Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03102/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03102-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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COURT

For the Northern District of California

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15-cv-3102 LB

ORDER

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

San Francisco Division

KENNETH CLAIR,

Plaintiff,

v.

V. TERRY; et al., 

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. 15-cv-3102 LB

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

[Re: ECF Nos. 1-1, 2]

INTRODUCTION

Kenneth Clair, a prisoner on death row at San Quentin State Prison, commenced this action by

filing a complaint in Marin County Superior Court. The defendants then removed the action to

federal court because the complaint alleged claims for violations of Mr. Clair’s rights under the U.S.

Constitution and presented a federal question. The parties have consented to proceed before a

magistrate judge. (ECF Nos. 6, 7.1

) The defendants have requested, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

that the court screen Mr. Clair’s complaint. This order screens the complaint, finds some claims

cognizable, but requires Mr. Clair to file an amendment to attempt to state a claim against three

defendants as to whom the complaint does not state a claim. 

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For the Northern District of California

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ORDER 2

STATEMENT

Mr. Clair alleges the following in his complaint.

Since 1987, Mr. Clair has been housed on death row at San Quentin. (ECF No. 1-1 at 7.) He has

chronic shoulder problems that make it painful for him to be handcuffed with standard handcuffs. 

On July 12, 2012, Mr. Clair was moved from the East Block to the Adjustment Center, a

“disciplinary building,” for a rule violation. (Id.) He was moved back to East Block on August 20,

2012, and his privileges were later restored. (Id. at 10.) 

Before he was moved to the Adjustment Center, whenever Mr. Clair was taken out of his cell to

be escorted to another location, he “would be placed in mechanical modified restraints (waist chains

or extended handcuffs) that was approved by the chief Medical Officer” due to his chronic shoulder

problems. (Id. at 8.) At the Adjustment Center, however, correctional officers insisted on using

standard handcuffing techniques and standard handcuffs regardless of an inmate’s medical needs.

(Id.) This standard handcuffing technique required the inmate to “back up to the cell door, come to a

half squat position, and place[] both hands through the tray slot” for the handcuffs to be applied.

(Id.) The use of the standard handcuffing technique and the standard handcuffs caused pain for Mr.

Clair. Dr. Grant saw Mr. Clair on August 10, 2012, and was aware of Mr. Clair’s right

shoulder problems. Dr. Grant failed to write an order for modified mechanical restraints for Mr.

Clair. (Id. at 8-10.)

On August 30, 2012, after Mr. Clair returned to East Block from the Adjustment Center, he was

seen by Dr. Leighton and complained of renewed shoulder problems. (Id. at 10.) Dr. Leighton failed

to adequately examine Mr. Clair’s shoulders due to her failure to have his mechanical restraints

removed. 

Dr. Leighton saw Mr. Clair again on October 9, 2012. In response to Mr. Clair’s complaints of

muscle cramps and his inconsistent blood pressure readings, Dr. Leighton decided to stop one of Mr.

Clair’s medications and have his blood pressure checked for three weeks. (Id. at 12.) Dr. Leighton

failed to be sure that her order was followed, and Mr. Clair’s blood pressure was not checked. 

On October 18, 2012, correctional officer Terry escorted Mr. Clair to a medical appointment in

waist restraint handcuffs. (Id.) After the appointment, correctional officer Terry escorted Mr. Clair

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ORDER 3

back to his cell. While Mr. Clair was ascending a metal staircase, correctional officer Terry

“abandoned her duties/post, to engage in talk and laughter with another officer(s)” and violated the

prison’s policy for hands-on escort of inmates. (Id. at 13.) Mr. Clair became dizzy, and fell while he

was alone on the stairs. Mr. Clair broke his right hand, hit his head, and damaged his right shoulder.

(Id. at 9.) Mr. Clair believes he suffered a concussion. Correctional sergeant Madding was the

supervisor and failed to carry out her duties to instruct the staff to write an incident report and

further investigate the incident. Instead, sergeant Madding “used her vested authority to cover up all

misconduct of defendant V. Terry/other subordinate officers” and put Mr. Clair “back in harms

way/substantial risk falling on the metal staircase again despite visible impaired physical mobility.” 

(Id. at 14-15 (errors in source).)

Mr. Clair received inadequate treatment for his injuries from nurse Han and Dr. Garrigan for the

injuries he sustained in the fall. (Id. at 15-17.) Among other things, these individuals failed to

adequately address his concussion or symptoms of concussion. On October 22, 2012, Mr. Clair was

taken to the prison hospital for treatment of injuries related to his fall. Dr. S. Garrigan did not take

time to fully assess Mr. Clair’s injuries and refused to write an order for him to stay off the stairs.

(Id. at 19.) 

Dr. Tootell, the chief medical officer, and Dr. Deems, the chief executive officer, “failed to

implement adequate performance policies, effective grievance policies/investigation of doctors,” and

generally have allowed inadequate medical care to continue at the prison. (Id. at 18.) They learned of

Mr. Clair’s “medical needs, injuries and denial of adequate treatment through a medical complaint.” 

(Id.) 

Sergeant T.I. Johnson and correctional officer E. McNeel “collectively interfered with the

treatment prescribed to the plaintiff” by Dr. Leighton by demanding that Dr. Leighton rescind the

medical order that moved Mr. Clair from the third tier to the first tier so Mr. Clair could avoid stairs.

(Id. at 19.)

Mr. Clair filed an inmate appeal regarding the rescission of his first tier medical chrono. Nurse

Podolsky signed the December 12, 2012 first level response to that appeal. (See id. at 39.) Dr.

