Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05122/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05122-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 5, 2012 Decided April 23, 2013 

No. 12-5122 

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE AND SIERRA CLUB, 

APPELLEES

UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP, 

APPELLANT

v. 

BOB PERCIASEPE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING 

ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:10-cv-01915) 

Kristy A.N. Bulleit argued the cause for the appellant. 

James N. Christman was on brief. 

Thomas J. Ward was on brief for amici curiae National 

Association of Home Builders et al. in support of the 

appellant. 

USCA Case #12-5122 Document #1432098 Filed: 04/23/2013 Page 1 of 21
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Robert J. Lundman, Attorney, United States Department 

of Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellee. Madeline 

Fleisher and John L. Smeltzer, Attorneys, were on brief. 

Jennifer Suzanne Peterson argued the cause for appellees 

Defenders of Wildlife et al. Abigail Dillen was on brief. 

Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

 KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Defenders 

of Wildlife and Sierra Club (collectively, Defenders) sued the 

United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) based 

on EPA’s alleged failure to promptly promulgate revisions to 

certain effluent limitations and effluent limitations guidelines 

under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. 

When Defenders filed its complaint, it simultaneously filed a 

proposed consent decree—signed by Defenders and EPA—

establishing a schedule for EPA to initiate notice-andcomment rulemaking and make a formal decision whether to 

promulgate a new rule revising certain effluent limitations and 

effluent limitations guidelines. Utility Water Act Group 

(UWAG), an association of energy companies and three 

national trade associations of energy companies, moved to 

intervene but the district court denied UWAG’s motion and 

entered the consent decree. UWAG appeals the denial of 

intervention and also asserts that—whatever our decision on 

the denial of intervention—we should vacate the district court 

order entering the consent decree because the district court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree. We affirm the 

denial of intervention—because UWAG lacks Article III 

standing—and, as there is no appellant with standing, we 

dismiss the remainder of the appeal. 

USCA Case #12-5122 Document #1432098 Filed: 04/23/2013 Page 2 of 21
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I. 

Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits “the discharge of 

any pollutant by any person” into the waters of the United 

States except in compliance with the CWA. 33 U.S.C. 

§ 1311(a). The CWA requires a point source1 of pollution to 

satisfy effluent limitations.2 Id. § 1311(b). “For the purpose of 

adopting or revising effluent limitations,” the CWA requires 

EPA to develop effluent limitations guidelines (ELGs). Id. 

§ 1314(b); see also Our Children’s Earth Found. v. EPA, 527 

F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 555 U.S. 1045 

(2008) (“The specific effluent limitations . . . are determined 

by the terms of more general ‘effluent limitation guidelines,’ 

which are separately promulgated by the EPA.”). EPA 

implements the requirements for individual point sources 

through the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 

permitting scheme. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342. 

The CWA establishes review and revision requirements 

for effluent limitations and ELGs. Section 301(d) provides 

that “[a]ny effluent limitation . . . shall be reviewed at least 

 1

 “The term ‘point source’ means any discernible, confined and 

discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, 

channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling 

stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other 

floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This 

term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return 

flows from irrigated agriculture.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 

2

 “The term ‘effluent limitation’ means any restriction 

established by a State or the [EPA] Administrator on quantities, 

rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and 

other constituents which are discharged from point sources into 

navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, 

including schedules of compliance.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11). 

USCA Case #12-5122 Document #1432098 Filed: 04/23/2013 Page 3 of 21
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every five years and, if appropriate, revised.” Id. § 1311(d). 

Section 304(b) provides: “ . . . the Administrator shall . . . 

publish within one year of October 18, 1972, regulations, 

providing guidelines for effluent limitations, and, at least 

annually thereafter, revise, if appropriate, such regulations.” 

Id. § 1314(b). Section 304(m) requires EPA to publish a plan 

every two years that, inter alia, “establish[es] a schedule for 

the annual review and revision of promulgated effluent 

guidelines.” Id. § 1314(m)(1)(A). 

As EPA explained in its most recent section 304(m) plan: 

For over three decades, EPA has implemented 

sections 301 and 304 through the promulgation 

of effluent limitations guidelines, resulting in 

regulations for 57 industrial categories. 

Consequently, as part of its annual review of 

effluent limitations guidelines under section 

304(b), EPA is also reviewing the effluent 

limitations they contain, thereby fulfilling its 

obligations under sections 301(d) and 304(b) 

simultaneously. 

