Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01207/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01207-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Laurie Leigh Wellington, by her attorney, seeks judicial review of a final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social 

Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) (the “Act”). The matter is currently before the Court on the 

parties’ cross-briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sandra M. 

Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge. Following a review of the complete record and 

applicable law, this Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based on proper legal standards.

I. Background

A. Procedural History

In December 2009, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

security income alleging an onset of disability date of December 24, 2008. The Commissioner 

initially denied the claims on July 14, 2010, and upon reconsideration again denied the claims on 

September 20, 2010. October 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing.

LAURIE LEIGH WELLINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-1207-SMS 

ORDER AFFIRMING AGENCY’S 

DENIAL OF BENEFITS AND ORDERING 

JUDGMENT FOR COMMISSIONER

(Doc. 19)

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On June 8, 2011, and represented by counsel, Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing 

presided over by Timothy S. Snelling, Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”). See 20 C.F.R. 

404.929 et seq. 

On July 22, 2011, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. The Appeals Council denied 

review on August 21, 2012. Plaintiff filed a civil action. The Commissioner stipulated to a 

voluntary remanded the case, and the Appeals Council vacated the Commissioner’s final decision. 

On February 27, 2014, and represented by counsel, Plaintiff appeared and testified at a 

second hearing before the ALJ. An impartial vocational expert, George A. Meyers (“the VE”), 

also appeared and testified. 

On April 4, 2014, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. On July 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed a 

complaint seeking this Court’s review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony – June 2011

At the time of the hearing in June 2011, Plaintiff was forty-five years old. She testified that 

she last worked in December 2008 in retail, stocking and register. She had to call in sick 

frequently because of her chest pain and anxiety. She also had pain in her shoulders, neck, arms, 

hips, and legs. She was in pain all day except for a few hours while sleeping. She was diagnosed 

with fibromyalgia and took Vicodin and baclofen for the pain. The medication reduced the pain 

for about an hour, but would get stronger after the hour. Physical activities made her pain worse. 

Plaintiff also testified that she had anxiety all the time. She would be afraid of noises, 

being alone, and hypothetical bad situations. When left alone, her heart started beating quickly and 

she could not breathe. She had chest pains and would call an ambulance. She went to the 

emergency room two to six times a month. Someone was home with her at all times. She was 

prescribed Klonopin for anxiety by her primary care provider. She did not take it every day, but 

whenever she had an anxiety attack, approximately three or four times a week. She testified that 

the medication worked immediately, but it did not remove the anxiety completely. Medication

took away the symptoms of rapid heart rate and shortness of breath. Plaintiff testified that she 

began to have anxiety in an intense disabling way around December 2008. Plaintiff had not seen a 

psychiatrist. She began seeing a therapist once a month in 2009. She did not feel that the therapy 

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sessions helped, but the therapist taught her to do breathing exercises which she continued to do. 

Plaintiff also testified that she had problems sleeping because she had bad dreams about her exhusband.

Plaintiff had three children, aged twenty-one through twenty-six, and lived with the 

younger two and a friend of one of the children. On a normal day, she gets up and does some 

dishes and other “little things,” taking rests in between. She goes grocery shopping with a friend 

or relative. Her mother helps drive her to doctor visits and to stores. She does not drive or have a 

valid driver’s license. It is painful for her to walk. 

Plaintiff worked as a certified nursing assistant from 1996 to 1999, and in retail customer 

service from 2005 to December 2008. The record indicates there were several significant gaps in 

her work history. 

C. First Disability Determination – July, 2011

After considering the evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status 

requirements of the Act on December 31, 2008. He found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date of disability. The ALJ found that Plaintiff 

had the following medically severe combination of impairments: history of acute coronary 

syndrome, fibromyalgia, polymyalgia rheumatic, hypertension, gastritis, chronic obstructive 

pulmonary disease, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety disorder with frequent palpitations.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or medically equaled the 

severity of a listed impairment. He found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work but 

could only bend, stoop, and climb ramps or stairs occasionally, should never climb ladders, ropes 

or scaffolds, and should avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants. The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had a limited ability to understand, remember or carry out complex or detailed job 

instructions and should have no more than occasional interaction with the general public. The ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work. However, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments only minimally impacted Plaintiff’s potential 

unskilled occupational base at the light exertion level, and concluded that there were other jobs 

existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. Hence, he 

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determined that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from the alleged onset date through the 

date of his decision. 

D. Additional Proceedings –February 2014

After the parties stipulated to a voluntary remand in the District Court, further proceedings 

were held in February 2014. At the hearing in February 2014, Plaintiff was forty-eight years old.

She testified that she had completed high school, graduated as a medical assistant, and received 

training to become a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”). As a CNA, she took care of people in a 

nursing home. She was required to move patients on her own, but had assistance when the people 

were very big. She injured herself once when a patient buckled his knees and she carried him to 

the wheelchair. 

