Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-22-56181/USCOURTS-ca9-22-56181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CITY OF COSTA MESA, a municipal 

corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

BRANDON STUMP, an individual; 

RYAN STUMP, an individual; KEITH 

STUMP, an individual; BUCKEYE 

RECOVERY TREE COLLECTIVE, 

LLC, a California limited liability

company; BUCKEYE TREE 

COLLECTIVE, LLC, a California 

limited liability company; 

CHADWICK HOUSE, LLC, a 

California limited liability company; 

ASHBROOKE, LLC, an Ohio limited 

liability company, 

Counter-Defendants.

No.22-56181 

D.C. No. 

8:19-cv-0171f0-

JVS-GJS 

OPINION

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2 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding 

Argued and Submitted March 29, 2024 

Pasadena, California

Filed December 4, 2024 

Before: Ronald M. Gould, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Danielle J. 

Forrest, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion by Judge Forrest; 

Special Concurrence by Judge Ikuta; 

Concurrence by Judge Forrest; 

Partial Dissent by Judge Gould 

SUMMARY*

Fair Housing Discrimination

The panel affirmed the district court’s partial summary 

judgment to the City of Costa Mesa and denial of The Ohio 

House LLC’s post-verdict motions in Ohio House’s action 

challenging the City’s zoning laws as discriminatory against 

the disabled in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 3

and the California Planning and Zoning Law, California 

Government Code § 65008.

Ohio House operates a sober-living facility in a multiplefamily residential (MFR) zone. The City notified Ohio 

House that the property was subject to Ordinance 15-11, 

which requires that all group homes with over six residents 

located in MFR zones obtain a conditional-use permit and 

satisfy a separation requirement. The City denied Ohio 

House’s application for a conditional-use permit because the 

property did not meet the separation requirement, and also 

denied Ohio House’s request for a reasonable 

accommodation or waiver of the separation requirement.

Addressing Ohio House’s disparate treatment claim, the 

panel agreed with the parties that whether the City’s zoning 

code facially subjects the disabled to unlawful disparate 

treatment is a question of law that should have been resolved 

at summary judgment. On the merits, the panel held that 

Ohio House failed to establish facial disparate treatment as a 

matter of law because the differential treatment under the 

City’s group-living regulations facially benefits the 

protected class of disabled people. The district court’s error 

in submitting this matter to the jury was harmless because 

the jury correctly concluded that Ohio House failed to prove 

disparate treatment.

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment for the City on Ohio House’s disparate impact 

claim, agreeing with the district court that Ohio House failed 

to prove a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect 

on a protected group.

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of judgment 

as a matter of law on Ohio House’s discriminatory 

statements claim. Ohio House’s contention that the City 

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4 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

violated the FHA’s and the FEHA’s prohibition against 

discriminatory statements by enacting a facially 

discriminatory zoning code fails for the same reasons that 

the disparate treatment claim fails. Comments made by 

individual city employees suggesting that they had a 

discriminatory purpose for adopting the challenged zoning 

regulations are, standing alone, insufficient to overturn the 

jury’s verdict. 

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of judgment 

as a matter of law on Ohio House’s claim that the City 

interfered with Ohio House aiding or encouraging others’ 

exercise of their rights under the FHA because Ohio House 

failed to prove a causal link between its protected activity of 

providing sober-living housing and the City’s actions that 

impeded that activity. The panel adopted the Seventh 

Circuit’s approach to causation, which requires proof of 

intentional discrimination or discriminatory animus to 

establish a prima facie claim based on an interference theory.

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of judgment 

as a matter of law on Ohio House’s facial challenge to the 

City’s reasonable-accommodation ordinance, concluding 

that (1) the City’s reasonable-accommodations ordinance is 

not facially inconsistent with the FHA; and (2) the jury had 

an evidentiary basis for finding that Ohio House’s requested 

accommodation—granting an exception to the separation 

requirement—was unreasonable. Because the jury 

ultimately reached the correct outcome, it was harmless error 

for the district court to submit this purely legal issue to the 

jury.

Finally, the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of 

Ohio House’s post-trial renewed motion for judgment as a 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 5

matter of law on Ohio House’s § 65008 claim because it was 

time-barred.

Specially concurring, Judge Ikuta would hold that to 

establish a facial disparate treatment claim under the FHA 

and FEHA, a plaintiff must show that the protected group 

suffered unfavorable treatment compared to the unprotected 

group and not merely show that the protected group has been 

treated differently than the unprotected group.

Concurring, Judge Forrest agreed with Judge Ikuta that a 

plaintiff should be required to prove adverse facially 

differential treatment as part of its prima facie case, but 

disagreed that a prima facie showing of unfavorable

treatment is required under Ninth Circuit precedent.

Dissenting in part, Judge Gould would have dismissed 

Ohio House’s interference claim under the FHA as waived 

for lack of adequate briefing, instead of reaching the merits.

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6 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

COUNSEL

Christopher Brancart (argued) and Elizabeth Brancart, 

Brancart & Brancart, Pescadero, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Mary-Christine Sungaila (argued), Charles M. Kagay, 

Jocelyn Sperling, and Greg Wolff, Complex Appellate 

Litigation Group LLP, Newport Beach, California; 

Kimberly H. Barlow, Jones & Mayer, Fullerton, California; 

Samantha E. Dorey, Seymour B. Everett, and Christopher D. 

Lee, Everett Dorey LLP, Irvine, California; for DefendantAppellee.

Norman A. Dupont, Patrick K. Bobko, Jay A. Tufano, and 

Sage Ertman, Ring Bender LLP, Westlake Village, 

California, for Amicus Curiae League of California Cities.

Lisa C. Ehrlich and Kenneth J. Sugarman, Deputy Attorneys 

General; Christina B. Arendt and James F. Zahradka II, 

Supervising Deputy Attorneys General; Michael L. Newman 

and Daniel A. Olivas, Senior Assistant Attorneys General; 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California; Office of the 

California Attorney General, San Francisco, California; for 

Amici Curiae California Civil Rights Department and the 

California Department of Housing and Community 

Development.

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 7

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant The Ohio House, LLC operates a 

sober-living home located in Costa Mesa, California (City) 

for individuals recovering from addiction. In this case, Ohio 

House challenges the City’s zoning laws as discriminatory 

against the disabled in violation of the Fair Housing Act 

(FHA), codified as amended by the Fair Housing Act 

Amendments of 1988 at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.;

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA);

and the California Planning and Zoning Law, California 

Government Code § 65008.

In recent years, the City has changed its regulations

governing the ability of group-living facilities to operate in 

residential zones. Some such facilities are categorically 

barred from operating in these zones, and others that provide 

housing for individuals with a disability recognized under

federal or state law may operate if they meet certain 

conditions, including a separation requirement from other 

such facilities. Ohio House cannot operate its facility under 

the City’s current zoning regulations because it cannot 

satisfy the separation requirement, and the City denied Ohio 

House a variance from this requirement, which Ohio House

had requested as an accommodation. Thus, Ohio House 

brought this action to enjoin enforcement of the City’s 

zoning requirements based on the above troika of fairhousing laws, advancing multiple theories of disability 

discrimination. The district court granted partial summary 

judgment to the City, and a jury returned a verdict in favor 

of the City on Ohio House’s remaining claims. After the 

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8 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

jury’s verdict, the district court denied Ohio House’s 

motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.

On appeal, Ohio House challenges the district court’s 

summary judgment and post-verdict rulings. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Costa Mesa’s Zoning Ordinances

Costa Mesa regulates zoning “to promote the public 

health, safety, general welfare and [to] preserve and enhance 

the aesthetic quality of the city by providing regulations to 

ensure that an appropriate mix of land uses occur in an 

orderly manner.” Costa Mesa Municipal Code (CMMC)

§ 13-2. Part of the zoning code regulates group-living 

facilities. Originally, these types of facilities were loosely 

defined. For example, from at least 2000 until 2014, “[g]roup 

home” was defined as “[a] residential facility designed or 

used for occupancy by persons that do not constitute a 

family.” A small boardinghouse was defined as “[a] 

dwelling which is designed or used to accommodate a 

maximum of 3 guests, where guestrooms are provided in 

exchange for an agreed payment of a fixed amount of money 

or other compensation based on the period of occupancy.” 

And a large boardinghouse was defined as “[a] dwelling 

which has all of the characteristics of a small boardinghouse 

and which accommodates 4 or more guests . . . [and] 

includes, but is not limited to, a residence for a sorority or 

fraternity.” “Sober living home” was not originally a defined 

category. The regulations allowed the City Council to adopt 

standards to evaluate “group home applications,” but the 

record on appeal is unclear about how much these facilities 

were regulated.

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 9

Beginning in 2014, the City expanded its zoning code

and enacted new rules governing group-living facilities, 

including, relevant here, group housing for disabled persons, 

CMMC §§ 13-310 to -312; Socal Recovery, LLC v. City of 

Costa Mesa, 56 F.4th 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2023), which 

includes “persons recovering from drug and/or alcohol 

addiction,” Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport 

Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2013). In the City’s 

view, federal and state legislation had incentivized a 

“significant increase in the number of single- and multifamily homes being utilized as alcohol and drug recovery 

facilities for large numbers of individuals,” which led to

“overconcentration” of sober living homes in residential 

communities.

1 The City concluded this produced 

“deleterious” effects “to the residential character” of its 

communities and “generated secondary impacts including, 

but not limited to neighborhood parking shortfalls, 

overcrowding, inordinate amounts of second-hand smoke, 

and noise; and the clustering of sober living facilities in close 

proximity to each other creating near neighborhoods of sober 

living homes.” It was also concerned that these changes 

increased “institutionalization,” harming the very people 

sober living homes were supposed to serve:

[H]ousing inordinately large numbers of 

unrelated adults in a single dwelling or 

congregating sober living homes in close 

proximity to each other does not provide the 

handicapped with an opportunity to “live in 

1 The City largely tied the increased number of group homes to the 2000 

California Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, which allowed 

for diversion from incarceration for treatment, and the federal Affordable 

Care Act, which expanded coverage for substance-abuse treatment.

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10 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

normal residential surroundings,” but rather 

places them into living environments bearing 

more in common with the types of 

institutional/campus/dormitory living that

the FEHA and [FHA] were designed to 

provide relief from for the handicapped, and 

which no reasonable person could contend 

provides a life in a normal residential 

surrounding.

By regulating group housing for the disabled, the City was 

“attempting to strike a balance between the City’s and 

residents’ interests of preserving the characteristics of 

residential neighborhoods and to provide opportunities for 

the handicapped to reside in such neighborhoods that are 

enjoyed by the non-handicapped.”

Ordinance 14-13 established the framework for the 

City’s comprehensive plan to address “overconcentration”

and “institutionalization” and amended the definitions for 

group housing. CMMC §§ 13-310 to -312. Under the new 

regulatory scheme, “group home,” is defined as a “facility

that is being used as a supportive living environment for 

persons who are considered handicapped under state or 

federal law,” and “boardinghouse” is defined as “[a] 

residence or dwelling, other than a hotel, wherein rooms are 

rented under two (2) or more separate written or oral rental 

agreements, leases or subleases or combination thereof, 

whether or not the owner, agent or rental manager resides 

within the residence.” Id. § 13-6.

2 Ordinance 14-13 also 

2 The new ordinance also distinguished between small boarding houses: 

“two (2) or fewer rooms being rented,” and large boardinghouses: “three 

(3) to six (6) rooms being rented.” Id.

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 11

created the “[s]ober living home” category, defined as “a 

group home for persons who are recovering from a drug 

and/or alcohol addiction and who are considered 

handicapped under state or federal law.” Id. § 13-6; Socal 

Recovery, 56 F.4th at 806.

The 2014 regulations also imposed new substantive 

requirements for group homes located in single-family 

zoning districts (R1 zones). Boardinghouses—both small 

and large—are categorically prohibited from operating in R1

zones. CMMC § 13-30 (Costa Mesa Land Use Matrix). 

Group homes, including sober-living homes, with more than 

six residents are prohibited in R1 zones. Id. § 13-312. Group

homes with six or fewer residents may operate in R1 zones

if they obtain a special-use permit. Id. § 13-311. Sober-living 

homes must also obtain a special-use permit and comply 

with a separation requirement. Id. § 13-311(a)(14)(i). The 

separation requirement mandates that sober-living homes be 

spaced at least 650 feet apart, “as measured from the closest 

property lines, of any other sober living home or a state 

licensed alcoholism or drug abuse recovery or treatment 

facility.” Id.

