Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02513/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Tonatihu Aguilar, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02513-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

 On January 20, 2015, Petitioner Tonatihu Aguilar filed an Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner argues that his sentences of life 

imprisonment, imposed in two separate cases, are unconstitutional under the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) 

(holding that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time 

of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 

punishments). 

 On April 22, 2015, Respondents filed an answer arguing that the amended petition 

is untimely, Miller does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, and that 

Petitioner’s claims lack merit. (Doc. 22.) After Respondents filed their answer, the 

Supreme Court granted review in Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 

1546 (2015), in which one of the questions presented was whether Miller applies 

retroactively. Montgomery, 2014 WL 4441518 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2014) (writ of certiorari). 

On January 26, 2016, Respondents notified the Court that the Supreme Court had issued 

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its decision in Montgomery, and held that Miller applies retroactively to cases on 

collateral review. (Doc. 39, Ex. A at 14-22.) In view of Montgomery, and in the interest 

of creating a clear record, the Court ordered further briefing. (Doc. 40.) On February 26, 

2016, Respondents filed an amended answer. (Doc. 41.) On April 1, 2016, Respondents 

filed a notice of supplemental authority arguing that based on a recent Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision, the Court should either stay this matter to permit Petitioner to pursue 

potential remedies in state court, or deny the amended petition on the merits. (Doc. 44.) 

Petitioner then filed an amended reply to the amended answer, in which he also addressed 

the arguments in Respondents’ notice of supplemental authority. (Doc. 45.) For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that habeas corpus relief be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 The amended petition seeks habeas corpus relief from Petitioner’s natural life 

sentences that were imposed for two unrelated murders in Maricopa County Superior 

Court Case Nos. CR1997-009430 and CR2002-006143.1

 (Doc. 10.) The Court discusses 

the background of those cases before considering Petitioner’s claims. 

A. Charges, Trial, Sentence, and Direct Review in No. CR1997-009430

 In Case No. CR1997-009430 (the 1997 case), Petitioner was charged with two 

counts of first-degree murder, and several other counts, including one count of 

endangerment. (Doc. 22, Ex. B.)2

 After a trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of: 

(1) second-degree murder for the killing of Hector Imperial, Sr.; (2) first-degree murder 

for the killing of Sandra Imperial; and (3) endangerment of Hector Imperial, Jr. (Doc. 22, 

Ex. E.) The convictions were based on evidence that Petitioner went to the Imperials’ 

 

1

 Rule 2(e) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that “[a] petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more than one state court must file a 

separate petition covering the judgment or judgments of the each court.” Petitioner 

challenges two separate judgments from the same court. Therefore, Rule 2(e) does not 

bar Petitioner from seeking relief in a single § 2254 petition. Respondents do not object to Petitioner challenging two separate judgments in a single petition. (Doc. 41 at 6 n.5.) 

2

 Respondents’ exhibits are attached to their original answer. (Doc. 22; see also

Doc. 40 at 2 (stating that the “amended answer may cite to portions of the record that Respondents previously filed”).) 

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home on October 14, 1996, and threatened Sandra Imperial about money for a car he had 

sold the Imperials. (Doc. 22, Ex. O at 5-6.) The next day, October 15, 1996, Petitioner 

returned and killed Hector Imperial, Sr. (Id. at 2-3.) Petitioner left the house, but 

returned a short time later and killed Sandra Imperial. (Id. at 3-4.) Petitioner was sixteen 

years old at the time. (Doc.22, Ex. F at 5.) 

 The State sought the death penalty, and the court conducted a sentencing hearing 

in October and November 2001. (Doc. 22, Exs. G, H, I.) Hector Imperial’s brother, 

Ruben Imperial, testified for the State. (Doc. 22, Ex. G at 5-10.) Five witnesses testified 

on Petitioner’s behalf: (1) Lisa Christianson, a mitigation specialist with the Maricopa 

County Office of the Legal Advocate (Doc. 22, Ex. G at 11-65; Ex. H at 62-76); 

(2) Professor Constance de la Vega, of the University of San Francisco School of Law, 

who addressed the issue of executing juvenile offenders under international law (Doc. 22, 

Ex. G at 66-114); (3) Professor Victor Streib, a professor at the Ohio Northern University 

School of Law, who addressed the issue of executing juvenile offenders under American 

law (Doc. 22, Ex. G at 115-147); (4) Dr. Mark Walter, a neuropsychologist, who 

described the effects of injuries to the brain that Petitioner had suffered as an infant, 

child, and young teenager (Doc. 22, Ex. H at 5-61); and (5) Dr. Carlos Jones, a 

psychologist, who evaluated Petitioner and testified about his intelligence and mental 

health in view of his alleged brain damage and use of inhalants. (Doc. 22, Ex. I at 3-47.) 

 On January 4, 2002, the trial court held a hearing for the imposition of sentence. 

(Doc. 22, Ex. J.) The court found two statutory aggravating factors that made Petitioner 

eligible for the death penalty. (Doc. 22, Ex. J at 6-7.) The court also found two statutory 

mitigating factors. (Doc. 22 at 7.) First, in view of the doctors’ testimony, the court 

found that Petitioner’s “capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 

conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired.” 

(Doc. 22, Ex. J at 7; Ex. L at 2 ); see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(G)(1) (1997). Second, the 

court found Petitioner’s age at the time of the murders a mitigating circumstance. 

(Doc. 22, Ex. J at 7; Ex. L at 3); see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(G)(5) (1997). After 

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finding the mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency, the court imposed a 

sentence of life without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, plus a total of 

twenty-nine years’ imprisonment on the other counts of conviction, with the sentences to 

run consecutively. (Doc. 22, Ex. J at 7-8; Doc. 22, Exs. K, L.) 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner raised claims that are unrelated to his current habeas 

petition. (Doc. 22, Exs. M, N, O, P.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Doc. 22, Exs. Q, R.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied 

Petitioner’s petition for review. (Doc. 22, Exs. S, T.) 

B. Charges, Trial, Sentence, and Direct Review in No. CR2002-006143

 In Case No. CR2002-006143 (the 2002 case), the State charged Petitioner on April 

15, 2002 with one count of first-degree murder, and multiple counts of attempted firstdegree murder, based on a shooting that took place on September 21, 1996. (Doc. 22, 

Ex. BB.) After a trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of one count of first-degree murder 

and six counts of attempted first-degree murder. (Doc. 22, Ex. CC.) The convictions 

were based on evidence that Petitioner was driving in his car alone following a pick-up 

truck that was carrying seven passengers when he fired multiple gunshots at the truck and 

passengers. (Doc. 22, Ex. NN at 2-5.) 

 The State sought the death penalty and the case proceeded to an aggravation 

phase. At the conclusion of the aggravation phase, the jury found two aggravating factors 

that made Petitioner eligible for the death penalty. (Doc. 22, Ex. KK at 12; Doc. 32-1 at 

137-39.)3

 The penalty phase hearing began on May 15, 2003. (Doc. 22, Ex. KK at 12.) 

