Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02093/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02093-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Tamicia Currie, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County Community College

District; Marvin Shapiro, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-07-2093-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendant Marvin Shapiro’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings (doc. 23), plaintiff’s response (doc. 24), and Shapiro’s reply (doc. 25). 

I

Plaintiff filed a complaint on October 16, 2007, alleging racial and sexual harassment

under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972, as amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (“Title IX”), respectively, as well as deprivation of rights pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, against Maricopa County Community College District (“MCCCD”) and

instructor Marvin Shapiro. She also alleged state law claims of intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and “personal injury.” Plaintiff contends that

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Shapiro began harassing her during classes in the fall of 2005, and continuing into the fall

of 2006. She claims that she was forced to withdraw from classes during the fall of 2006,

and suffered personal injury and damage to her business as a result of defendants’ actions.

We previously granted MCCCD’s motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the

state law claims due to plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of A.R.S.

§ 12-821.01(A) (doc. 18). In doing so, we also rejected her argument that she was entitled

to equitable tolling under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(D). 

Shapiro now moves to dismiss the claims against him on the pleadings pursuant to

Rule 12(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. He contends that plaintiff’s state law claims are barred because

she failed to comply with the notice requirements of A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). He also moves

to dismiss the Title VI and Title IX claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. 

II

Under Arizona’s notice of claim statute, a plaintiff with a claim against a public entity

or a public employee must first file a notice of claim with the person authorized to accept

service on behalf of that entity or employee within 180 days after the cause of action accrues.

A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Compliance with the notice provision is a "mandatory and essential

prerequisite," Martineau v. Maricopa County, 207 Ariz. 332, 334, 86 P.3d 912, 914 (Ct. App.

2004), and a plaintiff's failure to comply bars any claim, Falcon v. Maricopa County, 213

Ariz. 525, 527, 144 P.3d 1254, 1256 (2006). 

Plaintiff incorrectly argues that the notice of claim statute only applies to public

entities, not individuals. The statute expressly applies to “[p]ersons who have claims against

a public entity or a public employee.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) (emphasis added). There is

no dispute that Shapiro is a public employee. 

Plaintiff also argues that the notice of claim statute does not apply because her claims

are asserted against Shapiro in his individual, as well as his official capacity. This

distinction, however, is not relevant in the context of the notice of claim statute. Instead, the

relevant inquiry is whether the claims arise “out of acts by public employees in the scope of

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their employment.” McCloud v. State, 217 Ariz. 82, 170 P.3d 691, 699 (Ct. App. 2007). An

employee’s conduct falls within the scope of employment “if it is the kind the employee is

employed to perform, it occurs within the authorized time and space limits, and furthers the

employer’s business even if the employer has expressly forbidden it.” Id. at 700. An

employee’s improper conduct will be deemed “within the scope of employment” if the

conduct is “incidental to the employee’s legitimate work activity.” Dube v. Desai, No. 07-

CV-0084, 2008 WL 141181, at *4 (Ct. App. January 11, 2008) (citing State v. Schallock, 189

Ariz. 250, 258, 941 P.2d 1275, 1283 (1997) (an employee may act within the scope of

authorized employment when sexually harassing subordinates)). 

Here, plaintiff alleges that Shapiro “committed the below listed wrongful torts as

official acts of [his] position,” and “engaged in outrageous harassing conduct . . . during

educational hours.” Amended Complaint at 2. The specific allegations demonstrate that

claims against Shapiro arose within the context of his employment. Id. at 3, ¶ 4 (Shapiro

placed a student sign-in sheet on his desk), ¶ 6 (Shapiro’s comment in the classroom), ¶ 7

(comments to plaintiff’s classmates during educational hours), ¶ 8 (comment in front of the

entire class). Because the claims against Shapiro are alleged to have occurred within the

scope of his employment, compliance with the notice of claims statute is required. 

Plaintiff sent a notice of claim on June 25, 2007, stating that her cause of action

occurred on November 14, 2006. Id. ¶ 22; Amended Answer, ex. A. She alleges no action

by Shapiro after November 14, 2006. Therefore, plaintiff was required to file her notice of

claim against Shapiro no later than May 14, 2007. Because she did not file her notice until

June 25, 2007, some 42 days late, her state law claims against Shapiro are barred by A.R.S.

