Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05020/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 502
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

FRANK GAYLORD,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________ 

2014-5020

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:06-cv-00539-TCW, Judge Thomas C. 

Wheeler. 

______________________ 

Decided: February 4, 2015

______________________ 

HEIDI E. HARVEY, Fish & Richardson P.C., of Boston, 

Massachusetts, argued for plaintiff-appellee. 

SCOTT BOLDEN, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendantappellant. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Assistant Attorney General, and JOHN J. FARGO, Director. 

Of counsel on the brief were DAVID C. BELT and MICHAEL 

F. KIELY, Attorney, United States Postal Service, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

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2 GAYLORD v. US

Before MOORE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

On remand from earlier holdings of this court, the 

Court of Federal Claims held that ten percent of $5.4 

million in revenue (which was almost pure profit) was a 

reasonable royalty for the United States to pay as damages for its unauthorized use of a distinctive copyrighted 

work on a postage stamp. Finding an adequate basis for 

the trial court’s determination, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Much of the background to the present appeal is detailed in our prior opinions, Gaylord v. United States, 595 

F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Gaylord I), and Gaylord v. 

United States, 678 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Gaylord II). 

Frank Gaylord, a World War II veteran and renowned 

sculptor, created The Column, consisting of nineteen 

stainless steel statues depicting a squad of soldiers on 

patrol, to form a central part of the Korean War Veterans 

Memorial located on the National Mall in Washington, 

D.C. The Memorial also includes a reflecting pool and a 

mural wall, created by others. Mr. Gaylord was paid

$775,000 for his contribution, time and materials included. 

In January 1996, roughly six months after the Memorial was completed and dedicated, an amateur photographer named John Alli visited the Memorial during a 

heavy snowstorm and photographed The Column, later 

titling the resulting photograph Real Life. In 2002, the 

United States Postal Service decided to issue a stamp to 

commemorate the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the 

Korean War armistice. From the very outset of the process of selecting an image for the commemoration, the 

relevant Postal Service advisory committee fastened onto 

the idea of using The Column on the stamp. It selected 

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GAYLORD v. US 3

Mr. Alli’s photograph of The Column for the stamp face, 

and it paid Mr. Alli a one-time fee of $1,500 for the right 

to use his photo. The Postal Service did not seek Mr. 

Gaylord’s consent to use The Column—the photograph 

was a “derivative work” of The Column under 17 U.S.C. 

§ 106(2)—before issuing the stamp in 2003, and Mr.

Gaylord never gave his consent. See Gaylord I, 595 F.3d 

at 1370–71. 

Mr. Gaylord sued the United States for copyright infringement in 2006. In Gaylord I, we held that the government was liable to Mr. Gaylord for copyright 

infringement, because it used his work on the stamp 

without his permission, The Column was not a “joint 

work” (whose joint authors individually might grant 

permission), and its use was not protected as fair use. 

595 F.3d at 1371, 1376, 1381. In Gaylord II, we vacated 

the Court of Federal Claims’ decision awarding Mr. 

Gaylord $5,000 as the “reasonable and entire compensation” he was due under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b). 678 F.3d at 

1345. We remanded to determine the fair market value of 

a license for Mr. Gaylord’s work based on a hypothetical 

negotiation with the government. Id. at 1344–45.

On remand after Gaylord II, the Court of Federal 

Claims reopened the record to allow additional discovery 

and expert reports, and it then held a two-day trial on 

damages. As we had suggested, and the parties accept as 

sound, the trial court broke down its consideration of 

damages into three categories of infringing goods: (1) 

stamps used to send mail; (2) commercial merchandise 

featuring an image of the stamp; and (3) unused stamps 

purchased by collectors. Gaylord v. United States, 112 

Fed. Cl. 539, 542–43 (2013); see Gaylord II, 678 F.3d at 

1344. The first two categories are not now in dispute: the 

parties agreed that no damages would be awarded for

stamps used to send mail and that a per-unit royalty was 

appropriate for the commercial merchandise, the trial 

court setting the rate at 10% of revenue to produce a 

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4 GAYLORD v. US

merchandise award of $33,092 (plus prejudgment interest), which neither side now contests. Gaylord, 112 Fed. 

Cl. at 542–43. 

The only question disputed in this court concerns the 

award regarding the third category—unused stamps. 

