Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02838/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02838-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITF;!I) STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LILLIE BENALLY and :GRANT ,;:J3ENALLY on 

behalf of NORMAN E3ENALLY·l '.an adult, 

Plaintifts~App~~lants, 

v. 

AMON CARTER MUSEUM;QF WESTERN ART, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

'fenth Circuit 

OCT 0 31988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 85-2838 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. ·Givil No. 84-0313-JB) 

Stephen T. Lecuyer, DNA-People's Legal Ser,vices, Inc., ~hiprock, 

New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appellailts. 

Stephen L. Tatum of Cantey, ·Han~er, Gooch, Munn &:Collins, Fort 

Worth, Texas (Arthur 0. Beach and Margaret E. Davidson of Keleher 

& McLeod, Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on the brief) for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, ANDERSON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 85-2838 Document: 01019350195 Date Filed: 10/03/1988 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs Lillie Benally and Grant Benally, on behalf of 

Norman Benally, appeal the district court's dismissal, for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, of their invasion of privacy claims against 

defendant Amon Carter Museum of Western Art (the Museum). The 

district court's decision is reported as Benally v. Hundred Arrows 

Press, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 969 (D.N.M. 1985). The issues on appeal 

are (1) whether the New Mexico long-arm statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. 

§ 38-1-16, permits the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over the 

Museum, and if so, (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction in New 

Mexico over the Museum would offend the "traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice" embodied in the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution. 

Plaintiffs are Navajo Indians and domiciliaries of New 

Mexico. In 1932, artist Laura Gilpin photographed Lillie Benally 

in native dress in her home holding her baby, Norman, in a 

cradleboard. Lillie Benally granted Gilpin permission to take the 

photograph, but allegedly neither she nor anyone else in her 

family ever authorized its publication or public exhibition. The 

photograph, entitled "Navaho Madonna," became part of Gilpin's 

collection. Gilpin became famous, and before her death on 

November 30, 1979, the print had been published on a postcard and· 

in three books and two magazines, and exhibited at least thirtyfive times throughout the United States. 

The defendant Museum is a nonprofit corporation organized 

under Texas law and has its principal place of businesss in Fort 

Worth, Texas. In April 1978, Mitchell Wilder, the Museum 

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Appellate Case: 85-2838 Document: 01019350195 Date Filed: 10/03/1988 Page: 2 
director, reported to the Museum's board of directors that Gilpin 

would bequeath her photographic collection, including the Benally 

photograph, to the Museum; the gift was to be announced in May 

1978 in conjunction with an exhibition of Gilpin's works by the 

Museum. Over the next eighteen months, the Museum negotiated with 

Gilpin over the specific plans for the collection after her death. 

In June 1978, Wilder reported that he had spent almost a week in 

Santa Fe, New Mexico, working with Gilpin on plans for the 

collection. He returned from New Mexico with some of Gilpin's 

original nitrate negatives to work on methods of preserving them. 

In July 1978, the Museum hired Rosamund Kolberg to transfer the 

negatives to acid-free envelopes; she worked several months in 

Santa Fe, transferring and cataloging the negatives for use in the 

Museum. An internal memorandum dated July 27, 1978, proposed, and 

the Museum director agreed, that the Museum pay "all expenses 

incurred in the wooing and acquiring [of] Miss Gilpin's 

photographic collection" out of the Museum's account for acquiring 

photographs and treat these expenses on the Museum's books as part 

of the cost of the collection. I R., Exh. 4 at 5. 

