Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03745/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03745-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TINA BROOKS-NEWHOUSE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-03745 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

AND REMANDING ACTION

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tina Brooks-Newhouse is a 34 year old woman with a 12th grade education and six years of

intermittent college without a degree. Administrative Transcript (“A.T.”) at 68-81, 259. As of the date of the

written decision by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), plaintiff was homeless, sleeping in her car and

occasionally staying with friends. Id. at 24. Plaintiff has four children, three of whom are being cared for by

her mother. Id. at 170-88. 

Various medicalreports document plaintiff’s psychiatric and socialhistory. Briefly, plaintiff was cared

for primarily by her single mother. Id. At age five, plaintiff was raped by her 15-year-old brother. Id.

Plaintiff’s mother, who walked into the room while the assault was in progress, beat and verbally reprimanded

plaintiff over the incident. Id. At age seven, plaintiff was again raped by her babysitter’s sons. Id.

Plaintiff was first married at age 21 and divorced a few years later. Id. at 57-63. Plaintiff later

remarried and separated in 2001. Id. at 170-88, 269-70. Her second husband was recently incarcerated for

sexually abusing plaintiff’s daughter. Id. at 170-88. Plaintiff claims it is now difficult for her to be around men

and has since started dating women exclusively. A.T. 170-88, 272. 

Plaintiff claims that, in January of 2001, she became so depressed she could no longer function

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 1 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

adequately to maintain regular employment. Id. at 170-88. That same year, plaintiff lost her full-time job and

began working through a temporary agency. Id. Plaintiff’s earnings for 2001 were $5,528, less than the

previous two years, whichwere just above $26,000 per year. Id. at 64-67. With the exception of 1992 and

1997, in which she had no reported earnings, plaintiff’s yearly earningsfrom1994 to 1998 ranged from$4,045

to $9,998. Id.

In February 2002, plaintiff began visiting the Pacific Center for HumanGrowth, where she was treated

by TraciWilliams, Marriage Family Therapist Intern (“MFTI”). Ms. Williams’ diagnostic impression of plaintiff

was major depressive episode, (moderate), rule-out post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and anxietyinduced arrhythmia. Id. at 27, 170-88. Ms. Williams completed an updated report on August 28, 2002, and

again on April 25, 2003. Id. at 27, 202-03, 227-31. The last report from April 2003 diagnosed plaintiff with

major depressive disorder (recurrent with melancholic features) and PTSD (chronic). Id. at 227-31. 

In March 2002, at the request of the Commissioner, a consultative psychologist, Sokley Khoi, Ph.D.,

conducted an examination of the plaintiff, which yielded a diagnosis of depressive disorder, NOS, with mild

to moderate impairment in the ability to withstand the stress of a routine work day. Id. at 189-92. 

On February 13, 2002, plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security

Income payments. Id. at 57-63, 234-41. The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. Id.

at 41-45, 48-52, 95-100. On December 3, 2002, plaintiff filed a request for a hearing in front of an ALJ,

which took place on September 16, 2003. Id. at 53-54, 256-77. On October 24, 2003, the ALJ issued his

decision denying benefits based on a determination that, despite “severe” impairments restricting her capacity

to perform some work activities, plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404. Id. at 19-

31. 

Plaintiff appealed that decision to this Court. Plaintiff now brings a motion seeking summary judgment

for the award ofbenefits, or, in the alternative, remand forfurther administrative proceedings; defendant seeks

summary judgment of affirmance. The cross-motions for summary judgment are now before the Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 2 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The SocialSecurity Administration(“SSA”) must follow a five step analysis to determine if a claimant

is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 

First, the claimant must not currently be performing “substantialgainfulactivity.” Second, the

claimant, based on medical evidence, must have a “severe” impairment or combination of

impairments. A severe impairment is one “whichsignificantly limitsthe claimant's physicalor

mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, a “severe”

impairment must be equivalent in nature to an impairment listed in the regulations as one

which the Commissioner acknowledges is so severe as to preclude substantialgainfulactivity.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d). Fourth, if the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the

impairment must in combinationwith otherfactors preventthe claimantfromdoing past work.

Fifth and finally, if the claimant has established that the impairment prevents performance of

past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant can

perform other types ofwork that exist in the national economy, given the claimant's residual

functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 

Distasio v. Shalala , 47 F.3d 348, (9th Cir. 1995). 

A district court may disturb the final decision of the SSA “only ifit is based on legal error or if the fact

findings are notsupported by substantialevidence.” Sprague v.Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987).

