Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00887/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00887-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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The R & R more fully sets forth the factual and procedural background of this case,

to which neither party offered specific objections. The Court, therefore, adopts that

background as an accurate recital. The facts are merely supplemented here to provide helpful

context in resolving this Order. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Robert Ruderman, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-0887-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner

David Robert Ruderman (“Petitioner”). (Doc. 1). On April 30, 2010, Magistrate Judge

Michelle H. Burns issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) in which she proposed

that the Court deny and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. See (Doc. 20). Petitioner filed

Written Objections to the R & R on May 24, 2010 (Doc. 22); however, because his

Objections are without merit, the Court accepts the R & R.

BACKGROUND1

On September 16, 2005, after a jury trial in Arizona State Court, Petitioner was

convicted on two counts: (1) sexual conduct with a minor and (2) public sexual indecency

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to a minor. He was then sentenced to a presumptive life sentence on the first count and one

and one half years’ imprisonment on the second—with the sentences to run consecutively.

At trial, evidence was introduced that Kimberly Adams and her boyfriend, Aaron

Isakson, contacted Petitioner through an on-line babysitter website in September 2004.

Shortly thereafter, Petitioner began babysitting for Ms. Adams’s two children, six-year old

K and three-year-old M, on a regular basis at the family’s Chandler apartment. 

Several months later, on February 11, 2005, Petitioner agreed to stay late and watch

the children until 11:30 p.m. so that Mr. Isakson could go out after work with his friends. Mr.

Isakson, however, cut his evening short and returned home at approximately 9:30 p.m. When

he returned to the apartment, Mr. Isakson “heard the kids playing in the bathtub” and opened

the door. (Doc. 18, Ex. A at 18–19). In the mirror, Mr. Isakson saw Petitioner “standing up

against the wall pulling up his pants.” Id. at 18–19, 30–31. Petitioner had on “navy blue

underwear,” and was pulling up a pair of blue denim pants. Id. at 19, 22. According to Mr.

Isakson, Petitioner’s pants were “dry with patches of wet,” which suggested that Petitioner

had been bathing with the children when Mr. Isakson arrived home. Id. Shortly after this

encounter, Petitioner left the apartment without speaking a word to Mr. Isakson.

After Petitioner left, Mr. Isakson contacted Ms. Adams and told her what he had

witnessed. Ms. Adams, who liked Petitioner and had seen him give the children baths on two

prior occasions, was not initially concerned, but she decided to ask Petitioner what happened.

When Ms. Adams called Petitioner the next day, he admitted that he had taken a bath with

the kids and explained that “the kids always ask him to get in the bathtub with them.” Id. at

68. When Ms. Adams stated that it “probably wasn’t a good idea” for him to take baths with

the children, Petitioner indicated that it would not happen again. Id.

Later that day, Ms. Adams asked K, her six-year-old daughter, whether “there was

anything [Ms. Adams] needed to know about [Petitioner].” Id. at 70. She further asked “if

there had ever been any touching or any kind of physical contact, if [Petitioner] had ever

touched her down there.” Id. at 70. K responded that Petitioner had not touched her, but she

then added that M, her three-year-old brother, “sucked [Petitioner’s] wiener.” Id. at 70–71,

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83. 

Shortly after this conversation, Ms. Adams and Mr. Isakson took K and M to the

Chandler Police Department where K was interviewed. During that interview, which was

recorded and played during Petitioner’s trial, K explained that she was in the bathtub with

Petitioner and M when Petitioner’s “penis came out of his shorts.” (Doc. 18, Ex. C at 12–13).

K further explained that Petitioner’s “wiener” was “big, long, and stuck straight up.” Id. at

13. K then stated that M “started to suck on [Petitioner’s] privates.” (Doc. 18, Ex. D at 84).

According to K, this happened on two separate occasions while Petitioner was babysitting

the children. 

Chandler Police then arranged for K and M to meet with a forensic interviewer, who

specialized in interviewing young children. In this recorded interview, which was also

presented at Petitioner’s trial, K again stated that Petitioner took a bath with the children and

that M sucked on Petitioner’s penis when it came out of his blue underwear. (Doc. 18, Ex.

A at 109). Three-year-old M, however, was unable to provide any meaningful information

to the interviewer. (Doc. 18, Ex. B at 11–12, 16, 30).

