Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_14-cv-00094/USCOURTS-ared-5_14-cv-00094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

DEVARIOUS MOORE 

ADC #133403 PETITIONER 

 

VS. 5:14CV00094 JLH/JTR 

WENDY KELLEY, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction1

 RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

 The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been 

sent to United States District Judge J. Leon Holmes. You may file written 

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections 

must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and 

(2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of 

this Recommendation. The failure to timely file objections may result in waiver of 

the right to appeal questions of fact. 

 1

 Wendy Kelley is automatically substituted as Respondent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

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I. Background 

 Pending before the Court is a § 2254 habeas Petition filed by Petitioner, 

Devarious Moore (“Moore”). Doc. 1. Before addressing Moore’s habeas claims, 

the Court will review the relevant procedural history of this case in state court. 

 On May 5, 2005, Moore entered guilty pleas in two cases in Crittenden 

County Circuit Court. In Case No. CR2004-401 (“Moore I”), he pleaded guilty to a 

pending probation revocation petition2

 and was sentenced to 120 months in the 

ADC. Doc. 8-1 at 17. In Case No. CR2005-269-A, (“Moore II”), he pleaded guilty 

to the sale of a controlled substance, a Class Y felony, and received a 120-month 

“suspended imposition of sentence.”3

 The sentencing judge imposed the two 

sentences to run concurrently. Doc. 8-1 at 19. 

 The record is unclear on when Moore was paroled from the ADC; however, 

it appears to have been sometime prior to approximately August 1, 2007. 

 On September 14, 2007, the state filed a Petition to revoke Moore’s 

suspended sentence in Moore II based on new criminal conduct that he allegedly 

committed on August 8, 2007. Doc. 8-1 at 21. On September 21, 2007, that 

revocation petition was nolle prossed. Doc. 8-1 at 23. 

 2

 Moore was on probation, following his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a Class C 

felony. Doc. 8-1 at 17. 3

 Under Arkansas law, the so-called “suspended imposition of sentence” or “SIS” is a “procedure in which 

a defendant who pleads guilty . . . is released by the court without pronouncement of sentence” but is subject to 

specified conditions during a period of “suspension.” Ark. Code. §§ 5-4-101(5) (2005). If a court revokes a SIS 

during the period of “suspension,” it may then sentence a defendant to a period of incarceration within the full 

statutory range of punishment that might have been imposed originally for the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-

309(f)(1)(A) (2005) (repealed and now codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-308 (2015)). 

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 On November 10, 2010, the state filed another Petition to revoke Moore’s 

suspended sentence in Moore II based on new criminal conduct that he allegedly 

committed sometime in 2010. Doc. 8-1 at 24. On January 18, 2011, that revocation 

petition was nolle prossed. Doc. 8-1 at 31. 

 On April 14, 2012, the state filed a third Petition to revoke Moore’s 

suspended sentence in Moore II. Doc. 8-1 at 32. It alleged that Moore had: (1) 

failed to pay court costs and fees; (2) failed to notify the sheriff of his current 

address and place of employment; and (3) engaged in new criminal conduct 

consisting of first-degree domestic battery, kidnapping, possession of a controlled 

substance with the purpose to deliver, and the possession and use of marijuana. Id.

 On June 26, 2012, after conducting a revocation hearing, the trial court 

revoked Moore’s suspended sentence in Moore II, and entered a Judgment and 

Commitment Order that sentenced him to 300 months in the ADC. Doc. 8-1 at 37. 

 Moore appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arkansas Court of 

Appeals, which affirmed on March 6, 2013. Moore v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 159, 

2013 WL 840837 (2013). After the appellate mandate issued, on March 26, 2013, 

Moore did not pursue Rule 37 relief. 

 Moore initiated this habeas action on March 17, 2014. Doc. 1. In his 

Petition, he argues that: (1) there was insufficient evidence that he violated any 

condition of his suspended sentence in Moore II; (2) the trial court failed to 

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provide him with a written statement of reasons for revoking his suspended 

sentence; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his revocation 

hearing; and (4) the 300-sentence he received is “illegal.” 

Respondent argues that Moore’s habeas claims are: (1) not cognizable in a 

habeas action; (2) procedurally defaulted; and (3) fail on the merits. Doc. 8.

 For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that the Petition for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied, and that the case be dismissed, with prejudice. 

II. Discussion

 A. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Revocation of 

 Moore’s Suspended Sentence in Moore II

Moore argues that “the state did not introduce sufficient evidence to support 

a finding that [he] violated any condition of his suspended sentence.” Doc. 1 at 17. 

