Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01159/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01159-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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All references to the complaint herein shall be read as referring to 1

the second amended complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. 106). 

Neither the complaint nor the answer provides the first names of these 2

defendants. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Barry Northcross Patterson, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CV 05-1159-PHX-RCB 

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

 )

After more than six years of litigation, familiarity with

which is assumed, a single count remains in plaintiff pro se

Barry Northcross Patterson’s complaint. More specifically, in 1

count I plaintiff asserts claims against defendants Broderick

and Mason, both of whom are Arizona Department of Corrections 2

(“ADOC”) chaplains. Allegedly defendants violated plaintiff’s

free exercise rights under the First Amendment, and his rights

under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 127 Filed 08/26/11 Page 1 of 17
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(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., by not providing him

with a three meal a day kosher diet, despite the fact that he

is a Messianic Jew purportedly eligible for a kosher diet under

ADOC regulations. Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief as

well as compensatory and punitive damages. 

Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for partial

dismissal. Focusing solely on plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim,

defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of that

claim for two reasons. First, defendants argue that the

Eleventh Amendment bars any RLUIPA claim for damages against

them in their official capacities. Second, defendants argue

that RLUIPA does not provide a private cause for monetary

damages against state officials, like them, in their individual

capacities. Alternatively, defendants argue that they are

entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim for

monetary damages. Lastly, regardless of whether plaintiff is

asserting his rights under the First Amendment or RLUIPA,

defendants contend that the court should dismiss as moot his

request for an injunction ordering defendants to provide him

with a completely kosher diet.

Essentially, plaintiff concedes that the issue of whether

RLUIPA allows for the recovery of monetary damages against

defendants in either their official or individual capacities is

a legal one, properly resolved on this motion. See Supp. Resp.

(Doc. 124) at 1 (“Patterson leaves it to this Court or the

Supreme Court to decide whether or not he is allowed money

damages under RLUIPA.”); and at 3 (same). It is difficult to

discern exactly what plaintiff’s position is regarding the

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defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity. Evidently

plaintiff believes that the defendants’ reliance upon that

doctrine somehow contravenes the Ninth Circuit’s instructions

on remand. It is clear, however, that plaintiff disagrees that

his request for an injunction requiring that he be served three

kosher meals daily is moot. 

Background

 The material facts, taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-moving party, see

Johnson v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 2011 WL 3332368, at *8 (9th

Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), are straightforward and few.

During his incarceration, plaintiff became a Messianic Jew. SAC

(Doc. 106) at 3, ¶ 3. Thereafter, on approximately March 1,

2004, plaintiff filled out an ADOC form requesting a kosher

diet, which he claims “is common for many Messianic Judists

[sic] who follow many of the Jewish traditions.” Id. When he

received his first meal pursuant to that request, allegedly it

was “not the kosher meal given to Jewish believers[,]” but a

“vegetarian meal.” Id. 

Plaintiff received that vegetarian meal even though he “is

not . . . [and] has [n]ever been a vegetarian[.]” Id. According

to plaintiff, he was being provided vegetarian breakfasts and

lunches, but “standard kosher dinner[s]” because ADOC was

informed by a “Jewish Rabbi[] . . . [that] that should suffice

for [plaintiff’s] religious needs.” Id. The thrust of this

count is plaintiff’s belief that he is being discriminated

against because he is a Messianic Jew.

Plaintiff Patterson is currently housed at the Central

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Arizona Correction Facility (“CACF”) in Florence, Arizona. SAC

(Doc. 106) at 1. At the time of the events complained of

herein, however, he was housed at an ADOC facility, also in

Florence, Arizona. Id. at 1, ¶ 2. Defendants Broderick and

Mason maintain that they do not work at that CACF facility,

which they describe as a “private prison[.]” Reply (Doc. 125) at

3:24. The SAC is silent, however, as to where defendants are

currently working. And because this is a motion to dismiss, the

court must confine itself to the allegations in the SAC. The

SAC simply alleges that plaintiff encountered those two

defendants while at the ADOC facility in Florence, Arizona. SAC

(Doc. 106) at 1, ¶ 2; and at 3, ¶ 3. 

