Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01371/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01371-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TODD D’ARCY SWEAT,

Petitioner,

v.

SUZANNE M. PEERY, Acting Warden,1

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-01371-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION; AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Todd D’Arcy Sweat, a state prisoner, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) 

relating to his retained appellate counsel, Kurt K. Robinson, Esq., for failure to provide Petitioner 

“with transcripts and trial file of [his] criminal case.” Dkt. 1 at 6. Before the Court is 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition (1) for failure to state a claim upon which 

habeas relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases2; and (2) as 

untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss the petition.

 

1

Suzanne M. Peery, the current acting warden of the prison where Petitioner is 

incarcerated, has been substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

2 Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure are not appropriate in habeas cases. Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 

U.S. 257, 269 n.14 (1978). However, Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 in the United 

States District Courts “explicitly allows a district court to dismiss summarily the petition on the 

merits when no claim for relief is stated.” Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.

1983); see also White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir.1989) (meritorious motions to 

dismiss are permitted by Rule 4). Thus a motion to dismiss on grounds that, as a matter of law, 

the facts alleged in a petition do not entitle the petitioner to habeas relief may be entertained as a 

request for summary dismissal under Rule 4. Obremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 

1990). Here, Respondent has specified the authority for the motion to dismiss as having been 

brought under Rule 4, and has requested for the petition to be dismissed with prejudice. Dkt. 21 at 

4; see Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

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II. BACKGROUND

In 2004, Petitioner and his co-defendants, Willie Pepe Lewis and Karl Wayne Landry, 

were convicted of crimes related to a robbery of a Holiday Inn in San Jose that occurred on 

January 18, 2002. Dkt. 21-1 at 2. A Santa Clara County jury found Petitioner guilty of second 

degree robbery, false imprisonment and firearm possession by a felon, and found true the 

allegation that he committed the crimes in association with a criminal street gang.

3

Id. at 2, 7. 

The trial court found true the allegations that Petitioner used a firearm during the robbery as well 

as the false imprisonment, and that he suffered a prior prison term. Id. at 7. On June 16, 2004, the 

trial court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-six years in state prison. Id.

Thereafter, Petitioner appealed his conviction, and his mother retained Attorney Robinson 

as Petitioner’s appellate counsel. Id. at 46. Sometime in 2006, Petitioner claims that he 

discovered Attorney Robinson filed an opening brief in the state appellate court that “did not 

comply with basic rules.” Id. at 41. Petitioner claims he “advised Mr. Robinson that [he] was 

firing him . . . .” Id. On October 13, 2006, Petitioner claims that Attorney Robinson only 

provided him with “a portion of [his] appellate record,” including “one Clerk’s Augmented 

Transcript on appeal consisting of 263 pages and five Reporter’s Augmented Transcript[s] of voir 

dire consisting of 536 pages.” Id.; Dkt. 1 at 37. Petitioner claims that Attorney Robinson was 

“unable to provide the remaining transcripts.” Dkt. 21-1 at 41.

On October 24, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion in the state appellate court to have Attorney 

Robinson removed as retained counsel, to strike the opening brief, and to appoint counsel. Id. On 

December 21, 2006, Petitioner requested that the state appellate court rule on his motion. Id. On 

April 3, 2007, the state appellate court denied Petitioner’s motion. Id. On April 16, 2007, 

Petitioner filed a renewed motion stating that he “wanted to file a supplemental opening brief 

raising an issue pertaining to the Cunningham4case” and that he wanted to remove Attorney 

 

3 Co-Defendants Lewis and Landry, who were tried together with Petitioner, were also 

convicted of all charges filed against them in relation to the robbery. Dkt. 21-1 at 2. A fourth 

defendant, Lorenzo Fosselman, was also implicated in the robbery, and his case was resolved 

separately. Id.

4

The Court assumes Petitioner is referring to Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 

(2007).

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Robinson as his retained appellate counsel. Id. On April 18, 2007, the state appellate court denied 

Petitioner’s aforementioned motion.

