Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05924/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05924-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARON SAUNDERS,

Plaintiff, CV F 04 5924 LJO WMW 

vs. ORDER RE MOTION (DOC 125)

CYNTHIA KNIGHT, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants on claims of wrongful arrest and an

unconstitutional search. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s June 8, 2007,

motion to disqualify Magistrate Judge Wunderlich from all further

proceedings in this action. 

On April 30, 2007, an order was entered, granting Defendants’

motion to compel Plaintiff’s response to certain questions posed to her at

her deposition. The order reflected Magistrate Judge Wunderlich’s ruling

at the April 17, 2007, hearing on the motion to compel. On May 30, 2007,

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision. On June 13,

2007, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

Plaintiff brings her motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C.

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Section 144 applies only to judges conducting proceedings “in a

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district court”(district judges or other judges sitting by designation).

Section 455 applies to federal judges generally, including appellate,

magistrate, and bankruptcy judges. In re Smith, 305 F.3d 1078, 1092-1093 (9th

Cir. 2002). There is no provision under §455(b)(1) for referral to another

judge. The judge at whom the motion is directed must determine whether

recusal is warranted. In re Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 844 (9 Cir. 1994). 

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§ 455. Section 144 provides that a challenge regarding judicial bias or

prejudice shall be assigned to another judge. Section 455 provides that a

judge shall disqualify him or herself in any matter in which their

impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Though Plaintiff brings

this motion under both statutes, she noticed the motion for hearing

before the undersigned. The Court therefore construes this as a motion to

disqualify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. This construction does not

preclude Plaintiff from filing a separate motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

144, or from seeking reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 72-303(b). 

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The substantive standard for recusal, whether sought under 28

 U.S.C. §144 or §455, is the same: “[W]hether a reasonable person with

knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality

might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d

1450, 1453 (9 Cir. 1997) citing Unites States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939

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(9 Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). The alleged bias must stem from an th

“extrajudicial source.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994).

“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias

or partiality motion.” Id. at 555; Poland v. Stewart, 92 F.3d 881 (9 Cir. th

1996). “[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or

events occurring in the course of current proceedings, or of prior

proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion

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unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would

make fair judgment impossible.” United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869,

882 (9 Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980) (a judge’s views on th

legal issues may not serve as a basis for motions to disqualify).

Plaintiff seeks recusal on the grounds of bias and prejudice. 

Plaintiff contends that at the April 17 hearing, the undersigned “was th

rude, abrasive, intimidating, coercive, bias (sic) & unfair in his treatment

of Plaintiff Sharon Saunders, resulting in prejudice. . . ” Plaintiff

contends that the undersigned demonstrated bias toward defense counsel

because Plaintiff was denied her request to read into the record a

prepared written statement. As noted in the order issued after the

hearing, the ruling does not refer to any argument at the hearing, and is

based solely upon the written pleadings. Though counsel for Defendants

did address the Court, the underlying legal reasoning for the ruling is

based upon the written arguments in the pleadings. 

A judge’s critical or hostile remarks made during a judicial

proceeding as to counsel, parties or their cases, will not support a recusal

motion unless the reveal “an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial

source, or such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make a

fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Throughout this

motion to recuse, Plaintiff refers to bias, hostility and prejudice. Plaintiff

does not, however, refer to any extrajudicial source for her impressions. 

Plaintiff also revisits issues that were resolved in the motion at issue on

April 17th.

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of bias fail to establish legally

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sufficient grounds for recusal. See Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622,

626-27 (9 Cir. 1993)(concluding that speculative assertions of invidious th

motive are insufficient to show judicial bias). The Court finds that

Plaintiff’s motion fails to meet the standard set forth above. That

Plaintiff received an unfavorable ruling does not demonstrate bias. That

Plaintiff was not allowed to read her prepared statement does not

demonstrate bias or prejudice. The legal issues were clear: Plaintiff must

provide basic identifying information and Plaintiff was not granted leave

to exceed twenty-five interrogatories. Plaintiff offered no legal

justification for either of her positions in her written submissions. That

she was denied permission to read a written statement does not

constitute bias or prejudice as those terms are discussed above.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to

recuse the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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