Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05241/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05241-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANN LEMBERG,

Plaintiff,

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendant.

Case No.17-cv-05241-JSC 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 27

Plaintiff filed this personal injury action against Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 

in the Superior Court for the County of San Francisco and it was later removed to this Court based 

on diversity jurisdiction. The Court previously granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss concluding 

that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to adequately allege a claim upon which relief could be granted.

(Dkt. No. 21.) Defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint is now pending before 

the Court. (Dkt. No. 27.) After carefully considering the arguments and briefing submitted, the 

Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the June 14, 

2018 hearing, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff 

has adequately pled a claim for negligence, but fails to plead a viable products liability claim.

BACKGROUND

A. First Amended Complaint (FAC) Allegations

Plaintiff suffered a crush injury to her right long finger in an ATM machine that was 

poorly maintained on the Chase Bank Premises at 500 McAllister Street.

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 (Dkt. No. 23 at 1.

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) 

 

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Plaintiff’s original complaint indicated that this injury occurred on June 20, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1. at 

5.)

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The injury occurred when the ATM closed swiftly on her hand while she was attempting to 

remove a twenty dollar bill. (Id.) Although she cried out in pain when the injury occurred, it took 

the banker on duty a half hour to respond. (Id.) The banker later apologized for his “lackluster 

behavior.” (Id.) When she went to the emergency room, she was told to “ice it and brace it and let 

it heal.” (Id.) As a result of her injury, Plaintiff suffered impairment of her right hand as well as 

hospital and medical expenses. (Id. at 1, 3.) The premise where Plaintiff’s injury occurred has 

had “numerous security breaches.” (Id. at 1.) Chase has a contract with National Case Register 

Company to supply the ATM machines. (Id.)

B. Procedural Background

Approximately a year after her injury, Plaintiff filed this personal injury action against 

Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., in the Superior Court for the County of San Francisco. 

(Dkt. No. 1-1.) Her complaint alleged claims for (1) general negligence, (2) products liability, and 

(3) premises liability. (Id. at 5.) Defendant removed the action to this Court based on diversity 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Dkt. No. 1.) Defendant then moved to dismiss the complaint 

for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 7.) After 

Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion to dismiss and an order to show cause regarding the same, 

the Court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. (Dkt. No. 14.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff 

filed a motion to reopen the action based on excusable neglect which the Court granted. (Dkt. 

Nos. 15, 19.) Plaintiff also filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 20.) The Court 

granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss and gave Plaintiff until March 19, 2018 to file her amended 

complaint. (Dkt. No. 21.) 

On April 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed her amended complaint accompanied by a motion for 

leave to file her amended complaint late. (Dkt. Nos. 22 & 23.) The FAC alleges three claims for 

relief for (1) negligence, (2) personal injury, and (3) products liability negligence.3 (Dkt. No. 23.) 

 

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

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It is not clear whether Plaintiff pleads two or three claims for relief. Under the heading “second 

claim for relief” Plaintiff lists both “personal injury” and “product liability negligence.” (Dkt. No. 

23 at 3.) Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes her FAC as pleading 

three claims for relief.

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The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to file her complaint late and set a date for Defendant to file 

its responsive pleading. (Dkt. No. 25.) Defendant thereafter filed the now pending motion to 

dismiss the first amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 27.) Plaintiff has filed several documents since 

which the Court construes in part as her opposition to the motion to dismiss.4 (Dkt. No. 42.)

JURISDICTION

Defendant based its removal on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To properly 

allege diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must claim damages in excess of $75,000 and each 

defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Diaz v. 

Davis (In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.), 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 because Plaintiff pleads damages in the amount of 

$5,000,000. (Dkt. No. 23 at 3.) The diversity of citizenship requirement is likewise satisfied 

because Plaintiff is a resident of California and Defendant is a citizen of Ohio where its main 

office is located. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 7.)

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. 

A. Negligence and Personal Injury

The elements of a negligence claim are: (1) the existence of a duty to exercise due care; (2) 

breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage. See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 

465, 500 (2001). Plaintiff’s FAC adequately pleads the elements of a negligence claim; namely, 

that she was injured by an ATM on the Chase Bank premises at 500 McAllister Street that was 

poorly maintained. Plaintiff’s second claim for relief based on “personal injury” is subsumed 

within the negligence claim: her personal injury is the injury alleged to have occurred as a result of 

Defendant’s negligence. 

