Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-23-02850/USCOURTS-ca7-23-02850-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-2850 

CHARLES CURRY, JR., doing business as GET DIESEL NUTRITION, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

REVOLUTION LABORATORIES, LLC, et al., 

Defendant-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:17-cv-02283 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2024 — DECIDED DECEMBER 19, 2024 

____________________ 

Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Charles Curry, Jr., is a 

former competitive powerlifter and body builder. Today, he 

is an entrepreneur and small-business owner. In 2002, Curry 

started a nutritional supplements business called Get Diesel 

Nutrition, eponymous with his bodybuilding nickname, 

“Chuck Diesel.” He began selling a testosterone-boosting 

supplement called “Diesel Test” in 2005. The product name 

Diesel Test is the subject of this lawsuit.

Case: 23-2850 Document: 43 Filed: 12/19/2024 Pages: 34
2 No. 23-2850 

Defendant Revolution Laboratories is a limited liability 

company that sells nutritional supplements and apparel, including one supplement also called “Diesel Test.” Defendants 

Joshua and Barry Nussbaum are Revolution’s president and 

chief executive officer, respectively.

Acting without a lawyer, Curry filed this lawsuit against 

Revolution and the Nussbaums in 2017. Curry had not 

registered his trademark, but that did not prevent him from 

asserting trademark claims under the federal Lanham Act and 

Illinois common law. Curry later obtained counsel, and the 

case proceeded to a jury trial in May 2023, resulting in a 

verdict for Curry. The jury awarded $2,500 in actual damages 

for loss of goodwill and reputation and $500,000 as 

disgorgement of Revolution’s profits from the infringement. 

The jury also awarded Curry $300,000 in punitive damages 

against each of Joshua, Barry, and Revolution, for a total 

punitive damage award of $900,000. The district court later 

ruled that disgorgement of profits under the Lanham Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 1117(a), is an equitable remedy for the judge to 

decide, and recalculated the appropriate profits award to be 

$547,095.44.

Defendants raise two challenges on appeal. They assert 

first that the district court improperly allowed Curry’s punitive damages request to go to the jury, and second that the 

punitive damage awards were excessive in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. We affirm.1

1 A hidden but perhaps academic issue here is whether the Fifth or 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to a state-law 

punitive damage award in federal court. Compare E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, 

Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 838 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to 

federal-law punitive damage award), with Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Hytera 

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No. 23-2850 3

I. Facts and Procedural History

We begin with the conduct at issue in this case because the 

constitutionality of the punitive damage awards depends in 

large part on the defendants’ conduct. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (“[T]he most 

important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive 

damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the 

defendant’s conduct.”) (alteration in original), quoting BMW 

of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 

A. Plaintiff’s “Diesel Test”

Curry began powerlifting and body building while he 

served in the Air Force. He started creating nutritional 

supplements while engaged in competitive weightlifting 

competitions to “figure out what I could take to improve my 

performance or recovery” without running afoul of the 

Olympic banned-substance list. When he returned from 

deployment in the Middle East, Curry sold his home and used 

the proceeds to start Get Diesel Nutrition. In 2005, he began 

selling Diesel Test, an “herbal test booster” designed to help 

users “naturally produce more testosterone.” 

Curry testified that he spent hundreds of thousands of 

dollars advertising Diesel Test online, in weightlifting magazines, and through competition and athlete sponsorships. He

sold the supplement through retailers, including eBay and 

Comms. Corp., 108 F.4th 458, 495 (7th Cir. 2024) (applying Fifth 

Amendment to federal-law punitive damage award), and Epic Systems

Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., 980 F.3d 1117, 1140 (7th Cir. 2020) 

(applying Fourteenth Amendment to state-law punitive damage award). 

The parties have not argued there is any difference relevant here, so we 

say no more.

Case: 23-2850 Document: 43 Filed: 12/19/2024 Pages: 34
4 No. 23-2850 

Amazon. He also testified that Diesel Test had amounted to 

roughly 75% of his overall sales since 2008.

Curry also testified that customers associated the Get 

Diesel brand with him, personally. Purchasers could call, text, 

or email him directly with questions about the product, and 

“[e]veryone knew about the Get Diesel name.” Curry testified 

that he “invested a lot of money and time” in building the 

company’s reputation and developing product design, 

marketing, and packaging. He saw his products as an 

“extension” of himself, and was “proud that I put out 

something” about which he continued to receive texts and 

emails.

B. Defendants’ “Diesel Test”

Defendants Joshua and Barry Nussbaum founded 

Revolution in 2012. Joshua became president of Revolution 

and took over day-to-day operations in 2015. Barry was 

Revolution’s CEO. While he was less involved in everyday 

management, he was involved in “some” big decisions for the 

company and, according to Joshua’s trial testimony, gave 

advice on Revolution’s Diesel Test product.

Around October 2016, Revolution took an existing product called “Rev Test,” relabeled it as “Diesel Test,” and began 

selling the product under that name. Joshua was personally 

involved in creating Revolution’s Diesel Test, including proposing the name to Revolution’s management team. Joshua 

testified that, prior to selling Diesel Test, he ran searches for 

the name on Google, Amazon, and a website called “Trademarks 411.” The purpose of these searches was to see if the 

name was trademarked and to avoid “wast[ing] money creating a product that somebody else is already using.” Finding 

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No. 23-2850 5

nothing registered, Revolution began to sell its Diesel Test on 

its company website (revlabs.com), Amazon, eBay, and other 

retail websites. It also registered a new website, dieseltestbooster-red.com, although Joshua later testified that Revolution never sold any Diesel Test through that website.

C. The Infringement and Plaintiff’s Cease-and-Desist Requests

In 2016, Revolution began promoting its Diesel Test product using free trials and other inducements. Some of these 

marketing tactics—including automatically adding additional products to online orders—upset customers, who complained.2 Other customers colorfully explained to Revolution 

that its products were not as effective as advertised.3

Some of Revolution’s customers mistakenly complained 

to Curry rather than Revolution. Curry testified that he 

2 It appears that Revolution charged for those automatically-added 

products. This, understandably, upset consumers. One complaint said: 

“Hello Customer Service. I was Trying to complete my order for one bottle 

of Diesel Test, when I see your website ADDED a bottle of ‘MRX’ to my 

order. I DO NOT WANT AND DID NOT ORDER MRX. Now please send 

me Diesel Test for $4.95 and REMOVE THE ORDER AND CHARGE FOR 

MRX, IMMEDIATELY, OR I WILL FILE A COMPLAINT ABOUT YOUR 

COMPANY WITH ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL, LISA MADIGAN. 

