Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00223/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00223-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH MARTIN DANKS,

Petitioner,

vs.

MICHAEL MARTEL, as Acting Warden of San

Quentin State Prison,

Respondent.

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Case No. 1:11-cv-00223 LJO

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIM 36;

HOLDING CLAIMS 1 THROUGH 30 AND

37 IN ABEYANCE; AND DIRECTING

PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

CLAIMS 31 THROUGH 35 SHOULD NOT

BE DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

HEARING DATE: October 19, 2011

VACATED

This matter is before the Court on the motion of Petitioner Joseph Martin Danks (“Danks”) to

hold federal proceedings in abeyance during the pendency of his state exhaustion petition before the

California Supreme Court. Respondent Michael Martel, Acting Warden of San Quentin State Prison

(the “Warden”), filed a timely opposition and Danks replied. This matter can be decided on the papers

without need for a hearing.

I. Case Summary

While serving a 156-year to life term at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi

(“CCI”), 28 year-old Danks used a bed sheet strip to strangle his 67 year-old cellmate, Walter Holt,

between midnight and 1 a.m. on September 21, 1990. Danks had been placed in the cell with Mr. Holt

several hours earlier on the evening of September 20, 1990, and reportedly decided to kill him as soon

as he was placed in the cell. Danks’ 156-year to life term was imposed based a negotiated plea

agreement for six first degree murders of homeless men in Los Angeles Koreatown in December 1986

and January 1987. Danks had an extensive history of violence since his January 20, 1987 arrest for those

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offenses, which history was introduced during the penalty phase trial of the Holt murder trial, including

violence against other patients at Atascadero StateHospital when hewas being evaluated for competence

to stand trial for the six Los Angeles murders, stabbing anotherinmate at CCI while he was awaiting trial

for the Holt murder, harboring numerous “homemade” shanks and weapons in his cell at CCI, setting

fire to his CCI cell, and assaulting a CCI correctional officer. Also, at his trial, he inflicted multiple stab

wounds on one of his defense attorneys and testified at penalty proceedings he would stab the other

defense attorney if given the opportunity. These attacks on his attorneys were not introduced as

aggravating evidence, but the jurors did observe some of his violence towards his attorneys.

Lay and expert witnesses testified at trial about Danks’ bizarre behavior, obsession with

cleanliness (hence, his loathing of “bums” in Los Angeles), paranoia about having his prison food

adulterated, and sadistic ideations. Expert mental health witnesses testified to numerous and varied

descriptions: average range ofintelligence (I.Q. of 106), severe thought disorder, paranoid schizophrenia,

antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), sociopathic tendencies to lie and manipulate, history of

polysubstance abuse, afflicted with delusions, easily controlled by schizophrenic delusions because

ASPD left him with a dearth of internal controls, “a happy camper” when he was in his sickness because

he was full of exotic violent themes and wishes to kill, the belief that he was righteously performing

murders, the desire to follow and harm disadvantaged people, organic brain damage, no organic

problems, that his competence to be tried could be maintained as long as he was medicated with Haldol

(anti-psychotic medication), that he was a continuing homicidal threat, even on Haldol. 

II. Procedural History

Danks commenced this action on February 9, 2011 with a joint request for a stay of execution

and appointment of counsel. The Habeas Corpus Resource Center (“HCRC”) was appointed as counsel

on February 17, 2011, with three staff attorneys authorized to work on the case. Phase I and Phase II

case management conferences were conducted on March 17, 2011 and May 4, 2011, respectively, and

budgets were approved for Danks’ attorneys to prepare a petition on or before September 15, 2011. At

the time of the Phase II case management conference, Danks’ represented that he intended to present

only exhausted claims in his federal petition. Intervening events described below led Danks to file a

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second state habeas petition on September 13, 2011, followed by his timely federal petition on

September 15, 2011. This motion followed on September 20, 2011. 