Notice of Final 2010 Effluent Guidelines Program Plan, 76 

Fed. Reg. 66,286, 66,289 (Oct. 26, 2011). One category of 

effluent limitations and ELGs that applies to UWAG’s 

members3 is the “Steam Electric Power Generating Point 

 3

 The Steam Electric effluent limitations and ELGs “are 

incorporated into National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 

(NPDES) discharge permits issued by EPA and States” and “apply 

to steam electric power plants using nuclear- and fossil-fueled 

steam electric power plants nationwide.” Environmental Protection 

Agency, Spring 2010 Semiannual Regulatory Agenda 148 (2010), 

available at http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/documents/regagenda 

book-spring10.pdf 

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Source Category” (Steam Electric). EPA first promulgated 

effluent limitations and ELGs for the Steam Electric Category 

in 1974, see Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source 

Category, 39 Fed. Reg. 36,186, 36,186 (Oct. 8, 1974), and last 

revised them in 1982, Steam Electric Power Generating Point 

Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 

Pretreatment Standards and New Source Performance 

Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,290, 52,292 (Nov. 19, 1982). 

On September 14, 2009, Defenders wrote to EPA, 

declaring that it intended to sue EPA for failing to “conduct 

and complete a review” of Steam Electric effluent limitations 

and ELGs under sections 301(d) and 304(b). Joint Appendix 

(JA) 22. On September 15, EPA issued a press release stating 

that it “plan[ned] to revise the existing standards for water 

discharges from coal-fired power plants.” Press Release, 

Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Expects to Revise 

Rules for Wastewater Discharges from Power Plants (Sept. 

15, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress 

.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/ce5c2d398240af02

852576320049a550!OpenDocument; see also Notice of 

Availability of Preliminary 2010 Effluent Guidelines Program 

Plan, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,599, 68,608 (Dec. 28, 2009) (“EPA has 

decided to pursue an effluent guidelines rulemaking for the 

Steam Electric Power Generating (Part 423) category.”). In its 

Spring 2010 Regulatory Agenda, EPA projected its issuing a 

notice of proposed rulemaking for the Steam Electric category 

by July 2012 and final action by March 2014. See 

Environmental Protection Agency, Spring 2010 Semiannual 

Regulatory Agenda 148 (2010), available at http:// 

www.epa.gov/lawsregs/documents/regagendabook-spring10.p

df. EPA intended to engage in the rulemaking because “[i]n a 

study completed in 2009, EPA found that the current 

regulations, which were last updated in 1982, do not 

adequately address the pollutants being discharged and have 

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not kept pace with changes that have occurred in the electric 

power industry over the last three decades.” Id.

On November 8, 2010, apparently upon reaching a 

settlement with EPA, Defenders filed a complaint against 

EPA in district court. Simultaneously, EPA and Defenders 

filed a consent decree and joint motion to enter the consent 

decree. The complaint alleges that the action “arises under the 

citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act,” Compl. ¶ 5,4

and contends that EPA failed to fulfill its nondiscretionary 

duty to review and, if appropriate, revise the Steam Electric 

effluent limitations and ELGs. The consent decree provides, 

inter alia, that (1) by July 23, 2012, EPA “shall sign . . . a 

notice of proposed rulemaking pertaining to revisions to the 

Steam Electric Effluent Guidelines under the Clean Water 

Act,” Consent Decree ¶ 3; and (2) by January 31, 2014, EPA 

“shall sign . . . a decision taking final action following notice 

and comment rulemaking pertaining to revisions to the Steam 

Electric Effluent Guidelines under the Clean Water Act,” id. 

¶ 4. The consent decree allows the parties to modify the 

timeline by mutual agreement or, failing agreement, through a 

dispute resolution procedure in district court. It further 

provides that it cannot be read to “limit or modify the 

discretion accorded EPA by the Clean Water Act or by 

general principles of administrative law.” Id. ¶ 15. 

On November 16, 2010, only eight days after the 

complaint was filed, UWAG moved to intervene as a party 

 4

 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) provides that: “Except as provided in 

subsection (b) of this section and section 1319(g)(6) of this title, 

any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . 

against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 

Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which 

is not discretionary with the Administrator.” 

