Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05074/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

RANDY ARNOLD I 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 211991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 89-5074 

LANTZ McCLAIN, individually 

as District Attorney of 

Creek County; BOARD OF COUNTY 

COMMISSIONERS, COUNTY OF CREEK; 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 

COUNTY OF OKFUSKEE, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

O:N APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-C-955-B) 

Chadwick Smith, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Robert A. Nance·, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma; and Michael s. Loeffler, Sapulpa, Oklahoma (Robert H. 

Henry, Attorney General; J. Bruce Schultz, Assistant District 

Attorney, Sapulpa, Oklahoma, with them on the brief), for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 1 
Randy Arnold (Plaintiff) appeals the grant of a motion to 

dismiss his civil rights complaint against two defendant counties1 

and the grant of summary judgment in favor of District Attorney 

Lantz McClain (Defendant). 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff is a police officer for the City of Sapulpa, 

Oklahoma. On November 6, 1987, at 2:30 p.m., Plaintiff was 

summoned to the office of District Attorney McClain. At that 

time, Plaintiff was informed by Defendant that because of 

inconsistencies in testimony given by Plaintiff under oath, 

criminal perjury charges would be filed against him unless he 

2 resigned from the Sapulpa police force by 5:00 p.m. that day. 

After two phone conversations with his wife, and a brief 

meeting with his attorney, Plaintiff tendered his resignation to 

the City of Sapulpa and it was accepted. Several days later, 

Plaintiff reconsidered and unsuccessfully attempted to rescind his 

resignation. 

On November 10, 1987, Plaintiff was invited to a meeting of 

the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to discuss the circumstances 

surrounding his resignation from the police force. Plaintiff 

attended the meeting with counsel and expressed to the officers 

1 The Boards of County Commissioners 

Okfuskee County are also named defendants. 

of Creek County and 

2 Initially, the deadline was set at 4 : 30p.m., but 

extended to 5:00 p.m. 

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later was 

Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 2 
present his version of the events surrounding his resignation. 

Defendant also came to the meeting and made statements regarding 

Plaintiff's resignation and the reasons behind it. Members of the 

press were admitted into the meeting and portions of Defendant's 

statements, as well as the earlier statements of Plaintiff and his 

counsel, were videotaped and later broadcast on television. 

On November 13, 1987, Plaintiff filed this action. 

Initially, the defendants were: Jack McKenzie, individually and 

in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the City of 

Sapulpa; Roger Miner, individually and in his official capacity as 

the City Manager of the City of Sapulpa; the City of Sapulpa 

(Oklahoma); Lantz McClain, individually and in his official 

capacity as District Attorney; and the Boards of Commissioners of 

Okfuskee and Creek Counties. Plaintiff and defendants City of 

Sapulpa, Roger Miner and Jack McKenzie, reached a settlement and 

Plaintiff was reinstated as a police officer. District Attorney 

McClain and the two counties were not involved in the settlement. 

Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint against 

Defendant and the two counties, and they filed Motions to Dismiss. 

The motion of Creek and Okfuskee Counties was granted, and the 

motion of Defendant was granted only as to a pendent state claim 

for breach of contract. Defendant then filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment raising the defenses of absolute and qualified immunity. 

After 

proceeded 

Plaintiff's 

to file the 

filing of 

perjury 

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his 

charge 

complaint, 

against him. 

Defendant 

Plaintiff 

Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 3 
sought and secured a Writ of Prohibition from the Oklahoma Court 

of Criminal Appeals prohibiting the prosecution of the perjury 

charge. In its order the court stated "[b]oth parties agree that 

the(] negotiations amounted to an agreement between the State and 

petitioner regarding criminal prosecution." The court found the 

agreement was binding; that Plaintiff had fulfilled his 

obligations under the agreement by resigning that day; and that 

"respondents [were] estopped from further prosectution [sic] of 

[the] action." 

