Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00743/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00743-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANTZ E. ARNELL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv0743-LAB (RBB)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE:

SANCTIONS; AND ORDER

STRIKING NOTICE OF

WITHDRAWAL OF SECOND

RECUSAL MOTION

vs.

JUDGE W. McADAM, Department 8

Superior Court of California, County of

San Diego, South County Judicial

District,

Defendants.

On June 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to disqualify Judge Larry Burns.

On July 10, 2007, this motion was denied. On July 17, 2007, Plaintiff filed an additional

motion seeking to disqualify Judge Burns on the basis that Judge Burns was not mentally

competent to preside in this matter (the “Second Recusal Motion”). On July 23, 2007, the

Court ordered the Second Recusal Motion stricken and ordered Plaintiff to appear at a

hearing on August 13, 2007 at 12:00 noon and show cause why he should not be sanctioned

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for having filed it. This order explained that no briefing was

required. It also directed Plaintiff to review Civil Local Rule 7.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, both

of which it appeared Plaintiff had violated.

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 22 Filed 08/08/07 Page 1 of 6
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On July 20, 2007, Plaintiff again submitted to the Court a pleading, captioned

“Complaint to Chief Justice that Judge Burns is Mentally Incapacitated” (the “Third Recusal

Motion”). The Court rejected this for filing by an order signed July 31, 2007, and entered

August 3. By this same order, the Court amended its previous order to show cause, and

directed Plaintiff to appear at a hearing on August 13, 2007 at 12:00 noon and show cause

why he should not be sanctioned for filing both the Second Recusal Motion and the Third

Recusal Motion. This order likewise explained that no briefing was required. 

On July 31, Plaintiff without leave filed a document styled “Response to Judge Burns’

Order Striking Successive Motion for Recusal, and Order Re: Sanctions. Retraction of

Motion” (the “Notice of Withdrawal”). Because the order of August 3, 2007 was not yet

entered in the docket when Plaintiff filed his Notice of Withdrawal, it is apparent he did not

yet have notice of amendments to the Court’s previous order to show cause. He clearly did

have notice of the Court’s order striking the Second Recusal Motion, however: He quotes

from it, and mentions the date and time he is to appear and show cause.

Plaintiff’s attempt to withdraw his Second Recusal Motion comes too late. The

Second Recusal Motion has already been ordered stricken from the docket, as Plaintiff is

aware, and it has in fact already been so stricken. As Plaintiff may have learned from

reviewing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A), sanctions for a Rule 11 violation may sometimes be

avoided by withdrawing the allegedly offending pleading. However, this safe harbor

provision applies when an opposing party has moved for sanctions, and not after the Court

has sua sponte ordered a party to show cause pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B), United Nat'l. Ins.

Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2001), as is the case here.

Monetary sanctions may also be avoided if the offending filing is withdrawn before the Court

issues an order to show cause, Rule 11(c)(2)(B), although here it is clear Plaintiff attempted

to withdraw the Second Recusal Motion only after he had notice of the Court’s order to show

cause. Therefore, Plaintiff is advised that his attempted withdrawal of the Second

Recusal Motion does not excuse him from appearing at the hearing on August 13,

2007 at 12:00 noon or showing cause why he should not be sanctioned.

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 22 Filed 08/08/07 Page 2 of 6
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1

 Previously, Plaintiff purported to diagnose Judge Burns as mentally incompetent

based on an alleged error in the Court’s recitation of the procedural history. In the Notice

of Withdrawal, Plaintiff re-emphasizes and expands on his diagnosis. (See Notice of

Withdrawal at 3:8–23; see especially id. at 3:9–10 (“The diagnosis is an educated

professional opinion . . . .”) and id. at 3:19–21 (“[Plaintiff] has an obligation to make the

diagnosis for Judge Burns because plaintiff also believes that the sanctity of our judicial

system requires it.”)) The diagnosis of mental incapacity is based on Plaintiff’s claim that one

sentence in the procedural history as recited by the Court inaccurately summarizes the

complaint. (See Second Recusal Motion at 3:21–28; Third Recusal Motion at 3:27–4:5;

5:3–8.)

- 3 - 07cv0743

Furthermore, the Notice of Withdrawal adds its own accusations and insultingremarks

against the Court. In most cases, these represent repeated and even magnified versions

of previous accusations and remarks the Court has admonished Plaintiff are inappropriate

in any paper filed with the Court. Virtually the entire Notice of Withdrawal is filled with

disparaging remarks impugning the integrity of the Court and accusing Judge Burns of

incompetence and dishonesty. To cite some of the more egregious examples:

. . . Unable to find anything in the complaint to give credibility to his false

statement, Judge Burns turns to plaintiff’s first recusal motion.

(Notice of Withdrawal at 2:24–25.)

Judge Burns admits that he has an inability to comprehend something that

is obvious to every federal prosecutor, federal judge, and half the

population . . . .

(Id. at 2:27–3:1.)

