Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02136/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02136-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS TORRES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

RITE AID CORP.,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-02136 WHA

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this action alleging access discrimination against a visually impaired man, both sides

move for summary judgment. Defendant Rite Aid Corp. operates the store that allegedly failed

to conform to Americans With Disabilities Act building standards. It moves for summary

judgment on plaintiff’s ADA and state-law claims. Plaintiff Jesus Torres moves for summary

judgment on whether certain in-store displays that protrude into the aisles of a Rite Aid store

would violate ADA regulations. Neither side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Both

motions are therefore DENIED. 

STATEMENT

At age four, plaintiff was diagnosed with glaucoma. He has a prosthetic right eye with

no vision and limited vision in his left eye. He is generally unable to see objects as he walks

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 1 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Defendant has not challenged plaintiff’s assertion that he is disabled under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.

12102(2) (definition of disability). 

2

 The Stewart declarations are unsworn and were not made under penalty of perjury. Defendant,

however, has not objected to those deficiencies. The Court therefore accepts those declarations as competent

evidence for purposes of the instant motions. See United States ex rel. Austin v. W. Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 568,

574–75 & n.19 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that court properly considered technically defective affidavits submitted

in connection with summary judgment motion in light of opponent’s failure to object); see also Scharf v. U.S.

Attorney Gen., 597 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Generally . . . formal defects [such as an affidavit not

being based on personal knowledge] are waived absent a motion to strike or other objection . . . .”). 

2

indoors, with the occasional exception of shopping carts at a distance of six inches or less

(Jesus Torres Decl. ¶ 2 (Nov. 28, 2005) (“Jesus Torres Decl. I”); Jesus Torres Dep. 12–13, 89).1

 

The Rite Aid store where plaintiff alleges ADA violations is in Pittsburg, California

(Jesus Torres Decl. I ¶ 4; Compl. ¶ 2). Defendant concedes that it operates the store (Br. 4,

Def.’s Motion for Summary J.). The store’s aisles are lined with shelves that hold merchandise

ranging from vodka to diapers (Stewart Decl. ¶ 2, Exhs. 1–3 (Nov. 28, 2005) (“Stewart Decl.

I”)).2 On April 13, 2005, plaintiff and his wife, Mabel Torres, visited the store. Although

plaintiff went to the store on other occasions, the April 13 trip is the one primarily at issue in the

case. During that visit, Ms. Torres encountered four or five objects sticking out from the

shelves. One object was an advertising sign made of plastic and cardboard, which plaintiff felt

with his hand. It projected about 9 to 11.5 inches from the shelf (Mabel Torres Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4–5;

Torres Dep. 77; Stewart Decl. I ¶ 4, Exh. 2 (image of object)). It apparently consisted of paper

attached to a hinged plastic clip that was affixed to a store shelf. The hinge allowed the

advertisement to give way if a shopper bumped into it (Aversano Decl. ¶ 9). The other objects

were identical or nearly identical to objects plaintiff’s counsel later photographed in the store. 

One stuck out about five to 7.5 inches from a shelf and included hanging merchandise. Another

was a plastic box that dispensed coupons from the end that jutted into the aisle. It protruded

approximately 5.5 to 8 inches into the aisle. The lower edge of each object was between two

feet, six inches and five feet, six inches above the floor. While in the store, Ms. Torres told

plaintiff about only one of protruding objects (Mabel Torres Decl. ¶¶ 4–6; Jesus Torres Decl. I ¶

2; Stewart Decl. I ¶¶ 2–3, 5, Exhs. 1, 3). 

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 2 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The blue plastic advertising sign that plaintiff and Ms. Torres encountered apparently

was one of the “Shelftalk” promotions that are common throughout

the store. (An example of such a display in a different store is

pictured at right. ) These displays attach to shelves and project into

the aisles, parallel to the floor. The subjects and locations of the

promotions change about every four weeks (Aversano Decl. ¶¶ 6–8). 

The Torreses went to the store April 13 to buy beer. Plaintiff carried with him the cane

he uses to detect objects in his path. He was dragging the cane on the ground to detect obstacles

but not using it with the same technique he used when by himself. In addition, Ms. Torres

guided plaintiff through the store by holding his arm. Plaintiff was also using his cane to

identify himself as visually impaired to passersby who might wonder why he was being guided

by another person. The Torreses browsed the merchandise for nearly twenty minutes before

getting their beer (Torres Dep. 55, 58–61; Jesus Torres Decl. I ¶ 4). 

