Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00817/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00817-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Waldy J. Mondragon,

Petitioner

-vsDennis R Smith,

Respondent.

CV-12-0817-PHX-ROS (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institute in Phoenix, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on 

April 19, 2012 (Doc. 1). On August 9, 2012, Respondents filed their Response (Doc.

11). Petitioner has not replied.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION BACKGROUND

Criminal Convictions - Prior to his federal prosecution, Petitioner was convicted 

in New Mexico state court of misdemeanor aggravated battery and an attempt to commit 

the same offense, in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-5(B) (2004). (Exhibit 1, 

Attachment 5, Regional Director Response 7/18/12.) (Exhibits to the Response, Doc. 11, 

are referenced hereinafter as “Exhibit ___.”) 

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That statute provides:

B. Whoever commits aggravated battery, inflicting an injury to the 

person which is not likely to cause death or great bodily harm, but 

does cause painful temporary disfigurement or temporary loss or 

impairment of the functions of any member or organ of the body, is 

guilty of a misdemeanor.

Petitioner was granted a deferred prosecution, which he eventually completed 

successfully, resulting in the dismissal of the case. (Exhibit 1, Attachment 5, Regional 

Director Response 7/18/12.) 

Federal Conviction - On October 5, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to 52 months 

in the Bureau of Prisons for maintaining a place for distribution and use of heroin. 

(Exhibit 1, Attach. 4, Computation Data.) 

B. SUBSTANCE ABUSE REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

On October 28, 2011 Petitioner began the BOP’s residential Drug Abuse 

Program. (Exhibit 1, Attachment 1, “Drug PGMS”; Exhibit 1, Attachment 4, Response 

7/18/12.) 

C. EARLY RELEASE PROCEEDINGS

First Round of Administrative Procedures - On or about March 31, 2011 (prior 

to beginning the Drug Abuse Program), Petitioner filed a Request (Exhibit 1, Attachment 

2) for review of his eligibility for early release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). That 

statute authorizes the BOP to reduce the sentence of “a prisoner convicted of a 

nonviolent offense [who] remains in custody after successfully completing a [substance 

abuse] treatment program.” That request was denied on the basis that Petitioner had 

been convicted of aggravated assault. (Exhibit 1, Attachment 2 at 2.)

On May 23, 2011, Petitioner filed a Request for Administrative Remedy (Exhibit 

1, Attachment 4), arguing that his New Mexico misdemeanor conviction for aggravated 

battery did not qualify as an aggravated assault under the FBI’s violent crime index, 

because it is defined under New Mexico law as an offense that does not cause substantial 

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bodily harm. Petitioner argued that the FBI’s violent crime index was controlling, citing 

Torres v. Hood, 2000 WL 1132112 (D.Or. 2000). This request was denied by 

Respondent on the basis that under 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(iv), an inmate is not eligible 

for a reduction under § 3621(e) if conviction of a felony or misdemeanor aggravated 

assault, and that his New Mexico conviction qualified as such. (Exhibit 1, Attachment 4, 

Response 6/8/11.)

Petitioner then filed a Regional Administrative Appeal (Exhibit 1, Attachment 4), 

arguing that the courts have ruled that BOP must look to the offense of conviction and 

not the underlying facts in making its determinations on § 3621 eligibility. On August 

31, 2011, the Regional Director rejected the appeal, finding that the New Mexico statute 

under which Petitioner was convicted was substantially similar to an identified offense 

under the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program. (Id.)

Petitioner then filed a Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal. (Id.) 

Petitioner again argued that because the New Mexico statute was premised on the 

absence of a likelihood of death or great bodily harm, it did not qualify as aggravated 

assault. On May 25, 2012, this appeal was also denied, with the National Inmate 

Appeals Administrator noting that the FBI’s definition of aggravated assault was “the 

unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or 

aggravated bodily injury.” 

Second Round of Administrative Procedures – On June 13, 2012, Petitioner 

again filed a Request for Administrative Remedy (Exhibit 1, Attachment 5). Petitioner 

argued that in the interim his New Mexico conviction had been expunged. On June 21, 

2012, the Warden responded that the conviction had not been expunged, but was 

“deferred” and that it “remains in effect.” (Id.)

On July 1, 2012, Petitioner filed a Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal (id.), 

which was denied on July 18, 2012 on the basis that his deferred sentence may have 

expired, but his conviction remained of record. (Id.) 

/ /

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D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on April 19, 2012 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts a single ground for relief:

Petitioner claims that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 

wrongfully found him ineligible for early release based upon his 

previous conviction for misdemeanor aggravated battery, which it 

found constituted a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e).

