Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-03827/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-03827-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TECHNICAL LED INTELLECTUAL 

PROPERTY, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

REVOGI, LLC, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 18-cv-03827-JSC 

ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT AND 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

Re: Dkt. No. 30, 37 

Plaintiff Technical LED Intellectual Property, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Revogi, 

LLC (“Revogi”), alleging infringement of one or more claims of Plaintiff’s patent, U.S. Reissue 

Patent No. 41,685 (“the ’685 Patent”), entitled “Light Source with Non-White and PhosphorBased White LED Devices and LCD Assembly.” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 7-10.)1

 The Clerk of Court 

entered default as to Revogi on March 27, 2019 after it failed to appear or otherwise defend itself 

in this action. (Dkt. No. 29.) Plaintiff then filed an unopposed motion for default judgment 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), (Dkt. No. 30), and the Court issued an order 

permitting Plaintiff to seek discovery regarding the number of infringing units sold and thereafter 

file a supplemental memorandum and evidence regarding its remedy request, (Dkt. No. 31). Now 

before the Court is Plaintiff’s supplemental briefing. (Dkt. No. 37.) The Court also heard oral 

argument from Plaintiff on February 6, 2020. 

As Revogi has not appeared, the Court has not obtained consent from all parties pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); accordingly, this matter must be REASSIGNED to a district court judge. 

Further, the Court RECOMMENDS that the newly assigned district court judge GRANT IN 

PART Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. 

1

 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

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BACKGROUND 

The background of this case is set forth in the Court’s June 27, 2019 order on Plaintiff’s 

original motion for default judgment (“June 2019 Order”). (See Dkt. No. 31 at 1-2.) The Court 

includes it here for ease of reference. 

I. Complaint Allegations 

 Upon the Clerk’s entry of default, the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, 

except those concerning damages, are deemed to have been admitted by the nonresponding party. 

Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). The Court thus accepts the 

following allegations as true. 

A. The Parties 

 Plaintiff is “a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal place of business 

located at 251 Little Falls Dr., Wilmington, DE 19808.” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 1.) Revogi is an entity 

that has “a principal place of business at 101 First St., Suite 440, Los Altos, CA.”2 (Id. at ¶ 2.) 

B. The Patent Infringement 

 Plaintiff’s ‘685 Patent was issued on September 14, 2010 by the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 7.) Revogi offers for sale and has sold to consumers in the 

United States LED light bulbs that infringe claims 10 through 14 of the ‘685 Patent. (Id. at ¶ 8; 

see also id., Ex. B at 2-5.) Thus, Revogi violated 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (the “Patent Act”) by 

“making, using, providing, supplying, distributing, selling, and/or offering for sale products . . . 

comprising a light source” that infringed Plaintiff’s patent. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 7-10.) Plaintiff seeks 

2

 Revogi’s current status is unclear but it is no longer operating as an LLC in the United States. 

The California Secretary of State website includes a Certificate of Cancellation for Revogi as of 

June 28, 2018. See California Secretary of State, Certificate of Cancellation Limited Liability 

Company (LLC), https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/Document/RetrievePDF?Id=201602710110-

24471991. The certificate is signed by Jun Meng. Id. Revogi’s Statement of Information on file 

with the California Secretary of State lists Jun Meng as its Manager and Chief Executive Officer. 

https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/Document/RetrievePDF?Id=201602710110-23748244. Plaintiff 

submits a screenshot of revogi.com from June 2017 identifying Revogi, LLC as the “US Sales 

Office” and Revogi Innovation Co., Ltd. as the “Shenzhen Office.” (Dkt. No. 37-11, Ex. K at 2.) 

Plaintiff also submits a June 27, 2018 email his counsel received from Joe Zeng, Sales Manager of 

“Revogi Innovation Ltd,” located in Shenzhen, Guangdong, China. (Dkt. No. 37-7, Ex. G at 2.) 

The email states, in pertinent part: “[W]e would like to point out that Revogi Innovation Ltd . . . is 

a Chinese company that has no . . . relation with Revogi LLC which [is] located in USA.” (Id.) 

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monetary and injunctive relief under the Patent Act based on Revogi’s infringement. 

