Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00800/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00800-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441pr Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELE BAKER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv0800 JM(JMA)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR

OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST

PLAINTIFF

v.

ROMAN CATHOLIC

ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN DIEGO;

ROMAN CATHOLIC

ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN DIEGO

dba CATHEDRAL CATHOLIC

HIGH SCHOOL; CATHEDRAL

CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL,

Defendants.

Defendant The Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego (“RCBSD”), erroneously

sued as Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Diego, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of

San Diego, dba Cathedral Catholic High School and Cathedral Catholic High School,

moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff Michele Baker’s remaining claim for

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Plaintiff opposes the

motion. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion for summary

judgment in favor of RCBSD and against Plaintiff. The Clerk of Court is instructed to

enter judgment accordingly and to close the file.

BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2014, RCBSD removed this action from the Superior Court for the

- 1 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

State of California, County of San Diego, based upon federal question jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1441, and 1446. The operative Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”) alleges three claims for relief: (1) disability discrimination in violation of the

ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12112 et seq.; (2) retaliation and wrongful termination in violation

of California public policy; and (3) declaratory and injunctive relief. (Ct. Dkt. 22). 

Following entry of this court’s March 23, 2015 Order Granting in Part and Denying in

Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the only remaining claim is the ADA claim. 

The parties have now completed discovery and Defendant moves for summary

judgment on the remaining ADA claim. The following evidentiary record is largely

undisputed. Plaintiff, a 68 year old mathematics teacher, commenced her employment

with RCBSD in 2000. Plaintiff was employed via an annual employment contract that

would be renewed annually from 2000 through August 2013. The employment

contract contained the following provision:

The term of this EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT shall be for one (1)

academic year commencing on September 1, 2000 and terminating on

June 30, 2001. . . . It is understood that . . . there is no obligation to offer

TEACHER another contract at the end of that term, notwithstanding the

fact that the contract may have been renewed in previous years. . . . 

Teacher is familiar with and understands the importance of the teaching

of the Roman Catholic Church and agrees to give Christian witness in

his/her personal and professional life. By accepting this term of the

Agreement, Teacher agrees to respect and implement the policies and

regulations regarding Catholic Schools and Catholic education as issued

by the Holy See, the Bishop of San Diego, and his delegates, including the

Office of Schools, the President and the Principal of the School.

Pursuant to RCBSD’s policies, Plaintiff’s performance was formally evaluated

annually during the first three years of employment and subsequent teacher evaluations

were performed as needed. Consistent with the policy, six performance evaluations

were conducted throughoutPlaintiff’s employment with RCBSD. The evaluations each

identify from 3 to 17 different areas in Plaintiff’s performance that needed

improvement. The evaluations noted several areas for improvement: For example,

“Need to clearly identify purpose, goals of each day’s lesson;” “Inadequate time for

homework assignment;” “Work more effectively with administrators;” “Prepare

- 2 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

lessons which reflect a strong understanding of the content;” and “Adhere to all school

policies, procedures and regulation.” 

The school principal, Principal Deely since 2006, would determine which

employment contracts would be renewed. Principal Deely testified that he had received

both positive and negative comments concerning Plaintiff. While some people at the

school considered Plaintiff to be very nice and supportive of students, Principal Deely

also testified that he received concerns about Plaintiff’s effectiveness in teaching

mathematics, managing her classroom, and whether the students received the kind of

instruction needed. (Deely Decl. ¶¶9-10). These concerns were voiced by school

counselors and several administrative personnel. Assistant Principal Mauro also

testified that she received several complaints, or concerns, from teachers and parents

concerning Plaintiff’s performance. 

On August 23, 2012, Plaintiff suffered a fall in the stairwell at work, and struck

her head on the concrete. Plaintiff was initially unable to get up and sat on the ground

for about ten minutes. Plaintiff then walked to her car, informed the school nurse of

the fall, drove home, spoke with Principal Deely, and then drove herself to the

emergency room at Sharp’s Hospital. Plaintiff underwent a CT scan of her head and

neck. She was diagnosed with a concussion. She received an anti-nausea medication

and stayed out of work for ten days.