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defendant—both as of right and permissively—pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). It sought to 

dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

and failure to state a claim; alternatively, it sought to weigh in 

on the rulemaking schedule. On March 18, 2012, the district 

court denied the motion. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Jackson, 

284 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2012). The court held that it had 

jurisdiction under the CWA’s citizen-suit provision and that 

UWAG had no right to intervene under Rule 24(a) because, 

inter alia, UWAG lacked Article III standing. See id. at 4-8. It 

also rejected UWAG’s alternative motion to permissively 

intervene under Rule 24(b). Id. at 8. On March 19, 2012, the 

district court signed and entered the consent decree. Since the 

decree was entered, the district court has entered three 

stipulated extensions to the consent decree’s deadlines.5

On April 17, 2012, UWAG timely appealed the district 

court order denying its motion to intervene. UWAG also 

purported to appeal the district court order entering the 

consent decree and the first of the stipulated extensions. 

II. 

 In addition to challenging the district court order denying 

its motion for intervention, UWAG maintains that we should 

 5

 The first stipulated extension, filed April 2, 2012, changed 

the deadline for EPA to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking from 

July 23, 2012 to November 20, 2012 and the deadline for EPA to 

take final action from January 31, 2014 to April 28, 2014. The 

second stipulated extension, filed September 20, 2012, extended the 

dates to December 14, 2012 and May 22, 2014, respectively. The 

third stipulated extension, filed December 10, 2012, extended the 

December 14, 2012 date to April 19, 2013 and left the May 22, 

2014 date unchanged. 

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first decide whether the district court had jurisdiction. We 

disagree with both arguments. 

A. 

We first address UWAG’s asserted right to intervene. We 

review the denial of a motion to intervene de novo for issues 

of law, for clear error as to findings of fact and for abuse of 

discretion on issues that “involve a measure of judicial 

discretion.” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 

732 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Rule 24(a)(2) provides: “[o]n timely 

motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who,” inter 

alia: 

claims an interest relating to the property or 

transaction that is the subject of the action, and 

is so situated that disposing of the action may 

as a practical matter impair or impede the 

movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless 

existing parties adequately represent that 

interest. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). We have, not surprisingly, divided Rule 

24(a)(2) into four elements: 

1) the application to intervene must be timely, 

2) the party must have an interest relating to 

the property or transaction which is the subject 

of the action, 3) the party must be so situated 

that the disposition of the action may, as a 

practical matter, impair or impede the party’s 

ability to protect that interest, and 4) the 

party’s interest must not be adequately 

represented by existing parties to the action. 

Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Reich, 40 F.3d 

1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

USCA Case #12-5122 Document #1432098 Filed: 04/23/2013 Page 8 of 21
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We also require a party seeking to intervene as of right to 

demonstrate Article III standing. In re Endangered Species 

Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 

2013); see also Jones v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 348 F.3d 

1014, 1018-19 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Article III standing satisfies 

second element of Rule 24(a)(2)). We review standing de 

novo. Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d at 976. 

UWAG asserts that it has representational standing. “An 

association only has standing to bring suit on behalf of its 

members when [1] its members would otherwise have 

standing to sue in their own right, [2] the interests it seeks to 

protect are germane to the organization’s purpose, and [3] 

neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 

participation of individual members[.]” Fund Democracy, 

LLC v. SEC, 278 F.3d 21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The parties 

dispute only the first of these elements—whether UWAG’s 

members would have standing to sue in their own right. 

To establish that a UWAG member has Article III 

standing in its own right, UWAG must demonstrate that the 

member has incurred “ ‘[1] an actual or imminent injury in 

fact, [2] fairly traceable to the challenged agency action, [3] 

that will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” N.Y. 

Reg’l Interconnect v. FERC, 634 F.3d 581, 586 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FERC, 571 F.3d 1208, 

1219 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). “An injury in fact is ‘an invasion of a 

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical.’ ” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). An injury is particularized if it 

affects the party asserting standing “ ‘in a personal and 

individual way.’ ” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 560 n.1). 

UWAG asserts two bases for its members’ standing. We 

reject both. 

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1. 

UWAG first argues that its members have standing 

because the consent decree imposes too strict a timeline for 

EPA to decide whether and when to engage in rulemaking. 

According to UWAG, the timeline provides too little time for 

notice and comment such that its members will not have an 

adequate opportunity to participate in the rulemaking, making 

it more likely that EPA will promulgate a rule economically 

harmful to its members. 

