Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05450/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05450-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2006, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENNIE BLANKENSHIP,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE, Acting Warden and ARNOLD

SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor,

Respondents. /

No. C 04-5450 CW

ORDER GRANTING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Plaintiff Bennie Blankenship, an inmate at Soledad

Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, filed pro se

this petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on former Governor

Gray Davis’ reversal of the decision of the Board of Parole

Hearings (Board)1

 that Plaintiff was suitable for parole. 

Respondent A.P. Kane opposes the petition. Petitioner, now

represented by counsel, has filed a traverse. Having considered

all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS the

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

On February 5, 1983, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Petitioner

shot the victim, Orbie Thomas, in the head with a shotgun. Resp’s.

Ex. 4, 2002 Life Prisoner Evaluation Report at 1. On the night

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before the crime, Petitioner, his cousin and the victim’s sister,

Gwen, had gone to a motel where Gwen had sex with Petitioner. 

Resp’s. Ex. 6, Probation Report at 2. All three were drinking and

smoking PCP. Resp’s. Ex. 5, Initial Parole Consideration Hearing,

June 13, 1990 at 9, 42. Gwen was going to have sex with

Petitioner’s cousin, and Petitioner left to get something to eat. 

Resp’s. Ex. 6 at 5-6. When Petitioner returned, his cousin was

running down the alleyway saying that Gwen was yelling “rape.” 

Resp’s. Ex. 6 at 6. At about 6:00 a.m. on February 5, Petitioner

and his cousin drove Gwen home to the victim’s house; Gwen got out

of the car and ran to the victim’s house screaming that she had

been raped. Resp’s. Ex. 4 at 1. Gwen’s family, including the

victim, exited the house. Petitioner’s parents lived across the

street from the victim. Resp’s. Ex. 6 at 6. The victim approached

the vehicle in which Petitioner was still sitting and the two men

exchanged words. Resp’s. Ex. 4 at 1. The victim asked his commonlaw wife to get his gun, but she did not do so. Resp’s. Ex. 6 

at 5. The victim and his wife entered his residence. Id.

Petitioner and his cousin left the area and went to Petitioner’s

sister’s house where Petitioner obtained a shotgun and returned to

the area where his parents and the victim lived. Id. at 6. 

Petitioner stated that he armed himself because he was afraid the

victim might hurt his parents who lived across the street. Id. 

Shortly thereafter, the victim took his dog for a walk. Id.

The victim’s common-law wife observed the victim standing near a

vehicle talking with Petitioner, who was seated on the right

passenger’s seat. Id. Shortly thereafter, the victim’s common-law

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wife observed a gun go off and strike the victim in the head. Id.

at 5. The gun was fired by Petitioner. Id. Soon after the

shooting, the driver drove the vehicle away from the crime scene. 

Id. A butcher knife was found on or near the victim. Id. 

After his trial and conviction, Petitioner gave the following

statement to the probation officer investigating his case. 

Petitioner was sitting in the front seat of his cousin’s car when

the victim approached him. Id. Petitioner pointed the shotgun at

the victim and told him to step back. Id. The victim complied,

but approached Petitioner a second and third time. Id. Each time

the victim approached the vehicle, Petitioner asked him to step

back. Id. When the victim approached the vehicle the fourth time,

Petitioner thought the victim was removing a knife or a gun from

his jacket pocket. Id. at 7. Fearing for his safety, Petitioner,

turned his head and pulled the trigger of the shotgun, hitting the

victim in the head area. Id.; Resp’s. Ex. 4 at 2. 

At approximately 2:15 p.m. the same day, Petitioner

surrendered of his own volition at the Los Angeles Police

Department. Id. at 1. Petitioner waived trial by jury in favor of

a court trial and on August 10, 1983, he was convicted of second

degree murder. Resp’s. Ex. 1, Indeterminate Sentence Report at 1. 

On November 9, 1983, Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to

life in prison. Resp’s. Ex. 1, State Judgment at 1. Petitioner

was given credit for 416 days in custody. Id. at 2.

