Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05180/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 13, 1999 Decided April 30, 1999

No. 98-5180

Daniel M. Byrd, III,

Appellant

v.

United States Environmental Protection Agency,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01923)

Thomas R. Bartman argued the cause for the appellant.

James V. Delong was on brief for the appellant.

Thomas M. Bondy, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Wilma A. Lewis, United

States Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney, United States

Department of Justice, were on brief for the appellee. Alisa

B. Klein, Attorney, United States Department of Justice,

entered an appearance.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Williams and Henderson,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part

filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Appellant Daniel M. Byrd seeks reversal of the district court's grant of

summary judgment to the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) on his claim that EPA violated the Federal Advisory

Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App. II ss 1-15. SpecifiUSCA Case #98-5180 Document #432659 Filed: 04/30/1999 Page 1 of 17
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cally, Byrd contends that a peer review panel convened by an

EPA contractor, the Eastern Research Group (ERG), to

update EPA's interim benzene report constituted a federal

"advisory committee" and therefore its proceedings were

governed by FACA, with which it admittedly did not comply.

Byrd seeks either reversal and a declaration that the panel's

proceedings violated FACA or, alternatively, remand for discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). EPA counters that

Byrd lacks standing, his claim is now moot and he is wrong

on the merits. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1985, EPA issued an interim report discussing the

carcinogenic effects of benzene. By 1996, EPA had prepared

a draft update of its interim benzene report (Benzene Update). See Sonawane Decl. pp 2-5, Joint Appendix (JA) 173-

75. Before finalizing the Benzene Update, EPA decided to

subject it to external peer review.

Under a contractual arrangement with EPA, ERG, a private environmental consulting firm, convened and conducted

the peer review. See id. p 5, JA 175. The contract required

ERG to select a panel of qualified experts, organize a public

meeting of the panel to discuss the proposed Benzene Update

and compile and submit a report to EPA summarizing the

panel's assessment. See Statement of Work at 1-7, JA 184-

90; Work Plan for Work Assignment No. 0-5 Contract No.

68-C6-0041, Expert Panel Peer Review of Benzene Risk

Assessment Update (May 14, 1997) [hereinafter Work Plan],

JA 199-204. In addition, the contract specified that EPA was

to pay ERG a fixed sum and that ERG was to compensate the

panel members. See Work Plan, JA 201. The contract also

allowed EPA to determine the issues for the panel to evaluate

and to comment in writing on ERG's draft final report. See

Statement of Work at 5, JA 188.

Pursuant to the contract, EPA submitted to ERG for its

consideration a list of twenty-four scientists who, in EPA's

view, possessed the professional credentials necessary to

serve on the peer review panel. See JA 192-93 (list of

potential panelists). From the list, ERG selected four individuals to be panelists. ERG also selected two panelists from

its own database of consultants. See EPA Mem. from Barbara Cook to Billy Oden, Re: Work Plan/Cost Estimate

Approval, ERG Contract No. 68-C6-0041, WA 0-5 (June 9,

1997) [hereinafter 6/9/97 Mem.], JA 220; 6/13/97 Letter, JA

221. EPA suggested no modifications to the list of panel

members selected by ERG. See 6/9/97 Mem., JA 220; 6/13/97

Letter, JA 221; see also Statement of Work at 2, JA 185

(stating that "final approval of selected experts will be made

by EPA").

On June 27, 1997 EPA held a teleconference with ERG and

the selected panelists, during which the panelists were instructed to prepare pre-meeting comments on the draft Benzene Update "specifically addressing a series of questions

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that [EPA] had provided" to ERG. Sonawane Decl. p 7, JA

176. The panelists circulated their pre-meeting notes among

themselves and provided a copy to EPA. See id. p 8, JA 176.

On June 30, 1997 EPA gave public notice in the Federal

Register of the panel's scheduled meeting. See Draft Carcinogenic Effects of Benzene: An Update, 62 Fed. Reg. 35,172,

35,172-73 (1997), JA 213-14. The Federal Register notice

explained the purpose of the meeting and noted that the draft

was publicly available on the Internet or in writing from

EPA. The notice also stated that ERG was to provide

"logistical support for the workshop" and that interested

persons could attend and participate in the meeting and

advised that written comments could be submitted to EPA

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during a 60-day period ending August 29, 1997. 62 Fed. Reg.

at 35,173, JA 214.

