Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06215/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06215-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KULBIR SINGH BARAPIND,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTONIO AMADOR, UNITED STATES

MARSHAL FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

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1:01-cv-06215 OWW 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER ON REMAND FROM THE

COURT OF APPEALS RE:

EXTRADITION

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on limited remand from the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in 

Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). The

Government of India sought extradition of Petitioner KULBIR SINGH

BARAPIND (“Petitioner”) for criminal charges arising out of

eleven separate incidents. The district court certified for

extradition charges arising out of three of the incidents. The

decisions certifying extradition for charges arising out of two

of the three incidents were affirmed. The charges in First

Information Report No. 34 (FIR 34) were remanded for the district

court to apply the political offense analysis from Quinn v.

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1 A First Information Report is a summary report of crimes

charged prepared by the Indian police. “FIR” is the designation

that has been used throughout this litigation to refer to the

discrete incidents out of which the criminal charges arose for

which extradition is sought.

2

Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).1

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kulbir Singh Barapind (“Petitioner”) brings this petition

for writ of habeas corpus challenging certification of his

extradition to India. In ruling on the petition, a lengthy

review was conducted of all the charges for which India sought

extradition. In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982

(E.D. Cal. 2001). The charges, including numerous counts of

murder, attempted murder, and robbery, arose out of eleven

incidents that took place in the state of Punjab, India, during a

time period when Sikh insurgents sought to establish a new

homeland, Khalistan. Id. at 986. Criminal charges relating to

three of the eleven incidents were certified for extradition. 

Petitioner challenged these determinations on appeal to the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Originally, the panel affirmed

the extradition order in all respects. 360 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.

2004). After an en banc hearing, all of the district court’s

determinations were affirmed, with the exception of the decision

regarding the charges in FIR 34. The Court of Appeals reversed

the certification and order for extradition for FIR 34 crimes and

ordered a limited remand to the district court with instructions

to apply the Ninth Circuit ruling in Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d

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3

776 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Quinn”) to determine if the extraditable

crimes charged in FIR 34 were covered by the political offense

exception. See Barapind, 400 F.3d at 753.

On June 24, 2005, a scheduling conference was held to

schedule proceedings on remand. (See Doc. 38, Scheduling Order) 

The parties stipulated to amend the petition to substitute

Antonio Amador, currently the United States Marshal for the

Eastern District of California, as custodian of Petitioner, in

place and stead of the former U.S. Marshal, Jerry J. Enomoto. 

They agreed the evidentiary record was complete. On August 29,

2005, the parties filed opening briefs: “Brief in Support of

Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus,” (Doc. 40) and “Government’s

Brief to FIR 34 on Remand,” (Doc. 39). On September 6, 2005,

Petitioner filed a reply titled “Petitioner’s Reply Brief in

Support of Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus.” (Doc. 41,

Petitioner’s Opp.) On September 12, 2005, the Government filed a

reply titled “Government’s Reply Brief to Barapind’s Opening

Brief.” (Doc. 42, Government’s Opp.)

Oral argument was heard on September 19, 2005. 

Jagdip Singh Sekhon, Esq., appeared on behalf of Petitioner. 

Stanley A. Boone, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney,

appeared on behalf of the Government of India.

III. BACKGROUND

The incident giving rise to the charges in FIR 34 occurred

on April 26, 1992. Petitioner and three other men, armed with

AK-47 rifles, shot and killed four occupants of a “gypsy” vehicle

in the village Garhi Mohan Singh. See Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at

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2 Dr. Cynthia Mahmood, Petitioner’s expert during the

extradition hearing, acknowledged that Sikh militants did not

have a formal military organization, command structure, uniforms,

or a revolutionary army. Id. at 991-92. She agreed the Punjab

had an historically high crime rate and cultural history of

murder and revenge killings.

