Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-19-00860/USCOURTS-ca2-19-00860-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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19‐860‐cv

Woolf v. Strada

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit    

AUGUST TERM 2019

No. 19‐860‐cv

RONALD WOOLF,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MELISSA STRADA, INDIVIDUALLY, MATTHEW ASMAN, INDIVIDUALLY, JIM

NIZIOLEK, INDIVIDUALLY, ANDREW BOWYER, INDIVIDUALLY,

BLOOMBERG L.P.,

Defendants‐Appellees,

GARY KOTOVETS, MICHAEL MORRIS, INDIVIDUALLY,

Defendant.

   

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

   

SUBMITTED: JANUARY 31, 2020

DECIDED: FEBRUARY 6, 2020

   

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Before: CABRANES, SACK, Circuit Judges, and FAILLA, District Judge.

*

   

Plaintiff‐Appellant Ronald Woolf appeals from an award of

summary judgment entered in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (P. Kevin Castel, Judge) in favor of his

former employer, Bloomberg L.P., and his direct supervisors. The

question presented is whether, in light of the ADA Amendments Act

of 2008, an employee’s inability to perform his or her particular job as

a result of stress arising from the circumstances surrounding that job

gives rise to a “disability” for purposes of the Americans with

Disabilities Act.

On de novo review, we conclude, as the District Court did, that

Woolf is not disabled for purposes of the ADA and, therefore, the

judgment in favor of Bloomberg is AFFIRMED.

   

         Abraham Z. Melamed, Derek Smith Law

Group, PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff‐

Appellant.

* Judge Katherine Polk Failla, of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.   

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David Wayne Garland, Edward M.

Yennock, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.,

New York, NY, for Defendants‐Appellees.

   

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff‐Appellant Ronald Woolf (“Woolf”) appeals from a

judgment entered on March 8, 2019, in the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York (P. Kevin Castel, Judge) in favor

of his former employer, Bloomberg L.P., and his direct supervisors

(jointly, “Bloomberg”), on Woolf’s claims of discrimination and

retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),1

impairment and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”),2 and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (“Title VII”).3 On appeal, Woolf raises a number of challenges to

the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of

Bloomberg. Our opinion today addresses only one such challenge:

whether Woolf’s inability to perform his particular job as a result of

stress arising from the circumstances surrounding that job gives rise

to an ADA‐qualifying disability in light of the ADA Amendments Act

of 2008 (“ADAAA”). We conclude that it does not. In a summary order

1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.

2 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.

3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.

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filed simultaneously herewith, we decide the other issues raised in

Woolf’s appeal.  

In sum, the March 8, 2019 judgment in favor of Bloomberg is

AFFIRMED.  

I. BACKGROUND4

When Woolf began his employment at Bloomberg L.P. in May

2011 as a sales representative, he signed a voluntary “self‐

identification form” stating that he did not have a disability and had

no history of physical or mental impairments that substantially limited

one or more major life activities. Between 2011 and 2013, however,

Woolf “suffered migraines that left him temporarily incapacitated,

which impaired his work ability and his life activities more

generally.”5  

Woolf’s migraines were related to his stress at work.

Throughout his time at Bloomberg, Woolf’s migraines worsened as he

received various performance reviews that placed him within the

lower third of employees at the company. Starting in 2012 and

throughout 2013, Woolf was notified of his supervisors’ concerns

4 We draw the facts relevant to the limited question addressed in this

opinion from the District Court’s thorough March 5, 2019 Opinion and Order. See

Woolf v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 16‐cv‐6953 (PKC), 2019 WL 1046656, at *1–*8 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 5, 2019) (providing a comprehensive account of the factual and procedural

background in the case).

5 Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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about underperformance, “struggle[s] to collaborate well with key

[Bloomberg] business managers,” “limited knowledge of the

Bloomberg product/audience overall,” “[l]ow credibility internally,”

and “[p]oor problem‐solving skills.”6 Bloomberg identified the

various areas for improvement and told Woolf that he should seek

help from his peers within the company.

Starting in January and February 2013, Woolf inquired about the

possibility of transferring within the company, including to Asia. At

the time, Woolf thought that moving to Asia was consistent with his

personal interests and experience in the region and would help him

advance professionally within the company. In March 2013, Woolf was

told that an employee must be in good standing to transfer internally.

That same month, Woolf received a verbal warning about his

performance and was told that he had to show “immediate and

sustained improvement,”7 to which Woolf responded with a 19‐page

memorandum rebutting the review and explaining that the warning

“was not necessary or even warranted.”8 In April 2013, Woolf notified

Bloomberg’s Human Resources Department and his supervisors that

he was having severe migraines and had been unable to complete a

certain work task. Woolf also inquired again about his options for

transferring.

