Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02111/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02111-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

MARIA DELALUZ GOMEZ, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

WACHOVIA MORTGAGE CORPORATION (a 

North Carolina Corporation); WORLD 

SAVINGS, INC. (a California Corporation); 

CAL-WESTERN RECONVEYANCE 

CORPORATION (a California Corporation) and 

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

Case No: CV-09-02111 SBA

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS BY DEFENDANT WORLD 

SAVINGS BANK, FSB

[Docket No. 17] 

Plaintiff Maria Delaluz Gomez (“Plaintiff”) brings the instant action against Defendant 

Wachovia Mortgage, F.S.B., formerly known as World Savings Bank, F.S.B. (“Defendant” or 

"Wachovia"), claiming numerous violations of state and federal laws that stem from the purchase 

of her home and the foreclosure process initiated by Defendant. The parties are presently before 

the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). (Docket No. 17.) Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with this 

matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to dismiss. The Court, in 

its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 

78(b). 

I. BACKGROUND 

On October 11, 2006, Plaintiff financed the purchase of a residential property located at 19 

Matisse Court, Oakley, CA 94561 ("the Property"). (See Notice of Removal, Docket No. 1, Ex. 1 

¶¶ 7-8 ("Compl.").) Specifically, Plaintiff obtained a loan in the amount of $426,000 from 

Wachovia (the "Loan"), which was secured by a deed of trust on the Property. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11; 

Compl. Ex. B) ("Deed of Trust.") Plaintiff later defaulted on the Loan. Cal-Western, the trustee 

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under the Deed of Trust, recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell under Deed of Trust on 

August 7, 2008.1 (Compl. Ex. C.) On November 26, 2008, Cal-Western recorded a Notice of 

Trustee's Sale. (Compl. Ex. D.) 

On December 30, 2008, Plaintiff filed the instant action in the Superior Court of the State of 

California for the County of Contra Costa, challenging the validity of the Loan and seeking, inter 

alia, its rescission and cancellation. Plaintiff alleges that Wachovia: (1) failed to fully disclose the 

loan terms and engaged in "deceptive loan practices" in violation of the federal Truth in Lending 

Act ("TILA"), Regulation Z (an implementing rule under TILA), the Home Ownership and Equity 

Protection Act ("HOPEA") and the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"); (2) failed to provide 

any documentation relating to the Loan in Spanish, in violation of California Civil Code § 1632; 

(3) failed to disclose a "Yield Spread Premium," in violation of California Financial Code § 4970; 

and (4) failed to serve timely Notice of Default and Notice of Sale in violation of California Civil 

Code § 2924. (Compl.¶¶ 12-19, 23 & 25.) The claims are framed as seven causes of action: (1) 

declaratory relief, (2) to set aside notice of trustee’s sale and notice of default, (3) cancellation of 

instruments, (4) quiet title, (5) accounting, (6) injunctive relief, and (7) damages. 

On May 14, 2009, Wachovia removed the action to federal court on the ground that certain 

of Plaintiff's claims arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1331. On August 20, 2009, 

Wachovia moved to dismiss the complaint, except as to Plaintiff's claim alleging a violation of 

California Civil Code § 1632. (Docket No. 17.) Plaintiff filed a cursory opposition on October 7, 

2009 (Docket No. 21), and Wachovia filed a reply on October 19, 2009 (Docket No. 25). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if 

it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Specific facts are not necessary; 

the statement need only give the defendant[s] fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds 

 1 Defendant Cal-Western Corp. was named because of its status as trustee under the Deed of 

Trust; it was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on October 6, 2009. (Docket No. 22.) 

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upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008). 

However, a complaint that only raises “the mere possibility of misconduct” does not establish that 

the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The plaintiff must 

establish that the allegations are pushed “across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

“In general, the inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as 

true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 

F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). However, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences or 

conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. Sprewell v. Golden State 

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). In the event dismissal is warranted, it is generally 

without prejudice, unless it is clear the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. See

Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. First Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, "any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate 

pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 

declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." A party seeking declaratory relief 

must establish that there is a present and actual controversy between the parties. City of Cotati v. 

Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69, 80 (2002). Declaratory relief is only appropriate "(1) when the judgment 

will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will 

terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the 

proceeding." Guerra v. Sutton, 783 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Thus, declaratory relief is ultimately a request for relief, rather than a cause of action, and 

in order to weigh it the Court must look to the underlying claims. See, e.g., Weiner v. Klais & Co., 

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108 F.3d 86, 92 (6th Cir. 1997) (“With regard to Count IV, in which plaintiff seeks declaratory 

relief, plaintiff has merely asserted a form of relief, not a cause of action. Plaintiff is not entitled to 

this relief in the absence of a viable claim.”). Within the cause of action for declaratory relief, 

Plaintiff alleges five distinct causes of action against Wachovia, based on violations of: (1) 

California Civil Code § 1632; (2) California Financial Code § 4970 et seq.; (3) HOEPA; (4) TILA; 

and (5) the FTCA. As noted, Wachovia does not move to dismiss the California Civil Code § 1632 

claim, the remaining causes of action will be addressed in turn. 

1. California Financial Code § 4970 

Plaintiff alleges Wachovia violated California Financial Code § 4970 et seq. ("§ 4970"), 

which prohibits predatory lending practices. Plaintiff claims that in failing to inform her that the 

Loan contained a Yield Spread Premium ("YSP") provision, Wachovia violated § 4970. (Compl. ¶ 

16.) A YSP is a bonus paid by a lender to a mortgage broker when it originates a loan at an interest 

rate higher than the minimum interest rate approved by the lender for a particular loan. It acts as an 

incentive to induce borrowers to enter into mortgages with higher interests rates. 

Wachovia moves to dismiss Plaintiff's § 4970 claim on the grounds that a state claim under 

§ 4970 may not be brought against a federal savings bank, since federal savings banks are 

statutorily preempted by Home Owners' Loan Act (“HOLA”). See Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage 

Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008). “HOLA created what is now the OTS [Office of Thrift 

Supervision] for the purpose of administering the statute, and it provided the OTS with ‘plenary 

authority’ to promulgate regulations involving the operation of federal savings associations.” State 

Farm Bank v. Reardon, 539 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2008).2 

The OTS has authority to issue broad regulations preempting state law. Fidelity Federal 

Savings & Loan, Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 160 (1982). In particular, 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 

 2 Defendant is a federal savings bank that is subject to regulation by the OTS. See Def.’s 

Request for Jud. Notice Ex 1. 

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provides that federal law “occupies the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings 

associations.” The effect of this express preemption clause is to virtually occupy the entire field of 

lending-related activities of qualifying lending associations, and to leave no room for conflicting 

state laws. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 152-154; Silvas, 514 F.3d as 1007 n.3 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe 

Elev. Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 

To clarify the scope of HOLA’s preemption, section 560.2(b) sets forth a non-exhaustive 

list of illustrative examples of the types of state laws that are expressly preempted, which include, 

inter alia, terms of credit, loan-related fees, servicing fees, disclosure and advertising, loan 

processing, loan origination, and servicing of mortgages. The specific section which is relevant to 

Plaintiff's Complaint is 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(5), which states, in relevant part: "Loan-related fees, 

including without limitation, initial charges, late charges, prepayment penalties, servicing fees, and 

overlimit fees..." Plaintiff's § 4970 claim is based on the alleged non-disclosure of a YSP, a loanrelated fee, and is therefore preempted. 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's § 4970 claim without leave to amend. 

2. HOEPA 

HOEPA prohibits creditors from “extending credit to consumers under mortgages referred 

to in section 1602(aa) of this title based on the consumers’ collateral without regard to the 

consumers’ repayment ability, including the consumers’ current and expected income, current 

obligations, and employment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h). Although section 1602(aa) covers consumer 

credit transactions secured by a consumer’s principal dwelling, it expressly excludes a “residential 

mortgage transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa). A “residential mortgage transaction” is defined as a 

“transaction in which a mortgage, deed of trust, purchase money security interest arising under an 

installment sales contract, or equivalent consensual security interest is created or retained against 

the consumer’s dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1602(w). 

Plaintiff obtained a "purchase money loan" from Wachovia to finance her purchase of the 

Property. (Comp. ¶¶ 8, 10-11). As the loan was a transaction upon which a deed of trust was 

recorded, Plaintiff's loan qualifies as a “residential mortgage transaction,” as defined by § 1602(w), 

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and thus is entirely exempt from HOEPA. See Llaban v. Carrington Mortg. Services, LLC, 2009 

WL 2870154*5 (S.D.Cal., 2009) ("Plaintiff also alleges HOEPA violations...Plaintiff's claims 

under HOEPA fail as a matter of law, because 'residential mortgage transactions,' such as Plaintiff's 

purchase money mortgage, are expressly excluded from coverage); 15 U .S.C. § 1639(a)(1). A 

'residential mortgage transaction' is defined in turn by 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) to include “a mortgage, 

deed of trust, ... or equivalent consensual security interest ... created ... against the consumer's 

dwelling to finance the acquisition ... of such dwelling.'"). The Court notes that Plaintiff did not 

dispute this argument in her opposition. 

