Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02571/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02571-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

2

The Honorable Paul Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2571

___________

Donna Henderson, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota

Ford Motor Company, *

*

Defendant/Appellee, *

___________

Submitted: May 14, 2004

Filed: April 14, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judge, and DORR,1

 District Judge.

___________

DORR, District Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Donna Henderson (“Henderson”) appeals the decision of

the district court2

 granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Ford Motor

Company (“Ford”) on Henderson’s claims of disability discrimination and retaliation

in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

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3

Since the beginning of her employment with Ford, Ms. Henderson has

changed her name from Donna Evans. For clarity’s sake, this opinion will refer to her

with her current surname.

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of 1964, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. For the reasons below, we affirm the

decision of the district court.

I. Factual Background

Donna Henderson,3

 an African-American female, was employed at the Twin

Cities Assembly Plant of Ford Motor Company. In 1991, Henderson prevailed on

claims of sexual harassment and discriminatory and retaliatory discharge under Title

VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, after a bench trial before then-District

Judge Diana Murphy. Evans v. Ford Motor Co., 768 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1991).

Judge Murphy entered an award of compensatory and punitive damages, interest, and

reinstatement with seniority, and enjoined Ford and its employees from retaliating

against Plaintiff for prosecuting the action. Id. at 1327-28. 

Between 1992 and 1997, Henderson continued to file grievances and assist

others with their Title VII and similar cases. During that same time, Henderson

suffered a number of physical and mental ailments that precluded her from

performing a full range of work. Throughout that period she was placed on“no work

available,” or NWA, medical leave. In March 1997, Henderson returned to work,

subject to various medical restrictions. On March 20 1998, Henderson was involved

in a car accident, causing Henderson to suffer from ailments including cervicalthoracic lumbrosacral spasms, myofascitis, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder

a closed-head brain injury, and multiple shoulder injuries, which increased her work

limitations even further. According to medical restrictions given by Henderson’s

doctor on November 30, 1998, she was severely restricted in the amount and nature

of any lifting; could not climb, crawl, crouch, jump, kneel, push, pull, run, stoop,

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twist, or repeatedly reach or bend at her waist; required a sit-stand option; and was

prohibited from operating air guns. As a result of these restrictions, Henderson

remained on NWA medical leave and received disability benefits through September

1, 1999. 

According to Ford’s agreement with the United Auto Workers, an employee

on NWA medical leave who becomes aware of a job assignment the employee can

perform is required to bring this information to the attention of Ford and the Union.

Ford argues that Henderson has never identified such a position, and Henderson

stated that the last discussion she had with Ford employees concerning the

availability of jobs was late June or early July 1999.

On July 20, 1999, Henderson, while on NWA medical leave from Ford, moved

from Minnesota to Phoenix, Arizona, where she attended the High-Tech Institute of

Phoenix as a full-time student.

On September 1, 1999, Ford considered Henderson’s medical leave to have

expired because she had failed to update her medical restrictions. Pursuant to the

collective bargaining agreement, Ford sent Henderson a “5-day quit letter” on

September 10, 1999. Said letter stated that within five working days, Henderson must

either report to the Hourly Personnel Office for work, or give a satisfactory reason for

her absence to the Hourly Personnel Office in writing or by telephone, or her

employment would be terminated and her seniority would be lost. In response to the

letter, Henderson called in and stated that she had sent new papers to extend her

restrictions. Ford granted Henderson “conditional leave” from September 1 to

September 15, to cover the previously expired time and to allow Ford time to review

the medical papers sent by Henderson. Upon review Ford found that the papers were

essentially a request for an extension of the November 1998 restrictions with no

modifications.

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 The district court dismissed Henderson’s race and religion discrimination

claims. Henderson has not appealed that dismissal, and we need not address it here.

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Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, Ford may require an employee

on NWA medical leave to return to the plant for a medical evaluation by a Ford

physician and possible job placement. Upon discovering that no modifications had

been made to her medical restrictions, Ford made such a request to Henderson

through a letter dated September 15, 1999. The letter stated that she was “being

instructed to report to the Twin Cities Assembly plant for [a medical examination by

a plant physician] and possible placement on a job within your medical restrictions.”

