Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00719/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00719-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEBORAH HEATH,

Plaintiff,

v

AT&T CORP,

Defendant. /

No C-05-0719 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff Deborah Heath (Heath) sues defendant AT&T

Corporation (AT&T) for claims stemming from the termination of her

employment with AT&T. Administrative Record (AR), Ex A (Compl). 

AT&T moves to dismiss Heath’s complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). 

Mot Dismiss (Doc #7). Heath opposes and seeks leave to amend her

complaint to name her former AT&T supervisor, Tracy Rohm (Rohm), as

a defendant. Pl Opp (Doc #24); Pl Decl in Support of Opp (Doc

#25). Based on the parties’ memoranda and the applicable law, the

court GRANTS IN PART AT&T’s motion to dismiss and DENIES Heath’s

request for leave to amend.

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I

The following facts are taken from Heath’s complaint and

are presumed true for purposes of this motion. See Wyler Summit

Partnership v Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc, 135 F3d 658, 661

(9th Cir 1998) (“On a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, all wellpleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and

construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

(citation omitted)).

In 1984, Heath entered into a “partly oral, partly

written, implied-in-fact and implied-in-law contract” with AT&T. 

Compl at 9, ¶ 39. The employment contract provided that (1)

Heath’s employment would be secure as long as her performance was

“satisfactory”; (2) Heath “would not be terminated without good

cause”; (3) Heath’s employment would be “free from disability based

discrimination and/or disability harassment” and (4) Heath “would

earn agreed upon wages and fringe benefits.” Id.

In November 1994, due to injuries sustained during her

employment, AT&T placed Heath on paid disability leave. Id at 3, ¶

11. Heath remained on paid disability leave until March 2002. Id

at 5, ¶ 23. On March 4, 2002, AT&T representatives sent Heath’s

treating physician, Dr Roger Drainer, a questionnaire inquiring

whether Heath could perform the work-related activities laid out in

a “New Highly Modified Job Duties description as a Senior

Operations Clerk.” Id. Drainer indicated that Heath could perform

the the new job. Id.

AT&T representatives subsequently contacted Heath and

informed her that there was a “position at AT&T within [her]

//

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restrictions,” and that she needed to “report to work on Monday,

April 1st, [2002].” Id at 6, ¶¶ 24, 25.

On April 1, 2002, Heath reported to work and met with her

“second level” supervisor, Rohm. Id at 6, ¶ 26. Heath informed

Rohm that she was “ready to work” and “requested a copy of [the]

New Highly Modified Job Duties [she] would be performing.” Id at

7, ¶ 27. But Rohm “refused to comply with the [Heath’s] request”

and informed Heath that she and Rohm were going to have a “short

meeting” with Cathy Crawford, Heath’s “first level supervisor.” Id

at 7, ¶ 28. 

Rohm made small talk with Heath, asking her “general

questions both job related and non-job related” and then informed

plaintiff that “she was terminating [her] for fraud.” Id. 

Specifically, Rohm informed Heath that “she had concrete proof that

[Heath] could do all the things [she] said [she] couldn’t do and

that if [Heath] pursued filing a Union Grievance or Hire[d] an

attorney [Rohm] would prosecute [Heath] and send [her] to jail.” 

Id at 7, ¶ 29. Heath reiterated to Rohm that she “was ready to

work” and “was not refusing to perform any work,” and she again

requested a copy of the “New Highly Modified Job Duties.” Id at 7,

¶ 30. In response, Rohm stated that “[n]one of that matters,” and

reiterated that she was “terminating [Heath] for fraud.” Id.

The following facts are taken from documents attached to

AT&T’s motion to dismiss. See Parrino v FHP, Inc, 146 F3d 699, 706

(9th Cir 1998) (“[T]he defendant may attach [documents crucial to

the plaintiff’s claims] to his Rule 12(b)(6) motion, even if the

plaintiff’s complaint does not explicitly refer to [them].”).

//

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On May 23, 2002, Heath filed a grievance with her union,

CWA Local 9415, for unjust termination in violation of contract

provisions “9, 12, 13 [and] any and all others that may apply.” 

AR, Ex B. Heath sought “[r]einstate[ment] with full back pay,

benefits, remov[al] [of] any warning or documentation from [her]

file and [to] make whole again in every way.” Id. 

