Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00090/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jason Beck, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Richard Bock, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV11-0090-TUC-RCC (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Jason Beck’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of Practice 

of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On February 10, 1998, Beck and his co-defendant, Kevin Craig, were indicted 

on charges of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and 

kidnapping in relation to the killing of David Nickell. Answer, Ex. Q. Both 

defendants were tried simultaneously before separate juries and Beck was convicted 

of first-degree murder (felony murder) and kidnapping. Id., Ex. A, p. 2. He was 

sentenced to natural life in prison on the murder conviction and to a concurrent, 

aggravated, ten-year prison term for the kidnapping conviction. Id. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarized the factual background of his convictions as follows: 

 In January 1998, while driving on a dirt road around midnight 

near Redington Pass just outside Tucson, a passerby and his passenger 

found the victim’s body by the side of the road and immediately called 

police. Pima County Sheriff’s Deputy Molchan testified that he had 

responded to the call and that, when he had arrived at the scene, he had 

noted that the victim’s hands had been bound with gray duct tape. Tire 

tracks near the body were subsequently determined to be of a similar 

tread pattern to the tires that belonged to codefendant Kevin Craig’s 

mother. The victim had sustained multiple sharp-force wounds in the 

neck and trunk areas of his body. Two neck wounds, one a sliced 

jugular vein and the other a sliced trachea, had likely caused the 

victim’s death. 

 At the time the victim was murdered, Matthew Kuiper and 

Aimee Morris were sharing a Tucson apartment, which, at previous 

times, they had also shared with [Beck], Craig, and the victim. The 

victim was still living there part-time, but [Beck] and Craig were not. 

Earlier in the day on which the victim’s body was found, [Beck] and 

Craig had gone to the apartment, and Craig had asked Kuiper where 

they could find or how they could contact the victim. Kuiper had asked 

why, and Craig had responded that “they wanted to get him” because 

the victim had tried to break into [Beck’s] car and take his stereo 

system. Kuiper refused to help them find the victim. [Beck] and Craig 

then had asked Morris, who gave Craig the victim’s pager number. 

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 That evening, the victim, who was with his girlfriend, received a 

telephone call from [Beck] and Craig. The two picked up the victim a 

while later in Craig’s mother’s car. The three later returned to the 

apartment, the victim went back inside for money for gasoline, and the 

three left again. Close to midnight, [Beck] and Craig retuned to Kuiper 

and Morris’s apartment. As they walked through the living room to the 

bathroom, Kuiper noticed that Craig was concealing his hands and 

forearms underneath his shirt and that [Beck] was immediately behind 

him, carrying a backpack. 

 Kuiper followed the two to the bathroom, knocked on the closed 

door, and forced it open when they did not respond. Craig had tried to 

keep Kuiper form entering. Once inside, Kuiper saw that Craig’s right 

hand and wrist were covered with blood, that there was blood spattered 

to his right elbow, and that Craig was washing blood off his hands and 

arm. He was also washing a knife. [Beck] was sitting on the toilet, 

wiping his boots and telling Craig he needed to get the blood off them. 

Kuiper saw the victim’s knife on the floor near [Beck’s] left foot. 

Kuiper asked the two what had happened. Craig first said they had had 

a fight with the victim and had “cut’ him. Craig then looked at [Beck], 

however, and said, “We killed [the victim].” During a recorded 

interview by defense counsel, a transcript which was attached to 

[Beck’s] motion in limine, Kuiper related that [Beck] had just laughed 

and smiled; Kuiper characterized the laugh as “an evil snicker.” At 

trial, Kuiper testified that [Beck] not only laughed and smiled, but had 

nodded his head repeatedly. 

 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 4-6. 

 Beck appealed his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred when it 

refused to give his requested jury instruction on second-degree murder, admitted a 

hearsay statement made by his codefendant, and either denied his motion for 

judgment of acquittal on the felony-murder charge or failed to dismiss the felonymurder charge on the ground “the offense of kidnapping . . . merged with the 

murder.” Beck also argued that the jury selection process was flawed, the trial court 

abused its discretion in imposing a natural life prison term, A.R.S. § 13-703(A) was 

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unconstitutional, and that the reasonable doubt instruction given by the court was 

unconstitutional. Id., Ex. A., p. 2; Ex. B (Brief on Appeal). On September 25, 2001, 

the Court of Appeals affirmed Beck’s conviction in an unpublished memorandum 

decision. Id., Ex. A. 

 The Arizona Supreme Court granted review and vacated Beck’s natural life 

sentence because the trial court had used the statutory aggravating factors for capital 

cases. State v Viramontes (Beck), 204 Ariz. 360, 362 (2003). On remand, the trial 

court imposed concurrent sentences, the longest of which is life with the possibility 

of release in 25 years. Answer, Ex. C. Beck did not appeal his sentence. 

 On August 10, 2005, Beck filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

with the Pima County Superior Court pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P., and on 

November 20, 2006, filed an Amended Petition/Additional Claims. Answer, Exs. D, 

E. Beck asserted a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on numerous alleged 

violations of disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

He also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to adequately 

investigate and confront witnesses Morris, Kuiper and Wimmer; (2) refusing to call 

another of Beck’s cellmates as a witness; (3) failing to adequately litigate the 

inadmissibility of Kuiper’s testimony about Beck’s silence; (4) failing to rebut the 

government’s motive evidence and to call character witnesses; (5) failing to urge 

alternative defenses; and (6) failing to object to “burden-shifting” during the State’s 

closing argument. Id., Ex. D, pp. 12-24. After allowing discovery on Beck’s Brady

claims and conducting a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court, in a ruling 

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filed on December 11, 2007, denied each of Beck’s claims on the merits. Id., Exs. F, 

G. On January 25, 2008, the trial court denied Beck’s motion for reconsideration. 

Id., Ex. H (unnumbered attachment). 

