Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03656/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03656-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA LAINE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF LIVERMORE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03656-VC 

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

In this case, the City towed Laine's car, and Laine sued on a variety of theories. The 

Court entered summary judgment for the City on all but one of Laine's claims – the claim that 

the City denied him procedural due process by failing to give him a timely hearing on the 

validity of the tow. The City conceded that it failed to give Laine a timely hearing, so the case 

was scheduled for trial to determine the damages Laine suffered because of this due process 

violation.

Before the pretrial conference, the Court advised the parties that it would grant summary 

judgment sua sponte unless they could identify some genuine dispute of material fact as to actual 

damages. Order re Pretrial Conference (Dkt. 90); see also Portsmouth Square Inc. v. 

Shareholders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985). The pretrial papers

suggested that both Laine and the City were proceeding to trial on the assumption that a violation 

of Laine's constitutional right to a post-deprivation hearing necessarily entitled him to actual 

damages for the underlying deprivation. That assumption was wrong. See Watson v. City of San 

Jose, 800 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 (1978). 

There's no question that the City had the right to tow and hold Laine's car. Laine Resp. to RFA 

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(Dkt. 93-6) at 5, 17-18; Laine Trial Br. (Dkt. 89) at 2-4; Cal. Veh. Code § 22651(o)(1)(A). 

Therefore, Laine can't recover damages for the loss of his car. The only damages he could 

recover are those resulting from the City's delay in letting him challenge the tow in a due process 

hearing – a hearing that he eventually lost, and would have lost had the hearing taken place 

earlier.

The parties' presentations at the pretrial conference have confirmed the Court's initial 

impression that Laine can't connect his alleged actual damages – emotional distress, loss of 

business, loss of income – to the denial of a post-tow hearing. Throughout this case, Laine has 

connected his alleged damages only to the loss of his car.

At the pretrial conference (after having been informed of the need to prove damages from 

the delay in a hearing as opposed to the loss of his car), Laine stated that he in fact would have 

gotten his car back had the City given him a hearing earlier. He asserted that his mother was the 

only person with the money to pay his impound fees, and that she had told him that she'd pay to 

get his car back, but only if he first challenged the validity of the tow in a hearing and lost. 

Pretrial Conf. at 3:05:25-06:25.

Putting aside the fanciful nature of this assertion, Laine's new theory is contradicted by 

his sworn testimony during his deposition. Laine Dep. (Dkt. 93-11) at 156:12-19. And Laine 

can't go to trial on evidence he never alluded to in discovery, hasn't produced on his own, and

previously disclaimed under oath. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(1)(A), 37(c); see also Laine 

Disclosures (Dkt. 93-2) at 2; Laine Initial Disclosures (Dkt. 93-1) at 3.

For the most part, though, Laine doesn't actually try to draw a line between the City's due

process violation and his alleged damages. Instead, Laine challenges the City's legal authority to 

tow his car in the first place, arguing that California's car-registration requirement is 

unconstitutional. But as the Court ruled at summary judgment, Laine's argument runs directly 

contrary to settled law. The constitutional right to travel does not create a constitutional right to 

drive. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). The state can require drivers to be 

licensed. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 (1977). The state can require drivers to be 

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insured. See Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933). The state can require drivers to register 

their cars. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cty. of Horry, S.C., 360 F. App'x 466, 469-72 (4th Cir. 2010); 

Matthew v. Honish, 233 F. App'x 563, 564 (7th Cir. 2007). States don't depend on the 

Commerce Clause for their authority to regulate private behavior, so it's irrelevant whether 

drivers are travelling for business purposes or across state lines. See Bond v. United States, 134 

S. Ct. 2077, 2086-87 (2014). Laine can of course challenge this body of law in a higher court, if 

he wishes. But he can't challenge it at trial, which is a forum reserved for disputes of fact. 

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 (1995).

Absent a dispute over actual damages stemming from the due process violation, there's 

no need for a trial. Both parties agree that Laine's car was unregistered for several years when 

the City towed and impounded it. City's Trial Br. (Dkt. 88) at 3; Laine Trial Br. (Dkt. 89) at 2-4. 

Both parties agree that Laine was denied a post-deprivation hearing in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Jt. Statement of the Case (Dkt. 86) at 2. Both parties agree that Laine is owed

nominal damages as a result.1 Id. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in Laine's 

favor. Laine is awarded nominal damages in the amount of one dollar. As discussed at the 

pretrial conference, this appears to be a case in which each side should bear its own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 31, 2016

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

 

1

Local governments aren't generally liable for all of their officers' unconstitutional acts. See

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Scofield v. City of 

Hillsborough, 862 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1988). However, the City has conceded its liability in 

this case, admitting that it failed to provide a hearing required by the Fourteenth Amendment,

and declining to make a Monell argument.

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