Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02907/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02907-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Robinson, Jr., )

)

 Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) CV 04-2907 PHX VAM

)

Jo Anne B.Barnhart,Commissioner,) ORDER

Social Security Administration, )

)

 Defendant. )

Pending before the Court are plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docs. 10,11 and 12) and defendant's Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment. (Docs. 18,19 and 20).

BACKGROUND

Robert Robinson, Jr., ("plaintiff") filed for benefits under

both Title II (disability) and Title XVI (supplemental security

income) of the Social Security Act on January 18, 2002, alleging a

disability onset date of March 9, 2001. (Doc. 6A at pp. 60, 435). 

Plaintiff was 60 years old at the time he filed his application

for benefits. (Id.). A hearing was held before the

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on April 19, 2004. Plaintiff and

vocational expert Mark Kelman testified. (Id. at pp. 458-83). On

June 21, 2004, the ALJ issued a written decision denying the

application for benefits. (Id. at pp. 16-28). Plaintiff filed

for review before the Appeals Council. On October 19, 2004, the

Appeals Council denied the application for review thereby

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upholding the ALJ's decision as the decision of the Agency. (Id.

at pp. 10-13). On December 16, 2004, plaintiff filed this

application in the District Court challenging the Agency's denial

of social security benefits. (Doc. 1).

DISCUSSION

I. General Statutory Authority

42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1) defines disability as the "inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months

..." In addition, subsection (d)(2)(A) provides:

 An individual shall be determined to be under a

disability only if his physical or mental impairment or

impairments are of such severity that he is not only

unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in

the national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or

whether he would be hired if he applied for work ....

Subsection (d)(3) of section 423 states:

... a "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment

that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques.

II. Standard of Review

The Court must affirm the Commissioner's findings if the

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and

are free of legal error. See Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172,

174 (9th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence means more than a mere

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scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is "such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);

see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).

In determining whether substantial evidence supports a

decision, the Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both 

the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ's

conclusions. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720; Tylitzki v. Shalala,

999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ is responsible for

resolving conflicts, determining credibility, and resolving

ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995); Margallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). 

If there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's

determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination. 

See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Therefore, if on the whole record before the Court substantial

evidence supports the Commissioner's decisions, the Court must

affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989); 42 U.S.C. §405(g).

Under the Social Security Act, a "disability" is defined as

an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). An individual is

determined to be under a disability if "his physical or mental

impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only

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unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 

42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A). The claimant bears the initial burden of

proving that he is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(5); Reddick,

157 F.3d at 721. If the claimant shows that he was unable to

perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner

to show that the claimant "can perform other substantial gainful

work that exists in the national economy." Reddick, 157 F.3d at

721.

An ALJ determines an applicant's eligibility for disability

benefits by following the five stages listed below:

(1) determine whether the applicant is engaged in

"substantial gainful activity;"

(2) determine whether the applicant has a "medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments;"

(3) determine whether the applicant's impairment equals one

of a number of listed impairments that the Commissioner

acknowledges as so severe as to preclude the applicant from

engaging in substantial gainful activity;

(4) if the applicant's impairment does not equal one of the

"listed impairments," determine whether the applicant is

capable of performing his or her past relevant work;

(5) if the applicant is not capable of performing his

or her past relevant work, determine whether the

applicant "is able to perform other work in the

national economy in view of his [or her] age,

education, and work experience."

See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987)(citing 20 C.F.R.

§404.1520(b)-(f)). At the fifth stage, the burden of proof shifts

to the Commissioner. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th

Cir. 1993).

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III. Hearing Testimony

 Plaintiff testified he did not attend school beyond 10th

grade but had a GED. He testified he had not worked since March

9, 2001, after injuring the rotator cuff of his shoulder at work. 

(Doc. 6A at pp. 462-63). Plaintiff testified this injury

aggravated an injury to his neck which prevented his return to

work after his rotator cuff injury healed. (Id. at p. 463). 

Prior to this injury, plaintiff worked as a nurses aid, first in a

nursing home and later for the Department of Corrections. 

Plaintiff also previously worked at a credit bureau between 1997

and 2000. (Doc. 6A at p. 20). He left that job after a sexual

harassment claim was filed against him by a co-worker, but denies

doing anything improper. (Id. at p. 475-76). His last job, from

about June, 2000, until his injury in March, 2001, was as a truck

driver for a waste management business. (Id. at p. 474).

