Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01186/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01186-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cory Lane Tower, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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CIV 09-1186-PHX-MHM (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Cory Lane Tower, who is represented by attorneys Jess A. Lorona and

Gregory E. McClure, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. (Doc. 1.) On December 11, 2009, Respondents filed an Answer and, on February

8, 2010, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Docs. 10, 15.)

BACKGROUND

On July 17, 2005, officers responded to a 9-1-1 call that had been placed around 3:30

p.m., in reference to a shooting. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 5.) Officers from the Mesa

Police Department arrived and spoke with Lisa Tower, the wife of Petitioner. (Doc. 1, Exh.

E, attach. A at 5-6.) Lisa stated that she and Petitioner were in the process of divorcing, and

had met at about 3:00 p.m. that day to exchange custody of their three-year-old son. (Doc.

1, Exh. E, attach. A at 6.) During the exchange, she noticed Petitioner was crying and “fairly

emotional,” and “was hugging [their child] and kissing him, and she thought that was a little

abnormal.” (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 6-7.) After giving Petitioner their child, Lisa was

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1

 The State alleged murder in the first degree committed with premeditation, or in the

alternative, felony murder occurring in the course of Petitioner’s commission of first degree

burglary.

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returning to her home when she received a text message from Petitioner, informing her that

he had some of her mail; she again met with Petitioner to retrieve her mail, and then

continued to her residence. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 7.)

When she arrived home, she saw her boyfriend, Timothy Zaragoza, lying on the floor

in the bedroom, using his laptop computer. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 7.) Lisa joined him

on the floor, and a few moments later they heard the door slam, prompting Timothy to ask

“whose that”; Lisa responded that she “hope[d] it [was] the landlord.” (Doc. 1, Exh. E,

attach. A at 7.) The next thing Lisa heard “was a gunshot, and she turn[ed] over in time

enough to see [Petitioner] shoot Timothy one more time in the back.” (Doc. 1, Exh. E,

attach. A at 7.) For “a period of time after the shooting,” Petitioner “order[ed] Lisa’s

movements throughout the house” at gunpoint, and would not allow Lisa to “render any kind

of aid” to Timothy, or let her “phone the police department.” (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at

8.) Lisa thought she was going to be killed as well, and pleaded with Petitioner to not kill

her, and to leave their child with her. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 8.)

Petitioner eventually wrapped the gun he had used to shoot Timothy in a blue shirt,

and took it out of the house. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 8.) Petitioner gave their child (who

had been left outside in his car seat when Petitioner entered Lisa’s residence) to Lisa, and

then left the residence. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 8.) Approximately two-and-a-half to

three hours later, Petitioner turned himself in to the police. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 8.)

The gun Petitioner had used to kill Timothy was later found in the trunk of Petitioner’s

vehicle, wrapped in a blue shirt. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 9.)

On July 27, 2005, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on one

count of first degree murder, a class 1 dangerous felony,1

 one count of aggravated assault,

a class 3 dangerous felony, and one count of burglary in the first degree, a class 3 felony.

(Doc. 10, Exh. A.) On August 18, 2005, the State moved to amend the indictment to reflect

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the burglary offense was a class 2 felony, and that it occurred in a residential structure. (Doc.

10, Exh. B.)

On October 11, 2006, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to first degree murder, a class

1 dangerous felony, and aggravated assault, a class 3 dangerous felony. (Doc. 1, Exhs. A,

B.) As part of the plea agreement, the parties stipulated that Petitioner would be sentenced

to the Department of Corrections for a term of life with the possibility of parole after 25

calendar years, and that the court’s sentence on the aggravated assault offense would run

concurrently with the sentence for first degree murder. (Doc. 1, Exhs. A, B.)

Petitioner was, subsequently, sentenced to a term of life with the possibility of parole

after 25 calendar years on the first degree murder charge and 10 years’ imprisonment on the

aggravated assault charge to run concurrently with the sentence for first degree murder.

(Doc. 1, Exh. C.) Petitioner was awarded 490 days of presentence incarceration credit, and

was ordered to pay restitution to the victim’s family in the amount of $7,897.34. (Doc. 1,

Exh. C.)

On July 16, 2007, Petitioner through counsel filed an amended petition for postconviction relief raising the following issues:

(1) The recording of Petitioner’s conversation with his parents without notice

violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to representation by counsel. (Doc. 1, Exh.

E at 5-6.)