The district court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 

Judgment. Plaintiff now appeals claiming the district court 

erred: 1) in granting Creek and Okfuskee Countie s' Motion to 

Dismiss and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the 

conclusion that District Attorney McClain is a s t ate officer for 

purposes of 42 u.s.c. § 1983 liability and Eleventh Amendment 

immunity; 3 2) i n finding Defendant was entitled to absolute 

prosecutorial immunity for his "constructive discharge" of 

Plaintiff; 3) in finding Defendant was entitled to qualified or 

good faith immunity from suit for his "constructive discharge" of 

Plaintiff; 4) in finding that Pl aintiff failed to sufficiently 

3 As an alternative to finding in Plaintiff's favor on this 

issue, Plaintiff requests this court to certify the question of 

whether the District Attorney, for purposes of liability under 42 

u.s.c. § 1983 and Eleventh Amendment immunity, is a state 

official. Certifying a question of law rests in the discretion of 

the federal court. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 

(1974). In light of our recent decision where we found that under 

Oklahoma law the district attorney is a state o f ficer, we deny 

Plaintiff's request of certification of this issue . Laidley v. 

McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1392 (lOt h Ci r. 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 4 
establish his liberty interest claim; and 5) in declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. We affirm. 

DISCUSSION 

When reviewing a district court's dismissal for failure to 

state a claim, we must accept as true the factual allegations of 

the plaintiff and resolve all reasonable inferences in his favor. 

Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1266 (lOth Cir. 

1989). We will uphold the district court's dismissal if it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of 

facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. Id. 

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing 

a district court's grant of summary judgment, we resolve all 

factual disputes and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving 

party. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 979 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3241 (1990). However, 

summary judgment is mandated "after adequate time for discovery 

and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 

that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 

proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). A failure by the nonmoving party to establish an 

essential element of its case necessarily renders all other facts 

immaterial, resulting in there being "genuine issue as to any 

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Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 5 
material fact." Id. at 323. Finally, this court is '"free to 

affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is 

a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not 

relied upon by the district court.'" Schepp v. Fremont County, 

900 F.2d 1448, 1454 (lOth Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff first contends the district court erred in granting 

Creek and Okfuskee Counties' Motion to Dismiss and in granting 

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on its finding that 

Defendant is a state official for purposes of liability under 42 

u.s.c. § 1983 and Eleventh Amendment immunity. We shall address 

these two rulings of the district court separately. 

Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims Against Creek and Okfuskee 

Counties 

Plaintiff argues Creek and Okfuskee Counties are liable for 

the official acts of Defendant as these counties comprise District 

Number 24, the district for which Defendant serves as district 

attorney. In a recent case, we decided this issue in regard to 

the very same defendants, stating: 

In contrast to the extensive funding and control 

exercised by the state over the office of district 

attorney, there is little in the record to show that the 

two counties comprising District No. 24 exercise control 

over the district attorney or his officers. Although 

the voters of Creek and Okfuskee Counties elect the 

district attorney, the office as it is arranged by 

statute seems to be an extension of the state. The 

Oklahoma Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on 

the issue, but there is some indication that it would 

view the district attorney as a state officer. We agree 

with the district court's conclusion that under Oklahoma 

law the district attorney is 2n arm of the state. 

Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d at 1391-92 (citations omitted and 

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Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 6 
emphasis added). we find this case dispositive. 

Recognizing Defendant is a state official under Oklahoma law, 

we affirm the district court's dismissal for failure to state a 

claim in favor of the two counties. 

Grant of Defendant Lantz McClain's Motion for Summary Judgment 

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant both individually 

and in his official capacity as district attorney. We deal first 

with Plaintiff's claims against Defendant in his capacity as 

district attorney. 

A. District Attorney Lantz McClain -- Official Capacity 

Official capacity suits represent "'another way of pleading 

an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" 

Laidley, 914 F.2d at 1392 (quoting Monell v. Department of Social 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). As we have already 

determined that Defendant is a state officer, Plaintiff, in 

effect, is bringing his claim against the state of Oklahoma. Such 

a claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits 

bringing an action for damages against a state in federal court. 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); see also Rozek v. 

