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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2983

RAUL SALAZAR GARCIA,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

EMELY GALVAN PINELO,

Respondent-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 09644 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2015 — DECIDED DECEMBER 22, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and MANION and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. Raul Salazar Garcia and Emely Galvan 

Pinelo, both Mexican citizens, dated only briefly in 2001 and 

early 2002. But their relationship had one lasting consequence: in October 2002, Galvan gave birth to a child, D.S., in 

Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico. Although Galvan at all 

times has had physical custody of D.S., Salazar played an active part in the child’s life. In 2013, Galvan and D.S. moved to 

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Chicago. Salazar now seeks D.S.’s return to Mexico under the 

Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child 

Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (Oct. 25, 

1980), to which both Mexico and the United States are parties. 

In the United States, it has been implemented through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 

U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. The Convention “entitles a person whose 

child has wrongfully been removed to the United States in violation of the Convention to petition for return of the child to 

the child’s country of ‘habitual residence,’ unless certain exceptions apply.” Norinder v. Fuentes, 657 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 

2011). Once the child is in that country, the local courts are 

empowered to resolve any questions about custody, support, 

or other family law matters.

This case presents us with three questions. First, we must 

determine whether, for the purpose of determining “rights of 

custody” under the Convention, a petitioner’s proof of foreign law should be treated as a question of law or a question 

of fact. Second, we must decide whether Salazar has shown 

that he had sufficient rights over D.S. at the time of the retention to trigger the Convention’s protections. Finally, we must 

evaluate whether the district court went beyond the bounds 

of its discretion when it declined to allow D.S. to stay in the 

United States pursuant to the Convention’s mature-child exception. 

We conclude that the Hague Convention is no exception 

to the general rule, reflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, that an issue about foreign law is a question of law, 

not fact, for purposes of litigation in federal court. We agree 

with the district court that Salazar had the necessary custodial 

right (referred to in Mexico either by its Latin name, patria 

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No. 15-2983 3

potestas, or occasionally by its Spanish name, patria potestad) 

over D.S. at the time when Galvan refused to permit his return 

to Mexico. Because D.S.’s habitual residence is Mexico (a 

point that is now uncontested), Galvan’s retention of D.S. is 

wrongful under the Convention. Finally, although we consider it a close question, we conclude that the district court 

had adequate reason to refuse to defer to D.S.’s indications 

that he prefers to stay in the United States. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

I

As we noted, Salazar and Galvan’s brief relationship left 

them with a son, D.S., who was born in October 2002. They 

never married, and they never lived together. In 2006, a 

Nuevo León court entered a custody order recognizing Galvan and Salazar as D.S.’s parents. The court awarded physical 

custody of D.S. to Galvan and gave Salazar weekly visitation 

rights. For the first ten years of his life, D.S. lived with his 

mother in Monterrey, and Salazar visited regularly in accordance with the custody agreement. 

In late 2012, Galvan requested Salazar’s assistance in obtaining a passport and visa for D.S. to visit the United States. 

She intended to visit relatives in Texas and then to take D.S. 

to either Disney World or Disneyland. Before that trip took 

place, however, she became engaged to an American citizen 

named Rogelio Hernandez, whom she married in July 2013. 

Around this time, she decided that she wanted to move with 

D.S. to the United States. While Galvan had told Salazar about 

her initial plans to travel with D.S. to the United States as a 

tourist, she did not advise him of her change in plans. Salazar

became suspicious, however, when he saw news of Galvan’s 

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engagement on Facebook. That led to a meeting among Galvan, Salazar, and D.S. on July 30, 2013, at a Starbucks in Monterrey. Galvan and Salazar agreed then that D.S. would move 

to Chicago with his mother and stay there for one school year.

What was not clear was what was to happen at the end of that 

year. Salazar recalls that the parties agreed that D.S.’s wishes 

would be dispositive, and Galvan thought that the two parents simply agreed to conduct further discussions.

As planned, Galvan and D.S. moved to Chicago on August 

15, 2013, and D.S. enrolled in school. Throughout the year, 

D.S. and Salazar kept in touch through Skype and Facebook. 