II. Procedural History 

 Plaintiff filed its complaint on June 27, 2018, (Dkt. No. 1), and served summons on July 3, 

2018, (Dkt. No. 9). On July 24, 2018, Plaintiff received and answer to the complaint sent by “Jun 

Meng, Defendant in pro per”;3 Mr. Meng did not file that answer with the Court. (See Dkt. No. 20 

at 2.) Plaintiff’s subsequent attempts to contact Mr. Meng failed. (See id.) On October 18, 2018, 

Mr. Meng filed with the Court an Answer to Plaintiff’s complaint, as “Defendant in Pro Per For 

Revogi, LLC.” (Dkt. No. 22.) However, because a corporation cannot be represented by a nonattorney, see Civ. L.R. 3-9(b) (“A corporation, unincorporated association, partnership or other 

such entity may appear only through a member of the bar of this Court.”); see also Rowland v. 

California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (“[A] 

corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.”), the Court ordered 

Revogi to proceed in this action with counsel, (see Dkt. No. 23). Revogi did not appear following 

the Court’s order requiring counsel, and Plaintiff filed for entry of default with the Clerk of the 

Court on March 26, 2019. (Dkt. No. 28.) The Clerk entered default as to Revogi the next day. 

(Dkt. No. 29.) 

 Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment on May 30, 2019. (Dkt. No. 30.) Following 

the Court’s June 2019 Order permitting Plaintiff to seek “limited discovery to determine the 

amount of damages related to Revogi’s infringement of the ’685 Patent” and file supplemental 

briefing regarding its requested remedies, (Dkt. No. 31 at 11), Plaintiff moved for extensions of 

time to file, (Dkt. Nos. 32 & 34), which the Court granted, (Dkt. Nos. 33 & 35). Plaintiff filed its 

supplemental briefing on December 12, 2019, (Dkt. No. 37), and a “corrected” memorandum in 

support on December 13, 2019, (Dkt. No. 38). The Court heard oral argument on February 6, 

2020. 

DISCUSSION 

 As set forth in the June 2019 Order, the Court has both subject matter jurisdiction over this 

3

 As previously discussed, records on file with the California Secretary of State indicate that Jun 

Meng is Revogi’s Manager and Chief Executive Officer. 

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case and personal jurisdiction over Revogi. (See Dkt. No. 31 at 3-4.) The Court also determined 

in the June 2019 Order that default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) is 

warranted based on consideration of the seven factors outlined in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 

1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). (Id. at 4-8 (“In sum, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default 

judgment.”).) The Court incorporates its analysis and conclusions from the June 2019 Order here 

and addresses the only outstanding issue—Plaintiff’s requested remedies. 

I. Remedies 

 The Patent Act provides monetary and injunctive relief for violations of 35 U.S.C. § 

271(a). Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages “reflecting an average reasonable royalty rate” 

under 35 U.S.C § 284; attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285; and litigation costs under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1920 and 35 U.S.C. § 285.4 (Dkt. No. 38 at 7.) 

A. Damages 

 Under the Patent Act, “[u]pon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant 

damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable 

royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed 

by the court.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. As the Federal Circuit has explained: 

When actual damages cannot be adequately proved, a reasonable 

royalty may be employed. Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply 

Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574, 7 USPQ2d 1606, 1612 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 

“A reasonable royalty is the amount that ‘a person, desiring to 

manufacture [, use, or] sell a patented article, as a business 

proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to 

make [, use, or] sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable 

profit.’” Trans–World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 

1552, 1568, 224 USPQ 259, 269 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (alterations in 

original; citations omitted). When an established royalty does not 

exist, a court may determine a reasonable royalty based on 

“hypothetical negotiations between willing licensor and willing 

licensee.” Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1574, 7 USPQ2d at 1612. “The key 

element in setting a reasonable royalty . . . is the necessity for return 

to the date when the infringement began.” Hanson v. Alpine Valley 

Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1079, 219 USPQ 679, 682 (Fed. Cir. 

1983) (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 

F.2d 1152, 1158, 197 USPQ 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1978)); see also 

Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1575, 7 USPQ2d at 1613 (hypothetical royalty 

4

 Plaintiff no longer seeks injunctive relief because the ’685 Patent expired on December 28, 2019. 

(See Dkt. No. 37-1, Ex. A at ¶ 2.) 

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negotiations methodology “speaks of negotiations as of the time 

infringement began”). 

Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Plaintiff insists that 

Defendant has infringing sales of approximately $22,000 and that a reasonable royalty, based on 

Plaintiff’s settlement of similar cases, would be $14,500. 

 1. Infringing Sales 

Plaintiff asserts that the infringement began “as early as January 1, 2012,” when Jun Meng 

filed for a United States Trademark for “Revogi,” “claiming first use in commerce covering the 

infringing and other goods.” (Dkt. No. 38 at 13.) In support, Plaintiff submits Revogi’s United 

States Trademark application, registration certificate, and related documents. (See generally Dkt. 