“After a full review of the evidence presented by both 

sides,” the trial court determined that a 10% per-unit

royalty was appropriate to calculate damages for stamps 

purchased by collectors. Id. at 542. Based on evidence 

from regularly conducted surveys that the Postal Service 

commissions and relies on in its ordinary course of business, the court determined that the Postal Service received $5.4 million in revenue—which was “almost pure 

profit”—from unused stamps of The Column sold to 

collectors during the (now-ended) life of the issue. Id. at 

541. The court therefore awarded Mr. Gaylord $540,000 

for the unused stamps, plus prejudgment interest. Id. at 

542–43. 

The government appeals the unused-stamp award. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review legal conclusions by the Court of Federal 

Claims de novo and its factual findings for clear error. 

Gaylord II, 678 F.3d at 1342; Gargoyles, Inc. v. United 

States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1576–77 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “A 

finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when[,] although there is 

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 

a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. 

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). In the patent 

context, we have treated the royalty determination as a 

factual finding but certain methodological questions for 

determining a fair market value as subject to abuse-ofdiscretion review. See SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. 

Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 

1991). Any difference in the standard of review does not 

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GAYLORD v. US 5

matter here, however, as we find no clear error or abuse of 

discretion in the Court of Federal Claims’ determinations 

supporting its royalty award.

A 

In 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), Congress waived the sovereign 

immunity of the United States to allow “the recovery of 

[the copyright owner’s] reasonable and entire compensation as damages” for copyright infringement. In Gaylord 

II, we held that “the methods used to determine ‘actual 

damages’ under the copyright damages statute, 17 U.S.C. 

§ 504, are appropriate for measuring the copyright owner’s loss” under § 1498(b). 678 F.3d at 1343. Consistent 

with the conclusions of other circuits that have considered 

the issue, we held that actual damages for copyright 

infringement may be based on a reasonable royalty representing “‘the fair market value of a license covering the 

defendant’s use.’” Id. (quoting On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 

246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Dowagiac Mfg. 

Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648–50 (1915) 

(affirming that, in the patent context, a reasonable royalty “afford[s] a basis for measuring the damages”); On 

Davis, 246 F.3d at 168–69 (summarizing copyright cases). 

To calculate the fair market value, a court deciding a 

copyright case may use a tool familiar from patent law, 

without necessarily following every aspect of patent law’s 

use of that tool. It may hypothesize a negotiation between 

the parties before the infringement occurred and determine “ ‘the reasonable license fee on which a willing buyer 

and a willing seller would have agreed for the use taken 

by the infringer.’” Gaylord II, 678 F.3d at 1343 (quoting 

On Davis, 246 F.3d at 167); see Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1174 

(9th Cir. 1977) (approving instruction to jury to determine

“what a willing buyer would have been reasonably required to pay to a willing seller for plaintiffs’ work.”). 

Several cases have stressed the use of “objective considerCase: 14-5020 Document: 39-2 Page: 5 Filed: 02/04/2015
6 GAYLORD v. US

ations” in the determination of a copyrighted work’s 

market value using that method. Jarvis v. K2 Inc., 486 

F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2007); see Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 

765 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2014); On Davis, 246 F.3d 

at 166–67. The court is not constrained to accept particular practices of the parties on either side—either to allow 

owners to charge what they “would like to have charged if 

unconstrained by reality,” Oracle, 765 F.3d at 1088, or to

“shield [infringers] from paying fair market value for 

what they took,” Gaylord II, 678 F.3d at 1343 (citing to 

patent law). 

Determining a reasonable royalty does not require 

“mathematical exactness,” but a “reasonable approximation” under the circumstances of a given case. See Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 647 (discussing the degree of precision 

required in the sometimes-similar process of apportioning 

profits). Other circuits have recognized the oftenunavoidable uncertainties in establishing the fair market 

value of a reasonable license fee as well as the importance 

of avoiding undue speculation. Oracle, 765 F.3d at 1088–

89; On Davis, 246 F.3d at 166. “[S]ome difficulty in 

quantifying the damages attributable to the infringement 

should not bar recovery.” On Davis, 246 F.3d at 167.

The hypothetical-negotiation determination must be 

tied to the particular work at issue and its marketplace 

value—much as, in patent law, the determination must be 

tied to the particular patented technology and its footprint in the market. See VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 

767 F.3d 1308, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014); LaserDynamics, Inc. 

v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67, 79 (Fed Cir. 

2012); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 

1315–18 (Fed. Cir. 2011); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, 

Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Different kinds of 

evidence may be relevant, as long as it is viewed for what 

it says about the work-specific value. For example, past 

arms-length licensing practices by the copyright owner or 

the infringer for similar uses and “benchmark” licenses by 

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GAYLORD v. US 7

others in the industry may be useful. See Oracle, 765 

F.3d at 1093; Jarvis, 486 F.3d 534–35. But the use of 

past licenses as evidence must always take account of 

economically relevant differences between the circumstances of those licenses and the circumstances of the 

matter in litigation—as we have said in the related patent-law context. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 

F.3d 1201, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 2014); VirnetX, 767 F.3d at 

1330–31; Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 

F.3d 1197, 1211–12 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, in the copyright context, the unique features of a particular work 

(including its recognized stature and symbolic value) may 

be important in assessing the ultimate significance of past 

practices in licensing other works. 

