Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00270/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Nicolai Tavilla, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Cephalon Incorporated, a Delaware 

corporation, 

Defendant. 

No. CV11-0270 PHX DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant Cephalon, Inc. has filed a Motion to Exclude Opinions of Michael 

Sucher, M.D. and Christine Grubb, Ph.D. Doc. 42. Plaintiffs have filed a response 

(Doc. 51) and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. 62). No party has requested oral 

argument. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it 

in part. 

I. The Admissibility Standard.

 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a special obligation on trial judges to 

“ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable.” 

Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Plaintiffs bear the 

burden of proving that their experts’ opinions are relevant and reliable. Kumho Tire Co. 

v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Bourjaily v. United States, 385 U.S. 171, 175 

(1987). “A trial court not only has broad latitude in determining whether an expert’s 

testimony is reliable, but also in determining how to determine the testimony’s 

reliability.” El Sayed Mukahtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th 

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Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). 

 In December of 2000, Rule 702 was amended to codify the gatekeeping 

requirements of Daubert. The Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment is 

instructive: 

A review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert 

testimony is the exception rather than the rule. Daubert did not work a “sea 

change over federal evidence law,” and “the trial court’s role as gatekeeper 

is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.” 

Fed. R. Ev. 702 advisory committee note (quoting United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land 

Situated in Leflore County, Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Advisory 

Committee further noted that proponents of expert testimony “‘do not have to 

demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their 

experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 

that their opinions are reliable. . . . . The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower 

than the merits standard of correctness.’” Id. (quoting In Re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.,

35 F.3d 717, 744 (3rd Cir. 1994)). As one court has explained: “[i]n serving its 

gatekeeping function, the court must be careful not to cross over into the role of 

factfinder. It is not the job of the court to ensure that the evidence heard by the jury is 

error-free, but to ensure that it is not wholly unreliable.” Southwire Co. v. J.P. Morgan 

Chase & Co., 528 F.Supp.2d 908, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 

 Thus, one notable commentator has observed that the 2000 amendments to 

Rule 702 “were not intended to signal an abandonment of the liberal attitude of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence toward the admissibility of opinion testimony.” 4 J. Weinstein 

& M. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 702.05[2][a] (2d. ed. 2011). Nor were they 

intended to suggest that courts should place less reliance on the traditional tools of the 

adversary system for finding truth. As the Supreme Court explained in Daubert, 

“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction 

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on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but 

admissible evidence.” 509 U.S. at 596. 

II. Dr. Michael Sucher.

A. Disclosure issues.

 On May 6, 2011, the Court entered an order governing the disclosure of expert 

opinions in this case. The order required Plaintiffs to “provide full and complete expert 

disclosures as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(A)-(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

no later than June 17, 2011.” Doc. 17 at 1. Defense expert reports were required on 

July 15, 2011, and Plaintiffs’ rebuttal expert disclosures, if any, were required by 

August 5, 2011. Id. Expert depositions were to be finished by August 19, 2011. 

 The Court made clear that full and complete disclosures were required by these 

dates. 

 As stated in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26 (1993 

Amendments), expert reports disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) must set 

forth “the testimony the witness is expected to present during direct 

examination, together with the reasons therefor.” Full and complete 

disclosures of such testimony are required on the dates set forth above. 

Absent truly extraordinary circumstances, parties will not be permitted to 

supplement their expert reports after these dates. 

Id. at 2. 

 Plaintiffs disclosed the initial expert report of Dr. Sucher on June 16, 2011. The 

report is very brief and contains little explanation of Dr. Sucher’s opinion that Plaintiff 

Nicolai Tavilla was mentally incompetent during the time period in question. Doc. 42-1 

at 2-9. In response, Defendant disclosed an opinion by Dr. Paul Berkowitz. The 

Berkowitz opinion largely critiqued the basis and methodology used in the Sucher report. 

In reply, Plaintiffs disclosed a rebuttal report by Dr. Sucher. Doc. 42-1 at 38-91. The 

rebuttal report contains more detail concerning the basis for Dr. Sucher’s opinions. 

 Defendant also chose to conduct a detailed deposition of Dr. Sucher and to inquire 

into the basis for his opinions. Defense counsel could have limited the deposition and 

required Dr. Sucher to stand on his reports, but instead allowed him to expand his 

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explanations and opinions. To the extent defense counsel chose to do so, Defendant 

clearly was on notice of his opinions and explanations and the Court would find it unfair 

to hold that Dr. Sucher could not restate them. As a result, the Court will consider the 

initial report, rebuttal report, and deposition of Dr. Sucher in ruling on this motion. 

 The Court will not consider the declaration attached to Plaintiffs’ response to the 

motion. Doc. 52 at 2-13. Not only was the new material contained in the declaration 

disclosed after the discovery period had closed, but the Court specifically advised the 

parties that, “absent truly extraordinary circumstances,” they would not be permitted to 

supplement their expert reports after the dates set in the Court’s order. Doc. 17 at 2. 

Plaintiffs make no attempt to identify extraordinary circumstances that prevented them 

from making full disclosure on the dates set by the Court. Plaintiffs did not ask that the 

dates be extended, nor did they seek permission to provide a supplement to the report. 

