Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06391/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06391-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

PUBLISH Umtldltatill CoGrt of ...... Ttnth otroutt. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP Q 7 1990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

CRYSCO OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., ) 

an Oklahoma corporation, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

HUTCHISON-HAYES INTERNATIONAL, ) 

INC., a Texas corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6391 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-0052-W) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

J. William Conger and Laura Haag McConnell of Hartzog, Conger, 

Cason & Hargis, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Gary L. Blevins of Stagner & Blevins Associates, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

Appellate Case: 89-6391 Document: 01019708235 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 1 
34(a). lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

I. Facts 

Defendant supplied plaintiff with machinery known as shale 

shakers for use in the oil well servicing business. The shale 

shakers did not work properly. Plaintiff sued defendant for 

breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 

and for violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, 15 

Okla. Stat.§§ 752-63 (1981). 

At trial, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the 

implied warranty claim after plaintiff had presented its case in 

chief. The district court denied the motion. On September 22, 

1989, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the 

implied warranty claim. Defendant now appeals the trial court's 

entry of judgment on the jury's verdict. Defendant claims that 

the trial court wrongfully denied its motion for a directed verdict at trial. We believe that a directed verdict was appropriate. Therefore, we reverse the case and remand to the district 

court. 

II. Discussion 

In order to reverse the trial court's decision on a motion 

for directed verdict we must find that "the evidence points but 

one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting 

the party [opposing the motion]; we must construe the evidence and 

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.. 

inferences most favorably to the nonmoving party." Zimmerman v. 

First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1051 (lOth Cir. 

1988). We believe that this high standard is met in this case. 

The facts are essentially undisputed by the parties. The real 

issue is whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law in 

application to these facts. We believe that the trial court 

incorrectly interpreted the law. 

Plaintiff's claim for an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose is based on the Oklahoma statute adopting section 

2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason 

to know any particular purpose for which the goods are 

required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's 

skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, 

there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for 

such purpose. 

12A Okla. Stat. § 2-315 (1981). Oklahoma's adoption of the exact 

language of the UCC creates two separate requirements for a claim 

to arise under this section. First, the seller must know that the 

goods will be used for a "particular purpose." Second, the buyer 

must rely on the skill or judgment of the seller in selecting 

suitable goods. See American Fertilizer Specialists, Inc. v. 

Wood, 635 P.2d 592, 595 (Okla. 1981); Collins Radio Co. of Dallas 

v. Bell, 623 P.2d 1039, 1054 (Ct. App. Okla. 1980); Jackson v. 

Glasgow, 622 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Ct. App. Okla. 1980). We do not 

reach the second requirement because we hold that plaintiff did 

not use the shale shakers for a "particular purpose" as required 

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by section 2-315. 

The record indicates that the shale shakers were manufactured 

to be used in oil fields in precisely the manner used by plaintiff. We hold that the use of a good in the ordinary manner for 

which the good was manufactured does not satisfy section 2-315's 

requirement that the good be used for a "particular purpose." In 

a case in which we interpreted section 2-315, as adopted by 

Colorado, we pointed out that "[t]he statute distinguishes between 

an ordinary purpose giving rise to an implied warranty of 

merchantability and a particular purpose giving rise to an implied 

warranty of fitness for a particular purpose." Weir v. Federal 

Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1387, 1393 (lOth Cir. 1987). In Weir, the 

plaintiffs purchased a clothes dryer and used it for drying 

clothes. We held: 

The jury in the present case was instructed that drying 

clothes could serve as the particular purpose that the 

Weirs had in mind in selecting the clothes dryer. It is 

obvious, however, that drying clothes is only the 

ordinary purpose of a clothes dryer •... Thus, the 

district judge erred in instructing the jury that drying 

clothes could be the "particular purpose" necessary to 

establish an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 

Id. at 1393. 

Thus, we have interpreted UCC section 2-315 to require a particular purpose as opposed to any ordinary purpose. This interpretation is supported by many other courts and by the leading 

commentators in this field. As White and Summers explain: 

Recently some courts have held that the 2-315 warranty 

as to fitness for a particular purpose may arise when 

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the buyer's "specific use" is the same as the "general 

use" to which the goods under contract are usually put. 

We are wary of such cases. They apparently enlarge the 

scope of the 2-315 warranty beyond the intent of the 

drafters. 

