Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01302/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01302-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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-1- 08cv1302

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS AVINA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO.08-CV-1302W (WMC)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[DOC. 23]

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant.

Thomas Avina, Rosalie Avina, and their two minor daughters B.F. Avina and

B.S. Avina (collectively “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against United States of

America (“Defendant”) for assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress after Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) agents executed search and arrest

warrants on Plaintiffs’ incorrectly identified home. Defendant seeks summary judgment,

and Plaintiffs oppose.

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral

argument. See Civ. Local R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons stated below, the Court

GRANTS Defendant’s motion (Doc. 23).

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1

 Exhibits designated with a number refer to Plaintiffs’ exhibits, and those identified by

a letter refer to Defendant’s exhibits.

2

 The DEA developed their information through an investigation and court-authorized

wire intercepts. (Report of Investigation Ex. 8, at 1-3, May, 30, 2006 [Doc. 31].)

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I. BACKGROUND1

On January 19, 2007, the DEA obtained a search warrant authorizing entry into

Plaintiffs’ home at 1601 Drew Road, Space 14, Seeley, California, to seek evidence of

illegal drug-trafficking, including “[w]eapons, firearms, firearm accessories, and

ammunition” (Search Warrant Ex. F, Attach. B ¶ 3 [Doc. 23-3].)2

 DEA agents planned

to concurrently execute a search warrant on the home and an arrest warrant for Luis

Eduardo Alvarez, a suspected drug-trafficker with a history of violence and resisting

arrest, who was believed to be at the search address. (Operational Plan Ex. G, at 41-42

[Doc. 23-3].) Thus, in order to minimize the possibility of violence and injury, the DEA

sent a search team of seven armed agents to move rapidly through the home and assert

control over the occupants. (Id. at 42.)

On the morning of January 20, 2007, agents executed the search warrant and

entered Plaintiffs’ home. (Search Warrant Return Ex. F [Doc. 23-3].) Before the agents

entered, Rosalie Avina was sleeping on the couch. (Rosalie Avina Dep. Ex. J, at 9:9-10

[Doc. 23-3].) She heard a loud pounding that woke her. (Id. at 9:10-13.) Then the

agents knocked on the door and announced that they are “police.” (Id. at 9:18-21.)

When Rosalie Avina got up to answer the door, it swung open and the agents entered

Plaintiffs’ home. (Id. at 19:21-22.) She then “froze.” (Id. at 9:24-10:-2.) She complied

when the agents commanded her to get down on the floor, and they subsequently

handcuffed her. (Id. at 10:3-7.) During the entry, the agents’ commands to Rosalie

Avina included profanity. (Id. at 10:3-4.)

After retreating into the bedroom from the living room as the agents entered the

home, Thomas Avina opened the bedroom door to an agent with a shotgun pointed at

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his face. (Thomas Avina Dep. Ex. H, at 11:8-10, 11:23-25 [Doc. 23-3].) The agents

commanded Thomas Avina to “[g]et down on the ground.” (Id. at 11:10.) However,

he did not comply. (Id. at 11:12-22.) Instead, he questioned the agents and told them

that they are “making a mistake.” (Id. at 11:12-13, 11:17-18.) In response, the agents

forced Thomas Avina to the ground and handcuffed him. (Id. at 11:19-22, 12:4-7.)

The agents’ commands to Thomas Avina also included profanity. (Id. at 11:16, 12:6.)

Once the agents secured Rosalie and Thomas Avina, they entered B.F. Avina’s

and B.S. Avina’s rooms. (Rosalie Avina Dep. Ex. J, at 10:7-10.) When the agents

entered B.F. Avina’s room, she was already awake lying on her bed. (B.F. Avina Dep.

Ex. K, at 7:25-8:3 [Doc. 23-3].) After the agents commanded her to get down on the

ground, she complied. (Id.) B.F. Avina, who was fourteen at the time, rolled off her bed

onto the floor and the agents handcuffed her. (Id. at 7:6, 8:4-7). B.S. Avina, who was

eleven at the time, was sleeping when the agents entered her room. (B.S. Avina Dep.

Ex. L, at 7:19-25, 8:18 [Doc. 23-3].) As they entered her room, the agents also

commanded her to get down on the ground. (Id. at 8:3.) However, she did not comply

and instead retorted, “Are you serious. What did I do?” (Id. at 8:4-7.) The agents then

pulled her to the floor and handcuffed her. (Id. at 8:7-10.)