 On September 17, 2008, Beck filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals reasserting his claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on Brady 

violations and also raising six claims that his counsel was ineffective based on his 

failure to: (1) adequately investigate and confront witnesses Morris, Kuiper, and 

Wimmer; (2) offer alternative defenses; (3) rebut the government’s motive evidence 

and to call character witnesses; (4) call another of Beck’s cellmates as a witness; (5) 

adequately litigate the inadmissibility of Kuiper’s testimony about Beck’s silence; 

and (6) object to “burden-shifting” during the State’s closing argument. Id., Ex. H. 

In a Memorandum Decision filed on August 28, 2009, the Court of Appeals granted 

review but adopted the trial court’s ruling and denied relief. Id., Ex. I. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals denied Beck’s motion for reconsideration. Id., Exs. J, K. Beck 

then petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Id., Ex. L. By letter dated March 3, 

2010, review was denied. Id., Ex. M. 

 In the petition now before the Court, Beck raises eight claims. In Ground I, he 

alleges that his conviction was in violation of his rights to a fair trial, due process and 

Brady v. Maryland. In Ground II, he alleges that his conviction violated his right to 

due process and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Ground III, he alleges 

ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s failure to adequately investigate and 

impeach the prosecution’s star witnesses. In Ground IV, he alleges ineffective 

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assistance based on his counsel’s failure to understand felony murder and present 

appropriate theories of defense. Ground V alleges ineffective assistance based on the 

failure to present witnesses to rebut the State’s motive evidence. In Ground VI, he 

alleges ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s failure to adequately challenge 

the admission of his adoptive statement and by failing to present evidence of Beck’s 

character trait for reticence. In Ground VII, Beck alleges that his counsel was 

ineffective for not objecting to the prosecution’s “burden-shifting.” In Ground VIII, 

he alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and challenge 

witness Joshua Wimmer’s testimony. Petition, pp. 3-10. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. The Petition is Timely 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Under these standards, Beck had one year from March 3, 2010, which was the 

date on which the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of his PCR petition, to file 

the instant petition. As Respondents recognize, the petition was timely filed on 

February 2, 2011. 

 B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 Respondents contend that all of Ground II and portions of Grounds VI, VII 

and VIII were not properly exhausted and are procedurally barred from habeas 

review. A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through 

the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

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claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

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trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the 

state court all the facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim 

or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 28 (2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

 Claims may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review 

in a variety of circumstances. If a state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise the claim in 

state court review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). Arizona courts have been consistent 

in the application of the state’s procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Cirm.P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent 

procedural bar). In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on 

either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review 

because any attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the 

claims fit into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

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days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 

860; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and 

preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim 

unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual 

prejudice, or establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of 

review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a 

petitioner must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his 

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference 

or reasonable unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s procedural 

rules or lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a 

petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

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constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Alternatively, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim where a petitioner can establish that a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” would otherwise result. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exists when a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent. Id. 

 1. Analysis of Claims

 a. Grounds II and VII 

In Ground II, Beck alleges that his conviction violated his right to due process 

and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Petition, p. 4. The basis of the claim, as 

explained in Beck’s reply and in his PCR petition, is the prosecution’s alleged Brady 

violations and the trial court’s refusal to allow him to undertake discovery on these 

claims. Reply, pp. 18-22; Answer, Ex. H, pp. 13-16. In Beck’s PCR proceedings, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals found that, to the extent Beck alleges prosecutorial 

misconduct at trial, based on Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3), “his claims are waived and 

precluded by his failure to have raised them at trial and on appeal.” Answer, Ex. I, p. 

6 n. 4. Rule 32.2(a)(3) constitutes an independent and adequate state ground 

justifying a procedural default. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). 

Beck offers nothing in his reply to rebut the Respondents’ position and, as such, 

Ground II is procedurally defaulted. 

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 The same analysis applies to a portion of Ground VII. In that claim, Beck 

asserts that his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to 

a fair trial were violated because his “statement was obtained in violation of burdenshifting and vouching and trial counsel committed Strickland error by failing to 

object to the prosecution’s burden-shifting.” Petition, p. 9. In his PCR petition, 

Beck raised this claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Answer, Ex. H, p. 29. As it did with Ground II, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals found the claim of prosecutorial misconduct precluded by Rule 32.2(a)(3). 

Answer, Ex. I, p. 6 n. 4. As such, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 

exhausted, but the claim of prosecutorial misconduct was not. 

 b. Ground VI 

 Respondents also contend that a portion of Ground VI is procedurally 

defaulted. In that claim, Beck alleges that his codefendant’s statement was 

inadmissible hearsay and was not properly admitted into evidence as an adopted 

admission by Beck. He asserts that its admission resulted from his counsel’s 

ineffective assistance and violated the confrontation clause and Bruton v. United 

States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that 

Beck: 

contends for the first time that admission of the statement violated 

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 

(1968), and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. As the 

state correctly points out, not only did [Beck] waive this claim by 

failing to present it squarely to the trial court, see State v. Calabrese, 

157 Ariz. 189, 755 P.2d 1177 (App. 1988), but Bruton does not apply 

here. 

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Answer, Ex. A, p. 8. 

 In State v. Calabrese, 157 Ariz. 189 (App. 1988) and the case upon which it 

relies, State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526 (1981), the Arizona courts determined that issues 

not timely raised in the trial court are waived on appeal. See Rule 16.1(c), 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. Thus, as Respondents contend, the decision of the Arizona Court of 

Appeals rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal questions and 

adequate to support it. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). 

However, as Respondents also recognize, Beck did raise this claim as a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, that part of the claim is exhausted. 

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 c. Ground VIII 

Ground VIII of the Petition addresses the testimony of Joshua Wimmer. At 

trial, Wimmer testified that he was in jail with Beck and that, while they were there, 

they spoke to each other daily, often through the vent that ran between their cells. 

