Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00720/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00720-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWNCEY BLAKE,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOYT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00720-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 22, 31

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Santa Clara Department of Corrections (“DOC”) – Main Jail 

Complex, filed the instant pro se civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These actions 

were consolidated on December 8, 2015. In the consolidated actions, Plaintiff alleges that Captain 

Hoyt, Lieutenant Borgzinner, Deputy Crawford, Chief John Hirokawa, and Deputy Hogan 

(collectively, “Defendants”), all employed by the Santa Clara County Office of the Sheriff 

(“Sheriff’s Office”), denied him access to the courts, prevented him from petitioning the 

government for redress of grievances, and retaliated against him for exercising his First 

Amendment rights. Now before the Court are two summary judgment motions filed by Plaintiff, a 

summary judgment motion filed by Capt. Hoyt, Lt. Borgzinner, Deputy Crawford, and a summary 

judgment motion filed by that Chief John Hirokawa, Capt. Hoyt, and Deputy Hogan. For the 

reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s summary judgment motions are DENIED, and Defendants’ 

summary judgment motions are GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant action, hereinafter referred to as Blake I, 

which the Court found stated cognizable claims that Capt. Hoyt, Lt. Borgzinner, and Deputy 

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Crawford denied him access to the courts, prevented him from petitioning the government for 

redress of grievances, and retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. 

Docket No. 13 (amended complaint) and Docket No. 14 (order of service). On March 17, 2015, 

Plaintiff brought a separate action, hereinafter referred to as Blake II, which the Court found stated 

cognizable claims that Chief John Hirokawa, Capt. Hoyt, and Deputy Hogan denied him access to

the courts, prevented him from petitioning the government for redress of grievances, and retaliated 

against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. See Compl., Blake II (ECF No. 11); and 

Order of Service, Blake II (ECF No. 12). 

On November 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion in Blake II. Pl. Summ. 

J. Mot., Blake II (ECF No. 21). On December 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed the same summary judgment 

motion in the instant action. Docket No. 22. On that same day, Capt. Hoyt, Lt. Borgzinner, 

Deputy Crawford filed a summary judgment motion in the instant action (Docket No. 31), and 

Chief John Hirokawa, Capt. Hoyt, and Deputy Hogan filed a nearly identical summary judgment 

motion in Blake II (Dfdts. Summ. J. Mot., Blake II (Docket No. 31). On December 8, 2015, the 

Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed request to consolidate these two cases. Docket No. 37.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

On November 14 and December 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed habeas corpus petitions in the 

Santa Clara County Superior Court in In re Blake, case no. F1451055, challenging his conditions 

of confinement at Elmwood Correctional Facility.2 Docket No. 32-1 at 1. Plaintiff’s petitions 

were denied for failure to exhaust the DOC’s administrative remedies. Docket No. 32-1 at 3. The 

state superior court stated that the Santa Clara DOC’s administrative grievance process required an 

inmate to appeal grievance denials by writing a letter to the appropriate division commander, and 

 

1

The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

2

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ request to take judicial notice of the opinion issued by the 

Santa Clara County Superior Court in In re Shawncey Blake, case no. F1451055, signed January 9, 

2015, and filed January 13, 2015. Docket No. 32. A district court “may take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 

(9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (granting request to take judicial 

notice in § 1983 action of five prior cases in which plaintiff was pro se litigant, to counter her 

argument that she deserved special treatment because of her pro se status).

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requesting a written response. Docket No. 32-1 at 2. The state superior court stated that the 

division commander’s written response is considered the final decision. Id. The state superior 

court concluded that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that he had exhausted administrative remedies 

because there was nothing in the record that indicated that Plaintiff had appealed the denial of his 

grievances. Id. at 2–3. 

On December 31, 2014, Plaintiff was advised not to submit grievances as “indigent legal 

mail.” Docket No. 35-2 at 1. Plaintiff was informed that if he submitted another grievance as 

“indigent legal mail,” he would be issued an infraction. Docket No. 35-2 at 1. 

I. January 2015 Infraction3

On January 22, 2015, Plaintiff sent an appeal letter to Capt. Hoyt that appealed the denial 

of certain grievances he had filed and was intended to exhaust administrative remedies for these 

grievances. Docket No. 40 at 43–46. Plaintiff placed the letter in an envelope addressed to Capt. 

