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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FIL.ob 

Uniw<l States tmm of Appeals 

Tenth Circuir 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

~fQ 2 G 19§0 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

WILLIAM GREENWOOD, MARION GREENWOOD, 

GREGORY J. LUKE, EDITH H. LUKE, LEVERE 

HERRINGSHAW, and MARI-LYNN HERRINGSHAW, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

Cross-Appellees, 

and 

THE MARION S. HOEFLICH FAMILY 

PRESERVATION TRUST, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

·KABARD EXPLORATION AND DRILLING 

COMPANY, LTD., 

Defendant, 

and 

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EDWARD T. BARDWELL, LOIS C. BARDWELL, ) 

SCANNER ENERGY EXPLORATION CORPORATION, ) 

DEANNA KELLY, MICHAEL J. WOODS, WHEL ) 

LAND CORP., ODIN-PHOENIX, LIBERTY LOBBY,) 

INC., OKLAHOMA PETROLEUM CORPORATION, )· . ) 

Defendants-Appellees, ) 

Cross-Appellants. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Nos. 88-1069, 

88-1299, 88-1326 

(D.C. No. 83-363-C) 

(E. Dist. Okla.) 

Before McKAY and BARRETT, Cir·cuit Judges, and O'CONNOR*, District 

Judge. 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

oe cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 1 
• 

Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Plaintiffs-appellants appeal from a judgment entered by the 

district court following a nonjury trial which awarded them 

judgment in amount of $495,000, together with interest, against 

defendant Kabard Exploration and Drilling Company, Ltd., (Kabard), 

on promissory notes under plaintiffs' First Cause of Action 

(identified as Count I in the district court's Judgment) and 

judgment on behalf of all defendants and against plaintiffs on the 

remaining counts (Second through Tenth Causes of Action). The 

defendants-appellees cross-appeal from the district court's order 

denying their motions for attorney fees and costs. 

General Background 

During the year 1978, plaintiffs William and Marion Greenwood 

and Edith Luke obtained a trust manual from Liberty Lobby, Inc. 

purportedly designed to minimize or eliminate inheritance and 

estate taxes. They considered this quite important because of the 

substantial estate owned by Marion S. Hoeflich, mother of Marion 

Greenwood and Edith Luke. At that time, defendant Edward Bardwell 

was serving as a consultant and as director of development for 

Liberty Lobby and it was he that Liberty Lobby referred the 

Greenwoods and Edith Luke to for assistance in preparation of a 

trust document. After some telephone conversations, Bardwell 

prepared and forwarded from his home in Haskell, Oklahoma, to the 

Greenwoods and Luke in Florida a trust document and he thereafter 

explained the manner of its execution by telephone. A fee was 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 2 
paid by plaintiffs Greenwoods-Luke of some $1500 for 

services divided between Bardwell and Liberty Lobby. 

Greenwoods and Edith Luke had developed considerable trust in 

respect for Bardwell. 

these 

The 

and 

On May 15, 1979, Bardwell's association with Liberty Lobby 

terminated. Even so, the Greenwoods continued to phone Bardwell 

at his Haskell, Oklahoma, residence to discuss family matters and 

various things and during the early part of 1980, during one of 

those telephone conversations, Bardwell related that he had 

drilled several wells on his property in Oklahoma which were good 

wells, producing oil and gas. (R., Vol. VI, p. 339). 

In the spring of 1981, the Greenwoods phoned Bardwell 

advising that they were contemplating the sale of some stock which 

would result in substantial gain and that they wished to invest 

the money from the sales in a manner as to alleviate tax problems. 

Id. at 341. The Greenwoods were interested in investing in 

Bardwell's oil and gas properties/development in Oklahoma. 

Bardwell advised them that he and a Mr. Kates were the sole 

stockholders of Kabard and that they had not taken in outside 

investors in their exploration/development program but that he 

would confer with Mr. Kates, who resided in Illinois. Id at 342. 

Mr. Kates did agree to the participation of Mr. & Mrs. Greenwood, 

and after so advising the Greenwoods, Bardwell flew to Florida to 

meet with them in April, 1981. Id. at 343. The Greenwoods asked 

Mr. & Mrs. Luke to participate in the discussions and they did. 

