Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00427/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00427-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAMIEN D. OLIVE,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. LOPEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:16-cv-00427-AWI-MJS

(PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST 

FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

AND A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER

(ECF No. 1)

FOURTEEN DAY OBJECTION 

DEADLINE

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Damien D. Olive, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 29, 2016. Plaintiff‟s 

complaint is before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff has declined Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this case. (ECF No. 6.) No 

other parties have appeared in the action.

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I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner 

has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

II. Pleading Standard

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are 

not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 

677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible 

claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to 

have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, 

the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

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III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) in Delano, 

California, where the acts giving rise to his complaint occurred. He brings this action 

against Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”) Dr. S. Lopez, Chief Physician Dr. M. Spaeth, and 

Physician‟s Assistant C. Ogbuehi (“Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his 

right to be free from inhumane conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment 

by denying him adequate medical care to treat his seizure disorder. 

Plaintiff‟s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows:

Plaintiff has suffered from seizures since a 1995 motor vehicle accident. His

condition has been well-documented since he entered the California prison system in 

2002. Left untreated, the disorder could lead to severe disability or premature death.

Over the past eleven years, Plaintiff has been prescribed a number of different 

medications to control his seizures, including Dilantin, Depakote, Keppra, and topiramate. 

Only a combination of the drugs gabapentin and oxcarbazepine1has proven successful 

in controlling his seizures. These medications kept him seizure free for over a year.

On December 22, 2015, Plaintiff had a clinical appointment with Ogbuehi, his

primary care provider (“PCP”). Plaintiff advised Ogbuehi that his then-current prescription 

of gabapentin and oxcarbazepine was the only medication combination that successfully 

controlled his seizures. Ogbuehi told Plaintiff he would present a treatment plan to the 

California Correctional Health Care Services (“CCHCS”) Institutional Utilization 

Management (“IUM”) committee, chaired by Defendant Lopez, on December 23, 2015 to 

determine if Plaintiff could continue to receive gabapentin or if it would be discontinued 

immediately or over time. According to Ogbuehi, Dr. Lopez did not believe gabapentin 

was a suitable medication for seizures. Plaintiff asserts that several other prison health 

care providers, including a neurologist and Ogbuehi, agreed gabapentin was the best 

treatment for Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Lopez is not a board certified neurologist and 

 

1 Gabapentin is also referred to by its brand name, Neurontin, and oxcarbazepine by its brand name,

Trileptal. 

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not trained in neurology. He claims that it is a deviation from policy to take such a 

treatment decision from Ogbuehi and give it to the IUM committee.

On December 23, 2015, Plaintiff‟s building nurse told Plaintiff that Ogbuehi had 

reduced Plaintiff‟s gabapentin dose from 3600 milligrams daily to 1700 milligrams for one 

week after which time it was to be discontinued entirely. Dr. Lopez directed this decision 

because he believed gabapentin was too easily traded between inmates. On January 19, 

2016, Dr. Jeff Sao, a “delegate” of Dr. Lopez, interviewed Plaintiff and wrote a 

memorandum stating gabapentin was not FDA approved for use in generalized seizure 

disorders such as Plaintiff‟s. Plaintiff believes this memorandum was written as 

justification for Dr. Lopez ordering Ogbuehi to discontinue Plaintiff‟s gabapentin. Plaintiff 

states gabapentin is in fact FDA approved to treat generalized seizure disorders if

prescribed in conjunction with other antiepileptic medications.

Since the cessation of his gabapentin, Plaintiff has submitted four Health Care 

Services Request Forms (“CDCR 7362”) to the facility triage nurse, Jennifer German. 

German told Plaintiff to stop submitting the forms because there was nothing she could 

do. 

Plaintiff alleges he has not been prescribed a substitute for gabapentin and 

oxcarbazepine by itself will not control his seizures. Since Plaintiff‟s gabapentin was 

discontinued, Plaintiff has suffered five to seven seizures and risks further disability.