D.S. visited his father in Mexico for the Christmas holiday in 

December 2013. In his conversations with Salazar, D.S. said

that he wanted to return to Mexico at the end of the school 

year; at the same time, he was telling his mother that he 

wanted to stay in Chicago. 

Believing that the parties had agreed that D.S.’s wishes 

would govern his placement after the 2013-14 school year, 

and further believing that D.S. wanted to return to Mexico, 

Salazar showed up in Chicago in July 2014 with two return 

tickets to Mexico, one for him and one for D.S. This time it 

was Galvan who was taken by surprise: she believed that Salazar was in Chicago only to visit. Salazar and D.S. spent several days as tourists in Chicago. On July 21, 2014, in another 

Starbucks, D.S. and Salazar announced to Galvan that D.S. 

was moving back to Mexico with Salazar. Galvan did not believe that he wanted to return, nor did she think that she had 

an obligation to defer to his wishes. Salazar left the Starbucks 

with D.S., but the Chicago Police later contacted Salazar and

instructed him to return D.S. to Galvan. Salazar complied. He

returned alone to Monterrey, where he filed the petition that 

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is now before us. The Mexican Central Authority transferred 

the petition to the United States Department of State, which 

filed it in the district court on December 2, 2014. 

The district court appointed a guardian ad litem for D.S. At 

first, D.S. did not indicate a preference for either Mexico or 

Chicago. Over time, however, his views evolved. In late April 

2015, D.S. told his guardian that he wanted to stay in Chicago. 

The district court conducted an in-camera hearing with D.S.—

by then 13 years old—to ascertain his views. D.S. told the 

judge that he preferred to stay in Chicago because it had better schools and opportunities, was safer, and he did not want 

his mother to be forced to pay Salazar’s costs and fees. He indicated that he wanted to finish eighth grade in Chicago, but 

that if he were not admitted to a good high school after eighth 

grade, he might return to Mexico. While he stated a preference for remaining in Chicago, he did not object to returning 

to Mexico. 

At some point while all this was happening, Galvan’s immigration status took a turn for the worse. We go into more 

detail below, but for present purposes it is enough to say that 

both she and D.S. had overstayed their tourist visas and had 

no other basis for staying in the United States. This meant, her

immigration lawyer told her, that she probably could not 

travel outside the United States, even to visit D.S. This news 

prompted Galvan to request a second in-camera hearing between the judge and D.S. She believed her immigration difficulties would change D.S.’s mind: since she would be unable 

to visit him in Mexico, it would be very difficult for D.S. to see 

his mother, possibly for a very long time. The district court 

obliged. During the second hearing, D.S. more clearly objected to returning to Mexico. While he gave several reasons 

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for doing so, he also indicated that he would not object to returning if Galvan’s immigration situation were quickly resolved and she could travel freely between the United States 

and Mexico. 

On August 21, 2015, the district court held an evidentiary 

hearing at which it received testimony from Salazar, Galvan, 

and Hernandez on the issues of the scope of Salazar and Galvan’s July 2013 agreement and whether the United States or 

Mexico was D.S.’s country of habitual residence. In orders entered on August 16 and August 28, 2015, the court granted 

summary judgment for Salazar. It found as a matter of fact 

that when Salazar and Galvan met in the Monterrey Starbucks 

in July 2013, they agreed that it would be D.S.’s decision

whether to remain in Chicago after one school year had 

passed. It also found that Mexico was D.S.’s country of habitual residence. Applying the law of the Mexican state of Nuevo 

León, the court found that Salazar had the right of patria 

potestas over D.S., and that this qualifies as a “right of custody” for purposes of the Convention. (We refer occasionally 

to “Mexican law” in this opinion; we intend that phrase to encompass both Mexican federal law, such as the Convention, 

and the state law of Nuevo León.) This meant, the court held, 

that as of the summer of 2014 D.S. was wrongfully retained. 

That meant that he had to be returned to Mexico, unless the 

mature-child exception recognized by the Convention was 

met (i.e. D.S. was mature enough to make his own decision, 

and his decision was to stay in the United States). The court 

found that D.S. had eventually objected to returning to Mexico, and that he was sufficiently mature. It nonetheless declined to give effect to D.S.’s wishes, because it determined 

that doing so would not serve the purposes of the Convention. It thus ordered D.S. to be returned to Mexico.