5

 Id. at 54. On May 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition for review in the California Supreme Court, again seeking removal of his retained 

appellate counsel. Id. at 34-56. On June 27, 2007, the state supreme court denied review. Dkt. 

21-2 at 2. 

On July 17, 2007, in a comprehensive opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the 

conviction as to Petitioner and co-defendant Lewis, but reversed co-defendant Landry’s 

conviction. Dkt. 21-1 at 23. The record does not show unambiguously whether Petitioner sought

review of the state appellate court’s decision affirming his conviction.6

On October 17, 2008, Petitioner initiated his first federal action, Case No. C 08-4785 

MMC (PR), by filing a document entitled, “Motion for Order Extending Time and Also Court 

Order Appointing [sic] Transcripts, Discovery.” See Dkt. 1 in Case No. C 08-4785 MMC (PR). 

On November 17, 2008, in reviewing the motion, the Honorable Maxine M. Chesney stated as 

follows: 

In said motion, petitioner, who has not yet exhausted his state court 

remedies with respect to his challenge to his underlying criminal 

conviction, asks the Court to order his state appellate counsel to 

provide petitioner with his trial transcripts and other documents 

necessary for petitioner to seek further state collateral relief. 

Additionally, petitioner asks the Court to grant him a one-year 

extension of the deadline, imposed by the applicable statute of 

limitations for federal habeas petitions, with respect to a federal

habeas petition he wishes to file in the future.

Dkt. 6 at 1 in Case No. C 08-4785 MMC (PR). Judge Chesney denied Petitioner’s motion and 

dismissed that action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating as follows:

Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution 

restricts adjudication in federal courts to “Cases” and 

“Controversies.” See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans

 

5

Petitioner claims the state appellate court allowed Attorney Robinson to file a 

“supplemental brief on the one issue which [Petitioner] asserted in the renewed motion”; however, 

Petitioner claims that such a filing “d[id] not cure the problem that [he] was denied counsel for 

many months . . . and that [he had] been unable to have counsel appointed who could review the 

record, consider additional issues, and act accordingly.” Dkt. 21-2 at 42.

6 Respondent claims that Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme Court. 

Dkt. 21 at 2. However, the record shows that Petitioner claims that he did seek such review, and 

that his petition for review was denied on an “unknown” date. Dkt. 21-2 at 42.

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United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 

(1982). In the absence of an actual petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, there is no case or controversy for the Court to adjudicate. 

See Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, 

petitioner asks the Court to order his state appellate counsel to 

provide him with documents necessary to filing state collateral 

proceedings, and to determine in advance that any future federal 

habeas petition that petitioner files will not be time-barred. In the 

absence of a properly-filed habeas petition, neither of petitioner’s 

requests present a justiciable controversy on which this Court can 

rule.

Although, in some instances, a motion may be construed to 

be a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see id. at 83-84, petitioner 

here has not alleged any grounds for such relief, and indeed it is

clear that he is not asking for relief from his conviction at this time, 

but rather from the statute of limitations.7 Additionally, it is clear 

from petitioner’s filings in the instant matter that he has not yet 

exhausted his state court remedies and does not intend to file a 

federal habeas petition at this time. Further, under such 

circumstances, any petition filed by petitioner would be subject to 

dismissal as unexhausted. See Rose v. Lundy[,] 455 U.S. 509, 510 

(1982) (holding unexhausted petition must be dismissed).

Dkt. 6 at 2 (footnote renumbered). The November 17, 2008 dismissal was “without prejudice to 

petitioner’s filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus once he has exhausted state remedies.” Id.

at 3.

Over five months later, on April 21, 2009, Petitioner “tried to obtain [his] transcripts by 

filing a complaint” against Attorney Robinson, and he “wrote to the State Bar of California with a 

complaint about counsel’s actions.” Dkt. 1 at 7, 15. In a letter dated May 11, 2009, the State Bar 

responded and informed Petitioner that it had “advised [Attorney Robinson] to contact [Petitioner] 

within ten (10) working days from the date of this letter, regarding the availability of [Petitioner’s] 

client file.” Id. at 17. The May 11, 2009 letter further instructed Petitioner to “recontact the State 

Bar” “[s]hould [his] attorney fail to contact [him] within the specified time.” Id. The State Bar 

then “closed” his complaint “without prejudice.” Id.