During the visit, plaintiff did not bump into any of the protruding objects he challenges

in this action (Torres Dep. 63–64). His wife guided him around four or five such objects

sticking out from shelves (Mabel Torres Decl. ¶ 4). On one occasion, he was walking down an

aisle with his right shoulder about an inch from the shelves when his wife abruptly told him to

stop. She then told him that his face had almost hit a plastic sign and guided him around it

(Torres Dep. 67–68, 71). 

After April 13, plaintiff visited the store three times, most recently on December 19. He

planned to visit it again if he needs something sold there that he cannot find at an adjacent

supermarket. He visits the supermarket about once per month. Pittsburg borders the town

where he lives (Jesus Torres Decl. ¶ 2 (Dec. 20, 2005) (“Jesus Torres Decl. II”)). 

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, declarations, attached

documents and other evidence “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c), (e); 28 U.S.C.

1746 (allowing substitution of declaration made under penalty of perjury for sworn affidavits). 

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 3 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

 The store itself was built and first occupied before passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(Stewart Supp. Decls.). 

4

On summary judgment, the “evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). 

1. Americans With Disabilities Act.

Title III of the ADA bars discrimination against people “on the basis of disability in the

full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or

leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. 12182(a). A sales

establishment is a public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(E). When a portion of a facility

is altered in a way that could affect its usability, those alternations must be made in “such a

manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily

accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 12183(a)(2). Anyone

who is “subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability” in violation of Title III may bring

an action for injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. 12188(a); 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(a). 

The Attorney General was required to issue regulations to carry out Title III. 42 U.S.C.

12186(b). Defendant contends that these regulations, which are the foundation of plaintiff’s

claim, did not cover moveable, protruding objects such as those he encountered at the store. 

This order now considers the scope of the relevant regulations to determine if they apply. The

Attorney General’s regulations were binding on all alterations to places of public

accommodation and commercial facilities that began after January 26, 1992. There is no

dispute here that the protruding objects were added after that day. Alterations after that date

must abide by the standards of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities,

28 C.F.R., pt. 36, App. A. 28 C.F.R. 36.406(a).3

Evaluation of the regulations’ scope begins with their stated purpose, which was to

guide the “design, construction, and alternation of . . . buildings and facilities [of public

accommodation].” 28 C.F.R., pt. 36, App. A, § 1. There is no dispute that the Rite Aid store is

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 4 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

a public accommodation. The standards’ definition of “alteration” is “a change to a place of

public accommodation or a commercial facility that affects or could affect the usability of the

building or any part thereof.” A “building” is a “structure used and intended for supporting or

sheltering any use or occupancy.” A facility is “[a]ll or any portion of buildings, structures, site

improvements, complexes, equipment . . . or other real or personal property located on a site.” 

A site is a “parcel of land bounded by a property line.” Id. § 3.5 (emphasis added). Black’s

Law Dictionary defines “personal property” as “[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject

to ownership and not classified as real property.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). The

regulations’ stated coverage of “personal property” suggests that they are not limited to fixed,

permanent parts of the building. This is not dispositive of the issue, however, because in some

cases personal property is fixed to the building. When a commercial tenant affixes personal

property to a building it does not thereby become realty, as it would in a non-commercial

facility. In a commercial tenancy, such items are trade fixtures, which usually but not always

retain the qualities of personal property. See generally William M. Howard, Annotation, What

Constitutes Trade Fixture — Modern Cases, 107 A.L.R. 5th 311; see also People v. Klopstock,

24 Cal.2d 897, 903 (1944) (“Trade fixtures are regarded as personalty as between the tenant and

owner of the land . . . but as between the tenant and the condemning party they are regarded as a

part of the realty . . . .”).

Sections 4.1.3(2) and 4.4.1 of the standards are at the core of the instant case. Section

4.1.3(2) covers alterations and states that “[a]ll objects that overhang or protrude into

circulation paths shall comply with 4.4.” Section 4.4.1, a subpart of 4.4, states: “Objects

projecting from walls (for example, telephones) with their leading edges between 27 in. and 80

in. (685 mm and 2030 mm) above the finished floor shall protrude no more than 4 in. (100 mm)

into walks, halls, corridors, passageways, or aisles.” 28 C.F.R., pt. 36, App. A, § 4.4.1. 

