Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02400/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02400-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN B. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. ROBINSON, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-CV-2400 WBS DAD P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action, brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, and is alleging violations of his civil rights. In his complaint, plaintiff has 

presented numerous claims, all of which center on prison officials‟ decision in 2009 to include an 

“R-suffix” in his custody classification. The California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) uses the R-suffix to indicate an inmate is a sex offender, a classification 

that in turn affects an inmate‟s eligibility for certain custody assignments. Plaintiff alleges that 

adding the R-suffix to his custody classification violated his rights to due process and equal 

protection. He further alleges that the defendants recommended or assigned him the R-suffix in 

retaliation for his filing of inmate grievances in the past and that the placement of the R-suffix in 

his classification violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 

Amendment. Plaintiff also avers state law causes of action for fraud, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress and negligence. 

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Pending before the court now are several motions to dismiss and one motion for summary 

judgment filed on behalf of the various defendants.

I. Factual background

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges as follows. Plaintiff‟s criminal history begins in 1977, 

when he pled guilty to one misdemeanor count of indecent exposure, a violation of California 

Penal Code § 314.1. (Complaint (Doc. No. 1) at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff claims that he “is not now, nor 

has he ever been, required to register per [Penal Code Section] 290 for that 1977 conviction.” (Id.

at ¶ 21.) Section 290 of the California Penal Code establishes the state‟s sex offender registration 

requirement for individuals convicted of certain sex offenses. California Code of Regulations, 

title 15, section 3377.1(b)(1)(A) (2008), states that “[a]n „R‟ suffix shall be affixed to an inmate‟s 

custody designation . . . during reception center processing if . . . [t]he inmate is required to 

register per PC Section 290.” The R-suffix is relevant to determining an inmate‟s housing 

assignment and the degree of supervision he will require while in CDCR‟s custody. See 15 CCR 

§ 3377.1(a).

Plaintiff states he entered California‟s correctional system in 1981 on a narcotics 

conviction. (Complaint at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff bounced in and out of CDCR‟s custody until 2000, 

when he was given a life sentence under California‟s Three-Strike provision. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-56; see

also Ex. D.) It does not appear that plaintiff was convicted of any sex offense other than the 

misdemeanor indecent exposure charge in 1977. However, in 1999, while in CDCR‟s custody, 

“plaintiff was forced to submit [to] the felony statutory provision found in P.C. 296 et seq. for his 

misdemeanor offense.” (Id. at ¶ 48.) Here, plaintiff refers to the sections of the California Penal 

Code that require CDCR officials to collect DNA samples from inmates who have been convicted 

of certain offenses. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 295-296. In his complaint he says that “as a direct 

result of this erroneous DNA collection, a [Folsom State Prison] classification committee 

erroneously affixed an „R‟ suffix to the plaintiff‟s custody designation[,] labeling him a „sex 

offender‟ without conducting any „R‟ suffix evaluation.” (Compl. at ¶ 49.) Plaintiff appealed the 

R-suffix designation through CDCR‟s internal grievance process and requested clarification as to

whether he was required to register as a sex offender under Penal Code § 290. (See Compl. Ex. 

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B.) A Correctional Case Supervisor responded to his appeal as follows:

After a thorough review of your Rap Sheet, I did discovered [sic] an 

arrest of Aug. 14, 1976 by Sacramento Co. for 314.1 PC/Indecent 

Exposure (Misdemeanor). On Feb. 3, 1977, you were convicted of 

that particular offense.

However, per People vs. King (1984) 157 Cal.3d 554 Court of 

Appeals, Fourth Appellate Dist. Court, conviction of this offense is 

no longer registrable [sic] if the offense was committed on or before 

June 22, 1984, or unless ordered by the court.

Contact was made with the Department of Justice (Registration 

Unit) in Sacramento to determine if the court had ever ordered you 

to register per 290 PC. . . . [N]o registration is required.

A Notation has been entered in your Central File to that affect [sic]. 

All existing forms will be purged from the Central File, and a copy 

of this appeal will remain in the file, as a point of reference.

Id. According to plaintiff, his inmate appeal resulted in having the R-suffix removed from his 

classification status. (Compl. at ¶¶ 51-53.) 

In December 2008, prison officials at Corcoran State Prison, however, revisited plaintiff‟s

custody classification. (Id. at ¶ 61.) Plaintiff had requested a transfer to a lower-security 

institution, and a classification staff representative was required to evaluate his custody 

designation prior to endorsing or opposing the transfer. (Id. at ¶¶ 62-65.) As part of that process, 

a unit classification committee (UCC) decided not to affix the R-suffix to plaintiff‟s custody 

classification because no documentation regarding his arrest and conviction for misdemeanor 

indecent exposure was available. (Id. at ¶ 66; Compl., Ex. G.) On January 20, 2009, plaintiff was 

transferred to California Training Facility (CTF). (Id. at ¶ 68.) 

Defendant Robinson was assigned as plaintiff‟s correctional counselor (CCI) upon 

plaintiff‟s arrival at CTF. (Compl. at ¶ 70.) According to plaintiff, he and Robinson had a 

negative history: Robinson had been plaintiff‟s CCI during plaintiff‟s previous stint at CTF from 

2005 to 2007. (Id. at ¶ 75.) In October or November 2006, plaintiff “lodged an administrative 

grievance / staff complaint against defendant R. Robinson for what plaintiff alleged was „a 

morally lax character when dealing with inmates and applying prison policy.‟” (Id. at ¶ 76.) 

“Plaintiff‟s return to CTF on Jan. 20, 2009, was his first encounter with defendant R. Robinson in 

over two years.” (Id. at ¶ 77.)

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According to plaintiff, during a meeting in Robinson‟s office on January 27, 2009, 

Robinson informed plaintiff that at an upcoming initial classification committee hearing he would 

recommend applying an R-suffix to plaintiff‟s custody classification in light of his conviction for 

misdemeanor indecent exposure in 1977. (Id. at ¶ 71.) Plaintiff informed Robinson that the UCC 

at Corcoran had just decided against affixing the R-suffix to plaintiff‟s classification. (Id. at ¶ 

81.) “Defendant R. Robinson stated that he was, indeed, aware of that fact.” (Id. at ¶ 82.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he continued to press Robinson that reconsideration of his classification was 

unnecessary, whereupon “Defendant R. Robinson . . . showed plaintiff the door, stating, „[I]f you 

don‟t like it, appeal it, or file one of your little complaints, you like to do that – right.‟” (Id. at ¶ 

86.)

