Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01714/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01714-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JULIO C. MARQUEZ, )

AIS # 229709 )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:13-cv-01714-RDP-JEO

)

WARDEN PRICE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The plaintiff, Julio C. Marquez, filed a pro se amended complaint pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging rights, privileges, or immunities afforded him under 

the Constitution or laws of the United States have been abridged during his 

incarceration at Donaldson Correctional Facility. (Doc. 16). The sole remaining 

claim is against defendant Raymond L. Gaines.1

 The plaintiff complains that 

during what was supposed to be a one-on-one fight with defendant Gaines, Gaines 

and another officer fought unfairly. (Doc. 16 at 6-8). The plaintiff seeks 

compensatory damages, transfer from Donaldson Correctional Facility, and the 

disciplinary action against him expunged from his record. (Id., at 4). 

 1 All other defendants were dismissed by court order of August 27, 2015. (Doc. 22).

FILED

 2016 Jan-29 AM 08:47

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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In accordance with the usual practices of this court and 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1), the complaint was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a 

preliminary report and recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 

(1991). 

I. Procedural History

After dismissal of all other defendants and claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 

(doc. 22), the court entered an Order for Special Report directing that copies of the 

complaint in this action be forwarded to the remaining defendant and requesting 

that he file a special report addressing the factual allegations of the plaintiff’s 

complaint. (Doc. 24). The defendant was advised that the special report could be 

submitted under oath or accompanied by affidavits and, if appropriate, would be 

considered as a motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By the same Order, the plaintiff was advised 

that after he received a copy of the special report submitted by the defendant he 

should file counter affidavits if he wished to rebut the matters presented by the 

defendant in the special report. The plaintiff was further advised that such 

affidavits should be filed within twenty days after receiving a copy of the 

defendant’s special report. 

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On November 25, 2015, defendant Raymond Gaines filed a special report 

with affidavits, medical records, and other evidence attached. (Doc. 32). The 

parties were notified that the court would construe the special report as motion for 

summary judgment and the plaintiff was informed that he would have an additional 

twenty days to respond to the motion for summary judgment, filing affidavits or 

other material if he so chose. (Doc. 33). The plaintiff was advised of the 

consequences of any default or failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See 

Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985). On December 14, 

2015, the plaintiff filed a response to the special report. (Doc. 35). 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Because the special report of the defendant is being considered as a motion 

for summary judgment, the court must determine whether the moving party, the 

defendant, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment may be 

granted only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In 

making that assessment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences against the 

moving party. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000). 

The burden of proof is upon the moving party to establish his prima facie 

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entitlement to summary judgment by showing the absence of genuine issues and 

that he is due to prevail as a matter of law. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 

F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Unless the plaintiff, who carries the ultimate 

burden of proving his action, is able to show some evidence with respect to each 

element of his claim, all other issues of fact become immaterial, and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 

1990). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Facts in dispute cease to be “material” facts when the plaintiff fails to 

establish a prima facie case. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no 

genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of 

proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” [citations omitted]. 

Thus, under such circumstances, the public official is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, because the plaintiff has failed to carry 

the burden of proof. This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually 

unsupported claims prior to trial. 

Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1532. However, any “specific facts” pled in a pro se 

plaintiff’s sworn complaint must be considered in opposition to summary 

judgment. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th 

Cir. 2014) (citing Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1986)). 

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III. Summary Judgment Facts

Applying the above standards to the pleadings before the court, the 

following facts are undisputed or, if material and disputed, taken in a light most 

favorable to the plaintiff.

On August 25, 2013, the plaintiff was talking to other inmates through his 

cell door. (Doc. 16 at 5). Defendant Gaines spoke to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff 

ignored him. (Id.) This made Gaines angry and he said “everybody is a man 

behind them doors,” so the plaintiff told him to open the door and Gaines said he 

was going to once the officers finished giving haircuts. (Id.) Gaines was the last 

officer in the block when the haircuts were finished, so the plaintiff beat on his 

door and asked Gaines “What’s up?” (Id. at 5-6). Gaines walked towards his door 

so the plaintiff put on his pants and shoes and got ready. (Id. at 6).

According to Gaines, the facts preceding the incident at issue are quite 

different. Gaines asserts that, as the officers were giving haircuts, he was informed 

by another officer that the plaintiff was standing in his door masturbating. (Doc. 

32-1 at 1-2). Gaines shut and locked the plaintiff’s cell tray door, but soon after 

was notified that the plaintiff’s tray door was again open with the plaintiff 

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continuing his prior actions.2 (Id. at 2). Gaines again shut and locked the tray 

door. (Id.) Officer Campbell asked the plaintiff why he kept unlocking his tray 

door and the plaintiff responded with profanity. (Id.) The plaintiff then told 

Gaines to “Roll the door, I’ll beat your ass.” (Id.) 

