Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02556/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02556-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CARLOS JAMAL BLEVINS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-02556 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On December 10, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254, asserting he is entitled to federal habeas relief based

on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New

Jersey. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 11) on March 31, 2008.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. Respondents also contend Petitioner

procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claim by failing to

properly exhaust it in the state courts, that Petitioner’s claim

is not cognizable, and that Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

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I Procedural History

In February of 1995 a Maricopa County grand jury

indicted Petitioner on five charges including, inter alia, one

count of attempted second degree murder, or, in the alternative,

aggravated assault, and one count of armed robbery. Answer,

Exh. A. The charges arose from an event occurring on December

26, 1994. Id., Exh. A. The state amended the indictment to

allege a prior felony conviction and to allege that Petitioner

had committed the offenses of December 26, 1994, while on

supervised release. Id., Exh. B & Exh. D. 

On October 30, 1996, Petitioner entered into a written

plea agreement, which provided he would plead guilty to one

count of attempted second-degree murder and one count of armed

robbery. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner also agreed to pay

restitution. Id., Exh. E. In return for Petitioner’s guilty

plea, the state dismissed the other three counts of the

indictment and the allegation that Petitioner committed the

crimes while on supervised release. Id., Exh. E. 

The plea agreement stated that the presumptive sentence

for each crime was 10.5 years imprisonment and that the maximum

sentence for each crime was 21 years imprisonment. Id., Exh. E.

The state also agreed that Petitioner’s sentences should be

served concurrently. Id., Exh. E. Additionally, in the plea

agreement Petitioner allowed that he had one prior felony

conviction. Id., Exh. E. At a change of plea hearing conducted

October 30, 1996, Petitioner admitted there was a factual basis

for his plea and Petitioner averred he understood the maximum

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sentence that could be imposed was 21 years imprisonment. Id.,

Exh. F at 3 & 11.

A sentencing hearing was conducted December 6, 1996.

Id., Exh. J. The sentencing court found no mitigating factors

and three aggravating factors. Id., Exh. J. As aggravating

factors, the sentencing court found Petitioner’s prior felony

conviction, the presence of an accomplice to the crime, and the

extent of the physical injury to the victim, who was shot twice.

Id., Exh. J. at 6-7. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent

terms of 21 years imprisonment on each count of conviction.

Id., Exh. J & Exh. K. 

Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences in his written plea agreement. Id.,

Exh. E. Petitioner filed an action for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, on

December 16, 1996. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner was appointed

counsel to represent him in his post-conviction proceedings.

Id., Exh. M. 

On or about July 9, 1997, counsel averred to the state

trial court that he could find no meritorious issues to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. M. Petitioner was allowed until

September 1, 1997, to file a pro per petition for postconviction relief. Id., Exh. M.

Five months after the deadline had passed for

Petitioner to file a pro per petition, in an order filed

February 20, 1998, the state trial court noted Petitioner had

not filed any actual petition for post-conviction relief and

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dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner

did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Id. at 5.

On December 1, 2004, Petitioner filed a second action

for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. R. In an order filed

January 7, 2005, the Superior Court noted the time to file this

action had expired. Id., Exh. S. The state court further

concluded Petitioner had not presented “any specifics as to how

[Petitioner] might come within one of the exceptions to the

timeliness requirements, as required by Rule 32.2(b).” Id.,

Exh. S. Accordingly, the state trial court dismissed the action

for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. S.

On December 10, 2007, Petitioner filed an action

seeking federal habeas corpus relief, which was dismissed

without prejudice. See Docket No. 1. Petitioner filed an

amended petition on January 16, 2008, asserting his sentences

violated the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Apprendi

v. New Jersey. Petitioner contends he should have received a

lesser sentence in acknowledgment of his guilty plea and the

fact his accomplice received a lesser sentence after a jury

trial. Docket No. 4. Petitioner also notes that he pled guilty

to another criminal charge in a separate 1995 case resulting in

imposition of the presumptive sentence. Id.