(2) Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel was denied. (Doc. 1, Exh. E at 6-10.)

(3) Petitioner’s guilty plea was unlawfully induced. (Doc. 1, Exh. E at 10-11.)

(4) The court’s failure to grant a continuance constituted a violation of Petitioner’s

right to due process of law. (Doc. 1, Exh. E at 12-13.)

The State filed its response to the petition, and Petitioner’s counsel filed a reply to the State’s

response. (Doc. 10, Exhs. C, D.) On October 12, 2007, the trial court summarily dismissed

the petition. (Doc. 1, Exh. F.)

On November 14, 2007, Petitioner’s counsel filed a petition for review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals, requesting review on the following issues:

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1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there was no

colorable claim for relief based on the recording of [Petitioner’s] conversation

with his parents without notice and after [Petitioner] had exercised his right to

counsel.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief where [Petitioner] had presented a colorable claim

that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel was denied.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief where [Petitioner] had presented a colorable claim

that his plea was unlawfully induced.

4. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the Petition for PostConviction Relief even though the court’s failure to grant a continuance

violated Petitioner’s Right to Due Process of Law.

5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Petitioner’s

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in light of the above claims.

(Doc. 1, Exh. G.) On June 3, 2008, the appellate court entered its order summarily denying

review. (Doc. 1, Exh. H.)

On June 2, 2009, Petitioner through counsel filed the instant Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises four grounds for relief:

(1) Petitioner’s right to representation by counsel was violated when his

conversation with his parents was recorded without his knowledge (Doc. 1 at 4-6);

(2) Petitioner was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel (Doc. 1 at 6-

11);

(3) Petitioner’s guilty plea was unlawfully induced (Doc. 1 at 11-12); and

(4) The trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for a continuance violated

Petitioner’s right to due process (Doc. 1 at 12-14).

On December 11, 2009, Respondents filed an Answer and, on February 8, 2010, Petitioner

filed a Reply. (Docs. 10, 15.)

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Grounds One through Four as set forth in

Petitioner’s habeas petition fail on the merits. As such, Respondents request that the Court

deny each of Petitioner’s claims and dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with

prejudice.

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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Pursuant to the AEDPA2

, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). “When applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last

reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

A. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his right to representation by counsel was

violated when his conversation with his parents was recorded without his knowledge.

On July 17, 2005, Lisa Tower was interviewed by a detective with the Mesa Police

Department at Police Headquarters, regarding the aggravated assault and murder charges

pending against Petitioner; Detective Faulkner monitored the interview. (Doc. 10, Exh. C,

app. 1.) After monitoring the interview, Detective Faulkner began his DVD and audio

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recorded interview with Petitioner in the Violent Crimes Interview Room at Police

Headquarters. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) After being advised of his Miranda rights,

Petitioner invoked his right to have an attorney present; Detective Faulkner did not ask

Petitioner any more questions, and left the interview room. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.)

A short time later, Detective Faulkner learned that Petitioner’s parents were at the

police station. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) Detective Faulkner went to the lobby to meet with

them, and Petitioner’s stepfather asked if they could speak with Petitioner “before he was

booked.” (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) Detective Faulkner then asked Petitioner if he wanted

to speak with his parents, and he indicated that he did. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) Detective

Faulker escorted the parents into the interview room. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) Detective

Faulkner let the DVD continue to record and “watched and listened to their meeting in the

monitoring room.” (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) Portions of the conversation between

Petitioner and his parents included the following:

1:27:20 – [Petitioner] – I’m so sorry, I had to.

1:28:15 – [Stepfather] – What provoked this son?

[Petitioner] – I had enough.

1:28:28 – [Stepfather] – Did you go there with the intention to do that or did

he provoke it after you got there?

[Petitioner] – No, I walked right in.

1:30:08 – [Mother] – Did he know it was coming, did he even know what you

were going to do?

[Petitioner] – I have no idea. He was playing poker or something,

laying down on the floor.

1:36:18 – [Mother] – Did you bring them the gun?

[Petitioner] – It was in the trunk.

1:36:34 – [Petitioner] – I don’t know what kept me from not doing her too.

1:36:50 – [Stepfather] – Was she in the room when this all happened, what did

she say?

[Petitioner] – Nods head in the affirmative. I can’t remember, I don’t

know.

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1:38:20 – [Mother] – Did you go in to kill him or just shoot him or just scare

him, what do you think?

