Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03203/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03203-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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Facts contained in the background statement are summarized from the factual

allegations of the Complaint and should not be understood as stating the Court’s

conclusions as to the truth of any such allegation. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRUDENCE CHOU,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOAN CHOW et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C-05-3203 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; VACATING

HEARING

(Docket No. 31)

Before the Court is the motion to dismiss filed January 20, 2006 by defendant Joan

Chow (“Chow”), seeking dismissal of the instant action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Alternatively, Chow moves to sever the claims asserted against her, pursuant

to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Prudence Chou (“Chou”),

appearing pro se, has filed opposition to the motion; Chow has filed a reply. Having

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court finds the

matter appropriate for decision without oral argument, see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), and hereby

VACATES the February 24, 2006 hearing. For the reasons set forth below, Chow’s motion

to dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND1

Chou and Chow are sisters. (See Compl. at 2.) Chou disputes Chow’s ownership of

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real property located at 36,329 Lane, Xmhwa Road, Shanghai (“Shanghai property”), in the

People’s Republic of China (“People’s Republic”), which property previously was owned by

their late mother. 

In 1981, eight years after her mother’s death, the Shanghai Housing Bureau

transferred ownership of the Shanghai property to Chow. (See id. at 3.) Chou asserts that

Chow, through her Shanghai representative, “Mr. Chang,” (“Chang”) bribed the Shanghai

Housing Bureau “to unlawfully and secretly transfer” the Shanghai property to Chow. (See

id.) Other property in the People’s Republic is still registered in their mother’s name. (See

id. at 5.)

In November 1990, Chou filed two lawsuits with the “Shanghai med-level court,” one

against Chow and Chang, and the other against Chang alone. (See id. at 4.) Additionally,

in December 1990, Chou filed an administrative complaint against the Shanghai Housing

Bureau. (See id.) In mid-1991, the Shanghai court dismissed Chou’s lawsuit against

Chow and Chang, as well as her administrative complaint against the Shanghai Housing

Bureau. (See id.) The Court failed to address Chou’s separate lawsuit against Chang. 

(See id.) The Shanghai Superior Court has not acted on Chou’s appeals of the dismissals. 

(See id.)

 Chou asserts that the current market value of the Shanghai property is more than

one million dollars. (See id. at 5.)

On August 8, 2005, Chou, along with her sister Betty Chiang (“Chiang”), filed the

instant action against Chow and the People’s Republic. Thereafter, Chiang voluntarily

dismissed her claims. To date, Chou has not served the People’s Republic.

Chou seeks an order directing the Shanghai Housing Bureau to restore ownership of

the Shanghai property to her deceased mother. (See id. at 5.) Chou further seeks an

order requiring Chow to pay Chou her “rightful share of income from the rent [Chow] has

collected from [their] deceased mother’s house.” (See id.) Chou additionally asks the

Court to order the Chinese Government to “designate a special official or a court to execute

[her] family inheritance according to the proclaimed Chinese Inheritance Law” and to

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 Although Chou alleges her brother John Chow misappropriated certain family

possessions, (see id. at 2), she has not named John Chow as a defendant.

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“[f]orfeit Joan Chow’s and John Chow’s share of inheritance pursuant to the Rule 7 of

Inheritance Law of the People’s Republic of China.”2

 (See id. at 6) 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is brought pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The party

asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing the existence of federal subject matter

jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

DISCUSSION

Chow moves to dismiss the instant action on the grounds that Chou’s complaint is

deficient in that she has failed to allege any basis for federal jurisdiction over the instant

action; that both diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction in fact are lacking;

and that the People’s Republic is immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act (“FSIA”). In the alternative, Chow argues that the Court should sever the

claims asserted against her, pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and/or decline jurisdiction over the instant action pursuant to the Act of State doctrine.

A. Failure to Allege Jurisdiction

Chow first argues that the instant action is subject to dismissal because Chou has

not included a jurisdictional allegation in her complaint. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure requires that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the

grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In addition,

the Civil Local Rules of this District provide that “[e]ach complaint . . . must include a

separate paragraph entitled ‘Jurisdiction,’” which must “identify the statutory or other basis

for federal jurisdiction and the facts supporting such jurisdiction.” See Civil L.R. 3-5. 