6 Joint App’x at 408, 657–58.

7 Id. at 426–27.  

8 Id. at 429.

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Woolf’s migraines continued and, in May 2013, he explained to

Bloomberg’s Human Resources Department that his migraine

condition could potentially result in serious health consequences.

Woolf’s treating neurologist also provided a letter explaining that the

condition placed him at risk of a stroke or heart attack ”simply from

the stress he is currently experiencing at work.”9 The neurologist

identified work‐related stress as “the primary trigger” for Woolf’s

migraines, and that, absent a “change [in] his current work

environment,” “a medical leave of absence . . . alone will not

significantly mitigate this stress.”10

On May 31, 2013, Woolf requested that, instead of being

transferred to a new position, he be permitted to continue performing

his same job as a sales representative without being managed by his

current supervisors. Bloomberg did not transfer Woolf, but

immediately granted his request for medical leave. Between May and

November 2013, Woolf was granted intermittent medical leave with

full pay. Indeed, all of Woolf’s requests for medical leave were

granted, as Bloomberg regularly encouraged Woolf to take medical

leave to address his medical condition. However, following another

low performance review and a written warning in September 2013,

Woolf was fired from his job on January 10, 2014.

On September 6, 2016, Woolf filed the instant suit alleging

various claims of discrimination and retaliation under federal and

9 Id. at 573.

10 Id.  

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New York state law, including that Bloomberg had violated the ADA

by failing to provide Woolf with a reasonable accommodation and by

firing him. As relevant here, Woolf and Bloomberg cross‐moved for

summary judgment on Woolf’s ADA claims. On March 5, 2019, the

District Court denied Woolf’s motion for partial summary judgment

and granted Bloomberg’s cross‐motion for summary judgment. The

District Court held that, based on Woolf’s own admission that he was

able to do the exact same job he had been doing if managed by

different supervisors, “no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that

he . . . was disabled under the ADA.”11  

On March 8, 2019, the District Court entered final judgment in

favor of Bloomberg on all claims and dismissed the case. This appeal

followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Woolf challenges the District Court’s conclusion that

he is not disabled for purposes of the ADA. Specifically, Woolf argues

that his serious migraine condition, which was triggered by work‐

related stress, substantially limited his major life activities of: (1)

working; and (2) seeing, speaking, and concentrating. We only address

here Woolf’s claim that his migraines substantially limited his ability

11 Woolf, 2019 WL 1046656, at *11.

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to work.12 We review Woolf’s challenge to the District Court’s “grant

of summary judgment de novo, resolving all ambiguities and drawing

all reasonable inferences” in his favor.13 We will affirm a summary

judgment “only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14  

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA,

a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his

employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was disabled within the

meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the

essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable

accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse employment action

because of his disability.15 Similarly, to establish a prima facie case for

failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff also must

satisfy the first three factors, but for the fourth factor, he must show by

a preponderance of the evidence that his employer refused to make a

reasonable accommodation.16 The ADA defines “disability” to include,

12 Woolf’s argument that the migraines affected his major life activities of

seeing, speaking, and concentrating are addressed in the summary order filed

simultaneously herewith.  

13 Pippins v. KPMG, LLP, 759 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

14 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  

15 See Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006) (involving

a discriminatory‐termination claim under the ADA).  

16 See McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (involving

a failure‐to‐accommodate claim under the ADA).

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among other things, “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities.”17  

Bloomberg does not dispute that Woolf’s serious migraine

condition constitutes a “physical or mental impairment.”18 As a result,

Woolf asks us to determine whether his migraine condition

“substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities,”19 such as

seeing, speaking, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,

and working.20 As stated above, here we address only Woolf’s

contention that his migraines substantially limited his major life

activity of working.  

Although Woolf’s migraines arguably affected his performance

at work, Woolf’s own admissions make clear that the migraines were

related to the stress caused by working under his direct supervisors.21

The record amply demonstrates that Woolf believed he could perform

17 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).

18 Id.  

19 Id.

20 See id. § 12102(2) (listing examples of major life activities).

21 See, e.g., Joint App’x at 86–87, 252–56, 312, 319, 515, 725 (Woolf’s

complaints about how his supervisors were causing him stress and affecting his

health); id. at 570–74, 597 (letters from Woolf’s neurologist stating that “emotional

stress at work” was the “primary trigger” of Woolf’s migraines and that Woolf

needed to “change his current work environment” “to reduce his stress levels”).

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the same job if he were transferred to a different location or if he were

managed by different supervisors.22  

Woolf’s argument that his condition could be accommodated

with a reassignment ortransfer conflates two separate inquiries: on the

one hand, whether the employee has a disability in the first instance

and, on the other hand, whether the employee can perform the job

with a reasonable accommodation. As the District Court correctly

concluded, under this Court’s precedent, “where a plaintiff’s

condition leaves him unable to perform only a single, specific job, ‘he

has failed to establish a substantial impairment to his majorlife activity

of working.’”23 That is this case.  

