Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01150/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01150-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SCOTT N. JOHNSON,

NO. CIV. S-06-01150 WBS GGH

Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

v. AND MOTION TO STRIKE

THELMA N. BARLOW, individually

and as trustee of the Marital

Trust (Trust A) of the Gilbert

B. and Thelma N. Barlow Family

Revocable Trust, dated September

15, 1987; THELMA N. BARLOW,

individually and as trustee of

the Exemption Trust (Trust B) of

the Gilbert B. and Thelma N.

Barlow Family Revocable Trust, 

dated September 15, 1987;

CITIBANK (WEST) FSB, individually

and d/b/a Citibank; CITIBANK;

CITIGROUP; CITIGROUP FINANCIAL, 

INC., individually and d/b/a 

Citibank; PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES 

GROUP, INC., individually and 

d/b/a PNC Realty Services, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

///

///

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Plaintiff Scott Johnson brought this action alleging

failure by defendants to remove access barriers to their bank,

and seeking relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and California’s Unruh

Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), California Civil Code §§ 51, 52. 

Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Defendants

additionally ask this court to strike portions of plaintiff’s

FAC, wherein he requests attorneys’ fees.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a person with physical impairments of

quadriplegia and is thus a “person with a disability” and a

“physically handicapped person” according to the ADA. (First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 1; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 28 C.F.R.

§ 36.104.) As a result of his disability, plaintiff has

substantial limitations on major life activities, such as

standing, walking, breathing, etc. (FAC ¶ 1.) To function with

these difficulties, plaintiff requires the use of a service

animal, electric wheelchair, and a full size van with handcontrols and wheelchair lift. (Id.)

Defendants are Thelma N. Barlow, individually and as

trustee of the Marital Trust (Trust A) of the Gilbert B. and

Thelma N. Barlow Family Revocable Trust, dated September 15,

1987; Thelma N. Barlow, individually and as trustee of the

Exemption Trust (Trust B) of the Gilbert B. and Thelma N. Barlow

Family Revocable Trust, dated September 15, 1987; Citibank (West)

FSB, individually and d/b/a Citibank; Citibank; Citigroup;

Citigroup Financial, Inc., individually and d/b/a Citibank; PNC

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Defendants subsequently made property alterations aimed 1

at alleviating the barriers to access. Plaintiff then filed a

First Amended Complaint based on remaining barriers to “disabled

parking because the slope of the actual disabled parking stall

and adjacent access aisles are greatly in excess for [sic] the

required 2% maximum slope.” (FAC 2.)

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Financial Services Group, Inc., individually and d/b/a PNC Realty

Services. (FAC ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants partly

“own, operate, manage, lease (or lease to)” a branch of Citibank

(the “bank”) with a parking lot located in a retail center in

Sacramento, California. (Id.)

On March 10, 2006, plaintiff visited the bank, and due

to the lack of a van-accessible parking space, was forced to

leave his two van side doors open. (FAC ¶ 3.) Plaintiff

discussed this deficiency with the manager of the bank. (Id.) 

Plaintiff returned to the bank on multiple subsequent occasions,

and encountered the same (or similar) access barriers on each

occasion. (Id.) Plaintiff estimates that he “has over 30 actual

and forgone visits to the BANK.” (Id.) 

Based on this alleged denial of full and equal access

to a public accommodation, on May 26, 2006, plaintiff filed a

complaint seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief

under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Unruh Act,

California Civil Code §§ 51, 52. (FAC.) 1

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, where a district court has

original jurisdiction over a claim, it also has supplemental

jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to claims

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form

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Section 1367(b) prohibits the assertion of supplemental 2

jurisdiction when the policies behind the limitations on

diversity jurisdiction would be defeated. Executive Software, 24

F.3d at 1555 n.8. None of these concerns are implicated here.

4

part of the same case or controversy.” A state claim is part of

the same “case or controversy” as a federal claim when the two

“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” such that

plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try them in one

judicial proceeding.” Kuba v. 1-A Agr. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 855-

56 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).

