Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07220/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07220-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 20, 1997 Decided June 17, l997 

No. 96-7220

TARA ANN JUNGQUIST, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

SHEIKH SULTAN BIN KHALIFA AL NAHYAN, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv01005)

T. Barry Kingham argued the cause for appellants, with 

whom George Kahale, III and Miriam K. Harwood were on 

the briefs.

R. Kenly Webster argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellees. Michael W. Kirk entered an appearance.

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1 Abu Dhabi is one of the seven autonomous emirates that form 

the United Arab Emirates. 

Before: WALD, GINSBURG and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In this interlocutory appeal of the 

denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of 

subject matter and personal jurisdiction, appellants Sheikh 

Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan ("Sheikh Sultan"), Khalil I. AlMalki, Osama Al Baba, and Faisal M. Seddiq Samea contend 

first, that they are entitled to immunity under the Foreign 

Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.

("FSIA"), and second, that due to their lack of contact with 

the District of Columbia, the district court did not have 

personal jurisdiction over them. Concluding that we have 

jurisdiction to consider the immunity claims under the collateral order doctrine, and may properly exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the non-immunity jurisdictional contentions, we reverse. Although we conclude that the evidence of 

a personal promise by Sheikh Sultan to compensate appellees 

Jungquists for medical expenses and injuries to Tara 

Jungquist from a boating accident in Abu Dhabi defeats the 

Sheikh's claim to immunity under the FSIA, we also conclude 

that the district court erred in ruling that it had personal 

jurisdiction over the Sheikh. The district court also erred in 

ruling it had personal jurisdiction over Samea. As to AlMalki and Al Baba, because the evidence showed that they 

acted in their official capacities on behalf of a foreign state 

and the commercial activities exception is inapplicable, they 

are entitled to FSIA immunity.

I.

According to the complaint, Tara Jungquist, a sixteen-yearold living with her parents, who were United States citizens 

working in Abu Dhabi,1and her older sister Michelle 

Jungquist attended a boat outing in May 1993, that was 

organized by Sheikh Sultan, the eldest son of the Crown 

Prince of Abu Dhabi and the President of the Crown Prince 

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2 The Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Court is the administrative arm 

of the government of Crown Prince Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al 

Nahyan ("Sheikh Khalifa"), Sheikh Sultan's father. 

Court.2 Sheikh Sultan had invited Tara and Michelle in 

recognition of their work for the Abu Dhabi International 

Fair, an event hosted by the Sheikh as Honorary Chairman of 

the Chamber of Commerce. On the return trip from Sheikh 

Sultans's private island, the Sheikh and one of his guests, 

after consuming alcoholic beverages, negligently caused two 

motorboats to collide. Tara was ejected into the water, and 

as she came to the surface, the rotating propeller of the boat 

driven by Sheikh Sultan struck and penetrated her skull, 

causing brain damage, a gash on her left leg, cuts on her 

hand, and other injuries. She was rushed to local hospitals 

where she received emergency neurosurgery.

At that time, Sheikh Sultan informed Michelle Jungquist by 

telephone that he was responsible for the collision and promised that he personally and the Crown Prince Court would 

fully compensate Tara and her parents for Tara's medical 

expenses and injuries. The next week Sheikh Sultan, personally and through his agents, reaffirmed to Tara's parents his 

intention to abide by his promise. For more than a year 

Tara received medical treatment at several hospitals in Abu 

Dhabi and elsewhere that was paid for by the Abu Dhabi 

government, and her family was compensated for related 

expenses, pursuant to arrangements approved by the Sheikh 

and carried out by other defendants. Tara's treatments were 

paid for under the aegis of a medical program of the Abu 

Dhabi government and administered by the Crown Prince's 

Court for all citizens and residents in need of foreign medical 

treatment.

Tara first received treatment abroad by a specialist in 

Aachen, Germany, who saw her within weeks of the accident. 

