Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01043/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01043-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 05-1043/1047

___________

Joseph Franklin, *

*

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, *

* Appeals from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Al Luebbers, *

*

Appellant/Cross-Appellee. * 

___________

Submitted: November 13, 2006

Filed: July 24, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Joseph Franklin (Franklin) applied for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, collaterally attacking his Missouri capital murder conviction and death

sentence. The district court granted Franklin’s application on two grounds and denied

the application on all other grounds. This appeal followed. We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 8, 1977, a sniper fired shots at worshipers exiting a St. Louis

synagogue, killing one man and wounding two other men. Police recovered a

Remington .30-06 rifle, spent shell casings, a guitar case, and a bicycle used in

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The state ultimately dismissed the three counts of armed criminal action.

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connection with the shootings, but never apprehended the sniper. The crimes

remained unsolved for seventeen years.

In 1994, while serving six consecutive life sentences at a federal penitentiary

in Marion, Illinois, Franklin requested an interview with an agent from the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI). During the interview, Franklin confessed to the 1977

St. Louis synagogue shootings. Franklin gave the FBI agent a detailed account of his

preparation for and execution of the shootings, which included: (1) buying a .30-06

rifle in Texas, obliterating the rifle’s serial numbers, and wiping his fingerprints from

the rifle and shell casings; (2) initially choosing Oklahoma City as the location for the

shootings, but selecting St. Louis instead, believing St. Louis had a larger Jewish

population; (3) choosing the Richmond Heights (St. Louis) synagogue because it had

bushes for cover; (4) carrying the rifle in a guitar case to the scene the night before the

shootings; (5) hammering nails into a telephone post to use as a rifle prop; (6) using

a bicycle to flee the scene undetected after the shootings; and (7) monitoring the

police radio to determine whether the police were looking for him. Franklin repeated

his confession in a videotaped interview to a Richmond Heights police officer, and

told the officer he wished he “had killed five Jews with the five bullets.”

Franklin was charged in Missouri state court with capital murder, two counts

of assault with intent to do great bodily harm with malice aforethought, and three

counts of armed criminal action.1

 Franklin’s court-appointed trial counsel filed a

notice of intent to rely on the defense of mental disease or defect and also requested

a hearing on Franklin’s mental fitness to proceed. The trial court ordered Franklin to

submit to psychiatric evaluations and held a competency hearing.

The trial court heard testimony from defense psychiatrist Dr. Dorothy Lewis

(Dr. Lewis), the state’s psychiatrist Dr. Sam Parwatikar (Dr. Parwatikar), and

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Franklin, as well as defense counsel’s arguments. Dr. Lewis opined Franklin suffered

from paranoid schizophrenia and was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Parwatikar, on

the other hand, opined Franklin suffered from idiosyncratic thoughts and found

Franklin’s behavior to be the result of a personality disorder, rather than a mental

disease. Dr. Parwatikar found Franklin was capable of assisting in his defense and

competent to stand trial.

Franklin told the trial court he disagreed with Dr. Lewis’s diagnosis of paranoid

schizophrenia, but admitted suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder, attention

deficit disorder, and social phobias. Franklin explained he wanted to be convicted for

the St. Louis synagogue shootings because corrections officers at the Marion federal

penitentiary were trying to kill him for exposing drug-smuggling activities. Franklin

testified he believed in reincarnation and was guided by dreams, numbers, letters,

lights, astrology, common sense, and the Bible. Franklin insisted his superstitions did

not mean he was “psychotic or completely crazy or stark, raving mad.” Franklin said

he was instructed in a dream to give his confession, but he was never instructed to

confess to a crime he did not commit. As evidence of his ability to assist in his

defense, Franklin testified that the state dropped the armed criminal action charges

after Franklin correctly advised his attorneys the state could not prosecute him under

the armed criminal action statute because his crimes occurred in 1977, two years

before the enactment of the statute. After considering the testimonies and arguments,

the trial court agreed with Dr. Parwatikar’s assessment and found Franklin competent

to proceed to trial.

Before trial began, Franklin filed a motion to proceed pro se because he

disagreed with his attorneys “in regards to the type of defense we want to use and

other issues.” Franklin asserted his ability to represent himself noting, “I am

experienced in trial law, and although I’ve never been to law school, I’ve represented

myself in two other murder trials, one of them a capital case.” Franklin, however, did

request advisory counsel.

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At a second competency hearing, the trial court considered factors under

Missouri’s waiver of counsel statute, see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 600.051, including whether

Franklin understood the charges against him and his right to counsel. Based upon

Franklin’s testimony, as well as evidence presented in conjunction with the

competency motion, the trial court found Franklin’s waiver of counsel was knowing

and voluntary, and granted Franklin’s motion to proceed pro se. The trial court denied

defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and ordered defense counsel to serve as

Franklin’s advisory counsel. Before trial, Franklin signed and submitted a written

waiver of counsel.

