Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-06644/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-06644-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOWARD HERSHIPS,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant. /

No. C06-06644 MJJ

ORDER STAYING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT, GRANTING

DEFENDANT CARLOS DE SANTIAGO’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

SECOND CLAIM, AND DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF’S THIRD CLAIM

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Carlos De Santiago’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,

Stay the First Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 65.)

For the following reasons, the Court STAYS Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

as the FAC pertains to Defendant De Santiago. Additionally, the Court GRANTS Defendant De

Santiago’s Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s second claim. The Court also sua sponte

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s third claim. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s second and third claims is with

LEAVE TO AMEND within twenty (20) days of a further order lifting the stay.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On March 13, 2007, this Court dismissed pro se Plaintiff’s claims against sole Defendant

Superior Court as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, but granted Plaintiff leave to amend

his complaint. (Docket No. 22.) The Court granted leave to amend based on Plaintiff’s

representation at oral argument that he intended to allege new factual allegations and add additional

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The eight defendants in this case are: (1) The Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara; (2) Santa Clara

County Deputy District Attorney Maxnilian Zarzana; (3) Santa Clara County Deputy District Attorney Pinaki Chakravort;

(4) Todd Kirsch; (5) David Duperrault; (6) Gerald Sorenson; (7) Palo Alto Police Officer Carlos De Santiago; and (8) John

Everding.

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parties. 

On April 9, 2007, Plaintiff filed the FAC presently at issue. (Docket No. 23.) The FAC

contains three claims: (1) a cause of action requesting a temporary restraining order or a preliminary

injunction; (2) a claim alleging a violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights; and (3) a claim alleging a

conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights. Plaintiff brings claims two and three pursuant to

Section 1983, and alleges these claims against eight defendants1

 (collectively, “Defendants”),

including Defendant De Santiago. Defendant De Santiago is a police officer who took part in an

investigation in which Plaintiff was a suspect. Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that Defendant De

Santiago’s actions during that investigation contributed to criminal charges being filed, and a

criminal case commencing, in violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Presently, Plaintiff’s criminal case

remains pending in Santa Clara County.

On August 31, 2007, Defendant De Santiago filed the present motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

FAC. Defendant De Santiago argues that as alleged against him, the FAC fails to state a claim on

which relief can be granted. Defendant De Santiago accepts that Plaintiff’s second claim implicates

him. However, Defendant De Santiago asserts that Plaintiff’s other two claims do not. Accordingly,

Defendant De Santiago’s motion only offers argument pertaining to dismissal of Plaintiff’s second

claim. Defendant De Santiago’s motion also includes an argument for entitlement to absolute

immunity from the present suit. As an alternative to granting the motion to dismiss, Defendant De

Santiago argues that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction in this case under the Younger

abstention doctrine. 

Plaintiff failed to file a timely response to Defendant De Santiago’s motion. The Court

subsequently ordered Plaintiff to show cause for the failure to file, and to file either an opposition or

statement of non-opposition to Defendant De Santiago’s motion. (Docket No. 71.) Plaintiff timely

responded to that order. (Docket No. 73.) The Court finds that Plaintiff demonstrated good cause

for late filing based on Plaintiff’s stated belief that all aspects of this case had been stayed when the

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Court had earlier stayed the proceedings with regard to some, but not all, Defendants. Plaintiff’s

opposition to Defendant De Santiago’s motion concedes that a stay of proceedings is proper at this

juncture, but fails to address the merits of the motion to dismiss. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a party to move to dismiss a

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; thus,

the Court presumes lack of jurisdiction, and the party seeks to invoke the court’s jurisdiction bears

the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A party challenging the court's jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may

do so by raising either a facial attack or a factual attack. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th

Cir. 2000). A facial attack is one where “the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a

complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v.

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating a facial attack to jurisdiction, the Court

must accept the factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true. See Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d

1156, 1157 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001). For a factual attack, in contrast, the Court may consider extrinsic

evidence. See Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.1987). Further, the court does

not have to assume the truthfulness of the allegations, and may resolve any factual disputes. See

White, 227 F.3d at 1242. Thus, “[o]nce the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a

factual motion by presenting affidavits or evidence properly before the court, the party opposing the

motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir.

2003). 

