Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56506/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56506-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE LUIS MUNOZ SANTOS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

LINDA R. THOMAS, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 12-56506

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-06330-MMM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc January 12, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed July 28, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and M. Margaret

McKeown, Kim McLane Wardlaw, William A. Fletcher,

Richard R. Clifton, Jay S. Bybee, Consuelo M. Callahan,

Milan D. Smith, Jr., Sandra S. Ikuta, Mary H. Murguia and

John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee;

Dissent by Judge Callahan

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2 MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Extradition

The en banc court reversed the district court’s judgment

denying habeas relief from a magistrate judge’s order

certifying Jose Luis Munoz Santos’s extradition to Mexico on

kidnapping charges, and remanded, in a case in which Munoz

sought to introduce evidence that incriminating statements

made against him by his co-conspirators were obtained by

torture and therefore could not support the probable cause

required to expedite.

The en banc court held that the co-conspirators’ claims

that their prior statements implicating themselves and Munoz

were obtained under duress are not contradictory, but

explanatory, because they go to the competence of the

government’s evidence, and may therefore be considered by

the extradition court.

The en banc court concluded that it could not resolve on

the record before it whether, assuming arguendo that the coconspirators’ confessions must be excluded, there is sufficient

evidence of probable cause to affirm. The en banc court

remanded for the district court to return the case to the

extradition court for further proceedings to address the

competency and the sufficiency of the government’s

evidence. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS 3

Dissenting, Judge Callahan, joined by Judge Ikuta, wrote

that the majority reviews the extradition court’s decision for

technical error, exceeding the scope of judicial review under

well-established Supreme Court precedent; risks converting

a probable cause hearing into a mini-trial with all the

evidentiary trappings, contrary to Supreme Court precedent;

and puts to test on American soil the reliability of the foreign

nation’s evidence, which is an assessment that the governing

treaty reserves for Mexican judicial authorities.

COUNSEL

Matthew B. Larsen (argued), Deputy Federal Public

Defender; Hilary L. Potashner, Federal Public Defender;

Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, California;

for Petitioner-Appellant.

Mark R. Yohalem (argued) and Aron Ketchel, Assistant

United States Attorneys; Robert E. Dugdale, Chief, Criminal

Division; Eileen M. Decker, United States Attorney; United

States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, California; for

Respondent-Appellee.

Jennifer Pasquarella, ACLU Foundation of Southern

California, Los Angeles, California; Steven M. Watt, Human

Rights Program, ACLU Foundation, New York, New York;

Melissa Hooper, Human Rights First, New York, New York;

Baher Azmy, Center For Constitutional Rights, New York,

New York; for Amici Curiae the American Civil Liberties

Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern

California, Human Rights First, and Human Rights Watch.

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4 MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS

William J. Aceves, California Western School of Law, San

Diego, California; Robert E. Kohn, Kohn Law Group, Santa

Monica, California; for Amicus Curiae Juan E. Méndez,

United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture.

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MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS 5

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Jose Luis Munoz Santos (“Munoz”), appeals the district

court’s denial of habeas relief from a magistrate judge’s order

certifying Munoz’s extradition to Mexico on charges of

kidnapping.

1

In his extradition hearing, Munoz sought to

1 We note that the extradition court’s opinion was originally reported as

In re Extradition of Santos, 795 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2011), and that

the panel’s opinion was reported as Santos v. Thomas, 779 F.3d 1021 (9th

Cir. 2015). This is incorrect. “Many Spanish names are composed of

both the father’s and the mother’s family names, usually in that order,

sometimes joined by y (and). . . . [P]ersons with such names are usually

referred to by both family names but sometimes by only one (usually, but

not always, the first of the two family names), according to their own

preference. It is never incorrect to use both.” Chicago Manual of Style

¶ 8.11 (16th ed. 2010); see also United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489,

1497 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing Hispanic naming conventions and

citing the Chicago Manual). By way of example, Colombian Nobel

Laureate Gabriel García Márquez may be referred to as “García” or

“García Márquez,” but generally not as “Márquez,” which is his mother’s

maiden name. In his briefs, Munoz refers to himself as “Munoz,” not

“Santos”; thus, this case is properly captioned as either Munoz v. Thomas

or Munoz Santos v. Thomas. Ironically, the extradition court notes this

naming convention in its opinion regarding Munoz’s release on bail—and

still proceeds to refer to Munoz as “Santos.” In re Extradition of Munoz

Santos, 473 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

This naming convention appears to have caused a great deal of

confusion among American courts generally. The Bluebook’s guidance

on this issue is unclear, noting that “if a party’s name is of Spanish or

Portuguese derivation, cite the surname and all names following,” but

without clarifying how a court is to determine what a person’s surname

actually is. The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation Rule 10.2.1(g),

at 100 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015). Likewise,

legal research databases frequently get this wrong.

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6 MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS

introduce evidence that incriminating statements made

against him by his co-conspirators were obtained by torture,

and therefore could not support the probable cause required

to extradite. The extradition court concluded that the

evidence of coercion was not admissible in the extradition

hearing, because the allegations were contained in statements

in which the witnesses had recanted their previous

incriminating statements. The court concluded that this

rendered the allegations “contradictory” evidence—as

opposed to “explanatory” evidence—and the allegations were

therefore inadmissible in an extradition proceeding. See

Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316–17 (1922). The district

court denied Munoz’s habeas petition, and a panel of this

court affirmed, relying in part on our decision in Barapind v.

Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (per

curiam). We took this case en banc to determine the

admissibility in an extradition hearing of evidence suggesting

that other evidence presented in the hearing was obtained

through coercion or torture.

We hold that evidence of coercion is explanatory, and

may be considered by the extradition court, even if the

evidence includes a recantation. We reverse the judgment of

the district court, and we remand to the district court to issue

the writ of habeas corpus unless the extradition court certifies

Munoz’s extraditability after proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

In the interest of allaying this confusion—and avoiding unintended

consequences—we provide this explanatory note as guidance for

ourselves and the lower courts.

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MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS 7

I. THE EXTRADITION PROCESS

The procedural history of this case will be easier to

navigate with an overview of the extradition process in mind. 

Extradition law is based on a combination of treaty law,

federal statutes, and judicial doctrines dating back to the late

nineteenth century. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181–96; see also

Ronald J. Hedges, International Extradition: A Guide for

Judges 1 n.3 (Federal Judicial Center 2014) (“FJC Manual”)

(“The law of extradition in the United States is well

established, dating back to the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries.”).

Authority over the extradition process is shared between

the executive and judicial branches. The process begins when

the foreign state seeking extradition makes a request directly

to the U.S. Department of State. If the State Department

determines that the request falls within the governing

extradition treaty, a U.S. Attorney files a complaint in federal

district court indicating an intent to extradite and seeking a

provisional warrant for the person sought. See Vo v. Benov,

447 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 18 U.S.C.

§ 3184. Once the warrant is issued, the district court, which

may include a magistrate judge, conducts a hearing to

determine “whether there is ‘evidence sufficient to sustain the

charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or

convention,’ or, in other words, whether there is probable

cause.” Vo, 447 F.3d at 1237 (quoting in part 18 U.S.C.

§ 3184).

The Supreme Court has described these extradition

hearings to determine probable cause as akin to a grand jury

investigation or a preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 5.1. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S.

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447, 461–62 (1913); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463

(1888); FJC Manual at 10. As the First Circuit described the

process:

In probable cause hearings under

American law, the evidence taken need not

meet the standards for admissibility at trial. 

Indeed, at a preliminary hearing in federal

court a “finding of probable cause may be

based upon hearsay in whole or in part.” Fed.

R. Crim. P. 5.1(a). This is because a

preliminary hearing is not a minitrial of the

issue of guilt; rather, its function is the more

limited one of determining whether probable

cause exists to hold the accused for trial. An

extradition hearing similarly involves a

preliminary examination of the evidence and

is not a trial.

United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted). We have said that the extradition court’s

review is limited to determining, first, whether the crime of

which the person is accused is extraditable, that is, whether it

falls within the terms of the extradition treaty between the

United States and the requesting state, and second, whether

there is probable cause to believe the person committed the

crime charged. See, e.g., Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d

1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by

Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.

2012) (en banc); see also Zanazanian v. United States,

729 F.2d 624, 625–26 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing the inquiry

as “whether: [1] the extradition judge had jurisdiction to

conduct proceedings; [2]the extradition court had jurisdiction

over the fugitive; [3] the extradition treaty was in full force

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MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS 9

and effect; [4] the crime fell within the terms of the treaty;

and [5] there was competent legal evidence to support a

finding of extraditability”).

Foreign states requesting extradition are not required to

litigate their criminal cases in American courts. Accordingly,

the scope of the extradition court’s review “is limited to a

narrow set of issues concerning the existence of a treaty, the

offense charged, and the quantum of evidence offered. The

larger assessment of extradition and its consequences is

committed to the Secretary of State.” Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at

110. “It is fundamental that the person whose extradition is

sought is not entitled to a full trial at the magistrate’s

probable cause hearing.” Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508

(7th Cir. 1981). Rather, “[t]he function of the committing

magistrate is to determine whether there is competent

evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial, and not

to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a

conviction.” Collins, 259 U.S. at 316. Thus, courts have

emphasized that “[t]he person charged is not to be tried in this

country for crimes he is alleged to have committed in the

requesting country. That is the task of the . . . courts of the

other country.” Eain, 641 F.2d at 508; see FJC Manual, at 10

(“An extradition hearing is not a criminal trial and is not

intended to ascertain guilt.”). So long as “the judicial officer

determines that there is probable cause, he ‘is required to

certify the individual as extraditable to the Secretary of

State.’” Vo, 447 F.3d at 1237 (quoting Blaxland v.

Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198,

1208 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Given the limited nature of extradition proceedings,

neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure apply. See Mainero v. Gregg,

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164 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Fed. R. Crim.

P. 1(a)(5)(A). Instead, 18 U.S.C. § 3190 provides that

evidence may be admitted as long as the evidence is

authenticated and would “be received for similar purposes by

the tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused

party shall have escaped.” The accused, however, does not

have the right to introduce evidence in defense because that

would require the government seeking his extradition “to go

into a full trial on the merits in a foreign country.” Collins,

259 U.S. at 316 (quoting In re Wadge, 15 F. 864, 866

(S.D.N.Y. 1883)). The Supreme Court has drawn a

distinction between evidence “properly admitted in behalf of

the [accused] and that improperly admitted.” Id. at 316. 

Evidence that may be admitted is evidence that “explain[s]

matters referred to by the witnesses for the government,”

Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461, while “evidence in defense” that

merely “contradict[s] the testimony for the prosecution” may

be excluded, Collins, 259 U.S. at 316–17 (quoting Charlton,

229 U.S. at 461). See Barapind, 400 F.3d at 750

(“[E]xtradition courts ‘do[] not weigh conflicting evidence’

in making their probable cause determinations.”) (second

alteration in original) (quoting Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d

776, 815 (9th Cir. 1986)); Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360,

1369 (9th Cir. 1978) (The “[a]dmission of evidence proffered

by the fugitive at an extradition proceeding is left to the

sound discretion of the court, guided of course by the

principle” that a fugitive’s right to introduce evidence

rebutting probable cause is limited to introducing evidence

that is “explanatory,” but not “contradictory.”); Mainero,

164 F.3d at 1207 n.7.

The difference between “explanatory” and

“contradictory” evidence is easier stated than applied. The

federal courts have struggled to distinguish between the two. 

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MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS 11

See, e.g., Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 2006)

(“In practice,” the line between contradictoryand explanatory

evidence “is not easily drawn”); In re Extradition of Strunk,

293 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (“The

distinction between evidence which ‘explains’ and evidence

which ‘contradicts’ seems metaphysical.”). Nevertheless, we

have generally settled on the principle that “explanatory”

evidence is evidence that “explains away or completely

obliterates probable cause,” whereas contradictory evidence

is that which “merely controverts the existence of probable

cause, or raises a defense.” Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1207 n.7;

see also Eain, 641 F.2d at 511 (“An accused in an extradition

hearing has no right to contradict the demanding country’s

proof or to pose questions of credibility as in an ordinary

trial, but only to offer evidence which explains or clarifies

that proof.”); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d

Cir. 1973) (holding that the extradition court had properly

excluded evidence that “would in no way ‘explain’—or, as

the district judge put it, ‘obliterate’—the government’s

evidence, but would only pose a conflict of credibility”). We

have also described “contradictory” evidence as evidence

“the credibility of which could not be assessed without a

trial.” Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749–50. In practice, this means

that an individual contesting extradition may not, for

example, present alibi evidence, facts contradicting the

government’s proof, or evidence of defenses like insanity, as

this tends to call into question the credibility of the

government’s offer of proof. Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1368. 