Based on this evidence, along with Petitioner’s subsequent admission to Chandler

Police that he had taken a bath with the children, the jury convicted Petitioner on charges of

sexual conduct with a minor and public sexual indecency to a minor. Following an

unsuccessful appeal and petition for post-conviction relief in state court, Petitioner filed the

instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner raises the following six grounds for

relief:

(1) Petitioner was denied due process of law when he was convicted based on

evidence insufficient to prove his guilt of the charged offenses;

(2) Petitioner was denied a fair trial by an impartial jury when he was tried by

a jury on which six members either indicated they would not be impartial

due to personal issues or were victims of the same type of crime charged

to Petitioner; 

(3) Petitioner was denied a fair trial and due process of law when the

prosecutor vouched for witness testimony, misstated and mischaracterized

other witness testimony so as to mislead the jury, and made remarks

intended to lead the jury to convict for impermissible reasons;

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(4) Petitioner was tried by a jury that was selected in violation of Equal

Protection when the prosecutor used most of his peremptory challenges to

strike males from the jury panel;

(5) Petitioner was denied due process of law when the State Court vacated

Petitioner’s preliminary hearing, a state-created right applicable to

criminal defendants, without Petitioner’s waiver; and

(6) Petitioner [suffered] ineffective assistance of counsel by his attorney’s

failure to raise appropriate objections and make appropriate motions to

raise constitutional issues and preserve them for appeal.

(Doc. 1 at 6–15).

After consideration of each of these claims, Judge Burns recommended that the Court

deny the Petition with prejudice. (Doc. 20). Petitioner now raises specific objections to

Grounds One, Two, Three, and portions of Ground Six of the R & R. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal district courts “‘may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].’” Carrillo-Lozano v. Stolc, 669 F.

Supp.2d 1074, 1076 (D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)); see United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). While a district judge “must review the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made,” Schmidt v.

Johnstone, 263 F. Supp.2d 1219, 1225 (D. Ariz. 2003)), no such review is necessary when

the parties do not raise specific objections. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (holding

that district courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not

the subject of an objection”); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“[T]he court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the [R & R] to which objection is made.”); CarrilloLozano, 669 F. Supp.2d at 1076 (same). 

DISCUSSION

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), federal

courts may not grant habeas relief unless the state’s adjudication of an issue resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);

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Plaintiff has not objected to Grounds Four, Five, and parts B, E, and F of Ground Six.

The Court, therefore, accepts the R & R as it pertains to those claims. See Thomas, 474 U.S.

at 149 (holding that district courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any

issue that is not the subject of an objection”). Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed the R &

R with respect to these claims and finds Judge Burns’s recommendations to be well-taken.

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see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 27 (2004); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839

(1999). “The Supreme Court has said that § 2254(d)(1) imposes a ‘highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state court decisions be given

the benefit of the doubt.’” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997) and Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

(2002)). Upon de novo review of the portions of the R & R to which Petitioner has objected,2

the Court concludes that Petitioner’s habeas claims are without merit. 

I. Petitioner’s Due Process Claim Based on Sufficiency of the Evidence is Without

Merit. 

A habeas petitioner must overcome a “heavy burden” to prevail on a claim that the

evidence at trial is insufficient to sustain his or her conviction. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d

1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005.) As Judge Burns explained in her R & R, “there is sufficient

evidence to support a conviction if ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Doc. 20 at 11) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979)).Where factual conflicts exist, it is the province of the jury to resolve those conflicts,

“to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

Petitioner fails to overcome the “heavy burden” required to demonstrate that the

evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. At

trial, K testified that the water level in the bathtub “kind of overflowed” when Petitioner

entered the tub. (Doc. 18, Ex. D at 77–78). K then testified that M proceeded to suck on

Petitioner’s penis while the children and Petitioner were in the tub. Id. at 80–87. According

to Petitioner, K’s testimony is “objectively unbelievable” because it requires that the jury

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believe that a three-year old child performed oral sex on the Petitioner underwater. See (Doc.

1; 23). Petitioner’s argument, however, is belied by the record. K never testified that the

sexual contact took place underwater. While she did indicate that the water “kind of

overflowed” when Petitioner entered the tub, she further explained that she simply meant that

the water “got higher” when Petitioner entered the tub. (Doc. 18 Ex. D at 77–78). M further

testified that the water was “kind of low” when Petitioner entered the tub and that she could

“see [her] toes” before he got in with the kids. Id. Thus, while K’s testimony indicates that

Petitioner displaced some of the water and caused the water level to rise, it does not establish

that Petitioner’s genitals were submerged when the sexual contact occurred. See id.

Furthermore, there are no facts in the record suggesting that Petitioner was so large a man

or that the tub was so small or shallow that Petitioner’s entry into the tub would have caused

the water level, which was below M’s toes, to flow over the edge of the tub. In fact,

testimony at trial established that the bathtub was large enough for two men the size of

Petitioner to fit in the tub. (Doc. 18, Ex. B. at 50–54). Accordingly, in weighing the evidence

and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, the jurors could have understood K’s

testimony to mean that the water level simply rose when Petitioner entered the tub. 

