Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01942/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01942-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENNIE DIXON

CDC #F-00012,

Civil No. 06-1942 IEG (POR)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND

FOR SEEKING MONETARY

DAMAGES AGAINST

DEFENDANTS WHO ARE IMMUNE

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

vs.

ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ, Warden;

RICHARD J. DONOVAN

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; DONNIE

BRAMETT, Inmate; CROWE, Correctional

Officer; CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF

CORRECTIONS,

Defendants.

On June 28, 2006, while incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility

(“Donovan”), Plaintiff, Bennie Dixon, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 in San Diego Superior Court requesting compensatory and punitive damages against

Defendants, California Department of Corrections (“CDC”) and Donovan officials, as well as

a fellow inmate, who are alleged to have violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from “cruel and

unusual punishment.” See Compl. at 2-3. On September 18, 2006, Defendants removed the

action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) on the grounds that the case arises under

Case 3:06-cv-01942-IEG-POR Document 2 Filed 10/30/06 Page 1 of 7
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federal civil rights laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has filed no

opposition to Defendant’s Notice of Removal.

I. Defendant’s Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 1]

A. Legal Standard

The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New

York, 790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, it cannot reach the merits of any dispute until

it confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S.

83, 94 (1998). “Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only

function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Id.

(quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 614 (1868)). District courts must construe

the removal statutes strictly against removal and resolve any uncertainty as to removability in

favor of remanding the case to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)

(per curiam); Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988).

Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. A state court action can

only be removed if it could have originally been brought in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th. Cir. 1996).

Thus, for an action to be removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, the complaint

must establish either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to

relief necessarily depends on the resolution of substantial questions of federal law. Franchise

Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10-11

(1983). Whether federal jurisdiction exists is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule.

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. Under this rule, the federal question must be “presented on the face

of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id.; accord Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294

F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002). “[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to

federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the

defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the

federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393; see Wayne, 294

F.3d at 1183 (“However, the existence of a defense based upon federal law is insufficient to

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support jurisdiction.”). Further, “[a]s the master of the complaint, a plaintiff may defeat removal

by choosing not to plead independent federal claims.” Arco Envtl. Remediation L.L.C. v.

Department of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000); Rains v. Criterion

Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 1996); Redwood Theaters, Inc. v. Festival Enters. Inc., 908

F.2d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 1990).

The artful pleading doctrine is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, and

provides that “a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal

questions in a complaint.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22; see also Rains, 80 F.3d at 343

(“Under the artful pleading doctrine, a plaintiff may not avoid federal jurisdiction by ‘omitting

from the complaint federal law essential to his claim, or by casting in state law terms a claim that

can be made only under federal law.’”) (quoting Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740

F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984)). Courts will apply the artful pleading doctrine “only if the

particular conduct complained of is governed exclusively by federal law.” Sullivan v. First

Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). Where

a defendant asserts “artful pleading,” the court may examine the removal notice and supporting

affidavits to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law. See Schroeder v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 702 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir. 1983). Under this doctrine, “[a] state

created cause of action can be deemed to arise under federal law (1) where federal law

completely preempts state law; (2) where the claim is necessarily federal in character; or (3)

where the right to relief depends on the resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question.”

Arco Envt’l Remediation, 213 F.3d at 1114. However, the Ninth Circuit has noted that the artful

pleading doctrine “is to be involved only in exceptional circumstances as it raises difficult issues

of state and federal relationships and often yields unsatisfactory results.” Salveson v. Western

States Bankcard Ass’n, 731 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1984). “The artful pleading doctrine does

not permit defendants to . . . rewrite a plaintiff’s properly pleaded claim in order to remove it to

federal court.” Rains, 80 F.3d at 344.

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The defendants have the burden of establishing that removal is proper and supporting its

jurisdictional allegations with competent proof. Gaus v. Miller, 980 F.2d at 566; Nishimoto v.

Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990). In addition, the

defendants must file a timely notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The notice of removal

must be filed within 30 days after receipt of a copy of the initial pleading if removability can be

determined from its text. Id.

B. Discussion

Defendants seek removal of this action on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint arises

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While Plaintiff has not filed a reply to Defendants’ notice of removal,

a district court may remand an action sua sponte if it concludes that it lacks jurisdiction. See

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); FED.R.CIV.P. 12(h)(3) (district court may

sua sponte dismiss an action, regardless of whether the plaintiffs are proceeding in forma

pauperis, if the court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction). 

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint specifically alleges a violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. 2-3. Defendants Crowe and Hernandez filed

this notice of removal within 30 days after the first Defendant was served. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(a), (b). As such, the Court finds that removal was proper. 

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A obligates this Court to review complaints filed by all

plaintiffs who are “prisoners” at the time the complaint is filed and who “seek redress from a

governmental entity or employee of a governmental entity” regardless of whether the prisoner

prepays filing fees, moves to proceed IFP, or is later released. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Under § 1915A, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or which seek

monetary relief from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2); Resnick

v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000).

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“Under § 1915A, when determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must

accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. at 447 (citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir.

1997)). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, in giving liberal interpretation

to a pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not, “supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). 

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely

provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal citations omitted); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420

(9th Cir. 1991). As such, § 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1)

that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the

conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.

527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986);

Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

A. Eighth Amendment claims

To the extent that a liberal construction of Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests that he may

intend to base his claim against Defendants based on their alleged failure to protect him from

harm, the Court notes that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment requires prison officials to act reasonably in order to protect inmates from violence

or other serious risks to their health and safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833

(1994); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). To state a failure to protect claim

under Farmer, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that the conditions of his

confinement objectively pose a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834;

see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). A prisoner must also plead facts which

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show that a prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” to his safety; that is, that the

official “knew of the risk and that the official inferred that substantial harm might result from

the risk.” Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks any factual allegations that any specific Defendant

actually knew of or could infer a serious risk to Plaintiff’s safety. See Wallis, 70 F.3d at 1077.

Plaintiff appears to allege that he was attacked by another inmate while incarcerated at Donovan.

However, Plaintiff fails to identify any knowledge on the part of any Defendant that there was

a serious risk to his safety. Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint as currently pleaded, fails to allege facts

sufficient to support a failure to protect claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Further, Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections and the Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility as Defendants. Compl. at 1-2. However, the California

Department of Corrections and Donovan, as agencies of the State of California, are not

“persons” subject to suit and are instead, entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages

actions under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,

53-54 (1996); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984); see also

Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department

of corrections is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). In order to state a claim under

§ 1983, Plaintiff must identify a “person” who, acting under color of state law, deprived him of

a right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s monetary claims against Donovan and the California Department

of Corrections are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

The case is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted and for seeking monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such

relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

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Plaintiff is granted forty-five (45) days in which to file an amended complaint which

addresses each deficiency of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIV. L R. 15.1.

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed

to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail an approved § 1983 Complaint form to

Plaintiff.

DATED: October 30, 2006

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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