Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-00465/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-00465-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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The other named plaintiffs who remain in the case as of the first amended 1

complaint filed on March 7, 2006, include Pam Hall (“Hall”), Linda Lockhart

(“Lockhart”), and Deandra Warren (“Warren”). The court understands that Plaintiffs

are agreeable to the dismissal of Warren. (Doc. #99 at 4 n.7). Plaintiffs also seek to

add a group of twenty (20) additional named plaintiffs (the “Battle Plaintiffs”), which

relief the court has granted by way of a separate order. A subset of the Battle

Plaintiffs, as discussed infra, at 2 n.3, have filed declarations in support of the EPA

notice motion (Doc. #91 at Exs. A, A-2) and are pursuing claims under the EPA, both

individually and on behalf of similarly situated women. (Doc. #93 at Ex. B ¶ 7). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JANET COLVERT, et al.,

Plaintiff, 

 

v.

DOLGENCORP, INC., d/b/a

Dollar General, 

Defendant. 

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CIVIL ACTION NO.:

 2:06-CV-465-VEH

 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

This Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) action is brought under § 216(b) of the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”) by Wanda Womack (“Womack”) and others against 1

Defendant Dolgencorp, Inc., d/b/a Dollar General’s (“Dollar General”) alleging that

she and other female Dollar General store managers were paid less than male store

managers who performed jobs of equal skill, responsibility and effort under similar

FILED

 2007 Nov-30 PM 04:20

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 1 of 18
The case also includes gender discrimination claims brought under Title VII. 2

(Doc. #3 ¶¶ 13, 15). 

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) authorizes employees to bring collective pay actions “in 3

behalf of . . . themselves and other employees similarly situated” who file notices of

consents to join or opt-in to the suit. The Notice Motion includes EPA declarations

fromfifteen (15) oftheBattle Plaintiffs: (1) AmyBattle (“Battle”); (2) Renita Bishop

(“Bishop”); (3) Connie Butler (“Butler”);(4) PennyDavis (“Davis”); (5) Patty Eberle

(“Eberle”); (6) Candie Gamble (“Gamble”); (7) Valerie Hallstrom-Miller (“Miller”);

(8) Peggy Jones (“Jones”); (9) Vicki Joy (“Joy”); (10) Penny Leonard (“Leonard”);

(11) Phyllis Nutt (“Nutt”); (12) Peggy Van Ostran (“Van Ostran”); (13) Ruby Sims

(“Sims”); (14) Audrey Spicer (“Spicer”); and (15) Alicen Taylor (“Taylor”)

(sometimes collectively referred to as the “EPA Battle Plaintiffs”). The remaining

five (5) of the Battle Plaintiffs: Patricia Blackmon, Mary Frazier, Patricia Howard,

Shirley Ledford, and Ann Thomas are not included in Plaintiffs’ Notice Motion as

EPA declarants. 

2

working conditions. (Doc. #3 ¶¶ 14-15). 

2

Pending before the court are Plaintiffs’ Motion to Facilitate EPA Notice

(“Notice Motion”) (Doc. #91) and Defendant Dolgencorp, Inc., d/b/a Dollar 3

General’s (“Dollar General”) related Motion to Drop Parties Pursuant to FRCP 21

(“Motion to Drop”) (Doc. #103). Womack seeks to send notice of the action to all

female Dollar General store managers nationwide. Dollar General asserts that

Plaintiffs’ EPA claims “are notsuited for treatment as a collective action,” (Doc. #99

at 1) and urges that “an individualized inquiry as to the underlying basis for each

individual Store Manager’s salary is required.” (Doc. #99 at 2). 

After consideration of the parties’ motions and briefs and for the reasons set

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 2 of 18
At this preliminary stage, the court is merely deciding whether a collective 4

action should be certified for notice purposes to the putative EPA class only.

