Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00853/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00853-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Scott Taylor, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-00853 PHX GMS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

On April 26, 2013, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed

a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 12) on September 11, 2013.

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer to his petition on

November 1, 2013. See Doc. 15.

I Procedural History

On May 6, 2008, a jury found Petitioner guilty on one

count of sexual conduct with a minor under 15 years of age

(Count I), one count of sexual abuse of a minor under 15 years

of age (Count II), one count of molestation of a minor under 15

years of age (Count III), and, in a related matter that was

consolidated with the other charges, two counts of witness

tampering. See Answer, Exh. B & Exh. M. Twelve days prior to

Case 2:13-cv-00853-GMS Document 17 Filed 11/14/13 Page 1 of 21
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Petitioner’s trial, the state trial court held a hearing

regarding Petitioner’s motion to change defense counsel, which

motion was denied at the conclusion of the hearing. See id.,

Exh. A (transcript of hearing). 

On June 2, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to a

combination of aggravated and presumptive, concurrent and

consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 52 years. Id., Exh.

M. Inter alia, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 27 years

imprisonment on Count I and to a consecutive term of 23 years

imprisonment on Count III. Id., Exh. M.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. In his direct appeal Petitioner

argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to

preclude expert testimony about the behavior of child victims of

sexual assault and that the sentences were improperly enhanced.

Id., Exh. B. In a decision entered October 14, 2009, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner did not seek review of the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in his direct appeal by the

Arizona Supreme Court.

Petitioner initiated a timely action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in

his post-conviction action. Counsel notified the state court

that they could find no legitimate claims to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. See id., Exh. E. Petitioner filed a pro

se brief in his Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner

Case 2:13-cv-00853-GMS Document 17 Filed 11/14/13 Page 2 of 21
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asserted that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to

change his defense counsel. Petitioner also asserted that his

appellate counsel was ineffective because they did not raise the

issue of the trial court’s denial of his motion to change

counsel in his direct appeal. Id., Exh. F & Exh. G. In a

decision entered July 7, 2011, the state trial court denied

relief in Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, finding no error in the

trial court’s denial of the motion to change counsel, and

therefore, no fault in appellate counsel’s alleged failure to

raise this issue in Petitioner’s direct appeal. Id., Exh. G.

On August 1, 2011, Petitioner initiated a second Rule

32 action, in which he asserted that the sentencing judge erred

in imposing a consecutive sentences. Id., Exh. H. The state

trial court dismissed the action on August 19, 2011, ruling that

Petitioner’s claim for relief was precluded pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it could have been

but was not raised in Petitioner’s direct appeal. Id., Exh. I.

The state trial court also determined that the claim failed on

the merits of the claim. Id., Ex. I. 

In separate petitions for review filed in the Arizona

Court of Appeals, which actions that court consolidated,

Petitioner challenged the imposition of consecutive sentences.

Petitioner also asserted that he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of appellate and post-conviction counsel.

Id., Exh. J & Exh. K. In a memorandum decision issued January

12, 2012, the appellate court granted review, but denied relief.

See Doc. 1, Attach. The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s

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claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective and that the

imposition of consecutive sentences was illegal. The appellate

court declined to address Petitioner’s contention regarding the

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, concluding

that Petitioner had not properly presented this claim. Id.,

Attach at 29 n.2. Petitioner sought review of the Arizona Court

of Appeal’s decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which review

was denied. See id., Attach. 

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts that:

(1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to change counsel

violated his federal constitutional rights; (2) his appellate

counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective; and

(3) the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences

violated his federal constitutional rights.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state

courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by

“fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in

a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

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1

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

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Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).1 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

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id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.

For purposes of exhausting state remedies, a

claim for relief in habeas corpus must

include reference to a specific federal

constitutional guarantee, as well as a

statement of the facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief. The federal claim is

fairly presented if raised in the petition

itself, an accompanying brief, or another

similar document filed with that court.

Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 897 (9th Cir. 2013)(internal

citations and quotations omitted).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in

the state courts. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-

93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the habeas

petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law,

the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural

default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S.

Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

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state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

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failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal

or in his first Rule 32 action. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403

F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975,

987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856,

860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules

regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims raised in

attacks on criminal convictions are adequate and independent

state grounds for affirming a conviction and denying federal

habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals recently confirmed this conclusion in

Hurles v. Ryan concluding “Arizona’s waiver rules are

independent and adequate bases for denying relief.” 706 F.3d

1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 82

U.S.L.W. 3009 (Jun. 17, 2013)(No. 12-1472). See also Jones v.

Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012).

“Federal habeas courts reviewing the

constitutionality of a state prisoner’s

conviction and sentence are guided by rules

designed to ensure that state-court judgments

are accorded the finality and respect

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necessary to preserve the integrity of legal

proceedings within our system of federalism.”

Martinez v. Ryan, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct.

1309, 1316[](2012). One such rule is the

doctrine of procedural default, according to

which a federal court is barred from hearing

the claims of a state prisoner in a habeas

corpus proceeding when the decision of the

last state court to which the prisoner

presented his federal claims rested on an

“independent and adequate state ground.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111

S.Ct. 2546, [](1991). However, federal courts

are to “presume that there is no independent

and adequate state ground for a state court

decision when the decision ‘fairly appears to

rest primarily on federal law, or to be

interwoven with federal law, and when the

adequacy and independence of any possible

state law ground is not clear from the face

of the opinion.’” Id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546

(quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,

1040–41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, [](1983)). A state

court may overcome the above presumption

simply by stating “clearly and expressly that

its decision is based on bona fide separate,

adequate, and independent grounds.” Id. at

733, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Long, 463 U.S.

at 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469) (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted).

 A state court judgment rests on an

independent and adequate state procedural

ground when the “state court decline[s] to

address a prisoner’s federal claims because

the prisoner ... failed to meet a state

procedural requirement.” Id. at 730, 111

S.Ct. 2546 (emphasis added).

 “For a state procedural rule to be

‘independent,’ the state law ground for

decision must not be ‘interwoven with the

federal law.’” Park v. California, 202 F.3d

1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Long, 463

U.S. at 1040–41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, and citing

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S.Ct.

1038,[](1989) (applying Long to federal

habeas cases)). “A state law ground is so

interwoven if ‘the state has made application

of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent

ruling on federal law [such as] the

determination of whether federal

constitutional error has been committed.’”

Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,

75, 105 S.Ct. 1087, [](1985)) (alteration in

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original). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856, 860, 122 S.Ct. 2578, [](2002) (per

curiam) (noting that, although the rule at

issue there “does not require a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits, if the

state court’s decision rested primarily on a

ruling on the merits nevertheless, its

decision would not be independent of federal

law”). A review of pertinent Supreme Court

case law illustrates that a state court

ruling, even on a state procedural issue,

that necessarily or actually depends on an

antecedent ruling on the merits of a federal

claim is interwoven with federal law and

therefore not independent.

Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 450 (2012).

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).

A petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not cause to

excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). Alleged

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not establish

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cause for the failure to properly exhaust a habeas claim in the

state courts unless the specific Sixth Amendment claim providing

the basis for cause was itself properly exhausted. See Edwards

v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111 S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money,

391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2004). “Attorney ignorance or

inadvertence is not cause, but attorney error rising to the

level of an independent constitutional violation (in the form of

ineffective assistance of counsel) does constitute cause.”

Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2012).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire criminal

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144

F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th

Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

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merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

B. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Carey v. Musladin, 549

U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque,

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal

court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was

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‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of United States

Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that

is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme

Court but reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v.

Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005);

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149

(2004); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012),

cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). For example, a state

court’s decision is considered contrary to federal law if the

state court erroneously applied the wrong standard of review or

an incorrect test to a claim. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556

U.S. 111, 121, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124–25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746–47 (2008);

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 784-85; Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d

1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557

(2011). See also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir.

2008); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law if it correctly

identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts

in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or

fails to extend, a clearly established legal principle to a new

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set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. See

McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). When

considering such a claim, “a habeas court must determine what

arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the

state court’s decision; and then it must ask where it is

possible fair-minded jurists could disagree that those arguments

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior

decision of this Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,

786 (2011).

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also McKinney v. Ryan, 703 F.3d 903,

909-910 (9th Cir. 2013); Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994

(9th Cir. 2010). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g.,

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010);

McKinney, McKinney v. Ryan, 703 F.3d 903, 909-910 (9th Cir.

2013); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An unreasonable

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See

Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077,

1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one and does

not permit a court to grant relief simply because the state

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court might have incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of

a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d

Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, if the Supreme Court has not addressed a

specific issue in its holdings, the state court’s adjudication

of the issue cannot be an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873,

881 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9,

10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006). Stated another way, if the

issue raised by the petitioner “is an open question in the

Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court may not issue a writ

of habeas corpus on the basis that the state court unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law by rejecting the precise

claim presented by the petitioner. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1016;

Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858–59

(2007); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro,

653 F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011).

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C. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner alleges the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his motion to change counsel

Petitioner asserts that the state trial court abused

its discretion when it denied his motion to change counsel,

thereby violating Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights to

a fair trial and to due process of law. Petitioner contends the

state trial judge did not properly inquire as to the totality of

the circumstances before denying the motion. 