Ex. 1 to Appellee’s Br. at 1. The letter informed Henderson that if she failed to report

within five working days “or provide a satisfactory reason for not reporting to the

Labor Relations Office in writing or by telephone, you will be terminated and you

will lose your seniority.” Id. In calculating the five days, Ford counted the day after

the letter was sent and the next four working days—Thursday, September 16, Friday

September 17, Monday, September 20, Tuesday, September 21, and Wednesday,

September 22. Henderson did not report during this five day period and, at the

beginning of the shift on Thursday, September 23, 1999, Henderson was terminated.

She filed a grievance with the union the next day, contending that she was unjustly

terminated. On November 14, 2000, the union withdrew the grievance.

On July 18, 2000, Henderson filed a charge with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission in Phoenix, Arizona, where she had been living since July

20, 1999. In October 2001, Henderson filed her complaint in the United States

District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging employment discrimination on

the basis of race, religion, and disability, and retaliation.4

 She later amended her

complaint to add claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). 

On May 16, 2003, the district court granted Ford’s motion for summary

judgment on all remaining claims, finding that Henderson’s claims that Ford failed

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to offer Henderson jobs within her work restrictions were untimely and that

Henderson could not show a causal connection between her termination and her

protected activities undertaken over two years prior to her termination. Henderson

now appeals that decision.

II. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.

Erenberg v. Methodist Hosp., 357 F.3d 787, 791 (8th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment

should be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Motions for summary judgment in

employment discrimination cases are scrutinized more carefully because of the

inherently factual nature of the inquiry and the factual standards set forth by

Congress. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Hillebrand

v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1987). However, when there

is no dispute of fact and there are no reasonable inferences that would sustain the

position of the plaintiff, summary judgment is appropriate. Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp.,

318 F.3d 803, 806, 810-11 (8th Cir. 2003).

III. Analysis

Henderson’s Amended Complaint alleges disability discrimination in violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the

Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Minn. Stat. § 363A.01, et seq., and

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 Except as otherwise noted, the MHRA parallels the federal statutes, and the

state and federal claims will be analyzed together. See Longen v. Waterous Co., 347

F.3d 685, 688 n.2 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting parallel between MHRA and the ADA);

Saulsberry v. St. Mary’s Univ. of Minn., 318 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting

parallel between MHRA and Title VII).

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retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq., and under the MHRA.5

A.

Regarding the ADA claim, Henderson first argues that Ford failed to

reasonably accommodate her during her tenure with Ford. Particularly, Henderson

argues that she was placed on NWA medical leave when there were jobs available for

her that she could have reasonably performed with her disabilities, but that Ford

refused to offer her those positions. Ford claims that such claims are barred by the

statute of limitations, and that even if they are not, that Henderson fails to establish

a prima facie case regarding her claim that Ford failed to reasonably accommodate.

The district court found that the claim was barred by the state and federal statutes of

limitations, and we agree with the district court.

Under the ADA, an employee must file a charge of discrimination—including

failure to accommodate—within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §

12117 (applying the 300-day statute of limitations listed in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) to

ADA claims). The MHRA requires that an employee file an administrative charge or

bring a civil action within one year of the discriminatory practice. Minn. Stat. §

363.06, subd. 1, 3 (2002), recodified at Minn. Stat. § 363A.28 subd. 1, 3 (Supp.

2003). These causes of action accrue the date on which the adverse employment

action is communicated to the employee. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258

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(1980); Turner v. IDS Fin. Servs., 471 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Minn. 1991). The

limitations periods begin to run even if the employee is not aware of the

discriminatory effect or the employer’s discriminatory motivation in taking the

adverse employment action. Dring v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 58 F.3d 1323, 1328

(8th Cir. 1995) (citing Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 923 F.2d 96, 88-89 (4th Cir.

1990)).

Henderson filed her charge on July 18, 2000; yet, in her deposition, she

admitted that the last time Ford refused to offer her a job she requested was late June

or early July 1999. She also admitted in her deposition that she left the Twin Cities

for Arizona on July 20, 1999. Thus, her ADA claims based on Ford’s alleged failure

to reasonably accommodate her with job offers accrued no later than late June or early

July 1999. Unless these limitations periods were tolled, these claims are time-barred.