Accordingly, Wachovia's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action arising under 

HOEPA is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

3. TILA 

Plaintiff brings forth a claim for money damages and rescission for alleged violations of 

TILA. “TILA was enacted in 1968 ‘to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 

consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid 

the uninformed use of credit.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).” Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, 329 F.3d 

1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003). 

a) TILA Claim for Money Damages 

TILA contains a one-year statute of limitations for the recovery of monetary damages, the 

time period for which runs from the date of the occurrence of the violation. 15 U.S.C. §1640(e). 

Here, the date of the violation is the date the loan closed on October 11, 2006. Plaintiff’s claim for 

money damages under TILA, filed in state court in May of 2009, exceeds the statute of limitations 

by approximately 1 year and 7 months and is clearly time-barred on its face. 

Plaintiff argues that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies because the Loan documents in 

this case were not provided in Spanish and at the point at which she did discover the violations, she 

timely filed this action. (Opp. at 4:27-5:2.) “Equitable tolling may be applied if, despite all due 

diligence, a plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of [her] claim.” 

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Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). “If a reasonable plaintiff would 

not have known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable 

tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what 

information she seeks.” Id. Plaintiff's argument fails for the simple reason that it does not take into 

account the exercise of "all due diligence." Id. Even construing the alleged facts in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff did not allege, or imply, any facts or circumstances that served to 

prevent her - in the exercise of all due diligence - from having the documents translated into 

Spanish or having a third party review the documents for her. Consequently, the Court finds that 

the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply to Plaintiff's TILA claim and is therefore timebarred. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for money damages arising under TILA is DISMISSED 

without leave to amend. 

b) TILA Claim for Rescission 

TILA’s rescission provision does not apply to “a residential mortgage,” which is defined by 

15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) to mean “a transaction in which a mortgage, deed of trust, purchase money 

security interest arising under an installment sales contract, or equivalent consensual security 

interest is created or retained against the consumer’s dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial 

construction of such dwelling.” Thus, no statutory right of rescission exists under 15 U.S.C. § 

1635(e) “where the loan at issue involves the creation of a first lien to finance the acquisition of a 

dwelling in which the customer resides or expects to reside.” Betancourt v. Countrywide Home 

Loans, Inc., 344 F. Supp.2d 1253, 1260 (D. Colo., 2004); Turczynski v. Friedman, 2007 WL 

4556923*4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2007) (statutory analysis supported by a long string cite of federal 

cases in other jurisdictions reaching the same conclusion). 

Plaintiff’s loan was for a residential mortgage transaction. (Comp. ¶¶ 8, 10-11.). As such, 

Plaintiff’s rescission claim fails under 15 U.S.C. § 1635, which bars the right of rescission for such 

loans. The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to dispute this argument in her opposition. 

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Accordinlgy, Plaintiff's claim for rescission arising under TILA is DISMISSED without 

leave to amend. 

4. The Federal Trade Commission Act 

Plaintiff alleged a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act for "deceptive loan 

practices" by Wachovia. (Compl. ¶ 19.) However, the FTCA does not provide a private right of 

action. Fisher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 1979 WL 1597*5 (C.D. Cal. Mar.12, 

1979) (“There is no private right of action under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Initial 

remedial power lies with the Commission itself,” citing Carlson v. Coca-Cola Company, 483 F.2d 

279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973)). 

Because the FTCA does not provide a private right of action, Wachovia's motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff's FTCA claim is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

B. Second Cause of Action: Set Aside Notice of Trustee's Sale & Notice of Default

Plaintiff's second cause of action seeks to set aside the Notice of Trustee Sale and the 

Notice of Default for the following reasons: (1) the Loan was the result of predatory lending based 

on statutory violations, (2) the Notices were not timely served, in violation of California Civil 

Code § 2924, and (3) the defendants were not in possession of the original promissory note 

divesting them of the right to statutory non-judicial foreclosure under California Civil Code § 

2924. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31.) 

