Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-00582/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-00582-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS ALLEN DARBY,

Petitioner,

v.

K. ALLISON, Warden,

Respondent.

________________________________/

No. C 11-0582 CW

ORDER DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner Thomas Allen Darby, a state prisoner, filed this 

amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, challenging his state criminal conviction. He asserts 

three claims as they relate to his indecent exposure conviction: 

(1) abuse of discretion by the trial court when it denied his

motion for a new trial; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on (a) trial counsel’s failure to argue sufficiently his

motion to suppress and failure to argue his motion for a new trial

and (b) appellate counsel’s filing of a Wende brief (see People v. 

Wendy, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979)); and (3) actual innocence. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum in support thereof 

and Petitioner has filed a traverse. For the reasons discussed 

below, the Court DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

In March 2008, at a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of 

indecent exposure and possession of child pornography, and 

sentenced to nine years in state prison. Ex. 1 at 195. 

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Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of 

Appeal and, in February 2009, the California Court of Appeal 

affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. Ex. 7. 

Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied. Exs. 

8 and 9. Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme 

Court. 

In April 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. Ex. 11. 

Petitioner asserted three claims: (a) that he was denied due 

process of law when the trial court judge denied his motion for a 

new trial; (b) that his September 2007 arrest, and the search of 

his computer, violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights; and 

(c) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The California 

Supreme Court denied the petition in August 2009. Ex. 12. 

In September 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the Sonoma County Superior Court. Ex. 13. 

Petitioner asserted five claims: (a) that he was denied due 

process of law when the trial court judge denied his motion for a 

new trial; (b) that the Marsden process (see People v. Marsden, 2 

Cal. 3d 118 (1970)) put him in the position of a prosecutor in an 

adversarial position with his own counsel in violation of the 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (c) that the search of his 

computer violated the Fourth Amendment; (d) that the prosecutor 

committed misconduct in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments; and (e) that he was prejudiced by being

handcuffed and dressed in jail clothing during the trial. The 

Superior Court denied the petition in November 2009, stating that 

his first three claims and his fifth claim could have been raised 

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or were raised on appeal, and thus were procedurally barred. Ex. 

14. It further held that he failed to show that either his trial 

lawyer’s or appellate lawyer’s performance was deficient or that 

such deficient performance was prejudicial. 

In March 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, which denied it 

in April 2010, stating that “habeas corpus cannot serve as a 

second appeal.” Ex. 15.

In May 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus in the California Supreme Court, which denied it in 

November 2010. Exs. 16 and 17.

In February 2011, Petitioner filed a timely petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus in this Court. Docket No. 1. Petitioner 

asserted four claims: (a) claims one and three: that he is 

actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted and the 

state courts wrongly refused to consider evidence of his 

innocence; (b) claim two: that the Wende brief filed by appellate 

counsel denied him due process of law and unfairly limited his 

appeal options; and (c) claim four: ineffective assistance of 

counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, based on counsel’s 

inadequate challenge to violations of the Fourth and Fifth 

Amendments. 

In March 2012, this Court granted Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss the petition as unexhausted. Docket No. 10. The Court 

found that Petitioner had filed a mixed petition, and that only 

the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim based on the 

Wende brief was exhausted. Accordingly, the Court required 

Petitioner to submit either a request to dismiss his unexhausted 

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claims and proceed only with his exhausted claim, or a request to 

stay the petition while he returned to state court to exhaust his 

unexhausted claims. Plaintiff requested a stay which, in May 

2012, the Court granted. Docket No. 12. 

In May 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus in Sonoma County Superior Court. Petitioner asserted three 

claims: (a) his motion for a new trial was wrongly denied; (b) 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (c) actual innocence. 

Ex. 18. The Superior Court denied the petition in July 2012, 

stating that his claim that the motion for a new trial was wrongly 

denied was or could have been raised on appeal, and because it was 

raised and denied, raising it again was an abuse of the writ. Ex. 

