Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02918/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02918-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The California Court of Appeal defines “wila” as a slang term for a “note passed from a jail or prison inmate to

another inmate.” (Lodgment 8 at 14 n. 14.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALDO OJITO, Civil No. 09-2918 JM (POR)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

v.

KEN CLARK, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 28, 2009, Petitioner Geraldo Ojito (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: (1) the trial court’s admission

of gang evidence denied him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process; (2) the trial court

“prejudicially erred” in admitting evidence of Petitioner’s standoff with the San Diego Police

Department SWAT team; (3) Petitioner’s conviction for aiding and abetting premeditated murder

was not supported by sufficient evidence; (4) Petitioner’s joint trial with co-defendant Garcia

violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (5) the trial court’s

admission of evidence of “wila” notes1

 violated state law and his Sixth Amendment right to confront

and cross-examine witnesses; and (6) the trial court’s cumulative errors violated due process. (Id. at

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2

 Like the California Court of Appeal, the Court refers to individuals by their nicknames used at trial for the sake

of clarity.

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7-14.)

On July 16, 2010, Respondent filed an Answer to Petitioner’s Petition. (ECF No. 9.) On

September 27, 2010, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 13.) Based upon a review of the parties’

pleadings, and in accordance with Local Rule 72.1(d), this Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion in People v.

Garcia, et al., 168 Cal. App. 4th 261 (2008). (Lodgment 8.) The Court presumes these factual

determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1). See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 240 (2003) (“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.”).

Petitioner Geraldo Ojito (also known as Mist)2

 and Pedro Alexander Zepeda Garcia (also

known as Teddy) were the founding members of a tagging crew that evolved into a gang known as

“TNS” (Trust No Souls). The victim, Manual Barajas (also known as Bonk or Manny) was a

member of a rival gang known as “ALS” (Another Logan Soldier). (Lodgment 8 at 5.) 

On the afternoon of August 11, 2002, Barajas stopped at the Gigante Market on 32nd Street

and National Avenue in southeast San Diego with his friends Jesus Garcia (also known as Cheech),

Jesus Flores (also known as Bozo) and Flores’ four-year-old son Javier. Barajas was approached by

Pedro Garcia in the grocery store parking lot. The two had fought in the past and agreed to a oneon-one fight in the alley behind the store. Upon returning from the alley, Barajas bragged to his

friends that he had knocked Garcia out with one punch. Flores pointed out that Barajas had blood on

his shirt, so after shopping the group took Barajas home to change his clothes. (Id.)

While en route to Barajas’ house, the group saw four to eight Hispanic males running out of

the alley behind the Gigante Market. One of the men raised his hand and gestured towards Cheech’s

truck. In order to avoid bringing trouble back to Barajas’ house, Cheech dropped Barajas off and

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parked his truck about two blocks away. Cheech, Flores and Javier walked east on Logan Avenue

back towards Barajas’ house to meet Barajas there. Flores carried a car club (steering wheel locking

device) he took from the truck. (Id.)

Meanwhile, the group of Hispanic males, which included Petitioner’s older brother, Mario

Ojito (also known as Casper) also made their way over to Barajas’ house. (Id. at 6.) The men

confronted Barajas’ brother-in-law, Angel Zepeda, who was outside with his two-year-old daughter. 

Casper said to Zepeda, “What’s up mother-fucker? You want some of this shit too, or what?” At

some point, Barajas came outside and Casper turned his attention to him. Pedro Garcia’s cousin,

Favio Garcia (also known as Thief) rode up on a bicycle and joined in, yelling, “You jumped my

cousin, fool!” Barajas responded, “I didn’t jump nobody, fool. I beat his ass.” Thief pulled out a

gun and attempted to shoot Barajas, but the gun did not fire. He attempted to shoot Barajas a second

time, but again the gun did not fire. (Id.)

Soon thereafter, Casper, Thief and the others left Barajas’ house, leaving Barajas outside. 

Barajas then reconvened with Cheech, Flores and Javier on Logan Avenue. The group turned to

walk back toward Cheech’s truck while Barajas recounted his confrontation with Casper and Thief. 

However, before they reached the truck, the group was stopped by Pedro Garcia and Petitioner

Geraldo Ojito. Garcia held a bloodstained shirt over his right temple and looked dazed from the

fight at the grocery store. Flores brandished the car club and told them to “back the fuck up”

because his son was with him. (Id.)

Moments later, Garcia and Ojito were joined by Casper, Yovani Pineda, and Ojito’s younger

brother, Victor Rodriguez. Ojito, Casper and Garcia accused Flores, Cheech and Barajas of

attacking Garcia at the Gigante Market. Cheech and Flores denied attacking Garcia, and told him to

“take an ass whooping like a man.” Garcia started to pull out a gun, but Cheech yelled at him to

“put that thing away.” As the confrontation escalated, Casper approached Flores, standing almost

chest-to-chest with him. Flores told Casper, “Back the fuck up off me. Don’t you see my son next

to me?” Ojito leaned in and whispered something to Garcia, then turned to Barajas and told him he

had “better run.” Pineda later told investigators that Ojito did most of the talking at the scene. (Id.) 

As Barajas turned to run away, Garcia took a handgun from his backpack and fired at him. 

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Ojito and Garcia chased Barajas into a nearby yard, and Garcia fired several more shots. Barajas

sustained three gunshot wounds and ultimately died from his injuries. (Id. at 7.) After the shooting,

Garcia, Ojito and Pineda ran to Pineda’s car and drove away from the scene. While in the car,

Garcia gave the gun to Ojito. As they neared Pineda’s house, police officers spotted the car and

began to pursue them. When Pineda finally stopped the car, Ojito jumped out and ran away with the

gun. (Id. at 6.) 

Police arrested Garcia and Pineda in front of Pineda’s house; however, they were unable

apprehend Ojito. (Id. at 7.) Six weeks later, Ojito was arrested following a standoff with the San

Diego Police Department SWAT team. (Id.)

