Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01173/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01173-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT RAMESES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-04-1173 GEB GGH P

vs.

SCOTT KERNAN, Warden, ORDER and

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction and Summary

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of one count (containing numerous

occasions) of passing checks with knowledge of insufficient funds to back them up. However,

this was not a garden variety bad checks case. Petitioner herein, Robert Rameses, was the former

Robert Rozier, a professional football player. As Rozier, he had pled guilty to four murders in

Florida. However, because of petitioner’s willingness to testify against a cult leader for whom,

or in connection with, he had performed the murders, petitioner received a plea bargain of a total

sentence of 22 years, and actually served less than 10. When El Dorado County prosecutors

acquired this information, either historical or by virtue of receiving immunized testimony

transcripts (an issue herein), the bad checks case was filed as a Three Strikes case. After lengthy

pretrial proceedings, petitioner went to trial before a jury, was found guilty of passing bad

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 1 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

checks, and the jury separately found that petitioner had previously been convicted of four

murders. He was sentenced to 25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law. 

Petitioner raises three issues, all of which involve colorable claims. First, without

a hearing, and without consideration of less restrictive means by which to ensure the security of

the courtroom, the court ordered petitioner to wear a stun belt. Petitioner argues that he was

prejudiced thereby. Secondly, petitioner argues that the prosecutors were motivated to pursue

this case as a Three Strikes case by relying, at least in part, on immunized testimony. Thirdly,

petitioner alleges that the failure to submit the definitional “serious felony” aspect of his prior

convictions to the jury, caused an Apprendi violation. 

For the reasons expressed herein, no evidentiary hearing is ordered for the stun

belt issue, and the undersigned recommends that the claim be denied on account of a lack of

prejudice to petitioner occasioned by his wearing of the stun belt. The stun belt claim should be

denied. The undersigned further does not find that non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony

states a federal claim as established by Supreme Court authority. Finally, the court finds that

petitioner’s sentence was imposed in violation of Apprendi, but finds beyond a reasonable doubt

that petitioner was not prejudiced thereby.

AEDPA Standards

 The AEDPA (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act) “worked

substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential standards of

review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication of a criminal

defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 2 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 , 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover,

the established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 10, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 3 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

Discussion

No detailed factual summary need be given here as the issues have their own

discrete set of facts. The necessary factual discussion will be held in each section.

A. Use of the Stun Belt

The undersigned agrees with petitioner that under Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d

897 (9th Cir. 2003), petitioner did not receive the restraints hearing to which he was entitled. 

The “hearing” he did receive was nothing more than a short explanation by the judge of a

predetermined restraints (stun belt) order which he had already given the court bailiffs. The issue

then becomes one of prejudice which itself is broken into two major areas: (a) the alleged

possible prejudice from a juror’s seeing the stun belt; (b) the alleged prejudice that the stun belt

had on petitioner’s ability to focus at trial and communicate with his counsel. 

Normally, this type of alleged prejudice would require an evidentiary hearing. 

However, in this case, after expansion of the record to take into account the filed declarations,

and based on those declarations as well as the trial record, the court finds: (a) AEDPA precludes

a hearing on the possible juror sighting issue; and (b) that allegations of

hindrance/communication prejudice are so far fetched as to not require an evidentiary hearing.

1. Facts and Some Observations

a. Contemporaneous Facts

The trial judge, to whom petitioner’s case had been reassigned just before trial,

had determined that petitioner was to wear a stun belt during his trial proceedings. Petitioner

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 4 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

was informed of the judge’s order before jury selection was to commence. The judge did not

hold a hearing, but simply announced his decision.The trial judge ordered a stun belt to be used

with petitioner at the start of trial despite his “[being] a gentleman thus far throughout our 

proceedings,’” RT 2986, because of petitioner’s prior criminal history, his size, and the potential

sentencing consequences for petitioner if he lost at trial. Id. 

 The trial judge was concerned that the jury not see the stun belt:

My concern was that it not show to the jury because I don’t want to

prejudice you in the eyes of the jury. Does your suit coat button so

that the whole thing is covered up? Could you stand so I could see

whether it shows at all.

RT 2986-87.

Petitioner replied that “It’s not going to button comfortably with that [stun gun belt].” RT 2987.

However, the trial judge was convinced that nothing would show: “Oh, I see. I don’t think that

it will show anything to the jury.” Id.

Importantly, the trial judge then advised petitioner:

So now it’s your obligation, Mr. Rameses, to speak through Ms.

London. If there’s anything you want me to know, anything you

want the jury to know, be sure and communicate to her. She is

your life-line here. She is your one chance to walk out these doors.

I want to impress upon you, it’s vital that you cooperate 100

percent fully with her. Give her any information, any thoughts that

you have throughout this case. And she’s a very competent

attorney. She will do a good job for you. But it takes your

cooperation, your input, and your participation. So keep that

foremost in your mind. Okay?

RT 2987-88. (Emphasis added).

