Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01152/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1152

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

*

v. * On Appeal from the United

* States District Court for the 

Stute Company, Inc., * District of Nebraska.

*

Defendant-Appellant; *

*

S.R. Livestock, Inc.; *

State Bank of Benkelman, Nebraska; *

A. M. Hahn, *

*

Defendants. *

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Submitted: August 26, 2004

Filed: March 30, 2005

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

The United States brought an action to foreclose a mortgage Stute Company,

Inc. (Stute) had given it to secure a loan. The district court granted the United States'

motion for summary judgment, entered judgment, decreed foreclosure of the

mortgage, and ordered a sale of the property. Stute appeals. We dismiss the appeal

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The United States also asked the district court to vacate its prior judgments

and dismiss the action. That motion, however, was presented to the court after the

notice of appeal had been filed. Thus, the district court found it had no jurisdiction

to consider the motion and forwarded the motion to us. 

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insofar as Stute has not timely appealed the summary-judgment ruling and vacate and

remand with instructions to dismiss because the remaining issues are now moot.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 1980, the United States, through the Farmers Home Administration,

lent money to Stute. As security, Stute gave the United States a real-estate mortgage

covering land located in Dundy County, Nebraska. Stute fell into default on the loan.

In July 2001 the United States filed an action to foreclose the mortgage to satisfy the

debt.

The district court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment,

decreed foreclosure, and ordered that the property be sold after a twenty-day

redemption period had elapsed. Stute then filed various motions. Some sought

amendments to the court's judgment, and they are detailed below. Another sought to

stay the foreclosure sale under Nebraska law. The district court denied the motion

to stay the foreclosure sale. The United States sought and obtained an order of sale

from the district court clerk, scheduling the sale for February 11, 2004. Stute paid the

underlying indebtedness it owed to the United States on February 10, 2004. As a

result, the United States cancelled the sale.1

 Stute's appeal questions the district

court's grant of summary judgment, its denial of Stute's motion to stay the foreclosure

sale, and the order of sale issued by the clerk of the district court.

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment

Stute claims the district court erred in granting the United States' summaryjudgment motion because the debt secured by the mortgage was not collectible and,

thus, the mortgage was not enforceable. The United States argues that we lack

jurisdiction, claiming Stute filed its notice of appeal too late to present that question.

We agree. A party must file a notice of appeal with the district court within sixty

days of the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken when the United States

is a party. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). "Timely filing is not merely a procedural

requirement, but 'is mandatory and jurisdictional.'" United States v. Fitzgerald, 109

F.3d 1339, 1342 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Bartunek v. Bubak, 941 F.2d 726, 728 (8th

Cir. 1991)). Stute filed its notice of appeal on January 14, 2004. The district court

entered judgment on October 10, 2003, amended it on October 15, 2003 (Amended

Judgment), amended it again on November 5, 2003 (Second Amended Judgment),

and amended it a final time by order on November 25, 2003 (November 25 Order).

The earliest district court order that is within the Rule 4(a) time frame is the

November 25 Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (notice of appeal must be filed

within sixty days of the judgment appealed). If the Rule 4 clock began to run upon

the original entry of judgment, the Amended Judgment, or the Second Amended

Judgment then Stute's appeal was untimely and we lack jurisdiction.

The district court amended its judgments because State Bank of Benkelman

(SBB) purportedly had a lien on the mortgaged property. On October 10, 2003, when

the first judgment was entered, the amount of SBB's claim, if any, remained unknown.

The district court ordered SBB to prove up the amount of its lien within ten days.

SBB filed a "Motion for Judgment" on October 14, 2003. Construing the motion as

one to make further factfinding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b), the

district court granted the timely motion and entered the Amended Judgment on

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October 15, 2003, to include a debt to SBB for approximately $58,000 and a lien for

that amount on the subject property.

On October 16, 2003, Stute filed two sets of papers that attacked SBB's debt

and lien and argued that SBB's claim had been extinguished in a prior bankruptcy. On

October 22, 2003, the district court construed Stute's papers as a motion to alter or

amend the judgment and ordered SBB to file a brief in response. On October 30,

2003, SBB filed a brief claiming the amount of the debt was correct but that it indeed

had no lien on the property because the bankruptcy court's decree had extinguished

it. The district court accordingly granted Stute's October 16 motions and entered the

Second Amended Judgment on November 5, 2003. 

The Second Amended Judgment appropriately stated that SBB had no lien on

the subject property, but it retained the language about the debt that Stute purportedly

owed SBB. This language posed problems to Stute when it sought to borrow money

to pay the debt that the United States was seeking to satisfy through the foreclosure.