4

1035. The four victims were Balwant Singh Sarhal, a former

member of India’s legislative assembly (“MLA”); Amar Nath Kanugo

of the Deputy Commissioner Office in Jahander; Suda Ram, a

constable; and Jasbir Singh, another constable. The gypsy

vehicle came from the side of the village. Petitioner and the

other assailants were present in the village at the time and

opened fire on the vehicle, killing all four occupants. After

the attack, petitioner and the other assailants took the

constables’ weapons and left. Id.

From the outset of this case, the Indian government has

alleged that Petitioner committed the acts underlying the

extradition request as a member of the Khalistan Commando Force

(“KCF”). As its name suggests, the KCF is a Sikh militant

organization that seeks the secession of the Punjab province from

India and the creation of an independent nation named Khalistan. 

During the period of the offenses underlying the extradition

request, the KCF was engaged in a struggle with the Indian

government in hopes of achieving its goal of independence.2 The

resulting violence occurred overwhelmingly in Punjab. The

struggle began in June 1984 with an event that became known as

the “Golden Temple Massacre.” Indian armed forces attacked Sikh

rebels who had taken refuge in the Golden Temple, the holiest of

Sikh shrines, resulting in the killing of at least 500

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3 In response to armed strife in the Punjab, the Indian

Government enacted TADA in May 1985. See Navkiran Singh, The

Terrorist Laws, Law Publishers, Def. Ex. 4. TADA granted police

sweeping powers to arrest, detain, interrogate, and charge

suspects accused of being terrorists or engaging in “disruptive

activities.” Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 989. TADA’s purpose was

to suppress “speech or actions” that “disrupt or challenge the

territorial integrity of India.” Id. at 1031 (citing U.S.

Department of State’s 1991 Human Rights Report for India, p.

5

individuals.

A decade of violence followed. Sikh militants engaged in

bombings, assassinations, and other terrorist activities against

the Indian government, its local collaborators, security forces,

and innocent civilians. See Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 991. The

Indian government responded to the Sikh independence movement

with counterinsurgency efforts, including efforts by Indian

security forces to suppress Sikh militants. These efforts

resulted in human rights abuses, extrajudicial “encounter”

killings, detentions without trial, and torture. By 1994, Indian

security forces succeeded in containing the armed Sikh

insurgency. See id. at 986-87, 988-92.

Dr. Mahmood, petitioner’s expert, testified that Petitioner

is a folk hero in the nature of a “saint-soldier.” He is a

religious-populist hero who has great popular support among Sikh

separatists. Id. at 992. All charges brought against him are

described in detail in the initial district court decision. Id.

at 999-1013. FIR 34 charges Petitioner with four counts of

murder under India Penal Code Sections 302 and 34, committed on

April 16, 1992. India also charged Petitioner under India’s

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (“TADA”).3

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1394).

4 Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Criminals Between the

United States of America and Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, U.S.-

Gr. Brit., T.S. No. 849 (1932), 47 Stat. 212 (“Treaty”).

5 Article VI of the Treaty provides:

A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered

if the crime or offense in respect of which

6

India seeks to extradite Petitioner for the murder charges only.

The district court originally found sufficient cause existed

to believe Petitioner was a perpetrator of the crimes charged in

FIR 34. Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-11. This holding was

affirmed on appeal and is not in dispute. Barapind, 400 F.3d at

752. The district court’s holding that Petitioner did not meet

his burden to establish that these charges fell within the

political offense exception was reversed. Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d

at 1035 (“Whether this attack was a domestic terrorist attack or

politically motivated cannot be determined.”); 400 F.3d at 753. 

It must be determined whether the FIR 34 charges fall within

Quinn’s interpretation of the political offense exception. 783

F.2d 776.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

The right of a foreign sovereign to demand and obtain

extradition of an accused criminal is created by treaty. See

Quinn, 783 F.2d at 782. The parties stipulate that Article VI of

the United States’ extradition treaty with Great Britain

applies.4 Article VI provides that a fugitive criminal shall not

be extradited if the offense is of a political character.5 The

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his surrender is demanded is one of a

political character, or if he proves that the

requisition for his surrender has, in fact,

been made with a view to try or punish him

for a crime or offense of a political

character. 

