Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-06347/USCOURTS-ca4-07-06347-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LEE O. WILSON, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GENE JOHNSON, Director of

Department of Corrections; DORIS  No. 07-6347

EWING, Court and Legal Supervisor;

EDWARD MEEKS, Superintendent

Cold Springs Work Center,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(1:07-cv-00165-LMB)

Argued: March 18, 2008

Decided: July 25, 2008

Before MICHAEL and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and

David R. HANSEN, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote

the opinion, in which Judge Michael joined. Senior Judge Hansen

wrote a dissenting opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Katherine Crawford, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL

OF LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Stephen R.

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 1 of 14
McCullough, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Erwin

Chemerinsky, James E. Coleman, Jr.; Students Sachin Bansal, Virginia Duke, Catherine Tucker, Kish Vinayagamoorthy, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for

Appellant. Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General of Virginia, William E. Thro, State Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

OPINION

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

The Appellant, Lee O. Wilson, Jr., ("Wilson") appeals the district

court’s decision to dismiss his 42 U.S.C. § 19831 action against the

Virginia Department of Corrections. Wilson claims that he is entitled

to monetary damages for unconstitutional imprisonment because Virginia improperly extended the length of his prison sentence. The district court, citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), dismissed Wilson’s wrongful incarceration claim sua sponte stating that a "§ 1983 damages

claim for unconstitutional imprisonment is not appropriate unless and

until plaintiff’s conviction or sentence ‘has been reversed on direct

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by

a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254.’" (J.A. 14.) This mandate is referred to as the "favorable termination" requirement.

Wilson contends that his § 1983 action is proper because success

on that claim will not impugn his underlying conviction or sentence.

1Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 

2 WILSON v. JOHNSON

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 2 of 14
Assuming, as we must, that Wilson’s well-pleaded allegations are

true, we agree that his claim is viable and as such, the district court’s

decision is reversed and remanded.

I.

Wilson was arrested on March 24, 2005, for grand larceny of a

motor vehicle. On July 26, 2005, he pled guilty to the lesser charge

of being an accessory after the fact. Consistent with Wilson’s plea

agreement, the Virginia state court sentenced him to twelve months

imprisonment, six months of which was suspended due to time

served. According to the Virginia Department of Corrections’

("VDOC") Uniform Commitment Report, Wilson’s release date was

April 21, 2006. (J.A. 6.) However, on March 15, 2006, the VDOC

changed Wilson’s release date to July 17, 2006. Wilson filed grievances with the prison administration disputing his additional imprisonment. The VDOC did not initiate any formal administrative

proceedings to resolve Wilson’s complaint. After Wilson was

released from prison,2 he sued, seeking monetary damages of

$105,000 for wrongful imprisonment. The district court dismissed

Wilson’s claim without prejudice, holding that Heck’s favorable termination requirement barred his § 1983 claim and stating that Wilson

"may resubmit his claims to this Court in a [habeas petition]." (J.A.

15.) Wilson appeals.

2After his release, Wilson was imprisoned again on an unrelated

charge. During this imprisonment, Wilson filed this § 1983 claim along

with a habeas claim. In the habeas petition, Wilson argued, inter alia,

that the VDOC improperly extended his accessory after the fact sentence.

The Virginia Circuit Court dismissed Wilson’s habeas petition, finding

that the VDOC properly calculated Wilson’s sentence. The Virginia

Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The VDOC argued in

a motion to stay prior to oral argument, and in a motion to dismiss after

oral argument, that the Virginia Circuit Court’s decision resolved the

underlying factual issue in this case, thus mooting Wilson’s claim.

Because the issue before us is limited to the legal question of whether

Wilson’s § 1983 claim is cognizable, we leave the issue of whether the

Virginia Circuit Court’s decision moots Wilson’s claim for the district

court to determine on remand. As such, the VDOC’s motion to dismiss

is denied. 

WILSON v. JOHNSON 3

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 3 of 14
II.

