Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01139/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01139-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES HENRY CARR, JR., No. CIV S-05-1139-LKK-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MARGARITA PEREZ, et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action for

declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is

defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 28). Also before the court is defendants’ request for

judicial notice (Doc. 29). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names as defendants to this action Margarita Perez and Susan Fisher,

both of whom are former members of California’s parole board. As outlined in the court’s

January 17, 2006, order, “plaintiff is . . . challenging the constitutionality of the procedures

employed during his parole hearing.” The order concluded that plaintiff’s claim is not a

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This is not to say that plaintiff’s complaint necessarily states a substantive claim 1

for relief. 

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challenge to the fact or duration of his confinement, which would not be cognizable under 

§ 1983. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005). The order also concluded that, because

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the action proceeds against defendants in their official capacity and seeks prospective

declaratory and injunctive relief only, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit. See

Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims

that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners

Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In considering a motion to dismiss under this

standard, the court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and must construe them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425

U.S. 738, 740 (1976); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 

All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

To determine whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be

granted, the court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See

Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th

Cir. 1994). The court may, however, consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or

attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454;

(2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily

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lies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice,

see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994), except prison regulations, see Anderson

v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).

Finally, leave to amend a deficient complaint must be granted “. . . [u]nless it is

absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66

F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc).

III. DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request that the court take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 201 that: (1) defendants are no longer members of the parole board; and (2) a copy of

the California Supreme Court’s decision in plaintiff’s case was “in the Board packet for

Plaintiff’s August 11, 2004, parole suitability hearing.” In support of the latter request,

defendants offer their counsel’s declaration that, when he reviewed the packet, “there was a copy

of the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Carr, California Supreme Court Criminal

Case No. 13829.” 

Under Rule 201(b), judicially noticeable facts are those which are either generally

known within the jurisdiction or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The court finds that the fact that defendants

are no longer members of the parole board meets this standard. As to whether the California

Supreme Court’s decision in plaintiff’s case was included in the packet for the August 11, 2004,

hearing, the court finds that the Rule 201(b) criteria are not met. Obviously, it is not generally

known in the jurisdiction. In addition, counsel’s declaration does not satisfy Rule 201(b). 

While counsel’s declaration certainly constitutes competent evidence of the fact, it is not a

source whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. For example, even if the California

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This does not necessarily mean that the board actually considered the decision in 2

2004. It just means that it was available in the file. 

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Supreme Court’s decision was included in the packet reviewed by counsel, that does not

necessarily mean that it was included in the packet which the board members reviewed in 2004. 

Even though the court cannot take judicial notice that the California Supreme

Court decision in plaintiff’s case was included in the file considered by the parole board at the

2004 hearing, the court can presume the fact to be true. See Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816 (holding that

all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff). In the complaint, plaintiff states: “[T]he defendants ignored the [California]

Supreme Court’s decision in Plaintiff’s central file. . .” From this, the court can presume that the

decision was, in fact, in plaintiff’s file. Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a transcript of the

August 11, 2004, parole hearing. This transcript reflects that defendant Fisher said: “We’ve had

the opportunity to review your files here and we’ll give you the opportunity to make any

corrections that you need to today for the record. . .” From this, the court can presume that

plaintiff’s file was, in fact, considered by the board. Therefore, it follows logically that the

California Supreme Court decision was in the file considered by the board. 

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Defendants’ request for judicial notice should be granted in part and denied in

part. It is appropriate to take judicial notice that defendants are no longer members of the parole

board. It is not appropriate to take judicial notice that the California Supreme Court’s decision

in People v. Carr was included in the packet reviewed by the parole board for the August 11,

2004, suitability hearing. That fact, however, has been admitted by plaintiff and is not disputed. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff is attempting to state constitutional claims arising from the denial of

parole in 2004. According to plaintiff, “he has been denied due process of law through the

improper use of amended, post-1977 guidelines and criteria at his parole hearing.” Plaintiff also

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In 2003, the board had decided that plaintiff was suitable for parole. That 3

decision, however, was reversed by the governor. 

