Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01753/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01753-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Rafael Martinez has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner submits numerous arguments in support of his claims that his 2008 trial 

convictions were unfairly obtained. Petitioner’s claim in Ground One is procedurally 

defaulted. Petitioner’s claim in Ground Seven is not cognizable. All of Petitioner’s 

remaining claims fail. Therefore, the Court will recommend the Amended Petition be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

II. BACKGROUND 

a. Factual and Procedural History 

The Arizona Court of Appeals found the following facts and procedural history as 

 Rafael Martinez, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-14-01753-PHX-JAT (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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true:1

In the early afternoon of July 25, 2007, Defendant and Nicholas Perez were passengers in the back seat of D.M.’s 

taxi. When the three-mile trip ended and D.M. requested the fare, Perez pointed a loaded handgun at D.M.’s neck and 

demanded money. D.M. gave Perez between eleven and thirty dollars and was reaching for more money when Perez ordered him out of the vehicle. D.M. complied. Defendant moved into the driver seat and sped away. 

 Five to ten minutes later, D.M. called 9-1-1 and gave 

physical descriptions of the suspects and their clothing. Within thirty minutes, police officers apprehended two suspects within one-half mile of the robbery. The stolen cab was discovered about the same time abandoned behind a 

nearby shopping center. Shortly thereafter, D.M. identified 

Defendant and Perez during separately held one-on-one show-ups. Additional details are discussed in the context of 

the issues addressed below. 

 Under an accomplice liability theory, the State charged Defendant and Perez each with one count of armed robbery, a dangerous offense and class two felony, and one count of theft of means of transportation, a class three felony. Perez entered into a plea agreement with the State. Defendant’s trial 

resulted twice in a hung jury. After his third trial, however, 

the jury found him guilty as charged. The trial court imposed aggravated consecutive terms of imprisonment: twenty-one years for the armed robbery conviction, and seven years for 

the theft of means conviction. 

State v. Martinez, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0924, 2010 WL 3366407, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 

26, 2010). 

b. Direct Appeal

 On January 4, 2010, Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal, which raised the 

following issues: 

1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied 

Petitioner’s Batson challenge. 

2. Whether the court abused its discretion in permitting the State to introduce evidence of a high-five and communication with codefendant. 

3. Whether the imposition of consecutive sentences was 

1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ recitation of the facts is presumed correct. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2012) (rejecting argument that statement of facts in state appellate court’s opinion should not be afforded the presumption of correctness). 

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error. 

4. Whether Petitioner’s sentences for both charges 

violated the probation against double punishment for 

the same offense. 

5. Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Petitioner. 

6. Whether the victim’s in-court identification was 

unduly suggestive. 

(Doc. 19-2, Ex. M, at 1.) 

 On April 26, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences. Martinez, 2010 WL 3366407, at *1. On September 16, 2010, Petitioner 

filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 19-2, Ex. Q, at 171.) 

The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review. (Doc. 19-3, Ex. R, at 2.) 

c. Petition for State Post-Conviction Relief

 On October 1, 2010, Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Post-conviction Relief. 

(Doc. 19-3, Ex. S, at 4.) Appointed counsel filed a notice stating she was “unable to find 

any claims for relief to raise in post-conviction proceedings.” (Doc. 19-3, Ex. V, at 13.) 

On May 4, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition. (Doc. 19-3, Ex. X, at 19.) On 

May 19, 2011, the trial court struck Petitioner’s PCR Petition and ordered Petitioner to 

file a Petition that complied with Rule 32.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

(Doc. 19-3, Ex. BB, at 55.) On November 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a revised petition, 

which raised the following arguments: 

1. A violation of due process based upon false testimony and an inaccurate presentence report. 

2. A disparity of sentences between codefendants based 

upon an appearance of vindictiveness for exercising the right to proceed to trial. 

3. Newly-discovered evidence related to $8.95 warranted 

a new trial. 

4. Prosecutorial misconduct based upon testimony related to DNA testing and $8.95. 

5. A violation of the presumption of innocence when the 

victim referred to a prior trial and a witness testified to 

a “high five” between codefendants. 

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6. Ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the 

arguments listed above. 

(Doc. 19-3, Ex. II, at 79.) On March 9, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR 

Petition, ruling that Petitioner “did not show a colorable claim for which post-conviction 

relief is warranted. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED denying Defendant’s request for PostConviction Relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of criminal procedure.” (Doc. 19-3, 

Ex. QQ, at 146.) 

d. PCR Appeal 

On May 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with exhibits. (Doc. 19-3, 

Exs. VV & WW, at 159, 180.) On August 8, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarily denied review of Petitioner’s Petition for Review. (Doc. 19-3, Ex. XX, at 

194.) 

III. PETITIONER’S HABEAS PETITION 

On October 8, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant, timely habeas Petition.2

 Petitioner 

submits 12 grounds in the Petition. The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas 

Corpus are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

a. Standard of Review – Procedural Default 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

 

2

 On August 5, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition (Doc. 1.), but it was dismissed 

without prejudice on September 23, 2014 (Doc. 6) with leave to amend within 30 days. The current Amended Petition (Doc. 7) contains the same grounds as the initial Petition. 

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present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id.at 31–

32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . . . 

(2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis 

for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

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Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet 

the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731–32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, 

“if the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as 

a result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as well as to those 

represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s 

procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-

89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or prejudice, the court need 

not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 

1999); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Lastly, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the 

procedural default rule” a petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has 

‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” 

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

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298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by 

“persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be 

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error 

with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

b. Martinez v. Ryan

A Petitioner may assert that the ineffectiveness of his appellate and PCR counsel 

constitutes cause and prejudice to excuse the presentation of his procedurally defaulted 

claims. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). 

