Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01513/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Anthony McDonald, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al. 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-10-1513-PHX-DGC (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 3) Respondents have filed an Answer, to which Petitioner has replied. (Docs. 12-13, 15) After considering the briefing, exhibits, and relevant

law, it is recommended that the Petition be denied. The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted in this case, especially in view of the evidentiary hearing conducted on

post-conviction review. Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011) (holding

that, when a petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal courts are

restricted to the state court record when deciding claims previously adjudicated on the merits

by the state courts.).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial and Sentencing

On January 29, 2004, the State of Arizona filed an indictment in the Arizona

Superior Court, Maricopa County, charging Petitioner with burglary in the second degree, a

Class 3 felony, and possession of burglary tools, a Class 6 felony. (Respondents’ Exh. A at

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 1 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1 The Honorable John A. Buttrick presided. 

 2 The Honorable Gregory H. Martin presided. 

- 2 -

5) The State amended the indictment to allege 23 historical prior felony convictions, commission of the offenses while released from confinement, and aggravating circumstances

other than prior convictions. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 14, 15, 44)

Following a mistrial,1

 on December 8, 2004, a second trial commenced on

December 9, 2004.2 On December 14, 2004, the jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B at 89, 91, 110; Exh. A 105, 109) The jury subsequently found that the

State had established several aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Respondents’ Exh. B at 117) On March 2, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner as a

repetitive offender to an aggravated 20-year term of imprisonment on the second-degree

burglary conviction and an aggravated concurrent 4.5-year term of imprisonment on the

possession of burglary tools conviction. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 126) 

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner timely appealed. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). (Respondents’ Exh. C) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro

se brief asserting that: (1) the trial court denied Petitioner the right to self-representation; (2)

the trial court considered improper aggravating circumstances when sentencing Petitioner;

(3) the trial court improperly admitted a victim impact statement during sentencing; (4) the

trial court denied Petitioner the opportunity to review the pre-sentence report; and (5) the

trial court imposed an excessive sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. D) 

On March 2, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions

and sentences. (Respondents’ Exh. E) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which

the appellate court denied. (Respondents’ Exhs. F, G) Petitioner filed a petition for review

in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on August 17, 2006. (Respondents’ Exhs. H, I) Petitioner did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of

certiorari. 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 2 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 3 Respondents concede that the Petition is timely; thus, the Court will not further address this

issue. (Doc. 12 at 5)

- 3 -

C. Post-Conviction Review

On August 25, 2006, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of postconviction relief in the trial court pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. J) 

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, raising the following claims:

1. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial based on juror

bias.

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise Petitioner on the

merits of a plea offer.

3. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements made by the

prosecution on behalf of the victim’s son at the sentencing hearing.

4. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively cross-examine state

witnesses.

5. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and interview

corroborating witnesses.

6. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present meaningful mitigation

evidence at the sentencing hearing. 

(Respondents’ Exh. K) After the petition was fully briefed, the trial court conducted an

evidentiary hearing on the issue of counsel’s failure to adequately advise Petitioner of the

strength and weaknesses of his case in association with a plea offer. (Respondents’ Exh. B

at 185, Exh. N) At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, on May 21, 2008, the court

denied the petition. (Exh. N at 48) 

Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review of the denial of postconviction relief. The appellate court summarily denied review on November 24, 2009. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. O, P) On December 18, 2009, the Arizona Supreme Court likewise

denied review. (Respondents’ Exh. Q) 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a timely3

 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 3 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this District Court. (Doc. 3) Petitioner raises the following claims for

relief:

1. The trial court denied Petitioner his right to self-representation.

2. Petitioner’s sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because the court

submitted improper aggravating circumstances to the jury and the trial court

considered an aggravating factor not submitted to the jury.

3. Petitioner’s aggravated sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.

4. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advocate on Petitioner’s behalf at

sentencing.

5. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct reasonable pretrial investigation.

6. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of juror bias.

7. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise Petitioner regarding

the merits of a plea offer. 

8. Petitioner’s right to due process was violated during post-conviction

proceedings. 

(Doc. 3) The Court previously dismissed Ground 8 and directed Respondents to answer the

remaining grounds for relief. (Doc. 4) Respondents have filed an Answer to the Petition, to

which Petitioner has replied. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be denied. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless

the petitioner has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). When

seeking habeas relief, petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has properly exhausted

each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The

exhaustion inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the petition for

writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). 

The prisoner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right under the law of

the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

In other words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state courts one full

opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One complete

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 4 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

round” includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of the

ordinary appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. 

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity

to rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349

(1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with

the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate

state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona,

unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F.Supp.2d

925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

In addition to presenting his claims to the proper court, a state prisoner must fairly

present his claims to that court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. A claim is “fairly

presented” in state court only if a petitioner has described both the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that

all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state court or that a

“somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Id. (stating that a reference to ineffective

assistance of counsel does not alert the court to federal nature of the claim). Rather, the

habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific constitutional guarantee upon which

he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as, due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a

federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended

on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th

Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal to a constitutional

guarantee,” such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a

“fair trial”). Likewise, a mere reference to the “Constitution of the United States” does not

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 5 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Even if the

basis of a federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim would be decided “on the same

considerations” under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal nature of the

claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts . . . .” Lyons,

232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court if the court

must read beyond the pleadings filed in that court to discover the federal claim. Baldwin,

541 U.S. at 27. 

In sum, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2)

through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in

state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds such as waiver

or preclusion. Beard v. Kindler, ___ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Thus, a petitioner may

be barred from raising federal claims that he did not preserve in state court by making a

contemporaneous objection at trial, on direct appeal, or when seeking post-conviction relief. 

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that failure to raise contemporaneous objection to alleged violation of federal rights during state trial constitutes a

procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991)

(finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court of Appeals held that habeas

petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal or in first petition for

post-conviction relief.) If the state court also addressed the merits of the underlying federal

claim, the “alternative” ruling does not vitiate the independent state procedural bar. Harris v.

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carringer v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)

(state supreme court found ineffective assistance of counsel claims “barred under state law,”

but also discussed and rejected the claims on the merits, en banc court held that the “on-theCase 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 6 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

merits” discussion was an “alternative ruling” and the claims were procedurally defaulted

and barred from federal review). A higher court’s subsequent summary denial of review

affirms the lower court’s application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

However, “in order to constitute adequate and independent grounds sufficient to support a

finding of procedural default, a state rule must be clear, consistently applied, and wellestablished at the time of Petitioner’s default.” Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir.

1994). The Supreme Court had held that “a discretionary state procedural rule can serve as

an adequate ground to bar federal habeas review,” and that “a discretionary rule can be

‘firmly established’ and ‘regularly followed’ - even if the appropriate exercise of discretion

may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases but not in others.” Kindler, 130

S.Ct. at 618. Likewise, occasionally excusing non-compliance with a procedural rule does

not render a state procedural bar inadequate. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n. 6

(1989). 

The second procedural default scenario arises when a petitioner failed to present

his federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the

state courts’ procedural rules, such as, waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the

previously unraised claims. See, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v.

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d

1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (postconviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal

of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule

32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion because

although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an

available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 7 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no

remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”).

 In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Hughes, 800 F.2d at 907-08.

III. Standard of Review

This Court’s consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s claims is constrained by the

applicable standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended in 1996 by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The ADEPA “modified a

federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent

federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the

extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). The standard in §

2254(d) is “meant to be” “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct.

770, 786 (2011). Section “2254 stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court

relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted).

“Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunction in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction

through appeal.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979)).

Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims subject to § 2254(d) unless it is

shown that the earlier state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law then clearly

established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); or that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such

law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in

light of the record before the state court, § 2254(d)(2). Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785; see also,

Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether a state court

ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law, courts

look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court which existed at the time of the state

court’s decision. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___ , ___, 130

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 8 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

S.Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010)). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that it cannot reverse a state

court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a

federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004); Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Even if the state court neither explains its

ruling nor cites United States Supreme Court authority, the reviewing federal court must

examine Supreme Court precedent to determine whether the state court reasonably applied

federal law. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784 (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003)). Citation

to federal law is not required and compliance with the habeas statute “does not even require

awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Early, 537 U.S. at 8; Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

“Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s

burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state to deny

relief. This is so whether or not the state court reveals which of the elements in a multipart

claim it found insufficient, for § 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim’, not a component of one,

has been adjudicated.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

Under § 2254(d), a state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a

rule of law “that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme

Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.”

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. A

state court decision results in an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect

application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.

652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state

court’s decision is objectively unreasonable.”). “A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on

the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. 786 (citing Yarborough,

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 9 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

541 U.S. at 664). “‘[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires

consider-ing the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing

Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). 

The habeas court presumes that the state court’s factual determinations are correct

and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues made by a

State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting

the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); Williams v. Rhoades,

354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). 

IV. Analysis 

Mindful of the foregoing principles, the Court will consider the Petition and

determine whether Petitioner’s claims are properly before the Court on habeas corpus

review. If so, the Court will consider the merits of Petitioner’s claims. 

A. Ground One - Right to Self-Representation 

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that he was denied the right to represent himself

at trial. (Doc. 3 at 6) Respondents concede that this claim is properly before the Court on

habeas corpus review. (Doc. 12 at 12)

Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to proceed in propria persona. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 32) Before Petitioner filed that motion, his trial had been continued from

May to June 2004. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 28) On June 2, 2004, the continuance panel

granted a second extension and continued the trial to July 20, 2004. (Id. at 31) Petitioner

moved to proceed in propria persona on June 30, 2004. The trial court scheduled oral

argument for July 9, 2004. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 32, Exh. B at 33) During the July 9,

2004 hearing, Petitioner informed the court that he lacked confidence in trial counsel,

wanted the assistance of advisory counsel, and needed an additional 90 to 180 days to

prepare for trial. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 5-7) The trial court advised Petitioner that his

simultaneous request to proceed in propria persona and for an extension of time weighed

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 10 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

against granting Petitioner’s request to represent himself. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 7) The

court also informed Petitioner that it could not grant a continuance, but that Petitioner would

have to return to the continuance panel to renew his request. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 7; Exh.

B at 30) The trial court then inquired whether Petitioner was prepared to proceed to trial on

July 20, 2004. Petitioner stated he was not ready to proceed on July 20, 2004 by himself. 

(Respondents’ Exh. S at 9) Petitioner explained that he thought the trial court could

continue the trial date. The trial court reiterated that it lacked the authority to grant a continuance and that Petitioner would have to seek a continuance from the continuance panel. 

(Respondents’ Exh. S at 10) The trial court proposed substituting counsel and Petitioner

responded that he would “be willing to try that.” (Respondents’ Exh. S at 11) The trial court

denied the motion without prejudice, withdrew the Office of the Public Defender from

further representation of Petitioner, and appointed the Office of the Legal Defender. 

(Respondents’ Exh. S at 15-16) The court emphasized that Petitioner retained the right to

represent himself and could “decide to try to exercise that [right] at a later time.” (Respondents’ Exh. S at 15) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court had denied his right to selfrepresentation. (Respondents’ Exh. D at 8-13) Petitioner argued that the trial court used a

“threat tactic” to deny Petitioner’s right to self-representation by stating that it could not

continue the trial date. (Id. at 11) The appellate court found that the trial court had not

threatened Petitioner, but had simply informed him that he would be held to the same

standard as an attorney, and would not necessarily be granted a continuance of the trial date. 

(Respondents’ Exh. E at 5-6) The appellate court found that the trial court did not deny

Petitioner his right to self-representation by advising him of the disadvantages of selfrepresentation. (Id.) The appellate court noted that the trial court had clarified that Petitioner

retained the right to self-representation and could renew his request. (Id.) The court also

noted that nothing in the record indicated that Petitioner had ever renewed his request to

represent himself. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 5) The appellate court concluded that the trial

court did not violate Petitioner’s right to self-representation. (Respondents’ Exh. E)

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 11 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

As Respondents argue, Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s decision

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law, or that it was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Under the Sixth

Amendment, criminal defendants have a right to be represented by counsel. The right to

counsel has been interpreted to include “an independent constitutional right” of the accused

to represent himself at trial, and thus waive the right to counsel. Feretta v. California, 422

U.S. 806 (1975). A defendant who seeks to represent himself “must ‘knowingly and intelligently’” waive the right to counsel by being “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages

of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and

his choice is made with eyes open.’” Id. at 835 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

464-65 (1938)); see also, Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004). A criminal defendant’s

request for self-representation must also be unequivocal, timely, and not for purposes of

delay. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir.

2004); see also United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1994). Courts consider three

factors to determine whether a request for self-representation is unequivocal: “the timing of

the request, the manner in which the request was made, whether the defendant repeatedly

made the request.” Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2007). In applying these

factors, the court gives significant deference to the state court’s factual findings. Id., 504

F.3d at 882 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (state court’s factual findings “shall be presumed

to be correct”).

Here, during the Faretta hearing, the trial court advised Petitioner of the responsibilities and disadvantages of self-representation. Petitioner agreed to the trial court’s proposal to substitute counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. S, Tr. 7/9/04 at 7-11) Petitioner’s request to

represent himself was not unequivocal when he simultaneously requested advisory counsel,

a continuance of the trial date, and conceded that he was not prepared to proceed on the trial

date. (Id.) The matter proceeded to trial in December 2004. Petitioner did not renew his

request to represent himself, even though the trial court had advised him that he could do so

at any time. 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 12 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

The record supports the State court’s finding that Petitioner’s right to selfrepresentation was not violated. Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s rejection of

this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or was contrary to, or

based on an unreasonable application of, controlling Supreme Court precedent. Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] federal court may not second-guess a state

court's fact-finding process unless . . . it determines that the state court was not merely

wrong, but actually unreasonable.”). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus

relief on this claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Ground Two - Aggravating Circumstances 

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment rights, as articulated

in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2000), were violated when the trial court asked the

jury to consider an improper aggravating circumstance at sentencing. (Doc. 3 at 6-7) Petitioner asserts that the aggravating circumstance, “use, threatened use, or possession of a

deadly weapon,” was improperly submitted to the jury because Petitioner was not charged

with those circumstances and use of a weapon was not a fact reflected in the guilty verdict. 

Petitioner further argues that the trial court improperly considered a victim impact statement

as an aggravating circumstance because it was not submitted to the jury for consideration. 

(Id.) Respondents concede that Petitioner’s sentencing claims are properly before the Court. 

(Doc. 12 at 15)

Before trial, the State filed an allegation of aggravating circumstances other than

prior convictions alleging that:

1. The offense(s) involved the use, threatened use or possession of a deadly

weapon or dangerous instrument during the commission of a crime, specifically a

gun.

2. The defendant committed the offense(s) as consideration for the receipt, or in

the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.

