Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08148/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08148-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Betty Marie Vanheesmkerck,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-14-8148-PCT-PGR (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE: 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Betty Marie Vanheesmkerck’s 

(“Petitioner”) Amended Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(the “Amended Petition”) (Doc. 4). The Amended Petition raises three claims for relief. 

On January 15, 2015, the Court dismissed Ground One and ordered Respondents to 

answer Grounds Two and Three of the Amended Petition. Respondents filed their 

Answer (Doc. 14) on May 1, 2015. Petitioner did not file a Reply. The matter is deemed 

ripe for consideration. 

Although this habeas proceeding is timely, the undersigned finds that Ground Two 

of the Amended Petition is procedurally defaulted and that Ground Three is without 

merit. It is therefore recommended that the Amended Petition be denied and dismissed 

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with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND

On November 30, 2011, a Mohave County jury found Petitioner guilty on two 

counts: (i) Possession of Dangerous Drugs for Sale and (ii) Possession of Drug 

Paraphernalia. (Doc. 14-1 at 5-8). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to six years of 

incarceration on the first count and nine months of incarceration on the second count. 

(Id. at 10-12). The sentences are to run concurrently. (Id.). The facts underlying 

Petitioner’s convictions relate to a police officer’s stop of a vehicle in which Petitioner 

was a passenger. As recounted by the Arizona Court of Appeals:

 [Petitioner] testified that she and a friend had been 

waiting by the side of the highway in Fort Mohave for 

another friend to pick her up to drive her to Bullhead City. . . . 

[S]he and a friend accepted a ride from [a stranger who did 

not speak English] after he pointed to Laughlin on a map, 

indicating he needed directions. Although [Petitioner] was 

initially waiting for a ride to Bullhead City to run an errand, 

she testified that she accepted a ride to Laughlin because she 

also needed to run an errand there before heading back to Fort 

Mohave to catch a ride to California later that day. 

(Id. at 90).

 A police officer observed an altered vehicle registration 

sticker and stopped the truck in which [Petitioner] was a 

front-seat passenger. During the traffic stop, the officer’s 

narcotics canine alerted to the truck. When the officer asked 

the driver if there was anything illegal in the truck, the driver 

paused and turned to look at [Petitioner] before answering. 

The officer testified that the driver understood and spoke 

broken English.

 After consenting to a search of the vehicle, the driver 

removed a black banker’s-type bag from the truck and gave it 

to [Petitioner], who ‘stuck it in her purse.’ With her consent, 

police subsequently searched [Petitioner’s] purse, including 

the black bag. They found a digital scale, $1,560 in cash, and 

methamphetamine valued at approximately $5,440. Police 

also found a drug-sales ledger in the driver’s side map pocket, 

methamphetamine valued at approximately $405 in a clear 

plastic baggie between the driver’s seat and the truck’s center 

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console, and more methamphetamine with an approximate 

value of $264 in the pocket of a jacket in the backseat.

(Id. at 89-90).

After her convictions and sentencing, Petitioner timely appealed to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Id. at 19-53). On December 18, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id. at 88-94). Petitioner did not file a 

petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

On January 7, 2013, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). 

(Id. at 98-100). The trial court appointed PCR counsel, who did not find any colorable 

claims for relief. (Id. at 102, 114-16). Petitioner filed a pro se PCR petition on October 

24, 2013, which the trial court dismissed. (Id. at 121-36, 138-39). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review as untimely. (Id. at 152).

On August 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ 

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) (the “Original Petition”), which the Court dismissed with

leave to amend (Doc. 3). Petitioner filed the Amended Petition on October 20, 2014 

(Doc. 4). The Court dismissed Ground One of the Amended Petition and ordered 

Respondents to answer Grounds Two and Three (Doc. 6). Respondents filed their 

Answer on May 1, 2015 (Doc. 14).

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

Respondents do not argue, and the undersigned does not find, that this habeas 

proceeding is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214.1

 The following 

principles govern review of Petitioner’s grounds for habeas relief.

A. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

For over one hundred years, it has been settled that a “state prisoner must normally 

exhaust available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the 

1 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

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federal courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. 

Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state 

judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). 

The rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 

U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to 

review and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s words, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 

federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 

courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); 

see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some 

circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 

criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner 

“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

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459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”).

B. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state

procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal 

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the 

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine 

is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 

based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 

(2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirements 

for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 

address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See Id. at 729-30. An 

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

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proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

C. Reviewing Habeas Claims on the Merits

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, AEDPA requires federal 

courts to defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 

1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be 

entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or 

her claims either:

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or 

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2. resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers 

to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the 

relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th 

Cir.2004) (as amended) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDED PETITION

A. Ground Two 

In Ground Two of her Amended Petition, Petitioner states:2

United States Constitution Amendments 5, 14; Arizona 

Constitution Article 2, 24; Arizona Constitution, Article 2, 

24. Further that the error went to the foundation of the case, 

2 Any claim that Petitioner’s rights have been violated under the State of Arizona’s 

Constitution is not cognizable in this federal habeas proceeding. 

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taking from the defendant a right essential to her defense and 

resulting in the denial of a fair trial. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 

561, 115 P.2d at 607 (2005). 

(Doc. 4 at 7). 

In the “Supporting Facts” section, Petitioner states:

[Petitioner] was denied [her] right to due process and a fair 

trial. [Petitioner] had no-one [sic] to testify on [her] behalf. 

The driver Caldera-Gurrola (co-defendant) was not 

[subpoenaed], and Zimmerman (co-defendant) was not called 

up to take the stand due to him not being able to stay Awake 

[sic] long enough and [Petitioner] had to sign a waiver for 

Officer Osborne whom was the Detaining Officer that was 

[subpoenaed] although was out of state during [her] trial so he 

could not appear. [Petitioner] signed a waiver same day as 

[her] trial under duress for his absence. 

(Id.). 

Out of all the claims Petitioner raised in her Arizona state court proceedings, 

Ground Two is most similar to the following claim that Petitioner raised in her PCR 

petition: 

[Petitioner’s] Sixth Amendment right to Confront her 

Accuser was violated when Trial Counsel refused to enforce 

subpoena issued to Bullhead City Police Officer Stephen 

Osborne guaranteeing his attendance at trial. 

Trial counsel’s deliberate suppression of office 

Osborne’s testimony as a . . . witness fundamentally violated 

[Petitioner’s] Due Process who would have been instrumental 

in testifying to [Petitioner’s] lack of culpability.

(Doc. 14-1 at 129). The trial court construed the above claim as an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim. (Id. at 138-39).

After comparing Ground Two to the above PCR claim, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner did not fairly present Ground Two in the Arizona state court proceedings. 

First, Ground Two references the Fifth Amendment, while the PCR claim references the 

Sixth Amendment. Second, Ground Two challenges the nonappearance of Officer 

Osborne and Petitioner’s two co-defendants as trial witnesses, while the PCR claim only 

challenges the nonappearance of Officer Osborne. 

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Third, Petitioner’s PCR claim explicitly challenged the conduct of Petitioner’s 

trial counsel. In support of her claim, Petitioner cited to Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 686 (1984) and stated that “Defendant has established a reasonable probability 

that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” (Doc. 14-1 at 136). Ground Two, however, does not allege that Petitioner’s 

trial counsel was ineffective. Rather, Petitioner states that Petitioner “was denied [her] 

right to due process and a fair trial” because she “had no-one [sic] to testify on [her] 

behalf.” (Doc. 4 at 7). Petitioner makes no mention of Strickland in support of Ground 

Two. Petitioner instead cites to State v. Henderson, 115 P.3d 601 (Ariz. 2005), a case 

that discusses the fundamental error standard under Arizona law and does not involve an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.3

 

Finally, with respect to Officer Osborne, Ground Two merely asserts that 

Petitioner “signed a waiver same day as [her] trial under duress for [Officer Osborne’s] 

absence.” (Doc. 4 at 7). Yet the claim in the PCR petition centered on trial counsel’s 

alleged refusal to “enforce” the subpoena issued to Officer Osborne. Petitioner alleged 

that “[a]fter officer Osborne’s Subpoena [sic] was served, but before trial, counsel for 

[Petitioner] took it upon herself to excuse officer Osborne from having to testify. . . . 

Counsel failed in her duties to postpone the trial, or in lieu, depose officer Osborne for 

discovery.” (Doc. 14-1 at 133). Nowhere in the PCR petition does Petitioner mention

that she signed a waiver for Officer Osborne’s absence, let alone that she signed the 

waiver under duress. 

After considering the significant differences between Ground Two and the PCR 

claim, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner did not fairly present Ground Two to the 

Arizona state court. See Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1111 (2005) (“petitioners 

3 In Henderson, the Arizona Supreme Court determined that an Arizona court should consider a claim based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) under the 

fundamental error standard when the defendant failed to raise the issue at trial. 

Henderson, 115 P.3d at 603. The U.S. Supreme Court in Blakely affirmed the rule that 

“any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 542 U.S. at 301.