At the outset, we note that this case is not a “procedural 

injury” case. “Where plaintiffs allege injury resulting from 

violation of a procedural right afforded to them by statute and 

designed to protect their threatened concrete interest, the 

courts relax—while not wholly eliminating—the issues of 

imminence and redressability, but not the issues of injury in 

fact or causation.” Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 

396 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2005); but see Summers v. 

Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (“[D]eprivation 

of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is 

affected by the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is 

insufficient to create Article III standing.”). UWAG has not 

identified a procedural requirement that either EPA has 

violated by agreeing to the consent decree or that is designed 

to protect UWAG’s members’ concrete interests. 

UWAG first argues that the consent decree violates its 

members’ asserted right to “be[ ] subject to such a rulemaking 

only to the extent the statute commands it or authorizes EPA, 

in its informed discretion, to undertake it.” See Appellant Br. 

27 (emphasis in original). We recently rejected a similar 

“discretion” argument in Section 4 Deadline Litigation. In 

that case, the Safari Club, an association whose members hunt 

three species of animals, sought to intervene in an action 

brought by environmental plaintiffs against the Secretary of 

USCA Case #12-5122 Document #1432098 Filed: 04/23/2013 Page 10 of 21
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the United States Department of the Interior and the U.S. Fish 

and Wildlife Service seeking to compel the government to 

comply with deadlines set forth in the Endangered Species 

Act. 704 F.3d at 974-75. The plaintiffs and the government 

had reached settlement agreements in which the government 

agreed, inter alia, to decide by a particular date whether to list 

the three species as “endangered” or “threatened” or find both 

listings “not warranted.” Id. at 975. The Safari Club argued 

that its procedural rights were violated because “the 

settlement agreements establish an illegal procedure—the 

elimination of the Service’s statutory authority to find that a 

proposal to list a species is warranted but precluded by higher 

priorities.” Id. at 976 (quotation marks omitted). We rejected 

its argument: “The Safari Club has neither identified a 

statutory procedure that the settlement agreements require the 

Service to violate, nor shown that the [statutory provision at 

issue] is designed to protect its interest in delaying formal 

listing.” Id. at 977. The same analysis applies here—whether 

UWAG is correct about EPA’s discretion to determine when 

to conduct a rulemaking, UWAG has failed to identify a 

statutory procedure that the consent decree requires EPA to 

violate. 

Nor is there a “procedural injury” flowing from the 

consent decree’s notice and comment schedule—it allows 

thirteen months between the notice of proposed rulemaking 

and final action. UWAG cites no authority holding a thirteenmonth notice-and-comment period is too short; UWAG 

simply asserts that it is too short compared to EPA’s past 

rulemakings. That one rulemaking moves faster than another, 

however, does not mean that it results in procedural injury to 

UWAG members.6

 Having determined that UWAG members 

 6

 UWAG cites a memorandum from the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) encouraging federal agencies with rulemaking 

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cannot establish standing based on a procedural rights theory, 

we turn to their asserted injury resulting from the rulemaking 

process. 

Significantly, the consent decree does not require EPA to 

promulgate a new, stricter rule. Instead, it merely requires that 

EPA conduct a rulemaking and then decide whether to 

promulgate a new rule—the content of which is not in any 

way dictated by the consent decree—using a specific timeline. 

But Article III standing requires more than the possibility of 

potentially adverse regulation. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders 

v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (association lacked 

standing to challenge agency determination because, until 

determination applied to particular property or the agencies 

used it in an enforcement action, “any challenge to it is [ ] 

premature. In the meanwhile, [its] members face only the 

possibility of regulation, as they did before the 

[determination]” (emphasis in original)); see also Alternative 

 

authority, “where appropriate and feasible, and to the extent 

permitted by law,” to consider, inter alia, “[e]arly consultation 

with, advance notice to, and close engagement with stakeholders.” 

Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, Cumulative Effect of 

Regulations 1–2 (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://www. 

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/cumulativeeffects-guidance.pdf. Whether EPA is in compliance with the 

memorandum, the memorandum simply provides guidance 

regarding Executive Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,823 

(Jan. 18, 2011), which provides: “This order is not intended to, and 

does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, 

enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United 

States, its departments, [or its] agencies.” Neither the OMB 

memorandum nor the Executive Order provides support for 

UWAG’s procedural injury argument. 

