Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01081/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01081-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

NORMA J. WARE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

tl.lJQ I.~ 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 86-1081 

) 

UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 492, ) 

BUTLER COUNTY, STATE OF KANSAS~ ) 

BOARD OF EDUCATION, UNIFIED SCHOOL) 

DISTRICT NO. 492, BUTLER COUNTY, ) 

STATE OF KANSAS and LARRY L. GEIL, ) 

Superintendent of Schools, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. CIV No. 82-1278) 

Philip A. Hamm, El Dorado, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Mary Kathleen Babcock (Timothy B. Mustaine with her on the brief), 

of Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, Wichita, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellee, Unified School District No. 492. 

Daniel J. Sevart, of Sevart & Sevart, Wichita, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellee, Larry L. Geil. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-1081 Document: 01019830742 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 1
Norma Ware brought this action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982) 

against Unified School District No. 492, the District school 

board, and Larry Geil, the District superintendent. Ware, who had 

been Geil's secretary and the school board clerk, alleged that 

defendants terminated her employment in retaliation for her 

exercise of free speech rights protected by the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments. The district court assumed that Ware's 

speech was constitutionally protected but entered a directed 

verdict for the school board, concluding Ware had presented no 

evidence that her speech played a part in the board's decision to 

terminate her. The court granted Geil's motion for a j.n.o.v. 

following a jury verdict against him, holding that Ware had failed 

to present sufficient evidence that her speech was a motivating 

factor in Geil's decision to recommend her termination to the 

board. We reverse. 

I 

Norma Ware's employment was terminated on April 8, 1980. At 

the time of her dismissal, Ware had worked for the school district 

for sixteen years and as Geil's secretary for nine years. A major 

part of her secretarial duties included keeping the school 

financial records and doing the payroll. She also served as clerk 

for the board of education from 1968 until her termination. 

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During the year prior to ware's dismissal, Geil and the board 

developed a master plan for the entire school district that 

included a proposed bond issue to raise funds for construction of 

a new school building and for maintenance and repairs to old 

buildings. Ware generally agreed with the bond issue, but in 

discussions with school district patrons and some school board 

members, she expressed disapproval of a proposal to seek money for 

certain repairs. 

Ware and Geil had two conversations involving the bond issue. 

Ware testified that on February 26, 1980, Geil asked her why she 

opposed the bond issue and she responded "exactly what I had said 

all the time,· that I felt like there was a lot of maintenance work 

in there that we should have already completed." Rec., vol. v, at 

59. Although Ware testified that Geil told her he did not think 

someone in her position as clerk of the board should openly oppose 

the bond issue, he denied telling Ware not to oppose it. After 

their discussion, Ware stopped calling patrons or otherwise openly 

talking about the bond issue. The bond issue was hotly contested 

but passed by a small margin on March 18, 1980. 

The second conversation occurred on April 2, when Geil 

informed Ware he was going to recommend that the board not renew 

her contract, and gave three reasons for the recommendation: poor 

working relationships in the office; his belief that working on 

the bond issue would upset Ware; and Ware's resistance to typing, 

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authority, computers, and changes in the office. That evening, 

Ware and her husband called several members of the school board 

either complaining that Ware was being fired over the bond issue 

or asking why Ware was being dismissed. The next day, Geil had 

the locks on the school office changed and did not give Ware a 

key. 

At the April 8 board meeting, the board reviewed employment 

contracts for all noncertified personnel. An unusually large 

number of people attended the meeting due to efforts to rally 

support for Ware, and the bond issue was a topic of discussion 

from the floor. After the board went into executive session, Geil 

made a formal recommendation not to renew Ware's contract, listing 

several reasons for his recommendation, including his belief that 

it would be impossible for him and Ware to continue working 

together in the future. Although Ware and her attorney were 

permitted to attend the second half of the executive session, 

Ware's attorney advised her to remain silent. When confronted 

with Geil's list of reasons, she objected only to the accusation 

of having alcohol on her breath at work. The board asked Ware one 

question. 1 Board member Remsburg moved to reject Geil's 

1 Testimony indicates that one board member asked Ware whether 

she could continue working after what had happened. The record is 

internally inconsistent in the transcription of Ware's reply. 