In August 1979, Ron Tyler, the Museum's acting director, and 

Martha Ann Sandweiss, the curator of photographs, met with Gilpin 

and her attorney in Santa Fe. The Museum also produced, in 

collaboration with a Texas film maker, a documentary film about 

Gilpin and her work. By September 30, 1979, fifteen days of 

filming in Santa Fe had been completed. In October 1979, the 

Museum corresponded with Gilpin's attorney in Santa Fe about an 

agreement obligating the Museum to preserve the collection and 

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dictating the conditions under which the Museum could exhibit, 

duplicate, and sell prints from the collection. Gilpin's attorney 

sent a draft of this agreement to Tyler on October 1. On 

October 10, 1979, Tyler wrote Gilpin's attorney in New Mexico 

proposing a change in the agreement to allow the Museum to make 

the Gilpin Collection available to the public according to the 

Museum's normal restrictions. Tyler, the next day, and Sandweiss, 

on October 23, telephoned Gilpin's attorney to discuss the 

agreement. An amended Gilpin-Museum 

Gilpin in October 1979 and by Tyler in 

agreement was signed by 

November 1979. The 

Museum's board of directors ratified it on November 15, 1979. 

Gilpin died on November 30, 1979, bequeathing, with certain 

exceptions, her entire photographic library to the Museum. The 

bequest included the negative and nine prints of the Benally 

photograph. Her will was executed and probated in New Mexico. 

Sandweiss traveled to New Mexico to supervise the packing and 

shipment of the photographs in Gilpin's possession at the time of 

her death. 

The Gilpin-Museum agreement requires the Museum to report 

annually on the use, maintenance, and activities of the Gilpin 

Collection to a three-person committee, which includes Richard 

Rudisill of Santa Fe, New Mexico. Pursuant to this agreement, 

Sandweiss submitted annual reports to Rudisill in Santa Fe in 

October 1980, September 1981, October 1982, and October 1983. In 

the 1983 report Sandweiss advised that the Henry Luce Foundation 

had given a grant of $125,000 to the Museum to support further 

work on the Gilpin Collection, including a biography of Gilpin. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2838 Document: 01019350195 Date Filed: 10/03/1988 Page: 4 
Sandweiss stated that she planned to go to Santa Fe for three 

months in 1984 to work on the biography. 

In February 1980, the Museum provided copies of several 

photographs from the Gilpin Collection, including "Navaho 

Madonna," to Four Winds magazine in Austin, Texas, for use with a 

story by Sandweiss entitled "Laura Gilpin's Indians--An Enduring 

Image." The Museum charged $5.00 for each print it sent to the 

magazine. Four Winds ran the story in its Autumn 1980 issue and 

displayed the Benally photograph on its cover. Pursuant to the 

Museum's regulations for reproducing photographs, the magazine 

provided a credit line under the photograph reading "Courtesy 

Laura Gilpin Collection, Amon Carter Museum, Fort Worth, Texas." 

I R. 54, Exh. 11 at 1. 

In August 1981, Lillie Benally's daughter-in-law, Sophie 

Benally, learned of and informed plaintiffs about the publication 

of the photograph; at that time plaintiffs were not aware that the 

photograph had been exhibited and published previously. 

Plaintiffs objected to the photograph's reproduction because of 

the traditional Navajo belief that the publication of photographs 

can have bad effects on the people in the photographs. 

The photograph was published twice in Texas-based magazines 

in 1981. Southwest Art published it with a story about Gilpin 

written by Michael Duty, who was then the Museum's public 

relations and development officer. The magazine gave a credit 

line to the Museum with the story. The Museum also provided the 

print for use with a story in Texas Monthly about the Museum's 

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Appellate Case: 85-2838 Document: 01019350195 Date Filed: 10/03/1988 Page: 5 
twentieth anniversary. It was the only photograph from the Gilpin 

Collection to appear with the story. 

In March 1984, plaintiffs sued the Museum, the publishers of 

Four Winds, Southwest Art and Texas Monthly, and Communications 

Specialists, Inc. (CSI) 1 in the federal district court in New 

Mexico for unlawful public disclosure of private facts and 

misappropriation of likeness. The Museum entered a special 

appearance seeking to dismiss the claims against it for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, and the district court granted the Museum's 

motion. The magazine publishers, who are all Texas residents, did 

not contest jurisdiction but moved to dismiss the claims pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court treated their motions as 

motions for summary judgment and granted them. Benally, 614 

F. Supp. at 976, 980-83. Plaintiffs do not appeal the entry of 

summary judgment; they challenge only the district court's 

decision that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Museum. 