During that hearing, Petitioner presented mitigating evidence from eight witnesses: 

(1) Alan Hubbard, general counsel for the Mexican consulate in Phoenix, who verified 

Petitioner’s birth certificate (Doc. 32-4 at 38-49); (2) Jose Acosta, Petitioner’s sixthgrade teacher, who testified regarding Petitioner’s difficulties in school that year 

 

3

 Documents 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36 are Petitioner’s “Notice of Augmentation of State Court Record.” Attached to those documents are transcripts of several hearings held in the Maricopa County Superior Court in the 2002 case. In his briefing, Petitioner does not refer to the transcripts as separate exhibits. Therefore, the Court cites to the 

CM/ECF document and page numbers. 

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(Doc. 32-4 at 49-79); (3) Lisa Christianson, a mitigation specialist (Doc. 32-4 at 80-128; 

Doc. 33-1 at 17-66); (4) Dr. Carlos Jones, a psychologist, who testified about Petitioner’s 

mental health in view of his brain damage and use of inhalants (Doc. 33-1 at 66-175); 

(5) Dr. Mark Walter, a neuropsychologist, who described the effects of injuries to the 

brain that Plaintiff suffered as an infant, child, and young teenager (Doc. 33-4 at 3-151; 

Doc. 34-1 at 3-73); (6) Luzminda Kendrick, a licensed therapist, who treated Petitioner 

after he was suspended and later expelled from school at the age of thirteen (Doc. 4-1 at 

74-109; Doc. 34-2 at 6-62); (7) Maria Gloria Aguilar, Petitioner’s mother, who testified 

about Petitioner’s family life when he was growing up, his meningitis as an infant, and 

his use of inhalants (Doc. 34-2 at 63-158; Doc. 34-4 at 3-11); and (8) Dr. Ricardo 

Weinstein, a psychologist trained in quantitative electroencephalography, who described 

Petitioner’s brain damage and how his brain development compared to that of other 

adolescents. (Doc. 34-4 at 11-122.) 

 The State presented the testimony of ten witnesses. (Doc. 35-1, 35-2, 36-1, 36-2 

at 6-27). After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding that there was 

“no mitigation sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” (Doc. 22, Ex. KK at 13.) On 

June 19, 2003, the court imposed the death penalty on the first-degree murder conviction. 

(Doc. 22, Ex. EE.) The trial court also sentenced Petitioner to six concurrent terms of 

thirty years’ imprisonment on each conviction for attempted-first-degree-murder, to run 

concurrently with the death sentence in the 2002 case, but consecutive to the sentences in 

the 1997 case. (Doc. 22, Ex. FF.) The death sentence triggered an automatic appeal to 

the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703.04 (2003). While that direct 

appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons, 543 

U.S. 551 (2005), that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of a juvenile offender. 

Accordingly, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to 

determine whether Petitioner was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense and, 

if so, to vacate the death sentence and impose an appropriate sentence for the first-degree 

murder conviction. (Doc. 22, Ex. GG.) 

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 On December 16, 2005, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. (Doc. 22, 

Ex. II.) Before the hearing, defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum and 

submitted three exhibits including the cross-examination of Hector Imperial, Jr., a 

Sheriff’s Department report, and the transcript of Dr. Weinstein’s testimony. (Id. at 5, 

15; Doc. 22, Ex. HH.) In the sentencing memorandum, defense counsel argued that a 

sentence of life without parole until Petitioner had served twenty-five years was 

appropriate, in part, because the crime was impulsive in nature, and because Petitioner 

“was less capable than an adult of using appropriate and considered judgment.” 

(Doc. 22, Ex. HH at 3.) He also argued that Petitioner’s behavior had improved over 

time. (Id. at 2.) 

 At the outset of the hearing, the trial court stated that it had received defense 

counsel’s memorandum and exhibits, and had “read all of [Defense counsel’s] papers” 

“in preparation for the hearing.” (Id. at 5, 8.) At the hearing, defense counsel again 

requested a mitigated sentence of life without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years. 

(Doc. 22, Ex. II at 4, 6.) Defense counsel argued that Dr. Weinstein’s testimony, 

including his testimony about the development of Petitioner’s brain, supported the 

request for a mitigated sentence. (Id. at 15.) Defense counsel also referred to Petitioner’s 

age at the time of the offense. (Id. at 18.) The prosecution asserted that defense counsel 

was arguing that “not only is the death penalty not appropriate for 16-year-olds because 

their brains aren’t developed . . . he’s also telling you natural life isn’t appropriate for 

them either.” (Id. at 17.) The trial court found that Petitioner was under the age of 

eighteen at the time of the offense. (Doc. 22, Ex. II at 27.) At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to natural life imprisonment for the firstdegree murder conviction. (Id. at 28.) The court stated that the basis for its decision was 

“the three aggravating factors found by the jury.” (Id.) Petitioner appealed, raising 

claims unrelated to his current habeas corpus petition. (Doc. 22, Exs. KK, NN.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s 

subsequent petition for review. (Doc. 22, Exs. OO, PP, QQ.) 

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C. Consolidated Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court decided Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455. The Court 

held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in 

prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Id. at 2469. Petitioner filed 

separate notices of post-conviction relief in the trial court pursuant to Rule 32 of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that his natural life sentences in the 1997 

and 2002 cases violated the Eighth Amendment as applied in Miller. (Doc. 22, Exs. VV, 

WW.) On October 26, 2012, the trial court consolidated the notices of post-conviction 

relief for consideration. (Doc. 22, Ex. XX.) 

 The trial court first found that the notices of post-conviction relief were untimely 

under Rule 32.4(a). (Id.) The trial court noted that Petitioner argued that it should 

consider his untimely notices under Rule 32.1(g) because Miller was a significant change 

in the law that, if applied retroactively, would probably affect the outcome of Petitioner’s 

case. (Id.) Petitioner argued in his notices of post-conviction relief that Miller prohibited 

imposing a life sentence without parole on a juvenile. (Id.) The court disagreed with 

Petitioner’s characterization of Miller, and stated that Miller did not categorically ban 

sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment. (Id.) Rather, the trial court stated that Miller

prohibits sentencing juveniles to mandatory life sentences, but permits such sentences 

when the judge or jury has the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before 

sentencing a juvenile to life. (Id.) The trial court concluded that Petitioner had not set 

forth a valid legal or factual basis to support his claim and, therefore, had not 

demonstrated that Miller was a significant change in the law that applied to Petitioner’s 

sentences in the 1997 and 2002 cases. (Id.) The trial court dismissed the notices of postconviction relief. (Doc. 22, Ex. XX at 2.) 

 Petitioner filed a single petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which 

included both superior court case numbers in the caption and addressed his sentences in 

both cases. (Doc. 22, Ex. YY.) The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but 

denied relief. (Doc. 22, AAA at 5.) The appellate court first noted that it was only 

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considering Petitioner’s claims related to the 2002 case because it concluded that 

although the petition for review referred to both the 2002 and 1997 cases, Petitioner’s 

notice of post-conviction relief filed in the trial court only pertained to the 2002 case.4

 

(Doc. 22, Ex. AAA at 4 n.4.) 

 The appellate court then stated that Petitioner argued that Miller was a significant 

change in the law that entitled him to relief from his sentence of natural life 

imprisonment and excused his untimely notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 22, 

Ex. AAA at 3-5.) The appellate court concluded that “[e]ven assuming without deciding 

that the rule announced in Miller constitutes a significant change in the law, [Petitioner] 

has not shown how the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his untimely notice.” 