Answer, Ex. V, pp. 14-15, 18. Wimmer testified that during one of their 

conversations through the vent, Beck said: 

that him and another male tricked this guy into going up to Reddington 

Pass with them. And he said that it was obvious that he had to have 

help from his friend to tie him up because one person couldn’t tie him 

up. But he at that time admitted that he was the one that stabbed him 

several times. 

Id., Ex. V, p. 25. 

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 In the Petition, Beck alleges that his trial counsel “failed to adequately 

investigate and challenge Wimmer’s credibility by confronting Wimmer about his 

clear motive to lie and by failing to call a defense witness who would have rebutted 

the substance of Wimmer’s testimony.” Petition, p. 10. Respondents contend that 

Beck did not allege in his PCR proceeding that his counsel failed to confront 

Wimmer about his motive to lie and, therefore, that portion of the claim is not 

exhausted. Answer, p. 14. While new bases for ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims that were not raised in the state proceedings are not exhausted, Moormann v. 

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005), the distinction between the claim Beck 

raised in his PCR petition and the claim he raises here is a bit too fine to support a 

finding that the claim is not exhausted. The PCR petition can be fairly read to claim 

ineffective assistance in relation to the entirety of the cross-examination of Wimmer 

by Beck’s counsel. Thus, this claim should be considered exhausted and be reviewed 

on its merits. 

 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 Respondents contend and Beck does not contradict, that Beck is procedurally 

barred from now raising Ground II and the unexhausted portions of Grounds VI and 

VII in State court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded 

from relief under [Rule 32] based upon any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, 

on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.”) Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, the merits of the claims need not be addressed 

unless Beck establishes cause and prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of 

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justice has occurred. In his reply, Beck does not argue that cause and prejudice exist 

in this case and, therefore, the claims are not subject to review. 

C. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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 1. Grounds I and III 

In Ground I, Beck alleges that his conviction was in violation of his rights to a 

fair trial, due process and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the 

prosecutor failed to disclose impeachment evidence relevant to the testimony of 

Kuiper and Morris. In Ground III, he alleges ineffective assistance based on his 

counsel’s failure to adequately investigate Kuiper and Morris’ backgrounds so they 

could be effectively impeached. Under both theories, Beck’s contention is that the 

testimony of Kuiper and Morris led to his conviction and he alleges that Brady 

material relevant to these witnesses went undisclosed. Reply, p. 14. According to 

Beck, the prosecution “never explained how the wealth of impeaching evidence 

available in Morris’ juvenile records was never disclosed.” This evidence includes 

“juvenile convictions, probation status, drug use, [and] false denial of drug use 

during her defense interview . . . .” Id. 

 Addressing Beck’s Brady/Strickland claims, the trial court found no prejudice 

resulted. Answer, Ex. G. The trial court first noted that after “extensive discovery” 

and “ample court time,” Beck had failed to establish his theories of prosecutorial 

misconduct. Id., p. 1. The court also noted that although the evidentiary hearing was 

directed at Beck’s Strickland claims, he was nevertheless permitted to examine the 

witnesses about his Brady claims. Id. Addressing the latter claims, the court stated: 

 [Beck’s] Rule 32 counsel argues that [Beck’s trial counsel] Mr. 

Bock’s cross examination of key witnesses was so ineffective that 

[Beck’s] right to effective trial counsel was unsatisfied. At the 

evidentiary hearing counsel for [Beck] had the opportunity to 

demonstrate the results of the cross examination he advocates. Ami 

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Morris testified and denied any special treatment by the county 

attorney’s office or ill feeling towards [Beck]. Matt Kuiper was 

located, testified and did confirm that he believed pending charges 

were resolved because of his status as a state’s witness. This was the 

only significant point supporting [Beck’s] position. 

Answer, Ex. G, p. 2. After discussing the potential testimony of another potential 

witness, the trial court concluded that “[t]he record here is not the rare one where 

additional impeachment would probably have changed the jury’s verdict.” Id., p. 3. 

 In adopting the trial court’s resolution of this claim, the Court of Appeals 

stated: 

 On review, Beck essentially restates the claims he raised below. 

He contends the trial court erred in relying on evidence other than the 

testimony of Aimee [Morris], Matt [Kuiper], and Joshua [Wimmer] in 

concluding that Beck had not been prejudiced by either the alleged 

Brady violations or the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. 

To determine whether a conviction must be reversed because either 

Brady violations or incompetent performance by counsel prejudiced the 

defense, the inquiry is the same: whether there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for the alleged violations or errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. See State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 

562, [568], 146 P.3d 63, 69 (2006) (establishing prejudice for claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel requires demonstration of “’reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different’”), quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694; State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 287, 908 P.2d 1062, 1072 

(1996) (“[Exculpatory e]vidence is material only if there is a 

reasonable probability that disclosure of the evidence to the defense 

would have changed the outcome of the proceeding.”). The court’s 

findings are consistent with this required analysis. 

Answer, Ex. I, pp. 7-8 (footnotes omitted). 

 The state courts’ resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an 

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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Assuming the impeachment evidence at 

issue was not disclosed by the prosecutor in violation of Brady, or was not 

discovered by his own counsel in violation of Strickland, Beck was required, as the 

state courts found, to establish prejudice. To establish a Brady violation, “[t]he 

evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or 

because it is impeaching; the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either 

willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 

U.S. at 281-82; Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 509 (9th Cri. 2010). To establish 

prejudice under Brady, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, had the 

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Similarly, under Strickland, a petitioner must prove that his counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he suffered 

prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Establishing 

prejudice requires a petitioner to demonstrate that a reasonable probability exists that, 

but for counsel’s error, the result would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694. The 

court is not required to determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient 

before determining whether petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged 

deficiencies. 466 U.S. at 697 (“if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on 

the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.”). A 

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review of the trial evidence fully supports a finding that the state court reasonably 

concluded that Beck was not prejudiced under these standards. 

