Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_00-cv-04036/USCOURTS-arwd-4_00-cv-04036-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

ANDREW SASSER PETITIONER

V. Civil No. 00-4036

LARRY NORRIS, Director of

Arkansas Department of Corrections RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Currently before this Court are Petitioner’s Second Supplemental

and Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief (Doc. 48),

Respondent’s Response (Doc. 51), Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 56), and

Petitioner’s Supporting Affidavit (Doc. 58). The Court finds that

these matters are ripe for consideration. For the reasons stated in

this Order, Petitioner’s Second Supplemental and Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief (Doc. 48) is hereby DENIED in its

entirety. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 4, 1994, a jury convicted Petitioner of capital murder

and sentenced him to death for the homicide of Jo Ann Kennedy.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Arkansas Supreme Court,

where it was affirmed on July 17, 1995. See Sasser v. State, 902

S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1995). Subsequently, Petitioner sought postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure

37. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied

Petitioner’s Rule 37 petition, in September 1997. On July 8, 1999,

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None of these claims addressed Petitioner’s alleged mental 1

retardation.

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the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. See Sasser v. State, 993 S.W.2d 901 (Ark. 1991).

On July 7, 2000, Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in

federal court. (Doc. 3.) Throughout several pleadings, Petitioner

presented eight (8) claims upon which he requested relief. On May 1

23, 2002, this Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (Doc. 30). On August 15, 2002, a Certificate of

Appealability was issued for five (5) of Petitioner’s claims. (Doc.

34).

While on appeal at the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit (Eighth Circuit Court), Petitioner moved to have the

case remanded to this Court to exhaust his mental retardation. On

August 15, 2003, the Eighth Circuit Court entered a judgment,

remanding the mental retardation issue to this Court, and granted the

motion to file a successive petition. (Doc. 37). On August 27,

2003, this Court entered a Scheduling Order, stating that this Court

would determine whether Petitioner is mentally retarded and whether

his execution is prohibited, using the standard for mental

retardation set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618. (Doc. 40). Then,

on March 9, 2004, the Eighth Circuit Court entered an Amended

Judgement, revising the previously entered order and remanded the

case to this Court for a determination of whether the mental

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retardation claim had been exhausted. (Doc. 44). The Judgment

provided that if this Court were to conclude that Petitioner has a

viable state court remedy, the Eight Circuit Court “invited this

Court to determine whether “truly exceptional circumstances”

involving “a consideration going beyond the running of the statute

of limitations” exist. Id. (citation omitted).

On September 3, 2004, Petitioner filed a Second Supplemental and

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief. (Doc. 48).

Petitioner raised a mental retardation claim, alleging that

Petitioner’s sentence to death by lethal injection violates the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner also raised ineffective

assistance of counsel claims; a claim that Petitioner’s statement was

taken in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments;

and a claim that Petitioner was incompetent during the trial and

post-trial proceedings. Additionally, Petitioner incorporated his

previously adjudicated eight claims, contained in his first habeas

petition, all of which this Court had previously denied. 

After a period of inactivity, on June 14, 2006, we entered a

scheduling order to ensure progression of the case. (Doc. 65.)

Completion of discovery was set for July 31, 2006 and motions

regarding additional information related to mental retardation (such

as motions for leave to file a supplemental and/or amended petition,

supplement the record, and request for an evidentiary hearing) were

to be filed by August 31, 2006. The order stated that a failure to

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file motions regarding additional evidence by the date provided would

constitute notice to the Court that Petitioner did not intend to

present additional evidence regarding his mental retardation claim.

Id. Petitioner failed to file any motions regarding the introduction

of additional information to support the mental retardation claim.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case have been recounted in detail at Sasser

v. Arkansas, 902 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1995). To summarize, Petitioner

was found guilty of killing Jo Ann Kennedy, a store clerk, by

stabbing, cutting and causing blunt force head injuries during the

commission or attempted commission of raping or kidnapping her. 