Hoyt and wrote “confidential legal mail” on the envelope. Docket No. 13 (“Am. Compl.”) at 3. 

That same day, Deputy Crawford issued Plaintiff an inmate infraction for disobeying a 

written order, a violation of DOC Rule 2-11, and for presenting false information or lying to staff, 

a violation of DOC Rule 2-15. Docket No. 35-4 at 1. Deputy Crawford stated that by mailing a 

grievance to Capt. Hoyt in an envelope marked “confidential” and “legal mail,” Plaintiff had 

disobeyed the December 31, 2014 order to cease submitting grievances as “indigent confidential 

mail.” Docket No. 35-4 at 1. Deputy Crawford also stated that Plaintiff presented false 

information in writing “confidential” and “legal mail” on the envelope because “the appeal and 

other grievances” are not confidential legal mail. Docket No. 35-4 at 1. 

The next day, January 23, 2015, Capt. Hoyt responded in writing to Plaintiff’s appeal 

letter. Docket No. 35-3 at 1–2. 

On February 6, 2015, Lt. Borgzinner presided over the infraction hearing. Docket No. 35-

5 at 1. Lt. Borgzinner found Plaintiff guilty of disobeying a written order from staff, but 

dismissed the charge of presenting false information to staff. Docket No. 35-5 at 1. Lt. 

 

3

This infraction is the subject of the complaint filed in Blake I.

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Borgzinner ordered discipline of ten days of disciplinary lockdown. Docket No. 29 (“Hoyt 

Decl.”) ¶ 22 and Ex. D. Capt. Hoyt reviewed the infraction and adjusted the discipline to two days 

of disciplinary lockdown. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 23 and Ex. D.

Plaintiff appealed Lt. Borgzinner’s findings on February 6, 2015. Capt. Hoyt denied the 

appeal on March 3, 2015. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 24 and Ex. F.

II. February 2015 Infraction4

On February 24, 2015, Plaintiff sent another appeal letter to Capt. Hoyt that again appealed 

certain other grievances that he had filed. Hoyt Decl., Ex. G, Blake II (ECF No. 29-7)

(complaining that Officers Tejada and DeStafani refused to answer his questions regarding 

conditions of confinement, that Officers Tejada and DeStafani failed to bring him requested 

grievance forms and inmate request forms, that Plaintiff was unable to make pro per phone calls, 

and that his housing unit lacked hot water). Plaintiff again placed his appeal letter in an envelope 

addressed to Capt. Hoyt and again wrote “confidential legal mail” on the envelope. Am. Compl. 

at 3, Blake II (ECF No. 11); Hogan Decl. ¶ 5, Blake II (ECF No. 26); Hoyt Decl., Ex. G, Blake II. 

That same day, Deputy Hogan issued Plaintiff an inmate infraction for disobeying written 

and verbal orders to not label grievances or letters as “legal mail,” and for falsely describing his 

appeal letter as legal mail. Hogan Decl. ¶¶ 7–9, Blake II; Hoyt Decl., Ex. H, Blake II. Disobeying 

written or verbal orders is a violation of DOC Rule 2-11, and presenting false information or lying 

to staff is a violation of DOC Rule 2-15. Hogan Decl. ¶¶ 7–9, Blake II; Docket No. 35-1 at 31. 

On March 5, 2015, Lt. Meyers presided over the infraction hearing. Meyers Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6, 

Blake II (ECF No. 28). Lt. Meyers found Plaintiff not guilty because although Plaintiff had falsely 

labeled non-legal mail as legal mail and disobeyed direct orders from staff, Plaintiff had done so in 

an attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies. Meyers Decl. ¶ 6, Blake II. Lt. Meyers did not 

order any discipline for this infraction. Meyers Decl. ¶ 7, Blake II. Capt. Hoyt reviewed the 

infraction and agreed that leniency was appropriate since Plaintiff had violated the rules in an 

attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 31, Blake II. 

 

4

This infraction was the subject of the complaint filed in Blake II. 