3. The offense(s) caused emotional harm to the victim.

4. At least one victim of the offense was sixty-five or more years of age or was a

disabled person. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 44) 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 13 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

After the jury found Petitioner guilty, the aggravation phase began. The jury considered whether the State proved the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 112-113) With regards to the burglary conviction, the jury

considered whether: (1) the offense involved the use of a weapon, (2) Petitioner committed

the offense for pecuniary gain, (3) the offense caused emotional harm to the victim, and (4)

whether one of the victims was at least 65 years old or disabled. (Respondents’ Exh. A at

112; Exh. B at 117) The jury found that the State had failed to prove that a weapon was used

in the commission of the offense, but found the existence of the other three aggravating

factors beyond a reasonable doubt. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 112) Before sentencing Petitioner, the trial court found the allegation that Petitioner had 23 historical prior felony

convictions was established beyond a reasonable doubt. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 119) The

trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of 20 years’ imprisonment on the

second-burglary conviction. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 126) 

With regards to the possession of burglary tools conviction, the jury considered

whether: (1) the offense involved the use of a weapon, and (2) whether Petitioner committed

the offense for pecuniary gain. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 13) The jury found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed the offense for pecuniary gain. (Id.) The jury

further found that the State had failed to prove that the offense involved the use of a weapon.

(Id.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner as a repetitive offender to an aggravated 4.5-year

term of imprisonment. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 126) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner raised the issue of improper aggravating circumstances. (Respondents’ Exh. D at 14-16) The appellate court found that the trial court did

not consider the objectionable aggravating circumstance in sentencing Petitioner. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 7) 

With regards to the “victim impact statement,” during the sentencing hearing, the

prosecutor relayed several statements from the victims’ son, who lived out of state, was not

present during the sentencing hearing, and had not written a letter to the court. The prosecutor stated that the victims’ son, Patrick, was staying with his parents during the incident. 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 14 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

(Respondents’ Exh. T at 3) The victims’ son was concerned that the incident had hastened

the death of his mother who was ill at the time of burglary and died several months later. (Id.

at 4) The prosecutor advised the court that the victim’s son felt the maximum sentence was

appropriate (Id.) Petitioner did not object to the prosecutor’s statements at the sentencing

hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. T) On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that those statements

unfairly influenced that the court in imposing a maximum, rather than the presumptive,

sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. D at 16)

The appellate court found that the “form and method in which [the] statement was

presented” to the trial court might have been improper, but that its admission was not fundamental error because Petitioner’s sentence was within the statutory range, several aggravating factors were present, and there was no evidence that the trial court’s sentencing

determination was influenced by the victim impact statement. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 8) 

Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s ruling was to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

 Before Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2000), in Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court held “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. The Supreme

Court specifically carved out an exception for prior convictions. Id.; United States v.

Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding the district court could

consider a defendant’s prior conviction in imposing a sentence enhancement even though

such conduct had not been charged in the indictment, presented to the jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 415 (9th Cir.

2001) (noting Apprendi held all prior convictions are exempt under Apprendi’s new rule,

therefore, district court properly considered prior convictions in sentencing).

As previously stated, under Blakely, any factor which lead to a sentence greater

than that which would be imposed based on the jury’s finding of guilt must be found by the

jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 301. Blakely reaffirmed the exemption for prior

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 15 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

convictions and reiterated that they may serve as aggravating factors without further proof. 

United States v. Quintana-Quintana, 383 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Blakely,

542 U.S. at 303). Blakely also clarified that the “statutory maximum” sentence is initially the

presumptive term and is the “maximum sentence the judge may impose solely on the basis

of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the

relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04 (emphasis in original). The Blakely Court concluded that, before

a trial court can impose a sentence above the statutory maximum, a jury must find beyond a

reasonable doubt, or defendant must admit, all facts “legally essential to punishment.” Id.,

542 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added). 

With respect to Petitioner’s second-degree burglary conviction on Count 1, the

jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following aggravating factors: (1) Petitioner

committed the offense for pecuniary gain, (2) the offense caused emotional harm to the

victim, and (3) one of the victims was over 65 years old or disabled. The jury found that the

State had failed to prove an additional aggravating factor regarding use of a weapon during

com-mission of the offense. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, there is no evidence that the

trial court considered that factor in sentencing Petitioner. Rather, in sentencing Petitioner on

Count 1, the court noted that the jury had found “three aggravators: You committed the

offense for pecuniary gain, the emotional harm to the victim, and then at least one of the

victims was 65 or more years of age or was a disabled.” (Respondents’ Exh. T at 8) The

Court found that there were sufficient aggravating factors to justify a sentence in excess of

the presumptive. (Id.) Moreover, the existence of one Blakely-complaint factor - such as a

prior conviction, facts admitted by defendant, or found beyond a reasonable doubt by the

jury - is sufficient support for the imposition of “a sentence anywhere within the statutory

range.” Jones v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1794765, * 3 (D.Ariz. June 27, 2006) (stating that “once

a jury finds or a defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits

the sentencing judge to find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 16 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.’” Id. at * 2 (quoting State v.

Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 585, 115 P.2d 618 (2005)). 

Likewise, with respect to Petitioner’s conviction for possession of burglary tools,

the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner committed the offense for

pecuniary gain. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 13) The jury further found that the State had failed

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense involved the use of a weapon. (Id.) 

Nothing in the record suggests that the State court relied on the unproven aggravating factor

- use of a weapon - when sentencing Petitioner. Indeed, the Court noted that the jury found

the pecuniary gain aggravating factor and that it was sufficient “to justify a sentence in

excess of the presumptive term . . . .” (Respondents’ Exh. T at 8) 

Petitioner further argues that the trial court’s alleged consideration of the victim

impact statement violated Blakely. Nothing in the record indicates that the court considered

the prosecutor’s statements made on behalf of the victim’s son when imposing the sentences. 

(Respondents’ Exh. T) However, assuming the trial court considered the victim impact

statement in sentencing Petitioner, it could do so even if the jury did not find the victim

impact statement proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Once a single Blakely-compliant or

Blakely-exempt aggravating factor was found, the court could consider other factors in

determining Petitioner’s sentence. Jones, 2006 WL 1794765, * 3. 

Finally, the trial court did not violate Blakely by considering Petitioner’s prior

convictions when sentencing him. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court specifically carved out an

exception for prior convictions. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; United States v. Maria-Gonzalez,

268 F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding prior aggravated felony conviction did not

constitute an element of the offense where base sentence for illegally reentering the United

States following deportation is enhanced if deportation was subsequent to conviction for

aggravated felony). United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding the district court could consider defendant’s prior conviction in imposing sentence

enhancement even though such conduct had not been charged in the indictment, presented to

the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). Blakely confirmed that exception. Blakely,

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 17 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

542 U.S. at 301. 

Because the sentences imposed comported with the Sixth Amendment as construed

in Blakely, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his sentencing claims. 

C. Ground Three - Disproportionate Sentence

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that the sentences are disproportionate to other

sentences imposed for the same conduct. (Doc. 3 at 8) The jury found Petitioner guilty of

burglary in the second-degree, a Class 3 felony, and possession of burglary tools, a Class 6

felony. (Respondents’ Exhs. A at 105, 109) The convictions were based on Petitioner’s

nighttime entry into an elderly couple’s home. (Respondents’ Exh. E) The jury found,

beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of three aggravating factors pertaining to the

burglary conviction, and one aggravating factor pertaining to the possession of burglary

tools conviction. (Respondents’ Exh. at 112-13) Before sentencing Petitioner, the trial court

determined that Petitioner had 23 historical prior felony convictions. (Respondents’ Exh. B

at 119) The court imposed an aggravated term of 20 years’ imprisonment on the burglary

conviction and sentenced Petitioner as a repetitive offender to an aggravated concurrent 4.5-

year term on the possession of burglary tools conviction. (Id.) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court imposed an excessive

sentence based on the improper consideration of an aggravating factor not found by the jury,

the improper consideration of the victim impact statement, and Petitioner’s lack of opportunity to review and challenge inaccuracies in an untimely disclosed pre-sentence report. 

(Respondents’ Exh. D at 18) The appellate court found that Petitioner’s sentence fell within

the statutory guidelines, and that imposition of a maximum sentence was supported by the

aggravating circumstances found by the jury and by Petitioner’s prior convictions as determined by the trial court. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 9-10) Petitioner has not shown that the

State court’s ruling is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 

The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” Harmelin v.

