Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00310/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00310-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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28 This motion was determined suitable for decision without *

oral argument. (Order, May 19, 2006, 3-4). 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN & CASSANDRA SPRINGER, ) 02:06-cv-0310-GEB-DAD

Individually and as Guardians Ad )

Litem for their minor children )

CAMERON S. and CHRISTIAN S., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER 

*

)

COUNTY OF PLACER, THOMAS LIND, )

individually and as an employee of )

the COUNTY OF PLACER, RHONDA )

LARSON, individually and as an )

employee of the COUNTY OF PLACER, )

DAVID JOHNSON, individually and as )

an employee of the COUNTY OF )

PLACER, JENNIFER COOK, )

individually and as an employee of ) 

the COUNTY OF PLACER, DEBBIE )

MORRIS, individually and as an )

employee of the COUNTY OF PLACER, ) 

LISA GRIMALDI, individually and as )

an employee of the COUNTY OF )

PLACER, and Does 1-10 inclusive. )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. section

1983 (“section 1983") claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), and request that the Court decline to excise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims if the

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28 All references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of 1

Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

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section 1983 claims are dismissed. Plaintiffs filed an untimely 1

opposition to the motion. (See Order, May 19, 2006.) 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs John and Cassandra Springer are the parents and

primary custodians of nine-year-old Plaintiff Christian and two-yearold Plaintiff Cameron. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 6.) Defendants Johnson,

Morris, Cook, Grimaldi, Larson, and Lind (“individual Defendants”) are

social workers employed by Defendant Placer County. (Id. ¶¶ 10-15.) 

On January 31, 2005, John and Cassandra disciplined

Christian for placing ice in Cameron’s diaper. (Id. ¶ 25.) While

disciplining him, John “pinched the tip of Christian’s nose with his

fingers and thumped him on the chest with the tip of his finger.” 

(Id. ¶ 26.) The next morning, Christian asked Cassandra to put makeup

on his nose to cover a “slight discoloration.” (Id. ¶ 29.) Cassandra

refused because the discoloration “was so slight it was barely

visible.” (Id.) Christian then left for school. (Id.)

Towards the end of the school day, a teacher noticed the

discoloration on Christian’s nose. (Id. ¶ 31.) When the teacher

asked Christian about it, he said that his father pinched him and it

“hurt.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Christian subsequently spoke about the incident

with the school secretary and principal, one of whom called Child

Protective Services. (Id.) In response to the call, Defendant Morris

went to the school and interviewed Christian. (Id. ¶ 34.) During

that interview, Christian told Defendant Morris his father spanks him

“maybe” once a week when he does “something bad,” and mentioned

“something about his father’s drinking.” (Id. ¶¶ 32, 34.) 

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Plaintiffs allege a variety of events occurred while 2

Christian was in foster care, but these allegations do not form the

basis of their section 1983 claims. 

The documents include a “detention report, jurisdiction 3

report, and W&IC 300 Petition.” (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 32.) 

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Defendant Morris called the Rocklin Police Department, and

Officer Seawell was dispatched to the school. (Id. ¶ 34.) With

Defendant Morris present, Officer Seaweall interviewed Christian and

heard information “that differed significantly” from what Christian

previously told Defendant Morris. (Id. ¶ 35.) When the interview

ended, Officer Seawell went to the Springer home to arrest John. 

(Id.) Defendant Morris placed Christian into protective custody,

without a warrant and without attempting to contact or interview John

and Cassandra. (Id. ¶ 41.) Christian was transported to a Placer

County shelter, and Defendant Johnson placed Christian in foster care

a few days later. (Id. ¶¶ 41, 46.) After approximately three 2

months, Christian was returned to his family. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 66.) 