Under Arkansas law, a suspended sentence may be revoked “upon a finding by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply 

with a condition of SIS.” Humphrey v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 179, 458 S.W.3d 265 

(2015); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-308(d) (2012). 

 At the conclusion of the June 26, 2012 revocation hearing, the trial court 

found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Moore violated the conditions of 

his suspended sentence by: (1) failing to pay his court costs; (2) testing positive for 

marijuana use; and (3) possessing marijuana. Doc. 8-2 at 62-63. The trial court 

made no specific findings on whether Moore had also committed first-degree 

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domestic battery; kidnapping; and possession of a controlled substance with the 

purpose to deliver. See Doc. 8-2 at 62-63.

 On appeal, Moore argued only that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the charges that he was guilty of kidnapping and possession of a controlled 

substance with the purpose to deliver. Because he did not challenge the sufficiency 

of evidence on the violations cited by the trial court to support the revocation of his 

suspended sentence in Moore II, the Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected his 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Moore, 2013 Ark. App. 159, *2, 

2013 WL 840837, *2 (“[Moore] does not challenge the findings that he tested 

positive for marijuana, failed to pay as previously ordered, and possessed 

marijuana. We will affirm when the appellant fails to attack the trial court's 

independent, alternate grounds for revoking suspension. Because Moore did not 

challenge the independent, alternate grounds that were the bases of the decision to 

revoke, we affirm.”) (internal citation omitted). 

 In this habeas action, Moore now makes the entirely conclusory argument 

that there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation of his suspended 

sentence. Based on the record, that argument is clearly without merit. 

 Among other things, the conditions of his suspended sentence required him: 

(1) to pay $750 in court costs; and (2) prohibited the use or possession of 

marijuana. Doc. 8-1 at 15. At the June 26, 2012 revocation hearing, Crittenden 

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County Sherriff’s Office employee Deborah Wiseman testified that Moore had 

made no payments toward the costs that were ordered. Doc. 8-2 at 25. Arkansas 

Department of Community Correction Supervisor April Thomas testified that, on 

January 17, 2012, Moore tested positive for marijuana. Doc. 8-2 at 29-30. Finally, 

West Memphis Police Officer Matt Presley testified that he responded to a 

domestic disturbance incident at 1:00 a.m. on April 2, 2012. After arriving at the 

residence, he arrested Moore and discovered he was in possession of a 4-gram 

baggie of marijuana. Doc. 8-2 at 41-42. Thus, there was strong evidence that 

preponderated in favor of the trial court’s decision that Moore “inexcusably failed” 

to comply with multiple conditions of his suspended sentence. 

 B. The Trial Court’s Failure to Provide Moore With A Written 

 Statement of Reasons for Revocation of the Suspended Sentence 

 in Moore II

Second, Moore argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial 

court did not provide him with a “written statement of the evidence relied on and 

the reasons for revoking suspension” as required by Ark Code Ann. § 5-4-

310(b)(5) (2011) (now repealed and re-codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-

307(b)(5) (Supp. 2015)). 

 This claim fails because it merely alleges noncompliance with a state statute. 

It is well established that § 2254 habeas relief is only available for federal 

constitutional violations, not for alleged errors of state law. Evenstad v. Carlson, 

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470 F.3d 777, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Moreover, while the 

record does not reflect whether the trial court provided Moore with a “written 

statement of reasons” for revocation, the trial court did explain to Moore its 

reasons for revoking the suspended sentence. Doc. 8-2 at 62-63. Thus, Moore was 

on actual notice of the reasons for his revocation. 

 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 

According to Moore, his trial lawyer provided him with ineffective 

assistance of counsel because he did not move for a directed verdict on all of the 

grounds asserted by the state at the revocation hearing. Respondent correctly points 

out that Moore procedurally defaulted this argument because it was never raised in 

a Rule 37 proceeding in state court. See Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 848–50 

(8th Cir. 2011) (a habeas petitioner must “fairly present” his claim to the state 

courts) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). 

 To escape having procedurally defaulted this claim, Moore attempts to fit 

within the narrow exception created by the Court in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 

1309 (2012). 

 Under Arkansas law, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be 

raised initially in a Rule 37 proceeding. According to the Court’s holding in 

Martinez, a procedural default does not bar federal habeas review if the Arkansas 

defendant did not receive court-appointed counsel to represent him in the Rule 37 

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proceeding, and raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on his behalf. See

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. 

