Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05069/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05069-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 1998 Decided October 30, 1998

No. 98-5047

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Chrysler Corporation,

Appellant

Consolidated with

98-5069

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv01236)

John G. Roberts, Jr. argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Gregory G. Garre and Erika Z. Jones.

Lawrence S. Robbins entered an appearance.

Irene M. Solet, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, Douglas N. Letter, Appellate Litigation

Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, and Enid Rubenstein,

Attorney, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Michael E. Robinson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

entered an appearance.

Andrew D. Koblenz, Charles H. Lockwood, Alan Charles

Raul and Thomas W. Merrill were on the brief for amici

curiae American Automobile Manufacturers, et al. Daniel J.

Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar entered appearances.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Silberman and Randolph,

Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 1 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Under the National Traffic and

Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("NTMVSA" or "Act"), the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") may seek

the recall of a motor vehicle either when a vehicle has "a

defect related to motor vehicle safety" or when a vehicle

"does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety

standard." 49 U.S.C. s 30118(b) (1994). These provisions

are not mutually exclusive, nor are they coterminous. Thus,

an allegation of noncompliance may or may not include a

charge that a vehicle has a safety defect.

The instant case involves only an allegation of noncompliance. There is no claim here that the vehicles in question

suffer from safety defects. The precise issue before the court

is whether NHTSA must provide notice of what is required

under a safety standard before seeking a recall under 49

U.S.C. s 30118 for noncompliance with that standard. We

find that, in light of both the requirements of 49 U.S.C.

ss 30112 and 30115 and the due process clause, notice is

required before a noncompliance recall may be ordered.

Because there was no notice here, we reverse the District

Court's recall order.

I. Background

On June 4, 1996, NHTSA filed this suit against Chrysler

seeking, inter alia, a recall of approximately 91,000 Model

Year 1995 Chrysler Cirrus and Dodge Stratus cars. NHTSA

alleged that the cars in question did not comply with Federal

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 210 ("Standard 210"), which

regulates seat belt assembly anchorages. See 49 C.F.R.

s 571.210 (1997). On February 4, 1998, the District Court

granted NHTSA's request and ordered a recall. See United

States v. Chrysler Corp., 995 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1998).

Vehicles manufactured after May 15, 1995 were not made

subject to the recall, because "tapping plates" were added to

reinforce the anchorages in these vehicles. See id. at 153 n.5.

The promulgation of safety standards under the NTMVSA,

49 U.S.C. ss 30101-30169, has been delegated to NHTSA.

See 49 C.F.R. s 1.50(a) (1997). Pursuant to this authority,

NHTSA adopted Standard 210, which requires seat belt

assembly anchorages to withstand certain forces to ensure

that seat belts will remain attached to the vehicle in the event

of a crash. Anchorages must withstand two phases of a test

procedure: First, they must be able to withstand force as it is

increased to 3,000 pounds over thirty seconds. Second, after

3,000 pounds of force is reached, the anchorages must withstand that force for ten seconds. See 49 C.F.R. s 571.210

p S5.2. The test procedures require the use of a "pelvic body

block," an L-shaped metal block that represents a human

pelvis. The standard, however, does not specify the placement of this block during testing. See id. pp S5, S5.2.

Chrysler tested the 1995 Cirrus and Stratus model designs

for compliance with Standard 210 on November 8, 1993, by

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 2 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

placing the pelvic body block against the seat back. Subsequently, in March 1995, Chrysler certified the 1995 Cirrus

and Stratus cars. In July 1995, NHTSA hired General

Testing Laboratories ("GTL") to conduct compliance testing

on a number of vehicles, including a 1995 Chrysler Cirrus.

When GTL performed the Standard 210 compliance test on

the 1995 Cirrus, it placed the pelvic body block away from the

rear seat back to prevent the seat buckles and webbing from

breaking during the test; this was done instead of replacing

the original belt webbing with wire rope, as Standard 210

allows. When testing was done with the pelvic body block

placed away from the rear seat back, the anchorage on one of

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 3 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the rear seat belts failed after approximately 24 seconds with

2,829 pounds of applied force.

NHTSA notified Chrysler of the failure and requested that

Chrysler institute a recall. Chrysler performed its own tests

in August 1995, simulating the testing done by GTL, and its

results were similar to those of GTL, i.e., the anchorages

failed when the pelvic body block was placed forward of the

seat back. See Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 105. Thus, Chrysler

did not argue that GTL's test results were in error. Rather,

Chrysler claimed that GTL's decision to place the pelvic body

block forward of the seat back, rather than replace the seat

belt webbing, was the cause of the test failure. In other

words, Chrysler asserted that it had followed permissible test

procedures and had satisfied the requirements of Standard

210 using these procedures, so it did not matter whether GTL

reached different results using different test procedures.

