Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05348/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05348-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD RICHARDSON,

Petitioner,

vs.

G.J. GUIRBINO,

Respondent.

No. 1:03-cv-05348-JKS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Richard Richardson, appearing pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently incarcerated by the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation at Centinela State Prison, Imperial, California.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner’s first trial in the California Superior Court, Stanislaus County, ended in a

mistrial. Upon retrial Petitioner was convicted after jury trial of two counts of attempted robbery

of an inhabited dwelling (CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 211, 212.5, 664), three counts of robbery of an

inhabited dwelling (CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 211, 212.5), and single counts of burglary (CAL. PEN.

CODE § 459), conspiracy to commit robbery of an inhabited dwelling (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 82,

211, 212.5), participation in a street gang (CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(a)), and being a felon in

possession of a firearm (CAL. PEN. CODE § 12021). The jury also found that Richardson

personally used a firearm (CAL. PEN. CODE § 12022.5), committed the offenses to benefit a

criminal street gang (CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(b)(1)), had one prior serious felony conviction

(CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(d)), and had served one prior prison term (CAL. PEN. CODE § 667.5(b)). 

Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 49 years.

Petitioner timely appealed to the California Court of Appeals, which, in an unpublished

decision, affirmed the convictions but remanded to correct the sentence. Petitioner sought timely

review by the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied the petition without opinion or

Case 1:03-cv-05348-JKS Document 27 Filed 08/24/07 Page 1 of 17
1/

 Respondent concedes that the amended petition relates back to the original petition.

2/

 As recited by the California Court of Appeal.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 2

citation to authority on January 23, 2002. On April 19, 2002, upon remand, the California

Superior Court modified Petitioner’s sentence to an aggregate of 47 years.

Petitioner did not seek post-conviction relief in the California state courts. Petitioner

timely filed his petition in this Court on March 20, 2003, and his amended petition on November

19, 2003.1/

II. FACTS2/

Shameka Gray was living with Sarah Hodge and her three-year-old son.

On the evening of December 3, 1997, Sarah's brother Leslie Hodge, Leslie's

friend Antoine McElvaine, and Jill Townsend were visiting. Shameka was in her

bedroom; the others were in the front room.

There was a knock on the door. Sarah asked, “Who is it?” She did not

understand the reply and asked again. The door was kicked open and several men

dressed in dark clothing with masks on their faces ran in. They were armed with

guns. They told the occupants to lie down. Leslie ran down the hall and Sarah

ran after him. Jill and Antoine remained in the front room, with Jill holding

Sarah’s son.

Some of the intruders confronted Leslie Hodge in the bathroom. He was

asked to turn over his money. Leslie gave the men $40, a ring and a necklace. He

was told to strip. He complied and was then wrapped in a blanket. One of the

intruders spread Leslie's buttocks apart, apparently to check for hidden drugs. 

Immediately after the robbery Leslie told police officer Benito Chavez that

Richardson had ordered the other subjects to take Leslie's clothes off, put a sheet

over his head, and do a pocket check.1

 At trial, Leslie said he could not identify

any of the intruders, denied that he previously identified any of the intruders, and

testified he could not even identify their race.

1

 A pocket check is a slang term for going through a victim's pockets for money and/or

drugs.

Sarah was stopped in the door to her bedroom. One of the robbers

instructed another to put some clothes over Sarah's head; he complied. The

robbers ransacked the room. They asked Sarah where she kept her purse; she did

not answer. Sarah asked one of the intruders if her son was okay; he said that he

was. The intruders left.

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 3

When questioned by police that evening, Sarah told officers that she

recognized Green and Richardson from their voices. She stated that Richardson

was the one who told her that her son was okay. Sarah was sure of her

identifications. When questioned a few days after the crime, she stated that

Richardson told her to get down. She heard Green tell others to strip Leslie. 