On November 13, 2002, Heath filed a complaint against

AT&T with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(DFEH) alleging employment discrimination based on disability. AR,

Ex 1. Heath subsequently received a United States Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “Notice of Charge Filed,” stating

that the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) had filed

Heath’s complaint with the EEOC and that the DFEH would process

Heath’s complaint of employment discrimination. AR, Ex 2.

In a letter dated April 15, 2003, the DFEH informed Heath

that she could request a right-to-sue notice, and that if she

decided to do so, she was required, inter alia, to “file [her]

lawsuit within one year from receipt of the right-to-sue notice.” 

Doc #25, Ex C. On November 16, 2003, Heath received a right-to-sue

notice from the DFEH pursuant to Cal Gov Code § 12965. AR, Ex 3;

Doc #24 at 2, ¶ 1. The right-to-sue notice stated that Heath may

bring a civil action “under the provisions of [FEHA] against the

person, employer, labor organization or employment agency named in

the above-referenced complaint within one year from the date of

this notice.” AR, Ex 3. Heath’s right-to-sue notice was dated

November 10, 2003. Id. 

The DFEH subsequently sent Heath a “Notice of Case

Closure,” dated November 12, 2003, which stated that the DFEH

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closed Heath’s case based on “No Probable Cause To Prove A

Violation Of The Statute.” AR, Ex 4. The notice also stated that

“[a] Right-To-Sue Notice (DFEH-200-42) was issued on November 10,

2003,” and that if Heath decided to bring a civil action under FEHA

[the California Fair Employment and Housing Act], the action must

be filed “within one year from the date of the Right-To-Sue

Notice.” Id. 

According to Heath, on November 10, 2004, Heath’s husband

called the Alameda County superior court and “was advised by the

clerks [sic] office, that a proof of a United States Postal

Service, Certified, Return Requested Mailing Date, was an

acceptable form of evidence, to identify a Plaintiff’s Complaint

filing Date in their venue.” Doc #24 at 3:15-18. On that same

date, plaintiff mailed her complaint to the Alameda County superior

court. Id at 3:20-24; Doc #25, Ex F. On November 15, 2004,

Heath’s complaint was received and filed by the Alameda County

superior court. Doc #24 at 2:15-18; Doc #25, Ex H. 

Heath’s complaint alleges five causes of action against

AT&T: (1) “Employment Disability Discrimination”; (2)

“Retaliation”; (3) “Breach of Implied-in-Fact Contract of

Employment Wrongful Termination”; (4) Wrongful Termination in

Violation of Public Policy”; and (5) “Breach of the Implied

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.” Compl at 1. Heath

contends, inter alia, that she was denied promotions and bonus

opportunities, and was terminated because of her disability. Compl

at 8. 

In addition, while Heath does not plead harassment as a

separate cause of action, she includes allegations of harassment in

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her complaint (Compl at 7, ¶ 31, 33) and AT&T addresses this claim

in its motion to dismiss. Mot Dismiss at 8 (“Plaintiff also

includes allegations of harassment, although they are not pled as a

separate cause of action.”). Accordingly, the court will liberally

construe Heath’s complaint to allege workplace harassment. See

United States v Ten Thousand Dollars ($ 10,000) in United States

Currency, 860 F2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir 1988) (“We have consistently

held in this circuit that courts should liberally construe the

pleadings and efforts of pro se litigants * * *.”) (quoting Garaux

v Pulley, 739 F2d 437, 439 (9th Cir 1984)).

On February 17, 2005, AT&T removed this case on the basis

of diversity jurisdiction and the case was assigned to Magistrate

Judge Bernard Zimmerman. Doc #1. On February 22, 2005, AT&T

declined to proceed before Magistrate Judge Zimmerman (Doc #4) and

the case was reassigned to the undersigned. Doc #5. AT&T moves to

dismiss Heath’s complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Doc #7 at 2. 

Specifically, AT&T contends that Heath’s claims for breach of

contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing are preempted under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations

Act (LMRA), 29 USC § 185(a). Id at 4-6. Further, AT&T contends

that Heath’s claims for wrongful termination in violation of public

policy, employment discrimination, harrassment and retaliation are

barred by the applicable California statutes of limitations. Id at

6-9. Heath filed a scattershot and sometimes unintelligible

opposition which the court has construed as liberally as possible. 