At trial, Franklin participated in jury selection, cross-examined the state’s

witnesses, and called one witness. At the close of the evidence, the state and Franklin

made closing arguments and the case was submitted to the jury. The jury convicted

Franklin of capital murder and two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily

harm with malice aforethought.

In the penalty phase, the state presented evidence of Franklin’s prior

convictions for the murders of two African-American men in Utah, the murder of an

interracial couple in Wisconsin, and the bombing of a synagogue in Tennessee.

During closing statements, the state prosecutor asserted Franklin’s plan to kill more

than one person during the sniper attack “exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity

of human life,” and “the aggravating circumstances of th[e] case justif[ied] the

imposition of the sentence of death.” In his own brief closing statement, Franklin

relayed a fellow inmate’s suggestion that if the jury did not recommend the death

penalty, Franklin “should kill somebody to make sure they do the next time.”

Franklin told the jurors, he thereafter “decided that if you guys do not vote for the

death penalty, that’s what’s going to happen. I’m already doing six consecutive life

sentences already, plus some other time. And it would just be a total farce if you guys

did not sentence me to death.”

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During Franklin’s pretrial competency hearing, Franklin testified that, if

convicted, he did not intend to appeal and did not want any conviction and death

sentence overturned. Franklin’s counsel acknowledged that Franklin had the right not

to appeal. (Counsel: “[Franklin] indicated that he wants the death sentence. He

doesn’t even want to appeal.” Court: “He has a right to not appeal, does he not?”

Counsel: “Yes, he does.”). After the reading of the jury’s guilty verdicts, Franklin

smiled, gave the jury the “thumbs up” sign, and said, “Right on.” When Franklin’s

sentence was pronounced, Franklin asked the trial court to remove his advisory

counsel from the case “so that she cannot try to file an appeal of this case.” Franklin

also asked the trial court to set his execution date.

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The jury recommended the death penalty for the murder conviction and two

terms of life imprisonment for each assault conviction. At the close of the penalty

phase, Franklin’s advisory counsel made a record of claimed errors and told the trial

court they intended to file a motion for new trial. Franklin objected to his advisory

counsel filing a motion for new trial, insisting he did not want a new trial, and asking

the trial court to “take [advisory counsel] off the case so that [advisory counsel]

cannot try to file an appeal of this case.” After verifying Franklin’s intentions, the

trial court overruled advisory counsel’s motion for a new trial.

The trial court sentenced Franklin to death by lethal injection for the capital

murder conviction and to concurrent life sentences for the two assault convictions.

The trial court advised Franklin of his right to appeal, but Franklin again declared he

did not want to appeal. The trial court read aloud and Franklin signed and submitted

a waiver of appeal. Despite Franklin’s repeated statements before, during, and after

trial expressing his wish not to appeal,2

 Franklin’s advisory counsel presented

Franklin with an authorization to file an appeal, which Franklin refused to sign.

Franklin’s advisory counsel nonetheless filed the unauthorized notice of appeal.

On May 1, 1998, after receiving Franklin’s waiver of appeal and advisory

counsel’s notice of appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered Franklin to submit

in writing his intention regarding an appeal on issues other than the statutory review

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of his death sentence. The Missouri Supreme Court received a letter from Franklin

on May 27, 1998, advising “the court [he did] NOT wish to appeal” his case and to

“[p]lease set an execution date as soon as possible.” The Missouri Supreme Court

treated Franklin’s letter as a response to the May 1, 1998, order and dismissed

Franklin’s appeal. See State v. Franklin (Franklin I), 969 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Mo.

1998) (en banc). The Missouri Supreme Court performed the mandatory

proportionality review of Franklin’s sentence, see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.014 (repealed

1983, current version at Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.035), and concluded “Franklin’s

punishment [was] neither excessive nor disproportionate in light of the crime and the

strength of the evidence against him.” Franklin I, 969 S.W.2d at 746. Two months

later, Franklin moved to file an out-of-time appeal authorization, stating he had

“changed his mind” and now wished to appeal. The Missouri Supreme Court denied

Franklin’s motion as untimely.

Thereafter, Franklin filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief asserting

several claims of error, including allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel and constitutional violations during trial. See State v. Franklin (Franklin

P.C.), 24 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Mo. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 951 (2000).