In 2015, the City enacted new regulations governing

multi-family residential districts (MFR zones). Id. §§ 13-

322 to -324. Ordinance 15-11 requires that all group homes

with six or fewer residents located in MFR zones, including 

sober-living homes, obtain a special-use permit and satisfy 

the separation requirement. Id. § 13-322(a). Group homes

with over six occupants in MFR zones must obtain a 

conditional-use permit. Id. § 13-323. A conditional-use 

permit may be granted only if the separation requirement is 

satisfied “unless the reviewing authority determines that 

such location will not result in an over-concentration of 

similar uses.” Id. § 13-323(b). A group-home operator 

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12 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

applying for a conditional-use permit must also obtain an 

operator’s permit. Id. § 13-323(c).

Ordinance 15-11 imposes different rules for 

boardinghouses located in MFR zones. Small 

boardinghouses, with two rooms or fewer, do not require a 

permit but must be located at least 650 feet from any other 

small boardinghouse. CMMC § 13-30 (table n.7). Large 

boardinghouses, with three to six rooms, must be separated 

from any other boardinghouse by at least 1,000 feet and must

obtain a conditional-use permit. But unlike group homes, 

they need not obtain an operator’s permit to qualify for a 

conditional-use permit. Id.

Ordinance 15-11 and its companion ordinance, 

Ordinance 15-13, apply retroactively to group homes. Preexisting facilities had a year to obtain a conditional-use 

permit and 120 days to obtain an operator’s permit from the 

effective date of the ordinances (December 17, 2015). Id.

§ 13-324. The regulations do not apply retroactively to 

boardinghouses. See generally id.

The City passed additional ordinances in 2017, 

Ordinances 17-05 and 17-06, that altered the application 

requirements for group homes and provided revised 

procedures for seeking reasonable accommodations.

B. The Ohio House, LLC

Ohio House operates a structured men’s sober-living 

facility at 115 East Wilson Street (Wilson Property). The 

Wilson Property is in a MFR zone, specifically a MultipleFamily Residential, Medium Density zone, that is designated 

“Commercial Residential.” This property consists of five 

2400-square-foot, two-story detached units, each with four 

bedrooms, outdoor space, a garage, and a parking area. Each 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 13

of the five units houses six to eight residents for a total of 

approximately 45 residents, including a house manager.

The Wilson Property began offering services and 

housing to men in substance-abuse recovery in 2012. Most 

residents moved to the Wilson Property after completing a 

substance-abuse treatment program. Residents must agree to 

rules designed to promote recovery to live independently 

without relapse. Residents spend an average of seven months

living at Ohio House.

C. The City’s Code Enforcement

In March 2016, City authorities investigated the Wilson 

Property and noted that it was “a Group Home serving 7 or 

more in the R2 zone and is subject to Ord. 15-11.” Within a 

week, the City notified Ohio House that the property was 

subject to Ordinance 15-11. Id. Ohio House applied for a 

conditional-use permit and an operator’s permit, as required, 

but its application was denied because the Wilson Property 

is located 550 feet from another sober living home that had 

already obtained a conditional use-permit. In fact, there were 

four other group homes within 650 feet of the Wilson 

Property—the licensed sober living home, two state-licensed 

treatment facilities, and an un-permitted facility against 

which the City was pursuing enforcement.

In September 2017, Ohio House requested a reasonable 

accommodation or a waiver of the separation requirement, 

but the City’s Economic and Development Services Director

denied these requests. Among other considerations, the 

Director noted that not requiring Ohio House to comply with 

the separation requirement would fundamentally alter the 

City’s zoning program. Ohio House appealed this denial to 

the City’s Planning Commission and stated at a public 

hearing that it would cap occupancy at the Wilson Property 

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14 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

to six residents per unit as a condition of receiving a 

conditional-use permit. The Planning Commission upheld 

the denial of Ohio House’s permit application.

Ohio House then appealed to the City Council, 

reiterating its willingness to reduce occupancy to six 

residents per unit. In August 2019, the City Council also 

upheld the denial of a conditional-use permit and ordered the 

Wilson Property to cease operations by September 8, 2019. 

The City also imposed numerous fines against the Wilson 

Property, totaling approximately $29,000.

D. Ohio House’s Lawsuit

Ohio House sued the City for unlawful discrimination 

against residents at the Wilson Property in violation of the 

FHA, the FEHA, and California Government Code § 65008. 

Specifically, Ohio House argued that provisions of the City’s 

zoning code enacted under Ordinances 15-11, 15-13, 17-05, 

and 17-06: (1) discriminated against the disabled (disparatetreatment claim), (2) disparately impacted the disabled 

(disparate-impact claim), (3) stated a discriminatory 

preference disfavoring the disabled (discriminatorystatements claim), (4) interfered with Ohio House’s 

operations because it aids and encourages the disabled in 

exercising their fair-housing rights (interference claim), 

(5) improperly disallowed reasonable accommodation for 

the disabled (reasonable-accommodation claim), and 

(6) violated California Government Code § 65008.

After discovery, the parties cross moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted the City’s motion on 

Ohio House’s disparate-impact claims but otherwise denied 

both motions. The remaining claims were then tried to a jury. 

Before the case was submitted to the jury, the parties each

moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 15

of Civil Procedure 50(a). The district court orally denied 

these motions, except that the district court reserved ruling 

on whether Ohio House’s California Government Code 

§ 65008 claim was untimely.

The jury found that the City had not violated the FHA or 

the FEHA. Thereafter, the district court issued findings and 

conclusions related to Ohio House’s California Government 

Code § 65008 claim, concluding that this claim was 

untimely and that judgment in favor of Ohio House would 

be inconsistent with the jury’s findings. Thus, the district 

court entered judgment in favor of the City on all claims.

Several weeks later, Ohio House renewed its motion for 

judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, moved for a 

new trial. Ohio House also requested that the district court 

take judicial notice of various documents, including letters 

from the California Department of Housing and Community 

Development, excerpts from the City’s “Housing Element 

Update,” and a notice of public hearing. The district court 

denied Ohio House’s motions but granted its request for 

judicial notice insofar as the district court relied on the

subject documents. Ohio House timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Ohio House’s primary claims fall under overlapping 

provisions of the FHA and the FEHA. We begin with those 

claims and then address Ohio House’s claim under 

California Government Code § 65008.

A. FHA/FEHA Claims

It is unlawful under the FHA “[t]o discriminate in the 

sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a 

dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap . . . .” 

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). A municipality violates this law if 

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16 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

its “zoning practices . . . discriminate against disabled 

individuals . . . [and] contribute to ‘mak[ing] unavailable or 

deny[ing]’ housing to those persons.” Pac. Shores Props., 

LLC, 730 F.3d at 1157 (second and third alterations in 

original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)); see also Socal 

Recovery, 56 F.4th at 814 (“[L]ocal governments are 

prohibited from discriminating on the basis of disability

through zoning and land use practices.”). The FEHA largely 

mirrors its federal counterpart. See Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 12927(c)(1) (tracking the FHA’s definition of

“discrimination”); id. § 12955(k) (recognizing overlapping

protected classes as the FHA); id. § 12955.6 (guaranteeing 

no “fewer rights or remedies than the [FHA]”). The FEHA

prohibits discrimination based on disability “through public 

or private land use practices, decisions, and authorizations.” 

Id. § 12955(l). We analyze FHA and FEHA claims under the 

same standard. Socal Recovery, 56 F.4th at 811; see also 

Pac. Shores Props., 730 F.3d at 1156 n.14.

“[P]ersons recovering from drug and/or alcohol 

addiction are disabled under the FHA and [are] therefore 

protected from housing discrimination.” Pac. Shores Props., 

730 F.3d at 1156–57. Group homes operated for persons 

recovering from addiction, often referred to as sober-living 

homes, are covered “dwellings.” Id. Therefore, both federal 

and California law “prohibit[] discriminatory actions that 

adversely affect the availability of such . . . homes.” Id.

Sober-living-home operators are “aggrieved” by unlawful 

zoning practices that prevent them from carrying out normal 

business operations, and they may sue to “invalidate any 

state or local law that ‘purports to require or permit’ an 

action that would be a discriminatory housing practice” 

without having to prove the individual disability status of 

their residents. Socal Recovery, 56 F.4th at 814; see also Cal. 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 17

Gov’t Code § 12927(g) (defining “aggrieved” parties that 

may sue under the FEHA). Thus, Ohio House is a proper 

plaintiff in this case.

1. Disparate Treatment

Ohio House first argues that the City’s zoning code is 

facially discriminatory because it imposes different 

requirements on group homes than other group-living 

facilities that are not defined in relation to disability status, 

namely boardinghouses. Ohio House further contends that to 

prevail on its disparate-treatment claim based on a facialdiscrimination theory, it need only prove facially different 

treatment, which is a purely legal question that should have 

been resolved at summary judgment. Alternatively, Ohio 

House argues that the City’s regulations do not benefit the 

disabled because they pose greater burdens on group homes 

than boardinghouses.

a. Legal Standard

Disparate treatment is synonymous with intentional 

discrimination. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 

(2009). Thus, to prevail on this claim a “plaintiff must 

establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or 

motive.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Community Affs. v. Inclusive

Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 524 (2015)

(emphasis added) (quoting Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577). There are 

multiple ways to prove such intent. Morris v. W. Hayden 

Ests. First Addition Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 104 F.4th 

1128, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2024).

First, a plaintiff may rely on the burden-shifting analysis 

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

792, 802–04 (1973). This analysis applies “where the 

evidence [of discrimination] is indirect” and the plaintiff is 

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18 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

“challenging as pretextual a facially neutral explanation for 

the challenged action.” Morris, 104 F.4th at 1140; see also 

Pac. Shores Props., 730 F.3d at 1158.

Second, a plaintiff may prove disparate treatment with 

“‘direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a 

discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated’ the 

defendant and that the defendant’s actions adversely affected 

the plaintiff in some way.” Pac. Shores Props., 730 F.3d at 

1158 (quoting McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103,

1122 (9th Cir. 2004)). The discriminatory purpose need not 

be the defendant’s “sole purpose” for taking the challenged 

action, but it must have been “a ‘motivating factor.’” Morris, 

104 F.4th at 1140 (emphasis removed) (quoting Ave. 6E 

Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 504 (9th Cir. 

2016)). Under this standard, we employ “the ‘sensitive’ 

multi-factor inquiry articulated by the Supreme Court in 

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 

252, 266 (1977), to determine whether the plaintiff[] ha[s]

created a triable issue of fact that the defendant’s actions 

were motivated by discriminatory intent.” Pac. Shores 

Props., 730 F.3d at 1158.

Finally, relevant here, we have held that a plaintiff may 

prove disparate treatment through “[a] facially 

discriminatory policy [that] on its face applies less favorably 

to a protected group.” Community House, Inc. v. City of 

Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007). In this context, 

we have held that International Union, United Automobile, 

Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. 

Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), governs. 

Community House, Inc., 490 F.3d at 1049. Under Johnson 

Controls, a disparate-treatment claim based on a facially 

discriminatory policy “does not depend on why the 

[defendant] discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 19

the discrimination.” 499 U.S. at 199. We adopted the 

following burden-shifting framework: The plaintiff has the 

initial burden to make a prima facie “showing that a 

protected group has been subjected to explicitly 

differential—i.e., discriminatory—treatment,” and then the 

burden shifts to the defendant to “show either: (1) that the 

[challenged] restriction benefits the protected class or 

(2) that it responds to legitimate safety concerns raised by 

the individuals affected, rather than being based on 

stereotypes.” Community House, 490 F.3d at 1050.

b. Ohio House’s Procedural Argument

We agree with the parties that whether the City’s zoning 

code facially subjects the disabled to unlawful disparate 

treatment is a question of law that should have been resolved 

at summary judgment. See In re York, 78 F.4th 1074, 1088 

(9th Cir. 2023) (“Given Rule 56’s mandatory language, if 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court lacks 

‘discretion’ to insist that, in defiance of Rule 56, a trial will 

be held anyway.”); see also Courage to Change Ranches 

Holding Co. v. El Paso Cnty., 73 F.4th 1175, 1191 (10th Cir. 