 Aimee Morris testified that she and Matthew Kuiper were living together and 

that Beck, Craig, and the victim, David Nickell, had also previously lived with them 

in their apartment. Answer, Ex. V, pp. 140, 142. Morris and Kuiper both recalled 

that Beck and Craig had come to the apartment in the afternoon of January 26, 1998. 

Id., Ex. V, pp. 145, 147-148; Ex. W, p. 67. Kuiper was in the bedroom at the time 

and both Craig and Beck went into the bedroom and Craig asked Kuiper if he knew 

where Nickell was or how he could contact him. Id., Ex. W, p. 68. Kuiper asked 

Craig why he was looking for Nickell, and Craig said “because he wanted to get 

him,” and both Craig and Beck claimed that Nickell tried to break into Beck’s car 

and steal a stereo system. Id., pp. 70-71. After Kuiper told them he would not give 

them Nickell’s pager number, they both stormed out of the room and went to speak 

to Morris. Id., pp. 71-72. Morris gave them the pager number and Craig and Beck 

then left the apartment. Id., Ex. V, pp. 148-149. 

 Tiffany Spivey, Nickell’s girlfriend, testified that Nickell, who was staying 

with Spivey, got a phone call at about 7:00 p.m. that evening. Answer, Ex. V, p. 110. 

Nickell got dressed. Id., p. 111. Beck and Craig then arrived at the apartment and 

Nickell left with them in a maroon colored vehicle. Id., Ex. V, p. 111. Spivey had 

seen the car previously and knew it belonged to Craig’s mother, Krystal. Id., p. 114. 

After getting a call from the victim at about 9:00 p.m., Spivey recalled that the three 

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returned to her apartment to get money for gas. Id., p. 115-116. Spivey did not see 

or talk to the victim again after he left with Beck and Craig. Id., p. 116. 

 Morris and Kuiper next saw Craig and Beck sometime before midnight that 

night when they returned to Morris and Kuiper’s apartment. Id., Ex. V, p. 149; Ex. 

W, pp. 72-73. Craig entered the apartment first, with his hands underneath his shirt, 

followed closely by Beck, who was carrying a backpack. Id., Ex. V, p. 151; Ex. W, 

p. 73. Both of them rushed to the master bathroom and closed themselves inside the 

bathroom. Id., Ex. V, pp. 151-152, 179; Ex. W. pp. 73-74. Kuiper followed them 

back to the bathroom to find out what was going on, but the door was shut and there 

was no response to his knock on the door. Id., Ex. W, p. 76. He then tried to force 

his way into the bathroom and, after overcoming Craig’s resistance, forced his way 

into the bathroom. Id., Ex. W, p. 77. Morris also followed, but when she reached the 

bathroom, they had already slammed the door preventing her from entering. Id., Ex. 

V, p. 153. At that time, she heard Beck “say something about getting rid of some 

clothes.” Id., Ex. V, p. 154. 

 Kuiper, who was then inside the bathroom with Beck and Craig, saw that 

Craig was washing blood from his right hand and arm and from a knife. Id., Ex. W, 

p. 78. Beck was sitting on the toilet seat telling Craig he needed to get the blood off 

his boots. Id., Ex. W, pp. 79, 128. Kuiper also saw a knife, which Kuiper recognized 

as belonging to Nickell, on the floor next to Beck. Id., Ex. W, p. 80. Kuiper asked 

the two what they had done and Craig initially told him that they had found Nickell 

at a Wal-Mart, got into a fight with him, and cut him. Craig said Nickell then got 

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into a car “and took off with some friends.” Id., Ex. W, pp. 81-82. Believing that 

there was too much blood for a “cut and run,” Kuiper kept asking what they had 

done. Eventually, Craig said to Beck, “We killed [Nickell].” Id., Ex. W, pp. 82, 

114-115. Beck responded by laughing, smiling and repeatedly nodding his head. Id. 

 After five or ten minutes, Morris had another man who was at the apartment 

bust the door down to get Kuiper out and to find out exactly what was going on. Id., 

Ex. V, p. 155. As the door opened, Craig slammed it closed again. Id., Ex. V, pp. 

155-156. However, while the door was open, Morris saw Craig washing blood off 

his hands in the sink with Beck sitting on the toilet seat. Id., Ex. V, p. 156-157. 

After a few more minutes, Kuiper told the two to leave and Beck and Craig together 

left the apartment. Id., Ex. V, p. 157; Ex. W, p. 84. 

 At trial, Criminologist Ronald Bridgemon testified that tire impressions found 

in Redington Pass near the victim’s body were similar in size and tread design to 

those on the car Beck was known to be driving the night of the murder. Answer, Ex. 

V, p. 97. Officer James Gamber transported Beck to jail the night he was arrested 

and Beck asked Gamber “as to what would happen to a person in a hypothetical 

situation who wanted someone to be beaten up and the second party of the assault 

killed the person who was scared.” Answer, Ex. V, 136-137. 

 During the hearing on Beck’s PCR claims, Morris repeatedly denied receiving 

any special treatment from the prosecution. Answer, Exs. FF, pp. 46-68; GG, pp. 21-

23, 36-40. She admitted using marijuana and methamphetamine from July 1997 until 

the time of the murder in January 1998, but said she was not a daily user. Id., Ex. FF, 

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pp. 35-36, 39. At the time of Beck’s trial, Morris was on juvenile probation for 

passing a bad check. Id., Ex. FF, pp. 32-33, 46-48, 56-58, 61; Ex. JJ, pp. 43-44, 92-

93. As for Kuiper, he testified that he thought a misdemeanor auto theft charge 

against him “was resolved” by a no contest plea because he had agreed to testify, but 

clarified that he assumed the plea was related but that no guarantees were made and 

that “no one offered [him] anything.” Id., Ex. G, p. 2; Ex. JJ, pp. 39, 112, 128-133. 

