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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 13, 2003 Decided June 27, 2003

No. 02-5260

COALITION FOR UNDERGROUND EXPANSION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

NORMAN Y. MINETA,

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND NURIA I. FERNANDEZ,

ACTING ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv02337)

David J. Newburger argued the cause for the appellants.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5260 Document #756565 Filed: 06/27/2003 Page 1 of 8
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John A. Bryson, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. Trudy B. Levy,

Associate Chief Counsel, Federal Transit Administration, was

on brief.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The Coalition

for Underground Expansion and its eight individual directors

(collectively identified as Coalition)1

 appeal the decision of the

district court dismissing its action against the Secretary of

the United States Department of Transportation and the

Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA),

an agency within the Department of Transportation. The

complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel

the FTA to conduct an environmental review of the proposed

addition of a third line segment—the Clayton–Shrewsbury

Extension (Extension)—to the MetroLink rail transit system,

which serves the St. Louis metropolitan area. The complaint

contended the FTA’s failure to conduct such review violated

the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4321–47,2

 the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),

16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470x–6,3

 and section 4(f) of the Depart1 The Coalition is a Missouri non-profit organization dedicated

to ‘‘developing and protecting civic resources in the St. Louis

metropolitan area.’’ Appellants’ Br. (Certificate as to Parties,

Rulings, and Related Cases).

2 Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires that federal agencies

include in every recommendation or report on proposals for

legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement

by the responsible official on

(I) the environmental impact of the proposed actionTTTT

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(I).

3 Section 106 of the NHPA provides in part:

The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect

jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted unUSCA Case #02-5260 Document #756565 Filed: 06/27/2003 Page 2 of 8
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ment of Transportation Act (DOTA), 49 U.S.C. § 303(c).4

The district court dismissed the complaint on two alternate

grounds: (1) the Coalition lacked standing because ‘‘the myriad injuries alleged by plaintiffs are in no respect caused by

any action or inaction of the federal defendants who remain in

the case and could not be redressed by any conceivable ruling

in plaintiffs’ favor’’ and (2) the complaint failed to state a

claim because ‘‘even with discovery plaintiffs would be able to

prove no state of facts from which it could be found that the

‘C[layton]-S[hrewsbury] Extension’ is a ‘major federal action’

under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), or is otherwise subject

to preconditions required by federal law.’’ Coalition for

Underground Expansion v. Slater, C.A. No. 99–2337, 1

(D.D.C. filed July 17, 2002) (citations omitted). We affirm the

dertaking in any State and the head of any Federal department

or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any

Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of

any license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of

the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or

object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National

Register.

16 U.S.C. § 470f.

4 Section 4(f) of DOTA provides in part:

(c) The Secretary may approve a transportation program or

project (other than any project for a park road or parkway

under section 204 of title 23) requiring the use of publicly

owned land of a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and

waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance, or land

of an historic site of national, State, or local significance (as

determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having

jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge, or site) only if—

(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that

land; and

(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to

minimize harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from the use.

49 U.S.C. § 303(c).

USCA Case #02-5260 Document #756565 Filed: 06/27/2003 Page 3 of 8
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dismissal on the ground that the Coalition lacked standing

because its claimed injuries were not caused by any final

federal agency action.5

Section 10(a) provides: ‘‘A person suffering legal wrong

because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved

by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is

entitled to judicial review thereof.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 702. The

APA generally defines ‘‘agency’’ to mean ‘‘each authority of

the Government of the United States, whether or not it is

within or subject to review by another agency,’’ id.

§ 701(b)(1), and limits review to ‘‘final agency action,’’ id.

§ 704. To establish standing under section 10(a), ‘‘the person

claiming a right to sue must identify some ‘agency action’ that

affects him in the specified fashion; it is judicial review

‘therof’ to which he is entitled.’’ Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed.,

497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). Here, the Coalition ‘‘fail[ed] to

identify any particular ‘agency action’ that was the source of

[its] injuries.’’ Id. at 899. In fact, it has identified no federal

agency action at all.

The complaint alleges the Clayton–Shrewsbury Extension

has been planned and will be constructed by two local governmental bodies, the East–West Gateway Coordinating Council,

which is the designated St. Louis metropolitan planning organization, and the Bi–State Development Agency, which operates MetroLink. See Complaint ¶¶ 37, 38, 49, 51, 81. To date

there has been no involvement with the Clayton–Shrewsbury

Extension by any federal agency. Nonetheless, the Coalition

argues that the FTA’s past and current funding of other

portions of the MetroLink system and its future funding of

the Clayton–Shrewsbury Extension make the Clayton–

Shrewsbury Extension a federal project.6

 We disagree.

5 Because we affirm on lack of standing, we do not address the

district court’s alternative ground for dismissal.

6 At oral argument, the Coalition asserted in addition that final

agency action lay in the FTA’s decision not to conduct an environUSCA Case #02-5260 Document #756565 Filed: 06/27/2003 Page 4 of 8
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To support federal status, the Coalition relies on the allegations in the complaint that the MetroLink system cannot

operate without federal funding, that the FTA is in fact

financing construction of a separate MetroLink extension and

that the FTA will provide funding to (1) maintain trains that

will run on the Clayton–Shrewsbury Extension (2) help make

up the transit system’s annual operating budget deficit caused

by the Extension, (3) construct facilities to repair and maintain trains that will run on the Extension, (4) purchase new

trains for the Extension and (5) construct exit ramps for

park-and-ride near stations that will serve the Extension.

Appellant’s Br. at 21–22; see also Complaint ¶¶ 45, 33–34, 46.

