Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00989/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00989-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE N. ALLEN, 

Plaintiff,

v.

AHLIN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00989-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING THE FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO FILE A 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Doc. 7)

30 DAY DEADLINE

After the Court dismissed the complaint for Plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable claim, 

he filed the first amended complaint, which is before the Court for screening. While Plaintiff 

corrected some of the deficiencies previously identified, the first amended complaint fails to 

identify specific instances of malfeasance upon which he bases his claims. Thus, the Court grants 

him ONE FINAL opportunity to amend his pleading to state cognizable claims. 

A. Screening Requirement

ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court 

shall dismiss [a case brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983] at any time if the court determines that . . . 

the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. '

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

///

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B. Summary of the first amended complaint

Plaintiff is a civil detainee at Coalinga State Hospital (CSH) in Coalinga, California B

where the acts he complains of allegedly occurred. Plaintiff has narrowed his claims and the list 

of named defendants in this action. He now delineates only three claims against the Director of 

Nutritional Services, Jennie Porter; Supervising Cook II, Melissa Porter; and Dietician, Sara 

Gilbert. The first claim is that the defendants are violating his right to freely practice his religion 

under the First Amendment by his inability to obtain a vegetarian diet. (Doc. 7, pp. 6-9.) The 

second claim is that the defendants are violating the Eighth Amendment due to their deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs because he is not being provided with a low-fat, lowsodium, low-cholesterol diet which is needed to address his high blood pressure. (Id., pp. 9-14.) 

The third claim is that defendants are violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 

because CSH serves contaminated/spoiled food. (Id., pp. 14-18.) 

The vast majority of the first amended complaint was quite obviously copied and pasted 

over from the original complaint, though variously rearranged. (Compare Doc. 1, pp. 5-6 with 

Doc. 7, p. 6; Doc. 1, pp. 7-9 with Doc. 7, p. 7; Doc. 1, pp. 10, 14 with Doc. 7. P.8; Doc. 1, p. 7 

with Doc. 7, p. 9; Doc. 1, pp. 7-9 with Doc. 7, p. 10; Doc. 1, p. 11 with Doc. 7, p. 11; Doc. 1, pp. 

11-12, 14 with Doc. 7, p. 12; Doc. 1, pp. 13-14 with Doc. 7, p. 13; Doc. 1, p. 9 with Doc. 7, p. 15; 

Doc. 1, pp. 9, 10, 12 with, Doc. 7, p. 16; Doc. 1, pp. 13-14 with Doc. 7, p. 17; Doc. 1, p. 14 with 

Doc. 7, p. 18.) Plaintiff would do well refrain from such practices in a second amended 

complaint and to present only the factual allegations that specifically relate to each of his claims 

in an orderly and logical fashion.

The court provided Plaintiff the applicable pleading requirements and legal standards

based on his stated claims when he was granted leave to file the first amended complaint. While 

he has provided some additional information Plaintiff fails to identify specific instances, or the 

number of times he was served food that did not meet his medical needs; did not meet his 

religious needs; and/or was contaminated/spoiled/unsuitable for human consumption. Further, 

while Plaintiff alleges that attempts to notify the remaining three defendants of the content/quality 

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of meals he was served via email and/or telephone calls, he fails to state allegations that show that 

any of the three remaining defendants actually were aware of the deficiencies in the meals he 

received and failed to take remedial action. Thus, this is the last time Plaintiff will be given the 

applicable standards1and opportunity to amend his pleading. 

Plaintiff should not merely copy and paste sections over from his prior pleadings to any 

second amended complaint and should refrain from including extraneous details. Background 

facts and circumstances that occurred before/after/beyond the claims which Plaintiff delineates 

are superfluous, should not be included. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

 

1

APersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of 

confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.@ Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 

U.S. 307, 322 (1982). As such, Plaintiff is entitled, at a minimum, to those rights provided to inmates confined in 

penal institution. McNeal v. Mayberg, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101926 at *3, 2008 WL 5114650 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 3, 

2008). Thus, the Court is on sound footing in relying upon cases involving incarcerated persons as a constitutional 

minimum to which Plaintiff is entitled.