Plaintiff testified at the hearing he suffered from severe

back pain (9 on a scale from 1 to 10). (Doc. 6A at p. 466). He

stated he lies down "most of the time ... during the day" to help

relieve the pain. Plaintiff also testified he "can't get me a

drink of water. I can't cook." He testified he takes medication,

including naproxin and neurontin. (Id.). Plaintiff states he

can't sit, stand or walk for more than 30 or 40 minutes at one

time due to his back pain. (Id. at p. 467).

Plaintiff also testified about neck pain that "goes down to

my left shoulder" causing "sharp pain" on occasion. (Doc. 6A at

p. 467). Plaintiff stated he had neck surgery "where they fused

some discs" in the past and was reluctant to have any more surgery

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"because I've heard of people having surgery on their back and

having problems .... they get worse instead of better." (Id. at p.

469). 

Plaintiff stated he does not work around the house. He

volunteered that "[i]f I attempted to do dishes I would do a

portion at a time, and then I'd have to rest and then get back up

and do another portion. Can't stand at the sink very long." 

(Doc. 6A at p. 470). Plaintiff also stated he doesn't prepare

meals except for in the microwave and further stated he didn't

drive because he doesn't have a car, but doubts he could drive and

has not tried to do so since March of 2001. (Id.).

Plaintiff also testified he takes medication for depression. 

He thinks he has been taking this medication for about a year (as

of April, 2004). (Doc. 6A at p. 471). In spite of taking

medication, plaintiff testified he still feels depressed. He

cited the fact he could not work and had no money as a basis for

his depression, because he has worked all his life up until March,

2001. (Id. at p. 472). 

Vocational expert Mark Kelman also testified at the hearing. 

Kelman stated plaintiff has no training as a certified nurses aid,

and probably worked as a nursing assistant. Kelman testified that

the exertional level for the work plaintiff performed as a nursing

assistant with the Department of Corrections was limited to

distributing medication, taking vital signs and writing some

reports. (See Doc. 6A at p. 473). Kelman characterized this work

as light and semi-skilled. (Id.). Kelman characterized

plaintiff's prior work as a nursing assistant in a nursing home as

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"medium" and also semi-skilled. (Id. at 473-74). He also

characterized plaintiff's truck driving work as "medium" and semiskilled work. (Id. at p. 477). Kelman characterized plaintiff's

work at the credit bureau as "light" or "sedentary." (Id.).

The ALJ asked Kelman to assume someone of plaintiff's age,

education and background who "can perform the exertional

requirements of light work ..." Under these circumstances, Kelman

opined plaintiff could perform his past work as a nursing

assistant or as a credit clerk. However, if plaintiff's testimony

that he cannot sit, stand or walk for more than 30 or 40 minutes

at a time is credited, Kelman concluded that plaintiff could not

perform the work of a nursing assistant but could still do the

work he performed at the credit bureau. (Doc. 6A at pp. 477-78). 

The ALJ acknowledged that if plaintiff is required to lie down for

a large portion of the day (say 4 hours in an 8 hour day) as he

testified, he could perform no work. (Id. at p. 479).

IV. ALJ's Decision

 In her decision denying plaintiff's application for benefits,

the ALJ determined that plaintiff satisfied the first three steps

of the five-part sequential evaluation. (See Doc. 6A at p. 27). 

However, at Step 3 the ALJ determined that although plaintiff's

physical maladies were "severe" they did not "meet or medically

equal one of the listed impairments" and, thus, before plaintiff

could be eligible for benefits, plaintiff must show he cannot

perform any past relevant work (Step 4). If he cannot perform

past relevant work he still will not be entitled to benefits if

the Agency demonstrates he could perform other work in the economy

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(Step 5). The ALJ determined at Step 4 that plaintiff's physical

injuries left him with a residual functional capacity to perform

"light work as defined in the Regulations with a limitation in

pushing and pulling with the lower extremities." (Id. at p. 28). 

In addition, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff "is precluded from

climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds and limited to occasional

climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling,

crouching, and crawling." (Id.). The ALJ determined that

plaintiff's past relevant work as a nurses aid "did not require

performance of work-related activities precluded by his residual

functional capacity." (Id.). As a result, the ALJ determined

that plaintiff's physical condition does "not prevent [him] from

performing his past relevant work as a certified nurses aide and

credit clerk supervisor" and he was, therefore, not disabled. 

(Id.).

In reaching her determination of not disabled at Step 4, the

ALJ concluded, inter alia: 

... [plaintiff's] allegations concerning his symptoms

and limitations [are] lacking in credibility. Although

[he] testified to a reduced range of activities, as

well as debilitating episodes of pain, the documentary

evidence nevertheless establishes [plaintiff] has

overstated his limitations. His statements concerning

his impairments and the impact upon his ability to work

are not entirely credible in light of the degree of

medical treatment required, the reports of the treating

practitioners, the medical history, findings made on

examination and information reported by [petitioner].