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III. Santa Clara DOC Procedures Regarding Grievances and Mail 

When inmates are booked into the Santa Clara DOC, they are provided with a copy of the 

Inmate Orientation Rulebook (“Rulebook”). The Rulebook sets forth the DOC’s Inmate 

Grievance Procedure. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 3. Inmates may grieve any condition of confinement over 

which the DOC has control. Inmates initiate a grievance by completing a grievance form and 

handing the form to any officer. Docket No. 35-1 (“Rulebook”) at 9. If the officer is unable to 

resolve the grievance, the grievance is forwarded to a sergeant. Rulebook at 9. If the sergeant is 

unable to resolve the grievance, the grievance is forwarded to the team lieutenant. Rulebook at 9. 

The team lieutenant will determine the appropriate action to take and provide the inmate with a 

written response. Rulebook at 9. If the grievance is denied in the written response, the inmate 

may appeal the decision by writing a letter to the facility captain. Rulebook at 9. 

All appeal letters addressed to the facility captain are treated as confidential, unless they 

obviously contain contraband. Hoyt. Decl. ¶ 5. This means that only the facility captain and her 

confidential secretary will review the contents of the letter, and that the letter will not be reviewed 

by other DOC staff. Hoyt. Decl. ¶ 5. Inmates are instructed not to send grievance mail via the 

indigent legal mail system. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 8. The facility captain will provide a written response to 

the appeal letter, either affirming or reversing the denial. Docket No. 35-1 at 9. 

The Rulebook also provides that inmates may “correspond confidentially with the Facility 

Captain, or the Chief of Correction” and provides that inmates will receive a written response to 

their confidential correspondence. Docket No. 35-1 at 9. 

The DOC has the following practices governing inmate mail. All outgoing mail is treated 

as confidential and will not be opened unless it obviously contains contraband. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 7. 

Accordingly, if an envelope contains only paper, it will not be opened. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 7. 

DOC inmates may send regular mail by addressing an envelope, purchasing postage, and 

handing it to their unit officer or sergeant. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 9. Pro se inmates may send legal mail by 

marking an envelope with the words “legal mail,” and asking their unit officer or sergeant to place 

the envelope in the pro per legal mail box. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 10. The DOC processes legal mail 

separately from regular mail because legal mail postage is paid for by the California court system. 

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Hoyt Decl. ¶ 10. In addition, the DOC expedites processing of legal mail, and the prompt 

processing of legal mail assists inmates in meeting court deadlines. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 10 and Docket 

No. 31 at 17. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is 

genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party. See id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the 

pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See 

id. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (amended 2010)). 

For purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence 

submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., v. 

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

II. Legal Claims

In Plaintiff’s summary judgment motions, he argues that Defendants denied him access to 

the courts, prevented him from petitioning the government for redress of grievances, and retaliated 

against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Docket No. 22 and Pl. Summ. J. Mot., 

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Blake II (ECF No. 21). In Defendants’ summary judgment motions and their opposition to 

Plaintiff’s summary judgment motions, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s claims or, in the alternative, they are entitled to qualified immunity on 

Plaintiff’s claims. Docket No. 31 and Dfdts. Mot. Summ. J., Blake II (ECF No. 31). In deciding 

the pending motions, the Court has considered the entire record.

A. Exercise of First Amendment Rights

Plaintiff claims that he was exercising his First Amendment rights to petition the 

government for redress of grievances and to access the courts when he sent grievance appeal 

letters marked “confidential legal mail.” He further argues that his First Amendment rights to 

access the courts and to file prison grievances “precludes jail officials from penalizing [him by 

issuing infractions] for exercising those rights.” Docket No. 22 at 1. Defendants argue that they 

are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim because the undisputed 

evidence shows that Plaintiff’s submission of grievance mail through the indigent legal mail 

system was not protected activity, because Defendants did not prevent Plaintiff from engaging in 

litigation or filing grievances through the DOC’s established grievance process, because Plaintiff 

suffered no injury as a result of Defendants’ actions, and because the DOC’s penological interests 

justified any infringement of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

1. Standard

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.5 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). A prisoner’s right to access the court 

 

5

The constitutional source of the right of access to the courts is not settled. See Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 366–67 (Thomas, J., concurring). 

