Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01401/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01401-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Pursuant to the Court’s limited grant of Plaintiffs’ motion for relief under Rule 56(f)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs were permitted to file a second response

to the First Motion for Summary Judgment after additional discovery on the statute of

limitations issue was completed. (Dkt. 73.) On March 4, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a second

supplemental response to the First Motion. (Dkt. 147–48.) The Court ordered the second

supplemental response be stricken from the record as untimely. (Dkt. 149.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sandra Dowling and Dennis Dowling,

husband and wife

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava Arpaio,

husband and wife; Maricopa County Board

of Supervisors; Maricopa County, a

Municipal entity; John Does I–X; Jane

Does I–X; Black Corporations I–V; White

Partnerships I–V,

Defendant.

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No. 09-1401-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is the Arpaio Defendants’ First Motion for Summary

Judgment (Dkt. 56) that Defendants Maricopa County Board of Supervisors and Maricopa

County joined (Dkt. 57). As permitted by the Court, Plaintiffs Sandra Dowling and Dennis

Dowling filed responses in opposition to the First Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 70,

80),1

 and Defendants filed a consolidated reply (Dkt. 91, 92). A hearing on the First Motion

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was held on March 7, 2011. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the First Motion

for Summary Judgment in part with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law claims, but denies the

motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sandra Dowling (“Dowling”) was the Superintendent of Public Instruction

for Maricopa County, Arizona from 1988 to 2008. (Defendants’ Statement of Facts, Dkt. 58

[“DSOF”] ¶ 1; Plaintiffs’ Controverting and Supplemental Statement of Facts, Dkt. 71

[“PSOF”] ¶ 1.) As Superintendent, Dowling oversaw an accommodation district, known as

the Maricopa County Regional School District (the “MCRSD”). (DSOF ¶ 2; PSOF ¶ 2.)

Dowling served as the sole member of the governing board of the MCRSD. (DSOF ¶ 3;

PSOF ¶ 3.) By 2006, there were 12 schools in the MCRSD, which included three campuses

of the Thomas J. Pappas School for homeless children. (DSOF ¶ 2; PSOF ¶ 2.) The

Maricopa County Board of Supervisors (the “Board”) was required to annually budget an

amount that would meet the requirements of the special county school reserve fund,

including the necessary expenses for conducting accommodation schools. A.R.S. § 15-

1001(A)(5). The MCRSD operated a budget deficit for many years. (DSOF ¶ 4; PSOF ¶ 4.)

Each year in which the deficit occurred, the Maricopa County Treasurer covered the MCRSD

deficit with County funds. (PSOF ¶ 43.)

In 2005, the Board asked Tom Horne, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, to

investigate the financial situation of the MCRSD. (DSOF, Ex. 3 at p. 5; PSOF ¶¶ 48–50.)

Mr. Horne determined that the MCRSD had been under-funded by $3.5 million over

approximately five years. (PSOF ¶ 4; DSOF ¶ 5 & Ex. 3 at p. 5.)

On January 11, 2006, at the request of the Board, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office (“MCSO”) initiated a criminal investigation of Dowling and others at the MCRSD.

(DSOF ¶ 7; PSOF ¶ 7.) As part of its investigation, MCSO obtained and executed a search

warrant for MCRSD offices on January 25, 2006. (DSOF ¶ 8; PSOF ¶ 8.) Also on January

25, 2006, MCSO obtained and executed a search warrant for Dowling’s home. (DSOF ¶¶

13–14; PSOF ¶¶ 13–14.)

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Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01, Plaintiffs served a 19-page Notice of Claim letter,

dated July 10, 2006 (the “2006 Notice of Claim”), on Defendants (and others). (PSOF ¶ 16,

DSOF ¶ 16 & Ex. 3.) The 2006 Notice of Claim sets forth legal claims for defamation,

intentional inflictions of emotional distress, depravation of civil rights, abuse of

process/malicious prosecution, and abuse of government resource. (DSOF, Ex. 3 at pp.

17–18.)

