Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01143/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01143-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYLVIA MAHACH-WATKINS, individually

and as the successor in interest to the Estate of

JOHN JOSEPH WAYNE WATKINS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LARRY DEPEE and THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-1143 SI

ADVICE TO COUNSEL RE: 

INSTRUCTIONS

The instructions to be given to the jury are attached. Please note that pages 5 (Summary of

Contentions), 6 (Claim 1), 8 (Objective Reasonableness Standard), 9 (Claim 2) and 11 (Claim 3/battery)

contain changes, most of which were discussed at the instruction conference. 

Additionally, this will memorialize the Court’s reasons for denying plaintiff’s request that an

Alexander instruction be given and defendants’ request that a qualified immunity instruction be given.

Plaintiff’s requested Alexander instructions

Plaintiff seeks a number of instructions regarding defendant’s “seizure” of Watkins when

defendant attempted to stop Watkins by blocking Watkins’ path with his patrol car. To the extent that

plaintiff’s instructions refer to a separate Fourth Amendment “claim” based on this incident, the

instructions are improper because they are beyond the scope of the pleadings. In addition, the Court

finds that the evidence adduced at trial does not support a separate Fourth Amendment claim related to

the bicycle incident. Plaintiff also seeks an instruction based on Alexander v. City and County of San

Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994). However, an Alexander instruction is only appropriate when

an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent response, and the provocation is an independent

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Fourth Amendment violation; under those circumstances, such provocation may render an officer’s

otherwise reasonable defensive use of deadly force unreasonable as a matter of law. Here, the Court

finds that the evidence at trial does not show that defendant intentionally or recklessly provoked a

violent response from Watkins. 

Defendants’ requested qualified immunity instruction

Defendants seek an instruction on qualified immunity. The Court finds that such an instruction

is unnecessary, and would likely be confusing to the jury. Defendants’ proposed instruction states that

qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and that defendants must prove the defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. Defendants’ proposed instruction also states that the jury must first

decide whether a reasonable office in defendant’s position could have believed that the force he used

was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. This instruction is confusing,

because the jury will analyze the reasonableness of defendant Depee’s force as an element of plaintiff’s

claims – plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show that defendant acted unreasonably. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2007

_____________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYLVIA MAHACH-WATKINS, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

LARRY DEPEE AND THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-1143 SI

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY

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DUTIES OF JURY TO FIND FACTS AND FOLLOW LAW

Members of the jury, now that you have heard all the evidence and the arguments of the attorneys,

it is my duty to instruct you on the law which applies to this case. A copy of these instructions will be

available in the jury room for you to consult if you find it necessary.

It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply

the law as I give it to you. You must follow the law as I give it to you whether you agree with it or not.

You must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices, or sympathy. That

means that you must decide the case solely on the evidence before you. You will recall that you took an

oath promising to do so at the beginning of the case.

In following my instructions, you must follow all of them and not single out some and ignore

others; they are all equally important. You must not read into these instructions or into anything the court

may have said or done any suggestion as to what verdict you should return – that is a matter entirely up

to you.

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WHAT IS EVIDENCE

The evidence from which you are to decide what the facts are consists of:

(1) the sworn testimony of any witness;

(2) the exhibits which have been received into evidence; and

(3) any facts to which the lawyers have agreed or stipulated.

WHAT IS NOT EVIDENCE

In reaching your verdict, you may consider only the testimony and exhibits received into

evidence. Certain things are not evidence, and you may not consider them in deciding what the facts are.

I will list them for you:

(1) Arguments and statements by lawyers are not evidence. The lawyers are not witnesses. What

they have said in their opening statements, closing arguments, and at other times is intended to help you

interpret the evidence, but it is not evidence. If the facts as you remember them differ from the way the

lawyers have stated them, your memory of them controls.

(2) Questions and objections by lawyers are not evidence. Attorneys have a duty to their clients to

object when they believe a question is improper under the rules of evidence. You should not be

influenced by the objection or by the court’s ruling on it.

