Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00808/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00808-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE BANNER, Civil

No.

13-CV-0808-MMA (BGS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION DENYING

PETITIONER’S WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

v.

G.J. JANDA, WARDEN,

Respondent

This Report & Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Michael M.

Anello pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2.

I. INTRODUCTION

Lawrence Banner (herein “Banner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (herein “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Banner is challenging prison disciplinary proceedings in which he

was found guilty of conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance with intent to distribute in

violation of California Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 3016c. (Id. at 7.) For the

reasons discussed below, the Court recommends the Petition be DENIED and that this action

be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2011, after a contact visit with a friend in the D-facility visiting area,

Banner found a small bindle of what he thought could be marijuana. (Doc. No. 1 at 14.) 

Although Banner claims he was not certain the package contained marijuana, he nevertheless

hid the bindle inside his mouth because knew he would have to undergo an unclothed postvisitation body search before reentering the prison. (Id.) During the search, a correctional

officer spotted and confiscated the bindle. (Id. at 14, 38-39.) A field test revealed the bindle

contained eight smaller, individually-wrapped pouches, each of which weighed

approximately 0.2 grams and tested positive for opiates/heroin. (Id. at 15, 38, 40.) Banner

claims a second field test revealed the eight individual pouches tested positive for marijuana. 

(Id. at 66.)

Banner was subsequently charged with conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance

with the intent to distribute. (Id. at 53.) The Serious Rules Violation Report indicates that 

while Banner did not initially request a continuance of his hearing on the conspiracy charge,

on July 4, 2011, he requested a postponement of his hearing pending the outcome of the

prison’s referral of the incident for felony prosecution. (Id. at 48.) However, on August 13,

2011, Banner revoked his request for postponement of a hearing; waived his right to have an

Investigative Employee assigned to the case; and indicated he would not request any

witnesses at the hearing. (Id.) 

A hearing was held on August 19, 2011. (Id. at 49.) At the hearing Banner stated “I

plead guilty to having dope.” (Id.) He also said, with respect to the bindle found in his

mouth, “I could have swallowed it, but I didn’t. I saw the bindle and I took it.” (Id.) 

Following the August 19, 2011 hearing, Banner was found guilty of the conspiracy charge in

violation of California Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 3016c. (Id. at 15, 49.) In

addition to temporary privilege reductions, Banner received a 180-day credit loss. (Id.)

 Banner contends, however, that before the August 19, 2011 hearing began, he

informally discussed a possible plea agreement with Lt. Nelson, a correctional officer who

claimed to have information pertinent to Banner’s defense. (Id. at 25-26.) Banner also

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alleges Lt. Nelson informed him “he could see to it that [Banner] receives a ‘possession’

charge based upon his full cooperation with the investigation.” (Id. at 26.) Banner claims the

hearing on August 19, 2011 began, but was suspended in order for the hearing officer to

contact Lt. Nelson regarding Banner’s potential to receive a possession charge as opposed to

a conspiracy charge. Banner contends the hearing was never reconvened after being

suspended. (Id.) 

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After Banner was found guilty at the August 19, 2011 disciplinary hearing, he

appealed the decision up to the third and final level of administrative review. (Doc. No. 1 at

106, 113.) Specifically, in Banner’s second level administrative appeal, he requested

dismissal of the conspiracy charge against him or in the alternative, a reduction of the

conspiracy charge to possession. (Id. at 107.) Banner also claimed the correctional officer

inappropriately found him guilty of the conspiracy charge without hearing from a requested

witness and without completing the hearing. (Id. at 107.) Banner’s request to have the

charge against him dismissed or reduced was denied. (Id. at 109.) 

Banner then appealed to the third level of administrative review and raised the same

issues; thereby exhausting his administrative remedies. (Id. at 110-11.; see also Exh. 3 to

Notice of Lodgment at 007.) Banner’s due process claim was rejected and the examiner

found all due process requirements were met with respect to Banner’s hearing. (Id. at 111.) 