Kuiper also admitted to heavy methamphetamine and cocaine use in the months 

before the murder. Id., Ex. JJ, pp. 45-48. He also indicated that the prosecutor had 

talked to him about “witness protection,” id., Ex. JJ, p. 62, but that nothing was ever 

promised. Id., Ex. JJ, p. 112. 

 Considering this potential impeachment evidence against the background of 

the testimony elicited at trial, it was not unreasonable for the state courts to find that 

Beck was not prejudiced by either the prosecutor’s alleged Brady violation or his 

counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in cross-examining Morris and Kuiper. The 

strongest impeachment evidence that went unused was Kuiper’s drug use, and that 

evidence is not as strong as Beck suggests it is. At the Rule 32 hearing, Kuiper 

admitted to drug use, but indicated that he had begun to try to go straight beginning 

about a month before Nickell’s murder. Answer, Ex. JJ, p. 47. More important, 

Kuiper’s story was fully consistent with that offered by Morris and Spivey. And, as 

the trial court determined, the jury’s guilty verdict on the kidnapping and felony 

murder counts was entirely consistent with the statement Beck made to Officer 

Gamber while he was being transported. The verdicts were also supported by 

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Criminologist Bridgemon’s determination that tread patterns left at the scene were 

consistent with those of the tires on the Honda Civic Beck and Craig were known to 

be driving. Finally, there was also the testimony from Joshua Wimmer that Beck, 

while in jail, admitted to his participation in tying up and stabbing Nickell. With this 

mountain of evidence working against him, this Court cannot conclude, as Beck 

contends, that the state courts reached an unreasonable conclusion in finding that the 

impeachment evidence he cites would not have changed the result of his trial. 

Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1110 (to establish prejudice under Brady, a petitioner must 

show a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 

(to establish prejudice a petitioner to demonstrate that a reasonable probability exists 

that, but for counsel’s error, the result would have been different). As such, Grounds 

I and III do not merit relief. 

 2. Remaining Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 

The remaining claims, which are comprised of Grounds IV, V, VIII and the 

exhausted portions of Grounds VI and VII, are all based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The operative legal standard applicable to the these remaining claims is a 

familiar one, addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The standards enunciated there by the Court are 

applied unless there is other Supreme Court precedent directly on point. See Wright 

v. Van Patten, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746 (2008). Under Strickland, Beck must show both 

deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s representation 

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was ineffective. 466 U.S. at 687. Deficient performance is established by a 

petitioner’s showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91 (2000) (citing Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Id. The review of counsel’s performance 

must be “highly deferential” and must adopt counsel’s perspective at the time of the 

challenged decision or conduct, in order to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

 Federal habeas rules also instruct that, if the state court has already rejected a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a federal habeas court may grant relief 

only if it finds the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standards. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 

(2003). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable assistance, id., and the Supreme Court had described federal 

review of a state court’s decision on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as 

“doubly deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112-113 (2009). 

 a. Ground IV 

 In Ground IV, Beck alleges ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s 

failure to understand felony murder and present appropriate theories of defense. 

Specifically, he contends that the defense presented, that he was not present when 

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Craig bound and killed Nickell, was not viable and that counsel should have argued 

in the alternative that, if Beck was present, he was only guilty of unlawful restraint 

and that the kidnapping was completed prior to Craig unexpectedly killing Nickell. 

Reply, p. 28. 

 Addressing this claim in Beck’s Rule 32 proceedings, the trial court found 

that: 

failing to argue in the alternative that petitioner was only guilty of 

unlawful imprisonment was not ineffective. This argument might look 

plausible in a Rule 32 petition but it has little likelihood of success 

before a jury. 

Answer, Ex. G, p. 4. The trial court then concluded that Beck had not established 

that his counsel was ineffective or that he had been prejudiced by the defense strategy 

or tactics. Id. The court of appeals adopted the trial court’s analysis. Id., Ex. I. 

 During the hearings on his Rule 32 petition, Beck’s counsel was asked if he 

ever contemplated the defense Beck now urges, and explained to Beck’s Rule 32 

counsel: 

Well, we talked about this, and your theory for a backup argument was 

that I should have asked for a lesser-included of false imprisonment, 

and the theory I did not feel was a good theory, as I discussed that with 

you. The way this person was duct taped, it certainly looked like he 

was moved without his consent, and I didn’t feel that was a good theory 

to be trying to get him a lesser-included of false imprisonment. 

 * * * 

And, you know, looking back at it, I still don’t think I made the wrong 

call even though Jason [Beck] has, you know, been convicted, I still 

don’t think I made the wrong call on this unlawful imprisonment. 

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 If you had tried the case, you might have the ability to argue it 

well, if he was present, he was – he only unlawfully imprisoned [Mr. 

Nickell], but sometimes inconsistent argument are very difficult to 

make. 

 * * * 

. . . there was no physical evidence to suggest that Jason [Beck] was 

even at the scene in terms of the State’s case in chief and their rebuttal, 

there was nothing to suggest that he was at the scene. 

Answer, Ex. Z, pp. 101-105. 

 Once counsel reasonably selects a defense, it is not deficient performance to 

fail to pursue alternative defenses. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Turk v. White, 116 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, defense counsel elected to 

present a defense consistent with the physical evidence which did not put Beck at the 

scene of the murder. The question is whether under the “doubly deferential” 

standards of the AEDPA the state courts’ finding that the decision to adopt that 

defense was not ineffective or prejudicial under Strickland was unreasonable. 

 Addressing first the effectiveness prong, this court cannot say counsel’s 

selection of a defense or the state courts’ finding on that point was unreasonable. 

Given the evidence presented at trial, there is no reason to believe that the defense 

Beck now urges could be considered a better choice even when viewed in hindsight. 

