Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01840/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01840-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shawn Lorin Henderson,

Petitioner

-vsDora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondents

CV-08-1840-PHX-GMS (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at San Luis,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October

6, 2008 (#1). On January 7, 2009, Respondents filed their Response (#9). Petitioner has not

replied.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

A Maricopa County Superior Court Information (Exhibit A) was filed charging

Petitioner with theft of a means of transportation and unlawful flight. (Exhibits to the

Answer, #9 are referenced herein as “Exhibit __.”) The state alleged historical priors (Exhibit

B), and various aggravating circumstances (Exhibit C). Eventually, Petitioner entered into

a plea agreement, and pled guilty to theft of a means of transportation. (Exhibit F, M.E.

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1/5/5.) A Presentence Investigation Report (Exhibit I) was prepared, and on March 2, 2005,

Petitioner was sentenced to a 3.5 year prison term. (Exhibit H, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition #1 at 2, 3 (physical pages 2 and 29).)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Trial Court - Petitioner did file a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit J).

Counsel was appointed (Exhibit K, M.E. 5/31/5), but eventually filed a Notice of Completion

of Review (Exhibit L) reflecting an inability to find a viable issue for review. Petitioner then

filed a pro per PCR petition (Exhibit N), arguing:

(1) counsel intimidated Petitioner into entering a guilty plea; 

(2) counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner about the risk of

consecutive sentencing with another pending prosecution;

(3) counsel was ineffective for advising Petitioner that the prosecutor would

recommend concurrent sentences.

The state opposed the petition on the merits. (Exhibit O, Response.)

The trial court summarily dismissed the Petition, based in part upon Petitioner’s

avowals in the plea proceeding that there were no threats or force used to induce him to

plead, and no promises outside the plea agreement.

Petitioner then filed a “Petition for Summary Judgment” (Exhibit R), asserting a

denial of due process as a result of failure to hold a hearing on the petition. The Court

construed the filing as asserting lack of a ruling, directed service of the Court’s earlier denial,

and extended the time for a motion for rehearing or petition for review. (Exhibit S, M.E.

1/9/7.) A subsequent request to again extend those time limits was granted. (Exhibit T, M.E.

1/9/7.) Petitioner also filed a Motion to Amend (Exhibit U). The motion was denied.

(Exhibit V, M.E. 2/26/7.) 

Eventually, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing (Exhibit W), arguing inter alia that

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the trial counsel’s firm had been appointed to represent Petitioner in his PCR proceeding. The

motion was summarily denied. (Exhibit X, M.E. 3/5/7.)

Arizona Court of Appeals - Petitioner then filed a Petitioner for Review (Exhibit Y),

asserting:

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel by:

(a) failure to adequately consult with Petitioner about the plea offer;

(b) failure to provide Petitioner a copy of the pre-sentence investigation;

(c) permitting a coerced plea agreement through threats of a 20 year sentence;

(d) coaching Petitioner’s testimony at the plea proceeding

(e) misrepresenting that the sentence would be concurrent to another sentence;

(f) failure to pursue mitigation of the sentence;

(g) failure to object to reliance on the presentence report and prior convictions;

and

(2) the trial court violated the Arizona rules by using a prior conviction to

determine his sentence and thereby violating Petitioner’s rights under

Apprendi.

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. (Exhibit Z, Order 11/30/07.)

Arizona Supreme Court - Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit AA)

with the Arizona Supreme Court, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea

negotiations and before the Court of Appeals. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily

denied review. (Exhibit BB, Order 5/29/08.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner commenced the present proceeding by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 6, 2008 (#1). Petitioner asserts four

grounds for relief: 

(1) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment

in advising Petitioner on the plea agreement 

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(2) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing to provide Petitioner with

a copy of the presentence report, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 

(3) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment,

in failing to ensure that Petitioner’s sentencing was fundamentally fair; and

(4) the trial court abused its discretion and violated Apprendi by considering a

prior conviction during sentencing.

On January 7, 2009, Respondents filed their Response (#9), arguing that the Petitioner

has failed to fairly exhaust his claims by presenting his ineffective assistance claims as

federal claims before the trial court, and is now barred from doing so by Arizona’s time and

preclusion bars. Respondents also argue that Ground 1 is without merit.

Petitioner has not replied.

On August 13, 2009, the undersigned directed (#10) Respondents to supplement the

record with complete copies of Petitioner’s PCR Petition. On August 17, 2009, Respondents

complied, filing Exhibit N (#11). Petitioner was given an opportunity to object to the exhibit,

but has not responded.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. SUBSTITUTION OF RESPONDENTS

Dora Schriro, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections is presently named

as Respondent in this action. However, Charles Ryan appears to be the current Director.

