capable of the exertional demands of

light work. (Tr. at 189.) Further, in February 2002, Plaintiff's treating physician, Sumit

Dewanjee, M.D., opined that Plaintiff could not use his right arm for work at all, but his

finding was temporary and was issued before Plaintiff's surgery – surgery that Dr. Dewanjee

opined would increase Plaintiff's employability. (Tr. at 198.) Dr. Dewanjee made no

indication that Plaintiff could not use his left arm for work. (Tr. at 196-200.)

Plaintiff's citations to Dr. Broky's opinion and treatment records from physical therapy

in support of his argument are also unpersuasive. As previously stated, Dr. Broky concluded

that Plaintiff could lift and carry less than five pounds with the right upper extremity at any

time, and that he could lift and carry up to one hundred pounds occasionally and ten pounds

frequently with the left upper extremity. (Tr. at 262.) Furthermore, the treatment records

from physical therapy are not acceptable medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513.

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ failed to address "contrary" opinions regarding his

ability to feel, fine finger, and perform gross manipulations. Again, the evidence Plaintiff

cites fails to support his assertion. The State agency reviewing physician cited by Plaintiff

did not find any limitations in handling, fine fingering, feeling, or the ability to perform gross

manipulations. (Tr. at 191.) Additionally, Dr. Broky did not, as Plaintiff cites, assess any

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such restrictions. Dr. Broky indicated that Plaintiff could use either hand for handling and

fingering – but only to waist level on the right. (Tr. at 263.) Any limitation construed within

this opinion fails to have an impact on the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment or

on Plaintiff's ability to perform the jobs identified by the vocational expert. Moreover, the

ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence presented to him. See Vincent on

Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, she must only

explain why "significant probative evidence" has been rejected. See id.

Lastly, regarding Plaintiff's residual functional capacity assessment, Plaintiff alleges

that the ALJ failed to provide a detailed rationale regarding his mental impairments. Plaintiff

claims that the ALJ's decision is contrary to the findings of James E. Huddleston, Ph.D. and

Gregory Novie, Ph.D. However, Plaintiff's position is not supported by the evidence.

In considering Plaintiff's mental impairments, the ALJ again addressed Plaintiff's

subjective allegations. (Tr. at 21.) The ALJ found that although Plaintiff testified that he has

had "terrible" memory problems since his involvement in an automobile accident in 1972,

she noted that "[Plaintiff] was able to work in at least an unskilled job setting through 2001,

which demonstrates his memory problems are not completely debilitating." (Tr. at 21.)

The ALJ also considered the opinions of Dr. Huddleston (Tr. at 385-392), Dr. Novie

(430-441), and the State agency's reviewing physicians (Tr. at 393-406; 407-410). (Tr. at 21-

22.) The ALJ documented Dr. Huddleston's opinion stating that he "diagnosed major

depressive disorder, moderate, without psychotic features, chronic." (Tr. at 22.) Dr.

Huddleston opined that Plaintiff "could perform relatively simple and repetitive work tasks

without supervision, with mild limitations understanding, remembering and carrying out

instructions, and moderate limitations responding to normal work pressures and

accomplishing the demands of a normal work day." (Tr. at 22.) He further noted that

Plaintiff was not significantly impaired with regard to his capacity for understanding and

memory, sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction, or general adaptation.

(Tr. at 22.)

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With regard to Dr. Novie's opinion, the ALJ reported that Dr. Novie diagnosed

Plaintiff with amnestic disorder due to head trauma, and "he opined that [Plaintiff] could be

severely limited in his ability to remember locations and work-like procedures and detailed

instructions, moderately-to-severely limited in his ability to perform activities within a

schedule and maintain competitive work standards." (Tr. at 22.)

The ALJ stated that she gave the opinions of Dr. Huddleston and the State agency's

reviewing physicians greater weight based on their consistency with the greater objective

record. (Tr. at 22.) She gave the opinion of Dr. Novie probative weight. (Tr. at 22.)