A court may not order a remand if the error committed is harmless. See Booz v. Secretary of Health and

HumanServs., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1984). “Substantial evidence, considering the entire record,

is relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Matthews

v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1993). Substantialevidence means “more than a mere scintilla, but less

than a preponderance.” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The court’s

review “must consider the record as a whole,” both that which supports, as well as that which detracts from,

the Secretary’s decision. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir.

1988). “If the evidence admits of more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the decision

of the ALJ.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Allen v. Secretary of Health &

Human Servs., 726 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984)).

DISCUSSION

The ALJ who evaluated plaintiff’s claims followed the five step analysis and found that she was “not

disabled” within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determination on six grounds,

discussed below.

A. Medical expert testimony

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 3 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to obtain expert psychiatric testimony on

the issue ofwhether plaintiff’simpairment is equivalent in severity to any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404 subpart P, App. 1. “[A]n [ALJ] and the Appeals Council must obtain an updated medical opinion from

a medical expert . . . [w]hen additional medical evidence is received that in the opinion of the [ALJ] or the

Appeals Council may change the State agency medical or psychological consultant’s finding that the

impairment(s) is not equivalent in severity to any [listed] impairment.” Social Security Rule (“SSR”) 96-6p.

Plaintiff claims that the April 25, 2003 “Evaluation Form” and “Community Outreach Questionnaire,”

completed by her MFTI, Ms. Williams, should have triggered the above provision. See A.T. at 227-31.

However, nothing in the record suggests that these documents would have changed the ALJ’s finding that

plaintiff’s impairment is not equivalent in severity to any of the listed impairments. If anything, the ALJ’s

decision suggests that the referenced documents reflect some mitigationin the degree ofplaintiff’simpairment.

The ALJ noted that the April 25, 2003 documents state that plaintiff had no difficulties communicating and

interacting appropriately and was able to understand and perform simple verbal and written instructions. See

A.T. 27, 227-31. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit legal error by failing to seek expert

psychiatric testimony. 

 

B. Development of the record

Plaintiff argues thatthe ALJ committed legalerror by requesting a consultative examinationwithout first

asking the treating source, Ms. Williams, for an updated medicalreport. The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly

develop a claimant’s medical record to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered. 20 C.F.R. §

416.912(d); see also DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). The ALJ’s duty to conduct

an appropriate inquiry is triggered when there is ambiguous evidence in the record or upon the ALJ’s own

finding that the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,

1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). However, plaintiff’s allegation of failure to fully develop

the record does not, in and ofitself, warrant reliefin this instance. See Abrego v. Commissioner of the SSA,

2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8900 at 14 (D. Or. 2000). The court must consider whether the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 4 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1These provisions define physicalexertion requirements and state that “[h]eavy work involveslifting no

more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds.” 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967.

5

 Here, although the record does not reflect whether the ALJ took it upon himself to request any

evidence fromthe treating source, Ms. Williams, such evidence was submitted to and considered by the ALJ.

A.T. 26-28. Plaintiff’s position seems to be that the ALJ erred by failing to request an updated report from

Ms. Williams. The most recent evaluation report from Ms. Williams is dated April 25, 2003. See id. at 227-

31. The hearing was held on September 16, 2003, approximately five months from the date of the report. The

Court cannot find the ALJ’s failure to request an updated report for the five-month period unreasonable.

Moreover, the record upon which the ALJ based his decision consisted of objective medical findings, three

opinion reports fromthe treating source, and one report from the consultative examiner. See id. at 117-231.

The Court is satisfied that the medical record was adequately developed and that the ALJ based his decision

on the entirety of the record. Therefore, the ALJ committed no legal error in failing to further develop the

record. 

C. Inconsistenciesbetweenplaintiff’s residualfunctionalcapacityand non-exertional limitations

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ made inconsistent findings about plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations and

her residual functional capacity. The ALJ found plaintiff limited to “unskilled” work due to psychologicallybased symptoms and moderate limitations in her ability to follow detailed instructions. Id. at 30. The ALJ also

found plaintiff’s capacity for heavy work, as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 and § 416.967, 1to be

substantially intact and not compromised by her non-exertional limitations. Id. at 31. Plaintiff apparently

contends that it is inconsistent to find plaintiff’s capacity forheavy work substantially intact despite “moderate”

non-exertional limitations. The Court disagrees. It is not logically inconsistent to say that a person may satisfy

the physical exertion requirements of heavy work yet be limited by psychologically-based symptoms in the

ability to follow detailed instructions. Therefore, the Court finds no legal error in the ALJ’s findings here. 