T.S. No. 849, 47 Stat. 212, Art. VI.

7

treaty does not define what constitutes a political offense.

The policies behind the political offense exception to

extradition are to: (a) protect the right of individuals “to

resort to political activism to foster political change;”

(b) help prevent individuals from being returned to countries

where they may be subjected to unfair punishments because of

their political opinions; and (c) promote the notion that

governments should not intervene in the internal political

struggles of other nations. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793.

There are two categories of political offenses: pure

political offenses and relative political offenses. Quinn, 783

F.2d at 793. Pure political offenses, which are not at issue

here, include treason, espionage, and sedition. Pure offenses

“are acts aimed directly at the government [citation] and have

none of the elements of ordinary crimes [citation].” Id. 

Relative political offenses are otherwise common crimes committed

in connection with a political act or for a political motive. 

Id. 

American courts use the “incidence test” to determine

whether an offense that is not purely political falls within the

political offense exception. The incidence test has two

requirements: “(1) the occurrence of an uprising or other

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8

violent political disturbance at the time of the charged offense,

and (2) a charged offense that is ‘incidental to’...the

uprising.” Id. at 797 (internal citations omitted). The first

prong of the test is not at issue; it is not disputed that the

acts of violence (murder) alleged occurred during the course of a

political uprising. See Barapind, 400 F.3d at 750 (“There is no

real doubt that the crimes Barapind is accused of committing

occurred during a time of violent political disturbance in India. 

Tens of thousands of deaths and casualties resulted between the

mid-1980s and early 1990s as Sikh nationalists clashed with

government officers and sympathizers in Punjab.” (quoting Singh,

170 F. Supp. 2d at 1032)). 

The sole issue in this case involves the second prong, i.e.,

whether the FIR 34 offenses were committed incidental to the

uprising.

A. The Quinn Interpretation

In Quinn, the Ninth Circuit adopted a “liberal nexus

standard” for evaluating the second prong of the incidence test. 

783 F.2d at 809-10. Quinn held that, for an offense to be

incidental to the uprising, it must be “related to or connected

with the insurgent activity.” Id. at 810. There must “be a

nexus between the act and the uprising.” Id. at 809. Other

factors that weigh in favor of a finding that the crime was

committed incident to the uprising include “membership in an

uprising group;” “similarity of the charged offense to other acts

committed by the uprising group;” and “the degree of control over

the accused’s acts by some hierarchy within the group....” 783

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6 Acts of international terrorism “are committed abroad, not

in the country run by a government that is the target of the

uprising,” and “seeks to promote chaos and is not political.” 

Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 996 (citing Quinn, 783 F.2d at 805-06).

9

F.2d at 810. The act must be limited by the geographic confines

of the uprising and must be contemporaneous with the uprising. 

Id. It is not necessary to show proof of potential or actual

effectiveness of actions in achieving political ends; direct

proof of the accused’s political motive; or membership in any

uprising group. 783 F.2d at 809. However, Quinn also states

that “the ‘incidental to’ component is not satisfied by ‘any

connection, however feeble, between a common crime and a

political disturbance....’” Id. “The act must be causally or

ideologically related to the uprising.” Id.

The Quinn court gave a number of examples of situations

where no nexus should be found, even under the liberal standard,

including criminal acts committed for purely personal reasons,

such as vengeance or vindictiveness, and acts of international

terrorism.6 Acts of violence against civilians can, under

certain unspecified circumstances, fall under the political

offense exception:

Under the liberal nexus test we have

traditionally applied, or even under a strict

nexus standard, there is no justification for

distinguishing, as [In re Doherty, 599 F.

Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)] suggests, between

attacks on military and civilian targets. 