(Order 7/23/12, Doc. 7 at 2.) Petitioner argues that the BOP has thus acted contrary to 

law, exceeding its statutory authority, and violating the Equal Protection Clause.

Response - On August 9, 2012, Respondent filed his Response (Doc. 11). 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claims are without merit, both because he fails to 

make out an equal protection argument, and because the BOP has acted within its 

statutory authority. Respondent further argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to render 

the relief requested by Petitioner.

Reply – The Court’s service Order provided that Petitioner could “file a reply 

within 30 days from the date of service of the Answer.” (Order 7/23/12, Doc. 7 at 3.) 

That time has now passed and Petitioner has not replied. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. JURISDICTION

APA Review Prohibited- As an exception to the Government’s sovereign 

immunity, Congress enacted the Judicial Review chapter of the Administrative 

Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701-706. Section 702 of that act provides a right of judicial 

review to persons “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected 

or aggrieved by agency action.” However, the APA does not apply “to the extent that –

(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency 

discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). 

Here, Petitioner challenges the rejection of his application for early release under 

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18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). That statute is part of Subchapter C, Chapter 229, Part II, of Title 

18. Section 3625 is also part of that Subchapter C, and provides that the provisions of 

the APA “do not apply to the making of any determination, decision, or order under this 

subchapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 3615. “Accordingly, any substantive decision by the BOP to 

admit a particular prisoner into RDAP, or to grant or deny a sentence reduction for 

completion of the program, is not reviewable by the district court.” Reeb v. Thomas, 636 

F.3d 1224, 1227 (9

th Cir. 2011).

Review for Violation of Statute – Although review of individualized decisions 

under § 3621 is not available, “judicial review remains available for allegations that BOP 

action is contrary to established federal law, violates the United States Constitution, or 

exceeds its statutory authority.” Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1228. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 

592, 603 (1988) (recognizing the “’serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a 

federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional 

claim”); and Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958)(“Court cannot lightly infer that 

Congress does not intend judicial protection of rights it confers against agency action 

taken in excess of delegated powers”).

Thus, Petitioner argues that he can maintain this action because the actions of the 

BOP have been contrary to statutory law and the Equal Protection Clause. The latter 

argument will be addressed hereinafter.

With regard to a statutory violation, Petitioner fails to suggest what statute or 

regulations has been violated. 

BOP undoubtedly has power under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) to limit the early release 

program to “a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense.” Moreover, it is not even 

mandated to release such prisoners, but “may” do so. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held 

that the BOP had authority to include in its release determination not only the offense for 

which the prisoner was currently incarcerated, but prior convictions as well. Jacks v. 

Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 984-985 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 

242 (2001) (“the Bureau need not blind itself to preconviction conduct that the agency 

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reasonably views as jeopardizing life and limb”).

What Petitioner functionally argues is that the BOP has violated its own 

regulation, embodied in 28 C.F.R. § 550.55. In pertinent part, that regulation provides in 

subsection (b) that as “an exercise of the Director's discretion, the following categories 

of inmates are not eligible for early release:...(4) Inmates who have a prior felony or 

misdemeanor conviction for:...(iv) Aggravated assault.” Subsection (b)(6) extends the 

exclusion to those “convicted of an attempt, conspiracy or other offense which involved” 

an excluding offense, such as aggravated assault.

To establish that he has not been convicted for aggravated assault (or attempted 

aggravated assault), Petitioner contends that BOP has adopted the FBI’s Uniform Crime 

Reporting (UCR) definition of aggravated assault, which he contends does not square 

with his New Mexico prosecution.

Petitioner Not Convicted of FBI’s Aggravated Assault - Indeed, the 

definitions do not appear to square. 

The Regional Director cited the definition from the “Uniform Crime Report, 

2007.” That Report provided:

The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program defines 

aggravated assault as an unlawful attack by one person upon another 

for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. The 

Program further specifies that this type of assault is usually 

accompanied by the use of a weapon or by other means likely to 

produce death or great bodily harm.

See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2007, last accessed 6/20/13. 

To meet this definition, an offense must involve an intent to inflict “severe or aggravated 

bodily injury.” Further, it must be accompanied by the use of a deadly weapon or other 

means of “death or great bodily harm.” In contrast, the Report defined “simple assault” 

as: “Assaults and attempted assaults which are not of an aggravated nature and do not 

result in serious injury to the victim.” (Id.)

The New Mexico statute provides three levels of the offense of “aggravated 

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battery.”1 At its lowest level it requires only touching or force and an intent to caus 

some injury:

Aggravated battery consists of the unlawful touching or application 

of force to the person of another with intent to injure that person or 

another.

