Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00480/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00480-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:0271 Patent Infringement

---

1

2

3 DEC 212016

4

CLERK US DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA h/lyUA DEPUTY 5 BY

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 H.I.S.C., INC. and DEPALMA

ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Case No.: 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

12 ORDER: Plaintiff,

13

(1) DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS;

v. 14

FRANMAR INTERNATIONAL

IMPORTERS, LTD. etal. 15

(2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’/COUNTERCLAIM

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

16 Defendants.

17

FRANMAR INTERNATIONAL

IMPORTERS, LTD.,

18

19 [Docket Nos. 15,18]

20 Counterclaimant,

v. 21

H.I.S.C., INC. and DEPALMA

ENTERPRISES, INC.,

22

23

24 Counterclaim Defendants.

25

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Maria

Rajanayagram (Docket No. 15), and the Motion to Dismiss filed by PlaintiffsCounterclaim Defendants H.I.S.C., Inc. and DePalma Enterprises, Inc. (Docket No. 18.)

26

27

28

l

3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 15
5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

1 The motions are fully briefed. The Court finds the Motions suitable for detennination on 

2 the papers without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.l. For the reasons 

3 set forth below, both Motions are DENIED. 

4 BACKGROUNDl 

Defendant-Counterclaimant Franmar International Importers, Ltd. ("Franmar") is a 

6 family-run business that sells outdoor brooms. (Answer & Countercl. at 12.) Franmar is 

7 owned and operated by Defendant Maria Rajanayagam ("Rajanayagam"). The design of 

8 The Garden Broom/The Original Garden Broom was inspired by the traditional Sri 

9 Lankan "Ekel broom." (Id.) The following image is an example of a traditional Sri 

Lankan Ekel broom: 

1 1 

12 

l3 

14 

16 

17 

18 

19 

(Answer & Countercl. at 13.) 

21 Defendant Ravi Industries, Ltd. ("Ravi"), is a company that manufactures 

22 Ekel brooms in Sri Lanka. In 2007, Rajanayagam began collaborating with Ravi to 

23 develop an "Ekel-like broom" for commercial sale in the United States and Canada. (Id.) 

24 

26 

1 The following overview of the relevant facts are drawn from the allegations of 

27 Plaintiffs' Complaint and Defendants' Counterclaim. (Docket Nos. 1, 14.) The Court is 

28 not making findings of fact. The allegations relevant to each Motion are detailed in 

analyzing the individual Motions. 

2 

3: 16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG 

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 15
1

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

· After nearly three years of research and development, Rajanayagam and Ravi created "a 

new Ekel broom," which they agreed to call "The Garden Broom." (Answer & 

Countercl. at 13-14.) Rajanayagam later changed the name to "The Original Garden 

Broom." (Id. at 14.) The Garden Broom/The Original Garden Broom is depicted in the 

images below. 

(Answer & Countercl. at 15.) 

Rajanayagam allegedly designed the "ornate weaving patterns, the coconut shell 

atop the bristles, and the smooth handle." (Id. at 14.) Additionally, "the intricate and 

ornate weaving on the broom, [the] wide-fan appearance, the coconut shell on the top of 

the bristles and the cylindrical, smooth handle," allegedly constitute The Original Garden 

Broom's trade dress. (Id. at 14-15.) 

In 2010, Rajanayagam incorporated Franmar to market and sell The Original 

Garden Broom. Franmar partnered with Ravi and became Ravi's sole and exclusive 

distributor in North America for The Original Garden Broom. Since 2010, Franmar has 

marketed, advertised, imported and sold The Original Garden Broom in the U.S.; 

Franmar's U.S. sales exceed 100,000 brooms. On September 9,2014, Ravi was issued 

U.S. Patent No. D712,664S (hereinafter, "the '664 patent") pursuant to an application 

3 

3: J6-cv-00480-BEN-WVG 

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 15
filed on July 6, 2012. Franmar and Rajanayagam claim to own the exclusive right to

distribute the broom depicted in the ’664 patent (i.e. The Original Garden Broom).

