Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_16-cv-00740/USCOURTS-alnd-4_16-cv-00740-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

ROGER W. WATTS, and ROGER

W. WATTS, JR.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

REGIONS FINANCIAL

CORPORATION ET AL.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 4:16-CV-740-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Sisyphean task of clearing the court’s high-Wattage docket continues.

Roger W.Watts [hereinafter, “Senior”] andRoger W. Watts, Jr [hereinafter, “Junior”]

[hereinafter and collectively, “the Watts”] have sued Regions Financial Corporation,

Regions Bank

1

[collectively, “Regions”], Etowah County Commission, Sheriff Todd

Entrekin, and RREF RB SBL-AL, LLC [hereinafter, “RREF”]. All defendants have

moved to dismiss the Watts’ complaint, and the motions will be GRANTED IN

PART. All federal claims will be DISMISSED. Any state claimsraised by the Watts

and not otherwise dismissed herein will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

1

 Incorrectly denominated “Regions Banks” in the complaint. 

FILED

 2016 Aug-23 PM 03:36

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:16-cv-00740-VEH Document 31 Filed 08/23/16 Page 1 of 16
STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 2002, Regions Bank loaned $49,745.92 to Senior and his company,

Enrestoration, Inc. (Doc. 11-1 at 1). The loan was secured by two parcels of real

property. Id. On August 13, 2013, Regions Bank sued Senior and Enrestoration to

recover the amount owed. Id. The state court granted summary judgment in Regions’

favor on January 16, 2014. (Doc. 10-4 at 10). In the meantime, Regions (or so the

Watts believed) attempted to foreclose on the parcels of real property. 

On December 19, 2013, Senior and Enrestoration moved in state court for a

temporary restraint of Regions’ (purported) foreclosure on the mortgaged property.

(See generally doc. 11-2). The state court judge granted the motion on December 20,

2013 and temporarily restrained Regions’ right to foreclose; the matter was then set

for a hearing on a preliminary injunction, to be held on December 30, 2013. (See

doc.11-3). But unbeknownst to the state judge (and, it seems, Senior), Regions had

assigned the mortgage to RREF RB Acquisitions, LLC, a Delaware limited liability

company, around July 17, 2012, doc. 10-3 at 2–5, which then assigned the mortgage

to RREF, an Alabama limited liability company, in June 2013, id. at 6–10—meaning

RREF was the true foreclosing party. So RREF hummed along on its foreclosure,

unburdened by the restraining order, which, by itsterms, applied only toRegions. The

hearing was held on December 31, 2013, but RREF had completed the foreclosure on

2

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December 20, 2013, so the hearing was not fruitful for the Watts. (See doc. 11-4).

After securing foreclosure, RREF sought possession of the properties and filed

unlawful detainer actions against a number of individuals whose names are irrelevant,

as well as “[a]ll [o]ther [o]ccupants” of the subject properties. (Doc. 10-2 at 2). Junior

was among these “[o]ther [o]ccupants,” so he defended the action. (Id.). And he lost

when the state district court entered an unlawful detainer order. (Id. at 2). So Junior

appealed the order to the Etowah County Circuit Court, where, on January 4, 2016,

he lost again. (Id. at 7). The state circuit judge issued a writ of possession in that

judgment. (Id.). The Etowah County Sheriff’s Office has issued notice to the Watts

to vacate the property. 

Although some may say that Junior and Senior have a blithe disregard for the

line between pugnacity and contumacy, see, e.g., doc. 10-1 at 4, the Watts do not take

bad news lying down, so they filed a new lawsuit in state court on March 28, 2016.

(Doc. 11-7). Therein, they requested a temporary restraining order of the execution

of the writs of possession. The complaint in that case is, for all intents and purposes,

the same as the one in this case. (Compare doc. 1, with doc. 11-7).

THE CURRENT CLAIMS, SO FAR AS THE COURT CAN TELL

This action was filed on May 6, 2016. As the defendants have pointed out, the

complaint “is not a model of the careful drafter’s art,” United States v. Hayes, 555

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Case 4:16-cv-00740-VEH Document 31 Filed 08/23/16 Page 3 of 16
U.S. 415, 429 (2009), so—aside from the fact that the Watts are unhappy about the

foreclosure—it is difficult to tell exactly what their beef is. Thisfailing could warrant

dismissal with prejudice on its own, if the court were willing to give the Watts

another shot (or two) at drafting the complaint. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty.

Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Dist. Bd.

of Tr. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (Sua sponte

dismissal is warranted where “it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of

fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief). Alas, because the defendants

have moved for dismissal, the court will attempt to figure out the federal claims

asserted.

The Wattsinvoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “is not itself a source of substantive

rights but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Backer v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979). A similar principal applies to their request

for declaratory relief, which is merely a procedural mechanism, not a substantive

right. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. Of Hartford v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).

Senior and Junior seek remedies in the form of damages, injunctive relief, and

declaratory relief. They additionally request that the court “enjoin case with case in

the district court for Etowah County, Alabama,” doc. 9 at 3 which the court takes to

be a request that this action be consolidated with the pending and identical Alabama

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Case 4:16-cv-00740-VEH Document 31 Filed 08/23/16 Page 4 of 16
action. The Watts, as plaintiffs, may always voluntarily dismisstheir state court case,

see ALA. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1), but this court cannot order the Alabama court to

withhold the exercise of its jurisdiction in this case. This case and the state case will

not be “enjoin[ed].” 

For substantive violations, the Watts appear to allege that they were denied the

process due under the Fourteenth Amendment in either the foreclosure itself or the

judgment issuing the writ of possession [hereinafter, “JWP”]. They also appear to

claim that the foreclosure and the JWP violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–92p [hereinafter, “FDCPA”]. Additionally, they

appear to assert that, in some way, the JWP and the foreclosure violated the

Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. Further, they argue that their

eviction from the property by the sheriff’s office would violate the Third

Amendment,

2

or at least the court takes this to be the import of their statement that

the sheriff has threatened a “hostile military takeover” of the property. (Doc. 1 at 15,

¶ 17).

The court assumes that each claim is asserted against each defendant, so, for

2

 “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the

Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST. amend III.

5

Case 4:16-cv-00740-VEH Document 31 Filed 08/23/16 Page 5 of 16
ease of reference, here are the claims

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in issue:

Count I

42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by

Monetary and Injunctive Relief

Count II

42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause

by Monetary and Injunctive Relief

Count III

42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the Third Amendment by Injunctive Relief

Count IV 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k to enforce the provisions of the FDCPA by Monetary and

Injunctive Relief

Count V

42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy to violate the Watts’ Civil Rights

The Watts may also assert divers claims under Alabama law.4 The court need

not reach these, whatever they may be, because any remaining state claims will be

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) after the resolution of

3

 The complaint features a section titled “Corruption of Authority,” doc. 1 at 17, the

content of which is mostly an argle-bargle string cite. But, to the extent it can be understood to

mean anything at all, the court reads this provision as a perfunctory allegation that whoever did

whatever in this case did so under color of state law. 

4

 Among these is a notice of dishonor and opportunity to cure, doc. 1 at 29, but the

historic remedy for dishonor—a duel—has been outlawed in this state since at least 1807, when

it was still the Alabama Territory. See Smith v. State, 1 Stew. 506, 507 (Ala. 1828). Additionally,

based on the rest of the complaint, it does not appear that the Watts are invoking the UCC’s

doctrine of dishonor of negotiable instruments. Otherwise, dishonor is not a cause of action in

Alabama, nor is it a federal claim, so the complaint cannot survive on this ground. 

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Case 4:16-cv-00740-VEH Document 31 Filed 08/23/16 Page 6 of 16
the federal claims. As to the other things in the complaint—the flapdoodle about

“UNITED STATES (INC)” being bankrupt, doc. 1 at 23, as well as boilerplate string

cites about judicial immunity and judicial bias, among others—they are too

disconnected to any of the facts in the case to state a claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint

provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). However, to survive a motion to dismiss brought

under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In ruling on a motion to

dismiss, all facts (but not legal conclusions) alleged in the complaint are presumed

to true. See id. at 555.

ANALYSIS

The five defendants filed three motions to dismiss. Regions filed its motion to

dismiss, then Entrekin and Etowah County, and finally RREF. Each has alleged

different grounds for dismissal, but, because “jurisdiction [must] be established as a

threshold matter,” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94

(1998), the first issues that the court must consider are the grounds for dismissal that

implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, RREF raises the

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Case 4:16-cv-00740-VEH Document 31 Filed 08/23/16 Page 7 of 16
Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar, and Entrekin raises the Eleventh Amendment. 