The “incidental to” component, like the

incidence test as a whole, must be applied in

an objective, non-judgmental manner. It is

for the revolutionaries, not the courts, to

determine what tactics may help further their

chances of bringing down or changing the

government. All that the courts should do is

determine whether the conduct is related to

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7 The court ultimately held that no uprising existed and

that therefore, the crimes with which Quinn was charged did not

fall within the political offense exception and were

extraditable. Id. at 813.

10

or connected with the insurgent activity. It

is clear that various “non-military”

offenses, including acts as disparate as

stealing food to sustain the combatants,

killing to avoid disclosure of strategies, or

killing simply to avoid capture, may be

incidental to or in furtherance of an

uprising. To conclude that attacks on

military are protected by the exception, but

that attacks on private sector institutions

and civilians are not, ignores the nature and

purpose of the test we apply, as well as the

realities of contemporary domestic

revolutionary struggles. 

Quinn, 783 F.2d at 810 (emphasis added). 

Quinn found bombings by Irish separatists that primarily

targeted unarmed civilians were “incidental to” the political

uprising (although no uprising was found to exist).7 Id. at 811. 

The accused in Quinn was a member of the Irish Republican Army

charged with murder and conspiracy to cause explosions. Id. at

781. The victims who were injured by bombs linked to Quinn were: 

-a Roman Catholic Bishop in the British Armed 

 Forces; 

-a Senior Treasury Prosecuting Counsel; and 

-a security guard who was injured by a mail 

bomb directed at the Chairman of the Daily 

Express newspaper in London.

Id. at 783-84.

In addition, three bombs linked to Quinn that did not injure

any victims were found in the foyer adjacent to the loading

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8 Judge Rymer in her Barapind dissent, recognizes Quinn’s

holding regarding the civilian/military distinction is contrary

to the holdings in numerous cases. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 756

(Rymer, J., dissenting) (citing Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389,

405-08 (E.D.N.Y 1989) (condemning the slaughter of innocent

civilians as not worthy of protection as a political offense),

aff’d, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1990); Eain v. Wilkes, 641

F.2d 504, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1981) (observing that “the

indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognized

as a protected political act even when the larger ‘political’

objective of the person who sets off the bomb may be to eliminate

the civilian population of a country”); In re Extradition of

Marzook, 924 F. Supp. 565, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that

‘attacks targeted at civilians do not advance any political

motive other than as terrorist acts’); In re Extradition of

Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 570 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (noting that

11

platform at Aldershot Railway Station in Hampshire County,

England; in an attache case in the archway entrance to the Kings

Arms Public House in Warminster, England; and in a black bag on

the front step of the Charco-Burger Grill on Heath Street in

London. Quinn was also charged with the murder of a police

officer during the course of a police chase. The police officer

who was shot by Quinn was helping another officer chase Quinn. 

Id. 

Quinn held that these crimes were committed “incidental to”

the unproven uprising, id. at 811, relying on the following

factors: (a) Quinn’s co-conspirators had been tried and

convicted of political crimes; (b) Quinn had already been

convicted of and served a sentence for his membership in the

Irish Republican Army; and (c) there was no evidence that Quinn

committed the crimes for other than political reasons. Id. The

court emphasized that the incidental to prong did not turn on a

distinction between attacks on military and civilian targets.8

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“[t]he civilian status of victims is also significant because the

United States does not regard the indiscriminate use of violence

against civilians as a political offense”), aff’d sub nom.,

Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also

In re Extradition of Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-42 (E.D.N.Y.

1989) (rejecting implication of Quinn holding that acts of

violence against civilians, if politically motivated, fall under

political offense exception); In re Matter of Doherty, 599 F.

Supp. 270, 275 (D.C.N.Y. 1984) (noting that conduct such as

detonating a bomb in a department store, public tavern, or a

resort hotel “would clearly be well beyond the parameters of what

and should properly be regarded as encompassed by the political

offense exception....”).

