Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00318/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00318-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS J. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, No. 2:12-cv-0318 KJN P 

vs.

C/O T. YOUNG, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing

fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court

will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s prison

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trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to

make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to

plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to

the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing

fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.

2000) (“a judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more

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than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. However,

“[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555) (citations and internal

quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept

as true the allegations of the complaint in question, id., and construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other

grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

Plaintiff’s initial filing is 364 pages -- a 36 page complaint, with 328 pages of

exhibits. Plaintiff names 12 individuals as defendants, and challenges four separate incidents

involving alleged excessive use of force at High Desert State Prison from July 28, 2009, through

October 24, 2010. 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (“Congress did not intend

§ 1983 liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)

(no affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or

policy demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’

another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an

affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is

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legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979) (no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979) (no liability where

there is no evidence of personal participation). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the

involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual allegations of

personal participation is insufficient).

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the United States Constitution. Whitley

v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith,

that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.

What is needed to show unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain “varies

according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 5 (1992) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim the

plaintiff must show that objectively he suffered a “sufficiently serious” deprivation. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). The plaintiff

must also show that subjectively each defendant had a culpable state of mind in allowing or

causing the plaintiff’s deprivation to occur. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

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It is well established that “whenever prison officials stand accused of using

excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core

judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley, i.e., whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” McMillian, 503

U.S. at 6-7. A prisoner is not required to show a “significant injury” to establish that he suffered

a sufficiently serious constitutional deprivation. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 9-10.

Factors such as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the

need and amount of force that was used, and the extent of injury inflicted are relevant to the

ultimate determination as to whether force used by prison personnel was excessive. From these

factors, inferences may be drawn as to whether the use of force could plausibly have been

thought necessary, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction

of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur. “Equally relevant are such

factors as the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the

responsible officials on the basis of facts known to them, and any efforts made to temper the

severity of a forceful response.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.

With regard to the July 28, 2009 incident, plaintiff’s complaint appears to state a

potentially cognizable civil rights claim alleging excessive use of force against defendants

Young, Sharp, Fish, Hanks, and Beasley. 

Moreover, although plaintiff did not expressly plead this claim, it appears plaintiff

may be able to state a cognizable failure to protect claim as to defendant Van Leer for his role in

the July 28, 2009 incident. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive

and harsh, prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical

care, and personal safety. Id.; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Prison

officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse. Hoptowit,

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682 F.2d at 1250; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. To establish a violation of this duty, the inmate must

establish that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to

the inmate's safety. Id., 511 U.S. at 834. The deliberate indifference standard involves an

objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

“sufficiently serious.” Id. at 834 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). Second, the prison official

must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837.

An officer can be held liable for failing to intercede if he had a “realistic

opportunity” to intercede. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff’s allegations as to defendant Van Leer suggest that plaintiff may be able

to allege facts sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 against defendant

Van Leer for failing to protect plaintiff, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). If plaintiff wishes to pursue this claim as to defendant Van Leer, he should include that

claim in any amended complaint.1

With regard to plaintiff’s other claims, however, plaintiff is advised that he may

join multiple claims only if they are all against a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). 

The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): “A

party asserting a claim . . . may join, [] as independent or as

alternate claims, as many claims . . . as the party has against an

opposing party.” Thus multiple claims against a single party are

fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with

unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against

different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent

the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit

produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing

fees -- for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number

of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without

prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

 Plaintiff may simply insert his paragraph numbers 2 - 42 into the amended complaint, 1

and begin his failure to protect claim against defendant Van Leer as paragraph 43. Plaintiff is not

required to plead or prove exhaustion in his initial pleading; plaintiff may simply answer the

exhaustion questions on the form complaint.

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George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (joinder of

defendants not permitted unless both commonality and same transaction requirements are

satisfied). Here, only one of the named defendants is involved in two of the incidents. The other

named defendants were all allegedly involved in separate incidents. Two of the incidents

resulted in rules violations, which may further complicate the case if the rules violation hearings

become an issue. Moreover, the incidents span a fourteen month period of time, further

complicating inclusion in one action. Because plaintiff’s remaining claims are unrelated claims

against different defendants, with the exception of only one defendant named in the last incident,

those claims must be pursued in multiple lawsuits. Plaintiff’s civil rights claims as to incidents 2

occurring after July 28, 2009, must be pled in different civil rights complaints. 

Thus, plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint as to his September 28,

2009 alleged excessive use of force claims against defendants Young, Sharp, Fish, Hanks, and

Beasley, and a failure to protect claim against defendant Van Leer. Plaintiff’s remaining claims

must be pled in separate actions. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371. Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo,

423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v.

Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

 Plaintiff does not allege that these four separate incidents of alleged excessive force are 2

related or connected in any way. Indeed, plaintiff refers to them as “several instances of

excessive force.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff separately addresses each incident and cites a

different set of exhibits for each incident. Plaintiff does not allege that defendants engaged in a

pattern or practice of using excessive force against plaintiff.

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In addition, plaintiff is hereby informed that the court cannot refer to a prior

pleading in order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that

an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This

requirement exists because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original

complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended

complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. However, the court will re-append previously submitted

exhibits upon request by plaintiff. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently

herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the

attached Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of

this action.

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5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff four copies of the form for

filing a prisoner civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

DATED: July 25, 2012

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

will0318.14

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS J. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, No. 2:12-cv-0318 KJN P 

vs.

C/O T. YOUNG, et al., NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Defendants.

_______________________/

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's

order filed :

______________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

 

Plaintiff

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