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must plead their claims with considerable specificity before the state courts in order to 

satisfy the exhaustion requirement”). The Arizona state court did not have a full and fair 

opportunity to address Petitioner’s claims in Ground Two that her federal constitutional 

rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when (i) she signed under duress a 

waiver regarding Officer Osborne’s attendance at trial and (ii) her two co-defendants did 

not appear as trial witnesses. Petitioner therefore has failed to exhaust her state remedies 

with respect to Ground Two. However, because Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure would preclude relief on Ground Two if Petitioner returned to state 

court, Ground Two is technically exhausted and deemed procedurally defaulted.

4

 Beaty, 

303 F.3d at 987 (a claim is procedurally defaulted “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state 

remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in 

order to meet the requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”) (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1)). 

Even if the Court finds that Ground Two was fairly presented in Petitioner’s PCR 

petition, dismissal of Ground Two remains warranted under the procedural default 

doctrine. On November 25, 2013, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR petition. 

(Doc. 14-1 at 138-39). Pursuant to Rule 32.9(c) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, Petitioner had thirty days to petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. 

Petitioner, however, did not file a petition for review until January 22, 2014—almost 

sixty days past the deadline. On February 8, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

dismissed the petition for review as untimely pursuant to Rule 32.9(c) of the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at 152). The Court of Appeals explained that whether 

Petitioner was without fault for the untimely filing was a question of fact appropriately 

4 Rule 32.2 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure precludes a defendant from post-conviction relief based upon any ground (i) raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or on post-trial motion under Rule 24; (ii) finally adjudicated on the merits on the appeal or in any previous collateral proceedings; or (iii) that has been waived at trial, on 

appeal, or in any previous collateral proceedings. In addition, Ground Two would be precluded in a post-conviction relief proceeding as untimely under Rule 32.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See O’Sullivan v. Boerkel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999) (where habeas petitioner was time-barred from presenting his claims in state court, claims were procedurally defaulted).

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addressed to the trial court. (Id.). Petitioner did not seek relief in the trial court. 

Petitioner’s failure to comply with the time requirements set forth in Rule 32.9(c) for 

filing a petition for review is an independent and adequate state law ground to support the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ judgment.5

 Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground Two claim is 

procedurally defaulted. 

For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss 

Ground Two. 

B. Petitioner’s Procedural Default is Not Excused

The merits of a habeas petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claim are to be reviewed 

if the petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the 

alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to consider the federal claim 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 

(9th Cir. 2013). 

Petitioner offers no reason to excuse the procedural default of Ground Two. 

Although Respondents thoroughly briefed the procedural default issue in their Answer 

(Doc. 14 at 7-14), Petitioner has chosen not to file a reply. The undersigned recommends 

that the Court not excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of Ground Two.

C. Ground Three

Ground Three of the Amended Petition alleges that Petitioner’s rights to due 

process and a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct.6

 (Doc. 4 at 8). Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor 

5 Rule 32.9(c) is “independent” because it is not interwoven with federal law. See 

LaCross v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (to be independent, “the state law 

basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal law”). Rule 32.9(c) is 

“adequate” because it is clear, firmly established, and consistently applied. See, e.g., 

State v. Carriger, 692 P.2d 991, 995 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (observing that petitioners must strictly comply with Rule 32 or be denied relief); State v. Gause, 541 P.2d 396, 397 

(Ariz. 1975) (en banc) (dismissing purported appeal where defendant did not comply 

with the requirements of Rule 32.9 and gave no valid reason for the failure); State v. 

French, 7 P.3d 128, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (summarily rejecting claims for failure to comply with Rule 32.9).

6 Petitioner’s Ground Three also references the Arizona Constitution. To reiterate, 

any claim that Petitioner’s rights under Arizona state law were violated is not cognizable 

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“argu[ed] facts that were not in evidence but that went to the heart of [Petitioner’s] 

defense and likely impacted the verdict, By [sic] saying that [Petitioner] was acting in 

concert with [the driver] when [the driver] was not at my trial to testify on Anything [sic] 

being implied about him to confirm to Anything [sic] the prosecutor was speculating to 

the jury.” (Id.).7

 

On direct appeal, Petitioner alleged three claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 

Liberally construing the Amended Petition, the undersigned finds that Petitioner fairly 

presented Ground Three in the first claim of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal:8

 Prosecutorial misconduct will require reversal if the 

appellant is denied federal and state due process and a fair 

trial due to the actions of the prosecutor. United States 

Constitution, Amendments 5, 14 . . . .

(Doc. 14-1 at 39).

 . . . . 