III. Intervening Events

New factual and legal predicates for Danks’ petition came into existence between May 2011 and

September 2011. First, on May 23, 2011, the United States Supreme Court filed Brown v. Plata, 131

S. Ct. 1910 (2011), which concludes that the medical and mental health care provided to California

inmates fell below standards of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment. The period covered by

this decision includes the period of Danks’ confinement at CCI when he killed Mr. Holt. Plata is

comprised of two California district court cases, Coleman v. Brown, from the Eastern District, and Plata

v. Brown, from the Northern District. Because release of prisoners was perceived as being a remedy for

the inadequate medical and mental health services delivered in California prisons, the respective judges

presiding in the Eastern and Northern District cases requested appointment of a three-judge court

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). The same three-judge panel was appointed for both cases and they

were consolidated. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922. Plata affirms the reduction of prisoners in this

consolidated case as an appropriate remedy to reduce prison overcrowding and improve the delivery of

medical and mental health care to California inmates. Id. at 1947.

Second, on September 1, 2011 an order was entered by the California Office of Administrative

Hearings granting the petition oftheCalifornia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)

for the administration of involuntary anti-psychotic medication to Danks. The petition was filed by the

CDCR on July 7, 2011 pursuant the Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526 (1986) following an

incident in which Danks threatened a female correctional officer who attempted to deliver his food. The

CDCR alleged Danks was a danger to others and supported this claim with the declaration of CDCR

psychiatrist Paul Burton, M.D. Dr. Burton averred:

Joseph Danks, age 49, is incarcerated for murder. His working diagnosis is

schizophrenia, paranoid type. He also suffers from antisocial personality disorder,

Hepatitis C viral infection, and Crohn’s disease. He has a documented history of mental

illness symptoms dating back to before he arrived on Condemned Row. He has required

psychiatric hospitalizations in state psychiatric facilities. For several years, he has

presented as disorganized, paranoid, agitated, threatening, and hostile. He frequently

yells racial slurs and profanities from his cell for hours on end. He consistently refuses

to speak with mental health clinicians, attend mental health appointments, or discuss

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medication treatment options. He also suffers from consistent delusions. Examples of

his delusional topics include government, media, and prison conspiracies.

Second State Petition, Exhibit 3: 7. Dr. Burton further opined in his declaration, “In my opinion, there

is a direct connection between his mental illness and his threatening and aggressive statements and

behaviors.” Id., Exhibit 3: 8.

In addition to providing a declaration, Dr. Burton also testified at the August 3, 2011

administrative hearing on behalf of the CDCR. When asked about Danks’ history of mental illness, Dr.

Burton testified:

In my review of the records – uh – because I’ve treated Mr. Danks only since 2009 – in

my review of the records, there’s evidence that Mr. Danks had mental illness – um –

dating back to his late adolescence. Um – the more formal records within the CDCR

indicate that – um – Mr. Danks has had evidence of a severe and persistent psychotic

mental illness, schizophrenia, for the duration of his incarceration here at – uh – San

Quentin.

Id., Exhibit 4:14-15 (emphasis added). At the hearing, Dr. Burton affirmed his opinion of there being

a direct connection between Mr. Danks’ mental illness and his threat to hit the correctional officer in the

head, spit in her face, clinch his fists, and be angry. Id., Exhibit 4: 19.

In response to Dr. Burton’s declaration and live testimony, Danks obtained the declaration of

Michael B. Coburn, M.D., a psychiatrist who actually was consulted by Danks’ attorneys in the capital

trial in 1991. In advance of swearing out his declaration, Dr. Coburn was asked to and did review Dr.

Burton’s testimony to determine whether Dr. Burton’s conclusions were consistent with the preliminary

impressions he (Dr. Coburn) formed following his examination of Danks in 1991, that Danks was

incompetent to stand trial for capital murder and further diagnostics steps were necessary to obtain an

adequate assessment of Danks’ then current mental state. Exhibit 5: 38-39.