Rule 25(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for automatic substitution of public

officers by their successors. Accordingly, an order of substitution should be entered.

B. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted, now procedurally defaulted,

and thus barred from habeas review.

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1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Forum/Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona

state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

Respondents argue (Answer, #9 at 10 n. 4) that presentation to the Arizona Supreme

Court (not just the Arizona Court of Appeals) is required for exhaustion, citing Baldwin v.

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 30–33 (1999). The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent reliance on Swoopes

in Castillo, notwithstanding Baldwin, dispels this argument. Moreover, nothing in Baldwin

precludes the reasoning in Swoopes. Nor does the language cited by Respondents from State

v. Ikirt, 160 Ariz. 113, 117, 770 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1989), which predated the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (Ariz.1989), on

which Swoopes is based.

/ /

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1

 Petitioner also complains in his Ground One that counsel failed to review the

presentence report with Petitioner, resulting in unspecified errors and failed to raise the

errors. This is duplicative of Ground Two and is addressed in connection with that ground

for relief.

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 b. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but

must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has

been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d

1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

"Of course, a claim is exhausted if the State’s highest court expressly addresses the

claim, whether or not it was fairly presented." Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 n. 18

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). 

2. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

a. Ground One - IAC re Advice on Plea - In his first ground for relief, Petitioner

alleges trial counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment in advising

Petitioner on the plea agreement. In particular, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was

ineffective because there were unspecified “glaring inconsistencies in plea negotiations. . .

and counsel’s failure to insure that the overall circumstances surrounding the plea agreement

were the product of a fundamentally fair procedure untainted by any type of coercion”

(Petition, #1 at 6.)1

 He also argues that “counsel never read or explained the terms and

conditions of the plea agreement.” (Id.)

In his PCR Petition for Review, Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective because

“Petitioner’s counsel [had not] conferred with him about . . .the terms and conditions of the

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2

 For the same reason, it is irrelevant whether Petitioner subsequently raised his

previously un-presented claims to the Arizona Supreme Court in his Petition for Review

(Exhibit AA) of the court of appeals’ decision, of which review was summarily denied

(Exhibit BB, Order 5/29/08).

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plea agreement.” (Exhibit Y at 2.) He clarified that counsel had failed to alert him that his

prior felony convictions could be used against him and that his sentences could be

consecutive. (Id. at 2-C.) However, Petitioner did not assert that broad claim to the trial

court in his PCR Petition. Rather, that petition was limited to arguing that counsel failed to

inform Petitioner that consecutive sentences were possible. (Exhibit N at 3-4.) 

Effect of Skipping Trial Court - Presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals for the

first time is not sufficient to exhaust an Arizona state prisoner’s remedies. "Submitting a

new claim to the state's highest court in a procedural context in which its merits will not be

considered absent special circumstances does not constitute fair presentation." Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351

(1989)). In Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004), the court reiterated that to properly

exhaust a claim, "a petitioner must properly raise it on every level of direct review." Id. at

916.

Academic treatment accords: The leading treatise on federal habeas

corpus states, “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion

requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire

direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire

judicial postconviction process available in the state.” 

Id. (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (4th

ed. 1998) (emphasis added).2

In Arizona, review of a petition for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Court of

Appeals is governed by Rule 32.9, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which clarifies that

review is available for “issues which were decided by the trial court.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.9(c)(1)(ii). See also State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (Ariz.App.,

1980) (issues first presented in petition for review and not presented to trial court not subject

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3

 Ramirez relied in part on Rule 32.9(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P., which at the time required

that issues for review also be preserved in a motion for rehearing to the PCR court. Although

the motion for rehearing requirement has since been eliminated, the Ramirez requirement for

presentation to the PCR court continues to be relied upon and cited by the Arizona courts,

albeit in unpublished decisions. See e.g. State v. Moore, 2009 WL 4346434 (Ariz. App. 2009

(unpublished). 

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to review).3 

Thus, Petitioner's failure to present claims to the trial court in a PCR petition before

presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals precludes a finding that they have been

fairly presented. 

Therefore, the only portion of Ground One that could be deemed fairly presented, and

thus exhausted, is Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that

consecutive sentences were possible. Indeed, Respondents concede that under Swoopes, this

claim would be exhausted, had Petitioner asserted it as a federal claim. (Answer, #9 at 10.)

Assertion as Federal Claim - Respondents argue, however, that Petitioner merely

presented the facts of this claim, and failed to identify the claim as a federal one. Indeed,

while the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,” Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758

(9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were

before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). 

Respondents describe Petitioner’s state petitions as simply asserting claims of

“ineffective assistance of counsel.” They cite several cases holding that simply designating

a claim as one for “ineffective assistance of counsel” is insufficient to fairly present a federal

claim. Here, however, Petitioner did not simply argue ineffective assistance. 