 The evidence showed that the driver looked at her when 

in this proceeding.

7 In addition, Petitioner states that “[t]here was also a drug ledger found in [the driver’s] truck written in Spanish that belonged to him that was never mentioned or there 

for evidence during my trial.” (Doc. 4 at 8). The purpose of this statement is unclear. 

None of Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims on direct appeal pertained to the 

ledger. Vague and conclusory allegations do not warrant habeas relief. See Jones v. 

Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, Petitioner’s statement is incorrect. 

The ledger was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 2. (Doc. 14-2 at 153). Petitioner’s trial 

counsel established that the ledger was written in Spanish. (Id. at 162-63). Petitioner’s 

trial counsel also remarked during her closing argument that the ledger was written in 

Spanish. (Doc. 14-3 at 114).

8 The other two prosecutorial misconduct claims alleged that: (i) the prosecutor misstated Petitioner’s testimony and (ii) the prosecutor improperly argued that Petitioner’s story is not believable because “since 9/11, the last 10 years, you don’t take 

bags from other people.” (Doc. 14-1 at 44-48). Ground Three contains no references to 

the prosecutor’s characterization of Petitioner’s testimony or the prosecutor’s remark about taking bags from strangers after 9/11. Nor does Ground Three attempt to 

incorporate by reference Petitioner’s Opening Brief on direct appeal. The undersigned 

therefore does not construe Ground Three as containing the two other claims of prosecutorial misconduct raised on direct appeal. See Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings (a habeas petition must “specify all the grounds for relief that 

are available to the petitioner” and “state facts supporting each ground”); Smith v. 

Swarthout, 742 F.3d 885, 893 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that a court must construe a habeas petition liberally, but declining to consider an issue not raised in the petition). Nevertheless, the undersigned does not find that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of the other two prosecutorial misconduct claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts. 

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asked for consent to search, and handed her the bag. But the 

prosecutor argued that [Petitioner] must have known about 

the methamphetamine and been acting in concert with the 

driver Caldera-Gurrola because Caldera-Gurrola would never 

have allowed them into the car as strangers because of the 

amount of methamphetamine that he had in the car and the 

risk that they may have turned him into police. . . .

 Yet, the state offered absolutely no evidence to support 

this theory that a drug dealer would never have let someone in 

their truck containing methamphetamine during the evidence 

phase of trial. 

(Id. at 42-43). 

The last reasoned state court decision addressing Petitioner’s claim in Ground 

Three is the December 18, 2012 Arizona Court of Appeals ruling affirming Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. The Court explained that:

 We find no prosecutorial misconduct, much less 

misconduct so egregious and persistent that it permeated the 

entire atmosphere of the trial or deprived [Petitioner] of a fair 

trial . . . . [T]he argument that a diver transporting more 

than $5,000 worth of methamphetamine would normally not 

give rides to strangers was simply an argument relying on 

common sense.

(Id. at 93).

To succeed on Ground Three, Petitioner must show that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision is (i) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law (as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court) or (ii) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

The clearly established federal law applicable to a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of 

supervisory power.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). “[T]he 

touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 

209, 219 (1982). Thus, to prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, a petitioner must 

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show that not only were the prosecutor’s actions improper, but that the actions “so 

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 

(it “is not enough that the prosecutor[’s] remarks were undesirable or even universally 

condemned”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Counsel are given latitude in the presentation of their closing arguments, and 

courts must allow the prosecution to strike hard blows based on the evidence presented 

and all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 

1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether a 

prosecutor’s closing remarks violated a defendant’s due process rights, a reviewing court 

“must consider the probable effect of the prosecutor’s [comments] on the jury’s ability to 

judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). A 

prosecutor’s remarks must be evaluated in the context of the entire trial, as well as the 

context in which they were made. See Darden, 477 U.S. 179; Boyde v. California, 494 

U.S 370, 385 (1990); United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1988); Williams v. 

Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 1998). As discussed in Darden, additional relevant 

factors include: (i) whether the prosecutor’s comments manipulated or misstated the 

evidence; (ii) the trial court’s jury instructions; (iii) the weight of the evidence against the 

defendant; and (iv) whether the prosecutor’s remarks were an “invited response.” 477 

U.S. at 181-82. “[I]f the prosecutor’s remarks were ‘invited,’ and did no more than 

respond substantially in order to ‘right the scale,’ such comments would not warrant 

reversing a conviction.” Young, 470 U.S. at 13.

