Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02265/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02265-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-02265-WHO 

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 9, 16

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ronald Turner alleges that after he met with defendant Dr. Tracie Rivera at a 

Veterans Clinic, Dr. Rivera negligently disclosed confidential medical information, causing 

worsening of plaintiff’s medical condition, loss of employment, and humiliation. He brings suit 

against Dr. Rivera and her employer, Locumtenens.com, LLC (“Locumtenens”), for medical 

malpractice, and against the United States Department of Veterans Affairs under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act (“FTCA”). The questions I must answer on defendants’ motions to dismiss are 

whether Turner’s claims were timely filed. Because Turner has diligently pursued his claims in 

good faith and defendants have shown no prejudice, I DENY the motions to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

Turner is a Marine Corps veteran. See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) [Dkt. No. 7] 

Ex. B (“Additional History”). He was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder by the 

Veteran’s Administration in San Bernadino, CA. Id. On May 5, 2014, while employed by the 

United States Forest Service, he visited the Veteran’s Resource Center in Eureka, California, 

where he met with his Veterans Counselor Andrew McLaughlin. FAC ¶ 5a; id. Ex. B. Despite his 

insistence that he would not harm anyone and was well aware of the consequences of doing so, 

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Turner alleges that McLaughlin pressed him to describe who he would hurt if he were to hurt 

someone, to which plaintiff responded his supervisor. FAC ¶ 5a. McLaughlin developed a crisis 

plan for Turner and suggested that he contact the Eureka Veterans Clinic to meet with the new 

psychiatrist. Id.

On May 14, 2014, Turner met with Dr. Tracie Rivera at the Eureka Veterans Clinic. FAC 

¶ 5b. He claims that there was no indication that Dr. Rivera was not an employee of the Veterans 

Administration. Id. Turner explained that he was following a crisis plan, continuing to meet with 

his counselor, and feeling better. Id. He reiterated that he “had no desire or intent to harm 

anyone.” Id. He was calm throughout the appointment. Id. 

The following day, he received a phone call from Dr. Rivera informing him that the 

treatment team at the clinic made the decision “to warn the appropriate entities about [his] harmful 

thoughts.” Id. ¶ 5c. After consulting with the legal team, Dr. Rivera made disclosures to Turner’s 

supervisor, William VanAuken, as well as the Redding Police Department. Id. Dr. Rivera also 

contacted the Redding Police Department and informed Officer Devin Ketel that Turner

threatened to murder his supervisor, setting off a series of meetings between various police 

personnel, Turner’s supervisor, and other employees from the U.S. Forest Service. FAC ¶ 5d. 

Turner was ultimately terminated from his employment on an undisclosed date, most likely 

between May and August of 2014. Id. 

II. Procedural Background

On October 21, 2014, Turner filed a complaint with the Office for Civil Rights within the 

Department of Health and Human Services to initiate an investigation into the two disclosures 

made by Dr. Rivera. See FAC Ex. D (“Administrative Actions”). The Office for Civil Rights 

accepted the complaint on January 15, 2015, and responded on August 5, 2016 that the initial 

disclosure “had been addressed with training” but there was no record of the second disclosure. 

See id. Turner submitted a FOIA request with the Office for Civil Rights for the investigative file 

on September 5, 2016. Id. On April 5, 2017, a member of the Department of Health and Human 

Resources e-mailed plaintiff with a status update, indicating that the investigative file was in the 

Department’s possession, and was being assigned to an analyst who would inform Turner when 

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those documents were ready for shipment. Id. He has yet to receive those documents.

Turner separately filed, on May 12, 2016, a claim with the Office of General Counsel of 

the Department of Veterans Affairs. See FAC Ex. D. On October 21, 2016, the Department 

mailed a response, received on October 24, indicating that Dr. Rivera was not a VA employee but 

rather an employee of their contractor, Locumtenens. 1 Id. He contends that he did not know that 

Dr. Rivera was not an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs until receipt of this letter. 

See FAC ¶ 5b. 

On November 8, 2016, Turner sent two notices via certified mail to Locumtenens and Dr. 

Rivera of his intent to file suit. Id. Ex. D. He also filed a second FOIA request with the 

Department of Veterans Affairs for the investigative file and clarifying information on the work 

status of Dr. Rivera on November 20, 2016. Id. On March 7, 2017, the Department submitted 14 

pages of 41 documents, denying him access to the remainder. Id. 