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 18 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991). A sentence that is “grossly disproportionate” to the

crime for which a defendant was convicted may violate the Eighth Amendment. Harmelin,

501 U.S. at 1001 (1991). “[O]utside of the context of capital punishment, successful

challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [are] exceedingly rare . . . . Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that

legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for

crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted

criminals.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983) (citations omitted). Petitioner is

correct that the Supreme Court has noted that a proportionality analysis under the Eighth

Amendment should consider the following criteria, including: “(i) the gravity of the offense

and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same

jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other

jurisdictions.” Id., 463 U.S. at 292. The Supreme Court, however, has not uniformly applied

this three step analysis. See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005; Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.

263, 285 (1980). 

In an effort resolve this inconsistency, the Supreme Court has identified what

constitutes “clearly established federal law” in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for the

purpose of habeas review. Specifically, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003), after

conceding that its “precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity,” the Supreme

Court held that “one governing legal principle emerges as ‘clearly established’ under §

2254(d)(1): A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of

years.” Id., 538 U.S. at 72; see also Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In so holding, the Court did not refer to a constitutional imperative requiring courts to make

the various intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons recommended by the Solem court.

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. Rather, the Supreme Court held that “the only relevant clearly

established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’ framework is

the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable

only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Id. at 73. 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 19 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

When analyzing an Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge, a court determines whether a “comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an

inference of gross disproportionality.” United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir.

1992) (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001) (finding that sentence of life imprisonment

without possibility of parole did not raise inference of disproportionality when imposed on a

felon in possession of a firearm.); see also Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-85 (9th Cir.

1996) (holding that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole

did not raise inference of disproportionality when imposed on convicted murderer). A court

generally will not overturn a sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds provided it does not

exceed statutory limits. United States v. Zavala-Serra, 853 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1988)

(upholding sentence of ten years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to possess and distribute

2,000 grams of cocaine where sentence was within statutory range.) 

Here, Petitioner’s sentences, totaling 20 years imprisonment, are not grossly

disproportionate to his convictions for second degree burglary and possession of burglary

tools. The jury found aggravating circumstances - Petitioner committed the offenses for

pecuniary gain, the offense caused emotional harm to the victim, and one of the victims was

over 65 years old or disabled. Additionally, Petitioner had an extensive criminal history

consisting of 23 prior felonies, involving kidnaping and similar offenses of burglary and

armed robbery. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (finding that sentence of 25

years to life in prison, imposed for felony grand theft under the three strikes law, is not

grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment. And stating, that “Ewing’s sentence is a long one. 

But it reflects a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have

committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be

incapacitated.”); Nunes v. Ramirez-Palmer, 485 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that

sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for shoplifting $114.40 worth of tools was not

grossly disproportionate in view of defendant’s “extensive felony record” dating back

almost sixty years). 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 20 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

Petitioner’s sentences do not raise an inference of gross disproportionality. Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s determination that his sentences do not violate the

Eighth Amendment is contrary to, or rests on an unreasonable application of, federal law. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

D. Ground Four - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground Four, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advocate on his behalf and present mitigating evidence at sentencing. (Doc. 3 at 9) Petitioner specifically argues that counsel failed to object to statements the prosecutor made on

behalf of the victims’ son, who was not present during the sentencing hearing. (Id.) During

sentencing, the prosecutor stated that the victims’ son was afraid for his parents during the

time Petitioner was inside the house with them, and speculated that the incident had

hastened his mother’s death several months later. (Id.) Petitioner further argues that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to present unspecified mitigating evidence. Petitioner

raised these claims on during post-conviction review. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 3-18) The

State court rejected these claims without discussion. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 185; Exh. N at

47-48) Although the State court did not explain its decision, Section 2254(d) applies to this

summary denial of Petitioner’s claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 786.

Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because

there is no clearly established federal governing the assistance of counsel during non-capital

sentencing. Respondents correctly note that the Supreme Court has not articulated a standard

which applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context of non-capital sentencing noting that, in Strickland, the Supreme Court declined to “consider the role of

counsel in ordinary sentencing which . . . may require a different approach to the definition

of constitutionally effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. See also Cooper-Smith

v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1233 (9th Cir. 2005). “Where the Supreme Court has not

addressed an issue in its holding, a state court adjudication of the issue not addressed by the

Supreme Court cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law.” Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Wright v. Van

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 21 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-26 (2008). In other words, if habeas corpus relief depends on the

resolution of an “open question in [Supreme Court] jurisprudence,’ § 2254(d)(1) precludes

relief.” Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Musladin, 549 U.S.

at 76) (stating that “[g]iven the lack of holdings from this Court regarding the potentially

prejudicial effect of spectators’ courtroom conduct of the kind involved here, it cannot be

said that the state court ‘unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.’”). Thus, as a

threshold matter, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

because there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent in the noncapital sentencing

context. Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006); Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at

1244. Even if the Strickland standard for capital cases applied to this noncapital sentencing,

Petitioner’s claims asserted in Ground Four fail.

The relevant federal law governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires a showing of “both deficient

performance by counsel and prejudice.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. ___, 129 S.Ct.

1411, 1420 (2009). “‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.’” Richter,

131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)). 

“The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best practices or most common

custom.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Establishing that a

state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is even more

difficult, because both standards are “highly deferential,” 466 U. S. at 689, and because

Strickland’s general standard has a substantial range of reasonable applications. The issue

under § 2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. Richter, 131

S.Ct. at 788. The Supreme Court recently addressed the reasons for a “most deferential”

standard for judging counsel’s performance:

Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings,

knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with

opposing counsel, and with the judge.

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 22 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

Premo v. Moore, ___ U.S.___, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739–40 (2011). Mindful of these principles,

the Court will consider whether the state court unreasonably applied Strickland to the facts

of this case. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

1. Failure to Object to Victim Impact Statement 

Even if the statement of the victims’ son was not presented to the sentencing court

in the appropriate manner, Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced. As the court of

appeals noted, there is no evidence that the trial court was improperly influenced by the

victim impact statement in sentencing Petitioner. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 8) The aggravated sentence that the trial court imposed was based on Petitioner’s extensive criminal

history, and the aggravating circumstances found by the jury. At sentencing, the court

stated:

All right. Well, I remember your testimony. I remember your defense. The 

jury didn’t buy it, and I don’t either.

Now you are here as a repetitive offender with two priors. That said, you have 

20 prior convictions. I understand a lot of them are in the same case, but you

really cover it. You got a possession for sale conviction, you’ve got - - 17 counts

of burglary, armed robbery, and kidnapping out of one of our matters some time

ago.

My recollection is that you had a big prison sentence in that case. You also got a

conviction for armed robbery. So your record remains aggravating even with the

fact that you are a repetitive offender.

The jury found on Count 1 the existence of . . . three aggravators: You committed

the offense for pecuniary gain, the emotional harm to the victim, and then at least

one of the victims was 65 or more years of age or was a disabled person; and then

aggravators two and three, if you — well, the pecuniary gain aggravator was also

found on . . .the second count. 

I think certainly there are sufficient aggravating factors in this case and your

record to justify a sentence in excess of the presumptive term on each count. And

I think [the probation officer’s] recommendation is well taken, frankly. I mean you

could justify the absolute maximum.

I am going to give you the maximum sentence on both counts. It is the judgment

and sentence of the Court on Count 1 that the defendant be imprisoned for 20

years, on Count 2 for 4 and a half years.