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580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of the doubt. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 

2013); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal pleading 

standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 

n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts 

are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 

681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 

defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; 

Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

Plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting the existence of substantively plausible 

claims for relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, __ U.S. __, __, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per 

curiam) (citation omitted). To this end, allegations simply stating that a defendant was notified of 

a situation that violated Plaintiff's rights do not suffice. Rather, Plaintiff must state factual 

allegations showing circumstances that gave a defendant knowledge that he was being served 

meals that violated his religious or medical needs, and/or were otherwise unfit for human 

consumption -- identified by an approximate number and applicable time frame in which he was 

served deficient meals. Since stated in general/broad terms, Plaintiff’s allegations amount to 

nothing more than implying a “sheer possibility” that the named Defendants knew of acted 

unlawfully which is not sufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

2. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which Plaintiff filed this action provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be 

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress.

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42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another=s affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named 

defendant with a specific affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s 

federal rights. 

Here again, allegations which amount to nothing more than general summaries do not 

suffice. Plaintiff must clearly identify which defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each 

violation of his constitutional rights and the specific factual basis. This requires him to allege the

wrongful acts/omissions that occurred, approximately how many times they occurred,

approximately when they occurred and when each defendant became aware of the situation. He 

must allege sufficient factual matter to put each defendant on notice of the specific factual basis 

for each of his claims to link them to his alleged deprivation(s). See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).

D. Claims for Relief

1. Claim #1 -- Religion

“[P]risoners retain the protections of the First Amendment” but their “right to freely 

exercise [their] religion is limited by institutional objectives and by the loss of freedom 

concomitant with incarceration.” Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 

1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 

2400 (1997)). The protections of the Free Exercise Clause are triggered when state officials 

substantially burden the practice of an one's religious beliefs by preventing him from engaging in 

conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith, but an impingement will be 

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upheld “‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 

F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 

(1987)). 

ARestrictions on access to >religious opportunities= . . . must be found reasonable in light of 

four factors: (1) whether there is a >valid, rational connection= between the regulation and a 

legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) >whether there are alternative means of 

exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates;= (3) whether accommodation of the 

asserted constitutional right would have a significant impact on guards and other inmates; and (4) 

whether ready alternatives are absent (bearing on the reasonableness of the regulation).@ Pierce, 

526 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987); ref. Beard v. Banks, 548 

U.S. 521 (2006); Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc)). 

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (ARLUIPA@) provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 

person residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from 

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition 

of the burden on that person B

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. 

42 U.S.C. ' 2000cc-1. Plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that defendants 

substantially burdened the exercise of his sincerely held religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. 

Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). If Plaintiff meets his burden, Defendants must 

demonstrate that Aany substantial burden of [plaintiff=s] exercise of his religious beliefs is both in 

furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering 

that compelling governmental interest.@ Id. (emphasis in original). ARLUIPA is to be construed 

broadly in favor of protecting an inmate=s right to exercise his religious beliefs.@ Id. 

In Claim #1 (Doc. 7, pp. 6-9), Plaintiff alleges that he "has been for the past 31 years 

because of religious belief a vegetarian." (Id., at p. 7.) This tends to show that Plaintiff has a 

sincerely held religious belief. However, a few lines earlier on that same page, in that same 

claim, Plaintiff added a line that the Defendants “on many occasions refused to correct and serve 

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plaintiff a vegetarian meal due to religious belief of not eating any red meat.” (Id., emphasis 

added.) Not eating red meat is not the same as being a vegetarian. Either Plaintiff’s religious 

beliefs do not allow him to eat red meat, or they do not allow him to eat any meat.2 This causes a 

lack of clarity related to whether he actually requires a vegetarian diet. Further, as stated in the 

prior screening order, Plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable because he fails to identify any specific 

instances (or an approximate number of instances) when he received meals that conflicted with 

his known religious belief that would demonstrate he suffered a substantial burden on his 

religious beliefs. Likewise, he fails to show specific basis upon which any Defendant(s) was

aware that his vegetarian requirements were for religious purposes (rather than related to his 

medical needs) which prevents his claims regarding infringement of his religious practices from 

being substantively plausible. Johnson, __ U.S. at __, 135 S.Ct. at 347. Thus, Plaintiff's 

allegations in the first amended complaint continue to be too general and conclusory to be 

cognizable. 

2. Claims #2 & #3 -- Deliberate Indifference 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. 

Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, no matter where they are housed, prison 

officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, 

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 

2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference. . . .” 

Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a subjective prong. 

First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer at 834. 

Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate 

 

2 The Court notes, confusingly, that Plaintiff claims to eat fish, but is allergic to shell fish. (Doc. 7 at 13)

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health or safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). As 

stated in the prior screening order, it is under this standard that Plaintiff's claims regarding food, 

both its contamination and in connection with controlling his hypertension, must be viewed. 

a. Claim #2 -- Medical 

Since Plaintiff alleges that his vegetarian diet was also dictated by his hypertension, Claim 

#2 (Doc. 7, pp. 9-14) must be analyzed as a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment. 

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a 

prisoner's] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). "A medical need 

is serious if failure to treat it will result in ' "significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain." ' " Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 

Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir.1997) (en banc))

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first Ashow a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.@ 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). 

The existence of a condition or injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and 

worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual=s daily activities, and the existence of chronic or substantial pain are indications of a 

serious medical need. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. 

v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (quotation marks omitted); Doty v. 

County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994). For screening purposes, the Court 

accepts Plaintiff's hypertension as a serious medical need. 

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Deliberate indifference is Aa state of mind more blameworthy than negligence@ and 

Arequires >more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner=s interests or safety.=@ Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). ADeliberate indifference 

is a high legal standard.@ Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). AUnder this 

standard, the prison official must not only >be aware of the facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,= but that person >must also draw the 

inference.=@ Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison official should have been 

aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter 

how severe the risk.=@ Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 

(9th Cir. 2002)). 

In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner=s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). More generally, deliberate indifference Amay 

appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it 

may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.@ Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Under Jett, A[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial.@ Id.; 

see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (A[A] finding that the defendant=s activities resulted in 

>substantial= harm to the prisoner is not necessary.@). 

While Plaintiff has reduced many of his allegations regarding his diet and hypertension, 

he still does not show specific facts as to what each of the three remaining defendants knew of 

his medical condition and how it related to his dietary requirements of what they knew of the

inadequacies in the meals he received or when they acquired this knowledge. Plaintiff’s 

allegations that records of his appeals/grievances and recommended solutions are in his dietary 

files as well as files located in Audrey King’s and Jennie Porter’s offices are insufficient. He 

provides no specifics as to the timing of these appeals to show knowledge and deliberate 

indifference of this issue by any of the remaining Defendants. Simply because a file is in one’s 

office does not necessarily mean there is knowledge of their contents. 

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Further, Plaintiff alleges that he is allergic to iodine, penicillin, all raw milk products as 

well as crab and shellfish. (Doc. 7, p. 13.) However, he fails to show that these allergies are

connected to his claim that he did not receive the diet ordered by his medical professionals. 

Likewise, he does not set forth any allegations to show that these conditions impact his 

hypertension or that they constitute a serious medical. Thus, without more, these allegations 

regarding Plaintiff’s allergies, fail to demonstrate a cognizable claim.

Plaintiff's allegations regarding difficulty he has obtaining appropriate meals for his 

hypertension are not cognizable since he fails to show both that he was not provided a medically 

ordered diet which any of the remaining Defendants were aware of and failed to rectify.

b. Claim #3 -- Contamination/Spoliation

Plaintiff identifies Claim #3 as follows:

Plaintiff have [sic] complained numerous times to defendants’ [sic] regarding 

food contamination and preparation of plaintiff’s diet. Plaintiff have [sic] found 

axel grease, bugs, hair, and other contaminates in plaintiff’s food on many 

occasions without any means of replacing the contaminated items. Once again 

‘deliberate indifference” attitude towards plaintiff’s need to consume food 

which is not contaminated with harmful objects. A 14th USCA Amendment 

violation.

Plaintiff made his complaint to the unit Treatment staff who documented 

the contamination and attempted to e-mail Nutritional Services about the 

contamination with no results. The safety of plaintiff’s diet ultimately falls 

upon Jennie Porter, Melissa Sandoval, and Sara Gilbert.

(Doc. 7, p. 14.) Plaintiff begins his allegations under this claim with allegations that he is served 

food that violates California Code of Regulations section 71243(g)(7)(h) which provides that

“[f]ood shall be prepared by methods which conserve nutritive value, flavor and appearance. 

