Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01361/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01361-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KJONNA OGGS,

CDCR #AG-6164,

Plaintiff,

vs.

O. NAVARRO, Correction Officer; 

E. ESTRADA, Correction Officer; 

M. RODRIGUEZ, Correction Officer; 

RUELAS, Correction Officer; 

BYRDHUNT, Correction Officer; 

MEJIA, Correction Officer,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01361-CAB-JMA

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE OF COMPLAINT 

AND SUMMONS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

KJONNA OGGS (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF Nos. 1, 2).1

 

1 Plaintiff e-filed only the cover sheet of his Complaint pursuant to S.D. Cal. Gen. Order 653 on June 20, 

2018 (ECF No. 1), but he mailed the completed pleading to the Clerk via U.S. Mail soon after. See ECF 

No. 2. The Court considers both ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”) and ECF No. 2, filed as a “Supplemental 

Document” to comprise the operative pleading in this case. Plaintiff also filed a Notice of Change of 

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Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 3).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). However, 

prisoners who are granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in 

“increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 

(2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of 

whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. 

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) also requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

 

Address on August 28, 2018, in which he requests all filings in this case be mailed to a private address in 

Hawthorne, California, but he admits he remains incarcerated at RJD. See ECF No. 8 at 1-2.

2

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted CDCR Inmate Statement 

Reports demonstrating his trust account activity and balances for the six-months 

preceding the filing of his Complaint. See ECF Nos. 4, 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D.

CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed these reports, but 

both show Plaintiff has a current available balance of zero in his account. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the 

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” 

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to 

the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 3) and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 

balance of the filing fees mandated will be collected by the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint also requires a 

pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

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2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

Finally, in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief, the 

Court may consider exhibits attached to his Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A 

copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 

purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 

n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 

426 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may 

be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.)).

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B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims that in late March 2018, he was moved into a cell with an inmate 

named Darden who “began asking to see [his] paperwork.” See Supp. Doc., ECF No. 2 at 

3. “For weeks” after, Plaintiff claims Darden threatened him and said “he was a 

pedophile and he must die.” Plaintiff contends he “repeatedly” told Officers Estrada, 

Mejia, Byrdhunt, Rueles, and Rodriguez “about Darden[’]s threats to kill, stab, and 

assault him.” Id. But “they all told Plaintiff to deal with him,” and “made comments like, 

“[Y]ou[’]r[e] a big guy,” and “refused to make any bed moves.” Id.

On May 1, 2018, Plaintiff claims Darden punched and kicked him, but when he 

told Officers Rueles and Byrdhunt “they did nothing.” Id. 

On May 29, 2018, Plaintiff claims Darden again attacked him “with a makeshift 

weapon.” Id. Plaintiff “ran to the door and scream[ed] for help,” but Officer O. Navarro, 

the control booth officer, refused to open it and said, “[H]andle your business[,] punk,” 

“loud[ly] on the microphone,” while Officer Estrada “stood there and did nothing.” Id.

Plaintiff contends Darden continued to kick and beat him, cut his eye, broke his T.V., and 

beat him with it for “over 30 minutes” before the officers intervened.3Id. at 3-4.

On June 4, 2018, Plaintiff claims Navarro “pointed [a] state[-]issued mini 14 rifle” 

at him while he was in the dayroom and told him “he[’d] better withdraw any 602’s he 

has on him or next time he pointed his rifle he will do worse than what Darden did to 

him.” Id. at 5. On June 13, 2018, Plaintiff further alleges Navarro “called him into [a] 

hallway,” closed the door, accused him of having a “jailhouse lawyer doing a lawsuit and 

602 on him,” grabbed him by the neck, punched him in the stomach, and told him the 

“beatings and harassment will continue until he withdr[ew] any 602s or lawsuits he has 

on him.” Id. at 5. 

 

3 Plaintiff further claims “Sgt. John Doe” refused to summon medical care for his “badly damaged eye” 

after the May 29, 2018 incident, saying it wasn’t “necessary[,] it’s not that bad,” and to “save him the 

headache of having to do paperwork.” See ECF No. 2 at 4. But Plaintiff does not include the unidentified 

sergeant as a party-defendant. Id. at 1-2.

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Finally, Plaintiff claims Officer E. Estrada issued a CDCR Serious Rules Violation 

Report against him charging him with fighting on May 29, 2018 as “a form of 

retaliation,” since she “was aware of Plaintiff’s multiple request[s] to be removed from 

the situation.” Id. at 6 & Ex. A at 10.

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF Nos. 1 & 2) 

contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” to state First and Eighth Amendment 

claims for relief that are “plausible on its face,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and therefore, 

sufficient to survive the “low threshold” set for sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678; United States v. Williams, 842 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016) (the Eighth 

Amendment “requires that prison officials ‘must take reasonable measures to guarantee 

the safety of the inmates.’”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 847 (1994) 

(“[P]rison officials have a duty [under the Eighth Amendment] ... to protect prisoners 

from violence at the hands of other prisoners[,]” and therefore, “may be held liable ... if 

[they] know[] that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard[] that risk 

by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”); Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 

1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] prison official can violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment 

rights by failing to intervene.”); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, (1992) (unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the 

Eighth Amendment); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (for claims 

arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether force was applied 

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm.”) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation 

entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such 

action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”).

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Therefore, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service of summons 

Plaintiff’s Complaint on his behalf.4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court 

shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or 

deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915.”).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 3).

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly 

payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 

the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

 

4 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a 

substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. 

Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). However, the Court finds it is not “clear from the 

face of the complaint,” whether Plaintiff has exhausted all “available” administrative remedies pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). On the one hand, Plaintiff claims “administrative remedies 

have not been exhausted,” but he also swears under penalty of perjury that this was due to Officer 

Navarro’s threats, his fear of further acts of retaliation, “and possible death at the hands of Navarro if [he] 

complained.” See ECF No. 2 at 7, 13. “[A]n inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance 

procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Ross v. Blake, 

136 S. Ct. 1850, 1859 (2016) (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)); id. at 1859-60 (noting 

unavailability where “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process 

through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”); McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 

2015) (setting out requirements for prisoners claiming fear of retaliation prevented exhaustion); see also

Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 792 (9th Cir. 2018). Therefore, because exhaustion is an 

affirmative defense, Defendants “will have to present probative evidence ... ‘to plead and prove’ ... that 

[Plaintiff] has failed to exhaust” all available administrative remedies pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, 

should they elect to defend on this basis. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 

204 (2007)).

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SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED 

TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 

Nos. 1 and 2) and forward them to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 

for each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of 

this Order, certified copies of his Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve 

Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the USM Form 

285s as completely and accurately as possible, include an address where each named 

Defendant may be found and/or subject to service pursuant to S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1c., and 

return them to the United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides 

in the letter accompanying his IFP package.

5. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon the Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to him. All 

costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

6. ORDERS Defendants, once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be 

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), 

and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone 

that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is 

required to respond).

7. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ 

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counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 

original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 

manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on 

Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any 

document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or 

which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, or their counsel, may 

be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 17, 2018

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