(Doc. 6A at p. 24).

In particular, the ALJ noted that although plaintiff

contends he suffered from "severe and chronic pain," in his neck,

lower back, shoulder and arm, the medical evidence "revealed a

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mild L1 compression fracture of unknown acuity and some lumbar

osteoarthritis." (Doc. 6A at p. 24). The ALJ also noted that for

these impairments plaintiff was treated with physical therapy and

medication. In addition, the ALJ observed that "[m]agnetic

resonance imaging revealed a tear of the supraspinatus tendon and 

[plaintiff] underwent a right shoulder open rotator cuff repair

... with good results" and plaintiff testified "he did not

experience right shoulder problems following surgery." (Id.). 

The ALJ further noted that plaintiff's treating physician "allowed

him to return to light duty work with the right arm with no

lifting of over 20 pounds and no overhead activity with the right

arm." (Id.).

V. Analysis

This case turns upon plaintiff's credibility. The ALJ

determined that plaintiff suffered from severe impairments capable

of causing pain. Both parties conceded at oral argument that

credibility was key. The Government's vocational expert stated

that if plaintiff's pain testimony is credited, plaintiff cannot

work and is entitled to disability.

In Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2004), cited

prominently by plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit stated:

"[O]nce a claimant produces objective medical evidence

of an underlying impairment, an [ALJ] may not reject a

claimant's subjective complaints based solely on lack

of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the

alleged severity of pain." If the ALJ finds claimant's

pain testimony not to be credible, the ALJ "must

specifically make findings that support this

conclusion," and the findings "must be sufficiently

specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the

[ALJ] rejected [the] claimant's testimony on

permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit

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the claimant's testimony." If there is no affirmative

evidence that the claimant is malingering, the ALJ must

provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the

claimant's testimony regarding the severity of

symptoms.

Moisa, 367 F.3d at 885. 

Here, as in Moisa, the ALJ found that plaintiff suffered

from a series of severe impairments capable of causing pain. 

Specifically, the ALJ found that plaintiff suffered from

"degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, with spondylosis,

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine with stenosis,

right rotator cuff tear status post surgery (June 2001), asthma

and diabetes, impairments that are 'severe' within the meaning of

the Regulations, ..." (Doc. 6A at p. 21). The ALJ also noted

that through the years plaintiff has had numerous surgeries for

his impairments and been under some type of professional treatment

on a constant basis. (See id. at pp. 21-22).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's basis for rejecting his

credibility did not meet the legal standard. Specifically,

plaintiff contends the ALJ employed the wrong standard of review

because in addition the citing "specific" reasons for discounting

plaintiff's credibility, she must also provide clear and

convincing evidence in the absence of evidence of malingering. 

Second, plaintiff contends the ALJ "ignor[ed] ... the requirement

to identify what testimony is not considered credible and what

evidence undermines that testimony." In addition, plaintiff

contends the ALJ "focuses on irrelevancies" such as plaintiff's

report of improvement after he had shoulder and hernia surgeries

"because [plaintiff's] spinal impairments were the primary basis

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for disability." (Doc. 21 at pp. 3-4).

As noted, because the medical evidence indicates plaintiff

suffers from "severe" impairments that can cause pain, and in the

absence of malingering, the ALJ could only discount plaintiff's

pain and symptom testimony with specific evidence that is also

clear and convincing. Plaintiff's subjective complaints

concerning his level of pain may not be rejected simply by saying

they are not supported by the objective medical evidence. See

Moisa, 367 F.3d at 885. 

In Moisa, the Court touched on the type of evidence which

may be relied on to satisfy the "clear and convincing" standard

necessary to reject plaintiff's pain testimony as lacking in

credibility. Barring evidence of malingering, and the ALJ found

no such evidence in this case, the ALJ could discount plaintiff's

pain testimony by showing evidence of his "reputation for

dishonesty, conflicts between [his] testimony and his conduct, or

internal contradictions in the testimony." See Moisa, 367 F.3d at

885.

In an attempt to do this, the ALJ noted plaintiff "reported

inconsistencies regarding his education." (Doc. 6A at p. 26). 

Specifically, the ALJ observed that in his hearing testimony

plaintiff stated he only completed the tenth grade but that he

told Dr. Huddleston, a psychologist who examined him on behalf of

the State, that he completed his high school education. 

In addition, the ALJ cited numerous inconsistencies between

plaintiff's hearing testimony (where he claimed he suffered from

pain on a level of nine out of possible ten scale) and evidence

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showing on several occasions he described his pain to others as

much less severe or virtually non-existent. 