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to adopt the restrictions assessed by either Dr.

Huddleston or Dr. Novie. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in relying on Dr. Huddleston's

opinion without explaining why she did not accept his indication that Plaintiff had "serious"

limitations in dealing with work stress. The Court disagrees.

First, the Court notes that Dr. Huddleston's correct indication regarding Plaintiff's

ability to deal with work stress was serious "But Not Precluded." (Tr. at 391.) Second,

despite this finding, Dr. Huddleston clearly opined that Plaintiff could work. (Tr. at 389-

390.) Dr. Huddleston stated, "[r]egarding his capacities to respond to normal work pressures

and to accomplish the demands of a normal work day, [Plaintiff] would likely suffer a

moderate limitation." (Tr. at 389.) "[Plaintiff] is not significantly limited with regard to his

capacity for understanding and memory, sustained concentration and persistence, social

interaction, or general adaptation." (Tr. at 390.)

Furthermore, regarding Dr. Novie, he indicated that Plaintiff was moderately limited

in his social interaction and adaptation skills, and in his ability to sustain an ordinary routine

without special supervision, work with others without being distracted and make simple,

work-related decisions. (Tr. at 440.) Dr. Novie also noted that Plaintiff had an "overall good

adjustment to his residual strengths and weaknesses." (Tr. at 436.)

Accordingly, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that the ALJ erred by failing to set forth

a detailed decision describing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity with respect to Plaintiff's

right arm restrictions; Plaintiff's ability to feel, fine finger, and perform gross manipulations;

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and Plaintiff's mental impairments, the Court finds that the ALJ provided: (1) a substantial

and detailed discussion of the objective medical and other evidence; (2) a resolution of

possible inconsistencies in the evidence; and (3) a logical explanation of the effects of

symptoms on the individual's ability to work. The Court, therefore, finds that the ALJ

provided an adequate assessment of Plaintiff's limitations and a narrative discussion of how

the medical evidence and other evidence of record supported her assessment of Plaintiff's

residual functional capacity. The ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

B. Plaintiff's Treating and Consulting Physician Evidence

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to properly reference the opinions of his treating

and consulting physicians. Plaintiff cites to numerous treatment and evaluation records to

support his position that he has limited use of his right upper extremity.

The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that the ALJ is responsible for determining

credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750.

While more weight is generally given to a treating physician's opinion than to the opinion of

a non-treating physician, the treating physician's opinion is not necessarily conclusive as to

either a physical condition or to the ultimate issue of disability. See id. at 751. The ALJ may

disregard the treating physician's opinion whether or not that opinion is contradicted if he

gives specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the

record. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at

751. The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed summary of the facts and

conflicting evidence, stating his interpretation, and making findings. See Magallanes, 881

F.2d at 751. The extent that the non-treating physician's opinion rests on objective clinical

tests, it must be viewed as substantial evidence. See id.

In his Motion, Plaintiff refers to a report completed by Dr. Dewanjee stating that

Plaintiff had a rotator cuff tear that was "significantly painful which makes the use of his arm

impossible for any type of work" until "possibly 7/01/02 @ earliest ... 7/1/03 at least [sic]."

(Tr. at 198.) Dr. Dewanjee also indicated that he would reexamine Plaintiff on April 24,

2002, and that surgical repair would improve Plaintiff's employability. (Tr. at 198.) Further,

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Dr. Dewanjee failed to give any indication that Plaintiff was disabled or that he could not use

his left arm for work, but, rather, stated that Plaintiff should change occupations. (Tr. at

199.) Finding that Dr. Dewanjee's report was somewhat ambiguous and not determinative

on the issue presented, the Court concludes that the ALJ committed no error by not expressly

addressing his report.