(3) Testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or that you have been instructed to disregard, is

not evidence and must not be considered. In addition, some testimony and exhibits have been received

only for a limited purpose; where I have given a limiting instruction, you must follow it.

(4) Anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session is not evidence. You

are to decide the case solely on the evidence received at the trial.

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DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Evidence may be direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as a

testimony by a witness about what the witness personally saw or heard or did. Circumstantial evidence

is proof of one or more facts from which you could find another fact.

You should consider both kinds of evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight

to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is for you to decide how much weight to give

to any evidence.

EVIDENCE ADMITTED FOR A LIMITED PURPOSE

During the trial, I explained to you that certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You

may consider such evidence only for the limited purpose for which it was admitted, and not for any other

purpose.

CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

In deciding the facts in this case, you may have to decide which testimony to believe and which

testimony not to believe. You may believe everything a witness says, or part of it, or none of it. In

considering the testimony of any witness, you may take into account:

(1) the opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know the things testified to;

(2) the witness’ memory;

(3) the witness’ manner while testifying;

(4) the witness’ interest in the outcome of the case and any bias or prejudice;

(5) whether other evidence contradicted the witness’ testimony;

(6) the reasonableness of the witness’ testimony in light of all the evidence; and

(7) any other factors that bear on believability.

The weight of the evidence as to a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of witnesses

who testify about that fact.

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OPINION EVIDENCE, EXPERT WITNESSES

You have heard testimony from persons who, because of education or experience, are permitted

to state opinions and the reasons for those opinions.

Opinion testimony should be judged just like any other testimony. You may accept it or reject

it, and give it as much weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness’ education and experience,

the reasons given for the opinion and all the other evidence in the case.

BURDEN OF PROOF – PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE

When a party has the burden of proof on any claim by a preponderance of the evidence, it means

you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim is more probably true than not true.

You should base your decision on all of the evidence, regardless of which party presented it.

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5

SUMMARY OF CONTENTIONS

Plaintiff Sylvia Mahach-Watkins is the mother of decedent John Watkins. 

Plaintiff brings three claims in this lawsuit. Each claim is governed by its own elements and legal

standards, and each of these three claims is to be decided by you independently of the other claims.

Plaintiff has the burden of proof on each claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 

The plaintiff brings two claims against defendant Larry Depee under the federal statute, 42 U.S.C.

Section 1983, which provides that any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States shall be liable

to the injured party. The two Section 1983 claims for violation of federal civil rights are the following:

(1) A claim on behalf of the decedent, John Watkins, for violation by defendant Larry Depee

of John Watkins’ Fourth Amendment constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable

seizure; and

(2) A claim on plaintiff’s own behalf for violation by defendant Larry Depee of her

Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the companionship of the decedent, John

Watkins.

The plaintiff’s third claim is a wrongful death claim under state law on her own behalf against

both defendant Larry Depee and his employer, defendant State of California, contending that defendant

Larry Depee committed an actionable battery against the decedent, John Watkins. 

Defendants deny all of these claims and contend that all of the actions of defendant Larry Depee

were proper and legally justifiable. 

 I will now explain the rules which apply to your decision on each of these claims.

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CLAIM 1: SECTION 1983 CLAIM ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT JOHN WATKINS, FOR

FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION – ELEMENTS AND BURDEN OF PROOF

Plaintiff Sylvia Mahach-Watkins, mother of and the executor of the estate of John Watkins,

claims that defendant Larry Depee violated John Watkins’ rights under the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . 

Every citizen has the right under the Fourth Amendment not to be subjected to unreasonable force

employed by a law enforcement officer to effect an arrest or seizure of his person. Shooting John

Watkins in the circumstances of this case is treated as a police seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

In order to prevail on the Section 1983/Fourth Amendment claims against defendant Larry Depee

brought on behalf of decedent John Watkins, plaintiff Sylvia Mahach-Watkins must prove each of the

following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. the defendant acted under color of law; and

2. the acts of the defendant deprived decedent John Watkins of his Fourth Amendment right

to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the United States Constitution, as explained in

later instructions.