The Complaint further alleges that the federal government is

‘‘providing federal subsidies for the rest of MetroLink’’ and

that, when the Extension is ‘‘completed,’’ the East–West

Gateway Coordinating Council will have the ‘‘opportunity’’ to

use the Extension to obtain matching federal grants to extend

the transit system. Complaint ¶¶ 49, 48. All of this may be

true but it does not make construction of the Clayton–

Shrewsbury Extension at this time a federal project constituting federal agency action.

In Macht v. Skinner, 916 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1990),7

 this

court held that a non-federally funded light rail transit line

mental review but it is well established that the ‘‘refusal to prepare

an [Environmental Impact Statement] is not itself a final agency

action for purposes of APA review.’’ Public Citizen v. Office of U.S.

Trade Reps., 970 F.2d 916, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Found. on

Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

7 Although Macht addressed specifically what constitutes a

‘‘major federal action’’ under NEPA, its principles apply equally to

defining federal action subject to review under the APA. In fact,

this court has expressly concluded that the requisite final agency

action under section 10(a) of the APA is the ‘‘ ‘major Federal

action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).’’ Found. on

Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Similar

federal involvement is required under section 4(f) of DOTA, which

USCA Case #02-5260 Document #756565 Filed: 06/27/2003 Page 5 of 8
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under construction in Baltimore was not ‘‘federalized’’ simply

because the federal government had financed studies of proposed extensions to the line or because the local transit

authority hoped to obtain federal funding to construct the

extensions down the line. The court reasoned that ‘‘[a]t

th[at] point, the federal involvement [was] not the firm commitment that could transform the so far entirely state-funded

Light Rail Project into major federal action affecting the

environment within the meaning of NEPA.’’ 916 F.2d at 17

(citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1243

(D.C. Cir. 1980)). The same holds true here. The declaration submitted by the FTA Regional Director below avers

that the FTA received no request or application to fund the

Clayton–Shrewsbury Extension, Declaration of FTA Regional

Director Mokhtee Ahmad in Support of the Federal Defendants’ motion to Dismiss ¶ 5, and the Coalition does not

dispute this statement. That the parties anticipate, even

intend, future federal funding does not ensure it will come

about. See Macht v. Skinner, 916 F.2d at 17 (‘‘ ‘[T]here is a

wide gulf between what a state may want and what the

federal government is willing to provide.’ ’’) (quoting Macht v.

Skinner, C.A. No. 89–1161, at 7–8 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1989)).

To seek review under the APA the Coalition must allege the

FTA is ‘‘ ‘irretrievably committed’ ’’ to providing funds for the

Clayton–Shrewsbury Extension, Macht, 816 F.2d at 17 (quot-

‘‘applies only to federally-funded transportation projects,’’ Macht,

916 F.2d at 15 n.3 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 405 (1971)), and under the NHPA, which

‘‘imposes obligations only when a project is undertaken either by a

federal agency or through the auspices of agency funding or approval,’’ Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F.2d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Cf. Macht, 916 F.2d at 15–16 n.3 (‘‘Because the expenditure of

federal funds for preliminary planning and environmental impact

statements does not federalize the Light Rail Project under NEPA,

it similarly does not federalize the Project under § 4(f).’’) (citing

Md. Conservation Council, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 808 F.2d 1039, 1043

(4th Cir. 1986)).

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ing Macht v. Skinner, No. 89–1161, at 7–8). This it cannot

do.

The Coalition argues that the MetroLink ‘‘system’’ has

become ‘‘irrevocably federalized’’ because of other funding it

has received and continues to receive from the federal government. That other parts of the system are federally funded, however, does not make the discrete Clayton–Shrewsbury

Extension federally funded. It is the Extension that the

Coalition alleges will affect the environment so as to trigger

the statutory environmental review requirement. Cf. Macht,

916 F.2d at 16–17 (federal funding of preliminary studies for

proposed extensions does not federalize non-federally funded

light rail system construction).8

Finally, the Coalition asserts the district court erred in

considering matters outside the pleadings on a motion to

dismiss, without affording the Coalition opportunity for discovery. Although ‘‘the District Court may in appropriate

cases dispose of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) on the complaint

standing alone,’’ ‘‘where necessary, the court may consider

the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in

the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed

facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.’’ Herbert v.

Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing

8 The Coalition also argues that the MetroLink system was

intentionally ‘‘segmented’’ to avoid environmental review of the

Clayton–Shrewsbury Extension. It is not impermissible, however,

to structure construction and funding so as to avoid the burden of

environmental review—this is precisely what the state of Maryland

did in Macht when it decided to scale back its proposed line and

withdraw its federal funding request for the express purpose of

avoiding the delay environmental review might cause. See 916 F.2d

at 15. Nor is there any indication here that the construction has

been structured in a way that will ‘‘lead to evaluation of segments in

isolation of one another, thereby creating a misleading picture of

the impact of the project as a whole.’’ Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v.

Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

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Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981);

Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947); Hohri v. United

States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other

grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987); Wilderness Soc’y v. Griles, 824

F.2d 4, 16–17 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 5A C. Wright & Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350, at 213 (1990)). Thus,

to the extent the district court relied on the declaration of the

FTA Regional Director, it did not err. As for the lack of

discovery, the Coalition has made no allegation which, if

substantiated, would establish standing to sue under the

APA. Most importantly, it does not dispute that at present

the federal government has made no commitment to finance

the Clayton–Shrewsbury Extension. Without such a commitment, there is no final federal agency action to review and

therefore no party with standing under section 10(a) of the

APA.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

Affirmed.

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