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Galvan has appealed. She offers three reasons for rejecting 

the district court’s decision. First, she argues that Salazar did 

not prove his custody rights by a preponderance of the evidence, and thus that there is no basis for finding that D.S. was 

wrongfully retained. Second, she asserts that as a matter of 

Mexican law, Salazar does not have the necessary custody 

rights for Convention purposes. Finally, she argues that the 

district court abused its discretion by declining to apply the 

Convention’s mature-child exception. She does not contest 

the district court’s findings with regard to D.S.’s country of 

habitual residence or the scope of the July 2013 agreement. 

II

We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its conclusions of law—whether American, foreign, 

or international—de novo. See Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 710 

(7th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 

1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“In determining foreign law ... [t]he court’s determination must be 

treated as a ruling on a question of law.”)).

At bottom, the Hague Convention “is an anti-abduction 

treaty.” Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 739 (7th Cir. 2013). 

It has two purposes: “to secure the prompt return of children 

wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State,” 

and “to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the 

law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the 

other Contracting States.” Hague Convention art. 1, T.I.A.S. 

No. 11670. It is meant “to deter parents from absconding with 

their children and crossing international borders in the hopes 

of obtaining a favorable custody determination in a friendlier 

jurisdiction.” Walker v. Walker, 701 F.3d 1110, 1116 (7th Cir. 

2012). 

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In order to accomplish its objectives, the Convention “employs a ‘remedy of return.’” Ortiz v. Martinez, 789 F.3d 722, 

728 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Kahn v. Fatima, 680 F.3d 781, 783 

(7th Cir. 2011)). This remedy “entitles a person whose child 

has wrongfully been [retained in] the United States in violation of the Convention to petition for return of the child to the 

child's country of ‘habitual residence.’” Norinder, 657 F.3d at 

529. A removal or retention is wrongful under the Convention 

where “it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person ... under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention,” and those rights were “actually exercised ... or would 

have been so exercised but for the removal or retention” at the 

time of the removal or retention. Hague Convention art. 3, 

T.I.A.S. No. 11670.

Several principles of the Convention have a bearing on 

this case. First, it is not our prerogative “to settle a custody 

dispute.” Ortiz, 789 F.3d at 728; Hague Convention art. 19,

T.I.A.S. No. 11670 (“A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.”); 22 U.S.C. 

§ 9001(b)(4). Rather, the Convention is designed to restore the 

pre-removal status quo. See Ortiz, 789 F.3d at 728. More 

broadly, it “seeks ... to prevent a later decision on the matter 

[from] being influenced by a change of circumstances brought 

about through unilateral action by one of the parties.” Elisa 

Pérez–Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Conference on Private International Law ¶ 71, in 3 Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth 

Session 426, 447–48 (1980). Finally, it is a “basic principle” of 

the Convention “that a child’s country of habitual residence 

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is ‘best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access.’” Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 456 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Explanatory Report ¶ 34, at 434–35). 

A

We turn first to the question whether Salazar must 

“prove” the content of the relevant Mexican law by a preponderance of the evidence, as if it were a question of fact, or if 

this is a straightforward question of law for the court. Galvan 

takes the former position and asserts that Salazar failed to 

prove that the rights he possesses under Mexican law qualify 

for protection under the Convention. Thus, she concludes, the 

district court should have dismissed his petition. 

Whatever one might think of Galvan’s position in the abstract, it does not stand up to scrutiny under the governing 

rules of procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 states 

that “[i]n determining foreign law, the court may consider 

any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether 

or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal 

Rules of Evidence.” It specifies that “[t]he court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.” Id. And 

this is not a rule exclusively for the district courts. To the contrary, “[i]n determining these questions of [foreign] law, both 

trial and appellate courts are urged to research and analyze 

foreign law independently.” Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir. 1985). This is because “one 

of the policies inherent in Rule 44.1 is that whenever possible 

issues of foreign law should be resolved on their merits and 

on the basis of a full evaluation of the available materials.” Id. 