[Petitioner] – As soon as she told me that, I drove around for two

minutes and went straight to the house. I opened the door and walked

right in, walked into the bedroom where they were at and saw them

laying there on the floor, and that was it.

1:39:12 – [Petitioner] – After it was done, she had talked me into giving [our

son] back to her. Like ok, I’m done. I gotta go.

1:39:56 – [Petitioner] – I just messed up my entire life.

1:46:37 – [Mother] – I wish you would have gone to anger management or

something.

[Petitioner] – I was thinking about that too.

(Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.)

Relying on Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), Petitioner argues that the

conduct of the officers in recording his conversation with his parents was a surreptitious use

of his parents as agents for the State and thus, any admissions made during that conversation

were unconstitutional. Petitioner states that the officers knew or should have known that his

conversation with his parents was reasonably likely to produce an incriminating response.

Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s failure to apply the holdings of Moulton is contrary to

or an unreasonable application of Federal law.

In Moulton, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated if

the state knowingly circumvents the right to counsel by a confrontation between the accused

and a state agent. See id. at 176. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the state

violated the Sixth Amendment right of a defendant when it arranged to record conversations

between the defendant and a codefendant who was operating as an undercover agent for the

state. See id. at 176-77. The codefendant had agreed to cooperate with the prosecution, and

the state placed a wire on him so he could record a face-to-face meeting between him and the

defendant. See id.

Petitioner’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment decision in Moulton

is misplaced. Pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a state criminal defendant

has the right to assistance of counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-43

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(1963). This right “is triggered at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been

initiated ... whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,

or arraignment.” Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The right also attaches at “critical stages” where there is a risk that the absence of

counsel might undermine a defendant’s right to a fair trial. See United States v. Wade, 388

U.S. 218, 228 (1967); see also Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A

‘critical stage’ is a trial-like confrontation in which potential substantial prejudice to the

defendant’s rights inheres and in which counsel may help avoid that prejudice.” (internal

quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)). Critical stages do not include, however,

events “that t[ake] place long before the commencement of any prosecution whatever.”

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).

Here, the conversation at issue between Petitioner and his parents occurred on July

17, 2005, within a few hours of the shooting. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1; Doc. 1, Exh. E, app.

A at 11) Within a few hours of the conclusion of that conversation, Petitioner was booked

into jail on charges of First Degree Murder, Aggravated Assault, and Burglary in the First

Degree. (Id.) A criminal complaint was filed on July 20, 2005. (Doc. 10, Exh. A at 3.) The

Indictment was returned against Petitioner on July 27, 2005. (Doc. 10, Exh. A.) Because

Petitioner had not yet been formally charged when he spoke to his parents, he did not have

a Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, as such, the Court’s Sixth Amendment precedent

does not apply. See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-90 (“The initiation of judicial criminal

proceedings is far from a mere formalism. ... It is this point, therefore, that marks the

commencement of the criminal prosecutions to which alone the explicit guarantees of the

Sixth Amendment are applicable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States

v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 667 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Because no formal charges were

pending against [the defendant] at the time of the surreptitious taping, it follows that ... [the

defendant’s] Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.”).

The Fifth Amendment, however, provides that an individual cannot “be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444

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(1966), the Court held that protection of the privilege against self-incrimination during

pretrial questioning requires the application of special procedural safeguards, specifically that

prior to any questioning, a person “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that

any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to

the presence of an attorney ... .” Once an accused has expressed a desire “to deal with the

police only through counsel,” he is not subject to further interrogation by police until counsel

has been made available, or unless the accused initiates further exchanges with the police.

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).

The Court clarified the directives of Miranda in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,

300-01 (1980), where it concluded that “the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever

a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.

That is to say, the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning,

but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant

to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from the suspect.” The Court also noted that “[t]he latter portion of

this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent

of the police.” Id.

Applying Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment reasoning as set forth in Moulton to the Fifth

Amendment context in the instant matter, Petitioner still cannot show that his parents were

acting as agents of the police or that the police interrogated him. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300

(“[T]he special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect

is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to

interrogation.”). Initially, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his parents were used as either

witting or unwitting agents of the police to elicit incriminating statements. First, there was

no clear motive for the police to enlist Petitioner’s parents’ assistance, given that Lisa was

an eyewitness to the murder and gave a statement to the police on the day of the murder,

telling them that Petitioner shot Timothy as she and he were lying on the bedroom floor.

(Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) The gun used to commit the offenses was found in Petitioner’s

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trunk, wrapped in a blue shirt just as Lisa had described to the police. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app.

1.) Second, Petitioner’s mother and stepfather voluntarily went to the police station and

requested to speak to Petitioner, and Petitioner indicated in response that he wanted to speak

to them. Specifically, the record shows that after Detective Faulkner left the Violent Crimes

Interview Room at Police Headquarters, he learned that Petitioner’s parents were at the

police station. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) Detective Faulkner went to the lobby to meet with

them, and Petitioner’s stepfather asked if they could speak with Petitioner “before he was

booked.” (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) Detective Faulkner then asked Petitioner if he wanted

to speak with his parents, and Petitioner indicated that he did. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.)

Detective Faulker escorted the parents into the interview room. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.)

Not only has Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his parents were acting as agents of

the police, Petitioner also cannot show that the police interrogated him within the meaning

of Miranda. The Supreme Court has explained that “‘[i]nterrogation,’ as conceptualized in

the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent

in custody itself.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.

Under certain circumstances, questioning by third parties may result in the “functional

equivalent” of police interrogation. For instance, in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987),

the defendant argued that he was subject to interrogation when the police allowed him to

speak with his wife in the presence of a police officer. See id. at 527. The Supreme Court

concluded that Mauro’s conversation with his wife did not constitute interrogation because

Mauro “was not subjected to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct

questioning,” and there was no evidence that “the officers sent Mrs. Mauro in to see her

husband for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements.” Id. at 528-29. Although the

officers were aware that Mauro might incriminate himself during the conversation with his

wife, the Court concluded that “[o]fficers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that

he will incriminate himself.” Id. at 529.

Petitioner appears to argue that he was subjected to the “functional equivalent” of

interrogation when he confessed to his parents because the police “knew or should have

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known that Petitioner’s conversation with his parents was reasonably likely to produce an

incriminating response.” In Mauro, the Court stressed that the purpose of Miranda is to

“prevent[] government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract

confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment.” 481 U.S. at 529-530.

For coercion to be present, the suspect must perceive that the pressure to speak is emanating

from the police. See id. Here, there is no evidence that Petitioner felt coerced by police

conduct. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) This is also not a case in which private questioning was

given the stamp of official authority, see, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981)

(questioning by court-appointed competency psychiatrist implicated defendant’s Miranda

rights), nor in which government officials forced a suspect to answer a third party’s

questions. See, e.g., Wilson v. O'Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding

Miranda applicable where sheriff detained defendant against his will in a vacant lot so

husband of victim could interrogate him). See also United States v. Gaddy, 894 F.2d 1307,

1311 (11th Cir. 1990) (suspect in custody was not interrogated when aunt, who was employed

by the police department but acted as a private citizen when conversing with her nephew,

urged him to tell police what he knew about a crime); Snethen v. Nix, 885 F.2d 456, 457 (8th

Cir. 1989) (suspect in custody was not interrogated when he confessed after a conversation

with his mother, who had told police before the conversation that “if [my son] did this, he

will tell me”); Endress v. Dugger, 880 F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1989) (detective who was

close friend of defendant and visited defendant to inquire on his well-being rather than at

direction of officer connected with investigation did not subject defendant to “functional

equivalent of interrogation,” and thus, statements made by defendant to detective were not

obtained in violation of Miranda ). 

Rather, the entire conversation between Petitioner and his parents appears to be that

of a son attempting to justify his conduct to some degree and apologizing for his actions, and

distraught parents asking “what” happened. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) Petitioner’s parents

questioned Petitioner on their own initiative and with no scripting or encouragement from

the police, and the police never instructed Petitioner that he had to speak to his parents.

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(Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) The record further illustrates that Petitioner initiated the

conversation and willingly responded to his parents’ questions about the incident in question.

(Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.)