Although the record at one point shows that Ware answered she 

could not continue working, we are convinced that this is a 

transcription error. Considering all the testimony on the 

question to Ware and her answer, we believe the record reflects 

that Ware said she could continue to work. At least one witness 

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recommendation concerning ware's contract, but his motion was 

voted down. A second mot·ion to accept all Geil's recommendations 

concerning noncertified personnel, including nonrenewal of Ware's 

contract, passed by a four to three vote. ware never returned to 

work. 

II 

We begin by addressing defendants' argument that Ware's 

speech on the bond issue is not constitutionally protected. 

Although the trial court assumed the speech was protected in 

deciding in favor of defendants on other grounds, "we can affirm 

on any grounds that find support in the record." Colorado Flying 

Academy, Inc. v. U.S., 724 F.2d 871, 880 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Moreover, while the sufficiency of the underlying historical facts 

is determined by the traditional standard of review, the protected 

nature of Ware's speech is subject to our independent 

constitutional judgment. Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School Dist. 

RE-lJ, 785 F.2d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 1986). In assessing the 

status of Ware's speech, we view the historical facts most 

favorably to Ware and give her the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Id. 

testified that Ware had added the phrase "with great difficulty," 

although at trial Ware denied making this addition. The district 

court stated that Ware had answered the question with "a qualified 

'yes.'" Rec., vol. I, doc. 64, at 7. 

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In determining whether a public employee's speech is entitled 

to First Amendment protection, a court must first consider whether 

the speech relates to a matter of public concern, that is, a 

"matter of political, social, or other concern to the community." 

Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). The plaintiff must 

also present evidence that the speech itself was of general 

interest rather than of purely personal significance. See Saye, 

785 F.2d at 866; Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 & n.l 

(10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987); Wilson v. 

City of Littleton, 732 F.2d 765, 768-69 (10th Cir. 1984). Ware 

met this burden with evidence that the bond issue was a matter of 

widespread community interest and that the content of her speech 

contributed to the public debate on that issue. 

When the speech is a matter of public concern, the court must 

then balance the interest of a public employee in commenting on 

such matters and the interest of the employer in promoting the 

efficiency of its public seivices. See Pickering v. Board of 

Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Under the Pickering test, an 

employee's First Amendment rights are protected '"unless the 

employer shows that some restriction is necessary to prevent the 

disruption of official functions or to insure effective 

performance by the employee.'" Wren, 798 F.2d at 1318 (quoting 

Childers v. Ind. School Dist. of Bryan Cty., 676 F.2d 1338, 1341 

(10th Cir. 1982)). The employer's burden to justify its 

restriction on speech increases in proportion to the value of that 

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speech in the public debate. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152: 

Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 7~7 _(10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 

In focusing on the effective functioning of the employer's 

enterprise, a court should consider "whether the statement impairs 

discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a 

detrimental impact on close working relationships for which 

personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the 

performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular 

operation of the enterprise." Rankin v. McPhersen, 107 s.ct. 

2891, 2899 (1987). 

On appeal, defendants contend that they were justified in 

terminating Ware because she and Geil had a confidential 

employment relationship that was compromised by their disagreement 

over the bond issue. Whatever merit this argument might have in 

the abstract, it is fatally undermined by defendants' failure to 

assert it at trial or present any evidence to support it. 

Although Geil testified that his action was based in part on a 

deteriorating work atmosphere, he attributed it to factors other 

than Ware's public statements on the bond issue. Indeed, Geil 

testified that Ware's stance on the bond issue played no part in 

his decision to recommend her termination. Neither did he offer 

the disruptive effect of Ware's speech as a basis for his action 

either to Ware or to the school board. Those testifying board 

members who voted in favor of Geil's recommendation also stated 

that Ware's speech had no bearing on their vote. 

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Under these circumstances it is difficult to give credence to 

defendants' argument on appeal that Ware's speech was so 

disruptive it justified her termination, particularly in view of 

independent evidence that the effective functioning of the office 

was not affected by Ware's speech. Marguerite Banks, the 

secretary who shared an office with Ware, Geil and the high school 

principal, Neill Wheeler, testified that she did not observe any 

change in Ware's relationship with Geil or Wheeler that led her to 

believe Ware would be fired. 

as friendly most of the time. 

She described the office atmosphere 

The evidence was undisputed that 

Ware had never revealed any confidential information and that her 

position on the bond issue was based on facts available to the 

public. On April 1, only a day before Geil told her he was 

recommending her termination, the state auditors praised her work. 

