Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04639/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04639-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1) 1

**E-Filed 3/30/07**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CARLOS M. HERNANDEZ,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 05-04639 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 1

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; DENYING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND

REMANDING FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS.

[re: docket nos. 14, 16]

Plaintiff Carlos M. Hernandez (“Hernandez”) seeks reversal of a decision by Defendant

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying him supplemental security income

benefits. The challenged decision was rendered by Administrative Law Judge Brenton Rogozen

(the “ALJ”) on June 30, 2005. The ALJ’s decision became final when the Appeals Council of

the Social Security Administration denied Hernandez’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision

on September 20, 2005. Hernandez filed a motion for summary judgment on August 4, 2006. 

Case 5:05-cv-04639-JF Document 20 Filed 03/30/07 Page 1 of 12
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Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1)

The Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on September 1, 2006. 

Hernandez filed a reply on September 25, 2006. The matter was submitted without oral

argument. 

I. BACKGROUND

Hernandez is a fifty year old man with a limited education level. Tr. 12. He has worked

in the past as a janitor and a dishwasher/server for a convalescent home. Tr. 12, 191. He filed an

application for supplemental security income benefits on November 19, 2003, alleging a

disability since June 1, 2002. Id. The Social Security Administration denied the application

initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 27, 32. Hernandez alleges that he became disabled due to

problems with his right leg, bleeding ulcers, a learning disability, and depression. Tr. 12. 

Pursuant to his request, the ALJ held a de novo administrative hearing on June 15, 2005 in San

Jose, California. Id. Hernandez, who was represented by counsel, testified at the hearing, but

there were no additional witnesses. Id. 

The ALJ found that Hernandez is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security

Act and therefore is not entitled to the benefits for which he applied. After consideration of the

entire record, including medical opinions described below, the ALJ found that Hernandez has not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of the disability, Tr. 17, and that he

suffers from a severe “foot disorder” that does not meet or medically equal one of the listed

impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. Tr. 12. The ALJ found that

Hernandez’s learning disability was “non-severe.” Tr. 15. The ALJ also noted that Hernandez

has a history of alcohol abuse, but stated that it was not material to the determination of

disability. Tr. 12. 

The ALJ made the following findings with respect to the period from June 1, 2002 to

May 25, 2005: (i) that Hernandez had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of

light work, as defined by 20 CFR § 416.967(b); that he could lift and/or carry up to twenty

pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, stand, walk and/or sit for up to six hours in an

eight-hour workday, and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. Tr. 17. The ALJ also found

Case 5:05-cv-04639-JF Document 20 Filed 03/30/07 Page 2 of 12
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Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1)

that as of May 26, 2005, Hernandez had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range

of sedentary work, as defined by 20 CFR § 416.967(a). Id. Specifically, the ALJ found that

Hernandez could lift and/or carry up to ten pounds occasionally, stand and/or walk up to two

hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. Id. 

The ALJ stated that Hernandez is unable to return to his past relevant work as a janitor,

which requires a medium level of exertional work. Tr. 16. During the hearing, Hernandez

explained that he was unable to return to work because of right leg pain resulting from post-polio

syndrome. Tr. 15. Hernandez underwent a second corrective foot surgery a few weeks before

the hearing on May 26, 2005. Tr. 193. The ALJ stated that he had considered Hernandez’s

statements regarding pain and other symptoms, and found the statements to be not credible to the

extent that Hernandez claims he cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity. Tr. 15. The

ALJ then found that there are other jobs that Hernandez could do in the national economy

considering his age, education, vocational background, and maximum sustained work capacity. 

Tr. 16.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard for Reviewing the Commissioner’s Decision

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the authority to review the

Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits. The Commissioner’s decision (here the

decision of the ALJ) will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is

based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523

(9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). In this context, the

term “substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance - it

is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the

conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When determining whether

substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s decision, the Court examines the administrative

record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at

1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to support

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A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what he or she can still do despite existing 2

exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir.

1989).

Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1)

more than one rational interpretation, the Court must defer to the decision of the ALJ. Moncada,

60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1258.

B. Standard for Determining Disability

A person is “disabled” for purposes of receiving social security benefits if he or she is

unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment which

is expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of

at least twelve months. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th

Cir. 1984). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant currently is

engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. 

