Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07269/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07269-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

WILLIAM HENRY CLAPP,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-07269-LB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS [FIFTH] 

AMENDED COMPLAINT1

Re: ECF No. 49

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff William H. Clapp alleges that in November 2016, he was leaving a restaurant 

in San Francisco’s Mission District, when he was confronted by a group of five to seven 

individuals who began yelling and advancing on him. In response, Mr. Clapp took out both pepper 

spray and a stun gun from his pockets and “sparked” the stun gun. Officers from the San Francisco 

Police Department arrived and ordered Mr. Clapp to drop his weapons. Mr. Clapp did so. Mr. 

Clapp alleges that he was then pulled from behind and fell onto the sidewalk and suffered injuries. 

 

1 While Mr. Clapp has not been numbering his successive complaints, by the court’s count, he has filed 

six complaints altogether: ECF No. 1 (his original complaint), ECF No. 39 (what would be his first 

amended complaint), ECF No. 40 (what would be his second amended complaint), ECF No. 41 (what 

would be his third amended complaint), ECF No. 42 (what would be his fourth amended complaint), 

and his operative complaint ECF No. 48 (what would be his fifth amended complaint) (“5AC”). 

Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECFgenerated page numbers at the top of documents.

Case 3:18-cv-07269-LB Document 62 Filed 06/07/19 Page 1 of 19
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 2

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Mr. Clapp alleges that he was then handcuffed and injected with a sedative, which rendered him 

unconscious until he woke up some time later at San Francisco General Hospital in restraints.

The San Francisco District Attorney’s Office charged Mr. Clapp with misdemeanor 

brandishing for the November 2016 incident and had a restraining order issued against him. In 

June 2017, Mr. Clapp was arrested for violating the restraining order for failing to turn in two 

“collector guns.” A court ordered him on an evening “house arrest/curfew” from 10:00 p.m. to 

6:00 a.m. and barred him from consuming any alcohol in any public place. In November 2017, the 

brandishing charges were dropped, and the curfew restrictions were lifted.

Mr. Clapp now brings this lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”), 

alleging that CCSF violated his constitutional rights. Mr. Clapp brings claims for “False Arrest/

False Imprisonment, Excessive Use of Force & Malicious Prosecution . . . Conspiracy, Gross 

Negligence, & Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.”2 Mr. Clapp does not name any 

individual police officer or prosecutor as a defendant. CCSF moves to dismiss Mr. Clapp’s 

complaint.3

The court held a hearing on June 6, 2019 and now grants CCSF’s motion to dismiss. The 

dismissal is without prejudice, i.e., the court extends Mr. Clapp one chance to file an amended 

complaint. Mr. Clapp must file an amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies the court 

identified in this order within 21 days (i.e., by June 28, 2019). If he does not do so, the court will 

dismiss Mr. Clapp’s claims with prejudice and close this case.

 

2

5AC – ECF No. 48 at 2 (¶ 3.1); see also id. at 3 (¶ 3.2).

Mr. Clapp states that his claims “include, but are not necessarily limited to” the claims listed above. 

Id. at 2 (¶ 3.1). The court explains for Mr. Clapp’s benefit that his complaint must identify the claims 

he is bringing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). He therefore may not use an “include, but are not necessarily 

limited to” disclaimer to bring claims that he does not identify in his complaint.

3 CCSF Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 49.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 3

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STATEMENT4

1. The Inciting Incident

On the evening of November 29, 2016, Mr. Clapp was on a first date at a restaurant in San 

Francisco’s Mission District, where he had dinner and three cocktails over two-and-a-quarter 

hours.

5

(Mr. Clapp makes a point of alleging that his date was “well known at the restaurant” and 

had given him a false name and “had committed bank card fraud against him during their +2 hour 

dinner engagement.”6) Mr. Clapp left the restaurant at approximately 11:15 p.m.7

At about 11:20 p.m., Mr. Clapp secured some gear on the rear luggage rack of his motorcycle, 

when he noticed that a group of five to seven people had assembled outside of the front entrance 

of the restaurant he had just left.8 One of the people was his dinner date.9 Mr. Clapp does not plead 

the names or identities of any of these five to seven individuals (including his dinner date).10

This group originally was 30 to 35 feet away from Mr. Clapp.11 Mr. Clapp alleges that the 

group then “began advancing toward [him],” with two “lead” individuals on either side.12 Mr. 