 As a threshold matter, Defendant moves to dismiss this claim on the grounds that Plaintiff 

lacks standing to challenge the foreclosure sale because she has not alleged that she offered or will 

offer to tender the undisputed amount of money she owes. According to Miller & Starr on 

California real estate law: 

A challenge to the validity of the trustee's sale is an attempt to have the sale 

set aside and to have the title restored. The action is in equity, and a trustor 

seeking to set the sale aside is required to do equity before the court will 

exercise its equitable powers. Therefore, as a condition precedent to an 

action by the trustor to set aside the trustee's sale on grounds that the sale is 

voidable, the trustor must pay, or offer to pay, the secured debt, or at least 

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all of the delinquencies and costs due for redemption, before an action is 

commenced or in the complaint. Without an allegation of such a tender in the 

complaint that attacks the validity of the sale, the complaint does not state a 

cause of action. 

MILCALRE § 10:212 (emphasis added). 

“A valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owed is essential to an action to 

cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust.” Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., 15 

Cal.App.3d 112, 117 (Cal.App.2.Dist. 1971); Nguyen v. Calhoun,105 Cal.App.4th 428, 439 

(Cal.App.6.Dist. 2003) (reiterating the tender rule and adding that it is strictly applied). Thus, 

Defendant’s standing argument provides a valid reason for dismissal. Plaintiff did not dispute this 

argument in her opposition. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's second cause of action. 

1. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action also Fails on other Grounds 

 

Plaintiff's second cause of action seeking to set aside the Notice of Trustee's Sale and 

Notice of Default alleges defendants "failed to comply with requirements of the statute by not 

serving said Notice[s] in the manner prescribed by law." (Comp. ¶¶ 23, 25). However, Plaintiff 

fails to specify which section of California Civil Code § 2924 et seq. is allegedly violated or how 

service of the Notice of Trustee's Sale or Notice of Default purportedly violated it. A cause of 

action based on a state statute must be pleaded with particularity. Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior 

Court, 32 Cal.4th 771, 790 (2004); Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Trans. Dist., 40 Cal.3d 780, 795 

(1985). Plaintiff’s legal conclusion based on an alleged violation of § 2924 does not provide, as a 

matter of law, a basis for setting aside the Notice of Trustee's Sale and Notice of Default. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts the defendants are not legally entitled to proceed with a 

foreclosure because they do not possess the original promissory note, such a contention is 

unsupported. See, e.g., Gamboa v. Trustee Corp., 2009 WL 656285, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“the 

statutory framework governing non-judicial foreclosures contains no requirement that the lender 

produce the original note to initiate the foreclosure process.”); Putkkuri v. Recontrust Co., 2009 

WL 32567, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (“Pursuant to section 2924(a)(1) of the California Civil Code, 

the trustee of a Deed of Trust has the right to initiate the foreclosure process. Cal. Civ. Code § 

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2924(a). Production of the original note is not required to proceed with a non-judicial 

foreclosure.”); Candelo v. NDex West, LLC, 2008 WL 5382259, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“No 

requirement exists under the statutory framework to produce the original note to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.”); San Diego Home Solutions, Inc. v. Recontrust Co., 2008 WL 5209972, at 

*2 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (“California law does not require that the original note be in the possession of 

the party initiating non-judicial foreclosure.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim that a trustee cannot 

institute non-judicial foreclosure without the beneficiary or the trustee showing possession of the 

original note fails, as a matter of law. 

C. Third Cause of Action: Cancellation of Instruments

Plaintiff's third cause of action seeks to cancel the Deed of Trust, the Promissory Note, the 

Notice of Trustee’s Sale and the Notice of Default. (Compl. ¶ 33.) However, Plaintiff's third cause 

of action simply incorporates all of her prior allegations, restating the Promissory Note and the 

Deed of Trust were the "product of multiple violations and statutes and were derived through a 

process of predatory lending practices..." Id. Thus, this cause of action fails on the same grounds 

as the second, as "[a] valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to 

an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust.” Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., 

15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117 (Cal.App.2.Dist.1971). As noted, Plaintiff has failed to offer to tender the 

full amount owed on the Loan and therefore lacks standing. Plaintiff did not respond to this 

argument in her opposition. Additionally, as discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to allege any 

violations of law that would warrant the cancellation of the instruments. 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's third cause of action without prejudice. 

D. Fourth Cause of Action to Quiet Title

The purpose of a quiet title action is to determine “all conflicting claims to the property in 

controversy and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to.” Newman 

v. Cornelius, 3 Cal. App. 3d 279, 284 (1970). California Code of Civil Procedure § 761.020 

provides that a complaint for quiet title “shall be verified” and shall include the following: 

(a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action.... 

In the case of real property, the description shall include both 

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its legal description and its street address or common 

designation, if any. 

(b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this 

chapter is sought and the basis of the title.... 

(c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a 

determination is sought. 

(d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the 

determination is sought as of a date other than the date the 

complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of 

the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought. 

