Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02269/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02269-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Declaratory Judgement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

David Gay, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Trumbull Insurance Company, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-02269-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment and a stipulated 

statement of facts consistent with the Court’s order. Docs. 7, 10-12. The Court finds that 

oral argument is not needed. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion, grant Defendant’s 

motion, and set another case management conference. 

I. Facts. 

 Defendant issued an automobile and personal umbrella policy (the “Policy”) to 

Daniel and Nancy Gay (“Named Insureds”). The Policy was issued in Chaska, 

Minnesota for the policy period from May 1, 2013 through November 1, 2013. All 

insured vehicles are garaged in Minnesota. Plaintiff is the Named Insureds’ son. 

 Sometime before July 9, 2013, Plaintiff purchased a motorcycle. Plaintiff’s 

motorcycle is not listed as an insured vehicle under the Policy. Plaintiff obtained liability 

insurance for his motorcycle through Foremost Insurance Company (“Foremost Policy”), 

but declined to purchase underinsured motorist coverage. 

 On July 9, 2013, Plaintiff was operating his motorcycle when he was involved in a 

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collision with a vehicle operated by Almira Guderjohn in Maricopa County, Arizona (the 

“Accident”). Guderjohn and her insurer have accepted a portion of liability for the 

Accident. Guderjohn’s liability insurance policy provides $100,000 per person for bodily 

injury. Guderjohn’s insurer has tendered its policy limits, but these limits are insufficient 

to fully compensate Plaintiff for his injuries. Plaintiff does not have any other insurance 

available that provides compensation for the bodily injuries he sustained in the Accident. 

 The parties agree that Minnesota law applies and that Plaintiff was an insured 

under the Policy, but the Policy contains the following exclusion (the “Exclusion”): 

A. We do not provide coverage under this section 

(underinsured motorist coverage) for bodily injury sustained 

by an insured: 

1. While occupying any motor vehicle owned by that insured 

which is not insured for this coverage under this Policy. This 

includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle. 

 Plaintiff tendered a claim for payment under the Policy, but Defendant declined 

coverage based on the Exclusion. Defendant agrees that it must provide coverage if the 

Exclusion is either inapplicable or unenforceable. 

II. Analysis. 

 The Court must consider two issues: first, whether the Exclusion is enforceable, 

and second, whether it applies to the Accident. 

A. Enforceability of the Exclusion. 

 Under Minnesota’s No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, “an insurer’s liability is 

governed by the contract between the parties only as long as coverage required by law is 

not omitted and policy provisions do not contravene applicable statutes.” Hertz Corp. v. 

State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 686, 689-90 (Minn. 1998). While an insurer may 

provide more coverage than is mandated by the Act, it may not provide less. Id. 

 The Act requires underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage for all motor vehicles. 

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(2) (2008) (“Every owner of a motor vehicle 

registered or principally garaged in this state shall maintain uninsured and underinsured 

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motorist coverages as provided in this subdivision.”). A person injured while occupying 

a motor vehicle is entitled to UIM benefits limited to the amount specified in the policy 

covering the motor vehicle operated at the time of injury. Coverage is specifically 

precluded in two situations: an insured injured while occupying a motor vehicle he or she 

owns is not entitled to UIM benefits unless the occupied vehicle is an insured motor 

vehicle, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(7), and an insured injured while occupying a 

motorcycle owned by the insured is not entitled to recover UIM benefits, Minn. Stat. 

Ann. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(8). 

 Under the Act, “motor vehicle” is defined as: 

[E]very vehicle, other than a motorcycle or other vehicle with 

fewer than four wheels, which (a) is required to be registered 

pursuant to chapter 168, and (b) is designed to be selfpropelled by an engine or motor for use primarily on public 

roads, highways or streets in the transportation of persons or 

property, and includes a trailer with one or more wheels, 

when the trailer is connected to or being towed by a motor 

vehicle. 

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65B.43, subd. 3. Because motorcycles are not “motor vehicles” for 

purposes of the Act, UIM coverage is not mandated for motorcycles. Am. Nat’l Prop. & 

Cas. Co. v. Loren, 597 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Minn. 1999); see also Johnson v. Cummiskey, 

765 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Minn. Ct App. 2009) (“It is clear that the No-Fault Act does not 

require insurers to provide motorcycles with UIM coverage.”). 

 Although Minnesota does not mandate UIM coverage for motorcycles, in 1989 the 

Minnesota Supreme Court found that insurers were nonetheless required by the Act to 

provide UIM benefits to an insured operating an owned motorcycle. Roering v. Grinnel 

Mut. Reinsurance Co., 444 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. 1989). Roering involved facts 

similar to this case. On September 9, 1986, Randy Roering was operating a motorcycle 

when he was involved in a collision with a motor vehicle. He was killed as a result of the 

collision. The motorcycle was owned by Randy and insured under a policy issued by 

Foremost Insurance Company that did not include UIM coverage. Randy’s father, 

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Donald Roering, was insured under a policy issued by Grinell Mutual Reinsurance 

Company that did include UIM coverage. At the time of the accident, Randy was a 

member of Donald’s household, but Randy’s motorcycle was not listed as insured under 

Donald’s policy. Grinnel Mutual denied Donald’s claim for UIM benefits, citing an 

exclusion in the policy that stated: “This [UIM] coverage does not apply to bodily injury 

sustained by a person: (1) while occupying a motor vehicle owned by you or a relative

for which insurance is not afforded under this part, or when struck by the motor vehicle.” 

