Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00407/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00407-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONNIE GUY YOUNG, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 2:14-CV-407-VEH

) 

)

KIMBERLY MYHRER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND

I. Introduction and Procedural History

Plaintiff Ronnie Guy Young (“Mr. Young”) initiated this civil rights lawsuit

on March 7, 2014. On May 30, 2014, Mr. Young filed a first amended complaint

(Doc. 10) against the following seven individual defendants who have all been sued

in their personal capacities only: Kimberly Myhrer (“Officer Myhrer”), Ronald

Higgins (“Officer Higgins”), Timothy Laatsch (“Sergeant Laatsch”), Shanna Young

(“Officer Young”), Matthew Joiner (“Officer Joiner”), David Mitchell (“Officer

Mitchell”), and Shane Mills(“Officer Mills”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). (Doc.

10 ¶¶ 4-6). 

By virtue of the court’s prior ruling on summary judgment, Mr. Young’s

federal counts for deliberate indifference and conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

were dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 55 at 24), and only his state law claims for

FILED

 2017 Mar-21 PM 03:19

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-00407-VEH Document 68 Filed 03/21/17 Page 1 of 45
negligence, wantonness, and the intentional infliction of emotional distressremained

in this lawsuit. (Id. at 24, 29). Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal on September

18, 2015, challenging the court’s rejection of their state sovereign immunity defense

raised under the Jailer Liability Protection Act of 2011 (the “Jailer Act”) to these state

law claims on summary judgment. (Doc. 57).

On July 1, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit reversed this court’ssovereign immunity

ruling adverse to Defendants and remanded this case for a determination in the first

instance:1

[W]hether the individual defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on state sovereign immunity grounds under Ala. Code §§ 14-6-1 & 36-

22-3(b). It should specifically consider whether the defendants acted in

compliance with the law asthe amended statutesrequire, and in so doing

will have to address who has the burden on that issue.

(Doc. 63-1 at 9-10). On December 12, 2016, this court entered an order establishing

a briefing schedule on the remand issues identified by the Eleventh Circuit under the

Jailer Act. (Doc. 64). 

Defendantsfiled their initial brief (Doc. 65) on December 29, 2016. Mr. Young

filed his responsive brief (Doc. 66) on January 19, 2017. On January 25, 2017,

Defendants replied. (Doc. 67). Having considered the parties’ arguments on remand,

1 As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, Defendants “did not make any burden-shifting

arguments to the district court and we decline to address them for the first time on appeal.” (Doc.

63-1 at 9).

2

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the court concludes that the sovereign immunity defense afforded to Defendants

under the Jailer Act precludes the state law claims that Mr. Young has asserted

against them. Therefore, the state law section of the court’s previous summary

judgment decision (Doc. 55 at 24-29) is due to be vacated. Further, that portion of

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 49) that deals with Mr. Young’s

state law claims is due to be treated as one requesting a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of

those counts on state sovereign immunity grounds. Accordingly, Counts I and II of

Mr. Young’slawsuitremain dismissed with prejudice while CountsIII and IV are due

to be dismissed without prejudice.2

II. Factual Background3

Mr. Young has an extensive criminal history in California, having been

convicted of assault with a firearm, possession of drugs, and possession of drugs with

the intent to distribute. AF No. 1.1.

4 He has spent 18 of his 46 years of life in state

2 Because the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Young’s state law

claims on sovereign immunity grounds, it does not reach the merits of Defendants’ expert testimony

contentions previouslyraised as an alternative basis for summary judgment, but not actively pursued

on remand.

3 As no party has challenged the court’s factual background previously used on summary

judgment (Doc. 55 at 9-17), the court restates those same facts on remand. However, this statement

does not represent actual findings of fact. See In re Celotex Corp., 487 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir.

2007). Instead, the court has provided this statement simply to place the court’s legal analysis in the

context of this particular case or controversy. 

4 The designation “AF” stands for admitted fact and indicates a fact offered by Defendants

that Mr. Young has admitted in his written submissions on summary judgment, in his deposition

testimony, or by virtue of any other evidence offered in support of his case. Under appendix II of the

3

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prisons in California. AF No. 1.2. Although born and raised in California, he has

family in Shelby County, Alabama. AF No. 2.

In 2011, Mr. Young was convicted in California of distribution of

methamphetamines and received a sentence of either four years of incarceration or

participation in an in-house drug program. AF No. 3.1. Mr. Young participated in the

program for approximately one and a half months, at which time he fled to Alabama.

AF No. 3.2. A fugitive from justice warrant was issued by California Department of

Corrections on February 13, 2012 for the arrest of Mr. Young. AF No. 4. 

On December 28, 2009, James Wesley Howard (“Mr. Howard”) was arrested

and charged with the murder of Kara Nichole Lee (“Kara Lee”), and wasincarcerated

in the Shelby County Jail pending trial for capital murder. AF No. 5.1. Kara Lee was

approximately 2 years old at the time of her death and Mr. Howard was the boyfriend

court’s uniform initial order (Doc. 4) entered on March 10, 2014, “[a]ll statements of fact must be

supported by specific reference to evidentiary submissions.” (Id. at 16). For Mr. Young, more

specifically, this means that “[a]ny statements of fact that are disputed by the non-moving partymust

be followed by a specific reference to those portions of the evidentiaryrecord upon which the dispute

is based.” (Id. at 17). Consequently, whenever Mr. Young has inadequately asserted a dispute over

a fact that Defendants have otherwise substantiated with an evidentiary citation, the court has

reviewed the cited evidence and, if it in fact fairly supports Defendants’ factual assertion, has

accepted Defendants’ fact. On the other hand, whenever Mr. Young has adequately disputed a fact

offered byDefendants, the court has reviewed the evidence cited byMr. Young and, if it in fact fairly

supports Mr. Young’s factual assertion, has accepted Mr. Young’s version. The court’s numbering

of admitted facts (e.g., AF No. 1) corresponds to the numbering of Defendants’ statement of

undisputed facts as set forth in Doc. 50 and responded to by Mr. Young in Doc. 52. A number

following a decimal point corresponds to the particular sentence within the numbered statement of

facts. For example, (AF No. 1.2) would indicate the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Defendants’

facts is the subject of the court’s citation to the record. 

4

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of Kara Lee’s mother, Britany Lee. AF No. 5.2. Mr. Young’s nephew, William

Young, Jr., (“William Young”) was the father of Kara Lee. AF No. 5.3. While Mr.

Young was in Alabama as a fugitive from California, he spoke with William Young

several times about Mr. Howard, and during these conversations William Young told

Mr. Young that Mr. Howard was incarcerated in the Shelby County jail. AF No. 6.

On the early morning hours of March 9, 2012, Mr. Young was arrested by the

U.S. Marshal’s Service at the home of his brother, George Young, in Shelby,

Alabama. AF No. 7. Mr. Young wastransported to the ShelbyCounty jail and booked

in on March 9, 2012. AF No. 8.1. The booking officers received a report that Mr.

Young was a known felon, gang member, had a history of carrying a gun, assaulting

police officers, and was an escape risk. AF No. 8.2. It was also reported that Mr.

Young had claimed to be a member of the Southern Brotherhood, a white supremacist

gang. AF No. 8.3.

During the booking process, an Inmate Questionnaire (the “Questionnaire”)

was completed which Mr. Young signed. AF No. 9.1; (see also Doc. 51-11 at 4 at 10

(Officer Higgins’s answering affirmatively that he was the officer who asked Mr.

Young the questions on the Questionnaire)). Question number 25 asked Mr. Young

if he was “aware of any reason [he] should be separated from another inmate while

[he] is here?” to which Mr. Young responded “no”. AF No. 9.2. Officer Higgins

5

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asked Mr. Young the questions verbatim asset out on the Questionnaire, and marked

down Mr. Young’s responses. AF No. 9.3; (see also Doc. 51-11 at 4 at 11 (Officer

Higgins’s testifying that “Sergeant Myers told me that you are to ask each question

verbatim to the inmate, and that’s how I asked them, verbatim”)). Further, Mr. Young

signed the Questionnaire attesting to the accuracy of the information. AF No. 9.3.

