Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00162/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00162-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 1/ Petitioner is housed at Calipatria State Prison. Leland McEwen is

the Acting Warden of Calipatria State Prison. Therefore, Mr. McEwen

is the proper Respondent in this action.

08cv0162 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO ALVE,

Petitioner,

v.

L. E. SCRIBNER, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 08-0162-W(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Alejandro Alve (hereafter “Petitioner”), has filed

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Respondent L. E. Scribner1/

(hereafter “Respondent”) has filed an Answer to the Petition.

Petitioner has filed a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer. The Court,

having reviewed the Petition, Answer, Traverse and all the documents

submitted by the parties, hereby RECOMMENDS that the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

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2/ The Report and Recommendation was issued by Hon. Leo S. Papas,

United States Magistrate Judge, Ret.

3/ The September 10, 2008 Order directed Respondent to re-initiate the

proceedings in this case within sixty (60) days after the Hayward

decision became final. (September 10, 2008 Order at 3).

08cv0162 2

I

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, was sentenced

to death following a 1976 conviction by a jury of two counts of

first degree murder and assault. Petitioner appealed his convictions

and sentence. The appeal resulted in reduction of the sentence of

death to an indeterminate sentence of seven years to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole and a retrial to address

Petitioner’s sanity. A second jury found that Petitioner was sane

when he committed the offenses. Petitioner appealed that decision.

The judgment was affirmed on appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6 at

1).

On June 30, 2008, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss because the Petition

was time-barred.2/ However, four days prior to the issuance of the

Report and Recommendation, Respondent withdrew his Motion to Dismiss

because he determined that Petitioner had timely filed his Petition.

Therefore, on September 10, 2008, the District Judge assigned to

this case declined to adopt the Report and Recommendation and stayed

the proceedings in this case pending the outcome of the Ninth

Circuit’s en banc decision on rehearing of Hayward v. Marshall, 512

F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc granted by 527 F.3d 797 (9th

Cir. 2008), vacated by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir.

2010) (en banc)3/. Among other things, the Hayward en banc decision

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4/ Petitioner also informs the Court that his parole suitability

hearing was delayed from its originally scheduled date because the

BPH did not have a current psychological report pertaining to him.

He specifically details his efforts to obtain a psychological

report. He suggests that the BPH and prison officials delayed in

having him seen by a mental health evaluator.

Petitioner also claims that at the parole hearing, BPH Deputy

Commissioner Bentley displayed a personal bias against, and

animosity toward, him, thereby prejudicing him. Specifically,

Petitioner alleges that Commissioner Bentley’s comments showed a

bias and animosity regarding Petitioner’s filing a 2002 lawsuit

against the state for retaliation by prison staff. However, a fair

reading of the parole hearing transcript reveals that Commissioner

Bentley simply sought from Petitioner information regarding the

lawsuit. After Petitioner explained the basis of the lawsuit and its

procedural status, Commissioner Bentley stopped discussing the

matter and did not mention it again. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim

in this regard is unsubstantiated.

08cv0162 3

answered the questions in this Circuit "whether federal constitutional law imposes on the states a requirement for some quantum of

evidence to support a state's denial of parole," and "whether, even

if there is no general federal quantum of evidence requirement,

applicants for parole in California, under the state's current laws,

may obtain federal habeas review of whether there is 'some evidence'

supporting a negative parole decision." Hayward, 603 F.3d at 549.

Petitioner alleges that the Board of Parole Hearings

(hereafter “BPH”), violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process

rights in denying him parole at a subsequent parole suitability

hearing on November 16, 2005.4/ Respondent contends that the

California Court of Appeal’s decision regarding the BPH’s parole

suitability decision is not infirm.

 II

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct. Petitioner may rebut the presumption of

correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(e)(1)(West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36

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28 5/ The California Court of Appeal decision is dated October 23, 2006.

Hayward was decided on April 22, 2010.

