Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03717/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03717-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 05-03717 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2) REFERRING PARTIES TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TRUMBULL

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 3/3/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ELIZABETH DEL CARMEN PEZOA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 05-03717 JF

ORDER1 (1) GRANTING IN PART

MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2)

REFERRING PARTIES TO

MAGISTRATE JUDGE TRUMBULL

[Docket No. 8]

On September 14, 2005, Plaintiff Elizabeth Del Carmen Pezoa (“Pezoa”) filed a

complaint alleging employment discrimination against Defendants County of Santa Clara (“the

County”), Hung Mahn Nguyen aka Sung Nguyen (“Nguyen”), and Does 1 through 25. On

January 17, 2006, the County of Santa Clara filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and lack

of jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Pezoa opposes the motion. 

The Court heard oral argument on March 3, 2006.

Case 5:05-cv-03717-JF Document 16 Filed 03/03/06 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Case No. C 05-03717 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2) REFERRING PARTIES TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TRUMBULL

(JFLC1)

I. BACKGROUND

Pezoa alleges the following. Originally from Chile, Pezoa began working for the County

as a psychiatric social worker on or about June 11, 2001. Nguyen, also employed by the County,

“maintained a workplace for psychiatric social workers that was segregated.” He designated two

groups of workers—“a ‘Vietnamese Group’ and a ‘Latino Group’ whose working areas were

officially designated by hallway signs with those specifications.” Nguyen treated the two groups

differently, “giving the ‘Vietnamese Group’ employees lower case loads and more flexibility in

work hours than non-Vietnamese employees, including Plaintiff.” Pezoa “complained all the

way up the County’s chain of command to the level of the Board of Supervisors.” In response to

these complaints, Defendants “retaliated against Plaintiff and/or did nothing to protect her from

retaliation.” Additionally, Pezoa alleges that Nguyen “has been convicted of sex crimes and is a

mentally disordered sex offender.”

Plaintiff alleges generally that she “has exhausted her administrative remedies.” On

August 28, 2003, the San Jose Local Office of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) issued a determination letter, stating:

The evidence uncovered during the Commission’s investigation establishes that

Respondent segregates its psychiatric social workers on the basis of race and/or

national origin. Respondent has created a “Latino Room” for its non-Vietnamese

social workers. Respondent is not coy about this as it even has hallway signs

designating ‘Latino Group” and “Vietnamese Group”. Moreover the evidence

shows that Vietnamese social workers are benefitted by having lower case loads

and are accorded more flexibility in work hours than non-Vietnamese. As a result

of Respondent’s practices, there is little communication or interaction between the

various racial and ethnic groups, creating racial and ethnic tension and a hostile

work environment.

The investigation also disclosed that Charging Party was retaliated against for

engaging in protected activity, in that she continued to be subjected to a

segregated work environment and an increased case load after she complained.

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 1. On July 19, 2005, the Civil Rights Division of the

United States Department of Justice issued a “Notice of Right to Sue Within 90 Days.”

Pezoa alleges four claims for relief: (1) employment discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2), (2) for retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), (3) violation of

Case 5:05-cv-03717-JF Document 16 Filed 03/03/06 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The County originally moved to dismiss Pezoa’s federal law claims for lack of

jurisdiction on the ground that she did not allege that she filed a complaint with the EEOC. 

However, Pezoa’s opposition papers included a determination letter issued by the EEOC on

August 28, 2003 and a right-to-sue notice issued by the Civil Rights Division of the United

States Department of Justice on July 19, 2005. The County conceded in its reply that Pezoa has

satisfied the jurisdictional requirements for alleging federal law employment discrimination

claims.

3

Case No. C 05-03717 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2) REFERRING PARTIES TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TRUMBULL

(JFLC1)

California Labor Code §§ 1102.5 and 1105, and (4) for harassment and failure to prevent

harassment pursuant to California Government Code § 12940(j).

II. DISCUSSION

The County moves to dismiss Pezoa’s federal and state law claims for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on

the ground that she has failed to allege that she suffered any adverse employment action. The

County also moves to dismiss Pezoa’s state law claims for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), on the ground that she has not alleged that she filed an

administrative complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(“DFEH”).2 Additionally, the County moves to dismiss Pezoa’s claims for punitive damages on

the ground that punitive damages against the County are barred.

1. Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

“A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King &

Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); see also Argabright v. United States, 35 F.3d 472, 474 (9th

Cir. 1994). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, and

the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Argabright, 35 F.3d at 474. 

a. Discrimination claims 

Pezoa alleges discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Case 5:05-cv-03717-JF Document 16 Filed 03/03/06 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Case No. C 05-03717 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2) REFERRING PARTIES TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TRUMBULL

(JFLC1)

(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”),

California Government Code § 12900 et seq. Her first claim is for employment discrimination

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2). As construed by United States Supreme Court

and the circuits, Title VII provides redress for discriminatory treatment only when that treatment

rises to the level of an adverse employment action. See, e.g. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1993) (discussing Title VII as a remedy for “adverse employment

actions”); Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the

factors for a prima facie case of discrimination under the federal burden shifting framework

include proof that the plaintiff “suffered an adverse employment action”). However, when a

claim under Title VII is based upon the creation of a hostile work environment, an adverse

employment action is not required. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765

(1998) (holding that an employer may be liable for the creation of a hostile work environment

absent any “tangible employment action”). In a hostile work environment case, “[w]hen the

workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment, Title VII is violated.” Dominguez- Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424

F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). In

order to establish a hostile work environment claim on the basis of race or national origin, Pezoa

must show “(1) that she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct based on her race or national

origin; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was ‘sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive work environment.’” 

Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Vasquez v. County of Los

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003).

It is not clear whether Pezoa’s first claim alleges discriminatory treatment, hostile work

environment, or both. She alleges only that Defendants “maintained a workplace for psychiatric

social workers that was segregated in violation of 42 USC 2000e-2(a)(2)” and “maintained a

policy in violation of 42 USC 2000e-2(a)(1).” Under either theory, these general allegations do

Case 5:05-cv-03717-JF Document 16 Filed 03/03/06 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Case No. C 05-03717 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2) REFERRING PARTIES TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TRUMBULL

(JFLC1)

not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under the discriminatory treatment theory,

Pezoa must allege specifically that she was subject to an adverse employment action. Under the

hostile work environment theory, Pezoa must allege additional facts that would show that there

was severe or pervasive conduct that created a hostile work environment. Accordingly, the Court

will dismiss Pezoa’s first claim with leave to amend.

Pezoa’s fourth claim is for harassment and failure to prevent harassment pursuant to

California Government Code § 12940(j). The County’s position with respect to this claim is not

entirely clear. The County argues that in order “[t]o properly plead retaliation under FEHA a

plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an adverse employment action due to a discriminatory

motive.” However, Pezoa’s only claim under FEHA is for harassment and failure to prevent

harassment, not retaliation. Moreover, while the County makes arguments with respect to the

adverse employment action requirements under FEHA, it specifically requests the dismissal of

only Pezoa’s third claim, brought pursuant to the California Government Code. Accordingly, the

Court will not dismiss the fourth claim. However, the Court notes that this claim, like Pezoa’s

other claims, contains very few specific allegations. In order to avoid another round of motion

practice, the Court recommends that Pezoa allege her fourth claim with greater specificity when

she files an amended complaint.

b. Retaliation claims

Pezoa alleges retaliation claims under Title VII and the California Labor Code. Pezoa’s

second claim is for retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In order to make out a prima

facie case of retaliation, Pezoa “must establish that [she] undertook a protected activity under

Title VII, [her] employer subjected [her] to an adverse employment action, and there is a causal

link between those two events.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir.

2003). The Ninth Circuit has held that “an action is cognizable as an adverse employment action

if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.” Id. (quoting

Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000)). Pezoa’s third claim, also for

Case 5:05-cv-03717-JF Document 16 Filed 03/03/06 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 California Labor Code § 1105 provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the

injured employee from recovering damages from his employer for injury suffered through a

violation of this chapter.”

