Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00522/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00522-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Angelika C. Cutino-Neil (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for cessation of disability insurance benefits

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the 

parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. 

McAuliffe.

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The Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, this 

Court affirms the agency’s determination for cessation of benefits.

 

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The parties consented to jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 6, 8).

ANGELIKA C. CUTINO-NEIL,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-00522-BAM

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On February 4, 2004, the Social Security Administration found Plaintiff disabled as of 

November 26, 2002. AR 17. On June 28, 2011, the Social Security Administration determined that 

Plaintiff was no longer disabled as of June 1, 2011, and her benefits would stop. AR 111-14. Plaintiff 

subsequently requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 145. ALJ 

Christopher Larsen held a hearing on September 30, 2013, and issued an order finding that Plaintiff’s 

disability ended as of June 1, 2011. AR 14-25, 32-65. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, 

which the Appeals Council denied, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. AR

8-10, 13. This appeal followed.

Hearing Testimony

The ALJ held a hearing on September 30, 2013, in Fresno, California. AR 32-65. Plaintiff 

appeared and testified without counsel. AR 34-25. Impartial Vocational Expert (“VE”) Stephen B. 

Schmidt also appeared and testified. AR 34.

At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 46 years old. She had received an Associate of 

Applied Science degree in criminal justice, along with a paralegal degree, and was taking online 

classes at National University to earn her bachelor’s degree in criminal justice. Plaintiff anticipated 

completing her degree in October 2014. AR 38-39. 

Plaintiff reported that she last worked in 2010/2011 as a supervisor at Wal-Mart, but her work 

attempt was unsuccessful because she was required to be on her feet all day. AR 39-41. In the last 

fifteen years, Plaintiff had a number of jobs, including as an after school childcare provider, in privateduty nursing care and as a full-time payroll clerk. AR 41-44.

When asked why she disagreed with the doctor’s conclusion that she was able to work, 

Plaintiff testified that he was a chiropractor who only asked her a few questions and did not conduct a 

physical examination. AR 44-45. Plaintiff explained that her disability was based on degenerative 

disc disease in her lower back, migraines and her knees. Although Plaintiff had her knees replaced, 

she still has knee pain. She also has problems in her back and neck and typically will have 10 

migraines a month lasting four hours or more. If she takes her medication and has fluids, she can 

sleep her migraines off. AR 46-50. Plaintiff testified that she can lift 5 to 10 pounds and can stand no

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more than 10 minutes without having to shift her weight. She thought she could work if she was 

allowed to sit down for 15 minutes every 30 minutes. AR 51-54.

Following Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ elicited testimony from the vocational expert (“VE”) 

Stephen Schmidt. AR 60. The VE testified that Plaintiff’s past work was classified as payroll clerk, 

home attendant, and supervisor, department. AR 60. The ALJ also asked the VE hypothetical 

questions. For the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a worker of Plaintiff’s age, 

education and work experience. This worker could perform sedentary physical exertion as the 

regulations define it, could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, could frequently balance, stoop, 

kneel, crouch, crawl and climb ramps or stairs, and must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, dusts, 

odors, gases and poor ventilation. The VE testified that this worker could perform Plaintiff’s past 

work as a payroll clerk and could perform other jobs in the economy, such as information clerk, order 

clerk and assembly. AR 60.

For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a worker of Plaintiff’s age, 

education and work experience. This worker could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 

pounds frequently, could stand and walk somewhere between two and three hours in an eight-hour day 

and could sit between two and three hours in an eight-hour day, had the same postural limitations as 

the first hypothetical and a restriction against exposure to fumes, dusts. The VE testified that there 

would be no jobs in the economy for such a worker. AR 61-62. 

Medical Record

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. AR 282-577. The relevant medical

evidence, summarized here, will be referenced below as necessary to this Court’s decision. 

In January 2008, Plaintiff underwent rotator cuff repair of her left shoulder. AR 336. Nearly 

two years later, in November 2009, Plaintiff reported pain and neck issues. On examination, 

Plaintiff’s neck had some pain with lateral bend and rotation. Her left shoulder had full motion, no 

impingement and excellent rotator cuff strength without weakness. Dr. Richard Ravalin diagnosed 

Plaintiff with suspected cervical spine degenerative disc disease and status post rotator cuff repair, 

which was stable. AR 342. 

