Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01334/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01334-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN DARNELL BRYANT,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-cv-1334 WQH (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS 

[ECF No. 133]

v.

SELEAINA THOMAS, et al.,

Defendants.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2009)

and Local Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. For the following reasons,

the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion be GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kevin Darnell Bryant (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Bryant”)

is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. (ECF No. 1). On June 19, 2009,

Plaintiff filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983

against officials at Calipatria State Prison (“Calipatria”). (Id.). On

November 9, 2009, the Court sua sponte dismissed several claims

presented in the Complaint. (ECF No. 16). 

On May 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) against Defendants Thomas, Vrooman and Sepulveda alleging

- 1 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 1 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to

provide adequate medical care during Plaintiff’s incarceration at

Calipatria in 2006. (ECF No. 48). On June 3, 2011, Defendants

answered. (ECF No. 50). On May 18, 2012, Defendants moved for

summary judgment claiming that Plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies against Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda,

and that Plaintiff did not establish that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (ECF No. 75). Plaintiff

responded in opposition on July 18, 2012. (ECF No. 94). On July 27,

2012, Defendants replied. (ECF No. 97). Plaintiff filed a sur–reply on

August 24, 2012. (ECF No. 102).

On September 7, 2012, this Court issued a Report and

Recommendation recommending that the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment be granted as to Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda

on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies

against those Defendants. (ECF No. 104). This Court also recommended

that the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted as to Defendant

Thomas on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Thomas

was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. (Id.). 

On October 1, 2012, Plaintiff objected to the Report and

Recommendation, “stipulate[d] to [this Court’s] Conclusion that [he] did

not exhaust administrative remedies on [D]efendants Vrooman and

Sepulveda” and reiterated the arguments regarding Defendant Thomas. 

(ECF No. 106). On October 12, 2012, Defendants replied. (ECF No. 107). 

Plaintiff supplemented his objections with a Sur–Reply on November 19,

2012. (ECF No. 111). United States District Judge William Q. Hayes

overruled Plaintiff’s objections, adopted this Court’s findings and

recommendations in their entirety, granted the motion for summary

- 2 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 2 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

judgment and gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint against

Vrooman and Sepulveda. (ECF No. 114). 

Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, but instead appealed

the Court’s order to the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 116). Plaintiff’s appeal

was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 120). On March 22,

2013, Judge Hayes ordered the case to be closed because Plaintiff had

failed to amend his claims against Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda. 

(ECF No. 122). Accordingly, on March 25, 2013, a Judgment against

Plaintiff was entered and the case was closed. (ECF No. 123).

On April 17, 2013, Plaintiff notified the Court about his placement

on “suicide watch” beginning in January 2013. (ECF No. 124 at 2). 

Plaintiff claimed to have remained on suicide watch until April 4, 2013,

resulting in his inability to comply with the Court’s orders. (Id. at 2–3). 

On April 24, 2013, Judge Hayes vacated the Court’s judgment and

reopened the case. (ECF No. 125). The Court extended the deadline for

Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint, which Plaintiff filed on July

26, 2013. (ECF No. 132). On August 12, 2013, Defendants Sepulveda and

Vrooman moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”). (ECF No. 133). 

On August 26, 2013, Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC (“Opposition”). (ECF No. 135). Defendants

replied on September 27, 2013. (ECF No. 136). In their Reply,

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with

prejudice because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

and alternatively failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be

granted. (Id.). 

- 3 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 3 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner who was transferred to Calipatria on

July 12, 2006. (ECF No. 48 at 2). At that time, Defendants were

employed at the prison’s medical clinic in the following positions:

Vrooman, as a Medical Technical Assistant (“MTA”), and Sepulveda, as a

Registered Nurse (“RN”). (Id. at 1). In his SAC, Plaintiff asserts that

MTA Vrooman and RN Sepulveda violated his constitutional rights

because they failed to provide him with adequate medical care. (ECF No.

132 at 3). 

Plaintiff contends that he is impaired due to severe arthritis in his

legs, hips, back, arms and hands. (ECF No. 133–2 at 11). Plaintiff alleges

that his medical condition justified a housing assignment on a lower bunk

and lower tier. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that former Defendant Thomas, a

Family Nurse Practitioner (“FNP”) at Calipatria, refused to recognize

Plaintiff’s medical condition and permanent lower bunk/lower tier chronos

issued from his prior California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) doctors. (ECF No. 132 at 3). Defendants

acknowledge that Plaintiff had been previously given a medical chrono

requiring that he be placed in a low bunk, but claim that the chrono

expired when Plaintiff arrived at Calipatria. (ECF No. 75 at 7–8). 

