Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01276/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01276-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN MONTALVO, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. 2:13-cv-01276 MCE GGH 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

Petitioner challenges his failure to obtain a favorable result at a parole suitability hearing. 

He challenges that result because: 

1. he was sentenced to a term with life imprisonment as a maximum possible term for 

first degree murder under the ISL (indeterminate sentencing law) structure, the state was 

compelled to fix a determinate term when the sentencing law was changed to DSL (determinate 

sentencing law); 

2. in denying petitioner parole eligibility1

, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) 

 

1

 There may be a semantic difference between parole “eligibility” and parole “suitability” in 

California law, but the undersigned will use the term “eligibility” and “suitability” 

interchangeably here for that requirement under California law that before a parole date can be 

fixed, petitioner must be found suitable, i.e., eligible, for parole by the BPH. 

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committed due process error when it typified his crime as a “hate crime,” something for which he 

was not convicted; 

3. in scheduling of petitioner’s next parole eligibility five years in the future the BPH 

committed federal due process (ex post facto) error. 

Respondent challenges the merits of petitioner’s argument, but also makes untimeliness 

and procedural default arguments. Because the petition is devoid of merit, and the procedural 

issues are complex, the undersigned will address the merits only. 

The petition should be denied as: (1) petitioner is simply mistaken about the interpretation 

of California law; (2) even if that law such could be construed as a federal due process issue; the 

evidentiary conclusion of at least one member of the BPH that petitioner’s crime was a “hate 

crime” is not reviewable in federal habeas corpus; and finally, (3) the five year delay in 

scheduling petitioner’s next parole hearing does not violate federal ex post facto law. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On June 9, 2011 Petitioner (again) raised the issue of his right to have a parole date set 

after a hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings [hereinafter “BPH”] held on March 1, 2011, 

through a Request for Evidentiary Hearing filed in the San Francisco Superior Court in which he 

also complained of the length of delay before his next hearing was scheduled which will be 

discussed below. ECF No. 17-2 at 2-10. The Superior Court denied the petition on July 26, 2011, 

finding it to be successive and piecemeal. ECF No. 17-2 at 12. The First District Court of 

Appeal summarily denied the Petition on September 14, 2011 without comment, ECF No. 17-2 at 

41, as did the California Supreme Court on September 14, 2011. ECF No. 17-2 at 55. 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus on October 4, 2012 in the Northern District 

of California. ECF No. 1. Insofar as he was challenging administrative decisions made regarding 

his parole status, and he was incarcerated in the Eastern District of California, the matter was 

transferred to this court on June 10, 2013. ECF Nos. 7, 8. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on 

September 3, 2013, ECF No. 17, which was followed by a Petitioner’s Motion for appointment of 

counsel and an extension of time to respond to the Motion both filed on September 10, 2013, ECF 

No. 19. On September 25,2013, the court denied the motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 21, but 

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additional time to respond was granted. ECF No. 20. On March 4, 2014, the District Judge 

signed an Order adopting the Findings and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge stating that 

the Petition was successive, and ruled that the matter be dismissed without prejudice and the case 

closed. ECF No. 28. Judgment was entered the same day. ECF No. 29. Petitioner sought, and 

was granted a certificate of appealability and an appeal was forwarded to the Ninth Circuit Court 

of Appeals on April 22, 2014. ECF Nos. 31-33. On July 27, 2015 the appellate court issued a 

Memorandum Decision which reversed the decision of this court and remanded the matter for 

further proceedings.2 ECF No. 35. The apparent basis of the reversal was that every parole 

eligibility denial permits petitioner to attack that most recent decision in federal habeas even if the 

same issue, previously disposed of on the merits, is raised time and again. 

The case was reopened in this court on August 20, 2015, and on October 1, 2015 

Petitioner again sought appointment of counsel, ECF No. 37, and the request was again denied. 

ECF No. 38. On December 7, 2015, the Defendant moved to Dismiss the Petition on procedural 

grounds and on the merits, ECF No. 39; petitioner opposed the Motion, ECF No. 43, and the 

Defendant replied. ECF No. 44. 

THE PETITION 

Petitioner is challenging his sentencing, not his conviction, based upon a crime committed 

in 1976. In December 1984, Petitioner was sentenced under the “old” ISL to an indeterminate 

sentence of seven years to life, plus two years -- which is what Penal Code § 1168(b) permitted at 

the time of his conviction -- pursuant to plea under Penal Code § 187 (first degree murder) with a 

firearm enhancement under Penal Code § 12022.5. ECF No. 17-1. The sentencing statute was 

amended several times between the date of Petitioner’s conviction in 1984 and the current 

pleading. ECF No. 39-1 at 16. At issue here-- the Legislature enacted Penal Code § 1170 to 

 

2

 Petitioner had first challenged the failure of the Board of Parole to set a parole date for him in 

February, 2006. ECF No. 17-1 at 8. It is this petition upon which this court’s determination that 

the present petition was successive and thus barred was based. The San Francisco Superior Court 

denied the writ as untimely on Aril 1, 2006, ECF No. 17-1 at 20-21, the First District Court of 

Appeal affirmed that decision on June 8, 2006. EF No. 17-1 at 47, and the California Supreme 

Court agreed on April 18, 2007. ECF No. 17-2 at 32. 

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reinstitute determinate sentencing in 1977.3 Petitioner claims that his sentence should have been 

fixed as a determinate sentence upon passage of the DSL. 

Petitioner also claims that the Board members who held his hearing in 2011 stated their 

belief that his crime was, in fact, a hate crime perpetrated because the victim was gay. A partial 

transcript of the hearing in question discloses that a Board member did indeed state that the panel 

was aware that the murder for which petitioner was sentenced was a hate crime, ECF No. 43 at 

11:19-12:24. Petitioner argues that this finding shows a violation of the ex post facto concerns of 

the federal Constitution insofar as he didn’t plead to a hate crime and this finding extended his 

sentence without being tested in the Superior Court. 

Finally, although difficult to decipher, petitioner appears to be complaining of the five 

year scheduling of his next parole eligibility hearing. 

DISCUSSION4

A. The Non-Fixture of a Determinate Term 

Generally, an allegation that state law was not correctly followed leads to a dismissal of 

the claim in federal habeas as federal habeas corpus deals solely with allegations of denial of 

federally protected rights. After Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 218 (2011), and even well 

before, it has been made clear that federal due process protections do not include federal 

assurance of adherence to California instituted procedures. As the Court stated it, “we have long 

recognized that ‘a “mere error of state law” is not a denial of due process.’” Swarthout, 562 U.S. 

at 220 (citations omitted). The authorities are clear that federal habeas review does not lie for 

alleged errors of state law. Id. See also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 158 (2009): ([A] mere 

error of state law, we have noted ‘is not a denial of due process;’” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 1 

 

3

 Petitioner committed the crime of first degree murder in 1976, but was not sentenced until 

1984. Therefore, petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the “old” indeterminate sentencing law 

(ISL) and regulations, and not the “new” determinate sentencing laws and regulations (DSL) 

which had come into being after 1976. 

4

 Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition, in part, for failure to state a claim. Whether that 

precise motion is permitted in federal habeas, the court may adjudicate the bona fides of such a 

motion pursuant to Rule 4 of the Section 2254 rules. Petitioner has been given an opportunity to 

respond so that the procedural posture of the case is no different than if an answer had been filed. 

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n.2 (1982). See also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). The Due Process Clause, our 

decisions instruct, safeguards not the meticulous observance of state procedural prescriptions, but 

the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial [or a parole hearing]. Spencer v. Texas, 

385 U.S. 554, 563-564 (1967).” 

However, one could suppose that a violation of fundamental rights described in state law, 

giving rise to a liberty interest protected under the Federal Constitution, is actionable in federal 

habeas. Such a liberty interest might well arise if state law had required an indeterminate term to 

be transformed into a determinate term with a fixed parole date, and petitioner’s sentence was not 

changed. Nevertheless, even assuming the change from ISL to DSL could give rise to a liberty 

interest in some respects, petitioner is simply incorrect that any state law required a fixed, 

determinate sentencing for ISL life prisoners upon enactment of the DSL. 

Under both the 1976 and the current rules, a life prisoner must first be 

 found suitable before a parole date is set. 

In re Stanworth, 33 Cal. 3d 176, 183 (1982).5

While ex post facto concerns dictate that petitioner is entitled in his eligibility 

review to the most favorable set of rules, either those developed for ISL or DSL life 

prisoners, Connor v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 1032, 1034-1034-1035 (9th Cir. 1992), this is not to 

say that petitioner is entitled under state law to a parole date fixed for non-life prisoners. 

 

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 California law recognizes the right to a fixed parole date for indeterminate sentences, unless the 

BPH legitimately finds that the public safety requires continued incarceration, is a matter of 

substantive due process under state law. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181 (2008). Some 

appellate cases have indicated that a term of imprisonment in excess of the maximum base term 

calculated by the BPH or the adjusted base term to be possibly a matter of cruel and unusual 

punishment under state law. See In re Stoneroad, 215 Cal.App.th 596, 654-655 (2013). 

