Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02250/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The motions came on for hearing before the undersigned on January 5, 2005. Ann C.

McClintock, Assistant Federal Defender, appeared as counsel for petitioner. Michael Llewellyn,

Deputy Attorney General, appeared as counsel for respondents.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS FOWLER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2250 GEB JFM P

vs.

DIANE BUTLER, et al.,

Respondents. ORDER

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Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is serving a sentence of fifteen

years to life in prison following his 1984 conviction on charges of second degree murder. By this

action, petitioner challenges a February 2000 decision of a panel of the California Board of

Prison Terms (BPT) denying him a parole date. This matter is before the court on petitioner’s

motions for leave to conduct discovery, to strike portions of the record, to expand the record, and

to seal documents, and on respondents’ motion to expand the record.1

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PETITIONER’S MOTIONS

A. Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery

Pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States Courts and Rules 26 and 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner seeks leave

of court to depose the three BPT commissioners who sat on the hearing panel that denied him

parole in February 2000. Respondents oppose the motion, contending that petitioner has not

shown the requisite “good cause” for the depositions.

Rule 6(a) provides that a habeas petitioner is entitled to discovery

“if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion

and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise.”

Rule 6(a). The Supreme Court has stated that Rule 6(a) “is meant

to be ‘consistent’” with its holding in Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.

286, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969), in which the Court

held that “where specific allegations before the court show reason

to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed,

be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief, it is the duty

of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for

an adequate inquiry.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09,

117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) (quoting Harris, 394 U.S. at

300, 89 S.Ct. 1082) (alteration in original).

Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Petitioner raises four claims in his petition. First, he claims that there is no

evidence in the record of the February 2000 parole hearing to support the decision to find him

unsuitable for parole. Second, petitioner claims that he met none of the criteria under California

law to support a finding that he was unsuitable for parole, that he met almost all of the criteria

necessary to a finding that he is suitable for parole, and that there is nothing more he can do to

comply with the recommendations made by the February 2000 panel. Third, he claims that

denial of parole based on the “cruel, heinous and atrocious” language of 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(c)(1)(A-E) is unlawful because those terms are unconstitutionally vague. Finally, he claims

that reliance on those terms is an impermissible “usurpation of the legislative function.” 

(Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed October 15, 2002, at 6.) 

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2

 Another judge of this court has found that such a policy existed under both Governors Pete

Wilson and Gray Davis. (Attachment C to Petitioner’s Reply in Support of His Motions for

3

Included in petitioner’s third claim for relief is a contention that the February

2000 denial of parole reflects the arbitrary decisionmaking practices of the BPT, which is

grounded in “almost a per se belief . . . that the very act of murder renders every prisoner ‘an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.’” (Petition, at 27.) Similarly, in

his fourth claim for relief petitioner contends that the BPT’s decision to deny parole was

motivated by a political agenda that has been a de facto policy of the California BPT at least

since Pete Wilson was governor of California. (Id. at 36.)

It is these contentions at which petitioner’s discovery request is aimed. Relying

on McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2002), respondents contend that parole

commissioners “should not be allowed to be deposed to reveal their deliberative process in

reaching a discretionary decision.” (Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Motions for

Discovery, to Strike Record, to Expand Record, and to Seal Exhibits, filed December 7, 2004, at

4.) McQuillion involved a due process challenge to a decision to rescind a parole date. In part,

McQuillion claimed that the rescission panel had violated his right to due process by refusing his

request to call as witnesses at the rescission hearing members of the panel that had granted his

parole date. The court of appeals, noting that “the right to call witnesses does not ordinarily

encompass a right to call a factfinder-decisionmaker to the stand,” held that due process had not

been violated by that refusal. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 900. 

