Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05402/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05402-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, all parties have expressly

consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated by the

undersigned.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MICHAEL PEKIN and AMANDA

HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

COUNTY OF SAN BENITO and DOES 1-10,

inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C05-05402 HRL

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Re: Docket No. 24]

Defendant County of San Benito (“County”) moves to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint. Plaintiffs Michael Pekin and Amanda Hernandez oppose the motion. Upon

consideration of the papers filed by the parties, as well as the arguments presented at the July

18, 2006 hearing, this court GRANTS the motion IN PART and DENIES the motion IN PART.1

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael Pekin is an attorney and a member of the California bar. Plaintiff

Amanda Hernandez is now an attorney; however, during the time period encompassed by

plaintiffs’ complaint, she was a law school graduate who worked as a paralegal in Pekin’s

office. On December 29, 2005, they brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

seeking money damages and claiming that the County retaliated against them for exercising

*E-FILED ON 8/25/06*

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2 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

3 The FAC also included a claim for malicious prosecution. However,

plaintiffs have withdrawn that claim as premature because the action upon which the claim is

based is currently on appeal. Accordingly, the County’s motion to dismiss as to that claim is

denied as moot.

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their claimed First Amendment right to “represent their clients.” The County moved to dismiss

the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the complaint failed to properly

assert a Monell2

 claim and did not allege facts establishing the violation of any constitutional

right. This court concluded that, under liberal federal pleading standards, the complaint

sufficiently alleged municipal liability under section 1983. It nevertheless agreed that attorneys

have no personal right under the First Amendment to simply “represent their clients,” and it

followed, neither did paralegals. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed with leave to

amend.

In their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), plaintiffs again assert claims for retaliation

for the exercise of their First Amendment rights, as well as for conspiracy to deprive them of

their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 For purposes of

a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, the factual allegations of plaintiffs’ FAC are assumed to be

true. The FAC alleges as follows:

Since mid-2003, Pekin became concerned about what he perceived to be government

corruption in San Benito County – namely, that Richard Scagliotti (then a member of the

County Board of Supervisors) used his political office for personal financial gain and to harm

his business competitors. Local business people allegedly also shared Pekin’s concerns, but

feared retaliation if they spoke out. Around mid-2003, a “citizen’s group fighting corruption”

began meeting secretly to discuss these concerns. (FAC at p. 6:12). With money contributed

by the group, Pekin hired a private investigator, David Henderson, to look into the suspected

corruption. Henderson later prepared a report which Pekin says confirmed his suspicions.

The FAC further alleges that by October 13, 2003, Pekin was convinced that litigation

was the only means available to the group to fight against the corruption; but the group

purportedly was unable to find any attorney willing to represent it in court because of a fear of

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retaliation. Wanting to publicly expose the alleged government corruption, two members of the

group (identified only by the pseudonyms “Benito Juarez” and “Pipila Guanajuato Guerrero”)

urged Pekin to file a motion to intervene in a lawsuit then pending against the County in the

state Superior Court, McGovern v. San Benito County, Case No. CV 03-00103 (“McGovern

Action”). To protect the identities of the citizens in the group, Pekin dubbed them “Los

Valientes”; and, on October 14, 2003, he filed a motion on the group’s behalf to intervene in the

McGovern Action. That motion was denied.

In December 2003, Pekin filed a taxpayer lawsuit on behalf of Juan Monteon against the

County and Scagliotti entitled Monteon v. Scagliotti, Case No. CU 03-00150 (“Monteon

Action”). That action is still pending in the San Benito County Superior Court. According to

the FAC, the Monteon complaint asserts many of the same allegations of corruption as those

made by Los Valientes in their unsuccessful motion to intervene in the McGovern Action.

Meanwhile, plaintiff Hernandez graduated from law school in June 2003, passed the

California bar exam that same summer, but was not “sworn in” to the bar that year. After

completing a one-year, out-of-state clerkship, she returned to California in October 2004 and

began working for Pekin as a paralegal. Plaintiffs allege that from the moment she began

assisting Pekin in his “anti-corruption litigation,” she “publicly and personally ascribed to the

same concerns, beliefs, and political activities of Pekin designed to carry out the goals of

fighting corruption of Supervisor Scagliotti and San Benito County.” (FAC at 3:26-4:2). Both

plaintiffs claim that they also “dispersed copies of the Henderson report and findings from the

report as widely as circumstances permitted in an effort to create and maintain a publicly

supported citizen’s group to fight the . . . corruption . . ..” (Id. at 4:13-15).

