Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01997/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01997-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL STEMPLE, individually and 

on behalf of all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 12-cv-01997-BAS(WVG)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY 

APPROVAL OF NATIONWIDE 

CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 

AND CERTIFICATION OF 

SETTLEMENT CLASS

[ECF No. 102]

v.

QC HOLDINGS, INC.,

Defendant.

On August 13, 2012, Plaintiff Paul Stemple commenced this class action

against Defendant QC Holdings, Inc. seeking relief for violations of the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”). (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff now 

moves unopposed for preliminary approval of a settlement reached between the 

parties and for certification of a settlement class. (ECF No. 102.)

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted 

and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the 

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Nationwide Class 

Action Settlement and Certification of Settlement Class. 

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I. PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

A. Settlement Class

Following three years of litigation and attending multiple mediations, the 

parties have reached a proposed settlement of this matter (“Settlement”). (Settlement 

Agreement and Release (“Settlement Agreement”) Recitals C, D, ECF No. 102-3.)1

The Settlement applies to a proposed Settlement Class that is defined as follows:

All persons or entities within the United States whose 10-digit cellular 

telephone numbers were listed by an account holder in the Employment 

and/or Contacts fields, but were not listed in the Personal fields, of a 

customer loan application produced to Defendant, and who were called 

by Defendant using an ATDS and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice 

for the purpose of collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt 

from the account holder, between August 13, 2008 and August 13, 2012.

(Id. § 2.1.) The parties estimate this Settlement Class consists of 31,230 class 

members. (Id. § 2.2.) A Settlement Class Member is a person or entity who is 

encompassed by the Settlement Class and does not timely and properly opt out of the 

Settlement. (Id. § 1.30.) To represent the Settlement Class, the parties agree to seek 

appointment of Plaintiff as Class Representative and Plaintiff’s counsel—Joshua B. 

Swigart of Hyde & Swigart, Abbas Kazerounian of Kazerouni Law Group, APC, and 

Todd M. Friedman of The Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C—as Class 

Counsel. (Id. § 3.2.) 

B. Settlement Fund

Defendant denies that it has violated the TCPA or any other law, but it agrees 

to establish a Settlement Fund in the amount of $1,500,000 to pay for awards to 

Settlement Class Members, settlement administration expenses, and any reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs approved and awarded by the Court. (Settlement Agreement

Recital E, § 4.1.) After deducting class expenses, a pro rata share of the Settlement 

 

1 Capitalized terms used in this Order but not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in 

the Settlement Agreement.

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Fund will be distributed by check to each Settlement Class Member who submits a 

claim to the third-party claims administrator. (Id. § 4.2.) If an award is approved but 

the resulting settlement check is not redeemed or is undeliverable, the award will be 

delivered to a cy pres recipient selected by the parties and approved by the Court. (Id.

§ 15.5.) 

C. Notice to Settlement Class Members

The Settlement requires the Claims Administrator to provide three forms of 

notice to the Settlement Class Members. (Settlement Agreement § 9.) First, the 

Claims Administrator will provide notice via First Class U.S. Mail to all class 

members with known addresses. (Id. § 9.1.2, Ex. A.) The class members’ addresses 

will be either provided by Defendant from its records or obtained through a reverse 

telephone number look-up. (Id. § 9.1.3.) The Mail Notice consists of an enlarged 

postcard that contains, among other things, a summary of the terms of the Settlement, 

instructions for submitting a claim, and directions for accessing the Settlement 

Website. (Id. § 9.1.5, Ex. A.)

Second, the Claims Administrator will create a website to provide information

regarding the Settlement and to allow for online claim submission. (Settlement 

Agreement § 9.2.1.) The Settlement Website will provide access to the Mail Notice 

and also contain a notice in question and answer format that provides more detailed 

information about the release of claims contained in the Settlement, contacting the 

Court to object to the Settlement, and other matters. (Id. § 9.2, Ex. B.) 

Third, notice will be provided by publication by (i) placing an advertisement 

in an issue of USA Today and (ii) sponsoring link and banner advertising on the 

internet for one month and for at least ninety million impressions—appearances of 

the advertisement on a webpage. (Settlement Agreement § 9.3, Ex. C.) A toll-free 

number will also be designated by the Claims Administrator on the various notices

to allow class members to contact the Claims Administrator to inquire about the 

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settlement process. (Id. § 9.4) 

D. Right to Opt Out or Object and Release of Claims

Settlement Class Members will have 130 days from the date of preliminary 

approval of the Settlement to opt out of the Settlement. (Settlement Agreement § 

11.1) Class members may opt out by submitting an exclusion request by mail. (Id. § 

11.2.) If 500 or more class members opt out of the Settlement, Defendant has the 

right to terminate the Settlement. (Id. § 11.4.) Class members will have the same time 

period to submit a written objection indicating their desire to object to the Settlement. 

