Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02162/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02162-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONIA M. HOWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-2162-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social 

Security Act (“Act”).1 In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff principally contends that 

the Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff was not disabled from March 27, 2007,

plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through April 3, 2014, the date of the final administrative 

decision. (ECF No. 14.) The Commissioner filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion and a crossmotion for summary judgment, and plaintiff subsequently filed a reply brief. (ECF Nos. 18, 20.)

 

1

This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(15), and both 

parties voluntarily consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. 

(ECF Nos. 7, 9.) 

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For the reasons discussed below, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and enters 

judgment for the Commissioner. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on November 18, 1972, has a GED, is able to communicate in English, 

and previously worked primarily as a cashier.

2

 (Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 28, 132.) On 

February 23, 2009, plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging that her disability began on March 

27, 2007, and that she was disabled primarily due to depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and a collapsed disc. (AT 163-66, 170, 411.) After 

plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing 

before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which took place before ALJ Mark Ramsey on May 

24, 2011, and at which plaintiff, represented by an attorney, testified. (AT 129-58.) In a decision 

dated September 7, 2011, ALJ Ramsey determined that plaintiff was not disabled. (AT 170-81.) 

After obtaining a remand from the Appeals Council, an additional hearing was conducted before 

ALJ Eileen Burlison on May 14, 2013, at which plaintiff, represented by an attorney, and a 

vocational expert testified. (AT 66-90.) On June 13, 2013, ALJ Burlison also found plaintiff not 

disabled. (AT 194-203.) Thereafter, plaintiff received another remand from the Appeals Council, 

and a further hearing was conducted before ALJ Burlison on March 12, 2014, at which plaintiff, 

represented by an attorney, and a vocational expert testified. (AT 39-65.) 

In a subsequent decision dated April 3, 2014, ALJ Burlison again determined that plaintiff 

had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from March 27, 2007, plaintiff’s alleged 

disability onset date, through the date of that decision. (AT 19-30.) ALJ Burlison’s April 3, 2014 

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied 

plaintiff’s request for further review on July 25, 2014. (AT 1-3.) Plaintiff then filed this action in 

 

2 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including plaintiff’s

medical and mental health history, the court does not exhaustively relate those facts in this order. 

The facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and treatment will be addressed insofar as they are 

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions.

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federal district court on September 17, 2014, to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner’s 

final decision. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) whether the ALJ improperly rejected 

the opinion of consultative psychologist Dr. Richard Lewis; and (2) whether the ALJ erroneously 

discounted plaintiff’s own testimony concerning her symptoms and functional limitations. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 

court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to DIB and SSI pursuant to the Commissioner’s 

standard five-step analytical framework.3 As an initial matter, the ALJ noted that plaintiff met the 

 

3 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social 

Security program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to disabled 

persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382, et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as 

an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel 

five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-

42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

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insured status requirements of the Act for purposes of DIB through September 30, 2012. (AT 

21.) At the first step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since March 27, 2007, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ 

found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the 

lumbar spine, obesity, anxiety, bipolar disorder, depression, attention deficit disorder, mild 

intellectual disability, schizoaffective disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline 

personality disorder. (Id.) However, at step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an 

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AT 22.) 

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find the claimant 

has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except: the claimant 

could frequently perform postural activities. She should avoid 

hazards. She would be limited to simple and routine work. She 

would be limited to brief and superficial contact with the general 

public, supervisors, and coworkers.

 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the 

claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step 

three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or 

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the 

claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past relevant work? If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any 

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id. 

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(AT 24.) 

At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. 

(AT 28.) However, at step five, the ALJ determined, based on the VE’s testimony, that,

considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. (AT 28-29.) Thus, the 

ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from March 

27, 2007, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 

29.)

B. Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the Commissioner’s Determinations

(1) Whether the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of consultative psychologist 

Dr. Richard Lewis

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 

1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally speaking, 

a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining physician’s opinion, and an 

examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a non-examining physician’s opinion. 

Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202. To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in 

addition to considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in 

the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted 

opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining 

professional may be rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons. Id. at 830. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, by itself, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or 

examining professional. Id. at 831.

