Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_21-cv-00020/USCOURTS-azd-4_21-cv-00020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Western Watersheds Project, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

Sonny Perdue, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-21-00020-TUC-SHR

Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary 

Judgment

Pending before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs 

Western Watersheds Project (“Western Watersheds”) and Wilderness Watch (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) (Doc. 16) and a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants

Sonny Perdue, Erick Stemmerman, Ed Holloway, Jr., United States Forest Service, and 

United States Department of Agriculture (collectively “Forest Service”) (Doc. 18). 

Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief against the Forest Service under the Administrative 

Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and allege three violations of the National 

Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (Doc. 1 at 19–29.) For the 

reasons below, the Court grants the Forest Service’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 

and denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from a livestock grazing project in the Apache-Sitgreaves and Gila 

National Forests called the Stateline Project (the “Project”). (AR at 20921, 20924.

1

)

1AR refers to the administrative record in this case.

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The stated purposes for the Project are to: 

• authorize livestock grazing on the Apache-Sitgreaves and 

Gila National Forests in a manner that maintains or improves 

project area resource conditions and achieves the objectives 

and desired conditions described in the forest plans; and

• provide long-term management direction on grazing through 

allotment management plans, including the permitted numbers 

and class of livestock, season of use, facilities associated with 

livestock grazing, allowable forage utilization levels, and 

associated permit clauses.

(AR at 20924.) And, the stated needs of the Project are to:

• meet the requirements of the Rescissions Act of 1995 (Public 

Law 104-19), section 504, which requires that all range 

allotments undergo National Environmental Policy Act 

analysis; 

• maintain or improve current satisfactory resource conditions 

and to improve those areas in unsatisfactory conditions to 

move toward desired conditions; and 

• incorporate management flexibility through an adaptive 

management strategy consistent with Forest Service policy 

(Forest Service Handbook 2209.13, chapter 90) to adapt

management to changing resource conditions or management 

objectives. 

(AR at 20924–25.) 

The Project area involves 14 allotments of land where grazing has been ongoing for 

decades. (AR at 20921; AR at 21002.) It covers approximately 271,665 acres with 126,243 

acres in Arizona and 145,422 acres in New Mexico. (AR at 20921.) This includes portions 

of special management areas, 21,531 acres of the Gila Wilderness, 58 acres of the Blue 

Range Wilderness, 33,495 acres of the Blue Range Primitive Area, and approximately 

79,990 acres of inventoried roadless areas. (AR at 21002.) It also includes portions of the 

San Francisco River and six river stretches in New Mexico designated as Outstanding 

National Resource Waters. (AR at 21003; AR at 20965.) There are 90 cultural resource 

sites located in the Arizona portion of the Project area, and 261 cultural resource sites in 

the New Mexico portion of the Project area. (AR at 20996–97.)

The Project area is home to numerous game species and provides habitat for several 

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critically imperiled species protected by the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1531 et seq. (AR at 20974–75.) This includes habitat for the endangered Mexican Gray 

Wolf (“Mexican Wolf”).

2

 (AR at 20974.) According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 

(“FWS”), the Mexican Wolf “is the rarest and most genetically distinct subspecies of all 

the North American gray wolves.” (AR at 12416.) Illegal shooting of Mexican Wolves 

constituted the “single greatest source of [Mexican] [W]olf mortality in the reintroduced 

population, accounting for almost half of all deaths between 1998 and June 1, 2009.” (AR

at 12421.) In 2015, the FWS promulgated a revised management rule for Mexican Wolves 

under Section 10(j) of the ESA. (AR at 12423.) This rule created three different 

geographic management zones—Zone 1, Zone 2, and Zone 3. (Id.) 

In Zone 1, Mexican [W]olves may be initially released or 

translocated. In Zone 2, Mexican [W]olves will be allowed to 

naturally disperse and occupy, and wolves may be translocated 

within the zone. Pups under five months of age will be released 

on federal land in Zone 2. In Zone 3, neither initial releases 

nor translocations will occur, but Mexican [W]olves will be

allowed to disperse into and occupy this zone. (Id.) 

The Project area is within a portion of Zone 1 of the Mexican Wolf Experimental 

Population Area.

3

 (AR at 23075–76.) 

“[T]he growth of the [Mexican Wolf] experimental population has been hindered 

by escalating adult mortalities, illegal takings, and pup mortality.” (AR at 12427.) Lawful 

management removals of Mexicans Wolves have also hindered population growth and 

2Though Mexican Wolves once numbered in the thousands, by the 1970s, Mexican 

Wolves “hovered on the brink of extinction.” (AR at 12416.) The Mexican Wolf was first 

listed as an endangered subspecies in 1976. (AR at 12417.) “All Mexican [W]olves alive 

today originated from the seven founding wolves that by 1980 constituted the last of the 

subspecies.” (Id.) In 1998, eleven Mexican Wolves were released into the wild in Arizona 

and New Mexico, “constituting the first reintroduction of the subspecies into the wild.” 

(AR at 12419.) 

3Mexican Wolf Experimental Population Area (“MWEPA”) means “an area in 

Arizona and New Mexico including Zones 1, 2, and 3, as defined in this paragraph (k)(3), 

that lies south of Interstate Highway 40 to the international border with Mexico.” 50 C.F.R. 

§ 17.84(k)(3).

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FWS “has recognized that permanent removals have the same practical effect on the wolf 

population as mortality.” (Id.) Past removals and control measures of Mexican Wolves 

“have led to the loss of genetically valuable animals.” (Id.) FWS “has repeatedly 

recognized that one of the chief threats to the species is loss of genetic diversity.” (Id.) 

“The Mexican [W]olf, in particular, is more susceptible to population decline than other 

gray wolf populations because of smaller litter sizes, less genetic variation, lack of 

immigration from other populations, and potential low pup recruitment.” (AR at 12428.)

A. The Forest Service’s Authorization of the Project

In December 2017, the Forest Service published a scoping notice for the Project. 

(AR at 20926; AR at 7468–69.) In January 2018, Western Watersheds submitted scoping 

comments on the Project. (AR at 11864–67.)

In October 2018, the Forest Service issued a Preliminary Environmental Assessment

(“EA”) in which it evaluated two options: a no-action grazing plan (“Alternative 1”) and 

a proposed action for grazing (“Alternative 2”). (AR at 13586; AR at 13596.) The Forest 

Service announced two 30-day periods for review and comment (AR at 20926), and both

Western Watersheds and Wilderness Watch submitted comments on the Preliminary EA. 

(AR at 14722–862.) Based on the information received, the Forest Service identified 

various issues and topics of concern. (AR at 20926–27.) The Forest Service subsequently 

clarified or modified some of the proposed actions, but concluded, “[t]he comments 

received did not result in the need to create additional alternatives,” so it maintained the

two alternatives it had in the Preliminary EA. (AR at 20927–28.)

In June 2019, the Final EA was published. (AR at 20917.) The next month, the 

Forest Service provided a 45-day period for the public to review and object to the Final EA 

and the three “draft decision notice[s] (DDN) and finding[s] of no significant impact 

(FONSI).” (AR at 23163; AR at 23184; AR at 23254; AR at 23002–04.) Western 

Watersheds and Wilderness Watch submitted formal objections again. (AR at 23072–93.) 

The Forest Service reviewed and responded to the objections in accordance with the

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administrative review procedures found at 36 C.F.R. § 218, Subparts A and B.

4

 (AR at 

23133–48.)