Thank you.”

3 Another complaint read in part: “YOU'RE SELLING SUGAR 

PILLS!!! YOUR PILLS ARE GARBAGE!! YOU TRICK PEOPLE WITH 

YOUR 14 DAY MONEY BACK SCAM! HAD YOU PRINTED CLEARLY 

THAT A CUSTOMER ONLY HAS 14 DAYS TO SEE IF YOUR S*** 

WORKS, I WOULD HAVE SENT YOUR FAKE PILLS BACK!! I PLAN ON 

TELLING EVERYONE ON FACEBOOK I KNOW, WHAT A S Y 

PRODUCT YOU’RE SELLING!! I WILL GET MY $89.00 WORTH OUT OF 

YOU! F** ***G THIEVES!!! HAVE A GREAT DAY ***HOLES!! Regards, 

....”

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6 No. 23-2850 

received around thirty such emails between November 2016 

and January 2017. After researching why he was receiving 

these emails about promotional tactics he was not using, 

Curry learned that another entity—Revolution—was selling a 

different product called Diesel Test. 

Curry then sent Revolution three separate cease-anddesist messages. The first was via Facebook on November 13, 

2016. It said that Revolution was “responsible for Trademark 

Infringement” and needed to “stop the sell, distribution and 

promotion of that ‘Diesel Test’ product asap ....” A 

Revolution employee responded, asking Curry to submit 

additional information to its support email address. Curry 

did not respond on Facebook but sent an email to the support 

address on November 15, 2016, saying that he had used the 

“Diesel trademark and brand name since 2002” and again 

instructing Revolution to “stop the production, distribution, 

and sale of any item using the ‘Diesel Test’ mark 

immediately.” Revolution did not respond.

At trial, Joshua and Barry testified that they thought these 

initial messages from Curry were scams. Joshua nonetheless 

forwarded the email to Barry and two other Revolution employees later in the day on November 15, 2016, saying:

FYI guys. Does anybody have any information 

if Jeff checked the trademarks on these? Russ 

can you please do a search and see if “diesel 

test” is available for trademark or if this guy is 

telling the truth. I personally vote we let him sue 

us to get through the remainder of our labels 

and then change the name to DZL Test on our 

next run.

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No. 23-2850 7

Barry testified that he agreed with Joshua that Revolution 

should ignore Curry’s cease-and-desist demands and let him 

sue the company. Another Revolution employee then ran a 

search for the trademark and learned that it was available for 

purchase. Someone else responded to the email chain asking 

whether Revolution should purchase the mark, and Barry 

responded “Yessssssssss.” Joshua—with Barry’s approval—

applied to register the Diesel Test trademark on November 28, 

2016.

Joshua and Barry testified that they took other steps to investigate Curry’s trademark claim. Joshua told the jury that 

he again searched Google and Trademarks 411 and spoke 

with distributors to determine whether they were aware of a 

non-Revolution Diesel Test. Barry testified that he personally 

searched Amazon for Curry’s Diesel Test but did not find anything. Barry also convened an office meeting to discuss 

Curry’s claim and issued several follow-up instructions. He 

dispatched multiple employees to search for Diesel Test’s 

trademark registration, one to call distributors, one to call “affiliate marketer networks,” and one to search online sales 

platforms for evidence of Curry’s Diesel Test. Barry testified 

that he ultimately concluded that Curry’s claim was “BS.”

Curry followed up on his cease-and-desist demands on 

November 18, 2016. He again received no response. Curry 

then filed a complaint with Amazon in February 2017 

claiming that Revolution’s Diesel Test was a counterfeit 

version of his Diesel Test. Amazon notified Revolution that 

there had been a complaint regarding the authenticity of its 

product. Revolution did not contest the complaint, and 

Amazon removed Revolution’s Diesel Test listing from the 

sales platform. But Revolution continued to sell its Diesel Test 

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8 No. 23-2850 

on other platforms. It stopped marketing Diesel Test in 2017

but continued selling the remaining product until at least 

early 2018, and possibly until 2020.

D. The Lawsuit

Curry filed this lawsuit without counsel in March 2017. In 

August of that year, the district court dismissed the complaint 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. Curry v. Revolution 

Laboratories, LLC, No. 17-cv-2283, 2017 WL 3520955, at *5 (N.D. 

Ill. Aug. 15, 2017). On appeal, we recruited counsel for Curry 

and reversed. Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, LLC, 949 F.3d 

385, 402–03 (7th Cir. 2020). On remand, Curry retained 

counsel.

As relevant to this appeal, Curry’s complaint asserted violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (ICFA) (Count I), the federal Lanham Act (Count III), 

and Illinois common-law trademark infringement (Count V). 

The complaint sought punitive damages pursuant to the ICFA 

and injunctive relief under Illinois common law. It did not ask 

expressly for punitive damages under Illinois common law. 

On December 22, 2020, defendants stipulated to 

Revolution’s liability under the Lanham Act and Illinois 

common law. The stipulation explicitly reserved questions 

regarding Revolution’s liability under the ICFA, Joshua and 

Barry’s personal liability as to all counts, and all available 

damages. On January 26, 2022, the district court entered 

summary judgment for defendants on Curry’s ICFA claim.

The federal Lanham Act and Illinois common-law claims 

proceeded to a five-day jury trial in May 2023. The jury found 

for Curry. It awarded him $2,500 in actual damages resulting 

from loss of goodwill and reputation and $500,000 as 

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No. 23-2850 9

disgorgement of Revolution’s profits. The jury also imposed 

a total of $900,000 in punitive damages, $300,000 each against 

Joshua, Barry, and Revolution. After trial, the district court 

ruled that disgorgement of profits under the Lanham Act, see 

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), is an equitable remedy, not a legal one, 

and exercised its judgment to increase the disgorgement 

award to $547,095.44. The court also denied defendants’ 

motion to reduce the jury’s punitive damages award, finding 

that the ratio between defendants’ profits award of roughly 

$550,000 and the punitive damage awards of $300,000 per 

defendant was less than 1:1 per defendant and therefore 

“easily permissible” under the Constitution. Curry v. 

Revolution Laboratories, LLC, 2023 WL 5509337, at *17 (N.D. Ill. 