(Respondents’ Exh. T at 7-8) The trial court’s statements at sentencing indicate that it did

not rely on the victim impact statement - as conveyed by the prosecutor - when sentencing

Petitioner. Rather, the court relied on the aggravating factors and Petitioner’s extensive

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 23 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 -

criminal history. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective at

sentencing for failing to object to the statements of the victims’ son as conveyed by the

prosecutor.

2. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence at Sentencing 

Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present

mitigating evidence at sentencing. (Doc. 3 at 9) Petitioner presented this claim on postconviction review. (Respondents’ Exh. K) Petitioner, however, did not identify what

evidence counsel should have presented at sentencing. The post-conviction court summarily

rejected Petitioner’s claim. Although the State court did not explain its decision, Section

2254(d) applies to this summary denial of Petitioner’s claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at ___, 131

S.Ct. at 786. Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of this claim was

contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, controlling federal law. 

To the extent that Petitioner argues that trial counsel should have called witnesses

to testify at the sentencing hearing, Petitioner’s failure to identify such witness is fatal to his

claim. “[C]omplaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus review

because allegations of what the witness would have testified are largely speculative . . . . In

addition, for [a petitioner] to demonstrate the requisite Strickland prejudice, [he] must show

not only that [the] testimony would have been favorable, but also that the witness would

have testified at trial.” Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Hardin, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the

claim of ineffective assistance based on counsels’ failure to call a witness who would have

taken responsibility for a gun found in defendant’s possession because, inter alia, “[t]here is

no evidence in the record which establishes that Washington would testify in [petitioner’s]

trial.”). Petitioner has not presented any factual or legal arguments in support of his claim

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing.

Petitioner’s conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The record reflects that Petitioner’s counsel advocated for Petitioner and argued

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 24 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

for the presumptive, or a mitigated term, at the sentencing hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. T at

7) Counsel discussed Petitioner’s intelligence, recent employment history, and family

support. (Respondents’ Exh. T at 7) Petitioner personally addressed the sentencing court

and apologized for intruding on the victims’ property. (Id.) The sentencing court found that

aggravated sentences were warranted because of Petitioner’s extensive criminal history and

the aggravating factors found by the jury. (Id. at 7-8) Petitioner does not present any

specific evidence that counsel should have presented to have mitigated his sentence. Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an

un-reasonable application of, federal law. 

E. Ground Five - Failure to Investigate

In Ground Five, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

conduct an adequate pretrial investigation to locate witnesses who could have supported

Petitioner’s defense. (Doc. 3 at 10) Petitioner contended that he entered the victims’ home

because he was looking for Danny Miller, who was giving him a ride home and had left him

in the car after telling Petitioner he “had business in the [victims’] home.” (Doc. 3 at 10) 

Petitioner asserts that, when Miller did not return to the car in a reasonable time, Petitioner

went in search of him. Petitioner claims that he entered the victims’ home through an open

door, then went inside the bathroom. While he was using the bathroom, police entered the

house and discovered Petitioner. (Doc. 3 at 10A-10B) Petitioner asserts that counsel should

have located and interviewed Danny Miller, conducted a latent print comparison with the

fingerprints found at the scene, and investigated discrepancies in the witness’ description of

the man he saw and described to the 911 operator. (Id.) 

Petitioner presented this claim on post-conviction review, which was rejected

without discussion. Although the State court did not explain its decision, Section 2254(d)

applies to this summary denial of Petitioner’s claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at

786. 

“Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable

decision that makes a particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 25 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 -

Additionally, “a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all circumstances.” Id. 

A court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of

counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed at the time

of counsel’s conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective

assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to

have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then

determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or 

omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In

making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel’s function,

as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing

process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize

that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made

all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

To assess Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate,

the evidence presented at Petitioner’s trial is relevant. The evidence indicated that Petitioner

stepped out from behind the door in the master bathroom in the victims’ home as a police

officer approached the bathroom to search it. (Respondents’ Exh. U at 32) Petitioner

struggled as he was arrested and never told police that he was looking for someone inside

the house. (Id. at 33-34) Police officers found a Leatherman’s tool on Petitioner’s person. 

Police officers on the scene also found that: (1) the light bulb had been removed from the

motion sensor over the back door and placed on the ground; (2) there were pry marks on the

back window; (3) a gym bag containing a purse and a jewelry box were on the ground

outside the patio door; and (4) there was a flashlight near the door to the master bedroom. 

(Id. at 25-27, 35-36) Officers also observed a picture or painting, and a wrapper of some

kind in the middle of the floor of the walk-in closet of the master bedroom, which seemed

out of place. (Id. at 44) A file cabinet in a spare bedroom had been pried open. (Id. at 46-48) 

Three houses away from the victims’ home, police officers found an unoccupied vehicle

with the engine running, and a window partially open. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 39-41) The

car was registered to a person named Lamar Ellis. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 41) The police

did not find anyone else in the backyard, alley, or inside the house. (Respondents’ Exh. U at

25-26, 43) 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 26 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 -

This evidence undermines Petitioner’s assertion that he was merely present at the

house looking for a person named Danny Miller and rendered the investigation that Petitioner claims counsel should have undertaken unnecessary. Additionally, Petitioner testified

at trial and presented his theory of defense. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 5) Petitioner explained

that Danny Miller was driving him home and stopped at the victims’ house. (Respondents’

Exh. V at 5-6) After waiting in the car for a while, Petitioner “went looking for [Miller.]”

(Respondents’ Exh. V at 6) Petitioner testified that he walked to the house, and entered

through the back door. (Id. at 8) He continued to walk through the house looking for Miller

and then decided to use the bathroom. (Id.) While he was using the bathroom, Petitioner

heard people talking, then opened the door, and saw the police. (Id. at 9-10) Petitioner

testified that a police officer directed him to “hit the floor, which [he] did.” (Id. at 10) Petitioner testified that he never saw Danny Miller inside the house. (Id.) He also testified that

Danny Miller “was shot in a police gun battle,” some time before trial. (Respondents’ Exh.

V at 5) The record reflects that Petitioner did not tell police that he was inside the victims’

home looking for Danny Miller, and nothing at the scene suggested the presence of a second

person. Police officers did not see another person near the victims’ home. The victims’ son

saw the shadow of one person rummaging through his parents’ bed-room with a flashlight. A

single flashlight was recovered by the door to the master bedroom. The car in which Petitioner had allegedly been a passenger was found three houses away from the victims’ home.

Nothing in the car connected it to Danny Miller. 

Based on the foregoing, counsel’s strategic decision not to investigate the whereabouts of Danny Miller was not ineffective assistance. On post-conviction review, defense

counsel testified that Petitioner’s “story was simply beyond belief.” (Respondents’ Exh. N

at 28) According to Petitioner, Danny Miller died before trial and could not have testified

on Petitioner’s behalf. At trial, Petitioner presented his theory of defense - that he was

inside the victims’ home because he was looking for Danny Miller. Aside from Petitioner’s

testimony, evidence showed that Petitioner was in the victims’ home when the burglary was

in progress. He had on his person a Leatherman’s Tool containing pliers. The police

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 27 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 -

officers’ testimony confirmed that Petitioner was found at the scene of the burglary. Finally,

Petitioner did not argue that Danny Miller committed the offense, but that he was merely

looking for Danny Miller who was inside the house because he had “some business” therein. 

In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s failure to investigate the presence of Danny Miller, the result of the trial

would have been different. 