The Courts have long rejected claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. 

“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. 

Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 

in such proceedings.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. The Coleman Court thus held that the 

ineffectiveness of PCR counsel also could not establish cause to excuse a failure to 

properly exhaust state remedies and procedural default on a claim. (Id.) 

However, the Supreme Court has since recognized an exception to the Coleman 

rule. In Martinez, the Court recognized that because courts increasingly reserve review 

of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to PCR proceedings, the 

ineffectiveness of counsel in such PCR proceedings could effectively defeat any review 

of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the Court recognized a narrow exception 

to Coleman’s ruling on the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as cause to excuse a 

procedural default on such a claim. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 

Under Martinez, a petitioner may establish cause for the procedural default of an 

ineffective assistance claim by establishing the following: (1) the claim of “ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there 

being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review 

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proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding 

in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and (4) state law requires

that an “ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claim] . . . be raised in an initial-review 

collateral proceeding.” Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (quoting 

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318). With regard to the first prong, Petitioner must 

“demonstrate that the underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is a 

substantial one, which is to say that . . . the claim has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 

at 1318-19. In Nguyen v. Curry, the Ninth Circuit held that Martinez applied equally to 

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that were not presented. 736 F.3d 

1287, 1289 (2013). 

 To determine whether Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 

counsel claims are “substantial,” and whether PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise them, the Court must determine whether PCR counsel’s conduct fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and whether petitioner was prejudiced, as outlined 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

c. Standard of Review - Merits

 The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision which was contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision 

was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 

F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the 

“last reasoned decision” from the state court, “which means that when the final state 

court decision contains no reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state 

court that provides a reasoned explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 

418, 441 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2000)). 

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this 

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Court’s decisions. And an unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. Rather, as a 

condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement. 

White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a 

formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the 

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S.Ct. 770, 786–787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to 

meet”—and it is—”that is because it was meant to be.” [] 131 

S.Ct., at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a State’s 

criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. 

Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013). 

 A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). 

 A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

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refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). However, the state 

court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if it 

can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 

1862 (2010). An unreasonable application of law is different from an incorrect one. See

Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“That test is an objective one and does not permit a court to grant relief simply because 

the state court might have incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” 

Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 

F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as 

opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 

593 (1982). See also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1202 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims 

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray, 745 F.3d at 998. Pursuant to 

section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a state-court’s factual 

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have 

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 15 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoted by Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724-25 

(9th Cir. 2014)). 

 If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

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state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

AEDPA otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 

U.S. 930, 953–54 (2007). Additionally, the petitioner must show the error was not 

harmless: “For reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners are not 

entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 

‘actual prejudice.’” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

d. Ground One 

 Petitioner asserts “the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state to 

present evidence of Petitioner and co-defendant [communicating] while in court” on a 

prior occasion. (Doc. 7 at 6.) In Petitioner’s direct appeal, he argued that a deputies’ 

testimony (that Petitioner and a codefendant exchanged a high five during a court 

appearance) violated Rule 404(b) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. (Doc. 19-2, Ex. M, 

at 28.) Petitioner did not cite to federal law or assert a federal claim. Because he did not 

fairly present a federal claim, Petitioner must establish cause and prejudice to excuse the 

default. 

 In his Reply, Petitioner states he “can satisfy the ‘cause’ requirements by showing 

that assistance of counsel was ineffective . . . .” (Doc. 24 at 5.) He asserts that “appellate 

counsel failed to cite any federal violation or case law that will protect the Petitioner from 

any additional harm if he [chose] to file for habeas corpus.” (Id.)3

 Because Petitioner’s 

claim is not substantial, he cannot establish cause to excuse this default. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the same claim in Petitioner’s direct appeal, 

finding as follows: 

Before trial, Defendant moved in limine to preclude a sheriff deputy’s testimony regarding his observation of a “high-five” and other communication between Defendant and Perez while 

they were previously in court on June 5, 2008 waiting for a 

 

3

 The Court assumes, without deciding, that Martinez applies to this claim. If true, this argument would add Martinez review to any claim not fairly presented in state court merely by stating counsel should have raised a federal claim. 

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pretrial hearing to commence.... The trial court found the 

anticipated testimony to be relevant but prohibited the State from eliciting evidence that Defendant and Perez were in 

custody at the time of the perceived high-five.... Here, 

evidence of Defendant and Perez exchanging a high-five after the robbery incident tends to prove that they knew each other and were accomplices in committing the charged offenses. The deputy’s testimony was therefore relevant. See State v. 

Beard, 107 Ariz. 388, 391, 489 P.2d 25, 28 (1971) 

(“companionship [ ] and conduct before and after the offense 

are circumstances from which one’s participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.”) (internal quotation 

omitted). Other explanations for the high-five may affect the weight to be afforded the evidence, but they have no bearing on its admissibility.... For these reasons, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the high-five 

between Defendant and Perez. 

Martinez, 2010 WL 3366407, at *3. 

One of Petitioner’s arguments at trial was misidentification. At the beginning of 

Petitioner’s closing argument, counsel argued that “. . . Mr. Martinez was in the wrong 

place at the wrong time, leading to a misidentification.” (Doc. 19-7, Ex. PPP, at 71.) 

Evidence tending to establish the codefendants knew each other would be relevant. See 

United States v. Souffront, 338 F.3d 809, 825 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming admission of 

photographs, one of which “shows that there is some type of relationship between” 

codefendants). During argument to the court regarding a motion in limine, counsel’s 

primary concern was that the jury would discover that Petitioner was in custody. 

