Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01081/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01081-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ESCOBEDO,

Plaintiff,

v.

QUE T. THUONG dba Pho Paradise Restaurant, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-01081-JLT-SKO

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 

SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

14 DAY DEADLINE

On September 12, 2024, Plaintiff Jose Escobedo (“Plaintiff”) filed his complaint against 

Defendants Que T. Thuong, doing business as Pho Paradise Restaurant; Truong Van Pham, doing 

business as Pho Paradise Restaurant; and TC Property Management, LTD (“Defendants”), alleging 

claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act

(“Unruh Act”), and California’s Health and Safety Code. (Doc. 1). These claims stem from alleged 

barriers Plaintiff encountered (such as lack of proper pavement markings and excessive slopes in 

paths of travel) while he visited “Pho Paradise Restaurant,” a facility owned, operated, or leased by 

Defendants. (See id.)

Based upon the Ninth Circuit opinion in Vo v. Choi, the Court will order Plaintiff to show 

cause why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state 

law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding the district 

court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a joint Unruh Act and ADA case).

Case 1:24-cv-01081-JLT-SKO Document 4 Filed 09/16/24 Page 1 of 3
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In the Unruh Act, a state law cause of action expands the remedies available in a private 

action. California, in response to the resulting substantial volume of claims asserted under the Unruh 

Act and the concern that high-frequency litigants may be using the statute to obtain monetary relief 

for themselves without accompanying adjustments to locations to assure accessibility to others, 

enacted filing restrictions designed to address that concern. Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1211–

12 (9th Cir. 2021). These heightened pleading requirements apply to actions alleging a 

“construction-related accessibility claim,” which California law defines as “any civil claim in a civil 

action with respect to a place of public accommodation, including but not limited to, a claim brought 

under Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55, based wholly or in part on an alleged violation of any constructionrelated accessibility standard.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1). The requirements apply to claims 

brought under the Unruh Act as well as to related claims under the California Health & Safety Code. 

See Gilbert v. Singh, No. 1:21cv1338-AWI-HBK, 2023 WL 2239335, *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023).

California imposes additional limitations on “high-frequency litigants,” defined as:

A plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a construction-related 

accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately preceding the 

filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility 

violation.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1). The definition of “high-frequency litigant” also extends to 

attorneys. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(2). “High-frequency litigants” are subject to a 

special filing fee and further heightened pleading requirements. See Cal. Gov. Code § 70616.5; Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a)(4)(A). By enacting restrictions on the filing of construction-related 

accessibility claims, California has expressed a desire to limit the financial burdens California’s 

businesses may face for claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act and the California Health 

& Safety Code . See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1206-07, 1212; Gilbert, 2023 WL 2239335, *2. The Ninth 

Circuit has also expressed “concerns about comity and fairness” by permitting plaintiffs to 

circumvent “California’s procedural requirements.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. Plaintiffs who file these 

actions in federal court evade these limits and pursue state law damages in a manner inconsistent 

with the state law’s requirements. See generally, Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12; Vo v, 49 F.4th at 

1171–72.

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In an action in which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, that court “shall have 

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 

United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, 

however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c). Such discretion may be exercised “[d]epending on a host of factors” including “the 

circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing 

state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. 

of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).

A review of Plaintiff Jose Escobedo’s prior cases from this District reveals that he has filed 

ten or more complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the twelvemonth period immediately preceding the filing of the current complaint.

1

 See Jacobsen v. Mims, 

No. 1:13-CV-00256-SKO-HC, 2013 WL 1284242, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (“The Court may 

take judicial notice of court records.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to show cause, in writing, within fourteen (14) days 

of service of this order, why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Plaintiff is warned that a failure to respond may result in a 

recommendation to dismiss of the entire action without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that 

dismissal is warranted “[i]f the plaintiff fails to . . . comply with . . . a court order”); see also Hells 

Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005). An inadequate 

response may result in a recommendation that supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims be declined and that they be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 16, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

Indeed, Plaintiff recently filed a response in another case on September 9, 2024, acknowledging that he would be 

considered a high-frequency litigant under California law. See Escobedo v. Sumrein, 1:24-cv-00990-KES-SKO (Doc. 

5, p. 2: “Plaintiff acknowledges that he would be considered a high-frequency litigant under California law as he filed 

more than ten construction-related accessibility claims in the twelve months preceding the filing of the instant action.”).

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