Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-1_20-cv-00001/USCOURTS-akd-1_20-cv-00001-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

DANIEL MACDONALD,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-00001-SLG

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants University of Alaska (“UA”), 

et al., on April 14, 2020, pleading ten claims arising out of UA’s investigation into 

complaints that Plaintiff had engaged in sexual harassment and non-consensual 

sexual contact.

1 On April 17, 2020, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion 

for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction without prejudice.

2

 

On April 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Renewed Emergency Motion for a Temporary 

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.3 The Court denied Plaintiff’s 

renewed request for a temporary restraining order on April 21, 2020, and 

established a briefing schedule for Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.4 

1 See generally Docket 1.

2 Docket 10; see also Docket 4 (Motion).

3 Docket 11.

4 Docket 13.

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The briefing is complete and the portion of Plaintiff’s motion requesting a 

preliminary injunction is now before the Court.5 Plaintiff has requested oral 

argument, but it was not necessary for the Court’s decision.

The relevant facts are well known to the parties and have been laid out by 

the Court in its previous orders regarding Plaintiff’s requests for a temporary 

restraining order.6 They will not be repeated here except where necessary for the 

Court’s analysis.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 

right.”7 In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the United States 

Supreme Court held that plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctive relief must 

establish that “(1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of 

equities tips in their favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.”8 

5 UA’s Response in Opposition is at Docket 15, and Plaintiff’s Reply is at Docket 19.

6 See Docket 10 at 1–4; Docket 13 at 2–5.

7 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 

674, 689–90 (2008)).

8 Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).

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Winter was focused on the second element, and clarified that irreparable harm 

must be likely, not just possible, for an injunction to issue.9

Following Winter, the Ninth Circuit addressed the first element—the 

likelihood of success on the merits—and held that its “serious questions” approach 

to preliminary injunctions was still valid “when applied as part of the four-element 

Winter test.”10 Accordingly, if a plaintiff shows “that there are ‘serious questions 

going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—

then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips sharply

in the plaintiff’s favor.’”

11

 

Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, and “[t]he essence of equity 

jurisdiction is the power of the court to fashion a remedy depending upon the 

necessities of the particular case.”12

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, the Court finds it necessary to clarify the relief 

available to Plaintiff on his motion, as that potential relief establishes the context 

for the Court’s analysis. In his motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court “enjoin UA 

9 See Winter, 555 U.S. at 25; see also All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131

(9th Cir. 2011).

10 See All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131–35.

11 Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original) 

(quoting Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013)).

12 Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. 

Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1987)).

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and its agents from continuing with their investigation” and also that it “order that 

UA allow Plaintiff to complete his studies at UA with no references to the 

allegations of sexual harassment and non-consensual sexual contact.”13 In his 

reply, Plaintiff clarifies that his “position is not that the investigation should be 

delayed,” but that “[t]he investigation should not be allowed to proceed.”14 To the 

extent that Plaintiff is requesting a permanent remedy—that the Court close the 

investigation into his conduct—his request is premature. “The purpose of [a 

preliminary injunction] is not to conclusively determine the rights of the parties but 

to balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.”15 A preliminary injunction, 

should the Court issue one, would prevent UA from continuing with its investigation

during the pendency of this case; it would not permanently end UA’s investigation. 

Rather, if UA were to eventually prevail on the merits, it would then be able to 

resume its investigation into Plaintiff’s conduct where it had left off. 

The Court now turns to the merits of Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff bases his 

request for preliminary injunctive relief on two alleged violations of his 14th 

Amendment right to procedural due process: first, that the conduct of Mr. Parkey, 

the initial investigator assigned to this case, “virtually assured that Plaintiff would 

13 Docket 11 at 24–25.

14 Docket 19 at 3 (emphasis in original).

15 California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 582 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance 

Project, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017)).