Plaintiff also refers to a conclusory notation from G. Herring, M.D., indicating that

Plaintiff was "unable to work due [to] recurrent dislocation [of his right] shoulder with

chronic pain and decreased range of motion." (Tr. at 372.) However, "[a] statement by a

medical source that [a claimant is] 'disabled' or 'unable to work' does not mean that [the

Commissioner] will determine that [the claimant is] disabled." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e); see

also Batson v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th

Cir. 2004) (an ALJ may discredit treating physicians' opinions that are brief, conclusory, and

unsupported by the record as a whole or by objective medical findings). The regulations

specifically provide that the determination of whether a claimant is disabled is a

determination to be made by the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e). Because the

ultimate determination of disability is for the Commissioner, a treating physician's statement

that a claimant is disabled is not determinative, and the Commissioner is not bound by that

opinion. Furthermore, as with Dr. Dewanjee's opinion, nothing in Dr. Herring's comment

indicates that Plaintiff's left arm was impaired in any manner.

As previously stated, Plaintiff cites to numerous treatment and evaluation records to

support his position that he had limited use of his right upper extremity. However, there is

no dispute that Plaintiff was limited. In her decision, the ALJ clearly documents Plaintiff's

limitations consistent with those found by Plaintiff's physicians – and consistent with

Plaintiff's own testimony and statements. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the

ALJ did not err in her assessment of Plaintiff's treating and consulting physician evidence.

The ALJ supported her decision with specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial

evidence in the record.

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C. Plaintiff's Credibility

Plaintiff further alleges that the ALJ erred in finding that his subjective complaints of

pain were not credible. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not adequately explain her

credibility findings.

As previously stated, the ALJ is responsible for determining credibility. See

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750. When deciding whether to accept the subjective testimony of

a claimant, the ALJ must perform a two-part analysis. In the first part, the claimant must (1)

produce objective medical evidence of one or more impairments; and (2) show that the

impairment or combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some

degree of symptom. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996). The claimant is not

required to produce objective medical evidence of the symptom itself, the severity of the

symptom, or the causal relationship between the medically determinable impairment and the

symptom. See id. at 1282. Rather, the claimant is only required to show that the impairment

could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. See id.

In the second stage of the analysis, the ALJ must assess the credibility of the

claimant's testimony regarding the severity of the symptoms. If there is no affirmative

evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant's testimony only if the ALJ makes

specific findings, stating clear and convincing reasons for the rejection. See id. at 1284. In

evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony, evidence of claimant's daily activities,

type and dosage of pain medication, treatment received, and the ALJ's own recorded

observations of the claimant during the hearing are all relevant as part of the ALJ's overall

assessment of the claimant. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991).

In finding that Plaintiff's allegations were partially credible, the ALJ observed several

inconsistencies between Plaintiff's subjective complaints of disabling pain, his own

testimony, and the greater objective record. The ALJ found that on August 11, 2003,

Plaintiff rated his pain at a level 3 on a scale of 1 to 10, and indicated that this level was

"acceptable" to him. (Tr. at 278.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff testified that he uses only

one Vicodin per day, if he needs it, and that it provides full relief of his pain. (Tr. at 484.)

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In addition, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff testified that he has had "terrible" memory

problems since his involvement in an automobile accident in 1972 (Tr. at 474), she noted that

"[Plaintiff] was able to work in at least an unskilled job setting through 2001, which

demonstrates his memory problems are not completely debilitating." (Tr. at 21.) Thus,

Plaintiff's own testimony and the objective record conflicted with Plaintiff's subjective

complaints of disabling pain. This evidence served to undermine Plaintiff's allegations.

The ALJ also contrasted Plaintiff's complaints of disabling pain with evidence of

Plaintiff's daily activities. Plaintiff testified that he uses his right hand on a limited basis for

eating and occasional writing, and that despite persistent right hand palmar numbness, he can

hold onto his keys with the right hand. (Tr. at 470-473; 476-477; 480-481.) Plaintiff also

testified that he cannot lift his right arm overhead, but that he helps with housework,

including washing the dishes and vacuuming the floors. (Tr. at 470-473; 476-477; 480-481.)