. . . Judge Burns pretends that he has the 12 years of training at the best

institutions in the world, the 25+ years of experience, the medical acumen

required to do cutting edge research, the god given talent and the credentials

to challenge Plaintiff’s diagnosis.1 No second year law student in his or her

right mind would do this.

(Id. at 3:12–16.)

Judge Burns had many options short of attempting to justify his false

statement and making personal unsubstantiated charges against plaintiff.

Instead, Judge Burns attacks the plaintiff creating an adversarial relationship

where he can’t be seen as impartial even if the diagnosis is wrong.

(Id. at 3:24–27.)

The Notice of Withdrawal is also riddled with inaccuracies that a reasonable inquiry

such as is required under Rule 11(b) would easily have uncovered. It is unclear to the Court

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 22 Filed 08/08/07 Page 3 of 6
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 Apparently, Plaintiff means 8/13/07 and 8/14/07. No hearings are scheduled in

September, 2007 in this matter.

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at this time whether these are errors caused by a failure to make reasonable inquiry, or

deliberate distortions. For example, Plaintiff states:

Page 1, line 24 [of the Court’s order issued July 23, 2007], Judge Burns

points out a typographical error, (hearing date 9/13/2007 instead of

9/14/20072 which should have been caught by the court clerk. He goes on

to state that this is a violation [of] local rules 7.1(b) and 7.1(e).

(Notice of Withdrawal at 1:28–2:3.) The Court’s order, however, did not find fault with an

typographical error in a hearing date, but rather with the fact that Plaintiff selected his own

hearing date rather than obtaining it from chambers as Civil Local Rule 7.1(b) requires. The

Court explained this to Plaintiff in detail. (Order of July 23, 2007, at 1:23–2:11.)

Furthermore, as the Court explained, selecting a date less than 28 days away interferes with

the briefing schedule provided for under Civil Local Rule 7.1(e). (Id. at 2:11–13.) As to the

suggestion that the error consisted in giving the 13th rather than the 14th as the hearing date

is inaccurate; no hearing is, or ever was, scheduled on August 14, 2007 in this matter. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s suggestion that this error was not Plaintiff’s fault but rather that

of the court Clerk, lacks any reasonable basis. Plaintiff bears the responsibility for

documents he presents to the Court, and it is not the role of the Clerk of court to act as

Plaintiff’s advocate and correct his drafting errors. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362,

1364–65 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that it is not the court’s role to act as advocate for any

litigant, even one proceeding pro se); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). 

To cite another example, Plaintiff repeats his assertion that the Court’s 1-sentence

statement of the procedural history below is erroneous. (Notice of Withdrawal at 2:20–23.)

He then reaffirms and expands on his earlier claims that such an error in written material,

standing alone, is a fully adequate basis for his diagnosis that Judge Burns is mentally

incapacitated:

/ / /

/ / /

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The diagnosis is an educated professional opinion which requires “proof” as

understood and required in the medical profession to justify a

diagnosis. . . In California the test for incapacity is less than a 4 page,

proof- read [sic] written statement and doesn’t have to be given by a

specialist.

(Id. at 3:9–11, 21–23.)

As the Court pointed out previously (Order of August 3, 2007 at 10:1–11:6), it is

irrelevant for this point whether the Court’s 1-sentence statement regarding the procedural

history is accurate or erroneous. It is ordinary common sense that anyone, even lawyers

and judges, can make an error. Plaintiff is clearly aware of this, because he has repeatedly

accused lawyers and judges of foolish errors. Bearing this in mind, it is also common sense

that a medical doctor cannot diagnose mental or neurological illness in a person he has

never examined or met based solely on one error. Even assuming Plaintiff is right and the

Court misstated the procedural history, Plaintiff’s claims that his diagnosis was made in good

faith and has a reasonable basis have no reasonable basis. By repeating them, he again

appears to have violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

As noted above, these examples are not exhaustive: Virtually the entire Notice of

Withdrawal distorts the record or the Court’s rulings, baselessly accuses the Court, or insults

the Court. 

For essentially the same reasons identified in the Court’s order of July 23, in the

Court’s order of August 3, 2007, and in the analysis above, the Notice of Withdrawal appears

to violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Moreover, this represents the third of Plaintiff’s apparently

knowing violations, and Plaintiff has been given notice of his earlier violations. 

Therefore, at the hearing on August 13, 2007 at 12:00 noon at which Plaintiff is

already under orders to appear, Plaintiff is also ORDERED to show cause why he

should not be sanctioned pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 or held in contempt for filing

his Notice of Withdrawal.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 22 Filed 08/08/07 Page 5 of 6
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The Clerk shall strike the Notice of Withdrawal (docket no. 17). The Clerk shall mail

a copy of this order to Plaintiff’s address as given in the docket, as well as his address as

given at the top of Plaintiff’s Notice of Withdrawal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 8, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 22 Filed 08/08/07 Page 6 of 6