Petitioner responded, not with a statement that he had been advised by the

deputies that he would be electrically shocked if he spoke with his attorney, or that he couldn’t

think with the stun belt on, but rather: “Yes, sir.” Petitioner added, on his own, the rather astute

objection: “I was advised that even though it is a court order for this restraint, that I would need

at least to object [citing case law]. Just so that it’s on the record.” RT 2988. The trial judge

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 5 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

responded that an “orderly and safe proceeding” was “paramount” in his mind. Petitioner again

responded astutely: “Yes, sir. Even though it speaks – evidentiary hearing must be held once the

objection is made. You’re overruling that?” RT 2989. The trial judge affirmed the overruling. 

Petitioner then went on himself to argue another point about his counsel.

The next morning, according to the Clerks Record, CT 486, the trial judge sua

sponte reiterated why he was ordering the stun belt to remain on petitioner. He stated:

In regard to the other issues Mr. Rameses raised yesterday about

whether we should have the electronic belt on him, I want to

amplify on the reasons why I authorized that. And in addition to

the reasons I gave you yesterday, Mr. Rameses, and the reasons

why an evidentiary hearing wouldn’t be required under Estelle v.

Williams and those other cases, the facts I recited, your four prior

murder convictions, the facts that this is a three-strikes case where

you’re facing a potential severe sentence are undisputed facts. So

there’s nothing to contest there. There’s no reason for evidentiary

hearing.

And you’re a very large, strong man. You used to play

professional football. That’s undisputed. You even played for our

alma mater, the Cal Bears.

And it was also reported to me by court staff that you were very

irritated and upset, agitated by Judge Kingsbury’s rulings on the

counsel issues last week. So that concerned me about your

potential of acting out. And those, again, are undisputed facts in

terms of perceptions of the court staff that you appeared very

agitated and upset by her ruling. So I have to act in the interest of

safety of everyone: You, court personnel, attorneys, staff, everyone. 

So those are the reasons why I authorized this electronic belt.

And I’m sure– you know– you have conducted yourself as a

gentleman before me, but I have to, you know, act out of an

abundance of caution on some issues. And that’s why I did it.

RT (augmented) 88.

The judge then went on to other items of discussion.

That same day, in the afternoon (after jury selection), petitioner’s counsel

indicated that she had in fact communicated with her client regarding acquiring transcripts for a

possible writ or appeal (not having to do with the stun belt). RT 3001. Petitioner himself

addressed the court on this issue without exhibiting any loss of focus or indicated discomfort. 

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 6 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

RT 3001-3004. Nor did he raise any issue with respect to the stun belt. Later, petitioner

communicated to the court that he was satisfied with the witnesses called on his behalf, and that

he had decided not to testify. RT 3355. 

Excluding jury selection and deliberations, the trial on the bad checks lasted only

approximately two and one-half court days. While the jury was deliberating on the bad check

charges, preliminary evidence was taken in court regarding petitioner’s prior convictions. If the

verdict was guilty on the bad check charges, the jury was to find whether in fact petitioner had

suffered prior convictions. The jury found petitioner guilty, and short evidence/argument was put

before the jury. In informing the court that she had no argument, petitioner’s counsel stated:

Because I don’t have any argument. I want–so– because I don’t

really have any argument, and I need to know if Robert [petitioner]

feels there’s something I need to be presenting on his behalf .

RT 3444.

The court told her to ask for a break if she needed one. It did not appear from this short exchange

that petitioner’s counsel felt that there was any impediment to her consultation with her client. 

When questioned on a logistical matter just after the jury had found the prior convictions,

petitioner did not raise any issue about the impediments of a stun belt. RT 3453. The court

invited petitioner to talk with his counsel on a particular matter. RT 3457. 

Further post-trial hearings were held even before a motion for new trial was made. 

At this time petitioner was representing himself and was free to communicate with the court. 

Many issues were raised. Not once did petitioner complain about having to have worn the stun

belt during trial. Petitioner filed his own motion for new trial and made a myriad of complaints

in his Points and Authorities about the trial and especially his counsel. He did not raise the issue

about a stun belt or that it caused any impediments at trial in any fashion. CT 582 et seq. He did

raise an issue that his counsel would not talk with him during trial, CT 586, nor that he could not

talk with his counsel. Apparently, he was trying to so communicate despite any later asserted

impediment in so doing. At sentencing, the issue of the stun belt was not raised.

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 7 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As respondent notes, petitioner’s allegations are somewhat inconsistent in that he avers 1

he was paying close attention to the testimony such that he desired to pass information on about

the testimony to his attorney.

8

b. Appellate and Habeas Facts

Petitioner did not raise the issue of the stun belt in his appeal or initial habeas

petitions with the Court of Appeal. The first time the stun belt issue was raised occurred in the

state supreme court petition filed on September 24, 2004 – sometime after his habeas petition

had been filed in this court on June 21, 2004. That state petition references a declaration, but the

records supplied to this court do not contain such a declaration. The first declaration referencing

prejudice from having worn the stun belt appeared in this federal case on November 21, 2005

(declaration executed October 3, 2005), but the federal declaration tracks the allegations in the

September 2004 state petition. 

