Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04685/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04685-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARJIT BHAMBRA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN M. TRUE, et al.,

Defendant. /

No. C 09-4685 CRB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

STRIKE AND GRANTING MOTION

FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 

Various Defendants in this action have moved for sanctions under Rule 11. The same

Defendants have also moved to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil

Procedure § 425.16. Defendants argue in their Rule 11 motion that Plaintiff Bhambra’s

complaint failed to allege requisite elements of claims, based its allegations on pure

speculation, and asked for an astronomical calculation of damages. In short, they claim it

was entirely frivolous. In their motion to strike, Defendants argue that some of Plaintiff’s

claims concern Defendants’ exercise of their free speech rights, and that they are therefore

subject to a motion to strike. 

For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motions are both GRANTED.

1. Motion to Strike

Pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s

fourth, fifth, eighth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action. These claims all arise from

Defendants’ conduct in filing and prosecuting legal actions in state court. 

Case 3:09-cv-04685-CRB Document 96 Filed 04/30/10 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Although the statute refers to “lawsuits brought primarily to chill exercise” of rights of free speech

and petition, defendant need not show that the lawsuit was brought with the subjective intent to

“chill” these rights. Equilon Enters., LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 58 (2002). Nor

need defendant demonstrate that plaintiff's complaint actually had a “chilling” effect on his or her

rights. Id. at 59.

2

A SLAPP suit—a strategic lawsuit against public participation—seeks to chill

or punish a party’s exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to

petition the government for redress of grievances. The [California] Legislature

enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16—known as the anti-SLAPP

statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought

to chill the exercise of constitutional rights.

Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1055-56 (2006) (citations omitted).1

 The anti-SLAPP

statute “establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using

a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” Soukup v. Law

Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260, 278 (2006).

The anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Newsham v.

Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Fry’s

Elecs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1206, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming Lockheed and finding the

district court “erroneously concluded that the anti-SLAPP statute was unavailable in federal

court”); Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130

(“[I]t appears that under the Erie analysis set forth in Lockheed the anti-SLAPP statute may

be applied to state law claims which . . . are asserted pendent to federal question claims.”).

Under the anti-SLAPP statute, a litigant may move to strike a “cause of action against

a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or

free speech under the Untied States or California Constitution in connection with a public

issue.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). Protected acts include “any written or oral

statement or writing made in connection with an . . . official proceeding authorized by law.” 

 Id. § (e)(2). 

The California Supreme Court has summarized the analysis a court must undertake

when a defendant moves to strike a plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute as

follows:

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Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) requires the court to engage in a two-step

process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold

showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected

activity. The moving defendant's burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts

of which the plaintiff complains were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]'s

right of petition or free speech under the United States or California

Constitution in connection with a public issue,” as defined in the statute. (§

425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then

determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing

on the claim. Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making

these determinations considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing

affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”

Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 67 (2002).

To establish a “probability” of prevailing on the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts

sufficient to support a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by plaintiff is credited. 

Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88-89 (2002). In making the determination, a court

considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both plaintiff and defendant but does

not weigh credibility or comparative strength of the evidence. Soukup, 39 Cal. 4th at 291. A

court considers defendant's evidence only to determine if it defeats plaintiff's showing as a

matter of law. Id. The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has “minimal merit”

to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at 89.

In this case, the claims identified by Defendants are clearly “based on the

defendant[s’] protected free speech or petitioning activity.” Navellier v. Sletter, 29 Cal. 4th

82, 89 (2002). All of them involve Defendants’ conduct in pursuing relief in state court, such

as in the Port Defendants’ action for unlawful detainer. Pursuing such a claim has been

found to be a protected petitioning activity. See Birkner v. Lam, 156 Cal. App. 4th 275

(2007) (“The prosecution of an unlawful detainer action indisputably is protected activity

within the meaning of section 425.16.”). 

As for the probability of Plaintiff’s success, this Court has already dismissed his

complaint with prejudice. While such a 12(b)(6) dismissal does not moot a motion to strike

in this context, Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Bello Paradiso, LLC, 2009 WL 1953468 (E.D. Cal.

2009), it certainly indicates that Plaintiff does not enjoy a probability of success. On the

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contrary, as Plaintiff’s complaint has been dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiff has by

definition failed. 

Because the identified claims in Plaintiff’s complaint are “based on the defendant[s’]

protected free speech or petitioning activity,” Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at 89, and because

Plaintiff enjoys no probability of success, Defendants’ motion to strike must be GRANTED.

2. Rule 11

Rule 11 provides this Court with the authority to sanction any individual who signs

and presents to the Court a pleading, motion or other paper that is “frivolous, legally

unreasonable, or without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose.” Estate

of Blue v. County of Los Angeles, 120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997). A claim is frivolous if

it is “both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Buster v.

Greisen, 104 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). Rule 11(b)(2)

requires even pro se litigants to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual

underpinnings of their claims. 

This Court concludes that Plaintiff indeed failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry. The

complaint seeks to readjudicate matters already settled in state court, pursues causes of action

for which there is no legal basis whatsoever, and asks for an unsubstantiated and entirely

absurd damages award. These grounds justify sanctions under Rule 11. See Hudson v.

Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he absence of any

reasonable support for the damage claim” supports issuance of sanctions under Rule 11.”);

Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Without question, successive

complaints based upon propositions of law previously rejected may constitute harassment

under Rule 11.” (overruled on other grounds)). 

This Court concludes that the appropriate sanction overlaps with the award of

attorneys’ fees to which Defendants are entitled as a result of their anti-SLAPP motion to

strike. A further monetary award, given the fact that Plaintiff is apparently indigent, would 

//

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G:\CRBALL\2009\4685\Order granting motion to strike .wpd 5

not materially further the interests of Rule 11. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 29, 2010 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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