Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00720/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00720-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HECTOR PABLO MOLINA,

Petitioner, 

v.

ERIC ARNOLD, Warden,

Respondent. 

Case No.: 16cv720-JLS-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California.

Hector Pablo Molina (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

seeks federal habeas relief from a felony conviction for second degree murder. 

After reviewing the operative First Amended Petition (“FAP”) [ECF No. 6], 

Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support 

thereof (“Answer”) [ECF No. 13], Petitioner’s Traverse [ECF No. 18] and 

pertinent state court lodgments, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be 

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DENIED for the reasons stated below.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. State Proceedings

“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be 

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has the “burden 

of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id.; see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (stating 

that federal courts are required to “give great deference to the state court’s 

factual findings.”)). 

Petitioner argues that the state court opinion is based on an 

unreasonable determination of facts. (ECF Nos. 6 at 8, 18 at 2-4). To prevail 

on this ground, Petitioner would have to demonstrate that the factual 

findings upon which the state court’s determination rests are objectively 

unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Petitioner 

makes no such argument. Petitioner does not identify facts he believes the 

Court of Appeal decided incorrectly. Rather, Petitioner provides the legal 

standard and makes a conclusory statement that the facts were unreasonably 

determined. (See ECF Nos. 6 at 8, 18 at 2-4). Petitioner merely states that 

“the trial court’s reliance on assumptionw [sic], its willingness to disregard 

those facts pointing to actual bias, and lack of objectivity resulted in clear 

error and entitle [Petitioner] to relief.” (ECF No. 18 at 3-4). This is 

insufficient to show that the Court of Appeal’s decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts and so this Court will consider its 

decision under the deferential AEDPA standard of review. Accordingly, the 

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s November 20, 

2015, opinion in People v. Molina, Appeal No. D066260. (See Lodg. No. 6). 

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The Prosecution Case

Jerry Macagno testified that he and [Petitioner] had been 

friends for many years. Macagno rented a space on his property on 

Hollister Street to [Petitioner] so that [Petitioner] could park his 

motor home there. [Petitioner] stayed in the motor home most of 

the time, but sometimes stayed at his mother’s home on Clairton 

Place.

On June 3, 2013, Macagno and [Petitioner] spent the day 

together. They went to a bank so [Petitioner] could withdraw 

money to pay rent to Macagno, and had lunch at a fast-food 

restaurant. While running these errands, a prostitute 

propositioned them. [Petitioner] offered to procure her services for 

Macagno, but Macagno declined. When they returned to Macagno’s 

home, they watched pornography and drank shots of bourbon. 

Altogether, they consumed up to one and one-half flask-sized 

bottles of bourbon.

Macagno said [Petitioner] began making phone calls to arrange for 

prostitutes to come to Macagno’s house. [Petitioner] became 

increasingly agitated as he was unable to reach the parties he was 

calling. [Petitioner] said “he wanted to kill the guy” and made a 

striking or stabbing gesture. Sometime that day or the day before, 

Macagno had given [Petitioner] a hunting knife, which Macagno 

saw [Petitioner] put in the glove box of [Petitioner’s] truck. 

[Petitioner] then got in his red Dodge truck and drove off.

Melvin Breaux testified that on June 3 he was homeless and 

lived in a tent near the Strawberry Fields area of Chula Vista. 

About two months earlier, he befriended another homeless man, 

David Craig, who had been living in an inoperable van in 

Strawberry Fields for about three years. One June 3, Breaux and 

Craig were sorting bottles for recycling. About 3:00 p.m., 

[Petitioner] drove up in his truck. Breaux had never seen 

[Petitioner] before, but Craig appeared to know him. Craig casually 

walked toward [Petitioner] and said, “What’s up, Big John?” 

[Petitioner] had his hands in his jacket. Breaux returned to sorting 

bottles, but later looked up and saw that Craig was bent over and 

[Petitioner] had him in a headlock. When [Petitioner] released 

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Craig, Craig fell to the ground saying, “I don’t know why you did 

that to me. I never done nothing to hurt you,” or “[W]hy did you do 

that to me Big John? I never done nothing to hurt you.” [Petitioner]

was holding a bloody hunting knife. He walked back to his truck 

and drove away.

As [Petitioner] drove off, Breaux wrote the license plate 

number on the dirt. Breaux walked to the area behind a nearby 

apartment complex and borrowed someone’s phone to call 911. 

Chula Vista police officers arrived within minutes, but Craig was 

declared dead at the scene. Breaux flagged down one of the arriving 

officers, recounted what had happened, and drew a picture of 

[Petitioner’s] knife.

Using the license plate information Breaux had captured, 

police identified a nearby address and broadcast a be-on-thelookout for [Petitioner’s] truck. Two San Diego police officers 

responded to the broadcast that afternoon and saw [Petitioner’s]

unoccupied truck parked near his mother’s house. They saw 

[Petitioner] get in his truck and drive off; they tailed him until he 

parked in Macagno’s driveway. After a while, [Petitioner] backed 

the truck out of the driveway and struck a vehicle that was stopped 

at a red light. The officers intervened and noticed blood on 

[Petitioner’s] pants and shoes. One of the officers also saw a 

hunting knife between the driver’s and passenger’s seat of 

[Petitioner’s] truck. The officers detained [Petitioner] for the Chula 

Vista police. When [Petitioner] was arrested, he had blood on his 

hands, shoes, pants, socks, and leg. There was also blood on the 

truck’s steering wheel and ignition switch.

Chula Vista police drove Breaux to where [Petitioner] was 

detained. Breaux identified [Petitioner] with 100 percent certainty 

as the person who stabbed Craig. Breaux also saw [Petitioner’s]

truck and said, “‘I think that’s the truck that the guy was driving.’”

While [Petitioner] was being booked into jail, he was crying 

and loudly said, “I can’t believe I’m here for hitting that lady’s car. 

Is she okay?” and “God, please forgive me” or “God, please help me.”

