Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00545/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00545-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:504 Copyright Infringement

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ODNIL MUSIC LIMITED and FIFTYSIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC LIMITED,

CASE NO. CIV. S-05-0545 WBS JFM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

KATHARSIS, LLC; WILLIAM JOSEPH

SCHECK, and NATHANIEL

CHRISTOPHER SCHECK,

Defendant.

----oo0oo---

On July 21, 2006, judgment was entered against 

defendants Katharsis LLC and William Scheck for copyright

infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 505. The court now considers

plaintiffs Odnil Music Limited and Fifty-Six Hope Road Music

Limited’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs Odnil Music Limited and Fifty-Six Hope Road

Music Limited filed suit on March 17, 2005, alleging that they

own the copyrights to four songs written by Bob Marley, that

defendants infringed those copyrights by causing those songs to

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be publicly performed in the Owl Club Ale House on September 2,

2004, and that defendants had not purchased a license for the

right to do so. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-14 (referencing Schedule A).) 

Defendants William Scheck and Nathaniel Scheck are members of

Katharsis L.L.C., which, in turn, owns the Owl Club Ale House

located in Roseville, California. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.) This matter

came on regularly for trial before the court, sitting without a

jury, on July 18, 2006. No appearance was made on behalf of

defendants Katharsis LLC or Nathaniel Scheck. Because defendant

Nathaniel Scheck failed to appear for trial, and the Magistrate

Judge had made Findings and Recommendations recommending that

default judgment be entered against defendant Katharsis,

plaintiffs elected to proceed in this trial against defendant

William Scheck only.

On July 20, 2006, the court made its findings of fact

and conclusions of law; pursuant to the court’s order, judgment

was entered against William Scheck and Katharsis LLC on July 21,

2006. The court indicated that plaintiffs are to recover

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit from defendants

Katharsis LLC and William Joseph Scheck, jointly and severally. 

(July 20, 2006 Order ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs now move for attorneys’

fees and costs in the amount of $68,020.50. (Pls.’ Mot. for

Att’ys’ Fees 9.) Defendant opposes this motion in its entirety

and seeks a denial of all attorneys’ fees and costs, or, in the

alternative, an award of attorneys’ fees in an amount no greater

than $5,000.

///

///

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II. Discussion

As the court previously explained in its order dated

July 20, 2006, the Copyright Act provides for the imposition of

costs and attorneys’ fees in favor of the prevailing party:

In any civil action under this title, the court in its

discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or

against any party other than the United States or an

officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this

title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s 

fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.

17 U.S.C. § 505; see also Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Plaintiffs in

copyright actions may be awarded attorney’s fees simply by virtue

of prevailing in the action: no other precondition need be met,

although the fee awarded must be reasonable.”); Fogerty v.

Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994). Further, “[a] plaintiff

need not succeed on every claim to be entitled to fees and ‘is a

prevailing party by succeeding on any significant issue which

achieves some of the benefit sought.’” Mantolete v. Bolger, 791

F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Soda Mountain Wilderness

Council v. Norton, 2006 WL 2054062, *1 (E.D. Cal. July 21,

2006)). 

If attorneys’ fees are warranted, the district court

determines the amount of an award of attorneys’ fees by using the

lodestar calculation--the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). There is a strong

presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable. Fischer v.

SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation

omitted). However, the court may adjust the lodestar figure if

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The court may adjust the lodestar figure on the basis 1

of the Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4)

the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances,

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9)

the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11)

the nature and length of the professional relationship

with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.

1975). However, many of the Kerr factors have been subsumed in

the lodestar approach. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879

F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, although the court

should consider the factors established by Kerr, it need not

discuss each factor. Sapper v. Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d 1069,

1073 (9th Cir. 1983). 

4

various factors overcome the presumption of reasonableness.1

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. 

A. Prevailing Party

The court previously determined that defendants William

Scheck and Katharsis LLC knowingly and deliberately infringed

upon plaintiffs’ copyrights, continue to perform copyrighted

materials in the ASCAP repertory, refused to obtain permission to

perform copyrighted materials, threatened ASCAP representatives

with bodily harm, and forced this matter to be litigated through

trial. Therefore, under § 505, plaintiffs are the prevailing

party and are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and

costs. See Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288,

1298 (D.R.I. 1982) (finding that where the “defendants had

deliberately and knowingly infringed upon plaintiffs’ copyrights”

and then “forced the plaintiffs to engage lawyers and to resort

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to the courts to enforce the proprietary interests in the

copyrights” without justification, the “litigation fairly crie[d]

out for an award of attorneys’ fees.”). 