Consultative examining psychologist Dr. Richard Lewis evaluated and diagnosed plaintiff

with bipolar II disorder hypomanic with mixed features, antisocial personality disorder, mild 

////

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intellectual disability, and continuous alcohol use disorder. (AT 799.)4 Dr. Lewis opined that 

plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to understand and remember simple instructions; 

markedly limited in her ability to carry out simple instructions and make judgments on simple 

work-related decisions; and extremely limited in her ability to understand and remember complex 

instructions, carry out complex instructions, make judgments on complex work-related decisions, 

interact appropriately with the public, interact appropriately with supervisors, interact 

appropriately with co-workers, and respond appropriately to usual work situations and the 

changes in a routine work setting. (AT 791-93.) In his narrative functional assessment, Dr. 

Lewis further emphasized that plaintiff’s focus was poor, she was impulsive, she was “unable to 

carry out any level of instructions consistently in competitive work settings,” and she was “unable 

to interact appropriately with supervisors, co-workers, and the general public.” (AT 798.)

Here, the ALJ permissibly gave little weight to Dr. Lewis’s extreme limitations, because 

they are inconsistent with the weight of the medical evidence, which documents that, although

plaintiff complained of severe depression, anxiety, mood swings, insomnia, and other mental 

symptoms, she frequently objectively presented to treating providers as cooperative, 

conversational, and pleasant with a bright affect, normal attention and concentration, intact 

memory, intact judgment and insight, and a linear and goal-directed thought process, particularly 

when she was compliant with a proper medication regimen. (AT 25-26, 629, 631-32, 635-36,

726-27, 781, 783-84, 838, 840, 843, 845, 847, 849, 851, 854.)5 In March 2008, plaintiff obtained 

 

4

In several portions of the record, plaintiff acknowledged that she had a history of alcoholism and 

drug abuse (including methamphetamines, marijuana, PCP, LSD, and cocaine). (AT 147.) 

Notably, at the March 12, 2014 administrative hearing, plaintiff admitted that she had consumed 

alcohol “up to a month ago” and had used marijuana “about four months ago.” (AT 50.) 

Although Dr. Lewis stated, in conclusory fashion, that plaintiff’s limitations would be the same 

even if she did not consume alcohol (AT 798), he provided no reasoning or analysis in support of 

that assertion, and the ALJ likewise failed to perform a proper investigation and analysis

regarding the materiality of plaintiff’s alcoholism or drug abuse. Nevertheless, because the court 

finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that plaintiff was not disabled, a 

remand for a substance abuse materiality analysis is unnecessary.

 

5

Plaintiff faults the Commissioner for citing to additional medical records not specifically cited 

by the ALJ. However, the additional records cited all relate to the same ground relied upon by 

the ALJ for discounting Dr. Lewis’s opinion – namely, that Dr. Lewis’s opinion is inconsistent 

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a 30/30 score on a mini mental status examination performed by Northern Nevada Adult Mental 

Health. (AT 25, 616.) In September 2012, plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist observed that plaintiff 

was less moody and irritable, euthymic with a congruent affect, and had a fairly good attention 

span for her community college classes. (AT 784.) 

The ALJ also reasonably relied on the opinion of another consultative examining 

psychologist, Dr. Kendra Beitz Thompson. (AT 25, 618-24.) Dr. Thompson diagnosed plaintiff 

with a major depressive disorder (recurrent) vs. mood disorder not otherwise specified; anxiety 

disorder not otherwise specified vs. rule out posttraumatic stress disorder; rule out alcohol 

dependence; amphetamine dependence in sustained full remission; cannabis dependence in 

sustained full remission; and a GAF score of 51, which corresponds to moderate symptoms or 

moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. (AT 622-23); see also 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000). Dr. Thompson opined 

that plaintiff was capable of consistently understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple 

tasks; but was not capable of consistently understanding, remembering, and carrying out complex 

or detailed tasks. (AT 622.) Dr. Thompson found that plaintiff was friendly and cooperative, and 

did not exhibit any inappropriate behaviors, but nonetheless indicated that plaintiff may have 

limitations in her ability to appropriately interact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public 

based on plaintiff’s self-report of a history of yelling, throwing things, and mood swings resulting 

in police encounters. (Id.) Consistent with Dr. Thompson’s opinion, the ALJ restricted plaintiff, 

inter alia, to simple and routine work, with only brief and superficial contact with the general 

public, supervisors, and coworkers. To the extent that Dr. Thompson’s opinion was ambiguous 

regarding the extent of plaintiff’s limitation in her ability to interact with other people, the ALJ’s 

interpretation was reasonable in light of the weight of the medical evidence from treating 

providers, as discussed above. 