 Petitioner also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and

present testimony regarding the discrepancies between the description of the intruder the

victims’ son gave to the 911 operator and Petitioner’s appearance. Any discrepancies

between Petitioner’s appearance and the description of the intruder given by the victims’ son

is explained by the son’s brief opportunity to observe the intruder in the dark. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 143-144 ) The victims’ son, Patrick, testified that he woke up in the middle

of the night and went to the kitchen to get some water. (Id. at 142-43) He noticed the backdoor was open and saw his “dad’s tennis bag with jewelry boxes and whatnot in it” on the

ground. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 143) Patrick testified that he returned to the kitchen and

noticed a flashlight coming from his parents’ bedroom. (Id.) He walked to the bathroom and

“walked up on somebody that didn’t belong there.” (Id.) Patrick testified that he saw the

person in his parents’ darkened bedroom from “the back . . . [l]ong enough to see what was

going on and to get out of there.” (Respondents’ Exh. W at 144) He testified that the person

appeared to be a man by “the build.” (Id. at 145) Patrick further testified that he did not see

the person’s face, and “couldn’t really say” what type of clothing the intruder was wearing. 

(Respondents’ Exh. W at 145) Thus, any discrepancies between Petitioner’s appearance and

the description of the intruder that Patrick gave the 911 operator was explained by Patrick’s

own testimony that he only caught a glimpse of the back of the intruder in the dark. Moreover, the intruder’s description was not an issue because police found Petitioner in the

victims’ home. 

Petitioner also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate for

latent fingerprints. (Doc. 3 at 10C) Police officers were unable to recover fingerprints from

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 28 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 29 -

the flashlight that was found near the master bedroom. (Respondents’ Exh. U at 44-46) 

Police officers recovered two latent fingerprints from the file cabinets in the second bedroom, and submitted them for testing. (Respondents’ Exh. U at 47-48) Petitioner was

excluded as a match for one of the prints and the other could not be identified. (Respondents’ Exh. X at 20) Officers did not try to recover prints from a wooden dresser in the

bedroom because the “grain structure” is “too rough to be able to see the tiny ridges on your

finger.” (Respondents’ Exh. U at 50) Officers did not try to recover fingerprints from the

light bulb from the motion sensor. (Id. at 52) The fingerprints available to defense counsel -

those taken by the police officers the night of the burglary - were exculpatory because they

were not Petitioner’s. Evidence regarding the fingerprints was presented at trial. Petitioner

has not shown how additional investigation into the fingerprints would have benefitted his

defense. Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to

investigate latent fingerprints when the fingerprint evidence presented at trial was exculpatory.

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on

his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate. 

F. Ground Six - Juror Bias and Inadequate Cross-Examination

In Ground Six, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate the improper communication between the trial judge, his judicial assistant, and

an impaneled juror. (Doc. 3 at 11) Petitioner asserts that trial counsel should have requested

a mistrial based on juror bias. Petitioner presented this claim on post-conviction review. The

trial court rejected it without discussion. Although the State court did not explain its

decision, Section 2254(d) applies to this summary denial of Petitioner’s claim. Richter, 562

U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 786. 

Petitioner’s case proceeded to trial on December 9, 2004. At the outset, the trial

judge introduced his staff, including his judicial assistant, who was not present in the

courtroom. The trial judge stated:

Let me go ahead and introduce everyone. My name is Greg Martin. I am a judge

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 29 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 30 -

on the Superior Court. Again, my court reporter is Melinda Setterman, the lady to

my right. Elaine Hill is my deputy clerk for today.

Greg Paduganan - you already met Greg. Deputy Patterson is here to the left. She

is usually in the courtroom as well. Also a part of my staff but not usually in the

courtroom is my judicial assistant, Ann Kaites. If you are one of the 14 people, it is

likely you will meet her. She is in the outer officer, and she’s . . . my judicial

assistant. 

By chance, does anybody know either me or somebody here on the staff at all? 

Okay. 

(Respondents’ Exh. W at 9) When the court next convened, the trial court notified the

parties that his judicial assistant, who had not been in the courtroom during voir dire, knew

one of the jurors. (Respondents’ Exh. U at 4) The juror was the mother of a someone with

whom the judicial assistant had attended school. The judicial assistant had not seen the juror

in 20 years. (Id.) When asked whether anyone on the jury panel knew the judicial assistant,

Ann Kaites, the juror did not respond because she did not know the judicial assistant by that

last name. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 4) The trial court had the following discussion with the

juror on the record:

The Court: Okay. This is juror 4. I understand you know Ann?

The Juror: Yes, I do.

The Court: Okay. And when I said her name, I said her married name of course. 

You probably know her as Ann Peralta?

The Juror: Yes. 

The Court: The fact that she’s my judicial assistant, is that going to make it hard

for you to be a fair and impartial juror in this case?

The Juror: No.

The Court: Any questions?

Ms. Kay: None from the State.

Ms. Todd: None from the defense, your Honor. 

(Respondents’ Exh. U at 4-5) 

The Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial “guarantees a criminally accused a fair

trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).The

bias or prejudice of a single juror denies a defendant the right to a fair trial. Tinsley v. Borg,

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 30 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 31 -

895 F.2d 520, 53-24 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir.

1979). The test for determining whether a juror is biased is whether the juror had such fixed

opinions that he or she could not judge the guilt of the defendant impartially. Patton v.

Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984). A trial judge’s finding that a particular juror was not

biased has been regarded as a factual finding subject to the statutory presumption of correctness, because “resolution [of the juror impartiality issue] depends heavily on the trial court’s

appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor.” See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111

(1995); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1985); Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038. Petitioner has not meet his burden of adducing clear and convincing evidence to overcome this

presumption. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The attenuated relationship between the judicial assistant and the juror in this case

does not support a claim of implied bias. The judicial assistant was not in the courtroom

during voir dire and the juror at issue did not recognize her current last name. The trial court

was immediately notified when the juror and the judicial assistant realized they knew each

other. The trial court notified counsel for both sides and conducted an examination of that

juror to determine whether she could remain impartial. The juror confirmed that she could

remain impartial. Nothing suggested that the juror’s response was not truthful. Counsel for

the State and the defense were permitted, but declined, to ask questions. Defense counsel

had no reason to infer improper communication or juror bias from this incident. Petitioner

has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to further pursue the issue of juror

bias. 

In Ground Six, Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses. (Doc. 3 at 11) Petitioner argues that

defense counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, including the alleged victim

and three police officers who responded to the scene, was “of no significance.” (Doc. 3 at

11E) He specifically argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to question “Stacy

Hubbard, a technician with the Phoenix Police Department crime lab” about whether she

compared the latent prints found at the scene with exemplars from Danny Miller. (Doc. 3 at

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 31 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 32 -

11D) 

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Here, Petitioner’s defense

was that he was merely present in the victims’s house looking for Danny Miller who was

giving him a ride home, but had stopped at the victims’ house to conduct some business. The

record reflects that counsel pursued that defense. On cross-examination of the victims’ son,

Patrick, defense counsel called into question his ability to identify Petitioner as the intruder. 

Counsel emphasized that Patrick’s identification of Petitioner was based “upon when [he]

saw the police bring [Petitioner] out of the house . . . .” (Respondents’ Exh. W at 153)

Counsel further elicited testimony from Patrick that his identification of Petitioner “was not

based on the intruder in the house,” because he only had a limited sighting of the intruder in

the dark. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 153-54) 

Defense counsel’s cross-examination of the police officers, who responded at the

scene, focused on the fact that the description of the intruder given to the 911 operator that

did not match Petitioner’s features or his clothing, that officers did not find a baseball cap

the intruder was reportedly wearing, that Petitioner had a substantial sum of money - over

$650.00 - in his wallet that did not belong to the victims, and that officers did not attempt to

obtain latent prints from the light bulb that had been removed from the motion sensor. 