The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is usually

mandatory, unless the exercise of jurisdiction is prohibited by

28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) or falls under one of the exceptions set

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v

U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1555-56

(9th Cir. 1994). Under section 1367(c), a court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a related state claim if

“(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2)

the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims

over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there

are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id.

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367). Defendants argue that exceptions (1), 2

(2), and (4) apply here and accordingly the court should decline

to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claim.

1. Novel or Complex Issues of Law

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s state law claim

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raises novel and complex issues of state law, citing a purported

conflict among the courts about the proper application of the

“intent” requirement established by the California Supreme Court

in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1175

(1991). In Harris, the California Supreme Court interpreted the

Unruh Act as requiring a finding of intentional discrimination in

order to recover. Id. The next year, the Unruh Act was amended

to provide that “[a] violation of the right of any individual

under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . shall

also constitute a violation of this section.” Cal. Civ. Code §

51(f). It is undisputed that a plaintiff under the ADA does not

need to prove intentional discrimination, see Lentini v. Cal.

Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)),

which would therefore seem to allow a plaintiff to bypass the

intent requirement in Harris by basing an Unruh Act claim on a

violation of the ADA. 

In 2004, the Ninth Circuit addressed this apparent

conflict and held that “no showing of intentional discrimination

is required where the Unruh Act violation is premised on an ADA

violation.” Lentini, 370 F.3d at 847. However, in 2006 a

California Court of Appeal held, in direct conflict with Lentini,

that intent is required under the Unruh Act. Gunther v. Lin, 144

Cal. App. 4th 223, 252 (2006) (stating that the Lentini court

incorrectly interpreted California law). 

This conflict does not represent the sort of “novel and

complex issue of unresolved state law” contemplated by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(1). Section 1367(c)(1) exists so that district courts

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The California Supreme Court denied review in Gunther. 3

While this is “not [] without significance,” review may be denied

for any number of reasons and does not necessarily indicate the

California Supreme Court’s agreement with the holding of the

California Court of Appeals. DiGenova v. State Bd. of Educ., 57

Cal. 2d 167, 178 (1962).

At oral argument, the court pressed defendant on the

precedential effect of Gunther, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s

opinion in Lentini, and allowed defendant’s counsel to submit a

letter brief to explain why this court might be required to

follow the California Court of Appeals in Gunther. Defendant

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need not “resolve difficult questions of [state] law.” Medrano

v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1506 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citing Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973)). 

When state law is substantially unsettled, a district court may

be left without sufficient guidance as to how to resolve a

dispute, which weighs against exercising supplemental

jurisdiction. Moor, 411 U.S. at 716. In this case, however, the

conflict internal to the Unruh Act is not novel--it has been

litigated and decided by the Ninth Circuit in Lentini, and this

court is legally bound to follow Ninth Circuit authority. Hart

v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A district

court bound by circuit authority . . . has no choice but to

follow it, even if convinced that such authority was wrongly

decided.”). 

“Where the state’s highest court has not decided an

issue, the task of the federal courts is to predict how the state

high court would resolve it.” Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803

F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986). In this instance, the Ninth

Circuit has made its prediction and, barring a clear holding to

the contrary by California’s highest court, it is not this

court’s prerogative to second guess that conclusion. A decision 3

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submitted several cases to this court which merely indicate that

other state Courts of Appeal will follow opinions of their peers,

in the absence of any indication to the contrary by the Supreme

Court or legislature. However, the fact remains that the only

state precedent binding on this court are decisions made by

California’s Supreme Court. Dimidowich, 803 F.2d at 1482. 

Regardless of whether California Courts of Appeal consider each

other’s decisions to be the those of “a court of last resort in

the state,” this court is not bound by their decisions. By

contrast, this court is undeniably bound to follow decisions by

the Ninth Circuit.