In addition to monetary damages, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction ordering 

Defendants to reinstate Plaintiff‟s gabapentin and a temporary restraining order against

Defendants. He also seeks the appointment of counsel. 

IV. Discussion

A. Exhaustion

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought 

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a 

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners are required 

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to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 

U.S. 199, 211 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of 

the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the 

exhaustion requirement applies to all suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 435 

U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Because exhaustion must precede the filing of the complaint, 

compliance with § 1997e(a) is not achieved by exhausting administrative remedies while 

the lawsuit is pending. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199.

A prison inmate in California satisfies the administrative exhaustion requirement by 

following the procedures set forth in §§ 3084.1-3084.8 of Title 15 of the California Code 

of Regulations. In California, inmates “may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, 

or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate...can demonstrate as having a 

material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

15, § 3084.1(a). The inmate must submit their appeal on the proper form, and is required 

to identify the staff member(s) involved as well as describing their involvement in the 

issue. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a). These regulations require the prisoner to 

proceed through three levels of appeal. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(b), 

3084.2, 3084.7. A decision at the third formal level, which is also referred to as the 

director's level, is not appealable and concludes a prisoner's departmental administrative 

remedy. See id.

“[I]nmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their 

complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is not 

jurisdictional; it creates an affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove. Id.

However, “in those rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the 

complaint,” dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate, even at the screening 

stage. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Wyatt v. Terhune, 

315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that “[a] prisoner's concession to 

nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal”), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 

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747 F.3d at 1166; Sorce v. Garikpaetiti, No. 14-cv-0327 BEN (JMA), 2014 WL 2506213, 

at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 2, 2014) (relying on Albino and dismissing the complaint on 

screening because “it is clear from the face of [plaintiff's] pleading that he has conceded 

that he failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies . . . before he commenced 

this action”).

Plaintiff‟s complaint reflects a failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. He 

says his administrative appeal was “summarily denied” and that further administrative

appeal would be pointless since it would be reviewed by Defendant Dr. Lopez. Such 

pleading is inconsistent with exhaustion. 

The PLRA requires an inmate exhaust only those administrative remedies that are 

available to him. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff‟s 

anticipation of an unfavorable resolution to his appeals or his belief in the inadequacy of 

relief available through such appeals does not make the administrative remedy 

unavailable; he must still pursue all administrative avenues available within the prison 

prior to filing a lawsuit. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. Plaintiff‟s complaint will therefore be 

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff will be granted leave to 

amend. Should Plaintiff choose to amend, he must state with specificity the steps he did 

or did not take toward exhausting his administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

B. Medical Indifference

Without analyzing the merits of Plaintiff‟s claim, the Court will advise Plaintiff of the 

standard for pleading a cognizable Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim. 

Should Plaintiff choose to amend, he must take care to meet this standard.

For Eighth Amendment claims arising out of medical care in prison, Plaintiff “must 

show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” 

and (2) that “the defendant‟s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm 

v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure 

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to respond to a prisoner‟s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite 

state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of 

due care. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on 

other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

The second element of an Eighth Amendment claim is subjective deliberate 

indifference, which involves two parts. Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1078. Plaintiff must 

demonstrate first that the risk was obvious or provide other circumstantial evidence that 

Defendants were aware of the substantial risk to his health, and second that there was no 

reasonable justification for exposing him to that risk. Id. (citing Thomas v. Ponder, 611 

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)) (quotation marks omitted). There must be some causal 

connection between the actions or omissions of each named defendant and the violation 

at issue; liability may not be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676-77; Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 

915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

C. Linkage

Finally, under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant 

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

676-77 (2009); Simmons, 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21(9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of 

Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 

Cir. 2002). Plaintiff may not attribute liability to a group of defendants, but must “set forth 

specific facts as to each individual defendant‟s” deprivation of his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 

844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable 

if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

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to prevent them.” Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 

1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A prison official in a supervisory position may be held liable 

under § 1983 . . . „if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or 

a sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor‟s unlawful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.‟”) (quoting Lolli v. Cty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 

2003)); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 

F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 

1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has currently alleged no facts linking Dr. Spaeth to the violation of his 

rights; indeed, Dr. Spaeth‟s name appears nowhere in Plaintiff‟s complaint outside of the 

caption. Plaintiff is advised that his amended complaint must link Dr. Spaeth to the 

constitutional violations alleged.