Yet, even if K’s testimony is read as implying that the unlawful sexual conduct

occurred underwater, the jury still could have convicted Petitioner on the basis of K’s

testimony. Jurors are permitted to believe all of a witness’s testimony, part of it, or none of

it. Thus, to the extent that it is implausible that oral sexual conduct took place underwater,

the jury could have credited K’s testimony that M sucked on Petitioner’s penis and

discredited the portion of K’s testimony implying that the event occurred underwater. This

is especially so given that M, a six-year-old child, provided detailed testimony regarding

Petitioner’s genitals and the erection that occurred when M sucked on Petitioner’s penis. And

while Petitioner further contends that K’s testimony, without more, is insufficient to sustain

his conviction for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, “[t]he testimony of one witness .

. . is sufficient to uphold a conviction.” See United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 940 (9th

Cir. 1981). 

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II. Petitioner’s Claim of Juror Bias Fails.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial

jury.” U.S. Const. Amend VI (emphasis added). The right to an impartial jury is further

applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.

717, 722 (1961). Generally, voir dire provides the mechanism that exposes possible biases,

both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors, and it serves to protect the

accused’s right to an impartial jury. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464

U.S. 548, 554 (1984). When a juror makes statements during voir dire that demonstrate

actual bias, the trial court must strike the juror for cause. See United States v. Mitchell, 568

F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009). In cases where neither counsel requests that the juror be

dismissed for cause, a trial court has a duty to dismiss the juror sua sponte where “the

evidence of partiality before the [trial] court” is highly “indicative of impermissible juror

bias.” Id.

Courts in the Ninth Circuit analyze claims of “‘juror bias under two theories—actual

bias and implied bias.’” Id. (quoting Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.

2008), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2973 (2008)); see Fields v. Woodford (Fields I), 309 F.3d

1095, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2002) (considering both actual bias and implied bias). Petitioner

claims that his jury was biased under both theories. The Court, however, concludes that the

record does not support Petitioner’s claim. 

A. Actual Bias

As the Ninth Circuit recently reiterated, “[A]ctual bias is, in essence,‘bias in fact—the

existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire

impartiality.’” Mitchell, 568 F.3d at 1151 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109,

1112 (9th Cir. 2000)). Actual bias, therefore, “is found where ‘a prospective juror states that

he [cannot] be impartial, or expresses a view adverse to one party’s position and responds

equivocally as to whether he could be fair and impartial despite that view.’” Id. (quoting

Fields v. Brown (Fields II), 503 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). In Gonzales, for

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example, a juror serving in a narcotics trial indicated that her ex-husband’s drug dealing had

been extremely painful to her and the primary cause of the couple’s divorce. 214 F.3d at

1113. When the trial court inquired three times whether she could put her experience aside

and serve fair and impartially, she equivocated and never affirmatively stated that she would

be impartial. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the juror’s statements regarding her

inability to be impartial, combined with “the similarity between her traumatic familial

experience and the defendant’s alleged conduct,” required reversal of the Defendant’s

conviction based on the juror’s bias. Id. at 1114. 

By contrast, in Mitchell, another panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that “evidence

of juror bias was insufficient” to establish actual bias. 568, F.3d at 1152. In that case, which

also involved narcotics, a juror indicated that her uncle had been killed by a drug dealer.

Id. at 1148. When the juror was asked “do you think that what happened [to your uncle]

would affect you, in any way, in being a fair juror in this case?” the juror responded that she

did not think so. Id. After additional questioning from the court, she further indicated, “no,

I’ll be fine. No. actually, I’m fine.” Id. And while the juror later indicated that she would

have a hard time putting her uncle’s murder out of her mind, the Ninth Circuit rejected any

claim for juror bias because “none” of the juror’s subsequent statements “returned to the

theme of whether she could be a fair juror[.]” Id. The Court further noted, “[i]n response to

the only question directly inquiring into her ability to be . . . impartial,” the juror indicated

that her experience “would not affect her impartiality.” Id. Similarly, in Fields II, the Ninth

Circuit rejected a claim of actual bias, even though the juror’s wife had been a victim of a

traumatic assault quite similar to the crime of which the defendant had been accused. 503

F.3d at 764–65. The court held that the juror was not actually biased because, when the trial

judge asked if the juror would be fair and impartial, he honestly indicated that he would. Id.

at 764, 767. 

In this case, Petitioner asserts that six members of his jury were actually biased based

on their answers to questions during voir dire. According to Petitioner, the trial court should

have stricken the following members of the jury panel sua sponte on the basis of actual bias:

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Around the time of Petitioner’s 2005 trial, Michael Jackson made headlines when he

was acquitted on charges of child molestation. See John M. Broder & Nick Madigan, Michael

Jackson Cleared After 14-Week Child Molesting Trial, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2005 available

at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/14/national/14jackson.html?_r=1 &pagewanted=all.

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Juror # 1 (panel # 4), Juror # 3 (panel # 7), Juror # 4 (panel # 9), Juror # 6 (panel # 21), Juror

# 10 (panel # 33), and Juror # 11 (panel # 35). A thorough review of record with respect to

each of these jurors, however, indicates otherwise.