In sum, the record contains no evidence that Ware's speech 

interfered with the efficient functioning of Geil's office or 

impeded the performance either of Ware or those with whom 'she 

worked. Consequently, we conclude that her speech is entitled to 

First Amendment protection. 

III 

After the jury returned a verdict against Geil for $22,000, 

the district court granted Geil's motion for j.n.o.v., concluding 

that "Ware failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 

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that her activity in relation to the bond issue was a substantial 

or motivating factor in Geil's decision to recommend termination." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 64, at 10. In so doing, the court 

characterized Ware's evidence as "subjective evaluations.'' Id. at 

8. Ware asserts that the district court erred by reweighing the 

evidence, by assessing the credibiilty of the witnesses, and by 

failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to her. 

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district 

court clearly substituted its judgment for that of the jury. 

"Jury verdicts are not to be lightly overturned as courts 

recognize that a 'traditional sanctity' attaches to the solemn 

verdict of a jury." Paz v. Carman Indus., 860 F.2d 977, 979 (10th 

Cir. 1988) (quoting Mid-West Underground Storage Inc. v. Porter, 

717 F.2d 498, 501 (10th Cir. 1983)). "'Judgment n.o.v. is proper 

only when the evidence so strongly supports an issue that 

reasonable minds could not differ.'" Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 

F.2d' 1412, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Delano v. Kitch, 663 

F.2d 990, 1002 (10th Cir. 1981). "In making this evaluation, the 

court must construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to 

the nonmoving party.'' EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 

763 F.2d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir. 1985). The court "'cannot weigh 

the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses or substitute 

its judgment for that of the jury.'" Id. (quoting Joyce v. 

Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 680 n.2 (10th Cir. 1981). 

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Evidence on the motivating factor issue may be sufficient to 

support a jury verdict even though it is ~ircumstantial. See 

Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 546-47 (6th Cir. 1987); Lindsey 

v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 1979). A 

plaintiff may create a reasonable inference of improper motivation 

by presenting evidence tending to show that the reasons proffered 

for the adverse action are without factual support. See McClure 

v. Cywinski, 686 F.2d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Fluker v. 

Alabama State Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 201, 209 (5th Cir. 

1971)); Love v. Sessions, 568 F.2d 357, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1978); 

Simineo v. School Dist. No. 16, 594 F.2d 1353, 1357 (10th Cir. 

1979). A j.n.o.v. is proper, however, if the verdict is supported 

only by sheer speculation and conjecture. See McClure, 686 F.2d 

at 546. 

Although Geil testified that his decision was based in part 

on a personality conflict with Ware that resulted in a 

deteriorating office environment, Ware presented evidence through 

Marguerite Banks that the office environment was friendly and that 

the relationship between ware and Geil remained harmonious. Ware 

also presented evidence that she and her husband maintained a 

social and neighborly relationship with Geil and his family, and 

with the principal, Mr. Wheeler, and his wife. 

Geil also stated that one of the reasons for his decision was 

his belief that Ware was losing interest in the job. The only 

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basis for this belief was his observation that Ware had nearly 

stqpped attending extracurricular school events such as football 

games. Ware testified that although she had faithfully attended 

numerous functions while her children· were in school, she had cut 

back when her youngest graduated, and that this reduction had 

nothing to do with loss of interest in her job. 

Geil testified that Ware resented change, although the only 

concrete example offered as evidence of this was his perception of 

her resistance to computerizing the bookkeeping in 1972-73. Two 

witnesses who had worked with Ware and Geil in setting up the 

computerization testified that Ware never indicated she disliked 

computers, that she had a very positive attitude, that she was 

willing to cooperate, and that her work was not only excellent, 

but far superior to that of secretaries in other school systems in 

which they had worked. 2 

Ware also presented evidence demonstrating the high quality 

of her job performance. She had received raises every year, 

including the year before her termination. She had never been 

criticized or reprimanded by Geil, and those in the best position 

to evaluate the quality of her work described it as excellent. In 

1974, two years after the bookkeeping was computerized, a previous 

2 Geil's assertion that he had noticed alcohol on Ware's breath 

was totally uncorroborated. 

