Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02063/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02063-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PERRY ROBERT AVILA, 

Plaintiff,

 vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, Director of

Corrections; J. McGRATH, former

warden; R. KIRKLAND, Warden; T.

SCHWARTZ, Associate Warden; B. J.

O’NEILL, Associate Warden; M.

FOSS, Lieutenant; L. E. SCRIBNER,

Captain; and D. CHRISTOPHERSON,

Sergeant,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-2063 WHA (PR)

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Defendants have moved for

summary judgment. Plaintiff has opposed the motion and filed his own motion for summary

judgment, which is opposed. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS

In addition to his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has filed a combined motion

to compel, for appointment of counsel, and to expedite consideration of his case.

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United States District Court

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A previous request for “appointment” of counsel was denied; plaintiff has renewed the

motion.

 There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district court only the power to

"request" that counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(1). This does not give the courts the power to make "coercive appointments of

counsel." Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). In short, the Court

has only the power to ask pro bono counsel to represent plaintiff, not the power to “appoint”

counsel.

Plaintiff has done an exceptional job of presenting his position, and clearly is not in

need of counsel in the interests of justice. The motion will be denied.

In his motion to compel plaintiff fails to show that the material he seeks would have any

bearing on the result here, which is straightforward and clear. The motion will be denied. The

motion to expedite consideration is moot, as this ruling disposes of the case.

II. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that

there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect

the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute

as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Ibid.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving party has

met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its

own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

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trial.. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to show a genuine issue of

material fact, the moving party wins. Ibid.

B. ANALYSIS 

The warden of Pelican Bay State Prison promulgated an operational procedure barring

“publications and correspondence written in the languages of Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic or

Celtic.” (Decl. Watkins, ex. D.) Plaintiff contends that his First Amendment rights were

violated when he was not allowed to receive in the mail a book called “Myths of Mexico and

Peru” because it contained Nahuatl, Mayan and “ancient Peruvian” words. 

Prisoners retain those First Amendment rights not inconsistent with their status as prison

inmates or with legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Pell v. Procunier,

417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Regulations limiting prisoners' access to publications or other

information are valid, however, if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89

(1987)).

The Supreme Court recognized in Turner that imprisonment does not automatically

deprive a prisoner of certain important constitutional protections, including those of the First

Amendment, but also that the Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights

in a prison than it would allow elsewhere. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2577-78 (2006). 

As was pointed out in Overton v. Bazzetta, courts owe "substantial deference to the professional

judgment of prison administrators." 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). Turner reconciled these

principles by holding that restrictive prison regulations are permissible if they are "reasonably

related" to legitimate penological interests, and are not an "exaggerated response" to such

objectives. Turner, 482 U.S. at 87.

In Turner, the Supreme Court identified four factors to consider when determining

whether a regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests: (1) whether there

is a "valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental

interest put forward to justify it"; (2) "whether there are alternative means of exercising the

right that remain open to prison inmates"; (3) "the impact accommodation of the asserted

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constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison

resources generally"; and (4) the "absence of ready alternatives", or, in other words, whether the

rule at issue is an "exaggerated response to prison concerns." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. The

Turner analysis applies equally to facial and “as applied” challenges. Bahrampour v. Lampert,

356 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2004). 

To meet the first Turner factor, the governmental interest underlying a regulation

restricting prisoners' First Amendment rights must be legitimate and neutral, and the regulation

must be rationally related to that objective. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414. A regulation

restricting certain publications is "neutral" if prison administrators draw distinctions between

publications solely on the basis of their potential implications for prison security. Id. at 415-16. 

The real task is not balancing the four factors outlined in Turner, but rather determining

whether the state shows a reasonable relation between the policy and legitimate penological

objectives, rather than simply a logical one. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2579-80. The district court

must draw all justifiable inferences in the prisoner's favor by distinguishing between evidence

of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, the

court's inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Id. at 2578. Unless

a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence showing the policy is not reasonably related to

legitimate penological objectives to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the

summary judgment stage. Id.

Defendants assert that publications and communications containing Nahuatl words were

banned because that language (and Swahili, Runic and Celtic) was being used by gang members

like plaintiff to communicate securely. They have supported this contention with a declaration

from Chief Deputy Warden M. D. Castellaw, who says that prison gang members have “over

the last few years” used the banned languages to communicate, endangering the safety of the

institution (decl. Castellaw at ¶ 5-6). Nothing in plaintiff’s filings refutes this.

It is generally the state's burden to establish a rational relationship between its limiting

regulation or policy and the legitimate penological objectives it asserts, Beard, 126 S. Ct. at

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2581-82, but if there is a "common-sense" connection between the regulation and the objective,

the inmate must first show evidence to rebut this reason, and only then does the state have the

burden of presenting counter-evidence, Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In this case the undisputed facts are sufficient to meet defendants’ burden, plus there is a

common-sense connection between the regulation and the objective which has not been rebutted

by plaintiff. Defendants have satisfied the first Turner factor.

The second Turner factor is "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right

that remain open to prison inmates." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. Consideration of this factor

requires that the right in question be viewed sensibly and expansively. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at

417. Regulations restricting certain publications generally will satisfy this factor if they permit

"a broad range of publications to be sent, received, and read." Id. at 418. The issue is whether

there are any alternative means available to the prisoners. See, e.g., Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1061

(although policy bans all sexually explicit materials depicting frontal nudity, it does not ban

sexually explicit letters between inmates and others, nor does it ban sexually explicit articles or

photographs of clothed females); Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466, 1474 (9th Cir. 1996)

(even though prisoner banned from reading particular publication, alternative means of

exercising First Amendment rights remain available where access to material which does not

violate prison security policy unaffected). Given that plaintiff was not barred from reading

books in languages other than those banned, defendants have established that this factor cuts in

their favor. 

The third Turner factor is "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional

right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources generally." 

Castellaw says in his declaration that if communications in Nahuatl is not banned, it is

necessary to look up each word in a dictionary(decl. Castellaw at ¶ 7). The impact of this on

the allocation of prison resources is obvious. Thus the result as to the third factor also favors

defendants. 

The fourth Turner factors is whether there are “ready alternatives", or, in other words,

whether the rule at issue is an "exaggerated response to prison concerns." There are no obvious

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ready alternatives that would involve less intrusion on plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 

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Plaintiff points out that prison regulations say that mail in languages other than English

is permitted, and makes much of the fact that Nahuatl is a “language other than English,” not a

code. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3146. This is a distinction without a difference, as the

Marine Corps’ use of the Navaho Code-Talkers in World War II illustrates. When a language is

sufficiently obscure, it can and does function as a code. And in any case the state’s regulations

do not control what First Amendment rights plaintiff has; that is a matter of federal law.

Applying that federal law, the Court concludes that the Turner factors all clearly favor

defendants, so their seizure of plaintiff’s books did not violate his First Amendment rights. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s combined motion to compel, for counsel, and to expedite (document number

32 on the docket) is DENIED. For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary

judgment (document number 30) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment

(document number 38) is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26 , 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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G:\PRO-SE\WHA\CR.05\AVILA063.MSJ2.wpd

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