(quoting 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2444 (1971)). 

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Galvan argues that two cases—In re Griffin Trading Co., 683 

F.3d 819, 824 (7th Cir. 2012), and Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1990)—support 

her position, but they do not. Griffin and Khreich address the 

distinct issue of choice of law, which is not contested in our 

case. The parties can waive a choice-of-law argument, but the 

court has an independent responsibility to ascertain the content of any given law. See Twohy, 758 F.2d at 1193; Curley v. 

AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1998). Indeed, the court is 

not limited to materials submitted by the parties when it undertakes this job: it is free to conduct its own research.

A central issue in the present case is whether Salazar had 

sufficient custody rights over D.S. to be entitled to relief under 

the Convention and ICARA. The answer depends on Mexican 

law, and thus the inquiry lies comfortably within Rule 44.1’s 

ambit. In this respect, the U.S. federal rules of procedure are 

entirely consistent with the Convention, which is based on respect for the law of the country of the child’s habitual residence. Whallon, 230 F.3d at 456, which in turn refers to Explanatory Report ¶ 34, at 434–35 (also noting at ¶ 67 that “the law 

of the child’s habitual residence is invoked in the widest possible sense.”).

Galvan attempts to avoid this logic by arguing that the 

bundle of fact and law on which the district court made its 

decision had to be treated as a question of fact. But she has no 

quarrel with the facts that Salazar presented; instead, she says 

that Salazar did not produce enough evidence of the law of 

Nuevo León to permit the district court to resolve the issue. 

The district court was not, however, limited to the evidence 

Salazar presented (and for what it is worth, he did present 

some). The district court was required to find that it was more 

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likely than not, given its independent analysis of the relevant 

Mexican law and its consideration of Salazar’s factual evidence, that the rights Salazar possessed are protected by the 

Convention. The important question, to which we now turn, 

is whether the court came to the right conclusion.

B

A removal or retention is wrongful if (1) “in breach of 

rights of custody ... under the law of the state in which the 

child was habitually resident immediately before the removal 

or retention”; and (2) “at the time of removal or retention 

those rights were exercised ... or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.” Hague Convention

art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11670. Because D.S.’s habitual residence at 

the time of the retention was the Mexican state of Nuevo 

León, the governing law is that state’s Civil Code.

Salazar relies on a doctrine known as patria potestas to support his claim. Patria potestas is a concept derived from the Roman civil law tradition; literally, the Latin words mean “the 

power of the father.” Historically, the power of the father over 

his children was absolute, both in scope and to the exclusion 

of others. Patricia Begné, Parental Authority and Child Custody 

in Mexico, 39 Fam. L.Q. 527, 529 (2005). Under Roman and 

German law, patria potestas permitted a father to discipline his 

children in any way, up to and including by death; that power 

endured throughout the father’s life. Id. Mexico’s codes of 

1870 and 1884 conveyed patria potestas first to the father of a 

child and only secondarily to the mother. Id. It was only in

1928 that the Civil Code began the process of eliminating its

gender bias. Id.

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Today, patria potestas is based on the central values of “fairness and reciprocity”; it is a gender-neutral legal regime that 

regulates the relationship between parents (or parent-like figures) and their children. Id. at 530 (citing Código Civil para el 

Distrito Federal art. 411); see also Civil Code for Nuevo León 

(CCNL) art. 411 (“Respect and mutual consideration shall 

govern the relationship between parents and children.”). This 

court has recognized patria potestas as a “right[] of custody” 

within the meaning of the Convention. See Altamiranda Vale v. 

Avila, 538 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2008) (“When the parent who 

does not receive physical custody is given the rights and duties of patria potestas, he has custody rights within the meaning 

of the Hague Convention.”). While we interpreted Venezuelan law in Avila, the concept of patria potestas is substantially 

the same under the law of Nuevo León.

Galvan does not dispute that patria potestas constitutes a 

“right of custody” under the Convention. Cf. Abbott v. Abbott, 

560 U.S. 1 (2010) (noncustodial parent’s ne exeat right is a 

“right of custody” for purposes of the Convention). Rather, 

she denies that Salazar has such a right. She does so on two 

bases: primarily, she asserts that he never possessed the patria 

potestas right over D.S.; her back-up position is that any patria 

potestas right he may have held was extinguished by the 2006 

custody agreement.