Plaintiff was assigned to a cell on an upper tier and on a top bunk. (ECF

No. 132 at 3).

Plaintiff contends in his SAC that on August 16, 20, and 25, 2006,

he fell while climbing down from his upper bunk, sustaining serious

injuries. (Id.). Bryant alleges that he sought medical care after each fall,

but was refused care by Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda. (Id.). 

Plaintiff claims that on all three occasions Vrooman and Sepulveda did

not even allow him to enter the prison’s medical clinic to clean the blood

- 4 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 4 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

from his wounds. (Id.). Plaintiff further claims that Defendants refused

to file incident reports as required by CDCR regulations. (Id.). 

Plaintiff alleges that on August 27, 2006, he fell down a flight of

metal stairs and sustained serious injuries. (Id.). Defendants claim that

Bryant only suffered a bruised and slightly swollen hand, a small cut, and

scraping on his arm. (ECF No. 75 at 10). Defendants assert that Plaintiff

was treated for his injuries and was prescribed pain medications. (Id.). 

Plaintiff acknowledges that he was prescribed pain medications, but

asserts that on several occasions Thomas refused to renew his pain

medication prescriptions. (ECF No. 1 at 2–3). Plaintiff contends that

both Vrooman and Sepulveda repeatedly lied to him on such occasions,

claiming that FNP Thomas ordered pain medication for Plaintiff, despite

their knowledge to the contrary. (ECF No. 132 at 3). Furthermore,

Plaintiff claims that Vrooman admitted to him that FNP Thomas asked

both Defendants to lie to Plaintiff regarding her order of Plaintiff’s pain

medications. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that Vrooman also admitted that

Defendants deliberately prevented Plaintiff from seeing Thomas to

address his complaints. (Id.). As a result, according to Plaintiff, his

injuries from the falls were untreated and unreported. (Id.). 

With regards to the incidents described above, Plaintiff asserts that

he exhausted available administrative remedies against Defendants

Vrooman and Sepulveda. (ECF No. 135 at 1–2). Defendants deny that

Plaintiff filed prison appeals regarding the allegations that Vrooman and

Sepulveda refused to treat Plaintiff on August 16, 20, and 25, 2006, or

that they conspired to lie to Plaintiff about his pain medications. (ECF

No. 136 at 1–2). Defendants further contend that even if Plaintiff filed

prison appeals regarding these allegations, those appeals were not

adjudicated at the third and final level, and thus were not exhausted. (Id.

- 5 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 5 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 2). 

Defendants provide as evidence the Declaration of Porfirio Nava, the

Appeals Coordinator at Calipatria, summarizing the appeals that Plaintiff

filed while he was housed in Calipatria. (ECF No. 133–2 at 1–3). After

reviewing Plaintiff’s third level appeal records, Nava determined that

Plaintiff exhausted four appeals. (Id. at 2). One of the exhausted appeals

concerned Plaintiff’s request to receive contact lenses, and anther appeal

addressed dental care. (Id.). Plaintiff does not contend that either of

those appeals relate to his claims against Defendants Vrooman and

Sepulveda. (See ECF. Nos. 132, 135).

Plaintiff references the remaining two exhausted appeals in his SAC

and claims that those appeals properly exhausted his administrative

remedies against Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda. (See ECF No. 135

at 1–3). The first exhausted appeal, CAL 06–02105 (hereinafter “Appeal

One”), concerned Bryant’s request for a low tier/low bunk medical

accommodation chrono and FNP Thomas’ alleged refusal to order such a

chrono. (ECF No. 133–2 at 2). The second exhausted appeal, CAL

06–02166 (“Appeal Two”), concerned Plaintiff’s request to be issued a form

permanently documenting his alleged disabilities. (Id.).

On August 20, 2006, Plaintiff initiated Appeal One by filing a

Reasonable Modification or Accommodation Request form for “lower

bunk/lower tier” in a specific prison housing facility. (Id. at 11). Plaintiff

stated that he suffered from severe arthritis, and complained of serious

headaches and a wrist injury resulting from his fall on August 16, 2006. 

(Id.). Plaintiff did not mention Defendants Vrooman or Sepulveda in his

written statement. (See id.).