B. Lodestar Calculation

1. Hours Reasonably Expended

Properly calculated fee awards should represent the

reasonable worth of the services rendered in vindication of the

plaintiffs’ copyright claim. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87,

96 (1989). “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a goodfaith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary . . . .” Hensley,

461 U.S. at 434. When the hours worked or the rates claimed are

not supported by evidence or adequate documentation, the district

court may reduce the award accordingly. Id. at 433. 

Plaintiffs have submitted a billing statement itemizing

the time counsel has spent on this matter. Plaintiffs seek

$68,020.50 in attorneys’ (and paralegals’) fees and $6,976.18 in

costs. (Alan M. Steinberg Decl. Ex. A.) Defendant would have

the court deny all fees and costs as unreasonable, contending

that the case should have required minimal preparation and

arguing in particular that telephone calls, conferencing,

letters, and document reviews were unnecessary and immaterial to

proving that the copyright violation occurred. (Def.’s Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. for Attys’ Fees 1.) 

By their own actions, defendants compounded the fees at

issue here. Both defendants failed, without advance notice or

justification, to appear at the settlement conference scheduled

for August 8, 2005. (Aug. 9, 2005 Order to Show Cause.) 

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Relatedly, the court notes that defendant William 2

Scheck’s opposition to this motion was untimely. 

6

Defendant Nathaniel Scheck additionally failed to appear at the

pretrial conference held on May 8, 2006. (May 8, 2006 Pretrial

Order 1.) On the morning that the bench trial was scheduled to

proceed, defendant William Scheck informed the court that

Nathaniel Scheck would not be appearing at trial because he had

entered a substance abuse rehabilitation program four days

earlier. (See July 18, 2006 Civil Court Trial Minutes.) 

By contrast, plaintiffs’ actions have demonstrated a

willingness to resolve the case expeditiously. After the summary

judgment hearing on June 1, 2006, plaintiffs’ counsel cautioned

defendant William Scheck that proceeding to trial would result in

substantial attorneys’ fees. (Alan Steinberg Decl. ¶ 6.) When

defendant Nathaniel Scheck did not appear for trial, plaintiffs

elected to proceed against defendants Katharsis LLC and William

Scheck. (July 18, 2006 Civil Court Trial Minutes.) Moreover,

plaintiffs have undertaken to reach a stipulated settlement the

case with defendant Nathaniel Scheck. What has prevented this

case from being resolved in a more efficient and cost-effective

manner is hardly an overzealous attempt by plaintiffs to bill

elevated fees. Instead, it was defendants’ failure to abide by

the orders and schedule set by the court that has caused delay 2

and increased expenditures by plaintiffs’ attorneys.

Moreover, defendant William Scheck has not demonstrated

that the particular work for which plaintiffs seek reimbursement

is unreasonable. Provided that the party seeking attorneys’ fees

submits supporting documentation, courts regularly award

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attorneys’ fees for legal activities such as communications by

phone with clients or opposing counsel, document review, and

meetings. See, e.g., Assembly of State of Cal. v. U.S. Dept. of

Commerce, No. 91-990, 1993 WL 188328, at *12 (E.D. Cal. May 28,

1993) (finding a billing entry that included phone calls

reasonable); Monsanto Co. v. Pacificorp, No. 01-607, 2006 WL

1128226, at *8 (D. Idaho Apr. 24, 2006) (awarding attorneys’ fees

for “considerable time investigating the potential success of

filing such a complaint, including interviewing witnesses and

reviewing relevant documents”); Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores,

Inc., 03-1843, 2005 WL 3287233, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005)

(concluding that meetings for support staff were reasonable

billing entries). Defendants here have submitted supporting

documentation for all of these charges. (Steinberg Decl. Ex. B.) 

Moreover, activities such as communications, meetings, and

document review are commonplace within, and central to, the legal

profession. Adequate preparation for trial requires more than

simply gathering evidence and marshaling arguments to make a

legal claim–-it necessarily involves working and interacting with

support staff, clients, court staff, and opposing counsel. An

attorney should not be expected to perform those essential

functions for free. Therefore, without a more specific reason to

consider these charges improper, the court will not reduce the

amount of attorneys’ fees requested. 

2. Rate Reasonably Charged

The reasonable hours expended in this litigation must

be multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate to determine the

lodestar amount. To determine the reasonableness of hourly rates

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Defendant does not appear to contest the hourly rate 3

charged by plaintiffs’ counsel.

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claimed, the court looks to the “prevailing market rates in the

relevant community,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984),

for “similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill,

experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles,

796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1997). The fee applicant bears 3

the burden “to produce satisfactory evidence--in addition to the

attorney’s own affidavits--that the requested rates are in line

with those in the prevailing community . . . .” Blum, 465 U.S.

at 895 n.11. The relevant community is generally the forum in

which the district court sits. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496,

500 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks a hourly compensation rate of

$195 for Forrest Plant, Jr., a partner of the law firm of

Goldsberry, Freeman & Guzman, LLP, prior to January 1, 2006, when

the firm ceased billing at that flat rate. Subsequently, Mr.