IV. Relevant Pleadings and Claims

Danks’ original state petition, filed December 8, 2003, raised 32 claims for relief. His second

state petition, filed on September 13, 2011, presents seven claims for relief, all of which are supported

by facts alleged in the original state petition, plus the evidence adduced at the Keyhea hearing and the

fact and implications derived from the Plata opinion. The seventh is of these claims alleges Danks is

incompetent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).

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Danks’ federal petition alleges 37 claims for relief. In the federal petition table of contents,

Claims 1 through 30 correspond almost exactly with the table of contents for Claims 1 through 30 in the

original state petition. Claim 36 in the federal petition, alleging Danks is incompetent to be executed

under Ford, corresponds to Claim 7 in the second state petition. Claim 37 of the federal petition, like

Claim 31 of the original state petition, alleges cumulative error. Claims 31 through 35 of the federal

petition allege constitutional violations for jury instructional errors and deprivation of Danks’ right of

self-representation. The Court discerns no corresponding state court claims in either the original or the

second state petition for the jury instruction or self-representation claims.

V. Standard for Ordering Abeyance of Federal Proceedings

The parties do not disagree about the standard for ordering abeyance of federal proceedings.

Under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), district courts have discretion to hold proceedings in

abeyance to permit state court exhaustion of claims filed in a mixed petition in federal court. Id. at 276. 

The high Court observed that “it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a stay

and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner [1] had good cause for his failure to exhaust, [2] his

unexhausted claims are potentiallymeritorious, and [3] there is no indication that the petitioner engaged

in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 278. Where the petitioner satisfies these criteria, “the

district court should stay, rather than dismiss, the mixed petition.” Id. 

The Warden adds that Rhines cautions “abeyance should be available only in limited

circumstances,” id. at 277, and courts should not effectively excuse a petitioner’s failure to present

claims in the first instance to the state court. The Warden also offers a working definition of “good

cause” which Rhines did not explain. Acknowledging that “good cause” for abeyance is less stringent

than an “extraordinary circumstances” standard, the Warden argues that at a minimum, “good cause”

requires a showing of diligence, citing Ninth Circuit authority in another context. See Johnson v.

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 974 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). 

VI. Analysis

There are three categories of claims brought to the Court’s attention by Danks’ motion for

abeyance. First, there is Danks’ Ford claim. Second, there are the numerous other mental state claims

which Danks has augmented by the evidence adduced at the state Keyhea proceedings as well as by the

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Supreme Court’s decision in Plata. Finally, there are the five claims which appear never to have been

presented to the California Supreme Court alleging instructional errors and denial of self-representation.

A. The Ford Claim

As the Warden argues, Danks’ Ford claim is premature. Simply stated under both federal and

state law, a determination of whether a defendant is mentally competent to be executed cannot be

determined until the defendant’s execution date has been set. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943

(2007) and People v. Leonard, 40 Cal. 4th 1370, 1430-31 (2007). 

In his reply, Danks presents a somewhat tortured analysis. He maintains his Ford claim must

be raised in a first (federal) petition and then dismissed as premature, citing Martinez-Villareal v.

Stewart, 118 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1997). In the event the habeas relief is denied and an execution

date is set, Danks continues, the Ford claim can be presented anew without being subjected to the

restrictions of a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), citing id. and Stewart v.

Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 645 (1998). Then, contrary to the holding by the Ninth Circuit in

Martinez-Villareal, Danks also recognizes the authority of Panetti, 551 U.S. at 947, that a Ford claim

filed when it is first ripe is not subject to the second or successive petition bar under § 2244(b)(2).

Whatever Danks’ understanding was previously, it is clear now that he understands he didn’t

need to raise his Ford claim only to have it dismissed as premature, but, instead was and is at liberty to

raise it without impediment when the claim actually becomes ripe. 

Claim 36 of the federal petition is subject to immediate dismissal as premature. When and if the

claim becomes ripe, Danks may raise it again and it will not be subject to the statutory requirements for

second and successive petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).

