Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00293/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00293-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BENNIE SCOTT, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 07-293-KD-C

DONALD GAINES, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis filed

a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the undersigned

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before the

undersigned on the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, Sergeant Donald

Gaines, Correctional Officer Michael McCrory, Correctional Officer Willie Harris,

Sergeant James English, and Deputy Warden Anthony Patterson (Docs. 23, 24) and

Plaintiff’s opposition thereto. (Docs. 1, 12). After consideration of these pleadings, and

for the reasons set out below, it is recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment

of Defendants be granted and that Plaintiff’s action against these Defendants be dismissed

with prejudice. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

From its review of the record, the Court summarizes the parties’ allegations which

are material to the issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation.

1. On January 22, 2007, while incarcerated at Holman Correctional Facility

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 1 of 19
2

(“Holman”), Plaintiff was attacked by a fellow inmate while eating dinner in the prison

kitchen. (Doc. 1 at 4, Complaint). 

2. The record shows that, at approximately 4:30 p.m., a fellow inmate, Timothy

Stanton, approached Plaintiff from behind and cut his throat with a prison made box

cutter. (Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 24, att. 6 at 3, Incident Report). 

3. Inmate Stanton exited the kitchen and walked up to Defendant Officer McCrory

who was standing in the hall at the pill call window. (Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 24, att. 2 at 2,

McCrory affidavit). 

4. Inmate Stanton handed the weapon to Officer McCrory and told him that he had

just cut Plaintiff’s throat. (Doc. 1 at 4-6). 

5. Officer McCrory ordered inmate Stanton to stand against the wall, and Stanton

complied. (Doc. 24, att. 2 at 2). 

6. Officer McCrory observed Plaintiff coming out of the kitchen holding his throat. 

(Id.). He instructed Defendant Officer Harris to escort Plaintiff to the health care unit and

called for assistance on his radio. (Id.). 

7. Officer McCrory escorted inmate Stanton to segregation, and informed Defendant

Sergeant Gaines of the assault. (Id.). 

8. Sergeant Gaines ordered that the facility be “lock[ed] down.” (Id.; Doc. 24, att. 6 at

4). 

9. When Plaintiff arrived at the prison health care unit, he was bleeding “profusely”

from a ten-inch laceration on his neck. (Doc. 24, att. 6 at 6, Medical Records). The

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 2 of 19
3

medical staff began emergency treatment and called an ambulance to transfer Plaintiff to

North Baldwin Hospital, where he was admitted. (Id. at 5-6). 

10. Following the incident, Sergeant Gaines conducted an investigation and

questioned inmate Stanton about the assault. (Id. at 4, Incident Report). 

11. Stanton informed Sergeant Gaines that he attacked Plaintiff in retaliation for

Plaintiff breaking into his locker “box” and making comments to him that he did not like. 

(Id.). 

12. Stanton was charged with a disciplinary for violating Rule 31, assault on another

inmate. (Id. at 4). 

13. Plaintiff was charged with a disciplinary for violating Rule 62, intentionally

creating a security, safety, or health hazard. (Id. at 9-10, Disciplinary Report). 

14. Defendant English presided over Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and found

Plaintiff guilty of the rule violation based on the findings of Sergeant Gaines’

investigation. (Id.).

15. Officer English recommended that Plaintiff be given disciplinary segregation for

twenty days and that Plaintiff be referred to classification for a possible custody increase. 

(Id. at 10). 

16. Defendant Deputy Warden Patterson approved the recommendation on February

20, 2007. (Id.). 

 17. On April 20, 2007, Plaintiff filed the present § 1983 action asserting an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendants, Sergeant Donald Gaines, Correctional Officer

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 3 of 19
1

 Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges an Eighth Amendment claim against an “Officer

Staple,” who Defendants maintain does not exist. (Doc. 24 at 1, Special Report). In any event,

for the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s claim against this defendant fails as a matter of law.

4

Michael McCrory, Correctional Officer Willie Harris, Sergeant James English, and

Deputy Warden Anthony Patterson.1

 (Doc. 1). 

18. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Gaines and Harris failed to protect him from the

assault by inmate Stanton and that Defendants Gaines, McCrory, English, and Patterson

conspired to blame him for the assault and charge him with a disciplinary violation for

creating a security hazard. (Doc. 1 at 4-6, 9-13). 

19. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. 

(Doc. 1 at 14). 

20. In their Answer and Special Report filed on April 21, 2008, Defendants deny that

they violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and assert the defenses of absolute and

qualified immunity. (Docs. 23, 24). 

21. On May 2, 2008, the Court entered an Order converting Defendants’ Special

Report and Answer to a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 25). That motion and

Plaintiff’s opposition thereto are now before the Court.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

1. In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary judgment, the Court begins

with these basic principles. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant this Court

authority under Rule 56 to render “judgment as a matter of law” to a party who moves for

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 4 of 19
5

summary judgment. 