Although the parties dispute the reason the fight began, they agree that they 

had a verbal dispute they decided to settle through a one-on-one fight. (Doc. 16 at 

6; doc. 26 at 1; doc. 32-1 at 2). Gaines handed his stick and radio to Officer 

Campbell and Campbell instructed Officer Purifoy to “roll the door.” (Doc. 16 at 

6-7; doc. 32-1 at 2). Purifoy did not open the door, so the plaintiff told Gaines to 

go to the cube and get Purifoy to open his door. (Doc. 16 at 6). A little later, 

Gaines came back with Campbell, and the plaintiff asked Gaines why he brought a 

woman with him when they had agreed to a one-on-one fight. (Id.)

Gaines and Campbell entered the cell. (Doc. 16 at 7; doc. 32-1 at 2). 

According to Gaines, he stepped in front of Campbell and the plaintiff swung, 

striking him in the face. (Doc. 32-1 at 3). A fist fight then ensued. (Id.) 

According to the plaintiff, Gaines swung at him first, striking him in the head. 

(Doc. 16 at 7). The plaintiff also asserts that as soon as Gaines had punched him,

 2 The plaintiff asserts that this incident never occurred. (Doc. 35, at 1). Moreover, he 

alleges that the cell tray doors only open and lock from the outside. (Id.)

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Campbell immediately grabbed him and held him down while Gaines continued to

swing at him. (Doc. 16 at 7). Gaines rushed him and Campbell, causing the 

plaintiff to fall against “the rock,”3 striking his ribs and spine. (Doc. 16 at 7). At 

this point the plaintiff was on the floor, with Officer Campbell holding him down, 

screaming for him to “chill” and telling defendant Gaines to get out of the cell.4

 

(Id., at 7-8). Gaines continued to punch him in the head. (Id. at 8). When the 

plaintiff attempted to rise, Gaines hit him on the head with his stick. (Id.) 

When Gaines left the cell, the plaintiff asked Campbell to take him to the 

infirmary for a body chart and report the incident to a supervisor, but she refused, 

stating the plaintiff needed to respect the “one on one.” (Doc. 16 at 9). Because 

the plaintiff was not taken to the infirmary, he cut his arm with the metal part of a 

pencil and put blood on his cell window door to attract a supervisor. (Id. at 11). 

When officers came to his cell, the plaintiff told them what happened. (Id.) 

Although the plaintiff was accused of lying, he was taken to the infirmary. (Id.) 

A subsequent investigation into this incident found that

all the officers involved were covering up the truth. Inmate Marquez 

did not harm his self (sic) but Officer Gaines and Officer Campbell 

entered Inmate Marquez cell without cause and Officer Gaines USED 

 3 The undersigned believes the plaintiff means “rack” as a shorthand term for his bed 

frame.

4 According to Gaines, Campbell got in between the plaintiff and Gaines, and instructed 

Gaines to exit the cell. (Doc. 32-1 at 3). 

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FORCE on Inmate Marquez with no Justification. The force used on 

Inmate Marquez was unnecessary. 

(Doc. 32-2 at 2). A body chart the day of the fight reflects bruising to the 

plaintiff’s head, neck, left shoulder and chest.5

 (Doc. 32-2 at 6). The plaintiff also 

had superficial cuts to his left arm from where he cut himself. (Doc. 32-2 at 6). 

Defendant Gaines was reprimanded, removed from the Mental Health and 

Segregation Units, and states he will not roll another door without following 

policy. (Doc. 32-1 at 3). The plaintiff was disciplined for intentionally creating a 

security, safety or health hazard. (Doc. 32-2 at 7, 9-11). 

IV. Discussion

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 

To the extent that the plaintiff brings this action against defendant Gaines in 

his official capacity, Gaines is immune from monetary damages. Official capacity 

lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the 

entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

“A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the 

state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst 

State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or 

Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. 

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, [59] (1996). Alabama has not waived its 

 5 Both the body chart and the photographs taken of the plaintiff show a large round 

abrasion in the middle of the plaintiff’s forehead. (Doc. 32-2 at 6, doc. 32-2 at 15). 

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Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 

F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has 

not abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state 

officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official 

capacities.” 

Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Because in his official capacity defendant Gaines is a state actor, and thus

entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking 

monetary damages from him, any such claim the plaintiff brings is due to be 

dismissed. 

B. Individual Capacity-Excessive Force

To establish a claim for excessive force, the test is not “whether a certain 

quantum of injury was sustained, but rather ‘whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm.’” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). Although the extent of any injury alone is not 

dispositive of an excessive force case, it is “one factor that may suggest ‘whether 

the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular 

situation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 

(1986)).

