Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02014/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BETH MANGIAPANE,

Plaintiff,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-02014-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 11

Pending before the Court is a motion to remand filed by Plaintiff Beth Mangiapane. See 

Dkt. No. 11. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the 

matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court 

GRANTS the motion to remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action in Santa Clara County Superior Court on March 12, 2019. See 

Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A (“Compl.”). Plaintiff alleges that on January 30, 2011, she purchased a 

vehicle manufactured by Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) from Defendant Tuttle-Click

Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. (“Tuttle-Click”), a Ford dealership. Id. at ¶¶ 8–9. The vehicle was 

covered by an express 3-year/36,000-mile bumper-to-bumper warranty and a 5-year/60,000-mile 

powertrain warranty from Ford. Id. at ¶ 9. Under the warranty, Ford undertook to maintain the 

utility and performance of the vehicle or to provide compensation in the event of a failure in utility 

or performance. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff could deliver the vehicle to Ford’s representative for 

repair in the event of a defect. Id.

Plaintiff identifies several defects that developed during the warranty period that impaired 

the use, value, or safety of the vehicle. See id. at ¶ 10. However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

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did not cure these defects, replace the vehicle, or make other restitution, despite having several 

opportunities to do so. Id. ¶¶ 11, 26. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts several causes of 

action, including for breach of express and implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Consumer 

Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq. (“Song-Beverly”). See id. at ¶¶ 8–46. Plaintiff’s 

only cause of action against Tuttle-Click is Count Five, for breach of the implied warranty of 

merchantability. See id. ¶¶ 29–33.

Defendants removed this action on April 15, 2019, asserting diversity jurisdiction. See 

Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff now seeks to remand the action back to state court. See Dkt. No. 11.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a 

State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 

removed” to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts have original jurisdiction over 

civil actions between citizens of different states in which the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To properly invoke diversity jurisdiction, the defendant 

bears the burden of proving that the parties in the action are completely diverse, meaning that 

“each plaintiff [is] of a different citizenship from each defendant.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by 

& through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018).

If the district court lacks jurisdiction over an action, a plaintiff may seek remand to state 

court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). There is a “strong presumption” in favor of remand, and 

“[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 

instance.” Guas v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, “[t]he strong 

presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of 

establishing that removal is proper . . . .” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th 

Cir. 2009).

III. DISCUSSION

Here, Defendants’ notice of removal states that there is complete diversity because

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Plaintiff is a citizen of California1and Ford is a citizen of Michigan and Delaware. See id. at 

¶¶ 19, 36. Defendants further assert that the only claim against Tuttle-Click, the non-diverse 

Defendant, is barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at ¶ 2. As such, Defendants state that 

Tuttle-Click was fraudulently joined, and its California citizenship should not defeat federal 

diversity jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 36. Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court exercise its 

discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to sever Tuttle-Click from this action. See id.

at ¶¶ 34–36. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Fraudulent Joinder

Tuttle-Click, as a corporation organized under the laws of California, would ordinarily 

defeat federal diversity jurisdiction because Plaintiff is also a citizen of California. See Compl. 

¶¶ 2, 5. Although the removing party must establish complete diversity, “[i]n determining whether 

there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant 

who has been fraudulently joined.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548. The Ninth Circuit has clarified 

that there are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder:

(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability 

of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse 

party in state court.

Id. (quotation omitted). In the absence of actual fraud, therefore, a defendant must “show[] that an 

individual joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory.” Id. “[I]f there is a possibility that a 

state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident 

defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state 

court.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, joinder is only fraudulent if it is “obvious according 

to the settled rules of the state that [the plaintiff] has failed to state a claim against [the resident

 

1 The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s attempt to demur as to whether she is a citizen of 

California. See Dkt. No. 11-1 at 2, n.2. Defendant’s notice of removal alleges that Plaintiff is a 

citizen of California, see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 18, and her complaint states that she “is a resident of 

Orange County, California,” see Compl. ¶ 2. “[A]bsent evidence about domicile to the contrary,”

Plaintiff’s California residence provides a factual basis for Defendants’ allegation that she is a 

California citizen. See, e.g., Ervin v. Ballard Marine Constr., Inc., No. 16-CV-02931-WHO, 2016 

WL 4239710, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016) (collecting cases); Covarrubias v. Ford Motor Co., 

No. 19-CV-01832-EMC, 2019 WL 2866046, at *5, n.2 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2019).