On August 27, 2012, by email, Plaintiff informed Principal Deely that she

suffered a concussion and felt dizzy. Subsequently, Principal Deely “asked me

periodically if I - - how I was, and I always told him that I had headaches and dizziness,

and that was about the extent of it.” (AS 296:5-8). In their conversations, Principal

Deely expressed concern for her well-being and told Plaintiff to follow her doctor’s

advice. On September 3, 2012, Plaintiff was medically cleared to return to work. 

Without providing necessary context as to frequency, severity, or duration, Plaintiff

represents that she suffers from double vision, blurred vision, memory issues, hearing

issues, dizziness, and nightmares. (AS 193:2012; Oppo. at p.9:6-7). Following the

- 3 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

incident, Plaintiff testified that she was able to competently carry out the duties of her

teaching position. (Exh. 1 338:1-342-19). At no time did a medical provider inform

her that she could not perform her duties as a teacher. 

Shortly after returning to work, Plaintiff filed a worker’s compensation claim. 

From September 2012 through the spring of 2013, Plaintiff was seen by medical

personnel on multiple occasions (about once per month) concerning her complaints of

headaches and dizziness. Plaintiff requested, and received, time off fromher employer

to attend doctor appointments. After each medical appointment, Plaintiff was cleared

for full duty without any limitations. During this time, Plaintiff was able continue

teaching without any accommodation or limitation.

During the firstsemester ofthe 2012-13 academic year, Principal Deely received

concerns aboutstudents and classroommanagement issuesrelated to Plaintiff’s classes. 

Principal Deely observed Plaintiff on two or three occasions in January and February

2013. Principal Deely observed that Plaintiff did not begin class with a prayer as

required, incorrectly solved a math problem on the board and failed to correct the

answer when a student pointed out the problem, and did not manage her class well. 

(Deely Decl. ¶18-19). 

Based upon his observations, as well as input from students, parents, and

administrators, Principal Deely decided not to offer Plaintiff a new contract for the

2013-2014 academic year. On February 28, 2013, Plaintiff met with Principal Deely

and Vice Principal Mauro to discuss the evaluation. Principal Deely discussed the

performance evaluation and modified one of the comments in the evaluation. Plaintiff

signed the evaluation but disputed the motivation and content of the evaluation. (Exh.

19). Principal Deely informed Plaintiff at the February 28, 2013 meeting that she

would not receive a new contract for the upcoming academic year.

On March 18, 2013, Plaintiff contacted her physician and informed her of the

following: 

. . . . I fell in August and continued to work. Although I have dizziness,

double-vision, and headaches, I felt I was doing a good job. I wastold last

- 4 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

week that my contract would not be renewed. I am devastated and feel

unworthy at school. I cannot stop crying. Is it possible to get a note from

you to get the rest of the year off, so I can pull myself together and move

forward? Please help me. Sincerely, Michele Baker

The physician complied and provided her with a note excusing her from work from

April 8, 2013, to June 15, 2013, due to “medical illness.” Plaintiff’s request for leave

was approved and Plaintiff was paid for the remainder of her contract through August

2013.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine

issue asto any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 698 (9th

Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the file which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that

the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating

the opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). The opposing party cannot rest on

the mere allegations or denials of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and

by [the party’s] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). The opposing party also may not rely solely on

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Any doubt

asto the existence of any issue of material fact requires denial of the motion. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment,

- 5 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

when “‘the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with

evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence were

uncontroverted at trial.’” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)

(emphasis in original) (quoting International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d

1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059 (1992)).

The ADA Claim

The basic theme of the ADA is that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate

against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application

procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee

compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.” 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (2009). The elements of a disability

discrimination claim under the ADA are (1) the claimant has a disability (as defined in

42 U.S.C. §12102(2)), (2) the claimant is qualified to perform the essential function of

the job, (3) the claimant has suffered adverse employment action because of the

disability. Hutton v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 895 (9th Cir.

2001).

The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities of [the] individual [who claims the

disability],” or “a record of such an impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an

impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “Major life activities” include “caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,

bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,

communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit in

Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2014), recently articulated that

the term“disability” isto be construed broadly to accomplish the purposes of the ADA. 