The ALJ cited inconsistencies between plaintiff's claims of

pain at the hearing and his treatment and medical history which

the ALJ interpreted as showing plaintiff did not claim pain as

severe as that to which he testified. (Doc. 6A at p. 25). In

particular, the ALJ noted that although plaintiff testified at the

hearing that his pain was nine on a ten scale, "he has not

reported this level of pain to treating medical professionals. On

numerous occasions he has reported no pain or mild to moderate

pain." (Id.). The ALJ also found that plaintiff's description of

his limited daily activities were not consistent with the

objective medical evidence. (Id. at p. 26). 

Finally, the ALJ found "inconsistencies" concerning

plaintiff's statements concerning his level of education to be

troubling and indicative of a credibility problem. The ALJ noted

that plaintiff testified at the hearing he only completed the

tenth grade and obtained a high school equivalency diploma. 

However, he told an examining psychologist, Dr. Huddleston, that

he completed his high school education. The ALJ also states he

made similar statements to his "treating physician. (Doc. 6A at

p. 26).

The Court finds the ALJ's description of plaintiff's alleged

"inconsistencies" concerning his education level not persuasive. 

The only difference cited is whether plaintiff was a high school

graduate or obtained an equivalency diploma. This distinction is

not great and is hardly indicative of a reputation for dishonesty. 

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Similarly, the Court discounts the ALJ's assertion that

plaintiff's statements about his restricted daily activities are

not credible because the ALJ utterly fails to provide specifics. 

The ALJ does not identify what statements by plaintiff on this

point are inconsistent. 

The ALJ's findings concerning inconsistencies between

plaintiff's hearing testimony about his level of pain (9 out of 10

requiring him to spend significant amounts of time lying down) and

previous statements during the course of routine examinations (of

a much lower level of pain) deserve closer scrutiny. In essence,

the ALJ asserts that plaintiff never complained of the severity of

pain to treating doctors that he testified to at the hearing.

In response, plaintiff does not deny he did not previously

describe his pain to treating or examining physician to be as

severe as he testified to at the agency hearing. He merely 

states that his failure to report his level of pain to doctors

"shows nothing other than his stoicism." (Doc. 12 at p. 8). The

Court finds this response unsatisfactory. The fact plaintiff may

not have rated his pain at 9 out of 10 before his hearing

testimony does not, in and of itself, destroy his credibility. 

 However, as highlighted by defendant, in notes concerning a

series of examinations conducted on plaintiff between May and

October, 2003, plaintiff gave a much different assessment of his

level of pain. Plaintiff was specifically asked to indicate in

examinations his level of pain on a scale of one to ten. On four

occasions, plaintiff rated his pain at 0 ("no pain"). On one

occasion plaintiff rated his pain as 1 on a scale of ten. (Doc.

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6A at pp. 257, 264, 287, 291 and 317). On two other occasions he

characterized his pain as a 3 on a 10 scale. (Id. at pp. 271,

274). Once he indicated he experienced "occasional" pain at 4 on

a 10 scale. (Id. at p. 322). Twice he characterized his pain as

"occasional" and 5 on a scale of ten. (Id. at pp. 267, 277). 

These characterizations support the ALJ's conclusion that

plaintiff never stated his pain to any medical professional at the

level he testified to at the hearing. As such, it provides

support for the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's pain testimony

lacks credibility because it contradicts his prior

characterizations of his pain in treating documents from 2003. 

Not once during this period of treatment (May - October, 2003) did

plaintiff characterize his pain as anything near 9 out of 10.

The Court further notes, and plaintiff does not dispute,

that no treating physician has opined that plaintiff cannot work. 

Defendant notes that one treating physician, Dr. Brennan, stated

that plaintiff was capable of light work. This assessment was

made in October, 2001, after plaintiff's claimed disability date

(March 9, 2001). (See Doc. 6A at p. 160).

Moisa requires that to discount plaintiff's pain testimony,

the Agency must cite specific evidence and clear and convincing

reasons for rejecting the pain testimony. In light of the

treatment notes cited above, the Court believes that the ALJ did

not err in concluding that plaintiff's testimony, characterizing

his pain as 9 on a 10 scale, requiring him to lie down for 4 hours

during an 8 hour period, was not credible. This fact, and the

fact plaintiff can cite no conclusion from a treating or examining

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physician to support his claim he is unable to work requires the

Court to affirm the Agency decision to deny benefits.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docs. 10, 11 and 12) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment (Docs. 18, 19 and 20) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter

judgment in this matter accordingly.

 DATED this 5th day of December, 2005.

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