THE COURT: Your main issue and concern is that in order to 

bring up this issue and have these officers testify, is that you have to go into the fact that they’ve been held in custody? 

COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor. 

(Doc. 19-5, Ex. LLL, at 5.) 

Here, the trial court ameliorated Petitioner’s primary concern and prohibited any 

reference to Petitioner’s custody status. Petitioner fails to establish that error, if any, had 

a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht 

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). Petitioner cannot demonstrate cause, let alone 

prejudice, for his default. Accordingly, habeas relief is precluded as to Ground One. 

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e. Ground Two

 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts four subclaims alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Petitioner also asserts that if these grounds are procedurally defaulted, then 

ineffective assistance of counsel should excuse the default. (Doc. 24 at 17-18.) The Court 

begins with the merits of this argument in the interest of judicial economy. See Lambrix 

v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1997) (explaining that the court may bypass the 

procedural default issue in the interest of judicial economy when the merits are clear but 

the procedural default issues are not); Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 543 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“we ordinarily consider exhaustion first, but we have discretion in some circumstances 

to deny a claim on the ground that it is barred by Teague, without considering 

exhaustion”). 

 The Supreme Court established a two-part test for evaluating ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 

(1984). In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must 

show (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 

and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88. 

 Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption 

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional 

judgment in making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney 

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 

815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of 

counsel’s performance is “extremely limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 

1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Acts or omissions that 

“might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of 

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counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of 

counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s 

performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. 

 In addition to showing counsel’s deficient performance, a petitioner must establish 

that he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. See id. at 691-92. To 

establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The prejudice component “focuses on the 

question whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable 

or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 

It is not enough to merely show “that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 

outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. A habeas court may proceed 

directly to the prejudice prong without deciding whether counsel’s performance was 

deficient. Id. at 697; Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citing Strickland). 

i. Failure to Examine Clothing for DNA Evidence 

 Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for failing “to preserve and have DNA 

expert examine clothing . . . .” (Doc. 7 at 7.) Petitioner asserts the “outcome of the trial 

would have been different” if DNA testing of the clothing was conducted. (Doc. 24 at 

15.) Petitioner presents no evidence to establish this claim is true. Here, DNA testing had 

been conducted on the vehicle where the offense occurred, but the results were 

inconclusive. The detective swabbed “six areas” of the taxi for DNA evidence. (Doc. 19-

6, Ex. OOO, at 191.) The DNA analyst testified that the “comparison of all the swabs 

from the taxicab to the two standards I had were inconclusive.” (Doc. 19-6, Ex. OOO, at 

215.) There’s no evidence to establish that DNA testing, if conclusive, would have been 

more or less likely to inculpate or exculpate the Petitioner. Petitioner’s speculation 

regarding the potential results of further DNA testing is insufficient to establish 

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prejudice. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Speculation about 

what an expert could have said is not enough to establish prejudice.”); Jackson v. 

Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (unsupported speculation and conclusory 

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to establish ineffective 

assistance); McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 972 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding “no merit” 

that counsel was ineffective for failing to submit evidence for forensic testing where 

petitioner “offers no evidence to establish that a forensic examination of the pubic hairs 

would have shown that he was not involved”). Petitioner’s claim fails. 

ii. Failure to Object to Reference of a Prior Trial 

 Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial when a 

witness referred to a prior trial. (Doc. 24 at 15.) During the trial, Petitioner’s counsel 

asked the victim on cross-examination, “[Have] you seen these pants before?” and the 

victim responded, “Yes.” (Doc. 19-5, Ex. MMM, at 210.) Petitioner’s counsel then asked, 

“Where?” and the victim responded, “Mr. Martinez was holding them up in front of him 

in the last trial.” (Id.) Petitioner asserts this affected his “presumption of innocence.” 

(Doc. 7 at 7.) 

 Petitioner’s claim fails because he cannot establish there was prejudice. The trial 

court instructed the jury at the end of the trial regarding the presumption of innocence. 

The standard instruction stated: “The law does not require a defendant to prove 

innocence. Every defendant is presumed by law to be innocent. You must start with the 

presumption that the defendant is innocent.” (Doc. 19-2, Ex. G, at 34.) A jury is 

presumed to follow its instructions. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 (2001). 

Although counsel did not request a mistrial, the decision whether to grant a mistrial is 

reserved to the broad discretion of the trial judge. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 

461–63 (1973). Here, the jury was not informed there was a prior hung jury, but only that 

there was a prior trial. Because the jury was not informed of a prior hung jury, Petitioner 

cannot establish his trial was unfair. See Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (finding on habeas review that the “dispositive issue is ... whether the trial 

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court committed an error which rendered the trial “so ‘arbitrary and fundamentally 

unfair’ that it violated federal due process) (citation omitted); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 

199, 204–205 (9th Cir. 1995) (conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel 

are not sufficient to support habeas relief). Petitioner cannot demonstrate any due process 

violation as a result of counsel’s failure to request a mistrial, which would almost 

certainly have been denied based upon a sole reference to a prior trial. 

iii. Improper Comments During Closing Argument 

 Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the “prosecution’s 

improper comments that some of the loci do match that of the defendant.” (Doc. 24 at 

16.) During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 

 Ultimately, the DNA from that taxicab was inconclusive. I 

did want to mention one thing. On the Power Point that Mr. 

Winchell showed you, he said not one of those loci matched 

up. That’s inaccurate, and you’ll have the exhibits back there 

that you can look at. Some of the exhibits from the cab do 

match up with the Defendant, but the criminalist told you there’s not enough there for him to come to a scientific 

conclusion. That was the testimony, and that’s the evidence, and when you look at those boards you’ll see that it’s not true that nothing lined up. 

