Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01122/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01122-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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1 See Tripati v. Felix, CV 05-762-PHX-DGC (DKD) (D. Ariz.) (Oct. 13, 2005 Ord.& J.

dismissing for failure to state a claim); Tripati v. Schriro, No CV 04-2228-PHX-DGC (DKD)

(D. Ariz.) (July 20, 2005 Ord. & J. dismissing for failure to state a claim); Tripati v. Currier,

No CV 00-2051-PHX-ROS (MS) (D. Ariz.) (Dec. 13, 2000 Order & J. dismissing for failure to

LMH

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anant Kumar Tripati, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charlette Thompson, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 03-1122-PHX-DGC (DKD)

ORDER

This stat e p risoner action was filed pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

and deny all pending motions.

A. Procedural Background.

Plaintiff Anant Kumar Tripati, a state prisoner, has a lengthy history of vexatious

litigation in the state and federal courts. In this Court, he has garnered more than three

strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the provision which prohibits inmates from proceeding

in forma pauperis when three or more of their prior actions have been dismissed as

frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim.1 The Supreme Court of t he United States

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state a claim); Tripati v. Maricopa County, No. CV 97-0021-PHX-ROS (BGS) (D. Ariz.) (May

22, 1997 Ord. & J. dismissing for failure to state a claim). 

2 See Tripati v. Schriro, 541 U.S. 1039 (2004) (“ As p et itioner has repeatedly abused

this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal

matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and petition

submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1.”) 

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has also recognized Plaintiff’s vexatious behavior.2

 His abusive techniques in the state

courts of Arizona are reflected more fully in the discussion below.

This action was originally filed as a “Complaint for Federal Racketeering” in state

court and removed by Defendant Charlette Thompson. Plaintiff named thirty-three

defendants and many more unknown p ersons, claiming that there was an enterprise among

the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), Arizona Department of Administration

(ADOA) and the Office of the Arizona Attorney General (OAG) to interfere in judicial

proceedings. The Court denied Plaintiff’s request for remand and dismissed the original

Complaint because Plaintiff failed to allege an injury in his business or property under

RICO. See Dkt. ##2, 6-10, 12, 17. 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. See Dkt. #19. The Court dismissed it

for failing to satisfy pleading st andards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Dkt. #26. The Court noted that the First Amended Complaint was “53

pages long, with an additional 237 pages of attachment s,” and the claims were “not concise

and direct.” Id. at p. 2. Plaintiff also failed to use the requisite court-approved form. Id.

at p. 3.

Plaintiff then filed a Second Amended Complaint on t he court-approved form.

See Dkt. #28. Plaintiff named forty-four Defendant s and fifty “John Does” of the discovery

unit of the ADOC. The named Defendants included four superior court judges, numerous

assistant attorneys general of OAG, and employees of the ADOC and ADOA. The Court

found that although the facts supporting some of the causes of act ion were not entirely

clear, service would be permitted but Defendants would not be prevented from filing

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dispositive motions. See Dkt. #33 at p. 3. The Court also expressly did not consider

whether Plaintiff had raised the same claims in other lawsuits. Id.

A flurry of mot ions ensued. Some motions have been resolved. See Dkt. #85

resolving Dkt. #79, #84; Dkt. #87 resolving Dkt. #86. Many motions are still pending.

Plaintiff filed a mot ion seeking addresses for service and to dismiss certain Defendants

(Dkt. #34), a motion to extend time for service (Dkt. #39), and a motion to disqualify the

attorney general (Dkt. #70). Defendants filed a motion and amended motion to vacate part

of the screening order (Dkt. #73, #75) and to dismiss the action (Dkt. #74). Plaintiff

responded to the amended motion t o vacate (Dkt. #77) and Defendants replied (Dkt. #76).

Plaintiff then moved to strike the reply (Dkt . #78) and Defendants responded to that motion

(Dkt. #82). Plaintiff also responded to the motion t o dismiss (Dkt. #83). Defendants replied

(Dkt. #88) and sought to strike exhibits to Plaintiff’s response (Dkt. #89). Plaintiff

responded to the motion to strike (Dkt. #90), and Defendants replied (Dkt. #91).