I 

Federal courts sitting in diversity have personal 

jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted 

by the law of the forum. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. 

Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440, 442 (lOth Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 474 u.s. 1082 (1986). New.Mexico's long-arm statute 

provides in pertinent part as follows: 

1 CSI used the "Navaho Madonna" photograph in an advertisement in 

the Autumn 1980 issue of Four Winds. The Museum did not authorize 

CSI's use of the photograph. Although the district court denied 

CSI's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs subsequently entered 

a voluntary dismissal of their claims against CSI with prejudice 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. 

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"Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of 

this state, who in person or through an agent does any 

of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby 

submits himself or his personal representative to the 

jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause 

of action arising from: 

(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 

(3) the commission of a tortious act within this state; 

" 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-l-16(A). New Mexico courts apply a threestep test to determine whether they have personal jurisdiction 

over nonresident defendants: "(1) the act must be enumerated in 

the long-arm statute, [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-l-16(A)]; 

(2} plaintiff's cause of action must arise from the act, [id. 

§ 38-l-16(C)]; and (3) the act(s) of defendant must establish the 

minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due process." Salas v. 

Homestake Enterprises, Inc., 106 N.M. 344, 742 P.2d 1049, 1050 

(1987). 

A 

The first step of this test requires us to determine whether 

the Museum committed an act enumerated in the long-arm statute. 

Plaintiffs assert that the Museum comes within the long-arm 

statute because it has "transacted business" within New Mexico. 

The Museum's first line of defense· against this argument is· 

that, as a nonprofit organization, whatever it did in New Mexico 

cannot be characterized as ''transacting business." The only New 

Mexico case we found explicitly involving a nonprofit corporation 

is Valley Wide Health Services, Inc. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 71, 738 

P.2d 1316 (1987), which held that the nonresident corporation was 

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Appellate Case: 85-2838 Document: 01019350195 Date Filed: 10/03/1988 Page: 7 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the New Mexico courts. But the 

court's decision rested on the finding of no purposefully 

initiated activity within the state, and the court did not discuss 

whether the activities of a nonprofit corporation could be 

characterized as transacting business within the meaning of the 

New Mexico long-arm statute. 

Lacking anything in the language of the statute itself, any 

cases interpreting the statute, or any legislative history, we 

look for guidance to other courts that have considered the issue. 

Some courts have used different semantics in describing the 

activities of nonprofit corporations. ~' Publications Group v. 

American Soc. of Heating, Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Eng'rs, 

Inc., 566 F. Supp. 316, 319 n.l (D. Conn. 1983) (nonstock 

corporations • . . "conduct affairs"; they generally do not 

"transact business"); Sales Arm, Inc. v. Automobile Club of S. 

Cal., 402 F. Supp. 763, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (nonprofit auto club 

did not "conduct business in the usual commercial sense"). But we 

have found no cases in which foreign nonprofit organizations with 

significant contacts within a state carrying out its purposes have 

been allowed to escape the reach of the state court's long-arm 

statute, and we have found a number in which jurisdiction was 

upheld. See Weinberg v. Colonial Williamsburg, Inc., 215 F. Supp: 

633, 639-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Steel Joist Inst., Inc. v. J.H. Mann, 

III, Inc., 171 So. 2d 625, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (for purposes 

of long-arm statute, "[a] non-profit corporation's business is 

whatever functions it has been organized to perform"), cert. 

dismissed, 179 So. 2d 211 (1965); Bankers Leasing Co. v. Eagle 

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Valley Environmentalists, Inc., 387 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1986); Novack v. Nat'l Hot Rod Ass'n, 247 Md. 350, 231 A.2d 22, 26 

(1967); Galatz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 100 Nev. 408, 683 

