Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05278/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05278-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 2005 Decided February 28, 2006

No. 04-5278

DONALD ROCHON,

APPELLANT

v.

ALBERTO GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv00958)

Michael A. Rubin argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Steven G. Reade and Emily N. Glatfelter.

Lisa S. Goldfluss, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an

appearance.

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* Senior Circuit Judge Edwards was in regular active service

at the time of oral argument.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, and

EDWARDS,

* Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Donald Rochon sued the Attorney

General of the United States in his official capacity, claiming the

Federal Bureau of Investigation had discriminated and retaliated

against him, in violation both of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000), and of a 1990

agreement settling his earlier Title VII suit against the Bureau.

The alleged discrimination and retaliation took the form of the

FBI’s refusal, contrary to policy, to investigate death threats a

federal prisoner made against Rochon and his wife. The district

court dismissed Rochon’s complaint on the grounds that Rochon

had neither pled facts demonstrating the FBI had taken an

adverse employment action against him nor shown a causal link

between his protected activity and the FBI’s alleged retaliation.

The district court should not have dismissed Rochon’s Title

VII claim because Rochon was not required to demonstrate his

employer’s retaliatory act was related to his employment.

Further, it is unclear whether the district court had direct

jurisdiction over the claim arising out of the settlement

agreement. See Brown v. United States, 389 F.3d 1296, 1297

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Therefore, we reverse the

judgment of the district court and remand the case for further

proceedings.

I. Background

In 1981 Donald Rochon began working as a Special Agent

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in the Omaha office of the FBI, where he became the target of

a campaign of racial harassment. Rochon filed a formal

complaint with his Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor

in 1984. In 1987 the Department of Justice concluded the

Bureau had discriminated against Rochon and then retaliated

against him for complaining about the discrimination. Rochon

sued the FBI and in 1990 the parties entered into a settlement

agreement as part of which the Bureau agreed “not to take any

retaliatory action” against Rochon in the future.

Soon thereafter, however, Ronald Kessler authored a book

entitled The FBI, in which he attributed to FBI agents certain

statements describing Rochon’s performance at the Bureau as

substandard. Rochon brought a second Title VII suit and in

1994 the parties entered into a second settlement agreement.

This time the FBI agreed to issue a corrective statement, to

refrain from interfering “with Mr. Rochon’s future employment

opportunities,” and to pay him $40,000 in damages. The 1994

agreement expressly provided that it did not “in any way

replace, diminish, or modify the terms or relief,” such as the bar

against retaliation, in the 1990 agreement.

In his complaint in the present case, Rochon alleges that in

1993 and 1994 the Philadelphia field office of the FBI received

“credible notice and evidence of death threats directed at [him]

and his wife” by an inmate in a federal prison. Rochon

maintains that, contrary to “its policies, duties, and usual

practices in such circumstances,” the FBI neither investigated

the threats nor took any steps to protect the Rochons, even after

the Bureau had indicated it would do so. In 2002, when Rochon

learned the FBI had failed to investigate the threats, he filed an

administrative complaint. 

In 2003 Rochon brought this suit in the district court,

alleging the FBI’s failure to investigate was discriminatory and

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retaliatory, in violation both of the 1990 settlement agreement

and of Title VII. The district court granted the Government’s

motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to

dismiss the complaint, and Rochon appealed.

II. Analysis

Rochon challenges the district court’s analyses both of Title

VII and of Rule 12(b)(6). The Government maintains the

district court properly dismissed Rochon’s claims on the merits

or, alternatively, did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the

claim arising out of the settlement agreement. We begin, as we

must, with the issue of jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for

a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998).

A. Jurisdiction

The Government argues that pursuant to the Tucker Act, the

district court lacked jurisdiction over Rochon’s claim that the

Bureau breached their 1990 settlement agreement. The Tucker

Act provides that the “United States Court of Federal Claims

shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim

against the United States founded ... upon any express or

implied contract with the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

1491(a)(1) (2000). When the contract claim is for damages in

excess of $10,000, as it is in this case, the jurisdiction of the

Court of Federal Claims is exclusive. Id. § 1346(a)(2) (2000).