1

Galvan’s more ambitious argument—that Salazar never 

possessed patria potestas over D.S.—was never squarely presented to the district court. In her reply brief, Galvan argues 

that she nevertheless did not waive it because it was an essential part of her argument that “the parties’ rights were limited 

to what was specified in the [2006] court order.” This assertion 

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is not borne out by Galvan’s summary judgment submission, 

which at no point asserts that Salazar lacked patria potestas before the custody agreement. This probably constitutes waiver 

of the point. Even if it were merely forfeited, however, we 

think that Salazar has the better of the argument.

Galvan relies on article 416 of the Civil Code for Nuevo 

León, because it is the only provision that expressly applies to 

parents who never lived together. Article 416 states:

When both parents have recognized a child born out of 

wedlock and they live together, they will jointly exert 

parental authority/responsibility (patria potestas). If

they do not live together, what is established by articles 

380 and 381 will apply to grant custody of the child. 

Articles 380 and 381 describe the procedures for establishing 

custody depending on the timing of the parents’ recognition 

of the child. Neither mentions patria potestas.

Galvan argues that article 416’s mention of the patria 

potestas right with regard to parents who live together—and 

especially the article’s silence on this point with regard to parents who do not—indicates that patria potestas does not attach 

automatically when the parents never cohabitated. She finds 

support for this position in article 417, which provides that 

“[w]hen the parents of a child born out of wedlock that were 

living together[] separate, both retain parental authority/responsibility (patria potestas).” This article, too, has nothing to 

say about unmarried parents who never lived together.

Salazar counters that patria potestas is a default doctrine 

that attaches automatically to both birth parents upon their 

acknowledgment of parentage. He provided the district court 

with a certificate from the Mexican Central Authority stating 

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that “[a]ccording to Mexican Law, individuals acquire parental rights (patria potestad) over a child since the moment of 

birth, or registration before the civil registry as a result of an 

acknowledgment of paternity.” Salazar also notes that article 

414 states that “[p]arental authority/responsibility (patria 

potestas) is exerted jointly by both parents.” Other authorities 

support this view. The Begné article suggests that patria 

potestas is “mandatory” and “not transferable.” Begné, Parental Authority, 39 Fam. L.Q. at 530 (“Parental authority has relevant social significance, as it involves the fulfillment of the 

most important responsibility that a person can assume ... . It 

is therefore considered by law to be mandatory.”). “Parents 

exercising their authority ‘always keep ... the right to shelter 

their descendants.’” A.A.M. v. J.L.R.C., 840 F. Supp. 2d 624, 

634–35 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting JOSÉ ANTONIO MÁRQUEZ 

GONZÁLEZ, FAMILY LAW IN MEXICO 81 (2011)). “The [Mexican] 

Supreme Court has ruled that ... ‘patria potesta[d], as a general 

rule, must be exercised by two parents jointly, and only as an 

exception may it be exercised by one parent.’” Saldivar v. 

Rodela, 879 F. Supp. 2d 610, 624 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (quoting 

STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW 459–60 (2004)). Salazar argues that article 416’s second sentence is better read as 

addressing the rules for physical custody in the case of unmarried, noncohabiting parents, not as a statement on 

broader rights of parental authority. After all, if the parents 

are cohabiting, it makes sense to assume that they will exercise joint custody.

Galvan’s textual argument depends entirely on the maxim 

expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to include one thing is to 

exclude another). But even assuming that this notion exists in 

Mexican law and operates there just as it does in the United 

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States, it is at best “an aid to determine the intent of the statute.” 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 424 (2015). Even if we set aside the 

certificate from the Mexican Central Authority (and we see no 

reason to do so), nothing justifies our applying the maxim 

here. Patria potestas is central to Mexican family law. See 

Lieberman v. Tabachnik, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1118 (D. Colo. 

