Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00854/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00854-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CLARENCE CLAY )

)

v ) Civ. Case No. 2:05cv854-MHT 

) WO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on the defendant’s pro se motion to vacate, set aside,

or correct sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On February 6, 2003, Clarence Clay

(“Clay”) was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute 4 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride, 50 or more grams of cocaine base, and 1,000

or more kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and with

unlawful use of a communication facility, a telephone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

On April 14, 2003, Clay was sentenced to 50 months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count

and 6 months’ imprisonment on the communications count.

Clay appealed, raising the following issues:

1. Whether the district court erred in concluding that

the prosecutor’s comments before the grand jury

did not substantially influence the grand jury’s

decision to return the superseding indictment in

this case?

2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain

Clay’s conviction for the unlawful use of a

communication facility, to wit, a telephone, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)?

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3. Whether drug quantity becomes an element of the

offense under federal drug trafficking statutes

only when it may be used to impose a sentence

above the applicable statutory maximum?

U.S. v. Clay, 376 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2004). On July 15, 2004, the Court affirmed his

convictions. Id. 

On September 2, 2005, Clay filed his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his motion, Clay asserts the following claims:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel; for failure of my

Attorney Stephen R. Glassroth, to protect my Due

Process Rights that were violated; when I was

allowed to be convicted of a Conspiracy when

none of the objects that constituted the conspiracy

were found to be true by the jury. My attorney

erroneously failed to legally challenge the judicial

invasion of the Court in the jury’s province to

accept a verdict of guilty; when the special verdict

form required the judge to unanimously agree on

the objects and amounts of the drugs that

constituted the alleged conspiracy. 

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel; for failure of my

Attorney Stephen R. Glassroth, to accept the

retrial offer of the Honorable Myron H.

Thompson; as it related to the failure of the jury

to reach a verdict on the objects and the amount

of drugs that I was allegedly responsible for. My

attorney did not confer with me, but made a

complete arbitrary decision on his own; and in the

process allowed my 5th and 6th Amendment

rights to be blatantly violated.

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel; for failure of my

Attorney Stephen R. Glassroth, to raise on my

direct appeal, the disparity of sentences that were

rendered by the Court, as it related to my alleged

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co-defendant Sonja Brown. My attorney raised

this issue and preserved it at my sentencing

hearing; but completely failed to raise it at the

direct appeal level. In essence, my attorney failed

to present a clear and obvious violation of my

Due Process rights; when the sentencing court for

no justifiable legal reason raised my sentence

approximately 4 times higher than that of my

alleged co-defendant. The record will clearly

show that it was based on personal bias and

opinion of the District Court judge, rather than on

sound legal facts of law.

4. Ineffective assistance of counsel; for failure of my

Attorney Stephen R. Glassroth, to preserve, and

thereby abandoning on direct appeal the fact that

the District Court’s findings usurped the role of

thejury; and violated the core value of Apprendias

identified in U.S. v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308 (11th

Cir. 2004); due to the fact that Mr. Clay properly

preserved his Apprendi-type argument at

sentencing.

5. Prosecutorial misconduct: as it related to the

Assistant United States Attorneys, Louis V.

Franklin & Terry F. Moorer, conspiring to

knowingly and intentionally present to the jury

and the court the perjured and fabricated

testimony by Roderick Blanding. Mr. Blanding’s

testimony was proven to be untrue, fabricated,

and perjured. Due to the fact that there was no

evidence connecting Mr. Clay with drug

trafficking of any kind; the Government

intentionally utilized this witness in an attempt to

establish drug culpability on the behalf of Mr.

Clay – before the jury and the Judge of the Court.

(Doc. No. 2, p. 5.)

The Government responded to Clay’s motion, asserting that his prosecutorial

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misconduct claim was not raised on direct appeal and is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. No.

15-1, pp. 6-7.) In addition, the Government asserts that Clay’s ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims are without merit. (Doc. Nos. 15-1 & 18.) Clay was afforded an opportunity

to respond to the Government’s submissions, and has done so. (Doc. No. 22-1.) No

evidentiary hearing is required because the facts are adequately developed in the record.