B 

The basic premise of the hypothetical negotiation in 

this case would have been the opportunity for making 

substantial profits if the two sides were willing to join 

forces, which we must assume they were. See Gaylord II, 

678 F.3d at 1343 (“ ‘a willing buyer and a willing seller’”). 

The Court of Federal Claims in this case determined that

the negotiators, presented such an opportunity and acting 

under assumptions designed to identify market value,

would have agreed to a 90/10 split of the revenue from 

retained stamps, which, here, is in substance a 90/10 split 

of profits, because the revenue for the unused stamps is 

almost pure profit to the Postal Service. The question for 

us is whether that result—giving the Postal Service 90% 

of the profits and Mr. Gaylord 10%—is within the range of 

reasonable findings from the evidence. See Polar Bear 

Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 

2004) (affirming jury award that was “within the range of 

the fair market value” justified by the evidence). 

In answering that question, “[w]e presume that a fact 

finder reviews all the evidence presented unless he explicitly expresses otherwise.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Daig Corp., 

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8 GAYLORD v. US

789 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Here, the trial court, 

far from stating otherwise, expressly stated that it conducted “a full review of the evidence presented by both 

sides.” Gaylord, 112 Fed. Cl. at 542. We therefore consider the entirety of the evidence, not just the evidence

expressly recited in the trial court’s opinion. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 

1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The fact that the district court did 

not in its opinion recite every piece of evidence does not 

mean that the evidence was not considered.”). We conclude that the trial court’s determination must be upheld.

1 

As a threshold matter, the trial court could reasonably find that a per-unit royalty, and not a one-time lumpsum payment, would have been the outcome of the negotiation. The familiar advantages of a per-unit royalty can 

readily be found present here. A per-unit royalty is a 

logical way to tie the amount paid for the asset to the 

marketplace success it helps produce, which fits the 

objective of measuring market value. Moreover, by using 

a per-unit royalty, the licensee avoids the risk of making a 

fixed payment that overvalues the asset before its market 

performance occurs, and the licensor avoids the risk that 

a sure up-front payment might undervalue the asset. In 

an important respect, it is the licensor that takes more of 

the risk in such an arrangement, because it typically 

retains little or no control over the efforts required to 

produce the revenue that would generate per-unit royalties. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 

1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

No evidence required the trial court to reject a perunit royalty here. For example, there is no overriding 

evidence of the kinds of difficulties of monitoring the 

number of sales or amount of revenue that would necessarily persuade rational negotiators that a per-unit royalty was inefficient. To the contrary, the evidence shows 

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that the Postal Service has long conducted quarterly 

surveys to track the retention rate of commemorative 

stamps, surveys the Postal Service considered statistically 

accurate and relied on its business. J.A. 1844, 6605 n.4.

The government argues that industry practice, by 

which it means its own past licensing practices, shows 

that it would not have agreed to a per-unit royalty. In the 

first trial on damages, the Court of Federal Claims found 

that Mr. Gaylord would have received a flat fee of $5,000, 

based primarily on the government’s evidence that it had 

never agreed to a per-unit royalty for stamps. Gaylord II, 

678 F.3d at 1341. The trial court has now found otherwise. The government challenges the new finding, pointing to witness testimony that, in the past, the Postal 

Service had found alternatives rather than agree to what 

it deemed excessive demands from a rights holder. But 

the issue is “first and foremost a question of fact,” with 

the trial court’s finding reviewed only for clear error based 

on what the record says about the particular circumstances defining the hypothetical negotiation. Bruce v. Weekly 

World News, 310 F.3d 25, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding 

no clear error in trial court’s adoption of lump-sum license 

based on industry practice). In this case, the record does 

not allow us to conclude that the Court of Federal Claims 

committed a clear error.