(e) A prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff 

against the adverse claims. 

Defendant correctly moves to dismiss this cause of action on the following grounds. First, 

Plaintiff failed to verify the complaint and provide the specific information required pursuant to § 

761.020. Second, in an action to quiet title, a debtor cannot “quiet title without discharging [her] 

debt. The cloud upon [her] title persists until the debt is paid.” Aguilar v. Bocci, 39 Cal.App.3d 

475, 477 (Cal.App.1 Dist.1974). As already noted, Plaintiff has not offered to pay her debt. 

Therefore, Plaintiff's cause of action to quiet title fails for failing to meet the requirements of 

§ 761.020 and Plaintiff lacks standing. The Court notes that Plaintiff did not dispute her lack of 

verification or failure to comply with § 761.020 in her opposition. 

 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's fourth cause of action without prejudice. 

E. Fifth Cause of Action: Accounting

Plaintiff alleges the right to an accounting, because she requested “from...Wachovia...and 

has yet to receive ...a detailed accounting calculation and summary of the payoff balance they are 

demanding, including the unpaid principal balance, accrued interest, unpaid interest, daily interest 

charges and all other fees, costs or expenses comprising the payoff sum.” (Compl. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff 

claims that she “is legally entitled to such an accounting, yet [Defendant has] refused to provide 

one in a timely manner in compliance with California Civil Code § 2943.” (Compl. ¶ 39.) 

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However, as Wachovia correctly argues, Plaintiff’s legal conclusion that she is entitled to a full 

accounting based on a reference to California Civil Code § 2943 is incorrect for several reasons. 

First, § 2943 does not require a "detailed accounting calculation and summary," but, rather, 

a payoff demand statement, which Plaintiff has not alleged Wachovia failed to provide. See

Cal.Civ.Code § 2943(a)(2)(H)(5). Thus, Plaintiff's claim is not actionable as the alleged violation - 

the failure to provide a detailed accounting - is not required by the cited statute. 

Second, depending upon the circumstances, § 2943 provides specific time limits for when a 

claim for accounting can be made. Plaintiff has not alleged a date for when she made her request 

and, thus, the Court is unable to determine whether there has been timely compliance. 

Lastly, accounting actions are equitable in nature and appropriate when “the accounts are so 

complicated that an ordinary legal action demanding a fixed sum is impracticable.” Civic W. Corp. 

v. Zila Indus., Inc., 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 14 (1977) (citations omitted). Normally, an accounting is 

appropriate where a plaintiff seeks to recover an amount that is unliquidated and unascertained, and 

that cannot be determined without an accounting. St. James Church v. Superior Court, 135 

Cal.App.2d 352, 359 (1955) (internal citations omitted). Because in this case Plaintiff is essentially 

seeking to have an explanation of her payoff amount, there does not appear to be a basis for an 

equitable accounting claim. Plaintiff failed to dispute or address these arguments in her opposition. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's fifth cause of action is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

F. Sixth Cause of Action: Injunctive Relief

Wachovia moves to dismiss Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for injunctive relief on the 

grounds that injunctive relief is a remedy, not a distinct cause of action. Wachovia is correct, 

“[i]njunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action, and a cause of action must exist 

before injunctive relief may be granted.” Camp v. Board of Supervisors, 123 Cal.App.3d 334, 356 

(1981) (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Richter, 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168 (1942)). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for injunctive relief is DISMISSED. 

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G. Seventh Cause of Action: Damages

Similarly, Wachovia is correct in moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action as 

damages are also a form of relief and not a distinct cause of action. County of Yolo v. Sacramento, 

36 Cal. 193, 196 (1868). Plaintiff's seventh cause of action is DISMISSED. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to California Financial Code § 4970, HOPEA, TILA 

and the FTCA are dismissed with prejudice; 

2. The remainder of Plaintiff's claims are dismissed without prejudice as Plaintiff can 

attempt to cure the various deficiencies discussed above; 

3. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before January 29, 2010; 

4. A Case Management Conference is scheduled for March 4, 2010, at 2:30 p.m. The 

parties shall meet and confer prior to the conference and shall prepare a joint Case 

Management Conference Statement which shall be filed no later than ten (10) days prior 

to the Case Management Conference that complies with the Standing Order For All 

Judges Of The Northern District Of California and the Standing Order of this Court. 

Plaintiff shall be responsible for filing the statement as well as for arranging the 

conference call. All parties shall be on the line and shall call (510) 637-3559 at the 

above indicated date and time. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated:_1/15/10 _______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

United States District Judge 

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