//

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II

A

FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss essentially “test

whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint.” 

Scheid v Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc, 859 F2d 434, 436 (6th Cir

1988). Although a plaintiff is not held to a “heightened pleading

standard,” the plaintiff must provide more than mere “conclusory

allegations.” Swierkiewicz v Sorema NA, 534 US 506, 515 (2002)

(rejecting heightened pleading standards); Schmier v United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F3d 817, 820 (9th Cir

2002) (rejecting conclusory allegations). 

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle [her] to relief.” Hughes v Rowe, 449 US 5, 9

(1980) (citing Haines v Kerner, 404 US 519, 520 (1972)); see also

Conley v Gibson, 355 US 41 at 45-46 (1957). All material

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in

the light most favorable to plaintiff. See In re Silicon Graphics

Inc Sec Lit, 183 F3d 970, 980 n 10 (9th Cir 1999). But “the court

[is not] required to accept as true allegations that are merely

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

inferences.” Sprewell v Golden State Warriors, 266 F3d 979, 988

(9th Cir 2001) (citing Clegg v Cult Awareness Network, 18 F3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir 1994)).

//

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B

Federal courts sitting in diversity are required to apply

state statutory and common law. Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304

US 64 (1938). It is clear that California law applies to the

present case and the parties do not argue otherwise. See Fonteno v

Equitable Real Estate Investment Management, Inc, 1995 WL 125493,

*3 (ND Cal 1995) (Patel, J) (“California substantive law governs

claims brought pursuant to the FEHA.”). Under the Erie doctrine,

“this court is bound by the pronouncements of the California

Supreme Court * * * and if the California Supreme Court has not

spoken directly to the issue, then [this court must] look to

California Courts of Appeal decisions as data for determining how

the highest California Court would rule.” Scandinavian Airlines

System v United Aircraft Corp, 601 F2d 425, 427 (9th Cir 1979).

If a claim is barred by the applicable state statute of

limitations, dismissal pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) is appropriate. 

Morales v City of Los Angeles, 214 F3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir 2000). 

“A motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of

limitations period may be granted only if the assertions of the

complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the

plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Supermail Cargo,

Inc v United States, 68 F3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir 1995) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “In fact, a complaint cannot be

dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the

claim.” Id at 1207.

//

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III

Contract Claims

Section 301 of the LMRA provides exclusive federal

jurisdiction over “suits for violation of contracts between an

employer and a labor organization.” 29 USC § 185(a); see Young v

Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc, 830 F2d 993, 997 (9th Cir 1987) (“[A]

suit for breach of collective bargaining agreement is governed

exclusively by federal law under section 301.”) (citing Franchise

Tax Board of the State of California v Construction Laborers

Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 US 1, 23 (1983)). 

Accordingly, § 301 of the LMRA preempts state law claims premised

on rights created by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) as

well as claims that are substantially dependent on the

interpretation of a CBA. Aguilera v Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp,

223 F3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir 2000). 

In other words, preemption is required if the state law

claim can be resolved only by referring to the terms of a CBA. 

Newberry v Pacific Racing Ass’n, 854 F2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir 1988);

Walton v UTV of San Francisco, Inc, 776 F Supp 1399, 1402 (ND Cal

1991) (Walker, J) (“[I]nterpretation of a CBA must be required in a

state cause of action for that action to be preempted by § 301.”). 

“Even suits based on torts, rather than on breach of [a CBA], are

governed by federal law if their evaluation ‘is inextricably

intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor

contract.’” Miller v AT&T Network Systems, 850 F2d 543, 545 (9th

Cir 1988) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp v Lueck, 471 US 202, 213

(1985)).

//

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Heath’s complaint does not make reference to a CBA

between her union and AT&T. Her complaint simply alleges breach of

a “partly oral, partly written, implied-in-fact and implied-in-law”

contract. Compl at 9, ¶ 39. This fact is of no moment, however,

as “it is not dispositive that a complaint is framed without

reference to a CBA.” Kirton v Summit Medical Center, 982 F Supp

1381, 1385 (ND Cal 1997) (James, MJ) (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 US

at 210-11). Indeed, this court has made clear that “[b]y careful

pleading, a plaintiff cannot avoid federal preemption.” Busey v P

W Supermarkets, Inc, 368 F Supp 2d 1045, 1054 (ND Cal 2005) (Ware,

J). See Fong v University of San Francisco, 1993 WL 106893, *1 (ND

Cal 1993) (Lynch, J) (“[A] plaintiff may not avoid removal by

artful pleading when her claims are actually preempted by § 301.”)