Chula Vista police detectives Michael Varga and Ricardo Cruz 

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interviewed [Petitioner] at the police station about 10:30 p.m. on 

June 3. [Petitioner] initially provided a detailed accounting of his 

day, which had him running a variety of errands, none of which 

involved the victim or Strawberry Fields. When asked to explain 

why witnesses had seen him and his truck in Chula Vista when he 

claimed to be at Macagno’s house, [Petitioner] changed his story 

and acknowledged he “might have been in . . . the wrong place at 

the . . . wrong time” and “saw somebody else . . . do something that 

. . . was a tragedy . . . .” [Petitioner] claimed he stopped at 

Strawberry Fields to urinate while picking up dinner for his 

mother. While there, [Petitioner] heard Craig moaning and saw 

him on the ground. [Petitioner] had never seen Craig before and 

did not know who he was. [Petitioner] lifted Craig’s body to see if 

he was alive, but “he didn’t seem to be.” [Petitioner] said he locked 

eyes with a Mexican man wearing a gray cap, blue jeans, and a 

striped shirt. The man ran away and [Petitioner] got back in his 

truck and left. [Petitioner] acknowledged Macagno had recently

given him the hunting knife and that he ([Petitioner]) had shown it 

to his mother June 2. [Petitioner] had no explanation for how, if 

the knife had been used in Craig’s murder, it ended up in his truck.

When asked about a possible motive for Craig’s killing, 

[Petitioner] told detectives he thought the suspect was “a junkie” he 

might have done drugs with once in the past. [Petitioner] claimed 

he had been clean for six months.

A pathologist testified that Craig died from a six-inch-deep 

stab wound that penetrated his ribs, lungs, and heart. The stab 

wound was consistent with being caused by the knife that was 

recovered from [Petitioner’s] truck. DNA evidence confirmed that 

the blood found on the steering wheel, [Petitioner’s] shoes, and the 

knife belonged to Craig. Law enforcement witnesses testified that 

tire and shoe tread imprints at the crime scene matched the tires 

on [Petitioner’s] truck and tread on [Petitioner’s] shoes.

The Defense Case

[Petitioner] testified in his defense. He said he got drunk on 

eight to 10 shots of bourbon at Macagno’s house while watching 

pornography. [Petitioner] made several phone calls in an 

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unsuccessful attempt to summon prostitutes. [Petitioner] then 

went to Strawberry Fields, where he had previously bought drugs 

and used prostitutes.

[Petitioner] claimed he knew both Craig and Breaux from 

their involvement in the drug trade at Strawberry Fields: Craig 

sold clean syringes and Breaux was a “doorman” who kept guard 

for a drug dealer named Paul. Two days before Craig’s murder, 

[Petitioner] purchased a syringe from Craig, purchased drugs from 

Paul, and had sex with a prostitute Breaux provided.

On June 3, [Petitioner] went to Strawberry Fields to buy 

drugs and obtain prostitutes. He purchased a syringe from Craig 

and then, with Breaux’s help, purchased drugs from Paul. 

[Petitioner] got high with a prostitute and used her services. As he 

was leaving, he gave Craig some drugs as a tip and returned to his 

truck. [Petitioner] remembered he had a used syringe in his pocket 

and started to walk back into the fields to put it in a tree where 

people leave used needles.

[Petitioner] heard a “commotion” around Craig’s van. 

[Petitioner] saw a man leaving and Craig lying in a pool of blood. 

[Petitioner] lifted Craig’s body, but heard his “last gasp.” 

[Petitioner] said he saw a man leaving Strawberry Fields. The man 

looked at [Petitioner], so [Petitioner] “got the hell out of there as 

fast as [he] could.” Still drunk and high, [Petitioner] returned to 

Macagno’s house to stash some of his leftover drugs.

[Petitioner] testified he did not see the knife in his truck and 

did not know how it ended up there. He acknowledged Macagno 

had given him a hunting knife earlier, but claimed he gave it to 

Breaux two weeks earlier in exchange for drugs.

[Petitioner] testified he lied during his interview with 

detectives to protect his drug connections. He claimed he was still 

drunk and high during the interview and did not remember what 

he said or why he answered the way he did.

[Petitioner] called two additional witnesses. Rosa Valenzuela 

(the mother of the woman who loaned her phone to Breaux) testified 

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she saw a red Ford truck near Strawberry Fields around the time 

of the murder that did not resemble photographs of [Petitioner’s]

truck. [Petitioner’s] cousin, Bertha Luna, testified she smoked 

drugs with Breaux on several occasions, and heard Breaux’s 

associates state that Breaux told the police that [Petitioner] had 

killed someone “they had killed.”

Jury Verdict and Sentence

The People charged [Petitioner] with the first degree murder 

of Craig and further alleged [Petitioner’s] personal use of a knife. 

(Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The jury found 

[Petitioner] guilty of second degree murder and made a true finding 

on the knife-used enhancement. The trial court sentenced 

[Petitioner] to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life and credited 

him with 382 days of presentence custody.

(Lodg. No. 6 at 2-8 (footnotes omitted)).

Petitioner appealed from the judgment, raising three issues: (1) the trial 

court erred by limiting his ability to impeach Breaux with evidence that

Breaux was currently under investigation for stalking his ex-wife, which 

violated the prosecutor’s Brady v. Maryland (“Brady”) obligations by failing 

to disclose the full substance of that investigation; (2) the trial court erred by 

denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, which claimed that the arresting 

officers should have preserved his blood alcohol level by taking a blood 

sample at the time of arrest; and (3) the trial court erred by excluding 

Petitioner’s expert witness, who would have testified that the police should 

have taken Petitioner’s blood sample at the time of his arrest. (See Lodg. No.

3). The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, but found that 

the trial court miscalculated Petitioner’s presentence custody credits and 

directed the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect one 

additional day of presentence custody credits. (Lodg. No. 6 at 25).

On December 17, 2015, Petitioner petitioned the California Supreme 

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Court for review of the Court of Appeal’s November 20, 2015, opinion. (Lodg. 

No. 7). Petitioner raised two arguments: (1) the trial court erred by limiting 

his ability to impeach Breaux with evidence that Breaux was currently under 

investigation for stalking his ex-wife, which violated the prosecutor’s Brady

obligations by failing to disclose the full substance of that investigation; and 

(2) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, which 

claimed that the arresting officers should have preserved his blood alcohol 

level by taking a blood sample at the time of arrest. (Id.). On February 2, 

2016, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. 

(Lodg. No. 8).

Petitioner did not seek collateral review in the state courts. (See Lodg. 

Nos. 1-8; ECF No. 6 at 5).

B. Federal Proceedings

On May 20, 2016, Petitioner filed the operative First Amended Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 6). 

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief: (1) the trial court erred by failing to 

disclose the full substance of Breaux’s investigation, which also violated the 

prosecutor’s Brady obligations; and (2) the trial court erred by denying 

Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, which claimed that the arresting officers 

should have preserved his blood alcohol level by taking a blood sample at the 

time of arrest. (Id. at 6, 7). Both grounds were raised in the California 

Supreme Court. (Id. at 2; see Lodg. No. 7).

