Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00507/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00507-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Suzanne Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV 13-00507-PHX-DGC

 ORDER 

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Suzanne Smith seeks judicial review of 

the Commissioner’s decision finding her not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act. Doc. 18. For the reasons that follow, the Court will remand for an award 

of benefits. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on December 10, 2009, alleging 

disability beginning August 1, 2006. Doc. 26 at 1. After a hearing on July 14, 2011, an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued an opinion on August 25, 2011, finding Plaintiff 

not disabled. Id. at 2; A.R. 27-35. A request for review was denied by the Appeals 

Council and the ALJ’s opinion became the Commissioner’s final decision on December 

31, 2012. Doc. 26 at 2. 

II. Legal Standard. 

Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

Case 2:13-cv-00507-DGC Document 28 Filed 02/03/14 Page 1 of 6
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). If there is sufficient evidence to 

support the Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990).

Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a sequential five-step 

evaluation process. The claimant must show (1) he is not currently engaged in 

substantial gainful employment, (2) he has a severe physical or mental impairment, and 

(3) the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) precludes him from performing his past work. If at any step the 

Commissioner determines that a claimant is or is not disabled, the analysis ends; 

otherwise it proceeds to step five. If the claimant establishes his burden through step 

four, the Commissioner bears the burden at step five of showing that the claimant has the 

RFC to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).

III. Analysis. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to provide specific 

and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for giving little 

weight to two treating physician opinions, namely Drs. Nuttall and Page. Doc. 18 at 4. 

 The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to 

one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when 

Case 2:13-cv-00507-DGC Document 28 Filed 02/03/14 Page 2 of 6
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, 

frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective 

evidence). The controverted opinion of a treating or examining physician “can only be 

rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in 

the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). “The ALJ can 

meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 

1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). Because the Court finds that the ALJ failed to comply with 

this requirement in addressing the opinion of Dr. Nuttall, the Court need not address 

Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Page’s opinion. 

 A. Dr. Nuttall. 

 In evaluating Dr. Nuttall’s opinion, the ALJ stated that he afforded the opinion 

“little weight because it was inconsistent with the record as a whole.” A.R. at 34. He 

further specified that Dr. Nuttall’s opinion “was inconsistent with [Plaintiff’s] reports of 

activities of daily living, such as her statements that she was able to drive, shop, perform 

some light household cleaning, prepare some simple meals, and study medical billing and 

coding.” Id. He finally noted that Dr. Nuttall’s opinion “appeared to be an underestimate 

of her functional capabilities, and contrasts sharply with the evidence in the record.” Id. 

 As noted above, the ALJ must provide specific reasons for rejecting the opinion of 

a treating physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The ALJ meets this burden “by setting 

out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 

stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421. The 

ALJ did set out the facts of Dr. Nuttall’s opinion (A.R. 33-34), but failed to summarize 

conflicting evidence, state his interpretation thereof, or make findings. The Court finds 

that the ALJ failed to offer anything more than conclusions in his analysis of Dr. Nuttall’s 

opinion, and only referred generally to its contradiction with other evidence in the record 

rather than identifying and interpreting the contradictory evidence. This is not sufficient 

Case 2:13-cv-00507-DGC Document 28 Filed 02/03/14 Page 3 of 6
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

to meet the standard required by the Ninth Circuit. See Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22 

(“The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own 

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Dr. Nuttall’s 

opinion. Defendant’s decision must therefore be vacated. 

B. Remand.

 Having decided to vacate Defendant’s decision, the Court has the discretion to 

remand the case for further development of the record or for an award benefits. See 

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 728. In Smolen, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence should be 

credited and an action remanded for an immediate award of benefits when the following 

three factors are satisfied: (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ 

would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 80 F.3d 

1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996); see Varney v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 

1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In cases where there are no outstanding issues that must be 

resolved before a proper determination can be made, and where it is clear from the record 

that the ALJ would be required to award benefits if the claimant’s excess pain testimony 

were credited, we will not remand solely to allow the ALJ to make specific findings 

regarding that testimony.”); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(same); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In a recent case where 

the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting the opinion of 

claimant’s treating physician, we accepted the physician’s uncontradicted testimony as 

true and awarded benefits.”) (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1988)); 

Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1989) (extending Varney’s “credit as 

true” rule to a case with outstanding issues where the claimant already had experienced a 

long delay and a treating doctor supported the claimant’s testimony). 

 Defendant argues that it would be contrary to the Act to remand for an award of 

Case 2:13-cv-00507-DGC Document 28 Filed 02/03/14 Page 4 of 6
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

benefits. Doc. 26 at 18. Defendant cites Strauss v. Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration, 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011), as stating that “[a] claimant is not 

entitled to benefits under the statute unless the claimant is, in fact, disabled, no matter 

how egregious the ALJ’s errors may be.” Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has not met 

her burden to prove that she was disabled during the period at issue, so an award of 

benefits is improper. Doc. 26 at 18 (citing Strauss, 635 F.3d at 1137-38). Defendant 

further argues that “where additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original 

administrative proceeding, a social security case should be remanded.” Id. at 19 (citing 

Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990)). Defendant finally argues that 

because “the record contains evidence inconsistent with a finding of disability,” remand 

for an award of benefits is inappropriate. Id. at 20. 

 The Court has found that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting the opinion of Dr. Nuttall, one of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. The 

uncontroverted testimony of the vocational expert in response to a question from the ALJ 

about Dr. Nuttall’s assessment shows that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff 

incapable of past or other full time work and therefore disabled if Dr. Nuttall’s opinion 

were credited as true. See A.R. 53. The procedural error the Court finds in this case is 

precisely the type of error that the Ninth Circuit in Strauss confirmed requires remand for 

an award of benefits: one in which the ALJ erred in discrediting evidence and, absent any 

outstanding issues to be resolved, “it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.” Strauss, 635 F.3d at 

1138 (quoting Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

 Moreover, the overwhelming authority in this Circuit makes clear that the “credit 

as true” doctrine is mandatory. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292; 

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 729; Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000); Moore 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 278 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 2002); McCartey v. Massanari, 298 

F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 

2004); Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593-95; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 640 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Case 2:13-cv-00507-DGC Document 28 Filed 02/03/14 Page 5 of 6
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d. at 1041 (“[W]e will not remand for further proceedings 

where, taking the claimant’s testimony as true, the ALJ would clearly be required to 

award benefits[.]”).1

 Applying these cases, the Court concludes that the improperly rejected opinion of 

Dr. Nuttall must be credited as true and, when credited as true and combined with the 

vocational expert’s opinion, requires an award of benefits. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. This case is remanded for an award of benefits. 

 2. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 3rd day of February, 2014. 

 

 

1

 This Court disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s credit as true doctrine. The Court 

is bound, nonetheless, to follow Ninth Circuit precedent. 

Case 2:13-cv-00507-DGC Document 28 Filed 02/03/14 Page 6 of 6