The McQuillion court specifically noted that the record in that case outlined in

“great detail” the basis for the rescission and that the petitioner in that case had “made no

showing of any special need to call the members of the granting panel as witnesses.” Id. Here,

by contrast, petitioner specifically claims that unconstitutionally vague language in the California

parole statutes was used in his case to mask reliance on a de facto policy to deny parole to all

convicted murders.2 The likely existence of such a policy, and its possible impact on the parole

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Discovery, to Strike, to Expand, and to Seal, filed December 23, 2004, Coleman v. Board of Prison

Terms, et al., No. CIV S-96-0783 LKK PAN P, Findings and Recommendations, filed December

22, 2004, at 3.-4. But cf. Irons v. Warden of California State Prison-Solano, 358 F.Supp.2d 936, 950

(E.D.Cal. 2005) (rejecting claim that BPT and Governor Davis conspired to deny murderers parole).

3

 This set of documents is identified by petitioner in his motion as the record from an

October 10, 2000 parole consideration hearing, but is elsewhere identified as Vols. I-VI of

petitioner’s central file. See Notice of Lodging Documents, filed December 1, 2004. 

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decision in petitioner’s case, are a sufficient showing of a “special need” to depose the panel

members who denied him parole in February 2000 to distinguish this case from the holding in

McQuillion.

For the foregoing reasons, this court finds that petitioner has shown good cause

for the requested discovery. Accordingly, petitioner’s motion to depose the three BPT panel

members will be granted.

B. Motion to Strike

Petitioner moves to strike all records lodged by respondents on April 29, 2004. 

This motion is unopposed and will therefore be granted.

C. Motion to Expand the Record

Petitioner moves to expand the record to include (1) the transcript of his

subsequent parole consideration hearing in October 2001 (Ex. 22); (2) a psychological evaluation

of petitioner for the September 2004 BPT calendar (Ex. 23); and (3) Volumes I-VI of his central

file (Ex. 24).3 Respondents oppose expanding the record to include any material generated after

the February 10, 2000 hearing at issue, with the exception of the fact that petitioner was again

denied parole in October 2001.

Petitioner contends that the post-2000 hearing material is relevant both to

respondents’ contention that the instant petition has been mooted by subsequent parole suitability

hearings at which petitioner has again been denied parole and to consideration of an appropriate

remedy in this case. With respect to the latter contention, petitioner’s position is that the 

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subsequent records show a continuation of the due process violation at issue in this action and,

therefore, review of those records will be necessary to determine an appropriate remedy.

This court is not persuaded that petitioner’s subsequent parole consideration

hearings render the instant action moot. See Irons, 358 F.Supp.2d at 948. In any event, the only

“fact” relevant to that argument is that petitioner has been denied parole since the hearing at issue

in these proceedings. The records related to those denials are not necessary to resolve

respondents’ mootness argument. 

With regard to remedy, this court is not persuaded that the records from

subsequent parole consideration hearings are properly considered in connection with fashioning

an appropriate remedy should a constitutional violation be found in this case. The question of

whether any constitutional violation occurred continued at a subsequent parole consideration

hearing is not properly before this court absent exhaustion of state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Moreover, relief in this case is not dependent on whether any constitutional violation

continued after the February 10, 2000 hearing, though it may be dependent on the rationale for

previous denials of parole. See Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003).

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s motion to expand the record will be denied

insofar as petitioner seeks to add records that post-date the February 10, 2000 hearing at issue in

these proceedings and granted in all other respects. Specifically, the motion will be denied as to

proposed Exhibits 22 and 23 and to all documents in Exhibit 24 that post-date petitioner’s

February 10, 2000 parole consideration hearing. The motion will be granted as to all documents

in Exhibit 24 that pre-date said hearing and to the transcript of said hearing and decision thereon.

D. Motion to Seal

Finally, petitioner seeks an order sealing “all exhibits that include prison, medical

or other confidential information,” identified as Exhibits 3, 8, 9 and 10 to the petition, the

probation report attached to docket entry # 9, the Cat X report lodged by respondents on June 3,

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4

 For the reasons set forth in section C, supra, Exhibit 23 will not be admitted into the record

in this action. A fortiori, petitioner’s motion to seal said document will be denied.