2023) (“[W]hether a zoning ordinance is facially 

discriminatory is a legal issue that can be discerned from the 

face of the ordinance[.]”).

The district court held that Ohio House established a 

prima facie case of facially differential treatment as a matter 

of law. But under Community House’s burden-shifting 

framework, it reserved the question of benefit as a factual 

issue to be resolved by the jury. That was error. Where, as 

here, the parties do not dispute any material facts, whether a

law facially benefits the protected class is a question of law. 

See Caruso v. Yamhill Cnty., 422 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 

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20 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

2005) (“Because the material facts are not in dispute, ‘the 

character and extent of the statute’s burden involves a 

question of law’ . . . .” (quoting Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 

851, 859 (7th Cir. 2000))). Nonetheless, the district court’s 

error in not resolving this legal issue and submitting the 

disparate-treatment claim to the jury was harmless if the 

jury’s verdict is consistent with the required legal outcome. 

See Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. Co. v. Columbus RollingMill Co., 119 U.S. 149, 152 (1886) (“The submission of a 

question of law to the jury is no ground of exception, if they 

decide it aright.”); Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1468–

69 (9th Cir. 1994) (where “the factual findings the jury must 

have made . . . would require the district court to deny [a 

defendant] qualified immunity” then “even if the court erred 

in sending the qualified immunity determination to the jury, 

the error was harmless”). Thus, we consider whether Ohio 

House established facial disparate treatment as a matter of 

law.

c. Ohio House’s Merits Argument

As discussed, we apply a burden-shifting framework to 

evaluate claims of facial discrimination. Community House, 

490 F.3d at 1050. Accordingly, we consider whether Ohio 

House established a prima facie case, whether the City 

rebutted that case by showing its regulations provide a 

benefit to the disabled, and—relevant to California law—

whether the City employed the least-restrictive means of 

achieving that benefit.

i.

At summary judgment, the district court concluded that 

Ohio House established a prima facie showing that the City’s 

zoning regulations facially impose differential treatment

because they “treat Group Homes and Sober Living Homes 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 21

differently from other dwellings that are not defined by 

disability.” Ohio House echoes this reasoning on appeal: 

“Because the City limited the definitions of ‘group home’ 

and ‘sober living home’ to housing for persons with 

disabilities, Ohio House established facial discrimination.”

See CMMC § 13-6.

Under Community House’s stated burden-shifting 

framework, Ohio House is correct. Although Community 

House stated generally that “[a] facially discriminatory 

policy is one which on its face applies less favorably to a 

protected group,” 490 F.3d at 1048, in defining the steps of 

its test for determining whether a facial-disparate treatment 

claim is established under the FHA, it instructed that the first 

step—the prima-facie case of intentional discrimination—is 

satisfied “merely by showing that a protected group has been 

subjected to explicitly differential—i.e., discriminatory—

treatment,” id. at 1050 (quoting Bangerter v. Orem City 

Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasis 

added). Neither Community House nor the cases it relied on 

for the burden-shifting framework required proof of 

unfavorable treatment at the initial prima-facie stage. See id.

(citing Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1501, 1503–04; Larkin v. Mich. 

Dept. of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1996)) (“[A] 

plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of intentional 

discrimination under the [Fair Housing Act] merely by 

showing that a protected group has been subjected to 

explicitly differential—i.e. discriminatory—treatment.”).

3

3 Nor is such proof required under the FEHA. Under that statute, a

facially discriminatory policy is one “that explicitly conditions a housing 

opportunity on a protected basis, takes adverse action based on a 

protected basis, or directs adverse action to be taken based on a protected 

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22 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

ii.

Regardless of its prima-facie showing, Ohio House’s 

disparate-treatment claim fails because the differential 

treatment imposed under the City’s group-living regulations 

facially “benefits the protected class.” Id.4

At the outset, Ohio House argues that a comparator 

analysis is inappropriate. This is incorrect. As discussed, all

disparate-treatment claims require proof that the defendant 

acted with discriminatory intent. Inclusive Communities, 

576 U.S. at 524. In analyzing whether the necessary intent 

was proven in a facial challenge governed by Community 

House, the defendant must have the opportunity to 

demonstrate that the differential treatment identified by the 

plaintiff actually benefits the disabled. 490 F.3d at 1050.

Otherwise, liability could be imposed for “benign 

discrimination” (“special restrictions upon the disabled that 

are really beneficial to, rather than discriminatory against, 

[disabled persons],” Courage to Change, 73 F.4th at 1197

(alteration in original)), which does not evidence

discriminatory intent—the ultimate touchstone of disparate

basis.” 2 C.C.R. § 12040(c); see also Martinez v. City of Clovis, 90 

Cal.App.5th 193, 270–71 (Jul. 19, 2023) (adopting the burden-shifting 

framework in 2 C.C.R. §§ 12040–12042 for a FEHA discriminatory 

effects claim). The disjunctive “or” suggests that, while the two latter 

items in the list require adverse action, the former does not. See Antonin 

Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 

Texts 116 (2012). And, similar to the Community House framework, a 

defendant can avoid liability for a facially discriminatory policy by 

showing the policy “[o]bjectively benefits a protected class” and “[i]s the 

least restrictive means of achieving the identified purpose.” 2 C.C.R. 

§ 12042(f).

4 The City does not argue that its zoning code “responds to legitimate 

safety concerns raised by the individuals affected.” Id.

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 23

treatment. A straightforward way to show benefit is to 

demonstrate that the challenged regulations treat disabled 

individuals more favorably than similarly situated 

nondisabled individuals. See Sailboat Bend Sober Living, 

LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 46 F.4th 1268, 1274 (11th 

Cir. 2022) (“Because the Zoning Ordinance undeniably 

treats individuals with disabilities more favorably than it 

treats similarly situated, nondisabled individuals, we 

conclude that the Zoning Ordinance is not facially 

discriminatory at all.”). Indeed, it is difficult to 

conceptualize a “benefit” without some baseline for 

comparison. There may be other ways to demonstrate 

benefit, even in a facial challenge, but a comparator analysis 

is certainly a permissible way.

In this case, the City’s zoning code benefits the disabled 

over the nondisabled with regard to group-living facilities. 

For example, group homes and sober-living homes with six

or fewer residents may operate in R1 zones if they meet

permitting and separation requirements. See CMMC § 13-

30. But boardinghouses of any size are categorically barred 

from operating in R1 zones. See id. Of course, group and 

sober-living homes would receive an even greater benefit if 

they could operate in R1 zones without meeting any

requirements. But Community House does not require proof 

that the defendant’s challenged policy provides the protected 

class with the maximum possible benefit. And Ohio House 

cannot use certain provisions of the zoning code as a sword 

while crying foul when the City uses intertwined provisions 

as a shield. The City’s permitting and separation 

requirements applicable to group homes located in R1 zones 

impose a burden, but they also give facilities housing the 

disabled an avenue for operating in these zones that is 

unavailable under any circumstances to similar group-living 

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24 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

dwellings housing the nondisabled. In this context, the 

burden imposed is connected to a benefit. And on net, 

operators and residents of group homes and sober-living 

homes in R1 zones are facially advantaged over other groupliving facilities.

There are other residential zones where group-living 

facilities for both the disabled and nondisabled may operate.

Here, we look to boardinghouses as a relevant comparator to 

determine if any benefit is conferred on the disabled. Cf. 

Gamble, 104 F.3d at 306–07 (cautioning that a zoning bias 

against group living should not be mistaken for a bias against 

the disabled); Olson v. California, 104 F.4th 66, 77 (9th Cir. 

2024) (“[C]omparator groups ‘need not be similar in all 

respects, but they must be similar in those respects relevant 

to the Defendants’ policy.’” (quoting Ariz. Dream Act Coal. 

v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014))). And again, 

we conclude that the City’s regulations facially benefit group 

homes and sober living homes, if not without conditions.

To start, as a category, boardinghouses are limited to 

dwellings that house no more than six residents. CMMC 

§ 13-6. Group homes are not subject to this numerical 

limitation. See CMMC § 13-323 (allowing permits to be 

issued to group and sober-living homes with “seven (7) or 

more occupants” in MFR zones). Therein lies a benefit for 

group homes.

Additionally, the City maintains that “boardinghouse” is 

an inclusive category for all forms of group living. 

Specifically, in relation to MFR zones, where both group 

homes and boardinghouses may operate, the City contends 

that a business offering housing to multiple nondisabled 

individuals must meet the boardinghouse requirements, 

while a business offering housing to multiple disabled 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 25

individuals has options: It may operate if it meets the 

boardinghouse requirements or if it meets the group or sober 

living home requirements. Although Ohio House contends

this is an implausible reading of the zoning code and “[w]e 

are not bound by a party’s concession as to the meaning of 

the law,” United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (en banc), we afford significant weight to a 

government’s narrowing interpretation of its own laws. See 

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 (1992) 

(accepting Solicitor General’s repudiation of governmental

authority); United Transp. Union v. Skinner, 975 F.2d 1421, 

1425 (9th Cir. 1992) (declining to resolve “dispute regarding 

enforcement” when government agency abandoned contrary 

interpretation). And we expect that the City will enforce its 

zoning code in accordance with its representations to the 

district court and to this court.5 Because the City’s zoning 

code, as the City interprets it, gives group homes that serve 

the disabled multiple pathways to operate lawfully—only 

one of which is open to those not serving the nondisabled—

its facial classification benefits the disabled.

Take Ohio House’s protest that small boardinghouses 

(those with two or fewer rooms) do not need a permit to 

operate, while small group homes (six or fewer occupants) 

5 Unlike, say, a state attorney general’s interpretation of a criminal statute 

that may not bind county attorneys enforcing that statute, Stenberg v. 

Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 941 (2000), there is no separate authority tasked 

with enforcing the City’s zoning ordinances. Nor is the City’s 

interpretation unreasonable. Contra id. at 944–45. The ordinances define 

a boardinghouse as a “dwelling unit, other than a hotel, wherein rooms 

are rented under two or more separate written or oral rental 

agreements . . . .” CMMC § 13-6. Nowhere do they say that that a 

boardinghouse cannot be a multiple dwelling unit that serves the 

disabled. See generally id.

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26 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

require a special-use permit. If a group home with two or 

fewer rooms wanted to open without a permit, it could opt 

into the boardinghouse regulatory scheme.

6 Based on the 

City’s concession, the group and sober-living home 

regulations operate as a one-way ratchet to broaden the 

regulatory options for group housing serving the disabled.7

In situations where the boardinghouse regulations are more 

favorable, group homes can opt into that scheme. Where 

group and sober-living home regulations are more favorable, 

they can make that choice. This choice benefits group and 

sober-living homes over boardinghouses. For this reason, we 

conclude that Ohio House’s FHA disparate-treatment claim 

fails.

iii.

The standard under the FEHA is slightly different than 

under the FHA because proof of a benefit to the protected 

class does not end the inquiry under California’s statute. The 

FEHA requires that a facially discriminatory policy be the 

least-restrictive means of achieving its purpose. Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 2, § 12042(f)(2). “Although the government bears 

the burden of proof” in a least-restrictive-means inquiry, “it 

is under no obligation to dream up alternatives that the 

plaintiff [itself] has not proposed.” Walker v. Beard, 789 

6 If the small group home had more than two rooms, a small 

boardinghouse would not be the legally relevant comparator. We would 

instead look to the regulations for a large boardinghouse.

7 Even if this one-way ratchet were not the case, Ohio House could not 

succeed simply by showing that the City’s regulations, which generally 

benefit the protected class, may not benefit it in isolated scenarios, as a

facial challenge must show that the law lacks a “plainly legitimate 

sweep.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 144 S. Ct. 2383, 2397 (2024) 

(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 27

F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we confine 

our analysis to Ohio House’s argument that it would have 

been less restrictive for the City to enforce its nuisance laws 

to limit the “secondary effects” arising from group homes

than to adopt its revised group-living regulations. It is 

unclear whether Ohio House envisions nuisance law as an 

alternative to all zoning laws pertaining to group and soberliving homes, or just some subset. Would nuisance 

enforcement replace the separation requirement? The 

permitting scheme? Both?

Regardless, nuisance laws alone could not accomplish 

the full array of objectives that the City sought to achieve. 

