Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-03262/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-03262-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Tracy Nicole-Pickett, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-16-03262-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Tracy Nicole-Pickett has asserted claims against Defendants Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A., U.S. Bank National Association, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 

Inc. (MERS), and other Defendants who have not appeared in this action. Defendants 

Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank have filed joined motions to dismiss, Plaintiff has filed a 

motion to remand, and the Court scheduled a case management conference for 

December 7, 2016. This order will grant Defendant Wells Fargo’s motion and dismiss 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. 

I. Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss. 

 Defendant Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiff’s claims against it are barred by res 

judicata because Plaintiff previously sued Wells Fargo on the same claims in this Court, 

and Judge Wake dismissed her claims with prejudice. Three elements are required for 

res judicata to apply: (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and 

(3) privity between parties. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 

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Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003). An identity of claims exists when two suits 

arise from “‘the same transactional nucleus of facts.’” Id. at 1078 (quoting Owens v. 

Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 2001)). “‘Res judicata bars 

relitigation of all grounds of recovery that were asserted, or could have been asserted, in a 

previous action between the parties, where the previous action was resolved on the 

merits.” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1998)). “‘It is immaterial whether the claims asserted subsequent to the 

judgment were actually pursued in the action that led to the judgment; rather, the relevant 

inquiry is whether they could have been brought.’” Id. (quoting Barajas, 147 F.3d at 

909). 

 The action before Judge Wake, Pearson v. Wells Fargo, CV-14-00726-PHX, 

involved claims by Plaintiff (in her previous married name) against Wells Fargo. The 

suit was based on a trustee’s sale of Plaintiff’s home for failure to make mortgage 

payments. Plaintiff alleged that Wells Fargo could not produce her note and prove its 

right to foreclose, that a third party paid off her mortgage, that her note was improperly 

transferred to an investment vehicle, and that Plaintiff made her mortgage payments. 

CV-14-00726, Doc. 14. After affording Plaintiff three opportunities to amend her 

complaint, Judge Wake dismissed her claims against Wells Fargo with prejudice and 

judgment was entered against her. See CV-14-00726, Docs. 38, 39. 

 Plaintiff’s claims in this case are not easily identified because her complaint 

includes numerous densely-worded single-spaced pages and a series of out-of-order 

claims. Doc. 1-1. Plaintiff summarized her claims against Wells Fargo in response to its 

motion to dismiss as follows: the trustee’s sale was improper because no default 

occurred, Wells Fargo does not own the note on her property, Plaintiff paid her mortgage 

and the debt was satisfied before the trustee’s sale, and reinstatement was not allowed. 

Doc. 21 at 3. 

 The three elements of res judicata are satisfied: (1) This case has an identity of 

claims with Judge Wake’s case because both cases arise out of Plaintiff’s mortgage and 

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the trustee’s sale of her house – the same transactional nucleus of facts. (2) Judge Wake 

entered a final judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. (3) Plaintiff and Wells Fargo are the same 

parties that were involved in Judge Wake’s case. The Court therefore will dismiss the 

claims against Wells Fargo with prejudice. 

II. Dismissal Under Rule 41(b).

 On October 31, 2016, the Court entered an order scheduling a case management 

conference in this case. Doc. 13. The conference was set for December 7, 2016, at 

4:30 p.m., and directed the parties to meet and confer at least ten days in advance as 

required by Rule 26(f) and develop a joint case management report. The order stated that 

Plaintiff was responsible for initiating the conference. Doc. 27. 

 Plaintiff never initiated the conference. To facilitate a timely Rule 26(f) report, 

counsel for Wells Fargo wrote Plaintiff, enclosed a draft case management report, and 

requested that Plaintiff provide dates and times before November 25, 2016, when 

Plaintiff would be available to confer, together with a telephone number where she could 

be reached. Doc. 27 at 2 & Ex. A. Plaintiff did not respond. Counsel attempted to reach 

Plaintiff by telephone at the number listed on her pleadings prior to filing the case 

management report, but Plaintiff did not respond. Id. 

