Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-06140/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-06140-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 42:4332 Environmental Policy - Coop of Agency Reports

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAVE SAN FRANCISCO BAY

ASSOCIATION, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE INTERIOR, et al.,

Defendants.

CIV-F-97-6140 OWW/DLB

CIV-F-98-5261 OWW/DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE SAN LUIS & DELTA-MENDOTA

WATER AUTHORITIES’ APPLICATION

FOR FEES AND COSTS UNDER THE

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT,

28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A) (DOC.

573)

SAN LUIS & DELTA-MENDOTA WATER

AUTHORITY AND WESTLANDS WATER

DISTRICT

Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE INTERIOR, et al.

 Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority (“Plaintiff” or

“the Authority”) moves for an award of attorney’s fees and

litigation expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Authority initially sought an award

of $724,919.46. (Doc. 548.) The district court issued a

memorandum decision and order regarding that initial fee request,

which (1) held that the Authority was only entitled to a fraction

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of the fees requested and (2) ordered the Authority to submit

supplemental documentation containing a more “specific breakdown

of legal fees, services, and costs.” (Doc. 567.) The Authority

submitted a revised fee request for “$327,915.02 in CPI-adjusted

EAJA fees and costs.” (Doc. 569 at 2.) The Authority concedes,

however, that it is unable to provide all of the supplemental

documentation the court requested. Federal defendants object to

the revised request. (Doc. 572.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The lengthy procedural history of this litigation is set

forth in great detail in numerous memoranda decisions issued by

the district court, including a prior decision on the Authority’s

fee request (Doc. 572, the “preliminary decision”), and a more

recent memorandum opinion and order on environmental plaintiffs’

fee request (Doc. 641). For the purposes of this motion, a

brief summary of the preliminary decision regarding the

Authority’s petition is sufficient. That reasoning and legal

analysis is made a part of this final decision. 

The preliminary decision examined several threshold issues. 

First, although the Authority’s success was limited, the

Authority could be considered a “prevailing party” for purposes

of the EAJA:

In this case, Plaintiff’s bedrock claim that the 1928-

34 drought regime should be the measuring criterion for

yield calculation did not succeed. Nor did Plaintiffs

succeed on Interior’s interpretation of treatment of

water used for (b)(2) ESA or water quality purposes. 

Plaintiff prevailed on two of the five discrete issues

concerning the accounting rules adopted by Interior for

CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). This is limited success.

Plaintiff can be considered a prevailing party only in

a substantively qualified sense.

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(Doc. 567 at 30.)

Second, the requirement that there be an absence of

“substantial justification” for the government’s position was

satisfied. With respect to those issues decided in the

Authority’s favor, the government’s position was not

substantially justified; specifically, the government’s “reset

methodology” was “an effort to circumvent clear limits on water

allocation, its conduct was not reasonable,” and “[o]ffset cannot

be considered reasonable or substantially justified.” (Id. at

36-37.) In addition, Interior’s treatment of water flows related

to the Auburn Dam, “violat[d] express statutory language” and was

therefore not substantially justified. (Id. at 38.) The federal

defendants’ argument that a government action is substantially

justified if a “genuine dispute exists,” was rejected because the

record indicated that Interior was actually attempting to use its

“interpretive discretion to re-write the statute.” (Id. at 37.)

The Authority’s request for reimbursement of all recoverable

costs in the amount of $94,082.96, for legal research,

photocopying, phone and fax charges, travel expenses (including

meals, lodging, milage, and parking), filing fee, and courier

services was reduced:

Plaintiff is not entitled to a full recovery.

Plaintiff only prevailed on two of five (or forty

percent) of the claims it raised. Plaintiff did not

prevail on its principal claim.

(Id. at 43-44.) The court found that the Authority had not

broken down its expenses with sufficient specificity. For

example, the Authority failed to “distinguish[] between those

costs incurred while litigating against the Federal Defendants

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and those that arose in litigating against Environmental

Interveners.” In addition, the Authority failed to justify its

large copying costs request in light of the Ninth Circuit’s rule

that “costs do not include extra copies of filed papers,

correspondence, and copies of cases since these are prepared for

the convenience of the attorneys. [Haagen-Days Co., Inc. v.

Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams, Inc., 920 F.2d 587, 588 (9th

Cir. 1990)].” (Id. at 44.) “Copying costs are not recoverable

at more than the prevailing commercial rate for copies, between

$0.08 (when printing between 1-100 pages) and $0.065 (when

printing over 500 pages) per page. Kinko’s Copying Center (7654

N. Blackstone Ave.; Fresno, CA).” The Authority was permitted

an opportunity to supplement the record with more specific

information. (Id. at 45.) 

As to the requested attorney’s fees, the Authority failed to

“provide sufficiently specific documentation for the $630,836.50

in legal fees” sought: 

Plaintiff is not entitled to a full recovery of these

fees. Plaintiff only prevailed on two of five (or

forty percent) of the claims it raised. Plaintiff did

not prevail on its principal claim...No more than forty

percent (40%) of Plaintiff’s fee request should be

recoverable.

(Id. at 47-48.) Further documentation was required: 

The “fee applicant bears the burden of establishing

entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate

hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at

437. “The applicant should exercise ‘billing judgment’

with respect to hours worked...and should maintain

billing time records in a manner that will enable a

reviewing court to identify distinct claims.” Id. 

Though “there is no certain method of determining when

claims are related’ or ‘unrelated[,]’[and] Plaintiff’s

counsel...is not required to record in great detail how

each minute of his time was expended[,]...counsel

should [still] identify the general subject matter of

his time expenditures.” Id. at 437 n. 12.

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Here, Plaintiff did not specifically document how

attorneys’ hours were expended. By submitting block

billing records, Plaintiff has not distinguished

between those attorneys’ fees incurred while litigating

against the Federal Defendants and those that arose in

litigating against Environmental Interveners. By

submitting block billing records, Plaintiff also

prevents a determination from being made as to whether

the tasked hours were reasonably expended for ends in

furtherance of the litigation. Plaintiff must provide

further particularity. 

(Id. 47-78.) The attorneys for the Authority billed at hourly

rates between $180 and $210 per hour, but the Authority provided

no justification for an enhanced hourly rate above the statutory

cap of $125 adjusted for inflation. (Id. at 48-49.) 

The extent of the Authority’s success was determined to

require further reductions:

In this case[], Plaintiff did not succeed on its

principal claim and was only successful on two of its

five claims. Plaintiff should not be allowed to

recover legal fees and costs related to the all of

their claims. Pending Plaintiff’s supplementation of

its documentation and Defendants’ reply, Plaintiff is

entitled to recover less than forty percent of those

costs and fees incurred in litigating against Federal

Defendants. 

(Id. at 51.) Finally, the extent to which the Authority’s

efforts were aimed at parties other than the federal defendants

was considered: 

Plaintiff cannot recover from the Federal Defendants

costs incurred in litigating against another defendant. 

Defendants’ Opposition at 20-22. Under the EAJA,

recovery “may [only] be awarded to the prevailing party

in any civil action brought by or against the United

States or any agency or any official of the United

States acting in his or her official capacity.” 28

U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1). The EAJA allows for the recovery

of “[f]ees and other expenses” but only from “an agency

over which the party prevails.” Id. at (d)(4). As a

result, the prevailing party may not use the EAJA to

recover from a private party against whom it prevailed. 

In this case, Plaintiff employs a block billing format

that contains no distinctions between parties or

amounts issued for tasks related to specific issues. 

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The Ninth Circuit routinely adjusts the $125 EAJA statutory 1

rate to account for cost of living increases, applying the

consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). Jones v.

Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1993). Federal defendants do

not object to the calculation of hourly rates on this basis. The

hourly rates applied to time billed for non-attorney work also

appear to be reasonable. 

