Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01230/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01230-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARON DREVON DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL A. JACQUES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-cv-01230-DAD-JDP (PS)

ORDER

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AN 

ORDER DIRECTING SERVICE

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THAT PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM AND HIS MOTION FOR A 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BE 

DENIED

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

DAYS

ECF Nos. 20, 21, & 26

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Michael Jacques, a commissioner, 

the Placer County Superior Court, the Placer County Department of Child Support Services, and 

Laura Van Buskirk, the director of Placer County Child Support Services. ECF No. 20 at 2-3. 

He alleges that these defendants have engaged in “fraudulent and coercive behavior” by having 

the superior court enter a child support order against him. ECF No. 20-2 at 1-2. His second 

amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim, and I now recommend that it be dismissed 

Case 2:23-cv-01230-DAD-JDP Document 27 Filed 08/02/24 Page 1 of 5
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without leave to amend. I also necessarily deny plaintiff’s motion for service of summons, ECF 

No. 26, and recommend that plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 21, be 

denied.

I. Second Amended Complaint

A. Screening and Pleading Requirements

A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 

in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 

dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. Id.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 

require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 

identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 

give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 

However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

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B. Analysis

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal review of state court decisions regarding 

proceedings in family court. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under

Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct 

appeal from the final judgment of a state court.”); Moore v. Cnty. of Butte, 547 F. App’x 826, 829 

(9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the plaintiff’s claims challenging the outcome of custody 

proceedings were properly dismissed); Rucker v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, State of California, 2003 

WL 21440151, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2003) (finding that the plaintiff’s claims were 

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s rulings where the plaintiff “challenge[d] his 

original child support order on jurisdictional grounds, dispute[d] his total child support 

arrearages, and allege[d] that Santa Clara County’s garnishment order against his disability 

benefits payments is invalid”); See Baquero v. Lallo, No. 2:23-cv-00775-GMN-BNW, 2023 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 129117, *3 (D. Nev. Jul. 7, 2023) (collecting supporting cases and holding that 

“[c]hallenges that attack state court proceedings concerning child custody or court child support 

orders are inextricably intertwined with the state court proceedings and thus beyond the 

jurisdiction of a federal district court under Rooker-Feldman”). Here, plaintiff’s challenge to a 

state court support order falls squarely within the scope of the doctrine. 

Moreover, Commissioner Jacques is immune based on his actions as a judge. See 

Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974) (“The general rule . . . is that judges are

immune from suit for judicial acts within and even in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts 

were done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception to this sweeping cloak of immunity exists 

for acts done in ‘the clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that court commissioners performing judge-like functions 

are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from civil liability for damages). And while 

municipalities such as cities and counties are amenable to suit, departments or bureaus of 

municipalities—like Placer County Child Support Services—are “not generally considered 

‘persons’ within the meaning of Section 1983.” United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th 

Cir. 2005); Lawrie v. Garcia, No. 11-cv-2237-DMS (BLM), 2011 WL 5036861, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 

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Oct. 24, 2011) (holding that the Department of Child Support Services for the County of San 

Diego was “not a proper defendant under § 1983”).

Accordingly, the second amended complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend 

because the claims at issue are fundamentally deficient. 

II. Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order should also be denied. To succeed in 

obtaining preliminary injunctive relief, a claimant must show, among other elements, that he or 

she is likely to succeed on the merits of the relevant claim. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (articulating the standard for preliminary injunctive relief). 

As discussed above, such a showing cannot be made here. 

III. Motion for Service of Summons

Plaintiff’s motion for service of summons is also necessarily denied insofar as he has 

failed to state a cognizable claim. 

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for an order directing service, 

ECF No. 26, is denied. 

Further, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, ECF No. 20, be dismissed without leave to 

amend.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 21, be denied.

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close the case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of 

service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 

court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 

within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 

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Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:23-cv-01230-DAD-JDP Document 27 Filed 08/02/24 Page 5 of 5