Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00219/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00219-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Case Nos. C 06 219 JF RS & C 06 926 JF RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

(DPSAGOK)

*E-FILED 5/2/06*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Michael Angelo MORALES,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

Jeanne S. WOODFORD, Acting Secretary of the

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation; Eddie S. Ylst, Acting Warden of

San Quentin State Prison; and Does 1-50,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 06 219 JF RS

Case Number C 06 926 JF RS

DEATH-PENALTY CASE

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

[Docket Nos. 132, 134 & 135]

The present action involves a challenge to California’s lethal-injection protocol for

carrying out sentences of death, which is known as San Quentin Operational Procedure No. 770,

or “OP 770.” Plaintiff Michael Angelo Morales, a condemned inmate at San Quentin State

Prison, moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) for an order compelling

discovery from Defendants Jeanne S. Woodford, Acting Secretary of the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and Eddie S. Ylst, Acting Warden of San Quentin State

Prison. Defendants oppose the Motion. The Court heard oral argument from counsel regarding

the Motion on April 25, 2006.

I

Case 3:06-cv-00219-RS Document 151 Filed 05/02/06 Page 1 of 7
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Case Nos. C 06 219 JF RS & C 06 926 JF RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

(DPSAGOK)

The parties’ discovery disputes stem primarily from document requests and

interrogatories propounded by Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 34. 

While the document requests and interrogatories involve a large number of complex issues in the

present action, to resolve the disputes about them, the Court need address only two narrow

issues: (1) whether information regarding the genesis and development of OP 770 is protected

by the deliberative-process privilege; and (2) whether Defendants must disclose the identities of

members of San Quentin’s execution team as well as various personal-background information

pursuant to the Protective Order entered in this action. In addition, the Court must address three

discrete issues that Plaintiff raised in his reply brief and that were addressed during oral

argument: (1) whether Defendants must produce Witness No. 4 to be deposed; (2) whether

Defendants must produce Anesthesiologist No. 2 to be deposed; and (3) whether Steven W.

Ornoski, a former acting warden of San Quentin State Prison, must answer certain questions

posed by Plaintiff during his deposition.

II

In response to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, Defendants initially declined to produce

documents or answer interrogatories regarding the genesis and development of the lethalinjection protocol as irrelevant and protected by various privileges. Following Plaintiff’s filing

of his Amended Complaint, Defendants supplemented their responses to the requests, and

Defendants’ counsel has represented to the Court that Defendants have provided all of the

discovery sought. Defendants’ counsel has stated that he will make every effort to confirm that

Defendants have produced all of the discovery related to the genesis and development of OP 770

and will turn over any additional discovery that may be found. However, Defendants continue to

assert that this discovery is protected by the deliberative-process privilege by means of a general,

boilerplate assertion of privilege—which, notably, is “insufficient to assert a privilege.” 

Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005).

Defendants note that the deliberative-process privilege “shields deliberations that

contribute to the formulation of important public policy.” Scott v. Board of Educ., 219 F.R.D.

333, 337 (D.N.J. 2004). However,

Case 3:06-cv-00219-RS Document 151 Filed 05/02/06 Page 2 of 7
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Case Nos. C 06 219 JF RS & C 06 926 JF RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

(DPSAGOK)

The burden of establishing application of the privilege is on the

party asserting it. Even if established, the privilege is strictly

confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the

logic of its principles. Moreover, even if established, the privilege

can be overcome because it is a qualified privilege; that is, a

litigant may obtain deliberative materials or information if his or

her need for the materials or information and the need for accurate

fact-finding override the government’s interest in non-disclosure.

North Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (internal

citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see Scott, 219 F.R.D. at 337. Additionally, the

privilege “is properly limited to communications relating to policy formulation at the higher

levels of government.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Kelly v. City of

San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 658-59 (N.D. Cal. 1987). “Further, when the deliberations of a

government agency are at issue, the [p]rivilege is not available to bar disclosure of such

deliberarations.” Scott, 219 F.R.D. at 337.