The panel meeting took place as scheduled on July 16,

1997. "The meeting was managed by ERG. Although several EPA employees who had been involved in developing the

draft benzene update attended the meeting and effectively

participated ..., no EPA employee or officer supervised the

conduct of the meeting."1 Byrd Decl. p 8, JA 345. Byrd, a

self-employed "consulting toxicologist and risk assessor," id.

p 2, JA 342, also attended after "learn[ing] about the [July 16,

1997] meeting through EPA's [public notice] in the Federal

Register."2 Id. p 4, JA 344. Byrd participated in the meeting, twice expressing his views to the panel and others

present. In addition, because of his concerns regarding the

assumptions underlying the Benzene Update and his desire to

be more informed, Byrd had earlier sought a copy of the

panel members' pre-meeting notes but had been rebuffed

three times. See id. pp 11, 13-15, JA 345-47; Sonawane Decl.

pp 12-13, JA 177-78. Byrd made no additional attempt at the

meeting to secure the notes. After the meeting, Byrd timely

submitted written comments to EPA on the draft Benzene

Update. See Sonawane Decl. p 15, JA 178.

On August 22, 1997, Byrd filed this action alleging that the

expert panel assembled by ERG was an "advisory committee"

within the meaning of FACA3. Byrd sought both declaratory

__________

1 David Bayless, an EPA employee, opened the meeting by

introducing the panel and repeating the questions EPA had posed

to the panel. See Panel Report at 3-4, JA 233-34; Byrd Decl. p 10,

JA 345.

2 Byrd "frequently attend[s], and plan[s] to continue attending,

meetings sponsored by [EPA] about the toxicology and risks of

specific air pollutants." Byrd Decl. p 2, JA 342.

3 If the benzene panel was in fact an "advisory committee"

subject to FACA as defined by 5 U.S.C. App. II s 3(2), both parties

agree that the panel functioned in violation of FACA. Among other

things, "the records, ... working papers ... or other documents

which were made available to ... each advisory committee shall be

available for public inspection and copying", FACA, 5 U.S.C. App.

relief and a use injunction barring EPA from using the

panel's work product. See Compl. p 16. One month later,

ERG submitted to EPA its final report, including its analysis

of the draft Benzene Update. See Sonawane Decl. p 14, JA

178; Schalk Decl. p 8, JA 219; Panel Report, JA 228-329.

EPA "did not participate in ERG's preparation of the final

report." Sonawane Decl. p 14, JA 178.

On October 10, 1997, almost three months after the meeting, Byrd's counsel wrote a letter to EPA's FOIA officer

requesting a copy of the panel's pre-meeting notes. See

Letter from Thomas R. Bartman to Jeralene Green, EPA,

Re: Written Comments Prepared for or by Members of the

Advisory Committee Convened July 16, 1997 (Oct. 10, 1997),

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JA 216. EPA provided all of the requested notes and invited

Byrd to submit additional comments. See Letter from William H. Farland, Director, Office of Research and Development, to Thomas R. Bartman, Re: FOIA Request HQ-Rin00186-98 (Nov. 14, 1997), JA 215. Byrd, however, declined to

do so. EPA then moved to dismiss Byrd's complaint or,

alternatively, for summary judgment. EPA challenged

Byrd's standing and, on the merits, argued that the peer

review panel assembled by ERG was not an "advisory committee" under FACA. The district court ruled in favor of

EPA. Byrd v. EPA, C.A. No. 97-1923 (D.D.C. May 1, 1998)

(Mem. and Order) [hereinafter Mem. & Order], JA 5-9.

Although it "assum[ed] without deciding" that Byrd had

standing, Mem. & Order at 2-3 n.1, JA 6-7, the district court

held that a panel convened by a private contractor is not a

FACA "advisory committee" as that term has been construed

by the Supreme Court and by this Court. See id. at 2-5, JA

6-9 (citing Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice,

491 U.S. 440 (1989), and Food Chem. News v. Young, 900

__________

II s l0(b), and "[d]etailed minutes of each meeting of each advisory

committee shall be kept." Id. s 10(c). FACA also stipulates that

"[t]here shall be designated an officer or employee of the Federal

Government to chair or attend each meeting of each advisory

committee." Id. s 10(e). "No advisory committee shall conduct any

meeting in the absence of that officer or employee." Id.