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner and his co-defendant Pedro Garcia were charged with murder in San Diego

Superior Court. (Lodgment 3 at 1; ECF No. 9-1 at 1.) In addition, Petitioner was charged as an

accessory to the crime. (Id.) The information alleged Petitioner and his brother Mario Ojito were

vicariously armed with a firearm and that Garcia personally discharged the firearm causing death. 

(Id.)

Petitioner, Pedro Garcia and Mario Ojito were tried jointly in a jury trial. On June 13, 2006,

the jury found Petitioner and Garcia guilty of first degree murder, found Petitioner guilty as an

accessory to the crime and found true the special allegations. (Lodgment 3 at 2; ECF No. 9-1 at 1.) 

Mario Ojito was acquitted. (Id.) On November 2, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

twenty-five years to life in state prison. (Id.; Lodgment 2, vol. 26.)

On November 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment 5.) Petitioner argued: (1) he was denied a fair

trial and due process of law by the admission of gang evidence; (2) the joint trial with Defendant

Garcia denied him his right to due process; (3) the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting

evidence of his standoff with the San Diego Police Department SWAT team; (4) the admission of

evidence of the wila notes violated the California Code of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause; (5) the cumulative impact of the trial court’s errors violated his right to due

process; and (6) there was insufficient evidence to support the aiding and abetting premeditated

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murder conviction. (See Lodgment 3; Lodgment 6.) On November 14, 2008, the Court of Appeal

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. (Lodgment 8.)

On December 29, 2008, Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court of California, raising the

same issues he did to the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 9.) The Court denied Petitioner’s

appeal without comment on February 18, 2009. (Lodgment 10.) Petitioner filed the instant Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court Southern District of California on

December 28, 2009. (ECF No. 1.) The Court now addresses the merits of Petitioner’s Petition. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas

petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court

unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state

prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the

state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring

only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540

U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court

applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a

case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if

the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions, but

unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established federal law

must be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

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Where a petitioner alleges a state court decision is based upon an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court, he must demonstrate that the factual

findings upon which the state court’s adjudication rests are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). A state court’s factual determination is unreasonable if it is “so

clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320

(1997). Moreover, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct, and Petitioner

carries the burden of rebutting this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(e)(1). 

To determine whether habeas relief is available under §2254(d), the Court “looks through” to

the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for its analysis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

801-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,”

federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the

state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

V. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: (1) the trial court’s admission of gang

evidence denied him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process; (2) the trial court

“prejudicially erred” in admitting evidence of Petitioner’s standoff with the San Diego Police

Department SWAT team; (3) Petitioner’s conviction for aiding and abetting premeditated murder

was not supported by sufficient evidence; (4) Petitioner’s joint trial with co-defendant Garcia

violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and denied him a fair

trial; (5) the trial court’s admission of evidence of “wila” notes violated state law and his Sixth

Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and (6) the trial court’s cumulative

errors violated due process. (Id. at 7-14.) 

Respondent argues Petitioner’s claims should be denied because the state court’s decision

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and the court

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did not rely on unreasonable factual determinations of the evidence. (ECF No. 9 at 2.) 

A. Ground One: Admission of Gang Evidence

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims the trial court’s admission of inflammatory

testimony from gang experts and fellow gang members denied him a fair trial in violation of his

right to due process. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Respondent argues the California Court of Appeal

reasonably rejected this claim on direct appeal. (See ECF No. 9-1 at 18.)

1. Background

 On February 15, 2005, Petitioner brought a motion in limine to exclude gang evidence as

irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under California Evidence Code Sections 350 and 352. (Lodgment

1, vol. 3 at 487-89.) Since Petitioner was not charged with a gang enhancement, he claimed any

association with a gang would be unduly prejudicial. (Id.) Rather, Petitioner argued gang evidence

would mislead the jury to believe gang membership was a material issue in the case. (Id.) The court

denied Petitioner’s motion. (Id. at 409-13.) Thus, the prosecution presented expert witness

testimony regarding gang culture in general, as well as evidence regarding the membership and

activities of ALS and TNS. (See Lodgment 8 at 9.) At the conclusion of the trial, however, the

court instructed jurors that evidence of gang membership alone cannot serve as proof of aiding and

abetting. (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 295.)

2. State Court Decision

Petitioner challenged the trial court’s admission of gang evidence on direct appeal, arguing

any probative value of the evidence was greatly outweighed by the prejudicial impact of

inflammatory gang evidence. (Lodgment 3 at 15-43.) The California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s appeal without comment. (Lodgment 10.) Therefore, this Court must “look through”

that denial to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion denying his claim as the basis for its analysis. 

Yslt, 501 U.S. at 803. 

Upon a thorough discussion of the evidence presented at trial, including photographs and

expert testimony, the Court of Appeal found the gang evidence was relevant to the issues before the

court. The Court of Appeal stated:

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We conclude the trial court acted well within its discretion in admitting the gang

evidence in question because the evidence is relevant to Ojito’s intent and motive to

aid and abet Barajas’s murder, or an offense of which Barajas’s murder was a

natural and probable consequence. The gang evidence was relevant to show the

relationship between Ojito and Garcia and the nature of the organization they had

strived to create. The various photographs of TNS members flashing their 211 sign

and brandishing guns showed they undertook to ‘elevate’ the status of TNS from

tagging crew to a gang patterned after established multigenerational Logan gangs --

i.e., that they intended TNS to be perceived as a gang rather than a tagging crew. In

light of this evidence of their gang mentality, the expert testimony about gang

culture -- particularly the testimony about the obligation of gang members to back

up fellow gang members -- was relevant to prove Ojito’s intent to aid Garcia in

avenging Garcia’s beating. The jury could reasonably infer from that evidence that

Ojito encouraged Garcia to confront and assault Barajas before they encountered

him on the 3100 block of Logan Avenue, regardless of whether Garcia’s own

motive to shoot Barajas was gang related or strictly personal. 

(Lodgment 8 at 10.)