(Doc. 19-7, Ex. PPP, at 103.) 

 The prosecutor’s argument that the jurors should review the exhibits to confirm 

that some “loci do match up with the Defendant” was not improper. By examining the 

exhibits, the jurors could easily determine for themselves whether “not one of these loci 

matched up.” (Id.) This comment was a response to an argument of the Petitioner,4

 and 

counsel reminded the jurors that the results were inconclusive. Counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to object to this statement. See Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 

1108–09 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding on federal habeas review that the “relevant question is 

whether the prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

 

4

 “Thus the import of the evaluation has been that if the prosecutor’s remarks were 

‘invited,’ and did no more than respond substantially in order to ‘right the scale,’ such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 

12–13 (1985). 

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resulting conviction a denial of due process.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

“[T]he failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance.” Rupe v. Wood, 

93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). 

iv. Failure to Interview Witnesses 

 Petitioner asserts “trial counsel’s failure to investigate and interview any potential 

witness” violated his “Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 

24 at 16.) Petitioner admits “there’s no telling what these witness[es] might say” but they 

could have relevant information about “what the suspects were wearing, . . . what race 

they were,” and who was running from the scene. (Doc. 24 at 16.) Petitioner’s claim fails 

because he cannot establish deficient performance by the failure to identify and interview 

additional witnesses. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486–87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 

531 U.S. 908 (2000) (determining that counsel’s failure to interview an alleged alibi 

witness did not constitute ineffective assistance because there was “no evidence that this 

witness would have provided helpful testimony—i.e., Dows has not presented an 

affidavit from this alleged witness”); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 

2001) (mere speculation that a witness might have provided helpful information if 

interviewed is not enough to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 

v. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate and PCR Counsel 

 Petitioner asserts that appellate and PCR counsel were ineffective for failing to 

raise the arguments he presents in the Petition. (Doc. 7 at 7.) This Court concludes the 

arguments are meritless, thus appellate and post-conviction counsel were not ineffective 

for failing to raise them. 

f. Ground Three

 Petitioner asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by “knowingly presenting 

false testimony” and contradicting the State’s DNA expert. (Doc. 1 at 13.) Regarding the 

false testimony claim, Petitioner claims that the prosecutor knowingly elicited (1) false 

testimony from Officer Gutierrez that Petitioner lived in South Phoenix (Doc. 24 at 20), 

and (2) false testimony from Detective Ybarra that Petitioner did not “have any money at 

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the time of his arrest” (Id. at 23). The trial court reviewed this argument in Petitioner’s 

PCR Petition,5

 and found Petitioner “did not show a colorable claim for which PostConviction Relief is warranted.” (Doc. 19-3, Ex. QQ, at 146.)6

 A conviction obtained based on the knowing use of false evidence violates an 

individual’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269–71 

(1950). But contradictory or inconsistent testimony is insufficient to warrant a reversal, 

instead the prosecutor must have knowingly presented false evidence. United States v. 

Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1364 (9th Cir. 1992). Reversal is even more difficult to obtain 

in habeas proceedings: a petitioner may only obtain habeas relief if the error had 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 637. 

i. Petitioner’s Residence 

 Here, Petitioner asserts he did not live in South Phoenix, but instead resided in 

“Maryvale.” (Doc. 24 at 21.) The prosecutor asked Officer Gutierrez “And do you 

remember what the -- which area of town he lived in, according to his ID card?” (Doc. 

19-6 at 93-94.) The officer responded “He -- the ID card said that he lived in South –

South Phoenix area.” (Id.) During cross-examination, Petitioner’s counsel asked 

“Officer, isn’t it true that the information you gathered from his ID card said that he 

resided at 3001 North Forty-Eighth Drive, Phoenix, Arizona?” (Doc. 19-6, Ex. OOO, at 

102.) Counsel then had Officer Gutierrez agree that the address was “north” of South 

Phoenix. (Id. at 103.) This information presented from Officer Gutierrez was, at most, 

contradictory. Moreover, Petitioner does not dispute the jurors knew Petitioner’s actual 

address, nor does he dispute that the officer agreed the address was north of “South 

 

5 See Doc. 19-3, Ex. II, at 91, 88, where Petitioner argued: “the testimony elicited from Officer Gutierrez that Mr. Martinez lived in South Phoenix was false” and “. . . it 

was Mr Martinez who had the $8.95 and not Mr. Perez.” 

6

 The trial court did not refer to a procedural bar in its PCR ruling, which pertains to Grounds 3, 9-12. The court instead found the claims were “not colorable.” (Doc. 19-3, 

Ex. QQ, at 146.) The Court reviews these Grounds on their merits. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). 

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Phoenix.” The jury was capable of determining whether that location could be described 

as “South Phoenix.” Petitioner cannot establish the information, in light of crossexamination, had an injurious effect on the jury. Petitioner’s claim is insufficient to 

warrant habeas relief. 

ii. Possession of $8.95 

 Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution falsely introduced evidence regarding the 

possession of $8.95 at the time of arrest is similarly insufficient. Petitioner’s argument is 

that Detective Ybarra testified Petitioner had no cash on his person at the time of arrest. 

Contrary to Detective Ybarra’s testimony, Petitioner asserts he did have $8.95. Petitioner 

presents jail documents to establish Petitioner possessed the $8.95.7

 Petitioner asserts 

that if he had this cash, then it corroborates his statement that he intended to take a bus 

ride prior to his arrest. (Doc. 24 at 26.) Because Detective Ybarra testified that Petitioner 

had no cash, this testimony impeached Petitioner’s statement that he intended to take a 

bus ride. 