08cv0162 4

(1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The facts as found by the California Court of

Appeal are substantially as follows:5/

At a November 2005 parole consideration hearing, the

BPT found Petitioner unsuitable for parole. The Board

reasoned that Petitioner would pose an ‘unreasonable

risk and danger to society or threat to public safety’

if paroled. The Board further based its decision on

the cruel and callous nature of the offenses and

Petitioner’s prior adult criminal history. It further

noted that Petitioner continued to receive disciplinary reports, including one in 2003. Also, a psychological report indicated that Petitioner’s potential for

violence might be at an above average level.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6 at 1-2)

The California Court of Appeal described Petitioner’s crimes

substantially as follows:

On October 3, 1975, David Stephens (hereafter

“Stephens”) and Gary Dores (hereafter “Dores”) locked

the doors of a bar and prepared to leave the bar out

the bar’s back door. Petitioner approached Stephens

and Dores, pointed a gun at them and demanded money.

Dores complied and gave Petitioner money from inside

the bar. Then, Petitioner ordered Dores to orally

copulate him. A few minutes later, Dores and Petitioner struggled with Petitioner’s gun. Two shots were

fired. Stephens hid behind the bar. Petitioner ordered

Stephens to get out from behind the bar and ordered

Stephens and Dores to go into the restroom and take

off their clothes. Petitioner said that he was going

to kill Stephens and Dores. Petitioner locked Stephens

in a closet. While Stephens was in the closet, he

heard a commotion and a gun shot.

Thereafter, Petitioner ordered Stephens out of the

closet. Petitioner asked Stephens for a beer.

Stephens gave Petitioner a beer before Petitioner

locked him in the closet again. While Stephens was in

the closet, he heard another gun shot followed by the

sound of the closing of the bar’s back door.

Stephens broke out of the closet and called the

police. The police found Dores dead on the floor. He

was naked and had a knife protruding from his abdomen.

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08cv0162 5

Dores had been shot twice in the head and stabbed in

the neck. His genitals had been cut five times.

On November 9, 1975, police officers received a call

concerning a burglary in progress. After the officers

arrived at the scene, they entered the house and

followed a trail of blood leading into a bedroom.

They found a body in the bedroom doorway. The victim’s

83-year-old mother, who lived in the house with the

victim, stated that the assailant had beaten her and

ransacked the house. Police apprehended Petitioner.

An investigation of the crime scene indicated that the

victim had been stabbed in the chest with a butcher

knife.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6 at 3).

The Court of Appeal, using the then existing federal and

state law, found that the nature of Petitioner’s offenses amounted

to “some evidence” that the crimes committed were cruel and callous.

Further, the Court noted that the BPH had considered a psychological

report on Petitioner that stated that Petitioner’s future potential

for violence might be at an above average level if he encountered

difficulties in the transition from inmate to parolee. Therefore,

“some evidence” supported the BPH’s decision. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 6 at 4).

 III

 STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). Federal habeas courts are bound by

a state's interpretation of its own law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (federal courts may not reexamine state court

determinations on state-law questions); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d

882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal courts "have no authority to

review a state's application of its own laws"); Oxborrow v.

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08cv0162 6

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989) ("errors of state

law do not concern us unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation").

Federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996 are

governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997).

AEDPA establishes a "'highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings,'" requiring "that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S.

19, 24 (2002), quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7. The petitioner

has "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear

and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Federal habeas

relief is warranted only if the result of a claim adjudicated on the

merits by a state court "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal court applies

AEDPA standards to the "last reasoned decision" by a state court.

Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005); see Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) ("Where there has been one

reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained

orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon

the same ground").

A. Due Process And Review Standards Applicable

 To Denials Of Parole 

1. Federal Standards Of Review

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08cv0162 7

A due process claim raises two questions: "the first asks

whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been

interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the

procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally

sufficient." Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted). "[A]n individual claiming a

protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to

it" arising either from "the Due Process Clause itself" or from "the

laws of the State." Id. (citation omitted). State-created rights can

give rise to liberty interests that may be enforced as a matter of

federal law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). 

An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit recently clarified the

standards that federal habeas courts must apply in reviewing

California prisoners' challenges to parole denials on due process

grounds. Hayward, 603 F.3d 546. The Hayward court acknowledged that

both the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme Court "have been

engaged in modification of the law to determine what limits there

are on denial of parole." Id. at 552. Among other things, "Hayward's appeal addresses what if anything the federal Constitution

requires as a condition of denial of parole." Id., citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a).