Food shall be served attractively at appropriate temperatures and in a form to meet individual 

needs.” (Id, at pp. 14-15.) The existence of regulations such as these governing the conduct of 

prison employees and for prosecution of criminal activities does not necessarily entitle Plaintiff to 

sue civilly to enforce the regulations, or for damages based on their violation. The Court has 

found no authority to support a finding that there is an implied private right of action under the 

California Code of Regulations and Plaintiff has provided none. Given that the statutory 

language does not support an inference that there is a private right of action, the Court finds that 

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Plaintiff is unable to state any cognizable claims upon which relief may be granted based on the 

violation of section 71243(g)(7)(h). 

Further, Plaintiff fails to state any compliance the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), 

set forth in California Government Code sections 810 et seq., which dictates a plaintiff may not 

bring a suit for monetary damages against a public employee or entity unless the plaintiff first 

presented the claim to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board 

(“VCGCB” or “Board”), and the Board acted on the claim, or the time for doing so expired. 

However, adequate food is a basic human need which is protected by the Eighth 

Amendment. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982), (abrogated on other grounds 

by Sandin v. O'Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)). While food served in a 

governmental facility need not be “tasty or aesthetically pleasing,” it must be “adequate to 

maintain health.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993). Objectively, extreme 

deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim and only those 

deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to 

form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). 

The Court allowed Plaintiff to amend this claim based on his allegations of being served 

food that did not meet the minimal civilized societal standards since it was contaminated and/or 

spoiled. However, his statement of facts/allegations for Claim #3 in the first amended complaint

contains minimal allegations anything regarding contamination of his food; rather he states facts 

related to his caloric intake, some food allergies/intolerances, and allegations that pertain to his 

dietary needs for his hypertension and religion. (See Doc. 7, pp. 14-18.) 

Plaintiff’s few allegations regarding contamination/spoilage are found in one paragraph 

which does not delineate any specific instance(s) of occurrence. (Id., at p. 17.) However, in that 

same paragraph, Plaintiff alleges that “Psych Techs” have witnessed and documented all of the 

instances that Plaintiff alludes to in his allegations. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff should be able to include 

allegations as to specific instances (or at least the number of incidents in a given time period) 

when he was served contaminated/spoiled food, since temporarily unconstitutional conditions of 

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confinement do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See Anderson v. County of Kern, 

45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995) ref Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1258 (9th Cir. 1982) 

(abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (in evaluating challenges 

to conditions of confinement, length of time the prisoner must go without basic human needs may 

be considered). Notably, a sustained deprivation of food may violate the Eighth Amendment; 

however, isolated incidents of denial of food do not. Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812, n.1

(9th Cir. 2009).

Further, Plaintiff fails to link any of the remaining Defendants to his allegations that he 

was served contaminated/spoiled food. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim regarding 

the procedures that he alleges led to contamination/spoliation of the food served to him at CSH. 

3. Supervisory Liability

It appears that Plaintiff has whittled the named Defendants in this action to those who hold 

supervisory positions. However, as stated in the prior screening order, supervisory personnel are 

generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of 

respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the 

causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See 

Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th 

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based 

on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim 

that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of 

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or 

"implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' 

and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions 

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In a § 1983 

suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the term 

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'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's 

misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or 

her own misconduct. Id. 

A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the 

elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to 

dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch 

allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather 

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 

form of a factual allegation.@ Id. 

Claims #2 & #3 assert the Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the food he was being 

served. As previously stated, deliberate indifference requires a showing that a given Defendant 

knew a violation of Plaintiff’s rights was occurring and failed to take action within their 

duties/power. It is not enough for Plaintiff to allege that other prison staff attempted to contact 

one of the remaining defendants without affect. Rather, Plaintiff must show that a remaining 

defendant, or grouping thereof, knew of Plaintiff’s needs (medical or otherwise), knew that they 

were not being met, and thereafter intentionally failed to take remedial steps -- an “email” being 

“attempted” to no avail does not raise a subsequent lack of ameliorating steps to deliberate 

indifference. 

E. CONCLUSION

As delineated above, Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claims. Thus, he is being 

given ONE FINAL opportunity to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the service of 

this order. Within that same time, if Plaintiff decides not to pursue this action, he must file a 

notice of voluntary dismissal. If Plaintiff needs more time to comply with this order, Plaintiff 

shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than 30 days from the date of service of 

this order.

If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the 

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The second amended complaint must allege in

specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 

1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the 

claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 

(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

A second amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and plain 

statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with ONE FINAL opportunity to amend to cure the 

deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his 

second amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" 

complaints).

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file either a

second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order, or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

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4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 5, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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