Plaintiff appeared before a “mock” classification committee on February 4, 2009.1 

(Compl. at ¶ 69.) The committee was comprised of defendants Robinson and King and non-party

correctional officer Todd. (Id. at ¶ 89.) King presided as “acting captain.” (Id. at ¶ 90.) 

Defendant Robinson formally recommended affixing the R-suffix in light of plaintiff‟s 

misdemeanor indecent exposure conviction. (Id. at ¶ 91.) Plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendant 

King then abruptly attempted to conclude [the hearing] by telling plaintiff that was all and he 

could go[,]” but plaintiff “began to address his disagreement . . . directing defendant King to the 

Dec. 4, 2008 [hearing] where the issue of the „R‟ suffix . . . had just been fully and exhaustively 

evaluated and resolved[.]” (Id. at ¶¶ 92-93.) King replied that Robinson had already reviewed 

that part of plaintiff‟s record and determined that affixing the R-suffix was appropriate. (Id. at ¶ 

94.) Plaintiff claims that when he “attempted to ask on what grounds had defendant Robinson 

made that „determination,‟ defendant R. Robinson interrupted plaintiff by standing and saying, 

„We‟re done here, let‟s go.‟” (Id. at ¶ 95.) The complaint further alleges that when he asked if he 

could submit a letter explaining his opposition to the R-suffix, and when defendant King 

“responded affirmatively and began to reach across the table top” to take the letter, Robinson 

 

1

The term “mock” appears to be plaintiff‟s characterization of the committee, reflecting his 

contention that the committee was not properly formed under CDCR regulations and had no 

authority to recommend the R-suffix. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 88-89, 113-17.) 

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“became livi[d] and very angry[,] placed his hand on his pepper-spray and stepped toward 

plaintiff, who was still seated, as if he was going to spray plaintiff right in the face.” (Id. at ¶ 

102-05.) Plaintiff avers that “[d]efendant King then jumped from her chair yelling, „Robinson, 

stop it. Sit down!‟” (Id. at ¶ 106.) King informed plaintiff that the committee‟s decision was 

“only a recommendation” to be submitted to a classification staff representative (CSR). (Id. at ¶ 

108.) King allegedly went on to tell plaintiff that “if the CSR does go along with our 

recommendation today, then I will personally provide you with the CDC Form 840 and the CDC 

Form 128G recording today‟s committee decision so you can appeal this action if that‟s what you 

want to do, but you must wait for the proper forms . . . so you can attach them to your appeal[.]” 

(Id.) The record of the February 4 hearing states that “[t]he inmate was told . . . that he can argue 

his case through a CDCR 602 Appeal process if the CSR approves today‟s committee action and 

receives copies of the CDCR 128-G and CDCR 840 forms.”

2

 (Compl., Ex. HH.) 

Plaintiff states as he exited the hearing room on February 4, he “made a conscious 

decision right there and then to stay as far away from defendant R. Robinson as possible.” 

(Compl. at ¶ 118.) 

It appears that defendant Donnelly, the CSR assigned to plaintiff‟s classification after the 

initial hearing, approved the R-suffix recommendation on February 17, 2009, though the form 

recording that decision simply states that the “R suffix is noted.” (Compl., Ex. I I.) The form 

documenting the CSR‟s review is labeled “CDC 128-G,” which is one of the forms plaintiff had

to wait for before filing an appeal. (Id.) However, plaintiff maintains that he received no notice 

of any final decision on his custody classification for over a year after the hearing of February 4, 

2009. He states that he sent defendant King notes “several times during the months that followed 

. . . inquiring about the status of his custody . . . but never received any reply.” (Id. at ¶ 122.) 

 

2

 The record of the February 4 hearing lists defendant Jordan as the committee chairperson. 

(Compl., Ex. HH.) There is a signature above Jordan‟s name. Plaintiff insists Jordan was not at 

the February 4 hearing and alleges that Jordan, Robinson and King have fraudulently represented 

that Jordan was there by signing their names on the record. (Compl. at ¶337, 340-41.) The court 

notes that the document also lists correctional officers Moffatt and Lacy as committee members. 

Neither of them is a defendant in this lawsuit, nor is Officer Todd, who no one disputes was at the 

hearing. 

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Plaintiff was transferred to Folsom State Prison (FSP) in July 2010. (Id. at ¶ 120.) He alleges 

that during his entire stay at CTF, he never heard that an R-suffix had been affixed to his custody 

status. (Id. at ¶ 124.) 

According to the complaint, “[i]t wasn‟t until plaintiff‟s initial classification committee at 

FSP on July 21, 2010 that plaintiff learned that he did, indeed, have an „R‟ suffix affixed to his 

custody designation dating back to the Feb. 4, 2009 UCC [hearing] at CTF.” (Id. at ¶ 125.) 

Plaintiff again argued his case at FSP that the change in his classification was an error and 

violated CDCR regulations. (Id. at ¶ 129.) Defendant Jacquez, who chaired the UCC that day, 

replied simply that the R-suffix was valid. (Id. at ¶ 131.) Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal 

of the R-suffix that same day, July 21, 2010. (See Compl., Ex. J.) It was the first inmate appeal 

related to his new custody classification.

Plaintiff‟s appeal was screened out by defendant Fransham initially because it did not 

include the proper documentation. (Compl. at ¶ 139.) Ultimately Fransham rejected plaintiff‟s 

inmate appeal as untimely. (Id. at ¶¶ 167, 169.) After extensive interaction with Fransham and 

plaintiff‟s correctional counselor at Folsom, defendant Pulley, “plaintiff felt, at this point, that he 

had no choice but to wait for the next annual classification review committee.” (Id. at ¶ 219.) 

Defendants Wilkinson, Marton and Pulley were present at plaintiff‟s next classification

hearing, in December 2011. (Compl. at ¶¶ 228-29.) Plaintiff again argued at that time against the 

affixing of the R-suffix to his classification, but Wilkinson informed him that the committee 

would not take up the issue. (Id. at ¶¶ 233-34.) As plaintiff continued to argue his case, 

defendant Pulley allegedly “shoved” plaintiff out of the room. (Id. at ¶¶ 237-39.) Plaintiff 

appealed again. Defendant Olstrom screened out the inmate appeal as untimely. (Compl., Ex. 