The VDOC contends that Wilson’s § 1983 claim is not cognizable

because: (1) Wilson failed to satisfy Heck’s favorable termination

requirement prior to filing his claim, and (2) even if Heck did not bar

Wilson’s claim, because the VDOC properly calculated his sentence,

Wilson’s claim is moot.3 Wilson argues that a § 1983 action is the

proper vehicle to bring his wrongful imprisonment claim because a

habeas action would have been inappropriate as he does not seek

release from custody. Thus, whether Wilson’s § 1983 claim for

wrongful imprisonment, filed after his sentence expired, is cognizable, is the sole issue before this Court. We review the district court’s

decision to dismiss Wilson’s claim due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a question of law, de novo, see e.g., Church v. Attorney General of Com. of Va., 125 F.3d 210, 215 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1997), taking

all of his allegations "in the light most favorable to [him]." Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Although the convergence of habeas and § 1983 actions has been

addressed by the Supreme Court on several occasions, as the VDOC

admits, it has sent "mixed signals" as to when an inmate or former

inmate can pursue a § 1983 claim. (Appellee’s Br. 4.) In Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), a group of state prisoners filed a

§ 1983 action alleging that the New York State Department of Correctional Services’ denial of good-time credits violated their constitutional right to due process. The prisoners sought an injunction to force

the prison to restore the credits, a remedy which would have reduced

the prisoners’ sentences. Despite the "literal applicability" of § 1983,

the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claim

because the prisoners’ "challenge is just as close to the core of habeas

corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s conviction, for it goes directly

to the constitutionality of his physical confinement itself and seeks

either immediate release from that confinement or the shortening of

its duration." Id. at 489. Because the plaintiffs "sought no [monetary]

damages, but only equitable relief-restoration of their good-time credits," id. at 494, the Supreme Court expressly limited its holding to the

equitable relief sought by the prisoners.

3

See note 2, supra. 

4 WILSON v. JOHNSON

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 4 of 14
Subsequently, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), an

inmate filed a § 1983 class action on behalf of himself and other

inmates, alleging inter alia, that the disciplinary proceedings at the

Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex violated their due process

rights. Like the plaintiffs in Preiser, the prisoners complained that the

prison had improperly denied them good-time credits and sought

injunctive relief. The Wolff inmates, however, also sought damages.

In holding that Preiser precluded injunctive relief—i.e., the restoration of good-time credits, the Supreme Court confirmed the propriety

of the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim:

habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available remedy for

damages claims, which, if not frivolous and of sufficient

substance to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court,

could be pressed under § 1983 along with suits challenging

the conditions of confinement rather than the fact or length

of custody.

Id. at 554. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court

erred by not determining "the validity of the procedures employed for

imposing sanctions, including loss of good . . . [because] a declaratory

judgment as a predicate to a damages award would not be barred by

Preiser." Id. at 554-55.

Two decades after Wolff, the Supreme Court, in Heck, considered

a prisoner’s § 1983 claim seeking monetary damages from the state

because (1) state officers participated in an "unlawful, unreasonable,

and arbitrary investigation leading to [his] arrest," (2) state officers

"knowingly destroyed" exculpatory evidence, and (3) "an illegal and

unlawful voice identification procedure" was relied upon at trial.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Recognizing that Preiser provided an "unreliable, if not an unintelligible,

guide," id. at 482, as to whether a § 1983 claim for monetary damages

is proper when it fails to challenge the "lawfulness of conviction or

confinement," id. at 483, and concluding that Wolff "recognized a

§ 1983 claim for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the

wrong result (i.e., denying good-time credits)," id. at 482-483, the

Court analyzed the issue as a matter of first impression. After reiterating that § 1983 claims, unlike petitions for habeas corpus, do not

require administrative exhaustion, the Court held that when a plainWILSON v. JOHNSON 5

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 5 of 14
tiff’s claims challenge "the lawfulness of conviction or confinement,"

id. at 483, they are simply not "cognizable as § 1983 claims" id.,

because:

[w]e think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not

appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions

that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always

applied to actions for malicious prosecution.

Id. at 486 (emphasis added). Heck’s holding precludes a prisoner from

a collateral attack that may result in two inconsistent results—for

example, a valid criminal conviction and a valid civil judgment under

§ 1983 for monetary damages due to unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment.4 Although not essential to its holding, the Supreme

Court extended its analysis a step further by concluding that "the principle barring collateral attacks . . . is not rendered inapplicable by the

fortuity that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated." Id. at 489

n. 10.

Justice Souter’s concurrence in Heck, joined by three Justices, recognized that the majority opinion could be interpreted to "risk the

rights of those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas statute, individuals not ‘in custody’ for habeas purposes," id. at 500, thus

preventing them from accessing a federal forum.

If these individuals (people who were merely fined, for

example, or who have completed short terms of imprisonment, probation, or parole, or who discover (through no

fault of their own) a constitutional violation after full expiration of their sentences), like state prisoners, were required

to show the prior invalidation of their convictions or sentences in order to obtain § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, the result would be to

deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal

rights to those who cannot first obtain a favorable state rul4An additional reason for the rule is to preclude undue federal interference with states’ administration of justice. 

