Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-02401/USCOURTS-ca4-09-02401-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Filed: January 12, 2010 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-2401 

(3:08-cv-03996-MJP) 

CARL G. FERRELL, individually and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC LLC, 

 Defendant - Appellant, 

 and 

ADVANCE AMERICA CASH ADVANCE CENTERS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 

INCORPORATED; LOCAL CASH ADVANCE OF SC III LLC; PAYDAY USA 

OF SC LLC, 

 Defendants. 

O R D E R 

 The court amends its opinion filed January 8, 2010, as 

follows: 

 On page 5, last line of text before section II, the 

date “December [21]” is corrected to read “December 22” and the 

brackets around the number are deleted. 

 For the Court – By Direction 

 /s/ Patricia S. Connor

 Clerk 

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CARL G. FERRELL, individually and 

on behalf of all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC

LLC,

Defendant-Appellant,  No. 09-2401

and

ADVANCE AMERICA CASH ADVANCE

CENTERS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

INCORPORATED; LOCAL CASH

ADVANCE OF SC III LLC; PAYDAY

USA OF SC LLC,

Defendants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(3:08-cv-03996-MJP)

Argued: October 27, 2009

Decided: January 8, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and

AGEE, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the

opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Agee joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: William Clifford Wood, Jr., NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Columbia, South

Carolina, for Appellant. Joseph Camden Wilson, PIERCE,

HERNS, SLOAN & MCLEOD, Charleston, South Carolina,

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: C. Mitchell Brown, NELSON,

MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Columbia,

South Carolina, for Appellant. Alan P. Sloan, III, PIERCE,

HERNS, SLOAN & MCLEOD, Charleston, South Carolina,

for Appellee.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we hold that, for purposes of determining

subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness

Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of Title 28, United States Code), a

limited liability company is an "unincorporated association"

as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) and therefore

is a citizen of the State under whose laws it is organized and

the State where it has its principal place of business.

After Carl Ferrell, a citizen of South Carolina, commenced

this class action in South Carolina state court against Express

Check Advance of South Carolina, LLC, and others, alleging

that their "payday loans" violated South Carolina law,

Express Check removed the action to federal court under

CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b), alleging minimal diversity, as

specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), as the basis for fed2 FERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC

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eral jurisdiction. Express Check contended that the minimal

diversity requirement of CAFA was satisfied because all other

parties are South Carolina citizens, while it, as a limited liability company, is a citizen of Missouri and Kansas based on the

citizenship of its sole member, a Missouri corporation with its

principal place of business in Overland, Kansas. Alternatively, it argued that if it was deemed an "unincorporated

association" within the meaning of § 1332(d)(10), it is nonetheless a citizen of Tennessee, under whose laws it is organized, and of Kansas, where it has its principal place of

business.

On Ferrell’s motion to remand, the district court concluded

that Express Check, as a limited liability company, is an "unincorporated association" under § 1332(d)(10) and that its

principal place of business is in South Carolina, not Kansas.

The court accordingly remanded the case to state court for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

On appeal, we conclude that (1) a limited liability company

is an "unincorporated association" as used in § 1332(d)(10),

whose citizenship is that of the State under whose laws it is

organized and the State where it has its principal place of

business, and (2) Express Check has its principal place of

business in South Carolina. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

Carl Ferrell commenced this class action in the Richland

County Court of Common Pleas, naming four business entities as defendants: Advance America, Cash Advance Centers

of South Carolina, Inc.; Local Cash Advance of SC, III, LLC;

Payday USA of SC, LLC; and Express Check Advance of

South Carolina, LLC. The complaint alleges that, in making

payday loans in South Carolina, the defendants violated (1)

the South Carolina Deferred Presentment Services Act, in particular S.C. Code Ann. § 34-39-200(5), by engaging in unfair,

deceptive, and fraudulent practices; (2) the South Carolina

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Consumer Protection Code, in particular S.C. Code Ann.

§ 37-5-108(1), by engaging in unconscionable conduct; and

(3) the South Carolina common-law duties of good faith and

fair dealing. The complaint also alleges that defendants acted

negligently and engaged in a civil conspiracy. Ferrell, a South

Carolina citizen, purports to represent a class of other South

Carolina citizens who had entered into payday loans in South

Carolina. The parties agree that, other than Express Check, all

defendants are also citizens of South Carolina for purposes of

diversity jurisdiction.