B. Screening.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to sua sponte screen a prisoner

action. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court must

dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if Plaintiff has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2); see also Lopez , 203 F.3d 1122 at 1127-29 (requiring an opportunity to

amend only when the complaint “could possibly be saved”). 

In determining whether the allegations of a Complaint state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the Court must take the allegations of material fact as true and construe

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th

Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The court need not accept as true allegat ions that contradict

matters properly subject to judicial notice, nor allegations that are merely conclusory,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State

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Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.

2001). 

The Court has sua sponte reexamined the Second Amended Complaint under these

screening standards. In particular, the Court has now had the opportunity to t ake judicial

not ice of state court records which are contradictory to Plaintiff’s allegations. Because the

Court finds t hat Plaintiff’s action fails to state a claim, the Court will vacate its earlier Order

requiring service and dismiss the action. 

C. Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff sets forth thirteen counts in his Second Amended Complaint which may be

divided into the following categories: (1) t hree counts of denial of access to the courts

(Counts IV, VI, and IX), (2) RICO-related allegations (Counts I-III, X-XII), and (3) retaliation

(Count XIII).

1. Access to Courts (Count IV)

In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that documents he submitted in support of Rule 59/60

motions were destroyed by Maricopa Superior Court Judge Edward Burke. (Sec. Am.

Compl. at 6, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff is particularly disappointed because these documents cont ained

numerous claims related to the destruction of documents by ADOC employees and three

other superior court judges. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Burke’s conduct caused Judges

Fields and Donahoe to be unable to rule and caused the Arizona Court of Appeals to be

unable t o decide an issue. According to Plaintiff, Judge Burke acknowledged receipt of the

documents in an Order issued on April 25, 2003. 

Plaintiff’s allegations, however, contradict matters subject to judicial notice. See

Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. The state court record reveals quit e a different course of events.

First, Plaintiff fails to mention that as a vexat ious litigant, he was required to seek

permission from the presiding judge before filing any pleadings in state court. At that time,

Judge Burke was the presiding judge. Judge Burke outlined this requirement in an October

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21, 2002, order denying Plaintiff’s request to file a complaint. In that Order, Judge Burke

set forth a procedural history which included that: 

(1) Plaintiff had filed a motion in 1996 that referred to a judge six times as an

“SOB” and stated that “[the judge] would sleep with his own mother t o see

that Plaintiff gets no relief.”

(2) In 1997, a superior court judge found that Plaintiff had filed more than

twenty lawsuits which were frivolous and vexatious. The clerk was ordered

to decline to accept any documents for filing, and Plaintiff was required to

seek leave from the presiding judge before file any papers in any case. 

(3) In 1995, the Arizona Court of Appeals had issued a similar order requiring

it s Clerk to decline to accept petitions for special action unless Plaint iff had

first obtained permission. 

Judge Burke found that Plaintiff had flout ed the Order by filing at least six additional

actions without permission and instead had “cleverly ” asked for deferral of fees and failed

to mention the restriction. Judge Burke required Plaintiff to submit a cover letter that

outlined t he restrictions imposed upon him with any future request to file a document. (See

Oct. 12, 2001 Order in Tripati v. McFadden, CV 2001-11718 (Maricopa County Sup. Ct.)

(attached as exhibit to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. #74).

Second, Plaintiff fails to completely recount t he p rocedural history regarding his

Rule 59/60 motion that was allegedly destroyed. On February 26, 2002, Judge Burke issued

an order declining to rule on Plaintiff’s Rule 59 and 60 motion on t he basis of lack of

jurisdiction in light of a notice of ap p eal filed by Plaintiff. (See February 26, 2002 Order in

Tripati v. McFadden, CV 2001-11718 (Maricopa County Sup. Ct.). Later, on July 5, 2002,

after Plaintiff had dismissed his appeal, Judge Burke granted him permission to file his Rule

59/60 motion, which was referred to Judge Donahoe for ruling. (See July 5, 2002 Order in

Tripati v. McFadden, CV 2001-11718 (Maricopa County Sup. Ct.) (attached as exhibit to

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. #74). The subsequent April 2003 Order by Judge Burke that

is challenged by Plaintiff stated: 

On February 25, 2002, the Court issued a minute entry stating that no action

would be taken on Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to Rule 59 and 60 because t he

Court no longer had jurisdiction. The Court has no recollection as to

whether or not those motions were filed in the court file or discarded

because the Court lacked jurisdiction.