(Id. at 4.) The appellate court noted that Petitioner did not appear to disagree with the 

trial court’s understanding of Miller, but argued that he was entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing. The appellate court noted that an evidentiary hearing may be appropriate if a 

petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief is timely and he establishes a colorable claim. 

(Id.) Because Petitioner had neither requested an evidentiary hearing in the trial court, 

nor “provide[ed] the basis for such a hearing,” the appellate court determined that the 

trial court did not err in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. (Id.) Accordingly, the 

appellate court granted review but denied relief. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner filed a petition for 

review in the Arizona Supreme Court that was denied on February 10, 2015. (Doc. 22, 

Exs. BBB, CCC.) 

D. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings 

 On January 20, 2015, Petitioner filed his amended petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in this Court. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner challenges his natural life sentences in the 

1997 and 2002 cases. Petitioner claims that his sentences are unconstitutional under 

Miller. (Id.) Petitioner argues that the sentencing courts imposed sentences of life 

 

4

 The parties agree that this statement was erroneous. (Doc. 45 at 5-6.) 

Respondents state that the appellate court apparently overlooked, or never received, a 

notice of post-conviction relief that Petitioner had filed in connection with the 1997 case. 

(Doc. 41 at 5 n.4 (citing Doc. 22, Exs. VV, WW).) 

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imprisonment without parole and did not consider that Petitioner was a juvenile at the 

time of the offenses. (Id. at 3.) In accordance with this Court’s order (Doc. 40), on 

February 26, 2016, Respondents filed an amended answer (Doc. 41), and Petitioner filed 

an amended reply. (Doc. 45.) Respondents also filed a notice of supplemental authority 

(Doc. 44), which Petitioner addresses in his amended reply. The Court will first address 

the issues presented in the notice of supplemental authority, and then address Petitioner’s 

claims. 

II. Notice of Supplemental Authority and the Montgomery Decision 

 As previously noted, in Miller, the Supreme Court held that “the Eighth 

Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility 

of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Court subsequently 

held in Montgomery that Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. 

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718. On April 12, 2016, Respondents filed a notice of 

supplemental authority advising the Court of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ recent 

decision in State v. Valencia, 2016 WL 1203414 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2016). 

(Doc. 44.) In Valencia, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that Montgomery

announced a new “constitutional standard” that requires courts to make a specific finding 

that a juvenile’s crime reflects “permanent incorrigibility” before imposing a life 

sentence without parole. Valencia, 2016 WL 1203414, at *3, *4. 

 Relying on Valencia, Respondents argue that Petitioner may have available, but 

unexhausted, state remedies related to any claims based on Montgomery. Respondents 

argue that Petitioner must either abandon any arguments that rely on Montgomery, or ask 

for a stay of this proceeding to allow him to exhaust his Montgomery claims in state 

court. In response, Petitioner argues that Montgomery “explicates the holding in Miller,” 

but does not create a new right. (Doc. 45 at 8.) Therefore, Petitioner asserts that his 

Miller claims “remain properly exhausted in the wake of Montgomery.” (Id. at 9.) As 

discussed below, the Court concludes that Petitioner has exhausted state remedies on his 

claims that his sentences of life imprisonment without parole imposed in the 1997 and 

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2002 cases violate the Eighth Amendment and, therefore, finds that there is no reason to 

stay this matter to permit Petitioner to return to state court. 

A. Section 2254’s Exhaustion Requirement 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule on 

the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court 

in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o 

provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his 

claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of 

the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 In the amended petition, Petitioner argues that his sentences of life imprisonment 

without parole, imposed in the 1997 and 2002 cases, violate the Supreme Court’s holding 

in Miller because, in each case, the court imposed that sentence “without considering the 

fact that [Petitioner] was a juvenile at the time of the murders . . . .” (Doc. 10 at 3.) In 

their amended answer, Respondents do not argue that Petitioner’s claims based on Miller

are unexhausted. (Doc. 41.) However, they assert that if Petitioner argues that 

Montgomery changed the law announced in Miller, then any arguments he asserts based 

on that interpretation of Mongtomery are unexhausted. (Doc. 41 at 12-13 n.7.) 

Respondents make that same argument in their notice of supplemental authority. 

(Doc. 44.) In his amended reply, Petitioner argues that his claims are based on Miller, as 

explained by Montgomery, and that they are exhausted. (Doc. 45 at 9.) Petitioner does 

not request permission to return to state court to present any claims to the state courts. 

(Doc. 45 at 9-12.) 

 The record reflects that in connection with the 1997 and the 2002 cases, Petitioner 

presented a Miller claim to the trial court in his notices of post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 22, Exs. VV, WW.) Petitioner argued that his sentences of life imprisonment 

without the possibility of parole violate the Eighth Amendment as articulated in Miller. 

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(Id.) After the trial court dismissed the notices of post-conviction relief related to the 

1997 and 2002 cases (Doc. 22, Ex. XX at 2), Petitioner filed a single petition for review 

in the Arizona Court of Appeals arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing the 

notices of post-conviction relief and that his sentences of life without parole in the 1997 

and 2002 cases violated Miller. (Doc. 22, Ex. YY.) The appellate court denied relief. 

(Doc. 22, Ex. AAA.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court 

arguing that his life sentences without parole in the 1997 and 2002 cases violated Miller. 

(Doc. 22, Ex. BBB.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Doc. 22, Ex. CCC.) 

 As set forth above, Petitioner presented his claims that his sentences of life 

imprisonment without parole in the 1997 and 2002 cases violate the Eighth Amendment, 

as explained in Miller, to the trial court and to the Arizona Court of Appeals on postconviction review. The appellate court apparently believed that Petitioner had only 

challenged his sentence in the 2002 case in the trial court. However, the record reflects 

that Petitioner challenged his sentences in the 1997 and the 2002 cases in both the trial 

court and the appellate court. (Doc. 22, Exs. VV, WW, XX, YY.) Thus, Petitioner gave 

the trial court and the appellate court “the opportunity to pass upon and correct the 

alleged violation of [Petitioner’s] federal rights.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. Therefore, he 

exhausted state remedies on his sentencing claims. See Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845. 

 Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner exhausted his challenge to his sentences 

of life imprisonment to the extent that his arguments are based solely on Miller. 

(Docs. 41, 44, Doc. 45 at 5-6.) However, they argue that to the extent that Petitioner 

argues that Montgomery created a new rule and relies on that alleged new rule to support 

his claims, such claims are unexhausted. (Doc. 41 at 12-13, n.7; Doc. 44.) Petitioner 

argues that Montgomery explained Miller and that his reliance on Montgomery does not 

render his claims unexhausted. (Doc. 45 at 9.) As set forth below, the Court agrees that 

Montgomery explained the Miller decision, and that Petitioner’s claims remain exhausted 

after Montgomery. The Court, however, disagrees with Petitioner’s characterization of 

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the Miller decision as requiring specific fact finding, as set forth in his amended reply. 

(Doc. 45 at 7.) 

