Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04007/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04007-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 33:1319 Pollutants &amp; Permit Violations

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CALIFORNIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO 

TOXICS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

KERNEN CONSTRUCTION CO., ET AL., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 16-cv-04007-YGR 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 32 

Plaintiff Californians for Alternatives to Toxics brings this action against defendants 

Kernan Construction Co., Bedrock Investments LLC, Scott Farley, and Kurt Kernen for alleged 

violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. sections 1311 and 1342 (the “CWA”), and California 

Health and Safety Code section 25249.5. Generally, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to 

comply with certain requirements imposed by a discharge permit issued pursuant to the CWA and 

unlawfully discharged certain pollutants in violation of California’s health laws. 

Now before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).1

 Defendants 

argue that plaintiff failed to comply with certain jurisdictional notice requirements under the 

CWA. Specifically, defendants contend that plaintiff’s notice was deficient because its status as a 

corporation was suspended at the time the notice was sent and at the time the complaint in this 

action was filed. Plaintiff has since reclaimed active corporate status. 

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 Defendants also purport to raise Rule 12(b)(6) issues for failure to state a claim, yet 

argue in this regard only that plaintiffs “fail to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for Discharge 

of Pollutants due to the court’s lack of jurisdiction.” (Dkt. No. 32 at 2.) Such does not appear to 

be a Rule 12(b)(6) issue and is the very same issue addressed in defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) 

argument. The Court will thus address such issue in the context of Rule 12(b)(1) and will not 

address the same separately. 

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Having carefully considered the pleadings and the papers submitted on this motion, and for 

the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion.2

I. BACKGROUND

Generally, plaintiff alleges that defendants have unlawfully operated a facility and 

discharged certain pollutants in violation of the CWA and California regulations. As will be 

discussed in more detail below, for private citizens to bring such claims, they must comply with 

certain notice requirements. Defendants challenge plaintiff’s compliance therewith. 

By way of background, the CWA gives any individual the ability to commence a civil 

action on their own behalf against any person alleged to be in violation of certain provisions of the 

CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Sixty days prior to initiating such a suit, a plaintiff must have given 

notice of the alleged violation to (i) the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 

(“EPA”), (ii) the state in which the alleged violation has occurred, and (iii) any alleged violator. 

Id. Similarly, under California laws, an individual can initiate a private action so long as the 

action is commenced “more than 60 days from the date that the person has given notice of an 

alleged violation” to the Attorney General, the district attorney or other prosecutor in whose 

jurisdiction the violation is alleged to have occurred, and the alleged violator. Cal. Health & 

Safety Code § 25249.7. 

On or about May 13, 2016, plaintiff provided written notice to defendants, informing 

defendants of its intention to file suit against them for violating the CWA. (FAC ¶ 2.) Plaintiff 

also mailed a copy of the same to the administrator of the EPA, the EPA administrator for Region 

IX, the executive director of the State Water Resources Control Board, and the executive officer of 

the Regional Water Quality Control Board. (Id.) On June 2, 2016, plaintiff provided notice to the 

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 In connection with their motion to dismiss, defendants also filed a request for judicial 

notice (“RJN”) and a supplemental request for judicial notice (“SRJN”) of the following 

documents: (1) Exhibit A, excerpted pages from the State of California Franchise Tax Board’s 

“Revoked Exempt Organization List”; (2) Exhibit B, Business Entity Detail Report; (3) Exhibit C, 

letter from plaintiff’s counsel dated August 23, 2016; (4) Exhibit D, email from plaintiff’s counsel 

dated September 14, 2016; (5) SRJN Exhibit A, Brief, Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. 

Hilfiker Pipe Co., No. 16-CV-04152-JST (N.D. Cal.), filed December 12, 2016. Plaintiff does not 

oppose. The Court takes judicial notice of such documents, and affords each its proper evidentiary 

weight. 

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defendants of its intent to sue for violations of analogous California laws. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff 

also sent such letter to the California Attorney General and the District Attorney for the relevant 

county. (Id.) Plaintiff then initiated this action on July 15, 2016 raising only claims under the 

CWA, and then filed an amended complaint on August 8, 2016 adding the state law claim. (Dkt. 

Nos. 1, 9.) 

Defendants do not contend that any deficiencies exist with regards to the contents of the 

notices, the recipients of the notices, or the timing of the filing of the complaint and amendment 

thereof. Rather, defendants argue that the notices themselves are ineffective because at the time 

the notices were issued, plaintiff’s status as a corporation was suspended. More specifically: 

State of California records indicate that on March 1, 2016, plaintiff’s status as a non-profit 

corporation was revoked by the Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”). (RJN Exs. A, C.) On March 16, 

2016, plaintiff was listed as a “suspended corporation” by the California Secretary of State. (RJN 

Exs. B, D.) Plaintiff avers that it first learned of such facts on August 18, 2016. (Dkt. No. 38, 

Declaration of Clary ¶ 8.) Plaintiff subsequently submitted an application for a certificate of 

revivor with the FTB, which then changed plaintiff’s status back to “active” on September 12, 

2016. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff is still in the process of recovering its tax exempt, non-profit status. 

Defendants concede that plaintiff has reclaimed its “active” status but contends that such is 

insufficient to cure the defects they argue deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is “presumed that a cause 

lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). The party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court bears the burden of 

establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. 