Harrell and Richardson were going through Sarah's drawers and Green stayed

with Leslie. At the preliminary hearing, Sarah testified that before her face was

covered she recognized Green, Richardson, Harrell, and Damon Morrison.2 She

had known all of them before the robbery occurred. At trial Sarah testified she

could not positively identify who was at her house that evening. She said it could

have been anybody. She had a reasonable doubt that the defendants were the ones

who robbed her. She also testified at trial that no one asked her for property

during the robbery.

2

 Morrison was not a defendant at trial.

Shameka was in her room when she heard screams and footsteps. She sat

on her bed and then opened her door. Richardson motioned for Shameka to go

back in her room. She shut the door to her room. She heard Green tell Leslie

what to do. Shameka hid her purse. Harrell came in and told Shameka to get

down. Because she knew Harrell Shameka said to him, “It’s Meek.”3

 One of the

intruders took food stamps from Shameka's jacket.

3

 Meek is Shameka's nickname.

When interviewed by police the evening of the crime, Shameka identified

Harrell, Green, and Richardson as the robbers. When interviewed a few days

later, Shameka again identified Harrell and Richardson as two of the robbers, and

said she also recognized Green's voice. At the preliminary hearing, Shameka

identified the three defendants and their activities. At trial, she testified that she

thought she saw Harrell and Richardson, but she wasn’t sure now. She could not

positively say that Harrell, Green, and Richardson were involved in the robberies.

Jill Townsend turned to the wall with Sarah’s son when the intruders came

through the door. Someone asked her where her purse was; she said she did not

have one. One of the intruders put a jacket over her head. Townsend was not

able to identify anyone at trial. She testified that she might have told officers that

she recognized Green’s voice and recognized Morrison. After the robbery,

Townsend received numerous pages on her pager displaying the number 187,

which is the Penal Code number for murder. In addition one night she received

45 hang-up calls. She said she was not fearful.

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 4

McElvaine remained in the front room during the robbery. He had $2

taken from him. After the robbery McElvaine told officers that he did not know

anything. The officers believed he was being uncooperative and evasive.4

4

 There was testimony that McElvaine was robbed of $1,200 the day before but he did

not report this robbery.

Immediately after the robbers left the home, the victims all discussed who

they believed was involved. Sarah called her father; he arrived and called police. 

About 15 minutes after the robbery Sarah received a call from Green. She

accused him of the robbery, he denied being in her house that evening.

Detective Allen Brocchini (sic) is a member of the police force's gang

unit. He testified that he is familiar with the Oak Street Posse (OSP), a criminal

street gang. The OSP claims the color black, and associates with the number 105

because that is the original address on Oak Street where the gang began. Based

on photographs, tattoos, gang rosters, police reports, and observations, it was

Detective Brochinni's (sic) opinion that Green and Richardson were current

members of the OSP when the crimes were committed and Harrell was an

associate of the gang. Detective Brochinni (sic) testified regarding numerous

crimes committed by members of the OSP.

Within a day or two after the robbery Sarah went to her car and found the

number 105 written in dust on a window.

III. GROUNDS RAISED/STANDARD OF REVIEW

Petitioner raises three grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) insufficiency of

the evidence to support conviction; and (3) a double jeopardy claim. Respondent concedes that

all three claims have been exhausted.

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the standard of

review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the

California court was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–406 (2000); see

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (explaining this standard). In applying this

standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state court, Robinson v. Ignacio,

Case 1:03-cv-05348-JKS Document 27 Filed 08/24/07 Page 4 of 17
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 5

360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.2004), which in this case was that of the California Court of

Appeal on direct appeal. In addition, the state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct

unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

To the extent that Petitioner alleges errors of state law, they are beyond the purview of

this Court in deciding a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. This Court may only address

violations of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991)

(“We have stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.

Today, we reemphasize that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine statecourt determinations on state-law questions.”) (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Petitioner alleges three errors of counsel that either individually or cumulatively rendered

assistance ineffective. First, counsel failed to move for acquittal on Count 5. Second, counsel

failed to request bifurcation of the gang charges and enhancements. Third, counsel failed to

object to the prosecutor’s argument implying defense counsel fabricated evidence. All, except

the second, were presented to the California Court of Appeal and rejected as follows.