After due consideration and upon review of the motion and numerous pleadings filed in this

case, the court concludes that Clay’s motion should be denied.

II. THE FACTS

On direct appeal, the Court summarized the facts as follows:

John W. Barnes (“Agent Barnes”) is a Senior Special

Agent with the United States Customs Service. At the time of

the events in this case, Agent Barnes was assigned to the High

Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (“HIDTA”) task force in

Montgomery, Alabama. The HIDTA task force is a federally

funded investigative task force composed of federal, state, and

local law enforcement officers. HIDTA's stated mission is to

locate, identify, and dismantle drug smuggling/trafficking

organizations.

In December 1997, Agent Barnes received a request from

Bill Baker (“Agent Baker”), a fellow Customs agent in

Cincinnati, Ohio, seeking information about an individual by the

name of “John Riley” in Montgomery, Alabama. Agent Barnes

requested and received information from the Montgomery

Police Department, which he forwarded to Agent Baker in

Cincinnati. Agent Barnes confirmed that the John Riley, who

was the subject of Agent Baker's interest, was also the John

Riley identified through the Montgomery Police Department.

Thereafter, Agents Barnes and Baker began working together in

a narcotics investigation that impacted Alabama and Kentucky.

In April 1998, Tony Montoya (“Montoya”), a

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cooperating individual (“CI”), assisted Agents Barnes and

Baker, along with others, in arranging a controlled meeting

between Montoya and Riley. The purpose of the meeting was

for Riley to deliver money to Montoya for marijuana that had

previously been delivered to Riley. When the meeting occurred,

Agent Barnes and others through the use of surveillance

equipment were able to monitor Riley giving Montoya $77,500.

In addition to monitoring Riley, the agents monitored the money

that Riley gave to Montoya as it left Montgomery and traveled

across the border into Mexico through Laredo, Texas. The

following month, a second delivery occurred. After arriving in

Montgomery, Montoya contacted Riley via pager and cell

telephone. Agent Barnes supervised these contacts. Again, the

agents set up surveillance in an adjoining hotel room and

monitored the delivery of approximately $60,000 by Riley to

Montoya. Montoya continued to provide agents with

information about Riley and his contacts outside the district.

Unable to identify Riley's local co-conspirators, Agent

Barnes decided to obtain pen registers for Riley's cellular

telephone with the hopes of obtaining authorization to intercept

Riley's telephone conversations. Records obtained through

subpoena revealed that Clay subscribed to the cellular telephone

number used by Riley to communicate with Montoya and other

CIs, and the cellular phone bills went to Clay's home address at

1030 Lynwood Drive, Montgomery, Alabama. Based on this

information about the unlawful use of the cellular telephone

subscribed to by Clay, the government sought and obtained a

wire tap order. On June 3, 1999, eleven days into the wire tap,

agents intercepted a conversation between Clay and Riley.

During this conversation, Clay complained about the poor

quality of the marijuana and his inability to sell it. Riley tried to

relieve Clay's anxiety by promising to pick up the marijuana and

give him some new marijuana when the next shipment came in.

Additionally, Clay and Riley used numbers that were consistent

with those used by Riley in a conversation with unindicted coconspirator, Louis Calvin Cook (“Cook”), when Riley and Cook

talked about marijuana.

When Riley realized that he was being followed by

agents, he met with Clay and gave him the cellular telephone.

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Clay took the cellular telephone to a local Powertel office and

changed the number. Additionally, Clay specifically requested

that the SIM card (i.e., a computer chip that identifies the phone

number with that card) be changed, resulting in the termination

of the first court authorized wiretap for that particular cellular

telephone. While in possession of the cellular telephone, Clay

answered the telephone and identified himself as Riley's

“partner” and promised to deliver a message to Riley. After

changing the number to the aforementioned cellular telephone,

Clay returned it to Riley.

