Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00258/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00258-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The court may take judicial notice of its own records. MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 1

803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT BASQUE, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-0258 GEB KJM P

vs.

TERESA SCHWARTZ, Warden, et al, 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

This matter was on calendar on July 25, 2007 for a hearing on respondent’s

motion to dismiss. Steven Sanders, Esq., appeared for petitioner; Robert C. Cross, Deputy

Attorney General, appeared for respondent. 

After the hearing the court permitted the parties to file letter briefs on the impact

of Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2004), on the issues raised by the motion.

I. Background

Counsel originally brought this challenge in this court in a civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking an injunction directing the defendant prison officials to transfer

plaintiff to a conservation camp or grant him the same increased credit earning status as an

inmate actually placed in a camp, among other things. Basque v. Schwarzenegger, Civ. No. S05-1612 FCD KJM P. In that case, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning 1

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that by granting plaintiff’s request for additional good time, plaintiff would gain a speedier

release from prison, a remedy available only in a habeas action. See 12/20/05 Order.

Petitioner turned to the state courts and filed habeas petitions in Solano County

Superior Court, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District, and the Supreme Court, all

of which were denied. Petition (Pet.), Exs. I, M & N. 

Petitioner filed his federal writ on February 9, 2007. He alleges that because of

his HIV status, he was denied a chance to be assigned to the fire camp, where he could earn

additional work-time credits and thus reduce his term of imprisonment. He argues that this

policy violates his rights to due process and equal protection and also violates the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA). 

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition does not raise

a federal claim as a result of findings of fact made by a state court, which are binding on this

court. Petitioner counters that the Superior Court ignored the evidence petitioner presented in

support of his petition. 

II. Analysis

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits

in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA”). Courts are not required

to address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the

ground that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71

(2003). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief by

§ 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

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The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th

Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S. 919 (2003). In this case, the only reasoned decision from

the state courts was issued by the Solano County Superior Court:

In a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . , Petitioner . . .alleges

that the Department of Corrections has improperly refused to place

him in a camp or fire fighting assignment based solely on his

disability of being infected with HIV. Petitioner alleges Due

Process and Equal Protection violations, as well as violations of

the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . .

Petitioner does not state a prima facie case for relief. (People v.

Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 475.)

Petitioner has not adequately shown that he is similarly situated to

inmates with other disabilities who have received medical

clearance for light duty non-hazardous work in camp with respect

to qualifying for camp placement. . . .The purpose of section

3355(c) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations is to

make sure that all inmates who are considered for camp

assignment . . . receive medical clearance establishing that they are

capable of doing the work and healthy enough not to pose a danger

to themselves or others. Petitioner’s medical chronos indicate that

he could not be cleared for camp placement not just because of

Petitioner’s HIV infection, a chronic infectious disease, but also

due to his heart disease, his history of ankle fracture and his

Achilles surgery. Petitioner fails to establish that his medical

problems do not make him any less capable of performing the

work or subject him to a heightened need for medical supervision

than those inmates who are medically cleared for light duty nonhazardous work. 

Even if the Court determined that Petitioner is being treated

unequally from other similarly situated inmates, the decision to

deny camp placement is rationally related to the Department’s

legitimate interest in maintaining Petitioner’s health and safety

while under its custody. . . . As indicated by Department Officials,

Petitioner’s infection with HIV and his heart disease constitute

medical concerns that require continuing monitoring and

intervention by medical staff that is not available in a camp

situation.

Petitioner has not demonstrated a need for heightened judicial

scrutiny. Classifications based on disabilities are not suspect and

do not require a more exacting standard of judicial review . . .

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 Although neither party has provided a copy of the Superior Court petition, the state 2

court’s description of the exhibits suggests that the same exhibits have been offered in support of

4

Moreover, allowing inmates to reduce their total term of commitment by

application of work time credit is a privilege, not a fundamental or

constitutionally protected right . . . . 

