Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03704/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03704-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 8:1105(a) Aliens: Habeas Corpus to Release INS Detainee

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1 All exhibit numbers in this Report and Recommendation are

references to the Bates stamped exhibit numbers in the exhibits

attached to Respondents' " Response in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus." 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MALICK M. NJAI,

Petitioner, 

vs.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ET AL., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 05-03704-PHX-SRB-(BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On November 15, 2005, Petitioner, Malick M. Njai, #A79-654-074, confined in

the Florence Service Processing Center in Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc #1). On November 16, 2005,

Petitioner filed an Amended Petition. (Doc. # 4.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of

this Court, on November 23, 2005, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge

Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge

recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an

order granting Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner is a citizen and native of The Gambia. (Ex. 1-8.)1

 He entered the

United States near New York, New York on June 20, 1995, pursuant to a visitor's visa.

(Ex. 5, 8.) Petitioner married Patricia Marie Smith on October 6, 2000. (Ex. 9.) On

January 2, 2002, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") served Petitioner with

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a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and

National Act ("INA"), charging Petitioner with remaining in the United States for a time

longer than permitted (six months) pursuant to his nonimmigrant visitor's visa in

violation of section 237(a)(1)(B)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1237(a)(1)(B)(iii). (Ex.

13.) The notice was served as a result of a Congressional inquiry into Petitioner's INS

status. (Ex. 8.) Petitioner was also found to have falsely claimed United States

citizenship on an I-9 form to obtain employment at a nursing home in Scottsdale,

Arizona. (Ex. 8.) On March 27, 2002, Petitioner entered into a Plea Agreement,

admitting to Count II of an Indictment charging him with "False Impersonation of a

Citizen of the United States," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911. (Ex. 15-21.) 

On the same day, he was convicted in the United States District Court, District

Court of Arizona, of "False Impersonation of a Citizen of the United States," a felony,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911. He was sentenced to time served and placed on

supervised release for a term of one year. (Ex. 22-24.) 

On April 11, 2002, the DHS served Petitioner with Additional Charges of

Admissibility/Deportability in his removal proceedings, alleging that Petitioner violated

Section 237(a)(3)(D) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D), as an alien who has falsely

represented himself to be a citizen of the United States, based on his March 28, 2002

conviction. (Ex. 25.) 

On October 20, 2003, Petitioner submitted a Form I-360, "Petitioner for

Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant," seeking to adjust his status under the

Violence Against Women's Act. ("VAWA") (Ex. 27-83.) On October 31, 2003, the

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services reviewed the petitioner and found that

it established a prima facie case for classification under the self-petitioning provisions

of the VAWA. (Ex. 85.) 

Due to the pending I-360 proceedings, the Immigration Judge administratively

closed Petitioner's removal proceedings on November 25, 2003. (Ex. 86.) DHS moved

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to recalendar the removal proceedings, arguing that Petitioner's conviction for violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 911 rendered him ineligible for adjustment of status. (Ex. 87-89.) The

motion was granted. (Ex. 90.) 

On March 15, 2004, the immigration judge sustained the charges of removal

lodged against the Petitioner. (Ex. 91-97.) The court also ruled that Petitioner's

conviction for "False Impersonation of a Citizen of the United States rendered him

ineligible for any form of relief, including adjustment under VAWA, and ordered

Petitioner removed to The Gambia. (Ex. 91-97.) 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the immigration judge's decision. (Ex.

98-103.) The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge's decision without

opinion on April 27, 2005. (Ex. 104.) 

Petitioner was apprehended by Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement ("ICE") officers on May 5, 2005, in Surprise, Arizona. (Ex. 128.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of Removal Order with the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals on May 9, 2005, and moved for a stay of deportation/removal on May

10, 2005, pending the appeal. (Ex. 106-108, 113-116.) 

On May 10, 2005, Petitioner moved for a telephonic bond redetermination

hearing, before the immigration judge, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.19. (Ex. 110-111.) On

May 16, 2005, the immigration judge denied the motion for bond, finding that the

immigration judge has "[n]o jurisdiction to set bond." (Ex. 118.) 

On May 19, 2005, DHS served Petitioner with a "Notice to Alien of File Custody

Review," indicating that Petitioner's custody status would be reviewed on or about

August 5, 2005. (Ex. 120.) 

On June 1, 2005, Petitioner's counsel submitted a Request for Release on Order

of Supervision to Philip Crawford, Filed Office Director, ICE and Patrick Contreras,

Supervisor, ICE. (Ex. 125-127.) The request was denied by Mr. Crawford, who

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reiterated that Petitioner's custody status would be reviewed on August 5, 2005, as

scheduled. (Ex. 128.)