Topolnicki, 865 F.2d 1154, 1158 (lOth Cir. 1989) (holding that 

when a district attorney is a state officer, he is entitled to 

Eleventh Amendment immunity). We therefore affirm the district 

court's grant of summary judgment in regard to Plaintiff's claims 

against Defendant in his official capacity. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 7 
B. District Attorney Lantz McClain -- Individual Capacity 

We next turn to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant in his 

individual capacity. Plaintiff asserts both liberty and property 

interest deprivations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 

the Constitution. In support of his claims Plaintiff argues: 1) 

that Defendant's "constructive discharge" of Plaintiff was a due 

process violation of his property interest based on his employment 

contract; and 2) that Defendant's alleged statements to the press 

amounted to a due process violation of Plaintiff's liberty 

interest in being "free of stigmatization." Defendant argues his 

actions were within the scope of his prosecutorial duties thereby 

entitling him to absolute prosecutorial immunity. 

1. Property Interest. 

Looking to Plaintiff's property interest claim, we first 

note our disagreement with Plaintiff's characterization of the 

district attorney's actions as being a "constructive discharge." 

Constructive discharge is a question of fact which we review under 

a clearly erroneous standard. Hirschfeld v. New Mexico 

Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 580 (lOth Cir. 1990) (quoting 

Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th 

Cir. 1989)). In determining whether a constructive discharge has 

occurred, we look to "'whether the employer by its illegal 

acts has made working conditions so difficult that a reasonable 

person in the employee's position would feel compelled to 

resign.'" Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1154 (lOth Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 8 
1990) (quoting Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (lOth 

Cir . 19 B 6 ) ) . 

In this case, Plaintiff was given a choice of whether to 

resign or to have criminal perjury charges brought against him. 

Plaintiff chose the former option. Plaintiff was given several 

hours in which to make his decision, during which time he 

consulted with his wife and with an attorney. Following his 

resignation, Plaintiff petitioned the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals to enforce the agreement reached between the parties, 

specifically, to enforce the district attorney's "promise 11 not to 

file perjury charges against Plaintiff . The Oklahoma court 

granted Plaintiff's request finding the negotiations resulted in a 

binding agreement between the parties. Based on the record, we do 

not find the district court's characterization of Defendant 's 

actions in connection with securing Plaintiff's resignation as 

being part of the "plea bargaining process" to be clearly 

erroneous. We find Plaintiff voluntarily resigned, accepting the 

benefits of his "bargain" with Defendant by avoiding facing the 

criminal perjury charge, and cannot now claim this bargain 

amounted to a constructive discharge, particularly in light of the 

fact that he went to state court and had the bargain judicially 

enforced . 

Having determined no constructive discharge occurred, we must 

still address whether the actions of Defendant were within his 

prosecutorial duties, entitli ng him to absolute immunity for 

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Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 9 
Plaintiff's property interest claim. The determination of whether 

Defendant should be entitled to prosecutorial immunity for his 

actions in securing Plaintiff's resignation is a question of law, 

which we review de novo. England v. Hendricks, 880 F.2d 281, 285 

(lOth Cir. 1989) (citing Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 

846 F . 2d 627, 629 (lOth Cir. 1988)), cert. denied 110 s.ct. 1130 

(1990) . 

In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-27 (1976), the 

Supreme Court made clear that prosecutors are entitled to absolute 

immunity from § 1983 suits for damages when their actions are 

within the scope of their prosecutorial duties. Plaintiff argues 

that the agreement reached between him and Defendant was not a 

"bona fide plea bargain" and therefore exceeded the scope of the 

district attorney's prosecutorial disc retion. We find this 

analysis flawed. First, we note this court's decision in Lerwill 

v. Josli n, 712 F . 2d 435, 439 (lOth Cir. 1983), where we stated: 

Even if a prosecutor may lose his absolute immunity 

for prosecutorial acts for which he has no colorable 

claim of authority, it does not follow that he does so 

immediately upon crossing the technical bounds of the 

powe r conferred on him by local law. Indeed, i t has 

long been a f undamental tenet of immunity doctri ne that 

when a judicial officer has absol ute immunity from 

liability, his immunity does not become qualified simply 

because he acted in excess of his authority. In Bradley 

v. Fisher, 80 U. s. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), the Supreme 

