Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_23-cv-06115/USCOURTS-arwd-6_23-cv-06115-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

 

VANDY STOVALL PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 6:23-CV-06115-SOH-MEF

JASON A. BROTHERTON DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, 

referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation. 

Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 15), and Plaintiff’s Response to the Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 19). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Vandy Stovall (“Stovall”), currently an inmate in the Ouachita River Correctional 

Unit of the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”), filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pro se on 

November 15, 2023. (ECF No. 1). The Court ordered the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint 

detailing how his constitutional rights were violated and what injury he suffered. (ECF No. 6). 

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 7) on December 18, 2023, and at the Court’s 

direction, Defendant was served with Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF Nos. 8-10). On March 

14, 2024, Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss and a Brief in Support, arguing that Stovall’s 

Amended Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF Nos. 12, 13). 

The Court issued an Order affording Stovall an opportunity to cure pleading defects in his 

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Amended Complaint and granted Stovall leave to file a second amended complaint under Fed. R. 

Civ. Pro. 15(a)(1)(B). (ECF No. 14). 

On April 29, 2024, Stovall filed his Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 15). Stovall’s 

Second Amended Complaint asserts a claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 4. Stovall alleges the date of occurrence as 

August 15, 2023, and he names Jason A. Brotherton (“Brotherton”) as the Defendant. Id. Stovall 

brings his claim against Brotherton in both his official and personal capacity.0F

1 Id. at 7. Stovall, 

however, does not correctly state a “policy or custom that [he] believe[s] caused a violation of his 

constitutional rights.” Id. Instead, he asserts that his rights were violated when Brotherton

allegedly placed his hand on his gun while saying, “Stovall, I heard Black people can run fast, so 

take off so I can shoot you!” Id. at 4, 7. Stovall claims he was injured by Brotherton’s actions,

and he suffered mentally because of the threat on his life. Id. at 5. 

On May 1, 2024, Brotherton filed a timely Motion to Dismiss, and a Brief in Support,

seeking dismissal of Stovall’s Second Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 16, 17). He argues 

Stovall’s claims against him should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because 

Stovall fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 17 at 3). He further

argues that Stovall’s requested relief is barred by statute and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 

and thus, the relief cannot be granted as a matter of law. Id. at 3-4. Brotherton contends that 

because Stovall only suffered mental injuries from the threat to his life, he is statutorily barred 

from recovering monetary relief by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Id. He also argues that Stovall is barred 

1 In Stovall’s Second Amended Complaint, he indicates he is bringing his claim against Brotherton

in his official capacity. (ECF No. 15 at 5). Two pages later, Plaintiff adds additional facts while 

echoing his first claim in the area for a second claim. Id. at 7. On the same page, he marked the 

option stating he is suing the Defendant in his official and individual capacity. Id. Accordingly, 

the Court will address the claims against Brotherton in each capacity. 

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from recovering monetary relief from him in his official capacity by the doctrine of sovereign 

immunity. Id. Brotherton, however, addresses Stovall’s substantive claims by arguing that he has

not stated an actionable constitutional violation against him. (ECF No. 17). Stovall filed a 

Response to the Motion to Dismiss on May 28, 2024. (ECF No. 19). The Motion to Dismiss (ECF 

No. 16) is ripe for decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). “In order to meet this standard, and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), ‘a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the Court will 

liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support 

his claims. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). For purposes of deciding a 

motion to dismiss, the Court takes the alleged facts as true, construing all reasonable inferences

arising from the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 

185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). 

III. ANALYSIS

As set forth above, Stovall argues that he suffered cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment when Brotherton placed his hand on his gun and told him to 

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take off running so that he could shoot him. Stovall argues that this incident caused him to fear 

for his life and caused mental distress. Brotherton’s arguments for dismissal are addressed below.

A. Sovereign Immunity

First, the Court looks to Brotherton’s argument that Stovall’s claims are barred by 

sovereign immunity. To the extent the Second Amended Complaint can be read to assert an

official capacity claim against Brotherton, the claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The 

Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages by private parties against a state. See, e.g., 

Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Fryberger v. Univ. 

of Ark., 889 F.3d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 2018) (Eleventh Amendment establishes that “an unconsenting 

State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of 

another state”). An official capacity claim against government officials is the equivalent of a claim 

against the entity itself. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits against state officials in 

their official capacity ... should be treated as suits against the State”). As Defendant Brotherton is 

an employee of the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”), and the ADC is a state agency in

the State of Arkansas, Stovall’s official capacity claim against Brotherton is subject to dismissal. 

