Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00081/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00081-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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The exact date of Plaintiff's discharge is not determined here because Defendant

states that Plaintiff received a notice of discharge on May 23, 2003 (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss

("Def.'s Mot.") at 2), while Plaintiff says she was terminated on May 30, 2003 (Pl.'s Resp.

in Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Resp.") at 3.)

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lynda Hobby, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Thomas Mulhern, Dir. Empl. Rel. Services

- T.S.A., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV05-0081-PHX-SRB

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Transportation Security Administration's ("TSA")

Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

(Doc. 10). For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Lynda Hobby was employed by TSA for approximately nine months as a

security screener at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport. TSA discharged Plaintiff

from her job on or about May 23, 2003.1

 According to TSA's discharge letter, Plaintiff was

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There seems to be some confusion about Mr. Mulhern's exact position with TSA.

Plaintiff captions her Complaint as "Thomas Mulhern, Dir. Empl. Rel. Services – T.S.A.,"

while Defendant states that Mr. Mulhern is "Program Executive in the Transportation

Security Administration's Office of Human Resources." (Def.'s Mot. at 4.) However, the

Court's decision is unaffected by Mr. Mulhern's precise title within T.S.A.

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terminated for failing to meet the conditions of employment, namely that she failed to list in

her employment application a December 10, 1997 arrest for "larceny, carrying a concealed

weapon, dangerous drugs, drug paraphernalia, two traffic offenses and making a false

report." (Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 3.) 

Plaintiff filed suit against Thomas Mulhern, a TSA executive officer for employee

relations,2

 on January 7, 2005. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached

an employment contract with her on April 30, 2003 when she was "terminated for an

unsuitability issue." (Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages of $50,000 for "18

months lost pay, lost revenue from agency matching contribution savings plan, defamation

of character, and mental/emotional anguish." (Compl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff also asks the Court to

reinstate her to her former job with TSA. (Compl. ¶ 3.) The Complaint asserts that this

Court has jurisdiction over the matter because Defendant is a representative of the United

States Government "and the amount and type of relief sought." (Compl. ¶ 1.) 

Defendant brought the instant Motion to Dismiss on the basis that this Court lacks

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and argues that Plaintiff failed

to state a claim. (Def.'s Mot. at 1.) Defendant requests that the Court dismiss the Complaint

with prejudice. Plaintiff responded that this Court does have jurisdiction because she has

"exhausted all other administrative means" and on the basis of diversity of citizenship. (Pl.'s

Resp. at 4.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

A. Overview

Defendant has raised two arguments regarding this Court's subject matter jurisdiction,

that is, the power to hear this dispute. The Court will address both of these arguments, even

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though each is dispositive. After examining the preliminary issues, the Court will first

address whether Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a basis for this Court's jurisdiction, either

under federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Second, the Court will determine whether

the United States has consented to be sued. Finally, the Court will address whether it will

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. 

B. Preliminary Issues

1. Federal Rule 12(b)(1)

When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the

court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on

the merits. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1946) (a decision on

whether the complaint states a cause of action "must be decided after and not before the court

has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy"); Drewien v. Medford Police Dep't, 2004 WL

948347, *1 (D. Or. Apr. 30, 2004) ("[A] motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter

jurisdiction should be addressed by the court before any other Rule 12 motion to prevent a

court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice.") (citing

Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)). A court's dismissal of a

plaintiff's case because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is not a determination of

the merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have

proper jurisdiction. Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977). Because

Defendant's jurisdictional attack is dispositive in this case, the Court will not address whether

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. 

2. Burden of Proof 

A motion to dismiss an action under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure raises the threshold question of whether the federal district court has subject matter

jurisdiction over the action before it. The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912

F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving

all jurisdictional facts.") (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189,

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56 S. Ct. 780, 785 (1936)). In this case, Plaintiff is asserting that this Court has jurisdiction

to hear her claim. Therefore, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction.

3. Suits Against Federal Agencies

Although Plaintiff brought her suit against an official of the TSA, "[t]he general rule

is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree

would operate against the latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58, 83 S. Ct. 1052, 1053

(1963) (citations omitted); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 83 S. Ct. 999, 1006 (1963) (a

suit is against the sovereign if judgment would come from the public treasury or compel the

government to act); Balser v. Dep't of Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In

sovereign immunity analysis, any lawsuit against an agency of the United States or against

an officer of the United States in his or her official capacity is considered an action against

the United States."); Hill v. United States, 571 F.2d 1098, 1101 n.5 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding

that claims for back pay against individual defendants must be considered a suit against the

United States since back pay would come from the federal treasury). An exception to this

general rule is when government officials act beyond their statutory powers. See Dugan, 372

U.S. at 622, 83 S. Ct. at 1007 (recognizing that an official may be sued in his individual

capacity when the official acts beyond his statutory power or when the official's powers are

"constitutionally void"). 

Because the relief Plaintiff seeks here would come from the federal treasury, and

because Plaintiff has not alleged that the named Defendant was acting outside his statutory

powers when she was terminated from her position as a security screener, Plaintiff's suit is

one against the United States.

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

An attack on subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental to a district court's ability to

hear a case. See Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[I]n all actions

before a federal court, the necessary and constitutional predicate for any decision is a

determination that the court has jurisdiction-that is the power-to adjudicate the dispute.")

(citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). A federal court has

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subject matter jurisdiction when the cause of action either involves a federal question or

when diversity jurisdiction exists. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391, 107 S. Ct.

