Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04039/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________

No. 03-4039

____________

Janet M. Strate, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the 

v. * Eastern District of Missouri

*

Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., *

*

Appellee. *

____________

Submitted: September 17, 2004

 Filed: February 17, 2005 

____________

Before MURPHY, McMILLIAN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Janet M. Strate appeals from a final order entered in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granting summary judgment in favor of her

former employer, Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., (the Bank), on her claims of unlawful

employment discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA),

Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010 et seq., and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1000 et seq., among other statutes. Strate v. Midwest

Bankcentre, Inc., No. 4:02-CV-219 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2003) (hereinafter “slip op.”).

For reversal, Strate argues that the district court erred in: (1) formulating the

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
1

Strate does not appeal the district court’s order with respect to claims she

brought under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), and the

Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611.

-2-

applicable legal standard under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)

( McDonnell Douglas), without incorporating a “modification” of that standard under

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (Desert Palace), and (2) applying the

law to the evidence in the record on summary judgment. She contends that she

established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her relationship or

association with her disabled newborn child was a motivating factor in the Bank’s

decision to eliminate her position and effectively terminate her employment. She

argues that summary judgment was therefore improperly granted on several of her

claims.1

 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part and

remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1343. Jurisdiction is proper in this court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice

of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Background

The following is a summary of the background facts as set forth in the district

court’s summary judgment order. Slip op. at 3-8. Strate began working for the Bank

on June 18, 1990. She held the position of auditor until August 1997, when she was

promoted to Senior Vice President (VP) of Operations and Information Systems. In

December 1998, she was promoted to Executive VP of Retail Banking, Trust

Services, and Human Resources. One month later, in January 1999, she became the

Executive VP of Consumer Services and a member of the Bank’s executive

committee. In May of 2000, Strate became the Executive VP of Operations and

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
-3-

Information Systems. Afterward, Tom Green and Paul Mahoney, the VPs of the

Operations Department and Information Systems Department, reported directly to

Strate, and Strate reported directly to Frank Ziegler, the Bank President.

In the latter part of 2000, the Bank hired an outside consultant, Tina Cherpes,

to help improve customer services. Cherpes identified several problems at the Bank,

such as unreconciled accounts and customer complaints. After identifying those

problems, Cherpes was engaged by the Bank to help stabilize and reengineer the

Operations Department. 

Meanwhile, Strate had become pregnant. In the fall of 2000, she informed

Ziegler and Jack Biggs, the Bank’s Chairman of the Board, of her pregnancy. Strate

was granted permission to take leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).

She began her FMLA leave on April 12, 2001. Before Strate went on leave, she

expressed concern to Ziegler about her job. He told her “that she had been a good

employee, that he had no reason to expect her job would not be there, and she should

not be concerned.” Id. at 5. 

On April 20, 2001, Strate gave birth to her third child, who was born with

Down’s Syndrome. On April 24, 2001, Strate enrolled her newborn child in the

Bank’s group healthcare plan. On June 3, 2001, she notified Ziegler that she planned

to return to work on July 2, 2001, but that she might require surgery due to her recent

delivery.

On June 11, 2001, while Strate was on maternity leave, Ziegler discharged

Green, purportedly in response to continuing problems within the Operations

Department. Thereafter, the Operations Department was run by three people:

Cherpes, the outside consultant; Sarina Strack, a bank employee; and another bank

employee. The three worked under the direction of an executive steering committee

at the Bank. 

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
2

Because the Operations Department was in the process of being renamed the

Customer Support Department, this newly-created position was interchangeably

referred to as VP of Operations or VP of Customer Support. For the sake of clarity

and consistency, the position is referred to herein as VP of Customer Support. 

-4-

Around the same time, while Strate was still on leave for the birth of her child,

Ziegler decided to eliminate her position. As the district court explained: 

Ziegler concluded that the Operations and Information Systems

Departments’ leaders should report directly to him and become part of

[the Bank’s] Executive Management Team so as to improve

communications. He determined that it was in [the Bank’s] best interest

to eliminate the layer of supervision or management between him and

those two departments’ VPs. As part of the stabilization project, the

Operations Department was renamed “Customer Support Department.”

