Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01871/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01871-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. KOUBONG, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01871 TLN CSK P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 8, 2024, plaintiff filed the original complaint and a motion for a 

preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. (ECF Nos. 1, 4.) Plaintiff’s original 

complaint named as defendants S. Koubong, Senior Librarian Chaudhry, State of California and 

does 1-10. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) On July 12, 2024, plaintiff filed an amended complaint and a 

second motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.) 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint named as defendants S. Koubong, Senior Librarian Chaudhry, 

Warden Jones and does 1-10. (ECF No. 8 at 1.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

15(a)(1), a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days. By order 

dated July 15, 2024, this Court therefore screened the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(1)(A). (ECF No. 10.)

Case 2:24-cv-01871-TLN-CSK Document 13 Filed 07/17/24 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff’s motions for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders seek the 

same relief. (ECF Nos. 4, 9.) However, plaintiff’s second motion for a preliminary injunction 

and temporary restraining order is addressed to defendant Warden Jones. (ECF No. 9 at 1.) 

Accordingly, this Court finds that plaintiff’s second motion for injunctive relief supersedes 

plaintiff’s first motion for injunctive relief. For the reasons stated herein, this Court recommends 

that plaintiff’s second motion for injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order be denied. 

II. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders, and 

requires that a motion for temporary restraining order include “specific facts in an affidavit or a 

verified complaint [that] clearly show that immediate, and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 

result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” as well as written 

certification from the movant’s attorney stating “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons 

why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).

Temporary restraining orders are generally governed by the same standard applicable to 

preliminary injunctions, except that preliminary injunctions require notice to the adverse party. 

See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 

(E.D. Cal. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). Eastern District of California Local Rule 231, however, 

requires notice for temporary restraining orders as well, “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary of 

circumstances,” and the court considers whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion 

for preliminary injunction at an earlier date. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 231(a)-(b). A temporary 

restraining order “should be restricted to serving [its] underlying purpose of preserving the status 

quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” 

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 

423, 439 (1974).

A temporary restraining order is “an extraordinary remedy” and may be issued only if 

plaintiff establishes: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in 

the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his/her favor; and (4) that 

an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 

Case 2:24-cv-01871-TLN-CSK Document 13 Filed 07/17/24 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(2008). Plaintiff bears the burden of clearly satisfying all four prongs. Alliance for the Wild 

Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A temporary restraining order will not 

issue if plaintiff merely shows irreparable harm is possible – a showing of likelihood is required. 

Id. at 1131. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional requirements on prisoner 

litigants seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. In such cases, 

“[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to 

correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means 

necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); Villery v. California Dep’t of Corr., 

2016 WL 70326, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, the PLRA 

places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to inmates, 

and “operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the 

bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve relief that 

binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v. People of 

the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. Background

Named as defendants in the amended complaint are S. Koubong, Senior Librarian 

Chaudhry, Warden Jones and does 1-10. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) The alleged deprivations occurred at 

the California Health Care Facility in Stockton, California. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint contains two claims. In claim one, plaintiff alleges that defendants Koubong and 

Chaudhry violated plaintiff’s right to access the courts by denying plaintiff’s requests for pleading 

paper and envelopes, refusing to photocopy a letter and delaying the delivery of plaintiff’s 

requests for legal materials. (Id. at 3.) In claim two, plaintiff alleges that defendant Koubong 

violated plaintiff’s right to access the courts, the Equal Protection Clause and California Bane Act 

on June 12, 2024 when defendant Koubong stated to plaintiff and other inmates that any inmate 

who filed a grievance would suffer retaliation. (Id. at 5.)

On July 15, 2024, this Court separately issued an order dismissing plaintiff’s amended 

complaint with leave to amend. (ECF No. 10.) This Court found that claims one and two failed 

Case 2:24-cv-01871-TLN-CSK Document 13 Filed 07/17/24 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

to state potentially colorable claims for violation of plaintiff’s right to access the courts because 

plaintiff failed to allege an actual injury involving a direct appeal, habeas corpus petition or civil 

rights action. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). This Court found that claim two failed 

to state a potentially colorable claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause because plaintiff 

failed to allege membership in a suspect class, Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th 

Cir. 1998), or that plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated individuals 

and that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment, Village of Willowbrook v. 

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). This Court also found that plaintiff did not state a potentially 

colorable Bane Act claim because plaintiff failed to allege compliance with the Government

Claims Act. State v. Superior Court of Kings Cnty and Bodde, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (2004); 

Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995); Karim-Panahi v. 

Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Finally, this Court found that the 

amended complaint contained no specific allegations against defendant Jones and the doe 

defendants and failed to allege a link between defendants Jones and the doe defendants and 

plaintiff’s claims. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976).

IV. Discussion

In the second motion for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order, 

plaintiff seeks an order reassigning defendant Koubong from the law library so that plaintiff has 

no further contact with defendant Koubong in the law library. (ECF No. 9 at 1-2.) In support of 

this motion, plaintiff provides a declaration that restates most of the allegations in the complaint. 

(Id. at 3-5.)

As stated above, in order to obtain injunctive relief, plaintiff must demonstrate a 

likelihood of success on the merits. This Court dismissed plaintiff’s amended complaint with 

leave to amend because plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state potentially colorable claims 

for relief. Based on this Court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s amended complaint with leave to 

amend, this Court finds that plaintiff fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits at 

this time. For this reason, plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief and a temporary restraining 

Case 2:24-cv-01871-TLN-CSK Document 13 Filed 07/17/24 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

order should be denied. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 

1135. Because plaintiff fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, this Court need 

not address the other three prongs required for issuance of injunctive relief. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s first motion for a preliminary 

injunction and a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 4) is superseded by plaintiff’s second 

motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s second motion for a preliminary 

injunction and a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 9) be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: July 17, 2024

Tay1871.inj

2

Case 2:24-cv-01871-TLN-CSK Document 13 Filed 07/17/24 Page 5 of 5