Id. Bardwell explained that oil and gas ventures are risky, but 

that the leases he held on the Oklahoma properties "[w]ere offset 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 3 
leases, offsetting existing production and with the geology that 

we had done on the leases, that even if we hit one or two dry 

holes, that the prognosis of the other four or five being good was 

very excellent." Id. at 344. 

As a result of the meeting in Florida, the Greenwoods and the 

Lukes invested some $400,000 for working interests in a six-well 

drilling venture then underway by Kabard. Thereafter, on November 

23, 1981, at the request of Mr. Greenwood, Bardwell again 

travelled to Florida where he met with the Greenwoods, the Lukes 

and Lavere and Mari Lqua Herringshaw, Jr., with regard to an 

additional 20 oil and gas well exploration program planned by 

Kabard on Bardwell's Oklahoma properties. The parties invested an 

additional $340,000. All discussions, offers and sales occurred 

in Florida. 

Of the 20 wells programmed for drilling, 16 were drilled, and 

of these, 10 were producers (R., Vol. VI, p. 356). Most of the 

production was gas and two of the wells had a combined daily 

average production of six million cubic feet which would realize 

$18,000 per day. Id at 357. It was necessary to hook these wells 

up to the Phillips gathering system and it took some six months 

after the wells were completed to accomplish this in the late 

summer or early fall of 1982. Id. The production was limited to 

500,000 to 600,000 cubic feet per day, or some $1,800 per day as 

delivered into the pipeline. Id. The Greenwoods came to Haskell, 

Oklahoma, during the spring of 1982, accompanied by a Mr. Matthew 

Warran, an accountant, and they inspected the wells with Bardwell. 

(R., Vol. VI, p. 358). The Greenwoods returned to Haskell that 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 4 
summer. They explained to Bardwell that they were not satisfied 

with the deal, particularly the tax consequences, and that they 

would like to have their money back. Id. at 359. Bardwell was 

receptive. He informed the Greenwoods that he believed they were 

making a mistake because two of the wells were capable of 

producing six million cubic feet of gas per day, but the 

repurchase was agreeable to him. Id. The Agreement of October 

30, 1982, followed. Kabard tendered to plaintiffs $150,000 upon 

execution of the Agreement and delivered promissory notes for the 

balance or $590,000. This balance, with _interest, was to be paid 

in monthly installments of $27,773.34, commencing December 1, 

1982. Four monthly installments were tendered totalling $95,000 

by Kabard to plaintiffs (apparently most of the fourth monthly 

installment checks were returned for want of sufficient funds), 

when Kabard defaulted. This action was filed June 27, 1983, and 

the original complaint named only Kabard and Bardwell. An amended 

complaint was filed on November 14, 1984, at which time other 

parties were joined as defendants. 

Bardwell testified that during the spring of 1983, the two 

wells that had tested for six million cubic feet of gas per day 

had "petered out'' and furthermore there had been a change in the 

oil industry in reference to reduced prices and markets. Id. at 

360. Thereafter, and prior to commencement of this action, both 

Kabard and Bardwell filed bankruptcy petitions. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 5 
Accord and Satisfaction 

During the course of her testimony, Mrs. Marion Greenwood 

acknowledged that the parties' intent was that the Agreement of 

October 30, 1982, was to "[f]ully settle all controversies of any 

kind" and to be "[t]hrough with it forever" upon the execution of 

the releases of any further liability of Kabard, Bardwell and all 

other defendants herein, with the exception of Bardwell's 

agreement to furnish the plaintiffs with a security interest in 

the wells (R., Vol. V, p. 138). 

Bardwell testified that at the time that the Agreement of 

October 30, 1982, was entered into, his oil and gas and working 

interests, oil and gas products, oil field equipment, roya1ties 

and certificates of deposit had been "pledged" to Commercial Bank 

& Trust of Muskogee, Oklahoma (R., Vol. VII, pp. 442-44). 

