Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01425/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01425-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

· FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LYNN MARTIN, Secretary of Labor, 

United States Department of Labor 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

PARKER FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, a ) 

Division of Parker city government, ) 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

MAR 2 21993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-1425 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 90-B-1664) 

Joan Brenner, Attorney (Marshall J. Breger, Solicitor of Labor; 

Monica Gallagher, Associate Solicitor; Tedrick A. Housh, Regional 

Solicitor; William J. Stone, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, 

with her on the brief), United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

David C. Hoskins, Parker, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-1425 Document: 010110198735 Date Filed: 03/22/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiff, the Secretary of Labor, brought suit against 

defendant Parker Fire Protection District under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, seeking to recover 

minimum wages that it alleged were due to four firefighters for 

the time they spent in training at the firefighting academy conducted by defendant in 1989. The district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of defendant, holding that these men were not 

employees, Martin v. Parker Fire Protection Dist. , 774 F. Supp. 

1301 (D. Colo. 1991). The Secretary has appealed. The only issue 

on appeal is the proper test for distinguishing between trainees 

and employees under FLSA, and how strictly we should apply a six 

factor enumeration developed by the Department of Labor's Wage and 

Hour Division. 

I 

In 1983, defendant began hiring career firefighters to 

replace its volunteer force. Prospective firefighters seeking 

employment with defendant had to submit applications and pass an 

initial screening before taking a written test. High scorers on 

the written examination were then tested physically. Candidates 

who performed satisfactori ly on the physical test were further 

screened by oral interviews. Finally, a limited number of interviewees were selected to attend the firefighting academy . Permanent employment as a firefighter was conditioned upon satisfactory 

completion of the ten week long training period. Because only the 

number expected to be hired were sent to the academy, those who 

successfully completed the course had every reasonable expectation 

of being hired, as in fact they were in this case. Trainees 

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understood that although they could obtain loans from defendant 

during this time, they were not entitled to wages for the time 

they spent at the academy. 

Defendant required attendance at its academy not only to 

ensure that its firefighters knew basic fire science and defendant's standard operating procedures, but also to build a sense of 

teamwork and cooperation among the incoming firefighters . Even 

certified and experienced firefighters had to complete instruction 

at the academy before going to work for defendant. The academy 

curriculum included classroom lectures, tours of the district, 

demonstrations, physical training, and simulations. Trainees also 

maintained defendant's equipment. During the final weeks of the 

1989 academy, the four trainees in question staffed a truck that 

had previously been attended by volunteers. Although they were 

never called into service, they maintained the truck and its 

equipment in a state of readiness. On one occasion, while returning from a training exercise, the trainees responded to a car 

accident and provided paramedical services. 

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) . We review a decision on 

summary judgment de novo, using the same standard applied by the 

district court. Hatfield v. Burlington N.R.R., 958 F.2d 320, 321 

(10th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3860 (U. S. 

June 8, 1992) (No. 91-1977). Furthermore, "the ultimate determination of employee status is a finding of law subject to gg novo 

consideration by this court." Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 

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F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987). 

Although the district court's underlying findings of historical 

fact and its assessment of the controlling factors are subject to 

the clearly erroneous standard of review, courts of appeals conduct plenary review to ensure that these findings are informed by 

the proper legal standards. See Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 805 

(10th Cir. 1989). 

II 

The FLSA itself provides little guidance in distinguishing 

between trainees and employees. The Act defines employee as "any 

individual employed by an employer. " 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1). To 

"' [e]mploy' includes to suffer or permit to work." Id. § 203(g). 

To give content to this very broad statutory language, using factors first articulated in the Supreme Court's landmark decision in 

Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947), the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division has developed a test listing six criteria for determining whether trainees are employees 

within the meaning of FLSA. Both parties agree that this test is 

the proper standard to apply here. It provides: 

Whether trainees are employees under the Act, 

according to the WH Administrator, will depend upon all 

the circumstances surrounding their activities on the 

premises of the employer. If all six of the following 

criteria apply, the trainees are not employees within 

the meaning of the Act: 

* The training, even though it includes actual 

operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar 

to that which would be given in a vocational school[.] 

* The training is for the benefit of the trainee[.] 

* The trainees do not displace regular employees, 

but work under close observation[.] 

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* The employer that provides the training derives 

no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees and on occasion his operations may actually be 

impeded [ . ] 

* The trainees are not necessarily entitled to a 

job at the completion of the training period[.] 

* The employer and the trainees understand that the 

trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent in 

training . 

Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 91 : 416 (1975). The parties disagree, 

however, over how this test is to be applied. At oral argument 

counsel for the Secretary denied that we are bound absolutely to 

an all or nothing standard. Nevertheless, the essence of the Secretary's argument is that unless all six criteria are met, the 

trainees are employees for purposes of FLSA. Defendant argues 

that, as a true "totality of the circumstances" test, this determination should not turn on the presence or absence of one factor 

in the equation. 

Neither the six factor test nor the Secretary's understanding 

of how it is to be applied are to be given the high level of deference accorded to agency regulations under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . 

Proper judicial treatment of nonregulatory guidelines, recently 

reaffirmed in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235 

(1991), was first articulated in a wage and hour case under FLSA: 

We consider that the rulings, interpretations and 

opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not 

controlling upon the courts by reason of their authori ty, do constitute a body of experience and informed 

judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 

resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a 

particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 

persuade, i f lacking power to control. 