After approximately twenty years in custody and his eleventh

consecutive parole date denial by the Board, Petitioner filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles Superior

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Court. On April 3, 2003, the superior court issued an order in

which it found that the Board said: 

nothing about why [Petitioner] currently presents an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released. . . .

the Board chooses to hang its hat on the ‘commitment

offense and its nature,’ something that never can change

and could keep an inmate confined forever if it continues

to be the dominant factor in justifying continued

confinement. Even though Title 15 C.C.R., section

2402(a) demands that the Board set a release dated [sic]

unless the prisoner currently presents an unreasonable

risk of danger for the public, there is absolutely

nothing in the Board’s decision indicating the basis for

that belief.

Pet.’s Ex. A, In re Bennie Blankenship, April 3, 2003 Order Re:

Writ of Habeas Corpus, No. BH 002016, Superior Court for the County

of Los Angeles at 1 (emphasis in original).

The superior court concluded:

The Court’s authority in parole matters is,

unfortunately, very limited. The most it can do is order

a new hearing, if warranted. . . . The Board is therefore

ordered to conduct a new hearing within 60 days of

receipt of this order and follow the dictates of In re

Ramirez, 94 Cal. App. 4th 549 in assessing petitioner’s

suitability for parole.

Id. at 2.

On May 23, 2003, at a rehearing, the Board found Petitioner

suitable for parole. The Board considered the commitment offense,

Resp’s. Ex. 2, 2003 Parole Hearing Transcript at 10-12, noting that

it resulted from significant stress in Petitioner’s life due to a

heavy substance abuse problem, id. at 84. The Board found that

Petitioner lacked a significant criminal history in that Petitioner

has no juvenile record and as an adult, he was convicted of a

misdemeanor for throwing an empty bottle at a car for which he was

sentenced to twenty-four months probation, and burglarizing a

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2

In its findings section, the Board overlooked the fact that

Petitioner had also been arrested on October 10, 1982 on a charge

of burglary of a home. Petitioner entered a guilty plea on this

charge and was sentenced to six years in prison to run

consecutively with his sentence for second degree murder. Resp.’s

Ex. 2 at 84; Resp.’s. Ex. 6 at 7-8; Resp.’s Ex. 6, app. 1, December

12, 1983 Probation Officer’s Rept. at 1-3. However, in its

computation of the matrix for his base term, the Board assessed

thirty-six months for the home burglary. Resp.’s Ex. 2 at 86. 

5

vehicle, for which he was sentenced to two months in county jail.2

The Board also found that Petitioner had realistic parole plans

which included family support and a possible job, had maintained

close family ties while in prison, had maintained positive

institutional behavior, showed signs of remorse, accepted

responsibility for the crime and demonstrated a desire to change

towards positive citizenship. Id. The Board noted that the most

current psycho-social report, dated April 19, 2003, indicated that

Petitioner represented no more danger to the community than the

average citizen. Id. at 85. The Board acknowledged that the

report also indicated that the greatest threat to Petitioner’s

remaining violence-free in the community would be any return to

drug or alcohol use, but noted that Petitioner had been a regular

attendee at Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA)

meetings and seemed sincere in his commitment to refrain from all

substance use. Id. The Board noted that a December 20, 2002

psychological report indicated that Petitioner was competent,

responsible and had the capacity to abide by institutional rules

and had done so during his period of incarceration. The Board

noted that Petitioner had upgraded educationally in prison by

obtaining his General Education Degree, taking college courses and

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participating in numerous self-help programs and in therapy

treatment. Id. at 83. The Board also stated that Petitioner had

upgraded vocationally while in prison by taking machine shop and

shoe repair classes and was currently a mechanic in a job

assignment with positive to above-average performance reviews. Id.

at 83-84. The Board also noted that Petitioner had been free from

disciplinary action for over nineteen years. Id. at 84.

The Board compared Petitioner’s offense with similar crimes by

computing his matrix of base terms and found that his offense

warranted a “II-B” category, which has a base term of seventeen to

nineteen years. Id. at 86 (citing 15 Cal. Code Regs., title 15, 

§ 2403(c)). The Board chose the aggravated term of nineteen years

because, during the commission of the offense, Petitioner had an

opportunity to cease, but continued with committing the offense. 