Eventually, Plaintiffs were all brought into the living room in handcuffs and

placed on the couch, except for Thomas Avina, who remained on the floor. (Thomas

Avina Dep. Ex H, at 13:5-11; B.F. Avina Dep. Ex. K, at 8:7-10; B.S. Avina Dep. Ex. L, at

9:3-7.) The search took no more than one hour, and the agents removed all handcuffs

on Plaintiffs about five to twenty minutes before the completion of the search. (Thomas

Avina Dep. Ex. H, at 20:12-17, 25:6-11, 29:1-7.) Before the agents left, Special Agent

Matthew Lankenau, the team leader, gave Plaintiffs claims-processing information and

claims-contact information. (Lankenau Decl. Ex. E, at 3:28-4:3, 7:5-7 [Doc. 23-3].)

Also, throughout the search, no one requested any medical attention. (Id. at 7:2-4.)

Plaintiffs visited a nearby clinic after the search (B.S. Avina 

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3

 Upon completion of the search, Luis Alvarez was not found and no evidence was

seized. (Search Warrant Return Ex. F.) It turns out that the DEA made an “inadvertent error”

identifying Alvarez’s residence during the preparation of the warrant. This error was made “as

Alvarez’ BMW was seen meeting with the driver of a black Honda which was registered to

1601 Drew Road, Space 14, Seeley, California.” (Id.) 

4

 Plaintiffs allege “assault and battery” as a single cause of action. However, “the term

assault and battery is frequently used when a battery has been committed . . . .” Black’s Law

Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). As such, the Court will address Plaintiffs’ assault-and-battery cause

of action as one for battery.

-4- 08cv1302

Dep. Ex. L, at 18:23-24), but no reports of physical injuries or complaints of injuries were

recorded (Avina Family Medical Records Ex. I [Doc 23-3]). The medical records of all

four Plaintiffs state “diagnosis: anxiety-nonspecific;” they were given unknown nonprescriptions pills to take in order to relax. (Id.) Afterwards, Plaintiffs did not go to any

follow-up appointments. (Rosalie Avina Dep. Ex. J, at 27:23-28:4.) Other than some

minor bruises from the handcuffs, no one suffered any permanent physical injuries.

(Thomas Avina Dep. Ex. H, at 9:15-19 (characterizing his current general health as good

and “100”), 27:13-19; Rosalie Avina Dep. Ex. J, at 19:1-13, 27:23-25, 28:1-4; B.F. Avina

Dep. Ex. K, at 11:9-25, 12:1-6; B.S. Avina Dep. Ex. L, at 18:15-25, 19:1-25.) The agents

established control, completed their search, and departed without permanent physical

injury to anyone.3

On July 21, 2008, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint asserts

a cause of action for assault and battery,4

 and intentional infliction of emotional distress

against Defendant. On April 15, 2010, Defendant filed this motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. 23.) Plaintiffs filed their opposition to Defendant’s motion on June

15, 2010. (Doc. 26.) On June 22, 2010, Defendant filed its reply. (Doc. 33.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to

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judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it

could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute about a

material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving

party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the

nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential

to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-

23. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary

judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987). 

“The district court may limit its review to the documents submitted for the

purpose of summary judgment and those parts of the record specifically referenced

therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.

2001). Therefore, the court is not obligated “to scour the record in search of a genuine

issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing

Richards v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)). If the moving

party fails to discharge this initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the

court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat

summary judgment merely by demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

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5

 In their opposition, Plaintiffs cite case law relevant to a civil-rights claim, and contend

that agents acted negligently during their entry into Plaintiffs’ home. (Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.

Summ. J. 5:11-14, 6:13-15 [Doc. 26].) However, Plaintiffs have neither asserted a civil-rights

nor negligence claim. As such neither is an issue before the Court. Furthermore, Plaintiffs

suggest that the agents’ alleged negligence raises a genuine issue of material fact with respect

to the assault-and-battery issue. (Id. at 6:13-15.) However, negligence is unrelated to assault

and battery because it is not an element of assault and battery. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to

meet their burden to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-

23.

-6- 08cv1302

Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 242, 252 (1986) (“The

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is

not sufficient.”). Rather, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and by

“the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

When making this determination, the court must view all inferences drawn from

the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and

the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a

judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert two tort causes of action: assault and battery, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress.5

 (Compl. ¶¶ 10-16 [Doc. 1].) Under the Federal Torts

Claims Act, the Court applies the law of the state in which the alleged tortious conduct

occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 2671; Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). Thus, the

Court adheres to the appropriate California tort laws in this case.