Supreme Court decisions have grounded the right in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 

Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the 

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415 

n.12 (citing cases). The Ninth Circuit also has found various constitutional sources for the right. 

See, e.g., Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1995) (right of access to courts grounded 

in due process and equal protection clauses); Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) 

overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 n.2 (2001) (use of prison 

grievance procedure protected by prisoner’s right to meaningful access to courts along with 

broader right to petition government for redress of grievances); see also Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. 

Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (nonprisoner case finding right of access to courts 

subsumed under First Amendment).

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also protects the right to utilize established prison grievance procedures and to petition the 

government for redress of grievances. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995)

overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 n.2 (2001); see also Turner v. 

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (prisoners retain the constitutional right to petition the government 

for the redress of grievances (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)).

The Ninth Circuit has “traditionally differentiated between two types of access to courts 

claims: those involving prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners’ 

rights to litigate without active interference.” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 

2011), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015). Plaintiff’s 

claim falls into the latter category. 

A prisoner’s constitutional right to litigate does not require prison officials to provide 

affirmative assistance in the preparation of legal papers, but rather forbids states from erecting 

barriers that impede the right of access of incarcerated persons. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1102–04 

(reversing district court and finding cognizable denial of access-to-courts claim based on 

prisoner’s allegations that he was repeatedly transferred between different facilities in order to 

hinder his ability to litigate his pending civil lawsuits, prison officials seized and withheld all of

his legal files, and as a result of such actions several of his pending suits were dismissed). 

To establish a claim for any violation of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner must 

prove that there was an inadequacy in the prison’s legal access program that caused him an actual 

injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352. Actual injury is a jurisdictional requirement that flows from 

the standing doctrine and may not be waived. Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349). To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show 

that the inadequacy in the prison’s program hindered his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim 

concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354–55; see also 

id. at 348 (actual injury is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, 

such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim”). With respect to a claim 

regarding active interference by prison officials, a prisoner alleges an actual injury if, as a result of 

the defendants’ alleged actions, his pending suit was dismissed. See Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104.

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Once the prisoner establishes a denial of access to the courts, the court should then 

determine whether the hindrance of the prisoner’s access to court was reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). If the 

hindrance passes the Turner test, the denial of access to the courts claim will fail even if there was 

actual injury.

2. Analysis

a. First Amendment Conduct

The Court agrees that Plaintiff was not exercising his First Amendment right to access the 

courts or exercising his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of 

grievances when he chose to disobey DOC staff orders and label his grievance appeal letter 

“confidential legal mail.” Plaintiff misunderstands DOC procedures and practices, and he 

misunderstands First Amendment jurisprudence. 

Plaintiff applies an overly broad reading to the DOC procedures, and ignores DOC 

practices, in order to reach the mistaken conclusion that labeling his grievance appeal letters 

“confidential legal mail” was an exercise of his First Amendment right to petition the government 

for redress of grievances. Plaintiff argues that his appeal letter is not grievance mail. However, 

the appeal letter is intended to appeal the denial of his grievances and is the final level of the DOC 

grievance procedure. Rulebook at 9. The appeal letter is therefore properly considered grievance 

mail. Plaintiff also argues that the appeal letter was both confidential and legal, pursuant to the 

DOC Policy and Procedure Manual,6and therefore appropriately labelled. In support of this 

argument, Plaintiff correctly notes that the DOC Policy and Procedure Manual provides that he 

 

6 Defendants argue that the Court may not consider the excerpts of the DOC Policy and Procedure 

Manual that Plaintiff has filed because these documents have not been authenticated. Docket No. 

41 at 3. Rule 56(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preclude the court from considering

evidence presented at summary judgment that “cannot be presented in a form that would be 

admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Here, Plaintiff could present the DOC Policy 

and Procedure Manual in an admissible form by obtaining an affidavit from a DOC prison official 

or proving that these excerpts were provided to him by the DOC. Accordingly, the excerpts of the 

DOC Policy and Procedure Manual in the record may be considered by the Court on summary 

judgment. See, e.g., Patterson v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 2013 WL 6328832, *3 

(C.D. Cal. Dec.4, 2013) (at summary judgment stage evidence may be considered if, while not 

presented in an admissible form, it could “be presented in an admissible form at trial”) (citing, 

inter alia, Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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may communicate confidentially with Capt. Hoyt. Docket No. 44 at 19 (Policy No. 14.05, VII).7 

He also correctly notes that the DOC Policy and Procedure Manual defines “legal/privileged mail” 

as follows:

Correspondence to or from persons and organizations including, but not limited to, courts, 

counsel, officials of a confining authority, state and local agency officers, grievance system 

administrators, paroling authority, medical professionals, religious institutions, or 

envelopes containing Money Orders or Cashier’s Checks.