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F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990)). Byrd

timely filed his appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

EPA first attacks Byrd's standing to bring this action.

Although the district court "assum[ed] without deciding"

Byrd's standing, Mem. & Order at 2-3 n.1, JA 6-7, its

approach is incorrect in light of the Supreme Court's recent

holding in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998), that standing is a "threshold

jurisdictional question" that cannot be assumed in resolving

litigation. Id. at 1016. "Moreover, because Article III standing is always an indispensable element of the plaintiff's case,

neither we nor the Congress can dispense with the requirement--even if its application renders a FACA violation irremediable in a particular case." Natural Resources Defense

Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(NRDC); see also Federal Express Corp. v. Air Line Pilots

Ass'n, 67 F.3d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The requirement of

a case or controversy is no less strict when a party is seeking

a declaratory judgment than for any other relief."). Therefore, we must decide EPA's challenge to Byrd's standing.

The Steel Company holding requires us to focus on three

elements:

First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately

proven) an injury in fact--a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.... Second, there must be causation--a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's

injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant.... And third, there must be redressability--a

likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury.... This triad of injury-in-fact, causation,

and redressability comprises the core of Article III's

case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking

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federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its

existence.

118 S. Ct. at 1016-17 (quotations and citations omitted).

According to the Supreme Court, a refusal to provide

information to which one is entitled under FACA constitutes

a cognizable injury sufficient to establish Article III standing.

See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449 ("refusal to permit appellants to scrutinize [committee's] activities to the extent FACA

allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide

standing to sue"). By denying Byrd timely access to the

panel's written comments and pre-meeting notes, EPA directly caused his informational injury. See Byrd Decl. at 6 p 15;

Sonawane Decl. at 5-6 p 13, JA 177-78; Panel Report at 30,

JA 260. EPA therefore can make no serious challenge to the

injury and causation elements of Byrd's standing. See Food

Chem. News v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 980

F.2d 1468, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[W]henever practicable, all

[Federal Advisory Committee] materials must be available for

public inspection and copying before or on the date of the

advisory committee meeting to which they apply.") (emphasis

added).

EPA does question whether Byrd can meet the redressability prong. It first contends that declaratory relief will no

longer redress Byrd's inability to obtain timely access to the

panel's documents because they have since been made available and the panel has completed its work and been disbanded. See Appellee's Br. at 13, 21-27; Sonawane Decl. at 6

p 14, JA 178; Schalk Decl. p 8, JA 219. EPA also stresses

that declaratory relief will not prevent additional informational injuries resulting from any future noncompliance with

FACA. [See Appellee's Br. at 21-27.] If Byrd had simply

complained that EPA failed to release the documents he

requested, his alleged injury could not be redressed by any

action of this Court because he ultimately received the materials. Byrd's injury, however, resulted from EPA's failure to

furnish him with the documents until long after they would

have been of any use to him. Thus, contrary to EPA's

contentions, declaratory relief will redress Byrd's injury because it will provide him with this Court's declaration that the

agency failed to comply with FACA; and such a declaration

will give Byrd "ammunition for [his] attack on the Committee's findings" in subsequent agency proceedings that make

use of the Benzene Update. NRDC, 147 F.3d at 1026 n.6.

Such an attack might also prompt, in view of the importance

placed on the Benzene Update by EPA, see Statement of

Work at 1 (contracting with ERG to conduct "category 1 peer

review of the draft benzene document"), JA 184; Sonawane

Decl. at 3 p 4 (" 'Category 1' peer review is used when major

scientific or technical work products are being generated...."), JA 175, additional, FACA-compliant peer review on

the issue. Moreover, declaratory relief might well cause EPA

to reevaluate and change peer review practices not in conformity with FACA. Accordingly, we conclude Byrd has

standing to maintain his action.

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B. Mootness

EPA also contends that Byrd's request for declaratory

relief is moot because it has already given him the panel's

pre-meeting notes and it is not engaged in any ongoing

violation of FACA. Nevertheless, "even the availability of a

'partial remedy' is 'sufficient to prevent [a] case from being

moot'." Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (quoting

Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13 (1992)).