USCA Case #12-5122 Document #1432098 Filed: 04/23/2013 Page 12 of 21
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Research & Dev. Found. v. Veneman, 262 F.3d 406, 411 

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“But NABR’s rights were not 

impaired by the initiation of a rulemaking. . . . As the district 

court noted during the hearing on the motion to intervene, 

NABR will not be precluded from participating in the 

rulemaking and, if USDA decides to issue a final rule, NABR 

is not precluded from challenging that rule. . . . [T]he 

stipulated dismissal does not bind the agency in its 

rulemaking.”); cf. Platte River Whooping Crane Critical 

Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) (“Allegations of injury based on predictions regarding 

future legal proceedings are . . . too speculative” to support 

showing of “current or even impending injury[.]”). Nor is 

Article III standing established by an inability to comment 

effectively or fully. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Transp. Sec. 

Admin., 429 F.3d 1130, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he ‘mere 

inability to comment effectively or fully, in and of itself, does 

not establish an actual injury.’ ” (quoting United States v. 

AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 119 (1st Cir. 1992))). That the 

consent decree prescribes a date by which regulation could

occur does not establish Article III standing.7

UWAG’s reliance on our holding in Natural Resources 

Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a 

case factually similar to this case, is unavailing. In Costle, 

environmental plaintiffs submitted to the district court a 

 7

 UWAG’s assertion notwithstanding, the standing question 

becomes no closer due to EPA’s statements—made before entering 

into the consent decree—that it intended to update the Steam 

Electric effluent limitations and ELGs. UWAG has the burden to 

establish that the consent decree—not EPA’s throat-clearing—will 

cause the injury of which it complains. The consent decree does not 

do so. In fact, it explicitly preserves EPA’s discretion to promulgate 

a rule or decline to do so. 

USCA Case #12-5122 Document #1432098 Filed: 04/23/2013 Page 13 of 21
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proposed settlement agreement that required EPA to initiate 

rulemaking for certain named pollutants pursuant to an 

agreed-upon schedule. Id. at 906. The settlement agreement 

permitted EPA to decline to issue any new rule but only if it 

met certain requirements set forth in the agreement and 

“promptly submit[ted] a statement under oath to the parties 

explaining and justifying the exclusion,” in which event “the 

parties [could] presumably invoke the continuing jurisdiction 

of the District Court to review whether the exclusion squares 

with the grounds of the settlement agreement.” Id. at 909. We 

held that intervenors subject to regulation under the new rules 

satisfied the third element of Rule 24(a)(2)—viz., “the denial 

of intervention works a practical impairment of [their] 

interests.” Id. at 908-11. 

But Costle does not dictate the outcome here. First, 

Costle does not analyze the standing issue and therefore has 

no precedential effect on the jurisdictional question before us. 

See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535, n.5 (1974) 

(“[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in 

prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered 

itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the 

jurisdictional issue before us.”).8

 Furthermore, unlike here, 

 8

 There is no argument that Costle indirectly addressed 

standing by analyzing Rule 24(a)(2). Had Costle analyzed the 

second element of Rule 24(a)(2)—the potential intervenor must 

have “an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 

subject of the action,” Costle might dictate our result. See Jones, 

348 F.3d at 1018-19 (if intervenor establishes Article III standing, it 

satisfies the second element of Rule 24(a)(2)) Costle, however,

does not analyze this element. See Costle, 561 F.2d at 909 n.27 

(noting only that district court found intervenors satisfied second 

element). Instead, Costle analyzed the third element—whether the 

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the proposed settlement agreement in Costle restricted EPA’s 

discretion—if EPA decided not to promulgate a rule, it had to 

comply with the requirements of the consent decree, which 

requirements were enforced by the district court. Compare 

Veneman, 262 F.3d at 411 (“Significantly, the stipulated 

dismissal does no more than what the agency could have done 

by granting Alternative Research’s pending agency petition 

for rulemaking, and the stipulated dismissal does not bind the 

agency in its rulemaking.” (emphasis added)). 

In sum, UWAG fails to establish Article III standing 

based on its members’ alleged injury resulting from the 

rulemaking process. 

2. 