Between February 2012 and July 25,2015, Plaintiffs-Counterclaim Defendants

H.I.S.C., Inc. (“H.I.S.C.”) and DePalma Enterprises, Inc. (“DePalma,” collectively,

“Plaintiffs”) purchased “certain garden brooms” from Franmar and Rajanayagam.

(Compl. at 3-4.) Plaintiffs marketed and sold the brooms on the QYC channel,

QVC.com, shopdepalma.com, Amazon.com, and at various home and garden trade

shows. Aside from the individual purchase orders, Plaintiffs and Defendants did not

enter into any written agreements for the garden broom products. (Compl. at 4; Answer

& Countercl. at 3.)

On or about July 25,2015, Franmar and Rajanayagam sent Plaintiffs a “Notice of

Termination” (“the Termination Letter”) advising Plaintiffs that they were “terminat[ing]

all ofFranmar’s business dealings with H.I.S.C.” (Compl. at 4, Ex. A.) The Termination

Letter further instructed Plaintiffs to “immediately . .. cease selling the Product, cease

using in any way all ofFranmar [sic] marks, property and products and cease all

representation [sic] ofFranmar.” (Id.)

On July 28, 2015, Plaintiffs, through their counsel, sent Franmar and Rajanayagam

a letter advising them ofPlaintiffs’ right under the Exhaustion Doctrine to sell off any

remaining inventory they had lawfully purchased. Plaintiffs did not receive an immediate

response to this letter from Franmar or Rajanayagam. About one month later, Franmar

and Rajanayagam, through their counsel, sent a letter to QVC, Inc. asserting intellectual

property rights to the garden brooms Plaintiffs had purchased from Franmar and

Rajanayagam.

After receiving the Termination Letter, Plaintiffs began procuring new garden

brooms from a new manufacturer. During and/or after selling offthe brooms Plaintiffs

had purchased from Franmar and Rajanayagam, Plaintiffs began selling the new brooms

“with a new name and with no reference to Franmar, Ravi or their respective ‘Franmar’

or ‘Ravi’ brands.” (Compl. at 7.)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 15
On September 1, 2015, counsel for Franmar and Rajanayagam sent Plaintiffs a

letter in response to their July 28, 2015 letter. This letter demanded Plaintiffs

“immediately cease and desist any further infringement ofFranmar’s exclusive rights to

its intellectual property, including without limitation, The Original Garden Broom

(‘Broom’), and all associated patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade dress, good will and

marketing/advertising ideas.” {Id. at 7-8.) The letter further accused Plaintiffs of

violating “Franmar’s IP” via their sales of “The Ultimate Garden Broom” and “The

Ultimate Coconut Garden Broom.” {Id. at 8.) Plaintiffs and Franmar and Rajanayagam

exchanged two additional letters on September 9, 2015 and September 11, 2015,

expressing their disagreement about the alleged violations ofFranmar’s IP.

In its Counterclaim, Franmar alleges Plaintiffs “designed, manufactured, marketed,

and/or sold, without Franmar’s knowledge or permission, a blatant ‘knock off ofThe

Original Garden Broom Trade Dress and The Original Garden Broom trademark under

the name ‘The Ultimate Garden Broom.’” (Answer & Countercl. at 19.) Franmar

alternatively or additionally alleges that Plaintiffs “repackaged The Original Garden

Broom,” to remove Franmar’s labeling and re-name the broom as “The Ultimate Garden

Broom.” {Id. at 21.)

The parties have not communicated with each other since September 11, 2015. On

or around December 4, 2015, counsel for Franmar and Rajanayagam sent a letter to

Entertainment On Location, Inc. and O’Loughlin Trade Shows Entertainment on

Location, Inc. Each ofthese corporations organizes flower shows in which Plaintiffs

intended to attend. The substance ofthe letters accused Plaintiffs ofintending to display

“knock off’ brooms in violation ofFranmar’s rights, including “trade dress and design of

the Broom” at their upcoming flower shows. (Compl. at 9.) As a result, Plaintiffs were

forced to retain counsel to respond to each ofDefendants’ letters to ensure their presence

at both ofthese flower shows. Below is an image purporting to show a side-by-side

comparison ofthe brooms:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

3:16-CV-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

' 

(Answer & Countercl. at 20.) 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiffs H.I.S.C. and DePalman filed their Complaint on February 23, 2016. 