Sometime during those three months, Defendants Morris and

Johnson prepared and submitted documents to the juvenile court, and

Defendants Cook, Grimaldi, Larson, and Lind signed documents submitted

to the juvenile court. (Id. ¶¶ 12-15, 32, 48.) Plaintiffs allege 3

these documents contained “lies, misrepresentations, omissions of

material fact, and . . . were completely devoid of any exculpatory

information.” (Id. ¶ 48.) For example, Plaintiffs allege Defendants

Morris and Johnson represented that John “abuses alcohol which

periodically renders him unable to care for his son,” even though John

only drinks “a beer now and again.” (Id. ¶ 32.) In addition,

Defendant Morris represented that John “was a physically abusive

father and Christian was at risk of serious bodily injury,” even

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though Cassandra and John told Defendant Morris that Christian “had

been spanked only a few times in his entire life.” (Id. ¶ 34.) 

Plaintiffs further allege the juvenile court documents did not include

Christian’s conflicting statements to Officer Seawell or include John

and Cassandra’s “version” of the events. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 35.) 

On February 13, 2006, Plaintiffs filed this federal action,

in which they assert two section 1983 claims: (1) Defendants Morris

and Placer County violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment by

removing Christian from his family, and (2) all Defendants violated

the Fourteenth Amendment by continuing to detain Christian away from

his family. (Id. ¶¶ 59-67.) Plaintiffs also assert state law claims

for violation of the Banes Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, false arrest

and/or imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

(Id. ¶¶ 68-85.) Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ section 1983

claims, arguing that the individual Defendants are entitled to

absolute and/or qualified immunity, and that Plaintiffs have not

alleged sufficient facts to support a claim against Defendant Placer

County under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978). (Defs.’ Mot at 5, 9.)

DISCUSSION

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiffs

failed (1) to present a cognizable legal theory, or (2) to plead

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, all material allegations in

the Complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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In addition, Plaintiffs are given the benefit of every reasonable

inference that can be drawn from the allegations in their Complaint. 

Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Accordingly, a motion to dismiss must be denied “unless it appears

beyond doubt that [Plaintiffs] can prove no set of facts in support of

[their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

I. Absolute Immunity

The individual Defendants argue they are entitled to

absolute immunity on both section 1983 claims. (Defs.’ Mot. at 5.) 

“[S]ocial workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing

quasi-prosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and

pursuit of child dependancy proceedings.” Meyers v. Contra Costa

County Dep’t of Social Services 812 F.3d 1154, 1157 (1987). “However,

the scope of this immunity is ‘extremely narrow.’” Wolf v. County of

San Joaquin, 2006 WL 11153755, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Miller

v. Gammie, 355 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Thus, while social

workers may claim absolute immunity for decisions to institute

dependancy proceedings and for submissions made to a court, they are

not similarly protected when they take actions to detain juveniles

prior to any dependancy proceedings.” Id. (citing Doe v. Lebbos, 348

F.3d 820, 825-26 (9th Cir. 2003), and Miller, 355 F.3d at 898). 

A. Removal of Christian

Plaintiffs allege Defendant Morris violated the Fourteenth

Amendment by removing Christian from his family without conducting “a

reasonable or moderately thorough investigation of the allegations,

which removal was compounded and extended and accompanied by fraud,

misrepresentations, and repeated failures to include exculpatory

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evidence.” (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 61.) Christian also alleges Defendant

Morris violated the Fourth Amendment by removing him from his family

without a warrant and without an imminent risk of serious bodily

injury. (Id. ¶ 62.) 

Defendant Morris is not entitled to absolute immunity from

the claim that Christian was removed without a warrant or a thorough

investigation because the removal allegedly occurred prior to the

initiation of juvenile court proceedings. See Meyers, 812 F.2d at

1157 (holding a social worker did not have absolute immunity for his

actions prior to the initiation of child dependancy proceedings);

Wolf, 2006 WL 11153755, at *5 (stating social workers do not have

absolute immunity for “actions to detain juveniles prior to any

dependancy proceedings”). However, Defendant Morris is entitled to

absolute immunity from the claim that she submitted false or

incomplete documents to the juvenile court. See Mabe v. San

Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding social

workers had absolute immunity for alleged submission of “false

evidence” to juvenile court); Wolf, 2006 WL 11153755, at *5 (holding

social workers had absolute immunity for “submissions to a court based

on an inadequate investigation of the allegations [and] . . . false

evidence”). 