By January 2020, the Forest Service had issued its three final FONSIs for all the 

allotments implicated by the Project. (AR at 23152–70 (Alma, Citizen, Dry Creek, Holt 

Gulch, Pleasanton, Potholes, and Sacaton Allotments); AR at 23172–92 (Alma Mesa, 

Copperas, Keller Canyon, and Lop Ear Allotments); AR at 23242–63 (Blackjack, Hickey, 

and Pleasant Valley Allotments).) These FONSIs indicated the Forest Service chose and 

authorized Alternative 2. (AR at 23153; AR at 23173; AR at 23243.)

Alternative 2 reauthorizes 10-year grazing permits and allotment management 

plans. (AR at 11616; AR at 19794.) Alternative 2 permits an overall number of 3,808 to 

3,838 head of cattle or horses, depending on the season, for a total of 44,186 Animal Unit 

Months (“AUMs”).5 (AR at 20928.) This represents a decrease of 1,276 AUMs from the 

previous permitted numbers. (Id.) Alternative 2 authorizes twelve allotments to be stocked 

with livestock year-round (AR at 20928; AR at 23154 (six); AR at 23174 (four); AR at 

23244 (two)), one allotment (Sacaton) to be used seasonally (AR at 23154), and one 

allotment (Pleasant Valley) to be closed from grazing altogether (AR at 20937–38). 

Alternative 2 also permits several new infrastructure projects to distribute and 

improve livestock management. (AR at 20933–34; AR at 7497; AR at 20968–69.) 

Specifically, it authorizes the installation or construction of: 16.7 miles of new fencing, 25

water storage tanks, 51 water troughs, 46.5 miles of pipeline to transport water, 5 new 

4The Council on Environmental Quality adopted new NEPA regulations that 

became effective September 14, 2020, and were codified as of July 1, 2021. 85 Fed. Reg. 

43,304, 43,357 (July 16, 2020) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1500–18 (2021)). Because the 

Forest Service’s planning and decision in this case predate these changes, the Court applies 

the regulations in effect prior to those revisions.

5

“An animal unit month is a measure of the amount of forage required by a 1,000-

pound cow or its equivalent for one month based on a daily allowance of 26 pounds of dry 

forage per day. It is not synonymous with animal-month or head-month, which is an 

expression of one month’s occupancy of the range by an animal. For calculating animal 

unit months and for conversion factors, a dry cow or a cow-calf pair is considered 1.0 

animal unit months, a yearling is 0.7 animal unit months, a bull is 1.5 animal unit months, 

and a horse is 1.2 animal unit months.” (AR at 20921.)

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wells, 1 new trick tank, 3 new cattleguards, 3 new solar panels, and 4 new corrals. (AR at 

20933.) 

B. Procedural History

In January 2021, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Forest Service alleging it 

failed to comply with NEPA in analyzing and authorizing the Project. (Doc. 1.) The parties

subsequently moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 16 (Plaintiff’s motion); Doc. 18 (Forest 

Service’s motion).) The motions have been fully briefed and the administrative record is 

lodged in the record. (See Doc. 15 (administrative record on a flash drive).) The Court 

held oral argument on August 16, 2023. (Docs. 24, 25.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is a particularly appropriate tool for resolving claims 

challenging agency actions, i.e., “deciding the legal question of whether the agency could 

reasonably have found the facts as it did.” Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 770 

(9th Cir. 1985). Summary judgment is appropriate in this case because the issues presented 

address the legality of Defendants’ actions based on the administrative record and do not 

require resolution of factual disputes. See Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 

F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Because this is a record review case, [the 

district court] may direct that summary judgment be granted to either party based upon our 

review of the administrative record.”).

B. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 

Because NEPA does not provide a private right of action, “judicial review of an 

agency action proceeds under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).” All. for the Wild 

Rockies v. Petrick, 68 F.4th 475, 491 (9th Cir. 2023); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. The 

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APA directs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions

found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “This standard of review is highly deferential, presuming 

the agency action to be valid and affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists 

for its decision.” Nw. Ecosystem All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 

(9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted). That is, “[a]gency action should 

be overturned only when the agency has ‘relied on factors which Congress has not intended 

it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 

explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 

implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 

expertise.’” Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 

265 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). The party challenging the 

administrative decision bears the burden of persuasion and, “even assuming the [agency] 

made missteps[,] the burden is on [the challenging party] to demonstrate that the [agency’s] 

ultimate conclusions are unreasonable.” Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. FAA, 18 

F.4th 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 

271 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 

III. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA)

When an agency proposes an action to address a need, the NEPA process begins 

and the agency must determine which level of NEPA review it will pursue: an 

Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), an Environmental Assessment (“EA”), or a 

categorical exclusion (“CE”). See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. 

An EIS is a “detailed written statement,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11, that is required for 

“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 

U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Certain agency proposals normally require an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 

1501.4. 

Conversely, an EA is a “concise public document” that serves to “[b]riefly provide 

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sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an” EIS or a finding of 

no significant impact (“FONSI”). 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1). A FONSI is a document 

“briefly presenting the reasons why an action . . . will not have a significant effect on the 

human environment and for which an [EIS] therefore will not be prepared.” 40 C.F.R. § 

1508.13. The FONSI “shall include the [EA] or a summary of it and shall note any other 

environmental documents related to it. . . . If the assessment is included, the finding need 

not repeat any of the discussion in the assessment but may incorporate it by reference.” Id.

A CE is “a category of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a 

significant effect on the human environment and which have been found to have no such 

effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency in implementation of these regulations

(§ 1507.3) and for which, therefore, neither an [EA] nor an [EIS] is required.” 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1508.4. 

If an EIS is not normally required for the proposed action and a CE does not apply, 

as is the case here, the agency must prepare an EA to see if the proposed action warrants 

an EIS. The EA will either help the agency confirm no EIS is necessary or help the agency 

prepare an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(2)–(3). An EA need only include a “reasonably 

thorough discussion of the significant aspects of probable environmental consequences,”

350 Montana v. Haaland, 50 F.4th 1254, 1265 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1194 (9th Cir. 2008)), and take a “hard look” at the 

“likely” effects of the proposed action, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 695 F.3d 

893, 916–17 (9th Cir. 2012).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue the Forest Service violated NEPA and the APA when it authorized 

the Project by failing to: (1) take a “hard look” at the Project’s impacts on Mexican 

Wolves, the Blue Range Primitive Area, and inventoried roadless areas; (2) prepare an EIS 

based on the context and intensity of the Project; and (3) consider a reasonable range of 

alternatives. (Doc. 16-1 at ii.) The Court addresses each argument below. 

. . . .

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A. “Hard Look” Under NEPA

Plaintiffs argue the Forest Service “failed to take a hard look at the direct, indirect, 

and cumulative” impacts of the Project on: (1) the Mexican Wolves; (2) the Blue Range 

Primitive Area’s wilderness values; and (3) the region’s inventoried roadless areas. (Doc. 

16-1 at 1, 10.) According to Plaintiffs, this “makes accurate assessment of the 

environmental consequences of the proposed action impossible” and makes the EA 

arbitrary and capricious. (Id. at 10–11.)

NEPA requires agencies to take “a ‘hard look’ at the likely effects of the proposed 

action,” including “all foreseeable direct and indirect impacts.” Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity, 695 F.3d at 916–17.

6 Direct impacts are “caused by the action and occur at the 

same time and place.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a). Indirect impacts “are caused by the action 

and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.” 

40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b).

Taking a “hard look” also requires agencies to conduct a full assessment of the 

project’s cumulative impacts. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 695 F.3d at 916–17. A 

cumulative impact “is the impact on the environment which results from the incremental 

impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future 

actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other 

actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. “Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but 

collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” Id. An agency takes a 

“hard look” and properly considers cumulative impacts by including some “quantified or 

detailed information.” Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. FAA, 61 F.4th 633, 644 (9th 

Cir. 2023) (quoting Bark v. U.S. Forest Serv., 958 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2020)). “General 

statements about possible effects and some risk do not constitute a hard look absent a 

justification regarding why more definitive information could not be provided.” Bark, 958 

F.3d at 872 (cleaned up).