III. PETITION

Before addressing the merits of the petition, we must first

determine what type of petition is before the Court. There is a

clear distinction between supplemental and/or amended petitions and

successive petitions, with the latter having more restrictive rules

governing what issues may be raised. Petitioner titled the petition

currently before the Court as “Petitioner’s Second Supplemental and

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” However, a

supplemental/amended petition is filed prior to the adjudication of

the original petition, whereas a petition that asserts claims that

have been adjudicated on their merits in a prior habeas petition

and/or claims that could have been asserted in a prior habeas

petition is a successive petition. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A);

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Vancleave v. Norris, 150 F.3d 926, 928 (8 Cir. 1998) (citing Stewart th

v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1998) (the Court found

that a claim raised in a prior petition that was dismissed as

premature escapes the requirements of successive petitions); Tyler

v. Purkett, 413 F.3d 696, 701 (8 Cir. 2005) (“Because the Rule 60(b) th

motion ‘sought ultimately to resurrect the denial’ of [petitioner’s]

earlier habeas petitions by asserting new claims of error in his

state conviction and reasserting prior claims, however, it was

properly construed as second or successive.” (Citations omitted)).

In the case sub judice, the original petition has been

adjudicated on its merits and Petitioner was in the process of

appealing that decision when he raised the issue of mental

retardation for the first time. The Eighth Circuit Court granted

permission for Petitioner to file a successive petition, specifically

to raise a mental retardation claim. (Doc. 37.) What has been

titled Petitioner’s Second Supplemental and Amended Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus is actually a successive petition in both definition

and function. Thus, for the reasons stated herein, the rules

governing the type of claims permitted in a successive petition will

apply (see discussion under Section V. below). 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A prisoner in state custody may petition a federal court for a

writ of habeas corpus “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

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States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1996). Specifically, Section 2254(d)(1)

of Title 28, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), provides as follows:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim-- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States[.]

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

State courts should have a proper opportunity to address a

petitioner’s claims of constitutional error before those claims are

presented to the federal court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729-32 (1991). The requirement of exhaustion of remedies is

satisfied if the petitioner has “fairly presented” his claims to the

state court, thus preserving those claims for federal review, by

properly raising both the factual and legal bases of the claim in

state court proceedings, affording that court “a fair opportunity to

rule on the factual and theoretical substance of [the] claim.”

Krimmel v. Hopkins, 56 F.3d 873, 876 (8 Cir. 1995). “In order to th

fairly present a federal claim to the state courts, the petitioner

must have referred to a specific federal constitutional right, a

particular constitutional provision, a federal constitutional case,

or a state case raising a pertinent federal constitutional issue in

a claim before the state courts.” McCall v. Benson, 114 F.3d 754,

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757 (8 Cir. 1997)(citations omitted). th

Even when a petitioner has technically met the exhaustion

requirement, the federal court may still be prevented from

considering the federal habeas claim if it is procedurally defaulted.

“A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State’s procedural

requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the state

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first

instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-32. Finally, a claim may be

lost due to procedural default at any level of state court review:

at trial, on direct appeal, or in the course of state post-conviction

proceedings. Kilmartin v. Kemna, 253 F.3d 1087, 1088 (8 Cir. 2001); th

see also Noel v. Norris, 194 F. Supp. 2d 893, 903 (E.D. Ark. 2002).

V. DISCUSSION OF PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

After a court of appeals authorizes the filing of a successive

petition based on a prima facie showing that the application

satisfies the statutory standard, the petitioner must actually show

that he satisfies the standard. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 2481

n.3 (2001). The statutory requirement evidences Congress’s intent

that court of appeals review an application as a whole rather than

examining each individual claim and that court’s decision to permit

the petition to go forward applies to the entire petition, not

particularly specified claims. Nevius v. McDaniel, 104 F.3d 1120,

1121 (9 Cir. 1997). Therefore, the district court must address, th

claim by claim, the entire application authorized by the court of

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appeals. Id. 

