Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08069/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08069-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Tyson Joseph Hiland, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison, has 

filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. Procedural Background1

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

 A. Charges 

 On June 8, 2007, Petitioner and co-defendants Joseph Hiland (Petitioner’s father), 

 

1

 The procedural background recounted here substantially mirrors, with Magistrate Judge Bade’s concurrence, the procedural background contained in the Report and Recommendation relating to the habeas corpus petition filed by co-defendant Travis Hiland in CV-13-08110-PHX-PGR (BSB). Travis Hiland’s matter is pending. 

Tyson Joseph Hiland, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-14-8069-PCT-NVW (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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Travis Hiland (Petitioner’s brother), and Stephen Cottrell were indicted by a Yavapai 

County Grand Jury on one count of conspiracy to commit theft (Count One), one count of 

theft (Count Two), one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices (Count Three), and one 

count of participating in a criminal syndicate (Count Four), all class two felonies. (Doc. 

12, Ex. A.) The indictment alleged that, through a Ponzi-type scheme, Petitioner and his 

co-defendants obtained funds totaling $1,658,849.71 from over 20 individuals, who were 

identified as victims in the indictment. (Id.)

 B. Rule 17.4 Hearings 

 The case was assigned to Superior Court Judge Thomas Lindberg. (Doc. 12, Ex. 

B.) Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.4, Petitioner and his codefendants 

participated in several plea negotiation conferences before Superior Court Judge Robert 

Brutinel. (Doc. 12, Exs. C, D, KK, LL.) 

 Over the course of those conferences, the State offered to allow the defendants to 

plead guilty to theft and fraudulent schemes in exchange for dismissing the other charges, 

provided that all of the defendants agreed to plead guilty. (Doc. 12, Ex. LL at 7-8.) The 

State indicated that it would consider recommending a sentencing range of three to 

twelve-and-a-half years’ imprisonment on each charge with the possibility of probation. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. KK at 12-13.) The State told Judge Brutinel that it “would be looking for 

prison with respect to the two [younger] Hilands, but for Joe Hiland . . . [it] would 

probably” recommend probation because of his poor health. (Doc. 12, Ex. LL at 9.) For 

Petitioner and co-defendant Travis Hiland, the State said “[w]e want that range of three to 

12.5 years . . . I don’t know that in the end we would be recommending the maximum, 

but I don’t want to make any promises that anyone relies on as part of the settlement 

negotiations what our position would be.” (Id. at 11.) The State explained that it wanted a 

presentence hearing and for the victims to be able to testify. (Id.) 

Judge Brutinel told Petitioner and his co-defendants that the State was “not willing 

to make a recommendation [about sentencing] one way or the other,” and that they “want 

to attend the presentence hearing and listen to the victims testify before they make a 

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recommendation.” (Id. at 11.) Judge Brutinel stated “I don’t see [the State] making a 

specific recommendation. I don’t see them agreeing to a cap.” (Id. at 12.) Judge Brutinel 

further stated “if [the defendants] wanted to take the offer the State’s making, you are 

kind of looking at the range between three and 12-and-a-half with the possibility of 

probation. I mean, that’s the ball park we are talking about.” (Id. at 14.) Judge Brutinel 

reiterated to Petitioner and his counsel that “I don’t see them offering you a probation 

mandatory plea.” (Id. at 18.) 

 On December 22, 2008, during the final Rule 17.4 conference before Judge 

Brutinel, Travis Hiland’s counsel argued that it could be considered coercive to “have a 

group of people that are forced to take a unified plea.” (Doc. 12, Ex. LL. at 4.) The State 

argued that, pursuant to State v. Solano, 150 Ariz. 398 (1986), package-plea deals were 

appropriate so long as the court reviewed the totality of circumstances surrounding the 

plea and ensured it was not coercive. (Id. at 7-8.) Judge Brutinel acknowledged that a 

“package plea offer which purports to offer a benefit to a third party does indeed require 

some extra judicial scrutiny,” concluding that under Arizona law, “package deals are 

okay, but you need to be careful with them.” (Id. at 17-18.) The change of plea was 

scheduled for the following day, December 23, 2008. (Id. at 35.)

 C. The Plea Agreement and Change of Plea Hearing 

 On December 23, 2008, Petitioner, his brother, and father pleaded guilty to one 

count of theft in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1802, a class two felony, and one count 

of fraudulent schemes in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2310, a class two felony. (Doc. 

12, Ex. F at 1; Ex. MM.) The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. (Id. at 

3.) 

 Petitioner’s plea agreement provided that “each Class 2 felony carries a 

presumptive sentence of 5 years; a minimum sentence of 4 years (3 years if the court 

finds exceptional circumstances); and a maximum sentence of 10 years (12.5 years if the 

Court finds exceptional circumstances).” (Id. at 1.) The agreement provided that 

probation was available “for a term not to exceed 7 years.” (Id. at 2.) The plea agreement 

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also required the payment of $1,663,849.71 in restitution to the listed victims. (Id. at 2.) 

Petitioner also agreed “to make a factual basis for the change of plea.” (Id.) 

 Pursuant to paragraph seven of the plea agreement, Petitioner “consent[ed] to 

judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement 

of sentence.” (Id. at 4.) That paragraph also stated that Petitioner “completely 

understand[s] and agree[s] that by entering into this Plea Agreement . . . any sentence 

either stipulated to or recommended herein [] is not binding on the court.” (Id.) Paragraph 

seven further provided that “[i]n making the sentencing determination, the Court is not 

bound by the rules of evidence.” (Id. at 4.) 

 Paragraph eight reiterated that Petitioner understood that the sentencing 

recommendations in the plea agreement were not binding on the court, and that the court 

was “bound only by the limits set forth in paragraph 1 and the applicable statutes.” (Id.) 

The plea agreement provided that Petitioner had “discussed the case and [his] 

constitutional rights with [his] lawyer.” (Id. at 4.) 

 At the change of plea hearing, Judge Lindberg discussed Petitioner’s sentencing 

exposure and emphasized that the plea agreement permitted it to sentence Petitioner 

within the range provided for in that agreement:

 If I find both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the whole range of sentence is available to the Court, from the 

very minimum to the very maximum. . . . I just want to 

convey to you the whole range of sentence is open if both aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found.

(Doc. 12, Ex. MM at 11.) 

 The court and Petitioner then had the following exchange:

COURT: Tyson did you read the plea agreement and go over it completely before signing it? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

. . . 

COURT: Tyson, do you understand the plea agreement? 

PETITIONER: I do. 

. . . 

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COURT: Did [your attorney] explain the plea agreement to you in full before you signed it . . . Tyson? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

. . . 

COURT: Tyson, has anybody made you any promises, guarantees or assurances, other than what is 

contained in the plea agreement? 

PETITIONER: No. 

COURT: Has anybody threatened you or forced you or coerced you into entering the plea agreement . . . Tyson? 

PETITIONER: No. 

. . . 