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However, the Clerk’s docket reflects that on July 5, 2002, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s Motion to File Post Appeal Dismissal To Vacate pursuant to Rules

59 and 60 and the matter was referred to the Honorable Gary Donahoe for

ruling.

This Court is not in a position t o review the file to determine the status or

locat ion of Plaintiff’s motions because Plaintiff has appealed this case and

the file is at the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Because t his Court was merely the gatekeeper for Plaintiff’s pleadings and

made no substantive rulings, the Court can only suggest to Plaintiff that if

and when t his case is returned from the Arizona Court of Appeals, that

Plaintiff direct his inquiries either to Judge Donahoe or the judge assigned

to this case at that time.

(See April 29, 2003 Order in T rip at i v. McFadden, CV 2001-11718 (Maricopa County Sup.

Ct.)(attached as exhibit to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. #74) (emphasis added)). 

Desp it e this procedural history in the state courts, Plaintiff alleges in his Second

Amended Complaint:

According to an order issued by Judge Edward Burke on July 5, [2002], he

did in fact receive the documents. According to the procedure established

by Judge Edward Burke, Edward Burke the Deputy Clerk was required to file

the documents. However, he destroyed these documents.

(Sec. Am. Compl. at 6, ¶ 15.) In light of the state court p rocedural history, is it easy to see

that Judge Burke did not attempt in any way to conceal that Plaintiff had sought to file

motions pursuant to Rule 59/60. Plaintiff’s insinuation otherwise is disingenuous. Also,

Plaintiff’s assertion that Judge Burke was required to file the documents is also flat ly

contradict ed by the state court record, which reflects that Plaintiff was to first obtain

permission for filing documents.

M oreover, the heart of Plaintiff’s challenge is that the documents in his Rule 59 and

60 motions contained claims against other persons regarding the destruction of

documents, and he was t herefore unable to present these claims. This claim is obviously

ludicrous considering Plaintiff’s legal sophistication. 

In addition, as circuitous as it may be, Plaintiff’s claim is actually a challenge to

Judge Burke’s decision t hat the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the Rule 59 and 60

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3 The Arizona Court of Appeals succinctly reviewed this procedural history:

Tripati originally submitted motions pursuant to Rule 59 and Rule 60 on

February 19, 2002, which the trial court denied for lack of jurisdiction because

he had already filed a not ice of appeal to this court. Consequently, Tripati

moved this court to dismiss his appeal in order to permit him to again submit

his post-judgment motions to the trial court. On May 22, 2002, this court

granted the motion and dismissed t he appeal without prejudice.

Subsequently, then new civil presiding judge in the trial court grant ed Tripati

permission pursuant t o the screening order to file his Rule 59 and 60 motions.

However, Tripati never did so.

See Tripati v. McFadden, No. 1 CA-CV 03-138 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (Oct. 2, 2003 Mem. Decision

at p p . 6-7) (copy attached as Ex. 36 to Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. #83) (emphasis

added). 

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mot ions in light of a pending appeal. Hence, Plaintiff’s claim is an impermissible collateral

attack. 

It is just as important that there should be a place to end as that there should

be a place to begin litigation. After a party has had his day in court . . . a

collateral attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction there rendered merely

retries the issue previously determined. There is no reason to expect that the

second decision will be more satisfactory than the first.

Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 113-113 (1963) (cit ing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172

(1938)). “It is for the court of first inst ance t o determine the question of the validity of the

law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by it self or by a

higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected . . . .” Walker v. City of

Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967) (citing Howat v. State of Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189

(1922)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s recourse was to challenge Judge Burke’s decision that he

lacked jurisdiction to rule on his claims under Rule 59/60. Instead, Plaintiff dismissed his

appeal and was granted permission to file a new mot ion. An order by the Arizona Court

of Appeals reveals that he never did file the motion.3

In sum, Plaintiff submitted a post-judgment motion over which the court lacked

jurisdict ion and when he was given the opportunity to file a new motion at the procedurally

prop er time, he failed to do so. He instead has attempted to turn his failure to follow proper

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p rocedure into a civil rights claim for denial of access to the courts. Plaintiff fails to st at e

a claim.

2. Access to courts (Counts VI). 

In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants Stewart, Schneider, Hills, Bayless,

Burns, each and every member of the Attorney General’s Office have approved the

‘custom and tradition of withholding, fabricating, destroying evidence adverse to them and

favorable to inmates’ in cases where inmates are litigants.” (Sec. Am. Compl. at 6(f)).

Plaintiff then asserts that he lost claims in CV 99-20757, CV 01-11718, CV 02-15875, and CV

02-11710. Again, these are conclusory allegations asserted by a disappointed litigant.

There are no specific factual allegations about the conduct of any of these Defendants.

Plaintiff also has not alleged that he had a nonfrivolous civil right s claim. See Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53 (1996). He therefore fails to state a claim.

 3. Access to courts (Counts IX).

In Count IX, Plaintiff alleges t hat Defendant Marla Currier, an ADOC employee,

dest royed eighty pages of exonerating documents that were given to her for copying, and

that as a result, Plaintiff lost a federal habeas action. This claim is also an impermissible

collateral attack. An access to court s claim based on the loss of eighty pages and a tape

was rejected by the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Trip ati v. State of Arizona, No 1 CA-CV

02-343 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (Feb. 20, 2003 Mem. Decision at p. 11) (copy attached to Pl.’s Resp.

to Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 37, Dkt. #83). Plaintiff’s recourse was to app eal that decision, not

to bring a new action in federal court. For this reason alone, Plaintiff’s claim fails. 

 Also in Count IX, Plaintiff alleges t hat t wo ADOC employees lost or misplaced an

exonerating tape that caused him to lose his habeas action. The allegation is too

ambiguous t o det ermine whether this claim might also be a collateral attack. Even if it is

not, the claim fails. The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits state officials

from actively interfering with inmates’ attempts t o p rep are or file legal documents. Lewis,

518 U.S. at 350. Injuries to life, liberty, or property that are inflicted by governmental

negligence are not addressed by t he United States Constitution. Daniels v. Williams, 474

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4 Plaintiff has not provided anything ot her than case numbers. The Court takes

judicial notice of the following official records of the Maricopa County Superior Court:

(1) Tripati v. State of Arizona, CV 1999-20757 (Maricopa County Sup. Ct.); (2) Tripati v.

McFadden, CV 01-11718 (Maricopa County Sup. Ct .); (3) Tripati v. Baca, CV 02-1584

(Maricopa County Sup. Ct.); and (4) Tripati v. Forwith, CV 02-14710 (Maricopa County Sup.

Ct.). Plaintiff listed CV 02-11710, which appears to be a typo for CV 02-14710. Also, CV 02-

0887 appears to refer to a federal civil rights action, Tripati v. Palmer, No. CV 02-0887-PHXNVW (D. Ariz.). 

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U.S. 327, 333 (1986). An allegat ion that employees lost or misplaced a tape shows

negligence and not active interference with Plaintiff’s attempts to file legal documents.

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to connect this part of Count IX to any of t he named

Defendants. Consequently, he fails to state a claim.

4. RICO-related allegations. 

Plaintiff’s RICO claims are based on other lawsuits he has filed. He list s t hese

actions as follows: CV 99-20757, CV 01-11718, CV 02-1584, CV 02-11710 and CV 02-0887.