The VP of Customer Support would report directly to Ziegler. He

decided to eliminate [Strate’s] position and so informed Biggs.

Id. at 6. 

Thereafter, following a meeting between Ziegler and Biggs, Biggs’s assistant,

Darla Clenin, overheard Biggs on the telephone saying, among other things, “Frank

was going to handle it,” “there’s no more room in the barn for her,” and “conscious

of the disability.” Id. 

 

On June 25, 2001, the Bank externally advertised that it was looking to hire a

VP of Customer Support.2

 The job opening was not posted internally. On June 29,

2001, Biggs sent an e-mail message to one of the Bank’s board members discussing

the management restructuring plan and favorably noting Strack’s interest in the

newly-created VP of Customer Support position. Biggs indicated that promoting

Strack, while eliminating Strate, would result in a net savings for the Bank, even if

Strack were given a raise. He further stated: 

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
-5-

Janet Strate will return Monday. Frank is prepared to deal with this

situation and advise Janet that her position is no longer here and that

there is not a role that suits her given the directions now being taken.

We are prepared to give her a fair exit and will counsel her accordingly.

Frank is giving his approach serious thought so that we do not get in a

sticky situation. 

Id. at 7 (quoting Plaintiff’s Deposition Exh. 3) (located in Joint Appendix (Vol. II)

at 279). 

When Strate returned to work on July 2, 2001, Ziegler told her that her position

had been eliminated due to restructuring. He also told her that she could apply for the

newly-created VP of Customer Support position, but the selection committee did not

view her as a viable candidate for the job. He further stated that, if she did not apply

for the new position, she could have a severance package which included eleven

months of salary plus six months of continued healthcare coverage. Strate did not

apply for the VP of Customer Support position and declined the severance package

offered by Ziegler. Id. at 7-8.

The Bank interviewed two external candidates and one internal candidate,

Strack, for the VP of Customer Support position. On July 18, 2001, Strack was

promoted to that position, and, on November 20, 2001, she was promoted to Senior

VP of Customer Service.

Strate received Right to Sue letters from the EEOC and the Missouri

Commission on Human Rights on January 9, 2002, and February 1, 2002,

respectively. On May 31, 2002, Strate filed the present action in the district court

claiming, among other things, that the Bank’s elimination of her position as Executive

VP of Operations and Information Systems, which effectively terminated her

employment, was motivated by discrimination or retaliation based upon her

relationship or association with a disabled person, her newborn child, in violation of

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
3

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 established the following pertinent standards:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful

employment practice is established when the complaining party

demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a

motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other

factors also motivated the practice.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section

2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the

respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the

impermissible factor, the court – 

 (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as

provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs

demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a

claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and 

-6-

the ADA, the MHRA, and ERISA. The Bank moved for summary judgment. Shortly

thereafter, the district court denied the Bank’s summary judgment motion without

prejudice and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the impact of

the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Desert Palace.

Desert Palace

In Desert Palace, the plaintiff sued her former employer in federal court

alleging gender discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. The

action proceeded to trial only on the gender discrimination claim. At trial,

notwithstanding the defendant’s objection based upon the plaintiff’s lack of direct

evidence, the district court gave a mixed motive jury instruction incorporating legal

standards established by Congress in the 1991 Civil Rights Act,3

 which had been

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
 (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any

admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment,

described in subparagraph (A). 

Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

4

Historically, a plaintiff could prove unlawful employment discrimination at

trial indirectly using circumstantial evidence under the pretext analysis of McDonell

Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas), or directly using direct

evidence under the mixed motive analysis of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.

228 (1989) (Price Waterhouse). In other words, before the Supreme Court rendered

its decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (Desert Palace),

McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse were viewed as providing alternative

-7-

enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,

490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Price Waterhouse). Regarding liability, the district court noted

that the jury had heard evidence of both lawful and unlawful motives for the

defendant’s adverse employment action and instructed the jury that the plaintiff was

entitled to a favorable verdict on liability if the protected characteristic (gender) was

a motivating factor in the adverse employment action, regardless of whether other

lawful motives also played a role. On damages, the district court instructed the jury

that the plaintiff was entitled to damages even if the adverse action was motivated by

both gender and a lawful reason, unless the defendant had proven by a preponderance

of the evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action if plaintiff’s gender

had played no role in the employment decision. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 96-97.

