Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00618/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00618-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES KERN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JIM COOPER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-0618 AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff, a county prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff was given an opportunity to file an amended complaint after the first amended complaint 

was screened and found to not state any claims for relief. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff has filed a 

second amended complaint. ECF No. 11. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

“frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 

 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

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Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal 

theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 

640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as 

stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a 

constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. 

Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted). 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

“Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context 

of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 

680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal for failure 

to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain 

something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 

cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this 

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. 

Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). 

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II. Second Amended Complaint 

The second amended complaint alleges that defendant Cooper and three Doe defendants 

violated plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting him to torture. ECF 

No. 11. Plaintiff alleges that Doe 1 placed him into an ice-cold cell, causing plaintiff to 

experience chest pains. Id. at 3. When plaintiff notified Doe 1 that he felt like he was having a 

heart attack, Doe 1 just laughed. Id. Doe 1 continued to place plaintiff in freezing cold cells and 

ignored plaintiff when he pushed his emergency button and explained that he was in pain due to 

being sensitive to the cold. Id. After submitting several medical requests and grievances, 

plaintiff was moved to a medical housing unit cell that was also very cold. Does 2 and 3 ignored 

plaintiff when he told them he was sensitive to the cold, it caused him pain, and he was having 

chest pains. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff states that he wrote to defendant Cooper’s office for help several 

times. Id. 

III. Doe Defendants 

The use of fictitiously named Doe defendants is generally not favored. Gillespie v. 

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). However, amendment is allowed 

to substitute true names for fictitiously named defendants, see Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 

875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1989), and plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim against 

the three Doe defendants for deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

see Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (officer fails to protect 

a pretrial detainee when he does not act reasonably to abate substantial risk of serious harm). 

Regardless, due to the impossibility of serving an unknown individual, if plaintiff chooses 

to proceed on the complaint as screened, the court will not order service on the Doe defendants 

until plaintiff has identified them and filed either an amended complaint that names the 

defendants or a motion to substitute named defendants for the Doe defendants. Plaintiff shall 

promptly seek such information through the California Public Records Act, Calif. Gov’t. Code 

§ 6250, et seq., or other means available to plaintiff.1 If access to the required information is 

1

 Plaintiff may be able to obtain the information he through the jails grievance system or other 

administrative process. 

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denied or unreasonably delayed, plaintiff may seek judicial intervention. 

IV. Defendant Cooper 

“Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant,” 

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980)), and “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 

rights violations are not sufficient,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) 

(citations omitted). Furthermore, “[t]here is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). A supervisor may be liable 

for the constitutional violations of his subordinates if he “knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Finally, supervisory liability may also exist without 

any personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is 

a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations 

marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-38 (1970). 

Even assuming that correspondence addressed to Cooper’s office was reviewed by 

Cooper, rather than his staff, there are no allegations regarding what information plaintiff 

included, such that the correspondence would have notified Cooper of an ongoing constitutional 

violation. Plaintiff was previously advised that in order to state a claim against Cooper, he 

needed to allege facts showing Cooper’s involvement in the violations and that Cooper’s position 

as the Sacramento County Sheriff was insufficient, by itself, to make him liable. 

V. Leave to Amend 

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the complaint does not state 

cognizable claims against defendant Cooper. However, it appears that plaintiff may be able to 

allege facts to remedy this and he will be given one final opportunity to amend the complaint if he 

desires. Plaintiff may proceed forthwith against the Doe defendants, or he may amend the 

complaint. 

Plaintiff will be required to complete and return the attached notice advising the court how 

he wishes to proceed. If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, he will be given thirty days to 

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file an amended complaint. If plaintiff elects to proceed on his claims against the Doe defendants 

without amending the complaint, he will have sixty days to identify the Doe defendants for 

service. A decision to go forward without amending the complaint will be considered a 

voluntarily dismissal without prejudice of all claims against defendant Cooper. 

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named 

defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 

 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 

his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967) (citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend do not have to be re-pled 

in subsequent amended complaint to preserve appeal). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, 

any previous complaints no longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. 

VI. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 

The second amended complaint states claims against the Doe defendants but not against 

defendant Cooper. 

You have a choice to make. You may either (1) proceed immediately on your claims 

against the Doe defendants and voluntarily dismiss the other claims, or (2) try to amend the 

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complaint. If you want to go forward without amending the complaint, you will be voluntarily 

dismissing without prejudice all claims against defendant Cooper. The court will also not be able 

to serve the doe defendants until you identify them and this case may be dismissed if you are 

unable to identify any individuals for service. If you choose to file an amended complaint, it must 

include all claims you want to bring. Once an amended complaint is filed, the court will not look 

at any information in the original complaint. Any claims and information not in the third 

amended complaint will not be considered. You must complete the attached notification 

showing what you want to do and return it to the court. Once the court receives the notice, it will 

issue an order telling you what you need to do next (i.e., file an amended complaint or identify the 

Doe defendants). 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Cooper do not state claims for which relief 

can be granted. 

2. Plaintiff has the option to proceed immediately on his claims against the Doe 

defendants as set forth in Section III above, or to amend the complaint. 

3. Within fourteen days of service of this order, plaintiff shall complete and return the 

attached form notifying the court whether he wants to proceed on the screened complaint or 

whether he wants to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff does not return the form, the court 

will assume that he is choosing to proceed on the complaint as screened and will recommend 

dismissal without prejudice of all claims against defendant Cooper. 

DATED: November 7, 2023 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES KERN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JIM COOPER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-0618 AC P 

NOTICE OF ELECTION 

 Check one: 

_____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on his claims against the Doe defendants without 

amending the complaint. Plaintiff understands that by going forward without amending 

the complaint he is voluntarily dismissing without prejudice all claims against defendant 

Cooper pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). 

_____ Plaintiff wants to amend the complaint. 

DATED:_______________________ 

 

 James Kern 

 Plaintiff pro se

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