Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04513/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04513-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EVOLUTIONARY INTELLIGENCE, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-04513-PJH 

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

Re: Dkt. No. 267, 269

On April 11, 2019, the court denied plaintiff's motion to vacate judgment under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Dkt. 266 (the “April 11th Order”).

1 On May 6, 

2019, pursuant to Local Rule 7-9, plaintiff filed a motion requesting leave to file a motion 

for reconsideration of the April 11th Order and attached the proposed motion for 

reconsideration, brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Having read 

plaintiff’s papers and carefully considered plaintiff’s arguments and the relevant legal 

authority, the court hereby DENIES the motion for leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration. 

A. Plaintiff’s Motion Is Procedurally and Jurisdictionally Improper

“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly recognize a motion for 

reconsideration.” Arnett Facial Reconstruction Courses, Inc. v. Patterson Dental Supply, 

Inc., No. CV 11-06929 CBM (EX), 2013 WL 12246259, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2013). 

The Northern District’s Local Rules, however, provide for such a motion under L.R. 7-9, 

which is itself promulgated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See L.R. 7-9. 

As relevant here, Rule 54(b) provides that: “[A]ny order or other decision, however

 

1 This order assumes the parties’ familiarity with the court’s April 11th Order. 

Case 4:13-cv-04513-PJH Document 270 Filed 05/09/19 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

designated, that adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than 

all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment[.]" Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). That is, as relevant here, after the court has entered 

judgment, Rule 54 no longer provides a basis for seeking reconsideration of a prior 

decision or order. Local Rule 7-9 reflects that limitation: “Before the entry of judgment . . . 

, any party may . . . request[ ] . . . leave to file a motion for reconsideration of any 

interlocutory order[.]” 

Here, no party disputes that final judgment has already been entered. Indeed, the 

order plaintiff seeks this court to reconsider denied plaintiff’s request to vacate that very 

judgment. Accordingly, by its own terms, L.R. 7-9 does not provide plaintiff an avenue to 

file its present motion.2 

After judgment has been entered, a motion for reconsideration is typically “brought 

as a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) [ ] 

or a motion for relief from judgments or orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(b)[.]” Arnett Facial, No. CV 11-06929 CBM (EX), 2013 WL 12246259, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 

Apr. 8, 2013). Here, plaintiff’s proposed motion for reconsideration is premised on Rule 

59(e). See Dkt. 269-1 at 1. But, just as plaintiff’s motion pursuant to L.R. 7-9 is 

procedurally improper, plaintiff’s proposed motion for reconsideration pursuant to 59(e) is 

jurisdictionally improper. Rule 59(e) provides that “[a] motion to alter or amend a 

judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.” Because “[t]he 

time period for filing a Rule 59(e) motion is jurisdictional,” Amerson v. Kindredcare, Inc., 

606 F. App'x 371, 372 (9th Cir. 2015), “district court[s] ha[ve] no discretion to consider a 

late rule 59(e) motion,” Carter v. United States, 973 F.2d 1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992). See 

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (“A court must not extend the time to act under Rules . . . 

59(b), (d), and (e)[.]”). Here, judgment was entered over three years prior to plaintiff filing 

its proposed Rule 59(e) motion. Accordingly, even if this court were inclined to grant 

 

2

Indeed, plaintiff implicitly recognized that conclusion by filing its Rule 60(b) motion 

without attempting to comply with L.R. 7-9. 

Case 4:13-cv-04513-PJH Document 270 Filed 05/09/19 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion—and the court is not so inclined—the court lacks jurisdiction 

to do so. See Amerson, 606 F. App’x at 372.

Lastly, plaintiff’s citation to Thomas v. Cty. of Sonoma, No. 17-CV-00245-LB, 2017 

WL 2500886, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2017), is unpersuasive. There, the court construed 

a pro se plaintiff’s post-judgment motion as a request for reconsideration pursuant to L.R. 

7-9 and Rule 59(e). Id. Critically, and assuming the propriety of applying L.R. 7-9, the 

Thomas court did not lack jurisdiction to consider the Rule 59(e) motion because Rule 

59(e)’s 28-day period had not yet expired. Id. at *1. Nor is the court persuaded by 

plaintiff’s argument that its Rule 59(e) motion is timely because no judgment will ever 

enter following the court’s April 11th Order. Plaintiff cites no authority suggesting that the 

Rule 59(e) jurisdictional clock restarts after the court decides a post-judgment motion.3

B. Plaintiff’s Motion Fails Under L.R. 7-9 and Rule 59(e)

Assuming plaintiff’s motion was procedurally proper under L.R. 7-9 and 

jurisdictionally proper under Rule 59(e), it would also fails on the merits. 

Before a party may file a motion for reconsideration, the party must first obtain 

leave of the court. L.R. 7-9(a). To do so, the moving party must show reasonable 

diligence in bringing the motion and, as relevant here, “[a] manifest failure by the Court to 

consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were [previously] presented 

to the Court[.]” L.R. 7-9(b). In addition, a motion for leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration may not “repeat any oral or written argument made by the applying party 

in support of or in opposition to” the order the party seeks reconsideration of. L.R. 7-9(c).

Here, despite arguing that the court failed to consider dispositive legal arguments, 

plaintiff appears to concede that the court considered the relevant law. Specifically, 

plaintiff contends that by “misapprehending” or “misunderstanding” three controlling 

points of law, the court manifestly failed to consider plaintiff’s dispositive legal arguments. 

