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Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued April 8, 2010

Decided July 21, 2010

Before

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐3662

PERRY MARSHALL,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

LOCAL 701, INTERNATIONAL

BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL

WORKERS, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 03 C 1302

Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

O R D E R

Perry Marshall, a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

Local 701, sued that union and two union officials for violating his speech rights under the

Labor‐Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.  He claimed that they retaliated against

him for speaking out about how union officials were violating union rules.  The defendants

moved for summary judgment, and after striking various parts of the documents Marshall

filed in response, the district court granted their motions.  Marshall appeals.  We affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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I.

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 701, is a party to a

collective bargaining agreement with an Illinois employer association of electrical

contractors.  That agreement contains referral provisions under which applicants for

employment are placed in jobs with signatory employers through Local 701’s referral hall.

Referrals by Local 701 are made according to an applicant’s position on an out‐of‐work list.

Normally, once an applicant accepts a referral, his name goes to the bottom of the list and

he must wait until those above him accept referrals before he is eligible for another one.  An

exception to that rule is for a “short call,” which is when an applicant is hired and receives,

through no fault of his own, work for less than fourteen days.  If an applicant receives a

short‐call assignment, he is restored to his original spot on the out‐of‐work list.  And under

a rule adopted by Local 701, once an applicant accepts a referral, he must report to the job

unless there is an emergency or illness.  If he does not, he loses his spot on the list.  

Perry Marshall is a member of Local 701.  From time to time, he spoke out against

decisions made by union officials that were inconsistent with various union rules and

agreements.  Other union members often sought Marshall’s advice on union rules, and he

would speak on their behalf.  Some union representatives did not welcome Marshall’s

outspokenness and berated him because of it.

In August 2002, Marshall was fifth on the out‐of‐work list and accepted a referral.

When he arrived at the job site, however, he told the project foreman that he could not work

that day because of personal reasons.  That evening, Kenneth Lambert, a Local 701

representative in charge of referrals, phoned Marshall, informed him that the foreman had

complained of his absence, and indicated that he would lose his place on the list.  After

Local 701 representatives visited the job site the following day, Art Ludwig, business

manager of Local 701, determined that Marshall had violated the referral rule by failing to

appear to work at the job site.  Ludwig sent him a letter indicating that he was being

removed from his number five spot on the out‐of‐work list, although that decision would be

stayed until he exhausted his appeal rights.  

Marshall appealed to the three‐member appeals committee established by the

collective bargaining agreement.  (The appeals committee consists of one person appointed

by Local 701, one person appointed by the employer association, and one member of the

public selected by the previous two appointees).  The committee met and requested

Marshall provide documentation of his personal situation that prompted him to leave the

job site.  The committee indicated that Marshall could keep his spot on the list if he

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provided such proof but would lose it if he could not.  He provided none, so the appeals

committee upheld his removal from the fifth position on the out‐of‐work list.

Marshall then contacted IBEW Sixth District vice‐president Lawrence Curley and

sought to bring an appeal under the IBEW constitution.  Curley denied that request because,

under a longstanding interpretation of the IBEW constitution, appeals concerning a local

union’s actions under the job referral provisions of a collective bargaining agreement are

heard in accordance with the appeals procedures outlined in the agreement rather than the

ones in the IBEW constitution.  

Over the next two weeks, Marshall filed eighteen charges against three Local 701

officers, alleging violations of various referral procedures.  Pursuant to IBEW procedure,

Curley assigned a union representative to look into those allegations.  The investigator

issued a report, concluding that the charges lacked merit.  Based on that report, Curley

dismissed the charges.  Nearly a year later, Marshall filed charges against Ludwig, which

Curley dismissed as untimely.

Marshall then sued Local 701, Ludwig, and Curley under the Labor‐Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA” or “Act”), for violating his speech rights

guaranteed by Title I of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411–15.  He alleged that the defendants’ actions

relating to his removal from the out‐of‐work list were retaliation for his previous speaking

out against decisions made by union officials that were violative of union rules and

agreements.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.  As part of his response, Marshall

submitted a lengthy affidavit, responses to the defendants’ statements of material fact, and

additional material facts.  The defendants filed separate motions to strike numerous

portions of those submissions.  The district court granted those motions to strike in part,

concluding that various segments of Marshall’s response documents did not comply with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Local Rule 56.1.  The court then entered summary

judgment for the defendants.  In particular, the district court held that Marshall had not

shown that Curley’s actions were caused by Marshall’s exercise of his LMRDA speech

rights.  As for Local 701 and Ludwig, the court held that Marshall had acquiesced to their

argument that he could not recover against them because the independent, non‐union

appeals committee was the final decision maker regarding his removal from the out‐of‐

work list.  Marshall appeals the district court’s decisions on the defendants’ motions to

strike and motions for summary judgment.

II.

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A. Motions to Strike

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to strike an affidavit or statement of

facts for an abuse of discretion.  Magyar v. Saint Joseph Reg’l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 770 (7th

Cir. 2008); Winfrey v. City of Chicago, 259 F.3d 610, 618–19 (7th Cir. 2001).  Marshall does not

present any argument in support of his bare assertion that the district court’s striking

portions of his responses to the defendants’ statements of material fact and his additional

material facts was improper, so the point is waived.   Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Elston Self Serv.

Wholesale Groceries, Inc., 559 F.3d 616, 619  (7th Cir. 2009).  And he concedes that the district

court correctly struck the portions of his affidavit it determined were hearsay, duplicative,

and legal arguments and conclusions.  Marshall does contest, however, the court’s striking

the parts of his affidavit it concluded were not based on personal knowledge and were not

accompanied by supporting documents.  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(1), an

affidavit must “be made on personal knowledge.”  The district court struck twelve full

paragraphs and nine partial ones from Marshall’s affidavit for lack of personal knowledge.