As set-out in more detail above, the testimonial and circumstantial evidence 

presented at trial set-out a pretty clear impression of Beck’s extensive role in 

Nickell’s murder. First, both Morris and Kuiper testified that Beck, by grinning and 

nodding, adopted Craig’s statement that “we killed Nickell.” Second, Beck as much 

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as admitted he was present during the murder when he asked Officer Gamber “what 

would happen to a person in a hypothetical situation who wanted someone to be 

beaten up and the second party of the assault killed the person who was scared.” 

Answer, Ex. V, 136-137. Third, Beck’s prison-mate, Wimmer, testified that Beck 

had admitted to binding Nickell and stabbing him. Fourth, all of the circumstantial 

evidence suggested that Beck and Craig remained together throughout the afternoon 

and evening. They first went to Kuiper’s apartment looking for Nickell, they were 

then seen twice by Nickell’s girlfriend, first when they picked Nickell up and again 

when they returned for gas money, and then lastly when they again showed up at 

Kuiper’s apartment just before midnight. 

 Faced with these facts, Beck’s trial counsel was required to decide whether he 

would argue Beck was not there; Beck was there, but was guilty only of unlawful 

imprisonment; or offer both possibilities and let the jury decide. None of these 

options are particularly attractive, but it was reasonable for counsel to choose the 

course he adopted for the defense. There was no physical evidence from the scene of 

the murder that conclusively established Beck was there. That factual situation 

enabled counsel to urge the jury to find that Beck had no role in the murder. 

 On the other hand, although Beck posits an alternative defense, he does not 

even attempt to explain how the evidence might support his assertion that a better 

defense would have been to argue he was guilty of only unlawful restraint or that ‘the 

kidnapping was completed prior to the co-defendant unexpectedly killing the 

decedent.” Reply, p. 28. As Beck himself notes, the prosecution “sneered at the 

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thought that [Craig] left [Beck], killed the decedent, retrieved [Beck], and then 

returned to Kuiper’s apartment to wash off the blood was ‘hogwash. That is 

absolutely false.’” Reply, p. 28 (citing Answer, Ex. X, pp. 32-39, 79-80, 82-83). 

What Beck fails to explain is how the alternative argument, that Beck was with Craig 

the entire time, would support the notion that he was guilty only of unlawful restraint 

or that the “kidnapping was completed” before Craig killed Nickell. Beck apparently 

believes it would have been a better approach to admit he was present during the 

course of the evening, but nevertheless expect the jury to somehow find him less 

culpable despite the statements he made to Officer Gamber and to prison-mate 

Wimmer. His argument is not compelling and supports neither the idea that his 

counsel’s selection of a defense was unreasonable, nor the assertion that the state 

courts’ decision on this claim was unreasonable. 

 The answer to that query determines not only whether Beck’s counsel was 

ineffective for choosing the defense presented at trial, but also determines if Beck 

suffered any prejudice. Simply put, if the defense chosen would have changed the 

outcome, Beck’s counsel was ineffective and prejudice resulted. Given the 

deferential standards of the AEDPA, this Court is unable to say that it was 

unreasonable for the state courts to find Beck was not prejudiced. As mentioned 

above, the testimonial and circumstantial evidence presented at trial set-out a pretty 

clear impression of Beck’s role in Nickell’s murder. 

 Moreover, presenting an alternative defense that admitted to Beck’s presence 

at the scene would have diluted the strength of the chosen defense because the 

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theories are mutually exclusive. As Beck’s trial counsel and the trial court 

recognized, presenting alternative theories often results in neither theory being 

believed by the jury. Had the alternative theory been presented in this case, the 

defense based on the lack of physical evidence would certainly have been rejected 

out of hand. Counsel made a reasonable decision in choosing to attack the State’s 

case based on the lack of physical evidence. See Turk v. White, 116 F.3d 1264, 

1266–67 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that once counsel reasonably selects a defense, 

failing to present an alternative and inconsistent defense is not ineffective assistance 

of counsel). 

 As for prejudice, as the preceding discussion suggests, it is unlikely that any 

potential defense other than that chosen by counsel would have changed the outcome 

of his trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Beck has simply not shown how his 

proposed defensive changes are supported by the evidence or how they would have 

swayed the jury. 

 b. Ground V 

 Ground V alleges ineffective assistance based on the failure to present 

witnesses to rebut the State’s motive theory that Nickell was targeted because he had 

tried to steal Beck’s car stereo. Respondents argue that “the record provides scant 

factual basis for these claims. Answer, p. 25. To his reply, Beck attached statements 

that he contends provide evidence to establish that Craig “was motivated to harm” 

Nickell, and that Beck was not. Reply, pp. 30-31. However, examination of the 

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testimony offered neither undermines the State’s motive theory, nor establishes that 

Craig had a motive other than that alleged. 

 The first statement is a partial transcription of Officer Gamber’s interview of 

Lara Nash. Reply, Ex. CCC-1 (Doc. 25-3). Nash was familiar with Beck, Craig, 

Nickell, Morris and Kuiper, was not an eyewitness to any of the events on the 

evening of Nickell’s death. She did state that Craig had Nickell pawned what she 

thought to be a stereo and that Craig was unhappy that Nickell had only received 

$10.00. Id., Ex. CCC-1, p. 3. After Craig got angry with Nickell about the stereo, 

Nickell threw $40.00 at him. Id. 

 John Mitchell, who was at the apartment with Morris and Kuiper when Beck 

and Craig returned the night of the murder, gave a statement to Deputy Egurrola of 

the Pima County Sheriff’s Department. Reply, Ex. DDD (Doc. No. 25-5). Beck 

claims that Mitchell confirmed that Craig and Nickell fought a few days before and 

also contradicted Morris’s statement that Beck and Craig went into the bathroom 

when they returned to the apartment sometime before midnight the night of the 

killing. Reply, p. 31. However, Mitchell only described an argument between Craig 

and Nickell, but did not know why the two were arguing. Reply, Ex. DDD, pp. 7-8. 