(Docket No.1.) On May 25,2016, Defendants Franmar and Rajanayagam filed their 

Answer and Franmar's Counterclaim. (Docket No. 14.) On the same day, Defendant 

Rajanayagam filed her Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Docket No. 15.) 

On June 20, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and 

for a More Definite Statement. (Docket No. 18.) 

6 

3: J6-cv-00480-BEN-WVG 

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 15
1 LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate if, taking

all factual allegations as true, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief on its

face. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007);

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (requiring plaintiffto plead factual content

that provides “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”);

accordAnticancerInc. v. Xenogen Corp., 248 F.R.D. 278, 282 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (holding

Twombly's plausibility standard applies to claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, and thirdparty claims). Under this standard, dismissal is appropriate ifthe complaint fails to state

enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence ofthe

matter complained of, or ifthe complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory under which

reliefmay be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “A claim is facially plausible ‘when

the plaintiffpleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” ZixiangLi v. Kerry, 710 F.3d

995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Threadbare recitals ofthe

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18 DISCUSSION

19 Defendant Maria Rajanayagram’s Motion to Dismiss

Defendant Rajanayagam moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First through Fifth Claims for

Relief against her for failure to state a claim. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ First through Fifth

Claims seek the following declaratory judgments:

(1) the ’664 patent is invalid and unenforceable;

(2) Plaintiffs have not infringed and are not infringing upon the ’664 patent;

(3) Defendants’ copyright infringement claims are invalid and Plaintiffs have not

infringed and are not infringing upon Defendants’ copyrights;

(4) Defendants’ trademark claims are unenforceable and Plaintiffs have not

infringed and are not infringing upon Defendants’ trademarks; and

I.

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 15
1 (5) Defendants’ trade dress is unenforceable and Plaintiffs have not infringed and

are not infringing upon Defendants’ trade dress.

(Def. Rajanayagam’s Mot. at 2; Compl. at 9-14.) Each ofthese claims for relief are

predicated on Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants have asserted and will continue to

assert wrongful claims of ownership to the aforementioned intellectual property rights.

2

3

4

5

6 {Id.)

The Declaratory Judgment Act (“Act”) permits a federal court to “declare the

rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration” in cases

“of actual controversy within itsjurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). In order to obtain

reliefunder the Act, a plaintiffmust establish the existence of an Article III case or

controversy between the parties. Anderson v. EverestNat. Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 2d 974,

977 (D. Ariz. 2013) (citing Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g

Co., 655 F.2d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1981). Courts must determine “whether the facts

alleged, under all circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between

parties having adverse legal interests, ofsufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the

issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118,

127 (2007).

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

The sole basis ofRajanayagam’s Motion is that Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not

allege specific facts that Rajanayagam claimed “thatshe (as opposed to her company,

Franmar) owns or otherwise enjoys any legal interest in the ’664 patent, the copyright, or

the trademarks or trade dress cited by Plaintiffs.”) (Def. Rajanayagam’s Mot. at 2.)

(emphasis in original.) Rajanayagam further argues that, at most, Plaintiffs have alleged

that her company, Franmar, asserted its legal interests in the intellectual property rights of

which Plaintiffs seek the declaratory judgments. {Id. at 5.) Thus, she concludes,

Plaintiffs have failed to plead a concrete dispute between her and Plaintiffs, and the Court

should dismiss all five ofPlaintiffs’ claims for declaratory judgments against her.

Plaintiffs’ Opposition asserts the Complaint expressly defined “Franmar” to

include both Franmar International Importers, Ltd. and Rajanayagam. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 4.)