On August 28, 2006, FNP Thomas interviewed Plaintiff and issued a

lower bunk chrono for fourteen days for an “acute arm injury” caused by

- 6 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 6 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s fall. (Id. at 14). On August 29, 2006, a First Formal Level

Response approved a temporary lower bunk chrono for fourteen days. (Id.

at 14). Additionally, the decision advised Plaintiff that reassignment to

another housing facility was not appropriately handled by the Medical

Department. (Id.). Plaintiff was also instructed to report to “Medical

Sick–Call” for assistance rather than file a Reasonable Modification or

Accommodation Request for acute incidents. (Id.). The decision did not

reference Vrooman or Sepulveda. (See id.).

On September 5, 2006, Plaintiff appealed the First Level Appeal

decision by filing a “Citizen Complaint” against FNP Thomas. (Id. at 12). 

Plaintiff claimed that Thomas violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

only recommending a temporary grant of a lower bunk/lower tier chrono. 

(Id.). Plaintiff also made the following statement in his appeal: “[o]n

08/02/06, I was placed in a upper bunk/upper tier, and since that time I’ve

fallen four times getting down from the upper bunk. I’ve reported each

incident to MTA at the Clinic.” (Id. at 12, 16). 

On September 24, 2006, Plaintiff filed an Inmate/Parolee Appeal

Form (CDC 602), which was consolidated into Appeal One, requesting an

assignment to a low bunk. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff claimed that he fell down a

flight of iron stairs on August 27, 2006, and blamed his arthritis and

reassignment to a top tier for his fall. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff

requested to be seen by a “real doctor.” (Id. at 15). Plaintiff also made the

following statement in his appeal: “Ms. Thomas does not like me and she

refused to see me for 26 days until the appeals coordinator Ms. Edwards

spoke to MTA Vrooman and found out what [Thomas] was doing to me

refusing to see me and refusing to give me pain meds.” (Id.) (emphasis

omitted). 

On October 26, 2006, a Second Level Appeal Response was issued. 

- 7 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 7 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Id. at 8). The decision extended Plaintiff’s lower bunk chrono through

October 31, 2006, and denied his request to be moved to a specific prison

housing facility. (Id.). The decision did not reference Defendants

Vrooman or Sepulveda. (See id. at 8–9).

Plaintiff appealed, and a Director’s Level Appeal Decision was

rendered on January 18, 2007, denying the appeal. (Id. at 5). The

decision stated that Bryant had been evaluated by an orthopedist, was

receiving ongoing medical care, and was at the time housed in low

bunk/low tier. (Id.). The decision advised Plaintiff that he was provided

“reasonable accommodation for his mobility and health concerns,” and

that “staff acted appropriately.” (Id.). There was no mention of Vrooman

or Sepulveda in the Director’s Appeal Decision. (See id.). 

Plaintiff filed another appeal, Appeal Two, which was exhausted on

June 14, 2007. (ECF No. 133–2 at 48–51). In his appeal, Plaintiff

claimed that he was “mobility and vision impaired,” and requested to be

issued a Disability Placement Program Verification Form permanently

documenting his disabilities. (Id. at 52). Additionally, Plaintiff requested

to be personally interviewed. (Id.). 

On September 19, 2006, FNP Thomas interviewed Plaintiff. (Id. at

61). The First Formal Level Response was rendered on September 21,

2006, and stated that Plaintiff did not meet the Americans with

Disabilities (ADA) criteria for the Disability Placement Program due to

vision and/or mobility impairment. (Id.). The decision cited a recent

optometry exam that established that Bryant’s vision was correctable to

20/20, and radiological studies of Plaintiff’s knees, feet and spine, which

were within the norm. (Id.). 

On September 22, 2006, Appeals Coordinator Edwards interviewed

Plaintiff regarding his appeals. (Id. at 56). Plaintiff asserts that he made

- 8 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 8 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the following statement during the interview:

I was being denied medical care by Thomas, Vrooman, and

Sepulveda. I told [Edwards] that I fell and seriously injured myself climbing down from my upper bunk and both Vrooman and Sepulveda refused to provide me any medical care or treatment and that they refused to even allow me to come inside

the clinic and that it was Thomas who was behind this. I told

[Edwards] that both Vrooman and Sepulveda refused to write a[n] injury Report each of those days I fell. They were required to do this.

(ECF No. 135 at 2). Plaintiff claims that Edwards informed him that she

went to the clinic and questioned Vrooman and Sepulveda about these

claims. (Id.). In support, Plaintiff references the entries in his “personal

legal and medical log book” for September 22, 2006, and September 28,

2006. (Id.) (citing ECF No. 135 at 7).