In this declaration, petitioner declares that pursuant to a form, he was told by the

bailiffs each day that he wore the stun belt “that the harness they had put on me was a stun belt

and that if he pressed the button on his belt, that a 50,000 volt shock would be produced. He told

me, ‘If you move, I will shock you. If you speak, I will shock you. If there are any sudden

moves, I will shock you. If you fail to respond to any verbal orders I give you, I will shock

you.’” Petitioner referenced one incident in which he asked a bailiff if he could speak with his

attorney, and was told: “‘Sit down and shut up.’” Petitioner asserts that he became intimidated

into not communicating with his attorney and was hampered with focusing on the trial because of

the fear of shock.1

Respondent attached to the Answer declarations from two of the bailiffs present at

petitioner’s trial. Both disclaimed any verbal warnings to “sit down and shut up.” The bailiffs

also disclaimed knowledge that petitioner was ever advised that if he spoke, he would be

shocked, but one recalled advice that if petitioner stood up, “he may be shocked.” Declaration of

Michael Koring. Respondent also supplied the declaration of his trial attorney, Lori London,

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 8 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

who stated:

3. Mr. Rameses was always very well dressed for his court

appearances. To my knowledge, no member of the jury was aware

that Mr. Rameses wore a stun belt at trial.

4. I recall that Mr. Rameses stated that he did not like having to wear the

stun belt, but he never indicated that any threat had been made by the

bailiffs regarding the use of the stun belt.

5. Mr Rameses never indicated that his ability to communicate

with me at trial was hampered by his fear that he would be shocked

with the stun belt if he did so.

6. Mr. Rameses never indicated that his ability to participate in his

own defense (whether to testify or otherwise) was influenced by

having to wear a stun belt.

7. Mr. Rameses often participated in courtroom laughter. I do not

believe that Mr. Rameses was impeded in any way by the stun belt. 

Had Mr. Rameses indicated that the stun belt was creating a

problem, I would not have hesitated to bring up the stun belt issue

to the trial judge.

There was not a statement about Rameses actually communicating with his counsel during the

time he wore the stun belt, leaving the court with the uncertainty whether no such contact

occurred, or to the contrary, that such communication actually did take place despite any felt

intimidation.

On November 5, 2007, the undersigned ordered the parties to meet and confer in

order to obtain a copy of the form referenced by petitioner ostensibly containing the advisements

about use of the stun belt orally read by the bailiffs to petitioner. Because petitioner refused to

sign the form when read, the form read to petitioner is not in existence in petitioner’s law

enforcement “jacket.” However, a generic copy of the form in use at the time of petitioner’s trial

was located and authenticated. This form did not include the advisements which petitioner

referenced insofar as the form does not indicate that “if you speak” you will be shocked. The

form does not advise that conferring with an attorney will result in triggering the stun. It does

indicate that “outbursts,” “hostile movements,” tampering with the belt device, failure to follow

commands for the movement of one’s person, a loss of vision of one’s hands by the custodial

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 9 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

officer, and “overt actions” against a person within a fifty foot vicinity could cause the device to

be triggered. Filing of Nov. 16, 2007, Exhibit 1 to Altmeyer Declaration. Exhibit 3 to the

Altmeyer declaration, the form utilized now, specifically provides that conferring with one’s

attorney will not result in stunning.

C. Analysis

Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2003) found in an AEDPA habeas case

that the use of stun belts equated with the use of physical restraints, i.e., shackles. Id. at 901. 

“And for these reasons, before a court may order the use of physical restraints on a defendant at

trial, ‘the court must be persuaded by compelling circumstances that some measure [is] needed to

maintain the security of the courtroom,’ and, as noted, ‘the court must pursue less restrictive

alternatives before imposing physical restraints.”

In fairness to the trial judge, both from a federal perspective, the use of a stun belt

at the time of petitioner’s trial could reasonably have been viewed as a less restrictive measure

than full scale shackling. All of the cases relied upon in Gonzalez for the purpose of equating the

use standards of shackles with a stun belt were issued after the trial in this case. United States v.

Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 2002); People v.Mar, 28 Cal. 4th 1201, 124 Cal. Rptr.

2d 161 (2002). Indeed, California law at the time of trial herein had expressly determined that

shackles and stun belts were different types of restraints not subject to the same standards. 

People v. Garcia, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1356, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 354 (1997). 

Respondent argues that the equating of stun belts with shackles is not clearly

established Supreme Court law citing Diaz v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections, 402 F.3d

1136, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005). If this were the only case on the issue, the undersigned would be

persuaded. This is especially so since California law at the time of petitioner’s trial would have

indicated to the trial judge that he was acting appropriately. However, Gonzalez determined that

the Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) pre-AEDPA “new rule” preclusion did

not apply because equating stun belts with other types of physical restraints was “dictated by

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 10 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

[Supreme Court] precedent.” Gonzalez, 341 F.3d at 904-905. The Ninth Circuit has held that

the AEDPA requirement to use only clearly established Supreme Court law in finding a

constitutional violation is the codification of Teague. Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 955 (9th

Cir. 2006). The undersigned is bound by Gonzalez.

