Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01770/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01770-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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1

Michael J. Astrue has been appointed to serve as Commissioner of Social

Security and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure 43(c)(2).

2

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1770

___________

Stanley E. Schultz, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Michael J. Astrue,1

 *

Commissioner of Social Security, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 20, 2006

Filed: March 22, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

 Stanley E. Schultz (Schultz) appeals the district court’s2

 order affirming the

Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits (SSDI) and

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supplemental security income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1383f. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

On January 8, 2002, Schultz (51 years old) filed an application for SSDI and

SSI, claiming he has been disabled and unable to work since November 25, 2001, due

to depression, generalized pain in his chest and throughout his body, high blood

pressure, an elevated heart rate, headaches, rectal bleeding, fatigue, and myocardial

ischemia. Schultz also complained of a bad right ankle, which he injured in a car

accident in 1988. Before November 25, 2001, Schultz had completed the tenth grade

and worked maintenance and construction. Schultz claimed his multiple conditions

prevented him from working maintenance and construction. 

Many physicians, psychologists, and other health professionals have examined

and treated Schultz. Dr. Michael D. Ball (Dr. Ball) examined Schultz’s right ankle.

Dr. Ball concluded Schultz had “full motion in the foot” and did “not appear to have

any gross restriction in his ability to sit, stand, walk or lift/carry/handle [objects less

than ten pounds],” even though Schultz had limited flexibility in the ankle. Dr. Ball

also opined Schultz did “not appear to have any mental problem which would impact

his ability to perform basic tasks [and] make decisions required for daily living.” Dr.

Gregory W. Hubbard noted Schultz had limited flexibility in his ankle and walked

with a limp. Dr. Dewey P. Ballard opined Schultz, even with his bad ankle, could

occasionally lift fifty pounds and frequently lift twenty pounds; stand or walk for

about six hours out of an eight-hour workday; occasionally climb, balance, kneel,

crouch, crawl, and stoop; and sit, push, pull, reach, handle, finger, and feel without

restriction. 

Dr. Donald R. Thompson (Dr. Thompson) treated Schultz’s

nausea and vomiting. On June 7, 2002, Dr. Thompson performed an

esophagogastroduodenoscopy, which revealed Schultz had an inflamed esophagus,

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specifically, grade 4 esophagitis. Dr. Thompson prescribed medication for Schultz’s

inflamed esophagus. On March 17, 2003, Schultz visited Dr. Thompson for a

check-up, at which time Dr. Thompson performed a second

esophagogastroduodenoscopy. The second esophagogastroduodenoscopy revealed

Schultz had a normal esophagus.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on June 23, 2003. At the

hearing, Schultz testified his pain, ankle, nausea, and vomiting prevented him from

working. Schultz stated he rarely leaves his home, has visitors, or talks on the

telephone, and he spends a typical day watching television alone. Schultz also said

he could walk without using a cane and had not used a cane in years. 

A vocational expert testified an individual of Schultz’s age, education, work

experience, and health condition—someone who could stand or sit for six hours out

of an eight-hour workday; could occasionally climb, push, and pull; could not perform

repetitive shoulder extensions; must avoid fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor

ventilation; and must avoid hazardous machinery and unguarded heights—could not

work at Schultz’s past jobs, but could perform light work as an assembler or a hand

packer. The vocational expert further testified there are approximately 21,000

assembler positions and 4,000 hand packer positions in Missouri. 

The ALJ performed the five-step analysis set forth at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520

and 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found Schultz had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since November 25, 2001. At step two, the ALJ found Schultz had

mild degenerative joint disease of the right ankle, mild tendonitis of the shoulder, mild

situational depression, and a remote history of alcohol abuse. The ALJ also found

medication effectively controlled Schultz’s hypertension, nausea, and vomiting. At

step three, the ALJ concluded “no impairment or combination of impairments . . .

meets or equals in severity the requirements of any impairment listed.” Moreover, the

ALJ found Schultz’s “allegation of impairments, either singly or in combination,

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producing symptoms and limitations of sufficient severity to prevent the performance

of any sustained work activity is not credible.” At step four, the ALJ found Schultz

had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work, subject to specific

conditions: (1) “lifting or carrying more than 10 pounds frequently or more than 20

pounds occasionally,” (2) “more than occasional climbing of ramps and stairs,”

(3) “work at unprotected heights or around dangerous moving machinery,” and

(4) “having concentrated or excessive exposure to dust, fumes, chemicals, temperature

extremes, high humidity or dampness, and other typical allergies, pollutants, and

atmospheric irritants.” The ALJ found Schultz had “no [other] credible, medicallyestablished mental or other nonexertional limitations.” The ALJ concluded, given

Schultz’s limitations, Schultz could not work maintenance or construction. At step

five, the ALJ determined, even though Schultz could not perform the full range of

light work, Schultz could perform “a significant number of jobs in the local and

national economies.” Therefore, because the ability to perform other work precludes

finding that an individual is disabled, the ALJ concluded Schultz was not disabled and

thus was not entitled to SSDI or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). 