Therefore, this decision, including the court’s assessment of the same establishment

issue, is conditional and is subject to further review upon the parties’ completion of

discovery. See infra, at 8-9; see also Moss v. Crawford & Co., 201 F.R.D. 398, 409

(W.D. Pa. 2000) (recognizing that second stage of FLSA certification process

involves higher standard of post-discovery review including assessment of “disparate

factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs” such as particular job

duties, geographical location, supervision, and salary)

In Plaintiffs’ response (Doc. #106) to Dollar General’s Motion to Drop, they 5

do not specifically address the status of Warren as an EPA plaintiff or oppose her

dismissal in any manner. Therefore through their silence, Plaintiffs have abandoned

the issue of Warren’s ability to properly proceed in this case. See, e.g., Wilkerson v.

Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding claim abandoned when

argument not presented in initial response to motion forsummary judgment); Bute v.

Schuller International, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding

unaddressed claim abandoned); see also Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana

Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (failure to brief

and argue issue at the district court is sufficient to find the issue has been abandoned);

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995); Hudson

v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2001). Cf.

McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 940-41 (11th Cir. 1999) (claim may be

considered abandoned when district court is presented with no argument concerning

a claim included in the plaintiff’s complaint);Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No.

3

forth hereinafter, Plaintiffs’ Notice Motion is GRANTED. More specifically, the

court agrees to conditionally certify an EPA collective action on a nationwide basis.

4

Dollar General’s Motion to Drop is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART. Specifically, Dollar General’s Motion to Drop is GRANTED as to Warren’s

EPA claims based upon this court’s understanding that Plaintiffs have no objection

to this dismissal, and is otherwise DENIED. 

5

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 3 of 18
669 v. Independent Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding

that a district court “could properly treat as abandoned a claim alleged in the

complaint but not even raised as a ground for summary judgment”). Also because

Plaintiffs have not challenged Dollar General’s position that Warren does not have

any Title VII claims either, this means that she is due to be dismissed from the case

with prejudice. Consistent with this ruling, the court notes that Plaintiffs’ proposed

second amended complaint omits any references to Warren or her claims. (See

generally Doc. #90 at Ex. B). 

The misspelling of Colvert’s last name as “Calvert” in the initial pleadings was 6

subsequently jointly acknowledged by the parties (see Doc. #12 at 1 n.1) and

corrected by the clerk on the court’s record.

On May 3, 2007, the court dismissed Colvert from the litigation. (Doc. #77 7

at 2).

According to Plaintiffs’ Notice Motion, the relevant districts and states 8

identified by the supporting declarations are: (1) #159 in Alabama (Womack Decl.);

4

Facts

This lawsuit was originally filed by Janet Colvert (“Colvert”) (Doc. #1) on 6

March 7, 2006. On that same date, Womack, along with several other plaintiffs,

7

filed an amended complaint. (See generally Doc. #3). Womack is a former female

store manager for Dollar General who joined this action on March 7, 2006, on the

basis that she and other female Dollar General store managers were discriminated

against in pay in violation of the EPA. (Doc. #3 ¶¶ 14-15). 

Womack and the fifteen (15) EPA Battle Plaintiffs (see supra, at 2 n.3) have

filed declarations with the court in support of Plaintiffs’ Notice Motion. (See Doc.

#91 at Exs. A, A-2). In these statements, each plaintiff alleges (when equipped with 8

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 4 of 18
(2) #23 in Virginia (Battle Decl.); (3) #56 in Mississippi (Bishop Decl.); (4) #146 in

Ohio (Butler Decl.); (5) #143 (no state location indicated) (Gamble Decl.); (6) #11

located in Kentucy (Leonard Decl.); (7) #147 located in Pennsylvania (Miller Decl.);

(8) #167 and district over store #2530 located in Missouri (Sims Decl.); (9) #482

located in Texas (Spicer Decl.); (10) #248 located in Georgia (Taylor Decl.); (11)

#278 located in Nebraska (Eberle Decl.); (12) #117 located in Missouri (Davis Decl.);

(13) #104 and #463 located in Iowa (Jones Decl.); (14) #396 located in Indiana (Joy

Decl.); (15) #25 located in Ohio (Nutt Decl.); and (16) #669 located in North Carolina

(Van Ostran Decl.).