Clapp alleges that there was a lot of yelling, including, “‘You are not allowed to leave’!!!”13 Mr. 

Clapp asked a passerby what was going on, and the passerby responded “I do not know.”14 Mr. 

Clapp yelled for someone to call the police.15 Mr. Clapp then took out pepper spray and a stun gun 

 

4 Unless otherwise noted, the facts recited in the Statement are allegations from the 5AC.

5

5AC – ECF No. 48 at 3 (¶ 4.1.1), 9 (¶ 5.2).

6

Id. at 4 (¶ 4.1.2).

7

Id. at 3 (¶ 4.1.1).

8

Id. (¶ 4.1.2).

9

Id. at 4 (¶ 4.1.2).

10 See 5AC – ECF No. 48.

11 Id. at 4 (¶ 4.1.3).

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 4

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from his pockets.16 Mr. Clapp alleges that he did not “spark” his stun gun until the two “lead” 

individuals from this group had advanced some 25 feet and were about five to ten feet away from 

him.17 Once Mr. Clapp “sparked” his stun gun, the group’s “assault” against him “immediately 

ended.”18

2. The Police’s Arrival and Actions in Response to the Inciting Incident

Officers from the San Francisco Police Department arrived and ordered Mr. Clapp to drop the 

pepper spray and stun gun.19 Mr. Clapp immediately did so.20 Mr. Clapp alleges that he was then 

pulled backward and downward from behind.21 Mr. Clapp lost his balance and fell onto a concrete 

sidewalk and incurred multiple injuries, including a concussion and injuries to his shoulder, back, 

and left wrist.22

Mr. Clapp was handcuffed while lying on the sidewalk.23 He then was asked to sign

something, to which he responded, “I have nothing to say without the presence of legal counsel.”24

Mr. Clapp alleges that his jacket and shirt then were torn open and that he was injected with a 

sedative that rendered him unconscious.25 Mr. Clapp woke up some time later at San Francisco 

General Hospital in gurney restraints.26 After he was released from his restraints, Mr. Clapp got 

 

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 5 (¶ 4.2.1).

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id. at 6 (¶ 4.2.3).

26 Id.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 5

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dressed and left the hospital at around 4:00 a.m.27 Mr. Clapp found in his pants pocket a citation 

for misdemeanor brandishing.28

3. Additional Incidents

In January 2017, a restraining order was issued against Mr. Clapp related to his November 

2016 arrest.29 Mr. Clapp alleges that the restraining order was issued at the request or direction of 

the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office.30

Neither Mr. Clapp nor CCSF provides additional details regarding this restraining order. It 

appears that the order may have called for Mr. Clapp turn over all firearms (and may have 

imposed other requirements).31 On June 20, 2017, the “California DOJ” arrested Mr. Clapp 

without a warrant for violating the restraining order by failing to turn in two registered “collector 

guns.”32 (Mr. Clapp alleges that this arrest “was also directly responsible for a second serious fall 

that took place the following morning which resulted in severe neck injuries,” but he does not 

explain how this arrest led to a fall or neck injuries and does not identify any person or entity that 

allegedly caused that fall.33)

Mr. Clapp was scheduled to go to trial on June 21, 2017 on the brandishing charge arising out 

of the November 2016 incident.