(Id. 12.1.)

Upon final approval of the Settlement, all Settlement Class Members shall be 

deemed to have released and discharged Defendant from any and all claims that are 

known or unknown to the class members and relate to the this action. (Settlement 

Agreement § 16.) 

E. Attorneys’ Fees and Settlement Costs

As compensation for its services and to recover its expenses, Class Counsel 

will seek from the Court an award of attorneys’ fees and litigation costs not to exceed 

$450,000 in attorneys’ fees and $50,000 in litigation costs. (Settlement Agreement § 

6.) Class Counsel will also seek from the Court a service award for Plaintiff in an 

amount not to exceed $5,000. (Id. § 7.) In addition to these expenses that are subject 

to the Court’s approval, the parties anticipate $181,695 in claims administration 

costs. (Id. § 8.1.) 

II. DISCUSSION

The Ninth Circuit maintains a “strong judicial policy” that favors the 

settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 

(9th Cir. 1992). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) first “require[s] the 

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district court to determine whether a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, 

adequate, and reasonable.” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Where the “parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, courts 

must peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification 

and the fairness of the settlement.” Stanton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th 

Cir. 2003). In these situations, settlement approval “requires a higher standard of 

fairness and a more probing inquiry than may normally be required under Rule 

23(e).” Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

In this case, the Court previously certified a California-only class. (ECF No. 

75 at 15:4–9.) The parties in reaching a settlement modified the certified class, 

however, by expanding it to include all persons or entities within the United States 

that satisfy the class criteria. (Settlement Agreement § 2.1.) The Court therefore

reviews the class certification requirements to determine whether it is also

appropriate to certify the Settlement Class. 

A. Class Certification

Before granting preliminary approval of a class-action settlement, the Court 

must first determine whether the proposed class can be certified. Amchem Prods., 

Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (indicating that a district court must apply 

“undiluted, even heightened, attention [to class certification] in the settlement 

context” in order to protect absentees).

The class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted 

by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 

442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). In order to justify a departure from that rule, “a class 

representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the 

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same injury’ as the class members.” Id. (citing E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. 

Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)). In this regard, Rule 23 contains two sets of 

class-certification requirements set forth in Rule 23(a) and (b). United Steel, Paper 

& Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. 

ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2010). “A court may certify a class 

if a plaintiff demonstrates that all of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been met, 

and that at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) have been met.” Otsuka v. 

Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 251 F.R.D. 439, 443 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

“Rule 23(a) provides four prerequisites that must be satisfied for class 

certification: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable; (2) questions of law or fact exist that are common to the class; (3) the 

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 

of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the class.” Otsuka, 251 F.R.D. at 443 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). “A 

plaintiff must also establish that one or more of the grounds for maintaining the suit 

are met under Rule 23(b), including: (1) that there is a risk of substantial prejudice 

from separate actions; (2) that declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting the class as 

a whole would be appropriate; or (3) that common questions of law or fact 

predominate and the class action is superior to other available methods of 

adjudication.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)). 

In the context of a proposed settlement class, questions regarding the 

manageability of the case for trial are not considered. E.g., Wright v. Linkus Enters., 

Inc., 259 F.R.D. 468, 474 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 

620 (“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district 

court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable 

management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no trial.”)).

The Court considers the threshold issue of whether the Settlement Class is 

ascertainable and each of prerequisites for certification in turn below. 

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1. Ascertainability 

“As a threshold matter, and apart from the explicit requirements of Rule 23(a), 

the party seeking class certification must demonstrate that an identifiable and 

ascertainable class exists.” Mazur v. eBay, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 563, 567 (N.D. Cal. 

2009). Certification is improper if there is “no definable class.” See Lozano v. AT & 

T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 730 (9th Cir. 2007).

“A class should be precise, objective, and presently ascertainable,” though “the 

class need not be so ascertainable that every potential member can be identified at 

the commencement of the action.” O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am. Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 

319 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A class is ascertainable if 

it is defined by ‘objective criteria’ and if it is ‘administratively feasible’ to determine 

whether a particular individual is a member of the class.” Bruton v. Gerber Prods. 