GG.) At a meeting with defendant Olstrom to discuss his inmate appeal‟s “cancellation,” 

Olstrom gave plaintiff copies of the 128-G form for the hearing of February 4, 2009, at which 

Robinson had originally recommended the R-suffix, and the 128-G form reflecting the CSR‟s 

apparent approval of that recommendation on February 17, 2009. (Compl. at ¶¶ 259-61.) 

According to plaintiff, that was the first time plaintiff had received those forms. (Id. at ¶¶ 262.)

/////

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II. The question of plaintiff‟s registration requirement under Penal Code § 290

One of plaintiff‟s key allegations is that his misdemeanor conviction for indecent 

exposure in 1977 has never required him to register as a sex offender under California Penal Code 

§ 290. The undersigned‟s own inquiry indicates that contention to be false: in fact, a conviction 

for indecent exposure has long been included in the text of § 290 as a sex offense that triggers the 

statute‟s mandatory reporting requirement. This appears to have been the case since at least 1970. 

See, e.g., Barrows v. Municipal Court, 1 Cal.3d 821, 826 (1970) (“Among the persons who are 

required to register pursuant to section 290 are those who are convicted of ... exposing one‟s 

person in a public place (§314)[.]”) Although there was a long period after plaintiff‟s conviction 

during which California courts questioned the constitutionality of including indecent exposure as 

an offense requiring registration under § 290, this court can find no indication that the 

requirement was not in effect when plaintiff pled guilty to indecent exposure in 1977.3 

 

3

 In 1983, the California Supreme Court held that requiring one convicted of misdemeanor “lewd 

or dissolute conduct” (California Penal Code § 647(a)), to register as a sex offender was a form of 

punishment that violated the California constitution‟s ban on cruel and unusual punishment (Cal. 

Const., art. I, § 17). In re Reed, 33 Cal.3d 914 (1983). In 1984, the California Court of Appeal 

relied on the decision in Reed to hold that “the continuing penalty of sex offender registration is 

out of all proportion to the crime of misdemeanor indecent exposure.” In re King, 157 Cal. App. 

3d 554, 558 (1984). CDCR‟s 1999 memorandum informing plaintiff that the R-suffix would be 

removed his classification cited King as the legal basis for that administrative decision. (Compl., 

Ex. B.) The California Supreme Court never squarely addressed the intermediate court‟s ruling in 

King or the status of indecent exposure under § 290 and Reed. In 2004, however, the California 

Supreme Court expressly overruled Reed. In In re Alva, 33 Cal.4th 254 (2004), the court held 

that “California‟s law requiring the mere registration of convicted sex offenders is not a punitive 

measure subject to either state or federal proscriptions against punishment that is „cruel‟ and/or 

„unusual.‟” Alva, 33 Cal. 4th at 262. The petitioner in Alva had been convicted of misdemeanor 

possession of child pornography. As before, the California Supreme Court offered no explicit 

extension of the new ruling to convictions for misdemeanor indecent exposure. Six months later, 

though, the same intermediate appellate court that had applied Reed‟s ban to a conviction for 

misdemeanor indecent exposure in King abrogated that ruling, concluding that Alva‟s analysis 

“applies with equal force to any of the misdemeanor crimes listed in section 290, subdivision 

(a)(2)(A).” In re Noriega, 124 Cal. App.4th 1334, 1342 (2004) (emphasis added). Thus King is 

no longer good law. Like the plaintiff in this case, the defendant in Noriega had been convicted 

of misdemeanor indecent exposure. The decision in Noriega required that defendant to register as 

a sex offender under § 290. This court‟s survey of California law uncovers no ruling inconsistent 

with Noriega‟s holding. The undersigned concludes, therefore, that after an ambiguous reprieve 

starting in 1984, plaintiff fell under the registration requirement of §290 again in 2004 and has 

remained there ever since. 

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IV. Defendant Robinson‟s summary judgment motion for failure to exhaust

Defendant Robinson initially filed a single motion to dismiss under Rule 12, arguing: (1) 

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required; (2) 

plaintiff has failed to state any federal claim on which relief could be granted; (3) plaintiff has 

failed to plead any viable state law claims; and (4) defendant Robinson is entitled to qualified 

immunity. (See Doc. No. 43.) Two weeks prior to Robinson‟s filing his motion to dismiss, 

however, the Ninth Circuit decided Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168-77 (9th Cir. 2014), 

holding that in most cases the appropriate procedural device for arguing failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies as a basis for dismissal is a motion for summary judgment under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56. On June 3, 2014, this court, relying on Albino, denied Robinson‟s 

motion to dismiss in part and without prejudice and gave him thirty days in which to re-file his 

exhaustion argument via a motion for summary judgment. (See Doc. No. 52.) Defendant 

Robinson complied with that order, and plaintiff timely filed his oppositions to the defendant‟s 

motions. (See Docs. 53, 56.) 

By the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether 

they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive 

force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that exhaustion of prison administrative 

procedures is mandatory regardless of the types of degrees of relief a state‟s correctional system 

offers. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). The Supreme Court has further

cautioned against reading futility or other exceptions into the statutory exhaustion requirement. 

See id. at 741 n.6. Moreover, because proper exhaustion is necessary, a prisoner cannot satisfy 

the exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective 

administrative grievance or appeal. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). “[T]o 

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properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners „must complete the administrative review 

process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,‟ [ ] – rules that are defined not by the 

PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) 

(quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). See also Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 

2009) (“The California prison system‟s requirements „define the boundaries of proper 

exhaustion.‟”).

A court may excuse a prisoner from complying with the PLRA‟s exhaustion requirement 

if he establishes that the existing administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. 

See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172-73. For example, where prison officials improperly screen out 

inmate grievances, they can render administrative remedies effectively unavailable. See Sapp v. 

Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010). In such a case, “the inmate cannot pursue the 

necessary sequence of appeals . . . .” Id. See also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (excusing an inmate‟s failure to exhaust because he was precluded from exhausting his 

administrative remedies by a warden‟s mistaken instruction to him that a particular unavailable 

document was needed for him to pursue his inmate appeal); Marella, 568 F.3d 1024 (excusing an 

inmate‟s failure to exhaust because he did not have access to the necessary grievance forms to 

timely file his grievance). 