34 As a result of Mr. Clapp’s arrest on June 20, a mistrial was 

declared pending a new trial date.35 As a result of either his new arrest or the mistrial, a court 

placed Mr. Clapp on a “house arrest/curfew” from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. every day and barred 

 

27 Id. (¶ 4.2.4).

28 Id.

29 Id. at 6–7 (¶¶ 4.3.1–4.3.2).

30 Id. at 6 (¶ 4.3.1).

31 See id. at 7 (¶ 4.3.2).

32 Id. at 6 (¶ 4.3), 7 (¶ 4.3.2).

33 See id. at 7 (¶ 4.3.3).

34 See id.

35 Id. at 8 (¶ 4.3.4).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 6

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him from consuming alcoholic beverages in any public place.36 This restriction remained in place 

for five months, until the brandishing charge was dismissed in November 2017.37

Mr. Clapp alleges that it took eighteen months before the “property” that was confiscated in 

connection with his June 2017 arrest was returned to him.38 Mr. Clapp alleges that the “property” 

that was confiscated from him in connection with his November 2016 arrest has yet to be 

returned.39 Mr. Clapp also claims that the police reports relating to his November 2016 arrest that 

CCSF attached to its case-management statement in this case40 are “materially different” from the 

copy he received in a Superior Court hearing held in January 2017, although he does not explain 

(beyond conclusory allegations) how the reports differ.41

4. Pre-Litigation Claims Under the Government Claims Act

Mr. Clapp does not allege in his complaint that he presented a pre-litigation claim to CCSF

pursuant to California’s Government Claims Act (“GCA”).

CCSF attached to its motion to dismiss a GCA claim that Mr. Clapp presented on May 26, 

2017.42 Mr. Clapp’s GCA claim does not provide any information regarding the basis of any claim

he might bring. Instead, Mr. Clapp wrote in his GCA claim that:

This filing with the San Francisco Controller’s office is being made at this time 

purely for the purposes of protecting my legal rights under relevant law (as both 

state and federal Statutes of Limitations) in the event formal legal action is 

undertaken. Further, as there have been no formal discussions/meetings with legal 

counsel to date, where possible causes of action have yet to be vetted/determined, 

 

36 Id.

37 Id.; see also id. at 6 (¶ 4.2.4).

38 Id. at 9 (¶ 5.4). Mr. Clapp does not specify what that property was.

39 Id. Again, Mr. Clapp does not specify what that property was.

40 CCSF Case Mgmt. Statement Ex. H (police reports) – ECF No. 27-9.

41 5AC – ECF No. 48 at 9 (¶ 5.3).

42 Clapp GCA Cl. – ECF No. 49-2. The court may take judicial notice of GCA claims on a motion to 

dismiss because “[s]uch a document is a matter of public record and is necessarily relied on by 

[p]laintiffs in bringing their state law claims[.]” Moore v. City of Vallejo, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1256 

(E.D. Cal. 2014).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 7

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there has been no decision made (of any time) as to any possible formal course of

action or legal court filing. As such, considering these facts, it is not possible at this 

time to determine either potential specific causes of action or damages as may 

either be mutually agreed to or awarded but such may be substantial.43

On June 15, 2017, CCSF sent Mr. Clapp a notice of insufficiency, explaining that his GCA 

claim did not provide all of the information required under California Government Code § 910,

44

which requires claimants to include “[t]he date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or 

transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted” and “[a] general description of the indebtedness, 

obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of 

the claim,” among other things. Mr. Clapp does not contend that he responded to CCSF’s notice of 

insufficiency or that he filed any additional or supplemental GCA claims.45

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon 

which they rest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a claim for relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which 

when accepted as true, “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

 

43 Clapp GCA Cl. – ECF No. 49-2 at 3–4.

44 CCSF Notice of Insufficiency – ECF No. 49-3.

45 See Clapp Opp’n – ECF No. 51 at 3–6.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 8

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‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557).

“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the inartful pleading 

of pro se litigants. It is settled that the allegations [in a pro se complaint,] however inartfully 

pleaded[,] are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Eldridge 

v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th 

Cir. 2000); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2011).

If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the “pleading could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 

848 F.3d 1161, 1182 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But “leave 

to amend may be denied when a plaintiff has demonstrated a ‘repeated failure to cure deficiencies 

by amendments previously allowed.’” Id. at 1183 (quoting Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 

316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)).

ANALYSIS

1. Constitutional Claims

1.1 Governing Law

Claims against state actors like CCSF for violations of constitutional rights are actionable 

through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

1.1.1 Violation of a constitutional right

First, to plead a constitutional claim against CCSF, Mr. Clapp must plead an underlying 

violation of a constitutional right. Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. # 40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 

(9th Cir. 1997).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 9

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Reading his complaint broadly, Mr. Clapp brings constitutional claims for false arrest/false 

imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to violate his constitutional 

rights.