We do not question the government’s suggestion that 

alternatives available to a potential licensee provide an 

important constraint in a hypothetical negotiation. “[T]he 

buyer will not ordinarily pay more for a license than its 

anticipated benefit,” a benefit measured relative to available alternatives. Oracle, 765 F.3d at 1089; see Aqua 

Shield v. Inter Pool Cover Team, 774 F.3d 766, 771 & n.1 

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying the same concept in the patent 

context). But given the uniqueness of the work at issue 

here, including its status as a distinctively recognized 

symbol of the Korean War for most Americans, the trial 

court could properly discount the significance of potential 

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10 GAYLORD v. US

alternatives. In fact, the government’s witnesses testified 

that the Memorial was the immediate and fixed focus of 

the stamp-selection committee as the subject for commemorating the Korean War armistice and that all of the 

images considered by the committee were photographs of 

The Column, not of less recognizable portions of the 

Memorial or other subjects. 

Accordingly, the trial court could plausibly discount as 

insufficiently analogous the government’s examples from 

other stamp-selection processes—such as replacing a 

stamp honoring one celebrity with a stamp honoring 

another. As already noted, see supra pp. 6–7, taking 

account of significant differences in circumstances is 

essential to a sound evaluation of evidence of payments 

for other works in a hypothetical negotiation. There is 

only one nationally recognized Korean War memorial, and 

the evidence readily allows the finding that, by 2003, that 

memorial—and particularly The Column within it—was a 

distinctively valuable subject for a commemoration of the 

veterans who sacrificed through service in that war. 

Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in 

concluding that, faced with limited alternatives, the 

Postal Service would have agreed to a per-unit license. 

2 

As to the particular amount of the royalty, the trial 

court awarded a 10%-per-unit royalty amounting to a 

90/10 split of profits between the Postal Service and Mr. 

Gaylord. We see no clear error in the trial court’s determination of the royalty amount, considering the perspectives of the two parties to the hypothetical negotiation. 

We begin with Mr. Gaylord’s perspective. In his other 

licenses for derivative works incorporating The Column, 

one of which was entered as a litigation settlement, Mr. 

Gaylord had obtained a per-unit royalty of revenue on tshirts, miniature replicas, and other collectibles. J.A. 

1180–81 (10% of “Product Revenue”); J.A. 1201 (10% of 

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GAYLORD v. US 11

“wholesale sales”); J.A. 1721 (10% of “gross proceeds”). 

And the government now accepts that rate for the merchandise portion of the award in this case. Moreover, in a 

1998 agreement, the contractor that oversaw the design 

and construction of the Memorial demanded and obtained 

a royalty “of 10% of the retail sales price” from Mr. Alli for 

the latter’s sales of Real Life, Mr. Alli believing the contractor to own the copyright to The Column. J.A. 1311, 

1784. Consistent with that pre-litigation result, Mr. Alli 

agreed in a 2007 litigation settlement—of less significance 

for that reason—to pay Mr. Gaylord 10% of “net retail 

sales” for his direct sales of Real Life. J.A. 1599. 

The per-unit royalty here gives Mr. Gaylord, if anything, a lower share of the joint gains from the stamp—

the profits—than The Column fetched in the foregoing 

licenses. In those other circumstances, where costs of 

production are substantial, revenues do not effectively 

equal profits, so that 10% of revenues represented a 

higher percentage of profits, leaving the licensee with less 

than 90% of the jointly earned profits. For example, if a 

manufacturer’s costs of creating a miniature of The Column accounted for 50% of its revenue from that product, 

Mr. Gaylord’s 10% share of revenue would amount to a 

20% share of the profits, with the licensee keeping 80%. 

For the unused stamps at issue, in contrast, the revenues 

are almost pure profit, and the trial court’s royalty left the 

Postal Service with 90% of profits.1 Under the trial 

1 The Postal Service produced 86.8 million stamps 

featuring Mr. Gaylord’s work, at a printing cost of 

$181,412. Other costs were minimal. Each stamp had a 

face value of 37 cents, for a total face value of $31.82 

million. The parties stipulated that the Postal Service 

sold at least 47.9 million stamps (generating $17.73 

million), though the evidence suggested the number was 

much higher. 

 

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12 GAYLORD v. US

court’s royalty award, therefore, Mr. Gaylord would 

actually come out of the negotiation with a smaller share 

of the net gains from the joint project than was paid by 

the licensee of the same work in other licenses. 

An additional common-sense factor supports the 10% 

figure from Mr. Gaylord’s perspective. At the time of the 

hypothetical negotiation here, Mr. Gaylord was not in a 

position like that of other copyright owners—e.g., The 

Walt Disney Company, an example the government 

cites—who might obtain appreciable indirect economic 

benefits from the publicity generated by a stamp and who, 

therefore, might have a strong economic incentive to 

accept less than their usual amount as a royalty. Before 

July 2003, when the parties agree the hypothetical negotiation would have occurred, Mr. Gaylord had retired, 

closed his studio, and was no longer seeking new opportunities as an artist. The record here permits a finding that 

Mr. Gaylord would have focused on a direct monetary 

royalty as the primary compensation for licensing his 

work on a stamp.

