Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05554/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05554-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 375
Nature of Suit: False Claims Act
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELLEN HARDIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

MENDOCINO COAST DISTRICT 

HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-05554-JST 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: ECF No. 55

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss certain causes of action from Plaintiff’s 

second amended complaint. ECF No. 55. The Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in 

part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ellen Hardin brings this case against the following Defendants: Mendocino Coast 

District Hospital (“MCDH” or “Mendocino”), her former employer; Bob Edwards, MCDH’s chief 

executive officer; Steve Lund, the president of MCDH’s board of directors; and Wade Sturgeon, 

MCDH’s chief financial officer. ECF No. 50 ¶¶ 4-8, 14. Hardin was formerly employed as 

MCDH’s chief human resources officer (“CHRO”). Id. ¶ 14. 

The Court dismissed several causes of action from Hardin’s first amended complaint

(“FAC”) with leave to amend:

the fourth cause of action for violation of the First Amendment as it 

relates to speech on alleged FEHA [Fair Employment and Housing 

Act] violations; the seventh cause of action for violation of 

California Government Code section 12940(j); the tenth cause of 

action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as to 

Defendants Lund and Sturgeon only; the eleventh cause of action for 

negligent infliction of emotional distress; the twelfth cause of action 

for negligent supervision, hiring, and retention; and the thirteenth 

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cause of action for defamation, as to Defendants Lund and Sturgeon 

only.

ECF No. 43 at 17-18. Defendants now move to dismiss these causes of action from the second 

amended complaint (“SAC”) with prejudice.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but facts pleaded by a plaintiff 

must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter that, when accepted as true, states a claim that is plausible on its 

face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While this standard is not a probability 

requirement, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether a plaintiff has met this plausibility 

standard, the Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the 

pleadings in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 (First Amendment Retaliation)

The Court dismissed Hardin’s First Amendment claim based on alleged FEHA violations

from the FAC because Hardin failed to allege that her “speech was spoken in the capacity of a 

private citizen and not a public employee,” Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009):

Hardin’s allegation that she engaged in protected speech when she 

‘voiced concerns regarding Mendocino’s violation of the FEHA, 

involving a female Hispanic/Latin employee entitled to a raise and a 

male employee who sought a protected leave of absence for health 

issues’ does not survive scrutiny, even at this early pleadings stage. 

ECF No. 10 ¶ 106. Hardin elsewhere alleges that she was 

“exercising her duties and obligations as the CHRO under the 

FEHA” when she “sought to ensure” that these employees’ FEHA 

rights were protected. Id. ¶ 126-27. She does not allege that she 

discussed these issues outside her chain of command, nor does she 

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allege that she ever spoke “in direct contravention to [her] 

supervisor’s orders.” Dahlia [v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1075 

(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)]. Thus, she does not allege that she was 

speaking as a private citizen rather than as a public employee, and 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to this category of 

speech.

ECF No. 43 at 8.

Defendants argue that Hardin has failed to cure this deficiency in the SAC, which 

continues to allege that Hardin was “exercising her duties and obligations as the CHRO under the 

FEHA” when she “sought to ensure” that two employees’ FEHA rights were protected. ECF No. 

50 ¶¶ 140-41. The SAC also adds that, as CHRO, Hardin was “responsible for developing and 

executing human resource strategy for Mendocino,” but that it was “not Plaintiff’s job to 

repeatedly oppose Mendocino’s illegal practices, which she often found herself faced with having 

to do.” Id. ¶ 119. Hardin contends that “she was exercising her duties and obligations as the 

CHRO under the FEHA, not as part of her official duties of Mendocino . . . when she oppose[d] 

the unlawful practices of Mendocino.” ECF No. 61 at 12-13 (emphasis in original). It might 

appear unlikely that the job duties of a chief human resources officer would not include reporting 

potentially illegal human resources practices. But, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court must 

construe the pleadings in a light most favorable to Hardin and accept as true Hardin’s factual 

allegation that her job responsibilities did not include opposing Mendocino’s illegal practices. See

Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071 (“In evaluating whether a plaintiff spoke as a private citizen, we must 

therefore assume the truth of the facts as alleged by the plaintiff with respect to employment 

responsibilities.”). Viewed under this standard, the SAC sufficiently alleges that Hardin’s speech 

regarding alleged FEHA violations was not made as a public employee. See ECF No. 43 at 8 

(“[W]hen construed in a light most favorable to Hardin, the complaint does not allege that such 

reports or investigations [of fraudulent billing] were part of Hardin’s official job duties. This is 

sufficient to plausibly allege that she was not speaking as a public employee when she reported the 

alleged fraud. . . .”). The motion to dismiss Hardin’s First Amendment retaliation cause of action 

is denied.1

 

1 Hardin’s opposition cites a number of California state court cases to for the proposition that 

“employees who are terminated or retaliated against for reporting illegal conduct may proceed 

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B. Defamation

The Court found that the majority of the alleged statements in the FAC did not support a 

defamation claim, but that allegations that “Edwards made ‘accusations of wrongdoing in front of 

all Board Members’ on December 15, 2016,” plausibly stated a claim. ECF No. 43 at 12-13 

(quoting ECF No. 10 ¶ 43). The Court therefore denied the motion to dismiss the defamation 

claim against Edwards but granted it “as to Lund and Sturgeon, who are not alleged to have made 

any allegedly defamatory statements.” Id. at 14.

Hardin points to paragraphs 214-233 of the SAC as “describ[ing] various defamatory 

statements made by Defendants Lund and Sturgeon,” but these paragraphs allege only one specific 

set of statements by Sturgeon and no specific statements by Lund.2 ECF No. 26. Sturgeon is 

alleged to have made the following statements:

On or about November 17, 2016, Plaintiff received an email from 

CFO Sturgeon accusing her of doing research into his staff, the offsite coders, without consulting him first. CFO Sturgeon expressed 

that he was disappointed that she was looking into whether the 

coders would be allowed to remain working remotely. Sturgeon had 

copied Edwards on his accusation about Plaintiff, inferring that 

Plaintiff and her staff were acting inappropriately in the performance 

of routine HR functions.

ECF No. 50 ¶ 217. The Court previously dismissed these statements as a basis for a defamation 

claim because Hardin did not allege that they were made to a third party. ECF No. 43 at 12; see

ECF No. 10 ¶ 36. The SAC cures this deficiency by alleging that Sturgeon copied Edwards on 

this email. ECF No. 50 ¶ 217. Without citing any case law, Defendants argue that these 

statements are covered by the common interest privilege, which provides that a communication is 

 

with claims even when the reporting of such conduct is part of their job duties.” ECF No. 61 at 

18-19 (emphasis omitted) (citing Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 4th 1164 (1994); 

Thompson v. Tracor Flight Sys., Inc., 86 Cal. App. 4th 1156 (2001); Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 

3 Cal. App. 4th 467 (1992); Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc., 3 Cal. App. 4th 382 

(1992)). However, retaliation under the First Amendment was not at issue in any of those cases.

2 Of the specific statements alleged in these paragraphs by others, the Court has already found one 

set of statements – those alleged to have been made by Edwards at a December 15, 2016 board 

meeting – to be a sufficient basis for a defamation claim. ECF No. 50 ¶ 218; ECF No. 43 at 13. 

The Court found others – allegations regarding articles in the Andersen Valley Advertiser – to be 

insufficient. ECF No. 50 ¶¶ 219-21; ECF No. 43 at 13. 

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privileged if it is made “without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also 

interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a 

reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is 

requested by the person interested to give the information.” Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c); ECF No. 55 

at 21. However, viewing the complaint in a light most favorable to Hardin, the Court cannot 

conclude, as a matter of law, that the statements were made without malice. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hardin’s defamation cause of action is denied as to these 

statements.

Hardin also relies on more general allegations to support her defamation claim:

While the precise dates of all defamatory publications are not known 

to Plaintiff, she is informed and believes that commencing in 

September of 2016, Defendants have made and continue to make 

false statements about Plaintiff and her job performance to 

Plaintiff’s supervisors, coworkers, subordinates, and other persons, 

including news media. The statements Defendants published about 

Plaintiff included but were not limited to stating that Plaintiff 

engaged in wrong doing, violated policies and rules, that Plaintiff’s 

performance was deficient, and indicating that Plaintiff would no 

longer be employed at Mendocino in the future. Defendants’ false 

statements expressly and impliedly stated that Plaintiff was 

dishonest, unprofessional, not invested in Mendocino’s success in 

the market place, and not a team player.