No. 37-9, Ex. I.) 

 The November 2012 application states that the mark “revogi” was first used in commerce 

on January 1, 2012 for the following products: 

Battery chargers; Computer operating programs, recorded; Electric 

wires; Electronic apparatus for the remote control of industrial 

operations; Electronic indicator panels; Flashing safety lights; 

Photographic cameras; Surveying instruments; Theft alarms; 

Transmitters of electronic signals. 

(Id. at 38.) The class of products does not include LED light bulbs. The application includes two 

photos depicting products from the class of items listed above; neither of which is an LED light 

bulb. (See id. at 43-44.) The July 2013 registration certificate includes the same class of products 

listed above. (See id. at 24.) 

 The Revogi trademark documents also include a “Declaration of Use and/or Excusable 

Nonuse of Mark in Commerce under Section 8” submitted by Jun Meng on July 25, 2018 (“July 

2018 Trademark Declaration”). (Id. at 8-9.) The July 2018 Trademark Declaration includes the 

previously listed class of products and pictures of several products “showing the mark as used in 

commerce on or in connection with any item in [the] class.” (Id. at 8.) The pictures include LED 

light bulbs. (Id. at 11, 13.) In other words, the trademark documents suggest only that Revogi 

was selling infringing products as of July 2018. The Court raised this issue with Plaintiff at oral 

argument on February 6, 2020, and Plaintiff acknowledged that the only evidence as to the alleged 

January 2012 start date is the trademark documents discussed above. That evidence is insufficient 

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to support a finding that Revogi was selling infringing LED light bulbs in January 2012. 

The sales information from Amazon demonstrates that Revogi has sold the allegedly 

infringing products since January 2018. Thus, the Court recommends extrapolating the Amazon 

sales data ($4,244 in sales from January 2018 to September 2019; an average of $202 per month) 

to cover likely sales from October 2019 through December 2019 and estimating total infringing 

sales in the amount of $4,850. As the patent expired in December 2019 (see Dkt. No. 37-1, Ex. A 

at ¶ 2), infringing sales ended as of that date. See Atlas-Pacific Eng’g Co. v. Geo. W. Ashlock Co., 

339 F.2d 288, 289 n.1 (9th Cir. 1964) (“There can be no infringement after a patent has expired.”). 

The recommended total sales figure is obviously not precise; however, it is the only figure 

adequately supported by the record. The question then is what royalty rate to assign to those sales 

for purposes of statutory damages. 

 2. Reasonable Royalty Rate 

 Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $14,500, reflecting “the low end” of a range of 

settlement amounts5 set forth in six “exemplary license agreements”6 in other litigation between 

Plaintiff and entities selling infringing products with total sales ranging from “[u]nder 50k” to 

“[u]nder 250k.” (See Dkt. No. 36-4, Ex. H at 3 (filed under seal).) Of those agreements, only one 

concerned sales of less than $50,000, and the amount at issue here is far less. That agreement 

granted the defendant “a personal, non-transferrable, non-exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, fullypaid up, and royalty-free license,” to “make, use, sell, offer to sell, export, import, and otherwise 

dispose of any products and services that may, alone or in combination with any other products or 

services, come within the claims of any and all Technical LED patents.” (Id. at 47-49 (emphasis 

added).) In consideration of the license and Plaintiff’s covenant not to sue the defendant, the 

defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff $15,000.00. (Id. at 49-50.) The agreement is dated August 30, 

2018. (Id. at 47.) 

5

 The agreements reflect settlement amounts ranging from $15,000-$23,000. (See Dkt. No. 36-4, 

Ex. C at 6, 15, 24, 32, 40, 50.) 

6

 Five of the agreements submitted by Plaintiff contain a “License” provision whereby Plaintiff 

granted the defendant a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable, license to sell products that fall 

within the claims of the “Covered Patents,” including the ’685 Patent, subject to the defendant’s 

payment of the settlement amount. (See Dkt. No. 36-4, Ex. C at 5, 23-24, 31-32, 39-40, 48.) 