Because Byrd's injury resulted not only from EPA's failure to

provide him materials but also from the tardiness of their

eventual release, his injury would be mooted if EPA convened

another panel to review the Benzene Update in compliance

with FACA and provided him with all panel documents either

before or at the meeting. Because EPA has not taken such

action, declaratory relief would afford Byrd some relief and

prevent his action from becoming moot.

Byrd also argues that EPA has a policy of hiring contractors to conduct peer reviews without following FACA requirements. See Payne Enters., Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d

486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("So long as an agency's refusal to

supply information evidences a policy or practice of delayed

disclosure or some other failure to abide by the terms of the

FOIA, and not merely isolated mistakes by agency officials, a

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party's challenge to the policy or practice cannot be mooted

by the release of the specific documents that prompted the

suit.").4 Thus, the tardy release of the documents does not

render the case moot because Byrd's challenge to the policy

remains. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,

632 (1953) ("[V]oluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct

does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine

the case, i.e., does not make the case moot. A controversy

may remain to be settled in such circumstances, e.g., a

dispute over the legality of the challenged practices. The

defendant is free to return to his old ways. This, together

with a public interest in having the legality of the practices

settled, militates against a mootness conclusion. For to say

that the case has become moot means that the defendant is

entitled to a dismissal as a matter of right. The courts have

rightly refused to grant defendants such a powerful weapon

against public law enforcement.") (citations omitted).

C. The Merits

FACA defines an "advisory committee" as

any committee, board, commission, council, conference,

panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof ... which is ... established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest

of obtaining advice or recommendations for ... one or

more agencies or officers of the Federal Government.

5 U.S.C. App. II, s 3(2) (emphasis added). Because EPA did

not "establish" nor did it "utilize" the panel within the meaning of section 3(2) of FACA, we affirm the district court's

grant of summary judgment to EPA.5 The district court

treated EPA's motion for dismissal and summary judgment

__________

4 Indeed, counsel for EPA conceded at oral argument that peer

review meetings conducted by contractors without following FACA

might occur in the future. See Tr. at 14-30, Byrd v. EPA, No.

98-5180 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 1999).

5 We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de

novo and sustain the decision below if "there is no genuine issue of

as a motion for summary judgment and on that basis granted

the motion. See Mem. & Order at 2, JA 6.

Relying on legislative history, Byrd suggests that "established" and "utilized" should be construed "in their most

liberal sense, so that when an officer brings together a group

by formal or informal means, by contract or other arrangement ... to obtain advice and information, such group is

covered by [FACA]." Appellant's Br. at 11 (quoting S. Rep.

No. 92-1098, reprinted in V. McMurty, Fed. Advisory Comm.

Act (Pub. L. 92-463), Source Book: Legislative History,

Texts, and Other Documents at 158 (Cong. Res. Serv. 1978)).

The Supreme Court, however, in Public Citizen v. United

States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), squarely rejected

an expansive interpretation of the words, reading "estabUSCA Case #98-5180 Document #432659 Filed: 04/30/1999 Page 9 of 17
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lished" and "utilized" narrowly to prevent FACA from sweeping more broadly than the Congress intended. See 491 U.S.

at 452, 461 (finding "utilized" a "wooly verb" and declining to

adopt dictionary meanings of "established" and "utilized" in

FACA); see also Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Shalala, 104

F.3d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir.) (noting "the term 'utilized' was given

a very narrow interpretation by the Supreme Court")

(ALDF), cert. denied sub nom., National Academy of Sciences v. Animal Legal Defense, 118 S. Ct. 367 (1997). In

addition, the Court indicated that an advisory panel is "established" by an agency only if it is actually formed by the

agency, see id. at 452, 456-57, and "utilized" by an agency

only if it is "amenable to ... strict management by agency

officials," id. at 457-58. The Court, therefore, held FACA

inapplicable to the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, rejecting the argument that

that committee had to comply with FACA simply because the

__________

material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Doe v. Gates, 981

F.2d 1316, 1322 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993). We

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party and ask "whether any reasonable jury could find in its favor."