(citations omitted)).

Heath appears to be one of the artful pleaders mentioned

above. Heath’s union, the Communications Workers of America, has a

CBA with AT&T; indeed, Heath has already filed a grievance

complaint with her union for “unjust termination,” thus taking

advantage of the CBA’s grievance procedures. See AR, Ex A, B. 

Heath’s grievance refers nebulously to provisions “9, 12, 13 any

and all others that may apply,” and seeks the remedy of

“[r]einstate[ment] with full back pay, benefits, remov[al] [of] any

warning or documentation from [her] file and [to] make [her] whole

again in every way.” AR, Ex B. Provision nine of the CBA is the

CBA’s grievance procedure. AR, Ex A. Thus, it is evident that the

CBA forms the basis for Heath’s grievance with the union.

Heath does not (1) dispute the existence of the CBA

between her union and AT&T or (2) contend that the “contract”

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referenced in her complaint is independent of the CBA. In fact,

Heath’s opposition does not mention the CBA, despite AT&T’s hefty

reliance on it in arguing for preemption. Heath’s opposition

contains one statement regarding § 301 preemption: “Plaintiff (is

not) barred or preempted under section 301 of the Labor Relations

Act, by filing a claim of disability discrimination and retaliation

against [AT&T], solely because plaintiff was a union member.” Doc

#24 at 1, ¶ 2. This statement, however, is fruitless; AT&T does

not claim that Heath’s discrimination and retaliation claims are

preempted under § 301. 

For all intents and purposes, Heath’s contract claims are

a § 301 claim for breach of the CBA between her union and AT&T and

are therefore subject to preemption and recharacterization. See

Busey, 368 F Supp 2d at 1054 (“Where a relationship is otherwise

governed by a collective bargaining agreement, state law theories

of breach of contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing are preempted, and subject to recharacterization as [§] 301

claim for breach of contract.”) (citing Fristoe v Reynolds Metals

Co, 615 F2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir 1980)); see also Price v GeorgiaPacific Corp, 99 F Supp 2d 1162, 1166 (ND Cal 2000) (Breyer, J)

(“[A]n employee in a position with access to a CBA-sanctioned

grievance procedure cannot state an individual claim for breach of

contract under state law. Such claim is necessarily preempted by

section 301.”).

Having recharacterized Heath’s claims, the court

addresses the validity of the § 301 claim. The Ninth Circuit has

held that a plaintiff “must first exhaust contractual grievance

procedures before bringing an action for breach of the collective

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bargaining agreement” under § 301. Carr v Pacific Maritime

Association, 904 F2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir 1990) (citing Clayton v

United Auto Workers, 451 US 679, 686 (1981)). It is clear that

Heath has not exhausted the CBA’s grievance procedures; indeed, she

is still waiting for the arbitrator’s ruling on her grievance. Mot

Dismiss at 3:8-12. Accordingly, “[b]ecause plaintiff alleges

neither exhaustion of [her] grievance and arbitration remedy, nor

breach by her union of its representation duty, to the extent that

plaintiff’s wrongful termination and breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing causes of action are recharacterized as

section 301 claims, they must be dismissed.” Busey, 368 F Supp 2d

at 1054-55.

The court GRANTS AT&T’s motion to dismiss Heath’s claims

for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing.

IV

Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

A

“A claim that a discharge violates public policy ‘is

preempted * * * if it is not based on any genuine state public

policy, or if it is bound up with interpretation of the collective

bargaining agreement and furthers no state policy independent of

the employment relationship.’” Jackson v Southern California Gas

Co, 881 F2d 638, 643-44 (9th Cir 1989) (quoting Young v Anthony’s

Fish Grottos, Inc, 830 F2d 993 (9th Cir 1987)). But a claim of

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is not preempted

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if it “poses no significant threat to the collective bargaining

process and furthers a state interest in protecting the public

transcending the employment relationship.” Young, 830 F2d at 1001. 