Around December 2008, Plaintiff was working in retail customer service in a department 

store. She was calling in sick because she was having a lot of anxiety attacks and was in the 

hospital often. It was also becoming too difficult to hold up her arms. Her employer put her on 

medical leave, but she continued to get worse. Her employer contacted her and informed her they 

were terminating her employment. She tried taking classes at a junior college in 2009 but it was 

too difficult for her to sit and type or work at the desk.

Plaintiff testified that fibromyalgia caused her to be foggy in the mornings and caused pain 

all day in her head, neck, shoulders, arms, back, hips, and legs. She would take her medication and 

use heating pads. She was taking Vicodin, hydrocodone, baclofen, and ibuprofen. The medications 

made the pain bearable, but did not take it all away. She had drowsiness from fibromyalgia and the 

medications. She slept every few hours and lied on a heating pad on and off all day. Plaintiff 

testified that her doctor told her to be careful and know her limits. He did not recommend surgery. 

Plaintiff testified that her back pain limited her ability to stand, sit, lift, and do chores. She could 

only sit for fifteen minutes before lying down on the heating pad due to pain. She could stand for 

fifteen to twenty minutes before the pain caused her to need to lie down. She could lift no more 

than ten pounds. 

Plaintiff testified that she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), 

anxiety, and memory problems. PTSD affected her by causing fear, and a dislike of dealing with 

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people and situations. She testified that she had an anxiety attack for fifteen to twenty minutes 

every day. During an anxiety attack, she could not breathe, her heart beat quickly, and she became 

sweaty, dizzy, and weak. She was not taking medication for anxiety at that time because she had 

not found one that worked for her. Plaintiff had a chemical sensitivity which caused adverse 

reactions, such as diarrhea and vomiting, to medications. She saw her primary care physician and 

therapist once a month, but occasionally forgot her appointments and would see them the next 

month. She would forget her appointments and medications. Her sons helped her remember 

things. 

Plaintiff lived with her son and two of her friends. She spent time with her grandchildren 

and her son every day. She could not vacuum or sweep, but could do some dishes here and there 

and wash and fold laundry. Her son carried the laundry. Plaintiff made food for herself, such as 

mashed potatoes or baked chicken. 

Plaintiff did not trust people, and her lack of trust worsened in about 2008. She once had a 

gun pulled on her while working, and was robbed while she was at work. Plaintiff believed she 

could not work because she would be in pain all day long and she had anxiety. 

E. Vocational Expert Testimony

At the February 2014 hearing, the VE classified Plaintiff’s past work as nurse assistant

(DOT # 355.674-014, medium, SVP 4, performed at very heavy) and labor store for retail (DOT # 

922.687-058, medium, SVP 2). The ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical person who was 

between forty-three and forty-eight years old, with a twelfth-grade education and some vocational 

training in the convalescent home nursing field, and past work experience characterized by the 

VE. The hypothetical person was restricted to light work with no climbing ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolding; occasional stooping, crouching, crawling, and kneeling; no concentrated exposure to 

temperature extremes, hazards, and pulmonary irritants; occasional face to face interaction with 

the general public; occasional ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex and detailed 

instructions; and occasional performing jobs in a cooperative team setting. The VE testified that 

such person could not perform Plaintiff’s past work. After clarifying that an elderly person in the 

home is not considered the public, the VE opined that this hypothetical person could perform the 

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position of companion (DOT # 309.677-010, light, SVP 3), production assembler (DOT # 

706.687.010, light, SVP 2), office help (DOT # 239.567-010, light SVP 2), and inspector/hand 

packer (DOT # 559.687-074). These jobs had significant numbers in the State and national 

economy.

The ALJ then directed the VE to assume a second hypothetical person with the same 

limitations as the first, but with the additional limitation that, due to pain and psychiatric 

symptoms, the individual would be unable to complete a normal work day or work week up to 

seven days per quarter. The VE could not name any jobs that such a person could perform. 

For the third hypothetical, Plaintiff’s counsel directed the VE to consider an individual 

with the same limitations as the first hypothetical person but also had a moderate limitation in the 

ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, moderate limitation in the ability to carry 

out detailed instructions, moderate limitation in the ability to work in coordination or proximity to 

others without being distracted by them, and a moderate limitation in the ability to complete a 

normal work day and work week without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms. 

“Moderate” was defined as an obvious limitation to others. The VE opined that this third 

hypothetical person would not be able to maintain or sustain employment in the national economy.