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On March 27, 2010, Plaintiff sought emergency room treatment for exacerbation of neck pain. 

She was given morphine, Phernergan and Soma. AR 398-99. 

On June 1, 2010, Plaintiff sought emergency room treatment for headache, blurry vision and 

slurred speech. The physician suspected that some combination of Plaintiff’s medication was making 

her speech slurred and making her tired. She was given a dose of Dilaudid. AR 393-94.

On July 7, 2010, Plaintiff sought emergency room treatment for right ankle pain. Plaintiff had 

low back pain and right ankle pain. She was given Reglan, morphine and Dilaudid. AR 382-83.

On July 10, 2010, Plaintiff sought emergency room treatment for her back pain, explaining that 

she was out of her narcotic medications and her regular doctor was out of town. Plaintiff had pain 

centered around her left CVA area and her left paraspinous area. Plaintiff was given Dilaudid and 

Zofran. AR 378-79.

On July 14, 2010, Plaintiff reported right ankle pain. On examination, Plaintiff had no 

swelling, no ligament or tendon abnormality, negative talar tilt and positive anterior impingement. 

Plaintiff was diagnosed with right ankle interior impingement. Dr. Ravalin recommended x-rays and 

provided a cortisone injection. AR 343. A right ankle x-ray completed on August 3, 2010, showed 

degenerative change about the right ankle. AR 302. 

On August 4, 2010, Plaintiff reported improvement after her ankle injection. She was 

contemplating surgical intervention with an arthroscopy and decompression. AR 345. 

On November 23, 2010, Plaintiff sought emergency room treatment for exacerbation of 

chronic neck and back pain. Plaintiff stated that she had been working many hours at her job, which 

required her to be on her feet for prolonged periods of time. On examination, Plaintiff had tenderness 

to both sides of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine. Her paraspinous muscle was very tender. 

Plaintiff was given a Dilaudid injection. AR 361-62.

On December 24, 2010, Plaintiff sought emergency room treatment after falling at work two 

days prior. Plaintiff complained of sharp pain in her lower back and was told to go to the ER for pain 

medication. On examination, Plaintiff’s spine was in normal alignment, but she had pain to palpating 

the paraspinal muscles in the lumbar area. She was diagnosed with exacerbation of chronic back pain 

and given Dilaudid, Phenergan and a prescription for Norco. AR 358-59.

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On January 5, 2011, Plaintiff sought emergency room treatment for exacerbation of her 

migraine headache with nausea, vomiting, light and noise sensitivity and blurred vision. Plaintiff was 

treated with Compazine, Benadryl and Dilaudid. AR 352-54.

On June 14, 2011, Dr. Tam Nguyen completed a consultative internal medicine evaluation. 

Plaintiff reported suffering from chronic back pain and joint pain, worse in her knees, neck and 

shoulders. Plaintiff indicated no impact on her activities of daily living. Her hobbies included reading 

books and watching television. She could take care of all her personal needs and housework. On a 

review of systems, Plaintiff denied any muscle ache or pain, weakness or numbness. She was able to 

walk to the exam room without any assistance, sat comfortably and could get up and off the table. On 

physical examination, she had no spinal or paraspinal tenderness on distraction. Straight leg raising 

was negative. She had normal neurological and quick mental status and memory exams. She also had 

normal muscle bulk and tone with strength of 5/5 in her upper and lower extremities. Dr. Nguyen 

diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic back pain – mild to moderate and stable; joint pain likely from 

osteoarthritis due to morbid obesity – moderate and stable; migraine – unsure of sub-types and needed

follow-up with primary care providers; and asthma – based on history and exam she was mild 

persistent and controlled with albuterol PRN. Dr. Nguyen opined that Plaintiff had no limitations for 

standing, walking or sitting. She also had no lifting or carrying limitation, no limitation to postural or 

manipulative activities, and no limitation to her workplace environment or activities. AR 422-26. 