The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded her back pay, compensatory

damages, and punitive damages. Judgment was entered accordingly. After the

district court’s judgment was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit en banc, the Supreme

Court granted review to consider the following limited issue: “whether a plaintiff

must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed motive

instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil

Rights Act of 1991.” Id. at 92. The Supreme Court held that direct evidence is not

required in order for a mixed motive jury instruction to be given.4

 The Court noted,

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
methods for proving discrimination, depending on the nature of the plaintiff’s

evidence. See, e.g., Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.) (en

banc) (“We have interpreted [Price Waterhouse] to require a plaintiff to present, at

a minimum, some direct evidence of discriminatory motive. Because [the plaintiff]

relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to establish the existence of a

discriminatory motive . . ., the district court was correct in reviewing [the plaintiff’s]

claim solely under the McDonnell Douglas framework.”) (internal citations omitted),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818 (1999). 

-8-

among other things, that “Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff

need only ‘demonstrat[e]’ that an employer used a forbidden consideration with

respect to ‘any employment practice.’ On its face, the statute does not mention, much

less require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence.” Id.

at 98-99.

Application of Desert Palace

In the present case, the parties addressed the impact of Desert Palace in legal

memoranda submitted in connection with a “renewed and supplemental” motion for

summary judgment filed by the Bank. The Bank’s renewed motion asserted that,

notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, the burden-shifting

analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05, continued to apply to

Strate’s employment discrimination claims, and that, upon application of that

analysis, the Bank was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Strate had

failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether a protected characteristic or

activity, such as her association with her disabled newborn child or her enrollment

of the child in the Bank’s group healthcare plan, motivated the Bank’s decision to

eliminate her position.

Upon consideration of the Bank’s renewed motion for summary judgment, the

district court correctly noted that the Eighth Circuit, in the aftermath of Desert Palace,

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
5

In its renewed motion for summary judgment, the Bank also maintained that,

even if there were a genuine issue of fact regarding unlawful discrimination, it was

nevertheless beyond genuine dispute that Ziegler would have made the “same

decision” for lawful reasons, irrespective of any unlawful motivation. The Bank thus

argued in the alternative that it was at least entitled to summary judgment on the

issues of back pay, emotional distress, and punitive damages, under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(b). The Bank additionally disputed the

applicability of §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(b) to Strate’s ERISA claim. See

District Court Record (Filing #47) (Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s

Renewed and Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment at 20-21, 15 & n.3, 16).

These issues are not before us in the present appeal.

-9-

has continued to apply the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell

Douglas to determine whether or not a claim of unlawful employment discrimination

can survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Slip op. at 16. The district

court concluded that the McDonnell Douglas analysis “governs [Strate’s] various

claims,” and proceeded to analyze Strate’s claims accordingly. Id. at 19. 

The Bank did not dispute, and the district court assumed, that Strate had made

a prima facie case on each of her claims. To meet its sequential burden of

production, the Bank asserted that it had eliminated Strate’s position as part of a

reorganization of its management structure. The district court then proceeded to

consider whether that stated explanation was a pretext for unlawful discrimination or

retaliation. The district court concluded that the evidence in the record, whether

direct or circumstantial, did not create any genuine issue of fact as to whether Strate

was terminated as a result of her association with her disabled child or the impact of

the child’s birth on her healthcare benefits. Slip op. at 23. Accordingly, the district

court, without reaching the Bank’s other arguments,5

 granted the Bank’s motion for

summary judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice. This appeal followed.