Turner filed this suit, pro se, on April 24, 2017. See Complaint [Dkt. No. 1]. He sent the 

Complaint for filing via overnight mail using United Parcel Service on April 20, 2017; he asserts

that a massive landslide blocked Highway 101 between Humboldt County and San Francisco that 

day. Dkt. No. 21, p.2. Delivery was attempted at 9:28 a.m. on Friday, April 21, 2017, which 

would have been timely. Id. But the federal building in San Francisco was closed as a result of a 

fire that caused an electrical outage in the area of the courthouse. Delivery occurred on Monday, 

April 24, 2017, when the federal building reopened.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when 

 

1 While plaintiff received the letter on October 24, plaintiff’s allegations are unclear as to the date 

of that letter. The timeline of administrative actions lists without further explanation October 21, 

2016 in association with the letter, and the Department asserts in its motion to dismiss that the 

letter was dated October 21, 2016. See Compl. Ex. D; VA Dep’t Mot. [Dkt. No. 16] at 1. Because 

this date appears on plaintiff’s administrative actions list and plaintiff does not dispute that it is the 

correct date of the letter in his opposition, I construe the date of the letter to be October 21, 2016. 

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the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation 

omitted). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must 

allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555, 570. 

In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). The court is not 

required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, 

or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Additionally, “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 

94 (2007). Indeed, the court must afford a pro se litigant “the benefit of any doubt.” Bretz v. 

Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). 

DISCUSSION

I. United States Department of Veterans Affairs’ Motion to Dismiss

The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“the Department”) moves to dismiss Turner’s 

FTCA claim for untimeliness. The FTCA states that “[a] tort claim against the United States shall 

be forever barred . . . unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by 

certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was 

presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The Department mailed Turner notice of denial of his claim on 

October 21, 2016, triggering the six month statute of limitations ending on April 21, 2017. His 

suit was filed three days late, on April 24, 2017.

Turner contends that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. See Kwai Fun 

Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that § 2401(b) is subject to equitable 

tolling). Under federal law, a plaintiff seeking equitable tolling must show “(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” 

Id. at 1052. The first element requires “reasonable diligence” and that plaintiff be “without any 

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fault in pursuing his claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). With regards to the second 

element, “[e]quitable tolling is typically granted when litigants are unable to file timely 

[documents] as a result of external circumstances beyond their direct control.” Id. 

Contrary to the Department’s assertions, there is nothing wrong with Turner attempting to 

file his claim on the day it was due to be filed, nor is the time of day relevant. As the

administrative actions timeline shows, he has diligently pursued his claim since its accrual, 

seeking information through various avenues and following all of the requisite procedures. See 

FAC Ex. D. This is especially noteworthy given that he has pursued these claims without the 

assistance of counsel. But for the fire and electricity outage closing the federal building, Turner’s 

complaint would have been filed in a timely manner, and his diligence would not be in dispute. 

The Department would have had UPS seek all alternative routes to avoid road closures, call 

alternative courthouses, and attempt to file Turner’s complaint in any courthouse that would 

accept it. See Reply at 4. But equitable tolling does not require this type of “overzealous or 

extreme pursuit of any and every avenue of relief.” Kwai Fun Wong, 732 F.3d at 1052.

The federal building’s unexpected closure due to the fire and electricity outage constitutes

“extraordinary circumstances” sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. While the Ninth Circuit 

found that the district court did not err in denying equitable tolling in Okafor v. United States, in 

that case plaintiff had no excuse but the delivery company’s delay. 846 F.3d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 

2017). Here, the delivery company was not to blame, but rather the federal building itself was 

closed no matter the method of the delivery. Likewise, Sack v. U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services is also easily distinguishable. No. 16-cv-05505-MEJ, 2017 WL 2472952 (N.D. 

Cal. June 8, 2017). There, plaintiff claimed that the extraordinary circumstance was defendant’s

bad faith, but the record lacked any support for that assertion and instead revealed plaintiff’s own 

failure to act. Id. at *5. In the present case, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged “external 

circumstances beyond [his] direct control” warranting equitable tolling. Kwai Fun Wong, 732 

F.3d at 1052. 

While the Department is correct that plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint makes no 

reference to the allegations supporting his equitable tolling argument, I find that the doctrine of 

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equitable tolling applies. Given that Turner has both alleged and evidenced in his Opposition and 

supporting exhibits that he can show the required elements to support the application of equitable 

tolling, because I can and do take judicial notice of the fact that the federal building in San 

Francisco was closed on April 21, 2017 because it had no electricity, and since the Department has 

had the opportunity to challenge the facts asserted by Turner and rebut his argument and failed to 

do so persuasively, in the interest of judicial efficiency I will not require the pro se plaintiff to file 

an second amended complaint merely to assert these facts. I DENY the Department of Veterans 

Affairs’ motion to dismiss. 

II. Locumtenens and Dr. Rivera’s Motion to Dismiss

Locumtenens and Dr. Rivera too bring a motion to dismiss the California medical 

malpractice claim against them based on untimeliness. California law provides that:

in an action for injury . . . against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged 

professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after 

the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable 

diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the 

time for commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled for any of the 

following: (1) upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a 

foreign body, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the 

injured person.