Sheikh Sultan flew to Germany to visit her and, while there, 

again acknowledged his responsibility for the accident and his 

intention to take care of Tara's expenses; he also gave Tara a 

diamond watch and a diamond and sapphire necklace. On the 

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3According to the complaint, during this period Tara's father 

was dismissed by his employer, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for Distribution, allegedly at the request of Sheikh Sultan, and 

informed that he and his family had to leave Abu Dhabi. Also in 

the fall of 1993, Tara's parents were allegedly harassed by having 

the water, electricity, and telephone periodically shut off at their 

home, by having their business car taken away, and by being 

followed and surveilled by unknown persons. 

recommendation of her doctors in Germany, and pursuant to 

Sheikh Sultan's instructions, appellant Faisal M. Seddiq Samea, a personal friend and confidant of the Sheikh as well as 

his secretary at the Crown Prince Court, arranged for Tara 

to go to the United States for specialized medical treatment 

and evaluation. In late May, Tara was transferred to Emory 

Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia, for optic nerve testing and a 

neurological review, including brain scans and magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI"). Later, she received additional testing, including an MRI, at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. She returned to Abu Dhabi in September, 

and between September 1993 and January 1994, she underwent additional neurological and neuropsychological testing in 

Abu Dhabi hospitals.3

In January 1994, Tara returned to the United States for 

more specialized testing and treatment. For the next six 

months, with the approval of the Medical Attache at the 

United Arab Emirates ("UAE") Embassy, Tara received extensive testing, evaluation, speech therapy, psychological evaluation, and physical therapy for her leg injury at the National 

Rehabilitation Hospital in the District of Columbia. Pursuant 

to UAE authorization, she and her mother received a housing 

and subsistence allowance while living in the District of 

Columbia, and established a bank account there to receive the 

allowance through direct deposits. In March 1994, after 

Michelle Jungquist complained about a reduction in the allowance, Sheikh Sultan reaffirmed his commitment to pay for 

Tara's medical expenses and to compensate her for her 

injuries.

In July 1994, the payments for Tara's medical treatment 

and related expenses stopped. Earlier that month the NaUSCA Case #96-7220 Document #279433 Filed: 06/17/1997 Page 4 of 21
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4 The district court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint 

as to defendants UAE, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, the Crown 

Prince Court, and Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown 

Prince of Abu Dhabi, and the Jungquists do not appeal this part of 

the district court's order. 

tional Rehabilitation Hospital and the Jungquists provided a 

medical report to the UAE's Medical Attache indicating that 

Tara would require indefinite, long-term medical care to treat 

the damage to her brain. The Crown Prince Court directed 

the UAE Medical Attache to refuse to approve further medical treatment for Tara. In August, Al Baba contacted one of 

Tara's treating physicians in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade him to alter his diagnosis that Tara would require 

indefinite medical care.

The Jungquists filed suit for money damages, asserting 

tort, contract, and conspiracy claims, against eight defendants, including the UAE; the Emirate of Abu Dhabi; the 

Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Court; and Sheikh Khalifa Bin 

Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, as well as 

appellants Sheikh Sultan; Faisal M. Seddiq Samea; Khalil I. 

Al-Malki, the UAE Embassy's Medical Attache in the District of Columbia; and Osama Al Baba, the Director of 

Patient Relations at the UAE Medical Attache's Office in the 

District of Columbia.4 The Jungquists sued each appellant 

for civil conspiracy, fraud, fraud in the inducement, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and also sued 

Sheikh Sultan for negligence, negligent entrustment, breach 

of contract, promissory estoppel, loss of filial consortium, and 

loss of services. The complaint alleged that in reliance on the 

promises of Sheikh Sultan and his agents, the Jungquists 

agreed to "cooperate in protecting Sheikh Sultan from public 

and private exposure concerning his presence at, involvement 

in, and responsibility for the collision and the illicit activities 

engaged in during the boat outing." According to the complaint, under Islamic law, a person who causes a collision 

resulting in injury requiring hospitalization may be incarcerated until the victim is released, and if the injury is permanent, the person who caused the accident can be incarcerated 

permanently. Further, the complaint alleged that Sheikh 

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5Appellants do not appeal the district court's denial of the 

motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Sultan's father had told him that "if he was lying about [his 

non-involvement in] the collision, he would personally take 

Sheikh Sultan 'for a walk in the desert,' meaning that he 

would cause his son to die."

The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the 

district court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and 

parties, and on the basis of forum non conveniens. As part 

of the discovery on the jurisdictional issues, Michelle and 

Calvin Jungquist submitted affidavits to the effect that 

Sheikh Sultan had promised that both he, in his personal 

capacity, and the Crown Prince Court would take care of 

Tara's medical expenses and her family's related expenses, 

and that the Sheikh took a number of actions personally to 

ensure that Tara received treatment and that her expenses 

and those of her family were taken care of from May 1993 

until July 11, 1994. The district court denied in part the 

motion to dismiss, Jungquist v. Al-Nahyan, 940 F. Supp. 312, 

323 (D.D.C. 1996), and the non-dismissed defendants appeal.5

II.