I. Claims Barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

28 U.S.C. § 1257 grants exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final state

court judgments to the Supreme Court of the United States. See District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). Accordingly, “[t]he [socalled] Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising

jurisdiction over cases brought bystate-court losers challenging state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Lance v. Dennis, 546

U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

jurisdictional bar extendsto claimsfirst raised in state court and again in federal court

and “to those inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment.” Casale v.

Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). “A claim is inextricably intertwined

if it would effectively nullify the state court judgment or itsucceeds only to the extent

that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Id. (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Rooker-Feldman is potentially applicable to the Watts’ section 1983 claims

against RREF, the motion for a temporary restraining order, and the section 1983

Third Amendment claim against all defendants. First up is the Watts’ motion for a

temporary restraining order, which the court construes as a motion for a preliminary

8

Case 4:16-cv-00740-VEH Document 31 Filed 08/23/16 Page 8 of 16
injunction [“MPI”]. Cf. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 950 F.2d 685, 686

(11th Cir. 1991) (construing “temporary restraining order” as preliminary injunction

where order issued after district court heard from all parties).

The Watts appear to advance two arguments to support their temporary

restraining order, and the first isthat the foreclosure proceeding violated the FDCPA.

This ground will be taken up later because Rooker-Feldman does not bar it. Second,

they ask this court to void “and to set aside all orders and Judgments in the District

Court of Etowah County in [the unlawful detainer actions],” as well as to restrain the

enforcement of those judgments. (Doc. 9 at 3). One does not even have to reach the

“Feldman” in Rooker-Feldman to determine that the court lacks jurisdiction to issue

the injunction requested in the MPI. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,

414–15 (1923) (holding that district court lacks jurisdiction to declare a state court

judgment “null and void”). The Watts’ motion must be denied as to this ground for

relief. 

To the extent that any claims against RREF (Counts I, II, and V, as well as any

the court may have missed) in the complaint attack the validity of the JWP they will

be dismissed without prejudice as barred byRooker-Feldman. See Exxon MobilCorp.

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman deprives

district court of subject matter jurisdiction); Stalley v. OrlandoReg’l Healthcare Sys.,

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524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissal for want of subject matter

jurisdiction is without prejudice). Additionally, Count III, against all defendants,

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which seeksto enjoin the “hostile military takeover” of the Watts’ property, is barred

by Rooker-Feldman, because a determination that the Sheriff’s forcible ejectment of

the Wattsfrom the property would be unlawful would “succeed only to the extent the

state court wrongly decided the issues.” Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260.

II. Claims Barred by the Eleventh Amendment 

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the

“judicial power of the United States” from “extend[ing] to any suit in law or equity”

against a state by citizens of other states, U.S.CONST. amend. XI, and against a state

by her own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In short, the Eleventh

Amendment creates a “jurisdictional bar,” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), against federal courts hearing actions in which

non-consenting states are defendants. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.

44, 67–69 (1996). A suit against a state officer in his official capacity, when damages

are sought, is a suit against the state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653 (1974).

5

 It may be nonsensical to imagine anyone other than Entrekin being enjoined from

performing a “military” coup on the property, but the Watts’ non-compliance with FED. R. CIV.

P. 10(b), which requires that individual claims for relief be limited to one defendant, compels the

court to do so.

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An action seeking damages from an Alabama sheriff in his official capacity is barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th

Cir. 1990). Accordingly, to the extent that any of the claims in this case are brought

against Sheriff Entrekin in his official capacity, they will be dismissed without

prejudice. 

III. The FDCPA Claim(s) 

Having cleared the jurisdictional briar patch, it’s on to the merits. Regions6

moves to dismiss the FDCPA claims on the ground that they are time-barred. The

statute provides that any claims to enforce the FDCPA must be brought “within one

year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Regions

argues that the complaint’s allegedly unfair debt collection practices predate or are

contemporaneous with the date of foreclosure—December 20, 2013—so anyFDCPA

claims would have expired in December 2014. 

For their part, the Watts complain in their responsive filing that defense

counsel “is aware and understand the court rules but is willfully engaging in acts of

fraud, deception, trickery, and even necromancy in order to deprive and defraud

6

 Because of the deep ambiguity of the complaint, reasonable minds could differ as to

which claims the Watts assert against which defendant(s). In light of the court’s decision to treat

each ground for relief as being brought against each defendant, the grounds for dismissal raised

by different defendants will be treated as applicable to all defendants, unless a particular ground

is necessarily limited to less than all defendants, such as the Eleventh Amendment. 

