Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06689/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06689-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN BATIESTE GREENE, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06689-JSC 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION 

TO DISMISS THE SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 44

John Batieste Greene, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) sued Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) and 

Affinia Default Services, LLC (“Affinia”) (together, “Defendants”) in the Superior Court of the 

State of California for the County of Contra Costa, alleging violations of California state law 

arising out of foreclosure proceedings.1(Dkt. Nos. 1 & 41 at ¶ 1.)2 Defendant Wells Fargo timely 

removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and 

federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(b). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants violated the California Homeowner Bill of Rights and California’s Unfair Competition 

Law when they recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale on his house while he was undergoing a loan 

modification review. (Dkt. No. 41.) Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended 

complaint is now pending before the Court. (Dkt. No. 44.) At oral argument, the parties agreed 

that Wells Fargo is no longer the loan servicer and as such, has no control over the subject 

property. After careful consideration of the parties’ briefing and oral argument, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend. 

 

1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 9, 11, 14.)

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

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BACKGROUND

I. Complaint Allegations 

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Defendants improperly initiated foreclosure 

proceedings while “Plaintiff was undergoing loan modification review.” (Dkt. No. 41 at ¶ 1.) 

Plaintiff has at all times owned the subject property located at 1795 Meadows Avenue, Pittsburg, 

CA 94565.3 (Id. at ¶ 3.) In November 2005, Plaintiff obtained a loan of $599,000 from World 

Savings Bank, FSB, secured by a deed of trust. (Dkt. No. 45-1, Ex. 1.) Effective December 31, 

2007, World Savings Bank, FSB, changed its name to Wachovia Mortgage, FSB. (Id., Ex. 2.) 

The loan was assigned to Wells Fargo in 2009 following a corporate merger. (Dkt. No. 41 at ¶ 11; 

see also Dkt. No. 45-1, Exs. 1-3.) 

In 2011, Plaintiff entered into a loan modification agreement with Wells Fargo. (Dkt. No. 

41 at ¶ 37.) On September 23, 2013, the trustee recorded a Notice of Default against the subject 

property. (Dkt. No. 45-1, Ex. 5.) In or around 2015, Plaintiff experienced financial hardship and 

was forced to file for bankruptcy. (Dkt. No. 41 at ¶¶ 13-14.) At some later time, Plaintiff again 

experienced financial hardship and was forced to file for bankruptcy a second time on July 25,

2017. (Dkt. No. 45-1, Ex. 9; see also id. at ¶ 18.) On January 4, 2018, the bankruptcy court 

granted Plaintiff and Wells Fargo’s Stipulation for Adequate Protection Re: Motion for Relief 

from Automatic Stay. (Dkt. No. 45-1, Ex. 6.) Thereafter, Plaintiff was unable to make payments 

under the Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plan and Wells Fargo sent him a Notice of Default. (Id., Ex. 7.) 

The bankruptcy court subsequently granted Wells Fargo relief from automatic stay on August 1, 

2018. (Dkt. Nos. 41 at ¶¶ 21-22 & 45-1, Ex. 8.) 

Plaintiff then completed a mortgage assistance application form, which he submitted to 

Wells Fargo with a number of documents in or around August 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 59-87.) On 

September 20, 2018, Wells Fargo recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale, indicating that Plaintiff was 

 

3 The current status of the property is unclear, however, the Second Amended Complaint alleges 

that Plaintiff is still the owner, (see Dkt. No. 41 at ¶ 3), and at oral argument Plaintiff confirmed 

that he still resides at the property. The bankruptcy case was closed on February 6, 2019. (Dkt. 

No. 45-1, Ex. 9.) 

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in default under the Deed and a public auction would take place on October 22, 2018 unless 

Plaintiff took corrective action. (Id. at ¶ 32; see also Dkt. No. 45-1, Ex. 11.)

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Contra Costa County Superior Court on October 17, 2018, 

seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages arising out of foreclosure proceedings. (Dkt. No. 

1, Ex. A at 12.) On November 2, 2018, Wells Fargo removed the action to this Court, (Dkt. No. 