The PLRA exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional; it creates an affirmative defense 

that defendants must plead and prove. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216 (“[I]nmates are not required to 

specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168. A 

defendant may move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “[i]n the rare 

event” that a prisoner‟s failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint. Albino, 747 F.3d 

at 1168-69. Otherwise defendants must move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56 and produce probative evidence that proves a prisoner‟s failure to exhaust. See id.

at 1166. Specifically, “the defendant‟s burden is to prove that there was an available 

administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 1172. 

If the defendant carries that burden, “the prisoner has the burden of production. That is, the 

burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in 

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his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies 

effectively unavailable to him.” Id. If the undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable 

to the prisoner demonstrates a failure to exhaust, the court should grant defendant‟s motion for 

summary judgment. Id. at 1166. On the other hand, if there are material facts in dispute, the 

court should deny defendant‟s motion summary judgment. Id.

In California, prisoners may appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission 

by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material 

adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). 

Prior to January 28, 2011, 

California‟s Department of Corrections provide[d] a four-step 

grievance process for prisoners who seek review of an 

administrative decision or perceived mistreatment. Within fifteen 

working days of “the event or decision being appealed,” the inmate 

. . . ordinarily [was to] file an “informal” appeal, through which 

“the appellant and staff involved in the action or decision attempt to 

resolve the grievance informally.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 

3084.5(a), 3084.6(c) (2009). [Footnote omitted.] If the issue [was] 

not resolved during the informal appeal, the grievant next 

proceed[ed] to the first formal appeal level, usually conducted by 

the prison‟s Appeals Coordinator. Id. §§ 3084.5(b), 3084.6(c). 

Next [was] the second level, providing review by the institution‟s 

head or a regional parole administrator, and the third level, in which 

review is conducted by a designee of the Director of the 

Department of Corrections. [Footnote omitted.] Id. § 3084.5(e)(1)-

(2).

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005).

4

 

In this case, it is not disputed that plaintiff did not file any inmate grievance concerning 

the classification process in his case until July 21, 2010, the same day he learned from the initial 

classification committee at Folsom that the R-suffix had been attached to his status. Defendant 

 

4

 CDCR regulations governing the grievance and appeals process underwent significant 

modifications that became effective January 28, 2011. One of those changes extended the time 

limit for filing an initial grievance from fifteen days to thirty days; that regulation was relisted 

from § 3084.6(c) (2009) to § 3084.8(b). See Garland v. Lewis, No. CV 10-9010 FMO (OPx), 

2013 WL 4198278 at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013). Defendant Robinson erroneously cites the 

thirty-day limit as applicable here. However, all relevant facts concerning exhaustion in this case 

occurred in 2009 and 2010, prior to the date these amendments became effective. Accordingly, 

the pre-amendment fifteen-day window is the applicable time period in this case. 

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Robinson argues that plaintiff was on notice of the R-suffix no later than February 4, 2009, the 

date of the initial classification committee‟s hearing at CTF, and that the administrative appeal 

plaintiff filed in July 2010 was therefore too late to exhaust any claims against him. Plaintiff 

responds that since he did not know that the R-suffix was attached to his classification status until 

July 21, 2010, he could not have filed a grievance against Robinson before that date. 

1. Exhaustion of the retaliation claim against Robinson

The court takes plaintiff‟s allegation that he did not learn about the R-suffix until his 

transfer to Folsom in July 2010 to be true. However, that allegation would not have been relevant 

to an inmate grievance based on defendant Robinson‟s alleged conduct at his meeting with 

plaintiff on January 27, 2009, and at the hearing of February 4, 2009, where the re-classification 

process began. Of the numerous federal claims plaintiff has levied against defendant Robinson, 

only the claim for retaliation arises purely from plaintiff‟s allegations concerning Robinson‟s 

conduct. It is therefore the only claim that is not arguably dependent on the final outcome of the 

February 4, 2009 hearing, i.e., the decision to give plaintiff the R-suffix.5 

According to plaintiff‟s own version of events, defendant Robinson‟s conduct in January 

and February 2009 made it apparent to him that Robinson was acting out of a retaliatory motive 

in recommending the R-suffix be affixed to his custody classification. Insofar as the complaint 

does not allege Robinson took any further action against plaintiff after the hearing of February 4, 

2009, the fact that plaintiff did not learn about the final decision on the R-suffix until July 2010 is 

irrelevant to plaintiff‟s failure to file an inmate grievance with respect to Robinson‟s alleged acts 

of retaliation when plaintiff became aware of those acts. There is no question plaintiff understood 

that the classification committee at CTF had convened to discuss whether to recommend affixing 

the R-suffix to his custody classification. Moreover, there is no dispute plaintiff understood 

 

5

 If, for example, plaintiff alleged that defendant Robinson used excessive force against him at 

the February 4 hearing, a grievance for that conduct obviously would have accrued right then, 

regardless of the outcome of the hearing. Likewise, a grievance based on Robinson‟s alleged 

retaliation against plaintiff accrued when plaintiff became aware of Robinson‟s alleged 

motivation to retaliate through the classification process regardless of whether Robinson was 

successful in recommending the R-suffix or when plaintiff finally found out about Robinson‟s 

success in actually getting the suffix affixed.

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Robinson‟s role in the classification process was limited to making a recommendation on 

February 4 to affix the R-suffix to plaintiff‟s custody status. Defendant Robinson did not have 

authority to do more than make his recommendation that day; plaintiff himself is adamant that the 

final decision was for another officer to make. Plaintiff is just as adamant that he had come to 

believe defendant Robinson was acting out of hostility toward him by the time the hearing of 

February 4 was over. Indeed, plaintiff claims that as he left that hearing, he “made a conscious 

decision right there and then to stay as far away from defendant R. Robinson as possible.” 

(Complaint, ¶ 118.) Yet plaintiff offers nothing as to why he did not file an inmate grievance 

against defendant Robinson for retaliation or any other wrongful conduct within fifteen days of 

the hearing. 

Plaintiff suspected or had good reason to suspect no later than February 4, 2009, that 

Robinson was carrying out some kind of retaliation against him through the classification process. 

Therefore any claim based on allegations of retaliation against Robinson, or any other claim 

based on Robinson‟s conduct or presence at the 2009 hearing, is unexhausted due to plaintiff‟s 

failure to pursue a timely inmate appeal with respect to that conduct.