The Court of Appeal also considered the prejudicial impact of the gang evidence and

reasoned that the jury’s acquittal of Petitioner’s brother, Mario Ojito (also known as Casper),

indicated the jury did not convict on gang evidence alone. (Id.) Specifically, the Court stated: 

Casper’s acquittal shows the gang evidence did not have the prejudicial effect of

causing the jury to convict solely because of gang affiliation. The acquittal indicates

the jury followed the court’s instruction that gang membership alone could not serve

as proof of aiding and abetting, assessed each defendant’s guilt and innocence on an

individual basis, and properly based its determinations on the evidence regarding

each defendant’s conduct at the scene of and after the shooting.

(Id.) The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason in ruling the

probative value of the gang evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect. Therefore, the Court

rejected Petitioner’s contention that the admission of gang evidence denied him a fair trial and due

process of law. (Id.)

3. Discussion

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Id. at 67; Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400

(9th Cir.1989) (“errors of state law do not concern us unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

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violation”). 

Therefore, a “state court’s procedural or evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas

review unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial

guaranteed by due process.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)). A federal court cannot disturb a state court’s procedural or

evidentiary ruling on due process grounds unless the decision was so arbitrary or prejudicial that it

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Id. (citing Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.

1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986)). 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate the admission of gang evidence was so arbitrary or prejudicial

that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. Under Ninth Circuit

authority, the admission of evidence renders a trial fundamentally unfair “[o]nly if there are no

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). Here, as explained by the California Court of

Appeal, the gang evidence was relevant to Petitioner’s intent and motive to aid and abet in Barajas’

murder. (Lodgment 8 at 10.) Given their close relationship as founding members of the TNS gang,

a jury could reasonably conclude Petitioner intended to help Garcia seek revenge against Barajas

and other members of the ALS gang for the incident at the grocery store earlier in the day. 

Moreover, the record indicates that any undue prejudice stemming from such evidence was

sufficiently ameliorated by the trial court’s instruction that gang membership alone “cannot serve as

proof of intent, or of the facilitation, advice, aid, promotion, encouragement, or instigation needed to

establish aiding and abetting.” (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 295.) In particular, the jury’s acquittal of

Mario Ojito demonstrates the jurors heeded the court’s instruction and did not rely on evidence of

gang membership alone in reaching a verdict. See Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir.

1997) (“Juries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.”). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the state court’s decision on this claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

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courts. Based thereon, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief as to this claim be DENIED.

B. Ground Two: Admission of Evidence of Standoff and Arrest 

Petitioner claims the trial court “prejudicially erred” in admitting evidence of his standoff

with the San Diego Police Department SWAT team and subsequent arrest. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) 

Respondent argues Petitioner’s claim does not raise a federal question and therefore fails to invoke

federal habeas jurisdiction. (ECF No. 9-1 at 20.)

1. Background

Petitioner also brought a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the circumstances

surrounding his arrest as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under California Evidence Code Sections

350 and 352. (Lodgment 1, vol. 3 at 410, 495-96; Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 63-74.) Petitioner claimed

that at the time of his arrest, he “was wanted for his participation in crimes where his role was far

more significant” than in this case. (Id. at 496.) Thus, Petitioner argued the jury could wrongly

infer that any alleged “consciousness of guilt” related to this case alone. (Id.) In its opposition to

Petitioner’s motion, the prosecution argued the standoff with the San Diego Police Department

SWAT team demonstrated Petitioner’s “consciousness of guilt” as to all crimes. (Lodgment 2, vol.

2 at 67.) On April 13, 2006, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion. (Lodgment 1, vol. 3 at 410;

Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 73-74.)

2. State Court Decision

Petitioner raised this claim for relief on direct appeal. (Lodgment 3 at 56-61.) Because the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s appeal without comment (Lodgment 10), this Court

must “look through” to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion as the basis for its analysis. Yslt,

501 U.S. at 803. 

The Court of Appeal stated it was not aware of California authority addressing whether

evidence of consciousness of guilt should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when the defendant has

committed a separate offense, of which the jury is unaware, and the evidence could relate to either

the undisclosed offense or the offense at issue in the trial. (Lodgment 8 at 13.) After a lengthy

discussion of authority in other jurisdictions, the court stated:

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We agree with the reasoning of these out-of-state decisions, particularly the reasoning

that a defendant who has committed multiple offenses should not enjoy the benefit of

the exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence that would be admissible against a

‘neophyte’ who has committed only one offense. We conclude the court did not

abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence of Ojito’s SWAT standoff as probative

of his consciousness of guilt. Although it is unnecessary to reach the issue, we

further conclude that in light evidence of Ojito’s actions immediately before and

during the shooting of Barajas, and the evidence of his flight and disposition of the

murder weapon immediately following the shooting, it is not reasonably probable that

exclusion of the SWAT standoff evidence would have resulted in a more favorable

verdict for Ojito on the murder charge. Accordingly, any error in the admission of

the evidence was harmless.

(Id.)

3. Discussion

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Id. at 67; Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400

(9th Cir.1989) (“errors of state law do not concern us unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation”). 

Here, Petitioner claims the California Court of Appeal erroneously applied out-of-state

authority over conflicting California law. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) Thus, Petitioner argues habeas relief

should be granted to resolve the alleged conflict between California and out-of-state law. (Id.) 

However, the state court’s application of California law, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal

habeas relief only if it rises to the level of a constitutional violation. Oxborrow, 877 F.2d at 1400. 

Because Petitioner does not argue the trial court’s admission of evidence of his standoff with the San

Diego Police Department SWAT team and subsequent arrest violated his constitutional rights, the

Court finds Petitioner fails to state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. Accordingly, the

Court RECOMMENDS this claim be DENIED.

C. Ground Three: Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner contends his right to due process was violated because there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction for aiding and abetting premeditated murder. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) 

While Petitioner concedes he was at the scene of the crime, he argues there was no evidence he

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encouraged or assisted Garcia in Barajas’ murder. (Id.) Respondent argues the state court

reasonably rejected this claim, concluding a rational trier of fact could have found Petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. (ECF No. 9-1 at 22.)

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for aiding and

abetting murder on direct appeal. (Lodgment 6 at 1-6.) According to Petitioner, the prosecution

secured a conviction by holding him vicariously responsible for the acts of his fellow gang members. 

(Id.) The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s appeal without comment. (Lodgment 10.) 