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 Because the agreement is contemporaneous and concerns the patent at issue, it provides 

guidance for determining the reasonable royalty rate. See Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum 

L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that consideration of “sufficiently 

comparable licenses” is appropriate to determine the reasonable royalty rate and finding no abuse 

of discretion where district court considered settlement agreement that “covered the patents at 

issue”); see also Boston Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 

2008) (“Where little or no satisfactory evidence of a reasonable royalty is presented, the court 

should award such reasonable royalties as the record evidence will support.”). However, it is 

distinguishable from this case in one significant respect: it provided the defendant with a fully paid 

up license to all Technical LED patents, “recognized anywhere in the world, existing now or later, 

that claim priority to any filing date” of any LED patent or patent application that exists as of the 

effective date of the license. (Dkt. No. 36-4 at 47 (definition of covered patents), 49 (grant of 

license).) Thus, the license upon which Plaintiff relies was a license for far more than the twoyear license for a single patent that is at issue in this case. 

 In light of the above, and in light of the limited sales identified by Plaintiff, the $14,500 

reasonable royalty sought by Plaintiff is excessive. The royalty cannot be more than the actual 

extrapolated sales since the patent expired in December 2019 and no royalties would be due after 

that date. See Geo. W. Ashlock Co., 339 F.2d at 289 n.1. Accordingly, the Court concludes that a 

reasonable royalty of $1,000 is the most that is supported by the evidence. See Boston Sci. Corp. 

v. Johnson & Johnson, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Where little or no 

satisfactory evidence of a reasonable royalty is presented, the court should award such reasonable 

royalties as the record evidence will support.”). 

 3. Enhanced Damages Based on Willful Infringement 

 Under the Patent Act it is within a district court’s discretion to “increase the damages up to 

three times the amount” determined. See 35 U.S.C. § 284. Such enhanced damages may be 

awarded in a “case of willful or bad-faith infringement.” Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 

136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016). The Supreme Court has instructed that enhanced damages should 

“not be meted out in a typical infringement case, but are instead designed as a ‘punitive’ or 

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‘vindictive’ sanction for egregious infringement behavior.” Id. at 1932. Enhanced damages may 

be appropriate where the defendant’s conduct related to infringement is “willful, wanton, 

malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed— characteristic of a 

pirate.” Id. Even where such conduct is shown, however, enhanced damages are not required. Id.

at 1933. Instead, a court must “take into account the particular circumstances of [the] case” in 

determining whether enhanced damages are warranted. Id. 

 Plaintiff requests enhanced damages from June 7, 2018—when Plaintiff first notified 

Revogi of its infringement—through December 28, 2019 for an award of “at least $20,300” in 

damages based on Revogi’s “willful, wanton[,] and deliberate infringing conduct” that continues 

to the present. (Dkt. No. 37-1, Ex. A at ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff bases that amount on the $14,500 

figure derived from the license agreements discussed above. 

 Because Plaintiff does not seek enhanced damages for Revogi’s prelitigation conduct, and 

indeed fails to allege willful infringement in the underlying complaint, (see generally Dkt. No. 1), 

the Court addresses only Revogi’s conduct since this litigation began and concludes that enhanced 

damages are warranted. Plaintiff notified Revogi of its intent to file suit based on Revogi’s 

infringement of the ’685 Patent. (See Dkt. No. 37-6, Ex. F.) Plaintiff received no response from 

Revogi, and filed this patent infringement action on June 27, 2018, (Dkt. No. 1), and served 

Summons on Revogi on July 3, 2018, (Dkt. No. 9). On July 17, 2018, “Jun Meng, Defendant in 

pro per” mailed an Answer to Plaintiff but did not file the Answer with the Court. (See Dkt. Nos. 

20.) Plaintiff’s counsel attests that he received an email from Charles Isikilu on October 10, 2018 

stating that “he was the contact person for Revogi, LLC.” (Dkt. No. 26-1 at ¶ 10.) Counsel and 

Mr. Isikilu engaged in discussions “regarding a $15,000 settlement offer based upon sales of less 

than $50,000 of the infringing product.” (Id.) Counsel attests that he notified Mr. Isikilu on 

October 18, 2018 that Plaintiff intended to move for default judgment, and that Mr. Isikilu 

responded that Revogi was considering the settlement offer. (Id.) 

That same day Jun Meng filed with the Court an Answer to Plaintiff’s complaint, as 

“Defendant in Pro Per For Revogi, LLC,” (Dkt. No. 22), and the Court issued an order on October 

22, 2018 noting that a corporation cannot be represented by a non-attorney and ruling that Revogi, 

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LLC cannot proceed in this action without counsel, (Dkt. No. 23). Plaintiff’s counsel attests that 

he continued to email Mr. Meng and Mr. Isikilu thereafter and notify them of Plaintiff’s filings in 

this action but received no response. (Dkt. No. 37-1, Ex. A at ¶ 7.) Despite such notice, Revogi 

has continued to infringe the ’685 Patent as shown by the sales information Plaintiff obtained from 

Amazon, which demonstrate sales from January 2018 through September 2019. (Dkt. No. 36-3, 

Ex. E (filed under seal).) Thus, the Court agrees that Revogi’s actions since being notified in June 

2018 of its infringement constitute willful and deliberate infringement. 