Aug. 25, 2023), quoting Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 534 

(7th Cir. 2004). 

II. Analysis

Defendants argue on appeal that the district court erred by 

allowing Curry to make his punitive damages request to the 

jury. They also argue that the punitive damage awards were 

unconstitutionally excessive in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. We conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in managing the case so as to allow Curry 

to present his punitive damage request to a jury. We also take 

this opportunity to clarify some of our case law on the due 

process limits on punitive damages, in particular agreeing 

with the district court that the appropriate analytic “ratio” 

should be calculated on a per-defendant basis and that disgorged profits may be added to compensatory damages in 

calculating such a ratio. 

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10 No. 23-2850 

A. Plaintiff’s Demand for Punitive Damages

First, we address whether the district court appropriately 

allowed Curry to present his punitive damage demand to the 

jury. Defendants paint this as a dispute over whether the 

district court’s decision to allow the jury to hear Curry’s 

punitive damages demand at all was an abuse of discretion 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(a)(2). That rule 

allows a court to take a claim away from a jury when it 

concludes that “there is no federal right to a jury trial.” But 

there is no question that Curry had a federal right to a jury 

trial on his punitive damages demand. The Seventh 

Amendment preserves the right of trial by jury in “suits at 

common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 

twenty dollars.” As a general rule, “a claim for damages ... 

[is] a suit at common law within the meaning of the Seventh 

Amendment.” Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC v. Marseilles Land 

& Water Co., 299 F.3d 643, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Jones 

v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1204 (10th Cir. 2012) 

(“[P]laintiffs have a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial 

when they seek punitive damages.”), citing Curtis v. Loether, 

415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (finding Seventh Amendment right to 

jury trial under statute now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 3613 and 

stating “the relief sought here—actual and punitive 

damages—is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts 

of law.”). Defendants do not argue that Curry did not have a 

right to a jury trial on his punitive damages claim.

The real question is whether the district court abused its 

discretion in allowing Curry to seek punitive damages at all 

because his complaint did not ask expressly for punitive 

damages on the Illinois common-law claim. That question is 

governed here by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), which 

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No. 23-2850 11

provides that a final judgment, other than a default judgment, 

“should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even 

if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.” The 

district court invoked Rule 54(c) when ruling that Curry could 

present his punitive damages demand to the jury, showing 

that the real question is the availability of relief, not the 

identity of the proper trier of fact.

We have explained generally that Rule 54(c) leaves “no 

question that it is the court’s duty to grant whatever relief is 

appropriate in the case on the facts proved.” Kaszuk v. Bakery 

& Confectionery Union & Indus. Int'l Pension Fund, 791 F.2d 548, 

559 (7th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), 

quoting United States v. Marin, 651 F.2d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 1981). 

But a party “may not be ‘entitled’ to relief if its conduct ... has 

improperly and substantially prejudiced the other party.” 

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975). A 

substantial increase in the defendant’s possible liability “can 

constitute specific prejudice barring additional relief under 

Rule 54(c).” Kaszuk, 791 F.2d at 559, quoting Atlantic 

Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716–17 (4th 

Cir. 1983); see also Brewer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 203, 

207 (7th Cir. 1996) (district court abused discretion by 

allowing jury to impose punitive damages when plaintiff 

“first raised the punitive damage issue after the close of 

evidence.”). We review a district court’s determination under 

Rule 54(c) for abuse of discretion. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. 

Employers Reinsurance Corp., 144 F.3d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir. 

1998). 

Defendants argue that the district court abused its 

discretion by allowing Curry to seek punitive damages from 

the jury because, they claim, they were unaware that Curry 

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12 No. 23-2850 

was seeking punitive damages under Illinois common law, 

and they stipulated to Revolution’s liability under that count. 

Defendants rely on Cullen v. Saddler, 668 F. App’x 656 (7th Cir. 

2016), as their primary authority for this argument. In 

addition to being non-precedential, Cullen is easily 

distinguishable—and the differences highlight why 

defendants were not unfairly prejudiced here. 

In Cullen, the plaintiff brought a pro se complaint against 

prison officials for violating his First Amendment rights by 

requiring him to participate in a religious substance-abuse 

program. Id. at 657. His complaint sought $350 in damages 

and an injunction. The district court granted summary judgment for Cullen on liability and proceeded to consider damages. At that point, for the first time, Cullen asserted that his 

relief should include more than $2 million in punitive damages. The district court denied his request to seek additional 

relief under Rule 54(c). We affirmed, noting that Cullen 

“pleaded in his amended complaint and swore under oath in 

five separate interrogatory responses that he sought only $350 

in compensatory damages.” Id. at 658. We emphasized: “Only 

after the parties had completed discovery, litigating this suit 

as a low-stakes dispute, and the district court had ruled 

against the defendants on liability did Cullen seek over $2 

million in punitive damages—a more than 5,000-fold increase 

in requested relief.” Id.

This case is unlike the non-precedential Cullen for three 

reasons. First, Curry’s complaint expressly sought punitive 

damages, giving defendants ample notice that this was not a 

low-stakes dispute. Second, unlike Cullen, Curry did not 

swear under oath that he sought only a modest amount in 

compensatory damages. As the district court explained here, 

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No. 23-2850 13

nothing in the record “amounts to a disavowal of punitive 

damages on the state law trademark claim.”

Finally, and perhaps most important, Curry made it clear 

that he was seeking punitive damages on the basis of Illinois 

common law well before the close of discovery. Defendants 

stipulated to Revolution’s liability under Illinois common law 

on December 22, 2020. At that time, they were still on notice 

that Curry was seeking punitive damages on the ICFA claim. 

More than a year later, when the district court granted 

summary judgment on that count on January 26, 2022, 

defendants might have believed (briefly) that they were off 

the hook for punitive damages. But further litigation on 

discovery disputes quickly showed that punitive damages 

were still at issue, albeit on the common-law claim. Just a few 

weeks later, on February 14, 2022, Curry moved to compel 

production of information regarding defendants’ net worth. 

That motion argued that “the Nussbaums’ financial 

information is ... directly relevant to deciding the amount of 

punitive damages on Plaintiff’s common law trademark 

infringement claim.” Dkt. 197-1 at 8 (emphasis added, footnote 

omitted). Curry’s motion also cited cases from this circuit 

confirming that punitive damages are available under Illinois 

common law of unfair competition. Id. at 8 n.10, citing JCW 

Investments, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 919 (7th Cir. 

