Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05424/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05424-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 4, 1999 Decided June 18, 1999

No. 98-5424

Samuel G. Kooritzky,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant

v.

Alexis M. Herman, Secretary,

United States Department of Labor,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Consolidated with

No. 98-5438

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cv003011)

(No. 91cv03011)

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Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellant/cross-appellee. With him on the briefs

were Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Vincent C. Costantino, Counsel,

U.S. Department of Labor.

Christopher A. Teras argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellee/cross-appellant. Samuel G. Kooritzky entered

an appearance.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle and Randolph, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellant Alexis Herman, Secretary of the Department of Labor ("DOL" or "Department"),

seeks reversal of the district court's award of attorney fees

under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") to Appellee

Samuel G. Kooritzky. Kooritzky cross-appeals, alleging that

the district court committed errors that resulted in an unwarranted reduction in the amount of attorney fees he was

awarded. We conclude that an attorney acting pro se, such

as Kooritzky, is not entitled to recover attorney fees under

the EAJA. We therefore reverse the district court's award

of fees, and conclude that Kooritzky's objections to the

amount of fees awarded are moot.

I. Background

Kooritzky, an immigration law attorney, commenced an

action pro se in November 1991 against the Secretary of

Labor, challenging promulgation of an "interim final rule" by

DOL which terminated the right of employers to substitute

one immigrant applicant for another in the labor certification

process. The district court ruled in DOL's favor, but we

reversed, concluding that DOL had promulgated its rule

without adequate notice and comment. Kooritzky v. Reich,

17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

After prevailing on the merits, Kooritzky sought to recover

attorney fees from the Department. Kooritzky asserted that,

in addition to his own efforts, he received assistance from

attorneys Christopher Teras, M. Sean Purcell, and Tae Kim,

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and law clerk Thomas Moore. None of these individuals,

however, had entered an appearance on Kooritzky's behalf

during the merits phase of the case.

On March 1, 1995, Kooritzky moved for an award of

attorney fees of $427,662 under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C.

s 2412(d)(1)(A), to compensate him for his and his colleagues'

work. The district court referred the matter to a magistrate

judge for a recommendation regarding the amount of attorney fees, if any, Kooritzky was entitled to recover. After

seven days of hearings, the magistrate judge recommended

that Kooritzky be awarded $31,798.71 for his own work only.

Joint Appendix at 18-59. The magistrate judge concluded

that Kooritzky had no representation agreement with any of

his alleged co-counsel and, as a result, could not recover their

attorney fees.

Both sides filed objections to the magistrate's report. On

December 17, 1997, the district court issued a Memorandum

on Attorney Fees, agreeing that Kooritzky was eligible for

attorney fees and finding that he was entitled to the following

amounts: $51,920.51 for Kooritzky, $47,689.03 for co-counsel

fees, and $134.70 for photocopying charges. Kooritzky v.

Herman, 6 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Kooritzky I"). The

court ordered the parties to submit evidence relevant to the

prevailing market rate for legal assistants working as independent contractors in the Washington, D.C. area in order to

assess the amount Kooritzky could recover for the work of

law clerk Moore.

On May 7, 1998, following further submissions by the

parties, including Kooritzky's motion for reconsideration and

DOL's opposition, the district court issued its final judgment

on attorney fees. Kooritzky v. Herman, 6 F. Supp.2d 13

(D.D.C. 1998) ("Kooritzky II"). The court directed that DOL

pay Kooritzky the following fees by June 15, 1998: $55,992.06

for Kooritzky, $82,754.98 for co-counsel fees, and $134.70 for

photocopying expenses.

On May 21, 1998, DOL moved for reconsideration based on

an intervening decision by this court, Burka v. United States

Department of Health and Human Services, 142 F.3d 1286

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(D.C. Cir. 1998), in which we affirmed a decision denying

attorney fees under the Freedom of Information Act

("FOIA") to a pro se attorney for his work and the work of

his colleagues. Our decision in Burka was based on our

reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Kay v. Ehrler, 499

U.S. 432 (1991). In Kay, the Court ruled that the word

"attorney" in the fee-shifting provision of the Civil Rights

Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. s 1988, assumes an

agency relationship, and therefore precludes recovery of attorney fees for work done by an attorney acting pro se. In

Burka, we held that the reasoning of Kay compelled denial of

attorney fees to a lawyer acting pro se under the similar feeshifting provision in FOIA. 142 F.3d at 1288-89. On June 9,

1998, the district court denied DOL's motion, concluding that

there were differences between FOIA and EAJA that counseled against application of the Kay decision in EAJA cases.