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not be given a fair and equitable treatment of the allegations lodged against him”;

and second, that UA failed to complete the investigation and formally resolve the 

complaints against Plaintiff within 50 days, as prescribed in the regulations 

implementing the University’s policy on sex-based and gender-based 

discrimination.16 

Plaintiff contends that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor, and 

that he therefore need only show “serious questions going to the merits” to prevail 

on his motion.

17

 Accordingly, the Court will begin by discussing the balance of 

hardships.

1. The Balance of Hardships

“To determine which way the balance of the hardships tips, a court must 

identify the possible harm caused by the preliminary injunction against the

possibility of the harm caused by not issuing it” and then weigh “the hardships of 

each party against one another.”18 Plaintiff contends that he will suffer several

irreparable harms in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief. And Plaintiff 

16 Docket 11 at 13–21; see also Docket 11-3 at 19, R01.04.009(C)(1) (UA regulation stating 

“[w]ithin approximately 50 calendar days from the date the complaint was filed, the final 

investigative report will be completed and the Title IX coordinator will notify the parties of the 

outcome of the investigation”).

17 Docket 11 at 13, 21 (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 

2011)).

18 Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999).

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maintains that the “violation of a constitutional right, no matter how minimal, 

presumptively constitutes irreparable harm.”19

Plaintiff contends that Mr. Parkey’s conduct tainted the witnesses against 

him and ensured that he would not receive a fair or impartial adjudication.20 The 

Court finds this alleged harm speculative. Plaintiff cites several short portions of 

interview transcripts to support his claim but has not provided the Court with the 

transcripts themselves.21 Further, it is unknown when the investigation will be

concluded, and whether the decision will be unfavorable to Plaintiff. And if an 

unfavorable decision is reached, UA’s regulations provide Plaintiff with the right to 

an internal appeal, wherein he can claim that “a procedural error was made during 

the process that significantly impacted the finding being appealed,” and during the 

pendency of which any sanction would be stayed.22

19 Docket 11 at 22 (citing Cuviello v. City of Vallejo, 944 F.3d 816, 833 (9th Cir. 2019); de Jesus 

Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)). The law of this Circuit “do[es] 

not require a strong showing of irreparable harm for constitutional injuries,” Cuviello, 944 F.3d at 

833 (discussing First Amendment violations), but, as discussed below, Plaintiff has not shown that 

he is likely to succeed on his constitutional claims. Nonetheless, the Court considers here the 

practical effect that the alleged procedural due process violations may have on Plaintiff during the 

pendency of this litigation.

20 Docket 11 at 17.

21 Docket 11 at 16. Plaintiff explains that the “transcripts are solely in the possession of 

Defendants and were only made available to Plaintiff for a brief time for him to review.” Docket 

11 at 14 n.2.

22 Docket 11-3 at 20, R1.04.100(B), (C)(1).

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Plaintiff’s second procedural due process claim alleges that UA did not 

complete its investigation in a timely manner.

23

 But if Plaintiff does not ultimately 

prevail on the merits in this case, a preliminary injunction would have the effect of 

exacerbating the very harm Plaintiff alleges by further delaying the resolution of 

the University’s investigation.

Plaintiff also contends that his “academic career is . . . suffering” and that 

“[h]e is intending to pursue a career in archaeology and has been delayed because 

of the ongoing investigation.”24 In a declaration attached to the instant motion, 

Plaintiff explains that the investigation has “disrupted [his] ability to gain admittance 

to a graduate program” because “[d]uring the pendency of the investigation, [he is] 

unable to obtain the necessary letters of recommendation.”25 He maintains that 

“[e]very day that Plaintiff continues to be denied the ability to continue his 

education is lost time which cannot ever be recovered.”26 

The Court is not persuaded that suspending UA’s investigation during the 

pendency of this litigation will resolve Plaintiff’s present inability to secure a letter 

23 Docket 11 at 19.

24 Docket 11 at 22.

25 Docket 11-2 at 6, ¶ 28. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[a]t [Mr.] Parkey’s prompting, [a 

complainant] told Professor Erica Hill that Plaintiff was a sexual predator and convinced her not 

to write a letter of recommendation for him.” Docket 1 at 9, ¶ 41. In a declaration, Ms. Childress 

states that Mr. Parkey received an email from Professor Hill regarding Plaintiff’s “request for a 

letter for graduate school” on December 4, 2019. Docket 16 at 6, ¶ 10.