Since Gonzalez states the law to be followed, the court has little difficulty in

finding that compelling circumstances for use of the stun belt were not present, but in any event,

less restrictive measures other than the stun belt were not considered. There is no “big man” rule

regarding the automatic use of physical restraints. Moreover, as petitioner argues, a prior

criminal record, while a factor in the decision to use physical restraints, is insufficient in itself to

be compelling. The potentially lengthy sentence, a Three Strikes sentence, is a rather

commonplace sentence in California courts and should not dictate the use of physical restraints. 

Of course, one looks at all the circumstances in combination; however, the trial court had only

good cause for use of a stun belt, not a compelling cause.

The item that cements the above finding is actually the reason given by the trial

court on the day after the stun belt order. The trial court referenced that petitioner had become

“agitated” on one occasion at one of the pre-trial judge’s rulings, and that the trial judge had

heard about this from court personnel in the pre-trial judge’s chambers. The level of agitation

was evidently not worth commenting about; in any event, there is no record that petitioner had to

be restrained at the time he became upset at the judge’s ruling. More importantly, even though 

pre-trial proceedings in petitioner’s case were lengthy and numerous, the record is bare of any

reference whatsoever of petitioner causing security problems. That petitioner, who had been in

lengthy pre-trial detention, did not maintain a passive or blase` attitude on one occasion, and

became upset at a ruling (something that all lawyers have probably done at one time or another)

is hardly a reason to order a stun belt or physical restraints at trial. The record does not support a

finding of compelling reasons to use restraints at trial. 

\\\\\

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 11 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

Finally, there was no recorded discussion whatsoever of alternatives to use of the

stun belt. A predetermined decision was announced; that was that. The issue becomes one of

prejudice and whether petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to prove that prejudice. In

the alternative, respondent can and does argue that the record refutes any notion of prejudice.

Evidentiary Hearing Standards

Gonzalez v. Pliler held that an AEDPA petitioner only need meet two

requirements to obtain an evidentiary hearing: (1) allege facts, which if proven, would entitle the

petitioner to relief, and (2) show that he did not receive a full and fair hearing in a state court,

either at the time of trial or in a collateral proceeding. Id, 341 F.3d at 903. The undersigned is

unsure of why Gonzalez did not speak of the other AEDPA requirements for an evidentiary

hearing, or the exceptions to the general rule, but it is clear from the Supreme Court and other

Ninth Circuit cases that other requirements/exceptions do exist.

The threshold requirement is that the petitioner act diligently in his pursuit of

having the evidentiary hearing in state court, i.e., “not failed [through the petitioner’s own lack of

diligence] to develop the factual basis of the claim in state courts.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Moreover, the court does not have to hold an evidentiary hearing when the record

clearly refutes the collateral factual allegations raised by petitioner. Schiro v. Landrigan,

__U.S.__, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2007); similarly, palpably incredible or patently frivolous

claims need not garner an evidentiary hearing just because the petition “says so.” United States

v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003). In addition, the court retains some discretion to

utilize expansion of the record in lieu of a full fledged trial type hearing. Where the district court

concludes that “[a full evidentiary] hearing would not offer any reasonable chance of altering [the

court’s] view of the facts,” as presented by the record and any expansions thereto, a trial type

hearing will not be necessary. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 591 (9th Cir. 2004). In

utilizing this discretion, the undersigned understands that matters of credibility are not often

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 12 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Thus, the issues of entitlement to an evidentiary hearing and exhaustion are not 2

completely overlapping. While one can speculate to a degree what claims may have been raised

had a requested evidentiary hearing been held in the trial court, petitioner still maintained the

obligation to expressly explicate his claim on state collateral review.

 An evidentiary hearing on the juror issue would be exploratory in any event. No 3

evidence has been produced, in terms of declarations or documents, which would suggest that

any juror has been contacted, and that a juror saw the stun belt. As the Ninth Circuit has held,

13

determined on the basis of the record.

Discussion

Respondent focuses exclusively on post-trial filings to arrive at a determination

that petitioner did not act diligently in requesting an evidentiary hearing even though he in fact

requested one in state court habeas proceedings. However, the trial record demonstrates that

petitioner could not have initially acted more diligently than he did when petitioner personally

raised an objection at trial that he was not receiving an evidentiary hearing on the stun belt issues. 

The fact that the trial court cut him off, and missed some of the potential reasoning for having

that hearing, i.e., was it intimidating to petitioner, and so forth, cannot be held against petitioner. 

(The failure of petitioner to raise the stun belt issue thereafter until 2004, despite many prior

opportunities to do so, adversely affects petitioner’s credibility, see below.) 

