Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02823/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02823-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE ROBERT JAMES,

CDCR #BB-1457,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEPUTY EMMENS, Team 1, San Diego 

Sheriff’s Deputy, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02823-WQH-NLS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION

[ECF No. 11]

AND

3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

KYLE ROBERT JAMES (“Plaintiff”) is currently incarcerated at California State 

Prison – Los Angeles County (“LAC”) in Lancaster, California.

1 He is proceeding pro se, 

 

1 Plaintiff was incarcerated at the California Institution for Men (“CIM”) in Chino, California, at the time 

of filing (ECF No. 1 at 1, 50), but on December 22, 2016, he filed a Notice of Change of Address noting 

his transfer to LAC. See ECF No. 7.

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and has filed a civil Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Together with 

his Complaint, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). He subsequently submitted a “Letter Explaining 

Documents” (ECF No. 6), and a Sworn Declaration in Support of his Complaint (ECF No. 

9). On January 19, 2017, he also filed a “Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 

(“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction” seeking the preservation of video evidence he claims 

exists and is related to his excessive force claims (ECF No. 11). 

Background

Plaintiff claims that on January 23, 2016, and again on February 5, 2016, while he 

was in the custody of the San Diego Sheriff’s Department and housed at the San Diego 

County Jail, Defendants used excessive force against him, labeled him a child molester in 

the presence of other inmates, and refused to respond to his administrative grievances in 

retaliation for his having filed a filed civil rights action and various internal affairs and 

“Citizens Law Enforcement Review Board” complaints against them. See ECF No. 1 at 5-

14.2

Discussion

A. IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

 

2 Plaintiff identifies his previously filed civil rights action as “15cv0409-AJB-MDD.” ECF No. 1 at 12, 

15. The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has another previously filed civil rights action currently 

pending before Judge Anthony J. Battaglia in James v. Agnew, et al, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:15-cv00409-AJB-MDD. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (courts “‘may take notice 

of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings 

have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 

(9th Cir. 2002)). In that case, Plaintiff also claims two San Diego Sheriff’s Department Deputies (Tade 

and Agnew) used excessive force against him while he was pretrial detainee at the San Diego County Jail 

on August 13, 2014. See id., ECF No. 41 at 1-3. Plaintiff’s current case alleges separate constitutional 

claims, arising at a later date, and against a different set of Defendants which do not appear duplicative. 

Cf. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs may not “merely repeat[] 

pending or previously litigated claims” in separate civil actions).

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$400.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (U.S. 2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 

F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a Trust Account Withdrawal 

Authorization and a certified Prison Certificate attesting to his balances and deposits over 

the 6-month period preceding the filing of his Complaint. See ECF No. 2 at 4, 5; 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff’s prison certificate 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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shows that while Plaintiff had a monthly average of $67.50 deposited to his account, he

carried an average balance of only $0.13, and his available balance was just $0.74 at the 

time. See ECF No. 2 at 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a 

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal 

judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the

initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, declines to “exact” any 

initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he “has no means to pay it,” 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing 

fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 

the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

C. Screening of Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening which the Court conducts sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, 

or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages 

from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to 

ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 

responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler 

v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

As currently pleaded, the Court finds that while Plaintiff has not shown, for the 

reasons discussed below, that he is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint nevertheless contains factual content sufficient to survive the “low threshold” 

for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(b), because it alleges both excessive force4and retaliation claims which are

plausible on its face. See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Kingsley 

v. Hendrickson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (“[T]he Due Process Clause 

protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”) 

(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)). Under Kingsley, a pretrial 

detainee, unlike a convicted prisoner, need not prove that the defendant subjectively knew 

 

4 While Plaintiff alleges in his TRO to have been “convicted of bank robbery at the beginning months of 

2016,” (ECF No. 11 at 5), it is not clear whether he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the 

time his excessive force claims arose on January 23, 2016, and February 5, 2016. See ECF No. 1 at 1. 

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that the force applied was excessive; that state-of-mind inquiry is “solely ... objective.” Id.

at 2473; Austin v. Baker, 616 F. App’x 365, 366 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (when prison officials stand accused of using excessive 

force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is “... whether force 

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.”); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the 

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal.”). 

Accordingly, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon the 

Defendants on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall 

issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3) 

(“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal 

. . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

D. Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion requesting a TRO and preliminary injunction 

requiring the San Diego Sheriff’s [Department] Legal Affairs Unit, and San Diego County 

Counsel Thomas Montgomery to preserve “material and relevant video evidence of the two 

excessive force incidents that [form] the basis of this case.” (ECF No. 11 at 1, 2-4.) 

Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it 

has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. 

See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting 

that one “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only 

upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within 

which the party served must appear to defend.”). The court may not attempt to determine 

the rights of persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 

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U.S. 229, 234-35 (1917); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983); Lathrop v. 

Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F. Supp. 953, 961 (M.D. Fl. 1993); 

Kandlbinder v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 337, 339 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Suster v. Marshall, 952 

F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 

(1979) (injunctive relief must be “narrowly tailored to give only the relief to which 

plaintiffs are entitled”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) an injunction binds 

only “the parties” to the action, their “officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,” 

and “other persons who are in active concert or participation[.]” FED. R. CIV. P.

65(d)(2)(A)-(C).

Substantively, “‘[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he 

is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 

of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 

in the public interest.” Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736-37 (2015) 

(quoting Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). 

“Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in 

order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 

F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Finally, the PLRA further requires prisonersto satisfy additional requirements when 

seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials:

Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no 

further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires 

preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to 

correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any 

adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal 

justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect 

the principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B) in tailoring 

any preliminary relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Section 3626(a)(2) places significant limits upon a court’s power 

to grant preliminary injunctive relief to inmates, and “operates simultaneously to restrict 

the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison 

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administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve relief that binds prison 

administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v. People of the State 

of California, 220 F.3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 

First, because Plaintiff’s case is still in its preliminary screening stage, the United 

States Marshal has yet to effect service on his behalf, and Defendants have no actual notice.

Therefore, the Court has no personal jurisdiction over any Defendant at this time. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2); Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 350; Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727-28. Even 

more critically, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against the “San Diego Sheriff’s 

[Department] Legal Affairs Unit,” (ECF No. 11 at 1-3), and San Diego County Counsel 

Thomas Montgomery, neither of which/whom are even named as parties to this action. Cf.

ECF No. 1 at 1-4.

Second, even if the Court had personal jurisdiction over the entity or person Plaintiff 

seeks to enjoin, he has failed to establish the imminent irreparable harm required to support 

a preliminary injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 

F.3d at 1131. “The fact that plaintiff has met the pleading requirements allowing him to 

proceed with the complaint does not, ipso facto, entitle him to a preliminary injunction.” 

Claiborne v. Blauser, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 3875892, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

31, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 

4765000 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011). Instead, to meet the “irreparable harm” requirement, 

Plaintiff must do more than simply allege imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. 

Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This 

requires Plaintiff to demonstrate by specific facts that there is a credible threat of immediate 

and irreparable harm. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). Mere “[s]peculative injury does not constitute 

irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean 

Marine, 844 F.2d at 674-75. 

Plaintiff claims that “relevant video evidence of the two excessive force incidents 

that are the basis of this case,” exist, yet the San Diego Sheriff’s [Department] Legal Affairs 

Unit “will not respond to numerous letters from [him] giving the Sheriff’s Department 

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“notice of [his] intention to bring suit.” ECF No. 11 at 1. He further claims that without 

this evidence he “will not be able to pursue his claim,” because there is a “lack of police 

accountability ... in police brutality cases such as this one.” Id. at 6. 

But these allegations are merely speculative at this stage of the proceedings, and the 

Court therefore finds Plaintiff has failed to establish either the immediate or irreparable

harm required to justify extraordinary injunctive relief. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102; see also 

Dymo Indus. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964) (“The grant of a 

preliminary injunction is the exercise of a very far reaching power never to be indulged in 

except in a case clearly warranting it.”). Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated he is entitled to 

compel the expedited discovery he essentially seeks.5 While “[t]he failure to preserve 

electronic or other records, once the duty to do so has been triggered, raises the issue of 

spoliation of evidence and its consequences,” Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 

Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. Md. 2003) (emphasis added); Pettit v. Smith, 45 F. Supp. 3d 

1099, 1104 (D. Ariz. 2014), “[a]bsent some special relationship or duty arising by reason 

of an agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance, ... there is no duty to 

preserve possible evidence for another party to aid that other party in some future legal 

action against a third party.” Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 921 F.2d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 1990) 

(internal citation omitted); Pettit, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1106.

For all these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO and Preliminary 

Injunction (ECF No. 11) pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 65 at this time. 

///

 

5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) provides, in part, that “[a] party may not seek discovery from any 

source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except ... when authorized by these 

rules, by stipulation, or by court order.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). A court may order expedited discovery 

under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d) only for good cause, which may be found “where the need for expedited 

discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding 

party.” Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Elec. Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Assef v. 

Does 1–10, No. 15-CV-01960-MEJ, 2015 WL 3430241, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2015). Even liberally 

construed, the Court finds Plaintiff’s TRO fails to demonstrate the good cause required to justify discovery 

at this preliminary and pre-service stage of the case. Id.

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Conclusion

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2);

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 

Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 11);

5. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 

1) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each named 

Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, 

a certified copy of his Complaint and the summons so that he may serve the Defendants. 

Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the Form 285s as completely 

and accurately as possible, include an address where each named Defendant may be found 

and/or subject to service, and return them to the United States Marshal according to the 

instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package;

6. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon the named Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to 

him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3);

///

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7. ORDERS the served Defendants to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the 

time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive the 

right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte 

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a 

preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a 

“reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is required to respond); 

and

8. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon the named Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon 

Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document 

submitted for the Court’s consideration pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must 

include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a 

certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been 

was served on Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. CAL.

CIVLR 5.2. Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with 

the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon Defendants may be 

disregarded. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2017

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