 

D. The ALJ’s reliance on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 5 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legalerror by relying on 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpart P, App. 2,

the Medical-VocationalGuidelines(“the Grids”) indeterminingthatplaintiffis “not disabled”within the meaning

of 20 C.F.R. § 404 and, instead, should have called upon a vocational expert to identify specific jobs within

plaintiff’s abilities. Defendant argues that this is an unusual instance in which reliance on the Grids without

vocational expert testimony is permissible despite the presence of non-exertional limitations. 

Once a claimant demonstrates that he or she is not capable of returning to his or her former

employment, the burden shiftsto the Commissioner to show that the claimant can performother types of work

in the national economy. Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988). This burden can be

satisfiedby either (1) applying the Grids in appropriate circumstances or (2) taking the testimonyofa vocational

expert. Id. “[T]he grids will be inappropriate where the predicate for using the grids – the ability to perform

a full range of either medium, light or sedentary activities – is not present.” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404

subpart P, App. 2(e). Where “a claimant’s nonexertionallimitations are in themselves enough to limit his range

of work, the grids do not apply and the testimony of a vocational expert is required to identify specific jobs

within the claimant’s abilities.” Polny v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 661, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The ALJ found that plaintiff has the maximum residual functional capacity to perform at all exertional

levels. A.T. 30. In other words, the ALJ found no significant limitations on plaintiff’s ability to perform the

physicalaspects of a givenjob. The ALJ also found “moderate limitations” in plaintiff’s ability to function based

on psychological symptoms. Id. Limitations based on psychologicalsymptoms are non-exertionallimitations.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c). Though plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations were deemed “moderate,” the

ALJ expressly found that these limitations restricted plaintiff’s range of work to “unskilled” work. A.T. 30.

Because the ALJ found that plaintiff’s non-exertionallimitations limited her range of work, he should not have

relied on the Grids in making his determination of “not disabled” and was instead required to take the testimony

of a vocationalexpert “to identify specific jobs within the claimant’s abilities.” See Polny, 864 F.2d at 663-64.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to seek the testimony of a

vocational expert.

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 6 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

E. Plaintiff’s subjective testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly dismissed plaintiff’s subjective testimony regarding her

functionallimitations as not “fully credible or reliable.” A.T. 28. Defendant contends thatsubstantialevidence

supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’ssubjective complaints are notfully credible. Though “[a]n ALJ [is not]

required to believe every allegation ofdisabling pain,”Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989), an

“ALJ may not reject [a] claimant’s testimony about her limitations only because they are not supported by

objective evidence.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ must give specific

and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant’s subjective statements. Id. at 1148. 

Here, the ALJ discredited plaintiff’s subjective testimony, in part, because of the lack of objective

evidence regarding the degree ofher alleged limitations. “Once a claimant submits objective medicalevidence

establishing an impairment that could reasonably be expected to cause some pain, it is improper as a matter

of law for an ALJ to discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is not fully corroborated by

objective medical findings.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989) (internalquotations omitted).

As the ALJ noted, “[plaintiff’s] subjective complaints and alleged functional limitations are consistent with

medicalsigns and findings in the record.” A.T. 25. Therefore, the ALJ in this case could not discredit plaintiff’s

subjective testimony on this basis alone. However, this lack of objective medical evidence was not the only

reason given. The ALJ also noted that, despite plaintiff’s alleged inability to function due to depression and

anxiety, she was still able to work through a temporary agency and to perform daily activities such as self-care

and caring for her children who are in the physical custody of her mother. In addition, the ALJ suggests that

plaintiff’s work record with the temporary agency in 2001 is evidence of her ability to function despite her

alleged limitations. While such evidence potentially supports a contrary view – especially giventhat plaintiff’s

earnings for 2001 were $5,528.00, significantly lower than that for the previous two years – the ALJ’s finding

here is rational and not baseless. Therefore, the Court must give deference to the ALJ’s finding on this point.

See Heckler, 749 F.2d at 579 (the court must uphold the ALJ’s decisionwhere the evidence admits more than

one rational interpretation). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit legal error by rejecting plaintiff’s subjective

testimony. 

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 7 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

F. Plaintiff’s treating source opinion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is based on legal error because the ALJ failed to give proper

weight to the opinions of plaintiff’s treating therapist and because the ALJ failed to give specific and legitimate

reasons for this failure. Defendant argues that a therapist is not an “acceptable medicalsource,” so no special

deference was owed to the opinions of Ms. Williams. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a), which is captioned “Medical and other evidence of your impairments,”

defines what constitutes an “acceptable medical source” in establishing whether a claimant has a medically

determinable impairment. Once an impairment is medically determinable, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (“Evaluating

opinion evidence”) states that evidence about the nature and severity ofa claimant’simpairment may be drawn

from medical opinions of physicians, psychologists, and other “acceptable medical sources.” A MFTI such

as Ms. Williams is not an “acceptable medical source” to establish a medically determinable impairment under