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defendant].” See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046 (quotation omitted).

Thus, courts have found fraudulent joinder “where a defendant presents extraordinarily 

strong evidence or arguments that a plaintiff could not possibly prevail on her claims against the 

allegedly fraudulently joined defendant,” including where “a plaintiff is barred by the statute of 

limitations from bringing claims against that defendant.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548. However, in 

contrast, it is not enough to sustain a finding of fraudulent joinder where “a defendant raises a 

defense that requires a searching inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff’s case, even if that defense, 

if successful, would prove fatal.” Id. at 548–49 (citing Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046).

Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s sole cause of action against Tuttle-Click for 

breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is barred by the statute of limitations. See Dkt. 

No. 1 at 5–8; Dkt. No. 14 at 3–11. Under California law, the applicable statute of limitations is 

four years from the date the vehicle was delivered. See Cal. Com. Code § 2725(1)–(2); see also 

Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1305–06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Because

Plaintiff took delivery of the vehicle on or about January 30, 2011, her cause of action for breach 

of the implied warranty accrued on that date, and the statute of limitations expired on January 30, 

2015. See Compl. ¶ 8. But Plaintiff did not file this action until March 12, 2019.

In response, Plaintiff cites several tolling doctrines—the future performance exception, the 

repair doctrine, and fraudulent concealment—that she contends apply so as to make her claim 

against Tuttle-Click viable. See Dkt. No. 11 at 7–11.

i. Future Performance

Plaintiff first contends that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the 

discovery of the breach. See Dkt. No. 11 at 8. In support of this theory, Plaintiff cites to an 

exception in California Commercial Code § 2725, which states that “where a warranty explicitly 

extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of 

such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.” 

See id. (citing Cal. Com. Code § 2725(2)). Plaintiff suggests that because Ford’s express 5-

year/60,000-mile powertrain warranty extends to future performance, somehow the implied 

warranty of merchantability is tolled during the duration of the express warranty. See id. at 9–10.

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The California Court of Appeal has emphasized that the future performance exception 

“must be narrowly construed,” as it “applies only when the seller has expressly agreed to warrant 

its product for a specific and defined period of time.” See Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Elecs. 

Corp., 169 Cal. App. 4th 116, 130, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added). “Because an 

implied warranty is one that arises by operation of law rather than by an express agreement of the 

parties, courts have consistently held it is not a warranty that explicitly extends to future 

performance of the goods . . . .” Id. at 134 (collecting cases).

Plaintiff relies on Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 211 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 1991), but Krieger does not hold that the four-year statute of limitations for implied 

warranties can be tolled for the duration of an express warranty. Id.; accord Covarrubias, 2019 

WL 2866046 at *3; Philips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-CV-02989-LHK, 2016 WL 1745948, at 

*12–13 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2016). Because Plaintiff’s cause of action against Tuttle-Click is for 

breach of an implied warranty, the future performance exception is inapplicable to her claim.

ii. Repair Doctrine

Next, Plaintiff suggests that the four-year statute of limitations was tolled under the “repair 

doctrine.” See Dkt. No. 11 at 10–11. California Civil Code § 1795.6 states that:

Notwithstanding the date or conditions set for the expiration of the 

warranty period, such warranty period shall not be deemed expired 

if . . . the warranty repairs or service performed upon the 

nonconforming goods did not remedy the nonconformity for which 

such repairs or service was performed and the buyer notified the 

manufacturer or seller of this failure within 60 days after the repairs 

or service was completed. When the warranty repairs or service has 

been performed so as to remedy the nonconformity, the warranty 

period shall expire in accordance with its terms, including any 

extension to the warranty period for warranty repairs or service.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1795.6(b). However, as the plain language of the provision makes clear, Section 

1795.6 addresses extending the “warranty period,” not tolling the statute of limitations, during the 

time of repair. Id.; cf. Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions Nos. 3212, 3231.

