Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00688/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00688-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rudolph A. Chavez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

JoAnne Barnhart, Commissioner of Social

Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-0688-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Docs. ##6, 15. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

Background

On June 21, 2004, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision denying

Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits. Doc. #3A, Tr. 18-29. Plaintiff

commenced this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of the decision

on March 3, 2005. Doc. #1. Defendant filed an answer and a transcript of the record on

May 18, 2005. Doc. #3, 3A. 

Plaintiff argues in his motion for summary judgment that the ALJ committed legal

error by relying on the opinion of the non-examining physicians, failing to perform a

function-by-function residual functional capacity (“RFC”) analysis, and failing to provide

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clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Doc. #1. Defendant argues in its cross-motion

that the ALJ did not commit legal error and that her decision is supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Doc. #17. 

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

The Court may vacate the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits “only if it is not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881

F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than

a preponderance. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). In determining

whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that

detracts from it. Id. 

II. Analysis

A. ALJ Decision

After holding a hearing on May 19, 2004, the ALJ issued a written decision on

June 21, 2004, in which she considered Plaintiff’s alleged disability according to the fivestep analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Doc. #3A, Tr. 21-29. First, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged June 1, 2002

disability onset date. Id. at 22. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following

impairments: status post fracture of the right tibia and fibula, malunion of tibia requiring

open reduction and internal fixation, minimal early arthritis of left hip, type II diabetes, and

major depressive disorder. Id. The ALJ did not find that Plaintiff’s impairments were severe

enough to meet an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Appendix 1, Subpart P of part 404 –

Listing of Impairments. Id. The ALJ concluded that even though Plaintiff’s limitations

preclude performance of the full range of skilled light work, Plaintiff was able to perform

light unskilled work such as that of a cashier at a courtesy booth. Id. at 27. 

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B. Plaintiff’s Physical Limitations.

The ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s assertion that he is incapable of all work activity to

be credible. Doc. #3A, Tr. 23. The ALJ found that Plaintiff “retains the physical functional

capacity to perform ‘light’ exertional work.” Id. Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

stated work limitations were credible “only to the extent that his ability to lift and carry

heavy objects is precluded by his subjective allegation of pain in his legs and hips.” Id.

Consequently, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the ability to “lift and carry no more than

10 pounds at a time frequently and 20 pounds occasionally. He can sit for 6 hours total in

an 8-hour workday and stand/walk for 6 hours total in an 8-hour work day.” Id. 

The ALJ was required to make specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons

supported by substantial evidence in the record for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. See

Smolen v. Chatter, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195,

1208 (9th Cir. 2001). The findings the ALJ made in rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony must be

sufficiently specific to permit the Court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit

Plaintiff’s testimony, but did so based on permissible factors and substantial evidence in the

record. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). Having reviewed

the ALJ’s decision and findings, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err and made specific

findings citing clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.

In reaching her decision the ALJ’s considered four factors in evaluating Plaintiff’s

credibility as to his level of pain and his ability to return to work: (1) Plaintiff’s daily

activities and reported symptoms; (2) the written progress notes from his treating physicians

concerning the nature and severity of the symptoms of which he complains; (3) his

compliance with prescribed treatment; and (4) the non-examining state physician’s physical

RFC report. Doc. #3A, Tr. 26-27.

First, the ALJ’s order considered Plaintiff’s own description of his hip pain and daily

activity level. Id., Tr. 26, 237-38. In July 2003, Plaintiff described his hip pain as “just

irritating” and reported to the examining psychologist, Dr. Armando A. Bencomo, that he

was able to care for his own personal grooming, pick up his room, make his bed, do his

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laundry, prepare occasional meals, and leave the house once or twice a week. Id., Tr. 26,

238. 

Second, the ALJ considered the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating surgeon, Dr. Douglas

Hartzler. Doc. #3A, Tr. 26, 191. In April 2003, Dr. Hartzler’s progress notes stated that

Plaintiff could resume activity as tolerated and return to work because his tibia injury had

healed. Id. The ALJ also noted that on May 29, 2003, Plaintiff’s examining physician, Dr.

Susan Hallman, M.D., reported that Plaintiff was able to get off and on the exam table with

no difficulty and had “full range of motion of both hips without significant pain, tenderness,

or crepitus.” Id., Tr. 26, 210. Finally, the ALJ referred to examining physician Dr. Richard

H. Daley’s report that “[Plaintiff] seems to be . . . well healed and pain free to the degree that

he has gotten another job as a machinist.” Id., Tr. 26, 270. 