Id. The aggravated term was chosen also because the manner in

which the crime was committed created potential of serious injury

to persons other than the victim. Id. The Board assessed an

additional thirty-six months for the home burglary conviction and

twelve months for the personal use of a firearm in the murder case. 

Id. at 87. The total number of months assessed was 276, or twentythree years. Id. The Board awarded Petitioner seventy-two months

of time credit yielding a total term of incarceration of 204

months, or seventeen years. Id. Petitioner had already been in

prison for twenty years. Id. He has now been in prison for

twenty-four years.

On October 20, 2003, former Governor Davis reversed the

Board’s decision, finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for

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parole. Resp.’s Ex. 3. In his written review, Governor Davis

commended Petitioner for his progress while incarcerated; however,

he concluded that Petitioner posed an unreasonable risk to public

safety. Id. at 2. 

 On December 24, 2003, Petitioner filed in the Los Angeles

superior court a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the

Governor’s decision. Pet.’s Ex. D, In re Bennie Blankenship,

BH002567, April 22, 2004. The court upheld the Governor’s

decision, finding that even though it disagreed with many of the

Governor’s findings, his findings as to the nature of the

commitment offense were supported by a “modicum” of evidence. Id.

at 2.

Petitioner filed habeas petitions with the California

appellate court and the California Supreme Court, which were

denied. Resp’s. Exs. 11, 13. On December 27, 2004, Petitioner

filed this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Respondent moved to dismiss arguing that the Court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction because Petitioner had no federally protected

liberty interest in parole. In its February 28, 2006 Order Denying

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court held that Petitioner has

a federally protected liberty interest in parole.

LEGAL STANDARD

A district court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21

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(1975). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), a district court may grant a petition challenging a state

conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state

court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established

United States Supreme Court precedent “if it applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,

‘or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from Supreme Court

precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). Under the “unreasonable

application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may

not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

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Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court may also grant the writ if it concludes that

the state court's adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969, 975 (2006). 

In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). Therefore, the Court addresses the state superior

court’s decision affirming the Governor.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues that the state court decision affirming the

Governor involved an unreasonable application of federal law

because no evidence supports the Governor’s finding of parole

unsuitability and therefore it violated Petitioner’s constitutional

right to due process. Petitioner also argues that the Governor’s

decision reflects the executive’s systematic bias against grants of

parole and that it violates the ex post facto clauses of the state

and federal constitutions. Because the Court grants the petition

based on Petitioner’s first argument, the Court does not reach the

latter two grounds.

Under California law, the Governor considers the same factors

as the Board in determining whether to affirm or reverse the

Board's decision. Johnson v. Finn, 2006 WL 195159, *6 (E.D. Cal.)

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(citing Cal. Const., art V, § 8(b); In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th

616, 660 (2002). 

Respondent argues that, under AEDPA, the “some evidence”

standard of Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), does not

apply to parole suitability hearings because the United States

Supreme Court has not applied it in that context. In Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.

2006), the Ninth Circuit addressed this very argument. The Sass

court explained that, because California has created a liberty

interest in parole, the requirements of due process must be

satisfied at parole hearings. Id. at 1128-29. The court

continued:

Hill’s some evidence standard is minimal, and assures

that ‘the record is not so devoid of evidence that the

findings of the disciplinary board were without support

or otherwise arbitrary.’ Hill held that although the

standard might be insufficient in other circumstances,

‘[t]he fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process

Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of

prison administrators that have some basis in fact.’ To

hold that less than the some evidence standard is

required would violate clearly established federal law

because it would mean that a state could interfere with a

liberty interest – that in parole – without support or in

an otherwise arbitrary manner. We therefore reject the

state’s contention that the some evidence standard is not

clearly established in the parole context.

Id. at 1129 (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, a parole board’s decision must be supported by

“some evidence” to satisfy the requirements of due process. Sass

at 1128. 

The standard of “some evidence” is met if there was some

evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal

could be deduced. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. An examination of the

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entire record is not required nor is an independent weighing of the

evidence. Id. The relevant question is whether there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the administrative board. Id. 