B. The Miller and Montgomery Decisions 

 Petitioner argues that Miller established the following two rules: (1) “a mandatory 

sentence of life without parole for a juvenile homicide defendant violates the Eighth 

Amendment”; and (2) “the Eighth Amendment forbids a judge from imposing a sentence 

without explaining how the juvenile’s crime reflects ‘permanent incorrigibility’ or 

‘irreparable corruption.’” (Doc. 45 at 7.) The second purported rule that Petitioner 

identifies follows Valencia, in which the Arizona Court of Appeals construed 

Montgomery to conclude that the Supreme Court announced a new standard that requires 

a sentencing court to make a finding of “permanent incorrigibility” before imposing a 

natural life sentence on a juvenile. See Valencia, 2016 WL 1203414, at *3, * 4. The 

court of appeals held that these specific findings required by the Montgomery decision 

“constitute a significant change under Arizona law” and, therefore, concluded that the 

petitioners in that case were entitled to relief under Rule32.1(g) and remanded for further 

proceedings. Id. at *4. This Court, however, as set forth below, concludes that Miller

and Montgomery do not require a sentencing court to make a specific finding of 

“permanent incorrigibility” or “irreparable corruption” before sentencing a juvenile 

defendant to life without parole and, therefore, declines to follow Valencia.

5

 See Miller, 

132 S. Ct. at 2464; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. 

 

5

 “When interpreting state law, a federal court is bound by the decision of the highest state court.” In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation 

omitted.) Here, the highest state court, the Arizona Supreme Court, has not addressed whether Miller and Montgomery require specific findings of “permanent incorrigibility” or “irreparable corruption” when sentencing juveniles, and whether such findings would constitute a significant change in Arizona law that would entitle a petitioner to relief under Rule 32.1(g). Thus, “[i]n the absence of such a decision, a federal court must 

predict how the highest state court would decide the issue using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as 

guidance.” Id. at 1239 (citations omitted). Because the Arizona Court of Appeals decision in Valencia was based on its application of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Montgomery, this Court looks directly to those decisions to predict how the Arizona Supreme Court would decide these issues. 

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 In determining whether Miller announced a new substantive rule that should apply 

retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),6

 the Court in Montgomery

referred to language from its decision in Miller stating that a sentence of life without 

parole should be reserved for “all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes 

reflect permanent incorrigibility.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (citing Miller, 132 

S. Ct. at 2469). In Montgomery, the Court interchangeably used concepts of 

“irretrievable depravity,” “permanent incorrigibility,” and “irreparable corruption,” in its 

discussion of the retroactivity of Miller. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct at 733-34. 

However, the Court concluded that Miller “did not require trial courts to make a finding 

of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility.” Id. at 735. The Court noted that “[w]hen a 

new substantive rule of constitutional law is established, [the] Court is careful to limit the 

scope of any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary 

upon the States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems.” Id. The 

Court explained that “[t]he procedure Miller prescribes” is “[a] hearing where ‘youth and 

its attendant characteristics’ are considered as sentencing factors . . . .” Id. (quoting 

Miller, 132 S. Ct at 2460). However, the Court stated that “Miller did not impose a 

formal fact finding requirement . . . .” Id. 136 S. Ct. at 735. 

 In summary, the Court’s discussion in Montgomery of its holding in Miller was in 

the context of determining whether that holding should be given retroactive effect under 

Teague. The Court held that “Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law,” 

and thus should be given retroactive effect. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. Contrary to 

Petitioner’s assertion in his amended reply, the Court did not conclude that its decision in 

Miller requires a sentencing court to “explain[] how the juvenile’s crime reflects 

‘permanent incorrigibility’ or ‘irreparable corruption.’” (Doc. 45 at 7). Instead, while 

 

6

 Under Teague, two categories of decisions apply retroactively to cases on collateral review: (1) new substantive rules, and (2) “watershed rules of criminal 

procedure.” See Welch v. United States, ___U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016) 

(discussing Teague and its progeny). 

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“‘Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant 

characteristics before determining that life without parole is a proportionate sentence,’” 

United States v. Pete, 2016 WL 1399337, at *8 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016) (quoting 

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734), it “did not impose a formal fact finding 

requirement . . . .” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct at 735. 

 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s Miller claims remain exhausted 

after the Montgomery decision. The Court also concludes that Miller, as explained by 

Montgomery, does not require a sentencing court to make findings of “permanent 

incorrigibility” or “irreparable corruption” before sentencing a juvenile defendant to life 

without parole. Because Petitioner exhausted state remedies on the claims asserted in his 

amended petition, the Court considers those claims after determining the applicable 

standard of review. 

III. Standard of Review 

If a habeas corpus petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in 

State court proceedings,” federal court review of that claim is limited by 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d).7

 However, if no state court adjudicated a claim on the merits, the 

federal court conducts de novo review. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d); Riley v. McDaniel, 786 

F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that because no state court had adjudicated the 

merits of the petitioner’s claim, but had denied a state habeas corpus petition on a 

procedural ground, and the state had not established a procedural bar to consider of the 

petitioner’s claim, the court’s review was de novo). 

 The parties dispute whether the state courts adjudicated Petitioner’s claims on the 

merits. (Docs. 41 at 8-11; Doc. 45 at 19-20.) Respondents argue that the state courts 

adjudicated on the merits Petitioner’s claims that his sentences in the 1997 and 2002 

 

7

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federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, or (2) that it 

“involved an unreasonable application of” such law, or (3) that it “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

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cases violate the Eighth Amendment and, therefore, this Court’s review is constrained by 

§ 2254(d). (Doc. 41 at 8-11.) Petitioner argues that de novo review applies. (Doc. 45 at 

19-20.) As the parties’ briefing on this issue indicates, whether the state courts 

adjudicated Petitioner’s claims on the merits is complicated by the wording of the trial 

court’s ruling on post-conviction review, and the appellate court’s failure to recognize 

that Petitioner had filed notices of post-conviction review related to his sentence in both 

the 1997 and 2002 cases. (Doc. 22, Exs. XX, AAA.) 

 The Court, however, need not resolve this issue because Petitioner and 

Respondents also addressed the merits of Petitioner’s claims. (Docs. 41, 45.) 

Respondents assert that this Court should apply § 2254(d) and defer to the state court’s 

rejection of Petitioner’s Miller claims. (Doc. 41 at 8.) Their conclusion that the state 

courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s Miller claims was “reasonable” under § 2254(d) is based 

on their assessment of the merits of Petitioner’s claims. (Doc. 41 at 11-18.) Specifically, 

Respondents discuss the state court records and conclude that the sentencing courts in the 

1997 and the 2002 cases considered Petitioner’s youth and attendant characteristics 

before imposing natural life sentences. Thus, they argue that Petitioner’s sentences 

comport with the Constitution, the trial court reasonably rejected Petitioner’s Miller 

claims, and he is not entitled to habeas relief. (Doc. 41 at 17, 18.) This analysis 

necessarily involves consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s claims. Because the 

parties addressed Petitioner’s claims on the merits, the Court will conduct a de novo 

review of the merits of Petitioner’s claims. 

IV. Review of Petitioner’s Claims 

 In Miller, the Supreme Court explained that “[m]andatory life without [possibility 

of] parole for a juvenile precludes consideration” of the defendant’s “chronological age 

and its hallmark features,” the defendant’s “family and home environment,” the 

“circumstances of the [underlying] homicide offense,” that the defendant “might have 

been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with 

youth,” and “the possibility of rehabilitation.” 132 S. Ct. at 2468. Thus, the Court 

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determined that the Eighth Amendment requires “a judge or jury . . . to consider [such] 

mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest penalty possible for juveniles.” 