P.2d 26, 28 (1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 

(1985); Barile v. Univ. of Va., 2 Ohio App. 3d 233, 441 N.E.2d 

608, 615-16 (1981); Jacobs v. Association of Independent Colleges 

and Schools, 219 S.E.2d 837, 840 (S.C. 1975); see also Fontanetta 

v. American Bd. of Internal Medicine, 303 F. Supp. 427, 429-30 

(E.D.N.Y. 1969), (construing New York law) (nonprofit corporation 

within long-arm statute, but finding case did not "arise from'' 

contacts with forum), aff'd, 421 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970). Several 

other decisions involving long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident 

individuals who asserted they did not engage in commercial 

activities have rejected arguments that "transacting business'' is 

limited to commercial activity. See, ~' San Juan Hotel Corp. 

v. Lefkowitz, 277 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.P.R. 1967); Woodring v. 

Hall, 200 Kan. 597, 438 P.2d 135, 143-45 (1968); Ross v. Ross, 371 

Mass. 439, 358 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1976); Trustees of the Sheppard 

and Enoch Pratt Hosp. v. Smith, 114 R.I. 181, 330 A.2d 804, 806-07 

(1975) (construing Maryland statute). 

Lewis v. Curry College, 89 Wash. 2d 565, 573 P.2d 1312 

(1978), relied upon by the Museum, does not support its position.· 

Although the Lewis court did indeed hold that a nonresident 

nonprofit college was not subject to personal jurisdiction, it 

based this conclusion on the lack of contacts between the college 

and the forum state, and not on the college's nonprofit status. 

Id., 573 P.2d at 1315. 

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With the advent of nonprofit trade or professional 

organizations, reliance upon traditional notions of what 

constitutes ''business" becomes somewhat attenuated, as the cases 

indicate. See, ~' Fontanetta v. American Bd. of Internal 

Medicine, 421 F.2d 355, 357 (2d Cir. 1970) (it would constitute a 

"considerable strain" to characterize medical organization's 

certifying activities as noncommercial since they had "direct 

professional and financial effect upon the doctors involved"). 

In the case sub judice, the Museum epitomizes the "pure" 

nonprofit organization, at the extreme end of the commercialnoncommercial continuum. Nevertheless, a common thread running 

through profit and nonprofit organizations alike, regardless of 

their degree of commerciality, is that all exist to achieve a 

purpose. "Business" has been defined not only as a commercial 

venture, but also as an activity that engages a person's serious 

attentions or constitutes a livelihood. See Black's Law 

Dictionary 179 (5th ed. 1979). No organization carries out its 

activities or achieves its objectives except through the people 

running it. So whether an organization's purpose is commercial in 

nature, or it exists only to promote cultural values, it must 

still conduct "business." 

This conclusion makes sense within the context of New 

Mexico's long-arm statute. When a wrong results from purposeful, 

organized activity, in terms of a state's interest in redressing 

harm to its citizens, it makes little difference whether that 

activity was of a commercial character or not. Although it was 

writing in a commercial activity context in Telephonic, Inc. v. 

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Rosenblum, 88 N.M. 532, 543 P.2d 825, 827 (1975), the New Mexico 

Supreme Court equated "transaction of any business" with "'doing a 

series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing 

pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing 

a single act for such purpose with the intention of thereby 

initiating a series of such acts.'" 543 P.2d at 827 (quoting 

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 35 comment a (1971) 

(emphasis added)). We believe the New Mexico Supreme Court would 

hold that the Museum "transacts business'' within the meaning of 

the state's long-arm statute whenever it engages in activities 

designed to further its purposes, objectives or goals. 