On September 8, 2016, Respondent filed an Answer. (ECF No. 13). On 

October 7, 2016, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 18).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh, 521 U.S. 320. 

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Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides the scope of review for federal habeas 

corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a 

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court only on the grounds that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 

the United States.

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any 

claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early 

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). 

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the 

dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions . . . .” Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court’s decision may be “contrary 

to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court applies a 

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if 

the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable 

from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Id. at 405. A state court decision does not 

have to demonstrate an awareness of clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent, provided neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court 

decision contradict such precedent. Early, 537 U.S. at 8.

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of 

Supreme Court precedent “if the state court identifies the correct governing 

legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of 

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the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. An 

unreasonable application may also be found “if the state court either 

unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that 

principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 

U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is 

available “if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies 

to a given set of facts that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the 

question.” White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 (2014) (quoting 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). An unreasonable application 

of federal law requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or 

erroneous. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). Instead, the state 

court’s application must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 76; Miller-El, 

537 U.S. at 340. Even if a petitioner can satisfy § 2254(d), the petitioner 

must still demonstrate a constitutional violation. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 

119-22 (2007).

Federal courts review the last reasoned decision from the state courts. 

See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991); Hibbler v. Benedetti, 

693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas 

petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with 

the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily 

deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was 

objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003); 

Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). The petitioner must 

establish that “the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal 

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond any 

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possibility for fairminded disagreement. . . .” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16

(2013) (citation omitted). It is not within a federal habeas court’s province “to 

reexamine state court determinations on state-law questions. . . .” Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 1: Failure to Disclose Breaux’s Background 

Information Learned at an In Camera Hearing

Petitioner argues the trial court and the prosecutor erred in failing to 

disclose to Petitioner that the prosecution’s witness, Breaux, used to be a 

police officer who was injured on duty, subsequently became addicted to pain 

medications, moved to California and was unable to obtain employment as a 

California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officer. (ECF Nos. 6 at 6, 18 at 4-6).

1. State Court Opinion

Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate and supreme 

courts on direct review. (Lodg. Nos. 3, 7). The appellate court denied 

Petitioner’s claim on the merits. (Lodg. No. 6 at 8-19). The California Court 

of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s contentions that the trial court erred by failing 

to disclose information learned “during an in camera examination of the 

detective leading the stalking investigation” and that the prosecutor 

committed a Brady violation “by failing to disclose the substance of the 

stalking investigation to the defense.” (Lodg. No. 6 at 8). The California 

Supreme Court summarily denied the petition without a statement of 

reasoning or citation to authority. (Lodg. No. 8). Accordingly, this Court 

must “look through” to the state appellate court’s opinion denying the claim

as the basis for authority. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That court wrote:

[Petitioner] contends the trial court committed a variety of 

errors in its handling of the defense’s request to impeach Breaux on 

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the basis that he was being investigated for stalking his ex-wife. 

He contends the court erred by . . . failing to disclose what it learned 

during an in camera examination of the detective leading the 

stalking investigation . . . . [Petitioner] also contends the prosecutor 

committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the substance of 

the stalking investigation to the defense. We reject these 

contentions.

A. Proceedings Below

The primary defense theory at trial was that Breaux was 

framing [Petitioner] for Craig’s murder or was somehow otherwise 

involved. Defense counsel vigorously cross-examined Breaux and 

impeached him on several points. For example, defense counsel 

elicited that Breaux (1) initially described the suspect as having a 

pony tail and wearing denim shorts and work boots, when none of 

that was true of [Petitioner]; (2) said Craig addressed the 

perpetrator as “Big John,” when [Petitioner] has never gone by that 

name; (3) initially denied using drugs, but later admitted smoking 

drugs with Luna on one occasion (which Luna further impeached 

by testifying they had used drugs together six times); (4) was 

receiving room and board from the district attorney’s office under a 

witness protection program; and (5) was uncooperative with 

[Petitioner’s] investigator.

In support of his defense, [Petitioner] points out his testimony 

put the murder weapon in Breaux’s hands two weeks before the 

murder and revealed Breaux as a doorman for drug dealing and 

prostitution activities. Both Valenzuela’s testimony impeached 

Breaux’s description of [Petitioner’s] truck, and Rosa’s testimony 

challenged Breaux’s ability to see what he claimed to have seen 

from his claimed location. And Luna testified she heard Breaux’s 

associates claim that Breaux told the police that [Petitioner] had 

killed someone “they had killed.”

In closing argument, defense counsel (1) reminded the jury 

[Petitioner] testified he traded the murder weapon for drugs or 

prostitution “with none other than the People’s star witness Melvin 

Breaux”; (2) argued “something was going [on] out there” and “Mr. 

Breaux was involved in it”; (3) insinuated Breaux was falsely 

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accusing [Petitioner] “to get a roof over his head”; and (4) noted the 

prosecutor elicited that Breaux suffered a felony conviction for 

burglary in 2000.

During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Breaux, 

counsel requested a sidebar conference regarding an additional 

impeachment topic related to the prosecutor’s disclosure at the 

preliminary hearing that Breaux was being investigated for 

domestic violence. Defense counsel wanted “to inquire of [Breaux] 

whether or not he has received a direct or implied immunity from 

the prosecution . . . from that criminal act because of his role here 

in this case.” The prosecutor responded she had been “constantly 

checking” on the stalking matter and nothing had been submitted 

by police to the district attorney’s office for prosecution. The 

prosecutor “unequivocally” represented that Breaux had received 

“[a]bsolutely nothing” in the stalking matter in exchange for his 

testimony in [Petitioner’s] case. The court tentatively ruled defense 

counsel could not cross-examine Breaux on the pending 

investigation, but directed the prosecutor to make an affirmative 

inquiry of the police to determine the status of the investigation.

Defense counsel later informed the court the prosecutor had 

put him in touch with the detective investigating the stalking claim 

(San Diego police detective Kevin McNamara), but the detective 

would not answer his questions due to confidentiality concerns. 

The court directed the prosecutor to produce McNamara for 

examination in court.

Detective McNamara testified in an evidentiary hearing 

outside the jury’s presence. He testified he was investigating 

allegations by Breaux’s ex-wife that Breaux had stalked her, but 

Breaux had not been arrested yet. When the judge asked a series 

of questions about whether any law enforcement agents or 

prosecutors had interfered in any way with McNamara’s 

investigation or sought to provide Breaux with immunity on the 

stalking claim, McNamara responded “[a]bsolutely not.” 