1. Juror # 1

The record does not support Petitioner’s claim of actual bias with respect to Juror #

1. During voir dire, Juror # 1 revealed that she had a four-year old daughter, which would

make it “difficult for [her] to participate in this case because it . . . involve[d] children

testifying.” (Doc. 18, Ex. Q at 40–41). Juror # 1 further indicated that she had a friend who

had been molested as a child. Id. Based on her experiences, Juror # 1 further stated that “an

emotional response” might make it “difficult” for her “personally” to “listen” to evidence of

child molestation. Id. The following exchange with Petitioner’s counsel during voir dire,

however, clarifies what Juror # 1 meant when she indicated that she might have an emotional

response to this type of evidence.

Counsel: You were worried about the emotional response

that you would have sitting in this trial. Is that

what I heard . . . ?

Juror # 1: An emotional response from the standpoint of all

of us, to see kids struggle . . . . I think we all

respond that way . . . . [I]t was about me, not

necessarily about my ability to be . . . an impartial

juror. But just . . . I probably would . . . struggle

with [a case involving harm to children]. I had

bad feeling last night. It was hard for me to sleep

last night. 

Counsel: Okay. Because of the fear you were going to

become a member of this jury? Is that—

Juror # 1: No. No. Because there’s so much—you go back

to Michael Jackson.3

 So much of this that [is] on

television and inundating us. My response to any

of it, . . . just being brought up in the news,

because it’s so close to home, having a kid, a

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child you know in that situation just—it gets to

me. 

Counsel: Okay.

Juror # 1: But that is not to suggest it doesn’t get to every

other person in this room. I just maybe raised my

hand first.

Counsel: Okay. That’s kind of my question. I’m not asking

you to extract your emotions before you come sit

in that jury chair. But what I’m saying is[,] I

wonder because you mentioned this specifically,

whether you would have such a strong emotional

response—you mentioned not sleeping well last

night—that this would somehow prevent you

from focusing on the evidence.

Juror # 1: No, it wouldn’t. Actually, after answering the

question, I realized that I probably should have

listened to the judge a little bit more before I

answered that, because probably what I was

responding to was not what he was asking.

Counsel: Okay. 

Juror # 1: It was emotional. That was what my response

was. You know it was emotional. 

(Doc 18, Ex. D at 16–18).

These statements do not establish actual bias. Juror # 1 never stated that she “c[ould]

not be impartial,” and a close review of her statements reveals that she never “ respond[ed]

equivocally” to questions about whether “[s]he could be fair and impartial” in this case. See

Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112. Instead, much like the juror in Mitchell, who indicated that she

would have a hard time putting her uncle’s murder out of her mind, Juror # 1 merely

indicated that she might have a hard time listening to testimony about a sexual crime

involving a young child. See 568, F.3d at 1152. And while this Juror initially stated that it

would be difficult for her to listen to the evidence, she later indicated that this would not

affect her ability to be impartial. (Doc. 18, Ex. D at 17). At most, Juror # 1’s comments

during voir dire suggest some ambiguity about her ability to be impartial. Ambiguous

statements, however, are insufficient for Petitioner to carry his burden of demonstrating that

the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to strike Juror # 1 sua sponte for bias.

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See Mitchell, 568, F.3d at 1151 (observing that a criminal defendant who fails to challenge

a potentially biased juror for cause bears the heavy burden of showing that the “evidence of

partiality before the [trial] court was so indicative of bias that the court was obliged to strike”

the juror sua sponte) (emphasis added); see also Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 458

(6th Cir. 2001) (“A juror’s express doubt as to her own impartiality on voir dire does not

necessarily entail a finding of actual bias.”).

2. Jurors # 3, # 4, # 6, # 10, and # 11

The record also lacks evidentiary support for Petitioner’s claim that the remaining

jurors were actually biased. During voir dire, the trial judge asked each juror whether he or

she had “ever been the victim of any kind of crime.” (Doc. 18, Ex. Q at 61). In response to

this question, Juror # 3 stated that she had been “molested as a kid[,]” and that she had a very

clear memory of the event. Id. at 64, 66. Similarly, Juror # 4 indicated that she “was sexually

molested when [she] was a child.” Id. at 63. She further stated that she had “blocked” the

event, which happened on one occasion, “out of [her] mind.” Id. Juror # 6 also answered

affirmatively to the trial judge’s question, indicating that she had a “pretty clear memory” of

being molested when she was nine-years old. Id. at 65. Lastly, Juror # 10 indicated that she

had been “raped when [she] was sixteen and assaulted when [she] was twenty-two,” id. at 70,

and Juror # 11 indicated that she too had been “a victim of molestation,” (Doc. 18, Ex. D at

35). 