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As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state with

specificity which fees and costs were incurred in

litigating against the Federal Defendants and which

against another party. Plaintiff is given leave to

AMEND its request to indicate specifically which fees

and costs were incurred while litigating against the

Federal Defendants.

(Id. at 52.) As to the fees claim:

This has become the kind of involved litigation within

litigation EAJA jurisprudence suggests should be

avoided.

Plaintiffs prevailed on only two of their five claims.

They should not recover more than forty percent (40%)

of their costs and fees. Plaintiffs, however, did not

prevail on their principal claim. Because Plaintiffs

only partially prevailed, they are only entitled to

recover part of their costs and fees: at most between

ten percent (10%) and twenty percent (20%). However,

because Plaintiff has failed to specifically document

its claims for fees and costs, Plaintiff must provide

supplemental information. 

(Id. at 52-53.)

The Authority timely filed a supplemental memorandum and

some additional documentation of the fees and costs billed,

requesting “a total of $327,915.02 in CPI-adjusted EAJA fees and

costs.” (Doc. 569 at 2; Doc. 571.) The Authority concedes that

it is unable to justify an award of fees at an enhanced hourly

rate, and accordingly bases its revised calculations on CPIadjusted EAJA statutory rates. The Authority also concedes that

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it is unable to provide all of the supplemental billing

documentation requested by the district court. (Id. at 5.) 

The Authority maintains that the level of specificity

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requested by the district court goes beyond that which is

required in the Ninth Circuit. As an alternative to providing

supplemental billing documents, the Authority suggests a series

of percentage deductions to be applied to various phases of the

litigation. Specifically, the Authority suggests breaking down

the analysis into the following four phases (1) preliminary

injunction phase; (2) after preliminary injunction through

motions for summary judgment; (3) offset/reset hearing; (4) fees

incurred after offset/reset hearing through Ninth Circuit

Decision. For each phase, the Authority detauks the attorney’s

fees, non-attorney (i.e., paralegals and law clerks) fees, and

costs requested. Also for each phase, the Authority provides an

estimate of the percentage of fees and costs incurred litigating

against the environmental intervenors and a percentage of fees

and costs incurred litigating issues on which the Authority did

not prevail. 

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The Authority’s revised request is summarized in the

following chart:

Phase Costs incurred Percentage

attributable to

litigation

against

Environmental

Plaintiffs

Percentage

attributable

to issues on

which the

Authority was

not

successful

Cost request

reflecting

percentage

reductions

volunteered by the

Authority

(1) Up to and

including

Preliminary

injunction 

$258,210.31

($233,796.14 CPIadjusted EAJA

attorneys fees,

$4,195.75 nonattorney fees,

$20,218.42 costs)

10% [no

percentage

reduction

suggested]

$232,389.28 

($210,416.52 CPIadjusted EAJA

attorney’s fees,

$3,776.18 nonattorney fees,

$18,196.58 costs.)

(2) After

preliminary

injunction

through motions

for summary

judgment

$253,867.97

($203,644.39 CPIadjusted EAJA

attorneys fees,

$7,192.75 nonattorney fees,

$43,030.83 costs)

10% 75% $57,120.30 

($45,819.99 CPIadjusted EAJA

attorney’s fees,

$1,618.37 nonattorney fees,

$9,681.94 costs.)

(3) Offset/reset

hearing

$16,580.16

($14,563.18 CPIadjusted EAJA

attorneys fees,

$255.00 nonattorney fees,

$1,761.98 costs)

10% [no

percentage

reduction

suggested]

$14,922.14 

($13,106.86 CPIadjusted EAJA

attorney’s fees,

$229.50 nonattorney fees,

$1,585.78 costs.)

(4) After

offset/reset

hearing through

Ninth Circuit

Decisions

$130,462.77

($90,929.04 CPIadjusted EAJA

attorneys fees,

$10,462.00 nonattorney fees,

$29,071.73 costs)

10% 80% $23,483.30

($16,367.23 CPIadjusted EAJA

attorney’s fees,

$1,883.16 in nonattorney fees,

$5,232.91 costs.)