Id. A challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 

1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial attack, the jurisdictional challenge is confined to the 

allegations pled in the complaint. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient “on their face” to 

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invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). 

To resolve this challenge, the court assumes the allegations in the complaint are true and draws all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing dismissal. See Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362. 

Additionally, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

“pendent state claims also should be dismissed.” Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of the 

City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1984). 

III. DISCUSSION

Compliance with the notice requirements under the CWA is a mandatory “prerequisite to a 

citizen enforcement action.” Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 998 (9th 

Cir. 2000); Waterkeepers N. Cal. v. AG Indus. Mfg., Inc., 375 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(“[C]ompliance with this notice provision is required for jurisdiction.”). In order to comply, a 

plaintiff must send such notice containing all the technical requirements along with “sufficient 

information to permit the recipient to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to 

have been violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, . . . [and] the date or dates of such 

violation.” Waterkeepers, 375 F.3d at 916 (citations omitted). 

Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the notices sent. Rather, defendants 

contend that plaintiff had no authority to send such letters because the corporation was deemed 

“suspended” at the time the notices were sent and at the time the complaint was filed and 

subsequently amended. Defendants argue that, under California law, a suspended corporation 

forfeits its corporate powers, rights, and privileges (see Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §§ 23301, et seq.), 

including the right to sue, defend, or appeal from an adverse decision (see Boyle v. Lakeview 

Creamery Co., 9 Cal. 2d 16, 18–20 (1937)). Therefore, because plaintiff was a suspended 

corporation, it had no authority to send a notice to defendants nor did it have the authority to 

initiate legal action. 

Plaintiff counters that the California Supreme Court has held that certain corporate actions, 

such as filing a lawsuit, are validated retroactively once the corporation’s status is revived. 

Bourhis v. Lord, 56 Cal. 4th 320 (2013). In Bourhis, the party at issue had filed a timely notice of 

appeal, but was, at the time, suspended by the FTB. Id. at 323. Months after the notice of appeal 

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had been filed, the FTB revived the party’s status as an active corporation. Id. at 329. The 

California Supreme Court then held that the revival of such status validates retroactively the notice 

of appeal. Id. The California Court of Appeal addressed an even more analogous situation in 

Center for Self-Improvement v. Lennar Corp., 173 Cal. App. 4th 1543, 1549 (2009). There, the 

plaintiff was also suspended by the FTB at the time it sent its notice letter, pursuant to the 

California Health & Safety Code. Id. at 1550. The plaintiff did not obtain a certificate of revivor 

until seven months after it had served the notice and four months after it had filed the complaint. 

Id. Nevertheless, the court that such revival retroactively validated the notice and the filing of the 

complaint. Id. at 1556–57. 

The Court agrees with plaintiff. Defendants have cited no authority indicating that a notice 

pursuant to the CWA is rendered invalid and irredeemable on the basis of plaintiff’s status as a 

suspended corporation. Defendants’ invocation of cases that require strict compliance with the 

CWA’s notice requirements does nothing to advance their position because defendants have not 

identified any requirements, which plaintiff has violated. Rather, such cases emphasize that the 

purpose of strict compliance with the notice requirements is to provide the alleged violator an 

“opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render 

unnecessary a citizen suit.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 

U.S. 49, 60 (1987). Such purpose would not be frustrated by the circumstances present here. 

Further, defendants’ attempts to distinguish plaintiff’s authorities do not persuade.3 Thus, the 

Court finds that the notices issued here satisfy the requirements of the CWA since plaintiff’s status 

as an “active” corporation has been revived. See Ctr. for Self-Improvement, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 

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 Defendants argue that such cases are inapposite because they do not speak to the 

jurisdictional requirements under the CWA but rather address state law. However, defendants’ 

very arguments rely on the application of state law to deprive plaintiff of its capacity to issue the 

notices here. Additionally, on questions of state law, such as the powers and privileges of a 

corporation domiciled in the state, federal courts defer to pronouncements by state courts. Bozzio 

v. EMI Grp. Ltd., 811 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2015). Further, defendants argue that Center for 

Self-Improvement is distinguishable because the notice requirement in Health & Safety Code 

section 25249.7 is not jurisdictional, as here, but rather a “mandatory precondition to bringing a 

citizen enforcement suit.” Ctr. for Self-Improvement, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1554. However, in 

light of the California Supreme Court’s holding in Bourhis, such distinction does not appear to be 

meaningful. 

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1557 (“The only issue is [plaintiff’s] suspended corporate status at the time of giving notice and 

filing the complaint. Since revivor cures defects in the complaint related to corporate disability, it 

follows that it would cure such technical defect as it affects the notice letter. We also bear in mind 

that notwithstanding [plaintiff’s] incapacity at the time of sending the notice letter, the notice itself 

had a life of its own; it reached the respondents and the public prosecutors, and the public 

prosecutors declined within 60 days to commence a public action. All the statutory purposes were 

fulfilled.” (emphasis in original)).4 Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. The Court VACATES the hearing currently set on this motion for 

January 10, 2017. 

This Order terminates Docket Number 31. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 4, 2017 

______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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 Defendants also argue that, even if the revival of plaintiff’s “active” status were 

sufficient, somehow the fact that plaintiff’s non-profit status has not been reinstated renders the 

notices ineffective because plaintiff described itself as such in the notices. However, defendants 

again fail to explain which notice requirement this “deficiency” violates. 

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