Docket No. 44 at 27 (Policy No. 17.13). Plaintiff also argues that his grievance appeal letter was 

“legal for administrative exhaustion requirement, which . . . was sent to the courts to satisfy 

exhaustion requirements for court procedures.” Docket No. 40 at 5. 

However, Plaintiff has been informed that, within the DOC, the “legal mail” designation 

on envelopes has a precise, specialized meaning, and should not be confused with the broader 

“legal/privileged mail” definition set forth in the DOC Policy and Procedure Manual or a layman’s 

understanding of the words “legal” and “confidential.” Docket No. 35-2 at 1. The DOC practice 

is that the “legal mail” designation on envelopes is used to identify mailings that may be sent via 

the indigent legal mail system. The indigent legal mail system is intended for correspondence 

from indigent inmates to their attorneys or the courts. Docket No. 44 at 29 (Policy No. 17.13, 

I.D.),8 Hoyt Decl. ¶¶ 8–10. Neither the DOC Policy and Procedure Manual nor the Rulebook 

require, specify, or suggest that grievance mail or confidential mail should be labelled 

“confidential mail” or “legal mail.” 

Plaintiff’s initial confusion as to whether his grievance appeal letter could be labelled 

“confidential legal mail” is understandable. There appears to be no written policy or procedure 

explaining when it is appropriate to use the “confidential mail” or “legal mail” designations on 

envelopes. There also appears to be no written policy or procedures that distinguish the different 

types of confidential and legal mail. But, on December 31, 2014, DOC staff clearly instructed 

Plaintiff that grievances, including letters appealing grievances, were not confidential legal mail 

 

7

In relevant part, Policy No. 14.05 states “An inmate may elect to write a confidential letter 

directly to any Division Commander or the Chief of Correction.” Docket No. 44 at 19.

8

In relevant part, Policy No. 17.13 states that “[t]here is no limitation to the number of postage 

paid letters [for indigent inmates] for correspondence with attorneys or the courts.” Docket No. 44 

at 29. 

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and should not be so labelled. Docket No. 35-2 at 1. Plaintiff’s insistence on sending another 

grievance appeal letter marked “confidential legal mail” on January 22 and February 24, 2015, and 

his arguments in the instant action indicate that he continues to misunderstand that the 

“confidential legal mail” designation on outgoing mail has a meaning distinct from the general 

understanding of confidential mail or legal mail.

Plaintiff also misunderstands what constitutes protected activity under the First 

Amendment. A prisoner’s First Amendment right to access the court protects the right to utilize 

established prison grievance procedures. Bradley, 64 F.3d at 1279. The DOC’s established 

grievance procedure prohibits inmates from sending grievance mail marked as “confidential legal 

mail.” Docket No. 44 at 29 (Policy No. 17.13, I.D.), Hoyt Decl. ¶¶ 8–10. Plaintiff argues that his 

appeal letter is unrelated to prison grievance procedures, but rather separate legal correspondence 

intended to exhaust his administrative remedies as directed by the state court judge who denied his 

habeas petition. Docket No. 40 at 6. Plaintiff misunderstands the exhaustion of administrative 

remedies requirement and the state court’s denial of his habeas petition. 

The requirement that inmates exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing a § 1983 

suit requires an inmate to pursue his claim through all levels of a prison’s administrative gr

process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2005). To exhaust the DOC’s 

administrative grievance process, inmates must appeal the denial of their grievances by submitting 

a written letter to the facility captain and obtaining a written response from the facility captain. 