Total $659,121.21 $327,915.02 

The total award sought by the Authority in its revised

request, $327,915.02, is approximately 45.23% of its $724,919.46

initial request (which was calculated at enhanced hourly rates)

or 49.75% of its $659,121.21 adjusted request (the Authority’s

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This figure, $659,121.21, equates to $565,038.25 in 2

fees calculated at the EAJA statutory rate plus $94,082.96 in

costs. This represents a recalculation of the Authority’s

initial request of $724,919.46, which equates to $630,836.50 in

legal fees at enhanced hourly rates plus $94,082.96 in costs. 

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initial request re-calculated at EAJA rates ). Notably, the

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Authority attempts to re-frame the extent of its success (or lack

thereof) by arguing that it should be treated as having

experienced significant success during the first phase of the

litigation, up to and including the issuance of the preliminary

injunction and, accordingly, no deduction for lack of success

should be applied to that phase of the case. 

Federal defendants object to the revised fee request on

several grounds. (Doc. 572.) First, the federal defendants

argue that “the Authority has totally failed to comply with the

Court’s directive” to provide more detailed billing information,

and, as a result, the federal defendants maintain that the

district court should either deny all fees and costs in their

entirety or award at most “between ten percent (10%) and twenty

percent (20%)” of the fees requested. (Id. at 2, quoting the

preliminary decision on the Authority’s fee petition.) Second,

the federal defendants urge the district court to reject the

Authority’s attempt to recharacterize the extent of its success

during the preliminary injunction phase of the case.

On October 24, 2005, the water authority plaintiffs moved

for leave to file a supplemental complaint concerning the

Interior’s accounting of the 2004 water year. (Doc. 623, Motion;

Doc. 634, Joinder.) The federal defendants and environmental

plaintiffs opposed. (Docs. 629 and 630.) In their opposition,

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the federal defendants suggested that it might be inappropriate

to rule on this fee petition if the court granted leave to file a

supplemental complaint. However, at oral argument on the motion

to supplement, all parties agreed that it is appropriate to

resolve the instant fee petition, in part because it concerns

claims for which partial final judgment has been entered and the

appeals process is concluded. 

III. ANALYSIS

The Authority’s fee petition has been extensively analyzed

in the previous memorandum decision (Doc. 567). No party has

moved for reconsideration of its reasoning or conclusions. Only

those issues left open by the previous opinion and addressed by

the supplemental briefs are now resolved. 

A. Extent of the Authority’s Success.

A court may reduce a fee award where the plaintiff only

received partial or limited success. Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d

1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 436-37 (1983)). A prevailing party is “not entitled to

compensation for attorney’s fees for time expended unsuccessfully

pursuing claims unrelated to those on which plaintiff ultimately

prevailed.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35. A court may reduce a

fee award if the significance of the overall relief obtained is

not consistent with the hours expended to obtain that relief. 

Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1147. The Ninth Circuit applies a two step

analysis where the plaintiff only partially prevailed. 

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Part I

The first step is to consider whether “the

plaintiff failed to prevail on claims that were

unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded.” 

Id. [Hensley, 461 U.S.] at 434. Claims are

“unrelated” if they are “entirely distinct and

separate” from the claims on which the plaintiff

prevailed. Odima [v. Westin Tucson Hotel], 53

F.3d 1484, 1499 [(9th Cir. 1995)]. Hours

expended on unrelated, unsuccessful claims

should not be included in an award of fees.

Part II

The second step of the Hensley analysis is to

consider whether “the plaintiff achieved a level

of success that makes the hours reasonably

expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee

award.” Id. [Hensley, 461 U.S.] at 434. In

answering that question, a district court

“should focus on the significance of the overall

relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to

the hours reasonably expended on the

litigation.” Id. at 435. “Where a plaintiff

has obtained excellent results, his attorney

should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Id. 