Id. at 2475. As discussed below, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief under 

Miller because the sentencing courts in the 1997 and 2002 cases considered his “youth 

and attendant characteristics” before imposing sentences of life imprisonment. See 

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471). 

A. Arizona Sentencing Law 

 In his amended reply, Petitioner argues that at the time of his sentencings in the 

1997 and 2002 cases, a sentence of life imprisonment without parole was, in effect, 

mandatory in Arizona, in violation of Miller. (Doc. 45 at 12-16.) In both the 1997 and 

the 2002 cases, Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703 (West 

1996), which provided that the court could sentence a person convicted of first-degree 

murder to a sentence of death, natural life imprisonment, or life without the possibility of 

“commutation or parole” until after serving twenty-five years. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

703(A). Additionally, at the time of Petitioner’s sentencings, § 13-703 provided that the 

court must hold a sentencing hearing to determine “the existence or non-existence of 

[aggravating and mitigating] circumstances.” Id. at § 13-703(B). Thus, facially, 

Arizona’s relevant sentencing statutes did not mandate a sentence of life without parole 

for a defendant convicted of first-degree murder, but provided a lesser alternative and 

allowed a sentencer to consider mitigating factors as a reason to impose a lesser term. 

 However, Arizona’s sentencing statutes must be viewed in the context of the 

Arizona legislature’s decision to abolish the mechanism for parole for felony offenses 

committed on or after January 1, 1994. See Ariz. Rev Stat. § 41-1604.09(I)(1). Under 

this revised scheme, defendants sentenced after January 1, 1994 earn “release credits” 

against their sentence. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1604.06(B). The Arizona courts have 

recognized that this system of earned release credits does not apply to an indeterminate 

life sentence. See Lawrence v. Ariz. Dep’t Corr., 729 P.2d 953, 954 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1986) (holding that credits may not be applied to a sentence carrying a maximum term of 

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life). Therefore, a prisoner’s only possibilities for release would be through a pardon or 

commutation by the governor. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-402(C)(4).8

 Considering the 

highly discretionary nature of such relief, a sentence of life imprisonment without parole 

was, in effect, mandatory. State v. Vera, 334 P.3d 754, 576 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (stating 

that, until the recent enactment of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-716, a sentence of life 

imprisonment without parole was effectively mandatory in view of Arizona’s statutes on 

parole and earned release credits).9

 

 Subsequently, in 2014, the Arizona legislature enacted Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-716, 

which provides that “a person who is sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility 

of release after serving a minimum number of calendar years . . . is eligible for parole on 

completion of service of the minimum sentence, regardless of whether the offense was 

committed on or after January 1, 1994.” This provision, however, was not in place when 

Petitioner’s sentences were imposed. Therefore, while the relevant sentencing statute 

that applied when Petitioner was sentenced, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(A), did not facially 

contradict Miller, that statute applied with the Arizona statutes regarding parole and 

 

8

 “[T]he board of executive clemency . . . [s]hall receive petitions from individuals, organizations or the department of [corrections] for review and commutation 

of sentences and pardoning of offenders in extraordinary cases and may make recommendations to the governor.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-402(C)(4). “[T]he governor retains ultimate authority to grant or deny a recommended commutation.” McDonald v. 

Thomas, 40 P.3d 819, 824 (Ariz. 2002); see also Wigglesworth v. Mauldin, 990 P.2d 26, 

33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that “an Arizona governor’s discretion to act on the 

Board’s recommendations remains unfettered, subjective, arbitrary, and a matter of grace.”). 

9

 In Miller, the Supreme Court cited Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-752 (West 2010) and 

§ 41-1604.09(I) (West 2011), and identified Arizona as one of twenty-nine jurisdictions “mandating life without parole for children . . . .” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2473 n.13. The 

Court, however, was not considering an Arizona sentence and did not indicate that every sentence of life without parole imposed in Arizona under those statutes would violate the 

rule announced in that case. Additionally, the Court did not mention Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§§ 13-703(B) and (G), which provide that the sentencing courts should consider mitigating circumstances, including the “defendant’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law,” and the “defendant’s age.” Therefore, footnote 13 in the Miller decision does not require a conclusion that Petitioner’s sentences violate the rule announced in that decision, and 

Petitioner does not make such an argument. (Docs. 1, 45.) 

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earned release credits,10 in effect, imposed a mandatory sentence of life without parole. 

Miller, however, did not categorially ban the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence 

on a juvenile. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Rather, Miller requires that there be judicial 

consideration of age-related factors before a court sentences a juvenile to life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. at 2467-68. 

 In Miller, the Court found that a sentencing scheme mandating life imprisonment 

for a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment because such a scheme excludes certain 

key considerations, including: 

consideration of [a juvenile defendant’s] chronological age and its hallmark features — among them immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him — and from which he cannot usually extricate himself — no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.” 

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-68. However, the Court stated that its holding did not 

foreclose the imposition of a sentence of life without parole in homicide cases, but 

required a sentencing court “to take into account how children are different, and how 

those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. 

 At the time of Petitioner’s sentencings in the 1997 and the 2002 cases, Arizona’s 

relevant sentencing statute facially allowed the sentencing court the discretion to impose 

a lesser sentence than natural life imprisonment. Additionally, § 13-703 provided that the 

court must hold a sentencing hearing to determine “the existence or non-existence of 

[aggravating and mitigating] circumstances included in subsections F and G of that 

section.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(B). These mitigating circumstances included the 

“defendant’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his 

conduct to the requirements of the law,” and the “defendant’s age.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

703(G). Thus, Arizona statutes gave the sentencing court the opportunity to consider a 

defendant’s age before imposing a sentence of life imprisonment. 

 

10 See Ariz. Rev Stat. § 41-1604.09(I), and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1604.06(B). 

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 As set forth in Section IV(B) and (C), the sentencing courts did consider 

Petitioner’s “youth and attendant characteristics” before imposing natural life sentences 

in each case. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s sentences do not violate Miller and the Court does not need to 

determine whether Arizona’s sentencing scheme that was in place at the time of 

Petitioner’s sentencings was unconstitutional.11 

B. The 1997 Case 

 The State initially sought the death penalty in the 1997 case. (Doc. 22, Ex. C.) 

Petitioner, who was a citizen of Mexico, moved to strike the State’s death-penalty 

allegation on the ground that international law does not permit the execution of juvenile 

offenders. (Id.) The Mexican government filed an amicus brief noting that international 

law does not permit the execution of juvenile offenders because they are immature. 

(Doc. 22, Ex. D.) 

 During sentencing hearings in Fall 2001, Petitioner presented testimony related to 

the sentencing of juvenile offenders. Professor De La Vega from the University of San 

Francisco School of Law testified that international law forbids sentencing juveniles to 

death. (Doc. 22, Ex. G at 66-114.) Victor Streib, a law professor from Ohio Northern 

University, testified that juvenile executions were rare within the United States because, 

among other things, juvenile offenders are less culpable than adults. (Id. at 116-37.) He 

also testified that juveniles’ brains do not “develop fully until the early 20s,” juveniles are 

“impulsive,” and they are less receptive to deterrence. (Id. at 143-45.) Therefore, he 

testified that when sentencing a juvenile defendant, the court should consider a 

defendant’s chronological age, youthfulness, and immaturity. (Id. at 147.) 

