Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02535/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02535-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Phuc C. Pham, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-2535-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1), respondents’ answer (doc. 10), and petitioner’s reply (doc. 12). We

also have before us the United States Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation

recommending that we deny the petition for failure to state a cognizable federal claim (doc.

13), petitioner’s objections (doc. 16) and motion for certificate of appealability (doc. 17).

After de novo consideration of the issues, we accept the recommended decision of the

Magistrate Judge and deny the habeas petition.

I

On June 23, 2003, petitioner pled guilty to attempted sexual conduct with a minor

(count one) and attempted child molestation (count two). He was sentenced to a presumptive

ten-year term of imprisonment on count one and lifetime parole on count two. On October

15, 2003, petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, but because he did not file a

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petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court summarily dismissed the proceedings.

Almost four years later, on January 28, 2008, petitioner filed a second notice of postconviction relief, this time also filing a petition for post-conviction relief. His only claim was

that his sentence under the statute for dangerous crimes against children, A.R.S. § 13-604.01,

was illegal under a new decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which held that the statute

did not apply to attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age of twelve. See State

v. Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, 162 P.3d 650 (Ct. App. 2007). The Superior Court granted the

requested relief, concluding that in light of Gonzalez, petitioner’s sentence was illegal and

void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court

continued the matter pending its decision in State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 203 P.2d 1175

(2009). 

In Shrum, the petitioner filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, arguing

for the first time that, pursuant to Gonzalez, his enhanced sentence for attempted sexual

conduct with a minor was unlawful. He sought to avoid the preclusive effect of his

successive petition by arguing that Gonzalez was a “significant change in the law” for

purposes of Rule 32.1(g), Ariz. R. Crim. P. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the

argument that Gonzalez constituted a “significant change in the law,” reasoning that

Gonzalez did not “rest on a changed interpretation of Arizona constitutional law,” or “purport

to overrule any prior opinion.” Id. at 119, 203 P.3d at 1179. Instead, it was merely the first

appellate opinion addressing the application of the enhanced sentencing statute to attempted

sexual conduct with a minor. Id. “In short, the law was not changed in any way by

Gonzalez.” Id. The court concluded that Shrum’s second petition for post-conviction relief

was precluded under Rule 32.2(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

As in Shrum, petitioner in the instant case pled guilty to attempted sexual conduct

with a minor who was under the age of twelve, was sentenced to prison under the dangerous

crimes against children statute, and failed to raise an illegal sentence claim in his first postconviction proceeding. Following its decision in Shrum, the Arizona Supreme Court

remanded petitioner’s case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to reconsider its decision

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in light of Shrum. On remand, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[l]ike Shrum, Pham’s

PCR was untimely and successive, and thus his Gonzalez claim is precluded.” (doc. 10, ex.

B at 6). 

Petitioner filed this habeas petition on December 4, 2009, asserting four claims for

relief, all of which essentially challenge his sentence as unconstitutional. (doc. 1). 

II

A state prisoner is eligible for habeas relief only if he is “in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). It is well

established that federal habeas relief is not available for errors of state law. Lewis v. Jeffers,

497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102 (1990). A federal habeas court cannot “reexamine

state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68,

112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991). Moreover, federal habeas relief is not available to “redress

alleged procedural errors in state post-conviction proceedings.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1998)

(holding that federal habeas courts lack jurisdiction to review state court applications of state

procedural rules, including specifically Rule 32.2, Ariz. R. Crim. P.). A petitioner may not

“transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due

process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). 

After our de novo review of the issues, we agree with the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion that despite petitioner’s characterizations of his claims as federal constitutional

violations, the claims turn solely on alleged state law errors. The gravamen of petitioner’s

claims challenge the state court’s interpretation and application of state sentencing statutes,

and the propriety of petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings. These claims challenge state

law determinations on issues of state law and accordingly are not cognizable on federal

habeas review. 

III

Even if we had found a constitutional component to petitioner’s claims, however, we

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would nevertheless deny the petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, a state prisoner must seek federal habeas

corpus relief within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). In this case, the trial court sentenced petitioner on October 10, 2003. He

commenced his “of right” post-conviction proceeding in compliance with Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.

R. Crim. P., but the trial court summarily dismissed the proceedings on June 9, 2004, when

petitioner failed to file a petition for post-conviction relief. His conviction became final

thirty-one days later, on July 10, 2004, when the time to seek review of the trial court’s order

expired. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). Therefore, petitioner had until July 10, 2005, to file

a habeas petition in federal court. However, he did not file his habeas petition until

December 4, 2009, more than five years after the expiration of the AEDPA deadline. Absent

statutory or equitable tolling, the petition is time-barred.

A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he can show (1) that diligently

pursued his rights, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way that

prevented timely filing. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085

(2007). Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he only recently

discovered the legal significance of his sentence when Gonzalez was decided, and that he

was essentially “prevented” from filing before that decision. However, a petitioner’s

discovery of the legal basis for his claim does not affect the date that the AEDPA statute of

limitations begins to run. Petitioner was aware of the factual predicate for his claims at the

time he was sentenced in October 2003. That he may not have understood the legal

significance of those facts until later does not toll the statute. See Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d

1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Time begins [under AEDPA] when the prisoner knows (or

through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their

legal significance.”). 

IV

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED DENYING petitioner’s petition for writ

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of habeas corpus (doc. 1). Because petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING petitioner’s

motion for Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

(doc. 17). 

DATED this 29th day of October, 2010.

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