For the fourth hypothetical, Plaintiff’s counsel also began with the same limitations as the 

first hypothetical person, but added difficulties performing detailed or complex tasks in a work 

setting, difficulties with regular attendance and consistent participation due to complaints of pain 

and anxiety, and difficulties working a normal work day and work week because of complaints 

and anxiety. This hypothetical person was capable of performing simple, repetitive tasks and 

following simple, verbal instructions from supervisors, but may have had some difficulties getting 

along with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public, and may need special or additional 

supervision to help manage interpersonal relationships in a work setting. The VE agreed that this 

hypothetical person would not be able to perform the additional jobs previously identified. 

F. Second Disability Determination – April 2014

In his second decision, the ALJ again found that Plaintiff met the insured status 

requirements through December 31, 2008 and that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

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activity since the alleged onset date of disability. In addition to the medically severe combination 

of impairments he found in his July 2011 decision, the ALJ found that, between the alleged date of 

onset of disability and during the period adjudicated, Plaintiff also had the following medically 

severe combination of impairments: degenerative disc disease of the thoracolumbar spine, panic 

disorder, dependent personality disorder, a history of transient ischemic attack, a history of chronic 

pain syndrome, a brief history of hypotension, non-displaced oblique fracture of the left foot, 

myalgia and myositis, and a bipolar disorder, manic, not otherwise specified. The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed 

impairment. 

The ALJ found that, prior to May 26, 2010, Plaintiff had largely the same RFC he 

determined in his July 2011 decision. The ALJ made a few clarifications and added that Plaintiff 

could perform jobs involving individual effort, but could no more than occasionally perform jobs 

in a cooperative team setting. 

The ALJ found that, beginning May 26, 2010, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a 

substantially reduced range of light work. He found that her RFC was the same as it had been prior 

to May 26, 2010, but, due to pain, psychiatric symptoms, and anxiety attacks, Plaintiff was unable 

to complete a normal workday or workweek up to seven days per quarter. 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work. The ALJ 

found that prior to May 26, 2010 there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant could have performed, but, beginning on May 26, 2010, that there were 

no jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform.

Hence, he determined that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to May 26, 2010, but became disabled 

on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of the decision. Thus, Plaintiff was 

not under a disability at any time through the date last insured –December 31, 2008. 

II. Legal Standard

A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if she is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

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mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a) 

(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment(s) must result from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically 

accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity that the 

claimant is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering her age, education, 

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that exists in the 

national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D). 

To encourage uniformity in decision making, the Commissioner has promulgated 

regulations prescribing a five-step sequential process for evaluating an alleged disability. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f); 416.920 (a)-(f). In the five-step sequential review process, the burden 

of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, but shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Id. at 

1098–99; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

In the first step of the analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently 

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, in the 

second step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a 

combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. Id. 

§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the third step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the requirements of 

the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If 

not, in the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC, despite 

the impairment or various limitations to perform his past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If 

not, in step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform 

other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 

416.920(g).

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B. Standard of Review

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny benefits under the Act. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper 

legal standards. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). If an ALJ 

applied the proper legal standards and the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, 

this Court must uphold the ALJ’s determination that the claimant is not disabled. See, e.g., Ukolov 

v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 104 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial 

evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Ryan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1998 (9th Cir. 2008). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 

2005). Where the evidence as a whole can support either outcome, the Court may not substitute its 

judgment for the ALJ’s, rather, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. Id. 

III. Discussion

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to make a legally sound determination of the 

disability onset date. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ found the onset date to be May 26, 2010 

because that was the date of her consultation with examining psychiatrist Philip M. Cushman, 

PhD., who noted substantial work limitations. Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff’s symptoms noted in 

Dr. Cushman’s opinion did not “magically appear” on the date of her examination, and that a 

medical expert should have been called, or further proceedings were necessary, to determine an 

unclear disability onset date. 

The Commissioner argues that prior to May 26, 2010, Plaintiff sought treatment primarily 

for physical ailments and the evidence failed to establish that she had disabling limitations that 

precluded her from working. The Commissioner further argues that the ALJ properly found that 

Plaintiff began having credible subjective complaints beginning May 26, 2010, after which she 

reported an increase in symptoms and received regular specialized mental health care.

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A. Applicable Law

Plaintiff must establish her disability began before her date last insured. 20 CFR § 404.131. 

Plaintiff was last insured on December 31, 2008. 

When an impairment is slowly progressive, precisely determining the onset date, or the 

date the impairment became disabling, may be impossible, and must be inferred from the medical 

and other evidence that describe the history and symptomatology of the disease process, including 

the applicant’s allegations and work history. SSR 83-20, 1983 SSR LEXIS 25. The ALJ’s 

judgment how long the impairment existed at a disabling level of severity must have a legitimate 

medical basis. Id. Determining the proper onset date is particularly difficult when the alleged onset 

and date last worked are far in the past and adequate medical records are not available. Id. “When 

the onset of disability must be inferred because a definite onset date cannot be determined from 

the medical evidence in the record, the ALJ must obtain expert testimony.” Moon v. Colvin, 542 

Fed. Appx. 646, 647 (9th Cir. 2013).