Therefore, this Court must “look through” that denial to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion

denying his claim as the basis for its analysis. Yslt, 501 U.S. at 803. 

The Court of Appeal held Petitioner’s conviction as an aider and abettor was supported by

substantial evidence. (Lodgment 8 at 8.) Specifically, the appellate court stated the evidence of the

confrontation at Barajas’ house showed “that shortly after his fight with Barajas [at the grocery

store], Garcia communicated his version of the fight to friends and relatives (e.g., Thief) who

immediately embarked on a quest to find Barajas to avenge Garcia’s beating.” (Id.) The court

determined “the jury could reasonably conclude that the intent of the group seeking Barajas,

including [Petitioner], was to murder him or cause him great bodily harm.” (Id.) Petitioner’s intent

was “further supported by evidence that [Petitioner] and Garcia were founding members of the gang

TNS, and evidence regarding gang culture.” (Id.)

In rejecting this claim, the appellate court also relied upon evidence of Petitioner’s presence

and actions at the scene of the crime, stating:

The testimony of Pineda and other witnesses to the shooting of Barajas supports

findings that Ojito did most of the talking in the confrontation leading up to the

shooting, was aware Garcia had a gun in his backpack before the shooting,

whispered something to Garcia and joined with Garcia in telling Barajas he had

better run seconds before the shooting began, and ran after Barajas with Garcia as

Garcia repeatedly shot Barajas. Based on this evidence alone, the jury could

reasonably find that Ojito, with the requisite state of mind for criminal liability,

encouraged Garcia in the shooting of Barajas and therefore is guilty of Barajas’s

murder as an aider and abettor.

(Id.) Finally, the court noted Petitioner’s conduct after the shooting further supported his conviction

for aiding and abetting in Barajas’ murder. The evidence showed Petitioner fled the scene with

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Garcia, disposed of the murder weapon and evaded arrest. (Id.) Based on the record as a whole, the

Court of Appeal concluded Petitioner’s conviction was supported by substantial evidence. (Id.)

2. Discussion

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond

a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Thus, a state prisoner who alleges the evidence introduced at

trial was insufficient to support the findings of the trier of fact states a cognizable federal habeas

claim. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993). In reviewing an insufficient evidence claim,

federal courts must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). The

Jackson standard “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in

the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate

facts. Id. In order to establish sufficient evidence, the prosecution need not affirmatively “rule out

every hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 326. Even where evidence is “almost entirely

circumstantial and relatively weak,” it may be sufficient to support a conviction. Jones v. Wood,

207 F.3d 557, 563 (9th Cir. 2000).

Moreover, a federal habeas court must apply the Jackson standard with an additional layer of

deference. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). Generally, a federal habeas court

must ask whether the operative state court decision reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson

to the facts of the case. Id. at 1275 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Thus, if a state court affirms a

conviction under Jackson, the federal court must decide whether the state court’s application of

Jackson was objectively unreasonable. See McDaniel v. Brown, --- U.S. ---, 130 S.Ct. 665, 673

(2010) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000)).

Here, the Court of Appeal reasonably concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the

jury’s verdict convicting Petitioner of aiding and abetting in Barajas’ murder. In rejecting

Petitioner’s claim, the state appellate court applied the standard set forth in People v. Jackson, 21

Cal. 4th 518, 528-29 (1993), a California Court of Appeal case that reflects the federal standard. 

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 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (holding that “there are some contexts in which the risk

that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions [to assess the impact of a statement of a co-defendant as to that defendant

only and not any other co-defendants] is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical

and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”) and People v. Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518 (1965) (finding that

admission of confession implicating co-defendant in joint trial resulted in miscarriage of justice notwithstanding jury

instruction that the confession was admissible only against confessing defendant).

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The state court’s decision was neither an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in this case. Based on the

confrontation at Barajas’ house and the expert testimony regarding gang culture, a reasonable trier of

fact could have found that Garcia’s friends and relatives, including Petitioner, tracked down Barajas

to avenge Garcia’s attack at the grocery store. (See Lodgment 8 at 8.) The testimony of Pineda and

other witnesses presented evidence that Petitioner did most of the talking at the scene. (Id.)

Immediately prior to the shooting, Petitioner whispered to Garcia and told Barajas he had “better

run.” (Id.) Based on this evidence alone, a reasonable trier of fact could have found Petitioner

encouraged Garcia to shoot Barajas. Finally, a reasonable trier of fact could have found Petitioner’s

conduct after the crime supported a conviction for aiding and abetting murder. The evidence

showed Petitioner fled the scene with Garcia, disposed of the murder weapon and evaded arrest. 

(Id.) 

In light of the record as a whole, the Court concludes the state court’s determination that

Petitioner’s conviction was supported by substantial evidence was neither contrary to, nor involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state courts. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief as to this claim be DENIED.

D. Ground Four: Joint Trial

Petitioner argues his joint trial with Garcia violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause because the court admitted evidence of Garcia’s “highly inflammatory” out-of-court

statements that implicated Petitioner in Barajas’ murder. (ECF No. 1 at 11.) Specifically, Petitioner

challenges the admission of the following evidence under the Bruton/Aranda rule3

: (1) Garcia’s outof-court statement to Pineda that he and Petitioner “went looking for” Barajas; (2) Garcia’s letters

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from prison, one of which stated, “see, I told you [Barajas] would pay;” and (3) photographs of a

book bearing the slogan “TNZ KILLZ.” (Id. at 11-12.) Given their close relationship as cofounders of the TNS gang, Petitioner argues it was unreasonable to assume the jury could separate

the evidence against him from the evidence against Garcia during the course of an eight-week trial. 

(Id.) He claims the evidence against Garcia “must have had a substantial an injurious effect” on the

jury’s perception of his case. (Id. at 12.) 

Respondent claims the state courts reasonably rejected his claim. (ECF No. 9-1 at 25.) 

Respondent argues none of the out-of-court statements implicated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment

right to confront Garcia because the statements were not made under circumstances that would lead

an objective witness to believe they would be available for use in a later trial. (Id.)