Discussion

I. Governing Legal Standards

Defendants did not specify which Rule forms the basis for

their dismissal motion. However, because defendants are

challenging the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim,

presumably they intended to rely upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

which allows for dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

However, because defendants contend that plaintiff’s claim for

injunctive relief is moot, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), governing

motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

the proper procedural vehicle for this aspect of defendants’

dismissal motion. See Nasoordeen v. F.D.I.C., 2010 WL 1135888,

at *5 (C.D.Cal. 2010) (citing cases) (“Federal courts lack

subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims that are moot.”)

Regardless of which Rule governs the present motion, plaintiff

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is entitled to similar safeguards. 

 “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a

claim.” Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9 Cir. 2001). “A th

claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “‘To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’’” Hinds Investments, L.P. v. Angioli, 2011 WL 3250461, at

*2 (9 Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 th

S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)) (other citation

omitted). “Conclusory allegations and unwarranted inferences,

however, are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”

Johnson, 2011 WL 3332368, at *8 (citation omitted). 

“Dismissal is proper where there is either a lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal claim.” Hinds Investments,

2011 WL 3250461, at *2 (citation omitted). At the same time,

however, because plaintiff Patterson is proceeding pro se, the

court “must construe his complaint[] liberally even when

evaluating it under the Iqbal standard.” Johnson, 2011 WL

3332368, at *9 (citation omitted). 

Likewise, when, as here, defendants are facially attacking

subject matter jurisdiction, “factual allegations of the

complaint are presumed to be true and conflicts in the pleadings

are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Kelly v. Public Utility

Dist. No. 2, 2011 WL 294166, at *4 (E.D.Wash. 2011) (citing,

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inter alia, Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.2009)

(internal citations omitted)). With these standards firmly in

mind, the court has carefully examined the complaint vis-a-vis

defendants’ motion for partial dismissal.

II. RLUIPA

A. Official Capacity

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in

federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials

acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9 Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); th

see also Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of NV. System

of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9 Cir. 2010) (citation th

omitted) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . shields state

officials from official capacity suits.”) “The Eleventh

Amendment bars an action by a private citizen against a state

‘unless Congress has abrogated state sovereign immunity under

its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment or [the] state has

waived it.’” Jachetta v. United States, 2011 WL 3250450, at *7

(9 Cir. 2011) (quoting Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d th

1108, 1111 (9 Cir. 2010)). th

“To abrogate a state's sovereign immunity under § 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment, Congress's intent must be ‘unequivocally

expressed.’” Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517,

124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). “Similarly, a state will be deemed to have waived

its immunity ‘only where stated by the most express language or

by such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no

room for any other reasonable construction.’” Id. (quoting

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Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d

662 (1974) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted));

see also Sossamon v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1658,

179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011) (“A State's consent to suit must be

‘unequivocally expressed’ in the text of the relevant statute

... [and] may not be implied.” (citations omitted)).

In moving for dismissal of the RLUIPA claim for damages

against them in their official capacities as ADOC chaplains,

initially defendants solely relied upon Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of

Corr., 599 F.3d 1108 (9 Cir. 2010). There, the Ninth Circuit, th

“join[ing] five of the six circuits to have considered th[e]

question[,]” held that “RLUIPA’s ‘appropriate relief’ language

does not unambiguously encompass monetary damages so as to

effect a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit for monetary

claims[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation and footnote

omitted). Continuing, the Holley Court explained that “[t]he

phrase ‘appropriate relief’ does not address sovereign immunity

specifically at all, let alone ‘extend [a waiver of sovereign

immunity] unambiguously to . . . monetary claims’ in

particular.” Id. (quoting Lane, 518 U.S., at 192, 116 S.Ct.

2092). Given that unequivocal holding, Holley supports the view

that plaintiff Patterson has not stated a RLUIPA claim for

monetary damages against defendants in their official

capacities. 

Not only that, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sossamon v.

Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 79 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011), which defendants

note in a supplemental filing, leaves no doubt that plaintiff

Patterson’s RLUIPA claim for monetary damages against defendants

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It is beyond peradventure that pro se complaints must be “liberally 3

construed[.]” Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 923 n.