Assistance of Counsel (Harrell & Richardson)

A. Standard of Review

“To secure reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must establish that counsel's performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and that, to a reasonable probability, defendant would

have obtained a more favorable result absent counsel’s shortcomings. [Citation.] 

If the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or failed to act in the

instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was asked for an explanation

and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory

explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1068-1069.)

B. Failure to Move for Acquittal on Count 5

Harrell claims his counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for

acquittal on count 5 at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief when there was

no evidence of a taking or attempted taking from McElvaine. Because the

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction at this time, he contends the

Case 1:03-cv-05348-JKS Document 27 Filed 08/24/07 Page 5 of 17
3/

 The record does not show that Richardson either presented this argument to the California Court

of Appeal in his opening brief or joined in Harrell’s argument in the reply brief. This issue not having

been properly presented to the California Court of Appeal it has not been exhausted and may not be

considered by this Court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 6

court would have been obligated to grant the motion. Counsel’s failure to bring

the motion, he argues, therefore deprived him of acquittal on this count. 

Richardson joins in this argument.

Respondent concedes that the People failed to produce sufficient evidence

to prove count 5 during their case-in-chief. Respondent contends that if a motion

had been made, the prosecution would have been allowed to reopen its case; thus

a motion for acquittal would not have altered the outcome of the case. 

Furthermore, because the court would have in all likelihood allowed the

prosecution to reopen its case, a motion by counsel would have been futile.

“It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretion to order a case

reopened and allow the introduction of additional evidence.” (People v.

Rodriguez (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 289,294.) “The court always has discretion to

allow the prosecution to reopen after a section 1118 motion so long as the court is

convinced that the failure to present evidence on the issue was a result of

‘inadvertence or mistake on the part of the prosecutor and not from an attempt to

gain a tactical advantage over [the defendant].” (People v. Goss (1992) 7

Cal.App.4th 702,708, brackets in original.)

Appellants have failed to provide any basis for us to conclude the trial

court would not have granted a motion by the prosecutor to reopen if a section

1118.1 motion had been made at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. 

They have failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.28

28 There is clearly a tactical reason for not making such a motion. A motion alerts the

prosecution to a possible defect in their case and allows them, in most instances, an

opportunity to reopen. If the motion is not made, there is always a possibility that the

People will not notice the defect until trial is over and then an acquittal would be

required.

C. Failure to Request Bifurcation of the Gang Enhancement and Charges3/

Harrell’s trial counsel did not move to bifurcate the trial of the gang

allegations from the jury's consideration of guilt of the other charges. Harrell

asserts his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to do so. He contends there was

no strategic reason for not making the motion and he was prejudiced because

counsel's failure allowed the admission of his prior convictions for burglary and a

mountain of evidence regarding crimes committed by Green and Richardson as

well as other OSP members.

Case 1:03-cv-05348-JKS Document 27 Filed 08/24/07 Page 6 of 17
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 7

The thrust of the prosecution’s case was that this home invasion robbery

was gang related. The perpetrators chose people they knew in order to intimidate

them and further establish their dominance as a gang in the area. The gang

connection also explained the changing identifications by the witnesses. The

evidence was very relevant. “Case law holds that where evidence of gang activity

or membership is important to the motive, it can be introduced even if

prejudicial.” (People v. Martin (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 76, 81.)

Furthermore, as previously discussed, in urging the jury to distance

Harrell from the others and treat him differently, his counsel emphasized that

Harrell was not, like his codefendants, connected to the bulk of the gang

evidence. Harrell has failed to show that a bifurcation motion would have been

successful, and in any event Harrell’s counsel had a tactical reason for allowing

most of the gang evidence to be admitted without seeking bifurcation.

