Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02631/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02631-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT ALAN GIBBS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BOYD, et. al, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-02631-KJM-CMK PS 

ORDER 

In this action, plaintiff Robert Alan Gibbs asserts Deputy Chris Edwards violated 

his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing his shotgun, and that Sergeant Brian Jackson is liable for 

the conduct of Deputy Edwards. Because Mr. Gibbs is not represented by counsel, the case has 

been referred to the assigned magistrate judge for initial handling of pretrial matters. Local Rule 

302. Defendants Shasta County Sheriff’s Department,1

 Deputy Edwards and Sergeant Jackson 

(collectively “defendants”) have moved for summary judgment. Mot., ECF No. 30. On March 4, 

2016, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations, recommending the motion for 

summary judgment be granted for Sergeant Jackson as a matter of law, and for Deputy Edwards 

 1

 Shasta County Sheriff’s Department was terminated as a party to this action on June 26, 

2014. ECF No. 5. 

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on grounds of qualified immunity. F&R 11–14, ECF No. 52. On March 11, Mr. Gibbs filed 

objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations. Objections, ECF No. 55. 

As explained below, the court adopts the magistrate judge’s findings and 

recommendations that summary judgment be granted for both defendants. The court, however, 

writes separately in response to Mr. Gibb’s objections, as well as to supplement and correct the 

magistrate court’s findings with respect to whether Deputy Edwards is entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Gibbs filed a complaint in this court on December 18, 2013. Compl., ECF 

No. 1. Because the complaint did not specify any particular basis of liability, the magistrate judge 

construed the complaint to assert the following: (1) Deputy Edwards violated Mr. Gibbs’ Fourth 

Amendment rights by seizing his shotgun,2

 and (2) Sergeant Jackson is liable under a theory of 

supervisory liability. F&R at 10. In defendants’ motion for summary judgment, they argue 

Deputy Edwards did not violate Mr. Gibbs’ Fourth Amendment rights because he seized Mr. 

Gibbs’ gun under the community caretaking exception. Mot. at 13. They further argue Sergeant 

Jackson cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for supervisory liability. Id. at 17. 

The magistrate judge noted defendants’ motion was unopposed. F&R at 1. 

Specifically, the magistrate judge found Sergeant Jackson did not implement a constitutionally 

deficient policy and he could not be liable under §1983 for the actions of his supervisees. Id. at 

11. As to Deputy Edwards, the magistrate judge rejected the argument that seizing Mr. Gibbs’ 

gun was justified under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 

 2

 The magistrate judge also construed Mr. Gibbs’ complaint to make a claim against 

Deputy Edwards for making a false report. F&R at 10. However, the court does not agree with 

this reading; Mr. Gibbs’ complaint alleges Deputy Edwards’s decision to charge Mr. Gibbs’ with 

felony possession of a firearm was based not on any report Deputy Edwards made, but on an 

official police record indicating Mr. Gibbs was a convicted felon. Id. The police record was 

ultimately found to be erroneous because the felony charge had been reduced. See id. Mr. Gibbs 

does not allege, however, that Deputy Edwards knew the report was erroneous when he decided 

to charge Mr. Gibbs, or that he otherwise made a false report. See generally Compl. Further, the 

record shows, and Mr. Gibbs does not dispute, that aside from seizing the shotgun, Deputy 

Edwards had no other role in subsequent proceedings against Mr. Gibbs. F&R at 6. 

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requirement. Id. at 12. After reviewing Shields v. Tracy, 2005 WL 1490300 *5 (E.D. Cal. 2009), 

the only in-circuit case defendants cited in support of their community caretaking defense, the 

magistrate judge concluded, 

Shields is unpersuasive. In that case, the community caretaker 

exception was discussed in the context of the plaintiff’s claim that 

she had been improperly stopped and detained by the police, not 

that her property had been improperly seized as is plaintiff’s claim 

in this case. Additionally, unlike the plaintiff in Shields, plaintiff in 

this case was not being detained, held in custody, or placed under 

arrest at the time defendant Edwards seized the shotgun. 

Defendants have not cited any Ninth Circuit authority supporting 

the proposition that a community caretaker exception applies to 

seizures of property occurring under the circumstances presented in 

this case. 

Id. The magistrate judge also noted searches under the community caretaking exception are 

generally limited to vehicles, and that no Ninth Circuit case has held the community caretaking 

exception applies to facts analogous to those of Mr. Gibbs’ case, which included a search of Mr. 

Gibbs’ person and not his vehicle. Id. at 13. In the absence of Ninth Circuit case law, the 

magistrate judge held Deputy Edwards was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not 

“clearly established” the community caretaking exception did not apply to the facts of this case. 

Id. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment as to Deputy Edwards. Id. 