Mitchell’s statement is also consistent with Morris’s recollection that both Beck and 

Craig went to the bathroom when they returned to the apartment. Id. 

 Jacob Workman, who identified himself as Beck’s best friend, was also 

interviewed. Reply, Ex. AAA (Doc. 25-1). He was not in town when the murder 

happened, but he believed that Beck would not have killed Nickell. He did confirm 

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that the others who had been at the apartment told him consistent stories about what 

had occurred. Id., Ex. AAA, pp. 7-10. 

 Jessica Costello was interviewed and Beck contends she heard Kuiper and 

Morris assert that Craig was responsible for the homicide and that she contradicted 

the story about the two going to the bathroom. Reply, p. 31. However, Costello 

stated that she thought Beck helped Craig kill Nickell. Reply, Ex. BBB (Doc. 25-2), 

p. 33-34. 

 Even considering these statements collectively, they do little to contradict the 

State’s motive theory. Assuming that any of the statements other than Mitchell’s 

would not have been inadmissible hearsay, they offer very little that would have had 

little impact on the existing evidence. As Kuiper testified, Craig told him that he and 

Beck were looking for Nickell. Thus, the jury was aware that Craig had a motive to 

find Nickell. That Beck also had a motive was confirmed by Beck’s inquiry to 

Officer Gamber “as to what would happen to a person in a hypothetical situation who 

wanted someone to be beaten up and the second party of the assault killed the person 

who was scared.” Answer, Ex. V, 136-137. As such, Beck cannot show that his trial 

counsel was ineffective for not procuring this testimony or that he was prejudiced 

because it was not presented. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Harrington v. Richter, 131 

S.Ct. 770, 792 (2011) (“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not 

just conceivable.”) 

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 c. Ground VI 

 In Ground VI, Beck alleges ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s 

failure to adequately challenge the admission of his adoptive admission of Craig’s 

statement that they had killed Nickell, and by failing to present evidence of Beck’s 

character trait for reticence. Addressing the first part of this claim on direct appeal, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that trial counsel had filed a motion in limine to 

preclude the statement on hearsay grounds, but that, “[a]fter a hearing, the trial court 

found that [Beck] had adopted the statement by failing to deny it and concluded that 

the statement was not hearsay and was admissible as an admission by a party 

opponent, pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2) . . . .” Answer, Ex. A, p. 6. Thus, it is clear in 

the record that Beck’s counsel did challenge the admissibility of the statement. 

 Moreover, rather than finding that Beck adopted the admission by silence, as 

Beck asserts was the case, the State courts found that he adopted the statement by 

laughing and nodding his head. Id., Ex. A, p. 7. This finding is supported by 

Kuiper’s testimony at trial, id., Ex. W, pp. 82, 114-115, and thoroughly undermines 

not only Beck’s contentions that the trial court found he adopted the statement by 

silence, but also his contention that evidence of his reticence would have helped his 

case. Reticence may have provided an explanation for silence in response to the 

statement, but as the trial court determined, “would have been of very little value” 

and “would have in all likelihood backfired” in light of the fact that the statement 

was actively adopted with a manifestation of approval. Beck was neither the 

recipient of ineffective assistance nor subjected to prejudice due to his counsel’s 

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actions in relation to his adoption of Craig’s statement about killing Nickell. 

Accordingly, the State court’s determination was not an unreasonable application of 

the Strickland standards. 

 d. Ground VII 

 In Ground VII, Beck alleges that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting 

to the prosecution’s “burden-shifting.” As described in his petition on appeal filed in 

the State court and in his Reply here, the alleged “burden-shifting” to which he refers 

occurred in opening statements when the prosecutor purportedly stated that 

Wimmer’s testimony, that Beck had confessed to the murder while in jail, had 

nothing to do with a beneficial plea agreement he was offered. Reply, p. 33; Answer, 

Ex. H, p. 29. 

 What Beck describes in this claim is more akin to “vouching,” which is how 

he describes the prosecutor’s statement later in his argument, than to “burden 

shifting.” “Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a 

witness through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity . . . .” United States v. 

Witherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005). In analyzing the effects of a 

prosecutor's vouching, the Court looks to a number of factors, including: “the form of 

the vouching; the degree of personal opinion asserted; how much the vouching 

implied that the prosecutor had extra record knowledge of the witness' truthfulness; 

and the importance of the testimony in the overall context of the case.” United States 

v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 

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 In support of his vouching argument, Beck provides a citation to the trial 

transcript where the vouching was said to occur. However, although the prosecutor 

does discuss Wimmer’s testimony on the cited page, he does not on that page or the 

adjacent pages mention anything about Wimmer’s plea agreement. See Answer, Ex. 

U, p. 58. As such, the vouching identified by Beck has not been shown to have taken 

any prejudicial form or to have been substantial in degree. 

 Additionally, on the witness stand at trial, Wimmer testified on direct 

examination that he was given a favorable plea agreement as a result of his testimony 

and on cross-examination the benefits he received under the agreement were fully 

explored. Answer, Ex. V, pp. 31-32, 45-47. The jurors were also told that the 

opening statements were not evidence. Id., Ex. V, pp. 15-16. As such, the jury was 

fully aware of the agreement and its parameters, knew that anything the prosecutor 

said was not evidence, and was therefore able to make its own determination of the 

plea agreement’s impact, or lack of impact, on what Wimmer was saying. 

Accordingly, Beck cannot show that there was no reasonable basis for the State court 

to reject his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecutor’s purported vouching. See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786. 

 e. Ground VIII 

 In Ground VIII, Beck alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 

investigate and challenge witness Joshua Wimmer’s testimony. Specifically, Beck 

asserts that his trial counsel “made no effort” to undermine Wimmer’s testimony by 

challenging the details of his testimony, that he failed to expose Wimmer’s lies to 

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police regarding the armed robbery charges he was facing, did not call Adam 

Hartley-Ramsey, Beck’s cell-mate, to rebut Wimmer’s testimony. Reply, pp. 34-35. 