Henderson argues that the statutes of limitations were tolled because Ford

fraudulently concealed its discriminatory acts against her when she was seeking

placement prior to 1999. In particular, Henderson points to an affidavit and

deposition given by a Ford plant physician, Dr. Zubeidah Kahn, in 2001 in another

employment discrimination case. In the documents, Dr. Kahn states that Ford labor

relations managers would request that certain employees, including Henderson, not

be cleared for work and that Henderson would be put on NWA medical leave

immediately after complaining to management about workplace harassment. Any

events referred to by Dr. Kahn would have occurred before February 1997, when Dr.

Khan left Ford.

Tolling of the statutes of limitations as claimed by Henderson would be based

on the doctrines of equitable estoppel or equitable tolling. The doctrine of equitable

estoppel applies when the employee knows she has a claim, but the employer

affirmatively and actively takes action that causes the employee not to timely file her

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suit. See Dring, 58 F.3d at 1329; Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451

(7th Cir. 1990). This doctrine does not apply in this case because Henderson

presented no evidence that she was induced not to timely file her ADA claims due to

any affirmative actions by Ford. 

An applicable statute of limitations may also be tolled by the doctrine of

equitable tolling. This doctrine focuses on the employee’s ignorance of a claim, not

on any possible misconduct by the employer, and tolls the limitations period when the

plaintiff, “‘despite all due diligence, is unable to obtain vital information bearing on

the existence of his claim.’” Dring, 58 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Chakonas v. City of

Chicago, 42 F.3d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1994)). Stated differently, the question is,

“‘whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have been aware’” that

her rights had been violated. Dring, 58 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Chakonas, 42 F.3d at

1135). 

Henderson argues that Ford’s “refusal to accommodate her disabilities only

came to light after Ms. Henderson uncovered Dr. Kahn’s affidavit and deposition in

May 2001.” However, Henderson admitted that she grew suspicious of Ford’s

motives as early as November 1998, when her supervisor “told me that he really

needed me but he had been told not to place me on any position within the

department” because she had been helping other employees file discrimination claims

against Ford, and her husband had a claim pending in federal court. At this time

Henderson may not have had knowledge of all the facts related to the purported

discrimination, but she had knowledge of facts that were sufficient to apprise her of

the purported discrimination. Certainty is not the standard. “[I]f a plaintiff were

entitled to have all the time [she] needed to be certain [her] rights had been violated,

the statute of limitations would never run—for even after judgment, there is no

certainty.”Cada, 920 F.2d at 451, quoted in Dring, 58 F.3d at 1329. Thus Dr. Khan’s

statements, even if newly-discovered, do not serve to toll the 300-day and one-year

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 Ford contends that this argument has been raised for the first time on appeal

and we should refuse to consider it. Appellee’s Br. at 28. Henderson disagrees that

the issue has not been properly raised. The facts related to Henderson’s preservation

of the issue are not clear. However, assuming that the issue was properly preserved,

we still find that is was proper for the district court to grant summary judgment.

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statutes of limitations applicable to Henderson’s failure to accommodate claims.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the failure

to accommodate claims.

B.

Next, Henderson argues that her termination on September 23, 1999 was

wrongful because she was discharged due to her disability.6

 To prove disability

discrimination, an employee must show that (1) the employee is disabled within the

meaning of the ADA; (2) the employee is qualified (with or without reasonable

accommodation) to perform the essential functions of a job; and (3) the employee

suffered an adverse employment action because of the disability. Longen v. Waterous

Co., 347 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotations omitted). Once a

plaintiff has proven a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to offer

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the

employer does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the reason was

pretextual. See Kincaid v. City of Omaha, 378 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2004)(applying

the burden-shifting to ADA discrimination cases). To prove pretext, the employee

must do more than show that the employment action was ill-advised or unwise, but

rather must show that the employer has offered a “phony excuse.” Hudson v. Chicago

Transit Authority, 375 F.3d 552, 561 (7th Cir. 2004); accord Kincaid v. City of

Omaha, 378 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 2004) (“‘[T]he employment-discrimination laws

have not vested in the federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel

departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by

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employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional

discrimination.’” (quoting Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781

(8th Cir. 1995))).