Deems signed the January 24, 2013 second level response to that appeal. (See id. at 31-32.) 

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15-cv-3102 LB

ORDER 4

ANALYSIS

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). Pro se

complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988).

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison

officials take reasonable measures for prisoner health and safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994). For an Eighth Amendment claim based on the response to a prisoner’s medical

needs, the prisoner must plead and prove: (1) that he had a serious medical need, and (2) deliberate

indifference to that need by the defendant, i.e., the prison official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to prisoner health and safety. See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir.

2014). A serious medical need may exist if the “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in

further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680

F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable § 1983 claim against Dr. Grant, Dr.

Leighton, Dr. Garrigan and nurse Han for deliberate indifference to Mr. Clair’s serious medical

needs based on their responses to Mr. Clair’s medical needs. Liberally construed, the complaint

states a cognizable § 1983 claim against sergeant Johnson and correctional officer McNeel for

deliberate indifference to Mr. Clair’s serious medical needs based on their alleged interference with

a doctor’s order that Mr. Clair was to be housed on the first floor. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177

F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999) (“allegations that a prison official has ignored the instructions of a

prisoner’s treating physician are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference”). 

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ORDER 5

Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable § 1983 claim against correctional officer

Terry for deliberate indifference to Mr. Clair’s safety based on her alleged failure to hold on to Mr.

Clair while he was in mechanical restraints on the staircase. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (Eighth

Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates).

The complaint does not state a claim against nurse Polosky or Dr. Weems for their handling of

Mr. Clair’s inmate appeal. Any mishandling or failure to grant Mr. Clair’s inmate appeal in the

prison administrative appeal system does not amount to a due process violation. There is no federal

constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system for California inmates. See

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (prison grievance procedure is

procedural right that does not give rise to protected liberty interest requiring procedural protections

of Due Process Clause); Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1993). Prison officials are not

liable for a due process violation for simply failing to process an appeal properly or failing to find in

Mr. Clair’s favor.

The complaint does not state a claim against Dr. Tootell or Dr. Deems. Dr. Tootell and Dr.

Deems are not alleged to have been Mr. Clair’s treating physician, and they apparently have been

named as defendants only because they were supervisors in charge of the prison’s medical

operations. “Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the

defendant. A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989 (citations omitted). If Mr. Clair wishes to pursue a claim against either Dr.

Tootell or Dr. Deems, he must file an amendment in which he alleges what each of these defendants

did or failed to do that caused a violation of his rights. He should bear in mind that a supervisor may

be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation

or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The complaint also does not state a claim against sergeant Madding, who allegedly was the

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ORDER 6

supervisor in the unit at the time Mr. Clair fell down the stairs. Sergeant Madding allegedly caused

the circumstances of Mr. Clair’s fall to be inadequately investigated, but that does not amount to a

constitutional violation because an inmate does not have a constitutional right to have his injuries

adequately investigated and documented. Mr. Clair also alleges that sergeant Madding “cover[ed] up

all misconduct” of correctional officer Terry. (ECF No. 1-1 at 15.) This allegation apparently is an

effort to show some sort of conspiracy liability, but conclusory allegations of a conspiracy which are

not supported by material facts are insufficient to state a claim. See Simmons v. Sacramento County

Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d

1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). “‘A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons who, by

some concerted action, intend to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming

another which results in damage.’” See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir.

1999) (citation omitted). A civil plaintiff “must show that the conspiring parties reached a unity of

purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful

arrangement.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A conspiracy is not itself a

constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but may “enlarge the pool of responsible defendants by

demonstrating their causal connections to the violation.” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896,

935 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). If Mr. Clair wishes to pursue a claim against sergeant Madding, he

must file an amendment to his complaint in which he alleges what sergeant Madding did or failed to

do that caused a violation of his rights. If he wishes to pursue her on a conspiracy theory, he needs to

make nonconclusory allegations showing a conspiracy, and must identify the federal constitutional

right of which he was deprived as a result of sergeant Madding’s acts or omissions. If he wishes to

pursue her on a supervisor liability theory, he needs to allege facts showing (1) personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1206-07.

CONCLUSION

The defendants’ motion for the court to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is

GRANTED. (ECF No. 2.) This order does the requested screening. 

Liberally construed the complaint states cognizable § 1983 claims against Dr. Grant, Dr.

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ORDER 7

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

Leighton, Dr. Garrigan, nurse Han, sergeant Johnson, correctional officer McNeel, and correctional

officer Terry. Nurse Polosky is dismissed because the complaint does not state a claim against her,

and leave to amend appears to be futile. The claims against Dr. Tootell, Dr. Weems, and sergeant

Madding are dismissed with leave to amend. 

If Mr. Clair wishes to pursue claims against Dr. Tootell, Dr. Weems and/or sergeant Madding, he

must file an amendment to his complaint no later than September 30, 2015 in which he states a

claim against each of these defendants and cures the deficiencies identified in this order. If Mr. Clair

does not file an amendment by the deadline, the action will proceed against the remaining

defendants and these three defendants will be dismissed.

The court has instructed Mr. Clair to file an amendment to the complaint rather than an amended

complaint because he only needs to fix a small part of his lengthy pleading. The difference between

an amendment to a complaint and an amended complaint is that an amendment will be read together

with the original complaint to see whether a claim is stated, whereas an amended complaint will

supersede the original and must state every one of a plaintiff’s claims. If Mr. Clair files an amended

complaint instead of an amendment to the complaint, any claim not included in the document will be

deemed to be voluntarily dismissed. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2015 _______________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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