Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01879/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01879-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.

(Docket No. 5.)

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLIFTON J. TERRELL, JR.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

C.E. DUCART,

Defendant. /

No. C 15-1879 EDL (PR)

ORDER DISMISSING WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, has filed a pro se civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 He has been granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis in a separate order. For the reasons stated below, the complaint is DISMISSED

with leave to amend.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary;

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the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not

need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

'entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim

for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff states that he was transferred to Pelican Bay State Prison from California

State Prison - Solano. His personal property was also sent to Pelican Bay State Prison. 

On August 23, 2014, Plaintiff received his personal property and was told that he could not

have his hot pot, hair and beard trimmers, or digital antenna. Plaintiff was given a choice to

either send those items home or donate them. Plaintiff has named Warden C.E. Ducat as

the Defendant because the Warden denied Plaintiff’s appeal.

There are several deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint that require dismissal of the

complaint with leave to amend.

 Prisons often ban or limit inmates’ possession of certain types of personal property

while incarcerated. The Constitution itself does not confer specific property interests such

that no limitation at all may be imposed on inmates’ possession of property. See Board of

Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). A property interest that has

been initially recognized and protected by state law may be protected under the Due

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 Courts are split on whether the rationale of Sandin should be

extended to property interest claims arising from prison conditions.

Compare Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999)

(extending Sandin' s atypical-and-significant-deprivation methodology

to property claims by prisoners) and Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d

1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that Sandin applies to property

interest claims brought by prisoners) with Bulger v. U.S. Bureau of

Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1995) (declining to extend Sandin’s

methodology to property interest claims by prisoners). The Ninth

Circuit has not yet determined whether Sandin applies to a prisoner's

property claim. 

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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,

710 (1976); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (protected property interests “stem from an independent

source, such as state law – rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and

support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”). Moreover, California Code of

Regulations, title 15, § 3192, generally provides that “[a]n inmate’s right to inherit, own, sell

or convey real or personal property does not include the right to possess such property

within the institutions of the department.” Therefore, it is doubtful that an inmate will have a

legitimate claim of entitlement to possess personal property in prison unless explicitly

authorized by other state laws or prison regulations. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

477-84 (1995),2 the Supreme Court held that a prisoner is entitled to procedural due

process only if the deprivation of which he complains imposes “atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Plaintiff is advised that inmates who have been afforded the opportunity to possess

personal property in prison may claim that prison officials have confiscated or destroyed

their property without due process. If the deprivation is not random and unauthorized, but

the result of “established state procedure,” the availability of a post-termination tort action

does not necessarily provide due process. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.

422, 435-37 (1982) (failure on part of state commission to hold hearing within statutory time

limits not permitted to terminate timely filed claim). The Fourteenth Amendment requires

“an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,. . . for a

hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Logan, 455 U.S. at 437. Due process is

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violated where a deprivation is predictable and pre-deprivation process possible, but state

officials, acting under apparent authority of state procedures, provide no pre-deprivation

procedure and are specifically charged with the authority to effect the deprivation

complained of. See Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Plaintiff has not provided enough information to determine whether he has a

constitutionally protected property interest. Further, the court cannot determine whether

plaintiff indeed sent his personal property items home, or whether the prison donated the

items. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend to provide more information. 

Finally, Plaintiff has not linked Defendant to an action or inaction that actually and

proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. Liability may be imposed

on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the

defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally

protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1085

(9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff must link Defendant’s actions or inactions with Plaintiff’s claim. He

must “set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s” actions which violated his or

her rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). To the extent Plaintiff is

attempting to impose supervisory liability on the Warden, a supervisor may be liable under

section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or

(2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff should keep in mind that

where there is no evidence that the supervisor was personally involved or connected to the

alleged violation, the supervisor may not be liable. See Edgerly v. City and County of San

Francisco, 599 F. 3d 946, 961-62 (9th Cir. 2010).

For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend to

provide the information as specified above. Even at the pleading stage, “[a] plaintiff must

allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in

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the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998).

CONCLUSION

1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the

standards set forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28)

days of the date this order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used

in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an

amended complaint completely replaces the original and supplemental complaints, Plaintiff

must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by

reference. Failure to file an amended complaint within the designated time and in

compliance with this order will result in the dismissal of this action.

2. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice

of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure

to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September , 2015. 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

P:\PRO-SE\EDL\CR.15\Terrell879dwla.wpd

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