A. Claim IX: Death by Lethal Injection of a Mentally Retarded

Person is Unconstitutional

The Eighth Circuit Court has remanded to this Court the

questions of whether Petitioner’s mental retardation claim has been

exhausted and whether the facts of his case present “truly

exceptional circumstances”. 

1. Exhaustion

Exhaustion is a prerequisite to a writ of habeas corpus except

where such exhaustion would be futile. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c);

Tatzel v. Hanlon, 530 F.2d 1205 (5 Cir. 1976). If there is a viable th

state remedy for the non-exhausted claim, the petition should be

dismissed to allow the state to decide the issue. Carmichael v.

White, 163 F.3d 1044 (8 Cir. 1998) (finding that the district court th

should have dismissed petitioner’s claims for failure to exhaust

state remedies, as petitioner failed to show that exceptional

circumstances existed to excuse the failure to exhaust). However,

a petitioner is excused from exhaustion requirements when going back

to the state would be futile. Hawkins v. Higgins, 898 F.2d 1365,

1367 (8 Cir. 1990) (finding that “[a]ny court challenge would be th

futile, and a waste of judicial resources”). In cases that present

a “truly exceptional circumstance,” a court may stay the petition and

hold it in abeyance pending the outcome of state proceedings. Lee

v. Norris, 354 F.3d 846 (8 Cir. 2004). th

Respondent has essentially conceded that Petitioner, at the

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Respondent stated that “[t]he respondent would contend that 2

Sasser’s claim is exhausted because he no longer has ‘the right under the law

of the State to raise, [by a belated appeal procedure], the question

presented [in habeas,]’ but rather has only a procedure by which he can attempt

to revive that right.” (Doc. 51, pg. 11 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c))

(alterations in original.)) Respondent went on to argue that regardless of the

existence of a right of law, the State courts should have the opportunity to

review the issue and possibly create a remedy. (Doc. 51, pg. 12.) However,

the Court notes that in Engram v. State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas

addressed this issue and declined to create a state remedy for this issue. 200

S.W.3d 367 (Ark. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2965 (2005).

9

present time, has no non-futile state remedies in which to address

his mental retardation claim. (Doc. 51 at 11-12.) We find this 2

position is reasonable in light of a recent state decision. See

Engram v. State, 200 S.W.3d 367 (Ark. 2004) (where the Arkansas

Supreme Court foreclosed any avenue of reopening a case in state

court involving a never before raised issue of a petitioner’s mental

retardation baring state execution under the new constitutional law

articulated in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), stating that

Arkansas has a similar rule of law that requires a defendant to raise

a mental retardation claim prior to trial and the state law

adequately addresses the new constitutional law). Therefore, we find

the mental retardation claim has been exhausted, as no non-futile

state remedies currently exist. 

The question whether “truly exceptional circumstances” exist

cannot be addressed as that inquiry would be necessary only if a

claim has not been exhausted in state court and the court is

considering holding the petition in abeyance to allow the petitioner

to exhaust his claim in state court. See Lee v. Norris, 354 F3d 846

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(ruling on when a “truly exceptional circumstance” exists to allow

a district court hold the petitioners habeas petition in abeyance and

dismissing the unexhausted claim without prejudice to allow petitions

the opportunity to raise a claim in state court instead of dismissing

entire petitions). In light of our finding that Petitioner is

excused from exhausting his Atkins claim--as there are no non-futile

state remedies currently available to Petitioner--the question of

whether or not there are “truly exceptional circumstances” is moot.