12

Id. at 810. The incidental to prong focuses on whether the

criminal acts are “related to or connected with” the insurgent

activity. The Barapind majority recognizes even under Quinn, “a

court may not rely on a fugitive’s mere assurance that a crime

had some political purpose” to find that relationship or

connection. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 751. Instead, the petitioner

bears the burden to produce evidence that shows “a factual nexus

between the crime and the political goal;” to show “the conduct

is related to or connected with the insurgent activity.” Id.;

see Quinn, 783 F.2d at 809 (“We believe the traditional liberal

construction of the requirement that there be a nexus between the

act and the uprising...is appropriate.”).

The Ninth Circuit, en banc, in a 6-5 decision, pronounced

that Quinn’s formulation of the “incidental to” prong was not

dicta, whether or not technically necessary to decide the issues

before the court:

In Quinn, the proper scope of “incidental to”

was an issue presented for review. We

addressed the issue and decided it in an

opinion joined in relevant part by a majority

of the panel. Consequently, our articulation

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9 Dr. Mahmood testified that every Sikh male has the name

“Singh,” which means “lion” and that every Sikh female has the

name “Kaur” which means “princess.” 

13

of “incidental to” became law of the circuit,

regardless of whether it was in some

technical sense “necessary” to our discussion

of the case.

Barapind, 400 F.3d at 750-51. Quinn must be applied. It is the

law of the Circuit.

V. ANALYSIS

Petitioner argues that the alleged FIR 34 killings meet the

Quinn interpretation of the “incidental to” prong. India rejoins

that Barapind did not present sufficient evidence to support his

claim that the killings were committed “incidental to” the

uprising, whether or not Quinn is applied. 

Under Quinn, the FIR 34 murders are incidental to the Sikh

uprising, if the crimes were “related to or connected with” the

Sikh independent Khalistan movement. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 810. 

Here, the four victims include: Singh Sarhal, a Sikh9 who was a

former legislative assembly member; Kanugo, a then-active

representative of the Deputy Commissioner’s office; and Suda Ram

and Jasbir Singh, two armed constables. Any connection, however

attenuated, between these murders and the Sikh Khalistan movement

will not suffice. Quinn at 809. The killings must bear some

causal or ideological relationship to the uprising. Id. It is

Petitioner who must produce evidence that shows some factual

nexus between the murders and the Sikh independence movement. 

Barapind, 400 F.3d at 751.

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10 The Government of India focused on Petitioner’s denial

that he is a member of the KCF and his claim he is a member of

the All India Sikh Student Federation. However, the Government

of India acknowledged during oral argument that this distinction

is not relevant as the Student Federation shared the same

political objectives as the KCF. It is undisputed that at the

time, Petitioner was a Sikh separatist who supported the same

cause as the militants. 

11 The Circuit Court noted that at present, the issue of the

degree of connection required under the Quinn test is an open

question:

Because the offenses at issue in this case present

relatively straightforward applications of the

political offense exception, we have no occasion to

consider whether to endorse in all cases Quinn’s

statement that, in deciding whether an act is

incidental to an uprising, “[a]ll that the courts

should do is determine whether the conduct is related

to or connected with the insurgent activity.” 783 F.2d

at 810. We leave for another day the question whether

some exceptional circumstances might arise in which the

14

Petitioner denied participation in the encounter. He

offered the following evidence to establish that the killings

were “incidental to” the uprising: (1) Petitioner was a member

of a militant separatist organization (the Khalistan Commando

Force (“KCF”)) seeking the overthrow of Indian control;10 (2) the

attack was similar to other attacks on persons associated with

the Indian government and its security forces, carried out by

separatists during the same time period; (3) two of the victims

were armed in anticipation of such an attack; (4) the assailants

took the victims’ weapons after the attack; and (5) TADA charges

associated with this attack were brought against Petitioner. 

The “liberal nexus standard” in Quinn, while easily stated,

is not as easy to apply.11 Quinn requires that the offense be

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relationship between the political goal and the act

would be too tenuous to fall under the political

offense exception.

