Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00991/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00991-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEAGUE FOR COASTAL PROTECTION, et

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Secretary of the

Interior; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE INTERIOR; and MINERALS MANAGEMENT

SERVICE and PETER TWEEDT, Regional

Manager;

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-0991-CW

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR

INTERIM AWARD OF

ATTORNEYS' FEES

AND COSTS 

Plaintiffs League for Coastal Protection, Otter Project,

Sierra Club, Citizens' Planning Association of Santa Barbara

County, Defenders of Wildlife, Environment California, Get Oil Out,

Natural Resources Defense Council, Santa Barbara Channel Keeper,

and Surfrider Foundation move for an interim award of attorneys'

fees and costs in the amount of $187,054.52. Defendants oppose the

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

Categorical exclusion means "a category of actions which do

not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the

human environment" and for which neither "an environmental

assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required." 40

C.F.R. § 1508.4.

2

motion. The matter was taken under submission on the papers. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court

GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion and awards interim fees and costs in the

amount of $185,230.28. 

BACKGROUND

In November, 1999, MMS granted suspensions for thirty-six oil

and gas leases located off of the central California coast, relying

on categorical exclusions1

 that allowed it to avoid conducting

environmental analyses. California ex rel. California Coastal

Comm'n v. Norton, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2001),

aff'd, 311 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002). In Norton, this Court deemed

those suspensions invalid because MMS had failed to comply with the

Coastal Zone Management Act and the National Environmental Policy

Act (NEPA) by not adequately documenting its reliance on the

exclusions. 150 F. Supp. at 1057. 

The issue was remanded to MMS to provide a reasoned

explanation for reliance on the categorical exclusions, including

explanations of why exceptions did not apply. Id. at 1057. This

Court retained jurisdiction over MMS's compliance with the Court's

Order. State of California v. Norton, C 99-4964 CW (Docket No. 

139, December 9, 2003 Order Re: Motion to Remand at 12). In

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2 An Environmental Assessment is a public document that may do

one of the following: 1) provide evidence and analysis for

determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or

a finding of no significant impact; 2) "aid an agency's compliance

with the Act when no environmental impact statement is necessary;"

or 3) "facilitate preparation of a statement when one is

necessary." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1-3).

3

response, MMS decided to perform environmental assessments2

 (EAs).

Pursuant to NEPA, Defendants conducted an administrative

process, including an opportunity for public comment and

participation. Plaintiffs in the instant case, who were also

Plaintiffs in Norton, participated in the administrative process. 

 On February 11, 2005, MMS issued six final EAs on new proposed

suspensions for the thirty-six leases involved in the prior

litigation, and an adjacent lease.

On March 9, 2005, Plaintiffs filed the instant case alleging

that Defendants violated NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 et seq.

On June 23, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary

judgment asserting that Defendants had violated the procedural and

substantive requirements of NEPA by failing to prepare an

environmental analysis of future exploration and development

activities under the suspended oil leases and by producing flawed

and incomplete EAs of activity that would occur during the

suspensions. Defendants opposed the motion and filed a crossmotion for summary judgment.

On August 31, 2005, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment and denied Defendants' cross-motion. August 31,

2005 Order at 13. The Court ordered the EAs and FONSIs relating to

the lease suspensions remanded to Defendant MMS to complete

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adequate NEPA analyses on the lease suspensions. Id.

On September 13, 2005, the Court approved a stipulation by the

parties to extend the deadline for filing a motion for attorneys'

fees to thirty days after final judgment following the exhaustion

of all appeals. On September 30, 2005, the Court decided to

consider Plaintiffs' bill of costs along with their petition for

attorneys' fees. September 30, 2005 Order at 1.

On October 25, 2005, Defendants filed a notice of appeal. On

February 9, 2006, the Ninth Circuit granted Defendant-Appellants'

motion to stay the appeal pending the outcome of Amber Resources

Co. v. United States, case numbers 02-30C, 04-1822C and 05-249C, 

in the United States Court of Federal Claims where the owners of

the leases that are the subject of the instant case are seeking

rescission of the leases and damages. Based on a January 30, 2006

mediation conference in Amber Resources, Plaintiffs state that

final resolution of that case may not occur until 2009. Krop. Dec.

¶ 8. 

On August 10, 2006, Plaintiffs moved for an award of

$187,054.52 for interim attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal

Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 

Plaintiffs argue that interim fee awards are available under the

EAJA and, as prevailing parties, they are entitled to the requested

fees. Plaintiffs add that their request for interim fees is in

response to the Ninth Circuit's stay of the appeal.