Chrysler therefore refused to institute a recall.

In December 1995, NHTSA officials acknowledged that

neither Standard 210 nor the laboratory test procedures

developed by the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance specified a position for the pelvic body block. See J.A. 129.

However, NHTSA asserted that, pursuant to a 1991 Federal

Register notice, manufacturers must pass the strength test

"with the safety belt and other vehicle features at any adjustment" whenever a standard does not indicate the specific test

conditions. See 56 Fed. Reg. 63,676, 63,677 (1991). NHTSA

thus suggested that Chrysler was on notice that it might be

required to satisfy Standard 210 using the test procedures

employed by GTL.

After a notice of noncompliance and a public hearing,

NHTSA issued a final decision in June 1996. See 49 U.S.C.

s 30118(b). NHTSA ordered Chrysler to notify owners, purchasers, and dealers of the noncompliance no later than July

8, 1996, and to provide a remedy without charge. Chrysler

refused and NHTSA filed this action, alleging that Chrysler

had violated ss 30112(a) and 30115 of the Act and requesting

that the District Court order a recall and award civil penalties.

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 4 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District

Court first sought to determine NHTSA's exact interpretation of Standard 210. This was no mean feat, because

NHTSA had articulated its interpretation "in different ways."

See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 995 F. Supp. at 155 &

n.8. The District Court finally concluded that "NHTSA's

interpretation of [Standard 210] is that vehicles must comply

with [Standard 210] when tested with the pelvic body block in

any position that would extend the lap belt to accommodate a

50th percentile 6-year-old to a 95th percentile adult male."

Id. at 155. The testing range cited by the District Court is

nowhere to be found in Standard 210; rather, it is taken from

Standard 208. See 49 C.F.R. s 571.208 p S7.1.1 (1997). In

any event, neither party disputes that the District Court's

statement is an accurate description of NHTSA's current

interpretation of Standard 210.

The District Court found that, because Chrysler had exercised reasonable care, it had not violated s 30112(a) of the

Act, which prohibits the manufacture of a vehicle that does

not comply with the applicable standards. The trial court

also found that Chrysler had not violated s 30115, which

prohibits the certification of a vehicle that is not in compliance with all applicable standards. Most importantly, the

District Court held that a manufacturer exercising reasonable

care would not have "been able to identify with ascertainable

certainty that vehicles must comply with [Standard 210] when

tested with the pelvic body block in any position that would

extend the lap belt to accommodate a 50th percentile 6-yearold to a 95th percentile adult male, i.e., with the pelvic body

block positioned between 2 to 6.5 inches from the seat back."

See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 995 F. Supp. at 162.

The District Court then went on to hold that a recall could

be ordered without regard to whether Chrysler had reasonable notice of the standard giving rise to the alleged noncompliance. Because the 1995 cars here at issue did not comply

with NHTSA's current interpretation of Standard 210, the

District Court ordered Chrysler to notify owners, purchasers,

and dealers of the noncompliance by March 30, 1998, and to

provide a remedy without charge. See id. at 163-164; United

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 5 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

States v. Chrysler Corp., Civ. No. 96-1236 (EGS), Order

(D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 260-61. After a panel

of this court denied Chrysler's emergency motion to stay the

District Court's recall order, Chrysler initiated a recall process by notifying owners, purchasers, and dealers of the

alleged noncompliance, offering to provide a remedy at no

charge, and submitting a "Noncompliance Information Report" to NHTSA. Chrysler has not, however, completed all

that is required under the recall order.

II. Analysis

A. Mootness

The Government suggests that we need not reach the

merits of this case, because, in light of Chrysler's recall of

some of the cars at issue, the appeal is moot. Chrysler

responds that the appeal is not moot, because it has not

completed all that is required by the recall order. Chrysler

has the better of this argument. Given the present posture

of the case, it is clear that this appeal is not moot.

"[A]n appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by

virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant

'any effectual relief whatever' in favor of the appellant."

Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (quoting Mills v.

Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). However, "even the availability of a 'partial remedy' is 'sufficient to prevent [a] case

from being moot.' " Id. (quoting Church of Scientology v.

United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13 (1992)). The question, then, is

whether this court can grant Chrysler any relief at all.

