Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17845/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17845-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JIMMY YAMADA; RUSSELL

STEWART,

Plaintiffs,

and

A-1 A-LECTRICIAN, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM SNIPES, in his official

capacity as chair and member of the

Hawaii Campaign Spending

Commission, TINA PEDRO GOMES, in

her official capacity as vice chair

and member of the Hawaii

Campaign Spending Commission;

and ELDON CHING, GREGORY SHODA

and ADRIENNE YOSHIHARA, in their

official capacities as members of the

Hawaii Campaign Spending

Commission,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-15913

D.C. No.

1:10-cv-00497-

JMS-RLP

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2 A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES

JIMMY YAMADA; RUSSELL

STEWART,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

A-1 A-LECTRICIAN, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM SNIPES, in his official

capacity as chair and member of the

Hawaii Campaign Spending

Commission; TINA PEDRO GOMES,

in her official capacity as vice chair

and member of the Hawaii

Campaign Spending Commission;

and ELDON CHING, GREGORY SHODA

and ADRIENNE YOSHIHARA, in their

official capacities as members of the

Hawaii Campaign Spending

Commission,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-17845

D.C. No.

1:10-cv-00497-

JMS-RLP

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 9, 2013—Honolulu, Hawaii

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A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES 3

Filed May 20, 2015

Before: Alex Kozinski, Raymond C. Fisher

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s summary judgment in an action brought by two

individuals and a Hawaii for-profit corporation, A-1

A-Lectrician, Inc., challenging the constitutionality of

Hawaii’s campaign finance laws.

During the 2010 election, plaintiff A-1 contributed over

$50,000 to candidates, candidate committees and party

committees. It also purchased three newspaper

advertisements. As a result of these expenditures and

contributions, A-1 was required to register as a “noncandidate

committee,” and was subjected to reporting and disclosure

requirements (HRS § 11-302) and advertising disclaimer

requirements (HRS § 11-391). A1, which plans to run similar

advertisements and make similar contributions to candidates

in the future, objects to both the disclaimer requirement and

the noncandidate committee registration and reporting

requirements.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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Addressing A-1's Fourteenth Amendment due process

vagueness challenge to Hawaii’s reporting and disclosure

requirements, the panel held that HRS § 11-302’s definitions

of “expenditure,” and “noncandidate committee” were not

vague given the narrowing construction of the term

“influence” proffered by Hawaii’s Campaign Spending

Commission. The panel also held that § 11-302’s definition

of “advertisement” was not unconstitutionally vague because

read as a whole and in context it was sufficiently clear to give

a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to

know what was prohibited.

Addressing the First Amendment challenges, the panel

held that the registration, reporting and disclosure

requirements that Hawaii places on “noncandidate

committees” survived exacting scrutiny as applied to A-1. 

The panel held that the requirements were substantially

related to Hawaii’s important interests in informing the

electorate, preventing corruption or its appearance, and

avoiding the circumvention of valid campaign finance laws. 

The panel also held that Hawaii’s requirement that political

advertising include a disclaimer as to the affiliation of the

advertiser with a candidate or candidate committee did not

violate the First Amendment as applied to A-1’s political

advertisements.

The panel declined to consider A1’s challenge to

Hawaii’s electioneering communication reporting

requirements (HRS § 341) because it determined that A-1

was not subject to those requirements as of the date the

complaint was filed.

The panel rejected A-1’s First Amendment challenge to

Hawaii’s ban on campaign contributions by government

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A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES 5

contractors to candidates or candidate committees, (HRS

§ 11-355). The panel held that Hawaii’s government

contractor contribution ban survived closely drawn scrutiny

even as applied to A-1’s proposed contributions to candidates

who neither decide whether A-1 receives contracts nor

oversee A-1’s contracts.

The panel held that the individual plaintiffs were entitled

to attorney’s fees arising from their prior interlocutory appeal

challenging HRS § 11-358, which prohibited any person from

making contributions to a noncandidate committee in an

aggregate amount greater than $1,000 in an election. The

panel held that because plaintiffs prevailed in the

interlocutory appeal, and subsequently became prevailing

parties after the district court entered judgment in their favor,

the district court erred by failing to consider whether to award

them reasonable appellate attorney’s fees. The panel referred

the matter to the Ninth Circuit Appellate Commissioner to

determine the amount of fees to be awarded.

COUNSEL

Randy Elf (argued) & James Bopp, Jr., James Madison

Center for Free Speech, Terre Haute, Indiana; James

Hochberg, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Justin L. McAdam (argued), Jeffrey P. Gallant & James

Bopp, Jr., The Bopp Law Firm, P.C., Terre Haute, Indiana;

James Hochberg, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Plaintiffs.

Deirdre Marie-Iha (argued), DeputySolicitor General, Robyn

B. Chun, Deputy Assistant Attorney General & David M.

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Louie, Attorney General, Department of the Attorney

General, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Defendants-Appellees.

Paul S. Ryan, J. Gerald Hebert, Tara Malloy & Megan

McAllen, Washington D.C., for Amicus Curiae The

Campaign Legal Center.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal concerns the constitutionality of four

provisions of Hawaii’s campaign finance laws under Citizens

United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010),

and related authority. A-1 A-Lectrician, Inc. (A-1), a forprofit corporation, appeals the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of members of Hawaii’s Campaign

Spending Commission (“the Commission”). Relying on

Human Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990

(9th Cir. 2010), we hold that the challenged laws satisfy the

First and Fourteenth Amendments.

I. Background

The plaintiffs are JimmyYamada, Russell Stewart and A1. Before the 2010 general election, Yamada and Stewart

each sought to contribute $2,500 to the Aloha Family

Alliance–Political Action Committee (AFA-PAC), a

registered “noncandidate committee” that makes independent

campaign expenditures in Hawaii elections. They were

forbidden from doing so, however, byHawaii Revised Statute

(HRS) § 11-358, which prohibits any person from “mak[ing]

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contributions to a noncandidate committee in an aggregate

amount greater than $1,000 in an election.”

Plaintiff A-1 is a Hawaii electrical-construction

corporation that makes campaign contributions and engages

in political speech. Yamada is its CEO. During the 2010

election, A-1 contributed over $50,000 to candidates,

candidate committees and party committees. It also

purchased three newspaper advertisements at a cost of $2,000

to $3,000 each. Under the heading “Freedom Under Siege,”

these advertisements declared that Hawaiians had “lost our

freedom” because “we have representatives who do not listen

to the people.” One advertisement asserted State House

Majority Leader Blake Oshiro and other representatives were

“intent on the destruction of the family.” Another accused

Oshiro and his colleagues of “disrespect[ing] the legislative

process and the people.” In accordance with Hawaii law, see

HRS § 11-391(a)(2)(B), all three advertisements included a

disclaimer that they were “[p]ublished without the approval

and authority of the candidate.”

As a result of these expenditures and contributions,

Hawaii law required A-1 to register as a “noncandidate

committee” as defined by HRS § 11-302. Section 11-302

imposes reporting and disclosure requirements on any

organization that has “the purpose of making or receiving

contributions, making expenditures, or incurring financial

obligations to influence [elections]” over $1,000 in the

aggregate for an election cycle. Id.; see HRS § 11-321(g). 

A-1, which plans to run similar advertisements and to make

similar contributions to candidates in the future, objects to

both the disclaimer requirement and the noncandidate

committee registration and reporting requirements.

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If A-1 is relieved of the obligation of registering as a

noncandidate committee, it could be subject to reporting

requirements associated with “electioneering

communications” because it seeks to publish newspaper

advertisements that mention candidates by name shortly

before an election. See HRS § 11-341. Every entity that

makes a disbursement for an electioneering communication,

such as A-1’s newspaper advertisements, must report certain

identifying information to the Commission within 24 hours of

certain disclosure dates. See id. Under the regulations in

effect when A-1 filed this action, if A-1 were to remain a

noncandidate committee, however, it would not have to file

an electioneering communications report or comply with the

provisions of HRS § 11-341. See Haw. Admin. Rule (HAR)

§ 3-160-48.1

Finally, A-1 is often a state government contractor, and

when it has such contracts, Hawaii law prohibits it from

making campaign contributions to candidates or candidate

committees. See HRS § 11-355. A-1 challenges that

prohibition as applied to its speech, although it declares it

seeks to contribute only to lawmakers who neither award nor

oversee its public contracts.

Shortly before the 2010 primary election, Yamada,

Stewart and A-1 filed a nine-count complaint challenging the

constitutionality of five provisions of Hawaii campaign

finance law. Yamada and Stewart challenged the $1,000

limit on contributions to noncandidate committees, HRS

§ 11-358, and A-1 challenged four other provisions: (1) the

1 On November 5, 2014, an amendment to HRS § 11-341 went into

effect, requiring registered noncandidate committees to file electioneering

communications statements. See 2013 Haw. Sess. L. Act 112.

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requirement that it register as a noncandidate committee and

the associated expenditure definition, HRS § 11-302; (2) if it

does not have to register as a noncandidate committee, the

requirement that it report identifying information when it

makes an electioneering communication, HRS § 11-341;

(3) the requirement that its advertisements include certain

disclaimers, HRS § 11-391; and (4) the ban on contributions

from government contractors to state legislative candidates,

HRS § 11-355.

In October 2010, the district court preliminarily enjoined

enforcement of the $1,000 contribution limit, HRS § 11-358,

as applied to Yamada’s and Stewart’s proposed $2,500

contributions to AFA-PAC, a noncandidate committee. See

Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1078, 1087 (D.

Haw. 2010) (Yamada I). The court denied A-1’s motion for

a preliminary injunction on its first, second and third claims. 

