Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01606/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01606-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1329 Writ of Mandamus to Adjudicate Visa Petition

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUKHWINDER DEOL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY )

OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F 06-1606 AWI DLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

(Document #7)

BACKGROUND

On November 9, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment of

naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) and 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) and for fees under 5 U.S.C. §

504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff filed an application for

naturalization on or about March 22, 2002. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff took the United

States Citizenship test on March 22, 2006 and submitted requested documents on July 7, 2006. 

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff has checked on the status of his application and been told that

he has to wait for security clearance, background check, and a name check. The complaint

alleges that Defendants’ inactions represent a denial of Plaintiff’s appeal. Plaintiff requests this

court de novo review his application for naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) and 8

U.S.C. § 1421(c).

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 When a defendant challenges jurisdiction “facially,” all material allegations in the 1

complaint are assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal

jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading itself. Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General

Telephone Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 549 F. 2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977); Cervantez v. Sullivan, 719 F. Supp. 899, 903 (E.D.

Cal.1989), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F. 2d 229 (9th Cir.1992).

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On March 9, 2007, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction. Defendants provide evidence that the appeal from Plaintiff’s second application

for naturalization was denied on May 27, 2005. Defendants provide evidence that on November

14, 2005, Plaintiff filed a third application for naturalization. Defendants provide evidence that

this third application was denied on November 16, 2006, and the administrative appeal of the

third application remains pending. Defendants contend that this court lacks jurisdiction because

Plaintiff’s application has been denied and he must await the outcome of administrative review

prior to filing an action in this court.

Plaintiff did not file an opposition or other response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction. Limits upon federal jurisdiction must not be disregarded or evaded. Owen

Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). The plaintiff has the burden to

establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient

allegations to show a proper basis for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over the

action. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(1). 

A defendant may attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction apart from the

pleadings. Mortensen, 549 F. 2d at 891. In such a case, the court may rely on evidence

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extrinsic to the pleadings and resolve factual disputes relating to jurisdiction. St. Clair v. City of

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Chico, 880 F. 2d 199, 201 (9 Cir.1989); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9 th th

Cir.1987); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir.1983). “No presumptive th

truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not

preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill

Publishing, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). 

DISCUSSION

A. Naturalization Proceedings

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1446 provides directions to an applicant, like Plaintiff, who wishes to file

an application for naturalization. Once an application is filed, 8 U.S.C. § 1446 lists the

Service’s requirements to conduct an investigation and have an examination. The Service

employee “designated to conduct any such examination shall make a determination as to whether

the application should be granted or denied, with reasons therefor.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1446(d). Title

8 C.F.R. § 336.1 provides that after completing all examination procedures and “determining to

deny an application for naturalization, the Service shall serve a written notice of denial upon an

applicant for naturalization no later than 120 days after the date of the applicant's first

examination on the application.” 8 C.F.R. § 336.1(a). 

If the Service denies the application for naturalization, the applicant may request a

hearing before a senior immigration examiner. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a); 8 C.F.R. § 336.2. The

hearing before the senior immigration examiner must be conducted promptly and no later than

180 days from the date the appeal is filed. 8 C.F.R. § 336.2(b). 

If the examiner upholds the denial on appeal, the applicant may appeal the decision to a

district court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). See 8 C.F.R. § 336.9(b) & (c). Title 8 U.S.C. §

1421(c) provides:

A person whose application for naturalization under this subchapter is denied,

after a hearing before an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this Title,

may seek review of such denial before the United States district court for the

district in which such person resides in accordance with chapter 7 of Title 5. Such

review shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and

conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de

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novo on the application.

B. Issues Before the Court

In this action, Defendants provide evidence that Plaintiff’s applications for naturalization

have been denied, and Plaintiff has appealed the last denial by requesting a hearing before a

senior immigration examiner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 336.2. Although

180 days have passed, the Service has not held a hearing or issued a final decision. Plaintiff

requests that the court hear his application and enter a declaratory judgment that finds Plaintiff is

entitled to be naturalized. Defendants contend that this court has no jurisdiction to issue a

ruling regarding Plaintiff’s naturalization at this time.

C. Section 1447(b) Jurisdiction

Plaintiff invokes this court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). The United

States Code provides a remedy if the Service fails to serve written notice within 120 days of an

interview as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 336.1. If the Service fails to grant or deny a naturalization

application within 120 days after the applicant is interviewed, the applicant may filed an

application in United States District Court on the matter. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) reads:

(b) Request for hearing before district court

If there is a failure to make a determination under section 1446 of this title before

the end of the 120-day period after the date on which the examination is

conducted under such section, the applicant may apply to the United States district

court for the district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on the matter.

Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine the matter or

remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the Service to determine the

matter.

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) gives the district court exclusive jurisdiction over a pending

naturalization application when: (1) over 120 days pass from the date of the initial examination;

(2) the applicant properly invokes the court's authority; and (3) there are no deportation

proceedings pending against the applicant. United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1164 (9th

Cir. 2004). In United States v. Hovsepian, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether 8 U.S.C. §

1447(b) gives district courts exclusive jurisdiction or concurrent jurisdiction over naturalization

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applications. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1159-60. The Ninth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b)

allows the district court to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over those naturalization applications on

which the Service fails to act within 120 days if the applicant properly invokes the court's

authority. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1164. 