Petitioner also claims an arbitrary deprivation of a constitutional

right in violation of the Due Process Clause. Given that a lawful

conviction permits a State to commit a prisoner in any of its

prisons, regardless of whether one institution imposes a more

onerous term of confinement than another, it is doubtful that

Petitioner has been denied a constitutional right. . . .Regardless,

assuming that failure to assign Petitioner to a camp assignment

somehow violated a constitutional right retained upon conviction,

judicial review is again limited to determining whether the

Department’s action is rationally related to a legitimate state

interest.

Petitioner also fails to state a prima facie case under the Americans

with Disabilities Act. Under the ADA, Petitioner must allege that

he is otherwise qualified for the benefit he seeks and that his

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of

the disability. . . . A person is otherwise qualified if he meets the

essential eligibility requirements for participation in spite of his

handicap. Though the Court must consider whether a reasonable

accommodation would enable a handicapped person to perform

those functions, accommodation is not reasonable if it requires a

fundamental alteration of the nature of the program. . . .

Petitioner fails to provide specific facts and documentary evidence

establishing that, but for his HIV infection, he is qualified for

placement in camp. . . . The fact that he was cleared for full duty at

an institution with the qualified medical personnel to monitor his

HIV infection and heart condition does not necessarily mean that

he was qualified for camp. Petitioner makes no showing that he

meets the Department’s criteria for camp placement, even for light

duty work, or that the Department could have reasonably provided

accommodation that would not change the fundamental nature of

the program. Moreover, though Petitioner states that his HIV

infection was the only basis for his denial his medical chronos

indicate that he had additional health problems that contributed to

the Department’s decision. His ankle fracture and Achilles surgery

rendered him unable to work around slippery surfaces and made

climbing difficult. His heart disease requires medication and

monitoring. These problems likely contributed to the decision to

deny camp placement.

Pet., Ex. I at 2-4.2

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26 the federal petition. 

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Respondent argues that because the state court found petitioner’s exclusion from

the fire camp was based on ankle fracture, problems with his Achilles tendon, and heart

condition as well as his HIV status, the denial of placement was based on the rational interest of

maintaining petitioner’s health. Petitioner counters, in essence, that the court should not have

made such factual findings without ordering a medical examination and a hearing.

In Taylor v. Maddox, the Ninth Circuit examined the application of the

“unreasonable determination” standard in the context of factual findings. It concluded that in

several situations, a state court’s factual determinations would not be entitled to deference. The

court observed:

Closely related to cases where the state courts make factual

findings infected by substantive legal error are those where the

fact-finding process itself is defective. If, for example, a state

court makes evidentiary findings without holding a hearing and

giving petitioner an opportunity to present evidence, such findings

clearly result in an “unreasonable determination” of the facts. 

366 F.3d at 1001. Respondent argues that this discussion is dicta, because the state court in

Taylor had conducted a hearing on the petitioner’s motion to suppress his confession, and cites

to Perez v. Rosario, 459 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2006) in support of his argument that the state court’s

failure to hold an evidentiary hearing does not render its findings unreasonable in the AEDPA

sense.

In Perez, the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that:

[S]tate court fact determinations are reasonable without an

evidentiary hearing, as here, where the record conclusively

establishes a fact or where petitioner’s factual allegations are

entirely without credibility. Where there is no likelihood that an

evidentiary hearing would have affected the determination of the

state court, its failure to hold one does not make such

determination unreasonable.

Id. at 951 (citation omitted). The court then examined the record and concluded that the

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 As noted above, respondent has not submitted a copy of the Superior Court petition. 3

 See Medical Records Analysis, Deciphering Medical Acronyms and Symbols 4

<http://www.goforthmedical.com/acronyms.htm> accessed 10/4/2007. Other notations on the

physical exam report are undecipherable. Pet., Ex. B. 

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petitioner’s account of his dealings with trial counsel, which changed and expanded after the

state had noted deficiencies in the initial declaration and which conflicted with portions of the

trial record, were not credible. Id. at 951-53.

