Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00076/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00076-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAXIMILIAN MONCLOVA-CHAVEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIC McEACHERN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-00076-AWI-SKO PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE

DENIED

(Doc. 62)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS

Plaintiff Maximilian Monclova-Chavez (“Plaintiff”) is a federal prisoner in this civil rights

action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388 (1971), which provides a remedyfor civil rights violations committed byfederal actors. Plaintiff

claims Defendants Eric McEachern, Timothy, Miller, Kenneth White, and C.O. Tincher violated the

Eighth Amendment by using excessive force against Plaintiff. On August 30, 2010, Defendant C.O.

Tincher filed a motion for summary judgement. (Doc. #62.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on

September 17, 2010. (Doc. #63.) Defendant Tincher filed a reply on September 27, 2010. (Doc.

#65.)

I. Background

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against C.O. Tincher

This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s January 15, 2008 complaint. (Doc. #1.) Plaintiff’s claim

against Defendant Tincher is described in “Claim Three” of his complaint. Plaintiff claims that

“Tincher, gratuitously and deliberately, with the intent of hurting Plaintiff, slammed a heavy steel

door from behind Plaintiff hitting him with full force in the hands, right shoulder and right arm

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causing Plaintiff to suffer severe pain.” (Compl. 7, ECF No. 1. ) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he door 1

hit Plaintiff so hard that it forced Plaintiff to be slammed forward with such force as to fall on the

concrete floor on his face but was grabbed by the escorting officer who stopped Plaintiff from hitting

the floor on his face and head.” (Compl. 8, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff claims to have suffered painful

bruises on his right shoulder, right arm, and hands, weakness and numbness in the right arm and

shoulder, and emotional distress because of Tincher’s actions.

Defendant Tincher argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact because Tincher did

not use excessive force against Plaintiff. Tincher argues that any use of force was merely de minimis

and is not actionable under Bivens. Tincher also argues that Plaintiff’s claim fails because there is

no evidence that Tincher acted with a subjective intent to do harm. Tincher also argues that

Plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages is barred bythe Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

because Plaintiff only suffered de minimis physical injury. Finally, Tincher argues that he is entitled

to qualified immunity.

II. Summary Judgment Legal Standards

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). “[A] party seeking summary

judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322. “A moving party without the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial-usually, but not always, a defendant-has both the initial burden of

production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire

Citations to Plaintiff’s complaint refer to the page number as the complaint is electronically docketed. The

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page numbers used by Plaintiff do not align with the electronic page numbers.

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& Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “In order to carry

its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have

enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Id.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention

is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors

Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers,

Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a

material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be

shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W.

Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the Court must

be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out

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of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal.

1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Discussion

Defendant Tincher argues that he is entitled to judgment on four separate grounds. First,

Tincher contends that he is entitled to judgment because his actions were at most a de minimis use

of force and are, therefore, not actionable under Bivens. Second, Tincher contends that Plaintiff has

no evidence that Tincher had a subjective intent to harm Plaintiff and therefore has no claim under

Bivens. Third, Tincher contends that Plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages is barred by the

PLRA. Fourth, Tincher contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Eighth Amendment Legal Standards

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and

“embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency.’” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir.

1968)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1)

the objective requirement that the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the subjective

requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

The objective requirement that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious” is met where the

prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The subjective

“sufficiently culpable state of mind” requirement is met when a prison official acts with “deliberate

indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303). A prison official

acts with deliberate indifferencewhen he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

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health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Id.

Where prison officials are accused of using excessive physical force, the issue is “‘whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quotingWhitley v. Albers,

475 U.S. 312, 320-321 (1986)). Factors relevant to the analysis are the need for the application of

force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used and the extent of the

injury inflicted. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. Other factors to be considered are the extent of the threat

to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis

of the facts known to them, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id. 

The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure “does not amount to cruel and

unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized

or applied was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary.” Id. at 319. Prison administrators “should be

accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their

judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”

Id. at 321-322 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1970)).