McNamara testified the current case against [Petitioner] would in 

no way impact his decisions as to the handling of the stalking case.

McNamara explained his investigation had been delayed for 

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several factors. First, when he learned Breaux was under the 

“control” of the detectives handling [Petitioner’s] case, McNamara 

purposefully refrained from contacting Breaux to avoid “mix[ing] 

the two cases.” Second, McNamara’s assignment in the police 

department changed and he was handling higher-priority matters. 

Third, McNamara had recently learned of some additional 

information that he thought would be “extremely probative to the 

[stalking] case,” but he preferred not to divulge it in open court. 

Despite the delay in his investigation, McNamara emphasized, “It’s 

not only my intent [to ultimately forward the case to the district 

attorney’s office for prosecution], but under oath it will be done.”

On cross-examination, McNamara explained he had never 

talked to Breaux nor told him about the investigation, but he 

“would not be surprised if Breaux knows about the allegations” 

because Breaux’s daughter knows generally of them and is in 

contact with both of her parents.

The court briefly examined McNamara in camera and sealed 

the transcript. On the record, the court stated, “I have interviewed 

Detective McNamara regarding what he called a recent piece of 

information that has affected his processing of this case. And he’s 

revealed that to me and that I find is no way relevant to any matters

that are pending before this court on this case.”

Defense counsel argued that because Breaux was being 

investigated for stalking his ex-wife, [Petitioner] has “a right to see 

whether or not the information gathered by [McNamara] on Mr. 

Breaux has any probative or relevant information that will support 

our defense” theory that “Breaux is framing [Petitioner] for this 

murder . . . .” Defense counsel also wanted to further explore 

whether Breaux had received any immunity deal or was shading 

his testimony in this case in hopes of getting one.

The court denied both defense requests, noting the “purpose 

of this hearing was limited” to the issue of “whether there is a deal 

offered to Breaux; immunity, leniency, potential plea bargains in 

the future on the case Detective McNamara is working on.” The 

court found “McNamara was very, very plain he’s had no 

interference, no prompts, no requests from anybody in the D.A’s 

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office on how to deal with his D[omestic][]V[iolence] case . . . . So 

I’m not going to allow Breaux or Detective McNamara to testify. 

I’m convinced there are no deals.”

The court also denied defense counsel’s request for discovery 

of McNamara’s investigative findings. The court refused to allow 

the case to “spin off in that direction” when trial was “almost 

finished” and the stalking allegations were not “relevant to what 

we’re dealing with in this case . . . .”

B. No Error in Not Disclosing the Information McNamara 

Revealed In Camera

Having since read the sealed transcript, [Petitioner] now 

contends the trial court erred by not disclosing the following 

information that Detective McNamara revealed during the court’s 

in camera examination:

“I know that Mr. Breaux used to be a New Orleans police 

officer and he was involved in an on-duty accident. He got 

addicted—this is coming from the victim—he got addicted to the 

pain meds. They moved out of New Orleans, actually came to 

California. He tried to become a CHP officer, but was turned out 

during the psychological for some anger issues. [¶] In my opinion, 

Mr. Breaux’s got a great amount of street sense.”

[Petitioner] asserts the trial court’s receipt of McNamara’s 

testimony in camera is analogous to a trial court’s in camera review 

of personnel files under a Pitchess motion. We review these 

determinations for an abuse of discretion.

Assuming without deciding that analogizing to the Pitchess

framework is appropriate, we conclude the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by finding Breaux’s status as a former police officer, 

his workplace injury and resulting addiction to pain medications, 

and his alleged anger management issues immaterial to this case. 

To the extent Breaux’s employment experience and workplace 

injury contributed to his “street sense” or potential problems with 

his powers of observation or recall, the trial court did not preclude 

[Petitioner] from cross-examining Breaux on these grounds 

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generally. Indeed, as noted above, defense counsel extensively 

cross-examined and impeached Breaux. Additional detail about 

Breaux’s background would not have materially aided that effort.

We also reject [Petitioner’s] contention that Breaux’s alleged 

history of anger management issues “would directly have impacted 

the defense theory that Breaux could have been the killer and was 

framing [Petitioner].” As propensity evidence, the trial court could 

properly have concluded Breaux’s history of anger was inadmissible 

character evidence. As third party culpability evidence, the trial 

court could properly have concluded Breaux’s alleged history of

anger issues is not sufficiently related to the manner in which Craig 

was murdered so as to identify Breaux as the real perpetrator. 

Either of these bases supports the trial court’s exercise of 

discretion.

Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

determination that defendant was not entitled to disclosure of the 

information that Detective McNamara revealed during his in 

camera examination—because it was in “no way relevant to any 

matters that are pending before this court on this case”—we 

likewise find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of 

[Petitioner’s] request to obtain the same information by way of 

discovery of McNamara’s investigative file.

. . . .

D. The Prosecutor Did Not Violate Her Brady Disclosure 

Obligations

[Petitioner] contends the prosecutor violated her Brady

obligations by failing to disclose the substance of McNamara’s 

investigation of Breaux. We disagree.

“Under Brady and its progeny, the prosecution has a 

constitutional duty to disclose to the defense material exculpatory 

evidence, including potential impeaching evidence.” “The duty to 

disclose ‘exists even though there has been no request by the 

accused.’” “For Brady purposes, evidence is material if it is 

reasonably probable its disclosure would alter the outcome of trial.” 

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This “requires more than a showing that the suppressed evidence 

would have been admissible [citation], that the absence of the 

suppressed evidence made conviction ‘more likely’ [citation], or that 

using the suppressed evidence to discredit a witness’s testimony 

‘might have changed the outcome of the trial’ [citation].”

The scope of a prosecutor’s Brady disclosure obligation 

“‘extends beyond the contents of the prosecutor’s case file and 

encompasses the duty to ascertain as well as divulge “any favorable 

evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf.”’” 

“Thus, the prosecution is responsible not only for evidence in its 

own files but also for information possessed by others acting on the 

government’s behalf that [was] gathered in connection with the 

investigation. But the prosecution cannot reasonably be held 

responsible for evidence in the possession of all governmental 

agencies, including those not involved in the investigation or 

prosecution of the case.” “‘Conversely, a prosecutor does not have a 

duty to disclose exculpatory evidence or information to a defendant 

unless the prosecution team actually or constructively possesses 

that evidence or information. Thus, information possessed by an 

agency that has no connection to the investigation or prosecution of 

the criminal charge against the defendant is not possessed by the 

prosecution team, and the prosecution does not have the duty to 

search for or to disclose such material.’”