Express Check is a limited liability company organized

under the laws of Tennessee, and its sole member is QC

Financial Services, Inc., a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business in Overland, Kansas. All the stock of

QC Financial Services is in turn owned by QC Holdings, Inc.,

a Kansas corporation with its principal place of business in

Overland, Kansas. Express Check engages in the business of

making payday loans from stores located solely in South Carolina. While its top four officers, who are also officers of QC

Financial Services, are located in Kansas, all other Express

Check employees are located in South Carolina.

Express Check’s operations in South Carolina are substantially controlled by QC Financial Services and QC Holdings.

These two corporations make the major operational and policy decisions for Express Check, which then are implemented

by Express Check’s employees in South Carolina. QC Financial Services and QC Holdings also provide a variety of general support services to Express Check, such as legal,

marketing, accounting, auditing, information technology, and

collection services.

Invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction based on minimal diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), Express

Check filed a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b),

contending that it is not a citizen of South Carolina and therefore that the minimal diversity requirement was fulfilled. Fer4 FERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC

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rell filed a motion to remand, claiming that Express Check is

a citizen of South Carolina and therefore that the minimal

diversity needed for jurisdiction did not exist. The district

court granted Ferrell’s motion to remand, concluding that

Express Check is an "unincorporated association," which,

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10), is "deemed to be a citizen of

the State where it has its principal place of business and the

State under whose laws it is organized." Concluding that

Express Check has its principal place of business in South

Carolina, the court found that it did not have subject matter

jurisdiction over the action.

Express Check filed a petition for permission to appeal

under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), and we granted the petition by

order dated December 22, 2009.

II

Express Check contends that, as a limited liability company, its citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction

should be determined under traditional rules by looking to the

citizenship of its sole member, QC Financial Services. See

Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990) (holding that

a limited partnership is not itself a citizen and that courts must

instead look to the citizenship of its members to determine if

diversity jurisdiction exists); Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v.

Exro Ltda, 388 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a

limited liability company’s "citizenship is that of its members"). It argues that CAFA, which, in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(10), changed the traditional rule for determining

the citizenship of "unincorporated association[s]" in class

actions, does not apply to it because a limited liability company is not an "unincorporated association." It argues that,

under Tennessee law, it is an artificial entity created by statute, whose nature falls somewhere between that of a corporation and an unincorporated association. Thus, when applying

the traditional rules, it should not be treated as a citizen of

South Carolina, but rather as a citizen of Missouri and KanFERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC 5

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sas, the States of citizenship of its sole member, QC Financial

Services. Because the minimal diversity requirement of 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) is thus satisfied, Express Check

argues that it properly removed this action to federal court

under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) and that the district court erred as

a matter of law in concluding otherwise.

Ferrell contends that the term "unincorporated association,"

as used in § 1332(d)(10), is "very broad and encompasses all

non-corporate entities, including limited liability companies."

He argues that in § 1332 Congress created two categories,

corporations and unincorporated associations, both of which

are treated similarly for determining diversity jurisdiction in

CAFA class actions, and that federal courts should not rely on

the nuances of Tennessee law to make their jurisdictional

decisions. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 197 (admonishing against

delving into such an analysis).

The issue thus presented focuses on the single question of

statutory interpretation of whether § 1332(d)(10), which, in

the CAFA context, changed the traditional rule for determining the citizenship of unincorporated associations, applies to

limited liability companies.

In CAFA, Congress conferred subject matter jurisdiction on

federal courts over class actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and in which "any member of a

class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any

defendant." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). The citizenship of a

corporation is determined by the State in which it is incorporated and the State in which it has its principal place of business, see id. § 1332(c)(1), and the citizenship of an

unincorporated association is determined similarly by the

State "under whose laws it is organized" and the State where

it has its principal place of business, see id. § 1332(d)(10).

The provisions for determining the citizenship of corporations

and of unincorporated associations, however, are contained in

separate places in § 1332, reflecting that the provision for

6 FERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC

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determining the citizenship of unincorporated associations

applies only to class actions covered by CAFA. The significance of including a provision for unincorporated associations

only in CAFA informs the proper interpretation of the provision, and this is better understood against the background

jurisprudence.