The criminal investigation conducted by MCSO resulted in a grand jury’s indictment

of Dowling on 25 felony counts on November 16, 2006. (DSOF ¶ 7; PSOF ¶¶ 7, 17.) After

being indicted, Dowling was booked and arraigned on the multiple felony counts. (DSOF

¶ 18; PSOF ¶ 18.) On May 4, 2007, based on motions filed by Dowling’s attorney, counts

1–10 of the indictment were remanded to the grand jury. (DSOF ¶ 19; PSOF ¶ 19.) In or

around June 2007, the prosecution of the criminal case was transferred from the Arizona

Attorney General’s Office to the United States Attorney’s Office due to a conflict of interest.

(DSOF ¶ 20; PSOF ¶ 20.)

On August 26, 2008, the Court accepted a Plea Agreement, dated July 11, 2008,

entered into by the State of Arizona and Dowling. (DSOF ¶ 23; PSOF ¶¶ 22–23.) The Plea

Agreement, in the case captioned CR 2008-007162, provided that Dowling agreed to plead

guilty to a misdemeanor (employment of a relative), and the parties stipulated to the

following additional item, among other items, “[a]t the time of sentencing, Counts 1–10 that

were previously dismissed on August 20, 2007, and the remaining Counts in CR 2006-

012508 (Counts 11–23 and Counts 26–27) will be dismissed with prejudice.” (DSOF, Ex.

15 at p. 1.)

On September 25, 2008, Plaintiffs served a Notice of Claim letter (the “2008 Notice

of Claim”) on Defendant Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and the Board. (DSOF ¶ 26 & Ex. 1; PSOF

¶ 26.) The 2008 Notice of Claim states that it was served “in connection with the

investigation, arrest, and malicious prosecution of Sandra Dowling,” and sets forth causes

of action for negligence, reckless conduct, gross negligence, infliction of emotional distress,

malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and law enforcement retaliation under Arizona law

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and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DSOF , Ex. 1 at pp. 3, 10.)

On June 3, 2009, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this action in Maricopa County

Superior Court (Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A), and Defendants subsequently removed this action to the

United States District Court (Dkt. 1).

On July 27, 2010, the Court permitted Defendants to file two motions for summary

judgment. (Dkt. 53.) A first motion for summary judgment could be filed on statute of

limitations issues, and a second motion for summary judgment on the merits could be filed

after the close of discovery. On August 27, 2010, Defendants filed the pending First Motion

for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 56.) This motion addressed the malicious prosecution claim

on its merits, in addition to statute of limitations issues. (Dkt. 56 at pp. 10–17.) Recognizing

the violation of the Court’s Order, Defendants filed a motion to withdraw the substantive

arguments made in the First Motion for Summary Judgment, and to preserve those arguments

for a second motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 87.) The Court granted the motion to

withdraw (Dkt. 116); therefore, this Order will not consider any of the substantive arguments

made by either party in connection with the merits of Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim

(Count II of the Complaint).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely

disputed must support that assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,”

including depositions, affidavits, interrogatory answers or other materials, or by “showing

that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an

adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Id. 56(c)(1). Thus,

summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the

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2

 Defendants do not argue that Count II (Malicious Prosecution) in the Complaint is

time barred; therefore, this claim survives the First Motion for Summary Judgment.

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motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be unable

to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by “com[ing]

forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)

(1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, in the summary judgment context, the Court

construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v.

Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that Counts I, III, IV, V and VI of Plaintiffs’ Complaint are barred

by their respective statutes of limitations.2

 (Dkt. 56 at p. 6.) Defendants generally argue that

these Counts accrued, if at all, by November 2006.

A. State Law Claims – Counts I and III

Defendants seek entry of judgment in their favor with respect to two of Plaintiffs’

three state law claims: Count I (Negligence/Gross Negligence) and Count III (Abuse of

Process) on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

The parties dispute the relevant statute of limitations period for Plaintiffs’ state law

claims. Plaintiffs argue the relevant statute of limitations is two years pursuant to A.R.S. §

12-542. Whereas, Defendants argue the statute of limitations is one year pursuant to A.R.S.