“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The 

evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because 

it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must 

have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; 

and prejudice must have ensued.” We review de novo whether a 

defendant has established a Brady violation.

Our independent review of the record reveals the prosecutor 

did not violate her disclosure obligations under Brady. First, she 

was not obligated to disclose the substance of McNamara’s 

investigation because he was not part of the prosecutorial team. 

McNamara is a detective with the San Diego Police Department; 

Craig’s murder was investigated by the Chula Vista Police 

Department. The San Diego Police Department’s only apparent 

involvement in [Petitioner’s] case was the initial traffic stop by the 

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two patrol officers who detained [Petitioner] until Chula Vista 

police officers arrived.

Second, the prosecutor was not obligated to disclose the 

substance of the investigation because, as discussed in part I.B., 

ante, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the information 

[Petitioner] sought is not material.

Finally, and in any event, even if the prosecutor were 

obligated to disclose Breaux’s investigation, she satisfied her 

obligation. She disclosed the investigation at the very outset of the 

preliminary hearing; “constantly check[ed] the status”; put 

[Petitioner’s] counsel in touch with Detective McNamara; and 

produced McNamara for examination by the court and defense 

counsel. By doing so, the prosecutor satisfied any Brady obligation 

she had with respect to the substance of the investigation.

(Lodg. No. 6 at 8-19 (internal citations and footnotes omitted)).

2. Summary of Arguments

Petitioner argues that the court of appeal’s decision finding no error in 

failing to disclose the information Detective McNamara revealed in camera1

and no Brady violation by the prosecutor were incorrect because Breaux was 

the key witness in the prosecution’s case. (ECF No. 18 at 4)2. As such, 

Petitioner contends that Breaux’s credibility was “key to the case” because he 

 

1 Petitioner refers to this as a Pitchess violation. California’s legislature 

enacted procedures implementing the Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 

531 (1974) decision “which allow criminal defendants to seek discovery from 

the court of potentially exculpatory information located in otherwise 

confidential peace officer personnel records. If a party bringing what is 

commonly called a Pitchess motion makes a threshold showing, the court 

must review the records in camera and disclose to that party any information 

they contain that is material to the underlying case.” People v. Superior 

Court, 61 Cal.4th 696, 705 (2015).

2 All pincite page references refer to the automatically generated ECF page 

number, not the page number in the original document.

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was the only witness to Craig’s murder and directly identified Petitioner as 

the killer. (Id.). Specifically, Petitioner contends that disclosure of the 

following testimony from the in camera hearing would have weakened 

Breaux’s credibility and strengthened Petitioner’s defense that he did not kill 

Craig:

I know that Mr. Breaux used to be a New Orleans police office[r] 

and he was involved in an on-duty accident. He got addicted – this 

is coming from the victim – he got addicted to the pain meds.[ ]They 

moved out of New Orleans, actually came to California.[ ]He tried 

to . . .[]become a CHP officer, but he was turned down during the 

psychological for some anger issues. [p] In my opinion,[]Mr. 

Breaux’s got a great amount of street sense.”

(Id. at 5).

Respondent argues that the court of appeal reasonably concluded that 

there was no Brady violation because the information was not in the hands of 

the prosecution, the information was not material, and the prosecutor 

properly alerted the court and the defense that Breaux was under 

investigation by another government agency. (ECF No. 13-1 at 12). Further, 

Respondent argues that Petitioner's so-called Pitchess violation is not 

cognizable because it deals only with state law discovery issues. (Id. at 23). 

3. Legal Standard

If Petitioner were to argue that the trial court erred in denying a 

Pitchess motion, Respondent would be correct that Petitioner’s Pitchess claim 

is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68 (“[I]t is 

not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions.”). That is not what Petitioner argues. 

(See ECF Nos. 6, 18). Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

disclose to Petitioner information, similar to Pitchess information, that was 

revealed in an in camera hearing. (ECF Nos. 6 at 6, 18 at 4-6). Denial of 

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access to an investigative report on a key witness could present a cognizable 

claim to the extent it affects Petitioner’s right to receive necessary 

exculpatory or impeachment evidence. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 

154 (1972) (finding that impeaching evidence is exculpatory evidence within 

the meaning of Brady). The Due Process Clause requires the government to 

produce to the defense favorable evidence material to a criminal defendant’s 

guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). California’s 

Supreme Court stated that Pitchess procedures parallel the prosecution’s 

obligations under Brady. Williams v. Malfi, No. CV 06-4367-DOC (JTL), 

2008 WL 618895 at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008) (citing City of Los Angeles v. 

Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 1, 14 (2004)).

Under Brady, evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 

(1995) (quoting U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “There are three 

components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be 

favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 

impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either 

willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. 

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). 

“Brady/Giglio information includes ‘material . . . that bears on the 

credibility of a significant witness in the case.’” United States v. Blanco, 392 

F.3d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Brumel-Alvarez, 991 

F.2d 1452, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993)). Impeachment evidence is favorable to the 

accused “when the reliability of the witness may be determinative of a 

criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted).

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4. Analysis

Petitioner’s first ground for relief asks whether the trial court and 

prosecution erred in failing to disclose to the defense Detective McNamara’s 

testimony from the in camera hearing. (ECF Nos. 6 at 6, 18 at 4-6). As 

discussed above, both grounds for relief are analyzed under the Brady

standard.

The facts show that on March 4, 2014, Detective McNamara appeared 

in court for a hearing outside the presence of the jury. (Lodg. No. 2 at 987). 

Detective McNamara testified that Breaux was not arrested for stalking his 

ex-wife, that he has not spoken with Breaux and that the case has not yet

been submitted to the Family Protection Unit in South Bay. (Id. at 989-91). 

He also testified that Breaux’s case has nothing to do with Petitioner’s 

murder case and “this particular case has had zero influence on [Detective 

McNamara’s] case or what will be done with [Detective McNamara’s] case.” 

(Id. at 991-92). Detective McNamara denied that Breaux had been “offered 

any deals, whether it’s immunity, whether it’s requests, misdemeanor versus 

a felony, whether it’s a sentencing, ultimate sentencing” and stated that 

“under oath” he will forward Breaux’s case to the South Bay’s District 

Attorney for prosecution. (Id. at 995-96).

