Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_00-cv-01329/USCOURTS-casd-3_00-cv-01329-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 

. . . 

(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTURO DELGADO GAXIOLA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 00CV1329 IEG (JFS)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

[Doc. No. 19]

vs.

V. M. ALMAGER, Warden,

Respondent.

Presently before the Court is petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 19.] On October 1, 2001, this

Court dismissed the petition with prejudice. [Doc. No. 12.] Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(6),1 petitioner now moves this Court to reconsider its dismissal in light of a new

Ninth Circuit case. 

The Court finds that petitioner has followed the correct procedural posture in bringing this

motion. Rule 60(b), rather than a successive petition, “is the appropriate rule to invoke when one

wishes a court to reconsider claims it has already decided.” Hamilton v. Newland, 374 F.3d 822,

825 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Petitioner specifically asks this Court to reconsider its rejection of petitioner’s claim for

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 Although petitioner does not explicitly so state, petitioner seems to be asking this Court to

reconsider its prior rejection of petitioner’s claim that the state court abused its discretion by not

allowing the petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court rejected that claim because it did not

raise any federal rights. [Doc. No. 12, at 8-9.] 

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ineffective assistance of counsel, in light of the opinion in Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688 (9th

Cir. 2006). The Court previously rejected petitioner’s claim because petitioner could not establish

any prejudice from counsel’s allegedly ineffective assistance. [Doc. No. 12, at 7-8.] 

The Court finds Buckley unavailing to petitioner, as it does not change the law on the

requirement of prejudice in claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, in Buckley, the

Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of Buckley’s writ because the California state court had violated §

2254 when it found that Buckley “well knew” the potential sentence for the offense to which he

had pled guilty. 441 F.3d at 691. Although Buckley had signed a felony disposition statement

providing that he could be sentenced “for a maximum possible term of 15 year(s),” the district

attorney subsequently added a paragraph describing the “maximum term of 15 years to life.” Id. at

691-92. The state court’s finding was contrary to federal law because the interpretation of statecourt plea agreements was a matter of state law, California law required interpretation of plea

agreements as contracts, and the state court failed to apply California contract law. Id. at 696. 

Although this petitioner likewise claims to believe that he would receive a 15-year sentence for

pleading guilty, the similarities between this case and Buckley end there. Nothing in Buckley

justifies reconsideration of this Court’s prior finding that the state court’s proper explanation of the

petitioner’s potential sentence cured any erroneous predictions by defense counsel. 

Petitioner also seeks to analogize to Buckley by claiming that petitioner’s handwritten

request to withdraw his guilty plea creates ambiguity in the plea agreement.2 Such an analogy is

unavailing because, as Buckley clearly explains, California contract law requires a court first to

determine whether the agreement’s language is ambiguous. 441 F.3d at 695. Here, petitioner has

made no allegation of ambiguity in the language of his plea agreement. If this Court were to grant

petitioner’s motion on the basis of extrinsic evidence, without a finding of ambiguity, it would

commit clear legal error. Id. at 696. 

//

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Therefore, for the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 29, 2006

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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