A 2008 amendment to the ADA provides, “The definition of disability in

this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals

under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this

chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall

be interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA

Amendments Act of 2008.” Id. § 12102(4)(B). Those findings and

- 6 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

purposes specifically express Congress's view that prior Supreme Court

and lower court cases, as well as Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) regulations, had given “substantially limits” an

unduly narrow construction.ADAAmendments Act of 2008, §2(a)(4)-(8),

Pub.L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553. “An impairment that

substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life

activities in order to be considered a disability.” 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(C).

According to post 2008 regulations promulgated by the EEOC,

An impairment is a disability ... if it substantially limits the

ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as

compared to most people in the general population. An

impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely

restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity

in order to be considered substantially limiting.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Determining whether an impairment is

substantially limiting “requires an individualized assessment.” Id.

§1630.2(j)(1)(iv).

Id. at 1112.

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case of disability discrimination

under the ADA, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action. The employee then bearsthe

burden of establishing that this proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. See 

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 2996) (applying the

McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting analysis to ADA claims). The court analyzes the

elements of an ADA claim.

Disability

Plaintiff comes forward with evidence to show that, on August 23, 2012, she

suffered a concussion when she fell and struck her head on concrete. At that time,

Plaintiff also complained of dizziness, headaches, double vision, memory issues, and

blurred treatment. Her treating physician would not release Plaintiff to resume her

work schedule until September 3, 2012, about ten days after the incident. This

evidence is sufficient to establish a cognizable disability for purposes of the ADA: the

concussion and related symptoms led to Plaintiff’s inability to carry out a major life

activity, working, for a period of at least ten days.

- 7 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

While Plaintiff was initially disabled for purposes of the ADA, the evidentiary

record demonstrates that, after her return to work, Plaintiff complained of suffering

from intermittent headaches and vision problems. However, the evidentiary record

fails to establish that Plaintiff’s medical condition prevented her from engaging in

major life activities. RCBSD comesforward with evidence to show that, after Plaintiff

returned to work, she was able to perform the essential functions of her teaching

position without aid or assistance. After Plaintiff’s return from medical leave on

September 3, 2012, Plaintiff testified that she was competently performing her workrelated duties including preparing lesson plans, grading homework and tests, meeting

with and supporting students, teaching her classes, effectively communicating with

students and coworkers, and driving herself to and from school. During this time,

Plaintiff testified that she was able to work around whatever unspecified vision and

hearing problems she may have had. She also testified that by mid-December 2012, her

headaches were no longer an issue and that, on October 11, 2012, Plaintiff informed

her treating physician that she experienced minimal symptoms and was functional. 

(Exh. 1 at 349: 4-11). The October 11, 2012 physician’s report noted:

Today, she complains of very intermittent dizziness, neck pain, and mild

headache in the afternoon, which she statesis not debilitating. She denies

any prior head injuries although she reports a history of arthritis in her

neck. She denies any nausea, vomiting, fever, or chills. She denies any

numbness, tingling, weakness, or radiating symptoms. She denies any

feeling [of] fatigue or lethargic [sic]. She denies problems with

confusion. The patient denies any change in vision or hearing.

(Id.). Plaintiff also stated that she “has very minimal symptoms, and [] is functional.”

Plaintiff was cleared for “full duty” without restrictions or limitations. Since

September 3, 2012, Plaintiff’s treating physicians determined that Plaintiff was able to

perform her usual occupation.

1

The court has not considered medical records submitted by Plaintiff that were 1

not provided to RCBSD. These records are irrelevant to prove that RCBSD was aware

of Plaintiff’s medical condition or symptoms because they were not provided to

RCBSD. (Exhs. U, Z, AB, AC, AE, AG, AH, and AI). The only medical notes

provided to RCBSD indicated that Plaintiff could return to full work duty. (Exh. 27,

Vol. 2, 365:2-366:12). The records are, however, relevant to Plaintiff’s medical

- 8 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On this record, the court concludes that there is no genuine dispute as to the

following and that, therefore, the evidentiary record establishes that (1) Plaintiff was

disabled, for purposes of the ADA, from the date of her fall, August 23, 2012, through

September 3, 2012; and, (2) after this date, the symptoms earlier suffered by Plaintiff

no longer prevented her from engaging in any major life activity as required by 42