On September 27, 2006, Plaintiff appealed the First Level Response

decision and alleged that FNP Thomas lied when she noted in Plaintiff’s

records that she had examined him on September 19, 2006. (ECF No.

133–2 at 58–60). Plaintiff claimed that on that date Thomas removed the

neck brace Plaintiff had been previously provided, but otherwise did not

examine him. (Id. at 60). Bryant wrote that a CDCR officer and an MTA

were present during the neck brace removal, and that he was intimidated

by their presence.1

 (Id.). Bryant also alleged that his back pain worsened

after the neck brace removal, and opined that he had a spinal cord injury. 

(Id.). Bryant further claimed in his appeal that his medical records

contained x–ray reports establishing that he had degeneration in his

knees and spine, and arthritis. (Id. at 59–60). 

Plaintiff’s September 27, 2006, appeal also contained the following

statement: “it has just recently come to my attention that [FNP Thomas]

gave false information to the appeals coordinator and tried to make it

1

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff named the prison officials present during the neck brace removal on September 19, 2006, as “c/o Peters and

MTA Stangle.” (ECF No. 1 at 2).

- 9 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 9 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

seem like it was MTA Vrooman and Ms. Sepulveda’s fault that I was not

receiving medical care.” (Id. at 60). Bryant requested an interview with

someone other than FNP Thomas and asked for his medical records to be

brought to the interview. (Id. at 59–60). 

The records attached to Appeal Two contain a response from the

Appeals Coordinator dated September 28, 2006. (Id. at 57). The letter

was addressed to Plaintiff, titled “RE: Screening at the SECOND Level,”

and advised Plaintiff that the enclosed documents were being returned

because he was “attempting to change” his “original appeal issue.” (Id.). 

The page numbering in the appeal documents, as well as CDCR’s

notations stating “Screened out September 29, 2006," suggest that the

screened out documents contained Plaintiff’s September 27, 2006, appeal

of the First Level Response decision. (See id. at 58–60). Plaintiff was

advised that the screening decision was not appealable. (Id. at 57). If

Plaintiff believed the decision to be erroneous, he was given an option to

write an explanation and return the screening decision form, along with

the supporting documents, to the Appeals Coordinator. (Id.). 

The records provided by Nava and Plaintiff do not contain any

documents establishing that Bryant challenged the September 28, 2006,

screening decision. (See ECF No. 133–2). However, Plaintiff submitted

several written requests to Appeals Coordinator Edwards inquiring about

the status of his September 27, 2006, appeal, the same appeal which

appears to have been screened out. (See id. at 64–66). In one of his

written requests to Edwards, Plaintiff speculated that CDCR staff might

have lost or deliberately withheld his September 27, 2006, appeal. (Id. at

65). In another written request, Plaintiff emphasized the importance of

Appeal Two and stated that the appeal needed “to be processed through

all the levels of review necessary.” (Id. at 64).

- 10 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 10 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On January 2, 2007, Plaintiff filed an Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form

(CDC 602) stating that he had sent Appeal Two for Second Level Review. 

(Id. at 54). Plaintiff stated that the appeals office claimed that it had

never received his appeal. (Id.). Bryant requested an interview regarding

the appeal, as well as the copies of the appeal records and the First Level

Response. (Id.). 

Plaintiff’s January 2, 2007, appeal was incorporated into Appeal

Two. (Id.). On February 26, 2007, Plaintiff received a Second Level

Appeal Response advising him that he “[did] not meet the criteria for

designation [as mobility and vision impaired].” (Id. at 56). Additionally,

the decision acknowledged an information chrono dated September 28,

2006, indicating that prison officials Edwards and McShan interviewed

Plaintiff on September 22, 2006, to discuss Plaintiff’s “numerous” ADA

appeals. (Id.). Plaintiff’s claim of not being able to see a doctor was

refuted because Plaintiff had been seen by a primary care provider. (Id.). 

It was further noted that Plaintiff was placed on an “Appeal Abuse

Warning.” (Id.). The Second Level Appeal decision did not reference

Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda. (See id.).

On June 14, 2007, a Director’s Level Appeal Decision2

 denied

Plaintiff’s request to be issued a form permanently documenting his

alleged disabilities. (Id. at 48). The decision noted Bryant’s claim that

his voluminous medical history established his permanent disability, as

well as the claim that FNP Thomas deliberately lied on Plaintiff’s medical

records when she remarked that Plaintiff did not have a permanent

disability. (Id. at 50). The decision stated that “medical opinions,

2

The original Director’s Level Appeal Decision rendered on June 14, 2007, was amended on August 29, 2007. (ECF No. 133–2 at 50–51). The

findings in the amended Director’s Level Appeal Decision appear to be identical to the findings in the original Director’s Level Appeal Decision. (See id. at 48–51).

