Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00456/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00456-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER LEE PEARSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

L. E. SCRIBNER, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:07-cv-00456-AWI-TAG HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

FOR UNTIMELINESS [Doc. 1]

ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE TO

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WITHIN

TWENTY DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND

On or about March 22, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant petition. In the petition, Petitioner

contends that his Three Strikes sentence violates federal due process. (Id.). 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Screening.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary review

of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears

from the face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing 2254 Cases; Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). The Advisory

Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus,

either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an

answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

Case 1:07-cv-00456-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 01/09/08 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte

a habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner

adequate notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. 

B. Statute of Limitations.

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). As the instant petition was filed on

or about March 22, 2007, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In this case, Petitioner was convicted on August 15, 2000. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Petitioner filed a

direct review of his conviction, which terminated with the California Supreme Court denying his

Case 1:07-cv-00456-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 01/09/08 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 Although Petitioner does not list the date of the denial of his Petition for Review, the Court has 1

determined the proper date from the California state courts’ electronic database.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 3

Petition for Review on March 20, 2002. Petitioner’s state court judgment would have become final 1

ninety days after that date, or June 18, 2002, when the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari

in the United States Supreme Court expired. Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.

2001); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner would then have had one year from that date, or until June 18, 2003, absent

applicable tolling, to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

governs the calculation of statutory tolling applicable to the one year limitations period.) 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In this

case, Petitioner alleges that he filed habeas petitions at each level of the state courts, beginning with

the Superior Court for the County of Tulare. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Petitioner does not indicate the date on

which he filed the Superior Court petition, which was denied on October 20, 2005; however, the

Superior Court’s ruling indicates that the petition was filed “5 years after [Petitioner’s] trial and

sentencing [in 2000].” (Doc. 1, p. 23). 

As mentioned, the statute of limitations would have expired on June 18, 2003, at least

eighteen months before Petitioner would have filed his first state habeas petition. A petitioner is not

entitled to tolling where, as here, the limitations period has already run prior to filing a state habeas

petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000); see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d

1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)(same); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (petitioner fails to

exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year limitations period). 

Accordingly, the instant petition appears to be untimely. If Petitioner has information that would

entitle him to additional statutory tolling, he should provide that information in his response to this

Order To Show Cause. 

///

Case 1:07-cv-00456-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 01/09/08 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

ORDER

Therefore, Petitioner is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why the instant petition should not be

dismissed for violating the limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner is GRANTED

twenty (20) days from the date of service of this order to respond. 

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to comply will result in Findings and Recommendations

recommending that the petition be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:07-cv-00456-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 01/09/08 Page 4 of 4