5

such knowledge), where she has worked as a store manager and within which

district(s), how long she has held (or held) the position ofstore manager, the basis for

her knowledge that “the duties and responsibilities of a Store Manager at Dollar

General are the same and require equal skill, effort and responsibilities under similar

working conditions regardless of the geographic location of the store (rural or urban),

the physical size of the store, or the amount of sales generated by a store” (see, e.g.,

Doc. #91 at Ex. A at Gamble Decl. ¶ 5), and how much she was (or is) compensated

as a store manager. The plaintiffs also state their belief that male store managers

were (or are) paid more for the same job. (See, e.g., Doc. #91 at Ex. A at Gamble

Decl. ¶ 7). 

Dollar General “is a retailer of basic consumable goods, items that are

frequently used and replenished by consumers, including cleaning supplies, health

and beauty aids, foods/snacks, housewares, toys and basic apparel.” (Doc. #99 at 6-

7). Dollar General operates more than 8,200 “stand-alone” stores in 35 states. (Doc.

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 5 of 18
See Doc. #100 at Ex. 3 ¶ 7. 

9

6

#99 at 7). Dollar General organizes its retail operations from the top down: first into

divisions (8), then into regions (approximately 50), then into districts (560), and 9

finally into stores. (Id.). Each district’s size ranges from 10 to 25 separate stores.

(Id.). 

The district manager who oversees a particular district is, among other things,

responsible for supervising the store managers who work in that district. More

specifically, Dollar General’s evidence demonstrates that district managers are

responsible for locating qualified candidates to fill any store manager vacancies and

for making store manager salary decisions, including starting pay, annual merit

increases, and off-cycle increases. (Doc. #99 at 17-18). 

Beyond the district level, Dollar General’s opposition to Plaintiffs’ Notice

Motion indicates that a regional manager may in some cases provide approval over

whether a formal offer is extended to a store manager within a particular district.

(Doc. #99 at 19). Also, “Dollar General’s Compensation Department provides district

managers with salary guidelines to use as a tool in setting [s]tore [m]anagers

salaries.” (Id. at 20). Since early 2004, Dollar General has expected district

managers to follow the salary guidelines and to obtain permission from regional

managers when seeking to go outside of them. (Id.). Additionally, performance

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 6 of 18
7

evaluations relating to annual merit increases are reviewed and signed-off on by

regional managers. (Id. at 22). 

Each regional manager reports to one of eight (8) division managers (who may

also hold the title of vice-president). Doc. #100 at Ex. 3 ¶ 8. One entire state, such

as Texas, for example, may constitute one complete division, while other divisions

may include multiple states. Id. Finally, all division managers “report to the senior

Vice President of Operations Tom Mitchell.” Id. 

Law

This action is brought pursuant to the EPA amendment, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), to

the FLSA, which provides:

No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section

shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees

are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages

to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which

he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment

for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,

effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar

working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i)

a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures

earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based

on any other factor other than sex.

Id.

Relatedly, § 216(b) of the FLSA, provides that:

[a]n action . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . in any

Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 7 of 18
8

employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other

employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to

any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such

a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.

Id.

Analysis

This court uses the “two-step” approach to § 216(b) certification adopted by

several other courts. First, the court determines whether a collective action should

be certified for notice purposes. Then, after discovery is completed and the case is

ready for trial, the court revisits the issue of certification. As observed by the

Eleventh Circuit regarding the scope of the court’s determination during the so-called

“notice stage” under the FLSA:

Because the court has minimal evidence, this determination is

made using a fairly lenient standard, and typically results in

“conditional certification” of a representative class. If the district

court “conditionally certifies” the class, putative class members are

given notice and the opportunity to “opt-in.” The action proceeds as a

representative action throughout discovery.

Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis

added) (citing Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (5th Cir.1995),

overruling on other grounds recognized by Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d

305 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214 n.8 (“At the notice stage,

courts appear to require nothing more than substantial allegations that the putative

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 8 of 18
9

class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan infected

by discrimination.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Therefore,

certification, if granted at the preliminary stage, is always conditional. 

In making the initial decision regarding certification, the court must consider

whether certification will serve the purposes and putative benefits of a collective

action under § 216. The Supreme Court has identified the main benefits of a

collective action under § 216(b):

A collective action allows . . . plaintiffs the advantage of lower

individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources. The

judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of

common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged . . .

activity.

Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S. Ct. 482, 107 L. Ed.

2d 480 (1989). Accordingly, the court must balance the putative benefits against any

prejudice to the defendant and any judicial inefficiencies that may result from

allowing plaintiffs to proceed collectively. Bayles v. American Medical Response of

Colorado, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1067 (D. Colo.1996).

The Eleventh Circuit has identified two areas on which the plaintiff bears the

initial burden in a case brought under the EPA: substantial similarity and same

establishment. More specifically,“[i]nitially, the burden rests with the plaintiff to

show that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 9 of 18
10

work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and

responsibility.’” Mulhall v. Advance Security, Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1994)

(quoting Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 907 (11th Cir. 1987)). 

The statute also imposes on the plaintiff a “geographic limitation.”

Those employees against whom plaintiff compares herself must work in

the same ‘establishment’ as the claimant. Brennan v. Goose Creek

Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d 53, 57 (5th Cir. 1975). [A

p]laintiff establishes a prima facie case by satisfying both the

geographic and descriptive components of the test as applied to even

one comparator. Mitchell v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 936 F.2d

539, 547 (11th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d

1006, 1009 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 590. Dollar General contends that Womack and the EPA Battle

Plaintiffs have failed to establish either the substantial similarity or the same

establishment requirement due to the highly individualized and store-specific nature

of compensation decisions. Dollar General’s argument regarding substantial

similarity is based on its prevailing on its establishment argument. Therefore, the

court focuses on the “same establishment” issue first. 

Womack has proposed a nationwide conditional class notice and argues that

a decision to limit the class notice, including a determination of the establishment

element, is premature at this time. Plaintiffs’ proposed notice is expressly directed

to “Female Store Managers of Dolgencorp, Inc. d/b/a Dollar General who have held

and/or currently hold the position of Store Manager on or after the date of receiving

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 10 of 18
In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh 10

Circuit adopted as binding precedent those cases decided by the Fifth Circuit prior

to October 1, 1981.

11

this Notice.” (Doc. #91 at Ex. B at 1).

The court’s decision to conditionally certify a nationwide class for notice, is

based on its reading and application of two (2) 1994 Eleventh Circuit cases to the

facts of this case: Meeks v. Computer Associates International, 15 F.3d 1013 (11th

Cir. 1994) and Mulhall v. Advance Security, Inc., 19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994). The

court is also guided by its prior conditional EPA collective action certification

decision in Collins v. Family Dollar, 7:04-CV-0553-VEH (Doc. #137). 

Turning first to Meeks and Mulhall, the Eleventh Circuit applied the facts of

each case to the statutory term, “establishment.” The Eleventh Circuit also focused

on the definition of that termas promulgated by regulations of the Secretary of Labor,

specifically, as “a distinct physical place of business rather than . . . an entire business

or ‘enterprise’ which may include several separate places of business.” 19 C.F.R. §

1620.9(a). However, at the same time, the Eleventh Circuit recognized in each

decision that under Brennan v. Goose Creek Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d

53 (5th Cir. 1975), there are situations in which a single establishment can include

10

operations at more than one physical location, although such situations are “unusual”.