Paragraph 4-A & B of the October 30th Agreement provided as 

follows: 

(a) a security agreement will be prepared by 

counsel for the parties and Kabard will enter into said 

security agreement and execute such UCC financing 

statements as may be reasonably required in order to 

permit the Sellers to have a perfected security interest 

in the Completed Wells as aforesaid; and 

(b) Mr. Mirabile (attorney for plaintiffs) will 

hold in escrow, to be delivered to Kabard upon the 

payment of the last Notes, UCC-3 termination statements 

executed by the Sellers which, when filed, will release 

the aforesaid security in~erest in the Completed Wells 

in each and every respect. 

Bardwell testified that it was his understanding that Mr. 

Mirabile was to furnish those security agreements for execution 

(R . , Vol. VI, p. 366). None was ever presented. Counsel for 

Kabard and Bardwell, et al., when asked by the court about the 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 6 
claim of impossibility of giving the security agreement in view of 

the fact that the properties had already been pledged to the Utica 

Bank in Tulsa, explained that it is not unusual to pledge some 

items at one time and again later and that, in any event there was 

"[n]o evidence here to show that these specific wells, which were 

the only subject of the security agreements to be given, were the 

wells pledged to someone else. 11 (R., Vol. VII, pp. ~06-508). The 

district court made the same observation. Id. at 480. We, too, 

conclude that plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that 

Kabard had pledged the security that plaintiffs were to receive 

under the October 30, 1982, Agreement. 

Appellants recognize that the district court's findings/ 

conclusions that the agreement entered into on October 30, 1982, 

was for "adequate consideration" and that it constituted "[a]n 

accord and satisfaction and release of all claims which plaintiffs 

ever had against these defendants concerning the April and 

November, 1981, offers and sales of securities," are the 

"keystone'' of the district court's ruling which, if upheld on 

appeal, would render moot all other issues raised by Appellants 

(Appellants' Amended Brief-in-Chief, p. 10). 

Contrary to the district court's findings/conclusions, 

Appellants contend that: 

[T]he agreement of October 30, 1982, cannot be 

construed as an accord and satisfaction of all claims 

due to the failure of the appellee Edward T. Bardwell 

acting on behalf of all other appellees to carry out a 

significant and material aspect of the October 30 

agreement to-wit: Either effecting the security of the 

wells by virtue of the grant of a security interest in 

the wells or in the alternative not having the ability 

or intent to do so by virtue of the pledge and securing 

of these interests the Commercial Bank in Muskogee, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 7 
evidenced by the filing of 

Commercial Bank on November 

approximately 15 days from the 

October 30, 1982. (Appellants' 

a security interest to 

15, 1982, a period of 

agreement to secure on 

Exhibit 21). 

Appellants allege that an accord and satisfaction 

of claims cannot occur as a matter of law if any 

conditions of said agreement are executory and have not 

been performed by a party to the agreement. 

Appellants allege that the failure of the Appellee 

Edward T. Bardwell in effecting a security interest in 

said wells, by the pledge of the same interests within 

15 days of the agreement, defeated the ability of the 

Appellants to effect a security interest pursuant to the 

October 30, 1982 agreement (Appellants' Amended Brief in 

Chief, pp. 10-11). 

Appellants argue that the failure of Bardwell to effect the 

security interest in the wells by virtue of his pledge of the same 

interests within 15 days of the October 30, 1982, Agreement 

defeated the ability of Appellants to effect the security interest 

as agreed, notwithstanding th~ covenant in the Agreement that 

counsel for the plaintiffs had been provided with all documents 

requested by counsel for plaintiffs respecting production and oil 

and gas wells by Kabard and Bardwell. 

The trial court found, inter alia: 

14. Plaintiffs, in return for adequate 

consideration, executed releases of all their thenexistin_g or potential claims of every sort in favor of 

Willard Kates, Kabard, Scanner Energy Exploration Corp., 

E.T. Bardwell, Deanne Kelly, Michael J. Woods, and 

Frederick L. Boss. 

15. Neither plaintiffs nor their counsel approached 

any of the defendants or their counsel after October 30, 

1982, for the purpose of preparing a security agreement 

with regard to the security interests in oil and gas 

wells granted to plaintiffs pursuant to the Agreement. 

16 . Kabard made 

approximately $95,000. 

March 23, 1983. It made 

balance due and owing of 

payments under the notes 

Its last payments were made 

no further payments, leaving 

$495,000. 