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II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposed a

one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners seeking

federal habeas relief from their state convictions. See Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the AEDPA

provides that a petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute

of limitations during the pendency of a “properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2)(2006 & Supp. 2007); Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8,

121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000).

By entering a guilty plea, Petitioner waived his right

to a direct appeal and, accordingly, his first action for postconviction relief was his first appeal “as of right.” See

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007).

Petitioner’s conviction was not “final” and the statute of

limitations regarding Petitioner’s federal habeas action did not

begin to run until the conclusion of Petitioner’s Rule 32

proceedings. Id.

The statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal

habeas action began to run on or about March 19, 1998, when the

time expired to seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals of

the Superior Court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s first action for

post-conviction relief. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799,

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803-04 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, we hold today that, regardless

of whether a petitioner actually appeals a denial of a

post-conviction application, the limitations period is tolled

during the period in which the petitioner could have sought an

appeal under state law.”); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417,

420-24 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, because a judgment is not

final until the time for seeking review expires, the word

“pending” includes that time period, whether or not such review

is sought, and collecting cases so holding). See also

Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 266 (5th Cir. 2002)

(collecting cases so holding). The one-year statute of

limitations expired on March 18, 1999, unless it was tolled by

the pendency of a properly-filed state action for postconviction relief. 

Petitioner did not have any action for state postconviction relief pending in the Arizona courts from March 19,

1998, through March 18, 1999. There is evidence in the record

that Petitioner had a petition pending before the state Board of

Clemency in early 1999. See Answer, Exh. P & Q. However, those

executive clemency proceedings were not a properly-filed state

action for post-conviction relief which acted to toll the

statute of limitations. Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 957 (9th

Cir. 2002). See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 412-13, 125

S. Ct. 1807, 1811-14 (2005); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145,

1146 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 132 (2006).

Accordingly, the statute of limitations with regard to

Petitioner’s federal habeas action expired on March 18, 1999. 

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1 This holding does not affect a petitioner’s ability to

raise claims involving a change in the law made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or claims

involving newly-discovered evidence of innocence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2007). Absent those circumstances, which are

not present here, the strict application of the jurisdictional

deadline is appropriate in a collateral proceeding and is now

established Supreme Court precedent. See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at

2365–66.

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Petitioner did not file any other action seeking state

post-conviction relief until December 1, 2004. This Rule 32

action could not and did not “restart” the already-expired

statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331,

1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120

(10th Cir. 2000).

The undersigned has previously reasoned that section

2254 habeas applicants are no longer entitled to consideration

of the merits of their untimely petitions based on the doctrine

that the statute of limitations could be equitably tolled. The

Supreme Court recently concluded section 2254 petitioners are

not entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations because this does not comport with the plain meaning

of the statute. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365

(2007) (holding that “time limits enacted by Congress” are

“jurisdictional” and rejecting the argument that the federal

courts could craft an “equitable” exception to the

jurisdictional requirement).1 But see Lawrence v. Florida, 127

S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (assuming, without deciding, that

section 2244(d) provides for equitable tolling).

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However, assuming the doctrine of equitable tolling

applies, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a

petition on time. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034

(9th Cir. 2003); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir.

2002). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty,

187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). It is Petitioner’s burden

to establish that equitable tolling is warranted in his case.

Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034. 

Petitioner has not established that there were

extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made it

impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition. A

federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable tolling must also

act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout the period he seeks

to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000);

see also Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2005)

(concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable

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tolling because he was misled or confused about timing of

exhausting his state remedies and filing his federal habeas

petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Each of the cases in which equitable tolling has been

applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state

officials or, occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”);

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1068 (concluding that counsel’s errors in

miscalculating the statute of limitations and mis-advising the

petitioner did not warrant equitable tolling). Compare Sanchez

v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006); Faught v. Butler, 135 Fed. App. 92, 93

(9th Cir. 2005). “Equitable tolling applies principally where

the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the

cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from

asserting his rights.” United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d

927, 930-31 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Compare Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

 Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the

statute of limitations or that Respondents acted to inhibit the

filing of his federal habeas petition. A petitioner’s pro se

status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the

applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling. See, e.g., Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–716

(5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.

