Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01103/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01103-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s answer, and 1

Petitioner’s traverse. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BILLY WAYNE MCGEE,

Petitioner,

v.

T.L. CAREY,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-01103 LJO SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1] 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

On September 29, 2000, following a jury trial, in the Fresno County Superior Court,

Petitioner was convicted of first degree burglary and attempted robbery. The court found true

that Petitioner suffered three serious felony convictions. Petitioner also admitted an additional

enhancing allegation. Petitioner was sentenced to forty-two years to life in state prison.

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. On March 4, 2002, the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. 

(Lodged Doc. C.)

On April 4, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

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 Respondents states that he attempted to obtain copies of these documents but was informed by the state 2

court that they were unable to locate the file related to this matter. 

 It was later discovered that a screen had been removed from one of Delphine’s windows. (RT 166-167.) 3

 Delphine had never met Petitioner before and had not given him permission to enter her residence. (RT 4

174.) 

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Court. (Lodged Doc. D.) The petition was denied on May 15, 2002. (Lodged Doc. E.)

On November 28, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Lodged Doc. F.) The petition was denied

on May 17, 2002, without prejudice to filing a petition in the superior court. (Lodged Doc. G.)

On July 5, 2002, Petitioner field a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Superior

Court of the State of California, County of Fresno. (Lodged Doc. H.) The petition was denied

on April 4, 2003. (Lodged Doc. I.)

On May 14, 2003, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The petition was denied on May 23, 2003.2

On June 19, 2003, Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Lodged Doc. J.) The petition was denied

on March 5, 2004. (Lodged Doc. K.)

On June 28, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California

Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. L.) The petition was denied on May 18, 2005. (Lodged Doc. M.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 29, 2005. 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on December 5, 2005, and Petitioner filed a traverse

on February 6, 2006.

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

In June of 2000, Delphine Tristan was living at 4837 East Nevada Avenue in Fresno. 

(RT 126.) Ms. Tristan’s son, George Tristan and his four-year-old daughter were spending the

night with her. (RT 126-128.) In the middle of the night, Delphine was awakened by the

presence of a man in her bedroom. (RT 135.) Petitioner pointed something into Delphine’s ribs 3

and told her he was going to kill her if she did not give him her purse. Delphine told Petitioner 4

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28 There actually was no address of 4711 East Nevada. (RT 266, 270-271.) However, Petitioner’s 5

employer did own property at 4911 East Nevada. (RT 404.) 

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they should go to the living room where her purse was located. (RT 137, 164.) Petitioner then

covered part of his face with his jacket and moved to the door. (RT 138-140.) 

Delphine’s sone, George, came out of his bedroom and asked, “What the hell’s going

on?” (RT 141-144.) Delphine stated that Petitioner was trying to kill or rob her. (RT 144.) 

Petitioner then attempted to flee from the residence but ran into a sliding door. (RT 145-149.) 

George was able to capture Petitioner and hold him until the police arrived. (RT 149-150, 158-

160.) 

When Petitioner was placed under arrest for home invasion, he stated, “I didn’t do no

fucking home invasion. I just did a fucking burglary.” (RT 222.) Petitioner was advised of his

Miranda rights, and agreed to talk to police. Petitioner claimed that he was staying at his

employer’s residence at 4711 East Nevada and was planning to spend the night in front of the

residence parked in his employer’s vehicle. Petitioner claimed the next thing he knew he was

being beaten up inside the victim’s home. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

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Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

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by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise sentencing

certain issues related to his 1995 conviction which was used to enhance his sentence. 

Petitioner presented this claim to the superior court, Court of Appeal, and California

Supreme Court, via state habeas corpus petitions. The superior court, in a written opinion,

denied the claim on the merits. (Lodged Doc. I.) The Court of Appeal and California Supreme

Court denied the petitions without comment. (Lodged Docs K, M.) 

Because the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, however, this

Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the Superior Court,

the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look

through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms

latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) th

(holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state

court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal

law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe,

151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective th

assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, th

the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that

counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s

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alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment

considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348

(9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court indulges

th

a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive

defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must

also evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356,

1461 (9 Cir. 1994). More precisely, petitioner must show that (1) his attorney’s performance

th

was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and, unless prejudice is presumed, that

(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would

have been different. 

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since it is necessary to prove

prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d

1058, 1062 (2000). 

As Respondent summarizes, Petitioner was charged in this case with three prior

convictions within the meaning of California’s Three Strikes law. See CT 58-60; Cal. Pen. Code

§§ 667, subds. (b)-(I), and 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d). The priors a robbery conviction on February

12, 1995, and burglary convictions on November 7, 1989, and September 19, 1980. CT 58-60. 