On appeal, Marshall claims that he supplied foundational support for his statements by

referring to conversations he had and observations he made.  But the stricken paragraphs

simply do not bear out that assertion, for none of them refers to such personal bases of

knowledge.  We thus find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s striking those

portions of his affidavit.

Rule 56(e)(1) also provides that “[i]f a paper or part of a paper is referred to in an

affidavit, a sworn or certified copy must be attached to or served with the affidavit.”  The

district court struck parts of four paragraphs of the affidavit because the documents

mentioned therein were not attached.  Marshall admits he did not attach those materials to

his affidavit but says that was because the defendants had already submitted the same

documents in support of their motions for summary judgment.  

Marshall did not comply with Rule 56(e)(1) when he failed to file the relevant

supporting documents.  Even if he was concerned about duplicative filings, he did not

obtain the permission of the court to deviate from Rule 56(e)(1).  Furthermore, the citations

he did include were not keyed to the defendants’ previous filings.  Under these

circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the four parts of

Marshall’s affidavit for want of supporting documentation.

B. Motions for Summary Judgment

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1 From our review of the record, it is unclear whether Marshall’s LMRDA claim is for

mere infringement of his Title I speech rights based on § 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412, or

for being subjected to union‐authorized “other discipline” as proscribed by § 609 of the Act,

29 U.S.C. § 529.  See Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 439 & n.10.  But as our discussion will show, this

issue is immaterial to the ultimate resolution of his appeal.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts in

the light most favorable to and drawing all reasonable inferences for the nonmoving party.

Goelzer v. Sheboygan County, 604 F.3d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 2010).  Summary judgment is

appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

Title I of the LMRDA developed from legislation that was “aimed at enlarged

protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal

Constitution.”  Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435 (1982).  Section 101(a)(2) of the Act

provides that

[e]very member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and

assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or

opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon

candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business

properly before the meeting, subject to the organization’s established and

reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings.

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2).  In that subsection, Congress “restate[d] a principal First Amendment

value—the right to speak one’s mind without fear of reprisal.”  United Steelworkers of Am. v.

Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982).  “In providing such protection, Congress sought to

further the basic objective of the LMRDA:  ‘ensuring that unions are democratically

governed and responsive to the will of their memberships.’”  Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n

v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 352 (1989) (quoting Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 436).

A union member may sue when his § 101(a)(2) free speech rights have been

infringed. 29 U.S.C. § 412.  One type of infringement is when a member faces retaliation

because he exercised his speech rights.  To succeed on such a claim, the member must

establish:  (1) he engaged in protected expression, (2) he was subjected to an adverse action1

reasonably likely to deter future expression, and (3) that action was caused by the protected

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2 As we recently made clear in Serafinn v. Local 722, International Brotherhood of

Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 914–15 (7th Cir. 2010), the causation the plaintiff must prove under

the LMRDA is the “but‐for” type.

expression.2

  See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 354; Casumpang v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, Local 142, 269 F.3d 1042, 1058 (9th Cir. 2001).

Regarding defendant Curley, assuming Marshall has established the first two

elements, he has failed to establish causation.  Marshall contends that Curley conspired with

Local 701 to enforce the allegedly wrongful removal of his name from the out‐of‐work list.

Although not entirely clear, it appears Marshall is arguing that Curley’s refusal to accept his

appeal of the appeals committee’s decision and dismissal of his subsequent internal union

charges was because of his protected expression.  Marshall’s causation argument is based

primarily on his affidavit statements (which particular ones, he does not say) relating to

Curley’s motivations for his actions that the district court struck.  But our affirmance of the

district court’s ruling on the motions to strike scuttles that particular argument.  

Marshall’s brief can also be read to assert that no other union members had their

appeals refused under the IBEW constitution or were denied the right to complain of

violations of union rules and agreements.  Even if that proposition were suggestive of

causation, it is unsupported by the record:  Marshall has not adduced proof of any similarly

situated members who were treated more favorably by Curley.  Marshall also points to the

fact that in dismissing his charges, Curley relied solely on the report of the investigator

assigned to look into the charges.  But it is not clear how that may be indicative of causation,

and Marshall does not say.  Absent the development of any other argument or identification

of any evidence regarding the causation element, we conclude that summary judgment was

appropriate for Curley.  See Roe‐Midgett v. CC Servs., Inc., 512 F.3d 865, 876 (7th Cir. 2008)

(failure to develop challenge to summary judgment order constitutes waiver).

Regarding defendants Local 701 and Ludwig, the district court granted their motion

for summary judgment.  It determined Marshall had waived opposition to their argument

that the independent, non‐union appeals committee was the final decision maker

concerning his removal from the out‐of‐work list and, therefore, under Konen v. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, 255 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2001), they are not liable under the LMRDA

because they were not responsible for his removal.  The district court’s decision was based

on Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Trust Co., where we affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the

plaintiffs’ failure to respond to the defendant’s argument in support of a motion for

judgment on the pleadings constituted a waiver and justified granting the motion.   477 F.3d

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924, 926 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. E. Atl. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir.

2001)).

Marshall’s lone argument against the district court’s finding of waiver was that it

was based on the incorrect disposition of the motions to strike.  But the propriety of the

partial granting of those motions was not implicated by the district court’s waiver

determination: that conclusion was based on Marshall’s failure to respond in his brief to the

defendant’s arguments based on Konen.  Whatever the case, Marshall’s argument founders

in light of our affirmance of the district court’s rulings on the motions to strike.  Therefore,

we affirm the grant of summary judgment for Local 701 and Ludwig.

III.

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting in part the

defendants’ motions to strike.  We also conclude that summary judgment was appropriate

for the defendants.  Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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