The parties subsequently filed these appeals.

II. Analysis

The Department challenges the district court's award of

attorney fees for both (1) Kooritzky's own work and (2) the

work of Kooritzky's co-counsel. Since the analysis for the

two categories of fees differs, we address them separately.

A. Attorney Fees for Work Performed by Kooritzky

DOL argues that the district court erred in awarding

attorney fees to Kooritzky since he was acting pro se. In

particular, DOL contends that the district court mistakenly

relied upon this court's decision in Jones v. Lujan, 887 F.2d

1096 (D.C. Cir. 1989), allowing recovery of attorney fees by a

pro se attorney-litigant under the EAJA. See Kooritzky I, 6

F. Supp.2d at 3. DOL submits that our decision in Jones was

implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court in Kay v. Ehrler,

499 U.S. 432 (1991), disallowing recovery of attorney fees to

pro se plaintiffs under the fee-shifting provision found in 42

U.S.C. s 1988. Kooritzky contends that the district court

correctly relied on this court's decision in Jones, which he

asserts remains the controlling law of this circuit despite the

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Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Kay. He argues

that the Kay opinion was limited to cases brought under the

Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act and that, while Kay

resolved a "statutory ambiguity" by examining the specific

legislative history of that Act, the Jones holding was based on

the clear and unambiguous language of the EAJA. Upon

review, we conclude that the fee-shifting provision of EAJA

does not differ in any material way from the statutes construed by the Supreme Court in Kay and by this court in

Burka. We therefore hold that our decision in Jones has

been overruled by the Supreme Court, and that the district

court erred in awarding fees to the pro se litigant under

EAJA.

In the United States, fee shifting is a departure from the

norm. In the general run of litigation, the "American rule"

dictates that each party to a lawsuit bears his own attorney

fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247

(1975). Congress has specified exceptions to this American

rule in a number of statutory schemes in the form of feeshifting provisions which allow recovery of attorney fees by a

"prevailing party." See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v.

Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 89 (1991) (noting that "[a]t least 34

statutes in 10 different titles of the United States Code

explicitly shift attorney's fees and expert witness fees"). The

governing fee-shifting statute for EAJA awards is 28 U.S.C.

s 2412(d)(1)(A):

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a

court shall award to a prevailing party other than the

United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any

costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by

that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding

in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any

court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court

finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an

award unjust.

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The EAJA elsewhere defines "fees and expenses" to include

"the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable

cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the

preparation of the party's case, and reasonable attorney fees."

Id. s 2412(d)(2)(A).

In Kay v. Ehrler, the Supreme Court considered the entitlement to fees of a lawyer litigating pro se in a civil rights

action. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act provided that in such an action, "the court, in its discretion, may

allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a

reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C.

s 1988(b). After noting that it was already fixed law "that a

pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to attorney's

fees," Kay, 499 U.S. at 435 (emphasis in original), a unanimous Supreme Court held that the same rule applied to a pro

se litigant who is a lawyer. While the Court allowed that

neither the text nor the legislative history of the statute

provided "a clear answer," it firmly declared that "the word

'attorney' assumes an agency relationship, and it seems likely

that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as

the predicate for an award under s 1988." Id. at 435-36. In

so declaring, the Court cited the definition of the word

"attorney" as " '[O]ne who is legally appointed by another to

transact business for him; specif: a legal agent qualified to

act for suitors and defendants in legal proceedings.' " Id. at

436 n.6 (quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 73

(1975)). The Court therefore concluded that the pro se

litigant, even though a qualified lawyer, is not entitled to

attorney fees for his own time, but may only collect fees for

work performed by third parties employed to act as his

attorneys at law in the litigation.