Section 4.4.1 was intended to allow visually impaired people who use canes to avoid

crashing into protruding objects. As they sweep their canes back and forth, these individuals

can detect any protruding object less than 27 inches from the ground. The regulations therefore

do not limit how far objects below that height can protrude. Cane users, however, cannot detect

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 5 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

protruding objects located 27 inches or more above the floor so they generally stay at least four

inches from the wall. They are therefore unlikely to crash into an object that protrudes four

inches or less. 28 C.F.R., pt. 36, App. A, App. § 4.4.1. The maximum allowable protrusion is

therefore limited to four inches, “subject to conventional building industry tolerances for field

conditions.” Id. App. A, §§ 4.4.1, 3.2 (allowances for industry tolerances). For illustration of

the regulation and cane techniques, see above. Reproduced from id. App. A, Figures 8(a)–(b) &

App., Figure A4. 

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 6 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment On Section 4.4.1.

Defendant contends that the ADA regulations apply to fixed, permanent parts of

buildings but not to temporarily placed and moveable objects. It claims the display items

encountered at the store by plaintiff were moveable. Defendant argues that the displays

therefore could not have violated the regulations. It asks for summary judgment on that issue. 

Defendant’s contention that the regulations, as a whole, never cover moveable objects

conflicts with the text of the regulations. In fact, the standards explicitly regulate freestanding

objects in certain cases. They govern “[f]ree-standing” water coolers, which is the most

obvious example of a moveable thing covered by the regulations. They also cover potentially

moveable objects such as vending machines, library magazine displays, airport clocks,

telephone books and devices that dispense tableware, condiments, food and beverages. 28

C.F.R., pt. 36, App. A, §§ 1, 4.15.5(2); 4.31.7; 5.6; 5.8; 8.4; 10.4.1(7). It is therefore impossible

to accept the following syllogism advanced by defendant: moveable objects are never regulated

by the standards, the objects in question here are moveable and therefore those objects are not

regulated. It would be error to dismiss, out of hand, the possibility that the protruding objects at

the Rite Aid store were covered by the regulations. 

The crucial issue thus becomes whether the placement of the Rite Aid displays were an

alteration within the meaning of the ADA regulations. If so, then they are covered by Section

4.4.1. See §§ 4.1.1(1), 4.1.3(2), 4.1.6 and 4.4.1 (collectively mandating that alterations comply

with Section 4.1.1). As stated above, an alteration is “a change to a place of public

accommodation or a commercial facility that affects or could affect the usability of the building

or any part thereof.” This court simply does not have enough evidence to make a

determination, as a matter of law, whether or not affixing the objects that protrude into Rite

Aid’s aisles were alterations under the ADA. This question turns on facts the parties have not

addressed. For example, the answer may hinge on whether the displays can be removed quickly

by a typical store employee, or whether a specialist must come in to move them. It may make a

difference how much they weigh, how flexible they are, how they are affixed to the shelf and

the exact nature of the shelves themselves. These myriad factual issues have not been

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 7 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

addressed by the parties. The Court has not even been presented with one of the objects, except

in low-quality, photocopied images. The Court therefore cannot rule, as a matter of law, on

whether putting the protruding objects on the shelves was an alteration. Without being able to

make that determination, this Court cannot grant summary judgment to defendant on the issue

of whether the objects at issue were covered by Section 4.4.1. This conclusion is bolstered by

the rule that, when considering defendant’s motion, all justifiable inferences must be drawn in

plaintiff’s favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Defendant resorts to secondary authority to argue that the regulations do not cover

moveable objects. It states that the Access Board, which wrote the guidelines, described them

as “intended to address only that equipment that is fixed or built into the structure.” This

comment, however, responded to a comment about “examining tables, diagnostic machinery,

and dental chairs” in medical offices. ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and

Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408, 35,414–15 (July 26, 1991). To read the guidelines as not

addressing movable equipment and objects would be to read out of them the provision

governing free-standing water coolers. 28 C.F.R., pt. 36, App. A, § 4.15.5(2). 

Next, defendant invokes the Department of Justice’s Title III Technical Assistance

Manual, which states that “[o]nly equipment that is fixed or built in to the facility, is covered by

the accessibility standards . . . . Free-standing equipment is not covered by ADAAG [ADA

Accessibility Guidelines].” Department of Justice, Title III Technical Assistance Manual, pt.