 The prosecutor asked Detective Ybarra the following questions: 

 Q How much money did Rafael Martinez have on his 

person? 

 A. I’m sorry, none. 

 Q Detective, could I direct your attention to the bottom of that page that you’re looking at there on Exhibit 41? 

 A. Yes, it says $8.95. 

 Q. And is that an amount that he had on his person? 

 A. I don’t believe it was his. 

 ... 

 Q. Let me follow up. Is this an arrest for both Rafael 

Martinez and Nicholas Perez? 

 A. Yes. 

 

7

 Petitioner is correct that the booking records do indicate he had $8.95 when he 

was accepted at the county jail on July 26, 2007. (Doc. 24-1, Ex. B, at 23; Doc. 24-1, Ex. 

E, at 34.) But as noted above, Detective Ybarra also agreed the records stated this fact. 

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 Q. And how much money did Nicholas Perez have on 

his person? 

 A. $8.95. 

(Doc. 19-7, Ex. PPP, at 35.) 

 Petitioner has not established that Detective’s testimony was false. Detective 

Ybarra agreed that the booking form stated $8.95 was listed on Petitioner’s “arrest 

record.” (Id.) But the witness also stated she did not believe the $8.95 was Petitioner’s, 

and instead testified that $8.95 was the amount on Perez’s person. (Id.) In fact, it was the 

prosecutor who brought document disparity to the jury’s attention. In response, the 

witness stated that she did not believe the money was Petitioner’s even though the 

document said otherwise. At most, Detective Ybarra’s knowledge regarding the cash 

compared to the entry listed on the booking record reflects an inconsistency. Petitioner 

has not established the testimony was false. Petitioner has also failed to establish that this 

testimony “had a substantial and injurious effect” on the jury’s determination. 

iii. Contradicting the DNA Witness 

 Petitioner asserts the prosecutor contradicted the DNA expert when the prosecutor 

argued “some of the exhibits from the lab do match up with the defendant.” (Doc. 24 at 

29.) This is the same argument presented, and rejected, in Ground Two above.8

 

g. Ground Four

 Petitioner asserts the State violated his Fifth Amendment guarantee against double 

jeopardy when it convicted him of Armed Robbery and the “lesser-included offense” of 

Theft of Means of Transportation. (Doc. 24 at 32.) The Arizona Court of Appeals 

rejected Petitioner’s argument, finding: 

 Here, the crimes of armed robbery and theft of means 

of transportation each contain at least one element not found 

in the other. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1902,-1904 (armed robbery requires a defendant to threaten to use force via a deadly weapon to take property from another); A.R.S. § 13-

1814(A)(5) (theft of means of transportation requires a 

defendant to knowingly control, without lawful authority, 

 

8

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another’s use of means of transportation knowing that the property was stolen). Thus, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, theft of means is not a lesser-included offense of armed 

robbery under the facts of this case. No double jeopardy violation occurred. 

Martinez, 2010 WL 3366407, at *8. 

 Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable and fails on the merits. Petitioner alleges he 

submitted this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 7 at 9, 13), but that claim was 

based upon a violation of A.R.S. § 13–116.9

 To the extent Petitioner argues the sentence 

violated Arizona law, that argument is not cognizable on habeas review. See Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“Federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state 

law.”); Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The decision 

whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is a matter of state criminal 

procedure and is not within the purview of federal habeas corpus.”). Petitioner’s federal 

claim is procedurally defaulted because it was not raised as a federal claim in state court. 

In the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner cited Arizona law and argued that the 

“Arizona Supreme Court has held that A.R.S. § 13–116 precludes the court from 

imposing consecutive sentences if the defendant’s conduct is considered a ‘single act.’” 

(Doc. 19-2, Ex. M, at 31.) Petitioner asserts no cause to excuse the procedural default. 

 The claim that Petitioner’s convictions violated his right against double jeopardy 

is also meritless. The test that determines whether two convictions violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause is “whether there are two offenses or only one,” which is established by 

evaluating “whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” 

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (citations omitted). The Arizona 

Court of Appeals determined the facts of this case support a finding that no double 

 

9

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jeopardy violation occurred. Respondent argues that the theft of cash from the victim was 

separate from the theft of the vehicle. (Doc. 19 at 41.) This argument is supported by the 

State’s closing argument, where the prosecutor stated: 

 Just to briefly go over the armed robbery count, there are five separate and distinct elements to that count, and those 

are described on page 7 of your jury instructions, and it tells you that the State must prove these five things. 

 One, that the Defendant or an accomplice took the 

property of another. 

 Well, in this case we know that Nicholas Perez took 

Deane Maki ‘s money, and the Defendant took his cab. 

(Doc. 19-7, Ex. PPP, at 59.) 

 Petitioner does not dispute that money and a vehicle were stolen. Additionally, the 

State was permitted to charge two separate crimes. “A state may punish separate offenses 

arising out of the same transaction without violating the double jeopardy clause.” Walker 

v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 

333 (1981)). See also, Rhoden v. Rowland. 10 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993) (it is 

“well settled that a single transaction can give rise to distinctive offenses under separate 

statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause”). Petitioner has failed to establish 

that the court’s determination was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law as set forth by the United States Supreme Court. 

h. Ground Five 

 Petitioner argues the trial court erred “by not applying a clear and convincing 

standard” to determine if Petitioner’s pretrial identification was unduly prejudicial. (Doc. 