Third, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s compliance with the medical recommendations

of his treating physicians. The ALJ noted that on February 2, 2004, his treating physician,

Dr. Daley, suggested that Plaintiff get a modified shoe for his right leg, which is 1⁄2 inch

shorter than his left, to help with his hip pain. Id., Tr. 26, 270. Plaintiff did not comply with

this recommendation due to financial constraints. Id., Tr. 26. In addition, the ALJ noted that

Plaintiff has Type II diabetes, but admitted to a past history of drinking up to 24 beers on the

weekends, which is a contraindication of his disease. Id. 

Fourth, the ALJ considered the physical RFC report issued by Dr. Murray Schreiber,

D.O., the state agency’s non-examining physician, who reported that Plaintiff’s “self

imposed restrictions are not fully supported by the objective findings,” and “[Plaintiff] is

capable of 2+ work activity.” Doc. #3A, Tr. 260. 

Based on these four considerations, the ALJ concluded that “[Plaintiff’s] allegation

that he is incapable of all work activity [is not] credible because . . . [t]he course of medical

treatment, minimal objective findings, and minimal abnormal clinical findings in this case

is not consistent with disabling pain and physical symptoms.” Doc. #3A, Tr. 23. Moreover,

the ALJ noted that she adopted the non-examining physician’s RFC because no treating

physician offered an opinion on Plaintiff’s physical functional residual capacity, and Dr.

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Schreiber’s opinion did not conflict with the medical record that “suggest[ed] . . . claimant’s

medical problems were generally well controlled.” Doc. #3A, Tr. 27.

Having reviewed the record as a whole, considering both the evidence that supports

the ALJ’s conclusion and the evidence that detracts from it, the Court finds that the ALJ did

not err in discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748,

750 (9th Cir. 1985). The ALJ’s decision was supported by the record and consistent with

Plaintiff’s treating physician’s medical progress notes, Plaintiff’s own description of his

limitations, and the non-examining physician’s physical RFC. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954

(A federal court “may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error.”) Summary judgment accordingly will be

granted in Defendant’s favor. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995);

20 C.F.R. § 404.1513 (2005).

C. Plaintiff’s Other Limitations.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s major depressive disorder qualified as a severe

medically determinable impairment, as evaluated under Listing 12.04 of the listing of

impairments. Doc. #3A, Tr. 25. The ALJ determined, however, that Plaintiff’s mental

impairment only resulted in mild restrictions of activities of daily living (“ADL”) and mild

difficulties in maintaining social functioning. Doc. #3A, Tr. 25. The ALJ found that

Plaintiff had “moderate deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace,” and therefore

retained the functional capacity to perform only “simple repetitive type jobs, in low stress

environments, with limited public contact.” Doc. #3A, Tr. 24-25. The ALJ’s opinion states

that her decision was based on the record as a whole, giving “substantial weight” to the State

Agency’s non-examining medical consultant, Dr. Campbell’s, mental RFC report, and the

examining psychologist, Dr. Bencomo’s, report, both of which she affirmatively adopted.

Doc. #3A, Tr. 27. 

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Bencomo’s report found multiple areas in which Plaintiff

showed significant limitations and the ALJ erred because she did not give sufficient weight

to areas where Plaintiff scored “fair.” Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ “ignored entirely”

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those areas where he showed a “poor” ability to function. Doc. #8. Plaintiff argues that even

though the ALJ’s opinion stated that she agreed with Dr. Bencomo’s report, she in fact

adopted the non-examining physician’s RFC finding of only “moderate” limitations in areas

where Dr. Bencomo scored Plaintiff as “fair” or “poor.” Id. Defendant’s respond that the

ALJ gave the proper weight to both the examining and non-examining physician reports, and

her decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Doc. #17. 

The Court agrees that the ALJ’s decision was properly supported by evidence in the

record. The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Thomas, 278 F.3d

at 954 (A federal court “may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if it is not supported

by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error”); Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016,

1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The [ALJ] and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in

evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the ALJ.”)