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asserts that the parole board violated both his due process rights and California rules and

regulations which require all available information to be considered because defendants did not

rely on “relevant information in plaintiff’s California Supreme Court appellate decision . . .”

Plaintiff further asserts that defendant Fisher’s “. . . biased re-characterization of plaintiff’s

commitment offense, with make shift findings in excess of the defined minimum elements for

plaintiff’s first degree felony murder conviction, was a blatant violation of . . . due process . . .”

Plaintiff also claims that it was unfair for his hearing to have been conducted by a two-member

panel, as opposed to a three-member panel. Plaintiff claims that “he was denied a full and fair

hearing when . . . the defendants referenced selected comments in [plaintiff’s] rebuttal to Gov.

Gray Davis’ letter reversing plaintiff’s [prior] parole grant.” Finally, plaintiff argues that 3

defendants’ finding that he would not be suitable for parole for at least two years constituted a

due process violation and an ex post facto violation. 

Because plaintiff is asserting that the August 11, 2004, parole hearing was unfair,

the court concludes that he is attempting to state claims based on violations of due process. 

Plaintiff, clearly, also asserts various ex post facto violations. Finally, it appears that plaintiff

argues that defendants’ conduct was in violation of applicable state law. In their motion to

dismiss, defendants argue that plaintiff fails to state any claim based on either due process or ex

post facto violations. Defendants also argue that, because they are former members of the parole

board, they should be dismissed. Finally, they argue that any claims based on violations of state

law are not cognizable under § 1983.

Before addressing whether plaintiff’s allegations state claims for relief based on

either due process or ex post facto violations, the court will address defendants’ contention that

this action cannot proceed against them because they are no longer members of the parole board. 

State officials sued in their official capacity for injunctive relief are considered persons for

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purposes of § 1983. See Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Such suits are merely an alternative way of pleading an action against the entity for which the

defendant acts officially. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). 

In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Perez “is employed as

Commissioner and Chairperson” of the California Board of Prison Terms. Similarly, plaintiff

alleges that defendant Fisher is a parole board Commissioner. By use of the present tense verb

“is” instead of the past tense verb “was,” and because there is no evidence before the court to

establish otherwise, the court concludes that, at the time plaintiff filed the complaint, defendants

were members of the parole board. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)(1),

“[w]hen a public officer is a party to an action in his official capacity and during its pendency . .

. ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and the officer’s successor is automatically

substituted as a party.” Moreover, any misnomers not affecting the substance of the suit are to

be disregarded. See id. Finally, “[a] public officer who . . . is sued in an official capacity may be

described as a party by the officer’s official title rather than by name.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(2). 

Here, because defendants were active members of the parole board at the time the

suit was filed, and because this is an official capacity suit seeking prospective injunctive relief,

the substitution of defendants’ successors was automatic when defendants ceased their official

roles. For this reason, it would not be appropriate to dismiss the action simply because

defendants are no longer members of the parole board.

Next, the court addresses defendants’ argument that any claims based on

violations of state law are not cognizable under § 1983. As a general rule, defendants are

correct. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2001). Where, however, a violation of state

law is also a violation of due process, § 1983 does provide a cause of action. See Draper v.

Coombs, 792 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, the court will consider plaintiff’s assertions

based on violation of state law in the context of a due process analysis. 

/ / /

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Plaintiff asserts that certain of his claims also give rise to ex post facto violations. 4

This particular claim is discussed in more detail in section IV.E. 5

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Turning now to plaintiff’s allegations, the overriding theme of the complaint is

that the August 11, 2004, parole hearing was not fair. Thus, plaintiff is alleging that his due

process rights were violated. In the parole context, procedural due process requires that: (1) the 4

inmate be provided an opportunity to be heard; and (2) where parole is denied, the inmate be

provided with an explanation for the denial. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.

Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (citing Greenholtz). 

