Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-07043/USCOURTS-caDC-02-07043-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 10, 2003 Decided May 16, 2003

No. 02-7043

THERESE CORNWELL FULLER,

ADMINISTRATOR, ESTATE OF DORIS HUNT CORNWELL,

APPELLANT

V.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(99cv01936)

Kim Sperduto argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Julia Penny Clark argued the cause for appellees. With

her on the brief was Robert Alexander.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-7043 Document #749723 Filed: 05/16/2003 Page 1 of 4
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Before: RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: After seven years an individual

who disappears without a trace is, under common law and the

laws of several states, presumed dead. The issue here is

whether there is also a presumption that the individual died

on the last day of the seven-year period, or in other words,

that the individual was alive until that time.

After her husband died in 1977, Doris Cornwell began

receiving surviving spouse benefits under the AFL–CIO Staff

Retirement Plan for Employees, of which her husband was a

member. The Plan entitled her to receive these benefits

during her ‘‘lifetime.’’ In early June 1982, Cornwell vanished.

Apart from an alleged sighting soon after she disappeared, no

one saw or heard from her again. After learning of her

disappearance, the Plan Trustees suspended payment of

Cornwell’s benefits, with the qualification that if she reappeared the suspended payments would be disbursed.

Fifteen years later, the Arlington County Circuit Court in

Virginia declared Cornwell presumed dead. The administrator of Cornwell’s estate, Therese C. Fuller, thereafter submitted a claim to the Trustees for the payment of benefits that

had accrued from November 1982 to March 6, 1998, the date

of the court decree. Although the Trustees requested Fuller

to submit evidence of Cornwell’s eligibility to receive benefits

during her absence, the only materials Fuller submitted were

a copy of the court decree, and a letter recounting Cornwell’s

disappearance and the fruitless searches for her and arguing

that under Virginia law (VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1–105) Cornwell

was not presumed to be dead – and thus was entitled to

payment – until the court issued its declaration. The Trustees denied Fuller’s claim, partly on the ground that Fuller

had provided no evidence indicating that Cornwell remained

alive after her disappearance.

Fuller filed a complaint on behalf of Cornwell’s estate,

seeking recovery of the benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) of

USCA Case #02-7043 Document #749723 Filed: 05/16/2003 Page 2 of 4
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ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The Trustees moved for

summary judgment, arguing that they were not required to

pay the benefits because there was no evidence that Cornwell

was alive during the period for which benefits were claimed.

Fuller’s cross-motion for summary judgment replied that the

Trustees’ rejection of the claim was unsupported since Cornwell was presumed to be alive until the Virginia court issued

the declaration in 1998. The district court granted summary

judgment for the Trustees. Estate of Cornwell v. AFL–CIO,

Civ. No. 99–1936, slip op. at 6, 13 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2002).

Fuller has refined her argument on appeal. She now

asserts that the Trustees were obligated to presume that

Cornwell was alive for the seven years following her disappearance, rather than for the entire period preceding the

declaration of presumed death. The parties now agree, and

the Plan provides, that District of Columbia law, not Virginia

law, controls. The District has adopted the common law rule

regarding the presumption of death: ‘‘If a person leaves his

domicile without a known intention of changing it, and does

not return or is not heard from for seven years from the time

of his so leaving, he shall be presumed to be dead in any case

where his death is in question, unless proof is made that he

was alive within that time.’’ D.C. CODE § 14–701; see Jemison v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 32 A.2d 704, 705 (D.C. 1943); see

generally 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2531a, at 603 (Chadbourn

rev. 1981). A corollary is that a person who has been absent

for less than seven years is presumed to be alive. See Groff

v. Groff, 36 App. D.C. 560 (D.C. Cir. 1911); Alexander v.

Alexander, 36 App. D.C. 78 (D.C. Cir. 1910). According to

Fuller, it follows that, in the absence of evidence to the

contrary, the Trustees had to act on the basis that Cornwell

was alive for the seven years following her disappearance.

Some courts have adopted Fuller’s theory. In Acosta v.

United States, 320 F.2d 382 (Ct. Cl. 1963), a retired serviceman disappeared and, after a prolonged absence, was declared dead. His widow sued to recover her husband’s

retirement pay for the seven years after his disappearance.

The Court of Claims ruled in her favor, holding that the

‘‘presumption should be that death occurred at the end of

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[the] seven-year period.’’ Id. at 385; see also United States

v. O’Brien, 51 F.2d 37, 42 (4th Cir. 1931); English v. United

States, 25 F.2d 335, 336 (D. Md. 1928); MacMurray v. United

States, 15 Cl. Ct. 323, 330 (1988).

Our court has not followed this line of cases. Interpreting

District of Columbia law, we held that the presumption of

death extends only to the fact of death; it establishes ‘‘no

presumption as to the time when’’ death occurred. Jones v.

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 555, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940)

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Davie v. Briggs,

97 U.S. 628, 634 (1878). Once the presumption of death is

triggered, the decedent is no longer presumed to have been

alive during the seven years following her disappearance.

The only presumption is that she is dead. See United States

v. Hayman, 62 F.2d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1932). The date of

Cornwell’s death was therefore a question of fact, to be

resolved on the evidence submitted to the Trustees. See

Briggs, 97 U.S. at 634.

The Plan designates the Trustees as ‘‘the sole judges of the

standard of proof required’’ to support a claim for Plan

benefits, and authorizes the Trustees to request ‘‘any information or proof reasonably required to determine’’ a claimant’s rights to benefits. Despite the Trustees’ request, Fuller

provided no evidence that Cornwell lived after she disappeared. (If Fuller had presented such evidence, the presumption of Cornwell’s death would have arisen at some time

later than seven years after her disappearance.) The district

court therefore correctly held that the Trustees acted in

accordance with the Plan and District of Columbia law in

refusing to honor the estate’s claim. Cf. Block v. Pitney

Bowes Inc., 952 F.2d 1450, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1992). We do not

decide whether, if District of Columbia law presumed a

particular date of death, the Plan terms would overcome that

presumption.

Affirmed.

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