Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00008/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00008-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAULTON MITCHELL, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

MS. GARCIA, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-00008-REC-SMS 

ORDER CONSTRUING PLAINTIFF’S

REPLY TO BE A FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT (DOC. 18) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (DOC.

18)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with an action for damages and other relief concerning

alleged civil rights violations. The matter has been referred to

the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Rules 72-302 and 72-304.

Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed on January 3, 2006,

was dismissed by the Court with leave to amend within thirty days

by order filed on March 9, 2006, and served on Plaintiff on the

same date. 

I. Reply is Deemed to Be a First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff filed a document entitled, “Completing Court Order

First Amended Reply with Thirty Days,” on April 19, 2006. Review

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of the document shows that it is an amended pleading, and thus

the Court CONSTRUES Plaintiff’s reply as a first amended

complaint (FAC).

II. Screening the Complaint

The Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if the Court determines that an allegation of poverty is

untrue or that the action is 1) frivolous or malicious, 2) fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 3) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

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Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

Here, the complaint was received a filed a few days late,

but because Plaintiff substantially complied with the Court’s

order to file a FAC, the slight tardiness of the filing will be

excused.

In the FAC, Plaintiff seeks unspecified relief based on his

conviction in Fresno County Superior Court of an offense

involving a controlled substance. Plaintiff names the State of

California as a defendant in the caption, but he complains of a

due process violation by Deputy District Attorney Howo’s delay in

turning over discovery documents, a misstatement by her in

closing argument that Plaintiff had confessed, and her failure to

identify a rebuttal witnesses; a violation by Judge Cardozo of

unspecified rights by denying a motion to suppress evidence based

on an arrest or detention without any evidence that Plaintiff

committed or was about to commit a crime; arrest by Officer

Compos for the sole reason of Plaintiff’s race; ineffective

assistance of Ms. Garcia, who was Plaintiff’s counsel for at

least part of the criminal proceedings, by failing to interview

or call witnesses, make pretrial motions, prepare for trial, make

unspecified arguments regarding Officer Compos’s interrogation of

Plaintiff, and mentioning Plaintiff’s prior conviction repeatedly

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in final argument; and Judge Austin’s failure to permit

Plaintiff’s counsel to cross-examine a witness, grant a mistrial

motion, and his admission of hearsay evidence.

III. Civil Rights Action

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] 

 . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States. . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution. . .

shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that

defendants acted under color of state law at the time the act

complained of was committed and that the defendants deprived the

plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).

Further, the statute plainly requires that there be an

actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants

and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by a plaintiff. 

See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit

has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if

he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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III. Judicial Immunity

Judges and officers whose functions bear a close association

to the judicial process are entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for judicial

acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts. Demoran v.

Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 156 (9th Cir. 1986). A judge loses judicial

immunity for judicial acts only when the judge acts in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not

judicial in nature. Shucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th

Cir. 1988). The factors relevant in determining whether an act is

judicial “relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether

it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the

expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the

judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356-357, 362 (1978). Judicial immunity is not lost by allegations

that a judge conspired with a third party. As long as the judge’s

ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope,

793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986).

The allegations of the FAC before the Court establish that

the judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Plaintiff

is complaining of actions or rulings made by the judges in a case

pending before the court. The actions or rulings made by the

judges in connection with Plaintiff’s case to which the judges

were assigned were within their jurisdiction.

IV. Prosecutorial Immunity

Plaintiff appears to allege that a prosecutor is liable for

actions undertaken in the prosecutorial role. State prosecutors

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are absolutely immune from civil liability for acts taken in

their official capacity that are closely associated with the

judicial process, such as initiating prosecution and presenting

the state’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430-431

(1976); Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff does not state facts warranting a conclusion that the

prosecutor was acting outside her prosecutorial role.

V. Actions by Counsel not under Color of Law

In order to recover under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege and

prove that Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive

Plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal

statute. Karim-Panahi v.Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). It is established that a public defender

does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s

traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

proceeding. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317, 325 (1981);

Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985).

It appears that Ms. Garcia, Plaintiff’s counsel and perhaps

Plaintiff’s public defender, was performing a lawyer’s

traditional function, namely, representation of Plaintiff, in

engaging in the conduct stated in the complaint. Hence, Plaintiff

has not alleged conduct under color of law with respect to Ms.

Garcia.

VI. Claims Relating to Convictions

The FAC shows that Plaintiff all Plaintiff’s complaints

alleged in the FAC pertain to injuries alleged to have been

received in the course of Plaintiff’s criminal trial. To the

extent that Plaintiff may be complaining of the effect of

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Defendants’ actions on the legality of his detention in

connection with any pending state court action, Plaintiff’s claim

would generally be more appropriately brought in a habeas corpus

proceeding. A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of

habeas corpus if the petitioner can show that "he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A

habeas corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to

challenge the “legality or duration” of his confinement. Badea v.

Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting, Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1833 (1973);

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases. In contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper method for a prisoner to challenge

the conditions of that confinement and obtain injunctive relief.

See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-42, 111 S.Ct. 1737,

1741-42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499, 93 S.Ct. at 1841;

Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Plaintiff does not specify in the FAC the relief he is

seeking. To the extent that Plaintiff is complaining of the

legality or duration of his custody, or raises a constitutional

challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release, his sole

federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.

1990), cert. denied 11 S.Ct. 1090 (1991).

If Plaintiff is seeking this Court to intervene in the state

court criminal proceedings, Plaintiff is informed that generally

the federal writ of habeas corpus will not extend to one awaiting

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trial unless special circumstances exist such that there is an

absence of state processes effective to protect a federal right.

See Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 245-254 (1886); Fay v. Noia,

372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722

(1991). There is no allegation of an absence of state processes.

Further, it is established that federal courts will not

interfere with pending state criminal proceedings unless the

petitioner has exhausted all state court remedies with respect to

the claim raised. See Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310, 1311-

1312 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged exhaustion

of any state court remedies.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to §

1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, he must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1994). “A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has

not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at

488.

To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking damages for a past

conviction, Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction has been

reversed or expunged.

VII. No Leave to Amend

In the Court’s previous order dismissing the complaint with

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leave to amend, Plaintiff was informed of the foregoing legal

standards and was given an opportunity to amend his complaint to

allege invalidation of his state conviction, conduct constituting

action undertaken under color of state law, and conduct not

subject to immunity. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is

subject to the same defects as the original complaint. There is

no basis for inferring that it is possible that Plaintiff can

remedy the defects outlined hereinabove, and it appears that

giving Plaintiff another opportunity to amend the complaint would

be futile. It does not appear that the deficiencies of the

complaint can be cured by amendment or that Plaintiff can allege

a set of facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of

the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief.

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1. The complaint BE DISMISSED without leave to amend and

with prejudice for failure to state a claim; and

2. The Clerk of Court BE DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Defendant because the dismissal would terminate the action in its

entirety.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

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and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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