Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00675/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00675-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MANUEL BALLESTEROS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-0675 PHX EHC (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL:

On March 8, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to [the] Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 9) on September 5, 2006.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, the petition must be denied and dismissed

with prejudice. Petitioner filed a traverse (Docket No. 13) to

Respondents’ answer to the petition on November 16, 2006.

I Procedural History

In 1994, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree

murder, arson, endangerment, misconduct involving weapons, and

seven counts of aggravated assault. See Answer, Exh. A & Exh.

B. In 1997, Petitioner was sentenced to natural life in prison

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pursuant to his conviction on the charge of first-degree murder,

and to various terms of imprisonment pursuant to his conviction

on the other charges. Id., Exh. A.

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner asserted the trial court

erred when instructing the jury on the premeditation element of

first-degree murder and by using Petitioner’s murder conviction

as an aggravating factor in sentencing Petitioner on the other

convictions. Id., Exh. B. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied

relief in a memorandum opinion issued August 20, 1998. Id.,

Exh. A. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of this

decision on February 18, 1999. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner initiated a timely state action for postconviction relief on March 17, 1999, by filing a notice of his

intent to seek post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner

filed his petition for post-conviction relief on July 7, 2000.

Id., Exh. E. Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief

because:

1. The jury’s verdicts were contrary to the relevant

law and the admitted evidence;

2. He was deprived of his right to the effective

assistance of trial counsel;

3. The prosecutor engaged in misconduct;

4. He was deprived of his right to the effective

assistance of appellate counsel;

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1

 In Donald, an action for post-conviction relief, the

Arizona Court of Appeals concluded the defendant had stated a claim

he had been denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

The petition alleged the defendant’s counsel had advised the defendant

to reject a plea offer. The defendant alleged his counsel did not

seem to know whether the defendant faced soft, hard, or flat time if

convicted at trial. The defendant also asserted his counsel failed

to advise him he would face a presumptive, flat time, ten-year

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5. The trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress his confession because the confession was taken in

violation of Petitioner’s Miranda rights. Id., Exh. E.

The Arizona Superior Court found Petitioner’s second,

third, and fifth claims, as stated supra, were precluded as

waived pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Id., Exh. F. The trial court determined

Petitioner’s claim regarding the jury’s verdict was not

cognizable, pursuant to Rule 32.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Id., Exh. F. Additionally, the Arizona trial court

concluded Petitioner had not raised a colorable claim he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of appellate

counsel. Id., Exh. F. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied

review of the Superior Court’s decision denying post-conviction

relief on March 1, 2002. Id., Exh. G.

Petitioner initiated a second action for postconviction relief on December 17, 2002. Id., Exh. H.

Petitioner asserted his trial counsel was ineffective because

counsel failed to communicate a plea offer to Petitioner and

counsel failed to adequately advise Petitioner of the

consequences of conviction. Id., Exh. H (citing Arizona v.

Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 412, 10 P.3d 1193, 1199 (Ct. App. 2000).1

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sentence if convicted at trial, while the plea agreement offered soft

time with the possibility of parole after serving one-half of his

sentence and offered a sentence of four to eight years.

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Petitioner asserted there had been a relevant change in the law

which would result in the reversal of his conviction. Id., Exh.

H. Petitioner asserted he had turned down a plea agreement

providing for a sentence of 15 years imprisonment because his

attorney told him he would “prevail” at trial. Id., Exh. H at

3. Petitioner also alleged his counsel spent very little time

communicating with Petitioner. Id., Exh. H. 

The Arizona Superior Court denied post-conviction

relief in an opinion issued May 30, 2003. Id., Exh. I. The

trial court concluded the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in

Donald, issued in 2000, did not apply retroactively to

Petitioner’s convictions, which became final in 1999. Id., Exh.