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2004, and petitioner’s exhibits 23 and 24.4 Respondents object to sealing the parole suitability

hearing transcript and decision thereon, as well as the letters from James F. Roach and Louis

Beermann. Respondents do not oppose sealing petitioner’s probation report or his medical or

psychiatric records, except that respondents oppose sealing any part of the hearing transcripts that

discuss those conditions. In response, petitioner modifies his request to exclude Exhibit 24,

Volume III, from the sealing order.

It is well-settled that “there is a strong presumption in favor of the common law

right to inspect and copy judicial records.” Phoenix Newspapers, Inc v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist.

of Arizona, 156 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1998). Although the parties do not dispute most of the

proposed sealing order, this court finds that petitioner has made no showing of need sufficient to

overcome the presumption of public access to records in these federal court proceedings. 

Accordingly, petitioner’s motion to seal will be denied.

RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO EXPAND THE RECORD

Respondents move to expand the record to include petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed by petitioner in the state court of appeal and supreme court as well as the exhibits to

said petition. Respondents contend that the petitions are relevant to petitioner’s exhaustion of

state court remedies and that they “elucidate” the state court decisions which are part of the

record. Petitioner opposes the motion on the ground that respondents have conceded exhaustion

of state court remedies and the state court petitions are not a proper aid to analysis of the state

court decisions, which are so-called postcard denials containing no statement of reasons therefor. 

Petitioner also contends that respondents have not verified that the petitions are complete and

accurate copies, and notes that many of the exhibits attached to the state petitions do not

correspond to the exhibit lists appended thereto.

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5 The Delgado court did note that the record before the federal court was the same as the

record before the state court of appeal and the state supreme court. See Delgado, at 982. In the

instant case, the relevant record is that considered by the California Board of Prison Terms. There

is no contention that any part of that record is only attached to petitioner’s state habeas corpus

petitions or otherwise missing from the record before this court. 

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Respondents have conceded that petitioner exhausted state court remedies. (See

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed January 15, 2003, at 5.) The habeas corpus

petitions are not, therefore, relevant to that determination. Moreover, where, as here, the state

courts summarily denied petitioner’s state habeas corpus petitions, this court conducts an

independent review of the record that was before the California Board of Prison Terms to

determine whether the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s habeas corpus petitions was contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000).5 That administrative record is before this court and will not be

supplemented by the addition of petitioner’s state habeas corpus petitions.

For the foregoing reasons, respondents’ motion to expand the record will be

denied.

Finally, on February 23, 2005, petitioner filed a request for leave to file late his

reply brief. Good cause, the request will be granted and the reply brief filed February 23, 2005

will be deemed timely filed.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s November 18, 2004 motion to conduct the depositions of Board of

Prison Terms Commissioners Thomas Gianquinto, Manuel Ortega, and John Iniquez is granted;

2. Said depositions shall be conducted so as to be completed, including

transcription thereof, not later than sixty days from the date of this order;

3. The parties shall have thirty days thereafter to file any supplemental briefing in

support of or opposition to the claims raised in this action based on testimony elicited at the

depositions authorized by this order;

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4. No extension of the deadlines set in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this order will be

granted;

5. Petitioner’s November 18, 2004 motion to strike is granted;

6. The records lodged by respondents on April 29, 2004 are stricken from the

record;

7. Petitioner’s November 18, 2004 motion to expand the record is granted as to

those documents in Exhibit 24 dated February 10, 2004 or earlier and denied in all other respects;

8. Petitioner’s November 18, 2004 motion to seal exhibits is denied; 

9. Respondents’ December 7, 2004 motion to expand the record is denied;

 10. Petitioner’s February 23, 2005 request for leave to file a late reply brief is

granted; and

 11. Petitioner’s February 23, 2005 reply brief is deemed timely filed.

DATED: May 25, 2005.

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fowl2250.dis

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