Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06487/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06487-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 This action was originally filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s 1983 claims have been 1

dismissed, and the sole remaining claim is one for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Americans with Disabilities Act). 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA JAMES SHEBBY,

Plaintiff,

v.

DERRAL ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-cv-06487-LJO-NEW (DLB) PC

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION, WITH

PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE

GRANTED UNDER THE ADA

(Doc. 34)

ORDER THAT THIS DISMISSAL SHALL

COUNT AS A STRIKE PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 1915(G)

I. Screening Order

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Joshua James Shebby (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil action, filed on October 24, 2003. On March 7, 2005, the court dismissed 1

plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state any claims upon which relief may be

granted. On March 23, 2005, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, and on May 24, 2006, the

court again dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state any claims upon

which relief may be granted. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on June 26, 2006. On May

2, 2007, the Magistrate Judge issued a Findings and Recommendations recommending that

Case 1:03-cv-06487-LJO -LJO Document 35 Filed 08/31/07 Page 1 of 5
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plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, state law medical malpractice claims, and claim for injunctive

relief be dismissed, and plaintiff be granted leave to file a third amended complaint, limited to his

ADA claim only. On August 28, 2007, the undersigned adopted the Findings and Recommendations

in full and directed the Clerk’s Office to file in plaintiff’s third amended complaint setting forth his

ADA claim, which plaintiff had submitted on July 23, 2007.

B. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s

factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation

of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially

pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v.

Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

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C. Plaintiff’s ADA Claim

Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison-Corcoran. The events at issue in this

action allegedly occurred at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi and the California

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison in Corcoran, where plaintiff was housed at the

time. Plaintiff names Chief Medical Officer Moor, Dr. Alan Yin, Lieutenant Covey, Sergeant Mick,

and Correctional Officers Barr, Doe 1, and Doe 2 as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages

for violation of Title II of the ADA. Plaintiff’s claim arises from the problems he experienced

participating in prison activities such as yard time and showers after an incident on July 2, 2002, in

which plaintiff broke his ankle while playing basketball. 

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act “prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of

disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II provides that “no

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,

or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the ADA applies to

inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955

(1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997); Duffy v. Riveland, 98

F.3d 447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a

qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise

discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) such

exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. “To

recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove

intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard for intentional

discrimination is deliberate indifference. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir.

2001).

As plaintiff was previously advised, “‘Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in

programs of a public entity or discrimination by any such entity.’” Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-

CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 2005) (quoting Thomas v.

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Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (D. Haw. 2000)). “The ADA defines ‘public entity’ in relevant

part as ‘any State or local government’ or ‘any department, agency, special purpose district, or other

instrumentality of a State or States or local government.’” Roundtree, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B)). Public entity, “‘as it is defined within the statute, does not

include individuals.’” Id. (quoting Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8thCir.

1999)). Thus, individual liability is precluded under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,

and plaintiff may not pursue his ADA claim against the individual defendants named in his

complaint, who allegedly failed to provide him with crutches or a wheelchair, which would have

allowed him to safety participate in yard and shower time.

Further, treatment, or lack of treatment, concerning plaintiff’s medical condition does not

provide a basis upon which to impose liability under the ADA. Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882,

882 (8th Cir. 2005) (medical treatment decisions not a basis for RA or ADA claims); Schiavo ex

rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (RA not intended to apply to medical

treatment decisions); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005)

(Medical decisions not ordinarily within scope of ADA or RA); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249

(7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”). Plaintiff’s claim

in part simply recasts his Eighth Amendment claims concerning the failure of prison employees to

provide him with certain items for his medical injury. For example, plaintiff alleges that defendant

Barr failed to provide him with ice or pillows on July 2, 2002, despite his medical chrono authorizing

those items. Although plaintiff alleges that this resulted in the denial of “a qualified medical

service,” the claim is not one of intentional preclusion from participation in a service, program, or

activity on the basis of a disability. (Doc. 34, 4:23.) Rather, defendant Barr allegedly refused to

honor the authorization chrono due to plaintiff’s Security Housing Unit classification. This does not

give rise to a claim for relief for violation of the ADA. 

D. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

for violation of the ADA, which is not a vehicle by which plaintiff may impose individual liability

on prison employees. Plaintiff was previously notified of the deficiencies in his claim and provided

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with the applicable legal standard, but failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the court. Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, this action is HEREBY DISMISSED,

with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the ADA. This

dismissal SHALL count as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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