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 15
As a result, Plaintiffs argues, all allegations in the Complaint that follow their definition

must be read to include both Defendants. {Id.) In her Reply, Rajanayagam argues,

without legal support, that Plaintiffs “must plead a concrete dispute ofsufficient

immediacy between the declaratory judgment plaintiff and each declaratory judgment

defendant.” (Def. Rajanayagam’s Reply at 2.) Rajanayagam further argues that

Plaintiffs have engaged in generalized pleading, which this Court may decline to accept,

and cited to a number of cases for the premise that courts routinely decline to accept

“such a shotgun approach to pleading claims.” {Id.)

It does not appear to the Court that the authority provided by Rajanayagam is

analogous to the present case because those cases refer to pleadings in which numerous

defendants are named, but it is not clear which acts are attributable to them.2 {Id.)

Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement ofthe

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Specific

facts are not necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice ofwhat

the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

93-94 (2007), citing Bell Atl. Corp., supra, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted).

Here, Rajanayagam admits she “owns[s] and operate[s]” Franmar, and was heavily

involved in the design and production ofthe disputed broom. (Answer & Countercl. at

12,14.) She also acknowledges that Plaintiffs have stated a claim against “Franmar” in

the Complaint. {See Def. Rajanayagam’s Mot. at 5.) Logically, ifRajanayagam finds a

cogent claim asserted against Franmar, she can similarly find a cogent claim asserted

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2 For example, Rajanayagam cited to Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34

(2d Cir. 2001) (dismissing complaint naming five defendants and John and Jane Doe

defendants for “failing to identify which defendants were alleged to be responsible for

which alleged violations” and “providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct”);

Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claims against

group of “Defendants,” which included any ofthe ten named defendants or John and Joe

Doe defendants, for failure to adhere to notice pleading standards).

24

25

26

27

28

9

3:16-CV-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 15
against herself. The mere fact that Plaintiffs have pled claims asserting improper actions

by two defendants together, i.e. Rajanayagam and the company she owns and operates, is

not on its own determinative that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the

individual defendant. Although the Court agrees that, in some circumstances, a plaintiff

who “lumps together” defendants has failed to give fair notice to the defendants ofthe

claims asserted against them individually, the Court finds Plaintiffs provided sufficient

notice oftheir claims against Rajanayagam in their Complaint.

Accordingly, Defendant Rajanayagam’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Franmar’s Counterclaim alleges four claims for relief: (1) trade dress infringement;

(2) unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (3) common law unfair competition;

and (4) unfair competition under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et

seq. Plaintiffs move to dismiss Franmar’s Counterclaim in its entirety.

As a preliminary matter, although Plaintiffs move to dismiss all ofFranmar’s

claims, after reviewing Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Court finds Plaintiffs only argue that

Franmar has failed to state a claim for trade dress,3 upon which the other three claims

rely. (Pis.’ Mot. at 2.) Thus, the Court need only determine whether Franmar has stated

a claim for trade dress or should be required to provide a more definite statement.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 II.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 3 Although both Plaintiffs’ and Franmar’s moving papers discuss whether Franmar

adequately identified a “protectable trademark,” the Court did not discern a trademark

infringement claim in Franmar’s Counterclaim. The Counterclaim refers to “The

Original Garden Broom Trademark” at page 19, but none ofthe claims for relief appear

to allege a trademark infringement claim. (See Answer & Countercl. at 19, 21-25.)

Rather, as identified above, the Counterclaim asserts four claims for relief: (1) trade dress

infringement; (2) unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (3) common law unfair

competition; and (4) unfair competition under California Business and Professions Code

§§ 17200 etseq. Thus, the Court concludes these arguments are not relevant to the

instant Motion and it need not address them.