(Sec. Am. Compl. at 4(b), ¶ 6d.)4

 Plaintiff blanketly alleges that t hree sup erior court judges

destroyed evidence, that a fourth judge destroyed documents, and that ADOC and ADOA

emp loy ees are members of an “ADOC enterprise.” (Sec. Am. Compl. at 2-2(c).) The

purpose of this enterprise, according to Plaintiff, is to interfere with judicial process in

which he is a litigant by fabricating and destroying evidence. 

The Court need not accept as true allegat ions that are merely conclusory,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. All

of Plaintiff’s RICO-related allegations are legal conclusions wit hout factual allegations in

sup p ort . For instance, Plaintiff has a list of more than thirty dates when “they” commit t ed

“predicate acts,” without identify ing t he p erson or the act. See Sec. Am. Compl. at 4(b),

¶ 6b. Another example is Plaintiff’s assumption that affidavits were false because he

believes that the affidavits were notarized when blank and filled in later by the affiant. See

Sec. Am. Compl. at 4(c)-(d), ¶¶ 7d-7f, 7h-7i, 7k-7l. Plaintiff’s allegations more reasonably

support the inference that he is a disappointed litigant than the inference that Defendants

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had some sort of enterprise to interfere with five lawsuits. Because these types of

allegations are conclusory, the Court finds that they fail to state a claim.

5. Retaliation (Count XIII). 

A viable retaliation claim contains five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s

protected conduct and that such action (4) chilled the inmat e’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) was not

narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d

559, 567-58 (9t h Cir. 2005). In Count XIII, Plaintiff alleges that all of the Defendants have

retaliated against him by harassing and intimidating him for exercising his right to challenge

their misconduct. This allegation is overbroad and conclusory, particularly considering

the number of Defendant s. The Court need not accept as true allegations that are merely

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell, 266

F.3d at 988. This claim therefore fails.

6. Remaining Counts.

Each of the remaining counts (Count V for denial of subst ant ive due process, Count

VII for redress of grievances, Count VIII for failure to intercede against all defendants, and

Count X for extrinsic fraud) is factually dependent on one or more of the foregoing counts

that have been dismissed for failure to state a claim. Consequently, these additional

counts fail as well.

D. Judicial Immunity.

In addition to the foregoing, the superior court judges possess immunity. Judges

are immune excep t when the acts are not taken in their judicial capacity or are taken in

absence of all jurisdiction. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000).

Immunity attaches even if the act was erroneous or injurious, and irrespective of the

judge’s motivation. Id. (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985)).

Although Plaintiff has attempted to craft his allegations to say that the judges acted

outside of their judicial capacity, his disingenuous allegations are too unreasonable to be

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taken as t rue. As stated in the foregoing, the only factual allegation concerns a ruling by

Judge Burke on a Rule 59/60 motion. Obviously, Judge Burke is immune for his judicial

decisionmaking. The allegations against the remaining judges devolve from this one act

by Judge Burke. Accordingly, the judges are immune.

E. Malicious.

A case is malicious if it was filed with the intention to desire or harm another.

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff has a

long hist ory of using the federal and state courts as his playground, and he has earned

many restrictions for his contumacious behavior. He is not merely an upset litigant who

misunderstands pleading standards. His allegations of judicial and governmental

misconduct are utterly unfounded. His twisting of facts and obscuring of actual events

leads t his Court t o conclude that this lawsuit is malicious. Thus, the Court alternately

dismisses this action as malicious.

F. Pending Motions.

In light of the Court’s determination that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails

to state a claim and is alternately malicious, all pending motions will be denied as moot.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

(1) The reference to the magistrate judge is withdrawn.

(2) All pending motions (Dkt. ##34, 39, 70, 74, 75, 78 and 89) are denied as moot.

(3) The Order (Dkt. #33) is vacated only to the extent that the Order required service.

(4) The Second Amended Complaint and this act ion are dismissed for failure to

state a claim and alternately as malicious, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

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(5) The Clerk of Court shall make an entry on the docket in this matter indicating

that the dismissal falls within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 27th day of December, 2005.

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