Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00231/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00231-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Myron Ray Reed is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of 

the United States Magistrate Judge on February 28, 2014. Local Rule 302.

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint, filed August 19, 2014. 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

MYRON RAY REED,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CHINH D. TRINH, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:14-cv-00231-SAB (PC)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY ACTION 

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS BARRED 

BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

[ECF No. 1]

Case 1:14-cv-00231-SAB Document 17 Filed 09/09/16 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive 

screening, Plaintiff‟s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow 

the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are „merely 

consistent with‟ a defendant‟s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

While serving time at Wasco State Reception Center Prison in 2004 through 2006, Plaintiff 

was prescribed three medications which caused side effects. Plaintiff repeatedly told doctors that he 

was suicidal and complained that he was suffering side effects from the prescribed medications. The 

doctors refused to take him off the medications, but they either ignored his requests or increased the 

dosage of medications. 

Plaintiff alleges that (1) Risperdal gave him female breasts; (2) Paxil caused him to repeatedly 

attempt suicide; and (3) Seroquel caused him to be overly sensitive leading to a physical altercation 

with a peace officer and was sent to Atascadero State Mental Hospital. 

Plaintiff has been informed by watching a television commercial that the Federal Drug 

Administration deemed these medications as “bad” drugs. 

Case 1:14-cv-00231-SAB Document 17 Filed 09/09/16 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

Federal law determines when a claim accrues, and “[u]nder federal law, a claim accrues when 

the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action.” Douglas v. 

Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 

955 (9th Cir. 2004); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Because section 1983 contains 

no specific statute of limitations, federal courts should apply the forum state‟s statute of limitations for 

personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 

954; Fink, 192 F.3d at 914. California=s statute of limitations for personal injury actions was extended 

to two years effective January 1, 2003. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927; 

Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954-955. 

In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitations, courts should also 

borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law. Jones, 393 F.3d 

at 927. Under California law, prisoners who at the time the cause of action accrued were either 

imprisoned on a criminal charge or serving a sentence of less than life for a criminal conviction 

benefit from a two-year tolling provision for damages actions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1. 

In addition, California=s equitable tolling doctrine “applies when an injured person has several 

legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.” McDonald v. Antelope Valley 

Community College Dist., 45 Cal.4th 88, 100 (Cal. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The equitable tolling of statutes of limitations is a judicially created, nonstatutory doctrine 

designed to prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits when the 

purpose of the statute of limitations – timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff=s claims – has been 

satisfied, McDonald, 45 Cal.4th at 99 (quotation marks and citations omitted), and pursuit of 

administrative remedies equitably tolls the statute of limitations so long as there was timely notice, 

lack of prejudice to the defendant, and reasonable, good faith conduct on the part of plaintiff, id. at 

101-103. 

Case 1:14-cv-00231-SAB Document 17 Filed 09/09/16 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed suit and is entitled to the application of the two 

year tolling provision. Therefore, Plaintiff had two years, plus two years for tolling, for a total of four 

years from the date the cause of action accrued to file suit. Plaintiff‟s allegations are based on 

incidents that took place from 2004 through 2006. In this instance, it is clear that Plaintiff was aware 

of the bad side effects he was suffering from the medications that were prescribed to him in 2004 

through 2006, as he complained of such to medical professionals. Yet, Plaintiff did not file the instant 

action until 2014-well after the statute of limitations expired. The Court will grant the opportunity to 

show cause why his claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall show cause why 

this action should not be dismissed as time-barred; and

2. Plaintiff‟s failure to respond to this order to show cause will result in dismissal of the 

action for failure to obey a court order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00231-SAB Document 17 Filed 09/09/16 Page 4 of 4