U.S.C. § 12102(1). While Plaintiff argues that she suffered from night vision issues

during this time period, she does not quantify the degree or severity of the night vision

issue nor does she identify how that prevented her from engaging in a major life

activity (Plaintiff’s treating physicians did not place any restrictions on Plaintiff’s

activities and Plaintiff testified that she drove herself to and from work). Moreover,

after the initial 10 day leave period, there is no evidence that any physician suggested

that Plaintiff could not maintain the same daily activities as before the fall. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that even if she were not disabled, she was regarded as

disabled by her employer in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). To be “regarded” as

disabled, Plaintiffmust show the RCASD perceived her as having a “physical ormental

impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §1202(3)(A). To meet her evidentiary burden, Plaintiff cites

the following evidence: she met with the Principal about every 7 to 10 days, (AS

p.45:9-19); she informed Principal Deely in either January, February or June 2013 that

she wassuffering from double vision, (AS pp.196:18- 197:1); when asked by Principal

Deely, she always told him she suffered from headaches and dizziness and “that was

about the extent of it,” (AS pp. 295:23 - 296:8). Plaintiff provides no evidence that

she informed anyone as to the frequency, severity, duration or any other characteristic

of the intermittent vision and headache issues and, therefore, fails to demonstrate that

these symptoms were disabling for purposes of the ADA. The evidentiary record also

shows that Principal Deely was concerned about Plaintiff’s health following the fall,

he encouraged her to take the time off she needed to heal, and inquired into Plaintiff’s

well-being from time to time. Plaintiff, at no time, informed any employee of RCBSD

condition.

- 9 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that she was disabled (except for the one week period following her fall) or that any

dizziness or headaches prevented her from engaging in any major life activity. To the

contrary, Plaintiff represents that she could, at all times except for the one week leave

period at the end of August 2012, perform the duties of her teaching position without

aid or assistance. 

Plaintiff also repeatedly argues that she suffered from non-descript headaches

and vision issues. The generic claims of intermittent headaches and vision issues do

not satisfy Plaintiff’s evidentiary burden to show that her employer regarded her as

disabled for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). That Plaintiffsuffers fromnon-descript

headaches or vision issues (there is no evidence as to frequency, severity, duration, or

limitation) and informed RCBSD of these facts, fails to show that Plaintiff was

regarded as disabled. There is simply no evidence that RCBSD, or even Plaintiff’s

treating physicians believed, or even considered, that Plaintiff was disabled and could

not engage in majorlife activities such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,

seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,

breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 

42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A). Principal Deely testified that, upon Plaintiff’s return to work

on September 3, 2012, he was not aware of any restrictions in performing Plaintiff’s

job as a teacher. Principal Deely further testified that he never observed “anything

about Plaintiff to believe that she wasin anyway disabled or limited in her ability to do

her job or to function generally.” (Deely Decl. ¶¶24-25). Moreover, Plaintiff’s treating

physicians did not limit her availability to work and found, both implicitly and

explicitly, that Plaintiff could performher work responsibilities. Finally, Plaintiff fails

to submit any evidence that she had a record of a disability or impairment. On this

record, the court concludes that Plaintiff fails to meet her initial evidentiary burden to

demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists, with respect to whether her

employer regarded her as disabled for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(C).

In sum, the court concludes that Plaintiff was disabled from August 23, 2012

- 10 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

through September 3, 2012. After that date, the evidence is beyond material dispute

that Plaintiff was neither disabled nor regarded as disabled.

The Adverse Employment Decision Because of a “Disability”

Plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating that her employment contract

was not renewed because of a disability. She failsto meet this burden. The evidentiary

record demonstrates that Plaintiff remained under a disability from the date of the fall,

August 22, 2012, until September 3, 2012, the date Plaintiff returned to work. 

Principal Deely made the decision in February 2013 not to renew Plaintiff’s contract

because of perceived performance issues. (Deely Decl. ¶¶10-20). The remoteness in

time between Plaintiff’s disability, and the decision to not renew the employment

contract, does not give rise to an inference that Plaintiff’s contract was not renewed

because of her disability. Further, there is no evidence in the record that Principal

Deely, nor any other RCBSD employee, considered or regarded Plaintiff as disabled. 

If she was never considered or regarded as disabled, she could not have suffered an

adverse employment decision because of her disability.

2

In sum, the record fails to identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that Plaintiff did not have her contract renewed because of her disability. 