2. Procedural Default

If a claim has been exhausted, but was not adjudicated on the

merits in state court, the question of whether the claim has been

procedurally defaulted must be addressed. “A federal court

conducting habeas corpus review must ordinarily refrain from

reviewing any issue that a state court has already found to be

defaulted on an adequate and independent state-law basis.” Murray

v. Hvass, 269 F.3d 896, 900 (8 Cir. 2001) (citing Owsley v. th

Bowersox, 234 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8 Cir. 2000)). Where a petitioner th

has defaulted his federal claims pursuant to an independent and

adequate state procedural rule, “federal habeas review of the claims

is barred unless the [petitioner] can demonstrate cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of

federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991), or “where a constitutional violation has

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probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,”

even if the petitioner failed to show cause for the default, Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995). See Langley v. Norris, 465 F.3d 861, 863

(8 Cir. 2006) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 th

(1998) (holding that a procedurally defaulted claim can be raised in

habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate cause and actual

prejudice for the failure to raise it on direct review, or that he

is actually innocent)). The United States Supreme Court has held

that the novelty of a constitutional issue at the time of state court

proceeding can give rise to cause for defense counsel’s failure to

raise the issue in accordance with applicable state procedures,

permitting entertainment of the claim in subsequent federal habeas

proceeding. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984).

The United States Supreme Court has also recognized an exception

for those actually innocent. To meet this exception, a petitioner

must show that he is actually innocent of the crime or the punishment

and that a failure to review his claim would be a miscarriage of

justice, and a “court may grant the writ even in the absence of a

showing of cause for the procedural default.” Murray, 477 U.S. at

496. The Eighth Circuit Court clarified the actual innocence

exception, stating “the concept of actual innocence is used as a

‘gateway,’ that is, actual innocence, if it can be shown, opens the

gate to consideration of constitutional claims on their merits,

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claims that would otherwise be procedurally barred. . . .” Flanders

v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 977 (8 Cir. 2002) (citing Sawyer v. th

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436

(1986)). To establish actual innocence, a petitioner must

demonstrate that, “in light of all the evidence, it is more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Schlup,

513 U.S. at 327-28 (citation omitted).

The actual innocence exception is not limited to inquiry into

actual innocence of the crime, but extends to actual innocence of the

punishment. In Sawyer v. Whitley, the United States Supreme Court

examined the issue of actual innocence of the death penalty. 505

U.S. 333 (1992). The Court held that to show actual innocence of the

death penalty, a petitioner has to “show by clear and convincing

evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror

would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under

the applicable state law.” Id. at 336. The Eighth Circuit Court has

applied a more lenient test, stating the actual innocence exception

“will be available if the federal constitutional error alleged

probably resulted in a verdict of death against whom the jury would

otherwise have sentenced to life imprisonment.” Id. at 345, (quoting

Stokes v. Armontrout, 893 F.2d 152, 156 (8 Cir. 1989) (additional th

citation omitted)). 

In the case sub judice, the mental retardation claim has been

procedurally defaulted, as Petitioner did not properly and timely

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It is unlikely that Petitioner would have qualified for the “Cause 3

and Prejudice” exception. Petitioner argues that Atkins created a new

constitutional right, therefore, cause exists for his failure to raise his

Atkins claim in state court. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“where a

constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably

available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim

in accordance with applicable state procedures”). However, cause does not

exist if a petitioner had tools available for him to construct the necessary

legal argument during earlier proceedings. Frizzell v. Hopkins, 87 F.3d 1019,

1021 (8 Cir. 1996), see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i). Here, Petitioner th

had available to him during trial and in later proceedings Ark. Code Ann. § 5-

4-618(b), which prohibits the sentence of death when the defendant is mentally

retarded. 

13

raise the claim in his state court appeals, nor has he successfully

shown that a procedural default exception applies. The “Cause and

Prejudice” exception and the “Actual Innocence” exception, as well

as a showing of fundamental miscarriage of justice may have been

applicable to Petitioner’s mental retardation claim, except, as

discussed below, Petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence

of mental retardation. Without a sufficient showing of mental 3

retardation, further inquiry into Petitioner’s Atkins claim is not

warranted. See Wiggins v. Lockhart, 825 F.2d 1237, 1238 (8 Cir. th

1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1074 (1988), see also 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2)(B) (a Court may not hold an evidentiary hearing on a claim

arising from a new rule of constitutional law unless the facts

underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error no

reasonable fact finder would have imposed the death penalty). 