In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. (16

How.) 314, 327-29 (1854), the Supreme Court, noting that

corporations technically were not citizens for diversity purposes, held nonetheless that corporations should be deemed

citizens of the State where they were incorporated because a

corporation’s shareholders could conclusively be presumed to

be citizens of the incorporating State. By contrast, in a line of

cases beginning with Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677

(1889), the Court made clear that artificial entities other than

corporations are not citizens for diversity purposes and that

courts must look to the citizenship of their members when

determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists. Id. at 682

(holding that a joint stock company "cannot be a citizen of

New York, within the meaning of the statutes regulating jurisdiction, unless it be a corporation"); see also Great Southern

Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456–57 (1900)

(refusing to extend the jurisdictional rule for corporations to

cover a limited partnership association); United Steelworkers

of America, AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145,

149-53 (1965) (maintaining the "distinction between the ‘personality’ and ‘citizenship’ of corporations and that of labor

unions and other unincorporated associations" and accordingly holding that an unincorporated labor union is not a citizen for diversity purposes); Carden, 494 U.S. at 194-97

(applying "the trilogy of Chapman, Great Southern, and

Bouligny" to hold that a limited partnership is not itself a citizen for diversity purposes).

Referring to this jurisprudence, which applies different

rules based on whether the entity in question is incorporated,

the Supreme Court has often characterized any business entity

FERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC 7

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that is not a corporation as an "unincorporated association."

See Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 149-50; Carden, 494 U.S. at 195

("[I]t is difficult to understand how the dissent can characterize as ‘newly formulated’ the ‘rule that the Court will, without

analysis of the particular entity before it, count every member

of an unincorporated association for purposes of diversity

jurisdiction’"); Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458,

461 (1980) ("Although corporations suing in diversity long

have been ‘deemed’ citizens, unincorporated associations

remain mere collections of individuals" (internal citation

omitted)). Even though the Supreme Court has also referred

to unincorporated associations as "artificial entities other than

corporations," Carden, 494 U.S. at 197, it intended no difference in meaning, and we have recognized that for determining

citizenship for diversity jurisdiction, the Chapman line of

cases established a categorical rule governing all "unincorporated associations." N.Y. State Teachers Retirement Sys. v.

Kalkus, 764 F.2d 1015, 1017 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he Supreme

Court has consistently held that in diversity actions involving

unincorporated associations, federal courts must look to the

citizenship of each member of the association to determine

whether diversity exists" (emphasis added)); see also Clephas

v. Fagelson, Shonberger, Payne & Arthur, 719 F.2d 92, 93

(4th Cir. 1983) ("It is hornbook law that ‘[u]nincorporated

associations have never been accorded a status as jural persons for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, nor has there

developed a presumption of a single citizenship of the members’" (emphasis added) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System

917 (1st ed. 1953))); Belle View Apartments v. Realty ReFund

Trust, 602 F.2d 668, 669 (4th Cir. 1979) ("Although the holding of Bouligny was technically limited to labor unions,

‘every argument advanced by the Court is applicable to all

forms of unincorporated associations’" (emphasis added)

(quoting 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward

H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3630, at 849

(1st ed. 1975))); 13F Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3630

8 FERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC

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(3d ed. 2009) (addressing the applicable legal landscape in a

section entitled, "Unincorporated Associations—History of

General Principle"); Walter W. Jones, Jr., Annotation, Determination of Citizenship of Unincorporated Associations, For

Federal Diversity of Citizenship Purposes, In Actions By or

Against Such Associations, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 849 (2004), cited

in S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 46 (2005), reprinted in 2005

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 43.

Thus, under the traditional jurisprudence, corporations were

deemed to be citizens of the State in which they were incorporated, and all other business enterprises were referred to as

unincorporated associations and treated effectively as citizens

of the States of which their members were citizens. In 1958,

Congress enacted § 1332(c) to modify the traditional rule with

respect to corporations by expanding the citizenship of a corporation to include not only the State of incorporation but also

the State where it has its principal place of business. But no

similar provision was made for unincorporated associations,

which remained governed by the Chapman line of cases.

While the Supreme Court in both Bouligny and Carden recognized that the incorporated/unincorporated dichotomy was

"unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing

realities of business organization," it noted that Congress was

better positioned to make the appropriate accommodations.

Carden, 494 U.S. at 196–97; Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 149–51.

And in enacting § 1332(d)(10) as a part of CAFA in 2005,

Congress accepted the Court’s invitation, modifying the rule

for business entities other than corporations to provide, for

purposes of CAFA, that the citizenship of all "unincorporated

association[s]" is determined by the State under whose laws

the unincorporated association is organized and the State

where it has its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(10).

Given this history, we read § 1332(d)(10) to respond to the

categorical distinction that the Supreme Court created in

Chapman and maintained in Bouligny and Carden. Moreover,

FERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC 9

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the specific language of § 1332(d)(10) indicates that a limited

liability company, if not a corporation, is an unincorporated

association, employing "unincorporated" as the counterpart to

"incorporated." See Gen. Tech. Applications, 388 F.3d at 121

("[A limited liability company] is an unincorporated association, akin to a partnership for diversity purposes").