The motion court overruled the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Missouri

Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, finding (1) the appellate

counsel’s failure to request a reevaluation of Franklin’s competency did not render

appellate counsel’s assistance ineffective because Franklin’s competence was fully

litigated before the trial court and Franklin presented no new evidence to cast doubt

on his continued competence, and (2) Franklin had not shown a reasonable probability

the result of the proceeding would have been any different, and therefore failed to

demonstrate prejudice. See id. at 690-93. The Missouri Supreme Court declined to

consider Franklin’s various constitutional challenges, concluding:

Postconviction motions cannot be used as a substitute for direct appeal

or to obtain further appellate review. Issues capable of being raised on

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direct appeal–even constitutional issues–may not be raised in

postconviction proceedings except where fundamental fairness requires

otherwise and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. We find that

the trial court did not err where it declined to enter specific findings

concerning these claims because they were specifically raised on appeal

and Franklin chose to voluntarily request dismissal of that appeal.

Id. at 693 (footnotes and internal citations omitted).

Franklin then applied for a federal writ of habeas corpus, asserting sixteen

grounds for relief. The state argued Franklin’s claims were procedurally barred

because Franklin waived his direct appeal. The district court held Franklin’s claims

were not procedurally barred because (1) there was “no basis in the record to conclude

that the Missouri Supreme Court found the waiver to be valid and binding”; (2) the

Missouri Supreme Court’s reliance on Franklin’s May 27 letter did not constitute the

enforcement of a state procedural rule because the process engaged in fell “entirely

outside the usual procedures”; and (3) there is “no rule that authorizes represented

appellants to bypass counsel and communicate directly with the court regarding

outcome-determinative matters.”

The district court, however, rejected Franklin’s claim that the trial court erred

in determining Franklin was competent, concluding Franklin had not overcome by

clear and convincing evidence the presumption of correctness afforded the state

court’s competence determination under § 2254(e)(1). See Demosthenes v. Baal, 495

U.S. 731, 735 (1990) (per curiam) (concluding a state court’s conclusion regarding a

defendant’s competence is a factual determination entitled to a presumption of

correctness); Lyon v. Luebbers, 403 F.3d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Because

competence to stand trial is a factual issue, we presume the state court’s finding of

competence is correct.” (internal citation omitted)). The district court also rejected

Franklin’s claim that the Missouri Supreme Court erred in determining Franklin was

competent to waive his direct appeal, finding the only new evidence calling Franklin’s

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previously determined competence into question was Franklin’s refusal to sign the

appeal authorization based on his interpretation of a dream. The district court

concluded this conduct was consistent with Franklin’s conduct throughout his criminal

proceeding, and therefore there was no good reason to doubt the continued correctness

of the trial court’s competence determination. See Garrett v. Groose, 99 F.3d 283, 286

(8th Cir. 1996) (“[A] finding of competence, once made, continues to be

presumptively correct until some good reason to doubt it is presented.”).

The district court similarly rejected Franklin’s claim that the Missouri Supreme

Court interfered with Franklin’s right to counsel in relying on Franklin’s May 27,

1998, letter as stating Franklin’s intentions regarding an appeal. The district court

concluded Franklin had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel on appeal, see Martinez

v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 160 (2000), and furthermore, Franklin’s

appointed counsel received notice of the Missouri Supreme Court’s intention to use

the May 27 letter as a response, but did not further challenge that ruling.

The district court granted Franklin relief on two grounds: Franklin’s waiver of

counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and the trial court erred in failing

to give a penalty phase jury instruction. The state appeals, arguing the district court

erred in finding Franklin’s claims were not procedurally defaulted, and alternatively,

relief is not warranted by the record. Franklin cross-appeals the district court’s denial

of relief on his claims that he was not competent to stand trial, his waiver of appeal

was invalid, and the trial court interfered with his right to counsel on appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

“On appeal of a denial of habeas corpus, this court reviews the district court’s

findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” Cagle v. Norris,

474 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2007). When a state prisoner applies for a writ of

habeas corpus, our review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which directs us

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“to undertake only a limited and deferential review of the underlying state court

decisions.” Morales v. Ault, 476 F.3d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

marks omitted), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 15, 2007) (No. 06-11912). 

However, we will not review an applicant’s federal habeas application and “a

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on

a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support

the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). The

“independent and adequate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional,” and applies

whether the state law ground is procedural or substantive. Id. at 729. Thus, the

doctrine bars federal habeas review “when a state court declined to address a

prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural

requirement.” Id. at 729-30. The state procedural ground is not adequate unless it is

“strictly or regularly followed.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988)

(quotation omitted); see also White v. Bowersox, 206 F.3d 776, 780 (8th Cir. 2000)

(“Procedural default of a claim under state law may constitute an independent and

adequate state ground, but only if the state procedural rule is firmly established,

regularly followed, and readily ascertainable.” (internal citation omitted)). 