2008) (citing Mexican attorney’s testimony that “patria potestas

is the most sacred concept in Mexican family law”). Galvan 

maintains that article 416 overrides the default rule in the case 

of unmarried, noncohabiting parents. But we reject the idea 

that the Code would exclude a subset of parents from such a 

fundamental right in this backhanded manner. 

Galvan’s interpretation of article 416 has the further disadvantage of creating a gap in the law: no one would have 

patria potestas over a child born to unmarried noncohabiting 

parents. Even Galvan accepts that article 416 does not award 

patria potestas to unmarried, noncohabiting parents; nor do articles 380 and 381. The latter articles describe only how to 

award physical custody, not patria potestas, for unmarried, 

noncohabiting parents. Here and elsewhere the Code carefully distinguishes between patria potestas and custody. See 

CCNL art. 415 bis (“Even if they do not have custody of the 

minors, those exerting parental responsibility (patria potestas), 

have a right to coexist (spend time) with their descendants 

... .”). Galvan’s view, taken to its logical extreme, would produce the odd result that even she would not possess patria 

potestas over D.S. today—indeed, no one would. This would

be inconsistent with article 412, which dictates that “nonemancipated minors are under parental authority/responsibility (patria potestas) as long as the ancestors that must exert 

it according to the Law subsist.” Galvan’s response is to shift 

her attention to the 2006 custody agreement as the source of 

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her own patria potestas. We turn to that agreement in a moment. For now, we conclude that under the law of Nuevo 

León, patria potestas attaches automatically at birth or acknowledgment. Since at least 2006, Salazar has been D.S.’s 

acknowledged father; he thus has the patria potestas right over 

D.S. unless something in the 2006 agreement requires a different result.

2

Putting original rights to one side, Galvan urges that the 

2006 agreement not only clarified (or conferred) her sole physical custody rights, but also granted patria potestas to her exclusively. In doing so, she says, it necessarily terminated any 

original patria potestas right Salazar had; it did so by failing to 

mention them.

Some courts have held that patria potestas may be extinguished by a custody agreement. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. 

Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Here, unlike the 

situation in Whallon, the parties have executed a formal, legal 

custody agreement, thus eliminating any basis for relying on 

patria potestas.”), abrogated by Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10, 22; see also 

Avila, 538 F.3d at 587. None of these decisions, however, cites

any Mexican law for this proposition, nor do we find any basis for it in the Civil Code for Nuevo León. Even if they are 

correct, however, the question would remain whether the 

2006 agreement before us had that effect.

Chapter III of the CCNL spells out the conditions under 

which patria potestas may be suspended or terminated. The list 

is extensive, detailed, and specific. The conditions all relate to 

the parent’s ability or willingness to care for the child. See 

CCNL arts. 443–448. Patria potestas terminates automatically 

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only by the death of the person exercising it, the child’s emancipation by marriage, or the child’s reaching majority. See 

CCNL art. 443. The right can be terminated if the person exercising it (1) is convicted of two or more serious crimes endangering the child or the child’s assets, (2) is convicted of an intentional offense against the child or the child’s assets, (3) mistreats or abandons the child in a way that puts the child at 

risk, (4) fails to visit the child in a public welfare institution, 

(5) abandons the child for greater than 180 days, or (6) leaves

the child alone for more than 30 days without any information 

about the child’s origin. Id. art. 444. It can also be terminated 

if the person exercising it “is expressly condemned to its loss.” 

Id. It can be suspended for lack of capacity, formally declared 

absence, or a criminal sentence imposing suspension. Id. art. 

447. Article 447 bis notes that the patria potestas right may be 

limited judicially, but the sole justification listed is “to protect 

the physical or psychological integrity” of the child. Id. art. 

447 bis.