After the jury reached its verdict of guilty on the underlying allegations in this case, a court trial

was held on the prior conviction allegations and each of the “three strikes” priors was found to be

true. RT 497. Under the “three strikes” law, only two such prior convictions are required for a

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28 People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996). 6

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sentence of twenty-five years to life. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the superior court held:

In the instant case, petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability

that a different sentence would have resulted, had counsel provided the sentencing

court the information available concerning the circumstances of his 1995

conviction. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that reasonable probability.

Even if this Court accepts petitioner’s argument that his attorney acted

incompetently in failing to apprise the sentencing judge of all of the “unusual”

circumstances leading up to the petitioner’s guilty plea to the 1995 robbery, and

that the judge would probably have stricken that prior conviction because of those

“unusual” circumstances, petitioner nevertheless fails to demonstrate that a

different sentence would have resulted.

Petitioner acknowledges that the sentencing court found he had suffered

three prior “strike” convictions, including that 1995 robbery. Petitioner offers no

support for his conclusion that [the sentencing judge] probably would have also

stricken one of those two, other, strike convictions.

Petitioner argues the court “might also have stricken” petitioner’s 1980

burglary conviction based on finding that it was 20 years old. The undisputed fact

is that the court did not strike that prior conviction, in spite of the fact that it was

20 years old, and in spite of the other reasons relating to petitioner’s long term

addiction to drugs, all of which was known to the sentencing judge.

Moreover, the simple fact that the 1980 conviction may be remove (which

this court does not find) cannot support the conclusion that the petitioner falls

outside the spirit of the three strikes law. The three strikes law itself expressly

rejects remoteness as a basis for avoiding the imposition of the sentence. People

v. Strong [, 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 342 (2001).]

Under all of the circumstances presented, Petitioner has not shown a

probability that the court would have imposed a lesser sentence, sufficient to

undermine confidence in the sentence which the court did in fact impose.

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to

demonstrate a reasonable probability that the sentencing judge would have

imposed a sentence other than that which was imposed.

Having failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from any errors of

counsel, the petition is hereby DENIED.

(Lodged Doc. I at 204, footnote omitted.)

 The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. To the state court and this Court,

Petitioner submitted the declaration of his trial attorney, Roberto Dulce, who declares that in

drafting the Romero motion, he “thought that the plea entered in 1995 was valid. There was no 6

indication that [Petitioner] was coerced into the plea or that he entered into an unknowing and

unintelligent plea. [¶] Nevertheless, in retrospect, I should have brought to the court’s attention

the unusual circumstances surrounding [Petitioner’s] 1995 conviction. The court could have

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considered and may have granted the Romero request. Primarily, I should have brought to the

court’s attention the fact that a new trial motion was granted on the grounds someone other than

[Petitioner] may have committed the 1995 offense. [¶] While the 1995 conviction may have been

legally valid, the unusual circumstances surrounding it may have moved the court to grant the

Romero motion.” (Declaration of Roberto Dulce; Petition, at 44-45.) 

Notwithstanding counsel’s declaration, even if counsel was ineffective for failing to

present the “unusual circumstances” of Petitioner’s 1995 conviction, Petitioner has not

demonstrated any resulting prejudice under Strickland. The state court properly identified and

analyzed the relevant United States Supreme Court precedent as set forth in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668. As previously stated herein, Petitioner was found to have suffered

three prior strike convictions. Only two prior strike convictions are required for a twenty five

year to life sentence. Thus, as stated by the state court, in order for Petitioner to demonstrate

prejudice in this case, he must demonstrate that the court would not have only stricken his 1995

conviction, but also one other conviction. Petitioner continues to argue that his 1980 burglary

conviction may have been stricken because it was 20 years old. However, as stated by the state

court, the simple fact is that the conviction was not stricken by the trial court due to its

remoteness in time. Petitioner’s claim that the trial court would have stricken one of the other

two priors is nothing more than pure speculation. Accordingly, the state courts’ determination of

this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent. 

With respect to Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary hearing, the Court finds such a hearing

unnecessary. As discussed above, the existing state court record is more than sufficient to

resolve Petitioner’s claims. Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9 Cir.1999); Totten v. th

Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9 Cir.1998); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 633 (9 th th

Cir.1997) (A petitioner’s request to have a federal court hear the same evidence heard by the state

court in the state habeas proceeding is not a valid reason for an evidentiary hearing.); Campbell

v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir.1994) (An evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that

can be resolved by reference to the state court record.). 

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RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; 

2. Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED (Court Doc. 16); and

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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