Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-16487/USCOURTS-ca9-11-16487-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANGEL LOPEZ-VALENZUELA; ISAAC

CASTRO-ARMENTA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF MARICOPA; JOSEPH M.

ARPAIO, Maricopa County Sheriff,

in his official capacity; WILLIAM G.

MONTGOMERY, Maricopa County

Attorney, in his official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-16487

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-00660-

SRB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 19, 2012—San Francisco, California

Filed June 18, 2013

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Richard C. Tallman,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman;

Dissent by Judge Fisher

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2 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

and partial Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of a class action

challenging Proposition 100, a ballot measure passed by

Arizona voters that amended the state constitution to preclude

bail for certain serious felony offenses if the person charged

has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if

the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the charge.

The panel held that the Arizona Legislature and Arizona

voters passed Proposition 100 and its implementing statute

and rules to further the state’s legitimate and compelling

interest in seeing that those accused of serious state-law

crimes are brought to trial. The panel concluded that

Plaintiffs-Appellants had not succeeded in raising triable

issues of fact as to whether Proposition 100 and its

implementing procedures violate the substantive and

procedural due process guarantees of the United States

Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, the Excessive Bail

Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel, nor whether the Proposition 100 laws are

preempted by federal immigration law. 

Dissenting, Judge Fisher stated that Proposition 100’s

legislative history and scope revealed that Arizona is plainly

using the denial of bail as a method to punish “illegal”

immigrants, rather than simply as a tool to help manage

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 3

arrestees’ flight risk. He stated that this bail-denial scheme

contravenes the Constitution’s fundamental prohibition on

punishment before a determination of guilt in a criminal trial.

COUNSEL

Cecillia D. Wang (argued) and Kenneth J. Sugarman,

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants’

Rights Project, San Francisco, California; Andre I. Segura

and Esha Bhandari, American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project, New York, New

York; Daniel Pochoda, American Civil Liberties Foundation

of Arizona, Phoenix, Arizona, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Timothy J. Casey (argued), Schmitt Schneck Smyth Casey &

Even, P.C., Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees

Maricopa County and Joseph M. Arpaio.

Bruce P. White and Anne C. Longo, Deputy County

Attorneys, Maricopa County Civil Services Division,

Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellee William

Montgomery.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

In 2006, Arizona voters overwhelmingly approved an

amendment to their state constitution known as “Proposition

100.” It commands that Arizona state courts may not set bail

“[f]or serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature

if the person charged has entered or remained in the United

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4 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

States illegally and if the proof is evident or the presumption

great as to the present charge.” Ariz. Const. art. II,

§ 22(A)(4) (as amended). Felony arrestee plaintiffs Angel

Lopez-Valenzuela and Isaac Castro-Armenta filed a class

action in the United States District Court for Arizona seeking

declaratory, injunctive, and habeas relief challenging the

constitutionality of Proposition 100 and its implementing

statute and rules. They argue that the new criminal

procedures violate the substantive and procedural due process

guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Excessive Bail

Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel. They further claim that the Arizona law is

preempted by federal immigration law. The district court

granted summary judgment and partial dismissal in favor of

the Arizona state officials named in the suit. We affirm.

I

Voters approved the November 2, 2006, ballot measure

by a margin of 78 percent to 22 percent. Prior to passage of

Proposition 100, Article II, Section 22 set forth several

exceptions to the general presumption that persons charged

with crimes are entitled to bail. These exceptions were for

particularly serious offenses such as murder or sexual abuse

of children or other indicia of dangerousness. To ensure the

defendant’s presence throughout his criminal prosecution,

amended Article II, Section 22 now provides that no bail may

be set “[f]or serious felony offenses as prescribed by the

legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in

the United States illegally and if the proof is evident or the

presumption great as to the present charge.” Ariz. Const. art.

II, § 22(A)(4). Proposition 100 does not contain a definition

of “serious felony offense.” To make that determination we

must look to the general laws of Arizona. Prior to

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 5

Proposition 100’s passage, the Arizona Legislature passed

House Bill 2580, defining “serious felony offense,” should

Proposition 100 be adopted by the electorate, as any Class 1,

2, 3, or 4 felony or aggravated driving-under-the-influence

offense. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3961(A)(5)(b).

In the early days after Proposition 100’s enactment there

was confusion over the standard of proof that should apply to

the determination of immigration status for bail purposes

during an initial appearance (“IA”).1 Some IA commissioners

were applying a “proof evident/presumption great” standard

to both the criminal charge and the immigration status

determination. To resolve the uncertainty, on April 3, 2007,

the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court issued

Administrative Order 2007-30. Admin. Order No. 2007-30,

available at http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/22/admorder/

orders07/2007-30.pdf (last visited June 10, 2013). The Order

set the standard of proof for IA immigration status

determinations as probable cause. Id. But the Order also

directed that if a commissioner found probable cause to

believe that a defendant had entered or remained in the

United States illegally, a follow-up evidentiary hearing on

whether bail should be denied was to be held within

twenty-four hours. Id. At that hearing, known as a

 

1

 A person arrested for a felony crime in Arizona must be taken before

a judicial officer for an initial review to ascertain probable cause to justify

the arrest (if made by a peace officer without an arrest warrant) and to

make a preliminary determination as to whether the person will be

detained or released on various conditions. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 4.1, 4.2. 

The task inMaricopa County is routinely handled by court commissioners. 

See Superior Court Criminal Department, THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF

ARIZONA, MARICOPA COUNTY, http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/

SuperiorCourt/CriminalDepartment/innovation.asp#a (last visited June 10,

2013).

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6 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

Simpson/Segura hearing,

2

defendants would be “entitled to

representation bycounsel, and to present evidence, testimony,

and witnesses, by proffer or otherwise, to provide evidence

on the defendant’s behalf.” Id. The standard of proof for

immigration status at the Simpson/Segura hearing was to be

the “proof evident/presumption great” standard. Id.

Before Administrative Order 2007-30 could be

implemented, however, the Arizona Legislature passed

Senate Bill 1265, codifying the probable cause standard for

the immigration status determination. Ariz. R. Crim. P.

7.2(b). In the wake of the Bill’s passage, the Chief Justice

rescinded Administrative Order 2007-30 and adopted

amendments to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

recognizing the probable cause standard for immigration

status determinations. See Segura, 196 P.3d at 840 (detailing

the historyofProposition 100, Administrative Order 2007-30,

and Senate Bill 1265). The current Rules now provide that

the bail determination must be made at the initial appearance,

that “any party” may move for a reexamination of release

conditions imposed at the initial appearance, and that a

hearing on such motion “shall be held on the record as soon

as practicable but not later than seven days after filing of the

motion.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 7.4(b).

Plaintiff-Appellant AngelLopez-Valenzuela was arrested

and charged with the crime of dangerous drug transportation

and/or offer to sell, a Class 2 felony under Arizona criminal

law. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3407(A)(7). Because the IA

commissioner found probable cause to believe him to be in

the United States illegally, he was denied bail pursuant to the

2

Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); Segura v.

Cunanan, 196 P.3d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 7

Proposition 100 laws. Plaintiff-Appellant Isaac CastroArmenta was arrested and charged with Class 2, 3, and 4

felonies including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,

kidnaping, and assisting a criminal syndicate. Probable cause

was also found to believe that Castro-Armenta was in the

United States illegally and he too was denied bail under

Proposition 100.

The two arrestees then filed a combined class action

complaint and habeas corpus petition seeking declaratoryand

injunctive relief to strike down the Proposition 100 laws and

to restrain the state’s bail enforcement policies and practices. 

The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify their

lawsuit as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23(b)(2), and by the same order granted

Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss their claim that

Proposition 100 was preempted by federal immigration laws. 

Lopez-Valenzuela v. Maricopa County, No. 08-00660 (D.

Ariz. Dec. 9, 2008) (order certifying class and granting partial

dismissal).3 The parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment on the remaining claims and the district court

entered final judgment granting Defendants’ motion as to five

of the remaining six counts in their Complaint. The court

subsequently dismissed without prejudice (per Plaintiffs’

request) the final count addressing the Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination.4 Lopez-Valenzuela v. Maricopa

3 The class was defined as “[a]ll persons who have been or will be

ineligible for release on bond by an Arizona state court in Maricopa

County pursuant to Section 22(A)(4) of the Arizona Constitution and

A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(5).”

 

4

 The Fifth Amendment claim is not before us on appeal.

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8 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

County, No. 08-00660 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2011) (order

granting summary judgment and dismissal).

II

We review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of

summary judgment. Russell Country Sportsmen v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 668 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). We also

review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cousins v.

Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). We review a

challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de novo as well. 

United States v. Gonzales, 307 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 2002).

A

We must first determine whether Proposition 100 bail

laws create an impermissible scheme of punishment in

violation of the federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause. 

We evaluate substantive due process challenges to bail

statutes under the framework articulated in United States v.

