Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-01151/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-01151-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INEZ TITO LUGO,

NO. CIV. S-99-1151 LKK/GGH P

Petitioner,

v. O R D E R

WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA

MEDICAL FACILITY, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Pending before the court are briefs addressing petitioner’s

habeas petition. This court declined to adopt the magistrate

judge’s Findings and Recommendations with respect to petitioner’s

third and fourth claims. These claims pertain to the trial court’s

failure to obtain a waiver of petitioner’s presence during the

readback and video playback of trial testimony during jury

deliberations. The court appointed the Federal Defenders’ Office

to represent petitioner and ordered briefing on the proper remedy

for this error.

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I. 

Background 

A. State Court Proceedings 

The court adopts by reference the factual background as set

forth in the September 3, 2004 Findings and Recommendations. 

See Findings and Recommendations, at 8-13. Relevant for the

purposes of this order are the discussions regarding readbacks

of trial testimony during jury deliberations. As discussed in

the Findings and Recommendations, after the jury retired to

deliberate, the court discussed with counsel the procedures for

the re-reading of testimony. Petitioner’s counsel stipulated

that it would suffice to be notified of any readback requests. 

See F&Rs at 33-34. 

On the first day of deliberations, the jury requested video

equipment to view petitioner’s interview with the police. CT

163, 165. The record is silent as to whether either the

petitioner or his counsel was informed that the jury had

requested the video equipment. The record is also silent as to

how much of the video was viewed. Petitioner asserts in his

verified petition that neither he nor his counsel were notified

or present when the video was played. See Petitioner’s Habeas

Petition at 32. 

Two days later, the jury requested a readback of the

testimony of petitioner and that of his daughter, Terra Lugo. 

CT 167. The record reflects that counsel was informed of these

readbacks and stipulated that the readback could take place in

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the jury room. The record is silent as to whether petitioner

was present when counsel was informed of the readbacks. The

court reporter read the testimony of Terra Lugo on the morning

of August 16, 1990 and concluded at around 11 a.m. that same

morning. The petitioner’s testimony was read to the jury on

August 17, and the readback lasted from 9:15 a.m. to 2:20 p.m.,

at which point the court reporter stopped reading at the jury’s

request. The court reporter stopped reading just prior to the

reading of the redirect examination. CT 107.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty at 3:00 p.m. that

same day. After the jurors were polled and excused,

petitioner’s defense counsel objected to the “juror’s request

and how the transcript was read, and I will wait until Monday.” 

RT 1532. The court responded: 

The court: For the record, what happened was the

request was to have the testimony of the

defendant read to the jury. We granted that

request. The court reporter commenced

reading that through the morning, and part

of the afternoon. 

She finished what notes she had with her,

had completed, to my understanding, all of

the direct and most, but not all, of the

cross examination. 

The juror’s asked to take a recess, and to

consider whether, – well, while the court

reporter was retrieving her other notes,

they had heard all that they required. 

They went back into deliberations briefly

after they recessed and advised the bailiff

that they did not require any further

reading, and I discussed that with counsel,

and allowed them to make that decision.

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RT 1532-33. When the court reconvened on Monday, petitioner’s

defense counsel did not renew his objection and the court made

no ruling on it. RT 13-19. 

B. Federal Proceedings 

This court adopted the magistrate judge’s Findings and

Recommendations with respect to claims one, two, five and six. 

The court did not adopt the findings and recommendations with

respect to claims three and four. These claims relate to the

failure of the trial court to obtain from petitioner a waiver of

presence during the readback and playback of trial testimony. 

Citing to Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 815 (9th Cir. 1995),

this court held that “[f]ailure to allow the defendant to be

present at the readback of testimony is constitutional error,

subject to harmless error.” Lugo v. Warden of the California

Medical Facility, Civ. Case No. 99-1151 (Order issued Sept. 21,

2005). The court requested the assistance of the Federal

Defender’s Office to determine the effect of the petitioner’s

non-waiver. “It is unclear to the court what remedies and

procedures are appropriate in light of this error.” Id. 

Soon thereafter, counsel for petitioner filed a status

report and explained that he had “undertaken an investigation to

determine whether the Court would be aided by conducting an

evidentiary hearing.” The report went on to state: 

Counsel’s investigator has interviewed eight of the twelve 

jurors in Mr. Lugo’s first trial but, despite having left

messages and in some cases sending follow-up letters and

leaving business cards, she has been unable to interview

the remaining four jurors, including the jury foreperson,

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John Blim. She has determined that the court reporter,

Karen Nowack, is still employed as a part-time court

reporter at the Sacramento County Superior Court, but Ms.

Nowack has not responded to at least four messages left for

her. The investigator has interviewed one of the bailiffs,

but has been able to make contact with the other bailiff,

J. Pettit, who appears to have been the principal bailiff

and the person who brought the videotape and viewing

equipment into the jury room.

Petitioner’s Status Report. Counsel requested that the court

set a status hearing several months out, which would allow

additional time for investigation. Subsequently, petitioner

requested that the status hearing be vacated and that the

parties simply submit briefs. 