On June 28, 2011, Dr. K. Quint, a state agency medical consultant, completed a Physical 

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. Dr. Quint opined that Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 

50 pounds occasionally, 25 pounds frequently, could stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour 

day, could sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour day and frequently could push and/or pull with her right 

lower extremity. She occasionally could climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes or 

scaffolds. She frequently could balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. She did not have any 

manipulative or visual limitations, but must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases 

and poor ventilation. AR 428-33.

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On October 7, 2011, Dr. N. Haroun, a state agency medical consultant, opined that the 

evidence did not support the presence of any symptoms or signs to establish the presence of a severe 

mental impairment. AR 498-512.

On November 22, 2011, Dr. G. Lee, a state agency medical consultant, completed a Physical 

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. Dr. Lee opined that Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 

50 pounds occasionally, 25 pounds frequently, could stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour 

workday, sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday and frequently could push/pull with her right lower 

extremity. She could occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. 

She frequently could balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. She did not have any manipulative, 

visual or communicative limitations, but must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, 

gases and poor ventilation. AR 513-17.

On May 4, 2012, Dr. Ekram Michiel, a board certified psychiatrist, completed a consultative 

psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff reported depression, anxiety, difficulty concentrating and difficulty 

recalling names or items. She had been on antidepressants since 1989, and stopped taking them in 

2011 because side effects caused her not to be able to concentrate or study for her paralegal program. 

Plaintiff indicated that she was able to take care of her personal hygiene and she could shop, cook and 

do household chores. On mental status examination, her mood was depressed and her affect was 

restricted, sad. She was oriented to person, place and date. Her attention and concentration were 

intact. Additionally, her recent memory was intact and her remote memory did not show any 

impairment. Dr. Michiel diagnosed depressive disorder NOS, and believed that Plaintiff was able to 

maintain attention and concentration to carry out simple job instructions, but could not carry out an 

extensive variety of technical and/or complex instructions. She could relate and interact with 

coworkers, supervisors and the general public and had no restrictions on her activities of daily living. 

AR 519-22.

On May 15, 2012, Dr. R. Betcher, a state agency medical consultant, completed a Physical 

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. Dr. Betcher opined that Plaintiff could lift and/or 

carry 50 pounds occasionally, 25 pounds frequently, could stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-

hour workday, could sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday and could push and/or pull without 

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limitation. Dr. Betcher also opined that Plaintiff frequently could climb ramps and stairs and 

occasionally climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds. She also frequently could balance, stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl. She did not have any manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental 

limitations. AR 525-29.

On June 1, 2012, Dr. N. Haroun, a state agency medical consultant, completed a Psychiatric 

Review Technique form for Plaintiff’s depression NOS. Dr. Haroun opined that Plaintiff did not have 

any functional limitations or repeated episodes of decompensation. AR 535-45.

On September 27, 2012, Plaintiff sought treatment at the Spine & Orthopedic Medical Center 

for evaluation of her lumbar spine. Plaintiff was evaluated by Nurse Practitioner Cindy Stevens. 

Plaintiff described the pain in her lumbar spine as burning, numbness in bilateral legs and spasms. 

She rated her pain as 10 out of 10, which was relieved with rest and worsened with activity. On 

examination, Plaintiff’s head and neck had normal range of motion, no tenderness, normal stability 

and normal muscle strength and tone. Her spine had no tenderness, normal range of motion, normal 

stability and normal muscle strength and tone. A neurological and psychiatric examination was 

normal. A musculoskeletal examination revealed a normal gait and pain in the lumbar spine on the 

left leg raise at about 30 degrees. X-rays of the lumbar spine were grossly negative. Plaintiff was 

diagnosed with lumbar spine pain and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. She was 

prescribed the least dose of Norco and Soma and given a Toradol injection, along with a back support 

and transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulator unit (“TENS unit”). A MRI was requested. 

Additionally, ice and a weight loss regimen were encouraged. Dr. P. James Nugent reviewed and 

approved the examination and treatment plan. AR 550-54.