On April 20, 2012, Banner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Imperial

County Superior Court of California, where he alleged: (1) he did not plead guilty to

conspiracy, (2) he was not allowed to present witnesses at the hearing on the conspiracy

charge, and (3) he was not given a complete hearing. (Id. at 128.) On May 31, 2012, the

Superior Court denied the petition. (Id. at 128.) The court reasoned:

“The Court finds that petitioner was afforded due process of law. The court’s review

of the evidence is limited as to whether the decision of the hearing officer is supported

by some evidence. (In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 1493, 1500.) Petitioner’s

possession admission coupled with the timing and circumstances of the search

constitute some evidence in support of the charge.”

 (Id. at 129.)

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On September 12, 2013, Banner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Doc. 1 at 134.) The

appellate court similarly denied the petition, concluding that there was “some evidence” as

required under Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), to support the decision of

the prison disciplinary hearing: 

“Petitioner [Banner] is incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison. During a strip

search of petitioner after he had a contact visit at the prison, the prison officer

found a bindle of heroin containing eight smaller bindles of heroin in

petitioner’s mouth. Petitioner pled guilty to possessing the heroin. He was

found guilty of conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance with the intent to

distribute it in the prison and received administrative discipline. 

Petitioner contends he was denied due process because he did not plead guilty

to the charge of which he was found guilty, but pleaded guilty to mere

possession of the substance. He argues a full hearing was not completed and

he was not allowed to present witnesses. He claims he is not guilty of the

charge and that he simply found the bindle on the floor of the strip room and

put it in his mouth....

Petitioner has not shown a denial of due process or that he was not afforded a

full hearing and the opportunity to present witnesses. He admitted possessing a

bindle of heroin, which the prison officer found on his person immediately

after he left a contact visit. The heroin had been packaged into eight small

bindles. Some evidence supports the hearing officer’s finding that petitioner

conspired to introduce a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it in

prison.”

(Doc. 1 at 134-135.)

Banner then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court of

California. (Id. at 147; see also Exh. 5 to Notice of Lodgment at 0036.) The California

Supreme Court denied Banner’s petition without citation or comment. (Doc. No. 1 at 147, see

also Exh. 5 to Notice of Lodgment at 0067.)

Banner filed the instant federal Petition on April 3, 2013. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent

filed an answer to the Petition on June 7, 2013. (Doc. No. 6.)

//

//

//

//

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IV. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

A. Due Process

Banner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas relief because the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation violated his Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights during the disciplinary hearing on August 19, 2011. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.)

Specifically, Banner alleges the senior hearing officer denied him the right to call a key

witness and improperly claimed, in documents summarizing the hearing, that Banner pled

guilty to the conspiracy charge. (Id. at 25-26.) Banner argues he only admitted guilt as to

the possession charge, not conspiracy, prior to the hearing in order to secure a possible plea

deal. (Id.) Banner contends his admission was erroneously construed as a guilty plea with

respect to the conspiracy charge. (Id.) When Banner attempted to call a correctional officer

as a witness during the hearing, Banner claims the senior hearing officer suspended the

proceeding.(Id.) As a result, Banner contends he was only made aware that he pled guilty

after the hearing was terminated and never resumed. (Id. at 5-6.)

Respondent opposes Banner’s allegations that the senior hearing officer suspended the

hearing, falsified documents, and denied Banner’s request to call witnesses on the ground

that nothing in the record supports those claims other than Banner’s self-serving allegations.

(Doc. No. 6 at 4, 6 and 9.)

B. Insufficient Evidence 

Banner also claims there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the conspiracy

charge. He states that the field test results of the bindle’s contents are inconclusive and

contradictory. (Id. at 16.) Specifically, Banner contends the first field test conducted on the

bindle was positive for “opiates/heroin,” while the second test returned positive results for

“marijuana/THC.” (Id. at 89.) Banner also argues the bindles were not individually opened,

not individually tested and therefore, the contents of the bindles remain unproven. (Id. at 28-

29.)