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employer sought to interview Ware. Geil and the school board 

requested her to ~tay in their employment and gave her a raise. 

Finally, we note evidence of statements by Geil indicating 

that he was not pleased with Ware's stance on the bond issue. 

Although disputed by Geil, Ware testified that he instructed her 

to stop contacting people about the matter. Geil admitted that 

one of the reasons for his decision to terminate her was his 

belief that she would have difficulty working on the bond issue 

after she had opposed it. Geil and the school board president 

discussed Ware's opposition and both stated that they "hated to 

see it." Rec. supp. vol. I, at 150. This testimony, coupled with 

the evidence that Geil's reasons for terminating Ware were 

pretextual, that her work was satisfactory and that, after working 

nine years as Geil's secretary without any indication that he was 

not pleased with her work, she was fired two weeks after the bond 

election, permitted the jury to infer that Geil was motivated by 

Ware's protected speech. See~, Conklin, 834 F.2d at 546-47 

(j.n.o.v. not proper given evidence of exemplary work record, lack 

of criticism or reprimands, and statements implying improper 

motive); Solis v. Rio Grande City Ind. Schools, 734 F.2d 243, 247 

(5th Cir. 1984) (denial of j.n.o.v. affirmed on evidence that 

plaintiff's protected speech open and well known, and plaintiff 

qualified and replaced by one with less experience); Crawford v. 

Garnier, 719 F.2d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983) (jury verdict for 

plaintiff supported by evidence of proximity of termination and 

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defendant's awareness of protected speech, and fact that defendant 

discussed speech w~th colleague shortly before termination). 

The district court erroneously concluded that Ware's evidence 

was insufficient as a matter of law because it was subjective. A 

case such as this one, which may properly be proven by 

circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences, will 

necessarily involve subjective elements. The evidence presented 

by both sides consisted largely of subjective evaluations of body 

language, tone of voice, facial expressions, the nature of the 

office atmosphere, and other inferences drawn from non-verbal 

conduct. In addition, the testimony as to the content of the 

critical conversations between Ware and Geil was directly 

conflicting. The weight given such subjective and contradictory 

evidence necessarily depends on an evaluation of the credibility 

of the witnesses, 3 a function exclusively within the province of 

the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of j.n.o.v. in favor 

of Geil. 

3 We note that Geil's credibility was impeached twice. Geil 

testified that after the board meeting, Ware came back to school 

with a smile on her face and cleaned out her desk. Ware and Banks 

both testified that Ware never returned to school after the 

meeting, and that Banks cleaned out Ware's desk and brought Ware's 

things to her home. Ware also presented evidence that Geil at one 

time had misled the board about his teacher recruiting activities. 

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IV 

Ware contends that the district court erred in granting a 

directed verdict for the school board because she presented 

sufficient evidence to impose liability on the board for Geil's 

illegal conduct. In granting the board's motion, the court 

stated: 

"The undisputed evidence convincingly demonstrates that 

the bond issue played no part whatsoever in the Board's 

decision to terminate Ware. The bond issue was not 

raised at the board meeting and the board members 

testified that the issue was not considered by them. 

Ware presented no evidence to the contrary." 

Rec. vol. I. doc. 64, at 11. We cannot agree with this assessment 

of the record. Moreover, during the pendency of this appeal, the 

Supreme Court decided two cases that shed light on the board's 

liability for the acts of Geil, its employee. See City of Canton 

v. Harris, 109 s.ct. 1197 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 

475 U.S. 469 (1986). Our review of the record in light of these 

cases convinces us that the district court's grant of a directed 

verdict must be reversed.· 

Liability under section 1983 cannot rest upon the doctrine of 

respondeat superior. See City of Canton, 109 S.Ct. at 1203. A 

direct causal link must exist between the acts of the governing 

body sought to be held liable and the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. Id. Such a causal connection may be established 

when the governing body has delegated its decision-making 

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authority to the official whose illegal conduct caused the harm, 

see Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 485, or when the governing body retains 

its decision-making authority but exercises it with deliberate 

indifference to the constitutional rights of those affected by its 

decisions, see City of Canton, 109 s.ct. 1204-06; Smith v. Rowe, 

761 F.2d 360, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1985). Ware contends that she 

presented sufficient evidence under both of these theories to 

raise a jury issue on the school board's liability. 