Initially, we must address the Jungquists' contention that 

the court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of appellants' 

motion to dismiss on interlocutory appeal. While acknowledging that the court has appellate jurisdiction to consider 

appeals from final orders denying certain claims of immunity 

from suit under the "collateral order doctrine," Cohen v. 

Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), 

the Jungquists, relying on Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151 

(1995), maintain that the resolution of the FSIA immunity 

claim falls outside the collateral order doctrine because it 

merely "resolved a fact-related dispute about the pre-trial 

record." Id. at 2153. They also maintain that the court 

should decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over 

the non-immunity claims, which, the parties agree, do not fall 

under the collateral order doctrine because those issues are 

not closely related to the immunity claims.

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court has jurisdiction of 

appeals "from all final decisions of the district courts." In 

interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court recognized in 

Cohen, that there is a "small class" of decisions that "finally 

determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, 

rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied 

review and too independent of the cause itself to require that 

appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is 

adjudicated." 337 U.S. at 546. Under the collateral order 

doctrine, a district court order qualifies for immediate appeal 

as a "final order" under § 1291 if it "(1) conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, (2) resolve[s] an important 

issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and 

(3) [would be] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 

judgment." Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. at 2155 (quoting 

Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, 

Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. 

Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978))).

It is well-established that an appeal from a denial of a 

motion to dismiss a complaint on the ground of sovereign 

immunity under the FSIA satisfies the three requirements of 

the collateral order doctrine and may thus be brought on an 

interlocutory basis. Foremost-McKesson v. Islamic Republic 

of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see McKesson 

Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 353 (D.C. Cir. 

1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996); Princz v. Federal 

Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 923 (1995); see also Federal Ins. Co. v. 

Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270, 1279-82 (3d Cir. 

1993) (citing similar decisions from six circuits), cert. denied 

sub nom. Ejay Travel v. Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds,

511 U.S. 1107 (1994). The district court's denial of dismissal 

on grounds of sovereign immunity is conclusive and final as to 

that issue; the issue of sovereign immunity is distinct from 

the question of liability on the claims asserted in the complaint; and the order denying dismissal for immunity is 

effectively unreviewable on appeal because " 'sovereign immunity is an immunity from trial and the attendant burdens of 

litigation, and not just a defense to liability on the merits.' " 

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Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 443 (quoting RushPresbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center v. Hellenic Republic,

877 F.2d 574, 576 n.2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 

(1989)). 

Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2151, does not require a contrary 

conclusion. There, the Supreme Court held that government 

officials entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense in a 

"constitutional tort" action were not entitled to appeal immediately the denial of summary judgment based on a finding 

that the pretrial evidence was sufficient to show a material 

issue of fact for trial. Id. at 2153-54. The Court noted that, 

unlike a claim of immunity, which is conceptually distinct 

from the merits of the action, a claim of evidence insufficiency 

cannot be said to present a "separate" question that is 

"significantly different from the fact-related legal issues that 

likely underlie the plaintiff's claim on the merits." Id. at 

2157. The Court observed that "considerations of delay, 

comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and wise 

use of appellate resources" favor limiting appeals of "qualified 

immunity" matters to cases raising broader issues of law, 

rather than fact-specific questions concerning the existence of 

a triable issue of fact. Id. at 2157-58.

The determination of whether appellants are entitled to 

claim sovereign immunity because they were acting in their 

official capacities, and thus were agencies or instrumentalities 

of a foreign state, does require the court to apply law to facts. 

But, as the Supreme Court has explained, "Johnson held, 

simply, that determinations of evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment are not immediately appealable merely because they happen to arise in a qualified-immunity case; if 

what is at issue in the sufficiency determination is nothing 

more than whether the evidence could support a finding that 

particular conduct occurred, the question decided is not truly 

'separable' from the plaintiff's claim, and hence there is no 

'final decision' under Cohen ...." Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 

S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996). The question of the applicability of 

sovereign immunity, as Johnson itself recognized, 115 S. Ct. 

at 2157, is "separable" from a determination of the merits of 

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6Because we do not reach appellants' claims concerning headof-state and diplomatic immunity, we need not address the 

Jungquists' contention that Johnson precludes review of those 

claims. 

tory appeal from the denial of their FSIA claim is permissible 

under the collateral order doctrine and is not inconsistent 

with Johnson.6

The Jungquists' further contention that this court should 

not assume pendent appellate jurisdiction over appellants' 

non-immunity claims fares no better. "A circuit court exercises pendent jurisdiction when, in the course of reviewing an 

order from which an appeal is within its jurisdiction, it hears 

an appeal from another order that, while part of the same 

case or controversy, would not otherwise be within its statutory jurisdiction." Gilda Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, 

Inc., 85 F.3d 675, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Consarc Corp. 

v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Lee v. 