However, the accused may testify “to things which might

have explained ambiguities or doubtful elements” in the

government’s case. Collins, 259 U.S. at 315–16. But he may

not impeach government witnesses or produce witnesses

whose testimony contradicts evidence already offered by the

government. See Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461.

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12 MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS

If the extradition court determines that there is probable

cause to extradite, it enters an order certifying extradition to

the Secretary of State, who ultimately decides whether to

surrender the individual to the requesting state. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3186; Vo, 447 F.3d at 1237; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 789; Exec.

Order No. 11,517, 35 Fed. Reg. 4,937 (Mar. 19, 1970),

reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3193 Historical & Revision Notes. 

Once the district court has made its probable cause

determination and entered an order certifying extradition, the

order can only be challenged via a writ of habeas corpus,

because the order is not final and there is no other statutory

provision for direct appeal of an extradition order. Vo,

447 F.3d at 1240; see Collins v. Miller (Collins I), 252 U.S.

364, 368 (1920).

II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Munoz is wanted in Mexico on kidnapping charges

arising out of the kidnapping for ransom of Dignora

Hermosillo Garcia (“Hermosillo”) and her two young

daughters from their home near Tepic, a city in the state of

Nayarit, Mexico, in August 2005. Hermosillo and her

daughters were abducted from their home at gunpoint by a

man in a ski mask. The abductor eventually abandoned the

two girls, one at a time, by the side of the road; the youngest

of the girls died before she was found. Hermosillo was

similarly abandoned, with her mouth, eyes, ears, hands, and

feet duct taped, after giving her captor the PIN for her bank

card and her husband’s cell phone number. She managed to

free herself using a piece of barbed wire, walked to the

highway, and hitched a ride into the town of Jolotemba,

where she called her husband to come pick her up.

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MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS 13

Mexico requested Munoz’s extradition. He was arrested

in the United States on May 17, 2006 in connection with the

kidnapping.

A. Extradition Hearing

The U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty states that

“[e]xtradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found

sufficient, according to the laws of the requested Party . . . to

justify the committal for trial of the person sought if the

offense of which he has been accused had been committed in

that place.” U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, art. 3, May 4,

1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9656. In other words, we assess whether,

based on the evidence, the person could be brought to trial for

the same crime in the United States. Munoz stipulated below

that all elements except probable cause have been

satisfied—thus, the only element disputed in the extradition

hearing, and here on appeal, is whether the probable cause

element is satisfied. The key question is what evidence the

extradition court may consider in determining whether the

charge against Munoz is supported by probable cause.

1. The government’s evidence

In order to establish probable cause that Munoz was

involved in the kidnapping, the government relied principally

on statements from two of Munoz’s alleged co-conspirators,

Jesus Servando Hurtado Osuna (“Hurtado”), and Fausto

Librado Rosas Alfaro (“Rosas”). The government also

submitted three additional statements to corroborate Rosas’s

and Hurtado’s stories. We review this evidence in detail

below.

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a. Rosas’s statement

On March 27, 2006, Rosas submitted a written

preliminary statement to the presiding criminal trial judge in

his case in Mexico implicating Munoz, Hurtado, and himself

in the kidnapping of Hermosillo and her daughters. 

According to his statement, Rosas abducted Hermosillo and

her daughters, but Munoz was the brains of the operation. 

Rosas stated that he had known Munoz for several years

because they “have a business in which [they] buy and sell

clothes.” In July 2005, Munoz contacted Rosas on the phone

about a “job” he was planning, and stated that he would

explain in detail at a planned meeting in Tepic, Nayarit. In

mid-July, Rosas met with Munoz, a man named “Negro,”

whom Rosas identified as Hurtado, and two others. At this

point, Rosas learned what the “job” was. Munoz wanted to

recruit Rosas to assist in a plan to kidnap Hermosillo and hold

her for ransom, and Rosas agreed to participate. A few days

later, the conspirators met at a nightclub at Zapata and

Zacatecas Streets to discuss the details, including the amount

of ransom to be demanded from “Beto.” “Beto” is a common

nickname for Roberto, which is the name of Hermosillo’s

husband, Roberto Castellanos Meza (“Castellanos”). 

According to Rosas, Hurtado was invited to participate in the

job at this second meeting, and eventually agreed to join.

On August 9, 2005, the conspirators met again, and Rosas

told Hurtado that his job was to watch the house and let the

others know “when a lady in a white van arrived.” On

August 18, the day of the job, Hurtado informed the

conspirators that Hermosillo had arrived home with her two

daughters in a white Cherokee van. Rosas stated that he “hid

behind the main door,” and once in the house, threatened

Hermosillo with a gun while wearing a black ski mask. He

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MUNOZ SANTOS V. THOMAS 15

was not supposed to take the two girls, but became nervous

and put them in the backseat of the white Cherokee as well.

During the drive, Munoz called Rosas and instructed him

to release the girls together. Rosas first released the girls and

then Hermosillo at three different locations along the side of

the road. He met with Munoz later that same day and gave

him Hermosillo’s cell phone. Munoz then called Castellanos,

and demanded a ransom for Hermosillo and the girls even

though they had already been released. Rosas stated that

Munoz “kept making phone calls,” and that he did not know

why no one went to retrieve the girls from where he had left

them, “because the plan was to take them to [a] rented house

to take care of them.” Munoz later got into an argument with

one of the other conspirators, told Rosas that they “were in

terrible trouble,” and that he, Munoz, would handle it himself. 

Munoz then “escaped” and went to Hermosillo, Sonora.

b. Hurtado’s statement

Hurtado made a sworn statement to a Deputy District

Attorney in Tepic, Nayarit, on March 14, 2006. He requested

the assistance of his public defender, Juan Manuel Ramírez

Dueñas, who accepted the designation. Hurtado first asserted

that a statement he had given on October 12, 2005 to the

district attorneywas “completely false,”2and that he had been

 

2

In October 2005, Hurtado gave a highly detailed, sworn statement to

the Deputy District Attorney that told a very different story and which was

not presented as part ofthe government’s evidence in the extradition court. 

In his October 2005 statement, Hurtado stated that in early August before

the kidnapping, he and two friends, El Pelon and El Sapo, had been

smoking marijuana and made a plan to rob Hermosillo’s house, because

it “looked luxurious.” Hurtado knew the house because he worked as a

carpenter nearby. El Pelon and El Sapo agreed and said they would give

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“inventing things as they came into [his] head” to throw off

the police investigation of the kidnapping. He then stated he

was ready to tell what he knew of the kidnapping.

During the last week of July 2005, Hurtado left his

brother’s carpentry shop, and while walking, ran into El

Pelon, whom he identified as Jorge Gonzalo Lopez Chavez. 

Hurtado had known Lopez Chavez for about twenty years

because they lived in the same neighborhood. They bought

some beers and then Hurtado accompanied Lopez Chavez to

Hurtado 30,000 pesos to do the job. On August 18, at about 5:00 in the

evening, Hurtado called El Sapo’s phone and asked him whether he was

going to participate in the robbery as planned. El Sapo said yes and that

he was planning to enter the house with someone named “Chonte.” At

8:00, Hurtado called a taxi, which he remembered was a white Atos, and

went to Hermosillo’s house. He stopped about two blocks away and

called El Sapo again, who told him to wait until 10:00. When Hurtado

called El Sapo again two hours later, he told him that he and Chonte were

on the way to the house. Hurtado stated that he saw El Sapo’s light brown

Ford truck drive by the house and assumed that all was going according

to plan. Hurtado then told the taxi driver to take him to buy cocaine at a

nearby motel known as the “Posada Real.” Hurtado and the taxi driver

then drove back past Hermosillo’s house, where they did not see anyone.

Hurtado said they got about two blocks down the street before they

were stopped by several cars driven by men. The men pulled Hurtado out

of the taxi and put him in the backseat of one of the other cars and

demanded “Where is the truck?” Hurtado said he didn’t know anything

and that he had only been in the area to drink beer. The men questioned

him for about thirty minutes and then put him and the taxi driver in the

backseat of another car, where they were told that the men were

“investigating something awful that had happened.” Hurtado and the taxi

driver were eventually released, and the taxi driver took Hurtado home.

Finally, Hurtado stated that he recognized a photo of Munoz that the

District Attorney’s Office showed him, and that he only knew Munoz by

sight.

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a paint store, and when they arrived, Lopez Chavez got out of

the car and began speaking with El Chilango, whom Hurtado

identified as Rosas. Hurtado stated that he had only known

Rosas by sight for a few months. The three went back out to

buymore beer and then returned to the paint store, where they

stayed for about fifteen minutes, until Lopez Chavez took

Hurtado home.

Approximately four days later, Hurtado ran into Lopez

Chavez again, and Lopez Chavez asked Hurtado to

accompany him downtown. They ran into Rosas again and

the three went to a nightclub located on Zacatecas and Zapata

streets. Munoz was waiting for them there. Hurtado did not

know Munoz at that time. As they were inside drinking,

Hurtado overheard Rosas ask Munoz, “Hey, what’s going on

with the job?” Hurtado didn’t pay any attention to their

conversation, and eventuallyleft the club with Lopez Chavez. 

On the way home, he asked Lopez Chavez about the “job,”

but Lopez Chavez did not answer.

The next day, Hurtado went to Lopez Chavez’s house to

ask again about the “job,” because he needed money. Lopez

Chavez said that he could take Hurtado to see Rosas, who

would tell him about the job, and Hurtado agreed. Lopez

Chavez and Hurtado met with Rosas at the same nightclub,

and Rosas pulled Hurtado aside, and asked if he “was up for

a kidnapping.” Hurtado said yes, thinking that Rosas was

kidding. On August 9, Hurtado met with Rosas again, and

Rosas confirmed that the kidnapping plot was real. Hurtado

again agreed to participate and Rosas told him that all he had

to do was watch the house and tell the others when

Hermosillo arrived. Rosas showed Hurtado pictures of

Hermosillo and the two girls, and told him that he would find

him when it was time to put the plan into action.

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On August 18, Rosas and Lopez Chavez came to

Hurtado’s house and told him that they were going to pull the

job that night. Hurtado was supposed to watch the house and

call Rosas’s cell phone when Hermosillo arrived, and Rosas,

Munoz, and another conspirator, Lopez Mendivil, would grab

Hermosillo. The three were to drive Hermosillo to a rented

house in a nearby town, and Hurtado was to wait and would

be paid by Rosas. At about 9:00 that night, Hurtado took a

white taxi to the neighborhood to keep watch. He called

Rosas from a payphone when Hermosillo drove up, and then

watched as Lopez Chavez and Rosas drove up to the house. 

Rosas ran into the garage “hooded,” put Hermosillo and her

two daughters in Hermosillo’s car, and drove off at “full

speed.”

Hurtado got back into the taxi and drove by the place

where Munoz and Lopez Mendivil were waiting, where he

heard Munoz “telling . . . off” Rosas on the phone for not

following the plan. The taxi then drove Hurtado home. 

Hurtado also noted that when he was driving around in the

taxi that same night after the kidnapping, he was stopped

twice by “afi agents” (Mexican federal authorities) and

questioned about what he was doing at that time of night, but

then released. He did not see the other members of the

conspiracy again.

At the end of this statement, Hurtado declared that he had

read Munoz’s statement and that Munoz, Lopez Chavez,

Rosas, and Lopez Mendivil lied when they denied their

involvement. He identified Munoz’s photograph as well. 

Finally, he stated that he was under “no coercion, physical or

moral violence on the part of [the District Attorney’s] office

or on the part of the officers of the state police.”

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c. Other evidence

The government submitted three other statements to

corroborate Rosas’s and Hurtado’s statements implicating

Munoz. It included Hermosillo’s statement describing the

details of her kidnapping and release and her identification of

Rosas. According to Hermosillo, the abductor tugged on his

ski mask while they were driving, and Hermosillo noticed

that he had “a mole or a scar” on his nose. Hermosillo later

identified Rosas as the man who had abducted her from her

home based on photographs the Mexican authorities showed

her. The government also introduced a statement byBenigno

Andrade Hernandez (“Andrade”), who told Mexican

prosecutors that he had been approached by Rosas and

Munoz a month or so before the kidnapping, and asked if he

was interested in “pulling a job” to extort “Beto” for two

million pesos. Finally, the government included a statement

from Castellanos, made to Mexican prosecutors, in which

Castellanos described a phone call he had received from his

wife’s phone the day of the kidnapping, but had been cut off

before he could answer. Castellanos tried unsuccessfully to

locate his family after his brother informed him that the

garage door to the family’s house had been left open, and that

Hermosillo’s car was missing. The next morning, Castellanos

received a call from Hermosillo asking him to pick her up in

the town where Rosas had abandoned her.