On July 15, 1999, agents executed several search

warrants at locations associated with Riley, including Clay's

residence at 1030 Lynwood Drive, Montgomery, Alabama. The

agents also searched Riley's stash house at 1702 French Street,

Montgomery, Alabama, and Riley's main address at 5713

Portsmouth Drive, Montgomery, Alabama. Agents seized

several firearms from each of these locations (i.e., two from

Clay's residence, eight from Riley's home residence, and four

from Riley's stash house).

The evidence produced at trial demonstrated that Clay

was the subscriber for the telephone that Riley used to conduct

his drug trafficking business from 1996 to 1999 through which

Riley possessed and distributed thousands of pounds of

marijuana, more than fifty grams of cocaine base, and four

kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride. During the trial, the

government also presented the testimony of co-conspirator

Roderick Blanding (“Blanding”), who testified that he worked

for Riley. According to Blanding, Clay was one of Riley's

regular customers.

United States v. Clay, 376 F.3d 1296, 1298 -1299 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. General Principles

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The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists to protect the fundamental right to a fair

trial. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must satisfy both

prongs of the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The performance prong requires a movant to establish

that counsel performed outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and

made errors so serious that he failed to function as the kind of counsel guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89. The prejudice prong requires a movant

to demonstrate that seriously deficient performance of his counsel prejudiced the defense.

Id. at 687.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, a movant must first establish that his

attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 688. “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness

under prevailing professional norms.” Id. In other words, criminal defendants have a Sixth

Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.

470, 476 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and

adequate, and great deference is shown to choices dictated by reasonable trial strategy.

Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Review

of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is conducted from the perspective of defense

counsel, based on facts “as they were known to counsel at the time of the representation.”

U.S. v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1535 (11th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original); see Strickland,

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466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at that

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

The prejudice component of the Strickland test focuses on whether counsel’s deficient

performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Unreliability or unfairness is not established if counsel’s

assistance did not deprive the defendant of any constitutionally protected right. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 n.17 (2000).

To establish prejudice, a movant must show that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “[P]etitioners must affirmatively prove

prejudice because ‘[a]ttorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly

harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial. [T]hat the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding’ is insufficient to show prejudice.”

Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547, 551 (11th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

Unless a movant satisfies both prongs of the Strickland inquiry, relief should be

denied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, a court need not “address both

components of the inquiry if the [movant] makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.

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See, e.g., Duren v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1998) (“if a defendant cannot satisfy

the prejudice prong, the court need not address the performance prong”).

A criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel continues through direct

appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel may be shown if the movant can “establish ... that counsel omitted significant and

obvious issues while pursuing issues that were clearly and significantly weaker.... Generally,

only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of

effective assistance of counsel be overcome.” Mayo v. Henderson, 13 

F.3d 528, 533 (2nd Cir. 1994).

2. The Apprendi-related Claims

In Claims One and Four of his § 2255 motion, Clay argues that trial counsel should

have argued that, because the jury failed to determine the “objects” of the conspiracy

unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, the court erred in allowing him to be convicted

and sentenced under the conspiracy count. Specifically, Clay contends that trial counsel

failed to preserve at trial and abandoned on appeal a challenge to his conviction and sentence

based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004), and U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In other words, Clay asserts that defense

counsel failed to argue that “judge-determined facts established by a mere preponderance of

the evidence violate[] the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.” (Doc. No. 2, pp. 23-24.)

The underlying Apprendi-related claim concerning the jury’s failure to reach a

unanimous decision on the amount of drugs attributed to Clay was addressed by the Court

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on direct appeal. The Court determined as follows:

Clay contends that his conspiracy conviction should be

reversed because the jury could not unanimously agree that the

amount of drugs alleged in the superseding indictment should be

attributed to Clay. No authority supports this Apprendi-related

contention, and most of Clay’s argument is nothing more than

an attack on this Court’s holding in Sanchez. Clay received a

50-month sentence for violating § 841(b)(1)(D), when the

maximum sentence that statutory provision sets for the smallest

quantity of drugs is 60 months. Under Sanchez, no error

occurred.

