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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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JERRY JOE 

v. 

M. ELDON 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MEDINA, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

BARNES, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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Nos. 94-4222 

& 95-4006 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 91-CV-464) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Jerry Joe Medina, pro se, for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Angela F. Micklos, Assistant Attorney General, and Jan Graham, 

Attorney General, State of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, LOGAN, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-4006 Document: 01019280394 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 1 
I 

Petitioner Jerry Joe Medina appeals the second dismissal of 

his habeas corpus petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, following our 

remand to the district court after the original dismissal. Medina 

v. Barnes, Nos. 91-4207 & 92-4030 (Dec. 11, 1992). The remand 

order focused on petitioner's allegations that two key prosecution 

witnesses gave perjured testimony, thereby undermining the fundamental fairness of petitioner's trial and second degree murder 

conviction. The district court dismissed again after determining 

petitioner failed to make the requisite showing that would entitle 

him to an evidentiary hearing in federal court. The issue on 

appeal is whether petitioner made the necessary showing to obtain 

an evidentiary hearing in which he might establish cause and 

prejudice for failing to develop in state court the underlying 

facts to support his allegations of perjured testimony. We review 

de novo the denial of habeas relief. Sinclair v. Henman, 986 F.2d 

407, 408 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 129 (1993) .1 

Petitioner was convicted in the shooting death of George 

Givens, a/k/a Gregory Newman. Petitioner first met Givens on the 

night of the murder. The shooting occurred at a party attended by 

Givens and an acquaintance, Rickey Myers, which petitioner also 

attended. Myers was a key government witness who provided the 

only eyewitness testimony identifying petitioner as the killer. 

The other principal government witness was Eli Archuleta, who 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-4006 Document: 01019280394 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 2 
testified that petitioner made an incriminating statement that he 

had killed Givens with a .32 caliber pistol. Petitioner asserts 

that Myers and Archuleta gave perjured testimony, and that petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish disputed 

facts concerning the use of this testimony. 

To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas 

action, the petitioner must first make allegations which, if 

proved, would entitle him to relief. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 

293, 307 (1963), overruled on other grounds gy Keeney v. TamayoReyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). If the petitioner does that the court 

must then determine whether petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to resolve any disputed facts underlying his claims. 

Id. at 309. 

Our prior order remanded this case for consideration of 

petitioner's allegations that his conviction was unlawfully premised upon Myers' and Archuleta's allegedly perjured testimony. 

Those allegations were the basis for petitioner's claims that he 

received ineffective attorney representation--from his trial lawyer for failing to discover the evidence establishing the falsity 

of this testimony, and from his appellate lawyer for failing to 

assert this evidence in his direct appeal. Further, petitioner 

claims that the prosecutor knowingly used false testimony and 

withheld evidence from petitioner that would have contradicted 

Myers' and Archuleta's testimony. Now, having the benefit of the 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-4006 Document: 01019280394 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 3 
state court record,2 we conclude that most of petitioner's allegations are meritless.3 But one, that petitioner's claim of trial 

counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to conduct an investigation 

that would have uncovered evidence undermining Myers' testimony, 

states a claim entitling petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. 

II 

A 

Petitioner's allegations that the prosecutor knowingly used 

perjured testimony must fail because petitioner has not pointed to 

2 Neither the district court, nor this court, in considering 

petitioner's prior appeal, had the state court record before it. 

In order to properly resolve this appeal we have, on our own 

motion, supplemented the appellate record to include the state 

court record in State v. Medina, No. CR-84-814. See Fed. R. App. 

P.lO(e). 

3 In addition to the claims implicated in this court's remand 

order concerning the allegedly false testimony of Archuleta and 

Myers, petitioner also asserted the following grounds for relief: 

(1) the state court post-conviction proceedings denied him a full 

and fair evidentiary hearing, due process and access to the 

courts; (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective representation 

by failing (a) to conduct an adequate investigation concerning the 

testimony of Detective John Johnson; (b) to object, and to preserve for review, the prosecutor's inflammatory closing argument; 

and (c) to object to the Allen instruction, contrary to petitioner's instructions, see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 

(1896); (d) to give the hung jury a lesser included offense 

instruction; (3) the Allen instruction given to the jury was 

legally erroneous; (4) the prosecutor improperly (a) used the 

perjured testimony; (b) withheld exculpatory evidence; and 

(c) made an inflammatory closing argument; (5) petitioner's counsel on direct appeal was ineffective because he failed to raise 

the issues of (a) Johnson's false testimony; and (b) the prosecutor's inflammatory closing argument; and (6) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for second degree murder. 