Take, for example, the City’s desire to avoid 

institutionalization and “ensure that handicapped persons 

have the opportunity to live in normal residential 

surroundings and enjoy a dwelling in a manner similar to the 

way a dwelling is enjoyed by the non-handicapped.”

Nuisance laws may help combat excessive noise and secondhand smoke, but they would do little to prevent 

overconcentration of group-living facilities in residential 

areas. Nuisance laws simply are not an alternative means for 

ensuring that individuals recovering from substance abuse 

have an equal opportunity to live in residential rather than 

institutionalized neighborhoods.

For these reasons, we conclude that the City has rebutted 

Ohio House’s prima facie case of discriminatory intent under 

the FEHA. And although the district court erred by not 

deciding Ohio House’s disparate-treatment claim under both 

federal and state law at summary judgment, this was 

harmless because the jury correctly concluded that Ohio 

House failed to prove disparate treatment. See Minneapolis

& Saint Louis Ry. Co., 119 U.S. at 152.

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28 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

2. Disparate Impact

Next, Ohio House challenges the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact 

claim.

The disparate-impact theory of discrimination prohibits 

actions that “create a discriminatory effect upon a protected 

class or perpetuate housing segregation without any 

concomitant legitimate reason.” S.W. Fair Hous. Council, 

Inc. v. Maricopa Domestic Water Improvement Dist., 17 

F.4th 950, 962 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 

503). These claims “‘permit[] plaintiffs to counteract 

unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape 

easy classification.’” Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 503 (quoting

Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 540). They “target[]

‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers’ to minority 

housing and integration that can occur through unthinking, 

even if not malignant, policies of developers and 

governmental entities.” Id. (quoting Inclusive Communities, 

576 U.S. at 540). In other words, as previously discussed,

disparate-impact claims—unlike disparate-treatment 

claims—focus on “the consequences of actions and not just 

[] the mindset of actors . . . .” Inclusive Communities, 576 

U.S. at 534.

To establish prima facie disparate impact, a plaintiff 

must present evidence of: “(1) the existence of a policy . . . 

that is outwardly neutral; (2) a significant, adverse, and 

disproportionate effect on a protected class; and (3) robust 

causality that shows, beyond mere evidence of a statistical 

disparity, that the challenged policy, and not some other 

factor or policy, caused the disproportionate effect.” S.W. 

Fair Hous. Council, 17 F.4th at 962 (footnote omitted). 

Here, the district court concluded that Ohio House failed to 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 29

prove the second requirement—a significantly adverse or 

disproportionate impact on a protected group. We agree.

An FHA plaintiff must present evidence of an adverse 

and disproportionate impact. “[R]aising an inference of 

discriminatory impact is insufficient.” Gamble, 104 F.3d at 

306 (quoting Pfaff v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 88 F.3d 

739, 746 (9th Cir. 1996)). Were it otherwise, disparateimpact claims could be used to “displace valid governmental 

and private priorities.” Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 

544.

Ohio House first argues that even if the challenged

zoning regulations benefit the disabled, they nonetheless

have an unlawful discriminatory effect because “[t]he City’s 

separation requirement served to disqualify 22 of 26 group 

home [conditional-use-permit] applicants.” Ohio House

further contends that it need not present statistical evidence 

of disparity because the City’s regulations “defined the 

affected classes” and the absence of any boardinghouses 

within the City demonstrates that enforcement of the 

separation requirement disproportionately impacts group 

homes. Ohio House is wrong on both counts.

A policy that benefits the disabled does not impose 

artificial and arbitrary barriers on that group. Cf. S.W. Fair 

Hous., 17 F.4th at 962 (requiring an adverse effect to satisfy 

the second prong of prima facie discriminatory impact). And

even if it could, by not pointing to evidence showing that the 

City’s zoning regulations disproportionately reduced 

housing opportunities for disabled individuals, Ohio House 

cannot prove that the disabled are suffering the type of 

“significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect” that the 

FHA prohibits. Id. The City’s denial of conditional-use 

permits shows that applicants seeking to operate group 

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30 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

homes are adversely impacted. But a disparate-impact claim 

requires proof that the protected class—disabled 

individuals—is suffering an adverse and disproportionate 

impact. Id. Ohio House infers that the disabled will suffer 

adverse downstream consequences if purveyors of group 

homes are not allowed to operate under the City’s revised

zoning code, but as noted, “raising an inference of 

discriminatory impact is insufficient.” Gamble, 104 F.3d at 

306 (quoting Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 746).

For the same reason, Ohio House’s assertion that it is not 

required to present any comparative or statistical analysis to 

demonstrate an adverse and disproportionate effect on the 

disabled is unpersuasive. Ohio House argues that it can 

prove disparate impact facially because the challenged 

regulations “defined the affected classes” and there were no 

boardinghouses in the City. As an initial matter, there is 

evidence in the record that boardinghouses did exist and,

therefore, are a relevant comparator.

8 See Gamble, 104 F.3d 

at 306–07 (“The relevant comparison group to determine a 

discriminatory effect on the . . . disabled is other groups of 

similar sizes living together. Otherwise, all that has been 

demonstrated is a discriminatory effect on group living.”). 

Additionally, without any evidence related to how the City’s 

revised regulations governing group-living facilities

impacted disabled versus nondisabled individuals seeking 

group-living arrangements, there is no evidence upon which 

8 Even if it were true that there were no boardinghouses within City 

limits, Ohio House places too much weight on this fact. A permitting 

scheme impacts proposed future development as much as it affects 

existing facilities. If the regulations dissuaded prospective builders of 

boardinghouses from applying for the necessary conditional-use permits,

then enforcement of the regulations may adversely affect 

boardinghouses.

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 31

a jury could find that these regulations have had a

“significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect” on the

disabled. S.W. Fair Hous., 17 F.4th at 962; Pulsifer v. United 

States, 601 U.S. 124, 133, 139 (2024) (explaining that an 

enumeration of three requirements linked by the conjunction 

“and” creates “three necessary conditions”).

Separate from whether Ohio House can prove the second 

element of the prima facie case, it has an additional problem

with proving the first element. Ohio House must establish

that the challenged policy is “outwardly neutral.” S.W. Fair 

Hous., 17 F.4th at 962. But here, its disparate impact theory

contends that the City’s zoning code is facially

discriminatory. Ohio House concedes that the “disparate 

impact analysis is usually not applied to a facially 

discriminatory policy”; nonetheless, it incorporates its 

facial-discrimination theory into its disparate-impact claim, 

thereby failing to prove the first element.

9

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did 

not err in granting summary judgment for the City on Ohio 

House’s disparate-impact claim.

9 Ohio House could have alternatively argued that the City’s zoning code 

is either (1) facially discriminatory or (2) facially neutral but 

discriminatory in its impact, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2), but that is not 

how it presented its disparate-impact claim. Ohio House expressly 

argued in support of its disparate-impact claim that it does not need to 

present evidence to prove “a significant, adverse and disproportionate 

impact,” S.W. Fair Hous., 17 F.4th at 962, because the City’s challenged 

regulations expressly “defined the affected classes.” Ohio House’s 

theory, which attempted to prove the second disparate-impact element 

with a facial discrimination allegation, defeated itself by therefore failing 

to allege the first element of a disparate-impact claim.

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32 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

3. Discriminatory Statements

Ohio House contends that it was entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law on its discriminatory-statements claim 

despite the jury’s finding that the City did not make any

unlawful discriminatory statements. We review the district 

court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de 

novo. Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., 52 

F.4th 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2022). Ohio House is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law only if the evidence, construed

in light most favorable to the City, “permits only one 

reasonable conclusion that is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” 

Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Newman, 51 F.4th 

1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2022); EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, 

Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009).

It is unlawful under the FHA “[t]o make, print, or 

publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any 

notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale 

or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, 

limitation, or discrimination based on . . . handicap . . . , or 

an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or 

discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); see also 24 C.F.R. 

§ 100.75(b). We have adopted “[a]n ‘objective ordinary’

reader” standard for determining whether a statement 

violates § 3604(c). Morris, 104 F.4th at 1148. The plaintiff 

must prove that “an ordinary listener would believe that [the 

challenged statement] suggests a preference, limitation, or 

discrimination based on a protected status.” Id. (quoting 

Corey v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. ex rel. 

Walker, 719 F.3d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 2013)). While proof of 

“facially discriminatory messages” is not required, id. at 

1149, “[a] ‘stray remark . . . unrelated to the decisional 

process’ is insufficient to establish a § 3604(c) violation,” id. 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 33

at 1150 (quoting Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th 

Cir. 1999)).

California’sstandard under the FEHA is similar. See Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12955(c).10 But unlike the federal housing 

regulations promulgated under authority granted by the 

FHA, see 24 C.F.R. § 100.75, California’s regulations 

explicitly state that “[a] facially discriminatory policy or 

express statement” violates the FEHA’s prohibition against 

discriminatory statements, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, 

§ 12042(g).

Ohio House contends that the City violated the FHA’s 

and the FEHA’s prohibition against discriminatory 

statements by enacting a facially discriminatory zoning 

code. We need not decide whether a municipal regulation 

can trigger discriminatory-statement liability under the FHA 

because Ohio House’s discriminatory-statements claim rises

and falls with its facial disparate-treatment claim, which we 

have concluded fails as a matter of law. See also Morris, 104 

F.4th at 1149 (“Merely mentioning one of the protected 

characteristics identified in § 3604(c), without more, does 

not necessarily convey a ‘preference, limitation, or 

10Section 12955(c) makes it unlawful:

For any person to make, print, or publish, or cause to 

be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, 

or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a 

housing accommodation that indicates any preference, 

limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex, gender, gender identity, gender 

expression, sexual orientation, marital status, national 

origin, ancestry, familial status, source of income, 

disability, veteran or military status, or genetic 

information or an intention to make that preference, 

limitation, or discrimination.

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34 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

discrimination’ forbidden by the FHA, particularly if ‘there 

are situations in which it is legitimate’ to do so.” (quoting 

Soules v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 

824 (2d Cir. 1992))).

To the extent that Ohio House relies on comments made 

by individual city employees suggesting that they had a 

discriminatory purpose for adopting the challenged zoning 

regulations, that alone is insufficient to overturn the jury’s 

verdict. See id. (“[E]vidence of a speaker or creator’s intent 

may be relevant insofar as it illuminates the likely 

understanding of the message by viewers. But the scope of 

§ 3604(c) liability is defined by the statement’s impact on 

the reader, viewer, or listener, not by the subjective 

motivations of the speaker . . . Nor is the speaker’s stated 

intent dispositive.”).

4. Interference with FHA Rights

Ohio House also argues that it was entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law on its claim that the City interfered with 

Ohio House aiding or encouraging others’ exercise of their 

rights under the FHA.11 It is unlawful under the FHA “to 

coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person . . .

on account of his having aided or encouraged any other 

person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or 

protected by [the FHA].” 42 U.S.C. § 3617. We interpret this 

provision broadly. Morris, 104 F.4th at 1143. It “reach[es]

11 While Ohio House’s opening brief was terse regarding this claim, the 

City addressed the merits and did not argue forfeiture, the City is not 

prejudiced by our resolution of this issue, and both the district court and 

the jury spent significant energy considering the causation prong of this 

claim. See United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992)

(noting discretion to adjudicate inadequately briefed arguments if 

consideration of the issues will not prejudice the appellee). 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 35

all practices which have the effect of interfering with the 

exercise of rights under the federal fair housing laws.” Id.

(quoting United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 835, 

836 (9th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original)); see also Smith v. 

Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1975) (explaining that 

§ 3617 is implicated when a “would-be tenant has been 

discouraged from asserting his rights, . . . rights have actually 

been respected by persons who suffer consequent 

retaliation,” or “the fundamental inequity of a discriminatory 

housing practice is compounded by coercion, intimidation, 

threat or interference”). Despite its breadth, to prove an

interference claim, the “plaintiff must show that the 

defendant’s actions affected the ‘exercise or enjoyment 

of . . . any right granted or protected’” by the FHA. Morris, 

104 F.4th at 1143 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3617).

We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework to FHA-interference claims and first “require[] 

the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by showing that 

(1) he was engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an 

adverse action; and (3) there was a causal link between the 

two.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citing Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 

1128 (9th Cir. 2001)). We address each of these elements in 

turn.

First, Ohio House established that it engaged in protected 

activity. The district court instructed the jury to accept as 

true that Ohio House engaged in protected activity by 

providing housing for the disabled.