COURT: Whether you enter the plea agreement has to be your own individual choice . . . . Tyson, do you understand that? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

COURT: I recognize that this was done as a package deal inclusive of Joseph Hiland, your father. But do you understand that if you did not wish to enter 

the plea agreement, you don’t have to enter the 

plea agreement? Is that your understanding . . . 

Tyson? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

. . . 

COURT: Tyson, are you entering your plea agreement voluntarily of your own free will? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

(Id. at 16-18.) 

 The court outlined the two counts to which Petitioner and his brother agreed to 

plead guilty. (Id. at 19.) The court then outlined the range of possible sentences to be 

imposed for the two counts: 

COURT: Let’s go over the range of sentence that is available. Each Class 2 felony can carry prison 

time. The presumptive sentence is five years. 

The least I could give is three years. The most I 

could give is twelve-and-a-half years for each count . . . Tyson, do you understand that 

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PETITIONER: Yes. 

(Id. at 21.) The court also outlined the $1,663,848.71 restitution Petitioner owed, as 

detailed in the plea agreement, and Petitioner agreed. (Id. at 26.) 

 During the plea hearing, the court specifically addressed Petitioner regarding the 

package-deal plea. (Id. at 33.) Co-defendant Travis Hiland’s counsel stated he had gone 

over the meaning of the Solano case with all three Hiland defendants, including 

Petitioner. (Id. at 34.) The court had the following exchange with Petitioner and his 

brother, Travis: 

COURT: I think with regard to the case law, Mr. 

Williams, Mr. Napper, because this is a package 

deal, I think I need some further record under 

Solano with regard to that. 

 So, Mr. Black or Mr. McGrane, if you are familiar with the factors in Ybarra and Solano, it seems apparent to me, honestly, because I 

have been dealing with this case, that there may be some reasons for the negotiation that does a 

joint or package plea agreement. But do you want to expound on that at all? 

MR. WILLIAMS: Judge, if I could assist on that. COURT: Mr. Williams. 

MR. WILLIAMS: We entered into the 17.4 negotiation before Judge Brutinel with the State and all four 

defendants in the case. I put on the record when we started my Solano concerns. The Court then 

got a copy of it. The State, I believe, provided 

that copy. 

 I have gone over what that means with all four, 

or actually, all three of the Hilands, and in 

particular with my client, Travis, and I can tell 

the Court that he is not receiving this plea so 

that another member of his family gets is a 

favorable plea. 

 The reason we took out the accomplice language and the conspiracy language of the 

plea agreement is because he is entering this 

plea agreement for his own actions, and it is his 

own decision. And that is what I will put on the record, Judge. 

COURT: Travis, is that correct? 

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TRAVIS: Yes. 

COURT: You are doing this of your own volition for the things that you are facing, the potential 

consequences of going to trial that you are facing, not because the other family member or 

members may receive benefit from this? 

TRAVIS: That’s correct. 

COURT: Tyson, is that your position, also? 

PETITIONER: The same. 

COURT: You are doing this for your own sake based on 

what is being offered to you, not because some other family member, either your brother or 

your father, is getting some kind of deal? 

PETITIONER: I know. 

COURT: Is there any other fact, then, other than the plea agreement itself and what you are looking at there, in terms of consequences versus going to 

trial and the consequences or possible outcome 

there, that is influencing you to any degree, Travis? 

TRAVIS: No. 

COURT: Tyson, any other considerations that are influencing you, other than your own viewpoint 

of the benefits of the plea agreement versus 

going to trial? 

PETITIONER: No. 

(Id. at 34–35.) 

 Co-defendant Travis Hiland’s counsel then provided the following factual basis 

for the plea: 

 Both counts covered between January 2nd of 2002 and August 31st of 2005. Travis was selling investments that ranged, but are not limited to, a shrimp farm, resort hotel 

named La Contessa. There was some timber involved. And he 

at some point knew or should have known that Mr. Cottrell 

was having difficulty with the investments. And then 

particular victims. . . not limited to, Wanda Orr and the 

Rutledges alerted his office that they were not getting payments accordingly, and he continued to sell those 

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 properties, Travis did, despite knowing there [were] material 

problems with them. 

 And also there were payments being made. Now, those payments were coming from Mr. Cottrell’s office via check to 

where . . . Travis Hiland was working. And they were being converted into withdrawals from the bank. The payments coming were termed loan. And Mr. Hiland had never gone 

over with his clients that there was going to be commissions coming out of what was paid into them. 

 [T]he State disclosed that something like 40-percent of the aggregate amount that went in were paid out to the Hilands, 

in general. About $190,000 over the period of three years was paid to Travis Hiland. He knew or should have known that 

the money was inappropriately going to him. That justifies the theft. He didn’t alert any authorities to it, and he accepted the money. And as I said, continued to sell the property.

(Id. at 37-38.) Petitioner confirmed that the factual basis counsel provided was “true.” 

(Id. at 38.) 

 The court then had the following exchange with Travis and Petitioner:

 COURT: Travis do you think in connection with your own actions that you were engaged in fraudulent schemes, then, in 

the course of defrauding folks of their money that they 

weren’t going to see their money as a result of these actions, 

once you learned about the co-defendant, Mr. Cottrell’s, 

actions? 

 TRAVIS: I believed Cottrell, but there came a time where I 

probably should have known. 

 COURT: And after that you continued to invite further 

investment into the products? 

 TRAVIS: Yes. 

 COURT: And that resulted in some benefit to you and loss of finances by the investors? 

 PETITIONER: Yes.

 COURT: Is that the case with you also, Tyson? 

 PETITIONER: It is the same, yes. 

(Id. at 39–40.) Petitioner then pled guilty to both counts, and the court accepted the pleas. 

(Id. at 40; Ex. E.) 

 D. Presentence Hearing and Sentencing 

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 Between January 22 and March 12, 2009, the trial court conducted a presentence 

hearing during which 38 witnesses testified, including 16 victims and 20 witnesses on 

Petitioner’s behalf. (Doc. 12, Exs. G, NN-SS; Doc. 16, Exs. TT-YY.) Retired Detective 

Anna Cahall testified regarding her investigation of the case, and John Fink, a financial 

expert from the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC), testified about his analysis of 

the money trail of the victims’ payments into the various accounts and then to the 

individual defendants. The State also filed numerous victim impact statements, and 

Petitioner and his co-defendants filed numerous letters attesting to their good character. 

(Doc. 12, Exs. H-J.)

 1. Letter from Detective Cahall 

 For purposes of sentencing, on March 3, 2009, the State filed a letter from 

Detective Cahall. (Doc. 12, Ex. K.) The letter, addressed to Judge Lindberg, stated:

 There were very few times in my career that I gave my opinion to a judge regarding the sentencing of defendants, but I would like to take the opportunity in this case. You may remember my first case involving the exploitation of an elder 

that you charged – the victim was Gertrude Medd, and the 

defendants Val Light and Jon Haywood. At that time, such cases were unusual and we struggled with how to charge it, if at all. Unfortunately since that time, these types of cases have become all too common, and in fact were the majority of my 

caseload in my last few years as a Detective. 

