Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00574/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00574-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Renie Varela Valencia, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan; et. al, 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 09-574-TUC-FRZ (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. 6). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court,

this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. For the following reasons, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny and dismiss Petitioner’s

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State Proceedings

1. Conviction

In 2006, after a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree burglary and theft

by control, both class two felonies. (Answer (Doc. 15), p. 2 (citing Exh. A, ¶1); Answer Exh.

C, p. 2; Amended Petition, p.1). He was sentenced, as a repetitive offender, to concurrent,

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presumptive prison terms, the longest of which is 15.75 years. (Answer, p. 2 (citing Exh. A,

¶1)).

The pertinent facts leading to Petitioner’s conviction are that in January 2005, a

Tucson residence was burglarized and many items were taken, including clothing the female

resident had purchased the day before at a local department store. (Answer, Exh. A, p. 2).

The police investigation led to Elizabeth Valencia, Petitioner’s sister, who had possession

of the clothing stolen in the burglary. (Answer, Exh. A, p. 3; Answer, Exh. B, p.2; Answer,

Exh. C, p. 5 (indicating that Petitioner’s sister returned the clothing taken during the burglary

to the department store where they had been purchased)). The police matched Petitioner’s

DNA to DNA found on a cigarette butt discovered “under a pile of [the female resident’s]

belongings...” at the residence. (Answer, Exh. A, pp. 2-3). Neither resident smoked, nor did

they have any guests in their home the day of the burglary. (Id. at p.2). At trial, the residents

testified that they did not know Petitioner, nor had they given him permission to enter their

home. (Id. at p.3).

2. Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction and sentences claiming that: (1) the

trial court erred by refusing to give his requested instruction on the legal significance of

DNA evidence; and (2) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and

the prohibition against double jeopardy when it found he had prior felony convictions which

qualified Petitioner for enhanced sentences. (Answer, p. 2 & Exh. A, pp. 3-4, 6-7). On

February 26, 2007, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences.

(Answer, p. 2 & Exh. A). Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Answer, p. 3 (citing Exh. D)). 

3. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On March 20, 2006, before the appellate court issued its decision in Petitioner’s direct

appeal, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the trial court. (Answer, Exh.

E). Thereafter, Petitioner, through counsel, filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

(hereinafter “PCR Petition”) wherein Petitioner claimed that trial counsel had been

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ineffective by failing to: (1) seek independent testing of the DNA evidence; (2) interview

witnesses before trial; and (3) proffer a third-party-culpability defense. (Answer, Exh. F).

The trial court found all three claims meritless under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984) and denied relief. (Answer, Exh. B).

Petitioner, through counsel, sought appellate review of the trial court’s denial of his

PCR Petition on the following issues: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

obtain independent testing of the DNA evidence; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective

by failing to interview witness; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in

denying Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing during the PCR proceeding. (Answer,

Exh. G). The appellate court granted review but denied relief. (Answer, Exh. H). Petitioner

sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court which was denied without comment. (Answer,

Exh. J). 

B. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief in his Amended Habeas Petition. Petitioner’s

first ground for relief contains multiple claims that his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel was violated when his trial counsel failed to: (a) object to the trial

court’s failure to give a jury instruction regarding the gathering of evidence; (b) investigate

alleged contamination of evidence; and (c) seek independent testing of DNA evidence.

(Ground I sub-claims (a)-(c)). Petitioner also claims in Ground I that the trial court’s refusal

to hold an evidentiary hearing violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Ground I sub-claim (d)). In his second ground for relief, Petitioner claims that

his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court, instead of a jury,

enhanced his sentence by determining the fact of Petitioner’s prior convictions, (Ground II

sub-claim (a)), and that this determination also violated the prohibition against double

jeopardy. (Ground II sub-claim (b)). Petitioner also claims that someone else confessed to

the crime for which Petitioner stands convicted and that his trial counsel failed to advance

a third-party culpability defense. (Ground II sub-claim (c). 

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Respondents concede that the Amended Petition is timely filed. (Answer, p. 4).

Respondents contend that the Amended Petition should be dismissed and denied because

many of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and those claims that are not

procedurally defaulted lack merit. Petitioner did not file a reply to Respondents’ Answer.