Co., No. 12-CV-02412-LHK, 2014 WL 2860995, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2014). 

However, “[a] class definition is inadequate if a court must make a determination of 

the merits of the individual claims to determine whether a person is a member of the 

class.” Hanni v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. C 08-00732, 2010 WL 289297, at *9 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 15, 2010). “It is not fatal for a class definition to require some inquiry into 

individual records, as long as the inquiry is not so daunting as to make the class 

definition insufficient.” Herrera v. LCS Fin. Servs. Corp., 274 F.R.D. 666, 673 (N.D. 

Cal. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Court finds the Settlement Class is ascertainable because class 

members can be identified by reviewing records available to Defendant and 

conducting a reverse telephone number look-up. Defendant’s agent who supplies 

Defendant’s autodialing system provided a complete list of all calls made by 

Defendant using the autodialing system during the proposed class period. (Evlin 

Decl. ¶¶ 12–13, ECF No. 102-4) All of the unique cell phone numbers called by 

Defendant were extracted from this list. (Hansen Decl. ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 102-10.) 

Some of these numbers have address information associated with them from 

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Defendant’s records, but almost all of them do not. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) 

To solve this issue, the parties propose to have the Claims Administrator 

perform a reverse telephone number look-up to determine the address information 

for class members for whom address information is not available. (Settlement 

Agreement § 9.1.3.) The Court finds this solution is acceptable, as the use of “reverse 

look-up technology to identify” the class members “is an objective approach that 

reinforces the ascertainability of the class.” Bee, Denning, Inc. v. Capital All. Grp., 

310 F.R.D. 614, 623 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Booth v. Appstack, Inc., No. C13–

1533JLR, 2015 WL 1466247, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 2015)). Thus, the Court 

concludes the Settlement Class is ascertainable.

2. Numerosity – Rule 23(a)(1) 

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “[C]ourts generally find that the 

numerosity factor is satisfied if the class comprises 40 or more members and will find 

that it has not been satisfied when the class comprises 21 or fewer.” Celano v. 

Marriott Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 544, 549 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

Here, the proposed Settlement Class consists of approximately 31,230 class 

members. (Elvin Decl. ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement § 2.2.) The Court therefore finds 

joinder of all class members is impracticable for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(1) and 

the numerosity requirement is satisfied. See Celano, 242 F.R.D. at 549. 

3. Commonality – Rule 23(a)(2)

Under Rule 23(a)(2), the named plaintiff must demonstrate that there are 

“questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 

“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have 

suffered the same injury[.]’” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. 

v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). However, “[a]ll questions of fact and law need 

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not be common to satisfy this rule.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019. “The existence of 

shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core 

of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges he was harmed when Defendant placed twelve 

calls to Plaintiff’s cell phone in an attempt to collect an alleged debt owed by a person 

other than Plaintiff. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 12, ECF No. 107.) These 

calls were allegedly made via an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”) 

within the meaning of the TCPA and with the use of an “artificial or prerecorded 

voice” as prohibited by the TCPA. (Id.) Plaintiff did not consent to these calls. (Id. ¶ 

18.) Plaintiff claims the proposed Settlement Class Members were similarly harmed 

when they were called for debt collection purposes by Defendant without their 

consent using an ATDS and artificial voice in violation of the TCPA. (Id. ¶¶ 20–22.) 

Given this context, the Court finds there are questions of law and fact common 

to the Settlement Class Members. A common core of salient facts exists with respect 

to Defendant’s alleged use of an ATDS and artificial voice to make unsolicited calls 

to persons or entities via their cell phone numbers for debt collection purposes. Class 

members also share a common legal issue: whether Defendant made these calls in 

violation of the TCPA. Accordingly, the commonality requirement is satisfied. 

4. Typicality – Rule 23(a)(3) 

To satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), the named plaintiff’s claims must be typical of the 

claims of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement is 

“permissive” and requires only that the named plaintiff’s claims “are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. “The test 

of typicality ‘is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the 

action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether 

other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.’” Hanon v. 

Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schwartz v. Harp, 

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108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). “[C]lass certification should not be granted 

if ‘there is a danger that absent class members will suffer if their representative is 

preoccupied with defenses unique to it.’” Id. (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. 

v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990)).