B. Continued Detention of Christian

Plaintiffs allege the individual Defendants violated the

Fourteenth Amendment by continuing to detain Christian away from his

family, which was “caused by . . . the complete failure or refusal of

Defendants to reasonably investigate the circumstances of the family

and the statements made by Christian, . . . withholding exculpatory or

contradictory information . . . in the . . . reports submitted to the

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[juvenile] court, and fabricating [and] stating out of context . . .

the statements of Christian and others in an effort to mislead the

[juvenile] court.” (Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 65-66.) As discussed above,

Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from the claim that they

submitted false documents to and withheld information from the

juvenile court. (See supra page 6.) However, Defendants are not

entitled to absolute immunity from the claim that Christian was

detained prior to the initiation of juvenile court proceedings due to

Defendants’ failure to investigate the circumstances of the family and

the statements made by Christian. (See supra page 6.)

II. Qualified Immunity

The individual Defendants argue they are entitled to

qualified immunity because Christian would have suffered imminent harm

if he continued to live with his family and because prior case law had

not informed Defendants that they could be subject to civil liability

for their actions. (Defs.’ Mot. at 5; Defs.’ Reply at 8.) “Qualified

immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages

if, in light of clearly established law governing the challenged

conduct, the official objectively could have believed the conduct was

lawful.” Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing

Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 997, 978 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In deciding a claim of [qualified] immunity, the

court must first decide if a constitutional right

has been violated on the plaintiffs’ alleged

facts. If so, the court must then decide whether

this right was clearly established at the time of

the unconstitutional conduct. A right is clearly

established if a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that

right. 

Rogers v. County of San Joaquin Human Services Agency, 363 F. Supp. 2d

1227, 1231 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 

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The same legal standard applies when evaluating Fourth 4

and Fourteenth Amendment claims based on the removal of a child

from his family. E.g., Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 826, n.9; Rogers, 363

F. Supp. 2d at 1235, n.6. Accordingly, the qualified immunity

analysis of the alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations

has been combined. 

8

A. Removal of Christian

“The first step in the qualified immunity analysis is to ask

whether, accepting [P]laintiffs’ alleged facts, [Defendants’] conduct

violated the Constitution.” Id. As discussed above, Plaintiffs

allege Defendant Morris violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

by removing Christian from his family without conducting an adequate

investigation. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 59-67.) The Fourteenth Amendment

guarantees “that parents will not be separated from their children

without due process of law except in emergencies.” Rogers, 363 F. 4

Supp. 2d at 1235 (citing Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1107). Consequently,

social workers “may remove a child from the custody of [his] parent[s]

without prior judicial authorization only if the information they

possess at the time of the seizure is such as provides reasonable

cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious

bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably

necessary to avert that specific injury.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d

1121, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1100. Further, social

workers cannot remove a child “suspected of being abused or neglected

unless reasonable avenues of investigation are first pursued,

particularly where it is not clear that [abuse] has been-or will becommitted.” Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138.

Construing the allegations in the Complaint in the light

most favorable to Plaintiffs, Defendant Morris did not have reasonable

cause to believe Christian was in imminent danger when she removed him

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from his family. Christian had not suffered any type of severe bodily

injury prior to his removal, but only had a “slight discoloration” on

his nose that he received when his father “pinched” him. Cf. Rogers,

363 F. Supp 2d at 1235 (stating a social worker should consider “the

severity of the threat to the child”). Furthermore, although

Christian told Defendant Morris that his father spanks him, he did not

disclose any other information about the spanking that would lead

Defendant Morris to believe the spanking was abusive in nature. Cf.

Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that

spanking is not prohibited under California law, only “cruel or

inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in traumatic

condition”). In addition, the allegations in the Complaint indicate

that Christian did not appear to be in any immediate harm from the

spanking because Christian said his father spanked him “maybe” once a

week when he did “something bad.” See Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1108 (no

justification for removal of child because the “delay of a few hours

. . . to obtain [a] warrant” would not have put the child “in imminent

danger of serious physical injury”). Finally, although Christian said

“something” about his “father’s drinking,” he did not indicate his

father abused alcohol or was unable to care for him. Cf. Lebbos, 348

F.3d 820 (holding child was in imminent danger of serious bodily

injury because her father abused alcohol and neglected her, and

because she complained of vaginal pain and had redness in her vaginal

area). Therefore, it was not clear Christian had been abused or would

be abused in the future, and consequently, Defendant Morris had an

obligation to pursue “reasonable avenues of investigation” before

removing Christian from his family. See Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138. 

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Nevertheless, Defendant Morris allegedly removed Christian based only

on her interview with him.

Furthermore, since Defendant Morris allegedly had no

information whatsoever that implicated Christian’s mother in any past

abuse, any “threat of future abuse” would have been “attributed

[solely] to [his] father.” Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1110. As a result,

Christian could “have been taken with [his] mother to a shelter, or

placed under some other form of protective custody with her,” rather

than placed in foster care with strangers. See Wallis, 202 F.3d at

1140. Consequently, the scope of the intrusion, i.e. the removal of

Christian from his entire family, was not reasonably necessary to

avert potential abuse by his father. See id. (holding the scope of

the intrusion was greater than necessary because the children were

removed from the custody of their mother, even though the allegations

of abuse concerned only the father). 

Therefore, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the

warrantless removal of Christian from his family violated their

constitutional right “to live together without governmental

interference” absent emergency circumstances. See Mabe, 237 F.3d at

1107. Although Defendant Morris would still be entitled to qualified

immunity if this right was not clearly established at the time of the

alleged unconstitutional conduct, this constitutional right “has been

clearly established in this circuit for some time . . . .” Wolf, 2006

WL 11153755, at *5; Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1107 (holding “[t]he

constitutional right of parents and children to live together without

governmental interference is clearly established”); Rogers, 363 F.

Supp 2d at 1237 (stating “[t]he law is now clearly established that

the officer must have reason to believe that immediate removal is

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necessary to avoid a recurrence of abuse”). Therefore, Defendant

Morris is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage in the

proceedings because “[her] action[s], as alleged, [were] not

reasonable in light of clearly established law . . . .” Wolf, 2006 WL

11153755, at *5. 

B. Continued Detention of Christian

As discussed above, Plaintiffs allege the individual

Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment by continuing to detain

Christian without conducting a reasonable investigation. (Pls.’

Compl. ¶ 66.) Since the Court has already determined Defendant Morris

is not entitled to qualified immunity for removing Christian from his

family, it follows that the individual Defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity for his continued detention, which was premised on

the same facts as his removal. See Wolf, 2006 WL 11153755, at *5

(“Because the court has rejected qualified immunity for claims one and

two based on a determination that defendants failed to show that,

based on the allegations in the complaint, the children were in

imminent danger, it follows that it must reject defendants’ arguments

for qualified immunity on claim three.”). 

III. Municipal Liability under Monell

Defendant Placer County argues Plaintiffs’ section 1983

claims should be dismissed because “[w]here the facts do not support

an underlying constitutional deprivation by a public employee, in most

cases no Monell claim can stand against the public entity.” (Defs.’

Mot. at 9.) As discussed above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a

constitutional violation. (See supra pages 9-10.) Therefore,

Defendant Placer County’s motion to dismiss is denied. 

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CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied

in part. Since the Court has not dismissed Plaintiffs’ section 1983

claims in their entirety, the Court will continue to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 8, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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