 As a threshold matter, the trial transcript shows that Beck’s counsel effectively 

cross-examined Wimmer. Wimmer testified that Beck had admitted to tying 

Nickell’s hands and stabbing him, and also testified that he had memorialized the 

admission with a contemporaneous note. Answer, Ex. V, pp. 22, 25. On crossexamination, Beck’s counsel elicited testimony from Wimmer about the armed 

robbery charges against him, the favorable plea he obtained in exchange for his 

testimony, that Beck was talking to him about the allegations contained in the police 

reports and not the actual facts of the case, and that the facts of Beck’s purported 

admission were inconsistent with the crime. Id., Ex. V, pp. 34-37. Trial counsel 

asked Wimmer if he had told the prosecution that Beck said he tied Nickell’s hands 

by himself. When Wimmer denied that statement, trial counsel impeached him with 

the transcript. Id., p. 37. Trial counsel also impeached Wimmer about 

inconsistencies about whether Beck had blood on him and whether one or two knives 

were used. Id., pp. 38-41. He also emphasized the fact that Wimmer waited 

approximately a month and a half or two months after Beck’s alleged statement to 

give his note about the statement to his own attorney. Id., p. 42. 

 Despite this examination of Wimmer, Beck nevertheless contends that he 

should also have been cross-examined about “his clear lies regarding his armed 

robbery allegations,” and about his juvenile record. Reply, p. 34. However, Beck 

does not identify any of the “clear lies” or what material from the juvenile record 

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should have been used. In any case, the jury was made thoroughly aware of the 

armed robbery charges, the potential sentence Wimmer was facing on those charges, 

the reduction of that potential sentence he received in exchange for his testimony, 

and the inconsistencies in his statements. 

 In his final argument, Beck contends that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to call as a witness Beck’s cell-mate, Adam Hartley-Ramsey. Beck asserts 

that Hartley-Ramsey would have testified that he never heard Beck admit his 

responsibility in the homicide. As Respondents note, during trial, Beck’s counsel 

decided, with Beck’s approval, not to call Hartley-Ramsey as a witness because the 

trial court intended to allow the prosecution to cross-examine Hartley-Ramsey about 

other issues that would undermine the defense. Answer, Ex. LL, pp. 9-15, 25. 

 Hartley-Ramsey later testified during the evidentiary hearings on Beck’s PCR 

petition. Id., Ex. BB, pp. 7-49. Hartley-Ramsey said he and Beck were in the same 

jail pod and were cell-mates for approximately six months and that Beck had told 

him on several occasions that he and a friend had taken the victim to the desert and 

tied him up with the intention to leave him there to frighten him. He said Beck was 

surprised when his co-defendant stabbed the victim. Id., pp. 10-12, 24-25; Ex. DD, 

pp. 26-27. Hartley-Ramsey also testified that it was “common knowledge” in the 

pod at the jail that Beck had kidnapped the victim and the victim “wound up dying.” 

Id., Ex. DD, pp. 28-29. Hartley-Ramsey also testified that he had not heard Beck 

discuss his case outside of their cell or with Wimmer, but said there had been 

opportunities for the two to speak without his knowledge and that he had witnessed 

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Beck speaking through the vent. Id., Ex. BB, pp. 13-16, 30-32; Ex. DD, pp. 22-23. 

He also stated that Beck’s trial counsel spoke to him “two or three times” about 

appearing as a witness in Beck’s defense. Id., Ex. BB, pp. 45-47; Ex. DD, pp. 21-22. 

 Based on this testimony, the trial court issued its ruling on Beck’s PCR 

petition and addressed this claim as follows: 

 Also called to testify at the [PCR] hearing was petitioner’s jail 

cell mate Adam Hartley-Ramsay. Petitioner argued that he should have 

been a defense witness to impeach Joshua Wimmer’s testimony about 

defendant’s jail admissions. He would have been useful to discredit 

Wimmer’s testimony to a degree. However, Hartley-Ramsay said he 

would have testified truthfully that petitioner confessed to him that he 

tied up the victim with the codefendant and took him to the desert 

where the victim was killed. This would have corroborated Detective 

Gamber’s testimony about petitioner’s “hypothetical” admission to 

him. In addition, Hartley-Ramsay said on examination by the county 

attorney that it was common knowledge in the jail pod that petitioner 

was involved in the kidnaping but denied the actual killing of the 

victim. The county attorney also elicited Hartley-Ramsay’s view that it 

was possible witness Wimmer and petitioner did have a conversation. 

[Beck’s counsel] was not ineffective for failing to call Adam HartleyRamsay. The evidentiary hearing demonstrated Hartley-Ramsay would 

have been a devastating witness for the state. 

 

Answer, Ex. G, p. 3.1

 

 Based on this record, Beck’s counsel’s decision, after consultation with Beck, 

not to call Hartley-Ramsey as a witness did not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel. After the trial court ruled that issues other than those used to impeach 

Wimmer would be admitted at trial, Beck’s counsel recognized, as the trial court also 

concluded after the PCR hearing, that the prejudice resulting from the testimony 

 

1

 Ramsey-Hartley’s name is spelled “Ramsey-Hartley” in the record, spelled 

“Ramsay-Hartlay” in the trial court’s order. 

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would far outweigh any potential benefit. As such, Beck’s counsel was not 

ineffective and the State court was not unreasonable in rejecting this claim. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88; Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (where AEDPA 

applies, federal habeas court’s review of state court’s denial of ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim is “doubly deferential”) (citations omitted). 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Beck’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 11-0090-TUC-RCC. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 7th day of August, 2013. 

 

 

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