In particular, one question presented was whether "federal

constitutional law imposes on the states a requirement for some

quantum of evidence to support a state's denial of parole."

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 549. The Hayward court distinguished the

deprivation of good time credits earned by prisoners while incarcerated, creating "a liberty interest of the most fundamental sort,"

from denial of release on parole, a decision entailing the "discreCase 3:08-cv-00162-W-WVG Document 25 Filed 12/06/10 Page 7 of 19
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6/ "To the extent our prior decisions including Biggs v. Terhune[, 334

F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003)], Sass v. California Board of Prison

Terms[, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006)], Irons v. Carey[, 505 F.3d

846, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2007)] and our panel decision in this case

might be read to imply that there is a federal constitutional right

regardless of whether state law entitles the prisoner to release, we

reject that reading and overrule those decisions to the extent they

may be read to mean that." Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555.

08cv0162 8

tionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables." Id. at 557

(citations omitted). "The proposition that the Supreme Court has

required 'some evidence' of anything derives from a misunderstanding

of the differences between 'good time' and parole." Id. at 555. The

Hayward court held: "(I)n the absence of state law establishing

otherwise, there is no federal constitutional requirement that

parole be granted in the absence of 'some evidence' of future

dangerousness or anything else." Id. at 561, 563 ("We overrule any

decisions suggesting that the federal constitution imposes a 

requirement of 'some evidence' of future dangerousness without

regard to state law").6/ Nevertheless:

Although the due process clause does not,

by itself, entitle a prisoner to parole in

the absence of some evidence of future

dangerousness, state law may supply a

predicate for that conclusion. "[D]espite

the necessarily subjective and predictive

nature of the parole-release decision,

state statutes may create liberty interests

in parole release that are entitled to

protection under the Due Process Clause."

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561, adding emphasis and quoting Board of

Prison Terms v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 371 (1987).

The Ninth Circuit has succinctly extracted pertinent holdings

from the Hayward decision in Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606 (9th

Cir. 2010). The Pearson court noted, 

A state has no duty under the federal Constitution to

create any parole system at all, let alone a parole

system in which a prisoner must be released unless

certain requirements have been satisfied. Once a state

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08cv0162 9

creates such a system, however, it must operate it in

a manner that comports with due process.

Id. at 611. (citations omitted).

The Pearson court also noted that federal courts "must apply

the California 'some evidence' test on federal habeas review under

AEDPA." Id. at 608. It is the state law "that gives rise to the

'interests' on the part of state prisoners that may be enforced as

a matter of federal law." Id. at 609. Federal habeas courts must

“decide whether the California judicial decision approving the

governor's decision rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the California ‘some evidence’ requirement, or was ‘based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence.'" Id. at 609, quoting Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563. "By

holding that a federal court may review the reasonableness of the

state court's application of the California 'some evidence' rule,

Hayward necessarily held that compliance with the state requirement

is mandated by federal law, specifically the Due Process Clause."

Id. at 609. 

 Inasmuch as "Hayward specifically commands federal courts to

examine the reasonableness of the state courts' application of the

California 'some evidence' requirement, as well as the reasonableness of the state court's determination of the facts in light of the

evidence," the federal court must examine "how the state court

applied the requirement." Id. at 609, quoting Hayward, 603 F.3d at

562-563. There must actually be "'some evidence of future dangerousness' justifying the denial of parole," with denial of parole not

justified "merely because the state court purported to identify some

evidence of future dangerousness." Id. at 609. 

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08cv0162 10

A psychological report about the inmate may provide “some

evidence” of “future dangerousness” that justifies the denial of

parole. Boyd v. Almaguer, 677 F.Supp 2d 1221, 1232 (C.D. Cal. 2009);

Brazil v. Davison, 639 F.Supp 2d 1129, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see

also Acevedo v. Yates, 2010 WL 3582433 at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 

2. California Parole Statute And Standards

Under California law, prisoners subject to indeterminate life

sentences "may serve up to life in prison, but they become eligible

for parole consideration after serving minimum terms of confinement." In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1078 (2005). "[L]ife

inmates' actual confinement periods within the statutory range are

decided by [the Board of Prison Terms]." Id. The Governor may review

the Board's parole decisions and is authorized to reverse or modify

them, applying the same standards as the Board applies. CAL. CONST

art. V, § 8, subd. (b); Cal. Penal Code § 3041.2. 