Neither a custody agreement nor anything akin to one is 

listed as a condition that may terminate, suspend, or even 

limit patria potestas. Nor is there a general provision for the 

judicial surrender of parental authority and responsibility. To 

the contrary, article 448 states expressly that “[p]arental authority/responsibility [patria potestas] is not waivable.” Article 

448 enumerates only two circumstances under which a person 

with patria potestas may be excused of his or her duties: (1) if 

the person is “sixty years or older” or (2) if he or she is “unable 

to properly carry out [his or her] duties” because of “a state of 

regular poor health.” Id. The fact that article 415 distinguishes 

between custody and parental authority rights further buttresses the idea that patria potestas cannot be lost through a 

custody agreement. Even if it were theoretically possible for a 

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18 No. 15-2983

parent to lose patria potestas through a custody agreement, this

custody agreement would not suffice. Article 444’s sole subsection not conditioning termination on a specific contingency indicates that a person may lose the patria potestas right

by being “expressly condemned to its loss.” The 2006 custody 

agreement did not mention either Galvan or Salazar’s patria 

potestas right, let alone “expressly condemn” Salazar to its

loss. The custody agreement thus did not extinguish Salazar’s 

patria potestas right over D.S.

C

As we noted earlier, patria potestas is considered a custodial right for purposes of the Convention. Since Salazar has 

that right, and Galvan arranged to have D.S. kept in the 

United States against Salazar’s will, it follows that for Convention purposes D.S. was wrongfully retained. This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry. Under the Convention, the district court had the discretion to refuse to return 

D.S. to Mexico if Galvan proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence that D.S. “object[ed] to being returned and ha[d] attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of [his] views.” Hague Convention art. 13,

T.I.A.S. No. 11670 (mature-child exception); 22 U.S.C. 

§ 9003(e)(2)(B) (burden of proof for article 13 defenses). The 

district court found that D.S. was sufficiently mature to invoke the exception, and we see nothing in the record to cast 

doubt on that assessment. The district court also found that 

D.S. eventually stated his objection to being returned to Mexico during the second in-camera hearing. Both formal prerequisites for this exception are therefore satisfied. 

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No. 15-2983 19

The question remains, however, whether the exception automatically applies in such a case, or if the district court retains discretion to follow the rule rather than the exception. In 

our view, it would be inconsistent both with the Convention 

and with the often sensitive questions involved in domestic 

relations to take a mechanical approach. This is consistent 

with the way other courts and the U.S. Department of State

have understood the exceptions. They have said that a district 

court retains discretion not to apply an exception, and that its 

decision either way is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. 

See de Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 

court still has discretion to order the return of the child if it 

would further the aim of the Convention which is to provide 

for the return of a wrongfully removed child.”) (citing Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1067); England, 234 F.3d at 270–71; see also 

Hague Convention art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11670 (“The judicial or 

administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of 

the child” if the mature-child exception applies) (emphasis 

added); U.S. Dep’t of State Public Notice 957: Hague Int’l 

Child Abduction Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10509 (1986)

(“The courts retain the discretion to order the child returned 

even if they consider that one or more of the exceptions applies.”).

Here, the district court decided that it would be inconsistent with the aims of the Convention to refuse to repatriate 

D.S. First, it noted D.S.’s ambivalence before he finally objected to returning to Mexico, and the fact that D.S.’s objection 

was founded “almost entirely” on his belief that his mother 

would not be able to travel to and from Mexico because of her 

immigration status. Galvan observes, correctly, that D.S. gave 

other reasons, too, but the district court’s sense of which reaCase: 15-2983 Document: 35 Filed: 12/22/2015 Pages: 23
20 No. 15-2983

son predominated was not clear error. The court was particularly struck by the fact that D.S. stated that he would not object to return if his mother’s travel to and from Mexico were 

not impeded, based on the assumption that she could obtain 

the proper visa within six months.1 The court never asked 

D.S. how he would react to periods longer than six months.

While this omission troubles us, in the end it does not compel a finding that the district court abused its discretion. The 

court’s greatest concern was independent of the amount of 

time D.S. might go without seeing his mother. It believed that 

the application of the mature-child exception in this case 

would reward Galvan for problems of her own making. Her 

immigration status was unstable because she (and D.S.) overstayed their tourist visas. Itreasoned that allowing D.S. to stay 

in the United States would allow Galvan to benefit from her 

own violations of the Convention and U.S. immigration laws. 