1), and Affinia consented to removal, (Dkt. No. 3). The Court granted Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the original complaint on December 28, 2018, granting leave to amend as to Plaintiff’s 

claims under the California Homeowner Bill of Rights and the Unfair Competition Law, and 

dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s claim under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

(Dkt. No. 20.)

Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on January 24, 2019, reasserting his 

claims under the California Homeowner Bill of Rights and the Unfair Competition Law. (Dkt. 

No. 22.) Defendants moved to dismiss thereafter. (Dkt. Nos. 28 & 30.) The Court granted 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint on March 25, 2019, with leave to 

amend. (Dkt. No. 36.) 

Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on April 15, 2019, reasserting the 

same claims. (Dkt. No. 41.) Defendants moved to dismiss thereafter. (Dkt. Nos. 44 & 46.) The 

motion is fully briefed, (Dkt. Nos. 47-49), and the Court heard oral argument on June 20, 2019. 

At oral argument, the parties agreed that Wells Fargo is no longer the servicer on the loan and 

does not have control over the property.

4

 

//

//

//

 

4 Plaintiff filed a separate action in Contra Costa County Superior Court against the current loan 

lender, U.S. Bank, N.A., the current loan servicer, Fay Servicing, LLC, and the current trustee of 

the loan, Affinia Default Services, LLC. The defendants removed the case to this Court, and the 

Court subsequently remanded the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Greene v. Fay 

Serv’g, No. 3:19-cv-01073-JSC, Dkt. Nos. 1-1 at ¶¶ 4-6 & 47. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

I. Mootness

“[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the 

complaint is filed.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997). Thus, 

courts must raise issues concerning subject matter jurisdiction, which include mootness, sua 

sponte. Bernhardt v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts may look 

beyond the pleadings for purposes of analyzing subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(d); see also Foote v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04465-EMC, 2016 WL 2851627, at *4 

(May 16, 2016). 

“A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000). In

other words, the central issue in mootness is whether circumstances that existed at the time of 

filing the complaint have changed and forestalled the possibility of meaningful relief. A case is 

thus moot if a defendant voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct in a way that makes it 

“absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” 

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v Slater, 528 US 216, 221 (2000). The question is not whether there is 

any possible relief, but whether there can be any effective relief. West v. Sec. of Dept. of Transp., 

206 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2000). 

II. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as 

failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial plausibility standard is not a “probability 

requirement” but mandates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When 

considering a motion to dismiss, a court accepts a plaintiff's factual allegations as true and 

construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 

Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, the court need not accept legal 

conclusions, including “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

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conclusory statements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, a complaint “that offers labels and 

conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient, as is a 

complaint that “tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request judicial notice of eleven documents, ten of which they have previously 

submitted in support of their motion to dismiss the original complaint. (See Dkt. Nos. 8 & 45.) 

The Court granted judicial notice of those documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) 

because they are undisputed matters of public record. (See Dkt. No. 20 at 4-5.) Defendants also 

request judicial notice of the docket from the bankruptcy proceedings (United States Bankruptcy 

Court, Northern District of California Case No. 17-41903). Plaintiff does not oppose judicial 

notice of any of the exhibits or otherwise dispute their authenticity. The Court grants judicial 

notice of those documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). See Harris v. Cty. of 

Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that judicial notice is appropriate for 

“undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts”) 

(internal citation omitted).

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of: (A) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 

41); (B), (D)-(I) filings in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of California 

Case No. 17-41903; and (C) the docket from the bankruptcy case. The Court grants judicial notice 

of these documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), because the Court already 

assesses the pleadings when evaluating a motion to dismiss, and as noted above, the bankruptcy 

records are matters of public record. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings two causes of action against Defendants, seeking damages and injunctive 

relief for alleged violations of: (1) the California Homeowner Bill of Rights, California Civil Code 

§ 2924.11; and (2) the Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code § 

17200. As previously discussed, the parties agreed at the June 20, 2019 hearing that Wells Fargo 

is no longer the servicer on Plaintiff’s loan, potentially rendering Plaintiff’s claims moot. Thus, 

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the Court must evaluate mootness sua sponte and determine whether the Complaint must be 

dismissed due to mootness or failure to state a claim.5 See Bernhardt, 279 F.3d at 871. 

