Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01057/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 315
Nature of Suit: Airplane Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1446pl Petition for Removal - Product Liability

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN BRITTON, LORINDA BRITTON,

SILVERHAWK AVIATION LLC, and DAVID

CURRIE,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ROLLS ROYCE ENGINE SERVICES,

OAKLAND, INC., DALLAS AIRMOTIVE,

INC., ROLLS ROYCE CORPORATION and

DOES ONE through ONE HUNDRED, 

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-01057 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO REMAND AND

REMANDING ACTION TO ALAMEDA

COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

On May 27, 2005, the Court heard argument on plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Having considered the

arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion to remand for

the reasons set forth below, and REMANDS this action to the Alameda County Superior Court..

BACKGROUND

On December 9, 2004, plaintiffs John Britton, Lorinda Britton, Silverhawk Aviation LLC, and David

Currie (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed an action in Alameda County Superior Court against defendants Rolls

Royce Engine Services Oakland, Inc. (“RRES”), Dallas Airmotive, Inc. (“DAI”), Rolls Royce Corporation

(“RR”) and Does 1-100 (collectively “defendants”). Plaintiffs sought damages for personal injury and property

damage arising out of a helicopter crash allegedly caused by negligence, product liability, and breach of

warranty. Defendant RRES, a California corporation, moved to dismiss the state court action based on forum

non conveners; thatmotionwas denied. On March 14, 2005, four days after the denial of defendants’ motion

to dismiss, defendant DAI removed the case to this court. Plaintiffs filed a motion for remand on April 7, 2005.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

That motion is now before the Court. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A suit filed in state court may be removed to federalcourt ifthe federalcourt would have had original

subject matter jurisdiction over thatsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 789

(9th Cir. 1977). The bases for federal subject-matter jurisdiction are: (1)federal question jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The removal statute

is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and doubt is resolved in favor of remand. Libhart v. Santa

Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979). 

There is also an independent basis for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) when "[a] ny officer of

the United States . . . , or person acting under him, for any act under color of such office" seeks removal to

federal court. To establish federal officer removal jurisdiction, the moving party must "(1) demonstrate that it

acted under the direction ofa federalofficer;(2) raise a federaldefense to plaintiffs' claims; and (3) demonstrate

a causal nexus between plaintiffs' claims and acts it performed under color of federal office." Blackman v.

Asbestos Defendants (BHC), 1997 WL 703773, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 1997). The moving party must also

be a "person"within the meaning of§ 1442(a)(1). See Jung v. AbexCorp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 572 (N.D. Cal.

1992). Parties satisfying these elements gain access to federal court even when no federal question is presented

in a plaintiff's complaint. See Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 781 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Courts

must strictly construe the statute against removal jurisdiction. See Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th

Cir. 1988); Gould v. MutualLife Ins. Co., 790 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1986). "Federal jurisdiction must be

rejected ifthere is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566

(9th Cir. 1992). 

A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. Remand to state court may be

ordered either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for any defect in removal procedure. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c). The court may remand sea sponge or on motion of a party, and the parties who invoked the

federal court's removal jurisdiction have the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Enrich v. Touche

Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & SteelCo., 257 U.S. 92,
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3

97 (1921)). When ruling on a motion to remand, the court generally looks to the complaint and the notice of

removal. See Miller v. Grgurich, 763 F.2d 372 (9 th Cir. 1985); see also 16 Moore’s FederalPractice - Civil

§ 107.41(1)(e)(ii). 

The existence of federal jurisdiction on removal must be determined on the face of the plaintiff's

complaint. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). A "cause of action arises under

federallaw only when the plaintiff's well pleaded complaint raises issues offederallaw." MetropolitanLife Ins.

Co v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). 

However, the Court may examine the entire record to determine ifthe realnature ofthe claim is federal,

notwithstanding plaintiff's characterization to the contrary, when the plaintiff has, by "artfulpleading," attempted

to defeat defendant's right to a federal forum. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397

n.2 (1981). A complainant cannot "avoid federal jurisdiction simply by omitting from the complaint federal law

essentialto his claim, or by casting in state law terms a claim that can be made only under federallaw." Harper

v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1985). 

