Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00720/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00720-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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 On April 27, 2011, the Court held a hearing on this matter to clarify several issues.

(Doc. 21). After the hearing, both parties, without authorization from the Court, filed

supplemental briefing. The Court disregards the supplemental briefings.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Linda Terry, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Social Security

Administration Commissioner, 

Defendant. 

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No. 10-cv-0720-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Michael J.

Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, to supplement the certified record. (Doc. 12). In

the alternative, Plaintiff seeks a remand so that the administrative record can be

supplemented. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion and

remands this matter to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings.1

BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2005, claimant Linda Terry filed an application for Disability

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Title II of the Social Security

Act (“Act”), alleging a disability onset date of July 1, 2001. (R. at 14). The claim was denied

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 Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual,

after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which

he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . .”).

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initially on November 17, 2005, and upon reconsideration on January 31, 2007. (Id.).

Plaintiff filed an untimely request for a hearing, but good cause being established for the late

filing, on June 10, 2008, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted a hearing on

Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.). Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified along with a

vocational expert. At the hearing, Plaintiff’s disability onset date was amended to June 1,

2004 due to a prior ALJ decision, dated May 24, 2004, which found that Plaintiff was not

disabled through the date of the decision. (R. at 1006–07). 

In a decision dated August 22, 2008, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application, finding

that she was not disabled because “claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1” (R. at 17) and she “has the residual functional capacity to perform

sedentary/light work.” (R. at 18). Thus, the ALJ concluded that Terry “has not been under

a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 17, 2001 through the date of this

decision.” (R. at 20). The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner

when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on February 26, 2010. (R.

at 5–7). 

Plaintiff filed the complaint underlying this action on March 31, 2010, seeking this

Court’s review of the ALJ’s denial of benefits.2

 On July 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed her opening

brief along with a motion to compel, or in the alternative, to remand based on the exclusion

of evidence from the record relating to the amendment of Terry’s alleged disability onset date

as well as three sets of medical records, including those from St. Luke’s, Affiliated

Cardiologists, and Arizona Age Reversal and Neurology. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff contends that

on the day following her hearing before the ALJ she hand-delivered notification to the

Phoenix Office of Hearings and Appeals of her amended alleged onset date. According to

the date-stamp on the letter, Plaintiff counsel’s letter regarding amendment of the disability

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onset date was received on June 11, 2008, the day after Plaintiff’s hearing. (Doc. 12-1, Doc.

15). In that letter, Plaintiff amended her disability onset date from July 17, 2001 to November

1, 2006 based on the vocational expert’s hearing testimony that there would be no work for

Terry based on Dr. Prieve’s report of December 2006 and her moderate mental limitations,

as found by her treatment providers. (R. at 46–61, 206–15, 972–974). The medical records

which Plaintiff seeks to add to the record were submitted prior to the hearing, between June

3, 2008 and June 5, 2008, but were never added to the record. On August 3, 2010, Defendant

supplemented the record with a copy of Plaintiff’s emergency medical records from the

Temple St. Luke’s Hospital, dated June 22, 2007. (Doc. 14). Defendant clarified that the

documents “were inadvertently omitted from the administrative record in the case of Linda

Terry, certified on April 27, 2010.” (Id.). However, the medical records from Affiliated

Cardiologists and Arizona Age Reversal and Neurology (Dr. Shafran) were not added. The

ALJ does not appear to have considered either the amended disability onset date or any of

the medical records at issue in her August 22, 2008 decision. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not including the amended disability onset date

in the record and by not considering the new date. Rather, the ALJ denied Terry’s claim

based on evidence dated prior to the amended onset date. The ALJ further erred by not

adding three of Plaintiff’s medical records to the administrative record. Although Plaintiff

requests that the Court supplement the record with the requested evidence before reviewing

it, the more appropriate remedy in these circumstances is to remand for further factual

proceedings. See Am. Bird Conservancy v. FCC, 545 F.3d 1190, 1195 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“The proper remedy for an inadequate record . . . is to remand to the agency for further fact

finding.”). 

Under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., there are only two kinds of

possible remands. Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 99 (1991). Sentence four permits

remand “in conjunction with a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the

[Commissioner’s] decision.” Id. at 99–100 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Sentence six permits

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 The statutory text providing for such orders states the following: “The court may,

on motion of the Commissioner of Social Security made for good cause shown before the

Commissioner files the Commissioner’s answer, remand the case to the Commissioner . . .

and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of

Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and

that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior

proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added). 

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remand to allow the agency to take some further action, or to consider new evidence not

presented previously. See id. at 100. Pursuant to sentence six, the Court may remand the case

without ruling on the merits only in two situations: 1) “where the Secretary requests a remand

before answering the Complaint,” or 2) “where new, material evidence is adduced that was

for good cause not presented before the agency.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297 n.2

(1993) (citing Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 100 & n.2); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626

(1990)).3

 The latter is the proper avenue for Plaintiff.

Defendant argues that remand is not appropriate because the evidence in question is

not material. The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[n]ew evidence is material when it ‘bear[s]

directly and substantially on the matter in dispute,’ and if there is a ‘reasonabl[e] possibility

that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the . . . determination.’” Luna v.

Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010) (alterations and omissions in original) (citing

Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 2001)). In addition, evidence is new and

material only where it relates to the period on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.970. Plaintiff amended her alleged disability onset date on June 11, 2008,

one day after her hearing before the ALJ and well before the ALJ’s decision, dated August

22, 2008. The date-stamps on the two omitted medical records at issue indicate that they were

received on June 3 and June 5, 2008, also before the date of the ALJ’s decision. Additionally,

at minimum, the amended disability onset date certainly bears directly and substantially on

the matter in dispute because it determines the relevant time frame. Pursuant to the Social

Security Act, the disability onset date determines the date from which a claimant is allegedly

unable to engage in “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

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physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1505(a). 

Because consideration of Plaintiff’s amended alleged disability onset date is material

to her case and Defendant, in its Response, has offered no convincing reason for its failure

to incorporate this evidence as well as the medical documents from Affiliated Cardiologists

and Dr. Shafran into the record, remand is appropriate. In Social Security cases, the ALJ has

an independent “duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s

interests are considered.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Accordingly, further consideration of the factual issues in light of the amended

disability onset date and omitted medical records is appropriate to determine whether the

outcome should be different.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief is DENIED (Doc. 26);

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, or alternatively to remand, is GRANTED (Doc. 12);

and 

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to REMAND back to the Social Security

Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence six, for further administrative

proceedings consistent with the amended alleged onset date of November 1, 2006. The ALJ

is directed to determine whether Plaintiff’s certified record should be supplemented with the

following documents: 1) Plaintiff counsel’s letter, dated June 11, 2008, modifying the alleged

disability onset date, 2) medical records from Affiliated Cardiologists, and 3) medical records

by Dr. Shafran at Arizona Age Reversal and Neurology. 

Dated this 2nd day of May, 2011. 

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