Chrysler points out that this court may grant relief because, even though we cannot "return the parties to the

status quo ante," see Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 12, a

ruling in Chrysler's favor would allow it to avoid the remaining obligations under the District Court's order. In particular, Chrysler seeks to avoid fixing vehicles that have not yet

been repaired and submitting "Quarterly Reports" to NHTSA

regarding the progress of repairs. If Chrysler prevails on

the merits, it will avoid these obligations imposed by the

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 6 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

District Court, as well as any monetary penalties that might

be sought for the alleged violations of the Act. In other

words, Chrysler asserts that there is still substantial relief

that can be afforded by this court, thus defeating any suggestion that the appeal is moot. We agree.

NHTSA argues that the decision in United States v. Ford

Motor Co., 574 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1978), requires a finding

that Chrysler's appeal was rendered moot as soon as the

company initiated a recall. In Ford, the manufacturer initiated a recall when it could not agree with NHTSA on the

proper recall notice for car owners. See id. at 538. The

court then found that the appeal was moot, because Ford had

"unilaterally instituted a final recall." Id. at 539-40. The

present case is readily distinguishable in that Chrysler did

not undertake any recall action voluntarily, but rather was

ordered by the District Court (with a stay denied by this

court) to recall the cars. See 13A Charles Alan Wright et

al., Federal Practice and Procedure s 3533.2, at 250 (1984)

("An order that expressly controls future conduct is not

mooted by compliance during the period required to complete

an appeal...."). In any event, to the extent that our decision in Ford gives pause, the subsequent decisions by the

Supreme Court in Calderon and Church of Scientology are

controlling. The availability of a partial remedy for Chrysler

is sufficient to prevent this case from being moot.

B. The Requirement of "Fair Notice"

As noted above, under the Act, NHTSA may seek recall of

a motor vehicle, either when a vehicle has "a defect related to

motor vehicle safety" or when a vehicle "does not comply with

an applicable motor vehicle safety standard." 49 U.S.C.

s 30118(b). An allegation of noncompliance may or may not

include a charge that a vehicle has a safety defect. In this

case, the District Court's recall order was based solely on

NHTSA's claim that approximately 91,000 of Chrysler's vehicles did not comply with Standard 210. NHTSA has never

contended that the Chrysler cars in question have a "defect

related to motor safety" that would warrant a recall. Indeed,

the Government does not even claim that Chrysler's alleged

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 7 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

breach of Standard 210 resulted in the manufacture of inherently unsafe vehicles.

The principal issue before this court is whether NHTSA

must give reasonable notice of what is required by a safety

standard, such as Standard 210, before seeking a recall under

49 U.S.C. s 30118 on the ground that a manufacturer has

failed to comply with the standard. The simple answer to

this question, at least where there is no safety defect at issue,

is that a manufacturer cannot be found to be out of compliance with a standard if NHTSA has failed to give fair notice

of what is required by the standard. And absent notice,

there can be no recall based solely on noncompliance.

In General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328, 1333

(D.C. Cir. 1995), we held that, because "[d]ue process requires that parties receive fair notice before being deprived of

property," the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")

could not penalize General Electric for asserted regulatory

violations when General Electric lacked "fair warning of

[EPA's] interpretation of the regulations." We made it clear

that, "[i]n the absence of notice--for example, where the

regulation is not sufficiently clear to warn a party about what

is expected of it--an agency may not deprive a party of

property," particularly when "the interpretation is so far from

a reasonable person's understanding of the regulations that

they could not have fairly informed [the regulated party] of

the agency's perspective." Id. at 1328, 1330; see also Rollins

Envtl. Servs. Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 652 n.2 (D.C. Cir.

1991) ("[A] regulation carrying penal sanctions must give fair

warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires.") (citation

omitted); id. at 654 n.1 (Edwards, J., dissenting in part and

concurring in part) ("It is basic hornbook law in the administrative context that 'the application of a regulation in a

particular situation may be challenged on the ground that it

does not give fair warning that the allegedly violative conduct

was prohibited.' ") (citation omitted); Satellite Broad. Co. v.

FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Traditional concepts of

due process incorporated into administrative law preclude an

agency from penalizing a private party for violating a rule

without first providing adequate notice of the substance of the

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 8 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

rule."); Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C.

Cir. 1986) ("[T]he due process clause prevents ... the application of a regulation that fails to give fair warning of the

conduct it prohibits or requires.").

NHTSA does not deny the viability of the "fair notice"

doctrine. Yet, the Government suggests that notice is not

required to compel compliance with standards under the Act.

