Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-02744/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-02744-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CLEAR-VIEW TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN H. RASNICK, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-02744-BLF 

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO STRIKE THE EXPERT 

REPORT OF JAMES A. TURNER AND 

EXCLUDE HIS TESTIMONY;

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 

TO STRIKE THE EXPERT REPORT OF 

EARL MCCUNE AND EXCLUDE HIS 

TESTIMONY

[Re: ECF 153]

On October 30, 2014, the Court modified the schedule in this case with regard to expert 

discovery. The schedule required the parties to disclose their initial experts and exchange expert 

reports no later than February 17, 2015; disclose rebuttal experts and exchange rebuttal expert

reports no later than March 17, 2015; and set an expert discovery cutoff date of April 14, 2015. 

See ECF 111 at 2 (adopting Plaintiff’s proposed schedule, at ECF 105-6, with minor 

modifications). 

On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff produced to Defendants the expert report of Dr. Jonathan 

Neuberger. Dr. Neuberger’s report set forth his expert opinions regarding Plaintiff’s valuation on 

June 17, 2011, prior to the alleged misconduct of Defendants that gives rise to this suit. 

Defendants did not produce an initial expert report by this date. But on March 17, 2015, the last 

day to disclose and exchange rebuttal reports, Defendants timely disclosed the rebuttal expert 

report of James A. Turner, which professed to rebut Dr. Neuberger’s valuation of CVT. The 

Turner Report included as an exhibit an additional report by Dr. Earl McCune entitled “Analysis 

of Failed Technology Utilized by Clear-View Technologies, Inc.” See ECF 153-6 Exh. B. Dr. 

McCune, a specialist in wireless communications and radio frequency technology, set forth in this 

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report his opinion that the radio frequency system employed by CVT’s product The BarMaster 

was “fatally flawed.” See id. at 4.

Plaintiff now moves to strike the entirety of the McCune Report and portions of the Turner 

Report, as well as exclude their related testimony at trial, on several grounds. First, Plaintiff seeks 

to strike the McCune Report for three reasons: (1) McCune’s disclosure as an expert was untimely 

because his opinions are affirmative expert opinions rather than rebuttal opinions; (2) the Report 

exceeds the scope of authorized rebuttal; and (3) Defendants cannot show that the failure to 

disclose McCune was substantially justified or harmless. Plaintiff further seeks to prohibit Turner 

from relying on the McCune Report in his own testimony and report, and also asks the Court to 

strike several improper arguments and conclusions of fact and law from the Turner Report. 

The Court heard oral argument on this motion at the parties’ pretrial conference on May 

28, 2015. Having considered the written and oral arguments of the parties, as well as the 

governing law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike the McCune Report in its entirety, 

and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s motion to strike portions of the Turner Report.1

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 governs parties’ disclosure obligations. The Rule 

demands that parties “make [their] disclosures at the times and in the sequence that the court 

orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D). A party need not disclose an expert within the deadline for 

initial expert reports, and can instead disclose an expert as a “rebuttal expert,” when the expert’s

testimony is “intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified 

by an initial expert witness.” R & O Constr. Co. v. Rox Pro Int’l Grp., Ltd., 2011 WL 2923703, at 

*2 (D. Nev. July 18, 2011). “The function of rebuttal testimony is to explain, repel, counteract or 

disprove evidence of the adverse party.” Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 749, 759 

(8th Cir. 2006).

 

1

Plaintiff also seeks its fees and costs related to bringing this motion. The Court DENIES this 

request. Cf. Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(noting that the district court has “wide latitude” to issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)). Here, the 

Court finds that excluding Dr. McCune from testifying and striking his Report is a sufficient 

sanction for Defendants’ failure to comply with Rule 26. 

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If the rebuttal expert’s testimony is offered, however, to “contradict an expected and 

anticipated portion of the other party’s case-in-chief, then the witness is not a rebuttal witness or 

anything close to one.” Amos v. Makita U.S.A., 2011 WL 43092, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2011) 

(citing In re Apex Oil Co., 958 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1992)); see also Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. 

Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the trial court’s 

exclusion of an expert who was improperly disclosed as a rebuttal expert); cf. Luke v. Family Care 

& Urgent Med. Clinics, 323 Fed. App’x 496, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2009). Although a defendant need 

not put forth expert opinions to challenge affirmative theories on which the plaintiff bears the 

burden of proof, such as damages, a defendant’s rebuttal expert is limited to offering opinions

rebutting and refuting the theories set forth by plaintiff’s expert(s). See, e.g., Cates v. Sears, 

Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1991). 

A party that, without substantial justification, fails to properly disclose information as 

required by Rule 26(a) may not “unless such failure is harmless, [] use as evidence at trial . . . any 

witness or information not so disclosed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). “The sanction is automatic and 

mandatory unless the sanctioned party can show that its violation . . . was either justified or 

harmless.” R & O Constr. at *3 (citing Salgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 

1998)) (emphasis added). 

 III. DISCUSSION

A. The McCune Report

It is undisputed that McCune was not disclosed prior to the Court’s February 17, 2015 

deadline to disclose initial expert reports. As such, the McCune Report survives only if it is 

properly considered rebuttal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); R & O Constr. at *3.

Defendants make several arguments in an attempt to save the McCune Report. First, 

Defendants contend that the McCune Report is “undoubtedly within the permissible scope of 

rebuttal,” because it discusses the “same subject matter” as the Neuberger Report offered by 

Plaintiff. See Opp., ECF 173 at 9, 11 (“The McCune Findings are set forth strictly for purposes of 

Turner’s valuation of CVT as of June 17, 2011. The unfeasible BarMaster product contributed to 

Turner’s valuation of CVT as being worthless.”). Second, Defendants argue the McCune Report 

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rebuts Dr. Neuberger’s assumptions that The BarMaster could be “finished” and placed on the 

market as a viable product. See Opp. at 12 (“Having opined that CVT could complete the 

BarMaster, and having opined that the BarMaster possessed certain desirable features, CVT 

cannot now prevent Defendants from producing relevant, admissible rebuttal evidence.”). Third, 

Defendants argue that the McCune Report is “properly relied on” by Turner in his expert report 

because “[f]or valuation analysts, the use of consultants is a widely-held custom and practice, one 

that is permitted under accounting guidelines and case authority.” Opp. at 13. Fourth, Defendants 

argue that the McCune Report must be stricken because it relies almost exclusively on the 

inadmissible hearsay testimony of three third-party witnesses (Messrs. Cano, Wyatt, and Simpson) 

and Defendant Parker Mattingly. See Pl.’s Mot. at 15-19. The Court considers each of these 

arguments in turn, and finds them unpersuasive.

1. The McCune Report is Not a Rebuttal Expert Report

Defendants’ first and second arguments, that the McCune Report opines on the “same 

subject matter” as the Neuberger Report and rebuts the Neuberger Report’s conclusion that The 

BarMaster was a viable product, are really one in the same: Defendants contend that McCune’s 

Report is properly considered rebuttal. Defendants are incorrect, however, for several reasons. 

First, the sum and substance of Dr. McCune’s Report, that The BarMaster did not work, 

speaks directly to Defendants’ affirmative defenses and counterclaims, on which Defendants bear 

the burden of proof. A review of Defendants’ Amended Answer, ECF 81, makes this clear. 

Defendants’ nineteenth affirmative defense states that “Plaintiff has breached the contracts alleged 

in the First Amended Complaint by failing to bring a viable product into the market.” Am. 

Answer, ECF 81 at 19. Defendants further assert a breach of contract counterclaim, alleging that 

Plaintiff breached the terms of the parties’ distribution agreement by “failing to manufacture or 

cause to be manufactured, promote and sell the product, and to develop into a successful 

production for distribution” The BarMaster. See id. at 21. Defendants bear the burden of proof as 

to all elements of this affirmative defense and counterclaim – because the McCune Report 

includes extensive expert opinion as to the workability and viability of The BarMaster, the report 

speaks directly to an issue on which Defendants bear the burden of proof, and cannot be properly 

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construed as a rebuttal report. See, e.g., R & O Constr. at *3. 