6 WILSON v. JOHNSON

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 6 of 14
ing. The reason, of course, is that individuals not in custody

cannot invoke federal habeas jurisdiction, the only statutory

mechanism besides § 1983 by which individuals may sue

state officials in federal court for violating federal rights.

That would be an untoward result.

Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent

a statutory edict to the contrary or a restriction within the common

law, the reach of § 1983 should not be compromised. Indeed, the

Court has given "full effect [to the language of § 1983 by] recognizing that § 1983 provides a remedy, to be broadly construed, against

all forms of official violation of federally protected rights." Id. at 502

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, we "[sh]ould

not cast doubt on the ability of an individual unaffected by the habeas

statute to take advantage of the broad reach of § 1983." Id. at 503.

Heck and its predecessors limited our inquiry to whether a prisoner’s § 1983 action, "even if successful," id. at 487, would compromise

the validity of his underlying sentence. Four years later, however, five

members of the Supreme Court found Heck’s "favorable termination"

requirement inapplicable to a released inmate’s § 1983 claim, since

this was the only avenue by which he could access a federal forum.

See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998). In Spencer, the defendant

filed a federal habeas claim averring that his due process rights were

violated because his parole was improperly revoked. The district court

dismissed the claim as moot because the defendant was released from

prison before the district court decided his habeas claim. The majority

opinion, written by Justice Scalia, who also authored the Court’s

opinion in Heck, affirmed the district court’s decision.

Justice Souter, joined by three other colleagues (O’Connor, Ginsburg,5

 and Breyer, JJ.), concurred with the reasoning of the majority

5

Justice Ginsburg, in addition to joining Justice Souter’s concurrence,

wrote a separate concurrence in which she stated, "I have come to agree

with Justice SOUTER’s reasoning: Individuals without recourse to the

habeas statute because they are not ‘in custody’ (people merely fined or

whose sentences have been fully served, for example) fit within § 1983’s

(‘broad reach.’" Id. at 21-22 (emphasis in original). 

WILSON v. JOHNSON 7

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 7 of 14
opinion, but more importantly, articulated an additional reason for

why the correct result was reached:

Now, as then, we are forced to recognize that any application of the favorable-termination requirement to § 1983 suits

brought by plaintiffs not in custody would produce a patent

anomaly: a given claim for relief from unconstitutional

injury would be placed beyond the scope of § 1983 if

brought by a convict free of custody (as, in this case, following service of a full term of imprisonment), when exactly

the same claim could be redressed if brought by a former

prisoner who had succeeded in cutting his custody short

through habeas.

The better view, then, is that a former prisoner, no longer ‘in

custody,’ may bring a § 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being

bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it

would be impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy.

Id. at 20-21. Justice Stevens dissented, agreeing with the four concurring judges that "[g]iven the Court’s holding that [Spencer] does not

have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice

SOUTER explains, that he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983." Id. at 25 n. 8 (emphasis in original).

Both parties readily recognize that the circuits are split on this

issue. Four circuits regard the five justice plurality in Spencer as

dicta, and continue to interpret Heck as barring individuals from filing

virtually all § 1983 claims unless the favorable termination requirement is met.6

 On the other hand, five circuits have held that the Spencer plurality’s view allows a plaintiff to obtain relief under § 1983

6

See e.g., Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1998); Randell

v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Entzi v. Redmann, 485

F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007); and Fuchs v. Mercer County, 260 Fed.

Appx. 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2008) but cf. Mendoza v. Meisel, 270 Fed.

Appx. 105, 107 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that "Heck does not bar a § 1983

claim where the plaintiff is unable to challenge his conditions of confinement through a petition for federal habeas corpus."). 

8 WILSON v. JOHNSON

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 8 of 14
when it is no longer possible to meet the favorable termination

requirement via a habeas action.7

As evidenced by the circuit split, the Supreme Court has yet to conclusively decide if a former inmate can file a § 1983 claim when his

habeas avenue to federal court has been foreclosed. See Muhammad

v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2004) (recognizing, without

deciding, that "[m]embers of the Court have expressed the view that

unavailability of habeas for other reasons may also dispense with the

Heck requirement.") Even the four judge concurrence in Spencer

admitted that Heck’s "favorable-termination requirement [can be

interpreted as] an element of any § 1983 action alleging unconstitutional conviction, whether or not leading to confinement and whether

or not any confinement continued when the § 1983 action was filed."