Although the definitional support for the holding might

have been sufficient, the Court buttressed its conclusion with

an examination of the purpose of the statute. While recognizing that the fee-shifting provision "was no doubt intended to

encourage litigation protecting civil rights," the Court further

noted that "it is also true that its more specific purpose was

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petent counsel in vindicating their rights." Id. at 436. There

is no limiting language in the Kay opinion to make us believe

that the Supreme Court intended its reasoning to apply only

to the specific statute before it. Other fee-shifting statutes

also speak of "attorney's" fees. The definitional implication

of an agency relationship in the EAJA provision is therefore

just as strong as in the Civil Rights Act. Therefore, in

Burka, we had no difficulty in holding that the fee-shifting

provision of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(4)(E) (1994), was governed by Kay and that a pro se

attorney-litigant pursuing a remedy under FOIA, like his

counterpart in a civil rights action, was not entitled to an

award of attorney fees. As the Supreme Court had done in

Kay, we noted in Burka that a contrary rule would be

counter to one purpose of the statute--that is, " 'to encourage

potential claimants to seek legal advice before commencing

litigation.' " Burka, 142 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Kay, 499 U.S.

at 435 n.4) (other citations and internal quotations omitted).

As both the Burka and Kay opinions further note, "although a pro se attorney possesses legal expertise, he is

unlikely to have the 'detached and objective perspective necessary to fulfill the aims of the Act.' " Burka, 142 F.3d at

1289 (quoting Kay, at 435 n.4) (other internal quotations and

citations omitted). Thus, Burka reflects a conviction that

nothing in the Supreme Court's Kay opinion limits its reasoning to the specific facts or statute before it. Nor does

anything in the reasoning of Kay or Burka draw a line

excluding the EAJA from the analysis controlling the application of the other fee-shifting statutes.

The EAJA uses precisely the same wording--"attorney's

fees"--construed to imply the necessity of an agency relationship in the other acts. Nothing in the statute defeats that

implication. Not only does this similarity in wording suggest

that the EAJA, like the FOIA, is controlled by the same

reasoning applied by the Supreme Court to the Civil Rights

Act, the Supreme Court itself has noted in the past the

similarity between the fee-shifting provisions of the EAJA

and Section 1988, observing that the EAJA is "the counterpart to s 1988 for violation of federal rights by federal

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employees." See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 89;

see also Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491

U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989) ("[F]ee-shifting statutes' similar

language is 'a strong indication' that they are to be interpreted alike.").

The district court, faced with an apparently controlling

precedent from this court in Jones compelling one result and

a later decision of the Supreme Court arguably but not

directly overruling that decision, concluded that Kooritzky

"presented a persuasive argument that the [EAJA] differs in

both language and purpose from the attorneys' fee provisions

of the Civil Rights Act and the Freedom of Information Act."

Kooritzky I, 6 F. Supp.2d at 3. We cannot agree. The

relevant fee-shifting provisions of the Civil Rights Attorney's

Fees Awards Act and the EAJA are the same in one controlling particular: both provide for recovery of "attorney's fees."

Thus, a straightforward analysis of the statutory text is

sufficient to conclude that, as in the case of the Civil Rights

Attorney's Fees Awards Act provision, a pro se attorneylitigant may not recover attorney fees under the comparable

fee-shifting provision of the EAJA.

Neither is there a difference of purpose in the statute that

impels us toward any different result. In concluding that the

plaintiff had "presented a persuasive argument that the

[EAJA] differs in both language and purpose from the attorneys' fee provision of the Civil Rights Act and the [FOIA]"

construed in Kay and Burka, the district court cited Spencer

v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1983), as "enumerating

purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act." Kooritzky I, 6

F. Supp.2d at 3. We have reviewed the goals we set forth in

Spencer: (1) to provide relief to victims of abusive governmental conduct without assuming "enormous financial burdens"; (2) "to reduce the incidence of such abuse"; and (3) to

"expos[e] a greater number of governmental actions to adversarial testing." 712 F.2d at 550. We find none of these to be

inconsistent with the corresponding goals of the Civil Rights

Act underlying the fee-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. s 1988.

Indeed, we must echo the Supreme Court's declaration in

West Virginia University Hospitals that EAJA is in a sense

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a counterpart of the civil rights statute. In neither instance

does the general goal of encouraging vindication of rights

warrant an award of attorney fees where no attorney-client

relationship exists and where the goal of the filtering of

litigation through an independent professional is not met.

In Kay, the Court determined that a lawyer who appears

pro se is "deprived of the judgment of an independent third

party in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative

methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile

witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making sure

that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical

response to unforeseen developments in the courtroom." 499

U.S. at 437. Thus, the Court concluded that "[t]he statutory

policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious

claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to

retain counsel in every such case." Id. at 438.

