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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 23, 2008 Decided February 29, 2008

No. 07-7053

DEREK T. WILSON,

APPELLANT

v.

CARCO GROUP, INCORPORATED,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv02313)

Kevin L. Chapple argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

James P. Steele argued the cause for appellee. With him on

the brief was Mariana D. Bravo. William J. Carter entered an

appearance.

Before: TATEL, BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Derek T. Wilson appeals the district

court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of CARCO

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Group, Inc. We conclude the Fair Credit Reporting Act does not

always require a plaintiff alleging a violation of 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681e(b) to present expert testimony on the issue of whether

the defendant’s procedures were reasonable. Thus, we reverse

the district court’s order.

I

Viewed in the light most favorable to Wilson, the facts are

as follows. In 2002, Prudential Insurance offered Wilson a job,

contingent upon the satisfactory completion of a background

check. Wilson accepted, and was scheduled to begin on August

12. Around August 1, Prudential retained CARCO to complete

Wilson’s criminal background check in Oklahoma. CARCO

subcontracted with Search & Find to conduct the background

check, and Search & Find retained an outside researcher to

undertake the task.

By August 9, the researcher’s scattershot approach yielded

thirteen “hits,” each apparently corresponding to an individual.

Four days later, Search & Find sent CARCO thirteen “I.D.

pages” with a note saying it was “at a loss.” Prudential then told

Wilson he had criminal charges in Oklahoma—an allegation

Wilson denied. Almost three weeks after being retained, Search

& Find faxed CARCO information on thirteen individuals, six

of whom couldn’t have been Wilson, because their names,

birthdates, and/or races differed from his.

On September 3, Prudential withdrew Wilson’s job offer

because it had “not received a complete and satisfactory

background verification in a reasonable amount of time.” Along

with its withdrawal letter, Prudential enclosed a copy of a

CARCO report which stated, “A criminal record search for

convictions and arrests, where prosecution is pending, was

[initiated] . . . on the subject as follows.” Below this statement,

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a chart listed “Pending” next to the Oklahoma entry for “Wilson,

Derek.”

On the day Prudential withdrew its offer, Wilson began his

own investigation. He contacted the Oklahoma State Bureau of

Investigation and the Oklahoma State Courts Network, both of

which concluded he had no criminal history in the state. Wilson

sent CARCO a letter detailing the results of his investigation.

On September 6, CARCO finally concluded Wilson had no

criminal history in Oklahoma, but Prudential never hired

Wilson. By the time the dust settled, CARCO had taken 36 days

to complete its task. In contrast, Wilson’s own investigation

took ten minutes, spread across 2-3 days.

Wilson sued CARCO in federal court for negligent violation

of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The district court held a

plaintiff in a 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) case always must present

expert testimony; therefore, it granted CARCO’s summary

judgment motion. Wilson appealed.

II

We review summary judgment decisions de novo. See

Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Summary judgment is only proper if “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). We “view the

evidence in the light most favorable to [Wilson and] draw all

reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Czekalski, 475 F.3d at

363.

Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),

“[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer

report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum

possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual

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1The FCRA sometimes requires “strict procedures” in the

employment context. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a). However, we need

not address this issue, because Wilson did not raise a “strict

procedures” claim in the district court. See Holcomb v. Powell, 433

F.3d 889, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting we “normally do[] not give

consideration to issues that were neither raised nor decided below”

(quotation marks omitted)).

about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (emphasis

added).1 The standard for judging the reasonableness of

procedures “is what a reasonably prudent person would do under

the circumstances.” Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47,

51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Applying this standard

“involves weighing the potential harm from inaccuracy against

the burden of safeguarding such accuracy.” Id. Where the

potential harm is great and the burden small, a consumer

reporting agency’s duty to clarify inaccurate or incomplete

information is at its apogee. See Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau,

Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Congress explicitly

established a private cause of action for negligent FCRA

violations in 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a). Wilson sued under § 1681o,

alleging CARCO negligently failed to use reasonable procedures

as required by § 1681e(b).

Federal law governs whether the FCRA requires a plaintiff

alleging a violation of § 1681e(b) to present expert testimony as

to the reasonableness of the defendant’s procedures. This court

has previously applied federal law to describe an FCRA

plaintiff’s burden at summary judgment, and we do so again

today. See, e.g., Stewart, 734 F.2d at 51–56 (establishing a

plaintiff’s burden in a § 1681e(b) case without relying on state

law); cf. Koropoulos, 734 F.2d at 42–45 (holding, as a matter of

federal law, that § 1681e(b) at least sometimes “covers . . .

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2CARCO’s summary judgment motion, Wilson’s opposition

motion, and the district court’s opinion treated Wilson’s claim as an

FCRA claim—not a common law negligence claim. Indeed, the

FCRA expressly preempts state-law negligence claims brought against

“consumer reporting agenc[ies] . . . based on information disclosed by

a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against whom the

user has taken adverse action” unless the agency acted “with malice

or willful intent to injure [the] consumer.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).

Thus, the district court’s citation of a diversity jurisdiction case to

support its conclusion that District of Columbia law applies was

simply incorrect.

incomplete information” as well as technically inaccurate

information).2

Our analysis begins—and ends—with Stewart, which

established “the showing a plaintiff must make for his claim to

survive summary judgment on the issue of the reasonableness of

[defendant’s] procedures.” Stewart, 734 F.2d at 49. Stewart

held an FCRA plaintiff must only “minimally present some

evidence from which a trier of fact can infer that the consumer

reporting agency failed to follow reasonable procedures in

preparing a credit report.” Id. at 51 (emphasis added). In fact,

“a plaintiff need not introduce direct evidence of

unreasonableness of procedures: [i]n certain instances,

inaccurate credit reports by themselves can fairly be read as

evidencing unreasonable procedures, and [an absence of] direct

evidence will not be fatal.” Id. at 52. Applying this precedent,

we conclude the FCRA does not always require a plaintiff

alleging a violation of § 1681e(b) to present expert testimony on

the issue of whether the defendant’s procedures were

reasonable. Stewart is the standard a plaintiff in a § 1681e(b)

case must satisfy at the summary judgment stage; there is not an

additional expert testimony requirement. Expert testimony will

undoubtedly prove helpful in some § 1681e(b) cases. Indeed, as

a practical matter, expert testimony might sometimes be

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necessary to satisfy Stewart. But it is certainly not required in

all § 1681e(b) cases. Holding otherwise would flatly contradict

Stewart’s conclusion that direct evidence of unreasonableness is

not always required.

The district court granted CARCO’s summary judgment

motion because it held a plaintiff in a § 1681e(b) case always

must present expert testimony; we reverse, because that holding

was erroneous. The issue of whether Wilson carried his burden

under Stewart is not before us. But if CARCO moves for

summary judgment on that ground, the district court should

consider that Wilson must “minimally present some evidence

from which a trier of fact can infer [a] fail[ure] to follow

reasonable procedures,” see Stewart, 734 F.2d at 51 (emphasis

added), and all “reasonable inferences” must be resolved in

Wilson’s favor, Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 363.

III

We reverse the district court’s order granting CARCO’s

summary judgment motion and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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