After the jurors gave their answers to this inquiry, the trial judge posed the following

question to each juror who had affirmatively stated that he or she had been a victim of a prior

crime: 

Those of you who answered yes to this last question, do any of

you feel that you can’t put your experiences aside, the emotional

response that you have, and the mental images that you have of

what may have occurred[?] . . . [Are] there any of you who feel

you cannot do that sufficiently so that you make a decision

based on . . . the facts of this case[] and the law that I give to

you? Is there anybody who feels they’re not capable of doing

that? 

(Doc. 18, Ex. Q at 73). In response, none of the aforementioned jurors indicated that they

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would base their decision on their experiences as victims of sexual crimes, rather than the

facts of Petitioner’s case. Id. at 76. Later in voir dire, upon additional questioning about

being molested or raped, Jurors # 4, # 10, and # 11 affirmatively reiterated that, despite their

experiences, they would listen to the facts and evidence and render a fair and impartial

verdict. (Doc. 18, Ex. D at 31–32, 38–40).

As with Juror # 1, Petitioner fails to set forth facts demonstrating that these jurors

were actually biased. None of these jurors stated that they “c[ould] not be impartial,” and

none “respond[ed] equivocally” to questions about whether “[t]he[y] could be fair and

impartial” in this case. See Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112. Instead, each of these jurors indicated

to the trial court that their experience as victims would not impact their ability to render an

impartial verdict. And while Jurors # 3 and # 6 were not questioned individually, and though

they never affirmatively stated that they would be impartial, these jurors did not make any

statements indicative of actual bias and their response to the trial court’s specific question

about bias based on past experience as victims suggests that they were not actually biased

in this case. See Matthews v. Simpson, 603 F. Supp.2d 960, 1026 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (finding

that a juror’s silence was indicative of impartiality when the trial court asked the jurors

whether their prior experiences might impair their ability to follow the law as instructed by

the court).; Cf. Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748, 754 (8thCir. 1992) (holding that “an

ambiguous silence by a large group of venire persons to a general question about bias [does

not] support a finding” of impartiality where these jurors had previously indicated that they

might be biased) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it failed to

strike jurors # 3, # 4, # 6, # 10, and # 11 sua sponte for bias. See Mitchell, 568, F.3d at 1151.

B. Implied Bias

In extreme cases, juror bias can be implied or presumed from the circumstances of the

case. The doctrine of implied bias, however, is reserved for those “exceptional”

circumstances that “leav[e] serious question whether the trial court . . . subjected the

defendant to manifestly unjust procedures resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring). For instance, bias may be

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presumed when “the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency,” where “the juror

is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction,” or where

the “juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction.” Id. at 222; see

also United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that implied bias

arises only when “the circumstances point so sharply to bias in a particular juror that even

his own denials must be discounted”) (emphasis added). Several circuit courts have also

“presumed bias in cases where the prospective juror has been the victim of a crime or

experienced a situation similar to the one at issue in the trial.” Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d

316, 319 (7th Cir. 1992) (implying bias where several jurors were victims of a robbery that

was “profoundly similar” to a robbery for which the defendant was on trial) (emphasis

added); see Jackson v. United States, 395 F.2d 615, 617–18 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (presuming bias

where a juror had been a participant in a “love-triangle” analogous to the one in issue at

trial); United States ex rel. De Vita v. McCorkle, 248 F.2d 1, 8 (3d Cir. 1957) (en banc)

(holding that bias can be imputed where a juror was the victim of a robbery similar to the

robbery charged against the defendant). 

Because implied bias is only found in the extreme and extraordinary case, however,

there is no per se rule that a victim of a particular criminal act cannot be juror in a case

involving a quasi-similar offense. See Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991) (“Prudence dictates that courts . . . should hesitate before

formulating categories of relationships which bar jurors from serving in certain types of

trials.”). This is so, even in cases that involve crimes that generate a strong emotional

response, such as molestation and rape. See Fields II, 503 F.3d at 775 n. 12 (“[T]o hold that

a rape victim can never be an impartial juror in a rape trial . . . would ‘insult not only all rape

victims but also our entire jury system, which is built upon the assumption that jurors will

honestly try to live up to the sanctity of [their] oath.’”) (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 99

F.3d 978, 989 (10th Cir. 1996)); cf. United States v. Miguel, 111 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir.

1997) (holding that the trial court, in a case involving sexual abuse, did not err when it failed

to excuse jurors for cause based on statements that they had been victims of child

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molestation). Accordingly, “[r]ather than presume bias in any rape [or molestation] victim

who is called as a prospective juror in a rape [or molestation] trial,” courts must “focus[]

more closely on the particular juror’s experience.” See Thomas, 99 F.3d at 990. 

Because “each [implied bias] case must turn on its own facts[,]” Smith, 455 U.S. at

222 (O’Connor, J., concurring), courts should “look to how the experience affected the juror

and what similarities exist between the juror’s experience and the case at trial.” Thomas, 99

F.3d at 990. “[T]he inquiry [for implied bias] is ‘whether an average person in the position

of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.’” Mitchell, 568 F.3d at 1151 (citing

Gonzales, 214 F.3d at 1112). To make this determination, courts consider the following: “the

similarity of the [juror’s] experience to the facts of the case, the nature of the experience, its

contemporaneous and continuing impact, . . . how the individual handles it, and so forth.” See

Fields II, 503 F.3d at 775.