- 11 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 11 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

diagnosis, and treatment recommendations can vary between facilities,

specialists, and physicians throughout CDCR.” (Id.). Plaintiff was

assured that he would continue receiving “all necessary health care”

regardless of CDCR’s classification of his medical condition. (Id.). The

decision further stated that Bryant had been examined and treated by

licensed physicians, and concluded that there was no reason for further

intervention at the Director’s Level of Review. (Id.).

In response to the current action, Defendants obtained the

declaration of Appeals Coordinator Porfirio Nava. After reviewing

Bryant’s exhausted appeals, Appeals Coordinator Nava determined that

Plaintiff did not exhaust claims that Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda

refused Plaintiff medical assistance and declined to file incident reports

on August 16, 20, or 25, 2006. (Id. at 3). Nava also concluded that

Plaintiff did not exhaust any appeals claiming that Defendants Vrooman

and Sepulveda ignored Bryant’s requests for help with his medical issues,

and that Vrooman, Sepulveda, and FNP Thomas conspired to cover up

any actions or failures to act in connection with Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. 

(Id.). Nava concluded that Plaintiff “did not exhaust any administrative

appeals related to any complaints Bryant had regarding MTA Vrooman

and RN Sepulveda during the time he was incarcerated at Calipatria....” 

(Id.).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To state a claim under Section 1983, a claimant must allege two

essential elements: (1) a person acting under color of state law committed

the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the claimant of some

right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996); Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S.

527, 535 (1981) (overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 471

- 12 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 12 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986)). A claimant’s right is violated within the

meaning of Section 1983 if another person “does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation....” Johnson

v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). The analysis of the causation

is individualized and focuses on the “duties and responsibilities of each

individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.

1988). 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Navarro

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2) only requires “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citation omitted). Nevertheless, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a

cause of action’s elements will not do.” Bell, 550 U.S. at 545 (internal

quotations omitted). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 547. A claim is

plausible on its face when a plaintiff pleads factual content that “allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

The courts are required to assume the truth of the presented facts

and construe all inferences from facts in the light most favorable to the

- 13 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 13 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Furthermore, the courts are obliged to liberally construe pleadings of pro

se plaintiffs and to afford such plaintiffs any benefit of the doubt,

particularly in civil rights cases. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). The courts, however, need not accept as true conclusory

allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). The

court may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), because they allege that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit and alternatively

failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. (ECF

No. 133–1 at 1–2). Plaintiff claims that he properly exhausted his

administrative remedies against Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda. 

(ECF No. 135 at 1–2). Plaintiff also asserts that his complaint states a

cause of action for Defendants’ deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs. (ECF 135 at 1,5).

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The Ninth Circuit has articulated a general rule that “failure to

exhaust nonjudicial remedies is a matter in abatement, not going to the

merits of the claim,” that is properly raised in a motion to dismiss,

including a nonenumerated motion under a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b). See Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368–69 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Wyatt v. Terhune,

315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that a nonenumerated motion

- 14 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 14 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

under Rule 12(b) is a proper pretrial motion for establishing

nonexhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). 

Nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, as set forth in 42 U.S.C 

§ 1997e(a), is an affirmative defense. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. Defendant

prison officials carry the burden of raising and proving the absence of

exhaustion. Id. Plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to develop a

record to refute the defendant’s showing of nonexhaustion. See id. at

1120 n.14. 

Dismissal of the action for nonexhaustion of administrative

remedies is not a decision on the merits. Id. (citation omitted). When

deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies,

the court “may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of

fact.” Id. at 1119–20. 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires prisoners to

exhaust administrative remedies before filing a suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

(2013). PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id.

Exhaustion is mandatory and not left to the discretion of the district

court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). Plaintiff is required to

comply with an agency’s deadlines and procedural rules, and does not

satisfy the exhaustion requirement “by filing an untimely or otherwise

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 83–84,

90. 

California inmates and parolees have the right to administratively

appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the

department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as

- 15 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 15 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or

welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a) (2013). Inmates must

proceed through the following levels of appeal in order to exhaust

administrative remedies within the prison grievance system: (1) informal

resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDCR’s Inmate/Parolee Appeal

Form (CDC 602), (3) second level appeal to the institution head or

designee, and (4) third level appeal to the director of CDCR. Barry v.

