Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01119/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of .Appeals 

Temh Circuit 

JUN 5 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MERLIN DOWNIE I ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION ) 

PENSION PLAN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

No. 90-1119 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

D.C. No. 89-A-929 

Timothy J. Parsons (David B. Seserman with him on the briefs) of 

Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and Grover, Denver, Colorado, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

James C. Ruh of Jensen Byrne Parsons Ruh & Tilton P.C., Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MOORE, SETH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-1119 Document: 01019297898 Date Filed: 06/05/1991 Page: 1 
This case arises under the civil enforcement provisions of 

the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Plaintiff, 

Merlin Downie, appeals a portion of the equitable remedy fashioned 

by the district court under 29 u.s.c. § 1132(a)(3)(B). The court 

fashioned this remedy because it found the . trustees of the 

defendant, Independent Drivers Association Pension Plan (Plan), 

had acted arbitrarily in revoking plaintiff's benefits and credits 

in the absence of proper notice that he would forfeit those 

entitlements for violation of the early retirement provisions of 

the Plan. The appealed portion of the court's remedy requires Mr. 

Downie to pay restitution to the Plan in exchange for restoration 

of his entitlements. Mr. Downie also appeals the court's denial 

of his claim for attorney fees and costs. We conclude the 

district court correctly ruled equitable relief was proper, but we 

remand for clarification of its judgment. Because the district 

court denied plaintiff's claim for attorney fees and costs without 

any findings, we are unable to determine whether it abused its 

discretion. We remand for findings and conclusions on that claim. 

Mr. Downie has been a driver for the Yellow Cab Company in 

Denver since 1957. He has participated in the Plan since its 

inception in 1975, and there is no dispute that he is an eligible 

employee under its terms. 

In June 1981, Mr. Downie elected to take advantage of the 

early retirement provisions of the Plan. At that time, he was 

advised that he could continue to work up to ninety-nine hours a 

month and still receive his monthly benefits of $78.09. On 

August 1, 1981, Mr. Downie received his first benefit payment. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1119 Document: 01019297898 Date Filed: 06/05/1991 Page: 2 
For the next twenty-four months, Mr. Downie was fully retired 

and did not drive a cab or otherwise engage in covered employment. 

However, he encountered financial difficulties and on September 1, 

1983, began driving a full schedule. It is undisputed that this 

return to full-time work violated the terms of the Plan; 

nevertheless, Mr. Downie continued to receive his full benefits of 

$78.09 until January 1, 1984. 

In December 1983, the trustees discovered Mr. Downie's 

violation and ordered that his benefits be suspended for the 

months of January, February, and March 1984. Despite the 

suspension of benefits, Mr. Downie continued to work during that 

period. Then, in February 1984, the trustees notified Mr. Downie 

that they had decided to "discontinue permanently" his benefits 

and terminate all the service credits he had earned prior to his 

retirement in August 1981. Since January 1, 1984, Mr. Downie has 

worked, but he has been considered a "new driver." Because of 

this classification, he has accumulated benefits and service 

credits as though he had initially commenced work on that day. 

Mr. Downie filed this action seeking, among other relief, the 

restoration of his terminated benefits and service credits. The 

district court granted Mr. Downie's motion for summary judgment, 

holding that the absence of any notice in the Plan's Summary 

Description of the consequences of returning to work full-time 

violated the minimum notice requirements of ERISA. 29 u.s.c. 

§ 1022(b). 1 The court concluded, therefore, that the trustees had 

acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding to "discontinue 

1

see also 29 C.F.R § 2520.102-3(1) (1989). 

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Appellate Case: 90-1119 Document: 01019297898 Date Filed: 06/05/1991 Page: 3 
permanently" Mr. Downie's benefits and service credits. The Plan 

has not appealed these decisions. 

Additionally, the court concluded the Plan's actions provided 

a basis for equitable relief under 29 u.s.c. § 1132(a)(3)(B). 

Thus, the court ordered the Plan to reinstate Mr. Downie's pension 

benefits as though he had not taken early retirement. 

Additionally, the court ordered: 

Defendants will restore to Plaintiff's pension records 

prior service credits that he had accrued as of December 

31, 1983 and permit Plaintiff to retain additional 

service credits he has earned since Defendant Plan began 

treating him as a new driver on January 1, 1984. 