A notice of removal is defective if it is not timely. See Shukov v. Isostent, LLC, 2003 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 6297 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (a late objection to an untimely notice of removalmaywaive the defect). For

removal to be timely, a notice of removal must be filed within thirty days after a defendant receives a copy of

the initialpleading. If the initial pleading does not indicate the removability of the action, a defendant must file

a notice of removal within thirty days of receipt, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended

pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or

has become removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to remand

Plaintiffs argue that this action should be remanded because: (1) the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the action; (2) there is no independent basis for removal under the Federal Officer Removal

Statute; and (3) removal was untimely in any event.

A. Subject matter jurisdiction 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1. Diversity jurisdiction

Plaintiffs argue that the action may not be removed based on diversity jurisdiction because the action

was first filed in California, the state of which RRES, a properly joined defendant, is a citizen. Mot. at 4.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), any civil action not arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United

States “shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a

citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 

Plaintiffs brought this civil action against defendants in California on December 9, 2004. See Compl.

at 1. Defendant DAI acknowledges that defendant RRES “was, at the time of the filing of this action, and still

is, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, having its principal place of

business in the State of California.” Notice of Removal at 3. Thus, this action was not removable based on

diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

2. Federal question jurisdiction

In its Opposition, defendant DAI makes the argument, not raised in its removal notice, that removal

is proper on the basis offederalquestion jurisdiction. Defendant contends that even if plaintiffs have not based

their claims on any violation of federal law, “removal is appropriate because federal statutes and regulations,

including the Transportation Laws of the United States and the regulations promulgated by the FAA [Federal

Aviation Administration] pursuant to those laws, preempt state law in these areas.” Opp’n at 3 (citation

omitted). As plaintiffs point out, controlling case law suggests otherwise, and this argument is time barred in

any event.

In Charas v. TWA, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered

the preemptive effect of another federal statute on a plaintiff’s state law cause of action. In holding that

plaintiffs’ personalinjury claims were not preempted by the federal Airline Deregulation Act, the Ninth Circuit

noted that a court considering preemptionmust consider “thatCongress does notcavalierly pre-emptstate-law

causes of action,” and “that the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”

Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265. 

Here, the only evidence of congressional intent to preempt offered by DAI is the statement in a 1958
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1The only specific statute pointed to bydefendantis 49 U.S.C. § 40103, which addresses “Sovereignty

and Use of Airspace.” However, defendant does not explain how this specific provision preempts state law

causes of action against airplane engine manufacturers. 

5

Senate Report that “the federal government bears virtually complete responsibility for the promotion and

supervision ofthis industry in the public interest.” Opp’n at 3 (citing S. Rep. No. 18111, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.

5 (1958)). This vague language does not establish Congress’ intent to preempt state tort claims, and indeed,

the courts have repeatedly rejected preemption in the aviation safety field. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc.

v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Duncanv. Northwest Airlines,Inc., 208 F.3d 1112 (9 th Cir. 2000); Vinnick

v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 859 (2001). DAI fails to demonstrate that Congress intended the

various “Transportation Laws”1 and the FAA regulations to preempt plaintiffs’ state-law causes of action for

negligence, products liability, and breach of warranty. 

In any event, the Court may not even consider DAI’s preemption argument because it is untimely. In

this circuit, it is well-settled that substantive amendments to a notice of removal may not be made after the

thirty-day period specified in 28 U.S.C § 1446(b). See Barrow Dev. Co. v. Fulton, Ins., 418 F.2d 316, 317

(9th Cir. 1969) (notice of removal can be amended after 30 day period only where party seeks to correct

defects in form but notto add allegations of substance); O’Halloran v. Univ. of Washington, 856 F.2d 1375,

1381 (9th Cir. 1988). Since defendant DAI’s preemption argument was first made in its May 6, 2005

Opposition brief, defendant has exceeded the 30-day period for amending its March 14, 2005 Notice of

Removal. 