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6

 “Claims that police officers used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory

stop or other ‘seizure’ . . . are analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App.

4th 1077, 1102 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).

“Reasonableness” used throughout this order refers to this standard.

-7- 08cv1302

A. DEA Agents Used Objectively Reasonable Force In Light of

Anticipating An Inherently Dangerous Situation.

Under California law, a plaintiff who brings an assault-and-battery action against

a law-enforcement officer has the burden of proving unreasonable force6

 as an element

of the tort. Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272 (Cal. Ct. App.

1998); see also Brown v. Ransweiller, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)

(“A state law battery is a counterpart to a federal claim of excessive use of force. In

both, a plaintiff must prove that the peace officer’s use of force was unreasonable.”).

Although the reasonableness of force used is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury,

a defendant can still win on summary judgment if the district court concludes that the

use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Liston v. Cnty. of

Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n.10 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912,

915 (9th Cir. 1994)). The “reasonableness of a particular use of force is judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not by 20/20 vision of hindsight.” In

re Joseph F., 85 Cal. App. 4th 975, 989 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). As such, the inquiry is

an objective one: was the officer’s action objectively reasonable in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting him, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99-100 (2005). 

In Meuhler, officers sought dangerous weapons and anticipated the presence of

a wanted gang member believed to be armed and dangerous during the execution of a

search warrant. 544 U.S. 95-96, 100. Instead, an eight-member Special Weapons and

Tactics (SWAT) team clad in helmets and black vests entered Iris Mena’s bedroom

while she slept, woke her at gunpoint, and placed her in handcuffs. Id. at 96, 107. The

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SWAT team also handcuffed three other individuals found on the property, and took

them, along with Mena, into a converted garage. Id. at 96. As the officers conducted

their search, Mena and the other occupants were detained for three hours in handcuffs.

Id. at 96, 100. The Supreme Court held that the officers’ use of force to effectuate

Mena’s three-hour detention was reasonable given that the warrant sought weapons and

evidence of gang membership. Id. at 99-100. 

 “The execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that

may give rise to sudden violence and frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence[.]”

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981). “[T]he risk of harm to both the police

and occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of

the situation.” Id. Therefore, “[w]hen officers undertake a dangerous assignment to

execute a warrant to search property that is presumably occupied by violence-prone

[suspects], it may well be appropriate to use both overwhelming force and surprise in

order to secure the premises as promptly as possible.” Muehler, 544 U.S. at 108

(Kennedy, J., concurring). Accordingly, governmental interests in detaining and using

force are at their maximum when a warrant authorizes a search that may expose officers

to an inherently dangerous situation. See id. at 100 (implying that the search for

weapons and a wanted gang member believed to reside at the premises creates an

inherently dangerous situation). 

In this case, DEA agents anticipated an inherently dangerous situation.

Foremost, the agents sought evidence of illegal drug-trafficking which is a “dangerous

[and] violent business.” United States v. Mierss-Vazquez, 983 F.2d 1079, 1993 WL

7246, at *1 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision); accord Summers, 452 U.S. at

702. Special Agent Lankenau and Defendant’s use-of-force expert, retired FBI

Supervisory Agent Urey Patrick, have stated that the illegal drug trade is characterized

by a prevalence of firearms and a propensity for violence. (Lankenau Decl. Ex. E, at 4:7-

//

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14; Urey Patrick Analysis & Report Ex. D, at 3 [Doc. 23-3].) Their opinions are

consistent with the evidence sought, which included weapons, firearms, firearm

accessories and ammunition. (Search Warrant Ex. F, Attach. B ¶ 3.) Moreover, the

agents entered the home to arrest a suspected drug-trafficker with a history of violence,

including resisting arrest, assault with a deadly weapon, and battery. (Lankenau Decl.

Ex. E, at 4:15-17.) In light of the anticipated dangers, Special Agent Lankenau took the

appropriate measures to minimize the risk of harm with a plan that used a team of seven

agents to rapidly move through the home and assert control over the occupants.

(Operational Plan Ex. G, at 41-42.) Additional contingencies included further local lawenforcement assistance for perimeter security and for immediate support, and notifying

and identifying the nearest trauma centers. (Lankenau Decl. Ex. E, at 4:18-25;

Operational Plan Ex. G, at 42.) Thus, anticipating an inherently dangerous situation,

Special Agent Lankenau thoughtfully planned for his team to use reasonable and

appropriate force during the execution of the search and arrest warrants.