D. [Omitted]

E. Failure to Object to the Prosecutor's Closing Argument

Citing two portions of the prosecution's closing arguments to the jury,

Harrell claims the prosecutor implied that defense counsel fabricated evidence. 

The failure of his trial counsel to object and request an admonition, asserts

Harrell, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Richardson joins in this

argument.

During his initial argument to the jury, the prosecutor explained why

Sarah’s initial story of seeing Richardson the day before was true and was in

conflict with Richardson’s alibi that he was sick in bed that day. He then stated,

“Mr. Spokes [counsel for Richardson], the defense counsel, is very creative.

Maybe he’ll have a response for you. But it’s not based in fact, I suggest to you

that.” Harrell cites this as the first instance of prosecutorial misconduct. This

statement was directed at counsel for Richardson; Harrell has failed to show how

it adversely affected his case. In any event the prosecutor was not alleging that

counsel was fabricating evidence; he made a legitimate suggestion that counsel

may be able to try and explain certain conflicts in the evidence with a creative

argument. This was a legitimate criticism that the defense lacked evidentiary

support and was a proper comment on the evidence and the inferences to be

drawn therefrom. (See People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173,212.)

Next Harrell points to a portion of the prosecutor's final argument to the

jury. During this portion of argument the prosecutor was rebutting arguments

made by defense counsel and pointing out why their arguments should not be

accepted. He stated: “Sometimes defense attorneys will come up with things that

aren’t quite true or perhaps open to several interpretations and push one

interpretation to get you to focus on something besides their client’s guilt. We

have had some examples of that in this case.” (Italics added.) 29 The prosecutor

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 8

went on to give more examples from the arguments of defense counsel where the

defense version is in conflict with evidence presented by the People.

29 Harrell quotes only the italicized portion of the above quote in his brief.

“It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of

fabricating a defense.” (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.) But, the

prosecutor is given wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing

counsel’s factual accounts. (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894,977-978.)

Viewed in the context in which the statement was made, the jury would

certainly understand the argument to be nothing more than urging it to not be

misled by defense evidence. Even if the comment was improper, it was fairly

innocuous and the remark was far too mild to constitute improper misconduct.

Harrell has failed to sufficiently prove ineffective assistance of counsel.

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show both that his

counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one in which

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment. Id. Petitioner must show that defense counsel’s representation was not

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, the result would have been

different. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).

In People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 124 (Cal.2000), cited by the California Court of Appeals,

the California Supreme Court adopted Strickland as the standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel under the California Constitution. The California Court of Appeal unquestionably

applied established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. This

Court cannot say that the decision of the California Court of Appeal was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, Strickland–Hill, or was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding as required by

Williams–Lockyer.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his first ground.

Case 1:03-cv-05348-JKS Document 27 Filed 08/24/07 Page 8 of 17
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 9

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Petitioner argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the gang crime,

which Petitioner further argues contributed to the jury finding him guilty on the other counts. In

rejecting this argument, the California Court of Appeal held:

Sufficiency of Evidence of Active Gang Participation

Richardson was charged and convicted of the felony offense of active

participation in a criminal street gang. This crime is set forth in section 186.22,

subdivision (a). It provides: “Any person who actively participates in any criminal

street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a

pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists

in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by

imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by

imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years.”

Richardson now claims the evidence was insufficient to support this

conviction. In particular he asserts the evidence was not sufficient to prove the

active participation element because it did not show that he devoted all or a

substantial part of his time and efforts to the criminal street gang. Richardson

does not dispute that the evidence clearly showed he was at one time a member of

the OSP. But he contends the evidence demonstrates that at the time of the crime

he was gainfully employed and was occupied in other, legitimate activities, which

left him too little time to have been able to devote all or a substantial part of his

time and efforts to the gang. Richardson places primary reliance on the case of

People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 692 to support his position.