Spencer, 523 U.S. at 19.

Because Wilson’s § 1983 claim seeks damages for past confinement, he does not fall squarely within the holdings of Preiser, Wolff,

Heck or Spencer. Thus, while Supreme Court dicta in Heck and Spencer provides grist for circuits on both sides of this dilemma, we are

left with no directly applicable precedent upon which to rely. We

believe that the reasoning employed by the plurality in Spencer must

prevail in a case, like Wilson’s, where an individual would be left

without any access to federal court if his § 1983 claim was barred.

Indeed, the reach and intent of the habeas remedy would not be circumscribed by Wilson’s § 1983 claim since he filed it after the expiration of his sentence.8

 Additionally, the sweeping breadth, "high

7

See e.g., Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1999);

Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001); Nonette v. Small, 316

F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 2002); Harden v. Patake, 320 F.3d 1289, 1298

(11th Cir. 2003); and Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender

Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 2007) ("We are persuaded by the

logic of those circuits that have held that Heck’s favorable-termination

requirement cannot be imposed against § 1983 plaintiffs who lack a

habeas option for the vindication of their federal rights."). 

8While Wilson concedes that filing a petition for habeas corpus was

theoretically possible, he argues that complying with habeas’ administrative exhaustion requirement during the additional confinement was

impossible. The plaintiffs in Preiser and Wolff admittedly could have

WILSON v. JOHNSON 9

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 9 of 14
purposes," and "unique[ness]" of § 1983 would be compromised in an

unprincipled manner if it could not be applied here. Wilson v. Garcia,

471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985) (overruled on other grounds). If a prisoner

could not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief, and after release,

was prevented from filing a § 1983 claim, § 1983’s purpose of providing litigants with "a uniquely federal remedy against incursions

under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the

Constitution and laws of the Nations," id. at 271-272 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), would be severely imperiled. Barring Wilson’s claim would leave him without access to any judicial

forum in which to seek relief for his alleged wrongful imprisonment.

Quite simply, we do not believe that a habeas ineligible former prisoner seeking redress for denial of his most precious right — freedom

— should be left without access to a federal court.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district

court and remand it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

filed habeas claims. The fact that a prisoner could have filed a habeas is

an issue in which courts have taken a keen interest. For example, in Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.

2007), the Sixth Circuit held that "a § 1983 plaintiff is entitled to a Heck

exception if the plaintiff was precluded as a matter of law from seeking

habeas redress, but not entitled to such an exception if the plaintiff could

have sought and obtained habeas review while still in prison but failed

to do so." Id. at 601 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In

Powers, the defendant only spent one day in jail, thus precluding him

from filing a habeas petition as a practical matter. In Leather v. Eyck, 180

F.3d. 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit held that Heck did not

bar an individual’s § 1983 claim alleging selective prosecution because

his criminal sentence only involved paying a monetary fine. 

10 WILSON v. JOHNSON

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 10 of 14
HANSEN, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The Heck1 favorable termination requirement is more than dicta

that we, as an inferior court, can choose to ignore. Despite the views

of the then-five sitting justices (now reduced to four on the current

Court) expressed in Spencer,

2

 the Supreme Court has not made any

exceptions to the favorable termination requirement, and we are

bound to enforce the requirement where it applies. Because Wilson’s

§ 1983 claim "necessarily require[s] [Wilson] to prove the unlawfulness of his . . . confinement," Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, I would affirm

the district court’s dismissal. I therefore respectfully dissent.

This court’s opinion properly articulates Heck’s holding that claims

challenging the lawfulness of a defendant’s conviction or his confinement are simply not cognizable under § 1983, and that the holding

applies to "‘§ 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.’" (See

supra at 6, quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 (emphasis omitted)). As

articulated by the Supreme Court, that holding is unqualified. See,

512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 ("We hold that, in

order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff

must prove that the conviction or sentence has been [overturned].")

(footnote omitted). Rather than apply Heck’s holding to Wilson’s

§ 1983 claim, this court’s opinion then goes into a discussion of the

views of five of the then-sitting justices espoused in Spencer about

the effect of Heck on claimants who lack a justiciable habeas claim.

