Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02663/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02663-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GENGHIS KHAN ALI STEVENSON,

CDCR # P-46050 Civil No. 10cv2663 JLS (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING

$350.00 BALANCE FROM

PRISONER TRUST ACCOUNT

 [Doc. No. 2]; 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

[Doc. No. 3] AND

(3) DISMISSING ACTION FOR

SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES

AGAINST DEFENDANTS WHO ARE

IMMUNE PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 

& 1915A(b)

vs.

RYAN THOMAS HARMON, Correctional

Officer; JOHN DOE,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison located in

Delano, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2], along with a Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3]

Case 3:10-cv-02663-JLS-JMA Document 4 Filed 02/23/11 Page 1 of 6
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I.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [Doc. No. 3]

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil action.

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, unless an

indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts are

granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be exercised

only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

“A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success

on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be

viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d

1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley,

827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

II.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493

F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

/ / /

/ / /

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The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement

shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further

orders the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)

to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in this case, collect and forward them

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

III.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the Complaint be served by the

U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits,

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

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claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Here, however, even

presuming Plaintiff’s factual allegations true, the Court finds his Complaint both fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted and seeks monetary relief from defendants who are

immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213

F.3d at 446, n.1.

In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he seeks to hold Defendant Harmon liable for “malicious

prosecution” arising from a criminal proceeding in Imperial County Superior Court wherein

Plaintiff was indicted for “battery on a non-confined person by prisoner.” (Compl. at 6.)

Plaintiff was charged with this crime by he later received a dismissal of all the charges. (Id.)

Plaintiff also alleges that he brought a civil action against Defendant Harmon for the incident

that gave rise to the criminal charges. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harmon perjured

himself while giving grand jury testimony and fabricated reports with regard to the alleged

incident. (Id. at 4-6.)

First, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendant Harmon, a

witness during his criminal trial, for allegedly committing perjury, Defendant Harmon is

absolutely immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii); § 1915A(b)(2). “Witnesses, including

police witnesses, are immune from liability for their testimony in earlier proceedings even if they

committed perjury.” Paine v. City of Lompoc, 965 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Briscoe

v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345 (1983)). “Witness immunity also extends to conspiracies to commit

perjury.” Id. (citing Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Burns

v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (witnesses are absolutely immune from

suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for testimony given at trial, or for testimony given

during adversarial pretrial proceedings); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1986).

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Thus, the claims against Defendant Harmon must be dismissed for seeking monetary

damages against an immune Defendant. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s entire Complaint must be dismissed for

seeking monetary damages against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446, n.1. If Plaintiff

chooses to file an Amended Complaint, he is cautioned that he may not re-allege any claims that

arose in Stevenson v. Harmon, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 07cv0277 W (PCL). This Court

takes judicial notice that Defendant Harmon’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

excessive force claims was granted in that matter and the Court’s ruling was later affirmed by

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED [Doc. No. 3].

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

/ / /

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED for seeking monetary damages against

immune defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading.

See S.D.CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended

Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79

(9th Cir. 1996).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 23, 2011

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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