Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01113/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01113-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KORY T. O’BRIEN,

CDCR #AM‒1378, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

ALDO GARCIA, et al., 

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01113-JAH-MDD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

OF SCREENING ORDER

[ECF No. 11]

Plaintiff Kory T. O’Brien, a prisoner currently incarcerated at Valley State Prison 

(“VSP”) in Chowchilla, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has filed a document entitled “Objection to Judge’s Analysis 

and Order.” See ECF No. 11. 

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this Court’s December 20, 2019 Order to the extent 

it dismissed Count 4 of his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) sua sponte pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim. Id. at 3. Because Plaintiff 

has failed to identify any intervening change in controlling law or show that the Court 

committed clear error in dismissing his equal protection claims, however, his Motion must 

be DENIED.

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I. Procedural History

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff claimed various prison officials at Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, including wardens, associate 

wardens, a “Plant Ops Supervisor,” and two inmate appeals reviewers, denied him equal 

protection, exposed him to harmful conditions of confinement in July and August 2017, 

and then retaliated against him in May 2019, after he continued to complain and file 

multiple grievances. See ECF No. 1 “Compl.,” at 1-4, 8, 14. He sought injunctive relief 

and “damages to be claimed at a later date.” Id. at 19. Plaintiff did not pay the civil filing 

fee at the time of filing, but instead filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). 

On August 26, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, but 

dismissed his Complaint sua sponte and in its entirety based on his failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to the mandatory screening required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See ECF No. 6. Plaintiff was provided notice of his 

pleading deficiencies, and was granted leave to amend them. Id. at 8‒17.

On September 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed his FAC (ECF No. 7) re-naming all the same 

Defendants and re-alleging four First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment “Counts” or 

causes of action. See FAC at 2‒23. His FAC continues to seek injunctive relief and an 

unspecified amount of damages. Id. at 25.1

 

On December 20, 2019, the Court conducted another sua sponte screening of 

Plaintiff’s FAC as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. See ECF No. 8. The 

1 The Court notes that just after he filed his current Motion, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address 

from RJD to VSP. See ECF No. 12. Plaintiff’s address was changed in the Court’s docket, and it has 

confirmed Plaintiff is currently housed at VSP in Chowchilla. See https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/ 

Details.aspx?ID=AM1378 (last visited Feb. 27, 2020). Because Plaintiff is no longer housed at RJD, his 

claims for injunctive relief have been rendered moot. See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 

1991) (per curiam) (finding claims for injunctive relief “relating to [a prison’s] policies are moot” when 

the prisoner has been moved and “he has demonstrated no reasonable expectation of returning to [the 

prison].”); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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Court again found Plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims, as pleaded in Counts 

3 and 4 of his FAC, failed to state a plausible claim for relief against any of the named 

Defendants. Id. at 5‒9. However, because the Court found Counts 1 and 2 contained factual 

allegations sufficient to plausibly state both a First Amendment retaliation claim and an 

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim with respect to Defendant Aldo 

Garcia (RJD’s Plant Ops Supervisor), it directed the Clerk to issue a summons as to Garcia, 

and ordered the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon Garcia on Plaintiff’s behalf pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). Id. at 9‒12.2

 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

A. Plaintiff’s Arguments

In his Motion, Plaintiff requests a “re-analysis” as to the sua sponte dismissal of

Count 4 of his FAC. See ECF No. 11 at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the Court’s 

equal protection analysis and its conclusion that his pleading failed to allege that RJD’s 

Wardens “intentionally treated similarly situated inmates differently without a rational 

basis” by equipping the cells of inmates in Building 20 with “multiple power outlets and a 

coaxial connection,” but failing to provide those same amenities to prisoners like him in 

Building 16. See ECF No. 8 at 7‒9. Plaintiff now appears to suggest that because Buildings 

16 and 20 are “in the same facility” and “on the same yard,” the Court erred in finding he 

alleged no plausible entitlement to relief on equal protection grounds. See ECF No. 3.

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2 The Court further found Plaintiff’s FAC failed to allege facts sufficient to allege personal liability as to 

Counts 1 and 2 on the part of any Defendant other than Garcia; therefore, the Clerk was directed to 

terminate Santana, Paramo, Buckel, Covello, Murphy, and Voong as parties to the case. See ECF No. 8 at 

10. Defendant Garcia has since been served, and has filed a Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of Plaintiff’s FAC

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 14; see also Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115,

1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of,

and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.”).

Garcia’s Motion to Dismiss has been referred to the assigned magistrate judge for disposition pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 72.3.

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B. Standard of Review

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for

reconsideration. But where reconsideration of a non-final order is sought, the court has 

“inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter or revoke it.” United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 

1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000). “The authority of district courts to reconsider their own orders 

before they become final, absent some applicable rule or statute to the contrary, allows 

them to correct not only simple mistakes, but also decisions based on shifting precedent, 

rather than waiting for the time-consuming, costly process of appeal.” Id. at 1049. Thus,

S.D. Cal. Civil Local Rule 7.1(i) permits motions for reconsideration “[w]henever any

motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been made to any

judge ... has been refused in whole or in part.” S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(i). However, the party

seeking reconsideration must show “what new or different facts and circumstances are

claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application.” Id.

Local Rule 7.1(i)(2) permits motions for re consideration within “30 days of the entry of

the ruling.”

A motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to a Local Rule may also be construed 

as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Osterneck v. 

Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989); In re Arrowhead Estates Development Co., 

42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). In Osterneck, the Supreme Court stated that “a postjudgment motion will be considered a Rule 59(e) motion where it involves ‘reconsideration 

of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.’” Id. at 174 (quoting White v. 

New Hampshire Dep’t of Employ’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)). A district court may 

grant a Rule 59(e) motion if it “‘is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.’” Wood v. Ryan, 759 

F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th

Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th

Cir. 1999)).

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Plaintiff’s Motion is timely considered under both Local Rule 7.1(i) and Rule 59(e) 

(applying to final judgments), because it was filed only 17 days “after the entry of the 

ruling, order or judgment sought to be reconsidered.” S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(i); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 59(e); see also Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty. v.

California, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2009).

However, Plaintiff’s Motion is unavailing because it fails to point to new evidence, 

clear error, or any change in the controlling law governing his purported Fourteenth 

Amendment claims. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1121. Instead, Plaintiff merely appears to disagree 

with the Court’s equal protection analysis with respect to Count 4, and re-alleges facts 

previously considered yet found insufficient to state a plausible equal protection claim. See

ECF No. 11 at 2‒3; cf. ECF No. 8 at 6‒9. “Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to 

reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used 

sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., 

Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Motions for reconsideration, like the one Plaintiff has filed in this case, may not be 

used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably 

have been raised earlier in the litigation. Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir.

2003); see also Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001). They 

also do not give parties a “second bite at the apple,” Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236-

37 (9th Cir. 2001), and may not “be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already 

thought.” United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998); see also 

Ramser v. Laielli, No. 3:15-CV-2018-CAB-DHB, 2017 WL 3524879, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 

15, 2017) (citing Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. State of Mich., 152 F.R.D. 562, 563 (W.D. 

Mich. 1992) (“[W]here the movant is attempting to obtain a complete reversal of the court’s 

judgment by offering essentially the same arguments presented on the original motion, the 

proper vehicle for relief is an appeal.”). 

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Ultimately, a party seeking reconsideration must show “more than a disagreement 

with the Court’s decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the 

court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden.” 

United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

III. Conclusion and Order

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Objections are overruled and his Motion for

Reconsideration is DENIED (ECF No. 11). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 6, 2020

Hon. John A. Houston

United States District Judge

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