Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01654/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01654-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KEITH CHANDLER,

NO. CIV. S-05-1654 WBS PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: MOTION TO CORRECT ORDER

PETE WILSON, Governor of the

State of California, In His

Official and Individual

Capacities; the STATE OF

CALIFORNIA; the CALIFORNIA

YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL

AGENCY; JOE SANDOVAL,

Secretary, Youth & Adult

Correctional Agency, In His

Official and Individual

Capacities; the CALIFORNIA

BOARD OF PRISON TERMS; TED

RICH, Chief Executive Officer,

California Board of Prison

Terms, In His Official and

Individual Capacities; THOMAS

GIAQUINTO, Commissioner,

California Board of Prison

Terms, In His Official and

Individual Capacities; CAROL

BENTLEY, Commissioner,

California Board of Prison

Terms, In Her Official and

Individual Capacities; and

DOES 1-25,

Defendants.

 ----oo0oo---- 

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The other defendants did not join in the motion. At 1

least two of these defendants, Governor Pete Wilson and Joe

Sandoval, had not yet been served. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to

Dismiss at 6 n.1.) 

2

Plaintiff Keith Chandler’s complaint alleges six causes

of action against defendants: (1) violation of plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2)

“abuse of process”, (3) false imprisonment, (4) malicious

prosecution, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress,

and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Compl.) On

November 3, 2005, this court held that defendants California

Board of Prison Terms (presently the California Board of Parole

Hearings) (“BPT”), Ted Rich, Thomas Giaquinto, and Carol Bentley

were absolutely immune from suit and dismissed plaintiff’s claims

against them. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1

60(a), plaintiff now moves the court to reconsider that order

with respect to defendant Rich, who did not argue for absolute

immunity.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff was convicted of second degree murder by the

Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County

of Yolo, and was sentenced to 15 years to life on June 7, 1985. 

(Compl. ¶ 16.) On July 31, 1991, the BPT found plaintiff

suitable for parole and set his parole date for July 2, 1998. 

(Id. ¶ 17); Chandler v. Mueller, No. Civ. 99-1284, slip op. at 2

(E.D. Cal. June 2, 2004). 

However, according to allegations in the complaint,

defendant Governor Pete Wilson, motivated by his political

aspirations, informed subordinates sometime between 1991 and 1994

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 In the opinion granting plaintiff’s habeas petition, Judge 2

Singleton described both the 1991 and 1994 parole hearings. The

1994 panel rescinded plaintiff’s parole because “the granting

panel failed to adequately consider the inmate’s obsessive

minimazation [sic] of his participation in the crime.” Chandler,

No. Civ. 99-1284, slip op. at 2. The panel concluded that this

oversight constituted “a fundamental error resulting in an

improvident grant.” Id. From the opinion, it is not clear that

this concern was actually considered by the 1991 panel, despite

the fact that they “questioned Chandler in detail regarding his

specific role in the crime.” Id. at 1.

3

that some existing grants of parole should be rescinded. (Compl.

¶¶ 19-20.) Subsequently, “[d]efendant Rich . . . took steps to

ensure that defendant Wilson’s desire to have existing parole

dates rescinded be followed.” (Id. ¶ 22.) On September 13,

1994, defendant BPT met for an en banc hearing and voted to

schedule a parole rescission hearing, which took place on April

12, 1995. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) Despite the lack of new evidence to

support revocation, defendants Giaquinto and Bentley nevertheless

rescinded plaintiff’s 1991 grant of parole. (Id. ¶ 25.) 

On June 3, 2004, Judge Singleton (sitting on this court

by designation), granted plaintiff’s habeas corpus petition,

holding that defendant BPT did not have the requisite “good

cause” to revoke the 1991 decision to grant plaintiff’s parole.2

(Id ¶ 29); Chandler, No. Civ. 99-1284, slip op. at 6. 

Consequently, plaintiff was released from state prison on June 5,

2004. (Compl. ¶ 30.) On April 14, 2005, defendant BPT

officially discharged plaintiff from parole. (Id. ¶ 35.) 

On August 17, 2005, plaintiff filed this suit, seeking

compensatory damages of $3,000,000, punitive damages in the

amount of $9,000,000, costs and fees, and any other relief the

court should deem just. (Id. at 10 (Prayer for Relief).) 

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Originally, plaintiffs claims were against defendants Wilson,

Rich, Giaquinto, Bentley, Sandoval, the State of California, BPT,

the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, the California

Department of Corrections, and Does 1-25. However, in its

November 3, 2005 Order, this court dismissed defendants Rich,

Giaquinto, Bentley, and the BPT from this case. Plaintiff now

challenges that order with respect to Rich, because dismissal was

based on absolute immunity, a defense that Rich did not raise or,

in plaintiff’s opinion, deserve. 

II. Discussion

A. Rule 60(a) Standard

Plaintiff brings his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(a), which permits the court, on “its own

initiative or on the motion of any party,” to correct clerical

errors in its orders. Primarily, the rule provides courts with a

means to conform an unclear judgment to a prior oral ruling. 