4 (9 Cir. 2011). So, even though plaintiff Patterson’s complaint does not th

explicitly allege that defendants are being sued both in their official and

individual capacities, that is a reasonable inference based upon a liberal

construction of the complaint. Thus, as did the defendants, this court is treating

plaintiff’s claims against defendants Broderick and Mason as being brought against

them in both capacities. 

As the Fifth Circuit observed in Sossamon, “[t]he Ninth Circuit appears 4

to have assumed that a cause of action for monetary relief against state actors in

their individual capacities exists, but its cases contain no analysis and are

unpublished.” Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 372 n. 23 (citing Campbell v. Alameida, 295

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in their official capacities cannot survive this motion to

dismiss. “[G]rounded on the line of Eleventh Amendment authority

requiring ‘clear expression’ to abrogate the sovereign immunity

of states from damages claims[,]” Center Familiar Cristiano

Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 2011 WL 2685288, at *3 (9 Cir. th

2011), the Sossamon Court held “that States, in accepting

federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign

immunity to private suits for money damages under RLUIPA because

no statute expressly and unequivocally includes such a waiver.

Sossamon, 131 S.Ct. at 1663, 79 L.Ed.2d 700. Therefore, this

court finds that the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff

Patterson’s RLUIPA claim insofar as he is seeking monetary

damages from defendants Broderick and Mason in their official

capacities. As such, defendants are entitled to dismissal of

that claim. 

B. Individual Capacity

Construing the complaint as alleging a RLUIPA claim for

damages against them in their individual capacities, defendants 3

argue that the court should dismiss that claim because it is not

cognizable. The Ninth Circuit has not yet “ruled . . . in a

precedential opinion[]” on the issue of whether RLUIPA 4

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Fed.Appx. 130, 131 (9 Cir. 2008) (mem.) (unpublished); Von Staich v. Hamlet, Nos. th

04-16011 & 06-17026, --- Fed.Appx. ----, ----, 2007 WL 3001726, at *2 (9 Cir. Oct. th

16, 2007) (mem.) (unpublished)); see also Shilling v. Crawford, 377 Fed.Appx. 702,

705 (9 Cir. 2010) (declining to “settle th[e] question” of “whether money damages th

for RLUIPA claims are available against state actors sued in their individual

capacities because even assuming arguendo that such damages would otherwise be

available, the defendants in this case are entitled to qualified immunity[]”).

The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Sossamon was limited to the 5

following question: “Whether an individual may sue a State or state official in his

official capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (2000 ed.).” Sossamon v.

Texas, 130 S.Ct. 3319, 176 L.Ed.2d 1218 (2010). Necessarily then, the Supreme

Court did not address the Fifth Circuit’s further holding in Sossamon there is no

cause of action under RLUIPA for individual capacity claims.

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“appli[es] to private actors sued for damages in their

individual capacity.” Florer, 639 F.3d at 922 n. 3. Indeed, as

recently as April 15, 2011, the Ninth Circuit has continued to

“reserve” on that “question for another day.” Id. Likewise,

the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether persons can be

sued in their individual capacities for damages under RLUIPA.5

Nonetheless, given the weight of soundly reasoned authority set

forth herein, the court agrees with defendants and dismisses

plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims against them for monetary damages in

their individual capacities. 

As the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged, “[t]he Fifth,

Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that RLUIPA does not

provide an action for damages for individual-capacity claims.”

Florer, 639 F.3d at 922 n. 3 citing Sossamon v. Lone Star State

of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 327-28 & n. 23 (5 Cir. 2009); Nelson v. th

Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 889 (7 Cir. 2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 th

F.3d 1255, 1272-75 (11 Cir. 2007)); see also Rendelman v. th

Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 184 (4 Cir. 2009) (holding that “when th

invoked as a spending clause statute, RLUIPA does not authorize

a claim for money damage against an official sued in her

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individual capacity[]”). Consequently, even in the absence of

Ninth Circuit case law squarely addressing the issue, numerous

district courts within this Circuit likewise have declared that

RLUIPA does not provide for damages claims against officials

sued in their individual capacities. See, e.g., Florer v.