The same policy goals undergird the EAJA. As this court

has observed, "[b]oth the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award

Act ... and the EAJA were designed to supplement a host of

more specific provisions allowing for the award of attorneys'

fees in suits brought under statutes granting or protecting

various federal rights." Spencer, 712 F.2d at 545 n.18; see

also Celeste v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 1069, 1070 (11th Cir. 1992)

("The fee shifting provisions in section 1988 and in the EAJA

serve the same purposes."). Like the Civil Rights Attorney's

Fees Awards Act, the policy goals underlying the fee-shifting

provision found in the EAJA support the conclusion that

Congress sought to encourage the procurement of objective

counsel to pursue claims against the government for violation

of various federal rights. See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong.,

2d Sess. 9 (1980) (fee-shifting enacted to aid citizens for whom

"the inability to recover attorney fees preclude[d] resort to

the adjudicatory process"); id. at 12 (noting that under the

EAJA, "fee shifting becomes an instrument for curbing excessive regulation and the unreasonable exercise of Government

authority"). In doing so, Congress contemplated that attorney and client would be distinct individuals. See id. at 15

("[T]he computation of attorney fees should be based on

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ments between the attorney and client."). Thus, as in Kay,

our interpretation of the EAJA is consistent with underlying

policy goals and congressional purpose.

Our prior applications of the Supreme Court's decision in

Kay further support our ruling in this case. We have already

held that the Supreme Court's holding in Kay extends beyond

the Section 1988 context. In Burka v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 142 F.3d 1286 (D.C.

Cir. 1998), we ruled that pro se plaintiffs could not recover

attorney fees under the fee-shifting provision in FOIA. In

doing so, we concluded that Kay overruled prior decisions of

this court holding that a pro se attorney-litigant was entitled

to recover attorney fees under the fee-shifting provisions of

FOIA. Id. at 1288 (citing Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360,

1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). As a result of our analysis of the Kay

decision, we concluded that "the Supreme Court intended its

ruling to apply beyond section 1988 cases to other similar feeshifting statutes, particularly the one in FOIA. It is, in short,

impossible to conclude otherwise than that pro se litigants

who are attorneys are not entitled to attorney's fees under

FOIA." Id. at 1289; see also Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying attorney fees

under FOIA to a pro se non-attorney on the grounds that

"the Supreme Court believes that the word 'attorney,' when

used in the context of a fee-shifting statute, does not encompass a lay-person proceeding on his own behalf"). Thus, in

Burka, we stated the position of this court that the Supreme

Court's decision in Kay applies outside of the Section 1988

context, extending to all similarly-worded fee-shifting provisions. We reaffirm that holding today.

In so ruling, we join a number of other circuits that have

ruled that Kay compels the conclusion that pro se plaintiffs

may not recover attorney fees under the EAJA. In SEC v.

Waterhouse, the Second Circuit applied Kay to bar recovery

of attorney fees by a pro se attorney-litigant, observing that

the "agency relationship [is absent] in the pro se context." 41

F.3d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1994). Similarly, in Celeste v. Sullivan,

the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the fee-shifting

provisions in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act

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and the EAJA serve the same purposes, the Supreme Court's

decision in Kay barred recovery of attorney fees under the

EAJA by a pro se non-attorney. 988 F.2d 1069, 1070 (11th

Cir. 1992). Finally, in Demarest v. Manspeaker, the Tenth

Circuit denied attorney fees under the EAJA to a pro se

litigant, concluding that, like the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees

Awards Act, the EAJA "attempts to enable meritorious litigation to take place, not to reward individuals who obtain legal

redress." 948 F.2d 655, 656 (10th Cir. 1991).

B. "Expert Witness" Expenses

Not content to rest on his argument that this court's

decision in Jones is controlling, however, Kooritzky further

claims that he is entitled to recover fees under 28 U.S.C.

s 2412(d)(2)(A) for time he spent acting as an immigration

law "expert" in his own case. Kooritzky contends that the

district court correctly found that he played a "dual role" in

the litigation and that he both "participated in the advocacy

role of an attorney" and "participated as an expert in immigration law as a supporter of his colleagues in the 'study ...

and analysis' of the specialized immigration law and policy

issues presented by this litigation." Kooritzky I, 6

F. Supp.2d at 4. Kooritzky extrapolates from this finding to

the conclusion that he is entitled to recover fees for his work

as an "expert witness" even if he is not entitled to recover

"attorney fees" for the same work.

