Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00771/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00771-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEDRO RODRIGUEZ,

Booking #14745493,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WILLIAM GORE, Sheriff; XAVIER 

BECERRA, Attorney General; GAVIN 

NEWSOME, Governor; CITY and 

COUNTY of SAN DIEGO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00771-CAB-RBM

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING 

FEE REQUIRED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Plaintiff, Pedro Rodriguez, while in custody at the San Diego Central Jail

(“SDCJ”)1, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 25, 2019. 

See Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff claims the San Diego County Sheriff, California’s 

Attorney General and Governor, and the City and County of San Diego have violated his 

 

1 Plaintiff’s exhibits show he was formerly incarcerated at Valley State Prison (“VSP”), 

and identified as CDCR #BC-6583, but was transferred from VSP to SDCJ on March 21, 

2019 for an “administrative re-sentencing.” See Compl., ECF No. 1, Ex. A at 14.

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First and Fourteenth Amendment by implementing policies that frustrate his right to 

petition for redress. Id. at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff claims unidentified SDCJ officials 

confiscated and stored 11 boxes of his “legal paperwork” in the SDCJ law library 

claiming it presented a fire hazard. Id. at 8-11. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief 

as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 12.

Plaintiff did not pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, 

“face ... additional hurdle[s].” Id.

Specifically, in addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing 

fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 

States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The 

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objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both 

before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311.

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a 

strike, the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the 

central question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or 

failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 

of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-

52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation 

that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of 

filing.”).

B. Discussion

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not include any “plausible allegations” to suggest he 

“faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 

F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, as described above, Plaintiff claims 

high-ranking state and county officials implemented a policy at the SDCJ that resulted in 

his separation from 11 boxes of “legal paperwork” transferred with him from VSP, and

during the time he was scheduled to appear in San Diego Superior Court for an 

“administrative re-sentencing” hearing. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8, 14. 

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And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 

some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 

satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id.

at 1120. That is the case here.

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council 

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Therefore, this Court takes judicial notice of its own records and finds that Plaintiff 

Pedro Rodriguez, currently identified as San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Inmate 

Booking No. 14745493 and as CDCR Inmate #BC-6583, while incarcerated, has filed 

five prior civil actions or appeals that were dismissed on the grounds that they were 

frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

They are: 

1) Rodriguez v. Robinson, et al., Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-02770-LABWVG (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and 

Dismissing Complaint for failing to state a claim) (ECF No. 4) (strike one);

2) Rodriguez v. Mitchell, et al., Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-02708-GPC-WVG 

(S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2015) (Order granting Motion to Proceed IFP and 

Dismissing Complaint for failing to state a claim) (ECF No. 4.) (strike two); 

3) Rodriguez v. Stall, et al., Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-02646-LAB-DHB 

(S.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2015) (Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint for 

failing to state a claim) (ECF No. 11) (strike three);

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4) Rodriguez v. Greco, et al., Civil Case No. 3:15-cv-02040-DMS-JLB 

(S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016) (Order Dismissing Second Amended Complaint for 

failing to state a claim) (ECF No. 13) (strike four); and

5) Rodriguez v. Pierce, et al., Appeal No. 16-55150 (9th Cir. July 19, 

2016) (Order denying IFP on appeal based on frivolousness) (Dkt. No. 14); 

(9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016) (Order dismissing appeal for failing to perfect 

appeal) (Dkt. No. 16) (strike five).2

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than 

three “strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he 

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is 

not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent 

all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of 

abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed 

IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

II. Conclusion 

 For the reasons explained, the Court: 

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

(2) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte for failing to prepay the $400 civil 

and administrative filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

 

2 See Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that appellate court’s 

denial of prisoner’s request for IFP status on appeal on grounds of frivolousness constituted 

a “strike” under § 1915(g) “even though [it] did not dismiss the appeal until later when the 

[appellant] did not pay the filing fee.”).

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(4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment of dismissal and close the 

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2019

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