During the hearing, Detective McNamara revealed that two weeks prior 

to the hearing he learned new information that “would be – if Mr. Breaux is 

responsible for it, it will be extremely probative to the case.” (Id. at 992). 

When asked what kind of information he received, Detective McNamara 

asked “Is there any way I can tell you outside the presence . . .” (Id.). The 

court determined there was a preliminary showing of confidentiality and 

materiality to warrant an in camera hearing regarding this information and 

ordered the transcript sealed. (Id. at 999). While the sealed transcript was 

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not included in the record, it appears that Petitioner obtained a copy of it and 

claims error in the trial court’s failure to disclose that Breaux used to be a 

police officer who was involved in an on-duty accident, became addicted to 

pain medications and that Breaux was not offered a CHP officer position 

because of anger issues. (See ECF No. 18 at 5).

The first component of a Brady violation is not met. Strickler, 527 U.S. 

at 281-82 (1999) (stating that the first component of a true Brady violation is 

that the evidence is favorable to the accused). Breaux’s status as a former 

police officer, his workplace injury, addiction to pain medications and anger 

management issues do not satisfy the favorable to the accused standard. 

While this information would bear on the credibility of a significant witness 

for the prosecution, Breaux’s reliability was not determinative of Petitioner’s 

guilt or innocence. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. 

There was overwhelming evidence that permitted the jury to determine

Petitioner’s guilt. Macagno testified that Petitioner became “agitated,” 

“rough,” “mad” and violent. (Lodg. No 2 at 356, 357, 359, 361). Macagno also 

testified that Petitioner was making stabbing demonstrations and saying he 

wanted to “kill the guy.” (See id. at 359-64, 374). When shown a picture of 

the hunting knife used to kill Craig, Macagno testified that it was his knife 

and he gave it to Petitioner the day before Craig’s murder. (Id. at 378-79). 

San Diego Police Officer Katrina Young testified that when her partner 

went to detain Petitioner, she immediately noticed blood on Petitioner’s shoes 

and pants and when she looked in Petitioner’s car she immediately saw a 

knife in between the driver’s and passenger’s seat. (Id. at 493-94). Chula 

Vista Police Officers Johnathon Deering and Michael Varga also testified 

that Petitioner had dried blood on his pants and blood spatter on his shoes. 

(Id. at 502-03, 533-34). Additionally, Officer Varga testified that he saw a 

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knife in Petitioner’s car. (Id. at 537-38). Chula Vista Detective David Beatty 

testified that the shoes Petitioner wore at the time of the arrest had a tread 

pattern that was “very similar” to the dirt impression of tread patterns at the 

scene of the crime. (Id. at 669-71). DNA analyst Monica Ammann testified 

that the blood on Petitioner’s car’s steering wheel, Petitioner’s shoes and the 

knife found in Petitioner’s car matched the victim’s DNA. (Id. at 862-75).

In this case, there was overwhelming evidence that permitted the jury 

to determine Petitioner’s guilt, regardless of Breaux’s credibility. As such, 

the impeaching evidence was not favorable to Petitioner because Breaux’s 

reliability, although important, was not determinative of the case.

The second component of a Brady violation is met as applied to the 

Court. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82 (1999) (stating that the second 

component of a true Brady violation is that the state withheld the evidence). 

The Court held an in camera hearing where it obtained information 

regarding Breaux’s background, including that he was a police officer in New 

Orleans who became addicted to pain medications and was unable to obtain 

employment in California as a CHP officer. (Lodg. No. 2 at 999; ECF No. 18 

at 5). The transcript was sealed and the information was not disclosed to 

Petitioner at trial. (Lodg. No. 2 at 999). As a result, the trial court did 

withhold the evidence from Petitioner. However, Petitioner must satisfy all 

three Brady components to succeed in showing a Brady violation.

The second component is not met as applied to the prosecutor. Ms. 

Golovato, the prosecutor, informed the trial court at the preliminary hearing 

that Breaux had a domestic violence case pending. (Id. at 1). However, she 

also stated that didn’t know anything about the facts. (Id.). Ms. Golovato 

contacted Detective McNamara at the trial court’s request and provided the 

defense with his contact information. (Id. at 810). The defense attempted to 

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elicit information from Detective McNamara, but Detective McNamara raised 

confidentiality and privacy issues. (Id. at 811). The trial court then decided 

to hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury with Detective McNamara, 

which ultimately led to a short in camera hearing. (Id. at 999). Ms. Golovato 

was not present at the in camera hearing, and therefore, could not have 

learned that Breaux was a police officer with a pain medication addiction who 

was unable to obtain employment as a CHP officer. (See id.). As a result, 

Ms. Golovato could not have withheld information she did not have. 

The third component of a Brady violation is also not satisfied. Strickler,

527 U.S. at 281-82 (1999) (stating that the third component of a true Brady

violation is that prejudice must have ensued). “[S]trictly speaking, there is 

never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that 

there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have 

produced a different verdict.” Id. at 281. As discussed above, the jury had 

overwhelming evidence to determine Petitioner’s guilt even absent Breaux’s

testimony. In addition to Breaux’s testimony, the prosecution presented 

forensic evidence sufficient to permit the jury to determine Petitioner’s guilt, 

including proof that the victim’s blood was on Petitioner’s shoes, pants and 

steering wheel. The prosecution also presented Macagno’s testimony about 

Petitioner’s behavior before the murder.

Additionally, the defense vigorously impeached Breaux at trial. (See

Lodg. No. 2 at 259-318, 329-34, 335-337). Petitioner’s trial counsel 

highlighted the fact that Breaux was homeless and “excluded” from his 

former marital residence, heard Craig address the suspect as “Big John,” 

when Petitioner’s name is Hector Pablo Molina and has never gone by Big 

John, denied using drugs but later admitted using drugs on at least one 

occasion and received room and board from the district attorney’s office under 

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a witness protection program. (Id. at 259, 296-97, 300-02). It is unlikely that 

the comparatively neutral fact that Breaux used to be a police officer who 

became addicted to pain medications and could not obtain employment as a 

CHP officer due to anger issues would have altered the jury’s determination 

of his credibility. See Silva v. Brown, 413 F.3d 980, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(undisclosed evidence of witness’s competency issues was material for its 

“potency” and ability to raise “new and more powerful doubts about the 

reliability of [the witness’s] testimony”); Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 

1055 (9th Cir. 2002) (undisclosed impeachment evidence of witness’s prior 

convictions, misrepresentations to law enforcement, and drug use was 

material where it “was substantial and was far more damaging to [the 

witness’s] credibility than the impeachment evidence available to the defense 

at trial”); Grajeda v. Scribner, No. CV 03-7280-PSG(CW), 2011 WL 4802564 

at *43 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (finding no prejudice where undisclosed 

impeaching evidence that a witness was an FBI informant was cumulative 

and less damaging than other impeachment evidence presented against him 

at trial). In sum, it was not reasonably probable that, had this evidence been 

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.