Id. at 830 (emphasis in original). Although the Roering court conceded that Randy was 

“occupying a motor vehicle owned by you or a relative” under the Grinell Mutual policy, 

it held that the exclusion was unenforceable because it conflicted with the coverage 

guaranteed by the Act. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (“If at the time of the 

accident the injured person is not occupying a motor vehicle, the injured person is 

entitled to select any one limit of liability for any one vehicle afforded by a policy under 

which the injured person is insured[.]”) 

 The Minnesota legislature responded to Roering by amending the Act to allow the 

exclusion invalidated in Roering. The Act now permits insurers to exclude insureds 

operating motorcycles from UIM coverage. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(8) 

(“The uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages required by this subdivision do not 

apply to bodily injury of the insured while occupying a motorcycle owned by the 

insured.”); Johnson v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins., 540 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Minn. Ct App. 1995) 

(“Effective August 1, 1990, the legislature amended the No Fault Act and partially 

overruled Roering. Under the 1990 amendment, an owner of a motorcycle who is injured 

while occupying that motorcycle may only look to uninsured or underinsured benefits 

purchased for that motorcycle.”). 

 The Exclusion in this case disclaims UIM coverage for an insured who is injured 

while “occupying any motor vehicle owned by that insured which is not insured for 

[UIM] coverage under this policy.” Doc. 11, ¶ 18. Plaintiff argues that the Exclusion is 

not enforceable because it “disclaims all coverage while occupying any ‘motor vehicle.’” 

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Doc. 10 at 10 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff is incorrect. The Exclusion disclaims UIM 

coverage for an insured injured while occupying a vehicle owned by that insured which is 

not insured for UIM coverage under the Policy. The Exclusion accords with Minn. Stat. 

Ann. §§ 65B.49, subd. 3a(7) & (8), which carve out two exceptions to the mandate for 

UIM coverage, one for motorcycles owned by the insured and one for motor vehicles 

owned by the insured that are not listed in the policy. The Exclusion is therefore 

enforceable.1

 

B. Applicability of the Exclusion. 

 Under Minnesota law, “[t]he insured bears the burden of demonstrating coverage 

under an insurance policy.” SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 323 

(Min. Ct. App. 2008). General principles of contract interpretation apply to insurance 

policies. St. Paul Sch. Dist. No. 625 v. Columbia Transit. Corp., 321 N.W.2d 41, 45 

(Minn. 1982). “The paramount question in construing an insurance policy is what 

hazards the parties intended to cover.” Hertog v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 415 N.W.2d 

370, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). A court looks first to the “ordinary and usual meaning” 

of the policy language. Simon v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 115 N.W.2d 40, 45 

(Minn. 1962). If the policy’s language is unambiguous, “the language must be given its 

usual and accepted meaning,” Lobeck v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 

582 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted), but if the policy language 

is ambiguous, “the ambiguity must be resolved in the insured’s favor,” Kastning v. State 

Farm Insurance Companies, 821 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting 

SECURA, 755 N.W.2d at 323); Brookfield Trade Center Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 

N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 1998) (“A contract is ambiguous if its language is reasonably 

susceptible to more than one interpretation.”). A court must not read ambiguities “into 

the policy’s plain language to provide coverage where it does not legitimately exist.” 

 

1

 Plaintiff misquotes the Exclusion. Plaintiff states that the Exclusion disclaims 

coverage when “occupying any motor vehicle which is not insured for this coverage.” Doc. 10 at 9. The Exclusion actually disclaims coverage when “occupying any motor vehicle owned by that insured which is not insured for [UIM] coverage under this policy.” Doc. 11, ¶ 18 (emphasis added). 

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Hertog, 415 N.W.2d at 372 (citing Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kangas, 245 N.W.2d 873, 

875 (1976)). 

 The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that the term “motor vehicle” is ambiguous as 

used in the Exclusion. Plaintiff urges the Court to apply the definition of “motor vehicle” 

from the Act, which does not include motorcycles. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65B.43, 

subd. 3. But the Court does not find “motor vehicle” to be ambiguous. As Defendant 

demonstrates from dictionary definitions, it includes land vehicles that are motorized, 

including motorcycles. See also Loren, 597 N.W.2d 291, 292-93 (assuming a motorcycle 

is a “land motor vehicle”); Wintz v. Colonial Ins. Co. of Cal., 542 N.W.2d 625, 626-27 

(Minn. 1996) (assuming that a motorcycle is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of construing 

an insurance policy exclusion); Taulelle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 736, 738-39 

(Minn. 1973) (“Motor vehicle is a generic term which in its broadest sense includes all 

self-propelled land vehicles.”); see generally Adams v. Julius, 719 S.W.2d 94, 99 (Mo. 

Ct. App. 1986) (“The term ‘land motor vehicle,’ although broad, is not ambiguous. 

Plaintiff’s motorcycle is clearly a ‘land motor vehicle[.]’”); Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. 

Ellegood, 386 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that the term “motor 

vehicle” is unambiguous and that its “plain, ordinary and generally accepted meaning is 

sufficiently broad to encompass a motorcycle.”). Because “motor vehicle” is not 

ambiguous, it “must be given its usual and accepted meaning.” Lobeck, 582 N.W.2d at 

249. It includes motorcycles, and the Exclusion therefore applies to this case. 

C. Conclusion. 

 Having found the Exclusion enforceable and applicable, the Court will enter 

summary judgment for Defendant. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 10) is denied. 

2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 12) is granted. 

 

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3. A second case management conference will be held September 19, 2014 at 

3:30 p.m. 

Dated this 18th day of August, 2014. 

Case 2:13-cv-02269-DGC Document 15 Filed 08/18/14 Page 7 of 7