Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00403/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00403-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Respondent asks that Anthony Malfi be substituted as respondent in this action by 1

virtue of the fact that he was the warden at petitioner’s place of incarceration at the time

respondents filed their answer. Mr. Malfi will not be substituted in, however, because petitioner

changed prisons approximately one and a half years after the answer was filed.

 Page cites are to the pages assigned by CM/ECF. 2

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE SILVA,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-05-0403 RRB KJM P 

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 

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Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently serving a term of seventeen-yearsto-life imprisonment following his 1989 San Joaquin County conviction for second degree

murder. Answer, Ex. 1 at 4, 14:20-24. Petitioner challenges the fact that he was denied parole

on May 14, 2004 at his second parole hearing. Answer, Ex. 1 at 20 & Ex. 3 at 84-92. The only 2

cognizable and colorable claims petitioner presents here are: 1) that denying petitioner parole

violated the terms of his plea agreement; and 2) that the decision to deny him parole was not

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 In ground 5 of his petition, petitioner asserts his plea agreement was breached in 2000 3

by the prosecution when the prosecution recommended that petitioner be denied parole. In his

traverse, petitioner indicates this is not an actual claim, but something he mentioned as alleged

facts for background. Traverse at 14:21-15:4. 

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supported by “some evidence” that releasing petitioner unreasonably endangers public safety and

therefore was not in compliance with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Pet. at 5-6b. See Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9thCir. 2007). See also 28 U.S.C. 3

§ 2254(a) (claims arising under state law are not cognizable in a § 2254 action). 

First, petitioner argues it was part of his plea agreement that he would be released

on parole as soon as he was eligible. See Pet., Ground Two. From the record, it appears

petitioner’s minimum eligible parole date was October 3, 2000. Answer, Ex. 1 at 20:18.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides as follows:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

With respect to petitioner’s claim that failure to release him on parole as soon as

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he was eligible violated the terms of his plea agreement, the limitations period identified above

began to run under § 2244(d)(1)(D) on October 3, 2000 when petitioner became eligible for

parole, and expired on October 3, 2001, if no tolling applies. Petitioner fails to point to anything

that might toll the limitations period to the extent necessary to make petitioner’s breach of plea

agreement claim, submitted to the court on March 1, 2005, timely. Therefore, this claim should

be rejected. 

In support of his other cognizable claim, petitioner argues that the evidence

presented at his parole hearing was not constitutionally sufficient to support a denial of parole. 

The court disagrees. 

As noted above, in order for this court to sustain a denial of parole there must be

“some evidence” in the record indicating that at the time of his parole hearing releasing petitioner

would have unreasonably endangered public safety. Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. The record before

the parole board indicates petitioner was arrested for fighting in 1982, battery in 1983 and battery

again in 1984. Answer, Ex. 1 at 36:16-23. With respect to his conviction for second degree

murder, the factual basis submitted by the prosecution in support of the plea was as follows: 

[O]n August 22nd , or in the early morning hours of August 23rd,

this defendant and Jeffrey Watson put Phillip Collett into this

defendant’s van against his will while he was protesting and saying

he was sorry. The co-defendant struck the victim Phillip Collett at

least two, perhaps three times after the defendant had sort of

thrown him into the van. Then the defendant got in the car and

was driving away when he took a handgun, apparently from his

pocket . . . [t]ook the handgun, fired at the victim in the back of the

van, struck him in the neck severing a carotid artery. For the next

ten minutes, when he is going down a variety of roads looking for a

place to dispose of the body and his co-defendant is back trying to

assist or control in some way the victim, they then reached a place

at the end of the road in a very remote area of the county, and this

defendant then fired one more shot into the right temple of the

victim who was almost dead at the time, but not quite, in sort of

coup de grace, and then they threw him out in the ditch. And the

evidence from the pathologist that was presented at the preliminary

hearing was that the victim Phillip Collett died of those two

gunshot wounds.

Id. at 13:21-14:15. While in prison, petitioner was disciplined for battery in 1996, was caught

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with heroin in 2002, participated in a riot in 2002 and was disciplined for fighting in 2003. 

Answer, Ex. 1 at 48-50, 54. In a psychiatric report prepared in 2004, and presented at

petitioner’s parole hearing, petitioner was described as among other things, a “loose cannon and

unable to fully integrate a lifestyle free of disciplinary problems.” Id. at 58:21-24. 

In light of this record, it cannot be questioned that there is at least some evidence

that releasing petitioner in 2004 would have posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. During

his time in prison prior to 2004, petitioner had demonstrated a consistent proclivity for

unnecessary violence. It is this proclivity, unchecked, which ended in the loss of life that led to

petitioner’s current conviction. Accordingly, petitioner’s right to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by the parole board that considered petitioner for parole

in 2004. Cf. Irons, 505 F.3d at 851; Sass v. Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir.

2006). Moreover, petitioner is precluded from obtaining relief on this claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d), as he presented his “some evidence” Fourteenth Amendment claim at all three levels

of California’s court and all three courts issued denials that are not contrary to federal law or

reflective of an unreasonable determination of the facts. Answer, Exs. 2-4. For these reasons,

this claim should be denied.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus (docket no. 2) be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 8, 2008. 

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silv0403.157

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