Harbor Ins. Co. v. Schnabel Found. Co., 946 F.2d 930, 935 (D.C.

Cir. 1991).

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Department of Justice regularly sought its input regarding

judicial nominees. See id. at 452-67.

We have similarly interpreted "established" and "utilized."

For example, in Food Chemical News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328

(D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990), we held that a

panel assembled by the Federation of American Societies for

Experimental Biologies (FASEB) pursuant to a formal contract to advise the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on

food safety was not an advisory committee subject to FACA.

In so holding, we explained that " 'established' indicates 'a

Government-formed advisory committee,' while 'utilized' encompasses a group organized by a nongovernmental entity

but nonetheless so 'closely tied' to an agency as to be amenable to 'strict management by agency officials'." Id. at 332-33

(quoting Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2568, 2570) (footnote

omitted). We have interpreted "utilized" to encompass "management ... 'by [any] semiprivate entity the Federal Government helped bring into being.' " Id. at 333 (quoting Public

Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2571) (alteration original); see also

ALDF, 104 F.3d at 427 (noting Supreme Court and this

Circuit have adopted " 'management and control' test to

determine whether a committee not established by a government agency is nevertheless 'utilized' "). This "second prong"

of Food Chemical New's "utilized" standard is inapplicable

here because EPA is a governmental agency and ERG is not

an entity the government had a role in creating. Thus,

contrary to the broad standard suggested by Byrd, "the

utilized test is a stringent standard, denoting 'something

along the lines of actual management or control of the

advisory committee.' " ALDF, 104 F.3d at 430 (quoting

Washington Legal Found. v. Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d

1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (emphasis original). Indeed, this

Court has held that participation by an agency or even an

agency's "significant influence" over a committee's deliberations does not qualify as management and control such that

the committee is utilized by the agency under FACA. See

Washington Legal Found., 17 F.3d at 1451.

Although this Court has held that an agency "establishes" a

committee only if the agency forms the committee, see Food

Chem. News, 900 F.2d at 332, Byrd contends that EPA

"effectively created" the panel by "conceiving of the need for"

it and implementing it by hiring ERG to handle the logistics.

Appellant's Br. at 16-17 (noting EPA's presentation of panel

as its own in Federal Register notice and at public meeting).

According to Byrd, EPA's actions are unlike those of the

FDA in Food Chemical News in that, there, the contractor

(not the agency) "proposed using ad hoc groups of knowledgeable experts as a means of carrying out the contract." Id. at

13 (quoting Br. of Resp't in Opp'n, Food Chem. News, No.

90-23 (in Supreme Ct. on pet. for writ of cert.)). But our

analysis of whether an advisory committee has been "established" does not turn on a determination of who determines

the methodology or operation of the peer review. Notably,

the contractors in both Food Chemical News and here received a "task order" or a "work assignment" from the

relevant agency defining the objective, the method and the

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scope of the studies to be performed. See Food Chem. News,

900 F.2d at 330; Statement of Work at 1-7, JA 184-90; Work

Plan, JA 199-204. Moreover, because ERG selected the

membership of the benzene panel, see 6/9/97 Mem., JA 220;

6/13/97 Letter, JA 221, Byrd cannot show that it was " 'a

Government-formed advisory committee' " as required by our

narrow interpretation of "established." Food Chem. News,

900 F.2d at 332 (quoting Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2570).

Byrd nevertheless argues that EPA established the panel

because it retained the power to approve ERG's panel member selections. Although EPA provided a list of suggested

panel members to ERG, ERG was not required to select its

members from that list and two of the panel members were

not on the EPA list.6 See JA 192-93 (list of potential

panelists); Work Plan, JA 201; 6/9/97 Mem., JA 220; 6/13/97

Letter, JA 221; Panel Report App. A, JA 275-76. Moreover,

EPA approved ERG's panel member selections without

changes. See Sonawane Decl. p 6, JA 176; 6/9/97 Mem., JA

220; 6/13/97 Letter, JA 221. Finally, ERG, not EPA, paid

the panelists from its own funds. See Schalk Decl. p 4, JA

__________

6 After consulting with EPA, see Statement of Work at 1, JA

184, ERG also designated the panel's chairman. See Sonawane

Decl. at 5, JA 177; Schalk Decl., JA 218; 6/13/97 Letter, JA 221;

Panel Report App. A, JA 275-76.

