Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00098/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00098-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD ALVARADO, et al,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDEX CORPORATION,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-00098 SI

(Related Case No. C 04-0099 SI)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AS

TO PLAINTIFFS JOHN AZZAM,

CHRISTOPHER WILKERSON, AND

LORE PAOGOFIE, AND DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ RULE 56(F) REQUESTS

On August 19, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on defendant’s motions for summary judgment

as to three plaintiffs: John Azzam, Christopher Wilkerson, and Lore Paogofie and on plaintiffs’ requests for

relief pursuant to Rule 56(f). Having carefully considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted,

the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motions for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of plaintiffs’ employment with defendant FedEx Corporation (“FedEx” or

“defendant”). Plaintiffs allege various forms of discrimination against FedEx, including discrimination in

promotion and compensation, harassment, and retaliation, and assert claims for disparate impact and disparate

treatment under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the California Fair Housing and

Employment Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant has filed motions

for summary judgment as to three plaintiffs, John Azzam, Lore Paogofie, and Christopher Wilkerson, relying

exclusively on the deposition testimony ofthese plaintiffs. Plaintiffs oppose the motions and seek relief pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f).

In requesting Rule 56(f) relief, plaintiffs repeat the same arguments made in Rule 56(f) motions made

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1 Defendant has also filed summary judgment motions regarding plaintiffs Tanda Brown, Lasonia

Walker, Kevin Neely, Pernell Evans, Alexander Rivera, and Gary White. Plaintiffs filed Rule 56(f) requests

with respect to those summary judgment motions as well because of FedEx’s failure to produce documents

responsive to plaintiffs’ First and Second Sets ofRequests for Production. The Court granted these Rule 56(f)

requests but has not yet ordered supplemental briefing for or re-set these motions.

2 Meanwhile, defendant also filed summary judgment motions against plaintiffs Gary White and

Alexander Rivera, set for July 1, 2005. 

2

by other plaintiffs,1 stating that defendants have still not fully produced documents from Plaintiff’s First Set of

Requests for Production, including external EEO complaints filed with the EEOC and DFEH and a privilege

log, and from Plaintiff’s Second Set of Requests for Production. According to plaintiffs, until these discovery

matters are resolved, they have had no full opportunity to obtain facts necessary to oppose the summary

judgment motions.

The discovery disputes in this action have been frequent and heated. On November 23, 2004, plaintiffs

served their First Set of Requests for Production on defendant. They then brought a motion to compel

production of many of these documents, which was set for hearing on March 11, 2005. At that hearing,

defendant stated that it would produce all responsive documents “forthwith,” and the parties entered into a

stipulated order to that effect. See March 15, 2005 Stipulated Order. Defendant then filed summary judgment

motions against four plaintiffs, which were set for May 27, 2005. Plaintiffs sought a continuance of these

motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) on grounds that defendant had not produced

documents as required by the March 11, 2005 stipulated order. On May 25, 2005, the Court granted this

request and re-set the hearing for June 24, 2005. On May 26, 2005, defendant filed a letter brief seeking

“relief” from the Court’s order. Plaintiffs requested an emergency hearing regarding defendant’s failure to

produce documents, and opposed defendant’s request. Plaintiffs also filed an additional request for Rule 56(f)

relief. On June 22, 2005, the Court granted a request for a one-week continuance of the four summary

judgment motions, which were re-set for July 1, 2005.2 Plaintiffs subsequently sought a further continuance,

pursuant to Rule 56(f), ofallsix ofthe summary judgment motions setfor Friday, July 1, 2005, which the Court

granted during a telephone conference held on June 27, 2005. See Docket # 157. In addition, at that

conference, the Court ordered FedEx to produce all documents responsive to plaintiffs’ First and Second Sets

of Requests for Production by July 8, 2005. Plaintiff subsequently filed a further letter brief claiming that

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3

 In their oppositions and supplemental materials, each plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice

of the class action complaint filed with this Court in Satchell, et al. v. FedEx, C 03-2659 SI, as well as of a

statistical report submitted in that case by Dr. Drogin. The Court DENIES both requests. The Court has

related cases C 04-0098 SI and 04-0099 SI, but these cases are not formally related to the Satchell class

action. In addition, the Drogin Report submitted in that action is not part of the record in this case. As

defendants point out, no experts have been noticed or disclosed in this case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

both request for judicial notice.

3

defendant had not produced allresponsive documents because it had merely made personnel files available for

inspection pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, and seeking the Court’s intervention. The Court denied this request.

See Docket # 169.

On July 28, 2005, plaintiffs’ counselfiled a letter briefwiththe Court asking for a telephone conference

regarding defendant’s “failureto allow inspection ofdocuments.” Defendant filed a responsive letter describing

a different series of events, and it is unclear from these letter briefs what remedy each party seeks. Plaintiff

stated that the documents were not prepared for inspection and that defense counsel’s representative

“obstruct[ed] our attempts to obtain documents during that on-site inspection.” Parker Decl. Re Azzam ¶ 5.

The three summary judgment motions now before the Court were filed by defendant on July 15, 2005

and noticed for August 19, 2005. Plaintiffs apparently did not attempt to inspect the relevant documents at

FedEx until July 27, 2005. In support of its request for Rule 56(f) relief, plaintiffs each submit the same

arguments – largely verbatim – that they raised in their prior Rule 56(f) filings. While the Court remains

concerned about FedEx’s generalattentivenessto its discovery obligations, it is not persuaded that defendant’s

prior failures to produce responsive documents have hampered these three plaintiffs’ ability to oppose these

summary judgment motions. Therefore, the Court will consider plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) motions individually, in the

context of the factual issues presented by each motion.3

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment or adjudication is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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4

In a motion forsummary judgment, "[if] the moving party forsummary judgment meets its initialburden

of identifying for the court those portions ofthe materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any

genuine issues ofmaterialfact, the burden ofproduction then shifts so that the non-moving party mustsetforth,

by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

See T. W. Elec. Service, Inc., v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 317 (1986)). In judging evidence at the summary

judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, and draws

all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See T.W. Electric, 809 F.2d at 630-31

(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)); Ting

v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991). The evidence presented by the parties must be

admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is

insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. GTE

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Rule 56(f)

Pursuant to FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 56(f), upon a showing by the party opposing a motion for

summary judgment that it “cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's

opposition,” the court may deny or continue the motion for summary judgment in order to permit that party an

opportunity to obtain necessary discovery. A Rule 56(f) motion should be granted where the party opposing

summary judgment makes a timely application thatspecifically identifiesrelevant informationto be discovered,

and there is some basis for believing that such information actually exists, and would prevent summary

judgment. Nidds v. Schindler, 113 F.3d 912, 921 (9th Cir. 1996); Visa Int'lServ. Ass'n v.Bankcard Holders,

784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986). 

DISCUSSION

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4 For example, plaintiff Wilkerson’s Opposition cites to the “Decl. of Tanda Brown” at the end of

severalparagraphs in the factual summary, but does not specify where in that declaration the supporting facts

may be found.

5

In response to defendant’s motions, plaintiffs have submitted Opposition briefs, the Declaration of

Tanda Brown in Support of Christopher Wilkerson and Lore Paogofie’s Oppositions, the Declaration of Kay

McKenzie Parker in Support of John Azzam’s Opposition, the Declaration of Rachael Orejana in support of

all three plaintiffs’ Oppositions, and two Supplemental Declarations of KayMcKenzie Parker (Supplemental

Declarations #1 and #2). Supplemental Declaration #1 contains “Supplemental Facts” specific to each plaintiff.

SupplementalDeclaration #2 contains further “SupplementalFacts”that“apply to all three groups ofthe named

plaintiffs, unless otherwise expressly noted as applying to particular plaintiff(s).” Supp. Parker Decl. #2 at 3:7-

9. Each Opposition brief devotes several pages to the plaintiff’s “Employment History and Specific Facts,”

but with a few exceptions,4these factual narratives are devoid of citations to the record. See Pl. Azzam’s

Opp’n at 6:1-10:18; Pl. Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 6:4-8:18; Pl. Paogofie’s Opp’n at 5:19-8:12. 

At oral argument on these motions, plaintiffs’ counsel described their submissions to the Court as

“piecemeal” because of the protracted nature of discovery in this case. Between these piecemeal filings and

plaintiffs’ failure to cite to the record in its Opposition briefs, it is extremely difficult for the Court to identify

which of the statements and arguments by plaintiffs’ counselhave evidentiary support. On summary judgment,

the Court views all facts in the lightmost favorable to the non-moving party – here, of course, to plaintiffs. But

the Court must restrict its inquiry to facts supported by the record, and plaintiffs may notrely on the allegations

made in pleadings or on their beliefs – however reasonable – about the “Ole Boys Network” and the pervasive

pattern of race and nationalorigin discriminationat FedEx. For example, the Court cannot consider plaintiffs

Azzam and Wilkerson’s citations to the complaint filed in this case, the original complaint filed in Alameda

County Superior Court, or the complaint filed in Satchell v. FedEx, C 03-2659 SI, a class action pending

before this Court, as evidence of termination and differential treatment. See Pl. Azzam’s Opp’n at 6:5-7; Pl.

Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 6:22-24. Unsworn allegations in the pleadings are not facts that can be used to defeat

summary judgment. Moreover, it is not the Court’s task “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of

triable fact,” see Kennan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1996), and it “need not examine the entire

file for evidence establishing a genuine issue offact, where the evidence is notsetforth in the opposition papers

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5

 These facts are taken from plaintiff’s deposition testimony and the parties’ papers. As mentioned

above, plaintiff’s opposition brief contains a narrative description of his employment at FedEx and his

discriminationallegations, without citations to the record. The Court does not rely on this narrative statement,

but instead restricts its inquiry to facts for which the parties have provided evidentiary support, including the

“Supplemental Facts Specific to Plaintiff Azzam” contained in the Supplemental Declaration #1 of Kay

McKenzie Parker (“Supp. Parker Decl. #1"). 

6

with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found.” Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237

F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Applying these standards, the Court considers each summary judgment motion in turn.

I. Summary Judgment as to John Azzam

FedEx seeks summary judgment against plaintiffJohn Azzamon his claims for discriminationbased on

wrongful termination, failure-to-promote, compensation, discrimination and harassment, and retaliation.

Plaintiff Azzam was born in Beirut, Lebanon. Azzam Depo. at 17. He began working at FedEx as a

data entry clerk, a position he obtained through a temp agency.5Id. at 11-12. He was hired as a permanent

part-time courier at the Sunnyvale facility (“COAA”) in September 1999. Id. at 24. He submitted a resignation

for his Monday through Friday part-time route and began working only on Saturdays in June 2001 because

ofschoolobligations and an internship withthe CityofSan Jose, but eventually began working another Monday

through Friday part-time route. Id. at 45-48. He was offered a permanent part-time route in July 2001, which

he turned down. Id. at 49. 

In January 2002, plaintiff’s employment with FedEx was terminated because he received three

performance reminders within a 12-month period. Id. at 102. Plaintiff was aware that receiving three

reminders or some combination of three reminders and written discipline in a 12-month period could result in

termination. Id. at 59. On December 10, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). 

A. Wrongful termination claim

FedEx seeks summary judgment on plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim on two grounds: (1) that the

claim is barred by plaintiff’s failure to allege termination as discrimination in the DFEH complaint he filed ten

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months after his termination, and (2) because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding discrimination

in the termination itself.

The Courtfindsthat plaintiff’s claim is not barred by his failure to specifically allege wrongfultermination

in his December 10, 2002 DFEH complaint. Subject matter jurisdiction “extends over all allegations of

discrimination that either fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation

which can reasonably be expected to grow out ofthe charge of discrimination.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified

Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); see also Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d

1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990) (the court “must inquire whether the original EEOC investigation would have

encompassed the additionalcharges made in the court complaint but notincluded in the EEOC charge itself”).

Plaintiff’s DFEH complaint alleges harassment, denialofpromotion, and retaliationby Robert Motter and Gary

Meek “[o]n or about February 7, 2002,” approximately one week after his terminationon January 31, 2002.

Decl. of Christopher Yost, Ex. C. The dates of the discriminatory acts, perpetrators, and location of the

discrimination are all the same as those in plaintiff’s termination claim, see B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276

F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002), and therefore an agency investigation would certainly have encompassed

the circumstances of his departure from FedEx.

For a wrongful termination claim, a plaintiff must meet the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell

Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), whereby he must first establish a prima facie case that (1) he was a

member of a protected class, (2) he performed his job in a satisfactory manner, (3) he was discharged, and

(4) that similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. If plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. If the employer is able to

articulate such a reason, then the plaintiff must show that the reason given is pretextual, “either directly by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing

that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 

FedEx argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because he was not performing his job

in a satisfactory manner based on his admissions during deposition. In addition, defendant contends that it has

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articulated a non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination: his four performance reminders, three of

which he received in a 12-month period, and three On-Line Compliments and Counselings (“OLCCs”). In

his opposition, plaintiff submits evidence of the disciplinary history of a purported comparator, a Caucasian

employee named Steve Kelso, who was disciplined for poor attendance and punctuality but apparently not

terminated from FedEx. Decl. of Rachael Orejana, Ex. B. 