19. The Superior Court also found that his actual innocence claim 

was conclusory and failed to demonstrate actual innocence, and 

that his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was raised 

and rejected in the 2009 petition, was untimely, and failed to 

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. 

In August 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. Ex. 20. The 

Court of Appeal denied it “for all the same reasons stated by the 

superior court in its order denying this same petition, along with 

the fact the petition is untimely, repetitious, and successive.”

Ex. 21.

In September 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review of 

the California Court of Appeal’s denial of his habeas petition in 

the California Supreme Court, which denied it in October 2012.

In November 2012, Petitioner informed this Court that the 

California Supreme Court had denied his petition, and moved to 

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reopen the action and lift the stay. Docket No. 16. In June 

2013, the Court lifted the stay and directed Petitioner to file an 

amended petition. Docket No. 19. 

In July 2013, Petitioner filed an amended petition. Docket 

No. 23.

II. Statement of Facts

On August 18, 2007, Nicole Lewis and her two daughters, aged 

five and two, visited Mother’s Beach on the Russian River in 

Sonoma County. Ms. Lewis’s eldest daughter told her mother that 

she had seen something in a bush nearby. Ms. Lewis dismissed the 

child’s concern. The child again told her mother she had seen 

something in the bushes. This second time, Ms. Lewis turned to 

see what the child was talking about. At trial, Ms. Lewis 

testified that she saw Petitioner in the bushes masturbating. She 

described seeing Petitioner touching his erect penis while looking

toward her and her daughters. Ms. Lewis testified that after she 

yelled at Petitioner, he walked away very quickly with a slight 

limp. 

In her description to the police, Ms. Lewis identified the 

man who exposed himself to her and her daughters as weighing 

between 170 and 200 pounds, with a gray mustache and stubbly 

beard. At trial, Ms. Lewis identified Petitioner as the man who 

exposed himself to her and her daughters.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state 

prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

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Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, a district court may not grant habeas 

relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: 

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court 

authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), 

only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court 

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412-

13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” 

Supreme Court authority, that is, it falls under the second clause 

of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal 

principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ 

“simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment 

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 

federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the 

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting 

the writ. Id. at 409. Under AEDPA, the writ may be granted only 

“where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree 

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that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s 

precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted only 

if the error had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence 

in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 

782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 

(1993)).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state 

court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the 

last reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the 

state judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). 

DISCUSSION

I. First Ground for Relief: Trial Court’s Denial of a New Trial

Petitioner claims that he was denied due process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment when the trial court judge wrongly denied his 

motion for a new trial. Respondent argues that this claim is 

untimely, not cognizable, and meritless.

A. Timeliness

Respondent argues that this claim is untimely because it was 

first raised in a federal petition after the one-year statute of 

limitations, does not relate back to the exhausted claim in the 

original petition and is procedurally barred. 

1. Exhaustion

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally 

in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or length of their 

confinement are first required to exhaust state judicial remedies, 

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by 

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presenting the highest state court available with a fair 

opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they 

seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); 

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 

454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231 (9th 

Cir. 1988). The state’s highest court must be given an 

opportunity to rule on the claims even if review is discretionary. 

See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (petitioner 

must invoke “one complete round of the State’s established 

appellate review process.”).

In its March 2012 Order dismissing Petitioner’s original 

habeas petition, the Court did not determine whether this claim 

was exhausted for purposes of federal review because it determined 

that, in his original petition, Petitioner had not raised a claim 

specifically challenging the denial of his motion for a new trial. 

Upon further consideration, the Court finds that Petitioner did 

raise this claim challenging the denial of his motion for a new 

trial in his original petition. See Docket No. 1 at 7 

(“Ineffective counsel, and resulting denial of new trial, created 

a situation where due process of law failed”) and 8 (“It must be 

determined by this Court if the trier of fact, and subsequent 

appellate court and Habeas Corpus Petitions, unfairly denied due 

process of law in denying a motion for new trial. . .”) 