Ware's argument that the board delegated to Geil its 

authority to terminate Ware is supported by the undisputed fact 

that Geil changed the locks to Ware's office, thus locking her 

out, the day after he told her he was going to recommend her 

nonrenewal and five days before the school board meeting at which 

his recommendation was presented. This fact permits an inference 

that Geil considered his decision to be final. The dissent relies 

on the board's 4 to 3 decision as apparently conclusive evidence 

that'the board did not rubber stamp Geil's decision. However, 

there is evidence that at least a majority of the board may have 

done just that. The school board president testified that during 

the board's executive session on April 8, the board discussed the 

fact that it was Geil's privilege to nonrenew his secretary and 

get another one. Rec., supp. vol. I, at 132-33. Another board 

member testified that when Geil began his job as superintendent, 

"it was the understanding between him and the Board that he could 

choose his immediate secretary." Id. at 213. This evidence is 

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clearly sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that the board 

had effectively delegated its power to terminate Ware to Geil. 

Accord Starrett v. Wadley, F.2d , , Nos. 86-2002, 86-

. 2067, 86-2423, slip op. at 19-20 (10th Cir. filed May 22, 1989) 

(county liable when it admitted vesting employee with authority to 

fire his staff). 

We also find evidence in the record to support Ware's claim 

that even if the board retained its decision-making power, it 

acted with deliberate indifference to Ware's First Amendment 

rights in approving her termination. School boards are chargeable 

with the knowledge that employees "may not be dismissed in 

retaliation for lawful exercise of first amendment freedoms." 

Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275, 279 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978). The 

record contains evidence that the board members knew about Ware's 

public stand on the bond issue and were informed of her belief 

that her termination was in retaliation for that stand. One 

member, Dale Remsburg, testified that he believed the bond issue 

was the cause and that another member told him he thought so as 

well. The board meeting itself was attended by an unusually large 

number of patrons and was apparently disorderly. Some evidence 

indicates that the bond issue and Ware's termination were raised 

from the floor. Significantly, Remsburg testified that at the 

executive session he raised the possibility that Geil's 

recommendation was tied to the bond issue and that Geil's 

proffered reasons were not valid. Rec., supp. vol. III, at 34. 

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Moreover, the school board president testified that he was 

concerned prior to the board meeting about Ware's speech. He 

stated that ''my main concern was that here you've got an employee 

of your District, and if they're out saying you don't need this 

here bond issue, that was my main concern, that it just wouldn't 

look as good.'' Rec., supp. vol. I, at 151. Notwithstanding the 

above indications that Geil's recommendation was in retaliation 

for Ware's position on the bond issue, the board made no 

independent investigation, asked Geil no questions about the 

reasons for his decision, and asked Ware only one question, the 

answer to which it did not take into consideration. This evidence 

is sufficient to create a jury question on whether the board acted 

with deliberate indifference to Ware's First Amendment rights in 

approving Geil's recommendation. We therefore reverse the grant 

of a directed verdict in favor of the school board. 

V 

In concluding that this case must be reversed, we agree with 

the dissent that the trial court correctly articulated the 

standards governing the assessment of motions for directed verdict 

and for j.n.o.v. It is not the articulation but the application 

of those standards with which we take issue. Although a scintilla 

of evidence is not sufficient to justify submitting a case to the 

jury, a verdict may not be directed "if the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "[T]he 

inquiry performed is the threshold one of determining whether 

there is the need for a trial--whether, in other words, there are 

any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a 

finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of 

either party." Id. at 250. The dissent has simply disregarded 

the evidence set out above upon which a reasonable jury could find 

in favor of Ware's claims. 

"[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence 

and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether 

there is a genuine issue of fact for trial." Id. at 249. The 

lower court here went beyond its proper function of determining 

whether the evidence presented a reasonable conflict and performed 

the jury function of weighing that conflicting evidence, as 

demonstrated by its statement that "Ware failed to establish [her 

claim against Geil] by a preponderance of the evidence.'' Rec., 

volo I, doc. 64, at 10 (emphasis added). The dissent tacitly 

recognizes this error by repeatedly calling for affirmance of the 

district court's "findings/conclusions," a hybrid term that 

appears to refer to a resolution of the merits of a claim by the 

bench rather than the jury. 