Id. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step

requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or

combination of impairments which significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work

activities; if not, a finding of “not disabled” is made and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant

has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the

Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or

equals an impairment in the Listing; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are

awarded. Id. If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or

equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine

whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functional capacity” to perform his or her past 2

work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. The plaintiff has the burden

of proving that he or she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If

the claimant meets this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. The Commissioner

then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful

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 There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that there is 3

other work in significant numbers in the national economy that claimant can do: (1) by the

testimony of a vocational expert or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999).

 Hernandez also submitted medical evidence dated after the hearing. For the purposes of 4

this decision, the Court will analyze only the pre-hearing evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b),

416.1470(b) (new and material evidence is considered only when it relates to a period on or

before the date of the ALJ’s decision). 

Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1) 5

work; the determination of this issue comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 3

20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995), as

amended April 9, 1996; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

III. DISCUSSION

Hernandez claims that the ALJ (1) failed to develop the record, (2) failed to consider the

existing evidence limiting Hernandez’s weight-bearing and evaluating his ability to perform light

or sedentary work, (3) concluded improperly that Hernandez’s learning disability was “not

severe,” and (4) rendered an improper credibility finding. The Commissioner argues that the

ALJ properly assessed the medical evidence. 

A. Development of the Record

Hernandez asserts that the ALJ failed to develop the administrative record fully and fairly

because it does not contain complete copies of records from Hernandez’s treating sources that

indicate his post-polio condition and learning disability. His new counsel has submitted

additional treatment and education records from the time period before the June 15, 2005

hearing, as well as post-hearing evidence. Mot. Summ. J. at 9. The Commissioner contends 4

that the record was fully developed even without the additional medical and education records. 

Cross Mot. Summ. J. at 2.

1. Post-Polio Condition

Hernandez argues that the record does not reflect the complete records of his treating

sources. Mot. Summ. J. at 9. The evidence before the ALJ consisted of only fourteen pages. 

Mot. Summ. J. at 9; Tr. 143-48, 172-74, 175, 176-80. Hernandez also asserts that this

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Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1) 6

incomplete record cannot be considered substantial evidence to sustain the ALJ’s finding that

Hernandez does not suffer from post-polio syndrome and can perform work at the light and

sedentary levels. Mot. Summ. J. at 10. 

In reaching his decision, the ALJ relied upon the report of Dr. Clark E. Gable, M.D. (“Dr.

Gable”). Tr. 13. Dr. Gable performed a consultative internal medicine evaluation with

Hernandez, and diagnosed Hernandez with deformities of the right foot with some mild foot drop

and some mild atrophy of the lower right leg, particularly the calf. He then stated that these

findings are compatible with spastic weakness and not polio. Tr.155. The ALJ found Dr.

Gable’s report to be very persuasive. Tr. 13. In accepting Dr. Gable’s conclusion, the ALJ gave

less weight to the prognosis of Dr. Jeffrey Spanko, DPM (“Dr. Spanko”) who found that

Hernandez suffered from post-polio syndrome in his right leg. The ALJ noted that he had a copy

of Dr. Spanko’s prognosis, but then stated: “the actual operative notes, however, are not

contained in the Record.” Tr. 15. Hernandez argues that at that point the ALJ should have

suspected that other medical records were likely missing. Mot. Summ. J. at 10. 

Generally, the ALJ has an "independent duty to fully and fairly develop the record" and to

assure that both the represented and unrepresented claimants' interests are considered. 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ also has a duty to conduct

an appropriate inquiry if the record is ambiguous or inadequate. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

1288 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, although the ALJ noted that the operative records were missing, he

never requested these records after the hearing. Nor did the ALJ keep the record open after the

hearing to allow supplementation of the record or order a consultative examination when the

medical evidence was found to be incomplete or unclear. 

In addition to identifying gaps in the record, Hernandez must then show that the evidence

not considered by the ALJ bears directly and substantially on the matter in dispute, and that there

is a reasonable possibility that the evidence would have changed the Commissioner’s decision. 

Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 2001). The first category of newly submitted

evidence consists of records from Santa Clara Valley Medical Center from January 17, 2005

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Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1) 7

through June 16, 2005. These represent the operation notes that the ALJ found to be absent at

the hearing. This evidence includes notations from Dr. Spanko detailing Hernandez’s history of

post-polio syndrome of the right leg. Ex. B. The documentation could have helped the ALJ

decide that Hernandez suffered from post-polio syndrome. The second category of newly

submitted evidence consists of additional records from the Department of Corrections that also

diagnose Hernandez with post-polio syndrome in his right leg. The ALJ noted in his opinion that

the one-page record from the Department of Corrections did not support findings demonstrating

the severity of Hernandez’s condition. The ALJ noted, “Dr. Vong did not make a diagnosis or

any objective medical findings,” Tr. 14, but did not inquire into further records from Dr. Vong. 

These records indicate that in 2004, Dr. Vong of the Department of Corrections diagnosed

Hernandez with chronic right foot tarsaglia with deformity, and a subsequent progress note

reported that his foot had a decreased range of motion and painful limiting gait secondary to postpolio syndrome. Ex. A. 

The Court concludes that the further detail supporting Dr. Spanko’s diagnosis and the

concurring diagnosis of Dr. Vong are sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility that the

Commissioner would have reached a contrary decision. It is likely that if he had known more

about the opinions of Dr. Spanko and Vong, the ALJ would have had a medical expert testify at

the hearing to resolve or at least address the differing medical opinions. Without this evidence

before him, the ALJ was unable to make a properly informed decision regarding the severity of

Hernandez’s foot disorder, the duration of the disability or Hernandez’s sitting, standing or

walking limitations. 

While Hernandez’s former attorney should have submitted all relevant medical records to

the ALJ, the ALJ retains the obligation to "fully and fairly develop the record" and to assure that

both represented and unrepresented claimants' interests are considered. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at

1150 (9th Cir. 2001). In light of the evidence now in the record, the Court concludes that the

ALJ did not develop the record adequately or satisfy his obligation to inquire thoroughly with

respect to all relevant facts. Accordingly, the case will be remanded for augmentation of the

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Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1) 8

record in light of all relevant evidence.

2. Learning Disabilities

Hernandez also claims that the ALJ failed to develop the record with respect to his

learning disability. During the hearing, Hernandez testified that he has difficulties writing, and

that he can read only at the third grade level. Tr. 152. The consultative psychologist, Dr. Ute

Kollath, Ph.D (Dr. Kollath), diagnosed Hernandez with borderline intellectual functioning. Tr.

157. The additional evidence from Dr. Kollath’s exam will be discussed in further detail below. 

Hernandez claims that the ALJ should have obtained his high school transcripts in order to

analyze the severity of his learning disability. Hernandez submitted his high school transcripts as

part of his motion for summary judgment. Ex. C. However, the Court concludes that Hernandez

suffered no prejudice from the ALJ’s failure to request his high school transcripts. Dr. Kollath’s

examination provided more contemporaneous results regarding Hernandez’s potential mental

limitations. The Court concludes that the ALJ properly developed the record regarding

Hernandez’s alleged learning disability. 

B. ALJ’s Consideration of Evidence Regarding Hernandez’s Limited Weight-bearing 

Hernandez asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the record in its entirety when

determining that Hernandez could perform light or sedentary work. While it appears that the

ALJ’s findings on this issue are supported by the record as it currently stands, development of the

record with respect to the condition of Hernandez’s foot may impact the ALJ’s findings. The

ALJ should consider the issue on remand.

C. ALJ’s Assessment of Hernandez’s Mental Impairments

Hernandez argues that the ALJ improperly rejected his mental impairments as

"non-severe" at the second step of the disability analysis assessment, and that the ALJ lacked

substantial evidence to dismiss the mental impairment claims. Mot. Summ J. 18. The

Commissioner asserts that there is no evidence of a medically-determinable severe mental

impairment that would support the finding of a learning disability. 

Hernandez refers to Dr. Kollath’s consultative examination of Hernandez in 2003 during

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Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1) 9

which Dr. Kollath performed a variety of psychological tests. Mot. Summ. J. 19. The full scale

IQ score of 64 placed Hernandez in the mild mental retardation range. Tr. 156. Hernandez also

received a verbal IQ score of 71 and a performance IQ score of 62. Id. Dr. Kollath reported that

Hernandez was unable to recite the alphabet or complete serial 3s. Tr. 158. In her report, Dr.