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that, under

§ 1332(d)(10), Express Check’s citizenship for purposes of

CAFA is that of the State under whose laws it is organized

and the State where it has its principal place of business. 

To argue that Congress intended "unincorporated association" in § 1332(d)(10) to refer to only those non-corporate

entities that lack a distinct legal identity under the law of the

State in which they are organized, Express Check compares

the language of § 1332(d)(10) (referring to "unincorporated

association") with the language in §§ 1332(d)(9)(B) and

1453(d)(2) (referring to "a corporation or other form of business enterprise"). Relying on the canon of statutory construction that, in general, different words used in the same statute

should be assigned different meanings, Express Check reasons that Congress must have intended these two phrases to

have different meanings. Moreover, it argues that the phrase

"other form of business enterprise" should be read naturally

as the broader of the two, connected to "corporation" by the

disjunctive "or," and that therefore "other form of business

enterprise" was the term that Congress employed when it

wanted to refer to all non-corporate entities. Thus, it reasons,

the term "unincorporated association" in § 1332(d)(10) refers

to only a narrower subset of non-corporate business forms, a

class that excludes entities having a distinct legal identity

under the law of the State in which they are organized.

This argument overlooks two linguistic restraints imposed

by the plain language of the statute. First, the use of "a corporation or other form of business enterprise" in

§§ 1332(d)(9)(B) and 1453(d)(2) refers to the class of all

10 FERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC

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business entities for the purpose of excluding from CAFA disputes over their internal affairs and governance. As Express

Check appropriately recognizes, "business enterprise" is a

broader term than either "corporation" or "unincorporated

association." Congress undoubtedly intended the exception in

§§ 1339(d)(9)(B) and 1453(d)(2) to apply to all business

forms, whether they be corporations or unincorporated associations. By using "or other" ("a corporation or other form of

business enterprise"), Congress included "corporation" as an

example form of "business enterprise," so that the term "business enterprise" itself includes both "corporations" and any

other form of business enterprise. Thus, "business enterprise"

was the broadest term Congress could use, and this class

includes corporations and non-corporate entities. When using

"unincorporated association" in § 1332(d)(10), therefore,

Congress needed to use a term narrower than "business enterprise," because the term "business enterprise" also includes

corporations. In essence, by using "business enterprise," "corporation," and "unincorporated association" as it did, Congress used "business enterprise" as the broadest term and

subdivided the entities covered by that term, as needed, into

two subclasses, corporations and non-corporate entities, referring to the latter subclass as "unincorporated association[s]."

Second, the phrase "unincorporated association" distinguishes itself linguistically from incorporated associations,

thereby suggesting two mutually exclusive classes of business

enterprises -– those that are incorporated, i.e., corporations,

and those that are not.

Moreover, Express Check’s argument overlooks the developmental history of § 1332. In 1958, in response to Marshall,

57 U.S. (16 How.) at 327-29, where the Supreme Court

defined in effect the citizenship of a corporation as determined by only its State of incorporation, Congress statutorily

expanded that holding to provide that the citizenship of the

corporation is also determined by the State where it has its

principal place of business. At that time, it left all other busiFERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC 11

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ness enterprises subject to the traditional rule of looking to the

citizenship of members, as provided in Chapman, 129 U.S. at

682, and its progeny. But in 2005, in order to give CAFA

broad application, Congress defined the citizenship of those

other business enterprises narrowly, i.e., limiting their citizenship to one or two States—where they were organized and

where they had their principal place of business—and thus

facilitating federal court jurisdiction over CAFA class actions.

Accordingly, we reject Express Check’s linguistic argument.

Express Check also makes an argument that "unincorporated association" as used in § 1332(d)(10) is limited to only

entities that lack a distinct legal identity based on some language contained in Navarro. Lifting isolated phrases from

Navarro, it argues that "unincorporated associations" are

"mere collections of individuals." 446 U.S. at 461. And

because a limited liability company organized under Tennessee law is "a legal entity distinct from its members," Tenn.

Code Ann. § 48-249-116, it is thus more than a "mere collection[ ] of individuals." Navarro, however, did not define or

even describe "unincorporated associations" as "mere collections of individuals." Rather, the language lifted by Express

Check from Navarro was simply Navarro’s restatement of

Chapman’s rule that, for diversity purposes, "unincorporated

associations remain mere collections of individuals," even

though corporations are deemed citizens. Navarro, 446 U.S.

at 461 (emphasis added).