46

For a constitutional claim of false arrest or false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants did not have probable cause to arrest him. Cabrera v. City 

of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing George v. City of Long Beach, 973 

F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1992)).

For a constitutional claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show 

that the defendants used force that was unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances, 

including “(1) how severe the crime at issue is, (2) whether the [plaintiff] posed an immediate 

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the [plaintiff] was actively resisting 

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 443, 441 (9th Cir. 

2011) (en banc) (citing Doerle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (9th Cir. 2001)).

For a constitutional claim of malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 

show that the prosecution “(1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was 

pursued to a legal termination in [the] plaintiff’s[] favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; 

. . . (3) was initiated with malice,” and (4) was brought “for the purpose of denying [the plaintiff] 

equal protection or another specific constitutional right.” Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 

1169 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)).

For a constitutional claim of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that 

(1) there was “an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate the [plaintiff’s] constitutional 

rights” and (2) “an[] actual deprivation of his constitutional rights resulted from the alleged 

conspiracy.” Woodrum v. Woodward Cty., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing cases).

 

46 5AC – ECF No. 48 at 2–3 (¶¶ 3.1–3.2). Mr. Clapp’s claims for gross negligence and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress are not constitutional claims. L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 899 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (“[G]ross negligence, in and of itself, is not unconstitutional.”); Kocol v. United States, No. 

CV 13-3511 ABC (PJWx), 2014 WL 12586440, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2014) (“IIED is not the basis 

of a constitutional claim[.]”).

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1.1.2 Government policy

Second, in addition to pleading an underlying violation of a constitutional right, to plead a 

constitutional claim against a government entity like CCSF (as opposed to an individual, such as 

an individual police officer), Mr. Clapp must plead that CCSF maintained a policy or custom that 

resulted that violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).

Liability against a government entity starts from the premise that there is no respondeat 

superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, i.e., no entity is liable simply because it employs a 

person who has violated a plaintiff’s rights. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor v. List, 880 

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). To plead a claim against a government entity, a plaintiff must 

show that (1) he possessed a constitutional right and was deprived of that right, (2) the government 

entity had a policy, (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, 

and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Plumeau, 130 F.3d at 

438.

The Ninth Circuit has explained how a policy may be established:

There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a municipality: (1) by showing 

“a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating 

procedure’ of the local government entity;” (2) “by showing that the decisionmaking official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose 

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the area of decision;” 

or (3) “by showing that an official with final policymaking authority either 

delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.”

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ulrich v. City and Cty. of 

San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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1.2 Application

1.2.1 Violation of a constitutional right

Mr. Clapp does not plead an underlying violation of a constitutional right with respect to his 

claims for false arrest/false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or conspiracy.

47

Mr. Clapp does not plead a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of the 

November 2016 incident because the police had probable cause to arrest him. By Mr. Clapp’s own 

admission, when the police arrived on the scene, he was brandishing pepper spray and “sparking” 

a stun gun at people who were five to ten feet away from him. The responding police officers —

having witnessed first-hand Mr. Clapp brandishing his weapons at a group of people — had 

probable cause to arrest him. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 22810(g)(1) (criminalizing the use of 

tear-gas weapons except in self-defense); People v. Hamilton, 61 Cal. App. 4th 149, 155 (1998) 

(“[t]he word ‘use’ in the context of weapon statutes uniformly and unambiguously means the 

 

47 The court declines at this juncture to decide whether Mr. Clapp pleads an underlying violation of a 

constitutional right with respect to his claim for excessive force relating to the November 2016 

incident.

Mr. Clapp may be able to plead a claim of excessive force based on his allegations that he was 

(1) pulled from behind and (2) injected with a sedative. Cf. Sheehan v. Bay Area Rapid Transit, No. 