Furthermore, Petitioner raised this issue in his 2009-2010 state 

habeas review process. Thus, the Court finds that this claim was 

raised in the original petition and is exhausted for federal 

review, and declines to deny habeas relief for this claim on the 

ground that it is unexhausted.

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2. One-year statute of limitations

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state 

convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the date 

on which the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct 

review or the time passed for seeking direct review. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1). AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations in 

§ 2244(d)(1) applies to each claim in a habeas application on an 

individual basis. Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1169-71 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (claim-by-claim approach consistent with Supreme Court 

dicta in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 n.6 (2005), which 

suggested that § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) required claim-by-claim 

consideration). 

Respondent argues that because this claim does not relate 

back to the only exhausted claim in Petitioner’s original 

petition, raising it now is untimely for purposes of the one-year 

AEDPA limitations rule. However, as discussed above, this 

argument is irrelevant because the claim was raised and exhausted 

in the original petition.

3. State procedural bar

A federal court will not review questions of federal law 

decided by a state court if the decision rests on a state law

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to 

support the judgment. Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 

(2011); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). In 

Walker, the United States Supreme Court held that California’s 

timeliness bar was an adequate procedural rule that bars federal 

habeas review. Id. at 1128-31. 

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In its July 2012 review, the Superior Court of Sonoma County 

found that, because Petitioner’s claim that the trial court 

wrongly denied his motion for a new trial was or could have been 

raised on appeal, Petitioner was procedurally barred from raising 

it in his state habeas petition. Ex. 19. Furthermore, the 

Superior Court found that, because the claim was raised on appeal 

and denied, raising it in his state habeas petition was an abuse 

of the writ. Id. In its August 2012 review, the Court of Appeal 

denied the petition “for all reasons the stated by the superior 

court . . . along with the fact that the petition is untimely, 

repetitious, and successive.” Ex. 21. Thus, Petitioner’s claim 

that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial 

in violation of due process is procedurally barred.

B. Non-cognizable claim

Petitioner argues that, as a result of not receiving a new 

trial, he has been denied due process in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner admits, however, that he “does 

not challenge the process by which the trial court denied the 

motion for a new trial . . . but the fact that the Petitioner was 

not allowed to argue his new and exonerative facts or enter them 

on record.” Traverse, Docket No. 28 at 4. 

A petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a 

federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.” 

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal 

court can disturb on due process grounds a state court’s 

procedural or evidentiary ruling only if the ruling was arbitrary 

or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

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See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley 

v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986).

As discussed below, the trial court considered Petitioner’s 

post-trial evidence and arguments as presented in his counsel’s 

brief supporting his motion for a new trial. Petitioner raised 

this issue on appeal, and the Court of Appeal ruled that there 

were “no procedural irregularities apparent in the record as to 

the assignment of trial to Judge Antolini, and no arguable due 

process or speedy trial violations.” Ex. 7 at 4. Petitioner does 

not present any other theory as to why a denial of a new trial 

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Thus, 

Petitioner has not stated a cognizable ground of federal habeas 

relief. 

C. Actual Innocence 

Petitioner argues that had the trial judge considered 

additional evidence, not only would he have granted the motion for 

a new trial, he would have found Petitioner innocent of the 

indecent exposure charge. 

In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal 

claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate 

state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is 

barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default 

and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of 

federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750. 

Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice or that 

failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental 

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miscarriage of justice. He claims that by denying his motion for 

a new trial, he was barred from arguing his “new and exonerative 

facts or enter them on record,” and this then prejudiced him in 

all future actions and appeals and constituted a gross miscarriage 

of justice. Traverse, Docket No. 28 at 4. However, Petitioner’s 

counsel filed a motion for a new trial on Petitioner’s behalf that 

included the “evidence” that Petitioner claims not to have been 

given the opportunity to present -— namely, that the witness

erroneously said she saw Petitioner engage in the same behavior 

years earlier when, in fact, Petitioner was incarcerated. Ex. 1 

at 184-187. Contrary to Petitioner’s unsubstantiated contention 

that the trial judge did not read or consider the motion, the

trial judge indicated that he considered the motion, see Ex. 4 at 

2203, prior to denying it. 