Rulebook at 9. Plaintiff’s appeal letters are the final level of the DOC’s grievance process and are 

correctly understood to be grievance mail. In fact, if these letters were not part of the DOC 

grievance process, they would not exhaust Plaintiff’s administrative remedies. See, e.g., 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006) (“Proper exhaustion [of administrative remedies] 

demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no 

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the 

course of its proceedings.”). In denying Plaintiff’s state habeas petitions for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, the state court did not direct Plaintiff to submit a private, non-grievancerelated letter to Capt. Hoyt. Rather, the state court indicated that Plaintiff needed to proceed 

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through all levels of the DOC’s administrative grievance process and exhaust the administrative 

remedies available to him through the DOC. Docket No. 35-1 at 2. 

Although Plaintiff had a First Amendment right to send grievance appeal letters to Capt. 

Hoyt, the First Amendment does not grant Plaintiff a right to send his appeal letters in a manner 

that violates DOC procedures and practices, e.g. to label them as “confidential legal mail.” 

b. Interference with Ability to Utilize Established Grievance 

Procedure

Plaintiff has not proven that the prohibition against sending grievance appeal letters via 

indigent mail or the issued infractions interfered with his ability to utilize the established 

grievance procedure or to access the courts. Plaintiff is still able to utilize the established DOC 

grievance procedure and to access the courts (i.e., exhaust administrative remedies) in two ways. 

First, Plaintiff can mail a letter addressed to Capt. Hoyt via regular mail. DOC practice is to treat 

this mail as confidential, even without the “confidential” designation on the envelope, unless the 

mail obviously contains contraband. Hoyt Dec. ¶ 7. Second, Plaintiff could hand a letter 

addressed to Capt. Hoyt to his unit officer or sergeant who would deliver it free of charge. Hoyt 

Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8 and 9 and Docket No. 35-1 at 9. DOC practice is also to treat this kind of mail as 

confidential, even without the “confidential” designation on the envelope, unless the mail 

obviously contains contraband. Hoyt Dec. ¶ 7. In addition, since receiving these infractions, 

Plaintiff has continued to file grievances, correspond with Capt. Hoyt, and file court actions. 

Docket No. 42 at 8 (“[As of December 15, 2015,] I’ve continued to send Captain Hoyt appeal 

letters of denied grievances to exhaustion (sic) my remedies and file court actions . . .”). The 

undisputed evidence shows that the prohibition against sending grievance appeal letters via 

indigent mail and the issued infractions have not interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to utilize the 

established grievance procedure and to access the courts.

c. Actual Injury

The Court further agrees that Plaintiff has suffered no “actual injury” due to the prohibition 

against sending grievance appeal letters via indigent mail and the issuance of the infractions. 

Plaintiff has not cited any injury and there is no evidence of injury in the record. To establish an 

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access-to-the-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that the interference with his First Amendment 

right caused “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348. The plaintiff 

must prove that the defendant’s conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the alleged 

constitutional violation. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

On January 9, 2015, Plaintiff’s state habeas petitions were dismissed for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies prior to filing the petition. Docket No. 32-1 at 2–3 (citing In re Hudson, 

143 Cal. App. 4th 1, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). Defendants issued infractions to Plaintiff on January 

22 and February 24, 2015, after the state habeas petitions were denied. The infractions did not 

cause the dismissal of the petitions. In addition, although Plaintiff was issued infractions for 

mailing his appeal letters in envelops marked “confidential legal mail,” Capt. Hoyt promptly 

responded to Plaintiff’s appeal letter, thereby exhausting Plaintiff’s administrative remedies. The 

undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff suffered no actual injury from the prohibition against 

sending grievance appeal letters via indigent mail or the issuance of the infractions. 

d. Legitimate Penological Interests

Defendants argue that the DOC’s practice of restricting the “confidential legal mail” 

designation to mail sent by indigent inmates to their attorneys or the courts is reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests. Plaintiff does not directly address this argument, but reiterates 

that he was engaged in protected activity when he labeled his appeal letter “confidential legal 

mail.” 

To determine whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological 

interest, the Court applies the four-factor Turner test that considers:

(1) whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate and neutral governmental 

objective, (2) whether there are alternative avenues that remain open . . . to exercise the 

right, (3) the impact that accommodating the asserted right will have on other guards and 

prisoners, and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether the existence of easy 

and obvious alternatives indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response by prison 

officials.

Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 

U.S. 78, 89 (1978)). Applying the Turner factors, the Court finds that the DOC’s practice of 

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limiting indigent mail to correspondence sent by indigent inmates to their attorneys or the courts is 

reasonably related to the DOC’s legitimate and neutral governmental objectives of fostering 

administrative efficiency, limiting expenses, and helping inmates meet court deadlines. 

The DOC houses roughly 3,500 inmates. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 6. If inmates were allowed to use 

the indigent mail system for any mail related to litigation (e.g., an appeal letter intended to exhaust 

administrative remedies) or any confidential mail (e.g., a confidential letter to the facility captain), 

the volume of indigent mail would increase. In restricting the use of the indigent mail system, the 

DOC ensures indigent mail is processed quickly, and prioritizes mail that helps inmates meet court 

deadlines. Hoyt Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11. 

As discussed in Section II.A.2.b supra, inmates have alternative avenues to communicate 

with the facility captain and exhaust their administrative remedies without placing the 

“confidential legal mail” designation on grievance appeal letters. See Section II.A.2.b supra. 

Accommodating Plaintiff’s desire to have his appeal letters or confidential letters processed as 

indigent mail would result in other inmates’ indigent mail being processed more slowly, 

decreasing administrative efficiency, and increasing expenses. Finally, refusing to allow Plaintiff 

to send his grievance appeal letters as “confidential legal mail” is not unduly burdensome since it 

only requires him to remove that designation from the mailing he sends out, but still provides him 

the ability to communicate confidentially and free of charge with Capt. Hoyt. The practice of 

restricting the “confidential legal mail” designation to mail sent by indigent inmates to their 

attorneys or the courts is rationally related to fostering administrative efficiency, limiting 

expenses, and helping inmates meet court deadlines. 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Defendants 

are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants denied him access to the 

courts and prevented him from petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

B. Retaliation

1. Standard

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

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because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted);

accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under § 

1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional 

rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as 

preserving institutional order and discipline). Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise of a 

constitutional right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if the act, when taken for different 

reasons, would have been proper. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 

274, 283–84 (1977). Retaliation, though it is not expressly referred to in the Constitution, is 

actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill individuals’ exercise of constitutional 

rights. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 

The prisoner must show that the type of activity he was engaged in was constitutionally 

protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the alleged 

retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest. 

Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring retaliatory motive from 

circumstantial evidence). The prisoner bears the burden of pleading and proving absence of 

legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. At 

that point, the burden shifts to the prison official to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the retaliatory action was narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate penological purpose. See 

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461–62 (9th Cir. 1995) (defendants had qualified immunity 

for their decision to transfer prisoner to preserve internal order and discipline and maintain 

institutional security).

Retaliation claims brought by prisoners must be evaluated in light of concerns over 

“excessive judicial involvement in day-to-day prison management, which ‘often squander[s] 

judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone.’” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (quoting Sandin 

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). In particular, courts should “‘afford appropriate deference 

and flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for 

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conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482).

The court should apply the four-factor test from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1978), to 

determine whether the proffered legitimate penological interest is reasonably related to a 

regulation which infringes on a prisoner’s constitutional rights, even in a retaliation analysis. See 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1272 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that Ninth Circuit’s practice of 

balancing the importance of the legitimate penological interest against the importance of the 

prisoner’s infringed right was disapproved by the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 

223 (2001)).

Prisoners may not be retaliated against for exercising their right of access to the courts. 

See Schroeder, 55 F.3d at 461; Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (1985) (retaliation for 

prisoner’s work as jailhouse lawyer). This constitutional prohibition clearly includes retaliation 

for filing a complaint. See Soranno’s, 874 F.2d at 1314. The right of access to the courts extends 

to established prison grievance procedures. See Bradley, 64 F.3d at 1279. Thus, a prisoner may 

not be retaliated against for using such procedures. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. The right to file 

a grievance is subsumed under the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of 

grievances, see Hines v. Gomez, 853 F. Supp. 329, 333 (N.D. Cal. 1994), and protects both the 

filing, see id., and content, see Bradley, 64 F.3d at 1279, of prison grievances. 