In assessing whether or not there is “some evidence”

supporting the Board’s denial of parole, the Court must consider

the regulations which guide the Board in making its parole

suitability determinations and which guide the Governor in his

review of the Board’s decisions. California Code of Regulations,

title 15, section 2402(a) states, “The panel shall first determine

whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on parole. 

Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be

found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the

panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society if released from prison.” The regulations direct the Board

to consider “all relevant, reliable information available.” Cal.

Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). Further, they list sets of

circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is

suitable for parole. Id. § 2402(c)-(d). 

The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability

are (1) the commitment offense was committed in an “especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;” (2) a previous record of

violence, particularly if assaultive behavior occurred at an early

age; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual offenses; 

(5) psychological factors such as a “lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense;” and (6) prison misconduct. 

Id. § 2402(c). The circumstances tending to show suitability are

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(1) no juvenile record of violent crimes; (2) stable social

history; (3) signs of remorse; (4) commitment offense was committed

as a result of stress which built up over time; (5) Battered Woman

Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; (7) age is such that it

reduces the possibility of recidivism; (8) plans for future

including development of marketable skills; and (9) institutional

activities that indicate ability to function within the law. Id.

§ 2402(d).

However, these circumstances are meant to serve as “general

guidelines,” giving the Board latitude in the weighing of the

importance of the combination of factors present in each particular

case. Id. § 2404(c). 

Under § 2402(c)(1) of title 15 of the California Code of

Regulations, the factors to be considered when determining whether

the commitment offense was carried out in an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner are (A) multiple victims were attacked,

injured or killed; (B) the offense was carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution-style

murder; (C) the victim was abused, defiled or mutilated; (D) the

offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering; and (E) the

motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to

the offense.

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for

several categories of crimes. See id. § 2403. For example, for

second degree murders, the matrix of base terms ranges from a low

of fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years to a high of nineteen,

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twenty, or twenty-one years, depending on the facts of the crime. 

The California Supreme Court has determined that the facts of

the crime alone can support a sentence longer than the statutory

minimum even if everything else about the prisoner is laudable. 

"While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements

of the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in

no further comparative analysis before concluding that the

particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to

fix a date for the prisoner's release." In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

4th 1061, 1071 (2005); see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at

682-83, cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he nature of the

prisoner's offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for

denying parole" but might violate due process "where no

circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more

aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a

conviction for that offense"). 

The Governor found that Petitioner was not suitable for parole

and would pose an unreasonable danger to society if released, based

on the following: (1) the gravity of the offense; (2) Petitioner's

extensive substance abuse problem; (3) Petitioner's unstable social

history; and (4) Petitioner's lack of any confirmed employment.

The state habeas court affirmed the Governor’s decision, but

rejected the third and fourth reasons upon which the Governor

relied. In rejecting the Governor’s finding that Petitioner has an

unstable social history, the court explained that the evidence, in

the form of letters of support from Petitioner’s family, showed the 

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reverse, that he has stable relationships with others despite his

former drug use and criminal conduct. Thus, the court implicitly

disagreed with the Governor that Petitioner’s past substance abuse

could provide the evidentiary support necessary for a finding of

unsuitability for parole. 

The state court also rejected the Governor's finding that

Petitioner had no employment plan because the evidence showed that

Petitioner had an offer of employment at Fred Jefferson Memorial

Homes. In upholding the Governor’s decision, the court merely

stated that “the Governor’s findings as to the nature of the

commitment offense are supported by, at least, a ‘modicum’ of

evidence. Accordingly, the court finds that there is ‘some

evidence’ to support the Governor’s finding that Petitioner is

unsuitable for parole.” 

Because the state court did not discuss the evidence

supporting the Governor’s finding, this Court addresses the

Governor’s reasons directly.

Regarding the gravity of the offense, the Governor stated:

Foremost, I believe the Board gave insufficient

consideration to the gravity of Mr. Blankenship’s crime. 

High on PCP, he argued with Mr. Thomas. He left the

scene and could have stayed away, ending the matter. 

Yet, merely ten minutes later, he returned armed with a

loaded shotgun. Without provocation, he shot Mr. Thomas

in the head and drove off. Based on the gravity of the

offense alone, I believe that consideration of public

safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.