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). The Supreme Court there

instructed us that “[t]o determine whether a restriction on

liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible

regulation, we first look to legislative intent.” Id. at 747. 

Absent an express intent on the part of the legislature to

punish, “the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on whether

an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally

be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears

excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.” 

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In other

words, under this two-pronged approach, even where a

legislature does not express a clear punitive intent a bail

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 9

regulation may still be unconstitutional if it is excessive in

relation to its legitimate alternative purpose.

The Arizona Legislature made no formal findings on the

purpose of Proposition 100. Absent such findings, courts can

look to the legislative record as well as to statements made in

election materials circulated to the voters who approved it to

determine legislative intent. See City of Cuyahoga Falls v.

Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 196–97 (2003). 

Having reviewed all of the evidence, we are convinced, as

was the district court, that the record as a whole does not

show that Proposition 100 was motivated by an improper

punitive purpose.

It is undisputed that during committee hearings on the

Proposition 100 laws, several legislators made statements

about controlling illegal immigration. For example, thenRepresentative Russell Pearce, the sponsor of the Proposition

100 bill, speaking in a March 2005 Arizona Senate Judiciary

Committee hearing, stated: “[B]ad enough you’re illegal but

you commit a serious crime you ought not to be bondable

unless you’re released after prosecution, after you do your

time to ICE and then to be deported. In fact, all illegal aliens

in this country ought to be detained, debriefed and deported.” 

Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting on H.B. 2389, Mar. 28,

2005, 47th Leg., 1st Regular Sess. (Ariz. 2005). Senator Jack

Harper, speaking at the same hearing, declared: “[W]hat part

of illegal don’t we understand? Illegal aliens shouldn’t be

able to get bond for anything let alone a Class 1, 2, or 3

felony.” Id. However, in this March 28 committee meeting

alone, Pearce mentioned flight risk and public safety as the

primary reasons behind the Proposition 100 laws three

different times. For example:

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10 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

The aim of the bill is to keep those folks who

are a threat to our society, again there’s

several criteria for release on bail as you know

currently. . . . This simply adds to that criteria

because one of the risks, one of the factors

involv[ed] in setting bond currently is flight

risk. If you are not in this country legally and

have no roots . . . their flight risk is a much

greater risk.

Id.

Representative Pearce again discussed flight risk during

a House Floor Meeting. House Floor Meeting on H.B. 2580,

Mar. 7, 2006, 47th Leg., 2nd Regular Sess. (Ariz. 2006). He

mentioned flight risk and public safety five times during the

June 7, 2007, House Floor Meeting on the companion Senate

Bill. House Floor Meeting on S.B. 1265, June 7, 2007, 48th

Leg., 1st Regular Sess. (Ariz. 2007). Other Representatives

mentioned flight risk and public safety as motiving factors

three more times in the same legislative meeting. Thus, while

it is clear from the record that Arizona lawmakers were

concerned with the effects of illegal immigration when they

were debating the Proposition 100 laws, a fair reading of the

record does not support Plaintiffs-Appellants’ argument that

Proposition 100’s primary purpose is to punish and deter

immigration offenses.5

5 The dissent suggests that Plaintiffs-Appellants need not “prove that

punishment was the sole or even the predominant purpose of the

legislation” in order for us to hold that it is impermissibly punitive. 

Dissent at 42, n.2. Not only are the cases cited for this proposition not on

point, but the dissent fails to acknowledge the presumption of

constitutionality which we are required to apply. See Flemming v. Nestor,

363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (“We observe initially that only the clearest

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 11

Nor do the materials provided to voters demonstrate a

clear punitive purpose. The official voter information guide

contained four statements in favor and one against

Proposition 100. Publicity Pamphlet Issued by Janice K.

Brewer, then Arizona Secretary of State, Ballot Propositions

&Judicial Performance Review,GeneralElection, November

7, 2006, 13–14, available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/

2006/info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop100.htm. A statement

by Don Goldwater, a candidate for Arizona Governor reads

in part: “This Ballot Measure addresses one area that needs to

be resolved in this fight to secure our borders and reduce the

level of crime in our neighborhoods.” Id. at 14. But a

statement byRepresentative Pearce reads: “With few real ties

to the community and often completely undocumented by

state agencies, any illegal aliens can easily escape prosecution

for law breaking simply because they are so difficult to

locate.” Id. at 13. The Maricopa County Attorney wrote:

“Far too many illegal immigrants accused of serious crimes

have jumped bail and slipped across the border in order to

avoid justice in an Arizona courtroom.” Id. at 13–14. The

other supporting statements also invoked “flight risk.” See id.

On balance, we agree with the district court that the ballot

proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on [the

ground that it is motivated by a punitive purpose]. . . . [T]he presumption

of constitutionality with which this enactment, like any other, comes to us

forbids us lightly to choose that reading of the statute’s setting which will

invalidate it over that which will save it. It is not on slight implication and

vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have

transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void.”) (citation,

alteration marks, and internal quotation marks omitted); Alaska Packers

Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 543 (1935) (applying

“the presumption of constitutionality which attaches to every state

statute”).

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12 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

materials to which voters were exposed are, at best, arguably

neutral on the question of punitive intent.

Likewise, the media coverage of Proposition 100 leading

up to the November 2006 election cited in the record does not

establish a punitive purpose. Although one Arizona

newspaper piece described Proposition 100 as one of “a

foursome of ballot measures aimed at curbing illegal

immigration,” Brady McCombs, Four Propositions on

Entrants Out in Front, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Oct. 29, 2006, at

B2, another editorial stated that “An illegal immigrant is,

without a doubt, a high [flight] risk because of the ability to

come and go out of the country when they please.” Moses

Sanchez, Research Immigration Issues Before Voting, ARIZ.

REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 2006, at 19. And in the same video where

a CNN correspondent discussed “four ballot measures that

will further crack down on illegal aliens in the state,” the

Maricopa County Attorney said: “Well, Arizona has a

tremendous problem with illegal immigrants coming into the

state, committing serious crimes, and then absconding, and

not facing trial for their crimes, either because they jump bail

after they are let out, or because, when they are let out on

bail, the federal government deports them.” Lou Dobbs

Tonight (CNN television broadcast Oct. 13, 2006). 

Reviewing the record, neither the legislative history nor the

voter materials and media coverage would support the

argument that Proposition 100 was motivated by a punitive

rather than a regulatory purpose. Proposition 100 survives

the first prong of the Salerno substantive due process test.

B

The second prong of the Salerno substantive due process

test asks that we examine whether Proposition 100 is

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 13

excessive in relation to its legitimate alternative purpose. 

481 U.S. at 747. Proposition 100’s legitimate—indeed its

compelling—purpose is ensuring that defendants remain in

the United States to stand trial for alleged felony violations of

Arizona’s criminal laws. Thus, the correct inquiry under

Salerno is whether Proposition 100 is “reasonably related to

[the] legitimate governmental objective” of controlling the

flight risk of defendants accused of certain state-law felonies. 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). We hold that it is.

Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that Proposition 100 is

excessive in relation to its goal because it precludes any

individualized determinations of flight risk and covers a

broad range of offenses, including some that might result in

non-custodial sentences. In essence, they argue, a

Proposition 100 status determination serves as a proxy for an

individualized finding of flight risk because while a defendant

held nonbondable under Proposition 100 can seek an

individualized Simpson/Segura hearing, the judicial officer

will determine only that there is proof evident or presumption

great that the defendant committed a Class 1 through 4 felony

and probable cause to believe that the defendant entered or

remained in the country illegally. See Segura, 196 P.3d at

843 (explaining that “Simpson identified what is necessary to

fully litigate a no-bail determination”); Simpson v. Owens,

85 P.3d 478, 494 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (“Arizona law does

not require that a risk of flight or a risk of recidivism be

considered before bail is denied.”).6

 

6

 The dissent compares the denial of bail in this context to the removal

by the state of an unwed father’s children after the death of their mother. 

We think it worth noting that an irrebuttable presumption that all unwed

fathers are unsuitable parents is hardly in the same category as Arizona’s

studied decision to withhold bail from those the government has shown by

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14 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

Denial of bail without individualized consideration of

flight risk or dangerousness is not unusual. After all, the vast

majority of states categorically deny the right to bail to

persons charged with capital crimes, and at least eight states

categorically deny bail to those charged with crimes

punishable by life imprisonment.7 Missouri has a bail

a proof evident/presumption great standard have committed Class 1

through 4 state-law felonies.

7

See Ala. Const. art. I, § 16; Alaska Const. art. I, § 11; Ark. Const. art.

2, § 8; Cal. Const. art. I, § 12; Colo. Const. art. II, § 19; Conn. Const. art.

