Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06614/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06614-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH M. HERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

RICHARD KIRKLAND,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 04-6614 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner pled no contest in Merced County Superior Court to possession of a prohibited

weapon, a billy club (Penal Code Section 12020(a)), misdemeanor display of a weapon (Penal Code

Section 417), transportation of a controlled substance (Health and Safety Code Section 11379),

being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health and Safety Code Section 11550(a)), and

resisting arrest (Penal Code Section 148), in exchange for felony probation and a twelve-month

sentence. Petitioner was released on a waiver pursuant to People v. Cruz, 44 Cal.3d 1247 (1988),

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agreeing that if he violated the conditions of his release, he would not receive the benefit of his plea. 

Petitioner subsequently violated the agreement and was sentenced to a term of four years and eight

months.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

(“Court of Appeal”). The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion entered

October 7, 2003. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which the

court denied on December 23, 2003. Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of habeas corpus with

any state court.

Petitioner filed the present petition with this court on November 24, 2004. Respondent

moves to dismiss the petition as a mixed petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Merced 

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9

th Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97

F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed on November 24, 2004, after

the enactment of the AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

//

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9th Cir. 1997). 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

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petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9

th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9

th Cir.1998). For

example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must

say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A

general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a

federal claim to a state court. See, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982)

(Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an

argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074

(1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal

constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition as containing both exhausted and unexhausted

claims. Petitioner opposes the motion.

In this case, the only grounds for relief Petitioner presented to the California Supreme Court

are the following: 1) the trial court did not understand its discretion in sentencing him; 2) if the trial

court understood its sentencing discretion, it did not exercise it properly; 3) trial counsel was

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ineffective; 4) the trial judge was biased against him. Claims 3 and 4 have never been presented to

the California Supreme Court and therefore, are unexhausted. The court must dismiss a petition that

contains unexhausted claims, even if it also contains exhausted claims. Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22,

102 S.Ct. at 1205; Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997); Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1988). 

Further, the court notes that although Claims 1 and 2 are exhausted, they are not cognizable on

federal habeas review because they are each state law claims.

In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Pub.L. No

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under the AEDPA, exhaustion can be waived by Respondent. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(C). The court can also excuse exhaustion if “(i) there is an absence of available State

corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such a process ineffective to protect the

rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this case, Respondent has not waived

exhaustion. In addition, California provides avenues for Petitioner to pursue state claims. For

example, these claims could have been presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See, Cal.

Penal Code §§ 1473 - 1475. Finally, there are not sufficient circumstances in this case for the court

to ignore the United States Supreme Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion and

find that California’s corrective processes are ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus currently before this court contains both exhausted and

unexhausted claims. As such, the petition must be dismissed. See, Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22, 102

S.Ct. at 1205; Gordon, 107 F.3d at 760; Guizar 843 F.2d at 372. This is particularly true where, as

here, the exhausted claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus. 

Petitioner seeks dismissal of this petition without prejudice. Petitioner should bear in mind

that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) sets out a critical one-year limitations period within which a federal habeas

petition may be filed. In most cases, the one year period starts to run on the date the California

Supreme Court denies the petitioner’s direct review. See, id. Although the limitations period tolls

while a properly filed request for collateral review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),

is does not toll for the time an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct.

2120, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

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Accordingly, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and this petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed as a mixed petition containing

both exhausted and unexhausted claims.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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