Court held that while a judge is not absolutely immune 

for judicial acts taken in "the c l ear absenc e of all 

jurisdiction over the subject matter," he remains immune 

f or such acts that were merely in "excess of [his] 

jurisdiction." Id. at 351-52 ••.. As the Court more 

recently explained ••. [a] judge will not be deprived of 

immunity because the acti on he took was in error, was 

done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; 

rather, he will be subject to liabili ty only when he has 

acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." ••. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 10 
While Bradley dealt with judicial Lmffiunity, it has 

generally been found applicable to a prosecutor's quasijudicial immunity as well ..•. In determining whether a 

prosecutor has lost his absolute immunity by committing 

a prosecutorial act beyond the scope of his authority, 

we must interpret his authority broadly. 

Id. (citations omitted). Second, the technical label applied to 

an agreement or negotiation of this nature is immaterial. As 

stated by the Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York, 404 u.s. 

257, 260 (1971): "[t]he disposition of criminal charges by 

agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes 

loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the 

administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be 

encouraged." We find the "agreement" between the two parties 

herein to be sufficiently analogous to a plea bargain to warrant 

the same deference to the prosecutor's discretion. Accordingly, 

we find Defendant is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity 

for his actions in securing the resignation of Officer Arnold. 

See Newton v. Rumery, 480 u.s. 386, 395 (1987); Imbler, 424 u.s. 

at 424-31. Having determined Defendant is absolutely immune for 

his actions in securing Plaintiff's resignation, we need not reach 

Plaintiff's contention that the district court erred in finding 

Defendant would also be entitled to good faith or qualified 

immunity for his actions. 

2. Liberty Interest. 

Plaintiff next contends the district court erred in 

sustaining Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's 

liberty interest claim. As the basis for his liberty interest 

claim Plaintiff contends that "stigmatizing statements [made by 

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Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 11 
Defendant) to the press against [Plaintiff] at the FOP meeting on 

November 10, 1987" deprived him of a liberty interest without due 

process of law. Defendant argues such statements were made only 

after the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's resignation had 

been made public by Plaintiff and his attorney. In granting 

summary judgment on this issue, the district court found that 

Defendant "appeared only in an effort to give his side of the 

story and to rebut charges of impropriety," and that the 

"information had already been publicly disseminated" prior to any 

statement by Defendant. The district court then held that 

Plaintiff 11 failed to come forward with specific facts showing 

a genuine issue for trial and that the record taken as a whole 

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

Plaintiff. 11 

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence in 

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we find Plaintiff has 

failed to sufficiently establish his liberty interest deprivation 

based on Defendant's alleged "stigmatizing" statements to the 

press. In his brief to this court, Plaintiff concedes that 

information regarding his resignation had been disseminated to the 

law enforcement community prior to any statements made by 

Defendant. 4 However, Plaintiff contends it is Defendant's 

4 Plaintiff apparently does not take full responsibility for 

the dissemination of information regarding his "discharge" but 

acknowledges in his brief to this court that he spoke to fellow 

officers at the FOP meeting about his discharge prior to 

Defendant's arrival at the meeting. Plaintiff contends, however, 

that the issue is not who initially released the information 

regarding his resignation; rather, the key is who publicly 

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Appellate Case: 89-5074 Document: 01019729002 Date Filed: 02/21/1991 Page: 12 
statements labeling Plaintiff a "perjurer" that provide the basis 

for his l iberty interest claim. Under the applicable case law and 

facts, we find this claim untenable. 

In order to establish a claim of liberty interest 

deprivation, a government employee must show publication of false 

and defamatory information in connection with his termination by 

someone acting under the color of state law. Codd v. Velger, 429 

U.S. 624, 628 (1977 ) ; Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567, 572 (lOth Cir. 

disseminated the stigmatizing information about him. We do not 

dispute Plainti ff's distinction; rather, we find the distinction 

inapplicable to the present facts. Plaintiff herein admits to 

explaining to the officers at the FOP meeting the circumstances 

which led to his resignation, including the perjury charge. 