12 The court also 

12 Ohio House argues that the district court erred by advising the jury that 

the FHA-interference claim was “contingent on proof of an underlying 

discriminatory housing practice,” but it concedes that the substantive

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36 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

instructed the jury “to accept as proven . . . that Ohio House 

provides or intends to provide housing for persons with 

disabilities.” See Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128 (holding that a 

fair housing advocacy organization had “shown that it 

instruction identifying the elements of this claim was correct. Ohio 

House also argues that the verdict form repeated the court’s initial 

instructional error because it “focus[ed] on the rights of the disabled” by 

asking whether the City “interfered with the rights of the disabled to a 

housing opportunity of their choice,” rather than asking whether the City 

“interfered with Ohio House . . . because Ohio House was engaged in 

providing housing for persons with disabilities [or protected activity as 

defined by the Court].” (emphasis added.) “We review for abuse of 

discretion the district court’s formulation of the instructions and review 

de novo whether the instructions accurately state the law.” Unicolors, 52 

F.4th at 1063–64 (quoting Skidmore ex rel. Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led 

Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc)). “[T]he panel 

must ‘consider the issued instructions as a whole,’ such that ‘reversal is 

not warranted if the error is more probably than not harmless.’” Id. at 

1064 (quoting Randy Craig Wolfe, 952 F.3d at 1065). Jury instruction 

No. 33 accurately stated the law for Ohio House’s “interference with fair 

housing rights” claim. And “taking the verdict form and instructions 

together” the FHA-interference claim “was fairly presented to the jury” 

and it was “clear which theory the jury was applying.” Mangold v. Cal. 

Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1476 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 

Carvalho v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 794 F.2d 454, 455 (9th Cir. 

1986) (“If the issues are fairly presented, the district court has broad 

discretion regarding the precise wording of the instructions and 

interrogatories.”). To the extent Ohio House claims that it was error to 

allow the City to reference the verdict form in arguing at closing that it 

had not “interfered with the rights of the disabled to a housing 

opportunity,” this argument was forfeited because Ohio House did not 

object during the City’s closing argument. See Swinton v. Potomac 

Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 816 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that failure to make a 

contemporaneous objection “subject[s] the error alleged only to the 

highly deferential ‘plain or fundamental error’ standard of review, where 

we will reverse only ‘where the integrity or fundamental fairness of the 

proceedings in the trial court is called into serious question’” (quoting 

Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001))).

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 37

participated in a protected activity [by] ‘aid[ing] or 

encourag[ing]’. . . [the protected class] in the exercise of 

their fair housing rights.” (alterations in original) (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 3617)). And the City does not dispute that Ohio 

House proved this element, nor does it challenge the scope 

of Ohio House’s protected activity on appeal.

Second, Ohio House established that it suffered “adverse 

action.” “Interference” with the exercise of rights bestowed 

by the FHA is an adverse action. Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128–

29. It is undisputed that the City took enforcement action and 

imposed fines against Ohio House, denied Ohio House’s 

reasonable-accommodation request, and filed a nuisance 

action against Ohio House to shut down its operations 

because it did not have a conditional-use permit. These 

actions impede Ohio House’s ability to provide housing for 

its clients and, as such, come within the FHA’s broad use of

term “interference.” Morris, 104 F.4th at 1143; see also City 

of Hayward, 36 F.3d at 835.

The third element—causation—is where Ohio House 

has trouble. The district court did not err in concluding that 

Ohio House failed to prove a causal link between its 

protected activity of providing sober-living housing and the 

City’s actions that impeded that activity. Brown, 336 F.3d at 

1192.

We have explained that the manner in which plaintiffs 

must prove causation at the prima-facie stage turns on

whether the plaintiff asserts that the defendant retaliated 

against plaintiff due to its activity or asserts that the 

defendant interfered with plaintiff’s activity under § 3617 

due to discriminatory intent. For example, in Walker, we 

analyzed a § 3617 retaliation claim and considered whether 

“an independent fair housing services provider engaged in 

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38 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

advocacy efforts may sue the city with whom it contracts for 

retaliating against the provider in response to that 

advocacy.” 272 F.3d at 1120. In resolving this issue, we 

considered whether the city’s challenged action was taken in 

response to, i.e. because of, the plaintiff’s “protected 

activity.” Id. at 1128–30. Specifically, we considered the 

temporal proximity between the plaintiff’s “protected 

activity” and the city’s actions and explained that the 

plaintiff “demonstrated the requisite causal link” partly 

because the city engaged in retaliatory action “two weeks 

after” it found out about plaintiff’s protected activity. Id. at 

1130. The plaintiff therefore established a prima facie case 

of retaliation under § 3617. Id. Finally, we concluded that 

even though the city “met its burden of articulating a 

nonretaliatory reason for its actions,” the plaintiff presented 

sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue regarding its 

“ultimate burden of demonstrating that the reason was 

merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive.” Id. at 1128, 

1130–31.

As we explained in Walker, a claim based on retaliation 

“is analogous to the more-familiar situation of a retaliatory 

failure-to-hire in the Title VII and First Amendment 

contexts.” Id. at 1126 (first citing Ruggles v. Cal. 

Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(Title VII retaliation claim); and then citing Mt. Healthy City 

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283–84 

(1977) (First Amendment retaliation claim)). And, as with

Title VII retaliatory action claims, an FHA retaliation claim 

hinges on the plaintiff’s actions that preceded the 

defendant’s actions. See Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living 

Community, LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 868 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Like 

all anti-retaliation provisions, [§ 3617, when invoked to 

pursue an FHA retaliation claim] provides protections not 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 39

because of who people are, but because of what they do.”).

Simplistically, a retaliation theory asserts: because A did 

this, B did that to A.

This type of temporal, cause-and-effect inquiry does not 

make sense for claims based on an interference theory, 

which presuppose a different causal inquiry. In this context, 

to establish causation at the prima-facie stage, we focus not 

on whether the defendant interfered with the plaintiff’s rights 

in reaction to plaintiff’s actions, but whether the defendant 

interfered because it had discriminatory intent.

We applied this intent-based causation standard most 

recently in Morris. There, the plaintiffs brought an 

interference claim under § 3617 when a Homeowners’ 

Association Board sought to prevent plaintiffs from hosting 

a Christmas event both before and after they purchased their

home. 104 F.4th at 1135–38, 1142. Assessing the viability 

of plaintiffs’ claim, we determined that “we must review the 

record for evidence that the Board’s threatening, 

intimidating, and interfering conduct, although it did not 

preclude the [plaintiffs] from purchasing their home or 

putting on their Christmas event, was driven at least in part 

by a motive to disfavor the [plaintiffs’] religion.” Id. at 1143. 

That is, we had to determine whether the Board’s actions 

“could serve as evidence that [it] was actually motivated, at 

least in part, by an anti-religious discriminatory purpose.” Id.

at 1145. And we held that the plaintiffs had presented 

sufficient evidence to show that the “Board interfered with 

the[ir] exercise of their right to purchase and enjoy their 

home at least in part because of their religious expression, 

and therefore violated § 3617 of the FHA.” Id.

“At its core, the FHA guarantees tenants and 

homeowners a right to take and enjoy possession of a home 

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40 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

free from discrimination based on a protected 

characteristic.” Id. at 1143 (emphasis added). And Morris 

makes clear that to establish a prima facie interference claim, 

the plaintiff must prove that a defendant interfered with 

protected activity because of discriminatory intent. Or stated 

differently, a plaintiff must prove that discriminatory intent 

was a partial cause of the defendant’s interference. But a

plaintiff “need not ‘prove that the [defendant’s] 

discriminatory purpose was the sole purpose of the 

challenged action’”; it need only be “a ‘motivating factor.’” 

Id. at 1144 (emphasis added) (quoting Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 

504).

We adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach to causation for 

§ 3617 claims and make explicit what our decision in Morris

suggests: Proof of intentional discrimination or 

discriminatory animus is required to establish a prima facie 

§ 3617 claim based on an interference theory, but not on a 

retaliation theory. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 868 (“Proof of 

discriminatory animus is not [required for retaliation 

claims]. [Instead,] a claim under section 3617 requires 

showing intentional discrimination only when considering 

an interference claim.” (emphasis removed)); see also Bloch 

v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009)

(“Discriminatory intent is the pivotal element [of an 

interference claim]. . . . [A defendant’s actions] would 

constitute ‘interference’ if it was invidiously motivated—

that is, if it was intentionally discriminatory.”). Again, we 

review the district court’s denial of Ohio House’s renewed 

motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, Unicolors, 

52 F.4th at 1063, but “we give significant deference to the 

jury’s verdict and to the nonmoving part[y] . . . when 

deciding whether that decision was correct.” A.D. v. Cal. 

Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2013).

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 41

Turning to Ohio House’s evidence here, it relies on what 

it calls “admissions” that “disability was a motivating factor 

in the City’s conduct.” These include: (1) the City’s 2015-

2019 reports to the California Department of Housing and 

Community Development explaining that its goal in passing 

zoning ordinances regulating group housing was to 

“[p]rotect existing stabilized residential neighborhoods[] . . . 

from the encroachment of incompatible or potentially 

disruptive land uses and/or activities” and that it had “taken 

. . . action,” including adopting “a Multiple Family Group 

Home Ordinance on November 17, 2015 to limit the number 

and concentration of group homes and sober living facilities 

in the Multiple Family Residential zones”; and 

(2) statements made by the City Director of Economic and 

Development Services that “the City had ‘a proliferation of 

group homes and sober living homes’ and that it had adopted 

the group home ordinances ‘as a way to address the 

complaints’ received from City residents” and that the City 

chose to “‘spread out the group homes in the city’ as an 

alternative to ‘citing them all and shutting them down.’”

Although this evidence taken in isolation might suggest 

discriminatory animus, there is countervailing evidence that

the City was motivated by legitimate, non-discriminatory 

goals.

13 In passing regulations governing group homes and 

13 Ohio House relies on these same “admissions” to support its “pattern 

or practice claim,” which it has characterized in different ways

throughout the litigation. Initially, in its operative complaint, Ohio 

House references “[t]he disparate impact of the city’s pattern or practice 

of zoning discrimination[.]” The district court then implied in its 

summary judgment ruling that a “pattern or practice” claim is a distinct 

type of discrimination claim and stated that both Attorneys General and

private plaintiffs can bring such a claim. Ultimately, in its pretrial 

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42 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

sober-living homes, the City explained that an 

“overconcentration” of group-living arrangements produced 

“deleterious” effects “to the residential character” of its 

communities and “generated secondary impacts including, 

but not limited to neighborhood parking shortfalls, 

overcrowding, inordinate amounts of second-hand smoke, 

and noise; and the clustering of sober living facilities in close 

proximity to each other creating near neighborhoods of sober 

living homes.” The City’s Economic and Development 

Services Director Jennifer Le echoed that “the City was 

concerned about changes in residential character of 

neighborhoods as homes transitioned to a use that was more

commercial or institutional as opposed to residential” and 

further explained that “[g]enerally when you have a cluster 

of group homes or when you have higher-than-average 

persons per household . . . you can have increased traffic, 

increased parking. There tends to be increased complaints 

due to noise, those types of things.”

Logistical and aesthetic disturbances that may arise due 

to changes in traffic patterns, availability of parking, and 

increased noise levels are legitimate concerns for any city

and are central to the goals of municipal zoning. Penn Cent. 

conference order, the district court correctly characterized Ohio House’s 

“pattern or practice” theory as a “disparate treatment claim.” By bringing 

allegations of a pattern and practice of discrimination, plaintiffs are 

effectively pursuing the “‘direct or circumstantial evidence’

approach. . . of [showing that] the defendant’s actions were motivated by 

discriminatory intent[,]” Pac. Shores Props., 730 F.3d at 1158, to which 

we apply the Arlington Heights test, id. at 1158–59. Ohio House does 

not provide a discernible legal framework for reviewing its claim, much 

less analyze the Arlington Heights factors. Regardless, because Ohio 

House relies on the same unconvincing evidence of alleged 

discriminatory intent used to support its interference claim, its disparatetreatment claim based on a pattern or practice theory fails as well.

