Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02406/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02406-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Deborah Lynne Vasquez, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-11-2406-PHX-GMS

ORDER

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Deborah Vasquez, which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 

1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court vacates that decision and remands for an 

award of benefits. 

BACKGROUND 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 On February 4, 2009, Vasquez filed for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income. (R. at 110-21.) Vasquez alleged disability due to chronic 

obstructive pulmonary disease, degenerative disc disease, arthritis, depression, anxiety, 

and post-traumatic stress disorder, with a disability onset date of March 15, 2008. (Id. at 

110-11, 124.) Vasquez’s claim was denied both initially, (id. at 46-49, 502,) and upon 

reconsideration (id. at 498, 41-43.) Vasquez then appealed to an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 27-33.) The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on July 23, 

2010. (Id. at 511.) 

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 In evaluating whether Vasquez was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.1

 (Id. at 11-26.) The ALJ determined at 

step one that Vasquez had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged 

onset date. At step two, he concluded that Vasquez suffered from the following severe 

impairments: degenerative disc disease, trigger finger contraction, major depression, 

anxiety disorder, and alcohol abuse in sustained remission. At step three, the ALJ 

determined that none of these impairments met or equaled any of the SSA’s listed 

impairments. (Id. at 16, 19.) 

The ALJ then evaluated Vasquez’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”),2

concluding that Vasquez could perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), “except that the claimant is limited to simple, routine, tasks, 

[sic] with few workplace changes.” (R. at 21.) Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined at 

step four that Vasquez’s RFC left her “unable to perform any past relevant work.” (Id. at 

24.) The ALJ therefore reached step five, concluding that Vasquez could perform a 

 

1

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if he proves: (1) that he is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

that his disability is severe, and (3) that his impairment meets or equals one of the specific impairments described in the regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, he is not able to perform any work that he has 

done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

2

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his impairments. See SSR 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

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significant number of other jobs in the national economy that met her RFC limitations. 

(Id. at 25.) The ALJ employed the medical-vocational guidelines (“the grids”) to make 

this determination. (Id.) As a result, the ALJ concluded Vasquez was not disabled. (Id. at 

26.) 

 On October 14, 2011, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision. 

(Id. at 4-7). Vasquez had supplemented the record with additional evidence regarding her 

mental treatment following the ALJ’s review. (Id. at 7, 511-604.) The Appeals Council’s 

ruling made the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. On December 6, 

2011, Vasquez filed suit in this Court.3

 (Doc. 1.) The matter became fully briefed on 

June 12, 2012. (Docs. 13, 14, 20.) 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Vasquez, born in January of 1959, alleges that she has been disabled since March 

15, 2008. (R. at 118.) Prior to the alleged onset of her disability, Vasquez had work 

experience as a convenience store clerk and as an insurance broker. (Id. at 24.) 

 In March 2008, Vasquez stopped work as a convenience clerk. (Id. at 111-12.) 

Vasquez reports that she was terminated from this position because of “leaning on the 

counter due to my back problems.” (Id.) Shortly after being terminated, Vasquez was 

admitted to Maricopa Medical Center for “secondary alcohol withdrawal, pneumonia, . . . 

and depression.” (Id. at 64, 323.) The record establishes a lengthy history of mental 

health issues, joint and back pain, and breathing problems. At her hearing, Vasquez 

testified that her primary complaint related to her mental health issues. This is the 

principal relevant issue in her appeal. 

 Vasquez’s complaints of mental health issues have been observed by both treating 

and examining medical providers. In October 2008, Vasquez’s primary physician, 

Douglas Ray, M.D., noted that in addition to her “diffuse joint pain,” Vasquez has “a 

 

3

 Vasquez was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . .”). 

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history of chronic depression with anxiety.” (Id. at 199.) Dr. Ray also diagnosed Vasquez 

with depression and associated anxiety. (Id.) Treating physicians noted her “altered 

mental status” in November 2008 and “persistent depression” in February 2009. (Id. at 

263, 185.) 

