Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-18-02481/USCOURTS-ca2-18-02481-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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Jon O. Newman, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in virtually all of Judge Lynch’s opinion for the Court (“Ct. Op.”)

but disagree on one point: interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (“Regulation”).

Because the Regulation might be at issue in subsequent cases concerning the

validity of an environmental impact statement (“EIS”), I write separately to

explain what I believe is the correct interpretation. The Regulation is set out in full

in the margin.1

1 “When an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the

human environment in an environmental impact statement and there is incomplete or

unavailable information, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking.

“(a) If the incomplete information relevant to reasonably foreseeable adverse impacts is

essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and the overall costs of obtaining it are not

exorbitant, the agency shall include the information in the environmental impact statement.

“(b) If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts

cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the means to obtain

it are not known, the agency shall include within the environmental impact statement:

“(1) A    statement that such information is incomplete or unavailable; (2) a

statement of the relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to

evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human

environment; (3) a summary of existing credible scientific evidence which is

relevant to evaluating the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on

the human environment, and (4) the agency’s evaluation of such impacts based

upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the

scientific community. For the purposes of this section, ‘reasonably foreseeable’

includes impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability

of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by

credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule

of reason.

“(c) The amended regulation will be applicable to all environmental impact statements

for which a Notice of Intent (40 CFR 1508.22) is published in the Federal Register on or after May

27, 1986. For environmental impact statements in progress, agencies may choose to comply with

the requirements of either the original or amended regulation.

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Judge Lynch’s opinion states that the EIS complies with the disclosure

requirements of the Regulation. See Ct. Op. at 23 n.10. The opinion reaches that

conclusion by combining the disclosure requirements of subparagraphs (a) and

(b).  

His reasoning has three parts. First, he invokes the language of

subparagraph (a) that states, “‘If the incomplete information relevant to

reasonably foreseeable adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among

alternatives,’” the information must be included in the EIS. See Ct. Op. at 13

(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a)). Second, he accepts the agency’s finding that the

incomplete information was not essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives.

See id. at 15. Third, and critically, he combines the disclosure requirements of

subparagraphs (a) and (b) by stating that if relevant information is essential, as

stated in subparagraph (a), but the cost of obtaining omitted information is

exorbitant or if the means to obtain it are unknown, as stated in subparagraph (b),

the EIS must provide other information, as also stated in subparagraph (b). See id.

at 13‐14.  

It is this third aspect of the reasoning that I believe is incorrect. The

disclosure requirements of the subparagraphs cannot be combined. Subparagraph

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(a) states the disclosure requirements for incomplete information; subparagraph

(b) states the disclosure requirements for unavailable information. The fact that

the EIS, after finding that the incomplete information was not essential, complied

with the disclosure requirement of subparagraph (a) provides no basis for

excusing the failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of subparagraph

(b). This becomes clear upon careful analysis of the wording and structure of the

Regulation.

That analysis begins with the introductory paragraph of the Regulation.

That paragraph states the general requirement that when an agency is evaluating

significant environmental impacts and there is “incomplete or unavailable

information,” the agency must say that the information is lacking. 40 C.F.R.

§ 1502.22, first paragraph. Note that the introductory paragraph applies when

there is either “incomplete” or “unavailable” information. Then, subparagraph (a)

states a requirement where information is incomplete, and subparagraph (b) states

different requirements where information is unavailable.

The distinction between the coverage of subparagraphs (a) and (b) is made

clear by the different requirements of the two subparagraphs. With respect to

incomplete information, subparagraph (a) requires such information to be

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included in the EIS. Obviously, such a requirement could not apply to unavailable

information. Instead of such an impossible requirement, subparagraph (b),

applicable to unavailable information, requires inclusion in the EIS of four items.

The EIS acknowledged that the idea of using site‐specific deer density targets, as

Appellant urged the National Park Service to do, was rejected “’because of the lack

of site‐specific information,’” J. App’x 308 (quoting EIS 59), and three of the four

items required by subparagraph (b) are not included in the EIS.

The point is this: the fact that the incomplete information is not essential to

a reasoned decision is irrelevant to this case because the clause concerning

essential information is located in, and applies only to, subparagraph (a) and does

not apply to subparagraph (b). And, to repeat, it is undisputed that the EIS does

not comply with the requirements of subparagraph (b), applicable to unavailable

information.

Despite the lack of compliance with the requirements of subparagraph (b),

I join the Court’s opinion affirming the judgment of the District Court. I rely on

the language of the Administrative Procedure Act stating that “due account shall

be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). I do not think the

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lack of compliance with subparagraph (b) was prejudicial in view of the overall

thoroughness of the EIS.

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