 As you have heard, the current case involved a long and complex investigation and I personally interviewed close to 60 victims (many who were involved in the earlier investment 

schemes, where the products were misrepresented as well) . . . . Many of the victims whose investments with the defendants 

were not charged kept in contact with me and during the four years of this investigation I saw many of both groups suffer the effects of their years — recurrences of cancer, strokes, 

heart attacks, and many deaths. It is also clear the defendants 

took advantage of the ages of the victims in the excuses and 

lies they gave as to why the investments weren’t working. 

 I won’t pretend this case hasn’t affected me personally — it has, and in fact played a large role in my decision to retire 

early. But more importantly, these victims — many from the Greatest Generation — a proud and trusting generation who survived the toughest of times and worked hard to save what 

little they had, were consciously targeted and ruthlessly taken advantage of. To sit in court and hear the defendants try to minimize their roles even after entering pleas of guilty does 

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more than add insult to injury. It confirms to me that they have no remorse for what they have done. To claim ignorance is insulting and an unconscionable excuse. Their actions since 

the Corporation Commission’s Cease and Desist Order 

further shows their lack of remorse and certainly a disregard for a court’s order to create the activity and pay restitution. 

 I hope you will make a statement, through your sentencing, that this type of blatant exploitation will not be tolerated in 

our County. Although many of the victims simply asked for their money back, the likelihood of any of these defendants obtaining employment that would provide even minimal reparations to these victims is doubtful. Please demonstrate 

that our system of justice works and if we can’t protect our elders from exploitation, the response after will be certain and 

considerable.

(Id.) 

 On March 12, 2009, the date of sentencing, Petitioner and his co-defendants filed a 

motion to disqualify Judge Lindberg based, in part, on the Cahall letter. (Doc. 12, Ex. N.) 

Judge Lindberg addressed the motion at the outset of the sentencing proceeding. (Doc. 

12, Ex. ZZ.) He noted that the parties knew he was a prosecutor before he became a 

judge, and made the following statement about the letter:

 I received a copy of a notice of filing that pertained to a letter addressed to me from now-retired Detective Cahall. I will say 

that, like all of the other pleadings that are filed in a case, I began to read that letter, and I will say that I thought it was inappropriate — with no offense intended — but I thought it was inappropriate to raise other cases with me as 

distinguished from alluding to what occurred in this case. So, 

in all honesty, I put it down and didn’t finish reading it. 

 I have finished reading it now because it was attached to the 

motion for the Court to disqualify itself. That notice was filed on March 2nd. This matter proceeded to additional hearing on March 5th . . . .

 I reviewed the request. I’ll note that there was not a motion to strike the letter. I’ll note that the matter proceeded to hearing after the notice had been sent and distributed to defense 

counsel. 

 I don’t feel particularly, in the manner in which I handled it, that it provides a reason why I ought to disqualify myself, so I am declining to disqualify on the case. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. ZZ at 3-4.) 

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 Judge Lindberg, however, referred the matter to Judge Brutinel to resolve the 

motion for disqualification. (Id. at 6-7.) After conducting a hearing on the motion, Judge 

Brutinel denied it, stating: 

 It appears to me that what effectively is disclosed to you is all the things that you already knew, which is that Judge Lindberg was a prosecutor. Judge Lindberg charged cases. That Judge Lindberg was involved in a number of different 

cases, including as it turns out a case such as this one. 

 I do not find that it was improper for Judge Lindberg to hear the case having been a member of the prosecutor’s office. It is not improper for him to have been the trial judge in this case having worked on a case similar to this one. There is nothing in the canons which would mandate disqualification as a result of any of those things, and I frankly do not find anything contained in the letter or as a result of the letter 

which would cause Judge Lindberg to have to be. 

 As opposed to — I don’t decide whether there is misconduct 

on the part of the State or misconduct for that matter on the 

part of Detective Cahall, but I simply don’t find that the letter in and of itself creates an appearance of impropriety.

(Doc. 12, Ex. AAA at 40.) 

 When the sentencing proceeding resumed before Judge Lindberg, he stated that he 

was striking that Cahall letter and reiterated that he would not consider that letter in 

sentencing any of the defendants: 

 I am striking the letter and the notice of filing the letter of former or now-retired Detective Cahall. 

 My view of it is what I explained earlier this morning, which was, I thought, when one puts on a robe, I think what you need to do is to address each case that you have, each defendant that you have, in an objective and independent fashion, not losing anything that you ever knew in terms of legal experience. . . . In all things, you are trying to be neutral and objective. 

 And the reason why I stated that I had only commenced reading the letter when it first came in was because I read 

everything that comes in. But I regarded it . . . as going into, in some aspects — not all, but in some aspects, personal history as distinguished from something that was legal precedent or something that pertained to the particular case. And in later reading it, pursuant to the request to recuse, I see in many ways it is talking about this case and this case only. 

 But I think the color of the initial part, with due respect to 

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 ringing a bell . . . I think the judges are called upon all the time to ignore. And I tell you that I will ignore the letter. I am 

striking it . . . .

(Doc. 12, Ex ZZ at 33-34.) 

 2. Other Presentence Motions and Sentencing 

 Before the sentencing proceeding, Defendants had also filed a motion to dismiss, a 

motion to disqualify the county attorney’s office, and a motion to compel additional 

discovery pertaining to the case referenced in the Cahall letter and the State’s 

communications with the victims, all of which the trial court denied. (Doc. 12, Exs. L-N; 

O; Doc. 12, Ex. ZZ at 62.) Petitioner and his co-defendants then moved to stay the 

sentencing proceeding to permit them to file a special action for review of the several 

motions the trial court had denied. The trial court denied that request. (Doc. 12, Ex. ZZ at 

63.) 

 After denying the co-defendants’ motions, the trial court proceeded to sentencing. 

The State recommended ten-year prison sentences for Petitioner, Travis Hiland, and 

Cottrell for the first count (theft), to be followed by probation on the second count 

(fraudulent schemes). (Id. at 88.) The State recommended probation for Joseph Hiland 

because his advanced age and poor health would make his incarceration very costly. (Id.) 

In support of its sentencing recommendations, the State noted that Petitioner and his 

codefendants had had the opportunity, but did not, change their business practices after 

the ACC ordered them to return $16 million to the investors they had misled. (Id. at 70-

71, 76, 83.) The State also emphasized that many of the vulnerable victims had lost their 

life savings. (Id. at 84-88.)

 All of the co-defendants minimized their participation in the scheme. Cottrell’s 

counsel argued that he was an unsophisticated dreamer, who did not sell the investments 

and did not know the investors were elderly. (Id. at 91- 92.) The court sentenced Cotrell 

to ten years’ imprisonment followed by a seven-year term of probation. (Id. at 91.) 

Petitioner’s counsel argued that Petitioner was only following in his father’s footsteps. 