2007).

Defendants responded on February 22, 2022 with an 

extensive discussion of why in their view Barry and Joshua’s 

personal finances were not relevant to calculating punitive 

damages for Illinois common-law trademark infringement. 

Dkt. 199 at 6. That brief argued that Illinois law generally 

disfavors punitive damages and that Curry was seeking “a 

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14 No. 23-2850 

new theory of damages that is based on facts not in his 

Complaint.” The district court granted Curry’s motion to 

compel, explaining that “defendants’ finances are relevant on 

the question of punitive damages on the state law claim” and 

that “[t]he conduct is what forms the basis for a punitive 

damages award.” This discovery litigation shows that 

defendants knew that Curry was seeking punitive damages 

under Illinois common law well before trial—and well before 

their objection filed on December 6, 2022.4

Revolution’s earlier stipulated liability to the Illinois 

common-law claim does not constitute unfair prejudice for 

three additional reasons. First, defendants explicitly reserved 

the right to dispute Joshua and Barry’s common-law liability 

4 This conclusion is also supported by additional events. On May 18, 

2022, the district court held a status hearing at which it asked counsel: 

“What exactly is there that will go to trial? What claims against whom on 

damages—on liability only, on damages only, what?” Dkt. 260 at 3. After 

Curry’s counsel told the court that he would be seeking punitive damages, 

the court asked whether those punitive damages would potentially apply 

to both the trademark and the counterfeiting claims. The lawyer 

responded: “The punitive damages would be on the common law 

trademark infringement claim.” Id. at 4. When the court then asked 

defendants’ counsel whether Curry’s statement about the triable issues 

was correct, he said that he “dealt solely with financial discovery” and 

could not “speak to the trademark claims.” Id. at 5. This exchange further 

rebuts defendants’ argument that Curry’s claim of punitive damages 

amounted to an eleventh-hour amendment of the complaint that they 

could not have foreseen. Several other post-summary judgment docket 

entries also referred to punitive damages, although they did not specify 

the cause of action. See, e.g., dkt. 216 at 4–5 (district court noting on April 

15, 2022 that punitive damages discovery was underway); dkt. 280 at 4 

(Curry’s proposed pretrial order, submitted on August 22, 2022, noting 

that he sought punitive damages); dkt. 467 at 20 (Curry’s counsel told 

district court he was seeking punitive damages).

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No. 23-2850 15

and “the amount of damages as to all Counts.” Additionally, 

to impose punitive damages, the jury still had to make an 

additional “willful and malicious” or “reckless disregard” 

finding, as to which defendants did not stipulate. Finally, 

defendants litigated discovery issues related to punitive 

damages, showing lack of unfair surprise. 

Defendants were not blindsided unfairly by a substantial 

increase in their potential liability, so the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in concluding that Curry was entitled to 

seek punitive damages under Illinois common law, even 

though he did not demand that relief in his pleadings. See 

Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (questioning 

whether plaintiffs needed to amend their complaint to seek 

punitive damages and noting: “Rule 54(c) contemplates an 

award of punitive damages if the party deserves such relief—

whether or not a claim for punitive damages appears in the 

complaint.”); see also Back Doctors Ltd. v. Metropolitan Property 

& Casualty Ins. Co., 637 F.3d 827, 830–31 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(vacating order remanding to state court under Class Action 

Fairness Act; amount in controversy may include legally 

available punitive damages even if lead plaintiff has not asked 

for them in pleadings). 

B. The Due Process Challenge to the Punitive Damage Awards 

Defendants next argue that the jury’s punitive damage 

awards were unconstitutionally excessive. We disagree. Before explaining our holding, though, we reiterate that “the 

Constitution is not the most relevant limit to a federal court 

when assessing punitive damages, as it comes into play ‘only 

after the assessment has been tested against statutory and 

common-law principles.’” Saccameno v. U.S. Bank N.A., 943 

F.3d 1071, 1086 (7th Cir. 2019), quoting Perez v. Z Frank 

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16 No. 23-2850 

Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 617, 625 (7th Cir. 2000). Defendants 

do not argue that any source of law other than the federal 

Constitution restrains the punitive damage awards here, 

though, so we address only the federal due process issue.5

The Supreme Court has explained that the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes constitutional 

limits on the power of states to award punitive damages in 

civil cases. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568. Punitive damages, unlike 

compensatory damages, are “retributive in nature and seek to 

deter wrongful acts in the first place.” Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 

1086, citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416. States retain “considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive damages 

that they will allow,” but constitutional fairness requires that 

a party receive fair notice of “the severity of the penalty that 

a State may impose.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (first quotation); at 

574 (second quotation). Because civil defendants subject to 

punitive damages do not receive the “protections applicable 

in a criminal proceeding,” courts conduct rigorous reviews of 

juries’ punitive damages awards. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417. 

That review is de novo. Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Hytera 

Comms. Corp., 108 F.4th 458, 495 (7th Cir. 2024), quoting Estate 

of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 756 (7th Cir. 2005), quoting 

in turn Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418.

The Supreme Court has instructed us to consider three 

guideposts when assessing the constitutionality of a punitive 

damage award: (1) the “degree of reprehensibility” of the 

5 Defendants say that “Illinois courts analyze the same factors” as 

courts assessing federal due process limits on punitive damages, Def. Br. 

at 28, but do not argue that Illinois law serves as an independent basis for 

reversal or requires any different or additional analysis. 

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No. 23-2850 17

defendant’s misconduct; (2) the “disparity between the harm 

or potential harm” suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive 

damage award; and (3) the difference between the punitive 

damage award and “the civil penalties authorized or imposed 

in comparable cases.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. We have explained 

that when punitive damage awards based on state commonlaw claims do not come with “precise, reasoned legislative 

judgment[s],” such awards are subject to “more exacting Gore 

review.” Motorola, 108 F.4th at 498–99. 

1. Reprehensibility

“The first and most important guidepost is the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct ....” Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 

1086. We judge reprehensibility by considering whether:

the harm caused was physical as opposed to 

economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health 

or safety of others; the target of the conduct had 

financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and 

the harm was the result of intentional malice, 

trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.

Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419, citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576–77. The 

presence of just one of these factors “weighing in favor of a 

plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages 

award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.” Id.