II. STANDARDS

A. Exhaustion & Procedural Default

1. Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state court remedies available to him 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion inquiry

focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion

generally requires that a prisoner provide the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims

before he presents those claims to a federal court. Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim

for relief so long as the petitioner has a right under state law to raise the claim by available

procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have “‘fairly present[ed]’ his

claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the factual or legal bases

for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that the...[petitioner is] asserting

claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. See also Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Mere similarity between a claim raised

in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at

365-66.

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts one

full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Once a federal

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1

The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there are exceptions

to the rule that a district court can decide whether state remedies remain available for claims

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claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.

See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas petitions, other than those

concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted

if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on appeal of the

conviction or through a collateral proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

529 U.S. 1124 (2000). Thus, “[a] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court

for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the

proper forum..., (2) through the proper vehicle..., and (3) by providing the proper factual and

legal basis for the claim....” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

2. Procedural Default

In some instances, a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court

did not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion;

there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). A claim is procedurally

defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on the merits for procedural reasons

such as waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Franklin

v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). A higher court’s subsequent summary denial

reaffirms the lower court’s application of a procedural bar. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.

Additionally, procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state

court and it is clear the state court would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for

procedural reasons. Id. Thus, if a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal

habeas court may determine whether state remedies remain available.1

 See Harris v. Reed,

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that require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d

614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1172 (2006). The issue of waiver must be

affirmatively raised by the petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir.

2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003).

2

Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his sentence

has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered material facts probably exist

and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there

has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's conviction

if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)

(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination

often involves consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

governing post-conviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies

when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal

constitutional challenges to convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred, inter

alia, on any claim which could have been raised on direct appeal or could have been raised

in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain claims2

which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. Moreover, a state

post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v.

Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from

preclusion under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)).

Both of these instances of procedural default provide an independent and adequate

state-law ground for the conviction and sentence and thus prevents federal habeas corpus

review. Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine prevents state prisoners from obtaining

federal review by allowing the time to run on available state remedies and then rushing to

federal court seeking review. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-732.

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A federal court may not consider a claim that is procedurally defaulted unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default, or demonstrates a

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162

(1996); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-495 (1986); Coleman, 501 U.S. at

750; Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 321 (1995)); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Generally, “cause” sufficient “to excuse a

default exists if the petitioner ‘can show that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’” Cook, 538 F.3d at

1027 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). Prejudice is defined as actual harm resulting from

the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.

1984). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). If the

petitioner fails to establish cause sufficient to excuse a procedural default, the court “need

not consider whether he suffered actual prejudice.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 n.13. 

To fall within the narrow class of cases that implicates a fundamental miscarriage of

justice, a petitioner “must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual innocence” which

“can be shown when a petitioner presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot

have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was

free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th

Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.

The Supreme Court has stated that “actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal

insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “‘To be credible,...a

claim [of actual innocence] requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional

error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence–that was not presented at trial.’” Cook,

538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).

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 3. Conclusion

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default/bar are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be required

to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that when a petitioner

fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present his claims there. Id.

In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and a petitioner cannot show

cause and prejudice for the default [or a fundamental miscarriage of justice]...the district

court dismisses the petition because the petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id.

at 1231.

B. Review of habeas corpus claim on the merits

Pursuant to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”), the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state

court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the

question whether a state court erred in applying the law is a different question from whether

it erred in determining the facts. Rice v. Collins 546 U.S. 333 (2006). 

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the “contrary to” test and the

“unreasonable application” test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under the first test, the state court’s “decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.

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3

“[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999), only the

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original).

4

Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial. Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011). In such circumstances, the petitioner

can satisfy the “unreasonable application” prong of section 2254(d)(1) “only by showing that

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2003)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000)). Additionally, a state court’s

decision is “‘contrary to’ Supreme Court case law if the state court ‘applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in’ Supreme Court cases.”3 Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347

F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). “Whether a

state court’s interpretation of federal law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a

question of federal law as to which [the federal courts]...owe no deference to the state

courts.” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis in original)(distinguishing deference owed

under the “contrary to” test of section (d)(1) with that owed under the “unreasonable

application” test). 