Kollath diagnosed Hernandez with adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and

conduct, antisocial personality disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning, rather than mild

mental retardation. Id. Dr. Kollath explained that her clinical impressions led her to conclude

that some of the test results underestimated Hernandez’s intellectual level of functioning. Tr.

159. In her notes regarding Hernandez’s performance on the Rey’s 15 Item Test, Dr. Kollath

states that “results were characteristic of malingering.” Id. 

Hernandez scored below on the Wechsler Memory Scale - III general memory index

(“WMS-III”) which is considered in the impaired range. Moreover, Dr. Kollath noted that on

both the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - III, and WMS-III, Hernandez’s low results appeared

to be an underestimate of his memory and intellectual functioning and that variable motivation

might account for the low results. Tr. 159. Dr. Kollath further asserted that Hernandez is

capable of performing “simple repetitive” tasks, and that he is “unable to perform detailed and

complex tasks.” Tr. 160. The ALJ did not find persuasive Dr. Kollath’s assessment that

Hernandez can do only simple and repetitive tasks. Tr. 13. 

Hernandez argues that the ALJ did not properly consider Dr. Kollath’s consultative

report, and “failed to meet, either explicitly or implicitly, the standard of clear and convincing

reasons required to reject an uncontradicted opinion of an examining psychologist.” Edlund v.

Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2001). The record shows that the ALJ did not

agree with Dr. Kollath’s opinion that Hernandez was capable of performing only simple

repetitive tasks because he did not think that the mental status examination revealed any

significant mental deficits. Tr. 13-14, 16. The ALJ found the rest of Dr. Kollath’s report

persuasive. The ALJ’s reliance on the part of Dr. Kollath’s report he found correct is proper

because it is unnecessary for an ALJ to agree with everything a medical source states in order for

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Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1) 10

the opinion to be considered substantial evidence. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 753 (9th

Cir. 1989). The determination of no mental disability also is supported by the state agency

medical consultant’s finding in a psychiatric review that Hernandez did not have a severe mental

impairment or combination of impairments. Tr. 154. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s finding that Hernandez did not have a severe mental impairment. 

D. ALJ’s Assessment of Hernandez’s Credibility

Finally, Hernandez claims that Social Security Ruling 96-7p mandates that the

adjudicator must consider the claimant’s subjective complaints, and that the ALJ should consider

such factors as daily activities, the descriptions of intensity and frequency of pain, the type and

dosage of any medications taken, the treatment received for relief of pain, and other relief

measures employed. Mot. Summ. J. at 22; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The Commissioner

argues that the ALJ properly considered Hernandez’s subjective complaints.

Hernandez claims that unless there is affirmative evidence of malingering, an ALJ may

reject a claimant’s testimony only on the basis of clear and convincing reasons supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th

Cir.1998). In this case, there is affirmative evidence of malingering in the administrative record. 

Dr. Kollath noted in her report that Hernandez’s performance on the Rey’s 15 Item Test was

indicative of malingering. Tr. 15. A specific and legitimate reason that the ALJ gives for

discounting Hernandez’s testimony is that “allegations . . . as to the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of his symptoms were not well supported by the probative evidence.” Tr. 15. 

The ALJ also noted properly the inconsistencies in Hernandez’s statements when Hernandez told

Dr. Gable that he did not attend special education classes, but then informed Dr. Kollath that he

did go to special education classes. Tr. 15-16. Accordingly, the evidence supports the ALJ’s

finding that portions of Hernandez’s testimony were not credible. The Court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the ALJ on this question. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.2d 1094, 1098 (9thCir.

1999).

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Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1) 11

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART;

(2) Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and

(3) this case is REMANDED to the Social Security Administration for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

DATED: March 30, 2007

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 05-04639 JF 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

(JFEX1) 12

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Jean Turk jean.turk@ssa.gov 

Harvey Peter Sackett hps@hpspc.com, lucyc@sackettlaw.com; julie@sackettlaw.com;

 juanita@sackettlaw.com 

Sara Winslow sara.winslow@usdoj.gov, kathy.terry@usdoj.gov;

claire.muller@usdoj.gov 

Case 5:05-cv-04639-JF Document 20 Filed 03/30/07 Page 12 of 12