The state argues Franklin’s claims are procedurally barred on habeas review

because Franklin waived his direct appeal. Franklin notes the procedural default

argument would apply to all his habeas claims, but insists no procedural default

occurred. Franklin argues “the Missouri Supreme Court created a procedural rule that

is nowhere written in the laws and had never before been in place,” and therefore the

dismissal of his direct appeal was not based on “independent and adequate state

grounds.” We disagree with Franklin’s position.

The pivotal question is Franklin’s competence. As the district court found,

under § 2254(e)(1), the state court’s competence determination is presumptively

correct, and Franklin failed to overcome that presumption by clear and convincing

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evidence. See Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 735. We also agree with the district court

that Franklin presented no new evidence to cast doubt on his continued competence

when he waived his appeal. At this point, however, we part company with the district

court’s findings.

First, Franklin’s advisory counsel, not the Missouri Supreme Court, pursued a

misleading and possibly improper procedure. Advisory counsel injected confusion

by filing an unauthorized notice of appeal after Franklin signed a waiver of appeal.

Thus, it was Franklin’s desire not to appeal that was clouded by advisory counsel

filing an unauthorized notice of appeal. The Missouri Supreme Court could have

rejected summarily the notice filed by advisory counsel on behalf of Franklin, who

was self-represented and refused to authorize the notice of appeal. However, in an

abundance of caution, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered Franklin to submit his

written authorization if he wished to appeal. See Franklin I, 969 S.W.2d at 744.

Franklin refused to sign the authorization and instead sent the May 27 letter to the

Missouri Supreme Court, which stated,

I am a Missouri prisoner under sentence of death, and am currently on

“writ of habeus [sic] corpus ad testificandum.” This is to advise the

court that I do NOT wish to appeal case No. 79735. Please set an

execution date as soon as possible, either in July or August of this year.

The Missouri Supreme Court concluded Franklin “unequivocally” did not wish to

appeal his case, and the court dismissed the appeal. Id.

As Franklin admits, the Missouri Supreme Court had no obligation to issue the

May 1 order requesting Franklin’s written response regarding his intention to appeal.

Instead, Franklin faults the Missouri Supreme Court for requesting clarification of the

record. Contrary to Franklin’s argument and the district court’s findings, the Missouri

Supreme Court’s request for clarification was not an act “entirely outside the usual

procedures.” Rather, the request fell precisely within the scope of the Missouri

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Franklin does not attempt to establish cause and prejudice or actual innocence

to excuse his procedural default nor do we perceive a basis for such a conclusion.

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Supreme Court’s procedural rules, which authorize appellate courts to order the

parties to correct errors or omissions in the record. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 81.12(f) (“If

anything material is omitted from the record on appeal, . . . the appellate court, on a

proper suggestion or of its own initiative, shall direct that the omission or

misstatement be corrected. The appellate court may, if it deems necessary, order that

a supplemental record on appeal be prepared.” (emphasis added)). The Missouri

Supreme Court’s action was cautious and proper procedure, not remotely

unconstitutional or unfair.

Similarly, the district court’s finding that the Missouri Supreme Court did not

consider Franklin’s waiver of appeal to be valid and binding is undercut by the

Missouri Supreme Court later rejecting claims raised by Franklin in his postconviction relief motion, which could have been raised on direct appeal. See Franklin

P.C., 24 S.W.3d at 693 (“Postconviction motions cannot be used as a substitute for

direct appeal or to obtain further appellate review.” (citing State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d

171, 181 (Mo. 1998) (en banc))). The Missouri Supreme Court’s rejection of

Franklin’s federal claims, due to Franklin voluntarily dismissing his direct appeal,

procedurally bars those claims from federal habeas review under the independent and

adequate state ground doctrine. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-31 (holding the

doctrine, rooted in principles of comity and federalism, prevents state prisoners,

whose custody is supported by independent and adequate state grounds, from making

an end run around the limits of federal jurisdiction by seeking on federal habeas

review to do what the United States Supreme Court could not do on direct review).3

We conclude Franklin’s voluntary waiver of his direct appeal resulted in

procedural default and bars review of all of Franklin’s claims raised in this appeal of

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Franklin’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim and his claim

challenging the constitutionality of the Missouri Supreme Court’s proportionality

review were not raised in this appeal and are not addressed in this opinion.

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his federal habeas application.4

 See id. at 729-30. The district court, therefore, was

without jurisdiction to grant relief on Franklin’s claims challenging the voluntariness

of Franklin’s waiver of trial counsel and the trial court’s omission of penalty-phase

jury instructions. Because the claims raised in Franklin’s cross-appeal also are

procedurally barred, we need not address Franklin’s arguments.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment granting in

part Franklin’s application for habeas relief. We remand with directions for the

district court to dismiss Franklin’s habeas application in total.

______________________________

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