Here, Plaintiff’s and the unnamed class members’ claims arise from the same 

alleged conduct of Defendant—unsolicited phone calls for debt collection purposes 

using an ATDS and artificial voice—and are based on the same legal theory—

violation of the TCPA. The typicality requirement is therefore satisfied. See, e.g.,

Bee, Denning, Inc., 310 F.R.D. at 623 (concluding typicality requirement satisfied 

where plaintiff alleged she received the same or similar unsolicited fax 

advertisements as those sent to putative class members in violation of the TCPA); 

Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., No. 3:12-cv-0964-GPC-DHB, 2013 WL 

4774763, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2015) (finding typicality satisfied where plaintiffs 

asserted they received autodialed and/or prerecorded calls from defendants, “and the 

proposed class [was] defined to include individuals who received the same type of 

calls”).

5. Adequacy – Rule 23(a)(4) 

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative plaintiff “will fairly and 

adequately protect the interest of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “To satisfy 

constitutional due process concerns, absent class members must be afforded adequate 

representation before entry of a judgment which binds them.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 

1020 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940)). “Resolution of two 

questions determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel 

have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named 

plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” 

Id. (citing Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 

1978)).

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Here, there is no indication that Plaintiff and his counsel have a conflict of 

interest with the Settlement Class Members, and they appear to have vigorously 

investigated and litigated this action. (See Kazerounian Decl. ¶¶ 4–8, 27, ECF No. 

102-2.) Thus, the interests of Plaintiff and the Settlement Class Members are aligned. 

In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel are qualified in class-action litigation. They have 

handled numerous class actions focused on consumer protection, including matters 

involving the TCPA. (Id. ¶¶ 13–26; Swigart Decl. ¶¶ 6–11, ECF No. 102-7; Friedman 

Decl. ¶¶ 4–9, ECF No. 102-8.) Consequently, the Court finds Plaintiff and his counsel 

adequately represent the unnamed class members.

6. Predominance and Superiority – Rule 23(b)(3)

Predominance

“The predominance inquiry focuses on ‘the relationship between the common 

and individual issues’ and ‘tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive 

to warrant adjudication by representation.’” Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 

571 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022). The focus of 

the inquiry is not the presence or absence of commonality as it is under Rule 23(a)(2). 

Instead, the predominance requirement ensures that common questions “present a 

significant aspect of the case” such that “there is clear justification”—in terms of 

efficiency and judicial economy—for resolving those questions in a single 

adjudication. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022; see also Vinole, 571 F.3d at 944 (“[A] central 

concern of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance test is whether adjudication of common 

issues will help achieve judicial economy.”)

Here, the Court finds a common issue predominates over any individual 

issue—specifically, whether Defendant’s alleged practice of using an ATDS to call 

the Settlement Class Members’ cell phone numbers without their consent violated 

the TCPA. A potential pitfall for parties seeking to satisfy the predominance 

requirement in a TCPA action is whether an individualized inquiry will be necessary 

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to determine if class members consented to the automated phone calls. See, e.g., 

Connelly v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., LLC, 294 F.R.D. 574, 578 (S.D. Cal. 2013) 

(holding predominance requirement not satisfied where the context of class 

members’ interactions with the defendant was sufficiently varied to require 

individual evaluation of whether express consent was provided). The Court 

previously addressed this concern in certifying a California-only class by adopting 

Plaintiff’s suggestion to exclude cell phone numbers that belonged to loan 

applicants—i.e., customers of Defendant’s short-term loan business. (ECF No. 75 at 

14:21–15:12.) Because the parties have also excluded cell phone numbers belonging 

to loan applicants in the expanded Settlement Class, this concern is similarly 

addressed here. Accordingly, the Court finds the predominance requirement is met. 

Superiority

“Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that a class action is ‘superior to other 

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.’” Otsuka, 

251 F.R.D. at 448 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). “Where classwide litigation of 

common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote greater efficiency, a class 

action may be superior to other methods of litigation,” and it is superior “if no 

realistic alternative exists.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234–

35 (9th Cir. 1996). The following factors are pertinent to this analysis:

(A) the class members’ interest in individually controlling the prosecution or 

defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 

begun by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 

claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

//

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A class action is a superior method for adjudicating the claims presented in 

this case because of the relatively low value of the average class member’s potential 

action against Defendant. The TCPA provides for $500 or the actual monetary loss 

in damages for each violation and treble damages for each willful or knowing 

violation. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The cost a Settlement Class Member would have to 

incur to bring an individual action against Defendant very likely outweighs the 

prospective recovery of the class member. This disparity between litigation costs and 

prospective recovery provides “the most compelling rationale for finding superiority 

in a class action.” Smith v. Microsoft Corp., 297 F.R.D. 464, 468–69 (S.D. Cal. 2014) 

(quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996)). Moreover, 

the Court is unaware of any other litigation regarding the claims at issue involving 

Defendant and the parties agree it is desirable to resolve the class members’ claims 

in this forum. Thus, the superiority requirement is satisfied. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court provisionally finds the prerequisites for a 

class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been met for 

the Settlement Class. 