We also hold that the Museum's activities in New Mexico, most 

of which we have set out above, taken together rise to the level 

of "transacting business'' under§ 38-l-16(A). The New Mexico 

Supreme Court has "repeatedly equated the 'transaction of 

business'--insofar as the acquisition of long-arm jurisdiction is 

concerned--with the due process standard of 'minimum contacts' 

sufficient to satisfy" federal· constitutional due process 

standards. Telephonic, Inc., 543 P.2d at 827. Thus, under this 

standard, the inquiry becomes whether a party's business 

activities constituted a "purposeful availment" of the privilege 

of conducting activities within the forum state. See Hanson v. · 

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); post at 15-17. 2 We defer 

2 Of course, the constitutional analysis also includes an inquiry 

as to whether an assertion of jurisdiction would comport with 

fundamental notions of justice and fair play. See International 

Shoe v. washington, 326 u.s. 310, 316 (1945); post at 17-18. 

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further discussion of this aspect to Part II. See post at 14-18. 

B 

Having found that the Museum transacted business within the 

state of New Mexico, we now must determine whether plaintiffs' 

action arises from those activities, as required by N.M. Stat. 

Ann. § 38-l-16(C). The district court held that plaintiffs' cause 

of action was not sufficiently related to the Museum's transaction 

of business to support jurisdiction because of the time lapse 

between most of the Museum's activities in New Mexico and the 

distribution of the photograph of which plaintiffs complain. See 

Benally, 614 F. Supp. at 973. 

The district court did not cite, nor have we found, any case 

requiring that the activities giving rise to jurisdiction occur 

within a specific time period from the accrual of the plaintiffs' 

cause of action. Rather, the New Mexico standard to determine 

whether the cause of action is one arising from the transaction of 

business in the state focuses on the logical relationship between 

the cause of action and that transaction of business. According 

to the New Mexico Supreme Court, 

"There must be a close relationship between [a nonresident defendant's] jurisdictional activities and the 

cause of action . . . • '[T]he statutory phrase 

"arising from'' requires only that the plaintiff's claim 

be one which lies in the wake of the commercial 

activities by which the defendant submitted to the 

jurisdiction of [the forum's] courts.'" 

Winward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc., 83 N.M. 469, 493 P.2d 954, 957 

(1972) (quoting Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 Ill. App. 2d 

242, 219 N.E.2d 646, 651 (1966)). 

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The instant case is analogous to Kathrein v. Parkview 

Meadows, Inc., 102 N.M. 75, 691 P.2d 462 (1984), in which the 

plaintiff's cause of action for emotional and psychological trauma 

allegedly inflicted at an alcohol treatment center in Arizona was 

held to arise out of the defendant's solicitations of plaintiff 

and her husband in New Mexico. In concluding that these facts 

satisfied the "arising out of" requirement of § 38-l-16(C), the 

New Mexico Supreme Court stated that 

"defendant's invitation to plaintiff to attend the 

program's Family Week, and plaintiff's subsequent 

attendance, were an integral part of defendant's overall 

program of alcoholic treatment. The invitation followed 

by attendance were a direct outgrowth of defendant's 

general solicitation for business in New Mexico. This 

cause of action does arise out of defendant's 

solicitation of business in New Mexico." 

Kathrein, 691 P.2d at 463. 

The court further reasoned as follows: 

"Given the level of defendant's activity within New 

Mexico, it seems fair to say that its conduct in this 

State was entirely voluntary, and that it reasonably 

could have contemplated being subject to New Mexico 

jurisdiction. . . • It is not singly significant to the 

result we reach that plaintiff travelled to Arizona to 

attend 'Family Week.' Plaintiff went there to 

participate in the treatment program which her husband 

was attending as a result of defendant's earlier 

solicitation in New Mexico. Defendant's total 

activities in New Mexico were sufficient to subject 

defendant to the jurisdiction of the New Mexico court in 

this case." 

Id., 691 P.2d at 464. 