Ply*Gem Industries, Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 

1979), cert. denied, 593 U.S. 1266 (1979). Indeed, the court 

exercises pendent jurisdiction sparingly, "only when substantial considerations of fairness or efficiency demand it." Gilda 

Marx, 85 F.3d at 678-79; see also Swint v. Chambers County 

Com'n, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 1212 (1995). We conclude that it is 

appropriate to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over 

appellants' non-immunity claims.

Contrary to the Jungquists' contention, the availability of 

pendent appellate jurisdiction is not limited to circumstances 

where claims are "so closely related" that review of the 

former is necessary to, or will dispose of, review of the latter.

Gilda Marx, 85 F.3d at 679. Considerations of fairness or 

efficiency may also justify the exercise of pendent appellate 

jurisdiction when the "review will likely terminate the entire 

case, sparing both this court and the district court from 

further proceedings and giving the parties a speedy resolution." Id. Adopting the view of leading commentators, the 

court has stated:

Jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal is in large measure jurisdiction to deal with all aspects of the case that 

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7 Although the Jungquists maintain that in the district court 

Samea did not claim to be a public official and his appeal should, 

therefore, be dismissed, the defendants' motion to dismiss asserted 

that the FSIA barred the Jungquists' claims with regard to all the 

named defendants. Because we hold that the district court lacked 

have been sufficiently illuminated to enable decision by 

the court of appeals without further trial court development. Any other rule frequently would require wasted 

litigation without any offsetting advantage in economy of 

appellate effort or uninterrupted trial court proceedings.

Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 760 

F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 

ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3921, at 17 (1977)). 

Because review of the district court's rulings on personal 

jurisdiction may dispose of the instant case, and the parties' 

jurisdictional discovery has sufficiently illuminated the jurisdictional facts, the exercise of jurisdiction over appellants' 

non-immunity claims furthers interests of fairness and efficiency, and the Jungquists offer no persuasive reason to 

conclude otherwise. 

III.

The FSIA provides that, subject to limited exceptions, "a 

foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 

courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1604. A "foreign 

state" includes "political subdivision[s]" and "agenc[ies] or 

instrumentalit[ies]" thereof. Id. § 1603(a). Individuals acting in their official capacities are considered "agenc[ies] or 

instrumentalit[ies] of a foreign state;" these same individuals, 

however, are not entitled to immunity under the FSIA for 

acts that are not committed in an official capacity. See ElFadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 

1996); see also Chuidian v. Philippine Nat. Bank, 912 F.2d 

1095, 1099-1103 (9th Cir. 1990).

Appellants maintain that all of the acts underlying the 

Jungquists' claims were performed as official acts of the 

Government of Abu Dhabi.7 Specifically, they contend that 

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all of the treatment and related assistance provided to Tara 

was within the scope of the Abu Dhabi government's official 

medical treatment program, which is available to all citizens 

and residents of the country, and that all acts by appellants 

were consistent with their duties in managing and implementing that program. Appellants contend that, in ruling to the 

contrary, the district court improperly focused on their alleged motives for their actions, rather than the nature of the 

actions themselves. Those actions, appellants continue, demonstrate that they were taken by government officials acting 

as agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state in performance of their official duties as administrators of the Abu 

Dhabi government's foreign medical treatment program. 

Generally, in entertaining a motion to dismiss, the district 

court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, 

and construe all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. ForemostMcKesson, 905 F.2d at 440 n. 3. Where the motion to 

dismiss is based on a claim of foreign sovereign immunity, 

which provides protection from suit and not merely a defense 

to liability, however, the court must engage in sufficient 

pretrial factual and legal determinations to " 'satisfy itself of 

its authority to hear the case' before trial." ForemostMcKesson, 905 F.2d at 449 (quoting Prakash v. American 

University, 727 F.2d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). We review 

the district court's factual findings for clear error, see Herbert 

v. National Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 

1992), and its legal conclusion that the FSIA does not apply to 

appellants de novo. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,

26 F.3d at 1169.

As appellants maintain, the relevant inquiry in determining 

whether an individual was acting in an official capacity focuses on the nature of the individual's alleged actions, rather 

than the alleged motives underlying them. See Chuidian,

912 F.2d at 1106-07; Herbage v. Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60, 66-

67 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd without opinion, 946 F.2d 1564 (D.C. 