N.M.Stat.Ann. § 30-3-5(A).2 That simple definition is far broader than the UCR’s 

definition of “aggravated assault,” which does not merely require intent “to injure,” but 

requires intent to inflict “severe or aggravated bodily injury.”

In contrast, the misdemeanor version, of which Petitioner was convicted, still 

requires no intent to inflict heightened injuries, although it does require some significant 

resulting injury, i.e. “painful temporary disfigurement...temporary loss...or 

impairment.” N.M.Stat.Ann. § 30-3-5(B).3 In addition, it excludes situations, 

incorporated in the felony offense, which involve a likelihood of “death or great bodily 

harm.” (Id.) Moreover, there is no requirement for the use of a weapon or any other 

means of death or great bodily harm. Thus, this level does not meet the UCR’s 

definition of aggravated assault. Rather, it fits under the definition of simple assault 

involving something less than serious injury to the victim.

Finally, the felony level is defined as:

Whoever commits aggravated battery inflicting great bodily harm or 

does so with a deadly weapon or does so in any manner whereby 

great bodily harm or death can be inflicted is guilty of a third degree 

felony.

N.M.Stat.Ann. § 30-3-5(C).4 Thus, to qualify as a felony, an aggravated battery must 

involve one of three things: great bodily harm, a deadly weapon, or a risk of great bodily 

harm or death. Again, there is no heightened intent requirement. Rather, the focus is on 

the result (“great bodily harm”) or the means of commission (“a deadly weapon or a 

 

1 New Mexico has a separate offense of “aggravated assault.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-2.

2

This type of offense would constitute a “petty misdemeanor,” see N.M.Stat.Ann. § 31-

18-13 (establishing default classifications), which would be punishable by less than 6 

months in jail, and/or a fine of $500, N.M.Stat.Ann. § 31-19-1(B). 

3 Misemeanor aggravated battery is punishable by less than 12 months and/or a fine of 

$1,000. N.M.Stat.Ann. § 31-19-1(A).

4 A first offense third degree felony is punishable by three years imprisonment. 

N.M.Stat. Ann. 31-18-15(A)(9). 

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manner...”). Thus, under the language of the UCR, even this level of aggravated battery 

would not qualify as aggravated assault. At best, it would fit within the accompanying 

fact patterns identified in the UCR’s definition, i.e. the use of a deadly weapon or other 

means of great bodily harm.

Therefore, if presented with the question for review, it appears this Court would 

have to conclude that the BOP got it wrong in finding Petitioner had been convicted of 

aggravated assault as defined in the UCR.

Error Beyond Limited Jurisdiction - However, this Court is limited to 

reviewing for violations of the statute and regulations, and not to rethinking the BOP’s 

decisions. And, the FBI’s UCR’s definition of aggravated assault is not part of the 

statute, nor is it part of the regulations. 

The only reference found in the regulations or program statements to the FBI’s 

reporting was in the BOP’s supplementary information provided in the 1995 proposal for 

adoption of 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 (now 28 C.F.R. § 550.555).

Because state convictions may show a considerable range in the 

degree of violence used in the offense, the Bureau has chosen to use 

the above cited categories of crimes, which are reported under the 

FBI Violent Crime Index, as the sole determinant of violence in the 

criminal history

Drug Abuse Treatment Programs: Early Release Consideration, 60 Fed.Reg. 27692-01

(1995). (The FBI’s Violent Crime Index is a subset of crimes reported on under the 

FBI’S UCR.) The regulation itself did not reference any FBI documents, but instead 

simply provided a generic list of “homicide, forcible rape, robbery or aggravated 

assault.” 60 Fed.Reg. 27692-01. Indeed, the regulation still provides only a generic list 

without any reference to governing definitions.

Moreover, even this commentary did not adopt the FBI’s Violent Crime Index 

(much less its definitions) as the standard, but merely noted that the categories of crime it 

had selected are the same as that in the FBI’s index.

Nor is the UCR or its Violent Crime Index part of BOP’s Program Statement 

 

5

See 69 Fed.Reg. 39887-02 (2004).

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5331.02,6 which effectuates the early release regulations. Even so, inclusion of the 

definition in a Program Statement would do little to benefit Petitioner. “A habeas claim 

cannot be sustained based solely upon the BOP's purported violation of its own program 

statement because noncompliance with a BOP program statement is not a violation of 

federal law.” Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9

th Cir. 2011).

It is true that in rejecting Petitioner’s Regional Appeal in his first round of 

administrative appeals, the Regional Director referenced the UCR:

In determining if a prior state conviction satisfies the prohibitions

listed in the regulation, the Bureau of Prisons will compare the 

relevant state statute to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program 

("UCR"). This practice has been upheld by the courts. If the relevant 

state statute is substantially similar to the UCR definition, then the 

prior state conviction will be found to be precluding pursuant to the 

federal regulation.