2. “[S]ummary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . .’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

3. The Court must view the evidence produced by “the nonmoving party, and all

factual inferences arising from it, in the light most favorable to” that party. Barfield v.

Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). 

4. However, Rule 56(e) states that:

an adverse party [to a motion for summary judgment] may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse

party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If

the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325-27. 

5. “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence is merely

colorable, . . . or is not significantly probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations

omitted). 6. “Summary judgment is mandated where a party ‘fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Custom Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v.

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 5 of 19
2

In his Complaint, Plaintiff does not specify whether he is suing Defendants in their

official or individual capacities. Therefore, the Court will consider both. 

As state officials, Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages in

their official capacities. See Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998)

(state officials sued in their official capacities are protected from suit for damages under the

Eleventh Amendment). Furthermore, “[q]ualified immunity protects government officials

performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct

violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.’” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). In determining whether qualified immunity is appropriate in a given

case, “[t]he court must first ask the threshold question whether the facts alleged, taken in the

light most favorable to the plaintiffs, show that the government official’s conduct violated a

constitutional right.” Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 995 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001)). Having found herein that Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish a constitutional

violation, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201.

6

Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

1. As discussed above, Plaintiff seeks redress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an

alleged constitutional deprivation arising out of an attack by another inmate. (Doc. 1). 

2. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Gaines and Harris violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from the attack by inmate Stanton and

that Defendants Gaines, McCrory, English, and Patterson violated his Eighth Amendment

rights by conspiring to blame him for the attack and charge him with a disciplinary

violation. (Id.). 

3. As discussed above, Defendants deny that they violated Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights and further assert the defenses of absolute and qualified immunity.2

 (Docs. 30,

31, 38, 43). 

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 6 of 19
7

4. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part that: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress. . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 

5. The Eighth Amendment provides that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const.

Amend. VIII. 

6. The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment

prohibits prison officials from exhibiting deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm to an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 

7. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989),

the Supreme Court summarized a state’s constitutional responsibilities with regard to

inmates:

[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him

there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a

corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his

safety and general well-being. . . . The rationale for this

principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative

exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it

renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time

fails to provide for his basic human needs -- e.g., food,

clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety -- it

transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 7 of 19
8

Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (citations omitted). 

8. In order to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must prove three

elements: “(1) a condition of confinement that inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering,

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981),

(2) the defendant’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to that condition, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.

294, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991), and (3) causation, Williams v.

Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1389-90 (11th Cir. 1982).” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526,

1535 (11th Cir. 1993). 

9. In Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 1994), the court described the

first two elements as follows:

An Eighth Amendment claim is said to have two components,

an objective component, which inquires whether the alleged

wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a

constitutional violation, and a subjective component, which

inquires whether the officials acted with a sufficiently

culpable state of mind.

10. The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim inquires whether the

alleged wrongdoing amounted to the infliction of “unnecessary pain or suffering upon the

prisoner.” LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1535. 

11. This standard requires that the alleged deprivation be “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 

12. The objective standard “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 8 of 19
9

civilized standards, humanity, and decency. . ., but must be balanced against competing

penological goals.” LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1535 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

102 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

13. The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim generally “inquires

whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Sims, 25 F.3d at

983-84 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). 

14. This component “follows from the principle that ‘only the unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834

(quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 

15. In prison condition cases, the required state of mind for a defendant is

“deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s health or safety. Id. (citations omitted). 

16. In defining “deliberate indifference,” the Supreme Court in Farmer stated:

We hold . . . that a prison official cannot be found liable under

the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane

conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

17. The court concluded that the “subjective recklessness” standard of criminal law

is the test for “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 839-40. 

18. There is no liability for “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that

he should have perceived but did not. . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 9 of 19
10

19. It is not enough that a plaintiff proves that the defendant should have known of

the risk, but did not, as actual subjective knowledge is the key. See, e.g., Cottrell v.

Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996). 

20. A prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure “reasonable

safety,” “a standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials’ ‘unenviable task of

keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

844-45 (citations omitted). 

21. “Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials

who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause.” Id.

22. Having set forth the general legal principles relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, the

Court now turns to the application of those legal principles to the facts before the Court. 

A. Failure to Protect.

23. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Gaines and Harris violated

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to

protect him from the attack by inmate Stanton. 

24. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Harris was assigned to the kitchen area and

never saw the attack. (Doc. 1 at 4). Plaintiff maintains that Officer Harris failed to

provide “any type of security.” (Doc. 1 at 5, 11). 

