Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02125/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02125-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 The caption is modified in accordance with Respondents’

statement that “Warden D.K. Sisto, as Tolliver’s custodian, is the

proper respondent in this case.” (Appl. at 2 n.1 (citing Stanley v.

Cal. Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994)).)

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARENCE TOLLIVER, )

) 2:05-cv-2125-GEB-GGH-P

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

D.K. SISTO, et al., )

)

Respondents.1 )

)

On March 1, 2007, Respondent filed an “Application for Stay

of February 27, 200[7] Order and Judgment [(“February 27 Order”)]

Pending Appeal.” Respondent requests a “stay [of] the portion of the

order directing that [Petitioner] be released on March 12, 2007 . . .” 

(Resp.’s Appl. at 2.) Further, Respondent states “[i]f the Court is

not inclined to grant a stay pending appeal, Respondent . . . requests

a temporary stay to allow time to seek a stay in the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals.” (Id.) Petitioner opposes both requests. (Opp’n

at 3-4.)

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2

STAY PENDING APPEAL

Respondent seeks a stay of the February 27 Order pending

appeal to the Ninth Circuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

62(c) (“Rule 62(c)”). Rule 62(c) “provides that when an appeal is

taken from a final judgment granting an injunction, the court has

discretion to suspend the injunction during the pendency of an appeal

upon such terms that will secure the rights of the adverse party.” 

(Appl. at 2 (citing Rule 62(c)).) 

“The plain language of [Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

23 (“Rule 23”)] gives the district court jurisdiction concurrent with

the appeals court over the custody of a habeas petitioner. As the

Supreme Court has made clear, a district court has broad discretion in

conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief, including whether or

not to release a prisoner pending appeal.” Stein v. Wood, 127 F.3d

1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770,

775 (1987)). Rule 23(c) provides that “[w]hile a decision ordering

the release of a prisoner is under review, the prisoner must--unless

the court or judge rendering the decision, or the court of appeals, or

the Supreme Court, or a judge or justice of either court orders

otherwise--be released on personal recognizance . . . .” 

“[T]he factors regulating the issuance of a stay are . . . :

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay

will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton, 481 U.S.

at 776. Respondent argues that “[i]n addition to these factors, the

Court should also consider the risk that [Petitioner] will flee upon

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release, the risk of danger to the public if he is released, and the

State’s interest in continuing his custody and rehabilitation.” 

(Appl. at 4 (citing Hilton, 481 U.S. at 777).)

Respondent contends that a stay pending appeal should be

granted because (1) Respondent has a high likelihood of success on the

merits of his appeal (Appl. at 4); (2) the Governor and the public

will be irreparably injured if the Governor is required to reevaluate

Petitioner’s suitability for parole in accordance with the February 27

Order before the appeal from that order is adjudicated (id. at 10);

(3) the issuance of a stay would not substantially injure Petitioner

(id. at 11); and (4) a stay is necessary to protect the public’s

safety pending the appeal since Petitioner is a convicted murderer

(id. at 9). 

Petitioner counters that (1) Respondent has not shown a

likelihood of success on the merits of his appeal (Opp’n at 5); (2)

neither the Respondent nor the Governor will be irreparably injured if

Petitioner is released pending appeal (id. at 10); (3) Petitioner will

suffer irreparable harm if he is not released pending Respondent’s

appeal (id. at 11); and (4) a stay is not necessary to protect the

public’s safety since the parole board has found that Petitioner “does

not currently present an unreasonable threat to public safety” and

Petitioner “will be closely supervised by a parole officer . . . and

will be subject to various conditions of parole” (id. at 10).

First, for the reasons stated in the February 27 Order,

Respondent has not established that he is “likely to succeed on the

merits.” Respondent contends that the February 27 Order incorrectly

relied upon Irons v. Warden of Cal. State Prison-Solano, 358 F. Supp.