In this case, respondent cites Perez, but makes no attempt to argue that the record

in the state court conclusively established a fact or that the factual allegations were so incredible

that an evidentiary hearing would have had no impact on the determination. Even if the court 3

assumes that the records attached to the federal petition were in fact the exhibits proffered in

Superior Court, it does not find that these records conclusively establish the reason petitioner

was excluded from camp placement. It is true that the officials who denied petitioner’s inmate

grievances relied on petitioner’s heart condition and foot and ankle problems, but there is no

suggestion that any of those officials had medical training or the ability to interpret whether the

medical problems they found in petitioner’s records had in fact contributed to the determination

that he was not camp-eligible. Pet., Ex. C at 8-10, 13-17. In contrast, the actual “reception

center medical clearance/restriction information chrono” notes that he was cleared for “full duty”

despite his “htn”–hypertension–but not cleared for camp placement. The reason for the latter 4

determination is not evident from the forms. Pet., Ex. B. at 1, 3. 

The instant case is more like Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003),

cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004), which is cited in Taylor. In Nunes, the petitioner alleged that

counsel had not conveyed a plea offer correctly, causing Nunes to reject it. Respondent argued

that the federal court was bound by the determinations made by the state habeas court, which had

decided that Nunes had failed to allege a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel;

found an evidentiary hearing to be unnecessary, but then found on the record presented that

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Nunes could not show he would have pleaded guilty had the offer been adequately conveyed;

rejected some of Nunes’ evidentiary support because of its dubious relevance and found portions

of his declaration not credible; and drew conclusions about what someone in Nunes’ position

would have done. Id. at 1053-54. 

 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state habeas court’s resolution of the issues

was unreasonable legally and factually. It noted that “[w]ith the state court having purported to

evaluate Nunes’ claim for sufficiency alone, it should not have required Nunes to prove his claim

without affording him an evidentiary hearing. . . .” Id. at 1054. The court continued:

Its assessment of the evidence went well beyond its self-assigned

task of assessing Nunes’ allegations for sufficiency to determine

whether Nunes would be entitled to relief. State court findings are

generally presumed correct unless they are rebutted by clear and

convincing evidence or based on an unreasonable evidentiary

foundation. But with the state court having refused Nunes an

evidentiary hearing, we need not of course defer to the state court’s

factual findings–if that is indeed how those stated findings should

be characterized –when they were made without such a hearing. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . [T]he state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable

because that court made factual findings (that is, it drew inferences

against Nunes where equally valid inferences could have been

made in his favor, and it made credibility determinations) when it

rather claimed to be determining prima facie sufficiency.

Id. at 1055-56 (citations omitted); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“[h]aving refused Killian an evidentiary hearing . . . , the state cannot argue now that the normal

AEDPA deference is owed the factual determinations of the California courts”); Green v. White,

232 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2000) (no deference to state court factual determination based on

speculation rather than on testimony). 

In this case, as in Nunes, the Superior Court found that petitioner had not stated a

prima facie case, but then evaluated the evidence petitioner had submitted and drew inferences

adverse to him, beyond what it needed to do to evaluate the prima facie sufficiency of

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petitioner’s showing. See In re Serrano, 10 Cal.4th 447, 456 (1995) (if respondent declines to

file a return and “the court rejects the petitioner’s undisputed factual allegations on credibility

grounds, and does so in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner is deprived of the

opportunity to present additional evidence in support of the undisputed allegations underlying

the claim for relief”); People v. Romero, 8 Cal.4th 728, 739 (1994) (once the issues have been

joined by the people’s return and the petitioner’s traverse, the court determines whether an

evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve factual disputes). 

Accordingly, because the Superior Court simultaneously found that petitioner had

not stated a prima facie case for relief but then made factual determinations based on the

evidence petitioner presented, these findings are not entitled to AEDPA deference and thus do

not resolve the federal issues presented in the petition. 

Respondent’s challenge to petitioner’s legal claims is based largely on the state

court’s factual findings and thus the motion to dismiss is not well-taken. 

This court need not decide at this stage whether petitioner’s equal protection

claim should be evaluated under the strict scrutiny or rational basis tests: plaintiff has raised an

issue of disparate treatment.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to

dismiss be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 17, 2007. 

2/basq0258.157

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