Substantive due process requires that “some evidence” support the decision to deny parole. See

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003); Sass v. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th

Cir. 2006) (adopting the standard announced in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455

(1985)). 

A. Application of Suitability Criteria Enacted After Offense Committed

Plaintiff claims that his parole hearing was not fair because the board applied

suitability criteria under California’s determinate sentencing law, which was adopted after his

1969 commitment offense. Specifically, plaintiff asserts an ex post facto violation, reasoning

that application of criteria harsher than were in place when he committed his offense essentially

subjects him to a longer sentence. As an example, plaintiff states that, “[u]nder the pre-1977 . . .

guidelines, plaintiff would not be subject to multi-year denials of parole.” By way of 5

background, defendants offer the following history:

Before the legislature enacted the Determinate Sentencing Law

(DSL) in 1976, California sentenced criminals under the Indeterminate

Sentencing Law (ISL).

The ISL actually had two types of sentences, indeterminate terms

and life terms. . . Life terms were reserved for the most serious crimes,

including first degree murder. Prisoners sentenced to a life term were

subject to a lifetime of supervision, either in prison or on parole. The

parole board had no authority to set a maximum release date at less than

life.

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Under the ISL, life term inmates had to be found suitable for

parole just as they are today. The first step in this process was for the

Adult Authority, the precursor of today’s Board of Parole Hearings, to

make a determination regarding the inmate’s parole suitability. Only after

an inmate was found suitable did the Adult Authority set a release date. 

Before 1976, there were no formal regulations governing parole

suitability. Rather, the Adult Authority had virtually unlimited discretion

in determining a life term inmate’s suitability. The first parole suitability

regulations, called the Parole Board Rules (PBR), were established in

1976. 

These rules provided that an inmate was unsuitable for parole if “in

the opinion of the hearing panel an unreasonable risk of danger to society

would be posed by release.” Although the rules provided examples of

factors that the Community Release Board, which had replaced the Adult

Authority, could use in determining an inmate’s suitability, these factors

were not exclusive. The board retained great discretion under the PBR,

and the primary issue was whether the danger to the public outweighed the

inmate’s interest in and suitability for release. 

In 1978, after the passage of the DSL, the Board of Parole Terms,

now the Board of Parole Hearings, enacted new regulations governing

parole suitability hearings. Under these regulations, inmates still have to

go through a two-step process before being released on parole. Enacted

primarily to achieve uniformity of sentences, the changes in the

regulations mostly concerned the second part of the process – the setting

of a release date once the Board found the inmate suitable for parole. The

primary concern at the first stage of the process remained the inmate’s risk

of danger to society if released. The regulations provide factors tending to

demonstrate suitability and unsuitability, but these are only guidelines. As

before, the Board retains significant discretion and is to consider “[a]ll

relevant, reliable information.”

Defendants cite Connor v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), in

support of their argument that plaintiff’s ex post facto claim is foreclosed as a matter of law. In

Connor, the prisoner was sentenced to life in prison under the ISL. See id. at 1033. However, he

was denied parole four times because he was found unsuitable for release under the DSL in place

at the time of the parole hearings. See id. The prisoner made the same argument plaintiff raises

in this case: “Connor argues that by considering him for parole under the DSL guidelines, rather

than the ISL guidelines, the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) violated the prohibition against ex

post facto laws.” Id. In Connor, the Ninth Circuit agreed with California courts which had

addressed the issue and concluded that, because application of the DSL guidelines does not

disadvantage prisoners sentenced under the ISL, there can be no ex post facto violation. See id.

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at 1034 (citing In re Duarte, 143 Cal. App. 3d 943 (3rd Dist. 1983), and In re Seabock, 140 Cal.

App. 3d 29 (1st Dist. 1983)). 