§ 404.1513(a). Therefore, defendant is correct that Ms. Williams’ opinion may not be used in determining

whether plaintiff has a medical impairment. However, as noted by the ALJ, “[plaintiff’s] medical record

contains a longitudinalrecord oftreatment with objective medicalfindings showing that the claimant has multiple

medically determinable mental impairments,” including major depression secondary to dysfunctional family

situations and loss of job. A.T. 25. Thus other acceptable medicalsources already establish that plaintiff has

a medically determinable impairment, so that it is of no consequence that Ms. Williams’ opinion is not an

acceptable medical source under § 404.1513(a).

Having established that plaintiff has medically determinable impairments, the question then becomes

whether Ms. Williams’ opinions are an “acceptable medical source” in evaluating the “nature and severity” of

plaintiff’s impairments. See § 404.1527. In addition to statements fromphysicians and psychologists, “other

acceptable medical sources” can include other health professionals who do not have M.D.’s. See Lester v.

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 n.7 (9th Cir. 1995). “[M]ore weight should be given to the opinion of a treating

source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” Id. If the treating source’s opinion is

well-supported by medically acceptable clinicaland laboratory diagnostic techniques and is notinconsistentwith

other substantial evidence in the record, then controlling weight is given to the treating source’s opinion. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). 

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 8 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2Even ifMs. Williams’ opinion did not deserve controlling weight under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2),

the ALJ should have given it more weight than Dr. Khoi’s opinion based on the factors listed under §

404.1527(d)(2)(i), (ii), and §404.1527(d)(3)-(6). Such factors include the length of the treatment relationship,

the frequency of examination, and the nature and extent of the treatment relationship.

3From the April 25, 2003 “Evaluation Form For Mental Disorders.” See A.T. 227-31.

9

Here, though the ALJ did notreject Ms. Williams’ opinion outright, he gave it minor weight. A.T. 28.

The ALJ appears to have given more weight to the opinion of the examining psychologist, Dr. Khoi. See id.

Since the treating source opinion is well-supported by the objective medical evidence and is not inconsistent

with other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ should have given Ms. Williams’ opinion controlling or

at least more than minor weight.2 

Dr. Khoistated that plaintiff’s abilityto withstand the stress of a routine workday was mild to moderate,

and that her ability to interact with others on a regular basis was mildly impaired. Id. This statement does not

necessarily conflictwith Ms. Williams’ most recent observations3that plaintiff has no difficulties communicating

and interacting appropriately, is able to understand and perform simple instructions, and has the ability to

manage business affairs without impediment, but Ms. Williams also stated that various psychological factors

may exacerbate plaintiff’s symptomatology and cause her some significant difficulty in being able to return to

work. A.T. 27-28. The Court cannot determine whether the ALJ’s determination of “not disabled” would

have resulted differently had Ms. Williams’ opinion been given either controlling or greater than minor weight.

Defendant argues that the ALJ legitimately rejected Ms. Williams’ opinion in any event because his

decision was based on specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ legitimately accorded less weight to examining

psychologist’s opinion because his diagnoses were based on the self reporting of an unreliable person);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989) (ALJ legitimately rejected treating physicians’

opinions because of specifically-noted conflicts with substantial objective medical evidence in the record).

Here, the ALJ noted that despite plaintiff’s mental impairment, she was able to maintain very responsible

positions in 1999 and 2000, and continued to work in responsible positions on a part-time basis after the

alleged onset date ofJanuary 2001. A.T. 28. Defendant seems to rely on this evidence as a sufficiently specific

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 9 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

and legitimate reason to justify rejection ofMs. Williams’ opinions. However, while such evidence might justify

the ALJ’s rejection of plaintiff’s subjective testimony, the Court does not see how this evidence justifies the

ALJ’s minimization of Ms. Williams’ medical opinions. As the treating source, the opinions of Ms. Williams

deserved more than minor weight. In addition, the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for

according them less weight than required. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ committed legal error in

giving Ms. Williams’ opinions only minor weight. 

Accordingly, the Court instructsthe ALJ on remand to reevaluate plaintiff’sdisabilityclaims withproper

weight accorded to the treating source opinion. 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

REMANDS the case for further administrative proceedings. On remand, the ALJ must (1) obtain testimony

from a vocational expert to identify specific jobs within the plaintiff’s abilities; (2) accord proper weight to

plaintiff’streatingsource opinion; and (3)reevaluate his finaldetermination of “not disabled” in light ofthe above

modifications. [Docket # 15]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 10 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TINA BROOKS-NEWHOUSE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-03745 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

AND REMANDING ACTION

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tina Brooks-Newhouse is a 34 year old woman with a 12th grade education and six years of

intermittent college without a degree. Administrative Transcript (“A.T.”) at 68-81, 259. As of the date of the

written decision by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), plaintiff was homeless, sleeping in her car and

occasionally staying with friends. Id. at 24. Plaintiff has four children, three of whom are being cared for by

her mother. Id. at 170-88. 