5.3000 (1994). This interpretation fails for the same reason as the Access Board’s gloss: it is

plainly inconsistent with the regulations themselves because it ignores the provision on freestanding water coolers and may conflict with those covering such moveable objects as library

magazine displays and telephone books. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490

U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (agency interpretations not controlling if “plainly erroneous” or

“inconsistent with the regulation”); Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment, Inc. v. City of

Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 732 & n. 11 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Justice Department’s . . . Technical

Assistance Manual[] . . . will be disregarded only if plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A similar fate befalls defendant’s third

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 8 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

authority: a letter from a Department of Justice official stating that the regulations cover only

“fixed building elements” and not “movable furniture or equipment.” Furthermore, the official

states that the letter “does not constitute a legal interpretation of the statute.” See Letter from

John L. Wodtach, Chief, Disability Rights Section, Department of Justice, to David A. Copus,

Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (Feb. 10, 1998), Mezias Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 2 (Nov. 30, 2005)),

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/ltr213.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Defendants also cite two district court decisions. In Lieber v. Macy’s West, Inc., 80 F.

Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 1999), Judge Marilyn Hall Patel held that the regulations covered

fixed display units in a department store but not moveable display racks. Id. at 1077. Chief

Judge Lewis T. Babcock made the same ruling in Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition v. Too

(Delaware), Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D. Colo. 2004). Such a holding would not extend

necessarily to protruding objects or other parts of the regulations. There was additional

authority influencing these decisions that has no bearing on the instant case. Display racks were

addressed in the legislative history to the ADA. The regulations also refer to “fixed or built-in

storage facilities such as . . shelves,” a limitation that Judge Babcock used to limit the meaning

of storage facilities in other parts of the regulations. 28 C.F.R., pt. 36, App. A, § 4.1.3(12)(a);

Colo. Cross-Disability Coalition, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 713. These decisions therefore provide

little guidance on the problem presented in the instant case. 

Defendant also contends that Section 4.4.1 does not apply to the objects in controversy

because it covers only objects protruding from “walls.” It argues that the shelves at Rite Aid

are not walls. There is no definition of “wall” in the ADA, its implementing regulations or any

court decision. There is no evidence as to the exact structure and nature of the shelves from

which the objects in this case protruded. Images of them, however, show typical drug-store

shelving. They appear to have been independent of the room’s exterior walls and to consist of

vertical supports rising about six feet — only part-way to the ceiling — and supporting several

shelves each. The shelves faced the store aisles (see Stewart Decl. I ¶¶ 2–5, Exhs. 1–3). 

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 9 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Given the bulk, solidity and seeming permanence of these shelving units, this Court

cannot say that, as a matter of law, they are not walls in the context of Section 4.4.1. More

evidence would be necessary to make such a determination on a motion for summary judgment. 

The shelving units are consistent with some dictionary definitions of “wall.” See, e.g., The

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Joseph P. Pickett et al. eds., 4th ed.

2000), available at http://www.bartleby.com/61/74/W0017400.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006)

(“[A]n upright structure of masonry, wood, plaster, or other building material serving to

enclose, divide, or protect an area, especially a vertical construction forming an inner partition

. . . of a building.”). Furthermore, to exclude such a structure from the definition of wall here

would defeat the remedial purpose of Section 4.4.1 in any aisle bordered by shelves. In such

aisles, visually impaired people could not protect themselves from crashing into protruding

objects. Because the ADA remedies discrimination, any construction given to it may be guided

by the canon that remedial legislation is to be “construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.” 

Given these considerations, Rite Aid is not entitled to summary judgment on its liability under

Section 4.4.1 solely on the basis of the potential wall/shelf distinction. 

 Rite Aid’s final line of defense on this issue is that it is not required to comply with

Section 4.4.1 because it supplies an alternative design or technology that provides “substantially

equivalent or greater access to and usability of the facility.” See 28 C.F.R., pt. 36, App. A, § 2.2

(allowing such deviations). Rite Aid claims that the relevant designs or technologies it supplies

are (1) personnel to guide visually impaired customers through the store and (2) the plastic clips

themselves, which use hinges and thin paper to flex away readily from anyone who collides

with them. When compared to compliance with Section 4.4.1, these alternatives do not make

the store as or more accessible and usable to visually disabled people. 

First, the store manager stated that, although it was his practice to ensure that employees

provide such assistance, he could not recall any blind customer ever availing himself or herself

of this service (Prushko Decl. ¶¶ 2–3). There is no evidence that a similar plan has ever been

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 10 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

 Rite Aid operates about 3,400 stores. Rite Aid Corp., About Our Company, 

http://www.riteaid.com/company_info/index.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 

11

put into practice in any other Rite Aid store.4 It is therefore speculation to claim that such a

plan will be substantially equivalent or better than compliance with Section 4.4.1. Second, the

flexibility of clips and paper sticking out more than four inches does not make the aisles as

usable to the visually impaired as aisles with no objects projecting that far. It might not hurt as

much to run into a flexible plastic clip or a piece of paper than it would be to collide with

protruding timber or metal but it nevertheless could injure an eye, startle the person and thus

cause a further accident, or simply humiliate him or her. 