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Case 4:16-cv-00740-VEH Document 31 Filed 08/23/16 Page 11 of 16
Plaintiff(s).” (Doc. 17 at 2). While it is true that necromancy is disfavored in the law,

the Watts Boys are the only necromancers before this court; they incessantly and

vexatiously attempt to raise dead claims from the grave.7 But, they make no effort to

dispute the Defendants’ characterization of the allegedly wrongful acts. The FDCPA

claims will be dismissed as to all defendants. 

The reader will recall that the Watts proposed an alternative ground for the

MPI: that “Defendant(s)’ collective actions that violated several FDCPA.” (Doc. 9 at

2). A preliminary injunction may issue if the moving party shows “(1) it has a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered

unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs

whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if

issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Siegel v. LePore,

234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000). Since the FDCPA claims are all time-barred,

there is no likelihood of success on the merits, and the Watts are not entitled to a

preliminary injunction. 

IV. The Civil Rights Claims

Regions moves to dismiss any civil rights claims against it on the ground that

7

 The court has no occasion to determine whether necromancy would ever not be

vexatious.

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the Watts have not plausibly alleged that it has done anything, legal or illegal, under

color of law, which is a requirement to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424–25 (1973). Regions is correct.

Accordingly, all section 1983 claims against Regions will be dismissed. 

Sheriff Entrekin moves to dismiss the civil rights claims against him,

individually, on the ground that the complaint does not allege that he personally

participated in the putative constitutional violations, and, since there is no respondeat

superiorliability under section 1983, Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), the

Watts have not stated a claim against him. As to Counts I and II, the court agrees.

These claims will be dismissed as to Sheriff Entrekin in his individual capacity. 

Etowah County moves to dismiss the section 1983 claims against it on two

grounds: the same respondeat superior ground as Sheriff Enrekin, and that any

possible wrongdoers in the complaint (the state court judges) are not employed by

Etowah County. To impose liability on a municipality, there must be “a direct causal

link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Finding no such

“policy or custom” plausibly alleged to have created the Watts’ injury, Counts I and

II against Etowah County will be dismissed. 

As to Count V, the Watts allege that all defendants have conspired to deprive

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Case 4:16-cv-00740-VEH Document 31 Filed 08/23/16 Page 13 of 16
them of their constitutional rights, and this allegation at least satisfies Iqbal’s

requirement of personal participation in a constitutional violation for liability to

attach. But Iqbal giveth and Iqbal taketh away, because these defendants also moved

to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the claims for relief were implausible—

which they are. As interpreted by Iqbal, FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires the court to

take into account “obvious alternative explanation[s]” for allegedly unconstitutional

conduct before allowing a complaint to clear a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

682. 

Here, the Watts’ allegation that Regions, RREF, Sheriff Entrekin, and the

Etowah County Commission conspired with a handful of state judges to deprive the

Watts of their constitutional rights by trumping-up a foreclosure is absurd on itsface.

The logical alternative explanation is that Senior failed to pay on his note, so the

propertywasforeclosed, the foreclosing party (RREF) exercised itslegalright to have

any squatters evicted, and the sheriff’s office did itsjob by attempting to convince the

squatters to leave. The Watts have pleaded no facts that plausibly suggest anything

has happened to them other than run-of-the-mill litigation and judgment execution.

Count V will be dismissed asto Etowah County and Sheriff Entrekin in hisindividual

capacity. 

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V. Any Other Federal Claims

To the extent the Watts intend to raise any other federal claims, they have put

neither this court nor these defendants on notice of those claims. Therefore, those

claims were filed in violation of FED. R. CIV. P. 8–11, so the court will exercise its

power and do its duty to dismissthe claims without prejudice. Cf. Davis v. Coca-Cola

Bottling Co. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955, 984 (11th Cir. 2008) (the court should sua

sponte strike unintelligible complaints). 

V. The Other State Law Claims

A district courtmay decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). All federal claims have been dismissed in this

matter, and there is no basis for the court to exercise original jurisdiction aside from

28 U.S.C. § 1331, so any remaining state claimsin this case will be dismissed without

prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

The Watts were entitled to their day in court, not every day in court. Cf. Wilson

v. Retail Credit Co., 474 F.2d 1260, 1261 (5th Cir. 1973)

8

(“Every citizen is entitled

8

 This authority is controlling in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).

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to his day in court; however, our judicialsystem was not designed as an experimental

laboratory to license losing parties to bring vexatious and repetitive claims based on

the same transaction.”). They have had their day. A separate order will issue

dismissing the case.

DONE this 23rd day of August, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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