The circumstances surrounding this murder indicate a

level of premeditation such that Mr. Blankenship could

have been convicted of first degree murder. Thus, the

egregious facts of this crime are clearly more than the

minimum necessary for a conviction of second degree

murder. Based on the exceptional indifference to human 

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life Mr. Blankenship demonstrated, I believe that public

safety requires a longer period of incarceration.

Resp.’s Ex. 3 at 2. 

The Governor cited the fact that Petitioner left the

scene of the altercation with the victim and then returned

with a gun as a basis for his conclusion that the offense was

premeditated. However, the evidence shows that, even though

Petitioner left the scene and then returned with a gun,

Petitioner was sitting in a car parked on the street and the

victim came over to the car. Pet’s. Ex. B, May 23, 2003

Parole Hearing Transcript at 11. Based on these facts, the

trial judge found that Petitioner’s offense was murder in the

second degree. 

In stating that Petitioner’s crime was premeditated, the

Governor appeared to be addressing the standard set forth in

In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 658, 683, that when the

Board finds parole unsuitable based solely on the facts of

the commitment offense, it must cite some evidence of factors

beyond the minimum elements of that offense. However, the

Governor’s characterization of Petitioner’s actions as

premeditated is incorrect because the trial court found that

the offense was murder in the second degree.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Governor’s

determination that the circumstances of the commitment

offense were egregious and beyond what is ordinarily required

for a conviction of second degree murder is not supported by

“some evidence.” Therefore, the state court’s decision

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affirming the Governor on this ground is an unreasonable

application of federal law.

The Governor also asserted that Petitioner’s version of

the offense had changed over time as evidence that he was not

remorseful. The Governor stated:

Mr. Blankenship admits shooting Mr. Thomas. 

However, he has consistently asserted that he acted

in self-defense. Also, since his incarceration,

Mr. Blankenship’s version of the crime has changed. 

Initially, he implied that he believed Mr. Thomas

was armed. In 1993, he began to claim that Mr.

Thomas actually threatened him with a 13-inch

butcher knife. However, four different witnesses,

including his own cousin and driver of the getaway

car, all maintain that he shot Mr. Thomas without

provocation. Thus, I believe his present and past

attitude towards the murder are unacceptable and

undermine his expression of responsibility.

Resp.’s Ex. 3 at 2.

The only inconsistency the Court can locate is that

Petitioner first denied that he had been abusing drugs on the

night of the offense. See Resp.’s Ex. 6, 1983 Probation

Report (“The Defendant denies both past and present use of

all narcotics, dangerous and non-prescription drugs.”). The

2002 Life Prisoner Evaluation Report states, “The prisoner’s

version written on June, 1990 and July, 1992 is inaccurate

according to Inmate Blankenship . . .” Resp’s. Ex. 4. This

report does not indicate how Petitioner’s past versions were

inaccurate, but it could be in regard to his original denial

of abuse of drugs. Otherwise, Petitioner’s version of the

offense through the years has been substantially consistent. 

The Governor emphasizes that, originally, Petitioner said he

thought the victim was armed, but that in 1993, he began to

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claim that the victim threatened him with a butcher knife. 

However, Petitioner has consistently said that he felt

threatened by the victim’s behavior and either that he

thought the victim was reaching for a weapon or thought he

had a weapon. For instance, the April 19, 2003 Mental Health

Evaluation for Board of Prison Terms Parole Consideration

Hearing (2003 Mental Health Evaluation) reports that

Petitioner described the events leading up to the offense as

follows:

[Petitioner] and his cousin left the area after the

initial confrontation with Gwen’s brother. He

reported that he went to his sister’s house and

became concerned about the safety of his family

across the street from where Gwen and her brother

lived. He stated this especially of concern [sic]

since the brother called out to his wife to bring

him a gun. [Petitioner] took a shotgun from his

sister’s home and returned with his cousin to the

area. When they drove up, [Petitioner] reported

that Gwen’s brother came up to the car with a

Doberman and his hand in his pocket. It eventually

became clear that the victim had a weapon. He was

told by [Petitioner] to get away from the car which

he did. However, he approached again and after

several retreats and approaches, [Petitioner]

stated, ‘after five times coming out of his pocket

I turned my head and pulled the trigger. I wasn’t

thinking clearly. Wired up on drugs and alcohol .