The first factor—whether the harm was physical or 

economic—weighs in favor of defendants. As in Motorola and 

Epic Systems Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., 980 F.3d 1117, 

1141 (7th Cir. 2020), which both involved stolen trade secrets, 

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18 No. 23-2850 

this case is about intellectual property and economic harm. As 

we explained in Saccameno: “The first factor is intended to 

draw a line—however hard to police—between physical 

injuries and those that are essentially economic, even if those 

economic injuries cause distress.” 943 F.3d at 1086–87. We also 

rejected the argument that economic injuries that “cause 

distress” qualify as “physical harm” under Gore (except 

perhaps in extreme circumstances). Id. at 1087, citing 

McGinnis v. American Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 901 F.3d 

1282, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding factor met because 

plaintiff’s depression caused projectile vomiting, and she told 

defendant that its conduct was causing undue stress). Curry’s 

testimony that Revolution’s use of the Diesel Test mark 

shocked and upset him does not rise to that level. The second 

factor—whether the defendants acted with “reckless 

disregard to the health or safety of others”—favors 

defendants for the same reason. 

The third factor, financial vulnerability, favors plaintiff 

Curry. The relevant fact here is the parties’ relative ability to 

weather financial turmoil. At the time of the infringement, 

Revolution was a well-capitalized and apparently successful 

business with more than 50 employees and more than 30 

products in circulation. The jury could reasonably find that 

Revolution was prepared to take a financial hit for its 

wrongdoing. Joshua admitted as much when he suggested 

that Revolution’s management “let him sue us to get through 

the remainder of our labels and then change the name to DZL 

Test on our next run.” Curry, on the other hand, sold his 

house to start Get Diesel Nutrition, and he worked a second 

job as an information technology professional to earn a more 

stable income. He did not have the assistance of counsel for 

his cease-and-desist demands, and he originally filed this 

Case: 23-2850 Document: 43 Filed: 12/19/2024 Pages: 34
No. 23-2850 19

lawsuit pro se. This lack of legal sophistication appears to 

have contributed to Revolution’s willingness to risk a lawsuit.

This conclusion on the third factor is consistent with our 

decision in Saccameno. There, we found that a loan servicing 

company’s “deliberately indifferent” conduct—erroneously 

calculating and seeking to collect a debt from a borrower who 

had recently gone through bankruptcy—supported an award 

of punitive damages. 943 F.3d at 1081 & 1085. On the financial 

vulnerability factor, we explained: “We have not required intentional exploitation to find that this factor weighs in favor 

of punitive damages.” Id. at 1087, citing Green v. Howser, 942 

F.3d 772, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2019); E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 

F.3d 824, 839 (7th Cir. 2013). We also noted that the creditor’s 

behavior would have been “both different and less reprehensible had Saccameno not recently come out of bankruptcy.” 

Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 1087. 

The same principles apply in this case. The evidence did 

not prove conclusively that Revolution intentionally exploited Curry’s financial vulnerability, but it did not need to. 

It is sufficient to note that Revolution’s conduct—promoting 

an infringing product and refusing to stop selling under the 

infringing name despite repeated cease-and-desist demands, 

including one from Amazon—would have been “different 

and less reprehensible,” id., if Curry had been a sophisticated 

commercial actor. This financial imbalance provides some 

support for the awards of punitive damages. See Willow Inn, 

Inc. v. Public Service Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 

2005) (finding financial vulnerability when insurance company exploited “modest family-run business” by withholding 

claim payments); International Union of Operating Eng’rs, Loc. 

150 v. Lowe Excavating Co., 870 N.E.2d 303, 314–15 (Ill. 2006) 

Case: 23-2850 Document: 43 Filed: 12/19/2024 Pages: 34
20 No. 23-2850 

(no financial vulnerability when plaintiff was a 16-person 

company and failed to submit evidence of financial struggle). 

The fourth factor—whether the conduct involved 

repeated actions or was an isolated incident—also favors 

Curry. After Revolution received Curry’s cease-and-desist 

demands, it continued to sell its Diesel Test, deciding to “let 

him sue” so it could continue to sell its already-labeled 

inventory. Defendants’ claim that they thought Curry’s letters 

were scams is undermined by two additional facts. First, 

Joshua’s email expressly acknowledged the possibility of a 

lawsuit and expressed a desire to continue selling the 

allegedly infringing product despite that possibility. Second, 

Amazon notified Revolution that its product had been 

flagged as a counterfeit. It then gave Revolution an 

opportunity to dispute that designation. Revolution declined 

to do so, and Amazon accordingly removed its online listing 

for Revolution’s Diesel Test. 

Amazon is not judge and jury on trademark infringement, 

but in deciding on punitive damages, the jury could treat its 

actions as a clear warning to Revolution of a serious problem. 

Revolution nonetheless chose to continue selling its 

infringing product through other channels. The jury could 

reasonably find that Revolution’s infringing actions were 

repeated, not isolated. See Epic Systems, 980 F.3d at 1136 

(when reviewing a due process challenge to punitive 

damages, “we view the facts and evidence in the light most 

favorable to ... the litigant who prevailed before the jury.”) 

(internal alterations omitted), quoting Valdivia v. Township 

High Sch. Dist. 214, 942 F.3d 395, 396 (7th Cir. 2019). 

The fifth factor cuts the same way, for the same reasons. 

While the evidence does not show that the harm resulted from 

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No. 23-2850 21

any malice towards Curry, it also was no “mere accident.” 

Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419. Revolution’s original product development and initial sales might have involved a good-faith 

mistake about Curry’s trademark, but the jury could reasonably find that good faith went out the window after Curry’s 

repeated cease-and-desist notices, Revolution’s acknowledgment of those messages, and its decision to continue selling 

the infringing product.6

Seeking to rehabilitate its appearance of good faith, 

Revolution argues that it voluntarily stopped selling Diesel 

Test once it realized its mistake. But that assertion is belied by 

evidence in the record that Revolution continued to sell Diesel 

Test until 2020, three years after the initial lawsuit was filed. 

That evidence, while contested, is plausible, and we take the 

facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. 

Sommerfield v. Knasiak, 967 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2020). The 

jury was entitled to view defendants as serial infringers 

whose word could not be trusted.