Plaintiff received a counseling letter on April 20, 2000, for unsafe driving, because he had received a

speeding ticket. AzzamDepo. at 55-57. Plaintiff received a performance reminder on October 25, 2001 for

backing into a parked car. Id. at 58-60. On January 3, 2002, he received a second performance reminder

in the form of a day off without pay (called a “decision day”) because 28 East Coast packages were found

mixed in with West Coast packages, and he had received three OLCCs forsimilar occurrences. Id. at 77-78.

The prior occurrences were: a March 27, 2001 OLCC based on his leaving four internationalpackages in the

courier checkout room; a November 19, 2001 OLCC forleaving four East Coast packages mixed with West

Coast packages, which plaintiff felt was unfair; and a December 11, 2001 OLCC, the details ofwhich he does

notremember. On January 29, 2002, plaintiff received a letter of suspension with pay “pending an investigation

ofpotentialviolations regarding his performance improvement.” Azzam Depo. Ex. 17. On January 31, 2002,

he received his third performance reminder for overlooking additional packages on January 25, 2002 and

January 28, 2002. Id. at 102. He was terminated for receiving three performance reminders in a 12-month

period, and he admits that he has no reason to believe there were additional reasons for his termination. Id.

at 103-04.

To establish a prima facie case despite his disciplinary history, plaintiffdraws a comparisonto employee

Steve Kelso. According to plaintiff:

Kelso received repeated counseling, performance reminders and warnings. His problems

included attendance and punctuality a[s] well as allegations of falsifying delivery records. In

fact, Kelso received a total of three performance reminders and/or warnings within [a] 12

month period. However, Kelso’s manager opted not to terminate him.

Decl. of Rachael Orejana ¶ 4.

Defendant argues that plaintiff and Kelso were not disciplined by the same supervisor norforthe same conduct:

Kelso was primarily disciplined for poor attendance and punctuality, while plaintiff was disciplined for

misdirecting packages. In addition, FedEx contends that, because many of the documented disciplines in

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In itssummary judgment motion, FedEx relied on Azzam’s deposition testimony that he did not know

ofany other FedEx employees who received three writtenwarnings, performance reminders, or a combination,

and were not terminated. Azzam Depo. at 151-52, cited in Def.’s Azzam Mot. at 6:18-21. Plaintiff has now

provided evidence of at least one other employee who was not terminated despite receiving this amount of

discipline. But even assuming that Kelso is an appropriate comparator and that plaintiff has established a prima

facie case, plaintiff’s admission at deposition that the performance-related reasons for his termination are true

and his failure to present evidence suggesting that any of these reminders or counselings were motivated by

discrimination defeats his claim.

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Kelso’s file predate plaintiff’s employment with the company, there is no true basis for comparison.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Azzam, the Court finds that he has not established

a prima facie case ofdiscriminationbecause he cannot establish that he was performing his job in a satisfactory

manner, as required by McDonell Douglas. In addition, the Court finds that plaintiff has not shown that

FedEx’s non-discriminatorybasisforterminatinghimis pretextual. Plaintiff admits that the performance-related

reasons for his termination are true, and he has presented no evidence that any of these reminders or

counselings were motivated by discrimination.6 The Court therefore GRANTS summary judgment on the

wrongful termination claim.

B. Promotion claim

FedEx seeks summary judgment on plaintiff’s promotion claim because Azzam never applied for any

position other than the one he held with FedEx. See AzzamDepo. at 44 (“I don’t recall ever filling out any type

of application for any different position other than what I was.”). Plaintiff’s promotion allegation is based on

the fact that, in 2001, he mentioned to his supervisor, Corey Waiters, that he wanted to work additionalhours

but was told that there were no full-time routes available. Id. at 29-30. Plaintiff stated that he later saw a

Caucasian employee, Michael Potter, coming in as a full-time courier. He admits, however, that he did not

know Potter’s qualifications, that Potter did notreport to Waiters, that Potter worked the “a.m. shift,” and that

plaintiff did not tell Waiters he wanted to work this shift and could not have worked in the mornings because

of his class and internship commitments. Id. at 33-35. 

To establish a promotion claim, plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2)

he was qualified for the position sought; (3) he was denied the promotion; and (4) individuals outside of the

protected class were promoted. Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988). Viewing

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the evidence most favorably to plaintiff, there is simply no basis to find that plaintiff ever applied for any other

position or that he was denied a promotion. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.

C. Compensation claim

The apparent factual basis for plaintiff’s compensation claim is his allegation that he had to confront

Corey Waiters on several occasions about “shorting” him on his pay, but each time he ultimately received all

of his compensation. Azzam Depo. at 173. Despite the complaint’s allegations of discrimination in

compensation, plaintiff testified that he does not believe his race or national origin played a role in his

compensation, and he does not believe he was paid differently than other part-time couriers. Id. at 22, 172.

D. Discrimination and harassment claims

FedEx seeks summary judgment on plaintiff’s harassment claim on grounds that, based on his

deposition testimony, plaintiff cannot show a genuine question of material fact regarding (1) whether a

reasonable person ofplaintiff’srace or nationalorigin would find the workplace so objectively and subjectively

racially hostile as to create an abusive working environment; and (2) whether the defendant failed to take

adequate remedial and disciplinary action. McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.

2004). 

Plaintiff alleges discriminationand harassment bymanagersRobertMotter and Gary Meek. According

to plaintiff, conditions for minorities at the Sunnyvale station worsened in 2000 when these two men became

managers there. Azzam Depo. at 42. He felt targeted by these managers, and testified that “[t]he badgering,

the insults, the yelling, the screaming, the pointing, you know, is really whatmade me realize that they had it in

for me.” Id. Specifically, Meek made comments to plaintiffsuch as “my grandmother works faster than you,”

“move faster, quit your yapping, quit talking,” and “stack neater.” He believed that Meek watched him and

plaintiff Christopher Wilkerson more closely than other employees, and he overheard Meek tell plaintiff

Christopher Wilkerson, who is African-American: “you remind me of Stevie Wonder. Blind, blind as hell,”

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7 A twilight delivery is a nighttime delivery of a package that FedEx had unsuccessfully tried to deliver

during the day.

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which he considered a racial comment. Id. at 110, 121. 

With respect to Motter, plaintiff also allegesdiscriminationbased on an incident where Motter required

him to do a “twilight delivery”7 in the Los Altos Hills area. Plaintiff told Corey Waiters that he felt this was a

dangerous assignment because it was raining, and the area was hilly with narrow roads and loose dogs. Id. at

128-29. According to plaintiff, Motter overheard this statement and spoke to Corey Waiters, and Waiters then

told plaintiffthat he had to make the delivery or he would lose his job. Plaintiff handled the route with another

person riding with him. After this incident, plaintiff did not do this route again. During the second incident,

Azzamwas working with anAfrican-Americanemployee and threeCaucasianemployees,whenMotter looked

at him and said “move faster, don’t talk.” Id. at 135-136. Plaintiff and two other minority employees worked

holidays after Motter became a manager at the station, and plaintiff alleges that when he first began working

at FedEx, holiday assignments were rotated. Id. at 177-78. Plaintiff did not express concern to anyone in

management about holidaywork schedules; he did not know ifthere was a bid process to receive holidays off;

and he did not know if employees requested the holiday assignment or were required to work then. Id. at 179-

81. 

In the Ninth Circuit, courts employ a totality ofthe circumstances test in determining whether a plaintiff

has established a hostile work environment, considering factors such as: “[the] frequency of discriminatory

conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Nichols v. AztecaRest. Enters., 256

F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001). To constitute harassment, the workplace must be both objectively and

subjectively abusive. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000).

FedEx argues, and the Court agrees, that Azzam’s deposition testimony requires a grant of summary

judgment on his harassment claim. No one at FedEx made a racial slur or offensive remark to plaintiff about

his Lebanese or Middle Eastern origin. The only derogatory comment plaintiff recalls was directed at another

employee. With respect to plaintiff’s allegation that Motter required him to make a twilight delivery against his

will, plaintiff admits that he does not know whether his race or nationalorigin played any role in this assignment,

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and testified that Motter just “didn’t care about his employees” and did not seem “concerned for [his] safety

at all.” Id. at 130-31, 136-37. In addition, plaintiff’s testimony about Motter’s comment “move faster, don’t

talk” does not establish that Motter was singling him out personally, much less on discriminatory grounds.

Plaintiff offers no evidence of racial animus towards him by Meek or Motter, and testifies only about his

subjective belief that they were treating him differently based on his national origin. In addition, plaintiff has

made no showing that FedEx failed to take remedial action, and he admits that he never used the company’s

EEO process to complain about the alleged harassment. 

Plaintiff’s entire opposition to this claim is contained in a single paragraph, which states:

All of the above factual allegations by plaintiff (and other minorities who have filed

administrative and judicialclaims against these same defendants during the same time period)

demonstrate that plaintiff was subjected to working in a hostile environment that altered the

terms and conditions of his employment with FedEx. Non-minority employees were not

subjected to such hostility. It is clear that defendants dispute this material fact.

Pl. Azzam’s Opp’n at 15:6-11. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that there are no triable issues of

material fact for a jury to decide. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.

E. Retaliation

FedEx is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim. To establish a prima facie case

ofretaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer subjected him to

an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Manatt v. Bank ofAmerica, 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003). To show a causal link,

a plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence, but he or she must demonstrate the employer’s knowledge of the

protected activity and proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse action. Morgan v.

Regents of the Univ. of California , 88 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2000). 

Here, plaintiff’s protected activity occurred after the adverse employment action. Azzam was

terminated on January 29, 2002, and he filed his DFEH complaint on December 10, 2002. There is no factual

basis for a retaliation claim.

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F. Rule 56(f) motion

In his opposition, plaintiff requests a continuance based on defendant’s failure to provide documents

requested by plaintiff. Plaintiff states that these documents “will substantiate many of [his] factual allegations.”

In requesting Rule 56(f) relief, plaintiff repeats the arguments from other plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) motions, stating

that defendants have still not fully produced documents from Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production,

including all external EEO complaints filed with the EEOC and DFEH and a privilege log, and from Plaintiff’s

Second Set of Requests for Production. According to plaintiff, “[u]ntil these outstanding critical discovery

matters are resolved, Plaintiffs have had no full opportunity to obtain facts necessary to oppose Defendant’s

instant motion for summary judgment.” Pl. Azzam’s Opp’n at 17:15-17.

"Ordinarily, summary judgment should not be granted when there are relevant facts remaining to be

discovered, but the party seeking a continuance bears the burden to show what specific facts it hopes to

discover thatwillraise an issue ofmaterialfact." ContinentalMaritime v. Pacific Coast MetalTrades, 817 F.2d

1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the burden of showing (1) that they have set forth specific

facts that they hope to elicit from further discovery; (2) that these facts exist; and (3) that the facts are

“essential” to resistsummary judgment. State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1997).

Although Rule 56(f) motions should be granted fairly freely, the Court cannotsee how further discovery would

provide additionalfacts precluding summary judgment against this particular plaintiff. Azzam’s own testimony

demonstrates that he cannot raise a triable issue of fact as to discrimination in his various claims. 

In her declaration in support of the opposition, plaintiff’s counsel has informed the Court that, upon

reviewing plaintiff’s personnel file, she found his parents’ personal income tax returns, and that plaintiff has

informed her “that at no time whatsoever would he have given FedEx his parents’ income tax returns.” Decl.

of Jay McKenzie Parker in Support ofAzzamOpp’n ¶ 6 (emphasis in original). Counsel states that no other

employee personnelfile reviewed contained similarrecords, and concludes: “Plaintiff John Azzam . . . believes

and, I agree with him, that the Defendant surreptitiously and unlawfully obtained his parents’ personnel files for

the unlawful purpose of attempting to find out the names of all charitable organizations to which they had given

donations. This was because his parents are from a Muslim nation and, based on the national origin of his

parents and himself(Lebanese), he was unlawfully and unfairly disciplined, harassed, and eventually terminated

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 The Court has not received any under seal submission from plaintiff, and hereby ORDERS counsel

to provide Azzam’s tax records for its inspection.

9

 26 U.S.C. § 7213 makes it unlawful for federal employees to willfully disclose any tax return to any

person without authorization, and for other persons to whom unauthorized disclosure has been made to copy

or publish such returns. That section also makes it unlawful for anyone to solicit or receive unauthorized tax

returns. Violations of this statute are punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years. 