Under the second test, “‘[a] state court’s decision involves an unreasonable

application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle...but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Van

Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the “unreasonable

application clause...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly....Rather that application must be

objectively unreasonable.’” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63 (2003)). When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable

application of federal law, “[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court

interpretations of federal law....” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929.4

 

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‘there was no reasonable basis for’ the...” state court’s decision. Id. (quoting Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011)).

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Further, a federal habeas court can only look to the record before the state court in

reviewing a state court decision under section 2254(d)(1). Cullen, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct.

at 1400 (“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas

petitioner must overcome the limitation of §2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that

state court.”)(footnote omitted); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004)(“[W]e have

made clear that whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light

of the record the court had before it.”)(citations omitted).

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, “the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978: see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied 543 U.S. 1038 (2004)(“a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.”). Section (d)(2) “applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court’s findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective...or that no

finding was made by the state court at all.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted). In

examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court “must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues...[M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court’s

findings of fact is insufficient; ‘we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court’s fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.’” Lambert. 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000)(emphasis in original). 

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5

Under the AEDPA “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct” and the presumption of correctness may be overcome only by clear

and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). The “AEDPA spells out what this

presumption means: State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence

presented for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and

convincing proof that the state-court finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption of

correctness and the clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into play once...” it

is found that the state court reasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state proceeding. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. 

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Once the federal court is satisfied that the state court’s fact-finding process was

reasonable, or where the petitioner does not challenge such findings, “the state court’s

findings are dressed in a presumption of correctness, which then helps steel them against any

challenge based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal

court.”5 Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000: see also 28 U.S.C. §2254(c). Factual and credibility

determinations by either state trial or appellate courts are imbued with a presumption of

correctness. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002);

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1078 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.

2001). Furthermore, factual assertions made in support of properly exhausted claims in state

court cannot be altered or expanded upon without permission of the federal habeas court. See

Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions “receive similarly mixed review; the state

court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed under section 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1).” Lambert, 393 F.3d at

978.

III. DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that Petitioner has exhausted only his: (1) Ground I claim that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek independent DNA testing; and (2) Ground II

claims regarding the trial court’s finding of the fact of his prior felony convictions. (Answer,

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6

Because this claim is procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 32.4(a),

Ariz.R.Crim.P., this Court need not determine whether the claims are of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver such that

the claims are precluded pursuant to Cassett. Moreover, the procedural timeliness bar of Rule

32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., is clear, consistently applied, and well established. Powell v.

Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.2004); see e.g., Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 987 P.2d 226 (where

petitioner did not raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through (g), the petition could be

summarily dismissed if untimely); Moreno, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (timeliness

provision of Rule 32.4(a) became effective September 20, 1992); Jones, 182 Ariz. at 434,

897 P.2d at 736 (Rule 32.4(a) was amended “to address potential abuse by defendants caused

by the old rule's unlimited filing periods”); see also Wagner v. Stewart, 2008 WL 169639,

*9 (D.Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008).

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p. 4). According to Respondents, all of Petitioner’s other claims are procedurally defaulted

and, thus, barred from federal habeas corpus review.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

1. Petitioner’s Ground I sub-claims (a) and (b)

Upon review of the record, the Court agrees with Respondents that Petitioner never

raised in state court his present claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (a)

object to the trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction regarding the gathering of

evidence; and (b) investigate alleged contamination of evidence. Therefore, Petitioner failed

to fairly present his claim to the state court. Moreover, Petitioner’s return to state court to

raise such a claim would be futile given that the claim is precluded as waived under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) because it was not presented on direct appeal or in Petitioner’s

PCR Petition. Further, presentation of such claim in a second post-conviction relief

proceeding would be untimely under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a

state post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred). Nor does the claim qualify for

any of the timeliness exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h). Thus, any additional

petition would be subject to summary dismissal. See State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266,

987 P.2d 226, 228 (App. 1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d 734 (App. 1995);

Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998) (timeliness is a separate

inquiry from preclusion). Under such circumstances, the claim is procedurally defaulted.6

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Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas review is

precluded where petitioner has not raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing

so has expired). Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural

default. Nor has Petitioner presented any evidence that would sustain application of the

“fundamental miscarriage of justice exception” to the procedural default rule. Consequently,

Petitioner’s Ground I sub-claims (a) and (b) are precluded from federal habeas review. 