A review of Defendants’ initial discovery disclosures shows that Defendants recognized 

their burden to produce initial expert testimony as to these affirmative claims. In September 2014, 

Defendants indicated in their initial expert disclosures that they intended to offer expert testimony 

regarding the technical feasibility of The BarMaster. See Tilley Decl., ECF 153-3 at ¶ 2 (a copy of 

Defendants’ initial expert disclosures, which disclosed that Defendants “may rely upon expert 

testimony at the time of trial on the following topics: (1) Scope and calculation of damages sought 

by Plaintiff; (2) Status of the BarMaster product during the relevant time period, including 

assessment of feasibility for mass production for purposes of distribution and sales”) (emphasis 

added). The disclosure deadline passed for the parties to disclose their affirmative experts on “all 

issues on which [the] disclosing party bears the burden of proof,” which clearly included this 

affirmative defense and counterclaim, and Defendants failed to disclose an expert, instead waiting 

until Plaintiff produced its damages expert report to offer such testimony as purported rebuttal. 

Had Dr. McCune been offered as an initial expert witness, Plaintiff could have designated an 

expert to rebut Dr. McCune’s opinions, and these dueling experts could have been put in front of a 

jury. In this circumstance, however, Defendants’ actions evince the intent to play fast-and-loose 

with Rule 26’s requirements to the detriment of Plaintiff, which the Court will not countenance.

In their opposition to Plaintiff’s motion and again at oral argument on the motion, 

Defendants offered to dismiss their affirmative defenses and counterclaims in an attempt to save 

the McCune Report and Dr. McCune’s ability to testify at trial. Defendants claimed that such a 

dismissal would render the McCune Report “solely for impeachment” purposes. See, e.g., Opp., 

ECF 173 at 17. Defendants are incorrect – even if Defendants dismissed their affirmative defenses 

and counterclaims, the McCune Report would still not be a rebuttal report, for several reasons. 

First, and most glaring, is the fact that Dr. McCune never reviewed the Neuberger Report, 

which he is purportedly being offered to rebut, prior to drafting his own expert report. See

McCune Depo. Tr., Tilley Decl., ECF 176-6 at 44-45 (Pl.’s counsel: “Are you familiar with a 

report that was prepared by Dr. Neuberger in this case?” Dr. McCune: “No.” Pl.’s counsel: You 

haven’t reviewed that at any time?” Dr. McCune: Haven’t seen anything.”). Courts have 

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repeatedly held that an expert is improperly designated as a rebuttal expert when he has failed to 

review the initial expert report, or “otherwise [failed to] indicate that he was aware of” the 

opinions offered by the initial expert. See, e.g., Houle v. Jubilee Fisheries, Inc., 2006 WL 27204, 

at *3, *3 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2006) (stating that plaintiff’s expert, who failed to mention, cite, 

or otherwise indicate that he was aware of the opinions of defendant’s expert “is not a rebuttal 

expert”); see also Amos v. Makita at *1 (“The Ninth Circuit has held that rebuttal experts are not 

rebuttal experts if the testimony they give does not address or rebut previously disclosed expert 

testimony.”). Such a rule makes sense: an expert cannot be said to “rebut” testimony he or she has 

never seen or reviewed. See, e.g., Houle at *3 n.4. 

Second, even if the Court were to disregard this glaring issue – which alone is a sufficient

reason to strike Dr. McCune’s Report – a review of the McCune Report alongside the Neuberger 

Report makes plain that Dr. McCune’s opinions are not rebuttal opinions, nor are they offered on 

the “same subject matter” as the Neuberger Report. Dr. Neuberger’s report includes no technical 

analysis of The BarMaster, but rather presents a sales projection in order to value CVT at the time 

of the alleged tortious interference. Though Dr. Neuberger’s valuation assumes that The 

BarMaster was a viable product – and, in fact, that CVT would be able to implement a new, more 

efficient version of The BarMaster, thus improving sales, see ECF 153-4 ¶ 30 – the question of 

whether The BarMaster worked, and could in fact be sold to, and installed in, businesses such as 

202 Market, was not raised by Dr. Neuberger’s expert report, but instead is a primary element of 

Plaintiff’s case-in-chief and Defendants’ affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Plainly, whether 

The BarMaster worked goes to the heart of the dispute between these parties. “If the purpose of 

expert testimony is to contradict an expected and anticipated portion of the other party’s case-inchief, then the witness is not a rebuttal witness or anything analogous to one.” Amos v. Makita, at

*2 (citing In re Apex Oil Co., 958 F.2d at 245). Permitting Defendants to backdoor such expert 

testimony under the guise of “rebuttal” testimony would render Rule 26’s limits generally 

meaningless, and permit Defendants to engage in substantial gamesmanship – something Rule 26 

was designed to combat, not foster. 