 In April 2009, a state examiner, Dr. Brent B. Geary, performed a consultative 

psychological assessment of Vasquez. Vasquez was diagnosed with “major depressive 

disorder, recurrent, presently moderate, panic disorder without agoraphobia, mild to 

moderate, alcohol abuse, active.” (Id. at 241.) Further, Dr. Geary noted that Vasquez has 

conditions which “will impose . . . limitation[s] for 12 months” and has “moderate 

limitation” on adaptation, including “reduced ability to handle stress and pressure, would 

likely miss more work than allowable, emotionally unstable with propensity for 

[c]rying.” (Id. at 243.) 

 Although he provided a narrative report, Dr. Geary also filled out a 

Psychological/Psychiatric Medical Source Statement form provided by the Arizona 

Department of Economic Security Disability Determination Service. The form gives the 

doctor’s summary assessment of Vasquez’s performance in four categories: (1) 

Understanding and Memory, (2) Sustained Concentration and Persistence, (3) Social 

Interaction, and (4) Adaptation. These assessments were apparently designed to reveal 

what Dr. Geary “in his best judgment feel[s] the [Vasquez] can do.” (Id.) 

 Under the adaptation category, Dr. Geary indicated the Vasquez suffered from 

only “moderate limitations”. Nevertheless in his note under that category as well as in his 

narrative report, Dr. Geary stated that the Vasquez ‘would likely miss work more than 

allowable.” 

 A month later, Dr. Mark Stevenson reviewed Vasquez’s mental health records, 

including Dr. Geary’s report, (id. at 220-37,) to make the initial determination regarding 

mental impairment. There is no evidence in the record that Dr. Stevenson is other than a 

non-examining source. He filled out the SSA forms that include the rating of functional 

limitations as is required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.520a(c). Dr. Stevenson scored Vasquez in 

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each of the four categories set forth for determining functional limitation. He found a 

mild degree of limitation in her activities of daily living and a moderate degree of 

limitation in maintaining both social functioning and concentration, persistence, and 

pace. (R. at 230.) He also notes that Vasquez has had no episodes of decompensation. 

(Id.) That assessment meant Vasquez’s psychological or psychiatric condition did not 

meet or equal the medical impairment set forth in the regulations. (Id. at 231.) Noting Dr.

Geary’s diagnoses and limitations, Dr. Stevenson nevertheless observed that Vasquez “is 

independent in her ADLs [Activities of Daily Living]” and that her symptoms “do[] not 

suggest a level of functional limitation that would preclude [her] from all work-related 

activities.” (Id. at 232.) 

 Dr. Stevenson also filled out the SSA’s Mental Residual Functional Capacity 

Assessment form. In that form the doctor rated Vasquez in twenty work-related mental 

activities “within the context of the individual’s capacity to sustain that activity over a 

normal workday and workweek on an ongoing basis.” (Id. at 234.) Dr. Stevenson found 

Vasquez “moderately limited” in six of twenty work-related mental activities. (Id. at 234-

35). Specifically, Dr. Stevenson found that Vasquez was “moderately limited” in her 

ability to: 

(1) understand and remember detailed instructions; 

(2) carry out detailed instructions; 

(3) maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; 

(4) complete a normal work-day and workweek without interruptions from 

psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace 

without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; 

(5) . . . interact appropriately with the general public; and, 

(6) . . . respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. 

(Id. at 234-35). Despite these limitations, Dr. Stevenson concluded that “[o]verall, . . . 

[Vasquez] is seen as capable of meeting the basic cognitive/emotional demands of 

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simple/unskilled work on a competitive, sustained basis.” (Id. at 236.) 

 On Vasquez’s request for reconsideration, Dr. Mary Downs reviewed Vasquez’s 

mental health in August 2009. (Id. at 125.) Affirming Dr. Stevenson’s determination, Dr.