(Exhibit 1, Attachment 4, Reg. Dir. Response 8/31/11.) That decision was subsequently 

reiterated by the Regional Director in his rejection of Petitioner’s second appeal. 

(Exhibit 1, Attachment 5, Reg. Dir. Response 7/18/12.) However, the Regional 

Director’s actual reliance upon the FBI’s definitions does not create a legal mandate for 

such reliance.

Here, Petitioner was convicted of touching someone with an intent to injure, in 

fact causing injury (albeit not “great bodily injury”). The undersigned cannot say that 

the BOP acted contrary to the statute in exercising discretion to deny him early release as 

a result of those actions. Such an offense does indeed involve a purposeful, violent 

assault.

Nor can the undersigned find that those actions would not qualify as an 

“aggravated assault,” so as to place Petitioner outside the regulatory standard of what 

constitutes a violent assault under 28 C.F.R. § 550.55. Aggravated assault is not a 

universal term. “The term ‘aggravated assault’ has no technical and definite commonlaw meaning.” 6A C.J.S. Assault § 86. It can involve reckless or intentional injuries, 

actual injuries or mere apprehension of injuries, weapons or not, special victims or not. 

 

6 Available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5331_002.pdf, last accessed 6/21/13.

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6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and Battery § 32. 

For example, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a felonious assault is 

considered an “aggravated assault” if it simply involves “serious bodily injury.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 Application Note 1. “‘Serious bodily injury’ means injury involving 

extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, 

organ, or mental faculty.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(L). But for New 

Mexico’s limitation of misdemeanor aggravated battery to a six month jail term, it would 

fit within the Guidelines’ definition of aggravated assault. Conversely, 18 U.S.C. § 113 

makes an assault in a maritime or territorial jurisdiction resulting in “serious bodily 

injury” punishable by ten years in prison, making it felonious assault. Assuming that 

temporary and protracted (as opposed to permanent) are not exclusive terms, the offense 

committed by Petitioner in New Mexico, if committed in a maritime or territorial 

jurisdiction, would be an aggravated assault under the sentencing guidelines.

The qualification of the offense under 28 C.F.R. § 550.55 is even greater, because 

the regulation excludes prisoners with aggravated assault convictions that were not only 

felonies, but also misdemeanors. 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(4). 

Thus, this Court cannot say that the BOP’s determination that Petitioner had been 

convicted of an “aggravated assault” was a violation of federal law, even if it was 

contrary to the FBI’s definition of such a crime.

Summary – Review of Petitioner’s claim under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) is limited to 

a review for violations of the law and constitutional violations. Despite the apparent 

error in comparing Petitioner’s New Mexico Conviction with the UCR definition of 

aggravate assault, Petitioner has failed to show a violation of statutory law, regulation, or 

even BOP Program statement.

B. EQUAL PROTECTION

As noted above, this Court also retains jurisdiction over claims that the BOP has 

violated the constitution. Petitioner argues that his exclusion from the early release 

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program was a denial of equal protection. Petitioner reasons that he is a nonviolent

offender, and every other nonviolent offender completing the drug abuse program is 

granted early release. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 4A.) 

An equal protection violation requires the petitioner to show that similarly 

situated people are being treated differently. McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185 

(9th Cir.1999). Petitioner does not present any facts demonstrating that he was treated 

differently from others who were similarly situated to him, because Petitioner has failed 

to demonstrate that he was a nonviolent offender. As discussed above, Petitioner’s 

offense not only was a violent offense, but fits within the regulatory exclusion of 

aggravated assault.

If Petitioner could show, for example, that other prisoners with convictions under 

New Mexico’s misdemeanor aggravated battery statute were being granted early release, 

then he would establish the requisite disparate treatment. He, of course, has not done so.

Accordingly, his equal protection claim is without merit.

C. SUMMARY

This Court’s review of the BOP’s discretionary decision to deny early release 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) is limited to violations of federal law, constitutional 

violations, and actions in excess of statutory authority. Petitioner attempts but fails to 

show a violation of law and the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution. 

Accordingly, his Petition must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in habeas cases the 

"district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order 

adverse to the applicant." However, such certificates are only required in cases 

concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 

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2253(c)(1). This case arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and does not attack a State court 

detention. Accordingly, no ruling on a certificate of appealability is required, and no 

recommendation thereon will be offered.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed April 19, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: June 24, 2013

12-0817r RR 13 06 19 on HC.docx James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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