A plaintiff may obtain excellent results without

receiving all the relief requested. Id. at 435

n.11.

Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1147.

Here, as discussed above, the Authority suggests breaking

the litigation into phases to analyze the extent of its success. 

Such a phased approach was applied to environmental plaintiff’s

fee petition and is equally applicable here. 

The Authority first argues that it should be fully

compensated (less a voluntary 10% deduction to account for time

spent litigating issues raised by the environmental plaintiffs)

for the work its counsel performed during the initial phases of

the case, which extended from the initiation of the lawsuit in

November 1997, through the first round of summary judgment

motions, up to and including the issuance a preliminary

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injunction in December 1999. The Authority did experience

substantial success during the early stages of the litigation. 

Its first motion for summary judgment was granted as to a number

of significant issues; Interior’s 1997 Administrative Proposal

was found to be contrary to the CVPIA; and the question of (b)(2)

compliance was remanded to Interior for further administrative

action. (See Doc. 156.) 

The Authority was far less successful, however, during later

stages of the case, prevailing only on a few discrete accounting

issues, and, critically, failing to succeed in the district court

or the Ninth Circuit on its fundamental assertion: that the 1928-

34 drought regime should be the measuring standard for yield

calculation.

Viewing the entire litigation as a whole, an across-theboard deduction to all of the Authority’s attorneys hours

throughout the entire litigation could be justified, including

those billed for the initial stages of the case. See Sorenson,

239 F.3d at 1147 (the fee award “should focus on the significance

of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to

the hours reasonably expended on the litigation”). However, in

the overall context of this litigation, it is more reasonable to

view the Authority’s and environmental plaintiff’s initial

challenges to Interior’s Administrative (b)(2) Accounting

Proposal as a stand-alone phase of the litigation. The

Authority’s significant success at this initial stage justifies

not further reducing its fees for limited success. (However, the

hours billed for this phase of the case are excessive and will be

reduced on that ground.)

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The Authority also requests essentially full compensation

(less the same 10% deduction for time spent litigating issues

raised by the environmental plaintiffs) for time spent litigating

the offset/reset issue. At the same time, to account for its

limited success at other stages, the Authority has voluntarily

reduced its fee request by an additional 75% for time spent from

the issuance of the preliminary injunction through the second

round of motions for summary judgment (December 23, 1999 through

October 2001) and an additional 80% for the time spent on all

subsequent litigation following the offset/reset hearing. In

total, the Authority has voluntarily reduced its initial request

of $400,910.90 for the final three phases of the litigation

($253,867.97 for the second phase + $16,580.16 for the third +

$130,462.77 for the fourth) to $95,525.74 ($57,120.30 for the

second phase + $14,922.14 for the third + $23,483.30 for the

fourth), a reduction of more than 75 percent. No further

reductions for limited success are warranted, although additional

deductions are appropriate on several other grounds, as discussed

below.

B. Fees: Adequacy of Documentation/ Excessive Billing.

“Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the

district court may reduce the award accordingly. The district

court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours

that were not ‘reasonably expended.’” Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1146

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34).

1. Adequacy of Fee Documentation.

The previous memorandum decision regarding the Authority’s

fee request concluded: 

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For several stages of the litigation, environmental 3

plaintiffs were required to deduct more than 10% to account for

time spent litigating issues raised by the Authority, e.g.,

additional deductions for a certain phase was required to account

for time spent litigating American River Flows issues. (Doc. 641

at 61-62.) Here, no party has argued for similarly large

deductions with respect to the Authority’s fee request. 

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In this case, [the Authority] employs a block billing

format that contains no distinctions between parties or

amounts issued for tasks related to specific issues. 

As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state with

specificity which costs were incurred litigating

against the Federal Defendants and which against

another party.

(Doc. 567 at 52.) The Authority was given leave to amend its

petition to “indicate more specifically which fees and costs were

incurred while litigating against the Federal Defendants.” (Id.) 