Additionally, at no time did Mr. Young informthe booking officers about his adverse

affiliation with Mr. Howard or otherwise indicate that he should be separated from

Mr. Howard.

5

 AF No. 9.4.

Mr. Young testified that he heard the [Deputy] U.S. Marshal state to the

booking officers that he was to remain in isolation, as opposed to being placed in the

general population. (Doc. 52 at 6 ¶ 10). Initially, Officer Myhrer placed Mr. Young

in administrative segregation. AF No. 10.

On March 10, 2012, Officer Joiner classified Mr. Young as a maximum

security inmate based on his extensive history of assaultive behavior and on the

5 While Defendants factually suggest that none of them had any knowledge of Mr. Young’s

adverse affiliation with Mr. Howard, Mr. Young objects to this particular fact and points out in his

opposition (Doc. 52 at 6 ¶ 9) that Defendants’ evidentiary citations are limited to the sworn

testimony from two of the seven Defendants. Officer Myhrer testified during her deposition that on

the date Mr. Young was booked, “we didn’t know he had any relation with Mr. Howard[,]” but does

not specify who “we” are. (Doc. 51-10 at 11 at 39). Sergeant Laatsch similarly testified that, “[a]t

no point were we made aware of [Mr. Young’s] affiliation with [Mr.] Howard.” (Doc. 51-13 at 27

at 101). At the same time, there is no evidence contained in the record from which a reasonable jury

could conclude that one or more of the remaining five Defendants actually had prior individualized

knowledge of the potential conflict between Mr. Young and Mr. Howard.

6

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reports from the arresting officers. AF No. 11.1. However, Officer Joiner could not

confirm these claims through the National Crime Information Center, and therefore

the classification evaluation of Mr. Young continued. AF No. 11.2.

On March 12, 2012, Sergeant Laatsch continued to investigate Mr. Young’s

criminal and behavioral history in order to further assess his classification status. AF

No. 12.1. Due to the fact that Sergeant Laatsch had received conflicting reports as to

Mr. Young’s criminal history and since he could not confirm the charges of assaults

against officers and escape attempts, Sergeant Laatsch had Mr. Young moved from

an administrative segregation cell to Unit B-3, which is a single person lockdown

cell. AF No. 12.2.

On the morning of March 14, 2012, Sergeant Laatsch continued his

investigation into the behavioralreports concerning Mr. Young. AF No. 16.1. He was

unsuccessful in confirming that Mr. Young was an escape risk and had a violent

history toward correction staff while at previousinstitutions. AF No. 16.2. He further

reviewed Mr. Young’s history and considered a report from Sergeant Dixon

6

of his

interview of Mr. Young. AF No. 16.3. Sergeant Dixon had reported to Sergeant

Laatsch that Mr. Young did not deny some of his past aggressive behavior but

declared that he was not like that anymore. AF No. 16.4. Based on the prior charges

6

 Mr. Young has not sued Sergeant Dixon.

7

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of kidnapping first and an aggravated assault from California, Sergeant Laatsch took

into consideration the behavioralreports on Mr. Young to classify himwith a medium

designation instead of continuing to keep him in segregation. AF No. 16.5.

In the afternoon of March 14, 2012, prior to the end of his shift, Sergeant

Laatsch sent an email to Officer Joiner informing him that he was unable to complete

three inmate housing moves during the day shift, and for Officer Joiner to make these

moves during his shift if he had the time. AF No. 17.1. One of these housing moves

was for Mr. Young to be moved from his B3 single cell to Pod A, Block 6. AF No.

17.2. Pod A, Block 6 (A-6) houses both maximum and medium security inmates

having a history of assaultive behavior. AF No. 18.

Pod A is comprised of a number of cell blocks. AF No. 19.1. Each block

contains a number of cells. AF No. 19.2. In the center of the pod is a tower manned

by a correctional officer, with a view into each block. AF No. 19.3. There are two

additional officers assigned to the pod who act as rovers throughout the pod. AF No.

19.4. 

Each block surrounding the tower is triangular in shape. AF No. 19.5. A-6 is

comprised of a large room with tables, chairs, phones, a television, and showers,

referred to as the “dayroom”. AF No. 19.6. Along the back wall of the block are twoman cells, configured in a lower and upper level. AF No. 19.7. The cell doors

8

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routinely remain open during the day so that inmates can utilize the dayroom and go

to and from their cells. AF No. 19.8.

Each block is monitored by a closed circuit camera which feedsinto the tower.

AF No. 20.1. Each block is also equipped with an intercom system which an inmate

can use to communicate directly with the tower guard. AF No. 20.2.

Mr. Howard was housed in A-6. AF No. 21.1. Within a few minutes of Mr.

Young entering A-6, Mr. Howard approached Mr. Young and introduced himself to

him. AF No. 21.2. Mr. Young confronted Mr. Howard with the death of his great

niece, and the two began to argue in the dayroom. AF No. 21.3.

Mr. Young accused Mr. Howard of killing his niece, to which Mr. Howard

responded that he was innocent and had paperwork in his cell showing that the DNA

results were inconclusive. AF No. 22.1. Mr. Howard left the dayroom and went up

the steps to his cell located on the upper level. AF No. 22.2. Mr. Young followed Mr.

Howard up the steps to Mr. Howard’s cell. AF No. 22.3.

Immediately after Mr. Howard entered his cell, he bent down next to his bunk

and started going through his paperwork. AF No. 23.1. While Mr. Young was

standing beside and over Mr. Howard, Mr. Young began punching Mr. Howard in the

head. AF No. 23.2. Mr. Howard retaliated and punched Mr. Young several times,

knocking him to the floor. AF No. 23.3. Mr. Howard kicked Mr. Young several times

9

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and then left the cell. AF No. 23.4.

Mr. Young wastaken to the jail medical unit and then transferred to the Shelby

Baptist Medical Center. AF No. 24.1. From there he was transported to UAB

Hospital. AF No. 24.2.

While Mr. Young criticizes its thoroughness (Doc. 52 at 8 ¶ 25), an

investigation into the fight took place, including a recorded interview of Mr. Young.

AF No. 25.1. During the interview, Mr. Young claimed not to remember any details

of the fight and that hislast memory was of him packing his belongingsto move from

B-3 to A-6. AF No. 25.2. Additionally, Mr. Young admitted in the interview that he

knew Mr. Howard was in the Shelby County jail and further admitted that he did not

inform the correctional officers of his relationship to Mr. Howard or that he should

be separated from Mr. Howard. AF No. 26.

On multiple occasions prior to his fight with Mr. Howard, Mr. Young had the

opportunity to inform the jail guards of his adverse affiliation with Mr. Howard and

yet he never did this. AF No. 32.1. More specifically, Mr. Young interacted with the

guards on a routine basis throughout the day, including being escorted by guards to

the shower and being served meals. AF Nos. 32.2, 32.3, 32.4. Additionally, Mr.

Young could have informed Sergeant Dixon about his knowledge of Mr. Howard

while being interviewed, but failed to do so. AF No. 32.5. 

10

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Mr. Young also could have brought the potential conflict issue to Defendants’

attention when he was being moved, but instead he remained silent and never

informed any Defendants (or other correctional personnel) about this combustible

relationship. AF Nos. 32.6, 32.7. Finally, Mr. Young also could have alerted the

tower guard via the intercom system in the dayroom that he should not be housed in

the same block as Mr. Howard, once he realized his presence. AF No. 32.8. Instead,

Mr. Young followed Mr. Howard to Mr. Howard’s cell and instigated a physical fight

with him. AF No. 32.9.