2. Analysis

After reviewing all the evidence in the record, the Court finds that Defendants have shown 

that there is no triable issue of material fact with respect to four of the five elements of a First 

Amendment retaliation claim. 

First, as discussed supra in section II.A.2.a, Plaintiff does not have a First Amendment 

right to send his grievance appeal letters in a manner that violates DOC procedures and practices, 

i.e. to send grievance appeal letters with the designation “confidential legal mail.” See supra

section II.A.2.a.

Second, there is no evidence that Defendants issued the infractions because Plaintiff was 

exercising his First Amendment rights. Defendants issued infractions to Plaintiff because Plaintiff 

had violated DOC rules. See, e.g., Docket No. 27 (“Crawford Decl.”) ¶¶ 8, 9 and Hogan Decl. ¶¶ 

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8, 9, Blake II (ECF No. 26). Plaintiff argues that the failure to discipline him for the February 24, 

2015 letter proves that he did not violate any DOC rules, and proves that the February 24, 2015 

infraction was purely retaliatory. Docket No. 43 at 2. Plaintiff misstates the record. Defendants 

granted him leniency and assessed no punishment for the February 24, 2015 letter because they 

concluded that Plaintiff violated Rule 2-15 (disobeying direct orders from staff) because he 

misunderstood when to use the “confidential legal mail” designation. Hoyt. Decl. ¶¶ 31, 32, Blake 

II (ECF No. 29). In other words, although Plaintiff did violate a DOC rule, Defendants concluded 

it was appropriate to show him leniency under the circumstances. 

Third, Defendants’ actions did not have a chilling effect on Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not 

specify any chilling effect, and there is no evidence in the record of a chilling effect. 

Finally, Defendants’ actions advanced legitimate penological goals. As discussed supra in 

section II.A.2.d, the DOC’s practice of restricting the “confidential legal mail” designation to mail 

sent by indigent inmates to their attorneys or the courts is reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests of fostering administrative efficiency, limiting expenses, and helping inmates 

meet court deadlines. In addition, the DOC’s policy of issuing infractions for disobeying lawful 

direct orders given by prison officials advances legitimate penological goals. The “essential 

goals” of correctional institutions are “institutional security and preserving internal order and 

discipline.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979). Requiring inmates to comply with lawful 

direct orders reasonably advances the goals of institutional security and preserving internal order 

and discipline. Allowing inmates to disregard direct orders would undermine the authority of 

correctional officers and limit their ability to enforce prison rules. Hoyt Decl. ¶ 14.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. 

See, e.g., Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting retaliatory transfer 

claim because transfer of prisoner to another prison to distance him from two female officers who 

were fraternizing with him contrary to prison policy reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional 

goal).

C. Qualified Immunity

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The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a twopronged test to determine whether qualified immunity exists. First, the court asks: “Taken in the 

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s 

conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated if the 

facts were as alleged, the inquiry ends and defendants prevail. See id. If, however, 

a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, 

sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. . . . The contours of the 

right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is 

doing violates that right. . . . The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a 

right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.

Id. at 201–02 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although Saucier required courts 

to address the questions in the particular sequence set out above, courts now have the discretion to 

decide which prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. See 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

The threshold question in a qualified immunity analysis is whether the plaintiff’s 

allegations, if true, establish a constitutional or statutory violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “If 

no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no 

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id. Here, there was no 

constitutional violation, so the Court need not reach the other prong of the qualified immunity 

analysis. As discussed supra, Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights when 

they prohibited him from sending grievance appeal letters in envelopes marked “confidential legal 

mail” or when they issued him infractions for such actions. Nor did Defendants retaliate against 

Plaintiff for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law on their qualified immunity defense.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ summary judgment motions (Docket No. 31 and 

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Dfdts. Summ. J. Mot., Blake II (ECF No. 31)) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s summary judgment 

motions (Docket No. 22 and Pl. Summ. J. Mot., Blake II (ECF No. 21)) are denied. All pending 

motions are denied as moot. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2016

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWNCEY BLAKE,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOYT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00720-HSG 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on August 3, 2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Shawncey Blake ID: DUJ722/14019586

Santa Clara Department of Corrections

Main Jail

150 West Hedding St

San Jose, CA 95110 

Dated: August 3, 2016

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Nikki D. Riley, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

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