I, § 8; Del. Const. art. I, § 12; Fla. Const. art. I, § 14 (categorical denial of

bail to those charged “with a capital offense or an offense punishable by

life imprisonment”); Idaho Const. art. I, § 6; Ill. Const. art. I, § 9

(categorical denial of bail to those charged with a capital offense or

offense punishable by life imprisonment); Ind. Const. art. 1, § 17

(categorical denial of bail to those charged with “murder or treason”);

Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 9; Ky. Const. § 16; La. Const. art. I, § 18; Me.

Const. art. I, § 10 (categorical denial of bail for “any of the crimes which

now are, or have been denominated capital offenses since the adoption of

the Constitution . . . whatever the punishment of the crimes may be”);

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, § 20D (categorical denial of bail to those

charged with a capital offense or offense punishable by life

imprisonment); Mich. Const. art. I, § 15 (categorical denial of bail for

charges ofmurder,treason, repeat violent felonies, and felonies committed

while out on bail, probation, or parole for a prior violent felony); Minn.

Const. art. I, § 7; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 29; Mo. Const. art I, § 20; Neb.

Const. art. I, § 9 (categorical denial of bail for murder, treason, and rape);

Nev. Const. art. 1, § 7 (categorical denial of bail to those charged with a

capital offense or offense punishable by life imprisonment); N.H. Rev.

Stat. § 597:1-c (categorical denial of bail for any offense “punishable by

up to life in prison”); N.J. Const. art. I, § 11; N.M. Const. art. II, § 13;

N.D. Const. art. I, § 11; Ohio Const. art. I, § 9; Okla. Const. art. 2, § 8; Or.

Const. art. I, § 14 (murder and treason); Pa. Const. art. I, § 14 (capital

offenses or offenses punishable by life imprisonment); R.I. Const. art. I,

§ 9 (offenses punishable by life imprisonment, offenses involving

dangerous weapons by defendants previously convicted of other offenses,

and certain controlled substance offenses); S.C. Const. art. I, §15 (capital

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 15

provision similar to Arizona’s Proposition 100 laws whereby

judges are to presume that no set of bail conditions can

reasonably assure a defendant’s appearance if the judge

reasonably believes that the defendant “is an alien unlawfully

present in the United States.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.470(2). 

Defendants held without bail under Missouri’s statute are

given the opportunity to prove their lawful presence in the

United States but if unable to do so are held without bail,

irrespective of any individualized considerations of flight

risk. Id. Arizona’s Proposition 100 laws, therefore, are

neither unprecedented nor unique.

Many states deny bail for those accused of a wide range

of offenses (including certain drug offenses, sexual assault

offenses, crimes of violence, and repeat felonies) after an

individualized showing of flight risk or dangerousness,8yet

offenses, offenses punishable by life imprisonment, and certain violent

offenses); Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15; Utah Const. art. I, § 8 (capital

offenses, felony offenses committed while out on bail, probation, or parole

for prior felony offense); Wash. Const. art. I, § 20; Wyo. Const. art. 1,

§ 14.

 

8

 California’s constitution is illustrative:

A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties,

except for:

. . . (b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on

another person, or felony sexual assault offenses on

another person, when the facts are evident or the

presumption great and the court finds based upon clear

and convincing evidence that there is a substantial

likelihood the person’s release would result in great

bodily harm to others.”

Cal. Const. art. I, § 12.

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not all states require such individualized determinations. 

Notably, Arizona is one of the states that categorically denies

bail to persons charged with certain particularly serious

crimes without requiring individualized determinations of

flight risk or dangerousness. See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22

(“All persons charged with crime shall be bailable by

sufficient sureties, except: 1. For capital offenses, sexual

assault, sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of

age or molestation of a child under fifteen years of age when

the proof is evident or the presumption great.”); Simpson,

85 P.3d at 494 (“Arizona law does not require that a risk of

flight or a risk of recidivism be considered before bail is

denied.”).9 Thus, Proposition 100 is nothing more than an

extension of Arizona’s existing pretrial detention scheme to

include defendants the state believes present a significant

flight risk, thus “narrowly focus[ing] on a particularly acute

problem in which the Government interests are

overwhelming.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.10

9

 Citing Simpson, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld a similar

categorical pretrial detention scheme in State v. Furgal, 13 A.3d 272

(N.H. 2010). The court rejected the defendant’s assertion that Salerno

requires a court to consider the specific circumstances of each defendant’s

risk of flight before denying bail. Id. at 279 (“Given this long history of

bail permitting courts in a narrow category of cases to focus exclusively

upon the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the individualized inquiry for

which the defendant argues cannot be said to be ‘implicit in the concept

of ordered liberty.’”).

10 The dissent complains that Arizona has failed to put forward

“findings, studies, statistics or other evidence” demonstrating that illegal

immigrants pose a heightened flight risk. Dissent at 43. There is no

requirement that a legislature support an intuitive proposition borne out by

anecdotal evidence with statistical studies. Otherwise, any state law or

local ordinance with an arguably punitive impact would require scientific

studies to withstand a due process challenge. Moreover, the Supreme

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 17

The Court of Appeals of Arizona embraced this

justification when it upheld Proposition 100 against a

constitutional challenge in Hernandez v. Lynch, 167 P.3d

1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). Quoting Salerno, the Arizona

court explained that “our electorate and Legislature

‘perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a

pressing societal problem.’” Id. at 1274. Addressing the

argument that Proposition 100 encompasses a broad range of

crimes, including those often resulting in non-custodial

sentences, the court pointed out that “the types of offenses . . .

are no less serious than those encompassed by the [federal

detention statute upheld in Demore].” Id. at 1275.11

Court has previously acknowledged that there is support for the

proposition that criminal aliens pose a greater flight risk. See Demore v.

Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 519 (2003) (noting that the record showed that “more

than 20% of deportable criminal aliens failed to appear for their removal

hearings”); cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,

51–52 (1986) (finding that city was entitled to rely on the experiences of

other cities and was not required to conduct new studies or gather

independent evidence when enacting a zoning ordinance challenged on

First Amendment grounds).

The record in this case includes committee hearing discussions on the

“numerous examples of serious and violent criminals that [the] Maricopa

County Attorney’s Office has prosecuted in the past that have escaped

justice because they have either slipped back across the border after

they’ve been released on bail or they’ve been deported by the federal

government after they were released on bail . . . .” If the dissent is not

satisfied by the anecdotal evidence presented in the Arizona Legislature

on this subject, it is unclear why it is comfortable with the anecdotal

evidence in the record of “examples of undocumented immigrants who

were arrested before Proposition 100, granted bail and appeared at their

court dates and trials.” Dissent at 46.

11 Demore upheld detention without bail of aliens subject to

deportation—an administrative proceeding without the more substantial

risks inherent when facing a serious felony criminal prosecution. 

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“Proposition 100 denies bail to illegal aliens charged with

Class 1, 2, 3 and 4 felonies, the least of which is punishable

by a minimum of one year in prison.” Id.

Arizona’s substantial interest in ensuring that those

charged with serious state-law crimes are available to answer

for them is undeniable. To strike down Proposition 100 on

the grounds that it violates substantive due process would

require us to find that Proposition 100 “is not reasonably

related to a legitimate goal” and is “arbitrary and

purposeless” such that we “may infer that the purpose of the

governmental action is punishment that may not

constitutionally be inflicted.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. 

Although Salerno requires an individualized determination of

dangerousness for nonbondability decisions under the federal

Bail Reform Act of 1984, our analysis of Arizona’s

Proposition 100 need not parallel Salerno’s analysis of the

federal Act. This is so because Proposition 100 seeks to

target flight risk rather than dangerousness.

In pursuit of this undeniably legitimate goal, Proposition

100 reaches a larger number of crimes than the Bail Reform

Act and allows for denial of bail on a showing of unlawful

presence. However, simply because the decision to deny bail

pursuant to Proposition 100 is arrived at differently than it

would be under federal law does not mean that Proposition

100 necessarily violates substantive due process. Balancing

Furthermore, Demore upheld these detentions pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c) without requiring individualized determinations of flight risk or

dangerousness. 538 U.S. at 515–16. If the federal government can detain

aliens subject to deportation for months while their administrative

proceedings are pending, Arizona is within constitutional bounds if it

chooses to incarcerate pre-trial those illegal aliens it has arrested on

probable cause for committing serious felony offenses.

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 19

the individual’s right to liberty with Arizona’s compelling

interest in assuring appearance at trial, “we cannot

categorically state that pretrial detention ‘offends some

principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience

of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’” Salerno,

481 U.S. at 751 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,

105 (1934)). Because Proposition 100 is reasonably related

to the legitimate goal of controlling flight risk, we hold that

it is not excessive in violation of substantive due process

under the Constitution of the United States.

III

“When government action depriving a person of life,

liberty, or property survives substantive due process scrutiny,

it must still be implemented in a fair manner. . . . This

requirement has traditionally been referred to as ‘procedural’

due process.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citing Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The felony arrestees

assert that the Proposition 100 laws violate procedural due

process by failing to provide a meaningful opportunity for

accused persons to contest their status determinations. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the probable

cause standard applied to immigration status determinations

at both the initial appearance and any subsequent

Simpson/Segura hearing is constitutionally inadequate. They

also challenge Defendants-Appellees’ implementing policies

and practices as procedurally deficient and error-prone. We

believe Proposition 100 survives both of these challenges.