On March 16, 2012, Mr. Young was returned back to the jail from UAB

Hospital, and then was extradited to California on March 27, 2012, to serve out his

sentence. AF No. 27.

III. Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Generally

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained the standard on motions to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction:

Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1) come in two forms. Facial attacks” on the complaint “require[]

the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged

a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegationsin his complaint

are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.” Menchaca v. Chrysler

Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953,

101 S. Ct. 358, 66 L. Ed. 2d 217 (1980) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed.

Sav. &Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). “Factual attacks,”

11

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on the other hand, challenge “the existence of subject matter jurisdiction

in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings,

such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Id.

These two forms of attack differ substantially. On a facial attack,

a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion-the court must consider the allegations of the

complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 396, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981). But

when the attack is factual, 

the trial court may proceed asit never could under 12(b)(6)

or FED.R.CIV. P. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1)

motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction-its very power to

hear the case-there is substantial authority that the trial

court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to

the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no

presumptive truthfulness attachesto plaintiff’s allegations,

and the existence of disputed material facts will not

preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits

of jurisdictional claims.

Id. at 412-13 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).

Here, the jurisdictional attack by Defendants on Mr. Young’s state law claims is

factual.

B. State Sovereign Immunity Generally

As the Eleventh Circuit set forth the Alabama sovereign immunity doctrine in

Lancaster v. Monroe County,116 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997), abrogation on other

grounds as recognized by Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1233 (11th Cir. 2016):

12

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“[U]nder Alabama law, a claim against an Alabama sheriff in his

individual capacity is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”

McMillian v. Johnson, 101 F.3d 1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 1996) cert.

denied, (June 27, 1997) (No. 96–1756). The source of absolute

sovereign immunity is Article I, § 14 of the Alabama Constitution of

1901, which provides that “the State of Alabama shall never be made a

defendant in any court of law or equity.” That provision bars any suit

against the state of Alabama or its agencies. See Phillips v. Thomas, 555

So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989). That provision also grants immunity to state

officers and employees in their official and individual capacities, when

the action is, in reality, a suit against the state. See id. . . .

In deciding whether an action against a state officer is, in fact, an

action against the state, Alabama law instructs us to consider the nature

of the action and the relief sought. See Phillips, 555 So. 2d at 83.

According to Parker v. Amerson, if the “nature of the action” is a suit

against a state official for the negligent performance of his statutory

duties, that action is in reality a suit against the state. See 519 So. 2d at

446. It does not matter, either, that Ms. Lancaster seeks only damages

from the individual defendants. The same relief was sought from the

deputy sheriff in Alexander; nevertheless, the Alabama Supreme Court

treated the suit as one against the state. See Alexander, 652 So. 2d at

1143-44.

Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1430-31 (emphasis added); see also McMillian v. Johnson,

101 F.3d 1363, 1365 (“Notwithstanding this confusing language in Tinney, the

holding of the case is clear: under Alabama law, a claim against an Alabama sheriff

in his individual capacity is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”).

Additionally, a sovereign immunity dismissal based upon § 14 of the Alabama

Constitution is a jurisdictional one. See, e.g., Ex parte Davis, 9 So. 3d 480, 483 (Ala.

2008) (“Because the original complaint purported to state a cause of action against

13

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Davis and Isaacs in violation of § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, the trial court

did not acquire subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against the deputies when

the original complaint wasfiled.” (emphasis added) (citing Ex parte Blankenship, 893

So. 2d 303, 306-07 (Ala. 2004))); Blankenship, 893 So. 2d at 306-07 (“Because the

complaint [against a deputy sheriff] purported to effect an action against the State in

violation of § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, the trial court acquired no subject-matter

jurisdiction over this action.”); Blankenship, 893 So. 2d at 307 (pointing out that

when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it “take no action other than to

exercise its power to dismiss the action . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala.

1999))); Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 26 (Ala. 2007) (“Thus,

this Court cannot order the trial court to allow Good Hope to amend its complaint

because the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction [due to sovereign

immunity].”); cf. Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing

that sovereign immunity under Alabama law “is immunity from suit, not merely a

defense from liability”).

Further, whenever a district court agrees that sovereign immunity divests it

from having subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, granting relief in the form of

summary judgment is error; instead, the court must dismiss without prejudice

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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Stanley v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146,

1157 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Accordingly, we conclude that the court below erred in

granting summary judgment in favor of the United States [on the basis of sovereign

immunity] and should have dismissed the case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.”);7see also Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Regional Healthcare System,

Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice.” citing

Crotwell v. Hockman–Lewis Ltd., 734 F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir. 1984))); Stalley, 524

F.3d at 1235 (“affirming district court dismissal for lack of jurisdiction but reversing

for entry of dismissal “without prejudice” on remand rather than “with prejudice” as

originally and erroneously entered); Blankenship, 893 So. 2d at 307 (issuing writ of

mandamus to trial court directing it “to enter an order dismissing the action for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction” on the basis of deputy sheriff’s state sovereign

immunity).

C. Alabama’s Jailer Act Specifically

In its reversal of this court, the Eleventh Circuit described the history leading

up to the passage of the Jailer Act:

7

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to October 1, 1981.

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Under Article I, § 14 of the Alabama Constitution, the State of

Alabama is immune from suit, and that sovereign immunity extends to

Alabama sheriffs “when they are executing their law enforcement

duties.” McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 793 (1997). In

Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So. 2d 209 (Ala. 1991), the Alabama

Supreme Court held that deputy sheriffs are immune from suit to the

same extent assheriffs because “the deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the

sheriff.” Id. at 210. But in Ex parte Shelley, 53 So. 3d 887 (Ala. 2009),

the Alabama Supreme Court refused to extend the scope of state

sovereign immunity further. There, the Alabama Supreme Court

explained that the jailers working for a sheriff’s office “cannot properly

be viewed in legal contemplation as an extension of the sheriff or as one

officer with the sheriff.” Id. at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the Alabama Constitution, therefore, jailers (unlike sheriffs and

deputy sheriffs) are not entitled to immunity from suits against them in

their individual capacities for money damages. See id.

In June of 2011, shortly after the Ex parte Shelley decision was

issued, the Alabama Legislature enacted the Jailer Liability Protection

Act, No. 2011-685, which amended Ala. Code §§ 14-6-1 & 36-22-3 to

provide immunity for jail personnel.

(Doc. 63-1 at 3-4).

As a result of the Jailer Act’s passage, Ala. Code § 14-6-1 now reads:

The sheriff has the legal custody and charge of the jail in his or her

county and all prisoners committed thereto, except in cases otherwise

provided by law. The sheriff may employ persons to carry out his or her

duty to operate the jail and supervise the inmates housed therein for

whose acts he or she is civilly responsible. Persons so employed by the

sheriff shall be acting for and under the direction and supervision of the

sheriff and shall be entitled to the same immunities and legal protections

granted to the sheriff under the general laws and the Constitution of

Alabama of 1901, as long as such persons are acting within the line and

scope of their duties and are acting in compliance with the law.

Ala. Code § 14-6-1 (emphasis added).

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The related statutory counterpart that discusses the duties of the sheriff

similarly provides as a subpart:

Any of the duties of the sheriff set out in subsection (a) or as otherwise

provided by law may be carried out by deputies, reserve deputies, and

persons employed as authorized in Section 14-6-1 as determined

appropriate by the sheriff in accordance with state law. Persons

undertaking such duties for and under the direction and supervision of

the sheriff shall be entitled to the same immunities and legal protections

granted to the sheriff under the general laws and the Constitution of

Alabama of 1901, aslong as he or she is acting within the line and scope

of his or her duties and is acting in compliance with the law.

Ala. Code § 36-22-3(b) (emphasis added).