The ALJ’s opinion that Plaintiff has mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning

was based, in part, on the fact that Plaintiff told his examining psychologist, Dr. Bencomo,

that he speaks with friends on the telephone once or twice a week and that, although he

“rarely does anything, . . . [he did go] boating with his friends the past weekend.” Doc. #3A,

Tr. 25. Dr. Bencomo reported that Plaintiff had “a fair ability to relate to coworkers and deal

with the public.” Id. at 27. The ALJ gave “substantial weight to the State Agency medical

consultants . . . and agree[d] with the conclusions reached by [Dr. Bencomo].” Id. The ALJ

also noted that “there was no evidence of psychiatric hospitalizations or other episodes of

deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings.” Id. at 25. 

The Court finds sufficient evidence in this record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that

Plaintiff had only mild limitations in his social functioning. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 (“[I]f

the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that

of the ALJ.”) Summary judgment accordingly will be granted in Defendant’s favor. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, the ALJ stated that her finding of

mild limitation was influenced by Plaintiff’s own statement to Dr. Bencomo that he “was

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able to care for his personal hygiene, grooming and dressing independently,” that he left the

house once or twice a week for medical appointments, and that he was able to walk for

approximately 50 yards. Doc. #3A, Tr. 25. The Court finds sufficient evidence in the record

to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff suffered mild limitations in his activities of

daily living. 

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff possessed “moderate deficiencies of concentration,

persistence or pace.” Doc. #3A, Tr. 25. Dr. Bencomo conducted a battery of tests and found

that Plaintiff scored “fair to good” in his ability to maintain concentration. Doc. #3A, Tr.

240. Dr. Campbell also reported moderate limitations in this area. Doc. #3A, Tr. 264. The

Court finds that because the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s mental RFC is consistent with

the examining and non-examining physicians, no legal error was committed. 

Finally, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity was “limited

to performing simple repetitive type jobs in low stress environments with limited public

contact.” Doc. #3A, Tr. 240, 264. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered Drs.

Bencomo and Campbell’s reports, both of which identified problems with Plaintiff’s ability

to interact with coworkers, with the public, and with supervisors. Doc. #3A, Tr. 240, 264.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because (1) the global statement of Plaintiff’s limitations

did not involve a function-by-function assessment as required by Social Security Ruling 96-

8p and (2) because she adopted the non-examining physician’s RFC that found only

“moderate” limitations in the above areas, whereas Dr. Bencomo scored Plaintiff as “fair”

or “poor.” See Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996); Doc. #8. 

The Court can “set aside a denial of disability benefits only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954. “Where the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the

ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld.” Id. In this case, Plaintiff’s is asking

the Court to isolate the areas where Plaintiff scored “poor” and “fair” and give more weight

to those areas than to the record as a whole. Dr. Bencomo’s mental RFC report found

Plaintiff “not limited” in two areas, “good” in five areas, “fair” in four areas, and “poor” in

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three areas. Doc. #3A, Tr. 240. Considering both Drs. Bencomo and Campbell’s reports,

both identified his inability to deal with coworkers, the public, work stress, and supervisors,

and the ALJ noted those limitations in her analysis. The Court finds that the ALJ conducted

the required function-by-function analysis and reasonably concluded Plaintiff was

moderately limited. 

D. Plaintiff’s Vocational Limitations. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff could perform other work.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony conflicts with the

Dictionary of Occupational titles (“DOT”) in violation of Social Security Ruling 00-4p,

which provides that an ALJ may not rely on vocational expert testimony that differs from the

data in the DOT without obtaining a “reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict.” See

Soc. Sec. Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000); Doc. #8. Plaintiff argues that the

jobs the VE reported Plaintiff was qualified to perform required the ability to carry out

“detailed” instructions. Doc. #8. Plaintiff argues, without citing any case law, that Plaintiff’s

limitation to performing “simple work” is inconsistent with jobs that require Plaintiff to

follow “detailed instructions.” Id. 

Defendant denies that Plaintiff’s limitation to performing “simple work” is

inconsistent with the his ability to follow “detailed” instruction and argues, therefore, that

no explanation was required under the Social Security Ruling 00-4p. Doc. #17. Defendant

points out that the occupations the VE identified required a specific vocational preparation

(“SVP”) of at least a level 2, which by definition is consistent with unskilled work. See

Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1990). Unskilled work is defined as

“work which needs little judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a

short period of time.” Id. 

The Court does not find that the ALJ erred in relying on the VE testimony. The

identified jobs were unskilled and therefore did not conflict with the data in the DOT.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #6) is denied.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. #15) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate this case.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2006.

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