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the

Court ordinarily limits its review to the face of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News

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Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court

accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Generally, dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or

failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v.

Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th

Cir. 1984). In pleading sufficient facts, however, a plaintiff must suggest his or her right to relief is

more than merely conceivable, but plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). Before a district court can dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint, the court

must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies and an opportunity to amend the complaint

effectively. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

ANALYSIS

A. Younger Principles Require This Court To Stay Plaintiff’s Damages Claims

Against Defendant De Santiago.

In his second and third causes of action, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Defendant

De Santiago for Defendant De Santiago’s alleged role in initiating a baseless criminal action against

him. (FAC page 11, ¶¶ 2, 3.) Defendant De Santiago acknowledges that a stay of Plaintiff’s damage

claims against him is appropriate under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37 (1971). The Court and Plaintiff both agree. 

To resolve the issues raised by Plaintiff’s damage claims against Defendant De Santiago, this

Court must determine whether the state criminal charges were filed as part of an improper

conspiracy or with an improper motive, and also must determine Defendant De Santiago’s

involvement in those activities. Adjudication of such issues would have the practical effect of

interfering with the state court’s resolution of the pending criminal proceedings and would run afoul

of the Younger abstention doctrine. See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 979-980 (9th Cir.

2004) (en banc). As Plaintiff’s damages claims are not cognizable in the state forum, a stay of the

claims, rather than dismissal, is appropriate. Id. Accordingly, the Court STAYS Plaintiff’s claims

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The Court is staying Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant De Santiago. However, the Court addresses the merits

of Defendant De Santiago’s Motion to Dismiss so that when the stay of proceedings has been lifted, Plaintiff will file a

properly amended complaint.

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Plaintiff has not pleaded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. However, the Court considered whether Plaintiff’s third

claim, arising from an alleged conspiracy to violate civil rights, was adequately pleaded pursuant to § 1985. The Court finds,

however, in light of Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc), that Plaintiff neither has, nor could, plead his

conspiracy claim as a § 1985 claim.

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against Defendant De Santiago until the resolution of the state criminal proceedings.

B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege Facts Sufficient to Support Any Claims Against

Defendant De Santiago.

Defendant De Santiago contends that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against him upon

which relief can be granted. The Court agrees.2

Plaintiff’s FAC consists of three claims. Defendant De Santiago asserts that only Plaintiff’s

second claim pertains to him. The Court, however, reads Plaintiff’s third claim as implicating

Defendant De Santiago as well. (FAC ¶¶ 19, 20, 46, 49.) The Court understands Plaintiff’s second 

and third claims as brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3

 (FAC ¶¶ 1, 18-20, 31, 32, 49.) 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.

Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. 

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff

must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811

F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). In the present case, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to

support a claim that Defendant De Santiago violated a right held by Plaintiff as secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 

1. Plaintiff’s Second Claim Fails to Allege Sufficient Facts.

It is well settled that in addition to providing a cause of action for the deprivation of rights

secured by the Constitution, § 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of certain rights

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Defendant De Santiago does not move to dismiss the third claim in Plaintiff’s FAC, presumably because Defendant

De Santiago does not think the third claim implicates him. The Court, in dismissing Plaintiff’s second claim with leave to

amend, sua sponte addresses deficiencies in Plaintiff’s third claim as well in the interest of judicial economy.

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conferred by federal statutes. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508; Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188,

190 (9th Cir. 1995). In order to seek redress under § 1983, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a

federal “right,” not merely the violation of federal “law.” See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los

Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). 

Plaintiff’s second claim alleges that Defendant De Santiago violated Plaintiff’s civil rights

while in the performance of his duties as a police officer. The Court reads Plaintiff’s second claim

to allege three actions by Defendant De Santiago as violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights. First,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant De Santiago failed to include possibly exculpatory evidence in his

police report. (FAC ¶ 19.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant De Santiago failed to write a

complete and accurate police report in his investigation of the crime for which Plaintiff is presently

on trial. (FAC ¶ 19.) Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant De Santiago breached a duty owed to

Plaintiff to ascertain the truth of reported information. (FAC ¶ 20.) 