Ratelle, 985 F.Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997); see Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.7 (2013).

The third level appeal, also referred to as the “Director’s Level

Decision,” is final and exhausts all administrative remedies available in

CDCR. See id § 3084.7(d)(3); Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F.Supp. 2d 1125, 1129

(S.D. Cal. 2001). An inmate may initiate litigation in federal court “only

after the administrative process ends and leaves his grievances

unredressed.” Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006);

see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013).

A prison grievance is sufficient when it “alerts the prison to the

nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” See Griffin v. Arpaio,

557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646,

650 (7th Cir. 2002)). Prisoners filing administrative appeals are not

required to allege every fact necessary to prove each element of a legal

claim, as long as they provide “enough information ... to allow prison

officials to take appropriate responsive measures.” Griffin, 557 F.3d at

1120–21 (citing Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004)). 

California administrative appeals must be in writing. See Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a) (2013) (stating that the “appellant shall use a

CDCR Form 602 ... Inmate/Parolee Appeal, to describe the specific issue

under appeal and the relief requested.”). Inmates are required to list all

- 16 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 16 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

staff members involved in the aggrieved incident and describe their

involvement. Id. § 3084.2(a)(3). Administrative remedies are not

exhausted “relative to any new issue, information or person later named

by the appellant that was not included in the originally submitted CDCR

Form 602 and addressed through all required levels of administrative

review ....” Cal. Dep’t of Corrections Operations Manual, § 54100.13.3.

1. Claims Against Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda

Plaintiff claims that on August 16, 20, and 25, 2006, Defendants

Vrooman and Sepulveda refused Plaintiff’s requests for medical

assistance and admission to the prison’s medical clinic. (ECF No. 132 at

3). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Vrooman and

Sepulveda refused to file incident reports following Plaintiff’s falls. (Id.). 

Bryant also claims that Defendants conspired with FNP Thomas to deny

Plaintiff medication and access to medical care. (Id.). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies and thus his SAC should be dismissed. (ECF No. 133–1 at 1–2). 

In support of their Motion, Defendants provide the sworn declaration of

Porfirio Nava, the Appeals Coordinator at Calipatria. (ECF No. 133–2 at

1–3). Nava concluded that none of the claims against Vrooman and

Sepulveda were decided at the Director’s Level of review, and that

Plaintiff did not exhaust any administrative appeals related to any

complaints against Defendants. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff counters in his

Opposition that his prison grievances, included as exhibits to Porfirio

Nava’s declaration, exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 135

at 1) (citing ECF No. 133–2 at 1–3). 

In his SAC, Plaintiff references two exhausted appeals to support

the assertion that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies

regarding his claims against Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda. (See

- 17 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 17 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ECF No. 135 at 1–2). The first appeal, Appeal One, concerned Bryant’s

request for a low tier/low bunk medical accommodation chrono and FNP

Thomas’ alleged refusal to order such a chrono. (ECF No. 133–2 at 2). 

The second appeal, Appeal Two, addressed Plaintiff’s request to be issued

a form permanently documenting his alleged disabilities. (Id.).

a. Appeal One 

Plaintiff filed Appeal One on August 20, 2006, requesting a lower

bunk/lower tier assignment in a specific prison housing facility. (ECF No.

133–2 at 11). Plaintiff did not mention Defendants Vrooman or Sepulveda

in the form that initiated the appeal. (See id.). 

To support the assertion that he properly exhausted administrative

remedies against Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda, Plaintiff cites his

September 5, 2006, appeal of the First Level Appeal decision. (ECF No.

135 at 2) (citing ECF No. 133–2 at 12, 16). In his appeal, Bryant stated

the following: “[o]n 08/02/06, I was placed in a upper bunk/upper tier, and

since that time I’ve fallen four times getting down from the upper bunk. 

I’ve reported each incident to MTA at the Clinic.” (ECF No. 133–2 at 12,

16). 

Prisoners need not allege every fact in their administrative appeals,

as long as they provide “enough information . . . to allow prison officials to

take appropriate responsive measures.” See Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d

1117, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Although Bryant does

not specifically name the MTA to whom he reported his injuries,

presumably Plaintiff’s contention is that he reported the incidents to

Defendant Vrooman. 

Plaintiff’s statement does not contain any additional factual

allegations describing Plaintiff’s injuries or Vrooman’s alleged refusal to

allow Plaintiff admission to the clinic. Plaintiff neither alleges that

- 18 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 18 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant Vrooman refused his requests for medical care, nor claims that

Vrooman refused to fill out incident reports following Plaintiff’s falls. 