Although this court's order and judgment ordering remand in 

the earlier appeal did not address specifically these issues presumably they were found meritless. See Medina v. Barnes, Nos. 91-

4207 & 92-4030 (lOth Cir. Dec. 11, 1992). In any event we have 

examined the entire state court record and are satisfied that only 

the issues we treat here in the text are sufficiently meritorious 

to warrant discussion. 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-4006 Document: 01019280394 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 4 
any evidence that the prosecutor was aware the testimony of his 

two key witnesses might be false. For the same reason, petitioner's claim that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence 

tending to contradict or undermine Myers' and Archuleta's testimony lacks merit. Petitioner states no facts that would support 

his assertion that the prosecution was in possession of such evidence. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1469-70 (lOth Cir. 

19 9 5) . Because these claims were meritless, any allegation that 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise them on 

direct appeal must also fail. See Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 

1508, 1515 (lOth Cir. 1995). In addition, petitioner's appellate 

counsel did file a motion with the Utah Supreme Court submitting 

the newly discovered evidence· contradicting Myers' and Archuleta's 

testimony. That court denied the motion on the basis that it 

involved matters outside-the trial court record. Thus, appellate 

counsel was not constitutionally ineffective on the basis petitioner alleges. 

B 

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to conduct an adequate investigation that would have 

revealed evidence impeaching Eli Archuleta's testimony. Archuleta 

gave somewhat confusing testimony that he had sold petitioner a 

.38 caliber weapon and that, after the shooting, petitioner 

approached Archuleta in The Annex bar and assured Archuleta that 

he had shot the victim with another weapon, a .32 caliber gun.4 

4 The coroner determined that the fatal wound could have been 

inflicted by either a .32 or a .38 caliber bullet. IV Supp. R. 

(continued on next page) 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-4006 Document: 01019280394 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 5 
Petitioner argues that an adequate investigation by counsel would 

have revealed that Archuleta was testifying pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution not to prosecute him or revoke his 

parole. Petitioner also asserts that before trial Archuleta had 

been involved in an ongoing argument with Leonard Fernandez, 

petitioner's cousin and a key defense witness, and that Archuleta 

had tried to kill Fernandez and had threatened Fernandez' family. 

These issues, however, were raised at trial. Also, defense 

counsel presented rebuttal testimony concerning the feud between 

Archuleta and Fernandez. The only additional evidence petitioner 

asserts counsel should have obtained was the testimony of a parttime disc jockey who worked at The Annex who, according to his 

affidavit, could have testified that he knew both petitioner and 

Archuleta. The disc jockey purportedly would have testified that 

he had never seen petitioner in The Annex, nor had he ever seen 

petitioner socializing with Archuleta. I R. doc. 3, addendum at 

16. This additional evidence is at most cumulative, and of limited probative value; it cannot provide the basis for habeas 

relief. See Romero v. Tansy, 46 F.3d 1024, 1030 (lOth Cir.) 

(considering potential value to defense of evidence counsel might 

have discovered in assessing whether counsel was ineffective for 

failing to conduct investigation), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2591 

(continued from previous page) 

563. A state criminalist indicated that the fragments taken from 

the victim were consistent with either a .357 or a .38 caliber 

bullet. Id. at 657-58. 

6 

Appellate Case: 95-4006 Document: 01019280394 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 6 
(1995). Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim based on trial counsel's inadequately investigating Archuleta's testimony must fail. 

c 

Petitioner's allegation that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to adequately investigate Rickey Myers' trial testimony is a much more serious issue. Myers was the only eyewitness 

to testify, and he identified petitioner as the shooter. Myers 

further testified that he had only met the victim that same evening while sight-seeing when the victim had invited Myers to party 

with him; and he testified that he, Myers, did not have any criminal record. Petitioner asserts, however, that after the trial he 

received information from an assistant district attorney and an 

FBI agent that Myers had a lengthy criminal history, had known and 

been involved in criminal activity with the victim for some time, 

and had been in prison with the victim. Petitioner asserts that 

had his attorney conducted an adequate pretrial investigation she 

would have discovered these facts. 

To be entitled to habeas relief due to the ineffectiveness of 

defense counsel, petitioner must establish both that counsel's 

performance was deficient and that the deficiencies prejudiced the 

defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We 

evaluate counsel's performance from her perspective at the time of 

that performance, considered in light of all the circumstances, 

and we indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell 

within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 

Id. at 689. 