6NEPA regulations use the terms “effects” and “impacts” synonymously. 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1508.8(b).

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In other words, an agency meets its obligations and takes a “hard look” when the 

EA contains a “reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of probable 

environmental consequences.” 350 Montana, 50 F.4th at 1265. The Court finds 

application of this standard fraught with confusion because it relies on vague murky 

definitions that provide little guidance to the Court and the parties impacted by the 

regulations. Nonetheless, the Court applies the standard, as set forth in the case law, within 

the context of the APA’s highly deferential standard of review. See N.W. Ecosystem All., 

475 F.3d at 1140 (“[APA] standard of review is highly deferential, presuming the agency 

action to be valid and affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its 

decision.”).

1. Impact on Mexican Wolves

Plaintiffs argue the EA is arbitrary and capricious because the Forest Service failed 

to take a “hard look” and conduct “a ‘thorough’ and ‘detailed’ review and analysis of the 

relevant impacts” of the Project on “Mexican [W]olves and Mexican [W]olf recovery.” 

(Doc. 16-1 at 10–11; Doc. 21 at 1–2.) According to Plaintiffs, the Forest Service 

“arbitrarily rubber-stamped” the Project simply because livestock grazing and 

infrastructure developments have “occurred in the region ‘for more than a century.’” (Doc. 

21 at 1.) Plaintiffs make three specific arguments on this matter: (1) the Forest Service

failed to analyze how authorizing grazing could directly lead to “management removals”

of Mexican Wolves in the wild—through either lethal removal or permanent relocations—

because of wolf/livestock conflicts; (2) the Forest Service failed to analyze the indirect 

impacts of removals on the “severely genetically depressed” Mexican Wolf population; 

and (3) the Forest Service failed to analyze the cumulative impacts of the Project based on

the authorization of grazing in “the core of the recovery zone explicitly designated for the 

reintroduction of Mexican [W]olves into the wild,” and Mexican Wolves’ “increased 

“susceptibil[ity] to population decline,” threats of “excessive levels of illegal killing[s],”

removals arising from “wolf/livestock conflicts,” and “dire genetic status.” (Doc. 16-1 at 

11–13.) Plaintiffs reason the cumulative impacts of the Project make the already 

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“extremely fragile situation for Mexican [W]olves even worse” and this may lead to no 

Mexican Wolves in the future. (Id. at 12–13.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the Forest Service’s “ultimate 

conclusions are unreasonable” regarding the minimal effects the Project will have on 

Mexican Wolves. See Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 18 F.4th at 599. Although the Project area 

includes habitat for the endangered Mexican Wolf, there is no designated or proposed 

critical habitat for the Mexican Wolves because they are an “experimental, non-essential 

population” (AR at 20978). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(k) (Mexican Wolf identified as nonessential experimental population for which critical habitat cannot be designated); see also

16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(C)(ii) (critical habitat not designated for non-essential,

experimental populations). 

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, the Forest Service did not solely rely on the

Mexican Wolf’s “experimental and non-essential” status to support a blanket exemption 

that no impacts for this status should be considered. (Doc. 21 at 2–5.) Rather, the Forest 

Service consulted with FWS multiple times (AR at 20977) and used that information to 

help inform its conclusion that any impact on the Mexican Wolves from this Project would

be minimal.7 

The Forest Service discussed Mexican Wolves in the EA and centered that 

discussion on mitigation measures in case the Mexican Wolves “establish[ed] a territory 

within an allotment or depredation by wolves bec[ame] an issue.”

8

 (AR at 20977.) This 

7Plaintiffs argue the Forest Service could not rely on ESA consultations with FWS 

because an agency’s ESA obligations are different than NEPA obligations. (Doc. 21 at 2–

5.) While the obligations are different, Plaintiff has not pointed to any meaningful 

authority showing it is improper to consider this information in a NEPA analysis. While it 

may be improper to exclusively rely on ESA consultations, it does not appear improper to 

use that information in a NEPA analysis. Cf. Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 

451 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Clearly, NEPA and the ESA involve different standards, 

but this does not require USFS to disregard the findings made by FWS in connection with 

formal consultation mandated by the ESA.”).

8Depredation “means the confirmed killing or wounding of lawfully present 

domestic animals by one or more Mexican [W]olves.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(k)(3).

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implies there was no established wolf territory on an allotment within the Project area and 

no significant wolf depredation issue. Plaintiffs do not dispute the Mexican Wolves lacked 

an established territory on an allotment and lacked a critical habitat due to their nonessential status under the ESA. The consultations with FWS support the finding that none 

of the Project’s allotments contained Mexican Wolf packs, territories, or rendezvous sites9

at the time of Project approval. (AR at 19629–30 (Alma Allotment); AR19677–78 (Citizen 

Allotment); AR19747–48 (Dry Creek Allotment); AR at 19787–88 (Holt Gulch 

Allotment); AR at 19851–52 (Pleasanton Allotment); AR at 19897–98 (Potholes 

Allotment); AR at 19915–16 (Sacaton Allotment); AR at 19959–60 (Keller Canyon 

Allotment); AR at 20177–78 (Alma Mesa Allotment); AR at 20274–75 (Copperas 

Allotment); AR at 20299–301 (Lop Ear Allotment); AR at 20883–85 (Blackjack and 

Hickey Allotments and portions of the Pleasant Valley Allotment added to Blackjack and 

Hickey).) 

The data analyzed by the Forest Service shows only one of the fourteen allotments 

(Alma Mesa) lies within the “occupied range” of the Mexican Wolf (AR at 20177) and 

only that allotment has a confirmed livestock killing by wolves (AR at 20883). Finally, 

the Project area only encompasses 3.5 percent of the approximately 7.7 million acres in 

Zone 1 (12,031.25 square miles) of the MWEPA.

10

 (AR at 12426 (Rule is codified at 50 

C.F.R. § 17.84(k)); AR at 20921 (Project Area = 271,665 acres or 424.48 square miles).) 

Plaintiffs do not dispute any of these facts. 

9Rendezvous site “means a gathering and activity area regularly used by Mexican 

Wolf pups after they have emerged from the den. Typically, these sites are used for a 

period ranging from about 1 week to 1 month in the first summer after birth during the 

period from June 1 to September 30. Several rendezvous sites may be used in succession 

within a single season.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(k)(3).

10The parties agree Zone 1 is approximately 7.7 million acres. See 50 C.F.R. 

§ 17.84(k)(3) (Zone 1 “means an area in Arizona and New Mexico into which Mexican 

[W]olves will be allowed to naturally disperse and occupy and where Mexican [W]olves 

may be initially released from captivity or translocated. Zone 1 includes all of the Apache, 

Gila, and Sitgreaves National Forests; the Payson, Pleasant Valley, and Tonto Basin 

Ranger Districts of the Tonto national Forest; and the Magdalena Ranger District of the 

Cibola National Forest.”). (Doc. 19 ¶ 53; Doc. 22 ¶ 53.)

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The Court finds the administrative record supports the Forest Service’s conclusion 

that negative impacts on Mexican Wolves were minimal if the grazing alternative was 

selected. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not shown the Forest Service failed to take a “hard 

look” at the likely impacts on Mexican Wolves.