On October 13, 2012, Plaintiff underwent a lumbar spine MRI, which showed minimal 

degenerative disc disease with mild narrowing of the left L2-L3 and bilateral L3-L4 neural foramen. 

AR 546-47. 

On October 18, 2012, Plaintiff received follow-up treatment with Dr. Nugent at the Spine & 

Orthopedic Medical Center after imaging studies. On examination, Plaintiff had pain in the 

lumbosacral region and restricted motion. Dr. Nugent indicated that x-rays of the lumbar spine 

revealed degenerative changes at multiple levels and the MRI was remarkable for multiple level 

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degenerative disc disease and foraminal narrowing. Dr. Nugent diagnosed lumbar spine pain and 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. Plaintiff underwent screening for osteoporosis. She 

was to continue with a cane, TENS unit, back support, Soma and Norco. Plaintiff wanted to continue 

with conservative care and was referred for consult and treatment of her cervical spine. AR 555-57.

On November 5, 2012, Nurse Practitioner Stevens evaluated Plaintiff’s cervical spine. 

Plaintiff was negative for osteopenia and osteoporosis. Cervical spine x-rays were grossly negative 

with some mild degenerative changes. She was diagnosed with cervical spine pain and degenerative 

disc disease of the cervical spine. She was to undergo a MRI scan and have physical therapy. She 

was to continue Soma, Norco and Vitamin D, along with her TENS unit and lumbar corset, both of 

which worked for her lumbar spine. Dr. Nugent reviewed and approved the evaluation and treatment. 

AR 558-60. 

On November 26, 2012, Plaintiff sought follow-up treatment for her lumbar spine. Plaintiff 

reported benefit from a Toradol injection and was to receive another injection. Additionally, she was 

to start Ibuprofen. AR 562-65.

On November 29, 2012, Plaintiff underwent a CT of her cervical spine, which showed 

degenerative changes of the cervical spine with straightening of the normal lordosis and neural 

foraminal narrowing, degenerative disc at C4-5 and C5-6 with posterior spondylotic ridges resulting in 

central canal stenosis and ossification of the stylohyoid ligament bilaterally, which may be seen with 

Eagle syndrome. AR 548-49. 

On January 23, 2013, Plaintiff sought follow-up treatment for her cervical spine following 

imaging studies. Dr. Nugent indicated that x-rays of the cervical spine revealed multiple level 

degenerative changes, most severe at C4-5 and C5-6, and the MRI was remarkable for degenerative 

changes and disc disease. Dr. Nugent diagnosed cervical spine pain, degenerative disc disease of the 

cervical spine and osteopenia. Plaintiff was to continue with the TENS unit and given an injection. 

Dr. Nugent outlined “conservative care,” and Plaintiff was to proceed with pronex and consider 

cervical facet injections. AR 566-68.

On January 28, April 15 and June 11, 2013, Plaintiff sought follow-up treatment for her lumbar 

spine. She was continued on her medications, with the exception of Ibuprofen, which was 

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discontinued in June. She also received Toradol injections to help with increased pain. AR 569-71, 

572-74. Physical therapy was recommended, which Plaintiff stopped attending due to cost. AR 572-

74, 575-77.

Legal Standard

Where the issue of continued disability or medical improvement is concerned, “a presumption 

of continuing disability arises” in the claimant’s favor once that claimant has been found to be 

disabled. Bellamy v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 755 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 

Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir.1983)). The Commissioner has the “burden of 

producing evidence sufficient to rebut [the] presumption of continuing disability.” Id.; see also 

Murray, 722 F.2d at 500 (“The Secretary ... has the burden to come forward with evidence of 

improvement.”). A reviewing court will not set aside a decision to terminate benefits unless the 

determination is based on legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984); accord Bellamy, 755 F.2d at 1381.

The ALJ’s Decision

A claimant who has been awarded disability benefits is required to undergo periodic disability 

reviews, “to determine whether a period of disability has ended.” Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 415, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 

101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) (most disability determinations must be reviewed at least once every three 

years); see 42 U.S.C. § 421(i)(1) (cases must be reviewed for continuing eligibility “at least once 

every three years”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 (rule governing termination of benefits). To determine 

whether a claimant continues to be disabled for purposes of receiving SSI benefits, the ALJ must 

apply and follow the evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594. 