The FAC further alleges that on December 17, 2004, the County District Attorney filed

a civil lawsuit against “‘Los Valientes,’ Pekin and Hernandez, along with Pekin’s son (an

attorney who also worked in the office)” for unfair business practices. (FAC at 10:16-18). That

lawsuit, which allegedly pertains to the filing of the intervention motion in the McGovern

Action and plaintiffs’ conduct in the Monteon Action, is still pending.

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On February 22, 2005, the County District Attorney filed criminal charges against

Pekin, based on a Grand Jury indictment, for activities allegedly arising out of his participation

in the McGovern and Monteon Actions. The charges included: (1) Conspiracy to Falsely Move

or Maintain Any Suit, Action, or Proceeding; (2) Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice or the Due

Administration of the Laws; (3) Preparing False Documentary Evidence; (4) Attempted

Subornation of Perjury; and (5) Attempting to Deceive the Court or Another Party to a Lawsuit. 

All of the criminal charges were later dismissed on June 20, 2005.

On April 26, 2005, the County District Attorney filed a single misdemeanor charge

against Hernandez for the unlicensed practice of law. The charge, which allegedly arose out of

her participation in the Monteon Action, was dismissed by the state court on September 1, 2005.

In the instant lawsuit, plaintiffs claim that the County engaged in a campaign of

harassment by encouraging the County’s District Attorney to file criminal and civil actions

against them in retaliation for the exercise of their First Amendment rights “to access the courts

and petition the government for redress of grievances, and exercise of freedom of speech, and

freedom of association.” (FAC at 10:24-25). Plaintiffs claim that they “have been harmed in

that [they] have incurred attorneys’ fees, suffered humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional

and physical distress.” (Id. at 11:2-3).

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the County now moves to dismiss the FAC for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It argues that the FAC still fails to

allege any facts demonstrating the violation of any constitutional rights. Alternatively, it moves

for an order directing plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(e) or striking portions of the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. In such a motion, all material allegations in

the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the claimant. 

See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). “However, the court

is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

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4 The County’s requests for judicial notice of records from the Monteon Action

and the McGovern Action are granted insofar as they appear to present undisputed matters of

public record which are relevant to the issues presently under consideration. FED.R.EVID. 201.

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conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness

Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). Dismissal is appropriate only when it “‘appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support his claim which would entitle

him to relief.’” Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957)). Ordinarily, a court may only look at the face of the complaint and documents attached

to the complaint in deciding a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Hal Roach

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). 

However, documents which are properly subject to judicial notice may be considered without

converting the motion into one for summary judgment. MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803

F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).4

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claim for Retaliation Under the First Amendment

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that

the alleged violation was committed under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

Retaliation, though it is not expressly referred to in the Constitution, is actionable

because retaliatory actions may tend to chill individuals’ exercise of constitutional rights. See

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). A claim under § 1983 for retaliation under the

First Amendment may be stated where a plaintiff alleges retaliation by state actors for the

exercise of his First Amendment rights. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429

U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). The plaintiff must show that the type of activity he was engaged in

was protected by the First Amendment and that the protected conduct was a substantial or

motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory acts. See id. at 287. Retaliation by a state actor for

the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if the act, when

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taken for different reasons, would have been proper. See id. at 283-84. A plaintiff need not

demonstrate that his speech actually was inhibited or suppressed, however. The proper inquiry

is whether the official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future

First Amendment activities. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283,

1300 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the instant case, the County contends that the FAC fails to allege facts demonstrating

that plaintiffs were engaged in any constitutionally protected activities. Here, it asserts that,

under the guise of “Los Valientes,” plaintiffs are merely re-asserting a right to simply

“represent their clients” – a claim that has already been rejected by this court. For their part,

plaintiffs argue that the FAC alleges facts demonstrating that their participation – either as

litigants or as attorneys – in the underlying state court actions is encompassed by rights of

expression and association under the First Amendment.