Cir. 1991); see also Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 391

____________________________

personal jurisdiction over Samea, see infra Part IV, we do not reach 

his immunity under the FSIA. 

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(S.D.N.Y. 1988). Thus, in Chuidian, although the plaintiff 

alleged that the defendant had intentionally interfered with 

his contractual relations out of malice, the Ninth Circuit 

focused on whether the defendant was authorized in his 

official capacity to so interfere. 912 F.2d at 1106. The fact 

that the defendant acted out of malice was irrelevant. Id.

The district court performed a similar analysis in the instant 

case, focusing on whether appellants were authorized to enter 

into the alleged contracts and perform the other alleged acts, 

and not on why appellants may have been motivated to 

engage in such activity.

In concluding that the Jungquists' claims concerned actions 

by appellants that were personal and private rather than 

official in nature, the district court relied on the allegation 

that "the Crown Prince Sheikh Khalifa told his son Sheikh 

Sultan that if he was 'lying about [his non-involvement in] the 

collision, he would personally take Sheikh Sultan 'for a walk 

in the desert,' meaning that he would cause his son to die.' " 

Jungquist, 940 F. Supp. at 317 (quoting Compl. ¶ 102). The 

court reasoned that regardless of whether Sheikh Sultan and 

his agents were authorized by their offices to pay for medical 

treatment through Abu Dhabi's medical program, they could 

not have been authorized to do so in exchange for a promise 

by the Jungquists to keep the truth from the Abu Dhabi 

government. Id. at 318. Appellants fail to demonstrate that 

this finding is clearly erroneous. See Foremost-McKesson,

905 F.2d at 440 n.3, 449. As the district court found, for 

purposes of FSIA analysis, appellants' actions are properly 

construed not simply as providing Tara with medical treatment pursuant to the government medical program, but 

rather as entering into a corrupt bargain whereby Tara's 

needs would be taken care of in exchange for the Jungquists' 

silence. Not only did Calvin and Michelle Jungquist submit 

affidavits attesting to Sheikh Sultan's repeated personal 

promise to compensate Tara and her parents fully for her 

medical expenses and injuries in return for their cooperation 

with the Sheikh's efforts to hide his involvement in the 

boating accident, but appellants do not dispute the assertions 

in the complaint about Islamic law or the meaning of the 

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statement by the Sheikh's father. The district court could 

reasonably infer that the statement by the Sheikh's father 

demonstrated that the Abu Dhabi government would have no 

part in an allegedly corrupt bargain with the Jungquists. So 

viewed, it follows that Sheikh Sultan's promise to the 

Jungquists was, as the district court found, not in furtherance 

of the interests of the sovereign but a personal and private 

action, 940 F. Supp. at 317, and that Sheikh Sultan, therefore, 

is not entitled to the protection of FSIA immunity. The fact 

that there was some convergence between Sheikh Sultan's 

official and unofficial conduct does not cloak his unofficial 

actions with immunity under the FSIA. Cf. Chuidian, 912 

F.2d at 1107.

We reach a different conclusion as to Al-Malki and Al 

Baba. The Jungquists alleged that Al-Malki and Al Baba 

acted as Sheikh Sultan's agents or co-conspirators in committing fraud, breaching the contract, and inflicting emotional 

distress. Yet nearly all the alleged actions by Al-Malki and 

Al Baba fell within their official duties, and there is no 

evidence that they participated in devising or agreeing to the 

private bargain struck with the Jungquists. As the UAE 

Medical Attache, Al-Malki was responsible for overseeing the 

administration of the Abu Dhabi foreign medical treatment 

program, which included assisting patients, supervising their 

medical care, and serving as the liaison between the Crown 

Prince Court and the patients and medical service providers. 

As the Director of Patient Relations for the program, Al Baba 

took care of logistical matters such as booking hotel accommodations, flights, and taxis, or securing documentation for 

patients. The only alleged actions that arguably did not fall 

within their official duties were their reiteration of Sheikh 

Sultan's personal promise to assume responsibility for the 

accident and Al Baba's attempt to persuade Tara's treating 

physician to alter his diagnosis of permanent brain damage. 