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Vrooman conspired with FNP

Thomas to deny Plaintiff medication or access to medical treatment. As to

Defendant Sepulveda, there is no reference to any alleged misconduct. 

(See ECF No. 133–2, Ex. A). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s September 5, 2006,

appeal did not provide sufficient information about any alleged

wrongdoing by either Defendants Vrooman or Sepulveda. See Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a) (2013). 

In an effort to establish that he properly exhausted administrative

remedies, Plaintiff references the statement he made on September 24,

2006. (ECF No. 135 at 1). The referenced sentence on an Inmate/Parolee

Appeal Form stated the following: “Ms. Thomas does not like me and she

refused to see me for 26 days until the appeals coordinator Ms. Edwards

spoke to MTA Vrooman and found out what [Thomas] was doing to me

refusing to see me and refusing to give me pain meds.” (ECF No. 133–2 at

15) (emphasis omitted). 

This Court has already concluded in its prior Report and

Recommendation that the above statement does not describe any

improper conduct by Defendants Vrooman or Sepulveda, but is directed at

FNP Thomas’ failure to treat Plaintiff. (ECF No. 104 at 10). Although

Plaintiff references Defendant Vrooman by last name, Plaintiff does not

describe his falls and injuries. Nor does Plaintiff describe Defendants’

refusal to treat Plaintiff after his falls, or failure to fill out an incident

report. Further, there are no factual allegations in the above statement

suggesting that Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda conspired with FNP

Thomas to deny Plaintiff medication or access to medical treatment. The

statement references Defendants as witnesses to FNP Thomas’ failure to

- 19 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 19 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

treat Plaintiff, but does not alert the prison officials to any alleged

wrongdoing by Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda.

Plaintiff does not allege any facts in Appeal One to support his

contention that on August 16, 20, and 25, 2006, Defendants Vrooman and

Sepulveda refused Plaintiff’s requests for medical assistance and

admission to the prison’s medical clinic. Further, Plaintiff does not allege

any facts in the appeal suggesting that Defendants Vrooman and

Sepulveda refused to file incident reports following Plaintiff’s falls, or

conspired with FNP Thomas to deny Plaintiff medication or access to

medical treatment. Therefore, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his

administrative remedies against Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda in

Appeal One. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013).

b. Appeal Two

Plaintiff claimed in Appeal Two, filed in 2006, that he was “mobility

and vision impaired” and requested to be issued a form that permanently

documented his disabilities. (ECF No. 133–2 at 52). Plaintiff did not

reference any misconduct by Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda when

he initiated the appeal. (See id.). Further, the First Level Response

decision, rendered on September 21, 2006, did not reference Defendants’

alleged misconduct. (See id. at 61).

In his Opposition, Plaintiff’ points to his September 27, 2006, appeal

of the First Level Appeal decision. (ECF No. 135 at 2) (citing ECF No.

133–2 at 60). The appeal alleged the following: “it has just recently come

to my attention that [FNP Thomas] gave false information to the appeals

coordinator and tried to make it seem like it was MTA Vrooman and Ms.

Sepulveda’s fault that I was not receiving medical care.” (ECF No. 133–2

at 60). It appears from the record that the above claim was screened out

of Appeal Two. (See id. at 57–60). Furthermore, the Second and Third

- 20 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 20 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Level Appeal decisions did not address Plaintiff’s claims against Vrooman

and Sepulveda. (See id. at 50–51, 56). Thus, the above claim was not

exhausted at the Director’s Level. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3084.7(d)(3) (2013). Even if the statement was included in Plaintiff’s

exhausted appeal, the statement does not allege wrongdoing by either

Defendant. (See id. at 60). Rather, the statement would appear to

exonerate Defendants.

Plaintiff claims in his Opposition that “corrective action was taken

[on] 09/22/06.” (ECF No. 135 at 3). On September 22, 2006, Appeals

Coordinator Edwards interviewed Plaintiff. (ECF No. 133–2 at 56). 

Plaintiff appears to be suggesting that his interview with Edwards

corrected any flaws in his prior appeals. 

Plaintiff’s alleged oral statement to Edwards referenced his falls and

injuries, and allegedly named Vrooman and Sepulveda as the prison staff

that had refused to provide medical care and to file an injury report. 

(ECF No. 135 at 2). Nevertheless, California Code of Regulations requires

that prisoner appeals be in writing. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3084.2(a) (2013). Bryant’s appeal records do not contain the factual

allegations that he allegedly asserted during the interview with Edwards. 