////

 

with the weight of the medical evidence. By citing to additional medical records on appeal, the 

Commissioner is not seeking to have this court affirm the ALJ’s decision on a new or 

independent ground not relied upon by the ALJ. 

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In sum, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Lewis’s 

opinion. While plaintiff unquestionably suffers from mental impairments resulting in significant 

functional limitations, the ALJ properly weighed the conflicting evidence and ultimately found, 

based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole, that such limitations were not present at a 

disabling level. The court thus defers, as it must, to the ALJ’s rational resolution of conflicting 

evidence and ambiguities in the record. 

(2) Whether the ALJ erroneously discounted plaintiff’s own testimony concerning 

her symptoms and functional limitations 

As noted above, plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly rejected plaintiff’s own

testimony regarding her symptoms and functional limitations. 

In Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged. 

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. . . .

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “At the same time, the 

ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would 

be available for the asking....” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

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“‘[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.’” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959.

In this case, the ALJ permissibly relied on the medical evidence, as properly weighed by 

the ALJ, to find plaintiff not completely credible. Although lack of medical evidence to fully 

corroborate the alleged severity of symptoms cannot form the sole basis for discounting plaintiff’s 

subjective symptom testimony, it is nevertheless a relevant factor for the ALJ to consider. Burch

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s daily activities were 

inconsistent with her allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. (AT 25, 28.) “While a 

claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order to be eligible for benefits, the ALJ may 

discredit a claimant’s testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities 

indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting...Even where those activities suggest 

some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the 

extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-

13 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (ALJ properly 

considered claimant’s ability to care for her own needs, cook, clean, shop, interact with her 

nephew and boyfriend, and manage her finances and those of her nephew in the credibility 

analysis); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s 

determination regarding claimant’s ability to “fix meals, do laundry, work in the yard, and 

occasionally care for his friend’s child” was a specific finding sufficient to discredit the 

claimant’s credibility). 

In this case, plaintiff stated that she cooked, did laundry and housework, and, although she 

did not like being around other people, she acknowledged that she was able to go shopping and 

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use public transportation when necessary. (AT 399-407.) She took a trip to California to visit her 

family in 2011. (AT 75.) She also went with her friend to a casino across the street about once a 

month. (AT 143.) Plaintiff further testified that she attended community college accounting 

classes, even though she also stated that she was not doing very well in those classes. (AT 84-

85.) Those activities plausibly suggest that plaintiff was not as limited as she claimed, and was

capable of at least simple and routine work, with only brief and superficial contact with the 

general public, supervisors, and coworkers. 

To be sure, the record also contains some contrary evidence suggesting that plaintiff’s 

activities were more limited. However, it is the function of the ALJ to resolve any ambiguities, 

and the court finds the ALJ’s assessment to be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. 

See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming ALJ’s credibility 

determination even where the claimant’s testimony was somewhat equivocal about how regularly 

she was able to keep up with all of the activities and noting that the ALJ’s interpretation “may not 

be the only reasonable one”). As the Ninth Circuit explained:

It may well be that a different judge, evaluating the same evidence, 

would have found [the claimant’s] allegations of disabling pain 

credible. But, as we reiterate in nearly every case where we are 

called upon to review a denial of benefits, we are not triers of fact. 

Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ...Where, as 

here, the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to 

disbelieve an allegation of excess pain, and those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to 

second-guess that decision.

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989).

Finally, the ALJ’s credibility analysis is further bolstered by record evidence concerning 

plaintiff’s work history and reputation for truthfulness.6 On the alleged disability onset date of 

March 27, 2007, plaintiff was terminated from her position as a full-time cashier at Walmart 

where she had worked since 2005, not because of problems with customers, co-workers, or 

supervisors, but because she had embezzled cash and store merchandise. (AT 134-35, 391-92.) 

 

6

In affirming the ALJ’s credibility analysis, the court need not, and does not, rely on this

independent ground not specifically mentioned in the ALJ’s decision. It merely bolsters the 

ALJ’s own sufficient reasons for discounting plaintiff’s credibility. 

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Thereafter, while in a court diversion program, plaintiff was convicted two more times for theft, 

and was also arrested a couple of times for contempt of court, because, according to plaintiff, she 

had lied to the judge about a death in the family and had falsified related information. (AT 135-

39.) 

In light of the above, the court finds that the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing 

reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony of disabling symptoms and functional limitations 

beyond the limitations assessed in the ALJ’s RFC. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is free from 

prejudicial error and supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, IT 

IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is DENIED. 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is 

GRANTED.

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 3, 2015

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