Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05331/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05331-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 15, 2013 Decided February 4, 2014

No. 12-5331

CAROLYN JUREWICZ, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND

HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-01683)

Ira T. Kasdan argued the cause for appellants. With him on

the brief was Elizabeth C. Johnson. 

Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Aaron D. Green and Jonathan R. Lovvorn were on the brief

for intervenor The Humane Society of the United States in

support of appellee.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, ROGERS, Circuit Judge,

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

 ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In this reverse-FOIA case, dog

breeders and dealers in Missouri challenge the Department of

Agriculture’s decision to release information in their annual

reports relating to their gross revenue and business volume. 

They contend the information requested by the Humane Society

of the United States under the Freedom of Information Act

(“FOIA”) is covered by Exemptions 4 and 6, which protect

confidential commercial or financial information and personal

privacy, respectively, and that the Department’s reasoning was

arbitrary and capricious. For the following reasons, we affirm

the grant of summary judgment to the Department and the

Humane Society.

I.

The Animal Welfare Act requires dealers of animals,

including dogs, to obtain an annual license from the Department

of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. § 2134. The Department must charge

a licensing fee that is “reasonable” and “adjusted on an equitable

basis taking into consideration the type and nature of the

operations to be licensed.” Id. § 2153. Under Department

regulations, dealers renew their licenses by paying the required

fee and filing an application and annual report, Form 7003, with

the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“the Service”). 

9 C.F.R. § 2.5(b). Block 8 (or Block 10 in some versions) of

Form 7003 asks for (1) the total number of animals purchased

and sold in the last year; (2) the gross revenue from regulated

activities; and (3) for dealers that are not breeders, the difference

between the purchase price and sale price of the animals sold. 

In addition, the Service conducts on-site inspections of licensed

breeders and dealers and publishes the inspection reports on its

website; those reports include the number of dogs counted at the

time of the inspection. 

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In 2009, the Humane Society submitted three FOIA

requests for copies of Form 7003s received by the Service. The

first two named specific licensees; the third requested Form

7003s for “all dog breeders and dealers” in Missouri. Initially,

the Department determined that Block 8 information was

covered by Exemptions 4 and 6, and redacted it before releasing

the forms to the Humane Society. The Humane Society

appealed in May 2010, and when it failed to receive a response,

it filed suit in October 2010. While this lawsuit was pending,

the Department solicited comments from the affected licensees

on whether they thought releasing Block 8 information would

cause substantial competitive harm. Upon reviewing the

responses, the Department concluded the information should be

released and notified the licensees in March 2011. 

In April 2011, appellants, who are (or whose members are)

licensed dog breeders and dealers in Missouri, sued to prevent

release of the Block 8 information. The Department moved for

a voluntary remand upon discovering an error in the March 2011

decision letter, which was granted. On remand, the Department

solicited additional comments. After review of these comments,

the Department again concluded that no FOIA exemption

applied to the Block 8 information and that the information

should be released. Appellants filed a second amended

complaint, and the parties filed cross motions for summary

judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the

Department and the Humane Society. Appellants appeal, and

this court directly reviews the Department’s decision under the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 ff. See Enterprise

Nat’l Bank v. Vilsack, 568 F.3d 229, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

II.

Under FOIA, “each agency, upon any request for records

which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in

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accordance with published rules . . . , shall make the records

promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). 

Certain categories of information are exempt from this general

disclosure requirement, but the exemptions are to be “narrowly

construed.” Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361

(1976). Appellants contend the Department’s decision to release

the Block 8 information is arbitrary and capricious in concluding

release of the total number of animals bought and sold by

appellants, and their gross revenues, would not cause them

substantial competitive harm. They rely on Exemption 4, which

covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information

obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(4). Likewise, appellants contend that the public

interests identified by the Department would not be served by

release and, alternatively, the Department failed to give

appropriate weight to their private interests in balancing the

public and private interests. They rely on Exemption 6, which

covers “personnel and medical files and similar files the

disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy.” Id. § 552(b)(6). 

In a reverse-FOIA case, the court must uphold the

Department’s decision to release the Block 8 information in

appellants’ Form 7003s unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see United Techs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def.,

601 F.3d 557, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Unlike a typical FOIA

case, in which the court would undertake its own analysis of the

interests at stake, see, e.g., Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of

Agric., 515 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Consumers’ Checkbook

Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,

554 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2009), under this deferential standard

of review, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of

the Department, but the Department must “examine the relevant

data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action

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including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the

choice made,’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal

citation omitted). The court does not defer to “conclusory or

unsupported suppositions.” United Techs., 601 F.3d at 562

(quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Dep’t of the Air Force,

375 F.3d 1182, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).

A.

Exemption 4 protects “trade secrets and commercial or

financial information obtained from a person and privileged or

confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). The only question here is

whether the Block 8 information, which is “commercial or

financial information” and not “privileged,” is “confidential.” 

Here, “confidential” means that “disclosure would be likely

either ‘(1) to impair the Government’s ability to obtain

necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial

harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the

information was obtained.’” Critical Mass Energy Project v.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (en banc) (quoting Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v.

Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). This requires a

showing of both actual competition and a likelihood of

substantial competitive injury. CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830

F.2d 1132, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court will “generally

defer to the agency’s predictive judgments as to ‘the

repercussions of disclosure.’” United Techs., 601 F.3d at 563

(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 375 F.3d at 1191 n.4). 

The Department determined Exemption 4 did not apply

because the Block 8 information was unlikely to cause

substantial competitive harm to appellants. Decision of Feb. 17,

2012 at 12. It reasoned that competitors would not be able to

use gross revenue and inventory data to undercut licensees’

pricing because there were too many variables, such as breed,

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age, quality, and market demands, to make a price per dog

calculation feasible. See id. at 9. Further, even if the price

could be calculated, the information would be stale. Id. The

Department also determined that release would not significantly

assist competitors in gauging the scale of a licensee’s operation

because similar information is already in the public domain. Id. 

at 11–12. 

Appellants contend that the Department’s analysis

improperly ignored the Humane Society’s intended use of this

information in “its crusade to destroy [appellants’] businesses,”

Appellants’ Br. 53. Exemption 4, however, “does not guard

against mere embarrassment in the marketplace or reputational

injury” of the kind appellants describe. United Techs, 601 F.3d

at 564. Additionally, substantial competitive harm must “flow

from the affirmative use of proprietary information by

competitors.” Id. at 563 (quoting CNA Fin. Corp., 830 F.2d at

1154). In asking the court to hold that the competitor rule

should not apply in their case, see Appellants’ Br. 57, appellants

seem to recognize that the Humane Society is not a competitor

of commercial dog breeders and dealers and that this court’s

precedent is against them. This court is bound by the law of the

circuit. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (en banc). 

Appellants’ suggestion that the Department’s conclusion on

substantial competitive harm impermissibly relied on the

existence of similar publicly available information is based on

Painting and Drywall Work Preservation Fund, Inc. v.

Department of Housing and Urban Development, 936 F.2d

1300, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991). That case addresses Exemption 6

and, consequently, fails to demonstrate that the Department’s

Exemption 4 conclusion was arbitrary or capricious. 

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B.

Potentially more favorable to appellants, Exemption 6

protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the

disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). The

parties agree the Block 8 information is a “similar file,”

disputing only whether “disclosure would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” To answer this

question, the Department first had to determine whether

“disclosure would compromise a substantial, as opposed to a de

minimis, privacy interest.” Consumers’ Checkbook, 554 F.3d at

1050 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner,

879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). In this context, “[a]

substantial privacy interest is anything greater than a de minimis

privacy interest.” Multi Ag, 515 F.3d at 1229–30. If a

substantial privacy interest exists, then that interest must be

balanced against any public interest in disclosure. Id. “[T]he

only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis [is]

the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would

‘shed light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties’

or otherwise let citizens know ‘what their government is up to.’” 

Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497

(1994) (quoting Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for

Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). The “use for

which the requestor seeks the information is not relevant for

purposes of determining the public interest.” Multi Ag, 515 F.3d

at 1231 n.2 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees, 879

F.2d at 875). FOIA’s “strong presumption in favor of

disclosure,” Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991), is

“at its zenith” in this Exemption 6 analysis. Nat’l Ass’n of

Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

“[U]nless the invasion of privacy is ‘clearly unwarranted,’ the

public interest in disclosure must prevail.” Ray, 502 U.S. at 177.

The Department concluded that Exemption 6 did not apply. 

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First, it found that licensees have a “limited privacy interest” in

their personal financial information (gross dollars earned

through regulated activities) but this interest is “lessened”

because Block 8 shows only gross income and not net profit and

so “does not provide a complete picture of the individual’s

finances.” Decision of Feb. 17, 2012 at 5. Nonetheless, the

Department concluded there was a non-negligible, limited

privacy interest in this information. A much weaker, negligible

privacy interest existed, however, in the number of animals

bought and sold in a given year. The Department acknowledged

that this information “could shed light on the size of a licensee’s

operation,” but stated that similar information is independently

available from the Department’s published inspection reports of

licensee facilities, which include the number of dogs counted at

the time of the inspection. Id. Although the inspection count

does not necessarily reflect the annual totals of animals bought

and sold, it does provide some information regarding the size of

the licensee’s operation. The Department discounted comments

expressing concern about alleged harassment incited by the

Humane Society, explaining that many of the comments

regarding privacy concerns did not address the specific

information at issue, namely the number of dogs bought and

sold and the gross revenue from regulated activities, and that

“the licensees’ association with the industry” is public

knowledge. Id. at 4. 

By contrast, the Department found there was “a significant

public interest in release of the information at issue.” Id. at 5. 

Specifically, the Block 8 information would assist the public in

assessing whether the Department is fulfilling its statutory

mandate to charge “reasonable” and “equitable” fees, 7 U.S.C.