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fromFedEx employment.” Id. at ¶ 8. Counselstates thatshe issubmittingthese documents under sealand asks

the Court to allow plaintifftime to investigate how these files were obtained by deposing “operations managers,

senior managers, the districtmanaging directors, human resources personnel and other witnesses (whether or

not their depositions have previously been taken)” on this issue. Id. at ¶ 9.8 

The Court agrees that FedEx’s possession of these tax returns is troubling. At oral argument on this

motion, the Court asked counsel for FedEx how his client obtained these records. Counsel responded that he

did not know and had not asked because the records are notrelevant to the pending motions. This response

is unsatisfactory, since the presence of such documents could reflect criminal conduct.9 However, the Court

agrees that the presence ofthe records in Azzam’sfile does not itself create factual issues appropriate for jury

determination in this employment case.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) motion is DENIED.

II. Summary Judgment as to Christopher Wilkerson

Plaintiff Wilkerson began working at FedEx on November 29, 1999 as a casual handler at the

Sunnyvale location. Wilkerson Depo. at 31. Two months later, he was promoted to part-time handler, and

on October 27, 2003, he became a part-time courier at the Sunnyvale station. Id. at 32-33, Ex. 8. On

November 12, 2002, he received the “Bravo Zulu Outstanding Performance” award from manager Roy

Johnson, although he believed that manager Aaron Holstein was really responsible for giving him the award,

notJohnson. Id. at 183-84. In 2003, at the suggestion of Aaron Holstein, plaintiff began taking LEAP classes,

which are a prerequisite to applying formanagement positions. Id. at 51-52. Plaintiff eventually dropped out

of the class because he had to pick up his daughter in the mornings. Id. at 53. Plaintiff still works at FedEx

as a part-time courier. He turned down a full-time courier position in 2004 or the beginning of 2005. Id. at

108-109. 

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10 An “On-Line Compliment/Counseling” may be either a compliment or a counseling notation made

on a computer by management.

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During his employment at FedEx, plaintiff has never received a written warning or performance

reminder. He has received thirteen OLCCs, three of which were negative, and the remainder of which were

complimentary.10 The first negative OLCC is from June 28, 2000 about reporting to work on time; the second

is from November 27, 2001 regarding a problem with a bucket of 21 East Coast documents that needed to

be checked; and the third, received on November 3, 2003, notified him that he had taken seven sick days and

could be subjected to disciplinary action for further sick days. Id. at Ex. 13. 

A. Compensation

Plaintiff’s compensation claim is apparently based on the allegation that his time cards were altered on

two occasions. See Pl. Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 6:13-15. Plaintiff does not allege, nor does he offer proof, that

FedEx paid African-American employees less than white employees for substantially equal work. FedEx

argues that Wilkerson’s deposition testimony demonstrates that he cannot establish a compensation claim.

Wilkerson testified that he knew of several employees who believed their time cards had been altered: an

African-American employee named Andre Megason, a Latino employee, and a Caucasian employee named

Lance White. Wilkerson Depo. at 200. Plaintiff reported the suspected altering to senior manager Robert

Motter, who told him to talk to his supervisor. He did not do so, but he left messages with human resources

and did not receive a call back. Id. at 201-202. 

To establish a claim for discrimination in compensation, a plaintiff must show that the employer paid

members of protected groups less than non-minorities for performing substantially equal work measured in

terms of skill, effort, and responsibility. See Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 456 F. Supp. 65, 68-69

(N.D. Cal. 1978). Here, plaintiff has offered no evidence that he, or other African-American couriers, were

paid less thanwhite employees for performing the same tasks. In fact, based on plaintiff’s own testimony, the

“shorting” of time cards appears to have occurred to other employees regardless of race.

Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim. 

B. Promotion

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1. Statute of limitations and failure to exhaust administrative remedies

FedEx argues thatsome ofplaintiff’s promotion claims are barred by the statutes of limitations and by

his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff alleges discrimination with respect to three positions: (1)

a part-time team leader position for which he applied in October 2001; (2) a courier position for which he

applied through the JCATS system; and (3) a full-time courier position for which he applied in 2004 or the

beginning of 2005. 

Plaintiff filed complaints with the DFEH on June 21, 2002 and July 19, 2002, and he filed an EEOC

charge on May 5, 2003. A First Amended Complaint in this action was filed on January 9, 2004, although

plaintiff states that “[a] lawsuit was filed on November 8, 2002, in Alameda County Superior Court.” Pl.

Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 9:24-25. It is not clear whether plaintiff believes that the 2002 lawsuit is the same case

as this federal action. 

Before filing a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the

unlawfulemployment practice, and must exhaust administrative remedies before coming to court. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(e)(1); Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim under FEHA must be filed

within one year of the unlawful practice. Cal. Gov. Code § 12760. The statute of limitations under § 1981

is four years pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1658, except that causes of action that were maintainable prior to the

1991 Civil Rights Act are governed by state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. R.R.

Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382-84 (2004).

Plaintiff appears to believe that none of his promotion claims are time-barred because they are all

continuing violations. See Pl. Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 10-11. Plaintiff is incorrect. Discrete discriminatory acts

such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire constitute separate actionable

unlawfulemployment practices, and the limitations period on each begins to run when the practice occurs. See

Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113

(2002). 

FedEx correctly contends that the October 26, 2001 decision not to promote plaintiff to the team

leader position occurred more than 300 days before plaintiff’s May 5, 2003 EEOC charge, and thus any Title

VII claim cannot be based on this alleged failure-to-promote. Plaintiff’s FEHA claim is exhausted, however,

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11 California’s statute of limitations has since been changed to two years, but the new statute is not

retroactive except for claims arising out of the September 11, 2001 attacks. See Krupnick v. Duke Energy

Morro Bay, LLC, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1026 (2004), Cal. Code Civ. P. § 340(3). 

17

because his DFEH complaints were timely filed within one year of this decision. Plaintiff’s allegation that he

was not promoted to a full-time courier position in 2004 or 2005 is barred for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, because he has not filed any administrative complaint regarding this decision. With respect to

plaintiff’s § 1981 claim, FedEx argues that it is subject to a one-year statute of limitations because failure-topromote claims were maintainable prior to 1990 and because California’s personalinjury statute was one year

at the time the alleged practice occurred.11 To determine which statute of limitations governs plaintiff’s § 1981

claim, however, the Court must consider whether each alleged failure-to-promote would have givenrise to an

actionable claim prior to the 1991 CivilRights Act. Because the Court finds that there are insufficient facts to

defeat summary judgment, it does not undertake this inquiry.

2. Prima facie case regarding discrimination in promotion

Plaintiff’s promotion claim is governed by the burden-shifting analysis ofMcDonnell Douglas v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). To prevail on his promotion claim, plaintiff must show (1) that he is a member of a

protected class, (2) qualified for the position sought, (3) denied the promotion, and (4) that individuals outside

of his protected class were promoted. If he can establish this prima facie case, then the burden shifts to

defendantto offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason forthe action. If the employer meets this burden, then

the plaintiff must show that the reason given is pretextual.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court findsthat he has not established

that a genuine issue of fact exists based on any of the promotion decisions. For the decision not to hire him as

a part-time teamleader in October 2001, plaintiff offers no evidence that an individual outside of his protected

class was promoted instead. In addition, plaintiff was informed by the hiring manager, Kimo Jackson, that

another candidate “who was already in [the] job class” (and who therefore had priority) had been selected for

the position. Wilkerson Depo., Ex. 6. Even if plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, there is no evidence

of pretext to undermine this non-discriminatory basis for the decision. 

Plaintiff also alleges that he was interested in a courier position after he passed the Basic Skills Test

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(“BST”). He told his manager, Roy Johnson, that he was interested in the position, and Johnson said that he

would submit the BST to the “JCATS” job posting system. Id. at 70-72. According to plaintiff, Johnson

delayed submitting his application, and then there was a hiring freeze. In addition, plaintiff claims that he had

to wait two years to qualify for this position, while non-minorities were hired off the streetfor courier positions.

When he talked to his managers about his desire to apply for this position, Robert Motter, Craig Diggle, and

Gary Meek told him that they would look into it and get back to him, and they sent him “in circles” telling him

to talk to his various managers. Id. at 26, 28, 29. Ultimately, plaintiff received assistance from another

African-American employee, Andrew Thompson, who showed him how to access the JCATS system and

apply for the position. Id. at 43-45. Plaintiff applied for a full-time courier position in 2004 or 2005, which

he was offered and turned down. 

Plaintiff attempts to create a factualissue by offering evidence that a white employee, Gretchen Spear,

was promoted to a courier position in 1997, within one year of working at FedEx. Decl. of Rachael Orejana

¶ 3. FedEx argues, and the Court agrees, that Spear is not an appropriate comparator for plaintiff because she

was not promoted over plaintiff for the position he sought, the hiring manager was not the same, and the gap

in time between her hiring as a courier and plaintiff’s own employment at FedEx undermines the comparison.

Because plaintiff has failed to establish a factual issue regarding his promotion claim, the Court

GRANTS summary judgment.

C. Harassment

FedEx argues that, under the totality of the circumstances test, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie

case of harassment. Plaintiff’s harassment claim is based on allegations of public humiliation by his managers,

including finger pointing and yelling, and on manager Roy Johnson’s decision to make Wilkerson work on the

heaviest “cans” in “Topside,” the most strenuous assignment, while white employees were given smaller cans

and assistance in completing their tasks. Id. at 72. He alleges that Robert Motter yelled at him and other

minority employees, singling them out by name orstanding close to them while they were working, but would

not yell at Caucasian employees. Id. at 90-91. The words he used were: “Come one, come on”; “I’m going

to switch you guys if you don’t go faster”; and “let’s go, let’s go.” 

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Despite the unpleasant nature of these working conditions, the Court cannot find a genuine question

of material fact regarding whether a reasonable person of plaintiff’s race or national origin would find the

workplace so objectively and subjectively racially hostile as to create an abusive working environment.

McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., supra, 360 F.3d at 1112. The Court considers the “frequency of

discriminatory conduct, its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Nichols v. Azteca

Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff states that he never heard any manager use a racial

slur or engage in offensive racial conduct in his presence. Id. at 88-89. In addition, the opinion of plaintiff

Tanda Brown, who was never employed at the Sunnyvale station, that “assigning an employee to consistently

work the topside . . . would alter the terms and conditions ofthat employee’s employment,” see Decl. ofTanda

Brown ¶ 11, does not create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment.

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to this claim.

D. Discipline

Plaintiff has not received any warning letters or performance reminders during his employment with

FedEx. He has received only three negative OLCCs, and he has testified that he does not believe that race

played a role in any of these counselings. Based on these facts and admissions, summary judgment is

GRANTED as to his discipline claim.

E. Retaliation

FedEx contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim because plaintiff

was notsubjected to anyadverse employment action. Defendant argues that the three negative OLCCs plaintiff

received do not constitute an adverse employment action, and nor does his allegationthathe was made to work

Topside longer than other couriers. In addition, FedEx argues that plaintiff cannot establish a causal link

between these OLCCs and his protected activity because the OLCCs were issued to him priorto his filing any

DFEH complaint or EEOC charge, except for the 2003 OLCC charge, which plaintiff admits was justified.

The Court finds that, even assuming that the OLCCs could constitute an adverse employment action, plaintiff

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received two ofthemon June 28, 2000 and November 27, 2001, before he filed his administrative complaints

on June 21, 2002, July 19, 2002, and May 5, 2003. The third OLCC, which plaintiff was issued on November

3, 2003, notified him that he had taken seven sick days and could be subjected to disciplinary action fortaking

further sick time. Plaintiff testified that this OLCC was justified, because the manager who issued it, Craig

Diggle, “gave [him] factual evidence of[his] missing those sick days,” and was a “good guy” who always gave

him a “fair shake.” Wilkerson Depo. at 167, 148. Under these circumstances, there is no causal link between

plaintiff’s protected activity and any of the few disciplinary actions against him.

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to this claim.

F. Rule 56(f) request 

Like John Azzam, plaintiff moves for a Rule 56(f) continuance based on defendant’s continued failure

to produce all documents responsive to plaintiffs’ First and Second Sets ofRequests for Production. Plaintiff

here has not met his burden of establishing what documents he has not received that are “essential” to his

opposition. The Court’s grant of summary judgment on all of his individual claims is based on the testimony

givenby plaintiff at his deposition, and it is not clear whatfurther proof, contained in FedEx’s files, would create

genuine issues ofmaterialfact. In any event, it is plaintiff’s burden to make this showing, which he has not done.

Moreover, FedEx’s summary judgment motion as to this plaintiff was filed and briefed after the series of

discovery disputes regarding the requested documents had been resolved. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

plaintiff’s request for Rule 56(f) relief.

