Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02049/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02049-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Limon Frausto,

Petitioner

-vsState of Arizona, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-14-2049-PHX-DLR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson, 

Arizona, filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on February 5, 2015 (Doc. 9). On June 1, 2015 Respondents filed their Response 

(Doc. 15). Petitioner has not filed a Reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On March 21, 2003, a Direct Complaint (Exhibit A) was filed in Maricopa 

County Superior Court against Petitioner and an accomplice, Ozuna, charging them with 

armed robbery. (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. #, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

On March 28, 2003, an equivalent Indictment (Exhibit C) was filed. 

Counsel was appointed, who filed a motion for a competency evaluation (“Rule 

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11 Prescreen”) (Exhibit D). A competency screening was ordered (Exhibit E, Order 

7/28/03), and then a full evaluation (Exhibit F, Order 8/27/03). After evaluation, the 

Court found Petitioner incompetent to stand trial, and ordered treatment for restoration. 

(Exhibit G, Order 11/20/03.) Continued treatment was ordered on February 17, 2004 

(Exhibit H), and April 12, 2004 (Exhibit I), until on June 10, 2004, Petitioner was 

deemed competent to stand trial (Exhibit J). 

Petitioner then advised the Court of his intent to assert a defense of insanity. 

Accordingly, mental health experts were appointed to evaluate Petitioner. (Exhibit K, 

Order 6/18/04.) Eventually, the matter was set for trial on November 16, 2014. (Exhibit 

N, M.E. 11/9/4.) However, on November 15, 2014, defense counsel reported fear of 

returned psychosis and that Petitioner reported not taking his medication. The trial court 

found that Petitioner was exhibiting signs of mental illness, and he was referred back to 

the state hospital for evaluation. (Exhibit BBB, R.T. 11/15/04 at 51-54; Exhibit P, M.E. 

11/15/04.) A mental health evaluation was filed, diagnosing Petitioner with 

“malingering,” based in large part upon his behavior during recorded phone calls he had 

made while in jail which had been provided by the prosecution. (Exhibit Q at 6.) 

The matter was again set for trial on February 21, 2005. (Exhibit R, M.E. 1/7/05.) 

Trial eventually began February 23, 2005. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 

charge of armed robbery and found it to be a dangerous offense. (Exhibit GGG, R.T. 

3/1/05 at 74.) Trial then proceeded on the aggravating factors, with the jury finding the 

presence of an accomplice. (Id. at 94.) 

On April 7, 2005, after a finding of seven prior felony convictions, Petitioner was 

sentenced to an aggravated term of 22 years in prison.1 (Exhibit T, Sentence; Exhibit 

HHH, R.T. 4/7/05.) 

/ /

 

1

Petitioner’s accomplice, Ozuna, had previously entered into a Plea Agreement (Exhibit 

YY; Exhibit ZZ, M.E. 10/16/03), and was convicted and sentenced to a presumptive 

sentence of 10.5 years. (Exhibit AAA, Sentence 10/28/03.) 

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B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner then filed a direct appeal, with counsel filing an Opening Brief (Exhibit 

V) alleging sentencing errors through the use of a stale prior conviction as an 

aggravating circumstance, and using a prior conviction that was not alleged for 

enhancement purposes. On December 19, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its 

Memorandum Decision (Exhibit X) affirming the conviction and sentence. 

Counsel declined to file a petition for review (Exhibit Y, Letter), and filed a 

Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review (Exhibit Z) to permit Petitioner 

to proceed pro se. Petitioner was given through February 22, 2007 to do so. (Exhibit 

AA, Order 1/11/07.) 

Petitioner did not do so, and on March 12, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

issued its Order and Mandate (Exhibit BB). 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding – On March 28, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit CC). Counsel was appointed, but filed a motion to withdraw 

based upon a conflict of interest. (Exhibit EE.) Substitute counsel eventually filed a 

Notice of Completion of Review (Exhibit HH) evidencing an inability to find an issue 

for review. Counsel was ordered to remain in an advisory capacity, and Petitioner was 

granted leave to file a pro per PCR petition. (Exhibit II, Order 12/20/07.) Petitioner 

failed to do so, and on March 17, 2008, the proceeding was dismissed. (Exhibit JJ, 

Order 3/17/08.) That Order was filed March 24, 2008. (Id.) Petitioner did not seek 

further review.