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

15
To assert a claim for trade dress infringement, a plaintiffmust allege facts to show:

(1) the trade dress is non-functional; (2) the trade dress is inherently distinctive or has

acquired secondary meaning; and (3) the defendant’s product creates a likelihood of

confusion to consumers. See Millennium Labs., Inc. v. Ameritox, Ltd., 817 F.3d 1123,

1127 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252,

1258 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted)). Here, Plaintiffs do not assert that

Franmar has failed to plead the existence of any ofthe three elements. They argue

instead that Franmar’s Counterclaim “only vaguely alleges the features it claims as its

protectable trade dress.” (Pis.’ Mot. at 4.) As such, Plaintiffs ask the Court to order

Franmar to provide a more definite statement. {Id. at 6.)

As stated above, Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). Additionally, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has emphasized that ‘[t]rade dress is the

composite tapestry ofvisual effects. Courts have repeatedly cautioned that, in

trademark—and especially trade-dress cases, the mark must be examined as a whole, not

by its individual constituent parts.’” Lepton Labs, LLC v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1230,

1240 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Clicks Billiards, supra, 251 F.3d at 1259). At the

pleading stage, “[s]o long as a plaintiffhas alleged a complete recitation ofthe concrete

elements ofits alleged trade dress, it should be allowed to proceed.” Lepton Labs, 55 F.

Supp. 3d at 1240 (“A court must test the legal merits of a plaintiffs alleged trade dress at

summary judgment or trial when the parties provide with all relevant, admissible

evidence—not at the pleading stage when the court has little more than the plaintiffs

allegations and the defendant’s summary denial ofthem.”).

Franmar cited to several cases4 where courts have found that photographs or other

images, in conjunction with written pleadings, were sufficient to identify a plaintiffs

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

•A. •

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

4 Emeco Indus., Inc. v. Restoration Hardware, Inc., No. C-12-5072 MMC, 2012 WL

28 6087329, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012) (finding sufficient pleading oftrade dress claim

li

3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

15
claimed trade dress. Plaintiffs agree that “a plaintiff can sufficiently identify an alleged

trade dress infringement with a combination ofspecific allegations and photographs.”

(Pis.’ Reply at 2) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs also acknowledge that Franmar’s

Counterclaim alleges it has a protectable trade dress interest in the “overall look and

configuration ofThe Original Garden Groom [sic], consisting ofits shape, size, color,

and specific combination of components.” (Pis.’ Mot. at 4, citing Answer & Countercl.

at 14.) In addition, Plaintiffs admit Franmar’s Counterclaim alleges it has a protectable

interest in the following features: (1) the “wide-fan appearance,” (2) the “cylindrical,

smooth handle,” and (3) the “intricate and ornate weaving on the broom.5” (Pis.’ Mot. at

6.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue it cannot adequately respond without more specific

facts as to “what features Franmar alleges constitute its protected trade dress and what

aspects ofthat trade dress it alleges are infringed.” (Id.) Plaintiffs further argue that

“[s]imply putting a photograph ofthe two products next to each other ... is not sufficient

information for Plaintiffs to prepare a response. (Id.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs’ argument meritless for two reasons. First, contrary to

Plaintiffs’ assertions, the Court finds that the combination ofFranmar’s written

description ofits claimed trade dress and the images provided is a sufficient “short and

plain statement ofthe claim” to indicate to Plaintiffs what Franmar alleges is its

protectable trade dress. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Axis Imex, Inc. v. Sunset Bay Rattan,

Inc., No. C 08-3931 RS, 2009 WL 55178, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2009) (“Under Rule 8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

based on description oftrade dress in pictorial and narrative forms); Axis Imex, Inc. v.

Sunset Bay Rattan, Inc., No. C 08-393 IRS, 2009 WL 55178, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7,

2009) (finding pleading combined with attached images sufficient to identify claimed

trade dress); Aadventure Prod., Inc. v. Simply Smashing, Inc., No. 07CV499 BTM(AJB),

2007 WL 2775128, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007) (finding complaint’s identification of

the trade dress, as set forth in an exhibit to the complaint, to be sufficient).

5 The Court notes Plaintiffs did not discuss that Franmar identified an additional feature

ofthe “coconut shell on the top ofthe bristles” as part ofits trade dress. (Answer &

Countercl. at 14.)