Petitioner, however, asserts that the surreptitious recording of his conversation with

his parents was unconstitutional. Although Petitioner has not raised the issue, the Court first

notes that under the circumstances of this case, Petitioner had no reasonable expectation of

privacy. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962) (rejecting the notion

that the visiting room of a public jail is a constitutionally protected area where “official

surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77

F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (pretrial detainee did not have a subjective or reasonable

expectation of privacy in telephone calls from jail at Metropolitan Detention Center);

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1994) (Officer was within

constitutional bounds where he recorded an arrestee’s telephone conversation in the police

station. The arrestee had the conversation within a few feet of an officer. Even though he

conducted the conversation in Thai, the court found that the arrestee “could not reasonably

expect any privacy during his conversation”). As previously indicated, the conversation

between Petitioner and his parents took place in the actively monitored Violent Crimes

Interview Room at Police Headquarters where Petitioner’s statements were initially being

recorded with Detective Faulkner and where various other detectives undoubtedly came and

went. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.) Further, the record fails to contain any references to

representations or inquiries made as to privacy or confidentiality. There is simply no

indication that Petitioner was lulled into believing that he and his parents could speak in

private or that he was lured into a false sense of security by misrepresentations made by the

police. Similarly, although it may be deeply disconcerting to parents who unwittingly

provide evidence incriminating their child, there exists no clearly established federal law

holding that Petitioner had a right to confidential communications with his parents. See

United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There is no judicially or

legislatively recognized general ‘family’ privilege ... .”). As such, Petitioner could not have

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had a subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy during the conversation with his

parents in this instance.

Furthermore, statements are not considered to be coerced or involuntary as violative

of Miranda, merely because the speakers are unaware that their statements are being

recorded. See Williams v. Nelson, 457 F.2d 376, 377 (9th Cir. 1972) (concluding that the

police recording of a defendant’s conversation with his co-defendant – without the

knowledge of either, by means of a concealed microphone – while the two were alone in an

interrogation room did “not constitute coercion”); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292,

298 (1990) (holding that an incarcerated suspect who made incriminating statements to an

undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate was not subjected to a

custodial interrogation); Siripongs, 35 F.3d at 319-20 (surreptitious recording of telephone

call in jail by corrections officer standing nearby with a hidden recorder did not violate

inmate’s rights because his statements were not uttered in response to any interrogation).

In sum, the Court finds that Petitioner “was not subjected to compelling influences,

psychological ploys, or direct questioning,” from police to properly be considered the

functional equivalent of a police interrogation, and there is no evidence that Petitioner’s

parents acted as agents for the police for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements.

Therefore, the Court concludes that the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary

to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner contends in Ground Two that he was denied the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Specifically, he alleges that he was denied effective assistance when his counsel

“failed to file a motion to suppress his surreptitiously recorded confession, waited over three

weeks from appointment until initially meeting with his client, waited over ten months to get

Petitioner professionally evaluated, and portrayed an unwillingness to proceed to trial but

rather was prepared only to settle the case through a plea agreement.”

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail

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on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88.

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional judgment

in making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of counsel’s performance under Strickland

is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.), judgment rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden

is on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining

whether prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14.

“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

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prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

The two-prong test set forth in Strickland also applies to challenges to guilty pleas

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). A

defendant who pleads guilty based on the advice of counsel may attack the voluntary and

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel

fell below the level of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See id. at 56.

To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, “the defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

In reviewing a state court’s resolution of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

the Court considers whether the state court applied Strickland unreasonably:

For [a petitioner] to succeed [on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim], ...

he must do more than show that he would have satisfied Strickland’stest if his

claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1),

it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent

judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, he

must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an

objectively unreasonable manner.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (“Under § 2254(d)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause,

a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather,

it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts

of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”) (citations omitted).

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the state court did not unreasonably

apply Strickland. The Court will recommend that Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground

Two be denied.

1. Failed to file a motion to suppress his surreptitiously recorded confession

Petitioner first asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel

failed to file a motion to suppress his surreptitiously recorded conversation with his parents.

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Petitioner claims that counsel did not move to have his recorded conversation with his

parents suppressed despite a strong argument that the State’s procurement of the taped

confession was a violation of his Miranda rights.

Although such conduct can constitute deficient performance, there was no prejudice

in this instance. An attorney’s failure to make a meritless objection or motion does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th

Cir. 2000) (citing Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985)). “To show prejudice

under Strickland from failure to file a motion, a defendant must show that (1) had his counsel

filed the motion, it is reasonable that the state court would have granted it as meritorious, and

(2) had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that there would have been an outcome more

favorable to him.” Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Kimmelman

v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-75 (1986) (so stating with respect to failure to file a motion

to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds). Here, Petitioner refers to counsel’s failure to

file a motion to suppress alleging a violation of his Miranda rights when the police recorded

his conversation with his parents. As discussed in connection with Ground One, however,

there was no such error. Since any such motion would have been denied, there was no

prejudice to Petitioner.