2. Plaintiff‟s failure to alert officials to Robinson‟s alleged conduct

An inmate appeal not only must be timely in order to exhaust a future claim presented in a 

civil action, it must also provide the factual detail required by prison regulations so that prison 

officials have notice of the nature of the prisoner‟s complaint. As a general matter, the level of 

specificity necessary to exhaust a claim in a prison appeal is not very high: 

A grievance need not include legal terminology or legal theories 

unless they are in some way needed to provide notice of the harm 

being grieved. A grievance also need not contain every fact 

necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal claim. The 

primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem 

and facilitate its resolution, not to lay the groundwork for litigation.

Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942, 

946 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Griffin to CDCR regulations governing prison grievances). Where 

a prisoner‟s inmate appeal “does not . . . challenge the plaintiff‟s [classification] based on alleged 

retaliatory conduct[,]” a § 1983 claim for retaliation is unexhausted. Dixon v. LaRosa, No. 2:10-

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cv-1441 GEB KJN P, 2011 WL 3875806 at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011). If “[p]laintiff‟s 

appeal . . . clearly complains about denial of due process rights but not retaliation,” the claim for 

retaliation is unexhausted. Goolsby v. Gonzalez, No. 1:11-cv-0394-LJO-GSA-PC, 2014 WL 

7272765 at *13 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014). 

Here, plaintiff‟s inmate appeal regarding his receiving of the R-suffix complained that 

there was no evidence to support the R-suffix and that it was affixed to his classification status 

without due process and contrary to CDCR regulations. (See Complaint, Ex. J.) Those 

allegations do nothing to apprise prison officials of the retaliatory conduct plaintiff would later 

allege against defendant Robinson in this lawsuit. Plaintiff made no mention of Robinson in the 

appeal, did not reference the February 4, 2009 hearing at CTF, and did not describe any action 

suggesting that a prison official had retaliated against plaintiff in any way. See Goolsby, 2014 

WL 7272765 at *13 (“Plaintiff was not required to name all the defendants, state legal theories, or 

use the word „retaliation,‟ but the language of the written appeals, without more, did not address 

Plaintiff‟s retaliation claim.”). 

In fact, plaintiff‟s use of the inmate grievance process in 2010 could not have alerted a 

CDCR official to the possibility that he was complaining about any wrongful conduct or decision 

for which defendant Robinson was responsible. Plaintiff‟s inmate appeal specifically attacked the 

decision of Folsom‟s classification committee to keep the R-suffix in place; it does not mention 

anything that allegedly happened at CTF, where defendant Robinson first recommended the 

affixing of the R-suffix to plaintiff‟s classification in February 2009. (See Complaint, Ex. J.) 

The fact that plaintiff challenged the R-suffix as soon as he learned about its imposition in July 

2010 does not exhaust every related, alleged wrong that plaintiff believes occurred in the inmate 

classification process going back to early 2009, alleged wrongs of which plaintiff was clearly 

aware when they occurred. “Where one set of facts and circumstances gives rise to more than 

one potential claim, the plaintiff cannot exhaust all of the potential claims by merely exhausting 

one such claim.” Johnson v. Woodford, No. CV 04-05995-GHK (CT), 2010 WL 4007308 at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2010) (relying on the decision in Morton). See also Escobar v. Smith, No. 

2:12-cv-0773 GEB DAD P, 2012 WL 5465889 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012) (stating that 

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although the inmate complained to prison officials about being deprived of medication, his 

grievance “did not give prison officials a fair opportunity to respond to a complaint that he was 

being wrongfully deprived of surgery”). 

Plaintiff cannot plausibly show that his use of the inmate grievance process in 2010 put 

prison officials on notice about any complaint that could be imputed to defendant Robinson. As a 

result, all of plaintiff‟s claims against defendant Robinson were unexhausted at the time this civil 

action was filed. Accordingly, defendant Robinson‟s motion for summary judgment for failure to 

exhaust prior to filing suit should be granted thereby rendering defendant Robinson‟s motion to 

dismiss the claims against him under Rule 12(b)(6) moot.

IV. Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendants Jordan, Marton, Pulley, Ostrom, Donnelly, Fransham, Jacquez and Wilkinson6

have jointly filed a motion seeking dismissal of all of plaintiff‟s claims under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Defendant 

Robinson has filed a separate motion dismiss on the same ground, but as stated above, it will be 

rendered if the undersigned‟s recommendation that his motion for summary judgment due to 

plaintiff‟s failure to exhaust prior to filing suit be granted is adopted. Nevertheless, the court will

also analyze the viability of plaintiff‟s claims against defendant Robinson under Rule 12(b)(6).

Finally, defendant King has also filed a separate motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).7

In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations of the 

complaint as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Pro se 

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. 

 

6

 The court refers occasionally to these defendants as “the joint defendants” or “jointly moving 

defendants.” 

7

 Defendant King‟s argument in support of her motion to dismiss appears to be cut-and-pasted 

verbatim from the memorandum submitted by the jointly moving defendants. (Doc. No. 37 at 8-

30.) Not even the names of the joint defendants are changed to “defendant King” where it would 

be appropriate. Needless to say, the arguments presented in such a fashion by counsel for 

defendant King are unhelpful. 

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Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se 

complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555-57 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, 

a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Attachments to a complaint are considered to be part of the complaint for 

purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir.1990).

A. Plaintiff‟s due process claims

Plaintiff contends that defendants Robinson, King and Jordan violated his right to due 

process in recommending the R-suffix be attached to his classification status at the hearing held at 

CTF on February 4, 2009. (Compl. at ¶ 443.) Again, according to plaintiff, King and Robinson 

attended the hearing (along with non-party Todd), while Jordan merely signed the 128-G form 

memorializing the recommendation. Plaintiff alleges defendant Donnelly also violated his right 

to due process by approving the recommendation. (Id. at ¶ 448.) Plaintiff alleges defendant 

Jacquez violated his right to due process in failing to remove the R-suffix once he arrived at 

Folsom in July 2010. (Id. at ¶¶ 450-53.) He also alleges defendants Wilkinson, Pulley and 

Marton violated his right to due process in the UCC hearing of December 2011. (Id. at ¶¶ 464, 

467.) Plaintiff claims that defendants Fransham, Pulley and Ostrom deprived him of due process 

in their handling of his inmate appeals before and after the UCC hearing of December 2011. (Id.

at ¶¶ 456, 460-61, 470, 472.)