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

3:16-CV-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

15
ofthe [FRCP], this newly attached picture in combination with the pleadings ...

sufficiently identifies the trade dress with particularity to warrant denial ofthe motion to

dismiss the trade dress claim.”) Second, Franmar alleged, alternatively or additionally,

that Plaintiffs’ infringed Franmar’s trade dress by repackaging Franmar’s brooms with

Plaintiffs’ own label. (Answer & Countercl. at 21.) In either case, Franmar alleges

Plaintiffs’ infringed upon its trade dress by copying either the individually described

features or the entire design ofThe Original Garden Broom.

Lastly, Plaintiffs argue, without any legal authority, that Franmar failed to state a

claim because it did not sufficiently allege that it owned the rights to the alleged trade

dress. Plaintiffs contend Franmar does not have standing to sue for trade dress

infringement because: (1) it did not allege assignment ofthe trade dress rights from

Rajanayagam, and (2) it failed to allege that its rights are superior to others’ trade dress

rights. (Pis.’ Mot. at 6.) In particular, Plaintiffs assert that Franmar lacks standing

because it did not allege that its trade dress rights were superior to those ofDefendant

Ravi on the grounds that Ravi owns the patent6 to the disputed broom “with features

similar, ifnot identical to, Franmar’s alleged trade dress.” (Id. at 7.)

In its Opposition, Franmar cited to several cases to support its contention that it

was not required to allege ownership or superior rights to the claimed trade dress to have

standing to bring its trade dress infringement claim. (Franmar’s Opp’n at 6-7.)

Plaintiffs’ reply repeats its earlier arguments, but provides no contradicting authority for

its arguments.

Section 43(a) ofthe Lanham Act provides a cause of action for trade dress

infringement to “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” by

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25 6 Plaintiffs identify and request the Court take judicial notice ofRavi’s Sri Lankan patent

application and the ’664 patent, attached to their Motion as Exhibits A and B, to support

this contention. The Court declines to take judicial notice because the patents are not

relevant to the Court’s determination ofFranmar’s trade dress infringement claim, as will

be explained in further detail below.

26

27

28

13

3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

15
a defendants' false designation of origin or use offalse or misleading descriptions. 15

U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). It reasonably follows that “[o]wnership is not a prerequisite for

standing in a § 43(a) claim.” Chihuly, Inc. v. Kaindl, No. C05-1801-JPD, 2006 WL

83462, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 11, 2006) (citing 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on

Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:21 (2005)). However, a non-owner must have

“some cognizable interest in the allegedly infringed trademark” to have standing. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has previously held that, to establish standing for a claim under the

“false association prong” of § 43 ofthe Lanham Act, a plaintiff “need only allege

commercial injury based upon the deceptive use of a trademark or its equivalent.” Jack

Russell Terrier Network ofN. Ca. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027,1037 (9th

Cir. 2005).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

As the Court discussed above, Franmar’s Counterclaim sufficiently identifies its

claimed trade dress. Franmar’s Counterclaim alleges it was “Ravi’s sole and exclusive

distributor in North America for The Original Garden Broom.” (Answer & Countercl. at

14.) As a result ofPlaintiffs’ alleged trade dress infringement, Franmar “lost substantial

sales ofThe Original Garden Broom and the value of[its] trade dress.” (Id. at 22.)

Additionally, Franmar suffered monetary damages consisting ofthe “sales and profits”

obtained by Plaintiffs as a result oftheir infringement. (Id.) At this initial pleading stage,

the Court finds Franmar has alleged sufficient facts to establish standing for its trade

dress infringement claim.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 III

23 III

24 III

25 III

26 III

27 III

28 III

14

3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

15
1 CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES both Defendant Rajanayagam’s

Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs’ Motions to Dismiss.

2

3

4 IT IS SO ORDERED.

5

DATED: December/^, 2016 6

T. BENITgZ

tates District Judge

/ HOM

Unite. 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG

Case 3:16-cv-00480-BEN-WVG Document 33 Filed 12/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

15