2. Waited over three weeks until initially meeting with Petitioner

Next, Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when

counsel did not contact Petitioner until over three weeks after he had been assigned to

Petitioner’s case. Petitioner makes a conclusory attack on the resulting prejudice of defense

counsel’s strategy alleging that “[t]his [delay] had an impact on important aspects of the

defense such as getting defendant professionally and timely evaluated, and investigating

certain evidence and procedures particular to this case.”

Again, while in some instances such conduct can constitute deficient performance,

there was no prejudice. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that had counsel met with him

three weeks earlier “he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

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3. Waited over ten months to get Petitioner professionally evaluated

Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel

did not arrange a professional evaluation of Petitioner until over ten months after the incident

at issue happened. Petitioner claims that “[e]stablishing the accused’s state of mind at the

time of an alleged first degree murder is an essential element of the prosecution’s case in a

criminal proceeding, thus also becoming an important tool for the defense. Consequently,

waiting ten months to have [Petitioner] professionally evaluated diluted the chances that the

evaluation would be an accurate representation of Petitioner’s state of mind at the time of the

murder.”

Petitioner has, once again, failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the timing

of his psychological evaluation. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. In any event, the record

demonstrates that Petitioner was evaluated more than four months prior to entering his plea

of guilty, giving defense counsel Petitioner’s relevant psychological information well in

advance of any plea being entered by Petitioner. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. C.)

4. Portrayed an unwillingness to proceed to trial

Lastly, Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his

counsel portrayed an unwillingness to proceed to trial but rather was prepared only to settle

the case through a plea agreement. Petitioner states that he was under severe time-pressure

with respect to making a decision on the plea agreement and argues that counsel’s eagerness

to settle the case through a plea agreement coupled with counsel’s assertions that the plea

was Petitioner’s only chance to get out of jail, undoubtedly prejudiced Petitioner in his

decision to take the plea.

Petitioner makes a conclusory attack on defense counsel’s strategy. The Court,

however, fails to find deficient performance. Here, the evidence against Petitioner was

overwhelming. Not only was there eyewitness testimony of the murder, but the gun used to

kill the victim was found in the trunk of Petitioner’s vehicle, wrapped in the blue shirt just

as Lisa had described to the police. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, attach. A at 7-9.) Other admissible

evidence which would have been used against Petitioner was the fact he voluntarily turned

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himself in to the police and the, subsequent, admissions made to his parents soon after the

murder had occurred. (Doc. 10, Exh. C, app. 1.)

The weight of the evidence against Petitioner, coupled with the very real concern that

if convicted, Petitioner may have been sentenced to a natural life term with no hope of ever

being released from prison, prevents Petitioner from establishing that counsel’s

representation was objectively unreasonable in advising Petitioner to enter a plea in this case.

See Coleman, 150 F.3d at 1113; Bonin, 59 F.3d at 833.

C. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner’s claims that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced.

Petitioner states that he “pled guilty to felony murder, mere hours after telling the judge he

did not fully understand the plea, while at the same time working under time-pressure, and

continued pressure from [defense counsel] to enter into the plea agreement ... .”

The record, however, establishes that Petitioner voluntarily entered into the plea

agreement with the State, and that the State extended its regular plea deadlines in order to

allow Petitioner additional time to make a decision regarding the plea. (Doc. 1, Exh. G,

attach. D, E.) For example, during the trial management conference held on October 11,

2006, the court, counsel and Petitioner addressed various provisions of the proposed plea

agreement. (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D.) The court explained that the principal inducement

for the plea was that if convicted at trial, Petitioner would be eligible for a natural life

sentence and/or consecutive sentences, but the proposed plea agreement took those sentences

“off the table.” (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 6.) When asked if he understood the various

terms of the agreement, Petitioner stated, “[n]ot one hundred percent, sir.” (Doc. 1, Exh. G,

attach. D at 6.) The following discussion then took place:

THE COURT: What is it that you do not understand, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: I was not aware of the felony murder side of it, and I

don’t understand what that exactly entails.

THE COURT: It means that the State can allege and prove alternative theories

to the jury. One is that the alleged murder was premeditated, or if not

premeditated, it was committed in the course of committing another predicate

felony. Another felony was being committed, and in the course of conducting

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that felony, a murder took place. So the State has the option to prove either of

those or both theories to the jury, and the jury can then choose whether they

believe beyond a reasonable doubt that you committed either a first degree

murder, a felony murder, or both. They can do a combination of that.