1. Background

Petitioner and Garcia both moved unsuccessfully for separate trials. (See Lodgment 1, vol. 3

at 353, 370, 409; Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 51, 108.) At the conclusion of the trial, the court reminded

the jury of the charges against each defendant and instructed the jurors to consider the evidence as it

applied to each defendant separately. (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 241.) The trial court also instructed the

jury that evidence of one defendant’s out-of-court statement may not be considered against any other

defendant. (Id. at 257.) 

2. State Court Decision

Petitioner also raised this claim on direct appeal. (Lodgment 3 at 48-53.) Because the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s appeal without comment (Lodgment 10), this Court

must “look through” that denial to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion denying his claim as the

basis for its analysis. Yslt, 501 U.S. at 803. 

The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s

motion for severance and held the evidence admitted in the joint trial “did not result in gross

unfairness” amounting to a denial of Petitioner’s right to due process. (Lodgment 8 at 12.) The

court rejected Petitioner’s claim under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and its

California equivalent, People v. Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518 (1965), stating:

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When a joint trial results in the admission of an out-of-court statement by a

codefendant that incriminates the defendant, the determination of whether the

defendant was denied due process generally centers on whether the admission

violated the defendant’s rights under People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, and

Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123. In [People v. Lewis], the California

Supreme Court explained that ‘in Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that

the admission into evidence at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession

implicating the defendant violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination

guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, even if the jury is instructed to disregard the confession in determining

the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The high court reasoned that although juries

ordinarily can and will follow a judge’s instructions to disregard inadmissible

evidence, there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,

follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the

defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be

ignored. Such a context is presented when the powerfully incriminating extra-judicial

statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are

deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.’ [citations omitted.]

. . . Lewis noted that the United States Supreme Court similarly limited the

scope of Bruton in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, which held that ‘the

Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying

codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when . . . the confession

is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or

existence.’ [citations omitted.]

Because Aranda/Bruton error implicates a constitutional right, it is generally

reviewed under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v.

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. [citations omitted.]

(Id.)

Thus, the court noted that under United States Supreme Court law, “the Bruton rule (that the

admission of a nontestifying defendant’s confession implicating a codefendant in a joint trial

violates the codefendant’s rights under the confrontation clause, even with an appropriate limiting

instruction) ‘extends only to confessions that are not only ‘powerfully incriminating’ but also

‘facially incriminating’ of the nondeclarant.’” (Id.)

First, the Court of Appeal determined Garcia’s letters did not facially incriminate Petitioner. 

(Id.) While the letters showed a “callous lack of remorse on the part of Garcia,” they were redacted

to exclude references to Petitioner and the jury was not informed that Petitioner was the

letters’recipient. (Id.) Similarly, the court found that the photographs of the book bearing the

notation “TNZ KILLZ” and the manila envelope bearing other gang insignias did not facially

incriminate Petitioner. (Id.) 

Second, the court reviewed Garcia’s statement to Pineda that he and Petitioner “went looking

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for the guy that [Garcia] had a fight with.” (Id.) The court found the statement facially incriminated

Petitioner; however, the court concluded the statement was not “powerfully incriminating” because

it showed only that Petitioner and Garcia were “looking for Barajas.” (Id.)(emphasis in original.) 

There was no “direct evidence that Ojito intended Barajas would be assaulted or murdered when

they found him.” (Id.)(emphasis in original.) Moreover, the court concluded the evidence was

“merely cumulative of other overwhelming evidence that fellow gang members, friends, and

relatives of Garcia, including Ojito, embarked on a quest to find Barajas minutes after his fight with

Garcia.” (Id.) Petitioner’s conduct at the scene of the murder strongly supported the finding that

“he was accompanying Garcia on a mission to find Barajas.” (Id.)

To the extent the admission of Garcia’s statement to Pineda constituted an Aranda/Bruton

error, the court held the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id.) Petitioner’s conviction

was amply supported by evidence of his actions at the scene of the murder and his conduct following

the shooting. Thus, the court was “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of

Garcia’s out-of-court statement that he and [Petitioner] went looking for Barajas would not have

resulted in a more favorable outcome” for Petitioner. (Id.)

3. Discussion

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall have the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend.

IV. “The right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to

confront the witnesses against him.” Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). 

In Bruton v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is denied his Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation when a facially incriminating extrajudicial statement of a

nontestifying co-defendant is admitted in their joint trial, even where the court provides a limiting

instruction. Id. at 135-36. The Court recognized that “there are some contexts in which the risk that

the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to

the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id.

The Supreme Court has limited the scope of Bruton in subsequent cases. In Richardson v.

Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987), the Court held a redacted confession fell outside Bruton’s scope

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and was admissible in a joint trial with appropriate limiting instructions. The Court reasoned that

“the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s

confession with a proper limiting instruction when [] the confession is redacted to eliminate not only

the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.” Id. at 211. Therefore, when

presented with a statement that would violate Bruton, the prosecutor must hold separate trials, use

separate juries, abandon the use of the confession or redact the confession to significantly reduce or

eliminate the statements that implicate the defendant. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192 (1998). 

Here, the California Court of Appeal’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, the Bruton rule. The record demonstrates that Garica’s letter containing the

statement “See I told you he would pay” did not facially incriminate Petitioner because all

references to Petitioner were properly redacted and the jury was not informed of the letter’s

recipient. Similarly, the photographs of the book bearing the slogan “TNZ KILLZ” contained no

reference to Petitioner. Though Garica’s statement that he and Petitioner “went looking for” Barajas

facially incriminated Petitioner, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the statement did

not violate Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was not objectively

unreasonable.

However, to the extent that Petitioner could establish the admission of Garcia’s statement

constituted a Confrontation Clause violation, or that the Court of Appeal’s adjudication of his claim

was objectively unreasonable, he must also demonstrate that the error was not harmless in order to

be entitled to federal habeas relief. “Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error

analysis, because ‘the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.’” 