 Petitioner also presented testimony from Dr. Walter, Lisa Christianson, and 

Dr. Jones, which was specific to Petitioner and included evidence about his age, 

 

11 Moreover, the amended petition does not argue that Arizona’s sentencing scheme was unconstitutional and, therefore, this issue is not squarely before the Court. 

See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 

F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that “[t]he district court need not consider 

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). 

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intellectual development, mental health, family and home environment, his peers, and the 

circumstances of the offense. Dr. Walter, a neuropsychologist, testified that he evaluated 

Petitioner in June 2001 and reviewed Petitioner’s records from the Arizona Department 

of Juvenile Corrections, “youth rehabilitations record,” school records, and detective 

reports related to the offense. (Id. at 6-7.) Those records included a psychoeducational 

evaluation from Dr. Berman, dated March 3, 1993, an evaluation by Dr. Roger Martig 

from August 1997, a report of a psychological evaluation by Dr. Carlos Jones that was 

completed “just before [Dr. Walter] had evaluated [Petitioner],” and a biographical 

overview of Petitioner. (Id. at 7-8.) 

 Dr. Walter testified the records showed that Petitioner had indications of “brain 

dysfunction” when he was thirteen to fourteen-years old. (Id. at 8.) Dr. Walter testified 

that records from four years later, in 1997, showed that Petitioner had “improved 

intellectually quite a bit,” but he still showed signs of brain dysfunction. (Id.) Dr. Walter 

opined that the brain dysfunction or brain damage could have been caused by Petitioner 

sniffing inhalants, such as paint, when he was a teenager, his bout with meningitis when 

he was two years old, or by being beaten with a baseball bat when he was thirteen or 

fourteen years old. (Id. at 9-10.) Dr. Walter also testified about Petitioner’s problems in 

school, including being expelled from school in his early teens. (Doc. 22, Ex. H at 22.) 

 Dr. Walter testified “the frontal and temporal lobes” of the brain are not fully 

developed until age eighteen, and possibly not until age twenty. (Doc. 22, Ex. H. at 11-

12.) Therefore, juveniles have problems “with memory and learning, with impulse 

control, learning from experience, that type of functioning, which . . . most of us would 

interpret . . . as maturity.” (Id. at 12.) Dr. Walter testified that “[t]he frontal lobe is 

especially important in terms of conscious awareness of what we’re doing, planning, and 

being aware of the consequences of our actions.” (Id.) These areas of the brain “aren’t 

completely grown really until — possibly until the early 20s, but certainly until the late 

teens.” (Id.) 

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 Dr. Walter testified that he diagnosed Petitioner with cognitive disorder and 

personality disorder. (Doc. 22, Ex. H at 25.) Based on the records and his testing, 

Dr. Walter stated that at the time of the offense in October 1996, Petitioner was 

“cognitively and psychologically functioning about the age of 10 to [13].” (Id. at 28-29.) 

He explained that at that stage, a person is in the beginning of adolescence and has “a lot 

left to learn in terms of self-control, in terms of judgment, [and] learning from 

experience.” (Id. at 29.) Dr. Walter testified that Petitioner had the ability to function on 

a day-to-day basis by controlling his emotions. (Id. at 30-31.) However, if Petitioner 

was stressed, he would “snap[]” and “deal with whatever situation was placing stress on 

him in an irrational and ineffective manner.” (Id. at 31.) Dr. Walter testified that reports 

from different doctors over a period of several years described Petitioner’s condition in a 

manner that was consistent with his diagnosis. (Id. at 33.) Dr. Walter testified that he 

was familiar with the facts of the case and agreed that the evening of the killings was a 

“stress producing situation.” (Id. at 33-34.) He testified that in that situation, he would 

expect Petitioner to be “impulsive,” and that he would react based on his environment 

including the other people who were present and the “attitude of the victims.” (Id. at 35.) 

 On cross-examination, Dr. Walter testified that Petitioner had an average IQ and 

the he “general[ly] knows right from wrong.” (Id. at 44.) He admitted that during his 

evaluation of Petitioner, Petitioner denied being under stress at the time of the offense, 

and denied that “his buddies made him do it.” (Id. at 44-45.) He agreed that the evidence 

showed that Petitioner killed Hector Imperial, left the house, and came back to kill 

Sandra Imperial. (Id. at 47.) He also agreed the evidence showed that the day before the 

offense Petitioner had gone to the Imperials’ house and told them if they did not pay the 

money they owed for a car he had sold them he would “shoot.” (Id. at 49-50.) 

Dr. Walter testified that, even though Petitioner made a threat the day before the incident, 

he still considered the shooting impulsive. (Id. at 50-52, 53.) Dr. Walter agreed that the 

evidence showed that after the offense Petitioner fled the country for a year. (Id. at 54.) 

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He testified that fleeing the country was a rational act and shows that “he did know what 

he did was wrong after the fact.” (Id. at 55.) 

 Lisa Christianson, a mitigation specialist with the Office of the Legal Advocate, 

also testified on Petitioner’s behalf. (Doc. 22, Ex. G at 11-65; H at 62-74.) She testified 

that she was assigned as a mitigation specialist in Petitioner’s case and that she 

investigated his background and talked with Petitioner “at the jail.” (Doc. 22, Ex. G at 

12.) She testified that Petitioner was hospitalized with meningitis when he was young. 

(Id. at 15-18.) She testified that Petitioner’s family left Mexico and came to the United 

States when he was eight years old. (Id. at 18-19.) She opined that Petitioner was raised 

in a “dysfunctional family environment.” (Id. at 68.) She explained that Petitioner’s 

father abused alcohol and destroyed the family’s property “about once a month.” (Id.; 

Doc. 22, Ex. G at 35-36.) She testified that Petitioner did not receive a lot of direction or 

supervision from his parents. (Doc. 22, Ex. H at 69.) She testified that during his 

teenage years, from age thirteen to sixteen, Petitioner lacked consistency in his school 

setting and reportedly did not have a lot of friends. (Id.) She also testified that there was 

evidence that Petitioner lacked proficiency in English, which can be “an isolator.” 

(Doc. 22, Ex. G at 29.) She testified that Petitioner started having contact with “juvenile 

authorities when he was approximately 10 to 12.” (Id. at 21.) The records reflected that 

Petitioner was charged with shoplifting spray paint in November 1993, and Petitioner 

told Christianson he was sniffing paint at that time. (Id. at 21-22, 64-65.) Christianson 

testified about Petitioner’s other encounters with the legal system. (Id. at 20-23, 24, 32-

35, 41-42, 59-60.) 

 She testified that Petitioner told her he “was jumped [into a gang]” when he was 

ten or twelve years old. (Doc. 22, Ex. H at 70; Doc. 22, Ex. G at 23.) She testified that 

there was evidence of gang involvement when Petitioner was fourteen years old and 

Petitioner lived in a neighborhood that was “full of street gang activity.” (Doc. 22, Ex. G 

at 27-28, 30-33, 43.) She testified that in early 1995, Petitioner’s “peer group was largely 

fellow gang members.” (Id. at 43.) She testified that Petitioner was having “severe 

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school problems.” (Id. at 44.) She testified that in Summer 1996, Petitioner had dropped 

out of school, was unemployed, was still involved in a gang, had no parental supervision, 

and had runaway several times. (Id. at 45-46.) 