On August 11, 2005, Petitioner's counsel submitted a request to Mr. Crawford

to expedite Petitioner's supervised custody release, (Ex. 129.) Mr. Crawford responded,

noting that Petitioner's custody status review was completed on August 21, 2005, and

that a letter notifying him of the decision to continue detention was served in person on

August 24, 2005. (Ex. 130.) 

On August 12, 2005, the Ninth Circuit entered a Stay of Removal for Petitioner

until the issuance of the mandate on his Petition for Review. (Ex. 131-132.) 

On November 15, 2005, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

with this Court. On November 16, 2005, the Petitioner filed an Amended Petition with

the Court (Doc. # 4), which the Court ordered served on Respondents. (Doc. # 5)

Respondents submitted a Response to the Amended Petition on January 27, 2005 with

Exhibits Bates numbers 001–135 attached. 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner argues that his continued and indefinite detention is a violation of his

due process and an abuse of discretion because it is neither statutorily required, nor

reasonably based on the facts at hand. 

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents argue first, that Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies,

and second, that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

Jurisdiction

The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 grants District Courts the

power to issue habeas corpus relief where the petitioner is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Specifically,

the Supreme Court has held that Section 2241 confers jurisdiction upon the federal

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courts to hear cases involving statutory and constitutional challenges to both pre- and

post-removal detention of aliens in deportation proceedings. See Demore v. Kim, 123

S.Ct. 1708, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491

(2001). 

Exhaustion

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

by failing to appeal the immigration judge's denial of bond on May 16, 2005. This

argument fails for two reasons. First, this determination is not the determination at

issue here, nor is it the cause of Petitioner's immediate detention. Petitioner remains in

custody pursuant to the DHS's custody review and denial of release completed on

August 21, 2005. Second, while the government broadly asserts that exhaustion is

required in this instance, the government fails to indicate what statutory or

administrative provisions mandate exhaustion in the present circumstances. In the

present case, there does not appear to be an explicit provision which requires

administrative review prior to the filing of an administrative action. See Tam v. INS,

14 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1189 (E.D. Cal. 1998) ("[J]urisdiction is not foreclosed by

petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.") 

Merits

Mandatory Detention

Respondent contends that petitioner is subject to the mandatory detention

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Petitioner is subject to an administratively final order

of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(defining final order of deportation)

Although Petitioner is subject to an administratively final order of removal, the

“removal period” has not yet begun because his removal order is currently on appeal

to the Ninth Circuit and because the Ninth Circuit has granted Petitioner a stay of his

removal. The “removal period” will not begin for Petitioner until “the date of [Ninth

Circuit's] final order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii). Accordingly, Petitioner's current

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detention is pursuant to the pre-removal order detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226,

section 236 of the INA, rather than the post-removal order detention statute, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231. See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, n.7, (9th Cir. 2005); see also

Kothandaraghipathy v. DHS, 396 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1106 (D.Ariz. 2005). Petitioner

concedes that his detention is regulated by the statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1226.

The Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation

proceedings. Demore v. Kim, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 1717 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.

292, 306, 113 S.Ct. 1439 (1993)). The Court in Kim, addressing a constitutional

challenge to the mandatory detention provision, held that detention during removal

proceedings is a "constitutionally permissible part of that process." Kim, 123 S.Ct. at

1722. Key to the Court's holding was the "definite termination point" of the

proceedings, roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases, and about five

months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal; and the criminal

alien's concession that he or she is deportable. Kim, 123 S.Ct. 1720-22. 

While the Supreme Court has found the mandatory detention provisions of 18

U.S.C. § 1226 to be valid under certain circumstances, this Court finds Petitioner's

continued detention to be unconstitutional and distinguishable from Kim for several

reasons.

First, the Court in Kim found mandatory detention constitutional only where the

criminal alien conceded deportability. Kim "did not dispute the validity of his prior

convictions, which were obtained following the full procedural protections our criminal

justice system offers" or the "conclusion that he [wa]s subject to mandatory detention

under § 1226(c)." Kim, 126 S.Ct. at 1712. "In conceding that he was deportable,

respondent forwent a hearing at which he would have been entitled to raise any nonfrivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not properly included in a

mandatory detention category. Kim, supra, citing 8 CFR § 3.19(h)(2)(ii)(2002); Matter

of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 1999 WL 339053 (BIA 1999).

