Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01913/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01913-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

'fenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT MAR 2 81989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 86-1913 

JONATHAN MOSS, JR., MELANIE MOSS, 

JONATHAN MOSS, SR., and REVER 

JUANITA MOSS, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

THE CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, 

a municipal corporation, 

MICHAEL MARSAC, individually 

and as a police officer of the 

Colorado Springs Police 

Department, GUY GRACE, 

individually and as a police 

officer of the Colorado Springs 

Police Department, and CECIL 

HUTCHESON, individually and as a 

police officer of the Colorado 

Springs Police Department, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) On Appeal From The 

) United States District Court 

) For The District Of Colorado 

) (D.C. Civil No. 84-C-1066) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

William F. Eggert of Hall & Evans (Alan Epstein, with him on the 

brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants. 

Kenneth H. Stern of Stern & Elkind, Denver, Colorado (Jeffrey A. 

Goldstein, Denver, Colorado, and Cuba Holloway of Bennett & 

Holloway, Colorado Springs, Colorado, with him on the brief), for 

Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 86-1913 Document: 01019300942 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 1 
Before ANDERSON, SETH and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

The plaintiffs, four residents of Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

sought damages under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 against the City of Colorado 

Springs and three of its police officers. They alleged violations 

of their Fourth Amendment rights against the unreasonable 

execution of a search warrant and against the use of excessive 

force. They also brought various pendent state claims including 

claims alleging that defendants were negligent. 

The Colorado Springs Police Department obtained a "no knock 

if necessary" warrant to search the plaintiffs' home during the 

course of an investigation of Kenneth Moss, a non-party resident 

of the house, for a February 17 robbery. 

The four plaintiffs, Jonathan Moss, Sr., his wife Rever, 

Jonathan Moss, Jr., and his wife Melanie, were in no way connected 

with this investigation of the young Moss. On the night the 

warrant was executed at about 10:50 p.m., February 29, the four 

plaintiffs were at home. Kenneth Moss, the subject of the 

investigation, was not. That night, plaintiff Jonathan Moss, Jr., 

a former marine, went into his bedroom to get his .44 Magnum 

pistol. After he showed the weapon to his wife, who was worried 

about a recent series of neighborhood burglaries, he placed the 

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Appellate Case: 86-1913 Document: 01019300942 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 2 
pistol in its holster and was returning it to his bedroom when he 

saw and heard the front door being knocked down. No warning 

shouts were heard. Jonathan Moss, Jr., thinking that they were 

being robbed or that someone was seeking revenge for a previous 

incident, fired two shots with the pistol as the door burst open. 

It was the City SWAT team which had broken down the door with 

sledgehammers. They were dressed in dark fatigues and baseball 

caps. The evidence was in some dispute as to whether the officers 

had identified themselves. One officer said he heard none and no 

one in the house heard anything before the door was broken down. 

The wife of Moss, Jr. called the police on the 911 number. 

The SWAT team began to fire after Moss, Jr. had fired his 

pistol and wounded a police officer. Moss, Jr. was severely 

injured by shotgun fire. The police also fired at Moss, Sr. who 

was armed. Some 22 shots were fired into the house by the police 

including three or four rounds from a shotgun. Rever Moss, 

Melanie Moss, and the child were not shot or otherwise injured. 

The officer in charge testified that he did not know that 

Jonathan Moss, Jr., his wife and child lived at the house. There 

had been no surveillance of the house. There had been a "driveby" by officers who reported they had seen an older man and a 

woman standing in the door and thought there was a party. The 

suspect Kenneth Moss was well known to the police and an officer 

testified he would see and talk to him on a daily basis. On the 

day of the incident this officer had talked to the suspect three 

times. The officer testified there was no hostility and in fact 

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Appellate Case: 86-1913 Document: 01019300942 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 3 
gave him a ride. He had no reason to think that the suspect was 

armed or anything but cooperative. This information was given to 

the officer in charge not long before the raid. A last minute 

attempt was made to find the suspect where he often was but this 

was not successful. The warrant was considered to be a "no knock 

if necessary" warrant. The SWAT team apparently took over the "if 

necessary" decision as to the entry from the officer who had 

obtained the warrant and who had the knowledge of the contacts 

with the suspect that day and the days before. 

At trial, the two constitutional claims were submitted to the 

jury. It returned a verdict against the City and in favor of each 

plaintiff on the "Unreasonable Execution of a Search Warrant" 

claim, but found in favor of the three police officers on the same 

claim. The jury found for all the defendants on the constitutional "Excessive Force" claim. 

The claims for negligence were submitted to the jury, which 

returned a verdict against the three police officers and·in favor 

of Moss, Jr. It also returned a verdict on the negligence claim 

against the City, but not the officers, in favor of Moss, Sr., for 

injuries suffered while he was in police custody following the 

incident. It found against Melanie Moss on her claim for loss of 

consortium. The defendants appeal each of the verdicts returned 

in favor of the plaintiffs. 

Among the issues raised on appeal, many for the first time, 

we reach only the defendants' argument that the verdicts returned 

by the jury are inconsistent. We agree that the jury's verdicts 

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Appellate Case: 86-1913 Document: 01019300942 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 4 
do contain inconsistencies. As mentioned, the parties raise 

important related legal issues on appeal that were not raised 

before the trial court. These issues impact on the 

inconsistencies in the verdicts and it is not possible to 

harmonize the verdicts. Instead, we must remand the case to the 

trial court for retrial. See Cheney v. Moler, 285 F.2d 116, 118 

(lOth Cir.); ~also Malley-Duff & Associates v. Crown Life Ins. 