Various medicalreports document plaintiff’s psychiatric and socialhistory. Briefly, plaintiff was cared

for primarily by her single mother. Id. At age five, plaintiff was raped by her 15-year-old brother. Id.

Plaintiff’s mother, who walked into the room while the assault was in progress, beat and verbally reprimanded

plaintiff over the incident. Id. At age seven, plaintiff was again raped by her babysitter’s sons. Id.

Plaintiff was first married at age 21 and divorced a few years later. Id. at 57-63. Plaintiff later

remarried and separated in 2001. Id. at 170-88, 269-70. Her second husband was recently incarcerated for

sexually abusing plaintiff’s daughter. Id. at 170-88. Plaintiff claims it is now difficult for her to be around men

and has since started dating women exclusively. A.T. 170-88, 272. 

Plaintiff claims that, in January of 2001, she became so depressed she could no longer function

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 11 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

adequately to maintain regular employment. Id. at 170-88. That same year, plaintiff lost her full-time job and

began working through a temporary agency. Id. Plaintiff’s earnings for 2001 were $5,528, less than the

previous two years, whichwere just above $26,000 per year. Id. at 64-67. With the exception of 1992 and

1997, in which she had no reported earnings, plaintiff’s yearly earningsfrom1994 to 1998 ranged from$4,045

to $9,998. Id.

In February 2002, plaintiff began visiting the Pacific Center for HumanGrowth, where she was treated

by TraciWilliams, Marriage Family Therapist Intern (“MFTI”). Ms. Williams’ diagnostic impression of plaintiff

was major depressive episode, (moderate), rule-out post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and anxietyinduced arrhythmia. Id. at 27, 170-88. Ms. Williams completed an updated report on August 28, 2002, and

again on April 25, 2003. Id. at 27, 202-03, 227-31. The last report from April 2003 diagnosed plaintiff with

major depressive disorder (recurrent with melancholic features) and PTSD (chronic). Id. at 227-31. 

In March 2002, at the request of the Commissioner, a consultative psychologist, Sokley Khoi, Ph.D.,

conducted an examination of the plaintiff, which yielded a diagnosis of depressive disorder, NOS, with mild

to moderate impairment in the ability to withstand the stress of a routine work day. Id. at 189-92. 

On February 13, 2002, plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security

Income payments. Id. at 57-63, 234-41. The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. Id.

at 41-45, 48-52, 95-100. On December 3, 2002, plaintiff filed a request for a hearing in front of an ALJ,

which took place on September 16, 2003. Id. at 53-54, 256-77. On October 24, 2003, the ALJ issued his

decision denying benefits based on a determination that, despite “severe” impairments restricting her capacity

to perform some work activities, plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404. Id. at 19-

31. 

Plaintiff appealed that decision to this Court. Plaintiff now brings a motion seeking summary judgment

for the award ofbenefits, or, in the alternative, remand forfurther administrative proceedings; defendant seeks

summary judgment of affirmance. The cross-motions for summary judgment are now before the Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 12 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The SocialSecurity Administration(“SSA”) must follow a five step analysis to determine if a claimant

is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 

First, the claimant must not currently be performing “substantialgainfulactivity.” Second, the

claimant, based on medical evidence, must have a “severe” impairment or combination of

impairments. A severe impairment is one “whichsignificantly limitsthe claimant's physicalor

mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, a “severe”

impairment must be equivalent in nature to an impairment listed in the regulations as one

which the Commissioner acknowledges is so severe as to preclude substantialgainfulactivity.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d). Fourth, if the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the

impairment must in combinationwith otherfactors preventthe claimantfromdoing past work.

Fifth and finally, if the claimant has established that the impairment prevents performance of

past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant can

perform other types ofwork that exist in the national economy, given the claimant's residual

functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 

Distasio v. Shalala , 47 F.3d 348, (9th Cir. 1995). 

A district court may disturb the final decision of the SSA “only ifit is based on legal error or if the fact

findings are notsupported by substantialevidence.” Sprague v.Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987).

