Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00557/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00557-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIFFANY L. DENSON, : 

Plaintiff, : 

vs. : 

 CIVIL ACTION 04-0557-P-M

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, : 

Commissioner of

Social Security, : 

Defendant. : 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

In this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3),

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse social security

ruling which denied claims for disability insurance benefits

and Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter SSI). The

action was referred for report and recommendation pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Oral argument was heard on June 27,

2005. Upon consideration of the administrative record, the

memoranda of the parties, and oral argument, it is recommended

that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed, that this

action be remanded, and that judgment be entered in favor of

Plaintiff Tiffany L. Denson and against Defendant Jo Anne B.

Barnhart.

This Court is not free to reweigh the evidence or

substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary of Health

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1The Court notes that a history of this case is summarized in

the ALJ’s most recent decision (see Tr. 397-98). Without recounting

it again here, the Court notes that Plaintiff previously sought—and

received—relief in this Court in that further administration action

was taken. Denson v. Apfel, No. 99-0895-RV-L (S.D. Ala. November 30,

2000) (Tr. 422-459). This action is Plaintiff’s second visit to

federal court.

2

and Human Services, Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233,

1239 (11th Cir. 1983), which must be supported by substantial

evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 

The substantial evidence test requires "that the decision

under review be supported by evidence sufficient to justify a

reasoning mind in accepting it; it is more than a scintilla,

but less than a preponderance." Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d

914, 918 (11th Cir. 1984), quoting Jones v. Schweiker, 551

F.Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1982).

Plaintiff was born December 28, 1973. At the time of the

most recent administrative hearing, Denson was twenty-eight

years old, had completed a high school education (Doc. 10 Fact

Sheet; Tr. 45), and had previous work experience as a cashier

and security guard (Tr. 553). In claiming benefits, Plaintiff

alleges disability due to Crohns Disease (Doc. 10 Fact Sheet).

The Plaintiff filed applications for disability benefits

and SSI on May 2, 1996 (Tr. 182-86, 350-53).1 Benefits were

denied following a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) who determined that Denson “possessed the residual

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2Though she originally sought an open-ended period of

disability, Denson subsequently requested consideration of a closed

period between February 1, 1996 through September 30, 1998 (see Tr.

502).

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functional capacity to perform the physical demands of a

reduced range of light work on a regular and sustained basis

between February 1996 and September 1998" (Tr. 404; see

generally Tr. 394-410).2 Plaintiff requested review of the

hearing decision (Tr. 383-93) by the Appeals Council, but it

was denied (Tr. 372-74).

Plaintiff claims that the opinion of the ALJ is not

supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Denson

alleges that the ALJ did not properly consider the opinions of

her treating physician (Doc. 10). Defendant has responded

to—and denies—this claim (Doc. 11).

In addressing Plaintiff’s claim, the Court initially

notes that this action was referred back to the Social

Security Administration, in the prior action, for specific

consideration of the opinions and conclusions of Denson’s

treating physician, Dr. Kania (Tr. 452-56). In the recent

determination, the ALJ stated that he “assigned great

evidentiary weight to the multiple opinions expressed by Dr.

Kania” in reaching his decision (Tr. 404). 

In a letter submitted by Dr. Kania, the treating

physician stated as follows:

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Ms. Denson suffers from Crohns Disease, an

incurable illness which waxes and wanes in

intensity and symptoms. It is typical of

Crohns to have more frequent bowel movement

than the normal individual. Ms. Denson

would have 1-6 bowel movement [sic] a day

and would be indisposed for about 15

minutes at a time. Cramping will often

accompany any loose bowel movement.

(Tr. 349) (emphasis added). The ALJ reported the substance of

this letter but, in doing so, he changed the word would to

could and emphasized it in his opinion (Tr. 405). At the

hearing, the Vocational Expert (hereinafter VE) testified that

having one to six bowel movements a day for fifteen minutes at

a time “would preclude any competitive work activity if they

were to occur on a sustained basis” (Tr. 578). This

hypothetical was based on a residual functional capacity “of a

reduced range of light and/or sedentary work . . . as

described in Exhibit 6F” (Tr. 409, ¶ 5; Tr. 576-78; cf. Tr.

270). 

The ALJ, in his decision, however, after changing Dr.

Kania’s wording from would to could, discussed the treating

physician’s “potential symptomatic limitations” and found that

those symptoms never materialized (Tr. 407) (emphasis in

original). The Court finds that this conclusion by the ALJ is

in direct conflict with his prior statement that he was giving

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great evidentiary weight to Dr. Kania’s opinions. The

treating physician very clearly stated that certain symptoms

would occur; the ALJ changed the opinion and ignored the

testimony of the VE which was relevant to that opinion. 

The Court finds it disturbing that the ALJ changed Dr.

Kania’s statements and furthermore gives no explanation for

doing so. Such action cannot be found harmless. This leaves

the Court no alternative but to find that the ALJ’s

conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. Though

it is unfortunate that the Plaintiff must endure the

process—and the time delay associated with it—of having her

claim examined once again by the Social Security

Administration, it is the proper method for going forward with

this action.

Based on review of the entire record, the Court finds

that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by

substantial evidence. Therefore, it is recommended that the

action be reversed and remanded to the Social Security

Administration for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion, to include, at a minimum, a proper

evaluation of the opinions and conclusions of Plaintiff’s

treating physician.

Furthermore, it is recommended that a final judgment be

entered ordering remand in this action pursuant to sentence

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four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501

U.S. 89 (1991). For further procedures not inconsistent with

this recommendation, see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292

(1993).

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation

or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service

of this document, file specific written objections with the

clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo

determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the

factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B,

1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings

and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by

filing a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after being

served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The

statement of objection shall specify those portions

of the recommendation to which objection is made and

the basis for the objection. The objecting party

shall submit to the district judge, at the time of

filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a

different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted

to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of

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the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to

a Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or

judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay

the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required

before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 27th day of June, 2005.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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