Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05926/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05926-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

ISSAC LAWRENCE SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CAPTAIN LOPEZ, M.D., et al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 04-5926 REC DLB P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend

may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). th

Case 1:04-cv-05926-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 10/04/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In the instant case, plaintiff brings action against the following individuals: Captain Lopez,

Lieutenant Ramos, Sergeants Bennit and Guitterez, as well as Correctional Officers Kowski,

Sandoval, Reimers. Plaintiff alleges that on January 26, 2003, he was violently assaulted by another

inmate, after which he was placed in administrative segregation despite his protests. He contends he

was left in administrative segregation for ten (10) months. He alleges his time in “isolation” was

excruciating and finally culminated in a physical assault on him by staff. He alleges that Captain

Lopez, Lt. Ramos, Sgt. Bennit and Sgt. Guitterez prolonged his confinement in administrative

segregation by refusing to reclassify him.

B. Due Process Claim

To the extent plaintiff claims his constitutional rights were violated in connection with his

placement and retention in administrative segregation, his claim fails. The Due Process Clause

protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action for deprivation of procedural due

process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is

sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a

liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population instead of administrative

segregation. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68. With respect to liberty interests arising from state law,

the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the

nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created

by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Plaintiff is not entitled to procedural due process protections in a vacuum. In order to be

entitled under federal law to any procedural due process protections, plaintiff must first have a liberty

interest at stake. Plaintiff has alleged no facts that establish the existence of a liberty interest in

remaining free from Ad-Seg. Id.; see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997)

Case 1:04-cv-05926-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 10/04/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 3

(convicted inmate’s due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state

action taken within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of

confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213

F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was within range of

confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and,

therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in the SHU)

(quotations omitted). Because plaintiff has not established the existence of a liberty interest in

remaining free from Ad-Seg, plaintiff may not pursue a claim for relief under section 1983 for

deprivation of procedural due process. 

 The court will grant plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint to allege facts

establishing a liberty interest in remaining free from lock-down, if he can do so. Further, even if

plaintiff had a liberty interest in remaining free from lock-down, plaintiff must allege facts to support

his claim he was deprived of the procedural due process protections he was due. See Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986). Due Process does not require that plaintiff be

provided with “detailed written notice of charges . . .” or “a written decision describing the reasons

for placing the prisoner in administrative segregation,” and “due process does not require the

disclosure of the identity of any person providing information leading to the placement of a prisoner

in administrative segregation.” Id.

C. Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiff’s allegations also fail to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for use of

excessive force. “What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . .

contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id. at

9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

Case 1:04-cv-05926-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 10/04/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may

also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and

the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts

made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does

not end it.” Id. Verbal harassment or abuse alone is not sufficient to state a constitutional

deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987),

and threats do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th

Cir. 1987).

While plaintiff alleges that Officer Reimers “assaulted” him, he fails to sufficiently describe

these allegations. Because the Court is granting plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended

complaint, he may also amend this claim, keeping in mind the above standards.

D. Leave to Amend

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The Court

will grant plaintiff an opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies of this complaint. Failure to cure

the deficiencies will result in dismissal of this action without leave to amend.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

Case 1:04-cv-05926-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 10/04/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 5

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint,

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket

number assigned this case and must be labeled "Amended Complaint"; plaintiff must file an original

and two copies of the amended complaint; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with

this order will result in dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim and failure to comply with

the court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 3, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3c0hj8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05926-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 10/04/06 Page 5 of 5