7 

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The defense theorized at trial that Myers, rather than petitioner, shot the victim as Myers and the victim left the party. 

Defense counsel contended as much in her opening statement: 

Listen very carefully . . . to see if the State can tell 

you why Mr. Medina would kill Mr. Givens when they had 

no contact, when there's no evidence that he even knew 

him, and you listen carefully to Rickey Myers who has 

spent time with Mr. Givens -- he said he had just met 

him, but we don't know that -- who spent time with him 

and obviously had more of an opportunity to build up a 

reason. 

III Supp. R. 177. The issue whether Myers knew the victim before 

the evening of the shooting, therefore, was crucial to petitioner's defense. Further, defense counsel cross-examined a police 

detective about Myers' criminal record. See IV Supp. R. 500, 508. 

That detective testified that police had discovered no criminal 

history for Myers, but that·their search had been limited to the 

State of Utah. Id. at 508. Myers himself denied ever having been 

convicted of a crime. Id. at 601. Thus, these issues were critical to the defense; and defense counsel herself identified them 

as such. Consequently, petitioner's argument that his attorney 

failed to conduct an adequate investigation into these matters 

sufficiently alleges performance falling below the objective 

standard of reasonable representation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688. 

Having made allegations which, if proven, would establish 

counsel's constitutionally deficient performance, petitioner must 

also establish prejudice to his defense as a result of that deficient performance. Id. at 687. Prejudice will be established if 

11 there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

8 

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different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome. 11 Id. at 694. 

Our review of the record convinces us that Myers' testimony 

was crucial to petitioner's conviction. Myers was presented as 

the only eyewitness to the murder. The record contains no testimony about a confrontation between petitioner and the victim. The 

only other evidence supporting the conviction were: (1) a live 

.38 caliber bullet found in petitioner's car the morning after the 

murder--which may or may not have been the same caliber as the 

fatal bullet; and (2) Archuleta's testimony--previously discussed, 

which was confusing and questionable.5 Myers' testimony was 

critical. And the evidence petitioner asserts his attorney should 

have discovered linking Myers to the victim and their previous 

criminal activity goes to the heart of Myers' credibility. Further, at one point during their deliberations, the jurors indicated that they might be unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Cf. 

Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1564-65 (lOth Cir. 1994) (considering, among other factors, length of jury deliberation, in 

determining whether failure to submit mitigating evidence to jury 

was prejudicial), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1830 (1995). All of 

these circumstances lead us to conclude that petitioner has 

alleged sufficient prejudice resulting from counsel's failure to 

5 For example, Archuleta's first testimony about when petitioner 

told him he had killed a man with a .32 weapon appears to declare 

that the confession occurred before the actual killing. See IV R. 

Supp. 665-66. Archuleta also seemed to have trouble determining 

whether he sold petitioner the gun before or after the killing. 

Id. at 667. He seemed to have trouble remembering the kind of 

bullets involved in the alleged sale. Id. at 672-73. It was 

established that Archuleta was feuding with petitioner's cousin, 

with whom petitioner was living at the time of the shooting. 

9 

Appellate Case: 95-4006 Document: 01019280394 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 9 
investigate the relationship between Myers and the victim to 

entitle petitioner to habeas relief for ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

III 

A 

The state court conducted a post-conviction evidentiary 

hearing on the issue of trial counsel effectiveness in failing to 

conduct an adequate investigation. It determined that counsel was 

not ineffective. That hearing, however, specifically failed to 

consider petitioner's newly discovered evidence that Myers had an 

extensive criminal history and had criminal links to the victim. 

In habeas cases a federal court defers to the state court's 

findings of disputed issues of historical fact, see, ~, Smith 

v. Secretary of N.M. Dep't of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 806 n.2 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995), absent some 

reason to doubt the adequacy or the accuracy of the fact-finding 

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We have attempted to obtain 

a transcript of the state court hearing. We made inquiry not only 

of the district court but of the Utah Supreme Court and the state 

trial court. We were told they transmitted to us everything they 

have. Thus, the hearing either was not transcribed or the transcript has been lost. 