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
-10-

Discussion

Strate first argues that “[t]he district court’s fundamental error was its failure

to recognize that Desert Palace modified the familiar three-stage test announced in

McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Brief for Appellant at 12

(emphasis original). She explains her argument as follows:

The district court held that, to avoid summary judgment, plaintiff

had to prove that the Bank’s “proffered explanation is both incorrect and

that discrimination is the true explanation for the adverse employment

action.” The district court also held that plaintiff had failed to prove that

the Bank’s proffered reason “was pretextual.”

Under Desert Palace, plaintiff only needs to offer evidence that

discrimination was “a” motivating factor. She does not need to prove

that the Bank’s proffered reason was entirely untrue, merely that it was

not the sole motivating factor in her discharge. 

Id. at 15-16 (citations to the district court order omitted).

At the outset, we note that, in the context of the McDonnell Douglas analytical

framework, a court’s use of the words “pretext,” “pretextual” or similar terminology,

often must be read as shorthand for indicating that a defendant’s proffered

discriminatory explanation for adverse employment action is a pretext for unlawful

discrimination, not that it is merely false in some way. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993) (“in our view ‘pretext’ means ‘pretext for

discrimination’”). With that assumption in mind, we perceive no error in the district

court’s statement of the basic McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. We

also note, at the outset, that the district court was correct in assuming that this burdenshifting approach may be applied to claims under the ADA, the MHRA, and ERISA.

See, e.g. Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to claims under the ADA and the

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
-11-

MHRA); Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (8th Cir. 1992)

(applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to claim under ERISA).

Moreover, as explained below, the district court did not err in concluding that Desert

Palace has not changed our summary judgment standards under the McDonnell

Douglas paradigm. 

As described above, Desert Palace was a post-trial appeal. It addressed issues

that arose in proceedings occurring after the plaintiff had presumably already

established genuine controversy as to whether the adverse employment action was

motivated, at least in part, by discrimination based on a protected characteristic. By

contrast, at the summary judgment stage, the controlling issue ordinarily is whether

or not there exists a genuine issue of fact regarding any discriminatory motive. In

that sense, Desert Palace really has no direct impact in the summary judgment

context. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735-36 & n.2 (8th

Cir. 2004) (“Desert Palace had no impact on prior Eighth Circuit summary judgment

decisions.”). 

In any event, our cases utilizing the McDonnell Douglas methodology at the

summary judgment stage are, in principle, consistent with Desert Palace. Contrary

to Strate’s apparent understanding of the law, we have long recognized that a genuine

issue of fact regarding unlawful employment discrimination may exist

notwithstanding the plaintiff’s inability to directly disprove the defendant’s proffered

reason for the adverse employment action. See, e.g., O’Bryan v. KTIV Television,

64 F.3d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1995) (“It appears that the district court was under the

impression that, in order to survive defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

plaintiff could only rely upon evidence that directly tended to disprove the exact

reason stated by defendants for terminating him. . . . We have specifically rejected

such a narrow approach to the plaintiff’s burden of proof, when resisting a

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, in order to establish a genuine issue of

fact as to pretext and the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination.”); Davenport

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
6

See generally Julie Tang & Hon. Theodore McMillian, Eighth Circuit

Employment Discrimination Law: Hicks and Its Impact on Summary Judgment, 42

St. Louis U. L.J. 519, 527-29 (1997) (discussing the Eighth Circuit summary

judgment standard). 

-12-

v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 945 n.8 (8th Cir. 1994) (Davenport)

(“[T]he standard for plaintiff to survive summary judgment required only that plaintiff

adduce enough admissible evidence to raise genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of the

defendant’s motive, even if that evidence did not directly contradict or disprove

defendant’s articulated reasons for its actions.”). 

As we have often stated, the focus of inquiry at the summary judgment stage

“always remains on the ultimate question of law: whether the evidence is sufficient

to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff because of [the protected characteristic].”

Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir. 1996). This

approach “is consistent with the Supreme Court’s . . . decision in St. Mary’s Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, [509 U.S. 502] (1993), where the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s

proof of pretext is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ultimate issue of intentional

discrimination.” Davenport, 30 F.3d at 945 n.8; accord McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 805 (holding that, at the pretext stage, the plaintiff “must be given a full and

fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid

reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory

decision”) (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace,

to the extent relevant, merely reaffirms our prior holdings by indicating that a plaintiff

bringing an employment discrimination claim may succeed in resisting a motion for

summary judgment where the evidence, direct or circumstantial, establishes a genuine

issue of fact regarding an unlawful motivation for the adverse employment action

(i.e., a motivation based upon a protected characteristic), even though the plaintiff

may not be able to create genuine doubt as to the truthfulness of a different, yet

lawful, motivation.6

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
-13-

In the present case, the district court did not ultimately focus on the

truthfulness of the Bank’s claim that it was undergoing a bona fide reorganization.

Rather, the district court ultimately focused on whether the evidence in the record

created a genuine issue of fact concerning unlawful discrimination based upon a

protected characteristic. See slip op. at 23. Therefore, contrary to Strate’s first

argument on appeal, we hold that the district court did not apply an incorrect legal

standard in the present case. 

We now review de novo the district court’s summary judgment decision within

the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. On summary judgment, the

question before the district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record,

when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50

(1986). 

The district court assumed, and the Bank did not dispute, that Strate had made

a prima facie case of discrimination based upon her association with her disabled

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
7

The ADA provides in relevant part: 

As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term “discriminate”

includes– 

. . . .

(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a

qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual

with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or

association[.] 

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).

The MHRA provides in relevant part:

It shall be an unlawful practice:

. . . .

(1) To discriminate in any manner against any other person because of

such person’s association with any person protected by this chapter.

 

 Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.070(4).

ERISA provides in relevant part:

It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,

discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for

exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an

employee benefit plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the

attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled

under the plan[.]

29 U.S.C. § 1140.

-14-

child, in violation of the ADA, the MHRA, and ERISA.7 Upon de novo review, we

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
8

Regarding the prima facie requirement of an adverse employment action, we

note that Strate was effectively terminated on July 2, 2002, when she was told that her

position had been eliminated. Strate was no less terminated merely because she was

also told that she could apply for the newly-created VP of Customer Support position.

As a general matter, such a gesture is materially different from a change in position

or reappointment in which the same terms and conditions of employment are retained.

Moreover, in this particular case, the evidence indicates that this was an empty

gesture – at the same time that Ziegler told her she could apply for the VP of

Customer Support position, he also told her that she was not considered to be a viable

candidate for the job. 

-15-

conclude that Strate met her prima facie burden on each of these claims.8 

The Bank came forward with a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Strate:

her position was eliminated as part of a reorganization of the Bank’s management

structure. Therefore, we now address de novo whether, in consideration of this

explanation, and viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Strate, there

is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the Bank’s motivation for eliminating

Strate’s position and effectively terminating her. If there is genuine factual

controversy regarding whether the Bank was motivated, in whole or in part, by

Strate’s association with her disabled newborn child, then summary judgment was

improperly granted for the Bank.

The evidence establishes that Strate gave birth to her disabled child on

April 20, 2001, enrolled the child in the Bank’s group healthcare plan on April 24,

2001, and was notified that her job had been eliminated on July 2, 2001,

approximately two months later. It is undisputed that Ziegler knew about the child’s

disability when he made the decision to eliminate her job. On rare occasions, a close

temporal connection between a protected activity and an adverse employment action

may be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation. See,e.g., Bassett v. City of

Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1105-06 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a temporal link

between protected activity and an adverse employment action may, in some cases, be

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
-16-

sufficient to create an inference of retaliation) (citing cases). It follows that close

temporal proximity between an employer’s discovery of a protected characteristic and

an adverse employment action may, on rare occasions, suffice to create an inference

of discrimination. However, “[g]enerally, more than a temporal connection between

the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is required to present a

genuine factual issue.” Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.)

(en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818 (1999). 