The one-year implied warranty duration can be lengthened by the number of days that the vehicle 

was available for repairs under the warranty. Id. Even assuming extending the duration of the 

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implied warranty under the repair doctrine would concomitantly extend the statute of limitations, 

Plaintiff did not file this action until eight years after she purchased the vehicle, see Compl. ¶ 8, 

and seven years after the implied warranty ordinarily would have expired. Thus, for the repair 

doctrine to somehow preserve Plaintiff’s implied warranty claim, the vehicle would have had to be 

under repair for seven of the eight years that Plaintiff owned the vehicle. The Court finds it 

entirely implausible that Plaintiff could toll the statute of limitations under the repair doctrine.

iii. Fraudulent Concealment

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ fraudulent concealment tolls her implied 

warranty claim against Tuttle-Click. See Dkt. No. 11 at 8, 11. The California Supreme Court has 

explained that “[t]he doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations where a 

defendant, through deceptive conduct, has caused a claim to grow stale.” Aryeh v. Canon Bus. 

Sols., Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1192 (Cal. 2013). The underlying purpose of the doctrine is “that the 

defendant, having by fraud or deceit concealed material facts and by misrepresentations hindered 

the plaintiff from bringing an action within the statutory period, is estopped from taking advantage 

of his own wrong.” Inv’rs Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1532 

(2011), as modified (Cal. Ct. App. June 15, 2011); Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior 

Court, 20 Cal. 4th 509, 533 (Cal. 1999) (“In articulating the doctrine, the courts have had as their 

purpose to disarm a defendant who, by his own deception, has caused a claim to become stale and 

a plaintiff dilatory.”).

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint and motion to remand suffer 

from significant drafting errors, including intermittently referring to “Defendants,” plural, and 

“Defendant,” singular. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 33 (“Plaintiff has been damaged by Defendant’s failure 

to comply with its obligations under the implied warranty” (emphasis added)); Dkt. No. 11-1 at 11 

(“Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant failed to disclose and actively concealed 

material facts from Plaintiff” (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, Plaintiff alleges in the complaint 

that “Ford was well aware and knew that the Sync system installed on the subject vehicle was 

defective but failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter,” and that 

“[Ford] has issued various technical bulletins to its dealers.” See Compl. ¶¶ 36–46, & n. 1. 

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Plaintiff further explains that Ford acquired this knowledge, at least in part, through “Ford’s 

network of dealers.” See id. at ¶ 39. Although such inartfully pleaded allegations may well fail to

survive a motion to dismiss, the standard for demonstrating fraudulent joinder is a high one. The 

Court thus cannot conclude that it would be impossible for Plaintiff to allege fraudulent 

concealment tolling sufficient to state a claim against Tuttle-Click were she given leave to amend. 

See Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548; see also Heslop v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-CV-01422-LHK, 2019 

WL 3026954, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2019) (finding that “it is not impossible for Plaintiffs to 

state a viable implied warranty claim against [the dealership]” because “fraudulent concealment 

tolling applies to claims brought under the Song-Beverly Act”); Cavale v. Ford Motor Co., No. 

118CV00680LJOBAM, 2018 WL 3811727, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2018) (same). The Court

therefore finds that Defendants have not met the high bar of establishing that Tuttle-Click was 

fraudulently joined. See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (“The strong presumption against removal 

jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 

proper . . . .”).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21

Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court sever Tuttle-Click from the action under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. See Dkt. No. 14 at 10–11. Rule 21 provides that a court may 

sua sponte “at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Sams v. Beech 

Aircraft, 625 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that Rule 21 “grants a federal district or 

appellate court the discretionary power to perfect its diversity jurisdiction by dropping a 

nondiverse party provided the nondiverse party is not indispensable to the action under Rule 19”). 

However, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to sever Tuttle-Click as it would run counter 

to judicial efficiency, and it would create an end-run around the Ninth Circuit’s admonition that 

“[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 

instance.” Guas, 980 F.2d at 566. Plaintiff’s claims against both Ford and Tuttle-Click involve 

the same vehicle and the same alleged defects, and Plaintiff brings its implied warranty of 

merchantability claim against both Defendants. See Compl. at ¶¶ 29–33.

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand and REMANDS the case to Santa

Clara County Superior Court. The clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/16/2019

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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