A court may not order a remand if the error committed is harmless. See Booz v. Secretary of Health and

HumanServs., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1984). “Substantial evidence, considering the entire record,

is relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Matthews

v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1993). Substantialevidence means “more than a mere scintilla, but less

than a preponderance.” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The court’s

review “must consider the record as a whole,” both that which supports, as well as that which detracts from,

the Secretary’s decision. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir.

1988). “If the evidence admits of more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the decision

of the ALJ.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Allen v. Secretary of Health &

Human Servs., 726 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984)).

DISCUSSION

The ALJ who evaluated plaintiff’s claims followed the five step analysis and found that she was “not

disabled” within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determination on six grounds,

discussed below.

A. Medical expert testimony

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 13 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to obtain expert psychiatric testimony on

the issue ofwhether plaintiff’simpairment is equivalent in severity to any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404 subpart P, App. 1. “[A]n [ALJ] and the Appeals Council must obtain an updated medical opinion from

a medical expert . . . [w]hen additional medical evidence is received that in the opinion of the [ALJ] or the

Appeals Council may change the State agency medical or psychological consultant’s finding that the

impairment(s) is not equivalent in severity to any [listed] impairment.” Social Security Rule (“SSR”) 96-6p.

Plaintiff claims that the April 25, 2003 “Evaluation Form” and “Community Outreach Questionnaire,”

completed by her MFTI, Ms. Williams, should have triggered the above provision. See A.T. at 227-31.

However, nothing in the record suggests that these documents would have changed the ALJ’s finding that

plaintiff’s impairment is not equivalent in severity to any of the listed impairments. If anything, the ALJ’s

decision suggests that the referenced documents reflect some mitigationin the degree ofplaintiff’simpairment.

The ALJ noted that the April 25, 2003 documents state that plaintiff had no difficulties communicating and

interacting appropriately and was able to understand and perform simple verbal and written instructions. See

A.T. 27, 227-31. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit legal error by failing to seek expert

psychiatric testimony. 

 

B. Development of the record

Plaintiff argues thatthe ALJ committed legalerror by requesting a consultative examinationwithout first

asking the treating source, Ms. Williams, for an updated medicalreport. The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly

develop a claimant’s medical record to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered. 20 C.F.R. §

416.912(d); see also DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). The ALJ’s duty to conduct

an appropriate inquiry is triggered when there is ambiguous evidence in the record or upon the ALJ’s own

finding that the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,

1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). However, plaintiff’s allegation of failure to fully develop

the record does not, in and ofitself, warrant reliefin this instance. See Abrego v. Commissioner of the SSA,

2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8900 at 14 (D. Or. 2000). The court must consider whether the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 14 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1These provisions define physicalexertion requirements and state that “[h]eavy work involveslifting no

more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds.” 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967.

5

 Here, although the record does not reflect whether the ALJ took it upon himself to request any

evidence fromthe treating source, Ms. Williams, such evidence was submitted to and considered by the ALJ.

A.T. 26-28. Plaintiff’s position seems to be that the ALJ erred by failing to request an updated report from

Ms. Williams. The most recent evaluation report from Ms. Williams is dated April 25, 2003. See id. at 227-

31. The hearing was held on September 16, 2003, approximately five months from the date of the report. The

Court cannot find the ALJ’s failure to request an updated report for the five-month period unreasonable.

Moreover, the record upon which the ALJ based his decision consisted of objective medical findings, three

opinion reports fromthe treating source, and one report from the consultative examiner. See id. at 117-231.

The Court is satisfied that the medical record was adequately developed and that the ALJ based his decision

on the entirety of the record. Therefore, the ALJ committed no legal error in failing to further develop the

record. 

C. Inconsistenciesbetweenplaintiff’s residualfunctionalcapacityand non-exertional limitations

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ made inconsistent findings about plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations and

her residual functional capacity. The ALJ found plaintiff limited to “unskilled” work due to psychologicallybased symptoms and moderate limitations in her ability to follow detailed instructions. Id. at 30. The ALJ also

found plaintiff’s capacity for heavy work, as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 and § 416.967, 1to be

substantially intact and not compromised by her non-exertional limitations. Id. at 31. Plaintiff apparently

contends that it is inconsistent to find plaintiff’s capacity forheavy work substantially intact despite “moderate”

non-exertional limitations. The Court disagrees. It is not logically inconsistent to say that a person may satisfy

the physical exertion requirements of heavy work yet be limited by psychologically-based symptoms in the

ability to follow detailed instructions. Therefore, the Court finds no legal error in the ALJ’s findings here. 