Although Plaintiff did not move for a preliminary injunction, “which generally provides an 

adequate remedy for combating post-filing willful infringement,” see In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 

497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Halo, 136 S. Ct. 1923, 

“there is no rigid rule that a patentee must seek a preliminary injunction in order to seek enhanced 

damages,” see Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Revogi’s continued infringement of the ’685 

Patent despite notice of both the infringement and this litigation constitutes willful behavior. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends tripling the reasonably royalty of $1,000 and awarding 

damages in the amount of $3,000. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (providing district courts with discretion 

to “increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed” as damages). 

 B. Attorneys’ Fees 

 Plaintiff requests an award of $26,681.00 in attorneys’ fees. (Dkt. No. 38 at 14.) Courts 

may award attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in patent actions only in “exceptional cases.” 35 

U.S.C. § 285. This is such a case. 

 1. Exceptional Case 

 “[A]n ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the 

substantive strength of a party’s litigation position (considering both the governing law and the 

facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Octane Fitness, 

LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554 (2014). Thus, “courts may determine 

whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the 

totality of the circumstances.” Id. In making that determination, courts may consider such factors 

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as “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal 

components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of 

compensation and deterrence.” Id. at n.6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts 

in this District “applying the Octane Fitness analysis commonly find that willful infringement, in 

conjunction with non-participation in litigation, makes a case ‘exceptional.’” ADG Concerns, Inc. 

v. Tsalevich LLC, No. 18-cv-00818-NC, 2018 WL 4241967, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2018) 

(collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-cv-00818-JSW, 2018 WL 6615139 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2018). 

 A finding that this case is “exceptional” is warranted based on Revogi’s conduct during 

this litigation, as discussed above. Further, Revogi’s refusal to properly appear in this action 

required Plaintiff to expend additional funds to obtain discovery from a third-party, Amazon. 

Such willful infringement and deliberate behavior in failing to appear in this action makes this an 

“exceptional” case, and attorneys’ fees are warranted. See, e.g., Sream, Inc. v. Sahebzada, No. 18-

CV-05673-DMR, 2019 WL 2180224, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (finding case “exceptional” 

and recommending award of attorneys’ fees on motion for default judgment based on defendant’s 

willful infringement and failure to appear), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV05673-RS, 2019 WL 2180215 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2019); ADG Concerns, 2018 WL 4241967, at 

*14 (same); Govino, LLC v. WhitePoles LLC, No. 4:16-cv-06981-JSW (KAW), 2017 WL 

6442187, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2017) (same), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-

CV-06981-JSW, 2017 WL 6442188 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2017). 

 The Court next considers the reasonableness of the fees requested and finds that while the 

rates requested and hours expended by The Law Offices of Louis M. Heidelberger, Esq. LLC are 

reasonable, the hours purportedly expended by Carr & Ferrell, LLP are not supported by 

Plaintiff’s submissions. 

 2. Reasonableness of Fees 

 To calculate an award of attorneys’ fees, district courts apply “the lodestar method, 

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” Ryan v. 

Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 786 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

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424, 433 (1983)). “A reasonable hourly rate is ordinarily the prevailing market rate in the relevant 

community.” Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in 

addition to the attorneys’ own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing 

in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and 

reputation.” Camancho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The party requesting fees also bears “the burden of 

submitting billing records to establish that the number of hours” requested are reasonable. 

Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). The number of hours should 

not exceed the number of hours reasonable competent counsel would bill for similar services. 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Courts may reduce the hours expended “where documentation of the 

hours is inadequate; if the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; if the hours expended are 

deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 

1210 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34). 

 Here, Plaintiff requests $26,681.00 in fees purportedly reflecting a total of 51.8 attorney 

hours and 13.2 paralegal hours expended on this case. (Dkt. No. 38 at 14-15.) In support of that 

request, Plaintiff submits a declaration from its counsel at The Law Offices of Louis M. 