26 Docket 11 at 21.

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of recommendation. Plaintiff, in effect, argues that the reputational harm caused 

by the investigation has impacted his academic career, but he does not explain 

how anything short of an order terminating the investigation entirely—a remedy 

unavailable at this preliminary stage—will cure this injury and prevent such harm 

from continuing while he litigates his case in federal court.

27

 And apart from the 

lack of a reference letter, Plaintiff does not contend that the investigation directly 

impacts his education in any other way. UA maintains that “if the investigation 

goes forward, [Plaintiff] will continue his studies with no impediments to his studies 

or access to campus life” and that “[t]he sole restriction on his conduct is that he 

cannot speak to [a complainant].”28

Plaintiff also contends that he suffers “severe emotional distress” during the 

pendency of the investigation due to his conviction that “[i]t is highly unlikely that 

Plaintiff can receive a fair and impartial adjudication of the charges.”29 He 

maintains that his mental and physical health have been seriously impacted by this 

distress.30 Preliminary injunctive relief, if ordered, might alleviate Plaintiff’s distress 

to some degree; but it does not ensure that Plaintiff will prevail on the merits and 

27 Indeed, the Court questions whether a final judgment for Plaintiff in this case would cure the 

reputational harm Plaintiff alleges, as Plaintiff himself asserts that he “will suffer harm even if he 

is vindicated.” Docket 19 at 10.

28 Docket 15 at 17.

29 Docket 11 at 22. 

30 Docket 11 at 22; see also Docket 11-2 at 6, ¶¶ 25–27.

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secure the termination of the investigation. Nor, as discussed above, would it 

repair any reputational harm that Plaintiff has already suffered. Plaintiff himself 

asserts that his injury will persist until the investigation is closed, regardless of its 

outcome, stating in his declaration that “[s]o long as the investigation continues, 

my health will likely continue to deteriorate” and “i[f] the investigation clears my 

name, I will still have lost time in pursing my career in addition to continued 

emotional distress.”31 

The Court therefore finds that any harm to Plaintiff caused by the absence 

of a preliminary injunction will not be irreparable. He does not currently face 

sanctions and is able to continue his education at UA. Should the investigation 

conclude and any sanctions be imposed before this litigation is over, Plaintiff has 

the ability to seek an internal appeal and stay those sanctions. Moreover, juries 

commonly award monetary damages for emotional distress, and harm that can “be 

adequately remedied by money damages and is [not] permanent or at least of long 

duration” is generally not irreparable.32

The Court must weigh Plaintiff’s asserted harm against the harm that a

preliminary injunction could cause to UA. The University contends that “[h]alting 

the investigation [would] nurture[] a misperception that the University is unable to 

31 Docket 11-2 at 6–7, ¶¶ 30, 32.

32 W. Watersheds Project v. Bernhardt, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1254 (D. Or. 2019) (quoting Amoco 

Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)).

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police its campus, enforce its rules, and keep its students safe.”33 It maintains that 

it has “the legal authority to regulate and police its campuses,”34 and that a 

preliminary injunction would restrict its ability to do so and prevent it from providing 

a forum to and protecting the interests of the complainants against Plaintiff. UA 

also contends that a preliminary injunction would make it more difficult for it to 

restart the investigation if it prevails in this forum, since it would make the events 

in question that much more remote. Plaintiff responds that “there has been no 

evidence presented that [the complainants against him] will be harmed while the 

matter is decided,” and maintains that UA brought the delay caused by a 

preliminary injunction on itself by the actions of its agents and that it must therefore 

bear the consequences.35 Plaintiff further asserts that the University’s ability to 

finish the investigation in the future would not be affected by a preliminary 

injunction, as “[a]ll of the evidence has already been collected.”36

33 Docket 15 at 17.

34 Docket 15 at 17 (citing Alaska v. Chevron Chem. Co., 669 F.2d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982)).