In two decisions of this court, issued after the district court’s

ruling in this case, we have made clear that “a claim for breach

of a Title VII settlement agreement is a contract claim within the

meaning of the Tucker Act” and, therefore, for claims exceeding

$10,000 jurisdiction belongs with the Court of Federal Claims.

Hansson v. Norton, 411 F.3d 231, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing

Brown, 389 F.3d at 1297).

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Rochon maintains the district court had jurisdiction over his

contract claim pursuant to this court’s decision in Hansson, 411

F.3d 231. In Hansson, we held the district court lacked

jurisdiction after noting the plaintiff did not seek, along with her

claim for damages within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal

Claims, equitable relief, which ordinarily only the district court

could grant. Id. at 232, 236. Because Rochon has requested, in

addition to damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, he argues

the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear his claims.

On the contrary, the combination of a claim for equitable relief

brought under Title VII and a related claim for breach of

contract does not give the district court jurisdiction over the

contract claim that, if brought separately, would be exclusively

in the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2),

1491(a)(1). Brown, 389 F.3d at 1297; see also Brown v. United

States, 271 F. Supp. 2d 225, 227-28 (D.D.C. 2003) (describing

claims).

In the present case, however, it is not immediately clear

whether Rochon’s claim, if brought separately, would fall within

the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. That court does

not have jurisdiction over claims for damages in cases

“sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). Rochon has requested

compensatory damages of up to $300,000 “for the emotional

distress and other harms” alleged in the complaint. Although his

claim for “emotional distress” may sound in tort, that does not

end the analysis. The Federal Circuit has held that where “the

primary thrust of [a] complaint is breach of contract, even if a

[claim sounding in tort] would lie, the Claims Court would

retain jurisdiction over the suit.” Wood v. United States, 961

F.2d 195, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Awad v. United States,

301 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (it is “well established that

where a tort claim stems from a breach of contract, the cause of

action is ultimately one arising in contract, and thus is properly

within the ... jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims”).

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This case was decided on Rochon’s complaint and the

Government’s motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). Because the Government has not yet filed an answer,

Rochon may amend his complaint as of right, see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a) (“A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a

matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is

served”), and take the opportunity to clarify whether the

“primary thrust” of his claim is, in fact, breach of contract and

thus within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.

Even if the district court concludes the gravamen of

Rochon’s claim lies in contract, however, it does not necessarily

follow that the district court is barred from exercising

jurisdiction over that claim. As explained in Part II.C below, we

are reinstating Rochon’s statutory claim. On remand, therefore,

the district court may determine it has ancillary jurisdiction over

his contract claim. See Shaffer v. Veneman, 325 F.3d 370, 373

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994)) (court may exercise ancillary

jurisdiction “to permit disposition by a single court of claims

that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually

interdependent”). 

B. Sovereign Immunity

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), a private employer may not

“discriminate against any [employee] ... because he has made a

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” Several

circuits have held this ban on retaliation applies to the

Government through § 2000e-16, which prohibits the Executive

Branch from engaging in “any discrimination based on race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin” in any “personnel

action[].” See Bd. of County Comm’rs, Fremont County, Colo.

v. EEOC, 405 F.3d 840, 845 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing the

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issue as “well-settled” and collecting cases from the Fifth,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits). Although we have not directly

confronted the issue, we have recognized the cogency of this

reasoning. See Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 297 (2001)

(citing Porter v. Adams, 639 F.2d 273, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1981)).

The Government now contends, however, as it did not in those

cases, that the Congress has not waived sovereign immunity

from claims of retaliation.

Although the Government conceded in its brief that it “has

indeed waived sovereign immunity for retaliation claims,” at

oral argument, counsel maintained it has not done so because

there is in § 2000e-16 no specific and unequivocal waiver of

sovereign immunity with respect to claims of retaliation, and the

court will not hold the United States has waived its sovereign

immunity unless the waiver is “unequivocally expressed” in an

Act of Congress. Hubbard v. EPA, 982 F.2d 531, 532 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sovereign immunity,

moreover, being jurisdictional, see Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp.

v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (because

“sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature ... the terms of

[the Government’s] consent to be sued in any court define that

court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit”), we must now consider,

notwithstanding the belatedness of the Government’s volte face,

whether the Congress has unequivocally exposed the United

States to damage claims based upon retaliation in violation of

Title VII.