 In addition, Plaintiff refused to accept mail unless it was addressed to her in a 

precise manner. Doc. 24, Ex. A. If her name was spelled incorrectly, Plaintiff refused to 

accept the mail, even if it was related to this litigation. As a result, a number of letters 

sent to Plaintiff’s address by the Court and defense counsel have been returned. See 

Docs. 10, 11, 12, 24. 

 On several occasions before the case management conference, Plaintiff stated 

either in writing or in phone calls to the Court’s staff that she would not appear for the 

case management conference. The Court’s staff told her, repeatedly, that she was 

obligated to appear at the conference in accordance with the Court’s order. 

 On December 7, 2016, Plaintiff came to the courthouse, but refused to enter the 

courtroom. She instead spoke with the Court’s Judicial Assistant on the Court’s intercom 

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system and stated that she would not enter the courtroom for the conference. The Judicial 

Assistant told Plaintiff that she was required to appear under the Court’s orders. 

 Plaintiff stood outside the double doors in the back of the courtroom looking 

through the glass window. When the Court saw Plaintiff standing outside the courtroom 

doors, it directed the courtroom clerk to step outside and tell Plaintiff that she was 

required to enter. Plaintiff refused. The Court directed the courtroom clerk to again step 

outside the doors and tell Plaintiff that her case would be dismissed if she refused to enter 

the courtroom and participate in the case management conference. Plaintiff initially 

refused, but then entered the courtroom. 

 Plaintiff came to counsel table and stated that she was going to leave some papers 

on the table and depart. The Court engaged Plaintiff in a conversation for approximately 

30 minutes regarding her need to participate in the case management conference. 

Plaintiff demanded instead that the Court rule on her motion to remand. The Court stated 

that it would not rule on the motion because Defendants had not had an opportunity to 

respond. Plaintiff stated that she did not consent to the Court’s jurisdiction in this matter, 

and that the only action the Court could take was to remand her case. When the Court 

made clear that it would not rule on the motion to remand before Defendants had an 

opportunity to respond, and that it intended to proceed with the case management 

conference, Plaintiff refused to participate. This entire exchange occurred on the record. 

 After more than 30 minutes of attempting to persuade Plaintiff to participate in the 

case management conference, and having no success, the Court told Plaintiff that her case 

would be dismissed. Before this time, and after, Plaintiff stated that she wanted to 

dismiss this action voluntarily if the Court would not grant immediate remand. 

Defendants opposed a voluntary dismissal. The Court advised Plaintiff that it would 

consider whether to allow her to voluntary dismiss her case or enter a dismissal under 

Rule 41(b). Having considered those options, and in light of Plaintiff’s steadfast refusal 

to comply with the orders of the Court, the Court concludes that this action should be 

dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 

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 The Ninth Circuit has developed a five-part test to determine whether a dismissal 

sanction is just: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of the litigation; (2) the 

court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; 

(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability 

of less drastic sanctions. Valley Engineers, Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 

1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malone v. USPS, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

“[W]here a court order is violated, factors 1 and 2 support sanctions and 4 cuts against 

case dispositive sanctions, so 3 and 5 . . . are decisive.” Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at 

1057. Factor 5 “involves consideration of three subparts: whether the court explicitly 

discussed alternative sanctions, whether it tried them, and whether it warned the 

recalcitrant party about the possibility of dismissal.” Id. 

 Considering this five-factor test, the Court concludes that dismissal is appropriate. 

The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court’s need to 

manage its docket require action when a plaintiff refuses to prosecute a case. In addition, 

Defendant will be prejudiced if a sanction of dismissal is not imposed and this case 

continues to languish due to Plaintiff’s non-cooperation and defiance of court orders. 

The Court specifically warned Plaintiff that her action would be dismissed if she refused 

to participate in the case management conference, and the Plaintiff refused. The Court 

has considered less drastic sanctions, and concludes that the only reasonable alternative is 

dismissal without prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendant Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is granted. Plaintiff’s 

claims against Wells Fargo are dismissed with prejudice on the basis of res 

judicata. 

 2. Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants are dismissed without 

prejudice under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 

 

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 3. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

 Dated this 8th day of December, 2016. 

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