The manner in which the Board is to make parole decisions is

addressed in Cal. Penal Code § 3041 and implementing regulations.

The Board "must apply detailed standards when evaluating whether an

individual is unsuitable for parole on public safety grounds."

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1096 n. 16; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29

Cal.4th 616, 677 (2002) (the Board's discretion is circumscribed by

the requirement "the decision must reflect an individualized

consideration of the specific criteria and cannot be arbitrary and

capricious"). "Regardless of the length of time served, a life

prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the

judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison." Cal. Code Regs., tit.

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7/ Sections 2281(a) and 2402(a) “are identical." In re Lawrence, 44

Cal.4th 1181, 1202 n.5 (2008). Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402

provides the Parole Consideration Criteria And Guidelines For Life

Prisoners applicable to murderers..." 

8/ Guideline circumstances tending to show unsuitability include: (1)

the heinousness or cruelty of the commitment offense, considering

such factors as multiple victims "attacked, injured or killed in the

same or separate incidents;" "the victim was abused, defiled or

mutilated during or after the offense;" the offense "was carried out

in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard

for human suffering;" (2) the prisoner's previous record of

violence, "particularly if the prisoner demonstrated serious

assaultive behavior at an early age;" (3) unstable social history in

relationships with others; (4) psychological factors; and (5)

institutional behavior engaging in serious misconduct while

incarcerated. Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)

9/ Guideline circumstances tending to show suitability include: (1) no

juvenile record; (2) stable social history; (3) signs of remorse,

such as performing acts or giving "indications he understands the

nature and magnitude of the offense;" (4) the crime was the result

of significant stress; (5) lack of any significant history of

violent crime; (6) the prisoner's age reduces the probability of

recidivism; (7) realistic plans for the future upon release, or

development of marketable skills usable upon release; and (8)

institutional behavior "indicating an enhanced ability to function

within the law upon release." Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

08cv0162 11

15, §§ 2281(a), 2402(a).7/

 The regulations guide the manner in which

the evidence is to be considered.

All relevant, reliable information available to the

panel shall be considered in determining suitability

for parole. Such information shall include the

circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past

and present mental state; past criminal history,

including involvement in other criminal misconduct

which is reliably documented; the base and other

commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during, and after the crime; past and present attitude

toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or

control, including the use of special conditions under

which the prisoner may safely be released to the

community; and any other information which bears on

the prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances

which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which

results in a finding of unsuitability.

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 2281(b), 2402(b).

The Board must consider both circumstances tending to show

unsuitability8/ and circumstances tending to show suitability9/ in the

particular case. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2401 ["A parole

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08cv0162 12

date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under

Section 2402(d)," but "(a) parole date shall be denied if the

prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c)"]; see

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1086. However, "[i]t is not the existence

or nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability factors that forms

the crux of the parole decision; the significant circumstance is how

those factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current

dangerousness to the public." In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212

(2008). A decision denying parole must articulate reasons that are

both grounded in evidence and rationally related to the statutory

public danger basis for denial. "[I]t is not enough that there is

some evidence to support the factors cited for the denial; that

evidence must also rationally support the core determination

required by the statute before parole can be denied, i.e., that a

prisoner's release will unreasonably endanger public safety." In re

Roderick, 154 Cal.App.4th 242, 263-64 (2007), citing, inter alia, In

re Lee, 143 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1409 (2006) ("Some evidence of the

existence of a particular factor does not necessarily equate to some

evidence the parolee's release unreasonably endangers public

safety"). 

The California parole statute provides that the Board

of Prison Terms 'shall set a release date unless it

determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual.'...[S]ome evidence of future dangerousness is a

necessary predicate for denial of parole." 

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562, quoting Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b).