B. Other Augmented Mental State Claims

For the augmented mental state claims, Danks highlights the testimony of Dr. Burton in three

respects: 1) Danks has suffered from a serious psychotic illness since adolescence; 2) his mental illness

is directly connected to his aggressive behaviors; and 3) anti-psychotic medication is the most medically

appropriate means of treating Danks’ illness and protecting the safety of others. He argues that this

testimony, which he refers to has “the Warden’s recent concessions,” and the holding in Plata provide

substantial support for several of the mental-health-related claims in the original state petition, including

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most notably that the homicide of Mr. Holt at CCI was “the foreseeable result of the State’s

unconstitutional denial of psychiatric treatment” of Danks. Citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), outlining

the exhaustion requirement of federal claims in state court, and Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___,

___,131 S. Ct. 1384, 1401 (2011), holding the goal of AEDPA is to promote comity, finality and

federalism by giving state courts the first opportunity to review a claim and correct any constitutional

violation in the first instance, he argues abeyance is the appropriate procedure to vindicate these

principals.

Danks also argues he has satisfied all the Rhines factors. Given the timing of when the new

factual and legal support came into existence, it would have been “impracticable” for him to have

presented this information to the California Supreme Court earlier. Therefore, he has shown good cause. 

Second, he argues his claims have merit, especially as substantiated by testimony of the CDCR

psychiatrist (who Danks refers to as “the Warden’s psychiatric expert”). He claims that Dr. Burton’s

testimony essentially agrees with the verified allegations and expert medical opinions presented in the

original state petition, that Danks medical records indicated the need for anti-psychotic medication

before Mr. Holt’s death, that Danks’ homicidal behavior were a direct result of his unmedicated

condition, and that providingDanks with medicallyindicated medication would have avoided the capital

homicide at CCI. Finally, because of the timing of the filing of this second state petition, he maintains

he has been diligent as well as expeditious in raising the new factual and legal information in a second

state petition before the California Supreme Court. He adds that the requested abeyance will not create

delay, since his second state petition now already is before the state court. He further notes that if the

California grants relief, this entire federal proceeding will be moot. In his reply, Danks further informs

the Court that the California Supreme Court, on September 29, 2011, directed the State of California to

file an informal response to the second state petition on or before October 31, 2011. Danks takes this

briefing order as an affirmation that his claims may warrant plenary adjudication in state court if the

Warden fails to refute the legal or factual bases supporting the claims. In so arguing he notes that in

successor “exhaustion” petitions, such as his second state petition, requests for informal briefing by the

California court are not automatic.

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The Warden’s focus with respect to the augmented mental state claims is Danks’ failure to meet

the Rhines good cause requirement. Essentially, he maintains good cause has not been established

because the new factual and legal predicates are duplicative of support for the claims Danks previously

presented to the California Supreme Court in the original petition or irrelevant. First, Danks’ mental

state has been litigated extensively, all the way back to his state trial. Turning to the Supreme Court

decision in Plata, the Warden argues the holding isn’t about whether the level of mental health care at

the time of Danks’ incarceration at CCI was constitutionally deficient. Rather it is an affirmation of the

three-judge order requiring reduction of the number of inmates in California prisons. Plata, 131 S. Ct.

at 1947. The Warden claims the decision that the mental health care in California State prisons was

already adjudicated in Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995). He argues nothing in

the Plata opinion would affect Danks’ prior or pending claims. With respect to Dr. Burton’s testimony,

the Warden points out that the entire Keyhea proceeding was conducted to determine Danks’ current

competence and need for involuntary medication. Danks’ current mental state, the Warden argues, is

not and should not be the subject matter of his habeas claims. The Warden also takes issue with Danks’

position the Warden has conceded that if Danks would have been medicated while he was incarcerated

at CCI, the capital homicide would never have happened. The Warden refers to Danks’ argument in this

respect as “outlandish” and clarifies that the “Warden has never made such broad statements.”