14-cv-03156-LB, 2016 WL 777784, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (depending on the totality of the 

circumstances, officer forcefully taking plaintiff to the ground may constitute excessive force); Rogers 

v. Grijalva, No. 1:09-cv-01298-SKO, 2011 WL 837172, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2011) (depending on 

the totality of the circumstances, state hospital worker injecting plaintiff with a sedative may constitute 

excessive force). The court notes that his current allegations are somewhat conclusory and lacking in 

detail. For example, he does not allege that a police officer pulled him down to the ground. Instead, he 

alleges only that he was pulled and that he then lost his balance and fell, but he does not allege whether 

he was pulled to the ground, or whether (conversely) he was pulled with only a little force and then 

lost balance himself. The court need not decide whether his current allegations are sufficient to plead a 

claim, however, because he currently names only CCSF — and not any individual police officers — as 

a defendant, and (as discussed below) he cannot plead any constitutional claim against CCSF unless it 

had a government policy that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation, which he does 

not plead here.

If he wishes, Mr. Clapp may amend his complaint to name individual police officers as defendants 

and add additional factual allegations about his excessive-force claim. (CCSF has filed on the public 

docket the police reports relating to the November 2016 incident, which contain the responding 

officers’ names. CCSF Case Mgmt. Statement Ex. H (police reports) – ECF No. 27-9. Mr. Clapp 

confirmed at the June 6, 2019 hearing that he has these police reports and the officers’ names.)

Mr. Clapp does not plead a violation of a constitutional right with respect to his claim for excessive 

force relating to the June 2017 incident, as he does not allege any facts about the force that anyone 

used.

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intentional display of the weapon in a menacing manner” in addition to the firing or discharging of 

the weapon).48 Mr. Clapp no doubt believes he was acting in self-defense. But probable cause 

turns on the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, not Mr. Clapp’s, and the facts 

and circumstances that Mr. Clapp pleads were within the officers’ knowledge at the time —that 

Mr. Clapp was brandishing his weapons at a group of people — established probable cause to 

arrest him. Cf. Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[P]robable

cause requires only that those facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are 

sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed an offense. . . . 

The mere existence of some evidence that could suggest self-defense does not negate probable 

cause.”) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted) (quoting Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 

773 (9th Cir. 1990)); Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 475 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“Ultimately, . . . our inquiry is not whether [plaintiff] was [committing an offense]. Rather, it is 

whether a reasonable officer had probable cause to think he could have been.”) (emphasis in 

original) (citing cases); Pallas v. Accornero, No. 3:19-cv-01171-LB, 2019 WL 2359215, at *4–5 

(N.D. Cal. June 3, 2019) (citing additional cases holding that an arrestee’s claim of self-defense 

does not necessarily negate probable cause to make an arrest). Where, as here, the facts in a 

plaintiff’s complaint show that that his arrest was supported by probable cause, the plaintiff cannot 

plead a constitutional false-arrest or false-imprisonment claim, and his claims are subject to 

dismissal. Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of claims at 

 

48 “Tear gas,” as used in Penal Code § 22810, includes pepper spray. See, e.g., People v. Brian P. (In 

re Brian P.), No. B255259, 2015 WL 3416888, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2015).

As a note, it does not matter for present purposes whether Mr. Clapp was charged with a violation of 

Penal Code § 22810(g)(1) or was charged under some other section of the Penal Code. Cf.

Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 473. “‘Probable cause may exist for an arrest for a closely related offense, 

even if that offense was not invoked by the arresting officer, as long as it involves the same conduct 

for which the suspect was arrested.’” Id. (internal brackets and some internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2003)). “‘As long as the 

officers had some reasonable basis to believe [Mr. Clapp] had committed a crime, the arrest is justified

as being based on probable cause. Probable cause need only exist as to any offense that could be 

charged under the circumstances.’” Cf. id. (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Barna v. City of Perth 

Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994)).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 13

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the pleading stage where “the facts in the amended complaint show that [plaintiff]’s arrest was 

supported by probable cause”).49

Mr. Clapp’s claim for malicious prosecution fails for the same reason, namely, that the facts in 

his complaint show that his prosecution was supported by probable cause. Additionally, Mr. Clapp 

does not cognizably plead that anyone prosecuted him with malice or did so for the purpose of 

denying him equal protection or another specific constitutional right.