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of a District Court of Appeal in California is not a decision of

the state’s highest court. See also Wilson v. Haria and Gogri

Corp., ___ F. Supp. ___, 2007 WL 851744 at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22,

2007) (conducting a comprehensive review of the issue, post

Gunther and Lentini, and concluding that the decision in Gunther

is “not likely the law of the state of California”). 

Accordingly, this case does not present a “novel or complex issue

of law” such that an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is

improper.

2. State Claim Predominating Over Federal Claim

A federal court may also decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction if the state law claim predominates

over the federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Gibbs, 383 U.S.

at 727 (“Once it appears that a state claim constitutes the real

body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage,

the state claim may fairly be dismissed.”). However, other than

mere assertion, defendants provide no support for their argument

that damages are “clearly central to Plaintiff’s litigation

strategy.” (Mot. to Dismiss 1, 9.) In this case, plaintiff

brought two claims, one under federal ADA law seeking injunctive

relief and the other under the Unruh Act seeking damages. (FAC.) 

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Plaintiff has not abandoned either claim, and continues to pursue

both aggressively.

Courts in this circuit have declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that predominate

over federal claims in instances when a plaintiff abandons his

federal ADA claims, Johnson v. Calagna, 2006 WL 3313816, slip.

op. (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2006), or a plaintiff’s request for

injunctive relief subsequently becomes moot, Wander v. Kaus, 304

F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2002), Pickern v. Best Western Timber

Cove Lodge Marina Resort, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2002),

or a plaintiff’s numerous state law claims outnumber a solitary

federal claim under the ADA, Molski v. Mandarin Touch Restaurant,

359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 937 (C.D. Cal. 2005), or when plaintiff’s

federal claims are dismissed before trial, Acri v. Varian

Assocs, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)).

None of those concerns are implicated in this case--

plaintiff has one state claim and one federal claim, both still

viable, and neither predominates over the other. As a practical

matter, plaintiff’s state law claims for damages are undoubtedly

a driving force behind this action. But to rule as defendants

propose would effectively preclude a district court from ever

asserting supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim under

the Unruh Act. Accordingly, the court cannot conclude that

plaintiff’s state law claim predominates over his federal claim

in the sense of § 1367(c)(3).

3. Other Compelling Reasons

Finally, a district court may decline to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if there are

“other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(4). Courts have held that a district court exercising

jurisdiction over pendent claims must consider the principles of

“economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Imagineering, Inc.

v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing

Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7.) Defendants argue that

this court must decline jurisdiction based on 1) the principles

of comity, and 2) discouraging plaintiff from forum shopping. 

(Mot. to Dismiss 10-14.)

The principles of comity suggest that, “[w]hen novel

issues of state law are presented . . . considerations of

judicial economy are not determinative.” Executive Software, 24

F.3d at 1553. Thus, when unsettled, novel, or complex issues of

state law are before the district court, Gibbs counsels that

“[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a

matter of comity” and to provide the parties with “a surer-footed

reading of applicable law.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; see also

Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1553 (citing Fin. Gen. Bankshares,

Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 776 (“[A] federal court should be

reluctant to retain pendent jurisdiction over a question for

which state jurisprudence gives inadequate guidance.”)). 

However, as discussed above, the precedent established in Lentini

gives this court clear guidance of the appropriate interpretation

of California law. Thus, the principles of comity do not counsel

against supplemental jurisdiction. 

Defendants suggest that plaintiff’s sole reason for

bringing this action in district court is to “forum shop for a

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Plaintiff objects to the “facts” proffered in the 4

article submitted by defendants. On a motion to dismiss, the

court may consider materials of which it may take judicial

notice, including newspaper articles. U.S. v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d

1270, 1278 (9th Cir. 1997). However, the court need not rely on

the Sacramento Bee article as evidence of plaintiff’s

litigiousness, as the court may also take judicial notice of

matters of public record, such as lawsuits filed by a particular

individual. See, generally, Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844

F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988).

