Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03441/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03441-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Plaintiff Michael Martinez seeks judicial review of the denial of his application for 

child’s insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by according inadequate 

weight to medical opinions and rejecting his subjective complaints (Doc. 11 at 1). 

To be eligible for child’s insurance benefits, Plaintiff must establish disability prior 

to attaining the age of twenty-two, or more specifically, he must establish disability on or 

before December 7, 2003. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B). The Social Security Act defines 

disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 

12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Administration’s decision to 

deny benefits should be upheld unless it is based on legal error or is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Bayliss 

Michael Martinez,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-18-03441-PHX-SPL

ORDER

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v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “It means such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted). The Court must review 

the record as a whole and consider both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 

detracts from the ALJ’s determination. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985).

A. PLAINTIFF’S CREDIBILITY 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in her analysis of Plaintiff’s credibility (Doc. 13 at 4). 

In evaluating a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis. 

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ must decide whether 

the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an impairment reasonably 

expected to produce some degree of the symptoms alleged. Id. If the first test is met and 

there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the testimony regarding the severity 

of the symptoms only by providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for the rejection. 

Id. Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medical impairments could reasonably be expected to 

cause some of the alleged symptoms, but concluded that his statements as to the intensity 

or limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible (AR 20).1 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ took his hearing testimony out of context (Doc. 13 at 5), 

and that a review of Plaintiff’s activities does not conflict with an application for disability 

(Doc. 13 at 6). In evaluating Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the ALJ found “[t]he 

claimant’s activity during the period at issue suggests a greater level of functioning than 

alleged.” (AR 21). The ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff graduated high school in 

2001, began attending Mesa Community College that same year, and transferred to ASU 

in 2004, where he earned a degree in biology in 2011 (AR 21, 59). Plaintiff also worked 

part time from 2001 to 2004, lived independently from 2000 to 2012 (AR 21, AR 52), and 

managed his symptoms without medication for a majority of that time. 

Although Plaintiff’s daily activities do not necessarily “conflict” with a finding for

1 Administrative Record (see Doc. 14).

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disability, the evidence is such that it could be rationally interpreted as also supporting a 

finding against disability. The Court thus finds that to reverse would require it to review 

the factual record de novo and re-weigh the evidence. The Court is prohibited from doing 

so. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Where evidence is susceptible 

to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)); Flynn v. Charter, 107 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1997) 

(“Rather, ‘if it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of 

those positions represents the agency’s findings, we must affirm the decision.’” (citation 

omitted)). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err, and provided clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 

B. MEDICAL OPINIONS

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ accorded inadequate weight to the opinion of 

Plaintiff’s therapist David C. Busch, LCSW (Doc. 11 at 6-8). Within that argument, 

Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to even consider the opinion of psychiatrist Dr. 

Aimee Schwartz, M.D. (Doc. 11 at 8).

To reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining 

doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence. If a treating or examining 

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an 

ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). “The 

ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.”

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). A board-certified psychiatrist is 

considered an “acceptable medical source” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a). See Swanson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 274 F.Supp.3d 932, 936 (D. Ariz. 2017). In contrast, mental 

health therapists are considered “other sources,” as opposed to “acceptable medical 

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sources.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502;2 Doney v. Berryhill, 728 Fed.Appx. 687, 690 (9th Cir. 

2018); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Knapp v. Colvin, 

No. 1:14-cv-3189-FVS, 2015 WL 6511614, at *12 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2015) (finding a 

mental health therapist or counselor did not qualify as an acceptable medical source where 

the services treatment team leader was not an acceptable medical source, there was no 

indication the therapist was supervised by a doctor, and a doctor’s signature did not appear 

on the treatment team’s opinion or elsewhere in the record). In reviewing “other source” 

opinions, the ALJ may discount such testimony by setting forth germane reasons for doing 

so. 

1. DAVID C. BUSCH, LCSW

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide germane reasons for rejecting a letter from 

David C. Busch, Plaintiff’s therapist from January 2003 to November 2005 (AR 1019). 

The short letter provided that Plaintiff “presented with a serious mental illness of

Schizoaffective Disorder,” “was at times difficult to understand,” had limited social 

awareness, “[h]is ability to function was often borderline,” “his condition fluctuated,” and 

“he was unable to continue seeing me when he had an active psychosis.” (AR 1019). 

Because the associated counseling records were not available, the ALJ found she was 

unable to compare the opinion to any corresponding treatment notes (AR 21). 

On this record, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in finding that the conclusory 

opinion conflicted with Plaintiff’s daily activities. (AR 21). See Orn, 495 F.3d at 631 

(noting factors relevant to evaluating a medical opinion include the amount of supporting 

evidence, the quality of the explanation, and the consistency of the opinion with the record 

as a whole (emphasis added)); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 

(9th Cir. 1999) (finding a medical opinion of disability premised on subjective complaints 

may be disregarded where the subjective complaints have been properly discounted). 

2 The Court notes that effective March 27, 2017, the definition of “acceptable 

medical source” was expanded to include licensed audiologists, licensed advanced practice 

registered nurses, and licensed physician assistants within their licensed scope of practice. 

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Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ provided germane reasons for rejecting the opinion 

of Plaintiff’s therapist, David C. Busch.

2. AIMEE SCHWARTZ, M.D.

Plaintiff further argues the ALJ failed to address the opinion of Plaintiff’s 

psychiatrist, Aimee Schwartz, M.D. (Doc. 11 at 8). Defendant argues the ALJ did not fail 

to address the opinion as it was not presented to the ALJ until after she rendered her 

decision (Doc. 12 at 5). Upon review of the hearing transcript, however, it appears that Dr. 

Schwartz’s medical source statement was, in fact, received into evidence (AR 44, 1016-

1018). “Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, 

legitimate reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, [s]he errs.” Garrison v. 

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Here, the Court finds the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms, which Dr. 

Schwartz opined began in 2000,

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and ultimately found they conflicted with Plaintiff’s 

reported daily activities at that time. See Isham v. Barnhart, 163 Fed.Appx. 473, 475 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Accordingly, even though Dr. Schwartz was not specifically mentioned by 

name, because there are clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the opinion specifically

discussed within the ALJ’s decision, the Court finds the error to be harmless. Id. (finding 

harmless error).4

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration is affirmed. 

3 Dr. Schwartz’s medical source statement is from April 12, 2017, and addresses 

Plaintiff’s limitations at that time period. As relevant here, the opinion provides generally 

that Plaintiff’s psychosis began at age 18 in 2000 (AR 1018). 

4 Because the Court finds the ALJ provided appropriate reasons for rejecting 

Plaintiff’s testimony based on daily activities, and subsequently provided appropriate 

reasons for rejecting the medical opinions based on that conduct, the Court does not address 

the other justifications provided in the decision and addressed in the Opening Brief. See 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n ALJ’s error was harmless 

where the ALJ provided one or more invalid reasons for disbelieving a claimant’s 

testimony, but also provided valid reasons that were supported by the record.”).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly and terminate this case.

Dated this 5th day of March, 2020.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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