A person acts “under color of state law” when the person acts or purports to act in the

performance of official duties under any state, county, or municipal law, ordinance or regulation. The

parties have stipulated that defendant Larry Depee acted under color of law.

If you find the plaintiff has proved each of the elements she is required to prove under these

instructions, your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this claim. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff has

failed to prove any one or more of these elements, your verdict should be for the defendant on this claim.

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RULES CONCERNING UNREASONABLE SEIZURE OF PERSON WHEN DEADLY

FORCE IS USED

In general, a seizure of a person is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if a police officer

uses deadly force without having probable cause to believe the person poses an imminent threat of death

or serious bodily injury to the officer or to others. Thus, in order to prove an unreasonable seizure in this

case, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer did not have probable

cause to believe John Watkins posed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer

or to others. 

“Deadly force” is force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A police officer has “probable cause” when, under all of the circumstances known to the officer at the

time, an objectively reasonable police officer would conclude there is a fair probability that the decedent

poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to others.

If feasible under the circumstances, the officer is required to give some warning before using

deadly force.

In determining whether the defendant had probable cause to use deadly force, consider all of the

circumstances known to the officer at the time, including:

1. the severity of the crime or other circumstances to which the officer was responding; 

2. whether John Watkins posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or to others;

3. whether John Watkins was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight;

4. the amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to

determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be necessary; and

5. the availability of alternative methods to subdue John Watkins.

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OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS STANDARD

In order to recover, plaintiff must demonstrate that Officer Depee used unreasonable force. In

making your determination about whether Officer Depee used reasonable or unreasonable force, you

must use an “objective” standard. You must evaluate the conduct of the officer from the perspective of

what a reasonable police officer on the scene would do at the time of the confrontation or encounter,

under the totality of facts and circumstances which are shown by the evidence. In making this

determination, you should consider only those facts known to the officer at the time of the shooting. In

applying the test of “objective reasonableness,” you must ignore the subjective intent and motivations

of the defendant police officer. 

A police officer is not necessarily required to take the least intrusive alternative. The law only

requires that the officer act as a reasonable police officer would act under the same circumstances. This

does not mean that an officer may ignore alternatives. It means that in deciding whether the officer acted

reasonably, you must consider any alternatives that a reasonable police officer would have considered

at the time when Officer Depee confronted or encountered John Watkins. When deadly force is justified,

there is no Constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. The proper inquiry is whether the

officer acted reasonably, not whether other less intrusive alternatives were available.

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CLAIM 2: SECTION 1983 CLAIM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF SYLVIA MAHACHWATKINS, FOR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT LIBERTY INTEREST VIOLATION –

ELEMENTS AND BURDEN OF PROOF

Plaintiff also claims that defendant Larry Depee unlawfully deprived her of her liberty interest

in her family relationship with John Watkins, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that: “No state shall . . . deprive any person

of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.”

In order to prevail on the Section 1983 claims against defendant Larry Depee brought on behalf

of plaintiff Sylvia Mahach-Watkins for Fourteenth Amendment/liberty interest violations, plaintiff must

prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. the defendant acted under color of law; and

2. the acts of the defendant deprived plaintiff Sylvia Mahach-Watkins of her Fourteenth

Amendment liberty interest in the companionship of her son, decedent John Watkins, as explained in

later instructions.

A person acts “under color of state law” when the person acts or purports to act in the

performance of official duties under any state, county, or municipal law, ordinance or regulation. The

parties have stipulated that the defendant acted under color of law.

If you find the plaintiff has proved each of the elements she is required to prove under these

instructions, your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this claim. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff has

failed to prove any one or more of these elements, your verdict should be for the defendant on this claim.