A

“[A] judicial determination of probable cause is a

prerequisite to any extended restraint on the liberty of an

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20 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

adult accused of crime.” Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,

274–75 (1984) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114

(1975)). Plaintiffs-Appellants ask us to hold that immigration

status inquiries in Proposition 100 cases are fundamentally

incompatible with a probable cause standard of proof because

immigration status is a technical legal question requiring

application of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act

rather than a probabilistic inquiry. They request the use of a

heightened standard “that takes into account the complexity

of the question and the exceptionally strong liberty interest at

stake.” Corrected Brief of Appellants at 46, No. 11-16487

(Nov. 2, 2011). The argument asks too much at the initial

appearance and ignores the procedural protections should a

request be made for a review hearing seven days later.

Where the United States seeks to hold a dangerous

defendant without bail, the federal Bail Reform Act places the

burden of proof on the government to show by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant poses a danger such

that “no condition or combination of conditions will

reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the

community . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). The Act is silent

about the standard of proof required when the government

seeks pretrial detention due to flight risk, but we have held

that under the Act flight risk must only be shown by the lower

“clear preponderance of the evidence” standard. See United

States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985). In

practice, temporary detention is frequently ordered by federal

magistrate judges at the initial appearance subject to review

at a subsequent detention hearing where the parties are better

prepared to litigate the issue.

The district court here found that the difference between

Arizona’s probable cause standard for Proposition 100 status

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determinations and the federal “clear preponderance”

standard for flight risk determinations does not amount to a

procedural due process violation, and we agree. States are

entitled to determine the laws that govern their criminal

justice systems, and the Arizona Legislature spoke clearly

when it passed Senate Bill 1265 codifying the probable cause

standard. This is especially true in light of the prior

confusion that had surrounded the standard of proof for

Proposition 100 status determinations. Taking account of this

confusion, as well as the complexity of status determinations

and the strong liberty interests at stake, the Arizona

Legislature nevertheless felt that the probable cause standard

was constitutionally adequate. The fact that Congress chose

to set a higher standard of proof for dangerousness

determinations under federal bail law does not render any less

legitimate Arizona’s choice regarding the standard of proof

that best achieves its goal of preventing flight before trial. 

Arizona’s probable cause standard for Proposition 100 status

determinations does not violate the United States

Constitution.

B

In Simpson v. Owens, the Court of Appeals of Arizona

established that due process requires an accused “be provided

a [bail] hearing, . . . during which he [or she] must be given

an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner,” 85 P.3d at 487 (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Drawing from the procedures

outlined in Salerno, the Simpson court explained that in an

Arizona bail hearing the accused is entitled to counsel, has

the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to review

in advance witnesses’ prior written statements, and that the

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court must make a determination on the record. Id. at

492–93.

Plaintiffs-Appellants nevertheless claim that procedures

employed both at initial appearances and bail hearings in

Arizona violate procedural due process guarantees and lead

to incorrect status determinations. Specifically, they note that

in Maricopa County sheriff’s deputies question arrestees,

check various databases including federal immigration

databases, and then list on Post-It notes the docket numbers

of those they deem nonbondable, delivering those notes to the

prosecution and the court who generally give the notes

conclusive effect at initial appearances. Proposition 100

defendants are not permitted to see the evidence the deputies

submit in support of a finding of nonbondability under

Proposition 100, either at the initial appearance or at the

Simpson/Segura hearing (if one is requested), and arrestees

are not informed during the initial appearance of their right to

an evidentiary hearing on bondability.

The concern with the procedures employed by sheriff’s

deputies at initial appearances is best addressed by looking to

the remedial procedures already in place in Arizona via

Simpson/Segura hearings. The Court of Appeals of Arizona

struck a balance between the state’s interest in detaining

certain arrestees and the arrestees’ fundamental liberty

interests when it declared that “[i]nitial appearances serve the

limited function of providing some check on the ability of the

state to hold a defendant, but they continue to be ill-suited to

support conclusive findings affecting a defendant’s liberty.” 

Segura, 196 P.3d at 841. Simpson/Segura hearings are

available in Arizona precisely because

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 23

[i]t would be a rare occasion when an

adequate bail hearing could be conducted at

the initial appearance for a [Proposition 100]

offense. . . . [I]t is not feasible for the bail

hearing to take place at the time of the initial

hearing if for no other reason than that the

accused must be given adequate notice to

prepare for the hearing.

Simpson, 85 P.3d at 495. Thus, any deficiencies in the

probable cause determination made at an initial

appearance—due to deputies’ Post-It notes or otherwise—can

be cured at a Simpson/Segura hearing. Indeed, that is exactly

what such hearings are for.

Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that Proposition 100

defendants are not permitted to see the evidence submitted in

support of a finding of nonbondability under Proposition 100. 

A review of the record reveals that Maricopa County’s

Section 287(g)-certified deputies12 must refuse to provide

documents to defendants or their attorneys regarding

immigration status because those documents are federal

immigration documents and under federal law are not

discoverable until immigration proceedings are commenced

12 The Section 287(g) program allows state and local law enforcement

entities to enter into partnerships with U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) in order to receive delegated authority to assist in

immigration enforcement within their respective jurisdictions. Under the

program, local officers are trained to enforce immigration law as

authorized throughSection 287(g) ofthe Immigration and NationalityAct. 

See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)

Immigration andNationality Act, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,

http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm(last visited June 10,

2013).

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against the alien by the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security. There is no indication from the record that the

sheriff deliberately withholds information from Proposition

100 defendants or otherwise deprives them of a fair

opportunity to litigate their status determinations at

Simpson/Segura hearings; therefore, we hold that procedural

due process guarantees are not violated.

Plaintiffs-Appellants also claim that arrestees are not

informed during the initial appearance of their right to an

evidentiary hearing on bondability. That may well be true. 

It does not appear that the IA commissioners regularly inform

the arrestees of their right to such hearings. Although

translations are provided at the hearings, some arrestees do

not speak English. Many are unrepresented at their initial

appearances, and if indigent they may not meet with

appointed counsel for some time after their Proposition 100

status determinations. During this period they will be

detained pursuant to Proposition 100 while they wait to meet

with their appointed attorneys, and may not know that they

can request a Simpson/Segura hearing to challenge their

status determinations until they speak with their lawyers.

Nevertheless, whether or not they are immediately aware

of it, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 7.4(b) provides

detainees a right to request a prompt bond hearing, and the

hearing must take place within seven days of the request. 

Arizona’s Rules of Criminal Procedure give criminal trials

priority over civil trials, so even a detainee who fails to

request a Simpson/Segura hearing is entitled to be tried within

150 days of arraignment. Hernandez, 167 P.3d at 1275. The

Supreme Court in Demore approved detention of illegal

aliens for periods longer than that. 538 U.S. at 529–31. In

light of Arizona’s legitimate and compelling interest in

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controlling flight risk, the pretrial detention of arrestees who,

it bears repeating, the government must demonstrate by a

proof evident/presumption great standard committed Class 1

through 4 state-law felonies, does not violate procedural due

process simply because arrestees are not informed at their

initial appearances of the existence of Rule 7.4(b).13 While

Arizona’s initial appearance procedures may not be ideal,

they are not fundamentally unfair so as to violate the

Constitution.

IV

We turn next to Plaintiffs-Appellants’ argument that

Proposition 100’s categorical bail prohibition is arbitrary and

unreasonable in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The

Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment provides

that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,” U.S. Const.

amend. VIII, cl. 1, but as the Supreme Court observed in

Salerno, “[t]his Clause, of course, says nothing about whether

bail shall be available at all.” 481 U.S. at 752. “The Eighth

Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the

classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this

country.” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952). To

determine whether a particular legislative denial of bail

violates the Excessive Bail Clause, we “look to the valid state

interests bail is intended to serve for a particular individual

and judge whether bail conditions are excessive for the

13 We note that this issue could be resolved if the commissioners would

informthe arrestees oftheir right to a Simpson/Segura hearing at the initial

appearance. Although perhaps advisable, we nonetheless conclude that

the failure of the commissioners to do so as a standard practice does not

amount to a due process violation. Once counsel appear to represent

arrestees, these lawyers will presumably know and request a hearing when

they believe it appropriate to do so.

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purpose of achieving those interests.” Galen v. Cnty. of L.A.,

477 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007). Because we have

determined that Proposition 100 is not excessive in relation

to Arizona’s interest in ensuring that illegal alien criminal

defendants appear for trial, it follows that Proposition 100

does not violate the Excessive Bail Clause.