The plaintiffs' cause of action in the case at bar, as in 

Kathrein, ''lies in the wake" of the Museum's transaction of 

business in New Mexico. Plaintiffs' claim for invasion of privacy 

against the Museum is closely and logically related to the 

Museum's actions in soliciting from a New Mexico resident the gift 

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of the Gilpin Collection, in taking possession of the collection 

in New Mexico, and in publicizing its ownership of the collection 

through magazine articles distributed in New Mexico. The causal 

relationship between the jurisdictional activities and the cause 

of action is at least as strong here as in Kathrein. See also 

Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 

(7th Cir. 1984) (because discussions in Illinois played a part in 

subsequent out-of-state negotiations, breach of warranty claim 

arising from those negotiations, "lies in the wake of" defendant's 

activities in Illinois, subjecting it to jurisdiction under 

state's long-arm statute); cf. GTP Leisure Products, Inc. v. B-W 

Footwear Co., 55 A.D.2d 1009, 391 N.Y.S.2d 489, 490 (1977) (mem.) 

("When a non-domiciliary engages in a purposeful business 

transaction in New York and makes a defamatory statement outside 

of New York about that specific transaction, New York courts may 

exercise jurisdiction over his person for a cause of action based 

upon the defamatory statement."). We hold that the Museum is 

subject to service of process under the New Mexico long-arm 

statute. 3 

II 

We also decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the 

Museum comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth · 

Amendment. The central inquiry is whether the defendant has 

"certain minimum contacts with [the forum state) such that the 

3 Because we hold that the Museum's transaction of business 

within New Mexico supports jurisdiction, we need not address 

plaintiffs' alternate argument that the Museum is subject to 

jurisdiction in New Mexico under the ''tortious act" provision. 

See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-l-16(A)(3). 

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maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 

311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The Constitution further requires that 

a defendant's contacts with the forum state be the purposeful 

activities of that defendant and not the result of activities of 

others in that state: 

"The unilateral activity of those who claim some 

relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy 

the requirement of contact with the forum State. The 

application of that rule will vary with the quality and 

nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential 

in each case that there be some act by which the 

defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State, thus 

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 

In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), the 

Supreme Court elaborated upon this principle as follows: 

"This 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures 

that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction 

solely as a result of 'random, ' 'fortuitous,' or 

'attenuated' contacts, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 

[465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)]; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 

v. Woodson, [444 u.s. 286, 299 (1980)], or of the 

'unilateral activity of another party or a third 

person, • Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 

Hall, [ 466 U.S. 408, 417 ( 1984)]. Jurisdiction is 

proper, however, where the contacts proximately result 

from actions by the defendant himself that create a 

'substantial connection' with the forum State. McGee v. 

International Life Insurance Co., [355 U.S. 220, 223 

(1957)]; see also Kulko v. California Superior Court, 

[436 u.s. 84, 94 n.7 (1978)]. Thus where the defendant 

'deliberately' has engaged in significant activities 

within a State, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., l465 

U.S. at 781], or has created 'continuing obligations' 

between himself and residents of the forum, Travelers 

Health Assn. v. Virginia, [339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950)], he 

manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of 

conducting business there, and because his activities 

are shielded by 'the benefits and protections' of the 

forum's laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to 

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require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in 

that forum as well." 

Id. at 475-76 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 

In holding that the contacts of the Museum with New Mexico 

were not sufficiently purposeful to subject the Museum to 

jurisdiction in the state, the district court reasoned as follows: 

"Prior to August, 1981, the last loan of art work(s) by 

the defendant to a museum in New Mexico was in 1979. 

The Museum has only made ten such loans in the past 

twenty-four years and all have been on a not-for-profit 

basis. Of the two books published by the Museum in 

conjunction with the University of New Mexico Press, one 

has ~been out of print since 1974 and the other was not 

published until two years after the plaintiffs' cause of 

action arose. Neither book includes the photograph in 

question. Although the Museum bookstore fills orders 

sent by New Mexico residents, such sales have only 

amounted to approximately .0173 percent of the 

bookstore's annual sales for each of the years between 

1977 and 1984. Furthermore, the Museum's book purchases 

from New Mexico residents have been infrequent in the 

past five years, and their acquisitions of New Mexico 

artists' photographs and prints have primarily been a 

result of solicitation by New Mexico resident dealers 

and brokers. All purchases were consummated in Texas 

and all were for exhibition or educational purposes and 

not for profit. The Museum has never published or 

exhibited the photograph in question in New Mexico, nor 

has it ever provided any New Mexico resident with the 

photograph for exhibition in this state." 

