Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01488/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01488-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL REED DORROUGH,

Plaintiff,

v.

N. CHINNAPA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01488-BAM-PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR 

RELIEF

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. On October 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a consent to proceed before a magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 6.) Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, 

filed October 1, 2015. 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

that “seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 

as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

342 (9th Cir. 2010)(citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially 

plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each 

named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969. 

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at California State Prison Solano, brings this action against Defendant 

correctional officials employed by the CDCR at Corcoran State Prison, where the events at issue 

occurred. Plaintiff names the following individual Defendants: Nareddy Chinnapa, M.D.; Huu 

Nguyen, M.D.; Wayne Ulit, M.D.; J. Wang, M.D., Chief Medical Officer; C. McCabe, M.D.; E. 

Clark. M.D. Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

In 1996 (while in CDCR custody) Plaintiff was diagnosed with high cholesterol. Plaintiff 

was prescribed a low salt, low fat medical diet. In 2007, Plaintiff was transferred to CSP 

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Corcoran, where he was housed at the time the complaint in this action was filed. Plaintiff 

alleges that his cholesterol is high, and in the last two years, “dangerously high.” (Comp. p. 6.) 

Plaintiff has been prescribed medication, Atorvastatin, 80 mg. Plaintiff alleges that “this 

treatment plan has been totally ineffective as the test results show . . . Plaintiff’s bad cholesterol 

has continued to be dangerously high.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff requested to be tested for arteriosclerosis, due to his high cholesterol and 

hypertension, as these conditions are high risk conditions for arteriosclerosis. Plaintiff also has a 

family history of stroke and heart disease. Plaintiff’s request was denied. Defendant Nareddy 

interviewed Plaintiff regarding his cholesterol level. Dr. Nareddy told Plaintiff that the 

medication he had been prescribed was sufficient. Plaintiff attempted to explain to Dr. Nareddy 

that the results of Plaintiff’s lab tests show that Plaintiff’s cholesterol is not being controlled. 

On September 9, 2012, a second lab test was ordered by Dr. Karan. Plaintiff alleges that 

the test results from the second test showed that Plaintiff’s cholesterol level was much higher. A 

third test was conducted on February 8, 2013. Plaintiff alleges that those results showed that his 

cholesterol level was even higher. Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Dr. Nguyen about 

the results. Dr. Nguyen told Plaintiff that his cholesterol level was under control, and that his 

medication was effective. 

On February 4, 2014, another test was conducted. Plaintiff alleges that the result showed 

that his triglyceride level was “68 points higher than the reference range.” (Id. p. 7.) Plaintiff 

spoke to Defendant Dr. Ulit, who ordered the test. Plaintiff explained to Dr. Ulit that “nothing 

different was being considered as part of any treatment plan, and it and that it should be obvious 

that the current treatment plan simply was not working.” (Id.) Dr. Ulit advised Plaintiff that he 

would prescribe Niacin. 

On September 9, 2014, a lab test was ordered by a psychologist, Dr. Zuckerman. The 

results showed that Plaintiff’s cholesterol and triglyceride levels were “dangerously high.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff spoke to Dr. Ulit about the results, and on January 1, 2015, Dr. Ulit ordered another lab 

test. Plaintiff alleges that this test showed that his cholesterol was “well over 300 points.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff explained to Dr. Ulit that the only time that his cholesterol level was under control was 

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

when he was on a low salt, low fat medical diet while housed at Pelican Bay State Prison. 

Plaintiff alleges that each of the Defendants told him that there was no evidence in his medical 

file that he was ever prescribed a medical diet, and that the CDCR does not prescribe low fat, 

low salt diets. Plaintiff was advised that the standard state diet was sufficient to control his 

cholesterol. 

Plaintiff explained to Dr. Ulit that if he stopped eating all of his state issued meals three 

times a day, his cholesterol level would go down. Plaintiff reasons that this demonstrates a 

correlation that the standard state diet was the source of Plaintiff’s high cholesterol. Dr. Ulit 

increased Plaintiff’s Atorvastatin to the maximum level. Plaintiff alleges that this did not result 

in a lowering of his cholesterol level. 

Plaintiff filed a medical grievance, requesting that his arteries be checked, and that he be 

prescribed a medical low fat, low salt diet. Defendant Dr. Clark interviewed Plaintiff regarding 

his grievance. Dr. Clark acknowledged that Plaintiff’s cholesterol level was high, and that 

Plaintiff’s family history did increase his risk of heart disease and stroke. Dr. Clark did advise 

Plaintiff that if he was able to get a religious diet, it would be healthier than the standard state 

diet. Defendant Dr. McCabe was the first level reviewer of Plaintiff’s grievance. Dr. McCabe 

denied the grievance on the ground that that there was no indication that Plaintiff’s request was 

necessary. Defendant CMO Dr. Wang denied Plaintiff’s request, indicating that although 

Plaintiff’s cholesterol was high, it was improving. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Wang referred to his 

lab results from a test taken on June 3, 2013, and did not consider other supporting 

documentation showing that his cholesterol level continued to increase. 

Plaintiff alleges that he has “experienced chest pains, heart palpitations, shortness of 

breath, pain and numbness down his left arm, dizziness.” (Id. p. 11.) Plaintiff does not indicate 

when this occurred.