(Id. at 151-152.) The court sentenced Petitioner to ten years’ imprisonment followed by 

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seven years’ probation. (Id. at 163.) Joseph Hiland’s counsel emphasized that after he had 

a stroke in 2003, he quit running the operation. (Id. at 116.) The court sentenced Joseph 

Hiland to seven years’ supervised probation “nearly exclusively on the basis of [his] 

health condition.” (Id. at 122). Travis Hiland’s counsel argued Travis was a peripheral 

participant. (Id. at 130-31.) Travis’s counsel also argued that Cottrell came up with the 

ideas for the investments and that he was only guilty of not doing his due diligence after 

he became suspicious. (Id. at 130-34.) The court sentenced Travis to nine years’ 

imprisonment followed by seven years’ supervised probation. (Id. at 144-145.) The court 

also ordered the restitution of $1,663,849.71 to be paid jointly and severally by the codefendants. (Id.) 

 E. Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On February 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 

trial court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 12, Ex. 

X.) Petitioner claimed that his “package-deal” guilty plea violated the Fourteenth 

Amendment, his lawyer’s advice was ineffective and violated the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments, his sentence violated the Fifth Amendment, and an impartial judge violated 

his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.) As discussed below, 

the trial court2

 issued a joint ruling addressing the claims that applied to all defendants 

and a separate supplemental ruling addressing Petitioner’s specific claims. (Doc. 12, Exs. 

AA, BB.)

 1. Joint Ruling on Claims Affecting all Defendants 

 The post-conviction court noted that the co-defendants raised several of the same 

claims, specifically: (1) whether the trial court was biased by the Cahall letter and the 

presentation of evidence during the presentence hearing; (2) whether the plea 

negotiations and colloquy complied with Solano; (3) whether the court properly imposed 

consecutive sentences, properly considered pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor, 

 

2

 The post-conviction matter was handled by the Honorable Cele Hancock. 

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properly considered mitigating factors, and whether there was improper sentencing 

disparity; and (4) whether the defendants entered the plea agreement free of duress and 

with a full understanding of their sentencing exposure. (Doc. 12, Ex. AA at 2.) The postconviction court denied relief on these claims.

 a. Presentence Hearing 

 The court rejected the claim that the trial court was biased based on events related 

to the presentence hearing. (Id. at 2-3.) Specifically, the court found “no basis in the 

record to find that Judge Lindberg was biased due to the ‘Cahall letter.’” (Id. at 2.) The 

court also concluded that Judge Lindberg was not biased by the prosecutor’s arguments at 

the pre-sentence hearing. The post-conviction court also found that evidence of the ACC 

ruling did not bias the trial court because it considered the ACC evidence only as 

background information. (Id.) The post-conviction court also concluded that the trial 

court had “clearly considered all the mitigating and aggravating factors and specifically 

applied them to each of the defendants.” (Id. at 2-3.) The post-conviction court found no 

evidence that the prosecution had manipulated the witnesses and victims who testified at 

the presentence hearing. (Id.) In summary, the post-conviction court found “nothing in 

the record to support the allegations that the State acted inappropriately.” (Id.)

 b. Plea Negotiations and Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas 

 The post-conviction court next found that the plea negotiations did not violate the 

standards articulated in Solano, and that the guilty pleas were voluntary in compliance 

with the Due Process Clause. The court explained that Solano requires the trial court to 

scrutinize any “package deal” to ensure the plea is not induced by a favor offered to one 

of the co-defendants. (Doc. 12, Ex. AA at 3-4.) However, the court noted that the trial 

court is not required to make specific findings as to each factor articulated in Solano. (Id.) 

The court then discussed the Rule 17.4 conferences that led to the plea agreement and 

noted that the “State was careful to emphasize that the possible recommendation of 

probation for Joseph Hiland was not made to induce the remainder of the defendants to 

plead guilty,” but was based on Joseph Hiland’s poor health. (Id.) The court also noted 

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that the range of possible penalties under the plea agreement was discussed in detail with 

all of the defendants and their attorneys. (Id. at 3.) 

 The post-conviction court also discussed the trial court’s detailed inquiry to ensure 

that each defendant entered the plea deal voluntarily and not to benefit another defendant. 

(Id. at 4-7.) The post-conviction court found that:

 [T]he plea offers in the instant case were not entered into 

contrary to law as there was no leniency promised to any Defendant if another Defendant entered into the plea, only an acknowledgement of the possible mitigating factors for the State to consider regarding Joseph Hiland. Each of the plea agreements were probation eligible. This is not a case where 

only Joseph Hiland’s plea agreement was probation eligible.

(Id. at 7.) 

 The post-conviction court also found that there was a factual basis for the pleas. 

(Id. at 8.) The court further found that, “[e]ven assuming that there was some 

psychological pressure placed on Travis and Tyson Hiland regarding the possibility of 

their father’s sentence,” that pressure did not make the plea involuntary, especially 

considering the trial court’s efforts to ensure the voluntariness of the pleas. (Id.) The 

court concluded that “[t]here are no other relevant factors that impermissibly influenced 

Tyson or Travis’s plea. The transcript is clear. Judge Lindberg labored to ensure that both 

Defendants were entering into the plea agreements of their own volition and not because 

of any outside promises or coercion.” (Id.)

 The post-conviction court further found that the defendants entered the plea 

agreements voluntarily and with full understanding of their sentencing exposure. (Id. at 

11-12.) The court noted that, during the plea negotiations, while the State agreed that 

probation was possible, the State refused to indicate the particular sentences it would 

recommend for Petitioner, Travis Hiland, and Cottrell. (Id. at 11.) Additionally, the full 

range of sentencing was discussed with all of the defendants during the Rule 17.4 

conferences. (Id.) The post-conviction court also noted that at the change-of-plea hearing, 

Petitioner and his codefendants affirmed several times that they entered their pleas 

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voluntarily and that they were not based on any promise or agreement with the State that 

was not memorialized in the plea agreement. (Id.) 

 The post-conviction court also noted that the plea agreements did not contain any 

guarantees as to the State’s sentencing recommendations and accurately stated the 

sentencing ranges. (Id. at 11-12.) The post-conviction court concluded that “Tyson and 

Travis Hiland and Steven Cottrell were fully advised as to the range of possible 

sentencing and that all three Defendants indicated that they understood the range of 

sentencing and answered several times that they were not entering into the plea 

agreement under any type of duress or coercion.” (Id. at 12.)

 c. Consecutive Sentences 

 The post-conviction court next concluded that the consecutive sentences did not 

violate the prohibition against double punishment. (Doc. 12, Ex. AA at 8.) The court 

conducted the analysis required under State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204 (Ariz. 1989), to 

determine whether the crimes constituted one act or multiple acts that could be punished 

separately. (Id. at 9.) The court concluded that “the act of the fraud scheme is separate 

from the act of the actual taking of the funds for their own use.” (Id.) The court explained 

that the defendants knowingly obtained a benefit by misrepresenting that they had actual 

investment opportunities for the victims and that they would benefit from the 

investments. (Id.) The Defendants then received money from the victims and kept the 

money for their own gain. (Id.) Because fraud and theft were separate acts, the court held 

that “[c]onsecutive sentencing under Gordon is not contrary to law in this case.” (Id.) 