400 F.3d at 751 n. 9. 

15

“related to or connected with” the insurgent activity. The

relationship or connection must have geographic and temporal

limitations, i.e., the offense must have been committed in a

place within the geographic area of the uprising and must have

taken place during the uprising. A mere geographic and temporal

relationship, is not enough. A causal nexus is also required. 

Quinn, 783 F.2d at 809; Barapind, 400 F.3d at 751.

Quinn was charged with conspiracy to perpetrate murder. The

bombings caused injuries to a Catholic Bishop in the British

army, a senior treasury prosecutor, and a security guard who

opened a bomb package sent to the editor of a newspaper. Quinn

was also linked to attempts to set off explosions in public

places, including a train station, a restaurant, and a public

house, as well as the murder of a police officer whom Quinn shot

and killed while the officer was chasing him. 

That Quinn’s crimes took place during the alleged political

uprising was not alone sufficient to establish the incidental to

prong. Something more was required. The Quinn court weighed the

following factors in finding that the offenses were committed

incidental to an uprising: 1) his membership in an uprising

group; 2) the similarity of the charged offense to other acts

committed by the uprising group; 3) the degree of control over

the accused acts by a hierarchy within the uprising group; 4)

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Quinn’s co-conspirators had been tried and convicted of political

crimes with respect to those incidents; 5) Quinn had been

convicted of and served a sentence for his membership in the IRA;

and 6) there was no evidence Quinn committed the crimes for other

than political reasons. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 810-811. 

The Quinn court did not require him to produce evidence that

the intended victims were actively engaged against the Irish

Republican Army’s cause. Other courts have characterized the

Quinn formulation of the incidental to prong as a lax standard

that even allows the killing of civilians to be political

offenses if it can be shown that those killings are related to

the political uprising in some way. See, e.g., Atta, 706 F.

Supp. at 1039-42; Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 404-05; see also

Barapind, 400 F.3d at 756 (Rymer, J., dissenting). The Quinn

court found that placing bombs in a restaurant, a train station,

and a bar -- under circumstances where the only intended victims

were innocent civilians -- could be political offenses. All the

Quinn decision ultimately required was a showing that Quinn was a

member of the IRA; that he conspired with individuals who were

involved in the same cause; that he and they had been convicted

of political offenses; and an absence of evidence that there was

any non-political purpose for the attacks. Arguably, Quinn only

requires evidence that the crimes were temporally and

geographically within the period of an uprising and that the

accused held the status of a revolutionary who participated in

crimes during the uprising. 

Quinn stringently limits the extradition court’s role in

analyzing an accused’s political activities in other countries. 

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Quinn prevents judges from evaluating the goals of political

movements elsewhere in the world; 783 F.2d at 804, or the

legitimacy of the revolutionaries’ political objectives or

tactics used to achieve their goals. Id. Quinn found: “the

tactics that are used in such internal political struggles are

simply irrelevant to the question whether the political offense

exception is applicable.” Quinn’s non-judgmental formulation

does not test the efficacy or righteousness of the

revolutionary’s goals or the acts chosen to accomplish such

goals:

It is understandable that Americans are

offended by the tactics used by many of those

seeking to change their governments. Often

these tactics are employed by persons who do

not share our cultural and social values or

mores. Sometimes they are employed by those

whose views of the nature, importance, or

relevance of individual human life differ

radically from ours. Nevertheless, it is not

our place to impose our notions of civilized

strife on people who are seeking to overthrow

the regimes in control of their countries in

contexts and circumstances that we have not

experienced, and with which we can identify

only with the greatest difficulty. It is the

fact that the insurgents are seeking to

change their governments that makes the

political offense exception applicable, not

their reasons for wishing to do so or the

nature of the acts by which they hope to

accomplish that goal.

Id. at 804-05 (emphasis added). 

B. Quinn Applied

Here, under the Quinn factors, Petitioner’s evidence is that

there was an uprising; he was a revolutionary supporting the

uprising; the attack on the gypsy vehicle was similar to other

attacks by revolutionaries during the Sikh insurgency; two of the

victims were armed constables, whose weapons were stolen after

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12 Although India does not seek Petitioner’s extradition for

TADA charges; Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 988, TADA charges are

“circumstantial evidence that India considered some FIR cases

which included TADA charges as politically motivated.” Id. at

1033.