United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. 673, 680-81 (1986)). “Evidence erroneously admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause

must be shown harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, with courts considering the importance of the

evidence, whether the evidence was cumulative, the presence of corroborating evidence, and the

overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Id. Habeas relief is not available “unless the error

resulted in ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,’ . . . or

unless the judge ‘is in grave doubt’ about the harmlessness of the error.” Medina v. Hornung, 386

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F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In this case, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that any Aranda/Bruton error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. Petitioner’s conviction was amply supported by evidence of his gang membership,

actions at the scene of the murder, as well as his attempt to flee the scene with the murder weapon

and evade arrest. (Lodgment 8 at 12.) Given the weight of the evidence presented, any prejudice

resulting from the admission of Garcia’s statement that he and Petitioner “went looking for” the

victim was slight in comparison. Accordingly, the state court’s determination that the exclusion of

Garcia’s out-of-court statement would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome at trial for

Petitioner was not objectively unreasonable. 

Based thereon, the Court concludes that the state court’s decision on this claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

courts. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief as to this claim be DENIED.

E. Ground Five: Admission of Wila Notes

Petitioner’s fifth ground for relief challenges the trial court’s admission of “Wila 1" and

“Wila 2,” notes written by his cellmate, Miguel Thompson, a member of the Mexican Mafia. 

Petitioner’s arguments on this issue are unclear. He seems to argue the admission of evidence

relating to the Mexican Mafia was “extremely prejudicial.” (ECF No. 1 at 14.) To the extent

Petitioner argues the trial court erred in admitting gang evidence, the Court has ruled Petitioner is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on this ground. Similarly, Petitioner seems to argue the

cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors in admitting gang evidence denied him a fair trial in

violation of due process. (ECF No. 1. at 13-14.) The Court construes Petitioner’s cumulative error

argument as a separate claim for habeas relief and addresses it below.

The Court has an obligation to “construe a pro se petition more liberally than it would

construe a petition drafted by counsel.” Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 729 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Accordingly, the Court assumes Petitioner intends to raise the same issues regarding Wila 1 and

Wila 2 that he did on direct appeal – that is, that the admission of the notes violated the Sixth

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 Maria Artega, a certified court interpreter, provided the alternate translations “hey, friends, pals, or buddies” for

this salutation. (Lodgment 2, vol. 20 at 3843.)

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Amendment Confrontation Clause and the California Code of Evidence. (See Lodgment 3 at 61-

76.) Respondent argues the state courts reasonably rejected this claim. (ECF No. 9-1 at 28.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the state court’s decision on this claim

was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state courts. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief as to this claim be DENIED.

1. Background

In January, 2005, police found Thompson’s first note, Wila 1, when arresting Flores at his

home on unrelated drug charges. (Id. at 113-14.) It read, in part:

Hey comrades.4

 This is homie. The homer Chore has specific instructions to relay

to you dudes, and I ain’t just bullshitting. If anyone decides to show up to make

any statements in this upcoming trial, I will most definitely reach out and not only

try and whack each and every one of you dudes, but I will go even further to reach

your families. . . . Watch out OR beware.

(Id. at 114-16; Lodgment 3 at 61-62.)

In March, 2005, Thompson sent the second note, Wila 2, to another inmate, Jesse Rubio, to

deliver to Petitioner (also known as Mist). (Id.) However, jail officials confiscated the note after

searching Rubio’s clothing. (Id.) Wila 2 read, in part:

Hey, Mist. I don’t know what’s up, but check this out. Do you remember that kite

that I wrote to Chore, that fucken dude turned it in or something, because they are

tripping in court that I’m doing or did you a favor on that. They trying to give me

25-to-life for that shit. So, if my attorney Gretchen goes over there, tell her

somebody else wrote it, not us or me. . . . 

(Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 121-22; Lodgment 3 at 62.) 

On April 13, 2006, the prosecution brought a motion in limine to introduce Wila 1 and Wila

2 as evidence of witness intimidation. (Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 111-39.) The prosecution alleged

Thompson wrote Wila 1 to threaten potential witnesses on Petitioner’s behalf. (Id.) The prosecution

argued Wila 2 tied Petitioner to Wila 1, thereby implicating him in the witness intimidation. 

(Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 121.) The prosecution further suggested the witness intimidation

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demonstrated Petitioner’s consciousness of guilt. (Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 123.) Conversely,

Petitioner argued there was no evidence he authorized or participated in the witness intimidation. 

(Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 130.) 

On April 13, 2006, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to introduce Wila 1 and

Wila 2 at trial. (Lodgment 1, vol. 3 at 410; Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 138-39.) There is no indication in

the record that the trial court considered whether the notes were admissible as an exception to the

hearsay rule. (See Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 111-39; see also Lodgment 3 at 63.) On the record, the

trial judge merely stated the probative value of the evidence was “just enormous” and that the notes

would be admitted. (Lodgment 2, vol. 2 at 138.) 

At trial, Steve Coneras, a Special Agent with the Office of Correctional Safety, testified as an

expert witness on Southern California gang membership and activity. (Lodgment 2, vol. 19 at 3797-

831.) During his direct examination, Special Agent Coneras read the contents of Wila 1 into

evidence and explained its meaning to the jury. (Id.) The notes were also translated for the jury by

a certified court interpreter, Maria Artega. (Lodgment 2, vol. 20 at 3836-47.) At the conclusion of

the trial, the court instructed the jury that evidence of witness intimidation “cannot prove guilt by

itself.” (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 272.) 

2. State Court Decision

Petitioner challenged the trial court’s admission of Wila 1 and Wila 2 on direct appeal. 

(Lodgment 3 at 61-76.) He argued that “Wila 1 standing alone should have been excluded under the

general rule that evidence of an attempt by a third person to suppress evidence is inadmissible

against a defendant when the attempt did not occur in the defendant’s presence and the defendant

did not authorize the attempt.” (Lodgment 8 at 15.) As to Wila 2, which evidences Petitioner’s

authorization of Wila 1, Petitioner argued it was inadmissible under California’s hearsay rule. (Id.) 

Petitioner further argued the court’s error in admitting Wila 2 violated his rights under the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. (Id.) Because the California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s appeal without comment (Lodgment 10), this Court must “look through” that denial to

the California Court of Appeal’s opinion denying his claim as the basis for its analysis. Yslt, 501

U.S. at 803. 

