Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02870/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02870-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

TPnth C'ir1"'1it 

AUG 1 0 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 

I NSURANCE CORPORATION, 

a s receiver for Liberty 

Federal Savings Bank, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

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WILLIAM MICHAEL FURMAN, JOHN ) 

FURMAN; MICHAEL SCOTT FURMAN; ) 

WI LLIAM STRAUGHN; MATTHEW ) 

BLEVINS; PHILIP M. POZDERAC, ) 

Defendants, 

RENE A. HARRIS, 

Defendant-Intervenor, 

and 

J AMES G. WILLIAMS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 88-2870 

(D.C. No. CV-88-1224-JC) 

(D.N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Be f ore LOGAN, SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

* This order and judgment has no precedent i al value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a). 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

s ubmitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 88-2870 Document: 01019974704 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 1 
In October 1988, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank 

Board) appointed the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to act as the receiver for Liberty Federal Savings 

Bank (Liberty) in Raton, New Mexico, directing FSLIC to liquidate 

Liberty in an orderly manner. The Bank Board authorized FSLIC "to 

t ake prompt possession of the books, records, property, and assets 

o f every kind and description of [Liberty]." Bank Board Resolut ion No. 88-1099P, see Brief of Appellee, Exhibit l(A) at 6-7. On 

October 7, 1988, FSLIC took possession of Liberty's books, 

r ecords, property, and other assets. 

FSLIC claimed to have received information that the 

d efendants at the district court, former officers and directors of 

Liberty and others involved in business transactions with Liberty, 

i ncluding the appellant, had removed certain documents and assets 

from the premises of Miracle Mountain, Inc., a wholly-owned 

s ubsidiary of Liberty. FSLIC filed a complaint on October 8, 

19 88, alleging the removal and destruction of materials properly 

within the scope of FSLIC's custody as receiver, and requesting 

t hat the defendants "be ordered to surrender forthwith all 

documents and equipment of Liberty." See Brief of Appellee, 

Exhibit 1 at 1-2. In an order filed the same day, the district 

court directed the U.S. Marshal to take custody of the records to 

pr event their destruction. The court further ordered that a hearing be held on October 14, 1988, "to hear any disputed claims of 

ownership." Id. at Exhibit 2. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2870 Document: 01019974704 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 2 
On October 10, 1988, pursuant to appellant's request, the 

trial court modified its previous order to allow for a review and 

removal of certain documents. On October 17, 1988, the appellant 

and other defendants, appearing with counsel before the trial 

court, agreed to the provisions of an order, filed the next day, 

establishing a procedure for the determination of ownership of the 

records in question. See Brief of Appellee, Exhibit 3. This 

order also denied appellant's motion to vacate the trial court's 

October 8, 1988, order. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from 

this denial. Because an appeal would lie from the October 18 

order only if the October 8 order were appealable, we consider the 

appealability of the October 8 order. According to defendantappellant James G. Williams, the district court's order of October 

8, 1988, is reviewable as a final order according to 28 U.S.C. § 

12 91, or as an injunction or temporary restraining order issued 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 64 or 65, therefore reviewable under 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l). 1 On February 14, 1989, this court issued 

1 28 U.S.C. § 1292 states: 

(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of 

this section, the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: 

(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of 

the United States, the United States District Court 

for the District of the Canal Zone, the District 

Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin 

Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting, 

continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving 

injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify 

injunctions, except where a direct review may be had 

in the Supreme Court; 

(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or 

refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take 

steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 88-2870 Document: 01019974704 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 3 
an order considering this case for summary disposition under 10th 

Cir. R. 27.2.2, ordering the parties to brief the issue of whether 

the October 18, 1988, order appealed from was in fact an appealable order. Because the authorities are consistent that the 

October 8 order is neither final nor an appealable injunction, we 

now dismiss the appeal. 

The October 8 order did not finally resolve the parties' 

rights to Miracle Mountain's assets, and it therefore does not 

represent a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Federal Trade 

Comm'n v. Overseas Unlimited Agency, Inc., 873 F.2d 1233, 1234-35 

(9th Cir. 1989); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. American 

Principals Holdings, Inc., 817 F.2d 1349, 1350 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(order directing partnerships to make payment to receiver not 

fi nal while receivership proceedings are continuing). Further, "a 

simple 'turnover' order made pursuant to a previously unappealed 

orde r appointing a receiver does not constitute an 'injunction' 

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l)." Overseas 

Unlimited, 873 F.2d at 1235; see Waylyn v. Casalduc, 219 F.2d 888, 

890 (1st Cir. 1955) (same); see also United States v. Chelsea Towers, Inc., 404 F.2d 329, 330 (3d Cir. 1968) ("order requiring the 

deli very of certain deposits to the receiver is neither final nor 

within any category of appealable interlocutory orders"). The 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

directing sales or other disposals of property; 

(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts 

of the judges thereof determining the rights and 

liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in 

which appeals from final decrees are allowed. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2870 Document: 01019974704 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 4 
. . 

order of the district court constitutes an analogous "turnover" 

order, and as such, the October 18 order denying the motion to 

vacate the October 8 order is unappealable under 28 U.S.C. § 

1 292(a) (1). 

Based on the foregoing, we DISMISS the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction. 

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Ente r ed for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2870 Document: 01019974704 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 5