Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02623/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02623-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO LMH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Anthony Pierog, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Officer Foster, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 05-2623-PCT-MHM (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff, currently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex – Phoenix West,

Arizona, has filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court will dismiss

the action.

A. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis & Filing Fee.

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of

$150.00 for this action. An initial partial filing fee of $65.63 (based on an average monthly

balance of $328.16) will be assessed by this Order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate

order, the Court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from

Plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of Court. Thereafter, Plaintiff will be

obligated for monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to

Plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the

Case 3:05-cv-02623-MHM--JRI Document 3 Filed 12/19/05 Page 1 of 7
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Clerk of Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing

fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Plaintiff should take notice that if he is released before the filing fee is paid in full, he

must pay the remaining unpaid amount of the filing fee within 120 days of the date of his

release. If Plaintiff fails to pay the remainder of the filing fee within 120 days of the date of

his release, the action will be dismissed, unless Plaintiff shows good cause, in writing, why

he is unable to pay the remainder of the filing fee.

B. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if Plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured

by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend the

complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court is required to grant leave to amend “if a complaint can

possibly be saved,” but not if the Complaint “lacks merit entirely.” Id. at 1129. A court

therefore should grant leave to amend if the pleading could be cured by the allegation of

other facts, or if it appears at all possible that the defect can be corrected. Id. at 1130. The

Court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice

“would undermine the district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 124

S. Ct. 2441, 2446 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide whether

court was required to inform litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed

for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend because the complaint cannot possibly be

saved by amendment.

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C. Complaint.

Plaintiff’s action concerns the theft and damage of personal property from his

impounded vehicle. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex

– Phoenix West, which is a facility for male offenders convicted of felony driving under the

influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Presumably, Plaintiff’s vehicle was impounded

pursuant to his arrest for felony DUI. Plaintiff sues Mohave County Sheriff’s Deputy Officer

Foster. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was living in his vehicle before it was impounded by Officer

Foster on August 11, 2003, and towed to an impound yard. The vehicle contained Plaintiff’s

wallets, small amounts of cash, five credit cards and other personal identification, personal

property worth thousands of dollars, books and other documents. When the vehicle was

reclaimed, the wallets, cash, credit cards, identification and personal property were missing.

The books and other documents, which were on the front seat of the car, had been damaged

by rain because a window had been left open. 

In Count I, Plaintiff contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when

his cash, credit cards, identification, and other personal property were stolen from the vehicle

after it was impounded. In Count II, Plaintiff asserts that his due process rights were

abridged for the same reasons as Count I. In Count III, Plaintiff contends that his Ninth

Amendment rights were violated for the same reasons as Count I and II, as well as when the

books and documents were damaged by rain. For relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and

punitive damages exceeding $100,000.

D. Failure to State a Claim.

1. Count I – Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST.

amend. IV. A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with

an individual’s possessory interests in that property. Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S.

56, 61 (1992) (citation and quotation omitted). A search occurs when an expectation of

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privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. United States v.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 

The impoundment of Plaintiff’s vehicle undoubtedly was a “seizure” and any

inventory of its contents, if an inventory was made, was a “search.” Plaintiff, however, does

not challenge the reasonableness of the impoundment or inventory, if one was made. See,

e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373 (1987) (reasonable police regulations relating

to inventory procedures of impounded vehicle administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth

Amendment); United States v. Penn, 233 F.3d 111 (9th Cir. 2000) (no Fourth Amendment

obligation to offer driver an opportunity to avoid impoundment). Instead, Plaintiff

challenges the ensuing damage and theft of the contents of the seized vehicle as violative of

the Fourth Amendment. 

 Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Foster intentionally stole or damaged the

property himself; rather, the loss occurred at the hands of an unknown third party or due to

unanticipated effects of nature while the vehicle was in the custody of the impoundment yard.