Defendants could have disclosed Dr. McCune as an initial expert to offer opinions on

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whether The BarMaster actually worked as Plaintiff claimed. When a party’s case, particularly 

with regard to damages, relies in part on the workability of a product, Defendants can be expected 

to introduce such expert testimony – this is particularly true when Defendants assert counterclaims 

or affirmative defenses which rely on proving that the product did not work. What a party cannot 

do, however, is exactly what Defendants did here – despite knowing that Plaintiff in its case-inchief would argue that The BarMaster was workable and valuable, which was made clear from the 

very first page of Plaintiff’s initial Complaint in this action, see ECF 1 at 1, Defendants attempted 

to sandbag Plaintiff by enclosing Dr. McCune’s technical report as an appendix to the Turner 

rebuttal report. This behavior runs afoul of the purpose and plain language of Rule 26, and cannot 

be countenanced. See, e.g., Vu v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 2010 WL 2179882, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 

2010) (“If the phrase ‘same subject matter’ is read broadly to encompass any possible topic that 

relates to the subject matter at issue, it will blur the distinction between ‘affirmative expert’ and 

‘rebuttal expert.’ More importantly, such broad reading of Rule 26(a)(2)(C)(ii) will render the 

scope of the subject matter limitless and will lead to unjust results.”) (emphasis in original); Cf. 

also Cates at 685.

Because McCune was not disclosed as an affirmative expert, his report must be stricken 

and he must be prohibited from testifying under Rule 37 unless Defendants make a showing that 

the failure to disclose was harmless or substantially justified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); R & O 

Constr. at *3. Defendants did not attempt to make such a showing in their opposition. As such, 

McCune was not properly disclosed pursuant to Rule 26, and Rule 37(c)(1) demands that his 

report be STRICKEN and that he not be permitted to testify at trial. See, e.g., id.

2. The McCune Report is Inadmissible as an Appendix to the Turner 

Report, and Turner Cannot Testify as to McCune’s Findings

Defendants’ third argument, that McCune’s report is nonetheless admissible as an 

appendix to the Turner Report because Dr. McCune is the type of expert on which Turner could 

reasonably be expected to rely, is also unpersuasive. It is axiomatic that an expert, “however well 

credentialed, is not permitted to be the mouthpiece of a scientist in a different specialty.” Dura 

Auto Sys. of Ind., Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Am. Key Corp. v. 

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Cole Nat’l Corp., 762 F.2d 1569, 1580 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Expert opinions ordinarily cannot be 

based upon the opinions of others whether those opinions are in evidence or not.”). Defendants 

have not shown how McCune, as an expert in radio frequency systems, is the type of expert on 

which Turner, as a Certified Public Accountant, would normally rely in offering expert opinions. 

Defendants cite to Ohio Environmental Development Limited P’ship v. Envirotest Society 

Corp., a 2007 case from the Northern District of Ohio, in support of their theory, but the Court 

finds the case distinguishable. There, the district court held that a real estate appraiser offered as 

an expert could reasonably rely on calculations made by an architect, because such data would be 

normally relied on by “experts in [the] field of appraisal in forming opinions on the diminution of 

the market value of property resulting from deferred maintenance.” 478 F. Supp. 2d 963, 975 

(N.D. Ohio 2007). First, Ohio Environmental’s ruling is consistent with the “great liberality” the 

Sixth Circuit affords to experts under Rule 703, see id. at 974, a liberality that courts in the Ninth 

Circuit have not adopted. See, e.g., Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 2009 WL 

1292913, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2009) (rejecting Ohio Environmental’s reading of Rule 703, and 

further stating that “nothing in Rule 703 suggests that an expert may rely on evidence the Court 

has expressly precluded.”) (emphasis added). Second, the district court in Ohio Environmental

found that the real estate appraiser had personally checked the architect’s work, “[a]s opposed to 

blindly accepting [his] calculations.” Id.

