Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06170/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06170-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL CARRILLO ORNELAS, CASE NO. CV-F-04-6170 DLB HC

Petitioner, ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS, DIRECTING

vs. CLERK OF COURT TO SERVE 

DOCUMENTS, AND DIRECTING 

KERN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, RESPONDENT TO FILE RESPONSE

TO AMENDED PETITION

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction

of the United States Magistrate Judge.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is incarcerated pursuant to a conviction entered in the Kern County Superior Court

for residential burglary, receiving stolen property, and possession of burglary tools. It was found true

that Petitioner has previously been convicted of two serious felonies. 

Petitioner timely appealed his convictions to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District, which affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. The petition was

denied. 

No state habeas corpus petitions were filed. 

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Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 26, 2004. On

September 7, 2004, the Court issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim. On December 8, 2004, Petitioner filed an amended petition.

On December 13, 2004, the Court directed Respondent to file a response to the petition. 

On February 11, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner did not file an

opposition. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be raised

by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” The Ninth

Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitioner failed to

exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). 

Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s

motion for dismissal pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

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Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). For

example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must

say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A

general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a

federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982)

(Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an

argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074

(1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional

guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999);

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

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 The Court notes that in its December 13, 2004, order to respond, it directed the Clerk of Court to serve a copy

of the petition on Respondent. The Court may have inadvertently served Respondent with a copy of the original, not amended

petition. 

2

 Because it is unclear, the Court will refrain from finding the claims to have been exhausted, without the benefit

of Respondent having further opportunity to raise the argument. 

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that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the 

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the instant case, Petitioner raises the following two claims for relief: 1) the trial court

engaged in instructional error; and 2) his trial counsel was ineffective. 

In his motion, Respondent argues that Petitioner raises a single claim that was not exhausted

at the state court level. It appears that Respondent’s argument may be based on the original petition,

as that petition raised a single (not cognizable) claim. However, this action is proceeding on

Petitioner’s first amended petition, filed on December 8, 2004.1 Because the claims raised in the

amended petition may be the same claims raised at the state highest’s court, Respondent’s motion to

dismiss must be denied.2

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED;

2. Within forty-five (45) days from the date of service of this order, Respondent shall

file a response to Petitioner’s first amended petition; 

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to serve a courtesy copy of the amended petition, filed

on December 8, 2004, at Court Doc. 9, on Respondent; and

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4. All provisions set forth in the Court’s December 13, 2004, order to respond remain in

full force and effect.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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