Petitioner claims that, due to his actual innocence, the 

Court’s refusal to consider this claim despite it being 

procedurally barred would result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. However, as discussed in greater detail below, 

Petitioner does not present any evidence to suggest that he is 

actually innocent of the indecent exposure charge. Because 

Petitioner has failed to show cause or prejudice or a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, his claim that the trial judge’s denial of 

his motion for a new trial violated his due process rights is 

barred from federal habeas review. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the 

petition for habeas relief on the grounds that the trial court 

erroneously denied Petitioner a new trial in violation of due 

process.

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II. Second Ground for Relief: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that both his trial counsel and his 

appellate counsel were ineffective in violation of his Sixth 

Amendment right to effective counsel. 

A. Trial Counsel

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for 

several reasons: failure to communicate, repeated failures to 

present important evidence at trial and failure to “properly and 

forcefully explain the Constitutional violations made during his 

arrest of the 5th Amendment.” Am. Pet., Docket No. 23 at 7. 

1. Timeliness

As noted above, California’s timeliness bar is a procedural

rule that bars federal habeas review. Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1128-

31. In its July 2012 review, the Superior Court of Sonoma County 

found that, because Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance 

of counsel was raised in his 2009 petition, raising it again was 

an abuse of writ. Ex. 19. In its August 2012 review, the Court 

of Appeal denied the petition “for all the reasons stated by the 

superior court . . . along with the fact that the petition is 

untimely, repetitious, and successive.” Ex. 21. Thus, 

Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel is 

procedurally barred by California’s timeliness rule.

As discussed in further detail below, because Petitioner has 

failed to show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice, his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance is barred from federal habeas review. See Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750.

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2. Merits

In addition to being procedurally barred, Petitioner’s claim 

for ineffective assistance of trial counsel is without merit. In 

order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel 

claim, Petitioner must establish two things. First, he must 

establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it

fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under 

prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687-88 (1984). A habeas petitioner has the burden of showing 

through evidentiary proof that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. See Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 743 (9th Cir.

1990). Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. “The 

likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just 

conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011) 

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

Petitioner presents a laundry list of his trial counsel’s

alleged failures. See Am. Pet., Docket No. 23 at 6. He does not, 

however, present any evidence to show that trial counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Petitioner claims that counsel did not “properly” investigate 

the witnesses, failed to impeach them or “ask important questions 

of the witness at trial.” Id. He does not, however, state what a 

proper investigation would have uncovered, in what way the 

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witnesses were impeachable or what important questions were not 

asked. 

Petitioner also claims that, against his wishes, counsel 

failed to call him as a witness even though Petitioner “demanded 

his say.” Id. The trial record indicates that when the trial 

judge asked Petitioner’s counsel if he had any further witnesses, 

counsel asked for one moment, presumably to consult with 

Petitioner, before saying, “No, your honor. No further 

witnesses.” Reporter’s Transcript (RT) 1652. Petitioner could 

have demanded “his say” but chose not to do so.

Petitioner claims that counsel failed to demonstrate his 

disabilities “which would show impossibility of his committing the 

crime.” Id. As Respondent points out, however, any testimony 

about Petitioner’s inability to walk on the beach due to his 

previous strokes or other physical issues would have been 

impeached by his testimony at the motion to suppress that while he 

has had two strokes, he “recovered really, really well” and that 

physically he was “mostly recovered.” RT 1025-6. His caregiver 

also testified that Petitioner walked to catch a bus and was able 

to go grocery shopping on his own. Petitioner maintains that 

counsel failed to present evidence that his medical issues made it 

impossible for him to have the erection Ms. Lewis testified to 

having seen. Petitioner does not, however, present any 

independent and verifiable evidence of this disability. 