California has clearly adopted a public policy against

workplace disability discrimination. Cal Gov Code § 12920. 

Because Heath’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of

public policy is based on a genuine state public policy of

preventing disability discrimination and poses no significant

threat to the collective bargaining process, it is not preempted.

B

Heath’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of

public policy is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Cal

Civ Pro § 335.1; see Anderson v American Airlines, Inc, 2005 WL

1712040, *4 (ND Cal 2005) (Wilken, J) (“A common law claim for

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is governed by a

two-year statute of limitations.”) (citing Mathieu v Norrell Corp,

115 Cal App 4th 1174, 1189 n 14 (2004)). Heath’s cause of action

for wrongful termination in violation of public policy accrued on

April 1, 2002, the date of Heath’s termination. Hence, under the

applicable two-year statute of limitations, Heath had until April

1, 2004, to file her claim. But Heath did not file her complaint

until November 15, 2004. Thus, Heath’s claim for wrongful

termination in violation of public policy is time barred under Cal

Civ Pro § 335.1.

Heath conclusorily states that the doctrine of equitable

tolling saves her claim for wrongful termination in violation of

public policy. The court disagrees. The California Supreme Court

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has held “that a common law cause of action for discharge in

violation of public policy is, in effect, an independent

alternative to a FEHA administrative claim and subsequent cause of

action under the act.” Mathieu, 115 Cal App 4th at 1189 (2004)

(citing Rojo v Kliger, 52 Cal 3d 65, 86 (1990) (“[A]lthough an

employee must exhaust the administrative remedy made available by

the FEHA before bringing a cause of action under the FEHA,

exhaustion is not required before filing a civil action for damages

alleging nonstatutory tort of wrongful discharge in violation of

public policy * * *.”). Cf Kang v U Lim American, Inc, 296 F3d

810, 819 (9th Cir 2002). In other words, California law does not

“permit[] a plaintiff to delay filing a common law tort action

because an alternative administrative process has not yet been

completed.” Mathieu, 115 Cal App 4th at 1190.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS AT&T’s motion to dismiss

Heath’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public

policy.

V

FEHA Claims

A

The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that state

discrimination claims brought under FEHA are not preempted by the

LMRA. See, e g, Jimeno v Mobil Oil Corp, 66 F3d 1514, 1522-28 (9th

Cir 1995) (concluding that the LMRA did not preempt a state law

claim for disability discrimination in employment brought under

FEHA). In fact, “[i]n every case in which [the Ninth Circuit]

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ha[s] considered an action brought under [FEHA], [the Ninth

Circuit] ha[s] held that it is not preempted by section 301.” 

Ramirez v Fox Television Station, 998 F2d 743, 748 (9th Cir 1993). 

B

Heath’s retaliation, harassment and disability

discrimination claims are subject to FEHA’s one-year statute of

limitations. Cal Gov Code § 12965(b) (“This [right-to-sue] notice

shall indicate that the person claiming to be aggrieved may bring a

civil action under this [statute] * * * within one year from the

date of that notice.”). Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on

November 15, 2004. Accordingly, the court counts back from

November 15, 2004, to determine which FEHA claims, if any, are

barred by the relevant statute of limitations.

Heath received her right-to-sue notice via the United

States Postal Service on November 16, 2003. But the right-to-sue

notice is dated November 10, 2003. There is a dispute whether the

one-year statute of limitations began to run on November 10, 2003,

or November 16, 2003. AT&T’s argument is straightforward: The

plain language of Cal Gov Code § 12965(b) requires a claimant to

bring suit within one year “from the date of [her right-to-sue]

notice,” i e, by November 10, 2003. (emphasis added). Mot Dismiss

at 8-9. Heath’s argument relies on the April 15, 2003, DFEH letter

which stated that Heath may “file [her] lawsuit within one year

from receipt of the right-to-sue notice,” i e, by November 16,

2003. Doc #24 at 2. If the statute of limitations began to run on

the former date, Heath’s FEHA claims are time-barred; if it was the

later date, however, Heath’s FEHA claims are timely.