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Respondent opposes Banner’s contention on the ground that the California Court of

Appeal properly found “some evidence” to support a finding of conspiracy to introduce a

Schedule I controlled substance into the prison with the intent to distribute it; including

Banner’s admission to possession of the bindle, the discovery of the bindle after Banner’s

contact visit with a friend and the eight individually-packaged substances found inside the

bindle. (Doc. No. 6 at 7-8.)

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal district court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) “on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court” so long as he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or other federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the AEDPA, a federal court

may not grant habeas relief, unless the state court’s adjudication was either: (1) contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

Supreme Court precedent; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

To establish that the state court unreasonably applied established federal law, Banner

must prove the state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent was incorrect and

objectively unreasonable. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 777 (2013). “If some

fairminded jurists could agree with the state court’s decision, although others might disagree,

federal habeas relief must be denied.” Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.4d 1204, 1220 (11th Cir.

2011); Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (stating this standard is difficult to meet, as the prisoner

must show the state court’s ruling on established law goes beyond fairminded disagreement).

“An unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of

federal law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). Hence, the reviewing court may

only grant habeas relief if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal principle . . .

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Id. at 365. 

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Furthermore, habeas relief under the AEDPA can also be granted when the state court

makes an unreasonable factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The decision cannot

be overturned unless the determination was “objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). The reviewing

federal court must “more than merely doubt whether the process operated properly” before

determining the state court fact-finding process was defective in a material way. Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). The state court’s factual determinations are

presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made by the state

court unless the prisoner can rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id; 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

VI. ANALYSIS

When applying the AEDPA standard for habeas relief, the federal court reviews the

state court’s last reasoned decision. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004). When the highest state court issues a summary denial, as was done by the California

Supreme Court in this case, the denial is presumed to rest on the same ground as the previous

reasoned state judgment. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991), (explaining that unexplained orders upholding or

rejecting the prior order rest upon same ground as that prior order). 

Specifically, federal courts must look through ambiguous or unexplained state court

decisions to the last reasoned decision in order to determine whether the state court made an

unreasonable and incorrect determination of federal law or made an unreasonable factual

determination. Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007); Bailey v. Rae, 339

F.3d 1107, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the California Court of Appeal’s decision

rejecting Banner’s due process and insufficient evidence claims is the last reasoned decision

and is, therefore, entitled to AEDPA deference. 

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Banner has failed to show the state appellate court’s decision affirming the guilty

finding of the disciplinary hearing was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established law,” or involved “an unreasonable determination of the facts in this

case. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (d)(2). For the reasons set forth below, Banner is not entitled

to federal habeas relief. 

1. Due Process

When a person is imprisoned for a crime, he does not relinquish his constitutional 

protections. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Inmates subject to disciplinary

action are entitled to certain constitutional rights, including rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s due process clause. Id. A prison disciplinary hearing, however, is not part of

a criminal prosecution; therefore, “the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such

proceedings does not apply.” Id. The rights afforded an inmate are “subject to restrictions

imposed by the nature of the regime to which [he has] been lawfully committed.” Id. Due

process considerations must be balanced with the state’s interest in maintaining safety and

order in the prison environment. Id. at 560-62. This is a flexible approach, requiring that,

before a prisoner’s good-time credits can be revoked, the prisoner must be afforded

“minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances.” Id. at

558.

To meet these “minimum requirements,” the institution must first give the charged

inmate “advance written notice of the claimed violation” and a written statement explaining

the evidence against the inmate and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Id. at 563. 

Second, the accused must be given an opportunity “to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly

hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. at 566. The second requirement

is subject to the “sound discretion of correctional officials.” Id. at 568 (granting correctional

officers the authority to deny a prisoner the right to cross-examine witnesses when they

believe it could be dangerous or disruptive). 