We believe having that transcript is not essential to decide 

this appeal because the state court made no specific findings of 

historical fact underlying its conclusion that counsel was effective. See I R. doc. 3, addendum at 28-32. The brief state court 

10 

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order is conclusory in nature and silent as to petitioner's specific factual assertions supporting his ineffective assistance 

claims. The order also recites that petitioner's claim of newly 

discovered evidence is more properly raised as a motion for new 

trial to the trial court, but again without mentioning the nature 

of the purported new evidence. Thus its conclusion is not entitled to a presumption of correctness under§ 2254(d). The ultimate determination of the effectiveness of counsel involves a 

mixed issue of law and fact that we review de novo. Smith, SO 

F.3d at 818 n.26 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698); see also 

Dever v. Kansas State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1536 (lOth Cir. 

1994). Therefore, we are not bound by the state court's conclusion. 

B 

Having alleged a claim which, if proven, would entitle him to 

habeas relief, petitioner should receive an·evidentiary hearing 

11 [w]here the facts are in dispute, ... if [he] did not receive a 

full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the 

time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding." Townsend, 372 

u.s. at 312. 

11 

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In Townsend, the Supreme Court delineated six circumstances 

that would require a federal habeas court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.6 Id. at 312-13. By citing to Keeney v. TamayoReyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), in our remand order, we focused the 

district court's inquiry on the fifth of those six circumstances. 

It requires an evidentiary hearing when the facts were not adequately developed in the state court, so long as that failure is 

not attributable to the petitioner. Keeney provides that, in 

situations governed by this fifth Townsend circumstance, federal 

habeas courts must apply the now familiar cause and prejudice 

standard to determine whether a habeas petitioner's failure to 

develop relevant facts in state court will be excused. Keeney, 

504 U.S. at 11-12. We review de novo the district court's determination that petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Dever, 36 F.3d at 1535. 

The Keeney Court indicated that, in addressing Townsend's 

fifth circumstance, attorney error will ordinarily not provide 

cause necessary to excuse a petitioner's failure to develop facts 

in state court because a petitioner does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Keeney, 504 

U.S. at 10 n.5 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) and 

6 Townsend provides for a mandatory evidentiary hearing if: 

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in a state 

hearing; (2} the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the state fact-finding procedure was not adequate to afford petitioner a full and fair hearing; (4) there are substantial allegations of newly discovered 

evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at 

the state hearing; and (6) for any reason it appears that the 

state trier of fact did not afford petitioner a full and fair 

factual hearing. 372 U.S. at 312-13. 

12 

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Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)). In this case, however, 

respondent argues, and the district court based its denial of a 

hearing, on petitioner's failure to assert at trial the evidence 

linking Myers with the victim. Petitioner, of course, is constitutionally entitled to effective representation of counsel at 

trial. ~' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85. 

Further, petitioner did afford the state a full and fair 

opportunity to address and resolve his claim that newly discovered 

evidence, which should have been discovered by competent counsel, 

established a link between Myers and the victim. See Keeney, 504 

U.S. at 10. The state, however, expressly never considered the 

merits of that claim, although it also never asserted any procedural reason precluding it from doing so. Under these circumstances petitioner cannot be faulted for failing to develop this 

evidence in state post-conviction proceedings. See Rhoden v. 

Rowland, 10 F.3d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (federal evidentiary 

hearing warranted where petitioner took all steps to develop 

facts, but state court deprived him of opportunity to.do so); 

United States ex rel. Collins v. Welborn, 868 F. Supp. 950, 988 

(N.D. Ill. 1994) (if success on constitutional claim required 

presentation of evidence outside trial record, failure to develop 

record concerning that claim on direct appeal will not be deemed 

waiver so long as petitioner presented issue to state court during 

post-conviction proceedings); United States ex rel. Williams v. 

Washington, 863 F. Supp. 697, 702 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (petitioner 

entitled to federal evidentiary hearing where she was not free to 

expand record on direct appeal; while she may have been able to 

13 

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obtain evidence through state post-conviction proceedings, state 

has conceded exhaustion of state court remedies for purposes of 

this federal petition), aff'd, 59 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1995). 