Buchanan v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 319, 324 (D. Or. 1990). 

“A district court is not permitted, however, to clarify a

judgment pursuant to Rule 60(a) to reflect a new and subsequent

intent because it perceives its original judgment to be

incorrect.” Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir.

1992). In other words, “Rule 60(a) does not apply when the court

changes its ruling because of a legal or factual mistake.” 

Ground v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (S.D. Cal. 1992)

(citing Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 n. 2 (9th Cir.

1987)).

In the instant case, the original order granting

defendant’s motion to dismiss was flawed not because it failed to

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The complaint does not allege that defendant Rich 3

participated in the decision to revoke plaintiff’s parole and

accuses him only of having “specifically [taken] steps to ensure

that Defendant Wilson’s desire to have existing parole dates

rescinded be followed.” (Compl. ¶ 22.) Indeed, defendant Rich

argued in support of his motion to dismiss that he “was not a

member of the Board of Prison Terms, nor did he participate in

any of their decisions . . . .” (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp.

of Mot. to Dismiss 11.) Therefore, this court erred when it

awarded him immunity reserved for the quasi-judicial actions of

Board members involved in the actual decision to revoke parole.

5

capture the court’s intent, but rather because it was based on a

factual mistake. The court mistakenly grouped defendant Rich

with other defendants who argued for absolute immunity. 

Consequently, defendant Rich (who, as the Chief Executive Officer

of the BPT, did not actually participate in the Board’s decision

to revoke plaintiff’s parole) was afforded a brand of quasijudicial immunity applicable to parole board members only “when

they decide to grant, deny, or revoke parole.” Sellars v. 3

Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Swift

v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding

that parole officials who play “only a preliminary role . . . in

a determination to revoke [parole]” are not entitled to absolute

immunity (clarifying Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906 (9th Cir.

1983)); McGrew v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 161

(5th Cir. 1995) (“Although parole board members who personally

participate in the ‘quasi-judicial activity of revoking parole’

are absolutely immune from suit, other executive officers who are

responsible for promulgating the rules and policies governing

such proceedings are entitled only to qualified immunity.”).

The fact that the court failed to consider defendant

Rich’s other immunity arguments further demonstrates that his

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

inclusion among the absolutely immune defendants was more than a

mere typographical error. The court simply misconstrued his role

in the revocation decision and ergo applied the wrong legal

standard when considering whether to dismiss him from the case. 

Such substantive errors are not the proper subject matter for a

Rule 60(a) motion to amend.

However, the court’s inability to grant plaintiff’s

requested relief under Rule 60(a) is not dispositive of this

motion. “Nomenclature is not controlling” when a court considers

a post-judgment motion for relief and a court should construe the

motion “however styled, to be the type proper for the relief

requested.” Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524,

527 (9th Cir. 1983). Here, since plaintiff essentially seeks

reconsideration of the court’s November 3, 2005 Order because it

was based on a mistaken understanding of the facts, he may still

succeed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(1). See

Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., No. CV 01-10396,

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27574, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2004)

(construing a motion under Rule 60(a) as one under Rule

60(b)(4)).

B. Rule 60(b)(1) Standard

Rule 60(b)(1) allows the court, “[o]n motion and upon

such terms as are just,” to relieve a party from a final order

for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” If

filed “within a reasonable time not exceeding the time for

appeal,” such motions can be used by a trial court to correct

judicial errors. Gila River Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 368

F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966); Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v.

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he words

‘mistake’ and ‘inadvertence’ . . . may include mistake and

inadvertence by the judge.”). 

Here, plaintiff filed his motion on November 30, 2005,

challenging an order issued on November 3, 2005. Thus, his

motion was timely as it fell within the 30 day period for filing

an appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 

However, because the court erroneously held that defendant Rich

was protected by absolute immunity, it did not consider whether

his dismissal was nevertheless warranted for other reasons. 

Justice will not be served if claims against defendant Rich

proceed when he argued for, and was entitled to, some other form

of immunity. Consequently, in order to relive plaintiff of this

court’s November 3, 2005 Order “upon such terms as are just,” the

court must consider the merits of these arguments. 

C. Qualified Immunity

In his motion to dismiss, defendant Rich first argued

for qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a generous

standard designed to protect “all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Schroeder v. McDonald, 41

F.3d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.

478, 495 (1991)); see also Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420,

1438 (9th Cir. 1994). The doctrine applies even in cases where

the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, so

long as the unlawfulness of the challenged action was not readily

apparent. Id.; Meyers v. Redwood City, 400 F.3d 765, 770 (9th

Cir. 2005). Therefore, to come within its protections, an

officer need only demonstrate (1) that the law governing his

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

conduct was not clearly established at the time of the challenged

actions, or (2) that under the clearly established law, he could

reasonably have believed that the alleged conduct was lawful. 

See Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999);

Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994); see also

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding “that

government officials performing discretionary functions generally

are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.”).