We fail to comprehend this argument and the Government

offers no coherent defense of its position. The simple truth is

that there is no real difference between "violating" a regulation, for which notice is required, and "not complying" with a

regulation, for which NHTSA argues notice is not required.

Thus, Chrysler cannot be required to recall cars for noncompliance with Standard 210 if it had no notice of what NHTSA

now says is required under the standard.

NHTSA also argues that the recall order does not raise due

process concerns, because this court has only found due

process violations in those cases involving "explicit penalties

or actions that the Court described as punitive in some

manner." Brief for the Appellee at 57. But a recall, which

entails the expenditure of significant amounts of money,

deprives Chrysler of property no less than a fine. We have

little doubt that a recall is a "sufficiently grave sanction" such

that the duty to provide notice is triggered. See Satellite

Broad., 824 F.2d at 3.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Act itself provides

that, before a manufacturer can be found to have manufactured a noncomplying vehicle, NHTSA must show that a

reasonable person, exercising reasonable care, would have

known that the vehicle did not comply with the applicable

standards. See 49 U.S.C. s 30112(b)(2)(A) (1994). Moreover,

a manufacturer does not violate s 30115 of the Act by certifying a vehicle as complying with all applicable standards if it

had no reason to know, in exercising reasonable care, that the

vehicle did not comply with the applicable safety standards.

See 49 U.S.C. s 30115 (1994). These statutory provisions

merely reinforce the well-established rule in administrative

law that the application of a rule may be successfully chalUSCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 9 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

lenged if it does not give fair warning that the allegedly

violative conduct was prohibited.

In light of both the notice requirements of ss 30112 and

30115 and the due process clause, we find that Chrysler was

owed fair notice before it could be ordered to recall vehicles

for alleged noncompliance with a standard under the Act.

The only remaining question is whether NHTSA provided

Chrysler with the requisite notice.

C. Notice of Pelvic Body Block Placement

The District Court concluded that "Chrysler was not provided sufficient notice of NHTSA's recently articulated interpretation of [Standard 210]." United States v. Chrysler

Corp., 995 F. Supp. at 162. NHTSA argues, however, that

Chrysler should have known to place the pelvic body block

between 2 to 6.5 inches from the seat back when testing for

compliance under Standard 210.

NHTSA is free to dispute the District Court's finding on

notice without filing a cross-appeal. See United States v.

American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924) ("[T]he

appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support

of a decree any matter appearing in the record, although his

argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the

lower court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or

ignored by it."); Freeman v. B & B Assocs., 790 F.2d 145, 151

(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("An appellate court ... will freely consider

any argument by an appellee that supports the judgment of

the district court including arguments rejected by the district

court and even arguments contradicting the logic of the

district court. Only when an appellee attempts to overturn or

modify a district court's judgment must the appellee file a

cross-appeal."). So we will entertain the Government's argument that the District Court was in error in concluding that

Chrysler did not have fair notice.

We begin with the language of Standard 210 to determine

whether "a regulated party acting in good faith would be able

to identify, with 'ascertainable certainty,' the standards with

which the agency expect[ed] parties to conform." General

Elec., 53 F.3d at 1329. As noted above, NHTSA acknowledged in a December 1995 letter to Chrysler that neither

Standard 210 nor the laboratory test procedures for Standard

210 indicate the proper placement of the pelvic body block

during compliance testing. See J.A. 129. However, NHTSA

relies on a 1991 Federal Register notice to support its claim

that Chrysler had fair notice. That 1991 notice provides, in

relevant part, that,

[a]s a general matter, when a standard does not specify a

particular test condition, there is a presumption that the

requirements of the standard must be met at all such

test conditions. This presumption that the standard

must be met at all positions of unspecified test conditions

may be rebutted if the language of the standard as a

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 10 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

whole or its purposes indicate an intention to limit unspecified test conditions to a particular condition or

conditions.

In the case of the strength requirements in Standard

No. 210, nothing in the language of the standard suggests that the strength requirements were only to be

measured with the safety belt or other vehicle features at

certain adjustment positions. Indeed, the purpose of the

standard is to reduce the likelihood that an anchorage

will fail in a crash. To serve this purpose, the anchorage

must be capable of meeting the strength requirements

with the safety belt and other vehicle features at any

adjustment, since those features could be at any adjustment position during a crash.