2. Impact on Blue Range Primitive Area

Plaintiffs argue the EA is “arbitrary and capricious” because the Forest Service 

failed to take a “hard look” at the Project’s impacts on “important special management area 

resources” (wilderness values and protected area characteristics) in the Blue Range 

Primitive Area.11 (Doc. 16-1 at 13–16.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the Forest Service 

either “failed to analyze” the Project’s impacts or failed to give the impacts “proper

weight.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs argue the Court cannot rely on the January 2019 Minimum Requirements 

Analysis (“MRA”) (AR at 19360–96) and the October 2018 Recreation and Special 

Management Areas Report (“RASMAR”) (AR at 20686–724) because the Forest Service’s 

“reasoning is not in the EA itself” and Plaintiffs were “never given the opportunity to

review and comment on these documents” because “neither the MRA nor any of the 

agency’s specialists’ reports were made available to the public during NEPA’s public 

process” as required by 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). (Doc. 21 at 7.) Plaintiffs also argue the 

Forest Service’s analysis is inadequate (i.e., fails to take a “hard look”) because the Forest 

Service incorrectly assumed: (1) the Project’s “proposed actions would be beneficial to 

11Plaintiffs also summarily argue the Project impacts “two designated wilderness 

areas (the Blue Range Wilderness in Arizona and the Gila Wilderness in New Mexico).” 

(Doc. 16-1 at 13–16.) The Forest Service argues no new improvements are proposed for 

these areas and Plaintiffs have waived these arguments because they do not explain how 

these areas are impacted and the parties agreed in the Court’s “Amended Case Management 

Order” (Doc. 14 ¶ 3) that “[a]ny claims or defenses not raised during summary judgment 

briefing will be deemed to have been waived.” (Doc. 18-1 n.4.) Plaintiffs do not attempt 

to rebut this argument (Doc. 21 at 5–8). Accordingly, the Court finds these arguments 

waived and will not address them. The Court will also not address Plaintiffs’ arguments 

related to the “Greater Gila Bioregion” because Plaintiffs have not cited any law 

establishing how this region is entitled to any special protection.

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enhancing the quality of the wilderness characteristics” because “livestock grazing is a 

necessary part of the wilderness experience” in the Blue Range Primitive Area; and (2) 

“livestock grazing, and the associated developments and motorized access as authorized in 

the decisions, is a required component of the area’s management scheme.” (Doc. 16-1 at 

15.) Plaintiffs also contend the Forest Service ignored that “the only need” for 

infrastructure developments is to address issues caused by allowing livestock grazing in 

the first place, so those developments could only be seen as beneficial if grazing continues. 

(Doc. 21 at 5–6.) 

“A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate 

the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life 

are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.” 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1131(c). “Wilderness” is further defined as: 

an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval 

character and influence, without permanent improvements or 

human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to 

preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears 

to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with 

the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has 

outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and 

unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand 

acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its 

preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may 

also contain ecological, geological, or other features of 

scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.

Id. Wilderness areas are to be managed in a manner that preserves and protects their

wilderness characteristics to leave them unimpaired for current and future use and 

enjoyment. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).

First, the Court addresses whether it is proper to consider the reports and analyses 

in the MRA and RASMAR. While detailed reasoning of these two documents may not 

appear in the final EA, the final EA explicitly referred its readers to these documents. (AR

at 20936.) This belies Plaintiffs’ argument that they were “never given the opportunity to 

review and comment on these documents.” Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not explain how 

these documents were unavailable or claim they requested the documents and were denied 

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access to them. Although the administrative record suggests Western Watersheds 

originally submitted a [Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)] request on October 31, 

2018, for “[a]ll specialist reports that are a part of the [Project] in the Apache-Sitgreaves 

and Gila National Forests,” that request was clarified by Western Watersheds two days 

later via email. (AR at 13884; AR at 14870.) The email indicated Western Watersheds 

“was interested in the annual livestock allotment monitoring to assess use or utilization as 

well as the long-range monitoring of livestock allotments that help identify trends in use 

or ecological condition of the allotments.” (AR at 14870.) The Forest Service produced 

responsive documents based on the clarification and Plaintiffs do not identify anywhere in 

the administrative record where they appealed that FOIA request despite the Forest 

Service’s response indicating “[t]he FOIA provides you the right to appeal this response.” 

(Id.) Nor do Plaintiffs point to anywhere in the administrative record suggesting that after 

the FOIA response, they attempted to obtain reports and the Forest Service denied them 

access. Accordingly, the Court finds no violation of § 1500.1(b) and will consider the 

information in those two documents. See § 1500.1(b) (only requiring information to be 

made available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made or actions are

taken).

Second, the Court addresses whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated the Forest 

Service’s “ultimate conclusions are unreasonable” regarding the minimal effects the 

Project will have on the Blue Range Primitive Area if grazing and infrastructure

developments are allowed. See Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 18 F.4th at 599. Here, the Project 

includes 33,495 out of 199,502 acres in the Blue Range Primitive area. (AR at 21002.) 

The Blue Range Primitive area is not a congressionally designated wilderness area, but it 

is managed as wilderness due to a Forest Service plan. (AR at 21002; AR at 19360

(MRA)). The Project’s proposed improvements in the Blue Range Primitive Area in 

Alternative 2 include “approximately 1.6 miles of new fence, 3 water storage tanks, 3 

troughs, a solar panel, and 2.9 miles of pipeline.” (AR at 21002.) The Project would also 

remove 1.3 miles of existing fence under Alternative 2. (AR at 21002.) Contrary to 

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Plaintiff’s suggestion, nothing in the EA or the administrative record shows the Forest 

Service assumed it was required to authorize livestock grazing. The Forest Service

explicitly considered an alternative (Alternative 1) that would authorize no grazing and no 

infrastructure developments in the EA, and it acknowledged this no-grazing alternative 

would likely improve wilderness characteristics. (AR at 21004.) The Forest Service 

simply chose not to pursue that plan after concluding the grazing alternative would only 

have minimal effects to the Blue Range Primitive Area. The Forest Service argues it was 

proper to do so because the Project’s improvements would be implemented in a manner 

that would “enhance the values” and “provide a net benefit to the resources in the area”

based on the conditions at the time of the Project. (Doc. 18-1 at 12, 14.) The Court agrees.

The EA discusses how many of the infrastructure developments in Alternative 2

would be implemented in a manner that would minimize environmental risks, protect 

resources, and more effectively manage these resources. For example, the Project includes

0.8 miles of fencing in the northwest corner of the Alma Mesa Pasture to “prevent livestock 

from congregating near the confluence of Little Blue Creek and Yam Canyon, improving 

resource conditions and helping to protect an occupied Mexican spotted owl Protected 

Activity Center.” (AR at 20936; AR at 20705 (RASMAR).) The “water developments in 

the Alma Mesa pasture would improve livestock distribution and, in turn, plant diversity, 

soil and watershed conditions and improved ecological processes which would improve 

the natural qualities.” (AR at 21008.) The solar panel “would mitigate the intrusive sounds 

of the authorized diesel generator at Stateline Cabin well, which would add to the feeling 

of solitude in that area.” (AR at 21007.) Notably, the proposed improvements represented 

the least impactful of three alternatives analyzed in the MRA. (AR at 19362–63, 69–88.) 

This information suggests the Forest Service knew and considered the grazing alternative

would have some environmental effects on the Blue Range Primitive Area,12 but found 

12These effects include, among other things, a decreased “feeling of solitude,” 

“feeling of modification or manipulation versus being unbound or unhampered” due to 

range improvements, and “intrusive sounds of the authorized diesel generator.” (AR at 

21004–07.)

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those effects would be minimal. See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350 (“NEPA merely prohibits 

uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.”). The EA also notes: “constructing the 

proposed 0.8-mile fence in the northwest corner of Alma Mesa, would allow approximately 

1.3 miles of existing fence in Yam Canyon and Little Blue Creek to be removed.” (AR at 

21006.) Removing fencing would be a positive impact on the area. 