In essence, Plaintiff’s claim is that Foster negligently failed to ensure the safekeeping of the

contents of the seized vehicle. Assuming that Fourth Amendment protections would extend

to the safekeeping of seized property, an allegation that the property was negligently kept

does not state a claim. “The Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard is not the same

as the standard of “reasonable care” under tort law, and negligent acts do not incur

constitutional liability.” Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002). Injuries

to life, liberty, or property that are inflicted by governmental negligence are not addressed

by the United States Constitution. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Foster negligently failed to ensure the

safekeeping of seized property fails to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment.

2. Count II – Due Process

Plaintiff contends that his due process rights were violated because the property in his

vehicle was stolen and damaged while in the custody of the impound yard. Arizona law

provides for due process in the impoundment process, including notice and a poststorage

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hearing. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-3511(F); § 28-3514. Plaintiff, however, does not

challenge Arizona’s procedures regarding impoundment. Instead, he asserts that he was

entitled to due process before Defendant Foster negligently permitted the personal property

in Plaintiff’s vehicle to be stolen or damaged. This allegation fails to state a claim.

In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), the Supreme Court held that due

process is not violated when a state employee negligently deprives an individual of property,

as long as the state makes available a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. The rationale

underlying Parratt was that predeprivation procedures are impractical when the deprivation

of property occurs through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, because

the state cannot know when such deprivations will occur. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

533 (1984). This logic was extended to intentional deprivations of property. Id. The

availability of a common-law tort suit against the state employee constitutes an adequate

postdeprivation remedy. Id. at 534-35. 

The Seventh Circuit, in Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 2002),

applied the holdings of Parratt and Hudson to a claim that is virtually identical to Plaintiff’s.

In Gable, a class of plaintiffs brought a lawsuit claiming that damage to their impounded

vehicles violated due process. Under Illinois law, an action of bailment for damages to the

vehicle could be brought against city, as well as an action in replevin to recover the vehicle.

Gable, 296 F.3d at 540. The Seventh Circuit therefore held that the plaintiffs were not

deprived of procedural due process. Id.

Similarly, Plaintiff could bring a state court action of bailment to recover for the stolen

and damaged property in his vehicle. See, e.g., Allright Phoenix Parking, Inc. v. Shabala,

429 P.2d 513 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (action of bailment to recover value of property stolen

from plaintiff’s automobile while in defendant’s parking lot); see also Hughes v. City of

Phoenix, 170 P.2d 297 (Ariz. 1946) (action in replevin to recover impounded vehicle); Fields

v. Steward, 515 P.2d 57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (action in replevin to recover automobile or

damages from garageman). Because Plaintiff has an adequate postdeprivation remedy in the

state courts, his due process claim fails.

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3. Count III – Ninth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that his Ninth Amendment rights were violated by the theft and

destruction of his personal property. The Ninth Amendment provides that “the enumeration

in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others

retained by the people.” The Ninth Amendment “has never been recognized as

independently securing any constitutional right, for purposes of pursuing a civil rights

claim.” Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1986); see also San

Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1996)

(collecting authorities rejecting the Ninth Amendment as independently securing

constitutional rights). Instead, a civil rights claim must be based on a specific constitutional

guarantee. Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 749 (collecting United States Supreme Court authorities).

In light of these authorities, Plaintiff’s Ninth Amendment claim cannot possibly warrant

relief

4. Negligence

Although Plaintiff has not expressly asserted a claim of negligence, the gist of his

action is nothing other than negligence. As described in the foregoing, a negligence action

is a state law claim that does not rise to the constitutional level. In addition, without a

cognizable constitutional claim over which the Court has original jurisdictions, the Court

cannot assert supplemental jurisdiction over a negligence claim. See Gini v. Las Vegas

Metro. Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (when federal law claims are

eliminated before trial, the court generally should decline jurisdiction over state law claims

and dismiss them without prejudice). Consequently, the Court cannot consider Plaintiff’s

negligence claim, which is properly brought in state court.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

(2) Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action.

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $65.63. All fees shall be collected and paid

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in accordance with this Court=s Order to the appropriate government agency filed

concurrently herewith.

(3) The Complaint and this action are dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

(4) The Clerk of Court shall make an entry on the docket in this matter indicating that

the dismissal for failure to state a claim falls within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 15th day of December, 2005.

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