On May 19, 2009, Petitioner wrote a letter to Attorney Robinson requesting the “court 

transcripts and trial file.” Id. at 20. 

Petitioner claims that Attorney Robinson did not respond to his May 19, 2009 letter, nor 

 

7 At such time as he files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner may, of course, 

raise any applicable grounds for relief from the statute of limitations.

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did Attorney Robinson comply with the State Bar’s instructions during the aforementioned time 

limitations. Id. at 7. Because Attorney Robinson did not contact Petitioner by May 26, 2009, 

Petitioner wrote another letter to the State Bar on that date. Id. at 23. Petitioner claims the State 

Bar did not reply to his May 26, 2009 letter. Id. at 7.

Thereafter, the record shows that over a period of seven months, Petitioner began making 

attempts to seek state court intervention in order to retrieve his trial transcripts from Attorney 

Robinson. Id. at 7, 25-28, 30; Dkt. 21-2 at 13.

On November 15, 2010, the Santa Clara County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s 

“request for the Court to obtain trial transcripts from his [appellate] attorney.” Dkts. 1 at 30; 21-2 

at 13. The state superior court further noted that the denial was “for the same reasons expressed in 

the prior orders,” which was that “Petitioner had failed to demonstrate he exhausted obtaining the 

transcripts through the State Bar.” Id.

On January 28, 2011, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Court of 

Appeal, alleging “ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Dkt. 21-2 at 4, 12. The record does 

not contain the state appellate court petition; therefore the basis of Petitioner’s IAC claim is 

unclear. On February 8, 2011, the state appellate court denied the petition. Id.

On March 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, 

alleging an IAC claim against Attorney Robinson based on counsel’s failure to send him his trial 

transcripts. Id. at 6-32. On August 10, 2011, the state supreme court denied the petition. Id. at 34.

On March 7, 2012, Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition in the California Supreme 

Court, again alleging the same IAC claim. Id. at 36-65. On June 13, 2012, the state supreme court 

denied his second state habeas petition. Id. at 67.

Over twenty-one months later, on March 25, 2014, Petitioner filed his federal habeas 

petition in this Court. Dkt. 1. His petition asserts the same IAC claim that he had asserted in his 

two state supreme court habeas petitions. Id. at 6-8. Specifically, Petitioner only contends that 

Attorney Robinson failed to send him his “[trial] transcripts and trial file” and prevented him from 

“filing a successful Writ/Petition on any Constitutional grounds, to any state or federal court(s).” 

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Id. at 6-7. Petitioner does not seek relief from his conviction, but instead states that he “prays the 

Court enter judgment granting [him]:” 

[1] appointment [sic] of transcripts and all relevant documents to 

Petitioner’s case[;]

[2] appointment of counsel due to Petitioner’s limited knowledge of 

the law[;]

[3] appointment of evidentiary hearing[; and]

[4] any additional relief this Court deems just, proper, and equitable.

Id. at 9.

Respondent now moves to dismiss on the grounds that (a) Petitioner’s IAC claim is not 

cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding because it does not attack his underlying conviction;

and (b) the claim is untimely. Dkt. 21. Petitioner’s two-page opposition to the motion argues 

solely that Respondent’s arguments are flawed based on the notion that the instant petition should 

be heard “on the merits.” Dkt. 28 at 2. Notably, Petitioner never challenges the legality of his 

conviction or identifies any issue upon which he believes his incarceration has resulted in a 

constitutional violation, even without the transcript and trial file in hand. Respondent filed a 

reply, which reiterated, among other arguments, that Petitioner “has never actually challenged the 

constitutionality of his conviction; rather, in his state and federal habeas petitions, [he] has claimed 

only that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to provide him with a 

complete set of trial transcripts.” Dkt. 29 at 4.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework

A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court can obtain a federal writ of 

habeas corpus only on the ground that she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In other words, “it is only noncompliance with

federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal 

courts.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has 

repeatedly held that federal habeas relief is unavailable for violations of state law or for alleged 

error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 

62 (2011); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 

(1982).