Defendant’s insistence that Plaintiff’s negligence claim fails because it did not owe 

 

4 Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her recent filings, while not captioned 

as her opposition to the motion to dismiss, as her opposition. (Dkt. Nos. 37 & 41.) The Court will 

thus not consider Defendant’s argument that its motion should be granted for failure to file an 

opposition. 

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Plaintiff a duty of care is unavailing. Banks—just like stores—“owe [their patrons] a duty to 

exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.” Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 26 Cal. 

4th 1200, 1205 (2001). A store owner exercises reasonable care by “making reasonable 

inspections of the portions of the premises open to customers.” Id. “Because the owner is not the 

insurer of the visitor’s personal safety, the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the 

dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” Id. at 1206 (internal citation omitted). 

However, “the plaintiff need not show actual knowledge where evidence suggests that the 

dangerous condition was present for a sufficient period of time to charge the owner with 

constructive knowledge of its existence”; instead, “if the condition has existed long enough for a 

reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury.” Id. Here, 

Plaintiff alleges that Chase has “had numerous security breaches, management problems and did 

not have a proper atm area at this Chase branch. Compared to other branches it appears 

substandard.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 2.) This is adequate to state a claim for negligence based on 

Defendant’s failure to maintain and/or protect its patrons from a known dangerous condition with 

respect to the ATM. Defendant’s attempt to recast Plaintiff’s tort claim as one lying in contract 

based on her allegation that Chase has a “contractual obligation to me as a customer” is 

unpersuasive—when the FAC is read as a whole, it is clear that Plaintiff is alleging that she was 

injured by the ATM which was poorly maintained by Chase. (Dkt. No. 23 at 2.) 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the negligence claim is DENIED. 

B. Products Liability

Plaintiff has not, however, adequately pled a claim for products liability. A plaintiff may 

seek recovery in a products liability case either on the theory of strict liability in tort or on the 

theory of negligence. See Merrill, 26 Cal. 4th at 478. “Under either a negligence or a strict 

liability theory of products liability, to recover from a manufacturer, a plaintiff must prove that a 

defect caused injury.” Id. at 479 (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiff alleges “product liability negligence for archaic and improperly serviced 

and timed machines on the premises where I suffered a personal injury to my hand from the Chase 

Machines.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 3.) Nowhere does Plaintiff allege that the ATM was defective; 

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instead, she repeatedly alleges that it was “poorly maintained.” Indeed, Plaintiff goes so far as to 

allege that “if [Chase] choose not to maintain the equipment they purchase and are supposed to 

maintain, that is a Chase problem, not a product liability issue.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff’s claim thus 

lies in negligence and not in products liability.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s products liability claim is 

GRANTED. Given that Plaintiff was previously granted leave to amend her products liability 

claim to allege that a defect in the ATM caused her injury and she has not done so, the Court 

concludes that further leave to amend would be futile and dismisses the product liability claim 

with prejudice.

C. Defendant’s Motion to Strike Allegations regarding Settlement Discussions

Under Rule 12(f), a court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is 

to avoid spending time and money litigating spurious issues. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 

618 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2010). Striking is appropriate if it “will make trial less complicated 

or eliminate serious risks of prejudice to the moving party, delay, or confusion of the issues.” 

Sliger v. Prospect Mortg., LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2011). However, motions 

to strike “are generally disfavored because the motions may be used as delaying tactics and 

because of the strong policy favoring resolution of the merits.” Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit 

Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010). A decision to strike 

material from the pleadings is vested to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Nurse v. United 

States, 226 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000).

Here, Defendant moves to strike portions of the FAC which refer to Defendant’s conduct 

and statements made in compromise negotiations as “immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous” 

under Rule 12(f), and as inadmissible settlement communications pursuant to Rule 408 of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED. To the extent that the FAC 

refers to settlement communications, these may not be used to prove the validity of a disputed 

claim, but they may be admissible for another purpose; namely, to demonstrate a course of 

conduct. See Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. James, No. C-14-04242 DMR, 2015 WL 730010, at *6 

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(N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015). However, Plaintiff is cautioned to refrain from including settlement 

related information in her pleadings.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff has adequately alleged a claim for negligence. Defendant shall file 

its answer within 21 days of the date of this Order. 

The Initial Case Management Conference remains set for July 12, 2018 at 1:30 p.m. The 

parties shall file a Joint Case Management Conference Statement by July 5, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2018

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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