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they were shot; and political (TADA) charges were brought in

association with these crimes.12 

Petitioner has no evidence he or his co-conspirators had

been convicted of political crimes or of any reason for the

killings. Petitioner has provided no evidence why the attacks

were perpetrated; whether the victims were anti-Sikh, or in any

way involved in the insurgency, nor as to the purpose of the

victims’ vehicle trip. There is no evidence that the Jahander

district or its district government representative worked with

the Indian government or had any connection with the insurgency. 

Nothing is known about Kanugo, a then-serving district

representative’s connection, if any, with the Indian government. 

No evidence is offered about any political activity of victim

Sarhal, a former Sikh legislator, or his stance regarding the

Khalistan movement. No evidence is presented about the

identification, political roles, or affiliations of the other

three assailants who acted in concert with Petitioner. Without

evidence of any reason why the crimes were committed, the court

is left to speculate about whether the murders had any connection

with or relation to the insurgency. 

The Ninth Circuit’s recent discussion of Quinn in Barapind

suggests that Petitioner’s showing is not sufficient. Barapind

explained that Quinn requires a showing of “a factual nexus

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between the crime(s) and the political goal.” Barapind, 400 F.3d

at 751, and affirmed the district court’s holding that one of the

FIR 89 murder charges was extraditable and not within the

political offense exception. 

FIR 89 involved an incident in which Petitioner and several

accomplices went to the home of three brothers who were known

armed adversaries of the Sikh movement, and Indian official

police collaborators. Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1035-36. 

Petitioner and his accomplices entered the house where all three

brothers were sleeping. They found and shot two of the brothers. 

Petitioner’s accomplices then entered the bedroom of the third

brother, where he was sleeping next to his wife. Both were shot

dead. Before leaving, the four assailants took the arms and

ammunition of the three victims. Id. at 1002-03. The district

court held that the murders of the three brothers were political

offenses, based on Petitioner’s evidence that the victims were

paramilitary operatives for the Indian government and opponents

of the Khalistan movement. 

Petitioner did not meet his burden to present evidence that

the murder of the wife of one of the brothers was incident to the

uprising. Id. at 1036-37; Barapind, 400 F.3d at 751-52. 

Petitioner presented no evidence that the wife was an opponent of

the Sikh movement or had any activity that aided or abetted her

husband’s or his brothers’ roles as Indian police collaborators. 

Petitioner presented no evidence that wives and other noncombatants were killed for political reasons during residential

attacks similar to the attack in FIR 89. Nor did the murdered

wife resist the intruders or have any political role or

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significance. 

There is substantially less evidence about FIR 34. 

Petitioner provides no evidence that Kanugo, the district Deputy

Commissioner’s representative, had any role or activity related

to the Sikh separatist movement. The former legislator, Kulwant

Singh Sarhal, was a Sikh. Nothing is known about whether Sarhal

supported or opposed or had anything to do with the Khalistan

cause. Nor is any information provided whether the two

constables were anything more than escorts in dangerous times or

that either had any role in counter-insurgency efforts. The

constables were not identified with the Indian government, Indian

police, or anti-Sikh enforcement efforts. There is no evidence

whatsoever of the purpose of the vehicle trip, all of which makes

it impossible to determine without speculating, any political

role or purpose for the attack on the Jeep’s occupants during

their excursion. 

The village where the attack occurred is not ascribed to

have any significance in the political strife. 170 F. Supp. 2d

at 1010. The assailants, including Petitioner, were present in

the village and opened fire on the gypsy vehicle as it drove

through the village. There is no evidence whether the other

three assailants were combatants or common criminals who had no

political role or cause. Petitioner offers no hierarchy evidence

that any acts of the assailants were controlled or directed by

the KCF or other agency of the Sikh rebel movement. No

explanation is offered for the murder of the four victims. Were

they murdered because two of the occupants were armed? Because

the assailants felt threatened? Because the assailants believed

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individuals in the vehicle to be supporters of the Indian

opposition to Khalistan to make a political statement? Was

robbery to obtain weapons the motive for the killings? 