DOL argues that Kooritzky should not be allowed to "sidestep" his preclusion from recovering attorney fees by characterizing the fees as "expert" expenses. DOL observes that

the district court agreed that this was a "routine APA case"

and contends that therefore no expert studies were required

and that "the substantial amounts of time wasted by plaintiff

hardly qualify him for compensation as an expert." DOL

Reply Brief at 2, 10. DOL also maintains that Kooritzky

characterized the fees he claimed as attorney fees and that he

cannot now claim that these amounts represent compensation

for time he spent preparing the case as an expert witness.

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We agree that a pro se attorney-litigant may not evade the

prohibition against recovery of attorney fees under the EAJA

by seeking to characterize himself as an "expert witness."

The EAJA provides that litigants may recover "fees and

other expenses" incurred in pursuing claims regarding alleged violations of various federal rights. Elsewhere, this

phrase is defined as follows:

"fees and other expenses" includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any

study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which

is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation

of the party's case, and reasonable attorney fees.

28 U.S.C. s 2412(d)(2)(A). On its face, therefore, the statutory language provides for the recovery of "reasonable expenses of expert witnesses" in addition to "reasonable attorney's fees." Unlike the term "attorney," the phrase "expert

witness" arguably does not connote as readily the sort of

agency relationship that would support a reading of the

statute requiring that the litigant and expert witness be

separate individuals before expenses may be awarded.

However, it is not at all unlikely that Congress intended

that expert witnesses, like attorneys, should be distinct from

litigants. EAJA with its net worth threshold, see 28 U.S.C.

s 2412(d)(2)(B), apparently contemplates placing less solvent

litigants facing the government as an adversary on a basis

similar to the multimillionaire engaged in the same type of

litigation. Appellee has shown us no precedent for a litigant,

wealthy or otherwise, receiving witness fees, expert or plain,

for his own litigation. Indeed, it would seem a strange

incentive to provide witness fees not for the purpose of

reimbursing a litigant for his out-of-pocket costs, but as

salary for time spent as a witness in his own litigation.

Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Kay "[e]thical

considerations may make it inappropriate for [a pro se lawyer] to appear as a witness." Kay, 499 U.S. at 437 n.9 (citing

the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility: "[t]he

roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the

function of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of

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another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively.").

We find decidedly uncompelling an argument that we should

enter a novel holding providing an incentive to tread that

questionable ethical ground.

The rationale of Kay further counsels in favor of barring

recovery of expenses incurred by a litigant acting as his own

expert. The Court in Kay noted that Congress in enacting

various fee-shifting provisions sought to encourage plaintiffs

to hire objective outside counsel:

A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to pro se

litigants--even if limited to those who are members of

the bar--would create a disincentive to employ counsel

whenever such a plaintiff considered himself competent

to litigate on his own behalf. The statutory policy of

furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious

claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive

to retain counsel in every such case.

499 U.S. at 436. By analogy, the same congressional policy is

served by a rule that encourages plaintiffs to retain objective

outside experts. Thus, Kooritzky's claim for fees, whether

characterized as "attorney fees" or "expert expenses" must

fail.

In any event, the statutory language also makes plain that

"attorney fees" and expert witness expenses are separate and

distinct items of expense. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps.,

499 U.S. at 92 (concluding that under the background against

which Congress enacted the fee-shifting provision of the Civil

Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, "[e]xpert fees were

regarded not as a subset of attorney's fees, but as a distinct

category of litigation expense"). Allowing a pro se attorneylitigant to recover fees for legal services rendered during the

course of litigation by characterizing them as "expenses of

expert witnesses" or the "reasonable cost" of various studies,

rather than "attorney fees" would vitiate the holding of Kay

as applied to the EAJA and would make the determination of

fee eligibility rest solely on the semantics of the litigant's fee

petition. Therefore, we hold that a lawyer-litigant acting pro

se may not recover fees for acting as an "expert witness" in

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his own case, at least, where the "expertise" possessed by the

litigant is essentially legal in nature.

Such a rule is particularly warranted in a case such as this

where the legal "expertise" claimed by the litigant is of

limited relevance to the subject matter of the underlying suit.

