Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-05419/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-05419-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY-MERRITT WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

HENRY J. TOBIAS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-05419-HSG

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER, 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND 

DECLARATORY RELIEF

Re: Dkt. No. 9

Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey-Merritt Wilson’s motion for a 

temporary restraining order (“TRO”), preliminary injunction, and declaratory relief. Dkt. No. 9. 

Plaintiff seeks these forms of relief “to maintain the status quo as to the matters [that] pertain and 

depend on this instant case.” Id. at 2. He petitions the Court to prevent a jury trial from going 

forward in state court. See id. at 2 & Ex. 3 (notice of jury trial in U.S. Bank Nation Ass’n. v. 

Wilson, Jeffrey Merritt, No. CL-16-00199 (San Benito Cty. Super. Ct.)). He also urges the Court

void a state court judgment in separate case. See id. at 3 (identifying case as No. CU-11-00119). 

After careful review of the papers submitted by the Plaintiff, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 

motion.

I. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. 

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The legal standard for a TRO and a preliminary 

injunction are “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 

F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. 

Case 4:16-cv-05419-HSG Document 12 Filed 11/07/16 Page 1 of 2
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Without more, his speculation that he is “most likely to prevail” is inadequate. See Dkt. No. 9 at 

3. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met the requirements for either a TRO or a preliminary 

injunction.1

II. DECLATRORY JUDGMENT

The Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (2012), is “procedural 

only” and does not extend federal jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 

667, 671-72 (1950) (citation omitted). Therefore, a federal court may not award declaratory relief 

unless the underlying claim provides a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 674. 

As a procedural statute dependent on an underlying cause of action, the DJA makes available an 

“additional remedy to litigants” without creating an independent “theory of recovery.” See Team 

Enters., LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Trust, 721 F. Supp. 2d 898, 911 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (original 

emphasis) (citations omitted), aff’d, 446 F. App’x 23 (9th Cir. 2011). Since Plaintiff has not yet 

prevailed on any underlying claim, he has not yet established any entitlement to declaratory relief.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 

1

Even if Plaintiff were able to meet the requirements to issue a preliminary injunction or TRO, the 

Court would likely lack authority to stay the state court proceedings at issue here, given the 

narrow exceptions under the Anti-Injunction Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012) (“A court of the 

United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly 

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 

effectuate its judgments.”) Similarly, the Court would likely lack authority to vacate the state 

court judgment at issue here, given the probable applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine instructs 

that federal district courts are without jurisdiction to hear direct appeals from the judgments of 

state courts. Congress, in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, vests the United States Supreme Court, not the lower 

federal courts, with appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. Accordingly, review of such 

judgments may be had only in the Supreme Court. The doctrine bars a district court from 

exercising jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the 

‘de facto equivalent’ of such an appeal.” (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets 

omitted)). However, the Court needs not reach these questions of its authority because Plaintiff 

has clearly not met the requirements for issuing a preliminary injunction or TRO.

November 11, 2016

Case 4:16-cv-05419-HSG Document 12 Filed 11/07/16 Page 2 of 2