Plaintiffs-Appellants point to pre-Salerno authority as

support for their position that Proposition 100 categorically

denies bail arbitrarily and unreasonably. Hunt v. Roth,

648 F.2d 1148, 1162 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub

nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982), held that the

Nebraska constitution’s categorical denial of bail to those

charged with certain sex offenses violated the Eighth

Amendment because it did not allow for individualized

determinations of suitability for pretrial release. But Hunt,

just as Salerno, dealt with a case in which the government’s

interest was “protecting society from [persons accused of

offenses],” id. at 1163, and “[t]he state [did] not contend that

an absolute denial of bail to all persons charged with forcible

rape is rationally related or necessary to assuring their

appearance at trial.” Id. at 1162. Thus, unlike Proposition

100, the Nebraska law was focused on dangerousness rather

than flight risk. Plaintiffs-Appellants point to no cases

holding that a legislature’s decision to categorically deny bail

in the interest of assuring presence at trial is arbitrary or

unreasonable in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because

Proposition 100 bail conditions are not excessive in light of

Arizona’s legitimate interests and bail is not denied arbitrarily

or unreasonably, the Proposition 100 laws do not violate the

Eighth Amendment Excessive Bail Clause.

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V

Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that Proposition 100 has

complicated initial appearances in Arizona to such a degree

that they have become an adversarial and critical stage of

proceedings triggering the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

The Maricopa County Attorney’s Office staffs IA

proceedings, although prosecutors are only called in to the IA

courtroom if needed. Maricopa County sheriff’s deputies

occasionally testify at IAs to address questions from the court

regarding an arrestee’s Proposition 100 status. After the

passage of Proposition 100, the indigent defense agency in

Maricopa County began sending attorneys to IAs, but the

practice was halted after Maricopa County decided not to

fund county-paid counsel for that purpose

Initial appearances in Arizona must take place within 24

hours of an arrest. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 4.1(a). The proceedings

are brief and no plea is entered. During the proceedings the

IA commissioner must: ascertain the defendant’s name and

address; inform the defendant of the charges, the right to

counsel, and the right to remain silent; determine whether

probable cause exists to believe that a crime was committed

(if the arrest was made without a warrant); appoint counsel if

the defendant is eligible; and determine release conditions,

including a Proposition 100 status determination if

appropriate. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 4.2(a).

Both we and the Supreme Court of Arizona have held that

there is no constitutional right to an attorney at initial

appearances. See United States v. Perez, 776 F.2d 797, 800

(9th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by United States

v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622, 634–35 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc); State v. Cook, 724 P.2d 556, 561 (Ariz. 1986). 

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Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that in light of the immigration

status determinations that now may take place at IAs, these

pre-Proposition 100 precedents no longer apply.

We employ a three-factor test to determine whether an

event constitutes a critical stage of a prosecution. If (1)

“failure to pursue strategies or remedies results in a loss of

significant rights,” (2) “skilled counsel would be useful in

helping the accused understand the legal confrontation,” or

(3) “the proceeding tests the merits of the accused’s case,”

then the proceeding is a critical stage triggering the right to

counsel. United States v. Bohn, 890 F.2d 1079, 1080–81 (9th

Cir. 1989) (citing Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 698–99

(9th Cir. 1989)). Applying this test, IAs in Arizona—even

those that include Proposition 100 status determinations—do

not trigger the right to counsel.

Given the administrative nature of Arizona’s IA

proceedings, it is unlikely that a defendant unrepresented by

counsel would fail to pursue a strategy or remedy during the

initial appearance and thereby lose significant rights. The

only strategies or remedies available to a defendant who

seeks to avoid pretrial detention are to deny either the

crime(s) alleged or that the defendant has entered or remained

in the United States illegally. But, as no plea is entered at an

IA and the “initial appearance provides no opportunity for a

defendant to present evidence or make any argument

regarding the law or evidence,” Segura, 196 P.3d at 841,

these are not remedies available at the initial appearance. 

Rather, these are remedies available after the initial

appearance at a Simpson/Segura hearing, by which point

counsel will have been appointed. Thus, Proposition 100

initial appearances do not run afoul of the first factor of the

Bohn test.

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Likewise, due to the administrative nature of IAs in

Arizona, skilled counsel would not be useful in helping the

accused understand the legal confrontation. Record

transcripts of Maricopa County IAs demonstrate that IA

commissioners are doing what Rule 4.2(a) requires. Skilled

counsel is unnecessary to help an accused understand the

purely administrative matters covered during an IA—in fact

the appointment of counsel is one of the tasks performed at

the first appearance. “To require that counsel be appointed

before the judge asks routine questions such as the

defendant’s name and financial ability would be selfdefeating.” Perez, 776 F.2d at 800. Proposition 100

procedures therefore survive the second factor of Bohn’s

“critical stage” test.

Finally, Proposition 100 status determinations at IAs do

not test the merits of the accused’s case such that Bohn’s third

factor is implicated. No plea is entered, and any discussion

of immigration status is undertaken for the sole purpose of

determining whether a defendant is nonbondable under

Proposition 100. The IA transcripts cited to by PlaintiffsAppellants support this reading. For example, when one

defendant’s interpreter said that “[defendant] has spoken to

his solicitor and she is getting the case ready for asylum,” the

commissioner responded, “You can certainly discuss that

matter with your solicitor and until your asylum petition is

approved . . . there is probable cause to believe that you’re in

the country illegally at this time. . . . [A]t this time, because

of your immigration status, you’re not entitled to bond . . . .” 

Plaintiffs-Appellants have not put forward any evidence

demonstrating that a defendant’s statements about

immigration status at an IA are being used in subsequent

federal criminal prosecutions for illegal entry or re-entry, or

in subsequent state criminal prosecutions where unlawful

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immigration status is an element of the offense. Accordingly,

they have failed to show that Proposition 100 determinations

at initial appearances are critical stages that trigger the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel.

VI

Proposition 100 laws are neither expressly nor impliedly

preempted by federal immigration law. While it is true that

many state laws addressing immigration are preempted by

federal law, the Supreme Court has said that not “every state

enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation

of immigration and thus per se preempted” by the federal

government’s broad and exclusive constitutional power to

regulate immigration. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 354, 355

(1976). Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that Proposition 100 is

preempted because it attempts to regulate immigration,

intrudes into fields exclusively occupied by federal

congressional action, and conflicts with the federal

Immigration and Nationality Act. Each of these arguments is

unavailing.

A

It is “[a] fundamental principle of the Constitution . . .

that Congress has the power to preempt state law.” Crosby v.

Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). And

it is beyond doubt that “[t]he authority to control

immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—is vested solely in

the Federal government.” Takahashi v. Fish & Game

Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) (citing Fong Yue Ting v.

United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)); see U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress has authority to “establish an

uniform Rule of Naturalization”). Were the Proposition 100

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laws actual regulations of immigration—that is, were they to

actually function as a determination of who should or should

not be admitted or allowed to remain in the United

States—they would be preempted. See De Canas, 424 U.S.

at 355. But, “standing alone, the fact that aliens are the

subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of

immigration . . . .” Id. The Proposition 100 laws neither

determine who should be admitted to the United States nor

prescribe conditions under which legal entrants may remain. 

Rather, those who are subject to detention under the

Proposition 100 laws are being detained because of the crime

they are accused of committing. Arizona state officials are

not directly facilitating immigration removals and their

immigration status decisions for the purposes of Proposition

100 are not binding in subsequent proceedings within the

federal immigration system.

Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that Proposition 100 is

nevertheless preempted because it creates a state-law

category of persons who have “entered or remained in the

United States illegally.” Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22(A)(4). 

Arizona’s implementing statute directs courts making

Proposition 100 status determinations to consider, among

other things, “[a]ny . . . relevant information that is obtained

by the court or that is presented to the court by a party or any

other person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3961(A)(5)(a)(vi). 

Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that Proposition 100 status

determinations amount to state-law determinations of

immigration status without regard to federal immigration law

and federal status determinations. Undeniably, “[t]he States

enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens.” 

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (citing Hines v.

Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)). On this basis, PlaintiffsAppellants point to several federal district court cases in

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which state law immigration classifications were deemed

preempted. Each of these cases, however, is distinguishable.

In Equal Access Education v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d

585, 603 (E.D. Va. 2004), the court held that a Virginia

higher education admissions policy denying admission to

illegal aliens would violate the Supremacy Clause only if the

institutions implementing the policy were relying on state

rather than federal immigration standards. In League of

United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755,

772 (C.D. Cal. 1995), the court deemed parts of a California

voter-approved initiative preempted, reasoning that portions

of the initiative were an impermissible regulation of

immigration because “the [immigration status] classification

. . . is not in any way tied to federal standards.” Likewise, in

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley, No. 5:11-

cv-02484-SLB, 2011 WL 5516953, at *23 (N.D. Ala. Sept.

28, 2011), vacated as moot in part by 691 F.3d 1236, 1242

(11th Cir. 2012), the court preliminarily enjoined some

provisions of Alabama’s House Bill 56 because their

implementation would impermissibly create state

classifications of aliens.