Assuming that Henderson’s impairments qualify her as disabled under the

ADA (a proposition not conceded by Ford but assumed for purposes of argument in

Ford’s brief), it is questionable whether Henderson can prove a prima facie case of

disability discrimination. The second element of the test requires proof that

Henderson is qualified to perform the essential functions of a job. Henderson’s

medical restrictions would certainly have severely limited her ability to work in an

auto assembly plant. Additionally, there is a lack of credible evidence that between

November 1998 and September 1999, Henderson ever identified a single position,

which Henderson could perform with her medical restrictions, that was vacant or held

by a person with less seniority as required by Ford’s rules. Finally, Henderson

proffers little beyond the mere fact that she was disabled and that Ford had failed to

accommodate her in the past to prove that she was terminated because of her

disability. In fact, most of the facts identified by Henderson to show discriminatory

animus on Ford’s part are linked to either her race or the fact that she had previously

engaged in protected activities. See, e.g. Appellant’s Br. at 11-15, 30-33, 38-40, 45-

46, 54-57. 

Even assuming that Henderson has proven a weak prima facie case, Ford has

offered a nondiscriminatory reason for her termination—Henderson failed to report

for a medical examination after Ford directed her to do so in its letter dated

September 15, 1999. Henderson attempts to argue that Ford’s reason is pretextual.

First, she argues that Ford violated collective bargaining practices by wrongly issuing

a “5-day quit” letter, which evidences Ford’s pretextual dismissal. Second, she argues

that previous instances of failures to accommodate, combined with the prior

statements of Ford officials, demonstrate pretext. Both of Henderson’s arguments fail.

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First, Henderson consistently misstates exactly why Ford terminated her. It was

not for failing to call in or otherwise respond to the “5-day quit” letter sent on

September 10, 1999. It was because she was directed to present herself for a physical

examination by the plant physician—as Ford had a right to do for any employee on

NWA medical leave—and she did not do so.

Henderson also argues that a genuine issue arises because of Ford’s failure to

accommodate her between 1996 and 1998. She cites to this Court’s decision in Kells

v. Sinclair Buick–GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2000) for the legal

proposition that a court could consider an employer’s failure to accommodate as

evidence of intent and pretext when determining whether an employee was

discriminatorily terminated. Kells does not change the outcome in Henderson’s case.

In Kells, a used car salesman sued his former employer for ADA and ADEA

discrimination once he resigned after being demoted from a finance and insurance

manager to a used car salesperson. Id. at 829. In opposing summary judgment, Kells

argued that he should be allowed to present evidence of the dealership’s failure to

accommodate his disabilities upon his request for accommodation, even though the

requests occurred after he was demoted. Id. at 833. The district court refused to

consider the evidence, holding it was not relevant because the requests were made

after Kells was demoted. However, this Court held that the evidence should have been

considered because “[f]ailing to provide an employee with reasonable

accommodations can tend to prove that the employer also acted adversely against the

employee because of the individual’s disability.” Id. at 834. Considering the

employee’s requests, insensitive comments made by supervisors in connection with

the disability and evidence that a consultant’s recommendation for demotion based

on performance was created after the demotion to support a non-discriminatory

reason to demote Kells, the Court held that Kells created a genuine issue of fact and

summary judgment was inappropriate. Id.

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 Henderson attempts to argue that she has documentary evidence directly

contradicting Ford’s explanation for her termination. She cites only to statements

made by various Ford managers and others relating to her placement on NWA

medical leave in 1998. While the statements may cast doubt on why Ford placed

Henderson on NWA medical leave initially, these statements have nothing to do with

Ford’s explanation for her termination in September 1999—that she failed to report

for a medical exam. A genuine issue of material fact might exist if Plaintiff had

evidence documenting that she was terminated for a reason other than her failure to

report. Cf. Kenney v. Swift Transp. Inc., 347 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding

genuine issue of fact where plaintiff would testify that he was instructed by the

employer not to fill out an employment application completely, and the employer

used the plaintiff’s failure to complete the application as instructed to deny plaintiff

a job). However, Plaintiff has provided no such evidence.

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In Henderson’s case, Kells does not help her survive summary judgment.