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of 

on 

a 

Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 8 
(R., Vol. I, Tab 19, p. 7). 

The 

including: 

trial court entered its conclusions of law, 

12. The October 30, 1982, Agreement between the 

plaintiffs (sic) Kabard and E.T. Bardwell, and the 

individual Releases executed by plaintiffs in favor of 

certain defendants operate as an accord and satisfaction 

and release of all claims which plaintiffs ever had 

against these defendants concerning the April and 

November, 1981, offers and sales of securities. 

14. The defendants did not commit any act of fraud 

against any of the plaintiffs in regard to either the 

October 30, 1982 Settlement Agreement or the promissory 

notes issued by Kabard to the plainiffs. There is no 

evidence showing that Kabard was insolvent at the time of 

the October 30, 1982, agreement. 

15. The defendants did not conspire with anyone 

else for the purpose of defrauding any of the plaintiffs 

in regard to either the October 30, 1982 Settlement 

Agreement or the promissory notes issued by Kabard to the 

plaintiffs. 

Id. at p. 13. 

We have carefully reviewed the entire trial record. We are 

satisfied that the district court's findings of fact are supported 

in the record and are not clearly erroneous. We review the 

district court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous 

standard. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). We review the district court's conclusions 

of law de novo. In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263 (10th 

Cir. 1988). We conclude that the district court's conclusions of 

law are correct. 

Notwithstanding the language in the October 30, 1982, 

Settlement Agreement that counsel for the parties would prepare a 

security agreement which Kabard would enter into and also execute 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 9 
such UCC financing statements as may 

order to permit sellers to have 

reasonably 

a security 

be required in 

interest in the 

completed wells, the record shows that no such documents were 

prepared and presented to Kabard for execution by Kabard by 

counsel for the parties on October 30, 1982, or at any time 

thereafter even though all information relative thereto had been 

supplied by Kabard and Bardwell. Surely the plaintiffs were 

fully aware when they executed the various releases that their 

attorney, Mr. Mirabile, who was also trial counsel for plaintiffs, 

had not prepared any security interest documents for execution by 

Kabard in the completed wells. The record is devoid of any 

evidence that any demand was ever made on Kabard to execute any 

security documents, even though plaintiffs received and retained 

three succeedipg full monthly payments from Kabard on the notes. 

It is uncontroverted that following the initial payment of 

$150,000 from Kabard to plaintiffs concurrent with the execution 

of the October 30, 1982 Agreement, Kabard also tendered $95,000 to 

plaintiffs in four monthly installments thereafter pursuant to the 

notes. There is nothing in the record demonstrating that 

plaintiffs at any time during this five-month period requested or 

demanded that Kabard execute any security documents in their 

favor. Yet, plaintiffs retained the payments without complaint. 

It was only upon default by Kabard under the notes that plaintiffs 

complained that Kabard had not executed security interests in the 

completed wells in their favor. 

An accord and satisfaction is effected when an obligation is 

discharged by an agreement to perform terms other than those 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 10 
originally agreed on. 42 A.L.R. 4th 89, 95. While the 

transaction here may have constituted a novation, i.e. , 

extinguishing one obligation by the substitution of a new one, in 

both instances they would arise by way of a defense to a suit upon 

the original claim. 

An accord and satisfaction, then, is a new contract between 

the parties, complete in itself. As such, it must be supported by 

good, adequate or valuable consideration. In the instant case, in 

consideration of plaintiffs' conveyance of their entire right, 

title and interest in the leasehold estates and release of all 

claims, Kabard tendered the down payment of $150,000 and 

delivered promissory notes for the balance. The consideration was 

indeed adequate, as found by the district court. No fraud or 

duress on the part of Kabard or Bardwell has been demonstrated in 

this record to have been practiced upon the plaintiffs in order to 

secure the accord and satisfaction. The district court so found, 

and we agree. 