3. Evidence of Mental Retardation

Petitioner carries the burden of presenting sufficient facts to

show that a writ is warranted. Id.

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The United States Supreme Court left the definition of mental 4

retardation to the States. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002)

(quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17 (1986) (“we leave to the

States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional

restriction upon its execution of sentences”)).

14

The standard to prove mental retardation is set fourth as :

4

Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning

accompanied by significant deficits or impairments in

adaptive functioning manifest in the developmental period,

but no later than age eighteen (18); and 

Deficits in adaptive behavior.

There is a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation

when a defendant has an intelligence quotient of sixty-five

(65) or below.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2004). 

Petitioner presented the Court with an affidavit (Doc. 58) to

support his claim of mental retardation. Petitioner states that the

affidavit “confirms Petitioners mental retardation.” Id. However,

it is imperative to recognize that the affiants do not state that

Petitioner was mentally retarded, but opined that he may be mentally

retarded. The affidavit was prepared by two licensed clinical social

workers, hired by Petitioner’s attorney to “provide an opinion

regarding the adequacy of previous investigations specifically as

they relate to identifying mental retardation and other relevant

social, emotional and mental deficits in the case of [Petitioner].”

The affiants discussed Petitioner’s I.Q. (79), school records, and

social behaviors to support their belief that Petitioner may be

mentally retarded. 

The evidence presented to the Court does not rise to the level

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of requiring further inquiry. See Wiggins, 825 F.2d at 1238 (“In

order to warrant relief, or, as an initial matter, even an

evidentiary hearing, a habeas corpus petitioner must allege

sufficient facts to establish a constitutional claim. Mere

conclusory allegations will not suffice.”) Petitioner has not

provided the results of an I.Q. test that would trigger a presumption

that he is mentally retarded (I.Q. of 65 under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-

618), nor did he present any medical findings that Petitioner is

mentally retarded. The claim that Petitioner is mentally retarded

and cannot be executed without violating the constitution, in light

of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), is not supported by

sufficient facts for the Court to grant a writ of habeas corpus or

to order an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we find that

Petitioner’s mental retardation claim is procedurally defaulted and

default is not excused. The claim is hereby DISMISSED with

prejudice.

B. Remaining Claims

The Eighth Circuit Court limited the issue on remand to “the

question of whether Mr. Sasser is mentally retarded and whether

pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002)

the Eighth Amendment prohibits his execution.” (Doc. 37.) The Eight

Circuit Court amended its judgment (Doc. 37) by remanding specific

questions regarding exhaustion of the mental retardation claim.

(Doc. 44.) The only proper claim before the Court is whether

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Claim X, Petitioner’s Death Sentence Should be Vacated Because 5

Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Adequately Investigate, Develop, and

Present Mitigating Evidence Including Evidence of Mental Retardation.

 Claim XI, Mr. Sasser’s Statement was Taken in Violation of the Fifth,

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, Requiring that his Convictions and Death

Sentence be Vacated.

 Claim XII, Mr. Sasser was not Competent at the Time of Trial, Direct

Appeal, and Post-Conviction Proceeding Stages and Prior Counsel Provided

Ineffective Assistance on These Matters. (Doc. 48.)

16

Petitioner is mentally retarded and whether his execution is

prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. However, in order to preserve

judicial economy, we reviewed the remaining claims.

1. Claims X-XII5

Abusive claims, one that could have been brought at the time of

the original habeas petition, are unreviewable absent showing of

either cause and prejudice or actual innocence. Cochrell v. Purkett,

113 F.3d 124 (8 Cir. 1997) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 th

n.34 (1995)). The facts alleged in Claims X-XII were known or should

have been known to Petitioner at the time he filed his first habeas

petition.