Mr. Gibbs makes three objections to the magistrate judge’s conclusions: (1) the 

magistrate judge should not have concluded defendants’ motion was unopposed, and in any event, 

Mr. Gibbs requests a continuance because he was incarcerated on September 11, 2015; (2) the 

magistrate judge’s conclusion as to Sergeant Jackson is erroneous; and (3) the conclusion as to 

Deputy Edwards is erroneous. See generally Objections. Additionally, Mr. Gibbs requests leave 

to join the County of Shasta and the District Attorney of Shasta as defendants to this action. 

Id. at 1. 

In response, defendants contend: (1) the magistrate judge rightly concluded the 

motion was unopposed, for Mr. Gibbs’ September 11, 2015 incarceration had no bearing on 

Mr. Gibbs’ ability to oppose defendants’ motion filed on August 5, 2015, and Mr. Gibbs’ request 

for continuance is untimely; (2) Mr. Gibbs has not adequately shown how the magistrate judge’s 

findings are erroneous as to Sergeant Jackson; and (3) Mr. Gibbs has not adequately shown how 

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the magistrate judge’s findings are erroneous as to Deputy Edwards. See generally Response, 

ECF No. 56. As to Mr. Gibbs’ requested leave to amend, defendants contend the request should 

be rejected as untimely. Id. at 2. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

On a review of a magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, this court 

undertakes a “de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings 

or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). As this language 

makes clear, the court need not “review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties 

themselves accept as correct.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(en banc). When reviewing the findings and recommendations, the court presumes any findings 

of fact not objected to are correct. See Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1979). 

The court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

III. DISCUSSION 

As a preliminary matter, the court notes neither party has alerted the court to errors 

in the magistrate judge’s factual findings. The court therefore adopts the findings in full. Orand, 

602 F.2d at 208. 

A. Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Finding of Non-Opposition 

Mr. Gibbs objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment was unopposed, and requests a continuance of the hearing date on this 

motion. See Objections at 1. Mr. Gibbs contends his objection and request is justified because of 

his incarceration in the Shasta County jail since September 11, 2015. Id. Defendants argue 

Mr. Gibbs’ incarceration is irrelevant, because his opposition was due before his arrest. Response 

to Objections, ECF No. 56 at 2. While defendants do not specify which date Mr. Gibbs’ 

opposition was due, the court notes Mr. Gibbs’ opposition was due by August 26 for the hearing 

on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which was set for September 9. See E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 230 (opposition to motion due fourteen days before hearing); see also ECF No. 30 (setting 

law and motion hearing date for September 9, 2015). 

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The court agrees with defendants in concluding Mr. Gibbs’ incarceration is not 

relevant to determining whether the magistrate judge rightly concluded the motion was 

unopposed. First, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was filed on August 5, 2016, over 

one month before Mr. Gibbs was incarcerated. Additionally, Mr. Gibbs was served at the address 

on file on August 5, the same day defendants’ motion was filed with this court. ECF No. 35. To 

the extent Mr. Gibbs changed his address or place of residency, he was under a continuing duty to 

notify the Clerk and all other parties of this change. E.D. Cal. L.R. 182(f). Because Mr. Gibbs 

did not formally file his change of address until February 29, 2016, ECF No. 50, service of 

documents at the prior address was deemed effective. E.D. Cal. L.R. 128(f). Moreover, as noted 

above, Mr. Gibbs’ opposition to defendants’ motion was due by August 26, 2015, allowing him 

to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment over two weeks before he was 

incarcerated. 

Requests for continuances of hearing dates must be made at least seven days 

before the scheduled hearing date. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(f). As noted above, the hearing date for 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment was set before the magistrate judge for September 9, 

2015, two days before Mr. Gibbs’ custodial arrest. See ECF No. 30. Mr. Gibbs did not request a 

continuance of the hearing date until February 29, 2016, long after the date had passed. See ECF 

No. 50. Mr. Gibbs’ request for continuance is untimely and the motion is deemed unopposed. 

Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the court considers the merits to Mr. Gibbs’ 

remaining objections, as discussed below. 

B. Objection to Recommendation Regarding Sergeant Jackson 

The magistrate judge determined Sergeant Jackson could not be held liable under 

§ 1983 for the actions of his supervisees, and because there was no showing that he implemented 

a constitutionally deficient policy. F&R at 12. Mr. Gibbs objects to these findings, contending 

the claim against Sergeant Jackson is based on “his own conduct” and not simply as Deputy 

Edwards’ supervisor. Objections at 3. 

In support of his argument, Mr. Gibbs reiterates the allegations made in his 

complaint, asserting Sergeant Jackson was very rude to him and refused to investigate Deputy 

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Edwards’ actions. Mr. Gibbs has not presented any additional allegations, facts, or evidence 

supporting a colorable claim based on supervisory liability against Sergeant Jackson. After an 

independent review, the court further concludes nothing shows Sergeant Jackson individually 

engaged in any constitutional violation. The magistrate judge’s recommendations as to Sergeant 

Jackson are adopted in full. 