Second PCR Proceeding - Some two years later, Petitioner sought leave to file a 

delayed petition, arguing that he had sent a pro per petition to counsel for filing, but 

counsel failed to file it. (Exhibit KK, Motion 4/12/10; Exhibit LL, Motion 4/16/10; 

Exhibit MM, Motion 4/19/10.) On June 28, 2010, the Court denied the motion(s), 

finding Petitioner failed to establish he was entitled to file a delayed Petition under Ariz. 

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R. Crim. P. 32.4 and 32.2(b).

Third PCR Proceeding - On July 6, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reinstate 

Rule 32 Proceedings (Exhibit RR), on September 10, 2012 a “Notice to Apprise Court of 

Exhaustion of All State Remedies” (Exhibit SS), and on February 11, 2013 a “Notice to 

the Record” (Exhibit TT).

2

 On February 28, 2013, the Motion to Reinstate was denied. 

(Exhibit UU, M.E. 3/1/13.) 

On March 18, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit VV) with the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, seeking review of the order of February 28, 2013. On August 

26, 2014, that court granted review, observed that the trial court had treated the 

proceeding as Petitioner’s “third successive petition for post-conviction relief,” and 

concluded that the claims raised were either precluded under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) 

because not raised in prior proceedings, and any assertion of newly discovered evidence 

was unsupported by any allegations of newly discovered evidence, or not properly raised 

because not previously raised to the trial court. Accordingly, relief was denied. (Exhibit 

WW, Mem. Dec. 8/26/14.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review, and on October 15, 2014, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals issued its Mandate (Exhibit XX). 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his original Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 15, 2014 (Doc. 1). 

On January 15, 2015, that Petition was dismissed with leave to amend on the basis that 

Petitioner had not named a proper respondent, but had instead named the State of 

Arizona and Arizona Attorney General. 

On February 5, 2015, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 9). In the Amended Petition, Petitioner 

 

2

In the interim, Petitioner had filed an “Opening Brief” (Exhibit QQ) with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals challenging prison disciplinary actions.

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raises the following four claims:

In Ground One, he argues that his trial counsel’s performance was 

constitutionally deficient because counsel did not request a 

preliminary hearing and failed to accurately convey Petitioner’s 

“realistic chances in prevailing at trial.” In Ground Two, Petitioner 

appears to argue that his due process rights were violated when his 

co-defendant accepted a plea agreement and received a ten-year 

prison sentence. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his trial 

was marred by prosecutorial misconduct. In Ground Four, he 

contends that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s 

jury instructions. 

(Service Order 3/6/15, Doc. 10 at 2.)

Response - On June 1, 2015, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) (Doc. 

15). Respondents argue that the Amended Petition is barred by the statute of limitations 

(id. at 20 et seq.), the claims are too vague to warrant relief (id. at 26), and his state 

remedies on all of his claims are procedurally defaulted (id. at 26, et seq.). 

On June 2, 2015, Respondents filed a Notice of Errata (Doc. 16), providing a copy 

of the same Answer with .pdf bookmarks included.

Reply – In the Order filed June 4, 2015 (Doc. 17), the Court noted the filing of 

the Answer, and set a deadline of July 6, 2015 for a reply. To date, Petitioner has not 

replied in support of his petition.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

Petitioner did not address timeliness in the Amended Petition. (Amend. Petition, 

Doc. 9 at 11.) He has not replied to address Respondents’ contentions.

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2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).3 

Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending at least through December 19, 

2006, when the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision (Exhibit X). 

Thereafter, on the basis of the order extending the deadline (Exhibit AA), Petitioner had 

until February 22, 2007 in which to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. He did 

not do so. Accordingly, his conviction became final by the conclusion of the time for 

direct review on February 22, 2007, his statute of limitations began running thereafter, 

and without any tolling expired one year later, on February 22, 2008.

3. Timeliness Without Tolling

a) Relation Back to Original Petition

Petitioner’s Amended Petition (Doc. 9) was filed on February 5, 2015. 