 

1 The record is unclear both on the status of Galvan’s application for 

legal permanent resident status and on the accuracy of the six-month estimate. Apparently Galvan had been trying ever since her arrival in the 

United States to pursue a visa, but she represents that she could not afford 

the necessary fees. The process takes some time: a qualified person (such 

as her husband) must first submit a Petition for Alien Relative (an I-130) 

on her behalf. The alien must also submit an application for adjustment of 

status (I-485). Although U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services indicates that the entire process can take as little as seven months, see USCIS 

Processing Time Information, https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/processTimesDisplayInit.do (last updated Dec. 15, 2015) (choose “Chicago IL” 

from “Field Office” drop-down menu), the Department of State represents 

that “[t]he length of time [for processing] varies from case to case and cannot be predicted for individual cases with any accuracy.” Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant Visa for a Spouse of a U.S. Citizen 

(IR1 or CR1), http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/family/immediate-relative.html#13 (last visited Dec. 16, 2015).

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No. 15-2983 21

Galvan argues that applying the mature-child exception 

would not “reward” her for her immigration problems because her visa overstay was not a “strategic ploy” and the visas expired before the wrongful retention. She notes that even 

the district court recognized that her conduct was not in bad 

faith. The court’s rationale, she urges, fits only more egregious 

cases of child abduction. 

Article 13 is meant to address both systemic concerns—in 

particular, deterrence—and individual cases. See England, 234 

F.3d at 271 (“The Convention’s primary aims are to ‘restore 

the pre-abduction status quo and to deter parents from crossing borders in search of a more sympathetic court.’”) (quoting 

Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1063); Explanatory Report ¶¶ 16 (noting 

that one of the Convention’s two central objectives is “deterring” the abductor by “depriv[ing] his actions of any practical 

or juridical consequences”), 17 (noting the enforcement of the 

objective of “effective respect for rights of custody and of access ... belongs on the preventive level”), at 429–30. The district court was concerned that exercising the exception in this 

case would set a precedent that allows a parent to prevent the

return of a child by problems of his or her own making. It reasoned that an inquiry into a litigant’s subjective intentions is

a difficult endeavor, and one potentially subject to abuse by 

savvy litigants. It would be difficult for a court to smoke out 

bad faith in these situations. Neither the Convention nor 

ICARA forbids the district court to take these concerns into 

account when it makes its ultimate decision. The Convention’s “defenses ... are narrowly construed” at least in part to 

preserve that deterrence. De Silva, 481 F.3d at 1285. 

The district court also reasoned that this was a weak case 

for the mature-child exception because D.S.’s objection was 

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partially premised on getting “used” to missing his father and 

extended family in Mexico, and D.S.’s views had not been 

consistent. At the time of the wrongful retention in July 2014, 

D.S. wanted to return to Mexico. By the time of the first incamera hearing, he preferred to stay in Chicago, but did not 

object to being returned to Mexico. It was only at the second 

in-camera hearing—roughly 13 months after he was wrongfully retained—that D.S. unequivocally objected to being returned. The district court reasoned that refusing to return D.S. 

under such conditions would reward Galvan for the continued wrongful retention. It would also signal that a parent 

might escape the Convention by running out the clock until 

the wrongfully retained child became accustomed to her new 

home. See, e.g., Yang v. Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 280 (3rd Cir. 2007) 

(affirming district court’s decision not to exercise exception 

because where the child “grew attached to her family and 

life” in the place where she was wrongfully retained during 

the retention itself, applying the exception “would encourage 

parents to wrongfully retain a child for as long as possible[,] 

... and reward [the retaining parent] for violating [the petitioner’s] custody rights, and defeat the purposes of the Convention”). The Convention is intended “to secure the prompt

return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 

Contracting State.” Hague Convention art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 

11670 (emphasis added). Creating an incentive for delay

would frustrate this central purpose. 

III

There is no doubt that this is a close case. Two points, however, are clear: Salazar had patria potestas over D.S. at the time 

of the retention; and he had “rights of custody” recognized by

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No. 15-2983 23

the Convention. That is enough to establish Galvan’s retention of D.S. in violation of her agreement with Salazar as 

wrongful under the Convention. Whether to apply the mature-child exception was a question within the district court’s 

discretion. We see nothing powerful enough in this record to 

warrant the rejection of its conclusion, and so we AFFIRM its 

judgment in favor of Salazar.

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