Like the conduct at issue in Saccameno and Epic Systems, 

Revolution’s conduct was not reprehensible “to an extreme 

degree.” See Epic Systems, 980 F.3d at 1142, quoting Saccameno, 

943 F.3d at 1088. It neither caused physical harm to Curry nor 

recklessly disregarded the physical safety of others. But 

Revolution continued to sell its Diesel Test for years after it 

6 In addition, the jury was not required to believe Revolution’s defense 

that it actually undertook a trademark search in good faith. See Curry v. 

Revolution Laboratories, LLC, No. 17-cv-2283, 2023 WL 5509337, at *21 (N.D. 

Ill. Aug. 25, 2023) (expressing skepticism about defendants’ claimed goodfaith belief that Curry did not have trademark rights based on documentary evidence, including Joshua’s “let him sue” email). The supposed 

searches were not documented.

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22 No. 23-2850 

was notified that it was violating Curry’s trademark. It also 

directly acknowledged that Curry might sue and decided to 

“let him” so that it could sell the rest of its labeled Diesel Test 

product. The jury could reasonably treat this conduct as 

showing calculated disregard for Curry’s property rights, and 

the jury was within its discretion to decide that it was worthy 

of punishment. 

2. Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages

The second guidepost from Gore is “the disparity between 

the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the 

punitive damages award.” 517 U.S. at 575. The Supreme 

Court has provided guidance for assessing this “ratio” 

between harm suffered and punitive damages. First, “few 

awards exceeding a single-digit ratio ‘to a significant degree’ 

will satisfy due process.” Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 1088, quoting 

Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. We have used this guidance to 

reduce a punitive damage award with a 2:1 ratio to 

compensatory damages, Epic Systems, 980 F.3d at 1143–44, 

and have upheld an award with a ratio as high as 37:1 in an 

egregious case. Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 

F.3d 672, 676–68 (7th Cir. 2003). Second, the ratio analysis is 

flexible and may allow for a higher ratio when compensatory 

damages are small. Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 1088, citing 

Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. The Mathias case is a good example. 

We affirmed punitive damages of $186,000 per plaintiff where 

compensatory damages were only $5,000 per plaintiff. The 

defendant hotel in that case had repeatedly chosen to 

disregard extensive evidence that its hotel rooms were 

infested with bed bugs in “farcical proportions,” leading to 

the plaintiffs’ injuries, which included physical injuries. 

Mathias, 347 F.3d at 675. 

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No. 23-2850 23

a. Per-Defendant or Aggregate?

This case presents two issues about how to calculate the 

ratio. The first is whether the ratio should be calculated by 

looking at punitive damages on a per-defendant basis or in 

the aggregate. The difference is meaningful here: the ratio 

changes by a factor of three depending on whether the analysis looks at each of the three defendants or instead compares 

total punitive damages to total compensatory damages. 

Due process challenges to punitive damage awards are 

properly evaluated on a per-defendant basis. First, approaching the punitive damage inquiry from a per-defendant standpoint is consistent with “the court’s task of determining 

whether any or all of the defendants had their due process 

rights violated.” Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette Inc. 

v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 422 F.3d 949, 960 (9th Cir. 

2005) (emphasis in original) (calculating ratio for each defendant by comparing each individual punitive damage award to 

compensatory damages for which that defendant was jointly 

and severally liable).7

Each defendant possesses individual due process rights, 

and the punishment imposed on each defendant must be assessed individually. Bert Co. v. Turk, 298 A.3d 44, 71 (Pa. 2023) 

(“The per-defendant ratio assesses the individualized impact 

intended by the punitive damages awards, whereas the per7 We need not address here the related question of how to analyze the 

punitive damage ratio in cases involving multiple plaintiffs. See Planned 

Parenthood, 422 F.3d at 960–63 (reducing and then affirming punitive damage awards in favor of different individual plaintiffs). Because Curry is the 

only plaintiff and defendants are jointly and severally liable for the compensatory damages and disgorgement awards, we treat them as equally 

culpable for the harm imposed.

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24 No. 23-2850 

judgment approach distorts the analysis by obscuring the due 

process rights of the individual defendants.”); Horizon Health 

Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., 520 S.W.3d 848, 874 (Tex. 2017) 

(same); see also Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 830 (7th Cir. 

2010) (punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, are 

“assessed separately against each defendant.”).8

The aggregate approach “fails to allow for the possibility 

that the reprehensibility of individual defendants can ... 

differ.” Planned Parenthood, 422 F.3d at 960. The jury’s verdict 

here ordered each of the three defendants to pay $300,000 in 

punitive damages. This approach shows that the jury “fixed 

the amount of the punitive damages award to each plaintiff 

from each defendant based on its assessment of each 

defendant’s reprehensibility relative to other defendants and 

to each plaintiff.” Id. The fact that the amount was the same 

for each defendant does not affect the due process issue. It 

signals only that the jury found that these defendants were 

similarly responsible for inflicting the harm that supported 

the punitive damage awards. The point is that this

particularized calculation of punitive damages is no accident. 

We decline to adopt a rule that would limit the jury’s ability 

to assess culpability individually. See Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 

1088–89 (assessing whether actual damages denominator 

should be divided based on claim or aggregated, declining to 

resolve the issue conclusively, and affirming district court’s 

8 The jury’s verdict here assigned joint and several liability for the 

compensatory damage award and the disgorgement award. Those awards 

indicate collective liability rather than particularized assessments of 

inflicted damage. The ratio analysis might be different in a case where 

compensatory damage awards differentiated among multiple defendants’ 

responsibilities. 

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No. 23-2850 25

decision to aggregate, explaining that it is ultimately “conduct 

and harm we must assess against the amount awarded”). 

Defendants cite United States E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. 

Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1287 (7th Cir. 1995), in 

support of their aggregation argument, but that case also 

counsels in favor of assessing the relevant ratio on a perdefendant basis. In AIC, the district court awarded $75,000 in 

punitive damages against each of two defendants—a 

corporation and an individual—after a jury awarded $50,000 

in actual damages. Id. at 1279. We concluded that the 

individual defendant should have been dismissed from the 

case, so we remanded for the district court to decide “whether 

[the individual’s] share of punitive damages should drop out 

or should instead be imposed on AIC.” Id. at 1287. Our 

decision to remand reflects the principle that punitive 

damage awards are based on facts allowing for individualized

assessments of culpability. We follow that principle here.

b. Including Disgorgement?