Spencer involved the issue of whether a habeas claim became moot

when the claimant was released from prison during the pendency of

the habeas claim. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 3. Spencer had not filed a

§ 1983 claim. The only relevance § 1983 had to the Spencer case was

Spencer’s argument that his habeas claim should not be moot because

Heck would preclude a later § 1983 claim, leaving him with no

1Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

2

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998). Notably, this court’s opinion

elevates these views to that of a "plurality," (supra at 9), even though the

Supreme Court itself has recognized them for what they are—the views

of five justices in Spencer articulated in concurrences and a dissent, see

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004). 

WILSON v. JOHNSON 11

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 11 of 14
recourse. The majority opinion, which was joined in full by the concurring opinions, rejected that argument, calling it "a great non sequitur, unless one believes (as we do not) that a § 1983 action for

damages must always and everywhere be available." Id. at 17. The

discussion in Justice Souter’s concurrence is nothing more than an

expression of his views about whether the habeas claimant ought to

be able to bring a § 1983 claim after his habeas claim became moot,

an issue not then before the Court.

Our panel’s opinion in this case then determines, without elaboration, that this case is not directly controlled by Heck "[b]ecause Wilson’s claim seeks damages for past confinement." (See supra at 9.)

That factual distinction notwithstanding, Heck’s holding, as well as its

reasoning, clearly covers Wilson’s § 1983 claim. In rejecting Justice

Souter’s suggestion that a § 1983 claim might lie where the claimant

has no available habeas remedy, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Heck, reinforced the purpose behind its holding by stating that

"the principle barring collateral attacks-a longstanding and deeply

rooted feature of both the common law and our own jurisprudence-is

not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a convicted criminal is

no longer incarcerated." Heck, 512 U.S. at 490 n.10. In my view,

although Heck did not involve a claim based on past confinement, this

statement is part of the core holding of Heck by which we are bound.

See Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Absent

a decision of the Court that explicitly overrules what we understand

to be the holding of Heck [referring to the statement in footnote 10],

however, we decline to depart from that rule."), cert. denied, 128

S. Ct. 1714 (2008); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 & n.3 (1st

Cir. 1998) (describing Heck’s "core holding" as requiring the "annulment of the underlying conviction" before a § 1983 claim could be

brought in a case where habeas was unavailable due to the inmate’s

death). The importance of avoiding inconsistent results between a

criminal conviction and sentence on the one hand and a civil constitutional tort action on the other is not lessened just because the defendant/claimant is no longer incarcerated.

The Supreme Court has reinforced the continuing validity of the

Heck favorable termination requirement since Spencer. In explaining

the intersection between habeas claims and § 1983 claims, the

Supreme Court stated that "[s]ome cases are hybrids, with a prisoner

12 WILSON v. JOHNSON

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 12 of 14
seeking relief unavailable in habeas, notably damages, but on allegations that not only support a claim for recompense, but imply the

invalidity either of an underlying conviction or of a particular ground

for denying release short of serving the maximum term of confinement." Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750-51. In those hybrid situations, a

defendant must still establish favorable termination of his underlying

conviction or sentence before being allowed to bring a § 1983 claim

seeking damages for the alleged deprivation of his constitutional

rights. Id. at 751. This case fits squarely within the favorable termination requirement as expressly articulated by the Supreme Court thus

far. 

Even if the views of the members of the Supreme Court have

changed, we are bound to follow the holdings of the Supreme Court

until the Court holds differently. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,

237 (1997) ("[I]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in

a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of

decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly

controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own

decisions." (internal marks omitted)); Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d

442, 445-49 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (applying the rule from Agostini and following Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987),

even though the case at hand was factually distinguishable from Finley and the Supreme Court had noted, but not ruled on, the same factual distinction in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)),

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1100 (1998). That Justice Ginsburg changed

her mind between Heck and Spencer does not change the fact that we,

as an inferior court, must continue to follow the holdings of the

Supreme Court, not the views as espoused by the varying justices on

issues not before the Court. See United States v. Chase, 466 F.3d 310,

315-16 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[Although] the overruling of AlmendarezTorres may be imminent, see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13,

27-28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment) (‘Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s

subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the

Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly

decided.’), . . . until such overruling occurs, we must follow the decision when it controls." (citing Agostini)). We hold no charter to carve

exceptions out of Supreme Court stone even if the winds of changing

views have eroded it. Judicial restraint, as well as respect for preceWILSON v. JOHNSON 13

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 13 of 14
dent and our place within the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, counsel that we must continue to apply the Heck favorable termination

requirement where applicable, and without exception, until the

Supreme Court tells us otherwise. 

I respectfully dissent. 

14 WILSON v. JOHNSON

Appeal: 07-6347 Doc: 80 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pg: 14 of 14