We conclude the Congress clearly has waived sovereign

immunity from claims of retaliation. Section 2000e-16(a)

prohibits the executive departments from discriminating in

personnel actions. A civil action alleging a violation of § 2000e16(a) is, per § 2000e-16(d), governed by “[t]he provisions of

section 2000e-5(f) through (k)”; those provisions are applicable

to actions against all employers subject to Title VII, public and

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private alike. One such provision, § 2000e-5(g)(1), expressly

allows a court to award equitable relief, including back pay, to

any claimant with respect to whom the defendant employer

“intentionally engaged ... in an unlawful employment practice,”

and § 2000e-3(a), in turn, clearly makes retaliation “an unlawful

employment practice.” It is clear, therefore, the Congress has

made the United States amenable to suits seeking equitable

relief and back pay for retaliation. The district court,

consequently, had jurisdiction over Rochon’s statutory claim. 

C. The Motion to Dismiss

The next question is whether the district court correctly

dismissed Rochon’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, per Rule 12(b)(6). This court

reviews de novo a district court order granting a motion to

dismiss. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666,

670-71 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a

claim unless, taking as true the facts alleged in the complaint, “it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). This is the

standard because “the issue presented by a motion to dismiss is

not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”

Caribbean Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d

1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Adverse Action

The district court concluded that, because Rochon did not

suffer a “diminution in pay or benefits,” he did not experience

an “adverse personnel action” and was therefore not the victim

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of any retaliation cognizable under Title VII. Rochon argues §

2000e-3(a), although referenced in § 2000e-16(a), which deals

with “personnel actions,” does not require that the employer’s

act of retaliation be related to the plaintiff’s employment: The

“plain and unambiguous terms” of § 2000e-3(a) itself, he points

out, “contain no employment-related limitation.” Here Rochon

contrasts § 2000e-2(a)(1), which prohibits discrimination more

narrowly “with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment,” and refers us to the Supreme Court’s

instruction in Russello v. United States: “[W]here Congress

includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits

it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed

that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate

inclusion or exclusion.” 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United

States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))

(alteration in original).

The Government urges us to reject Rochon’s “plain

language” argument on the undoubtedly solid ground that “the

meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on

context.” Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The anti-retaliation

provision is part of a statute that prohibits discriminatory

employment practices. Therefore, the Government argues, “[t]o

suggest that the scope of liability for discrimination based on

race should be narrower than the scope of liability for

discriminating against someone complaining about race

discrimination makes no sense in the context of the statute.”

Furthermore, the Government asserts, Rochon’s interpretation

would have “extremely problematic” consequences because it

would allow government employees to sue the Government

claiming retaliation based upon the exercise of quotidian

governmental functions adverse to their interests, such as a tax

audit by the Internal Revenue Service.

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We begin, of course, with the text of the statute. In Title

VII the Congress prohibited employers from retaliating against

employees for having engaged in activity protected by Title VII:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer to discriminate against any of his employees ...

because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful

employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has

made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under

this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Although this court has, as the

Government points out, described the prima facie case for

retaliation as requiring an adverse “personnel” or adverse

“employment” action, e.g., Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126,

1134 (2002), we have also, as Rochon notes, spoken more

generally of an employer’s “conduct having an adverse impact

on the plaintiff.” Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen

Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1423 (1988). Phrases used in passing

notwithstanding, the fact is we have yet to determine whether

the adverse action alleged must be an adverse personnel action,

or otherwise related to the plaintiff’s employment, in order to

state a claim under Title VII.

In Passer v. American Chemical Society, 935 F.2d 322, 330

(D.C. Cir. 1991), we confronted the question whether a plaintiff

claiming retaliation under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act must allege an adverse employment action.

There the plaintiff alleged that, after he had charged his

employer with violating the ADEA, the defendant unlawfully

retaliated by cancelling a symposium that was to have been held

in his honor. The anti-retaliation provision of the ADEA, 29

U.S.C. § 623(d), which closely tracks the cognate provision of

Title VII, makes it “unlawful ... to discriminate against any

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[employee] ... because such individual ... has opposed any

practice made unlawful by this section.” We concluded: “The

statute itself proscribes ‘discriminat[ion]’ against those who

invoke the Act’s protections; the statute does not limit its reach

only to acts of retaliation that take the form of cognizable

employment actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion.”