Plant billed at an hourly rate of $235. The same billing

schedule holds for David L. Ditora, another partner at the same

firm. For the work performed by associate Alan M. Steinberg,

plaintiffs’ counsel seeks compensation of $200 an hour. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel further seeks $75 an hour for paralegal Joan

Debra Ellison. (Steinberg Decl. Ex. B at 7.) This court has

consistently found that $250 per hour for an experienced attorney

and $75 for a paralegal are reasonable hourly rates for this

community. Loskot v. U.S.A. Gasoline Corp., No. 01-2125, slip

op. at 11 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2004) (applying those rates to

determine plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees); see also Sanford v.

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Thrifty Payless, Inc., No. 02-480, 2005 WL 2562712, at *4 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 11, 2005) (implicitly recognizing that these are rates

are still reasonable); Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified Sch. Dist.,

No. 03-2568, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004) (finding $250

to be a reasonable hourly rate for an experienced attorney).

The court has additionally found $150 an hour to be the

standard hourly rate for an associate practicing in this district

in suits brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See,

e.g., White v. GMRI, Inc., No. 04-0620, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

2059, at *14-15 (E.D. Cal. 2006); Eiden v. Thrifty Payless Inc.,

407 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (E.D. Cal. 2005). Mr. Steinberg’s

rates are admittedly higher than that rate. However, Mr.

Steinberg has over ten years of litigation experience (see Alan

Steinberg Decl. Ex. E (Resume)), which was amply demonstrated by

his proficiency in litigation skills in the proceedings before

thiscourt. Mr. Steinberg has additionally represented that the

hourly rate he seeks in this motion is the standard fee that he

charges and collects from clients, including plaintiffs (when he

is retained by them on other matters). Moreover, although Mr.

Steinberg is not an expert in copyright law, he represented to

the court that he wisely relied on his client’s considerable

expertise in the field to avoid research costs he might have

otherwise incurred due to any unfamiliarity with the field. 

Plaintiffs did not submit bills for the client’s time. 

Therefore, based on Mr. Steinberg’s skills and experience, the

court finds that a fee higher than the rate previously approved

by this court for associates in disability cases is eminently

reasonable here. 

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The court notes that the billing statement plaintiffs 4

submitted incorrectly lists Mr. Steinberg’s rate at $235/hour,

which is higher than plaintiffs contend it should be. (See

Steinberg Decl. Ex. B (Invoice 19878 at 5).) However, plaintiffs

appear to have calculated the total amount of fees correctly.

10

The remainder of the hourly rates are at or below the

billing rates previously approved by this court in other cases,

and the court therefore finds them reasonable. Thus, the court

will apply the hourly rates of $195 for Alan Steinberg prior to

January 1, 2006, and $200 after that time; $195 for Forrest 4

Plant, Jr. and David L. Ditora prior to January 1, 2006, and $235

after that time; and $75 for paralegal Joan Debra Ellison.

3. Adjusting the Lodestar Calculation

Defendants additionally appear to request that this

court apply a negative multiplier to the court-determined

lodestar amount. (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Attys’ Fees 4-

5.) There are twelve factors that the court in Kerr indicated

could be used to apply a negative multiplier to the lodestar

amount, but five Kerr factors are subsumed in the lodestar

analysis: (1) the novelty of the issues, (2) the skill and

experience of counsel, (3) the quality of representation, (4) the

results obtained, and (5) the contingent nature of the fee

agreement. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.9

(9th Cir. 1996). Further, there is a strong presumption that the

lodestar amount is reasonable. Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 n.4. 

Defendants argue that the questions involved did not

present any particular novelty or difficulty (Def.’s Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. for Attys’ Fees 3), and accordingly, the court should

reduce the fee amount. However, to consider the novelty of the

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At oral argument on the motion for attorneys’ fees, 5

defendant William Scheck contended that plaintiffs should not

have flown to attend the settlement conference. (This would

appear to be a brazen position to be taken by one who himself

defied the court’s order by his failure to appear at the

settlement at all.) In order to facilitate settlement, the court

required that parties with decision-making authority attend the

settlement conference. Therefore, the cost of a flight for a

person with the ability to make settlement decisions was a

necessary expense, and has appropriately been included in the

cost bill.