The latter action allegedly took place in August 1994 after 

Tara's participation in the medical treatment program had 

ended, and it is undisputed that Al Baba's official duties did 

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8 According to Al-Malki, Dr. Victoria Linda Zariff had responsibility for discussing the medical conditions of patients with the 

relevant physicians and doctors, and Al Baba's duties had "nothing 

to do with" the medical part of the program. 

9The district court did not reach the question of whether AlMalki's and Al Baba's performance of their official duties constituted commercial activity within the meaning of the FSIA. The 

Jungquists maintain that, if the court determines that the FSIA 

does apply, the case should be remanded to the district court for 

further discovery on this question. A remand is unnecessary, 

however, because the record is sufficiently developed to allow the 

court to resolve this issue as a matter of law. See King v. C.I.R.,

458 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir. 1972); see also 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 

& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2577, at 

522 (1995). 

not include contact with doctors concerning medical records.8

But there is no evidence supporting either allegation; instead, 

the evidence supports Al-Malki's and Al Baba's contentions 

that they had no knowledge of a personal promise by Sheikh 

Sultan and that they were merely performing their official 

duties.

Furthermore, the commercial activities exception to the 

FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), on which the Jungquists rely, 

does not apply to Al-Malki's and Al Baba's performance of 

their official duties.9 Under this exception, the term "commercial activity" is defined as "either a regular course of 

commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or 

act," and "[t]he commercial character of an activity [is] determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or 

particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its 

purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). As the Supreme Court has 

explained:

[T]he [relevant] question is not whether the foreign 

government is acting with a profit motive or instead with 

the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that the 

foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind 

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them) are the type of actions by a which a private party 

engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce.'

Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360-61 (1993) (quoting 

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)); 

see also Princz, 26 F.3d at 1172.

The Jungquists' contention that Al-Malki's and Al Baba's 

actions in the District of Columbia constitute commercial 

activity under the FSIA is flawed. They point to Al-Malki's 

and Al Baba's meetings and telephone conferences with the 

Jungquists to arrange for Tara's medical treatment; their 

processing of the payments for Tara's medical services and 

Tara's and her mother's living expenses, the latter by making 

wire transfers to the Jungquists' bank account in the District 

of Columbia; and their service as liaison between the 

Jungquists and various doctors and hospitals. In support of 

the characterization of this conduct as commercial activity, 

the Jungquists rely on Rush-Presbyterian, 877 F.2d 574. 

There, the government of Greece had contracted with hospitals in the United States for medical services not widely 

available in Greece, and was sued by the hospitals for nonpayment for services rendered. Id. at 575. Rejecting 

Greece's contention that the contract was not commercial 

because it had been secured in order to fulfill the government's constitutional obligation to provide for the health of its 

citizenry, the Seventh Circuit held that the essence of the 

contract, "the basic exchange of money for health care services," constituted commercial activity within the meaning of 

the FSIA. Id. at 581.

While the Abu Dhabi medical treatment program bears 

some resemblance to Greece's policy of providing medical 

care to its denizens, the Jungquists confuse general activity 

related to the claim with the specific activity upon which 

the claim is based. See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358. In RushPresbyterian, the plaintiffs were medical service providers 

suing a foreign government for breach of contract for its 

failure to pay for services. 877 F.2d at 575. The Jungquists, 

by contrast, are suing Al-Malki and Al Baba for actions that 

are uniquely sovereign in nature and that were taken in their 

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10 In Nelson, the Court held that acts of detention and torture 

in Saudi Arabia could not give rise to jurisdiction in the United 

States. 507 U.S. at 358-61. Although Saudi Arabia's recruitment 

in the United States of the plaintiff and entry into an employment 

contract with him for work in a Saudi Arabian government hospital 

may have constituted commercial activity within the meaning of the 

FSIA, those actions did not form the basis of the plaintiff's suit. Id.

at 358. Similarly, here, even if aspects of the Abu Dhabi foreign 

medical treatment program may be commercial, because the actions 

that form the basis of the Jungquists' claims against Al-Malki and 

Al Baba are not commercial in nature, the district court did not 

have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against Al-Malki 

and Al Baba under the commercial activities exception to the FSIA. 

official capacities. The Jungquists entered no contractual 

relationship with Al-Malki and Al Baba. Rather, the two 

officials fulfilled Sheikh Sultan's obligations to the Jungquists 

by performing their official tasks as administrators of a 

government program to provide for the health and welfare of 

Abu Dhabi's citizens and residents. Al-Malki and Al Baba's 

actions are not those by which a private party engages in 

" 'trade and traffic or commerce,' " and the fact that these 

actions may relate in certain respects to commercial activity 

does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605(a)(2).10 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358.