Pretext

At the outset, the court notes that, under the terms of the employment contract,

the parties could renew or not renew the contract for any reason, other than a failure to

renew the contract because of a disability. Principal Deely testified that he received

concerns about Plaintiff’s performance and informed Plaintiff that he would be

observing several of her classes. Based upon his evaluation, the evidence shows that

Principal Deely made the decision not to renew Plaintiff’s employment contract

because he was not satisfied with Plaintiff’s performance. (Deely Decl. ¶¶15-1 9). In

light of this non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that the

The court discusses Plaintiff’s arguments and evidence in context ofthe pretext

2

prong for ADA liability.

- 11 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

proffered reason was a pretext for disability discrimination.

Plaintiff contends that the non-renewal of the employment contract was more

likely than not the product of her disability (or the perception of her disability). As

concluded above, however, the evidence does not support that contention. First,

Plaintiff contends that RCBSD did not follow its policies with respect to performance

reviews and progressive discipline. While Plaintiff concedes that RCBSD complied

with its performance review policies (one performance review during each of the first

three years and then thereafter “as needed”), she argues that RCBSD had received

complaints for years about her performance but took no steps to conduct a performance

review until after she reported her disability. Similarly, Plaintiff contendsthat RCBSD

could have followed its progressive disciplinary policies, and she never received a

written warning before the non-renewal of the employment contract. These musings,

however, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the legitimate

reasons behind the non-renewal of the employment contract.

3

Plaintiff contends that RCBSD “failed to conduct performance review[s] to

address Plaintiff’s purported gross deficiencies.” (Oppo at p.20:8-9). The failure to

conduct more performance reviews, in light of the deficiencies identified in the earlier

performance reviews, Plaintiff concludes, is “evidence of Defendant’s discriminatory

animus.” (Oppo. at p.20:9). In a related argument, Plaintiff contends that RCBSD

“cannot explain why, notwithstanding the repeated complaints and poor performance,

it continually gave Plaintiff new employment contracts and annual raises and only

after Plaintiff reported her disability, did Defendant suddenly decide it was time to

end the employment relationship.” (Emphasis in original; Oppo. at p.20:20-24). The

difficulty with this argument is that Plaintiff draws a direct, but speculative, temporal

nexus between Plaintiff’s disability, which ended in early September 2012, and the

In the context of non-renewal of an employment contract, the court highlights 3

that either RCBSD or Plaintiff could decide not to renew the contract for virtually any

reason, including arbitrary ones. The only limitation imposed by the ADA is that an

employee not suffer adverse employment decisions on account of the disability. 

- 12 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

decision to not renew the employment contract on February 28, 2013. The passage of

five months time does not support a rational, evidentiary based temporal connection

that Plaintiff seeks to establish. This evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material

fact on the question of pretext.

Next, Plaintiff contends that the absence of corroborating evidence, and the

treatment ofsimilarly situated individuals by RCBSD, is evidence of pretext. As noted

above, RCBSD has met its evidentiary burden to establish a non-discriminatory reason

for the non-renewal of Plaintiff’s employment contract. Plaintiff’s burden is to raise

a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the reason proffered is a pretext

for disability discrimination. Plaintiff does not meet this burden by arguing that

RCBSD could have submitted additional evidence. The declarations submitted by

former employees, Radostina Zlatanov, Blanca Kressel, and Michael Fares, do not

establish that the proffered reasons for the non-renewal ofthe employment contract was

a pretext for discrimination. Ms. Zlatanov declares that she suffered a broken leg in 4

November 2011, required a wheelchair for mobility, “received glowing praise at work

from parents, students, as well as Principle [sic] Michael Deely” before she broke her

leg, was “subjected to increased scrutiny and criticism by Principle [sic] Deely” after

she required the use of a wheelchair, and in the Spring of 2011, she did not have her

employment contract renewed. Ms. Zlatanov “believe[s] [she] was wrongfully

terminated because [she] had an injury at work and required accommodations to do

[her] job.” (Zlatanov Decl.). Mr. Kressel declares that in 2008/2009 he began

suffering from sciatica and hip pain, had difficulty walking and, on occasion, RCBSD

provided a golf cart to assist him in traveling long distances at the school campus. In

RCBSD raises evidentiary objections to the declarations of Zlatanov and

4

Kressel, and Fares. RCBSD objects to the declarations on grounds that the

representations are not supported by documentary evidence, such as performance

reviews, and that the declarants never previously complained of any disability

discrimination nor ever filed any EEOC charges. The court overrules these specific

objections. These declarations establish, from the personal knowledge of the

declarants, their perceptions concerning circumstances related to the non-renewal of

their employment contracts. 

