Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01256/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01256-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Sam Begay, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Deputy Warden Freeland, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 10-1256-PHX-DGC (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner Daniel Sam Begay. Doc. 1. Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Petitioner pled guilty on May 9, 2000, in Coconino County Superior Court Case

No. CR 2000-240, to attempted sexual conduct with a minor, a class 3 felony and dangerous

crime against children under Arizona law. Doc. 14, Exh. C, D, E. The guilty plea also

resulted in a probation violation for a prior theft offense. Doc. 14, Exh. D, E. On June 6,

2000, Petitioner was sentenced to lifetime probation for the attempted sexual conduct with

at minor offense, the terms of which included 6 months in the county jail. Doc. 14, Exh. F.

For the probation violation, the court reinstated Petitioner to a concurrent term of intensive

probation. Id.

Case 2:10-cv-01256-DGC Document 15 Filed 03/24/11 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Presumably, because Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 14) contains no further discussion

of the issue, Petitioner completed his sentence of intensive probation for the prior theft

offense.

- 2 -

On January 2, 2003, the probation department filed a Petition for Revocation of

Probation in which it alleged that Petitioner failed to comply with several terms of his

probation. Doc. 14, Exh. G. Because Petitioner had absconded, a bench warrant was issued

against him. Doc. 14, Exh. H. More than four years later, Petitioner appeared on the

executed warrant. Doc. 14, Exh. I. In addition to the probation revocation charge in CR

2000-240, Petitioner was also charged with a new offense, failure to register as a sex

offender, in CR2007-300.1

 

On May 15, 2007, Petitioner entered a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to

failure to give notice of change of address as a sex offender (amended from failure to register

as a sex offender) and admitted to violating probation. Doc. 14, Exh. K, L, M. On July 17,

2007, the court revoked Petitioner’s probation and sentenced him to a mitigated term of 8

years in prison for the attempted sexual conduct with a minor conviction. Doc. 14, Exh. N,

O. Regarding the failure to give notice offense, the court imposed a concurrent prison

sentence of 2.5 years. Id.

On August 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief under Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Doc. 14, Exh. P. On January 8, 2008,

appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw and motion for leave to allow Petitioner to file

a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Doc. 14, Exh. R. Counsel stated in the motion

that he could find no claims for relief to raise in the petition. Id. The court granted the

motion and on February 15, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief. Doc. 14, Exh. T. After briefing was completed, the trial court denied the petition for

post-conviction relief on May 6, 2008. Doc. 14, Exh. Y. A Petition for Review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals was summarily denied on August 14, 2009. Doc. 14, Exh. Z, AA.

A subsequent Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court was rejected because it was

untimely and an insufficient number of copies was submitted. Doc. 14, Exh. BB.

Case 2:10-cv-01256-DGC Document 15 Filed 03/24/11 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The one case cited by Respondents, Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2005),

is inapplicable. Petitioner Caldwell’s habeas petition challenged only the underlying

convictions for which he was initially sentenced to probation. Id. at 523. The court

explained that the issue was “whether an order of deferred adjudication following a guilty

plea is a final judgment upon the expiration of the time for seeking direct review, for

purposes of section 2244, when the applicant only challenges issues pertaining to his guilt.”

Id. at 525 (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner is challenging the length of the sentence

imposed after his probation was revoked, not the underlying conviction. 

- 3 -

Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on June 14,

2010. Doc. 1. He alleges two grounds for relief. In ground one, Petitioner alleges that he

received an illegal sentence in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. He contends the court erred by sentencing him under Arizona Revised Statutes

§ 13-604.01, which Petitioner claims was not applicable to his offense of attempted sexual

conduct with a minor. In ground two, Petitioner alleges that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment when he failed to challenge the

application of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 to his offense. On December 7, 2010, Respondents filed

an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 14. Petitioner has not filed a reply.

DISCUSSION

Respondents first contend that the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. They

further argue that ground one is procedurally defaulted, and that it is not cognizable in a

federal habeas petition because it presents a state law issue. 

Respondents’ statute of limitations argument relies on a determination that under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the state court judgment became final back in 2000 when Petitioner

was sentenced to lifetime probation. They argue, therefore, that his habeas petition is late

by more than eight years. Respondents have presented no binding authority to support their

argument that the statute of limitations began to run back in 2000 when Petitioner was

sentenced to probation.2

 The court finds their argument to be without merit and will not

recommend denying the petition on this basis.