6

Case No. C 05-03717 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2) REFERRING PARTIES TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TRUMBULL

(JFLC1)

retaliation, is brought pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 1102.5 and 1105.3 “To establish a

prima facie case for retaliation under Section 1102.5, an employee must show (1) that he engaged

in protected activity, (2) that he was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment action by his

employer, and (3) that there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action.” Love v. Motion Industries, Inc., 309 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1134 (N.D. Cal.,

2004) (citing Morgan v. Regents of University of California, 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69 (2000).

Pezoa alleges conclusively that “[i]n reaction to her complaints, the Defendants retaliated

against Plaintiff and/or did nothing to protect her from retaliation in violation of the

aforementioned statutes and in criminal violation of Section 1103 of the California Labor Code.” 

Because her complaint does not include any specific allegation of how, if at all, she was treated

differently after she complained, Pezoa has not stated a claim of retaliation upon which relief can

be granted. Accordingly, Pezoa’s second and third claims will be dismissed with leave to amend.

2. Jurisdiction

The County argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Pezoa’s claims brought under

FEHA and the California Labor Code because Pezoa has not expressly alleged that she filed an

administrative complaint with the DFEH. She alleges only generally that she “has exhausted her

administrative remedies.” 

Because the Court will dismiss Pezoa’s third claim for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, the Court will deny the County’s motion to dismiss Pezoa’s third claim for

lack of jurisdiction as moot. However, the Court notes that Pezoa’s third claim is brought

pursuant to the California Labor Code, and the requirement that a plaintiff file a complaint with

DFEH applies only to claims brought under FEHA. Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d

890, 896 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If alleging discrimination under FEHA, plaintiff must file a charge of

Case 5:05-cv-03717-JF Document 16 Filed 03/03/06 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Case No. C 05-03717 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2) REFERRING PARTIES TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TRUMBULL

(JFLC1)

discrimination with [DFEH] within one year of the unlawful employment practice.”). 

The Court also will deny the County’s motion to dismiss Pezoa’s fourth claim for lack of

jurisdiction. Pezoa alleges that administrative remedies have been exhausted. Moreover, the

Court will presume for present purposes that the complaint filed with the EEOC demonstrates

that a complaint was also filed with DFEH: “The EEOC and DFEH operate under an agreement

whereunder complaints filed with one agency are crossfiled with the other.” Chavira v. Payless

Shoe Source, 140 F.R.D. 441, 442 n. 1 (E.D.Cal.,1991). As counsel for the County pointed out at

oral argument, it is possible that the DFEH administrative remedies have not been exhausted. 

However, the Court will not at this time dismiss Pezoa’s claim brought pursuant to FEHA

without a clear showing that the normal practice of crossfiling complaints with the EEOC and

DFEH was not followed in this particular instance.

3. Punitive damages

The County moves to dismiss Pezoa’s claims for punitive damages on the ground that

punitive damages against the County are barred. In opposition, Pezoa notes that in the complaint

punitive damages are sought against only “individual defendants,” not “all defendants.” Pezoa

indicates that she is willing to enter into a stipulation “that ‘individual’ means human beings as

opposed to the collective entity known as the ‘County.’” The County does not respond to this

concession in its reply. The Court construes Pezoa’s claims for punitive damages to be alleged

against only the individual defendants, not against the County. Accordingly, the Court will deny

the County’s motion to dismiss Pezoa’s claims for punitive damages.

III. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the County’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is GRANTED as set fort herein. IT

IS FURTHER ORDERED that the County’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) is DENIED.

Case 5:05-cv-03717-JF Document 16 Filed 03/03/06 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Case No. C 05-03717 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2) REFERRING PARTIES TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TRUMBULL

(JFLC1)

Additionally, as was discussed at the March 3, 2006 hearing, the Court hereby refers the

parties to Magistrate Judge Trumbull for an early settlement conference.

DATED: March 3, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-03717-JF Document 16 Filed 03/03/06 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Case No. C 05-03717 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (2) REFERRING PARTIES TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TRUMBULL

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Marguerite M. Buckley magibee2004@yahoo.com, janbtucker@aim.com

Michael L. Rossi michael.rossi@cco.co.scl.ca.us

Case 5:05-cv-03717-JF Document 16 Filed 03/03/06 Page 9 of 9