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RULES CONCERNING FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT LIBERTY INTEREST

STANDARDS

Plaintiff claims a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the companionship

of the decedent, John Watkins. In order to prevail on this claim, plaintiff must prove that defendant Larry

Depee acted in a manner which shocks the conscience; that is, that Larry Depee acted with a purpose to

cause John Watkins’ death unrelated to the legitimate law enforcement purposes of taking him into

custody, self-defense, or the defense of others. 

In determining whether defendant Larry Depee acted with a purpose to cause John Watkins’ death

unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement purpose, you are instructed that taking him into custody,

arresting him, self-defense, and the defense of others are legitimate law enforcement purposes.

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CLAIM 3: BATTERY – STATE LAW WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM

The plaintiff in this case also brings a wrongful death claim under state law against both

defendant Larry Depee and against his employer, defendant State of California.. The plaintiff claims that

defendant Larry Depee wrongfully caused the death of John Watkins by committing a battery against

him. If you find that plaintiff has established that Larry Depee did in fact wrongfully cause the death of

John Watkins as claimed, then the State of California as Larry Depee’s employer will also be responsible

for his actions.

To establish this claim, the plaintiff must prove all of the following:

1. That Larry Depee intentionally shot John Watkins;

2. That Larry Depee used unreasonable force to arrest, prevent the escape of, or overcome

the resistance of John Watkins;

3. That John Watkins did not consent to the use of that force;

4. That John Watkins was killed; and 

5. That Larry Depee’s use of unreasonable force was a substantial factor in causing John

Watkins’ death.

A California Highway Patrol Officer may use reasonable force to arrest or detain a person when

he or she has reasonable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime. Even if the officer is

mistaken, a person being arrested or detained has a duty not to use force to resist an officer unless the

officer is using unreasonable force.

In deciding whether Larry Depee used unreasonable force, you must determine the amount of

force that would have appeared reasonable to a police officer in Larry Depee’s position under the same

or similar circumstances. You should consider, among other factors, the following:

1. The seriousness of the crime at issue;

2. Whether John Watkins reasonably appeared to pose an immediate threat to the safety of

Larry Depee or others; and

3. Whether John Watkins was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest.

A California Highway Patrol Officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest is not required to

retreat or cease from his or her efforts because of the resistance or threatened resistance of the person

being arrested.

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DUTY TO DELIBERATE

When you begin your deliberations, you should elect one member of the jury as your presiding

juror. That person will preside over the deliberations and speak for you here in court.

You will then discuss the case with your fellow jurors to reach agreement if you can do so. Your

verdict must be unanimous.

Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but you should do so only after you have

considered all of the evidence, discussed it fully with the other jurors, and listened to the views of your

fellow jurors.

Do not be afraid to change your opinion if the discussion persuades you that you should. Do not

come to a decision simply because other jurors think it is right.

It is important that you attempt to reach a unanimous verdict but, of course, only if each of you

can do so after having made your own conscientious decision. Do not change an honest belief about the

weight and effect of the evidence simply to reach a verdict.

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USE OF NOTES

Some of you have taken notes during the trial. Whether or not you took notes, you should rely

on your own memory of what was said. Notes are only to assist your memory. You should not be overly

influenced by the notes.

COMMUNICATION WITH COURT

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a note

through the courtroom deputy, signed by your presiding juror or by one or more members of the jury.

No member of the jury should ever attempt to communicate with me except by a signed writing; and I

will communicate with any member of the jury on anything concerning the case only in writing, or here

in open court. If you send out a question, I will consult with the parties before answering it, which may

take some time. You may continue your deliberations while waiting for the answer to any question.

Remember that you are not to tell anyone – including me – how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise,

until after you have reached a unanimous verdict or have been discharged. Do not disclose any vote

count in any note to the court.

RETURN OF VERDICT

A verdict form has been prepared for you. After you have reached unanimous agreement on a

verdict, your presiding juror will fill in the form that has been given to you, sign and date it, and advise

the court that you are ready to return to the courtroom.

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