Defendants respond that Plaintiffs' motion is premature

because a final, non-appealable judgment has not been rendered. In

addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to fees

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because Defendants' litigation position was substantially

justified. Alternatively, if the Court rules that Plaintiffs are

entitled to fees, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are seeking

fees for work not performed in this case, the fees sought are

charged at an exorbitantly high rate, and the number of hours spent

is excessive.

DISCUSSION

I. Eligibility for Fees

To be eligible for EAJA fees, a party must be an “owner of an

unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation,

association, unit of local government, or organization, the net

worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil

action was filed, and which had not more than 500 employees at the

time the civil action was filed” or be “an organization described

in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26

U.S.C. section 501(c)(3)) exempt from taxation under section 501(a)

of such Code." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii). The party seeking

fees has the burden of establishing its eligibility. Thomas v.

Peterson, 841 F.2d 332, 337 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of

establishing eligibility for EAJA fees. On September 15, 2006,

with Plaintiffs' reply brief, they submit declarations and

documentation which establish that Plaintiffs Environment

California, Citizens' Planning Association of Santa Barbara, Santa

Barbara Channel Keeper, Otter Project, Surfrider Foundation, Get

Oil Out, Defenders of Wildlife, League for Coastal Protection and

NRDC meet the requirements for EAJA fees under 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii). Jacobson Dec. ¶ 2; Landecker Dec. ¶ 2; Krop

Supp. Dec. ¶¶ 2, 3, Ex. 1-4; Notthoff Dec. ¶ 2; Edelson Supp. Dec.

¶ 2, 3., Ex. 1; Eckberg Dec. ¶ 2. Sierra Club is the only

Plaintiff that is not eligible for fees. Krop Supp. Dec. ¶ 4. 

Plaintiffs argue that, even though Sierra Club is not eligible

for fees, this should not prevent the attorneys who represented all

Plaintiffs from receiving fees, considering that all other

Plaintiffs are eligible. Id. Plaintiffs contend that Sierra Club

played a relatively minor role in the litigation and did not

contribute significantly to attorneys' fees and expenses. Id.

Moreover, Sierra Club's role in the case was not material and the

case would have been filed without it. Id. 

The Court finds Plaintiffs' attorneys eligible for fees under

the EAJA. 

II. Timing of Request and Award of Fees

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees

is premature because a request for fees is allowed only after a

final, non-appealable judgment.

The EAJA requires that a party seeking attorneys' fees must

submit an application to the court "within thirty days of final

judgment in the action." 28 U.S.C. § 2413(d)(1)(B)(1988). In

1985, Congress defined "final judgment" as one that is "final and

not appealable." 28 U.S.C. § 2421(d)(2)(G)(1988). 

Despite the use of the "final judgment" language, a district

court in this circuit has found that it could consider an EAJA fee

petition while an appeal is pending. Cervantes v. Sullivan, 739 F.

Supp 517, 521 (E.D. Cal. 1990). In addition, Ninth Circuit cases

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have held, although not while an appeal was pending, that "interim

fees are available under the EAJA where a party has prevailed on

some substantial part of its claim, notwithstanding the need for

further proceedings." Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc. v.

Carlucci, 867 F.2d 1224, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989); National Wildlife

Fed'n v. FERC, 870 F.2d 542, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1989). In Animal

Lovers, 867 F.2d at 1224, the decision of the district court to

deny declaratory relief was reversed on appeal and the action was

remanded for a determination of whether injunctive relief should be

granted. In regard to the plaintiff's request for interim

attorneys' fees, the Ninth Circuit found that granting plaintiff

the declaratory relief it requested supported an interim award of

fees despite continued litigation of the claim for injunctive

relief in the district court. Id. at 1225. In National Wildlife

Fed'n, 870 F.2d at 543, 545, the Ninth Circuit determined that FERC

was statutorily required to consider the Fish and Wildlife Program

promulgated by the Northwest Power Planning Council in evaluating

all permit applications affecting the Columbia River and ruled that

FERC had failed to do so. Because this issue was a "significant

legal principle affecting the substantive rights of the parties,"

the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to

interim legal fees. Id. Both Ninth Circuit cases cited as

authority Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 756 (1980), which

addressed an interim fee request in a civil rights case, for the

proposition that fees may be awarded under the EAJA if the

plaintiff is the prevailing party even if a judgment which ends the

litigation on the merits has not been entered. Animal Lovers, 867

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F.2d at 1225; National Wildlife Fed'n, 870 F.2d at 545. 