25. In addition, Plaintiff claims that Sergeant Gaines failed to protect him by

failing to remove him from the general population before the attack and place him in

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 10 of 19
11

segregation so that inmate Stanton could not attack him. (Id. at 10).

26. As discussed above, the evidence shows that, at the time of the attack, inmate

Stanton approached Plaintiff from behind as Plaintiff sat at a table in the prison kitchen

eating dinner. (Doc. 24, att. 6 at 3-6). Using a prison-made box cutter, Stanton cut

Plaintiff’s throat, leaving a ten-inch laceration on his neck. (Id.). 

27. Stanton then walked out of the kitchen, handed his weapon to Officer

McCrory, and told Officer McCrory that he had cut Plaintiff’s throat. (Id.). Officer

McCrory ordered Stanton to stand against the wall as Plaintiff came to the door holding

his hand to his neck. (Id.). Officer McCrory ordered Officer Harris to take Plaintiff to

the prison health unit and radioed for assistance. (Id.). Officer McCrory took Stanton to

segregation, and the other officers locked down the facility. (Id.).

 28. In order to establish the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim in a

failure to protect case, an inmate must establish that the conditions under which he was

incarcerated presented “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

29. It is settled that “an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence at a jail

creates a substantial risk of serious harm. . . .” Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v.

Toombs County, Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005) (“confinement in a prison

where violence and terror reign is actionable.”). 

30. On the other hand, “occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another

may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320 (citations

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 11 of 19
12

omitted). 

31. “[A] prison custodian is not the guarantor of a prisoner’s safety.” Purcell, 400

F.3d at 1321 (citations omitted). “[N]ot . . . every injury suffered by one prisoner at the

hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible

for the victim’s safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

32. As discussed above, a prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to

ensure “reasonable safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

33. In the present case, Plaintiff has not established, nor even alleged, that he was

exposed to the “constant threat of violence” while incarcerated at Holman, see Purcell,

400 F.3d at 1320, or to any other condition that presented “a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1583

(11th Cir. 1995) (“Hale produced evidence that inmate-on-inmate violence occurred

regularly” in the two years preceding the attack). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy

the objective element of his Eighth Amendment claim. 

34. However, assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff did satisfy the objective element

of his Eighth Amendment claim, he must also show that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to the risk of serious harm to him. 

35. To meet this element, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants actually knew that a

substantial risk of serious harm existed, and they “knowingly or recklessly” declined to

take action to prevent that harm. LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1537. 

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 12 of 19
13

36. “[A]n officials’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be

condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

37. “‘Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is

a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from

circumstantial evidence.’” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). 

“Thus, ‘a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from

the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

38. In this case, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Officer Harris, Sergeant

Gaines, or any other Defendant knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff and

was deliberately indifferent to that risk. 

39. Plaintiff has presented no evidence “that a substantial risk of inmate attacks

was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in

the past.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

40. Moreover, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that any Defendant was aware of

a risk of harm to Plaintiff from inmate Stanton in particular. There is no evidence, nor

even an allegation, that Stanton, or any other inmate, had made threats against Plaintiff

and that these threats had been made known to any of the Defendants.

41. According to Plaintiff, he and inmate Stanton had argued previously over

money that Plaintiff claimed inmate Stanton owed him, but Plaintiff had resolved the

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 13 of 19
3

 At his disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of creating a security hazard and

given twenty days in disciplinary segregation and a referral to classification for a possible

increase in custody. (Doc. 1 at 4-6, 9-13; Doc. 24, att. 6 at 10). The record also shows that

inmate Stanton was charged with violating rule #31, assault on another inmate (Doc. 24, att. 6 at

4), although it is not clear precisely what punishment he received.

14

disagreement. (Doc. 24, att. 6 at 11). Even Plaintiff was unaware that he was in danger

of being attacked by inmate Stanton.

42. The evidence related to the attack itself similarly indicates that it was

premeditated, isolated, and deliberately executed without warning. Neither Plaintiff nor

Defendants had any reason to suspect that Plaintiff was in danger of being attacked or that

he needed to be segregated from inmate Stanton for protection. 

43. Because Plaintiff has failed to show that any of the Defendants knew that a

substantial risk of serious harm existed, i.e., that Plaintiff was at risk of being harmed by

another inmate, and they knowingly or recklessly declined to take action to prevent that

harm, he has failed to satisfy the subjective element of his Eighth Amendment claim as

well. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.

B. Conspiracy.

44. Next, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Gaines, McCrory, English, and Patterson

conspired to violate his constitutional rights by blaming him for the attack by Stanton and

charging him with a false disciplinary rule violation.3

45. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Gaines conducted an investigation

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 14 of 19
15

after the incident and falsely reported that Plaintiff had broken into inmate Stanton’s

locker several weeks before the assault, thereby prompting the attack. (Doc. 1 at 9-10;

Doc. 24, att. 1 at 2, Gaines Affidavit). 

46. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McCrory filed a disciplinary report against him

based on Sergeant Gaines’ false findings. (Doc. 1 at 9-10). 

47. According to Plaintiff, Defendant English presided over his disciplinary

hearing and found him guilty of creating a security hazard based on the false information

reported by Sergeant Gaines. (Id. at 5-6, 9, 12). Sergeant English also refused to allow

Plaintiff to call inmate Stanton as a witness. (Doc. 24, att. 3 at 2). 

48. Defendant Patterson approved Defendant English’s finding, as well as his

recommendation that Plaintiff receive twenty days in disciplinary segregation and be

referred to classification for a possible custody increase. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 24, att. 6 at

10). 

49. Plaintiff alleges that “all Defendants acted in concert with each other to try to

justify what took place in the kitchen area on 1-22-2007.” (Doc. 1 at 6).

50. “Conspiring to violate another person’s constitutional rights

violates section 1983. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 101

S. Ct. 183, 186 (1980); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425

(11th Cir. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds by

Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1996).”

Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th

2002). “To prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff

‘must show that the parties “reached an understanding” to

deny the plaintiff his or her rights [and] prove an actionable

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 15 of 19
16

wrong to support the conspiracy.’ Bendiburg v. Dempsey,

909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S.

932, 111 S. Ct. 2053, 114 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1991). . . . [T]he

linchpin for conspiracy is agreement . . .” Bailey v. Board of

County Comm’rs of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122

(11th Cir. 1992). In order for a plaintiff “to establish the

‘understanding’ or ‘willful participation’ required to show a

conspiracy, ... [he] must [produce] some evidence of

agreement between the defendants. . . . For a conspiracy

claim to survive a motion for summary judgment ‘[a] mere

“scintilla” of evidence . . . will not suffice; there must be

enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for

that party.’ Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.

1990).” Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1283-1284. Merely “stringing

together” adverse acts of individuals is insufficient to

demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy. Harvey v. Harvey,

949 F.2d 1127, 1133 (11th Cir. 1992).

Flynn v. Scott, 2006 WL 1236718, *6 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (unpublished).

51. Having carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and the record in this case,

there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s theory that Defendants conspired to deprive him

of his constitutional rights. 

52. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants “reached an

understanding” to violate his constitutional rights or committed an “actionable wrong to

support the conspiracy.” Bendiburg, 909 F.2d at 468; Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1122. 

53. Assuming, as Plaintiff alleges, that Sergeant Gaines’ investigative findings

were false and that Sergeant Gaines knew that they were false, there is no evidence that

any of the other Defendants knew that the information was false. 

54. Moreover, Plaintiff premises his conspiracy claim on the disciplinary that he

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 16 of 19
17

received for creating a security hazard. However, he fails to point out any defects in his

disciplinary proceedings. 

55. Although Plaintiff complains that he was not allowed to call inmate Stanton as

a witness, Sergeant English’s testimony establishes that the decision not to allow inmate

Stanton to testify was based on concerns that Plaintiff and/or Stanton would be in danger

of another assault. (Doc. 24, att. 3 at 2, English affidavit). Cf. Powell v. Carroll, 2006

WL 2715128, *9 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (“[O]rdinarily the right to present evidence is basic to a

fair hearing, but the inmate’s right to present witnesses [in a disciplinary hearing] is

necessarily circumscribed by the penological need to provide swift discipline in

individual cases,” and “by the very real dangers in prison life which may result from

violence or intimidation directed at either other inmates or staff.” Id. (citing Ponte v.

Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985)).

56. Where Plaintiff’s assertions are “self serving,” “purely conclusory,” and fail to

assert the material facts necessary to establish a conspiracy between the Defendants,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the conspiracy claim. Flynn, 2006 WL

1236718 at *7.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendants, Sergeant Donald

Gaines, Correctional Officer Michael McCrory, Correctional Officer Willie Harris,

Sergeant James English, and Deputy Warden Anthony Patterson are entitled to summary

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 17 of 19
18

judgment in their favor on all claims asserted against them by Plaintiff. Accordingly, it is

recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, that this

action be DISMISSED with prejudice, and that judgment be entered in favor of

Defendants and against Plaintiff on all claims.

The instructions which follow the undersigned’s signature contain important

information regarding objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this 7th day day of October, 2008. 

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 18 of 19
19

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’ S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within

ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR

72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in a dispositive

matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement of

Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation" within ten days after being served

with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is established by order. The

statement of objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which

objection is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the party’s

arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a

different disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may be submitted

or referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to

submit a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals; only the

district judge’s order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915

and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in this

action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost

of the transcript.

Case 1:07-cv-00293-KD-C Document 30 Filed 10/08/08 Page 19 of 19