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In this case, Banner does not dispute he received notice of the rules violation hearing.

(Doc. No. 1 at 48.) Instead, Banner contends the presiding officer at the hearing on his rules

violation charge did not allow him to question a witness, suspended the hearing, and wrongly

entered a guilty plea on his behalf in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process

rights. (Id. at 17-18.) The California Court of Appeal rejected Banner’s claims and found he

failed to show a denial of due process or that he was not afforded a full hearing and the

opportunity to present witnesses. (Id. at 134.) The record supports the state appellate court’s

finding. After receiving notice of the charge against him, on August 13, 2011, Banner

declined, in writing, the opportunity to present witnesses at the hearing. (See CDC Form

115A Serious Rules Violation Report, Doc No. 1 at 48.) The record also reflects that a

hearing, regardless of its length, was indeed held in front of Lieutenant J.D. Callahan on

August 19, 2011. (Doc. No.1 at 54-55.) 

Even if, as Banner argues, he spontaneously requested a witness on the morning of his

hearing, despite previously having waived that right on his CDC-115 form, the fact that the

witness did not appear does not change the reasonableness of the state appellate court’s

analysis. Legitimate institutional needs and penological concerns circumscribe a prisoner’s

right to call witnesses and present evidence in a disciplinary hearing. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S.

491, 495, 499 (1985) (explaining “‘[p]rison officials must have the necessary discretion to

keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create a

risk of reprisal or undermine authority....’”); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566 (disciplinary

board may refuse to call a witness for reasons of “irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the

hazards presented in individual cases.”). Banner’s contention that he was not allowed to call

Lt. Nelson, the correctional officer who he claims “could see to it that [Banner] receive[d] a

‘possession’ charge...,” did not violate due process because Banner had already admitted

possessing the contents of the bindle. Lt. Nelsons’ anticipated testimony regarding

possession was redundant and unnecessary in light of Banner’s admission. Accordingly, the

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senior hearing officer was well within the limits of his discretion to refuse Banner’s

impromptu witness under Wolff. 

Finally, as to Banner’s allegation that the senior hearing officer falsely indicated in an

official report following the hearing that Banner pleaded guilty to conspiracy when he

actually only pleaded guilty to possession, the state appellate court found “Petitioner has not

shown a denial of due process” based on those allegations. (Doc. No. 1 at 134.) The court of

appeal’s ruling that due process was not implicated by the facts is supported by clearly

established federal law. Numerous federal courts have held that constitutional errors in

connection with disciplinary hearings are subject to harmless error. See e.g. Jones v. Cross,

637 F.3d 841, 846-47 (7th Cir. 2011); Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 508 (4th Cir. 2004);

Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 53 (3d Cir. 1992); Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 750 (2d.

Cir. 1991). Assuming arguendo, that the report of the senior hearing officer erroneously

failed to make clear that Banner pled guilty only to possession of a controlled substance and

not conspiracy to distribute; it nevertheless follows that the factual misstatement in the report

was harmless. The record reflects Banner was given: (1) advance written notice of the

charge; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses, which he declined or was otherwise denied; and

(3) a written statement explaining the evidence against him as well as the reasons for the

disciplinary action. (Doc. No. 48-51.) Moreover, as explained in Section VI, subsection 2,

infra., the senior hearing officer’s finding and the decision of the state appellate court

upholding that finding were not based on a notation in the hearing officer’s report that

Banner pled guilty to conspiracy, but on “some evidence” in the record demonstrating

conspiracy to introduce a Schedule I controlled substance into the prison with the intent to

distribute it. Consequently, the state appellate court’s finding that Banner did not show a

denial of due process or the denial of a hearing and the opportunity to present witnesses is

neither “contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law” or based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court RECOMMENDS this claim be

DENIED.