I. Homeowner Bill of Rights

Plaintiff’s claim under the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (“HBOR”) alleges 

specific violations of Sections 2924.11(a) and 2924.11(b). Section 2924.11(a) prohibits “dual 

tracking” in which a mortgage servicer pursues foreclosure while a borrower’s “complete 

application for a foreclosure prevention alternative” is pending. Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.11(a). 

Section 2924.11(b) requires a mortgage servicer to send written notice to a borrower if it denies 

the borrower’s loan modification application. Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.11(b). 

The HBOR further provides that there are two possible situations in which relief may be 

granted. Under section 2924.12(a), “[i]f a trustee’s deed of sale has not been recorded,” then a 

plaintiff may get a temporary injunction until the alleged violation has been corrected. Cal. Civ. 

Code § 2924.12(a). “After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded,” a plaintiff may be able 

to recover monetary relief. Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12(b). “Thus, prior to sale, damages are not 

available under HBOR.” Foote, 2016 WL 2851627, at *7. 

Here, the complaint does not allege that the subject property has been foreclosed upon and 

at oral argument Plaintiff confirmed that he still resides at the property. (Dkt. No. 41 at ¶ 3.) 

Section 2924.12(a) thus applies because this is a pre-foreclosure case and the only remedy 

available to Plaintiff under the HBOR is an injunction. Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12(a). As 

previously discussed, since this action was filed Wells Fargo has transferred the loan. Greene, No. 

3:19-cv-01073-JSC, Dkt. No. 47. The Court therefore cannot enjoin Wells Fargo from foreclosing 

Plaintiff’s home because it no longer has control over the property; thus, Plaintiff’s HBOR claim 

against Wells Fargo is moot. See Tuan Anh Le v. Bank of New York Mellon, 152 F. Supp. 3d 

1200, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding plaintiff’s pre-foreclosure HBOR claim moot because 

defendant could not foreclose on a defective and expired notice of sale). Plaintiff’s claim against 

Affinia is similarly moot because, “[w]hile it is the trustee who formally initiates the nonjudicial 

 

5 Plaintiff appeared to recognize at oral argument the HBOR claim is moot because the Court 

cannot grant the requested relief. 

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foreclosure . . . the trustee may take these steps only at the direction of the person or entity that 

currently holds the note and the beneficial interest under the deed of trust—the original beneficiary 

or its assignee.” Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 62 Cal. 4th 919, 927, 365 P.3d 845, 850 

(2016). Affinia cannot be enjoined from foreclosing on Plaintiff’s house because it does not have 

decision-making authority as trustee—that power lies with the new lender. Thus, Plaintiff’s 

HBOR claim is moot.

II. Unfair Competition Law

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, 

“unfair competition,” defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Plaintiff’s second claim alleges Defendants participated in unfair 

business practices, including negligent and intentional misrepresentations and a refusal to deal in 

good faith, thereby violating the UCL. (Dkt. No. 41 at ¶¶ 123-25.) 

To have standing to sue under the UCL, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he suffered an 

injury in fact, (2) he lost money or property, and (3) the economic injury was caused by the 

defendant’s conduct. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 

4th 310, 322, 326 (2011). The “lost money or property” element requires that a plaintiff 

“demonstrate some form of economic injury.” Kwikset Corp., 51 Cal. 4th at 323. “At the 

pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may 

suffice.” Id. at 327. 

As discussed in the Court’s prior orders dismissing the original Complaint and the FAC, 

the first two elements are not in dispute because Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an economic injury 

based on the impending foreclosure. (See Dk. Nos. 20 at 16 & 36 at 15 (citing Galang v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 16-cv-03468-HSG, 2017 WL 1210021, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2017)

(concluding that impending foreclosure was sufficient to show cognizable injury for purposes of 

UCL)).) Defendants argue that dismissal of the UCL claim is nonetheless warranted because 

Plaintiff again fails to adequately allege causation of injury. The Court agrees. Plaintiff repeats 

his causation allegations verbatim between the FAC and the SAC. (Compare Dkt. No. 22 at ¶¶ 

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62-63 with Dkt. No. 41 at ¶¶ 130-31.) Thus, the SAC fails to cure the deficiencies outlined in the 

Court’s March 25, 2019 Order, and the Court’s previous analysis applies. 