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The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s admission of both Wila 1 and Wila 2. 

(Lodgment 8 at 14-17.) As to Wila 1, the court held it was admissible for the “nonhearsay purpose

of showing why Flores and Cheech were afraid to testify.” (Lodgment 8 at 15.) Specifically, the

Court stated:

We conclude the court acted within its discretion in admitting Wila 1, because

it was relevant for the nonhearsay purpose of showing why Flores and Cheech were

afraid to testify. 16 ‘Evidence a witness is afraid to testify is relevant to the credibility

of that witness and is therefore admissible. [Citations omitted.] Testimony a witness

is fearful of retaliation similarly relates to that witness’s credibility and is also

admissible. [Citation omitted.] It is not necessary to show threats against the witness

were made by the defendant personally, or the witness’s fear of retaliation is directly

linked to the defendant for the evidence to be admissible.’ [Citations omitted.]

Ojito contends Wila 1 was inadmissible under the following principles

articulated in [People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 200-201]: ‘Generally,

evidence of the attempt of third persons to suppress testimony is inadmissible against

a defendant where the effort did not occur in his presence. . . . 

Assuming these principles articulated in Williams should have controlled the

court’s exercise of discretion as to whether Wila 1 was admissible, we find no abuse

of discretion because the evidence shows more than ‘mere opportunity’ on Ojito’s

part to authorize Wila 1. The evidence showed that Ojito and Thompson shared a jail

cell during the time Wila 1 was written; the note was delivered to a key witness in

this case (Flores); and Wila 2, which concerns Wila 1, begins with Thompson’s

nonhearsay greeting, ‘Hey Mist,’ which shows the note was addressed to Ojito. In

light of the circumstantial evidence that Ojito authorized or even participated in the

creation of Wila 1, the court reasonably could have admitted Wila 1 on the additional

ground that, as evidence of an attempt to suppress evidence, it was relevant to show

consciousness of guilt. 

______________________________

16 Before ultimately deciding to testify, both Cheech and Flores were held in contempt of court

and jailed for several days for refusing to testify out of fear of retaliation.

(Id. at 15) (internal citations and ellipsis omitted).

The Court of Appeal then considered whether Wila 2 contained inadmissible hearsay and, if

so, whether its admission violated Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause. (Id. at 15-16.) The court held the statements in Wila 2 constituted implied hearsay and were

inadmissible under California law, stating:

The implied hearsay assertions reasonably inferred from Wila 2 are that Thompson

wrote Wila 1 as a favor to Ojito, and that Ojito requested, authorized or

participated in the writing of Wila 1. The People suggest that Wila 2 was

admissible under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay

rule set forth in Evidence Code section 1230. The problem with this suggestion is

that ‘[t]he statement against interest exception allows admission only of those

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portions of the statement that are ‘specifically disserving’ to the declarant’s

interest.’ [Citations and footnote omitted.] Thompson’s statement in Wila 2 that he

wrote ‘that kite’ to ‘Chore’ is disserving to his interest, but the statements

implying that Ojito authorized or participated in the writing of Wila 1 are not; they

are disserving to Ojito’s penal interest.

(Id. at 16.)

However, to the extent the trial court’s admission of Wila 2 violated the California Code of

Evidence, the Court of Appeal held the error was harmless. (Id. at 17.) Considering the other

evidence of Petitioner’s consciousness of guilt, including the evidence of his flight and disposition

of the murder weapon, as well as the evidence of his actions at the scene of the crime, the court held

it was “not reasonably probable that the exclusion of Wila 1 or Wila 2 or both would have resulted

in a different outcome at trial.” (Id.) 

In addition, the Court of Appeal held that to the extent the trial court erred in admitting Wila

2, “the error was under state law only, and did not implicate the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation

clause.” (Id.) Specifically, the court determined the statements in Wila 2 are not testimonial and

therefore do not implicate Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. The court stated: 

[A]fter Davis [v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)], the determination of whether the

admission of a hearsay statement violates a defendant’s rights under the confrontation

clause turns on whether the statement is testimonial. If the statement is testimonial, it

must be excluded unless the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the defendant

had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. If the statement is not

testimonial, it does not implicate the confrontation clause, and the issue is simply

whether the statement is admissible under state law as an exception to the hearsay rule.

. . . Thompson’s implied hearsay statements in Wila 2 clearly were not testimonial. 

Consequently, their admission into evidence does not implicate Ojito’s rights under

the confrontation clause.

(Id. at 17.) 

3. Discussion

As stated above, the Court assumes Petitioner intends to raise the same issues regarding

Wila 1 and Wila 2 that he did on direct appeal – that is, that the admission of the notes violated the

Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and the California Code of Evidence. (See Lodgment 3 at

61-76.) The Court will address each argument in turn. 

a. California Code of Evidence

Petitioner seems to argue the notes contained inadmissible hearsay and therefore the 

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trial court’s admission of the notes was contrary to the California Rules of Evidence. (ECF No. 1 at

13.) 

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Id. at 67; Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400

(9th Cir.1989) (“errors of state law do not concern us unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation”). 

Therefore, a “state court’s procedural or evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas

review unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial

guaranteed by due process.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)). A federal court cannot disturb a state court’s procedural or

evidentiary ruling on due process grounds unless the decision was so arbitrary or prejudicial that it

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Id. (citing Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.

1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986)). 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate the admission of the wila notes was so arbitrary or prejudicial

that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. Under Ninth Circuit

authority, the admission of evidence renders a trial fundamentally unfair “[o]nly if there are no

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). Here, as explained by the California Court of

Appeal, the notes were relevant for the non-hearsay purpose of establishing the credibility of Cheech

and Flores’ testimony. (Lodgment 8 at 15.) Even if the trial court erred in admitting Wila 2, any

prejudice stemming from the note was outweighed by the substantial evidence of Petitioner’s

participation in Barajas’ murder. Given the weight of the evidence against Petitioner, the admission

of Wila 1and Wila 2 did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. 