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2. Some Evidence to Support Finding of Guilt

Under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445 (1985), a prisoner’s due process rights are satisfied if there is some evidence to support

a disciplinary finding. Id. at 455-56. No testing or analysis is necessary to meet the

“minimum requirements” of due process required in these circumstances. Wolff, 418 U.S. at

563, 566. The Supreme Court has differentiated the due process requirements among

different types of proceedings, and prison disciplinary hearings have the lowest requirements. 

United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977). Consequently, the “some

evidence” standard is “minimally stringent.” Powell v. Gomez, 33 F. 3d 39, 40 (9th Cir.

1994). The standard is met if there is “any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent, 472 U.S. at 455-56. The

standard “does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence,” rather, it requires only a modicum of

evidence to support the decision reached by the prison disciplinary officer. Id. To fail to

meet the “some evidence” standard, the record must be “so devoid of evidence that the

findings of the disciplinary board [are] without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Id. at 456. 

In this case, Banner contends his constitutional due process rights were violated

because the record does not support a guilty finding on the charge of conspiracy to introduce

a controlled substance with intent to distribute. (Doc. No. 1 at 28.) Specifically, Banner cites

the conflicting field test results and photographs of allegedly unopened bindles as evidence

that the contents of the bindle were unproven. The California Court of Appeal rejected

Banner’s argument and explained that despite Banner’s admission of guilt only as to

possession, there was some evidence to support a guilty finding on the conspiracy charge

including facts that: 

“[he] admitted possessing a bindle of heroin, which the prison offer found on his

person immediately after he left a contact visit [and][t]he heroin had been packaged

into eight small bindles.” 

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(Id. at 134.) 

The court of appeal correctly identified the legal principles governing this case. See

Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1399 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). Moreover, the record supports

the state appellate court’s decision that “some evidence” exists to uphold the senior hearing

officer’s guilty finding on the conspiracy with intent to distribute charge. It is undisputed

that a correctional officer discovered a bindle of eight individually-wrapped pouches of

heroin inside Banner’s mouth directly after a contact visit with an un-incarcerated friend. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 61-65.) When the correctional officer performed a field test on the bindle’s

contents, it tested positive for heroin. (Id. at 66.) A subsequent field test was positive for

marijuana. Id. Both of these drugs are indistinguishable Schedule I controlled substances

with respect to the conspiracy charge under Cal. Code of Regs., Title 15, section 3016c. 

Therefore, the conflicting test results have no bearing on the court of appeal’s analysis

especially in light of Banner’s admission to “having dope.” (Id. at 50.) Based on the timing

and the packaging of the controlled substance found on Banner, the state court reasonably

applied federal law’s “some evidence” principle to those facts and rendered a justified

decision. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664); 28 U.S.C. §§

2254(d)(1)-(d)(2). As such, Banner fails to meet his burden under AEDPA. Accordingly,

this Court RECOMMENDS Banner be DENIED federal habeas relief on this claim as well.

3. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

In Banner’s Traverse, he requests an evidentiary hearing on his claims. (See Traverse,

Doc. No. 10 at 3.) Evidentiary hearings in § 2254 cases are governed by AEDPA, which

“substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja v.

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary

hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to

prove the petitioner’s factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the applicant to habeas

relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474-75 (2007). “[I]f the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not

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required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The due process issues raised by Banner can be

resolved with reference to the ample administrative and state court record. Accordingly, IT

IS RECOMMENDED Banner’s request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED.

VII. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS the District Judge: (1)

approve and adopt this Report and Recommendation, and (2) direct that the judgment be

entered DENYING Banner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than seventeen (17) days after receiving a copy this

Report & Recommendation, any party to this action may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed

with the Court and served on all parties within fourteen (14) days of being served with the

objections.

DATED: February 24, 2014

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

 -13- 13cv808 MMA (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-00808-MMA-BGS Document 11 Filed 02/24/14 Page 13 of 13