Downs opined that Vasquez’s depression was not a “significant enough impairment to 

preclude employment. Additional MER [Medical Evidence of Record] does not support a 

worsening of [her] mental condition or suggest significant functional limitations that 

would preclude participation in competitive SGA.” (Id.) 

 In October 2009, Vasquez was admitted to Urgent Psychiatric Care for suicidal 

ideation and auditory hallucinations. (Id. at 416, 418.) At the time, Vasquez was assigned 

a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 35, which represents severe 

symptoms; following treatment with psychotropic drugs she was assessed a GAF score of 

60, representing moderate symptoms, but she still complained of auditory hallucinations.4

(Id.) 

 In April 2010, Dr. Ray stated that Vasquez “continues to be homeless and is 

currently still sleeping on the ground in a tent. . . . She continues to have significant 

anxiety, . . . states her depression is stable on sertraline . . . and denies any increased 

feelings of depression or any suicidal thoughts.” (Id. at 445.) Following her ALJ hearing, 

Vasquez submitted additional medical records from Valle Del Sol, where she had been 

receiving counseling. Records from Valle Del Sol note “both A/V [audio-visual] 

hallucinations,” “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,” and other issues with depression, 

anxiety, and sleep and appetite problems. (Id. at 544-49, 521.) 

 

4

 Rated on a scale from zero to 100, the GAF is “used to rate social, occupational and psychological functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health.” Social Security Disability Law & Procedure in Federal Court § 5:30. “A GAF of 35 is strong evidence of an inability to work.” Haag v. Barnhart, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 (N.D. 

Ala. 2004). “A GAF score between 51 and 60 indicates moderate symptoms, such as occasional panic attacks, while a score from 71 to 80 indicates transient reactions to 

normal stress, with only a slight impairment of functioning.” Gravatt v. Paul Revere Life 

Ins. Co., CV982166PHXROSOMP, 2005 WL 2789315, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2005). 

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DISCUSSION 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

 A reviewing federal court will address only the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits when that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 Subject to the Ninth Circuit’s standards in particular cases, the ALJ is responsible 

for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. 

See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before 

the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s 

conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). 

This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in 

evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citations omitted). However, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and 

may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Id.

(citing Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). Nor may the Court 

“affirm the ALJ’s . . . decision based on evidence that the ALJ did not discuss.” Connett 

v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Vasquez argues that the ALJ erred by: (A) making findings contrary to those of 

state consultative examining physician, Dr. Geary; (B) rejecting Vasquez’s subjective 

complaint testimony without articulating clear and convincing reasons for doing so; and 

(C) relying on the medical-vocational guidelines (“the grids”) for assessing Vasquez 

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within nonexertional limitations. For the reasons below, the Court finds that the ALJ 

dealt improperly with Dr. Geary’s testimony and improperly discounted Vasquez’s 

testimony. Applying the credit as true rule, the third argument is moot and remand for 

calculation of benefits is in order. 

 A. Dr. Geary’s Assessment 

 Vasquez contends that the ALJ failed to properly account for the opinion of the 

state consultative examining physician, Dr. Geary, when formulating Vasquez’s RFC.5

State physicians like Dr. Geary are considered experts. See SSR 96-6p (July 2, 1996).6

Their opinions and conclusions should be accorded greater weight than non-examining 

physicians. See Edlund v. Masssanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2001). When an 

examining physician is contradicted by another physician, the ALJ must still give specific 

and legitimate reasons founded on substantial evidence in the record for rejecting the 

opinions of an examining physician. Here, the ALJ purportedly gave “great weight” to 

Dr. Geary’s “comprehensive and consistent” “evaluation[ ] of the claimant’s mental and 

physical impairments.” (R. at 24.) Vasquez, however, contends that the ALJ’s RFC 

conclusion runs contrary to the limitations described by Dr. Geary in his report. 