The non-exhaustion argument fares better for respondent with respect to the issue

of whether the jury could see the stun belt. Petitioner never asserted in state court that he

believed the jurors could see the belt – his sole ground of complaint concerned the alleged

intimidation caused by the stun belt and focus interrupting nature of the stun belt. Respondent is

correct that petitioner cannot simply raise as an afterthought in federal court a completely

different factual basis for the stun belt claim, and a fairly dispositive one, than that which was

raised in the state direct review or collateral proceedings. Aiken v. Spaulding, 841 F.2d 881,

883-84 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 92 S. Ct. 509 (1971) (both

operative facts and legal claim must have been presented to the state courts). Therefore,

2

petitioner may not have an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the jury saw the stun belt.3

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 13 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to “explore [his] case in search of its

existence.” Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, the trial judge

himself remarked that the jury would not be able to see petitioner’s belt, and that fact is entitled

to deference. See Gonzalez at 341 F.3d at 903.

14

The “intimidation” issue poses a different question. As previously indicated, the

trial court erred in not having an evidentiary hearing on the stun belt issue, including an analysis

of lesser means to ensure security which may have been effective. The closer issue, however, is

whether the record clearly refutes petitioner’s latter day assertions of prejudice in terms of

hindering petitioner’s focus at trial or intimidating petitioner into not communicating with his

client. Petitioner has so sworn in his declaration presently before the court.

Normally, such a declaration would require the holding of an evidentiary hearing. 

If it were true that petitioner felt precluded from conferring with his attorney, or that his

concentration was significantly affected, the writ should be granted. However, the record so

clearly refutes petitioner’s allegations that holding an evidentiary hearing would be wasteful. 

First, petitioner declared that the custodial officers read from the form – but the form does not

contain the rather bizarre “do not speak” advisements to which petitioner testified. Second,

given the entire record in this case, and petitioner’s history of being outspoken, it is beyond belief

that he would never have mentioned his thoughts regarding the stun belt to his attorney, at some

time, in court or otherwise, orally or in writing, that he felt hindered in communication and focus. 

There are certainly no writings to this effect. Third, and very important, the judge told petitioner

on the record that he was to confer with his attorney. Petitioner himself responded to the judge,

but the response did not contain mention of any draconian stun belt procedures which would

have precluded such communication – petitioner merely raised a legal objection to use of the stun

belt at all. How “shocked” could petitioner have been at his stun belt procedures if he failed to

even reference them when the topic was being aired in court? Throughout the remainder of the

trial, petitioner never raised the issue of his supposed lack of focus or communication even when

he was personally speaking. To the extent that petitioner asserts that he was discouraged from

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 14 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 According to petitioner’s present habeas counsel, the Florida prosecutors bought a pig 4

in a poke. Counsel reports that the Florida prosecutor told the deputy district attorney

prosecuting this bad check case that “the jury had acquitted Yahweh Ben Yahweh in an hour, that

Mr. Rameses was not credible, and that he was a dangerous, pathological liar.” See RT 1162-

15

testifying because of the wearing of the stun belt, his calm, unequivocal statement to the judge

that he was satisfied with the witnesses called on his behalf, and did not desire to testify, RT

3355, obliterates the assertion. After trial, the alleged prejudice was not mentioned at the motion

for new trial, the brief for which was written by petitioner himself at a time that he was

representing himself, nor was it raised at all on appeal. Such was not even thought of in the

initial habeas petition. The court can only find that petitioner’s recollection of the prejudice from

the stun belt advisements that he received was exaggerated in its harshness over the lengthy time

between being given advisements and petitioner’s decision to finally raise the stun belt issue in

his state supreme court habeas petition in 2004. It may well be that the Ninth Circuit decision in

Gonzalez, which had just been issued prior to the filing of that state petition, simply prompted a

recitation of facts by petitioner which would equate with prejudice. Finally, the internal

inconsistency of petitioner’s allegations, i.e., that his concentration was hampered, but that he

nevertheless desired to communicate many times with his counsel about evidence/testimony

which had concerned him in court, cements the conclusion that petitioner’s prejudice assertions

are makeweight. 

B. Rameses Cannot Prevail on His Apprendi Claim

After his professional football career, petitioner had become a type of enforcer for

a cult leader whose cult was located in Florida. In 1988, petitioner was sentenced to a total of 22

years after pleading guilty to four murders in Florida; petitioner was out of prison less than ten

years later. While it might seem odd that four murders would warrant such lenient treatment,

petitioner had agreed to help the government prosecute the cult leader. Evidently, the

government officials needed to prosecute and convict the leader more than they needed to punish

petitioner for murder.4

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 15 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 1163.

16

After being convicted on the bad check charges in El Dorado County in 2001,

petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to life. The bad check charges, which by themselves would

have led to approximately one year in prison, were greatly enhanced for sentencing purposes by

California’s Three Strikes Law. Petitioner contends that the jury had to find that his murder

convictions in Florida were “serious felonies” for purposes of California law, and the failure to

give this issue to the jury requires reversal of the sentence. The undersigned starts with a

recitation of the Three Strike law.

(2)(A) If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions as

defined in subdivision (d) that have been pled and proved, the term

for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of

life imprisonment with a minimum term of the indeterminate

sentence calculated as the greater of:

(i) Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each

current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior

felony convictions.

(ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years.

(iii) The term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for

the underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable

under Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of

Part 2, or any period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046.