§ 12-821. Section 12-821 of the Arizona Revised Statutes limits the time period in which

actions can be brought against public entities and public employees: “All actions against any

public entity or public employee shall be brought within one year after the cause of action

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accrues and not afterward.” Because Plaintiffs have filed suit against a public employee and

public entities, the correct statute of limitations with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law

negligence and abuse of process claims is one year. See e.g., Stulce v. Salt River Project

Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 3 P.3d 1007, 1008 (Ariz. App. 1999) (affirming the

dismissal of a negligence suit against a public entity based on the plaintiff’s failure to bring

the suit within one year as required by A.R.S. § 12-821).

Due to the one-year statute of limitations period, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are

untimely if they did not accrue within one year of the filing of the Complaint. Plaintiffs filed

their Complaint on June 3, 2009; therefore, their state law claims are untimely if the claims

did not accrue after June 3, 2008. Defendants argue that, as evidenced by the 2006 Notice

of Claim, Plaintiffs knew they were injured as early as July 10, 2006. (Dkt. 91 at p. 2.)

Plaintiffs argue that the conduct complained of continued up until the time that all 25 felony

counts were dismissed on August 26, 2008, which is within the limitations period. (Dkt. 70

at p. 1.) Defendants respond to this argument by alleging that Plaintiffs’ state law claims are

not continuing torts, and the post-2006 conduct of Defendants was neither continuous, nor

tortious. (Dkt. 91 at pp. 4–5.)

In Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege negligence and gross negligence with

respect to Defendants’ investigation, encouragement and provision of information on which

the criminal prosecution was based. (Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at ¶ 73.) In Count II of the Complaint,

Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in an abuse of process by participating in the criminal

investigation and prosecution of Dowling, which investigation resulted in an indictment. (Id.

at ¶ 84.) Both of these claims involve the Defendants’ roles in investigating and aiding the

prosecution of Dowling. Plaintiffs argue in their response that Defendants’ involvement did

not cease with the indictment of Dowling on November 16, 2006: “While some of the

conduct engaged in by Defendants which gave rise to these claims began in 2006, that same

conduct continued up until the time the charges were dismissed in the summer of 2008.”

(Dkt. 70 at p. 9.)

Plaintiffs correctly note that a claim for negligent investigation may accrue after the

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arrest of a plaintiff, if the investigation occurred after the arrest, Mohajerin v. Pinal County,

2007 WL 4358254, *6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2007), and a claim for abuse of process can accrue

at any time during the course of litigation, id. at *5. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims for

negligence/gross negligence and abuse of process are not barred simply because Dowling’s

indictment occurred more than one year before Plaintiffs commenced this action. The

Complaint contains factual allegations regarding the prosecution of Dowling, which did not

end until August 26, 2008, when the Plea Agreement was approved and the felony counts

dismissed.

Under certain conditions, a tort can be continuous and the statute of limitations does

not begin to run until the date of the last tortious act. Floyd v. Donahue, 923 P.2d 875, 879

(Ariz. App. 1996) (citing Garcia v. Sumrall, 121 P.2d 640, 643 (Ariz. 1942) (holding that

where a trespass is continuing in nature, an action may be brought any time within two years

of the last trespass, but damages are recoverable only for trespass occurring within the

limitations period)). However, there is no authority under Arizona law for the proposition

that the torts of negligence and abuse of process are continuing torts. A commission of either

of these torts may have continuing effects, but those continuing effects do not forestall the

accrual of a cause of action.

Under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B), “a cause of action accrues when the damaged party

realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source,

act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage.” The

term “accrual” in A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B) is construed in accordance with the common law

discovery rule. Little v. State, 240 P.3d 861, 864 (Ariz. App. 2010). As long as a plaintiff

has notice of wrongful conduct, it is not necessary that the plaintiff have knowledge of all

the details in order for the cause of action to accrue. Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 962 (Ariz.

1998) (“A plaintiff need not know all the facts underlying a cause of action to trigger

accrual.”); CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., 7 P.3d 979, 982 (Ariz. App.

