Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02884/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02884-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 * This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE BELZER, )

) 2:06-cv-2884-GEB-GGH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

AMERICAN AIRLINES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction. Defendant

American Airlines (“Defendant”) opposes this motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a senior pilot from

May 22, 1986 through December 1, 2006. (Belzer Decl. ¶ 2.) On August

31, 2006, “Plaintiff submitted an Early Retirement Form (“Form”) [in

which] he elected a Benefit Commencement Date of December 1, 2006.” 

(Houston Decl. Ex. A at 1.) The Form states “I also understand . . .

that a new [Form] must be completed to change my Benefit Commencement

Date.” (Id. at 2.) Shortly after December 1, 2006, Plaintiff learned

Case 2:06-cv-02884-GEB-GGH Document 29 Filed 03/05/07 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Plaintiff did not mention his attempts to be reemployed or

Defendant’s reemployment practice until he filed a Reply on February 15,

2007, two days after the Reply was due under Local Rule 78-230(d). 

2

that Defendant listed his employment status as “retired.” (Belzer

Decl. ¶ 2.) However, Plaintiff asserts after submitting the Form, he

changed his mind and wrote a letter to Defendant stating he was “not

going to renew [his] early election of retirement form” and that he

called Defendant and orally advised a staff assistant that he was

revoking his early election. (Pl.’s Reply at 4.) Plaintiff asserts

Defendant has a common practice of allowing employees to change their

early retirement status in this manner.1 (Id. at 3.) Since Plaintiff

has not benefitted from this practice he contends his retirement was

involuntary. (Id. at 3-4.) Therefore, he commenced this action in

which he alleges (1) breach of contract; (2) wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing; (4) disability discrimination; (5) retaliation; (6)

libel; (7) slander; and (8) age discrimination. (Pl.’s Compl. at 1.) 

Defendant contends “[t]hese claims all hinge on Plaintiff’s allegation

that [Defendant] involuntarily terminated his employment in violation

of some legal obligation.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 7-8.) 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues since his “‘retirement’ was without [his]

knowledge or consent” he is entitled to a preliminary injunction

“enjoin[ing] the parties from changing the status quo (one of full

employment and benefits) until the question of termination of

employment or ‘retirement’ can be fairly heard and determined.” 

(Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 3.) Defendant responds that since Plaintiff

has not shown any of his claims have merit or that he will suffer

Case 2:06-cv-02884-GEB-GGH Document 29 Filed 03/05/07 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

irreparable harm absent an injunction he is not entitled to a

preliminary injunction. (Def.’s Opp’n at 7.)

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, [Plaintiff is] required

to demonstrate either: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and

the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions

going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips

sharply in its favor.” Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725,

730-31 (9th Cir. 1999). “These two formulations represent two points

on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm

increases as the probability of success decreases. Under any

formulation of the test, [P]laintiff must demonstrate that there

exists a significant threat of irreparable injury.” Oakland Tribune,

Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). 

“It frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted

unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of

persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).

I. Irreparable Harm

Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff were able to show a

likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiff’s motion should be

denied because “Plaintiff’s lost wages and benefits are insufficient

to warrant his immediate reinstatement - Plaintiff will be able to

recover money damages to compensate him for lost wages and out-ofpocket expenses paid for healthcare if he succeeds in his suit.” 

(Def.’s Opp’n at 13.) Plaintiff argues the “harm that is being forced

upon [him] on a daily basis is irreparable” because he is suffering

trauma as a result of his lost wages and health benefits. (Pl.’s

Reply at 5-6.)

Case 2:06-cv-02884-GEB-GGH Document 29 Filed 03/05/07 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

“[T]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has

always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.” 

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974). “[T]he temporary loss of

income, ultimately to be recovered [if Plaintiff prevails at trial],

does not usually constitute irreparable injury.” Id. at 90. “Mere

injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy

necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough.” Id.

Even “an insufficiency of savings or difficulties in immediately

obtaining other employment . . . will not support a finding of

irreparable injury, however severely they may affect a particular

individual.” Id. at 92 n.68.