35 Docket 19 at 8–9.

36 Docket 19 at 9. The Court notes that it is unclear whether Mr. Tillinghast is continuing to collect 

evidence at this point in the investigation. Ms. Childress states in her May 5, 2020 declaration 

that “[t]he University continues to investigate the subject Title IX proceeding against [Plaintiff],” 

Docket 16 at 9, ¶ 14, and the record shows that Mr. Tillinghast was attempting to schedule an 

interview with Plaintiff in mid-April 2020. See Docket 11-8 (April 14, 2020 email from Ms. 

Childress). UA’s response states that Mr. Tillinghast “can . . . re-interview witnesses if he finds it 

necessary,” Docket 15 at 23, and Ms. Childress indicated to Plaintiff in an April 14, 2020 email 

that Mr. Tillinghast would be re-interviewing the relevant parties, stating: “You were provided the 

evidence to review following the initial interviews. You will be provided that opportunity again 

following the interviews with Mr. Tillinghast.” Docket 11-8 at 2.

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The Court finds the University’s argument compelling, especially its 

contention that a preliminary injunction would negatively impact its ability to protect 

the interests of the complainants against Plaintiff. Weighing this harm to UA 

against the speculative and reparable harm that Plaintiff alleges he would suffer in 

the absence of preliminary injunctive relief, the Court concludes that the balance 

of hardships does not tip sharply in Plaintiff’s favor. To the contrary, the Court 

finds that balance of hardships tips squarely in UA’s favor. Accordingly, a “serious 

questions going to the merits” inquiry would be improper.37

2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Even if the balance of hardships did tip in Plaintiff’s favor, he has failed to

prove the remaining Winter factors. Plaintiff bases his request for a preliminary 

injunction on two procedural due process claims; he has not shown a likelihood of 

success on either.

“A procedural due process claim has two elements: deprivation of a 

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest and denial of adequate 

procedural protection.”38 Supreme Court precedent makes clear that university 

students facing dismissal or other sanctions on disciplinary grounds are entitled to 

37 Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014).

38 Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 970

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 

982 (9th Cir. 1998)).

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some degree of process.39 However, the extent of the process due is unclear 

under Ninth Circuit law,

40 and other Circuits are divided on the question.41

 But it is 

unnecessary for the Court to resolve this question here, since Plaintiff does not 

contend that UA’s procedures are facially invalid.42 The Court instead turns to 

Plaintiff’s claims that UA’s procedures as applied to him violated his constitutional 

rights.

A. Mr. Parkey’s Conduct

Plaintiff’s first procedural due process claim arises out of Mr. Parkey’s 

conduct while he was the investigator assigned to the case. Plaintiff contends that 

“[Mr.] Parkey did not act impartially and he conducted his investigation in a biased 

39 See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1978) (“[D]ue process 

requires, in connection with the suspension of a student from public school for disciplinary 

reasons, ‘that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he 

denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present 

his side of the story.’” (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975))).

40 See Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 875 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “[a]cademic 

dismissals do not require a hearing and ‘meet[] the requirements of procedural due process so 

long as the dismissal decision is “careful and deliberate,”’” but “[d]isciplinary dismissals, by 

contrast, may require more formal procedures” (second alteration in original) (first quoting Brown 

v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2002); then citing Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85–86)).

41 Compare Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that university student 

facing disciplinary charges and suspension does not have right to unlimited cross-examination of

witnesses) with Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 400–04 (6th Cir. 2017) (requiring crossexamination in university sexual harassment proceeding where credibility of witness was at 

issue). 