Dr. Geary made the following diagnoses: major depressive disorder, panic 

disorder without agoraphobia, alcohol abuse, and depressive personality features. (Id. at 

 

5

 In greater detail, a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is “an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work 

setting on a regular and continuing basis.” S.S.R. 96–8p. In particular, the RFC assessment must describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case record. Id. The RFC 

determination may be based on a wide variety of evidence in the record–the claimant’s medical history, laboratory findings, the effects of treatment, reports of daily activities, lay evidence, recorded observations, medical source statements, effects of symptoms that are reasonably attributable to a medically determinable impairment, evidence from attempts to work, the need for a structured living environment, and work evaluations. Id.

6

 Social Security Rulings (SSRs) “do not carry the ‘force of law,’ but they are binding on ALJs nonetheless.” Bray v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1224 

(9th Cir. 2009). They “‘reflect the official interpretation of the [SSA] and are entitled to 

some deference as long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act and regulations.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 

1124 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

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241.) These diagnoses mirror those impairments the ALJ found to be severe (major 

depression, anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse in sustained remission). (Id. at 16.) With 

regard to the severity and impact of Vasquez’s symptoms, Dr. Geary noted that Vasquez 

had “moderate limitations” and that she had “reduced ability to handle stress . . . [and] 

would likely miss more work than allowable.” (Id. at 243.) He further opined that 

Vasquez’s tendency to have panic attacks would “disrupt her attention and task 

orientation.” (Id. at 242.) He also noted that Vasquez’s “pace is considerably slowed.” 

(Id.) Although the ALJ gave this opinion “great weight” and specifically mentioned Dr. 

Geary’s doubts about Vasquez’s ability to sustain regular work, (id. at 18,) the ALJ 

nevertheless declared Vasquez capable of performing modified light work (id. at 24.) 

Vasquez asserts that the ALJ cannot give “great weight” to Dr. Geary on one hand, and 

then ignore the significant limitations he found with the other. 

SSR 96-8p details the metric intended for capture in the RFC: “Ordinarily, RFC is 

the individual’s maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary 

work setting on a regular and continuing basis, and the RFC assessment must include a 

discussion of the individual's abilities on that basis. A ‘regular and continuing basis’ 

means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” (emphases in 

original). The question becomes whether Dr. Geary’s opinion amounts to a finding that 

Vasquez is unable to sustain full-time work. 

Two non-examining physicians did not think so. Dr. Stevenson, who performed 

his review of Vasquez’s medical records a month after Dr. Geary, appears to have based 

his conclusions on Dr. Geary’s report. Dr. Stevenson determined that Vasquez’s 

symptoms “do[] not suggest a level of functional limitation that would preclude 

[claimant] from all work-related activities.” (Id. at 232.) After the SSA’s original denial 

of benefits, and on the motion for reconsideration, Dr. Downs produced a one page case 

analysis in which she observed that “[w]hile MER indicates [claimant] drinking 

substantial amounts of alcohol . . . it does not seem to be cause significant enough 

impairment to preclude employment. Additional MER does not support a worsening of 

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[claimant’s] mental condition or suggest significant functional limitations that would 

preclude participation in competitive SGA.” (Id. at 125.) 

 The ALJ improperly addressed Dr. Geary’s findings. The limitations Dr. Geary 

ascribed to Vasquez are inconsistent with an RFC of modified light work. That RFC 

meant Vasquez would be able “to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting 

on a regular and continuing basis, . . . 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week.” SSR 96-8p 

(emphases omitted). Contrast that with Dr. Geary’s opinion that Vasquez had “reduced 

ability to handle stress . . . [,] would likely miss more work than allowable”, a tendency to 

have panic attacks that would “disrupt her attention and task orientation”, and a 

“considerably slowed” pace. (Id. at 242-43.) There is a clear asymmetry between those 

two findings. That is troubling in light of the ALJ’s claimed reliance on Dr. Greary’s 

opinion. See Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding error where “the 

primary piece of evidence that [the ALJ] relied on does not support the propositions for 

which it is cited” and concluding “that the ALJ failed to build the requisite ‘logical 

bridge’ between the evidence and her conclusion”). 