Schultz requested the appeals council review the ALJ’s decision. The appeals

council declined Schultz’s request. Schultz appealed to the district court, which

affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of SSDI and SSI. This appeal followed. Schultz

argues the ALJ erred by concluding he did not meet or exceed a listed impairment,

discounting his subjective complaints, and improperly calculating his RFC. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s decision to affirm the Commissioner’s

denial of SSDI and SSI. Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 2006). If

substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the Commissioner’s decision,

it must be affirmed. Choate v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 2006).

“‘Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as

adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.’” Smith v. Barnhart, 435 F.3d

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926, 930 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.

2000)). “The ALJ is in the best position to gauge the credibility of testimony and is

granted deference in that regard.” Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir.

2002). 

A. Listing of Major Impairments

Schultz argues the ALJ erred by concluding Schultz did not meet a listed

impairment at the third step of the analysis. The Listing of Major Impairments, in

relevant part, provides:

Reconstructive surgery or surgical arthrodesis of a major

weight-bearing joint, with inability to ambulate effectively, as defined

in 1.00B2b, and return to effective ambulation did not occur, or is not

expected to occur, within 12 months of onset.

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 1.03. “Inability to ambulate effectively means an

extreme limitation of the ability to walk.” Id. § 1.00(B)(2)(b)(1). “Ineffective

ambulation is defined generally as having insufficient lower extremity functioning . . .

to permit independent ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive device.”

Id. Section 1.00(B)(2)(b)(2) further provides:

To ambulate effectively, individuals must be capable of sustaining a

reasonable walking pace over a sufficient distance to be able to carry out

activities of daily living. They must have the ability to travel without

companion assistance to and from a place of employment or school.

Therefore, examples of ineffective ambulation include, but are not

limited to, the inability to walk without the use of a walker, two crutches

or two canes, the inability to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough

or uneven surfaces, the inability to use standard public transportation, the

inability to carry out routine ambulatory activities, such as shopping and

banking, and the inability to climb a few steps at a reasonable pace with

the use of a single hand rail.

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Schultz contends he meets the listed impairment set forth in § 1.03 because he

struggles to walk on rough or uneven surfaces. Schultz’s contention, however, lacks

support in the record. Schultz’s doctors never imposed any specific limitation on

Schultz’s ability to walk. Moreover, at the administrative hearing, Schultz testified

he could walk fifty yards without a cane and has not used a cane in years. See id.

§ 1.00(B)(2)(b)(1) (defining ineffective ambulation as generally requiring the use of

hand-held assistive devices to walk). Furthermore, after Schultz injured his ankle in

1988, he worked construction and maintenance until 2001. Absent a showing of

deterioration, working after the onset of an impairment is some evidence of an ability

to work. See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2005); Gowell v. Apfel,

242 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

conclusion Schultz’s ankle did not meet a listed impairment. 

B. Polaski Analysis

Additionally, Schultz argues the ALJ failed to properly perform an analysis

under Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984). “[Schultz’s] subjective

complaints may be discounted if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole.”

Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). We will defer to an ALJ’s

credibility finding as long as the “ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant’s testimony and

gives a good reason for doing so.” Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Dixon v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 237, 238 (8th Cir. 1990)). 

Under Polaski, to evaluate Schultz’s subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ, in

addition to considering “[t]he absence of an objective medical basis which supports

the degree of severity of subjective complaints,” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322, must

examine “the claimant’s prior work record and observations of third parties and

physicians relating to: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency

and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage,

effectiveness and side effects of medication; and (5) functional restrictions.” Pelkey

v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 2006). Although the ALJ never expressly

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cited Polaski (which is our preferred practice), the ALJ cited and conducted an

analysis pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929, which largely mirror the

Polaski factors. See Randolph v. Barnhart, 386 F.3d 835, 842 (8th Cir. 2004).

Specifically, the ALJ found the objective medical evidence did not support Schultz’s

subjective complaints and Schultz had a good work history. The ALJ also found

(1) Schultz spends most days sitting at home watching television, although this is by

choice and not for any medical reason; (2) the signs of chronic and severe

musculoskeletal pain are not present; (3) nothing exists regarding precipitating and

aggravating factors; (4) medications control Schultz’s hypertension, nausea, and

vomiting, and Schultz neither takes strong doses of pain medication nor experiences

adverse side-effects; and (5) no doctor has limited Schultz’s ability to stand, sit, walk,

bend, lift, or carry. We conclude the ALJ adequately, if not expressly, applied the

Polaski factors and discounted Schultz’s subjective complaints of pain. See, e.g.,

Goff, 421 F.3d at 791-92. 

C. Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)

Finally, Schultz argues the ALJ improperly calculated Schultz’s RFC because

the ALJ underestimated the severity of Schultz’s inflamed esophagus. The ALJ

concluded medication controls Schultz’s inflamed esophagus. “If an impairment can

be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling.” Brown

v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Schultz’s RFC

was supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

We have reviewed Schultz’s remaining arguments and find them to be

meritless. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

III. CONCLUSION

We find no error of law, and substantial evidence in the record as a whole

supports the ALJ’s decision. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________

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