The state court objectively and reasonably concluded that neither the 

trial court nor the prosecution erred in failing to disclose information about 

Breaux’s past. This Court reaches the same conclusion, and recommends 

finding the state court’s determination is not unreasonable or contrary to 

federal law. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS claim one (1) be 

DENIED.

B. Claim 2: Error in Denying Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

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dismiss on the grounds that arresting officers should have preserved his 

blood alcohol level by taking a blood sample at the time of arrest. (ECF No. 6 

at 7). Petitioner contends that his blood sample could have supported an 

affirmative defense of intoxication. (See id.).

1. State Court Opinion

Petitioner also presented this claim to the state appellate and supreme 

courts on direct review. (Lodg. Nos. 3, 7). The appellate court denied 

Petitioner’s claim on the merits. (Lodg. No. 6 at 19-22). The California Court 

of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s contention that the trial court should have 

dismissed the case because police violated Petitioner’s due process rights by 

failing to take samples of his blood to determine his level of intoxication at 

his arrest, which could have supported an affirmative defense of intoxication. 

(Id.). The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition without a 

statement of reasoning or citation to authority. (Lodg. No. 8). Accordingly, 

this Court must again “look through” to the state appellate court’s opinion 

denying this claim. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That court wrote:

II. Preservation of Defendant’s Blood Alcohol Level

Defendant moved under California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 

U.S. 479 and Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 to dismiss 

the case (or, alternatively, for an ameliorative instruction and an 

evidentiary hearing) because “the police violated [Petitioner’s] due 

process rights by failing to obtain samples of his blood to determine 

his level of intoxication at the time of arrest.” He asserts a blood 

sample may have supported an affirmative defense of intoxication. 

We find no error.

The two San Diego police officers who followed [Petitioner] 

from Clairton Place to Hollister Street and initially detained him 

that afternoon testified [Petitioner] did not swerve while driving. 

When standing within a foot of defendant, they smelled no odor of 

alcohol and observed no other signs of intoxication. The Chula 

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Vista police officer who took [Petitioner] into custody and 

transported him to the police station testified he was in 

[Petitioner’s] presence for over one hour and smelled no odor of 

alcohol and observed no other signs of intoxication.

When Detectives Varga and Cruz interviewed Macagno on the 

afternoon of June 3, Macagno told them he and [Petitioner] had 

been drinking bourbon that day and [Petitioner] appeared 

“plastered.” Macagno said there were two empty bottles in the 

trash can at his house. Detective Cruz testified that, because of 

this, he closely observed Macagno for signs of intoxication and 

observed none. This caused Cruz to doubt Macagno’s statement 

about the quantity of liquor the men had consumed.

Nevertheless, Cruz and Varga paid particular attention to 

[Petitioner’s] demeanor when they interviewed him later that 

night. Cruz testified [Petitioner] responded promptly to commands; 

walked normally down a 30- or 40-foot-long hallway while 

handcuffed; and gave off no odor of alcohol and displayed no other 

signs of intoxication. Based on his observations, Cruz testified, “If 

this contact had occurred out in the field and he was driving under 

the same circumstances . . . , I would have handed him his keys 

back. That is how confident I was that he was not under the 

influence.” Cruz concluded he would not have had probable cause 

to obtain a warrant to draw [Petitioner’s] blood. Detective Varga 

similarly testified he did not detect the odor of alcohol emanating 

from [Petitioner] or observe any other signs of intoxication.

During his interview, [Petitioner] told Detectives Varga and 

Cruz he had only “a couple shots” of bourbon and boasted of being 

sober for six months. At trial, however, [Petitioner] testified he was 

drunk on bourbon and high on heroin and methamphetamine on 

June 3, including during his interview with detectives.

The trial court denied [Petitioner’s] motion to dismiss, but 

allowed [Petitioner] to argue the police were “incompetent” in their 

treatment of the issue and instructed the jury on voluntary 

intoxication.

[Petitioner] acknowledges his challenge “in part has been 

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addressed” by the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809 (Montes), but requests “the 

extension of existing precedent.” No extension is warranted here.

Montes acknowledged that although “due process does not 

require the police to collect particular items of evidence,” Trombetta

recognized that due process does impose “a duty on the state to 

preserve ‘evidence that might be expected to play a significant role 

in the suspect’s defense.’” However, for the obligation to preserve 

evidence to arise, the “evidence ‘must both possess an exculpatory 

value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be 

of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain 

comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.’” “A 

trial court’s ruling on a Trombetta motion is upheld on appeal if a 

reviewing court finds substantial evidence supporting the ruling.”

The defendant in Montes moved to dismiss under Trombetta

on the ground the police should have taken a blood sample when 

they arrested him, which may have supported an intoxication 

defense. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly 

denied the motion because, even assuming Trombetta imposed a 

duty to collect apparently exculpatory evidence, there was none 

because (1) the arresting officers testified they did not believe the 

defendant was under the influence of drugs when they arrested him 

24 hours after the murder, and (2) the record “failed to establish an 

apparent exculpatory connection between the possible presence of 

a narcotic in a defendant’s blood when he was arrested and his level 

of intoxication, if any, when the murder was committed nearly 24 

hours earlier.”

Montes is controlling here. Five law enforcement witnesses 

testified uniformly that there was nothing apparently exculpatory 

about [Petitioner’s] condition at the time of his arrest or 

interrogation. This alone is dispositive. Further, [Petitioner] 

offered no evidence of the exculpatory value of his intoxication level 

hours after Craig’s murder. Because the officers who detained and 

transported [Petitioner] observed no signs he was intoxicated, the 

first suggestion [Petitioner] had been drinking arose during 

Macagno’s interview sometime after 6:00 p.m. (about three hours 

after the murder). [Petitioner] did not tell anyone he had been 

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drinking until after 10:30 p.m. (about seven hours after the 

murder), and even then he downplayed his consumption. This 

substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling.

Montes and Trombetta aside, the trial court instructed the 

jury on intoxication and defense counsel vigorously cross-examined 

the law enforcement witnesses regarding their conclusions 

[Petitioner] was not intoxicated. The trial court did not err in 

denying [Petitioner’s] motion to dismiss.

(Lodg. 6 at 19-22) (internal citations omitted).

2. Summary of Arguments

Petitioner contends that “the police violated [Petitioner’s] due process 

rights by failing to obtain samples of his blood to determine his level of 

intoxication at the time of his arrest.” (ECF No. 6 at 7). Petitioner explains 

that both Petitioner and Macagno told police they had been drinking the day 

of Craig’s murder. (Id.). Petitioner asserts that the police should have taken 

samples of his blood at that time because they knew Petitioner was under 

arrest for murder and that intoxication is a defense to murder. (Id.). In his 

Traverse, Petitioner further argues that the failure to take samples of 

Petitioner’s blood after learning Petitioner had been drinking “is tantamount 

to destruction of evidence.” (ECF No. 18 at 7, 9).

Respondent contends the state court reasonably concluded that the 

police had no duty to obtain a blood sample from Petitioner. (ECF No. 13-1 at 

27). Respondent first points out the “incongruity” in Petitioner’s argument 

that his blood sample would have been used to support an intoxication 

defense because Petitioner’s defense at trial was that he did not kill Craig. 

(Id.). Respondent then argues that “there is no clearly established Supreme 

Court precedent on collection of evidence that the state court could have 

acted contrary to or applied in an unreasonable fashion. This bars relief.” 

(Id. at 31). Even if there were Supreme Court precedent, Respondent 

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contends Petitioner’s claim would fail because he cannot show either 

exculpatory value of his blood sample or the police officers’ bad faith in failing 

to take a blood sample. (Id.). 

3. Legal Standard

In general, law enforcement officials have a duty to preserve “evidence 

that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). While the Supreme Court 

has not directly addressed the duty to collect evidence, some courts have held 

that Trombetta includes the duty to collect evidence. Miller v Vasquez, 868 

F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the failure to collect potentially 

exculpatory evidence could be a due process violation). This duty applies only 

to “material evidence, i.e., evidence whose exculpatory value was apparent 

before its destruction and that is of such nature that the defendant cannot 

obtain comparable evidence from other sources.” Cooper v. Calderon, 255 

F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489). 

Additionally, the failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence 

amounts to a due process violation only when the petitioner “can show bad 

faith.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); Miller, 868 F.2d at 

1120 (“Since, in the absence of bad faith, the police’s failure to preserve

evidence that is only potentially exculpatory does not violate due process, 

then a fortiori neither does the good faith failure to collect such evidence 

violate due process.”) (emphasis in original). Bad faith “turns on the 

government’s knowledge of the apparent exculpatory value of the evidence at 

the time it was lost or destroyed.” Martinez v. Barnes, No. 2:12-cv-2975 KJM 

GGH P, 2013 WL 5773108 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013) (citing Youngblood, 

488 U.S. at 56-57; United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993)).

//

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4. Analysis

Assuming without deciding that the duty to collect evidence is within 

Trombetta, this Court concludes that the appellate court’s decision was not 

objectively unreasonable and not contrary to federal law. Petitioner’s blood 

sample, which purportedly would have shown that Petitioner was 

intoxicated, would not have had exculpatory value that was apparent at the 

time of Petitioner’s arrest. Petitioner also has not shown that police acted 

with bad faith in failing to take Petitioner’s blood sample.

San Diego Police Officer Jason Tsui testified he did not smell any 

alcohol on Petitioner at the time of the car accident and “didn’t think [any 

sobriety testing] was necessary” because Petitioner did not appear to be 

under the influence. (Lodg. No. 2 at 475-77). San Diego Police Officer 

Katrina Young also testified that she did not notice the odor of alcohol on 

Petitioner when she was within a foot of him and he exhibited no objective 

symptoms of intoxication. (Id. at 489). Additionally, Chula Vista Police 

Officer Johnathon Deering testified that while he was enclosed in his patrol 

car with Petitioner for 20 minutes, he did not smell alcohol and Petitioner did 

not appear to be under the influence of either alcohol or a controlled 

substance. (Id. at 501-02). Chula Vista Police Officer Michael Varga also

testified that he did not detect the odor of alcohol coming from Petitioner and 

did not notice objective symptoms of intoxication. (Id. at 535). 

Chula Vista Police Officer Ricardo Cruz testified that after Macagno 

told him Petitioner drank bourbon, he paid particular attention to 

Petitioner’s mannerisms. (Id. at 619). Officer Cruz explained that Petitioner 

responded to commands immediately, “which struck [Officer Cruz] as odd. 

[He] thought if this man is inebriated he is going to take a while to respond, 

he is going to stagger over . . . .” (Id.). Officer Cruz stated that Petitioner’s 

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gait as he walked while handcuffed was “perfect,” which surprised Officer 

Cruz because “most people that are inebriated will have a stagger gait, would

be off balance.” (Id. at 620). Officer Cruz explained that he was looking for 

the objective symptoms of intoxication and did not see any. (Id. at 621). 

After lengthy questioning regarding Petitioner’s level of intoxication, Officer 

Cruz testified: “Let me put it to you this way: If this contact had occurred out 

in the field and he was driving under the same circumstances, had he not 

been arrested, I would have handed him his keys back. That is how confident 

I was that he was not under the influence.” (Id. at 633).

While intoxication is a defense to murder and a blood sample could have 

exculpatory value, the police officers testimonies evince that it was not 

apparent to them at the time of Petitioner’s arrest that he was intoxicated. 

As such, it was not apparent that Petitioner’s blood sample, if it were taken, 

would have had exculpatory value. Further, Petitioner has not demonstrated 

that the police acted in bad faith. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59 (“the police 

do not have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests”); Villafuerte 

v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 625-26 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the petitioner 

had not demonstrated that the failure to test a semen sample amounted to 

bad faith because there was no evidence that it had exculpatory value 

apparent to the officers at the time police failed to test the sample) (cert. 

denied, 522 U.S. 1079 (1998)).

The state court’s adjudication did not result in a decision contrary to 

federal law and was not an unreasonable application of federal law. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early, 537 U.S. at 8. Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS claim two (2) be DENIED.

//

//

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V. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Judge issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this 

Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered 

DENYING the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than February 14, 2017, 

any party to this action may file written objections with this Court and serve 

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than February 21, 

2017. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appear of the 

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2017

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