Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04555/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04555-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Amended Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PIERRE LEBON HOFFMAN,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

CLAYTON SHYTLE, et al.,

Defendant(s).

 

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No. C 05-04555 JW (PR)

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; DENYING MOTION

FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL

(Docket Nos. 14, 16, 19, 20 & 21)

Plaintiff filed the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that officials

at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, to which

plaintiff has filed an opposition. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits

show that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are

those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

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In plaintiff’s other case filed in this court regarding his medical care at

SVSP, see Hoffman v. Lee, No. C 06-2248 JW, plaintiff states, in his response to the

motion for summary judgment in that case, that he sustained a host of serious

injuries in 1983, prior to his incarceration. He further states that these injuries have

led to ongoing medical problems while in prison. 

Amended Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

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477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

See id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of

identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of

proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier

of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the

opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving

party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go

beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If the

nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff claims that defendants Kelley Ogle and Clayton Shytle, two

registered nurses at SVSP, denied his requests for medical treatment. Plaintiff

alleges he developed a serious urinary tract infection and bladder infection which

has resulted in his having a permanent catheter.1

 In addition to the complaint, the

Court has considered the exhibits lodged by plaintiff on December 14, 2005. These

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Amended Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

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exhibits consist of plaintiff’s administrative appeals in which he alleged he received

inadequate medical care from Ogle and Shytle (whom he referred to as “RN Kelley”

and “RN Clay,” respectively) in June and July 2004. 

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials provide all prisoners

with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical

care and personal safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). However, a

prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met:

(1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison

official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 834.

To establish that the medical care provided by prison officials fell short of

that required by the Eighth Amendment rights, a prisoner must show that the

officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th

Cir. 1994). A “serious medical need” exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s

condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled in part on other grounds by WMX Technologies,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prison official is

“deliberately indifferent” if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Negligence is not enough for liability under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at

835-36 & n4. An “official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not, . . . cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of

punishment.” Id. at 838. Instead, “the official’s conduct must have been ‘wanton,’

which turns not upon its effect on the prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints

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Plaintiff’s allegations in his administrative appeals and in his opposition do

not constitute evidence. The Court notes that plaintiff’s other case challenging the

same course of medical treatment, Hoffmann v. Lee, No. 06-2248 JW, has been

referred to the Prisoner Mediation Program for mediation.

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facing the official.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)). Prison officials violate their

constitutional obligation only by “intentionally denying or delaying access to

medical care.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that

there is no genuine issue of fact that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical

needs. Defendant Shytle submits a declaration in which he states that he was not

involved in plaintiff’s medical treatment during the time period about which plaintiff

complains, June and July 2004. (Shytle Decl. at 2.) Shytle goes on to describe the

medical treatment plaintiff received during that time, as evidenced by plaintiff’s

medical records. On June 2, 2004, plaintiff submitted a form requesting medical

care for a skin condition. (Id.) The condition was considered routine, and plaintiff

was referred to a doctor. (Id.) Dr. Haffner treated plaintiff on June 15, 2004 for his

diabetes and other medical needs. (Id.) Two days later, plaintiff complained of

chest pains, and Dr. Haffner, after assessing plaintiff’s medical condition, promptly

sent him to an outside hospital in an ambulance for treatment. (Id.) Shytle also

offers her medical opinion that the above-described medical treatment of plaintiff

was reasonable and within the applicable standard of care. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff submits no evidence disputing the above-described facts, either that

defendants were involved in his treatment, or the denial thereof, during the time

period alleged.2

 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under section

1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation

of a federally protected right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.

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1988). In the absence of any evidence that defendants were involved in plaintiff’s

treatment during the time period of which he complains, there is no genuine issue of

material fact that they caused him to receive inadequate medical care. Furthermore,

even if defendants had been involved in plaintiff’s care during that time, plaintiff

offers no evidence, beyond his own opinion, disputing defendants’ evidence that the

treatment plaintiff received for his complaints during the relevant time period was

reasonable and medically sound. "A difference of opinion between a prisonerpatient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a §

1983 claim." Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981); Toguchi v.

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004). As plaintiff has failed to create a

genuine issue of material fact that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

claims. 

 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Docket No. 16) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motions for an extension of time (Docket

Nos. 19-21) are GRANTED. The motion for appointment of counsel (Docket No.

14) is DENIED. 

The clerk shall terminate Docket Nos. 14, 16, 19, 20 & 21. 

DATED: 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge 

September 21, 2007

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