The Court does not find any of Defendant De Santiago’s actions alleged in Plaintiff’s second

claim as violative of Plaintiff’s established federal or constitutional rights. Plaintiff fails to offer

authority in support of the proposition that inaccurate or incomplete police reports amount to a

violation of a suspect’s federal right. Nor does Plaintiff offer authority for the proposition that

failure to include possibly exculpatory evidence in a police report amounts to violation of a suspect’s

federal right. Lastly, no authority is offered to establish a federal right requiring police officers to

ascertain the truth of reported information. Plaintiff’s second claim in the FAC is not alleged to be

grounded in any federal or constitutional rights. Accordingly, with regard to Plaintiff’s second

claim, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES with LEAVE TO AMEND within twenty

(20) days of a further order lifting the stay. 

2. Plaintiff’s Third Claim Fails to Allege Sufficient Facts.

Defendant De Santiago asserts that the only claim in the FAC implicating him is Plaintiff’s

second claim. The Court disagrees.4

 Plaintiff’s third claim alleges that a conspiracy existed among

multiple parties, including Defendant De Santiago. (FAC ¶¶ 31-33, 46, 49.) Plaintiff further alleges

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Plaintiff’s opposition brief to Defendant De Santiago’s Motion to Dismiss does not discuss immunity.

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that the conspiracy resulted in criminal proceedings against Plaintiff in violation of Plaintiff’s equal

protection and due process rights. (FAC ¶¶ 33, 49.) 

Pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff can allege a claim that multiple defendants conspired to violate

that plaintiff’s civil rights. See Woodrum v. Woodword County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.

1989); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). In pleading a conspiracy claim

under § 1983, conclusory allegations of a conspiracy which are not supported by material facts are

insufficient to state a claim. See Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1126. To properly allege conspiracy, a

Plaintiff must allege specific facts that tend to show an agreement between the people alleged to be

taking part in the conspiracy to deprive a plaintiff of his or her civil rights. See id. Furthermore, a

plaintiff must allege that a constitutional right was violated; conspiracy, even if established, does not

give rise to liability under § 1983 unless there is such a deprivation. See id. 

Plaintiff’s third claim alleges a violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff

asserts that his equal protection and due process rights were violated as a result of the culmination of

Defendants’ efforts. The alleged constitutional violations, however, are too conclusory. Plaintiff’s

third claim is deficient as it fails to allege specific facts that would tend to show an agreement

between Defendant De Santiago and any other Defendant to deprive Plaintiff of his allegedly

violated constitutional rights. A showing of such an agreement is necessary to properly allege a

conspiracy claim pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s third claim

with LEAVE TO AMEND within twenty (20) days of a further order lifting the stay. 

C. Defendant De Santiago Is Not Entitled to Immunity.

Defendant De Santiago asserts entitlement to absolute immunity from Plaintiff’s claims

against him. If Defendant De Santiago were entitled to the asserted immunity, the Court would

necessarily dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant De Santiago without leave to amend. 

However, Defendant De Santiago has not met his burden of establishing he is entitled to absolute

immunity at the pleading stage.5

 

Defendant De Santiago’s theory of entitlement to absolute immunity is based on the

immunity granted to witnesses in criminal trials. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976);

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Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342-45 (1983). However, the allegations that Plaintiff has made

against Defendant De Santiago do not pertain to testimony. The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s FAC

arise from Defendant De Santiago’s actions as a police officer, not his testimony about those events. 

Although an investigating officer is a likely witness in a criminal trial subsequent to a criminal

investigation, the Court is not aware of any authority that treats that likelihood as a sufficient basis

for immunizing an officer from suit based on actions done under the color of law prior to testifying. 

Defendant De Santiago fails to persuade the Court that testimonial absolute immunity should

extend, carte blanche, to a police officer during the performance of his or her duties. The Court

therefore finds the proffered absolute immunity doctrine inapplicable to Defendant De Santiago on

the facts Plaintiff alleges. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court STAYS Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as it

pertains to Defendant De Santiago until the resolution of the state criminal proceedings. 

Additionally, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s second claim with

LEAVE TO AMEND within twenty (20) days of a further order lifting the stay. The Court also

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s third claim with LEAVE TO AMEND within twenty (20) days of a further

order lifting the stay. The parties SHALL notify the Court within fourteen (14) days of the

conclusion of the state criminal proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 15, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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