Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01301/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01301-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COREY ANTHONY COLLINS,

Petitioner,

v.

DOMINGO URIBE, JR., Warden, 

 

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 12cv1301 IEG (WMc)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: GRANT OF PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

I. Introduction

On May 29, 2012, Petitioner Corey Anthony Collins (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2254 (“Petition”). [ECF No.

1.] On that same day, Petitioner also filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance (“Motion to Stay”). [ECF

No. 2.] On June 13, 2012, the above-entitled case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to pay the

filing fee. [ECF No. 3.] This case was reopened on July 23, 2012 and the Court issued a briefing

schedule for Petitioner’s Motion to Stay on August 14, 2012. [ECF No. 5.] On October 11, 2012,

Respondent filed its response to the Motion to Stay. [ECF No. 9.] This Report and Recommendation is

submitted to United States District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local

Civil Rule H.C.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After

reviewing the Petition, Motion for Stay and Abeyance, and all of the briefing submitted by the parties,

the Court recommends the Motion to Stay be GRANTED for the reasons stated below.

 

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II. Procedural History - Appeal of State Court Conviction

On January 9, 2009, the Kern County District Attorney charged Petitioner with second degree

robbery and active participation in a criminal street gang. According to the state appellate court’s

opinion, the procedural history of Petitioner’s conviction and sentencing is as follows:

“A jury found defendant guilty as charged and found the gang allegation true. The trial court

found the prior conviction and prison term allegations true. The Court sentenced defendant to 27 years

in prison, as follows: the upper term of five years for the robbery, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes

law, plus a 10-year term for the gang enhancement, plus a five-year enhancement for the prior serious

felony enhancement, and two one-year terms for the prior prison term enhancements. On the active

participation offense, the court imposed the six-year upper term, stayed pursuant to section 654.”

People v. Collins, 2011 WL 242363, *1-5 (Cal. App. 5 Dist Jan, 27, 2011.) 

On appeal, Petitioner raised the following issues: “(1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by

arguing guilt by association, (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of retaliation against a

witness in an unrelated case, (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the gang enhancement and the

active participation conviction, (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the true finding on one of the

prior prison term enhancements, and (5) the sentencing court denied defendant the right to allocute and

an opportunity to speak.” People v. Collins, 2011 WL 242363, at *1.

The state appellate court reversed the gang enhancement, vacated Petitioner’s sentence,

remanded for re-sentencing and affirmed the state court conviction in all other respects. People v.

Collins, 2011 WL 242363, at *1.

Petitioner sought review of the state appellate court’s decision in the California Supreme Court,

but the court denied his petition for review on April 13, 2011. (Pet. at 2.)1

Petitioner also sought collateral review in state court claiming insufficient evidence to support

the conviction and use of false evidence at trial. (Pet. at 3, 21.) Specifically, on June 2, 2011, Petitioner

filed his first state habeas corpus petition in Kern County Superior Court, which was denied on June 30,

1

For ease of reference, the Court uses the page numbers assigned to the Petition by the Court’s electronic

filing system.

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2011. (Pet. at 3.) Another petition was filed on November 11, 2011, and an order denying that petition

issued on December 22, 2011.2

 In the Motion to Stay, Petitioner indicates he seeks a stay and abeyance

in order to exhaust the sufficiency of the evidence claim, which is listed as ground three in the federal

Petition. (ECF No. 2, Motion to Stay at 5.)

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their

confinement in state prison, must first exhaust their state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c);

Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). Ordinarily, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a

petitioner must “fairly present[] his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider

it . . . or . . . demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available. Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6

(1982)). “[The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)] aims to encourage the

finality of sentences and to encourage petitioners to exhaust their claims in state court before filing in

federal court.” Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 265, 276-277 (2005).

AEDPA also applies a one-year statute of limitations also to federal habeas corpus petitions. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 2002). Thus, a petitioner who wishes to challenge his state

court conviction in federal court via a habeas corpus petition must file within one year of his conviction

becoming final. The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus

petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its

delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.”). However, absent some other basis for

tolling, the statute of limitations does run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker,

533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). 

2

See Appellate Courts Case Information for Case Number F063591 online as follows:

http://appellatecase.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=5&doc_id=1996077&doc_no=F063591. 

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AEDPA has two main purposes: “(1) to reduce delays in executing state and federal criminal

sentences, and (2) to streamline federal habeas proceedings by increasing a petitioner’s incentive to

exhaust all claims in state court.” Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008). The

Supreme Court has therefore held that when a petitioner files a petition containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, a district court has limited discretion under Rhines to grant a stay and abeyance of

the mixed petition if: (1) “the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust”; (2) “his unexhausted

claims are potentially meritorious”; and (3) “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. The Supreme Court made clear in

Rhines, however, that because staying a federal habeas petition frustrates AEDPA’s objective of

encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay the resolution of federal proceedings and

undermines AEDPA’s goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s

incentive to first exhaust all his claims in state court, “stay and abeyance should be available only in

limited circumstances.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. 