The State devotes the majority of its brief to arguing that

petitioner’s claims should be rejected because of the procedural

default doctrine. The court discusses this issue first and then

turns to the merits of petitioner’s claims. As set forth below, 

the court finds that the State waived their procedural default

defense and thus, the court must address the merits of

petitioner’s claims. However, the court ultimately concludes

that the errors are harmless.

II.

Procedural Default 

The State asserts that petitioner did not raise claims

three or four on direct appeal or in his state habeas petitions

before the Sacramento County Superior and the California Court

of Appeal. Rather, they were raised for the first time before

the California Supreme Court. That court denied the claims with

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a citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998). A citation

to Robbins indicates that the petitioner failed to timely

present his claims. In re Sanders, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899, 903

(1999).

In his brief, petitioner responds that the State failed to

raise the procedural default doctrine in its answer, thereby

waiving the defense. In support of its position, he relies on

two cases. First, in Nardi v. Stewart, 354 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.

2004), the Ninth Circuit held that the state waives the one-year

statute of limitation defense under AEDPA by failing to assert

it in its answer, and that the court may not raise the issue sua

sponte thereafter. Id. at 1141-42. Second, in Morrison v.

Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit

expanded this rule to encompass the procedural default defense. 

Id. at 1046-47.

After petitioner filed his brief, and before this court

issued this order, the Supreme Court decided Day v. McDonough,

126 S. Ct. 1675 (2006), which abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s

holding in Nardi. The Court held that “district courts are

permitted, but not obliged, to consider, sua sponte, the

timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition.” Id. at 1684. 

Although the timeliness at issue in Day related to whether the

petitioner had complied with AEDPA’s statute of limitations, the

Court “not[ed] that it would make scant sense to distinguish in

this regard AEDPA’s time bar from other threshold constraints on

federal habeas petitioners.” Id. Accordingly, it is likely

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 There is one narrow exception which does not apply here. 1

In Day, the Court found that if the failure to waive a statute of

limitations defense was the result of mistake or human error, a

court may disregard the waiver. Here, there is simply no evidence

that the failure to raise the procedural default defense was the

result of mistake or human error. 

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that this rule encompasses the procedural default doctrine. 

Nevertheless, Day cautioned that a court may only exercise

its discretion to rule on these threshold constraints that were

not raised in the answer within limits. One important limit is

that “should a State intelligently choose to waive a statute of

limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty to

disregard that choice.” Id., at 1685, n.11. Here, there is

every indication to suggest that the waiver was intelligent. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the state has waived the

procedural default defense, and that the court may not disregard

that waiver. The court turns to the merits of petitioner’s 1

claims.

III.

Harmless Error Review 

A. Applicable Law 

As discussed in the court’s previous order, it is an error

to permit the readback of testimony without first obtaining

defendant’s personal waiver of his right to be present. Failure

to allow the defendant to be present at the readback of

testimony is constitutional error, subject to harmless error

review. Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). On

collateral review, the district court must determine whether the

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error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 638 (1993). 

In Brecht, the Supreme Court recognized that habeas corpus

is "an extraordinary remedy." 507 U.S. at 633. There, the Court

also held that an error is harmless unless it had "a substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict." Id., citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,

776 (1946). Any time a federal court in a habeas proceeding is

in "grave doubt" as to the harmlessness of an error, it must

find that the error is not harmless and the petitioner must

prevail. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437-45 (1995).

There is some confusion as to which party bears the

responsibility for demonstrating that the error was harmless or

harmful. In Belmontes v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit remarked that

“[o]ur cases appear to be divided as to whether the petitioner,

the state, or neither bears the responsibility for showing

harmless error under the Brecht harmless error standard.” 414

F.3d 1094, 1138-1139 (9th Cir. 2005) (overruled on other grounds

by Ayers v. Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. 469 (2006)).

In Belmontes, the Ninth Circuit compared Rodriguez v.

Marshall, 125 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 1997) (placing burden on

petitioner), with Keating v. Hood, 191 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir.

1999) (as amended) (placing burden on state), and Thompson v.

Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting burdens of

proof in favor of an independent determination of whether a

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trial error had a substantial and injurious effect). See also

Morales v. Woodford, 336 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he

state must provide us with a ‘fair assurance’ that the error was

harmless under Brecht.”). 

Despite this lack of clarity, the Belmontes decision

suggests that the question of who has the burden is not

conclusive. The Ninth Circuit observed that “[t]he Supreme

Court has made clear that whether a trial error had a

substantial and injurious effect is not to be analyzed in terms

of burdens of proof.” Id. at 1138, citing Mancuso v. Olivarez,

282 F.3d 728, 737 n. 4 (9th Cir.), as amended, 292 F.3d 939

(2002). The Belmontes decision concludes that the reviewing

court has “the responsibility to determine this legal question

‘without benefit of such aids as presumptions or allocated

burdens of proof that expedite factfinding at the trial.’” Id.