Petitioner’s claims of erectile dysfunction are self-serving, and 

counsel was not unreasonable for not introducing those claims at 

trial. 

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Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has 

not satisfied his burden to show that trial counsel’s performance 

was deficient. It is unnecessary for a federal court considering 

a habeas ineffective assistance claim to address the prejudice 

prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot even 

establish incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs v. 

Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, Petitioner’s 

request for habeas relief on this ground is DENIED.

B. Appellate Counsel

Petitioner asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective 

when she submitted a Wende brief to the Court of Appeal, thereby 

depriving him of adequate legal representation during the appeal.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 

a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his 

first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 

(1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are 

also reviewed according to the standard set out in Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 668. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). First, 

the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was 

objectively unreasonable, which in the appellate context requires 

the petitioner to demonstrate that counsel acted unreasonably in 

failing to discover and brief a meritorious issue. Id. Second, 

the petitioner must show prejudice, which in this context means 

that the petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability 

that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue, the 

petitioner would have prevailed in his appeal. Id. Appellate 

counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 

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U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983). The weeding out of weaker issues is 

widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate 

advocacy. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Appellate counsel therefore will frequently remain above an 

objective standard of competence and have caused his client no 

prejudice for the same reason-- because he declined to raise a

weak issue. Id.

Petitioner has not shown that appellate counsel acted 

unreasonably in failing to discover and brief a meritorious issue. 

In this case, appellate counsel filed a Wende brief, a procedure 

approved by the Supreme Court in Smith, 528 U.S. at 284. Under 

this procedure, appellate counsel, upon concluding that an appeal 

would be frivolous, files a brief with the appellate court that 

summarizes the procedural and factual history of the case. 

Counsel attests to having reviewed the record, explained his 

evaluation of the case to the client, provided the client with a 

copy of the brief, and informed the client of his or her right to 

file a pro se supplemental brief. Counsel further requests that 

the appellate court independently examine the record for arguable 

issues. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 265 (citing Wende). The appellate 

court, upon receiving a Wende brief, conducts a review of the 

entire record and affirms if it finds the appeal to be frivolous.

A California prisoner cannot state a constitutional claim simply 

because the Wende procedure was used. See id. at 284-85.

Petitioner’s counsel was not unreasonable when she filed her 

Wende brief because there were no non-frivolous issues to raise on 

appeal, as affirmed in the written opinion of the Court of Appeal. 

See Ex. 7 (“Upon our independent review of the record we conclude 

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there are no meritorious issues to be argued, or that require 

further briefing.”) Furthermore, Petitioner fails to state what

those non-frivolous issues were, except for his claim of actual 

innocence, which, as discussed elsewhere, is non-meritorious. 

Thus, Petitioner fails to show ineffectiveness of appellate 

counsel. 

As noted above, the Court need not address the prejudice 

prong of the Strickland test if Petitioner cannot even establish 

incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs, 133 F.3d at

737. Thus, Petitioner’s request for habeas relief on this ground 

is DENIED.

III. Third Ground for Relief: Actual Innocence

Petitioner contends that, had he been able to present 

exculpatory evidence, he would not have been found guilty of the 

indecent exposure charge.