B. Arguments

In the Motion to Stay, Petitioner acknowledges his sufficiency of the evidence claim was

unexhausted at the time of the federal Petition’s filing on May 29, 2012. (ECF No. 2, Motion to Stay at

5.) Nevertheless, Petitioner notes in his motion that he diligently began his state collateral challenge

before his judgment became final on July 11, 2011.3

 Petitioner also contends he could not have known

of the factual predicate for his sufficiency of the evidence claim at an earlier point in time. Id.

Respondents oppose a stay and abeyance of Petitioner’s claims under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269 (2005), arguing Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the good cause required by the standard set

forth in Rhines. [ECF No. 9, Resp.’s brief at 11.] In the alternative, Respondents advise they would not

oppose a stay and abeyance of the federal petition if Petitioner dismisses ground three (the sufficiency of

3

Petitioner’s conviction became final on July 11, 2011, the last day he could have filed a petition for writ

of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which is ninety days following the April 13, 2011 denial of his

petition for review by the California Supreme Court on direct appeal. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th

Cir. 1999). The AEDPA’s statute of limitations period began to run on July 12, 2011 and absent statutory or

equitable tolling, a federal petition under the AEDPA limitations period had to be filed no later than July 11,

2012. 

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the evidence claim) and then attempts to amend the original petition to include the claim after the

California Supreme Court issues its decision. Id. at 15.

C. Analysis

There are two approaches for analyzing a stay and abeyance motion, depending on whether the

petition is mixed or fully exhausted. Jackson v. Roe, 524 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005). If the petitioner

files a stay and abeyance motion under a mixed petition, the request is analyzed under the Supreme

Court standard set forth in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. When

the petition is fully exhausted, the request for stay and abeyance is analyzed under the standard set forth

in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. 

Under the total exhaustion requirement set forth in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 and the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitation,

petitioners with mixed petitions “run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal review

of their unexhausted claims.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 269-70. The limited options facing a mixed petition

create this risk. If a petitioner elects to abandon only the unexhausted claims and proceed with the

exhausted claims, once the exhausted claims are decided on the merits, the petitioner may not include

any newly exhausted claims in a subsequent petition due to the strict limitations AEDPA places on

successive motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). If a petitioner elects to dismiss the entire mixed petition, the

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations will likely run before a petitioner can exhaust state court

remedies and return to federal court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. Due to these potential risks, a federal

district court has discretion to stay a mixed habeas petition. Id. at 278. When a court stays a mixed

petition, the petitioner may present his unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance, and

then return to federal court for review of the “perfected” petition. Id. at 279. A petitioner must “show

good cause for his failure to exhaust, demonstrate the unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious,”

and show no indication of “intentional[] dilatory litigation tactics” in order for the court to stay a mixed

petition. Id. at 270. If the court finds a stay and abeyance inappropriate, the court may allow a

petitioner to dismiss the unexhausted claims and proceed with the exhausted claims if dismissal of the

entire petition would “unreasonably impair” the petitioner’s right to obtain federal relief. Id.

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The Supreme Court did not define the good cause standard in Rhines. In the Ninth Circuit, good

cause is, a standard less stringent than the “extraordinary circumstances” standard for equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 2005). District courts

within the Ninth Circuit have more narrowly defined the standard. Some have required the showing of

“some objective factor external to the petitioner” that prevented timely exhaustion. Hernandez v.

Sullivan, 397 F. Supp.2d 1205, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Others have equated the good cause standard to

“excusable neglect.” See Corjasso v. Ayers, 2006 WL 618380, 1 (E.D. Cal. 2006). The latter interpretation considers such factors as prejudice to the non-moving party, length of the delay, its effect on

efficient court administration, and whether the delay was caused by factors beyond the control of the

movant and good faith. Id. at 1. 

Here, IT IS RECOMMENDED the Court find Petitioner has shown good cause to grant a stay

of the action. In the motion to stay, Petitioner states that he never received a ruling from the California

Appellate Court on his sufficiency of the evidence claim [ECF No. 2 at 2, 19] and indeed the online

Appellate Courts Case Information for Case Number F063591 indicates Petitioner has inquired twice

since the filing of his federal Petition in May 2012 about the status of the appellate court case and

requested a copy of the ruling.4

 Petitioner has no control over his receipt of legal mail and has

demonstrated that he: (1) has followed up on his failure to receive a ruling which would allow him to

file with the state supreme court and (2) has attempted to comply with the state and federal courts

procedural deadlines by promptly instituting collateral review and timely filing a federal petition. In

addition, the Court cannot conclude, on the record before it, that Petitioners claims are not “potentially

meritorious.” See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a claim is colorable

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) unless it is “perfectly clear that petitioner has not hope of

prevailing”). Petitioner satisfies the criteria set forth in Rhines for issuance of a stay, namely, he has

good cause for failure to exhaust, there is an arguably meritorious unexhausted claim, and he is

4

See Appellate Courts Case Information for Case Number F063591 online as follows:

http://appellatecase.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=5&doc_id=1996077&doc_no=F063591.

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diligently pursuing state court remedies concerning that claim. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278; Jackson, 425

F.3d at 661; Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070. 

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order

Granting Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 31, 2012, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than November 14, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1553, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 17, 2012

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court

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