So you have been charged with both, and the State can argue those alternative

theories to the jury at the same time. Either one of those. Premeditated and

felony murder are both first degree murder. That’s the distinction.

State want to add anything to that explanation?

[THE PROSECUTOR]: Just that under our theory under the felony murder is

the burglary, so that basically we would argue as part of our theory, that in

addition to premeditation, that the defendant entered the residential structure

with a weapon with the intent to commit a felony therein, the murder and the

aggravated assault, and that in doing so, cause the death of another person in

this case, Tim Zaragoza. So that, obviously, would not require any proof of

premeditation.

(Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 7-8.) The prosecutor then informed the court that the plea offer

expired that day, that office policies had already been extended beyond normal limits in

Petitioner’s case, and that there would be no other offer. (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 8.)

Regarding the issue of felony murder, later in the proceedings defense counsel

informed the court:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, if I could just put one last thing on the record.

My client, Mr. Tower, indicated he wasn’t aware of the felony – that they may

proceed under felony murder. For the defense’s purposes, we treat the mental

state in this case pretty much the same, because the State is going to have to

show the intent to enter, and so his mental state is really what’s been at issue,

and that’s how we have treated it all along. So I just wanted to make that for

the record.

(Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 11.)

As to the expiration of the plea offer, the prosecutor informed the court that the

victim’s family had traveled to the court proceedings, and that they wanted to be present for

any change of plea entered by Petitioner. (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 8, 11.) The

prosecutor pointed out that defense counsel had her cell phone number, she was available if

Petitioner wanted to enter a plea later that day, but that after that day there would be no other

offer. (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 11.)

In addition, during the change of plea proceeding, Petitioner was asked by the court

whether he had signed and initialed each paragraph of the plea agreement, to which Petitioner

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replied, “[y]es, I did, of my own free will.” (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. E at 3-4.) When

specifically questioned if he “had an opportunity to discuss with [his] attorney everything

that’s in [the plea] agreement before [he] did that,” Petitioner responded, “[y]es, I did.”

(Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. E at 3-4.) When questioned if he understood the stipulations in the

plea agreement and whether the sentencing provisions had been explained to him, Petitioner

answered in the affirmative, and the following discussion ensued:

THE COURT: Other than what is contained in writing in this plea agreement,

are there any additional promises that were made to you by anyone to induce

you to enter into this agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: None whatsoever.

THE COURT: Anyone threaten you, sir, or force you to enter into this

agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Tower, I need you to again affirm to me that you are doing

this voluntarily and of your own free will.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. E at 6.) The court verified that Petitioner understood that by

pleading guilty he was waiving his rights, including the right to confront and cross-examine

witnesses, to present his own evidence, to have his witnesses testify on his behalf, to testify

in his own defense, and the right to remain silent. (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. E at 6-8.) After

confirming Petitioner’s understanding of the rights he was waiving, the court found

Petitioner’s plea was “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.” (Doc. 1, Exh. G,

attach. E at 10.) 

The foregoing illustrates that Petitioner voluntarily and knowingly entered into the

plea agreement with the State, and that there was no coercion or duress prompting him to do

so. Petitioner confirmed he wished to enter a plea agreement, acknowledged there were no

promises made other than those contained in the agreement to induce his plea, and affirmed

he had discussed all of the terms of the agreement with his counsel prior to entering his plea.

Furthermore, Petitioner specifically stated he was entering the plea voluntarily and of his

own free will, without threats or force being used to coerce his plea.

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Thus, the Court finds that the court’s determination that Petitioner failed to present

a colorable claim for relief on the ground his plea was unlawfully induced was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

D. Ground Four

Petitioner asserts in Ground Four that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a 30-

day continuance during the course of the trial management conference so that Petitioner

could “assess the plea agreement,” and investigate the possibility of having another attorney

“look at the case,” was a denial of his right to due process of law.

During the course of the trial management conference, the court addressed the

scheduling of the trial, and indicated to counsel that the court could begin trial in five days,

on October 16, 2006, or alternatively, on “the 18th or the 19th” of October. (Doc. 1, Exh.