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 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 43

Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978)

(“States and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls 

to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and 

desirable aesthetic features of a city.”); Budnick v. Town of 

Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] city’s 

interest in achieving its zoning goals has long been 

recognized as a legitimate governmental interest.”); 

Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (recognizing as “legitimate objectives” 

“preserving the agricultural heritage of the City, providing 

for a range of housing types and densities, preserving the 

‘small town’ character of the City, and limiting development 

within the City to levels consistent with available 

resources”); cf. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 

50, 54–55, 71 n.34 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding a 

1,000-foot restriction on adult businesses when motivated by 

the businesses’ secondary effects on surrounding 

communities). In fact, high-density housing of any kind may

dilute the desired residential character of a neighborhood. 

The jury could have concluded that the City’s challenged 

zoning regulations were intended to address these problems 

and did not indicate the City has discriminatory animus 

towards the disabled. See Gamble,104 F.3d at 306 (holding 

that concern for the residential character of the neighborhood 

is a legitimate and nondiscriminatory goal). Whether the 

residents of high-density group-living facilities are disabled 

or not does not inherently dictate whether such facilities will 

contribute to higher traffic, lack of sufficient parking, or 

increased noise—those problems arise from high-density 

housing in and of itself, regardless of the residents. And the 

City’s focus on group homes is not inherently suggestive of 

discriminatory animus given their rapid proliferation, which 

the City attributed to federal and state legislation that had 

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44 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

incentivized a “significant increase in the number of singleand multi-family homes being utilized as alcohol and drug 

recovery facilities for large numbers of individuals.”

“Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 

[City], there is sufficient ‘evidence adequate to support the 

jury’s conclusion’” that the City did not unlawfully interfere 

with Ohio House’s right to provide housing for disabled 

individuals. Morris, 104 F.4th at 1145 (citation omitted) 

(quoting Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 

F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001)). A reasonable jury could 

have concluded that the City enacted its zoning ordinances 

and took enforcement action against Ohio House to pursue 

legitimate municipal goals. See Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 

1196, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[J]udgment as a matter of law 

is appropriate when the evidence presented at trial permits 

only one reasonable conclusion.” (quoting Torres v. City of 

Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008))). The 

district court’s explanation for why it properly denied Ohio 

House’s motion is exactly right:

[L]ike Ohio House’s other arguments 

regarding discrimination, [its interference 

claim] fails. Th[e] evidence does not compel 

only one conclusion, i.e., that the City denied 

Ohio House’s applications because it was a 

sober living home servicing disabled persons. 

The jury could have inferred that . . . the 

denial of the permits [was] based simply on 

the fact that Ohio House did not meet the 

650-foot separation requirement to operate 

within the residential zone of its choosing. 

The jury had sufficient evidence to conclude 

that [the] City took adverse action against 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 45

Ohio House because it had not met the 

requirements under the City’s regulation, not 

because it was a sober living home or because 

its residents were disabled. Nor did Ohio 

House produce any other evidence that the 

City’s denial was pretext for its “real” 

discriminatory intent.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ohio 

House’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on 

its interference claim.

5. Reasonable Accommodation

Below, Ohio House raised a facial challenge to the City’s 

reasonable-accommodation ordinance, see CMMC §§ 13-

200.60 to 13-200.63, argued that it was unlawfully denied an 

accommodation, and moved for summary judgment on this 

claim. Ohio House correctly notes that the district court 

failed to decide the purely legal issue presented by Ohio 

House’s facial challenge and instead submitted the entirety 

of the reasonable-accommodation claim to the jury. 

Nonetheless, again, it was harmless error to submit this 

claim to the jury if the jury ultimately reached the correct 

outcome. Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. Co., 119 U.S. at 

152.

After the jury found that the City did not “unlawfully 

refuse to make a reasonable accommodation,” the district 

court denied Ohio House’s motion for judgment as a matter 

of law. It concluded that the jury lawfully could have found

that the requested accommodation was unreasonable 

because it was unnecessary for disabled individuals to be 

able to reside in the dwelling of their choosing and because 

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46 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

the separation requirement was fundamental to the City’s 

zoning scheme.

Although Ohio House asserted its reasonableaccommodation claim under both the FHA and the FEHA, it 

forfeited reliance on the FEHA on appeal. See Indep. Towers 

of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[W]e cannot ‘manufacture arguments for an appellant’ and 

therefore we will not consider any claims that were not 

actually argued in appellant’s opening brief.” (quoting 

Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th 

Cir. 1994))); see also D.A.R.E. America v. Rolling Stone 

Mag., 270 F.3d 793, 793 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A bare assertion 

of an issue does not preserve a claim.”). Ohio House did not 

provide any meaningful legal authority or argument related 

to the FEHA on this claim. The only state law that Ohio 

House referenced that implicates the FEHA is California 

Government Code § 12955.6, which simply states that 

nothing in the FEHA should be interpreted in a way that 

affords less rights than the FHA.14 Therefore, we analyze 

this claim only under the FHA.

Unlawful discrimination under the FHA includes “a 

refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules [or] 

policies . . . when such accommodations may be necessary 

to afford [the disabled] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a 

dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). We first consider 

Ohio House’s argument that federal law preempts CMMC 

§ 13-200.62(f)(7) as a facial matter, and then turn to whether 

14 Although Ohio House cited an immaterial provision of the FHA, it 

offers sufficient caselaw and argument to preserve its challenge under 

this statute.

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 47

the City was required to waive enforcement of the separation 

requirement as a reasonable accommodation.

a. CMMC § 13-200.62(f)(7)

“[A] plaintiff cannot succeed on a facial challenge unless 

[it] ‘establish[es] that no set of circumstances exists under 

which the [law] would be valid,’ or [it] shows that the law 

lacks a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Moody, 144 S. Ct. at

2397 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (third and fourth 

alterations in original)). We begin our analysis by 

determining the scope of the challenged law. See id. at 2398.

We then determine “which of the laws’ applications violate 

[the FHA] and . . . measure them against the rest [of the 

lawful applications].” Id.

The City’s reasonable-accommodation regulation gives 

anyone seeking zoning approval related to housing and other 

facilities that “substantially serve persons with disabilities” 

the right to apply for reasonable accommodation from 

regulations or policies that impose “a barrier to equal 

opportunity for housing.” CMMC § 13-200.61. This portion 

of the regulation reads in full:

Any person seeking approval to construct 

and/or modify residential housing for 

person(s) with disabilities, and/or operate a 

residential care facility, group home, or 

referral facility, which will substantially 

serve persons with disabilities may apply for

a reasonable accommodation to obtain relief 

from a Zoning Code provision, regulation, 

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48 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

policy, or condition which causes a barrier to 

equal opportunity for housing.

CMMC § 13-200.61. Whether a reasonable accommodation

may be granted depends on whether it is necessary to give 

the disabled “an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a 

dwelling,” and whether it is reasonable. Id. § 13-

200.62(e)(1)-(2). The regulation provides that an 

accommodation is not reasonable if it “impose[s] an undue 

financial or administrative burden on the City” or “if it 

would fundamentally alter a City program, such as the City’s 

zoning scheme.” Id. The regulation defines the procedures

that must be followed in seeking an accommodation, 

including the “findings” that the City must make before 

granting the requested accommodation or an “alternative 

reasonable accommodations which provide an equivalent 

level of benefit to the applicant. CMMC § 13-200.62(f).

15

15 The required findings are as follows:

(1) The requested accommodation is requested by or 

on the behalf of one or more individuals with a 

disability protected under the fair housing laws.

(2) The requested accommodation is necessary to 

provide one or more individuals with a disability an 

equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

(3) The requested accommodation will not impose an 

undue financial or administrative burden on the city, 

as “undue financial or administrative burden” is 

defined in fair housing laws and interpretive case law.

(4) The requested accommodation is consistent with 

surrounding uses in scale and intensity of use.

(5) The requested accommodation will not, under the 

specific facts of the case, result in a direct threat to the 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 49

The regulation comprehensively covers the right to seek, and 

the requirements for obtaining, a reasonable accommodation 

from the City’s zoning rules to ensure disabled persons

realize their right to equal access to housing.

Taken as a whole, the City’s reasonable-accommodation 

regulation is not inconsistent with the FHA. Indeed, Ohio 

House challenges only one specific subsection that requires 

the City to consider “[w]hether the existing supply of 

facilities of a similar nature and operation in the community 

is sufficient to provide individuals with a disability an equal 

opportunity to live in a residential setting.” CMMC § 13-

200.62(f)(7). Ohio House argues that this subsection facially 

violates the FHA because that Act “protects the right of 

individuals to live in the residence of their choice in the 

community, not in a location the City might choose.” 

According to Ohio House, “the availability of another 

health or safety of other individuals or substantial 

physical damage to the property of others.

(6) If economic viability is raised by the applicant as 

part of the applicant’s showing that the requested 

accommodation is necessary, then a finding that the 

requested accommodation is necessary to make 

facilities of a similar nature or operation economically

viable in light of the particularities of the relevant 

market and market participants generally, not just for 

that particular applicant.

(7) Whether the existing supply of facilities of a 

similar nature and operation in the community is 

sufficient to provide individuals with a disability an 

equal opportunity to live in a residential setting.

(8) The requested accommodation will not result in a 

fundamental alteration in the nature of the City’s 

zoning program.

Id. 

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50 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

dwelling somewhere within a city’s boundaries is irrelevant 

to a municipality’s duty to make reasonable

accommodations.”

In Giebeler v. M & B Associates, we stated that the

“specific goals” of the FHA’s reasonable-accommodation 

provisions were “to protect the right of handicapped persons 

to live in the residence of their choice in the community,” 

and “to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with 

handicaps from the American mainstream.” 343 F.3d 1143, 

1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting City of 

Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 

806 (9th Cir. 1994)). Although subsection 13-200.62(f)(7) 

uses more permissive language than the other subsections 

describing the findings that the City must make,16 the City is 

nevertheless “required” to resolve requests for 

accommodations in part “on . . . the existing supply of 

facilities of a similar nature and operation in the 

community.” CMMC § 13-200.62(f)(7). Thus, Ohio House 

is correct that the City’s reasonable-accommodation 

regulation requires it to consider the availability of 

alternative housing.

However, Ohio House’s facial challenge to subsection 

13-200.62(f)(7) fails. It is not clear that the finding the City 

is required to make under subsection 13-200.62(f)(7)

conflicts with the FHA’s “specific goal” of “protect[ing] the 

16 Unlike other enumerated provisions, subsection (f)(7) does not require 

a finding that “[t]he requested accommodation is” one that meets a 

specified criterion, e.g., subsection (f)(2) (emphasis added), or that it 

“will not” have a certain effect, e.g., subsection (f)(5) (emphasis added). 

Rather, subsection (f)(7) requires a finding as to “[w]hether the existing 

supply of facilities of a similar nature and operation in the community is 

sufficient to provide individuals with a disability an equal opportunity to 

live in a residential setting”

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 51

right of handicapped persons to live in the residence of their 

choice . . . .” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1149 (emphasis added) 

(quoting City of Edmonds, 18 F.3d at 806), such that obstacle 

preemption applies. City of Los Angeles v. AECOM Servs., 

Inc., 854 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Crosby v. 

Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).

The City need not give that required finding any weight in 

assessing a request for reasonable accommodation and the 

reasoning in Giebeler may not apply the same to the situation 

here where a group-home operator is suing based on 

limitations imposed on its ability to operate a facility due to 

the presence of existing facilities, as opposed to a disabled 

individual seeking occupancy. See Moody, 144 S. Ct. at 2397 

(to establish obstacle preemption, the plaintiff must establish 

“that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] 

would be valid, or . . . shows that the law lacks a plainly 

legitimate sweep”).

But even if Ohio House were correct that CMMC § 13-

200.62(f)(7) is preempted by the FHA, that does not mean 

that the City’s entire reasonable-accommodation regulation 

fails. See Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(“As a general rule, courts are to ‘refrain from invalidating 

more of [a] statute than is necessary,’ because ‘[a] ruling of 

unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected 

representatives.’” (alterations in original) (citation omitted) 

(first quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258 

(2005); and then quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. 

New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006))). Rather, we 

consider whether the inconsistent provisions can viably be 

severed. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 

561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) (“‘Generally speaking, when 

confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit 

the solution to the problem,’ severing any ‘problematic 

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52 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

portions while leaving the remainder intact.’ Because ‘[t]he 

unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily 

defeat or affect the validity of its remaining provisions,’ the 

‘normal rule’ is ‘that partial, rather than facial, invalidation 

is the required course.’” (alteration in original) (citations 

omitted)). And consistent with principles of federalism, 

“‘[s]everability of a local ordinance is a question of state 

law.’” Vivid Ent., LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 574 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting City of Lakewood 

v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988)).