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218. Although the contract between ERG and EPA afforded

EPA significant potential authority in the panel selection

process, EPA never fully exercised it. And there is no reason

to assume that the threat of an EPA veto affected ERG's

panel selections. The result in this case might have been

different if EPA had exercised its authority. The record,

however, belies any claim that EPA in fact "established" the

panel as required by FACA. The statute describes a panel

that "is ... established," 5 U.S.C. App. II, s 3(2), not one

that could have been established by a government agency.

Accordingly, EPA did not establish the benzene panel within

the meaning of FACA.

Byrd also contends that EPA "utilized" the benzene panel

because it exercised much more control over it than the

agencies in Food Chemical News and Washington Legal

Foundation exercised over the committees at issue in those

cases.7 See Appellant's Br. at 14-15 (asserting EPA provided

list of experts from which ERG was to select panel, reserved

final authority to approve composition of panel, consulted

with ERG on choice of chairman and agenda, presented

charge to panel in pre-meeting conference call and reserved

right to make written comments on ERG draft report). But

even assuming EPA exercised more influence here than did

the FDA or the DOJ in relation to their committees, EPA did

not manage and control the benzene panel within FACA's

scope, keeping in mind that "the utilized test is a stringent

standard, denoting 'something along the lines of actual management or control of the advisory committee.' " ALDF, 104

F.3d at 430 (quoting Washington Legal Found., 17 F.3d at

1450) (emphasis original)). As we held in Washington Legal

__________

7 Although Byrd asserts that EPA exerted greater influence on

the benzene panel than did the Justice Department on the Sentencing Commission's Advisory Group in Washington Legal Foundation, see Reply Br. at 4-5, his assertion is debatable. In Washington Legal Foundation, the agency placed its own employees on the

panel. See 17 F.3d at 1450-51. And even with agency employees

on the panel, this Court nonetheless held that their influence did

not meet the management and control level needed to trigger

FACA. See id. at 1451.

Foundation, even "significant" influence does not represent

the level of control necessary to establish that a government

agency "utilized" an advisory panel. 17 F.3d at 1451 ("But

influence is not control.").

Contrary to Byrd's contention, the record shows that ERG

in fact actually managed and controlled the selection of the

panel's membership. See Mem. & Order at 4 n.2, 5; Sonawane Decl. at 4, JA 176; 6/9/97 Mem., JA 220; 6/13/97 Letter,

JA 221. Moreover, as even Byrd admits,

The [panel's July 16, 1997 public] meeting was managed

by a contractor, ERG. Although several EPA employees

who had been involved in developing the draft benzene

update attended the meeting and effectively participated

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..., no EPA employee or officer supervised the conduct

of the meeting.

Byrd Decl. p 8, JA 345; see Schalk Decl. p 6, JA 219. Finally,

ERG, rather than EPA, prepared the report of the panel's

proceedings. See Statement of Work at 5, JA 188; Work

Plan, JA 204. Although the contract authorized EPA to

receive and comment on the draft report before it was

finalized, the district court found "no evidence that EPA's

input, if any, resulted in changes being made to the final

Expert Panel Report." Mem. & Order at 4 n.2, JA 8; see

Sonawane Decl. p 14, JA 178 (EPA "did not participate in

ERG's preparation of the final report."). Because our decision is based on what EPA in fact did, rather than on what it

could have done under its contract with ERG, we conclude

that EPA's actions regarding the benzene panel do not constitute "actual management and control." ALDF, 104 F.3d at

430; Washington Legal Found., 17 F.3d at 1450. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that the benzene

panel was not subject to the constraints of FACA because

EPA neither "utilized" nor "established" it.

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For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of

summary judgment to the Environmental Protection Agency

is

Affirmed.8

__________

8 Byrd alternatively sought remand for discovery pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (allowing discovery before summary judgment

if "it appear[s] from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion

that the party cannot for the reasons stated present by affidavit

facts essential to justify the party opposition."). See Decl. of Daniel

M. Byrd Pursuant to Rule 56(f), JA 350-51. Byrd had to show

what facts he intended to discover that would create a triable issue

and why he could not produce them in opposition to the motion.

See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25, et al. v.