Petitioner has consistently asserted that he was unable to 

present this evidence because of trial counsel's inadequate 

investigation. See I R. doc. 38 at 1 (among other issues, arguing 

evidentiary hearing required on petitioner's ineffective assistance claim); id., doc. 55 at 1 (requesting reconsideration of 

dismissal of habeas petition, asserting, among other things, that 

the false testimony used to convict petitioner was obtained as a 

result of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel) . As we have discussed above and determined, these assertions are sufficient to 

allege a viable claim for federal habeas relief. A claim of 

ineffective assistance will provide the requisite cause excusing 

petitioner's failure to develop these facts. See Mann v. Scott, 

41 F.3d 968, 985 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1977 

(1995); see generally Banks, 54 F.3d at 1514 (ineffective assistance in violation of Sixth Amendment can establish cause excusing 

procedural bar) . 

c 

The district court correctly noted that if cause for petitioner's failure to develop these facts in state court was predicated upon his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation, then petitioner 

would also have to establish cause and prejudice excusing his 

failure to develop the facts underlying this ineffective assistance claim at the state post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Cf. 

14 

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Welborn, 868 F. Supp. at 988 (ineffective assistance claim never 

presented to state court could not establish cause under Keeney) . 

In support of this claim, petitioner asserts the same documentary 

evidence that he alleges he presented to the state court in his 

post-conviction proceedings. He contends, however, that he was 

unable to also submit the crucial criminal histories of Myers and 

the victim because he was unable to obtain them without a court 

order. See generally United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters 

Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 751, 780 (1989) 

(Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (C), exempts, as 

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, disclosure of FBI criminal identification records, or "rap sheets," to third parties). 

This allegation, if true, provides sufficient cause to excuse 

petitioner's failure to present this evidence to the state courts. 

See generally McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991) (cause 

requires showing of some external impediment preventing the construction or assertion of claim) . 

Further, the same allegations of prejudice supporting petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim will also support 

prejudice under Keeney justifying an evidentiary hearing. See 

Parkus v. Delo, 33 F.3d 933, 938-39 (8th Cir. 1994); see generally 

Banks, 54 F.3d at 1516 (sufficient allegations of ineffective 

assistance, underlying allegation of required prejudice, sufficient also to establish prejudice excusing state procedural 

default) . Thus, we hold that petitioner has established entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his claim. 

15 

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IV 

We have carefully sifted through the procedural shoals to 

conclude that petitioner has satisfied the cause and prejudice 

test to obtain an evidentiary hearing on the one crucial issue in 

this case--the credibility of Myers. But even had petitioner 

failed in that regard we believe that the narrow 11 fundamental 

miscarriage of justice 11 standard adopted by Keeney, 504 U.S. at 

122, would apply here. This was not a strong case. As discussed, 

Archuleta's testimony was very weak. Myers lied at trial about 

his employment in Omaha and that he had served in the U.S. Army. 

He also lied about how soon he called police, when the dispatcher's record showed it was approximately two hours after the 

shooting rather than the few minutes suggested by Myers. Our 

review of the record convinces us that if Myers, who provided the 

only eyewitness testimony, could be shown to have an extensive 

criminal record, to have served in prison and in criminal activity 

with the victim--contrary to Myers' testimony that he had never 

been convicted of a crime and had only met the victim the night of 

the murder while sight-seeing--the jury almost surely would not 

have convicted petitioner. The trial record also shows one bit of 

testimony that apparently escaped everyone's attention. On direct 

examination Myers, who allegedly was in Salt Lake City alone, was 

asked by the prosecutor where he kept his truck the two or three 

nights before the shooting. In answering he stated "Oh, we parked 

it in one particular spot which is down by the Holiday Inn. 11 IV 

R. Supp. 458 (emphasis added) . This answer might indicate prior 

contact between Myers and the victim. 

16 

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Reading the trial record, we have the distinct impression 

that if petitioner's allegations as to Myers' background, prior 

dealings and contacts with the victim are true, then petitioner 

may indeed be innocent. The respondent admits "no prior court has 

reached the merits of petitioner's claims," and apparently no 

post-conviction proceeding ever reviewed the transcript of petitioner's criminal trial. Brief of Appellee at 14. Rather, this 

case has become a procedural morass. 

Petitioner alleges that after the trial assistant district 

attorney Bernard Tanner and Wendall Coombs of the FBI Criminal 

Identification Division alerted his ex-wife to the extensive 

criminal record of Myers. The criminal records of Myers and the 

victim are unavailable to petitioner because of the Freedom of 

Information Act exemptions. It seems to us that this case may be 

resolved rather quickly by a court order requiring the production 

of the entire criminal record of Myers and the victim. A comparison may establish the truth or untruth of petitioner's claims. 

The information revealed pursuant to such an order should be the 

focus of the evidentiary hearing that results from the remand we 

here order. If the "rap sheets" are inconclusive the district 

court should appoint counsel for petitioner. 

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent 

herewith. 

17 

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