UWAG also asserts it has Article III standing because the 

consent decree is likely to be costly to its members. The CWA 

requires UWAG members to respond to EPA’s information 

requests. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A). UWAG argues that the 

consent decree’s accelerated schedule forces EPA to request 

information from UWAG members on tight deadlines, which 

is expensive and time consuming. See Ass’n of Private Sector 

Colleges & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 457–58 (D.C. 

Cir. 2012) (party not directly regulated by agency rule had 

standing based on increased compliance costs resulting from 

regulation of a different party). For example, a UWAG 

member submitted an affidavit declaring that it had incurred 

over one hundred thousand dollars in costs because it had to 

respond to an EPA questionnaire about the Steam Electric 

effluent limitations and ELGs on a short timeframe. 

 

denial of intervention would work a “practical impairment of [the 

putative intervenors’] interests.” 

USCA Case #12-5122 Document #1432098 Filed: 04/23/2013 Page 15 of 21
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But the consent decree did not cause and is not currently 

causing the alleged informational cost. Rather, EPA submitted 

the questionnaire at issue months before Defenders and EPA 

signed the consent decree and years before the district court 

entered it. See Questionnaire for Steam Electric Power 

Generating Effluent Guidelines (New), 75 Fed. Reg. 10,791 

(Mar. 9, 2010). Indeed, Defenders challenge UWAG’s 

standing argument on this very basis. See Br. for Pl.-

Appellees 45-46 (“EPA submitted the relevant data requests 

before it reached a settlement with Plaintiffs.”). UWAG, 

however, has not attempted to establish that its members 

continue to incur the costs of additional or more stringent 

information requests as a result of the consent decree. See Los 

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (“[Past injury,] 

while presumably affording [plaintiff] standing to claim 

damages . . . does nothing to establish a real and immediate 

threat that he would again be [injured in the future.]”); Worth 

v. Jackson, 451 F.3d 854, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“While 

HUD’s policies did allegedly injure Worth in the past, he 

seeks no relief for such injuries. . . . Instead, the basis for both 

his claims is that he intends to apply for new positions and 

promotions . . . . For standing purposes, then, we limit our 

inquiry to determining whether that prospective injury 

qualifies as an injury in fact.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

 While we treat UWAG’s “factual allegations as true and 

must grant [the intervenor] the benefit of all inferences that 

can be derived from the facts alleged,” NB ex rel. Peacock v. 

District of Columbia, 682 F.3d 77, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 

(quotation marks and ellipses omitted), UWAG provides no 

more than speculation to support its argument that the consent 

decree—as opposed to EPA’s actions aliunde the consent 

decree—caused or will cause increased information gathering 

costs. Accordingly, UWAG cannot establish its members’ 

standing based on increased costs. 

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B. 

UWAG also contends that the district court erred in 

rejecting UWAG’s alternative argument that it is entitled to 

intervene permissively under Rule 24(b). Rule 24(b) allows 

for permissive intervention as follows: 

(1) In General. On timely motion, the court 

may permit anyone to intervene who . . . 

(B) has a claim or defense that shares 

with the main action a common 

question of law or fact. . . . 

(3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its 

discretion, the court must consider whether the 

intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 

adjudication of the original parties' rights. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). “It remains . . . an open question in this 

circuit whether Article III standing is required for permissive 

intervention.” Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d at 980. The 

district court concluded that UWAG’s claim “share[d] with 

the main action a common question of law or fact” but that 

the UWAG’s intervention would “unduly delay . . . the 

adjudication of the original parties’ rights” because UWAG 

challenged the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Defenders 

of Wildlife, 284 F.R.D. at 8 (quotation marks omitted). 

UWAG asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 

finding that its intervention would cause delay. 

“The denial of a Rule 24(b) motion is not usually 

appealable in itself, although the court may exercise its 

pendent appellate jurisdiction to reach questions that are 

inextricably intertwined with ones of which we have direct 

jurisdiction.” Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d at 979. In at 

least two cases, however, we have declined to review the 

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denial of a Rule 24(b) motion once we determined the 

potential intervenor lacked standing. Id. at 980; In re Vitamins 

Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“In 

view of the unresolved standing issue, however, we think it 

inappropriate to exercise our pendent jurisdiction.”). Here, 

too, given UWAG’s lack of Article III standing, we decline to 

reach the Rule 24(b) issue. 

C. 

Even if it cannot intervene, UWAG asserts that we 

should nonetheless consider its arguments regarding the 

district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree. 