Woolf has pointed out, however, that our precedential decisions

on this issue, as well as most cases cited by the District Court, predate

Congress’s 2008 amendments to the ADA. In those amendments, the

ADAAA, Congress instructed courts that the “definition of disability .

. . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals,”24 and

that an impairment that “substantially limits one major life activity

22 See, e.g., Joint App’x at 312–13, 319–21, 2287 (Woolf’s confirmation that he

could perform his same job under different managers, in a situation where his work

would be appreciated, and he would not be subjected to manufactured stress).  

23 Woolf, 2019 WL 1046656, at *10 (quoting Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298,

312 (2d Cir. 1999)); accord Cameron v. Cmty. Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d

60, 65 (2d Cir. 2003); Felix v. New York City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir.

2003).

24 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).

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need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a

disability.”25 The principal purpose of the ADAAA was to overrule the

Supreme Court’s arguably narrow interpretation of what constitutes

an ADA‐qualifying disability set forth in Sutton v. United Air Lines,

Inc.,

26 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,27 and

to make clear that the substantial‐limitation requirement in the

definition of “disability” is not an exacting one.28

But nothing in the ADAAA’s text, or its legislative history for

that matter, suggests that Congress intended to modify, let alone

abandon altogether, the well‐established understanding that an

employee’s “inability to perform a single, particular job does not

constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of

working.”29 This longstanding, common‐sense principle of law

recognizes that employees who are precluded only from doing their

specific job, or from working under a specific supervisor, do not have

a “disability.” Rather, an employee alleging a substantial limitation in

25 Id. § 12102(4)(C).

26 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

27 534 U.S. 184 (2002).

28 See ADAAA of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008).

29 Cameron, 335 F.3d at 65.  

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the major life activity of working must show that the limitation affects

the ability to “perform a class . . . or broad range of jobs.”30   

Had Congress intended to change this fundamental principle of

law in the ADA’s regulatory scheme, Congress could have done so.

Indeed, Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a

regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not,

one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”31 We decline to read a

limitation into the statute that was so clearly not enacted by

Congress.32

Even after the ADAAA’s enactment in 2008, we have continued

to hold, in non‐precedential summary orders, that an impairment does

not rise to the level of a “disability” if it only impairs the employee’s

ability to perform his or her current job.33 District courts in this Circuit

30 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (2016) (emphasis added).  

31 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assocs., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citations

omitted).

32 See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (“[W]e ordinarily resist[

] reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”

(quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, (1997))).

33 See, e.g., Mazzeo v. Mnuchin, 751 F. App’x 13, 15 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary

order); Chang v. MetroPlus Health Plan, 590 F. App’x 74, 75 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary

order) (adopting the analysis of the district court’s memorandum and order by

reference); Price v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 458 F. App’x 49, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2012)

(summary order) (holding that limitations on plaintiff’s ability to perform her

particular job were “insufficient to satisfy the ADA’s disability,” but referring to

pre‐ADAAA law).

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have followed suit,34 and the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission’s  most recent interpretive guidance on this subject has

reinforced that ongoing understanding of the ADA’s definition of

disability.35 Finally, every Circuit that has addressed this question in

the aftermath of the ADAAA also has held that Congress’s

amendments did not change the fact that “a plaintiff alleging a work‐

related disability must show that his condition precludes him from

working in a class or broad range of jobs.”36   

Accordingly, we join our sister Circuits in holding that the

ADAAA did not alter or erode our well‐settled understanding that the

inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a

substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. As relevant

here, because Woolf does not attempt to show that his work‐induced

34 See, e.g., Chang v. MetroPlus Health Plan, No. 12‐cv‐3181 (WHP), 2014 WL

842635, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2014); Davitt v. Rockland Cty. Dep’t of Mental Health,

No. 10‐cv‐2919 (FPS), 2013 WL 1091982, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013).  

35 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (2016) (“Demonstrating a substantial limitation in

performing the unique aspects of a single specific job is not sufficient to establish

that a person is substantially limited in the major life activity of working.”).

36 Booth v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 927 F.3d 387, 394 (6th Cir. 2019) (emphasis

added); see also Mancini v. City of Providence by & through Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 42

n.6 (1st Cir. 2018); Nurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (involving

a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), which

incorporates the ADA’s definition of “individual with a disability”); Carothers v.

Cty. of Cook, 808 F.3d 1140, 1147 (7th Cir. 2015); Allen v. SouthCrest Hosp., 455 F.

Appʹx 827, 835 (10th Cir. 2011) (summary order) (noting that the “order and

judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,

res judicata, and collateral estoppel” and “may be cited . . . for its persuasive value

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1”).

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impairment substantially limited his ability to work in a class or broad

range of jobs, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Woolf has

a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s March 8, 2019

judgment is AFFIRMED.

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