C. Objection to Recommendations Regarding Deputy Edwards 

The magistrate judge determined Deputy Edwards did not adequately contend the 

community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement excused seizing 

Mr. Gibbs’ gun without a warrant because all cases cited to discussed searches under the 

community caretaker exception to vehicles, and the facts in Mr. Gibbs’ case involved a search of 

his person. F&R at 13. Nonetheless, the magistrate judge determined Deputy Edwards was 

entitled to qualified immunity because the application of the community caretaking exception to 

the facts of this case was not “clearly established” at the time of Deputy Edwards’ seizure. Id. 

Mr. Gibbs objects, contending Deputy Edwards’ seizure violated clearly established law of which 

a reasonable person would have been aware. Objections at 2. 

A government official such as Deputy Edwards may be entitled to qualified 

immunity insofar as his conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

818 (1982). The qualified immunity test is two-fold. Under the first prong, the court considers 

whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, show defendant’s conduct violated 

a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Under the second prong, the 

court determines whether the constitutional right was “clearly established.” Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In determining whether a constitutional or statutory right was “clearly 

established,” the touchstone question is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th 

Cir. 2009) ( “[T]he . . . question in this case is, was the law such that it should have been clear to 

[the officer] that he was required in the situation he confronted to give pre-deprivation and postdeprivation notice to an absent father.”). Courts in their sound discretion can address the two 

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prongs in any order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. If the court concludes defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity, it need not consider whether defendants violated the right in the first 

instance. See id. at 244 (holding defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity without 

revolving constitutional issue). 

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants sought to establish the 

community caretaking exception justified seizing Mr. Gibbs’ shotgun. Mot. at 18. The 

magistrate judge concluded this novel defense was meritless, for it had no support in case law. 

F&R at 12. Nonetheless, the magistrate judge stated the absence of any authority supporting the 

application of the community caretaker exception to the facts meant Deputy Edwards did not 

violate “clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.” F&R at 13 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). This statement does not accurately reflect 

the required qualified immunity analysis; the invention of a meritless exception does not entitle a 

defendant to qualified immunity. Officer Edwards is not entitled to qualified immunity based on 

this reasoning. 

The qualified immunity question, however, does not ask whether it would be clear 

to an officer that a specific defense would justify his conduct, but whether “his conduct was 

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The answer to this question entitles Deputy Edwards to qualified immunity. 

Because the court finds no Supreme Court precedent clearly on point, it looks to 

the Ninth Circuit for application of “clearly established law.” See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244–45 

(looking to circuit court decisions to inform its qualified immunity analysis). In United States v. 

Orman, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held no Fourth Amendment violation occurred 

when, following a consensual encounter, an officer seized a person’s weapon upon reasonable 

suspicion that the person was armed and where the seizure was effected for safety purposes. 486 

F. 3d 1170, 1175–77 (9th Cir. 2007). In Orman, the officer asked for and received consent to 

approach the plaintiff after hearing he had brought a gun into a shopping mall. Id. at 1176. The 

officer’s reasonable suspicion rose to certainty after the plaintiff confirmed he was carrying a gun. 

Id. Because the officer’s eventual retrieval of the gun was designed to protect the officer’s safety 

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and the safety of shoppers, the Ninth Circuit held the officer’s “seizure . . . was not contrary to the 

Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1177. 

Here, the undisputed material facts show Deputy Edwards’ encounter with Mr. 

Gibbs was consensual. Deputy Edwards encountered Mr. Gibbs in response to a request to 

transport Mr. Gibbs to Motel 6. F&R at 2. The undisputed facts show at the time of the 

encounter, upon seeing Mr. Gibbs with a shotgun and three dogs, Deputy Edwards had safety 

concerns about Mr. Gibbs, who appeared unstable. Id. at 6. These facts taken together, when 

considered in light of Orman, convince the court Deputy Edwards’ seizure was reasonable. 

Deputy Edwards is entitled to qualified immunity. 

D. Requested Leave for Joinder 

Mr. Gibbs requests leave to join Shasta County and the District Attorney of Shasta 

County, contending when he first filed the action on December 18, 2013, the County civil clerk 

erroneously informed him that “entities” could not be sued. Objections at 1. Notwithstanding 

whether Mr. Gibbs properly characterizes the District Attorney of Shasta County as an entity, this 

argument is not properly before this court, and is hereby disregarded. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 302 

(c)(21) (Magistrate judges shall perform all actions in which all the plaintiffs or all the defendants 

are proceeding in in propria persona, including dispositive and non-dispositive motions and 

matters). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The findings and recommendations are ADOPTED as clarified here and to the 

extent consistent with this order. Sergeant Jackson’s and Deputy Edward’s motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED. 

This order resolves ECF No. 30. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 30, 2016. 

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