Here, Martinez cannot be applied to Moore’s habeas claims because he 

never initiated a Rule 37 action. Courts have consistently held that a habeas 

petitioner must at least initiate the “initial collateral review proceeding” before the 

failure to appoint counsel in that proceeding can be deemed to equitably preclude 

procedural default. See e.g. Anderson v. Clarke, 2014 WL 1203032, *5 (E.D. Va. 

24, 2014) (“Martinez does not apply when the defendant fails to initiate any state 

court collateral review proceeding whatsoever”); Jones v. Pennsylvania, 492 Fed. 

Appx. 242 (3rd Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“we conclude that the Martinez analysis 

is inapplicable where the criminal defendant did not initiate any state collateral 

review proceeding whatsoever.”); Anderson v. Koster, 2012 WL 1898781, *9 

(W.D. Mo. 2012) (“Martinez is inapposite because, here, the petitioner himself is 

at fault for not filing a pro se [postconviction] motion in the first place.”). 

 Moore also makes the conclusory assertion that he was “misinformed” about 

the need to file a Rule 37 action, and this constitutes “cause” to excuse his 

procedural default. However, under well-established law, a pro se litigant is still 

charged with knowing the law relevant to his habeas claims, and he cannot fault 

others for “misinforming” him about the law. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 750 (1991); Johnson v. Hobbs, 678 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 2012); Shoemate 

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v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 597–98 (8th Cir. 2004); Weeks v. Bowersox, 106 F.3d 248, 

249 (8th Cir. 1997); Cornman v. Armontrout, 959 F.2d 727, 729 (8th Cir. 1992). 

Accordingly, as a matter of law, Moore’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

argument is procedurally defaulted. 

 D. Illegal Sentence 

Finally, Moore argues that his sentence in Moore II is “illegal” under 

Arkansas law because: (1) the trial court was prohibited from imposing a 

suspended sentence on a Class Y felony; and (2) the trial court effectively made his 

“original concurrent sentence run consecutively.” 

 First, under Arkansas law, a defendant is permitted to challenge the validity 

of his sentence “at any time,” in the sentencing court, by filing a motion pursuant 

to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111. Williams v. State, 2016 Ark. 16, *2, 2016 WL 

270777 (Ark. 2016) (“section 16–90–111 . . . provides a means to challenge a 

sentence at any time on the ground that the sentence is illegal on its face.”). 

Because Moore failed to challenge the validity of his sentence in state court, he has 

not exhausted his remedies in state court, as required by the AEDPA. See 28 

U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A); Pollard v. Armontrout, 16 F.3d 295, 297 (8th Cir. 1994); 

Kennedy v. Delo, 959 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1992). 

 Second, on its face, Moore’s argument that he received an “illegal sentence” 

is without merit. Moore contends his sentence is “illegal” under Ark. Code Ann. §§ 

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5-4-301 and § 5-4-104 (2005), which generally prohibit the imposition of a 

suspended sentence for a Class Y felony. He argues that, when he was sentenced in 

Moore II, for a Class Y felony conviction, the trial court was required to impose a 

sentence of incarceration. Because the trial court was prohibited from imposing a 

suspended sentence, the subsequent revocation proceeding and resulting sentence 

of incarceration is now void. 

 In making this argument, Moore overlooks a line of Arkansas Supreme 

Court cases that have explicitly rejected his argument and held that, as to Class Y 

felonies under the Arkansas Uniform Controlled Substance Act (Ark. Code Ann. § 

5-64-401), sentencing courts were authorized to impose probationary and 

suspended sentences for Class Y controlled substance offenses under the 2005 

sentencing scheme applicable to Moore. See Murry v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 98, 2014 

WL 805342 (Ark. 2014) (citing cases); Crouse v. State, 2012 Ark. 442, 2012 WL 

5963197 (Ark. 2012) (citing cases). Thus, on the merits, Moore’s illegal sentence 

argument also fails. 

 As to Moore’s argument that his sentence was somehow “illegally 

consecutive,” he ignores the fact that his period of incarceration in Moore I was 

running concurrent with the period of suspension imposed in Moore II. Once his 

suspended sentence was revoked in Moore II, the trial court imposed a sentence of 

300 months, well within the 120 to 480 range authorized for a Class Y felony. See

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Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401 (2005). Thus, after the suspended sentence in Moore II

was revoked, there was nothing “illegal” about the sentence of incarceration that 

was imposed by the trial court. 

III. Conclusion

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be DENIED, and that the case be DISMISSED, WITH 

PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases. 

 Dated this 18th day of February, 2016. 

 

 ____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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