2d 936, 947 (E.D. Cal. 2004) which, at the time of Respondent’s

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Application, was “pending appeal.” (Appl. at 7.) Yesterday, the

Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Irons. 2007 WL 656345, No. 05-

15275 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2007). Although the Circuit reversed the

district court’s opinion in Irons, the Ninth Circuit opinion reveals

that Respondent is not likely to succeed on the merits of his appeal

in the case sub judice. The Circuit confirmed that a California

prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole,

and that a decision denying parole “deprives a prisoner of due process

with respect to th[at] interest if the . . . decision is not supported

by ‘some evidence in the record.’” Id. at *3. The Circuit also

stated that the holding in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-17 (9th

Cir. 2003), upon which the February 27 Order partially relied, and

which Respondent states the Circuit has “backed away from” (Appl. at

7), “represents the law of this circuit.” Irons, 2007 WL 656345, at

*5. 

The Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting

Irons’ petition because it found that, in light of Sass v. Cal. Board

of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006), upon which Respondent

also relies, some evidence supported the finding that Irons was

unsuitable for parole. Irons, 2007 WL 656345, at *4. However, the

Circuit went on to note that even if some evidence supported the

decision, the denial of parole could still have violated Irons’ right

to due process. Id. at *5. The Circuit found that there was no due

process violation because Irons “had not served the minimum number of

years to which [he] had been sentenced at the time of the challenged

parole denial.” Id. The Circuit specifically stated: “All we held

in [Biggs and Sass] and all we hold today, therefore, is that given

the particular circumstances of the offenses in these cases, due

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process was not violated when these prisoners were deemed unsuitable

for parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms.” Id.

(emphasis added). 

The Circuit went on to state that “in some cases, indefinite

detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless

of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due

process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from the

relevant California statutes.” Id. at *6. In the case sub judice,

not only had Petitioner served his minimum sentence at the time the

Governor reversed the parole board’s finding that he was suitable for

parole, but there was also evidence of his rehabilitation, and the

parole board found that he was suitable for parole. Therefore,

Respondent is not likely to succeed on the merits on appeal.

Additionally, Respondent’s argument that the Governor and

the public will suffer irreparable if the Governor has to “compl[y]

with the [February 27 Order] and evaluate[ Petitioner’s] suitability

without considering his crime and his social history” (Appl. at 11),

is unpersuasive. First, Respondent’s application seeks only to stay

the release portion of the February 27 Order, not the portion of the

Order providing the Governor with an opportunity to correct the

constitutional violation (Appl. at 2). Second, the February 27 Order

does not require the Governor to take any action; rather, the February

27 Order only provides the Governor with an opportunity to correct the

constitutional violation. (Feb. 27 Order at 5 (emphasis added).) 

Moreover, Petitioner has a strong irreparable harm position,

since under the parole board’s determination that he should already

have been released, Petitioner has no prison sentence remaining to be

served. Therefore, Petitioner would be irreparably harmed by a stay

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2 Respondent argues that since Respondent’s stay is sought in

district court, Rule 62(c) governs rather than Rule 23(c), which creates

a presumption in favor of release of a prisoner while a decision

ordering the release is under review. (Appl. at 3 n.2.) Respondent

therefore contends that “this Court should be more willing to stay its

order than an appellate court applying rule 23” because the presumption

in favor of release articulated in Rule 23(c) is not present in Rule

62(c). (Id.) Petitioner rejoins that Rule 23(c) governs Respondent’s

application for a stay. (Opp’n at 4.) Since Respondent has not shown he

is entitled to a stay pending appeal under either rule, the issue of

which rule applies need not be reached. 

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that would keep him in prison indefinitely, especially since

Respondent has indicated that, if necessary, he “will pursue this

matter to the United States Supreme Court.” (Reply at 2.) 

Nor has it been shown that Petitioner would be a danger to

the public if released, in light of the parole board’s finding that

Petitioner “does not currently present an unreasonable threat to

public safety” and “will be closely supervised by a parole officer.” 

(Opp’n at 10). 

For the stated reasons, Respondent has not shown that a stay

pending appeal should issue.2

 Therefore, Respondents’ application for

a stay pending appeal is denied.

TEMPORARY STAY

Respondent further seeks a temporary stay of the portion of

the February 27 Order directing that Petitioner be released on March

12, 2007, so that Respondent can seek a stay from the Ninth Circuit. 

(Appl. at 2.) Because Petitioner has not pointedly shown why

Respondent’s request for a temporary stay should be denied, the March 

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28 3 Respondent failed to state how much time he desired to seek a

stay in the Ninth Circuit.

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12, 2007 date for release in the February 27 Order is changed to March

22, 2007.3

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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