The FAC does not allege any facts demonstrating that plaintiffs were litigants in the

underlying state court lawsuits, nor have plaintiffs shown that they could amend their complaint

to allege any such facts. Neither plaintiff is identified as a party to the McGovern or Monteon

Actions. To the contrary, the FAC indicates that the motion to intervene in the McGovern

Action was filed on behalf of Los Valientes and that the Monteon Action was filed on behalf of

Juan Monteon. Moreover, as plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged at oral argument, the FAC

alleges that both the motion to intervene and the Monteon Action were filed while plaintiff

Hernandez was out-of-state and approximately one year before she even began working for

Pekin. (See FAC at 3:19-23, 6:1-3, 7:14-19). Further, the County says that Pekin cannot be a

member of the group because, according to his own court filings in the McGovern Action, Los

Valientes is comprised of San Benito County citizens, whereas the FAC acknowledges that

Pekin is not a County resident. (See Serverian Reply Decl., Ex. A at p. 3; FAC at 7:7-10).

Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that their participation in the underlying state court

litigation constitutes an exercise of their First Amendment political expression and association

rights under NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) and its progeny. As discussed in this

court’s order granting the County’s prior motion to dismiss, those cases recognize that

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collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a form of political

expression and association protected by the First Amendment. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.

415 (1963); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); First Defense Legal Aid v. City of

Chicago, 209 F. Supp.2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

The County argues that the collective activity concerns at issue in the Button line of

cases are not implicated here because (1) Los Valientes is not comprised of socially

marginalized citizens; (2) judicial relief is not sought on Los Valientes’ behalf in any event –

either in the instant action or in the Monteon Action; and (3) there is no “group” because

plaintiffs and Pekin’s son claim to be the only publicly known members of Los Valientes. As

such, the County argues that dismissal is warranted because this court has already ruled that

plaintiffs have no personal right to simply “represent their clients” in court. See, e.g., Mezibov

v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that an attorney did not engage in free

expression protected by the First Amendment when he filed motions and raised defenses in

court, and holding, as a matter of first impression, that an attorney retains no personal First

Amendment rights when representing his client in courtroom proceedings); Hinds v. Dallas

Independent School Dist., 188 F. Supp.2d 664 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (concluding that defendants’

allegedly retaliatory lawsuit did not infringe the attorney-plaintiff’s First Amendment rights of

free speech or access to the courts, notwithstanding that the attorney filed the litigation to

express his own personal views).

The instant case does not fall squarely within the cases cited by either party. On the one

hand, the allegations of the FAC indicate that, unlike the NAACP or the ACLU, Los Valientes

is a rather loosely organized group of County citizens. Moreover, unlike Button and Primus,

the FAC indicates that “Los Valientes” was not and is not involved in the Monteon Action, and

the group’s effort to intervene in the McGovern Action failed only because its motion was

denied by the court. (See FAC at 6:1-3, 7:14-16). Indeed, if these were the only allegations in

the FAC, defendant’s motion to dismiss might indeed be well taken.

On the other hand, unlike those cases which rejected an attorney’s First Amendment

right to simply represent clients, here, the FAC does contain allegations which – broadly

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that plaintiffs litigated the Monteon Action on behalf of a client.

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construed under liberal federal pleading rules – support plaintiffs’ contention that they were

punished for their activities as members or supporters of Los Valientes.5

 This court is

unpersuaded that a group must be comprised of socially marginalized citizens before its rights

of association and expression will be recognized (as the County seems to suggest). Although

the allegations of the FAC are not a model of clarity, at this stage of the litigation the court

views the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Here, the FAC alleges that

County officials conducted a “campaign to retaliate against Pekin and Hernandez for their

creation of and participation in ‘Los Valientes.’” (FAC at 8:2-3). As discussed above, it is

unclear that Los Valientes has any connection with the Monteon Action under the facts as pled. 