Although it is true that Arizona’s implementing statute

directs courts making Proposition 100 status determinations

to consider “any . . . relevant information,” it also commands

consideration of “[w]hether a hold has been placed on the

arrested person by the United States immigration or customs

enforcement.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3961(A)(5)(a)(i). 

Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs-Appellants’ assertions, Arizona

state courts are not authorized to make state-law

determinations of immigration status without regard to

federal status determinations. Unlike in Wilson, the state-law

determination here is tied to federal standards. Furthermore,

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evidence in the record shows that Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office Section 287(g)-certified deputies cross-reference ICE

databases when making Proposition 100 recommendations at

initial appearances. Finally, the screening questionnaire

administered by the deputies to determine whether an arrestee

is subject to Proposition 100 includes questions such as, “Do

you have any applications or petitions pending with US

CIS?”

14

and, “Have you been removed, deported, excluded or

VR’d15

 before from the U.S.?”

This evidence demonstrates that Arizona state officials

are not attempting to create a new state-law classification for

those who have “entered or remained in the United States

illegally,” but rather are seeking to determine whether

arrestees are in violation of federal immigration law. As the

Supreme Court recently held in Arizona v. United States,

132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508 (2012), Congress has “encouraged the

sharing of information about possible immigration

violations,” and federal law permits “a policy requiring state

14 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services processes

applications to adjust the immigration status of aliens present in the United

States, including adjustments through the issuance of Green Cards

granting Lawful Permanent Resident Status. See generally U.S.

Immigration Online, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

http://www.immigrationdirect.com/ (last visited June 10, 2013).

15

“VR” here refers to Voluntary Departure (or Removal), a benefit

extended to illegal aliens who are permitted to waive deportation

proceedings by agreeing to immediately leave the United States upon

apprehension by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers such as

the United States Border Patrol. See Glossary, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND

IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/

menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=9e258fa2

9935f010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b328194d

3e88d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD (last visited June 10, 2013).

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34 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.” Because

Proposition 100 neither regulates immigration nor

impermissibly creates state-law immigration classifications,

we hold that Proposition 100 is not constitutionally

preempted.

B

Plaintiffs-Appellants next argue that Proposition 100

intrudes on a field exclusively occupied by federal law

because it imposes mandatory detention under state law of

persons suspected of committing federal immigration law

offenses. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs-Appellants cite

to myriad federal Immigration and Naturalization Act

provisions related to federal immigration detention and

removal. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 354 (1976), provides

the framework for the resolution of this argument. De Canas

teaches, “we will not presume that Congress, in enacting the

INA, intended to oust state authority to regulate . . . in a

manner consistent with pertinent federal laws.” 424 U.S. at

357. Instead, “[o]nly a demonstration that complete ouster of

state power including state power to promulgate laws not in

conflict with federal laws was the clear and manifest purpose

of Congress would justify that conclusion.” Id. (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

The INA provisions cited by Plaintiffs-Appellants

regulate detention for immigration violations, while

Proposition 100 regulates pretrial detention for those arrested

for committing Class 1 through 4 state felonies and

aggravated driving-under-the-influence offenses. PlaintiffsAppellants have not shown that Congress intended to effect

a “complete ouster of state power” with respect to bail

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 35

determinations for state-law crimes. Accordingly, we hold

that Proposition 100 is not field preempted.

C

Finally, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that even if

Proposition 100 is not field preempted, it nevertheless “stands

as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress.” De Canas, 424 U.S.

at 363 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Following the Supreme Court’s directive that “[i]mplied

preemption analysis does not justify a freewheeling judicial

inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal

objectives” and that “a high threshold must be met if a state

law is to be preempted for conflicting with the purposes of a

federal Act,” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting,

131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011), we hold that Proposition 100

does not conflict with federal law.

Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that the Proposition 100 laws

impose incarceration for unlawful presence in the United

States in opposition to Congress’s judgment as to when aliens

should or should not be detained for immigration violations. 

But Proposition 100 regulates only the bail determinations for

state-law crimes and does not impose incarceration for

federal immigration law violations. While it is true that in

certain instances Proposition 100 may mandate the pretrial

detention of a person who would be deemed bondable by a

federal immigration judge, such detention is not meant to

punish an alleged immigration violation but rather to ensure

presence in Arizona to stand trial for alleged state-law crimes.

Plaintiffs-Appellants cite to Arizona v. United States as

support for their argument that state officers cannot deprive

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36 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

noncitizens of their liberty based upon purported immigration

violations without running afoul of conflict preemption

principles. Admittedly, the Arizona court wrote that “it

would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in

the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful

presence without federal direction and supervision.” 

132 S. Ct. at 2509. But Proposition 100 does not permit state

officials to hold aliens because of their unlawful presence. 

Rather, it permits them to hold those arrested based on

probable cause for committing serious state-law felonies to

ensure they will remain here to answer the charges. 

Plaintiffs-Appellants’ declaration that “[b]ut for their

purported immigration violations, individuals subjected to

Proposition 100 would be eligible for bail like any other

defendant under Arizona law,” Corrected Brief of Appellants

at 62, No. 11-16487 (Nov. 2, 2011), could just as easily be

expressed as “but for their commission of state-law felonies,

those unlawfully present in the United States would not be

detained under Proposition 100.” Proposition 100 is not

conflict preempted.

VII

The Arizona Legislature and Arizona voters passed the

Proposition 100 laws to further the state’s legitimate and

compelling interest in seeing that those accused of serious

state-law crimes are brought to trial. At oral argument,

counsel for both sides urged us to rule on the constitutional

issues presented by passage and implementation of Arizona’s

constitutional amendment based on the record presented to

the district court. After reviewing the record, we are satisfied

that Plaintiffs-Appellants have not succeeded in raising

triable issues of fact as to whether Proposition 100 and its

implementing procedures violate the substantive and

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 37

procedural due process guarantees of the United States

Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, the Excessive Bail

Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel, nor whether the Proposition 100 laws are

preempted by federal immigration law.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Due process guarantees that individuals arrested for a

crime are entitled to bail pending determination of their guilt

or innocence, with some limited exceptions. Arizona,

however, has decided to deny pretrial bail to all persons

arrested for a range of felony crimes who are in the United

States without authorization, theorizing they are likely to flee

the country solely because of their immigration status. 

Without any evidence that unauthorized immigrants released

on bail have been or are less likely to appear for trial

compared to arrestees who are lawful residents, the majority

accepts Arizona’s unsupported assertion that all unauthorized

immigrants necessarily pose an unmanageable flight risk,

such that a blanket denial of bail is not an “excessive” tool to

combat flight risk. As revealed by Proposition 100’s

legislative history and scope, however, Arizona is plainly

using the denial of bail as a method to punish “illegal”

immigrants, rather than simply as a tool to help manage

arrestees’ flight risk. “It is axiomatic that ‘due process

requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.’” Schall v.

Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984) (alteration omitted)

(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)). 

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38 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

Because this bail-denial scheme contravenes the

Constitution’s fundamental prohibition on punishment before

determination of guilt in a criminal trial, I dissent.

I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Proposition 100 categorically denies bail and thus

requires pretrial detention for everyundocumented immigrant

charged with any of a broad range of felonies, regardless of

the seriousness of the offense or the individual circumstances

of the defendant, including the defendant’s strong ties to and

deep roots in the community. The state maintains – and the

majority holds – that this unique, sweeping pretrial detention

statute, directed solely at undocumented immigrants,

comports with substantive due process because it has a

permissible purpose and is reasonably related to the state’s

interest in preventing pretrial flight. I respectfully disagree.

Under United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), a

restriction on bail violates substantive due process if it either

(1) has a punitive purpose or (2) imposes an excessive

restriction on liberty in relation to a permissible regulatory

purpose.

To determine whether a restriction on liberty

constitutes impermissible punishment or

permissible regulation, we first look to

legislative intent. Unless [the legislature]

expressly intended to impose punitive

restrictions, the punitive/regulatorydistinction

turns on whether an alternative purpose to

which the restriction may rationally be

connected is assignable for it, and whether it

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 39

appears excessive in relation to the alternative

purpose assigned to it.

Id. at 747 (citation, alterations and internal quotation marks

omitted). Although preventing flight risk is a permissible

regulatory purpose, see id. at 749; Bell, 441 U.S. at 536,

Arizona’s indiscriminate pretrial detention law is

unconstitutionally punitive under both prongs of Salerno. I

address each in turn.

A. Legislative Purpose

First, the record plainly shows that lawmakers designed

Proposition 100 – at least in large part – to punish

undocumented immigrants for being in the United States

unlawfully:

• State Representative Russell Pearce, the bill’s sponsor,

stated that Proposition 100

just simply bridges the gap, a loophole in the

law that would allow people who are not in

this country []legally who have no business to

be released if they commit any crime, they

have no business being released if they

commit no crime, no additional crime

[be]cause they’re already in this country

illegally.

Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting on H.B. 2389, Mar. 28,

2005, 47th Leg., 1st Regular Sess. (Ariz. 2005). Notably, and

contrary to Pearce’s suggestion, being “in this country

illegally” is not a crime. See Arizona v. United States,

132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2011).

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40 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

• Rep. Pearce promoted the bill on the ground that “all

illegal aliens in this country ought to be detained, debriefed

and deported.” Id. He reiterated: “If you’re in this country

illegally you ought to be detained [and] deported[.] [E]nd of

story,” and defended the bill as a “reasonable approach” to

border security.

1

Id.

• State Representative Ray Barnes expressly promoted

the bill on the (again, erroneous) assumption that “the mere

fact that they’re here undocumented [means] that the crime

has already been committed.” House Judiciary Committee

Meeting on H.B. 2389, Jan. 27, 2005, 47th Leg., 1st Regular

Sess. (Ariz. 2005).

1 To Rep. Pearce, Proposition 100 would punish undocumented

immigrants for two wrongs: being present in the United States unlawfully

and committing (more accurately, being arrested for) a felony. See Senate

Judiciary Committee Meeting on H.B. 2389, Mar. 28, 2005, 47thLeg., 1st

Regular Sess. (Ariz. 2005) (“[B]ad enough you’re illegal but you commit

a serious crime you ought not to be bondable.”); id. (“[T]his bill targets

very simply those who commit serious, serious [criminal] acts in our

community. A very responsible bill to protect our citizens from those who

would enter our country illegally and commit serious crimes against us.”). 

Both of Pearce’s reasons are impermissibly punitive. Bail cannot be

denied to punish immigrants for being in the country illegally. Nor can it

be denied to punish them for charged, but unproven, crimes. See Bell,

441 U.S. at 535 (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a [defendant] may not

be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due

process of law.”); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citing Bell for the proposition

that pretrial detention violates substantive due process when it constitutes

“impermissible punishment before trial”). As the Supreme Court has

recognized, “Arizona may have understandable frustrations with the

problems caused by illegal immigration,” Arizona v. United States,

132 S. Ct. at 2510, but punishing undocumented immigrants by denying

them bail is not a permissible expression of that frustration.

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 41

• State Senator Jack Harper said, “what part of illegal

don’t we understand? Illegal aliens shouldn’t be able to get

bond for anything.” Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting on

H.B. 2389, Mar. 28, 2005, 47th Leg., 1st Regular Sess. (Ariz.

2005).

• In a hearing on a bill to implement Proposition 100

after its passage, State Representative John Kavanagh said:

“I’m amazed that we provide bail to anybody who’s arrested

for a crime that’s an illegal alien. . . . I therefore support this

bill as a first step to what we should be really doing and that’s

deporting anybody here illegally.” House Floor Meeting on

S.B. 1265, June 13, 2007, 48th Leg., 1st Regular Sess. (Ariz.

2007).

The majority correctly observes that some statements in

the legislative record refer to flight risk rather than

punishment. Fairly viewed, however, the legislative record

as a whole clearly shows that legislators were motivated at

least in large part by an overriding desire to punish

undocumented immigrants for being in the country

unlawfully – i.e., that lawmakers “intended to impose

punitive restrictions” on undocumented immigrants. Salerno,

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42 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

481 U.S. at 747.2 The plaintiffs therefore have established a

due process violation under Salerno’s first prong.

3

B. Excessiveness

Even if Proposition 100 were enacted for the regulatory

purpose of managing flight risk, it would still violate

substantive due process under Salerno’s second prong,

because it restricts substantially more liberty than necessary

to achieve the state’s legitimate interest. See Salerno,

481 U.S. at 747. The state’s premise that immigration status

and flight risk are closely linked is unsubstantiated. 

Furthermore, even if there is some link, the state’s blanket

2

Salerno does not require the plaintiffs to prove that punishment was the

sole or even the predominant purpose of the legislation. Even if that were

a requirement, however, the plaintiffs have satisfied it here. Cf. McCreary

Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“When the government

acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion,

it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious

neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible

object is to take sides.”); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,

46–47 (2000) (holding that a checkpoint program with an impermissible

primary purpose violated the FourthAmendment even though the program

served lawful secondary purposes); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959

(1996) (plurality opinion) (concluding that in a “mixed motive” case

challenging race-consciousredistricting on equal protection grounds, strict

scrutiny would apply only if race was the “predominant factor” in drawing

the districts).

3 This, of course, is not the first time Arizona’s concerns about illegal

immigration have resulted in impermissible legislation. See, e.g., Arizona

v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2503, 2505, 2507 (striking down alienregistration and criminal provisions targeting undocumented immigrants

as preempted by federal law); Valle Del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808

(9th Cir. 2013) (enjoining day laborer provisionstargeting undocumented

immigrants as a violation of the First Amendment).

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denial of bail is an excessive and overbroad tool to prevent

flight risk.

To conduct a meaningful excessiveness analysis, we must

compare the magnitude of the societal problem being

addressed against the severity of the chosen remedy. The

societal ill Proposition 100 targets is not flight risk generally,

but rather the increased flight risk supposedly posed by

undocumented immigrants, the only individuals the

proposition covers.4 The defendants have failed to establish

that this societal problem exists, much less demonstrate its

magnitude.

Unlike the defendants in Salerno and Demore v. Kim,

538 U.S. 510 (2003) – who presented data to back up their

claims that the bail schemes under review addressed “a

particularly acute problem,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750; see

also Demore, 538 U.S. at 518–20 – the defendants here have

failed to present any findings, studies, statistics or other

evidence showing that undocumented immigrants actually

posed a significantly greater flight risk than lawful residents

before implementation of Proposition 100.5 Despite the lack

4 Before Proposition 100 passed, Arizona had an extensive bail scheme

designed to help ensure that arrestees appear for trial. See Ariz. Const. art.

II, § 22 (West Nov. 27, 2006 version); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3967(B). 

These procedures already required judges to consider the arrestee’s

immigration status when making bail determinations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 13-3967(B)(11)–(12). The defendants have not shown that this set of

regulations, addressing flight risk on a case-by-case basis, was inadequate

to protect the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring arrestees’ appearance

at trial.

5 Neither Demore’s holding nor the statistics cited therein helps establish

the constitutionality of pretrial detention in criminal cases. Demore

approved the brief detention of an alien pending removal proceedings

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44 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

of any supporting data, Arizona, the district court and the

majority have all assumed that undocumented immigrants

pose a greater flight risk than other arrestees. When the

chosen remedy is so draconian as to categorically deny bail

to anyone who is probably an undocumented immigrant, the

justification should be demonstrated factually, rather than

supported by only unsubstantiated assumptions and

anecdotes. If undocumented immigrants actually

demonstrated a substantially greater flight risk before

Proposition 100, defendants had five years to gather and

present data to back up such a claim. They have presented

nothing of the sort to support their assertion that Proposition

100 addresses “a pressing societal problem.” Salerno,

481 U.S. at 747.

On the other side of the scale from the state’s interest in

ensuring appearance at trial is a profound infringement on

when the alien had already been convicted of an enumerated crime. See

Demore, 538 U.S. at 513. The periods of detention at issue in Demore

were short – an average of 47 days if the alien did not appeal the decision

of the Immigration Judge, or four months if the alien appealed. See id. at

529. The time between an arrest and a criminal trial can last far longer. 

Before passing the law at issue in Demore, Congress reviewed several

studies concerning recidivism rates of criminal aliens and their rates of

failure to appear for subsequent removal hearings. See id. at 518–20. 

These studies, however related to convicted immigrants appearing for their

removal proceedings; they do not provide support for Proposition 100,

which ostensibly rests on arrested immigrants appearing for their criminal

proceedings. Congress also had specific reason to conclude that, under the

circumstances at issue in Demore, case-by-case determinations of

suitability for release would be ineffectual. See id. at 528. Importantly,

the Supreme Court approved the brief detention of criminal aliens in

Demore in recognition ofCongress’ “broad power over naturalization and

immigration,” which allows Congress to “regularly make[] rules that

would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Id. at 521. The states do

not have plenary power over naturalization and immigration.

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liberty interests: automatic detention in jail without the

possibility of bail, simply based on an arrestee’s presumed

status as an undocumented immigrant. Such a denial of bail

implicates “a basic and significant liberty interest in not being

confined pending trial.” United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d

1403, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985) (Boochever, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part). “The consequences of prolonged

[pretrial] detention may be more serious than the interference

occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the

suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his

family relationships.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114

(1975). “Pretrial detention may hamper the preparation of a

defense by limiting the defendant’s access to his attorney and

to potential witnesses for the defense.” Motamedi, 767 F.2d

at 1414 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)).