IV. Analysis

A. Mr. Young’s Conceded/Abandoned Claims

In his brief, Mr. Young expressly “concedesthat he does not have a cognizable

cause of action against Officer Ronald Higgins, who was being trained as a booking

officer by Officer Myhrer and only asked Plaintiff questions on an intake

questionnaire.” (Doc. 66 at 20).8 Further, Mr. Young implicitly concedes or has

abandoned the right to assertstate law claims Officers Mitchell and Mills by omitting

any analysis of their actions as being inconsistent with the requirementsfor coverage

under the Jailer Act. (See, e.g., Doc. 66 at 17-20 (discussing conduct of Officers

Young, Myhrer, and Joiner and Sergeant Laatsch only)); (id. at 20 (“Plaintiff brought

8

 All page references to Doc. 66 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

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forth substantial evidence indicating that each of the remaining four Defendants were

not in compliance either with recognized common law principles or the policies and

proceduresidentified in the Classification Handbook.”) (emphasis added)); (see also

Doc. 67 at 3 n.1 (Plaintiff now affirms that he abandoned his state-law claims against

Officers Mitchell and Millsin response to Defendants’motion for summary judgment

. . . .”)).9

Therefore, allstate law claims asserted against Officers Higgins, Mitchell, and

Mills are due to be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds as conceded or

abandoned by Mr. Young. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314,

1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding claim abandoned when argument not presented in

initial response to motion for summary judgment); Bute v. Schuller International,

Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding unaddressed claim

abandoned); see also Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of

Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (failure to brief and argue issue at the

district court is sufficient to find the issue has been abandoned); Resolution Trust

Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he onus is upon the

parties to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon

in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”); Hudson v. Norfolk SouthernRy. Co.,

9

 All page references to Doc. 67 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

18

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209 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“When a party fails to respond to an

argument or otherwise address a claim, the Court deems such argument or claim

abandoned. (citing Dunmar, 43 F.3d at 599); cf. McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d

936, 940-41 (11thCir. 1999) (claimmay be considered abandoned when district court

is presented with no argument concerning a claim included in the plaintiff’s

complaint); Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. Independent Sprinkler

Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a district court “could

properly treat as abandoned a claim alleged in the complaint but not even raised as

a ground for summary judgment”). 

B. Mr. Young’s Contested Claims

1. Acting Within the Line and Scope of Duties

Mr. Young’s contested state law claims against the remaining four

Defendants–Officers Young, Myhrer, and Joiner and Sergeant Laatsch–require this

court to determine the scope of, and apply, sovereign immunity under the Jailer Act.

As set out above, jailers are covered under the Jailer Act so long as two conditions

are present: they are “acting within the line and scope of their duties and are acting

in compliance with the law.” Ala. Code §§ 14-6-1, 36-22-3(b). Concerning the first

prong, Defendants have stated on remand that they previously developed uncontested

evidence that “was required to satisfy the burden [that Mr. Young] represented was

19

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necessary for Defendants to invoke the privilege of sovereign immunity . . . .” (Doc.

65 at 18-19).

10

In response, Mr. Young “does not dispute that the individual

defendants were ‘acting within the line and scope of [their] duties’; thus, the

remaining issue is whether they were acting ‘in compliance with the law.’”

11

(Doc.

66 at 9). 

2. Acting in Compliance With the Law

a. Decisions Reached by Other Courts

Based on the parties’ briefs and this court’s related research, what the “acting

in compliance with the law” component means under the Jailer Act remains an open

question under Alabama and Eleventh Circuit law. Several district courts that have

addressed this phrase are in agreement that the language must mean more than just

a restatement of the Jailer Act’s first prong; otherwise, the phrase would be

superfluous. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Collins, No. CIV. A. 12-0020-KD-M, 2012 WL

6046019, at *10 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Sawyer R&R] (“The Court ...

finds that such an interpretation would render the second requirement of no moment

as the requirement has already been stated.”), report and recommendation adopted

10 All page references to Doc. 65 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

11 Because Mr. Young concedes that Defendants’ proof satisfies the line-and-scope prong,

the court does not need to address which party has the burden of proof on this particular component

of the Jailer Act and expresses no opinion as to the correctness of the approach followed by the

parties on this particular undisputed prong.

20

Case 2:14-cv-00407-VEH Document 68 Filed 03/21/17 Page 20 of 45
after certified question declined, No. CIV. A. 2:12-0020-KD, 2013 WL 2458458

(S.D. Ala. June 6, 2013); Hobbs v. Powell, 138 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 1337 (N.D. Ala.

2015) (“However, acting within the line and scope of one’s duty is not enough to

guarantee immunity, as immunity is also conditioned on ‘acting in compliance with

the law.’”). Such a repetitive interpretation would also contradict fundamental

principles of statutory construction under Alabama law. See, e.g., Ex parte Uniroyal

Tire Co., 779 So. 2d 227, 236 (Ala. 2000) (“‘There is a presumption that every word,

sentence, or provision was intended for some useful purpose, has some force and

effect, and that some effect is to be given to each, and also that no superfluous words

or provisions were used’” (quoting Sheffield v. State, 708 So. 2d 899, 909 (ALA.

CRIM. APP. 1997))), overturned on other grounds due to legislative action of

Alabama Sp. Sess. Act 2001-1113;see also Ex parte Darnell, 262 Ala. 71, 81, 76 So.

2d 770, 778 (1954) (“In determining this question we must look to the statute and in

construing the statute we must certainly give effect to each part of the statute, if

possible, without doing violence to some other portion of the law.”) (emphasis

added).

As one court has aptly described the statutory conundrum contained in the

Jailer Act by virtue of the “law” clause:

What the Alabama legislature intended this phrase to mean is

unclear and something of a riddle. While courts are required to construe

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statutes in a way that gives meaning to every part of the statute, it seems

unnecessary to extend immunity to jailers if it applies only in those

instances when they are acting “in compliance with the law.” If the jailer

is acting “in compliance with law,” it seems unlikely that he can be

civilly liable for his acts, but if he does not act “in compliance with the

law,” (that is, when he has done something that may expose him to civil

liability), he loses the immunity.

Bell v. Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-0278-TMP, 2016 WL

7242170, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 14, 2016). Thus, the plain meaning rule is

inapplicable in this situation and this court must construct the meaning of the “law”

prong. Cf. City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1074 (Ala. 2006)

(explaining that “[i]f, giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning,

we conclude that the language is unambiguous, there is no room for judicial

construction” (citing Ex parte Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789, 794 (Ala. 2001))).

This “in compliance with the law” language “do[es] not appear in the bill, as

it wasinitially introduced, for either statute.” Sawyer R&R, 2012 WL 6046019, at *10

Unfortunately, the legislative history for both code sections lack “information as to

how th[is] amendment[] w[as] formed or came to be part of the bill.” Sawyer R&R,

2012 WL 6046019, at *10. 

In Sawyer v. Collins,No. 2:12-0020-KD-M, 2012WL 6052000 (S.D. Ala. Dec.

5, 2012) [hereinafter SawyerCertified], the Southern District of Alabama certified the

following question to the Supreme Court of Alabama:

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Alabama Code § 14-6-1 provides that persons, such as jail employees,

who act or undertake duties at the direction and supervision of the

sheriff are immune from state law claims to the same extent as a Sheriff

“as long as he or she is acting within the line and scope of his or her

duties and is acting in compliance with the law”. How should this court

interpret “acting in compliance with the law” in order to not render the

grant of immunity meaningless or the phrase superfluous? Specifically,

what “law” is encompassed by the requirement that a jail employee act

in compliance with the law?

Sawyer Certified, 2012 WL6052000, at *2. Although the Supreme Court of Alabama

“initially accepted the question certified to it by the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Alabama . . . .” itsubsequently declined to provide an answer.