- 13 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Spring of 2010, RCBSD did not renew Mr. Kressel’s employment contract.

Despite his good work performance and reviews, in the Spring of 2010, Principal Deely

informed Kressel that his contract would not be renewed. Notably, unlike Ms.

Zlatanov, Mr. Kressel does not state his beliefs regarding the reason for the nonrenewal of the contract. 

The court concludes that these declarations fail to raise a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to the pretextual nature of the reason proffered for the nonrenewal of Plaintiff’s employment contact. Plaintiff, citing Goldsmith v. Bagby

Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2006), contends that the declarations are

“me too” evidence and demonstrate a discriminatory animus on the part of RCBSD. 

The declarations establish that both Zlatanov and Kressel were obviously mobility

disabled at the time of the non-renewal of the contract. Zlatanov used a wheelchair for

mobility and Kressel, due to sciatica, could not walk significant distances. In the

present case, except for the initial week or two following Plaintiff’s fall and

concussion, the record does not establish that Plaintiff was disabled or regarded as

such. The fact that the non-renewal of Plaintiff’s employment contract did not occur

until about five months after Plaintiff was no longer disabled is markedly different from

the situation of either Zlatanov or Kressel. The non-renewal of the declarants’

employment contracts occurred at a time when they were obviously suffering from a

disability. The declarants’ temporal connection does not exist in the present case and,

in this sense, is not “me too” evidence. The court also notes that only Ms. Zlatanov

opines that the non-renewal of the contract was because of her disability. Mr. Kressel

expresses no opinion on this issue.5

Lastly, Plaintiffrefersto the declaration of Mr. Fares for the apparent proposition

that Plaintiff did not have performance issues. Mr. Fares, a retired English teacher with

CCHS, declares that he substituted for Plaintiff and believed her to be a good teacher. 

To provide additional context to the declarations, RCBSD represents that 5

several teachers a year (five teachers in 2013) are not offered contract renewals. (Ct.

Dkt. 51-4, ¶15). 

- 14 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

He also noted that Plaintiff was a “good educator”and her classes were well-organized

and operated very smoothly. (Fares Decl. ¶4). This declaration is insufficient to raise

a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s performance. Mr. Fares, an

English teacher, and not a mathematics teacher, substituted for Plaintiff on a single

occasion in March 2013, after Plaintiff went out on medical leave. Mr. Fares did not

observe Plaintiff’s teaching performance. Rather, he taught a single course, in a field

not his own, at a time when Plaintiff had already been informed that her employment

contract would not be renewed. The Fares declaration isinsufficient to raise a genuine

issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s workplace performance.

Looking to the cumulative value of Plaintiff’s pretext evidence, the court

concludes that Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the

legitimate reasons for the non-renewal of the employment contract. RCBSD is entitled

to summary judgment on the remaining ADA claim.

The ADA Retaliation Claim

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, Plaintiff must show

(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) there

was a but-for casual link between the protected activity and the adverse employment

decision. See Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003). To the

extent Plaintiff seeks to establish an ADA retaliation claim, such a claim suffers from

the same defects identified above: (1) a temporal disconnect between Plaintiff’s

disability in August/September and Principal Deely’s decision not to renew the

employment contract the following February; (2) the abundant evidence that Principal

Deely encouraged Plaintiff to take medical leave, stay out as long as necessary, and

make and keep all necessary medical appointments; (3) Principal Deely was constantly

solicitous of her injury; and (4) there is no evidence of any opposition to and/or

concern about Plaintiff missing work while attending medical appointments. 

Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiff failsto raise a genuine issue of material

- 15 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fact with respect to the ADA retaliation claim.

In sum, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant RCBSD, and

against Plaintiff, on the remaining ADA claims. The Clerk of Court is instructed to

enter judgment accordingly and to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 23, 2016

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

- 16 - 14cv0800

Case 3:14-cv-00800-JM-JMA Document 61 Filed 06/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of 16