In sum, we conclude that Ware's speech on the school bond 

issue was entitled to First Amendment protection. We hold that 

the district court erred in entering a j.n.o.v. in favor of Geil, 

and we reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury 

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verdict against him. We also hold that the court erred in 

granting a directed verdict for the school board, and we reverse 

and remand for further proceedings. 4 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

4 Ware contends that the district court erred in its jury 

instructions by refusing to allow her to recover lost wages 

allegedly accruing after the time of trial. In view of the 

speculative nature of these wages, and the fact that the jury 

awarded Ware an amount less than the figure she offered as lost 

wages up to the date of trial, we conclude that the court's 

instruction was not prejudicial error. 

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No. 86-1081, Ware v. Unified School District No. 492 and 

Larry L. Geil, Superintendent of Schools. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I would affirm the district court. In my view, the trial 

court was correct in granting the school district's motion for a 

directed verdict and in granting Superintendent Geil's motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This is a case where this 

court has substituted its outcome-oriented objectives for the 

district court's considered findings/conclusions. 

I. 

The district court was fully aware of the rigid standards 

governing the grant of a judgment n.o.v., i.e., that the court 

cannot reweigh the evidence, consider the credibility of 

witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury. See, 

Opinion and Order of December 20, 1985, pp. 2-3. When the trial 

court denied Geil's motion for a directed verdict, it observed 

that the evidence favoring Ware was "razor thin." Thereafter, the 

trial court concluded that the overwhelming weight of the evidence 

supported Geil's contention that the school board terminated Ware 

for legitimate reasons which had no relationship to the bond 

issue. There was no inconsistency on the trial court's part in 

denying the motion for directed verdict made by defendant Geil 

even though the court thereafter, based on the same evidence, 

granted Geil's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 

In Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §2533, 

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p. 586, it is observed: 

Even at the close of all the evidence it may be 

desirable to refrain from directing a verdict though it 

would be possible to do so. If a verdict is directed 

and· the appellate court holds that the evidence was in 

fact sufficient to go to the jury, an entire new trial 

must be had. If, on the other hand, the trial court 

submits the case to the jury, though it thinks the 

evidence insufficient, final determination of the case 

is greatly expedited. If the jury agrees with the 

court's appraisal of the evidence, and returns a verdict 

for the party who moved for a directed verdict, the case 

is at an end. If the jury brings in a different 

verdict, the trial court can grant judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict. Th~n if the appellate 

court holds that the trial court was in error in its 

appraisal of the evidence, it can reverse and order 

judgment on the verdict of the jury, without any need 

for a new trial. For this reason the appellate courts 

have repeatedly said that it 1s usually desirable to 

take a verdict, and then pass on the sufficiency of the 

evidence on a post-verdict motion. (footnote omitted). 

The record simply does not support the proposition that the 

school board members terminated Ware in order to punish her for 

her opposition to the bond issue. The district court observed, 

and I agree, that "[t]he overwhelming weight of the evidence 

supports [the] interpretation that Geil's 

recommendation was prompted entirely by permissible concerns. 

Geil, Banks and even Ware testified to conflict in Geil's and 

Ware's relationship predating the bond issue." Opinion and Order 

of December 20, 1985, at p. 9. The court pointed to Geil's 

testimony that Ware "resisted typing, taking directions," etc. 

Id. at 4. Significantly, the court pointed out that Marguerite 

Banks, who worked both with Geil and Ware, as well as Neil 

Wheeler, the school principal (who was called as an adverse 

witness by Ware) confirmed and corroborated Geil's testimony that 

the working relationship between Geil and Ware had worsened long 

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before the bond issue developed. Id. Thus, in my view, the 

district court properly concluded that Ware failed to establish 

by a preponderance of the evidence that her activity in relation 

to the bond issue was a substantial or motivating factor in Geil's 

recommendation that she be terminated. The district court found/ . concluded: 

Ware and her attorney, O.J. Connell, were present 

at the board meeting on April 8, 1980. Board members 

testified that the reasons Geil presented to the Board 

for his recommendation that Ware be terminated included 

the strained work atmosphere and Ware's resistance to 

Geil's policy decision. [Specifically, resistance to 

typing and installation of the mini computers]. 