. . being up all night. He had sent for a gun. I

made some bad judgments.’ 

Resp.’s Ex. 7 at 5. Petitioner reported similar versions of

the events leading up to the offense as evidenced in: (1)

the December 20, 2002 Psychological Evaluation for the Board

of Prison Terms Parole Consideration Hearing, which states,

“Inmate Blankenship described the circumstances surrounding

his commitment offense. It was the same account that he has

given previously over the years.”, Pet.’s Ex. C at 4-5; (2)

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the 2002 Life Prisoner Evaluation Report, Resp.’s Ex. 4 at 1-

2; and (3) the August 30, 1983 Probation Officer’s Report,

Resp.’s Ex. 6 at 5-7. The Governor did not mention that the

1983 Probation Report indicated that a butcher knife was

found on or near the victim’s body. Resp.’s Ex. 6 at 5.

Furthermore, although the Governor concluded that

Petitioner did not express adequate remorse for his offense,

in his psychological evaluations, Petitioner did express

regret that he had killed the victim. See e.g., Resp.’s Ex.

7 at 5 (Petitioner admits his culpability, admits his

judgment was flawed, and expresses sincere and appropriate

remorse for his act); Pet.’s Ex. C at 4 (Petitioner admits he

made the mistakes of drug use, using drugs to have sex,

arming himself and coming back to the scene of the

altercation); Petitioner’s Ex. D at 6 (Petitioner admits his

culpability for the crime; he admits he used poor judgment

and that his actions led to the demise of the victim).

The state court affirmed the Governor’s decision only in

regard to the gravity of the offense and did not explicitly

address the Governor’s second reason for reversing the Board,

that is, Petitioner’s extensive substance abuse problem. The

Court will independently review the record regarding

Petitioner’s substance abuse problem. See Plascencia v.

Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2006) (when there

is no state court decision, a federal court should conduct

“an independent review of the record” to determine whether

the state court’s decision was an unreasonable application of

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clearly established federal law).

The Governor indicated that he considered Petitioner’s

past substance abuse a reason to reverse the Board’s

decision, on the grounds that Petitioner had been abusing PCP

since the age of sixteen, using it twice a week for eight to

nine years and that Petitioner is an alcoholic. The Governor

stated his belief that Petitioner must continue his

participation in substance abuse counseling before he will be

suitable for parole.

However, Petitioner has participated in AA and NA for

many years and has expressed the self-knowledge that

substance abuse caused him to act with poor judgment and was

a major factor in his commitment offense. Petitioner’s

latest psychological evaluation indicates that Petitioner

“certainly seemed sincere in his commitment to refraining

from all substance use upon his return to the community,”

Resp.’s Ex. 7 at 6, and that conditions of parole would

require Petitioner to abstain from all illegal drugs and

alcohol, random monitoring, and mandatory attendance at AA or

other self-help groups. The record contains no evidence that

Petitioner is currently abusing alcohol or drugs. Therefore,

there is no evidence that Petitioner needs more substance

abuse counseling before he is suitable for parole. 

In sum, there is no evidence to establish unsuitability

for parole under California regulations. 

Other factors indicate that Petitioner is suitable for

parole. First, the fact that Petitioner’s criminal record is

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3The 2002 Psychological Evaluation indicates that Petitioner 

attended AA since 1988 and NA since 1991. Therefore, the state

habeas opinion, written in 2004, might have over-stated the number

of years Petitioner attended AA and NA meetings. 

20

minimal and involves no violence supports the conclusion that

the offense was situational. Second, Petitioner’s

psychological evaluations consistently stated that he would

pose a low threat to the public safety if released. See e.g.

Resp.’s Ex. 7 at 6 (Based upon the lack of a violent criminal

history and the fact that in all prior assessments,

Petitioner was judged to be non-violent, Petitioner “is seen

as representing no more danger in the community than the

average citizen living in the community.”); Pet.’s Ex. C at

5-6 (“If released to the community, [Petitioner’s] violence

potential is estimated to be no higher than the average

citizen in the community.” This is based on the fact that he

has no violent criminal history and the continued evaluations

of him “as an exemplary inmate who has no sign of antisocial

tendencies, and with a low potential for violence.”).