Because Richardson does not challenge the element that OSP is a criminal

street gang nor challenge that he previously was an OSP member, it is not

necessary to discuss this evidence. Our review of the evidence focuses on the

testimony that was offered to prove that Richardson was an active gang member

at the time of the instant offenses.26

26 Citing People v. Smith (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1458 respondent argues that Richardson

has waived his right to ask for substantial evidence review on appeal by failing to object

below. It has been held that sufficiency of the evidence issues are never waived. (People

v. Neal (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 11 14, 1122.) The Smith case determined that “the failure

to seek a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case in chief pursuant to

Penal Code section 1118.1 waives argument on appeal that the evidence was insufficient

at that point to support conviction.” (64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1461.) The Smith case does not

hold that substantial evidence review is precluded in general, it is limited to the

availability to challenge the substantiality of the evidence at the close of the prosecution's

case when a motion for judgment of acquittal was not raised below. The discussion in

Issue IX below at pages 42-45 illustrates this point. Substantial evidence for count 5 was

not presented until after the prosecution's case, but appellant could not challenge this

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 10

state of the evidence on appeal absent a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of

the prosecution's case. Smith does not stand for the proposition asserted by respondent.

Richardson has not waived this issue for purposes of appeal.

On appeal “the court must review the whole record in the light most

favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial

evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such

that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) Substantial evidence

includes circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.

(In re James D. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 810, 813.)

Detective Brochinni testified that Richardson was an active participant in

a criminal street gang. In addition to the abundance of evidence that Richardson

was an active gang member prior to his incarceration in 1991, Brochinni testified

to Richardson's gang participation after his release from prison in 1995. In

January of 1995, Richardson was present in a house where a search warrant was

served. Also present were OSP members. In July of 1997, Richardson was with

an OSP member when he was contacted by his parole agent. In September of

1997 he showed Brochinni his OSP tattoos and said he was OG (Original

Gangster) OSP. He did not say he was a former gangster. After this crime

occurred, a search warrant was served at Richardson’s residence. Officers found

a binder containing OSP materials and a gang-related poster on the wall of

Richardson's room. Although the poster was not of recent origin, it was still

being displayed in the room. Although the gang material in the binder might not

have been of recent origin, other materials in the binder were recent, which

indicated that Richardson still used the binder. In addition Richardson’s

participation in the current criminal offenses was offered to prove his active

participation. Also, Officer Roberts testified that when she searched Richardson’s

bunk in jail on June 19, 1998, she found writing above Richardson’s bed which

said “Oak Lov.”

As previously set forth, in People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 692,

the appellate court held that active participation in a street gang, as that term is

used in the substantive crime contained in section 186.22, subdivision (a),

referred to a person who devoted all or a substantial portion of his time and

efforts to the gang. After trial in this case the Supreme Court in People v.

Castenada, supra, 23 Cal.4th 743 overruled Green and held that the active

participation contained in section 186.22, subdivision (a) requires proof that the

defendant's involvement with the gang is more than nominal or passive. Although

Castenada was filed after the opening brief was filed in this case, it was filed

before respondent’s brief was filed and before Richardson’s reply brief was filed,

yet neither party mentions this case. It is dispositive of the issue here.

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 11

“[O]ne ‘actively participates' in some enterprise or activity by taking part

in it in a manner that is not passive. Thus, giving these words their usual and

ordinary meaning, we construe the statutory language ‘actively participates in any

criminal street gang’ [citation] as meaning involvement with a criminal street

gang that is more than nominal or passive.” (People v. Castaneda, supra, 23

Cal.4th at p. 747.)

Richardson had a prior established relationship with OSP that is not

disputed. He was in the presence of OSP members on at least three occasions

after his release from prison, including the current offenses that were described by

Brochinni as gang offenses. He displayed OSP materials on the wall of his room

and maintained a binder in his room which contained OSP materials. OSP-related

grafitti was found above his bed in jail after his arrest. He displayed his OSP

tattoos to police officers claiming to be an OG, but he did not renounce his

membership in the gang. This was sufficient proof that Richardson “actively

participated” in a criminal street gang. Contrary to his argument on appeal, the

prosecution was not required to prove that he devoted all or a substantial portion

of his time to OSP activities.