Accordingly, there is no federal question jurisdiction over the action, and no basis for removal under

§ 1441(b). 

B. Federal Officer Removal Statute

Defendant contends that there is an independent basis for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a). This

provision, known as the Federal Officer Removal Statute, allows for removal of any civil or criminal action

against “any officer of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individualcapacity for

any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The defendant seeking removal must raise a

colorable federal defense to plaintiffs’ claims, and must also establish that it acted under the direction of a
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2Plaintiffs’ complaint acknowledges thatDAI is an FAA Repair Station. Compl. at ¶ 2. Neither party,

however, suggests that all employees of such repair stations are necessarily DMIRs. 

3The Court declines to read Magnin so broadly as to consider all underlying conduct involved in

airplane engine repair and maintenance in determining whether a defendant may raise a colorable federalofficer

defense. Assuming that every repair or maintenance inspection on an airplane engine is eventually followed by

issuance of a certificate of airworthiness, then every airplane engine repair and maintenance mechanic could

remove to federalcourt even the simplest ofnegligence claims. Such a result seems questionable, and the Court

does not reach it. 

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federal officer by demonstrating a causalnexus between plaintiffs’ claims and acts defendant performed under

color of federal office. AIG Eur. P’Ship v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1770 at *4

(C.D. Cal. 2003). If established under this provision, the right of removal is absolute,“regardless of whether

the suit could originally have been brought in a federal court.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406

(1969).

Defendant DAI argues that removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 is proper because the FAA has

designated private individuals, including DAI employees, “to serve as representatives ofthe FAA by certifying

aircraft and engine maintenance according to [the FAA’s] specifications.” Opp’n at 6. For this proposition,

defendant relies on Magnin v. Teledyne ContinentalMotors, 91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1996). Magnin involved

a French citizenwho died while piloting an airplane that crashed in France. The decedent’s representative sued

Teledyne Industries and J.B. Smith, a Teledyne employee. The complaint alleged “that [the] fatal crash was

proximately caused by [defendants’] negligent inspection and wrongful certification of the aircraft’s engine as

airworthy, and [] expressly described Smith as a ‘designated manufacturing inspection representative (DMIR)

that certifiedengines “airworthy”orsafe for exportation and installationon aircraft.’” Magnin, 91 F.3d at 1426.

The court in Magnin determined that removal was proper because defendant could raise a colorable federal

officer defense to plaintiff’s claim that the wrongful certificationby defendant Smith was a proximate cause of

the crash. Magnin, 91 F.3d at 1428. Magnin is factually distinguishable from this case, because plaintiffs’

complaint here does not name any individual defendants, does not specifically identify DAI as a DMIR2 and

does not expressly allege that defendant’s issuance of an airworthiness certificate was a proximate cause ofthe

accident; in fact, it makes no mention of any such certificate.3 See also AIG, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1770

at5-6 (federalofficer removalallowed because ofplaintiff’s express allegationthat defendant’s negligentfailure

to comply with the aircraft certification process proximately contributed to the destruction of the downed
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4This Court may consider the state court filings insofar as is necessary to determine when a case, not

originally removable on the basis of any allegation in the initial pleading, became removable. See Peabody v.

Schroll Trust, 892 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1989). 

7

aircraft). 

Defendant DAI also contends that it has a federal defense to an allegation that became evident only

through plaintiffs’ opposition to defendant RRES’s state court motion to dismiss.4 Notice of Removal at 5;

Opp’n at 5. Specifically, defendant points to the following paragraph:

The second-stage compressor, where the blades failed, was subsequently repaired by Dallas

Airmotive which is, as you might expect, in Texas, but does extensive business throughout

California.

Compl., Ex. D at 4:19-21. DAI argues that “[t]he conduct underlying these allegations (i.e., carrying out a

repair ofthis sectionofthe engine and certifying that it was airworthy), would be ‘acting under’” color offederal

office within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Notice of Removal at 4. The Court disagrees. The

above paragraphdoes not actually allege anything about the engine’s airworthiness certification, and itis difficult

to see how it alleges any conduct to which defendant would have a colorable federal officer defense. In other

words, this “new allegation” is no different from the allegations appearing in the complaint. If anything,

reference to repairs made to a mechanical component that failed simply sounds in negligence.