However, under any interpretation of California law, the BPH retains discretion to find a life 

prisoner ineligible for a fixed parole date. As demonstrated by In re Stanworth, above, 

California’s parole scheme contemplates that a prisoner sentenced to a term of seven years to life, 

as was Petitioner, must be found suitable for parole before a parole date can be set. The criteria 

for determining whether a prisoner is suitable for parole are set forth in California Penal Code § 

3041(b) and related implementing regulations. See 15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402. Whether 

petitioner would be entitled to application of the 1976 rules if such rules were more beneficial 

than the one’s currently in effect is doubtful. If, pursuant to the judgment of the panel, a prisoner 

will pose an unreasonable danger to society if released, he must be found unsuitable and be 

denied a parole late. Id. at § 2402(a). 

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There is no need, therefore, to analyze whether some fundamental right, guaranteed by 

state law, has given rise to a federal liberty interest. 

Even if this court interprets petitioner’s claim herein as one being sought directly 

under the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and not the similarly worded 

state constitution, petitioner’s claim also fails. “There is no constitutional or inherent right 

of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid 

sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. U.S. 

1, 7 (1979). The possibility that Petitioner will have been incarcerated in excess of the 

applicable base term if and when he ultimately is found suitable for parole does not 

implicate the Eighth Amendment, given his “life” sentence. 

The Supreme Court has never held that a sentence of seven years to life, in and of itself, 

violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. It has also not determined that such a 

sentence imposed for the crime of first degree murder is excessive for purposes of the Eighth 

Amendment. As petitioner is serving a sentence that is consistent with California law, his 

punishment cannot be considered excessive or disproportionate under clearly established Eighth 

Amendment precedent. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24 (2003) (“‘Eighth Amendment 

does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence’”; “‘[r]ather, it forbids only 

extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime’”) (citation omitted); see also 

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991)(upholding sentence of life without the 

possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine by first time offender); Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (affirming 25 years to life sentence under Three Strikes law for 

petty theft of $153.54 worth of videotapes). These Supreme Court decisions indicate that the 

term Petitioner has served to date for the crime of first degree murder with the use of a firearm is 

not so disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment or due process. 

Covering all potential bases for a claim in this pro se case, to state an Equal Protection 

claim, petitioner must allege that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly 

situated and that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. See Village of 

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living 

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Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 446 (1985). Petitioner has not shown that he was intentionally treated 

differently from other similarly situated parole applicants. See Remsen v. Holland, 2012 WL 

5386347, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Nov.1, 2012) (in light of discretionary and “highly fact bound” nature of 

the parole decision, and legal standards governing a parole decision, “the histories of other 

prisoners do not establish that Petitioner was similarly situated with other prisoners or tend to 

show any invidious discrimination that would be protected under the federal Equal Protection 

Clause”); Rowe v. Cuyler, 534 F.Supp. 297, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 696 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 

1982) (unpublished disposition) (“Indeed, it is difficult to believe that any two prisoners could 

ever be considered ‘similarly situated’ for the purpose of judicial review on equal protection 

grounds of broadly discretionary decisions [such as eligibility for prison pre-release program] 

because such decisions may legitimately be informed by a broad variety of an individual’s 

characteristics.”); see also Wilson v. Walker, 2011 WL 572116, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011), 

adopted, 2011 WL 1087285 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2011) (“petitioner was treated equally to other 

indeterminate life-term inmates seeking parole in that he was given a hearing pursuant to state 

law where his individual circumstances were considered in determining whether he was suitable 

for parole”). For these reasons, petitioner has not stated a potentially colorable Equal Protection 

claim. 

In sum, petitioner’s assertion that he is entitled to a fixed parole date, i.e., a fixed term, is 

not reviewable in federal habeas. 

B. The Terming of Petitioner’s Crime of Murder as a Hate Crime 

It may well be that petitioner’s 1976 crime was not a hate crime as such laws were 

generally unknown in the 1970s. Moreover, there is no record that petitioner was convicted of 

such a crime as it is known today. Prior to 2011, petitioner would have an arguable claim, 

therefore, that “some evidence” did not support the “hate crime” finding of at least one 

commissioner, if this finding had a meaningful impact on the parole eligibility decision. Not so 

after 2011.6

 

 

6

 Petitioner believes that the commissioner’s expression of an evidentiary conclusion violates ex 

post facto due process concerns. However, the commissioner’s expression is not the application 

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In 2011, the United States Supreme Court overruled a line of Ninth Circuit precedent that 

had supported habeas review in California cases involving denials of parole by the BPH and/or 

the governor because of the lack of some evidence supporting parole ineligibility. Swarthout v. 