Kooritzky's alleged legal expertise consists of his knowledge

of immigration law. His suit, however, challenged a DOL

regulation on the ground that it was promulgated in violation

of the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative

Procedure Act--an issue of administrative, not immigration,

law. Moreover, the record contains evidence that Kooritzky

lacked the very expertise that was most required in this

case--experience trying administrative law cases in the federal courts. Indeed, the district court observed that Kooritzky

"admitted [his] absence of court experience." Kooritzky, 6

F. Supp.2d at 8. Such circumstances demonstrate the danger

of a holding that would allow attorney-litigants to evade the

Court's pronouncement in Kay by proclaiming themselves

legal "experts" and thereby allowing them to recover attorney

fees relabeled as "expert expenses."

C. Attorney Fees for Work Performed

by Kooritzky's "Co-Counsel"

In addition to seeking reversal of the district court's award

of attorney fees for legal work performed by Kooritzky in his

own case, DOL argues that Kooritzky should not have been

permitted to recover attorney fees for the work of his colleagues. The Department relies primarily on our ruling in

Burka that a pro se attorney-litigant must demonstrate that

he and his co-counsel have a "genuine attorney-client relationship" and that his co-counsel are exercising "independent"

judgment before he may be awarded attorney fees for their

work under the EAJA. 142 F.3d at 1291-92. DOL argues

that the rationale of Burka applies in this case even though

Kooritzky's co-counsel are not employees of his law firm, as

were the attorneys in Burka. DOL Reply Brief at 12.

Kooritzky responds that he need only demonstrate that a

valid attorney-client relationship existed between him and his

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co-counsel. While admitting that he never had a written

agreement with any of his co-counsel, Kooritzky asserts that

no such agreement is necessary for there to be a valid

attorney-client relationship.

DOL is correct that our analysis in Burka is controlling.

Our holding in Burka dictates that a pro se attorney-litigant

must demonstrate that he and his co-counsel have a "genuine

attorney-client relationship" and that his co-counsel are "independent" before attorney fees may be awarded. 142 F.3d at

1291-92. We concluded that this requirement followed from

the Supreme Court's ruling in Kay that the term "attorney"

used in a similarly-worded fee-shifting statute " 'assumes an

agency relationship' " that bars recovery of attorney fees for

work performed by all those who are not "independent third

part[ies]." Id. at 1291 (quoting Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-36, 437).

Adhering to the Supreme Court's reasoning we denied recovery of fees to a pro se attorney-litigant who (1) controlled the

legal strategy and presentation in his own case, (2) was the

only attorney to enter an appearance in the case, and (3)

directed the work of his colleagues who were employed by the

attorney-litigant's law firm. Id. We distinguished cases

relied upon by the plaintiff in Burka in which pro se litigants

were allowed to recover fees, noting:

In all three cases, the court awarded attorney's fees to a

pro se attorney-litigant for the work of co-counsel. Yet,

as the district court noted below, all three cases involved

attorneys who were not affiliated with the litigant's law

practice. As a result, these outside counsel, unlike the

colleagues employed by Burka, enjoyed a genuine

attorney-client relationship with the litigants, were situated to offer "independent" legal advice and assistance,

and were presumably paid for their services by the

attorney-litigants involved. This was not true here. Instead, Burka controlled the legal strategy and presentation, he was the only attorney to enter an appearance in

the case, and his colleagues worked under his direction.

These are material differences.

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Id. at 1291. We concluded that, based on these factors, cocounsel in Burka lacked the requisite independence necessary

for recovery of attorney fees under the fee-shifting provision

found in FOIA.

The same analysis applies under the EAJA. A pro se

attorney-litigant seeking to obtain attorney fees under the

EAJA for work performed by co-counsel must demonstrate

that his colleagues are situated to offer "independent" legal

advice and assistance. As we demonstrated above, the Supreme Court's conclusion in Kay that the term "attorney"

contemplates an agency relationship between a litigant and an

independent lawyer applies not only to the fee-shifting provisions of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, but to

all similarly-worded fee-shifting provisions, including that

found in the EAJA.

Applying the test we outlined in Burka, we conclude that

Kooritzky has not shown that his co-counsel evidenced the

independence necessary for recovery of fees under the EAJA.