In reviewing an interim fee request, the court in Golden Gate

Audubon Soc., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 738 F.

Supp. 339, 341 (N.D. Cal. 1988), noted that the House Committee

report in support of 28 U.S.C. § 2413(d)(1)(B)(1988) "explicitly

states that this subsection 'should not be construed as requiring a

final judgment on the merits before a court may award fees.'" 

(citing H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 18, reprinted in

1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4953, 4997). "Instead, '[a] fee

award may . . . be approved where the party has prevailed on an

interim order that was central to the case.'" Id. at 341 (citing

H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 18, reprinted in 1980

U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4953, 4990); also see, Haitian Refugee

Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489, 1495 (11th Cir. 1986) (legislative

history of EAJA amendments provides that fee petitions may be filed

before final judgment). Additionally, other circuits have also

upheld interim fee awards. See id.; Young v. Pierce, 822 F.2d

1376, 1377 (5th Cir. 1987).

Under the above-cited authority, this Court concludes that

entry of a final, non-appealable judgment is not necessary before

an attorneys' fee award may be filed.

In the instant case, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment

that Defendants violated NEPA and requested that the Court remand

the EAs and FONSIs to the MMS with instructions to complete

adequate NEPA environmental analyses of the proposed suspensions. 

This Court granted their request. August 31, 2005 Order at 13.

Because a final, non-appealable judgment on the merits is not

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required before an award may be granted, and Plaintiffs prevailed

on a substantial part of their claim, Plaintiffs' application for

interim fees is not premature.

Defendants argue that Auke Bay Concerned Citizen's Advisory

Council v. Marsh, 779 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986), stands for the

proposition that interim attorneys' fees are only awarded before

final judgment when the plaintiff has prevailed on a discrete issue

that is non-appealable. In Auke Bay, the plaintiff filed an

application for attorneys' fees after the court granted a permanent

injunction but eight months before entry of final judgment. Id. at

1391. The issue was whether the plaintiff's fee petition was

premature. Id. The Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiff's request

for interim attorneys' fees, explaining that an application

submitted before entry of judgment by the district court is timely

when "a court substantially grants the applicant's remedy before

final judgment is entered." Id. at 1393. Therefore, contrary to

Defendants' contention, Auke Bay supports Plaintiffs' position that

its application is timely although a final, non-appealable judgment

has not been entered because the Court has substantially granted

its remedy. Furthermore, in Auke Bay the district court had not

yet entered final judgment. Here, the district court has entered

final judgment in favor of Plaintiffs; it is only the appeal in the

circuit court that is pending. Thus, the facts in the present case

weigh more heavily in favor of granting Plaintiffs' interim

attorneys' fees than those in Auke Bay. 

Furthermore, if an interim fee award were not available,

through no fault of their own, Plaintiffs would have to wait an

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additional two to three years before this Court could consider

their fee request because Defendants have successfully moved to

stay their appeal until final resolution of Amber Resources, which

may not occur until 2009.

For the above-mentioned reasons, the Court concludes that

Plaintiffs' application for interim fees is not premature.

III. Prevailing Party

Plaintiffs argue that they are prevailing parties because the

Court granted their motion for summary judgment in its entirety,

setting aside the lease suspensions pending compliance with NEPA. 

Defendants appear not to dispute this point.

Because the Court granted all of the relief sought by

Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs are prevailing parties for the purpose of

their attorneys' fees request under the EAJA.

IV. Substantial Justification and Special Circumstances

The EAJA provides as follows:

a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the

United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that

party in any civil action . . . including proceedings for

judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the

United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action,

unless the court finds that the position of the United States

was substantially justified or that special circumstances make

an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 

Defendants do not assert that special circumstances exist here

that would make an award of fees unjust. They do, however, argue

that their litigation position and their actions or failure to act

in the environmental analysis of the lease suspensions were

substantially justified. 

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Whether the position of the United States is substantially

justified “shall be determined on the basis of the record which is

made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are

sought." Id. The “position of the United States,” as referred to

in § 2412(d)(1)(a), “encompasses both an agency’s action or failure

to act upon which the civil action is based as well as the

government’s litigation position.” Oregon Natural Resources

Council v. Madigan, 980 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The government has the burden of demonstrating that its

position was substantially justified. Bay Area Peace Navy v.