Co., 734 F.2d 133, 145 (3d Cir.); Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 508 

F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir.). We have on this point considered the 

dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in City of Los Angeles v. 

Heller, 475 u.s. 796, 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 

It must be concluded that the jury's verdicts in favor of the 

three defendant police officers on the claim for unreasonable 

execution of the search warrant are inconsistent with the jury's 

verdict against the City on the same claim. Further, the jury's 

verdicts in favor of the three defendant police officers on the 

two constitutional claims are inconsistent with the jury's verdict 

against the officers, in favor of Jonathan Moss, Jr., on the claim 

for negligence. 

We recognize the need to try to reconcile the verdicts and 

have attempted to do so. Kirkendoll v. Neustrom, 379 F.2d 694 

(lOth Cir.). 

As to the City's claim that the jury's verdict against it for 

the unreasonable execution of a search warrant is inconsistent 

with the jury's finding that none of the individual police 

officers were liable to plaintiffs on the same claim, the City 

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Appellate Case: 86-1913 Document: 01019300942 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 5 
cites City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 u.s. 796. This is for 

the proposition that a municipality cannot be held liable for a 

Fourth Amendment violation by police officers when the jury 

returns a verdict in favor of the individual police officers on 

the same claim, absent an instruction that the police officers 

could invoke an affirmative defense such as qualified immunity. 

Thus it argues that the jury's verdict in favor of the three 

police officers is inconsistent with the verdict against the City 

on the same claim. 

There were no instructions as contemplated by Heller to 

permit the application of an affirmative defense by the police 

officers on the unreasonable execution claim. The officers were 

in the same position as the City on this point. Thus the jury, it 

would appear, imposed liability on the City despite a conclusion 

that the officers were not guilty of a constitutional violation. 

The plaintiffs argue strongly that the policy and practice 

doctrine should apply to hold the City liable. The proof advanced 

on this point at trial was that of plaintiffs' expert and was 

directed to the poor operation and administration of the SWAT 

team. This proof simply did not reach the requirements of Pembaur 

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 u.s. 469. In addition, we note that 

the Supreme Court has rendered numerous opinions on municipal 

liability under § 1983 that were not available to the parties or 

the trial court when this case was tried. See City of Canton v. 

Harris, U.S. , 57 U.S.L.W. 4270 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1989); City 

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Appellate Case: 86-1913 Document: 01019300942 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 6 
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, ___ u.s. I 56 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. 

March 2, 1988); Beller, supra. 

We must conclude that the jury's verdicts on the claim for 

unreasonable execution of the search warrant were inconsistent. 

As to the negligence claims, the three defendant police 

officers assert that the jury's verdict against them, in favor of 

Jonathan Moss, Jr., on the claim for negligence is inconsistent 

with the jury's verdicts in favor of the three officers on both 

constitutional claims. 

To the extent that the negligence claim, the two 

constitutional claims, and the affirmative defenses to the constitutional claim for excessive force are all governed by doctrines 

of reasonableness, it appears that the jury's verdicts are 

inconsistent on this point or issue. Further, because the 

plaintiffs' claim for negligence covered the period "from the time 

the SWAT team became involved in this case, up to and including 

the events which transpired at the Moss household," Jury 

Instructions at 3, the facts giving rise to the claim are coextensive with the facts giving rise to both of the plaintiffs' 

constitutional claims. Thus it is impossible to determine which 

of the verdicts on plaintiffs' constitutional claims are 

implicated by this inconsistency. 

Because of the interrelated nature of the claims brought in 

this case, we remand the entire case to the trial court for a new 

trial. In remanding the negligence claims to the trial court, 

however, we express no opinion on the validity of the argument, 

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first raised on appeal, that the three defendant police officers 

enjoy official immunity for any negligence committed against the 

plaintiffs to the extent that their negligence does not rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation. See Trimble v. City and 

County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716 (Colo.), and Leake v. Cain, 720 

P.2d 152 (Colo.). 

Finally, we note the strong possibility that the 

inconsistencies in the verdicts returned by the jury were the 

result of confusion among the jurors over the instructions 

delivered by the trial court. The instructions were ambiguous 

regarding whether certain affirmative defenses applied to both of 

plaintiffs' constitutional claims or only the claim for excessive 

force. In addition, the instructions on the affirmative defenses 

to the claim for excessive force are contradictory and misleading. 

The instructions are full of extraneous material, such as an 

entire page quoting Colorado statutes on the use of force by 

police officers making an arrest, that could only have confused 

the jury's view of the law governing the case. The instructions 

also contain four references to the fact that the search warrant 

was lawfully obtained, giving the incorrect impression that this 

somehow provides the defendants with a complete defense to 

plaintiffs' claims. Finally, the section of the jury instructions 

that outlines the constitutional claims against the City contains 

nothing on how the claims against the City were related to the 

claims against the defendant police officers. 

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Again, the deficiencies outlined above prevent us from 

harmonizing the verdicts returned by the jury and a remand is 

necessary. 

The judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and the case is 

REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion. 

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