The facts of this case fall short of the extreme and extraordinary circumstances

necessary to presume bias. According to Petitioner, bias can be implied because five of the

jurors who convicted him had been victims of rape or child molestation. Nevertheless, while

these jurors’ experiences might suggest a possibility of bias, “[i]t cannot be said” as a matter

of law “that the average person in [the position of these jurors] would be highly unlikely to

remain impartial whether he [or she] acknowledged it or not.” See Fields II, 503 F.3d at 774.

To presume bias in this case would be to hold that a victim of sexual molestation can never

be an impartial juror in a case involving molestation. Such an approach would “‘insult not

only all . . . victims [of molestation] but also our entire jury system.” See id. at n. 12. Instead,

as in Thomas, the more appropriate inquiry is whether these “experience[s] affected the

juror[s]” and whether there are sufficient “similarities . . . between” these juror’s experiences

and Petitioner’s offense. See 99 F.3d at 990. 

Petitioner has not presented any facts suggesting that the jurors’ experiences affected

them in a way that prevented them from being impartial in this case. Indeed, while some of

these jurors stated that they had a clear memory of being molested,, none indicated that their

experience would cause them to be biased, and there is no evidence that any of these jurors

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intentionally withheld facts regarding the crimes committed against them. See (Doc. 18, Ex.

Q at 64–66). Instead, each of the jurors at issue volunteered information regarding their

victimization and indicated that they would be impartial. Id. at 76; see Fields II, 503 F.3d at

773 (noting that bias is less likely to be implied when a juror is “forthcoming” about his life

experiences on voir dire); Gonzales, 214 F.3d at 1113 (recognizing that a juror’s statements

pertaining to his ability to be impartial may also “be relevant to a determination of implied

bias”). 

Additionally, there are no facts in the record indicating that these jurors were

victimized in circumstances so profoundly similar to the facts of this case that an average

person in the position of these jurors “would be prejudiced.” See Mitchell, 568 F.3d at 1151.

Nothing in the record indicates that these jurors were molested by their babysitter, that their

molesters’ actions involved same-sex attraction, that the sexual contact occurred in the

presence of other children or persons, that the molestations involved oral sex, or that the

jurors’ molestations were otherwise substantially similar to Petitioner’s offense of conviction.

There also are no facts indicating that their experiences had a contemporaneous or continual

impact on the jurors or that these jurors handled the situation in a way that points “sharply

to bias[.]” See Nell, 526 F.2d at 1229 n. 8. 

III. Petitioner’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Does Not Merit Habeas Relief.

“To warrant habeas relief, prosecutorial misconduct must ‘so infect the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628, 644 (9th Cir. 2004) (brackets omitted) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477

U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). In other words, “it ‘is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were

undesirable or even universally condemned[,]’” see Tak Sun Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101,

1112 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at 181), those remarks must have had a

“‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Sechrest

v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 808 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

622 (1993)). “Only if the record demonstrates that the jury’s decision was substantially

influenced by the error or there is ‘grave doubt about whether an error affected a jury’ will

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4

In his habeas petition, Petitioner points to several additional statements by the

prosecutor that Petitioner contends violated his right to a fair trial. Judge Burns, however,

dispensed with these contentions in her R & R, and Petitioner does not object to the R & R’s

findings.

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[a petitioner] be entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir.

1995) (quotation marks omitted)). 

In his Written Objections to Judge Burns’s R & R, Petitioner points only to two

instances of prosecutorial misconduct.4

 Neither objection has merit. First, Petitioner claims

that the prosecutor’s closing argument mischaracterized the testimony of Ms. Adams, the

victims’ mother. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following:

Back to February 3rd, the weekend, you recall Kimberly Adams

said it was really the weekend that I was hiring this guy who

was accepting half the amount of money than any other

weekend babysitter would accept . . . . He was taking advantage

of people who cannot otherwise [afford] a babysitter . . . . He

told them he liked to help struggling parents, help them out

when they needed help. He accepted half the pay to get himself

alone in a bathtub with boys, with children. 

(Doc. 18, Ex. S at 36–39). Contrary to Petitioner’s claim, this statement was not improper.

At trial, Ms. Adams testified that when she looked for babysitters, she interviewed four other

babysitters, each of whom each quoted her a price of $200. (Doc. 18, Ex. A at 58). Given that

Petitioner offered to provide virtually identical services for a price of $120, the prosecutor’s

statement was a reasonable inference based on Ms. Adams’s testimony. See Ceja v. Stewart,

97 F.3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Counsel are given latitude in the presentation of their

closing arguments, and courts must allow the prosecution to strike hard blows based on the

evidence presented and all reasonable inferences therefrom.”) (quotation omitted); Bible v.

