Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02816/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02816-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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06cv2816

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAN JIANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 06-CV-2816-L(LSP)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS [doc. #8] and

DIRECTING AN ANSWER TO THE

COMPLAINT

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint contending that the Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction and even if subject matter exists, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The motion has been fully briefed. Having carefully

considered the matters presented, the Court enters the following decision. 

Background

Plaintiff Shan Jiang brings this case to compel defendants to act on the processing of an I485 Application filed by plaintiff on June 3, 2004, at the United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services (“USCIS”) San Jose Office. Plaintiff’s fingerprints were submitted on

July 20, 2004, and plaintiff and his wife were interviewed at the USCIS San Jose Office on

January 25, 2005. After the interview, plaintiff was given an “Adjustment of Status Notice” that

indicated plaintiff’s FBI Name Check result was pending; therefore, the USCIS was unable to

approve plaintiff’s petition.

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On August 10, 2005, the FBI sent an email to plaintiff in response to his February 1, 2005

inquiry, indicating that the original Name Check request contained an error that required a

resubmission of the request. The resubmission was made on May 26, 2005, and the second

Name Check request remained pending.

Plaintiff submitted a change of address to the USCIS on June 3, 2005. Because of the

change of address, plaintiff’s I-485 petition files were transferred to the San Diego office of the

USCIS. 

As a result the delayed Name Check, plaintiff was required to submit a second set of

fingerprints to the USCIS. Upon further inquiry by plaintiff on November 2, 2005 and July 24,

2006, plaintiff was advised that the name check remained pending. To date, plaintiff’s I-485

Application has not been reviewed.

Discussion

In their motion to dismiss the complaint, defendants challenge subject matter jurisdiction

over plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff bases subject matter jurisdiction on federal question pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1331; declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201; and the APA, 5

U.S.C. § 701, et seq.. Defendants correctly argue that neither the Declaratory Relief Act, 28

U.S.C. §2201, nor the APA provide an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Skelly

Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950) (Declaratory Relief Act);

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 106-07 (1977) (APA). But the court can exercise subject

matter jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. §1331 or §1361.

“[A]gency actions are generally reviewable under federal question jurisdiction, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §1331.” Spencer Enter., Inc. v United States, 345 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Califano,, 430 U.S. at 105). “Even if no statute specifically provides that an agency’s

decisions are subject to judicial review, the Supreme Court customarily refuses to treat such

silence ‘as a denial of authority to an aggrieved person to seek appropriate relief in the federal

courts,’ and this custom has been ‘reinforced by the enactment of the Administrative Procedure

Act, which embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one ‘suffering legal wrong

because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the

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meaning of a relevant statute.’” Id. at 687-88 (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309

(1944) & Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)) (internal brackets omitted). 

Accordingly, the question presented is “whether any statute has deprived the federal

courts of jurisdiction to review the particular agency action at issue . . ..” Id. at 688. The statute

relevant to this question is 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which provides in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory) . . .

and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in

removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review--

. . .

(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of

Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this

subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary

of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section

1158(a) of this title.

This provision has been interpreted to bar judicial review of those acts which are within the

Attorney General’s discretion as specified by statute. Spencer Enter., 345 F.3d at 688-91.

Plaintiff’s Application was filed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1255, which authorizes the

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“Secretary”) to adjust to permanent

residence status certain aliens who have been admitted into the United States:

The status if an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United

States . . . may be adjusted by the [Secretary], in his discretion and under such

regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent

residence. 

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the decision to grant or deny the application

is discretionary. The regulations further provide that the “applicant shall be notified of the

decision.” 8 C.F.R. §209.2(f). The duty to adjudicate an application, by either granting or

denying it, is therefore not discretionary. See Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 & n.6

(N.D. Cal. 2006) (duty to adjudicate mandatory); Aboushaban v. Mueller, 2006 WL 3041086

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2006) (duty to adjudicate nondiscretionary); see also Razaq v. Poulos, 2007

WL 61884 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2007) (duty to adjudicate I-130 application mandatory under

similar statutory language). The statute and the regulations are silent about the time within

which the adjudication must be completed.

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “withdraws jurisdiction wherever discretionary authority is

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‘specified’ by statute” and not otherwise. Spencer Enter., 345 F.2d at 691. Section 1255 does

not address, much less specify, any discretion associated with the time to adjudicate applications. 

See 8 U.S.C. §1255; Duan v. Zamberry, 2007 WL 626116, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2007); see

also Elmalky v. Upchurch, 2007 WL 944330, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2007). Section

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) therefore does not preclude judicial review of a claim about the delay in

adjudication. 

In the alternative, judicial review of the same claim is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §1361,

which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the

nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof

to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” See Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931-32 (9th Cir.

1998) (finding jurisdiction under analogous circumstances: “[D]iscretionary decision to grant or

deny a visa petition is not normally subject to judicial review. [Citations omitted] However,

when the suit challenges the authority . . . to take or fail to take an action . . ., jurisdiction

exists.”); Indep. Mining Co., Inc. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 n.6 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejected

argument that inaction involved a non-discretionary act because “at some level, the government

has a general non-discretionary duty to process the applications in the first instance”). 

Defendants argue the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the official duty at issue is

discretionary, while one of the requirements for mandamus is that the official’s duty be

“nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt.” Kildare v.

Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003). For the reasons discussed above, defendants’ duty

to adjudicate Plaintiff’s Application is nondiscretionary. 

Further, “mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is available to compel a federal

official to perform a duty only if: (1) the individual’s claim is clear and certain; (2) the official’s

duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and (3)

no other adequate remedy is available. Kildare, 325 F.3d at 1084 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), plaintiff has stated a claim.

Accordingly, the court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide plaintiff’s claim of delay

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in the processing of his I-485 Application and plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief may be

granted. To the extent plaintiff requests other relief, subject matter jurisdiction is lacking

because granting or denying the Application is within the Secretary’s discretion. See Spencer

Enter., 345 F.3d at 690. 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED defendant’s motion to dismiss this

action with prejudice is DENIED insofar as it seeks relief from delay in processing Plaintiff’s

pending I-485 application. Defendants shall file an answer to the complaint within five days of

the filing of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 28, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. LEO S. PAPAS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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