Perceiving that Mr. Downie would achieve a "windfall" if he 

were allowed to retain retirement benefits paid to him in 

violation of the Plan, the court ordered him to pay restitution to 

the Plan. The court set the amount of restitution at $2,264.61, 

the entire amount of benefits received by Mr. Downie since the 

time of his early retirement. Without explanation, the court 

ordered the parties to bear their own costs and attorney fees. 

We review the application of the district court's equitable 

remedy for abuse of discretion. Keyes v. School Dist. No. l, 

Denver, Colo., 895 F.2d 659, 665 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

111 S. Ct. 951 (1991); Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 873 

(lOth Cir. 1989). We see no such abuse in this case. 

We agree explicitly with the decision of the district court 

to apply an equitable resolution to this case. Even Mr. Downie 

concedes he is not entitled to a windfall and that equity requires 

he not be permitted to retain benefits paid to him in violation of 

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Appellate Case: 90-1119 Document: 01019297898 Date Filed: 06/05/1991 Page: 4 
the Plan. 2 He contends, however, "it was inequitable for the 

district court to order [him] to repay all of the pension benefits 

he had received." 

Although the Plan argues the district court "fashioned a 

remedy which gives Downie exactly what he would have received, 

without penalty, had he not violated the Plan Document by 

collecting pension benefits and then returning to full time 

status," we are unable to determine whether this result has been 

achieved. While the remedy was conceived to put the parties in 

the exact position they would have been on the day Mr. Downie took 

early retirement, the judgment may permit the Plan to come out 

ahead. 

Had Mr. Downie not taken early retirement on August 1, 1981, 

he would have continued to earn service credits as long as he 

worked. Assuming for the purpose of equitable relief that Mr. 

Downie had worked until the date of the judgment, as the district 

court did, he would have accumulated service credits for twentyseven months. Yet, we are uncertain whether the remedy provided 

by the district court requires restoration of the credits that 

would have been 

January 1, 1984. 

earned for the period of August 1, 1981, to 

The court mandated that the Plan restore the 

"prior service credits [plaintiff] had accrued as of December 31, 

1983," but we are uncertain whether the court intended that Mr. 

Downie receive those credits he would have earned through 

continuous employment or that the Plan merely restore the service 

credits he earned prior to taking early retirement. If the court 

2

Mr. Downie concedes he should refund $312.36. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1119 Document: 01019297898 Date Filed: 06/05/1991 Page: 5 
intended the former, we agree in full; but, if the court intended 

the latter, we do not believe full equity was achieved. If the 

district court did not intend that the Plan give Mr. Downie 

service credits for the twenty-four months he was actually retired 

in exchange for the restitution of benefits, the Plan gets 

favorable treatment. 

Contrarily, if it was the court's intent that the Plan give 

plaintiff service credits for the period between August 1, 1981, 

and August 30, 1983, both sides would come out even. An equal 

exchange of restitution for service credits will fully return the 

parties to the status they held on August 1, 1981, and the 

restitution of benefits will be offset later by a corresponding 

increase in monthly benefits to be received by Mr. Downie upon his 

full retirement. 

Having reached this point, we must add we also believe it was 

the district court's intent to achieve the full balance of equity. 

Yet, because the order is not absolutely clear to us, we are 

hesitant to so hold. We are, consequently, in a quandary that can 

only be resolved by the district court. 

Finally, although Mr. Downie's complaint sought recovery of 

attorney fees and costs under 29 u.s.c. § 1132(g)(l), the court 

made no findings upon that claim. While there may be ample 

grounds upon which to deny relief, the absence of findings leaves 

us with no means by which to judge the exercise of the court's 

discretion. We are left with no course but to remand for those 

findings. Gordon v. United States Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 106, 108-

09 (lOth Cir. 1983). 

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Appellate Case: 90-1119 Document: 01019297898 Date Filed: 06/05/1991 Page: 6 
We REMAND for clarification of the equitable remedy to either 

explicitly grant plaintiff restoration of service credits for the 

period of August 1, 1982, to January 1, 1984, or to reduce the 

order of restitution by the sum of the benefits plaintiff received 

between August 1, 1981, and September 1, 1983, without service 

credits for that period. We further REMAND for findings of fact 

and conclusions of law upon plaintiff's claim for attorney fees 

and costs. 

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