III. Summary Judgment as to Lore Paogofie

FedEx seeks summary judgment ofplaintiff Lore Paogofie’s compensation, promotion, retaliation, and

harassment allegations. Plaintiff brings a Rule 56(f) motion with respect to this motion on the same grounds as

described above.

Lore Paogofie, a Samoan female, began working at FedEx as a part-time handler in April 2000.

Paogofie Depo. at 22. She was promoted to permanent part-time handler on or about June 1, 2000. Id. at

24-25. While working at FedEx, she also attended San Jose State University full-time. Id. at 16. Gary Meek

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12 For example, plaintiff cites no evidence in the record to support her allegations of discrimination

based on vacation decisions. In any event, plaintiff was never denied a vacation request. Paogofie Depo. at

194-96. Plaintiff planned to take four days off for her graduation, and Meek mistakenly told her that she could

be compensated for these days because she had four additional days of vacation time. Although Meek

discovered his error and could not compensate her forthe days, plaintiff was still permitted to take the time off

without pay. Id. at 199-200.

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was plaintiff’s operations manager at the Sunnyvale facility from 2000 to 2003, and Robert Motter was the

senior manager. Id. at 74.

Plaintiff has not received any discipline or written warnings while at FedEx, with the sole exception of

one OLCC for jumping over a moving belt. Id. at 222-24. She has received performance evaluation scores

ranging from 5.1 to 6.7 out of 7.0 during her time at FedEx. Id. at 290-292. Plaintiff filed DFEH complaints

against Gary Meek, Robert Motter, and FedEx on June 13, 2002. She submitted an EEOC charge on May

30, 2003.

In her Opposition, plaintiffstates thatshe made repeated requests for a permanent or full-time position

but was passed over for non-minority individuals who applied after her, before she was given a full-time

position. Pl. Paogofie’s Opp’n at 5:22-6:1. She alleges that, since the arrival of managers Meek and Motter

at the Sunnyvale station, she has been assigned to work “Topside,” the most strenuous assignment, and that

non-minority females with lessseniority and experience were given less strenuous assignments. Plaintiff alleges

that she has been required to conduct an audit after the first sort on her shift – something non-minority

employees are not required to do – as well as forcing her to cancel her vacation and refusing to exercise

discretion on her behalf with respect to vacation time,something defendant allegedly has done for non-minority

employees. Plaintiff also alleges that she has been harassed by repeated reprimands for trivial matters, public

criticism, and “by failing to publicly recognize her for her achievements.” Id. at 8:7-8. Plaintiff provides no

citations to the record for these allegations. As discussed above, the Court cannot consider any facts

unsupported by the record, and will not scour the record in search of support for plaintiff’s statements.12

A. Harassment and discrimination

In her Opposition, Paogofie specifically addresses only the harassment claim. She repeats the

paragraph from plaintiff Azzam’s motion, and adds the following (Paogofie’s Opp’n at 13:9-14):

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Plaintiff Lore Paogofie was treated differently than non-minority females. In addition, she

witnessed the very pregnant African American female employee, Camille Leekins, being

treated differently because of her race. They were made to work the heaviest jobs in the

station[] “Topside” while non-minority CaucasianGretchen Spear was rapidly promoted and

given easy assignments. 

In addition to her consistent assignment to Topside for two to three years, Paogofie’s harassment and

discriminationclaims are based on offensive comments made to her by Gary Meek, along with his tone ofvoice

and facial expressions. 

The SupplementalParker Declaration #1 states that “[o]nly minority females and notthe non-minority

females were assigned to the ‘Topside’ heavy duty line consistently.” Supp. Parker Decl. #1 at 5:13-14.

Counselprovides no citation to evidence forthis statement; she merely states that the affected minority females

included plaintiff, an African-American female Lisa McCoy, and an African-American female Camille Leekins,

and cites the page ofPaogofie’s depositionwhere plaintifftestifiedthatshe “[did]n’tknow any casuals that have

been, besides Camille Leekins, Lisa McCoy, myself, working on the line.” Paogofie Depo. at 32. Counsel

also states that Caucasian females Noelia Anaya and Kolainia Hettig were never made to work Topside on

a regular basis and were given assistance when they were, and that Caucasian female Sheshe Maltini has

always been a customer service agent (“CSA”). Supp. Parker Decl #1 at 6:16-20. Plaintiff’s actual testimony

was that she and Lisa McCoy were immediately put on this assignment, while Anaya and Hettig were “there

for ten, 15 minutes and then switched off to the doc sort, which is a light duty area,” Paogofie Depo. at 131.

Camille Leekins, an African American female employee, was made to work Topside when she was pregnant.

Id. at 140. With respectto gender discrimination, plaintiff allegesthatCaucasianmale HermanHanna was hired

as a handler after plaintiff received a courier position; that Bill Bailey was given the lead handler position by

Gary Meek after only two to three months on Topside; and that Daniel Durkin worked only two to three

months on Topside. Id. at 55, 62-63, 150. 

Plaintiff submits the Declaration of Tanda Brown, an operations manager at other FedEx facilities,

which describes the Topside assignment and states that, “because Topside is so physically demanding and has

so many safety issues, most handlers would only be assigned to work in that function for no more than 2

consecutive years”; that “[i]n all my experience at FedEx, I knew of no non-minority female worker who was

assigned to Topside for more than two years consistently – as happened with Lore Paogofie.” Brown Decl.

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13 Defendant argues that the opinions expressed in the Declaration of Tanda Brown are inadmissible

on grounds ofhearsay and speculation, because Brown never worked at the Sunnyvale station and thus could

not have personal knowledge of the working conditions there.

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¶¶ 9, 10. She opines that “it is race discriminationto assign a minority female worker to Topside formore than

2 years consistently, unlessshe specifically expressed her desire forthis position for that duration of time,” and

that “assigning an employee to consistently work the topside, rather than allowing the employee to be rotated

in and out on a basis consistent with other handlers would alter the terms and conditions of that employee’s

employment.” Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12 (emphasis in original).13 

According to plaintiff, Gary Meek made offensive remarks to her and commented that she could not

speak English. Supp. Parker Decl. #1 at 7. At her deposition, plaintiff testified that Meek mocked her by

saying “What?” or “What are you talking about” when she spoke. Paogofie Depo. at 67-68. Plaintiff also

testified that Meek raised his eyebrows at her and lifted his right lip when he said that he did not understand

what she was saying. Id. at 68-69. Other than this conduct, plaintiff testified that no manager at FedEx has

engaged in any conduct or gesture that she found racially offensive. Id. at 69.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude that there is a

triable issue on whether a reasonable person of plaintiff’s race or national origin would find the workplace so

objectively and subjectively racially hostile as to create an abusive working environment. McGinest v. GTE

Service Corp., 360 F.3d at 1112. Plaintiff admits that Caucasian females Anaya and Hettig had more seniority

than she and thatDanielDurkin was assigned to document sort because he had a medicalcondition. Id. at 133,

137. The Court agrees with defendant that the Brown declaration is conclusory and speculative, and it does

not suffice to show that a Topside assignment, even a lengthy one, creates a racially hostile work environment

under an objective standard. Considering “[the] frequency of discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it

is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whetheritunreasonably interfereswith

an employee’s work performance,”see Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d at 872, the Court also finds

that Meek’s comments that he could not understand plaintiff, and his facial expressions and tone, at most

amount to “mere offensive utterances.” Under all the circumstances, and in the absence of racially offensive

remarks by anyone else at FedEx, Meek’s rude demeanor towards plaintiff is not enough.

Plaintiff also alleges discrimination because she did not receive training on a “jumpseat test,” which is

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14 These appear to be the same argumentsraised by plaintiffs Azzamand Wilkerson intheir Opposition

papers.

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required before an employee may ride in a FedEx plane. However, at her deposition she testified that her

manager provided her with the information about the test and she “got into it,” but did not have enough time

to do it. Paogofie Depo. at 124-25. This allegation of a “denial of training” is simply not supported by the

record.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s

harassment and discrimination claims.

B. Promotion

FedEx argues that plaintiff’s promotion claims are barred by the statutes oflimitations and by her failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. Her DFEH complaints were filed on June 13, 2002, and her EEOC charge

on May 30, 2003. Plaintiff’s promotion claims are based on events that occurred after she filed both the DFEH

complaints and her EEOC charge. Defendant also contends that plaintiff could not establish a promotion claim

in any event because she was never denied a promotion, but rather voluntarily withdrew her application for a

courier position in October 2003. 

Plaintiff offersseveralargumentsin response.14 First, she contends that there are material factual issues

to be resolved before the Court can determine if plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. This

is an incorrect statement of the law; summary judgment is only improper “if tolling of the statute of limitations

requires the resolution of disputed factual issues.” Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.

1983). Since there appears to be no tolling issue, the Court may consider the merits of a summary judgment

motion at this time.

Plaintiff also contends, inter alia, that she timely filed her DFEH complaint and filed suit within a year

after her complaint, that various claims are established through the “continuing violations doctrine,” thatshe “has

been harassed, deceived, retaliated against and discriminated in the terms and conditions of her employment,”

and that she filed “numerous” agency complaints with the DFEH and EEOC “in a timely manner.” Pl.

Paogofie’s Opp’n at 10:4-12:11. Plaintiff apparently fails to recognize that FedEx has restricted this argument

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to her failure-to-promote claim. As FedEx correctly states, plaintiff was required to file a timely DFEH or

EEOC charge after an alleged discriminatory act in promotion, which she did not do. Moreover, plaintiff’s

repeated voluntary withdrawals of her applications for various promotions undermine her promotion claim. 

Plaintiff also identifies FedEx employee Gretchen Spear as a potential comparator. Spear was

promoted to a courier position in 1997, within her first year of working at FedEx. Decl. of Rachael Orejana

¶ 3. Defendant argues that this comparison makes no sense because plaintiff was not even hired at FedEx until

2000, and more importantly, thatshe was made a permanent employee within two months ofbeing hired, while

Gretchen Spear became permanent within three months. See Paogofie Depo. at 24-25. The Court agrees that

the comparison with Gretchen Spear is unavailing.

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s promotion claim.

C. Retaliation

Plaintiff is still employed at FedEx as a permanent part-time handler and has received no warnings,

discipline, orlost compensation or benefits. Her retaliation claim is based on (1) her voluntary withdrawal of

an application for a courier position in February 2004 because of a fear ofretaliation, (2) four unpaid vacation

days that were mistakenly given to her and then withdrawn, (3) FedEx’s determination that an injury plaintiff

incurred on March 3, 2004 was preventable, and (4) the fact thatmanager Aaron Holstein assigned her tasks

without adequate help in 2004. Defendant argues that none of these constitutes an adverse employment action.

In addition, defendant argues that, even assuming that plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action,

she cannot establish a causal link between her June 13, 2002 DFEH complaints, her May 30, 2003 EEOC

charge, and the alleged retaliatory acts in 2004.

The Court agrees with defendant. Even if plaintiff could demonstrate that any one of these events

constituted an adverse employment action, plaintiff has utterly failed to show any causal link between her

administrative complaints in 2002 and 2003 and the events of2004. A causal link may be established through

circumstantialevidence, but plaintiff must demonstrate her employer’s knowledge ofthe protected activity and

proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse action. Morgan v. Regents of the Univ. of

California, 88 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2000). Viewing the evidence in the lightmost favorable to plaintiff, the Court

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can find no showing of thatthe hiring manager for the February 2004 courier position, Gary Meek, or Aaron

Holstein knew about plaintiff’s complaints. Nor does plaintiff argue or show that the nearly two years between

the DFEH complaints and the adverse actions or the seven months between the EEOC charge and the first

action constitutessufficient proximity in time. The Court concludes that there is no triable issue of fact regarding

her retaliation claim. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.

D. Disparate impact claim

FedEx also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s disparate impact claim. See Compl. ¶ 285. The disparate

impact claim is based on plaintiff’s allegationthat FedEx applies differentstandards based on race in disciplining

employees. According to defendant, plaintiff has failed to observe the critical distinction between disparate

impact and disparate treatment claims, and has in substance alleged a disparate treatment claim. The Court

agrees. Plaintiff has not identified a facially neutral policy that falls more harshly on a particular group;rather,

she alleges a pattern of intentional discrimination by defendant in singling out minority employees for more

severe discipline than their white counterparts receive. 