ECF No. 50 ¶ 222. She further alleges:

Plaintiff is informed and believes, that such statements and 

documents were published to numerous employees of Mendocino, 

coworkers of Plaintiff, and other persons who reside in or around 

Mendocino County, California, including the media, employees and 

managers of Mendocino, all of whom are known to Defendants 

Edwards, Lund and Sturgeon, but are unknown at this time to 

Plaintiff, and whose identities shall be ascertained during discovery 

in this action, as well as the exact contents of defamatory statements.

Id. ¶ 223. These allegations are too conclusory to state a claim for relief. Even under federal 

liberal pleading standards, a plaintiff must allege the “substance of the alleged defamatory 

statements” and “specifically identify who made the statements, when they were made and to 

whom they were made.” PAI Corp. v. Integrated Sci. Sols., Inc., No. C-06-5349 JSW (JCS), 2007 

WL 1229329, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007). It is not enough, for example, to allege that “all of 

the co-conspirators” made false statements on certain topics without “identify[ing] who made 

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which statements or when they made each such statement.” Gressett v. Contra Costa Cty., No. 

C-12-3798 EMC, 2013 WL 2156278, at *30 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2013) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Likewise, alleging that “Defendants, and each of them” published defamatory 

statements to “third person recipients and other members of the community who are known to 

Defendants, and each of them, but unknown to Plaintiff at this time” also fails to state a plausible 

claim for relief. MacKinnon v. Logitech Inc., No. 15-CV-05231-TEH, 2016 WL 541068, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nor is it sufficient to allege 

general statements “about . . . leadership abilities,” or that someone “is an incompetent and 

dishonest leader who will not reveal to his group the elements necessary to be successful,” or 

“about the character and business acumen” of the plaintiff. Titan Glob. LLC v. Organo Gold Int’l, 

Inc., No. 12-CV-2104-LHK, 2012 WL 6019285, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2012) (quotation marks 

and citations omitted).

Hardin’s defamation cause of action is therefore dismissed to the extent that it relies on 

these general allegations, but Defendants’ motion is denied as to the statements allegedly made by 

Sturgeon on November 17, 2016, and by Edwards on December 15, 2016. The defamation cause 

of action is dismissed only as to Lund, who is not alleged to have made any defamatory statements 

with sufficient specificity. Because the Court’s prior ruling on the motion to dismiss the FAC did 

not address lack of specificity, the Court will grant leave to amend.

C. Harassment

The Court dismissed Hardin’s cause of action for harassment under California Government 

Code section 12940(j) after concluding that Hardin did not sufficiently allege that “she was 

subjected to harassment because she belonged to [a protected] group,” Lawler v. Montblanc N. 

Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 

Cal. 4th 121 (1999)):

Although Hardin conclusorily alleges that she “was subjected to 

unwanted harassing conduct and a hostile work environment 

because of her age, gender, her opposition to discrimination, and her 

insistence that Mendocino comply with the FEHA concerning an 

employee who was on leave for a health issue and a Latin/Hispanic 

female employee who was entitled to a raise,” ECF No. 10 ¶ 134, 

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her opposition relies on allegations that Hardin suffered “numerous 

adverse employment actions . . . because of engaging in the 

protected activity of exercising her duties to the FEHA,” ECF No. 

37 at 25 (emphasis added). But section 12940(j) prohibits 

harassment based on membership in a protected group, not for 

complaining that the employer was violating FEHA.

ECF No. 43 at 11. The Court also explained that, under California law, harassment “consists of 

actions outside the scope of job duties which are not of a type necessary to business and personnel 

management.” Id. at 11-12 (quoting Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 64-65 

(1996)).

In opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC, Hardin relies on Roby v. McKesson 

Corp. for the proposition that evidence of discriminatory personnel management decisions can 

support a harassment claim. 47 Cal. 4th 686, 705-11 (2009). In Roby, the California Supreme 

Court confirmed that FEHA distinguishes between discrimination and harassment, and that 

“commonly necessary personnel management actions do not come within the meaning of 

harassment. These actions may retrospectively be found discriminatory if based on improper 

motives, but in that event the remedies provided by the FEHA are those for discrimination, not 

harassment.” Id. at 707 (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). However, the court 

explained, “in analyzing the sufficiency of evidence in support of a harassment claim, there is no 

basis for excluding evidence of biased personnel management actions so long as that evidence is 

relevant to prove the communication of a hostile message.” Id. at 708. This is because “some 

official employment actions done in furtherance of a supervisor’s managerial role can also have a 

secondary effect of communicating a hostile message.” Id. at 709.

This Court previously concluded that the “vast majority” of activities alleged by Hardin –

all but defamation – are personnel management decisions:

The alleged conduct in this case includes “unwarranted discipline, 

criticism, stripping of [Hardin’s] responsibilities, demotion, denying 

requests for time off, making false claims about her job 

performance, suspension, leaking confidential information to the 

news media, defaming Plaintiff, and ultimately termination.” ECF 

No. 10 ¶ 19. The vast majority of these activities are “personnel 

management decisions” that cannot give rise to an intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim even if, as Hardin alleges, they 

were “improperly motivated” by discrimination or retaliation. 

Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 80; see also id. at 64-65 (characterizing 

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“hiring and firing, job or project assignments, office or work station 

assignments, promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, the 

provision of support, the assignment or nonassignment of 

supervisory functions, deciding who will and who will not attend 

meetings, deciding who will be laid off, and the like” as “personnel 

management actions”). 

However, the Court concluded above that Hardin has stated a 

defamation claim against Edwards based on his alleged statements at 

a board meeting. Defendants do not argue, and the Court is aware of 

no authority for the proposition that, such conduct falls within the 

realm of “personnel management decisions.” 

ECF No. 43 at 15-16. Although the Court was discussing these activities in the context of 

Hardin’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the same analysis applies to the 

distinction between harassment and discrimination. Thus, as with Hardin’s claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, the alleged defamation may give rise to a claim for harassment 

rather than discrimination. As discussed above, Hardin has stated a defamation claim against both 

Edwards and Sturgeon, and she has therefore alleged harassing, and not just discriminatory, 

conduct by these two Defendants.3

In addition, even though the SAC merely repeats the conclusory allegation from the FAC 

that Hardin “was subjected to unwanted harassing conduct and a hostile work environment 

because of her age [and] gender,” compare ECF No. 50 ¶ 147 with ECF No. 10 ¶ 134, Defendants 

do not dispute that Hardin has stated a plausible claim for discrimination. If the alleged personnel 

management actions were, in fact, discriminatory, then such evidence would support a reasonable 

inference that the harassing conduct was based on Hardin’s age and gender. See Roby, 47 Cal. 4th 

at 711. Whether the allegedly discriminatory actions had the “secondary effect of communicating 

a hostile message” remains a question for the jury. Id. at 709. At the pleadings stage, it is 

sufficient to allege “a combination of personnel management actions that could create a harassing 

atmosphere as well as conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance.” Wells v. Regents 

of the Univ. of California, No. 15-CV-01700-SI, 2015 WL 6746820, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 

2015). Hardin has met this standard, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss her harassment claim is 

denied.

 

3 Hardin does not assert the harassment cause of action against Lund. ECF No. 50 ¶ 146 (“This 

cause of action is asserted against all Defendants, except Lund.”).

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D. Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants move to dismiss both the negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claims from the SAC on grounds that they 

are barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity. The Court has already rejected this argument 

and does not find good cause to reconsider it. ECF No. 43 at 14.

1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Court also explained that “[a] simple pleading of personnel management activity is 

insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper 

motivation is alleged.” Id. at 15 (quoting Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 80). Now that Hardin has 

adequately alleged a defamation claim against Sturgeon, she has also alleged an IIED against him. 

See ECF No. 43 at 16 (denying motion to dismiss IIED claim as to Edwards on grounds that 

defamation can give rise to an IIED claim). However, the Court continues to find Hardin’s 

defamation claim deficient as to Lund, and Hardin has alleged no other conduct outside of 

personnel management activities by him. Id. Hardin’s IIED claim is therefore dismissed as to 

Lund. Because the Court grants leave to amend the defamation claim, it also grants leave to 

amend the IIED claim.

