Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01767/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01767-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Although the motion to dismiss was originally filed only by Defendant City of

Phoenix, Defendants City of Phoenix Police Department, Jack Harris, Frank Fairbanks, and

Joe Knott join in the motion to dismiss. See Doc. # 8. Hence, the Court will address the

motion to dismiss as if filed by all named Defendants.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David H. Barnes; Trisha Barnes, husband

and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

City of Phoenix, a political subdivision of

the State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 09-1767-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Defendants City of Phoenix, City of Phoenix Police

Department, Jack Harris, Frank Fairbanks, and Joe Knott’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 2).1

For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that they sustained injuries and damages as a result of intentional

retaliation on the part of Defendants. In August 2008, Plaintiff David Barnes, an officer with

the City of Phoenix Police Department, was demoted from a homicide unit to a patrol unit.

Plaintiffs allege that this demotion was the direct result of Plaintiff David Barnes’ disclosure

Case 2:09-cv-01767-JAT Document 16 Filed 10/22/09 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

of mis-management and abuse of authority within the Phoenix crime lab. Specifically,

Plaintiffs allege five causes of action: 1) violation of A.R.S. § 38-352 and common law

whistle blower and retaliation; 2) violation of Plaintiffs’ due process rights; 3) intentional

infliction of emotional distress; 4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and 5) loss of

consortium.

ANALYSIS

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the

defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 47 (1957)). 

Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires “more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The factual allegations

of the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Id.

Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.

Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could

satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also

‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure §1202, pp. 94, 95(3d ed. 2004)).

Rule 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that offers nothing more than naked assertions will

not suffice. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. At 1949. Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual content that allows

Case 2:09-cv-01767-JAT Document 16 Filed 10/22/09 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility requires more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts

that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the facts

alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and the

Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States,

234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true

a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986).

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that: 1) Plaintiffs’ notice of claim under

A.R.S. § 12-821.01 fails as a matter of law; 2) Phoenix Police Department is a non-jural

entity incapable of being sued; 3) Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements

propounded in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

658 (1978); 4) Plaintiffs fail to properly allege a liberty or property interest secured by the

Fourteenth Amendment; and 5) Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages. In response,

Plaintiffs argue only that they properly adhered to the notice of claim requirements. In

addition, Plaintiffs agree to dismiss all claims against the City of Phoenix Police Department,

as well as Count II–violation of Plaintiffs’ due process rights–against the City of Phoenix.

In their reply in support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants withdraw their argument that

Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice of claim requirements. Accordingly, all that is

properly before the Court based upon Defendants’ motion to dismiss is whether Plaintiffs

may recover punitive damages, and whether Plaintiffs claim in Count II is viable against

Defendants Jack Harris, Frank Fairbanks, and Joe Knott.

Punitive Damages

Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants argument that Plaintiffs are precluded from

recovering punitive damages in this case. Such a failure is grounds alone for granting

Case 2:09-cv-01767-JAT Document 16 Filed 10/22/09 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Defendants’ motion with respect to punitive damages. See LRCiv. 7.2(i). Nevertheless, even

in reaching the merits of Defendants’ contention, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs are

precluded from recovering punitive damages in this case.

Plaintiffs’ are precluded from recovering punitive damages under Count II, as

municipalities and their agents are immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Plaintiffs are precluded

from recovering punitive damages on their state law claims under Counts I, III, IV, and V by

A.R.S. § 12-820.04, which mandates that “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee

acting within the scope of his employment is liable for punitive or exemplary damages.”

Because punitive damages are expressly precluded on all of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court

grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to punitive damages.

Count II

In their response to Defendants motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs state that “Plaintiffs

further agree that their claim for violation of Civil Rights-Due Process rights against the City

of Phoenix may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a) Fed.R.Civ.P. Plaintiffs are dismissing

only this claim against the City of Phoenix. This agreement to dismiss should not be

interpreted to dismiss any of Plaintiffs’ other claims against the City of Phoenix or any other

defendant.” (Doc. # 14 at p. 4.) It is not clear from this statement whether Plaintiffs intend

to dismiss Count II against all defendants, but no other claims against the City of Phoenix

or any other Defendant; or, whether Plaintiffs intended to pursue Count II against Defendants

Jack Harris, Frank Fairbanks, and Joe Knott but not Defendant City of Phoenix. As such, the

Court will address Defendants’ argument as though Plaintiffs intend to pursue their claims

under Count II against Defendants Jack Harris, Frank Fairbanks, and Joe Knott but not

Defendant City of Phoenix.

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of

Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Accordingly, a person must be

deprived of an interest secured by the Fourteenth Amendment before due process concerns

Case 2:09-cv-01767-JAT Document 16 Filed 10/22/09 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

arise. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not give rise to a deprivation of property or liberty interests

such that the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated.

Although demoted from a detective unit to a patrol unit, Plaintiff David Barnes was

nevertheless still employed by the City of Phoenix Police Department. Hence, Plaintiffs’ due

process claims are not for continued employment by a governmental employer, but what

amounts to a loss of overtime and use of a city vehicle. State law defines what property

interests are subject to the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brady v.

Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1548 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs do not allege that Arizona law

created a property interest in overtime pay and the use of a city vehicle for Plaintiff David

Barnes. Such losses do not amount to a deprivation of one’s property interest under the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ main allegations with respect to Count II involve assertions that

Defendants failed to conduct a proper investigation as required by Phoenix Police

Department internal policy and procedure manuals, or otherwise adhere to such policies and

procedures while conducting the investigation that led to Plaintiff David Barnes’ demotion.

Even assuming Defendants did not follow their own internal policies and procedures, such

violations amount only to violations of an internal process, and not the type of due process

protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d

419, 441 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Plaintiffs provide no authority for their suggestion that a federal

due process claim lies whenever a local entity deviates from its own procedures in enacting

a local regulation.”).

Regardless, even if the Court assumed that Plaintiffs’ due process rights were violated,

Plaintiffs’ due process claims are effectively barred. Plaintiffs due process claims against

Defendants Jack Harris, Frank Fairbanks, and Joe Knott are precluded by the doctrine of

qualified immunity. “Government officials are given qualified immunity from civil liability

under § 1983 ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Jensen v. City of

Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

Case 2:09-cv-01767-JAT Document 16 Filed 10/22/09 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

818 (1982)). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Due Process Clause by not

adhering to policies and procedures contained in the City of Phoenix Police Department’s

internal manual. To require a police department to strictly adhere to its internal policies in

conducting an investigation or face claims under Section 1983 for Due Process Clause

violations would amount to an additional due process requirement above and beyond the

requirements contained in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Therefore, Defendants

Jack Harris, Frank Fairbanks, and Joe Knott would be entitled to qualified immunity, as such

a requirement was not “clearly established” at the time of the events in question. Jensen, 145

F.3d at 1085.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants City of Phoenix, City of Phoenix Police

Department, Jack Harris, Frank Fairbanks, and Joe Knott’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 2) is

granted in part and denied in part as follows: Defendant City of Phoenix Police Department

is dismissed without prejudice as a party to this case; Plaintiffs’ claims under Count II of the

complaint is dismissed; Plaintiffs are precluded from recovering punitive damages in this

case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing all fictitious Defendants because the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit the use of fictitious defendants.

DATED this 21st day of October, 2009.

Case 2:09-cv-01767-JAT Document 16 Filed 10/22/09 Page 6 of 6