Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01030/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONALD WHITE,

Plaintiff,

v.

HONORABLE SUZANNE S.

CHILDERS, BIRMINGHAM FIRE AND

RESCUE SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO. 2:14-cv-1030-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the court on defendant Birmingham Fire and Rescue Service’s

Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 10),1defendant Suzanne S. Childers’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc.

11), plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, (Doc. 16), and plaintiff’s Amended Motion to

Amend Complaint, (Doc. 17). Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory relief and damages for alleged violations of his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the

parties, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that defendant Suzanne S. Childers’s

Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 11), and defendant Birmingham Fire and Rescue Service’s Motion

to Dismiss, (Doc. 10), are due to be granted, and plaintiff’s Motions to Amend Complaint,

(Docs. 16 and 17), are due to be denied. 

1

 Reference to a document number, (“Doc. ___”), refers to the number assigned to

each document as it is filed in the court’s record.

FILED

 2015 Aug-17 PM 02:51

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-01030-SLB Document 21 Filed 08/17/15 Page 1 of 11
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint is required to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to

dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff has

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the

complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations;” however, the “plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Accordingly, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true

(even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations and footnote omitted). The plaintiff need not prove

his case, but must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id. at 570 (emphasis added). 

Additionally, “[w]hen considering a motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the

plaintiff’s complaint ‘are to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the

pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.’” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228,

1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting GSW, Inc. v. Long Cnty., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.

1993)). Further, all “reasonable inferences” are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. St. George

v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). However, “‘[u]nsupported

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Case 2:14-cv-01030-SLB Document 21 Filed 08/17/15 Page 2 of 11
conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have long been recognized not to prevent a Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal.’” Dalrymple v.Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11thCir. 2003) (quoting Marsh

v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, though the court

must accept all factual allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citation omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

A. DEFENDANT SUZANNE S. CHILDERS’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Suzanne S. Childers, a judge presiding in the Circuit Court of Jefferson

County, Alabama at the time of the alleged actions giving rise to plaintiff’s claims, moves

to dismiss all claims against her on the basis of immunity and moves to dismiss that part of

plaintiff’s Complaint barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. 11 at 1-2.)

“All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute

of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been

brought.” Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crowe v.

Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted). Alabama

imposes a two-year limitations period, so plaintiff must have brought his claims within two

years of the date the limitations period began to run. See id. The limitations period begins

running when “facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be

apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” McNair v. Allen, 515

3

Case 2:14-cv-01030-SLB Document 21 Filed 08/17/15 Page 3 of 11
F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff filed this action on June 1, 2014. (Doc. 1.) To the

extent the alleged actions in plaintiff’s Complaint occurred before June 1, 2012, claims

arising from those actions are time-barred.2

Plaintiff alleges that on June 6, 2012, defendant Childers entered a judgment holding

him in contempt of court for actions occurring on January 25, 2012. In this Circuit,

“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those

acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted

in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234,

1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “This immunity applies even

when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her

jurisdiction.” Id. Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his

judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted

a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers

or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the

judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the

judge in his judicial capacity. Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th

Cir. 1983).

Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Defendant Childers’s alleged conduct occurred in her judicial capacity and related

to divorce proceedings over which she had jurisdiction. Therefore, to the extent plaintiff

seeks money damages from defendant Childers for this conduct, plaintiff’s claims are due

to be dismissed based on absolute judicial immunity. Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff is

2

 While equitable tolling may prevent a limitations period from beginning to run in

“extraordinary circumstances,” plaintiff has not alleged any grounds for tolling the

statute of limitations, nor do any appear from the pleadings. See Thomas v. Allred, Civil

Action No. 2:12-cv-227-AKK, 2012 WL 5379179, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 26, 2012)

(citation omitted). 

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Case 2:14-cv-01030-SLB Document 21 Filed 08/17/15 Page 4 of 11
seeking declaratoryor injunctive relief, such reliefis unavailable under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine barring “cases brought bystate-court losers complaining of injuries caused bystatecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Green v. Jefferson County

Commission, 563 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). In any event, plaintiff’s claim is moot, given

that the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed defendant Childers’s June 15, 2012 order

holding plaintiff in contempt for actions he took at a proceeding on January 25, 2012. See

White v. White, 124 So. 3d 734, 738 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).

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Case 2:14-cv-01030-SLB Document 21 Filed 08/17/15 Page 5 of 11
The remaining allegation in plaintiff’s Complaint3

states that someone told plaintiff

that defendant Childers posted comments about plaintiff’s divorce proceedings on her

Facebook page. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges the comments contained incorrect statements

about what occurred during the proceedings, including a statement that plaintiff brandished

3

 Plaintiff attempts to raise allegations that are not included in his Complaint in his

Response to Defendant[‘]s Motion to Dismiss. (See Doc. 15.) Plaintiff also filed

Document 13, styled as an objection to defendant Childers’s Motion to Dismiss and a

motion to appoint counsel, in which plaintiff attempts to assert additional allegations.

The additional “allegations” are not part of the Complaint, and there is no indication that

either document is intended as an Amended Complaint. Nevertheless, even if the court

were to consider the additional allegations as part of the Complaint, all of the allegations

fail to state a claim and/or meet the applicable statute of limitations. For example,

plaintiff alleges that paramedics arrived at the courthouse to transport him to a hospital

after he began having a heart attack. (Doc. 13 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant

Childers told the paramedics to delay taking plaintiff until she “c[a]me back with a court

order ordering [plaintiff] back to court” if he left the hospital and that this delay took

thirty minutes. (Id.) 

The court takes judicial notice of the facts relating to this incident, as stated by the

Alabama Court of Civil Appeals in White v. White, 124 So. 3d 734 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).

See Fed. R. Evid. 201. There, the court stated,

After one continuance, the trial in this matter began on May 30, 2012;

however, the circuit court's order, entered that same day, reveals that the

husband had informed the court that he became ill after the trial began and

that an ambulance was called to transport the husband to a hospital. The

circuit court's order required that if the husband was released from the

hospital that same day, he was to immediately return to the circuit court and,

if not, that the trial would resume on June 6, 2012.

Id. at 735 (emphasis added). To the extent plaintiff attempts to state a claim against

defendant Childers for depriving plaintiff of medical care, (and regardless of whether that

claim is viable), that claim would be barred by the statute of limitations, as plaintiff’s

allegations relate to events occurring on May 30, 2012, and thus, outside the two-year

limitations period.

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Case 2:14-cv-01030-SLB Document 21 Filed 08/17/15 Page 6 of 11
a firearm. (Id.) In plaintiff’s Response, plaintiff correctly asserts that defendant Childers was

not performing judicial duties when she allegedly wrote incorrect statements about plaintiff

on Facebook. (Doc. 15 at 2.) Therefore, judicial immunitydoes not shield defendant Childers

from this allegation. However, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to assert a defamation

claim, such a claim is not properly brought under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment,

given the facts alleged by plaintiff. A mere claim for defamation, absent additional

governmental action, does not state a claim under § 1983. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 694,

710 (1976). Therefore, plaintiff’s alleged claim for defamation, ifsuch a claim was intended,

is due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, all claims against defendant

Childers are due to be dismissed. 

B. BIRMINGHAM FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Birmingham Fire and Rescue Service (hereafter “defendant BFRS”)

moves to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint on the basis that it is not a legal entity subject to suit.

(Doc. 10 at 1-2.) “Sheriff’s departments and police departments are not usually considered

legal entities subject to suit.” Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992)

(citations omitted). Under Alabama law, a police department is not a suable entity under state

law or § 1983. Seltzer v. Mobile City Police Dept., Civil Action No. 07-0383-WS-M, 2008

WL 3852679, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2008) (citation omitted). Similarly, defendant BFRS,

as a division or department of the City of Birmingham, is not a suable entity, and as such, all

claims against defendant BFRS are due to be dismissed. 

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Case 2:14-cv-01030-SLB Document 21 Filed 08/17/15 Page 7 of 11
Defendant BFRS also moves to dismiss claims brought against it for plaintiff’s failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court finds this additional ground for

dismissal meritorious. Even assuming plaintiff could sue defendant BFRS, plaintiff failed

to state any constitutional deprivation by defendant BFRS. Plaintiff makes no allegations

regarding defendant BFRS in his Complaint. (See Doc. 1.) Even if the court considered the

allegations in Document 13 that paramedics arrived at the courthouse to transport plaintiff

to the hospital and delayed his transportation for thirty minutes, as discussed above, those

allegations occurred on May 30, 2012, which is outside the two-year limitations period. 

Finally, defendant BFRS moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for lack of proper

service. (Doc. 10 at 2.) Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2) provides, “A state, a municipal corporation,

or any other state-created governmental organization that is subject to suit must be served by:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or

(B) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state'slaw for serving a summons

or like process on such a defendant.” Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(8) states that

service of process upon a local government must be effected “by serving the chief executive

officer or the clerk, or other person designated by appointment or by statute to receive service

of process . . . .” Because plaintiffserved defendant BFRS directly, plaintiff failed to perfect

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Case 2:14-cv-01030-SLB Document 21 Filed 08/17/15 Page 8 of 11
service according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the foregoing reasons,

plaintiff’s claims against defendant BFRS are due to be dismissed.

4

C. PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT

Plaintiff seeks leave of the court to amend his Complaint to add a party, previously

listed as a “Fictitious Defendant,” to this action. In both the Motion to Amend Complaint,

(Doc. 16), and the Amended Motion to Amend Complaint, (Doc. 17), which are virtually

identical, plaintiffstates that he wants to add “the true party to this cause of action,” but does

not identify “the true party” in either Motion, or state any facts supporting a claim against

that party. (Doc. 16 at 1; see also Doc. 17 at 1.)

Even if plaintiff had identified the party he seeks to add, all claims against that party

are time-barred. Plaintiff states he is bringing a motion to amend pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), which governs amendments other than those made as a matter

of course. Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with the

opposing party's written consent or the court's leave,” and that “[t]he court should freely give

leave when justice so requires.” However, the issue is not whether the court will grant

plaintiff leave to amend, but whether plaintiff can amend. 

Replacing a fictitious party with a specifically-named defendant is “a change in the

parties sued.” Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1102-03 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled on other

4

 Upon a review of the entire record, the court finds that allowing plaintiff to

replead his claims against defendant Childers and defendant BFRS would be futile. 

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Case 2:14-cv-01030-SLB Document 21 Filed 08/17/15 Page 9 of 11
grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff moved to amend his

Complaint to replace a fictitious party with a new party on March 3, 2015 and again on

March 18, 2015. (Docs. 16 and 17.) Because all of the allegations in plaintiff’s Complaint

occurred in 2012,5plaintiff filed his motion to add the new party after the statute of

limitations for plaintiff’s claims ran. Therefore, plaintiff’s claims against the new party

would have to relate back to the original Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(c) to survive. Wayne, 197 F.3d at 1103. However, plaintiff’s claims cannot relate back

because, in the Eleventh Circuit, replacing a “John Doe” defendant with a real party does not

satisfy the requirement that a plaintiff must have made “a mistake concerning the proper

party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see Wayne, 197 F.3d at 1103 (stating that the

plaintiff’s “lack of knowledge regarding the identities of the [“John Doe” defendants] was

not ‘a mistake concerning the identity of the property party’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15)6;

Williams v. Grieg Shipping A/S, 219 F.R.D. 537, 539 (S.D. Ala 2003). Although courts

liberally construe the complaints of pro se litigants, “[l]iberal construction does not mean

liberal deadlines.” Wayne, 197 F.3d at 1104 (citing Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780

5

 The court also takes judicial notice of this fact from White v. White, 124 So. 3d

734 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). White states the dates of the divorce proceedings over which

defendant Childers presided, all of which occurred in 2012. Id.

6

 While Wayne v. Jarvis refers to Rule 15(c)(3), which is the previous version of

Rule 15(c)(1)(C), there are no substantive differences in the two versions of the Rule and

the difference is wording is minimal. 

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(11th Cir. 1993)). Therefore, plaintiff’s Motions to Amend are due to be denied, and all

claims against “Fictitious Defendants A-F” are due to be dismissed with prejudice. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Suzanne S. Childers’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc.

11), and defendant Birmingham Fire and Rescue Service’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 10), are

due to be granted, and plaintiff’s Motions to Amend his Complaint, (Docs. 16 and 17), are

due to be denied. This case is due to be dismissed with prejudice. An order in accordance will

be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.

DONE this 17th day of August, 2015.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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