 

D. The ALJ’s reliance on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 15 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legalerror by relying on 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpart P, App. 2,

the Medical-VocationalGuidelines(“the Grids”) indeterminingthatplaintiffis “not disabled”within the meaning

of 20 C.F.R. § 404 and, instead, should have called upon a vocational expert to identify specific jobs within

plaintiff’s abilities. Defendant argues that this is an unusual instance in which reliance on the Grids without

vocational expert testimony is permissible despite the presence of non-exertional limitations. 

Once a claimant demonstrates that he or she is not capable of returning to his or her former

employment, the burden shiftsto the Commissioner to show that the claimant can performother types of work

in the national economy. Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988). This burden can be

satisfiedby either (1) applying the Grids in appropriate circumstances or (2) taking the testimonyofa vocational

expert. Id. “[T]he grids will be inappropriate where the predicate for using the grids – the ability to perform

a full range of either medium, light or sedentary activities – is not present.” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404

subpart P, App. 2(e). Where “a claimant’s nonexertionallimitations are in themselves enough to limit his range

of work, the grids do not apply and the testimony of a vocational expert is required to identify specific jobs

within the claimant’s abilities.” Polny v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 661, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The ALJ found that plaintiff has the maximum residual functional capacity to perform at all exertional

levels. A.T. 30. In other words, the ALJ found no significant limitations on plaintiff’s ability to perform the

physicalaspects of a givenjob. The ALJ also found “moderate limitations” in plaintiff’s ability to function based

on psychological symptoms. Id. Limitations based on psychologicalsymptoms are non-exertionallimitations.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c). Though plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations were deemed “moderate,” the

ALJ expressly found that these limitations restricted plaintiff’s range of work to “unskilled” work. A.T. 30.

Because the ALJ found that plaintiff’s non-exertionallimitations limited her range of work, he should not have

relied on the Grids in making his determination of “not disabled” and was instead required to take the testimony

of a vocationalexpert “to identify specific jobs within the claimant’s abilities.” See Polny, 864 F.2d at 663-64.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to seek the testimony of a

vocational expert.

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 16 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

E. Plaintiff’s subjective testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly dismissed plaintiff’s subjective testimony regarding her

functionallimitations as not “fully credible or reliable.” A.T. 28. Defendant contends thatsubstantialevidence

supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’ssubjective complaints are notfully credible. Though “[a]n ALJ [is not]

required to believe every allegation ofdisabling pain,”Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989), an

“ALJ may not reject [a] claimant’s testimony about her limitations only because they are not supported by

objective evidence.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ must give specific

and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant’s subjective statements. Id. at 1148. 

Here, the ALJ discredited plaintiff’s subjective testimony, in part, because of the lack of objective

evidence regarding the degree ofher alleged limitations. “Once a claimant submits objective medicalevidence

establishing an impairment that could reasonably be expected to cause some pain, it is improper as a matter

of law for an ALJ to discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is not fully corroborated by

objective medical findings.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989) (internalquotations omitted).

As the ALJ noted, “[plaintiff’s] subjective complaints and alleged functional limitations are consistent with

medicalsigns and findings in the record.” A.T. 25. Therefore, the ALJ in this case could not discredit plaintiff’s

subjective testimony on this basis alone. However, this lack of objective medical evidence was not the only

reason given. The ALJ also noted that, despite plaintiff’s alleged inability to function due to depression and

anxiety, she was still able to work through a temporary agency and to perform daily activities such as self-care

and caring for her children who are in the physical custody of her mother. In addition, the ALJ suggests that

plaintiff’s work record with the temporary agency in 2001 is evidence of her ability to function despite her

alleged limitations. While such evidence potentially supports a contrary view – especially giventhat plaintiff’s

earnings for 2001 were $5,528.00, significantly lower than that for the previous two years – the ALJ’s finding

here is rational and not baseless. Therefore, the Court must give deference to the ALJ’s finding on this point.

See Heckler, 749 F.2d at 579 (the court must uphold the ALJ’s decisionwhere the evidence admits more than

one rational interpretation). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit legal error by rejecting plaintiff’s subjective

testimony. 

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 17 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

F. Plaintiff’s treating source opinion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is based on legal error because the ALJ failed to give proper

weight to the opinions of plaintiff’s treating therapist and because the ALJ failed to give specific and legitimate

reasons for this failure. Defendant argues that a therapist is not an “acceptable medicalsource,” so no special

deference was owed to the opinions of Ms. Williams. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a), which is captioned “Medical and other evidence of your impairments,”

defines what constitutes an “acceptable medical source” in establishing whether a claimant has a medically

determinable impairment. Once an impairment is medically determinable, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (“Evaluating

opinion evidence”) states that evidence about the nature and severity ofa claimant’simpairment may be drawn

from medical opinions of physicians, psychologists, and other “acceptable medical sources.” A MFTI such

as Ms. Williams is not an “acceptable medical source” to establish a medically determinable impairment under

§ 404.1513(a). Therefore, defendant is correct that Ms. Williams’ opinion may not be used in determining

whether plaintiff has a medical impairment. However, as noted by the ALJ, “[plaintiff’s] medical record

contains a longitudinalrecord oftreatment with objective medicalfindings showing that the claimant has multiple

medically determinable mental impairments,” including major depression secondary to dysfunctional family

situations and loss of job. A.T. 25. Thus other acceptable medicalsources already establish that plaintiff has

a medically determinable impairment, so that it is of no consequence that Ms. Williams’ opinion is not an

acceptable medical source under § 404.1513(a).