 The post-conviction court next found that the trial court did not err by considering 

pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance. (Id. at 10.) The court noted that pursuant 

to State v. Germain, 723 P.2d 105, 108 (Ariz. 1986), if the state legislature has 

specifically identified an aggravating factor in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702, it may be used 

to enhance a sentence, even if it is an element of the charged offense. Because § 13-702 

specifically identified pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor, the court concluded that 

the trial court properly considered pecuniary gain an aggravating factor. (Id. at 9-10.) 

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 The post-conviction court next found that the trial court properly considered the 

mitigating factors for each defendant and there was no improper sentencing disparity. (Id. 

at 10-11.) The court noted that, at sentencing, each defendant and his counsel addressed 

the court and the trial court reviewed each defendant’s particular role in the events “even 

to the point of naming the particular victims that each of them had contact with and that 

victim’s personal situation.” (Id. at 10.) The court also noted that the trial court had 

reviewed numerous letters written on behalf of the individual defendants. (Id.) 

 The post-conviction court also discussed the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances the trial court considered for each defendant. (Id. at 10-11.) The postconviction court stated that “[t]he record shows that Judge Lindberg went to great lengths 

to avail himself of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each individual case. 

There is nothing in the record that shows that Judge Lindberg failed to consider 

mitigating factors in this case. Aggravated sentences were not improper under law in this 

case and any disparity in sentencing was considered and explained on the record.” (Id. at 

11.)

 2. The Supplemental Ruling on Petitioner’s Claims 

 In a supplemental ruling, the post-conviction court addressed Petitioner’s separate 

claim that trial counsel misadvised Petitioner regarding the likely sentence in the case. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. BB.) The post-conviction court found that trial counsel did not provide 

ineffective assistance. The court found the record did not support Petitioner’s claims. 

The court found the record did not support Petitioner’s claim that counsel “guaranteed” a 

lower and concurrent sentence. (Id. at 1.) Instead, the court concluded the record reflected 

that Petitioner was advised numerous times on the record that there were no guarantees, 

and that Petitioner faced lengthy and potentially consecutive sentences. The court also 

noted that it had reviewed the entire file and record in the case and found no basis to 

grant relief under Rule 32. (Id. at 5.) 

 3. Petitions for Review by Higher State Courts 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s denial of his petition for 

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post-conviction relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 12, Exs. EE-GG.) On 

August 14, 2012, the appellate court granted review, but denied relief, and adopted the 

trial court’s rulings. (Doc. 12, Ex. HH.) A mandate issued on August 8, 2013. (Doc. 12, 

Ex. JJ.) Petitioner’s timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed on April 25, 

2014. 

II. EXHAUSTION 

Grounds Three, Four, and Five were sufficiently raised as federal claims in 

Petitioner’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and on appeal. (Doc. 12, Exs. X, EE, 

GG.) Grounds One and Two were raised as federal claims in the Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Doc. 12, Ex. X at 1.) On appeal, however, Petitioner asserted that 

Ground One (coercive package-deal plea) warranted an evidentiary hearing and was 

improperly decided under Solano (Doc. 12, Ex. EE at 12); and, “the resolution of” 

Ground Two (ineffective assistance of counsel’s advice regarding the potential sentence) 

“without a hearing was an abuse of discretion” (Doc. 12, Ex. EE at 18). Petitioner did not 

raise a federal claim on appeal regarding Grounds One and Two. 

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 

1347 (2004) (“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must 

‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to 

the federal nature of the claim”). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts 

and federal legal theories on which the claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 

277–78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a 

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state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state 

court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal 

law.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 

247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731–32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review when a petitioner failed to present his 

federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the 

state court’s procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of 

the previously unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty 

v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state 

courts the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and 

federal legal theory upon which the claim is based. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 78 (“[W]e 

have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges 

upon the federal courts.”); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a 

petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional 

claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in 

state court.”). 

A. Grounds One and Two 

 Grounds One and Two are unexhausted because Petitioner did not identify a claim 

under the United States Constitution when he litigated these grounds on appeal. In order 

to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court.” 

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if 

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he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct appellate process of the state, 

or (2) throughout one entire judicial post-conviction process available in the state.” Casey 

v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas 

Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (4th ed.1998)). 

 Grounds One and Two were raised as federal claims in the Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Doc. 12 Ex. X at 1.) On appeal, however, Petitioner asserted that 

Ground One (coercive package-deal plea) warranted an evidentiary hearing and was 

improperly decided under Solano. (Doc. 12, Ex. EE at 12.) Petitioner argued “In sum, the 

trial court’s analysis of this issue was contrary to the facts before it and established legal 

precedent on all relevant Solano factors. The matter should now be remanded for an 

evidentiary hearing on this issue.” (Id. at 16.) For Ground Two (ineffective assistance of 

counsel’s advice regarding the potential sentence), Petitioner argued that “the resolution 

of this factual dispute without a hearing was an abuse of discretion.” (Doc. 12, Ex. EE at 

18.) Petitioner did not cite to a federal amendment or raise a federal claim on appeal in 

his arguments in Grounds One and Two. In his Reply, Petitioner asserted that the 

sentencing violated federal law, but this argument did not include Grounds One and Two. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. GG at 8.) 

 Grounds One and Two are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because 

Petitioner cannot file another appeal or PCR on this issue in state court. Under Ariz. 

R.Crim. P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct appeal expires 20 days after entry of the 

judgment and sentence. Moreover, no provision is made for a successive direct appeal. 

Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted 

claims. Petitioner is also barred from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz. 

R.Crim. P. 32.4 requires that petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which 

are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or 

within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, 

whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 912 P.2d 1357, 1360 (App. 1995) (applying 

Rule 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant 

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deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed. 

B. Grounds Three, Four, and Five 

 The Court finds that Petitioner’s federal constitutional claims in Grounds Three, 

Four, and Five were adequately exhausted in the Arizona Superior Court and the Arizona 

Court of Appeals post-conviction proceedings, where Petitioner raised his claims, citing 

to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth, Amendments of the Constitution. (Doc. 12, 

Exs. EE at 19, GG at 8.) Upon review of the briefing to the state courts, the Court finds 

that these specific claims are more than similar, albeit not identical, to those raised in the 

Petition before this Court. Because the Court finds that these claims were presented to 

the state courts, there is a presumption that they were adjudicated on the merits in those 

courts. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (“When a federal claim has 

been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed 

that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or 

state-law procedural principles to the contrary .”). 

III. THE PETITION FAILS ON THE MERITS. 

 Petitioner’s claims fail on the merits. 

A. Ground One – “Package Deal” Plea Agreement 

 In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his guilty plea was the result of coercion 

based on the State’s insistence on a “package-deal” plea agreement. He contends that this 

coercion rendered his plea involuntary and violated the Due Process Clause. He claims 

that had “the court properly considered all the Solano3

 factors it would have rejected the 

plea and allowed the Petitioner to negotiate an individual plea that was consistent with his 

particular degree of culpability.” (Doc. 1 at 18.) The trial court conducted a proper plea 

 

3 Solano, 724 P.2d at 402 (adopting these factors (1) whether the inducement to 

plead was proper, in that the prosecutor acted in good faith and had a reasonable case 

against any third party to whom leniency is promised; (2) whether there is a factual basis for the plea in terms of supportable evidence and proportionality of sentence; (3) whether the nature and degree of coercion and psychological pressure upon the defendant indicate the plea is involuntary; (4) whether the promise of leniency to another was a significant or insignificant concern to the defendant in his choice to plead guilty; and (5) whether any other relevant factor impermissibly influenced defendant’s plea.”). 