§ 2153, and is properly assessing fees in accordance with its

regulations. Decision of Feb. 17, 2012 at 7. In addition, the

public could gauge the effectiveness of inspections by

comparing data on Form 7003 with publicly available inspection

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reports. Id. Balancing the two interests, the Department

concluded that “[t]he public’s interest in the activities of the

[Department] outweigh the negligible privacy interest in the

number of animals bought and sold and the minimal privacy

interest in the gross dollars earned from regulated activities and

the dollars upon which the fee was based.” Id. Therefore, it

concluded, “[a]lthough there is a privacy interest, release of this

information would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion

of personal privacy.” Id. 

Appellants contend that the Department’s reasoning is

arbitrary and capricious because they see no valid public interest

in disclosure of the Block 8 information. Even if Block 8

information did provide some information about the

Department, they maintain the Department understated their

privacy interest and overestimated the purported public interests.

The record shows that the Department “examine[d] the relevant

data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation” for its

conclusions “including a rational connection between the facts

found and the choice made.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463

U.S. at 43 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);

United Techs, 601 F.3d at 562. Contrary to appellants’ position, 

the Department’s characterization of licensees’ privacy interest

in their gross revenue information as “limited” was sufficiently

explained, see Decision of Feb. 17, 2012 at 5, as was the

Department’s conclusion regarding comments about harassment

allegedly incited by the Humane Society. Notably, publicly

available licensee inspection reports and licensees’ own

advertising materials include their names and addresses and

information about the scale of their operations. 

Similarly, appellants fail to show that the Department’s

identification of three public interests in disclosure of the Block

8 information was arbitrary or capricious. Appellants maintain

that a valid public interest under FOIA exists only if the

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information sought would “contribute significantly to public

understanding of the operations or activities of the government.” 

Appellants’ Br. 24 (quoting Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor

Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 495). This misstates the standard. 

The quote from Department of Defense v. Federal Labor

Relations Authority on which they rely articulates the “core

purpose of the FOIA,” 510 U.S. at 495 (quoting Reporters’

Comm., 489 U.S. at 775), not the required nexus between the

information at issue and public understanding of government

activity. The proper inquiry is whether the information “sheds

light” on government activities, Ray, 502 U.S. at 177–78

(quoting Reporters’ Comm., 489 U.S. at 773), and whether it

would “appreciably further” public understanding of the

government’s actions, Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations

Auth., 510 U.S. at 497. A public interest exists where the public

“can more easily determine” whether an agency is in compliance

with a statutory mandate, Multi Ag, 515 F.3d at 1232, even if

“the data will not be perfect” with respect to the value of the

information that might be derived from that requested. Am.

Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C.

Cir. 2011). 

The gross revenue information in Block 8 does not provide

perfect data concerning whether the Department’s fee schedule

is reasonable and equitable and whether it is properly assessing

fees, but it does add to the public’s knowledge. The Department

could reasonably conclude that it would assist observers in

evaluating the Department’s activity. Similarly, comparisons

between the number of dogs reported on licensing applications

and counted during inspections could assist the public in

determining whether the Department is properly pursuing any

significant discrepancies, which might indicate problems such

as disease, business changes, or fraud in licensing applications. 

See Decision of Feb. 17, 2012 at 7. On the other hand,

disclosure of redacted documents, as appellants propose, would

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decrease the utility of the information because comparisons

between individual businesses’ Block 8 information and

published inspection reports would not be possible. In any

event, the suggestion for redaction was not presented to the

Department and is therefore forfeited. See, e.g., Riffin v. Surface

Transp. Bd., 733 F.3d 340, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And, contrary

to appellants’ assertion, the record offers no indication that

members of the public lack the expertise necessary to

meaningfully compare inspection reports and Block 8

information. Moreover, appellants err in suggesting that a

public interest in disclosure of the Block 8 information can only

exist where there is evidence of agency impropriety. Although

in a traditional FOIA case a requester who asserts a public

interest in uncovering Government deficiencies or misfeasance

must produce evidence to support that public interest, see Nat’l

Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174

(2004); Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at

497 n.6, a reverse-FOIA case presents a different situation. The

Department has reasonably explained why there is a sufficient

public interest and why release of this information would not

constitute a “clearly unwarranted” invasion of personal privacy.

To prevail, appellants must demonstrate that conclusion is

arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law, and they have failed

to do so. See Multi Ag, 515 F.3d at 1233. 

There is no merit in appellants’ alternative procedural

arguments that the Department did not give licensees a

meaningful opportunity to respond to its analysis and that by

failing to “provide the submitter an opportunity to object to any

decision to disclose the information” it violated its regulations,

7 C.F.R. § 1.12. Appellants cite no authority for the procedural

requirements they assert and the regulatory provision on which

they rely applies only to cases in which the Department cannot

readily determine whether Exemption 4, not Exemption 6,

applies. Reverse-FOIA actions “are in the nature of informal

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adjudications,” Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d

325, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and in such adjudications, “agencies

must satisfy only ‘minimal procedural requirements,’”

Southwest Airlines Co. v. TSA, 650 F.3d 752, 757 (D.C. Cir.

2011) (citation omitted). Appellants fail to show such

procedural requirements were not met in their case.

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to

the Department and the Humane Society.

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