The next issue is whether “harm suffered” by the plaintiff—the denominator in the ratio—can include equitable relief, including disgorgement of wrongful profits, or whether 

the denominator is limited, as a matter of law, to compensatory damages. The issue matters here because the jury 

awarded Curry just $2,500 in compensatory damages. If the 

ratio did not include the $547,000 in disgorgement of wrongful profits, the ratio would be 120:1 for each of the $300,000 

punitive damage awards, well beyond what would typically 

be considered constitutionally permissible. We see no reason 

to adopt defendants’ proposed rule, which would rigidly and 

categorically exclude consideration of equitable relief as a 

matter of law when weighing the constitutionality of a 

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26 No. 23-2850 

punitive damage award. We also conclude that the ratio in 

this case properly included the equitable disgorgement 

award. 

Defendants note that the district court’s disgorgement 

award was “an equitable remedy specifically provided by the 

Lanham Act,” not based on Illinois common law. They assert 

that because Curry’s disgorgement award is equitable, it “is 

not considered harm suffered by the mark owner and, therefore, cannot be used in assessing the punitive damages ratio.” 

The argument depends on two mistaken assumptions: first, 

that equitable awards cannot reflect “harm suffered by the 

mark owner,” and second, that if an award is not for “harm 

suffered,” it may not be considered as part of the punitive 

damages calculation. We disagree with both assumptions.

As for the first, the fact that a remedy is deemed equitable 

rather than legal simply does not mean that it cannot reflect 

harm caused to a plaintiff. We acknowledged this in Epic 

Systems, where we compared a $140 million damage award—

which was based on benefit to the defendant, not harm to the 

plaintiff—to a $280 million punitive damage award. 980 F.3d 

at 1143. We noted that if the plaintiff had suffered quantifiable 

economic harm, that harm was “significantly smaller” than 

the $140 million damage award, id., but decided nonetheless 

to consider the $140 million damage award in calculating the 

ratio for two primary reasons. First, to be sure, the defendant 

in Epic Systems waived the argument that defendants make 

here. But second: “If we had to quantify [plaintiff’s] harm to 

arrive at the appropriate ratio, applying the second dueprocess guidepost would pose a challenging task.” Id. Epic 

Systems acknowledged that when courts are faced with the 

challenge of approximating actual damages, reliance on illCase: 23-2850 Document: 43 Filed: 12/19/2024 Pages: 34
No. 23-2850 27

gotten gains can serve as a useful proxy, or at the very least as 

an indicator of how serious the wrongdoing was. See also 

Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 

1335, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that unjust enrichment 

is not always only the return of a purchase price but can 

approximate value of unlawful conduct), vacated, 538 U.S. 

974 (2003), on remand, Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb 

Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reaffirming 

punitive damage award). Nothing about the Due Process 

Clauses in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments precludes 

courts from considering equitable awards when assessing 

punitive damages.

Epic Systems provides further support on this point. After 

concluding that the $140 million actual damages award 

(which was based on benefit to that defendant, not harm to 

that plaintiff) was the proper denominator for the ratio, we 

imposed a 1:1 ratio of punitive damages. Epic Systems, 980 

F.3d at 1145. Applying defendants’ argument in this case—

that only compensatory damages may be considered in the denominator—would have made the ratio in that case much 

higher because the denominator would have been significantly smaller. This comparison helps show why considering 

non-punitive relief as a whole is the proper way to assess the 

constitutionality of a punitive damages award. The broader 

view helps compare the magnitude of the bad action to the 

magnitude of the punishment.9

9 We do not address here a situation where punitive damages were 

based on a legal theory that would apply to only a portion of the nonpunitive relief. 

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28 No. 23-2850 

Defendants’ second mistaken assumption is that only 

“harm suffered” may be used as the comparator in due 

process assessments of punitive damage awards. To start, the 

Supreme Court has “eschewed an approach that concentrates 

entirely on the relationship between actual and punitive 

damages.” TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp., 509 U.S. 

443, 460 (1993). It is also appropriate to consider the 

“magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant’s conduct 

would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan 

had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to other victims 

that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not 

deterred.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Saccameno, 943 

F.3d at 1088 (“ratio should not be confined to actual harm, but 

can also consider potential harm”). Supreme Court precedent 

directly rejects defendants’ assumption. 

Defendants cite Adidas America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, 

Inc., No. CV 01-1655-KI, 2008 WL 4279812 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 

2008), for the principle that equitable relief may not be considered in evaluating a punitive damage award. In that case,

Adidas sued Payless for various allegedly unfair trade practices. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Adidas, including 

$30.6 million in actual damages, a $137 million disgorgement 

award, and $137 million in punitive damages. Id. at *1. The 

district court—like the district court in this case—exercised its 

discretion under the Lanham Act to adjust the disgorgement 

award, in Adidas reducing it to $19.7 million. Id. at *13. In considering the constitutionality of the punitive damage award, 

the court cited Gore for the principle that it must consider “the 

disparity between the harm suffered by adidas and the punitive damages award,” stated that the profits award was “not 

harm suffered by the mark owner,” and accordingly 

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No. 23-2850 29

calculated the ratio based on only the compensatory damages 

award. Id. at *15. 

We respectfully disagree with the Adidas court’s exclusion 

of the disgorgement award for purposes of the due process 

analysis, at least as a general rule, apart from possible unique 

features of the Adidas case. As we explained above, Saccameno 

and Epic Systems clarify that the ratio guidepost seeks to compare the egregiousness of the conduct—represented by the 

punitive damage award—to the actual and potential realworld consequences of the defendants’ actions. Those consequences can be approximated by compensatory damages, but 

as we explained in Mathias, considerations of punitive proportionality may change “when the probability of detection is 

very low (a familiar example is the heavy fines for littering) or 

the crime is potentially lucrative (as in the case of trafficking 

in illegal drugs).” 347 F.3d at 676. Compensatory damages 

will not always paint a full picture of the wrongfulness of the 

defendant’s conduct. 

So Supreme Court precedent and well-established principles of punitive proportionality teach that courts may consider equitable remedies in calculating the punitive damage 

ratio. But was it appropriate to do so in this case? We conclude 

that it was. Defendants make much of the fact that the district 

court explicitly instructed the jury not to include their profits 

in any potential damage award, arguing that it shows that 

their profits were unrelated to any harm to Curry. But the 

court also narrowly limited the types of actual damages that 

the jury could award, instructing it to consider only damage 

to Curry’s reputation and related loss of goodwill, but not lost 

profits. This instruction ensured that the compensatory damage award would not reflect any of Curry’s lost profits, and it 

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30 No. 23-2850 

guarded against possible double-counting of those economic 

harms in the actual damages award and the disgorgement 

award. Judge Kennelly’s strict limits on what the jury could 

consider in various damages calculations counsels in favor of 

using the disgorgement award in the ratio analysis to paint a 

more complete picture of Curry’s harm and Revolution’s 

wrongdoing. 