 Dr. Carlos Jones, a psychologist who evaluated Petitioner in 1994 and 2001, also 

testified on Petitioner’s behalf. (Doc. 22, Ex. I at 3-47.) Dr. Jones testified that he 

performed various intelligence and personality tests on Petitioner. (Id. at 5.) He opined 

that Petitioner’s intelligence was in the “low average range.” (Id. at 5-6.) He testified 

that he was familiar with the facts of the criminal case. (Id. at 11.) He opined that at the 

time of the offense, Petitioner had a “high likelihood of some organic brain damage from 

the inhalant abuse,” “thought disorder,” and paranoia. (Id. at 11-12.) Dr. Jones testified 

that under the circumstances of the offense, “there would be a high likelihood that 

[Petitioner] would be out of control and unable to remain in control . . . .” (Id. at 12.) 

Dr. Jones acknowledged that Petitioner was sixteen years old at the time of the offense 

and testified that it was “highly likely and probable that his maturity level was less than 

the average 16 year old.” (Id. at 13, 43.) He testified that at the time of the offense, 

Petitioner was functioning at an “[u]pper 12 to mid 13[-year-old]” age range. (Id. at 14.) 

 In addition to this testimony, defense counsel offered into evidence “records from 

the jail back when [Petitioner] was a juvenile,” and numerous letters Petitioner had 

written inquiring about participating in the G.E.D. program and degree programs for 

“people who can’t study on site.” (Id. at 50-51.) The court accepted the evidence. (Id. at 

51.) 

 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that “the first 

and most substantial [mitigating factor was] age.” (Doc. 22, Ex. I at 76-77.) Defense 

counsel further argued that the court should consider as mitigating factors Petitioner’s 

chronological age, the degree of his intellectual development, and his maturity. (Id. at 

78, 80.) He emphasized the doctors’ testimony that, at the time of the offense, 

Petitioner’s degree of development was not consistent with a “normal” sixteen-year old. 

(Id.) Rather, “his level of development, maturity and insight and judgment was that of a 

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12 or 13 year old.” (Id.) Defense counsel further argued that the evidence related to the 

offense showed “impulsivity, lack of judgment, [and] lack of insight.” (Id. at 81-82.) 

Defense counsel also argued that the Court should consider evidence that Petitioner had a 

“troubled, abusive, and dysfunctional family.” (Id. at 84.) 

 The record reflects that the trial court considered these arguments. (Doc. 22, Ex. I 

at 85 (stating that the attorneys had given the court “a lot of material” and that the court 

wanted “to go over this as well as the memorandums.”); Ex. J at 4 (stating that the court 

had read and reviewed the presentence report, considered the time Petitioner has spent in 

custody, read counsel’s memoranda, considered counsel’s arguments, and considered all 

documentation and exhibits.) On January 4, 2002, the court held a hearing to impose the 

sentence and render a special verdict. (Doc. 22, Ex. J.) The court entered a special 

verdict that specifically found Petitioner’s age to be a mitigating factor, cited 

Dr. Walter’s testimony, and noted Petitioner’s “significant lack of intelligence and 

maturity.” (Doc. 22, Ex. L at 3.) The trial court also noted Petitioner’s age as a 

mitigating factor during its pronouncement of the sentence. (Doc. 22, Ex. J at 7.) The 

court also noted that Petitioner “was found guilty of another homicide committed on the 

same occasion” and that his crime was “an especially cruel, heinous, depraved killing.” 

(Id. at 6–7.) After considering the evidence and arguments pertaining to sentencing, the 

court imposed a natural-life sentence. (Doc. 22, Ex. J at 7.) 

 Thus, the evidence presented during the sentencing proceedings included evidence 

of Petitioner’s age and “its hallmark features.” See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. Because 

the trial court had the opportunity to, and did, consider Petitioner’s “youth and its 

attendant characteristics” before imposing a natural life sentence, Miller was not violated. 

See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (citing Miller, 132 S. CT. at 2471). Therefore, 

Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief related to his 

sentence in the 1997 case. 

C. The 2002 Case 

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 In the 2002 case, Petitioner was initially sentenced to death for a first-degree 

murder conviction. (Doc. 22, Ex. EE.) Subsequently, in Roper, the Supreme Court held 

that the Constitution does not permit juvenile offenders to be sentenced to death and, 

therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for 

resentencing. (Doc. 22, Ex. GG.) 

 The issue on remand was whether Petitioner would be sentenced to natural life or 

to life with a possibility of parole. Petitioner argued in his sentencing memorandum that 

he should receive “a life sentence, with parole eligibility after twenty-five years because 

that sentence [was] appropriate under all the facts and circumstances of [the] case, which 

include[d] the impulsive nature of the crime” and “the fact that [Petitioner] was less 

capable than an adult of using appropriate and considered judgment[.]” (Doc. 22, Ex. HH 

at 3.) The memorandum also discussed “the recognized differences between young 

people and adults,” including “impetuous and ill-considered actions, vulnerability to 

negative influences and outside pressures, and that the character of juveniles is not wellformed.” (Id. at 1.) Defense counsel argued that evidence had been presented “that all of 

these factors were present [for Petitioner] at the time of the offense in 1996.” (Id. at 2.) 

He specifically argued that, based on testimony by Ricardo Weinstein, Ph.D., Petitioner’s 

“‘executive function’ was still not completely developed at the time of testing some six 

years after this offense.” (Id.) Defense counsel further argued that Petitioner’s actions 

were “impulsive” and “ill-considered.” (Id.) 

 In support of the sentencing memorandum, among other evidence, defense counsel 

submitted the transcript of Dr. Weinstein’s testimony from Petitioner’s previous 

sentencing hearing in June 2003. (Doc. 22, Ex. HH; Doc. 34-4 at 11-122.) 

Dr. Weinstein, a neuropsychologist, testified that in March 2003 he evaluated Petitioner 

in connection with the 2002 case by reviewing police reports and reports from other 

doctors who had performed neuropsychological an psychological evaluations of 

Petitioner. (Doc. 34-4 at 14, 19-20 33, 79-80.) He also interviewed Petitioner’s mother. 

(Doc. 34-4 at 19-20, 33, 85-86.) In May 2003, Dr. Weinstein performed an 

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electroencephalogram (EEG) on Petitioner who was then twenty-two years old. (Id. at 40, 

79.) 

 Dr. Weinstein testified about the how the brain functions and explained that the 

frontal lobes of the brain control “executive functions,” including problem solving, 

spontaneity, memory, language, motivation, judgment, impulse control, and social and 

sexual behavior. (Id. at 24-25.) He testified about the development of the brain from 

“conception through young adulthood.” (Id. at 28-29.) Dr. Weinstein stated that brain 

development is affected by genetics, and by environmental factors including parenting 

and exposure to drugs or toxic substances. (Id. at 29.) He testified that the first three 

years of life are very important to brain development because cells that are not used 

disappear. (Id. at 30.) Thus, lack of stimulation or experience leads to “cell death or 

pruning.” (Id. at 30-31.) Dr. Weinstein further testified that the frontal lobe of brain does 

not function well between the ages of the ten and seventeen. (Id. at 44.) Dr. Weinstein 

further testified that the brain continues development until about age twenty-two. (Id. at 

33.) 