Here, the prosecutor’s opening statement did not discuss whether or not Petitioner 

knew the driver. (Doc. 14-2 at 126-29). Petitioner’s trial counsel began her opening 

statement by saying “What the state failed to tell you is that [Petitioner] had just met [the 

driver] 20 minutes prior to being stopped by Officer Menard.” (Id. at 130). Thus, 

Petitioner’s trial counsel “invited” the following closing remarks made by the prosecutor: 

 When [the driver] grabbed the black nylon bag from the 

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F-150 before the search, he passes that bag to [Petitioner] and 

that bag gets put in her purse. And the place where she 

exercises control – and again, this is knowing control over 

this $5,550 of meth that’s in that black bag . . . I mean these 

folks are working together, right? 

(Doc. 14-3 at 104).

 . . . .

 There is a team effort that is going on here. These 

people are accomplices; they are working together. These are 

not good guys. . . . 

(Id. at 110).

 . . . .

 I mean, I guess to me, if you’re looking at this, these 

people are working together, and you don’t have a good guy 

on board; right? You don’t have a nun. Why not? Why 

don’t you have a person who know[s] nothing about what’s 

going on when you’re carrying around [$]5,000 worth of 

methamphetamine? Because you’re risking your [$]5,000 

worth of methamphetamine, because what is the reaction of 

the person who’s not involved, whose not an accomplice? 

(Id. at 111). 

Petitioner’s trial counsel then delivered her closing argument and controverted the 

prosecutor’s remarks:

 [Petitioner] is innocent, because she is not a drug 

dealer, and she didn’t know that [the driver] had drugs in the 

vehicle and on his person.

(Id. at 113).

 . . . .

 [Petitioner] allowed [the driver], “a guy she didn’t 

even know, give her a bag. That’s because never, in her 

wildest dreams, did she ever think that he would be giving her 

something illegal, right in front of three police officers. . . . 

[A]nd I think it’s actually a little absurd to think that if she 

knew there was like a lot of cash, and meth, and scales, and . . 

. illegal items in there, that she would say yeah, okay, I will 

take that bag.

(Id. at 115) (emphasis added).

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 . . . .

 Now, it’s not as if [the driver] handed [Petitioner] a gun 

and said here, take this, or even maybe a bloody knife, or 

even a regular knife for that matter, or bong, or syringe, 

something like that illegal. He handed her a solid black bag, 

right in front of other officers.

 Now, I would say if I walked up to any one of you with 

a pen and said here, at least one of you would take it. Okay, 

that’s because our instincts are to take something that 

somebody’s giving us.

(Id. at 117).

After reviewing the prosecutor’s remarks in context, the undersigned does not find 

that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of the claim contained in Ground Three

warrants habeas relief. Petitioner’s trial counsel invited the remarks by asserting in her 

opening statement that Petitioner did not know the driver. The prosecutor’s responsive 

remarks did no more than “right the scale.” Young, 470 U.S. at 13. Moreover, 

Petitioner’s trial counsel disputed the prosecutor’s remarks in her closing argument, thus 

counter-balancing the scale in Petitioner’s favor. Further, the other factors considered in 

Darden support the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. First, the trial court twice 

instructed the jury that what the lawyers say in their opening statements and closing 

arguments is not evidence. (Doc. 14-2 at 112; Doc. 14-3 at 77). The trial court also 

twice instructed the jury that they should not be influenced by sympathy or prejudice. 

(Doc. 14-2 at 110-11; Doc. 14-3 at 76). See Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1106-07 

(9th Cir. 2000) (isolated comments by a prosecutor may be cured by jury instructions). 

Petitioner has not offered anything to rebut the presumption that the jury failed to follow 

the trial court’s instructions. 

Second, the undersigned does not find that the prosecutor misstated or 

manipulated the evidence by asserting that Petitioner was working in concert with the 

driver. As noted by the Arizona Court of Appeals, “the argument that a driver 

transporting more than $5,000 worth of methamphetamine would normally not give rides 

to strangers was simply an argument relying on common sense. See United States v. 

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Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1997).” (Doc. 14-1 at 93-94). Finally, the 

undersigned notes that the weight of evidence against Petitioner was great. Petitioner 

admitted that she accepted and placed the black bag in her purse and there was sufficient 

circumstantial evidence for a jury to find that Petitioner knew of the bag’s contents. 

For the above reasons, the undersigned concludes that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ denial of Petitioner’s claim in Ground Three (i) was neither contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or (ii) based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. The undersigned thus recommends that the 

Court dismiss Ground Three.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss the Amended Petition (Doc. 4) with prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition (Doc. 4) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of Ground Two is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right in her remaining claim for relief.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

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District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 23rd day of November, 2015. 

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