F. Rule 56(f) relief

Plaintiff seeks a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f) on the same grounds as discussed above. As with

plaintiffs Azzamand Wilkerson, Paogofie has notshown what additionalfacts will be obtained in discovery that

would defeatsummary judgment. Her own testimony establishes that: (1) the facts she alleges do not constitute

objective and subjective harassment; (2) she was never denied a promotion at FedEx; and (3) there are no

facts to support her retaliation claim. Paogofie’s request for a continuance is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiffs’ requests

for Rule 56(f) relief and GRANTS defendant’s motions for summary judgment as to all claims. [Docket #s

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162, 163, 170]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD ALVARADO, et al,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDEX CORPORATION,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-00098 SI

(Related Case No. C 04-0099 SI)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AS

TO PLAINTIFFS JOHN AZZAM,

CHRISTOPHER WILKERSON, AND

LORE PAOGOFIE, AND DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ RULE 56(F) REQUESTS

On August 19, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on defendant’s motions for summary judgment

as to three plaintiffs: John Azzam, Christopher Wilkerson, and Lore Paogofie and on plaintiffs’ requests for

relief pursuant to Rule 56(f). Having carefully considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted,

the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motions for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of plaintiffs’ employment with defendant FedEx Corporation (“FedEx” or

“defendant”). Plaintiffs allege various forms of discrimination against FedEx, including discrimination in

promotion and compensation, harassment, and retaliation, and assert claims for disparate impact and disparate

treatment under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the California Fair Housing and

Employment Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant has filed motions

for summary judgment as to three plaintiffs, John Azzam, Lore Paogofie, and Christopher Wilkerson, relying

exclusively on the deposition testimony ofthese plaintiffs. Plaintiffs oppose the motions and seek relief pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f).

In requesting Rule 56(f) relief, plaintiffs repeat the same arguments made in Rule 56(f) motions made

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1 Defendant has also filed summary judgment motions regarding plaintiffs Tanda Brown, Lasonia

Walker, Kevin Neely, Pernell Evans, Alexander Rivera, and Gary White. Plaintiffs filed Rule 56(f) requests

with respect to those summary judgment motions as well because of FedEx’s failure to produce documents

responsive to plaintiffs’ First and Second Sets ofRequests for Production. The Court granted these Rule 56(f)

requests but has not yet ordered supplemental briefing for or re-set these motions.

2 Meanwhile, defendant also filed summary judgment motions against plaintiffs Gary White and

Alexander Rivera, set for July 1, 2005. 

2

by other plaintiffs,1 stating that defendants have still not fully produced documents from Plaintiff’s First Set of

Requests for Production, including external EEO complaints filed with the EEOC and DFEH and a privilege

log, and from Plaintiff’s Second Set of Requests for Production. According to plaintiffs, until these discovery

matters are resolved, they have had no full opportunity to obtain facts necessary to oppose the summary

judgment motions.

The discovery disputes in this action have been frequent and heated. On November 23, 2004, plaintiffs

served their First Set of Requests for Production on defendant. They then brought a motion to compel

production of many of these documents, which was set for hearing on March 11, 2005. At that hearing,

defendant stated that it would produce all responsive documents “forthwith,” and the parties entered into a

stipulated order to that effect. See March 15, 2005 Stipulated Order. Defendant then filed summary judgment

motions against four plaintiffs, which were set for May 27, 2005. Plaintiffs sought a continuance of these

motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) on grounds that defendant had not produced

documents as required by the March 11, 2005 stipulated order. On May 25, 2005, the Court granted this

request and re-set the hearing for June 24, 2005. On May 26, 2005, defendant filed a letter brief seeking

“relief” from the Court’s order. Plaintiffs requested an emergency hearing regarding defendant’s failure to

produce documents, and opposed defendant’s request. Plaintiffs also filed an additional request for Rule 56(f)

relief. On June 22, 2005, the Court granted a request for a one-week continuance of the four summary

judgment motions, which were re-set for July 1, 2005.2 Plaintiffs subsequently sought a further continuance,

pursuant to Rule 56(f), ofallsix ofthe summary judgment motions setfor Friday, July 1, 2005, which the Court

granted during a telephone conference held on June 27, 2005. See Docket # 157. In addition, at that

conference, the Court ordered FedEx to produce all documents responsive to plaintiffs’ First and Second Sets

of Requests for Production by July 8, 2005. Plaintiff subsequently filed a further letter brief claiming that

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3

 In their oppositions and supplemental materials, each plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice

of the class action complaint filed with this Court in Satchell, et al. v. FedEx, C 03-2659 SI, as well as of a

statistical report submitted in that case by Dr. Drogin. The Court DENIES both requests. The Court has

related cases C 04-0098 SI and 04-0099 SI, but these cases are not formally related to the Satchell class

action. In addition, the Drogin Report submitted in that action is not part of the record in this case. As

defendants point out, no experts have been noticed or disclosed in this case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

both request for judicial notice.

3

defendant had not produced allresponsive documents because it had merely made personnel files available for

inspection pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, and seeking the Court’s intervention. The Court denied this request.

See Docket # 169.

On July 28, 2005, plaintiffs’ counselfiled a letter briefwiththe Court asking for a telephone conference

regarding defendant’s “failureto allow inspection ofdocuments.” Defendant filed a responsive letter describing

a different series of events, and it is unclear from these letter briefs what remedy each party seeks. Plaintiff

stated that the documents were not prepared for inspection and that defense counsel’s representative

“obstruct[ed] our attempts to obtain documents during that on-site inspection.” Parker Decl. Re Azzam ¶ 5.

The three summary judgment motions now before the Court were filed by defendant on July 15, 2005

and noticed for August 19, 2005. Plaintiffs apparently did not attempt to inspect the relevant documents at

FedEx until July 27, 2005. In support of its request for Rule 56(f) relief, plaintiffs each submit the same

arguments – largely verbatim – that they raised in their prior Rule 56(f) filings. While the Court remains

concerned about FedEx’s generalattentivenessto its discovery obligations, it is not persuaded that defendant’s

prior failures to produce responsive documents have hampered these three plaintiffs’ ability to oppose these

summary judgment motions. Therefore, the Court will consider plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) motions individually, in the

context of the factual issues presented by each motion.3

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment or adjudication is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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4

In a motion forsummary judgment, "[if] the moving party forsummary judgment meets its initialburden

of identifying for the court those portions ofthe materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any

genuine issues ofmaterialfact, the burden ofproduction then shifts so that the non-moving party mustsetforth,

by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

See T. W. Elec. Service, Inc., v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 317 (1986)). In judging evidence at the summary

judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, and draws

all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See T.W. Electric, 809 F.2d at 630-31

(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)); Ting

v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991). The evidence presented by the parties must be

admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is

insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. GTE

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Rule 56(f)

Pursuant to FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 56(f), upon a showing by the party opposing a motion for

summary judgment that it “cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's

opposition,” the court may deny or continue the motion for summary judgment in order to permit that party an

opportunity to obtain necessary discovery. A Rule 56(f) motion should be granted where the party opposing

summary judgment makes a timely application thatspecifically identifiesrelevant informationto be discovered,

and there is some basis for believing that such information actually exists, and would prevent summary

judgment. Nidds v. Schindler, 113 F.3d 912, 921 (9th Cir. 1996); Visa Int'lServ. Ass'n v.Bankcard Holders,

784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986). 

DISCUSSION

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4 For example, plaintiff Wilkerson’s Opposition cites to the “Decl. of Tanda Brown” at the end of

severalparagraphs in the factual summary, but does not specify where in that declaration the supporting facts

may be found.

5

In response to defendant’s motions, plaintiffs have submitted Opposition briefs, the Declaration of

Tanda Brown in Support of Christopher Wilkerson and Lore Paogofie’s Oppositions, the Declaration of Kay

McKenzie Parker in Support of John Azzam’s Opposition, the Declaration of Rachael Orejana in support of

all three plaintiffs’ Oppositions, and two Supplemental Declarations of KayMcKenzie Parker (Supplemental

Declarations #1 and #2). Supplemental Declaration #1 contains “Supplemental Facts” specific to each plaintiff.

SupplementalDeclaration #2 contains further “SupplementalFacts”that“apply to all three groups ofthe named

plaintiffs, unless otherwise expressly noted as applying to particular plaintiff(s).” Supp. Parker Decl. #2 at 3:7-

9. Each Opposition brief devotes several pages to the plaintiff’s “Employment History and Specific Facts,”

but with a few exceptions,4these factual narratives are devoid of citations to the record. See Pl. Azzam’s

Opp’n at 6:1-10:18; Pl. Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 6:4-8:18; Pl. Paogofie’s Opp’n at 5:19-8:12. 

At oral argument on these motions, plaintiffs’ counsel described their submissions to the Court as

“piecemeal” because of the protracted nature of discovery in this case. Between these piecemeal filings and

plaintiffs’ failure to cite to the record in its Opposition briefs, it is extremely difficult for the Court to identify

which of the statements and arguments by plaintiffs’ counselhave evidentiary support. On summary judgment,

the Court views all facts in the lightmost favorable to the non-moving party – here, of course, to plaintiffs. But

the Court must restrict its inquiry to facts supported by the record, and plaintiffs may notrely on the allegations

made in pleadings or on their beliefs – however reasonable – about the “Ole Boys Network” and the pervasive

pattern of race and nationalorigin discriminationat FedEx. For example, the Court cannot consider plaintiffs

Azzam and Wilkerson’s citations to the complaint filed in this case, the original complaint filed in Alameda

County Superior Court, or the complaint filed in Satchell v. FedEx, C 03-2659 SI, a class action pending

before this Court, as evidence of termination and differential treatment. See Pl. Azzam’s Opp’n at 6:5-7; Pl.

Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 6:22-24. Unsworn allegations in the pleadings are not facts that can be used to defeat

summary judgment. Moreover, it is not the Court’s task “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of

triable fact,” see Kennan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1996), and it “need not examine the entire

file for evidence establishing a genuine issue offact, where the evidence is notsetforth in the opposition papers

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5

 These facts are taken from plaintiff’s deposition testimony and the parties’ papers. As mentioned

above, plaintiff’s opposition brief contains a narrative description of his employment at FedEx and his

discriminationallegations, without citations to the record. The Court does not rely on this narrative statement,

but instead restricts its inquiry to facts for which the parties have provided evidentiary support, including the

“Supplemental Facts Specific to Plaintiff Azzam” contained in the Supplemental Declaration #1 of Kay

McKenzie Parker (“Supp. Parker Decl. #1"). 

6

with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found.” Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237

F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Applying these standards, the Court considers each summary judgment motion in turn.

I. Summary Judgment as to John Azzam

FedEx seeks summary judgment against plaintiffJohn Azzamon his claims for discriminationbased on

wrongful termination, failure-to-promote, compensation, discrimination and harassment, and retaliation.

Plaintiff Azzam was born in Beirut, Lebanon. Azzam Depo. at 17. He began working at FedEx as a

data entry clerk, a position he obtained through a temp agency.5Id. at 11-12. He was hired as a permanent

part-time courier at the Sunnyvale facility (“COAA”) in September 1999. Id. at 24. He submitted a resignation

for his Monday through Friday part-time route and began working only on Saturdays in June 2001 because

ofschoolobligations and an internship withthe CityofSan Jose, but eventually began working another Monday

through Friday part-time route. Id. at 45-48. He was offered a permanent part-time route in July 2001, which

he turned down. Id. at 49. 

In January 2002, plaintiff’s employment with FedEx was terminated because he received three

performance reminders within a 12-month period. Id. at 102. Plaintiff was aware that receiving three

reminders or some combination of three reminders and written discipline in a 12-month period could result in

termination. Id. at 59. On December 10, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). 

A. Wrongful termination claim

FedEx seeks summary judgment on plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim on two grounds: (1) that the

claim is barred by plaintiff’s failure to allege termination as discrimination in the DFEH complaint he filed ten

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months after his termination, and (2) because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding discrimination

in the termination itself.

The Courtfindsthat plaintiff’s claim is not barred by his failure to specifically allege wrongfultermination

in his December 10, 2002 DFEH complaint. Subject matter jurisdiction “extends over all allegations of

discrimination that either fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation

which can reasonably be expected to grow out ofthe charge of discrimination.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified

Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); see also Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d

1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990) (the court “must inquire whether the original EEOC investigation would have

encompassed the additionalcharges made in the court complaint but notincluded in the EEOC charge itself”).

Plaintiff’s DFEH complaint alleges harassment, denialofpromotion, and retaliationby Robert Motter and Gary

Meek “[o]n or about February 7, 2002,” approximately one week after his terminationon January 31, 2002.

Decl. of Christopher Yost, Ex. C. The dates of the discriminatory acts, perpetrators, and location of the

discrimination are all the same as those in plaintiff’s termination claim, see B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276

F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002), and therefore an agency investigation would certainly have encompassed

the circumstances of his departure from FedEx.

For a wrongful termination claim, a plaintiff must meet the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell

Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), whereby he must first establish a prima facie case that (1) he was a

member of a protected class, (2) he performed his job in a satisfactory manner, (3) he was discharged, and

(4) that similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. If plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. If the employer is able to

articulate such a reason, then the plaintiff must show that the reason given is pretextual, “either directly by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing

that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 

FedEx argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because he was not performing his job

in a satisfactory manner based on his admissions during deposition. In addition, defendant contends that it has

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articulated a non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination: his four performance reminders, three of

which he received in a 12-month period, and three On-Line Compliments and Counselings (“OLCCs”). In

his opposition, plaintiff submits evidence of the disciplinary history of a purported comparator, a Caucasian

employee named Steve Kelso, who was disciplined for poor attendance and punctuality but apparently not

terminated from FedEx. Decl. of Rachael Orejana, Ex. B. 