Cal. Penal Code 667(e).

Subdivision (d) defined the requisite prior “serious” felonies as:

(1) Any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a

violent felony or any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section

1192.7 as a serious felony in this state...

(2) A conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that, if

committed in California, is punishable by imprisonment in the state

prison. A prior conviction of a particular felony shall include a

conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that includes all of

the elements of the particular felony as defined in subdivision (c)

of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7.

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 16 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Petitioner was fortunate in that clearly the Apprendi issue could have been procedurally 5

barred for failure to object to the asserted error in the trial court and in failure to raise it on direct

appeal. For whatever reason, the state habeas courts did not make their rulings on procedural

bar.

17

In turn, Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7 (c)(8) and (c) (23), defines serious felony in pertinent part as

any felony in which the defendant personally used a “firearm” or “dangerous or deadly weapon.”

In the trial court, evidence of the indictments, plea agreement and judgments were

put before the jury. (In California, the jury determines the existence of prior convictions). 

Petitioner presented no contrary evidence to that contained in the documents. In addition,

petitioner’s counsel never asked that the matter of whether the previous convictions were

“serious felonies” go before the jury; rather she was content with the judge deciding the issue at a

later time. RT 3446. It so happened that the issue was not raised again in the trial court, and no

ruling was ever made.

In state appellate court, petitioner argued, and the Court of Appeal accepted, the

argument that the Florida murder felonies did not match all of the elements of a California

murder felony. The precise reasons for this are unimportant. However, any previous felony is a

serious felony for purposes of Three Strikes, and regardless of matching elements, if that felony

was committed whereby the defendant personally used a firearm or other dangerous or deadly

weapon; such is a qualifying felony for the purposes of Three Strikes. Petitioner does not contest

the validity of the state law conclusion. The Court of Appeal also found that sufficient evidence

was in the record such that a finding could be made [on appeal] that the Florida murders

qualified as serious felonies. Petitioner does not contest that finding per se. Appellate counsel

raised no Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)] issue. The Apprendi

issue was not raised until later in habeas corpus.5

Petitioner argues here that in order to qualify for “serious” felony, the factual

issues of personal use of a firearm or dangerous weapon in connection with the charged prior

felony would have to be submitted to the jury (not just the fact of the conviction). Respondent

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 17 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

argues that the Apprendi exception, which in federal law authorizes proof of the fact of a prior

conviction to be decided by the court and need not be submitted to the jury, saves the day, and

that definitions concerning the nature of the prior crimes within the prior conviction exception do

not require a jury verdict either. 

The issue is complicated because California law requires prior convictions to be

found by a jury, and is further complicated by the very recent Ninth Circuit en banc case of

Medley v. Runnels, __F.3d__, 2007 WL 3197087 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2007) [not available to the

parties at the time of briefing]. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds an

Apprendi violation, but that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Respondent’s argument might be a good one, and his cited cases applicable, if

California law did not require the fact of a prior conviction to go before a jury. However, it does. 

The case of Medley is similar in many respects to the case here. Medley was convicted of

murder with the sentencing enhancement of discharging a firearm during the course of a murder. 

Both matters were submitted to the jury. However, the judge determined to instruct the jury that

a flare gun, the device used to kill the victim, was a firearm under California law – thereby taking

that factual matter from the jury. California law did not expressly so state; there were factual

requirements to find that a weapon was a firearm, and the judge had taken it upon himself to

make those findings. Of particular importance here, the Ninth Circuit found substantively

identical the asserted Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979)] error with

that of the found Apprendi error. Medley, 2007 WL 3197087 *4. In either case, the

constitutional defect was not presenting all factual issues to the jury. The writ was granted.

Thus, Respondent’s argument that the Apprendi “prior conviction”exception

places this case in a different posture falls away. Whether California would have been required

to submit all factual matters regarding the prior conviction sentencing enhancement to a jury if

jury trial were not required by state law is beside the point, the fact is that the jury is tasked with

such findings. The issue then becomes, whether considered a Sandstrom or Apprendi issue, was

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 18 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

every fact determination necessary to find a sentence enhancement in petitioner’s case presented

to the jury.

Respondent argues (citing cases from jurisdictions where a jury is not required to

find the prior conviction) that the definition of “serious” felony is a legal matter, and that the

Court of Appeal decided that legal matter. While that argument had initial appeal to the

undersigned, the same type argument was found unavailing in Medley. Just as in Medley where

“firearm” was to be determined by factual characteristics, a felony in petitioner’s case was only

“serious” when proof of personal use of a firearm or knife-like weapon in the previous felony

was put before the trier of fact and so found. As a factual matter, the jury had to determine from

the submitted exhibits the factual matters of personal use of a firearm and knife-like object. 

While that fact is not often difficult to ascertain, there is no Apprendi/Sandstrom rule that “easy”

factual matters can be decided by the judge.