Furthermore, since his incarceration, Petitioner has

upgraded his education, vocational skills and self-awareness. 

As detailed by the state habeas court, while in prison,

“Petitioner has completed his GED as well as courses in

machine shop and shoe repair. He has been a participant in

Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) for

almost nineteen years.3 Petitioner has also completed

courses in Anger Management and infectious diseases. He has

received many favorable reviews from staff and the

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psychologist reports that he is an ideal candidate for

parole. Petitioner received only one disciplinary violation

and that was in 1985. Petitioner has many offers of a place

to live and an employment offer . . . to work as a

maintenance person, as well as many offers of assistance in

finding employment.” Pet.’s Ex. A at 1-2.

Petitioner has accomplished many things that make him

suitable for parole under California Code of Regulations,

title 15, § 2402(d). Petitioner does not have a record of

violent crime, he has a stable social history, he has shown

remorse, he committed the crime as a result of significant

stress in his life, he has made realistic plans for release

and has marketable skills that can be put to use upon

release, and his institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. 

Thus, there is substantial evidence to support parole

suitability.

As indicated above, the California regulations require

the Board to find some evidence that the prisoner poses a

present danger to society. A continued reliance over time on

an unchanging factor, such as the commitment offense and past

substance abuse, does not provide evidence of a present

danger to society and thus may rise to the level of a due

process violation. Reliance on unchanging factors transforms

an offense for which California law–and the sentencing

judge–provided parole eligibility into an offense carrying

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 

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The Ninth Circuit has stated that a federal habeas court

may consider the parole board's decision-making over time: 

The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and

requires a careful balancing and assessment of the

factors considered. . . . Over time, however, should

Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and

evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior

conduct would raise serious questions involving his

liberty interest in parole. . . . A continued reliance

in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance

of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the

prison system and could result in a due process

violation.

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In a more recent case, the Ninth Circuit noted that

in all cases in which we have held that a parole

board’s decision to deem a prisoner unsuitable for

parole solely on the basis of his commitment

offense comports with due process, the decision was

made before the inmate had served the minimum

number of years required by his sentence. 

Specifically, in Biggs, Sass, and here, the

petitioners had not served the minimum number of

years to which they had been sentenced at the time

of the challenged parole denial by the Board. All

we held in those cases and all we hold today,

therefore, is that, given the particular

circumstances of the offenses in these cases, due

process was not violated when these prisoners were

deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the

expiration of their minimum terms.

Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 665 (9th Cir. 2007). Cf. Sass,

461 F.3d at 1129. 

Here, Petitioner had served approximately twenty years

at the time of the parole hearing in question, and has now

served twenty-four. His sentence included a fifteen-year

minimum term and the Board found that Petitioner’s uniform

term was only seventeen years.

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Accordingly, the Governor’s decision to reverse the

Board based on Petitioner’s offense and past substance abuse

is not supported by “some evidence” and the state court’s

decision affirming the Governor was an unreasonable

application of federal law.

III. Appropriate Procedure Upon Reversal

In In re Capistran, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1299, 1302 (2003),

the Governor had reversed the Board’s decision granting

parole but the state habeas trial court reversed the Governor

and instructed the Board to set a parole date. The habeas

appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the

Governor’s decision was not sufficiently supported by

evidence and affirmed the granting of the writ of habeas

corpus. However, the appellate court held that the trial

court erred in ordering the petitioner’s release. Instead it

ordered the trial court, on remand, to order the Governor to

vacate his decision and to proceed to review the Board’s

decision in accordance with due process of law. Id.

This Court will follow the procedure set out in

Capistran. Therefore, it grants the petition for writ of

habeas corpus and remands to the current Governor to vacate

the decision of the previous Governor and to review the

Board’s decision in accordance with due process of law. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The

Board’s decision granting parole shall be deemed reinstated

as of the date the previous Governor’s order is vacated. 

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Within thirty days thereafter, the Governor, in his

discretion, may issue a new decision or he may allow the

Board’s decision to stand. 

April 12, 2007

Dated 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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