Bales-Johnson, 752 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1205-1206 (W.D.Wash. 2010)

(footnote omitted) (dismissing claim regarding, inter alia,

kosher meals because “individual Defendants cannot be held

liable in their individual capacities in an action under

RLUIPA[]”); Parks v. Brooks, 2010 WL 5186071, *1–*2 (D.Nev.

2010); Sokolsky v. Voss, 2010 WL 2991522, *2–*4 (E.D.Cal. 2010);

Alvarez v. Hill, 2010 WL 582217, *11 (D.Or. 2010); Harris v.

Schriro, 652 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1030 (D.Ariz. 2009). 

There is no reason here for the court to depart from this

weight of soundly reasoned authority. Particularly persuasive

is the Spending Clause analysis of the Fifth, Seventh and

Eleventh Circuits. Following that reasoning, in Harris v.

Schriro, 652 F.Supp.2d 1024 (D.Ariz. 2009), the court cogently

wrote: 

RLUIPA creates a cause of action for suits against

‘a government’; government is defined as ‘(i) a State

county, municipality, or other governmental entity

created under the authority of a State; (ii) a

branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official

of an entity listed in [that] clause . . . ; and (iii)

any other person acting under color of state law

. . . . ’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5. As the court in Sossamon

noted, this language appears to create a right

against state actors in their individual capacities

and it even mirrors the ‘under color of’ language in §

1983. 560 F.3d at 327-28. But the Fifth, Seventh

and Eleventh Circuits n e v e r t h e l e s s h e l d t h a t

individuals may not be sued for damages under RLUIPA.

The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that R L U IPA was e n a c t e d

pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause p o w e r , n o t

pursuant to the Section 5 power of the F o u r t e e n t h

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Amendment, citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544

U.S. 709, 715-16, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020

(2005), and that Spending Clause legislation is

not legislation in its operation but operates like

a contract, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694

(1981). Smith, 502 F.3d at 1273-75. Individual RLUIPA

defendants are not parties to the contract in their

individual capacities, and therefore, only the grant

recipient-that is, the state-may be liable for its

violation. Id.

The Fifth Circuit also concluded that RLUIPA was passed

pursuant to the Spending Clause and noted that it also

followed the same rule for Spending Clause legislation.

Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328-29. Likewise, the Seventh

Circuit reasoned that ‘[c]onstruing RLUIPA to

provide 

for damages actions against officials in their

individual capacities would raise serious questions

regarding whether Congress had exceeded its

authority under the Spending Clause,’ and so the

court declined to read RLUIPA as allowing damages

against defendants in their indivi d u a l c a p a cities.

Nelson, 570 F.3d at 889.

Id. at 1029-1030. That Spending Clause analysis is particularly

apropos given that the Ninth Circuit has “upheld RLUIPA as a

constitutional exercise of Congress’ spending power.” San Jose

Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034

(9 Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). th

Moreover, although noting RLUIPA’s “ostensibl[e] . . .

Commerce Clause underpinnings[,]” in Nelson the Seventh Circuit

“interpret[ed] RLUIPA as an exercise of Congress's power under

the Spending Clause[]” where there was “no evidence . . . that

plaintiff’s denial of a religious diet affect[ed] . . . commerce

with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian

tribes.” Nelson, 570 F.3d at 886 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted) (citing Smith, 502 F.3d at 1274 n. 9

(reasoning that RLUIPA should be analyzed as an exercise of

Congress's Spending Clause authority when there is no evidence

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of an effect on interstate or international commerce); Sossamon,