11

issues would be to consider a factor already subsumed in the

lodestar analysis. This circuit disfavors consideration of

subsumed reasonableness factors after the lodestar has been

calculated. Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.9. Therefore, the court

is unpersuaded by defendant’s argument in favor of departure from

the lodestar calculation.

4. Costs

Plaintiffs have submitted a cost bill totaling

$6,976.18. Defendants have not objected. The fact that 5

defendant William Scheck subsequently filed an appeal of the

court’s underlying judgment has no bearing on the court’s

jurisdiction to consider this bill of costs. Cent. States, Se. &

Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Cartage Co., 992 F. Supp. 980,

985 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“A district court may still address

ancillary matters, such as costs, while a case is pending

appeal.” (citing Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 194 (7th

Cir. 1995))); see also United States v. Kersting, 891 F.2d 1407,

1413 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that “a motion for costs may be

collateral to the action on appeal” if it “does not seek

reconsideration of substantive issues resolved in the judgment”),

overruled on other grounds by Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling

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Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1480 (9th Cir. 1992). Additionally,

because defendants William and Nathaniel Scheck are jointly and

severally liable for fees and costs in this action, (see July 20,

2006 Order 19), the court need not wait until Nathaniel’s

liability is determined before awarding costs.

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and Local Rule 54-292(f) govern the taxation of costs to losing

parties, which are generally subject to limits set under 28

U.S.C. § 1920. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating taxable costs);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“costs other than attorneys’ fees shall

be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court

otherwise directs . . . .”); L.R. 54-292(f); Crawford Fitting Co.

v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987) (limiting taxable

costs to those enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920). However, when a

party prevails on claims of copyright infringement, the

limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 do not apply. See 17

U.S.C. § 505 (permitting the court, in its discretion, to “allow

the recovery of full costs by or against any party” in actions

for copyright infringement (emphasis added)); Twentieth Century

Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 885 (9th Cir.

2005) (“[D]istrict courts may award otherwise non-taxable costs,

including those that lie outside the scope of § 1920, under §

505.”). 

Under either statute, the court exercises its

discretion in determining whether to allow certain costs. 17

U.S.C. § 505 (“[U]nder this title, the court in its discretion

may allow the recovery of full costs . . . .”); Amarel v.

Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1523 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the

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district court has discretion to determine what constitutes a

taxable cost within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1920); Alflex

Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir.

1990) (same). Also, regardless of the applicable statute, the

losing party has the burden of overcoming the presumption in

favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party. See Russian

River Watershed Protection Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d

1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the presumption “may only

be overcome by pointing to some impropriety on the part of the

prevailing party”); Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1523; see also L.R. 54-

292(d) (“If no objection is filed, the Clerk shall proceed to tax

and enter costs.”).

After reviewing the bill, the court finds that certain

costs are unreasonable. Namely, the court takes issue with the

costs for subsistence (lodging and meals) for witnesses called by

defendant at William Scheck’s trial. The subsistence costs

($479.98 for Dean DeMerritt, $243.76 for Scott Greene, and

$253.22 for Kevin McDonough) exceed the statutory limits for a

two day/one night stay in the Sacramento area. 28 U.S.C. §

1821(d)(2) (“A subsistence allowance for a witness shall be paid

in an amount not to exceed the maximum per diem allowance

prescribed by the Administrator of General Services . . . for

official travel in the area of attendance.”). The maximum amount

that plaintiffs can bill for these three witnesses comes to $183

each. See U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., Per Diem Rates, California -

FY 06, available at http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/perdiem.do?

pf=y&queryYear=2006&queryState=California (last visited Sept. 18,

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Although the maximum GSA rate for hotel stays does not 6

include taxes, the court is ignorant of the going rate for

applicable taxes in the Sacramento area during the relevant time

period and consequently cannot take account of these amounts in

this order. 

14

2006) (setting the maximum lodging cost, excluding taxes, at $946

per day and allowing for $44.25 for meals and incidental expenses

on the first and last day). Pursuant to the foregoing

discussion, costs of $5,525.02 will be allowed. 

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, attorneys’

fees are awarded in the following amounts:

David L. Ditora: 7.7 hours @ $195/hr

19.5 hours @ $235/hr

=

=

$1,501.50

$4,582.50

Forrest Plant, Jr.: 37.5 hours @ $195/hr = $7,312.50

Alan M. Steinberg:

Paralegal:

 40.4 hours @ $235/hr

221.3 hours @ $200/hr 

 11.6 hours @ $75/hr

=

=

=

 $9,494.00

$44,260.00

$870.00

Costs: ($6,976.18 - $1,451.16) = $5,525.02

TOTAL = $73,545.52

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for 

attorneys’ fees and costs as against defendants William Scheck

and Katharsis LLC be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in the

total sum of $73,545.52. 

DATED: September 22, 2006

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