Cooke, supra. The Supreme Court held that federal habeas jurisdiction does not extend to review 

of the evidentiary basis for state parole decisions. Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and 

Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979), the Supreme Court noted it had found under 

Nebraska’s similar parole regimen that a prisoner had “received adequate process” when 

“allowed an opportunity to be heard” and “provided a statement of the reasons why parole was 

denied.” Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220. Because habeas relief is not available for errors of state 

law, and because the Due Process Clause does not require correct application of California's 

“some evidence” standard for denial of parole, federal courts may not intervene in parole 

decisions as long as minimum procedural protections are provided. Id. at 861–62. Federal due 

process protection for such a state-created liberty interest is “minimal,” the determination being 

whether “the minimum procedures adequate for due-process protection of that interest” have been 

met. The inquiry is limited to whether the prisoner was given the opportunity to be heard and 

received a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. Id. at 862–63; Miller v. Oregon Bd. 

of Parole and Post–Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir.2011) (“The Supreme Court 

held in Cooke [v. Swarthout] that in the context of parole eligibility decisions the due process 

right is procedural, and entitles a prisoner to nothing more than a fair hearing and a statement of 

reasons for a parole board's decision.”) (emphasis in original). This procedural inquiry is “the 

beginning and the end of” a federal habeas court's analysis of whether due process has been 

violated when a state prisoner is denied parole. Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 218. The Ninth Circuit 

has acknowledged that after Swarthout, substantive challenges to parole decisions are not 

cognizable in habeas. Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 

of law which should not apply to petitioner because it post-dates his crime. It is more correctly 

viewed as an evidentiary conclusion, i.e., petitioner’s crime might well have been termed a hate 

crime today (something viewed as more heinous than mere murder), and it is the circumstances of 

petitioner’s crime which deem him unsuitable or ineligible for parole. Petitioner actually attacks 

the evidence supporting such a conclusion, or more accurately, the lack thereof. 

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Petitioner raises Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), to support his position. Clearly Apprendi does hold that to 

enhance a defendant’s sentence using a crime for which he had not been convicted (or plead 

guilty) constituted a due process violation insofar as the defendant has the right to have a jury 

decide his guilt or innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. But this case does not implicate 

Apprendi principles. There, after the defendant had pled guilty, the prosecutor sought 

enhancement of his sentence on the ground that his crime was a hate crime, the court held an 

evidentiary hearing, and ultimately enhanced defendant’s sentence. 530 U.S. at 470-471. But 

here, the Board’s action did not “extend” or “enhance” petitioner’s sentence – he had been 

sentenced to 7 years to life. Instead, it exercised the discretion it is given to determine whether 

petitioner was “suitable” for release, one element of which is whether it has some evidence that 

leads it to believe the release of Petitioner would threaten the public safety. See Connor v. 

Estelle, supra, 981 F.2d at 1033-1034. Blakely was decided on essentially the same principle – a 

court cannot enhance a sentence beyond the scope permitted by the prescribed penalty under the 

law to which the defendant pleaded or the jury convicted him. It speaks not at all to a limit on the 

discretion reposed in a BPD which has a specific charge to determine suitability on any number 

of factors not necessarily related to the specific facts of his conviction or sentencing. The Board’s 

action here is within its purview and falls directly within the Swarthout proscription against 

interfering with the discretion given to the Board as a procedural matter. It did not expand his 

sentence beyond the outside limits of that to which he had pleaded and that had been imposed by 

the court. 542 U.S. at 303-304. 

Petitioner does not contest that he was present and had an opportunity to present his 

arguments before the BPH, and was then informed on the record why parole was denied. The 

federal Due Process Clause requires no more. Petitioner’s argument fails under § 2254 habeas 

review because it implicates questions of whether the finding of ineligibility, i.e., unsuitability, 

was supported by some meaningful evidence. Petitioner is not entitled under federal law to have 

this court review the record evidence. 

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C. The Five Year Period Before the Next Parole Eligibility Hearing 

Petitioner barely raises the issue that due process (ex post facto) was violated because his 

next parole eligibility (suitability) hearing was not scheduled for five years. The Ninth Circuit 

has rejected that argument. Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Gilman v. 

Brown, 814 F.3d 1007, 1016-1017 (9th Cir. 2016). 

CONCLUSION 

 No writ of habeas corpus should issue in this case. 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, this court must issue or 

deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A 

certificate of appealability may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in these 

findings and recommendations, a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has 

not been made in this case. 

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be summarily dismissed; and 

2. The District Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's 

Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed and served within 

fourteen days after service of the objections. Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: August 1, 2016 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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