Mr. Clapp does not plead a claim for conspiracy, because, among other things, he does not 

cognizably allege that there was an agreement or meeting of the minds between any parties to 

violate his constitutional rights. Cf. Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1126 (“allegations of conspiracy must 

be supported by material facts, not merely conclusory statements”) (citation omitted).

1.2.2 Government policy

In any event, even if Mr. Clapp pleaded an underlying violation of his constitutional rights, his 

claims against CCSF fail because he does not allege that CCSF had a policy that amounted to 

deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, much less that CCSF’s policy was the moving 

force behind any violation of his rights. Mr. Clapp does not name any individual police officer or 

prosecutor as a defendant, only CCSF as an entity. CCSF cannot be held liable simply because it 

employed a person who may have violated Mr. Clapp’s rights, and Mr. Clapp does not meet the 

standard for pleading a claim for constitutional violations against CCSF.

2. State-Law Claims

2.1 Governing Law

2.1.1 Government Claims Act

With some exceptions not relevant here, the California Government Claims Act requires a 

party seeking to recover money damages from a public entity or its employees to present a claim 

 

49 Mr. Clapp does not plead a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of the June 2017 

incident either. Mr. Clapp acknowledges that he was violating a restraining order and the reason the 

“California DOJ” arrested him then was for that violation. Additionally, allegations against the 

“California DOJ” do not plead a claim against CCSF, because the California Department of Justice is 

not a division of CCSF.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 14

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within six months after accrual of the claim to the entity before filing suit in court. Cal. Gov’t 

Code §§ 911.2(a), 945.4; see, e.g., Doe v. Whittington, No. 5:18-cv-02581-EJD, 2019 WL 

1436983, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2019) (GCA presentment requirement applies to state-law 

claims for false arrest and false imprisonment); Gimbel v. Crescent City Police Dep’t, No. C 07-

0113 MJJ, 2007 WL 9735064, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2007) (same re state-law claims for 

false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress); 

Heyward v. BART Police Dep’t, No. 3:15-cv-04503-LB, 2015 WL 9319485, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 

23, 2015) (same re state-law claims for conspiracy); Cardenas v. Cty. of Alameda, No. C 16-

05205 WHA, 2017 WL 1650563, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2017) (same re state-law claims for 

false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress).50

A GCA claim must include “[t]he date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or 

transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted” and “[a] general description of the indebtedness, 

obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of 

the claim,” among other things. Cal. Gov’t Code § 910. As the California Supreme Court has held, 

the purpose of the GCA claims statutes are “to provide the public entity sufficient information to 

enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of 

litigation.” DiCampli-Mintz v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 55 Cal. 4th 983, 991 (2012). “It is well-settled 

that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity’s actual knowledge of the 

circumstances surrounding the claim.” Id. “[T]he intent of the [GCA] is to confine potential 

governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.” Id. (citations omitted). “The claimant 

bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is presented to the appropriate public entity.” Id.

(citations omitted).

 

50 Mr. Clapp correctly notes that federal constitutional claims are not subject to California’s GCA.

Amatrone v. Champion, No. 15-cv-01356-JST, 2015 WL 5591614, at *8 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 

2015) (citing Barsch v. O’Toole, No. C 07-00615 SI, 2007 WL 1795750, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 

2007) (citing Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1989))). Mr. Clapp’s federal constitutional 

claims are independently dismissible, however (as discussed above).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 15

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2.1.2 Underlying claims

For a California state-law claim of false arrest or false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show 

that the defendants (1) intentionally confined the plaintiff without his consent, (2) without lawful 

privilege, (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief. Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 

839, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (2000)).51

Police officers are privileged to make lawful arrests, including arrests of a person who has 

committed a public offense in the officers’ presence. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 486–87 (citing Cal. 

Penal Code § 847(b)).

For a California state-law claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the 

prosecution “(1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal 

termination in [the] plaintiff’s[] favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was 

initiated with malice.” Mills, 921 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 

Cal. 3d 863, 871 (1989)).

