Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02005/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1 

 16cv02005 JAH 

Criminal No.: 16cr00837 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JORGE MORGAS-MENDOZA, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent. 

 Civil No.: 16cv02005 JAH 

Criminal No.: 16cr00837 JAH 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE 

 Petitioner Jorge Morgas-Mendoza, proceeding pro se, filed a motion challenging his 

conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“section 2255”). Respondent filed a response. After 

a thorough review of the record and the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth 

below, this Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

 On March 22, 2016, Petitioner was arrested by a United States Border Patrol agent 

after attempting to conceal himself in a brush approximately three miles east of the Otay 

Mesa Port of Entry and admitting he did not possess proper immigration documents. Doc. 

No. 1 at 2. On April 21, 2016, Petitioner signed a waiver of indictment and the United 

States Attorney filed a superseding information charging Defendant with illegally 

reentering the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)-(b). See 

Case 3:16-cv-02005-JAH Document 2 Filed 11/18/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
2 

 16cv02005 JAH 

Criminal No.: 16cr00837 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Doc. No. 11. On May 3, 2016, Petitioner pled guilty to the superseding information 

pursuant to a plea agreement. See Doc. No. 17. 

 In the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a base offense level of 8, and -3 levels 

for acceptance of responsibility. Doc. No. 17 at 8. Petitioner also agreed to waive appeal 

and collateral attack. Doc. No. 17 at 10-11. After Petitioner entered his change of plea, 

the United States recommended Petitioner be sentenced to the maximum amount permitted 

under the guideline range of 46 months in custody. Doc. No. 22 at 2. Defense counsel 

recommended Petitioner be sentenced to 8 months in custody. Doc. No. 24-1 at 1. 

 At the sentencing hearing on July 25, 2016, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 30 

months in custody, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. See Doc. No. 30. 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant motion seeking to vacate or set aside his sentence 

and the United States filed a response in opposition. See Doc. Nos. 27, 31. 

DISCUSSION

 Petitioner seeks an order modifying on the grounds he received ineffective assistance 

of counsel and he was sentenced outside his guideline range. Respondent argues the 

motion should be denied because defense counsel was not ineffective, and his claim is 

barred by the appellate waiver in the plea agreement. 

I. Legal Standard 

 A section 2255 motion may be brought to vacate, set aside or correct a federal 

sentence on the following grounds: (1) the sentence “was imposed in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States;” (2) “the court was without jurisdiction to impose 

such sentence;” (3) “the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law;” or (4) 

the sentence is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 

II. Analysis 

 Petitioner waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his judgment and sentence. 

Doc. No. 17 at 10-11. A knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right is enforceable. 

United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). The right to 

collaterally attack a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2255 is statutory in nature, and 

Case 3:16-cv-02005-JAH Document 2 Filed 11/18/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
3 

 16cv02005 JAH 

Criminal No.: 16cr00837 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a defendant may therefore waive the right to file a section 2255 petition. See United States 

v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that, by entering plea agreement 

whereby defendant waived right to appeal his sentence, defendant relinquished right to 

directly or collaterally attack his sentence on the ground of newly discovered exculpatory 

evidence). 

 The scope of a section 2255 waiver may be subject to potential limitations. For 

example, a defendant’s waiver will not bar an appeal if the trial court did not satisfy certain 

requirements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 to ensure that the waiver was 

knowingly and voluntarily made. See Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. Such a waiver 

might also be ineffective where the sentence imposed is not in accordance with the 

negotiated agreement or violates the law. See Id.; United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 

527, 528 (9th Cir. 1997). Additionally, a waiver may be “unenforceable” and may not 

“categorically foreclose” a defendant from bringing section 2255 proceedings where a 

petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel challenging the voluntariness of his plea. 

Lampert, 422 F.3d at 871; Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014; see also United States v. Pruitt, 32 

F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). 

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, two requirements must be 

met: (1) That the counsel’s performance was deficient, which requires a showing that 

counsel made errors so serious that he/she was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed 

by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) That the counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the 

petitioner, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious they deprived 

the petitioner of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

 The record demonstrates Petitioner’s waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily. 

In the plea agreement, Defendant certified that he read the agreement and fully understood 

its meaning and effect. See Doc. No. 17 at 5. In his motion, Petitioner contends his counsel 

was ineffective because she coerced him into signing the plea agreement and misinformed 

him about the amount of time he was exposing himself to when he signed the plea 

Case 3:16-cv-02005-JAH Document 2 Filed 11/18/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 5
4 

 16cv02005 JAH 

Criminal No.: 16cr00837 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

agreement.1

 In a declaration submitted by the United States in its response, defense counsel 

states she never promised Petitioner any type of sentence, that the sentence would be 

determined by this Court, and that she thoroughly reviewed the plea agreement with 

Petitioner before he signed it. Doc. No. 31-1 at 1-2. At the plea hearing, the magistrate 

judge determined Petitioner made his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily, which was 

not the result of force, threats, or promises other than those in the plea agreement. Doc. 

No. 18 at 4. The magistrate judge further determined that Petitioner understood the plea 

agreement would waive his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. Id. at 

3. Additionally, the plea agreement, which Petitioner signed and initialed, clearly reads 

that Petitioner had a full opportunity to discuss the facts and circumstances of his case, 

understood the consequences of his plea, was not made any promises other than those in 

the plea agreement, and was not threatened to induce the guilty plea. Doc No. 17 at 5. 

Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Petitioner presents no facts indicating he 

was coerced into signing the plea agreement by any of the parties or that his counsel 

misinformed him about the time he was exposing himself to. The plea agreement also 

clearly states that his sentencing was within the sole discretion of the Court, not the United 

States nor his defense counsel. Doc. No. 17 at 7. For these reasons, Petitioner has failed 

to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient. 

 Petitioner further fails to demonstrate prejudice. As such, Petitioner fails to 

demonstrate his guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily, and his waiver is 

enforceable and forecloses his collateral attack. 

III. Certificate of Appealability 

 Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules following 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a district court “must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

                                               

1

 Petitioner claims he “sign[ed] for a year and a day” and received 37 months at sentencing. Doc No. 

27 at 13-14. However, Petitioner was sentenced to 30 months followed by three years of supervised 

release. See Doc. No. 30. Petitioner does not make it clear whether his counsel specifically told him he 

would be sentenced “for a year and a day” or if he would receive a different sentence. 

Case 3:16-cv-02005-JAH Document 2 Filed 11/18/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 5
5 

 16cv02005 JAH 

Criminal No.: 16cr00837 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

applicant” in Section 2255 cases such as this. A habeas petitioner may not appeal the denial 

of a Section 2255 habeas petition unless he obtains a certificate of appealability from a 

district or circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Asrar, 116 

F.3d 1268, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district courts retain authority to issue 

certificates of appealability under AEDPA). A certificate of appealability is authorized “if 

the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this threshold showing, a petitioner must show that: (1) the 

issues are debatable among jurists of reason, (2) that a court could resolve the issues in a 

different manner, or (3) that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). 

 Based on this Court’s review of the record, this Court finds no issues are debatable 

among jurists of reason and no issues could be resolved in a different manner. This Court 

further finds that no questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

 1. Petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence is DENIED; 

and 

 2. Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability. 

Dated: November 18, 2019 

HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:16-cv-02005-JAH Document 2 Filed 11/18/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 5