V. Request for a Preliminary Injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to reinstate Plaintiff‟s 

gabapentin “until time of trial or when no longer deemed essential by this Honorable 

Court.” He also requests a temporary restraining order against “both of the defendants 

involved as health care providers” for as long as he is housed at KVSP.

The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo before 

a preliminary injunction hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed 

merely to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. 

Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 65, a temporary restraining order may be granted only if “specific facts in an 

affidavit or verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 

damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).

The analysis for a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to that for a 

preliminary injunction, Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush and Co., Inc., 

240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001), and “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 

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remedy never awarded as of right,” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). 

 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Id. at 20 (citations omitted). Alternatively, a preliminary injunction 

may issue where the plaintiff demonstrates the existence of serious questions going to 

the merits and the hardship balance tips sharply toward the plaintiff, assuming the other 

two elements of the Winter test are also met. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 

632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011). Under either formulation of the principles, 

preliminary injunctive relief should be denied if the probability of success on the merits is 

low. See Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(even if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party, it must be 

shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits).

As Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, there is no 

case or controversy before the Court; therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to preliminary 

injunctive relief at this time. Knapp v. Cate, No. 1:08–cv–01779–AWI–WMW PC, 2009 

WL 1684900, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2009) (citing Zepeda v. United States Immigration 

Service, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may issue an injunction if it 

has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it 

may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”)). Therefore, the 

Court will recommend denying Plaintiff‟s motion for a preliminary injunction and a 

temporary restraining order. Plaintiff will be given fourteen days to file any objections to 

the Court‟s order.

VI. Request for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff requests the appointment of an attorney. Plaintiff does not have a 

constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 

1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the Court cannot require an attorney to represent Plaintiff 

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of 

Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances the Court may 

request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 

F.3d at 1525. However, without a reasonable method of securing and compensating 

counsel, the Court will seek volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional 

cases. In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, the District Court must 

evaluate both the likelihood of success of the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to 

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Id.

(citations omitted).

In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional 

circumstances. At this stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a determination 

that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, and based on a review of the record in this 

case, the Court does not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. 

Plaintiff claims that he is an “ADA” inmate, presumably meaning an inmate subject to the 

Americans with Disabilities Act. However, Plaintiff does not support his claim, nor does 

he detail how his particular disabilities affect his ability to litigate this case. Plaintiff 

presently faces no pending deadlines in this case, and he may request an extension of 

time if he has trouble meeting deadlines in the future. 

Plaintiff‟s present request for appointment of counsel will be denied without 

prejudice. If the Plaintiff can show good cause why he needs a lawyer appointed, the 

Court may reconsider his motion. The Court may also reevaluate the propriety of 

appointing counsel if and when Plaintiff‟s case proceeds to trial.

VII. Conclusion 

Plaintiff‟s complaint will be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. Plaintiff will be given thirty days from the date of this order to amend his 

complaint if he believes, in good faith, he can cure the identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). In the alternative, Plaintiff may file a 

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notice of voluntary dismissal with the Court. If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the 

nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George, 

507 F.3d at 607.

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but 

under section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on 

supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; 

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-07. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be 

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff‟s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

2. Plaintiff‟s request for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 1) is DENIED;

3. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank complaint form along with a copy 

of the complaint filed March 29, 2016;

4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file 

an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend this action 

be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure to obey a 

court order, subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g).

Additionally, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

6. Plaintiff‟s request for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order

(ECF No. 1) be DENIED.

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These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, 

Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 

923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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