Clay recognizes that in Sanchez, we held that drug type

and quantity are not required to be alleged in the indictment,

submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as

long as the statutory maximum punishment is not exceeded. See

Sanchez, 269 F.3d at 1268 (“To repeat the oft-repeated,

Apprendi explicitly limited its holding to facts ‘that increase []

the maximum penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum.’ Therefore Apprendi has no effect on cases

in which a defendant’s actual sentence falls within the range

prescribed by the statute for the crime of conviction.”). Clay’s

contention is that because the jury was asked to ascertain the

quantity of drugs for which he was accountable and was unable

to unanimously agree on that, the government failed to meet its

burden of proving every element of the charge beyond a

reasonable doubt. The flaw in Clay’s reasoning is that the

specific quantity of drugs for which he was accountable is not

an element of the crime charged. See United States v. Matthews,

168 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999). Under Sanchez,

specification of quantity does not become essential unless the

amount of the drugs involved is used to increase the defendant’s

sentence beyond the applicable maximum penalty for the

smallest detectable quantity. In this case it was not.

Had the district court sentenced Clay to a term of

imprisonment above the 60-month maximum for any detectable

quantity of drugs, see § 841(b)(1)(A) (maximum sentence of life

if 1000 kg or more of marijuana); § 841(b)(1)(B) (40-year

maximum if more than 100 of marijuana), Clay would have a

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point under Apprendi. However, recognizing that the failure of

the jury to agree on a specific drug quantity limited the type of

sentence it could impose on Clay, the district court sentenced

him to only 50 months, which is below the 60-month maximum

that he could have received pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(D).

Therefore, in light of our reasoning in Sanchez, the 50-month

sentence was in the permissible range and the district court did

not plainly err. See also United States v. Richards, 302 F.3d 58,

66 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[D]rug quantity becomes an element of the

offense under § 841 only where it may be used to impose a

sentence above the statutory maximum sentence” because “the

constitutional rule of Apprendi does not apply where the

sentence imposed is not greater than the prescribed maximum

for the offense of conviction”).

Clay, 376 F.3d at 1301.

To the extent Clay contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for emphasizing

the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Sanchez instead of the Supreme Court’s opinion in

Apprendi, his contention is unavailing. Although the Court discussed Sanchez, the Eleventh

Circuit also concluded that Clay’s Apprendi-related claims were without merit. The test used

to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel applies equally to an analysis of

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Jackson v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 712,

715 (11th Cir. 1991). Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise

meritless claims on appeal. See Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001); U.S.

v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000); Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1573

(11th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the failure to raise nonmeritorious issues does not

constitute ineffective assistance”). This court therefore concludes that Clay has failed to

demonstrate that appellate counsel’s emphasis on the Sanchez opinion fell below an objective

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1 In Cunningham v. California, No. 05-6551, ___ U.S. ___, 2007 WL 135687, at *4 (January 22,

2007), the Court noted that its decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Ring v. Arizona,

536 U.S. 584 (2002), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005), establish that the United States Constitution’s jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme

that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior

conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.

12

standard of reasonableness and prejudiced his case. See Strickland, supra. 

To the extent Clay asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to provide a

successful avenue for him to amend his appellate brief with claims challenging his conviction

and sentence in light of the holdings in Blakely, Booker, and other Apprendi-related

opinions,1

 the court concludes that Clay’s contention is likewise without merit. The Eleventh

Circuit determined that Clay’s contention that his conspiracy conviction should be reversed

because the jury could not unanimously agree on the amount of drugs was without merit. See

Clay, 376 F.3d at 1300-01. The Court specifically determined that Clay’s Apprendi-related

claims must fail because his 50-month sentence was below the 60-month sentence he could

have received. Id., at 1301. Consequently, Clay has failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s

failure to assert more specific Apprendi-related claims at trial and on direct appeal fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced his case. See Strickland, supra. 