Schriro, 497 F. Supp.2d 991, 1026 (D. Ariz. 2007) (“[C]ounsel are given wide latitude during

closing argument.”) (citing United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997)).

Petitioner next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing

argument by alluding to evidence that was not introduced at trial. Specifically, Petitioner

challenges the following portion of the Prosecutor’s closing argument:

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[Defense counsel] asks you to think of the fate of [Petitioner]. I

ask you, ladies and gentlemen, what about the fate of these

children? Luckily we caught this. Luckily Aaron Isakson came

back. If [K’s] answers were suggested, as [Defense Counsel]

suggests, why were they different? Why when I asked her on the

stand what happened, did she not say what she had said to the

interviewers? Because they weren’t suggested by the

interviewers. They were not suggested by her mother. This isn’t

[K’s made-up] story. This is what she saw. This is her

observation of what happened to her younger brother . . . . And

maybe it is very true that we didn’t get the whole story of what

happened in the bathtub, but we got something that happened

with details that she would not otherwise know. There’s been no

evidence at all that she’s seen photographs, that she’s seen other

naked people. You recall the evidence. Where would she get

that detail . . . unless she actually saw that?

(Doc. 18, Ex. S. at 45–46) (emphasis added to reflect Petitioner’s specific objections).

Contrary to Petitioner’s claim, there is nothing to suggest that these statements “‘so infect[ed]

the trial with unfairness as to make [Petitioner’s] resulting conviction a denial of due

process.’” See Davis, 384 F.3d at 644 (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at 181). Instead, as Judge

Burns explained in her R & R, “[T]he prosecutor was merely attempting to respond to

Petitioner’s proffered defense and argument, which attacked K’s credibility and attacked the

inconsistency of her statements and testimony, by arguing that [K’s] testimony was

believable [and] supported by the evidence.” (Doc. 20 at 19). There is simply nothing in the

record suggesting these remarks had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’” See Sechrest, 549 F.3d at 808 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at

622). 

Yet, even if these statements were somehow prejudicial to Petitioner, any potential

prejudice was sufficiently minimized by the trial court’s final jury instructions, which

explicitly stated that “statements by counsel are not evidence.” (Doc. 18, Ex. S at 14–16).

The trial court further instructed the jury that its verdict must be based solely on the evidence

and not based on “sympathy, bias, or prejudice.” See Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 713

(9th Cir. 2000) (“[B]efore the lawyers made their closing arguments, the court instructed the

jury that “[s]tatements made by the attorneys during trial are not evidence,’ and that the jury

‘must not be influenced by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public

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opinion or public feeling.’ We presume that the jury followed those instructions.”) (citation

omitted). Petitioner points to nothing in the record that overcomes the presumption that the

jury in this case followed the judge’s instruction to make its decision based on the evidence

presented at trial. See id.

IV. Petitioner’s Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Fails on the Merits.

To prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of effective assistance

of counsel, a habeas petitioner must establish that (1) his attorney’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) but for his attorney’s errors, there is a

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). With respect to Strickland’s first prong, the

relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather, whether the

decisions made by defense counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170,

1173 (9th Cir.1998). To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 1988)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). As both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied

to establish a constitutional violation, failure to satisfy either prong requires that an

ineffective assistance claim be denied. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we

expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”). 

Petitioner raises three objections to Judge Burns’s conclusion that counsel was not

constitutionally defective: (1) Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective when he failed to

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) counsel’s failure to challenge biased jurors

constitutes ineffective assistance; and (3) Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to prejudicial prosecutorial statements. As discussed throughout this Order and the R

& R, all of Petitioner’s arguments underlying his ineffective assistance claim (i.e. Petitioner’s

sufficiency of the evidence claim, his juror bias claim, and his prosecutorial misconduct

claim) are without merit. Accordingly, Petitioner’s attorney was not ineffective for failing

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to raise objections based on these arguments. See Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th

Cir. 1985) (holding that counsel’s failure to raise a meritless argument does not constitute

ineffective assistance) (citing Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)); see

also Evans, 855 F.2d at 636 (noting that prejudice requires the defendant to “show that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). To be sure,

it is somewhat troubling that Petitioner’s counsel failed to challenge or question several

jurors who indicated that they had been victims of sexual crimes; nevertheless, his attorney’s

failure was not prejudicial because Petitioner fails to present facts demonstrating that

counsel’s alleged error resulted in a biased jury. See Fields II, 503 F.3d at 776 (rejecting an

ineffective assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to challenge jurors for bias where the

petitioner failed to demonstrate that the jurors were biased). 

V. Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing is Denied.