 Based on his review records related to Petitioner, Dr. Weinstein identified several 

factors, including a stressful pregnancy, living in poverty, abuse, lack of stimulation, and 

a bout with meningitis that may have affected the development of Petitioner’s brain from 

before he was born through his childhood. (Id. at 34-35, 90, 92.) Dr. Weinstein also 

testified that there was evidence that at a young age Petitioner started inhaling toxic 

substances, which kills brain cells. (Doc. 34-4 at 35.) There was also evidence that 

Petitioner used drugs and alcohol during puberty, and was hit in the head with a baseball 

bat and lost consciousness at age fourteen, and these factors affect brain development. 

(Doc. 34-4 at 35, 93-94.) He testified that when Petitioner was sixteen, his age at the 

time of the offense, his brain had not developed to a point where it could function 

adequately. (Id. at 109.) He further stated that the brain of a “normal” sixteen-year-old is 

not fully developed, but is undergoing “major changes, particularly affecting the frontal 

lobe.” (Id.) 

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 Dr. Weinstein testified that there was evidence that Petitioner had brain damage 

that would “impair his judgment, reasoning, impulse control and ability to adequately 

size up a situation.” (Id. at 36, 39.) Dr. Weinstein testified that an EEG that he 

performed on Petitioner’s brain showed “excessive slow wave functioning or slow 

functioning,” that was typical of brain injuries and brain damage. (Id. at 39.) The EEG 

results also showed that “the prefrontal area and all the frontal areas [of Petitioner’s brain 

were] not talking to the rest of the brain,” and showed that there was “poor 

communication between the right and the left side of the brain.” (Id. at 40, 54.) 

Dr. Weinstein testified that the EEG results showed that Petitioner had a brain 

dysfunction, which he categorized as “mild to moderate.” (Id. at 40, 42-43.) 

Dr. Weinstein explained that moderate brain dysfunction is “similar to how a six-year-old 

functions,” and mild dysfunction is comparable to “a kid that can think, that can start 

doing things, but you cannot let them be on their own and make decisions because they 

don’t have the capacity to do that.” (Id. at 43.) Dr. Weinstein testified that he didn’t 

“think that [Petitioner has] ever gotten to where we can say he thinks like an adult, he 

behaves like an adult, he behaves and acts in the environment how you would expect 

somebody thinks about what they do before they act, that considers the consequences of 

their actions and behaviors.” (Id. at 46.) He testified that Petitioner’s ability to function 

ranged between “12, 14, and 16 years old in terms of where he is at times. And I’m 

talking about how he makes decisions, how he acts up, how he comes up with the ideas 

that he does.” (Id. at 119.) He testified that Petitioner’s “brain wasn’t working in 1996. 

His brain is not working now.” (Id. at 121.) He also testified that Petitioner did not have 

a normal brain and could not “conform his conduct” because of the dysfunction of his 

brain. (Tr. 118.) 

 Dr. Weinstein testified that a person with “the brain pattern” reflected on 

Petitioner’s EEG would act impulsively when under stress. (Id. at 51, 53.) He stated that 

since 1996 when the offense occurred, Petitioner had not had the opportunity to develop 

adequately and there was evidence that, during his incarceration, he was “still acting out 

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like he would be as teenager, as a young teenager. So his brain has not matured.” (Id. at 

110-11.) He opined that Petitioner was “still at a time in his life where the brain will 

develop and will develop in a positive way.” (Id. at 111.) 

 At the outset of the 2005 re-sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it had 

“read all of [defense counsel’s] papers,” which included the transcript of Dr. Weinstein’s 

testimony. (Doc. 22, Ex. II at 5, 8.) Consistent with the sentencing memorandum, 

defense counsel argued that Petitioner should receive a lesser sentence than life without 

imprisonment because of his age, the state of his development, and the impulsive nature 

of the crime. (Doc. 22, Ex. II at 15-16.) He argued that Dr. Weinstein’s testimony 

regarding the development of Petitioner’s brain supported a lesser sentence. (Id. at 15.) 

Defense counsel also referred to Petitioner’s age. (Id. at 18.) The prosecution asserted 

that defense counsel was arguing “not only is the death penalty not appropriate for 16-

year-olds because their brains aren’t developed . . . he’s telling you natural life isn’t 

appropriate for them either.” (Id. at 17.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court 

sentenced Petitioner to natural life, stating that the basis for its decision was “the three 

aggravating factors found by the jury.” (Id. at 28.) Those factors were: (1) the fact that 

Petitioner committed first-degree murder while on release from a jail or corrections 

department; (2) Petitioner had previously been convicted of first-degree murder; and 

(3) Petitioner had previously been convicted of other serious offenses. (Id. at 28; 

Doc. 22, Ex. JJ.) 

 As set forth above, the record reflects that the trial court considered Petitioner’s 

“youth and attendant characteristics” before imposing a sentence of life imprisonment 

without parole. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471). 

As Petitioner notes, the trial court did not make factual findings regarding Petitioner’s 

youth or other facts mentioned in the Miller and Montgomery decisions. (Doc. 22, Ex. II 

at 28.) However, as previously stated, “‘Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile 

offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before determining that life without parole 

is a proportionate sentence,’” United States v. Pete, 2016 WL 1399337, at *8 (9th Cir. 

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Apr. 11, 2016) (quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734), but it “did not impose a formal 

fact finding requirement . . . .” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct at 745. Accordingly, the trial 

court’s failure to make specific factual findings does not run afoul of Miller. Because the 

trial court complied with Miller, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on 

his sentence in the 2002 case. 

D. Harmless Error Analysis 

 Respondent further argues that, even assuming the sentencing courts in the 1997 

and the 2002 cases violated Miller, any error was harmless. (Doc. 41 at 18.) Petitioner 

does not address this issue. (Doc. 45.) “For reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, 

habeas petitioners ‘are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can 

establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Davis v. Ayala, ___ U.S.___, 135 S. Ct. 

2187, 2197 (2015) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Under 

that test, habeas corpus relief is proper only if the federal court has “grave doubt about 

whether a trial error of federal law ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Rogers v. McDaniel, 793 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 

2015). There must be more than a “reasonable possibility” that the error was harmful. 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. “The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas 

corpus review of an error with respect to sentencing, in other words, the test is whether 

such error had a ‘substantial and injurious effect’ on the sentence.” Hernandez v. 

LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Aug.18, 2006) (citing Calderon v. 

Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1998) (finding sentencing error harmless because even 

if evidence of three prior convictions was insufficient, the petitioner was not prejudiced 

by the court’s consideration of those convictions because it found four other prior 

convictions that would have supported the petitioner’s sentence)). Because the Court has 

not found error, the Court does not conduct a Brecht analysis. 

V. Conclusion

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 As set forth above, Petitioner has not shown that his sentences in the 1997 or the 

2002 cases violated the rule announced in Miller. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled 

to habeas corpus relief. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 10) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be granted because reasonable jurists could find 

the ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which to 

file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 1st day of September, 2016. 

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