Based on that holding, the California court of appeals further held:

Admission of Gang Evidence Against Richardson

Richardson argues: “Since juries are extremely prejudiced by gang

membership evidence, it is reasonably possible that the jury's erroneous finding

that appellant devoted all or a substantial amount of his time and efforts to the

gang, and the substantial prejudicial effect such a finding would have on the jury,

contributed to the other guilty verdicts in this closely contested case.”

Richardson's argument is premised on the faulty assumption that the jury

erroneously convicted him of the active gang participation felony. Since, as

previously discussed, his active gang participation felony was supported by

substantial evidence, Richardson's argument has no basis.

The constitutional standard for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, “after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in the original). This court must determine whether the

decision by the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied Jackson.

It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the States possess primary authority

for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). 

Consequently, although the sufficiency of the evidence review by this Court is grounded in the

Fourteenth Amendment, it must undertake its inquiry by reference to the elements of the crime

Case 1:03-cv-05348-JKS Document 27 Filed 08/24/07 Page 11 of 17
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 12

as set forth in state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16. This Court must also be ever mindful of

the deference owed to the trier of fact and the sharply limited nature of constitutional sufficiency

review. Juan H. v. Allen, 406 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir.2005). The California Court of Appeal

clearly held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Petitioner’s conviction of the crimes

under California law, as interpreted and applied by it. Whether the California Court of Appeal

correctly applied California law is beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas

proceeding. 

Petitioner misperceives the role of a federal court in a habeas proceeding challenging a

state-court conviction. This Court is precluded from either re-weighing the evidence or

assessing the credibility of witnesses. Under Jackson, the role of this Court is to simply

determine whether there is any evidence, if accepted as credible by the jury, sufficient to sustain

conviction of the crime with which a petitioner is charged, as determined by state law. Petitioner

bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the factual findings of the

jury were erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A burden Petitioner has failed to carry.

This Court cannot say that the decision of the California Court of Appeal was “contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor

can this Court find that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied the correct legal

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case as required by Lockyer–Williams; i.e., the state court

decision was more than incorrect or erroneous, its application of clearly established law was

objectively unreasonable.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his second ground.

C. Double Jeopardy.

Petitioner claims before this Court as he did before the California Court of Appeal that

the retrial following the earlier mistrial violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the United States

Constitution. In rejecting Petitioner’s arguments, the California Court of Appeal held:

Motion to Dismiss based on Double Jeopardy and Due Process

Appellants’ first trial resulted in a mistrial. Prior to that trial coappellants

made a motion to preclude the prosecution from utilizing 15 predicate acts to

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Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 13

prove the gang allegations because the People had not provided timely discovery. 

The trial court granted the motion stating that the People could not present

testimony of the predicate acts set forth in the late discovery. However, the

People could offer certified copies of any predicate acts that were mentioned

during the preliminary examinations of the defendants. In addition all appellants

moved to exclude evidence of any prior uncharged home invasion robberies. The

motion was granted. Trial commenced. As in the second trial, the witnesses at the

first trial retreated from their previous positive identifications of the appellants.

Detective Brocchini testified at the first trial. He was questioned about the

day he served Shameka with a subpoena for trial. While he was there he saw the

business card of Jack Vines, a private investigator for appellants. The district

attorney asked Brocchini what Vine’s job was. He replied, “His job is to

interview my witnesses and twist things they say.” An objection was made. The

court stated, “It is an improper comment. Be stricken.” The questioning of

Brocchini continued. Detective Brocchini was questioned about his interview

with Green just after his arrest. The district attorney asked, “How did you start

the interview?” Brocchini replied “I told him what I wanted to talk to him about.

I wanted to talk to him about this robbery and another robbery that he may or may

not have been involved.” An objection was made and the court discussed the

matter outside the presence of the jury.