B. Relevant Medical Record

Plaintiff’s appeal alleges disability based on psychiatric impairments and symptoms. 

Hence, Plaintiff’s history of physical impairments will not be thoroughly discussed in this order. 

In June 2008, Plaintiff began complaining of anxiety to her primary health care provider at 

Emmanuel Medical Center. AR 381. She was prescribed medication for acute anxiety in October 

2008. AR 363. She continued to consistently complain of anxiety through 2009 at Golden Valley 

Health Center. In December 2008, Plaintiff was hospitalized heart palpitations and chest pain. It 

was determined that her symptoms were not cardiac in nature. AR 382. Upon discharge, Plaintiff 

was advised to see a neurologist and a gastroenterologist, but not a mental health care 

professional. AR 383. During 2008 and 2009, Plaintiff visited her primary care provider almost 

monthly with complaints of pain and anxiety. See AR 263-517. However, her chief complaints 

were usually back and body pain, and not all appointments identified complaints of mental health 

symptoms. Plaintiff reported that medication helped her pain and anxiety symptoms. There were 

also several periods when Plaintiff was not consistently taking her medication. Plaintiff did not see 

a mental health care professional until May 2010, when she referred for a consultative 

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psychological examination by Philip M. Cushman, PhD., a clinical psychologist, by the 

Department of Social Services (“DSS”). After this appointment, Plaintiff began seeing Pete 

Thompson, L.C.S.W. in June 2010. AR 630. She continued to see him occasionally through 2013. 

In his written report, Dr. Cushman discussed Plaintiff’s family and medical history. He 

noted that she was taking Klonopin over the past year but had not taken it for a month. He noted 

that she said she talked to a therapist at Golden Valley who helped her manage her PTSD. Dr. 

Cushman diagnosed Plaintiff with sexual abuse as a child, physical and sexual abuse as an adult, 

PTSD, pain disorder associated with both psychological factors and a general medical condition, 

polysubstance dependence in full remission, and dependent personality disorder. He also noted 

psychosocial stressors of unemployment and history of abuse. He noted that Plaintiff would 

benefit from ongoing outpatient psychiatric treatment in the form of antidepressant medications 

and supportive counseling. Dr. Cushman opined that Plaintiff would have difficulties with regular 

attendance and consistent participation, as well as working a normal day or work week, because of 

complaints of pain, anxiety, and malaise. He noted that she would have some difficulties dealing 

with the usual stressors encountered in a work environment. He opined that she may need special 

or additional supervision to help her manage interpersonal relationships in the work setting.

C. Analysis

It is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate disability prior to the date last insured. Here, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff was not under a disability at any time through December 31, 2008, the date last 

insured. The ALJ properly found that the record does not contain any specialized mental health 

care notes during 2008. The record shows that Plaintiff regularly sought medical care for her pain 

and anxiety, but did not seek and was not referred to a psychiatrist or therapist until May 2010, 

when she was referred by DDS based on her claims of disabling mental health symptoms. The

ALJ also correctly noted that there are very few clinical findings prior to May 2010 that indicate 

that Plaintiff was disabled due to psychiatric symptoms or impairments. No health care provider 

noted any limitations based on her anxiety or mental health symptoms. Other than medication, 

there is no evidence in the record that further treatment was recommended or sought. Plaintiff was 

also inconsistent with taking her mediation, including during the time of her examination with Dr. 

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Cushman. 

In addition, the ALJ noted that, during the relevant time period, Plaintiff was essentially 

independent in self-care, and had some ability to perform household chores. She handled her own 

finances. She spent time with family members and went out alone. She stated that she could pay 

attention and follow written instructions adequately. These contentions are also supported by the 

record. Plaintiff also stated in her function report in March 2010 that she was able to follow 

written instructions and that she had no problems paying attention. AR 214. She also noted that 

she got along well with authority figures. Therefore, based on the medical record and the evidence 

provided by Plaintiff, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff was not under a disability at any time 

through December 31, 2008. 

Plaintiff’s only issue on appeal is that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s disability onset 

date to be May 26, 2010 without calling a medical expert. However, the specific disability onset 

date is immaterial in this case, where the ALJ made a separate and distinct finding that Plaintiff 

was not under a disability at any time through December 31, 2008. As discussed, this finding is 

supported by the record. Overall, the ALJ properly considered the evidence before him in making 

his finding that Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant time period between the alleged 

onset date and the date last insured. Further proceedings to determine the precise disability onset 

date are not required. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ applied appropriate legal standards 

and that substantial credible evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not 

disabled during the relevant time period. Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s 

appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of 

Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2016 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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