Respondents contend Petitioner did not properly exhaust

this claim in the state courts by presenting it in his direct

appeal. Respondents contend: “Though Taylor referenced the

substance of the claim to the PCR court, he did so as a claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and the PCR court

resolved it as such.”

In Petitioner’s first action for state post-conviction

relief, the state trial court reviewed the merits of

Petitioner’s contention that the trial court had erred by

denying Petitioner’s motion for new counsel. The state court

determined that the trial court had not erred by denying the

motion, and that Petitioner’s appellate counsel had not been

unconstitutionally ineffective for not raising this claim in

Petitioner’s direct appeal.

Regardless of whether Petitioner technically properly

exhausted this matter in the state courts, the claim may be

denied on the merits of the claim. The federal courts have

determined that when a defendant indicates dissatisfaction with

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his counsel, the trial court ordinarily must conduct a thorough

inquiry in order to discover whether the situation is depriving

the defendant of an adequate defense. See Schell v. Witek, 218

F.3d 1017, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2000); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d

826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982). In determining whether the trial

judge should have granted a substitution motion, the reviewing

habeas court may consider the extent of the alleged conflict,

whether the trial judge made an appropriate inquiry into the

extent of the conflict, and the timeliness of the motion to

substitute counsel. See, e.g., Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d

1181, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2005).

A review of the record in this matter, see Answer, Exh.

A, indicates that the state trial court conducted the relevant

inquiry after Petitioner moved to change counsel. See King v.

Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, this

alleged error did not deprive Petitioner of a fair trial or his

right to due process of law, and Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief regarding this claim.

2. Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel

Petitioner asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel because his

appellate counsel did not argue that the trial court should have

granted his motion to change counsel. Respondents allow

Petitioner properly exhausted this claim in the state courts.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a habeas petitioner must show both that his attorney’s

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performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

outcome of his criminal proceedings. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).

The petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct was within the range of reasonable

professional assistance required of attorneys in that

circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th

Cir. 2010). To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s

performance was deficient because counsel failed to raise a

particular argument, the petitioner must establish the argument

was likely to be successful, thereby establishing that he was

prejudiced by his counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel,

493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455

F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006).

The state courts did not err in concluding Petitioner

had not been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

The state courts determined that the decision to deny the motion

to substitute counsel was not an abuse of discretion and did not

provide a basis for reversing Petitioner’s convictions.

Accordingly, counsel’s alleged failure to raise the issue was

neither deficient performance nor prejudicial and the state

court’s decision was not contrary to nor an unreasonable

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application of federal law. 

3. Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to due

process and his right to be free of double jeopardy because the

trial court imposed consecutive sentences

Petitioner contends the state trial court erred by

imposing consecutive sentences. Respondents assert that this

claim has been found procedurally defaulted by the state courts.

Respondents also maintain that, because Petitioner argued to the

state courts only that his consecutive sentences violate state

law, he did not “fairly present” the claim as one alleging a

violation of his federal constitutional rights. Respondents

further argue that a claim presented to the state courts only as

a violation of state law is not cognizable on habeas review. 

Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged

errors in the interpretation or application of state law,

including a state’s statutes regarding imposition of sentences.

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480

(1991); Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We

may not second-guess the California appellate court’s

construction of its own state law unless it appears that its

interpretation is an obvious subterfuge to evade consideration

of a federal issue.”(internal quotations omitted)); Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). To the extent that

Petitioner asserts his sentences violated his right to due

process because they were improperly imposed as consecutive

sentences, pursuant to Arizona statutory law, Petitioner has not

stated a claim for federal habeas relief. See Beaty v. Stewart,

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303 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2002); Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d

616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002). Although Petitioner asserts that his

right to due process was violated because the state allegedly

did not follow its sentencing statutes, the characterization of

this claim in this fashion does not render it cognizable on

federal habeas review. See Cacoperdo v. Demonsthenes, 37 F.3d

504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994); Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 765

(7th Cir. 2002).

IV Conclusion

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

the merits of his claims that he was denied a fair trial because

the state trial court denied his motion to change counsel and

that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

counsel. Petitioner’s claim that the state court violated state

sentencing statutes by imposing consecutive sentences is not

cognizable in a federal habeas action.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Taylor’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

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file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 14th day of November, 2013.

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