Deliberations regarding the development of the lethal-injection protocol—which, as

noted, is formally categorized as a San Quentin Operational Procedure—relate to the routine

implementation by corrections officials of the State’s policy choice of lethal injection as its

primary method of execution, not the formulation of that policy at the higher levels of

government. “Routine operating decisions cannot be transformed into policy formulation at the

higher levels of government simply because they are made at public institutions.” Id. at 338. In

addition, those deliberations are directly at issue in the instant litigation due to allegations

contained in the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the deliberative-process privilege is

inapplicable. Moreover, even if it were applicable, the need for accurate fact-finding in

answering the question of whether California’s lethal-injection protocol comports with the

Constitution outweighs Defendants’ insufficiently asserted desire to keep such deliberations

secret. Defendants therefore must disclose information regarding the genesis and development

of OP 770.

III

In the Protective Order entered in the present action, the Court recognized Defendants’

“legitimate ‘concerns about the safety of prison personnel’ who conduct executions.” Protective

Case 3:06-cv-00219-RS Document 151 Filed 05/02/06 Page 3 of 7
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Case Nos. C 06 219 JF RS & C 06 926 JF RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

(DPSAGOK)

Order at 1 (quoting California First Amend. Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir.

2002)). However, the Court also concluded that Defendants’ proposed form of order, which

would have prevented Plaintiff’s counsel from learning the identities of members of the

execution team, was “overly broad.” Protective Order at 1. As the Court stated,

The issue in the present action is not, as argued by Defendants,

“merely . . . the narrow question of whether the combination of

drugs used by California in a lethal injection results in the

infliction of cruel and unusual pain.” Indeed, it is undisputed that

the combination of drugs used by Defendants should not cause

such pain if properly administered. However, the Court has found

that the records of recent executions raise substantial questions as

to whether the drugs are in fact being administered properly. See

Morales v. Hickman, 438 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 2006). Under

these circumstances, Plaintiff must be given a reasonable

opportunity, in a manner that will not jeopardize the safety of

prison personnel, to explore possible answers to these substantial

questions, including answers that relate to the background,

training, and experience of the members of the execution team.

Protective Order at 1-2. Accordingly, to ensure the safety of prison personnel, the Court entered

a strict protective order providing that the identities and identifying information of members of

the execution team

shall be revealed to and used by only Plaintiff’s attorneys, one

expert (Dr. Mark Heath), and one licensed private investigator

whose background and credentials must be approved by

Defendants. Plaintiff’s attorneys, expert, and investigator shall not

disclose Protected Information to anyone without first obtaining

express authorization to do so from the Court. Plaintiff’s attorneys

shall provide copies of this Protective Order to the expert and the

investigator, who shall submit to the Court declarations under

penalty of perjury that they have read this Protective Order and

agree to abide by its terms. A violation of this Protective Order by

any attorney, the expert, or the investigator may be punished by

the Court as a contempt.

Protective Order at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). This Protective Order—particularly when

considered in light of the Court’s rejection of Defendants’ effort to prevent altogether the

disclosure of the identities of members of the execution team—reflects the Court’s determination

that this information is relevant.

Nonetheless, Defendants continue to refuse to disclose the identities of members of the

execution team in accordance with this Protective Order. In their brief opposing the Motion to

Compel and in a supplemental declaration, Defendants refer the Court to protective orders

Case 3:06-cv-00219-RS Document 151 Filed 05/02/06 Page 4 of 7
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Case Nos. C 06 219 JF RS & C 06 926 JF RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

(DPSAGOK)

entered in actions pending in the United States District Courts for the Western District of

Missouri and the Eastern District of Virginia in which condemned inmates challenge their states’

lethal-injection protocols. The court in Missouri ordered “that the names of persons involved in

executions will not be ordered produced by defendants in response to plaintiff’s discovery

requests.” Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-SOW, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 31, 2005)

(Protective Order). The court in Virginia “reserve[d] ruling upon Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

with respect to Requests for Production and Interrogatories that request the names of persons”

and ordered “that, pending further action by the Court, in responding to Plaintiff’s discovery

requests Defendants need not disclose the names or identities of any person acting on behalf of

the Commonwealth [of Virginia], or information reasonably calculated to identify any such

person. . . .” Walker v. Johnson, No. 1:05cv934, slip. op. at 1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2005)

(Discovery Order).

While the particular circumstances that prompted these courts to address the difficult

issues presented by means of restrictive protective orders are beyond the present record, what is

of consequence here is the Protective Order actually entered by the presiding judge. Defendants

must reveal the information requested by Plaintiff—including the identities of members of the

execution team—as is clearly contemplated by and in conformance with that order.