The Commissioner’s attempt to suggest that Dr. Geary’s statement that claimant 

“would likely miss more work than allowable” can be disregarded because he did not say 

that she “would for certain miss more work than allowable” is unavailing. Opinions by 

their nature are not sureties. As discussed above, the regulations governing the program 

provide that “[w]hen we assess your mental abilities we . . . determine your residual 

functional capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(c). To the extent the Commissioner argues, pursuant to Stubbs-Danielson v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2008), that the ALJ “reasonably translated” Dr. 

Geary’s opinion that Vasquez “would likely miss work more than allowable” into his 

determination that Vasquez had a residual functional capacity for light work, that 

argument is untenable. One cannot have a residual functional capacity to perform any 

work as it is defined by the regulations when one would “miss work more than 

allowable.” There was a higher degree of congruity between the examining physician, 

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non-examining physician, and the ALJ’s RFC in Stubbs-Danielson. See Brink v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 Fed. App’x 211 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 It is possible, as the Commissioner speculates in his brief, that Dr. Geary’s opinion 

could be reconciled with the ALJ’s RFC if the right testimony were in the record, 

together with corresponding analysis. For example, Dr. Geary might have been 

questioned on follow-up whether Vasquez would miss work more than was allowable if 

Vasquez were given a light or sedentary job. Yet there is no such evidence in the record, 

and the ALJ never addressed the inconsistency. As it stands, the opinions are in 

opposition. And the ALJ must give the opinions of a psychologist who actually examined 

the claimant more deference than the opinions of a psychologist who did not. Edlund,

253 F.3d at 1159; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995); 20 CFR § 

404.1527(c) (“Generally we give more weight to the opinion of a source who has 

examined you than to the opinion of a source who has not examined you.”); see also Orn 

v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, the opinions of examining 

physicians are afforded more weight than those of non-examining physicians, and the 

opinions of examining non-treating physicians are afforded less weight than those of 

treating physicians.”) The ALJ cannot cover the inconsistency between its RFC and Dr. 

Geary’s conclusions by pointing to the conclusions of two non-examining physicians. No 

matter how finely the Court parses the separate conclusions of Dr. Geary on the one hand 

and Dr. Stevenson and Dr. Downs on the other, they are in opposition. 

 This is not to say that the ALJ was bound by the opinion of Dr. Geary, Dr. 

Stevenson, or Dr. Downs when he made his RFC determination. See 20 CFR 

§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i). But when Dr. Geary’s opinion contradicted the opinions of both Drs. 

Stevenson and Downs, the ALJ had to present specific and legitimate reasons for 

rejecting the opinion of Dr. Geary that are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. However, because neither Dr. Stevenson nor Dr. 

Downs examined the claimant, their assessments, either separately or in concert, cannot 

by themselves constitute substantial evidence sufficient to justify the rejection of Dr. 

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Geary’s opinion by the ALJ. “The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself 

constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an 

examining physician or a treating physician.” Id. at 831. 

The ALJ states that he gave great weight to the opinions of Dr. Geary. It is 

conceivable that the ALJ had other reasons for determining that Dr. Geary’s opinion was 

incorrect, or, somehow not inconsistent with the finding of some RFC in the claimant 

here. Nevertheless, they are not in the record. An ALJ must resolve conflicts in the 

evidence. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). This Court is required 

to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the 

ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have 

been thinking. Bray v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 ((9th 

Cir. 2009) (citing Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)). 

Because Dr. Geary actually examined Vasquez, the ALJ was required to be more clear in 

his analysis before rejecting his opinion—implicitly or explicitly. The ALJ was not. 

Accordingly, it was error for the ALJ to ignore parts of Dr. Geary’s opinion. Given that 

Dr. Geary’s opinion cuts straight to the heart of the disability inquiry, the error was not 

harmless. 