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2 Clearly, it was Mr. Njai who filed an appeal and the Petition for

Review to the Ninth Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit

obviously did not consider this an impediment to relief for

Tijani. See Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1246 (Judge Tashima concurring)

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In this case, Petitioner has not conceded deportability, and, in fact, was not even

placed in the mandatory detention category by the Service, (see Ex. 133-134) and,

accordingly, was not provided an opportunity for a Joseph hearing or an opportunity

to argue that his prior was improperly included in the mandatory detention category.

The argument that Petitioner's prior convictions placed him in that category was not

even raised until the Respondents filed their Response in this habeas case. 

Second, this case has far exceeded the brief period of detention envisioned by

the Court in Kim for the majority of cases, or even the minority of cases in which the

Court considered the alien might appeal. Petitioner has now been in detention for more

than 400 days, and it has been approximately 300 days since his last review of

detention. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit distinguished the holding in Kim,

and the authority conferred by § 1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of criminal

aliens only. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). This case has clearly not

been an "expedited" case.

Tijani, detained pursuant to the mandatory provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),

appealed his order of removal first to the BIA, and second, filed a petition for review

of the BIA's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. His removal was stayed

pending the Ninth Circuits decision, however, he was detained throughout the

proceedings. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1246. (Judge Tashima, concurring) Although Tijani

had early in his case requested some continuances, which the Ninth Circuit obviously

considered negligible, in Petitioner's case, there is no evidence that any delay in the

proceedings beyond bureaucratic delay is attributable to Petitioner2

. 

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Finally, mandatory detention is inappropriate in this case, where, pursuant to the

language of the statute, Petitioner was taken into custody many years after his release

from federal custody for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 911. See Quezada-Bucio v.

Ridge, 317 F.Supp2d 1221 (W.D. Wash 2004). (holding that 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which

substitutes "when ... released" for "upon release," does not apply to a petitioner who

was detained three years after release from incarceration).

For the above stated reasons, this Court finds that the mandatory provisions of

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) do not apply to Petitioner's case. 

Due Process 

In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001),

the United States Supreme Court recognized the constitutional implications of

prolonged detention for those subject to a valid order of removal. “Freedom from

imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment's Due Process] Clause

protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “[G]overnment detention violates that Clause

unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural

protections, or, in certain special and ‘narrow’ non-punitive ‘circumstances,’ where a

special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the

‘individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” ’ Id.

(citations omitted).

Petitioner asks this Court for immediate release. This Court recognizes that,

ordinarily, detention decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 are not subject to judicial review.

Petitioner's continued detention, without review, has become presumptively

unreasonable. See Zadvydas. Furthermore, review of the decision previously rendered

in this case, demonstrates that Petitioner, although granted a detention review, was not

granted a meaningful review. 

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The Decision to Continue Detention states in support of its decision denying

release that "[I]t has been considered that you did not submit any support

documentation on behalf of your case." (Ex. 133.) On the contrary, Petitioner's counsel

submitted three pages of documentation addressing specifically, point by point, the ten

categories the Deciding Official had notified Petitioner would be open for consideration

in the review of Petitioner's custody. (Ex. 120-127.) 

Despite notifying Petitioner that it would consider these ten categories, and

despite Petitioner's extensive preparation of materials in response, the Deciding Official

completely ignored both the categories and the material in making the decision to detain

Petitioner. (Ex. 133.)

The Deciding Official did note that Petitioner had no disciplinary issues during

his detention, but, in an interesting turn of logic, noted that his conviction for

Impersonation of a Citizen of the United States led ICE to believe that Petitioner posed

both a threat to the community and a flight risk. 

Petitioner's so called custody review did not meet the constitutional standards

procedural due process demands in this case. Accordingly, after a careful review of the

file in this case, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court order

Respondents to release petitioner immediately on reasonable conditions. There is no

indication on this record that petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk.

Petitioner has a young daughter here. He has not fled throughout any of the immigration

court's earlier proceedings. 

Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court order

Respondents to provide Petitioner with a hearing within 60 days before an Immigration

Judge with the power to grant him bail unless the government establishes that he is a

flight risk or will be a danger to the community; further ordering the Immigration Judge

to specifically address in a written decision the categories noticed by DHS, and the

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material submitted by Petitioner at Exhibit 125 as it relates to those categories and flight

risk and danger to the community. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

RECOMMENDS that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter

an order GRANTING the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket #4).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed the

parties should use the following case number: CV 04-3704-PHX-SRB.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Report and

Recommendation to the attorneys for the Plaintiff and for the Defendants.

DATED this 15th day of June, 2006.

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