 Instead, in his PCR Petition, Petitioner referred to his claim as assertions of

“ineffective assistance of counsel which caused a violation of the Petitioner’s Constitutional

Rights of Due Process.” (Exhibit N at 3.) In Arizona, the state right to counsel arises under

Article II, § 24 of the Arizona Constitution. That provision is not part of the State’s

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4

 In addition, Petitioner plainly asserted his ineffective assistance claims as asserting

a federal claim in his Motion for Rehearing, citing a variety of federal cases. (See Exhibit

W, Mot. Rehearing at VI, et seq.)

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guarantee of due process. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Const. Art. 2 § 4. It is true that Arizona’s due

process guarantee does indirectly incorporate a right to counsel in some situations. See eg.

State v. Transon, 186 Ariz. 482, 485, 924 P.2d 486, 489 (App. 1996) (due process right to

gather evidence incorporates right to counsel during gathering). On the other hand, the

federal Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the concomitant right to effective counsel, is

applicable to the states only through the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Thus, Petitioner’s qualification of his claim of

ineffective assistance as arising under his “Constitutional Rights of Due Process” would have

meant to any reasonable jurist in Arizona that the Petitioner was asserting the violation of his

federal right to effective assistance of counsel.4

In his petition for review, Petitioner made much clearer reference to federal law,

arguing that “court appointed counsel was grossly ineffective violating Petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment right.” (Exhibit Y, Petition at 2.) He further referenced his right to counsel

“pursuant to both federal and state law.” (Id.) And, he specifically cited to “Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671” as establishing the controlling test. (Id. at 2-A.) 

Conclusion re Exhaustion of Ground One - Accordingly, the undersigned concludes

that Petitioner fairly presented as a federal claim his claim that counsel was ineffective for

failing to advise him that consecutive sentences were possible. 

The remainder of Ground One, however, is unexhausted.

b. Ground Two: IAC re Copy of Presentence Report - For his Ground Two,

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to provide Petitioner with a copy

of the presentence report, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Although generally attacking

the effectiveness of counsel with regard to sentencing, Petitioner did not argue in his PCR

petition that such ineffectiveness included failure to provide the presentence report. (See

Exhibit N, PCR Pet.) He did raise the claim in his Petition for Review (see Exhibit Y at 2-

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5

 Petitioner also includes in his Ground Three additional allegations about counsel’s

failure to properly advise him on the plea agreement. These allegations are repetitive of the

claims in Ground One, and are addressed herein above.

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A), but as discussed above, his failure to raise it to the trial court precludes a finding that the

claim was fairly presented. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that this ground for

relief is unexhausted.

c. Ground Three: IAC re Sentencing - For his Ground Three, Petitioner argues that

counsel was ineffective for failing to insure that the sentencing was “fundamentally fair” by

failing to object to errors and omissions in the presentence report.5

 Petitioner made no such

allegations in his PCR Petition (Exhibit N) or his Motion for Rehearing (Exhibit W).

Petitioner did assert these allegations in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Exhibit Y at 2-E.) But, as discussed above, his failure to raise them to the trial

court precludes a finding that the claim was fairly presented. Accordingly, the undersigned

concludes that this ground for relief is also unexhausted. 

d. Ground Four: Apprendi- In his Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that the trial court

violated his right to a jury trial at sentencing under Apprendi by considering a prior

conviction during sentencing. He asserted no such claim in his PCR Petition (Exhibit N), nor

his Motion for Rehearing (Exhibit W). In his Petition for Review, he did argue that he was

never advised of his Apprendi rights, and thus his admission of his prior convictions was not

knowing and intelligent as required by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.6. (Exhibit

Y, PFT at 2-G). However, as discussed above, his failure to raise it to the trial court

precludes a finding that the claim was fairly presented. Accordingly, the undersigned

concludes that this ground for relief is unexhausted.

e. Summary re Exhaustion - Petitioner has failed to exhaust all of his claims except

that portion of Ground One asserting that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him

that consecutive sentences were possible. 

/ /

/ /

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3. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis,

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted"

and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a

procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11

(1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims to

the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim.

Proc. 32.2(a), and its timeliness bar in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, #9 at 13.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, direct

appeal is no longer available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. Moreover,

because Petitioner entered a guilty plea, he has no right to file a direct appeal. See Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 13-4033; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.1(e); State v. Stevens, 173 Ariz. 494, 495, 844 P.2d 661,

662 (App. 1992).

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can also no longer seek review by

a subsequent PCR Petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions for post-conviction

relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days after the entry of

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in

the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357

(App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition of pleading

defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the

category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to timeliness

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bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to his claims. 