See Yamada v. Kuramoto, No. 10-cv-00497, 2010 WL

4603936, at *20 (D. Haw. Oct. 29, 2010) (Yamada II). A-1

did not seek to enjoin the government contractor ban. The

defendants appealed the preliminary injunction of § 11-358

but dismissed their appeal before argument.

On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the

district court permanently enjoined the $1,000 contribution

limit, HRS § 11-358, as applied to Yamada’s and Stewart’s

contributions to AFA-PAC and rejected each of A-1’s

constitutional challenges. See Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F.

Supp. 2d 1023, 1027–28, 1063 (D. Haw. 2012) (Yamada III). 

A-1 appeals the denial of summary judgment on its claims. 

The defendants have not cross-appealed the court’s

invalidation of § 11-358.

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Yamada and Stewart sought their attorney’s fees under

41 U.S.C. § 1988 based on their successful constitutional

challenge to the $1,000 contribution limit. The district court

awarded them $60,152.65 in fees and $3,623.29 in costs. 

Yamada and Stewart appeal that award in several respects,

including the district court’s denial of the fees they incurred

defending against the defendants’ abandoned appeal of the

preliminary injunction ruling.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review

A-1’s constitutional challenges de novo. See Human Life,

624 F.3d at 1000. A-1 raises three groups of issues on

appeal: (1) whether the expenditure, noncandidate committee

and advertisement definitions are unconstitutionally vague;

(2) whether the noncandidate committee definition and

advertising disclaimer and electioneering communications

reporting requirements impose unconstitutional burdens on

speech; and (3) whether the ban on contributions by

government contractors is unconstitutional as applied to A1’s proposed contributions. Yamada and Stewart also appeal

the partial denial of attorney’s fees. We address these issues

in turn.

II. Due Process Vagueness Challenge

We begin by addressing A-1’s argument that § 11-302’s

definitions of “expenditure,” “noncandidate committee” and

“advertisement” are unconstitutionally vague under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A law is

unconstitutionally vague when it “fails to provide a person of

ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so

standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously

discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams,

553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). This doctrine “addresses at least

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two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that

regulated parties should know what is required of them so

they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are

necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an

arbitrary or discriminatory way.” FCC v. Fox Television

Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). Where, as here,

FirstAmendment freedoms are involved, “rigorous adherence

to those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity

does not chill protected speech.” Id. Even for regulations of

expressive activity, however, “perfect clarity and precise

guidance” are not required, Ward v. Rock Against Racism,

491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989), because “we can never expect

mathematical certainty from our language,” Human Life,

624 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford,

408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating A-1’s challenges, we must consider “any

limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency

has proffered.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 (quoting Vill. of

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.

489, 494 n.5 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We

may impose a limiting construction on a statute, however,

“only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such a construction.” 

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997) (quoting Virginia v.

Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). We will

not “insert missing terms into the statute or adopt an

interpretation precluded by the plain language of the

ordinance.” Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 639

(9th Cir. 1998).

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A. Hawaii’s Expenditure and Noncandidate Committee

Definitions Are Not Vague Given the Commission’s

Narrowing Construction

A-1’s first vagueness challenge is to the expenditure and

noncandidate committee definitions. Section 11-302 defines

an “expenditure” to include:

(1) Any purchase or transfer of money or

anything of value, or promise or agreement to

purchase or transfer money or anything of

value, or payment incurred or made, or the use

or consumption of a nonmonetary

contribution for the purpose of:

(A) Influencing the nomination for

election, or the election, of any person

seeking nomination for election or

election to office, whether or not the

person has filed the person’s nomination

papers;

(B) Influencing the outcome of any

question or issue that has been certified to

appear on the ballot at the next applicable

election . . . .

HRS § 11-302 (emphasis added). It defines a “noncandidate

committee” as:

[A]n organization, association, party, or

individual that has the purpose of making or

receiving contributions,making expenditures,

or incurring financial obligations to influence

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the nomination for election, or the election, of

any candidate to office, or for or against any

question or issue on the ballot . . . .

Id.(emphasis added). Noncandidate committees are Hawaii’s

version of independent expenditure committees, similar to the

Washington “political committee” definition we addressed in

Human Life. See 624 F.3d at 997.

A-1 challenges these definitions under Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (per curiam), which held that the terms

“influencing” and “for the purpose of influencing” were

unconstitutionally vague when used to delineate types of

speech subject to regulation. Id. at 77–82. If both definitions

are unconstitutionally vague, Hawaii cannot constitutionally

impose noncandidate committee status and the accompanying

registration and reporting burdens on A-1.

Like the district court, we assume without deciding that

the term “influence” may be vague under some

circumstances. “Conceivably falling within the meaning of

‘influence’ are objectives as varied as advocacy for or against

a candidate’s election; championing an issue for inclusion in

a candidate’s platform; and encouraging all candidates to

embrace public funding.” Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee,

649 F.3d 34, 65 (1st Cir. 2011). But the Commission has

offered and the district court applied a limiting construction

on the term “influence” in § 11-302’s definitions of

“expenditure” and “noncandidate committee,” eliminating

this potential vagueness. Under the Commission’s

interpretation, “influence” refers only to “communications or

activities that constitute express advocacy or its functional

equivalent.” This interpretation significantly narrows the

statutory language, because “express advocacy” requires

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words “such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot

for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject,’”

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52, and communications are the

“functional equivalent of express advocacy” only when they

are “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as

an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,” Fed.

Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.

449, 469–70 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).

A-1 argues that the proffered limiting construction does

not render § 11-302 constitutional because (1) it is

inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, thus

barring us from adopting it, and (2) even if we could adopt it,

the challenged definitions remain unconstitutionally vague. 

We find neither argument persuasive.

1.

The Commission’s proffered construction is not

inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. We have

previously noted that the term “influencing” is susceptible to

a narrowing construction, see ACLU of Nev. v. Heller,

378 F.3d 979, 986 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004), and the Commission’s

interpretation of “influence” is consistent with Buckley, which

construed the phrase “for the purpose of . . . influencing” to

mean “communications that expressly advocate the election

or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,” 424 U.S. at 79, 80

(footnote omitted). Given the substantial similarity between

the statutory language in Buckley and the language at issue

here, the Commission’s gloss is entirely reasonable. 

Compare 2 U.S.C. § 431(f) (1971), with HRS § 11-302.

Moreover, the Commission reasonably construes the

statute as referring not only to express advocacy but also to

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its functional equivalent. After Buckley, case law and Federal

Election Commission regulations have broadened the concept

of express advocacy to include its “functional equivalent,” as

defined in Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469–70. See

11 C.F.R. § 100.22; Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed.

Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 550–53 (4th Cir. 2012)

(discussing the evolution of the “functional equivalent of

express advocacy” concept). Elsewhere, Hawaii’s

Commission has adopted a regulation defining express

advocacy with reference to its functional equivalent, or as

communications that are “susceptible to no other reasonable

interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a

candidate.” HAR § 3-160-6. The Commission’s proposed

construction is consistent with Buckley, subsequent Supreme

Court decisions, federal regulations and other Commission

regulations. The proposed construction, therefore, is neither

unreasonable nor foreclosed by the plain language of the

statute. See Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc. v. Barland,

751 F.3d 804, 832–34 (7th Cir. 2014) (limiting “for the

purpose of influencing the election or nomination for election

of any individual to state or local office” to express advocacy

and its functional equivalent); McKee, 649 F.3d at 66–67

(construing “influencing” and “influence” in Maine campaign

finance statutes to include only communications that

constitute express advocacy or its functional equivalent).

The legislative history of Hawaii’s noncandidate

committee and expenditure definitions lends further validity

to the Commission’s interpretation. In 1979, the Hawaii

legislature revised state campaign finance laws to harmonize

them with Buckley. See 1979 Haw. Sess. L. Act 224; Conf.

Comm. Rep. No. 78, in Haw. H.J. 1137, 1140 (1979). The

legislature was “mindful” that Buckley “narrowly construed

the operation of the federal spending and contribution

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disclosure requirements” to encompass only

“communications that expressly advocate the election or

defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Conf. Comm. Rep.

No. 78, in Haw. H.J. 1137, 1140 (1979). Thus, as the district

court concluded, “[i]t is reasonable to infer . . . that Hawaii’s

Legislature adopted terminology such as ‘to influence’ in

reliance on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the same

terminology in federal law.” Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at

1046. We agree.2

A-1 nonetheless contends we should not adopt the

narrowing construction because it would not bind a state

court and therefore provides insufficient protection for First

Amendment values. We again disagree. By adopting a

“‘readily apparent’ constitutional interpretation,” we provide

A-1 and other parties not before the court “sufficient

protection from unconstitutional application of the statute, as

it is quite likely nonparty prosecutors and state courts will

apply the same interpretation.” Planned Parenthood of

Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 932 (9th Cir. 2004); see

also Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1022 n.15

(9th Cir. 2013).3

2 A-1 draws a different inference from this legislative history, arguing

that the legislature’s retention of the word “influence” after Buckley

suggests that the legislature did not intend to limit the law to express

advocacy and its functional equivalent. See Va. Soc’y for Human Life,

Inc. v. Caldwell, 152 F.3d 268, 271 (4th Cir. 1998). We disagree, but

even if the legislative history is debatable, the Commission’s reasonable

limiting interpretation merits our deference. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates,

455 U.S. at 504; McKee, 649 F.3d at 66.

3 Like federal courts, Hawaii courts construe state statutes to avoid

constitutional infirmities whenever possible. See, e.g., Kapiolani Park

Pres. Soc’y v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022, 1028 (Haw.

1988) (“Legislative acts . . . are not to be held invalid, or unconstitutional,

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We hold that the Commission’s proffered construction is

neither unreasonable nor the product of “strained statutory

construction.” Wasden, 376 F.3d at 932. We therefore adopt

it.

2.