3. The Disparity of Sentences

Clay asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim

challenging the disparity between his and his co-defendant’s sentences. The Government

argues that the disparity in sentences is justified because Clay received a higher offense level

than his co-defendant, Sonja Brown (“Brown”). The record demonstrates that Brown’s

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offense level was 14, that her criminal history category was 1, and that she was sentenced to

15 months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count. (Doc. No. 15-3, 57.) Thus, the guideline

range for Brown’s conspiracy conviction was 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. (Id.) Clay’s

offense level was 24, his criminal history category was 1, the guideline range for his

conspiracy conviction was 51 to 60 months’ imprisonment, but he was sentenced to 50

months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count,. (Id., at 68.) 

At sentencing, trial counsel argued that the Court’s findings concerning relevant

conduct with respect to Brown and Clay were inconsistent. (Id., at 76.) Specifically, trial

counsel argued that, although the facts demonstrated that both Brown and Clay had provided

another defendant, John Riley (“Riley”), with cellular phones, the court found that Brown

did not foresee that providing the telephone would “enable [Riley] to conduct his business.”

(Id.) Trial counsel questioned the court’s determination that the evidence demonstrated that

Clay should have known, based on his relationship with Riley, that at least 100 kilograms of

marijuana were foreseeable as to Carlie Bill Thompson, another co-defendant. However, the

court found differences between each defendants’ relevant conduct, specifically finding that,

due to the nature of Brown and Riley’s amorous relationship, Riley did not have “the control

over Mr. Clay that he had over Ms. Brown.” (Id., at 77.) The court specifically recognized

“that the nature of Ms. Brown’s involvement was quite different from Mr. Clay’s” Id.

The record clearly demonstrates that both Brown and Clay had a special relationship

with Riley; however, it is likewise clear that Riley’s relationship with Brown was based on

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 At sentencing, the court noted that Clay “was in a friendship with knowledge of what was going

on” and that “there was nothing to blind him as to the dramatic depth and breadth of this operation.” (Doc.

No. 15-3, p. 16.)

14

mutual attraction, while his relationship with Clay was based on business and friendship.2

Therefore, although both defendants were convicted of conspiracy, their specific roles in

relation to the specific conduct were obviously different. More importantly, Clay has failed

to present any evidence demonstrating that, in light of the facts used to calculate each

defendants’ offense level, the disparities in sentencing were so severe as to give rise to a

constitutional violation. For example, Clay has failed to demonstrate that he was similarly

situated with Brown or that the reason for the differential treatment was based on a

constitutionally protected interest. See Damiano v. Fla. Parole and Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d

929 (11th Cir. 1986); Boglin v. Thomas, No. CA 00-0035-CB-C, 2001 WL 102337, *9 (S.D.

Ala. Jan. 2, 2001). Consequently, to the extent Clay asserts that appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to present a claim challenging his sentence based on the disparities

between his and Brown’s sentences, the court concludes that Clay has failed to demonstrate

that counsel’s failure to raise this non-meritorious argument on appeal fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and prejudiced his case. See Strickland, supra.

4. The Offer for a Mistrial

Clay contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with him

concerning the trial court’s “offer” to retry the drug quantity issue. Specifically, Clay asserts

that trial counsel “forfeited this most important offer to confront the fact that there was no

evidence of any kind that connected his client with any drugs.” (Doc. No. 2, p. 17.) 

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Prior to sentencing, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: The Court calls the case of United States of America vs.

Clarence Clay. Actually, I’ll call the cases of Clarence

Clay as well as Sonja Brown. There are several common

issues that we may as well take up together. Now the

court still has outstanding a motion for judgment of

acquittal by both defendants, and I wanted some

clarification first of all from the United States as to

whether they intend to pursue a retrial with regard to the

amount of drugs that the jury could not reach a verdict

on.

FRANKLIN: No, Your Honor, not at this point.