Heidelberger, Esq. LLC and Mr. Heidelberger’s billing records for this case and attorney 

biography. (See Dkt. Nos. 26-1; 26-3, Ex. B; 26-4, Ex. C; 30-1; 37-1, Ex. A.) Plaintiff does not, 

however, submit any declaration from counsel at Carr & Ferrell, LLP, although Plaintiff does 

submit billing records for that counsel and an attorney biography. (See Dkt. Nos. 26-3, Ex. B at 3-

4 & 26-4, Ex. C at 4-12.) 

 Mr. Heidelberger can attest that the invoices from his firm in this case are “true and correct 

copies” but he cannot do so for the invoices from Carr & Ferrell. The Court raised this issue with 

Mr. Heidelberger at oral argument, and he directed the Court to his submission at Dkt. No. 26. 

Again, however, that submission does not include a declaration from counsel for Carr & Ferrell, 

LLP. (See Dkt. Nos. 26 – 26-4.) Thus, the Court will only address the fees sought by Mr. 

Heidelberger. 

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 Mr. Heidelberger graduated from Temple University School of Law in 1975 and has been 

a patent litigator since that time. (Dkt. No. 26-3, Ex. B at 1-2.) He is admitted to practice in the 

District of Columbia, New York, Pennsylvania, and before the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office. (Id.) His billing rate in this case was $500 per hour. (Dkt. No. 26-1, Ex. A at ¶ 

22.) He billed 20.8 hours at that rate, (id. at ¶ 22), for a total of $10,400 in fees, (Dkt. No. 26-4, 

Ex. D at 3). 

 Mr. Heidelberger’s rates are in line with those found reasonable in similar cases in this 

Circuit and are thus reasonable. See, e.g., Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Const. Mach. Co., 668 F.3d 

677, 689 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming attorneys’ fee award in trademark infringement case based on 

rates of $320–$685/hour), abrogated on other grounds by SunEarth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar 

Power Co., Ltd., 839 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016); Chanel, Inc. v. Hsiao Yin Fu, No. 16-cv-02259- 

EMC, 2017 WL 1079544, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2017) (granting $35,640 in attorneys’ fees in 

a trademark infringement case based on rates of $325–$500/hour for partners and $325/hour for an 

associate); see also Superior Consulting Servs., Inc. v. Steeves-Kiss, No. 17-cv-06059-EMC, 2018 

WL 2183295, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) (noting that “district courts in Northern California 

have found that rates of $475-$975 per hour for partners and $300-$490 per hour for associates are 

reasonable.”). The hours expended are also reasonable and supported by billing records, (see Dkt. 

No. 26-4, Ex. C at 1-3), that “account for these hours with what appear to be legitimate efforts at 

advancing the litigation and advocating for their client,” see ADG Concerns, 2018 WL 4241967, 

at *14. 

 Accordingly, the Court recommends granting Plaintiff’s request for $10,400 for Mr. 

Heidelberger’s fees. 

C. Litigation Costs 

 As with Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff seeks an award of its non-taxable 

litigation costs pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285 because this is an “exceptional” case. (Dkt. No. 38 at 

15-16.) The Court agrees that this is an “exceptional” case, however, Plaintiff is also entitled to 

costs as the prevailing party under the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (providing that a 

prevailing plaintiff is entitled to “costs as fixed by the court”); see also Gryphon Mobile Elecs., 

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LLC v. Brookstone, Inc., SACV 15-2056-DOC (JCGx), 2016 WL 7637987, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 

12, 2016) (awarding costs pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284); IP Power Holdings Ltd. v. Bam 

Brokerage, Inc., SACV 11-01234-JVS (ANx), 2014 WL 12589630, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2014) 

(“A patentee may recover costs incurred in litigating an infringement action ‘upon finding for the 

claimant.’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284). 

 Mr. Heidelberger attests that Plaintiff has expended $1,561.94 in litigation costs as of 

October 28, 2019. (Dkt. No. 37-1, Ex. A at ¶ 13.) However, the invoices reflect only costs 

incurred by Carr & Ferrell, LLP. (See Dkt. No. 26-4.) As previously discussed, Plaintiff submits 

no declaration from a Carr & Ferrell attorney attesting to the authenticity of those invoices. 

 Accordingly, the Court recommends denying Plaintiff’s request for an award of costs. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that the newly assigned district court 

judge GRANT IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. The Court recommends 

awarding $3,000 in damages and $10,400 in attorneys’ fees. The Court recommends denying 

Plaintiff’s request for litigation costs because Plaintiff fails to provide a declaration from Carr & 

Ferrell. 

 Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district judge 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72. Failure to file an objection may waive the right to review of the 

issue in the district court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 14, 2020 

 

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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