We also reject A-1’s argument that § 11-302’s definitions

of “expenditure” and “noncandidate committee” are

unconstitutionally vague even with this limiting construction

in place. With the narrowing gloss, these definitions are

sufficiently precise to provide “a person of ordinary

intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.” Williams,

553 U.S. at 304. Only expenditures for communications that

expressly advocate for a candidate or are “susceptible of no

reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for

or against a specific candidate” can trigger noncandidate

committee registration, reporting and disclosure requirements

under § 11-302. There is no dispute that “express advocacy”

is not a vague term, and the controlling opinion in Wisconsin

Right to Life held the “functional equivalent” or “appeal to

vote” component of this test also meets the “imperative for

clarity” that due process requires. 551 U.S. at 474 n.7. That

close cases may arise in applying this test does not make it

unconstitutional, given there will always be an inherent but

permissible degree of uncertainty in applying any standardsbased test. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 306 (“Close cases can

be imagined under virtually any statute.”); Real Truth,

681 F.3d at 554–55. We therefore join the First, Fourth and

Tenth Circuits in holding that the “appeal to vote” language

or unconscionable, if such a construction can reasonably be avoided.”). 

We would therefore expect Hawaii courts to adopt the same limiting

construction.

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is not unconstitutionally vague. See Free Speech v. Fed.

Election Comm’n, 720 F.3d 788, 795–96 (10th Cir. 2013);

Real Truth, 681 F.3d at 552, 554 (“[T]he test in Wisconsin

Right to Life is not vague.”); McKee, 649 F.3d at 70.

A-1 resists this conclusion, advancing two arguments why

the “appeal to vote” language is impermissibly vague. 

Neither is persuasive.

First, A-1 contends the test is unconstitutionally vague

because Hawaii’s law applies to a broader range of

communicationsthan the provision upheld in Wisconsin Right

to Life. Wisconsin Right to Life sustained the functional

equivalent test against a vagueness challenge to the federal

definition of electioneering communications, which covers

only broadcast communications, see 551 U.S. at 474 n.7; 2

U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), whereas Hawaii’s

noncandidate committee and expenditure definitions extend

to speech in printed form, see HRS § 11-302. The statute at

issue in Wisconsin Right to Life also regulated only

communications run shortly before an election, whereas

Hawaii’s statute applies to communications without strict

temporal limitations. But these differences are immaterial. 

Regardless of when a communication is aired or printed and

whether it appears in print or in a broadcast medium, the

purveyor of the advertisement has fair notice that the

regulations reach only those ads that clearly advocate for an

identified candidate. Like the Fourth Circuit, we hold that the

functional equivalent language is not unconstitutionallyvague

merely because it applies more broadly than the federal

provision upheld in Wisconsin Right to Life. See Ctr. for

Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 280–81

(4th Cir. 2013).

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Second, the validity of the functional equivalent test has

not been undermined by Citizens United, which struck down

the federal electioneering communication definition, see

1 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3), for which the test was first developed. 

As the First Circuit explained in rejecting an identical

argument:

The basis for Citizens United’s holding on the

constitutionality of the electioneering

expenditure statute had nothing to do with the

appeal-to-vote test . . . . Instead, the decision

turned on a reconsideration of prior case law

holding that a corporation’s political speech

may be subjected to greater regulation than an

individual’s. The opinion offered no view on

the clarity of the appeal-to-vote test. In fact,

the Court itself relied on the appeal-to-vote

test in disposing of a threshold argument that

the appeal should be resolved on narrower, asapplied grounds.

McKee, 649 F.3d at 69 (citations omitted); see also Nat’l Org.

for Marriage v. Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220 (N.D.

Fla. 2010), aff’d, 477 Fed. App’x 584, 585 (11th Cir. 2012)

(per curiam). We also have relied on the appeal to vote test,

albeit in dicta, since Citizens United. See Human Life,

624 F.3d at 1015. We could not have done so if the test was

unconstitutionally vague.

Accordingly, we sustain Hawaii’s noncandidate

committee and expenditure definitions from A-1’s vagueness

challenges. The term “influence” is readily and reasonably

interpreted to encompass only “communications or activities

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that constitute express advocacyor its functional equivalent.” 

As construed, the definitions are not unconstitutionally vague.

B. Hawaii’s Advertising Definition is Not

Unconstitutionally Vague

A-1 argues that § 11-302’s advertising definition is

unconstitutionally vague because it uses the terms

“advocates,” “supports” and “opposition.” This provision

spells out when an advertisement must include a disclaimer

as to whether the ad was disseminated with or without the

approval of a candidate. See HRS § 11-391. In relevant part,

Hawaii law defines an “advertisement” as:

any communication, excluding sundry items

such as bumper stickers, that:

(1) Identifies a candidate directly or by

implication, or identifies an issue or

question that will appear on the ballot at

the next applicable election; and

(2) Advocates or supports the nomination,

opposition, or election of the candidate, or

advocates the passage or defeat of the

issue or question on the ballot.

HRS § 11-302 (emphasis added).

Applying a narrowing construction to this definition, as

before, the district court limited the reach of “advocates or

supports the nomination, opposition, or election of the

candidate” to express advocacy or its functional equivalent. 

See Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. With this limiting

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construction, the district court concluded that Hawaii’s

definition of an advertisement was not unconstitutionally

vague. A-1 contends that the district court impermissibly

adopted a limiting construction for the same reasons it argues

a limiting construction was inappropriate for the

noncandidate committee and expenditure definitions. It

further argues that with or without the limiting construction,

the challenged definition is unconstitutionally vague under

Buckley and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,

540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens

United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. The Commission responds that

the definition is not vague even without a limiting

construction.

We agree with the Commission that Hawaii’s advertising

definition is sufficiently precise without a limiting

construction and therefore decline to adopt one. The words

“advocates or supports” and “opposition” as used here are

substantially similar to the words “promote,” “oppose,”

“attack” and “support” that survived a vagueness challenge in

McConnell. There, the Court considered a statute defining

“Federal election activity” as “a public communication that

refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office . . .

and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or

attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of

whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or

against a candidate).” 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii). The Court

noted that “[t]he words ‘promote,’ ‘oppose,’ ‘attack,’ and

‘support’ clearly set forth the confines within which potential

party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the

provision.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64. Because

“[t]hese words ‘provide explicit standards for those who

apply them’ and ‘give the person of ordinary intelligence a

reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,’” the

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Court held that the provision was not unconstitutionally

vague. Id. (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09).4

McConnell supports the conclusion that Hawaii’s

advertisement definition is not unconstitutionally vague.

Decisions in other circuits also support that conclusion. 

In McKee, the First Circuit turned away a vagueness

challenge to a Maine law using the terms “promoting,”

“support” and “opposition” in several campaign finance

provisions. The terms were not impermissibly vague because

they were tied to an “election-related object” – either

“candidate,” “nomination or election of any candidate” or

“campaign.” McKee, 649 F.3d at 64. Maine’s expenditure

statute, for example, “instructs that reports submitted

pursuant to the provision ‘must state whether the expenditure

is in support of or in opposition to the candidate.’” Id. at 63

n.41 (quoting Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1019-B(3)(B)). The

Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits have reached similar

conclusions. See Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v.

Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 128–30 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that

“promotes,” “supports,” “attacks” and “opposes” were not

vague with reference to a “clearly identified candidate”);

Tennant, 706 F.3d at 286–87 (holding that “promoting or

opposing” was not vague); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v.

Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 485–87, 495 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding

that “promote” and “oppose” were not vague).

4

Joining the First, Second and Fourth Circuits, we reject A-1’s argument

that McConnell’s vagueness holding is limited to laws that regulate

campaign finance for political parties. See Vermont Right to Life Comm.,

Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2014); Tennant, 706 F.3d at 287

(“[T]he Court . . . did not limit its holding to situations involving political

parties.”); McKee, 649 F.3d at 63.

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As in McKee, Hawaii’s statutes are tied to an electionrelated object – the terms “advocates,” “supports” and

“opposition” refer only to “the nomination . . . or election of

the candidate.” HRS § 11-302. So too does the federal law

upheld in McConnell, which used the words “promote,”

“oppose,” “attack” and “support” only in relation to a “clearly

identified candidate for Federal office.” 2 U.S.C.

§ 431(20)(A)(iii). Although the terms “advocate,” “support”

and “opposition” may not, in isolation, offer sufficient clarity

as to what advertisements must include a disclaimer, their

proximity to “nomination” or “election of the candidate”

make clear the sort of campaign-related advertising for which

a disclaimer must be included. Read as a whole and in

context, the advertisement definition is sufficiently clear to

“give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable

opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Grayned, 408 U.S.

at 108.

Finally, we reject A-1’s argument that “advocates,” a term

that McConnell did not consider, makes Hawaii’s advertising

definition unconstitutionally vague. A-1 relies on Buckley,

which considered a provision that prohibited any person or

group from making “any expenditure . . . relative to a clearly

identified candidate during a calendar year which, when

added to all other expenditures . . . advocating the election or

defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000.” 424 U.S. at 42. 

Buckley held that this provision – which imposed a severe

restriction on independent spending by all individuals and

groups other than political parties and campaign

organizations – was impermissibly vague because of its

potential breadth, extending to the discussion of public issues

untethered from particular candidates. See id. at 40, 42. The

Court therefore construed the provision “to apply only to

expenditures for communications that in express terms

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advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified

candidate for federal office.” Id. at 44.

A-1’s contention that “advocates” is unconstitutionally

vague in this context does not survive the Supreme Court’s

post-Buckley discussion of nearly identical language in

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64. For candidate elections,

Hawaii’s definition uses the word “advocates” only in

relation to a communication that (1) identifies a candidate and

(2) “advocates or supports the nomination, opposition, or

election of [that] candidate.” HRS § 11-302. Although the

word “advocates” was not at issue in McConnell, there is

nothingunconstitutionally vague about “advocate” when used

in Hawaii’s advertising definition to refer to communications

that identify a candidate for state office and “plead in favor

of” that candidate’s election. Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 32 (2002). A-1’s vagueness

challenge to the Hawaii advertising definition therefore fails.