 

3

Indeed, under plaintiff’s argument, because no judgment will ever enter after the court’s 

April 11th Order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)(6), plaintiff’s rule 59(e) motion could never be 

untimely. 

Case 4:13-cv-04513-PJH Document 270 Filed 05/09/19 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

That argument necessarily asks the court to reconsider legal arguments it considered,

but ultimately rejected. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for leave fails L.R. 7-9(c). 

Plaintiff argues that L.R. 7-9(c) does not apply because a party may relitigate 

previously raised arguments when the court has committed “clear” or “manifest” error. 

See Dkt. 269-1 at 3 (citing Kinney v. Clark, 2016 WL 3401765, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2016)). 

To the extent that exception applies, it flows from Rule 59(e). See McDowell v. Calderon, 

197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (“There are four basic grounds upon which a 

Rule 59(e) motion may be granted. First, . . . to correct manifest errors of law[.]”

(emphasis omitted)); Dixon v. Wallowa Cnty., 336 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 

59(e) amendments are appropriate if the district court . . . committed clear error[.]”); 

Kinney, 2016 WL 3401765, at *1 (discussing Rules 59(e) & 60(b), and citing McDowell

and Dixon). As explained above, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 59(e) 

motion, regardless of any supposed error in the court’s prior decision.

In any event, the court is satisfied that it did not commit a “clear” or “manifest”

error, or fail to consider dispositive legal arguments, as plaintiff is required to show under 

Rule 59(e) and L.R. 7-9, respectively. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration makes 

essentially three arguments: 

(1) The court misunderstood that under Rule 60(b)(6) and Phelps v. Alameida, 569 

F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009), it could have granted plaintiff’s motion despite the 

Federal Circuit affirming Judge Whyte’s 2015 Order dismissing the action with 

prejudice under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 

(2) Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) and Aatrix Software, 

Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018), provided 

a definitive answer to a legal issue that was unsettled at the time the Federal 

Circuit affirmed Judge Whyte’s 2015 Order. That, according to plaintiff, is 

sufficient under Phelps to constitute an “intervening change in law” and, 

therefore, an en banc decision was not necessary.

(3) Though Berkheimer stated “[n]othing in [its] decision . . . cast[s] doubt on the 

Case 4:13-cv-04513-PJH Document 270 Filed 05/09/19 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

propriety of [past] cases” resolving the § 101 issue on motions to dismiss, and 

despite the en banc plurality describing Berkheimer/Aatrix as standing for an 

“unremarkable proposition,” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368; Berkheimer v. HP 

Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1370-1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018), those statements were dicta 

that fail to alter the (purported) fact that Berkheimer altered the § 101 analysis. 

Each of those arguments fail because they depend on the same unfounded 

assumption: that the Berkheimer/Aatrix panel decisions were somehow more “correct” or 

binding than the Federal Circuit’s pre-Berkheimer/Aatrix panel decisions. Indeed, plaintiff 

sums up its argument as “prior to Berkheimer, the factual inquiry under § 101 was 

optional; after Berkheimer, it is necessary.” Dkt. 269-1 at 7. That assertion shows 

exactly how plaintiff’s argument exalts the Berkheimer/Aatrix decisions over the Federal 

Circuit’s other panel decisions—a proposition that plaintiff provides no authority for. As 

discussed in the court’s prior order, and as plaintiff concedes, Berkheimer/Aatrix “could 

not have overruled the Federal Circuit’s prior § 101 jurisprudence . . . because in the 

Federal Circuit only an en banc decision may overrule prior precedent.” April 11th Order 

at 4. Accordingly, assuming Berkheimer/Aatrix espoused a legal principle contrary to or 

different from the Federal Circuit’s prior § 101 jurisprudence—an assumption that seems 

questionable at best considering Berkheimer and the en banc plurality’s description of 

Berkheimer/Aatrix—Berkheimer/Aatrix merely contributed to the purported “unsettled” 

nature of the Federal Circuit’s § 101 jurisprudence. That is, Berkheimer/Aatrix no more 

“require” district courts to undertake a § 101 factual inquiry, than any other Federal Circuit 

panel decision makes that same inquiry “optional.” It is for that reason that the April 11th 

Order found that a qualifying intervening change of law had not occurred. 

Lastly, plaintiff contends that granting it leave to file its motion for reconsideration 

“would prevent the ‘manifest injustice’ that EI has lost its two patents without having its 

factual evidence considered” as part of the § 101 inquiry. Dkt. 269-1 at 8; see Allstate 

Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (A Rule 59(e) motion may be 

granted “to prevent manifest injustice[.]”). That argument begs the question by assuming 

Case 4:13-cv-04513-PJH Document 270 Filed 05/09/19 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

that Judge Whyte’s 2015 Order and the Federal Circuit’s subsequent affirmance were 

incorrect under present § 101 law, and that this court April 11th Order was erroneous. 

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration cannot succeed based on the assumption that the 

court will reverse itself by embracing arguments it has already rejected.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES plaintiff’s request for leave to file a 

motion for reconsideration. The motion is procedurally and jurisdictionally improper, and 

the court is satisfied that it neither failed to consider plaintiff’s dispositive legal arguments 

nor committed a clear or manifest error of law. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 9, 2019

___________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:13-cv-04513-PJH Document 270 Filed 05/09/19 Page 6 of 6