G, attach. D at 3-4.) Defense counsel then informed the court:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, from our perspective, that would be fine. We

have no objection to that. However, as I made the Court aware at the bench

with [the prosecutor], the family has approached me, and because it is a very

emotional case for the family, as well as to Mr. Tower, and the stakes are very

high to everybody involved, it is their desire, as I made the Court aware, that

they want to get a little extra time, possibly thirty days, so that they can have

the opportunity to assess the plea agreement, as well as maybe have another

lawyer look at the case.

I have assured them that a continuance may or may not happen, but I am going

to make that request to the Court at this time.

(Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 4.) The court then responded:

Well, Mr. Tower and his family can have another attorney look at this at any

point in time. If we are talking about a new attorney coming in cold to this

case, I wouldn’t expect that any attorney would be able to be prepared for trial

in thirty days. If we are talking about just looking and considering the plea,

that’s another matter, and they can do that at any point in time.

(Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 4-5.) Then, the court inquired as to whether a plea had been

offered to Petitioner, and when it would expire; the prosecutor informed the parties that the

plea offer would expire that day, and there would be no other offer. (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach.

D at 5, 8, 11.) After hearing the status of the plea, the court stated:

[Defense counsel], Mr. Tower, you understand the plea expires today, and the

offering of a plea and the terms of a plea are within the sole discretion of the

prosecutor’s office. I do not have the authority to change that. Your attorney

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certainly does not have the authority to change that. If the State says the plea

expires today, it expires today, and there is nothing that the Court or [defense

counsel] can do to change that. If the State changes it, they can, but that’s

completely in their discretion.

Given all of that information, [defense counsel], I am not inclined to continue

this matter for thirty days. I think I will – in fact, I’d like to set it now for trial,

for jury selection the afternoon of the 18th, and then ask you to call my staff

on the 16th to firm that up. I mean, there is a possibility it could get bumped

up until the 19th, but I would like to plan on selecting the jury on the afternoon

of the 18th.

(Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 9.) Defense counsel then requested that the offer be left open

until 5:00 p.m. that day, so that he could discuss matters with Petitioner and his family.

(Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 9-10.)

“The matter of a continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge,

and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party

fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. Contrariwise, a myopic

insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the

right to defend with counsel an empty formality. There are no mechanical tests for deciding

when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be

found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the

trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)

(internal citations omitted); see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (“broad discretion

must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary

‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates the

right to assistance of counsel”). Additionally, even if the continuance was improperly

denied, habeas relief is not available unless there is a showing of actual prejudice to

petitioner’s defense resulting from the refusal to grant a continuance. See Gallego v.

McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1997).

In considering whether the denial of a continuance implicating a defendant’s right to

counsel is an abuse of discretion, the Ninth Circuit has applied these factors: (1) whether the

continuance would inconvenience witnesses, the court, counsel, or the litigants; (2) whether

other continuances have been granted; (3) whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay; (4)

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whether the delay is the defendant’s fault; and (5) whether a denial would prejudice the

defendant. See United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 314 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing United

States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Garrett, 179

F.3d 1143, 1145-47 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc).

Here, the trial court did not act arbitrarily in denying the motion for a continuance.

The application of the factors identified by the Ninth Circuit to Petitioner’s claim leads to the

conclusion that this was not a case of a judge with a “myopic insistence upon expeditiousness

in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. As indicated, during

the course of the trial management conference, counsel for Petitioner requested a 30-day

continuance “so that [Petitioner’s family] can have the opportunity to assess the plea

agreement, as well as maybe have another lawyer look at the case.” Prior to ruling on the

issue, the court ascertained the status of plea negotiations, and pointed out that if a

continuance were granted, Petitioner would still forfeit his opportunity to enter into a plea

agreement. (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 9.) If Petitioner had been granted a continuance,

not only would the plea agreement have been withdrawn, but it is unreasonable to believe the

continuance would have served a useful purpose since the weight of the evidence against

Petitioner was overwhelming and, as set forth by the court, “[i]f we are talking about a new

attorney coming in cold to this case, I wouldn’t expect that any attorney would be able to be

prepared for trial in thirty days.” (Doc. 1, Exh. G, attach. D at 4-5.)

On these facts, the denial of Petitioner’s request for a continuance was neither

arbitrary, nor fundamentally unfair. Consequently, denial of post-conviction relief was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that the claims set forth in Petitioner’s habeas petition fail on the

merits, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 13th day of July, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-01186-MHM Document 16 Filed 07/13/10 Page 24 of 24