United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1230 (9th Cir. 1990). At least two

circuit courts of appeals have held that the government must make a

“strong showing” in order to meet its burden. Natural Resources

Defense Council v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 712 (3rd Cir. 1983);

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081, 1085 (2nd

Cir. 1983). 

For the reasons expressed in its Order of August 31, 2005, the

Court finds that neither Defendants' actions nor their litigation

position were "substantially justified" within the meaning of EAJA.

V. Reasonableness of Fees

In the Ninth Circuit, reasonable attorneys' fees are

determined by first calculating the "lodestar." Jordan v.

Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). "The

'lodestar' is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the

prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a

reasonable hourly rate." Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d

359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The EAJA provides that attorneys' fees “shall not be awarded

in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an

increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the

limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings

involved justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(a). The

Ninth Circuit has held that three requirements must be satisfied

before the court can exceed the statutory limit: (1) the attorney

possesses distinctive knowledge and skills developed through a

practice specialty; (2) those skills are needed in the litigation;

and (3) those skills are not available elsewhere at the statutory

rate. Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492, 1496 (9th Cir. 1991). The

Ninth Circuit has held that environmental litigation is a specialty

area that requires distinctive knowledge. Id. (citing Animal

Lovers, 867 F. 2d at 1226).

If the statutory limit is exceeded, the party requesting fees

must demonstrate "that the requested rates are in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Blum v.

Stinson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).

Attorneys Linda Krop and Andrew Caputo request fees of $450

per hour for 322.75 hours of work which, they state, required their

distinctive knowledge and skills in environmental law. For the

263.84 hours that did not require environmental law expertise,

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3Plaintiffs request a cost of living adjustment from the

statutory EAJA hourly rate of $125 per hour to an hourly rate of

$152 per hour for hours expended in 2004, and $157 per hour for

hours expended in 2005. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

13

Plaintiffs' attorneys request payment at the EAJA hourly rate3

.

Plaintiffs provide declarations from several attorneys, each

having experience with billing practices in the San Francisco Bay

Area and some having specific experience with NEPA cases,

supporting $450 as a reasonable rate for the services provided by

Ms. Krop and Mr. Caputo. Folk Dec. ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 7; Atkins-Pattenson

Dec. ¶¶ 6, 7, 9; Weissglass Dec. ¶ 3, 5; Wheaton Dec. ¶¶ 9, 10, 16. 

Moreover, Ms. Folk, Mr. Atkins-Patterson and Mr. Wheaton state that

senior attorneys with the specialized expertise of Mr. Caputo and

Ms. Krop are generally not available at the EAJA statutory rate. 

Folk Dec. ¶ 7; Atkins-Pattenson Dec. ¶ 9b; Wheaton Dec. ¶ 15.

Defendants do not dispute that environmental litigation is an

identifiable practice specialty, nor do they dispute that Ms. Krop

and Mr. Caputo have specialized knowledge and skills in

environmental law. Rather, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have

not adequately shown that other attorneys in the area would not have

taken the case at the statutory rate, nor have they shown that the

prevailing market rate for their work is $450 per hour. However,

Defendants provide no evidence to dispute that provided by

Plaintiffs. Defendants concede that a $450 or $500 rate would be

billable by a senior partner doing environmental litigation for a

corporate client but argue that this amount should not be billed for

work done for public interest clients. However, they provide no

authority for their statement.

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Because Plaintiffs provide evidence that $450 per hour is a

reasonable rate in the San Francisco area for attorneys of Ms.

Krop's and Mr. Caputo's background and experience, and Plaintiffs'

attorneys have exercised reasonable billing judgment by charging

that rate only for work that required their specialized knowledge

and skills, the Court finds the hourly rates requested to be

reasonable.

B. Reasonable Number of Hours

The district court may not award fees for hours that were not

reasonably expended. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434

(1983). "Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith

effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Id.

1. Administrative Process

As discussed above, Plaintiffs in the instant case were also

Plaintiffs in California ex rel. California Coastal Comm'n v.

Norton. That case was remanded to the MMS to undertake the

administrative process which is now the subject of this case. 

Plaintiffs request compensation for the 150 hours of legal services

performed during the administrative process. 