Plaintiff received a counseling letter on April 20, 2000, for unsafe driving, because he had received a

speeding ticket. AzzamDepo. at 55-57. Plaintiff received a performance reminder on October 25, 2001 for

backing into a parked car. Id. at 58-60. On January 3, 2002, he received a second performance reminder

in the form of a day off without pay (called a “decision day”) because 28 East Coast packages were found

mixed in with West Coast packages, and he had received three OLCCs forsimilar occurrences. Id. at 77-78.

The prior occurrences were: a March 27, 2001 OLCC based on his leaving four internationalpackages in the

courier checkout room; a November 19, 2001 OLCC forleaving four East Coast packages mixed with West

Coast packages, which plaintiff felt was unfair; and a December 11, 2001 OLCC, the details ofwhich he does

notremember. On January 29, 2002, plaintiff received a letter of suspension with pay “pending an investigation

ofpotentialviolations regarding his performance improvement.” Azzam Depo. Ex. 17. On January 31, 2002,

he received his third performance reminder for overlooking additional packages on January 25, 2002 and

January 28, 2002. Id. at 102. He was terminated for receiving three performance reminders in a 12-month

period, and he admits that he has no reason to believe there were additional reasons for his termination. Id.

at 103-04.

To establish a prima facie case despite his disciplinary history, plaintiffdraws a comparisonto employee

Steve Kelso. According to plaintiff:

Kelso received repeated counseling, performance reminders and warnings. His problems

included attendance and punctuality a[s] well as allegations of falsifying delivery records. In

fact, Kelso received a total of three performance reminders and/or warnings within [a] 12

month period. However, Kelso’s manager opted not to terminate him.

Decl. of Rachael Orejana ¶ 4.

Defendant argues that plaintiff and Kelso were not disciplined by the same supervisor norforthe same conduct:

Kelso was primarily disciplined for poor attendance and punctuality, while plaintiff was disciplined for

misdirecting packages. In addition, FedEx contends that, because many of the documented disciplines in

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In itssummary judgment motion, FedEx relied on Azzam’s deposition testimony that he did not know

ofany other FedEx employees who received three writtenwarnings, performance reminders, or a combination,

and were not terminated. Azzam Depo. at 151-52, cited in Def.’s Azzam Mot. at 6:18-21. Plaintiff has now

provided evidence of at least one other employee who was not terminated despite receiving this amount of

discipline. But even assuming that Kelso is an appropriate comparator and that plaintiff has established a prima

facie case, plaintiff’s admission at deposition that the performance-related reasons for his termination are true

and his failure to present evidence suggesting that any of these reminders or counselings were motivated by

discrimination defeats his claim.

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Kelso’s file predate plaintiff’s employment with the company, there is no true basis for comparison.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Azzam, the Court finds that he has not established

a prima facie case ofdiscriminationbecause he cannot establish that he was performing his job in a satisfactory

manner, as required by McDonell Douglas. In addition, the Court finds that plaintiff has not shown that

FedEx’s non-discriminatorybasisforterminatinghimis pretextual. Plaintiff admits that the performance-related

reasons for his termination are true, and he has presented no evidence that any of these reminders or

counselings were motivated by discrimination.6 The Court therefore GRANTS summary judgment on the

wrongful termination claim.

B. Promotion claim

FedEx seeks summary judgment on plaintiff’s promotion claim because Azzam never applied for any

position other than the one he held with FedEx. See AzzamDepo. at 44 (“I don’t recall ever filling out any type

of application for any different position other than what I was.”). Plaintiff’s promotion allegation is based on

the fact that, in 2001, he mentioned to his supervisor, Corey Waiters, that he wanted to work additionalhours

but was told that there were no full-time routes available. Id. at 29-30. Plaintiff stated that he later saw a

Caucasian employee, Michael Potter, coming in as a full-time courier. He admits, however, that he did not

know Potter’s qualifications, that Potter did notreport to Waiters, that Potter worked the “a.m. shift,” and that

plaintiff did not tell Waiters he wanted to work this shift and could not have worked in the mornings because

of his class and internship commitments. Id. at 33-35. 

To establish a promotion claim, plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2)

he was qualified for the position sought; (3) he was denied the promotion; and (4) individuals outside of the

protected class were promoted. Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988). Viewing

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the evidence most favorably to plaintiff, there is simply no basis to find that plaintiff ever applied for any other

position or that he was denied a promotion. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.

C. Compensation claim

The apparent factual basis for plaintiff’s compensation claim is his allegation that he had to confront

Corey Waiters on several occasions about “shorting” him on his pay, but each time he ultimately received all

of his compensation. Azzam Depo. at 173. Despite the complaint’s allegations of discrimination in

compensation, plaintiff testified that he does not believe his race or national origin played a role in his

compensation, and he does not believe he was paid differently than other part-time couriers. Id. at 22, 172.

D. Discrimination and harassment claims

FedEx seeks summary judgment on plaintiff’s harassment claim on grounds that, based on his

deposition testimony, plaintiff cannot show a genuine question of material fact regarding (1) whether a

reasonable person ofplaintiff’srace or nationalorigin would find the workplace so objectively and subjectively

racially hostile as to create an abusive working environment; and (2) whether the defendant failed to take

adequate remedial and disciplinary action. McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.

2004). 

Plaintiff alleges discriminationand harassment bymanagersRobertMotter and Gary Meek. According

to plaintiff, conditions for minorities at the Sunnyvale station worsened in 2000 when these two men became

managers there. Azzam Depo. at 42. He felt targeted by these managers, and testified that “[t]he badgering,

the insults, the yelling, the screaming, the pointing, you know, is really whatmade me realize that they had it in

for me.” Id. Specifically, Meek made comments to plaintiffsuch as “my grandmother works faster than you,”

“move faster, quit your yapping, quit talking,” and “stack neater.” He believed that Meek watched him and

plaintiff Christopher Wilkerson more closely than other employees, and he overheard Meek tell plaintiff

Christopher Wilkerson, who is African-American: “you remind me of Stevie Wonder. Blind, blind as hell,”

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7 A twilight delivery is a nighttime delivery of a package that FedEx had unsuccessfully tried to deliver

during the day.

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which he considered a racial comment. Id. at 110, 121. 

With respect to Motter, plaintiff also allegesdiscriminationbased on an incident where Motter required

him to do a “twilight delivery”7 in the Los Altos Hills area. Plaintiff told Corey Waiters that he felt this was a

dangerous assignment because it was raining, and the area was hilly with narrow roads and loose dogs. Id. at

128-29. According to plaintiff, Motter overheard this statement and spoke to Corey Waiters, and Waiters then

told plaintiffthat he had to make the delivery or he would lose his job. Plaintiff handled the route with another

person riding with him. After this incident, plaintiff did not do this route again. During the second incident,

Azzamwas working with anAfrican-Americanemployee and threeCaucasianemployees,whenMotter looked

at him and said “move faster, don’t talk.” Id. at 135-136. Plaintiff and two other minority employees worked

holidays after Motter became a manager at the station, and plaintiff alleges that when he first began working

at FedEx, holiday assignments were rotated. Id. at 177-78. Plaintiff did not express concern to anyone in

management about holidaywork schedules; he did not know ifthere was a bid process to receive holidays off;

and he did not know if employees requested the holiday assignment or were required to work then. Id. at 179-

81. 

In the Ninth Circuit, courts employ a totality ofthe circumstances test in determining whether a plaintiff

has established a hostile work environment, considering factors such as: “[the] frequency of discriminatory

conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Nichols v. AztecaRest. Enters., 256

F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001). To constitute harassment, the workplace must be both objectively and

subjectively abusive. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000).

FedEx argues, and the Court agrees, that Azzam’s deposition testimony requires a grant of summary

judgment on his harassment claim. No one at FedEx made a racial slur or offensive remark to plaintiff about

his Lebanese or Middle Eastern origin. The only derogatory comment plaintiff recalls was directed at another

employee. With respect to plaintiff’s allegation that Motter required him to make a twilight delivery against his

will, plaintiff admits that he does not know whether his race or nationalorigin played any role in this assignment,

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and testified that Motter just “didn’t care about his employees” and did not seem “concerned for [his] safety

at all.” Id. at 130-31, 136-37. In addition, plaintiff’s testimony about Motter’s comment “move faster, don’t

talk” does not establish that Motter was singling him out personally, much less on discriminatory grounds.

Plaintiff offers no evidence of racial animus towards him by Meek or Motter, and testifies only about his

subjective belief that they were treating him differently based on his national origin. In addition, plaintiff has

made no showing that FedEx failed to take remedial action, and he admits that he never used the company’s

EEO process to complain about the alleged harassment. 

Plaintiff’s entire opposition to this claim is contained in a single paragraph, which states:

All of the above factual allegations by plaintiff (and other minorities who have filed

administrative and judicialclaims against these same defendants during the same time period)

demonstrate that plaintiff was subjected to working in a hostile environment that altered the

terms and conditions of his employment with FedEx. Non-minority employees were not

subjected to such hostility. It is clear that defendants dispute this material fact.

Pl. Azzam’s Opp’n at 15:6-11. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that there are no triable issues of

material fact for a jury to decide. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.

E. Retaliation

FedEx is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim. To establish a prima facie case

ofretaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer subjected him to

an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Manatt v. Bank ofAmerica, 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003). To show a causal link,

a plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence, but he or she must demonstrate the employer’s knowledge of the

protected activity and proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse action. Morgan v.

Regents of the Univ. of California , 88 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2000). 

Here, plaintiff’s protected activity occurred after the adverse employment action. Azzam was

terminated on January 29, 2002, and he filed his DFEH complaint on December 10, 2002. There is no factual

basis for a retaliation claim.

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F. Rule 56(f) motion

In his opposition, plaintiff requests a continuance based on defendant’s failure to provide documents

requested by plaintiff. Plaintiff states that these documents “will substantiate many of [his] factual allegations.”

In requesting Rule 56(f) relief, plaintiff repeats the arguments from other plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) motions, stating

that defendants have still not fully produced documents from Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production,

including all external EEO complaints filed with the EEOC and DFEH and a privilege log, and from Plaintiff’s

Second Set of Requests for Production. According to plaintiff, “[u]ntil these outstanding critical discovery

matters are resolved, Plaintiffs have had no full opportunity to obtain facts necessary to oppose Defendant’s

instant motion for summary judgment.” Pl. Azzam’s Opp’n at 17:15-17.

"Ordinarily, summary judgment should not be granted when there are relevant facts remaining to be

discovered, but the party seeking a continuance bears the burden to show what specific facts it hopes to

discover thatwillraise an issue ofmaterialfact." ContinentalMaritime v. Pacific Coast MetalTrades, 817 F.2d

1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the burden of showing (1) that they have set forth specific

facts that they hope to elicit from further discovery; (2) that these facts exist; and (3) that the facts are

“essential” to resistsummary judgment. State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1997).

Although Rule 56(f) motions should be granted fairly freely, the Court cannotsee how further discovery would

provide additionalfacts precluding summary judgment against this particular plaintiff. Azzam’s own testimony

demonstrates that he cannot raise a triable issue of fact as to discrimination in his various claims. 

In her declaration in support of the opposition, plaintiff’s counsel has informed the Court that, upon

reviewing plaintiff’s personnel file, she found his parents’ personal income tax returns, and that plaintiff has

informed her “that at no time whatsoever would he have given FedEx his parents’ income tax returns.” Decl.

of Jay McKenzie Parker in Support ofAzzamOpp’n ¶ 6 (emphasis in original). Counsel states that no other

employee personnelfile reviewed contained similarrecords, and concludes: “Plaintiff John Azzam . . . believes

and, I agree with him, that the Defendant surreptitiously and unlawfully obtained his parents’ personnel files for

the unlawful purpose of attempting to find out the names of all charitable organizations to which they had given

donations. This was because his parents are from a Muslim nation and, based on the national origin of his

parents and himself(Lebanese), he was unlawfully and unfairly disciplined, harassed, and eventually terminated

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 The Court has not received any under seal submission from plaintiff, and hereby ORDERS counsel

to provide Azzam’s tax records for its inspection.

9

 26 U.S.C. § 7213 makes it unlawful for federal employees to willfully disclose any tax return to any

person without authorization, and for other persons to whom unauthorized disclosure has been made to copy

or publish such returns. That section also makes it unlawful for anyone to solicit or receive unauthorized tax

returns. Violations of this statute are punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years. 