24 at 38.) The Arizona Court of Appeals found: 

To obtain relief under fundamental error review, Defendant 

has the burden to show that error occurred, the error was 

fundamental, and that he was prejudiced thereby. State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567-68, ¶¶ 20-22, 115 P.3d 601, 607-08 (2005). Without deciding whether the court 

fundamentally erred by applying an incorrect standard, see 

Dessureault, 104 Ariz. at 384, 454 P.2d at 985, we conclude 

Defendant cannot sustain his burden of establishing the requisite prejudice. 

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Defendant claims he was prejudiced because “[u]ndoubtedly, [Defendant] would not have been convicted if the court had 

determined that the State has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that [D.M.]’s in-court identification of 

[Defendant] was reliable.” This argument, however, 

speculates that, had the trial court applied the heightened standard, it would have found no clear-and-convincing 

evidence of the identification procedure’s reliability. We will not presume prejudice when none appears affirmatively in the record. See State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 13-14, 951 P.2d 869, 

878-79 (1997); State v. Munninger, 213 Ariz. 393, 397, ¶ 14, 142 P.3d 701, 705 (App. 2006); see also Henderson, 210 

Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607 (noting burden of persuasion placed on the defendant in a fundamental error 

review to discourage him from taking his chances on a favorable verdict, “reserving the ‘hole card’ of a later appeal” on a matter that was wholly curable at trial, and then seeking reversal on appeal) (quotation omitted). Defendant’s 

speculation is therefore insufficient to warrant reversal under 

fundamental error review. 

Martinez, 2010 WL 3366407, at *6. 

 A pretrial identification violates due process where (1) the police-arranged 

identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive, and (2) the suggestive procedure 

gives rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 

188, 197 (1972). “If we find that a challenged procedure is not impermissibly suggestive, 

our inquiry into the due process claim ends.” United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 492 

(9th Cir.1985). It is only after finding it unduly suggestive, that the court is required to 

consider the Biggers factors. Id. The factors to be considered in assessing reliability are: 

(1) the witness’s opportunity to view the accused at the time of the crime, (2) the 

witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the description, (4) the witness’s level 

of certainty, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Biggers, 

409 U.S. at 199–200. 

 In his Petition, Petitioner states (without argument) that “the in court identification 

of Petitioner was unduly subjective . . . .” (Doc. 7 at 10.) In his Reply, Petitioner 

extensively argues each of the five factors of Biggers. (Doc. 24 at 33-38.) The Ninth 

Circuit “has found that show-ups are not objectionable unless the procedure was so 

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

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misidentification.” United States v. Kessler, 692 F.2d 584, 585 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals found no prejudice appeared affirmatively in the 

record, noting that: 

D.M. testified at trial that he clearly observed Defendant before and during the robbery, and that he performed the 

show-up of Defendant less than one hour after the incident, 

during which he recognized Defendant “right away.” D.M. had “no doubt” at trial that Defendant was “the man.” 

Martinez, 2010 WL 3366407, at *6, n.16. The court also noted that the trial court 

“specifically found that (1) D.M. had sufficient opportunities to view Defendant as 

Defendant approached and entered the taxi; (2) D.M. had a high degree of confidence that 

Defendant was the person ‘at the scene’; and (3) the show-up occurred soon after the 

robbery. The record supports these findings.” Id., at *6, n.15. 

 The Arizona state court’s fact finding was not unreasonable. After assessing the 

totality of the circumstances, D.M.’s pretrial identification was reliable and the show-up 

conducted was not so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 

likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 

 Regarding the first factor (the witness’s opportunity to view the accused at the 

time of the crime), the victim testified that he got “a very good look” at Petitioner (Doc. 

19-4, Ex. EEE, a 85), the victim looked at Petitioner’s face from one to two feet away 

when the door was opened (Id. at 78), he was “inches” from the Petitioner at one point 

during the robbery (Id. at 83), and he saw Petitioner again when the Petitioner moved 

from the back seat into the front seat of the taxi (Id.). 

 For the second factor (the witness’s degree of attention), the victim testified he 

was paying attention to the codefendants because he was suspicious they “were going to 

jump out and run” and not pay the cab fare. (Doc. 19-4, Ex. EEE, at 85.) 

 For the third factor (the accuracy of the description), the victim stated the 

Petitioner wore “baggy shorts, baggy pants.” (Id. at 100.) The victim testified the 

Petitioner wore “a long short” that was “tapered a little.” (Id. at 101.) The officer testified 

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Petitioner was wearing “dark short or dark colored pants” when he was arrested. (Id. at 

48.) Petitioner was cross-examined extensively regarding his description of the pants. (Id. 

at 99-101.) The victim testified “[t]hey both had tattoos” but explained that he did not 

volunteer information about the tattoos because “[t]attoos are just not that uncommon 

among young kids.” (Id. at 99.) 

 For the fourth factor (the witness’s level of certainty), the victim stated he 

recognized the Petitioner “immediately” (Id. at 94), and said “I seen his face very clearly, 

and I just really recognized him immediately” (Id. at 94-95). The victim was 95 percent 

certain in his identification. (Id. at 95.) The officer testified that the victim’s identification 

at the scene was “immediate” and certain. (Id. at 20.) The record does not support 

Petitioner’s claim that the victim’s certainty was “below average.” (Doc. 24 at 36.) 