III. First Amendment Claims

A-1 brings First Amendment challenges to (1) the

registration, reporting and disclosure requirements that

Hawaii places on “noncandidate committees” and (2) the

requirement that political advertisements include a disclaimer

stating whether they are broadcast or published with the

approval of a candidate. Because the challenged laws provide

for the disclosure and reporting of political spending but do

not limit or ban contributions or expenditures, we apply

exacting scrutiny. See Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d

800, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1005. 

To survive this scrutiny, a law must bear a substantial

relationship to a sufficiently important governmental interest. 

See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010); Human Life,

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624 F.3d at 1008. Put differently, “the strength of the

governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the

actual burden on First Amendment rights.” Doe, 561 U.S. at

196 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724,

744 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. The Noncandidate Committee Reporting and

Disclosure Requirements Survive Exacting Scrutiny As

Applied to A-1

We first consider whether the noncandidate committee

reporting and disclosure requirements satisfy exacting

scrutiny as applied to A-1. Looking to the burden side of the

balance, the district court found that the “registration and

disclosure requirements that come with noncandidate

committee status do not present an undue burden on A-1.” 

Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1052. We agree.

The noncandidate committee is Hawaii’s method for

monitoring and regulating independent political spending in

state elections. In relevant part, a noncandidate committee is

broadly defined as an organization “that has the purpose of

making or receiving contributions, making expenditures, or

incurring financial obligations to influence” Hawaii elections. 

HRS § 11-302.5 To paraphrase the statute, and incorporating

the Commission’s narrowing construction we adopted earlier

(see page 20), the noncandidate committee definition is

limited to an organization that:

5 Although noncandidate committee status also extends to an individual

who makes contributions or expenditures not of his or her own funds, see

HRS § 11-302, the parties focus solely on noncandidate committee status

for organizations, and we shall do the same.

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Has “the purpose” of making or receiving

contributions, or making expenditures, for

communications or activities that constitute

express advocacy or its functional equivalent

(i.e., that are susceptible of no reasonable

interpretation other than as an appeal to vote

for or against a specific candidate to office, or

for or against any question or issue on the

ballot).

Expenditures are further defined as payments or nonmonetary

contributions made for the purpose of communications or

activities that constitute express advocacy or its functional

equivalent. See id.; HRS § 11-302.

Noncandidate committee status is triggered only when an

organization receives contributions or makes or incurs

qualifying expenditures totaling more than $1,000 during a

two-year election cycle. See HRS § 11-321(g). Within 10

days of reaching this threshold, the organization must register

as a noncandidate committee by filing an organizational

report with the Commission. Id. In addition to registering,

the organization must file an organizational report, designate

officers, disclose its bank account information, and designate

a treasurer responsible for recording contributions and

expenditures and maintaining records for five years. See

HRS §§ 11-321, 11-323, 11-324, 11-351(a). The committee’s

contributions must be segregated from its other funds. See

HAR § 3-160-21(c).

Every committee must also comply with reporting

requirements tied to election periods. These requirements

include disclosing contributions made and received,

expenditures by the committee and the assets on hand at the

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end of the reporting period. See HRS §§ 11-331 (filing of

reports), 11-335 (noncandidate committee reports), 11-336

(timing of reports for noncandidate committees), 11-340

(penalties for failure to file a required report).6 The reports

must be filed no later than 10 days before an election, 20 days

after a primary election and 30 days after a general election;

additional reports must be filed on January 31 of every year

and July 31 after an election year. See HRS § 11-336(a)–(d). 

If a noncandidate committee has aggregate contributions and

expenditures of $1,000 or less in an election period, it need

only file a single, final election-period report, or it may

simply request to terminate its registration. See HRS §§ 11-

326, 11-339(a).

A-1’s argument that these burdens are substantial is

foreclosed by Human Life, which held that the burdens of

compliance with Washington State’s materially

indistinguishable registration and reporting requirements

were “modest” and “not unduly onerous.” 624 F.3d at

1013–14. Indeed, the majority of circuits have concluded that

such disclosure requirements are not unduly burdensome. 

See Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 137–38 (rejecting the argument that

“registration, recordkeeping necessary for reporting, and

reporting requirements” are onerous as a matter of law);

Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1250 (11th Cir.

2013) (holding that Florida’s analogous “PAC regulations do

not generally impose an undue burden”); McKee, 649 F.3d at

6 The Hawaii Legislature slightly revised the reporting requirements

after the district court granted summary judgment to the Commission. See

2013 Haw. Sess. Laws 209-10 (S.B. 31) (amending HRS §§ 11-335, 11-

336). We consider the version of the reporting statutes in effect at the

time this suit was filed. In any event, the minor amendments do not affect

our constitutional analysis.

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56 (holding that Maine’s analogous PAC regulations “do not

prohibit, limit, or impose any onerous burdens on speech”);

Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 808 n.6 (noting the generally

“modest” administrative burdens imposed on ballot

committees by Washington law); Speechnow.org v. Fed.

Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 697–98 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

(holding that the organizational, administrative and

continuous reporting requirements applicable to federal

political committees were not unduly burdensome); Alaska

Right to Life Comm. v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 789–92 (9th Cir.

2006) (holding that registration, reporting and disclosure

requirements applicable toAlaskan political committees were

not “significantly burdensome” or “particularly onerous”).

A-1 would distinguish Human Life’s burden analysis on

the ground that a noncandidate committee in Hawaii is

subject to additional limits on the kinds of contributions it

may receive. Specifically, A-1 points to Hawaii law limiting

contributions to noncandidate committees (HRS § 11-358),

and banning contributions from particular sources, including

bans on contributions made in the name of another (HRS

§ 11-352), anonymous contributions (HRS § 11-353), or

prohibitions on contributions from government contractors

and foreign nationals (HRS §§ 11-355, 11-356). These

differences do not distinguish Human Life. First, because A1 is self-financed and does not receive contributions, any

funding limits or bans have no bearing on our as-applied

constitutional analysis. Second, none of these limits imposes

a substantial burden. The Commission concedes that the only

constitutionally suspect limit A-1 identifies – the $1,000 limit

on contributions to noncandidate committees – is

unconstitutional as applied to committees making only

independent expenditures. The other limits apply to A-1

regardless of its status as a noncandidate committee. Thus,

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there are no material differences between the burdens of

noncandidate committee status in Hawaii and political

committee status in Washington.7

A-1 has been complyingwith the noncandidate committee

requirements for several years without difficulty. No separate

organization need be created, as long as records are kept

tracking financial activitybythe noncandidate committee, see

HAR § 3-160-21(c), and filing of the brief, required reports

may be performed electronically at infrequent intervals, see

HRS § 11-336. As the district court concluded, “[a]lthough

the requirements might be inconvenient, the record does not

indicate the burdens on A-1 are onerous as matters of fact or

law.” Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.

7 The burdens of noncandidate committee status in Hawaii are also

distinguishable from the burdens of federal “PAC status” that A-1 labels

“onerous,” citing to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Federal Election

Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S.

238, 248 (1986), and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–39. The federal

PAC statusin MCFL required corporations to set up a separate legal entity

and create a segregated fund before engaging in any direct political

speech, and further prohibited an organization from soliciting

contributions beyond its “members.” See McKee, 649 F.3d at 56; see also

Madigan, 697 F.3d at 488 (distinguishing MCFL’s PAC burdens); Human

Life, 624 F.3d at 1010 (same); Alaska Right to Life, 441 F.3d at 786–87,

791–92 (same). But see Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc. v. Barland,

751 F.3d 804, 839–42 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing the “heavy

administrative burdens” of Wisconsin’s analogous, but more detailed,

“PAC-like disclosure program,” which “in critical respects [was]

unchanged from Buckley’s day”). Like Maine’s political committee

provision, Hawaii law “imposes three simple obligations” on a qualifying

entity that are not nearly as onerous as those considered in MCFL: “filing

of a registration form disclosing basic information, . . . reporting of

election-related contributions and expenditures, and simple

recordkeeping.” McKee, 649 F.3d at 56.

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Turning to the governmental interests side of the

equation, there is no question that Hawaii’s noncandidate

committee requirements serve important government

interests. The Hawaii legislature created these requirements

to “expand the scope of public scrutiny relative to the

financial aspects of the campaign process” and to avoid

corruption or its appearance in electoral politics. House

Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 188, H.B. No. 22, in Haw. H.J. 840

(1973). Subsequent amendments to Hawaii’s disclosure

scheme reaffirmed the important “informational value”

served by reporting and disclosure requirements, as well as

the state’s interest in“deterr[ing] . . . corruption” and

“gathering data necessary to detect violations” of campaign

finance laws. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 78, in Haw. H.J. 1137,

1140 (1979). When Hawaii revised its campaign finance

laws in 1995, the legislature cited the importance of

“reforming the campaign spending law . . . to restor[e] the

public’s confidence in the political process.” S. Stand.

Comm. Rep. No. 1344, H.B. No. 2094, Haw. S.J. 1346

(1995). The legislature found that “[m]aking candidates,

contributors, and others more accountable by requiring the

filing of reports . . . and specifying what information must

appear in these reports go[es] a long way to accomplishing

these goals.” Id.

Thus, Hawaii’s noncandidate committee regulations serve

all three interests that the Supreme Court has recognized as

“important” in the context of reporting and disclosure

requirements: “providing the electorate with information,

deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance

thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more

substantive electioneering restrictions.” Canyon Ferry Rd.

Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d

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1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at

196).