Sawyer v. Collins, 129 So. 3d 1004, 1004 (Ala. 2013).12

In Justice Shaw’s dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court of Alabama’s

decision not to answer the Sawyer Certified question, he opined:

It seems axiomatic that both criminal statutes and civil statutes,

as well as constitutional precepts, are “the law” for purposes of § 14-6-1.

It is apparent that the district court seeks to know whether, as Sawyer

suggests, policies and proceduresfor handling sick inmates propounded

12 Similarly, in Johnson v. Conner, 720 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013), the Eleventh

Circuit certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama about: (i) the meaning of the “law”

prong under the Jailer Act; and (ii) the retroactivity of the Act. The Supreme Court of Alabama

declined to answer either one. See Johnson v. Conner, 754 F.3d 918, 919 n.1 (11th Cir. 2014)

(“Federal courts have twice certified questions about amended § 14-6-1’s applicability to the

Alabama Supreme Court, and the Alabama Supreme Court has twice declined to rule. Johnson v.

Conner, No. 1121178 (Ala. Oct. 31, 2013); Sawyer v. Collins, 129 So. 3d 1004, 1004 (Ala. 2013).”).

Because the Eleventh Circuit decided the Johnson appeal on the non-retroactivity of § 14-6-1, as

amended, it became unnecessary to address what “in compliance with the law” means under the

Jailer Act. See Johnson, 754 F.3d at 923 (“apply[ing] the law at the time of Appellee’s injury, and

hold[ing] that Appellants cannot claim immunity under the amended § 14-6-1.”); see also Ex parte

Burnell, 90 So. 3d 708, 714 n.2 (Ala. 2012) (indicating that amended §§ 14-6-1 and 36-22-3 “are not

applicable in this case” involving an inmate incident occurring in 2007).

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by a sheriff are, for purposes of § 14-6-1, “law” that must be followed

by jailers acting for and under the direction and supervision of the

sheriff. The answer to that query has not been decided by an Alabama

court, and it is clearly an issue an Alabama court should be the first to

decide. To answer this question, this Court does not need to know the

content of any policies or procedures Sheriff Hood has issued. And the

principles for determining whether any such policies and procedures

have the force of law or legal effect are settled.

Sawyer, 129 So. 3d at 1006-07 (emphasis added) (Shaw, J., dissenting). Upon the

case’s return to federal court, the district court accepted the magistrate judge’s

recommendation, 2013 WL 2458458, at *1, that the defendants could not satisfy the

second prong of the Jailer Act without having to decide whether “acting in

compliance with the law” included the obligation to follow “nondiscretionary orders,

rules, regulations, statutes, checklists, and/or policies[.]” Sawyer R&R, 2012 WL

6046019, at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Court reaches no particular finding with regard to this

argument. However, the Court finds that Defendants Sanders and

Collins have not met the second requirement of the statutes. This

conclusion isreached after noting that the Court has already determined

that a jury could find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to

Water’s serious medical needs, rendering, at best, grossly inadequate

care, violating the Inmate’s clearly established rights to medical

treatment. The Court finds that a jury finding that Sanders and Collins

violated the Eighth Amendment, most likely, is not what the drafters of

§§ 14-6-1 and 36-22-3 had in mind when they required that sheriff’s

employees “act[ ] in compliance with the law.” 

Therefore, the Court specifically finds that the statutes in

question, Ala. Code §§ 14-6-1 and 36-22-3, do not deprive this Court of

subject-matter jurisdiction. With that finding, it is recommended that

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Defendants’ Sanders and Collins Motion to Dismiss the common law

negligence claim against them be denied.

Sawyer R&R, 2012 WL 6046019, at *11 (emphasis added). Thus, because the

plaintiff in Sawyer had a viable deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth

Amendment, the jailers were not acting in compliance with the law and the plaintiff’s

common-law negligence claim was not subject to a jurisdictional dismissal on

sovereign immunity grounds.

More recently, in Hobbs v. Powell, 138 F. Supp. 3d 1328 (N.D. Ala. 2015),

another judge sitting in the Northern District of Alabama addressed the meaning of

thissecond prong in the context of a wrongful death claim that was challenged by the

defendant jailers in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). After first

determining that Ala. Code § 14-6-1, as amended, was constitutional, “the remaining

question [wa]s whether defendant jailers [we]re entitled to the immunity granted to

jail personnel by Ala. Code § 14-6-1.” Hobbs, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 1337. In denying

the defendant jailers’ immunity defense, the Hobbs court discussed the various parts

of the Sawyer case history and, in particular, explained:

Unlike in Sawyer where the court faced the question of whether

“policies and procedures for handling sick inmates propounded by a

sheriff are, for purposes of § 14–6–1, ‘law’ that must be followed by

jailers acting for and under the direction and supervision of the sheriff,”

id. this case involves the potential violation of a constitutional right and

a civil statute guaranteeing medical care. See U.S. amend. VIII; Ala.

Code § 14-6-19 (“Necessary clothing and bedding must be furnished by

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the sheriff or jailer, at the expense of the county, to those prisoners who

are unable to provide themfor themselves, and also necessary medicines

and medical attention to those who are sick or injured, when they are

unable to provide them for themselves. ”) (emphasis added). The law

defendant jailers allegedly violated seems to squarely fall within Justice

Shaw’s definition of “the law” for purposes of § 14-6-1.

Hobbs, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 1339 (emphasis by underlining added). Thus, because the

plaintiff had not only a cognizable deliberate indifference claim, but also an

underlying state statute regarding medical care that the defendant jailers had arguably

violated, the Hobbs court concluded that the Jailer Act did “not deprive the court of

subjectmatterjurisdiction over plaintiff’sstate law claim[for wrongful death] against

defendant jailers . . . .” Id. at 1340;see also Johnson v. Milliner, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1295,

1305 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (“The statutory immunity in Ala. Code § 14-6-1 and Ala. Code

§ 36-22-3 does not extend to the circumstance where the person employed by the

Sheriff was not acting within the line and scope of their duties and was not acting in

compliance with the law.”); Milliner, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 1305 (denying immunity

under Jailer Act when material factual dispute exists over whether defendant has

violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights).

b. Committing Torts or Violating

Policies and Procedures, Without

More, Does not Disqualify

Defendants from Sovereign

Immunity under the “Law” Prong.

Mr. Young argues in his brief that the “law” prong removes immunity

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protection for the remaining Defendants because they “violated their own agency’s

policies and procedures, as well as the laws of negligence, wantonness, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. . . . [and that] the individual defendants

must therefore prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not violate

those laws.” (Doc. 66 at 11). As an initial matter, the court disagrees with Mr.

Young’s reliance upon acts of negligence, wantonness, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress, without more, as adequate examples of the relevant “law” under

the disputed Jailer Act prong. The cases discussed above certainly do not embrace

that suggested construction of the Jailer Act. Moreover, Mr. Young has offered no

authority which even arguably supports such a strained view of the “law” prong. See

Ex parte Watley, 708 So. 2d 890, 892 (Ala. 1997) (“It has been called a golden rule

of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among

alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that

interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result . . . .”

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ex parte Meeks, 682 So. 2d 423, 428

(Ala. 1996)) (in turn quoting Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction

§ 45.11, p. 61 (5th ed. 1993))); cf. McClain, 957 So. 2d at 1075 (“If a literal

construction would produce an absurd and unjust result that is clearly inconsistent

with the purpose and policy of the statute, such a construction is to be avoided.”).