IV.

While the evidence of Sheikh Sultan's personal promise 

supported the district court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, the question remains whether the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Sheikh Sultan and 

Samea.

In considering the Jungquist's contract, fraud, fraud in the 

inducement, civil conspiracy, and promissory estoppel claims, 

the district court concluded that appellants' contacts with the 

District of Columbia provided a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under either the "transacting any 

business" prong or the "contracting to supply services" prong 

of the District of Columbia's Long Arm Statute, D.C. Code 

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11 D.C. Code § 13-423 provides in relevant part:

(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a 

claim for relief arising from the person's

(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;

(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;

(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this 

section, only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in 

this section may be asserted against him.

§ 13-423(a)(1)-(a)(2),11 and that this exercise of personal jurisdiction was consistent with the Due Process Clause. 

Jungquist, 940 F. Supp. at 320. The court relied on the 

allegations that the defendants contracted for the payment of 

medical expenses and compensation for injuries, and that this 

contract was partially performed in the District of Columbia 

where Tara was medically treated and she and her mother 

lived for several months at the defendants' expense, as well as 

allegations that their expenses were paid from District of 

Columbia bank accounts to the Jungquists' District of Columbia bank account and to the National Rehabilitation Hospital 

in the District of Columbia, and that one of Tara's treating 

physicians in the District of Columbia was contacted on behalf 

of the defendants in an attempt to get him to alter his medical 

diagnosis. Id. at 319. As to Sheikh Sultan specifically, the 

district court relied on the allegations that he conspired to 

perform acts in the District of Columbia in furtherance of the 

conspiracy to defraud the Jungquists, contracted with them to 

provide medical treatment in the District of Columbia, and 

caused his agents to perform part of the contract, to contact 

one of Tara's treating physicians to influence his diagnosis, 

and to breach the contract in the District of Columbia. Id. at 

320.

Appellants challenge each ground relied on by the district 

court for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. 

Noting that Sheikh Sultan and Samea were never physically 

present in the District of Columbia during the relevant time 

period and did not personally perform any acts here, appelUSCA Case #96-7220 Document #279433 Filed: 06/17/1997 Page 17 of 21
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lants maintain that the district court could not exercise 

jurisdiction under a conspiracy theory because the conclusory 

allegations in the complaint fail to plead conspiracy with the 

requisite degree of particularity. They further contend that 

neither the "transacting any business" nor "contracting to 

supply services" prong of the District of Columbia's long-arm 

statute provides a basis for personal jurisdiction. They point 

out that the complaint alleges that the promises were made in 

Abu Dhabi and Germany, not the District of Columbia, and 

that there is no allegation or proof that Sheikh Sultan, either 

alone or through his agents, promised to compensate the 

Jungquists in or through the District of Columbia or transacted any business here from which the Jungquists' causes of 

actions could arise. In addition, appellants maintain that 

there is no allegation or proof that any appellant purposely 

contracted to provide services to Tara in the District of 

Columbia; rather, Tara's treatment in the District of Columbia occurred not pursuant to an agreement with any appellant, but as a result of the advice of medical authorities in 

Abu Dhabi and at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 

Maryland. Thus, appellants contend, the fact that Tara's 

medical treatment fortuitously occurred in the District of 

Columbia does not provide sufficient contacts between appellants and the District of Columbia to allow the district court 

to assert personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.

We agree that the district court could not, consistent with 

due process, exercise personal jurisdiction over Sheikh Sultan 

and Samea. First, personal jurisdiction is unavailable here 

under a conspiracy theory. The complaint alleged that 

Sheikh Sultan and Samea engaged in purposeful and consistent contacts with the District of Columbia through the overt 

acts of their co-conspirators. But "[b]ald speculation" or a 

"conclusionary statement" that individuals are co-conspirators 

is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy theory. Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 

779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). 

Instead, the plaintiff must plead with particularity "the conspiracy as well as the overt acts within the forum taken in 

furtherance of the conspiracy." Dooley v. United Technolo

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gies Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65, 78 (D.D.C. 1992) (citing Naartex,

722 F.2d at 787 and First Chicago Int'l v. United Exchange 

Co., Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The 

Jungquists have not done so. The only actions alleged to 

have occurred in the District of Columbia were by Al-Malki 

and Al Baba. But, their alleged actions in furtherance of the 

conspiracy either fell within their official duties or were 

without support in the evidence. See supra Part III. Thus, 

the Jungquists failed to plead with sufficient particularity any 

overt acts within the District of Columbia in furtherance of 

the conspiracy, and personal jurisdiction over Sheikh Sultan 

and Samea is unavailable under a conspiracy theory.