Defendant also argues that it met the substantial-equivalence standard because plaintiff

had substantially equivalent access to the store, due the fact that his wife guided him. For the

Court to accept this theory, it would have to find that Ms. Torres was herself an alternative

design or technology and that she provided her assistance on behalf of Rite Aid. Neither is true. 

Finally, defendant claims there was substantially equivalent access because the object with

which plaintiff nearly collided was “located in a shopping aisle where a visually impaired

person . . . would not be shopping without a sighted companion” (Br. 15). This argument

suggests that there was no requirement to make the store’s aisles accessible if disabled people

were unlikely to go there independently. The law provided no such exception to Rite Aid. 

More practically, even if visually disabled people would not shop independently in the aisles,

they might nevertheless use them as a path to the store’s pharmacy. In that case, they would be

subject to the hazards of any protruding objects. 

For the reasons stated above, defendant is denied summary judgment on its claim that

Section 4.4.1 does not apply to the protruding objects at issue in this case. 

3. Defendant’s Motion on Denial of Access. 

Defendant also moves for summary judgment on the grounds that neither “the single

cardboard advertisement Plaintiff alleges he ‘encountered’ . . . [nor] any other allegedly

‘protruding objects’ in the store[] denied him access . . . in violation of the ADA” (Br. 2). 

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 11 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Defendant misses the point here. Plaintiff does not seek to prove ultimately that he was

denied access. To prevail, he must instead demonstrate that Rite Aid discriminated against him. 

See 42 U.S.C. 12182(a). Discrimination in the provision of public accommodations, such as the

Rite Aid store, is defined as failing to alter a facility “in such a manner that, to the maximum

extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by

individuals with disabilities . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 12183(a)(2). The Attorney General, in turn, has

implemented that statute by adopting Section 4.4.1 and other standards. Thus, whether or not

plaintiff was able to get to all the merchandise and parts of the store is not dispositive. In fact,

he did not need to enter the store at all to make out a case. See 42 U.S.C. 12188(a)(1)

(“Nothing in this section shall require a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if

such person has actual notice [of a violation].”). Plaintiff may make out a valid claim of

discrimination based solely on Rite Aid’s purported failure to conform the store’s alterations to

Section 4.4.1. For this reason, defendant’s argument for summary judgment on grounds that

plaintiff was not denied access is rejected. 

4. Defendant’s Motion on California State-Law Violations.

Plaintiff also alleges that Rite Aid violated California Civil Code Sections 51(f), 54(c)

and 54.1(a), which each requires compliance with the ADA (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 10–11). Rite Aid

moves for summary judgment on these claims solely on grounds that they fail in the event that

the ADA claim is rejected. This order denies defendant’s motion on the ADA claim. Its motion

therefore must be denied as to the California state-law claims. 

5. Defendant’s Motion on Standing.

Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff does not have

standing to bring this lawsuit. It first argues the plaintiff has not introduced evidence sufficient

to show that he suffered injury in fact, thus failing to meet the requirements of Article III,

Section 2 of the Constitution. To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, litigants must show “an

invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b)

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical . . . . By particularized, we mean that the

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 12 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A

plaintiff need not prove that he or she will succeed on the merits to satisfy this and the other

standing requirements. The inquiry focuses instead on the “nature and source of the claim

asserted.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 

Plaintiff has introduced enough evidence to show that his claim rests on an injury that, if

it occurred, affected him in a personal way. The injury he claims was that he was denied an

equal “opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations of” the Rite Aid store. See 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(1)(a)(i)

(emphasis added). The ADA created a right for the disabled to enjoy such equal opportunity. 

Sighted people enjoyed the opportunity to walk down Rite Aid aisles and avoid protruding

objects. Plaintiff has introduced enough evidence to go to the jury on whether he was denied

that same opportunity when Rite Aid allegedly put protruding objects in the aisles where he

could not have detected them. This is more than enough to demonstrate injury-in-fact in the

Ninth Circuit. In Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002), Judge

William Fletcher, a professor and expert on standing issues, wrote for the Ninth Circuit that a

plaintiff who did not even enter a store — but who knew there were illegal barriers inside it —

had suffered an injury in fact. Id. at 1135. Plaintiff here also has introduced evidence that he

has actual knowledge of the allegedly illegal barriers at the Rite Aid store. His claim therefore

withstands summary judgment on whether he suffered injury in fact. 