The Authority, in its supplemental memorandum, essentially

concedes that it cannot provide additional individual time

records that would indicate the tasks included within each blockbilled entry. Instead, the Authority offers an alternative means

to address the district court’s primary concern with block

billing of fees, suggesting a 10% across-the-board deduction to

account for time spent litigating against the environmental

plaintiffs. This is a reasonable deduction to account for time

spent litigating issues raised by the environmental plaintiffs.

A similar deduction was applied to some phases of work performed

by the environmental plaintiffs. (See Doc. 641.)3

The federal defendants vehemently object that “the Authority

has totally failed to comply with the Court’s directive....”

But, the Authority’s supplemental filing has addressed the

district court’s primary concern with the apparent block billing

of fees: the problem of distinguishing between compensable fees

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This 1000 hour figure was calculated by adding up the 4

hours recorded by Ms. Koehler and Mr. Peters from November 1997

through December 1999 as set forth in their billing records as

Exhibits A and B to the Koehler Declaration. Although the

environmental plaintiffs did benefit from pro bono attorney

assistance unavailable to the Authority, the environmental

plaintiff’s fee request is still a valuable benchmark for

reasonableness.

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incurred litigating against the government and non-compensable

fees incurred litigating against other parties. The 10% acrossthe-board reduction, combined with additional deductions for

excessive billing, results in a lawful and reasonable fee award. 

The billing records are otherwise complete and sufficiently

detailed.

2. Excessive Billing of Fees.

Although the general framework of percentage deductions

suggested by the Authority is reasonable, the number of hours

billed is excessive in one respect. The Authority was billed

1,763.15 hours in attorney time for the first phase of the case,

a 25 month period from November 1997 through December 1999. In

contrast, although it is difficult to discern from the record an

exactly parallel figure, the environmental plaintiffs’ hour award

for this same period of time appears to be slightly more than

1000 hours. This almost 60% disparity in the initial phase of 4

the case is unexplained and reflects excessive billing,

warranting a 40% reduction for all attorney and non-attorney

hours billed during this phase of the litigation. (This equates,

essentially to an award of attorneys fees for 60% of 1,763.15

hours, or 1057.8 hours, only slightly more than that billed by

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the environmental plaintiffs over the same time period.) 

The number of hours billed for the later phases of the case

is more reasonable in light of the complexity of the issues

raised. For the second phase, a 20 month period which included a

second round of complex summary judgment motions, the Authority

was billed 1,460.35 hours of attorney time. For the five month

span of the third phase, the Authority was billed 102.4 hours of

attorney time, and for the seventeen-month fourth phase, the

Authority was billed 624.40 hours of attorney time. The total

number of hours billed for the latter three phases of the case is

2187.15, extending over a forty-two month time span. 

The total of the hours billed to the Authority for all four

phases is over 3900 hours in attorney time alone, before any

deductions. By way of comparison, the environmental plaintiffs

billed 2989 hours of attorney time on merits work during the

course of the entire litigation (see Koehler Decl. at 13:18),

before any deductions. The 40% deduction for excessive billing

during the first phase of the case brings the Authority’s total

billed time down to just over 3200 hours (before any further

deductions), much closer to the total number of hours billed by

the environmental plaintiffs. No further deduction for excessive

billing is warranted.

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C. Costs: Adequacy of Documentation/ Excessive Costs.

The lack of specificity contained within the Authority’s

documentation of its claimed costs makes it impossible to

determine which costs are compensable and which are not under

prevailing Ninth Circuit standards. The Authority argues that

the bar is being set too high for costs documentation, citing

International Woodworkers of America, AFLCIO v. Donovan, 792 F.2d

762, 767 (9th Cir. 1986), in which the Ninth Circuit advanced a

liberal view of the types of costs which may be included in an

EAJA award. Although International Woodworkers did expand the

scope of the EAJA costs provision to include many types of costs

not specifically enumerated in the statutory text, it in no way

diminishes a prevailing party’s obligation to document whether

particular billed costs are reasonably connected to the

litigation. Here, it is not possible to do so with any accuracy. 