Apprendi errors are not automatically fatal, but are subject to a harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt exception. Washington v. Recuenco, __U.S.__, 126 S. Ct. 2546 (2006). In this

case, that standard is satisfied with at least two of the prior convictions (all that is necessary for

the 25-life sentence). The Court of Appeal determined that sufficient evidence existed in the

record to determine the “seriousness” of the prior felonies (admittedly a much different standard

than the one to be used here). However, that court’s description demonstrates that the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as well.

Each of the three relevant indictments [encompassing four

murders] charged the admitted murders with some particularity, as

follows. Indictment No. 86-32222 charged (count I) that on

October 30, 1986, defendant “as part of a common scheme or plan,

while acting as a principal in concert with [another], did unlawfully

and feloniously, from a premeditated design to effect the death of a

human being, to wit: RUDOLPH BROUSSARD, kill RUDOLPH

BROUSSARD, a human being, by shooting him with a firearm , to

wit: a pistol.” Count II alleges the same as to victim Anthony

Brown. Indictment No. 87-3750 charged that on September 21,

1986, defendant, acting with premeditation or while committing a

burglary “did... kill and murder CECIL BRANCH, a human being,

by stabbing, slashing or cutting the said CECIL BRANCH with a

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 19 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 No one contends that petitioner was granted transactional immunity. 6

20

deadly weapon, to wit: a sharp metal object, such as a knife or

sword.” Indictment No. 87-3751 alleged the same as to victim

Raymond Kelley, except the weapon was described simply as a

knife.” Therefore, the indictments served to provide the factual

bases of the crimes admitted by defendant’s plea.

The plea agreement disposed of other charges and another case...

and reduced the first degree murder charges to second degree

murder. The judgments show defendant was guilty of two second

degree murders “with” a firearm and two second-degree murders

“with” deadly weapons (“knife or sword” and knife”).

Court of Appeal Opinion at 13-14.

Only one with an advocate’s stretch could conclude from the record evidence

presented to the jury that someone else, i.e, the other person acting in concert, and aside from

petitioner, actually used the firearms. But even assuming that stretch, there is no doubt that

petitioner, the only person named with respect to the knifings, killed two persons with a “knife or

sword” like instrument, and the judgments confirmed those facts. It only takes two prior felonies

to trigger the Three Strikes 25-life penalty. Thus, the triggering felonies would have no doubt

been found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, petitioner cannot seriously argue

that the sentencing judge in petitioner’s case would have been swayed by the fact in determining

to strike triggering priors (in his discretion – the Romero motion) that there were only two

triggering murder offenses. Surely, the judge’s discretion would have also been legitimately

guided by the undisputed facts of the other two firearm murders, and anyone reading the

sentencing transcript can tell that all the lightly punished murders weighed heavily in the judge’s

mind to not strike any priors. RT 3552-3554.

Petitioner’s Apprendi, aka Sandstrom, claim should be denied.

The Supreme Court Has Not Extended the Rule of Kastigar to Non-Evidentiary Uses

There is no need to detail all the facts concerning alleged use of testimony which

had been given under a grant of use immunity in the Florida prosecution. Suffice it to say, as the 6

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 20 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

Court of Appeal did in its lead paragraph on the issue:

Defendant had committed several murders in Florida at the behest

of Yahweh Ben Yahweh, whom he described as the “head of a

black, racist cult, whose members claimed to be the true Jews, and

who believed their divine mission to be the elimination of the

white race.” In 1988 he [petitioner] pleaded guilty to four second

degree murders and agreed to testify under immunity about the cult

in exchange for dismissal of three murder counts, and a 22-year

sentence; were he later charged with other Florida homicides he

would receive concurrent terms. Breach of his agreement would

result in consecutive terms.

Court of Appeal Opinion at 5.

There is no dispute that petitioner’s criminal history played a dispositive role in

prosecuting the bad check incidents as felonies with the Three Strikes enhancement. There is

also no dispute that the El Dorado County prosecutors obtained transcripts of the immunized

testimony. Disputed is the extent to which that immunized testimony, as opposed to the nonimmunized Florida plea bargain and historical facts, influenced the prosecutor’s charging

discretion and case strategy. For the purposes of initially analyzing the issue in this habeas

petition, the undersigned will assume that knowledge of the immunized testimony played some

additive role in these decisions.

 The California prosecutors had also “used” some of the immunized testimony,

not at trial or before a grand jury, but at a bail hearing and in opposition to a motion to strike

priors. The Court of Appeal found in this respect:

The [trial] court found Sutherland’s use of immunized information

at the bail hearing was harmless “piling on” because defendant had

four murder convictions and a pending murder warrant from New

Jersey. Sutherland’s effort to use the information to oppose

defendant’s motion to strike the priors was harmless because the

trial court had refused to consider that evidence.

Court of Appeal Opinion at 9

Petitioner does not attack the attempted use of the immunized testimony at the

bail hearing and motion to strike priors evidently agreeing with the common sense conclusion

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 21 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

22

reached by the Court of Appeal – that any such use was rejected or harmless. Petitioner does

argue:

The evidence adduced at the [state court] hearing in this case

unequivocally demonstrated that immunized testimony and

information contributed substantially to the prosecution’s decision

to pursue this as a three strike’s case, provided investigatory leads

in finding additional recipients of Mr. Rameses’ checks, and

significantly affected the prosecutor’s strategy in opposing the

motion to strike priors. 