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Although AT&T’s argument is statutorily sound, a number

of cases in this court appear to assume that a claimant must file

his or her FEHA claims “within one year from their receipt of the

right-to-sue notice.” Wilton v San Francisco, 1992 US Dist LEXIS

19439, *4 (ND Cal 1992) (Caulfield, J) (emphasis added). See also

Deppe v United Airlines, 2002 WL 1897296, *3 (ND Cal 2000) (Breyer,

J) (“Plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter from the DFEH on

December 2, 1993. Plaintiff had one year from that date to file

his FEHA claim.”) (emphasis added); Paine v Dept of Mental Health

Services of the State of California, 1995 WL 56588, *6 (ND Cal

1995) (Conti, J) (“[Cal Gov Code] § 12965(b) sets forth a one-year

statute of limitations for filing a civil action after receipt of a

right-to-sue notice from the [DFEH].”) (emphasis added). 

Moreoever, a California appellate court has held that “obtaining a

right-to-sue notice is the final necessary step in exhausting one’s

administrative remedies under the FEHA.” Grant v Comp USA, Inc,

109 Cal App 4th 637, 646 (2003) (emphasis added). 

The court cannot find a decision that has squarely

addressed the question of whether a claimant’s FEHA cause of action

accrues on the date of the right-to-sue notice or the date the

claimant receives the notice. As tempted as the court is to plow

new ground in the field of FEHA statute of limitations

jurisprudence, the court need not reach this issue, for assuming

Heath’s cause of action accrued on November 10, 2005, the statute

of limitations was equitably tolled.

“A statute of limitations non-compliance may be excused

by equitable doctrines such as waiver or tolling.” Valenzuela v

Kraft, Inc, 801 F2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir 1986). Regarding

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discrimination actions brought under Title VII, the Supreme Court

held that “[t]he doctrine of equitable tolling may be invoked

“where the court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done

everything required of her.” Baldwin County Welcome Center v

Brown, 466 US 147, 151 (1984) (citing Carlile v South Routt School

District RE 3-J, 652 F2d 981, 986 (10th Cir 1981) (“Equitable

tolling is appropriate when a plaintiff has been “lulled into

inaction by her past employer, state or federal agencies, or the

courts.”)). No California court appears to have spoken to whether

a plaintiff may invoke equitable tolling when she alleges a court

clerk misled her as to the requirements for filing her complaint

within the statute of limitations. California courts have,

however, stated that while “Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (42 USC § 2000e)] differs in some respects from FEHA, [] “* *

* the antidiscriminatory objectives and overriding public policy

purposes of the two acts are identical.’ [And] [a]lthough * * *

not controlling, federal cases interpreting title VII are

instructive when analyzing a FEHA claim.” Spaziano v Lucky Stores,

Inc, 69 Cal App 4th 106, 112 (1999) (quoting Beyda v City of Los

Angeles, 65 Cal App 4th 511, 517 (1998)).

Heath alleges the court clerk informed her “that a proof

of a United States Postal Service, Certified, Return Requested

Mailing Date, was an acceptable form of evidence, to identify a

Plaintiff’s Complaint filing Date in their venue.” Doc #24 at

3:15-18. On that same date, Heath mailed her complaint to the

Alameda County superior court. Id at 3, Ex F, G. Heath’s actions

were undertaken in reliance on representations made by the court 

//

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clerk. Such reliance by a pro se plaintiff is reasonable under the

circumstances. 

Moreover, AT&T has alleged no prejudice resulting from

the five-day delay due to Heath’s reliance on the clerk’s

representation. Under California law, “[a] plaintiff whose

ignorance of the statutory period is excusable may file a lawsuit

outside that period as long as he causes no prejudice to the

defendants by doing so.” Guerrero v Gates, 357 F3d 911, 919 (9th

Cir 2004) (emphasis added) (citing Lantzy v Centex Homes, 31 Cal

4th 363 (2003) (applying “equitable tolling in carefully considered

situations to prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of causes of

action, where the defendant would suffer no prejudice.”). 

Moreover, California courts instruct that “[i]n order to carry out

the purpose of the FEHA to safeguard the employee’s right to hold

employment without experiencing discrimination, the limitations

period set out in the FEHA should be interpreted so as to promote

the resolution of potentially meritorious claims on the merits.” 

Romano v Rockwell International, Inc, 14 Cal 4th 479, 493-94

(1996).