I. Therefore, the court reasoned, the claim was precluded as

waived pursuant to Rule 32.2, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Id., Exh. I. The Arizona Superior Court also

determined Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel and

appellate counsel were ineffective was precluded by Rule

32.3(a)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, for

Petitioner’s failure to raise them in his first action for postconviction relief. Id., Exh. I. The state trial court also

determined Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the effective

assistance of post-conviction counsel was not cognizable. Id.,

Exh. I. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of this

decision on August 5, 2004, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied

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review on March 16, 2005. Id., Exh. J.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on March

8, 2006. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because: (1) the jury was improperly instructed regarding

the elements of first-degree murder; (2) he was improperly

sentenced to a term of natural life in prison; (3) there was

insufficient evidence to convict him on eight of the charges

against him; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (5)

prosecutorial misconduct; (6) he was deprived of his right to

the effective assistance of appellate counsel; (7) he was

deprived of his right to remain silent, pursuant to the holding

in Miranda; (8) he was deprived of his right to the effective

assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to advise him

to accept a plea agreement.

II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

Petitioner is a state prisoner whose conviction became

final on approximately May 19, 1999, when the time expired for

petitioning the United States Supreme Court for review of his

direct appeal of his convictions and sentences. See Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly,

Petitioner’s state conviction became final after April 24, 1996,

the effective date of the AEDPA. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214. 

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2

 Several United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, and one

published opinion issued by the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, have concluded that the relevant statute of

limitations begins to run on a federal habeas action when a petitioner

stands convicted by a state court and the time for seeking certiorari

by the United States Supreme Court expires, regardless of whether or

not the petitioner actually sought certiorari. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920,

924 (9th Cir. 2002); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 345 (1st Cir. 2003);

Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002); Williams v.

Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159

F.3d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 400

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The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). However, the AEDPA also entitles a petitioner to tolling

of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a “properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2006); Artuz v. Bennet, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000). 

Section 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling

during the time a “properly filed” state

court petition is pending. “Properly filed”

means the petition’s “delivery and acceptance

are in compliance with the applicable laws

and rules governing filings” in that state.

In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the United States

Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a

postconviction petition is untimely under

state law, that [is] the end of the matter

for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”

Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005).

 Petitioner’s conviction became final on May 19, 1999,

when the time expired for seeking certiorari of the denial of

his direct appeal. Cf. Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897-

98 (9th Cir. 2001); Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1158-59.2

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(4th Cir. 1998); Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 98 (2nd Cir. 1998); Souch

v. Harkins, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1084-85 (D. Ariz. 1998); Smith v.

Lord, 230 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Moore v. Hawley, 7 F.

Supp. 2d 901, 903 (E.D. Mich. 1998). See also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1525 (1997) (noting that the

defendant’s conviction became final when his time for filing a

petition for a writ of certiorari expired). Cf. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1994) (“A state conviction and

sentence become final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the

availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted

and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has

elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied.”). 

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Prior to May 19, 1999, Petitioner filed a timely action

for state post-conviction relief which tolled the one-year

statute of limitations until the Arizona Court of Appeals denied

relief on March 1, 2002. Petitioner had thirty days to seek

review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court and,

therefore, the statute of limitations on his federal habeas

action was further statutorily tolled until April 1, 2002. See

Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir. 2000); Swartz

v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 420-24 (3d Cir. 2000). See also

Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 266 (5th Cir. 2002)

(collecting cases so holding).

The statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal

habeas action then ran against Petitioner for approximately

eight months, from April 2, 2002, until December 17, 2002, when

Petitioner filed a second action for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

During this time Petitioner had no action for relief pending in

any state court. 

Petitioner’s second action for post-conviction relief,

filed December 17, 2002, did not, arguably, further toll the

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statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas claims

because it was not a “properly filed” action for state postconviction relief as that term is defined by the federal courts’

interpretation of the AEDPA. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 412-13, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-14 (2005); Bonner v. Carey,

425 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.