On November 1, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision and determined that Plaintiff’s 

comparison point decision (“CPD”) was dated October 20, 2015. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 

had the severe impairments of obesity, degenerative disc disease, migraine headaches, asthma and 

status post bilateral knee replacement. The ALJ found that medical improvement had occurred as of 

June 1, 2011, because there had been a decrease in the medical severity of her impairments since her 

CPD. The ALJ determined that as of June 1, 2011, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity 

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(“RFC”) to lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally, less than 10 pounds frequently, could stand and walk 

for two hours in an 8-hour day, could sit for six hours in an 8-hour day, and could frequently balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl and climb ramps or stairs, but could never climb ladders, ropes or 

scaffolds. Plaintiff also must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, dusts, odors, gases and poor 

ventilation. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, but could 

perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The ALJ therefore concluded that 

Plaintiff’s disability ended as of June 1, 2011. AR 18-24.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this 

Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 

1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be 

considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the 

evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. E.g., 

Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s 

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, 

and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of 

Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987). 

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such 

severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his or 

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her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). 

DISCUSSION2

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled 

as of the date of the written decision as required by Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 13-3p and (2)

improperly discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony.

1. Relevant Time Period for Disability Status

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to adjudicate Plaintiff’s disability status through the 

date of the decision as required by SSR 13-3p. (Doc. 15 at pp. 6-7). The Commissioner counters that 

the ALJ was not required to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled through the date of his decision 

because Plaintiff did not meet the insured status requirements as of that date. (Doc. 16 at pp. 9-10). 

SSR 13-3p requires the ALJ to decide “whether the beneficiary is under a disability through 

the date of the [ALJ’s] determination or decision.” SSR 13-3p, 2013 WL 785484, at *4 (Feb. 21, 

2013). Although the Commissioner argues that Plaintiff did not meet the insured status requirements 

as of the date of the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ did not expressly state that Plaintiff was not disabled 

through the date of the decision, nor did the ALJ provide a reason for not determining Plaintiff’s 

disability status through the date of the decision. The Court cannot affirm the ALJ’s decision on a 

ground that the ALJ did not consider in making his decision. See Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 

847 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e cannot affirm the decision of an agency on a ground that the agency did 

not invoke in making its decision.”).

Nonetheless, it is evident from the record that the ALJ specifically considered whether Plaintiff 

had been disabled from June 1, 2011, through the date of the decision. The ALJ summarized and 

discussed evidence spanning from 2010 through 2013 in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, including 

Plaintiff’s own testimony from September 2013. AR 20-23. Any failure of the ALJ to explicitly state 

that Plaintiff had not been disabled from June 1, 2011, through the date of the decision on November 

 

2

The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including 

arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific argument or 

brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief.

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1, 2013, cannot be considered reversible error. This is particularly true given that the bulk of the 

evidence and testimony discussed by the ALJ was from the period of time after Plaintiff’s disability 

was found to have ended (AR 20-22). See, e.g., Mendoza v. Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-00975-SKO, 2016 

WL 4126706, at *5 (“Court cannot find it a violation of SSR 13-3p to not use the magic words 

‘through the date of this decision’ when virtually all the evidence and testimony mentioned and 

analyzed comes from the period after the Plaintiff's disability was found to have ceased”). Further, 

Plaintiff cites no evidence demonstrating that she became disabled at some point between June 1, 

2011, and the date of the decision. (Doc. 15 at pp. 6-7). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s argument that 

the ALJ committed reversible error is without merit. 

2. Credibility

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for finding 

her not credible. (Doc. 15 at pp. 7-11). In deciding whether to admit a claimant’s subjective 

complaints, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 

F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). First, the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of his 

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptom or pain alleged. 