California law mandates two inquiries. First, we must 

consider whether the challenged law includes a severability 

clause. Cal. Redev. Ass’n v. Matosantos, 267 P.3d 580, 607

(Cal. 2011). A severability clause “establishes a presumption 

that the Legislature intended that the invalid . . . applications 

be severed from the valid . . . ones.” Friends of the Eel River 

v. N. Coast R.R. Auth., 399 P.3d 37, 76 (Cal. 2017); see also 

Matosantos, 267 P.3d at 607. Though “not conclusive,” this 

presumption weighs heavily in favor of severance. Santa 

Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 530 P.2d 605, 618 (Cal. 

1975) (in bank) (quoting McCafferty v. Bd. of Supervisors, 

83 Cal. Rptr. 229, 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)). And second, 

we must consider whether the invalid provision is 

“grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.” 

Matosantos, 267 P.3d at 607 (quoting Calfarm Ins. Co. v. 

Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1256 (Cal. 1989)). All three of 

these separability criteria “must be satisfied” before an 

invalid provision can be severed. McMahan v. City & 

County of San Francisco, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 513 (Cal Ct. 

App. 2005). “Grammatical separability, also known as 

mechanical separability, depends on whether the invalid 

parts ‘can be removed as a whole without affecting the 

wording’ or coherence of what remains.” Matosantos, 267 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 53

P.3d at 607 (quoting Calfarm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d at 1256). 

Relatedly, “[f]unctional separability depends on whether 

‘the remainder of the statute “is complete in itself.”’” Id. at

608 (quoting Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of 

Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 14 (Cal. 1979) (in bank)). “Volitional 

separability depends on whether the remainder ‘would have 

been adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen 

the partial invalidation of the statute.’” Matosantos, 267 P.3d 

at 608 (quoting Santa Barbara Sch. Dist., 530 P.2d at 618). 

Volitional separability is the “the ‘most important’ factor in 

the severability analysis.” Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 

F.3d 800, 817 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Katz v. Children’s 

Hosp. of Orange Cnty., 28 F.3d 1520, 1531 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Here, both required inquiries would counsel in favor of 

severing subsection 13-200.62(f)(7). The City’s reasonableaccommodation regulation contains a severability clause, 

which states that the validity of the regulation “shall not be 

affected” if “any section, subsection, clause, or provision of 

this article for any reason be held to be invalid . . .” CMMC 

§ 13-200.63. Moreover, both grammatical and functional 

separability are established because subsection 13-

200.62(f)(7) is a separate, enumerated provision that can be 

cleanly severed without disrupting the syntax or meaning of 

any other sections of the regulation; importantly, the 

regulation, including the other seven required findings, 

remains fully functional. See generally CMMC § 13-200.62.

And in addition to the explicit expression of legislative intent 

found in the severability provision, the regulation’s purpose 

provision states that “[i]t is the city’s policy to provide 

reasonable accommodation in accordance with federal and 

state fair housing laws.” CMMC § 13-200.60. This 

unmistakably indicates that in passing its reasonableaccommodation regulation, the City sought to comply with 

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54 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

both state and federal housing laws. Thus, we conclude that 

the City would have adopted this regulation even if it had 

“foreseen” that subsection 13-200.62(f)(7) would be found 

invalid. Matosantos, 267 P.3d at 608.

For the foregoing reasons, we reject Ohio House’s facial 

challenge to subsection 13-200.62(f)(7).

b. Ohio House’s Reasonable-Accommodation 

Application

Ohio House argues the City erroneously relied on its

subsection § 13-200.62(f)(7) finding in denying Ohio 

House’s requested accommodation. But that was not the 

City’s sole ground for denying the accommodation, so we 

evaluate Ohio House’s additional challenge to the City’s 

assertion that it was not obligated to grant an exception to its 

separation requirement because doing so would 

fundamentally alter its zoning scheme.

As indicated above, “[a] municipality commits 

discrimination under the [FHA] if it refuses ‘to make 

reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or 

services, when such accommodations may be necessary to 

afford [the disabled] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a 

dwelling.’” Budnick, 518 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Gamble, 104 

F.3d at 307); see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Public agencies 

have “an ‘affirmative duty’ . . . to reasonably accommodate 

disabled individuals by modifying administrative rules and 

policies,” including zoning ordinances. McGary v. City of 

Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 2004). The scope of 

this duty is “highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case 

determination.” United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park 

Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 

1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1994)). To prevail on a reasonableCase: 22-56181, 12/04/2024, ID: 12916252, DktEntry: 68-1, Page 54 of 69
THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 55

accommodation claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the 

plaintiff or his associate is handicapped within the meaning 

of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or 

should reasonably be expected to know of the handicap; 

(3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to 

afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use 

and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is 

reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make the 

requested accommodation.” Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment

Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 

2006).

Here, there is no dispute that Ohio House established

elements one, two, and five. Likewise, although the district 

court made conflicting statements regarding element three, 

it ultimately concluded that Ohio House’s requested 

accommodation was necessary, and the City did not 

challenge that decision. Thus, we have no occasion to 

address this issue given how the case was presented to us. 

See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley 

Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1152 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (holding that unraised arguments are forfeited).

That leaves the fourth element—whether Ohio House’s 

requested accommodation was reasonable. The district court 

concluded that in light of the evidence presented “the jury 

could have concluded that granting the request could have 

constituted a fundamental change in the City’s zoning 

scheme and thus the accommodation was unreasonable.”

This was not error.

Municipalities are not required “to make ‘fundamental’

or ‘substantial’ modifications to accommodate the 

handicapped . . . .” Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 

532, 538 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Edmonds, 18 F.3d 

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56 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

at 806). They are required only to make reasonable 

accommodations. Id. “[A]n accommodation is 

reasonable . . . ‘when it imposes no “fundamental alteration 

in the nature of the program” or “undue financial or 

administrative burdens.”’” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1157 

(quoting Howard v. City of Beavercreek, 276 F.3d 802, 806 

(6th Cir. 2002)). Recognizing the case-specific nature of a 

reasonable-accommodation analysis, FHA regulations 

intentionally provide little guidance on how to determine the

reasonableness of an accommodation or the need for a 

particular rule in a zoning scheme. See Schwarz v. City of 

Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1220 n.12 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(first citing 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(C); and then citing Fair 

Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 

(Jan. 23, 1989)); see also Oconomowoc Residential 

Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 

2002) (“Whether a requested accommodation is reasonable 

or not . . . requires balancing the needs of the parties.”). The 

Eleventh Circuit’s survey of the caselaw from the Supreme 

Court and our sister circuits in Schwarz v. City of Treasure 

Island provides helpful guidance:

Whether a particular rule is “essential” to a 

zoning scheme will, of course, turn on the 

facts of each case, but a few general 

principles guide us. The basic purpose of 

zoning is to bring complementary land uses 

together, while separating incompatible ones. 

See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 

U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“A nuisance may be 

merely a right thing in the wrong place, like 

a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”). 

Thus, ordering a municipality to waive a 

zoning rule ordinarily would cause a 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 57

“fundamental alteration” of its zoning 

scheme if the proposed use was incompatible 

with surrounding land uses. See Bryant 

Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., 124 F.3d 

597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997) (“In determining 

whether the reasonableness requirement has 

been met, a court may consider . . . the extent 

to which the accommodation would 

undermine the legitimate purposes and 

effects of existing zoning regulations . . . .”). 

On the other hand, if the proposed use is quite 

similar to surrounding uses expressly 

permitted by the zoning code, it will be more 

difficult to show that a waiver of the rule 

would cause a “fundamental alteration” of 

the zoning scheme. Similarly, if the 

municipality routinely waives the rule upon 

request, it will be harder to show that the rule 

is “essential.”

544 F.3d 1201, 1221 (11th Cir. 2008).

Applying these general principles to the facts of this 

case, the jury had an evidentiary basis on which to find that 

Ohio House’s requested accommodation was unreasonable 

because it would cause a “fundamental alteration” of the 

City’s zoning scheme. As previously explained, there is 

evidence in the record that the City enacted its challenged 

regulations governing group homes located in residential 

zones out of concern about “overconcentration of sober 

living units in any area” and to ensure that “disabled persons 

recovering from addiction can reside in a comfortable 

residential environment versus in an institutional setting.” 

The jury could have reasonably concluded that the

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58 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

separation requirement from which Ohio House sought an 

exception is fundamental to achieving these goals. Giebeler, 

343 F.3d at 1157. Indeed, Ohio House does not dispute the 

importance of the separation requirement to the City’s 

zoning scheme. Instead, it contends that this “categorical and 

rigid rule[]” from which the City refuses to grant any 

accommodation is inherently at odds with the City’s 

obligation to conduct an “‘individualized inquiry’ to 

determine whether the requested accommodation [is 

reasonable].”

As support, Ohio House cites a Sixth Circuit case for the 

principle that “making an exception to a zoning scheme to 

permit something that would normally be forbidden [does 

not] automatically amount[] to a fundamental alteration.” 

Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 363 (6th Cir.

2015). At issue in Anderson was whether a disabled 

individual should be granted an accommodation from an 

animal restriction applicable in residential zones. Id. at 346.

In rejecting the City’s argument that it was entitled to 

summary judgment on the basis that the accommodation was 

unreasonable as a matter of law, the court noted that “[w]hile 

protecting public health and property values are central to 

the City’s interests,” there was evidence that one otherwise 

disallowed animal would “not create unsanitary conditions 

or devalue her neighbors’ property.” Id. at 363.

Anderson is distinguishable from the present case in 

which we are reviewing a jury verdict. Unlike the one-off 

request in Anderson for an exception to an animal restriction,

here Ohio House ultimately disputes as unlawful the City’s 

denial of permits for over 20 existing group homes located 

in residential zones. As previously stated, although 

“routinely waiv[ing]” a specific zoning requirement 

suggests that it is not fundamental to a municipality’s landCase: 22-56181, 12/04/2024, ID: 12916252, DktEntry: 68-1, Page 58 of 69
THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 59

use policy, Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1221, the jury here 

reasonably could have found that the separation requirement

is fundamental to the City’s zoning policy governing 

residential areas. Thus, the jury reasonably applied the

principle recognized in Schwarz that “ordering a 

municipality to waive a zoning rule ordinarily would cause 

a ‘fundamental alteration’ of its zoning scheme if the 

proposed use was incompatible with surrounding land uses.”

Id (citing Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 604).

For all these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial 

of judgment as a matter of law on Ohio House’s reasonable 

accommodation claim.

B. California Govt. Code § 65008 Claim

Finally, Ohio House claims that the district court erred 

in denying its post-trial renewed motion for judgment as a 

matter of law on its claim under Cal. Govt. Code § 65008(a). 

Section 65008(a) provides that any action by a city “is null 

and void” if it denies any individual or group of individuals 

“the enjoyment of residence, landownership, tenancy, or any 

other land use in this state” because of a protected 

characteristic under the FEHA. The district held that Ohio 

House’s suit under this provision is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations set forth in Cal. Govt. Code 

§ 65009(c)(1), which requires claims to be brought “within 

90 days after the legislative body’s decision” to adopt or 

amend a zoning ordinance or to enforce conditions attached 

to land-use permits. See Cnty. of Sonoma, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

at 919 n.4. Ohio House disagrees, arguing that 

§ 65009(c)(1)’s 90-day period is “applicable only to 

challenges to local zoning decisions” and not “to Ohio 

House’s broader cla[i]m of discrimination based on 

‘administration of ordinances pursuant to any law.” Cal. 

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60 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

Govt. Code § 65008 (b)(1)(B)(ii). As the district court 

explained, “Ohio House argues that it is not challenging a 

‘decision’ governed by § 65009,” namely the Ordinances’ 

enactment and the denial of its conditional use-permit, “but 

rather ‘the exercise of municipal code enforcement power to 

cite, fine, and compel the closure of a dwelling.’”

