Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00051/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LURIE D. JAMES, III, as 

Personal Representative of 

the Estate of 

LURIE JAMES, SR., Deceased, 

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-51-KD-M

:

CURTIS McDANIEL; ALLSTATE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

:

:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 4) has been 

referred for report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72. After consideration of 

Plaintiff’s Motion and Brief (Docs. 4 and 5), Defendant’s 

Response (Doc. 10), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 11), it is 

recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 4) be 

granted and that this action be remanded to the Circuit 

Court of Conecuh County, Alabama. 

Facts and Proceedings

On December 18, 2015, Plaintiff, Laurie D. James, 

(“James” or “Plaintiff”) filed a wrongful death action 

against Curtis McDaniel (McDaniel) and Allstate Insurance 

Company (Allstate), in the Circuit Court of Conecuh County, 

Alabama. (Doc. 1-1). Allstate was served on December 23, 

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2015, and filed its Answer on January 19, 2016. (Doc. 1-2; 

1-1 at p.7). McDaniel was served on January 4, 2016, and 

filed its Notice of Removal on February 2, 2016 (Doc. 1).

According to the Notice, removal is warranted because the 

parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000.00. (Id). In her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff

argues that this action is due to be remanded because 

Allstate did not timely consent to removal which rendered 

the removal improper for lack of unanimity among the 

Defendants.1 (Doc. 5). 

Discussion

A federal court may exercise diversity jurisdiction 

over all civil actions where the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the 

action is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(a)(1). In a removal action, the party asserting 

jurisdiction has the burden of establishing proof of it by 

a preponderance of the evidence. See Lowery v. Alabama 

Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. 

denied sub nom Hanna Steel Corp. v. Lowery, 553 U.S. 1080 

(2008). However, “[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises

significant federalism concerns, federal courts are 

directed to construe removal statutes strictly. Indeed, all 

																																																							 1 Plaintiff initially argued that McDaniel’s removal was also untimely, 

but Plaintiff has since withdrawn that claim. (See Doc. 11 at ¶ 7). 

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doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of 

remand to state court.” Univ. of South Alabama. v. American 

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal 

and external citations omitted). “Therefore, when an 

action is removed from state court, the district court 

first must determine whether it has original jurisdiction 

over the plaintiff’s claims.” Id. at 410. (citation 

omitted). “If at any time before final judgment it appears 

the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 

case shall be remanded to the state court from whence it 

came.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). 

Discussion

Prior to determining whether diversity jurisdiction 

exists, this Court will address the procedural defects 

raised by Plaintiff. Specifically, whether Defendants were 

unanimous in the removal of this action.

In the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]he unanimity requirement 

mandates that in cases involving multiple defendants, all 

defendants must consent to removal.” Russell Corp. v. 

American Home Assurance Co., 264 f.3d 1040, 1044 (11th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). Like all rules governing 

removal, this unanimity requirement must be strictly 

interpreted and enforced because of the significant 

federalism concerns arising in the context of federal 

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removal jurisdiction. (Id. at 1049). 

W]hile it may be true that consent to removal is 

all that is required under section 1446, a 

defendant must do so itself. This does not mean 

that each defendant must sign the original 

petition for removal, but there must be some 

timely filed written indication from each served 

defendant, or from some person or entity 

purporting to formally act on its behalf in this 

respect and to have authority to do so, that it 

has actually consented to such action. Otherwise 

there would be nothing on the record to “bind” 

the allegedly consenting defendant.

Yezzi v. Hawker Financial Corp., 2009 WL 4898380 (S.D. Ala. 

Dec. 14, 2009 citing to Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of 

N.A., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262, n. 11 (5th Cir. 1998)(emphasis 

added). The unanimity requirement provides that “each 

defendant must join in the removal by signing the notice of 

removal or by explicitly stating for itself its consent on 

the record, either orally or in writing, within the 30–day 

period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).” Leaming v. 

Liberty University, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 

WL 1589542 (S.D.Ala., 2007) (quoting Diebel v. S.B. 