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5. While the statute allows for tolling in only three circumstances, 

courts have also applied California’s doctrine of equitable tolling to the statute. See, e.g., Warne v. 

City and Cty. of San Francisco, No. 16-cv-06773-JSC, 2017 WL 2834050, at *7–9 (N.D. Cal. 

June 30, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss claim under § 340.5 based on equitable tolling of 

statute of limitations); Gray v. Romero, No. 1:13-cv-01473, 2017 WL 220238, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 18, 2017) (applying equitable tolling doctrine to § 340.5 claim); Righetti v. Cal. Dep’t of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, No. C-11-2717 EMC, 2012 WL 4742801, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

3, 2012) (same); Thomas v. Gilliland, 95 Cal. App. 4th 427, 433–37 (2002) (discussing application 

of equitable tolling in context of § 340.5 claim); but see Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 

380 (2003) (stating, in dicta, that the Legislature could have expressly disallowed equitable tolling 

in one statute “as in section[] 340.5 (health care malpractice)”).

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Under California law,2“application of the doctrine of equitable tolling requires timely 

notice, and lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and reasonable and good faith conduct on the part 

of the plaintiff.” Addison v. State of Cal., 21 Cal. 3d 313, 319 (1978). As the Ninth Circuit has 

“acknowledged[,] the analysis of California's equitable tolling doctrine, particularly on the issue of 

prejudice to defendant, generally requires consideration of matters outside the pleadings. As a 

result, only in the rare case could the inquiry proceed at the pleading stage.” Daviton v. 

Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).

Turner discovered his injury in 2014 and did not file suit until April of 2017, well beyond

the one-year statute of limitations. Locumtenens and Dr. Rivera assert that Turner’s pursuit of a 

FTCA claim cannot toll the statute of limitations under Section 340.5, arguing that California case 

law has disallowed claims brought under the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) to toll the 

statute of limitations. But they do not address the doctrine of equitable tolling, the relevant issue 

here.

Turner has pleaded sufficient allegations to establish that equitable tolling may apply, at 

least to survive the motion to dismiss. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (“California’s fact-intensive test for equitable tolling is more appropriately applied at 

the summary judgment or trial stage of litigation.”). On November 8, 2016, only two weeks after 

he discovered that Dr. Rivera was an employee of Locumtenens on October 24, 2016, Turner

notified both defendants via certified mail of his intent to file a lawsuit. See FAC Ex. D. 

Moreover, Dr. Rivera had reason to know of his intent to file suit as early as October of 2014, 

when Turner filed a complaint with the Office for Civil Rights to initiate an investigation into Dr. 

Rivera’s two disclosures. See id. Given that Dr. Rivera had reason to know all along, and that 

Turner notified Locumtenens as soon as he discovered its involvement, there is no prejudice to 

either defendant, nor have they argued otherwise. Finally, Turner has acted reasonably and in 

good faith, and his allegations establish that he has diligently pursued his claims with respect to 

 

2

“Along with the limitations period, the court borrows the state’s equitable tolling rules, absent a 

reason not to do so.” Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 

2001).

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the information available to him at any given time. The record establishes that he followed the 

procedures in a timely manner for filing a FTCA claim, which he believed was the applicable 

statute to Dr. Rivera, up until October of 2016 when he learned otherwise. Id. Using October 24, 

2016 as the date from which the statute of limitations began running on his Section 340.5 claim, 

his filing of this lawsuit on April 24, 2017 was well within the one-year time limit. 

While Locumtenens and Dr. Rivera cite Roberts v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 175 Cal. App. 4th 

474 (2009) for the proposition that the CTCA’s tolling provisions do not apply to Section 340.5, 

Turner does not argue and I do not conclude that pursuit of a FTCA claim may toll Section 340.5’s 

statute of limitation. Instead, I conclude that Turner has stated a plausible claim for equitable 

tolling of the statute of limitation, which was not considered in Roberts, nor did the plaintiff in 

Roberts discover previously unknown information affecting her claims after the statute of 

limitation had run as Turner has here. Should additional information suggesting that he had 

reason to know of Dr. Rivera’s employment status or Locumtenens’ involvement earlier than 

October of 2016, defendants are welcome to revisit the issue. At this stage, however, I DENY 

Locumtenens and Dr. Rivera’s motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I DENY the United States Department of Veterans Affairs’ 

motion to dismiss as well as Locumtenens and Dr. Rivera’s motion to dismiss. Defendants shall 

answer within 20 days. A Joint Case Management Conference Statement shall be filed by 

November 21, 2017 and the Case Management Conference is set for November 28, 2017 at 2:00 

p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2017

William H. Orrick

United States District Judge

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