First, the reporting and disclosure obligations provide

information to the electorate about who is speaking –

information that “is vital to the efficient functioning of the

marketplace of ideas, and thus to advancing the democratic

objectives underlying the First Amendment.” Human Life,

624 F.3d at 1005; see also McCutcheon v. Fed. Election

Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459–60 (2014); Citizens United,

558 U.S. at 368–69; Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 806, 808. 

“This transparency enables the electorate to make informed

decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and

messages,” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371, making

disclosure of this information a “sufficiently important, if not

compelling, governmental interest,” Human Life, 624 F.3d at

1005–06. Second, Hawaii’s reporting and disclosure

obligations “deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance

of corruption by exposing large contributions and

expenditures to the light of publicity.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at

67; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1459. Third, the

registration, record keeping, reporting and disclosure

requirements provide a means of detecting violations of valid

contribution limitations, preventing circumvention of

Hawaii’s campaign spending limitations, including rules that

bar contributions by foreign corporations or individuals, see

HRS § 11-356, or that prohibit contributions from

government contractors, see HRS § 11-355. See Buckley,

424 U.S. at 67–68; Speechnow.org, 599 F.3d at 698 (holding

that “requiring disclosure . . . deters and helps expose

violations of other campaign finance restrictions”). Thus,

Hawaii’s noncandidate committee reporting and disclosure

requirements indisputably serve important governmental

interests.

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A-1 nonetheless contends these reporting and disclosure

requirements are not sufficiently tailored to survive exacting

scrutiny because they apply to any organization that has “the

purpose” of engaging in political advocacy, HRS § 11-302,

rather than applying more narrowly to organizations having

a primary purpose of engaging in such activity. A-1

concedes that Hawaii may impose reporting and disclosure

requirements on organizations that make political advocacy

a priority but argues that it only incidentally engages in such

advocacy.

A-1’s argument rests on Human Life, which considered

the Washington disclosure regime whereby an organization

qualifies as a political committee if its “primary or one of [its]

primary purposes is to affect, directly or indirectly,

governmental decision making by supporting or opposing

candidates or ballot propositions.” 624 F.3d at 1008 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). First, Human Life

rejected the argument that this definition was facially

overbroad because “it covers groups with ‘a’ primarypurpose

of political advocacy, instead of being limited to groups with

‘the’ primary purpose of political advocacy.” 624 F.3d at

1008–11 (emphasis added). It explained that Buckley and

Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for

Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986), did not hold that an

entitymust have the sole, major purpose of political advocacy

“to be deemed constitutionally a political committee.” 

Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1009–10 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 79). Next, Human Life held that Washington’s political

committee definition withstood exacting scrutiny because

there was “a substantial relationship between Washington

State’s informational interest and its decision to impose

disclosure requirements on organizations with a primary

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purpose of political advocacy.” Id. at 1011. We reasoned

that the definition:

does not extend to all groups with “a purpose”

of political advocacy, but instead is tailored to

reach only those groups with a “primary”

purpose of political activity. This limitation

ensures that the electorate has information

about groups that make political advocacy a

priority, without sweeping into its purview

groups that only incidentally engage in such

advocacy. Under this statutory scheme, the

word “primary” – not the words “a” or “the”

– is what is constitutionally significant.

Id. at 1011 (emphasis added).

A-1 correctly points out that the provision at issue in

Human Life applied to organizations with a primary purpose

of political advocacy, whereas Hawaii’s law applies to an

organization with “the purpose” of political advocacy. 

Human Life, however, did not “hold that the word ‘primary’

or its equivalent [was] constitutionally necessary.” Id. It

held only that this limitation was “sufficient” for

Washington’s political committee definition to withstand

First Amendment scrutiny. Id. Human Life is therefore not

controlling, and, reaching an issue we did not address there,

we conclude that Hawaii’s noncandidate committee reporting

and disclosure requirements are sufficiently tailored as

applied to A-1 even without a “primary” modifier.

First, because Hawaii’s definition extends only to

organizations having “the purpose” of political advocacy, it

avoids reaching organizations engaged in only incidental

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advocacy. Under the Commission’s narrowing construction,

noncandidate committee status applies to organizations that

have the purpose of making or receiving contributions, or

making expenditures, for express advocacy or its functional

equivalent. Cf. Madigan, 697 F.3d at 488 (holding that

Illinois’ political committee definition’s “limit of ‘on behalf

of or in opposition to’ confines the realm of regulated activity

to expenditures and contributions within the core area of

genuinely campaign-related transactions”).8

Second, Hawaii’s registration and reporting requirements

are not triggered until an organization makes more than

$1,000 in aggregate contributions and expenditures during a

two-year election period. See HRS § 11-321(g); HAR § 3-

160-21(a). This threshold also ensures that an organization

must be more than incidentally engaged in political advocacy

before it will be required to register and file reports as a

noncandidate committee. Third, an organization that “raises

or expends funds for the sole purpose of producing and

disseminating informational or educational communications”

– even if it also engages in limited political advocacy costing

less than $1,000 in the aggregate – need not register as a

noncandidate committee. See HRS §§ 11-302; 11-321(g). 

8 Hawaii’s definition is distinguishable from the Wisconsin regulation

struck down in Barland, 751 F.3d at 822, 834–37, which treated an

organization as a political committee if it, inter alia, spent more than $300

to communicate “almost anything . . . about a candidate within 30 days of

a primary and 60 days of a general election.” Hawaii’s more tailored

disclosure regime only extends to organizations with the purpose of

engaging in express advocacy or its functional equivalent. See Sorrell,

758 F.3d at 137–38 (distinguishing Barland and upholding Vermont’s

political committee regime, which applied only to groups that accepted

contributions and made expenditures over $1,000 “for the purpose of

supporting or opposing one or more candidates”).

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Fourth, if an organization registers as a noncandidate

committee, but subsequently reduces its advocacy activity

below the $1,000 threshold, it need only file a single report

per election period or can terminate its registration. HRS

§ 11-339.9

Given these limits and the extent of A-1’s past and

planned political advocacy, we have little trouble concluding

that the regulations are constitutional as applied to A-1. A-1,

which made more than $50,000 in contributions and spent

more than $6,000 on political ads in 2010, clearly engages in

more than incidental political advocacy. Although A-1 now

pledges to limit its individual contributions to $250 and to

contribute only to candidates, these proposed activities –

combined with A-1’s expenditures on its political ads –

9 The reporting requirements of Hawaii law are more narrowly tailored

than the “onerous” and “potentially perpetual” reporting requirement

preliminary enjoined in Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v.

Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 873–74 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). In Minnesota,

an organization must register as a political committee once it spends $100

in the aggregate on political advocacy, and once registered, it must “file

five reports during a general election year” even if the committee makes

no further expenditures. Id. at 873, 876; see also Iowa Right to Life

Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 596–98 (8th Cir. 2013) (striking

down Iowa’s ongoing reporting requirements that were untethered to any

future political spending). We do not agree that such reporting

requirements are “onerous” as a general matter. See Human Life, 624 F.3d

at 1013–14. Moreover, unlike in Minnesota, an organization need not

register as a noncandidate committee in Hawaii until it crosses the $1,000

threshold for a two-year election cycle, see HRS § 11-321(g), and a

committee with aggregate contributions and expenditures of $1,000 or less

in any subsequent election cycle need only file a single, final electionperiod report, see HRS § 11-326. Hawaii’s reporting regime is thus

contingent on an organization’s ongoing contributions and expenditures,

reflecting its closer tailoring to Hawaii’s informational interest than

Minnesota’s analogous regime.

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plainly exceed incidental activity. Hawaii thus has a strong

interest in regulating A-1.

Hawaii’s choice of a $1,000 registration and reporting

threshold is also a far cry from the zero dollar threshold

invalidated in Canyon Ferry, 556 F.3d at 1033–34. See also

Worley, 717 F.3d at 1251 (noting that “federal PAC

requirements kick in once a group has raised $1000 during a

calendar year to influence elections and . . . these

requirements have not been held unconstitutional” (citing

1 U.S.C. § 431(4)(a) (2012))). Although we carefully

scrutinize the constitutionality of a legislature’s chosen

threshold for imposing registration and reporting

requirements, see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248–49

(2006) (plurality opinion), the precise “line is necessarily a

judgmental decision, best left in the context of this complex

legislation to [legislative] discretion,” Family PAC, 685 F.3d

at 811 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83); see also Worley,

717 F.3d at 1253 (“Challengers are free to petition the

legislature to reset the reporting requirements for Florida’s

PAC regulations, but we decline to do so here.”). At least as

applied to A-1, Hawaii’s $1,000 threshold adequatelyensures

that political committee burdens are not imposed on “groups

that only incidentally engage” in political advocacy. Human

Life, 624 F.3d at 1011.

A-1’s argument that regulations should reach only

organizations with a primary purpose of political advocacy

also ignores the “fundamental organizational reality that most

organizations do not have just one major purpose.” Human

Life, 624 F.3d at 1011 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Large organizations that spend only one percent of

their funds on political advocacy likely have many other,

more important purposes – but this small percentage could

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amount to tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars in political

activity, depending on the size of the organization. See id.;

see also Madigan, 697 F.3d at 489–90; McKee, 649 F.3d at

59. The $1,000 threshold appropriately reaches these

multipurpose organizations’ participation in the political

process.

