Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_24-cv-01050/USCOURTS-arwd-1_24-cv-01050-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

SHARDA MULLINS. PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:24-cv-01050

GEAN SIEGER; JERRY MANESS; 

LEROY MARTIN; and OFFICER SCOTT DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant 

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3)(2011), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief 

United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a 

Report and Recommendation. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary 

Restraining Order. (ECF No. 20). Defendants Maness, Martin, and Sieger responded.0F

1

 (ECF No. 

25). The matter is now ripe for consideration. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas on August 6, 2024. 

(ECF No. 2). The case was transferred to this Court on August 7, 2024. The Court subsequently 

granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and served Defendants Maness, Martin, and Sieger. 

(ECF Nos. 7, 10). On August 27, 2024, the Court entered an Order consolidating this case with 

Civil No. 1:24-cv-01054 and Civil No. 1:24-cv-01055. (ECF No. 16). The Court then ordered 

Plaintiff to Amend his Complaint in this lead case to incorporate all claims made in the three 

consolidated cases. (ECF No. 17). 

1 Defendant Scott was not yet served when the instant motion was filed so all reference to 

Defendants herein will be specifically to Defendants Maness, Martin, and Sieger. 

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Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint and the instant Motion for Temporary Restraining 

Order on September 16, 2024. (ECF No. 21, 22). Plaintiff added an additional Defendant in his 

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 21). As all parties were not yet served and Plaintiff made 

allegations he was being denied emergent medical care at the Columbia County Detention Center

(“CCDC”), the Court entered an Order on September 17, 2024 directing Defendant Martin, Sheriff 

of Columbia County, to respond to Plaintiff’s claims made in the Motion for Temporary 

Restraining Order. (ECF No. 22). The Court also indicated Plaintiff’s Motion would be set for 

hearing. However, after receiving Defendants’ thorough response, the Court determined no 

hearing was needed to issue this Report and Recommendation. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs requests for injunctive relief which 

includes both preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Federal courts may issue 

an order for a temporary restraining order without first hearing from all parties only if “specific 

facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, 

loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). By contrast, courts may issue preliminary injunction only on notice to 

the adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). As the Court provided notice to the Defendants and 

allowed them time to respond, it will consider Plaintiff’s Motion as one for a preliminary 

injunction. However, this distinction is of little import here since courts apply the same legal 

standard for issuing a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. See S. B. McLaughlin 

& Co., Ltd. V. Tudor Oaks Condominium Project, 877 F.2d 707, 708-09 (8th Cir. 1989). Required 

considerations include: “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance 

between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other interested parties; 

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(3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Dataphase 

Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981). 

While no single factor, alone, is dispositive, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held 

“the two most critical factors for a district court to consider in determining whether to grant a 

preliminary injunction are (1) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits, and (2) 

whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted.” Chicago Stadium 

Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1976). Further, a “mere possibility” irreparable harm 

will occur is insufficient. Sessler v. City of Davenport, Iowa, 990 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2021). 

“A movant must show he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief” 

to establish the need for injunctive relief. Id. (emphasis added). The burden of proof for a

preliminary injunction rest on the movant. Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995). In 

addition, the Eighth Circuit has instructed that “in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief 

must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for in 

dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges in his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order that Defendants are 

continuously denying him medical care. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges:

On 9-6-2024 I had to be rushed to Magnolia Regional Medical Center from Columbia 

County Jail in Magnolia, Arkansas because my blood pressure had fell to 79/63. I’ve been 

asking for help for my chest pains which have been on-going since Ive arrived here at

Columbia County Jail. I’ve passed out 3 different times causing injury to the back of my 

head and lower and upper back. Since Ive been released from the hospital I haven’t been 

given any medical attention and/or treatment; so therefore Im in another process of filing 

another 1983 Form due to medical neglect, cruel and unusual punishment, improper 

treatment, on going pain and suffering; due to not getting the proper help for my heart 

condition, which is worsening as well as my health conditions worsening. I’ve told Jail 

[administrator] and staff, as well as the Doctor which comes here whenever there are 

enough inmates to see in-order to make it worth his and there while; that the medications 

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aren’t working nor do they ever check my blood pressure or blood sugar while doctor is 

here or when he isn’t. 

(ECF No. 20). (errors in original). Plaintiff alleges in his Motion that he is enduring pain and 

suffering from his alleged heart condition. The Court presumes this is the irreparable harm 

Plaintiff alleges. However, it is less clear what injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks in his Motion. The 

Court presumes Plaintiff seeks treatment of his alleged heart condition. Id.

Defendants argue in their Response that they are providing Plaintiff with medical care, he 

simply disagrees with the specific care he is receiving. (ECF No. 26). Defendants attached to 

their Brief in Support of Response Plaintiff’s medical records from the CCDC as well as his 

medical records from the September 6, 2024, emergency room visit referenced in his Motion. 

(ECF Nos. 26-3, p. 1-36; 26-4, pp. 1-5). The Court notes Plaintiff has many health concerns, as 

evident in the medical records attached to Defendants’ Response and his claims in his Amended 

Complaint, however, the only medical condition at issue in Plaintiff’s Motion is that which 

occurred on September 6, 2024. 

While Plaintiff claims he has not received any medical care for chest pains since he arrived 

at the CCDC, that he has passed out three times injuring himself, and has not received any medical 

attention since returning to the CCDC from the emergency room on September 6, 2024, the 

medical records, inmate requests and notes, and emergency room records presented by Defendants 

contradict Plaintiff’s allegations. 