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fromFedEx employment.” Id. at ¶ 8. Counselstates thatshe issubmittingthese documents under sealand asks

the Court to allow plaintifftime to investigate how these files were obtained by deposing “operations managers,

senior managers, the districtmanaging directors, human resources personnel and other witnesses (whether or

not their depositions have previously been taken)” on this issue. Id. at ¶ 9.8 

The Court agrees that FedEx’s possession of these tax returns is troubling. At oral argument on this

motion, the Court asked counsel for FedEx how his client obtained these records. Counsel responded that he

did not know and had not asked because the records are notrelevant to the pending motions. This response

is unsatisfactory, since the presence of such documents could reflect criminal conduct.9 However, the Court

agrees that the presence ofthe records in Azzam’sfile does not itself create factual issues appropriate for jury

determination in this employment case.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) motion is DENIED.

II. Summary Judgment as to Christopher Wilkerson

Plaintiff Wilkerson began working at FedEx on November 29, 1999 as a casual handler at the

Sunnyvale location. Wilkerson Depo. at 31. Two months later, he was promoted to part-time handler, and

on October 27, 2003, he became a part-time courier at the Sunnyvale station. Id. at 32-33, Ex. 8. On

November 12, 2002, he received the “Bravo Zulu Outstanding Performance” award from manager Roy

Johnson, although he believed that manager Aaron Holstein was really responsible for giving him the award,

notJohnson. Id. at 183-84. In 2003, at the suggestion of Aaron Holstein, plaintiff began taking LEAP classes,

which are a prerequisite to applying formanagement positions. Id. at 51-52. Plaintiff eventually dropped out

of the class because he had to pick up his daughter in the mornings. Id. at 53. Plaintiff still works at FedEx

as a part-time courier. He turned down a full-time courier position in 2004 or the beginning of 2005. Id. at

108-109. 

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10 An “On-Line Compliment/Counseling” may be either a compliment or a counseling notation made

on a computer by management.

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During his employment at FedEx, plaintiff has never received a written warning or performance

reminder. He has received thirteen OLCCs, three of which were negative, and the remainder of which were

complimentary.10 The first negative OLCC is from June 28, 2000 about reporting to work on time; the second

is from November 27, 2001 regarding a problem with a bucket of 21 East Coast documents that needed to

be checked; and the third, received on November 3, 2003, notified him that he had taken seven sick days and

could be subjected to disciplinary action for further sick days. Id. at Ex. 13. 

A. Compensation

Plaintiff’s compensation claim is apparently based on the allegation that his time cards were altered on

two occasions. See Pl. Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 6:13-15. Plaintiff does not allege, nor does he offer proof, that

FedEx paid African-American employees less than white employees for substantially equal work. FedEx

argues that Wilkerson’s deposition testimony demonstrates that he cannot establish a compensation claim.

Wilkerson testified that he knew of several employees who believed their time cards had been altered: an

African-American employee named Andre Megason, a Latino employee, and a Caucasian employee named

Lance White. Wilkerson Depo. at 200. Plaintiff reported the suspected altering to senior manager Robert

Motter, who told him to talk to his supervisor. He did not do so, but he left messages with human resources

and did not receive a call back. Id. at 201-202. 

To establish a claim for discrimination in compensation, a plaintiff must show that the employer paid

members of protected groups less than non-minorities for performing substantially equal work measured in

terms of skill, effort, and responsibility. See Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 456 F. Supp. 65, 68-69

(N.D. Cal. 1978). Here, plaintiff has offered no evidence that he, or other African-American couriers, were

paid less thanwhite employees for performing the same tasks. In fact, based on plaintiff’s own testimony, the

“shorting” of time cards appears to have occurred to other employees regardless of race.

Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim. 

B. Promotion

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1. Statute of limitations and failure to exhaust administrative remedies

FedEx argues thatsome ofplaintiff’s promotion claims are barred by the statutes of limitations and by

his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff alleges discrimination with respect to three positions: (1)

a part-time team leader position for which he applied in October 2001; (2) a courier position for which he

applied through the JCATS system; and (3) a full-time courier position for which he applied in 2004 or the

beginning of 2005. 

Plaintiff filed complaints with the DFEH on June 21, 2002 and July 19, 2002, and he filed an EEOC

charge on May 5, 2003. A First Amended Complaint in this action was filed on January 9, 2004, although

plaintiff states that “[a] lawsuit was filed on November 8, 2002, in Alameda County Superior Court.” Pl.

Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 9:24-25. It is not clear whether plaintiff believes that the 2002 lawsuit is the same case

as this federal action. 

Before filing a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the

unlawfulemployment practice, and must exhaust administrative remedies before coming to court. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(e)(1); Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim under FEHA must be filed

within one year of the unlawful practice. Cal. Gov. Code § 12760. The statute of limitations under § 1981

is four years pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1658, except that causes of action that were maintainable prior to the

1991 Civil Rights Act are governed by state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. R.R.

Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382-84 (2004).

Plaintiff appears to believe that none of his promotion claims are time-barred because they are all

continuing violations. See Pl. Wilkerson’s Opp’n at 10-11. Plaintiff is incorrect. Discrete discriminatory acts

such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire constitute separate actionable

unlawfulemployment practices, and the limitations period on each begins to run when the practice occurs. See

Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113

(2002). 

FedEx correctly contends that the October 26, 2001 decision not to promote plaintiff to the team

leader position occurred more than 300 days before plaintiff’s May 5, 2003 EEOC charge, and thus any Title

VII claim cannot be based on this alleged failure-to-promote. Plaintiff’s FEHA claim is exhausted, however,

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11 California’s statute of limitations has since been changed to two years, but the new statute is not

retroactive except for claims arising out of the September 11, 2001 attacks. See Krupnick v. Duke Energy

Morro Bay, LLC, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1026 (2004), Cal. Code Civ. P. § 340(3). 

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because his DFEH complaints were timely filed within one year of this decision. Plaintiff’s allegation that he

was not promoted to a full-time courier position in 2004 or 2005 is barred for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, because he has not filed any administrative complaint regarding this decision. With respect to

plaintiff’s § 1981 claim, FedEx argues that it is subject to a one-year statute of limitations because failure-topromote claims were maintainable prior to 1990 and because California’s personalinjury statute was one year

at the time the alleged practice occurred.11 To determine which statute of limitations governs plaintiff’s § 1981

claim, however, the Court must consider whether each alleged failure-to-promote would have givenrise to an

actionable claim prior to the 1991 CivilRights Act. Because the Court finds that there are insufficient facts to

defeat summary judgment, it does not undertake this inquiry.

2. Prima facie case regarding discrimination in promotion

Plaintiff’s promotion claim is governed by the burden-shifting analysis ofMcDonnell Douglas v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). To prevail on his promotion claim, plaintiff must show (1) that he is a member of a

protected class, (2) qualified for the position sought, (3) denied the promotion, and (4) that individuals outside

of his protected class were promoted. If he can establish this prima facie case, then the burden shifts to

defendantto offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason forthe action. If the employer meets this burden, then

the plaintiff must show that the reason given is pretextual.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court findsthat he has not established

that a genuine issue of fact exists based on any of the promotion decisions. For the decision not to hire him as

a part-time teamleader in October 2001, plaintiff offers no evidence that an individual outside of his protected

class was promoted instead. In addition, plaintiff was informed by the hiring manager, Kimo Jackson, that

another candidate “who was already in [the] job class” (and who therefore had priority) had been selected for

the position. Wilkerson Depo., Ex. 6. Even if plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, there is no evidence

of pretext to undermine this non-discriminatory basis for the decision. 

Plaintiff also alleges that he was interested in a courier position after he passed the Basic Skills Test

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(“BST”). He told his manager, Roy Johnson, that he was interested in the position, and Johnson said that he

would submit the BST to the “JCATS” job posting system. Id. at 70-72. According to plaintiff, Johnson

delayed submitting his application, and then there was a hiring freeze. In addition, plaintiff claims that he had

to wait two years to qualify for this position, while non-minorities were hired off the streetfor courier positions.

When he talked to his managers about his desire to apply for this position, Robert Motter, Craig Diggle, and

Gary Meek told him that they would look into it and get back to him, and they sent him “in circles” telling him

to talk to his various managers. Id. at 26, 28, 29. Ultimately, plaintiff received assistance from another

African-American employee, Andrew Thompson, who showed him how to access the JCATS system and

apply for the position. Id. at 43-45. Plaintiff applied for a full-time courier position in 2004 or 2005, which

he was offered and turned down. 

Plaintiff attempts to create a factualissue by offering evidence that a white employee, Gretchen Spear,

was promoted to a courier position in 1997, within one year of working at FedEx. Decl. of Rachael Orejana

¶ 3. FedEx argues, and the Court agrees, that Spear is not an appropriate comparator for plaintiff because she

was not promoted over plaintiff for the position he sought, the hiring manager was not the same, and the gap

in time between her hiring as a courier and plaintiff’s own employment at FedEx undermines the comparison.

Because plaintiff has failed to establish a factual issue regarding his promotion claim, the Court

GRANTS summary judgment.

C. Harassment

FedEx argues that, under the totality of the circumstances test, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie

case of harassment. Plaintiff’s harassment claim is based on allegations of public humiliation by his managers,

including finger pointing and yelling, and on manager Roy Johnson’s decision to make Wilkerson work on the

heaviest “cans” in “Topside,” the most strenuous assignment, while white employees were given smaller cans

and assistance in completing their tasks. Id. at 72. He alleges that Robert Motter yelled at him and other

minority employees, singling them out by name orstanding close to them while they were working, but would

not yell at Caucasian employees. Id. at 90-91. The words he used were: “Come one, come on”; “I’m going

to switch you guys if you don’t go faster”; and “let’s go, let’s go.” 

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Despite the unpleasant nature of these working conditions, the Court cannot find a genuine question

of material fact regarding whether a reasonable person of plaintiff’s race or national origin would find the

workplace so objectively and subjectively racially hostile as to create an abusive working environment.

McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., supra, 360 F.3d at 1112. The Court considers the “frequency of

discriminatory conduct, its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Nichols v. Azteca

Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff states that he never heard any manager use a racial

slur or engage in offensive racial conduct in his presence. Id. at 88-89. In addition, the opinion of plaintiff

Tanda Brown, who was never employed at the Sunnyvale station, that “assigning an employee to consistently

work the topside . . . would alter the terms and conditions ofthat employee’s employment,” see Decl. ofTanda

Brown ¶ 11, does not create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment.

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to this claim.

D. Discipline

Plaintiff has not received any warning letters or performance reminders during his employment with

FedEx. He has received only three negative OLCCs, and he has testified that he does not believe that race

played a role in any of these counselings. Based on these facts and admissions, summary judgment is

GRANTED as to his discipline claim.

E. Retaliation

FedEx contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim because plaintiff

was notsubjected to anyadverse employment action. Defendant argues that the three negative OLCCs plaintiff

received do not constitute an adverse employment action, and nor does his allegationthathe was made to work

Topside longer than other couriers. In addition, FedEx argues that plaintiff cannot establish a causal link

between these OLCCs and his protected activity because the OLCCs were issued to him priorto his filing any

DFEH complaint or EEOC charge, except for the 2003 OLCC charge, which plaintiff admits was justified.

The Court finds that, even assuming that the OLCCs could constitute an adverse employment action, plaintiff

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received two ofthemon June 28, 2000 and November 27, 2001, before he filed his administrative complaints

on June 21, 2002, July 19, 2002, and May 5, 2003. The third OLCC, which plaintiff was issued on November

3, 2003, notified him that he had taken seven sick days and could be subjected to disciplinary action fortaking

further sick time. Plaintiff testified that this OLCC was justified, because the manager who issued it, Craig

Diggle, “gave [him] factual evidence of[his] missing those sick days,” and was a “good guy” who always gave

him a “fair shake.” Wilkerson Depo. at 167, 148. Under these circumstances, there is no causal link between

plaintiff’s protected activity and any of the few disciplinary actions against him.

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to this claim.

F. Rule 56(f) request 

Like John Azzam, plaintiff moves for a Rule 56(f) continuance based on defendant’s continued failure

to produce all documents responsive to plaintiffs’ First and Second Sets ofRequests for Production. Plaintiff

here has not met his burden of establishing what documents he has not received that are “essential” to his

opposition. The Court’s grant of summary judgment on all of his individual claims is based on the testimony

givenby plaintiff at his deposition, and it is not clear whatfurther proof, contained in FedEx’s files, would create

genuine issues ofmaterialfact. In any event, it is plaintiff’s burden to make this showing, which he has not done.

Moreover, FedEx’s summary judgment motion as to this plaintiff was filed and briefed after the series of

discovery disputes regarding the requested documents had been resolved. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

plaintiff’s request for Rule 56(f) relief.