1 J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 9-10 at 481 n.1 

(3d ed. 1988) (citations omitted). White and Summers then go on 

to cite a string of cases adopting the view that section 2-315 

does not apply where the buyer's "specific use" coincides with the 

"general use" of the goods. Id. We point out two cases clearly 

adopting this view. See Intern. Petrol. Serv., Inc. v. S & N Well 

Serv., 639 P.2d 29, 37 (Kan. 1982); Duford v. Sears, Roebuck and 

Co., 833 F.2d 407, 413 (1st Cir. 1987). 1 

Having reviewed the Oklahoma cases in this area, we conclude 

that Oklahoma follows the position discussed above. For example, 

in American Fertilizer Specialists, Inc. v. Wood, 635 P.2d 592 

(Okla. 1981), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma considered a case 

involving a sale of fertilizer. In Wood, the seller contacted the 

buyer and suggested a new fertilizer mix for use on the buyer's 

pasture land. When the fertilizer failed to work, the buyer sued 

asserting implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for 

particular purpose. See Wood, 635 P.2d at 594-95. 

1 Plaintiff rented the shale shakers to its customers. 

Plaintiff might argue that rental of the shakers was a 

sufficiently particular purpose to fall within section 2-315. 

However, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit's holding that leasing 

as opposed to selling is not a particular purpose under section 2-

315. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 

F.2d 1092, 1100 (11th Cir. 1983). 

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In considering the buyer's warranty claims, the Wood court 

clearly recognized a distinction between the two implied 

warranties. Indeed, the court quoted the language of the comment 

to UCC section 2-315 regarding what is a "particular purpose." 2 

See id. at 595 n.B. Having considered carefully the UCC language, 

the court pointed out that the seller knew of the particular 

purpose for the fertilizer and that the buyer had relied on the 

seller's skill in selecting a proper mix. Id. at 595. 

Accordingly, the court held that under those facts "there was 

competent evidence reasonably tending to support the trial court's 

conclusion, and to support the judgment in favor of [the buyer] on 

the ground of breach of implied warranty under both § 2-314 and 

. § 2-315 of 12A 0 . S . 19 7 1. " I d . at 59 4 . 

Based on its decision in Wood, we believe the Oklahoma courts 

follow our interpretation of section 2-315. The court focused 

specifically on the fact that the seller was aware of the· 

2 Comment 2 following section 2-315 states: 

A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary 

purpose for which the goods are used in that it 

envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar 

to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary 

purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in 

the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are 

customarily made of the goods in question. For example, 

shoes are generally used for the purpose of walking upon 

ordinary ground, but a seller may know that a particular 

pair was selected to be used for climbing mountains. 

A contract may of course include both a warranty of 

merchantability and one of fitness for a particular 

purpose. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 2-315, comment 2 (1981). 

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particular purpose for which the fertilizer would be used. We do 

not believe such evidence would have been critical unless the 

court was following our interpretation of section 2-315. 

We acknowledge the similarity between our case and the facts 

of Wood. One critical distinction, however, mandates a different 

result in this case. Unlike the fertilizer in Wood, which can 

have many formulations for various purposes, the shale shakers 

involved here have only one possible use. Consequently, we must 

conclude that while the fertilizer involved in Wood was for a 

particular use, the shale shakers here were purchased for their 

ordinary use. 

Plaintiff cites two additional Oklahoma cases that are also 

distinguishable. In Larrance Tank Corp. v. Burrough, 476 P.2d 346 

(Okla. 1970), the defendant provided underground tanks to plaintiff for the storage of gas. The court upheld the plaintiff's 

subsequent claim under section 2-315. However, unlike this case, 

it is likely that the tanks could have been used for a variety of 

purposes and that the defendant was well aware that the tanks 

would be used for the particular purpose of holding gas. 

Moreover, the case does not clearly adopt an interpretation of 

section 2-315 contrary to our own reading of Wood. Plaintiff also 

cites Old Albany Estates v. Highland Carpet Mills, 604 P.2d 849 

(Okla. 1980). In Old Albany the defendant provided carpet to the 

plaintiff knowing that it would be used in an apartment building. 

When the carpet wore out prematurely, the plaintiff sued under 

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section 2-315. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the plaintiff 

was entitled to damages under section 2-315. In Old Albany the 

defendant knew that a higher grade of carpet was necessary because 

of the plaintiff's particular use. As discussed above, however, 

the shale shakers in this case were not used in an unusual or 

"particular" manner. 

III. Conclusion 

We interpret Oklahoma's adoption of section 2-315 of the UCC 

in conformity with our prior interpretation of the same section 

adopted in Colorado. We hold that section 2-315 requires a 

particular purpose or use separate from the general or ordinary 

use of the product. The record before us indicates that plaintiff 

used the shale shakers in the normal, general manner that the 

shakers were typically used. We hold that such use does not fall 

under section 2-315. Thus, plaintiff has made no claim under 

section 2-315, and the trial court's failure to grant a directed 

verdict must be reversed. 

We REVERSE the trial court's judgment in this case and REMAND 

to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

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