Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01174/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01174-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICK J. MEJIA, )

) 2:02-cv-1174-GEB-EFB

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants County of Sacramento, Sacramento County Probation

Department, Sue Florence, Patti McGowan, and Edward Horning (“County

Defendants”) filed a request on May 25, 2007, for a status conference

and leave to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment. (Defs.’

Req. at 1.) 

County Defendants state that a status conference is

necessary because “[d]ue to the lack of clarity from the Ninth Circuit

opinion [in this case] it is unclear to counsel on behalf of the

County [D]efendants precisely which defendants remain.” (Id. at 2:25-

28.) The Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in this case on August 28,

2006. (J. 9th Cir. at 1.) County Defendants fail to explain why they

have waited over nine months before filing this request, and why this

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1 The parties are required to specify in the JPS the claim

against each Defendant, and any affirmative defense to a claim.

Further, it is expected that such a claim or defense will be dismissed

if no factual and legal basis exist to support it.

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matter cannot be handled through the meet and confer process with

opposing counsel in which parties are expected to engage before the

parties file a joint pretrial statement (“JPS”), or in the JPS if

Plaintiff is unwilling to agree to a dismissal of claims against

County Defendants.1 In addition, County Defendants have not shown why

it is appropriate to schedule a status conference for the purpose of

having the assigned district judge explain the Ninth Circuit’s opinion

to counsel. Therefore, County Defendants’ request for a status

conference is denied.

County Defendants also request leave to file a supplemental

motion for summary judgment asserting they are entitled to qualified

immunity under Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“Ramirez”), aff’d, Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004). 

County Defendants argue that “they would be entitled to qualified

immunity for their entry into [Plaintiff’s] home based on their belief

that the entry executed by Sacramento [City] Police Officer[] Hinz was

appropriate.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 3:18-20.) County Defendants admit

Ramirez, a 2002 case, was “not discussed or briefed” in the summary

judgment motion they filed on December 11, 2003, but do not explain

this failure. (Id. at 3:5-6.) Further, County Defendants do not

explain why they waited until two months before the final pretrial

conference (“FPC”) to make this request. Even though the County

Defendants “did not specifically request that the court modify its

scheduling order” because they simply request leave to file a motion

after the law and motion deadline, the leave they seek is “treated as

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2 Since the Ninth Circuit had already explained this principle

in 2002, and County Defendants have not shown that anything in the

Supreme Court ruling in 2004 affirming the Ninth Circuit decision in

Ramirez provided County Defendants with a reason to have omitted this

principle from their motion filed in 2003, it is unclear why this

principle was not raised earlier.

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a de facto motion to amend the scheduling order.” Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1992). Since the

law and motion completion date set in the Scheduling Order has passed,

(Order, Sept. 16, 2002), County Defendants have the burden of showing

that “good cause” justifies amending that portion of the Scheduling

Order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). In addition, since the FPC is set for

July 2, 2007, granting County Defendants the forty-five days they

request to prepare and file a supplemental summary judgment motion

would require moving the FPC as well. (Order, Oct. 4, 2006, at 1.) 

County Defendants’ failure to explain why they did not raise the

principle in Ramirez on which they now seek to rely when they filed

their summary judgment motion in 2003, is not “compatible” with a

finding of good cause “and offers no reason for a grant of relief.”2

Id. at 609. Since good cause has not been shown, County Defendants’

request to file a supplemental summary judgment motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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