However, not all invocations of 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) are sufficient to vest exclusive

jurisdiction in the district court. Hovsepian distinguished prior Ninth Circuit authority found in

Sze v. INS, 153 F.3d 1005 (9 Cir.1998). In Sze, the INS granted a naturalization application th

after the plaintiffs sued under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). In Hovsepian the Ninth Circuit found that the

district court in Sze did not have exclusive jurisdiction because the applicant in Sze did not ask

the district court to decide the applicants' naturalization petition, but rather requested the court

issue a writ of mandamus requiring the INS to act faster on the applications. Hovsepian, 359

F.3d at 1161. Because the issue in Sze was only a request to force the INS to act, and the

applicants were not asking the district court to review the naturalization applications de novo, the

Ninth Circuit court had no occasion to examine whether it could act. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at

1161.

Here, Plaintiff is asking the court to exercise exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1447(b) over Plaintiff’s naturalization application. However, Section 1447(b) does not apply

to the part of the naturalization process when an applicant is appealing of the denial of his

application. The undisputed evidence before the court reveals that the Service has denied

Plaintiff’s application, and it is Plaintiff’s administrative appeal that is pending. Thus,

jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1447(b) is not available. 

What remains pending before the Service at this time is Plaintiff’s appeal and request for

a hearing before a senior immigration examiner. The Code of Federal Regulations requires this

hearing be conducted no later than 180 days from the date the appeal is filed. 8 C.F.R. §

336.2(b). However, Section 1447 does not give this court jurisdiction over those naturalization

appeals for which the Service fails to act within 180 days. Given that Section 1447(b)

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 The court makes no finding on whether a petition for writ of mandamus may be 2

available if the Service delays more than 180 days at this stage of the process. No petition for

writ of mandamus is currently pending before the court.

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specifically provides jurisdiction if the Service fails to act within 120 days during the

examination process, Congress clearly knew how to give this court jurisdiction over stalled

applications. By not specifically providing for jurisdiction if the Service fails to act within 180

when conducting an appeal, the plan language of the Section 1447 clearly shows Congress’s

desire to not have the court interfere with the appeals of applications that have been delayed after

a denial at the first level. Because in this case Plaintiff is awaiting a hearing before a senior

immigration examiner as part of his appeal, this court has no jurisdiction under Section 1447(b)

to either force the Service to rule on the appeal or review the naturalization application de novo.2

D. Section 1421(c)

In the complaint, Plaintiff also asks that the court deem Defendants’ delay as a final

denial of his application and review the Service’s denial pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). The

court declines to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1421(c). First, Plaintiff has not cited,

and this court was unable to find, any authority for the proposition that the failure of a senior

hearing officer to hold a hearing and rule on an appeal within 180 deems the appeal denied. 

Second, other than the limited review set forth under Section 1447(b) and discussed

above, the court may only review the denial of a naturalization application if the applicant has

exhausted his or her administrative appeals. See 8 U.S.C. §1421(c). “Unsuccessful applicants

must first take an administrative appeal of the denial and complete the INS's administrative

process before seeking judicial review.” Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1162 n.15 (citing 8 U.S.C. §

1421(c), (d); 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a); 8 C.F.R. § 336.2.); Pichardo-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 399

F.Supp.2d 1043, 1045 (D.Ariz. 2005). 

The court lacks jurisdiction to review Plaintiff’s naturalization application under Section

1421(c) because he has not yet exhausted his administrative remedies by obtaining a hearing

before an immigration officer. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) provides: “If, after an examination under

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section 1446 of this title, an application for naturalization is denied, the applicant may request a

hearing before an immigration officer.” Where, as here, exhaustion of administrative remedies

is required by statute, exhaustion is jurisdictional and must be enforced. See McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992); Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561,

579 (1989); Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9 Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the court lacks th

jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 1321(c).

E. Equal Access To Justice Act

While not specifically addressed in Defendants’ motion, the complaint lists the Equal

Access to Justice Act as a basis of this action. The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5

U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, provides that prevailing parties in certain adversarial

proceedings against the United States may recover attorney's fees from the United States. Title 5

U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) provides:

An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing

party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party

in connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency

finds that the position of the agency was substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award unjust. Whether or not the position of the agency

was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the administrative

record, as a whole, which is made in the adversary adjudication for which fees and

other expenses are sought.

5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). Here, Plaintiff would not be entitled to these fees because, at this time,

Plaintiff is not the prevailing party.

In general, the fees and expenses allowed for by Section 504(a)(1) are for adjudications

made under the Administrative Procedure Act that are subject to or governed by 5 U.S.C. § 554. 

Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991); Collord v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 154 F.3d 933,

936 (9 Cir. 1998). Generally, immigration proceedings are not governed by the Administrative th

Procedure Act. See Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 137; Silveyra v. Moschorak, 989 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th

Cir.1993); Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9 Cir.1992); Full Gospel Portland th

Church v. Thornburgh, 927 F.2d 628, 630-31 (D.C. Cir.1991); Clarke v. INS, 904 F.2d 172,

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174-78 (3d Cir.1990). Thus, Plaintiff would not be entitled to the fees and costs that have arisen

out of Plaintiff’s naturalization application. 

Finally, nothing in 5 U.S.C. § 504, nor any other provision of the EAJA, provides a basis

for this court’s jurisdiction over this action.

ORDER

Accordingly, based on the above memorandum opinion, the court ORDERS that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice; and

3. The Clerk of the Court shall close this file as this order terminates this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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