42 Plaintiff does, however, argue that his inability to directly cross-examine witnesses under UA’s 

regulations will exacerbate the effect of Mr. Parkey’s alleged misconduct. See Docket 11 at 17–

19; Docket 19 at 6–7; see also 11-3 at 18, R01.04.090(A)(5) (“The parties are not permitted to 

cross-examine each other, but each party may submit questions in writing to the investigator to 

be asked of the other party.”).

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manner which irreparably tainted the witnesses against Plaintiff,” depriving him of 

“the impartial forum . . . required under Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections and Stivers 

v. Pierce.”43 In Stivers, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[i]t is well-settled that the 

Due Process Clause prevents the state from depriving a plaintiff of a protected 

property interest without a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal.’”

44 “In attempting to make out 

a claim of unconstitutional bias, a plaintiff must ‘overcome a presumption of 

honesty and integrity’ on the part of decision-makers” and “show that the 

adjudicator has ‘prejudged, or reasonably appears to have prejudged, an issue.’”45

Plaintiff cites to several interactions between Mr. Parkey and witnesses. In 

one, Plaintiff points to Mr. Parkey’s use of the word “ass,” claiming that is was 

“unprofessional and crude and bordered on [a] Title IX violation[] itself.”46 In 

another, Plaintiff quotes an interview in which a complainant asked Mr. Parkey 

whether “telling my friends about what happened . . . [w]ould . . . be considered 

retaliation against [Plaintiff],” and Mr. Parkey replied: “It depends on how you tell 

them. If you go walking around campus with a sign, maybe. If you just talk to 

43 Docket 11 at 14 (first citing 249 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2001); then citing 71 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1995)).

44 71 F.3d at 741 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). The Ninth Circuit explained 

that “[t]his requirement applies not only to courts, but also to state administrative agencies

charged with applying eligibility criteria for licenses.” Id. (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 

(1975)). For purposes of resolving this motion, the Court will assume that it also applies to 

university disciplinary proceedings .

45 Id. (first quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47; then quoting Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 333 

(9th Cir. 1992)).

46 Docket 11 at 14.

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someone like you do with [name omitted] or [name omitted], no.”47 Plaintiff further 

contends that Mr. Parkey “used improper interview and interrogation techniques” 

and “disclosed confidential information about the pending investigation.”

48

In response, UA maintains that the transcript portions that Plaintiff cites do 

not show bias on the part of Mr. Parkey, nor even that he acted inappropriately.49 

Moreover, the University contends that any bias or impropriety on Mr. Parkey’s 

part is irrelevant since he was removed from the case and replaced by Mr. 

Tillinghast.50 The Court finds both of these arguments compelling. UA provides a 

reasonable explanation for the transcript portions quoted in Plaintiff’s motion. For 

example, addressing the exchange quoted above, the University maintains that 

Mr. Parkey “[wa]s simply trying to explain to a student that there is a fine line 

between her First Amendment rights to discuss this matter publicly and the point 

where advertising the allegations against [Plaintiff] can actually become harassing 

to him.”51 And the Court does not find it likely that Mr. Parkey’s use of the word 

“ass” is indicative of an unconstitutional bias against Plaintiff. Nor has Plaintiff 

47 Docket 11 at 15.

48 Docket 11 at 16.

49 Docket 15 at 20–22.

50 Docket 15 at 23.

51 Docket 15 at 22. 

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provided portions of the transcript that demonstrate Mr. Parkey’s allegedly 

improper interrogation techniques.52

Plaintiff replies that while he “identified certain instances of [Mr.] Parkey’s 

misdeeds in the complaint and motion, that was not intended to be a complete 

listing,” and that “[b]ecause Plaintiff had limited access to the investigation 

materials on one occasion and no access after January 27, 2020, Plaintiff was 

limited in identifying more examples.”53 However, Plaintiff bears the burden of 

showing that he is likely to prevail on the merits of this claim; the record before the 

Court on this motion is simply insufficient to show that Mr. Parkey prejudged or 

appeared to prejudge an issue in Plaintiff’s case. 