2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Court dismissed Hardin’s NIED claim from the FAC because Hardin failed to allege 

any duty. Id. at 14-15. The SAC now alleges that “Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to operate 

Plaintiff’s place of employment in a manner that was free from unlawful discrimination, 

harassment and retaliation, and to hire, train, supervise and discipline his employees to fulfill that 

duty”; that “Defendants had a duty to refrain from causing damages to Plaintiff”; and that 

“Defendants also had a duty to exercise due care toward Plaintiff and to refrain from carelessly, 

negligently, and arbitrarily inflicting emotional distress upon her.” ECF No. 50 ¶¶ 192, 193, 195. 

The Court does not decide whether these allegations are sufficient to allege a duty because 

her NIED claims fail for a different reason: intentional conduct, including supervisory conduct by 

an employer, cannot give rise to a negligence cause of action. E.g., McNaboe v. Safeway Inc., No. 

13-CV-04174-SI, 2016 WL 80553, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2016); Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 

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3d 1087, 1105 (1990). Hardin argues that both her IIED and NIED claims “are directly predicated 

on her above described allegations of the retaliation, FEHA and the defamation claims of the 

Plaintiff.” ECF No. 61 at 25. All of these alleged actions reflect intentional conduct. Hardin’s 

NIED claim is therefore dismissed, without leave to amend because no amendment would cure 

this defect.

E. Tort Claims Against MCDH

Finally, Defendants again move to dismiss the IIED, NIED, and negligent supervision, 

hiring, and retention causes of action against MCDH on grounds that it is immune from suit. First, 

as discussed above, Hardin has adequately stated an IIED claim against Defendants Edwards and 

Sturgeon. MCDH is therefore potentially liable under California Government Code section 

815.2(a), which provides that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or 

omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or 

omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee 

or his personal representative.” The motion to dismiss the IIED claim against MCDH is denied.

Second, the Court has already dismissed the NIED claim because Hardin alleges only 

intentional conduct. This ruling applies to MCDH as well as to individual Defendants. In 

addition, because Hardin cannot state an NIED claim against any individual defendant, section 

815.2(a) does not provide for any liability by MCDH. Nor has Hardin cited any other statutory 

basis for liability. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A 

public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the 

public entity or a public employee or any other person.”). The NIED claim against MCDH is 

dismissed with prejudice.

Finally, the Court previously explained that section 815.2(a) does not apply to a negligent 

supervision, hiring, and retention claim because such a claim “is one of direct liability for 

negligence, not vicarious liability.” ECF No. 43 at 16-17 (quoting Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 

145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 815 (2006)). The Court further held that California Civil Code sections 

1708 and 1714(a) “are not sufficient to impose liability on public entities,” and instructed Hardin 

to “include in her amended complaint the statutory basis for liability” if she amended this claim. 

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Id. at 17. The SAC cites only to California Civil Code section 1714(a) and to vicarious liability 

under California Government Code section 815.2. ECF No. 50 ¶¶ 208-09. Hardin’s opposition 

cites these statutes as well as California Civil Code section 1708. ECF No. 61 at 30. But the 

Court has already ruled that these three provisions cannot provide the necessary statutory basis for 

liability. Accordingly, Hardin’s negligent supervision, hiring, and retention cause of action is 

dismissed. Dismissal is with prejudice because Hardin has already had one opportunity to amend 

and failed to cure the identified deficiency. See Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 

(9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is ‘particularly broad’ where 

the plaintiff has previously amended.” (citation omitted)).

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted 

with prejudice as to the eleventh cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and 

the twelfth cause of action for negligent supervision, hiring, and retention. It is granted with leave 

to amend as to the tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the 

thirteenth cause of action for defamation as to Defendant Lund. The motion is denied in all other 

respects.

Any amended complaint must be filed within fourteen days of the date of this order. 

Failure to file a timely amended complaint will result in dismissal with prejudice of the intentional 

infliction of emotional distress and defamation causes of action against Lund.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 4, 2018

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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