Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00035/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00035-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMERICAN RESOURCES INSURANCE)

COMPANY, INC., )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0035-WS-M

 )

THE EVOLENO COMPANY, LLC, et al.,)

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as

to the counterclaims of The Evoleno Company (“Evoleno”). (Doc. 101). The plaintiff

has filed a brief and evidentiary materials in support of its motion, (Docs. 102-112), and

Evoleno (counsel for which was allowed to withdraw in March), has not responded. 

After carefully considering the foregoing material, the Court concludes that the motion

for summary judgment is due to be denied.

Evoleno asserts seven counterclaims: breach of contract; negligence; wantonness;

fraud; suppression; tortious interference with business relations; and a demand for an

accounting. The claims and their antecedent factual allegations cover some fifteen pages,

(Doc. 65 at 18-32); the plaintiff purports to establish its entitlement to summary judgment

as to all seven claims in a scant five pages. (Doc. 111 at 4-8). It does so without

addressing a single factual allegation of the counterclaims and without even mentioning

the two affidavits and six exhibits (totaling 142 pages) which it filed in nominal support

of its motion. (Docs. 103-10).

To the extent the plaintiff assumes it can meet its initial burden on motion for

summary judgment simply by positing that Evoleno “has no substantial evidence” to

support its claims, it is mistaken. 

Case 1:07-cv-00035-WS-M Document 119 Filed 09/16/08 Page 1 of 3
1

E.g., Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The

district court has discretion to go beyond the referenced portions of these [summary

judgment] materials, but is not required to do so.”); accord Jones v. Sheehan, Young &

Culp, P.C., 82 F.3d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1996); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d

1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989); Lawson v. Sheriff of Tippecanoe County, 725 F.2d 1136,

1139 (7th Cir. 1984); Karlozian v. Clovis Unified School District, 2001 WL 488880 at *1

(9th Cir. 2001); see also Local Rule 7.2. 

-2-

The moving party bears the initial burden to show the district court, 

by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material 

fact that should be decided at trial. ... Celotex did not change the general rule. 

 Celotex simply holds that under certain circumstances the movant may meet 

its Rule 56 burden without negating an element of the non-moving party’s 

claim and that under such circumstances it is sufficient to point to materials 

on file that demonstrate that the party bearing the burden of proof at trial will 

not be able to meet that burden. Even after Celotex it is never enough simply 

to state that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial.

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added);

accord Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). 

To the extent the plaintiff assumes it can meet its initial burden by dumping a

mound of evidence into the record without discussing the evidence and explaining how it

supports the plaintiff’s position, or even directing the Court’s attention to the portions on

which it relies, it is equally mistaken. The Court has no obligation to review

unreferenced evidence in order to find support for a party’s position,1

 and it declines to do

so.

The motion for summary judgment manifests additional infirmities, including

without limitation the following: (1) assuming, without providing analysis or legal

authority or acknowledging the counterclaim’s allegations, that Evoleno’s negligence

claim cannot be based on any duty other than a contractual duty; (2) assuming, without

discussion of the counterclaims’ allegations, that it cannot be liable for fraud if it did not

breach the contract; (3) assuming that the suppression claim is based on non-disclosures

different from those alleged in the counterclaim; (4) positing, without analysis or legal

Case 1:07-cv-00035-WS-M Document 119 Filed 09/16/08 Page 2 of 3
-3-

authority, that the plaintiff owed no duty of disclosure; (5) assuming, without analysis or

authority, that it cannot be liable for tortious interference with business relations if it did

not breach the contract. The Court will not supply these and other deficiencies on the

plaintiff’s behalf. Cf. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th

Cir. 1995) (“There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument

that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.”).

That Evoleno has not responded to the plaintiff’s motion does not allow the Court

to overlook the problems noted above. Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)

specifies that summary judgment may be entered only when the record evidence shows

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law, “the district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the

mere fact that the motion was unopposed but, rather, must consider the merits of the

motion.” United States v. One Piece of Real Property, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir.

2004). 

For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

denied.

 

 DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of September, 2008.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00035-WS-M Document 119 Filed 09/16/08 Page 3 of 3