Respondents assume, for purposes of their response, that pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 15(c), the Amended Petition relates back in time to the original Petition, 

filed September 15, 2014. 

Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned likewise presumes for 

purposes of this Report and Recommendation (in Petitioner’s favor), that the Amended 

Petition relates back to the filing of the original Petition. 

b) Prison Mailbox Rule

The original Petition was filed September 15, 2014, but was mailed from the 

 

3

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

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Arizona State Prison. “In determining when a pro se state or federal petition is filed, the 

‘mailbox’ rule applies. A petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands 

the petition to prison officials for mailing.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Petitioner proffers nothing apart from the return address on the envelope 

(Doc. 1-1) containing his original Petition, to suggest that his Petition was delivered to 

prison officials for mailing, or that it was delivered prior to its filing date. The Petition is 

undated and the certificate of delivery for mailing is not completed and is unsigned. (See 

Doc. 1 at 11.) Because it would be reasonable to assume that Petitioner did deliver his 

petition to prison officials for mailing, and to assume that it was done prior to the filing 

date, and because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes (in 

Petitioner’s favor) that his Petition was delivered to prison officials for mailing on the 

date of the postmark, September 12, 2014, and that it should be deemed “filed” as of that 

date.

c) Conclusion

As determined in subsection (1) above, without any tolling Petitioner’s one year 

habeas limitations period expired no later than February 22, 2008, making his September 

12, 2014 Petition over six and a half years delinquent.

4. Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Properly Filed - Statutory tolling of the habeas limitations period only results 

from state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is never 

“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 

(2005). On the other hand, the fact that the application may contain procedurally barred 

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claims does not mean it is not “properly filed.” “[T]he question whether an application 

has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims 

contained in the application are meritorious and free of procedural bar.” Artuz v. 

Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 (2000). 

Even if the state court provides alternative grounds for disposing of the state 

application, a ruling that the application was untimely precludes it from being “properly 

filed” and tolling the limitations period. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-26 (2002). 

If the state court summarily disposes of a state application without identifying if it was 

on timeliness grounds, or otherwise fails to give a clear indication wehther it has deemed 

the application timely or untimely, the federal habeas court “must itself examine the 

delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to 

timeliness.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006).

Mailbox Rule - For purposes of calculating tolling under § 2244(d), the federal 

prisoner “mailbox rule” applies. Under this rule, a prisoner’s state filings are deemed 

“filed” (and tolling thus commenced) when they are delivered to prison officials for 

mailing. In Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit noted: 

[I]n Saffold v. Newland, 224 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.2000), we squarely 

held that the mailbox rule applies with equal force to the filing of 

state as well as federal petitions, because "[a]t both times, the 

conditions that led to the adoption of the mailbox rule are present; 

the prisoner is powerless and unable to control the time of delivery 

of documents to the court." Id. at 1091. 

Id. at 575. 

Similarly, the “mailbox rule” applies to determining whether an Arizona 

prisoner’s state filings were timely. Although a state may direct that the prison mailbox 

rule does not apply to filings in its court, see Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1090 

(9th Cir. 2014), Arizona has applied the rule to a variety of its state proceedings. See e.g. 

Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 245, 908 P.2d 56, 59 (App.1995) (notice of direct appeal); 

State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.1999) (PCR notice); State 

v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 23, 106 P.3d 1035, 1038 (App. 2005) (petition for review to 

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Arizona Supreme Court).

Application to Petitioner - Petitioner’s limitations period commenced running 

on February 23, 2007. Petitioner’s First PCR proceeding was commenced on March 28, 

2007, when he filed his first PCR notice (Exhibit CC). Because it does not affect the 

outcome, the undersigned presumes for purposes of this Report & Recommendation, that 

Petitioner delivered this notice to prison officials for mailing on the date of his signature, 

March 22, 2007. (Id. at 4.) At that time, 27 days of Petitioner’s one year had expired, 

leaving him 338 days.

That proceeding remained pending at least until March 17, 2008, when it was 

dismissed. (Exhibit JJ, Order 3/17/08.) That Order was filed March 24, 2008. (Id.) 

Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to directly address this issue, a number of 

other circuits have held that statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) also continues 

through the time that further state review could have been sought on a state postconviction relief petition, even though it was not sought. For the reasons discussed in

Holemen v. Ryan, CV12-02350-PHX-SRB, 2013 WL 3716603, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 15, 

2013), the undersigned concludes that tolling continues until the expiration of time for 

further review. Respondents’ reference to the dicta in Evans v. Chavis ̧ 546 U.S. 189, 

191 (2006) (see Answer, Doc. 16 at 22) is just that, and does not address or resolve the 

issue. But see Hines v. Bartos, 2007 WL 1381655, *1 (D.Ariz.,2007) (CV 06-697-PHXJAT) (concluding that “ an appeal that is never filed cannot be considered timely and 

Petitioner cannot reap the benefit of statutory tolling without actually filing a petition for 

review of the post-conviction relief denial”). 

Here, Petitioner had 30 days after the CPR court ruled to seek review by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (30 days to petition for 

review). Moreover, Arizona has broadly applied its rule expanding time limits by five 

days after service by mail, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3(a), to include time 

limits running from the issuance of court orders. See e.g State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 261, 

782 P.2d 737 (1989) (applying Rule 1.3(a) to Rule 31.3 deadline for notices of appeal); 

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State v. Savage, 117 Ariz. 535, 573 P.2d 1388 (1978) (applying Rule 1.3(a) to Rule 

32.9(c) deadline for petition for review from denial of motion for rehearing in PCR 

proceeding); and State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 786 P.3d 956 (1990) (citing applying 

Rule 1.3 to time for notice of appeal delivered to attorneys' courthouse internal mailbox).

Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes for purposes of 

this Report & Recommendation (in Petitioner’s favor) that his first PCR proceeding 

remained pending until 35 days after the PCR court filed and mailed its ruling on March 

24, 2008, or until Monday, April 28, 2008. Thus, under the foregoing presumptions, 

Petitioner’s habeas limitations period was tolled from no more than March 22, 2007 until 

April 28, 2008. It commenced running again no later than April 29, 2009, and expired 

338 days later, on April 2, 2010.

Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was not commenced until April 12, 2010, 

when Petitioner filed his first Motion for Leave to File Delayed Petition (Exhibit KK).4 

However, because that proceeding was dismissed as untimely (id.) it was not properly 

filed, and thus does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. Pace, 544 U.S. 

408.

5

Petitioner’s third PCR proceeding was not commenced for over two years (in any 

event, no sooner than July 1, 2012, when he signed his Motion to Reinstate Rule 32 

Proceedings (Exhibit RR)). Once the statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or 

collateral relief filing does not reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 

276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

Accordingly, Petitioner has no statutory tolling resulting from his second or third 

 

4

The PCR Court found that the Motion was filed on April 8, 2010. (Exhibit PP, M.E. 

6/30/10.) The Motion was dated March 29, 2010. (Exhibit KK.)

5

That proceeding was pending no longer than through June 30, 2010, then the PCR court 

mailed its Minute Entry (Exhibit PP) denying the motion. The 128 days between the 

arguable mailing of the Petition on March 29, 2010 and the expiration of the 35 days for 

further review on August 4, 2010, would not provide sufficient tolling to render the 

Petition timely.

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PCR proceedings, and his limitations period expired no later than April 2, 2010, making 

his September 12, 2014 Petition almost four and a half years delinquent. 

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner does not proffer any grounds for equitable tolling, and the undersigned 

finds none.

6. Actual Innocence 

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

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petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding.

7. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas 

limitations period commenced running on February 23, 2007, and with the available 

statutory tolling, expired no later than April 2, 2010, making his Amended Petition 

(presumed to be filed as of September 12, 2014) almost four and a half years delinquent. 

Petitioner has shown no basis for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable 

tolling or actual innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition 

must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Because the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Petition is plainly barred by 

the statute of limitations, Respondents other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

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cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

procedural ruling is correct. Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report 

& Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Amended Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed February 5, 2015 (Doc. 9) be DISMISSED WITH 

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PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: October 23, 2015

14-2049r RR 15 10 21 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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