 B. Vasquez’s Statements 

 Vasquez testified at the SSA hearing on the degree of her mental and physical 

impairments. She described manic depression, an inability to be around a lot of people, 

severe anxiety, extreme pain in her lower back, and a need to lie down most of the day, 

but reported that her hands were much better after surgery. (R. at 611-19.) The ALJ 

articulated four reasons for finding much of her testimony incredible: (1) Vasquez’s 

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms 

are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional 

capacity assessment”; (2) her claims of extreme lower back pain, a need to lie down for 

almost the whole day, and COPD symptoms were inconsistent with her medical records 

and statements to physicians; (3) there was never an objective diagnosis of manic 

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depression; and (4) her account of her symptoms and their severity often changed from 

visit to visit. (Id. at 23.) The ALJ did not find any evidence of malingering on the part of 

Vasquez. None of the reasons he articulated supplies a proper basis for finding that 

Vasquez lacked credibility in her statements concerning the intensity of her impairments. 

 The legal standard governing claimant credibility is a matter of dispute between 

the parties. The Commissioner relies on Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(en banc), where the Ninth Circuit set out to “determine the appropriate standard for 

evaluating subjective complaints of pain in Social Security disability cases.” Id. at 342. 

The Bunnell Court opined that once there has been objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment, the ALJ must make specific findings, supported by the record, 

for why he rejected the claimant’s testimony on the severity of the pain. Id. at 345-46. 

This is to ensure that the ALJ “did not ‘arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony 

regarding pain.’” Id. (quoting Elam v. R.R. Retirement Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 

1991)). Thus the Commissioner asserts that the standard governing claimant credibility is 

a specific finding standard, which it claims is more in line with the overall “substantial 

evidence” standard that governs these cases. 

 Many panels of the Ninth Circuit have subsequently held, however, that if there is 

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, “and there is no evidence of 

malingering, then the ALJ must give ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ in order to 

reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1112 (quoting Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also, e.g., 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). The Commissioner claims 

that these cases, along with the several others reference in Vasquez’s briefs, have 

overruled the standard articulated in Bunnell in violation of the Ninth Circuit rule that 

only en banc panels can overrule existing precedent. See United States v. Camper, 66 

F.3d 229, 232 (9th Cir. 1995). That is not the case. Bunnell articulated a general standard 

for dealing with claimant testimony. The many subsequent cases have addressed a subset 

of cases where there is also no evidence of claimant malingering. They have articulated a 

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“clear and convincing” standard for those situations. While the Commissioner is 

undoubtedly unhappy with that approach, this Court cannot sit in judgment of the 

application of that standard, which is clearly the standard that governs claimant 

credibility in this circuit. Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasons for finding Vasquez’s testimony 

incredible must be “clear and convincing.” 

 The first reason—that Vasquez’s statements “are not credible to the extent they are 

inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment”—is circular. The 

ALJ cannot determine the RFC and then look at Vasquez’s statements; the RFC is 

supposed to incorporate those statements. See Leitheiser v. Astrue, No. CV 10-6243-SI 

2012 WL 967647 at *9 (D. Or. March 16, 2012) (“Dismissing a claimant's credibility 

because it is inconsistent with a conclusion that must itself address the claimant's 

credibility is circular reasoning and is not sustained by this court.”); Carlson v. Astrue, 

682 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1167 (D. Or. 2010) (same). It was improper to reject Vasquez’s 

testimony on that basis. 

The second reason is an inconsistency between Vasquez’s testimony as to the 

severity of her physical impairments and her previous statements to physicians. Vasquez 

testified to “extreme” back pain and a need to lie down for six to eight hours in an eight 

hour day. (R. at 614-15.) The ALJ noted, however, that Vasquez had made several 

statements to physicians that were inconsistent with extreme back pain that requires one 

to lie down for the vast majority of the day. (Id. at 23.) The physicians who reviewed her 

records likewise found that she still retained a normal range of motion and the physical 

capacity to lift, stand, crouch, squat, bend, and so forth. (Id.) Vasquez does not appear to 

challenge the ALJ’s finding of inconsistencies between her testimony on the severity of 

her physical symptoms and the other medical evidence. That is a clear and convincing 

basis for rejecting claimant testimony on symptom severity. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In reaching a credibility 

determination, an ALJ may weigh inconsistencies between the claimant's testimony and 

his or her conduct, daily activities, and work record, among other factors.”). 