(Respondents’ Exh. U at 38-40, 51-52) Defense counsel did not cross-examine Stacy

Hubbard, the latent print examiner, who testified on direct that Petitioner was excluded from

one of the fingerprints she examined and that she did not match the second print to any

known exemplars. (Respondents’ Exh. X at 14, 19-20)

During closing argument, defense counsel argued that the State had not established

beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was in the home to commit a burglary. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 60) Counsel reiterated that the State had not presented any fingerprint

evidence connecting Petitioner to the crime, that the fingerprint evidence presented excluded

Petitioner, and that the police officers had not attempted to take fingerprints from the light

bulb of the motion sensor. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 59-60) Counsel further argued that

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 32 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 33 -

police had not tried to match the pry marks on the window with the Leatherman Tool found

on Petitioner. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 59-60) Defense counsel also argued that description

of the intruder given to the 911 operator did not match Petitioner’s appearance, and argued

that it did not make sense that Petitioner would commit the robbery when he had nearly

$650.00 in cash on his person. (Id. at 61-62) 

The record reflects that Petitioner’s trial counsel adequately cross-examined the

State’s witnesses. His cross-examination focused on Petitioner’s mere-presence defense, and

the weaknesses in the State’s case - including the lack of fingerprints connecting Petitioner

to the crime scene, and the discrepancies between the description of the intruder given to the

911 operator and Petitioner’s appearance. Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s

rejection of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to crossexamine witness is contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court

precedent. 

G. Ground Seven - Failure to Adequately Advise on Merits of Plea Offer

In Ground Seven, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to

properly advise him of a plea offer, and failing to adequately inform him of risks of going to

trial and his sentencing exposure. (Doc. 3 at 12) 

Petitioner raised this claim during post-conviction proceedings and the State court

conducted an evidentiary hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. K) At the evidentiary hearing, trial

counsel testified that the State had extended several plea offers but that the first, mandating a

term of 7 years’ imprisonment, was withdrawn by the State shortly after it was extended. 

(Respondents’ Exh. N at 35, 37) The plea was withdrawn on March 22, 2004 after the

police detective investigating the case objected to the plea offer as too lenient. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 17-18, 37) A second plea offer was extended for a sentencing range of 10

to 13 years imprisonment, but Petitioner rejected that offer after informing counsel that he

had given a free-talk in a murder case that the State could not prove without his testimony,

and he thought the State would extend a better offer. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 28, 37) PetiCase 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 33 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 34 -

tioner told defense counsel that he was telling the truth, that he wanted to go to trial, and that

he thought he would be acquitted. (Id. at 28, 30) Petitioner asked counsel about the substantial difference in the proposed sentences between the two offers and asked what had

happened to the offer for a term of 7-years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 36-37)

Defense counsel testified that she explained the terms of the plea offer to Petitioner, discussing the impact of his 20-plus prior felony convictions on the sentencing range,

and informed Petitioner that he would be subject to “an extremely aggravated sentence” if

convicted at trial, “which was much worse than we get under the plea offer.” (Respondents’

Exh. N at 27) Defense counsel also explained that the plea offer was for a sentencing range

of not less than 10 years and no more than 13 years, and that it “was better than what he was

going to get from [the trial judge].” (Id. at 31) Petitioner never conveyed to counsel that he

interpreted the sentencing range to be an additional 13-year sentence. (Id.) Defense counsel

testified that she reviewed the merits of the case with Petitioner, and informed him that his

version of the events could not be corroborated and that she “didn’t think the jury was going

to believe his story. His story was simply beyond belief.” (Respondents’ Exh. N at 28) 

Defense counsel confirmed with the prosecutor and the previous defense attorney that Petitioner had had discussions with the State about testifying in a murder case. (Id. at 33) The

State offered Petitioner an “8 to 11-year” plea offer if Petitioner cooperated in the murder

case. (Id. at 34, 37) Petitioner rejected the offer, stating that it was “still too much time.” 

(Id. at 37) 

Counsel further testified that, on the first day of trial which ended in a mistrial,

Petitioner gave counsel the name of a woman he said would corroborate his story. Counsel

called the woman, but she hung up the phone once counsel explained the nature of her call. 

(Respondents’ Exh. N at 28-29) After the mistrial, the attorneys talked to the jurors who

conveyed that they did not believe Petitioner’s version of the events. (Respondents’ Exh. N

at 29) After speaking to the jurors, the State notified defense counsel that it would re-extend

the “10 to 13-year” plea offer, but that Petitioner would have to accept it immediately. 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 34 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 35 -

(Respondents’ Exh. N at 29-30) Defense counsel conveyed the jurors’ impressions to Petitioner, and Petitioner stated that he did not care and wanted to select a new jury. (Id. at 30) 

Defense counsel told Petitioner that the State had re-extended the “10 to 13-year” plea offer.

(Id. at 31) Defense counsel’s discussion with Petitioner was brief and focused on the length

of the sentence offered. (Id.) Petitioner rejected the plea offer because the sentence was too

long. (Id. at 32) 

At Petitioner’s first trial, when the court decided that it would grant a mistrial, the

judge asked the prosecutor how quickly she could retry the case. (Respondents’ Exh. Y at

40) The prosecutor responded that Petitioner could accept the plea offer, or the trial would

commence the following day. (Id.) The court asked about the terms of the plea offer and

defense counsel stated that it was a “10 to 13-year” plea. (Id. at 41) As the parties discussed

an additional term of the plea offer, defense counsel interrupted and stated, “my client just

informed me that he’s continuing to reject that offer.” (Respondents’ Exh. N at 42) The jury

returned to the courtroom and the trial court declared a mistrial. (Id.)

At the evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief,

Petitioner testified that he first became aware of a plea offer including a 7-year term of

imprisonment after he received the file from appellate counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 7-9) 

Petitioner also stated that he did not hear about the “10 to 13-year” plea offer until a mistrial

was declared. (Id. at 9-11) Petitioner stated that he and counsel had a brief conversation

about the plea offer at the defense table and it was the only conversation he ever had with

counsel about that plea offer. (Id. at 11-13) Petitioner testified that he understood the “10 to

13-year” plea offer to mean that the trial court could “give [him] up to 13 plus years” or “the

top was 13 and aggravated meant that [the court] could go over the 13 and give [him] a few

years on top of it.” (Respondents’ Exh. N at 10-11) 

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that

Petitioner had not met his burden of establishing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The State court explained:

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 35 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 36 -

The testimony from Ms. Todd (defense counsel) indicates that she did in fact, have

a conversation with Mr. McDonald in the jail regarding the plea agreement, that

she had the plea agreement with her, that she advised the defendant of the

stipulations in the plea agreement for an aggravated term of 10 to 13 years and that

there was some discussion regarding the 7 years being withdrawn. 

So it sounds like based on her testimony, Mr. McDonald also knew about the

seven-year offer and I don’t need to reach the second prong unless I find that

counsel’s performance was deficient. 

I find that the defendant has not proved by a preponderance that defense counsel’s

performance was deficient and he was aware of the offer and communicated to him

in the jail and communicated again to him after the mistrial, as reflected in the

transcript and the resuscitation of the conversation between the prosecutor, the

Court and defense counsel on page 12 of Mr. Beene’s response [to the petition for

post-conviction relief.]

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is dismissed. 

(Respondents’ Exh. N at 47-48) 

Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s ruling was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. The relevant federal law governing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which

requires a showing of “both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice.” Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U. S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009). The Sixth Amendment guarantees

a criminal defendant effective assistance of counsel during all critical stages of the criminal

process, including plea negotiations. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985); United States

v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, Strickland’s two-prong test applies to

ineffectiveness claims in connection with the plea process. Hill, 474 U.S. at 57. The first part

of the inquiry is whether counsel’s performance was “within the range of competence

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.

759, 771 (1970)). The second part focuses on whether counsel’s deficient performance

affected the outcome of the plea process. Id., 474 U.S. at 59. Petitioner must establish that he

was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Id. 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 36 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 37 -

“‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at

788 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)). “The question

is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom.”