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Instead, consistent with the above persuasive authorities, this court concludes

that § 14-6-1, as amended, provides sovereign immunity to jailers for all state law

torts (just like sheriffs and sheriff deputies) so long as those jailers are acting within

the line and scope of their duties and they are complying with criminal statutes, civil

statutes, and constitutional standards. In this court’s view, if a case has reached the

dispositive motions phase, only when sufficient evidence exists that a jailer has

violated a criminal statute, a civil statute, or a constitutional principle

13

does he lose

the Jailer Act’s sovereign immunity protection and become subject to Alabama tort

laws. See, e.g., Hobbs, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 1339-40 (holding that potential violations

of Eighth Amendment and Ala. Code § 14-6-19 (duty to provide clothing, bedding,

and medical attention to prisoners) removes jailer’s sovereign immunity protection

and allows plaintiff to pursue wrongful death action). Put differently, it would be a

tortured construction of the Jailer Act to find thatsimply upon a plaintiff’s assertions

of negligent conduct, a jailer would lose his sovereign immunity protection and the

court would have subjectmatter jurisdiction overthe plaintiff’s negligence claim. The

court now turns to the thornier issue of whether non-compliance with policies and

procedures can similarly strip away sovereign immunity.

Mr. Young refers to Black’s Law Dictionary as a source for defining the term

13

 Or acts outside of the line and scope of his authority.

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“law” to include “administrative agency rules and regulations.” (Doc. 66 at 10

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979))).

However, Mr. Young has not cited any case in which any court has determined that

a jailer who has intentionally or unintentionally violated policies and procedures in

carrying out his sheriff-related duties is precluded from sovereign immunity

protection under the “law” prong of the Jailer Act.

In both Sawyer and Hobbs, the plaintiffs(unlike Mr. Young) persevered at the

pleadingsstage in light of each one having a cognizable deliberate indifference claim.

The Hobbs plaintiff had the additional statutory duties provided under Ala. Code

§ 14-6-19, as part of his “law” prong arsenal. At the same time, this court has been

unable to find a decision in which a court has held that reliance upon policies and

procedures as the “law” is foreclosed under the Jailer Act. Further, Hobbs hinted in

dicta that non-compliance with policies and procedures might remove a jailer’s

sovereign immunity shield. See Hobbs, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 1339 (“The plain language

of the statute requires jail personnel to act in compliance with the law to receive the

protection of § 14-6-1 immunity, and the statute does not limit that requirement to

compliance with only certain types of law.”) (emphasis added). Hobbs’s dicta is the

closest persuasive authority that Mr. Young has, but this court is not persuaded by

Hobb’s commentary on an issue that was not key to its holding.

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Therefore, in the absence of legislative history, a statutory amendment, or an

Alabama Supreme Court case confirming that compliance with the law includes

adhering to policies and procedures governing jailers, cf. Sawyer, 129 So. 3d at 1006

(“The answer to that query has not been decided by an Alabama court, and it is clearly

an issue an Alabama court should be the first to decide.”), this court rejects Mr.

Young’s position that the “law” prong rightfully closes the sovereign immunity door

on those jailers whose actions merely deviate from policies and procedures. In fact,

under Mr. Young’s expansive interpretation of the “law” prong, a jailer who failed

to follow policies and procedures would be treated with a degree of protection from

litigation that is more consistent with Alabama’sstate agent immunity doctrine rather

than the broad scope of sovereign immunity afforded to sheriffs and sheriff deputies.

A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her

personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against

the agent is based upon the agent’s . . . (3) discharging duties imposed

on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the

statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the

duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; . . . . 

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing

statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil

liability in his or her personal capacity

(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the

Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State

enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a

governmental agency require otherwise; or

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(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad

faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of

the law.

See Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000) (plurality opinion) (emphasis

by underlining added), holding for category (4) of Cranman modified by Hollis v.

City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006);14see also Ex parte Butts, 775 So.

2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000) (“We today adopt this new test suggested in Cranman.”).

Such an incongruous result would substantially undermine the overall

legislative purpose of the Jailer Act–to cloak jail personnel with the same (or nearly

the same) level of sovereign immunity as is enjoyed by Alabama sheriffs and sheriff

deputies. See Ala. Code § 14-6-1 (“Persons so employed by the sheriff shall be acting

for and under the direction and supervision of the sheriff and shall be entitled to the

same immunities and legal protections granted to the sheriff under the general laws

and the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 . . . .”) (emphasis added); Ex parte McCall,

596 So. 2d 4, 6 (1992) (“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain

and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.” (citing Clark

v. Houston County Comm’n, 507 So. 2d 902, 903 (Ala. 1987))); Darks Dairy, Inc. v.

14 As confirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court in the Hollis opinion, the defendant has the

initial burden to show that he fits into one of the five Cranman immunity categories. After that, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the exceptions to state agent immunity exists. See

Hollis, 950 So. 2d at 306 (agreeing with pre-Cranman’s description of burdens as stated in Ex parte

Davis, 721 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1998)).

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Alabama Dairy Comm’n, 367 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Ala. 1979) (internal citation

omitted) (“In this ascertainment, we must look to the entire Act instead of isolated

phrases or clauses . . . .”); see also Stallworth v. Bibb Cnty., No. 7:14-CV-410-RDP,

2014 WL 3540521, at *5 (N.D. Ala. July 16, 2014) (“T]he Alabama Legislature

intended the enactment of § 14-6-1 to correct what it perceived as an incorrect result

in Shelley and to legislatively overrule that decision.”); Stallworth, 2014 WL

3540521, at *5 (concluding that “based upon a straight forward application of § 14-6-

1, Defendants Poole and Goodwin [who were acting as deputies and/or jailers] are

absolutely immune from Plaintiff”s state law claims” without ever analyzing the

meaning of the “law” prong or indicating which party bears the burden of proving

compliance or non-compliance);Redding v. Dale Cty., No. 1:15-CV-539-MHT-PWG,

2016 WL 1243241, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 14, 2016) (same), amended report and

recommendation adopted, No. 1:15CV539-MHT, 2016 WL1230004 (M.D.Ala. Mar.

29, 2016), judgment entered, No. 1:15CV539-MHT, 2016 WL 1230006 (M.D. Ala.

Mar. 29, 2016); cf. Johnson, 720 F.3d at 1313 (“Under Alabama law, sheriffs and

deputy sheriffs are considered executive officers of the state, and are therefore

immune from suit in both their official and individual capacities.”);15 Alexander v.

15 The Supreme Court of Alabama has recognized only a handful of some very targeted

exceptions to a sheriff’s immunity from suit that are mostly injunctive in nature:

(1) to compel him to perform his duties, (2) to compel him to perform ministerial

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Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Ala. 1994) (“A sheriff is an employee of the State

and, as such, is immune from suit, in his official [and individual] capacity, for

negligent performance of his statutory duties.”). 

Put differently, taking the “law” prong to a policy and procedures level would

substantially eviscerate the scope of the sovereign immunitydefense that the Alabama

Legislature intended to provide in passing the Jailer Act. See Clark, 507 So. 2d at 903

(“If the statute is ambiguous or uncertain, the court may consider conditions which

might arise under the provisions of the statute and examine resultsthat will flow from

giving the language in question one particular meaning rather than another.” (citing

Studdard v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 356 So. 2d 139, 142 (Ala. 1978))).

Instead, the court finds that the Alabama Supreme Court would not embrace a

statutory construction of the Jailer Act that would limit state law immunity coverage

for jailers when carrying out policies and procedures incorrectly (whether

intentionally or unintentionally) and would reasonably interpret the Jailer Act in a

acts, (3) to enjoin him from enforcing unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin him from

acting in bad faith, fraudulently, beyond his authority, or under mistaken

interpretation of the law, or (5) to seek construction of a statute under the Declaratory

Judgment Act if he is a necessary party for the construction of the statute.

Johnson, 720 F.3d at 1313 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alexander v. Hatfield, 652

So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Ala. 1994)); see also Tinney, 77 F.3d at 383 (“Because the sheriff in Alexander

was being sued for damages and not injunctive relief, the court held that the exceptions to Section

14 were inapplicable and therefore the sheriff was immune from suit.”); Tinney, 77 F.3d at 383

(reversing district court’s denial of sovereign immunity in suit claiming, “damages, based upon

[intentional torts] of conversion and trespass” arising under Alabama law).

