Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02680/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02680-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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18-CV-2680-MDD 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

VICTOR LAW,

Plaintiff,

v.

TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 683; 

TODD MENDEZ; FRANK SEVILLA; 

THE PASHA GROUP, a California 

corporation; TRANSDEV SERVICES., a 

Maryland corporation,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-CV-2680-GPC-MDD 

ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 

TO PROCEED IFP AND 

CONDUCTING SUA SPONTE 

SCREENING

[ECF No. 3.]

Plaintiff Victor Law, an individual proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against his 

former union, Teamsters Local 683 (the “Union”), two Union officers, his former 

employer, the Pasha Group, and Transdev Services, a corporation subject to a collective 

bargaining agreement with the Union. (ECF No. 1.) Earlier this year, Plaintiff was 

nominated to run for union office as Vice President, on a slate opposed to the current 

Union leadership. Plaintiff alleges that after he campaigned at a trolley stop operated by 

Transdev on October 29, 2018, Transdev, the two Union officers, and the Pasha Group 

conspired together to retaliate against Plaintiff by unlawfully surveilling him. Plaintiff 

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further asserts that he was terminated on November 13, 2018 by the Pasha Group for 

engaging in activity protected under the Union Member’s Bill of Rights, 29 U.S.C. § 411. 

Plaintiff comes before the Court, alleging various causes of action against the 

defendants, including violations of the National Labor Relations Act, a breach of the duty 

of fair representation, tortious interference with contract, and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. Before any further action can take place in this case, however, the 

Court must address Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (ECF No. 

3.) 

Application to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a). See 

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 

1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must submit an affidavit demonstrating his 

inability to pay the filing fee, and the affidavit must include a complete statement of the 

plaintiff’s assets. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). When a plaintiff moves to proceed IFP, the 

court first “grants or denies IFP status based on the plaintiff’s financial resources alone 

and then independently determines whether to dismiss the complaint” pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff has filed an affidavit detailing his financial situation. (ECF No. 4.) 

Plaintiff explains therein that he maintains a banking account with a $4,000 balance, but 

has monthly expenses of approximately $3,470, and that he is the sole provider for his 

 

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 

(eff. Dec. 1, 2014)). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 

proceed IFP. Id.

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teenage daughter. Although ostensibly Plaintiff would be able to pay the $350 filing fee

based on simple arithmetic, the Court appreciates that Plaintiff has been terminated from 

his job, the propriety of which is at the heart of his lawsuit, and will likely not be with 

means to cover his future monthly expenses if a filing fee is required. 

While the Court “may deny IFP status to an applicant who can pay the filing fee 

with acceptable sacrifice to other expenses,” Foreman v. Freedman, No. 11-CV-1187-

MMA (RBB), 2012 WL 12931999, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012), the Court does not 

believe that Plaintiff is such an applicant. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).1 (ECF No. 3.)

Sua Sponte Screening

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the complaint is subject to mandatory 

screening and the Court must order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds 

“frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”). “[W]hen determining whether a 

complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and 

must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 

213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe 

a pro se’s pleadings. Id. In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, however, 

the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey 

v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to survive the 

sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court finds 

 

1 Plaintiff is reminded, however, that IFP status may be lost and acquired during the course of litigation, 

and that the present order might be effected if Plaintiff secures new employment. See Wilson v. Dir. of 

Div. of Adult Insts., No. CIV S–06–0791, 2009 WL 311150, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009). 

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Plaintiff is entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The 

officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] 

cases.”); FED. R. CIV. PROC. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a 

United States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in 

forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”). 

The Clerk shall issue a summons for Defendants, provide Plaintiff with a certified 

copy of both this Order and his complaint (ECF No. 1), and forward them to Plaintiff 

along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each of the named Defendants. Plaintiff 

shall complete the Form 285s and forward them to the United States Marshal within a 

reasonable amount of time such that the U.S. Marshal can timely serve the Defendants 

within the 120 days provided by FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). The U.S. Marshal shall, after 

receiving Plaintiff's completed Form 285s, serve a copy of the complaint, as directed by 

Plaintiff on each U.S. Marshal Form 285. All costs of service shall be advanced by the 

United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 12, 2018

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