As a matter of California law, ‘the paramount consideration for both the Board [of Prison Terms] and the

Governor under the governing statutes is whether the

inmate currently poses a threat to public safety.’

There must be ‘some evidence’ of such a threat, and an

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10/ The Hayward court emphasized the "right in California to parole in

the absence of some evidence of one's future dangerousness to the

public arises from California law." Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563. The en

banc majority declined to decide "whether the California parole

scheme establishes a predicate for imposing (the liberty interest)

as a matter of federal constitutional law." Id. at 562 ("State law

already does what Hayward would have federal constitutional law do,"

so that the court found it need "not decide whether a right arises

in California under the United States Constitution to parole in the

absence of some evidence of future dangerousness").

08cv0162 13

aggravated offense "does not, in every case, provide

evidence that the inmate is a current threat to public

safety. The prisoner's aggravated offense does not

establish current dangerousness "unless the record

also establishes that something in the prisoner's preor post-incarceration history, or his or her current

demeanor and mental state, supports the inference of

dangerousness. Thus, in California, the offense of

conviction may be considered, but the consideration

must address the determining factor, "a current threat

to public safety.

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted),

quoting Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1210, 1213-14.

"The crucial determinant of whether the prisoner gets parole

in California is 'consideration of the public safety.'" Hayward,

603 F.3d at 561, citing Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181 and In re

Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241 (2008). "[T]he California Supreme Court

established in [those] two decisions... that as a matter of state

law, 'some evidence' of future dangerousness is indeed a state sine

qua non for denial of parole in California," creating a liberty

interest.10/ Id. at 562, 563 ("There was some evidence of future

dangerousness, so [Hayward's] parole was [properly] denied, and the

district court correctly denied the writ.")

 While judicial review of a parole denial is "extremely

deferential," the purpose of the review is to ensure the result was

supported by "some evidence." Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561-62; see also

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th at 660; Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at

1212,["(W)hen a court reviews a decision of the Board or the

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Governor, the relevant inquiry is whether some evidence supports the

decision of the Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a

current threat to public safety, and not merely whether some

evidence confirms the existence of certain factual findings."]

citing, inter alia, Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th at 658 and Dannenberg,

34 Cal.4th at 1071. Thus, a reviewing court must verify that

evidence of the factors recited as the reasons for denial supports

the "core determination" the prisoner would pose a public danger if

released. Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212 ["Under the statute and

governing regulations, the circumstances of the commitment offense

(or any of the other factors related to unsuitability) establish

unsuitability if, and only if, those circumstances are probative to

the determination that a prisoner remains a danger to the public."]

Therefore, California's "some evidence" standard requires a rational

nexus between the prisoner's "current circumstances" and his or her

current dangerousness in order "to provide the 'modicum of evidence'

necessary" for a legitimate denial of parole. Id. at 1227 (setting

aside the Governor's action in vacating the Board's grant of parole

through reliance on the "immutable and unchanging" circumstances of

the "egregious" commitment offense, on grounds that decision was not

supported by "some evidence" of the prisoner's current dangerousness). 

In summary, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits states from

depriving persons of protected liberty interests without due process

of law. As construed by the Ninth Circuit in Hayward, California

law explicitly creates a right to release on parole in the absence

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of "some evidence" of current dangerousness. Therefore, California

law creates by statute a liberty interest in release on parole. As

a result, eligible prisoners serving indeterminate life sentences

who challenge the decisions of the BPH state claims that are

cognizable on federal habeas review. Denial of parole must comport

with the state's "some evidence" criteria linking the prisoner's

current circumstances to the ultimate finding of present dangerousness.

Since the ‘some evidence’ requirement

applies without regard to whether the

United States Constitution requires it, we

in this case, and courts in this circuit

facing the same issue in the future, need

only decide whether the California judicial

decision approving the governor's decision

rejecting parole was an "unreasonable

application"... of the California ‘some

evidence’ requirement, or was "based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence.

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-63, quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2);

see also Hayward, 603 F.3d at 569, Berzon, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part (the "some evidence" rule must be applied in

light of the deference owed to the factual determinations of state

courts under AEDPA).