Defendants correctly cite Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885

(1989), for the proposition that attorneys' fees are not allowable

in "traditional review of agency action," and argue that the

administrative review in this case is traditional. However,

Sullivan v. Hudson goes on to explain that if the administrative

proceedings "are intimately tied to the resolution of the judicial

action and necessary to the attainment of the results Congress

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sought to promote by providing for fees, they should be considered

part and parcel of the action for which fees may be awarded." Id.

at 888. Fee awards under the EAJA are appropriate for time expended

in administrative proceedings because the act was intended "to

diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending

against, governmental action." Id. at 890. Inability to secure

representation during mandatory administrative proceedings, because

of the expense, would severely hamper a plaintiff's opportunity to

challenge government action when considering the need to develop an

accurate and full administrative record in advance of civil

litigation. Native Village of Quinhagak v. United States, 307 F.3d

1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, according to Melkonyan v.

Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1991), the rule in Sullivan v. Hudson

specifically allows for attorneys' fees performed during an

administrative process when the process is the product of a remand

and the court retains jurisdiction. 

The determinative issue is whether these administrative

proceedings were "crucial to the vindication of [the plaintiff’s]

rights." Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. at 889.

The administrative process at issue here was the result of a

remand from a related case and this Court retained jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs meet the "intimately tied" requirement in Sullivan v.

Hudson because development of the administrative record played a

significant role in their ability to bring subsequent litigation. 

See Krop Dec. ¶¶ 3-6. 

Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees for

time spent during the administrative process.

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2. Time Spent on Public Relations

Plaintiffs argue that they should be compensated for their time

communicating with the press because they are entitled to

compensation for attorney time "reasonably expended in pursuit of

the ultimate result achieved, in the same manner as an attorney

traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time

reasonably expended on a matter." Lucas v. White, 63 F. Supp. 2d

1046, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 

Although one of Plaintiffs' goals in litigation may have been

to educate the public about the environmental impacts of the

proposed lease suspensions, Plaintiffs do not explain how this

relates to the "ultimate result achieved" in litigation. 

Plaintiffs also rely on Davis v. City & County of San

Francisco to support their request, but this case is

distinguishable. 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992). In Davis,

the court held that the plaintiffs could recover for public

relations work with the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, whose

support was "vital" to the ultimate resolution of the case. Id. at

1545. The court found that the plaintiffs could only recover for

"the giving of press conferences and performance of lobbying and

public relations work" that was "directly and intimately related to

the successful representation of [the] client." Id. In this case,

Plaintiffs have not shown the required direct, intimate

relationship between their press activities and success on the

merits of the case. 

The Court denies Plaintiffs' fee request for time spent by

David Newman and Ms. Krop on press activities. Mr. Newman spent

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Defendants state that Plaintiffs request payment for 744

hours, but Plaintiffs actually request payment for 587 hours.

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7.92 hours on press activities and Ms. Krop spent 3.7 hours.

Accordingly, 11.62 hours are deducted from the total amount

requested, calculated at the EAJA hourly rate of $157 per hour. 

Therefore, the total deduction is $1,824.34.

3. Total Hours Expended

Finally, Defendants argue that the total number of hours

requested by Plaintiffs "should give the Court pause." Defendants

contend that they had the more difficult argument and their counsel

David Glazier was new to this area of the law, yet he only expended

183.5 hours, compared to the 587 hours expended by Plaintiffs'

counsel.4

Plaintiffs contend that the number of hours expended was

reasonable and that they exercised considerable billing judgment. 

They support this contention with declarations from attorneys

familiar with federal litigation and administrative proceedings. 

Folk Dec. ¶ 5; Atkins-Pattenson Dec. ¶ 9(a). They also question

how much time, beyond the 183.5 hours spent by Mr. Glazier, other

counsel for Defendants spent working on this case. In addition,

Plaintiffs argue that the contrast in hours may be explained by the

differences between prosecuting and defending a case. Chabner v.

United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. C-95-0447 MHP, 1999 WL 33227443,

at 3-4 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (reason for disparity in number of hours

billed by plaintiffs' attorney versus defendants' was due to

differences in burden of proof and the difficulty of obtaining

access to information).

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This Court finds most of Defendants' arguments unpersuasive.

Therefore, Plaintiffs' attorneys will be compensated for a total of

575.38 hours: 587 hours claimed minus 11.62 hours spent on press

activities. The total fee award is $184,507.14.

VI. Reasonable Expenses

EAJA allows compensation for reasonable expenses. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(1)(A). Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs' claim of

$723.14 for expenses. The expenses appear to be reasonable. The

Court awards $723.14 for expenses.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for interim

attorneys' fees (Docket No. 51) is granted. The Court denies

Plaintiffs' request for fees for time spent on press activities and

accordingly deducts $1,824.34 from the amount of the total fee

request. Defendants shall forthwith pay Plaintiffs $185,230.18 in

interim attorneys' fees and costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/22/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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