Although Ware was given an opportunity to respond, the 

bond issue was not mentioned by anyone. Board members 

asked Ware and Geil whether they thought they could work 

together in the future. Ware responded with a qualified 

"yes;" Geil answered "no." The Board voted 4-3 to 

accept Geil's recommendation that Ware be discharged. 

All of the board members who voted to terminate Ware 

testified at trial that the bond issue did not enter 

into their decision. 

Id. at 6-7. 

I agree with the district court's finding that on the record 

made, the jurors could not have reasonably inferred that Ware's 

opposition to the bond issue was a substantial or motivating 

factor in either Geil's recommendation for termination or the 

board's 4-3 vote in support thereof. One of the board members 

who voted to retain Ware was Dale Remsburg. At trial, Remsburg 

testified that he recalled board member Patton mentioning the bond 

issue as the reason for Ware's termination.· However, Mr. Patton 

testified that he had no recollection of having made any such 

remarks to Remsburg. (R., Vol. IV, pp. 155-56). Other than 

Ware's own self-serving testimony, Remsburg's "recollection'' is 

the only evidence connecting the bond issue matter to Ware's 

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termination. It is less than "razor thin!" Undaunted, the 

majority has found ''evidence" to support Ware's "claim that even 

if the board retained its decision-making power, it acted with 

deliberate indifference to Ware's First Amendment rights in 

approving her termination." (Majority Opinion, p. 16) 

(underlining supplied). 

The revised majority opinion, in accord with my previous 

revised dissent, properly relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) for the standard governing the grant of 

motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. The majority thus 

recognizes that if the party bearing the burden of proof has 

presented only a scintilla of evidence (as did plaintiff Ware) in 

contrast to the compelling evidence presented by the defendants 

(see district court's findings/conclusions, Opinion and Order of 

December 20, 1985, at pp. 4, 6-7, 9), there would not be any 

evidence "[u]pon which a jury could properly proceed to find a 

verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is 

imposed." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 251. On 

the other hand, the trial judge must direct a verdict if there can 

be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. A directed 

verdict is "[a]ppropriate only if the proof weighs so 

overwhelmingly in favor of the movant as to permit no other 

rational conclusion." Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 814 F.2d 1489, 

1495 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 262 

(1988). The trial court applied this standard. See, Opinion and 

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Order of December 20, 1985, p. 9 (the "overwhelming weight of the 

evidence supports .. . . . " ) 

Plaintiff Ware was legally obligated to prove that her 

protected speech (opp6sition to the bond issue) was the 

substantial or motivating factor for Geil's recommendation that 

she be terminated or that Geil's preferred explanations for her 

termination were pretextual. Mt. Healthy City Board of Education 

v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d 1188, 

1190 (10th Cir. 1977). See also EEOC v. Prudential Federal 

Savings and Loan Association, 763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985). She plainly failed to make the 

grade. The district court was on solid ground in finding/ 

concluding that plaintiff Ware failed to carry her burden of 

persuasion. 

II. 

The majority opinion is in absolute contradiction to the 

district court's findings/ conclusions relative to the district 

court's grant of the school board's motion for a directed verdict. 

The district court, in granting the school board's motion for 

directed verdict found/concluded: 

The undisputed evidence convincingly demonstrates 

that the bond issue played no part whatsoever in the 

Board's decision to terminate Ware. The bond issue was 

not raised at the board meeting and the board members 

testified that the issue was not considered by them. 

Ware presented no testimony to the contrary. 

(R., Vol. I, Doc. 64, p. 11). 

The majority disagrees with this "assessment of the record" 

because (1) Geil's action in locking Ware out of her office the 

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day after he told her that he was going to recommend her 

termination shows that the Board delegated to Geil the ultimate 

authority in the matter, and (2) there is evidence to support 

ware's claim that even if the board had retained its decisionmaking power, it acted with deliberate indifference to Ware's 

First Amendment rights in approving her termination. Both of 

these "findings" by the majority are based on rank assumptions, 

speculations and "indications." 

The very vote on the issue 

recommendation that Ware's contract 

louder than words that the board 

of whether to accept Geil's 

be terminated, 4-3, speaks 

did not "rubber stamp" or 

routinely approve Geil's recommendations. Furthermore, the 

. majority apparently discounts the testimony of all of the board 

members that they retained the power and authority to hire and 

fire employees of the school district. This evidence was not 

disputed. 

I would affirm the district court. 

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