B. Preliminary Fairness Determination

Having certified the Settlement Class, the Court must next make a preliminary 

determination of whether the class-action settlement is “fair, reasonable, and 

adequate” pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2). “It is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than 

the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.” Hanlon, 

150 F.3d at 1026. A court may not “delete, modify or substitute certain provisions” 

of the settlement; rather, “[t]he settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.” Id.

Relevant factors to this determination include, among others: 

//

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the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and

likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class-action 

status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent 

of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience 

and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and 

the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

Id.; see also Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004).

Preliminary approval of a settlement and notice to the proposed class is 

appropriate if “the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, 

informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not 

improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the 

class, and falls within the range of possible approval.” In re Tableware Antitrust 

Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Here, the proposed Settlement complies with all of these requirements. The 

Court addresses the relevant factors in further detail below.

1. Strength of the Plaintiffs’Case and Risk of Further Litigation

“[T]he very essence of a settlement is compromise, ‘a yielding of absolutes 

and an abandoning of highest hopes.’” Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of 

the City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Cotton 

v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977)). As explained by the Supreme Court, 

“[n]aturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange 

for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they 

might have won had they proceeded with litigation.” United States v. Armour & Co., 

402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971).

Although each party here strongly believes in the merits of the party’s side of 

the case, the parties have agreed to settle the matter in light of the risks to both sides 

in continuing this matter through trial. (See Settlement Agreement Recitals D–F; 

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Kazerounian Decl. ¶¶ 11–12.) Plaintiff and Class Counsel in particular recognize 

prosecuting this matter “through trial would be protracted, burdensome, and 

expensive.” (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 11.) One court, in discussing a large proposed 

settlement in a TCPA action at length, adopted a report concluding that “the average 

TCPA case carries a 43% chance of success.” In re Capital One Tel. Consumer Prot. 

Act Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 781, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Plaintiff and the class members 

would similarly face a substantial risk of being unsuccessful at trial here. Moreover, 

preparing this matter for trial would indeed be burdensome and expensive. Thus, the 

Court agrees with the parties that the proposed Settlement eliminates litigation risks 

and ensures that the Settlement Class Members receive some compensation for their 

claims, and this factor weighs in favor of approving the Settlement. 

2. Amount of the Proposed Settlement

The Settlement provides for a Settlement Fund of $1,500,000. (Settlement 

Agreement § 4.1.) Offsetting this amount are anticipated notice and claims 

administration expenses in the amount of $181,695; an incentive award up to $5,000; 

litigation costs up to $50,000; and attorneys’ fees up to $450,000. (Id. §§ 6–8.) The 

parties estimate three percent of the Settlement Class Members will submit a valid 

claim to the Claims Administrator. (ECF No. 102-1 at 12:22, fn. 4.) Assuming the 

anticipated expenses are incurred and the claims participation rate is correct, each 

Settlement Class Member who submits a claim will receive approximately $868 from 

the Settlement Fund. (Id.) 

Although the TCPA provides for statutory damages of only $500 for each

negligent violation and $1,500 for each willful violation, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3),

Defendant potentially contacted many of the 31,230 Settlement Class Members in 

violation of the TCPA multiple times. Plaintiff, as an example, alleges he received 

approximately twelve calls from Defendant. (FAC ¶ 16.) Thus, given the potential 

for numerous violations per Settlement Class Member, the amount of the Settlement 

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Fund is only a small percentage of the potential recovery that might be available to 

the class at trial. Yet, “[t]he fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a 

fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed 

settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved.” Linney v. Cellular 

Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Moreover, in comparing the Settlement to settlements approved in 

comparable cases, the amount of the Settlement Fund appears appropriate in light of 

the claims rate anticipated by the parties. (See ECF No. 102-6 (containing matrix of 

TCPA class action cases with information regarding class size, settlement amount, 

and claims rates)). Therefore, under the circumstances, the Court concludes that the 

amount offered in the Settlement weighs in favor of preliminary approval. 

3. Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of the Proceedings

The Court assesses the stage of proceedings and the amount of discovery 

completed to ensure the parties have an adequate appreciation of the merits of the 

case before reaching a settlement. See Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 371 

(E.D. Cal. 2014) (“A settlement that occurs in an advanced stage of the proceedings 

indicates that the parties carefully investigated the claims before reaching a 

resolution.”). So long as the parties have “sufficient information to make an informed 

decision about settlement,” this factor will weigh in favor of approval. Linney v. 

Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998); see also In re Mego 

Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

combination of investigation, discovery, and research conducted prior to settlement 

can provide sufficient information for class counsel to make an informed decision 

about settlement).

The advanced stage of the proceedings in this case also weighs significantly in 

favor of approval of the Settlement. The parties engaged in pre-certification 

discovery and litigated a number of discovery issues. (See Order on Discovery 

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Disputes, ECF No. 21.) Thereafter, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for class 

certification of a California-only class. (ECF No. 75.) Defendant sought 

reconsideration of the Court’s decision, but Defendant’s request was denied. (ECF 

Nos. 78, 89.) Defendant also unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal the class 

certification order. (ECF No. 92.)

Following certification of a California-only class, Plaintiff conducted 

additional discovery. (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 5.) The parties also attended an all-day 

mediation presided over by the Honorable Leo S. Wagner (Ret.) and a part-day 

mediation with the Honorable Leo S. Papas (Ret.). (Id. ¶ 6; see also Settlement 

Agreement Recital D.) With the guidance of Judge Papas, the parties ultimately 

reached the Settlement. (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 6.) Given the discovery conducted, the 

stage of the proceedings, and the evidence of significant arms-length negotiations 

following certification of a California-only class, the Court concludes that this factor 

weighs significantly in favor of preliminary approval of the Settlement. 

4. Experience and Views of Counsel

As mentioned above, Class Counsel have significant experience in handling 

class actions. (Kazerounian Decl. ¶¶ 13–26; Swigart Decl. ¶¶ 6–11; Friedman Decl. 

¶¶ 4–9.) For example, one of Class Counsel has been involved in at least twenty-two 

TCPA class actions. (Swigart Decl. ¶ 8.) As for their opinions of the Settlement, Class 

Counsel believe the Settlement is desirable, fair, and beneficial to the Settlement 

Class. (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 11.) “The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should 

be given a presumption of reasonableness.” Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 

622 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Accordingly, giving the appropriate weight to Class Counsel’s 

recommendation, the Court concludes that this factor also weighs in favor of 

approval.

//

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5. Reaction of the Class to the Settlement

Plaintiff, aside from his own view, provides no evidence regarding any 

putative Settlement Class Members’ reactions to the proposed settlement—

presumably because no other class members have been informed of the proposed 

Settlement. The proposed Mail Notice, Website Notice, and Publication Notice 

provide instructions as to how class members may object to the Settlement, contact 

the Court regarding the Settlement, and request to appear at the Fairness Hearing. 

(Settlement Agreement Exs. A–C.) Accordingly, the Court will further consider this 

factor at the Fairness Hearing before granting final approval of the Settlement.

On balance, the Court finds the Settlement falls within the range of 

reasonableness meriting possible final approval. The Court therefore preliminarily 

approves the Settlement and the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement 

Agreement, subject to further consideration at the Fairness Hearing.

C. Proposed Class Notice

Under Rule 23(c)(2)(B), “the court must direct to class members the best notice 

that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 

members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(c)(2)(B). 

The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood 

language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class 

certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class 

member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so 

desires; (v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who 

requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; 

and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 

23(c)(3).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)(2)(B). “[T]he mechanics of the notice process are left to the 

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discretion of the court subject only to the broad ‘reasonableness’ standards imposed 

by due process.” Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 120 (8th Cir. 

1975).

Here, the proposed notices describe the litigation, the terms of the Settlement, 

and each class member’s rights and options under the Settlement. (Settlement 

Agreement Exs. A–C.) As outlined above, the Claims Administrator will distribute 

the Mail Notice and establish the Settlement Website containing the Website Notice. 

(Id. §§ 9.1, 9.2.) A Publication Notice will also be disseminated. (Id. § 9.3.) All of 

the notices state the deadlines for opting out or objecting to the Settlement, and the 

Mail Notice and Publication Notice direct class members to the Settlement Website 

for additional information. (Id.) The Settlement Administrator will also operate a tollfree telephone number for Settlement Class Members to call for more information 

about the Settlement. (Id. § 9.4.)