56 Fed. Reg. 63,676, 63,677.

NHTSA asserts that it is irrelevant that the pelvic body

block placement was not discussed in the 1991 notice. Rather, NHTSA argues that the 1991 notice reflects the agency's

general policy and the phrase "must be capable of meeting

the strength requirements with the safety belt and other

vehicle features at any adjustment" has a discernible bearing

on the placement of the pelvic body block during compliance

testing. Thus, according to NHTSA, Chrysler could have

determined what NHTSA now views as the proper placement

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 11 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of the pelvic body block simply by applying this general policy

notice when it performed its Standard 210 compliance testing.

NHTSA also argues that Chrysler should have known that

the compliance test must be performed with the pelvic body

block in any position that would extend the lap belt to

accommodate a 50th percentile six-year-old and a 95th percentile adult male. The notice for this testing requirement,

claims NHTSA, is readily apparent from another safety standard, Standard 208.

On the record at hand, we disagree with the Government's

claim that Chrysler should have been able to discern what

NHTSA now says is the correct pelvic body block placement

for Standard 210 compliance testing. The 1991 notice did not

even discuss pelvic body block placement. Moreover, the

language of the 1991 notice that NHTSA relies on is far too

general to suggest that Chrysler should have looked to another standard, Standard 208, in order to determine the proper

placement under Standard 210. Before Chrysler could be

required to perform Standard 210 compliance testing with the

pelvic body block in any position that would accommodate a

50th percentile six-year-old and a 95th percentile adult male,

NHTSA must have either put this language into Standard 210

itself, or at least referenced this language in Standard 210.

In addition, NHTSA's own test schematic for Standard 210,

entitled "Typical FMVSS 210 Anchorage Pull Test Setup,"

shows the pelvic body block against the seat back, not forward of it. See J.A. 141, 156. And as the District Court

found, NHTSA itself had tested for compliance with Standard

210 with the pelvic body block against the seat back. See

United States v. Chrysler Corp., 995 F. Supp at 162 n.20.

NHTSA's only response is that manufacturers may not rely

on NHTSA's own test procedures and practices to ensure

compliance with a standard. However, an agency is hard

pressed to show fair notice when the agency itself has taken

action in the past that conflicts with its current interpretation

of a regulation. Cf. General Elec., 53 F.3d at 1332 ("While we

accept EPA's argument that the regional office interpretation

was wrong, confusion at the regional level is yet more eviUSCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 12 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

dence that the agency's interpretation of its own regulation

could not possibly have provided fair notice.").

Furthermore, the Standard 210 test procedures allow contractors to replace the seat buckles if there is a risk of

breakage. See Laboratory Test Procedure for FMVSS No.

210, at 19, reprinted in J.A. 55; 49 C.F.R. s 571.210 p S5. As

the District Court pointed out, "the risk of seat belt buckle

breakage occurs if a test vehicle's original seat belts are used

and the pelvic body block is placed directly against the seat

back," and, thus, "[a]t the very least, [paragraph S5 and the

test procedures] suggest that testing with the pelvic body

block against the seat back is within the permissible range of

positions." United States v. Chrysler Corp., 995 F. Supp. at

162.

Finally, it should be noted that NHTSA's most recent

interpretation of Standard 210, regarding the positioning of

the pelvic body block, no more simulates the real world

conditions of a vehicle crash than does placing the block

against the seat back as Chrysler did. In fact, the positioning

of the pelvic body block during the GTL testing did not even

fall within the Standard 208 range that NHTSA now argues

governs pelvic body block placement for Standard 210 compliance testing. The GTL testing only fell within the belt length

payout (the position on the seat forward of the seat back)

called for by the Standard 208 range, but not the corresponding height and angle. NHTSA's response is that "[t]o have

tested with the body block in the forward and raised position

... would have required additional test equipment not contemplated by Standard 210." Brief for the Appellee at 37

n.11. In other words, according to NHTSA, Chrysler not

only should have known that it must look to Standard 208 for

the proper pelvic body block range, it also should have known

to use only one of the dimensions specified in that range when

performing Standard 210 compliance testing. Chrysler might

have satisfied NHTSA with the exercise of extraordinary

intuition or with the aid of a psychic, but these possibilities

are more than the law requires.

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 13 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Because we find that NHTSA failed to provide adequate

notice of what it now believes is the appropriate pelvic body

block placement when testing for compliance under Standard

210, Chrysler cannot be compelled to recall its 1995 Cirrus

and Stratus cars.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the

District Court is reversed.

So ordered.

USCA Case #98-5069 Document #392876 Filed: 10/30/1998 Page 14 of 14