First, Plaintiff’s fainting incidents did not all occur in the CCDC. The only fainting 

incident which occurred at the CCDC was on the night of September 6, 2024, and Plaintiff was 

immediately assessed by CCDC employees, EMTs were called, and Plaintiff was transported to 

the emergency room. (ECF No. 26-1, p. 3; ECF No. 26-2, p. 40). The discharge papers from the 

emergency room on September 6, 2024, indicated Plaintiff suffered from “Fainting,” “Vagal 

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Reaction,” 1F

2 and “Chest Pain, Uncertain Cause.” (ECF No. 26-4, pp. 1-5). A lab for a cardiac 

panel, EKG, and images of his head and chest were done at the emergency room. However, there 

was no injury to his head or back, and no heart ailment diagnosed in the discharge paperwork. The 

discharge instructions in the emergency room papers indicated Plaintiff was to follow up with 

doctor “if not better.” Id.at 2. There was no indication in the discharge paperwork to indicate 

Plaintiff suffered from any condition subjecting him to imminent danger requiring immediate 

attention. 

After Plaintiff returned from the emergency room he was evaluated by the CCDC medical 

provider, Dr. Davis, on September 10, 2024. (ECF No. 26-2, p. 1). The notes on this Medical Call 

form state: “saw [patient] multiple times. He told me last week that he was supposed to have a 

stint placed 3 years ago but he did not go back to see cardiologist. I am trying to get records to . . 

. confirm this.” Id. Additional records note the CCDC medical staff subsequently attempted to 

get Plaintiff’s cardiology records from the Arkansas Heart Clinic, Arkansas Heart Hospital, and 

the “dept VM” but no patient on file at any of these facilities. (ECF No. 26-2, p. 41). Finally, 

Plaintiff states in his September 15, 2024 Medical Call that he has told the “jail doctor” three times 

about his chest pains. Id. Accordingly, these records clearly indicate Plaintiff is seeing and being 

evaluated by the CCDC medical provider. Finally, Plaintiff’s medical records from the CCDC 

show he is receiving medications and treatments from the CCDC medical staff on various medical 

issues. (ECF Nos. 26-2, pp. 1-54; 26-3, pp. 1-36). Plaintiff did not file any reply or objection 

disputing any of his medical records submitted by Defendants in their Response to his Motion for 

Temporary Restraining Order. 

2 Defined by the discharge paperwork as a temporary loss of consciousness associated with loss of 

postural tone. Also noted: “This condition is not a sign of serious disease.” (ECF No. 26-4, p. 2). 

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While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is suffering from various medical concerns which 

require treatment, the standard required to secure injunctive relief under Dataphase has not been 

met here. Plaintiff has failed to show he faces a threat of irreparable harm stemming from the 

incident on September 6, 2024. Plaintiff was provided immediate care by EMTs and transport to 

the emergency room. The emergency room evaluation and discharge did not indicate any 

diagnoses presenting a situation that warrants the grant of injunctive relief at this time. Finally, 

the medical provider at the CCDC appears to be evaluating and treating Plaintiff on a regular and 

as needed basis. 

Furthermore, based on the limited record presented for purposes of Plaintiff’s Motion, it 

does not appear Plaintiff would be successful on a denial of medical care claim relating to the 

September 6, 2024 incident. To succeed on this type of claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that 

he had an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that the Defendants actually knew of, but 

deliberately disregarded, that serious medical need. See Ivey v. Audrain Cty., Mo., 968 F.3d 845, 

848 (8th Cir. 2020). “A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as 

requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the 

necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal 

quotations omitted). “To demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of, but deliberately 

disregarded, a serious medical need, the plaintiff must establish a mental state akin to criminal 

recklessness: disregarding a known risk to the [detainee’s] health.” Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 

1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit has 

stated that this “onerous standard requires a showing more than negligence, more than even gross 

negligence, but less than purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of 

serious harm to the inmate.” Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

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Deliberate indifference may also be manifested by “prison guards in intentionally denying 

or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). However, the “Constitution does not require jailers 

to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might wish.” Jenkins v. Cty. of 

Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). “A prisoner alleging a delay in treatment 

must present verifying medical evidence that the prison officials ignored an acute or escalating 

situation or that these delays adversely affected his prognosis[,]” Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 

342 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted), unless the need for medical attention is obvious 

to a layperson, in which case the plaintiff need not submit verifying medical evidence to show the 

detrimental effects of delay. See Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 919 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 

969 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding a three-week delay, “coupled with knowledge of inmate-patient’s 

suffering, can support a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation”). 

Here, after Plaintiff fainted, he was immediately transported to the emergency room,

treated, discharged to return to the CCDC, and provided with a follow-up appointment with the 

CCDC medical provider. Plaintiff is entitled to adequate medical care under the Constitution, but 

he is not entitled to the specific medical treatment of his choice. See Meuir v. Green Cty Jail 

Employees, 487 F.3d 1115, 1118-9 (8th Circuit 2007). 

Lastly, in assessing the public interest, it must be remembered that “federal courts do not 

sit to supervise state prisons, the administration of which is of acute interest to the States.” 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976). Granting Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief, a 

specific heart surgery, would amount to direct interference by the Court with the operation and 

administration of the CCDC which is harmful to the CCDC and does not serve any public interest. 

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Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing injunctive relief is warranted here. See Goff, 

60 F.3d at 520; see also Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, I recommend Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 

20) be DENIED. 

Referral Status: This matter should remain referred.

The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in 

which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely 

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are 

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the 

district court.

DATED this 12th day of November 2024 . 

/s/ Barry A. Bryant

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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