2000) (“[A]ccrual requires only actual or constructive knowledge of the fact of damage,

rather than of the total extent or calculated amount of damage[.]”). A cause of action accrues

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3

 Plaintiffs base this argument on the two-year statute of limitations for personal torts,

not the applicable one-year statute of limitations for actions against public entities.

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when a plaintiff discovers the injury is attributable to a particular defendant’s conduct.

Lawhorn v. L.B.J. Inst. Supply, Inc., 765 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Ariz. App. 1988). The cause of

action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows both the “what” and “who” elements. Id.

It is clear that Plaintiffs had notice of Defendants’ conduct giving rise to the claims

by July 10, 2006, when the 2006 Notice of Claim was served on Defendants. The 2006

Notice of Claim identifies the persons and the actions that give rise to the same causes of

action set forth in the Complaint, albeit at the early state of the investigation of Dowling.

Certainly, Plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the allegedly wrongful conduct described in

Counts I and II of the Complaint as early as November 16, 2006, when the investigation of

Dowling culminated in her indictment. The Complaint does not allege any additional basis

for a claim of negligence or abuse of process that did not stem from the Board’s and MCSO’s

investigation and assistance with the indictment of Dowling. Because the continuing

violation theory does not apply to the torts of negligence and abuse of process, the

continuation of the investigation and the criminal prosecution does not toll the statute of

limitations when Plaintiffs were aware of the allegedly wrongful conduct more than one year

before the Complaint was filed.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ continued participation in the investigation and

prosecution of Dowling is actionable in and of itself, and occurred within the limitation

period.3

 (Dkt. 70 at p. 13.) As set forth in Plaintiffs’ supplemental statement of facts, the

allegedly wrongful conduct occurring after June 3, 2008, which is within the limitations

period, is based on allegations that the Board’s attorney objected to a provision of the Plea

Agreement and that MCSO continued its investigation of Dowling until the Plea Agreement

was finalized. (Dkt. 81.) These actions do not constitute wrongful acts rising to the level of

separately actionable torts. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts to indicate how Defendants’

continuation of an investigation or aid to prosecutors after June 3, 2008 satisfies the elements

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4

 To establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must show a duty, a breach

of that duty, causation, and injury or damages. Saucedo v. Salvation Army, 24 P.3d 1274,

1278 (Ariz. App. 2001).

5

 To establish a cause of action for abuse of process, a plaintiff must show that the

defendant has used a legal process against the plaintiff primarily to accomplish a purpose for

which the process was not designed, and harm has been caused to the plaintiff by such

misuse of process. Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. App. 1982).

6

 Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have presented no substantive grounds for dismissal

of Count V (Conspiracy to Commit Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and should be barred

from addressing this claim in Defendants’ reply brief. (Dkt. 70 at p. 9 n.10.) Defendants

refer to Counts IV, V and VI of the Complaint generically and inclusively as “Plaintiffs’ civil

rights claims under § 1983.” (Dkt. 56 at p. 10). Defendants continue to refer to Plaintiffs’

three § 1983 claims in this manner in their reply brief. Even though Defendants briefly

address Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy argument, there is no reason to ignore Defendants’

treatment of Count V in their reply brief.

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of negligence4

 or abuse of process.5

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and abuse of process (Counts I and II

of the Complaint) are barred by the statute of limitations, because Plaintiffs were aware of

the wrongful conduct alleged in the Complaint as early as November 16, 2006, and failed to

bring a cause of action within the one-year limitations period. Further, based on the date on

which the Complaint was filed, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to support timely state law

claims that accrued within the one-year limitations period.

B. Section 1983 Claims – Counts IV, V and VI

Defendants also seek an entry of judgment in their favor with respect to Count IV (42

U.S.C. § 1983 – Unconstitutional Policies, Customs, and Failure to Train), Count V

(Conspiracy to Commit Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983),6

 and Count VI (Violations of 42

U.S.C. § 1983: Free Speech, Law Enforcement Retaliatory Conduct, Malicious and Selective

Prosecution, and Abuse of Process) on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are barred

by the statute of limitations.

“Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations.” TwoRivers v. Lewis,

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, federal courts must apply a statute of

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limitations from the forum state to § 1983 claims. Id. Because the Supreme Court has

“directed the lower federal courts in § 1983 cases to borrow the state-law limitations period

for personal injury claims,” Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 140 (1988), federal courts in

Arizona apply a two-year statute of limitations to all § 1983 claims, TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at

991; see A.R.S. § 12-542.

Plaintiffs were required to file their complaint within two years of the date that the

alleged § 1983 causes of action accrued. Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County, 943 P.2d 822,

826 (Ariz. App. 1997). Federal courts look to federal, not state, law to determine when a

§ 1983 claims accrues. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991 (citing Elliott v. City of Union City, 24

F.3d 800, 801–02 (9th Cir. 1994)). Under federal law, a § 1983 claim, “accrues when a

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id.

(citing Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Based on the two-year limitations period, Plaintiffs’ claims are untimely if they did

not accrue within two years of the filing of the Complaint. Defendants acknowledge that the

continuing violation theory applies to § 1983 claims, but argue that Plaintiffs failed to allege

any wrongful acts committed by Defendants during the limitations period (i.e., after June 3,

2007). (Dkt. 91 at pp. 6–7.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants continued to engage in

wrongful conduct up until the felony charges against Dowling were dismissed on August 26,

2008, and the claims based on Defendants’ continuing conduct were brought within the twoyear limitations period. (Dkt. 70 at p. 10.)

The continuing violation theory, which applies to § 1983 claims, allows a plaintiff to

seek relief for events outside the limitations period. Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th

Cir. 2001). In order to show a continuing violation, a plaintiff must state facts sufficient to

support a determination that the alleged discriminatory acts are related closely enough to

constitute a continuing violation, and that one or more of the acts falls within the limitations

period. Id. (quoting DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 645 (9th Cir.2000)).

However, a “mere continuing impact from past violations is not actionable.” Id. (quoting

and citing numerous authorities). In Knox, the Court of Appeals held that the continuing

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violation doctrine was inapplicable, because the prison’s subsequent and repeated denials of

Knox’s privileges with her clients were merely the continuing effect of her original

suspension. Id.

With respect to Count V and the continuing conspiracy theory, the Ninth Circuit has

determined that the “last overt act” doctrine applies to the accrual of civil conspiracies for

limitations purposes. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986). Under

the last overt act doctrine, the injury and damage in a civil conspiracy action flows from the

overt acts, not from the mere continuance of a conspiracy, and the cause of action runs

separately from each overt act that is alleged to cause damage to the plaintiff. Id. (holding

that a plaintiff may recover only for the overt acts that specifically were alleged to have

occurred within the limitations period).

Contrary to Defendants’ contention, the acts alleged in Counts IV, V and VI of the

Complaint are not limited to acts occurring prior to the November 16, 2006 indictment of

Dowling. With respect to Count IV of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants

violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by failing to adopt “policies and procedures to ensure

due process and equal protection for those subject to investigation and prosecution.” (Dkt.

1-1, Ex. A at ¶ 91.) Count V of the Complaint alleges that the Defendants’ pursuit of the

investigation and prosecution of Dowling was undertaken pursuant to a meeting of the minds

among Defendants to act in concert to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (Id. at ¶¶

101–02.) Finally, Count VI of the Complaint alleges that “Dowling was investigated,

indicted, and prosecuted by or at the behest of Defendants for improper unconstitutional

motives.” (Id. at ¶ 109.) As noted above, the criminal prosecution of Dowling began with

her indictment on November 16, 2006, and ended on August 26, 2008 with the Plea

Agreement and dismissal of the felony charges. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are not barred

simply because Dowling’s indictment occurred at least two years before Plaintiffs

commenced this action. Part of the prosecution and the continued investigation of Dowling

occurred within the limitations period for Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

Applying the continuing violation theory, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are not barred by