Because the Court concludes that defendant cannot raise a colorable federal officer defense, it finds

that there is no basis for removal under the Federal Officer Removal Statute. 

C. Timeliness of the Notice of Removal 

Plaintiffs argue thatDAI’s Notice ofRemovalwas untimely because itwasfiled more than 30 days after

defendant received the summons and complaint. Mot. at 7. Defendant contends that the bases for removal

did not become ascertainable untilFebruary 15, 2005, when defendant RRES filed its motion to dismissin state

court. Opp’n at 7. Therefore, defendant contends, the Notice ofRemovalwas timely filed 27 days later, on

March 14, 2005.

A notice of removal must be filed within thirty days after the defendant receives either a copy of the

complaint orsummons. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). If the case stated by the initial complaint is not removable, then

a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after defendant receives “an amended pleading, motion, order
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5The parties also dispute whether, by joining in the forum non conveniens motion in state court,

defendant DAI engaged the merits of the case and thereby waived any right to remove. Plaintiffs rely on Hill

v. Citicorp, 804 F. Supp. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), where the court considered the merits ofthe case in deciding

a forum non conveniens motion to determine what contacts with the forum were relevant and what law

applied. Defendant argues thatjoining a motion to dismissforforum non conveniens does not engage a case

on its merits and, therefore, does not waive a party’s right to remove to federalcourt. Opp’n at 8. Defendant

relies on Beasley v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 497 F. Supp. 213 (D. Neb. 1980), which involved a temporary

restraining order, and where the court held that “actions which are preliminary and not conclusive in character

and which do not actually submit the merits of a claim for a binding decision do not constitute a waiver of

defendant’s right to remove.” Beasley, 497 F.Supp. at 216. Because ofthe fact-specific nature ofthis inquiry,

this Court cannot on the record before it determine whether DAI waived its right to remove by joining in the

motion. Because removal was nonetheless improper, the Court does not decide the issue.

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or other paper fromwhich it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.”

Id. “The record of the state court is considered the sole source from which to ascertain whether a case

originally notremovable has since become removable.” Peabody v. Schroll Trust, 892 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir.

1989) (citation omitted).

Defendant contends that two bases forremovaldid not become ascertainable until February 15, 2005:

(1) plaintiffs’ Idaho citizenship, and (2) defendant DAI’s repair of the second stage compressor allowing for

removal under the Federal Officer Removal Statute. As discussed above, however, removal was not proper

under either § 1441(b) or the Federal Officer Removal Statute, and thus the February 15, 2005 opposition

is not the controlling date. Because defendant received plaintiffs’ complaint and summons on February 3,

2005, and its Notice of Removal was filed on March 14, 2005, it is untimely.5

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for remand. 

II. Request for sanctions

Plaintiffs seek costs, attorney fees and sanctions for defendants’ improper removalofthis action. Mot.

at 11; Reply at 8. “An order remanding [a] case may require payment of just costs and any actualexpenses,

including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). When defendants remove

a case improperly and cause the plaintiffs to incur the expense ofseeking a remand, “[such] expense is a direct

result of the removal, and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) permits the plaintiffs to recoup that expense.” Baddie v.

Berkeley Farms, 64 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court has discretion to impose sanctions. 

Plaintiffs request sanctions on grounds that DAI has, in bad faith, advanced fallacious arguments in
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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opposition to this motion. They seek the $6,300.00 in attorneys’ fees expended in support of this motion. See

O’Reilly Reply Declat ¶ 3. Although the Court concludes that remand is proper, it does not consider an award

of sanctions appropriate in this case. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ request is DENIED.

 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion

forremand and REMANDS this action to the Alameda County Superior Court where it was filed. The Court

also DENIES plaintiffs’ request for sanctions. [Docket # 18.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2005 S/Susan Illston 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge