Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02882/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02882-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE FIGUEROA,

Petitioner,

v.

MELISSA LEA, Warden, et al.,

Respondents 

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Case No. 12-CV-2882-BEN (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY

AND ABEYANCE

[ECF No. 16]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Roger T.

Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California. Currently before the Court is a motion

to stay and abey federal proceedings while Petitioner Jose Figueroa, a state prisoner, proceeding

pro se and in form pauperis, exhausts his claims in state court. ECF No. 16. 

On October 30, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in case number

10-CV-2274-MMA (JMA). See Docket for Case No. 10-CV-2274-MMA (JMA). The petition alleged

eight claims that are identical to the claims found in Petitioner’s current First Amended Petition

(“FAP”) [ECF No. 9 (“FAP”)], discussed below. See Docket for Case No. 10-CV-2274-MMA (JMA)

at ECF No. 1. On February 8, 2011, Petitioner also filed a Motion to Stay and Abey in Case No.

10-CV-2274-MMA (JMA) which was denied in part and granted in part. See Id. at ECF Nos. 8 &

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19. The court denied Petitioner a stay and abeyance under Rhines, but granted Petitioner a stay

pursuant to Kelly provided that he withdraw his unexhausted claims (claims three though eight)

within thirty days of the September 2, 2011 order. Id. at ECF No. 19. On October 15, 2011,

Petitioner filed a motion to stay enforcement of the Court’s September 2, 2011 order so that he

could challenge the order on appeal. Id. at ECF No. 23. The Court denied Petitioner’s request

for a certificate of appealability, but granted the motion to stay enforcement of the order. Id.

at ECF No. 24. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction on

November 15, 2011 [id. at ECF No. 26] and that same day, the Court lifted the stay and ordered

Petitioner to withdraw his unexhausted claims within twenty-one days. Id. at ECF No. 27. More

than three months later, on February 28, 2012, the Court dismissed Petitioner’s petition without

prejudice for failing to withdraw the six unexhausted claims as ordered. Id. at ECF No. 30. 

On November 13, 2012, Petitioner filed a second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF

No. 1 (“Pet.”). On December 17, 2012, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice due to

Petitioner’s failure to pay the filing fee or to file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No.

3. On April 24, 2013, Petitioner filed a FAP. ECF No. 9.1

 In response to the FAP, the Court

issued a Notice Regarding Possible Dismissal of Petition for Failure to Exhaust State Court

Remedies on May 13, 2013. ECF No. 10. In the Notice, the Court stated that Petitioner alleged

exhaustion of state court remedies as to his first two claims, but not as to the remaining claims

(claims three through eight). Id. at 1. The Notice then presented Petitioner with four options

to avoid having his FAP dismissed by the Court. Id. at 2-4. Petitioner failed to adequately

respond to the Notice and on August 2, 2013, the Court issued an Order requesting that

Petitioner (1) file papers stating that he has in fact exhausted claims three through eight and

providing proof of the exhaustion, (2) file a motion voluntarily dismissing his entire federal

petition so he may return to state court and exhaust his claims, (3) file a motion asking to

abandon his unexhausted claims (claims three through eight) so that he may proceed forward

with the exhausted claims (claims one through two), or (4) file a motion to stay this federal

1

On April 24, 2013, Petitioner attempted to open a third case in this Court with the FAP, but the Court

dismissed the case and ordered that the petition be filed as the FAP in the instant matter. See Docket for Case No.

13-CV-1018 -JCL (PCL).

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proceeding while he returns to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. ECF No. 15. In

response, Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay and Abey to exhaust his remaining claims in state

court. ECF No. 16 ("Mot. Stay"). Respondents were required to file a response, if any, on or

before September 20, 2013. ECF No. 15 at 2. No response was filed. See Docket. On October

1, 2013, Respondents filed an application for enlargement of time to file a response to

Petitioner’s motion to stay. ECF No. 17. In support, Respondents’ counsel, Vincent P. LaPietra

stated that “Respondent failed to file such a response because the order was incorrectly routed

to a previous federal case-file involving the same parties. Respondent was notified of the failure

to file on or about September 27, 2013.” ECF No. 17-1, LaPietra Declaration at 2. Respondents’

motion was granted on October 2, 2013 [ECF No. 18] and Respondents filed an opposition to the

motion to stay on October 30, 2013. ECF No. 19. 

The Court has considered the motion to stay and opposition as well as the record as a

whole. Based thereon, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Petitioner filed the currently-operative FAP on April 24, 2013. In his FAP, Petitioner

claims that his constitutional rights were violated when (1) jurors saw the victim crying in the

bathroom during a break in her testimony which constituted juror misconduct, (2) aggravated

terms were imposed on counts one and four therefore violating Petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights, (3) an all white jury was used to convict Petitioner who was denied "a trial

by his peers and a representative cross section of the community in violation of the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the constitution of the United States," (4) he was required to wear

shackles during his trial without receiving notice as to why he had to wear shackles or

instructions on how to have the shackles removed, (5) he was unable to effectively assist his

counsel due to the treatment he received in prison, (6) he was denied the effective assistance

of counsel, (7) he was denied due process of law due to cumulative error, and (8) the trial court

failed to establish jurisdiction over Petitioner and his counsel failed to challenge the court's

jurisdiction. Id. at 6-18. Petitioner states that the first two claims have been fully exhausted and

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that claims three through eight are unexhausted. Mot. Stay at 2. 

On August 25, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion to stay. Mot. Stay. In his motion to stay,

Petitioner asks the Court to stay his FAP pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) "so

that he may return to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims." Id. at 8. Petitioner

argues that there is good cause for his failure to exhaust his claims. Id. at 9-11. 

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may not consider a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner first

has presented his claims to the state courts, thereby “exhausting” them. 28 U.S.C.A.

§2254(b)(1)(A); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). The exhaustion requirement is

founded on federal-state comity, as only when the state court has been presented with the claim

may it “pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (quotes and citations omitted). Thus, exhaustion

of a habeas petitioner’s federal claims requires that they have been “fairly present[ed]” in each

appropriate state court, including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review. 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). In California, this generally entails direct or collateral

presentation to both the lower courts of appeal and the state supreme court, though

presentation to the state supreme court alone may suffice. Rieger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d

1425, 1427 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). However,

claims are not exhausted by mere presentation to the state appellate system. A petitioner must

also “alert[ ] [the state] court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. A

petitioner may indicate a federal claim by citing the source of federal law upon which he relies,

or by merely labeling the claim as “federal.” Id. at 32. 

Claims articulated in a federal habeas petition also must be the “substantial equivalent”

of those previously presented to the state courts. Pappageorge v. Summer, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295

(9th Cir. 1982); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 258 (1986) (a petitioner must “present [ ] the

substance of his claim to the state courts”). The requirement of substantial equivalency is not

rigid, and the state habeas petition may be exhausted even when it does not spell out each

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syllable of the federal claim. Delgado v. Lewis, 181 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (vacated and

remanded on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1122 (2000)). Additionally, arguments presented to the

federal court may be supplemented with evidence not provided to the state court, so long as the

additional information does not “fundamentally alter” the claim. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260.

If state remedies have not been exhausted as to any of the federal claims, the habeas

petition typically should be dismissed. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Rose, 455

U.S. at 522 (requiring dismissal of petitions that contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims,

commonly referred to as “mixed petitions”); see also Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274-78 (confirming

continued applicability of “total exhaustion” rule even after AEDPA imposed one-year statute of

limitations on habeas claims). 

Pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), all federal

habeas petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and claims not exhausted and

presented to the federal court within the one-year period are forfeited. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Generally a court may not consider a “mixed” habeas petition, that is a petition that contains or

seeks to present both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose, 455 U.S. at 522. If a petitioner

presents a mixed petition, the petitioner may seek to stay the exhausted claims while he pursues

the unexhausted claims in state court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. Case law has established two

alternative procedures for seeking and obtaining a stay, which are set forth in Rhines and Kelly

v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481

F. 3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007). See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Under Rhines, a district court has discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner

time to return to state court to present the unexhausted claims. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276. This

stay and abeyance is available only in limited circumstances, and only when: (1) there is "good

cause" for the failure to exhaust; (2) the unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious; and 

(3) the petitioner did not intentionally engage in dilatory litigation tactics. Id. at 277-78. 

A Kelly abeyance requires compliance with the following three-step procedure: (1)

petitioner files an amended petition deleting his unexhausted claims; (2) the district court “stays

and holds in abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing petitioner the opportunity

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to proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted claims”; and (3) petitioner must subsequently

seek to amend the federal habeas petition to reattach “the newly-exhausted claims to the original

petition.” King, 564 F.3d at 1135. However, the petitioner only is allowed to amend his

newly-exhausted claims back into his federal petition if the claims are timely under the AEDPA

or “relate back” to the exhausted claims in the pending petition. Id. at 1140-41, see also Mayle

v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662-664 (2005). A new claim relates back to an existing claim if the two

claims share a “common core of operative facts.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 646. A new claim does not

"relate back" to an existing claim simply because it arises from "the same trial, conviction or

sentence." Id. If the newly-exhausted claim is not timely under the AEDPA or the relation-back

doctrine, it may not be added to the existing petition. Haskins v. Schriro, 2009 WL 3241836, *3

(D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2009). If amendment is futile, a stay is inappropriate. Id. at *7.

II. A STAY PURSUANT TO RHINES

Petitioner has failed to establish good cause for a stay pursuant to Rhines. Stay and

abeyence pending exhaustion of claims in state court is only available in “limited circumstances”

where the petitioner shows good cause for his failure to previously exhaust. Rhines, 544 U.S.

at 277. The paramount concern in considering a motion to stay is adherence to AEDPA’s twin

objectives of encouraging petitioners to “seek relief from state courts in the first instance” and

“reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences.” Id. at 276; Wooten

v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner spends his entire motion arguing the

merit of his claims, but fails to provide any reason for his failure to exhaust his state remedies

prior to filing his federal petition. See Mot. Stay. The lack of good cause is established by

numerous facts, including, that approximately three years passed between the California

Supreme Court order on direct appeal and the FAP, Petitioner failed to utilize the Kelly stay

granted in Case Number 10-CV-2274-MMA (JMA), and Petitioner failed to respond to this Court’s

first notice of failure to exhaust. 

Because Petitioner fails to show good cause for his failure to exhaust his claims, the Court

need not consider the whether his arguments are plainly meritless or whether Petitioner engaged

in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1023. The Court therefore

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RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s motion to stay and abey pursuant to Rhines be DENIED.

III. A STAY PURSUANT TO KELLY

Because a Rhines stay is not available to Petitioner, the Court will consider if Petitioner

is eligible for a stay pursuant to Kelly. Under the Kelly procedure, a court may grant a stay

unless the new and unexhausted claims are untimely and, therefore, may not be added to the

existing petition. Haskins, 2009 WL 3241836 at *7. To determine whether Petitioner’s new

claims are untimely, the Court will consider the AEDPA time limits.

A. Statute of Limitations

The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year limitations period

runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Here, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's Petition for

Review on February 3, 2010. Lodgment 1 at 2. The statute of limitations began to run ninety

days later on May 4, 2010.2

 Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (limitations

period does not begin until after expiration of ninety-day period for seeking certiorari). Absent

tolling, the limitations period expired one year later on May 4, 2011. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 30, 2010. See Docket for

Case No. 10-CV-2274-MMA (JMA) at ECF No. 1. While that petition was timely and left Petitioner

2

Where a Petitioner pursues direct appeal, but does not seek certiorari, a conviction becomes final after the

ninety days in which certiorari may have been sought. Here, Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari in the United

States Supreme Court, but that was dismissed as untimely on June 24, 2010 and, accordingly, does not impact the

date of finality. Lodgment 1 at 3. 

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with approximately six months (179 days) left in the statute of limitations period, the petition

was dismissed without prejudice on February 28, 2012 [id. at ECF No. 30] and Petitioner did not

file another federal petition until nine months later, on November 13, 2012. ECF No. 1.

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the "time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending." 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). "The time that an application for state postconviction review is ‘pending' includes

the period between (1) a lower court's adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner's filing of a

notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law". Evans

v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (emphasis in original). Here, Petitioner did not seek

collateral review in state court and is not entitled to any statutory tolling.3

 Without tolling,

Petitioner's Petition and FAP are well past the May 4, 2011 statute of limitations and untimely.4

Because Kelly requires a claim to be timely, a stay in this case would be futile. Even if the

unexhausted claims relate back to the petition [ECF No. 1], since the petition itself is untimely,

a stay under Kelly would still be futile. In addition, even if the unexhausted claims relate back

to the first federal petition Petitioner timely filed in Case No. 10-CV-2274-MMA (JMA), since the

petition was properly dismissed, a stay under Kelly is not available.5 The Court therefore

3

While the statute of limitations period is subject to both statutory and equitable tolling, Petitioner has not

presented any argument that he is entitled to equitable tolling, nor has he presented any evidence that would support

such an argument. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (Petitioner bears the burden of

establishing his entitlement to equitable tolling).

4

This is true even though Petitioner’s first federal petition in Case No. 10-CV-2274-MMA (JMA) was timely filed. 

Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling during the pendency of that habeas petition. See Bacot v. Clark, 2009

WL 514068, *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2009) (noting that “[w]hile petitioner's earlier federal habeas petition was filed

prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, that habeas petition was dismissed without prejudice to refiling

after exhaustion of state remedies. Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling during the pendency of that

habeas petition”) (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-182 (2001) (holding "that an application for federal

habeas corpus review is not an 'application for State post-conviction or other collateral review' within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Section 2244(d)(2) therefore did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of

respondent's first federal habeas petition.")).

5

See Cyrus v. Hedgpeth, 2012 WL 4372279, * 6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2012) (stating that “[a] second petition

relates back to, and preserves, the filing date of an earlier petition only if the earlier petition was improperly dismissed

by the court”) (citing Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d 1086, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003) (relating back second petition where

dismissal of mixed petition was improper because district court had not informed pro se petitioner of stay option or

of petition's status under AEDPA's limitations period), rev'd on other grounds). Here, Petitioner’s first habeas petition

was not improperly dismissed as the Court provided Petitioner with an opportunity to dismiss his unexhausted claims

and proceed on his exhausted claims. See Docket in Case No. 10-CV-2274-MMA (JMA), at ECF Nos. 19 & 27; see also 

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RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s motion to stay and abey pursuant to Kelly be DENIED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge issue

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation and (2) DENYING

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance pursuant to Rhines, and DENYING a stay pursuant

to Kelly, and (3) requiring Petitioner to (a) file a motion asking to abandon his unexhausted

claims (claims three through eight) so that he may proceed forward with the exhausted claims

(claims one through two), or (b) file a motion to dismiss the petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 27, 2013, any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than January 17, 2014. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 3, 2013

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

Cyrus v. Hedgpeth, 2012 WL 4372279 at * 6 (citing Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005))

(petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling because district court dismissed his mixed petition without giving him the

choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas petition so as to

present only exhausted claims).

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