Moreover, Mr. Parkey has been removed from the investigation. Plaintiff 

has not shown that the effects of any misconduct by Mr. Parkey have carried over 

into Mr. Tillinghast’s investigation. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Parkey’s

“unprofessional and partial [conduct] le[d] to the likely bias of the witnesses” and 

that “[t]hese witnesses are tainted to the point that given the very low 

‘preponderance of the evidence’ the violations of Plaintiff’s due process rights 

52 See Docket 11 at 16. Plaintiff maintains that “[Mr.] Parkey presented leading questions to coax 

[a witness] into agreeing with his preconceived notions of the facts,” but does not provide the 

transcript itself for the Court’s review. Docket 11 at 16.

53 Docket 19 at 5–6.

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cannot be remedied if the investigation is allowed to proceed.”54 He contends that 

“[i]n this context, it is irrelevant whether [Mr.] Parkey was biased.”55 Plaintiff cites 

no law for this proposition.56 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is likely to 

prevail on a claim that one or more witnesses has been irreparably tainted against 

him. Plaintiff also contends that any effect Mr. Parkey had upon the witnesses will 

be magnified by the unavailability of cross-examination,57 but Plaintiff does not 

indicate whether he has availed himself of his ability to “submit questions in writing 

to the investigator to be asked of the other party,” or why that approach is 

inadequate.58

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of success 

on the merits of his procedural due process claim arising out of Mr. Parkey’s 

conduct.

54 Docket 11 at 19, 17–18; see also Docket 19 at 6 (“Plaintiff alleges that Parkey’s conduct tainted 

the witnesses in this matter and that because the witnesses have been tainted, Plaintiff will not 

receive a fair adjudication.”). 

55 Docket 19 at 6.

56 Indeed, the only two cases that Plaintiff does cite to directly support his claim regarding Mr. 

Parkey’s conduct, Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections, 249 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2001), and Stivens v. 

Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1995), concerned bias on the part of an adjudicator, not the tainting 

of witnesses. Docket 11 at 14.

57 See Docket 11 at 18–19; Docket 19 at 6 (“Plaintiff will not have a reasonable opportunity to 

elucidate testimony of the witnesses in a manner that mitigates [Mr.] Parkey’s misconduct.”).

58 See Docket 11-3 at 18, R.01.04.090.

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B. The Investigative Timeline

Plaintiff’s second claim asserts that UA failed to comply with its regulations, 

which direct that “the final investigative report will be completed” within 

“approximately 50 calendar days from the date the complaint was filed,”

59 and that 

the length of the investigation into the complaints against him violates his right to 

procedural due process.60 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was informed 

of the complaint against him on November 8, 2019,

61 and that the investigation 

had not concluded as of April 14, 2020, when Plaintiff initiated this action.

62

 Plaintiff 

contends that there was no good cause for this delay and that even if there was 

good cause, he had not been informed that the timeline would be extended.63 The 

University responds that the timeline was extended for good cause, that Plaintiff 

himself requested “almost a month in delay,” that school breaks had interrupted 

the investigation, and that the replacement of Mr. Parkey with Mr. Tillinghast also 

caused delay.64

59 Docket 11-3 at 19, R01.04.090(C)(1).

60 Docket 11 at 19–21.

61 Docket 11-2 at 4, ¶ 11; Docket 16 at 4, ¶ 7.

62 Docket 16 at 9, ¶ 14 (Ms. Childress declaration stating that as of May 5, 2020, “[t]he University 

continues to investigate the subject Title IX proceeding against [Plaintiff]”).

63 Docket 11 at 19–20; see also Docket 11-3 at 20, R01.040.90(C)(3) (providing that “[i]f the 

investigation is extended for good cause, the Title IX coordinator will notify both parties of the 

delay and its anticipated duration”).

64 Docket 15 at 27–29; see also Docket 11-3 at 20, R01.04.090(C)(2) (listing potential bases for 

extending investigative timeline).