2. Ground I sub-claim (d)

Petitioner asserts that the “trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant me [a]n

evidentiary hearing [sic] to deprive me a hearing would deny me due process of law.”

(Amended Petition, p. 6). Petitioner does not identify the proceeding, (i.e., pre-trial, trial, or

post-conviction relief) during which Petitioner contends he was denied an evidentiary

hearing. Nor does Petitioner state the issue that would have been addressed at the hearing.

Petitioner is “required to allege facts with sufficient specificity to support his claim for

relief.” Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1246 (9th Cir.1979)(footnote omitted). In the

petition, he must “... specify all the grounds for relief which are available to [him]... and

[s]hall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified.”

Id. (citations omitted); see also Rule 2(c)(1), Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under

Section 2254 (“The petition must...state the facts supporting each ground[]” for relief.).

Petitioner has failed to set forth sufficient facts upon which this Court can resolve such a

claim. Additionally, to any extent that Petitioner alleges the trial court’s denial of an

evidentiary hearing prior to conviction constituted a due process violation, Petitioner has

failed to present such a claim on direct appeal or during the PCR proceeding, and the claim

is now procedurally defaulted for the same reasons that Petitioner’s Ground I sub-claims (a)

and (b) are defaulted. See supra, at III.A.1. Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and

prejudice to excuse his procedural default on this issue. Nor has Petitioner presented any

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evidence that would sustain application of the “fundamental miscarriage of justice exception”

to the procedural default rule on this issue. 

Further, to any extent that Petitioner’s claim is directed to the trial court’s denial of

an evidentiary hearing during the PCR proceeding, it is well-settled that a habeas petition

“alleging errors in the state-post conviction review process is not addressable through habeas

corpus proceedings.” Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (due process claim

based on alleged delay by state court in resolving petitioner’s petition for post-conviction

relief is not cognizable through federal habeas corpus proceeding); see also Gerlaugh v.

Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) (alleged errors concerning Arizona’s postconviction review process are not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding); Carriger v.

Stewart, 95 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 1996) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 132 F.3d 463

(1997). Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground I sub-claim (d) should be dismissed as conclusory,

and/or procedurally defaulted, and/or not cognizable for federal habeas relief.

3. Ground II sub-claim (c)

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advance a thirdparty culpability defense. (Amended Petition, p. 7). Petitioner raised this claim in his PCR

Petition. (Answer, Exh. F). However, as Respondents correctly point out, Petitioner did not

raise this issue in his Petition for Review of the trial court’s denial of his PCR Petition. (See

Answer, Exh. G). To properly exhaust this claim, Petitioner was required to present it to the

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. Therefore, Petitioner has failed

to present the issue for one complete round of state court review. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S.

at 845 (to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established

appellate review process."). Further, Arizona's statutory time limit for seeking appellate

review of the trial court's denial of post-conviction review bars Petitioner from returning to

state court now to seek appellate review. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4; 32.9(c)(requiring a

petition for review to be filed within 30 days of the final decision of the trial court on a

petition for post-conviction relief); see also Perry v. Elliot, 2008 WL 725012, *8 (D.Ariz.

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Mar. 17, 2008) (petitioner’s claim was procedurally defaulted because petition did not

present claim to appellate court within time limit set by Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9). Although a

procedural default may be overcome upon a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51, Petitioner has not established that

any exception to procedural default applies.

B. Review of Petitioner’s remaining claims on the merits

1. Ground I sub-claim (c)

At trial, the police department’s criminalist testified that DNA from the cigarette butt

found at the residence matched DNA obtained from Petitioner. (Answer, Exh. A, p.3).

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel’s failure to requisition independent testing of the DNA

evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

Respondents concede that Petitioner exhausted this claim during the PCR proceeding.

a. Standard

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984), the Supreme Court established

a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To establish that his

trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland, a petitioner must show: (1) that his trial

counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that trial counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced petitioner’s defense. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).

 To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that “counsel made errors

so serious...that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. The relevant inquiry

is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the decisions made by

defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998).

In considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained that ‘[r]eview of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

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fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.’” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting

Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The reasonableness of counsel’s

performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and

in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential.”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Additionally, “[a] fair assessment of

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct , and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Even where trial counsel’s performance is deficient, Petitioner must also establish

prejudice in order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To establish

prejudice, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

Under the prejudice factor, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does

not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on

the judgment.” Id. at 691. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just

conceivable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. at 792. Further, because failure to make

the required showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats the claim, the court

need not address both factors where one is lacking. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-700.

It is well settled that “[c]onclusory allegations [of ineffective assistance of counsel]

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James

v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (a petitioner

“making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that

are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment”); Ortiz, 149 F.3d

at 933 (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim where petitioner failed “to indicate

how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure...” to conduct cross-examination on a specific

issue); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987)(defendant was not denied

effective assistance of counsel for failure to call out-of-state witnesses absent indication of

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what witnesses would have testified to or how their testimony would have changed the

outcome of proceeding.); Cranford v. Sumner, 672 F.Supp. 453, 457 (D.Nev. 1987)(“Aside

from the bald allegation that his attorney should have raised this claim but did not, the

petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his attorney’s performance fell below the reasonable

level of professional competence required by Strickland.”). 

It is also well-established that a defendant has the ultimate authority to make

fundamental decisions regarding whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in his or

her own behalf, or take an appeal. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n. 1 (1977)(Burger,

C.J. concurring). However: 

[no decision of the Supreme Court] suggests,...that the indigent defendant has

a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points

requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment,

decides not to present those points.

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). To require otherwise would “seriously

undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s

professional evaluation.” Id. The professional judgment and evaluation every defendant is

entitled to is an examination of the record, research of the law, and the marshaling of

arguments on behalf of the defendant. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).

Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court’s review of the state court’s

decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689-699 (2002).

In order to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing that

the state court’s ruling rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim constituted an

unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); see also Cullen, __ U.S.

__, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (federal habeas court’s review of state court’s decision on ineffective

assistance of counsel claim is “doubly deferential.”); Harrington, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct.

at 788 (“Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness

under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the

question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is

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any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.”); West v.

Schriro, 2007 WL 4240859, *7 (D.Ariz. Nov. 29, 2007).

b. The state court proceeding

Petitioner raised this issue during his PCR proceeding. In it’s decision, the trial court

recognized that:

A successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must meet the twoprong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052

(1984). First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced his case.

(Answer, Exh. B, p. 1). Applying the Strickland standard, the trial court denied Petitioner’s

PCR Petition on this ground as follows:

By way of background, two things tied the defendant to the burglary scene.

His DNA was found on a cigarette butt, and his sister had possession of

clothing stolen in the burglary. He asserts that his trial counsel should have

arranged an independent DNA test.

The State arranged to have the DNA evidence reanalyzed on April 25, 2008

with the same results as presented at trial. The defendant’s petition is silent on

whether the defendant’s Rule 32 counsel arranged for an independent test.

Nor does the petition suggest any reason to believe that an independent

examination would have produced an outcome more favorable to the defense.

Thus, the defendant has not presented a colorable claim that he has been

prejudiced by his trial counsel’s purported failure. Relief is denied on this

claim.

(Id. at p.2). The trial court also noted that trial counsel “was well prepared and effectively

cross-examined the witnesses [including the State’s DNA expert] against the defendant.”

(Id.). 

Petitioner sought appellate review of the trial court’s decision. The appellate court

affirmed the trial court as follows in pertinent part:

Even assuming, arguendo, counsel’s omissions constituted deficient

performance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding lack of

prejudice. “Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an

ineffective assistance claim.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶21, 146 P.3d

63, 68 (2006). Valencia failed to explain how counsel’s failure to interview

the available witnesses negatively affected his defense, and the court

specifically noted its memory that “defense counsel was well prepared and

effectively cross-examined the witnesses.” Valencia also failed to show that

additional DNA testing would have yielded different or more favorable results

than those presented at trial.

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To the extent Valencia suggests prejudice should be presumed in this

case, we disagree. “[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case

to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth

Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively

unreliable.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). But an

“‘attorney’s failure must be complete’” in order for prejudice to be presumed.

State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, ¶63, 116 P.3d 1193, 1211 (2005) quoting Bell

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002) (emphasis in Glassel). This was not the

case here.

(Answer, Exh. H, pp. 2-3)(emphasis in original).