Plaintiff cites Brown v. Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2004), in his

opposition. Initially, the court observes that, in Brown, the prisoner was an Oregon inmate

challenging denial of parole under Oregon law. See id. at 1091. In that case, the state passed a

statute after Brown committed his crimes which changed the method by which it was decided

whether to postpone a parole date. See id. The old law required a “psychiatric or psychological

diagnosis of present severe emotional disturbance such as to constitute a danger to the . . .

community.” Id. (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.125(3) (1991)). The new law did not require a

mental health diagnosis, but allowed the parole board to make the determination on its own. See

id. (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.125(3)(a) (1993)). The Ninth Circuit held that the new law

created a “‘sufficient risk’ of increased punishment” and, as a result, constituted an ex post facto

violation. See id. at 1095 (citing Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

The court finds Connor to be the more applicable authority. Specifically, Brown

is inapplicable because it considered a change to Oregon law, not California law. In Connor, the

Ninth Circuit considered the same argument raised by plaintiff in this case and rejected it. This

court is bound to follow Connor. 

This conclusion is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005). In Wilkinson, two state prisoners brought a § 1983

action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Ohio’s parole procedures are

unconstitutional because they allowed application of harsher guidelines adopted after the

commitment offense date. See id. at 76. First, the Court held that the claim could proceed in the

context of a § 1983 action and did not need to be raised in a habeas corpus petition, as the district

court had concluded. See id. at 81. The Court did not, however, address the merits of the claim. 

Thus, while the Court in Wilkinson said that it was possible to allege this kind of constitutional

challenge under § 1983, the Court did not say that the allegations actually stated a claim. 

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The Northern District of Ohio’s docket for this case reflects that, ultimately, the 6

district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. An appeal of that decision is pending.

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Rather, it remanded for further proceedings. Moreover, Wilkinson involved application of 6

Ohio’s parole scheme, and not California’s. Therefore, Wilkinson is distinguishable on the facts.

B. Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Commitment Offense

Plaintiff asserts two constitutional violations concerning the parole board’s

evaluation of the facts of his commitment offense. He argues that his hearing was unfair because

the board ignored the facts as set forth in the California Supreme Court’s decision in his criminal

case. Plaintiff also argues that his hearing was unfair because the board redefined his offense as

constituting crimes carrying a more severe penalty. Because these allegations do not relate to

procedural requirements, they must relate to substantive due process. 

1. Consideration of Facts Set Forth in California Supreme Court’s Decision

Plaintiff asserts that defendants failed to consider the facts as described in the

California Supreme Court’s decision in his case, instead relying on their own version of

plaintiff’s commitment offense. Specifically, plaintiff alleges:

. . . As the hearing unfolded, defendant FISHER stated that the Panel

would be reading from the current (Correctional Counselor’s) Board

report for a description of the commitment offense. However, in so doing,

the defendants ignored the [California] Supreme Court’s decision in

Plaintiff’s central file, that reliably documented circumstances of the

commitment offense, as set forth in People v. Carr. (citation omitted).

As discussed above, substantive due process requires that “some evidence” support the decision

to deny parole. Therefore, for plaintiff to state a prima facie claim based on denial of substantive

due process, he must allege that the failure to consider the facts as set forth in the California

Supreme Court’s decision somehow means that the decision in 2004 was not based on some

evidence. 

/ / /

/ / /

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Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a complete transcript of the August 11, 2004,

parole suitability hearing, which this court may consider when deciding a motion to dismiss. See

Branch, 14 F.3d at 454. This transcript clearly shows that the parole board considered several

items of evidence, in addition to the facts of plaintiff’s commitment offense as outlined in the

correctional counselor’s report. For example, a chief deputy district attorney testified at the

hearing and argued against granting parole. In addition, the transcript shows that the board

considered, among other things, plaintiff’s file, plaintiff’s prison history, a current psychological

evaluation, plaintiff’s parole plans, and plaintiff’s statements at the hearing. These facts, as set

forth in the complaint and which the court must assume to be true, show that the board’s decision

was based on a number of pieces of evidence. Therefore, because plaintiff cannot allege that the

board’s decision was not based on “some evidence,” plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim

based on denial of substantive due process. Assuming, as the court must, that defendant Fisher

ignored the California Supreme Court decision available in the file, it cannot amount to a due

process violation given other facts alleged in the complaint.