Because the one-year statute of limitations was tolled,

Heath’s claims for retaliation, harassment, and disability

discrimination under FEHA are not barred time-barred. 

C

The fact that Heath’s FEHA claims are not time-barred

does not end the inquiry; the court must still determine whether

Heath succeeds in substantially stating a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

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Retaliation

Cal Gov Code § 12940(h) provides that “[f]or any employer

* * * or person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate

against any person because the person has opposed any practices

forbidden under [FEHA] or because the person has filed a complaint,

testified, or assisted in any proceeding under [FEHA].” (emphasis

added). Hence, “[t]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation,

[Heath] must show she engaged in a protected activity, she was

thereafter subjected to adverse employment action by her employer

and there was a causal link between the two.” Mathieu, 115 Cal App

4th at 1185.

Heath does not allege that she was discharged for

opposing any practices by AT&T that are forbidden by FEHA or for

participating in a FEHA proceeding. Heath simply alleges that she

was fired because she was disabled. This allegation supports a

claim for disability discrimination under FEHA, not a claim for

retaliation. Accordingly, the court GRANTS AT&T’s motion to

dismiss Heath’s claim for retaliation.

Harassment

Nor does Heath’s complaint state a claim for harassment

pursuant to Cal Gov Code § 12940. Cal Gov Code § 12940(h)(1)

provides that it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an

employer * * * or any other person, because of * * * physical

disability * * * to harass an employee or applicant.” “Harassment

includes, but is not limited to, verbal epithets or derogatory

comments, physical interference with freedom of movement,

derogatory posters or cartoons, and unwanted sexual advances.” 

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Janken v FM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal App 4th 55, 63 (1996). 

Further, “harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of

necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for

personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for

other personal motives.” Id. Moreover, “[h]arassment is not

conduct of a type necessary for management of the employer’s

business or performance of the supervisory employee’s job.” Id.

Heath does not allege that she was subjected to any of

the aformentioned conduct. Rather, Heath alleges that she was

denied promotions and bonuses, and was terminated because of her

disability. Such actions are within the realm of properly

delegated personnel management authority. Hence, this alleged

conduct, which the court assumes to be true and motivated by

Heath’s disability, states a claim for disability discrimination,

not harassment.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS AT&T’s motion to dismiss

Heath’s claim for harassment. 

Disability Discrimination

There are two elements to a prima facie disability

discrimination claim under FEHA: “(1) the complainant must satisfy

one of the statutory definitions of ‘handicapped’ individual and

(2) the employer must have ‘discriminated on that basis.’” Jimeno,

66 F3d at 1520 (quoting Cassita v Community Foods, Inc, 5 Cal 4th

1050 (1993)). Heath alleges that she is a “handicapped” individual

and that she was terminated because of her disability. Hence,

Heath states a claim for disability discrimination and AT&T’s 

//

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motion to dismiss Heath’s claim for disability discrimination is

DENIED.

As to the claims which have been dismissed, the court

must determine whether such dismissal should be with or without

prejudice. While Heath has sought leave to amend to add Rohm, she

has not sought leave to amend her claims against AT&T should the

court dismiss any or all of these claims. The Ninth Circuit,

however, instructs that “a district court should grant leave to

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts.” Lopez v Smith, 203 F3d 1122, 1127 (9th

Cir 2000). The court cannot conclude at this preliminary stage

that Heath’s pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation

of other facts. Accordingly, the court dismisses all of Heath’s

claims against AT&T, save her disability discrimination claim,

without prejudice.

VI

Motion to Amend

Finally, the court addresses Heath’s request for leave to

amend to add Rohm as a defendant. “[A] party may amend the party’s

pleading * * * by leave of court * * * and leave shall be freely

given when justice so requires.” FRCP 15(a). The Ninth Circuit

directs district courts to apply the policy of Rule 15(a) with

“extreme liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v Rose, 893

F2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir 1990) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd v Leighton,

833 F2d 183, 186 (9th Cir 1987)). This liberality, however, is

“subject to the qualification that amendment of the complaint [1]

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does not cause the opposing party undue prejudice, [2] is not

sought in bad faith and [3] does not constitute an exercise in

futility.” DCD Programs, 833 F2d at 186 (internal citations

omitted). 