Green made a motion for mistrial claiming that the testimony regarding

another robbery was prejudicial and was made to inflame the jury. Richardson

and Harrell joined in the motion stating that Brochinni’s testimony was a

gratuitous remark intended to inflame the jury. The district attorney opposed the

motion and stated he had no intention of eliciting the response he received and

furthermore he believed that Brochinni’s testimony was just a slip and not an

intentional violation of the court’s previous order. The People also represented

the harm could be cured by telling the jury that Green was clearly not involved in

the other robbery. Also, the prior court order related to another home invasion

robbery, while Brochinni's testimony was not related to that robbery. The

appellants reiterated their desire for a mistrial and in his further argument to the

court counsel for Green also pointed to the earlier statement by Brochinni

regarding Jack Vine twisting the testimony of witnesses. Based upon Brochinni's

two nonresponsive, prejudicial comments, the court granted the mistrial.

Appellants thereafter made a motion to dismiss on the ground that a retrial

would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy and on the further ground

of outrageous government conduct in violation of due process of law. The

appellants claimed that Brochinni’s testimony was a “calculated, intentional and

purposeful tactic to goad the defense into moving the Court for a mistrial.” They

asserted that this was done because the prosecution felt the case was slipping

away and a retrial would afford them the opportunity to fix whatever problems

arose in the first trial with the victims and to seek a more favorable judicial

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Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 14

forum. They also alleged that the police, via Brochinni, engaged in outrageous

governmental conduct depriving them of due process.

The motion to dismiss was heard by the same judge who granted the

mistrial. The court denied the motion stating “the court here does not find that

Detective Brocchini acted as he did for the purpose of subjecting the defendants

to the burden of multiple prosecutions or to make a fair trial for them to be

impossible. [¶] The Court could speculate that he did so either because of his zeal

to have the defendants convicted whom he truly believed to be guilty or because

of his frustration with the prosecution witnesses who had for whatever reason

obviously changed their stories, . . . had either blatantly lied to him initially or to

the jury.”

Harrell now claims on appeal that the trial court erred when it denied the

motion to dismiss. First, Harrell argues that Brocchini's behavior was designed to

provoke a mistrial so that weaknesses in the case, the witness recantations and the

court's exclusion of numerous predicate offenses, could be alleviated in a

subsequent proceeding.13 In support of his argument that Brocchini's behavior

was calculated to cause a mistrial, Harrell asserts that Brocchini was admonished

by the trial court “repeatedly” that he was broaching impermissible areas of

testimony and also claims that the comment about investigator Vine and the

comment about the robbery occurred within a short period of time (claiming the

comments occurred within one page of transcripted testimony). Without further

argument, Richardson and Green have joined in this issue on appeal.

A defendant is normally precluded from invoking the bar of double

jeopardy when he has successfully moved for a mistrial. A defendant may invoke

the bar of double jeopardy in “those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the

successful motion for mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving

for a mistrial.” (Oregon.v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667, 679.)14

13 Respondent concedes that Brochinni was acting as an agent of the People and thus his

intentions can be imputed to the prosecution. We accept this concession for the sake of

argument only.

14 The court in People v. Valenzuela-Gonzales (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 728 found that the

California Constitution does not afford a defendant a standard different from the federal

standard in these types of cases. Appellants here have not urged that a different standard

applies under California law.

In Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667, defendant Kennedy’s motion

for mistrial was granted. When he moved for dismissal of the charges based on

double jeopardy, the court denied the motion, finding that the prosecutor did not

intend to cause a mistrial. (Id. at p. 669.) The Court of Appeals accepted the trial

court’s finding but sustained the double jeopardy claim because the prosecutor’s

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Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 15

conduct constituted “‘overreaching.’” (Id. at p. 670.) The United States Supreme

Court reversed the Court of Appeals and established the aforementioned rule. In

conclusion it stated: “Since the Oregon trial court found, and the Oregon Court of

Appeals accepted, that the prosecutorial conduct culminating in the termination of

the first trial in this case was not so intended by the prosecutor, that is the end of

the matter for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.” (Id. at p. 679.)