A-1’s political advocacyunderscores this point. Although

A-1’s political spending may be limited in proportion to its

overall activities, the strength of Hawaii’s informational

interest does not fluctuate based on the diversity of the

speaker’s activities. Hawaii has an interest in ensuring the

public can follow the money in an election cycle, regardless

of whether it comes from a single-issue, political advocacy

organization or a for-profit corporation such as A-1. The

Commission makes the reported information freely available

in searchable databases on its website, which provides

Hawaiians with a vital window into the flow of campaign

dollars.10 This prompt, electronic disclosure of contributions

and expenditures “can provide . . . citizens with the

information needed to hold corporations and elected officials

accountable for their positions and supporters,” Citizens

United, 558 U.S. at 370, and “given the Internet, disclosure

offers much more robust protections against corruption,”

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460. Thus, the distinction

between A-1, a for-profit electrical contractor, and a group

like Human Life of Washington, a “nonprofit, pro-life

advocacy corporation,” 624 F.3d at 994, is not

constitutionally significant here. A-1 may not make political

advocacy a priority, but it nonetheless has been a significant

participant in Hawaii’s electoral process, justifying the state’s

imposition of registration and reporting burdens.

 

10 See http://ags.hawaii.gov/campaign/nc/.

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Furthermore, Hawaii’s noncandidate committee

definition, by extending beyond organizations making

political advocacy a priority, avoids the circumvention of

valid campaign finance laws and disclosure requirements. 

See Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1011–12. As the Seventh

Circuit has explained:

[L]imiting disclosure requirements to groups

with the major purpose of influencing

elections would allow even those very groups

to circumvent the law with ease. Any

organization dedicated primarily to electing

candidates or promoting ballot measures

could easily dilute that major purpose by just

increasing its non-electioneering activities or

better yet by merging with a sympathetic

organization that engaged in activities

unrelated to campaigning.

Madigan, 697 F.3d at 489. Hawaii’s definition addresses the

“hard lesson of circumvention” in the campaign finance

arena, by including within its reach any entity that has

political advocacy as one of its goals. McConnell, 540 U.S.

at 165. As the district court explained:

[A-1] has purposely not created a separate

organizational structure for election-related

activity, choosing instead to register itself (A1 A-Lectrician, Inc.) as a noncandidate

committee. If it were allowed to avoid

registration merely because its political

activity is small proportionally to its overall

activities (as an electrical contractor and

perhaps as a pure issue advocacy

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organization), it would encourage any

affiliated noncandidate committee to avoid

disclosure requirements by merging its

activities into a larger affiliated organization.

Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (citation omitted).11

In sum, the noncandidate committee definition and

accompanying reporting and disclosure requirements are

substantially related to Hawaii’s important interests in

informing the electorate, preventing corruption or its

appearance, and avoiding the circumvention of valid

campaign finance laws. Because the burden of complying

with this disclosure scheme is modest compared to the

significance of the interests being served, we uphold Hawaii’s

noncandidate committee reporting and disclosure

requirements as applied to A-1.

In doing so on an as-applied basis, we have no occasion

to consider whether Hawaii law would withstand exacting

scrutiny as applied to another business or nonprofit group that

seeks to engage in less substantial political advocacy than A1. We decline to “speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or

11 Although not directly relevant to A-1’s challenge – because A-1’s

political activities are self-financed and it receives no contributions – we

also note the heightened importance of noncandidate committee disclosure

requirements now that the limit on contributions to noncandidate

committees has been permanently enjoined. A single contributor may

provide thousands of dollars to independent committees, and yet avoid

disclosing its identity if the committee makes all the expenditures itself. 

The noncandidate committee definition acts to ensure that the

contributor’s identity will be disclosed to the voting public. Hawaii’s

efforts to provide transparency would be incomplete if disclosure was not

required in such circumstances.

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‘imaginary’ cases.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State

Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). Based on the

record before us, we hold only that noncandidate committee

status may be extended to organizations, such as A-1, even

though their primary purpose is not political advocacy. The

burdens attending such a status are modest and substantially

related to important government interests.

B. The Disclaimer Requirement for Advertisements is

Constitutional Under Citizens United

A-1 contends that Hawaii’s requirement that political

advertising include a disclaimer as to the affiliation of the

advertiser with a candidate or candidate committee cannot

survive exacting scrutiny. “Advertisements” for purposes of

Hawaii election law are print and broadcast communications

that (1) identify a candidate or ballot issue directly or by

implication and (2) “advocate[] or support[] the nomination,

opposition, or election of the candidate, or advocate[] the

passage or defeat of the issue or question on the ballot.” HRS

§ 11-302. The challenged disclaimer rule provides that an

advertisement must include a “notice in a prominent location”

that “[t]he advertisement has the approval and authority of the

candidate” or “has not been approved by the candidate.” 

HRS § 11-391(a)(2).12, 13 The rule thus advises voters

whether an advertisement is coordinated with or independent

12 A-1 does not challenge the related requirement that all political

advertisements disclose the name and address of the person or entity

paying for the ad. See HRS § 11-391(a)(1).

 

13 This provision was amended during the pendency of this appeal, but

the minor changes are immaterial. See 2014 Hawaii Laws Act 128 (H.B.

452).

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from a candidate for elected office. The fine for violating this

section is $25 per advertisement, not to exceed $5,000 in the

aggregate. See HRS § 11-391(b).

A-1 seeks to place advertisements that (1) mention a

candidate by name; (2) run in close proximity to an election;

and (3) include language stating that particular candidates

“are representatives who do not listen to the people,” “do not

understand the importance of the values that made our nation

great” or “do not show the aloha spirit.” It argues the

disclaimer requirement is unconstitutional because it

regulates the content of speech itself and is therefore an even

greater incursion on its First Amendment rights than

reporting requirements. A-1 further contends a disclaimer

can be mandated only for speech that is a federal

electioneering communication, as defined by federal law, or

that is express advocacy, not including its functional

equivalent.

We agree with the district court that the disclaimer

requirement survives exacting scrutiny as applied to A-1’s

newspaper advertisements. Like the noncandidate committee

requirements, the disclaimer serves an important

governmental interest by informing the public about who is

speaking in favor or against a candidate before the election

and imposes only a modest burden on First Amendment

rights. A-1’s arguments to the contrary are all but foreclosed

by Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–69.

First, the disclaimer requirement imposes only a modest

burden on A-1’s First Amendment rights. Like disclosure

requirements, “[d]isclaimer . . . requirements may burden the

ability to speak, but they impose no ceiling on campaignrelated activities and do not prevent anyone from speaking.” 

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Id. at 366 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Hawaii’s disclaimer requirement is no more burdensome than

the one for televised electioneering communications upheld

in Citizens United. See id. at 366–69. That rule required a

statement as to who was responsible for the content of the

advertisement “be made in a ‘clearly spoken manner,’ and

displayed on the screen in a ‘clearly readable manner’ for at

least four seconds,” along with a further statement that “the

communication ‘is not authorized by any candidate or

candidate’s committee.’” Id. at 366 (quoting 2 U.S.C.

§ 441d(d)(2), (a)(3)). Similarly, all that is required here is a

short statement stating that the advertisement is published,

broadcast, televised, or circulated with or without the

approval and authority of the candidate. See HRS § 11-

391(a).

Second, requiring a disclaimer is closely related to

Hawaii’s important governmental interest in “dissemination

of information regarding the financing of political messages.” 

McKee, 649 F.3d at 61. A-1’s past advertisements ran shortly

before an election and criticized candidates by name as

persons who did not, for example, “listen to the people.” As

the district court found, these advertisements – published on

or shortly before election day – are not susceptible to any

reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote

against a candidate. Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1055. 

Such ads are the very kind for which “the public has an

interest in knowing who is speaking,” Citizens United,

558 U.S. at 369, and where disclaimers can “avoid confusion

by making clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or

political party,” id. at 368. See also Worley, 717 F.3d at

1253–55 (rejecting a challenge to an analogous disclaimer

requirement); McKee, 649 F.3d at 61 (same); Alaska Right to

Life, 441 F.3d at 792–93 (same). And contrary to A-1’s

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argument, nothing in Citizens United suggests that a state

may not require disclaimers for political advertising that is

not the functional equivalent of a federal electioneering

communication. In applying the federal disclaimer

requirement to an advertisement urging voters to see a short

film about a presidential candidate, Citizens United explained

that “[e]ven if the ads only pertain to a commercial

transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who is

speaking about a candidate shortly before an election.” 

558 U.S. at 369.14

Accordingly, the disclaimer requirement does not violate

the First Amendment as applied to A-1’s political

advertisements.

14 We reject A-1’s comparison to the disclaimer invalidated by the

Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334,

340 (1995), which prohibited the distribution of pamphlets without the

name and address of the person responsible for the materials, or to the

disclosure provision invalidated by this court in ACLU of Nev. v. Heller,

378 F.3d 979, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2004), which required persons paying for

publication of any material “relating to an election” to include their names

and addresses. Citizens United’s post-McIntyre, post-Heller discussion

makes clear that disclaimer laws such as Hawaii’s may be imposed on

political advertisements that discuss a candidate shortly before an election. 

See 558 U.S. at 368–69; see also Worley, 717 F.3d at 1254 (rejecting the

argument that McIntyre dictated the demise of Florida’s analogous

disclaimer requirement). An individual pamphleteer may have an interest

in maintaining anonymity, but “[l]eaving aside McIntyre-type

communications . . . there is a compelling state interest in informing voters

who or what entity is trying to persuade them to vote in a certain way.” 

Alaska Right to Life, 441 F.3d at 793.

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C. A-1 Lacks Standing to Challenge the Electioneering

Communications Reporting Requirements

A-1 acknowledges that, at the time it filed this action, it

lacked standing to challenge the electioneering

communications law if it must continue to register as a

noncandidate committee. See Washington Envtl. Council v.

Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A plaintiff

must demonstrate standing for each claim he or she seeks to

press and for each form of relief sought.” (citing

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)). 

A-1 argues, however, that it now has standing because

Hawaii law was amended as of November 5, 2014, to require

registered noncandidate committees to comply with

electioneering communications reporting requirements. See

2013 Haw. Sess. L. Act 112. But, “[s]tanding is determined

as of the commencement of litigation.” Biodiversity Legal

Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002); see

also Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except

mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing

of the complaint. . . . The party invoking the jurisdiction of

the court cannot rely on events that unfolded after the filing

of the complaint to establish its standing.” (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on

other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S.