2004) (holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s

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“rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not

justify equitable tolling”). 

B. Failure to exhaust

Additionally, habeas relief may not be predicated on

the merits of an Apprendi claim because Petitioner failed to

properly exhaust this claim in the state courts.

The District Court may not grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which was not exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Castille v. Peoples, 489

U.S. 346, 349, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989). To properly

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the

state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by

“fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in

a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110

(9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

concluded that, in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the

“highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied

if the habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, either on direct appeal or in a petition for

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d

993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005). 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

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any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2007). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 541 U.S.

81, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109

S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s claim is

procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Because the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness,

waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar Petitioner from now

returning to the state courts to exhaust any unexhausted federal

habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but procedurally

defaulted, any claim not previously fairly presented to the

Arizona courts. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665

(9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.

2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct.

2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the

waiver and procedural default of claims raised in attacks on

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criminal convictions are adequate and independent state grounds

for affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on

the grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner did not fairly present his Apprendi claim to

the state’s highest court, i.e., the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Petitioner never pursued any form of post-conviction relief to

the Arizona Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted the sole claim for habeas relief stated

in his amended petition.

3. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the Court does

not consider the merits of the claim, or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse their default of the claim. See House v.

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076 (2006); Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-93, 124 S. Ct. 1827, 1852 (2004). 

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate

cause, a petitioner must show the existence of some external

factor which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617

(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305

(9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must

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2

 Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the merits

of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A

fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

factually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at

2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992).

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show that the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire criminal

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144

F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th

Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. 

Petitioner has not established cause for, nor prejudice

arising from, his procedural default of his Apprendi claim.2

Accordingly, relief may not be granted on the merits of the

claim. 

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C. Relief may be denied on the merits of the claim

Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to

dismiss a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for

federal habeas relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2007). 

The Supreme Court held in Apprendi that, other than the

fact of a prior conviction, any fact which increases the penalty

for a crime beyond the legislatively-prescribed “statutory

maximum” must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,

490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000). The federal courts

interpreted Apprendi to mean that a judge may not aggravate a

sentence beyond the “statutory maximum” proscribed by the state

legislature. 

As stated supra, Petitioner’s conviction became final

in 1998, and the decision in Apprendi was published in 2000.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in addition to the other

Circuit Courts of Appeal, have held Apprendi may not be applied

retroactively to cases which were on collateral review or

already final at the time this decision was rendered by the

United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Cambra, 290

F.3d 1029, 1030 (9th Cir. 2002). Cf. United States v. Sua, 307

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding Apprendi was not

violated where sentence imposed did not exceed the statutory

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3

Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. [] Here, only the existence of

a prior conviction is at issue, and Petitioner

has no federal right to have a jury decide that

question. .... The Constitution permits prior

convictions to be used to enhance a sentence,

without being submitted to a jury, so long as the

convictions were themselves obtained in

proceedings that required the right to a jury

trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S. Ct. 2348 [].

There is no suggestion that Petitioner’s []

conviction was obtained without the requisite

procedural safeguards. Thus, we reject

Petitioner’s claim that his sentence violated

Apprendi. Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 2006).

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maximum).

Additionally, the fact that Petitioner’s sentence was

aggravated by, inter alia, an admitted prior conviction and that

he admitted this conviction removes his circumstance from the

umbrella of Apprendi.3 See Hughes v. Harrison, 129 Fed. App.

340, 341 (9th Cir. 2005); Stevenson v. Lewis, 116 Fed. App. 814,

815 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Apprendi carved out a “narrow exception”

for sentence enhancements based on “the fact of a prior

conviction.”). 

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances

of his case warrant application of equitable tolling so that

this Court may address the merits of his petition for a writ of

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habeas corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Blevins’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 5th day of May, 2008.

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