(quoting O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 437). 

The court’s task, ultimately, is to determine what effect

the error had upon the verdict. “Only if the record

demonstrates the jury's decision was substantially influenced by

the trial error or there is grave doubt about whether an error

affected a jury in this way will [petitioner] be entitled to

habeas relief.” Hegler, 50 F.3d at 1478 (citations omitted).

2. Whether Petitioner’s Claims Constitute Harmless Error

The court is in a difficult position. The State’s brief

barely addresses the issue of harmlessness. The State, hoping

that the court would rule on procedural grounds, dedicates only

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one page to the question of harmlessness. Failing to appreciate

the discussion of burdens and responsibilities set forth in the

Belmontes case, the State simply asserts that petitioner “has

failed to show trial error that had a ‘substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” 

State’s Br. at 8 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638). The State

goes on to assert that in light of petitioner’s unsuccessful

investigation, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. The State

does not, however, provide any argument which instills in the

court a “fair assurance” that the error was harmless. See

Morales v. Woodford, 336 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he

state must provide us with a ‘fair assurance’ that the error was

harmless under Brecht.”). On this ground alone, the court is

tempted to grant petitioner’s petition.

That said, this case presents a somewhat unique situation. 

As noted above, the court appointed the Federal Defender’s

Office to assist petitioner. After conducting investigation,

which included interviews of former jurors, and attempts to

interview the court reporter, the petitioner’s appointed counsel

has been unable to provide any further factual development of

plaintiff’s claims. Petitioner, therefore, did not request an

evidentiary hearing. 

Several courts confronting the issue of testimony readbacks

outside the defendant’s presence have found harmless error after

conducting an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Hegler, 50 F.3d

at 1472. Here, however, it is clear that such a hearing would

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be futile. Where the petitioner cannot “forecast any evidence

beyond that already contained in the record, or otherwise to

explain how his claim would be advanced by an evidentiary

hearing,” the court may decline to hold such a hearing. 

Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled

on other grounds by Bell v. Jarvis, 236 f.3d 149 (4th Cir.

2000). 

In short, the court is left with the record, petitioner’s

verified petition, and nothing more. There is simply nothing in

the record or the petition which “demonstrates the jury's

decision was substantially influenced by the trial error.” 

Hegler, 50 F.3d at 1478. 

This conclusion is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Hegler v. Borg, where the court concluded that the

petitioner not being present for readbacks was harmless error. 

The court found that the petitioner was not prejudiced by his

absence from the readback: 

The evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court

established that the court reporter read the testimony

without inappropriate inflection or comment, and that the

substance of the readback was not materially different from

the witness's testimony at trial. Indeed, there is no

evidence indicating there was any improper conduct during

the reading of the testimony to the jury. Under these

circumstances, a habeas petitioner is not entitled to

relief.

Hegler, 50 F.3d at 1478. Here, as in Hegler, there is no

evidence which suggests that there was any improper conduct

during the readback of the testimony. 

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Petitioner relies extensively on Fisher v. Roe in support

of his position that his absence increased the risk of

prejudice. See Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir. 2001)

(overruled on other grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 346 F.3d 1204

(9th Cir. 2003)). In Fisher, the petitioners claimed that

neither they nor their counsel knew of or were present for

readbacks to the jury. “In short, they had been completely and

unilaterally excluded from that part of the trial.” Id. at 916. 

The court remarked that the “trial record and the district court

record do not shed any light on whether the court reporter

unduly emphasized any particular testimony, either by failing to

read cross examination or through improper voice inflections.”

Id. at 918. The court concluded that the case was “one of the

rare situations in which a review of the record leaves us at the

least in ‘virtual equipoise’ as to whether the error had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's

verdict. Accordingly, [petitioners] must be granted relief.”

Id. (citations omitted).

In the case at bar, the transcript clearly indicates that

defense counsel stipulated to being told about the readbacks,

and was in fact informed each time that a readback was

requested. It is unknown if counsel knew of the video playback. 

In this respect, the Fisher case is distinguishable. In Fisher,

neither petitioners nor their counsel even knew the readbacks

took place. Here, counsel knew of the readbacks and stipulated

to having the readbacks occur in the jury room. Certainly,

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these facts suggest that the harm to petitioner was mitigated by

the presence of his attorney. Although the record does not

elaborate on who was present in the jury room when the testimony

was read, or which exact sections of the testimony was read,

petitioner’s counsel was alerted to the fact that the readbacks

were occurring. In this respect, the facts in the case at bar

are more similar to those in Hegler, where the court found that

the absence of petitioner from the readbacks was harmless. 

While petitioner makes several arguments about how his

absence may have undermined the verdict, there is simply no

evidence in the record to support these arguments. Moreover, as

petitioner concedes, an evidentiary hearing will provide no

additional evidence or insight. In viewing the record as a

whole, there is simply nothing to suggest that these errors were

harmful. There is no evidence which supports a finding that

these errors had “substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury's verdict.” O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 436.

Accordingly, the petition must be DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 28, 2007. 

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