“A proposed amendment to a complaint is ‘futile only if

no set of facts can be proved under the amendment * * * that would

constitute a valid and sufficient claim.’” Fischer v City of

Portland, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 25613, *6 (D Ore 2003) (quoting

Sweaney v Ada County, Idaho, 119 F3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir 1997)). 

“A plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on

the merits rather than on a motion to amend unless it appears

beyond doubt that the proposed amended complaint would be dismissed

for failure to state a claim under [FRCP] 12(b)(6).” Id. 

It would be futile to allow Heath to amend to add a cause

of action against Rohm for either (1) wrongful termination in

violation of public policy or (2) disability discrimination. See

Frederickson v United Parcel Service, 1999 WL 129534, *5 (ND Cal

1999) (Walker, J) (“[A]n employee may not sue her supervisor

individually for wrongful discharge in violation of public

policy.”) (citing Reno v Baird, 18 Cal 4th 640, 663-64 (1998)); see

also Calero v UniSys Corp, 271 F Supp 2d 1172, 1178 (ND Cal 2003)

(Patel, J) (“It is now well settled that supervisors may not be

held personally liable for discriminatory personnel decisions under

[FEHA].”) (citing Cal Gov’t Code § 12940(a)). 

It would not be futile, however, to allow Heath to amend

to add claims against Rohm for harassment and retaliation under

FEHA. Calero, 271 F Supp at 1178. But because Heath’s request for

leave to amend fails to meet the one-year statute of limitations

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for FEHA causes of action, she “must satisfy the requirements of

FRCP 15(c)(3).” Martell v Trilogy Ltd, 872 F2d 322, 324 (9th Cir

1989); see Korn v Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc, 724 F2d 1397,

1399 (9th Cir 1984) (“[FRCP] 15(c) is the only vehicle through

which a plaintiff may amend his complaint, after a statute of

limitation period has run * * *.”). Rule 15(c)(3) requires that: 

(1) the claim arise out of the “same conduct, transaction or

occurrence”; (2) the new defendant, so as not to be prejudiced in

defending on the merits, receive “sufficient notice” of the

original action within the time provided for by Rule 4(m); and (3)

the new defendant must have or should have known the action would

have included him or her “but for a mistake concerning [his or her]

identity.” See G F Co v Pan Ocean Shipping Co, 23 F3d 1498, 1501

(9th Cir 1994). This third condition permits amendment to cure a

formal defect such as a misnomer or misidentification. As such,

the condition presents an insurmountable hurdle for Heath.

In the present case, Rohm was not misnamed and she cannot

be named after the limitation period has expired. See, e g, Pan

Ocean, 23 F3d at 1503-04 (1994); Gilmore v State of California,

1995 WL 492625, *3 (ND Cal 1995). While Rohm is mentioned

throughout Heath’s complaint, Heath made no attempt to identify

Rohm as a defendant or otherwise signal her intent to seek redress

from Rohm. See Brink v First Credit Resources, 57 F Supp 2d 848,

859 (D Ariz 1999) (“[P]laintiff’s failure to add the defendant(s)

before the expiration of the statute of limitations cannot be

characterized as a ‘mistake concerning * * * identity’ because the

plaintiff was aware of the new party’s identity before the statute

of limitations had run.”). Clearly, Heath could have named Rohm as

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a defendant but simply failed to do so and Heath’s request for

leave to amend makes no attempt to explain this failure. See

Kilkenny v Arco Marine Inc, 800 F2d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir 1986)

(“Rule 15(c) was never intended to assist a plaintiff who ignores

or fails to respond in a reasonable fashion to notice of a

potential party.”).

Heath’s request for leave to amend her complaint to name

Rohm as a defendant is DENIED.

VII

In sum, the court GRANTS IN PART AT&T’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff Heath’s complaint. Specifically, Heath’s claims for

breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, wrongful termination in violation of public

policy, harassment and retaliation are dismissed without prejudice. 

AT&T’s motion to dismiss Heath’s claim for disability

discrimination is DENIED. Heath’s request for leave to amend her

complaint to name her former AT&T supervisor, Tracy Rohm, as a

defendant is DENIED.

//

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The parties are ORDERED to attend a further case

management conference on October 4, 2005, at 9:00 am, or on another

such date that the parties may arrange with each other and the

court’s deputy, Ms Cora Delfin, 415-522-2039. 

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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