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Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 

The six criteria in the Secretary's test were derived almost 

directly from Portland Terminal and have appeared in Wage and Hour 

Administrator opinions since at least 1967. Several courts have 

referred to this test and conducted their analyses of employment 

status according to its standards. See Atkins v. General Motors 

Corn., 701 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1983); Donovan v. American 

Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 273 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982); Marshall v. 

Baptist Hospital, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465, 478 (M. D. Tenn. 1979), 

rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1981). Other 

courts have used elements of this test in applying Portland Terminal directly. See McLaughlin v . Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 n.2 

(4th Cir. 1989); Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785, 787-88 (4th Cir. 

1964); Bailey v. Pilots' Ass'n for the Bay and River Delaware, 406 

F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1976) . Similarly, numerous letter 

opinions of the Wage and Hour Administrator indicate that the 

Department of Labor has consistently responded to inquiries concerning trainees' employment status by applying this test. See, 

~. Op. Wage-Hour Adm'r No . 1067 (March 31, 1970); Op. Wage-Hour 

Adm'r No. 1001 (June 9, 1969; Op . Wage-Hour Adm'r No. 533 (Dec. 2, 

1966 ) . 

Nevertheless, following Skidmore we find little support for 

as strict an application of this test as the Secretary urges 

before us. Although we do not doubt that the Secretary thoroughly 

considered her position, we believe that the position she urges 

upon us is inconsistent with prior Wage and Hour Division interpretations and opinions. Moreover, there is nothing in Portland 

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Terminal to support an "all or nothing" approach. The prefatory 

language to the Secretary's test itself makes clear that the six 

factors are meant as an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. "Whether trainees are employees . . . will depend upon 

all of the circumstances surrounding their activities on the 

premises of the employer. " Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 91 : 416 . Wage 

and Hour Administrator opinions also support this view. "The 

Court has made it clear that there is no single rule or test for 

determining whether an individual is an employee, but that the 

total situation controls. The Court has indicated a number of 

factors which help to determine whether an employment relationship 

exists. " Op. Wage-Hour Adrn'r No. 638 (July 18, 1967). 

This circuit has no decision on the employee-trainee distinction, but in the analogous situation of distinguishing between an 

independent contractor and an employee under FLSA this court has 

held that "no one. factor[] in isolation is dispositive; 

rather, the test is based upon a totality of the circumstances. " 

Dole v . Snell, 875 F . 2d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1989); .TM~Rutherford Food Cor:p . v. McComb. 331 U.S . 722, 730 (1947). We have 

also held with respect to this issue that "[i]n determining 

whether an individual is an 'employee' within the meaning of the 

FLSA, we must look to the economic realities of the relationship . " 

Doty v . Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1984). Although we 

recognize that the factors distinguishing employees from independent contractors are different from the factors distinguishing 

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employees from trainees, we find it informative that determinations of employee status under FLSA in other contexts are not subject to rigid tests but rather to consideration of a number of 

criteria in their totality. See also Marshall v. Regis Educ. 

Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1326-27 (10th Cir. 1981) (student residenthall assistants in college dormitories were not employees under 

FLSA following totality of circumstances standard of Rutherford). 

There is little of substance to distinguish this case from 

the Fifth Circuit American Airlines decision, 686 F.2d 267, which 

addressed this issue and ruled that the trainees involved were not 

employees for FLSA purposes. American Airlines concerned the 

employment status of flight attendant and reservation agent trainees who attended American's Learning Center for up to five weeks 

of unpaid instruction. Like the defendant here, American screened 

its applicants extensively and attempted to train only those individuals it anticipated it could hire at the completion of the 

course. The Learning Center, like defendant's academy, taught 

vocational skills transferable within the industry, but strongly 

emphasized the potential employer's particular practices. Both 

sets of trainees understood they were not to be paid for their 

time, and that they had not created an employment relationship by 

entering . . 1 training. In neither situation did trainees displace 

regular employees, nor did the employer gain an immediate benefit 

1 we note, as did the Fifth Circuit, that such an agreement does 

not constitute a waiver of FLSA benefits, and is "material only 

insofar as it shows the expectations of trainees." American Air1 ines , 6 8 6 F. 2 d at 2 6 9 n. 3 . See =B=a=r=r'-"e=n=t=i=n=e'-=v'-'.'--"A...,r""'k"""a=n~s~a,.,.s,_-..,,B~e::.,s=t 

Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981). 

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from the trainees' activities. Were it not for the larger trainee 

classes in American's program and the longer training period 

required by defendant here, the two cases would be practically 

indistinguishable. 

We are satisfied that the six criteria are relevant but not 

conclusive to the determination of whether these firefighter 

trainees were employees under the FLSA, that the interpretation 

the Secretary urges is unreasonable, and that the district court 

applied the proper legal standard. Having so determined, we are 

bound by the district court's application of the historical facts 

to the six relevant criteria unless its findings are clearly 

erroneous. We are satisfied by our review of the facts that no 

such error was made. The district court used the six factor test 

to assess the totality of the circumstances, and found that except 

for one area--the expectation of employment upon successful 

completion of the course--the test clearly indicated that the 

trainees were not employees. Because that single factor could not 

carry the entire weight of an inquiry into the totality of the 

circumstances, the district court was correct in granting judgment 

in favor of defendant. 

AFFIRMED. 

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