Passer, 935 F.2d at 331. The court in Passer thus determined

the concept of retaliation encompasses more than just adverse

employment actions. 

Carrying our approach in Passer over to the closely related

context of Title VII accords with the decisions of the four other

circuits that do not require that a retaliatory action be

employment-related in order to state a claim under Title VII.

See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000)

(retaliation includes “any adverse treatment that is based on a

retaliatory motive”); Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598,

606 (7th Cir. 1999) (§ 2000e-3(a) is broad enough to prohibit

retaliatory actions “that are not ostensibly employment related”);

Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th

Cir. 1998) (holding “Title VII's protection against retaliatory

discrimination extends to adverse actions which fall short of

ultimate employment decisions”); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet,

74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting “[i]t would be

illogical to define a section [2000e-3(a)] employee liberally to

include former employees and to simultaneously define an

adverse employment action narrowly by limiting it to those

formal practices linked to an existing employee/employer

relationship”); see also White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.

Co., 364 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir. 2004) (dictum describing

Passer, 935 F.2d 322, as a “well-reasoned opinion[] that

conclude[s] that ... an employer is prohibited [by the ADEA]

from retaliating in materially adverse ways, regardless of

whether the retaliatory acts affect employment”). But see

Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1995)

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(requirement that plaintiff obtain prior approval before visiting

employer’s campus did not constitute retaliation prohibited by

§ 2000e-3(a), which “requires a harm which impedes plaintiff’s

employment situation”); cf. Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127

F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997) (requirement that plaintiff

demonstrate “materially adverse employment action” inferred

from § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2)).

Our decision in Passer is also consistent with the

understanding of the EEOC: “The statutory retaliation clauses

[including that of Title VII] prohibit any adverse treatment that

is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter

the charging party or others from engaging in protected

activity.” EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 8-II.D.3 (1998).

The EEOC appears to have based its broad reading of retaliation

upon the Supreme Court’s functional approach in Robinson v.

Shell Oil Co., where the Court adopted the agency’s position

that “employee” as used in § 2000e-3(a) comprises former as

well as current employees because that interpretation is more

“consisten[t] with a primary purpose of antiretaliation

provisions: Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial

mechanisms.” 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). As the Court

explained, “[I]t would be destructive of this purpose of the

antiretaliation provision for an employer to be able to retaliate

with impunity against an entire class of acts under Title VII --

for example, complaints regarding discriminatory termination.”

Id.

Considering the Supreme Court’s reasoning and its

description of “a primary purpose” of § 2000e-3(a), we reject

the Government’s contextual argument that it is illogical to

interpret § 2000e-16(a) as reaching an employer’s retaliatory

acts outside the realm of employment. The Government’s

suggested limitation, like that of the respondent in Robinson,

would allow “an employer ... to retaliate with impunity” against

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an employee who engages in protected activity as long as the

employer takes an action unrelated to the plaintiff’s

employment. To take the Government’s own example, the IRS

could retaliate against a complaining employee by subjecting

him to a tax audit. Or an employer could falsely accuse an

employee of engaging in criminal activity, as was alleged in

Aviles, 183 F.3d at 606. Thus is it clear the Government’s

reading of § 2000e-3(a) “would be destructive of this purpose of

the antiretaliation provision,” namely, “[m]aintaining unfettered

access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Robinson, 519 U.S.

at 346.

We recognize the plaintiffs in Passer and Robinson each

challenged as retaliatory the actions of a private employer. Here

we must determine whether the Government is similarly liable

under § 2000e-3(a) for retaliation that does not come in the form

of a personnel action. In other words, we must consider

whether, when referenced in § 2000e-16(d) via § 2000e-5(g)(1)-

(2)(A), the general ban on retaliation in § 2000e-3(a) is limited

by the requirement in § 2000e-16(a) that “[a]ll [Government]

personnel actions” be made free from discrimination. We do not

believe the prohibition is so qualified. Nothing in § 2000e-16(d)

or § 2000e-5(g) suggests § 2000e-3(a) is to be read differently

when applied to the Government. Nor did the Supreme Court in

any way qualify its observation in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.

