Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01103/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01103-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS JOSEPH MELGER,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL WESP, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-1103 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has submitted a complete request for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 

302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff consented to proceed before the undersigned for 

all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

However, the court will not assess a filing fee at this time. Instead, the undersigned summarily 

dismisses the complaint. 

On June 24, 2016, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint as of right under Rule 15 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 15.) On July 12, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to 

amend, accompanied by his second amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 23, 24.) Plaintiff seeks to 

clarify the nature of his claims, asserting that he is not challenging his underlying conviction, that 

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the district attorney incorrectly charged him, or that his current prison sentence is too long. (ECF 

No. 23; 24 at 4.) Therefore, plaintiff’s motion to amend is granted, and the court now screens 

plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. However, “[s]pecific 

facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 

(2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

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In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 

grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

Here, plaintiff alleges that the District Attorney’s office of Placer County is liable on a 

failure to train theory under Section 1983 based on Brady1violations committed by subordinate 

prosecutors in his underlying criminal prosecution. Plaintiff asserts that Brady violations were 

caused by the defendants’ deliberate indifference to an obvious need to train prosecutors to avoid 

such constitutional violations. Plaintiff contends defendants are liable under the “policy of 

inaction,” citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). Specifically, plaintiff claims that his 

“uncharged” greater offense of “theft or fraud of a check, alteration of a check” was suppressed in 

the “silent record,” or “discovery that was never issued to him.” (ECF No. 14 at 4.) Plaintiff 

contends that the district attorney’s office failed to train its employees on how to disclose the 

greater offense when the evidence of the greater offense is exculpatory and favorable to the 

defendant. Plaintiff argues that if the greater offense was charged as California Penal Code 

§§ 476/473(b), it would operate to reduce Penal Code 530.5(a) identity theft to a misdemeanor 

per se. Plaintiff asserts that once defendants appear, plaintiff will be able to prove his case by 

discovering the evidence that was not disclosed in his case, citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 

U.S. 51 (2011). In conclusion, plaintiff claims that the defendants violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights and were deliberately indifferent because they were obligated to disclose the 

exculpatory evidence of the greater offense of California Penal Code §§ 476/473(b), and are 

therefore liable for their failure to train. 

A state prisoner may not recover damages under § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional 

imprisonment, or for any other harm caused by “actions whose unlawfulness would render the 

imprisonment invalid,” unless he can prove that the conviction or other basis for confinement has 

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal 

 

1

 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a 

writ of habeas corpus). Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). “A state prisoner’s 

§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or 

equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or 

internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the 

invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). 

Here, plaintiff’s challenge would necessarily implicate the validity of his underlying 

criminal conviction. In his motion to amend, plaintiff concedes that had the prosecution disclosed 

the Brady material, it would change the outcome of his underlying criminal case because it would 

operate to reduce the charged offense and trigger constitutional error under Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and would reduce the felony to a misdemeanor of the lesser 

included offense. (ECF No. 23 at 3.) Thus, if plaintiff wishes to challenge the district attorney’s 

office’s failure to release evidence of plaintiff’s greater offense, even under a failure to train 

theory, he must first obtain a reversal of his conviction through a writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. 

Plaintiff’s reliance on Connick, 563 U.S. at 51, is unavailing for two reasons. First, in 

Connick, the prisoner’s conviction was vacated, so the prisoner’s civil rights claims were not 

barred by Heck. Second, and more importantly, in Connick, the Supreme Court held that a 

district attorney’s office could not be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train based on a single 

Brady violation. Connick, 563 U.S. at 54. The prisoner in Connick relied on a theory of “singleincident” liability hypothesized in City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).

2

 The 

 

2

 “In Canton, the Court left open the possibility that, “in a narrow range of circumstances,” a 

pattern of similar violations might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference. [Board of 

Comm’rs of] Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). The Court posed the hypothetical example 

of a city that arms its police force with firearms and deploys the armed officers into the public to 

capture fleeing felons without training the officers in the constitutional limitation on the use of 

deadly force. Canton, supra, at 390, n.10. Given the known frequency with which police attempt 

to arrest fleeing felons and the “predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that 

situation will violate citizens' rights,” the Court theorized that a city's decision not to train the 

officers about constitutional limits on the use of deadly force could reflect the city's deliberate 

indifference to the “highly predictable consequence,” namely, violations of constitutional rights. 

Bryan Cty., supra, at 409. The Court sought not to foreclose the possibility, however rare, that the 

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Court found that the failure to train prosecutors in their Brady obligations does not fall within the 

narrow range of Canton’s hypothesized single incident liability. Connick, 563 U.S. at 63. The 

Supreme Court found that Brady violations differ dramatically from the hypothetical involving 

armed police in Canton. Connick, 563 U.S. at 64-68. The civil rights “statute does not provide 

plaintiffs or courts carte blanche to micromanage local governments throughout the United 

States.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 68. “The reason why the Canton hypothetical is inapplicable is 

that attorneys, unlike police officers, are equipped with the tools to find, interpret, and apply legal 

principles.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 69. Here, plaintiff does not assert a failure to train claim based 

on pattern or practice, but similarly relies on the alleged failure of prosecutors to disclose 

discovery in his criminal prosecution. Thus, plaintiff’s claim is unavailing under Connick or 

Canton. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Leave 

to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the pleading could be 

corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc); see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se 

litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, 

unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.”) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, if, after 

careful consideration, it is clear that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the Court may 

dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1005-06.

Because plaintiff’s claim is barred under Heck, granting plaintiff leave to amend his 

pleading again would be futile. Therefore, plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed 

without leave to amend, but without prejudice.

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unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city could be 

liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 

63-64.

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Finally, on July 13, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its order 

denying plaintiff’s motion for discovery. However, in light of the above ruling, plaintiff’s motion 

for discovery is now moot; thus, the court denies the motion for reconsideration. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted;

2. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 23) is granted;

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); and

4. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF no. 27) is denied. 

Dated: July 19, 2016

/melg1103.56

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