Having reviewed the proposed class notices, the Court finds that the methods 

and contents of the notices comply with due process and Rule 23, are the best notice 

practicable under the circumstances, and shall constitute due and sufficient notice to 

all persons entitled to notice of the Settlement. Therefore, the Court approves the 

form and content of the proposed notices to be provided to the Settlement Class 

Members as set forth in Section 9 of the Settlement Agreement and Exhibits A 

through C to the Settlement Agreement. 

II. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Preliminary Approval of Nationwide Class Action Settlement and Certification of 

Settlement Class (ECF No. 102). Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS the 

following:

(1) Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court 

hereby conditionally certifies the following class for settlement purposes only: 

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All persons or entities within the United States whose 10-digit cellular 

telephone numbers were listed by an account holder in the Employment 

and/or Contacts fields, but were not listed in the Personal fields, of a 

customer loan application produced to Defendant, and who were called 

by Defendant using an ATDS and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice 

for the purpose of collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt 

from the account holder, between August 13, 2008 and August 13, 2012.

(2) The Court hereby appoints Plaintiff as Class Representative of the

Settlement Class.

(3) The Court hereby appoints Joshua B. Swigart of Hyde & Swigart, Abbas 

Kazerounian of Kazerouni Law Group, APC, and Todd M. Friedman of The Law 

Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C as Class Counsel to represent the Settlement Class.

(4) The Court hereby preliminarily approves the Settlement Agreement and 

the terms and conditions of the Settlement set forth therein, subject to further 

consideration at the Fairness Hearing.

(5) The Court will hold a Fairness Hearing on Monday, November 7, 2016, 

at 10:30 a.m., in the Courtroom of the Honorable Cynthia Bashant, United States 

District Court for the Southern District of California, Courtroom 4B (4th Floor -

Schwartz), 221 West Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101, for the following purposes:

(a) finally determining whether the Settlement Class meets all 

applicable requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus, 

whether the claims of the Settlement Class should be certified for purposes of 

effectuating the Settlement; determining whether the proposed Settlement of the 

action on the terms and conditions provided for in the Settlement Agreement is fair, 

reasonable, and adequate and should be approved by the Court;

(b) considering any motion of Class Counsel for an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs;

(c) considering the motion of the Plaintiff for a service award, if any;

(d) considering whether the Court should enter the [Proposed] Final 

Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice;

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(e) considering whether the releases by the Settlement Class 

Members as set forth in the Settlement Agreement should be provided; and

(f) ruling upon such other matters as the Court may deem just and 

appropriate.

(6) The Court may adjourn the Fairness Hearing and later reconvene such 

hearing without further notice to the Settlement Class Members.

(7) Any motion in support of the Settlement and any motion for an award 

of attorneys’ fees and costs or Plaintiff’s service award, if any, must be filed with the 

Court no later than August 15, 2016. Any opposition must be filed no later than 

fourteen days after the motion is filed, and any reply must be filed no later than 

twenty-eight days after the motion is filed.

(8) The Court appoints Kurtzman Carlson Consultants (“KCC”) to serve as 

the Claims Administrator for the Settlement. 

(9) The Claims Administrator shall carry out all duties set forth in the 

Settlement Agreement in the manner provided in the Settlement Agreement.

(10) The costs and expenses related to claims administration shall be paid 

from the Settlement Fund in accordance with the applicable provisions of the 

Settlement Agreement. 

(11) All Settlement Class Members shall be bound by all determinations and 

judgments in this action concerning the Settlement, whether favorable or unfavorable 

to the Settlement Class.

(12) Any Settlement Class Member may enter an appearance in this action, 

at his or her own expense, individually or through counsel. All Settlement Class 

Members who do not enter an appearance will be represented by Class Counsel.

(13) Any person—including any entity via its authorized representative

when applicable throughout this Order—falling within the definition of the 

Settlement Class may, upon request, be excluded from the Settlement Class. This 

procedure is also referred to as “opting out” of the Settlement Class. Any person 

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wishing to be excluded from the Settlement Class must submit a written “Exclusion 

Request” to the Claims Administrator postmarked or delivered no later than 130 

calendar days after the date of entry of this Order (“Exclusion Deadline”). The 

Exclusion Request must include: (a) the name of this case and its number: Stemple v. 

QC Holdings, Inc., Case No. 3:12-cv-01997-BAS(WVG) (S.D. Cal.); (b) the 

person’s name; (c) the person’s address; (d) the person’s telephone number; (e) the 

person’s signature; and (f) a statement that the person is a class member and that he 

or she wishes to be excluded from the Settlement. Exclusion Requests purportedly 

filed on behalf of groups of persons are prohibited and will be deemed to be void. An 

Exclusion Request must be written and may not be asked for telephonically or by 

email. 