B. Limitation on Damages

Brotherton next argues that Stovall’s claim is limited because his request for compensatory

damages and parole as a form of relief are barred as a matter of law. (ECF No. 17 at 3-4). First, 

Brotherton argues that Stovall’s claim for compensatory damages is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(e). (ECF No. 17 at 3). Brotherton is correct in asserting that § 1997e(e) bars compensatory 

damages as a form of relief “without a showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual 

act.” Id. And Stovall has not alleged that he suffered a physical injury due to Brotherton’s alleged 

misconduct. Additionally, Stovall’s assertion that Brotherton caused him mental injuries and 

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PTSD have not been recognized to rise to physical injuries in the context of the Eighth

Amendment. See Thomas v. Leggins, 2024 WL 3509500, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 22, 2024) (finding 

that PTSD is still a mental injury that is barred under the PLRA). Therefore, Stovall’s request for 

compensatory damages is subject to dismissal.

As Stovall has stated a claim of a constitutional dimension, his potential recovery would 

be limited to the recovery of nominal and punitive damages. See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 

723 (8th Cir. 2004) (The physical injury requirement of the PLRA places limits on recovery for 

mental and emotional injury but it does not bar recovery of nominal and punitive damages); see 

also Pitts v. Helder, 2023 WL 2497989, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 31, 2023) (without a physical 

showing, claims of constitutional dimension are limited to the recovery of nominal and possibly 

punitive damages). Indeed, “[p]unitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 ‘when the 

defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless 

or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 

905, 922 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). 

Next, Brotherton contends that Stovall’s request for relief in the form of parole is barred 

by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a 

claim for damages for “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm 

caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” is not 

cognizable until “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or 

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 

486-87. Under this body of law, a plaintiff may not employ the civil rights statutes as a substitute 

for habeas corpus relief. In other words, Stovall cannot seek relief pursuant to § 1983 which 

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would undermine or potentially invalidate his criminal charges, convictions, and subsequent 

confinement. See, e.g., Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 

U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy for prisoners attacking the validity 

of their conviction or confinement). As Stovall is barred by Heck from utilizing § 1983 as 

mechanism to challenge his current sentence, his request for parole should be denied.

C. Constitutional Claims

Turning to Stovall’s constitutional claim, he alleges he suffered cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state an Eighth Amendment claim a 

prisoner must meet two requirements, one objective and one subjective. The first requirement is 

whether, viewed objectively, the deprivation of rights was sufficiently serious. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Meaning, “a prison official’s act or omission must result in 

the denial of the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Determining if an injury is sufficiently serious is a claim specific inquiry, as it permits the court to 

analyze the Eighth Amendment claims in context and in accordance with “contemporary standards 

of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). The second requirement is subjective 

and requires the plaintiff to prove that prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” 

Id. For Eighth Amendment claims, the court looks to the specific claim raised by a prisoner. Irving 

v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008). When a prisoner alleges that an officer or prison 

official has used excessive force that impacts his health and safety, the claim is treated as a 

conditions of confinement claim. Id. at 446. In an excessive force case, the subjective inquiry 

turns to whether force was used “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or 

maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm.” Arnold v. Goose, 109 F.3d 1292, 

1298 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted). The words “maliciously” and “sadistically”

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establish a higher standard of intent together than either would alone. See Howard v. Barnett, 21 

F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Beginning with the subjective requirement, Stovall claims that Brotherton told him, “I 

heard Black people can run fast so take off running so I can shoot you,” while Brotherton rested 

his hand on his pistol. (ECF No. 15 at 4, 7). Taking Stovall’s claim as true, it is difficult to see 

what legitimate penological purpose could have been served by Brotherton’s statement and 

physical gesture. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (finding that penological 

purpose must exist to show a legitimate or good faith purpose for the officer’s action); cf. Small v. 

Brock, 963 F.3d 539, 541 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that there is no penological purpose for 

brandishing a knife merely for the purpose of placing a prisoner in fear of his life). At this stage, 

the record does not indicate any institutional or penological purposes at play during the incident 

between Stovall and Brotherton. Arnold, 109 F.3d at 1298. Nor does the record indicate any 

disciplinary context that could justify Brotherton’s alleged statement. Indeed, the record is unclear

as to the purpose of Brotherton’s statement; however, the statement does provide insight into 

Brotherton’s state of mind at the time that he made his statement towards Stovall. See Pelfrey v. 

Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding an Eighth Amendment violation based on 

conduct “designed to frighten and degrade by reinforcing the fact that his continued well-being 

was entirely dependent on the good humor of his armed guards”). Analyzing the record before the 

Court, the officer’s statement was, at a minimum, made with deliberate indifference to Stovall’s 

health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. In fact, a statement made by an officer to test a racial 

stereotype is more akin to the “purpose of causing harm” rather than “maintaining or restoring 

discipline” in a prison. Id. Therefore, the Court is left to conclude that Brotherton’s actions were 

likely done with the purpose of causing harm and served a malicious or sadistic purpose rather 

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than a legitimate penological objective. See Arnold, 109 F.3d at 1298. Thus, at this stage, Stovall’s 

claim meets the subjective requirement. 

Turning to the objective requirement, excessive force claims involve the direct infliction 

of harm on inmates. Because the use of force is sometimes required in prison settings, guards are

only liable when the use of force is to, maliciously or sadistically, cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S.,

at 9. However, “not every push or shove ... violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id. Only 

where the use of force is greater than de minimis, or the use of force is “repugnant to the conscious 

of mankind,” does a prisoner have a valid constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment. Id. 

at 9-10; see also Irving, 519 F.3d at 446. Yet, “[i]t is not hard to imagine inflictions of 

psychological harm ... that might prove to be cruel and unusual punishment.” Hudson, 503 U.S. 

at 16 (Blackmon J., concurring). Indeed, “psychological pain can be more than de minimis” and

can similarly be the basis of a claim. Id. In his Second Amended Complaint, Stovall does not 

allege any specific physical injury; instead, he asserts he has suffered mentally because of the

threat on his life. (ECF No. 15 at 4). In determining whether Stovall’s deprivation of rights is 

sufficiently serious, the Court will analyze the type of injury incurred. 

Beginning with the verbal threat, the Eighth Circuit has previously held “[v]erbal threats 

do not constitute a constitutional violation.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir. 

1985). Similarly, taunts, name calling, and the use of offensive language does not state a claim of 

constitutional dimension. McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (inmate's claims 

of general harassment and of verbal harassment were not actionable under § 1983); O'Donnell v. 

Thomas, 826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) (verbal threats and abuse by jail officials did not rise 

to the level of a constitutional violation). Yet, the Eighth Circuit has found an exception to this 

rule if a public official engages in “brutal” and “wanton act[s] of cruelty” without causing physical 

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injury. Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding a plaintiff had a claim 

when an officer threatened his life at gunpoint and used racial epithets). This exception extends

to instances where the actions of the officer subject the prisoner to the fear of instant death. See 

id.; see also Irving, 519 F.3d at 449. But an officer’s verbal threat must be accompanied by some 

sort of physical showing. Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1992)

(finding that a plaintiff’s claim failed as the officer did not brandish his weapon or make any 

physical gesture when verbally threatening the plaintiff).

Here, Stovall’s claim lies at the intersection of the Eighth Circuit’s caselaw on excessive

force, racial epithets, and verbal threats. In Hopson, the court reviewed a district court’s decision 

to grant a directed verdict against Hopson’s § 1983 claim that Officer Thomure used excessive 

force when he used racial slurs and threatened to “knock Hopson’s remaining teeth out of his 

mouth if he remained silent.” Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1378 (cleaned up); see also Black Spotted 

Horse v. Else, 767 F.2d 516, 517 (8th Cir. 1985) (use of racially offensive language in dealing 

with a prisoner does not, by itself, state a claim). The court held that Hopson’s claim was 

distinguishable from Burton because Hopson was not physically assaulted by Officer Thomure, 

nor did the officer make a physical gesture towards Hopson with his fist or a firearm. Id. at 1379. 

While the court did not condone the actions of Officer Thomure’s alleged conduct, the use of racial 

slurs while making mere verbal threats was not sufficient for a cognizable claim. Id. at 1378-79.

Therefore, the court acknowledged that Hopson’s claim failed to rise to the level of brutal and 

wanton cruelty necessary to meet a cognizable claim under § 1983. Id. The Eighth Circuit’s ruling 

in Hopson makes clear that a mere verbal threat and the use of racial slurs is not enough to 

constitute a cognizable claim, a physical gesture must accompany the threat to make it objectively 

credible.

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In Irving v. Dormire, the court analyzed a prisoner’s claims that multiple corrections

officers made repeated threats to kill him and threatened to arrange to have him killed or beaten

by other inmates. Irving, 519 F.3d at 449. The threats spanned a period of several months from 

2004-2005 and involved one of the officers giving a razor to an inmate to harm Irving. Id. at 445. 

