Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00037/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00037-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE RUBIDOUX, 

Petitioner,

v. 

R. GROUNDS, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 3:14-cv-00037-H-MDD 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

AND 

[Doc. No. 18]

(2) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE’S REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

[Doc. No. 21]

On December 16, 2013, Petitioner Andre Rubidoux, a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254.1

 (Doc. Nos. 1, 7.) The Court allowed Petitioner to amend his pleading twice. (Doc. 

                                                                

1

 Under the prisoner mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus is deemed filed at 

the moment of delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 

270 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010). The present petition was 

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Nos. 4, 7, 10.) On July 30, 2015, Petitioner filed his second amended petition. (Doc. No. 

11.) 

On December 10, 2015, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the 

petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2244. (Doc. 

No. 18.) On February 2, 2016, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to 

grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 21.) On March 28, 2016, Petitioner filed 

an objection to the report and recommendation.2

 (Doc. No. 26.) For the reasons that follow, 

the Court adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and grants 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

Background 

In 2009, Petitioner pleaded guilty in San Diego County Superior Court to one count 

of carjacking in violation of California Penal Code § 215(a) and was sentenced to nine 

years imprisonment. (Doc. No. 19-1, Lodgment No. 1 at CT36.) On appeal, the California 

Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. (Doc. No. 19-6, Lodgment No. 5.) On 

October 13, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for direct 

review. (Doc. No. 19-8, Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of 

certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. 

 Petitioner previously filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this district 

on October 20, 2011, which was dismissed without prejudice for failure to pay the filing 

fee and for failure to exhaust state judicial remedies. (Rubidoux v. Grounds, No. 11-cv2444, Doc. Nos. 1, 2.) The Court gave Petitioner until December 27, 2011, to reopen his 

                                                                

postmarked and therefore constructively filed on December 16, 2013. (Doc. No. 1 at 52.) The Court 

notes that there is a signature on the envelope that appears to be dated December 12, 2013. (Doc. No. 1 

at 53.) But, the Court need not determine whether the constructive filing date should be December 16, 

2013, or December 12, 2013, because, on the facts of this case, it would not affect the Court’s analysis 

whether the petition is dated from the date of the signature or from date of the postmark. See Campbell, 

614 F.3d at 1059 n.2. 

2

 In the objection, Petitioner alleged experiencing delays in receiving mail due to a change of 

address. (Doc. No. 26.) Petitioner did not address the statute of limitations issue contained in 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss. (Id.) 

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case. (Id., Doc. No. 2 at 2.) Petitioner failed to reopen the case by the deadline. 

Approximately two years later, on December 16, 2013, Petitioner filed the present 

federal habeas petition before this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) On March 24, 2015, Petitioner filed 

a state habeas petition with the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 19-9, Lodgment No. 

8.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition and cited In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 

770, 780 (1998).3 (Doc. No. 11 at 13.) 

Discussion 

I. Legal Standards 

Since Petitioner filed the present federal habeas corpus petition after April 24, 1996, 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs the 

petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 

983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on habeas 

corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Holland 

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 635 (2010). Section 2244(d) provides that: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

                                                                

3

 In Robbins, the California Supreme Court held that a habeas corpus petition is untimely if it is 

filed more than ninety days after the final due date for direct appeal unless the defendant establishes 

good cause for the delay or that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. See 18 

Cal. 4th at 780. 

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2). 

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year statute of limitations begins 

to run the day after the judgment becomes final on direct review. See McMonagle v. Meyer, 

802 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). The direct 

review process includes the ninety-day period within which a petitioner can seek a writ of 

certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States, whether or not the petitioner 

actually files such a petition. McMonagle, 802 F.3d at 1097; see also U.S.C.S. Supreme 

Ct. R. 13. 

The one-year period AEDPA affords a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus 

petition is tolled during the pendency of any properly filed state court application for 

collateral review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002). In 

addition to statutory tolling, a petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief is entitled to equitable 

tolling if the following two elements are established: “(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “The diligence required for equitable tolling 

purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 

653 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

II. Statute of Limitations 

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the grounds 

that the petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d). (Doc. No. 18-1 at 2-4.) The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition 

for review on October 13, 2010. (Doc. No. 19-8, Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner had ninety 

days, or until January 11, 2011, to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme 

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Court of the United States. See McMonagle, 802 F.3d at 1097; U.S.C.S. Supreme Ct. R. 

13. Petitioner did not seek certiorari. Therefore, Petitioner’s conviction became final on the 

following day, January 12, 2011, and AEDPA’s one–year statutory period began to run on 

that same day. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations expired on January 11, 2012, absent statutory or equitable tolling. See id. 

Although Petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition on October 20, 2011, 

within the limitations period, it was dismissed without prejudice for failure to pay the filing 

fee and for failure to exhaust state judicial remedies. (Rubidoux v. Grounds, No. 11-cv2444, Doc. Nos. 1, 2.) Petitioner waited until December 16, 2013, to file the present 

petition, (Doc. No. 1), which was almost two years after AEDPA’s statute of limitations 

expired. Accordingly, absent tolling, the present petition is untimely. 

III. Tolling of Statute of Limitations 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2). Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court did 

not toll AEDPA’s statutory period because the state petition was filed on March 24, 2015, 

after he filed the present federal petition and after AEDPA’s statute of limitations had 

already run out. (Doc. No. 19-9, Lodgment No. 8.) Moreover, Petitioner’s previous filing 

of a federal habeas petition did not toll the limitations period because a federal petition for 

habeas review is not “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” 

within the meaning of section 2244(d)(2). Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). 

Furthermore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling under Pace. 544 U.S. at 

418. Petitioner did not allege that he was entitled to equitable tolling in any of his habeas 

petitions in this action, nor did he present any evidence as to why he did not diligently 

pursue his legal interests after his first federal petition was dismissed in the prior action. 

(See Doc. No. 11.) In addition, Petitioner has made no showing of any extraordinary 

circumstance that would have prevented a timely filing. (See id.) Therefore, Petitioner has 

failed to satisfy Pace’s standard of equitable tolling, and his petition is barred by AEDPA’s 

one-year statute of limitations. 

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Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation and grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus. (Doc. Nos. 7, 9.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 27, 2016 

 

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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