Trucking Co., 262 F. Supp .2d 1319, 1328 (M.D.Fla.2003)

(citation omitted)).

In the present action, there is no dispute that 

McDaniel timely filed a Notice of Removal or that James 

timely objected to the same. There is, likewise, no 

dispute that Allstate, although not having filed its own 

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Notice of Removal within the proper time, may still consent 

to McDaniel’s Removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C)(“If 

defendants are served at different times, and a laterserved defendant files a notice of removal, any earlierserved defendant may consent to the removal even though 

that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate 

or consent to removal.”). Thus, the only remaining issues 

are 1) whether Allstate properly consented and 2) whether 

said consent was timely. 

There is no indication, and McDaniel does not make the 

argument, that Allstate joined in on McDaniel’s Notice of 

Removal. Instead, McDaniel argues that the language 

expressed in his removal which states, “[c]ounsel for 

McDaniel has corresponded with counsel for Allstate, and 

all Defendants consent to this Removal, thereby satisfying 

the unanimity requirement ...” meets the burden of 

establishing consent. (Doc. 1 at p.2). While McDaniel 

argues this language should be acceptable because attorneys

are officers of the Court, he has presented no authority to

support his position and the Court is unaware of any such 

precedent. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has found 

this type of alleged consent to be insufficient. See 

Yeezi, supra, 2009 WL 4898380 at *2 (“Mere assertion in the 

removal petition that all defendants consent to removal 

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fails to satisfy the joinder requirement”) (citing Jones ex 

rel. Bazerman v. Florida Department of Children & Family 

Services, 2002 F.Supp. 2d 1319, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2002)). 

This Court agrees that the language in McDaniel’s removal 

fails to satisfy the unanimity requirement. As a result, 

it is a clear that at the time of removal Allstate had not 

properly consented to removal, a defect which, if not 

cured, would warrant remand. 

With regard to McDaniel’s argument that any potential 

defect was cured by Allstate filing its Consent to Removal

(Doc. 8), this Court does not find McDaniel’s argument to 

be compelling. “Removal is a privilege accorded by 

statute, and a removing party must comply with the 

statutory requirements in order to invoke the statute.“ 

Clingan v. Celtic Life Ins. Co., 244 F.Supp.2d. 1298, 1302 

(M.D. Ala. 2003) (citation omitted). “The time limit in 28 

U.S.C. § 1446(b) is ‘mandatory and must be strictly 

applied.’“ Id. (citations omitted).		 There is no question 

that for consent to be proper, it must be timely, i.e., it

must be provided within the 30-day period prescribed by 28 

U.S.C. § 1446(b). See Chakra 5 Inc. v. City of Miami 

Beach, 968 F.Supp.2d 1210 (S.D. Fla. 2013)(City was 

required to obtain from individual defendants unanimous 

consent to the removal of plaintiffs's § 1983 action no 

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later than the date on which the last-served defendant had 

to file a notice of removal, in order for removal to be 

effective.); See also Newman v. Spectrum Stores, 109 

F.Supp.2d 1342, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“A consent to 

removal must be filed within thirty days after the first 

defendant is served... Neither the late filed consent nor 

the later assertion by counsel that the statement included 

in the Notice of Removal was authorized can cure the 

defect.”) In order for Allstate’s consent to be timely and 

removal proper, the required consent must have been 

conveyed to this Court by no later than February 4, 2016. 

Therefore, Allstate’s consent filed on February 16, 2016, 

was not timely and did not cure the previously discussed 

defect of lack of unanimity. 

CONCLUSION

After reviewing all of the relevant pleadings of 

record, the Court finds that Defendants have not 

demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

removal is proper. Thus, it is recommended that 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand be granted, and that this 

action be remanded to the Circuit Court of Conecuh County, 

Alabama. 

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

FED.R.CIV.P. 72(B); S.D. ALA. GenLR72. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE this 15th day of March, 2016.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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