Both the FAC and the SAC make the conclusory allegations that Plaintiff “was harmed 

economically by suffering an increase in the arrears on his loan balance by Defendants’ delay in 

rendering a written determination on his loss mitigation application,” and that “Plaintiff would not 

have suffered this harm but for Defendants’ unfair, fraudulent, and unlawful conduct as those 

terms are defined under the UCL.” (Dkt. Nos. 22 at ¶¶ 62-63 & 41 at 130-31.) These allegations 

do not reasonably support the inference that any delay in reaching a decision on Plaintiff’s loan 

modification application caused the impending foreclosure because the SAC acknowledges that 

Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and obtained a confirmed Chapter 13 Plan, defaulted on that Plan, 

and Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure proceedings after that default. (Dkt. No. 41 at ¶¶ 56-57.) 

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting that the court must be able to “draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”). The SAC alleges 

that Wells Fargo caused Plaintiff to default on his bankruptcy plan, but even when that conclusory 

allegation is accepted as true, that allegation does not create a plausible inference that Wells 

Fargo’s delay in reviewing Plaintiff’s modification application caused the impending foreclosure. 

As the Court has explained before:

Plaintiff fails to allege that notwithstanding the financial hardship that 

led him to default on his bankruptcy plan, he would have qualified for 

a loan modification that he could have continued to pay to avoid 

foreclosure. See Travis v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 733 F. App’x. 

371, 376 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding allegations insufficient where the 

plaintiffs failed to allege “how the foreclosure alternatives [they] 

would have sought, had they received an answer on their application 

from [the defendant], would have avoided or reduced the damages

they allege.”). 

(Dkt. No. 36 at 16.) Plaintiff continues to make the conclusory allegations that Defendants caused 

the impending foreclosure while also acknowledging Wells Fargo only initiated foreclosure 

proceedings after Plaintiff had defaulted on his bankruptcy plan. 

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Additionally, the SAC fails to state a cognizable UCL claim with respect to relief. The 

UCL allows for injunctive relief and restitution, but not damages. See Korea Supply Co. v. 

Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1144 (Cal. 2003); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 

v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1110 (1996). Restitution under the UCL “is confined to 

restoration of any interest in ‘money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired 

by means of . . . unfair competition.’” Kwikset Corp., 51 Cal. 4th at 120 (quoting Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17203). The Court cannot give injunctive relief for the same reason as stated above;

namely, that the Court cannot enjoin Wells Fargo, nor Affinia, from foreclosing on the property 

because Wells Fargo has transferred the beneficial interest in the loan. Additionally, the Court 

cannot order restitution because the SAC does not allege that Defendants have wrongfully taken 

money or property from Plaintiff in the context of his loan modification. See Haynish v. Bank of 

Am., N.A., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding Plaintiff’s claim for restitution 

failed because, while Plaintiffs claim harm “in the form of lost equity in their home and attorneys’

fees... they fail[ed] to allege that any of the defendants took anything from them wrongfully”) 

(emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim 

because he fails to adequately plead causation of injury sufficient to confer standing to sue under 

the UCL and he has not plausibly alleged that he can obtain any relief under the Act.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC.

As oral argument revealed, Wells Fargo is no longer the servicer on the loan, rendering Plaintiff’s 

HBOR claim moot because the Court cannot provide any effective relief. Thus, the HBOR claim 

must be dismissed. Plaintiff’s UCL claim fails because the SAC does not sufficiently allege 

standing and, even if the allegations were sufficient, the Court cannot provide effective relief due 

to the current status of the loan. The Court dismisses the UCL claim with prejudice because 

Plaintiff has now had two opportunities to correct the same deficiencies, and it does not appear 

that he is able to allege sufficient facts in support of his claims. Further, the Court’s previous 

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order warned Plaintiff that failure to cure those deficiencies would likely result in dismissal with 

prejudice. 

This Order disposes of Docket No. 44.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2019

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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