Benally, 614 F. Supp. at 975 (footnote omitted). Although the 

district court may have been correct in its conclusion that these 

contacts were not enough, the court ignored other important 

contacts between the Museum and New Mexico. 

In our view, the Museum's activities in New Mexico--

soliciting the devise of the Gilpin Collection, negotiating the 

terms of the collection's maintenance and exhibition, traveling to 

New Mexico to take possession of the collection, and invoking the 

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benefits of New Mexico's laws of testamentary disposition 4--are 

significant to the jurisdictional inquiry in a dispute involving 

an item in the collection impacting on a New Mexico resident. 

Also significant are the Museum's acceptance of a continuing 

obligation to report annually to a New Mexico resident about the 

collection and its consent to the publication of the Benally 

photograph and other works in regional publications that are 

circulated in New Mexico. These additional activities manifest a 

purposeful intent to conduct business in New Mexico, with a 

citizen of that state and under the protection of its laws. 

Finally, we must determine whether, given the Museum's 

minimum contacts with New Mexico, "the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial 

justice.'" Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting International 

Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320); see generally Maltz, Unraveling the 

Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment on Asahi 

Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 Duke L.J. 

669, 680-81. This inquiry considers "the burden on the defendant, 

the interests of the forum state, and the plaintiff's interest in 

obtaining relief," as well as the interests of the several states 

in resolving cases efficiently and in furthering social policies. 

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 · 

S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987). The Museum has not convinced us that 

4 Ordinarily, a gift is the unilateral action of the donor, and a 

nonresident's receipt of a gift from a resident of the forum under 

a will executed and probated in the forum would not be purposeful 

activity subjecting the nonresident beneficiary to jurisdiction 

there. But this is not an ordinary bequest to a fortunate and 

fortuitous recipient; the Museum acted purposefully to solicit a 

gift from a New Mexico resident. 

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these factors make New Mexico's assertion of jurisdiction 

inconsistent with "fair play and substantial justice." The burden 

on the Museum is relatively slight; it is located in an adjacent 

state. Further, plaintiffs are residents of New Mexico, which 

itself has an interest in asserting jurisdiction over claims 

involving injuries allegedly suffered in the state by its 

residents. The dispute involves an item in a photograph 

collection the defendant Museum solicited from a New Mexico 

resident by activities many of which were in New Mexico. 

For the reasons stated, we hold that the Museum is subject to 

jurisdiction in New Mexico under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16 and 

that the exercise of such jurisdiction is constitutional. 

III 

The district court treated the merits of plaintiffs' claims 

against the non-Museum defendants, finding for those defendants on 

the merits or by upholding their defense of the statute of 

limitations. On appeal the Museum's answer brief discussed the 

merits, relying upon the district court's decision favoring 

others, in arguing that no tortious act occurred in New Mexico. 

We construe its brief to ask that we address the merits as an 

alternative ground to support the district court's judgment for 

the Museum. 

Certainly some of the district court's analysis of the merits 

is applicable to plaintiffs' assertions against the Museum in this 

interesting case. But plaintiffs correctly point out that the 

district court did not address the merits of their claims against 

the Museum. They allege that their discovery related only to 

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• 

jurisdictional issues. We note that the Museum, as successor to 

Laura Gilpin by bequest, and as owner of the negative of the 

Benally photograph, may be in a different posture from the other 

defendants for purposes of applying statutes of limitations and 

because plaintiffs request injunctive relief against future use of 

the photograph. Thus, we do not treat the merits of plaintiffs' 

claims in the instant appeal; we believe they should be addressed 

first by the district court. 

REVERSED and REMANDED for additional proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

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