THE COURT: Does the defendant want a retrial on that issue?

GLASSROTH: On the issue of the jury’s failure to arrive at a quantity

determination?

THE COURT: Yes.

GLASSROTH: No, sir.

THE COURT: Well in light of the fact that both defendants – well, let

me ask Ms. Brown’s attorney.

JONES: No, sir.

THE COURT: In light of the fact that both the Government and the

defendants, that is Clarence Clay and Sonja Brown, do

not wish a retrial on the amount of drugs issued, the

Court will sentence both defendants, that is Clay and

Brown, within the limits allowed by Apprendi. The

motions for judgment of acquittal will be denied as to

both defendants. So we’ll now proceed with sentencing.

(Doc. No. 3, p. 25; Sentencing Hearing Transcript, pp. 2-3.)

First, the court notes that Clay’s contention that the court “offered” to retry the drug

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quantity issue is a misinterpretation of what took place at the hearing. The transcript

demonstrates that the trial judge merely asked counsel to clarify whether his motion for a

judgment of acquittal included a motion for a new trial with respect to the drug quantity

issue. The trial court, however, did not offer a retrial on the drug quantity issue at any point

in the proceedings. (Id.)

Moreover, in the context of this case trial counsel was not obligated to confer with his

client when deciding whether to pursue a motion for a new trial. In Florida v. Nixon, 543

U.S. 175 (2004), the Court discussed when a criminal defense attorney has a duty to consult

with his client.

An attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the

client regarding “important decisions,” including questions of

overarching defense strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104

S.Ct. 2052. That obligation, however, does not require counsel

to “obtain the defendant’s consent to ‘every tactical decision.’”

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) (an attorney has

authority to manage most aspects of the defense without

obtaining his client’s approval). But certain decisions regarding

the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment

that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate. A

defendant, this Court affirmed, has the “ultimate authority” to

determine “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his

or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.

745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); Wainwright

v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93, n.1, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594

(1977) (Burger, C. J., concurring). Concerning those decisions,

an attorney must both consult with the defendant and obtain

consent to the recommended course of action.

Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187. Because trial counsel was not obligated to consult with Clay prior

to forgoing a motion for a new trial with respect to the drug quantity issue, this court

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concludes that Clay has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were objectively

unreasonable. See Strickland, supra.

The court also notes that counsel’s decision to forego a motion for a new trial with

respect to the drug quantity issue appears to be a matter of sound strategy under the

circumstances of this case. In many respects, Clay’s arguments presented here are premised

on the erroneous notion that a new trial would have addressed anew the issue of his guilt.

Plainly, that view is incorrect. The jury found Clay guilty of conspiracy to distribute and

possess with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, cocaine base, and marijuana, and the

jury’s failure to reach agreement on the drug quantity issue does not in any way undermine

the validity of that verdict. See Clay, 376 F.3d at 1301 (determining that the specific quantity

of drugs for which Clay was accountable was not an element of the conspiracy charge). 

Even if the trial court had retried the drug quantity issue, the best Clay might have hoped for

was receipt of the same sentence. If a new jury had reached agreement on drug quantity,

Clay may well have received a higher sentence. Given Clay’s risk of receiving a higher

sentence, counsel’s decision to forego a motion for a new trial on the basis of the jury’s

failure to reach a unanimous verdict on drug quantity was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances. See Strickland, supra. Finally, the court concludes that, even assuming

arguendo, that trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable (which it surely was

not), for the reasons already discussed Clay has failed to demonstrate that he suffered

prejudiced as a result of trial counsel’s failure to pursue a motion for a new trial with respect

to the drug quantity issue. See Strickland, supra. 

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18

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Clay’s § 2255 motion with respect

to his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel are due to be denied.

B. Procedural Default

Clay’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is procedurally defaulted because Clay failed

to raise this claim on direct appeal. U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982); Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478 (1986); Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 1996). However, a movant may

avoid the procedural bar by demonstrating “cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence.”