132 (2006). See also Richardson v. Newland, 171 Fed. App. 156,

157 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Additionally, even allowing the statute of limitations

was tolled during the pendency of this action, Petitioner’s

federal habeas petition was not timely filed. At the time

Petitioner’s second action for post-conviction relief was filed,

eight months of the one-year statute of limitations had already

passed. Proceedings in Petitioner’s second action for postconviction relief concluded on March 16, 2005, and his federal

habeas action was not filed until March 8, 2006. The statute of

limitations regarding Petitioner’s federal habeas action was not

tolled during this approximately eleven month interval.

Therefore, an undisputed period of at least 19 months passed,

absent statutory tolling, from the time Petitioner’s convictions

became final and the time he filed his federal habeas action.

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the one-year period specified by the AEDPA, absent

any statutory tolling, the merits of his petition for habeas

relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time limitation may be

“equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d

798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

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3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not squarely

addressed whether the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Pace

“lowered” the standard for equitable tolling set in Spitsyn. See

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n.5 (9th Cir.

2005). See also Astorga v. Terhune, 130 Fed. App. 181, 183 (9th Cir.

2005); Boudette v. Schriro, 2006 WL 664364, at *3 (D. Ariz.).

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has determined equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a

federal habeas petition is available only if extraordinary

circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control make it impossible

to file a petition on time. See Lott, 304 F.3d at 922

(concluding the petitioner was entitled to tolling for time

period the petitioner was denied access to his legal files while

being transferred); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir.

2002). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas petitioner

“must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the

but-for and proximate causes of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003).3 It is Petitioner’s

burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted in his

case. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.

2005). Petitioner bears the burden of proving both that he has

been diligently pursuing his claims and that extraordinary

circumstances impeded his timely filing of his federal habeas

petition. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, 125 S. Ct. at 1814; Lehman

v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998). “‘[T]he

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA]

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting United

States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000).

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In his traverse, Petitioner contends he is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because he was

“without assistance of counsel” while presenting his federal

habeas claims in the state courts in his state post-conviction

proceedings. See Docket No. 13 at 7-8. Petitioner asserts the

paralegal assistance provided by the Arizona Department of

Corrections during his state post-conviction proceedings was

inadequate. Id. 

The Court notes that, although Petitioner claims he was

deprived of adequate legal assistance in his state postconviction proceedings, Petitioner succeeded in initiating and

prosecuting two actions for state post-conviction relief.

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was

considered on the merits in Petitioner’s first action for postconviction relief, and Petitioner was able to raise arguable

claims in his second action for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner does not assert how Respondents prevented him from

filing a federal habeas action from March 16, 2005, when his

second action for state post-conviction relief concluded, until

he filed his federal habeas action on March 8, 2006, or how he

diligently pursued his interests during this eleven-month

interval. 

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing there

were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made

it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition,

or that any state action was the “but for” cause for his failure

to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace, 544 U.S. at

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418-19, 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding that the petitioner was

not entitled to equitable tolling because he was misled or

confused about timing of exhausting his state remedies and

filing his federal habeas petition); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d

964, 970 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); Shannon v.

Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Each of the cases

in which equitable tolling has been applied have involved

wrongful conduct, either by state officials or, occasionally, by

the petitioner’s counsel.”); Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1068

(concluding that counsel’s errors in miscalculating the statute

of limitations and mis-advising the petitioner did not warrant

equitable tolling). Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App.

989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006);

Faught v. Butler, 135 Fed. App. 92, 93 (9th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the statute of

limitations or that Respondents acted to inhibit the filing of

his federal habeas petition. A petitioner’s pro se status,

ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the

applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling. See, e.g., Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–716

(5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.

2004) (holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s

“rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not

justify equitable tolling”). 

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III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action

within the one-year period specified by the AEDPA and Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations regarding his federal habeas action.

See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17-18 (2d Cir. 2000)

(concluding that the petitioner’s delays in seeking collateral

review of his conviction did not show reasonable diligence, and

that the AEDPA’s tolling provision already accommodated the

exhaustion requirements that prisoners faced, and that

petitioner’s pro se status during most of limitations period did

not merit equitable tolling); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978

(10th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Ballesteros’

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

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specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 28th day of November, 2006.

 

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