Even if the defendants could show that undocumented

immigrants pose a greater flight risk on average than lawful

residents, Proposition 100 is fatally flawed because it uses the

disfavored mechanism of an irrebuttable presumption, rather

than an individualized hearing, to determine whether an

arrestee is an unmanageable flight risk. In Salerno, the

regulatory scheme was limited to arrestees who actually

posed a danger to the community. First, it was limited to

“individuals who have been arrested for a specific category

of extremely serious offenses” – who Congress found were

“far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the

community after arrest.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. Second,

even for arrestees falling within that specific category, the

scheme provided case-by-case determinations of the need for

pretrial detention. Each arrestee was entitled to a “full-blown

adversary hearing,” at which the government was required to

prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that the individual

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presented “a demonstrable danger to the community” and that

“no conditions of release c[ould] reasonably assure the safety

of the community.” Id. It was only “[u]nder these narrow

circumstances” that the Court held that society’s interest was

sufficient to outweigh the “individual’s strong interest in

[pretrial] liberty.” Id.

In contrast, Proposition 100 is not narrowly focused on

those arrestees who actually pose the greatest flight risk. 

Plainly, some undocumented immigrants do not pose

unmanageable flight risks. The record includes examples of

undocumented immigrants who were arrested before

Proposition 100, granted bail and appeared at their court dates

and trials. Yet even these individuals were needlessly

remanded into state custody following Proposition 100’s

passage.6 Proposition 100 eliminates the opportunity for

comparable arrestees to show that, notwithstanding their

immigration status, they do not pose a flight risk.7

 

6

 The majority finds it odd that I am “comfortable” with this anecdotal

evidence but not comfortable with Arizona’s anecdotal evidence of

undocumented immigrants evading justice by leaving the United States. 

Maj. Op. at 16–17 n.10. But I do not suggest that anecdotal evidence

cannot inform legislation; rather, I believe anecdotal evidence, standing

alone, cannot support an irrebuttable presumption affecting substantial

rights. I mention the anecdotal evidence of some undocumented

immigrants posting bail and continuing to appear for their court dates and

trial not to suggest a per se rule that undocumented immigrants should

receive bail. On the contrary, I cite this evidence to illustrate the need for

an individualized inquiry regarding the flight risks posed by particular

undocumented immigrants, whose behavior in the face of criminal charges

is not as homogeneous as Arizona assumes it to be.

 

7 Unlike the Bail Reform Act provision Salerno upheld, which applies

only to a narrow category of extremely serious offenses, see Salerno,

481 U.S. at 750-51, Proposition 100 applies to anyone arrested for a Class

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The Arizona legislature surmised that undocumented

immigrants pose a greater flight risk than lawful residents

because they supposedly lack strong ties to the community

and have a “home” in another country to which they can flee,

but this ignores those undocumented immigrants who have

strong ties to their community and no home abroad. Many

undocumented immigrants, for example, have “children born

in the United States” and “long ties to the community.” 

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.8 Moreover,

although the defendants consistently refer to undocumented

immigrant arrestees as “flight risks,” the pertinent inquiry is

whether the arrestee is an unmanageable flight risk. There

are a variety of methods to manage flight risk, such as bond

requirements, monitoring and reporting requirements. See,

e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3967(D). Proposition 100 ignores

1, 2, 3 or 4 felony or aggravated driving under the influence. This broad

list of crimes includes nonviolent offenses such as unlawful copying or

sale ofsound recordings, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3705, altering a lottery

ticket with intent to defraud, see id. § 5-566, and tampering with a

computer with the intent to defraud, see id, § 13-2316. Non-custodial

sentences are possible for several of these crimes.

8 A recent study of undocumented immigrants in California, conducted

by the Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration at the University of

Southern California, found that, “contrary to popular misconceptions,”

undocumented immigrants “are a fairly settled population.” 

Undocumented Californians, Immigration Reform, and Our Future

Together (May 2013), available at http://csii.usc.edu/documents/

whats_at_stake_for_the_state.pdf. The researchers found that 50 percent

of undocumented immigrants have been in the United States for more than

10 years; 17 percent of those who are household heads are homeowners;

and millions more have U.S.-born children. See id. at 9, 15. These data

about Arizona’s neighboring state cast grave doubt on Arizona’s

irrebuttable presumption that undocumented immigrants lack strong ties

to the community.

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these tools for managing flight risk, instead mandating

incarceration in every case.

TheConstitution disfavors irrebuttable presumptions like

Proposition 100’s categorical denial of bail. See Cleveland

Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645–46 (1974);

Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973). In Stanley v.

Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), an unwed father’s children

were removed by the state after the children’s mother died,

based on the state’s use of a conclusive presumption that

unwed fathers were unsuitable, neglectful parents. See id. at

646–47. The Court acknowledged that “[i]t may be, as the

State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and

neglectful parents,” but it noted that even if true on average,

there were exceptions: “all unmarried fathers are not in this

category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their

children.” Id. at 654. So too here. Even assuming

undocumented immigrants pose a greater flight risk on

average (not established, as discussed above), some by

definition do not. Proposition 100 therefore results in far

more arrestees being denied bail than necessary, making it

plainly excessive in relation to its stated purpose.

Contraryto the majority’s assertion, categorical denials of

bail for non-capital crimes are rare.9 The majority identifies

9 Assuming categorical denials of bail for capital offenses are

constitutional (although no federal appellate court has yet so decided),

such a result would likely be based on the Anglo-American legal tradition,

which has a unique history of denying bail in capital cases. See Hunt v.

Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1159–60 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussing the historical

basis for the denial of bail for capital crimes), vacated as moot sub nom.

Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982). Similar historical underpinnings

do notsupport categorical denial of bail for other crimes or, as here, on the

basis of immigration status.

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only eight states that categorically deny bail for crimes

punishable by life in prison. Maj. Op. at 14. Whether even

these laws are constitutional is hardly a settled question,

having never been declared such by the Supreme Court or a

federal appellate court. But even these eight states do not go

as far as Arizona. The majority identifies only one other state

that categorically denies bail to undocumented immigrant

arrestees.10

Even before Proposition 100, Arizona went further than

most states in restricting bail, categorically denying bail not

only to those arrested for capital crimes or crimes subject to

life in prison, but also to those arrested for certain sexual

crimes not subject to life imprisonment. Maj. Op. at 16

(citing Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22). The majority takes comfort

in Arizona’s expansive use of categorical denial of bail,

saying “Proposition 100 is nothing more than an extension of

Arizona’s existing pretrial detention scheme.” Maj. Op. at

16. The more appropriate reaction would be that Proposition

100, which is a major expansion of categorical bail denial,

reflects a serious devaluation of the presumption of innocence

and the constitutional principle that arrestees may not be

punished before judgment of guilt.

In sum, Proposition 100 is excessive in relation to its

stated legitimate purpose for two independent reasons. First,

10 Of course, even if Arizona’s bail scheme were better represented

among the states, a challenged law does not become constitutional simply

because it has company. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570

(2003) (striking down a Texas law criminalizing homosexual intercourse,

even though similar laws existed in nine states); Loving v. Virginia,

388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967) (striking down a Virginia statute prohibiting

interracial marriages, although Virginia was one of 16 states to have such

a prohibition).

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50 LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA

it purports to deal with a societal ill that has not been shown

to exist at all. Second, even if we assume that undocumented

immigrants pose a greater flight risk on average than lawful

residents, Proposition 100 is fatally flawed because it uses the

disfavored mechanism of an irrebuttable presumption, rather

than an individualized hearing, to determine whether an

arrestee is an unmanageable flight risk. This mechanism

necessarily results in the deprivation of far more liberty than

necessary to ensure appearance at trial, because even

undocumented immigrants who do not pose a flight risk or

who pose a manageable one will be categorically denied bail

based on their status alone. Proposition 100 fails Salerno’s

second prong and facially violates substantive due process.

II. REMAINING CLAIMS

Because I conclude that Proposition 100 on its face

violates substantive due process, I do not address the

plaintiffs’ procedural due process, Eighth Amendment,

Supremacy Clause and as-applied claims, though some of

them appear meritorious.

III. CONCLUSION

“Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier

than individualized determination. But when, as here, the

procedure forecloses the determinative issues . . . , when it

explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past

formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the

important interests” of the person whose rights are at stake. 

Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656–57. By employing a no-bail scheme

that conclusively equates unlawful immigration status with

unmanageable flight risk, Arizona is needlessly locking up

undocumented immigrant arrestees awaiting trial under the

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LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA 51

guise of ensuring their appearance at trial, even though many

of these individuals would voluntarily appear for trial if

released on bail and could demonstrate such willingness if

provided the opportunity, or other methods exist to assure

their appearances. The excessiveness and overbreadth of this

scheme, particularly in light of its legislative history, reveal

that the real purpose of Proposition 100 was to use the

categorical denial of bail to punish arrestees – for their

assumed undocumented status and for their suspected but

unproven crimes.

Iwould hold that Proposition 100 violates substantive due

process because it fails both prongs of the Salerno test, either

one of which is sufficient to find Arizona’s categorical denial

of bail here unconstitutional. I therefore respectfully dissent.

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