2. Characterization of Plaintiff’s Commitment Offense

Plaintiff claims that the 2004 parole suitability hearing was unfair because

defendants re-characterized the facts of his commitment offense as constituting crimes carrying a

harsher sentence. He specifically asserts that this “. . .violates the applicable legal principles of

judicial construction established by the California state courts.” As legal authority supporting

his claim, plaintiff cites In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (2002), as follows:

. . . When weighing the seriousness of his criminal conduct to determine

whether (Plaintiff) would pose a threat to public safety if paroled, the

Board is not free to disregard his (conviction under the felony/murder

rule) and the concurrent (4-year) terms for robbery. . . The Board’s broad

discretion over parole suitability determinations is not a license to recharacterize the commitment offense as crimes carrying a more severe

penalty. (citations omitted).

/ / /

/ / /

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First, to the extent plaintiff is challenging defendants’ application of California

regulations governing parole suitability determinations, as explained in Rosenkrantz, such a

claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless there is also a prima facie due process violation. 

Next, as discussed above, to state a claim based on violation of substantive due process in the

parole context, plaintiff must allege that the decision to deny parole was not based on “some

evidence.” As with his allegation that defendants improperly ignored the California Supreme

Court decision when evaluating the facts of his commitment offense, given the totality of the

facts presented in the complaint, plaintiff cannot make this allegation. The court concludes,

therefore, that plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim for relief based on his allegation that

the defendants improperly re-characterized the facts of his commitment offense. 

C. Consideration of Plaintiff’s Prior Parole Decisions

Plaintiff’s claim is as follows:

The Plaintiff further alleges that he has been denied a full and fair

hearing when, acting as his own attorney, the defendants referenced

selected comments in [plaintiff’s] rebuttal to Gov. Gray Davis’ letter

reversing plaintiff’s parole grant, as findings in support of finding plaintiff

unsuitable for parole. Such conduct by defendants is a clear violation of

the First and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of the U.S. Constitution,

and in contravention of the tenet set forth in [California] Penal Code

Section 5011(b). 

In support of this claim, plaintiff alleges the following facts:

After defendant FISHER read Governor Gray Davis’ parole grant

reversal letter into the record of the parole hearing . . . I was asked if I

“would you like to close and you can incorporate the response to the

Governor’s decision in any way that you think is the best.”

Responding thereto, presenting a rebuttal to Governor Davis’

reversal letter, I stated that, “This is in response to Gray Davis’ parole

grant reversal.” After refuting all six items specific to Davis’ reversal

letter, I informed the panel, “That ends my rebuttal to the Governor’s

letter, Commissioners.” 

The complaint does not offer more.

/ / /

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These allegations fail to state a claim for relief for at least two reasons. First,

plaintiff does not specify which comments defendants selected or how defendants made

reference to such comments in support of the unsuitability finding. Second, as with the

allegations discussed above, plaintiff’s complaint cannot state a prima facie substantive due

process violation given the totality of the facts alleged. In particular, the facts alleged in the

complaint clearly show that the 2004 parole denial was based on some evidence other than any

reliance on plaintiff’s rebuttal. While the first defect could theoretically be cured through

amendment of the complaint, the second defect cannot. 

D. Use of a Two-Member Hearing Panel

Plaintiff alleges that his hearing was unfair because it was conduced by a twomember panel rather than a three-member panel. Plaintiff reasons as follows:

. . . The July 30, 2001, amendment to [California] Penal Code,

section 304a(d) reducing the number of commissioners that a life prisoner

may appear before from three to two can result in a tie decision. BPT

policy require[s] that a hearing panel’s tie decision for and against the

grant of parole, shall be referred to an en banc panel. Sudden illness can

also result in eight commissioners. As a consequence, all even-numbered,

en banc panels reviewing the tie decision of a parole panel, where the vote

tally is a 4-4 tie is automatically denied parole. 

Plaintiff asserts that the 2001 amendment results in an ex post facto violation as well as a due

process violation. 