For a California state-law claim of gross negligence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant 

owed the plaintiff a duty, breached that duty, that the breach caused the plaintiff injury, and that 

the defendant engaged in “extreme conduct” that “demonstrate[d] either a ‘want of even scant 

care’ or ‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.’” Sampson v. Ukiah Valley 

Med. Ctr., No. 15-cv-00160-WHO, 2015 WL 13661551, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2015) (quoting 

City of Santa Barbara v. Super. Ct., 41 Cal. 4th 747, 754 (2007)).

For a California state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must 

show “‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or 

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering 

severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional 

distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’” Tekle, 511 F.3d at 855 (quoting Davidson v. City 

of Westminster, 32 Cal 3d 197, 209 (1982)).

 

51 Under California law, “[f]alse arrest is not a different tort; it is merely ‘one way of committing a 

false imprisonment.’” Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 

Collins v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 673 (1975)).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 16

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A plaintiff cannot plead a standalone California state-law claim for civil conspiracy, because 

“[u]nder California law, ‘there is no separate tort of civil conspiracy and no action for conspiracy 

to commit a tort unless the underlying tort is committed and damage results therefrom.’” Julian v. 

Mission Cmty. Hosp., 11 Cal. App. 5th 360, 390 (2017) (quoting Prakashpalan v. Engstron, 

Lipscomb and Lack, 223 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1136 (2014)).

2.2 Application

2.2.1 Government Claims Act

Mr. Clapp’s claims against CCSF are barred by his failure to comply with the GCA.

Mr. Clapp’s GCA claim did not provide CCSF sufficient information to enable it to adequately 

investigate his claims and to settle them without the expense of litigation. Instead, Mr. Clapp 

expressly declined to provide CCSF with notice of what legal claims he might bring and stated 

that he was filing his GCA claim — which provided no details about the circumstances 

surrounding his claim — solely to preserve his right to file a lawsuit and impose upon CCSF the 

expense of litigation.52 This flies in the face of the purposes of the GCA. Cf. DiCampli-Mintz, 55 

Cal. 4th at 991. Mr. Clapp’s failure to comply with the requirement of the GCA warrants dismissal 

of his state-law claims. Cf., e.g., Ramachandran v. City of Los Angeles, 359 F. Supp. 3d 801, 817–

18 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (dismissing state-law claims where “[GCA] notices contain no information 

that would have permitted the city to investigate the bases for [plaintiff]’s claim”).

Mr. Clapp argues that he was unable to provide a more complete GCA claim in May 2017 

because the underlying proceedings against him for brandishing and violating the restraining order 

against him had not yet been fully resolved.53 This argument fails for multiple reasons.

First, Mr. Clapp cannot condition his filing a GCA claim on the underlying proceedings 

against him fully resolving. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3 (pending criminal charges toll the statute 

 

52 Clapp GCA Notice – ECF No. 49-2 at 3 (“This filing with the San Francisco Controller’s office is 

being made at this time purely for the purposes of protecting my legal rights under relevant law (as 

both state and federal Statutes of Limitations) in the event formal legal action is undertaken. . . . 

[W]here possible causes of action have yet to be vetted/determined, there has been no decision made 

(of any type) as to the possible formal course of action or legal court filing.”).

53 Clapp Opp’n – ECF No. 51 at 5–6.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 17

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of limitations for bringing a civil lawsuit but do not extend the time to file a GCA claim). The 

court confronted a similar situation in Doe v. Whittington, 2019 WL 1436983. There, the plaintiff 

was arrested in June 2016 for alleged extortion and released from custody the next day. Id. at *2, 

4. The criminal case against her continued until October 2017, when the court found her to be 

factually innocent. Id. at *2. The court held that the plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and false 

imprisonment accrued for the purposes of the GCA at the time of her arrest and release from 

custody, respectively. Id. at *4 (citing Mohlmann v. City of Burbank, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1041 

n.1 (1986); Torres v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 217 Cal. App. 4th 844, 848 (2013); Collins v. Cty. 

of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App. 2d 451, 457 (1966)). Even though the underlying criminal case 

against her continued for over a year, the plaintiff’s failure to file GCA claims within six months 

of her arrest rendered her claims untimely and therefore barred. Id. at *4–5. Likewise, the fact that 

the underlying proceedings against Mr. Clapp may not have been fully resolved in May 2017 does 

not excuse him from filing a proper GCA claim then.