Defendant next asserts that plaintiff does not have standing because he was not “within

the class of visually impaired individuals Section 4.4.1 was designed to protect — i.e.,

individuals who use a cane for detection purposes” (Br. 17). This order assumes, without

adopting, the notion that Congress and the Attorney General have limited the group of people

within the zone of interests protected by Section 4.4.1 to those who use canes to detect

obstacles. Plaintiff has met his burden to withstand summary judgment on this issue. He

introduced evidence that he used his cane for detection purposes, including during his April 13

visit to the Rite Aid store. He stated, “On April 13, 2005 . . . [w]hile we were in the Store,

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 13 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

I . . . dragged my cane in front of me . . . as we walked down the aisles. In such situations, my

cane serves the dual purpose of informing others that I am visually impaired and helping me

detect objects in front of me. On that day, in the Store, I detected several objects in front of me,

using my cane” (Jesus Torres Decl. I ¶ 4). This description of plaintiff’s cane technique is

consistent with one that the Access Board and, by ratification, the Attorney General have stated

Section 4.4.1 is designed to accommodate. 28 C.F.R., pt. 35, App. A, App. § 4.4.1. Plaintiff is

within the zone of interests protected by Section 4.4.1. 

Defendant also claims that plaintiff lacks standing because his injury could not be

redressed by the request he seeks, namely damages and injunctive relief. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at

561 (requiring that it be likely that a favorable decision will redress the claimed injury). 

Defendant’s argument is patently bogus. First, plaintiff states that he will return to the store

(Jesus Torres ¶ 2). Because he uses a cane for detection purposes, an injunction ordering Rite

Aid to comply with Section 4.4.1 would redress his injury. Second, plaintiff requests damages

which presumably would compensate him for any other injuries. 

Defendant next contends that no causal connection exists between the protruding object

encountered by plaintiff and his alleged injury. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“[T]here must be a

causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be

fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.”) (brackets in original deleted). 

This contention is also devoid of merit. There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, if

plaintiff suffered the loss of equal opportunity he alleged, it was caused by Rite Aid putting

protruding objects on its shelves. 

Finally, defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment that plaintiff may not

pursue injunctive relief because he has failed to demonstrate any substantial risk of future harm. 

Plaintiff has introduced evidence that he probably will visit the store again and that Rite Aid has

violated Section 4.4.1 there (Torres Decl. II ¶ 2). He thus has properly supported his claim that

he suffers a substantial risk of future harm. Defendant’s argument therefore fails.

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 14 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

 At trial, plaintiff will have the burden of proving that Rite Aid exceeded such tolerances. 

15

6. Plaintiff’s Motion.

Plaintiff seeks a ruling that the types of hanging merchandise, advertising sign and

coupon dispenser depicted in Exhibits 1–3 of Stewart Declaration I violate Sections 4.1.3(2)

and 4.4.1 when their “lowest edge[s are] between 27 inches and 80 inches above the finished

floor, to the extent that [they] project[] from shelves into walking areas more than 4 inches

beyond a vertical line represented by the outermost edge of the portion of the shelf that is at or

below 27 inches above the finished floor” (Br. ii). 

These dimensions are to vague for this Court to hold them compatible with the

regulation. Specifically, it is unclear whether the four inches is measured from the edge of the

shelf or from the edge of the floor. If it is measured from the edge of the shelf that is at or

below 27 inches, and that shelf is set back from the edge of the floor, plaintiff’s rule would bar

objects that project less than four inches into the aisle. For this reason alone, plaintiff’s motion

would be denied. Even if there were not this problem, plaintiff’s motion would be denied

because he asks this Court to require strict compliance with the dimensions of Section 4.4.1. 

No such strict compliance is required. Rite Aid is exempt from strict compliance if its deviation

is within “conventional building industry tolerances for field conditions.” See 28 C.F.R., pt. 36,

App. A, § 3.2. To succeed on this motion, plaintiff would have to introduce evidence that the

industry disallows any deviation. He has not done so. For these reasons, this Court cannot hold

that strict compliance with the dimensions of Section 4.4.1 is required.5

 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, both motions for summary judgment are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2006 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-02136-WHA Document 46 Filed 01/27/06 Page 15 of 15