Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00070/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ELIZABETH MERRIEX, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12cv70-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff, Elizabeth Merriex, applied for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and 

supplemental security income (“SSI”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & 1383(c)(3). 

Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision in which Plaintiff was found 

not disabled at any time through the date of the decision. The Appeals Council rejected 

Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently 

became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 

See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the 

 

1 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-

296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social 

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Case 1:12-cv-00070-WC Document 16 Filed 09/13/13 Page 1 of 9
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court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties 

have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the 

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 15); 

Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 14). Based on the court’s review of the record and 

the briefs of the parties, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2 

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2006). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the Listing of 

Impairments] 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

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An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still 

able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 

1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines4

 (grids) or call a vocational expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

 

3 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case (SSI). The 

same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited 

as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

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or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This Court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). See also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

 4 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was 35 years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ and had a 12th 

grade education. Tr. 18. Plaintiff had past relevant experience as a poultry eviscerator 

and as a cleaner. Tr. 21. Following the administrative hearing, and employing the fivestep process, the ALJ found Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

her alleged onset date[].”5 (Step 1) Tr. 15. At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

suffers from the following severe impairments: “Depression, mild, Adjustment Disorder 

with Anxiety, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” Tr. 16. The ALJ then found that 

Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).” Id. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

has the RFC “to perform a full range of unskilled work at all exertional levels but with 

the following nonexertional limitations: She is limited to occasional contact with the 

general public and coworkers.” Tr. 17. At Step 4, and after consulting a VE, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work. Tr. 21. Accordingly, 

the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from the alleged onset 

date, through the date of the decision. Id. 

 

5

 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff did engage in work activities, but that determining whether she had 

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IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents two issues for this court’s consideration in review of the ALJ’s 

decision: 1) whether “the ALJ erred as a matter of law in her treatment of the opinion 

evidence”; and 2) whether “the ALJ erred as a matter of law in denying Ms. Merriex’s 

claim for benefits on the basis of non-compliance without resolving key issues . . .” Pl.’s 

Br. (Doc. 11) at 8. The first issue concerns the ALJ’s rejection of the consulting 

psychologist’s opinion and because that rejection was based on a finding of 

noncompliance, the issues are intertwined and the court will address them as one. 

V. DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff’s first claim is that the ALJ failed to “accord proper weight to the 

consulting psychologist, Fred George, Ph.D.,” by failing to properly consider the 

opinions of all experts contained within the record. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 8. Specifically, 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s decision to accord Dr. George’s opinion “no weight” was 

in error. Id. at 10. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by “choosing to 

create her own assessment of [Plaintiff’s RFC] without referring to any opinion, medical 

or otherwise, in support thereof.” Id. at 11. 

 With regard to Dr. George, the ALJ did not state she was giving the opinion “no 

weight.” Instead, the ALJ stated that the opinion was “not given significant weight 

because the claimant has been noncompliant with treatment.” Tr. 20. Indeed, Plaintiff 

 

engaged in substantial gainful activity would require obtaining further evidence. Tr. 15. 

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was not complaint with treatment, her medical records from South Central Alabama 

Mental Health in 2008 and 2009 show several instances of noncompliance. See (Tr. 247-

57, 275, 277, 312, 314). In discounting Dr. George’s opinion, the ALJ pointed to the 

noncompliance, the fact that no “credible treating or consultative physician has opined 

that the claimant was disabled because of any mental condition or from any resulting 

symptoms,” and Plaintiff’s work activities since the alleged onset disability date. Tr. 20. 

 The issue of noncompliance is important because of the ALJ’s determination that 

there is nothing in the record to suggest that Plaintiff’s “mental impairments are 

incapable of being alleviated or controlled with the proper and regular use of prescription 

medications if taken as prescribed.” Tr. 21. In other words, it is the noncompliance that 

leads to evidence of disability. Plaintiff argues that her noncompliance should be 

excused based on her inability to afford treatment and her underlying mental illness. Pl.’s 

Br. (Doc. 11) at 11. Plaintiff’s argument is that while the ALJ stated that she considered 

Plaintiff’s inability to afford treatment, the ALJ failed to “engage in the necessary 

questioning to determine whether [Plaintiff] should be excused from non[]compliance.” 

Id. at 16. At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that she did not have the 

money to pay the $5 to $10 cost for mental health treatment. Tr. 40. However, the ALJ 

found that “no evidence has been provided that the claimant ever sought and was denied 

medical treatment from any treating source.” Tr. 21. Further, the ALJ noted that 

“[m]oreover, no evidence has been provided that the claimant has sought and been denied 

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medical treatment from indigent care facilities run by various government agencies.” Id. 

While Plaintiff points to comments in the South Central Alabama Mental Health records 

to say that she would be unable to meet her financial expectations without assistance, 

those records do not indicate that Plaintiff sought or was denied assistance. As stated 

above, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through the first four steps. Phillips, 357 F.3d 

at 1237. The court cannot find fault with the ALJ’s decision here, when Plaintiff fails to 

set forth evidence the she sought and was denied assistance, or treatment. 

 Similarly, it is important to note that none of the medical evidence of record that 

documents Plaintiff’s noncompliance indicate that the noncompliance was due to her 

underlying mental illness. Instead, the records indicate that she had been seeking 

treatment without the aid of her family. Tr. 253. This is consistent with Plaintiff’s 

reported daily activities. See, e.g., Tr. 20 (“The Claimant testifies that she is able to read 

and write. She can handle a checking account. She grocer[y] shops,” etc . . .). Thus, 

there is no support in the record for the ALJ to find that Plaintiff’s mental limitations 

excused her noncompliance. Therefore, the court finds no error in the weight given to 

Dr. George’s opinion based on noncompliance. 

 Moreover, the court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by 

“choosing to create her own assessment of [Plaintiff’s] mental functioning without 

referring to any opinion, medical or otherwise, in support thereof.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 

11. First, the RFC determination is for the ALJ to make. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238 (the 

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ALJ will “assess and make a finding about the [claimant’s] residual functional capacity 

based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)). 

Second, the ALJ referred to the medical evidence of record as well as the noncompliance, 

the evidence of daily activities, and Plaintiff’s work activities since the alleged onset 

date, and concluded that in light of all of these factors, Plaintiff’s “alleged mental 

symptoms and conditions are not of a disabling degree.” Tr. 21. The court reviews that 

decision to determine if there is substantial evidence in support and finds that there is. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

 Done this 13th day of September, 2013. 

 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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