Second, Mr. Clapp acknowledges that the underlying proceedings against him were fully

resolved by March 2018.

54 Even assuming he could not file a GCA claim until then, he still should 

have filed a complete and proper GCA claim within six months of when the proceedings fully 

resolved, i.e., by September 2018. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2(a) (GCA claims must be filed “not 

later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action”). Mr. Clapp does not allege that he 

filed a proper GCA claim before September 2018. His failure to allege that he filed a proper GCA 

claim renders his state-law claims subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Heyward, 2015 WL 9319485, at 

*4 (“‘Where compliance with the [GCA] is required, the plaintiff must allege compliance or 

circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to general [dismissal].’”) (quoting 

Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Mr. Clapp also argues that California Government Code § 815.2 authorizes him to bring his 

state-law claims.55 This argument fails too. Government Code § 815.2 provides that, “[w]ith 

 

54 Id. at 6.

55 Id. at 7, 12, 19–20.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 18

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certain exceptions, public entities and public employees are liable for their torts to the same extent 

as private parties.” Turner v. State, 232 Cal. App. 3d 883, 888 (1991) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code 

§§ 815.2, 820). “However, before a complaint may be filed against a governmental entity[,] such 

entity must be presented with a claim in the form required by [the GCA].” Id. (citing Cal. Gov’t 

Code §§ 910, 945.4). Contrary to Mr. Clapp’s suggestion, Government Code § 815.2 does not 

supersede the GCA and does not excuse Mr. Clapp’s failure to present a timely and proper GCA 

notice. See id.

2.2.2 Underlying claims

In any event, even if Mr. Clapp had complied with the GCA, his state-law claims against 

CCSF fail because he does not plead the elements of any of his claims.

Mr. Clapp’s state-law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution 

fail for the same reason that his analogous constitutional claims do, namely, there was probable 

cause and (with respect to his malicious-prosecution claim) he does not cognizably allege malice.

Mr. Clapp’s state-law claim for gross negligence fails because he does not allege that CCSF 

engaged in “extreme conduct” that demonstrated either a “want of even scant care” or “an extreme 

departure from the ordinary standard of conduct” that breached a duty that it owed to him.

Mr. Clapp’s state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because he 

does not allege that CCSF engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent to cause, or

reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress or that he suffered severe or 

extreme emotional distress caused by CCSF’s conduct.

Mr. Clapp’s state-law claim for conspiracy fails because conspiracy is not a separate tort in 

California.

CONCLUSION

The court grants CCSF’s motion to dismiss.

While Mr. Clapp has filed six complaints in this case, this is the first time that the court has 

ruled on a motion to dismiss. The court therefore declines to dismiss the case with prejudice and 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07269-LB 19

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extends Mr. Clapp one chance to file an amended complaint. Cf. United Healthcare, 848 F.3d at 

1183.

Mr. Clapp must file any amended complaint within 21 days of the date of this order (i.e., by

June 28, 2019). Mr. Clapp must clearly specify what claims he is bringing and, separately for each 

claim, must specify whether he is bringing the claim under the federal constitution, under state 

law, or both. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To the extent that he repleads any state-law claims, he 

must allege how he complied with the requirements of the GCA or allege circumstances excusing 

compliance. Cf. Heyward, 2015 WL 9319485, at *4.56

If Mr. Clapp does not timely file an amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies the 

court identified in this order, the court will dismiss Mr. Clapp’s claims with prejudice and close 

this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2019

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

 

56 The court said at the June 6, 2019 hearing that it was dismissing Mr. Clapp’s state-law claims with 

prejudice. Upon reflection, the court will dismiss Mr. Clapp’s state-law claims without prejudice and 

give him a last opportunity to plead that he timely complied with the GCA. If he did not timely comply 

with the GCA, the court will dismiss his state-law claims with prejudice.

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