The amount of the costs for which the Authority seeks

reimbursement is almost ten times that of the environmental

plaintiffs, who seek less than $4,500 in attorney and expert

costs combined. The Authority originally sought over $94,000.00

in costs, before any deductions. Such a figure is not

reasonable, even for litigation of this length and complexity. 

The problem is compounded, however, by the fact that the billing

records make it impossible to specifically parse the

reasonableness of any given billed cost. The Authority only be

awarded 25% of its billed costs. 

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D. Recalculated Award.

Phase 1: This phase is subject to a 40% deduction of the

fees (both attorney and non-attorney fees) to account for

excessive fee billing, a 75% deduction of costs to account for

excessive cost billing, along with an across-the-board deduction

of 10% to account for time spent litigating issues raised by the

environmental plaintiffs. The original attorney and non-attorney

fee request for this phase was $237,991.85 ($233,796.14 CPIadjusted EAJA attorneys fees, $4,195.75 non-attorney fees). A

40% deduction results in $142,795.11 in attorney and non-attorney

fees. After a 75% deduction, the original cost request of

$20,218.42, is lowered to $5054.61. Applying the additional 10%

deduction to the sum of these two figures, $147,849.72, results

in a final award for the first phase of $133,064.77.

Phase 2: This phase is subject to a 75% deduction of costs

to account for excessive cost billing, along with an across-theboard deduction of 10% to account for time spent litigating

issues raised by the environmental plaintiffs, followed by a

voluntary across-the-board deduction of 75% to account for lack

of success on the merits. Applying the 75% deduction to the

original costs request of $43,030.83 results in a costs award of

$10,757.71. The sum of this adjusted cost award and the original

attorney and non-attorney fee request is $221,594.85. Applying

the further 75% and 10% deductions results in a final award for

this phase of $49,858.84.

Phase 3: This phase is subject to a 75% deduction of costs

to account for excessive costs, along with an across-the-board

deduction of 10% to account for time spent litigating issues

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raised by the environmental plaintiffs. Applying the 75%

deduction to the original costs request of $1,761.98 costs

results in a costs award of $440.50. The sum of this adjusted

cost award and the original attorney and non-attorney fee request

is $15,258.68. Applying the 10% voluntary deduction results in a

final award for this phase of $13,732.81.

Phase 4: This phase is subject to a 75% deduction of costs

to account for excessive cost billing, along with an across-theboard deduction of 10% to account for time spent litigating

issues raised by the environmental plaintiffs, followed by a

voluntary across-the-board deduction of 80% to account for lack

of success on the merits. Applying the 75% deduction to the

original costs request of $29,071.73 results in a costs award of

$7,267.93. The sum of this adjusted cost award and the original

attorney and non-attorney fee request is $108,658.97. Applying

the further 85% and 10% deductions results in a final award for

this phase of $19,558.61.

For all four phases, the total award will be: $216,215.03. 

This equates to approximately 29% of the Authority’s initial

$724,919.46 initial request (which was calculated at enhanced

hourly rates) or 32% of its $659,121.21 adjusted request (the

Authority’s initial request re-calculated at EAJA rates). The

preliminary decision noted that the Authority “prevailed on only

two of [its] five claims” and concluded that it “should not

recover more than forty percent (40%) of their costs and fees.”

In the concluding paragraph, the district court did qualify its

previous 40% figure, reasoning that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs only

partially prevailed, they are only entitled to recover part of

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their costs and fees: at most between ten percent (10%) and

twenty percent (20%).” (Id. at 52-53.) On further reflection,

given the more substantial success experienced by the Authority

at the earliest stage of the case, the award of $216,215.03,

which is admittedly higher than 20% ceiling suggested by the

concluding paragraph in the preliminary decision, is just and

reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in the previous preliminary

memorandum decision and order (Doc. 567), federal defendants

shall remit to the Authority’s fees counsel, $216,215.03 for EAJA

attorneys fees and costs. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 6, 2006 /s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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