Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01872/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01872-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1872

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Malik Abdul-Muhammad; Rashid *

Ash-Sheikh Junaid, *

*

Appellants, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Gary Kempker; Dora B. Schriro; * District Court for the

Steve Long; Winfrey Dickerson; * Eastern District of Missouri.

Allen D. Luebbers; Pat Smith; *

Donna Y. McCondichie; Charles R. * [PUBLISHED]

Dwyer; Thomas King; Paul Powell; *

George Lombardi; Don Roper, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: May 8, 2007

Filed: May 24, 2007

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

In an earlier opinion, we affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 complaint filed by Missouri inmates Malik Abdul-Muhammad and Rashid

Ash-Sheikh Junaid for failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies as

required by a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Abdul-Muhammad v. Kempker, 450 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2006).

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We held that "a prisoner who files a complaint in federal court asserting multiple

claims against multiple prison officials based on multiple prison grievances must have

exhausted each claim against each defendant in at least one of the grievances." Id. at

352. In so holding, we observed that in several unpublished opinions, our Court has

affirmed the dismissal of an inmate's § 1983 complaint for failure to exhaust under §

1997e(a) because the inmate failed during the prison grievance process to identify by

name each individual defendant the inmate later sued in federal court. Id. at 351–52.

We also reiterated that when an inmate files a single complaint alleging multiple

prison-condition claims, each of the claims asserted must be properly exhausted, or

§ 1997e(a) requires that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Id. at 352. 

Thereafter, Ash-Sheikh Junaid, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Abdul-Muhammad did not file a

petition for a writ of certiorari, nor did he file any document with the Supreme Court

indicating that he intended to join in Ash-Sheikh Junaid's petition. On April 2, 2007,

the Supreme Court granted Ash-Sheikh Junaid's petition for a writ of certiorari,

vacated our earlier judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light

of the Court's decision in Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007). Ash-Sheikh Junaid

v. Kempker, 127 S. Ct. 1909 (2007). Because Ash-Sheikh Junaid was the only party

who filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and because that petition was pro se, AshSheikh Junaid is the only party to benefit from the Supreme Court's order granting

certiorari and remanding the case for further consideration. See, e.g., Sup. Ct. R. 12.6

("Parties who file no document will not qualify for any relief from this Court.").

Accordingly, we again affirm the District Court's dismissal of Abdul-Muhammad's

claims pursuant to the reasoning in our earlier opinion, Abdul-Muhammad v.

Kempker, 450 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2006). As instructed by the Supreme Court, we now

proceed to consider the claims raised by Ash-Sheikh Junaid.

On remand, the Supreme Court instructed us to reconsider Ash-Sheikh Junaid's

claims in light of Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007). In Jones, the Supreme Court

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concluded that "exhaustion [as required by the PLRA] is not per se inadequate simply

because an individual later sued was not named in the grievance[]" filed by an inmate.

127 S. Ct. at 923. Instead, the Court ruled that the degree of specificity required in a

prison grievance "will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the

prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper

exhaustion." Id. The Court also concluded that the language of § 1997e(a) does not

support a total-exhaustion requirement. Id. at 924. If an inmate fails to exhaust one

or more discrete claims raised in a § 1983 complaint, the PLRA requires only that the

unexhausted claim or claims be dismissed—it does not require that the complaint be

dismissed in its entirety. Id. ("As a general matter, if a complaint contains both good

and bad claims, the court proceeds with the good and leaves the bad."). 

In this case, the District Court dismissed Ash-Sheikh Junaid's claims based on

his failure to properly exhaust all available administrative remedies as to each discrete

claim raised in his complaint, and we affirmed. We now have the benefit of the

Supreme Court's guidance in Jones. Because the District Court has not determined in

the first instance which of Ash-Sheikh Junaid's claims have been properly exhausted

and which of Ash-Sheikh Junaid's properly exhausted claims, if any, are meritorious,

we reverse the District Court's dismissal of Ash-Sheikh Junaid's claims and remand

the case for further consideration of those claims in light of the Supreme Court's

decision in Jones. 

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