Case 2:10-cv-01256-DGC Document 15 Filed 03/24/11 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

The court does find, however, that Petitioner’s claim in ground one is not cognizable

on federal habeas review, and that Petitioner’s claim in ground two should be denied on the

merits. The court will, therefore, recommend that the petition be dismissed.

A. Cognizable Claims

To be eligible for federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner must establish that he

is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state law. Lewis

v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). It is not the policy of the federal courts to re-examine

state court determinations of state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991). Federal courts are without jurisdiction to review State court applications of state

procedural rules. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1998). A petitioner may not

"transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due

process." Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). "[T]he Supreme Court has

long settled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure immunity from judicial error or

uniformity of judicial decisions." Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006).

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim alleges the misapplication of a state

sentencing statute which is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Further, they argue that

he fails to demonstrate how the sentence violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

In his state petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner argues that he was entitled

to relief pursuant to State v. Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, 162 P.3d 650 (App. 2007). In Gonzalez,

the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the enhanced sentencing statute for dangerous crimes

against children under which Gonzalez was sentenced did not apply to attempted sexual

conduct with a minor under the age of twelve. The Court ruled that despite what was likely

an oversight by the state legislature, it was bound to follow the plain language of the statute,

which did not encompass attempted sexual conduct with a victim under twelve. Id. at 13-14,

162 P.3d at 652-53. The Court therefore concluded that the 7.5 year sentence imposed

against Gonzalez for attempted sexual conduct with a minor was illegal, and it remanded the

matter for resentencing. Id. at 15, 162 P.3d at 654.

Case 2:10-cv-01256-DGC Document 15 Filed 03/24/11 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

- 5 -

Petitioner’s habeas petition raises essentially the same claim that he presented in the

state post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner’s attempt to characterize the claim as a

violation of due process does not transform it into a federal claim. The claim turns solely on

the interpretation and application of a state sentencing law, A.R.S. § 13-604.01, and is,

therefore, not cognizable on federal habeas review. Moreover, by failing to file a reply to

Respondents’ answer, Petitioner has done nothing to refute Respondents’ argument. Because

federal habeas review is unavailable for Petitioner's claim, the court will recommend that this

claim be denied.

B. Merits Analysis

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Under the AEDPA3

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2)

"if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent."

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an 'unreasonable

application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then

applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the

Case 2:10-cv-01256-DGC Document 15 Filed 03/24/11 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

“unreasonable application” clause requires the state court’s application of Supreme Court law

to be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). "When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Legal Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims

The two-prong test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

In the context of a habeas petition, a petitioner must do more than demonstrate to the

federal court that the state court applied Strickland incorrectly. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,

698-99 (2002). Rather, a petitioner must demonstrate that the state court “applied Strickland

to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id.

Here, Petitioner claims his lawyer provided ineffective assistance when he failed to

challenge the application of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 to his sentence. He contends that his lawyer

should have challenged the state’s contention regarding the victim’s age, which would have

called into question the application of the sentencing statute.

The last reasoned decision on this issue came from the trial court when it denied

Petitioner’s state petition for post-conviction relief. Doc. 14, Exh. Y at 4-5. The trial court

explained that the victim’s age was not a disputed issue and that Petitioner did not argue the

Case 2:10-cv-01256-DGC Document 15 Filed 03/24/11 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

victim was any age other than 13, which was the age set forth by the prosecutor during the

change of plea factual basis. Id. at 1-5. The court went on to explain that even if it found

deficient performance, Petitioner failed to show prejudice because whether the victim was

12, 13 or 14 years old, Petitioner was subject to the sentencing provisions of A.R.S. § 13-

604.01.

Petitioner’s brief ineffective assistance claim in ground two presents nothing to show

that the state trial court applied Strickland incorrectly, let alone that it was applied in an

objectively unreasonable manner. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the standard for

habeas relief, the court will recommend that ground two be denied. 

C. Conclusion

The court having determined that ground one is not cognizable on federal habeas

review, and that ground two fails on the merits, it will recommend that the petition be

dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

Case 2:10-cv-01256-DGC Document 15 Filed 03/24/11 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 24th day of March, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-01256-DGC Document 15 Filed 03/24/11 Page 8 of 8