413 (2010); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569

n.4 (1992) (“The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily

depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed. 

It cannot be that, by later participating in the suit, the State

Department and AID retroactively created a redressability

(and hence a jurisdiction) that did not exist at the outset.” 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Accordingly, because we conclude the noncandidate

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committee requirements can be constitutionally applied to A1, and A-1 was not subject to the “electioneering

communication” reporting requirements as of the date the

complaint was filed, we do not consider A-1’s constitutional

challenge to those requirements. See HRS § 11-341.15

D. The Contractor Contribution Ban is Constitutional

Even As Applied to Contributions to Legislators Who

Neither Award nor Oversee Contracts

A-1’s final First Amendment challenge is to Hawaii’s ban

on contributions by government contractors. The challenged

provision makes it

unlawful for any person who enters into any

contract with the State, any of the counties, or

any department or agency thereof either for

the rendition of personal services, the buying

of property, or furnishing of any material,

supplies, or equipment to the State, any of the

counties, any department or agency thereof, or

for selling any land or building to the State,

any of the counties, or any department or

agency thereof, if payment for the

performance of the contract or payment for

material, supplies, equipment, land, property,

or building is to be made in whole or in part

from funds appropriated by the legislative

body, at any time between the execution of

15 Nothing we say today (other than as a matter of stare decisis)

precludes A-1 from bringing a future challenge to the electioneering

communication reporting requirements to which, it claims, it is now

subject.

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the contract through the completion of the

contract, to:

. . . Directly or indirectly make any

contribution, or promise expressly or

impliedly to make any contribution to any

candidate committee or noncandidate

committee, or to any candidate or to any

person for any political purpose or use;

HRS § 11-355(a).

A-1 does not challenge the ban as applied to contributions

it makes to lawmakers or legislative candidates who either

decide whether it will receive a contract or oversee its

performance of a contract. Instead, A-1 asserts it intends to

make contributions only to lawmakers or candidates who will

neither award nor oversee its contracts, and it argues the

government contractor contribution ban is unconstitutional

solely as applied to those intended contributions.16

Contribution bans are subject to “closely drawn” scrutiny. 

See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146,

161–63 (2003) (applying the closely drawn standard in

upholding a federal law banning campaign contributions

made by corporations); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego,

645 F.3d 1109, 1124 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying closely

16 A-1 challenges only its right to make contributions to state legislative

candidates while acting as a state government contractor. It does not

distinctly argue, for example, that § 11-355(a) impermissibly infringes its

right to contribute to county or municipal officials while serving as a state

contractor. We therefore have no occasion to decide whether the ban

would survive First Amendment scrutiny as applied to those

circumstances.

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drawn scrutiny to a city ordinance making it unlawful for

“non-individuals” to contribute directly to candidates). A

regulation satisfies closely drawn scrutiny when “the State

demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs

means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of

associational freedoms.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25) (internal quotation marks

omitted).17

A-1 does not argue that Hawaii’s government contractor

contribution ban is unconstitutional as a general matter. The

Second Circuit confronted a similar ban in Green Party of

Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010). There,

the court turned away a First Amendment challenge to

Connecticut’s ban on campaign contributions by state

contractors, holding that it furthered a “‘sufficiently

important’ government interest[]” by “combat[ing] both

actual corruption and the appearance of corruption caused by

contractor contributions.” Id. at 200. The court further held

that the ban was “closely drawn” because it targeted

contributions by current and prospective state contractors –

the contributions associated most strongly with actual and

perceived corruption. See id. at 202. Recognizing a ban on

17 We previously noted that Beaumont and other cases applying the

closely drawn standard to contribution limits remained good law after

Citizens United. See Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1124–25. This remains true

after McCutcheon. There, the Supreme Court considered the

constitutionality of “aggregate limits” under federal law, which

“restrict[ed] how much money a donor [could] contribute in total to all

candidates or committees” in a given election period. See 134 S. Ct. at

1442 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)). Because the Court held that the

aggregate limit for federal elections failed even under less stringent,

“closely drawn” scrutiny, the Court declined to revisit the proper standard

of review for contribution limits. See id. at 1445–46.

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contributions by government contractors, rather than a mere

limit on the amount of those contributions, was “a drastic

measure,” the court held that the ban was closely drawn

because it addressed a perception of corruption brought about

by recent government-contractor-related corruption scandals

in Connecticut. See id. at 193–94, 204–05. The ban

“unequivocally addresses the perception of corruption”

because, “[b]y totally shutting off the flow of money from

contractors to state officials, it eliminates any notion that

contractors can influence state officials by donating to their

campaigns.” Id. at 205; see also Ognibene v. Parkes,

671 F.3d 174, 185 (2d Cir. 2011) (“When the appearance of

corruption is particularly strong due to recent scandals . . . a

ban may be appropriate.”).

The same reasoning applies here. Hawaii’s government

contractor contribution ban serves sufficiently important

governmental interests by combating both actual and the

appearance of quid pro quo corruption. Green Party,

616 F.3d at 200; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450

(reaffirming that a legislature may limit contributions to

prevent actual quid pro quo corruption or its appearance); cf.

Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 736–37 (4th Cir. 2011)

(upholding a complete ban on contributions by lobbyists “as

a prophylactic to prevent not only actual corruption but also

the appearance of corruption in future state political

campaigns”). It is closely drawn because it targets direct

contributions from contractors to officeholders and

candidates, the contributions most closelylinked to actual and

perceived quid pro quo corruption. See Green Party,

616 F.3d at 202; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452

(noting that the “risk of quid pro quo corruption or its

appearance” is greatest when “a donor contributes to a

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candidate directly”).18 And as in Connecticut, Hawaii’s

decision to adopt an outright ban rather than mere restrictions

on how much contractors could contribute was justified in

light of past “pay to play” scandals and the widespread

appearance of corruption that existed at the time of the

legislature’s actions. See Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at

1058–59 nn. 26–27 (summarizing the evidence of past

scandals and the perception of corruption). Thus, as a general

matter, Hawaii’s ban on contributions by government

contractors satisfies closely drawn scrutiny.

A-1’s narrower argument that the contractor contribution

ban is unconstitutional as applied to its contributions to

lawmakers and candidates who neither award nor oversee its

contracts is also without merit. Hawaii’s interest in

preventing actual or the appearance of quid pro quo

corruption is no less potent as applied to A-1’s proposed

contributions because the Hawaii legislature as a whole

considers all bills concerning procurement. Thus, although

an individual legislator may not be closely involved in

awarding or overseeing a particular contract, state money can

18 Hawaii’s contractor contribution ban is narrower than many others. 

The ban upheld in Green Party, for example, applied not only to

contractors but also to principals of that contractor and to family members

of a contractor or of a principal of a contractor. See Green Party,

616 F.3d at 202–03. The federal ban is also broader than the Hawaii ban;

it applies not only to existing contractors but also to prospective

contractors. See 2 U.S.C. § 441c. Hawaii’s law does not prohibit A-1

from making contributions as a prospective contractor, A-1’s principals

(such as plaintiff Yamada) frommaking contributions or A-1 frommaking

independent expenditures on behalf of the candidates it seeks to support. 

Cf. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161 n.8 (“A ban on direct corporate

contributions leaves individual members of corporations free tomake their

own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no material

information.”).

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be spent only with an appropriation by the entire legislature. 

See Haw. Const. art. VII, §§ 5, 9. Hawaii reasonably

concluded that contributions to any legislator could give rise

to the appearance of corruption.

In essence, A-1 contends that Hawaii’s contractor ban

should be tailored more narrowly, but narrower tailoring is

not required here. There is no question the ban is closely

drawn to the state’s anticorruption interest as a general

matter, and we decline to revisit the legislature’s judgment

not to craft a still narrower provision. Closely drawn scrutiny

requires “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable,”

and Hawaii’s contractor contribution ban is a reasonable

response to the strong appearance of corruption that existed

at the time of the legislature’s actions. McCutcheon, 134 S.

Ct. at 1456 (quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y.

v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We need not “determine with any degree of

exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the

statute’s legitimate objectives” to uphold the contribution

ban. Randall, 548 U.S. at 248.

Even if narrower tailoring were required, A-1’s proposal

for a narrower ban is unworkable. A-1 does not explain how

it would determine, before the election, which candidates

would neither award nor oversee any of its contracts. The

membership of the various legislative committees can change

with each election, and a different committee – whether the

Education Committee or Public Safety, Government

Operations, and Military Affairs Committee – may serve a

greater or lesser oversight role on a particular project. There

is, therefore, a “clear fallacy” in A-1’s logic:

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[During the 2011 Legislative Session], A-1

testified . . . in favor of a construction and

procurement-related bill regarding the

University of Hawaii. At least three

Legislators that served on committees that

considered the bill (and voted in favor of it)

also received campaign contributions from A1 in the 2010 elections. And A-1 made

contributions to opponents of fifteen other

Legislators who considered the bill.

Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 n.30 (citation omitted). 

Simply put, A-1 cannot predict with certainty which

candidates will not become involved in the contract award or

oversight process when it makes its contributions. Moreover,

A-1’s contributions to candidates who do not become directly

involved in contract award and oversight could still create the

appearance of “the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political

favors.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting Fed.

Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action

Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

For these reasons, we hold that Hawaii’s government

contractor contribution ban survives closely drawn scrutiny

even as applied to A-1’s proposed contributions to candidates

who neither decide whether A-1 receives contracts nor

oversee A-1’s contracts.