///

///

///

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment 

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to 

medical care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th 

Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th 

Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating 

that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). Deliberate indifference 

is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical 

need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. The requisite state of mind is one of 

subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 

985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner – or between medical 

professionals – concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 987 (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 

1989)), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1082-83; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 

122-23 (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d at 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must 

show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive 

risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

1. High Cholesterol

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate, at most, a disagreement with the course of treatment 

that Defendants have prescribed for him. That Plaintiff, in his view, suffers from “dangerously 

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

high” cholesterol levels, does not subject Defendant physicians to liability because they have a 

different view. As noted above, Plaintiff must allege some facts indicating a purposeful act or 

failure to respond to his high cholesterol, causing him injury. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts 

indicating that any of the Defendants were aware of a diagnosis from a medical professional 

indicating that Plaintiff, in the opinion of a medical professional, had a condition that required 

the treatment sought by Plaintiff. 

Although Plaintiff sincerely believes that he suffers from a dangerous medical condition 

that is not being adequately addressed by Defendants, he has not alleged any facts indicating that 

any of the Defendants knew of an objectively serious medical condition, and chose a course of 

treatment in conscious disregard of that risk. Even assuming that Plaintiff has alleged facts 

indicating that Defendants’ course of treatment constituted medical malpractice, Plaintiff has not 

stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) 

(quotation marks omitted). Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating deliberate 

indifference as that term is defined above, the complaint should be dismissed for Plaintiff’s 

failure to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff will, however, be granted leave to file an amended 

complaint that cures this defect. 

2. Chest Pains

Regarding Plaintiff’s allegations that he suffered chest pains and other symptoms 

indicating a heart attack, liberally construed, Plaintiff has alleged facts indicating that he suffered 

from an objectively serious medical condition. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged any facts that 

any of the named Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that condition. Plaintiff does not 

indicate when he suffered his chest pains, or what medical attention he sought. A bare allegation 

that Plaintiff suffered from high cholesterol and had symptoms of a heart attack do not subject 

Defendants to liability under the Eighth Amendment. In order to hold an individual defendant 

liable, Plaintiff must name the individual defendant, describe where that defendant is employed 

and in what capacity, and explain how that defendant acted under color of state law. Plaintiff 

should state clearly, in his or her own words, what happened. Plaintiff must describe what each 

defendant, by name, did to violate the particular right described by Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not 

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

allege any facts indicating that any of the named Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s symptoms, 

or that they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s symptoms. This claim should therefore be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff will, however, be granted leave to file an amended 

complaint that cures this defect.

B. Grievance Process

The only conduct charged to Defendants Clark, McCabe, and Wang is their conduct in 

reviewing Plaintiff’s grievance related to his medical treatment. Involvement in reviewing an 

inmate’s administrative appeal does not necessarily demonstrate awareness of an alleged 

violation, or contribute to the underlying violation. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 

2007); Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2014). In order to hold these 

Defendants liable, Plaintiff must allege facts as to each Defendant indicating that they knew of 

and disregarded a serious medical condition of Plaintiff’s. Assuming Plaintiff had alleged facts 

demonstrating that his treating physicians were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need 

of Plaintiff’s involvement in reviewing an inmate’s administrative appeal does not necessarily 

demonstrate awareness of the alleged violation. Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1086-87. Plaintiff must 

allege facts indicating that each Defendant knew of and disregarded a serious risk to Plaintiff’s 

health. Plaintiff has failed to do so here. These Defendants should therefore be dismissed for 

Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against them. 

C. Dr. Nguyen

Plaintiff fails to allege any conduct as to Dr. Nguyen. Section 1983 provides a cause of 

action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under 

color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009); Long v. County of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 

Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada 

Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012)(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-

94 (1989))(internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts 

demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or 

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 

726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

In order to hold Defendant Dr. Nguyen liable, Plaintiff must allege some conduct by Dr. Nguyen 

that indicates a deprivation of a protected interest of Plaintiff’s. Plaintiff has not done so here. 

Dr. Nguyen should therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

D. Rule 18

Plaintiff alleges conduct that occurred from 2012 to 2015. While Plaintiff sought 

treatment for the same medical issue during that time frame, the conduct of the Defendant 

Physicians appears to be unrelated. Plaintiff may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated 

parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 653 F.3d 950, 952 

(7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may bring a claim 

against multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim arises out of the same transaction or 

occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2) there are common questions of law 

or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); 

Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Only if the defendants are properly joined under Rule 20(a) will the Court review the other 

claims to determine if they may be joined under Rule 18(a), which permits the joinder of 

multiple claims against the same party.

Plaintiff’s claims fail to comply with the rules regarding joinder of claims. For example, 

Plaintiff appears to be pursuing claims against certain defendants for separate requests for 

treatment. Plaintiff may not pursue unrelated claims against unrelated defendants in this action. 

If Plaintiff elects to amend his complaint, Plaintiff shall choose which claims he wishes to pursue 

his action. If Plaintiff does not do and his amended complaint again sets forth unrelated claims 

which violate joinder rules, the Court may dismiss this action for failure to comply with Court 

orders. 

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days. Noll 

v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this 

suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007)(no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what 

each defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the 

duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to 

have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, 

Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), 

and must be “complete in and of itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” 

Local Rule 220. “All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in 

an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers 

Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send to Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed October 1, 2015, is dismissed for failure to state a 

claim;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

A first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

///

///

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 

Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and to 

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01488-BAM Document 9 Filed 05/17/16 Page 10 of 10