Defendant, in his statements, addressed the same issues. Merely 

because Defendant's version was less favorable to Plaintiff than 

his own does not give rise to the type o f claim advanced by 

Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff also argues Defendant 11Crashed [the] FOP meeting 

uninvited .... " Yet, in reviewi ng the transcript from the FOP 

meeting, we found the following statement made by a fellow officer 

near the end of Defendant's comments: 

You've all had the rare opportunity to see both 

sides of it first hand, as the jury, the judge, defense 

attorney, and prosecutor. And that's the only reason 

that [Plaintiff] agreed to speak tonight to let you 

judge for yourself. And you've certainly had the 

perfect certain opportunity to do that. And I think 

we ought to appreciate [Defendant] for coming and giving 

his side of it. 

This statement indicates a clear understanding by FOP members that 

the purpose of this meeting was to hear both sides of this 

dispute. It is also clear that even if this meeting was initially 

meant to be "closed," as Plaintiff contends, it became "open" 

through no fault of Defendant. We find further support for this 

propositi on in Plaintiff's Brie f in Objection of Motion for 

Summary Judgment, where Plaintiff offers the statement of Officer 

Harley Hausam, Sapulpa FOP president. Included in his statement, 

Offi cer Hausam stat es that "GARY YOUNG, FOP Secretary-Treasurer, 

then invited the press, who were waiting outside, into the 

meeting." 

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1985). In addition, "once a properly supported motion for summary 

judgment is made, the opposing party may not merely rest on the 

allegations in the complaint [but] must respond with some factual 

showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." 

Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 746 F.2d 1407, 1412 (lOth Cir. 

1984) (emphasis added). Plaintiff failed to make a factual 

showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the 

falsity of the statements made by Defendant. Nor has there been 

any such finding made by the Oklahoma state courts or federal 

district court. See Codd, 429 u.s. at 627. Plaintiff has also 

affirmatively acknowledged that general information regarding his 

resignation was published prior to any statement by Defendant. We 

therefore uphold the district court's ruling that Defendant 's 

statements at the FOP meeting did not provide the basis for a 

constitutional claim of a liberty interest deprivation. 5 

5 We recognize that a public prosecutor's statements in regard 

to criminal proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity when 

made in a capacity other than that of an advocate, since such 

statements would not be considered quasi-judicial acts. England 

v. Hendricks, 880 F.2d 281 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied 110 S. 

Ct. 1130 (1990); Gobel v . Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1205 

(9th Cir. 1989). However, while unnecessary in light of our 

disposition of this issue, we note here that we believe Defendant 

would be entitled to qualified immunity for his statements made at 

the FOP meeting. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); 

England, 880 F.2d at 285. This court noted in England that a 

prosecutor's statements to the press are considered an 

administrative function entitling the prosecutor to qualified 

immunity in most instances. The scope of this immunity was set 

out in Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1394 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(citing Harlow, 457 U.S . at 818), where we acknowledged that 

government officials would be entitled to qualified immunity 

"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known." Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing a substantial correspondence between the conduct in 

question and prior law which would show the defendant's actions 

were clearly prohibited. Id., citing Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 

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Dismissal of Plaintiff's Pendent State Tort Claims 

The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff's pendent state tort claims. Inasmuch as we find no 

substantial federal claim to exist, we affirm the district court's 

ruling on Plaintiff's pendent tort claims. United Mine Workers of 

America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-29 (1966). 

CONCLUSION 

For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the district 

court's order granting Creek and Okfuskee Counties' Motion to 

Dismiss and District Attorney Lantz McClain's Motion for Summary 

Judgment. 

907 F.2d 129, 130-31 (lOth Cir. 1990). Plaintiff has failed to 

establish a violation of c l early established law by Defendant or 

the requisite nexus to his actions. 

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