“We review a district court’s determination of the 

applicable statute of limitations de novo.” Stanley v. Trustees 

of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006). And 

we agree with the district court that Ohio House’s claim is 

subject to § 65009’s 90-day limitations period. Despite Ohio 

House’s contentions to the contrary, it is effectively 

challenging the City’s zoning ordinances on their face based 

on alleged defects in the ordinances themselves. See Cnty. of 

Sonoma, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 924–25 (explaining that despite 

plaintiff’s claim that it was making a facial and as-applied 

challenge, its claim was truly “facial in nature,” because it 

was based on an “alleged defect . . . in the [o]rdinance itself, 

not in the manner or circumstances in which it [was] being 

applied.”). Ohio House seeks an injunction enjoining 

enforcement of the City’s zoning ordinances and a 

declaration that the ordinances “are invalid and void 

pursuant to the Fair Housing Act and Fair Employment and 

Housing Act.” This is a challenge to the facial validity of an 

ordinance, not an as-applied challenge of a final adjudicatory 

decision triggering its own 90-day statutory limitations 

period. Cal. Govt. Code § 65009(c)(1)(E).

Ohio House provides no legal or factual support for its 

theory that the City’s “administration” of ordinances is 

something other than a facial challenge or an as-applied 

challenge of a “final adjudicatory decision.” Indeed, Ohio 

House does not point to anything other than the ordinances 

themselves as a source of purported injury. See San Diego 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 61

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Yee, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 896, 906 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that plaintiffs were “in substance 

and effect” challenging “the constitutionality of the . . . 

statutes themselves” by challenging actions that were 

“compelled by and taken under the . . . statutes”). Ordinance 

17-06, adopted on May 2, 2017, is the most recent law that 

Ohio House challenges. Because Ohio House filed its initial 

complaint on September 6, 2019, well after the applicable 

90-day statute of limitations period set forth in § 65009, it is 

time-barred from asserting its § 65008(a) claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on Ohio 

House’s disparate-impact claim and its denial of judgment 

as a matter of law on all other claims.17 To the extent there 

were errors in the district court’s submission of claims to the 

jury and in its jury instructions, we conclude that they were

harmless and do not warrant a new trial.

AFFIRMED.

17 Ohio House’s Motions for Judicial Notice, Dkts. 18, 54, are granted.

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62 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

I generally concur in the majority opinion, but would 

hold that in order to establish a facial disparate treatment 

claim under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Fair 

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), a plaintiff must 

show that the protected group suffered unfavorable

treatment compared to the unprotected group, not merely 

show that a protected group has been treated differently than 

an unprotected group. See Maj. Op. 21. Because Ohio 

House failed to make such a showing, it did not establish a 

prima facie case of disparate treatment.

It has long been the rule that to prove disparate treatment, 

the plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to have 

an adverse effect on the protected group. See Ricci v. 

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (stating standard under 

Title VII); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 

Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“The critical issue, Title VII’s 

text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to 

disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment . . . .” 

(emphasis added) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 

U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))); Burlington 

N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006) (“No 

one doubts that the term ‘discriminate against’ [in Title VII] 

refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure

protected individuals.” (emphasis added)). Conc. 66–67. 

The Supreme Court has recently confirmed this longstanding 

rule, stating: “The words ‘discriminate against,’ we have 

explained, refer to ‘differences in treatment that injure’ 

employees.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354 

(2024) (quoting Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 681 

(2020)).

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 63

Ninth Circuit precedent is consistent with this Supreme 

Court rule, stating that a plaintiff alleging disparate 

treatment (that is, intentional discrimination) may “produce 

direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a 

discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the 

defendant and that the defendant’s actions adversely affected

the plaintiff in some way.” Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City 

of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(cleaned up) (emphasis added). And as we explained in 

Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, “[a] facially 

discriminatory policy is one which on its face applies less 

favorably to a protected group.” 490 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).

We have expanded the standard for showing disparate 

treatment in the Fair Housing Act context. Under our 

approach, if the plaintiff has been subject to “intentional 

differential treatment” compared to an unprotected group, “a 

defendant must show either: (1) that the restriction benefits 

the protected class or (2) that it responds to legitimate safety 

concerns raised by the individuals affected, rather than being 

based on stereotypes.” Cmty. House, Inc., 490 F.3d at 1050. 

In other words, if the plaintiff challenges a policy that 

facially applies less favorably to a protected group, the 

defendant may still justify the policy by proving that under 

the facts of that particular case, the difference is beneficial 

to the protected class. See id. For instance, in Community 

House, the City of Boise argued that despite the plaintiff’s 

claim that Boise’s policy adversely affected women by not 

allowing them to take advantage of men-only shelters, the 

policy “benefits women and families by protecting their 

safety.” Id. at 1051–52. The evidence establishing a 

beneficial effect of a facially discriminatory, adverse rule 

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64 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

can defeat an FHA claim, even if it did not in Community 

House itself. See id. at 1051.1

Here, the district court concluded that because the City’s 

zoning regulations treated group homes and sober living 

homes differently from boardinghouses, Ohio House 

established a prima facie claim of facial discrimination. But 

this conclusion was wrong: although Ohio House established 

that the relevant ordinances treated Ohio House and 

boardinghouses differently, Ohio House failed to prove that 

the treatment was less favorable, and therefore 

discriminatory. To the contrary, group homes and sober 

living homes get more favorable treatment than 

boardinghouses. Under the relevant zoning regulations, 

small boardinghouses (those with two rooms or fewer) may 

operate in multi-family residential districts (MFR zones), 

subject to a 650-foot separation requirement. Costa Mesa 

Municipal Code (CMMC) § 13-30 (tbl. n.4). Large 

boardinghouses (those with three to six rooms) may operate 

in MFR zones with a conditional-use permit (CUP), subject 

to a 1,000-foot separation requirement. Id. (tbl. n.5). Group 

homes and sober living homes seeking to operate in MFR 

zones must obtain different permits. Id. (tbl. nn.7 & 7.1). 

Maj. Op. 11–12. But this does not mean that boardinghouses 

get more favorable treatment than group home or sober 

1 The FEHA similarly focuses on adverse action, providing that a facially 

discriminatory policy is one “that explicitly conditions a housing 

opportunity on a protected basis, requires or allows adverse action based 

on a protected basis, or directs adverse action to be taken based on a 

protected basis.” 2 C.C.R. § 12040(c) (emphases added). And, similar 

to the Community House framework, a defendant can avoid liability for 

a facially discriminatory policy by showing the policy “[o]bjectively 

benefits a protected class” and “is the least restrictive means of achieving 

the identified purpose.” Id. § 12042(f).

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 65

living homes, because such homes may elect to classify 

themselves as boardinghouses and receive all the benefits 

accorded to boardinghouses. Maj. Op. 25–26. Therefore, I 

would reverse the district court’s holding that Ohio House 

established a prima facie claim of facial discrimination.

Although I would hold that Ohio House failed to make a 

prima facie showing of discrimination, I nevertheless agree 

with the majority that Ohio House’s disparate treatment 

claim fails because the differential treatment imposed 

benefits the protected class. Maj. Op. 23. For instance, 

under the ordinances, if a group home has six or fewer 

residents, it can operate in a single-family zoning district (R1 

zone) if it obtains a special-use permit. CMMC § 13-311. 

And if a sober living home has six or fewer residents, it can 

operate in an R1 zone if it obtains a special-use permit and 

complies with a 650-foot separation requirement. Id. § 13-

311(a)(14)(i). By contrast, boardinghouses are categorically 

prohibited from operating in R1 zones. Id. § 13-30 (tbl. nn.4 

& 5). Maj. Op. 11. Moreover, unlike boardinghouses, a 

group home or sober living home can operate in an 

Institutional and Recreational zone as a matter of right. Id.

§ 13-30 (tbl. nn.4, 5, 7, & 7.1). Given that a group home or 

sober living home is entitled to all the benefits of a 

boardinghouse plus additional rights, it is clear that the 

City’s ordinances do not disadvantage the group home or 

sober living home. Therefore, I concur in the majority.

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66 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

FORREST, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with Judge Ikuta that under Supreme Court 

precedent, a plaintiff must prove adverse differential 

treatment to establish discrimination. See, e.g., Muldrow v. 

City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354 (“The words 

‘discriminate against,’ we have explained, refer to 

‘differences in treatment that injure’ employees.” (quoting 

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 681 (2020))); cf.

Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 

1997) (“We apply Title VII discrimination analysis in 

examining [FHA] discrimination claims.”). I also agree that, 

because adversity is part of discriminatory treatment, a 

plaintiff should be required to show that facially differential 

treatment was adverse as part of its prima-facie case. See 

Sailboat Bend Sober Living, LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 

46 F.4th 1268, 1274–79 (11th Cir. 2022); Prima Facie Case, 

Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (a prima facie case 

requires enough evidence to “rule in the party’s favor”). But 

for the reasons described in the majority opinion, I cannot 

read Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041 

(9th Cir. 2007), as requiring a prima facie showing of 

unfavorable treatment. See Maj. Op. at 21. That is where I 

respectfully disagree with Judge Ikuta.

That leaves the question of how to handle this tension 

between our precedent and Supreme Court precedent. The 

Supreme Court had long espoused an adversity requirement 

for facial discrimination when Community House was 

decided. See Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 354 (citing Oncale v. 

Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998), for 

the proposition that discrimination implies disadvantageous 

treatment); Bostock, 590 U.S. at 657 (same, citing 

Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 67

(2006)). Accordingly, even though the Supreme Court has 

continued to reiterate that differential treatment must be 

adverse to be discriminatory, id., its recent espousals of that 

rule are not “intervening” decisions that “undercut the theory 

or reasoning underlying” Community House such that we are 

free to depart from that opinion. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 

889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 689 

F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2012), reversed on other grounds, 

735 F.3d 1060 (en banc) (reservations about a prior panel’s 

application of existing Supreme Court precedent is not 

grounds under Gammie to revisit that panel’s decision). To 

the extent Community House got the law wrong under 

Supreme Court precedent, it was just as wrong when it was 

decided as it is now. I thus conclude that in deciding this case 

we are compelled to apply Community House’s burdenshifting framework as written until the en banc court corrects 

our error or the Supreme Court issues intervening authority 

that permits departure from Community House.

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68 THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

GOULD, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part with respect to 

Part II.A.4:

Rather than reach the merits by holding that Plaintiff did 

not demonstrate discriminatory intent, I would have 

dismissed the plaintiff’s interference claim under the FHA as 

waived for lack of adequate briefing. Greenwood v. Fed. 

Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). I believe 

the majority misconstrues the existing law with respect to the 

interference claim by instead holding that the plaintiff must 

demonstrate intentional discrimination or discriminatory 

animus to prove the third element of the McDonnell Douglas 

framework: causation. Op. at 37, 40. 

The majority relies on Morris, which held that plaintiffs 

succeeded on an interference claim where statements by the 

Homeowners’ Association Board “sufficiently support[ed] 

an inference by the jury that an anti-Christian purpose was 

at least a motivating factor in the Board’s conduct.” Morris 

v. W. Hayden Ests. First Addition Homeowners Ass’n, 104 

F.4th 1128, 1145 (9th Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original). 

However, the plaintiffs in Morris did not use the McDonnell 

Douglas framework to prove their interference claim; rather, 

the plaintiffs produced circumstantial evidence that a 

discriminatory purpose motivated the defendant as an 

alternative to the McDonnell Douglass framework. Id. at 

1140 (“The McDonnell Douglas framework, however, is 

only one way of establishing a disparate treatment 

claim...the Morrises may prevail by otherwise producing 

direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a 

discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the 

defendant and that the defendant’s actions adversely affected 

them in some way.”) (cleaned up). 

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THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 69

The Court in Morris employed the Arlington Heights 

inquiry, which is an alternative to the McDonnell Douglass 

framework, not merely an element of that framework. Id. at 

1144 (citing to Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport 

Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2013) and Ave. 6E 

Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 504 (9th Cir. 2016),

both of which describe the alternative Arlington Heights 

inquiry); see also Op. at 18–19 (describing the Arlington 

Heights inquiry as an alternative way to prove disparate 

treatment). By conflating the Arlington Heights requirement 

for discriminatory intent with the McDonnell Douglas 

framework, the majority opinion does not “make explicit 

what our decision in Morris suggests,” but instead raises the 

burden on plaintiffs to prove interference under the FHA. 

Op. at 40. Because this portion of the decision is contrary to 

our precedent, I respectfully dissent. 

Case: 22-56181, 12/04/2024, ID: 12916252, DktEntry: 68-1, Page 69 of 69