A liberty interest that requires the protections of due process arises from one of two 

sources: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or state law. Wilkinson v. 

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222 (2005). Prisoners have no freestanding right under the Fourteenth 

Amendment to any particular security classification. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 

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(9th Cir.1997) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976)). Therefore any liberty 

interest plaintiff had in avoiding the R-suffix must be grounded in California‟s correctional 

statutes or in CDCR regulations.

In Sandin v. O‟Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a 

state‟s correctional law creates a liberty interest if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on 

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin and its progeny identify 

three factors to consider in determining whether an atypical and significant hardship exists: (1) 

whether the conditions “mirrored those conditions imposed . . . in analogous discretionary

confinement settings, namely administrative segregation and protective custody;” (2) the duration 

and intensity of the conditions; and (3) whether the change in confinement would “inevitably 

affect the duration of [the prisoner‟s] sentence.” Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1064 

(9th Cir.2013) (citation omitted) (alteration in original).

If a state regulation creates a liberty interest in avoiding a particular decision or condition 

of confinement, prison officials must provide a prisoner with a hearing on that decision plus: (1) 

written notice of the charges or allegations to be considered at the hearing; (2) a brief period after 

notice, no less than twenty-four hours, to prepare for the hearing; (3) a written statement by the 

fact-finder regarding the evidence and reasons for the finding; and (4) an opportunity to seek 

assistance if the inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

563-70 (1974).

In this case, the court need not consider whether the plaintiff had a liberty interest in not 

being classified with the R-suffix, for even assuming he did, plaintiff has received all the process 

due. 

An inmate who has been convicted of a sex crime in a prior 

adversarial setting, whether as the result of a bench trial, jury trial 

or plea agreement, has received the minimum protections required 

by due process. Prison officials need do no more than notify such 

an inmate that he has been classified as a sex offender because of 

his prior conviction for a sex crime. 

Neal, 131 F.3d at 831. As explained in footnote 3 above, California courts questioned for some

time whether § 290 could be constitutionally applied to a person convicted of misdemeanor 

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indecent exposure. However, there was no such question in 1977, when plaintiff pled guilty to 

that violation, nor is there any such question now. If the court were addressing plaintiff‟s due 

process claim with that issue still unresolved, it might pause at the validity of plaintiff‟s 1977 

conviction as “all the process due.” But the legality of plaintiff‟s conviction as a pre-requisite for 

California‟s sex offender registry is now well settled in California law, and, according to the 

Ninth Circuit in Neal, it is dispositive of his due process claim. Pursuant to the decision in Neal, 

plaintiff‟s plea of guilty to one count of misdemeanor indecent exposure met the minimum due 

process protections required before prison officials classified him as a sex offender pursuant to

CDCR regulations and California Penal Code § 290. See Washington v. Woodford, No. C 05-

2889 SI (PR), 2005 WL 3096116, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2005) (“[T]here was no due process 

violation in adding to Washington‟s classification score the “R” suffix that indicated he had a sex 

crime history. As the state habeas court noted, Washington did not dispute that he had the 

requisite sex offense conviction. Washington‟s criminal case provided the procedural protections 

necessary before the prison officials could label him as a sex offender. [¶] The fact that the “R” 

suffix allegedly was not added to Washington‟s classification score within the time frame 

provided by the state regulations does not make it a federal due process violation. A violation of 

the state's regulation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) Plaintiff‟s claim that affixing 

the R-suffix to his custodial classification violated his right to due process should therefore be 

dismissed as to all defendants. 

B. Plaintiff‟s equal protection claims

Plaintiff also alleges the defendants violated his right to equal protection under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. (See Complaint at ¶¶ 451, 453, 458, 461, 464, and 470.) “The Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall „deny to any 

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,‟ which is essentially a direction that 

all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citation omitted). Typically, “[t]o state a § 1983 claim for violation of 

the Equal Protection Clause a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or 

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” 

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Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). A claimant may also attack a “facially neutral” regulation or policy under the 

Equal Protection Clause, but “proof of its disproportionate impact on an identifiable group can 

satisfy the intent requirement only if it tends to show that some invidious or discriminatory 

purpose underlies the policy.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citations omitted). Moreover, a regulation that purposefully affects a non-protected group 

remains constitutional as long as it bears some rational relation to a governmental purpose. Id. at 

687. Therefore a prison policy that treats a non-protected class of inmates differently from 

similarly situated prisoners is constitutional if it is rationally related to legitimate correctional 

goals. Id.; Brignac v. Kimzey, No. CIV S-07-0624 GEB DAD P, 2009 WL 545991 at *3 (E.D.

Cal. Mar. 4, 2009) (“Moreover, prisoners incarcerated at different state prisons are not „similarly 

situated.‟ The court is aware that state prisons vary based on security level, inmate population 

and other factors. The educational programming available at New Folsom may well be different 

than what is available at other state prisons without violating the Equal Protection Clause.”) 

Plaintiff does not allege that his inclusion in a particular group, protected or nonprotected, motivated prison officials to treat him differently from other similarly situated 

prisoners. In fact, plaintiff‟s allegations of equal protection violations amount to no more than 

due process claims of “atypical and significant hardship” alongside which plaintiff applies the 

label “equal protection” for good measure. (See Complaint at ¶¶ 451, 453, 458, 461, 464, and 

470.) However, plaintiff alleges no facts explaining how he was targeted for a discriminatory 

purpose or even how his treatment differed adversely from that accorded other prisoners. The 

undersigned finds nothing in plaintiff‟s complaint that would, if true, support a cause of action for 

violation of plaintiff‟s right to equal protection against any defendant. 

C. Plaintiff‟s retaliation claims

Plaintiff has alleged defendants Robinson, King and Jordan violated his rights under the 

First Amendment when they used their recommendation of the R-suffix to retaliate against him 

for the inmate grievance he filed several years earlier against Robinson. (Compl. at ¶ 442.) He 

/////

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incorporates by reference the same claim against defendants Jacquez, Fransham, Pulley, 

Wilkinson, Marton and Olstrom. (Id. at ¶¶ 450, 456, 460, 467 and 472.)