So Stute contacted SBB and requested that it clarify the court's understanding of the

bankruptcy decree, which, according to Stute, had extinguished the debt as well. On

November 14, 2003, SBB filed a "Second Brief in Response to Memorandum and

Order Dated October 22, 2003" (Second Brief). In that brief, SBB acknowledged that

Stute owed it no money. On November 24, 2003, Stute filed a motion entitled, in

relevant part, "Renewed Motion that the United States District Court Stay Its Decree

of Sale in Favor of the United States Until the Court Has Once Again Amended Its

Final Decree and Order such that the Third Amended Order Indicates that the State

Bank of Benkelman Has No Remaining Claim Against the Stute Company" (Renewed

Motion). The district court granted that motion in its November 25 Order and

amended the Second Amended Judgment to say that Stute owed nothing to SBB.

Stute had sixty days from the disposition of the United States' summaryjudgment motion to file his notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Certain

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post-judgment motions filed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lengthen the

time within which the notice of appeal must be filed. Those motions must be "timely

file[d]" by a party. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). SBB's October 14 motion and Stute's

October 16 motions, all of which were construed as motions under Rule 52(b), were

filed within ten days of the of the judgments they sought to amend. Thus, they were

timely, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b), and therefore the time to appeal began to run "for all

parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion." Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). The last order disposing of those timely motions was entered

on November 5, 2003.

The United States argues that the time for appeal began to run on November

5, 2003, and therefore Stute's January 14, 2004, notice of appeal was untimely

because it was filed more than sixty days after the order was entered. Stute argues

that SBB's November 14 Second Brief constituted a motion attacking the judgment

under Rule 59(e), and that, as such a motion, it was timely because it was filed within

ten days of the November 5 Second Amended Judgment. If SBB's Second Brief were

a Rule 59(e) motion, we would agree that Stute's January 14 notice of appeal was

timely because it was filed within sixty days of the November 25 Order that disposed

of that motion. But SBB's Second Brief cannot be construed as a motion. Motions

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must, among other things, "set forth the

relief or order sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). The closest this brief comes to such

a statement is, "[t]o the extent the Decree in this case needs to be modified to satisfy

potential lenders of the Defendants, State Bank of Benkelman has no objection to

such modification," and "State Bank of Benkelman has no objection to any further

amendment to the Decree which will satisfy the Court and the other parties." SBB's

Second Brief does not seek any relief or order. Cf. Riley v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 1

F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction because the

appellant's motion to amend the judgment failed to comply with Rule 7).

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Similarly, it would be too much of a stretch to conclude that Stute's October

16 motion was a "remaining motion" for purposes of Rule 4(a)(4)(A). The November

5 order disposed of that motion and Stute recognized the necessity of the further

motion it made on November 24. And the district court did not base its November

25 Order on the October 16 motion.

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In fact, neither the district court nor Stute understood the Second Brief as a

motion. Stute filed its Renewed Motion on November 24 to correct the error, and the

district court ordered the Second Amended Judgment amended based on Stute's

Renewed Motion.2

 That cumbersomely titled motion—even if we construe it as a

Rule 52(b), Rule 59(e), or a Rule 60(b) motion—sought an amendment to the court's

Second Amended Judgment that was filed on November 5. But it was not filed on or

before November 19, 2003—the final day of the ten-day period. See Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(4)(A)(ii, iv, vi), 26(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Thus, that Renewed Motion did not

toll the time in which Stute could file its notice of appeal, and the November 5

Second Amended Judgment started the clock for Rule 4 purposes. We are therefore

without jurisdiction to consider the errors Stute assigns to the district court's grant of

summary judgment—that the mortgage was unenforceable because the underlying

debt was unenforceable. Fitzgerald, 109 F.3d at 1341-42.

B. Motion for Stay

Stute's notice of appeal, however, lists more than the district court's grant of

summary judgment. Specifically, Stute appeals the district court's denial of its motion

to stay under Nebraska law. That motion was denied on December 12, 2003. So

Stute's appeal is timely with regard to the disposition of that motion.

Stute claims it was entitled to a nine-month stay under section 25-1506 of the

Nebraska Revised Statutes. Under section 25-1506, "[t]he order of sale on all decrees

for the sale of mortgaged premises shall be stayed for the period of nine months from

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and after the rendition of such decree." If this provision applies to the Nebraska

mortgage at issue, then a stay should have been entered. The United States responds

by arguing that this provision of Nebraska law was validly waived by Stute in the

mortgage. See United States v. Jacobsen, 319 F.3d 323, 324 (8th Cir. 2002) (per

curiam) (finding waiver valid under United States v. Birchem, 100 F.3d 607, 609 (8th

Cir. 1996)). However, the waiver provision the United States relies on only waives

"any right of redemption . . . following any foreclosure sale." Section 25-1506 does

not grant the mortgagor any right of redemption, and the stay it allows the defendantmortgagor is, by definition, pre-sale. Thus, this argument misses the mark.