(14) Any class member who does not send a completed, signed Exclusion 

Request with the information listed in Paragraph 13 above to the Claims 

Administrator postmarked or delivered on or before the Exclusion Deadline will be 

deemed to be a Settlement Class Member for all purposes and will be bound by all 

further orders of the Court in this Action and by the terms of the Settlement, if finally 

approved by the Court. All persons who submit valid and timely Exclusion Requests 

in the manner set forth in this Paragraph and Paragraph 13 above shall have no rights 

under the Settlement and shall not be bound by the Settlement Agreement or the Final 

Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice approving the Settlement, if issued.

(15) No later than fourteen calendar days after the Exclusion Deadline, the 

Claims Administrator shall cause to be filed with the Court a list reflecting all

Exclusion Requests.

(16) Any Settlement Class Member who desires to object either to the 

Settlement, the award of Class Counsel’s fees and costs, or Plaintiff’s service award, 

if any, must timely file with the Clerk of this Court and timely serve on the parties’ 

counsel identified below by hand or first-class mail a notice of the objection(s) and 

proof of membership in the Settlement Class and the grounds for such objections, 

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together with all papers that the Settlement Class Member desires to submit to the 

Court no later than the deadline as set forth in the class notices, which is 130 calendar 

days after the date of entry of this Order (“Objection Deadline”). Settlement Class 

Members may not both object and request exclusion from the Settlement. If a 

Settlement Class Member submits both an Exclusion Request and an objection, the 

Exclusion Request will be controlling. To be considered by the Court, the objection 

must also contain all of the information listed in Paragraph 17 below. The Court will 

consider such objection(s) and papers only if such papers are received on or before 

the Objection Deadline by the Clerk of the Court and by Class Counsel and 

Defendant’s counsel. Such papers must be sent to each of the following persons:

U.S. District Court

Southern District of California

Office of the Clerk

333 West Broadway, Suite 420

San Diego, CA 92101

HYDE & SWIGART

Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.

2221 Camino Del Rio South

Suite 101

San Diego, CA 92108

SHOOK HARDY & BACON LLP

Rebecca J. Schwartz, Esq.

2555 Grand. Blvd.

Kansas City, MO 64108

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(17) All objections must include: (a) the name of this case and its number: 

Stemple v. QC Holdings, Inc., Case No. 3:12-cv-01997-BAS(WVG) (S.D. Cal.); (b) 

the objector’s full name, telephone number, and address; (c) if represented by 

counsel, the full name, telephone number, and address of all counsel; (d) all of the 

reasons for his or her objection; (e) whether the objector intends to appear at the 

Fairness Hearing on his or her own behalf or through counsel; (f) a statement that the 

objector is a class member; and (g) the objector’s signature. Any documents 

supporting the objection must also be attached to the objection. If any testimony is to 

be given in support of the objection, the names of all persons who will testify must 

be set forth in the objection.

(18) All objections must be filed with the Clerk and served on the parties’ 

counsel no later than the Objection Deadline. Objections that do not contain all 

required information or are received after the Objection Deadline will not be 

considered at the Fairness Hearing. 

(19) Attendance at the Fairness Hearing is not necessary; however, any 

Settlement Class Member wishing to be heard orally with respect to approval of the 

Settlement, the motion for an award of Class Counsel’s fees and costs, or the motion 

for Plaintiff’s service award, if any, is required to provide written notice of his or her 

intention to appear at the Fairness Hearing no later than the Objection Deadline by 

filing a “Notice of Intention to Appear.” The Notice of Intention to Appear must 

include the Settlement Class Member’s name, address, telephone number, and 

signature and must be filed and served as described in Paragraph 16 of this Order. 

Settlement Class Members who do not oppose the Settlement, the motion for an 

award of Class Counsel’s fees and costs, or the motion for Plaintiff’s service award, 

if any, need not take any action to indicate their approval. A person’s failure to submit 

a written objection in accordance with the Objection Deadline and the procedure set 

forth in the class notices waives any right the person may have to object to the 

Settlement, the award of Class Counsel’s fees and costs, or Plaintiff’s service award, 

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if any, or to appeal or seek other review of, if issued, the Final Judgment and Order 

of Dismissal with Prejudice approving the Settlement.

(20) The parties are ordered to carry out the Settlement Agreement in the 

manner provided in the Settlement Agreement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2016

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