Plaintiff has not shown that money damages and recovering

back pay for the loss of his job are inadequate remedies to redress

his situation if he prevails at trial. See Stanley v. Univ. of S.

Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1319-1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating money damages

and back pay is an adequate remedy for loss of employment). In

addition, the loss of health benefits does not ordinarily constitute

irreparable harm. See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Verizon Commc’ns,

Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 479, 485-486 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (denying motion for

a preliminary injunction because “full reimbursement to the affected

employees of any out-of-pocket medical expenses and/or health

insurance premiums which they may incur” would be available if

plaintiffs prevailed at trial). Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his

burden of showing “truly extraordinary circumstances” warranting a

finding of irreparable harm. Without showing irreparable harm,

Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Case 2:06-cv-02884-GEB-GGH Document 29 Filed 03/05/07 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

II. Success on the Merits

In addition, Defendant asserts Plaintiff has not shown a

likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions going to the

merits since Plaintiff elected an early retirement. (Def.’s Opp’n at

4.) Plaintiff rejoins that Defendant has “a common practice of

allowing pilots to revoke their [Form], either orally or in writing”

and that Plaintiff revoked his Form. (Pl.’s Reply at 3-4.)

Although Plaintiff has raised questions whether his

retirement was involuntary, he has not shown a likelihood of success

on the merits because his contract claims are likely preempted and he

does not appear to have exhausted applicable administrative remedies.

A. Contract Claims

Defendant argues Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of

success on the merits of his two contract claims because the governing

employment contract was a collective bargaining agreement and “when

employees of an air carrier subject to a collective bargaining

agreement pursue claims for breach of contract and breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against their

employers, those claims are preempted by the federal Railway Labor

Act.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 9.) Plaintiff does not respond to this

argument.

When an employment contract is covered by a collective

bargaining agreement the “only contractual remedies lie in the

grievance procedures set forth under the [collective bargaining

agreement]” because “contractual claims are preempted by the [Railway

Labor Act].” Espinal v. Nw. Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452, 1459 (9th Cir.

1996). Since Plaintiff has not shown his claims are not preempted,

Case 2:06-cv-02884-GEB-GGH Document 29 Filed 03/05/07 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on the merits of

his contract claims.

B. Libel/Slander

Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff could succeed on his

claims of libel or slander, that would not support his argument for

reinstatement to full employment. (Def.’s Opp’n at 7 n.5.) Plaintiff

does not respond to this argument, and presents no evidence showing a

likelihood of success on his libel or slander claim.

C. Remaining Claims

Defendant also argues Plaintiff cannot succeed on the merits

of his claims because he has not exhausted the applicable

administrative remedies under the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act (“ERISA”) or the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). 

(Def.’s Opp’n at 8, 9.) Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. 

Defendant contends that all of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to ERISA

because they relate to his contention that he was involuntarily

retired. (Def.’s Opp’n at 8.) Plaintiff’s claims for disability

discrimination, retaliation, and age discrimination are alleged under

FEHA. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 35, 38, 44.) 

“[T]he general rule governing ERISA claims [is] that a

claimant must avail himself or herself of a plan’s own internal review

procedures before bringing suit in federal court.” Diaz v. United

Agric. Employee Welfare Benefit Plan & Trust, 50 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th

Cir. 1995). Exhausting administrative remedies is a prerequisite to

bringing a lawsuit under FEHA as well. See Miller v. United Airlines,

Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 878, 890 (1985) (stating plaintiff “could not

maintain a civil action alleging violations of the FEHA until after

she had exhausted her administrative remedies pursuant to the FEHA.”).

Case 2:06-cv-02884-GEB-GGH Document 29 Filed 03/05/07 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Plaintiff has made no showing that he exhausted his administrative

remedies under either ERISA or FEHA. Nor has Plaintiff shown his

claims are not subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirement of

ERISA and FEHA. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of

success or serious questions going to the merits of his claims.

Conclusion

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff has not shown he has a

likelihood of success on the merits or that he will suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:06-cv-02884-GEB-GGH Document 29 Filed 03/05/07 Page 7 of 7