From these allegations, it appears that plaintiff is claiming that a two-member

panel increases the possibility of an initial tie vote, which results in an increased possibility of a

tied en banc vote, which results in a greater possibility that parole will be denied. This logic

clearly stems from the observation that one dissenting vote denying parole on a two-member

panel results in a tie, whereas on a three-member panel the other two panel members overrule the

lone dissenter and there can never be a tie. 

/ / /

/ / /

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In their motion to dismiss, defendants counter that, even if plaintiff’s hearing had

been conducted by a three-member panel, the result would have been the same because the two

members that actually heard plaintiff’s case agreed that he was not suitable for parole. 

Therefore, a third vote in plaintiff’s favor would not have changed the result. Given that

plaintiff’s claim goes to the increased risk of tie vote on a two-member panel, which is axiomatic

because a three-member panel cannot reach a tie vote, defendants’ argument does not quite

address plaintiff’s assertion. Even though defendants are correct that the result in plaintiff’s case

would have been the same either way, this does not mean that plaintiff was not exposed to a

greater risk of a tie vote by going before a two-member panel. 

Ultimately, however, plaintiff’s allegation of an increased risk of a tie vote does

not state a claim because it is too speculative and, therefore, not a live controversy. If the twomember panel had actually reached a tie in plaintiff’s case, and if the subsequent en banc panel

also reached a tie, then plaintiff might be able to complain that, as a result of the 2001 change in

procedure, he was actually harmed. This conclusion – that plaintiff cannot allege any harm

based on the facts in the complaint – is distinguishable from defendants’ conclusion that,

essentially, any error was harmless because the result would not have been any different even

absent the error. The court does not find that using a two-member panel was erroneous on the

facts of this case as alleged in the complaint. 

E. Two-Year Unsuitability Determination

Plaintiff claims that his hearing was unfair because the board employed a rule

adopted after his offense date which allows subsequent parole suitability hearings to be deferred

for two years in any case where the board finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole

would be granted any sooner and states reasons. Plaintiff asserts both due process and ex post

facto violations. 

/ / /

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As explained by defendants, in 1981 the rules were amended to authorize the

board to defer subsequent parole suitability hearings for up to three years if, among other things,

the prisoner had been convicted of more than one offense involving the taking of a life. The

rules were later amended to the version applied in plaintiff’s case. In California Dept. of

Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995), the Supreme Court addressed whether application

of the 1981 amendment to parole hearings relating to crimes which occurred before 1981

constituted an ex post facto violation. In concluding that it did not, the Court held that the

amendment did not change the sentencing range for crimes covered by the amendment, but

merely altered the method for fixing a release date under identical substantive standards. See id.

at 507. 

In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that the reasoning of Morales applies

equally to the current version of the rules. Specifically, defendants assert that, like the 1981

version considered by the Supreme Court, the current version applied in plaintiff’s case does not

alter the substantive standard that the board must make a separate determination that it is not

likely that the inmate would be suitable for parole sooner and state its reasons. Rather, as in

Morales, the current rules only alter the method for fixing a release date once such a finding is

made. The court agrees that the reasoning in Morales applies to plaintiff’s challenge to the

current version of the rules governing the decision to defer future parole suitability hearings. 

As to whether plaintiff’s allegations concerning application of the current rules

state a claim based on violation of due process, the court concludes that they do not. It is clear

from the complaint as a whole that plaintiff was both given the opportunity to be heard and a

statement of the reasons parole was denied. Therefore, the complaint does not state a claim

based on a violation of procedural due process. Similarly, as with plaintiff’s other substantive

due process claims, the totality of the facts set forth in plaintiff’s complaint, and in particular the

transcript of the 2004 parole hearing plaintiff attaches, shows that the decision to deny parole

was based on “some evidence.” 

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V. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendants’ request for judicial notice be granted in part and denied in

part, as outlined herein;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted; and

3. This action be dismissed and the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter

judgment and close this file.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 16, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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