Second, absent personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy 

theory, the district court could not, consistent with the constitutional requirements of due process, properly assert jurisdiction over Sheikh Sultan and Samea under the District of 

Columbia long-arm statute. The district court may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant only if "there are 

'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum 

'such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " United 

States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting 

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 

(1945)). While the defendant's absence of physical contact 

with a forum will not defeat personal jurisdiction there, 

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985), 

"the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State 

[must be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being 

haled into court there." Ferrara, 54 F.3d at 828 (quoting 

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 

(1980)). The Jungquists failed to offer evidence that Sheikh 

Sultan and Samea had the requisite "minimum contacts" with 

the District of Columbia. See Ferrara, 54 F.3d at 828 

(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).

It is undisputed that at the time of contracting Sheikh 

Sultan did not originally promise that the contract would be 

performed in the District of Columbia. While he subsequently authorized Tara's transfer to the United States for treatment, there is no evidence that Sheikh Sultan knowingly 

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12 The district court erred in ruling that it could exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over 

these claims. Jungquist, 940 F. Supp. at 320-21. Subject matter 

jurisdiction was established by reason of diversity of citizenship. 

Id. at 316; 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Hence, there was no need to exercise 

'supplemental' subject matter jurisdiction under § 1367(a). Section 

1367(a) does not apply to questions of personal jurisdiction, and the 

two cases cited by the district court are inapposite: Wiggins v. 

Philip Morris, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 458, 469 (D.D.C. 1994), involved 

the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction, 

authorized her treatment in the District of Columbia. The 

only evidence that Sheikh Sultan knew of Tara's treatment 

here appears in Michelle Jungquist's affidavit, where she 

states that in March 1994 in response to her complaints about 

the reduction in Tara and her mother's housing and subsistence allowance in the District of Columbia, Sheikh Sultan 

reaffirmed his promise to pay for Tara's medical expenses 

and injuries. There is no evidence, however, and the 

Jungquists do not allege, that Sheikh Sultan ever took any 

specific action pursuant to that reaffirmation. Nor do they 

point to any evidence that Samea arranged for or was connected with Tara's treatment in the District of Columbia. In 

short, there is no evidence that either Sheikh Sultan or 

Samea purposefully directed his efforts toward the District of 

Columbia or availed himself of the privilege of conducting 

business here. See, e.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,

339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950). Under the circumstances, neither appellant could have reasonably anticipated being haled 

into court in the District of Columbia, and the district court 

therefore lacked personal jurisdiction over them. See WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 

Likewise, the district court could not exercise personal 

jurisdiction over Sheikh Sultan for the remaining tort claims 

alleged against him. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423. The 

Sheikh's amenability to suit must be determined by reference 

to the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, which confers 

not general jurisdiction, but personal jurisdiction specific to 

the claims arising out of actions related to the District of 

Columbia.12 D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(b), quoted supra note 

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10; see El-Fadl, 75 F.3d at 672; Koteen, 913 F.2d at 974-75. 

The only relevant provision of the long-arm statute provides 

for personal jurisdiction over claims arising from the defendant's "causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by 

an act or omission in the District of Columbia." See D.C.

CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(3). Because the tort claims against 

the Sheikh for negligence, negligent entrustment, loss of filial 

consortium, and loss of services do not arise out of any act in 

the District of Columbia, but from the boating accident in 

Abu Dhabi, the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over him as to these claims. While the complaint alleged 

some actions by the Sheikh's agents in the District of Columbia related to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, namely, the repeated intentional misrepresentations 

of the Sheikh's intention fully to compensate the Jungquists 

for Tara's injuries, there is no evidence that the Sheikh 

authorized, intended, or even knew of, the performance of 

these actions in the District of Columbia, and hence, even if 

this claim fell within the long-arm statute, the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction would be inconsistent with due process.

See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294; Travelers 

Health Ass'n, 339 U.S. at 648-49.

Accordingly, we reverse insofar as the district court's order 

denies appellants' motion to dismiss the complaint.

_______________________

over supplemental claims, and Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta,

549 F. Supp. 1084, 1116 (S.D.N.Y.), concerned the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction where subject matter jurisdiction was based on 

the FSIA, not diversity of citizenship. 

...

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