In sum, we conclude that the term "unincorporated association" in § 1332(d)(10) refers to all non-corporate business

entities. This interpretation not only serves the language and

history of § 1332 but also the purpose of broadening the reach

of CAFA. Thus, a limited liability company, such as Express

Check, is an "unincorporated association" within the meaning

of § 1332(d)(10).

12 FERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC

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III

That still leaves the question of where Express Check has

its principal place of business. Express Check contends that

because its operations, even though conducted in South Carolina, are controlled by officers in Kansas, Kansas should be

found to be its principal place of business, thus establishing

it as a Kansas citizen, as well as a citizen of Tennessee under

whose laws it is organized.

Ferrell, on the other hand, contends that Express Check’s

principal place of business is in South Carolina because all of

its business operations are conducted there. It makes payday

loans only in South Carolina from locations only in South

Carolina through its employees, all of whom function in

South Carolina, except for its top four officers, who are also

among the top officers of QC Financial Services and who

function in Overland, Kansas.

We have recognized two tests for determining a business’

principal place of business: the "nerve center" test, which

makes determinative the home office or place where the corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate its activities,

and the "place of operations" test, which makes determinative

the place where the bulk of corporate activity takes place. See

Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181, 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., 489 F.2d 260, 262

(4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)). Although these tests were

developed in the context of ascertaining a corporation’s principal place of business under § 1332(c)(1), we conclude that

it is logical to apply the same tests when determining an unincorporated association’s principal place of business under

§ 1332(d)(10). See Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 557

F.3d 1026, 1032 n.16 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) ("We apply the same tests to determine the ‘principal

place of business’ for corporations and unincorporated associations").

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Although we have not endorsed either test to the exclusion

of the other and have noted that both tests need not be applied

in any given case, we have recognized that the nature of the

business involved determines best which test is the more

appropriate to apply. Thus, in Peterson, we explained that the

place of operations test, which "presumes the existence of

physical operations by which a corporation’s presence in different states can be measured," is "applied when a company

has multiple centers of manufacturing, purchasing, or sales."

142 F.3d at 184. But when, for example, a company "engage[s] primarily in the ownership and management of investment assets such as debt or equities," so that it "is not really

geographically bound," we apply the nerve center test. Id.; see

also Athena Auto., Inc. v. Digregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 290 (4th

Cir. 1999).*

The nature of Express Check’s business, simply put, is to

make payday loans from its numerous store locations in South

Carolina, where all of its employees, except four officers, also

work. We conclude that when a company has all of its physical operations for doing business in a given State and its four

top officers in another, the place of operations test should be

applied to most accurately reflect its principal place of business. In this case, that is South Carolina. 

Express Check’s primary challenge to this conclusion is

that we should attribute to it the citizenship of its parent companies because they exercise complete control over it. Express

Check argues that it is merely the alter ego of its sole member, QC Financial Services, and QC Financial Services’ parent, QC Holdings. Thus, it concludes that the citizenship of

those companies—Missouri and Kansas—should be imputed

*Resolving the simply stated question of where a business entity has its

principal place of business is not a simple matter, and the circuit courts

have developed different tests. In June 2009, the Supreme Court granted

certiorari in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 129 S. Ct. 2766, to resolve the split,

and that case was argued in November 2009. 

14 FERRELL v. EXPRESS CHECK ADVANCE OF SC

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to it. In the circumstances of this case, we reject that argument.

Express Check’s corporate parents decided to maintain it as

a legally separate entity and have undoubtedly benefited from

this arrangement. It may not now complain that it would

improperly elevate form over substance for us to respect the

very corporate structure its parents selected. See J.A. Olson

Co. v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 414 (5th Cir. 1987)

("We hold then that the alter ego doctrine may not be used to

create diversity jurisdiction by ignoring the principal place of

business of a subsidiary corporation and imputing to it the

principal place of business of the parent").

In sum, because Express Check has its principal place of

business in South Carolina, it is a citizen of South Carolina

for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under CAFA. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(10). Accordingly, it has not carried its burden of

demonstrating that minimal diversity as defined in

§ 1332(d)(2)(A) exists. See Johnson v. Advance America,

Cash Advance Ctrs. of S.C., Inc., 549 F.3d 932, 936 (4th Cir.

2008); Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 298 (4th

Cir. 2008).

The order remanding this case to state court is accordingly

AFFIRMED.

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