However, many provisions of state law are preempted when the United States

acts as mortgagee. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).

In any event, Stute has made the issue of a stay under state law moot. When events

occur that leave the appellate court with no remedial power, the appeal is moot.

Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992); Fitzgerald, 109 F.3d

at 1342. After the district court entered its Second Amended Judgment and denied

the motion to stay, Stute did not seek a stay pending appeal. Rather, it paid the debt

that the United States was seeking to satisfy through the mortgage. Stute now claims

that the district court erred by refusing to stay the foreclosure sale for nine months

under Nebraska law. But the foreclosure sale has not occurred, nor will it occur. The

United States cannot request an order of sale now that it has accepted payment, and

we do not believe we have the power to direct a district court to stay a sale that will

not occur. Thus, the dispute over the stay has become moot.

Stute suggests that we order the United States to return the money Stute paid

to avoid the foreclosure sale. If we were to order the money returned, a foreclosure

sale would be inevitable, and a stay would be within a court's power to issue. But we

have no power to order the money returned. Stute cites a Nebraska case for the

proposition that a judgment debtor who pays a judgment to prevent execution on his

property does not thereby divest himself of the ability to pursue an appeal. While that

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Stute has also brought a third party's rights into this case. Stute sold its

interest in the property to Sitzman-Mitchell & Company, giving it a deed, and

retained an option to repurchase the property. Stute has given us no information as

to the terms of the option. In this regard, ordering the United States to pay money

back to Stute, even though (1) we have no assurances that Stute will reacquire the

property and (2) we are unsure of a court's ability to order Stute and the absent third

party to consummate such a transaction, implicates the rights of a third party that is

not before the court. This further supports our mootness determination. See Matter

of Magnes, 29 F.3d 1034, 1042-43 (5th Cir. 1994).

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premise is correct, Tungseth v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir.

1994), Stute's case is quite distinguishable. When a party pays a judgment that is

later invalidated, restitution remains an available and appropriate remedy because the

payee has no right to the payment made under the invalidated judgment. The

availability of that remedy keeps the dispute from becoming moot, even after

payment. Had the mortgage here been unenforceable, the United States would not be

entitled to the payment Stute made, restitution would be an available remedy, and the

availability of that relief would keep the enforceability question from becoming moot.

But we do not have the merits of the summary-judgment ruling—that which settled

the enforceability question—before us because we lack jurisdiction to consider that

issue. See ante. Thus, the district court's ruling on the validity of the debt underlying

the mortgage, and therefore the enforceability of the mortgage, is settled as the law

of the case. In re Design Classics, Inc., 788 F.2d 1384, 1386 (8th Cir. 1986). So the

United States was and is legally entitled to the payment it accepted. This remains true

even if the foreclosure sale should have been stayed. We cannot order the United

States to refund a payment to which it was legally entitled. Thus, restitution is not an

available remedy, and the question whether a stay should have issued remains moot

because we have no way of correcting the alleged error that Stute presents. By

choosing to pay the United States—rather than, for instance, posting a supersedeas

bond—Stute limited our remedial power and thereby mooted the stay issue.3

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C. Order of Sale

Finally, Stute asserts as error the order of sale issued by the district court clerk.

Stute raised this error before the district court in its November 24 Renewed Motion.

The district court denied this part of the motion on November 25, 2003. According

to Stute, the order of sale the clerk issued was invalid because it was issued under the

October 15, 2003, Amended Judgment, which was superseded by the Second

Amended Judgment on November 5, which was amended by the November 25 Order.

The order of sale was never executed by the United States Marshals because the sale

was cancelled by the United States after Stute's payment. Even if the order of sale

was deficient, the United States' action accorded Stute the relief we would be able to

give it. Thus, this issue is also moot. See McMillan v. Chief Judge, Circuit Ct. of

Greene County, 711 F.2d 108, 109 (8th Cir. 1983).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we vacate the judgments of the district court that were properly

appealed and remand with directions to dismiss the motions relating to those items

as moot. CIA v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 455 U.S.

997 (1982) (mem. order). The appeal is dismissed with regard to Stute's untimely

appeal of the district court's summary-judgment ruling. We return the United States'

motion to vacate and dismiss to the district court. If the district court chooses to

entertain the motion—which is premised on the impact of Stute's payment of the

underlying indebtedness—the United States should inform the district court whether

it has made and recorded the appropriate release of its interest in the subject property.

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