III. Summary Judgment as to Lore Paogofie

FedEx seeks summary judgment ofplaintiff Lore Paogofie’s compensation, promotion, retaliation, and

harassment allegations. Plaintiff brings a Rule 56(f) motion with respect to this motion on the same grounds as

described above.

Lore Paogofie, a Samoan female, began working at FedEx as a part-time handler in April 2000.

Paogofie Depo. at 22. She was promoted to permanent part-time handler on or about June 1, 2000. Id. at

24-25. While working at FedEx, she also attended San Jose State University full-time. Id. at 16. Gary Meek

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12 For example, plaintiff cites no evidence in the record to support her allegations of discrimination

based on vacation decisions. In any event, plaintiff was never denied a vacation request. Paogofie Depo. at

194-96. Plaintiff planned to take four days off for her graduation, and Meek mistakenly told her that she could

be compensated for these days because she had four additional days of vacation time. Although Meek

discovered his error and could not compensate her forthe days, plaintiff was still permitted to take the time off

without pay. Id. at 199-200.

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was plaintiff’s operations manager at the Sunnyvale facility from 2000 to 2003, and Robert Motter was the

senior manager. Id. at 74.

Plaintiff has not received any discipline or written warnings while at FedEx, with the sole exception of

one OLCC for jumping over a moving belt. Id. at 222-24. She has received performance evaluation scores

ranging from 5.1 to 6.7 out of 7.0 during her time at FedEx. Id. at 290-292. Plaintiff filed DFEH complaints

against Gary Meek, Robert Motter, and FedEx on June 13, 2002. She submitted an EEOC charge on May

30, 2003.

In her Opposition, plaintiffstates thatshe made repeated requests for a permanent or full-time position

but was passed over for non-minority individuals who applied after her, before she was given a full-time

position. Pl. Paogofie’s Opp’n at 5:22-6:1. She alleges that, since the arrival of managers Meek and Motter

at the Sunnyvale station, she has been assigned to work “Topside,” the most strenuous assignment, and that

non-minority females with lessseniority and experience were given less strenuous assignments. Plaintiff alleges

that she has been required to conduct an audit after the first sort on her shift – something non-minority

employees are not required to do – as well as forcing her to cancel her vacation and refusing to exercise

discretion on her behalf with respect to vacation time,something defendant allegedly has done for non-minority

employees. Plaintiff also alleges that she has been harassed by repeated reprimands for trivial matters, public

criticism, and “by failing to publicly recognize her for her achievements.” Id. at 8:7-8. Plaintiff provides no

citations to the record for these allegations. As discussed above, the Court cannot consider any facts

unsupported by the record, and will not scour the record in search of support for plaintiff’s statements.12

A. Harassment and discrimination

In her Opposition, Paogofie specifically addresses only the harassment claim. She repeats the

paragraph from plaintiff Azzam’s motion, and adds the following (Paogofie’s Opp’n at 13:9-14):

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Plaintiff Lore Paogofie was treated differently than non-minority females. In addition, she

witnessed the very pregnant African American female employee, Camille Leekins, being

treated differently because of her race. They were made to work the heaviest jobs in the

station[] “Topside” while non-minority CaucasianGretchen Spear was rapidly promoted and

given easy assignments. 

In addition to her consistent assignment to Topside for two to three years, Paogofie’s harassment and

discriminationclaims are based on offensive comments made to her by Gary Meek, along with his tone ofvoice

and facial expressions. 

The SupplementalParker Declaration #1 states that “[o]nly minority females and notthe non-minority

females were assigned to the ‘Topside’ heavy duty line consistently.” Supp. Parker Decl. #1 at 5:13-14.

Counselprovides no citation to evidence forthis statement; she merely states that the affected minority females

included plaintiff, an African-American female Lisa McCoy, and an African-American female Camille Leekins,

and cites the page ofPaogofie’s depositionwhere plaintifftestifiedthatshe “[did]n’tknow any casuals that have

been, besides Camille Leekins, Lisa McCoy, myself, working on the line.” Paogofie Depo. at 32. Counsel

also states that Caucasian females Noelia Anaya and Kolainia Hettig were never made to work Topside on

a regular basis and were given assistance when they were, and that Caucasian female Sheshe Maltini has

always been a customer service agent (“CSA”). Supp. Parker Decl #1 at 6:16-20. Plaintiff’s actual testimony

was that she and Lisa McCoy were immediately put on this assignment, while Anaya and Hettig were “there

for ten, 15 minutes and then switched off to the doc sort, which is a light duty area,” Paogofie Depo. at 131.

Camille Leekins, an African American female employee, was made to work Topside when she was pregnant.

Id. at 140. With respectto gender discrimination, plaintiff allegesthatCaucasianmale HermanHanna was hired

as a handler after plaintiff received a courier position; that Bill Bailey was given the lead handler position by

Gary Meek after only two to three months on Topside; and that Daniel Durkin worked only two to three

months on Topside. Id. at 55, 62-63, 150. 

Plaintiff submits the Declaration of Tanda Brown, an operations manager at other FedEx facilities,

which describes the Topside assignment and states that, “because Topside is so physically demanding and has

so many safety issues, most handlers would only be assigned to work in that function for no more than 2

consecutive years”; that “[i]n all my experience at FedEx, I knew of no non-minority female worker who was

assigned to Topside for more than two years consistently – as happened with Lore Paogofie.” Brown Decl.

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13 Defendant argues that the opinions expressed in the Declaration of Tanda Brown are inadmissible

on grounds ofhearsay and speculation, because Brown never worked at the Sunnyvale station and thus could

not have personal knowledge of the working conditions there.

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¶¶ 9, 10. She opines that “it is race discriminationto assign a minority female worker to Topside formore than

2 years consistently, unlessshe specifically expressed her desire forthis position for that duration of time,” and

that “assigning an employee to consistently work the topside, rather than allowing the employee to be rotated

in and out on a basis consistent with other handlers would alter the terms and conditions of that employee’s

employment.” Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12 (emphasis in original).13 

According to plaintiff, Gary Meek made offensive remarks to her and commented that she could not

speak English. Supp. Parker Decl. #1 at 7. At her deposition, plaintiff testified that Meek mocked her by

saying “What?” or “What are you talking about” when she spoke. Paogofie Depo. at 67-68. Plaintiff also

testified that Meek raised his eyebrows at her and lifted his right lip when he said that he did not understand

what she was saying. Id. at 68-69. Other than this conduct, plaintiff testified that no manager at FedEx has

engaged in any conduct or gesture that she found racially offensive. Id. at 69.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude that there is a

triable issue on whether a reasonable person of plaintiff’s race or national origin would find the workplace so

objectively and subjectively racially hostile as to create an abusive working environment. McGinest v. GTE

Service Corp., 360 F.3d at 1112. Plaintiff admits that Caucasian females Anaya and Hettig had more seniority

than she and thatDanielDurkin was assigned to document sort because he had a medicalcondition. Id. at 133,

137. The Court agrees with defendant that the Brown declaration is conclusory and speculative, and it does

not suffice to show that a Topside assignment, even a lengthy one, creates a racially hostile work environment

under an objective standard. Considering “[the] frequency of discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it

is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whetheritunreasonably interfereswith

an employee’s work performance,”see Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d at 872, the Court also finds

that Meek’s comments that he could not understand plaintiff, and his facial expressions and tone, at most

amount to “mere offensive utterances.” Under all the circumstances, and in the absence of racially offensive

remarks by anyone else at FedEx, Meek’s rude demeanor towards plaintiff is not enough.

Plaintiff also alleges discrimination because she did not receive training on a “jumpseat test,” which is

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14 These appear to be the same argumentsraised by plaintiffs Azzamand Wilkerson intheir Opposition

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required before an employee may ride in a FedEx plane. However, at her deposition she testified that her

manager provided her with the information about the test and she “got into it,” but did not have enough time

to do it. Paogofie Depo. at 124-25. This allegation of a “denial of training” is simply not supported by the

record.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s

harassment and discrimination claims.

B. Promotion

FedEx argues that plaintiff’s promotion claims are barred by the statutes oflimitations and by her failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. Her DFEH complaints were filed on June 13, 2002, and her EEOC charge

on May 30, 2003. Plaintiff’s promotion claims are based on events that occurred after she filed both the DFEH

complaints and her EEOC charge. Defendant also contends that plaintiff could not establish a promotion claim

in any event because she was never denied a promotion, but rather voluntarily withdrew her application for a

courier position in October 2003. 

Plaintiff offersseveralargumentsin response.14 First, she contends that there are material factual issues

to be resolved before the Court can determine if plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. This

is an incorrect statement of the law; summary judgment is only improper “if tolling of the statute of limitations

requires the resolution of disputed factual issues.” Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.

1983). Since there appears to be no tolling issue, the Court may consider the merits of a summary judgment

motion at this time.

Plaintiff also contends, inter alia, that she timely filed her DFEH complaint and filed suit within a year

after her complaint, that various claims are established through the “continuing violations doctrine,” thatshe “has

been harassed, deceived, retaliated against and discriminated in the terms and conditions of her employment,”

and that she filed “numerous” agency complaints with the DFEH and EEOC “in a timely manner.” Pl.

Paogofie’s Opp’n at 10:4-12:11. Plaintiff apparently fails to recognize that FedEx has restricted this argument

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to her failure-to-promote claim. As FedEx correctly states, plaintiff was required to file a timely DFEH or

EEOC charge after an alleged discriminatory act in promotion, which she did not do. Moreover, plaintiff’s

repeated voluntary withdrawals of her applications for various promotions undermine her promotion claim. 

Plaintiff also identifies FedEx employee Gretchen Spear as a potential comparator. Spear was

promoted to a courier position in 1997, within her first year of working at FedEx. Decl. of Rachael Orejana

¶ 3. Defendant argues that this comparison makes no sense because plaintiff was not even hired at FedEx until

2000, and more importantly, thatshe was made a permanent employee within two months ofbeing hired, while

Gretchen Spear became permanent within three months. See Paogofie Depo. at 24-25. The Court agrees that

the comparison with Gretchen Spear is unavailing.

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s promotion claim.

C. Retaliation

Plaintiff is still employed at FedEx as a permanent part-time handler and has received no warnings,

discipline, orlost compensation or benefits. Her retaliation claim is based on (1) her voluntary withdrawal of

an application for a courier position in February 2004 because of a fear ofretaliation, (2) four unpaid vacation

days that were mistakenly given to her and then withdrawn, (3) FedEx’s determination that an injury plaintiff

incurred on March 3, 2004 was preventable, and (4) the fact thatmanager Aaron Holstein assigned her tasks

without adequate help in 2004. Defendant argues that none of these constitutes an adverse employment action.

In addition, defendant argues that, even assuming that plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action,

she cannot establish a causal link between her June 13, 2002 DFEH complaints, her May 30, 2003 EEOC

charge, and the alleged retaliatory acts in 2004.

The Court agrees with defendant. Even if plaintiff could demonstrate that any one of these events

constituted an adverse employment action, plaintiff has utterly failed to show any causal link between her

administrative complaints in 2002 and 2003 and the events of2004. A causal link may be established through

circumstantialevidence, but plaintiff must demonstrate her employer’s knowledge ofthe protected activity and

proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse action. Morgan v. Regents of the Univ. of

California, 88 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2000). Viewing the evidence in the lightmost favorable to plaintiff, the Court

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can find no showing of thatthe hiring manager for the February 2004 courier position, Gary Meek, or Aaron

Holstein knew about plaintiff’s complaints. Nor does plaintiff argue or show that the nearly two years between

the DFEH complaints and the adverse actions or the seven months between the EEOC charge and the first

action constitutessufficient proximity in time. The Court concludes that there is no triable issue of fact regarding

her retaliation claim. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.

D. Disparate impact claim

FedEx also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s disparate impact claim. See Compl. ¶ 285. The disparate

impact claim is based on plaintiff’s allegationthat FedEx applies differentstandards based on race in disciplining

employees. According to defendant, plaintiff has failed to observe the critical distinction between disparate

impact and disparate treatment claims, and has in substance alleged a disparate treatment claim. The Court

agrees. Plaintiff has not identified a facially neutral policy that falls more harshly on a particular group;rather,

she alleges a pattern of intentional discrimination by defendant in singling out minority employees for more

severe discipline than their white counterparts receive. 

F. Rule 56(f) relief

Plaintiff seeks a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f) on the same grounds as discussed above. As with

plaintiffs Azzamand Wilkerson, Paogofie has notshown what additionalfacts will be obtained in discovery that

would defeatsummary judgment. Her own testimony establishes that: (1) the facts she alleges do not constitute

objective and subjective harassment; (2) she was never denied a promotion at FedEx; and (3) there are no

facts to support her retaliation claim. Paogofie’s request for a continuance is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiffs’ requests

for Rule 56(f) relief and GRANTS defendant’s motions for summary judgment as to all claims. [Docket #s

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162, 163, 170]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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