Even where a complaint does not contain adequate jurisdictional allegations,

however, the Court should not dismiss if the factual allegations of the complaint

demonstrate a basis for jurisdiction. See Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir.

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1998) (“Imperfections in pleading will not divest a federal court of jurisdiction where the

complaint as a whole reveals a proper basis for jurisdiction.”)

Accordingly, because Chou’s failure to allege a basis for jurisdiction does not require

dismissal of her complaint, the Court turns to the factual allegations of the complaint to

determine whether Chou has stated a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over the

instant action.

B. Diversity Jurisdiction

Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, over actions

between citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Diversity jurisdiction

requires that the citizenship of each plaintiff be diverse from that of each defendant. See

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Here, Chou alleges that she and Chow

both reside in California, (see Compl. at 1, 2), and does not contend that diversity of

citizenship exists among the parties.

Accordingly, the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over the instant action. 

C. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28

U.S.C. § 1331. Chou’s complaint contains no allegation that defendants violated any

federal law, and the Court is unaware of any federal law that may have been violated as a

result of the acts alleged in the complaint. Indeed, Chou alleges only violations of Chinese

inheritance law, (see Compl. at 6), and does not contend in her opposition that she is

asserting any federal claim.

Accordingly, the Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over the instant

action.

D. Actions Against Foreign States

The district courts have “original jurisdiction . . . of any nonjury civil action against a

foreign state . . . as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign

state is not entitled to immunity” under the FSIA or any applicable international agreement. 

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 The FSIA defines “foreign state” to include “a political subdivision of a foreign state

or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state[.]” See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 

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See 28 U.S.C. § 1330. Chou’s claims against the People’s Republic and against Chow

arise from the same case or controversy. Consequently, if the Court has jurisdiction over

the People’s Republic, it also has supplemental jurisdiction over Chou’s claims against

Chow. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). As noted, Chow contends the People’s Republic is

immune from suit under the FSIA.

Under the FSIA, and, in particular, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, “a foreign state shall be

immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States” unless an

exception specified in § 1605 is applicable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604; see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605 (setting forth exceptions). Accordingly, absent an exception, as set forth in § 1605,

federal and state courts are barred, by § 1604, from exercising jurisdiction when a foreign

state is entitled to immunity. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488

U.S. 428, 434 (1989) (emphasis omitted).

The defendant bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is immune from

suit under the FSIA. See Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 306 (9th Cir.

1997). The defendant first establishes a prima facie case of sovereign immunity, and thus

a presumption of immunity, by demonstrating that it is a foreign state within the meaning of

the FSIA. See id. If the defendant establishes a prima facie case of immunity, “the burden

of production then shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence that an exception [to the FSIA]

applies.” See id. at 307. If the plaintiff meets its burden of production, the defendant then

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an exception does not apply. See id.

It cannot be disputed that the People’s Republic is a foreign state within the meaning

of the FSIA. See, e.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc., 937 F.2d 1444,

1446 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting corporation organized under laws of the People’s Republic

was foreign state within meaning of FSIA);3 see also BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo

Corp. (Group) Ltd., 420 F.3d 810, 812, 816 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding corporation wholly

owned by People’s Republic was foreign state under FSIA). Accordingly, Chow has

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In light of the above rulings, the Court does not reach Chow’s additional argument

that the Court should sever the claims asserted against her, pursuant to Rule 21 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction

over the instant action under the Act of State doctrine.

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established a prima facie case that the People’s Republic is immune from suit under the

FSIA.

Chou makes no attempt to meet her burden of production of evidence that an

exception to the FSIA applies. Rather, Chou states that her “position is to leave the

jurisdiction matters for the Court to decide.” (See Opp. at 1.) As Chou has not met her

burden of production, she has not rebutted the presumption that the People’s Republic is

immune from suit under the FSIA. See Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d at

306-07. Moreover, having reviewed the relevant statutes, the Court has discerned no

exception even arguably applicable to Chou’s claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605.

CONCLUSION

Because diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction do not exist over

Chou’s claims against Chow, and because the People’s Republic is immune from suit,

Chow’s motion to dismiss the instant action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby

GRANTED as follows:

1. Chou’s claims against the People’s Republic are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 2. Chou’s claims against Chow are DISMISSED without prejudice to Chou’s

reasserting said claims in state court.4

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2006 MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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