Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02469/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02469-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Victor Valenzuela, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-2469-PHX-SPL (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Victor Valenzuela filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 6, 

2014, challenging his convictions in Pinal County Superior Court for multiple drug 

related offenses. His petition argues that he was denied effective assistance of trial 

counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of a plea agreement and the 

risks of going to trial. Respondents contend that Valenzuela’s petition should be denied 

as untimely. As explained below, the Court recommends that Valenzuela’s petition be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

On July 22, 2010, a jury in Pinal County Superior Court found Valenzuela guilty 

of three felonies: possession of a dangerous drug for sale, possession of drug 

paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. (Doc. 8, Ex. C) On September 8, 2010, the 

Superior Court sentenced Valenzuela to presumptive, concurrent terms, the longest of 

which was 10 years. (Doc. 8, Ex. D) 

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 Through counsel, Valenzuela timely appealed and argued in that appeal that the 

State offered improper testimony. (Doc. 8, Ex. E at 7) At the conclusion of briefing, the 

Court of Appeals found no error with the State’s evidence and affirmed Valenzuela’s 

convictions and sentences on March 23, 2011. (Doc. 8, Exs. F, G, H) Valenzuela did not 

move for reconsideration and he did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review. 

(Doc. 8, Ex. I) 

 On April 15, 2011, Valenzuela filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in Pinal 

County Superior Court. (Doc. 8, Ex. J) The Superior Court appointed counsel who, on 

August 12, 2011, stated she could not find any colorable claims. (Doc. 8, Ex. K) Then 

the Superior Court appointed a second attorney who, on November 5, 2012, also told the 

Court that he could not find any colorable claims. (Doc. 8, Ex. L) Valenzuela then filed 

a pro per petition with the Superior Court raising multiple claims, none of which related 

to ineffective assistance of trial counsel during plea negotiations. (Doc. 8, Ex. M) At the 

conclusion of briefing, the Superior Court dismissed Valenzuela’s petition on August 14, 

2013, after finding that one of his claims lacked merit and the remaining claims could 

have been raised on direct appeal. (Doc. 8, Exs. N, O, P) 

 On October 7, 2013, Valenzuela signed a petition for review with the Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 8, Ex. Q) The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as untimely. 

(Doc. 8, Ex. R) The Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition for review. (Doc. 8, Ex. 

S) 

 On April 4, 2014, Valenzuela signed1

 a second Petition of Post-Conviction Relief 

in Superior Court alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel during 

plea negotiations and that various changes in the law applied to his case. (Doc. 8, Ex. T) 

After the state responded, the Superior Court found that Valenzuela’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim was precluded, that the new case law did not apply to him, 

 

1

 The Court will assume that Valenzuela’s documents were delivered to prison authorities the day they were signed and, thus, will use his signature date, not the filing date, as the operative date for calculating his deadlines. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 

266, 270-74 (1988); Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 244, 908 P.2d 56, 58 (App. 1995); State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 987 P.2d 226 (App. 1999). 

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and dismissed his post-conviction relief proceedings. (Doc. 8, Exs. U, V) Valenzuela 

filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. (Doc. 8, Ex. W) After the state 

responded, the Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief, agreeing with the 

Superior Court that Valenzuela’s ineffective assistance claim was precluded and that the 

new cases he cited were not significant changes in Arizona law. (Doc. 8, Ex. Y) 

Valenzuela did not move for reconsideration and he did not petition the Arizona Supreme 

Court for review. (Doc. 8, Ex. Z) 

 On October 4, 2014, Valenzuela signed2

 a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in 

this Court. (Doc. 1) His petition argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel during plea negotiations by failing to adequately convey the 

benefits of the plea offer and the risks of going to trial. (Doc. 1) Respondents contend 

that Valenzuela’s petition is untimely and that he is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

(Doc. 8 at 7-9). The Court agrees and recommends that the petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

Valenzuela’s Petition is Untimely. 