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the statute of limitations if the claims are based on discriminatory or overt acts that occurred

within the limitations period (i.e., after June 3, 2007). However, Plaintiffs cannot obtain

relief against Defendants under § 1983 for alleged discriminatory events that occurred

outside the two-year statute of limitations period. See Berg v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 419

F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1227 (E.D. Cal. 2009). The Court does not need to address Plaintiffs’

requested relief at this time. The inquiry currently before the Court is whether Plaintiffs

introduced facts, which if viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the non-moving

party, raise material questions about whether Defendants continued to discriminate against

Dowling within the statute of limitations period. Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271

F.3d 812, 824 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants pushed, encouraged, contributed to, or otherwise

participated in the decision to ‘investigate’ and later prosecute Dr. Dowling, all for their own

benefit and to further their improper and unconstitutional, political, and retaliatory motives.”

(Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at ¶ 40) (emphasis added). The Complaint provides that “[u]pon

information and belief, other superintendents similarly situated are not subjected to such

heavy-handed investigation and prosecution.” (Id.) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs allege that

“[i]n the ‘investigation’ into Dr. Dowling’s activities, the indictment brought against her, her

booking, and the subsequent criminal proceedings, the Defendants acted maliciously and

without any probably cause to believe that Dr. Dowling was guilty of any of the crimes.” (Id.

at ¶ 62) (emphasis added). Repeated references to the investigation and prosecution clearly

expand scope of the Complaint beyond the actions of Defendants prior to the November 16,

2006 indictment. In fact, the Complaint refers to the July 2008 motion to dismiss the

remaining felony charges, Dowling’s August 26, 2008 guilty plea, and a subsequent civil suit

filed by Defendants against Plaintiffs in connection with the MCRSD. (Id. at ¶¶ 58–61.)

Plaintiffs’ supplemental statement of facts sets forth specific actions taken by

Defendants after June 3, 2007, in connection with the investigation and prosecution of

Dowling. (Dkt. 71 at ¶¶ 70–81.) Specifically, Defendants received information and

interviewed potential witnesses (id. at ¶ 70), picked up the State’s audit of the MCRSD (id.

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at ¶ 71), met with FBI official to discuss the status of the investigation (id. at ¶ 72), continued

to follow leads in the open investigation (id. at ¶ 73), met with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to

discuss the dismissal of felony charges (id. at ¶ 75), appeared at the sentencing hearing and

objected to a provision in the Plea Agreement (id. at ¶ 76), wrote to the Judge regarding the

enforcement of the Plea Agreement (id. at ¶ 77), and continued to pursue a civil action

against Plaintiffs (id. at ¶¶ 80–81).

While the alleged wrongdoing began in 2006, the Complaint, the 2008 Notice of

Claim, and Plaintiffs’ supplemental statement of facts describe actions taken by Defendants

after June 3, 2007, which support continuing violations of § 1983 in connection with the

investigation and criminal prosecution of Dowling. Because one or more of these alleged

acts occurred within the two-year limitations period, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled

sufficient facts to show that Defendants engaged in actions after June 3, 2007, that, if true,

may show a continuing violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under § 1983. The merits

of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims is not before the Court. Accordingly, Counts IV, V and VI of

the Complaint are not barred by the statute of limitations.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant the First Motion for Summary Judgment

with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to support

timely state law claims that accrued within the one-year limitations period. However, the

Court will deny the First Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983

claims, because Plaintiffs set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendants’ allegedly

discriminatory or overt acts related closely enough to constitute a continuing violation, and

that one or more of these acts falls within the two-year statute of limitations period.

Because the First Motion for Summary Judgment was limited to statutes of limitations

issues, the Court has not considered the merits of any of Plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore,

Defendants may file a second motion for summary judgment on the merits of Counts II, IV,

V and/or VI in accordance with the schedule previously set forth by the Court.

Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED that Arpaio Defendants’ First Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 56) is granted in part with respect to Counts I and III of the Complaint, and denied

in part with respect to Counts IV, V and VI.

DATED this 8th day of March, 2011.

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