Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00949/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00949-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY JAMES COHEA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

A. PACILLAS, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-0949-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER REVOKING IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS STATUS AND DIRECTING 

PLAINTIFF TO PAY FILING FEE IN FULL

(ECF NO. 9)

FOURTEEN DAY DEADLINE

This civil rights action is brought by three Plaintiffs—Danny James Cohea, 

Raymond George Glass, and R.J. Dupree—pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, though only 

Plaintiff Cohea has signed the complaint. See ECF No. 1 at 75; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). 

Additionally, only Plaintiff Cohea moved to proceed in forma pauperis, and his motion 

was granted on September 8, 2016. (See ECF Nos. 6, 9.) The Court has subsequently 

determined, for the reasons discussed below, that Plaintiff Cohea is not entitled to in 

forma pauperis status and therefore must pay the filing fee before this case may proceed 

further.

Plaintiff Cohea is subject to 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), which provides that “[i]n no event 

shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more 

prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 

Case 1:16-cv-00949-AWI-MJS Document 10 Filed 10/25/16 Page 1 of 4
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frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the 

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 

The Court takes judicial notice of the following cases filed by Plaintiff Cohea:

Cohea v. Bray, 2:97-cv-0366-FCD-DAD (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed on March 24, 1998, for 

failure to state a claim); Cohea v. Access Secure Pak, 3:09-cv-0679-RCJ-RAM (D. Nev.) 

(dismissed on August 3, 2010, for failure to state a claim); and Cohea v. Patzloff, 3:10-

cv-0437-IEG-RBB (S.D. Cal.) (dismissed on March 2, 2011, for failure to state a claim 

and for failure to comply with the Court’s orders). Plaintiff is thus a “three-striker” within 

the meaning of Section 1915(g), and the only question remaining is whether Plaintiff 

Cohea is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

The imminent danger exception applies if “the complaint makes a plausible 

allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit 

interprets “imminent danger” to mean “ongoing danger,” meaning the prisoner must 

allege that prison officials have continued with a practice that has injured him or others 

similarly situated in the past. Id. at 1056-57. 

A prisoner seeking to invoke the imminent danger exception in § 1915(g) must 

make specific, credible allegations of imminent danger of serious physical harm. McNeil 

v. U.S., 2006 WL 581081 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2006) (citing Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 

1125, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2001), and White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 

1998)). Vague, speculative, and non-specific allegations are insufficient. See Pauline v. 

Mishner, 2009 WL 1505672 (D. Haw. May 28, 2009) (plaintiff's vague and conclusory 

allegations of possible future harm to himself or others are insufficient to trigger the 

“imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception to dismissal under § 1915(g)); 

Cooper v. Bush, 2006 WL 2054090 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2006) (plaintiff's allegations that 

he will commit suicide, or that he has already attempted suicide and will do so again, are 

insufficient to show imminent danger); Luedtke v. Bertrand, 32 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1077 

(E.D. Wis. 1999) (“[p]laintiff's vague allegation of a conspiracy among the defendants to 

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beat, assault, injure, harass and retaliate against him are not enough. These allegations 

are insufficient and lack the specificity necessary to show an imminent threat of serious 

physical injury.”). 

The complaint identifies 23 Defendants and asserts numerous violations of 

Plaintiff Cohea’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He alleges that the Defendants 

issued false rule violation reports against him in retaliation for having exercised his First 

Amendment right to file inmate grievances and petition the courts. Those rule violation 

reports were then used by various Defendants, who knew them to be false, to justify a 

series of disciplinary housing transfers into the Administrative Housing Unit and 

eventually the Security Housing Unit. The transfers were retaliation against Plaintiff for 

engaging in First Amendment protected activity and were conducted in a manner that 

deprived Plaintiff of procedural due process rights. Defendants also conducted improper 

cell searches and colluded to violate Plaintiff’s rights. 

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a basis for an imminent danger exception. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have affixed “R” (rape) and “IEX” (indecent 

exposure) suffixes to his inmate records without administrative hearings. Plaintiff 

maintains that the disciplinary reports supporting these designations are falsified and 

that the Defendants are aware that either label can spur violence at the hands of other 

prisoners. Plaintiff has been forced to take a cell-mate. A fellow inmate was murdered 

in-cell under similar conditions and there have been multiple physical assaults.

Plaintiff’s abstract fear of assault does not constitute an imminent danger. 

Imminent danger of serious physical injury must be a real, present threat, not merely 

speculative or hypothetical. Plaintiff’s allegations do not identify a specific threat; instead 

he argues that he is at risk of harm from any potential cell-mate. “Plaintiff's generalized 

apprehension that he might be a target of attack does not constitute an imminent danger 

at the time of filing the Complaint.” Ellington v. Clark, 2012 WL 466730, *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 13, 2012) (“child molester” label causing a generalized fear of attack from inmates 

and prison staff did not satisfy the imminent danger requirement).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status (ECF No. 9) is REVOKED; 

2. Plaintiff shall pay the $400 filing fee within fourteen (14) days of this Order; 

and

3. Failure to pay the filing fee or otherwise respond to this Order will result in a 

recommendation to dismiss this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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