Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01996/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01996-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL VARGAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

AT&T,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-01996 CRB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Daniel Vargas previously was an employee of the Pacific Bell Telephone

Company (“PBTC”). During his employment with PBTC, Plaintiff was a member of the

Communication Workers of America (“CWA”). In April of 1999, PBTC terminated

Plaintiff’s employment.

Seven years later, in February of 2006, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in San Mateo Superior

Court challenging his termination. His former employer removed the case to federal court,

on the basis that Plaintiff’s complaint set forth both federal and state-law claims. This Court

dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims with prejudice, finding that they were time-barred. The

Court dismissed Plaintiff’s state-law claims without prejudice. See Vargas v. SBC

Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-2030 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2006).

In March of 2007, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in San Mateo Superior Court. 

Purporting to eschew any federal clams, and explicitly pointing to this Court’s suggestion

Case 3:07-cv-01996-CRB Document 27 Filed 06/11/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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that he pursue his state-law claims in state court if he believed them to have merit, Plaintiff

filed an “amended case” that set forth, among other items, causes of action for “defamation,”

“slander,” and “libel.” Defendant removed the case to federal court, arguing that all of

Plaintiff’s state-law claims are preempted by federal law and that Plaintiff failed to plead

them sufficiently.

Notwithstanding its previous suggestion that Plaintiff might pursue his state-law

claims in state court, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s state-law claims are preempted by

federal law. Under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act a state-law claim is

preempted by federal law if it is based on the “violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185. Not all state-law claims are preempted,

however. Compare Tellez v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding

state-law defamation claims not preempted), with Shane v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d

1057 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding state-law defamation claims preempted). The test for

preemption is whether the theory of the state-law claims is “independent of any right

established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim[s] is inextricably

intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.

Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).

Here, Plaintiff’s theory is that Defendant continues to defame, libel, and slander him

by telling his prospective employers that it considers him “not re-hireable.” According to

Plaintiff, he has been questioned by several potential employers about the circumstances of

his termination at PBTC, and he has had great difficulty finding a job due to Defendant’s

description of him. In challenging Defendant’s actions, however, Plaintiff claims that

Defendant has improperly and unfairly labeled him “not re-hireable.” This claim rests on

Plaintiff’s theory that Defendant failed to follow the agreed-upon grievance procedure,

violated the terms of his union’s collective bargaining agreement with PBTC, and thereby

wrongfully terminated him. The “amended complaint” that Plaintiff originally filed in state

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United States District Court

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1 See Decl. of Laura N. Monfredini in Support of Removal, Ex. A, at 5 (“I also believe

that they’re MAY-BE another violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBR) that the

Labor Union – Communication Workers of America (CWA) has with AT&T.); id. at 5 (“The

legal term of consideration should be upheld and enforced due to the fact that my Collective

Bargaining Agreement Wrongful Termination Grievance was never completed thus my

termination was not proven to be valid or Just as required by the Collective Bargaining

Agreement.”); id. at 6-7 (“[M]y grievance was left and is still pending thus to be re-opened as

required by the Collective Bargaining Agreement or AT LEAST a De-Fault ruling be ruled and

there by ruling my termination as a WRONGFUL Termination and thus therefore I am ReHirable.”); id. at 7 (“I believe that both Defendants had ample time to complete the Wrongful

Termination Grievance and since neither did then it is FAIR and JUST and in the interest of

JUSTICE to enter a ruling that my WRONGFUL Termination be upheld via on a grounds of a

DEFAULT RULING against both defendants for not bothering with my grievance as required

by the Collective Bargaining Agreement.”).

G:\CRBALL\2007\1996\order2.wpd 3

court refers to the collective bargaining agreement, and Defendant’s alleged violation of it,

numerous times.1

It is therefore clear that Plaintiff’s state-law claims rest on a challenge to Defendant’s

compliance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, and that adjudication of

those claims would require this Court to interpret the terms of that agreement. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s causes of action for defamations, libel, and slander are “inextricably intertwined

with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213. 

Accordingly, those claims are preempted and must be dismissed. Shane, 868 F.2d at 1063. 

For this reason, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss

is GRANTED. Because the Court has previously ruled that Plaintiff’s federal claims

challenging his termination are time-barred, the state-law claims are DISMISSED with

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 11, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-01996-CRB Document 27 Filed 06/11/07 Page 3 of 3