(See ECF No. 133–2). Because proper exhaustion is mandatory and not

left to the discretion of the court, this Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

alleged oral statements to Appeals Coordinator Edwards are not sufficient

to exhaust his claims against Vrooman and Sepulveda. See Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). 

Additionally, Plaintiff provides an excerpt from his “personal legal

and medical log book” attached in his Opposition. (ECF No. 135 at 7). 

Plaintiff claims that Appeals Coordinator Edwards questioned Vrooman

and Sepulveda about the allegations that Plaintiff had allegedly made

- 21 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 21 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

during the interview with Edwards, and that the entries in his “log book”

corroborate his claims. (Id. at 2). 

Plaintiff’s entries in his “log book” are not part of his official appeal

records. (See ECF No. 133–2). Such entries were not addressed through

the required levels of administrative review within the prison grievance

system. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7 (2013). Consequently,

Plaintiff entries in his “log book” have no bearing on whether Plaintiff

exhausted administrative remedies against Defendants Vrooman and

Sepulveda.

Neither Plaintiff’s oral statements to Edwards on September 22,

2006, nor Plaintiff’s entries in his personal “log book” establish proper

exhaustion of administrative remedies against Defendants. See id. §§

3084.2(a), 3084.7. Plaintiff does not allege any facts in Appeal Two that

on August 16, 20, and 25, 2006, Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda

refused Plaintiff’s requests for medical assistance and admission to the

prison clinic. Further, Plaintiff did not allege in Appeal Two that

Defendants refused to file incident reports following Plaintiff’s falls, or

conspired with FNP Thomas to deny Plaintiff medication or access to

medical treatment. Therefore, Appeal Two did not properly exhaust

Plaintiff’s administrative remedies against Defendants Vrooman and

Sepulveda. See id. § 3084.7.

2. Conclusion

Plaintiff claims that his prison grievances included as exhibits to

Nava’s declaration exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 135

at 1) (citing ECF 133–2). However, none of the appeals decided at the

Director’s Level contain factual allegations that on August 16, 20, and 25,

2006, Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda refused Plaintiff’s requests for

medical assistance and admission to the prison’s medical clinic. None of 

- 22 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 22 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the appeals contain Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants Vrooman and

Sepulveda refused to file incident reports following Plaintiff’s falls, or

claims that Defendants conspired with FNP Thomas to deny Plaintiff

medication or access to medical treatment. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s exhibits confirm Appeals Coordinator Nava’s sworn

declaration. Defendants have established that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies with regard to all claims against Defendants

Vrooman and Sepulveda. Defendants have met their burden of raising

and proving the absence of exhaustion. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because Plaintiff’s claims are not exhausted

as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), they are not properly before the

Court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013). Accordingly, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’s claims against Defendants Vrooman

and Sepulveda be DISMISSED.

Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when a plaintiff repeatedly

fails to cure deficiencies in his pleading and when further amendment is

futile. See Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993)

(upholding the district court’s decision to dismiss with prejudice when

plaintiff repeatedly failed to cure the deficiencies in his pleadings); see

also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a))

(stating that “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed” and “futility of amendment” are factors justifying

refusal of leave to amend). This is Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint,

and Plaintiff has had several opportunities to establish proper exhaustion

of his administrative remedies with regard to all claims against

Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda. (ECF No. 132). Plaintiff was aware

of the deficiencies in his claims (see ECF No. 106 at 4), yet failed to

provide evidence to establish exhaustion. (See ECF Nos. 132, 135). While

- 23 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 23 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Court is mindful that a pro se Plaintiff should be given every

opportunity to amend his Complaint, in light of Plaintiff’s repeated

failures to cure its deficiencies, and because further amendment of the

complaint would be futile, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

claims against Vrooman and Sepulveda be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

B. Failure to State a Claim 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action

against them. (ECF No. 133–1 at 2). Plaintiff asserts that his complaint

states a cause of action for Defendants’ deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. (ECF No. 135 at 1, 5). Because the Court

concludes that the claims against Vrooman and Sepulveda are not

properly exhausted, the Court need not address Plaintiff’’s Eighth

Amendment Claims. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendants Vrooman and Sepulveda be DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2009).

Any party may file written objections to this Report and serve a copy

on all parties by January 28, 2014. The document shall be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objection

shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court by February 11,

2014. The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the

- 24 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 24 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 7, 2014

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

- 25 - 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD

Case 3:09-cv-01334-WQH-MDD Document 137 Filed 01/07/14 Page 25 of 25