 For the fifth factor (the length of time between the crime and the confrontation), 

the victim testified the scene identification was no more than 40 minutes after the 

incident. (Id. at 93-94.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed the record and determined no prejudice 

“appears affirmatively in the record.” Martinez, 2010 WL 3366407, at *6. This decision 

was not based on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

i. Ground Six 

Petitioner asserts the trial court erred “when it denied Batson challenge to 

Petitioner when the State struck a Hispanic juror” (Juror no. 10). (Doc. 24 at 38.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals concluded the following: 

 At the conclusion of voir dire, the State exercised one 

of its peremptory challenges to strike venire person no. 10 (Juror no. 10). Defendant raised a Batson challenge noting he and Juror no. 10 are both Hispanic and “[Juror no. 10] never 

answered any questions.” In response, the prosecutor said she eliminated Juror no. 10 because he was young, did not have a high school degree and did not use proper English when he introduced himself during voir dire by stating, “I ain’t been on no jury.” As further proof that she did not strike Juror no. 

10 because of his race, the prosecutor noted two other 

Hispanic panel members would be seated on the jury and stated “I don’t have a problem with either of them.” The court 

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overruled Defendant’s objection finding Juror no. 10’s lack of education to be a race-neutral reason for the strike, and the 

court found Defendant failed to demonstrate racial prejudice 

to rebut the State’s explanation. 

... 

Here, the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for dismissing Juror no. 10 were race-neutral. Defendant’s argument regarding the purported pretextual nature of those reasons is essentially a challenge to the prosecutor’s credibility. But, “determining the validity of those explanations required the court to evaluate the sincerity of the prosecutor as well as the behavior 

of the juror [ ]. These are credibility determinations that the court was in the best position to make.” Id. at 221, ¶ 19, 150 P.3d at 794. “We will not second-guess the trial court’s 

credibility determination, especially when, as here, both 

parties agree that at least one juror with a Hispanic surname was ultimately chosen.” State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 10, ¶ 27, 226 P.3d 370, 379 (2010) (noting that “[a]lthough not dispositive, the fact that the state accepted other [minority] jurors on the venire is indicative of a nondiscriminatory motive”). Accordingly, on this record, we will not hold that 

the trial court clearly erred in finding the State’s proffered race-neutral reason for striking Juror no. 10 was not pretextual. We therefore affirm the court’s order denying 

Defendant’s Batson challenge. 

Martinez, 2010 WL 3366407, at *1. 

 Here, the Petitioner made a prima facie showing that the strike was based upon 

race, and the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Martinez, 2010 

WL 3366407, at *1. The issue before the Court is Batson’s third step, which is the 

evaluation of “the persuasiveness of the justification proffered by the prosecutor” to 

decide whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Rice v. Collins, 546 

U.S. 333, 338-339 (2006). “[A] federal habeas court can only grant [the] petition if it 

was unreasonable to credit the prosecutor’s . . . neutral explanations for the Batson

challenge.” Rice, 546 U.S. 338-339. The factual findings of the state court are presumed 

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In evaluating habeas petitions premised on a Batson

violation, “our standard is doubly deferential: unless the state appellate court was 

objectively unreasonable in concluding that a trial court’s credibility determination was 

supported by substantial evidence, we must uphold it.” Briggs v. Grounds, 682 F.3d 

1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Rice, 546 U.S. at 338–42). 

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 Petitioner argues that the juror did not use the word “ain’t,” which proves the 

prosecutor misled the trial court. (Doc. 24 at 39.) But the prosecutor also told the court 

the juror did not “have a high school education.” (Doc. 19-5, Ex. LLL, at 119.) Petitioner 

responds only that the juror “could [have] had a GED.” (Doc. 24 at 29.) A lack of 

education is a non-discriminatory reason for striking a juror. See United States v. Marin, 

7 F.3d 679, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The attainment of a certain educational level has 

been accepted by numerous circuits as a race neutral criterion for exercising a peremptory 

challenge under the Batson mandate, and, as far as we can determine, has been rejected 

by none.”); United States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576, 584 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding 

dismissal of sole African–American juror for lack of education). Petitioner does not 

dispute that “two other Hispanic panel members” would be seated on the jury. Martinez, 

2010 WL 3366407, at *1. “The fact that African–American jurors remained on the panel 

‘may be considered indicative of a nondiscriminatory motive.’” Gonzalez v. Brown, 585 

F.3d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th 

Cir. 1997)). 

 Petitioner cannot show that the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination as 

to Juror no. 10. Accordingly, the court of appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s Batson claim 

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law as determined by the Supreme Court. 

j. Ground Seven 

Petitioner asserts he was unconstitutionally detained, in violation of his due 

process rights, and that “the investigatory stop was not based on reasonable suspicion.” 

(Doc. 7 at 12.) Petitioner acknowledges in his Reply that the argument is predicated on a 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 24 at 43.) This is not a cognizable claim for 

federal habeas relief. Under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), “where the State has 

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,” federal 

habeas corpus relief will not lie for a claim that evidence recovered through an illegal 

search or seizure was introduced at trial. See also Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1328 

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(9th Cir. 1993) (“We read Stone as a categorical limitation on the applicability of fourth 

amendment exclusionary rules in habeas corpus proceedings” (citations omitted)). The 

only question before the Court is whether Petitioner had a fair opportunity to litigate his 

claim. See Ortiz–Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The relevant 

inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did, 

in fact, do so, or even whether the claim was correctly decided.”) (citations omitted). 

 Here, Petitioner had multiple opportunities to litigate this issue in the Arizona 

courts. He filed a “Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Illegal Detention/Arrest,” 

which argued a violation of the “Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” (Doc. 19-1, Ex. D, at 17.) The trial court held a hearing on the 

motion to suppress. (Doc. 19-4, Ex. FFF, at 109.) The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled 

on Petitioner’s argument and determined officers had reasonable suspicion to detain 

Petitioner. See Martinez, 2010 WL 3366407, at *5 (“Because reasonable suspicion 

existed, the police acted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment when they stopped 

and temporarily detained Defendant for further investigation.”). Petitioner’s claim is not 

cognizable and must be dismissed. 

k. Ground Eight

 Petitioner alleges a violation of due process based upon the consecutive sentence 

imposed for the theft of means of transportation conviction. In the Petition, Petitioner 

only alleges a “violation of Petitioner’s 14th Amendment right to due process of law.” 