Two assertions by Harrell lack support in the record. Harrell cites to the

two instances of misconduct on the part of Brochinni (references to the Vine

incident and the prior robbery incident), yet refers to the trial court’s admonishing

Brochinni that he was “repeatedly” broaching impermissible areas of testimony. 

The two instances cited by Harrell do not rise to the level of “repeatedly.”15 Also

Harrell asserts that the two instances of misconduct occurred with less than a page

of testimony between them. The first instance occurs at page 443 of the

supplemental reporter’s transcript, the second instance occurs at page 497 of that

same transcript. Not only are the two instances separated by multiple pages of

transcript, the first instance occurred on Friday June 19, 1998, and the second

instance occurred on Monday, June 22, 1998. Thus the two instances were

separated significantly in time. Harrell’s argument, that the two instances

occurred in close succession, thus giving rise to an inference that Brochinni’s

behavior was calculated, is simply not supported by the record.

15 Repeated is defined in the dictionary as “[s]aid, done, or occurring again and again.” 

(American Heritage Dict. (2d vollege ed. 1976) p. 1048.)

Although Brichinni’s conduct was improper, the trial court was in the best

position to judge the intentions of Brochinni. It determined that his actions were

the result of zeal or frustration, rather than an effort to trigger a mistrial. The

record supports this finding. As stated in Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. at

page 679 “that is the end of the matter for purposes of the Double Jeopardy

Clause . . . .”

Next Harrell argues that if double jeopardy did not bar appellants’ retrial,

then due process of law required the dismissal of the charges because of the great

advantage obtained by the prosecution upon retrial of the case. These advantages,

as argued by Harrell, include that the government was able to more thoroughly

prepare for the impeachment of witnesses who had changed their stories and was

able to obtain the admission of appellants’ predicate priors, ruled inadmissible at

the first trial. Harrell characterizes the actions of Brochinni as “unconscionable

misconduct.”

“When conduct on the part of the authorities is so outrageous as to

interfere with an accused’s right to due process of law, proceedings against the

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Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 16

accussed are thereby rendered improper. [Citations.] Dismissal is, on occasion,

used by the courts to discourage flagrant and shocking misconduct by overzealous

governmental officials in subsequent cases [Citations.]” (Boulas v. Superior

Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 422, 429.)

Harrell’s assertions of advantage gained by the government are

speculative and are not made upon an adequate factual basis. Harrell has not

demonstrated that the People were better equipped to impeach the prosecution

witnesses at the second trial than they were at the first. Although the prosecution

presented more predicate acts in the second trial than they were at the first,

Harrell has not outlined what acts were admitted during the first trial as compared

to the second trial in order for this court to assess whether the difference was

prejudicial. More importantly the record does not demonstrate that the improper

responses by Brochinni were outrageous, flagrant and shocking. The trial court

properly denied the motion to dismiss.

The California trial court having found that the actions of the prosecution witness were

not an effort to trigger a mistrial and the California Court of Appeal having accepted that

determination, Richardson’s arguments are foreclosed by Oregon v. Kennedy, supra. The

California Court of Appeal unquestionably applied established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. This Court cannot say that the decision of the California

Court of Appeal was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of Oregon v.

Kennedy, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding as required by Williams–Lockyer.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his third ground. 

Accordingly, because Petitioner is not entitled to relief under any claim asserted,

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the Petition

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the court declines to issue a Certificate of

Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (“reasonable

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further” (internal quotation marks omitted)). All federal

constitutional issues properly raised in the petition were addressed by the California Court of

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Richardson v. Guirbino, No. 1:03-05348-JKS 17

Appeal in its decision and no reasonable jurist could find that decisions was “objectively

unreasonable.”

The Clerk of the Court shall enter final judgment accordingly.

Dated: August 16, 2007.

s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

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