B. Plaintiff Alleged More Than a De Minimis Use of Force

Tincher argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred because Plaintiff has only alleged a de minimis

use of force. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments necessarily

excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at

9-10. Accordingly, Tincher has not committed a constitutional violation if his use of force was de

minimis.

Tincher argues that his use of force was at most de minimis because Plaintiff “did not suffer

any more than de minimis injury.” (Def. Patrick Tincher’s Notice of Mot. and Mot. for Summ. J.

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15:6-8, ECF No. 62. ) However, the relevant inquiry is not whether Plaintiff’s injuries are de 2

minimis, but whether the use of force was de minimis. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178

(2010) (“Injury and force . . . are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately

counts.”). The degree of Plaintiff’s injuries only serves as evidence of the degree of force used, it

does not conclusively resolve the question of whether the degree of force was de minimis. See

Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178 (“The extent of injury may . . . provide some indication of the amount

of force applied.”). In other words, Defendant cannot escape liability for the use of force simply

because Plaintiff was particularly resilient and failed to suffer any treatable injury. See Wilkins, 130

S. Ct. at 1178-79 (“An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue

an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.”);

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (“In the excessive force context, society’s expectations are different. When

prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of

decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident.”) (internal

citations omitted).

Tincher has submitted evidence that his use of force was, at most, de minimis. The Court

must then turn to Plaintiff’s evidence to determine whether Plaintiff can establish a genuine issue

of material fact regarding the degree of force used by Tincher. Plaintiff has consistently alleged that

Tincher violently slammed a gate into Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified to the same facts during his

deposition, the transcript of which is attached as evidence to Plaintiff’s opposition. Plaintiff was

taken to the medical clinic after the incident.

Tincher argues that Plaintiff’s evidence should be disregarded under the “sham affidavits”

rule. See Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). Tincher contends

that Plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment because

Plaintiff’s deposition statements contradict the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. Tincher

contends that Plaintiff’s deposition statements contradict the allegations in his complaint because

he testified that Tincher yelled at him or shoved him but did not include any allegations of yelling

Citations to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment refer to the page numbers as the motion is

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electronically docketed. The page numbers used by Defendant do not align with the electronic page numbers.

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or shoving in his complaint. 

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony does not contradict his allegations. The alleged yelling and

shoving testimony is not directlyrelated to Plaintiff's claims because Plaintiff's claim against Tincher

consists of the alleged slamming of a heavy door that hit Plaintiff. Thus, it is conceivable that

Plaintiff would not have alleged facts regarding yelling and shoving in his complaint. Further, the

omission of a fact is not the same as the contradiction of a fact. Thus, the “sham affidavits” rule is

inapplicable in this context.

Plaintiff’s testimony is based on his personal knowledge and is not contradicted by any

allegations he made in his complaint. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s evidence of

Tincher’s use of force is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of disputed fact with respect to

whether the degree of force was more than de minimis.

C. Plaintiff Has Sufficient Evidence of Tincher’s Subjective Intent

Defendant Tincher alternativelyarguesthat summaryjudgment would be appropriate because

Plaintiff has no “colorable evidence” that Tincher acted with a subjective intent to harm Plaintiff. 

The Court disagrees. As discussed above, Plaintiff disputes Tincher’s version of the facts with his

own testimony based on his personal knowledge of the incident in question. Plaintiff claims that

Tincher gratuitously slammed a heavy steel door into Plaintiff. The subjective intent to cause harm

is implied by Tincher’s actions. Plaintiff’s testimony is “colorable evidence.” 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s testimony is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact

with regard to whether Tincher acted with a subjective intent to harm Plaintiff.

D. Plaintiff’s Claim for Compensatory Damages Is Not Barred by the PLRA

Defendant Tincher argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the PLRA. Section 1997e(e) of

the PLRA provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,

prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injurysuffered while in custodywithout

a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Section 1997e(e) prohibits the recovery

of compensatorydamages for mental or emotional injuries unless the prisoner has suffered a physical

injury that is more than de minimis. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626-28 (9th Cir. 2002). In

Oliver, the Court reasoned that a prisoner’s back and leg pain from sitting and sleeping on the bench

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and floor of a temporary cell was merely de minimis injury. In Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d

1190, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit determined that bed sores and bladder infections were

more than de minimis.