Nor, with one exception, does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines

the excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a claim

is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state

courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application.

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal.

Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in the law.

Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application to

Petitioner’s procedural claims. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 404, 166 P.3d 945, 959

(App. 2007) (32.1(h) did not apply where petitioner had “ not established that trial error

...amounts to a claim of actual innocence”). 

Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude that review through Arizona’s direct

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6

 This Court reviews the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. Ylst

v.Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). The Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit Z) and

Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit BB) issued summary denials. Accordingly, it is the trial

court’s decision which is reviewed on this claim.

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appeal and post-conviction relief process is no longer possible for Petitioner’s unexhausted

claims. Accordingly, these unexhausted claims are procedurally defaulted, and absent a

showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence, must be dismissed with prejudice. 

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, he may not obtain

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to

excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Failure to establish cause may be

excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in

the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496

(1986) Here, Petitioner has offered no explanation to excuse his failure to exhaust. The

undersigned finds none. Nor has Petitioner made any assertion that he is actually innocent.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s unexhausted claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

C. MERITS OF EXHAUSTED PORTION OF GROUND ONE

The exhausted portion of Petitioner’s Ground One asserts that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to advise him that consecutive sentences were possible. Respondents

argue that the trial court’s6

 rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable application of nor

contrary to Federal law, as required for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The trial court rejected this claim, having determined that at the plea proceeding the

Petitioner “indicated that he knew that the sentences could be made to run consecutively and

[Petitioner] also acknowledged that each plea agreement contained everything he agreed to

and that no promises had been made other than those set forth in the plea agreements.”

(Exhibit Q, M.E. 5/31/06 at 1.)

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim,

petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the

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objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 687-88, 694. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may

reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the

claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

In the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must prove he was prejudiced from

counsel's deficient performance by demonstrating a reasonable probability that but for his

attorney's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Even if one assumes that counsel failed to advise Petitioner that he could receive

consecutive sentences, Petitioner became aware of such an outcome at the plea proceeding,

prior to entering his plea, as a result of the Court’s colloquy.

THE COURT: Do you understand the sentences could be

made to run consecutively, or on top of one another?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

(Exhibit E, R.T. 1/5/5 at 5.) In U.S. v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1987), the court

rejected a claim of ineffective assistance based on failure to properly advise of the potential

of consecutive sentences, because the defendant had acknowledged to the court at the plea

proceeding the potential for consecutive sentences. “Even if Rubalcaba’s attorney acted

incompetently by misinforming him of the nature of the plea bargain, Rubalcaba has failed

to show this act prejudiced him.” Id. at 494. 

It is true that the Rubalcaba court also referenced the defendant’s acknowledgment

“that he was satisfied with his attorney.” Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d at 494. See also Gonzalez v.

U.S., 33 F.3d 1047, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Rubalcaba and rejecting claim based on

advice by court and acknowledgment of satisfaction with counsel). Petitioner made no

similar representation to the court in this case. However, it is not clear to the undersigned

the import of such acknowledgment of satisfaction with counsel. The deficiency of counsel

was, in effect, cured by the court’s advice, thus eliminating any prejudice. The Petitioner’s

satisfaction with counsel, as a general matter, might further derogate his claim of

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ineffectiveness, but is logically unnecessary to a conclusion that the deficiency in advice was

non-prejudicial.

Moreover, at least one court has read Rubalcaba as being based on the trial court’s

advice at the plea colloquy, without reference to the defendant’s purported satisfaction with

counsel. See U.S. v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 2005). Further, other courts have

relied upon a defendant’s advice at the plea colloquy without requiring such a representation

as to satisfaction with counsel. See e.g. U.S. v. Boniface, 601 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979)

(misrepresentation about possible sentencing by attorney irrelevant where court properly

advised defendant on effect of plea)); and Doganiere v. U.S. , 914 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1990)

(same).

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to show that but for his

counsel’s presumably defective advice he would not have pled guilty. Therefore, his claim

of ineffective performance is without merit, and this remaining portion of Ground One

should be denied. 

G. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. In such event, a decision on a

certificate of appealability will be required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

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constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds and in part on

the merits. As to both, the undersigned finds that jurists of reason would not find the

conclusions reached herein debatable. Accordingly, the certificate of appealability should

be denied.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Charles L. Ryan, as successor to Dora

Schriro as Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, be SUBSTITUTED for

Respondent Dora Schriro.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the portion of Petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed on October 6, 2008 (#1), alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel based on failure to advise Petitioner on consecutive sentencing be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed on October 6, 2008 (#1), be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that in the event this Report &

Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

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V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: February 8, 2010 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

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