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5

 The Court cannot ascertain from Petitioner’s briefing whether he also argues the admission of Wila 1 violated his

rights under the Confrontation Clause. On direct appeal, Petitioner seemed to concede Wila 1 was properly admitted for the

non-hearsay purpose of showing witnesses were afraid to testify. (Lodgment 3 at 64.) Petitioner then argued Wila 2 was

“the key to the admissibility of Wila 1,” but Wila 2 was inadmissible under California’s hearsay rule and the trial court’s error

in admitting it violated Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. (Id. at 65.) The Court assumes

Petitioner raises the same argument in his Petition.

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Based thereon, the Court concludes that the state court’s decision on this claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

courts. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED on this ground.

b. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause

In addition, Petitioner seems to argue the trial court’s error in admitting Wila 2 violated his

rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.5

 (ECF No 1. at 13.) 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment “guarantees the right of an accused in a

criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. 673, 678 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). The right of confrontation “means more than

being allowed to confront the witness physically.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). “The

main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure the opportunity of cross examination.” Id.

at 315-16. Thus, the United State Supreme Court has held Confrontation Clause bars the admission

of out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” in nature, “unless the witness is unavailable, and

only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Crawford v. Washington,

541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).

Following its decision in Crawford, the Supreme Court has elaborated on the distinction

between “testimonial” and “nontestimonial” statements. In Davis v. Washington, the Court

observed:

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under

circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is

to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial

when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing

emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove

past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 

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547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Most recently, in Michigan v. Bryant, -- U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155

(2011), the Court emphasized that for Confrontation Clause purposes, statements must be evaluated

in the context of the circumstances in which they are made. A statement is “testimonial” and

therefore subject to Crawford when the “primary purpose” of procuring the statement is to create “an

out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Id. However, “[w]here no such primary purpose exists,

the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the

Confrontation Clause.” Id. 

Here, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the admission of Wila 2 did not

violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. The record indicates Wila 2 was not procured as an

“out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” See Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1155. Consequently, the Court

of Appeal’s determination that Wila 2 was not testimonial and its admission into evidence did not

implicate Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was objectively reasonable. See

Giles v. California, 544 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) (“[O]nly testimonial statements are excluded by the

Confrontation Clause.”) (emphasis in original). 

However, even assuming Petitioner could establish the admission of Wila 2 constituted a

Confrontation Clause violation, or that the Court of Appeal’s adjudication of his claim was

objectively unreasonable, he must also demonstrate that the error was not harmless in order to be

entitled to federal habeas relief. “Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error

analysis.” Nielsen, 371 F.3d at 581. “Evidence erroneously admitted in violation of the

Confrontation Clause must be shown harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, with courts considering

the importance of the evidence, whether the evidence was cumulative, the presence of corroborating

evidence, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Id. Habeas relief is not available

“unless the error resulted in ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict,’ . . . or unless the judge ‘is in grave doubt’ about the harmlessness of the error.” Medina,

386 F.3d at 877.

In this case, Petitioner fails to demonstrate any error in the admission of Wila 2 “resulted in

‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. As previously

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discussed, Petitioner’s conviction was amply supported by evidence of his gang membership,

actions at the scene of the murder, as well as his attempt to flee the scene with the murder weapon

and evade arrest. (Lodgment 8 at 12.) Given the weight of the evidence presented, any prejudice

resulting from the admission of the wila notes was slight in comparison. Accordingly, the Court

finds any error in the admission of the wila notes was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Based

thereon, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED on this ground.

F. Ground Six: Cumulative Error

In his final claim for relief, Petitioner argues the combined prejudice of the trial court’s

alleged errors was so overwhelming that he was denied a fair trial in violation of due process. (ECF

No. 1 at 14.) Respondent does not address this issue. (See ECF No. 9-1.)

Petitioner raised this claim for relief on direct appeal. (Lodgment 3 at 76.) Because the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s appeal without comment (Lodgment 10), the Court

must “look through” to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion as the basis for its analysis. Yslt,

501 U.S. at 803. The Court of Appeal rejected this claim, stating only: “Because we reject all of

[Petitioner’s] claims of substantive error, we necessarily reject his claim of cumulative error.” 

(Lodgment 8 at 17 n. 18.)

The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect of multiple

trial errors violates due process where it renders the resulting criminal trial fundamentally unfair. 

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,

53 (1996) (stating “evidentiary rulings can, in combination, rise to the level of a due process

violation”). “The cumulative effect of multiple errors can violate due process even where no single

error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or would independently warrant reversal.” Parle

v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 290 n. 3). In

conducting cumulative error analysis, this Court must weigh the relative harm caused by the errors

that occurred during Petitioner’s trial. Id. at 927-28. “[T]he fundamental question in determining

whether the combined effect of trial errors violated a defendant’s due process rights is whether the

errors rendered the criminal defense far less persuasive . . . and thereby had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 928 (internal quotations and citations

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omitted.)

In this case, the Court of Appeal’s decision on this issue was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Both the Court of Appeal and this Court

have found error only in the trial court’s admission of Wila 2. Nevertheless, as previously

discussed, 

there was substantial evidence supporting Petitioner’s conviction for aiding and abetting in Barajas’

murder. Based on the confrontations at the grocery store and Barajas’ house, a reasonable trier of

fact could have found Garcia’s friends, including Petitioner, sought to track down Barajas to avenge

Garcia’s attack. The testimony of Pineda and other witnesses evidenced that Petitioner did most of

the talking at the scene. Immediately prior to the shooting, Petitioner whispered to Garcia and told

Barajas he had “better run.” In addition, a reasonable trier of fact could have found Petitioner’s

conduct after the shooting, including his attempt to dispose of the murder weapon and evade arrest,

supported a conviction for aiding and abetting murder. Given the strength of this evidence, the

Court of Appeal’s opinion rejecting Petitioner’s claim for cumulative error was not objectively

unreasonable. 

Based thereon, the Court concludes that the state court’s decision on this claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

courts. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief as to this claim be DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing analysis, this

Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This Proposed

Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, the Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller,

pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2007) and Local Rule 72.1(d). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than October 20, 2011, any party may file and

serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no

later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2011

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller

All parties

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