Defendant Tincher argues that Plaintiff’s injuries were de minimis because Plaintiff was

examined bymedical staff and there was no indication of any injury and Plaintiff did not request any

treatment. 

Plaintiff correctly points out that Section 1997e(e) does not bar claims for nominal or

punitive damages. Accordingly, Tincher’s contention that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law under Section 1997e(e) is not accurate. At most, Section 1997e(e) would operate to bar

Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages based on his emotional injuries.

Plaintiff also correctly points out that the absence of an observable medical condition

requiring treatment by a medical professional does not necessarily render Plaintiff’s injuries de

minimis. In Oliver, the Ninth Circuit stated:

Appellees . . . argue that de minimis “physical injury under §

1997e(e) should be understood as “an observable or diagnosable

medical condition requiring treatment by a medical care

professional,” which would cause a “‘free world person’ to seek such

treatment.” If appellant’s proposed standard requires too little,

appellee’s proposed standard requires too much.

Oliver, 289 F.3d at 628 (quoting Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997)) (internal

citations omitted).

Plaintiff has alleged that he had significant bruises, weakness and numbness in his shoulder,

and that his injuries from an earlier beating were exacerbated by Tincher’s actions. Plaintiff’s

injuries are more akin to the injuries discussed in Pierce than the injuries that were “nothing too

serious” in Oliver. Oliver, 289 F.3d at 629 (“on deposition [the plaintiff] testified that ‘[his injury]

was nothing too serious’ and that he did not seek medical treatment.”). Even if Plaintiff did not

suffer any diagnosable injury that necessitated medical treatment, Plaintiff’s alleged injuries are

more than de minimis. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages for his emotional injuries

is not barred by the PLRA.

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E. Defendant Tincher Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Tincher argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity

protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982)). “The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the

government official’s error ‘is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed

questions of law and fact.’” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting)). Questions regarding qualified immunity should be resolved at the earliest possible

stage in litigation because qualified immunity serves as an immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability. Id.

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court mandated a two-step sequence

for resolving claims of qualified immunity. First, a court must decide whether the facts alleged by

a plaintiff set forth a violation of a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Second, if the

plaintiff has satisfied the first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly

established” at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct. Id. If the defendant did not violate a

clearly established constitutional right, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from

plaintiff’s claims. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)). However, the Supreme Court has since held that the Saucier sequence is not mandatory in

all cases and courts may resolve the “clearly established” question first when the Saucier sequence

would result in a “substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have

no effect on the outcome of the case.” Id. at 818.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity based on their version of the

facts. As discussed earlier, Plaintiff has established a genuine dispute over these facts. When

analyzing Defendants’ claim to qualified immunity, the Court must view the facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. When viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, Defendant Tincher gratuitously slammed a heavy steel door into Plaintiff, causing

significant pain, bruising, numbness, and aggravation of Plaintiff’s pre-existing injuries. There is

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no suggestion that Tincher’s actions were in furtherance of any legitimate penological interest. 

Accordingly, Tincher’s actions, as alleged by Plaintiff, were violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights and Plaintiff’s rights were clearly established byWhitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312

(1986) (unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain against prisoner violates Eighth Amendment) and

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (use of excessive force against prisoner violates Eighth

Amendment even when plaintiff suffers no significant injury). Defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material

fact with respect to his Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Tincher. Plaintiff has presented

sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute over whether Tincher used unnecessary and

malicious force by slamming a heavysteel door into Plaintiff. The Court furtherfinds that Plaintiff’s

alleged injuries were more than de minimis and Plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages for his

emotional injuries is not barred by the PLRA. Finally, the Court finds that Defendant Tincher is not

entitled to qualified immunity.

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendant Tincher’s

motion for summary judgment be DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2011 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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