Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00321/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00321-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lorraine Patterson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona Department of Economic Security, 

et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00321-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the court is a joint Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 30) 

filed by the Arizona Department of Economic Security and eight individual defendants 

(collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff Lorraine Patterson seeks damages from 

Defendants for allegedly depriving her of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

during state court dependency proceedings that terminated Plaintiff’s custody over her 

daughter. In their Motion, Defendants urge dismissal of Patterson’s Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 17) on the grounds that 1) Patterson has failed to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted, 2) Defendants are protected by sovereign, qualified, and absolute 

immunity, and 3) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this court of subject-matter 

jurisdiction over “this de facto appeal of a state-court ruling.” (Doc. 30 at 2-3, 12-14.) 

 Under Rooker-Feldman, when a “losing party in state court file[s] suit in federal 

court after the state proceedings end[], complaining of an injury caused by the state-court 

judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment,” the federal district court 

lacks jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 

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(2005). Rooker-Feldman applies only in these “limited circumstances.” Id. at 291. The 

doctrine bars subject matter jurisdiction only where a “federal plaintiff asserts as a legal 

wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court 

judgment based on that decision.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act 

or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” Id. And, 

contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, a finding that prior state litigation is “inextricably 

intertwined” with subsequent federal litigation does not automatically trigger application 

of Rooker-Feldman: 

The premise for the operation of the “inextricably intertwined” test in 

Feldman is that the federal plaintiff is seeking to bring a forbidden de facto 

appeal. The federal suit is not a forbidden de facto appeal because it is 

“inextricably intertwined” with something. Rather, it is simply a forbidden 

de facto appeal. Only when there is already a forbidden de facto appeal in 

federal court does the “inextricably intertwined” test come into play: Once 

a federal plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden de facto appeal, as in Feldman, 

that federal plaintiff may not, as part of the suit in which the forbidden 

appeal is brought, seek to litigate an issue that is “inextricably intertwined” 

with the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto 

appeal is brought. 

Id. at 1158. 

 Here, Patterson does not ask this court to “review and reject” the state juvenile 

court’s judgment or to remedy an “injury” caused by that judgment. Instead, she merely 

requests damages against Defendants for their alleged violations of her constitutional 

rights. (Doc. 17-3 at 2.) 

 Defendant Regina Rodriguez works for the Arizona Foster Care Review Board, a 

“citizen review board created by Arizona statute” and “operated by the Arizona Supreme 

Court.” (Doc. 30 at 4.) The Board “reviews cases and provides reports to the juvenile 

court in dependency proceedings.” (Id. at 2.) It is not clear from the pleadings and 

Defendants’ Motion whether the Board qualifies as a judicial or quasi-judicial, as 

opposed to executive, actor. Even if the Board is judicial in nature, however, Plaintiff 

does not aim to “vacate or set aside the judgment” of the Board or the juvenile court to 

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which the Board reports. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1156. She simply seeks damages for “an 

allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party,” id. at 1164—namely, Rodriguez. 

Rooker-Feldman is thus no obstacle to jurisdiction. As all other Defendants are 

undoubtedly executive officers, they similarly cannot be responsible for “a legal injury 

caused by a state court judgment.” Id. at 1163. And Plaintiff does not move to set aside 

any such judgment in any event. 

 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does allege that, at various points during the state 

court proceedings, she was deprived of certain due process protections. For example, she 

asserts she “was denied the right to witnesses,” was “denied an evidential hearing,” and 

was “denied a continuance although unprepared to argue her case on July 24th, 2013.” 

(Doc. 17-2 at 18.) But her Amended Complaint does not attempt to have those 

procedural rulings vacated or otherwise to disturb the final judgment of the Arizona 

juvenile court. Defendants cite no authority suggesting Rooker-Feldman strips this court 

of jurisdiction to hear such complaints. 

Patterson’s claims may be barred by various immunities or come up short under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); further briefing is required before the court can 

decide that issue. But it is clear from the face of the Amended Complaint that Patterson 

has not filed an appeal—“de facto” or otherwise—of the juvenile court judgment. 

Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable to this case, and the portion of Defendants’ 

Motion that seeks dismissal under that doctrine must be denied. Because the remainder 

of Defendants’ Motion requests dismissal on non-jurisdictional grounds, Patterson will 

have seventeen days, rather than thirty-three, in which to file a response. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ joint Motion to Dismiss Third 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 30) is denied to the extent it seeks dismissal under Rooker- 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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Feldman. Plaintiff shall file a response to the remainder of the Motion no later than 

August 4, 2015. 

 Dated this 21st day of July, 2015. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

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