(Doc. 7 at 13.) In his Reply, Petitioner asserts “a violation of his Sixth Amendment right 

to stand trial against his accusers.” (Doc. 24 at 45.) He claims that the theft victim (Mr. 

Mertz) did not testify at trial, and thus “the jury never decided” the theft charge beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (Id. at 46.) The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides 

that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him.” 

 Petitioner’s claim in his Reply (confrontation) was not raised in his Petition 

because his Petition alleged “consecutive sentences violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth 

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Amendment right to due process.” (Doc. 7 at 13.) His Reply alleges a Sixth Amendment 

violation, which requires a dismissal rather than a concurrent sentence. A reply “is not 

the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief” in a habeas proceeding. 

Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 507. The claim raised in his Reply is waived. The claim raised in 

his Petition (consecutive sentences) is the same claim raised in Ground Four, and is 

procedurally defaulted and denied for reasons explained in Section III.g above. 

 Petitioner’s new claim is also meritless because the victim testified the 

codefendant pointed a handgun at him and said “Get out of the cab” (Doc. 19-5, Ex. 

MMM, at 179), the codefendants “took off” in the cab (Id. at 180), and the victim told a 

bystander he “had just been “robbed” (Id.). Theft of Means of Transportation in violation 

of A.R.S. § 13-1814(A)(5) requires proof Petitioner knowingly controlled, without lawful 

authority, another’s use of means of transportation knowing that the property was stolen. 

The testimony of the victim was sufficient to prove this offense, and the victim was 

subject to cross-examination during trial. 

l. Ground Nine 

 Petitioner alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 

occurred because of “improper consideration in determining sentencing.” (Doc. 7 at 14.) 

In his Reply, Petitioner elaborates that (1) the presentence report “was inaccurate in its 

criminal history” because “it double[d] the Defendant’s guilty plea as though he pleaded 

guilty to two armed robberies back in ‘02,” and (2) Petitioner “was never convicted for 

two separate victims” in the instant case. (Doc. 24 at 48.) 

 A misapplication of a state’s sentencing law will violate due process only if the 

misapplication was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. “Absent a showing of fundamental 

unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify 

federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the 

court imposed an aggravated sentence based upon the findings that Petitioner was on 

parole at the time of the offense, the jury found Petitioner had “a prior felony 

conviction,” the threat of serious physical injury, the presence of an accomplice, and the 

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commission of the offense for pecuniary gain. (Doc. 19-7, Ex. SSS, at 178-179.) The 

record does not support Petitioner’s claim that the court double counted a prior 

conviction. Petitioner offers nothing more than an allegation. Conclusory allegations will 

not overcome the presumption that the state court’s findings are correct. Bragg v. Galaza, 

242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner’s argument regarding two victims is 

meritless, as outlined in above, because the separate offenses were a result of two 

separate crimes. 

m. Ground Ten 

 Petitioner alleges that the State “retaliated against Petitioner for exercising [his] 

right to trial” in violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

(Doc. 7 at 15.) Petitioner argues that “the fact that the Petitioner went through two 

separate trials which resulted in hung jury mistrials created the inference that the 

prosecution wanted to punish the Petitioner by increasing the Petitioner’s sentence. . . .” 

(Doc. 24 at 50.) 

 Habeas corpus relief cannot be granted unless the state court proceeding “resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner does not argue that the 

disparity in sentencing was the result of discrimination based on race, sex, or similar 

grounds that would implicate the federal constitution. Instead, he claims an inference of 

vindictiveness based upon errors and multiple trials. The fact that a codefendant who 

pleaded guilty received a lesser sentence is not a violation of due process. See United 

States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009) (sentencing disparity based on 

codefendants having pleaded guilty instead of going to trial not unreasonable). The trial 

judge based the sentence upon Petitioner’s criminal history and the facts of the case. 

Petitioner’s allegation of an inference of vindictiveness, which is not supported in the 

record, is insufficient to merit relief. 

n. Ground Eleven 

 Petitioner asserts a violation of due process based upon the trial court’s “not 

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allowing the Petitioner to present to the jury the newly discovered evidence.” (Doc. 24 at 

51.) Petitioner alleges he discovered new evidence that he possessed $8.95 at the time of 

the offense, which would have corroborated his defense that he was intending to take a 

bus ride. He states that he “didn’t discover a receipt to the 4th Avenue jail store until after 

closing arguments” and he was prevented from presenting it to the jury. As outlined in 

Ground Three above, the prosecutor told the jury that the jail records indicated Petitioner 

possessed $8.95 at the time of the offense. The witness, however, testified that she 

believed that money was in fact in the possession of the codefendant. The jurors were 

aware of at least one jail record, and Petitioner’s second document was at best 

cumulative. Thus, Petitioner cannot establish that any error had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

o. Ground Twelve 

 Petitioner reasserts his claim that he was denied the presumption of innocence 

“after the State’s leading witness stated that I had a previous trial....” (Doc. 24 at 54.) 

This is the same claim presented and rejected above (Section III.e.ii). 

IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim in Ground One 

is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner’s claim in Ground Seven is not cognizable. The 

Court finds all of Petitioner’s remaining claims fail. The Court will therefore recommend 

that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 7) be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 7) be DENIED and DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

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 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not 

find the procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 28th day of January, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

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