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The remaining reasons pertain to Vasquez’s testimony regarding her mental 

impairments. At her hearing, Vasquez stated that the biggest problem that keeps her from 

being able to hold down a steady job is her “mental situation.” (Id. at 611-12.) The ALJ 

noted that Vasquez’s statement in her hearing that she was experiencing “manic 

depression” was not supported in the record because there was never any diagnosis of 

manic depression. (Id. at 23.) The ALJ also observed that “claimant’s primary care 

physician has prescribed psychotropic medications, which the claimant recently reported 

were helping manage her depression symptoms.” (Id.) Finally, the ALJ noted “claimant’s 

account of her hallucinatory symptoms changed between her evaluation in the morning 

and her reevaluation in the afternoon” of her admission for suicidal ideation. (Id.). 

 First, while Vasquez may have misstated or been confused as to her diagnosis, the 

record is clear that she suffered from multiple mental health issues, including major 

depressive disorder. (Id. at 527, 547, 553, 596.) That a person suffering from a mental 

disorder may have misstated her diagnosis is not a clear and convincing reason for 

rejecting her testimony as to the subjective limitations she experiences as a result of those 

mental health issues. There is no evidence that Vasquez was using the purported 

diagnosis of manic depression to enhance her other symptoms. The symptoms she 

described were symptoms attributable to the impairments that the ALJ already recognized 

were severe. The difference between “manic” depression and depression is too minute to 

be a clear and convincing reason to reject Vasquez’s testimony. 

 Similarly, fluctuations in the symptoms a claimant experiences, particularly in the 

course of a single day, is not atypical of severe mental illness. See Hutsell v. Massanari, 

259 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[g]iven the unpredictable course of 

mental illness, symptom-free intervals and brief remission are generally of uncertain 

duration and marked by the impending possibility of relapse”). Although Vasquez’s 

symptoms fluctuated, the time frame the ALJ highlighted was a fifteen hour period while 

Vasquez was undergoing a battery of psychotropic treatment at an urgent care facility to 

which she was admitted for suicidal ideation. (Compare R. at 418 (treatment notes at 1 

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A.M. on October 12, 2009, noting battery of psychotropic drugs prescribed) with (id. at 

416) (treatment notes at 4 P.M. on same day, noting general improvement but new 

hallucinatory symptoms).) Such fluctuation in the symptoms a claimant experiences or 

describes to her treating physicians is not inconsistent with the symptoms of a mentally ill 

person; nor is it a clear and convincing reason to reject Vasquez’s testimony. Orn, 495 

F.3d at 634 (“[c]onsistency does not require similarity in findings over time despite a 

claimant’s evolving medical status”; instead, the opinions should be consistent “with the 

record as a whole”). 

 Neither is the fact that Vasquez’s primary care physician noted, at one time, that 

Vasquez’s depression was “stable” a reason to reject Vasquez’s testimony. First, the 

Commissioner presents this argument in his brief, but it does not appear in the ALJ’s 

decision. Second, even if it did, it would be unavailing. “Impairments that can be 

controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining 

eligibility for SSI benefits.” Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 

(9th Cir. 2006). The medical evidence must therefore show not only that Vasquez was on

medication, but that Vasquez maintained “effective control” over her symptoms with the 

aid of those medications. Id. The full text of the note from Dr. Ray is that Vasquez 

“continues to have significant anxiety, is taking Vistaril . . . for her anxiety, states her 

depression is stable on sertraline . . . and denies any increased feelings of depression or 

any suicidal thoughts.” (Id. at 445 (emphasis added).) It appears clear that “stable” in this 

context does not mean “improved” or “controlled”, but rather “has not worsened,” or 

“has not increased.” Therefore, this is also not a clear and convincing reason to reject 

Vasquez’s testimony. 