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Establishing that a state

court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is even more difficult,

because both standards are “highly deferential,” 466 U. S. at 689, and Strickland’s general

standard has a substantial range of reasonable applications. The issue under § 2254(d) is not

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but whether there is any reasonable argument

that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788. The

Supreme Court recently addressed the reasons for a “most deferential” standard for judging

counsel’s performance:

Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings,

knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with

opposing counsel, and with the judge.

Premo v. Moore, ___ U.S.___, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739–40 (2011). The Court also recognized

that “[p]lea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with uncertainty, and

defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in balancing opportunities and risks”

of a plea. Id. at 741. Considerations surrounding these strategic choices in the pre-trial

context “make strict adherence to the Strickland standard all the more essential when

reviewing the choices an attorney made at the plea bargain stage.” Id. Mindful of these

principles, the Court will consider whether the State court unreasonably applied Strickland

to the facts of this case. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

A. Whether Counsel’s Performance was Deficient

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, a

petitioner must establish that his counsel’s errors were so serious that counsel was deficient,

and that counsel’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. To be deficient, counsel’s representation must have fallen “below an objective standard

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 37 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 38 -

of reasonableness,” Id., 466 U.S. at 688, and there is a “strong presumption” that counsel’s

representation is within the “wide range” of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689;

see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689). Strickland mandates a “strong presumption of competence.” Cullen v. Pinholster, __

U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011). This Court must “‘give [counsel] the benefit of the

doubt.” Id. (citations omitted). As stated above, the post-conviction court found that there

was no evidence that trial counsel’s performance was deficient. (Respondents’ Exh. N) 

During the evidentiary hearing on post-conviction review, the trial court found that counsel

discussed the plea offers with Petitioner. On habeas corpus review, this Court defers to the

State court’s factual findings. 

The State court record establishes that the State extended several plea offers in this

case and that Petitioner was aware of the offers. The State court’s record further establishes

that Petitioner rejected the plea offers because the sentences were too long and he thought he

would be acquitted. (Respondents’ Exh. N) Petitioner has not met his high burden of

establishing that the State court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s performance was not

deficient was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Moreover, as discussed below,

even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, Petitioner has not established prejudice. 

B. Prejudice

Even if counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas corpus relief because he fails to demonstrate prejudice. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. Petitioner must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.,

466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. “That requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131

S.Ct. at 791). 

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 38 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 39 -

The United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed what constitutes

prejudice when a criminal defendant rejects a plea offer and proceeds to trial. The parties’

briefing does not specifically address this issue. Rather, Petitioner appears to argue that, to

establish prejudice, he must establish a reasonable likelihood he would have accepted a plea

offer. Respondents appear to agree with this statement of the law. 

The Supreme Court has held that Strickland applies in the context of plea bargaining. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). However, the Supreme Court has not addressed the specific question of what constitutes prejudice when a petitioner rejects a plea offer

and proceeds to a fair trial. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s right

to effective assistance of counsel as ensuring a criminal defendant receives a fair trial.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Supreme Court reiterated in Pinholster that, “‘the purpose

of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of

legal representation . . . [but] simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.’”

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The Supreme Court has

never held that a defendant who foregoes a plea bargain and is later convicted after a fair

trial has suffered a constitutional violation. See Nunes v. Miller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1052 -53

(9th Cir. 2003). Rather, the Supreme Court’s cases interpreting the Sixth Amendment in the

context of plea bargaining have involved cases where the petitioner waived the right to a fair

trial by accepting a plea offer, not a case where the petitioner rejected a plea and exercised

his right to a fair trial. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 733, 737-40 (2011); Wright

v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25 (2008); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985);

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 760-66 (1970). Although circuit courts, including the

Ninth Circuit, have discussed Strickland’s prejudice prong in the context of a rejected plea

offer, the lack of any Supreme Court holding on that issue precludes a finding that the State

court’s decision in this case was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 39 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 4 The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to determine, “What remedy, if any

should be provided for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargain negotiations if the

defendant was later convicted and sentenced pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures?”

Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S.__, 131 S.Ct. 856 (January 7, 2011). 

 5 However, as discussed below, while the Ninth Circuit has discussed Strickland’s prejudice

prong in the context of a rejected plea offer, the lack of any Supreme Court holding on that issue

precludes a finding that the State court’s decision in this case was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct.

at 1399 (“State court decisions are measured against [the United States Supreme Court’s]

precedents as of the ‘time the state renders its decision.’”) (citations omitted). 

- 40 -

established Supreme Court precedent.4 Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1399 (“State court decisions

are measured against [the United States Supreme Court’s] precedents as of the ‘time the

state renders its decision.’”) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003));

Ponce v. Felkner, 606 F.3d 596, 604 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If Supreme Court cases ‘give no clear

answer to the question presented,’ the state court’s decision cannot be an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.”) (quoting Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 126);

Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In light of Musladin, Panetti, and Van

Patten, we conclude that when a Supreme Court decision does not ‘squarely address[] the

issue in th[e] case’ or establish a legal principle that ‘clearly extend[s]’ to a new context to

the extent required by the Supreme Court in these recent decisions . . . , it cannot be said,

under [the] AEDPA, there is ‘clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent addressing the

issue before us, and so we must defer to the state court’s decision.”) (quoting Van Patten,

552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (alterations in original); see also Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158,

1184 n. 23 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing habeas petitioner’s reliance on circuit-court authority

as “futile” because, “post-AEDPA[,] only Supreme Court holdings are binding on state

courts.”) (citing Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Nevertheless, for purposes of analyzing Petitioner’s claim, the Court will consider

Ninth Circuit authority.5

 The Ninth Circuit has held that to establish prejudice from incorrect

advice resulting in rejection of a plea offer, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable

probability that he would have accepted the plea agreement had he received accurate advice

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 40 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 41 -

from his attorney.” Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 941-942 (9th Cir. 2006), judgment

vacated in part on other grounds by Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 117 (2008); see also Nunes,

350 F.3d at 1052. 

Undoubtedly, Petitioner would prefer a lesser sentence than the one he received.

The Court, however, must look to Petitioner’s statements and beliefs at the time of the trial

to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would have pled guilty

absent counsel’s alleged deficient performance. The record here reflects that Petitioner was

committed to his defense that he was merely present at the scene and did not commit any

crimes. When discussing plea offers with his trial counsel, Petitioner expressed his belief

that he thought he would be acquitted. Before and during his trial, during his post-conviction

proceedings in State court, and in this Petition, Petitioner has consistently maintained that he

was merely present at the scene and did not commit any crimes. (Doc. 3 at 10) Additionally,

the record reflects that Petitioner felt that the plea offers were for too much time. (Respondents’ Exh. N) Petitioner does not offer any support for his contention that he would have

accepted a plea offer. The Ninth Circuit has stated that such self-serving statements are

viewed with skepticism:

[The petitioner’s] self-serving statement, made years later, that [defense counsel]

told him that ‘this was not a death penalty case’ is insufficient to establish that [the

habeas petitioner] was unaware of the potential death verdict. If the rule were

otherwise, every rejection of a plea offer, viewed perhaps with more clarity in the

light of an unfavorable verdict, could be relitigated upon the defendant’s later

claim that had his counsel better advised him, he would have accepted the plea

offer. 

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 881 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 

Petitioner’s consistent belief that he was merely present at the scene and had not

committed a crime, does not support his contention that he would have accepted any plea

offer. See Smith v. United States, 348 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that, although

not dispositive, “[p]rotestations of innocence throughout trial are properly a factor” in

determining whether a defendant would have accepted a plea agreement).

In sum, Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s rejection of his claim of

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 41 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 42 -

ineffective assistance of counsel was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. 

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied

and dismissed because Petitioner’s claims lacks merit.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

doc. 3, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 42 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 43 -

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 24th day of October, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-01513-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/24/11 Page 43 of 43