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Whether the use of force is excessive and thus violates the inmate’s right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment depends on whether the official’s act 

“shocks the conscience.” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007).

To evaluate whether actions shock the conscience, the court must consider the 

following factors: (1) the need for force; (2) the relationship between that need and 

the amount of force used; and (3) the extent of the resulting injury; (4) the extent of 

the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the 

responsible official on the basis of facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made 

to temper the severity of a forceful response. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321

(1986). These factors must be viewed with “a wide range of deference to prison 

officials acting to preserve discipline and security.” Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 

1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990). Even so, in taking the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, each of these factors weighs in the plaintiff’s favor. 

The undisputed evidence is that, regardless of the origin of dispute, the 

plaintiff and Gaines engaged in a verbal altercation and agreed to a fight. (Doc. 16 

at 6, doc. 32-1 at 2). Until Gaines ordered that the plaintiff’s cell door be opened, 

no need for force existed.6

 Moreover, once Gaines entered the cell, and while the 

 6 As noted above, the Investigation Report into the use of force found that 

Officer Gaines and Officer Campbell entered Inmate Marquez cell without cause 

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plaintiff was restrained by Campbell, Gaines continued to strike blows upon the 

plaintiff’s head and ribs. (Doc. 16 at 7-8). The question concerning the 

relationship between the need for force and the amount used thus becomes whether 

a reasonable jury could find that the actions of Gaines, in engaging continuing to 

punch the plaintiff in the head and ribs, after Campbell had the plaintiff restrained, 

constituted more than the force made necessary by the situation. 

As to the third Whitley factor, the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, the 

plaintiff suffered bruises and scrapes to multiple areas of his face, neck, torso and 

shoulders. (Doc. 32-2 at 6). He alleges he continues to suffer from head, neck and 

spine problems. (Doc. 16 at 13). The defendant argues that the force used was de 

minimus, and much lesser than force not found sufficient in other cases. (Doc. 32 

at 11). However, the absence of a serious injury to plaintiff, although of 

evidentiary relevance, does not end the court’s inquiry. “An inmate who is 

gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force 

claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” 

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38. See also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4 (“the use of excessive 

physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment 

 

and Officer Gaines USED FORCE on Inmate Marquez with no Justification. The 

force used on Inmate Marquez was unnecessary. 

(Doc. 32-2 at 2). 

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[even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury.”); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 

102, 108 (3rd Cir. 2000) (“the absence of significant resulting injury is not a per se 

reason for dismissing a claim based on alleged wanton and unnecessary use of 

force . . . .” Otherwise, “a prisoner could constitutionally be attacked for the sole 

purpose of causing pain as long as the blows were inflicted in a manner that 

resulted in visible . . . injuries that were de minimis”). 

The cases cited by the defendant for the proposition that injuries must be 

“sufficiently serious” to survive summary judgment do not support his position. 

For example, in Williams v. Cash, 836 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1986), the court did 

not find that the allegation of a broken elbow was insufficient, as Gaines asserts,

but held that, “[b]ecause there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how 

Williams’ elbow was broken, summary judgment was inappropriate.” Id. at 1320. 

The case was reversed and remanded for trial. Id. Similarly, in Perry v. 

Thompson, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor 

of the defendants, holding that the pleadings filed created “a square, head-on 

dispute of material facts. 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1986).7

 Although the 

defendant also cites Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002), for the 

 7 In Perry, the Eleventh Circuit noted that under the defendant’s version of events, the 

force used was reasonable whereas under the plaintiff’s version, it was not. 786 F.2d at 1093. 

The extent of the plaintiff’s injuries was not mentioned by the court. Id.

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proposition that “even an officer acting with specific malevolent intent to cause 

harm must inflict more than de minimis injury to violate the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment” (doc. 32 at 13), the Court in 

Johnson actually stated:

The same is true in this case where the subjective element of the 

constitutional violation is that the force was used and the injury 

inflicted not in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline, 

but maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm 

to the plaintiff. Acting with that specific malevolent intent to cause 

harm, at least where (as here) more than de minimis injury results, 

violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 

Amendment, and that was clearly established law at the time Breeden 

and Gomez entered Johnson’s cell on August 22, 1995. See Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).

Id., 280 F.3d at 1321.