Id. If the claimant satisfies the first step and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject 

the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms only if he makes specific findings and 

provides clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Id. The ALJ must “state which testimony is not 

credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible.” Mersman v. Halter, 161 

F.Supp.2d 1078, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“The lack of specific, clear, and convincing reasons why 

Plaintiff’s testimony is not credible renders it impossible for [the] Court to determine whether the 

ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.”). Factors an ALJ may consider include: (1) 

the applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

1284 (9th Cir. 1996).

At the first step of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable 

impairments can reasonably be expected to produce her alleged symptoms.” AR 21. At the second 

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step, however, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. In so doing, the ALJ provided clear and 

convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff not fully credible. AR 21-23. 

Initially, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living to be inconsistent 

with her complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations. AR 22. An ALJ’s credibility finding may 

consider a claimant’s daily activities which are inconsistent with allegations of disability. Lingenfelter 

v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). In this instance, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s report 

that she “watched television, took care of her personal grooming needs, did laundry, cleaned, used the 

computer, read, prepared simple meals, drove, . . . shopped once or twice a month for 30 to 60 

minutes, and visited with others.” AR 22, 251-58, 263-70. The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s reports 

that she obtained a paralegal degree and was taking full-time college classes, along with statements 

that she could take care of her personal needs and housework and that her pain complaints had no 

impact on her activities of daily living. AR 22, 38-39, 422, 26, 519-22. 

Plaintiff argues that she cannot perform her daily activities on a sustained basis, and faults the 

ALJ for allegedly expecting her to “waste away.” (Doc. 15 at p. 9). While it is true that “[o]ne does 

not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled,” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 

(9th Cir.2001), the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s activities, including her ability to shop, 

perform housework, take college classes and obtain a degree, were inconsistent with her allegations of 

total disability. See Stubbs–Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (claimant’s 

“normal activities of daily living, including cooking, house cleaning, doing laundry, and helping her 

husband in managing finances” was sufficient explanation for rejecting claimant’s credibility); 

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (claimant’s ability to perform various household chores such as cooking, 

laundry, washing dishes and shopping, among other factors, bolstered “the ALJ’s negative conclusions 

about [her] veracity”); see also Branham v. Colvin, 2015 WL 8664157, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 

2015) (ALJ properly considered plaintiff’s activities of daily living in assessing credibility; plaintiff 

was able to use a computer, attend church, shop, ride in a car, cook occasionally and take care of her 

own personal care); Butler v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1108504, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2009) (ALJ 

properly discounted claimant’s credibility in part because she was taking online college courses). 

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“Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting 

the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012).

The ALJ next determined that certain of Plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent with 

statements made to her physicians and with her conduct. An ALJ may properly consider a claimant’s 

inconsistent statements and testimony when assessing credibility. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958–59 (ALJ 

may consider inconsistencies either in either claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and her 

conduct when weighing the claimant’s credibility); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Here, the ALJ 

considered Plaintiff’s assertions she could concentrate for only 0 to 20 minutes and could walk only 

for six to ten feet and then must rest for five minutes. AR 22. The ALJ determined that these 

assertions were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s reports to Dr. Michiel that she was enrolled in college 

classes and could shop, cook and do household chores (AR 22, 519-22), and her reports to Dr. Nguyen

that despite her pain there was no impact on her activities of daily living and she could take care of all 

her personal needs and housework (AR 22, 422-26). The ALJ also appropriately reasoned that 

Plaintiff’s allegations of disability were inconsistent with her testimony not only to the Disability 

Hearing Officer in October 2012 that she was independent in all activities of daily living and was a 

full-time student pursuing a Bachelor’s degree taking online courses (AR 133), but also her statements 

to the ALJ that she obtained a paralegal degree and was taking full-time online classes for a bachelor’s 

degree (AR 38-39).

The Commissioner acknowledges that the ALJ erred in his credibility determination by finding 

that Plaintiff told the Disability Hearing Officer that she could walk four miles. (Doc. 16 at p. 13; AR 

22-23). Although this finding may have been erroneous, the ALJ’s credibility determination will not 

be disturbed because there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s other conclusions. See, e.g., 

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197 (upholding ALJ’s credibility determination even though one reason may 

have been in error).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

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DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Angelika Cutino-Neil. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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