Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04367/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04367-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 730
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Report &amp; Disclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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1 All parties have consented to my jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for all proceedings, including

entry of final judgment, other than plaintiffs’ request for

remand.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL ASSEKO, ALFREDO RITA,

and ALEX SHPAK, individually

and on behalf of all other

similarly situated,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

GUARDSMARK LLC, et al.,

Defendant(s).

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No. C07-4367 BZ

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiffs have moved to remand this action to state

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).1 For the reasons

articulated below, plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.

On May 31, 2007, plaintiffs filed suit in state court, on

their own behalf as well as on behalf of those similarly

situated, against their employer defendant Guardsmark, a

private security company. Plaintiffs are security guards and

members of the Service Employees International Union

Case 3:07-cv-04367-BZ Document 25 Filed 12/06/07 Page 1 of 8
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2 Plaintiffs attached the CBA effective July 1, 2003

through June 30, 2007 as an exhibit to their moving papers. It

does not appear that defendant was a party to that CBA. 

Defendant was a party to a latter CBA effective September 1,

2004 through April 30, 2007. As such, I will only consider the

September 1, 2004 CBA to which defendant was a party. 

2

(“Union”). Plaintiffs’ employment is governed by a collective

bargaining agreement between defendant and the Union (“CBA”)2. 

Defendant also contracted with the California Department of

General Services (“Department”) to provide security at the

State Building in the San Francisco Civic Center Complex. 

In state court, plaintiffs sued defendant for allegedly

failing to pay wages and benefits as required by California

Government Code section 19134 (“section 19134"). Section

19134 provides that “[p]ersonal services contracts entered

into by a state agency . . . for persons providing ...

security guard services shall include provisions for employee

wages and benefits that are valued at least 85 percent of the

state employer cost of wages and benefits provided to state

employees for performing similar duties.” 

Defendant removed the matter to federal court contending

that plaintiffs’ third through eighth causes of action were 

preempted by Section 301 of the federal Labor Management

Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Defendant argued

that to the extent plaintiffs’ first and second causes of

action for failure to pay wages and for unfair business

practices under California’s Business & Professions and Labor

Codes were not preempted by the LMRA, this Court had

supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. 

On September 27, 2007, by stipulation, plaintiffs filed a

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3 In the amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that the

failure to pay benefits required by Section 19134 not only

violates that law but also violates provisions of the contract

between defendant and the Department which requires defendant

to pay plaintiffs in accordance with state laws and constitutes

an unfair business practice under state law. Plaintiffs’

amended complaint does not mention the CBA, let alone allege

that it is violated. Plaintiffs dropped their claims involving

failure to pay and underpayment of holiday pay as well as

failure to pay for mandated training. 

4 Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiffs

claims titled breach of contract, breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and constructive fraud

involving defendant’s alleged breach of its contract with the

Department for payment of wages and benefits (or cash-in-lieu

of benefits) pursuant to section 19134 are still preempted.

3

first amended complaint (“amended complaint”) dismissing all

claims they contend were preempted by the LMRA. The amended

complaint only contains claims for relief involving

defendant’s alleged failure to provide wages and benefits as

required by section 19134.3 Plaintiffs then moved to remand

the matter to state court. Defendant argues that several of

plaintiffs’ claims are still preempted under section 301 of

the LMRA.4

A federal court may remand an action to state court for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction any time before entry of

final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Subject matter

jurisdiction is generally determined by viewing the complaint

at the time of removal. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National

Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir.

1998.) When a plaintiff makes a tactical decision to dismiss

claims after removal to avoid federal jurisdiction, the court

has discretion to remand if subject matter jurisdiction is

lacking. See Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 490

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(9th Cir. 1995); see also Schuster v. Gardner, 319 F.Supp.2d

1159, 1164 - 65 Court. (S.D.Cal. 2003) 

Section 301 of the LMRA preempts state law claims that

are directly based on rights provided under a collective

bargaining agreement or dependent on interpreting a collective

bargaining agreement. Caterpillar, Inc. V. Williams, 482 U.S.

286, 394 (1987). “When the meaning of particular contract

terms is not disputed, however, the fact that a collective

bargaining agreement must be consulted for information will

not result in § 301 preemption.” Aguilera v. Pirelli

Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The Ninth Circuit has set forth a two part test to

determine if section 301 of the LMRA preempts state law

claims. Initially, it must be determined “whether the

asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an

employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside v.

Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). If

“the right exists independently of the CBA, we must still

consider whether it is nevertheless ‘substantially dependent

on analysis of a collective- bargaining agreement.’” Id.;

quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394. 

Here, plaintiff’s right to receive wages and benefits (or

cash-in-lieu of benefits) pursuant to section 19134 is set

forth in both the statute and the contract between defendant

and the Department. The collective bargaining agreement does

not refer to section 19134 and plaintiffs do not allege a

violation of that agreement. The collective bargaining

agreement sets forth wages the Union bargained for on behalf

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5 The collective bargaining agreement effective

September 1, 2004 through April 30, 2007 is the only collective

bargaining agreement before me.

5

of its workers. With respect to health benefits, the

collective bargaining agreement calls for continued benefits

pursuant to the previous collective bargaining agreement5 “and

in accounts where such coverage is agreed upon between

[defendant] and [the Department].” 

“[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not subject to

dispute, the bare fact that a collective bargaining agreement

will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation

plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.” 

Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994). Whether

analysis of the collective bargaining agreement is necessary

requires a determination as to whether the claim can be

resolved by “looking to” versus “interpreting” the contract. 

Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. In the context of section 301

preemption, “the term ‘interpret’ is defined narrowly” and

means more than considering, referring to or applying the

collective bargaining agreement terms. Balcorta v. Twentieth

Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The Ninth Circuit acknowledges that while the “‘line between

reference to and interpretation of an agreement may be

somewhat hazy,’ (citation omitted), the totality of the

policies underlying § 301- promoting the arbitration of labor

contract disputes, securing the uniform interpretation of

labor contracts, and protecting the states' authority to enact

minimum labor standards- guides our understanding of what

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constitutes ‘interpretation.’” Id. at 1108 - 1109; citing

Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 749

(9th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiffs’ claims are not dependent on an analysis or

interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 

Although plaintiffs’ wages and benefits are referred to in the

collective bargaining agreement, there is no evidence that

plaintiffs negotiated away or expressly waived their state law

rights under section 19134, as defendant admitted at the

hearing. Nor does section 301 of the LMRA “grant the parties

to a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract

for what is illegal under state law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.

Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 (1985). 

Defendant repeatedly points to the Ninth Circuit’s

holding in Aguilera to support its contention that because the

contract with the Department involves job positions covered by

the CBA, the claims are preempted. In Aguilera, to the extent

plaintiffs claimed defendant had violated state law, that

claim was time barred. The only remaining claim - that

defendant had violated promises that plaintiffs would be

permanently employed - was found preempted by a CBA signed

after plaintiffs were hired, to which they “expressly acceded”

(Aguilera, 223 F.3d at 1015), and whose seniority provisions

governed the manner in which plaintiffs were laid off. 

Plaintiffs’ claims for relief are more akin to those of the

plaintiffs in Burnside because their claims are based on

rights for wages and benefits provided by state law, and

resolving the claims does not require interpretation or

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6

 During oral argument, the parties acknowledged that

the question of whether a suit brought by employees as third

party beneficiaries to enforce a contract between their

employer and a third party is preempted is a matter of first

impression.

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analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. See 491 F.3d

at 1053.

Defendant mistakenly relies on the Ninth Circuit’s

statement that “where the position in dispute is ‘covered by

the CBA, the CBA controls and any claims seeking to enforce

the terms of [an agreement] are preempted.’” Aguilera, 223

F.3d at 1015, brackets in original; citing Audette v. ILWU

Local 24, 195 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1999). However, these

plaintiffs seek to enforce an agreement between defendant and

the Department which incorporates defendant’s obligations

under Section 19134. In Aguilera and Audette, plaintiffs were

attempting to enforce employment agreements between themselves

and their employer (Aguilera) or between themselves, their

employer and their union (Audette) in situations in which the

courts had to interpret the CBA to decide the claims.6 Here

all of plaintiffs’ claims, however denominated, are based on

an alleged violation of Section 19134. They are not based on

the CBA and do not require interpretation of the CBA.

Even though plaintiffs’ remaining claims for relief are

not preempted, I have discretion to retain supplemental

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1367(c)(3). Since “[n]eedless

decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of

comity and to promote justice between the parties, by

procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law,” 

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United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966),

I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction here. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is GRANTED and

the clerk is ordered to TRANSFER the case to the Superior

Court of the City and County of San Francisco for further

proceedings. 

Dated: December 6, 2007

 Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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