The Court finds the administrative record supports the Forest Service’s conclusion 

that negative impacts to the Blue Range Primitive Area would be minimal if the grazing 

alternative was selected. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not shown the Forest Service failed to 

take a “hard look” at the likely impacts upon the Blue Range Primitive Area.

3. Impact on Inventoried Roadless Areas

Plaintiffs argue the EA is arbitrary and capricious because the Forest Service failed 

to take a “hard look” at the Project’s effects on inventoried roadless areas. (Doc. 16-1 at 

15.) According to Plaintiffs, the Forest Service needed to analyze the “effects of the 

extensive infrastructure developments slated for these unique, remote, wild and roadless 

landscapes” to comply with NEPA. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiffs argue the Forest Service failed 

to do this and instead relied on a generalized conclusory statement that no analysis was 

needed because “no new roads will be developed in inventoried roadless areas.” (Id.)

The 2001 Roadless Area Conservation Rule (“Roadless Rule”), 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 

(Jan. 12, 2001), was promulgated to provide lasting protection for roadless areas. Los 

Padres ForestWatch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 25 F.4th 649, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2022). An 

“Inventoried Roadless Area” (“IRA”) is an area providing “large, relatively undisturbed 

landscapes that are important to biological diversity and the long-term survival of many at 

risk species.” Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3245 (Jan. 

12, 2001); see also 36 C.F.R. § 294.11. Absent certain exceptions, the Roadless Rule 

“prohibits road construction [and] reconstruction . . . in [IRAs] because they have the 

greatest likelihood of altering and fragmenting landscapes, resulting in immediate, longterm loss of roadless area values and characteristics.” See 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3272 (Jan. 

12, 2001).

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Here, approximately 79,990 acres of IRAs are within the Project area. (AR at 

21002.) Alternative 2 of the Project permits the following infrastructure developments on 

some of these IRAs: the installation of approximately 10 miles of fence, 11 miles of water 

pipeline, 1 well, 1 trick tank, 2 corrals, 9 water storage tanks, and 14 water troughs. (AR

at 21007.) It is undisputed no new roads are being constructed or reconstructed within an 

IRA. (AR at 21007.) Therefore, the Roadless Rule does not apply. Nonetheless, the Forest 

Service still analyzed the nine roadless characteristics, even though it was not required to,

and concluded the Project will not have significant impacts on the IRAs.13 (AR at 20707–

08.) This belies Plaintiffs’ argument that the Forest Service only relied on a generalized 

conclusory statement.

Further, the Forest Service summarized the Project’s effects on: (1) soil, water, and 

air resources; (2) sources of public drinking water; (3) diversity of plant and animal 

communities; (4) habitat for threatened or endangered species and species dependent on 

undisturbed areas of land; (5) primitive and semiprimitive classes of recreation; 

(6) reference landscapes for research study or interpretation; (7) landscape character and 

integrity; (8) traditional cultural properties and sacred sites; and (9) other locally unique 

characteristics. (AR at 23149–51.) Plaintiffs do not dispute any of this analysis. 

Therefore, the administrative record supports the Forest Service’s conclusion that 

negative impacts to the IRAs were minimal if the grazing alternative was selected. Thus, 

the Court concludes Plaintiffs have not shown the Forest Service failed to take a “hard 

look” at the likely impacts on the IRAs.

4. Summary

In sum, Plaintiffs have not shown the Forest Service violated the APA by failing to 

take a “hard look” at the Project’s impacts on the Mexican Wolves, the Blue Range 

Primitive Area, or IRAs. 

. . . . 

13Although these nine roadless characteristics were not discussed in the original 

Final EA, the Forest Service issued a notice of errata adding this analysis. (AR at 23149–

51.) Plaintiffs do not challenge the Forest Service’s reliance on the notice of errata.

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B. Failure to Prepare an EIS

Plaintiffs argue the Forest Service’s decision to authorize the Project without

preparing an EIS is “arbitrary and violates NEPA because the . . . Project may result in 

significant impacts upon the human environment” and substantial questions exist regarding 

those impacts. (Doc. 16-1 at 8, 16–24; Doc. 21 at 8.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue the 

context of the Project is “massive” and there are several intensity factors warranting an 

EIS, including the effects on certain endangered species, the unique characteristics of the 

area, public safety concerns, and significant cumulative impacts. (Doc. 16-1 at 18–25; 

Doc. 21 at 8–14.)

When an agency prepares an EA and subsequently determines an EIS is not 

required, as the Forest Service did here, it must “issue a [FONSI], briefly describing why 

the action ‘will not have a significant effect on the human environment.’” In Def. of 

Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 751 F.3d 1054, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1508.13). In this Circuit, an EIS is required if there are “‘substantial questions whether 

a project may have a significant effect’ on the environment.” Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 

1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 

161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Agencies must consider the context and intensity of a proposed action to determine 

whether there will be significant environmental impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. The 

significance of a proposed action “must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as 

a whole (human, national), the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality”; both 

the “short- and long-term effects are relevant.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a). Intensity “refers 

to the severity of impact” and the following factors, among others, “should be considered”: 

“The degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species 

or its habitat that has been determined to be critical under the Endangered Species Act of 

1973”; “Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic or 

cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or 

ecologically critical areas”; “The degree to which the proposed action affects public health 

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or safety”; and “Whether the action is related to other actions with individually 

insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b). The presence 

of even “one of these factors may be sufficient to require preparation of an EIS in 

appropriate circumstances.” Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 

846, 865 (9th Cir. 2005).

When reviewing an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS under NEPA, the Court 

must “determine whether the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at the consequences of its 

actions, based [its decision] on a consideration of the relevant factors, and provided a 

convincing statement of reasons to explain why a project’s impacts are insignificant.’” In 

Def. of Animals, 751 F.3d at 1068. The agency cannot rely on “conclusory assertions that 

an activity will have only an insignificant impact on the environment” to avoid preparing 

an EIS. Ocean Advocs., 402 F.3d at 864.

1. Context of Project 

Here, the Forest Service considered the context of the Project and concluded 

authorizing the grazing alternative would “not have a significant effect on the quality of 

the human environment” after reviewing the information in the EA “and the documentation 

included in the [P]roject record.” (AR at 23163–64; AR at 23185; AR at 23256.) In the 

FONSIs issued for the Project, the Forest Service reasoned: “This [P]roject is a sitespecific action that does not have international, national, regionwide, or statewide 

importance and will not affect regional or national resources. This decision is made within 

the context of local importance in the project area along the Arizona-New Mexico state

line.” (AR at 23164.)

Specifically, the Project considered authorizing ten years of livestock grazing on 

fourteen allotments of land; including 271,665 acres across two states and multiple national 

forests. (AR at 20921; AR at 11616.) “Permitted numbers vary from 3,791 to 4,022 head 

of cattle and horses, depending on the time of year, for a total of 45,462 animal unit months 

currently permitted through term grazing permits or authorized per decision notices on 

these allotments.” (AR at 20921.)

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While this is a large Project—spanning across two states and multiple national 

forests—Plaintiffs do not point to, and the Court is unaware of, any authority holding large 

projects necessarily have a significant environmental impact. Indeed, case law suggests 

otherwise. See WildEarth Guardians v. Conner, 920 F.3d 1245, 1262 (10th Cir. 2019)

(“[T]here is no categorical rule that sizable federal undertakings always have a significant 

effect on the quality of the human environment.” (quoting TOMAC v. Norton, 433 F.3d 

852, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2006))); Decker v. U.S. Forest Serv., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 (D. 

Colo. 2011) (“Even assuming that the project does impact a relatively large area, plaintiffs 

have not provided any support for the contention that an EIS is necessary when a project 

reaches a certain size.”). Therefore, the Court concludes this factor alone does not show 

substantial questions exist as to whether the Project may have significant effects. 

