Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02616/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02616-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Keith T. Parker, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Warden J. Stems, et al., 

Respondents.

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No. CV-10-2616-PHX-JAT (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc. 1, and

Motion to Stay Proceedings, doc. 9. Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, doc. 15, and a Response to the Motion to Stay Proceedings, doc. 13. Petitioner

has not replied and the time to do so has passed. For the reasons set forth below, the

undersigned recommends denying the Motion to Stay and the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. 

I. Background 

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing

Petitioner challenges his convictions in Maricopa County Cause Number CR 2002-

012403. On August 1, 2006, a Maricopa County grand jury charged Petitioner with first-degree

murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault based on events on June 29, 2005.

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 1 Citations to Respondents’ Exh. __ are to exhibits attached to Respondents’ Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc. 15. 

 2 The Honorable Edward O. Burke presided. 

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(Respondents’ Exh. A1) Petitioner’s case proceeded to trial.2 On February 20, 2007, a jury

found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder, and not guilty of first-degree murder. The jury

also found Petitioner guilty of attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault. The jury found

that the offenses were dangerous. (Respondents’ Exhs. B, C) On April 4, 2007, the court

sentenced Petitioner to 16 years’ imprisonment on the second-degree murder conviction, and

to 71⁄2 year terms on the attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions.

(Respondents’ Exh. D) The court ordered the sentence on the aggravated assault conviction

run consecutively to the sentences for the second-degree murder and armed robbery convictions.

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner timely appealed. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), advising the Court that he could find no colorable issue to raise

on appeal. (Respondents’ Exh. E) Petitioner subsequently filed a supplemental brief.

(Respondents’ Exh. F) On August 13, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Respondents’ Exh. G) The Arizona Court of Appeals

granted Petitioner an extension to November 16, 2009 to file a petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court. (Respondents’ Exh. H) Upon receipt of a non-conforming petition for review,

the appellate court rejected the petition and issued its mandate. (Respondents’ Exhs. H, I) 

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings

On December 9, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief.

(Respondents’ Exh. J) According to the record, the post-conviction proceeding is pending in

state court. (Respondents’ Exh. K) 

D. Habeas Corpus Proceeding

On December 6, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. (Doc. 1) On January 13, 2011, Petitioner moved to stay the habeas corpus proceedings

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while he pursued his post-conviction action in state court. (Doc. 9) Respondents oppose the

motion to stay and argue that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely. (Docs. 13, 15) 

Petitioner has not replied. Whether a petition is barred by the statute of limitations is a

threshold issue that the Court must resolve before considering other procedural issues or the

merits of any claims. White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the

Court will consider whether the Petition is timely. 

II. Timeliness under the AEDPA

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996

established a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Petitioner filed his Petition after the effective date

of the AEDPA, it governs this action. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). 

A. Commencement of Limitations Period 

The AEDPA’s one-year limitations period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Upon review of the record, the Court finds that § 2244 (d)(1)(A) applies in this case.

Thus, the one-year limitations period runs from “the date on which the judgment became final

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Here, Petitioner’s last direct review proceeding, his appeal to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, terminated on August 13, 2009, when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the appeal.

(Respondents’ Exh. G) However, pursuant to the appellate court’s order, Petitioner had until

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 3 Although Respondents miscalculate the date upon which Petitioner’s conviction became

final by excluding the time Petitioner had in which to seek further review in the Arizona

Supreme Court, that miscalculation does not affect their conclusion that the Petition is untimely.

(Doc. 15 at 5)

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November 16, 2009 to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Respondents’ Exh. A);

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19(a) (establishing 30-day limit for petitioning Arizona Supreme Court to

review court of appeals’ decision on direct appeal.) Because he did not seek such review, his

judgement became final on the expiration of that time - November 16, 2009 - and the one-year

limitation period commenced the next day, on November 17, 2009.3 See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(a); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1072-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that direct

appeal is final upon expiration of time for seeking further appellate review).

Although direct review is normally not deemed complete until the time for a writ of

certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court has expired, see Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th

Cir.1999), Petitioner is not entitled to this additional delay. Certiorari review with the U.S.

Supreme Court may only be sought following a decision or denial of discretionary review by

the state court of last resort, i.e. the Arizona Supreme Court. Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619

(1981). Accordingly, the time for seeking a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court

cannot be considered in determining when Petitioner’s judgment became final when review by

the state court of last resort was not sought. Eisermann v. Penarosa, 33 F.Supp.2d 1269

(D.Hawai’i 1999). See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (certiorari jurisdiction limited to highest available

state court); Sup.Ct. Rule 13 (timeliness from decision of highest state court). See also Foreman

v. Dretke, 383 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2004) (“If a criminal defendant has pursued his direct

appeal through the highest state court, then this period includes the 90 days for filing a petition

for certiorari to the Supreme Court. If not, then it includes the time for seeking further

state-court direct review.”).

Thus, the limitations period commenced on November 17, 2009 and expired one

year later on November 17, 2010. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, filed December 6, 2010, is untimely unless statutory or equitable tolling applies. 

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B. Tolling the Limitations Period

1. Statutory Tolling

AEDPA’s limitations period is tolled during the time that a “properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner’s convictions became final

on November 16, 2009. The statute of limitations commenced the following day and expired

on November 17, 2010. After the AEDPA limitations period expired, Petitioner filed a notice

of post-conviction relief. Because the AEDPA statute of limitations had already run by the time

Petitioner commenced his post-conviction action, statutory tolling will not save his Petition.

Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed petition for post-conviction

relief cannot restart the statute of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

Section 2244(d)(2) cannot “revive ‘the limitation period (i.e. restart the clock to zero); it can

only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. Once the limitation period is expired,

collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of limitation.’” Johnson v. Galaza, No.

C 00-0450 CRB (PR), 2001 WL 125312, * 1 (N.D.Ca., Feb. 7, 2001) (quoting Rashia v.

Kuhlman, 991 F.Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). See also, Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “section 2244(d) does not permit reinitiation of the

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”). 

Petitioner did not file his habeas corpus petition until December 6, 2010, after the

limitations period expired. Thus, it is untimely unless equitable tolling applies. 

2. Equitable Tolling

Section 2244(d)’s limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute

of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, ___ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560

(2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009). A petitioner

seeking equitable tolling must show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

418 (2005). “The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not

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maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2565 (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

Petitioner does not establish any basis for equitable tolling. Petitioner’s lack of

familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154

(9th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of equitable tolling because neither the district court’s failure

to advise the petitioner of the right to amend his petition to include unexhausted claims nor

petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the limitations period were extraordinary

circumstances warranting equitable tolling); Ballesteros v. Schriro, CV-06-675-EHC (MEA),

2007 WL 666927 (D.Ariz., February 26, 2007) (noting that a petitioner’s pro se status,

ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and temporary

incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances) (citing Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d

170, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1999)). “[I]t is well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an

incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares, 223

F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1999)).

See also, Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding

that a pro se prisoner’s illiteracy was not sufficient to satisfy the standard of an objective,

external factor amounting to “cause” for purposes of avoiding the procedural bar on his habeas

claim). 

Similarly, Petitioner’s status as a prison inmate does not constitute an extraordinary

circumstance beyond his control warranting the tolling of the one-year limitations period.

Marsh, 223 F.3d at 1220. The ordinary difficulties inherent in prison life do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the AEDPA limitations period. Bomar v. Schriro,

2008 WL 4183382, * 8 (D. Ariz., Sept. 11, 2008); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090

(9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[e]ach of the cases in which equitable tolling has been applied have

involved wrongful conduct, either by state officials or occasionally, by the petitioner’s

counsel.”).

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Petitioner has not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstance that would justify

equitable tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Accordingly, there is no basis for equitably tolling

the AEDPA statute of limitations and the Petition should be dismissed as untimely.

III. Stay and Abeyance

In a separate motion, Petitioner requests a stay so he can exhaust “other issues that

are not raised in this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” (Doc. 9) He argues, without

explanation or support, that “several significant questions of law, and several constitutional

violation claims . . . need to be decided in a state court, prior to being raised in District Court.”

(Id.) As discussed below, the stay and abeyance procedure is not appropriate in this case. 

Habeas corpus relief is unavailable “unless the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9th Cir. 1996). Generally, “a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing both

unexhausted and exhausted claims.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). Subsequent to

Rose, the AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations for filing federal habeas corpus

petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court recognizes that if a petitioner files a

mixed petition (a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims) in federal court,

the combined effect of Rose and the AEDPA could result in the loss of all claims, including

those already exhausted, because the limitations period could expire while a petitioner returned

to state court to present his unexhausted claims. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230-31 (2004).

Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the district court has limited discretion to hold in

abeyance a habeas petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, to permit a

petitioner to return to state court to exhaust additional claims while the federal proceedings are

stayed. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) (stating that “[w]e confront here the problem of

a ‘mixed’ petition for habeas corpus relief in which a state prisoner presents a federal court with

a single petition containing some claims that have been exhausted in state courts and some that

have not.”). Stay-and-abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines that (1)

there was good cause for petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court; and (2) the

unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless;” and (3) there is no indication that the petitioner

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has engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. Rhines

cautioned that the stay-and-abeyance procedure “should be available only in limited

circumstances,” and should be applied consistently with the AEDPA’s twin purposes:

“reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences” and encouraging

“petitioners to seek relief from state courts in the first instance.” Id.

The stay-and-abeyance procedure is not appropriate in this case because the Petition

is not “mixed.” Rather, all of Petitioner’s claims were exhausted on direct review. (compare

doc. 1; Exhs. F, G) Because all of Petitioner’s claims are exhausted, the stay-and-abeyance

procedure does not apply. See Felder v. Hickman, Civil No. 05cv2225-L (CAB), 2007 WL

2265146, * 5 (S.D.Cal., Aug. 6, 2007); Greer v. Arizona Attorney General, No. CV-04-1265-

PHX-JAT, 2006 WL 2553403, * 7 n. 8 (D.Ariz., Sept. 1, 2006).

Additionally, to extent that Petitioner seeks to stay the pending proceedings to

exhaust new claims, the motion should be denied. In Pace, 544 U.S. at 416-17, the Supreme

Court invited petitioners who are “reasonably confused” about their state’s timeliness rules to

file “protective” petitions - before the expiration of the ADEPA limitations period - in federal

court to avoid a statute of limitations problem.” Id. Unlike that situation, the Petition in this

case was untimely and cannot serve to avoid a statute of limitations problem pertaining to any

future claim. 

IV. Summary

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition should be denied as untimely. And, the

Motion to Stay habeas corpus proceedings should be denied. 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc.

1, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Habeas

Corpus Proceedings, doc. 9, be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

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justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have (14) fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have (14) fourteen days

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 19th day of July, 2011.

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