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colloquy and discussed the issue of coercion with Petitioner. Petitioner’s plea was 

voluntary and Petitioner’s claim is not supported by the record. 

 A prosecutor’s promise to treat a third party leniently during plea bargaining is not 

“coercive per se.” See, e.g., United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657, 659-60 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(if the trial court is aware that co-defendants are entering into a package deal arrangement 

and conducts a more careful examination of the voluntariness of the pleas, contingent 

plea agreements are permissible); United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 

1984) (“None of these courts has held that third party threats or promises are coercive per 

se.”). In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 n. 8 (1978), the Court, in dicta, 

simply cautioned that “a prosecutor’s offer during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient 

treatment for some person other than the accused . . . might pose a greater danger of 

inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant must 

consider.” The ultimate question is whether a defendant’s decision to plead guilty was 

voluntary and intelligent. “The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty 

plea is ‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 

alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 

(1985) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). 

 Petitioner’s statements during his plea proceedings establish that his decision to 

plead guilty was voluntarily made. The trial court conducted a plea colloquy that also 

included specific questions regarding the nature of the package plea offer. In such cases, 

“the prosecutor must alert the district court to the fact that codefendants are entering a 

package deal” because these deals “pose an additional risk of coercion not present when 

the defendant is dealing with the government alone.” Caro, 997 F.2d at 659–60. The 

court must then perform a “more careful examination of the voluntariness of a plea . . . .” 

Id. at 659 (quoting Castello, 724 F.2d at 815). This “more careful examination” requires 

“[s]pecifically [that] the court . . . find whether [the defendant] entered [the] plea because 

of threats or pressures from . . . codefendants.” Id. at 660. The trial judge conducted a 

thorough plea colloquy. 

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 During the plea hearing, the court specifically addressed Petitioner regarding the 

package-deal plea. (Id. at 33.) Co-defendant Travis Hiland’s counsel stated he had gone 

over the meaning of the Solano case with all three Hiland defendants, including 

Petitioner. (Id. at 34.) The court had the following exchange with Petitioner and his 

brother, Travis: 

COURT: I think with regard to the case law, Mr. 

Williams, Mr. Napper, because this is a package 

deal, I think I need some further record under 

Solano with regard to that. 

 So, Mr. Black or Mr. McGrane, if you are familiar with the factors in Ybarra and Solano, it seems apparent to me, honestly, because I 

have been dealing with this case, that there may be some reasons for the negotiation that does a 

joint or package plea agreement. But do you want to expound on that at all? 

MR. WILLIAMS: Judge, if I could assist on that. COURT: Mr. Williams. 

MR. WILLIAMS: We entered into the 17.4 negotiation before Judge Brutinel with the State and all four 

defendants in the case. I put on the record when we started my Solano concerns. The Court then 

got a copy of it. The State, I believe, provided 

that copy. 

 I have gone over what that means with all four, 

or actually, all three of the Hilands, and in 

particular with my client, Travis, and I can tell 

the Court that he is not receiving this plea so 

that another member of his family gets is a 

favorable plea. 

 The reason we took out the accomplice language and the conspiracy language of the 

plea agreement is because he is entering this 

plea agreement for his own actions, and it is his 

own decision. And that is what I will put on the record, Judge. 

COURT: Travis, is that correct? 

TRAVIS: Yes. 

COURT: You are doing this of your own volition for the things that you are facing, the potential 

consequences of going to trial that you are 

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facing, not because the other family member or 

members may receive benefit from this? 

TRAVIS: That’s correct. 

COURT: Tyson, is that your position, also? 

PETITIONER: The same. 

COURT: You are doing this for your own sake based on 

what is being offered to you, not because some other family member, either your brother or 

your father, is getting some kind of deal? 

PETITIONER: I know. 

COURT: Is there any other fact, then, other than the plea agreement itself and what you are looking at there, in terms of consequences versus going to 

trial and the consequences or possible outcome 

there, that is influencing you to any degree, Travis? 

TRAVIS: No. 

COURT: Tyson, any other considerations that are influencing you, other than your own viewpoint 

of the benefits of the plea agreement versus 

going to trial? 

PETITIONER: No. 

(Id. at 34–35.) 

 A defendant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the 

plea agreement carry substantial weight in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea. 

United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991). The court may properly credit a 

defendant’s testimony at a hearing regarding entry of a guilty plea over any subsequent 

declarations to the contrary. See Castello, 724 F.2d at 815. 

 Based on the record, Petitioner has not shown that his guilty plea was involuntary 

and has not established a Due Process violation. Petitioner’s plea was voluntary and 

intelligent as required by Hill v. Lockhart, supra, and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 

(1969). Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s rejection of this claim 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. 

B. Ground Two – Guilty Plea Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 Petitioner asserts that counsel provided ineffective assistance during the plea 

process. Petitioner claims that counsel advised him to accept the plea agreement because 

he would “most likely receive concurrent sentencing” with probation and jail, or at worst 

a “prison term in a ‘minimum’ yard (which Petitioner took to mean the presumptive term 

of 5 years or less).” (Doc. 1 at 19-20.) Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective 

because he failed to relay the assessment of Judge Brutinel (the settlement conference 

judge) “that the likely result was a maximum sentence.” (Id.) Petitioner claims that if he 

had “known” that he would be sentenced to a 10-year prison sentence and consecutive 

probation, then “he would not have pled guilty. . . .” (Doc. 1 at 20.) 

 The court of appeals’ determination that Petitioner failed to prove ineffective 

assistance of counsel regarding the guilty plea was not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, or an unreasonable application of established federal law. 

Even if counsel said the “most likely” outcome would not exceed five years of 

imprisonment, that claim implicitly concedes that counsel advised Petitioner that a longer 

sentence was possible. Petitioner knew the prosecution was likely requesting a prison 

sentence up to 12.5 years, and Petitioner repeatedly acknowledged he knew his ultimate 

sentence was permissible under the plea. 

 The negotiation of a plea bargain is “‘a critical phase of litigation for purposes of 

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. 

Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)). If counsel has 

misadvised a defendant about the law during a plea negotiation, or improperly coerced a 

defendant to accept a plea bargain, counsel’s performance may be found deficient. See

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (counsel’s erroneous legal advice about 

possibility of conviction that led to rejection of plea offer constituted deficient 

performance). “If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective 

assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it.” Id. at 1387. To satisfy 

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Strickland’s4 prejudice prong when a petitioner has pleaded guilty, he must show that 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (citations omitted). 