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manner that would render it more effective than a discretionary-driven defense

already available under state agent immunity. See, e.g., Uniroyal, 779 So. 2d at 236

(“‘It must be presumed,’ however, that statutes are enacted with a meaningful

purpose.’” (quoting Adams v. Mathis, 350 So. 2d 381, 385-86 (Ala. 1977))); Ex parte

Watley, 708 So. 2d 890, 892 (Ala. 1997) (“The Legislature will not be presumed to

have done a futile thing in enacting a statute.”); cf. Hill v. Fairfield Nursing &Rehab.

Ctr., LLC, 134 So. 3d 396, 404 (Ala. 2013) (rejecting medical provider’s attempt “to

control the standard of care for which it will be held responsible simply by having

some department within its corporate structure, rather than the law, select the standard

of care applicable to various activities undertaken by its individual medical-provider

employees”) (emphasis added); Hill, 134 So. 3d at 404 n.7 (“The law, not the

institutional medical provider, sets the standard of care for a given service based on

the nature of that service and who is providing it.”) (emphasis added). 

Although Mr. Young’s lawsuit includes a constitutional count alleging a

violation of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 25),

this court has previously determined that he lacks sufficient evidence to support that

deliberate indifference claim. (See Doc. 55 at 19-20 (“Therefore, in the absence of

proof establishing Defendants’ requisite subjective awareness [of the adverse

connection shared between Mr. Young and Mr. Howard or the potential danger

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created by placing Mr. Young in the same cell block as Mr. Howard], no reasonable

jury could ever find in Mr. Young’s favor on his deliberate indifference claim.”)).16

Accordingly, in the absence of an underlying viable constitutional claim or the

potential violation of a civil or criminalstatute, this court concludesthat Mr. Young’s

common-law claims for negligence, wantonness, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress are subject to dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds under the

Jailer Act. 

c. Alternatively, the Issue of

Defendants’ Violation of Policies and

Procedures Is not Properly Before

This Court Because It Is not Part of

Mr. Young’s First Amended

Complaint.

Assuming for argument purposes that a violation of jail policies and procedures

could constitute non-compliance under the “law” prong of the Jailer Act, Defendants

would still be entitled to a sovereign-immunity dismissal of Mr. Young’s state law

claims for a different reason. As pointed out by Defendants in their reply brief:

On remand Plaintiff attemptsto wholly recast both the allegations in his

complaint and the sovereign immunity argument he presented in the

summary judgment proceedings. The only conduct alleged as the basis

of Plaintiff’s state-law tort claims was assigning Plaintiff to the same

cell as Howard with knowledge of their adverse relationship, and the

only laws this claimed act was alleged to have violated were the Fifth,

16 The court likewise found that Mr. Young lack sufficient evidence to support his dependent

federal conspiracy count. (Doc. 55 at 23-24).

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Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 10 at ¶¶ 12, 21, 22, 23, 25,

32, 36). Plaintiff did not plead any claim, against any Officer, based

upon an alleged failure to follow jail policies or procedures, or an

alleged failure to intervene. (Id.).

(Doc. 67 at 3). The court has reviewed Mr. Young’s first amended complaint and

agrees it lacks any allegations that Defendants failed to follow jail policies or

procedures or that they failed to intervene to protect Mr. Young. 

Defendants further explain, with reference to controlling case authority:

The Rules of Civil Procedure do “not afford plaintiffs with the

opportunity to raise new claims at the summary judgment stage.”

Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir.

2004). Hence, Plaintiff “cannot use his briefing to add new allegations

and argue that those new assertions support his cause of action.” Michel

v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 705 (11th Cir. 2016).

(Doc. 67 at 3); see also Flintlock Const. Servs., LLC v. Well-Come Holdings, LLC,

710 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th Cir. 2013) (“In affirming the district court’s dismissal of

the claim at issue, we refused to consider these additional facts, citing precedent that

precludes a plaintiff from amending its complaint ‘through argument at the summary

judgment phase of proceedings.’” (quoting GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687

F.3d 1244, 1258 n. 27 (11th Cir. 2012))); Flintlock, 710 F.3d at 1128 (“This court’s

precedent foreclosed Well–Come’s attempt to amend its complaint at the summary

judgment stage without seeking leave of court[.]”); Blankenship, 893 So. 2d at 306

(recognizing that “[i]t is a well-settled rule that a party is bound by what it states in

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its pleadings” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Help At Home, Inc. v.

Medical Capital, L.L.C., 260 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2001)) (citing Best Canvas

Prods. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir.

1983))).

Therefore, based upon binding Eleventh Circuit, Defendants are alternatively

entitled to a sovereign-immunity dismissal under the Jailer Act because Mr. Young’s

first amended complaint is devoid of allegationsthat Defendants violated policies and

procedures and he has not sought leave to amend his complaint to include those

critical assertions.

17

See Gilmour, 382 F.3d at 1315 (“At the summary judgmentstage,

the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint in

accordance with [FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) and] FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).”); cf. also GJR

Investments, Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)

(recognizing when analyzing qualified immunity that “defense becomes uselessif an

17 While Mr. Young does assert in his first amended complaint that his removal from

isolation “was taken in direct violation of the warrant and the Marshal’s orders” (Doc. 10 at 5 ¶ 21),

that allegation is not linked to any policy or procedure applicable to jailers. Regardless, the court

comfortably concludes that failing to follow a directive from a U.S. Marshal is not within the scope

of the “law” prong. See Henderson v. Thrower, 497 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[A]greements

between the Bureau of Prisons and state officials, though imposing an obligation on the national

government to inspect the state facilities to insure proper conditions, in no way authorize federal

interference with the operation of the prisons or jails.”); id. (“Control of the inmates, state and

federal, rests in the local authorities. “); cf. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 530, 93 S. Ct.

2215, 2221, 37 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1973) (“The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the deputy marshal

had no authority to control the activities of the sheriff’s employees is supported by both the enabling

statute and the contract actually executed between the parties.”). 

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official’s motion to dismiss covers all of the claims reasonably apparent from a

plaintiff's complaint, but the district court divines another claimbywhich the plaintiff

may defeat qualified immunity”), overruled on other grounds as recognized by

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010); cf. also Ex parte Sumter Cty.,

953 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (Ala. 2006) (“The administrator ad litem’s complaint does not

allege any facts that would tend to show that the sheriff or deputy sheriffs were not

working within the line and scope of their employment when the tragic events

underlying this wrongful-death action occurred, nor did the administrator ad litem

allege any such facts in his response to the motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis added).

d. Alternatively, Mr. Young Has not

C a r r i e d h is B u r d e n i n

Demonstrating Defendants’ Noncompliance With the Law Based

upon Policies and Procedures. 

Assuming for argument purposes that a violation of policies and procedures

could constitute non-compliance under the “law” prong of the Jailer Act and that Mr.

Young’s first amended complaint puts Defendants on notice of that category of noncompliance, Defendants would still be entitled to a sovereign-immunity dismissal of

Mr. Young’s state law claims because Mr. Young has not carried his evidentiary

burden. In particular, the court rejects Mr. Young’s reliance upon the self-defense

immunity structure for Ala. Code § 13-3-23(d) addressed in Ex parte Watters, No.

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1150182, 2016 WL 6135232 (Ala. Oct. 21, 2017) (Doc. 66 at 11-13) as a useful

framework for deciding burdens of proof under the Jailer Act. (Doc. 66 at 11). In

making this particular argument, Mr. Young has missed a key ingredient of the Jailer

Act–it bestows Alabama jailers with sovereign immunity, not qualified immunity.(Cf.