It is well established that a facially legitimate prison security measure, such as a change in 

a prisoner‟s custody classification, may be actionable under the Civil Rights Act if it is carried out 

in retaliation for the prisoner‟s decision to engage in constitutionally protected conduct. See

Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff who claims a prison official 

retaliated against him must show: (1) that a state actor took some adverse action against him (2)

because of (3) the prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate‟s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The burden is on the plaintiff to plead and prove the absence of any legitimate penological 

purpose in the act that he alleges was retaliatory in nature. See Pratt v. Rowland, 802, 806 (9th 

Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has approved of requiring a plaintiff who alleges retaliation to 

show that his exercise of constitutionally protected conduct was a “substantial factor” or 

“motivating factor” behind the state actor‟s adverse action when that action appears on the 

surface to be legally justified. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 

287 (1977). 

According to the allegations of his complaint, plaintiff first learned of Robinson‟s 

intention to recommend the imposition of the R-suffix at a meeting with Robinson on January 27, 

2009. The complaint describes Robinson behaving at that meeting in a way that could suggest a 

retaliatory motive, telling plaintiff that “[i]f you don‟t like it, appeal it, or file one of your little 

complaints, you like to do that – right.” (Complaint at ¶ 86.) Robinson‟s alleged intention 

became manifest at the hearing of February 4, 2009, when he followed through with the 

recommendation and continued to behave in a way suggesting personal animosity toward the 

plaintiff. 

The complaint alleges facts that, if proved, could be the basis of a claim for retaliation 

against defendant Robinson – but only Robinson. Although plaintiff avers in conclusory fashion

some sort of collusion between Robinson and other defendants who were involved in his

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classification process at CTF in 2009,

8

the complaint contains no facts supporting a reasonable 

inference that any defendant besides Robinson was motivated to repay plaintiff for an inmate 

grievance he filed against Robinson several years prior. Plaintiff admits as much in his 

opposition to the joint motion to dismiss, in which he argues “[t]here is only one reason that the 

plaintiff thirty-seven years after suffering a misdemeanor conviction is now deemed to be a threat 

to anyone; and that reason being only due to the fact that the plaintiff had the misfortune of again

crossing paths with defendant R. Robinson.” (Opposition (Doc. No. 40) at 26.) 

Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a cognizable claim of retaliation against defendants 

King, Jordan, Jacquez, Fransham, Pulley, Wilkinson, Marton and Olstrom. Accordingly, their 

motions to dismiss that claim should be granted.

D. Plaintiff‟s Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff makes blanket allegations against the defendants that their participation in the reclassification process violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment. (Compl. at ¶¶ 444, 454, 462, 466 and 471.) 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement and 

from the “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 

(1981). Inhumane conditions exist when a prisoner is deprived of the “minimal civilized measure 

of life‟s necessities” – food, clothing, shelter, medical care and personal safety. Id. at 347; 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under 

the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the 

official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 837. A plaintiff who claims that his conditions of confinement fall below the constitutional 

standard must make two showings. “First, the plaintiff must make an „objective‟ showing that the 

deprivation was „sufficiently serious‟ to form the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation.” 

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “The Constitution . . . 

 

8

See, e.g., Counts I and II of the complaint, in which plaintiff alleges that defendants Robinson, 

King and Jordan acted “individually and collectively” in retaliating against plaintiff for his 

previously filed grievances. (Compl. at ¶¶ 442-43.) 

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„does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only those deprivations denying „the minimal 

civilized measure of life‟s necessities‟ are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth 

Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (citations omitted). Second, 

the prisoner must make a “subjective” showing that prison officials “acted with the requisite 

culpable intent such that the infliction of pain is „unnecessary and wanton.‟ In prison conditions 

cases, prison officials act with the requisite culpable intent when they act with deliberate 

indifference to the inmate‟s suffering.” Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th

Cir.1995). 

“Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical 

abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982). A violation of this duty 

entails deliberate indifference to the inmate‟s safety – that is, a prison official must know of and 

disregard an excessive risk to the inmate‟s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The very 

obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish a defendant‟s knowledge. Id. at 842; Wallis 

v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

calling a prisoner a “snitch” in the presence of other inmates was sufficient to state a claim of 

deliberate indifference to the inmate‟s safety as well as a claim of retaliation. See

Vanlandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In this case, the only allegation of plaintiff‟s complaint that plausibly satisfies the 

objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim is the suggestion that the R-suffix puts plaintiff

in physical danger. In Paragraph 212 of his complaint, plaintiff references the “‟sex offender‟ 

stigma” and his “fear for his safety should the information fall on the wrong ears.” In his 

opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, plaintiff says “[i]t is no secret what the „R‟ suffix 

implications are, and what impact such a classification will have on a white male prisoner 

incarcerated within the California state correctional system.” (Opposition (Doc. No. 40) at 50-

51.) In his opposition plaintiff repeats the statement in his complaint that “[p]laintiff has, since 

learning of the „R‟ suffix attachment to his paperwork, been in extreme fear for his safety.” (Id.

at 51.) 

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Courts have not ignored the potentially severe consequences of being known as a “sex 

offender” in prison. In Neal, the Ninth Circuit was blunt in acknowledging that “[w]e can hardly 

conceive of a state‟s action bearing more „stigmatizing consequences‟ than the labeling of a 

prison inmate as a sex offender.” Neal, 131 F.3d at 829. In Neal the court analyzed a due process 

claim, but the seriousness of the “sex offender” label in prison is tangible enough to support, in 

certain circumstances, a claim that a defendant used the dangerous implications of that label or 

ignored them in deliberate indifference to an inmate‟s safety. See, e.g., Knight v. Runnels, No. 

CIV S-07-0751-FCD-CMK-P, 2007 WL 2390139 at * 2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2007) (finding both 

prongs of a deliberate indifference claim were sufficiently pled where plaintiff “allege[d] that this 

defendant put a „R-suffix‟ in his file knowing that, if plaintiff was put in the general population, 

he would be stabbed”); Sims v. Woodford, No. 1:05-cv-1523-LJO-DLB (PC), 2008 WL 669943 

at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2008) (denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) where the 

plaintiff had pled that “defendants errantly classified him as a convicted sex offender, and failed 

to remove that classification subsequent to correspondence from the court to the contrary”); 

Nailing v. Fosterer, No. CIV S-09-2475-MCE-CMK, 2012 WL 1130655 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 

2012) (finding a cause of action sufficiently pled because “a reasonable jury could conclude that 

defendants were deliberately indifferent to the generally known risk sex offenders face in the 

prison general population”). Although in this case plaintiff‟s complaint is spare in detailing the 

extent to which the R-suffix places him in danger of abuse by other inmates, at this stage of the 

litigation the court must give the complaint a liberal reading and draw all inferences from it in the 

plaintiff‟s favor. Therefore the court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently pled the objective 

element of his Eighth Amendment claim. 