 IV

 THE BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER’S

 DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER PAROLE

During the parole suitability hearing, the BPH discussed with

Petitioner several factors that weighed for and against a grant of

parole. The factors that weighed in favor of a grant of parole were

that Petitioner had successfully engaged in numerous vocational

opportunities while he was in prison (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at

38-41), and that he had family members who would provide financial

and supportive assistance to him if he was released from prison.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 20, 29-31). The factors that weighed

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against a grant of parole were Petitioner’s commitment offense

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 16), several minor disciplinary

actions taken against Petitioner while he was in prison (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 32-37), and a July 27, 2005 mental health

evaluation submitted by Psychologist John R. Bellinger, Ph.D.

(hereafter “Dr. Bellinger”), (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exh. 11,

Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 48-49).

In the portion of the parole suitability hearing in which the

BPH issued its decision, the BPH concluded that Petitioner was “not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk and danger

to society or a threat to public safety if (he was) released from

prison.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 61). In reaching its

decision, the BPH noted the following: (1) Petitioner’s commitment

offenses involved victims that were particularly vulnerable and the

crimes were marked by viciousness, cruelty, and callousness.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 16, 61); (2) Petitioner had a good

work history while he was in prison. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at

64); (3) Petitioner had good family support. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 1 at 65); and (4) Petitioner had developed marketable employment

skills while he was in prison (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 65-

66).

However, the BPH concluded that the positive aspects of

Petitioner’s behavior did not outweigh the factors of unsuitability

for parole. Specifically, the BPH referred to, and relied on,

Petitioner’s commitment offenses and the conclusions contained in

Petitioner’s mental health evaluation submitted by Dr. Bellinger.

Dr. Bellinger’s mental health evaluation states:

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If released to the community, under supervision of his

family, his level of dangerousness would be far below

that of the average Level IV inmate. He might become

at high risk for acting out if encountering frustrations in the transitions, such as termination of

family support, inability to find employment or

resumption of alcohol abuse. The latter would certainly put his potential for violence at an above

average level.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 48-49, 64-65, Respondent’s Lodgment

No, 3, Exh. 11)(emphasis added)

A. Commitment Offense

Under California law, the potential parolee’s commitment

offense does not provide “some evidence” of current dangerousness

“unless the record establishes that something in the (inmate’s) preor post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and

mental state” supports the inference that the inmate remains

dangerous. Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (quoting Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th

at 1212).

Here, neither the Board of Parole Hearings nor the California

Court of Appeal found that something in Petitioner’s pre- or postincarceration history, or Petitioner’s current demeanor and mental

state, supported the inference that Petitioner remained dangerous.

Instead, the Court of Appeal stated: “The nature of the prisoner’s

offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying

parole, so long as the (BPH) does not fail to consider all other

relevant factors.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6 at 3).

Therefore, the Court finds that this decision to be an

objectively unreasonable application of the California “some

evidence” standard because Petitioner’s commitment offenses did not

provide “some evidence” of his current dangerousness. As a result,

the Court of Appeal’s decision denying Petitioner parole in this

regard was not only an “unreasonable application” of the California

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“some evidence” requirement, but also was “based on an unreasonable

determination of facts in light of the evidence presented.” Hayward,

603 F.3d at 563 [quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)], Acevedo, 2010

WL 3582433 at *5-*6.

B. Mental Health Evaluation

Nevertheless, the Court finds that Dr. Bellinger’s conclusions noted in his mental health evaluation of Petitioner provided

the BPH and the Court of Appeal with “some evidence” of Petitioner’s

current dangerousness. See Boyd, Brazil, Acevedo, supra. The mental

health evaluation specifically found that Petitioner’s potential for

violence would be at an above average level if he encountered

frustrations in the transitions from inmate to parolee. Therefore,

the Court finds that the mental health evaluation supports the BPH’s

and the Court of Appeal’s conclusions that Petitioner was not

suitable for parole. Consequently, Petitioner’s constitutional

rights to due process were not violated because the mental health

evaluation meets the standards of the “some evidence” inquiry as

required by Hayward and Pearson. As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Petitioner’s claim be DENIED.

 V

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED with prejudice.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 7, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

January 21, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 6, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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