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Plaintiff contends that the delay in completing the investigation violated his 

right to procedural due process but cites no law to support this claim. Even 

assuming that UA violated its internal policy, the Court is not aware of any 

precedent that would support Plaintiff’s contention that such a violation would be 

unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has held that 

due process requires, in connection with the suspension of a student 

from public school for disciplinary reasons, “that the student be given 

oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies 

them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an 

opportunity to present his side of the story.”65 

Plaintiff provides no legal support for the proposition that resolution of a complaint 

within 50 calendar days is an additional constitutional protection afforded to

university students facing disciplinary action. Accordingly, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on his procedural due process claim 

arising out of the investigative timeline.66

65 Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85 (1978) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 

419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975)).

66 In his reply, Plaintiff contends that the untimely resolution of the investigation also “violate[s] the 

AK Administrative Procedures Act, and breach[es] the contract between UA and Plaintiff.” Docket 

19 at 4. Plaintiff included these claims in his complaint, see Docket 1 at 26–31, ¶¶ 115–142, but 

did not identify them in the instant motion as entitling him to preliminary injunctive relief. The 

Court therefore declines to address these claims for the purpose of resolving Plaintiff’s request 

for a preliminary injunction. Moreover, since Plaintiff makes only passing reference to them in his 

reply, he has not shown a likelihood on the success of the merits of these claims. The Court 

reaches the same conclusion for the remainder of the claims in Plaintiff’s complaint, which are not 

given serious treatment, if raised at all, in the instant motion. See Docket 1 at 15–34, ¶¶ 70–165 

(stating Plaintiff’s ten causes of action); Docket 15 at 25–26, 29–31 (addressing several of 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims); Docket 19 at 11–12 (contending that violations of the Alaska 

Administrative Procedure Act and that UA’s alleged use of illegal surveillance also justify 

preliminary injunctive relief). 

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3. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm

The Court has already found, in its discussion of the balance of hardships, 

that the harms Plaintiff seeks to avert through preliminary injunctive relief are 

speculative and not irreparable.67 Plaintiff has not shown that he will likely suffer 

irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.68

4. The Public Interest

Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that a preliminary injunction would serve the 

public interest. “Whereas the balance of equities focuses on the parties, ‘[t]he 

public interest inquiry primarily addresses impact on non-parties rather than 

parties,’ and takes into consideration ‘the public consequences in employing the 

extraordinary remedy of injunction.’”69 

Plaintiff contends that “[t]he issuance of injunctive relief would vindicate the 

public’s interest in preserving fundamental individual constitutional rights.”70 

However, as discussed above,71 Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on 

his constitutional claims. UA asserts that “[t]he public has an interest in the 

67 See supra 5–9.

68 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); see also All. for the Wild 

Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).

69 hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1004 (9th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Bernhardt v. L.A. Cty., 339 F.3d 920, 931–32 (9th Cir. 2003)).

70 Docket 11 at 23–24 (citing de Jesus Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 

2012)).

71 See supra 12–18.

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University investigating and addressing sexual harassment and sexual assault on 

its campuses.”

72

 It maintains specifically that “for the female students that [Plaintiff] 

harassed, justice delayed is justice denied. They are planning for the upcoming 

semester and will want to register for classes and housing knowing that they will 

be safe on campus.”73 The Court expresses no opinion at this time regarding the 

merits of the complaints made against Plaintiff. But the Court recognizes that the 

complainants have a strong interest in seeing their complaints adjudicated fully,

despite Plaintiff’s contention that “there has been no evidence presented that [the 

complainants] will be harmed while the matter is decided.”

74 For the foregoing 

reasons, the Court finds that a preliminary injunction that suspends UA’s 

investigation during the pendency of this action would not serve the public interest.

Plaintiff has therefore failed to establish the four factors necessary for a 

preliminary injunction to issue, and the Court will deny his request for that 

extraordinary remedy.

5. Younger Abstention

UA contends that the Younger abstention doctrine constitutes a separate

basis for denying Plaintiff’s motion.