If a state prisoner cannot meet the cause and prejudice 

standard, a federal court may still hear the merits of the 

successive, abusive, procedurally defaulted or untimely claims if 

the failure to hear the claims would constitute a “miscarriage of 

justice.” See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931-32 

(2013). The Supreme Court limits the “miscarriage of justice”

exception to habeas petitioners who can show that “a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327 (1995) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

The required evidence must create a colorable claim of actual 

innocence, that the petitioner is innocent of the charge for which 

he is incarcerated, as opposed to legal innocence as a result of 

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legal error. Id. at 321. It is not enough that the evidence show 

the existence of reasonable doubt, the petitioner must show “that 

it is more likely than not that no ‘reasonable juror’ would have 

convicted him.” Id. at 329. As the Ninth Circuit has put it, 

“the test is whether, with the new evidence, it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have found [p]etitioner 

guilty.” Van Buskirk v. Baldwin, 265 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

Petitioner has not met this burden. Petitioner claims that 

Ms. Lewis’s description of the perpetrator and his behaviors was 

inconsistent with his actual appearance and abilities. At trial, 

Ms. Lewis stated that the man who exposed himself to her and her 

daughters was between 170 and 200 pounds, and had a gray mustache 

and stubbly beard. Petitioner states that he weighed over 300 

pounds, and his caregiver testified that he was clean-shaven the 

day prior to the crime. Ms. Lewis also testified that, after she 

yelled at him, Petitioner “didn’t run away, but took off very 

quickly.” RT 1619. Petitioner argues that due to various health 

problems, including two strokes and Parkinson’s disease, he “could 

not walk on a beach, let alone run off.” Am. Pet., Docket No. 23 

at 9.

Petitioner’s counsel cross-examined Ms. Lewis and asked her 

specifically about various parts of her testimony, including her 

description of the perpetrator. On cross-examination, Ms. Lewis 

stated that the perpetrator had a “slight” limp that “wasn’t very 

noticeable. You would have to be paying attention to notice it.” 

RT 1621. Petitioner’s counsel argued to the judge that Ms. Lewis 

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had misidentified Petitioner, and pointed to the incongruity of 

her description with Petitioner’s actual characteristics. 

While this incongruity may provide some doubt of the accuracy 

of Ms. Lewis’s identification, it does not rise to the level of 

doubt such that, had they considered it, “no ‘reasonable juror’ 

would have convicted him.” As the trial judge commented, the 

issue in this case was not whether a crime had been committed, but 

the identity of the person who committed it. Ms. Lewis’s 

description of the perpetrator was not so incompatible with 

Petitioner’s characteristics as to make her in-court 

identification unpersuasive. Of particular significance to the 

trial judge, Ms. Lewis’s in-court identification was without 

hesitation, giving credibility to her testimony. 

Further, while Petitioner claimed that he was unable to move 

as quickly as Ms. Lewis indicated, his caregiver, in her 

testimony, stated that he was able to walk and go grocery shopping 

on his own. Thus, Ms. Lewis’s testimony and identification are

not so far removed from Petitioner’s actual appearance and 

abilities to call into question the trial court’s determination 

that, given all the evidence presented at trial, the man who 

committed this crime and Petitioner were one and the same. Even 

if Petitioner could show constitutional errors in this case (which 

he cannot), he does not present any strong evidence of actual 

innocence.

Accordingly, Petitioner fails to meet the Schlup standard for 

a finding of a miscarriage of justice due to actual innocence. 

Thus, Petitioner’s request for habeas relief on this ground is 

DENIED.

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IV. Evidentiary Hearing

A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 

disputed facts where his allegations, if proven, would entitle him 

to relief. Perez v. Rosario, 459 F.3d 943, 954 n.5 (9th Cir. 

2006); Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he 

has failed to present any allegations which, if proven, would 

entitle him to relief.

V. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state 

prisoners require a district court that denies a habeas petition 

to grant or deny a certificate of appealability in the ruling. 

Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 

 A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas 

corpus proceeding without first obtaining a certificate of 

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A 

judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The certificate 

must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to 

satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

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 The Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find its 

ruling on any of Petitioner’s claims debatable or wrong. 

Therefore, a certificate of appealability is denied. 

 Petitioner may not appeal the denial of a certificate of 

appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the 

Court of Appeals under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

 1. The request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

2. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter a separate judgment, 

terminate all pending motions and close the file.

 4. A certificate of appealability is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 05/05/2015

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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