§ 12-821.01(A). 

We reject plaintiff’s argument that the filing deadline should be tolled because she

made an informal complaint to the Vice President of Student Affairs. Section 12-821.01(C)

provides a tolling of the notice period where “any claim must be submitted to a binding or

nonbinding . . . review process pursuant to a statute, ordinance, resolution, administrative or

governmental rule or regulation, or contractual term.” Id. (emphasis added). There is no

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Plaintiff does not respond to this argument, and her failure to do so serves as an

independent basis upon which to grant Shapiro’s motion to dismiss Title VI and Title IX

claims. See LRCiv 7.2(i).

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allegation, however, that plaintiff was required, pursuant to any statute, rule, regulation, or

otherwise, to submit a complaint to MCCCD before filing a notice of claim against Shapiro.

Plaintiff is not entitled to tolling under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(C).

III

Shapiro next argues that plaintiff’s claims under Title VI and Title IX should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim.1

 Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in “any

educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681.

Only recipients of federal funding may be liable in damages under Title IX. Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640-42, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1670-71 (1999) (holding that

the “Government’s enforcement power may only be exercised against the funding recipient,

and we have not extended damages liability under Title IX to parties outside the scope of this

power”) (citation omitted). Because Shapiro is an employee of MCCCD, and is not alleged

to be the recipient of federal funds, we dismiss plaintiff’s Title IX claim against Shapiro. See

Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999). 

Similarly, Title VI applies only to programs receiving federal financial assistance. 42

U.S.C. § 2000d. It is “parallel to Title IX except that it prohibits race discrimination, not sex

discrimination,” but otherwise “[t]he two statutes operate in the same manner.” Gebser v.

Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286, 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (1998). We

conclude that Title VI does not impose liability on an individual instructor who is not the

recipient of federal funds. Accordingly, we also dismiss plaintiff’s Title VI claim against

Shapiro. 

We note that plaintiff filed this action against Shapiro in both his official and

individual capacities. An “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be

treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S. Ct.

3099, 3105 (1985). Because it is the functional equivalent of a direct suit against a

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government entity, an official capacity claim is duplicative and should be dismissed. See,

e.g., Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (concluding that "[t]o

keep both the City and the officers sued in their official capacity as defendants . . . would

have been redundant and possibly confusing to the jury"). Accordingly, we dismiss the Title

VI and Title IX claims against Shapiro in both his individual and official capacities. 

IV

Plaintiff challenges a question we posed to defendants’ counsel during the Rule 16

scheduling conference as to whether the notice of claim statute applies to the individual, as

well as the entity, defendant, and our suggestion that any future motion resolving this issue

be filed sooner rather than later. Plaintiff contends that this discussion evidences our bias in

favor of defendants. This allegation indicates plaintiff’s basic misunderstanding of the

purpose of a Rule 16 scheduling conference, as well as the role of the court. Pursuant to Rule

16(c)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., during a Rule 16 scheduling conference, a court is charged with the

responsibility of taking appropriate action to simplify the issues and eliminate frivolous

claims and defenses, determining the propriety of summary adjudication of issues, and

otherwise facilitating the “just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action.” As the

transcript makes clear, we explained this process to plaintiff at the conference. We told her

how important is was to narrow the issues. Having just ruled on the issue in connection with

MCCCD, it would have been neglectful not to cover the issue as to Shapiro. There is no bias

here. 

Plaintiff is once again advised to seek the advice of a lawyer. If she cannot find a

lawyer, she may wish to contact the Lawyer Referral Service of the Maricopa Bar

Association at 602-257-4434, or the Volunteer Lawyers Program sponsored by Community

Legal Services at 602-258-3434. 

V

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Shapiro’s motion for judgment on the pleadings with

respect to all state law claims, as well as claims under Title VI and Title IX (doc. 23). The

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only claims remaining in this action are those brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both

defendants, and claims under Title VI and Title IX against MCCCD.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2008.

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