 Even if counsel had advised Petitioner that the most likely “worst case scenario” 

was a five-year prison term, Petitioner has not established that this advice was 

unconstitutionally deficient or prejudicial. “To establish a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel based on alleged erroneous advice regarding a guilty plea, a petitioner must 

demonstrate more than a ‘mere inaccurate prediction.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 

F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864–65) (9th Cir. 

1986)). Defense counsel’s alleged erroneous predictions as to the likely sentence 

following a guilty plea, “are deficient only if they constitute ‘gross mischaracterization of 

the likely outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined with . . . erroneous advice on the 

probable effects of going to trial.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 

1394 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

 Furthermore, if the defendant was informed prior to entering his guilty plea of the 

potential sentence he could receive, he cannot establish prejudice from counsel’s 

incorrect prediction as to his sentence. See Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1003–4 

(9th Cir. 2007) (finding that because the defendant was informed of the maximum 

possible sentence, “he cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s 

prediction.”); United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining 

that an erroneous sentence prediction “does not entitle a defendant to challenge his guilty 

plea”). 

 Here, Petitioner does not assert that counsel actually told him a five-year sentence 

was the most likely prison term. Petitioner concedes that at worst, counsel told him he 

would receive prison time in a “‘minimum yard’ (which Petitioner took to mean the 

presumptive term of five years or less).” (Doc. 1 at 20.) Petitioner’s assumption that a 

 

4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

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“minimum yard” would equal no more than a term of five years is Petitioner’s fault not 

counsel’s. Even if counsel advised that a five-year sentence was most likely the 

maximum he would receive, that advice was not a gross mischaracterization. The 

settlement judge agreed that concurrent, imprisonment sentences were likely. Judge 

Brutinel told Petitioner, the codefendants and the attorneys “. . . I kind of agree with your 

position that it strikes me concurrent time is probably appropriate here, but that’s up to 

the trial judge.” (Doc. 12, Ex. KK at 14.) The ultimate question was the length of that 

sentence, and Petitioner was repeatedly advised it could include imprisonment up to 25 

years. Petitioner also knew the prosecution was requesting a sentence of imprisonment up 

to 12 years and six months. Petitioner did not in fact receive a maximum sentence of 

imprisonment, and his ultimate sentence was within the range he explicitly agreed the 

court could impose. The court of appeals decision was not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

established federal law. See Womack, 497 F.3d at 1003–4. 

C. Ground Three – Consecutive Sentences for Theft/Fraud Schemes 

 Petitioner asserts that his consecutive sentences for Theft and Fraudulent Schemes 

and Artifices violate the Double Punishment Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the 

two offenses “were based on identical operative facts. . . .” (Doc. 1 at 21.) The Double 

Jeopardy Clause “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” See Ohio 

v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984) (citation omitted). To determine whether a 

double jeopardy violation has occurred, the court applies the same-elements test, also 

known as the Blockburger5

 test, which “inquires whether each offense contains an 

element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offense’ and double 

jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.” United States v. Dixon, 

509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). 

 Theft required the state to prove that a defendant knowingly and without lawful 

 

5 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 

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authority either: (a) controlled the property of another with the intent to deprive that 

person of the property; (b) converted for an unauthorized use or term another person’s 

property which was entrusted to him; or (c) obtained the property of another by means of 

a material misrepresentation with the intent to deprive that person of the property. A.R.S. 

§ 13–1802. A scheme or artifice to defraud under A.R.S. § 13–2310 contains two 

elements: (a) the existence of a scheme or artifice to defraud; and (2) knowingly 

obtaining a benefit by means of false pretenses, false representations or material 

omissions. The trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR allegation on this ground, finding that 

the “act of fraud scheme is separate from the act of the actual taking of the funds for their 

own use.” (Doc. 12, Ex. AA at 9.) The trial court concluded that “[c]onsecutive 

sentencing under Gordon is not contrary to law in this case.” (Id.) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed this conclusion. (Doc. 12, Ex. HH at 2.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeal’s decision was not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Theft can 

be established by proving that a defendant controlled, converted, or obtained the property 

of another, elements that are not found in the fraudulent scheme statute. A scheme to 

defraud and the attainment of a benefit are not required to prove a theft. Under the 

Blockburger same-elements test, these offenses are not the same and consecutive 

sentences do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Saccoccia, 18 

F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Felix, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 1384 (1992)) 

(“A substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit that crime are not the same offense for 

double jeopardy purposes.”); United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1252 (11th Cir. 

2008) (convictions for wire fraud and theft do not violate the Fifth Amendment Double 

Jeopardy Clause because each crime satisfies the Blockburger test); State v. Harper, 868 

P.2d 1027, 1029 (App. 1993) (noting that a defendant could commit either theft or money 

laundering without also committing the other). 

 Any claim by Petitioner that there was a violation of state law during sentencing is 

not subject to federal habeas corpus review. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 

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507 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that petitioner’s claim that the state court erred in imposing 

consecutive sentences was not cognizable in federal habeas); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 

F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “claim regarding merger of convictions for 

sentencing is exclusively concerned with state law and therefore not cognizable in a 

federal habeas corpus proceeding.”); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 

1989) (refusing to consider alleged errors in violation of state sentencing law). 

D. Ground Four – Excessive Sentence 

 Petitioner asserts that the trial court “improperly considered aggravating and 

mitigating factors, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution. (Doc. 1 at 22.) Petitioner specifically alleged in his PCR 

Petition that this was a “violation of Arizona law” and a violation of the “double 

punishment clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (Doc. 12, Ex. X at 16-17.) 

 Petitioner’s allegation that the trial court committed a sentencing error, under the 

relevant state law, is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(federal court has no authority to review state application of state law); Miller, 868 F.2d 

at 1118–19 (refusing to consider alleged errors in violation of state sentencing law); 

Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011) (refusing to adjudicate a state law 

sentencing “double counting” issue). Petitioner’s argument is copied almost verbatim 

from his PCR Petition, which primarily argues a claim under Arizona state law. 

 There is also no fundamental unfairness present in Petitioner’s sentence. See

Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Absent a showing of fundamental 

unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify 

federal habeas relief.”). Petitioner owes $1.6 million in restitution for his participation in 

a scheme that impoverished numerous elderly victims. Petitioner was sentenced below 

the maximum terms he knowingly authorized. Petitioner has not demonstrated 

fundamental unfairness. 

 The trial court also properly considered Petitioner’s financial gain and resulting 

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impact to the victims. A court may consider pecuniary gain to the Petitioner without 

implicating double-punishment concerns in a theft case. Theft only requires the taking of 

property, which could have no monetary value (e.g. family photographs or letters). See 

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329, 335–36 (9th Cir.1996) (finding pecuniary gain in a 

felony murder sentencing an appropriate aggravating factor because robbing a person of 

property does not “necessarily” prove that a defendant was motivated by the expectation 

of pecuniary gain). Moreover, a court may consider economic harm to the victims. See

Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13–702(C); United States v. Rangel, 688 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 

2012) (District court appropriately focused upon “the impact on the victims of [the 

defendant’s] crimes.”). There is no violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Arizona Court 

of Appeals did not act unreasonably in rejecting this claim. 