Several additional considerations help convince us that it 

is appropriate to look to the disgorgement award in this case. 

First, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “low awards of 

compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio 

than high compensatory awards ....” Gore, 517 U.S. at 582. We 

outlined the reason above: reprehensible acts with a low 

detection rate or highly lucrative potential payouts that may 

result in small compensatory damages may support a higher 

ratio of punitive damages to deter future offenders. The small 

compensatory award here is (1) artificially deflated because it 

did not account for any of Curry’s lost profits (which would 

be difficult to calculate) and (2) inadequate to deter future 

mark infringement—either by Revolution or by other 

companies dealing with less sophisticated small businesses.10

10 Defendants argue that the disgorgement award should not be considered because it is not a proxy for Curry’s damages. We need not address whether the profits calculation is an accurate proxy. First, the compensatory award here definitely fails to represent Curry’s actual lost profits because they were explicitly excluded from that figure. Second, the 

profits award is relevant to the reprehensibility of defendants’ infringing 

actions. Defendants argue that Curry should be estopped from arguing 

that the disgorgement award is a proxy for his damages because he argued 

that disgorgement was equitable in the district court, but this argument 

relies on a flawed view of the nature of equitable relief, as explained 

above. 

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No. 23-2850 31

Defendants say that using the disgorgement award to help 

affirm the punitive damage awards transformed the 

disgorgement award into a penalty, which would be contrary 

to the express terms of the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) 

(in fashioning relief under Lanham Act, court may “in its 

discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find 

to be just” and which “shall constitute compensation and not 

a penalty”). We disagree. The district court calculated the 

appropriate profit disgorgement in a thorough and 

thoughtful opinion, explaining why certain profits were 

recoverable and why others were not. Curry, 2023 WL 

5509337, at *8–*14. The court then assessed whether the 

punitive damage awards were proportional to the magnitude 

of the ill-gotten gains in the case. This analysis did not 

transform the disgorgement award into a penalty; it properly 

used the disgorgement award, which reflects the nature of the 

illegal conduct, as a basis for assessing the appropriate 

punitive damage awards. 

Because equitable relief may be considered when calculating the ratio between punitive and actual damages, and because we may consider factors other than compensatory damages in that calculation, the district court did not err in concluding that the disgorgement award combined with the compensatory damage award was the appropriate denominator 

for due process purposes. The appropriate ratio is $300,000 in 

punitive damages per defendant compared against 

$549,595.44. As the district court explained, this ratio of less 

than 1:1 is “easily permissible.” Curry, 2023 WL 5509337, at 

*17, quoting Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 534 (7th Cir. 

2004). 

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32 No. 23-2850 

Defendants’ final argument, advanced in a footnote of 

their opening brief, is that the court should consider only 

defendants’ Illinois sales in the punitive damage ratio. We 

decline the invitation to find a constitutional federalism 

elephant in that mousehole. This argument (which also was 

not made to the district court) is waived. See Puffer v. Allstate 

Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that 

underdeveloped arguments and arguments not made to the 

district court are waived or forfeited). Additionally, 

defendants’ waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice 

for two reasons. Campbell, which defendants use as authority 

for their argument, found constitutional issues with imposing 

punitive damages resulting from (1) state-law violations 

committed against (2) out-of-state victims other than the 

plaintiff, including those in jurisdictions where the conduct 

may have been legal. See 538 U.S. at 420 (“The Utah Supreme 

Court’s opinion makes explicit that State Farm was being 

condemned for its nationwide policies rather than for the 

conduct directed toward the Campbells.”). Here, we have 

violations of a federal statute and state common law 

committed against one plaintiff. This case does not raise the 

same federalism issues because the remedy is based (at least 

in part) on a federal cause of action, and because Curry is the 

only victim of Revolution’s misconduct. Curry did not need 

to file separate suits in all 50 states to vindicate his Lanham 

Act rights.

3. Comparable Civil Penalties

The final Gore guidepost compares the punitive damage 

awards “and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 

comparable cases.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. This factor “allows 

courts to show ‘substantial deference to legislative judgments 

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No. 23-2850 33

concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.’” 

AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 840, quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 583. The 

parties agree that the Lanham Act is the appropriate comparator.

Remedies for federal Lanham Act violations are set out in 

15 U.S.C. § 1117. Subsection 1117(a) authorizes awards including defendants’ profits and up to three times the amount of 

actual damages for violations of registered trademarks. That 

subsection specifies that such a remedy “shall constitute compensation and not a penalty.” (Recall that Curry’s trademark 

was not registered, but that difference does not undermine the 

comparison for constitutional purposes.) Section 1117(b)(1) 

authorizes imposition of treble damages or profits, whichever 

is greater, for intentional use of a counterfeit mark. And 

§ 1117(c) authorizes up to $2 million in statutory damages for 

willful use of a counterfeit mark, “as the court considers just.”

The parties dispute whether subsection 1117(a), (b), or 

(c) should guide our consideration here. The answer does not 

matter. All three authorize awards above what the jury and 

court awarded here. And the magnitude of the punitive 

damage awards in this case ($300,000 per defendant) is less 

than the district judge’s disgorgement order of roughly 

$547,000, making them not disproportionate when compared 

to remedies under any of subsections (a), (b), and/or (c). This 

comparison indicates that the punitive damage awards were 

not out of bounds as compared to the penalties authorized in 

“comparable cases” arising under the Lanham Act.

Defendants argue that imposing punitive damages at all 

runs contrary to subsection (a), which does not authorize imposition of a penalty. The fact that a federal statute does not 

authorize imposition of a penalty is irrelevant to whether 

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34 No. 23-2850 

punitive damages may be awarded under a separate state-law 

cause of action. The Lanham Act reveals a legislative insight 

into the gravity of the harm. As explained above, the awards 

here are at least roughly consistent with that guidance. The 

Illinois common-law awards therefore did not depart from 

“legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for 

the conduct at issue.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 583. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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