2425, 2429 (1987) ("Absent diversity of citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is

required.").

1. Federal-Question Jurisdiction 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a federal district court has original jurisdiction of all civil

actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," regardless of

the amount in controversy. For purposes of § 1331, a federal claim must appear on the face

of the complaint. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S. Ct. 96,

81 (1936) ("[T]he controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by

the answer or by the petition for removal."). Cf. Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film

Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that under the "well-pleaded complaint

rule," federal jurisdiction "exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the

Plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint") (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S. Ct. at

2429). 

In this case, Plaintiff's Complaint does not base jurisdiction on the Constitution, laws,

or treaties of the United States. Instead, Plaintiff merely states in her Complaint that

Defendant "is a representative of the United States Government, (Trans. Sec. Adm.), and the

amount and type of relief sought." (Compl. ¶ 1.) Thus, a federal claim does not appear on

the face of Plaintiff's Complaint.

2. Diversity Jurisdiction 

Later, in her Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff claims jurisdiction

is founded upon diversity of citizenship and because she has exhausted all other

administrative means. (Pl.'s Resp. at 4.) Even if Plaintiff had asserted more clearly in her

Complaint that jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship under 29 U.S.C. § 1332, 

that argument fails. 

In order for jurisdiction to be founded upon diversity of citizenship, the matter in

controversy must exceed the sum or value of $75,000, and the action must be between United

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States citizens who are citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff's claim

of diversity jurisdiction fails on both bases. Plaintiff is seeking $50,000 in damages, and so

her Complaint does not meet the statutory minimum amount for diversity jurisdiction. Nor

is an agency of the United States a citizen of any particular state for diversity purposes. See

Hancock Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 492 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1974).

Thus, a federal agency may not be sued on the basis of diversity alone. See Gen. Ry. Signal

Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir.1991) ("Federal jurisdiction over a suit against

an agency of the United States is proper when, for example, federal questions exist . . . . U.S.

agencies cannot be sued in diversity, however."). Therefore, Plaintiff's suit does not meet

either of the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish either federal-question jurisdiction or

jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, Plaintiff's claim will be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

D. Sovereign Immunity

Even if Plaintiff had succeeded in establishing this Court's subject matter jurisdiction

on the basis of either a federal question or diversity, Plaintiff would still bear the burden of

showing that the government has consented to be sued. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,

1107 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Baker v. United States, 817 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987)). If

the United States has not consented to be sued, then a court has no jurisdiction over the case.

Id. (citing F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1000 (1994)). 

When a party sues the United States, a court starts with the assumption that, due to

governmental immunity, no relief is available. See Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics

Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1998). A party "may sue the United States only if

Congress has waived sovereign immunity for the lawsuit, and may bring its claim in federal

district court only if Congress has provided for jurisdiction there." N. Star Alaska v. United

States, 9 F.3d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See also United States v. Mitchell, 463

U.S. 206, 212, 103 S. Ct. 2961, 2965 (1983) ("It is axiomatic that the United States may not

be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for

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jurisdiction."). Because Plaintiff's Complaint does not identify any federal law under which

she is suing, Congress could not have consented to this suit.

Plaintiff's Response in this case failed to address the issue of sovereign immunity

raised by Defendant, except to say that sovereign immunity "should be considered a

(desperate) effort by the Defense to over shadow that the Defendant did not answer the

March 08th Summons in the correct time frame, and that the TSA terminated the Plaintiff

illegally." (Pl.'s Resp. at 6.) Plaintiff is mistaken because the government cannot be sued

unless the government has consented to be sued. 

Despite Plaintiff's failure to establish the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court

will continue its analysis based on her allegation that she had a contract with the United

States.

E. Waiver

Congress has waived sovereign immunity in certain cases involving contracts. Under

the Tucker Act, the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear claims

against the United States founded upon "any express or implied contract with the United

States . . . ." See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Assuming that Plaintiff intended to bring her suit

under the Tucker Act, this Court would still lack subject matter jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is exclusive when the amount in controversy

is more than $10,000. United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 66 n.1, 107 S. Ct. 2246, 2249 n.1

(1987). The "Little Tucker Act," on the other hand, gives the district courts concurrent

jurisdiction with the Court of Claims when the amount in controversy in less than $10,000.

See id.; N. Star Alaska, 9 F.3d at 1432 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)).

In this case, even assuming, as Plaintiff alleges, that there is a contract, and because

Plaintiff is seeking damages in the amount of $50,000 for an alleged breach of that contract,

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It is worth noting that the Court of Federal Claims held earlier this year that TSA

security screeners were appointed and not contract employees, precluding the screeners'

claim that offers of conditional appointment were binding contracts. See Calvin v. United

States, 63 Fed. Cl. 468, 473 (2005)

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then the Federal Court of Claims would hold exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, and this

Court has no jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's breach of contract claim.3

F. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Although not pleaded as such, Plaintiff appears to be asserting state law claims for

defamation and negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Compl. ¶ 4.) If so,

this Court could potentially exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367(a) provides: "In any civil action of which the district

courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over

all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

Constitution." However, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over a claim under subsection (a) if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which

it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Moreover, when a court has determined

that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims in a suit, "the court is

compelled to refrain from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law

claims as well." Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 876 F. Supp. 1153, 1168 (D.C. Mont. 1995),

aff'd, 76 F.3d 287 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680,

692 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

As this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's alleged federal claim,

this Court must refrain from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state

law claims. 

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IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction (Doc. 10). 

DATED this 21st day of October, 2005.

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