Nevertheless, for purposes of resolving the instant motion, the court finds that plaintiffs’ claims

that they are being unjustifiably punished for activities connected with the group are supported

by the allegation suggesting (albeit in very vague fashion) that the County’s civil suit was

brought against “Los Valientes.” (See FAC at 10:16-18). While the County contends, in

essence, that there is no “group” because its known membership is essentially limited to

Hernandez and Pekin’s son, the FAC contains allegations indicating that there are a number of

other (albeit currently anonymous) members of Los Valientes. (See id. at 4:22-23, 5:3-4; 6:26-

7:3). Whether plaintiffs will succeed in establishing their claims remains to be seen. Taking

these allegations as true (as is required on the instant motion), this court concludes that

dismissal is not appropriate as to plaintiffs’ claims for retaliation in violation of their claimed

First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association.

The County argues that the FAC nevertheless is deficient because it does not contain

specific allegations that plaintiffs’ activities were actually suppressed or that a person of

ordinary firmness would have been chilled by the alleged retaliatory conduct. However, as

noted above, and as the County acknowledges in its own moving papers, plaintiffs are not

obliged to show that their activities were in fact suppressed to state a claim for retaliation. See

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Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d at 1300. In any event, the court finds

that the complaint meets the liberal federal notice pleading standards under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.

However, the court agrees that plaintiffs have not, and cannot, allege facts

demonstrating any violation of an underlying First Amendment right of access or petition. The

Ninth Circuit apparently has not resolved whether it is unconstitutional to retaliate against an

individual who already has fully accessed the courts. See Lytle v. Wondrash, 182 F.3d 1083,

1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (granting qualified immunity on question whether retaliation which

occurred after the plaintiff filed a complaint, litigated her claim, and won her case was

unconstitutional). However, it seems that to state a claim based on a denial of access to the

courts, plaintiffs must allege facts demonstrating that they suffered an actual injury by being

shut out of court. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). Here, plaintiffs have

not alleged that they were precluded from litigating their views in court or from expressing their

views elsewhere. Nor have they alleged any facts indicating that they were otherwise barred by

virtue of any County action. Indeed, the FAC indicates that they continue to prosecute the

Monteon Action and that they were unable to proceed in the McGovern Action only because the

motion to intervene was denied. (See FAC 6:1; 7:20).

B. Plaintiffs’ Conspiracy Claim

The FAC alleges that the County conspired with county officials and others to deprive

plaintiffs of their rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. As discussed

above, the court finds that plaintiffs have, under liberal pleading standards, sufficiently alleged

a claim for violation of their claimed First Amendment rights of expression and association. 

Accordingly, their conspiracy claim survives insofar as it is based upon the alleged violation of

these claimed rights.

However, the court agrees that plaintiffs have not alleged any facts demonstrating a

violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Nor is it apparent that such claims

could be asserted by amendment. Accordingly, the County’s motion to dismiss is granted

without leave to amend as to plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim to the extent that plaintiffs claim a

violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

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C. The County’s Alternate Motions Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) and 12(f)

The County alternatively moves for an order compelling plaintiffs to provide a more

definite statement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) or for an order striking portions of the

complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Where a pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that a

party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a

more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” FED.R.CIV.P. 12(e). Such a

motion “shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Id. In addition, the

court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient defense, or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED.R.CIV.P. 12(f).

Here, the County argues that the FAC is obscure in that it is unable to distinguish

Hernandez’s claims from those of Pekin. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel readily acknowledged at

oral argument that the underlying allegations are convoluted. Nevertheless, the court concludes

that the complaint satisfies liberal federal notice pleading standards under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. The

parties will have an opportunity in discovery to seek further detail or clarification as to the

allegations. Accordingly, the County’s alternate motions under Fed.R.Civ.P 12(e) and 12(f) are

denied.

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT the County’s motion to dismiss is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. With respect to plaintiffs’ claim for relief for retaliation, the County’s motion is

DENIED insofar as plaintiffs claim a violation of their rights to freedom of expression and

association. The motion is GRANTED to the extent plaintiffs claim a violation of their First

Amendment rights of access or petition.

2. With respect to plaintiffs’ claim for conspiracy, the County’s motion is DENIED

to the extent plaintiffs’ claim is based upon the alleged deprivation of their First Amendment

rights of expression and association. The motion is GRANTED to the extent plaintiffs claim a

violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

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3. The County’s alternate motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(f) are DENIED.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

August 25, 2006

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5:05-cv-5402 Notice will be electronically mailed to:

William L Marder bill@polarislawgroup.com 

Michael C. Serverian mserverian@rllss.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have

not registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

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