As an initial matter, though, the court must determine

whether the alleged conduct actually violated a constitutional

right. Meyers, 400 F.3d at 770. “If no constitutional right

would have been violated were the allegations established, there

is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

immunity.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Here,

plaintiff had a constitutional right to due process in a

California state parole revocation proceeding. In re Powell, 45

Cal. 3d 894, 902 (1998). Moreover, courts have, subsequent to

the revocation of plaintiff’s parole in 1995, determined that a

decision to “resc[ind] a parole release date merely because

‘reasonable minds could differ’ [regarding] the prisoner’s

suitability for parole” falls short of the constitutional

requirement that “some evidence” support a decision to revoke. 

In re Caswell, 92 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1029 (2001); see also

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 2002).

However, although plaintiff had a constitutional right

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

to due process in a parole revocation proceeding, the procedural

requirements for such a proceeding were not entirely clear at the

time of his hearing. Sweeping statements from the California

Supreme Court recognizing the BPT’s “great” and “almost

unlimited” discretion in parole matters and permitting the BPT to

“determine[], in its discretion, that parole was ‘improvidently

granted’ under the circumstances that appeared at the time of the

grant” certainly suggested that a parole candidate’s rights would

not be violated if a later panel simply disagreed with the prior

panel’s decision to grant parole. In re Powell, 45 Cal. 3d at

902 (emphasis added). Indeed, in In re Johnson, 35 Cal. App. 4th

160 (1995), decided just one month after plaintiff’s recision

hearing, a California court held that inadequate consideration of

evidence by the granting board could support recision at a later

date. Id. at 168-70. But see In re Caswell, 92 Cal. App. 4th at

1029 (limiting Johnson to situations where a grant of parole

“cannot be reconciled with the evidence before the granting

panel, or when the granting panel . . . explicitly declined to

consider information germane to the gravity of the crimes”). 

Evidently, the law governing the BPT’s conduct was not

clearly established at the time of the challenged actions. 

Specifically, it was not clear, at the time, that the BPT could

not rescind a grant of parole based on “[t]he granting panel[‘s]

fail[ure] to adequately consider the inmate’s obsessive

minimazation [sic] of his participation in the crime . . . .” 

Chandler, No. Civ. 99-1284, slip op. at 2 (quoting the panel’s

reasons for revocation). Indeed, the law in this area arguably

remains unclear to this day. Judge England recently held that

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 This procedure was recently changed pursuant to S.B. 737, 4

Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).

 Moreover, even if not deserving of qualified immunity, 5

defendant Rich simply cannot be held responsible for the decision

to revoke plaintiff’s parole. Even if, as alleged, defendant

Rich was “responsible for ensuring that California operated its

10

California state prisoners do not have a federal liberty interest

in parole and are, accordingly, “not entitled to federal due

process protections as a matter of right.” Sass v. Cal. Bd. of

Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975, 983 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 

Furthermore, under the clearly established law,

defendant Rich “could reasonably have believed that [his] alleged

conduct was lawful.” The complaint notes only that “Defendant

Rich specifically took steps to ensure that Defendant Wilson’s

desire to have existing parole dates rescinded be followed.” 

(Compl. ¶ 22.) According to California law however, defendant

Rich was powerless to interfere with Governor Wilson’s efforts to

reconsider parole grants. California Penal Code § 3041.1 

empowered the governor to, “[u]p to 90 days prior to a scheduled

parole release date, . . . request review of any decision

concerning the grant or denial of parole to any prisoner in a

state prison.” In the event of such a request, the full board,

sitting en banc, was required to review the parole decision.4

Id. Defendant Rich had no role to play here. Because the

rescinding board’s actions were not necessarily contrary to

clearly established law and because defendant Rich could

reasonably have believed that he was not in a position to block

the revocation of plaintiff’s parole, defendant Rich is entitled

to qualified immunity for the actions complained of here.5

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

parole system in compliance with State and Federal Constitutional

mandates and with respect for the rights of inmates appearing

before it,” (compl. ¶ 11), he was not empowered to interfere with

the Governor and the Board’s decision to revisit and revoke

plaintiff’s parole. See Cal. Penal Code § 3041.1 (creating

procedures for recision that involve only the governor and the

Board); see also Cal. Penal Code § 3063 (permitting the Board to

rescind parole “for cause”). 

11

III. Conclusion

Although the court erred in granting defendant Rich

absolute immunity in its November 3, 2005 Order, this mistake had

no impact on plaintiff’s legal rights. Defendant Rich should

have been granted qualified immunity in the previous order and he

therefore remains immune from suit for the actions complained of

here.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this court’s November 3,

2005 Order be MODIFIED to the extent that it purported to grant

defendant Rich’s motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity and

defendant Rich’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED for the

reasons set forth in this order.

DATED: January 13, 2006

Case 2:05-cv-01654-WBS-PAN Document 35 Filed 01/17/06 Page 11 of 11