In the present case, there is more than mere temporal proximity between the

birth of Strate’s disabled child (and Ziegler’s knowledge thereof) and the decision to

eliminate her position within the Bank. In the present case, Strate had an eleven-year

employment history with the Bank, during which she was promoted several times and

received numerous salary increases. She received consistently favorable evaluations

over the years, showing no employment problems whatsoever. Ziegler admitted in

his deposition that, shortly before Strate went on leave in April 2001, he indicated to

her that he was pleased with her work for the Bank and that she had no reason to

worry about her job security. Joint Appendix (Vol. I) at 180-81 (Deposition of Frank

Ziegler). Ziegler also testified in his deposition that, at the time he made the decision

to eliminate Strate’s position, he had no job performance issues related strictly to

Strate. Id. at 151. 

We recognize that evidence of a strong employment history will not alone

create a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext and discrimination. However, such

circumstantial evidence can be relevant when considering whether the record as a

whole establishes a genuine issue of material fact. Cf. Hase v. Missouri Div. of

Employment Sec., 972 F.2d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Evidence of Plaintiff’s rank,

her higher examination and performance ratings, and her years of experience, when

compared with [the hiree’s] supervisory experience and job recommendations, could

reasonably lead a trier of fact to infer that Defendants’ proffered reasons were

pretextual.”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 906 (1993). In the present case, Strate’s

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
-17-

apparently unblemished employment history with the Bank, spanning more than a

decade of work, casts genuine doubt upon the Bank’s stated reason for terminating

her. 

Moreover, evidence concerning Strate’s objective qualifications for the VP of

Customer Support position and the manner in which the Bank filled that new position

is also relevant to our analysis. According to the Bank itself, the reorganization on

which it justifies the elimination of Strate’s job as Executive VP of Consumer

Services simultaneously involved the creation of the new VP of Customer Support

position. Strate admittedly did not apply for the new position, but the evidence

indicates that, when Ziegler informed her that she could apply, he also told her that

she was considered not to be a viable candidate. Strate’s evidence further establishes

that, while she may not have been viewed as the best candidate for the VP of

Customer Support position, she certainly was qualified for the job, having already

performed all or most of the very same tasks that the new position entailed.

Nevertheless, she was told that she was viewed as a non-viable candidate, and no

explanation for that view was given.

On appeal, the Bank argues that evidence related to the new VP of Customer

Support position is irrelevant to the issue of pretext because its articulated business

reason for terminating Strate referred only to the elimination of her old position, not

the denial of the new position. The Bank argues: “Casting doubt on some collateral

action of an employer does not prove pretext. The articulated business reason must

be the subject of the attack if pretext is to be shown. Strate’s pretext burden is to

‘squarely rebut the articulated reason for [the elimination of her position].’” Brief for

Appellee at 38 (quoting Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 349 (7th Cir.

1997)). The Bank continues: “She must present facts to rebut each and every

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason advanced to survive summary judgment.” Id.

(citing Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2001)). 

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
9

We do not base this holding on evidence in the record merely showing that

decision makers at the Bank were aware of the child’s disability or that they desired

to handle Strate’s termination carefully. 

-18-

Contrary to the Bank’s argument, which is based upon Seventh Circuit case

law, the applicable standard in our circuit on summary judgment (as discussed above)

“require[s] only that [the] plaintiff adduce enough admissible evidence to raise a

genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of the defendant’s motive, even if that evidence

[does] not directly contradict or disprove [the] defendant’s articulated reasons for

its actions.” Davenport, 30 F.3d at 945 n.8 (emphasis added). In the present case, the

evidence showing that Strate was objectively qualified for the new VP of Customer

Support position, but was written off from the start as a non-viable candidate for the

job, certainly adds doubt regarding to the legitimacy of the Bank’s motives for its

actions.

In view of the evidence establishing a close temporal proximity between the

birth of Strate’s disabled child and her termination, combined with the evidence

indicating that she maintained a stellar employment record at the Bank over an

eleven-year period leading up to the child’s birth and was objectively qualified for the

new the VP of Customer Support position but was dismissed from the start as a nonviable candidate, we hold that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Strate’s

association with her disabled newborn child was a motivating factor in the decision

to terminate her.9

 Insofar as the district court’s summary judgment order is contrary

to our holding, it is reversed.

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840 
-19-

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the order of the district court granting summary

judgment for the Bank is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded

to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

___________________________

Appellate Case: 03-4039 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Entry ID: 1868840