Jones v. U. S., 153 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998). Clay asserts that he satisfies the cause

and prejudice standard because appellate counsel failed to raise his prosecutorial misconduct

claim on direct appeal. Specifically, Clay contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to assert that the Government knowingly used perjured or false testimony of a witness,

Roderick Blanding (“Blanding”). Clay asserts that Blanding’s testimony concerning the

number of times he sold drugs to him and the amount of marijuana attributed to him was

false. (Doc. No. 2, p. 27-28.) 

It is well-settled law that the “deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the

presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with the ‘rudimentary demands of

justice.’”Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.

103, 112 (1935)); DeMarco v. U.S., 928 F.2d 1074, 1076 (11th Cir. 1991). However, only

the knowing use of perjured testimony constitutes a due process violation. U.S. v. Lopez, 985

F.2d 520, 524 (11th Cir. 1993). “In connection with the general claim that the prosecution

colluded with the witness to commit perjury . . . the burden is on the [defendant] to allege and

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3

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as

binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.

4

 The court noted that Blanding “perked up” on cross-examination. (Sentencing Transcript, p. 12.)

19

prove, not conclusions, but facts which would entitle him to relief.” Smith v. U.S., 252 F.2d

369, 371 (5th Cir. 1958).3

Clay points to certain statements that a probation officer made at sentencing to support

his argument that the Government knew that Blanding’s testimony was false. During the

sentencing proceeding, a probation officer stated that he “did not find Blanding to be

extremely credible because of the way he testified.” (Doc. No. 15-3, p. 4; Sentencing

Transcript, p. 10.) In addition, the probation officer noted that Blanding mumbled and

looked down during direct examination and that Blanding’s testimony was inconsistent with

a prior statement given to an agent at Maxwell Air Force Base.4

 (Id., at pp. 10-11.)

Neither Blanding’s demeanor on the stand during direct examination nor his prior

inconsistent statements demonstrate that his testimony was false or that the Government had

knowledge of its falsity. See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 662 F.2d 728, 730 (11th Cir. 1981)

(Prior inconsistent statements are insufficient to demonstrate knowing use of false

testimony). See also Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 n.5 (1985) (Differences in

statements do not compel conclusion that statements are false but only reflect on credibility.);

Overdear v. United States, No. 05-13443, 2006 WL 3826673, *1 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that

“it may well be that the witness’ subsequent statements were true, in which event the claim

of inconsistency is not a constitutional objection” (citation omitted)). Based on the

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20

foregoing, the court concludes that Clay has failed to show that the Government engaged in

the deliberate deception of the court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence.

Consequently, Clay has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to raise this nonmeritorious issue on appeal fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced

his case. See Strickland, supra. Because the court concludes that Clay’s allegation of

ineffective assistance of counsel is wholly without merit, Clay has failed to demonstrate

cause for his procedural default. 

Clay also asserts that this court should consider his prosecutorial misconduct claim

because he is actually innocent. The “actual innocence” standard is set forth in Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995), and is linked to a “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

analysis. Id. at 315. Innocence is not an independent claim; rather, it is the “gateway”

through which a movant must pass before a court may consider constitutional claims which

are defaulted or barred. Id. This exception applies where a movant establishes that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); Schlup, supra. Actual innocence

is defined as “factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S.

614, 623 (1998); Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1367 (11th Cir. 2003). Nothing in the

record before the court calls into question the jury’s verdict in this case. The court therefore

concludes that Clay’s conclusory claim that “the record supports the fact that numerous

constitutional violations took place to convict someone who was actually innocent of the

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5

 (Doc. No. 22-1, p. 9.) 

21

offense”5

 fails to satisfy the standard set forth in Schlup, supra. Consequently, Clay’s

procedurally defaulted claim is foreclosed from review in this § 2255 motion.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion be denied as the claims presented therein entitle the defendant to no

relief.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before March 12, 2007. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation objected to. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are

advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

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22

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done this 26th day of February, 2007.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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