Points and Authorities at 25.

Thus, the issue is clearly drawn – does established Supreme Court authority exist which

precludes the non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony. While the issue may be clearly

drawn, the case authority on the issue is in disarray – even within the Ninth Circuit. Thus, the

undersigned cannot find that the Supreme Court has established a prohibition on non-evidentiary

use of immunized testimony – an AEDPA prerequsite.

In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653 (1972), the Supreme

Court clearly held that evidentiary use of testimony compelled under a grant of use and derivative

use immunity is constitutionally prohibited. The Court then turned to the questions “we must

consider” concerning the argument that “use and derivative-use immunity will not adequately

protect a witness from various possible incriminating uses of the compelled testimony: for

example, the prosecutor or other law enforcement officer may obtain leads, names of witnesses,

or other information not otherwise available that might result in a prosecution.” Id. at 459, 92 S.

Ct. at 1664. While the “other information” could possibly relate to the motivation for bringing

the instant prosecution, the Supreme Court indicated that the “other information” had to be

ultimately other information used in an evidentiary sense. In discussing the burden of proof

related to showing an independent source for the use of information otherwise encompassed by

the immunized testimony, the Court limited that burden to showing “that the evidence it [the

prosecution] proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent from the

compelled testimony.” Id. at 460, 92 S. Ct. at 1665. It appears to the undersigned that the

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 22 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

23

Supreme Court is referencing evidentiary usage and not something as intangible as a prosecutor’s

motivation in bringing a case.

The Ninth Circuit has not made up its mind either way, or perhaps has held

inconsistently that Kastigar does and does not apply to non-evidentiary uses. The first Ninth

Circuit case to tackle the issue was United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1987). It

is unclear from reading that case whether the Ninth Circuit was holding that non-evidentiary uses

of immunized testimony were precluded, or was simply discussing the approach of different

circuits and making a ruling simply assuming the more preclusive rule. But rather than relying

on the undersigned’s reading, there are authoritative interpretations of the Crowson case, albeit

inconsistent:

Non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony could include the

decision to prosecute an immunized witness. Crowson, 828 F.2d

at 1430. Kastigar did not expressly discuss the propriety of

non-evidentiary use. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453, 460, 92 S.Ct.

at 1661, 1664-65. In Crowson, we assumed that non-evidentiary

use was prohibited. Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430 (“A more difficult

question is what proof or procedures the government must employ

to carry its burden of showing that it made no non-evidentiary use

of the immunized testimony.”). 

 ***

As pointed out above, this circuit has not specifically decided

whether non-evidentiary use comes within the prohibition of the

statute. We need not decide that general issue in this case, either,

but will assume that some non-evidentiary uses could come within

the ban of the statute.

United States v. Montoya 45 F.3d 1286, 1295-1296 (9th Cir. 1995).

However, in United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), the statement was

made (without citing Montoya):

In this circuit, we have interpreted Kastigar's prohibition on use to

include both direct and indirect use. For example, information

derived from compelled testimony may not be used in providing

“assistance in focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate the

prosecution, refusing to plea bargain, interpreting evidence,

planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planning trial

strategy.” United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th

Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311

(8th Cir.1973)).

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 23 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The undersigned is well aware of the authority which uses some circuit court decisions 7

as so closely on point with a Supreme Court case or line of cases that the circuit case is in fact

finding that the decision in its case was decided by “established” Supreme Court authority, or the

decision is simply a clarification of such authority. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597,

602-03 (9 Cir. 1000). However, in light of the conflict in interpreting Kastigar’s meaning with th

respect to non-evidentiary uses of immunized testimony, none of the Ninth Circuit cases

constitute a “clarification.”

24

The point to be made here is that if two panels of the Ninth Circuit cannot agree

whether Kastigar precludes the non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony, much less even

agree on an interpretation of a previous case discussion of the issue in Crowson, it cannot be

held that the Supreme Court has clearly established law on the subject – an AEDPA requirement. 

See also other out-of-circuit cases cited by respondent going both ways on the issue. Answer at

29-30.7

Given the clear lack of established Supreme Court authority on the issue of

whether Kastigar set a rule precluding non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony, and a

substantial disagreement within and without the Ninth Circuit on what Kastigar meant to say on

the subject, the court need not determine whether the state prosecutors in this case would have

been motivated to act as they did purely on the non-immunized historical facts. Petitioner cannot

prevail on the threshold prerequisite of demonstrating that the Supreme Court has established a

rule precluding non-evidentiary use of use and derivative use of immunized testimony. 

Conclusion

The undersigned ORDERS that no evidentiary hearing be held on the stun belt

issue. The court FINDS and RECOMMENDS that the petition be denied in its entirety.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 24 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

25

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 11/27/07 

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:gh:035

rame1173.157

Case 2:04-cv-01173-GEB -GGH Document 55 Filed 11/27/07 Page 25 of 25