We further conclude that Kooritzky and his co-counsel did not

enjoy a genuine attorney-client relationship for purposes of

the fee-shifting provision of the Act. As the district court

noted, the relationship between Kooritzky and his "cocounsel" was "unusual." Kooritzky I, 6 F. Supp.2d at 5. As

in Burka, none of Kooritzky's co-counsel entered an appearance on his behalf during the merits phase of the case. The

only appearance by co-counsel on behalf of Kooritzky occurred after Kooritzky had prevailed on the merits when the

district court was determining the amount of attorney fees, if

any, Kooritzky was entitled to receive. There was no formal

agreement between Kooritzky and his colleagues concerning

fees for legal services rendered. None of Kooritzky's alleged

co-counsel ever billed him for legal services rendered. Moreover, his co-counsel did not even keep accurate records of the

time they allegedly spent on Kooritzky's case. After reviewing the evidence, the magistrate judge observed that " '[n]obody expected to get paid.' " Id. (citing Magistrate Report

and Recommendation at 39).

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Indeed, as Kooritzky's counsel acknowledged during oral

argument, it was only after Kooritzky had prevailed on the

merits that he and his colleagues realized that they might be

able--in his words--to "stick the government" for attorney

fees. Once this realization dawned upon them, they proceeded to reconstruct the hours spent working on this case,

leading to protracted litigation below concerning the amount

of fees to which they were entitled. See id. at 8 (noting that

"plaintiff's inexperience and disorderly recordkeeping imposed an enormous and unnecessary burden on the Court and

the Magistrate Judge"). In engaging in such practices, Kooritzky and his colleagues ignored the admonition of the Supreme Court in Hensley that "[a] request for attorney's fees

should not result in a second major litigation." 461 U.S. at

437. While the facts in this case differ from those in Burka

in that Kooritzky's co-counsel, unlike the attorneys in Burka,

are not employed by his law firm, this fact alone is not

dispositive.

We are not holding that in every instance an EAJA litigant

must show that each attorney for whom he is entitled to

counsel fees entered an appearance in the case. We do

however hold that such fees must be for a professional who

has in fact acted in an attorney-client relationship with the fee

claimant in the relevant EAJA litigation. Kooritzky has not

made the necessary showing. Did the lawyers for whom he

claims recompense receive or contemplate fees? According

to the record they did not. Did they appear for him in the

merits phase of the case? According to the record they did

not. Did they enter an attorney-client relationship with

reference to this litigation? So far as the record shows, they

did not. They may have counseled him, they may have

advised him, but they did not provide the function recognized

in Kay v. Ehrler of "filtering out meritless claims." 499 U.S.

at 437. The litigant himself acted as sole trial counsel. He

was the final filter. He, like the FOIA litigant in Burka,

"controlled the legal strategy and presentation," and "was the

only attorney to enter an appearance," at least in the merits

phase of the case. 142 F.3d at 1291. Like the litigant in

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Burka, he cannot collect attorney fees for professionals who

did not act as his attorneys.1

D. Kooritzky's Cross-Appeal

Having concluded that Kooritzky may not recover attorney

fees for work performed by either himself or his colleagues,

we need not reach the merits of Kooritzky's objections to the

amount of the fee award. Specifically, Kooritzky argues that

the district court erred by (1) failing to increase his attorney

fee award to compensate him for "special factors" permitted

under 28 U.S.C. s 2412(d), (2) failing to permit him to submit

a supplemental fee request, and (3) refusing to allow him to

submit a fee petition for work conducted in preparation for

hearings before the magistrate judge. However, because

Kooritzky is not entitled to any attorney fees under the

EAJA, his objections to the amount of the fee award are

moot.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a pro se attorneylitigant may not recover attorney fees under EAJA, 28 U.S.C.

s 2412(d)(1)(A). We further hold that a pro se attorneylitigant may not recover attorney fees under the EAJA for

the work of his co-counsel where the attorney and his colleagues lack a genuine attorney-client relationship. Accordingly, the district court's award of fees is reversed.

1 The exact status of the law clerk "Thomas Moore" for whom

Kooritzky claims fees is the matter of gravest confusion in the

record. Apparently he was a student for the bar under a "reading

law" method of eligibility in a state adjoining the District of

Columbia. So far as we can tell, he was neither eligible for nor did

he receive any sort of fees.

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