That being said, the Court is not unmindful of the legitimate concerns regarding safety

and privacy that Defendants have raised. At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to limit

access to the actual names of members of the execution team to Plaintiff’s investigator, and to

continue using numbers to identify execution-team members for other purposes. In addition,

while Plaintiff is entitled to information regarding the training, experience, and competence of

execution-team members—including, for example, educational, licensing, employment,

disciplinary, and malpractice records—Plaintiff has not demonstrated a need for personal,

private information, including information regarding drug use and criminal histories, that would

outweigh the obvious privacy interests implicated by that material. Accordingly, Defendants

must reveal the names of members of the execution team solely to Plaintiff’s private investigator

but are not required to provide execution-team members’ personal, private information such as

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Case Nos. C 06 219 JF RS & C 06 926 JF RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

(DPSAGOK)

that regarding histories of drug use, criminal records, or background checks.

IV

Plaintiff has, in addition, raised three issues regarding depositions. First, Plaintiff relates

that Defendants have declined to produce Witness No. 4 for deposition. At oral argument,

Defendants’ counsel stated that Defendants would produce Witness No. 4 to be deposed if

ordered to do so. As the Court indicated at that time, Defendants are required to produce

Witness No. 4 for deposition.

Second, at oral argument, Defendants indicated that they were not willing to produce

Anesthesiologist No. 2 for deposition. Defendants contend that the testimony of

Anesthesiologist No. 2 would be cumulative of that of Anesthesiologist No. 1, who also will be

an expert witness for Defendants at the evidentiary hearing to be held in this action. However,

the fact that two witnesses were present at the same event does not necessarily make their

testimony cumulative: the two anesthesiologists may have different perspectives and

conclusions regarding their experiences during the events surrounding Plaintiff’s scheduled

execution. Defendants must produce Anesthesiologist No. 2 to be deposed.

Third, Plaintiff reports that at a deposition Defendants’ counsel instructed Mr. Ornoski

not to answer questions regarding a state investigation into mismanagement at San Quentin

during his tenure as acting warden, including questions regarding whether the witness’s

reassignment from San Quentin was related to mismanagement of the three executions he

conducted. Of course, if a witness or his counsel objects to a line of questioning at a deposition

as not relevant, the witness nonetheless is required to answer the questions subject to the

objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c). Moreover, whether Mr. Ornoski was reassigned from San

Quentin because of the mismanagement of executions is plainly relevant to the instant litigation. 

Mr. Ornoski must answer the questions.

Similarly, again on the advice of Defendants’ counsel, Mr. Ornoski declined on privilege

grounds to answer questions regarding a meeting he attended regarding the development of the

current version of OP 770 that was chaired by the legal counsel to Governor Arnold

Schwarzenegger. However, the deliberative-process privilege is inapplicable and outweighed by

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Case Nos. C 06 219 JF RS & C 06 926 JF RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

(DPSAGOK)

the need for evidence for the reasons discussed above; moreover, that privilege does not cover

“communications made after the decision and designed to explain it,” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1975) (citations omitted), which may describe the meeting at issue. 

Mr. Ornoski must answer these questions as well.

V

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has indicated its desire to

review a challenge to California’s lethal-injection protocol “based on a full record.” Beardslee

v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). This Court has indicated its intention to have

that record developed in the present action, noting at an earlier hearing that “there will be a value

to the entire criminal-justice system to vetting this issue thoroughly.” Defendants have assured

the Court of their willingness to cooperate in developing a full record.

Accordingly, and good cause therefor appearing, Plaintiff’s unopposed Ex Parte Motion

to File Oversize Brief is granted and Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery is granted in part as

referenced above. Not later than twenty days after the present Order is issued: (1) in accordance

with the limitations outlined herein, Defendants shall produce to Plaintiff’s counsel the

documents that Plaintiff has requested, except that the Execution Security Plan shall be

submitted to the Court for review in camera; (2) in accordance with the limitations outlined

herein, Defendants shall answer Plaintiff’s interrogatories; (3) Defendants shall produce Witness

No. 4 for deposition; (4) Defendants shall produce Anesthesiologist No. 2 for deposition; and (5)

Steven W. Ornoski shall answer Plaintiff’s deposition questions as indicated herein. Plaintiff’s

Motion for Order Shortening Time to Hear Motion to Compel is denied as moot.

 It is so ordered.

DATED: May 2, 2006 __________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00219-RS Document 151 Filed 05/02/06 Page 7 of 7