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federal forum.” (Mot. to Dismiss 13.) Defendants sole

explanation for this assertion is that, because California’s

Unruh Act allows plaintiff to recover both injunctive and

monetary relief, the need for the inclusion of the ADA claim is

obviated. (Id.) Such reasoning, however, runs counter to the

fundamental objective of the ADA, which is to create a federal

forum for disabled individuals to protect their rights. 42

U.S.C. § 12101(b) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to

provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards

addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities .

. . and to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central

role in enforcing the standards . . .”). Plaintiff’s decision to

pursue his ADA claim in federal court is a right afforded to him

under that statute. Indeed, the ADA is a statutory scheme that

relies almost exclusively on such private actions for its

enforcement. See, e.g., Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d

724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188). 

The law does not prohibit a plaintiff from shopping for

a federal forum. Moreover, other than plaintiff’s litigious

history, defendants provide no evidence of plaintiff’s apparent

forum-shopping motivation. Supplemental jurisdiction over his 4

state law claim is therefore not improper.

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In this case, the competing principles of judicial

economy and convenience weigh strongly in favor of asserting

supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s state and federal law

claim involve the identical nucleus of operative fact, and

require a very similar, if not identical, showing in order to

succeed. If this court forced plaintiff to pursue his state law

claim in state court, the result would be two highly duplicative

trials, constituting an unnecessary expenditure of plaintiff’s,

defendants’, and the courts’ resources. Accordingly, the court

will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state

law claim.

B. Motion to Strike

“Upon a motion made by a party . . . the court may

order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(f). A “motion to strike is appropriate to address

requested relief . . . which is not recoverable as a matter of

law.” Wilkerson v. Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166, 172 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 

However, when ruling on a motion to strike, the court views the

challenged pleadings in the light most favorable to the pleader. 

See Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924, 928 (9th

Cir. 1994). Motions to strike are not favored and “should not be

granted unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the

allegation would be admissible, or those issues could have no

possible bearing on the issues in the litigation.” Gay-Straight

Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified School Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d

1088, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2001). 

Defendants object to all portions of plaintiff’s FAC

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On May 3, 2007, notice was given to the court by 5

plaintiff that Thomas N. Stewart, III, has associated with

plaintiff as an attorney of record. (May 3, 2007 Notice (Docket

No. 41).)

12

that seek to recover attorneys’ fees. Specifically, defendants

argue that because plaintiff is an attorney representing himself

in this matter pro se, neither federal nor state law allow him to

recover attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432,

438 (1991) (refusing to allow for the recovery of fees by an

attorney representing himself pro se). Here, although plaintiff

represents himself in many of his cases, it so happens that he is

in fact represented by another attorney in this action.5

Plaintiff does not dispute that he cannot recover attorneys’ fees

for work done by himself, but explains that the language in the

complaint merely asks for fees “if incurred.” Thus, plaintiff

seems to acknowledge that it is only the fees of additional

outside counsel that he seeks to recover.

Recent case law suggests that plaintiff’s conditional

request for attorneys’ fees is proper (for the services of

additional counsel should he ultimately prevail on the merits). 

See Blazy v. Tenet, 194 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (refusing to

extend Kay v. Ehrler to exclude the collection of fees paid to

lawyers who were consulted by a pro se plaintiff in the

formulation of his or her case); cf. U.S. ex rel. Virani v. Jerry

M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equip., Inc., 89 F.3d 574, 578 (9th Cir.

1996) (noting that only a plaintiff has the power to demand

attorney’s fees of defendant, even though, once awarded, they are

assets of the attorney). Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for

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Plaintiff is put on notice that any fees incurred as a 6

result of work done representing himself cannot be recovered.

13

fees need not be stricken from the complaint.6

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants’ motions to

dismiss and to strike portions of plaintiff’s complaint be, and

the same hereby are, DENIED.

DATED: June 9, 2007

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