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 11 of 18
By a matter of weeks. 11

19 F.3d 586, 591 (emphasis in original). 12

12

In the first of those decisions, the Eleventh Circuit held that the employer 11

lacked “the degree of centralization necessary to justify treating all of the company’s

technical writers as working at a single establishment.” Meeks, 15 F.3d 1013, 1017.

The court found the defendant’s evidence of centralization insufficient in face of the

fact that “the ultimate decision respecting the hiring of the two personsreally in issue,

male and female, . . . was at the [local] level considering the [local] community and

the office requirements.” Id. That is, the court was persuaded that, among all the

factors it considered, the fact that “[the two j]ob applicants [at issue were] screened

and interviewed by local supervisors who then recommend[ed] the applicants and a

suggested salary to the central personnel office, which [gave] final approval,” was

determinative. Id. 

In contrast, in Mulhall, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff, who

operated out of the defendant corporation’s main offices, worked in the same

establishment as three (3) project managers who performed services at military sites

in different locations. The court found the following facts “dispositive”: (1) the

project managers “reported to plaintiff”, (2) the plaintiff “determined all cost items, 12

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 12 of 18
Id.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 592. 15

The court notes that unlike this case, neither Meeks nor Mulhall involves a 16

putative class of opt-in plaintiffs. Therefore, while the cases provide insight as to the

same establishment issue generally, they do not provide controlling authority on the

matter of conditional certification for the purposes of nationwide notice.

13

wages and benefit levels”, and (3) when another company offered one of the project 13

managers a job, the corporate defendant “immediately increased [his] salary ... and

added benefits sufficient to keep him”, thus “further demonstrat[ing] defendants’

14

control.” The court then explained that it was the combination of “centralized

15

control and the functional interrelationship between plaintiff and the” project

managers that allowed “a reasonable trier of fact [to] infer that . . . a single

establishment existed for purposes of the EPA.” Id. 

As applied to the facts of this case and based upon the evidence offered by

Dollar General, Plaintiffs have at least preliminarily established sufficient evidence

of centralized control over compensation for store managers as explained by Meeks

and Mulhall for the purpose of sending notice out on a nationwide level. Although 16

aspects of a store manager’s position may involve determinations at the district level,

the salary guidelines are generated at a corporate level and the regional managers play

significant roles in determining, what the store managers (Womack, the EPA Battle

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 13 of 18
14

Plaintiffs, the purported opt-ins, and the male store managers) were paid initially and

as raises. As summarized by the Vice President of Operations for Dollar General,

William Bass, “the [r]egional managers participate in the process for hiring and

promoting [s]tore [m]anagers (to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the

preference of the particular [r]egional [m]anager) and also sign-off on [d]istrict

[m]anager decisions relating to starting pay, performance evaluations, salary increases

and bonuses.” (Doc. #100 at Ex. 3 ¶ 7). Thus, the “functional relationship” for

Dollar General, which governs the EPA establishment analysis under the conditional

notice phase, is centralized from the standpoint of the involvement of Dollar

General’s Compensation Department and its fifty (50) regional managers regarding

compensation for store managers. Therefore, certification of a conditional collective

action on a nationwide basis for notice to potential opt-ins serves the purposes and

putative benefits of a collective action under § 216 and balances against any prejudice

caused to Dollar General. 

The court next turns to the question whether Womack and the other plaintiffs

have demonstrated that they are “similarly situated” to the purported opt-ins and to

the proposed comparators, that is, the male employees of Dollar General who hold the

same position of store manager.

In Equal Pay Act cases, we compare the jobs, not the individual

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 14 of 18
15

employees holding those jobs. Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1533. Only the

“skills and qualifications actually needed to perform the jobs are

considered.” Id. Comparators’ prior experience is not relevant to the

“substantially similar” inquiry. Id. The examination also rests on

primary, as opposed to incidental or insubstantial job duties. Id. Job

titles are a factor for consideration, but are not dispositive. Id. The

plaintiff need not prove that her job and those of the comparators are

identical; the test is one of substantiality, not entirety. Id. Nonetheless,

in EPA cases “[t]he standard for determining whether jobs are equal in

terms of skill, effort, and responsibility is high.” Waters v. Turner,

Wood & Smith Ins. Agency, Inc., 874 F.2d 797, 799 (11th Cir. 1989).