Rather than delay resolution of the exhausted claims, the Warden maintains the unexhausted

claims and allegations should be deleted from the federal petition. He argues that if the facts and legal

predicates are “truly newly discovered,” Danks would be free to seek to amend those claims into his

federal petition following exhaustion in state court, subject to a determination of timeliness and

relationship back under Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005). Danks responds that the delete,

exhaust, amend, and then litigate timeliness process is a cumbersome procedure which can be

completely alleviated by the much more expeditious procedure of abeyance.

The circumstances presented in this case convince the Court that Danks has established full

compliance with the Rhinesfactors: good cause, merit, and lack of delay. As Danks argues, good cause

exists for him not to have brought the facts of his Keyhea hearing or the Supreme Court decision in Plata

to the California Supreme Court earlier. The Warden’s characterization of Coleman v. Wilson, 912

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F.Supp. 1282, as independent of Brown v. Plata is disingenuous. Coleman v. Wilson, now Coleman

Brown, is one of the two cases consolidated into Brown v. Plata. Next, contrary to the Warden’s

argument, the additional support the new factual and legal predicates provide is not merely duplicative

of what Danks previously presented. CDCR psychiatric expert Dr. Burton stated: 1) Danks has suffered

from a serious psychotic illness since adolescence, 2) his mental illness is directly connected to his

aggressive behaviors, and 3) anti-psychotic medication is the most medically appropriate means of

treating Danks’ illness and protecting the safety of others. While this is not a departure from what

Danks’ own experts have presented in the past, it is quite different from the position taken by the State

of California at Danks’ trial, on appeal, and on state habeas. Danks has exaggerated, however, the extent

of “the Warden’s concession.” Although CDCR may be said to have conceded that Danks has suffered

from a serious psychotic illness since adolescence and that appropriate medication can control his

aggressive behaviors, that is not the same as conceding to the merits of his claim that lack of adequate

anti-psychotic medication was the foreseeable cause of Danks killing Mr. Holt. 

Since the augmented claims are the same as the claims in the original state petition, they are no

less meritorious augmented than they were when the were pleaded in the first place. The fact they are

now further substantiated certainly does not detract from their merit. Moreover, the fact that the

California Supreme Court has requested the State of California to file an informal response by October

31, 2011 does indicate that the state court intends to give the augmented claims more than summary

review with a “postcard” denial. 

Timeliness also is established since Danks filed the state petition within two weeks after the

conclusion of the CDCR’s Keyhea proceeding. The danger of delay also is minimized since the

California Supreme Court currently is gearing up for litigation of the second state petition.

C. Claims 31 through 35

As best as the Court can discern, Claims 31 through 35 have not been exhausted. It also is clear

that the one-year limitations period has passed. Under Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001),

those claims are untimely and not subject to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Accordingly, it appears the claims should be dismissed as unexhausted and barred bythe one-yearstatute

of limitations. It is further questionable whether amendment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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15(a) to reallege those claims (after they have been exhausted) would be useful because of the stringent

requirements for relation-back Danks must satisfy under Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. at 664 (the original

and amended petitions state claims that “are tied to a common core of operative facts”). Since neither

party addressed this issue, Danks will be given an opportunity to respond by filing a return to the Court’s

order to show cause as set forth below.

VII. Order

1. The motion to hold federal proceedings is granted, except as to Claim 1 through

36 of the petition. Abeyance will commence after the Court addresses the

viability of Claims 31 through 35. The Clerk is directed not to flag this case as

stayed until that time.

2. Claim 36 is dismissed as premature.

3. Danks is ordered to show cause why Claims 31 through 35 should not be

dismissed as barred by the one-year statute of limitation. The return should be

filed within two weeks from the entry of this order addressing the authorities

cited in the body of the order. The Warden’s response shall be filed within one

calendar week of the filing of Danks’ return. The matter thereafter will stand

submitted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 14, 2011 

 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

 Lawrence J. O’Neill

United States District Judge

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