Defendants cannot show that CPAs regularly rely on scientific experts such as Dr. McCune 

when determining a business’s valuation. Nor does Turner state in his report that he independently 

attempted to verify McCune’s work, or that he would be qualified to do so. Instead, Turner 

testified that his understanding of the radio frequency technology employed by The BarMaster 

came from McCune’s Report. See Turner Depo. Tr., Tilley Reply Decl. at 86:4-24. There is a 

sharp difference between a real estate appraiser relying on the opinions of an architect – two 

related professions that involve similar expertise – and a CPA relying on, and then repeating, the 

opinions of a scientific technical expert in a wholly different field with which the CPA has neither 

familiarity or expertise. See Dura at 614. For that reason, Turner may not rely on the McCune 

Report when rendering his own expert opinions, in either his Report or in testimony. Turner is 

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free to testify that he has seen no evidence to support an assumption that The BarMaster is a viable 

product, but he may not rely on McCune’s Report to support such an opinion. See, e.g., id.

3. Defendants’ Undisclosed “Impeachment” Witnesses Cannot Testify at 

Trial Because Their Testimony is Direct Evidence Relating to

Defendants’ Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses

In their opposition, Defendants further argue that three other fact witnesses, Messrs. Cano, 

Wyatt, and Simpson, should be allowed to testify to impeach Mr. Mula’s anticipated testimony 

about the success of an installation of The BarMaster at a Roanoke, Virginia establishment called 

202 Market. Neither Cano nor Wyatt were disclosed by Defendants pursuant to Rule 26. 

Plaintiff makes two arguments with regard to these witnesses. First, it argues that the 

McCune Report is inadmissible because it relies almost exclusively on this hearsay testimony, 

which would be inadmissible. See Pl.’s Mot. at 16-17. Because the Court strikes the McCune 

Report, and precludes Dr. McCune from testifying at trial, this argument is moot. Second, Plaintiff 

argues that Cano and Wyatt are not impeachment witnesses because their testimony would be 

offered as direct evidence that The BarMaster did not work – evidence that would speak to 

Defendants’ counterclaims and affirmative defenses. See Pl.’s Reply at 9. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Though Defendants argue that Wyatt and Cano will testify 

only as impeachment witnesses, they argue that they intend to call these witnesses in order to 

contradict testimony by CVT that the 202 Market installation was “finished in 2011” and “fully 

functioning.” See Opp. at 15. Defendants are correct that witnesses who are called solely for 

impeachment purposes need not be disclosed pursuant to Rule 26, but Defendants’ description of 

the testimony to be offered by these witnesses shows that their testimony would not be solely for 

impeachment and would instead be directly related to Defendants’ affirmative defenses and

counterclaims – matters on which Defendants bear the burden of proof.

Evidence is “solely for impeachment” when it “has value solely for the purpose of 

impeaching a witness.” Robert Kubicek Architects & Assocs., Inc. v. Bosley, 2013 WL 998222, at 

*2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2013). If evidence instead “has independent relevancy to the merits of the 

case, [the evidence] is not ‘solely for impeachment’ and must be disclosed to opposing counsel”

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pursuant to Rule 26. Id. (citing Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255, 270 (1st Cir. 1998)); see also 

Wilson v. AM Gen. Corp., 167 F.3d 1114, 1122 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that when a witness will 

offer testimony related to a “primary line of defense” in the suit, the witness is not offered solely 

for impeachment purposes). Here, evidence that the 202 Market installation did not work, or was 

otherwise not fully functional, is not impeachment evidence because it has independent relevance

beyond impeaching Mr. Mula or any other CVT witness – the testimony goes directly to 

Defendants’ breach of contract counterclaims and affirmative defenses, which require Defendants 

to prove that Plaintiff did not bring a viable product to market. See Valiavicharska v. Tinney, 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11334, at *5 (“‘Impeachment’ as contemplated by the Rule 26(a) exception 

refers to attacks on the credibility of a witness and not to rebuttal evidence, which tends to prove 

any element of [a party’s] claims.”) (emphasis added). Defendants may not seek to introduce these 

witnesses under the guise of impeaching Mr. Mula’s credibility when the witness would actually 

testify about the effectiveness of the 202 Market installation and the workability of The 

BarMaster. 