560 F.3d at 328 n. 34 (same)). 

Similarly, here, plaintiff Patterson’s allegations that he

has been denied a three meal a day kosher diet do not appear to

implicate the Commerce Clause. See Mahone v. Pierce County,

2011 WL 3298898, at *5 (W.D.Wash. May 23, 2011), adopted in full

by 2011 WL 3298528 (W.D.Wash. Aug. 1, 2011)(treating RLUIPA as

an exercise of Congress’s Spending Clause power where there was

“no evidence of an effect on interstate or international

commerce by an alleged denial of [“Jewish Kosher Meals three

times a day”] to indicate that RLUIPA should be interpreted

under the Commerce Clause[]”); Sokolsky v. Voss, 2010 2991522,

at *4 n. 4 (“Plaintiff’s allegations that he was denied a proper

Kosher . . . for Passover diet do not appear to implicate the

Commerce Clause.”); Harris, 652 F.Supp.2d at 1030 (citation

omitted) (Jewish inmate’s claim, inter alia, that prison refused

to modify his kosher diet meals did “not appear to implicate the

Commerce Clause and so the Court interpret[ed] RLUIPA as a

Spending Clause enactment[]”). Thus, following the rationale

first set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Smith, and

subsequently adopted by the Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits,

the court holds that plaintiff Patterson cannot obtain monetary

relief against defendants Broderick and Mason in their

individual capacities for allegedly violating RLUIPA.

Accordingly, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss in

that regard. 

III. Qualified Immunity

Having found that the complaint fails to state a RLUIPA

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claim for damages against defendants in either their official or

individual capacities, there is no need to consider defendants’

alternative argument that they are entitled to qualified

immunity on such claim. See Sokolsky, 2010 WL 2991522, at *4

(“[B]ecause this court finds that RLUIPA creates no right to

recovery for damages against state officials acting in their

individual capacities, the Court declines to reach” the

qualified immunity “question.”) (citing Sossamon, 560 F.3d at

327 (“Of course, if no private right of action exists against

the defendants in their individual capacities, then a qualified

immunity ... analysis would be unnecessary.”); see also Alvarez,

2010 WL 582217, at *11 (citing Sossamon in support of the

court's decision to decline to reach a qualified immunity

analysis once it found that individual damages were not

available against defendants)). If the court were to consider

this argument, though, it would grant defendants’ request for

qualified immunity primarily because it was not until nearly

four years after the events complained of herein that the Ninth

Circuit interpreted RLUIPA with respect to the provision of

kosher meals. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9 Cir. th

2008). Thus, it is entirely plausible that defendants Broderick

and Mason had no notice of the evolving status of the law in

this Circuit on this question until after the conduct complained

of herein. 

IV. Injunctive Relief

In addition to seeking monetary damages, plaintiff is

seeking “[a] Court Order requiring 3 [three] Kosher meals or the

equivalent for all Kosher diets[.]” SAC (Doc. 106) at 13, ¶ E.

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The court takes judicial notice of plaintiff’s earlier motion and the 6

court’s decision relating thereto, as well as plaintiff’s response to the pending

motion. See Spectravest, Inc. v. Mervyn’s Inc., 673 F.Supp. 1486, 1490 (N.D.Cal.

1987) (citation omitted) (“Court may take judicial notice of the existence of an

earlier pleading, particularly when the same parties are involved.”) The court

may take judicial notice in its discretion even absent a specific request for

judicial notice (“RJN”) by a party. See Rodriguez v. SGLC, Inc., 2010 WL 2943128,

at *1 n. 4 (E.D.Cal. 2010) (granting defendants’ RJNs, although such requests where

“unnecessary for pleadings in ths same case[]”). By taking judicial notice, there

is no need, as defendants suggest, to convert this aspect of their dismissal motion

to one for summary judgment. See Mot. (Doc. 115) at 10:20, n. 4. 

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Defendants offer several reasons for dismissing as moot this

claim for injunctive relief. There is no need to address each

of those reasons, however, because one is dispositive; that is,

plaintiff Patterson “is receiving precisely the diet that he is

seeking by way of injunctive relief in this action.” See Reply

(Doc. 124) at 4:11 (emphasis added). 