Additionally, the officers, on several occasions attempted to dragoon other inmates into attacking 

Irving in exchange for money and cigarettes. Id. The court held that the repeated use of death 

threats, in addition to the other misconduct involved, distinguished the officers’ actions from 

verbal threats and constituted objectively credible death threats from state actors that are 

cognizable as brutal and wanton cruelty that serve no penological purpose under the Eighth 

Amendment. Id. at 449-50.

Brotherton argues his statement constitutes a mere verbal threat; but Stovall asserts that 

Brotherton made the statement while resting his hand on his gun. (ECF No. 15 at 7). Brotherton 

argues that even if he did have his hand on his gun and used stereotypes, it is not as egregious as 

the conduct described in Burton, thus decreasing the severity of the incident. (ECF No. 17 at 6). 

In Burton, the Eighth Circuit found a constitutional violation when Officer Livingston brandished

his service weapon, armed it, and threatened to kill Burton for exercising his constitutional rights

while Livingston yelled racial epithets. Burton, 791 F.2d at 100. At this stage, it is unclear if 

Brotherton’s hand on his gun is a physical gesture sufficient to raise his statement from a verbal 

threat to an actionable death threat. However, Brotherton’s argument misunderstands the purpose 

of Burton. The Burton court took pains to acknowledge that there was no provocation for the

“wanton act of cruelty which, if it occurred, was brutal despite the fact that it resulted in no 

measurable physical injury to the prisoner.” Burton, 791 F.2d at 100. In fact, the principle of 

Burton was subsequently furthered by the Irving court when the court recognized that “a guard is 

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not permitted to threaten an inmate with death by means readily at hand.” Irving, 519 F.3d at 450.

Similarly, the record does not indicate, nor can the Court identify, any provocation that justifies

the use of a death threat towards an inmate for the purpose of testing a stereotype. 

Moreover, Brotherton’s use of the phrase, “run so I can shoot you” bears too close a relation

to the threat used by Officer Livingston that caused Burton to fear for his life. See Burton, 791 

F.2d at 99 (“. . . ‘run so I can blow your Goddamn brains out, I want you to run so I’ll be justified’”) 

(alteration in the original). As the Burton court acknowledged, “a prisoner retains at least the right 

to be free from the terror of instant and unexpected death at the whim of his custodians.” Id. at 

100 (alteration in the original). In this instance, while the semantics are softer the sentiment is the 

same. Taking Stovall’s assertions as true, it was reasonable for Stovall to fear for his life while a 

corrections officer issued a death threat with his hand on his weapon. Therefore, there is a 

plausible claim that Brotherton was making a death threat towards Stovall. 

The Court does not condone such behavior, and at this stage, the Court is not convinced 

the use of the phrase, “run so I can shoot you” while resting a hand on a firearm can reasonably be 

interpreted as an idle threat. Indeed, other courts have similarly found that objectively credible

death threats constitute a cognizable harm. See Chandler v. D.C. Dept. of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355, 

1360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that a single death threat by a guard who had the ability carry

out the threat was sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim); see also Hudspeth v. Figgins, 

548 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1978) (where an officer ordered the prisoner to drop his lawsuit or 

he would be “accidently” shot constituted a cognizable claim); cf. Small, 963 F.3d at 541-42

(“objectively credible threats” such as aggressively brandishing a deadly weapon make threats 

credible). Like Chandler, accepting Stovall’s claims as true, “depending on the gravity of the fear, 

the credibility of the threat, and on [his] psychological condition, the threat itself could have caused 

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more than a de minimis harm and therefore could have been sufficient to state a claim of excessive 

force.” 145 F.3d at 1361; see also Small, 963 F.3d at 542 (finding that the threat of death by knife 

caused a prisoner to fear for his life to the point of paranoia and psychological distress that

necessitated mental health treatment was more than de minimis). Given the current facts before 

the Court, Stovall has sufficiently plead more than a de minimis harm under the Eighth 

Amendment. As Stovall has asserted a claim with sufficient particularity to, at least, plausibly 

claim that the defendant is liable for his conduct, Brotherton’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted should be DENIED as to the Stovall’s constitutional 

claim against Brotherton in his individual capacity. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it isrecommended that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 16) should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, it is 

recommended that the Motion be GRANTED as to Stovall’s official capacity claim, his claim for 

compensatory damages, and his request for relief in the form of parole; and that the Motion be

DENIED in all other respects.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation 

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely 

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are 

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the 

district court.

DATED this 19th day of November 2024.

/s/ Mark E. Ford

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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