However, plaintiff‟s claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety – the 

second, or subjective, element of an Eighth Amendment claim – is cognizable against defendant 

Robinson only. This determination follows from the court‟s conclusion, discussed above, that 

plaintiff adequately pled his retaliation claim against Robinson only. That is, it is plausible that 

every defendant knew the danger an R-suffix could impose on the plaintiff, but only defendant 

Robinson‟s alleged, retaliatory motive supplies the state of mind necessary to plead a claim of 

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deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See Vanlandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138. 

The allegations of the complaint do not support an inference that any defendant besides Robinson

participated in the re-classification process to retaliate against the plaintiff; therefore it does not 

support an inference that any other defendant harbored the only state of mind that qualifies as 

deliberate indifference in this case. 

For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable 

Eighth Amendment claim against defendants King, Jordan, Jacquez, Fransham, Pulley, 

Wilkinson, Marton and Olstrom. Therefore, their motions to dismiss that claim should be 

granted. 

E. Other federal claims

To the extent that the complaint contains other federal claims under the First, Eighth or 

Fourteenth Amendments, they are too vaguely alleged to meet the federal rules‟ “demand [for] 

more than an unadorned . . . accusation” that a defendant unlawfully injured the plaintiff. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a federal complaint to present a “short 

and plain statement” of the claim that entitle a plaintiff to relief). Although plaintiff‟s allegations 

of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations leave little space for speculation, the court 

finds the joint defendants‟ expressed concern for loose ends under plaintiff‟s broad First 

Amendment accusations is well taken. Having carefully reviewed plaintiff‟s extraordinarily long, 

wide-ranging complaint, the court finds only one outstanding claim: at various points in his 

complaint, plaintiff references his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress 

of grievances. (See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 457, 465 and 469.) 

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). Prisoners have no freestanding right to a prison grievance process, see

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003), but “a prisoner‟s fundamental right of 

access to the courts hinges on his ability to access the prison grievance system.” Bradley v. Hall, 

64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S.

223, 230 n. 2 (2001). To state a viable claim that his right to access the courts has been violated, 

a plaintiff must have suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out of court. Christopher v. 

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Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). Therefore a correctional officer‟s active interference with an 

inmate‟s appeal may be the basis of a claim under the First Amendment if that action disabled the 

inmate from pursuing litigation in court. See Navarro v. Herndon, No. 2:09-cv-1878 KJM KJN 

P, 2012 WL 6097112 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2012). 

In this case, plaintiff availed himself of the grievance process at least twice after he 

learned that the R-suffix was part of his classification status. The fact that plaintiff was denied 

administrative relief on procedural bases with which he disagreed does not state a cognizable 

claim that his access to the process itself was unconstitutionally foreclosed. Furthermore, the 

denials of plaintiff‟s inmate grievances, even if improper, have not shut his access to this court, 

nor has plaintiff alleged they have. Rather, plaintiff alleges only that some inmate appeals 

coordinators were negligent or reckless in their attention to his inmate appeals or, at worst, 

unlawfully motivated to deny them. If defendants were to rely on an administrative denial of

plaintiff‟s inmate grievances to argue that he has not exhausted the inmate grievance procedure, 

plaintiff could then attempt to show that a denial was improper and that he exhausted all 

procedural avenues available to him. The denial of the inmate grievance itself, however, does not 

create an independent cause of action. See Stockton v. Tyson, No. 1:10-cv-0662-BAM PC, 2011 

WL 5118456 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011) (dismissing a complaint on screening because 

“[p]laintiff may not pursue a claim for denial of access to the courts . . . based on the rejection of 

his appeals by staff”); Carroll v. Gricewich, No. 1:07-cv-0070-AWI-NEW (DLB) PC, 2007 WL 

1345340 at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2007) (collecting cases).

For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that plaintiff has not stated a viable, 

cognizable claim that his access to the courts has been violated. To the extent plaintiff means to 

allege any other federal claim under the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision, 

such claims are too vaguely described in the complaint to be allowed to go forward. 

F. State law claims

Plaintiff has also alleged state law claims of negligence, fraud and infliction of emotional 

distress. However, in light of the court‟s conclusion that none of plaintiff‟s federal claims can 

proceed, this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

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1367(c)(3) and dismiss plaintiff‟s state law claims without prejudice to his pursuing them in state 

court.

VI. Conclusion

The court concludes that plaintiff has failed to state any viable claim under the 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against defendants Jordan, Marton, Pulley, Ostrom, Donnelly, Fransham, Jacquez,

Wilkinson and King. The motions to dismiss all federal claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) brought 

on behalf of those defendants should be granted. 

Plaintiff has, however, stated viable, cognizable claims for retaliation and deliberate 

indifference against defendant Robinson; he has failed to state viable claims against Robinson for 

violations of due process and equal protection. However all of plaintiff‟s claims against 

Robinson are unexhausted. Therefore defendant Robinson‟s motion for summary judgment due 

to plaintiff‟s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required should also 

be granted. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The motion to dismiss filed by defendants Jordan, Marton, Pulley, Ostrom, Donnelly, 

Fransham, Jacquez and Wilkinson (Doc. No. 26) should be granted with prejudice as to all federal 

claims, for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The 

motion to dismiss should be granted without prejudice as to all state law claims, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

2. The motion to dismiss filed by defendant King (Doc. No. 37) should be granted with 

prejudice as to all federal claims with prejudice, for failure to state a claim on which relief could 

be granted . Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion to dismiss should be granted without prejudice 

as to all state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

3. Defendant Robinson‟s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 53) should be granted 

as to all federal claims due to plaintiff‟s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing 

suit. 

4. Defendant Robinson‟s motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part. 

It should be granted without prejudice as to all state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

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1367(c)(3). The motion to dismiss should be denied as moot as to all federal claims alleged 

against defendant Robinson, in light of plaintiff‟s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior 

to filing suit as required.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court‟s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 1, 2015

hm

john2400.57

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