During the execution of the warrants, DEA agents successfully carried out the

operational plan through the reasonable use of force during the entry and search of

Plaintiffs’ home. After knocking on the front door and announcing that they are the

police, the agents quickly entered and handcuffed Rosalie Avina. (Rosalie Avina Dep.

Ex. J, at 10:3-7.) Thomas Avina, however, was not compliant. (Thomas Avina Dep. Ex.

H, at 11:12-22.) Thus, the agents reasonably forced Thomas Avina to the ground in

order to handcuff him. (See id. at 11:19-22, 12:4-7.) The agents also handcuffed both

daughters, but unhandcuffed them after learning their ages about three-fourths of the

way through the search. (Rosalie Avina Dep. Ex. J, at 15:3-11.) Thomas and Rosalie

Avina were unhandcuffed shortly thereafter. (Thomas Avina Dep. Ex. H, at 28:22-29:7.)

Plaintiffs did not testify that they were hit in any way by the agents. Based on Plaintiffs’

deposition testimonies, the only force applied by the agents was associated solely with

handcuffing Plaintiffs during entry to secure the home. Furthermore, it is 

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an undisputed fact that the only physical injuries sustained by Plaintiffs were bruises on

the wrists associated with the handcuffs. (Rosalie Avina Dep. Ex. J, at 27:23-28:4;

Thomas Avina Dep. Ex. H, at 19:16-18 (“[T]hey didn’t physically slap me in the face –

I felt like they had mentally slapped me in the face . . . .”); 27:13-19.) Therefore, the

agents’ use of force in the form of handcuffing to effectuate detention was clearly

reasonable given the anticipated danger. See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 99-100 (citing

Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-03).

Plaintiffs also argue that the allegedly extensive use of profanity somehow

contributes to a finding that the agents used unreasonable force. (Pls.’ Opp’n 9:19-21.)

However, there is no evidence that suggests any use of profanity was extensive. Thomas

Avina testified that the agents used profanity when they commanded him to get on the

ground and to not move. (Thomas Avina Dep. Ex. H, at 11:16, 12:6.) Rosalie Avina

also testified that an agent used profanity when commanding her to get down on the

ground. (Rosalie Avina Dep. Ex. J, at 10:12-13.) Though B.F. Avina testified that she

heard profanity used in the background during the agents’ entry (B.F. Avina Dep. Ex.

K, at 7:25-8:3), neither B.F. nor B.A. Avina testified that any of the agents used any

profanity directed at them. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the evidence

demonstrates that the agents sparsely used profanity. And during the few instances the

agents used profanity, they did so only in association with commands during entry

directed solely at the adults. Furthermore, there is also no evidence that indicates the

agents used profanity at all during the detention as they searched the home.

Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument. 

Though the execution of the search and arrest warrants on Plaintiffs’ home was

unfortunate, based on the undisputed facts—particularly, the minimal amount of force

used throughout the search relative to the inherently dangerous circumstances

confronting the agents—the Court finds that the DEA agents used objectively

reasonable force in executing the search and arrest warrants at Plaintiffs’ incorrectly

identified home.

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B. DEA Agents Did Not Engage in Extreme and Outrageous Conduct.

To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in

California, Plaintiffs must prove that Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous

conduct with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,

emotional distress. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (Cal.

1993). For conduct to be outrageous, it must be “so extreme in degree, as to go beyond

all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable

in civilized community.” Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th 488, 496 (Cal. Ct. App.

1998); accord Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001 (“[Outrageous] conduct must be so extreme

as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by civilized society.”). Further, “the tort

does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or

other trivialities.” Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 496 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

In this case, the Court has already determined that the DEA agents’ use of force

was objectively reasonable. According to Muehler, brandishing firearms and applying

handcuffs while executing a warrant—even on the wrong premises—is objectively

reasonable conduct given the inherently dangerous conditions confronting the lawenforcement agents. 544 U.S. at 99-100. Thus, to say that the DEA agents’ actions

were extreme and outrageous to the point that it exceeded all bounds of that usually

tolerated by civilized society would clearly be antithetical to the Supreme Court’s

holding in Muehler—objectively reasonably conduct is neither extreme nor outrageous.

See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 99-100; Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 496. Therefore, the

DEA agents’ conduct during the execution of the search and arrest warrants at

Plaintiffs’ home was neither extreme nor outrageous.

//

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. 23.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 1, 2010

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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