As defendants stress, and plaintiff concedes, he has been

“given his main request - 3 kosher meals[.]” Resp. (Doc. 124)

at 4. Indeed, plaintiff acknowledges that he was granted that

request “about 6 months after he filed this case[,]” i.e.,

roughly six months after April 15, 2005, or, more than six years

ago. See id. Not only that, presumably based upon the

foregoing, in April, 2010, plaintiff sought an order, inter

alia, “enjoining the ADC from discontinuing the 3-meal-a-day

kosher diet that he currently receives,” and “‘moot[ing] his

action as complete[.]’” Patterson v. Schriro, 2010 WL 3522500,

at *1 (D.Ariz. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing Mot. (Doc. 87)).6

In denying that preliminary injunction motion, this court

explained that plaintiff did not “set forth any facts indicating

that he [wa]s subject to a threat of irreparable harm” where he

did “not explain why an order to maintain his kosher diet [wa]s

necessary nor d[id] he present any facts showing that his

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current kosher diet is likely to be discontinued or changed in

the future.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added). As to plaintiff’s

request to moot the action, the court found that because it had

recently granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, that

“indicate[d] his desire to proceed with this litigation[.]” Id.

(citation omitted). 

 Given that plaintiff is receiving the kosher diet that he

is seeking through an injunction, defendants argue that this

claim is moot because no case or controversy exists as Article

III requires. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that “ADOC & CACF

regularly take his diet for false reasons and an injunction

might prevent him from such abuse.” Supp. Resp. (Doc. 124) at

1. Defendants retort that the issue of whether those “previous

suspensions and delays . . . were justified is not . . . before

the Court.” Reply (Doc. 125) at 4:9-10. Even if they were,

defendants reiterate that an injunction requiring plaintiff to

receive a “‘complete daily’ kosher diet (when available)[,]”

nonetheless is moot due to the lack of a case or controversy.

See Resp. (Doc. 116) at 2. 

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of

the federal courts to “Cases” or “Controversies.” See U.S.

Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “The doctrine of mootness, which

is embedded in Article III's case or controversy requirement,

requires that an actual, ongoing controversy exist at all stages

of federal court proceedings.” Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc.,

2011 WL 3449473, at *3 (9 Cir. 2011) (citing Burke v. Barnes, th

479 U.S. 361, 363, 107 S.Ct. 734, 93 L.Ed.2d 732 (1987)).

“Whether ‘the dispute between the parties was very much alive

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when suit was filed . . . cannot substitute for the actual case

or controversy that an exercise of this [c]ourt's jurisdiction

requires.’” Id. (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317, 108

S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)). “A case becomes moot ‘when

the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a

legally cognizable interest in the outcome’ of the litigation.”

Id. (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct.

1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969)). “In other words, if events

subsequent to the filing of the case resolve the parties’

dispute,” the court “must dismiss the case as moot” because the

court does “not have the constitutional authority to decide moot

cases[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis added). 

Applying those well-settled rules to the present case, it

is patently obvious that plaintiff Patterson’s request for “[a]

court order requiring 3 kosher meals or the equivalent for all

kosher diets, no vegetarian[,]” SAC (Doc. 106 at 6, ¶ E(1), is

moot. Since shortly after the filing of this lawsuit, plaintiff

Patterson has been receiving the very kosher diet for which he

requests injunctive relief. Hence, there is no longer any

“present controversy as to which [that] relief can be granted.”

See Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011,

1018 (9 Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. th

2096, 179 L.Ed.2d 891 (U.S. 2011). Consequently, the court

GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction insofar as plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief

requiring that he be provided three kosher meals. That

particular claim is moot. 

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Because the court finds that none of these three claims can

be cured by allegations of other facts, defendants’ motion

herein is granted with prejudice. See Balsam v. Tucows Inc.,

627 F.3d 1158, 1163 n. 3 (9 Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) th

(“because no amendment could cure the defect in [plaintiff’s]

claims[,] [t]he district court did not err in dismissing the

complaint with prejudice[]”).

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) the reference to the Magistrate Judge is WITHDRAWN as

to defendants’ “Amended Motion to Dismiss RLUIPA and Injunction

Claims” (Doc. 115);

(2) Defendants’ “Amended Motion to Dismiss RLUIPA and

Injunction Claims” (Doc. 115) is GRANTED with prejudice. 

DATED this 26 day of August, 2011. th

copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 127 Filed 08/26/11 Page 17 of 17