Having established that plaintiff has medically determinable impairments, the question then becomes

whether Ms. Williams’ opinions are an “acceptable medical source” in evaluating the “nature and severity” of

plaintiff’s impairments. See § 404.1527. In addition to statements fromphysicians and psychologists, “other

acceptable medical sources” can include other health professionals who do not have M.D.’s. See Lester v.

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 n.7 (9th Cir. 1995). “[M]ore weight should be given to the opinion of a treating

source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” Id. If the treating source’s opinion is

well-supported by medically acceptable clinicaland laboratory diagnostic techniques and is notinconsistentwith

other substantial evidence in the record, then controlling weight is given to the treating source’s opinion. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). 

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 18 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2Even ifMs. Williams’ opinion did not deserve controlling weight under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2),

the ALJ should have given it more weight than Dr. Khoi’s opinion based on the factors listed under §

404.1527(d)(2)(i), (ii), and §404.1527(d)(3)-(6). Such factors include the length of the treatment relationship,

the frequency of examination, and the nature and extent of the treatment relationship.

3From the April 25, 2003 “Evaluation Form For Mental Disorders.” See A.T. 227-31.

9

Here, though the ALJ did notreject Ms. Williams’ opinion outright, he gave it minor weight. A.T. 28.

The ALJ appears to have given more weight to the opinion of the examining psychologist, Dr. Khoi. See id.

Since the treating source opinion is well-supported by the objective medical evidence and is not inconsistent

with other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ should have given Ms. Williams’ opinion controlling or

at least more than minor weight.2 

Dr. Khoistated that plaintiff’s abilityto withstand the stress of a routine workday was mild to moderate,

and that her ability to interact with others on a regular basis was mildly impaired. Id. This statement does not

necessarily conflictwith Ms. Williams’ most recent observations3that plaintiff has no difficulties communicating

and interacting appropriately, is able to understand and perform simple instructions, and has the ability to

manage business affairs without impediment, but Ms. Williams also stated that various psychological factors

may exacerbate plaintiff’s symptomatology and cause her some significant difficulty in being able to return to

work. A.T. 27-28. The Court cannot determine whether the ALJ’s determination of “not disabled” would

have resulted differently had Ms. Williams’ opinion been given either controlling or greater than minor weight.

Defendant argues that the ALJ legitimately rejected Ms. Williams’ opinion in any event because his

decision was based on specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ legitimately accorded less weight to examining

psychologist’s opinion because his diagnoses were based on the self reporting of an unreliable person);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989) (ALJ legitimately rejected treating physicians’

opinions because of specifically-noted conflicts with substantial objective medical evidence in the record).

Here, the ALJ noted that despite plaintiff’s mental impairment, she was able to maintain very responsible

positions in 1999 and 2000, and continued to work in responsible positions on a part-time basis after the

alleged onset date ofJanuary 2001. A.T. 28. Defendant seems to rely on this evidence as a sufficiently specific

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 19 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

and legitimate reason to justify rejection ofMs. Williams’ opinions. However, while such evidence might justify

the ALJ’s rejection of plaintiff’s subjective testimony, the Court does not see how this evidence justifies the

ALJ’s minimization of Ms. Williams’ medical opinions. As the treating source, the opinions of Ms. Williams

deserved more than minor weight. In addition, the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for

according them less weight than required. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ committed legal error in

giving Ms. Williams’ opinions only minor weight. 

Accordingly, the Court instructsthe ALJ on remand to reevaluate plaintiff’sdisabilityclaims withproper

weight accorded to the treating source opinion. 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

REMANDS the case for further administrative proceedings. On remand, the ALJ must (1) obtain testimony

from a vocational expert to identify specific jobs within the plaintiff’s abilities; (2) accord proper weight to

plaintiff’streatingsource opinion; and (3)reevaluate his finaldetermination of “not disabled” in light ofthe above

modifications. [Docket # 15]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-03745-SI Document 24 Filed 07/07/05 Page 20 of 20