Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03190/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03190-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAREN HEATHERLY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ILINKHOBBY, INC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-03190-JSC 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 

ILINKHOBBY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO FILE A MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

Re: Dkt. No. 70

Now pending before the Court is Defendant Ilinkhobby’s motion for leave to file a motion 

for reconsideration of the Court’s November 6, 2015 Order denying Ilinkhobby’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment and granting Defendants Peter Kai Chuen Chiu and Rita Shuet Kuen Chiu’s 

(“the Chius”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 67.) For the reasons stated below, 

Ilinkhobby’s motion is DENIED.

“[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual 

circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. 

Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). A motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise 

arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised 

earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In its Order, the Court rejected Ilinkhobby’s express indemnity claim premised on 

paragraph 2 of the lease. (Dkt. No. 67 at 8-9). The Court’s holding was based on the plain 

language of paragraph 2 which, the Court held, did not apply to the facts in the record. (Id. at 8.) 

The Court noted that instead paragraph 9 of the lease “governs the at-issue ADA barriers” and that 

neither Ilinkhobby nor the Lis had even addressed paragraph 9 in their briefs. (Id. at 8-9.) 

Case 3:13-cv-03190-JSC Document 71 Filed 11/17/15 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Ilinkhobby contends that its briefs did address paragraph 9 and that the Court committed clear 

legal error by failing to address its argument that under California law a lessor cannot assign 

liability for compliance with the ADA absent an explicit assumption of that duty. 

The Court is unpersuaded. First, Ilinkhobby’s motion for reconsideration does not identify 

where in any of its briefs it refers to paragraph 9 of the lease. They do not. Instead, Ilinkhobby 

argued that paragraph 2 placed the responsibility for ADA barrier removal on the Lessor (Dkt. No. 

38 at 14-15) and that California law requires the landlord to ensure leased premises are in 

compliance with the law “unless explicitly assumed by the tenant in a written agreement,” citing 

Glen R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde, 70 Cal. 2d 666, 672 (1969). (Id. at 14.) Ilinkhobby 

never addressed paragraph 9, let alone why it does not constitute an explicit assignment of the 

duty to comply with all federal laws to the Lessee (here, the Lis1 who the parties have treated as 

interchangeable with Ilinkhobby). Rather, Ilinkhobby argued that paragraph 2 “explicitly 

confirms that the [Lessor] retained their duty to bring the property into compliance with the 

particular law at issue here, the ADA.” (Id. at 14:22-24.) For this reason alone Ilinkhobby’s 

motion for reconsideration must be denied.

Second, to the extent Ilinkhobby intended to argue that Glen r. Sewell Sheet Metal defeats 

paragraph 9, the Court disagrees. In Sewell, the California Supreme Court noted “the general rule 

[] that a lessee’s unqualified covenant to comply with applicable laws, standing alone, does not 

constitute an assumption of the duty to comply with those laws that require curative actions of a 

‘substantial’ nature.” Id. at 674. If the curative actions are “substantial,” the court must look 

beyond the language of the covenant to repair to ascertain the parties’ intent as to which of them, 

landlord or tenant, had assumed the risk of such repairs. Id. at 675. In Sewell, the court concluded 

that given the covenant and the additional obligations assumed by the lessor under the lease 

agreement, the responsibility to comply with other laws—namely, the county’s order to connect 

the septic system to the public sewer—lay with the lessee. The lessee “took the premises ‘as is,’

 

1

The “Lis” are third-party defendants Wilfred Leung, Amy W. Li, Peter Yao Liang and Lai Hung 

Li to whom the Chius leased the premise wherein Ilinkhobby operates the restaurant, the New 

China Restaurant.

Case 3:13-cv-03190-JSC Document 71 Filed 11/17/15 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

relieved the [lessor] of the duty to repair or maintain the improvements, agreed to indemnify them 

for any liability arising out of his use of the premises, and assumed the duty of compliance with all 

laws respecting the premises.” Id. at 676. The court also considered the nature of the lessee’s use 

of the property and any doubt that the lessee had agreed to assume the risks of compliance and 

repair was dispelled, “by a consideration of the character of the premises involved.” Id. at 675. 

Thus, for a lease agreement for a trailer park, “one who intends to operate a trailer park must know 

that laws respecting and regulating such facilities would be of primary importance to him and 

would be those most obviously included in a clause requiring compliance with all applicable 

laws.” Id. at 676. 

Paragraph 9 of the lease allocates responsibility for compliance with federal, state, and 

county laws to the Lessee. (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 5.2) Under Sewell and its progeny, this allocation of 

responsibility is accepted at face value unless the curative actions (here, remediation of the access 

barriers) are substantial in nature. Id. at 674; Brown v. Green, 8 Cal. 4th 812, 823 (1994). 

Ilinkhobby’s motion fails as it has made no effort to satisfy even this threshold question. Indeed, 

neither Ilinkhobby in its motion for summary judgment, nor the Lis in opposing the Chiu’s motion 

for summary judgment argued that the cost of compliance here was substantial. Nor has 

Ilinkhobby contended as much in seeking reconsideration. Perhaps this is because such an 

argument would be unavailing as the cost of compliance was $6,700, only slightly more that the 

monthly lease amount of $6,000. (Compare Dkt. No. 53 at ¶¶ 4-7 and Dkt. No. 53-3 with Dkt. No. 

40-4.) In contrast, the cost of the repair at issue 45 years ago in Sewell was $7,500 compared to a

monthly rental of $725. See Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde, 70 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133 

(Ct. App. 1968) vacated, 70 Cal. 2d 666 (1969).

Even if the Court were to conclude that this amount were substantial, the totality of 

circumstances under the lease agreement here would mandate a finding that the responsibility lies 

with the Lessee as in Sewell. The lease includes a specific allocation of the costs of compliance, 

Ilinkhobby intended to operate the business as a restaurant, i.e., a place of public accommodation,

 

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

Case 3:13-cv-03190-JSC Document 71 Filed 11/17/15 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

which it either knew or should have known was subject to the requirements of the ADA, and the 

sale agreement between the Chius and Ilinkhobby (for operation of the restaurant at issue) states 

that the buyer accepts the “premises and equipment which Buyer [Ilinkhobby] is leasing from 

Seller [the Chius]” as is and did so after “carefully inspect[ing] [it] for the purposes for which 

Buyer [Ilinkhobby] intends.” (Dkt. No. 52-2 at ¶ 21.) Thus, just as in Sewell, the responsibility 

for ADA compliance under the assumption of responsibility covenant of the lease was assumed by 

Ilinkhobby/the Lis as the Lessee.

Accordingly, Ilinkhobby’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is 

DENIED. Ilinkhobby has failed to demonstrate clear error with respect to the Court’s decision 

denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the Chius’ motion for summary judgment.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 70.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 17, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:13-cv-03190-JSC Document 71 Filed 11/17/15 Page 4 of 4