2. Intensity of the Project

i. Adverse Effect on Endangered or Threated Species

An agency should consider “[t]he degree to which the action may adversely affect 

an endangered or threatened species or its habitat that has been determined to be critical 

under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(9). 

Plaintiffs argue substantial questions exist as to whether the Project may adversely 

affect the Mexican Wolf and the Forest Service failed to include a “convincing statement 

of reasons” as to why no significant adverse impacts may occur. (Doc. 16-1 at 19; Doc. 

21 at 9–11.) Plaintiffs repeat their arguments that it was improper for the Forest Service to 

rely on ESA consultations because the ESA and NEPA standards are different, and the 

Forest Service incorrectly believed the Mexican Wolf was exempt from NEPA analysis

based on its ESA status. (Doc. 16-1 at 19–20; Doc. 21 at 9.) 

The Court finds Plaintiffs have not shown substantial questions exist as to whether 

the Project may have significant adverse effects on the Mexican wolves. The Forest 

Service addressed this intensity factor in the three FONSIs it issued and concluded there 

would not be significant effects based on the information in the EA. (AR at 23160–61, 68 

(Alma, Citizen, Dry Creek, Holt Gulch, Pleasanton, Potholes, & Sacaton); AR at 23181–

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82, 90 (Alma Mesa, Copperas, Keller Canyon, & Lop Ear); AR at 23252–53, 61

(Blackjack, Hickey, Pleasant Valley).) For the reasons explained in Section IV(A)(1)

above, the administrative record shows the Forest Service adequately considered the

potential adverse impacts of the Project on Mexican Wolves and reasonably found them to 

be minimal. 

Plaintiffs also contend the Forest Service failed to properly consider the adverse 

effects on ten other species14 by solely relying on a generalized conclusory statement—

“may affect, not likely to adversely affect”—for each of the species in some of the Project 

allotments. (Doc. 16-1 at 19–20.) The administrative record suggests the Forest Service 

did not rely on this statement alone. The Forest Service consulted with FWS for each 

allotment and considered proposed utilization levels and management plans for each 

allotment including: pasture rests, grazing duration, timing and frequency; proposed range 

improvements and developments; vegetation conditions and trends and forage availability; 

watershed conditions and trends; suitable habitat; and habitat needs for each specific listed 

species. (See AR at 20974–86.) The Court finds Plaintiffs have not shown substantial 

questions exist as to whether the Project may have significant adverse effects on these ten 

species. Thus, Plaintiffs have not shown this intensity factor requires an EIS.

ii. Unique Characteristics of Area

An agency must consider the “[u]nique characteristics of the geographic area such 

as proximity to historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild 

and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical areas.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(3).

Plaintiffs argue substantial questions exist as to whether there may be significant 

environmental effects on the unique characteristics of this area because the Project would 

authorize “grazing and infrastructure developments in or near areas with ‘unique 

characteristics.’” (Doc. 16-1 at 20–22; Doc. 21 at 11.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue the 

14These ten species are the “Southwest willow flycatchers, Gila chub, Loach 

minnows, Spikedace, Mexican spotted owls, Western yellow-billed cuckoos, Chiricahua 

leopard frogs, northern Mexican gartersnakes, narrow-headed gartersnakes, and Gila trout, 

all of which are listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA.” (Doc. 16-1 at 20.) 

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Project area is unique because it includes “[o]ver 21,589 acres” of two federally designated 

Wilderness areas, 33,495 acres of the Blue Range Primitive Area, 79,990 acres of IRAs, 

“three stretches of rivers that have been deemed eligible for inclusion in the National Wild 

and Scenic Rivers system,” and six river stretches designated as Outstanding National 

Resource Waters. (Doc. 16-1 at 21–22.) Plaintiffs argue the EA fails to mention the Project 

occurs “within the heart of Management Zone 1 of the Mexican Wolf Recovery Area,”

which, Plaintiffs assert, is an ecologically critical area containing “some of the most 

suitable habitable for Mexican [W]olf recovery in the American Southwest.” (Doc. 16-1

at 21–22; Doc. 21 at 11.) Plaintiffs also argue all allotments affected by the Project 

“contain significant cultural resources.” (Doc. 16-1 at 22.) Plaintiffs further assert the EA 

“includes only generalized conclusory statements that effects are not significant or will be 

effectively mitigated” and the Forest Service failed to provide a convincing statement of 

reasons in the EA or FONSIs as to why the Project’s impacts on these “unique 

characteristics” are insignificant. (Doc. 21 at 12–13.) 

The Court finds Plaintiffs have not shown substantial questions exist as to whether 

the Project may have significant environmental impacts on the Project area’s “unique 

characteristics.” The Forest Service addressed this intensity factor in the three FONSIs it 

issued and concluded there would not be significant environmental effects based on the 

information in the EA. (AR at 23252–53, 57–58 (Blackjack, Hickey, Pleasant Valley); AR

at 23160–61, 65 (Alma, Citizen, Dry Creek, Holt Gulch, Pleasanton, Potholes, & Sacaton); 

AR at 23181–82, 86 (Alma Mesa, Copperas, Keller Canyon, & Lop Ear).) The Forest 

Service analyzed the effects to the two federally designated Wilderness areas, the Blue 

Range Primitive Area, and the rivers mentioned above in each allotment of land implicated. 

Assuming without deciding Zone 1 is an ecologically critical area that can be analyzed 

under this intensity factor, the Project only affects up to 3.5 percent of Zone 1. 

The Forest Service discussed cultural resources in the Project’s area and explained 

different mitigation measures it would take to preserve cultural resources in the three 

FONSIs. (AR at 23167–68; AR at 23189–90, AR at 23260–61.) These FONSIs indicated 

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Alternative 2 would have no significant adverse effects to cultural resources and this 

information was also in the EA. (AR at 20996–97.) Plaintiffs do not meaningfully explain 

how the Forest Service’s reasoning on this issue is insufficient. Thus, Plaintiffs have not 

shown this intensity factor requires an EIS.

iii. Public Health and Safety Concerns

An agency must consider “[t]he degree to which the proposed action affects public 

health or safety.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(2).

Plaintiffs argue substantial questions exist as to whether the Project “may present 

impacts affecting public health and safety” as a result of “E. coli contamination of water 

resources in the [P]roject area.”

15 (Doc. 16-1 at 22–24; Doc. 21 at 13.) Plaintiffs assert the 

Forest Service “fail[ed] entirely to explain or analyze” this factor because it failed to 

address Plaintiffs’ concerns that the grazing alternative “will continue to exacerbate already 

impaired water quality in the [P]roject area” due to degradation caused by livestock 

trampling and defecation, increased allowance of withdrawals via new pipelines and wells,

and “the documented concern regarding trespass livestock breaching . . . exclosures.” 

(Doc. 16-1 at 22–23; Doc. 21 at 13.) Plaintiffs express particular concern over six riparian 

reaches at risk of contamination (AR at 20963) and four waterbodies in the Project area, 

which are considered impaired waterbodies under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act 

(AR at 20964).16 (Doc. 16-1 at 23.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs have not shown substantial questions exist as to whether 

the Project may have significant adverse effects on public health or safety based on E. coli

contamination. The Forest Service addressed this intensity factor in the three FONSIs it 

issued and concluded there would not be significant environmental effects based on the 

information in the EA. (AR at 23252–53, 23257–58 (Blackjack, Hickey, Pleasant Valley); 

15

“E. coli is a bacteria used as an indicator of contamination and health risk . . . . 

Fecal matter may introduce E. coli and pathogens making people, wildlife and livestock 

potential sources of pollution.” (AR at 6116.) 