Mulhall, 19 F.3d 586, 593.

All of Dollar General’s arguments that the similarly situated requirement has

not been met are premised upon its position that each store, or alternatively each

district, is a separate establishment. However, as stated above, the court has found

that the “establishment” requirement is met in this case at the corporate and regional

level such that the sending of nationwide notice is appropriate.

Dollar General has correctly pointed out that Womack and the other plaintiffs

have the burden to show that they are similarly situated. “Initially, the burden rests

with the plaintiff to show that an employer pays different wages to employees of

opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,

effort, and responsibility.’” Mulhall v. Advance Security, Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 590 (11th

Cir. 1994) (quoting Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 907 (11th Cir.

1987)). However at the same time, “the similarly situated requirement is not very

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 15 of 18
16

stringent in this circuit.” See Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218-19. 

After examining the entire record, the evidence filed establishes, at least on a

prima facie basis, that Womack and the EPA Battle Plaintiffs are similarly situated

to the purported opt-ins and to the proposed comparators. Therefore and similar to

the court’s conclusion on conditional collective action status in Collins v. Family

Dollar, Plaintiffs have met their burden, as it exists at this stage of the litigation, that

they are “similarly situated.”

Dollar General’s Motion to Drop is similarly premised upon its argument that

each store (or alternatively each district) is a separate establishment and therefore no

“similarly situated” opt-ins exist. Dollar General also argues that a collective action

involving multiple EPA plaintiffs is unworkable; however, it fails to translate any of

these litigation difficulties into legal prohibitions against conditional nationwide

collective status under the EPA. 

Moreover, Plaintiffs have cited this court to two (2) Eleventh Circuit cases that

clarify that the joinder standards under Rules 20 and 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure are not required to be satisfied in order to provide notice pursuant to the

FLSA. See Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219 (“[T]he ‘similarly situated’ requirement of §

216(b) is more elastic and less stringent than the requirements found in Rule 20

(joinder) and Rule 42 (severance).”) (quoting Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 16 of 18
Several of Dollar General’s objectionsto the language in Plaintiffs’ proposed 17

notice are well-taken and the court has incorporated those valid points in the attached

replacement form. 

17

1086, 1095 (11th Cir. 1996)); Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1095 (“Essentially we hold that the

‘similarly situated’ requirement of § 216(b) is more elastic and less stringent than the

requirements found in Rule 20 (joinder) and Rule 42 (severance).”). 

For the same reasons as stated as to the establishment issue, Dollar General’s

Motion to Drop is due to be denied without prejudice to a subsequent challenge upon

further development of the record. Additionally, Dollar General’s Motion to Drop

will be granted as to the claims of Warren. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ Notice Motion pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is GRANTED;

2. The conditional nationwide collective action is certified for notice

purposes only;

3. The parties shall complete where necessary and file any objections to the

attached forms of notice and consent within ten (10) calendar days from the date this

Order enters. Accordingly, Dollar General’s previously filed objections to Plaintiffs’

proposed notice (Doc. #102) are MOOT;

17

4. Dollar General SHALL PROVIDE Plaintiffs with the names and last

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 17 of 18
18

known physical addresses of all individuals in the putative EPA collective action

within thirty (30) days from the entry date of this Order;

5. Dollar General SHALL PROVIDE NOTICE by First Class Mail to all

putative opt-in Plaintiffs;

6. Dollar General’s Motion to Drop is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART as set forth above; and

7. With no objection from Plaintiffs, Plaintiff Deandra Warren and her

claims in this case are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DONE and ORDERED this the 30th day of November, 2007.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

Case 2:06-cv-00465-VEH Document 111 Filed 11/30/07 Page 18 of 18