“The power of federal courts to hear and decide cases is 

defined by Article III of the Constitution and by the federal 

statutes enacted thereunder.” Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 

(1987). We have jurisdiction over, inter alia, “appeals from 

all final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

“The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly 

become parties, [e.g., through intervention,] may appeal an 

adverse judgment, is well settled.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 

301, 304 (1988) (per curiam); see also id. (“[W]e hold that 

because petitioners were not parties to the underlying lawsuit, 

and because they failed to intervene for purposes of appeal, 

they may not appeal from the consent decree approving that 

lawsuit’s settlement . . . .”); cf. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A) 

(“The notice of appeal must: specify the party or parties 

taking the appeal . . . .”). 

There are a few exceptions to this general rule, e.g., if the 

district court order “effectively [binds] a non-party.” United 

States v. LTV Corp., 746 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The 

exceptions “are limited,” however, and “the fact that a 

decision against a defendant may practically [affect] a third 

party is not ordinarily enough for appellant status absent 

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intervention or joinder in the trial court.” Nat’l Ass’n of Chain 

Drug Stores v. New England Carpenters Health Benefits 

Fund, 582 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Marino, 484 

U.S. at 304 (“[T]he better practice is for such a nonparty to 

seek intervention for purposes of appeal . . . .”). 

Because a party unsuccessfully appealing a denial of 

intervention is not a “party,” it may not obtain review of any 

district court holding other than the denial of intervention. See 

Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d at 980 (affirming denial of 

intervention and thus not “reaching the Safari Club’s 

objections to the settlement agreements”); Veneman, 262 F.3d 

at 406 (“[B]ecause the district court correctly denied 

intervention, NABR is not a party to the action and lacks 

standing to appeal from either the stipulation of dismissal or 

the order denying its Rule 60(b) motion, which challenged the 

stipulated dismissal.”); United States v. British Am. Tobacco 

Australia Servs., Ltd., 437 F.3d 1235, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(“We have stated many times that failed intervenors may not 

appeal District Court actions to which they are not a party.”). 

UWAG argues for an exception to this rule, contending 

that the general prohibition on non-party appeals must yield to 

the doctrine that “every federal appellate court has a special 

obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but 

also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.’ ” 

Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 

(1986). But we have this obligation only to the extent we have 

authority to act in the first place, that is, if we have 

jurisdiction. Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 

671 F.3d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Because we are a 

court of limited jurisdiction, our inquiry must always begin by 

asking whether we have jurisdiction to decide a particular 

appeal.”). If we lack jurisdiction, we cannot vacate the district 

court’s order for lack of jurisdiction because we lack the 

power to do so. See Bender, 475 U.S. at 546 (“On every writ 

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of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of 

jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from 

which the record comes.” (emphasis added)). 

Applying these principles in a fairly recent case, we 

addressed a prospective intervenor’s jurisdictional challenge 

only after we concluded that it had the right to intervene. See 

Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 50-51 (D.C. Cir. 

2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1010 (2005), abrogated in other 

part by Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848 (2009). In 

Acree, the United States sought to intervene in district court 

“for the sole purpose of contesting the subject matter 

jurisdiction of the District Court;” however, the district court 

denied intervention. Id. at 46-47. In so doing, it “considered 

its own subject matter jurisdiction and concluded that it 

retained jurisdiction.” Id. at 47. On appeal, we declined to 

reach any of the “merits issues” (including the issue of subject 

matter jurisdiction) until after considering the propriety of the 

district court’s denial of intervention. Id. at 49. We declared: 

“If the United States were not properly a party to this case, 

then it would have no right to appeal the District Court’s 

judgment, and we would be required to dismiss this case 

without passing upon its merits for lack of a proper 

appellant.” Id. (citation omitted). We ultimately concluded 

that intervention was proper and thus “reverse[d] the decision 

of the District Court denying the United States’ motion to 

intervene and turn[ed] to the merits of the Government’s 

jurisdictional challenge.” Id. at 51. While we have jurisdiction 

to decide UWAG’s appeal of the district court order denying 

intervention, because we conclude that the district court 

properly denied that motion, UWAG, a non-party, cannot 

appeal any other issue. 

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

denial of UWAG’s motion to intervene and dismiss the appeal 

in all other respects. 

So ordered. 

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