535, 547 (1974), that “the substantive anti-discrimination law

embraced in Title VII was carried over and applied to the

Federal Government” through the addition of § 2000e-16 in

1972. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14

(1977) (noting “Congress expressly indicated the intent that the

same Title VII principles be applied to governmental and private

employers alike” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 17 (1971); S.

REP. NO. 92-415, at 10 (1971))). In light of the Congress’s

recognized intent in 1972 to apply to the Government the

principles it had in 1964 applied to private employers, we now

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hold that an alleged act of retaliation by the Government need

not be related to the plaintiff’s employment in order to state a

claim of discrimination under Title VII.

We are not indifferent to the Government’s concern that too

broad a reading of § 2000e-3(a) could lead to a barrage of

lawsuits against it based upon trivial actions, such as the

“misdelivery of a letter” by the Postal Service. On the contrary,

we think making actionable insignificant disparities in the

treatment of employees of different races, or religions, et cetera,

is too absurd to be attributed to the Congress. Such suits are

properly precluded, however, not by the court creating an

atextual loophole for forms of retaliation unrelated to the

plaintiff’s employment, but by our requiring that the alleged

retaliation be “material” or “significant.” Indeed, we have

already held that materiality is implicit in the term

“discriminate” as it is used in Title VII. See Brown v. Brody,

199 F.3d 446, 457 (1999) (plaintiff must demonstrate

“materially adverse consequences ... such that a reasonable trier

of fact could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively

tangible harm”). In the framework of Title VII, a claim of

retaliation is necessarily a claim of discrimination and the

requirement of materiality therefore inheres in it as well. 

We therefore agree with several other circuits that in order

to support a claim of retaliation a plaintiff must demonstrate the

“employer’s challenged action would have been material to a

reasonable employee,” which in this context means it well might

have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting

a charge of discrimination.” Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of

Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Manning,

127 F.3d at 692 (“not everything that makes an employee

unhappy is an actionable adverse action”); Randlett v. Shalala,

118 F.3d 857, 862 (1st Cir. 1997) (dictum noting “there is room

for a de minimis threshold” in claims of retaliatory conduct).

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And this is so regardless whether the alleged retaliatory act is

related to the plaintiff’s employment.

The retaliatory conduct Rochon alleges, to wit, the FBI’s

refusal to investigate, as it would ordinarily do for any member

of the public, a death threat made against him by a federal prison

inmate, meets this threshold of significance. In other words, a

reasonable FBI agent well might be dissuaded from engaging in

activity protected by Title VII if he knew that doing so would

leave him unprotected by the FBI in the face of threats against

him or his family.

2. Causation

The district court also concluded Rochon had failed to state

a claim because “[t]here is no support to show that the [FBI’s]

adverse action would not have occurred ‘but for’ [Rochon’s]

protected activity.” Rochon is not required, however, in order

to state a claim of retaliation, to allege facts sufficient to negate

the FBI’s alternative explanations for its actions -- whatever

they may turn out to be. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

216 F.3d 1111, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On the contrary, in order

to survive a motion to dismiss, “all [the] complaint has to say,”

id. at 1115, is “the Government retaliated against me because I

engaged in protected activity.” Rochon’s complaint meets this

liberal pleading standard.

Rochon unquestionably engaged in statutorily protected

activity when he filed Title VII complaints against the FBI. And

we have long held a “causal connection ... may be established by

showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee's

protected activity, and that the adverse ... action took place

shortly after that activity.” Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 86

(1985). Here, Rochon claims the FBI refused to investigate

threats against him around the time he and the Bureau settled his

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Title VII suit concerning the statements in Kessler’s book. The

district court erred, therefore, in concluding that Rochon failed

“to [allege sufficient] facts to support a reasonable inference that

the FBI acted with retaliatory or discriminatory motives.”

III. Conclusion

We hold Title VII makes unlawful any act of retaliation by

an employer that well might dissuade a reasonable employee

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination pursuant

to Title VII. The district court therefore erred in dismissing

Rochon’s statutory claim. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the

district court could exercise jurisdiction directly over Rochon’s

claim based upon the agreement into which he and the FBI had

entered to settle his prior lawsuit. The case is accordingly

remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

So ordered.

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