Because Claim X is related to the mental retardation claim

remanded by the Eight Circuit Court, we will review the claim on its

merits. Claim X includes a claim that Petitioner’s trial defense

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether Petitioner

was mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, established a new

constitutional rule that prohibits the execution of mentally retarded

persons. 536 U.S. 302 (2002). The creation of a new constitutional

rule may excuse a Petitioner from raising the newly recognized claim

in a previous petition for writ of habeas corpus, if the issue is

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Even if Claims X-XII were not abusive, they would not survive a 6

review on their merits. There has not been an adequate showing that Petitioner

is mentally retarded or was not competent during trial or after trial. The

ineffective assistance of counsel claims would fail under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under Strickland, Petitioner “must show

that counsel’s performance was deficient.... [and] that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. Objective medical and clinical data

does not show that Petitioner is mentally retarded or that he was not competent

during trial, thus failure to conduct further investigations into the issues

was not objectively unreasonable under Strickland, as any possible deficiency

failed to prejudice Petitioner. Since there is no finding of mental

retardation, the claim that Petitioner’s statement was involuntary due to

mental retardation must also fail. 

17

novel enough to warrant excusing the procedural default. Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984); 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2). However, in the case

sub judice, Petitioner had a State rule similar to the one created

in Atkins, available to him both at trial and during his appeals.

Due to the similar State rule prohibiting the execution of mentally

retarded persons, whether Petitioner is mentally retarded or that his

counsel failed to discover he was mentally retarded are issues that

could or should have been known at the time Petitioner filed his

first habeas petition. Furthermore, “‘attorney error that results

in a procedural default’ is not cause unless the attorney’s

performance was constitutionally deficient.” Armstrong v. Iowa, 418

F.3d 924, 927 (8 Cir. 2005) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. th

478, 488 (1986)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1351 (2006). Petitioner

has failed to show that he is mentally retarded, therefore, he cannot

show prejudice in his attorney’s failure to find and present evidence

of mental retardation.6

The issues contained in the rest of Claim X (failure to

investigate and present mitigating evidence) and Claims XI-XII

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Id.

7

Petitioner states that “Claims 1 to 8 are in Mr. Sasser’s original 8

and/or amended petition for habeas corpus relief and are incorporated herein.” 

Petitioner’s Second Supplemental and Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Relief, p. 6 n.1 (Doc. 48).

18

(whether Petitioner was competent during proceedings and whether

counsel provided ineffective assistance regarding Petitioner’s

alleged incompetence ) also could or should have been known at the 7

time Petitioner filed his first habeas petition. Accordingly, the

Court finds Claims X-XII impermissible as abusive claims and they are

hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 

2. Claims I-VIII

Same-claim successive petitions are prohibited. 28 U.S.C.A.

§2244(b)(1) (1996) (“A claim presented in a second or successive

habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in

a prior application shall be dismissed.”). Any claim that had been

previously adjudicated and denied on the merits in a previous federal

habeas proceeding, shall be dismissed, without a finding, unless a

“substantial injustice” will occur in the absence of a finding. 28

U.S.C. 2244(b)(1); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 899

(5 Cir. 2001); LaFevers v. Gibson, 238 F.3d 1263, 1256-66 (10 Cir. th th

2001). 

Petitioner attempts to relitigate claims raised in his original

petition by stating he is incorporating the claims of the prior

petition, and by numbering the first claim in the successive 8

petition IX (the initial petition contained claims numbered I-VIII.

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

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The claims contained in the original petition have been adjudicated

on their merits and are thus impermissible claims in Petitioner’s

current successive petition. Therefore, the claims that were

adjudicated as part of the original petition, Claims I-VIII, are

impermissible claims and are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 

VI. CONCLUSION

In light of the above findings, the Court finds that

Petitioner’s Second Supplemental and Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus should be and hereby is DENIED in its entirety.

Judgment will be entered accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 9 day of January 2007. th

 /S/ Harry F. Barnes 

 Harry F. Barnes

 United States District Judge

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