The fourth and fifth factors also weigh in the plaintiff’s favor. The extent of 

the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by a

responsible official on the basis of facts known to him, was non-existent until 

defendant Gaines opened the plaintiff’s cell door and entered the cell. Even then, 

both Gaines and Campbell were in the cell with solely Gaines. The plaintiff asserts 

that Gaines swung at him first. (Doc. 16 at 7). As to the fifth factor, Gaines made 

no effort to temper the severity of a forceful response. In the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff, Gaines continued to hit and kick the plaintiff after he was restrained 

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by Campbell. When prison officials “continue to use substantial force against a 

prisoner who has clearly stopped resisting–whether because he has decided to 

become compliant, he has been subdued, or he is otherwise incapacitated–that use 

of force is excessive.” Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) rev’d 

on other grounds, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See also Skrtich v. 

Thorton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (“government officials may not use 

gratuitous force against a prisoner who has been already subdued or, as in this 

case, incapacitated.”). Under the facts alleged, a fact finder could reasonably 

conclude that Gaines used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose 

of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. Because a genuine issue of 

material fact remains as to the events which occurred inside the plaintiff’s cell, the 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is due to be denied. 

C. Qualified Immunity

Having found a constitutional violation of the plaintiff’s rights, the court 

must now consider whether the defense of qualified immunity assists the 

defendant. Qualified immunity ensures that, before an official is subjected to suit, 

he or she is on notice that the conduct in question is unlawful. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 

U.S. 730, 739 (2002). Thus, qualified immunity shields public officials in their 

individual capacities from some lawsuits against them arising from torts committed 

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while they are performing a discretionary duty. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 

1312, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007). Neither party disputes that Gaines’s actions occurred 

while defendant Gaines was engaged in discretionary duties. Thus, the question 

becomes whether Gaines’s actions violated a right that was clearly established at 

the time the incident occurred. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

In the Eleventh Circuit, the defense of qualified immunity is not available 

where the plaintiff alleges excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, 

because force used “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” is clearly 

established as a violation of the Constitution. Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1317. The 

Eleventh Circuit has held:

The question for qualified immunity analysis is whether, at the time of 

the incident, it was clearly established that it is unlawful to inflict a 

beating upon a prisoner in custody when he is incapacitated and no 

longer able to pose a threat to the guards’ ability to maintain order, 

resist the guards’ directions, or engage in disruptive behavior. We 

answer that question in the affirmative. By 1998, our precedent clearly 

established that government officials may not use gratuitous force 

against a prisoner who has been already subdued or, as in this case, 

incapacitated. See Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505-06 (11th Cir.

1996); Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 1991); 

Williams v. Cash–C.O.I., 836 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1988); Perry 

v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093 (11th Cir. 1986). 

Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1303. See also Council v. Sutton, 366 F. App’x 31, 37 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (applying Skrtich to hold that “where a plaintiff alleges that the 

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defendants used excessive force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, the 

right to be free from gratuitous force after a prisoner has been subdued is a clearly 

established constitutional right.”).

Applying the foregoing to the present facts, even if Gaines had entered the 

plaintiff’s cell for a valid reason, once Officer Campbell held down the plaintiff, 

every kick and punch Gaines applied was a gratuitous use of force. An internal 

inquiry found not only that Gaines entered the plaintiff’s cell without cause, but 

also that Gaines’s use of force on the plaintiff was unnecessary. (Doc. 32-2 at 2). 

This evidence, coupled with the plaintiff’s allegations, is sufficient to find qualified 

immunity inapplicable to the facts. 

V. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the magistrate judge 

RECOMMENDS that defendant Gaines’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 

32) be DENIED.

VI. Notice of Right to Object

Any party who objects to this report and recommendation must, within 

fourteen (14) days of the date on which it is entered, file specific written objections 

with the clerk of this court. Any objections to the failure of the magistrate 

judge to address any contention raised in the petition also must be included. 

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Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings of the 

magistrate judge, except for plain error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. 

Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); Dupree v. Warden, 

715 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013). 

To challenge the findings of the magistrate judge, a party must file with the 

clerk of the court written objections which specifically identify the portions of the 

proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the specific 

basis for objection. Any objections to the failure of the magistrate judge to address 

any contention raised in the complaint must also be included. Objections not 

meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a 

district judge. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to 

make new allegations or present additional evidence. Furthermore, it is not 

necessary for a party to repeat legal arguments in objections. A copy of the 

objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.

On receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a 

United States District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions 

of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made 

and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The district judge, however, need 

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conduct a hearing only in his discretion or if required by law, and may consider the 

record developed before the magistrate judge, making his own determination on 

the basis of that record. The district judge may also receive further evidence, recall 

witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 

Objections not meeting the foregoing specificity requirement will not be 

considered by a district judge.

A party may not appeal a magistrate judge’s recommendation directly to the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made 

only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a district judge.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this report and recommendation

on the plaintiff.

DONE this 29th day of January, 2016.

_________________________________

JOHN E. OTT

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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