Attorney Gen. of the United States, 804 F.2d 1256, 1259 (D.C. Cir.

1986). "It is well settled that [c]onclusory allegations unsupported

by factual data will not create a triable issue of fact." Exxon Corp.

v. FTC, 663 F.2d 120, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quotation omitted).

Byrd merely alleged that "there may well be knowledge on the part

of EPA employees or undisclosed documents identifying additional

contacts between EPA and the peer panel members," Rule 56(f)

Decl. at 1-2 p 3, JA 350-51, a plainly conclusionary assertion

without any supporting facts. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Byrd discovery before granting EPA's summary judgment motion. See Exxon Corp., 663 F.2d at 126 (Rule

56(f) ruling reviewed for abuse of discretion).

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Williams, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part: I agree with the majority that we have jurisdiction,

albeit on a different theory. On the merits, however, though

the case is close, I would reverse.

Jurisdiction rests, I think, entirely on EPA's policy of using

contractors to do peer reviews of risk assessments under

arrangements like those involved in the Benzene Update that

triggered this suit. Because Byrd is a regular participant in

risk assessment panels, the threat of future injury from the

policy is likely and imminent enough to justify standing.

Jurisdiction based on the policy rather than the benzene

episode suffers no mootness problem: EPA never claimed it

would back away from the alleged policy; indeed, counsel at

oral argument more or less admitted that the procedures

used for benzene represented EPA's ongoing policy.

Unlike the future informational injuries that will flow from

EPA's refusal to apply FACA to its contractors' consultative

process, Byrd's injury from EPA's applying that view to the

Benzene Update appears irredressable. His claim to the

documents, of course, is mooted by EPA's FOIA officer's

releasing them to him. And I do not see how a mere

declaration that he should have had them at the time of the

meeting constitutes redress for that loss. The majority suggests that a declaration would help Byrd attack this committee's findings on benzene if EPA wishes to use them in some

future proceeding. Perhaps this provides standing for one

claiming threatened injury-in-fact from the outcome of this

future proceeding, but Byrd made no such claim. Further,

such a declaration would seem a telling weapon for Byrd in a

hypothetical future proceeding only if he asserted that the

documents belatedly turned over enabled him to poke a hole

in the substance of the peer review, a hole that he was unable

to perceive on a timely basis because of EPA's original

refusal to deliver them. But he has identified no such gap.

Nor do I think NRDC v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012, 1026 n.6

(D.C. Cir. 1998), see Maj. Op. at 7-8, extended "informational

injury" so far. That footnote merely observed that denying

an injunction against future use of findings from a FACAdefective proceeding would not render FACA entirely toothless. One such tooth may be declaratory relief, and its utility

in some cases may depend on the winner's being able to use it

to delegitimate such findings. But nothing in Pena suggested

that the prospect of securing such a benefit from the court

could alone support standing as a general matter. The

majority's language extending the "informational injury" redressable under FACA appears to assume that a highly

theoretical injury is adequate for standing; the language is

unnecessary to jurisdiction here.

On the merits, I believe that FACA governs panels established under the challenged policy. Our precedent on this

language is rather thin, but appears to say that an agency

"establish[es]" a panel if it has real control over its personnel

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and subject matter at its inception. Thus in Food Chemical

News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1990), we said

that the agency had not "established" the panel because the

contractor "proposed" it, "alone selected its members," "set

the panel's agenda," "scheduled its meetings," and "would

have reviewed the panel's work." Here EPA proposes the

use of a panel, submits an initial list of suggested members to

the contractor, retains veto power over the final membership,

and sets the panel's agenda. (The procedure used for the

Benzene Update is evidently representative of EPA's practice.) The veto power is key. That it was not used in the

benzene episode does not much help EPA: not only may EPA

exercise it in future applications of the policy, but the contractor was and is quite likely to take the fact of veto power into

account in its selection decisions. Assuming that contractors

will ignore this fact--as the majority appears to do, see Maj.

Op. at 13--seems akin to believing that the President takes

no account of senators' opinions when he nominates federal

judges.

Although the issue of whether EPA "established" the panel

is certainly a close one, it seems to me inconsistent with the

statute's language and intent to exempt from FACA a panel

controlled so closely in membership and purpose.

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