Messrs. Cano and Wyatt are not being offered “solely for impeachment,” and needed to be 

disclosed by Defendants pursuant to Rule 26. Because Defendants did not do so, both witnesses 

must be precluded from testifying, pursuant to Rule 37. 

Defendants argued at the hearing on this motion that, were they to dismiss their 

counterclaims and affirmative defenses, Wyatt and Cano’s testimony would be rendered solely for 

impeachment purposes. The Court DEFERS ruling on such a request to offer Wyatt and Cano’s 

testimony as impeachment evidence until (1) Defendants dismiss their counterclaims and 

affirmative defenses and (2) the Court hears the testimony Defendants would seek to impeach.2

Even if Defendants were to dismiss their counterclaims and affirmative defenses, Messrs. Wyatt 

and Cano may still be precluded from testifying if the Court determines that their testimony is not 

offered solely for impeachment purposes. 

 

2

Further, it would be unjust to conditionally deny Plaintiff’s motion on the mere offer that 

Defendants will dismiss their affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Defendants may, at any 

time, dismiss their counterclaims and affirmative defenses, but such a dismissal is no guarantee 

that the Court will permit Wyatt and Cano to testify. 

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B. The Turner Report

Because the Court strikes the McCune Report, Turner may not testify regarding The 

BarMaster’s technical flaws. This is because Turner himself does not have any expertise in radio 

frequencies or wireless communications, and stated in his deposition testimony that his technical 

knowledge of The BarMaster came from Dr. McCune’s Report. See, e.g., Turner Depo. Tr. at 

86:4-24; see also Dura at 614.

Plaintiff also seeks to strike and exclude portions of the Turner Report which it argues

“go[] far beyond the scope of authorized rebuttal.” Pl.’s Reply at 10. At oral argument on the 

motion, Plaintiff pointed to several specific portions of the Turner Report that it sought to strike: 

(1) Turner’s legal conclusions that CVT was a Ponzi scheme, that CVT failed to mitigate its 

damages, and that certain portions of the Neuberger Report had “no evidentiary value”; and (2) 

Turner’s testimony that CVT had “no patentable technology.”

As discussed by the Court at oral argument, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that these 

statements each go beyond the permissible scope of expert testimony. With regard to Turner’s 

legal conclusions, the Court STRIKES the section of Turner’s Report which states that CVT failed 

to mitigate its damages, see Turner Report, Part V.C at 16-17, and the portions of his Report 

which state that the Neuberger Report lacks evidentiary value. Further, the Court STRIKES 

Turner’s statement that “CVT had the elements of a [P]onzi scheme,” id. at 17, because Turner’s 

Report points to no evidence that money was being raised by CVT’s leadership in order to pay 

amounts due to other earlier investors. The phrase “Ponzi scheme” is a loaded term that Turner 

and Defendants shall not be permitted to put before a jury without such evidentiary support. 

As to Turner’s opinion that CVT had “no patentable IP,” see Turner Report at 17, the 

Court limits Turner’s opinion and testimony to statements that CVT held no issued patents, but 

otherwise excludes his opinion that CVT and its owners had no patentable technology. Turner 

professed no expertise in patents and cannot serve as a mouthpiece for McCune’s analyses of 

Plaintiff’s patent applications. See, e.g., Dura at 614. The Court otherwise DENIES Plaintiff’s 

motion to strike the Turner Report. 

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IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The McCune Report is STRICKEN, and McCune cannot testify at trial.

2. Turner may not rely on the opinions offered in the McCune Report in his testimony 

at trial, and any reference by Turner to McCune’s opinions is STRICKEN.

3. Messrs. Wyatt and Cano are precluded from testifying at trial. 

4. The Turner Report is STRICKEN IN PART as to the legal conclusions contained 

within and its opinion that CVT or its owners lacked patentable technology, and 

Turner shall not be permitted to testify at trial as to these opinions. Plaintiff’s 

motion to strike the Turner Report is otherwise DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:13-cv-02744-BLF Document 225 Filed 06/03/15 Page 12 of 12