2. Munoz’s additional evidence

To undermine the government’s showing of probable

cause, Munoz sought to introduce additional evidence at his

extradition hearing, including several statements by Rosas

and Hurtado alleging that their statements implicating Munoz

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had been obtained by torture or coercion. Again, we review

these statements in detail.

a. Rosas’s additional statements

On May 25, 2006, two months after providing his original

preliminary statement, Rosas was given the opportunity to

verify or retract his preliminary statement before a Mexican

judge, under oath.3

 Rosas retracted, asserting that the police

had forced him to sign his previous incriminating statement. 

He specifically identified a man named Martin Lujan, whom

he described as a “coordinator,” who “took [him] out of the

place [he] was in by beating and threatening [him].” Rosas

was told that if he did not sign the statement something “bad”

would happen to his family, and that the police knew his wife

had arrived in Hermosillo, Sonora. Rosas was asked whether

state police forced him to appear before the media and

“declare himself guilty,” and he answered, “Yes.”

Munoz also sought to introduce another statement by

Rosas, made on June 20, 2006, again sworn in court. Rosas

was represented by a public defender. He denied the parts of

his preliminary statement in which he implicated himself,

stating that when he was taken into court, he was only asked

whether he recognized his own signature on the statement. 

He was not read the statement itself. He was told that

something bad would happen to his family, and that the

3

In Mexican courts, witnesses are given an opportunity to accept, reject,

or amend their preliminary or “ministerial” statements when they make

their first appearances before the judge trying a case—the purpose being

to weed out false or coerced confessions. See, e.g., In re Extradition of

Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914, 923–24 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (explaining the

procedure in Mexican courts).

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police knew his wife and son had arrived in a black Altima. 

Rosas also stated that he was beaten and threatened on several

occasions while in custody. He again identified Martin

Lujan, whom he described as the “General Director.”

According to his June 20th statement, when Rosas was

detained, he was taken to a cell, “without lights, and with

only a chair.” He was tied to the chair, had a bag placed over

his head, and was struck repeatedly in the chest while being

asked what he knew about the kidnapping. Rosas repeated

facts that he remembered from the district attorney’s file on

the case, “so that they would stop torturing [him].” The next

morning he was taken out of his cell, and told that he was

going to a press conference, at which he was expected to

implicate himself and Munoz, or else he would be beaten

again. Rosas went to the press conference but denied his

involvement in the kidnapping; he was brought back to the

prison and held incommunicado for two days, during which

time Lujan periodically beat him.

Eventually, the police sent a detailed written statement to

Rosas through his lawyer, and Rosas was directed to sign it

or else “something serious” would happen to his family. 

Rosas’s lawyer “never told [him] anything” regarding the

statement—Rosas stated that he made the decision to sign the

statement alone, “due to the threats and beatings” to which he

was subjected. Rosas was asked in court if Lujan ever told

him why he wanted to force Rosas to confess, and Rosas said

that Lujan told him that he was under pressure from “the

father of the victims,” who was “calling him and pressuring

him from the outside.”

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b. Hurtado’s additional statements

On March 22, 2006, Hurtado gave a similar statement

before a judge in Mexico, under oath and represented by

private counsel. Hurtado stated that he “[did] not ratify”

either his October 12, 2005 or March 14, 2006 statements,

because the statements were false and had been obtained

under torture. Hurtado stated that after he dropped his

daughter off at his mother’s house, he was abducted, and

forced into a “gray Lobo truck with tinted windows.” A

“cap” was placed over his head, and he was taken to an

unknown location. Someone started hitting him in the face,

asking him to “tell them the truth.” A plastic bag was placed

over his head and tightened until he could not breathe. 

Hurtado told his captors that he didn’t know anything. He

was shown photographs of people but did not recognize

anyone. His captors poured water into his nose and mouth,

beat him, and questioned him again. According to Hurtado,

this went on for several days. He was told more than once

that if he did not “cooperate” his daughter would be given to

him in “pieces.”

Eventually, Hurtado was taken out at night, blindfolded,

and presented to “a man at a desk,” where he was told that if

he stated what he had been told to state, he would be allowed

to see his family. He made his statement as directed, and then

was taken back to where he was being held captive. The day

before he was brought before the court, he was taken to the

Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the chief of the judiciary

police told him that he had to “say what they had told [him]

before.” He was not allowed to call his family or speak with

a lawyer. The police brought him before “cameramen” who

were taking pictures and asking questions.

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Hurtado stated that he had nothing to do with the

kidnapping and did not know anyone involved. He identified

the “man who caught [him]” as a “potbellied, tall judiciary

police office with short, wavy hair.” His attorney asked the

court to take note of Hurtado’s injuries, and the Clerk of the

Court noted that Hurtado had “minor bruises on both

cheekbones . . . complain[ed] about [a] left earache, as well

as pain on the right foot next to the shin.”

Hurtado gave another sworn statement before a judge on

May 25, 2006, again represented by counsel, in which he

reiterated much of his March 22 statement. He alleged that

he had been detained by the state police for twelve days,

during which time he was tortured, had bags placed over his

face, was punched in the stomach, had water poured into his

nose and mouth, and received death threats. He reiterated

that he was “force[d]” to make incriminating statements.

On November 21, 2006, Hurtado gave further testimony

in court, under oath and represented by counsel. He wished

to add to his previous statements. He again reiterated that he

had been detained, tortured, and kept hooded for days, and

repeatedly been shown photographs of people he could not

identify. He added that after he had been taken to the

Prosecutor’s Office to make a statement, he was taken again

to the house where he was being held, and was given a

written statement to sign. Several days later, he was taken

back to the Prosecutor’s Office, and when he arrived at the

detention center, an inmate named Martin Lujan threatened

him, and told him not to change his statement or he would be

killed. He stated that he was afraid for his life and that of his

family.

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Finally, Munoz sought to introduce a declaration Hurtado

made under oath on June 10, 2009, in which Hurtado

essentially echoed the details of his previous statements. He

repeated that he had been detained and beaten by the police

for twelve days, told what statements to make, and that he

ultimately agreed to sign a written statement because his

family was threatened.

c. Other evidence

Munoz also sought to submit evidence to corroborate the

torture allegations, including evidence that he had been

tortured and his family threatened; a statement from another

alleged co-conspirator, Lopez Chavez, alleging that he had

been tortured; evidence that Rosas’s lawyer colluded with the

Mexican government to get Rosas to sign an incriminating

statement; evidence supporting Munoz’s alibi; and evidence

regarding the acquittal of another co-conspirator for

insufficient evidence.

3. The extradition court’s decision

In a published order, a magistrate judge, sitting as the

extradition court, carefully considered the government’s

evidence against Munoz and Munoz’s offer of evidence

rebutting the government’s probable cause showing. The

court concluded that Munoz was extraditable and declined to

consider the additional evidence Munoz sought to admit,

including the statements by Rosas and Hurtado alleging

torture. In re Extradition of Munoz Santos, 795 F. Supp. 2d

966 (C.D. Cal. 2011). The extradition court focused on the

fact that the allegations of coercion were contained in

statements in which Rosas and Hurtado had also recanted

their previous statements implicating Munoz. Id. at 987. The

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court noted that the Ninth Circuit had “never determined”

whether “recantation evidence is admissible in an extradition

hearing.” Id. at 988 (quoting Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1207 n.7). 

However, the extradition court relied on our decision in

Barapind, in which we concluded that probable cause was not

undermined in an extradition proceeding by a witness’s

recantation of a prior incriminating statement, because the

credibility of the recantation could not be determined without

a trial, “which would exceed the limited mandate of an

extradition court.” Id. (quoting Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749). 

The extradition court concluded that the recantation

statements were “contradictory” evidence inadmissible in

extradition proceedings. Id. at 988–89. Because Rosas’s and

Hurtado’s allegations of coercion were included in their

recantation statements, the allegations of coercion were

likewise inadmissible “contradictory” evidence. Id. at 989. 

Accordingly, based on the admissible evidence offered by the

government, the extradition court concluded that there was

sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause,

and it certified that Munoz was extraditable. Id. at 979–83.

B. Habeas Proceedings

In 2011, Munoz filed a habeas petition challenging the

extradition order, claiming that the extradition court had

committed legal error in ruling the evidence of torture

inadmissible. App. at 2–3. In a thorough opinion, the district

court declined to issue the writ.4 The district court agreed

that if Munoz could show that the confessions of key

witnesses “were procured through torture or duress,” that

4 The district court’s opinion is not published in any database. Because

of its importance to this case, we have reprinted it in an appendix to this

opinion.

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showing would “undermine the evidence on which the

government relies to meet its burden.” App. at 8. The court

distinguished between “recantation” statements that directly

contradict a previously offered version of the facts, which

would require the extradition court to make impermissible

credibility determinations, and evidence that a statement was

procured by torture. App. at 10. The court explained that

evidence that a statement was procured by torture is not

necessarily “contradictory,” and thus inadmissible in

extradition proceedings, because it does not inherently

“present an alternate version of events, or factually contradict

the [requesting] government’s probable cause narrative.” 

App. at 11. Rather, evidence that a statement was obtained

through torture “addresses the reliability of the incriminating

statements the government has presented and questions their

competence.” App. at 11. Therefore, such evidence is

theoretically admissible in extradition proceedings. App. at

11–12. The court observed:

While extradition courts cannot weigh

conflicting evidence, evidence of torture does

not require such weighing. Evidence of

torture addresses the circumstances under

which the government’s witnesses made

inculpatory statements; an extradition court

properlyconsiders evidence of torture, duress,

or unlawfully procured confessions in

deciding the reliability of the government’s

evidence.

App. at 12.

Nevertheless, the district court concluded that it was

impossible to distinguish between Rosas’s and Hurtado’s

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statements regarding torture, and their recantation of their

previous incriminating statements.5 Evaluating the torture

statements “would almost certainly require the extradition

court to determine whether the recantations are more reliable

than the original inculpatory statements.” App. at 19. Thus,

the district court ultimately agreed with the extradition court

that the torture statements could not be considered. Likewise,

the district court concluded that admission of the other

evidence Munoz sought to offer, e.g., the alibi evidence, etc.,

was either irrelevant to the question of how the inculpatory

statements were obtained or would require the extradition

court to make impermissible credibility determinations and

thus was properly excluded. App. at 20–24.

A panel of this court affirmed, agreeing that the

statements concerning torture were properly excluded by the

extradition court, and concluding that Rosas’s and Hurtado’s

statements were “inadmissible recantations.” Munoz Santos

v. Thomas, 779 F.3d 1021, 1026–28 (9th Cir. 2015). The

panel concluded that the “allegations of torture are

‘inextricably intertwined’ with Rosas’[s] and Hurtado’s

recantations,” because “[e]ach recantation includes both a

disavowal of the witness’s prior inculpatory statements, as

well as allegations that the statements were procured by

torture.” Id. at 1027. As a result, “the extradition court

would necessarily have had to evaluate the veracity of the

recantations and weigh them against the conflicting

5 The government argued that probable cause could be established on the

basis ofHermosillo’s, Castellanos’s and Andrade’s testimonyalone, given

that there was no claim that their testimony was coerced. The district

court found the question “close,” but concluded that “these statements do

not provide an adequate basis for affirming the extradition court’s order.” 

App. at 17 n.41. That conclusion made Hurtado’s and Rosas’s statements

critical to the government’s case.

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inculpatory statements. Doing so would have exceeded the

limited authority of the extradition court.” Id.

We granted en banc review and vacated the panel opinion. 

Munoz Santos v. Thomas, 804 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2015).

III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The extradition court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3184. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and we have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). Under § 3184, “any justice

or judge of the United States, or any magistrate judge

authorized so to do by a court of the United States” may sit as

an extradition court to consider whether the evidence is

“sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the

proper treaty or convention.” If so, the extradition court

“shall certify the same . . . to the Secretary of State.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3184.

There is no right of direct appeal to a district court or a

court of appeals from the extradition court’s certification of

extraditability. Because the extradition court’s order is not

final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the “only available

avenue to challenge an extradition order” is through a habeas

petition. Vo, 447 F.3d at 1240; see Skaftouros v. United

States, 667 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 2011); Oen Yin-Choy v.

Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1988).

The district court’s habeas review of an

extradition order is limited to whether: (1) the

extradition magistrate had jurisdiction over

the individual sought, (2) the treaty was in

force and the accused’s alleged offense fell

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within the treaty’s terms, and (3) there is “any

competent evidence” supporting the probable

cause determination of the magistrate.

Vo, 447 F.3d at 1240; see Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S.

311, 312 (1925). Our review is similarly circumscribed. We

review the district court’s judgment de novo. McKnight v.

Torres, 563 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2009). In this context,

that means that, with respect to the extradition court, we stand

in the same position as did the district court. We review the

extradition court’s legal rulings de novo, and its findings of

fact for clear error. And “[b]ecause the magistrate’s probable

cause finding is thus not a finding of fact ‘in the sense that the

court has weighed the evidence and resolved disputed factual

issues,’ it must be upheld if there is any competent evidence

in the record to support it.” Quinn, 783 F.2d at 791 (quoting

Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1342 n.10 (9th Cir. 1981)).

IV. ANALYSIS

The issue before us is whether the extradition court

properly refused to consider evidence that Rosas’s and

Hurtado’s statements—in which they confessed to their

involvement in the kidnapping and implicated Munoz—were

obtained by coercion, including torture. The extradition court

refused to consider evidence of coercion because it was

contained in subsequent statements in which Rosas and

Hurtado recanted their earlier testimony. The extradition

court excluded the subsequent statements because they were

“contradictory” and not “explanatory,” rendering the

statements inadmissible under the Supreme Court’s

framework governing an extraditee’s ability to present

evidence in the extradition proceeding. For reasons we

explain in Part A, this was legal error. The extradition court

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should have considered the evidence of coercion because a

coerced statement is not competent evidence and cannot

support probable cause.

In Part B we address a second issue: whether, assuming

arguendo that we must exclude Rosas’s and Hurtado’s

confessions, there is sufficient evidence of probable cause to

affirm. We conclude that we cannot resolve this question on

this record, and we remand this case to the district court with

instructions to return this case to the extradition court for

further proceedings to address the competency and the

sufficiency of the government’s evidence.

A. Exclusion of Rosas’s and Hurtado’s Statements

Our task is to determine whether there is any competent

evidence supporting the extradition court’s finding of

probable cause. The extradition court found probable cause

based largely on inculpating statements made by Rosas and

Hurtado, Munoz’s alleged co-conspirators. We took this case

en banc to clarify whether evidence that these statements

were obtained by torture or other coercion constitute

“contradictory” evidence inadmissible in an extradition

proceeding, or admissible “explanatory” evidence.

There can be little question that, standing by themselves,

Rosas’s March 27, 2006 statement and Hurtado’s March 14,

2006 statement, whether considered separately, together, or

together with statements from Hermosillo (the victim),

Castellanos (her husband), and Andrade (who may have

heard early plans for the kidnapping) constitute probable

cause to believe that Munoz participated in the kidnapping of

Hermosillo and her daughters. The statements were detailed

and authenticated. Hurtado gave his statement in the

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presence of his public defender and under oath to a deputy

district attorney in Mexico. Rosas submitted his statement in

writing to the judge presiding over his case and asked that it

be included in the court’s record.

The extradition court, however, refused to consider

subsequent statements by Rosas and Hurtado in which they

recanted their initial statements, claiming that the Mexican

police had coerced them into making those statements. The

extradition court, and the district court on habeas, concluded

that the allegations of torture were inadmissible because, as

the district court described it, the claims were “inextricably

intertwined” with the recantation statements. App. at 19–20;

Extradition of Munoz Santos, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 988–90. In

other words, both courts reasoned that it was impossible to

determine the credibility of the allegations of torture without

determining the credibility of Rosas’s and Hurtado’s

recantation statements. Because the credibility of the

recantation statements could not be determined without a

trial, those statements were inadmissible as “contradictory”

evidence. App. at 19–20; Id. at 990.

As we review Rosas’s and Hurtado’s various subsequent

statements, which are quite detailed, their claims are of two

types (and here we are simplifying): (1) I wasn’t involved,

and (2) the reason I previously said I was involved is that I

was tortured or otherwise coerced. The first type of statement

is a recantation of the kind that courts have properly refused

to consider. For example, in Barapind we considered

whether there was evidence to support Barapind’s extradition

to India for crimes in connection with his activities as a leader

in the All India Sikh Student Federation. In support of the

charges, India produced an affidavit from a police inspector,

who claimed that Nirmal Singh, an eyewitness, had identified

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Barapind as one of the principals in a shootout with

government officials. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 752. Barapind

produced a second affidavit from Nirmal in which he denied

having identified Barapind at all. “The extradition court

determined that Barapind’s evidence was insufficient to

destroy probable cause, concluding that a trial would be

required to determine who was telling the truth.” Id. We

concluded that the court made the proper decision. Id.

Similarly, in Bovio v. United States, the petitioner argued

that probable cause was lacking, in part, because the major

witness on which the government relied had admitted to lying

during the investigation. 989 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1993). 

The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting that

“Bovio [had] no right to attack the credibility of witnesses,”

because “issues of credibility are to be determined at trial.” 

Id. Consistent with both Barapind and Bovio, in Shapiro v.

Ferrandina, the Second Circuit upheld the extradition court’s

refusal to admit evidence “that one declarant of an

inculpatory statement had once blackmailed Shapiro’s father

and that certain fraudulent statements alleged to have been

made by Shapiro had not in fact been made.” 478 F.2d at

905. The court noted that “such statements would in no way

‘explain’ . . . the government’s evidence, but would only pose

a conflict of credibility.” Id.

Rosas’s and Hurtado’s recantations of their prior

confessions are, indeed, contradictory. But their claims that

their prior statements implicating themselves and Munoz

were obtained under duress are not contradictory, but

explanatory. Recanting statements contest the credibility of

the original statements, presenting a different version of the

facts or offering reasons why the government’s evidence

should not be believed. Reliable evidence that the

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government’s evidence was obtained by torture or coercion,

however, goes to the competence of the government’s

evidence.

The Supreme Court has long held that the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bars the

admission of coerced confessions. “The Constitution of the

United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any

individual in an American court by means of a coerced

confession.” Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155

(1944). As the Court explained in Brown v. Mississippi, “trial

. . . is a mere pretense where the state authorities have

contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions

obtained by violence . . . and the use of the confessions thus

obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence [is] a clear

denial of due process.” 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936); see

Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 159 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Forced

confessions are ruled out of a fair trial.”); Ward v. Texas,

316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) (“[T]his confession was not free

and voluntary but was the product of coercion and duress,

that petitioner was no longer able freely to admit or to deny

or to refuse to answer, and that he was willing to make any

statement that the officers wanted him to make.”); Chambers

v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1940); Palko v.

Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).

We and other courts have sometimes explained the

inadmissibility of coerced confessions in terms of their

unreliability. See, e.g., Crowe v. County of San Diego,

608 F.3d 406, 433 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[C]oerced confessions

are legally insufficient and unreliable and thus cannot factor

into the probable cause analysis.”); Livers v. Schenck,

700 F.3d 340, 358 (8th Cir. 2012) (“No reasonable officer

could believe statements from a coerced confession could

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alone provide probable cause.”); Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 121

(“[A] confession obtained by duress is inherently unreliable

and would be given little weight even if the confession were

authenticated.”). But the Supreme Court has made clear that

“[t]he aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude

presumptively false evidence but to prevent fundamental

unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.” 

Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (emphasis

added). The Court offered an extended explanation in Lego

v. Twomey:

[T]here may be a relationship between the

involuntariness of a confession and its

unreliability. But our decision [in Jackson v.

Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)] was not based in

the slightest on the fear that juries might

misjudge the accuracy of confessions and

arrive at erroneous determinations of guilt or

innocence. That case was not aimed at

reducing the possibility of convicting innocent

men.

Quite the contrary, we feared that the

reliability and truthfulness of even coerced

confessions could impermissibly influence a

jury’s judgment as to voluntariness. The use

of coerced confessions, whether true or false,

is forbidden because the method used to

extract them offends constitutional principles.

404 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1972) (emphasis added) (footnote

omitted). “To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be

and have been, to an unascertained extent, found to be

untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding

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confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on this

consideration.” Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541

(1961); see also United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008,

1017–18 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).

The Court’s clarity on this point gives us a different

perspective on Munoz’s claim that the principal evidence

against him was obtained through coercion that may have

amounted to torture.6 His claims of coerced testimony are

independent of the truthfulness of the testimony. It is

irrelevant whether Rosas’s and Hurtado’s statements about

their involvement in the kidnapping are true; we do not care

if they have indicia of reliability or whether they are

corroborated by other evidence. If they were obtained by

coercion in violation of the principles in the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the statements are not

competent and cannot support probable cause. In the

language of the extradition cases, such statements are not

“contradictory” because the truthfulness of the statements is

not the issue. The fact of coercion is “explanatory” because,

as the district court stated, it “addresses the circumstances

under which the government’s witnesses made inculpatory

statements.” App. at 12.

An allegation of coercion is essentially a second-order

question—a question about questions; the allegation

undermines the process by which the evidence was obtained,

6 Because the Due Process Clause prohibits the use of coerced

statements, including those obtained by torture, we need not address

whether the Convention Against Torture would also prohibit the use in

extradition proceedings of statements obtained under torture. See

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment, art. 15, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.

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not the credibility of the evidence itself. There are a number

of examples in which we and other courts have distinguished

between the evidence and the process. This is true even

where the allegations of torture or coercion appear alongside

claims that a previously made incriminating statement is not

true—i.e., where the allegations of coercion include

recantation statements. In these cases, once the evidence of

coercion is admitted, courts weigh whether the allegations of

coercion are credible, and if so, whether probable cause still

exists once the tainted evidence is excluded from the analysis. 

See, e.g., Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1008 (“To isolate any

possible taint the alleged torture could have on the evidence

supporting the probable cause determination, the judge

considered the sufficiency of the evidence without the

challenged confessions.”); Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1206 (noting

that the magistrate judge “carefully considered the

recantations offered . . . [and] . . . acknowledged that the

suggestion of torture is present in the record,” but upholding

the lower court’s conclusion that the torture allegations were

not sufficiently reliable to undermine probable cause); In re

Extradition of Atuar, 300 F. Supp. 2d 418, 431 (S.D. W. Va.

2003) (noting that a recantation statement is admissible “[i]f

it is evident . . . that the inculpating statement was coerced

and not made voluntarily,” in which case the court should

consider “which of the statements is more reliable in view of

the totality of the evidence”), aff’d, 156 F. App’x 555 (4th

Cir. 2005); In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982,

1021–23, 1028–29 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (evaluating allegations of

torture and concluding that the statements were reliable and

destroyed probable cause as to two of eleven charges), aff’d

in relevant part by Barapind, 400 F.3d 744; In re Extradition

of Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462, 1469 (S.D. Tex. 1992)

(“Obviously, where the indicia of reliability is on the prior

inculpating statement, then a recantation, if admitted, would

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not negate the existence of probable cause . . . [but] where a

prior statement is shown to be coerced and the indicia of

reliability is on the recantation, then the subsequent statement

negating the existence of probable cause is germane.”); Gill

v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1043–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)

(granting writ of habeas corpus because new extradition

hearing was required in light of a recent ruling by an Indian

court that the confession on which probable cause was based

had been coerced); cf. Hoxha, 465 F.3d at 561 (holding that

the district court did not err in excluding recantation

statements, some of which included allegations of torture,

because other competent evidence supported probable cause).

In sum, we have treated allegations of torture or coercion

differently from a recantation statement, even where the

allegations of coercion are made in conjunction with a claim

that a previous incriminating statement was false. Contrary

to what the district court and the extradition court concluded

here, it is possible to separate the two inquiries. Indeed, to

hold otherwise would create an odd rule in which allegations

of coercion would only be admissible when the witness

admits that the incriminating statements were true. This

makes little sense, because the question of whether a

recantation statement is credible or not is irrelevant to the

question of whether the incriminating statement—recanted or

not—was obtained under coercion, i.e., is competent

evidence. We conclude that evidence that a statement was

obtained under torture or other coercion constitutes

“explanatory” evidence generallyadmissible in an extradition

proceeding. An extradition court may properly consider

evidence of torture or coercion in considering the competency

of the government’s evidence, even when the claim of

coercion is intertwined with a recantation.

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Our decision in Barapind supports our conclusion. We

observed in that case that the extradition court had conducted

“a careful, incident-by-incident analysis as to whether there

was impropriety on the part of the Indian government” in

obtaining the statements on which probable cause rested. 

Barapind, 400 F.3d at 748. On two of the eleven charges

brought against the petitioner, the extradition court found that

allegations of torture undermined probable cause. With

respect to one of the charges, the single witness alleged that

his previous incriminating statement was involuntarily

obtained and that he had never identified Barapind or the

other alleged assailants in the case. Extradition of Singh,

170 F. Supp. 2d at 1021–22. India declined to challenge the

witness’s explanation.7 The extradition court weighed the

credibility of this statement and concluded that, under the

totality of the circumstances, the later affidavit “destroy[ed]

the competence of the evidence and obliterate[d] probable

cause” for the charge. Id. at 1023. On the second charge,

India had submitted the confession of a co-conspirator, who

was later killed. Barapind submitted affidavits from three

witnesses who stated that the confession had been obtained

by torture while the co-conspirator was in police custody. 

India apparently did not dispute this evidence, and the court

again concluded that the three witness statements alleging

torture were reliable and the confession should be excluded. 

Id. at 1028–29.

The portion of our decision in Barapind that appears to

have presented a stumbling block for both the extradition

court and the district court here involved a different charge

7 Belying the dissent’s assertion that “[f]oreign governments seeking

extradition are unlikely to let allegations of torture lie unanswered.” 

Dissenting Op. at 71.

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based on the inculpatory affidavit of Makhan Ram. Barapind

offered a second affidavit from Ram in which Ram claimed

that police had forced him to sign blank pieces of paper, on

which statements incriminating Barapind were later written. 

Ram said his statement implicating Barapind was a

“falsification.” Id. at 1024; see also Barapind, 400 F.3d at

749–50. The extradition court analyzed this statement and

factors going to its reliability, and ultimately concluded that,

under the circumstances, the court could not determine Ram’s

credibility. Accordingly, the extradition court concluded that

Ram’s statement did not undermine probable cause. 

Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1024–25. We

affirmed, finding that Ram’s statement constituted

“conflicting evidence,” because its credibility could not be

determined without a trial, and that it would have been

improper for the extradition court to engage in the kind of

review that would have been necessary to determine the

statement’s credibility. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749–50.8

The extradition court and the district court here relied on

this section of Barapind in concluding that Rosas’s and

Hurtado’s statements alleging coercion were inadmissible

evidence. But what the extradition court did here is different

from what the extradition court did in Barapind. In

Barapind, the extradition court first considered the

allegations of coercion, before concluding that it could not

determine their reliability without exceeding the scope of its

review. Here, however, the extradition court refused to

consider Rosas’s and Hurtado’s statements in the first

8 Our extended discussion of Barapind rebuts the dissent’s unfounded

claim that we have “recant[ed]” that decision. Dissenting Op. at 64. Far

from it: we have carefully explained why our decision here follows from

our nuanced decision in Barapind.

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instance. This was error. A petitioner in an extradition

proceeding has the right to introduce evidence that “explains

away” or “obliterates” probable cause, and credible evidence

that a statement was obtained under coercion does just that by

undermining the competence of the government’s evidence.

The dissent argues that the government’s evidence need

only be properly authenticated, as required under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3190, to be admissible in an extradition proceeding,

seeming to suggest that admissibility necessarily renders the

government’s evidence sufficient to satisfy probable cause. 

Dissenting Op. at 61–64. Such a suggestion conflates the

admissibility standard with the standard required to satisfy

probable cause. Simply because evidence has been

authenticated does not mean any evidence the government

submits is sufficient to satisfy probable cause. Were that the

case, the judiciary’s role in the extradition process would be

meaningless. Our role here is indeed a limited one, but

“[t]his is not to say that a judge . . . [in] an extradition

proceeding is expected to wield a rubber stamp.” Skaftouros

v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). Rather,

our “function in an extradition hearing is . . . to ensure that

our judicial standard of probable cause is met by the

Requesting Nation.” United States v. Linson, 88 F. Supp. 2d

1123, 1128 (D. Guam 2000). As we have made clear, the

manner in which evidence used to support probable cause

was obtained is relevant in determining whether the probable

cause standard has indeed been satisfied. Our case law,

including Supreme Court case law that the dissent largely

ignores, does not allow us to leave this determination to the

Secretary of State—or, for that matter, the Mexican

courts—under principles of deference to the executive or

international comity. Dissenting Op. at 74. The probable

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cause determination has been placed squarely in the

judiciary’s hands and is ours alone.9

We wish to be clear, however, that the scope of our

holding here is limited, and that our decision should not be

taken as a license to engage in mini-trials on the question of

coercion or torture. The extradition court does not have to

determine which party’s evidence represents the truth where

9 Nor does the rule of non-inquiry apply here: the long-standing

principle that courts should refrain from inquiring into how an individual

will be treated by a foreign state if extradited. In other words, the rule

bars the judiciary from preventing the surrender of a fugitive on the basis

of humanitarian considerations once extradition has been certified,

reserving that decision to the Secretary of State. See, e.g., Hoxha,

465 F.3d at 563 (“[H]umanitarian considerations are within the purview

of the executive branch and generally should not be addressed by the

courts in deciding whether a petitioner is extraditable.”); Prasoprat v.

Benov, 421 F.3d 1009, 1116 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We have long adhered to

the rule of non-inquiry—that it is the role of the Secretary of State, not the

courts, to determine whether extradition should be denied on humanitarian

grounds or on account of the treatment that the fugitive is likely to receive

upon his return to the requesting state.”); Blaxland, 323 F.3d at 1208

(“While potential abuses in the requesting country rising to the level of

torture are reviewable by American courts . . . judges generally refrain

from examining the penal systems of requesting nations, leaving to the

Secretary of State determinations of whether the defendant is likely to be

treated humanely.”) (quotations omitted); Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1205 n.6

(“[The so-called ‘rule of non-inquiry’ recognizes that ‘[a]n extradition

court will generally not inquire into the procedures or treatment which

await a surrendered fugitive in the requesting country.’”) (quoting

Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir.

1983)); FJC Manual at 26 (“[T]he rule of non-inquiry reserves for the

Secretary of State the task of assessing whether there are political or

humanitarian grounds to deny extradition.”). The question we address in

this case has to do with whether there is probable cause to extradite

Munoz to Mexico, not how Munoz will be treated if he is removed to

Mexico. Hence, the rule of non-inquiry is inapplicable.

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the facts are contested. Where an extradition court first

considers evidence that a statement was improperly obtained,

but concludes that it is impossible to determine the credibility

of the allegations without exceeding the scope of an

extradition court’s limited review, the court has fulfilled its

obligation—as the extradition court did in Barapind. If the

court cannot determine the credibility of the allegations (or

other evidence) once it has examined them, the inquiry ends. 

Probable cause is not undermined, and the court must certify

the extradition. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184.

The extradition court, of course, may consider other

evidence, separate from potentially tainted evidence, that will

satisfy the probable cause requirement. See, e.g., Barapind,

400 F.3d at 749–50; Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1206; cf. Hoxha,

465 F.3d at 561–62 (holding that exclusion of evidence of

coercion was proper where other competent evidence

supported probable cause). Furthermore, we note that the fact

that evidence of torture can properly be considered by the

extradition court as “explanatory” evidence does not mean

that all evidence of torture must be admitted. The extradition

court still has broad discretion to determine the admissibility

of the evidence before it. See Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1206;

Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1369; see also In re Extradition of

Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“The extent

of such explanatory evidence to be received is largely in the

discretion of the judge ruling on the extradition request.”).

Our holding today is narrow: Evidence that a statement

was obtained by coercion may be treated as “explanatory”

evidence that is admissible in an extradition hearing.

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B. Probable Cause

Although we have concluded that the extradition court

improperly excluded Rosas’s and Hurtado’s subsequent

statements alleging that their initial inculpatory statements

had been obtained by coercion, our inquiry is not at an end. 

Our inquiry on habeas review is whether any competent

evidence supports the extradition court’s probable cause

finding. Vo, 447 F.3d at 1240; see Fernandez, 268 U.S. at

312. Evidentiary error alone is not a sufficient basis on which

to grant a writ of habeas in the extradition context. See

Collins, 259 U.S. at 316 (“It is clear that the mere wrongful

exclusion of specific pieces of evidence, however important,

does not render the detention illegal.”).

The district court carefully considered whether, if the

court excluded Rosas’s and Hurtado’s statements, there

remained sufficient evidence to support a probable cause

finding against Munoz. It concluded that the matter was

“close,” but that there was not. App. at 17–18 n.41. We

share the district court’s doubts. Neither Castellanos’s nor

Hermosillo’s statements mention Munoz; at best theyconnect

Rosas to the kidnapping, but only Rosas’s and Hurtado’s

statements implicate Munoz. Without Rosas’s and Hurtado’s

statements, only Andrade’s statement that Rosas and Munoz

approached him about a “job” to extort “Beto” for two

million pesos potentially connects Munoz to the kidnapping. 

This statement, however, lacks any other specifics that would

suggest the “job” was a kidnapping involving Roberto

Castellanos’s family. Standing alone, Andrade’s statement is

insufficient to support probable cause. This is not a case in

which there is overwhelming evidence available from other

sources. Nevertheless, because the question is a close one,

we think the extradition court should decide this question in

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the first instance, when it will have the opportunity to

redetermine the admissibility of Munoz’s evidence and then

consider all of the evidence together.

The extradition court here “operated under a mistaken

understanding of what constitutes circuit law,” Barapind,

400 F.3d at 750, and took an overly restrictive view of its

authority to consider evidence that an inculpatory statement

was obtained under coercion. In light of our conclusion that

the extradition court may consider allegations of coercion,

even when they are included in a recantation statement, we

think it best to return this matter to the extradition court for

reconsideration. See, e.g., Caplan, 649 F.2d at 1343–45;

Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d 956, 960–61 (1st Cir. 1976);

United States ex rel. D’Amico v. Bishopp, 286 F.2d 320,

321–23 (2d Cir. 1961); Gill, 747 F. Supp. at 1046. Since this

case is here on habeas and not on direct appeal, our

mechanism for returning this case to the extradition court is

necessarily circuitous, because “the proceeding before a

committing magistrate in international extradition is not

subject to correction by appeal.” Collins I, 252 U.S. at 369. 

We cannot issue or refuse the certification of extraditability;

we can only order the release of the accused if there are no

grounds for holding him, a judgment we are unwilling to

make on the present record. As a result, we will remand the

case to the district court with instructions to grant the writ of

habeas corpus unless a judge or magistrate certifies Munoz’s

extraditability within a reasonable time and after proceedings

consistent with this opinion. See Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 914;

Gill, 747 F. Supp. at 1046, 1050. “If the magistrate so

certifies, the district court shall thereupon dismiss the

petition, except it may entertain renewal thereof for adequate

cause.” Greci, 527 F.2d at 961 (following Shapiro). “This

somewhat cumbersome method of remand is needed because,

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owing to the collateral nature of habeas corpus review in an

extradition proceeding, we have no direct power to vacate or

modify the extradition court’s certification.” Caplan,

649 F.2d at 1345 n.18 (citing Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 914).

The extradition court may consider the competency and

sufficiency of the government’s evidence, exercise discretion

as to the admission of Munoz’s proffered evidence, and

consider any other evidence it deems necessary, consistent

with our opinion. See, e.g., Greci, 527 F.2d at 960–61. Our

decision does not foreclose a finding by the extradition court

that the allegations of coercion are unreliable or insufficient

to undermine probable cause or that Munoz is, in fact,

extraditable. Rather, we simply decline to make these

determinations in the first instance before the extradition

court has had a chance to do so.

IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand

this case to the district court with instructions to discharge the

petitioner unless, within 90 days, the extradition court

certifies Munoz’s extraditability under 18 U.S.C. § 3184 after

proceedings consistent with this opinion. If the extradition

court issues a certificate of extraditability to the Secretary of

State, the district court shall dismiss the petition, subject to

renewal for adequate cause. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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APPENDIX

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CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, with whom IKUTA, Circuit

Judge, joins, dissenting:

The question in this habeas case is straight-forward: 

Under the federal extradition statute, 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3181–3195, and the terms of the extradition treatybetween

the United States (“Government”) and Mexico, did the

extradition judge err in excluding evidence that contradicts

the Mexican government’s evidence of probable cause to

believe that Jose Luis Munoz Santos (“petitioner”), a fugitive

of Mexico, is guilty of kidnapping in Mexico? The majority

answers with a resounding “yes,” overturning more than a

century’s worth of extradition jurisprudence. It first reviews

the extradition court’s decision for technical error, exceeding

the scope of judicial review under well-established Supreme

Court precedent. Second, despite its protestations to the

contrary, the majority risks converting a probable cause

hearing into a mini-trial with all the evidentiary trappings,

again contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, by

requiring extradition judges to consider and weigh evidence

that a fugitive raises in defense of the criminal charge he

faces abroad, the reliability of the foreign nation’s evidence

is put to the test on American soil. Under the governing

treaty, however, and consistent with controlling precedent,

this assessment is reserved for the Mexican judicial

authorities, not U.S. courts.

Extradition judges are not judicial Transformers; they are

not trial judges in disguise. Congress has never deputized

extradition judges for this purpose, nor has it vested Article

III judges with the power to expand the limited role these

judicial officers serve in the realm of foreign relations. The

majority’s approach violates the terms of the governing treaty

and the statutory framework established by Congress. The

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approach also interferes with the diplomatic relationship that

the Executive and Legislative branches have established with

Mexico. Because the Judiciary is not authorized to drive a

wedge in that relationship, I dissent.

I. Background

Mexican authorities have charged the petitioner with

kidnapping Dignora Hermosillo Garcia (“Hermosillo”) and

her four- and six-year-old daughters for ransom in August

2005.1 Kidnapping is an extraditable offense under the

extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. 

Extradition TreatyBetween the United States of America and

the United Mexican States, Mex.-U.S., May 4, 1978, 31

U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter “Extradition Treaty” or “Treaty”].

2

On August 15, 2006, Mexico requested the petitioner’s

extradition by formal request, and a United States Magistrate

Judge of the Central District of California held a hearing to

determine his extraditability. On behalf of Mexico, the

United States submitted witness statements from the victims

and confessions from the petitioner’s co-conspirators:

(1) Hermosillo described the kidnapping and

identified Fausto Librado Rosas Alfaro

(“Rosas”) as the armed, masked man who

abducted her and her daughters from their

1 Hermosillo’s younger daughter died during the course of the

kidnapping. Mexico initially charged the petitioner with kidnapping and

homicide, but the charge was ultimately reduced to kidnapping alone.

2 The Treaty was signed and ratified by President Jimmy Carter with the

consent of the Senate, and entered into force on January 25, 1980.

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home and tied them up (August 29, 2005 and

November 7, 2005);

(2) Roberto Castellanos Meza

(“Castellanos”),Hermosillo’s husband and the

father of the abducted children, described

events that transpired before and after the

kidnapping (August 21, 2005);

(3) Benigno Andrade Hernandez (“Andrade”)

voluntarily appeared before a prosecutor and

incriminated himself, Munoz and Rosas in a

sworn statement, and identified both in

photographs (January 12, 2006);

(4) Jesus Servando Hurtado Osuna

(“Hurtado”), a co-conspirator, received

assistance from a public defender and

incriminated himself, Munoz, Rosas and two

other individuals, admitting their involvement

both in planning and executing the kidnapping

(March 14, 2006); and

(5) Rosas, a co-conspirator, appeared before

a criminal court judge and implicated himself,

Hurtado and Munoz, and corroborated

Hurtado’s version of events (signed March 27,

2006).

In re Extradition of Santos, 795 F. Supp. 2d 966, 972–79

(C.D. Cal. 2011).

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The statements were made to Mexican law enforcement

or to the Mexican judiciary and properly authenticated, a fact

the petitioner does not contest. Specifically,

[t]hat evidence was contained in various

filings accompanied by certificates with

ribbons and seals signed by the then-current

principal consular officer, the “Minister

Counselor of Consular Affairs” of the United

States at Mexico City, Mexico, attesting that

the annexed documents were “properly and

legally authenticated so as to entitle them to

be received in evidence for similar purposes

by the tribunals of the United Mexican

States.”

Id. at 971 (record citations omitted).

Based on the Government’s presentation, the extradition

judge found probable cause to believe that the petitioner was

guilty of the alleged kidnapping and, accordingly, certified

his extradition. In reaching this conclusion, the judge

excluded statements from the co-conspirators recanting their

prior confessions, which they alleged were obtained through

torture.3 The Mexican government disputed these allegations

3

It appears that the extradition judge also excluded “voluminous

additional evidence” offered to “enhance the reliability” of the

recantations and allegations oftorture and coercion. Extradition of Santos,

795 F. Supp. 2d at 988, 990 (“Munoz’s evidence offered to show that the

inculpatory statements relied on by the government to establish probable

cause were recanted and were procured through torture or coercion is

inadmissible and has not been considered in determining probable

cause.”). As stated by that court:

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with an affidavit from a Mexican prosecutor attesting to

Hurtado’s and Rosas’s detention in Mexico, the failure of

either conspirator to file a formal complaint with Mexican

authorities that they had been tortured, and the results of

medical and psychological examinations conducted of both

individuals on March 21–22, 2006, which revealed no

evidence of bodily injury or mental disorder.4

II. Standard of Review

“[A] habeas petition is the only available avenue to

challenge an extradition order,” and the scope of review is

The additional evidence includes, but is not limited to:

(1) additional declarations by Munoz, Hurtado, and

other witnesses who had some connection to Munoz or

his co-defendants in the criminal case in Mexico;

(2) newspaper articles identifying Hermosillo’s

husband’s brother as a suspected drug dealer who

reportedly attacked Mexican soldiers; (3) copies of

reports of forensic medical examinations of Munoz;

(4) bank records, hotel records, Western Union records,

and similar evidence offered to establish alibi defenses

by Munoz or his co-defendants; (5) Mexican court

documents showing that an appeals court reversed the

kidnapping conviction of Lopez Mendivil, acquitted

her, and ordered her immediate release from custody;

and (6) reports on human rights practices in Mexico

prepared by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of

Democracy, Rights, and Labor.

Id. at 988.

4 Curiously, in their initial recantations, both Hurtado and Rosas stated

that they were tortured sometime between March 19 and March 22, 2006,

the precise time-frame during which they were medically examined. They

adjusted this time-line in later amendments to their statements.

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severely limited. Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir.

2006); see 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An error in declining to

consider evidence at an extradition hearing is not a basis for

habeas relief. Long ago Justice Brandeis, speaking on behalf

of a unanimous Supreme Court, made it abundantly clear that

the “mere wrongful exclusion of specific pieces of evidence,

however important, does not render [an extradition] detention

illegal.” Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922); see

Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925) (Holmes, J.);

Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920) (Brandeis, J.);

Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461 (1913). When the

magistrate in Charlton excluded the fugitive’s “impressive

evidence of insanity,” for example, the Supreme Court

rejected the fugitive’s claim of reversible error because the

alleged error was beyond the scope of habeas relief. 229 U.S.

at 457–58, 461–62.

The Supreme Court has not created any exception to this

rule. Habeas review is limited to “[1] whether the magistrate

had jurisdiction, [2] whether the offense charged is within the

treaty and, [3] by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there

was any evidence warranting the finding that there was

reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.” Fernandez,

268 U.S. at 312 (emphasis added). The third factor—the only

factor at issue here—requires the court to determine

“whether, under the construction of the act of [C]ongress and

the treaty entered into between this country and Mexico, there

was legal evidence before the [extradition judge] to justify

him in exercising his power to commit the person accused to

custodyto awaitthe requisition of the Mexican government.”5

5 At the extradition hearing, counsel for the petitioner stipulated that all

elements, except the element of probable cause, had been satisfied. Id. at

970.

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Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) (emphasis

added).

This express limitation reflects the principle that the

existence of foreign criminal proceedings, which we must

accept as adequate for purposes of extradition, will give the

fugitive ample process to develop his claims of innocence. 

See Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312; Glucksman v. Henkel,

221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911) (Holmes, J.). Unlike a habeas

petition from a criminal conviction, a habeas petition in the

extradition context is not the end of the line; rather, it is only

a preliminary step designed to allow the criminal process to

continue and be completed in the country with jurisdiction

over the charged crime.

The majority, in essence, disregards this longstanding

precedent. Although it acknowledges that a judge sitting as

an extradition court must “consider whether the evidence is

‘sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the

proper treaty or convention,’” Maj. Op. 28 (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 3184), this acknowledgment is just a token

reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3184. That’s the last time either the

Treaty or the statute appears in the opinion. The majority’s

approach departs from the example set by the Supreme Court

confining its review of an extradition order to strict

applications of the extradition statute and the relevant treaty. 

In setting its preferred standard of review, the majority loses

sight of the paramount inquiry of any extradition application: 

whether probable cause exists to believe that the fugitive

committed the crimes charged in the requesting country. The

majority’s approach allows it to make determinations

reserved for the Mexican legal system. This is a clear

violation of principles of international comity and separation

of powers.

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III. Extradition Framework

Courts play a narrowly defined role in the extradition

process. The process begins with the decision of the political

branches to enter into an extradition treaty, a decision that

rests on those branches’ determination that the foreign

country’s legal and penal system is one into which the United

States is willing to extradite fugitives. By statute, courts play

an important role in determining whether an individual is

eligible to be extradited under the terms of the applicable

treaty, but that role is limited, as courts have long recognized.

For example, an extradition judge may not deny

extradition on the ground that the requesting country will not

provide a fugitive the procedures and rights available in an

American criminal court, even if those rights are guaranteed

under our Federal Constitution. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S.

109, 122–23 (1901). Nor may a judge entertain challenges

that a requesting country has not followed its own laws in

bringing a criminal case or extradition request. See

Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 155–56 (2d Cir.

2011) (principles of international comityand judicial modesty

restrain extradition courts from deciding most questions of

foreign law and procedure). Unanimously, in Munaf v.

Green, the Supreme Court even refused to review claims that

a fugitive would be subject to torture or other inhumane

treatment if surrendered. 553 U.S. 674, 700–02 (2008)

(Roberts, C. J.); see Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d

952, 978 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[C]ourts in this country refrain

from examining the penal systems of requesting nations,

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leaving to the Secretary of State determinations of whether

the defendant is likely to be treated humanely.”).6

To the extent that the alleged denial of constitutional

rights should affect the willingness of the United States to

extradite, the Supreme Court has held that “it is for the

political branches, not the Judiciary, to assess practices in

foreign countries and to determine national policy in light of

those assessments.” Munaf, 553 U.S. at 700–01. In

particular, the Court has emphasized:

The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess

such determinations—determinations that

would require federal courts to pass judgment

on foreign justice systems and undermine the

Government’s ability to speak with one voice

in this area. See The Federalist No. 42, p. 279

(J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“If we are

to be one nation in any respect, it clearly

ought to be in respect to other nations[.]”). In

contrast, the political branches are well

situated to consider sensitive foreign policy

issues, such as whether there is a serious

6

In Munaf, the Supreme Court noted that “the Solicitor General state[d]

that it is the policy of the United States not to transfer an individual in

circumstances where torture is likely to result.” 553 U.S. at 702. Although

the prospect of future torture is not the subject of this appeal, it is worth

noting that the petitioner raised this claim on his own behalf to the

extradition court. There, he argued that his extradition should be denied

under the United Nations Convention Against Torture “‘[g]iven the record

of torture and death threats’ in this case,” and because “‘it is extremely

likely that [he] and his family will be subjected to grievous harm’ in the

form of torture, threats, and even assassination if he were returned to

Mexico.” Extradition of Santos, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 990.

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prospect of torture at the hands of an ally, and

what to do about it if there is.

Id. at 702; see Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484–85

(2d Cir. 1976) (“It is not the business of our courts to assume

the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial

system of another sovereign nation. Such an assumption

would directly conflict with the principle of comity upon

which extradition is based.” (citing Factor v. Laubenheimer,

290 U.S. 276 (1933)). In effect, U.S. courts “are bound by

the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the

[foreign] trial will be fair.” Glucksman, 221 U.S. at 512. 

Here, the Treaty requires us to accept that Mexico’s judiciary

will fairly evaluate the proffered evidence of torture should

the petitioner choose to raise such evidence in defense of the

kidnapping charge he faces there.

Because the political branches have plenary authority to

accept the fairness of a foreign country’s legal system, it

makes sense that the final decision to extradite rests with

them. As defined by Congress, the Executive remains

primarily responsible for extradition while the extradition

judge is assigned the limited duty of determining the

sufficiency of the request under the applicable treaty

provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 3184; see Martin v. Warden,

993 F.2d 824, 828–29 (11th Cir. 1993); Lopez-Smith v. Hood,

121 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Extradition is a matter

of foreign policy entirely within the discretion of the

executive branch, except to the extent that [a] statute

interposes a judicial function.”). That judicial function is

carried out by conducting a hearing pursuant to § 3184 and,

if the request is supported by sufficient evidence, certifying

the foreign country’s request to the Secretary of State. The

Secretary of State is not required to grant extradition but may,

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in his or her discretion, decline extradition for reasons that are

not available to the courts or grant extradition subject to

conditions. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186. This division of

responsibility between the courts and the Executive branch

reflects “institutional competence rationales and our

constitutional structure, which places primary responsibility

for foreign affairs in the executive branch.” United States v.

Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997).

IV. The Extradition Hearing

The extradition process reflects these fundamental

differences in institutional competence and separation of

powers principles. In Benson, the Supreme Court stated that

an extradition hearing is a limited affair akin to a preliminary

hearing to determine whether to hold an accused to answer

for the commission of a crime. 127 U.S. at 463. “That

explanation . . . is no less persuasive today.” Ward v.

Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Ginsburg, J.)

(discussing Benson and citing Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d

1360, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932

(1978)). The Supreme Court has also likened an extradition

proceeding to a grand jury investigation, where the

procedural rights of the accused are limited. See Bingham v.

Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517 (1916) (no right to cross-examine

government affiants at extradition hearings); Charlton,

229 U.S. at 459–62 (analogizing extradition proceedings to

grand jury proceedings). We embraced this understanding in

Barapind v. Enomoto when we held that an extraditee has no

right to introduce contradictory or impeaching evidence. 

400 F.3d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Because an

extradition hearing is not a plenary trial at which guilt or

innocence is decided, the Supreme Court has derided attempts

to import trial-type procedural requirements into the

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proceeding. Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312; Glucksman,

221 U.S. at 512 (“It is common in extradition cases to attempt

to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a criminal trial at

common law. But it is a waste of time.”).

A. Role of the Extradition Judge

We have previously stated that extradition judges

“conduct a circumscribed inquiry in extradition cases.” 

Blaxland v. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions,

323 F.3d 1198, 1208 (9th Cir. 2003). Their role is defined by

statute as well as by the relevant extradition treaty. 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3181–3195; see id. § 3181(a) (“The provisions of this

chapter relating to the surrender of persons who have

committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force

only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with

such foreign government.”). The extradition judge is

authorized only to “determine whether there is competent

evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial.” 

Collins, 259 U.S. at 316. (As explained below, “competent

evidence” is simply any evidence that has been certified in

accordance with the extradition statute.) In making this

assessment, the extradition judge does not weigh conflicting

evidence presented by the fugitive or make credibility

determinations based on that evidence. Barapind, 400 F.3d

at 749–50. To the extent that an extradition judge is

authorized to assess the credibility and reliability of the

Government’s evidence, he or she does so based on an

examination of that evidence under the terms of the

governing treaty. Upon a showing of sufficiency, the

inquiring magistrate judge is required to certify the fugitive

as extraditable to the Secretary of State and to issue a warrant. 

18 U.S.C. § 3184.

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B. Probable Cause Standard of Proof

The Government (on behalf of the requesting country)

bears the burden of submitting evidence that is “sufficient to

sustain the charge [of criminality] under the provisions of the

proper treaty or convention.” 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Extradition

treaties, unlike criminal statutes, “should be liberally

construed as to effect the apparent intention of the

parties”—i.e., in favor of enforcement—as they are brokered

“in the interest of justice and friendly relationships.” Factor,

290 U.S. at 293, 298. Courts are bound by this principle to

“interpret extradition treaties to produce reciprocity between,

and expanded rights on behalf of, the signatories.” Kin-Hong,

110 F.3d at 110 (quoting In re Extradition of Howard,

996 F.3d 1320, 1330–31 (1st Cir. 1993)); accord Factor,

290 U.S. at 293–94.

Here, the Treaty requires that evidence be “sufficient,

according to [United States] laws . . . to justify the committal

for trial of the person sought.” Treaty, art. 3. The Treaty

further provides that

[w]hen the request for extradition relates to a

person who has not yet been convicted, it

shall be accompanied by . . . [e]vidence

which, in accordance with the laws of the

[United States], would justify apprehension

and commitment for trial of the person sought

if the offense had been committed there.

Id., art. 10(3)(b) (emphasis added).

The standard of proof set forth in § 3190 and the Treaty

allows for nothing more than an inquiry into whether

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probable cause exists to believe that the fugitive committed

the alleged crimes. Probable cause exists when, under the

“totality of the circumstances known to the [Government], a

prudent person [knowing those facts] would have concluded

that there was a fair probability that [the accused] had

committed a crime.” United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789,

792 (9th Cir. 1986); see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.

160, 175–76 (1949).

In the context of evaluating the sufficiency of a criminal

complaint, the Supreme Court framed the probable cause

inquiry as simply: “What makes you think that the defendant

committed the offense charged?” Jaben v. United States,

381 U.S. 214, 224 (1965). This question, the Court

explained,

does not reflect a requirement that the

Commissioner ignore the credibility of the

complaining witness. There is a difference

between disbelieving the affiant and requiring

him to indicate some basis for his allegations. 

Obviously any reliance upon factual

allegations necessarily entails some degree of

reliance upon the credibility of the source. 

Nor does it indicate that each factual

allegation which the affiant puts forth must be

independently documented, or that each and

every fact which contributed to his

conclusions be spelled out in the complaint. 

It simply requires that enough information be

presented to the Commissioner to enable him

to make the judgment that the charges are not

capricious and are sufficiently supported to

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justify bringing into play the further steps of

the criminal process.

Id. at 224–25 (internal citations omitted).

Here, the Government has answered the question—“What

makes you think that the fugitive committed the offense

charged?”—with affidavits from Hermosillo and her husband

(Castellanos), from whom the ransom was extorted;

authenticated confessions from Rosas and Hurtado, two coconspirators to the kidnapping who fingered the petitioner as

the mastermind behind the abduction plan; an affidavit from

Andrade, who identified the petitioner and Rosas in

photographs as the men who approached him approximately

one month before the kidnapping to ask if he was interested

in “pulling a ‘job’ . . . . to ask ‘Beto’ [Hermosillo’s husband]

for two million pesos”; and an affidavit from a prosecutor

from Mexico rebutting the allegations of torture. Extradition

of Santos, 795 F. Supp.2d at 972–79 & n.8.

The extradition court was not simply authorized to admit

this evidence; it was obligated to do so under the Treaty. 

Treaty, art. 10(6)(b) (“The documents which, according to

this Article, shall accompany the request for extradition, shall

be received in evidence when . . . they are certified by the

principle diplomatic or consular officer of the Untied States

in Mexico.”). It’s hard to imagine what more the

Government would have to submit to satisfy the low

threshold of probable cause.

C. Admissibility of Evidence

“The special and limited nature of extradition hearings is

manifested in a more lenient standard for admissibility of

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evidence.” Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 120. The Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not

apply in the extradition context. Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(a)(5)

(rules are not applicable to the “extradition and rendition of

a fugitive”); Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (same). Admissibility

is instead controlled by § 3190.7 Under that statute,

[d]epositions, warrants, or other papers or

copies thereof offered in evidence upon the

hearing of any extradition case shall be

received and admitted as evidence on such

hearing for all the purposes of such hearing if

they shall be properly and legally

authenticated so as to entitle them to be

received for similar purposes by the tribunals

of the foreign country from which the accused

party shall have escaped, and the certificate of

the principal diplomatic or consular officer of

the United States resident in such foreign

country shall be proof that the same, so

7 Citing the predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. § 3190, which mandates the

admission of a requesting country’s supporting documents if they have

been certified through diplomatic channels, the Supreme Court in

Bingham explained:

It is one of the objects of § 5170 [today, § 3190] to

obviate the necessity of confronting the accused with

the witnesses against him; and a construction of this

section, or of the treaty, that would require the

demanding government to send its citizens to another

country to institute legal proceedings, would defeat the

whole object of the treaty.

241 U.S. at 517; see Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227, 231 (1909).

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offered, are authenticated in the manner

required.

18 U.S.C. § 3190. Correspondingly, the Treaty provides that

documents submitted in support of extradition “shall be

received in evidence when . . . certified by the principle

diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in

Mexico.” Treaty, art. 10(6)(b).

Unless the relevant treaty provides otherwise, the only

requirement for admitting evidence is that the evidence be

authenticated. Manta v. Chertoff, 518 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th

Cir. 2008); see Man-Seok Choe v. Torres, 525 F.3d 733, 740

(9th Cir. 2008); Oen Yin Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400,

1406 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We have indicated that authentication

is the only requirement for admissibility of evidence under

general United States extradition law.” (citing Emami v.

United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 834 F.2d

1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1987)). Thus, “competent evidence to

justify holding the accused to await trial,” Collins, 259 U.S.

at 316, is simply any evidence that has been certified in

accordance with the extradition statute. The documents

submitted by the Government comport with the requirements

of § 3190. It bears repeating that the petitioner does not

challenge the authentication of any of the Government’s

documentation. The extradition judge was obligated to

receive this evidence and assess whether the evidence

adequately established probable cause. Upon receiving and

examining the Government’s authenticated evidence, the

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magistrate determined that probable cause was established to

hold the petitioner.8

Until today, we have rejected invitations to impose any

additional requirement for admitting documentary evidence

in an extradition proceeding. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 748. In

Barapind, we stated:

[I]t is undisputed that the evidence presented

against Barapind was properly authenticated

pursuant to section 3190, and the Treaty itself

contains no supplementary authentication

requirements. We therefore reject Barapind’s

claim that the extradition court erred in

relying upon the authenticated documentary

evidence submitted by India.

Id. Today, the majority recants these principled statements.

The majority now requires that authenticated evidence must

also satisfy the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Maj.

Op. 33–35. The majority’s rationale conflicts with Supreme

Court precedent holding that the right to extradite arises

from—and only from—the treaty that created it. Factor,

290 U.S. at 287.

 

8 Although authenticated evidence is admissible, admissibility by itself

is not the test for probable cause. In cases where the Government’s

evidence has been authenticated and admitted but nevertheless fails to

satisfy probable cause, an extradition judge may not certify extradition. 

This is not one of those cases, however.

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D. Limited Rights of the Fugitive

Because of the limited purpose of an extradition hearing

and the comity owed other nations under an extradition treaty,

a fugitive’s ability to present evidence is limited. In Loisel,

the Supreme Court held that a fugitive does not have a broad

right to present evidence at an extradition hearing. 259 U.S.

at 315–17. The Court reasoned:

If [the right to introduce evidence in defense

of the charged crime] were recognized as the

legal right of the accused in extradition

proceedings, it would give him the option of

insisting upon a full hearing and trial of his

case here; and that might compel the

demanding government to produce all its

evidence here, both direct and rebutting, in

order to meet the defense thus gathered from

every quarter. The result would be that the

foreign government though entitled by the

terms of the treaty to the extradition of the

accused for the purpose of a trial where the

crime was committed, would be compelled to

go into a full trial on the merits in a foreign

country, under all the disadvantages of such a

situation, and could not obtain extradition

until after it had procured a conviction of the

accused upon a full and substantial trial here.

This would be in plain contravention of the

intent and meaning of the extradition treaties.

Id. at 316 (quoting In re Wadge, 15 F. 864, 866 (S.D.N.Y.

1883)); see also Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461. The Court further

explained that evidence offered to “contradict” the

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government’s evidence was not properly admitted under this

standard. Collins, 259 U.S. at 316.

For that reason, evidence that “goes to guilt or innocence

or tends to contradict the requesting party’s case”—i.e.,

evidence that would lead to a material dispute over the

truthfulness of proffered evidence—has been held to be

inadmissible at an extradition hearing. Hooker, 573 F.2d at

1368; Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749–50; Desmond v. Eggers,

18 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir. 1927) (“All of the authorities agree

. . . that matters which are only a defense to a trial on the

merits are not admissible.”); In re Extradition of Zhenly Ye

Gon, 613 F. Supp. 2d 92, 102 (D.D.C. 2009).

While a fugitive may introduce evidence explaining the

evidence submitted by the requesting country, Barapind,

400 F.3d at 749, “explanatory” evidence has a narrow

meaning in an extradition proceeding. “Explanatory”

evidence is undisputed evidence that essentially accepts the

substance of the requesting country’s evidence as true, but

casts the requesting country’s evidence in a light that,

although innocent, negates or “obliterates” the inference of

guilt. See id.; see also Extradition of Glantz, No. 94 Crim.

Misc. 1 P. 25, 1995 WL 495644, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,

1995) (fugitive is “limited to attempting to offer a benign

explanation of the evidence presented against him”); In re

Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (“explanatory”

evidence “does not contradict or impugn testimony

[submitted by] the prosecution”); Jacques Semmelman, The

Rule of Non-Contradiction in International Extradition

Proceedings: A Proposed Approach to the Admission of

Exculpatory Evidence, 23 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1295, 1297

(2000) (describing “explanatory” evidence as evidence that

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“provides an innocent explanation for events that the

government contends point toward guilt”).

The Government offers a useful hypothetical example of

“explanatory” evidence:

A requesting country seeks extradition based

solely on an eyewitness account of an

apparent homicide at a train station. The

requesting country proffers an eyewitness

account, in which the witness reported

standing near the train tracks and seeing two

men farther down the train platform arguing

with one another, and heard one man threaten

to harm the other. As the train approached the

platform, the witness turned away from the

men for a moment, and when he turned back,

he saw the man who had been threatened on

the train tracks, where he was immediately

struck by the train and killed. The requesting

country inferred from the eyewitness account

that the second man had pushed the victim

onto the train tracks and charged the second

man with murder. The accused man located

security video footage of the train tracks (the

authenticity of which was not disputed by the

requesting country) and the video clearly

showed that in the moment the witness looked

away, the victim jumped onto the train tracks

without any contact from the accused. 

Critically, the introduction of the uncontested

security video would require no fact-finding,

would not invite weighing of evidence, and

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would negate the only evidence of probable

cause.

Government’s Answering Brief at 34, Santos v. Thomas, No.

12-56506 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (emphasis added).

An extradition hearing cannot serve the purpose for which

it was created if we require extradition judges to resolve

evidentiary disputes. We have stated that “[t]he very purpose

of extradition treaties is to obviate the necessity of

confronting the accused with witnesses against him.” 

Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Requiring extradition judges to resolve evidentiary disputes

would undermine this objective since rebutting a fugitive’s

evidentiary challenge would necessitate that the requesting

country send its evidence and witnesses to the United States

to be (improperly) tested. As the Supreme Court has

explained, the very point of extradition treaties would be

defeated were the requesting country forced to bear this

burden. Bingham, 241 U.S. at 517; see Benson, 127 U.S. at

463 (“We are not sitting in this court on the trial of the

prisoner, with power to pronounce him guilty and punish him

or declare him innocent and acquit him.”). It is this

foreseeable burden that animates the distinction between

“contradictory” evidence and “explanatory” evidence.

In this case, the petitioner sought to admit self-serving

statements by Hurtado and Rosas that recant their prior

confessions inculpating the petitioner for kidnapping. The

disputed recantations are “contradictory,” as even the

majority admits. Maj. Op. 32. The majority labors to

surgically detach the assertions of torture from the recanted

assertions contained in the very same documents. Maj. Op.

32–35. The assertions of torture, the majority contends, are

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“explanatory” rather than “contradictory” evidence because

they suggest that a due process violation has occurred. The

characterization is flawed, and the operation a failure, for

multiple reasons.

The majority assumes that due process afforded at an

extradition proceeding is the same due process afforded at a

criminal trial, but this is not true. The Supreme Court has

likened an extradition proceeding to a grand jury

investigation into the existence of probable cause. See

Bingham, 241 U.S. at 517; Charlton, 229 U.S. at 459–62. It

is well settled that the target of a grand jury investigation has

no right to present any evidence to the grand jury, even if that

evidence would completely undermine the government’s

evidence. The defendant in an extradition hearing, however,

may present “explanatory” evidence, but only “explanatory”

evidence. Anything more forces an extradition judge to

conduct a mini-trial into the probative value of the proffered

evidence—the very procedure disapproved by the Supreme

Court.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a number of

Constitutional rights are not cognizable in extradition

hearings. For example, while it violates due process to try a

person who is so mentally incompetent that he cannot assist

with his defense, the Supreme Court in Charlton held that a

fugitive had no right to introduce evidence of insanity at his

extradition hearing. 229 U.S. at 462. Similarly, due process

may protect a criminal defendant from excessive preaccusation delay by the prosecution, e.g., United States v.

Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1977), but we have held that

“the [U.S.] Constitution does not of its own force impose on

foreign governments the obligation to act speedily in seeking

extradition of a fugitive from the United States,” In re

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Extradition of Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.

1986) (no constitutional or treaty violation simply because

extradition was requested five years after offense occurred).9

Thus, contrary to the majority’s assumption, the Judiciary has

no obligation to ensure that an extradition request or evidence

submitted to show probable cause does not violate our

Constitution. Its obligation is to ensure that an extradition

request does not violate the extradition statute or the

governing treaty.

Critically, labeling the proffered evidence as going to the

“competence of the government’s evidence” does not, as the

majority suggests, magically or otherwise make the evidence 

“explanatory” rather than “contradictory.” Maj. Op. 32–33. 

The litmus test is whether, as a practical matter, the

admission of the evidence will result in a mini-trial. Collins,

259 U.S. at 315–16; Charlton, 229 U.S. at 460–62; Benson,

127 U.S. at 463; Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749–50. If the

evidence would compel such a trial, the evidence is

“contradictory.” Here, the majority contends that the

extradition judge must consider the petitioner’s evidence,

even though it contradicts Mexico’s medical evidence

showing the absence of physical injuries shortly after the

9

See also Drayer, 190 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 1999) (14-year delay

between crime and extradition request did not violate due process);

Martin, 993 F.2d at 825 (17-year delay in bringing extradition request did

not bar extradition; neither treaty nor due process afforded right to speedy

extradition); In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1482, 1486–87 (7thCir. 1984) (no

violation of due process to extradite fugitive even though extradition

request was made 16 years after commission of crime); Kamrin v. United

States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 1984) (due process protections

not applicable and did not bar extradition where Australia sought

extradition eight years after crime occurred).

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torture allegedly occurred.10 Once the extradition judge

“considers” the allegations of duress, Mexico will likely feel

obligated to “produce all its evidence here, both direct and

rebutting, in order to meet the [allegations].” Collins,

259 U.S. at 316. As forewarned by the Supreme Court, “[t]he

result would be that the foreign government . . . would be

compelled to go into a full trial” on the duress issue. Id.

Indeed, an improper mini-trial is likely to result even if, as the

majority holds in conclusory fashion, the extradition judge

may certify extradition in cases where the allegations do not

credibly allege torture on their face. Maj. Op. 41–42. 

Foreign governments seeking extradition are unlikely to let

allegations of torture lie unanswered, and the credibility of

conflicting evidence simply cannot be determined without a

trial. The majority has not explained how, in this situation, a

mini-trial could be avoided.

The majority, perhaps recognizing the impracticality of its

approach, attempts to cabin its holding. It states:

Where an extradition court first considers

evidence that a statement was improperly

obtained, but concludes that it is impossible to

determine the credibility of the allegations

without exceeding the scope of an extradition

court’s limited review, the court has fulfilled

its obligation—as the extradition court did in

Barapind.

10 Lest we lose sight of the quantity of evidence facing the judge in this

case, this evidence includes all of the additional volumes of documentary

evidence proffered by the petitioner, but not raised on appeal, in

supporting the allegations of torture. Extradition of Santos, 795 F. Supp.

2d at 988.

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Maj. Op. 42. This distinction is illusory. Given the

Government’s evidence and the torture evidence proffered in

this case, how could the extradition court determine the

credibility of the evidence of torture without holding a minitrial—in other words, “without exceeding the scope of an

extradition court’s limited review?”

Under the guidance of the Supreme Court, courts have

attempted to draw a bright line between “explanatory”

evidence and “contradictory” evidence. As explained above,

the cases and supporting literature indicate that “explanatory”

evidence is undisputed evidence that accepts the requesting

country’s evidence as true and casts such evidence in an

innocent light while simultaneously negating the inference of

guilt. See Collins, 259 U.S. at 315–16 (fugitive permitted to

testify “to things which might have explained ambiguities or

doubtful elements in the prima facie case made against

him”—i.e., “evidence bearing upon the issue of probable

cause”); Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749; see also Extradition of

Glantz, 1995 WL 495644, at *13 (fugitive is “limited to

attempting to offer a benign explanation of the evidence

presented against him”); Ezeta, 62 F. at 986 (“explanatory”

evidence “does not contradict or impugn testimony

[submitted by]the prosecution”);Semmelman, supra, at 1297

(“explanatory” evidence is evidence that “provides an

innocent explanation for events that the government contends

point toward guilt”).11 Such evidence requires no fact-finding

and would not invite the weighing of evidence.

11 Failure to adhere to this narrow definition could yield unintended

results. It is not clear what estoppel or preclusive effect an extradition

judge’s evidentiary ruling could have in the criminal courts of the

requesting country.

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Of course the deference that the requesting country enjoys

does not mean that an extradition judge must accept

unsubstantiated or otherwise insufficient allegations of

criminality. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486

(1958).12“The improbability or the vagueness of the

testimony [relied upon by the requesting country] may

destroy the probability of guilt.” Shapiro v. Ferrandina,

355 F. Supp. 563, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Likewise, probable

cause may not exist where an accusation of criminality has

been lodged for which there is insufficient evidence. ManSeok Choe, 525 F.3d at 738. Where, as here, the accusation

has been substantiated, probable cause may be defeated by

showing that the evidence was not properly authenticated or

by challenging its sufficiency on some other ground that does

not involve the proffering of competing evidence tending to

contradict the Government’s evidence.

12 Several courts have concluded that evidence proffered by the

extraditing state should be deemed truthful by the extradition judge when

assessing probable cause. See In re Extradition of Atta, 706 F. Supp.

1032, 1050–51 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that evidence contained in the

extradition request “is deemed truthful for purposes ofthis determination”

(citing Loisel, 259 U.S. at 315–16 )); In re Solis, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1132;

In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 794 n.6 (D. Conn. 1997);

Marzook v. Christopher, 924 F. Supp. 565, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“I must

accept as true all of the statements and offers of proof by the demanding

state.”); Desautels v. United States, 782 F. Supp. 942, 944 n.2 (D. Vt.

1991). This view has been held to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s

approach in domestic extradition cases. In re Extradition of Singh,

124 F.R.D. 571, 577 (D.N.J. 1987) (citing California v. Superior Court of

Cal., San Bernardino Cty., 482 U.S. 400, 409 (1987) (“If we accept as true

every fact alleged, [the fugitives whose extradition from California was

sought by Louisiana] are properly charged with kidnapping under

Louisiana law. In our view, this ends the inquiry into the issue of whether

or not a crime is charged for purposes of the Extradition Act [18 U.S.C.

§ 3182].”)).

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V. Deference to the Mexican Courts

In extradition proceedings, the responsibility for

addressing proffered evidence of torture rests with the

requesting country. In recognition of this principle, Justice

Holmes stated: “[I]f there is presented, even in somewhat

untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable

ground to suppose [a fugitive] guilty as to make it proper that

he should be tried, good faith to the demanding government

requires his surrender.” Glucksman, 221 U.S. at 512. Such

deference arises from the comity shared between Treaty

partners as well as case law acknowledging that the courts of

the requesting country, having full access to the necessary

evidence and witnesses, are better qualified than we are to

consider the fugitive’s allegations. Where, at the behest of a

foreign state, the Executive branch requests extradition, it is

for the courts in the requesting country to determine whether

law enforcement agents in that country have procured

evidence improperly and, if so, whether any impropriety so

taints the evidence that it should not be considered.

Consistent with the determination previouslymade by the

Executive and Legislative branches, we must accept that the

Mexican legal system can be relied on to adjudicate the

petitioner’s claims fairly. See Spatola v. United States, 741 F.

Supp. 362, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.

1991) (“[A] judicial proceeding in extradition is not the

proper vehicle for challenging or questioning the fairness of

another country’s criminal justice system.”). Indeed, here the

Mexican courts have already granted the petitioner relief on

the homicide charge that was originally brought against him.

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VI. Conclusion

“The principles of international law recognize no right to

extradition apart from treaty.” Factor, 290 U.S. at 287. “To

determine the nature and extent of that right,” therefore, “we

must look to the treaty which created it.” Id. The Extradition

Treaty between the United States and Mexico has been in full

force and effect since 1980. In it the nations have “agree[d]

to mutually extradite, subject to the provisions of this Treaty,

persons who the competent authorities of the requesting Party

have charged with an offense.” Treaty, art. 1. Our system of

government demands that the Judiciary yield to this

arrangement.

The record in this case consists of documentary evidence

submitted by Mexico that comports with § 3190 and Article

10(6)(b). As such, the evidence meets the competency test

and was properly admitted. The evidence established

probable cause that the petitioner abducted Hermosillo and

her two daughters for ransom in Mexico. When the

extradition judge excluded the petitioner’s competing

evidence in defense, he did so consistent with his limited role

under § 3184. Indeed, this ruling was compelled by the

Supreme Court’s longstanding extradition jurisprudence. See

Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312; Collins, 259 U.S. at 316;

Bingham, 241 U.S. at 517; Charlton, 229 U.S. at 457–58,

461–62. The ruling cannot be overturned under the

extradition statute or governing treaty, unless principles of

statutory construction and international comity“are now to be

discarded.” Factor, 290 U.S. at 294; cf. Ward, 921 F.2d at

287 (citing plain meaning of § 3184 as justification for

upholding “constitutionality of assigning extradition requests

to a United States magistrate”).

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A defendant’s ability to offer evidence in an extradition

proceeding is limited to “explanatory” evidence. This is

evidence that accepts the requesting country’s evidence as

true and casts the requesting country’s evidence in an

innocent light, while at the same time negating the inference

of guilt. The test for determining whether the proffered

evidence is “explanatory” or “contradictory” is whether its

admission will require a mini-trial. See Collins, 259 U.S. at

315–16; Charlton, 229 U.S. at 460–62; Benson, 127 U.S. at

463; Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749–50. Here, there can be no

doubt that the required admission of “contradictory” torture

evidence demands a mini-trial. There is no other way of

determining whether the authenticated statements were

coerced as the petitioner contends, or whether they were

voluntarily given, as Mexico asserts.

I am not immune from the “natural anxiety” the majority

has in wanting to investigate the allegations of torture raised

in this case. Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312. But our concern

does not justify abandoning the limited role we play in the

extradition process. The extradition judge determines only

whether the authenticated evidence establishes probable cause

to believe the fugitive committed the crime, much like a

grand jury returns an indictment, looking only at the evidence

presented by the government. See Bingham, 241 U.S. at 517;

Charlton, 229 U.S. at 459–62. Although allegations that the

authenticated evidence was procured by torture can be

troubling, in extradition proceedings we must trust the

Executive branch and the judicial system of the requesting

country to determine the veracity of such allegations and the

attendant consequences. Because the majority would have

the Judiciary convert extradition proceedings into minitrials—contrary to the provisions of the Treaty, the

extradition statute and Supreme Court precedent—I dissent.

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