All of the essentials of accord and satisfaction under the 

law of Oklahoma exist in this case. In Hodges v. Anderson 

Drilling Co., 465 P.2d 784 (Okla. 1969), the court held that an 

accord is an agreement whereby one of the parties (Kabard) 

undertakes to give or perform ($150,000 down payment and delivery 

of promissory notes for balance) and the other party (plaintiffs) 

agrees to accept in satisfaction of a claim (right to royalties 

derived from working interests acquired in leasehold estates 

arising from contract) something other (cash payments in monthly 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 11 
installments pursuant to the promissory notes executed by Kabard). 

The satisfaction arose upon execution of the Agreement. 

An accord and satisfaction has been described as a compromise 

agreement. French v. Sotheby & Co., 470 P.2d 318 (Okla. 1970). 

Such was accomplished here. And whether an accord and 

satisfaction exists has been held to be a question of a fact to be 

determined from all of the evidence. Id. It is not essential 

that a claim discharged by accord and satisfaction be in dispute 

or controversy. Conklin v. Patterson, 379 P.2d 428 (Idaho, 1963). 

In this case, plaintiffs, by acquiring working interests in 

the Kabard wells, bargained for a speculative return of their 

investment in· the nature of royalty payments from production of 

oil and gas. In that sense, Kabard was in nowise legally liable 

to return plaintiffs' $740,000 investment in the drilling 

programs. Plaintiffs had received some royalty payments from 

Kabard prior to the October 30, 1982, Agreement. However, they 

were not satisfied with that arrangement and, thus, were anxious 

to discharge Kabard from .any obligation to tender payments to them 

for their working interests in the completed wells in 

consideration for their releases and Kabard's tender of $150,000 

in cash and execution of promissory notes for the balance. 

was the bargained-for agreemen~. The . - remittances on 

That 

the 

promissory notes were fixed as to principal and interest and were 

not contingent. Thus, the new contract, by accord and 

satisfaction, came into full bloom with the delivery of $150,000 

and the promissory notes from Kabard to plaintiffs and plaintiffs' 

concurrent execution and delivery of full releases of any interest 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 12 
in the completed wells or other properties of Kabard or any/all 

claims plaintiffs may have had against Kabard and all of the 

defendants. 

If the security agreement in the completed wells from Kabard 

to plaintiffs was, as contended on appeal by plaintiffs, a 

condition of performance by Kabard in order to render the original 

duty - excused, we are not provided with any reason in this record 

why plaintiffs did not demand of Kabard the execution and delivery 

of the security agreement concurrent with the October 30, 1982, 

Agreement or at any time prior to Kabard's default in payment 

under the promissory notes. Failure on the part of plaintiffs to 

submit a security agreement to Kabard for execution at anx time 

following the October 30; 1982, Agreement or to otherwise request 

same from Kabard, demonstrates that the $150,000 payment and 

delive~y by Kabard of the promissory notes constituted complete 

satisfaction of the agreement. Furthermore, although plaintiffs 

cite law supportive of the rule that a partial failure of 

performance is ground for recission of a contract and that when an 

executory accord is breached, a non-breaching party may sue upon 

the original obligation (Amended Brief-in-Chief of Appellants, p. 

18), the record does not show that plaintiffs were ever willing to 

tender back to Kaba-rd the $150,000 paid down at the date of 

execution of the October 30, 1982, Agreement and the $95,000 

tendered during the succeeding three monthly payment periods 

pursuant to the promissory notes delivered by Kabard to 

plaintiffs. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 13 
After all evidence had been received, the district court 

inquired of counsel for plaintiffs relative to their theories of 

recovery. Addressing the Second Cause of Action, which alleged 

that Kabard, et al., knew that Kabard was insolvent when it 

fraudulently induced plaintiffs to enter into the October 30, 

1982, Agreement, the following colloquy occurred: 

MR. MIRABILE: (Counsel for plaintiffs) Because 

essentially the agreement was entered into at a time 

when the corporation did not have the ability to repay 

the notes. The mere fact that they were only able to 

make three payments, I think, speaks to that issue. 

That's been introduced by 

THE COURT: And you're trying to rescind the agreement? 

MR. MIRABILE: Yes, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Have you tendered back the money paid to 

you? You can't take the benefit of the agreement and 

contend it's a void agreement. Is that what you're 

asking? 