In summary, the ALJ provided a sufficient basis to find Plaintiff's allegations partially

credible, including: evidence of Plaintiff's daily activities and inconsistencies between

Plaintiff's subjective complaints of disabling pain, his own testimony, and the greater

objective record. While perhaps the individual factors, viewed in isolation, are not sufficient

to uphold the ALJ's decision to discredit Plaintiff's allegations of disabling pain, each factor

is relevant to the ALJ's overall analysis, and it was the cumulative effect of all the factors that

led to the ALJ's decision. The Court concludes that the ALJ has supported his decision to

discredit Plaintiff's allegations with specific, clear and convincing reasons and, therefore, the

Court finds no error.

D. The ALJ's Reliance on Vocational Expert Testimony

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly relied on the vocational expert's testimony

without considering the vocational issues and job descriptions set forth in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles ("DOT"). Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ could not properly rely on the

jobs identified by the vocational expert because, pursuant to the DOT, these jobs require

frequent reaching and handling. Since the ALJ found that Plaintiff had limited reaching

capacity in all directions with the right upper extremity, Plaintiff claims there is a conflict

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between the vocational expert's opinion and the provisions in the DOT, which required the

ALJ to seek further explanation according to Social Security Ruling 00-4p.

SSR 00-4p sets forth the actions required of an ALJ when there is an apparent conflict

between the testimony of the vocational expert and the DOT. SSR 00-4p provides, in

pertinent part:

[o]ccupational evidence provided by a [vocational expert] or [vocational

specialist] generally should be consistent with the occupational information

supplied by the DOT. When there is an apparent unresolved conflict between

[vocational expert] or [vocational specialist] evidence and the DOT, the

adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying

on the [vocational expert] or [vocational specialist] evidence to support a

determination or decision about whether the claimant is disabled.

SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2 (SSA Dec. 4, 2000).

Although the jobs identified by the vocational expert appear to require frequent

reaching and handling as set forth by the DOT, Plaintiff has not been precluded from

frequent reaching and handling; Plaintiff only has limited reaching capacity in all directions

with the right upper extremity including no overhead reaching. Thus, Plaintiff has been

limited from a certain subset of reaching, not reaching altogether and he has no limitations

with his left arm. Accordingly, there is no conflict between the testimony of the vocational

expert and the DOT.

Moreover, the DOT is not the sole source of admissible information concerning jobs.

The Commissioner may take administrative notice of any reliable job information, including

the services of a vocational expert. The DOT itself states that it is not comprehensive, but

provides only occupational information on – 

jobs as they have been found to occur, but they may not coincide in every

respect with the content of jobs as performed in particular establishments or

at certain localities. DOT users demanding specific job requirements should

supplement this data with local information detailing jobs within their

community.

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing DOT at xiii). The Social

Security Administration recognizes this limitation. "The DOT lists maximum requirements

of occupations as generally performed, not the range of requirements of a particular job as

it is performed in specific settings." SSR 00-4p. "A [vocational expert], [vocational

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specialist], or other reliable source of occupational information may be able to provide more

specific information about jobs or occupations than the DOT." Id. Thus, introduction of

evidence of the characteristics of specific jobs available in the local area through the

testimony of a vocational expert is appropriate, even though the job may vary from the way

the job title is classified in the DOT.

Lastly, Plaintiff complains that the unarmed guard position is identified as semiskilled and the ALJ limited Plaintiff to unskilled work. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed

to address this conflict. After being questioned by the ALJ regarding the conflict, however,

the vocational expert explained his testimony as to why the demands of the security guard

job differed from the DOT. (Tr. at 488.) The vocational expert testified that the job did not

require the amount of training necessary to be categorized as semi-skilled. He stated that he

had conducted surveys upon which this information was based.

Accordingly, the Court finds that no error occurred pursuant to SSR 00-4p.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. Based

upon the foregoing discussion,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #23) is

DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. #27) is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 16th day of May, 2007.

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