We turn to the perspective from the other side of the 

negotiating table. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the Postal Service had sufficient incentive to

agree to a 10% per-unit royalty for sales of unused stamps 

to collectors. The evidence shows that the Postal Service 

knew that retained stamps were a source of significant 

revenue, which was almost pure profit, and tracked 

estimates of that revenue on a quarterly basis. The 

Postal Service knew, too, that past military-themed 

stamps had performed well with collectors, and it expected the Korean War Veterans Memorial stamp to sell

well, as evidenced by its choice to print roughly 50% more 

of the Memorial stamps than was typical for its commemorative stamps (86.8 million compared to 50 to 60 million). 

An arrangement under which it kept 90% of the profits 

from this opportunity was a good economic deal.

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GAYLORD v. US 13

The government argues that the availability of alternatives and its past licenses show that the royalty rate 

would have been lower. We have already explained why 

the trial court could appropriately discount the alleged 

effect of alternatives on the hypothetical negotiation in 

this case. The trial court could likewise justifiably find

that the government’s past negotiations regarding other 

stamps are of limited probative value. As already noted, 

respecting economically relevant differences in evaluating 

evidence about other works is critical to the royalty assessment. 

The government points to past licenses of sculptural 

and architectural works as examples of licenses containing a much lower royalty. But the works can easily be 

found to be quite different for licensing purposes. Some, 

such as the sculptures Akari 25N or Mother and Child, 

1944-45, do not have the household recognition and 

symbolic value of The Column. Others, such as the Walt 

Disney Concert Hall, might not have copyright protection 

for pictorial representations at all, see Gaylord I, 595 F.3d 

at 1380–81 (discussing the Architectural Works Copyright 

Protection Act, applicable to buildings but not The Column, a sculptural work), and involve owners with apparent indirect interests in stamp-generated publicity. The 

government has not pointed to such clear evidence of past 

similar licensing situations as could warrant overturning 

the trial court’s finding regarding the distinctive work at 

issue here.

3 

The remaining issue is whether the trial court erred 

in using $5.4 million as the base for the Postal Service’s 

revenue from sold but unused stamps. We find no clear 

error in the trial court’s determination. 

The government argues that the trial court should not 

have relied on the survey data estimating $5.4 million in 

revenue from retained copies of The Column stamp, 

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14 GAYLORD v. US

because a later study conducted by the same survey 

company concluded that its earlier methodology overestimated the number of unused stamps for some types of 

stamps. The trial court had sufficient reason not to alter 

the $5.4 million base. The later study focused on the 

retention of “forever stamps,”2 J.A. 6605, and the Postal 

Service itself did not apply the results to non-forever 

stamps, like the stamp at issue here, in its internal accounting procedures, J.A. 6603. That decision squares 

with the Postal Service’s position that non-forever stamps 

“have different consumer behavior characteristics” from 

forever stamps. J.A. 6375. On these facts, the trial court 

did not err by relying on the same data the Postal Service 

has relied on for decades to track the retention of stamps.

The government also challenges use of the $5.4 million figure by invoking our patent-law decisions involving 

multi-component products, where we have insisted that 

the base of a running-royalty calculation presented to a 

jury generally be tied realistically to the component 

embodying the invention. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1226–27;

Virnetx, Inc., 767 F.3d at 1327–28; LaserDynamics, 694 

F.3d at 67. But even aside from the fact that this is a 

copyright case, and one not tried to a jury, it is enough to 

say that the principles of the cited line of patent-law

authorities do not undermine the use of the $5.4 million 

figure based on the price of the stamp here. The stamp 

consists, essentially in full, of the image of Mr. Gaylord’s 

work and is not a multi-component product in a meaningful sense. There are two copyrights in that stamp, but 

2 Forever stamps, which first issued in 2007, “can 

be used to mail a one-ounce letter regardless of when the 

stamps are purchased or used and no matter how prices 

may change in the future.” USPS, Forever Stamp Fact 

Sheet, https://about.usps.com/news/fact-sheets/foreverstamp-facts.htm. 

 

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GAYLORD v. US 15

Mr. Alli has already been paid, and the government does 

not seek reversal to subtract that $1,500 payment. What 

remains is to apportion the revenues, here equaling the 

gains, to Mr. Gaylord’s contribution. The 90/10 split 

accomplishes that goal.

CONCLUSION

For those reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

Court of Federal Claims.

No costs.

AFFIRMED

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