E. Ground Five – Judicial Bias

 In Ground Five, Petitioner asserts judicial bias prevented him from receiving fair 

and impartial hearings. The trial court denied Petitioner’s claim and found no bias in the 

record. Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the Arizona state courts applied federal law or 

interpreted the facts before them unreasonably; nor does he show that the state courts’ 

denial of his appeal was contrary to federal law. 

 1. The “Cahall Letter” 

 Petitioner asserts that the Cahall letter created “an appearance of impropriety.” 

Petitioner cites to Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1987) but not does not claim the review 

of the letter created actual bias. The post-conviction court found there was “no basis in 

the record to find that Judge Lindberg was biased due to the Cahall letter.” (Doc. 12, Ex. 

AA at 2.) Petitioner has not argued or shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, free from judicial bias. In re Murchison, 349 

U.S. 133, 136 (1955). A petitioner may show judicial bias in one of two ways—by 

demonstrating the judge’s actual bias or by showing that the judge had an incentive to be 

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biased sufficiently strong enough to overcome the presumption of judicial integrity (i.e., a 

substantial likelihood of bias). Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 1994). 

“Supreme Court precedent reveals only three circumstances in which an appearance of 

bias—as opposed to evidence of actual bias—necessitates recusal.” Crater v. Galaza, 491 

F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 

These are (1) when the judge has a direct, substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of 

the case; (2) when the judge becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy with one 

of the litigants; and (3) when the judge acts as part of the accusatory process. (Id.) 

(citations omitted). 

 The determination of judicial bias is a factual question to which the federal courts 

defer on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 

632 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that state court’s finding of lack of judicial bias was entitled 

to a presumption of correctness). To succeed on a judicial bias claim, a petitioner must 

“overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” 

Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. The Supreme Court has stated that “opinions formed by the 

judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current 

proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality 

motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 

judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

 Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate actual bias is extremely high because there is a 

presumption that judicial officials have “properly discharged their official duties.” Bracy 

v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997) (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 

464, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (1996)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that “only in the 

most extreme cases would disqualification [for bias or prejudice] be constitutionally 

required.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (1986). 

 Here, Petitioner fails to establish actual bias or the appearance of impropriety. 

Petitioner’s PCR Petition alleged the trial court was biased after it reviewed a letter from 

“retired Detective Cahall who spearheaded the investigation” and the detective referenced 

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a former case that Cahall and the judge had worked on together. (Doc. 12, Ex. X at 20.) 

The trial court and the court of appeals found no judicial bias because the court 

“indicated several times on the record it had stricken and not considered” the “Cahall 

letter” and there was no bias found in the record. (Doc. 12, Ex. AA at 30.) Petitioner’s 

claim regarding the “Cahall letter” fails. 

 2. Denial of Motions and Request for Transcript 

 Petitioner also asserts that Judge Lindberg’s denial of several motions (state 

disqualification, a transcript request, a continuance, and discovery requests) demonstrates 

bias and prejudice against Petitioner.6

 The record does not reflect such bias. “[J]udicial 

rulings alone almost never constitute [a] valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” 

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Adverse rulings should be appealed; they do not form the basis 

for a recusal motion. Opinions formed in the courtroom “do not constitute a basis for a 

bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that 

would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. 

 Plaintiff has not shown that the trial court’s denial of motions that Petitioner and 

his co-defendants filed immediately before sentencing was based on bias. The record 

reflects that the trial court considered arguments from counsel on the motions. (Doc. 12, 

Ex. ZZ at 30-62.) Although the trial court did not elaborate on its rulings, it apparently 

determined that the Cahall letter, which the trial court struck and did not consider at 

sentencing, did not warrant further discovery, continuing the trial, or disqualifying the 

county attorney’s office. (Doc. 16, Ex. ZZ at 62.) The court also determined that no 

inquiry into the State’s communications with the victims was necessary. (Id.) The court’s 

denial of a request for a transcript of the sentencing hearing in relation to a postconviction proceeding does not establish the court was biased against Petitioner. 

 

6

 Petitioner also alleges that a denial of the motion to recuse Judge Lindberg demonstrates bias. Judge Lindberg did not rule on this motion. Judge Lindberg referred the motion to disqualify to Judge Brutinel. (Doc. 12, Ex. ZZ at 6-9; Ex. O.) Judge Brutinel denied the motion. Petitioner does not allege Judge Brutinel was biased. Referral of this motion to Judge Brutinel demonstrates a lack of bias by Judge Lindberg. 

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 3. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

 Petitioner alleges the court “allowed the state to engage in ongoing prosecutorial 

misconduct discussed above.” (Doc. 1 at 27.) This is Petitioner’s sole sentence on this 

allegation. Petitioner’s argument is devoid of factual reference or legal citation. 

Petitioner’s reference to “misconduct discussed above” is unacceptably vague. 

Petitioner’s claim is denied. See United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 886 (6th Cir. 

2004) (“We have cautioned that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, 

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived, and that 

it is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, 

leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 4. Different Standards of Treatment for Defense and Prosecution 

 To support his judicial bias claim, Petitioner also asserts that Judge Lindberg had 

“different standards of treatment” for the prosecution and defense during the presentence 

hearing. (Doc. 1 at 27.) To support this claim of bias, Petitioner points to the trial court 

urging the defense to pick up the pace of it presentation of its case and to the court’s 

statement that defense witnesses could become cumulative. (Id.) 

 These incidents do not establish judicial bias. The trial court’s request that defense 

counsel increase the pace of their presentation, its concern about cumulative witnesses, 

and its rulings on the formulation of questions to the witnesses were part of the trial 

court’s management of a lengthy pre-sentence hearing that included 20 witnesses who 

spoke on behalf of Petitioner and his codefendants. (Doc. 12, Exs. NN-SS; Doc. 16, Exs. 

TT-YY.) Petitioner’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish that the trial 

court’s management of the presentencing hearing was biased against Petitioner or to 

establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a 

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”). 

 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim 

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was based on an unreasonable determination of facts, or that it was contrary to, or based 

on an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). 

IV. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), 

a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he presents a “meritorious claim” and 

he exercised reasonable diligence in developing the factual record in the state 

proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 434-37 (2000). A petitioner exercises the 

diligence necessary to preserve a claim if “the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in 

light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state 

court.” Id. at 435. Thus, to qualify for an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must both: “(1) 

allege facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, and (2) show that he did not 

receive a full and fair hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a 

collateral proceeding.” Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005). No 

hearing is necessary, however, if this Court “is able to determine without a hearing that 

the allegations are without credibility or that the allegations if true would not warrant a 

new trial . . . .” United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Based on its review of Petitioner’s claims, as set forth above, the Court finds that 

Petitioner has not made any allegations that, if true, would warrant habeas relief, and 

finds that his allegations (particularly his allegations related to the voluntariness of his 

guilty plea asserted in Grounds One and Two) are without credibility. Accordingly, an 

evidentiary hearing is not warranted. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that two of Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally barred from review and all fail on the merits. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

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 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 15th day of April, 2015. 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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