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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 24, 2020*

Decided February 26, 2020 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1339 

STEVEN D. LISLE, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

KEVIN KELLER, et al. 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 17-1530-CSB 

Colin S. Bruce, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Steven Lisle, an inmate, sued prison officials at the Correctional Center in 

Pontiac, Illinois, for violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments. Lisle asserts that officers sprayed him with mace and then 

shut off the water in his cell, and later, other officers strip-searched and sexually 

assaulted him. The court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding that 

Lisle failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Because the issue of exhaustion is 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 19-1339 Page 2 

contested, as defendants concede, we vacate and remand with respect to that issue. But 

the district court did not err in denying Lisle’s other motions, so we affirm the 

remainder of the judgment. 

In a grievance filed on June 9, 2017 (with whom is unclear from the record), Lisle 

described a 48-hour period during which he was repeatedly assaulted while at the 

prison. Two months earlier, Lisle wrote, officer Kevin Keller used a racial slur and then 

sprayed a can of mace at his face and body and into his cell. Keller reportedly then told 

Sergeant Micah Dillon to turn the water off and “let [Lisle] die.” Lisle says that he 

demanded medical attention but was told he would receive none. He was left in his cell 

without running water for 48 hours. Lisle went on to say in his grievance that two days 

later the “Orange Crush” Tactical Unit subjected him to a strip search and that a team 

member digitally penetrated his rectum. 

A counselor responded to Lisle’s grievance on July 10, 2017, stating that an 

investigation did not substantiate his claims. Lisle considered the counselor’s response 

inadequate because the counselor had interviewed only the officers. Seeking to appeal 

the counselor’s ruling, he says that he gave a copy of the original grievance to a 

correctional officer to deliver to the grievance officer. Pontiac’s grievance officer, Sharon 

Simpson, declared that she had no record of receiving any correspondence. Lisle 

appealed the denial of his grievance to the Administrative Review Board, reporting that 

his grievances were not being processed; he included a copy of his grievance of June 9, 

2017. The Board received Lisle’s appeal on November 3, 2017. After receiving Lisle’s 

appeal, the Board informed Lisle that he needed to provide his original written 

grievance, including the counselor’s response, as well as the grievance officer’s and 

chief administrative officer’s response. Lisle did not respond. 

Lisle then brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting various 

constitutional claims, including a claim for excessive use of force. He detailed the 48-

hour period that he described in his grievances, explained why he believed he had 

exhausted his administrative remedies, and requested both compensatory damages and 

injunctive relief in the form of changed prison policies. During discovery, he moved 

both for Judge Bruce to recuse himself and for a transfer of venue because he believed 

that the judges in the Central District of Illinois were all biased against him. Judge Bruce 

denied both motions, determining that Lisle’s “wild accusations” and discussion of 

prior adverse rulings did not demonstrate his bias or that of any other judges in the 

Central District. 

Case: 19-1339 Document: 40 Filed: 02/26/2020 Pages: 4
No. 19-1339 Page 3 

The state defendants then moved for summary judgment on grounds that Lisle 

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the district court granted the motion. 

The court said that it “ordinarily” would hold a hearing under Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 

739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008), to resolve the disputed question whether Lisle had appealed his 

grievance to the grievance officer and was not given a response. But the court 

determined, without a hearing, that Lisle had failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies when he appealed to the Board and subsequently failed to provide the Board 

with the additional documentation it requested. The court did not address another issue 

disputed by the parties—whether Lisle had filed his initial grievance with a counselor 

or a grievance officer. 

On appeal Lisle argues that the district court erred in entering summary 

judgment on exhaustion grounds without holding a Pavey hearing. A hearing is 

necessary, he maintains, to determine whether he exhausted his administrative 

remedies when he forwarded his original grievance to Pontiac’s grievance officer. 

Further, he argues, it was irrelevant that he failed to respond to the Board’s request for 

documentation because he did all he was required to do: he forwarded his original 

grievance to the grievance officer and did not receive a timely response. The state 

defendants concede on appeal that a Pavey hearing is required where, as here, the 

parties dispute whether an inmate exhausted his administrative remedies. Pavey, 

544 F.3d at 742. 

We accept the state defendants’ concession of error and agree that the case must 

be remanded to the district court for a Pavey hearing to determine two factual issues. 

First, a hearing is needed to resolve whether Lisle filed his original grievance with the 

appropriate person. Under the state’s regulations, he could file the grievance either with 

a counselor or, in the case or alleged sexual abuse, with the grievance officer herself. 20 

ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The second factual dispute is the one Lisle highlighted in 

his briefing: whether he forwarded the counselor’s denial of his original grievance to 

the grievance officer. Because “[a] swearing contest requires an evidentiary hearing to 

resolve, and none was held,” Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 2014), the case 

must go back to the district court on the issue of exhaustion. 

The district court also erred by reasoning that Lisle had failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies by not complying with the Board’s instructions regarding his 

grievance appeal. As the state defendants concede, his lack of compliance with the 

Board’s instructions would have been irrelevant if he never received a response to the 

appeal he filed with the grievance officer. Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 

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No. 19-1339 Page 4 

2002). See also Roberts, 745 F.3d at 236 (an inmate need not “do anything further to keep 

his grievance alive” when that inmate followed his prison’s internal processes but did 

not receive a response). 

Lisle’s remaining arguments are less persuasive. He argues, for instance, that 

Judge Bruce was biased, as reflected in his prior rulings in the case, and should have 

recused or disqualified himself. But adverse judicial rulings are not a basis for either 

recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 or disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144. See In re City of 

Milwaukee, 788 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (recusal); Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 

709, 718 (7th Cir. 2004) (disqualification). Lisle also asserts that Judge Bruce had 

“personal and political” connections to IDOC officials, but he points to no evidence in 

support. 

Lisle argues last that the court erred in denying his motion to transfer because he 

believed that he presented enough evidence of potential bias. But the court acted within 

its discretion to deny the motion because Lisle’s arguments indicated an intent to 

forum-shop, which is an impermissible reason for transfer. Boyer v. BNSF Ry. Co., 

824 F.3d 694, 710 (7th Cir. 2016). 

In light of the foregoing, we VACATE the entry of summary judgment and 

REMAND for a Pavey hearing. 

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