Doc. 66 at 12 (“Although Watters’ holding applied to Ala. Code § 13A-3-23, it is

equally applicable to the qualified immunity granted by Ala. Code §§ 14-6-1 and 36-

22-3.”) (emphasis added)). 

Mr. Young’s position that Defendants must prove their compliance with jail

policies and procedures to retain (or avoid a waiver of) sovereign immunity is also

at odds with the overriding general principle that the burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction falls squarely upon the party who is attempting to invoke the jurisdiction

of the federal court. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S.

178, 189, 56 S. Ct. 780, 785, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936); see also Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd.

v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The burden for

establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction rests with the party bringing the

claim.” (citing McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (per

curiam))); cf. Carter v. Butts Cty., 821 F.3d 1310, 1324 (11th Cir. 2016) (recognizing

under Georgia law that “burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity

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falls on the party seeking to benefit from it”);18 Garrett v. Talladega Cty. Drug &

Violent Crime Task Force, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (recognizing

that in case involvingEleventh Amendment immunity, plaintiff “‘constantly bearsthe

burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist’” (quoting Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001))).

The court further finds that an approach which places a burden on the jailer to

demonstrate that he was acting in compliance with policies and procedures is

untenable because it would make accessing sovereign immunity under the Jailer Act

more difficult for a jailer than receiving state agent immunity. Additionally, putting

that burden on the plaintiff at the dispositive motions phase is comparable with the

burden placed on the plaintiff at the pleadings stage in Sawyer–the plaintiff’s state

law common-law negligence claim was not dismissed under the Jailer Act because

the plaintiff had plausibly shown that the jailer defendants had violated the Eighth

Amendment. Sawyer R&R, 2012 WL 6046019, at *11.

Therefore, consistent with the Jailer Act’s overall purpose to place jailers on

nearly equal legal footing with sheriff and sheriff deputies and the general

18 The court has searched for, but has not located, a similar statement made about sovereign

immunity by an Alabama court. Cf. Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 978 So. 2d at 21 (“In this case,

ALDOT, as the party asserting the defense of immunity, bore the burden of demonstrating that Good

Hope can prove no set of facts establishing one of the exceptions to the State’s sovereign immunity.”

(citing Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 177 (describing standard that applies when a party moves to

dismiss for failure to state a claim))).

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jurisdictional principlesreferenced above, the court concludesthatMr. Young hasthe

burden to show sufficient evidence of Defendants’ non-compliance with policies and

procedures for this court to acquire subject matter jurisdiction over his state law

claims. Further, the evidence that Mr. Young hasrelied upon in his post-remand brief

is inadequate to meet that burden. 

As for those policies and procedures discussed more specifically, Mr. Young

maintainsthat Defendants disregarded the prisoner classification process as provided

for under the Classification Handbook (Officer Joiner and Sergeant Laatsch). (Doc.

66 at 13-14, 18-20). Further, without referencing a specific policy or procedure, Mr.

Young contends that Officer Young failed to adequately perform tower operator

duties and Officer Myhrer failed to follow or report explicit instructionsfromthe U.S.

Marshal to keep Mr. Young in isolation. (Doc. 66 at 17-18). 

The court first addresses Mr. Young’s contentions relating to Officers Young

and Myhrer. In the absence of Mr. Young’slinking these challenged actsto a specific

jail policy or procedure that these Defendants have arguably violated, those

arguments are, on their face, insufficient to show non-compliance with the law under

the Jailer Act. 

As for the challenged actions of Officer Joiner, Mr. Young contends that he

violated the Classification Handbook when Mr. Young was placed into A-6. The

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complete paragraph from the Classification Handbook that Mr. Young relies upon

states:

Since there are fewer blocksto choose from with a maximum and

medium designation, cross housing is allowed between maximum and

medium inmates. This is based on both security classes having

assaultive felonies. However, this should be used sparingly and reports

indicating the justification for the move need to be completed. Due to

having fewer maximum and medium inmates, there are fewer cells

designated for these classes to offer more room for minimum security.

(Doc. 51-15 at 19).19 Mr. Young contends that Officer Joiner violated the

Classification Handbook in his placement of Mr. Young because cross housing is to

be used “sparingly” and because he did not provide a report detailing the justification

for moving Mr. Young into A-6, which housed both medium and maximum security

inmates. (Doc. 66 at 18-19). Mr. Young argues that Sergeant Laatsch violated the

same Classification Handbook provision in the same manner. (Doc. 66 at 19-20).

Because the Classification Handbook expressly permits cross housing, the

court concludes that Mr. Young’s evidence is insufficient to show that either Officer

Joiner or Sergeant Laatsch violated a jail policy or procedure when they decided to

move Mr. Young into A-6. As for the apparent failure of Officer Joiner or Sergeant

Laatsch to provide a report explaining the move of Mr. Young into A-6, that evidence

of an arguable violation of procedure is inadequate because Mr. Young has notshown

19 All page references to Doc. 51-15 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering

system.

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how the omission of a report proximately caused his claimed injuries. Importantly,

the Classification Handbook does not mandate that the report must be completed in

advance of moving a prisoner or that, absent a report, a prisoner shall not be moved.

Further, even if Officer Joiner or Sergeant Laatsch had completed a written

report at the time Mr. Young was moved, Mr. Young has failed to demonstrate how

adhering to that reporting procedure would have made a meaningful difference. The

same resulting injuries still would have occurred with the paperwork completed

because Mr. Young still would have been moved to A-6 and gotten into an altercation

with Mr. Howard. To the extent Mr. Young’s brief speculates that if Officer Joiner

and Sergeant Laatsch had adhered to the reporting rule, Mr. Young would have

remained in his single cell or placed somewhere else other than in A-6, “[s]tatements

by counsel in briefs are not evidence.” Skyline Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 613 F.2d 1328, 1337

(5th Cir. 1980), and Mr. Young is left with no supporting evidence. Therefore, the

court alternatively finds that, to the extent the “law” prong of the Jailer Act includes

violations of policies and procedures, Mr. Young has the burden to show how

Defendants have violated policies and procedures in a manner that proximately

caused hisinjuries and damages. Further, based upon the record before this court, Mr.

Young has not met his burden. Therefore, a sovereign-immunity dismissal of Mr.

Young’s state law claims in favor of Defendants is appropriate for this third

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alternative reason.

V. Conclusion

Thus, on remand, a without-prejudice dismissal of Mr. Young’s state law

claims is appropriate for three alternative reasons. First, for a jailer to receive

sovereign immunity protection comparable to sheriffs, the “law” clause requires

compliance with civilstatutes, criminalstatutes, and constitutional principles, but not

with common-law torts or policies and procedures. Second, assuming the Jailer Act

requires compliance with policies and procedures to preserve sovereign immunity,

Mr. Young’s first amended complaint omits any such critical allegations and, absent

obtaining leave to amend,Mr.Young’s policies-and-procedurestheory is not properly

before the court from a procedural standpoint. Third, assuming that the “law” clause

doesrequire compliance with policies and procedures and excusingMr. Young’slack

of reference to any within his first amended complaint, Mr. Young has the burden to

show Defendants’ non-compliance with them for a jailer’s sovereign immunity to be

waived and he has not met that burden on this record.

Accordingly, the court’s previous ruling on Mr. Young’s state law claims

(Doc. 55 at 24-29) is due to be vacated. Instead, Mr. Young’sstate law claims against

all Defendants are due to be dismissed without prejudice by virtue of the sovereign

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immunity granted to them under the Jailer Act.

20 The court will enter a final dismissal

order that is consistent with this memorandum opinion.

DONE this 21st day of March, 2017.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

20 As explained in § IV.A, supra, Mr. Young does not contest the dismissal of his state law

claims against Officer Higgins and has abandoned his state law claims against Officers Mitchell and

Mills.

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