The declaration attached to their response is untimely and will not be considered. 

B. The Requirements of Rule 702.

 Rule 702 governs the opinion testimony of a witness “qualified as an expert by 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Ev. 702. Such opinion 

testimony is admissible if four requirements are satisfied: (1) the expert’s scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact in understanding the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue, (2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or 

data, (3) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (4) the 

expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Id. 

Defendant’s motion asserts that the second and third requirements have not been met – 

that Dr. Sucher lacks sufficient facts or data to render his opinion, and that he did not use 

a reliable methodology. 

 Defendant does not dispute that Dr. Sucher is qualified to render opinions on the 

effects of addiction to narcotic pain medication. In addition to being licensed to practice 

medicine in Arizona and California and being board certified by the American Board of 

Addiction Medicine, Dr. Sucher is the addiction specialist for the Arizona Medical 

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Board, Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners, Arizona Medical Association, Arizona 

State Board of Osteopathic Examiners, Arizona State Board of Nursing, Arizona Board 

of Chiropractic Examiners, and the State Bar of Arizona. He has been associated with 

numerous Phoenix-area hospitals and was president of the American Society of 

Addiction Medicine for 12 years. Doc. 51. 

 In determining whether Dr. Sucher’s opinion is based on sufficient facts or data, 

the Court will consider the facts and data set forth in his initial report, rebuttal report, and 

deposition. Those sources show that Dr. Sucher’s opinion that Plaintiff Nicolai Tavilla 

was mentally incompetent while taking the drug Actiq includes the following: In 

additional to Actiq, Mr. Tavilla was prescribed Oxycontin, Percocet, Vistaril, and 

Valium; Dr. Barnes prescribed Mr. Tavilla ever increasing dosages of Schedule II and III 

narcotics, as well as other medications which would have the capability of increasing the 

effects of the narcotics; Mr. Tavilla began to experience a variety of physical symptoms 

during the period that the pain medications were prescribed; this course of treatment 

constituted gross over-prescription of dangerous narcotic medications, particularly Actiq; 

Mr. Tavilla was demonstrating addictive behavior during the course of this treatment; 

these medications affect the central nervous system and include the effects of analgesia, 

sedation, euphoria, mental clouding, anxiety, and confusion; Dr. Barnes’ records show 

that Mr. Tavilla displayed an inability to follow through with referrals, was unable to 

keep appointments, was unable to follow medical prescription regimes, depended on his 

spouse to assist with his current problems, inaccurately reported medical information, 

displayed an inability to understand information given to him, and experienced 

fluctuations in mood; Mr. Tavilla was psychologically and physically addicted to 

dangerous narcotics, specifically Actiq, which caused him to be mentally and emotionally 

unstable, thereby negatively affecting his ability to relate to others and rendering him 

incompetent to make any decisions affecting his rights, actions, health, and legal matters. 

Docs. 42-1 at 2-9, 38-51. 

 The Court cannot conclude that this information, when combined with Dr. 

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Sucher’s extensive expertise in addiction medicine, was clearly insufficient to support an 

opinion on Mr. Tavilla’s mental competency. Defendant identifies various categories of 

information that Dr. Sucher did not consider, including actions that Mr. Tavilla took 

during the years in question to protect his legal rights and information contained in the 

medical records of other doctors. Defendant also notes that Dr. Sucher reached the 

opinions stated in his initial report before considering much of the information set forth in 

his rebuttal report. The Court concludes, however, that the facts set forth above are 

sufficient to satisfy the threshold reliability requirements of Rule 702. Facts not 

considered by Dr. Sucher, or first considered after he had expressed an opinion, will 

provide a fertile basis for cross-examination, but the Court does not find that they provide 

a basis for excluding Dr. Sucher’s testimony altogether. 

 The Court reaches the same conclusion with respect to Dr. Sucher’s methodology. 

When asked to describe the methodology used in reaching his opinions, Dr. Sucher relied 

on his years of experience in addiction medicine. As noted above, that experience is 

substantial. “Despite the importance of evidence-based medicine, much of medical 

decision-making relies on judgment – a process that is difficult to quantify or even to 

assess qualitatively. Especially when a relative experience base is unavailable, 

physicians must use their knowledge and experience for weighing known factors along 

with the inevitable uncertainties to make a sound judgment.” Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 

558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 

Again, Defendant will be permitted to cross-examine Dr. Sucher on his conclusion that 

the facts set forth above support an opinion that Mr. Tavilla was not mentally competent 

during the years at issue. As already noted, vigorous cross-examination is still the 

preferred method for determining the truth of questionable opinion evidence. 