16

“Under Section 303(d)(1) of the Clean Water Act, states are required to develop a 

list of waters within a state that are not in compliance with water quality standards and to 

establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL) for each pollutant.” (AR at 21057.)

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AR at 23160–61, 23165 (Alma, Citizen, Dry Creek, Holt Gulch, Pleasanton, Potholes, & 

Sacaton); AR at 23181–82, 23186 (Alma Mesa, Copperas, Keller Canyon, & Lop Ear).) 

The Forest Service also addressed this factor in the EA. There, The Forest Service 

acknowledged the no-grazing alternative would improve water quality due to no grazing. 

(AR at 20972.) However, it also concluded the grazing alternative would only have

insignificant impacts because it would only have “[l]ocalized, short-term effects to water 

quality” and this alternative would be implemented in an adaptive manner that would 

maintain or improve water quality levels. (Id.) 

The Forest Service acknowledged grazing has contributed to water impairment in 

the past and two segments of the Blue River and San Francisco River are listed as impaired 

waterbodies under Section 303(d) due to E.coli contamination. (AR at 20963–64.) It 

addressed E. coli concerns and explained how the Project’s features would maintain or help 

to improve water quality in impaired areas in relation to E. coli if the grazing alternative 

was selected. Specifically, the EA indicated the Project would continue to limit access to

the San Francisco River, better distribute livestock in uplands, and keep a conservative 

utilization rate to help improve water quality. (AR at 20969.) The EA also references the 

Watershed Report (AR at 20962), which acknowledged livestock grazing is a concern, but 

the greatest cause of concern regarding E. coli in the Blue and San Francisco Rivers is 

unmanaged recreation.17 (AR at 21057.) 

Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have not shown a 

substantial question exists as to whether the Project may have a significant effect on public 

health or safety. The EA already appears to address the questions raised by Plaintiffs’

water quality concerns and this analysis supports the Forest Service’s conclusion the effects 

are insignificant. First, Plaintiffs seem to overstate the poor quality of water in the area

17Once again, Plaintiffs argue the Watershed Report should not be considered 

because it “was never made available to the public contrary to” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). 

(Doc. 21 at 13; Doc. 23 at 14, n.5.) Again, the Watershed Report was mentioned in the 

Preliminary EA and Final EA and Plaintiffs could have obtained the Report if they had

requested it. (AR at 13627 (Preliminary EA); AR at 20962 (Final EA).)

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caused by past livestock grazing. The EA indicates 43 out of the 51 riparian areas are 

functioning properly, 8 are at risk, and no areas were rated as impaired. (AR at 20963.) 

Although not perfect, the public health and safety concern here does not appear to be

significant. Second, contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, the EA makes clear the Project 

would lead to a “3 percent decrease in [the] total permitted” AUMs, which would result in 

a slight decrease in the amount of water consumed by livestock annually. (AR at 20968; 

AR at 21013.) Third, the EA acknowledged livestock trespass may occur because “no 

exclosure or fence is 100 percent effective,” but the Forest Service indicated it planned to

monitor the presence of livestock and would address breaches as needed. (AR at 20935.) 

Thus, Plaintiffs have not shown this intensity factor requires an EIS. 

iv. Cumulatively Significant Impacts

An agency should consider “[w]hether the action is related to other actions with 

individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. Significance exists if it is 

reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment.

Significance cannot be avoided by terming an action temporary or by breaking it down into 

small component parts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). “Cumulative impact” is also defined 

as “the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action 

when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions” and “can 

result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a 

period of time.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.

Plaintiffs argue “[a] substantial question exists whether the [] Project will have 

significant cumulative impacts” on the “Mexican [W]olves, Mexican [W]olf recovery, and 

the ecosystems in which Mexican [W]olves live.” (Doc. 16-1 at 24; Doc. 21 at 13.) 

Plaintiffs repeat their argument the Forest Service failed to consider the magnitude of the 

“potentially detrimental impacts” of the grazing, “especially considering that grazing has 

already been ongoing for more than a century.” (Doc. 21 at 13–14 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).) The Court disagrees.

The Forest Service addressed this intensity factor in the three FONSIs it issued and 

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concluded there would not be significant environmental effects based on the information 

in the EA. (AR at 23252–53, 23260 (Blackjack, Hickey, Pleasant Valley); AR at 23160–

61, 23167 (Alma, Citizen, Dry Creek, Holt Gulch, Pleasanton, Potholes, & Sacaton); AR

at 23181–82, 23188 (Alma Mesa, Copperas, Keller Canyon, & Lop Ear).) The Forest 

Service explained:

The direct and indirect effects of the selected alternative are 

expected to be minor in the short term and beneficial or neutral 

over the long term. None of the effects are considered 

significant for reasons described herein. No past or future 

actions have been identified that will combine with the effects 

of the selected alternative to cause cumulatively significant 

effects.

(AR at 23260, 23167, 23188.) The Forest Service also addressed this factor in more detail 

in the EA as described in section IV(A)(1). Having reviewed the record, the Court 

concludes Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial question exists as to whether the Project 

may have significant cumulative environmental impacts on Mexican Wolves. Although

the Mexican Wolf may be in “grave shape” as Plaintiffs state (Doc. 16-1 at 24), Plaintiffs 

have not shown an EIS is necessary due to cumulative impacts based on this Project.

3. Summary

In sum, Plaintiffs have not shown the Forest Service’s decision to not prepare an 

EIS was “arbitrary and capricious” because Plaintiffs failed to show there are substantial 

questions as to whether the Project may have a significant effect on the environment based 

on the context and intensity factors.

C. Range of Alternatives

Plaintiffs argue the Forest Service’s “failure to consider numerous reasonable 

alternatives renders the EA ‘inadequate’ and is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance 

with law.” (Doc. 16-1 at 25–27 (internal citations omitted).) According to Plaintiffs, the 

Forest Service ignored “requests for multiple different alternatives to be considered” and 

“failed to explain why the varying reduced grazing options as proposed by commenters 

were not considered here” even though they were “all viable alternatives that meet the 

purpose and objectives of the [P]roject.” (Id. at 26–27.) Plaintiffs argue that by only 

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considering the two alternatives it did, the Forest Service failed to properly “consider the 

importance of the suggested alternatives for allowing management flexibility in the [] 

Project’s grazing management scheme” and relegated “environmental considerations to 

secondary status.” (Doc. 21 at 14–15 (internal citation omitted).)

NEPA requires federal agencies to “study, develop, and describe appropriate 

alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved 

conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). 

“Although an agency must still ‘give full and meaningful consideration to all reasonable 

alternatives’ in an [EA], the agency’s obligation to discuss alternatives is less than in an 

EIS.” W. Watersheds Project v. Abbey, 719 F.3d 1035, 1050 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting N. 

Idaho Cmty. Action Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 545 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

“The range of alternatives that an agency must consider under NEPA is based on 

the purpose and need of the proposed agency action,” Audubon Soc’y of Portland v. 

Haaland, 40 F.4th 967, 981 (9th Cir. 2022), and the agency is only required to consider 

alternatives “reasonably related to the purposes of the project,” Westlands Water Dist. v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The focus of the reasonable alternatives analysis is on the “substance of 

the alternatives” rather than “the sheer number of alternatives considered” because there is 

no minimum number of alternatives an agency must consider. Native Ecosystems Council 

v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005). “An agency need not [] discuss 

alternatives similar to alternatives actually considered, or alternatives which are infeasible, 

ineffective, or inconsistent with the basic policy objectives for the management of the 

area.” Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Res. Dev. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 524 

F.3d 938, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, 

“[t]he existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an [EA] inadequate.” 