75

 In “exceptional circumstances,” a federal 

72 Docket 15 at 35.

73 Docket 15 at 17.

74 Docket 19 at 9.

75 Docket 15 at 11 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).

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court may abstain from exercising its jurisdiction “where denying a federal forum 

would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.”76 Younger abstention 

may apply with “three categories of cases: ‘(1) parallel, pending state criminal 

proceedings, (2) state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, and 

(3) state civil proceedings that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders 

and judgments of its courts.’”77 If a state proceeding fits into one of these 

categories, Younger abstention is warranted if “the state proceeding [is] (1) 

‘ongoing,’ (2) ‘implicate[s] important state interests,’ and (3) provide[s] ‘an 

adequate opportunity . . . to raise constitutional challenges.’”78 Abstention under 

Younger is proper “so long as ‘the federal action would have the practical effect of 

enjoining the state proceedings.’”

79

UA maintains that Younger abstention is warranted in this case because the 

Title IX enforcement action against Plaintiff is akin to a criminal prosecution, or 

“quasi-criminal.”80 The University further maintains that the ongoing investigation 

implicates an important state interest—“[p]reventing sexual harassment and 

76 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (quoting Colo. River Water 

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)). 

77 Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting ReadyLink Healthcare, 

Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund., 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014)).

78 Id. at 1044 (omissions in original) (quoting Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar 

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

79 Id. (quoting ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759).

80 Docket 15 at 13 (citing Doe v. University of Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 371 (2017)).

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sexual assault on the University’s campuses”—and provides Plaintiff with 

adequate opportunities to raise constitutional challenges.

81

Plaintiff addresses this argument only briefly in his reply and cites no law in 

doing so. He contends that abstention under Younger would be inappropriate 

because “[t]here is no procedure identified in the UA policies to allow something 

akin to a motion to dismiss,” which “leaves judicial involvement as Plaintiff’s only 

recourse to stop an investigation that violates UA’s policies and procedures.”82 In 

addition, Plaintiff appears to argue that the investigation ended automatically after 

the 50-day limit in UA’s policy, maintaining that “[i]n effect, the investigation is 

concluded without a finding of responsibility” and that “[s]ince the investigation 

should be considered concluded, it is appropriate for this Court to intervene at this 

time to prevent Defendants from continuing to violate Plaintiff’s due process 

rights.”83 The Court does not entirely follow Plaintiff’s argument, and notes that 

Ms. Childress states in her declaration that “[t]he University continues to 

investigate the subject Title IX proceeding against [Plaintiff].”84 Further, the Court 

is not convinced that Plaintiff’s asserted inability to move for dismissal of the 

complaints against him based on alleged violations of UA’s internal procedures 

81 Docket 15 at 14–15.

82 Docket 19 at 10–11.

83 Docket 19 at 11.

84 Docket 16 at 9, ¶ 14.

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forecloses Younger abstention, as that doctrine focuses on a federal plaintiff’s 

ability to raise constitutional challenges in ongoing state proceedings.

85

Nevertheless, the Court will not at this time decide whether Younger 

abstention is appropriate in this case. Rather, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request 

for preliminary injunctive relief on the grounds discussed herein. To the extent that 

UA seeks to dismiss or stay this entire case on the basis of Younger abstention,

86

it may file a separate motion to that effect. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief at

Docket 11 is DENIED. 

DATED this 22nd day of May, 2020 at Anchorage, Alaska. 

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

85 Plaintiff does not address UA’s contention that Plaintiff’s ability to retain counsel, submit 

questions for witnesses, present evidence, and file an internal appeal enable him to raise his 

constitutional claims in UA’s investigation proceeding. Docket 15 at 14.

86 Compare Docket 15 at 15 (“[Plaintiff’s] attempt to have the federal courts enjoin a state agency’s 

enforcement of an important state interest violates the Younger abstention doctrine and must be 

dismissed.”) with Docket 15 at 11 (“[Plaintiff’s] request for a temporary restraining order or 

preliminary injunction violates the Younger abstention doctrine.”). 

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