III. Dr. Grubb.

 Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Grubb is a treating physician, not a specially retained 

expert, and that her opinions therefore are not subject to Daubert. Doc. 51 at 11. This 

clearly is incorrect. Rule 702 applies to any opinion testimony based on knowledge, 

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skill, experience, training, or education. Indeed, Rule 701, governing lay opinion 

testimony, specifically states that opinion testimony may not be admitted under Rule 701 

(and thereby evade the requirements of Rule 702) if it is “based on scientific, technical, 

or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Ev. 701(c). The 

purpose for this requirement is to ensure that any specialized or expert opinion evidence 

is funneled through the admissibility requirements of Rule 702, including the testimony 

of treating physicians. See, e.g., Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1201, 1207 

(8th Cir. 2000) (“a treating physician’s expert opinion . . . is subject to the same standards 

of scientific reliability that govern the expert opinions of physicians hired solely for 

purposes of litigation.”) 

 Because Dr. Grubb was not specially retained for this litigation, she was not 

required to produce an expert report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Doc. 42 at 8. In their 

disclosure statement, Plaintiffs stated that Dr. Grubb would opine that Nicolai Tavilla 

was not competent to make decisions concerning his personal affairs during the years he 

was taking Actiq. Doc. 42-1 at 69. 

 Plaintiffs produced a second disclosure statement on behalf of Dr. Grubb that 

responded to opinions of defense expert Berkowitz. Doc. 42-1 at 74-84. Portions of this 

disclosure statement set forth new opinions – opinions not formed during Dr. Grubb’s 

alleged treatment of Mr. Tavilla. Doc. 42-1 at 81-84. For such opinions, Dr. Grubb was 

required to produce a detailed expert report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). See Goodman v. 

Staples The Office Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2011) (“a treating 

physician is only exempt from Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s written report requirement to the extent 

that his opinions were formed during the course of treatment”; for opinions formed 

outside the course of treatment, a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report is required). Because 

Plaintiffs’ second disclosure statement clearly does not comply with the requirements of 

Rule 26(a)(2)(B)1

, the Court will not consider opinions of Dr. Grubb that were formed 

 

1

 For example, the disclosure statement is not signed by Dr. Grubb, does not set forth her qualifications, does not list publications she authored in the previous ten years, 

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outside the course of her treatment of Mr. Tavilla. The Court will also disregard the 

declaration of Dr. Grubb attached to Plaintiffs’ reply (Doc. 52-2 at 37-40) because it, like 

Dr. Sucher’s declaration, is untimely under the Court’s scheduling order. Thus, in 

evaluating the sufficiency of Dr. Grubb’s opinion under Rule 702, the Court will consider 

only her initial disclosure statement, portions of the second disclosure statement that 

address opinions formed during treatment (Doc. 42-1 at 74-80), and her deposition. 

 During her deposition, Dr. Grubb equivocated on whether Mr. Tavilla was her 

patient, stating that she “really didn’t think of him that way,” didn’t see him as an 

“official” patient, and would not have responded yes if someone asked her if Mr. Tavilla 

was her patient. Doc. 42 at 9. When required by subpoena to produce documents related 

to her treatment of Mr. Tavilla, Dr. Grubb produced only one psychological test 

conducted in 2003 (before the events at issue here) and a declaration prepared in August 

of 2007 in one of Mr. Tavilla’s other lawsuits. She produced no treatment records, no 

notes, and no other documentation of visitations with Mr. Tavilla. When asked why she 

did not have documentation of her treatment, she gave varying responses, including that 

they could have been destroyed in a flood, were only contained on a notepad in her car, 

and could have been shredded inadvertently with other documents. Doc. 42 at 10-11. 

When asked to describe her methodology, she said it was based on clinical interviews, 

asserting that “you know very quickly that they’re mentally deficient and you don’t have 

to do official tests to determine that.” Id. at 12. 

 In short, Dr. Grubb has provided nothing but her “I know it when I see it” opinion 

that Mr. Tavilla was mentally incompetent during the years in question. She has failed to 

support her opinion with treatment records, clinical notes, diagnostic tests, dates of 

treatment, details of treatment, or any other record of traditional medical care. Her 

methodology is just as sparse – she states that she saw Mr. Tavilla, talked to him, and 

knew he was not competent. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that “nothing 

 does not list other cases in which she has testified as an expert in the previous four years, and does not set forth the amount of her compensation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(vi). 

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in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit 

opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” 

General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 

Given the sparse factual basis for her opinions and the scant information on her 

methodology, Plaintiffs were obligated, in response to Defendant’s motion, to show that 

Dr. Grubb’s opinions are admissible under Rule 702. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141; 

Bourjaily, 385 U.S. at 175. Plaintiffs clearly failed to do so. Instead of showing the 

factual basis for Dr. Grubb’s opinions and the reliability of her methodology, Plaintiffs 

argued that she is not subject to Daubert and that she lacks records because she was 

seeing Mr. Tavilla on a “pro bono” basis. Even if it is true that Dr. Grubb saw Mr. 

Tavilla on a non-paid basis, this does not excuse the requirement that Plaintiffs show that 

her opinions satisfy the four requirements of Rule 702. Because Plaintiffs have failed to 

make any showing as to the reliability of her opinions, the Court will grant Defendant’s 

motion with respect to Dr. Grubb. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to exclude (Doc. 42) is granted with 

respect to Dr. Grubb and denied with respect to Dr. Sucher. 

 Dated this 10th day of April, 2012. 

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