Unlike Kells, any failure to accommodate has not been unequivocally proven. Such

alleged failures took place long before she was terminated. Additionally, there is no

evidence that Ford’s reason for the termination was pretextual.7

 Henderson has not

alleged that she did not receive the letter requiring her to return for a physical exam,

nor has she alleged that Ford has inconsistently enforced the policy by not requiring

others on NWA medical leave whose medical restrictions have not changed to return

for a physical. Cf. EEOC v. Kohler Co., 335 F.3d 766, 774 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting

that “lax enforcement of [an employer’s] company policies and disciplinary actions”

evidence discriminatory motive). 

Her only possible evidence of pretext—that Ford had discriminated against her

in the distant past and (might have) failed to accommodate her in the recent past—are

not close in time to the alleged adverse employment action, and are not related to the

legitimacy of such action. As such, they do not raise a genuine issue of fact as to

whether Ford’s reason for terminating her is not legitimate, or, in the words of the

Seventh Circuit, “phony.” Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment on Henderson’s ADA/MHRA disability discrimination claim.

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 Henderson points out that the EEOC found probable cause in Ms. Ross’s case

on August 3, 1998, and Ford settled with Ms. Ross on or after February 2, 1999.

However, Henderson does not aver that she herself engaged in any protected

activities related to the Ross case during that time.

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C.

Finally, Henderson alleges that she was discharged in retaliation for her

protected activities of filing various complaints and grievances and helping others to

file discrimination claims. To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that she

(1) engaged in a protected activity, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment

action, and (3) that the two events are causally connected. Stevens v. St. Louis Univ.

Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Smith v. Ashland, Inc., 250 F.3d

1167, 1173 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying the same standard to retaliation claims under the

MHRA). The district court found that Henderson could not make a prima facie case

because there was no causal connection between her protected activities and her

termination. We agree.

There is no doubt that Henderson engaged in a number of statutorily protected

activities during her employment with Ford. She prosecuted her own discrimination

claims and grievances; she assisted with the prosecution of her ex-husband’s case;

and she attended trials and assisted other Ford employees with their cases. However,

the last protected activity that Henderson offers proof of was assisting Janell Ross in

complaining about discriminatory treatment in the spring of 1997.8

 Henderson’s

protected activities undertaken more than two years prior to the adverse employment

action are too separated in time to raise any inference of the requisite causal

relationship. See Sowell v. Alumina Ceramics, Inc., 251 F3d 678, 685 (8th Cir. 2001)

(“[T]he seven-month time lapse between the protected activity and the alleged

retaliatory act is, without more, too long for the incidents to be temporally—and

therefore causally—related.”); see also Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 851-52

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(8th Cir. 2002) (noting that a one-month lapse between the protected activity and the

retaliatory act is insufficient to support a causal link alone). Henderson offers a

number of pieces of evidence relating her pre-1998 protected activities to her

perpetual placement on NWA medical leave status during and prior to 1998. See

Appellant’s Br. at 54-56. However, such evidence would only be relevant if the

adverse employment action Henderson is complaining of is the denial of work. As

explained above, that claim is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

Henderson also invites this Court to consider the entirety of her history with

Ford to “call into serious question any claim by Ford that it fired her fair and square.”

Appellant’s Br. at 57. Even though a court may use background information as

evidence of discrimination to support a timely claim, see Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 110, 113 (2001), Henderson’s burden to show a causal connection

between a protected activity and the adverse action at issue does not disappear merely

because the history between employer and employee is long and contentious. Because

Henderson has offered no credible proof of a connection between past activities and

her ultimate termination, she cannot make out a prima facie case of Title VII

retaliation. Therefore, summary judgment is proper on this issue.

IV. Conclusion

The long and short of this case is that Henderson was terminated, after a long

period of NWA medical leave, for failing to return to the place of employment for a

medical evaluation by a Ford physician. Henderson has no evidence that Ford’s

current reason for dismissing her was pretextual or that her previous protected

activities were causally connected to her dismissal. Her alleged discrimination claims

relating to being placed or retained on NWA medical leave are barred by the

applicable state and federal statutes of limitations, and Dr. Khan’s statements made

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in another case do not require that such limitations period be tolled. We therefore

affirm the well-reasoned opinion of the district court.

______________________________

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