MR. MIRABILE: Your Honor, we are alleging that my 

clients were induced to enter into this agreement, that 

Kabard was insolvent at the time of this agreement. It 

agreed to do something that it was physically incapable 

of doing. It agreed to secure interests that already, 

our testimony, were secured to the· Utica Bank in Tulsa 

and ·additionally, whatever remaining .... 

(R . Vol. VII, pp. 478-79). 

Thereafter, the district court inquired of plaintiffs' 

contention that when the October 30, 1982, Agreement was entered 

into, Kabard had already pledged all of its interests to either/or 

Utica Bank of Tulsa, the Bank of Deerfield in Deerfield, Illinois, 

or Commerce Bank in Muskogee, 

occurred: 

id. at 479, and this colloquy 

THE COURT: Now, I've looked at the document you 

submitted here. There is a guaranty agreement, 

guaranteeing Kabard's borrowings. That's all I see. I 

don't see any pledge of security. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1069 Document: 01019964511 Date Filed: 02/26/1990 Page: 14 
MR. MIRABILE: The last pa·ge of that document, Your 

Honor, if I'm recalling correctly, contains a UCC filing 

listing for security of that note and that borrowing 

power and itemizes the particular chosen action. 

THE COURT: Well, it indicates that collateral 

categories, assignment of CD, oil and gas working 

interests, oil and gas products, oil field equipment and 

royalties, but nothing specified other than that. Is 

that what you're talking about? 

MR. MIRABILE: Yes, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: And you say this was filed? 

* * * 

MR. MIRABILE: Your Honor, it's the only document we 

received from the defendant. I assume it was . 

Id. at 480. 

Plaintiffs obviously confused the district court relative to 

the relief they sought . While seeking judgment against Kabard on 

the balance owing under the promissory notes executed October 30, 

1982, under the First Cause of Action they denied the validity of 

the agreement under the Second Cause of Action. Quite noticeably, 

counsel for plaintiffs did not respond affirmatively to the 

district court's inquiry whether plaintiffs had tendered back the 

money paid by Kabard under the agreement in order to effect a 

recission. And the plaintiffs failed to present any copies of 

financing statements or security agreements evidencing that Kabard 

had pledged the security plaintiffs were to receive within two or 

three weeks of execution of the October 30, 1982, Agreement. 

Under Oklahoma law, a contract may be rescinded for material 

misrepresentations of fact. Indispensable elements of such fraud 

are (1) that the representations must have been material to the 

contract at the time they were made, (2) the misrepresented facts 

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• 

must be facts of which a person of ordinary sagacity and diligence 

would have acquired no knowledge of, (3) the misrepresentations 

must be well calculated to deceive and to induce the victim to 

make the contract, and (4) they must have induced him to do so. 

James Talcott, Inc. v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988 (Okla. 1964). 

Plaintiffs-appellants failed to present evidence meeting these 

standards of proof. 

Statute of Limitations 

We concur in the district court's careful analysis and 

conclusions that all relief sought by plaintiffs except suit on 

the promissory notes was barred by the statute of limitations. 

Cross-Appeals 

Appellees filed cross-appeals from the district court's 

denial of their applications for attorney fees against plaintiffs. 

Further, appellees request an allowance of attorney fees and costs 

on appeal, contending that the appeal taken by plaintiffs is 

frivolous. Although the district court did not file an opinion 

with its order denying appellees' application for attorney fees 

and costs, we cannot conclude that the court abused its 

discretion. Further, we cannot hold that plaintiffs-appellants 

have undertaken this appeal without merit or that the appeal was 

frivolous. Thus, the cross-appeals are denied. 

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• 

Conclusion 

We affirm the judgment entered by the district court on 

December 1, 1989, awarding plaintiffs judgment against Kabard on 

Count I in the amount of $495,000, together with interest thereon 

at 12% per annum, as provided in the promissory notes and judgment 

in favo~ of all defendants except Kabard on Count I and judgment 

for all defendants and against plaintiffs on the remaining counts 

of the Amended Complaint. We affirm for substantially the reasons 

set forth in the district court's detailed "Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law'' filed December 14, 1987 (R., Vol. I, Tab 19). 

We also affirm the district court's order denying defendantsappel~ees' motions for at~orney fees and costs and we deny like 

applications on appeal. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

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