 A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is 

required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review.” 28 U.S.C.§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during 

the time in which a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State 

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s convictions and 

sentences on March 23, 2011. Valenzuela did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for 

 

2

 Valenzuela signed his petition on October 4, 2014, it was postmarked on November 4, 2014, and it was filed on November 6, 2014. (Doc. 1 at 11, Doc. 1-1) 

Thus, it appears that the October 4, 2014 signature date was a typographical error. However, the differences between the signature, postmarked, and filing dates are immaterial to this recommendation because his habeas petition is untimely under all three dates. 

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review. Thus, Valenzuela’s conviction became final when his time to petition the 

Arizona Supreme Court for review of his direct appeal expired. See Hemmerle v. 

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (a direct appeal is final when the time for 

seeking review of the Court of Appeals decision in the Arizona Supreme Court has 

expired); State v. Savage, 117 Ariz. 535, 573 P.2d 1388 (1978) (applying Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 1.3(a)). 

 Before his conviction became final, Valenzuela filed a timely Notice of PostConviction Relief in state court thereby initiating the tolling period of limitations under 

Section 2244(d)(2). Isley v. Ariz. Dept. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 

2004) (“The language and structure of the Arizona post-conviction rules demonstrate that 

the proceedings begin with the filing of the Notice.”). Valenzuela’s tolling continued 

until his post-conviction proceedings became final on September 18, 2013, the last day 

Valenzuela could timely petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for review of the Superior 

Court’s dismissal of his post-conviction relief proceedings.3

 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 

S.Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012) (time for seeking review under Section 2244(d)(1)(A)); 

Holemen v. Ryan, 2013 WL 3716603, at *7 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2013) (collecting cases 

from other circuits concluding that habeas claim is pending until further appellate review 

is unavailable). Thus, his one year limitations period began the next day, on September 

19, 2013, and he was required to file his habeas petition in this court by September 19, 

2014. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3, 32.9(c); Savage, 573 P.3d at 1389. However, he did not file 

his habeas petition until November 6, 2014, after his one year period had already expired. 

Once expired the one year period could not be restarted by filing additional untimely 

post-conviction relief motions. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005) (no 

AEDPA tolling for untimely state post-conviction petitions); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the 

 

3

 Respondents assert that Valenzuela’s post-conviction relief period became final on August 14, 2013 (Doc. 8 at 8). The difference between this date and the Court’s 

conclusion that it became final on September 18, 2014, is immaterial to this 

recommendation. 

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limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed). Since Valenzuela’s 

second post-conviction relief proceeding was untimely, it did not further toll the one year 

limitations bar. Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1072-73. Therefore, as he seems to 

acknowledge, Valenzuela’s habeas petition is untimely. (Doc. 1 at 11) 

Valenzuela is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling. 

Valenzuela’s petition should be denied as untimely unless he can show that he is 

entitled to equitable tolling. To make such a showing, Valenzuela must demonstrate both 

that he pursued his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented 

him from filing his petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). In his 

petition and his reply, Valenzuela has not attempted to meet either prong of the equitable 

tolling test. (Doc. 1 at 6-11; Doc. 9) 

Instead, Valenzuela argues that Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2013), and its 

progeny should apply to his case and he should be entitled to file a federal habeas 

petition. (Docs. 1, 9). However, Martinez does not address the limitations bar in Section 

2244(d)(2) and it does not excuse an untimely federal habeas petition. E.g., Madueno v. 

Ryan, 2014 WL 2094189, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2014); Marshall v. Ryan, 2014 WL 

710954, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2014); Moreno v. Ryan, 2014 WL 24151, at *5 (D. Ariz. 

Jan. 2, 2014). Therefore, the exception cannot apply to Valenzuela’s petition and he is 

not entitled to equitable tolling. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Victor Valenzuela’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

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timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Dated this 22nd day of June, 2015. 

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