As a final matter, the Court finds that Petitioner has not set forth a basis for an

evidentiary hearing on his claims. To obtain an evidentiary hearing on a habeas claim, a state

prisoner is required to both diligently pursue that claim in state court and allege a colorable

claim for relief. West v. Ryan, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2303337, at *6 (9th Cir. 2010).

Petitioner meets neither of these requirements. 

A. Diligence

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing when he or

she fails to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Failure

to develop the factual basis of a claim is established when “there is a lack of diligence, or

some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000). Diligence, under this standard, “depends upon whether the

prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to

investigate and pursue claims in state court; it does not depend . . . upon whether those efforts

could have been successful.” Id. at 435. “[A]t a minimum,” diligence requires that “the

prisoner . . . seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.”

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Id. at 437 (emphasis added). A petitioner who fails to exercise diligence will be entitled to

an evidentiary hearing only when his claim raises a new issue of constitutional law, made

retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court, or where efforts to discover the facts

underlying the claim would have been in vain. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). Additionally,

a lack of diligence will not be excused unless the facts underlying the claim are sufficient to

establish actual innocence. See id. at § 2254(e)(2)(B)

Here, Petitioner has not diligently pursued the facts underlying his claims. Under

Arizona law, Petitioner should have presented his sufficiency of the evidence claim, his claim

of juror bias, and his claim for prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31,

32.2. He did not. Moreover, under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1(d), Petitioner

should have raised his claim of juror bias and should have requested a hearing on that issue

through a post-trial motion. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(d). And while Petitioner arguably

presented his claim of ineffective assistance in the manner prescribed under Arizona law, the

facts underlying that claim, at least as they pertain to his attorney’s failure to challenge jurors

for bias, were not diligently developed because Petitioner failed to raise the issue of bias in

a post-trial motion following his conviction. See id. Petitioner, therefore, failed to give the

state courts the necessary opportunity to make additional factual findings related to his

claims. 

Petitioner’s failure to diligently pursue his claims cannot be excused under the

AEDPA. There is nothing to suggest that Petitioner’s claims present a new issue of

constitutional law, made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). Nor would diligent efforts to pursue Petitioner’s claims have been

in vain. See id. Indeed, the factual basis upon which Petitioner asserts juror bias appears to

have been available to Petitioner from the very first day of his trial. Further, the factual basis

underlying Petitioner’s claims do not demonstrate actual innocence. See id. at §

2254(e)(2)(B).

2. Colorability

Even if Petitioner had been diligent in pursuing the factual basis for his claims in state

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court, he fails to allege facts that would entitle him to relief. A habeas petitioner presents a

colorable claim when he or she “(1) alleges facts, which, if proven, would entitle him to

relief; and (2) shows that he did not receive a full and fair hearing in the state court.”

Houston v. Schomig, 533 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2);

Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 873 (9th Cir. 2006) cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1287 (2007)).

To receive an evidentiary hearing, however, a habeas petitioner must establish what

additional facts could be developed and explain how those facts might have affected the

outcome of his trial. See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999). In other

words, a petitioner must present specific facts that would entitle him to relief. Tilcock v.

Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a habeas petitioner must allege

“specific facts” to receive an evidentiary hearing); see Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006,

1014 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that mere speculation, unsupported by facts, is insufficient to

merit an evidentiary hearing on federal habeas review).

A review of Petitioner’s Habeas Petition and his Written Objections reveals that

Petitioner does not allege specific “ facts, which, if proven, would entitle him to relief.” See

Houston, 533 F.3d at 1083. Instead, each of Petitioner’s arguments relies exclusively on the

record at trial. With respect to Petitioner’s juror bias claim, for example, Petitioner does not

allege any additional facts, let alone specific facts, that would entitle him to relief. See Rich,

187 F.3d at 1067; Tilcock, 538 F.3d at 1146. To grant an evidentiary hearing based on

Petitioner’s speculation that additional evidence will show bias would allow Petitioner to

conduct a “fishing expedition” on his claim. See United States v. Wright, 506 F.3d 1293,

1303 (10th Cir. 2007) (“District courts have ‘wide discretion’ to restrict contact with jurors

to protect jurors from ‘fishing expeditions’ by losing attorneys.”); Rich, 187 F.3d at 1067

(noting that petitioners are not entitled to go on fishing expeditions in search of evidence that

may or may not support their claims). 

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner fails to state a claim for habeas relief, 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

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1. Judge Burns’s R & R is ACCEPTED as set forth in this Order. See (Doc. 20).

2. Petitioner David Robert Ruderman’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is

DENIED with prejudice. See (Doc. 1).

3. A certificate of appealability is GRANTED with respect to Petitioner’s claim

of juror bias and his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s

alleged failure to challenge biased jurors. 

4. A certificate of appealability is DENIED with respect to Petitioner’s remaining

claims because he has not made a substantial showing that the state courts’ decision on these

claims resulted in the denial of a constitutional right. 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to TERMINATE this action. 

DATED this 13th day of July, 2010.

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