 The ALJ also noted that despite Vasquez’s testimony “that she went to group 

sessions twice per week and met with her therapist bi-weekly . . . . no updated mental 

health treatment records were ever received.” (Id. at 23.) Vasquez subsequently did 

submit those records, and they were made part of the record by the Appeals Council. (Id.

at 7.) However, the Appeals Council found “that this information does not provide a basis 

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for changing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.” (Id. at 5.) The Court disagrees. 

Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting a 

claimant’s testimony, it is a factor the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis. Burch 

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, however, Vasquez has provided 

additional records which objectively document her on-going treatment for depression, 

treatment for hallucinations, and a diagnosis, inter alia of “post-traumatic stress 

disorder,” all consistent with Vasquez’s testimony. (Id. at 520-604.) 

 The Commissioner argues that the Court should not consider this evidence in its 

determination of whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

However, two days after this case was fully briefed, the Ninth Circuit decided Brewes v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., which held that “when the Appeals Council considers new 

evidence in deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part 

of the administrative record, which the district court must consider when reviewing the 

Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence.” 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 

2012). This ruling has effectively decided the issue, and the Court finds that the evidence 

submitted after the hearing corroborates Vasquez’s testimony. The ALJ’s reasons for 

discounting her testimony regarding her mental impairments are not, therefore, clear and 

convincing. That error was not harmless because a claimant’s attestation of the severity 

of her mental impairment has significant bearing on the disability determination. The 

ALJ, however, did properly discount Vasquez’s testimony as to the severity of her 

physical symptoms. 

Having reached this conclusion, the question of whether the ALJ erred in relying 

on “the grids” rather than on a vocational expert is moot. 

III. REMEDY 

The following determinations of ALJ were in error: arriving at an RFC that is 

inconsistent with the examining physician’s diagnosis without proper explanation and 

discrediting Vasquez’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. All of these 

errors prejudiced Vasquez’s case. The Court must therefore vacate the ALJ’s conclusions 

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at steps four and five. 

 Having decided to vacate the ALJ’s decision, the Court has the discretion to 

remand the case either for further proceedings or for an award of benefits. See Reddick, 

157 F.3d at 728. The rule in this Circuit is that the Court should: 

credit[] evidence and remand[] for an award of benefits where (1) the ALJ 

has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting [certain] 

evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record 

that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such 

evidence credited. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292.

 Here, all three elements are present. The ALJ has not produced substantial 

evidence showing that Vasquez is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 

Act. The main contrary evidence is found in the opinions of Drs. Stevenson and Downs, 

but those opinions, absent sufficient supporting evidence in the record, cannot serve as 

the required “substantial evidence.” Moreover, the evidence is that Vasquez’s mental 

impairments are the primary driver of her symptoms and are sufficient to make her 

disabled. Therefore, the purported inconsistencies in Vasquez’s testimony regarding 

those physical impairments do not create an “outstanding issue[ ] that must be resolved 

before a determination of disability can be made.” Id. The Court must therefore credit Dr. 

Geary’s opinion and Vasquez’s own testimony regarding the severity of Vasquez’s 

mental impairments.7

 

CONCLUSION

 The ALJ made several errors of law that require vacating his decision. Because the 

 

7

 The Court is aware of the Commissioner’s position regarding the credit-as-true rule, but 

notes that even a Ninth Circuit judge who shares some skepticism of the rule’s validity 

has noted that “because the crediting-as-true rule is part of our circuit's law, only an en 

banc court can change it.” Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 602 (O'Scannlain, J. dissenting). A 

district court is not at liberty to ignore the rule based upon Defendant’s claims that it 

conflicts with the Social Security Act and improperly usurps the ALJ’s role as finder of 

fact. (Doc. 14 at 23). 

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record makes clear that Vasquez is disabled under the guidelines promulgated by the 

SSA, the Court reverses and remands for an award of benefits. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND VACATED IN PART. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED for an award of 

benefits. 

 Dated this 7th day of February, 2013. 

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