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Errors in the state post-conviction review process are not addressable through federal 

habeas corpus proceedings. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998); Gerlaugh v. 

Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 n.7 (9th 

Cir. 1997); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989); Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245, 

247 (6th Cir. 1986). Such errors do not generally represent an attack on the prisoner’s detention 

and therefore are not proper grounds for habeas relief. They instead generally pertain to the 

review process itself and not to the constitutionality of a state conviction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(i) (claims of ineffective assistance of state or federal post-conviction counsel not

cognizable on federal habeas review); Franzen, 877 F.2d at 26 (delay in state habeas proceeding 

not addressable in federal habeas); Millard v. Lynaugh, 810 F.2d 1403, 1410 (5th Cir. 1987) 

(denial of hearing on state collateral proceedings not addressable in federal habeas); see also 

Application of Gordon, 157 F.2d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 1946) (allegation that state court decided 

appeal improperly not enough to state claim in federal habeas).

The rule that federal habeas courts cannot address errors in the state post-conviction 

procedure (such as a state habeas proceeding) may appear confusing at first, especially in light of 

the fact that federal habeas courts routinely entertain claims that were presented in state court in a 

state habeas petition. The critical dividing point for determining whether the claim is barred by 

the rule in the preceding paragraph is whether the claim is of a constitutional violation at the 

underlying trial or of an alleged constitutional violation in the state habeas proceedings. In a 

federal habeas action, the former can be entertained but the latter cannot. Although claims may 

arrive in a federal habeas court after having been presented to state courts in state habeas petitions, 

the federal court can entertain only those claims that pertain to the trial and not to the state habeas 

proceeding. 

B. Application To This Case

Based on the foregoing, in the present case, the Court must determine whether Petitioner’s 

IAC claim pertains to a violation in the trial proceedings or not.

The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the right to 

effective assistance of appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); Smith v. 

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Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-86 (2000). Here, Petitioner has raised an IAC claim, however, he 

does not specifically identify any dereliction by his appellate counsel, Attorney Robinson, as it 

relates specifically to Petitioner’s direct appeal. Petitioner only contends that his appellate 

attorney failed to send him his trial transcripts and trial file so that he could use them in preparing 

his state and federal habeas petitions. Dkt. 1 at 6-7.

The Court agrees that appellate counsel’s failure to send Petitioner the trial transcripts and 

trial file is unacceptable. However, that failure is not pertinent to the legality of Petitioner’s 

conviction. Rather, it is only pertinent to the prosecution of his post-conviction proceedings, 

including his state habeas proceedings and this federal habeas action. The failure to provide 

Petitioner with transcripts and his file does not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(i) (“The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State 

collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under 

section 2254.”)

Accordingly, Petitioner’s IAC claim as set forth in his petition does not warrant federal 

habeas relief. The Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition—containing 

Petitioner’s sole IAC claim—for failure to state a claim upon which federal habeas relief may be 

granted, and the petition is DISMISSED with prejudice.

8

 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have been amended to 

require a district court that dismisses or denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of 

appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254 (effective Dec. 1, 2009). For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has not shown “that 

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural 

ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a COA is DENIED.

 

8

The Court’s dismissal of the instant petition for failure to state a claim upon which 

federal habeas relief may be granted obviates the need to address Respondent’s alternative 

argument that the petition is untimely.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which 

federal habeas relief may be granted (dkt. 21) is GRANTED, and the petition is DISMISSED with

prejudice under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

2. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Petitioner may seek a certificate of 

appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

3. Suzanne M. Peery, the current acting warden of the prison where Petitioner is 

incarcerated, has been substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all pending motions, and 

close the file. 

5. This Order terminates Docket No. 21.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

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