Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05571/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05571-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN D. GADSON,

Petitioner,

 v.

DERRICK L. OLLISON,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-05571 CRB

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Floyd Collins, a state prisoner incarcerated at Ironwood State Prison, seeks

federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. section 2254 of a conviction for robbery after trial

before a San Mateo County jury. Petitioner raises two interrelated claims: (1) the trial court

erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of battery; and

(2) the trial court erred by denying petitioner’s motion for a new trial based on the failure to

include a battery instruction. As the parties are familiar with the facts as set forth in the

opinion of the California Court of Appeal, the Court will not repeat them here.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

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Relief may not be granted unless the state ruling was “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). The federal habeas court may not

engage in a de novo analysis of the judgment, but must review it with deference to the state

court. It is not enough that the state court applied clearly established federal law incorrectly;

to grant habeas the federal court must find that the incorrect application was also

unreasonable. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410-411 (2000).

THE STATE APPELLATE COURT OPINION

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claims in a written opinion. First,

the court concluded that battery is not a necessarily included offense of the crime of robbery. 

“To determine whether a lesser offense is necessarily included in the charged offense, one of

two tests (called the ‘elements’ test and the ‘accusatory pleading’ test) must be met.” People

v. Gadson, May 5, 2005 at 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“Opinion”). 

Under the elements test, “if a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily

committing a lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included offense within the former.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that since robbery may be committed

without the use of force or violence, that is without committing a battery, battery is not a

lesser-included offense under the elements test. Id. at 8. 

Under the “accusatory pleading” test “if the charging allegations of accusatory

pleading include language describing the offense in such a way that if committed as specified

the lesser offense is necessarily committed.” Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The court concluded that because the accusatory pleading here charged petitioner

using the disjunctive statutory language, that is, that the robbery was committed with force or

fear, battery was not a lesser-included offense under this alternate test. Id. at 8.

The court held that the absence of a battery instruction did not prevent the jury from

considering Petitioner’s defense, that is, his contention that he did not know “that Derek and

Jose wanted to rob Andrew” and he did not “harbor[] the requisite intent to encourage or

facilitate the robbery and then to promote and encourage Jose to commit the robbery.” Id. at

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9 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Pursuant to the robbery and aiding and abetting

instructions, to reach a verdict of guilty of the charged offense the jury was required to make

the findings that defendant had the specific intent to deprive the victim of property, and

intended to encourage or facilitate the commission of the robbery.” Id. at 9. 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s habeas claims fail. In the Ninth Circuit “‘the failure of a state court to

instruct on a lesser offense [in a non-capital case] fails to present a federal constitutional

question and will not be considered in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.’” Solis v. Garcia,

219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d

1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir.

1998) (“Under the law of this circuit, the failure of a state trial court to instruct on lesser

included offenses in non-capital cases does not present a federal constitutional question”). 

Petitioner correctly responds that Bashor and Solis both recognize that the rule barring

habeas consideration of a claim involving a failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense

does not bar a claim that the trial court deprived the petitioner of an adequate instruction on

his theory of defense. See Bashor, 433 F.3d at 1240 (“This general statement [failure to

instruct on a lesser-included offense is not reviewable on habeas] may not apply to every

habeas corpus review, because the criminal defendant is also entitled to adequate instructions

on his or her theory of defense.”); Solis, 219 F.3d at 929 (“The Bashnor court noted,

however, that the defendant’s right to adequate jury instructions on his or her theory of the

case might, in some cases, constitute an exception to the general rule.”). 

This claim, too, fails. Petitioner has not established that the trial court failed to

instruct on his theory of defense. Petitioner’s defense is that he may have been guilty of

battery, but he did not have the requisite intent to be found guilty of robbery; that is, “[t]he

dispute turned on why Petitioner hit Andrew with the prosecution arguing that he punched

Andrew in order to effectuate a robbery while Petitioner argued he hit Andrew to keep

Andrew and Jose apart and that he had no knowledge of Jose’s plan to rob Andrew.” Habeas

Petition at 10; see also id. at 11 (“Petitioner did not even know that Jose intended to rob the

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G:\CRBALL\2006\5571\orderdenyingpetition.wpd4

victim or that Jose had taken any of the victim’s property.”). In order to convict Petitioner of

robbery, the jury was instructed that it had to find that Petitioner “has the specific intent to

deprive the victim of property, and intended to encourage or facilitate the commission of the

robbery.” Opinion at 9. Thus, the jury had to consider Petitioner’s defense that, while he

may have battered the victim, he did not intend to rob him; in other words, if the jury

accepted his story, it would have to acquit. In any event, Petitioner has not cited any wellestablished Federal law that suggests that the trial court violated his due process rights by not

sua sponte giving a battery instruction in the circumstances of this case.

Petitioner’s real argument is that the jury was deprived of the option of convicting

Petitioner of the lesser offense of battery; that is, that it was robbery or nothing. See Petition

at 9 (“Giving the jury the opportunity to convict on a lesser offense when supported by the

evidence ensures that the jury will give the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt

standard.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); id. at 11 (“[T]he jury was

needlessly limited to the two options of finding Petitioner guilty of robbery or not”). This is

precisely the type of claim that under binding Ninth Circuit precedent is not reviewable on a

habeas petition. This district court is bound by that precedent.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the petition for habeas corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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