IV. Attorney’s Fees

Finally, we consider the district court’s fee award to

Yamada and Stewart (the plaintiffs) for their successful

constitutional challenge to the $1,000 limit on contributions

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to noncandidate committees, HRS § 11-358. Under

41 U.S.C. § 1988(b), the district court had discretion to award

“the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.” We

review the award for an abuse of discretion, but any element

of legal analysis that figures into the district court’s decision

is reviewed de novo. See Watson v. Cnty. of Riverside,

300 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002). The plaintiffs’ primary

contention, with which we agree, is that the district court

erred by refusing to award the fees they incurred in

successfully defending against the defendants’ interlocutory

appeal. We address the plaintiffs’ other contentions in a

concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

In October 2010, the district court granted a preliminary

injunction in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim that HRS

§ 11-358, limiting to $1,000 contributions to noncandidate

committees, violates the First Amendment. The defendants

then filed an interlocutory appeal. After the parties finished

briefing in this court, however, the defendants dismissed the

appeal, presumably in light of an intervening decision

upholding a preliminary injunction of a similar contribution

limit. See Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1117–21. In subsequent

district court proceedings, the defendants offered to stipulate

to a permanent injunction against § 11-358. The parties,

however, were unable to reach agreement on the form of an

injunction, and on the parties’ subsequent cross-motions for

summary judgment, the district court permanently enjoined

§ 11-358 as applied to the plaintiffs’ proposed contributions.

Based on their successful constitutional challenge to § 11-

358, Yamada and Stewart sought attorney’s fees and costs,

including those fees incurred in defending against the

defendants’ interlocutory appeal, under § 1988. The district

court granted in part and denied in part their fee request. As

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relevant here, it concluded it had “no authority” to award fees

pertaining to the interlocutory appeal because (1) the

plaintiffs became prevailing parties when the defendants

abandoned their appeal of the preliminary injunction, see

Watson, 300 F.3d at 1095 (stating that, under certain

circumstances, “a plaintiff who obtains a preliminary

injunction is a prevailing party for purposes of § 1988”), and

(2) under Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6 and Cummings v.

Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (Cummings II),

“[a] district court is not authorized to award attorney’s fees

for an appeal unless we transfer the fee request to the district

court for consideration.” Because it assumed the plaintiffs

could have requested fees from the Ninth Circuit as

prevailing parties when the defendants dismissed their appeal,

the court concluded it had no authority to award fees for the

appeal.

The plaintiffs contend, and we agree, that the district

court’s analysis was flawed for two reasons. First, contrary

to the district court’s analysis, Yamada and Stewart were not

yet prevailing parties when the defendants dismissed their

interlocutory appeal and could not have requested fees at that

time. A court may award attorney’s fees under § 1988 only

to a “prevailing party,” and a plaintiff prevails for purposes

of § 1988 only “when actual relief on the merits of his claim

materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by

modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly

benefits the plaintiff.” Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma,

717 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby,

506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). This requires an “enduring” change in the parties’

relationship, Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 86 (2007), that has

“‘judicial imprimatur’ . . . such as a judgment on the merits

or a court-ordered consent decree,” Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096

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(quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t

of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001)).

The district court concluded that the plaintiffs were

prevailing parties under Watson, but Watson is

distinguishable. As explained in Higher Taste, Watson stands

for the proposition that, “when a plaintiff wins a preliminary

injunction and the case is rendered moot before final

judgment, either by the passage of time or other

circumstances beyond the parties’ control, the plaintiff is a

prevailing party eligible for a fee award.” Higher Taste,

717 F.3d at 717 (emphasis added). Here, the plaintiffs’

challenge to HRS § 11-358 was not “rendered moot” until the

district court entered final judgment against the Commission

on that claim. A plaintiff does not become a prevailing party

until it obtains relief that is “no longer subject to being

‘reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final

decision in the same case.’” Id. (quoting Sole, 551 U.S. at

83). Here, that occurred when the district court entered a

final judgment on the plaintiffs’ § 11-358 claim, not when the

Commission abandoned its appeal of the adverse preliminary

injunction ruling.

19

The defendants argue Yamada and Stewart were

nonetheless prevailing parties at the time the defendants

dismissed their interlocutory appeal because the preliminary

19 Higher Taste extended Watson’s prevailing party analysis to

circumstances in which a plaintiff obtains a preliminary injunction and

then the case is dismissed upon the parties’ stipulation following

settlement, when the settlement agreement provides the plaintiff with

“what it had hoped to obtain through a permanent injunction.” 717 F.3d

at 717–18. Here, however, the parties did not reach a settlement

agreement at the time of the preliminary injunction appeal or any time

thereafter.

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injunction issued by the district court was not an “ephemeral”

victory at all, but “a published opinion, resolving a

constitutional question, enjoining a campaign finance law

weeks before an election.” That the preliminary injunction

would be converted into a permanent one appeared to be a

“foregone conclusion” to the parties and the district court,

particularly once we issued our decision in Thalheimer.

We disagree. Because the preliminary injunction order

could be negated by a final decision on the merits, it was an

interlocutory order that did not confer prevailing party status

on the plaintiffs when the defendants dismissed their appeal.

Furthermore, because the plaintiffs were not yet

prevailing parties when the defendants dismissed the

interlocutory appeal, the district court erred by relying on

Cummings II to deny them attorney’s fees for the appeal. 

Cummings II was the second appeal before this court in a case

proceeding under § 1983. The district court granted summary

judgment to the plaintiffs in the underlying case, and the

defendant appealed that final order. In Cummings v. Connell,

316 F.3d 886, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2003) (Cummings I), we

upheld the grant of summary judgment as to the defendant’s

liability, thus preserving the plaintiffs’ status as prevailing

parties on the merits, but remanded for reconsideration of

damages. On remand, the district court awarded an additional

$30,000 in attorney’s fees the plaintiffs had incurred

defending against the defendant’s prior appeal in Cummings

I. Cummings II, 402 F.3d at 942, 947. The parties crossappealed again. We held that the fees related to the first

appeal were improperly awarded “because plaintiffs failed to

file their request with the court of appeals as required by

Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6.” Id. at 947. In short,

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[p]laintiffs’ application for attorneys’ fees and

expenses incurred on appeal in Cummings I

should have been filed with the Clerk of the

Ninth Circuit. Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.8

authorizes us to transfer a timely-filed

fees-on-appeal request to the district court for

consideration, but the decision to permit the

district court to handle the matter rests with

the court of appeals. In the absence of such a

transfer, the district court was not authorized

to rule on the request for appellate attorney’s

fees.

Id. at 947–48.20See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter,

543 F.3d 1152, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In Cummings [II], we

held that appellate fees requested pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 must be filed with the Clerk of the Ninth Circuit in the

first instance, not with the district court.”). Accordingly, we

reversed the attorney’s fees award for the first appeal, holding

that the plaintiffs’ request for fees was untimely. See

Cummings II, 402 F.3d at 948.

 

20 Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6(a) reads:

Absent a statutory provision to the contrary, a request

for attorneys’ fees shall be filed no later than 14 days

after the expiration ofthe period within which a petition

for rehearing may be filed, unless a timely petition for

rehearing is filed. If a timely petition for rehearing is

filed, the request for attorneys fees shall be filed no

later than 14 days after the Court’s disposition of the

petition.

This amended version of Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6 omits the “shall be

filed with the Clerk” language of the prior version, but as the district court

correctly concluded, the amendment did not alter the substance ofthe rule.

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Cummings II, however, did not consider a situation in

which a party prevails on interlocutory review and only

subsequently becomes entitled to attorney’s fees under a feeshifting statute such as § 1988. When a plaintiff is not

entitled to attorney’s fees after an interlocutory appeal, as was

the case here, it cannot immediately request attorney’s fees

from this court. Should the plaintiff subsequently become a

prevailing party, however, it should presumptively be eligible

for attorney’s fees incurred during the first appeal, because

that appeal likely contributed to the success of the underlying

litigation. See Crumpacker v. Kansas, Dep’t of Human Res.,

474 F.3d 747, 756 (10th Cir. 2007) (Title VII) (holding that

“parties who prevail on interlocutory review in this court, and

who subsequently become prevailing parties . . . are implicitly

entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees related to the

interlocutory appeal”); cf. Cabrales v. Cnty. of L.A., 935 F.2d

1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that “a plaintiff who is

unsuccessful at a stage of litigation that was a necessary step

to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney’s fees even for

the unsuccessful stage”).

Here, because Yamada and Stewart prevailed in an

interlocutory appeal, and subsequently became prevailing

parties after the district court entered judgment in their favor,

the district court erred by failing to consider whether to award

them reasonable appellate attorney’s fees. We hold that

Yamada and Stewart are entitled to attorney’s fees arising

from the prior appeal. The matter is referred to the Ninth

Circuit Appellate Commissioner to determine the amount of

fees to be awarded.21

 

21 The plaintiffs further argue Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6 cannot restrict

the jurisdiction of the district court to award attorney’s fees related to a

prior appeal where a fee-shifting statute, such as § 1988, does not preclude

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V. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the district court on the merits

of A-1’s constitutional claims. We vacate the district court’s

fee award to Yamada and Stewart in part and refer the matter

to the Ninth Circuit Appellate Commissioner for a

determination of the proper fee award arising out of the

interlocutory appeal. Each party shall bear its own costs on

appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART;

REFERRED TO THE APPELLATE COMMISSIONER

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

the district court from awarding such fees. The EighthCircuit agreed with

this position in Little Rock School District v. State of Arkansas, 127 F.3d

693, 696 (8th Cir. 1997), where it held that, despite an analogous Eighth

Circuit rule to our Rule 39-1.6, “the district courts retain jurisdiction to

decide attorneys’ fees issues that we have not ourselves undertaken to

decide.” Although the plaintiffs’ argument has some appeal, we are bound

by our contrary holding in Cummings II.

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