On cross-examination, Petitioner’s experts could not testify 

whether Sikh separatists’ attacks on and murders of civilians or

former government officials were committed in furtherance of the

independence movement. Professor Mahmood distinguished such

killings from the killings of active government agents and

security forces. The latter she acknowledged “could possibly” be

political acts, but she could not offer any opinion that killings

of civilians or former government officials were presumptively

political. Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-30. The record is

devoid of evidence that Singh Sarhal or any of the other three

victims was an Indian government agent. 

Judge Rymer, for the dissenters, has already analyzed the

facts of FIR 34 and found them insufficient:

The expert witness could not express an opinion as

to whether murder of former government ministers was an

act in furtherance of the Khalistan separation

movement, so I need not decide whether it would make

any difference if this were the object. So far as the

record discloses, none of these victims was a

combatant. Barapind took the victims’ guns, for all

that appears, he and his accomplices were taking

advantage of a target of opportunity for mayhem,

murder, and theft like the marauders in Ornelas. 400

F.3d at 758. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Petitioner has not provided evidence as to the reasons for

the victims’ vehicle’s presence at the encounter site, nor that

ambushes of gypsy vehicles in Jahander district were

presumptively political, or that any victim was anti-Sikh or had

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any political identity or purpose related to the Sikh uprising. 

Nothing is known about the other three perpetrators. 

Petitioner’s expert testified that the Punjab had a historically

high crime rate and cultural history of non-political murder and

revenge killings. There is no evidence as to what prompted

Petitioner and the other assailants to open fire on the gypsy

vehicle and to murder the four victims and take the weapons. 

That the attack took place during the uprising is not sufficient. 

Petitioner’s evidence does not show that the FIR 34 crimes

were committed incidental to the uprising. There is a failure of

proof to establish the political offense exception to extradition

under Quinn for the FIR 34 charges. Petitioner is certified to

be extradited for the criminal charges in FIR 34. 

The prior extradition order for FIR 89 and FIR 100 has been

affirmed by the Court of Appeals, certiorari was denied, and the

first order remains in full force and effect.

IT IS CERTIFIED that the evidence submitted by the

government of India is sufficient to establish probable cause to

believe that Kulbir Singh Barapind has committed the offenses of

murder of Balwant Singh Sarhal, an ex-member of the Legislative

Assembly, Amar Nath Kanugo, Suda Ram, and Jasbir Singh as charged

in FIR 34. 

The Government of India’s petition for extradition of Kulbir

Singh Barapind to India IS GRANTED for these specified crimes. 

Attorneys for India shall, within five days following date

of service of this decision by the Clerk of Court, lodge a form

of CERTIFICATION OF EXTRADITABILITY to be transmitted to the

Secretary of State of the United States in accordance with this

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decision and the requirements of law.

Once executed, the Clerk of Court shall transmit to the

Secretary of State of the United States: (1) a certified copy of

the CERTIFICATION OF EXTRADITABILITY; (2) a copy of all evidence

received in these extradition proceedings and certified copy of

the testimony taken in the proceedings in February 9, 13, 14, 15,

16, and March 2, 2001; (3) a certified copy of the Memorandum

Decision and Order filed September 18, 2001; (4) a certified copy

of this Memorandum Decision and Order; and (5) a certified copy

of the Complaint and Request for Extradition and Annexures

(Exhibits) Thereto.

A warrant may issue upon the requisition of a duly

authorized representative of the Government of India for the

surrender of Kulbir Singh Barapind in accordance with the terms

of the Treaty. Barapind shall continue to be detained pending

final outcome of these proceedings. 

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October 24, 2005. 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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