Because the Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment of the appellate

court’s decision (Answer, Exh. J), the decision from the Arizona Court of Appeals is the lastreasoned state court decision in this matter. 

c. Analysis

The state court, in applying Strickland, applied the correct law to the issue. See Dows

v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2000) (Strickland “is considered in this circuit to be

[]clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[]

for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) review.”). In applying Strickland, the state court

determined that defense counsel’s performance was not ineffective.

The state appellate court held that “[e]ven assuming, arguendo, counsel’s omission

constituted deficient performance...”, Petitioner, nonetheless, failed to satisfy Strickland’s

prejudice requirement. (Answer, Exh. H, p.3). There is no question that, in certain

circumstances, defense counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation can constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. However, speculation

about what evidence could have been produced by further investigation will not support a

Strickland claim. See Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 933 (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim

where petitioner failed “to indicate how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure...” to conduct

cross-examination on a specific issue); Berry, 814 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987)(defendant was

not denied effective assistance of counsel for failure to call out-of-state witnesses absent

indication of what witnesses would have testified to or how their testimony would have

changed the outcome of proceeding). The record reflects that results of the State’s re-test of

the DNA evidence during the PCR proceeding were consistent with that presented at trial.

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Petitioner fails to identify what additional evidence independent DNA testing would have

produced. Nor does Petitioner proffer any credible basis for questioning the veracity of the

prosecution’s DNA analysis. There simply is no basis for finding that an independent DNA

test would have been more beneficial to Petitioner’s position. Consequently, the state court’s

conclusion that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice under Strickland was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of Strickland. See id.; see also Grisby v. Blodgett, 130

F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Speculation about what an expert could have said is not

enough to establish prejudice[]” under Strickland). Further, there is no showing on the

instant record that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Petitioner’s claim

fails on the merits.

2. Ground II sub-claims (a) and (b)

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s finding concerning his prior felony convictions

violated his right to a jury trial and the prohibition against double jeopardy. Respondents

concede that Petitioner exhausted “his Sixth Amendment claim regarding the trial court’s

finding the fact of his prior convictions.” (Answer, p. 4). Respondents do not address

Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim. The record is clear that Petitioner raised the double

jeopardy issue on direct appeal, thus, the claim is exhausted. (See Answer, Exh. A, pp. 6-7).

a. The state court proceeding

In resolving Petitioner’s direct appeal regarding the trial court’s finding of Petitioner’s

prior felony convictions during sentencing, the appellate court stated:

Valencia next argues the trial court violated his constitutional right to

a jury trial when it found he had prior felony convictions that qualified him for

enhanced sentences. He also contends the trial court violated his right to be

free from double jeopardy by imposing an enhanced sentence based on that

finding because it was made after the court had dismissed the jury. As

Valencia acknowledges, both of these arguments have been presented to us in

a previous case, and we have rejected them. State v. Keith, 211 Ariz. 436, ¶¶3,

7, 122 P.3d 229, 230, 231 (App. 2005). We again reject them for the reasons

we articulated there. 

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(Answer, Exh. A, pp. 6-7). The appellate decision is the last-reasoned state court decision

on this issue. 

b. Analysis

Petitioner takes issue with the fact that the trial court, and not a jury, determined the

fact of Petitioner’s prior felony convictions which, in turn, qualified him for enhanced

sentences.

(1.) Sixth Amendment claim

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal

defendant the right to a jury. This right continues through the sentencing process, i.e., a

defendant has the right to demand that a jury find the existence of any specific fact that the

law makes essential to his punishment. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that:

Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for

a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,

and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)(emphasis added). Accordingly, the U.S.

Supreme Court has made clear that the aggravating factor of a prior conviction is exempt

from the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial requirement. Id.; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.

 In rejecting Petitioner’s direct appeal on this issue, the appellate court adopted the

reasoning set out in another Arizona case, State v. Keith, 211 Ariz. 436, 122 P.2d 229 (App.

2005). (Answer, Exh. A, pp. 6-7). In Keith, the defendant, like Petitioner herein, argued that

for sentencing enhancement purposes, “the fact of a prior conviction must be submitted to

a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Keith, 211 Ariz. at 437, 122 P.2d at 230. In

denying this claim, the Arizona Court held that “Apprendi expressly exempts prior

convictions from the requirement of a jury trial: ‘Other than the fact of a prior conviction,

any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 490) (citations omitted). 