Abbey, 719 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Westlands, 376 F.3d at 868). In rejecting any 

alternatives, the agency must only “briefly discuss the reasons” why alternatives “were 

eliminated from detailed study.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14; see also Native Ecosystems, 428 

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F.3d at 1245 (applying § 1502.14 to EA analysis). The Court will address the arguments 

related to the range of alternatives in the context of the highly deferential APA standard. 

See N.W. Ecosystem All., 475 F.3d at 1140.

Here, the EA only analyzed two alternatives: a no-grazing alternative and the 

grazing alternative. (AR at 20927–28.) Throughout the NEPA process (i.e., scoping 

period, Preliminary EA, Final EA, FONSIs), members of the public proposed different 

alternatives the Forest Service could consider, but the Forest Service found it appropriate 

to only consider two alternatives in detail. (AR at 11619–20 (Scoping); AR at 13586,

13596 (Preliminary EA); AR at 20917, 20927–28 (Final EA).) 

Plaintiffs cite comments made by Western Watersheds during the scoping period 

and argue the Forest Service failed to consider its requests for “alternatives that considered 

environmental impacts on an allotment-by-allotment basis instead of the proposed all-ornothing approach” and “an alternative that considered maintaining the Pleasant Valley 

allotment as vacant, and not merely transitioning allowed numbers to neighboring 

allotments.” (Doc. 16-1 at 26 (citing AR at 11864, 14740).) In response to these 

comments, the Forest Service explained, “The comment does not identify a specific issue. 

However, for each allotment or relevant portion thereof, this analysis will assess whether 

livestock grazing is compatible with desired conditions and objectives or if it would result 

in substantial and permanent impairment of the resources.” (AR at 12214.) When the issue 

was raised again by Western Watershed in a comment to the Preliminary EA, the Forest 

Service responded it found no additional alternatives were needed because the “current 

analysis” in the Preliminary EA addressed these issues because “[t]he no action alternative

[] consider[ed] removing cattle from the allotments and the deciding official has discretion 

to decide from among components of the two alternatives analyzed including by 

allotment.” (AR at 21350, 21409–10.) That is, the Forest Service indicated it did not need 

to consider these proposed alternatives because they were already addressed or similar 

enough to the two alternatives analyzed in the EA. The Court finds these explanations 

adequate to explain why Plaintiffs’ proposed alternatives were not explored in further 

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detail.

Next, Plaintiffs cite an objection from WildEarth Guardians which argued the 

following proposed alternatives were not considered: (1) an alternative “with no grazing 

in wilderness areas”; (2) an alternative specifically addressing wolf/livestock conflicts. 

(Doc. 16-1 at 26 (citing AR at 23066–67).) The Forest Service addressed this objection

and explained “the draft Decision Notice provides a range of actions from which the 

responsible officials can choose components from implementing all activities analyzed to 

something less.” (AR at 23116–17.) The Forest Service also addressed these two proposed 

alternatives when it responded to comments to the Preliminary EA and explained these are 

addressed by the “current analysis.” (AR at 21428–33 (wilderness); AR at 21441–45

(wolves).) Because the grazing alternative in the EA addressed wolf/livestock conflicts 

and the no-grazing alternative in the EA addressed no grazing in wilderness areas, the Court 

finds these brief explanations adequate to explain why these alternatives were not explored 

in further detail.

Lastly, Plaintiffs argue the Forest Service ignored an alternative proposed by the 

Center for Biological Diversity, which would have: (1) “reduced stocking levels”; (2) 

shortened grazing season durations (i.e. “less than a year”); (3) decreased allowable 

utilization levels; (4) added periods of pasture rest; (5) full riparian area exclusion; and (6) 

no new construction of water developments or fencing. (Doc. 16-1 at 26 (citing AR at 

23044–45 (objection to Final EA and FONSIs)); see also AR at 11887 (scoping comment).) 

In response to this objection, the Forest Service explained an earlier document described 

“changes [from the scoping notice to the Preliminary EA] resulting from public 

involvement and internal discussions such as shortening the duration of use in some 

pastures, decreasing utilization levels on 9 allotments, eliminating grazing from additional 

riparian areas, and modifying the proposed range improvements.” (AR at 23126–28 (citing 

AR at 12620–22).) The Forest Service also explained the grazing alternative “responds to 

the issues,” the no-grazing alternative “considers removing cattlemen from the allotments,”

and “[t]he deciding official can choose from among the components of the two alternatives 

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analyzed, including choosing individual components for different allotments.” (AR at 

23127.) The administrative record indicates the alternatives proposed by the Center for 

Biological Diversity were considered but not addressed in detail because the proposed 

alternatives had already been addressed by or were similar enough to the two alternatives 

considered.

The Forest Service is not required to consider a specific number of alternatives and 

courts have upheld agency decisions where the agency only considered two alternatives in

an EA. See, e.g., Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1246 (“The statutory and regulatory 

requirements that an agency must consider ‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonable’ alternatives do[]

not dictate the minimum number of alternatives that an agency must consider.”); Bark v. 

U.S. Forest Serv., 393 F.Supp.3d 1043, 1060 (D. Or. 2019), rev’d on other grounds, 958 

F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2020) (“There is no numerical floor on alternatives to be considered, 

and it is usually sufficient to consider only the preferred and no action alternatives” in an 

EA (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Akiak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 213 F.3d 1140, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2000) (EA considered “reasonable range of 

alternatives given the objectives of the Project”).

Given the Project’s objectives of providing “long-term management direction on 

grazing” and maintaining or improving the Project area resource conditions, the two 

alternatives considered in the EA were a reasonable range of alternatives. (AR at 20924.)

While the Forest Service only examined two alternatives to the dismay of Plaintiffs, it 

considered other proposed alternatives and discussed why it deemed it unnecessary to 

address those proposed alternatives in detail. That is all NEPA requires when rejecting 

alternatives—NEPA does not require the Forest Service to scale back its Project in favor 

of an arguably more environment-friendly alternative that Plaintiffs would prefer. See

Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 184 (4th Cir. 2005) (“NEPA is a 

procedural statute; it does not force an agency to reach substantive, environment-friendly 

outcomes.”). Therefore, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have not shown the Forest Service 

violated the APA or NEPA by only considering the two alternatives analyzed in its EA.

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The Forest Service’s consideration of two alternatives was reasonable and the range of 

alternatives considered achieved the goals intended by NEPA: open, thorough public 

discussion promoting informed decision-making. See Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 872 (9th Cir. 2004).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Plaintiffs have not shown the Forest Service’s decision was 

arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The 

administrative record shows the Forest Service considered data and public input and 

decided to reauthorize livestock grazing on these allotments of land based on the 

appropriate factors. See Earth Island Inst. v. Muldoon, -- F.4th --, 2023 WL 5921619 at 

*10 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Once the agency considers the proper factors and makes a factual 

determination on whether the impacts are significant or not, that decision implicates 

substantial agency expertise and is entitled to deference.”). In particular, the Court finds 

the lengthy 102-page Final EA (AR at 20921–21022) coupled with its reference in three 

FONSIs of approximately 20 pages each (AR at 23152–70; AR at 23172–92; AR at 23242–

63) more than sufficient to meet the “concise public document” standard to briefly provide 

sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1508.9(a)(1). This belies Plaintiffs’ suggestions throughout the pleadings the Forest 

Service relied on generalized conclusory statements and arbitrarily rubber stamped this 

Project without much thought. Because Plaintiffs have not met their burden of 

demonstrating the Forest Service’s “ultimate conclusions are unreasonable,” Ctr. for Cmty. 

Action, 18 F.4th at 599, the Court must uphold the Forest Service’s decision. See Pac. 

Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n, Inc., 265 F.3d at 1034.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Forest Service's Cross Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 18) is GRANTED. 

. . . . 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor 

of Defendants, docket accordingly, and close this action.

Dated this 29th day of September, 2023.

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