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Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224(1998).

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The Keith court correctly recognized that under United States Supreme Court case

law, the aggravating factor of a prior conviction is exempt from the Sixth Amendment’s jury

trial requirement. In Petitioner’s case, the appellate court followed Keith’s application of the

U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi to deny Petitioner’s claim. There is no question

that Petitioner’s claim is foreclosed by Apprendi. Therefore, the state court’s decision in

Petitioner’s case is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application, of clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Further, there is no showing

on the instant record that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits.

(2.) Double jeopardy claim

Petitioner claims that the “prior convictions finding made after the trial jury had been

dismissed violated the prohibition against double jeopardy.” (Amended Petition, p. 7). The

appellate court adopted the reasoning in Keith to deny Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim.

(Answer, Exh. A, pp. 6-7). In rejecting a similar claim, the Keith court relied on the United

States Supreme Court’s ruling in Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728-729 (1998) “which

excepts noncapital sentencing proceedings from double jeopardy clause protection....” 

Keith, 211 Ariz. at 437, 122 P. 3d. at 230. The Keith court went on to hold that because the

defendant “had no right to a jury trial on his prior convictions...the dismissal of the jury was

irrelevant to any double jeopardy issue.” Id. The Keith court also stated: “Because the

Supreme Court has excepted prior convictions from inclusion as elements of the offense

under Apprendi, we see nothing in Apprendi or Blakely that disapproves of this bifurcated

approach approved in Almendarez–Torres[7] under which the existence of prior convictions

is determined after conviction.” Id. at 437-438, 122 P.3d at 230-231.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

Amendment “protects against successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal or

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conviction and against multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.” Monge, 524

U.S. at 728 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has also generally found “double

jeopardy protections inapplicable to sentencing proceedings...because the determinations at

issue do not place a defendant in jeopardy for an ‘offense’....Nor have sentence

enhancements been construed as additional punishment for the previous offense....” Id.

(citations omitted). Thus,

[a]n enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender...“is not to be viewed

as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes” but as “a

stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated

offense because a repetitive one.”

Id. (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)); see also Witte v. United States, 515

U.S. 389, 400 (1995)(recidivist statutes do not violate the prohibition against double

jeopardy). Therefore, double jeopardy protections are inapplicable to Petitioner’s challenged

sentencing enhancement. See id.; see also Escalera v. Almager, 2009 WL 735199, *6 (E.D.

Cal. Mar. 19, 2009) (use of petitioner’s prior conviction to enhance his current sentence did

not place petitioner in double jeopardy); Guzman v. Ryan, 2009 WL 1066239, *17 (D.Ariz.

April 21, 2009) (“use of a prior conviction to enhance a sentence is not a double jeopardy

violation.”). Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law

as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Further, there is no showing on the

instant record that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Petitioner’s claim

fails on the merits.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s claims that have been exhausted should be

denied on the merits. Petitioner’s remaining claims are either procedurally defaulted or not

cognizable for federal habeas review.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

dismiss and deny Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 6) as

follows:

(1) Ground 1 sub-claim (a) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to the trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction regarding the gathering of

evidence should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted;

(2) Ground I sub-claim (b) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate alleged contamination evidence should be dismissed as

procedurally defaulted;

(3) Petitioner’s Ground I sub-claim (c) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to conduct independent testing of the DNA evidence should be denied on the

merits;

(4) Petitioner’s Ground I sub-claim (d) that the trial court violated his right to due

process when it declined to hold an evidentiary hearing should be dismissed

as conclusory, or alternatively as procedurally defaulted, or alternatively as not

cognizable for federal habeas relief; 

(5) Petitioner’s Ground II sub-claims (a) and (b) regarding the trial court’s finding

of Petitioner’s prior felony convictions should be denied on the merits; and

(6) Petitioner’s Ground II sub-claim (c) that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to advance a third-party culpability defense should be dismissed as

procedurally defaulted.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P.

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72(b)(2). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 09-

574-TUC-FRZ.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 6th day of January, 2012.

Case 4:09-cv-00574-FRZ Document 16 Filed 01/09/12 Page 25 of 25