Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01519/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01519-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George Melendez Estrada, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B.Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-1519-PHX-ROS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the court is Petitioner George Melendez Estrada's pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, filed on June 12, 2006 (docket #1).

Respondents have filed an Answer (docket #14), and Petitioner has filed a Reply (docket

#15). Petitioner challenges his conviction in the Maricopa County Superior Court following

a jury trial on one count of Burglary and one count of Possession of Burglary Tools. (docket

#1.) He raises two issues as grounds for relief: (1) that a jury instruction given by the trial

judge to the jury describing the elements of the offense left out the phrase, "without lawful

authority," in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) that the trial court

improperly imposed aggravated sentences based on factors not found by a jury, in violation

of the Sixth Amendment. (Id.) Respondents contend that Petitioner's first claim is

procedurally defaulted, as it was not presented to the Arizona courts as a federal

constitutional claim, and that his second claim fails on its merits, as the sentencing judge

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1

State court findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Wainwright v. Witt,

469 U.S. 412, 426 (1985); 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).

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found several prior convictions, which are Apprendi/Blakely-exempt, to support his

aggravated sentence. (Id.) The court agrees.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged by Indictment with one count of Burglary in the Third Degree,

a class four felony, and Possession of Burglary Tools, a class six felony, committed on or

about April 22, 2003. (docket #14, Exh. A.) The State of Arizona thereafter filed an

allegation that the defendant had six historical prior felony convictions, dating from 1987

through 2001, and an allegation that he had committed the offenses while released from

confinement. (Id.) Petitioner went to trial on the Indictment, and the following facts were

established, as drawn from the Arizona Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Estrada, 210

Ariz. 111, 113 (App. 2005) (Id., Exh. B):1

On April 22, 2003, the victim was home alone when she heard a knock

at her front door. She did not recognize the man at the door and did not open

it. The man, later identified as Estrada, sat in a chair on the front porch and

began reading a newspaper. Periodically, he would get up and knock on the

door, look into the window, and shake the door knob. The victim

surreptitiously watched Estrada from inside the house but did not reveal her

presence.

After repeating this pattern for approximately half an hour, Estrada

went to the side of the house. Becoming increasingly alarmed, the victim

called the police. Estrada tried unsuccessfully to open the door of her truck

and then climbed atop some wooden pallets near her fence and whistled. Bolt

cutters were handed over the fence. Estrada used the bolt cutters to cut the

lock on the back gate and another lock on the gate leading to the back alley

where a white truck was parked. Estrada's accomplice entered the backyard

through the alley gate. Estrada then used the bolt cutters to cut the lock

securing the victim's lawn mower to a wooden post and took the lawn mower.

Estrada came to the victim's back door and unsuccessfully attempted to

open the sliding door lock. The victim became increasingly frightened and

worried that the police would not respond in time, and hung up the telephone

and called her neighbor. The neighbor came over immediately and confronted

the two men who fled to the white truck in the alley.

By this time, two Phoenix Police Officers had responded to the scene

and had just come upon the entrance to the alley when the truck appeared. The

officers ordered the men out of the truck and put them under arrest. At trial,

both officers identified Estrada as one of the occupants of the truck.

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2

The crime of burglary requires, as one of its elements, that the defendant enter with

the intent to commit any theft or felony therein. A. R. S. §13-1501.

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The officers found a padlock with its clasp cut on the front seat of the

truck and the lawn mower in the bed of the truck. One of the officer's found

bolt cutters in the victim's backyard, a broken chain that had secured the front

gate, a broken lock on the ground near the back gate, and a cut cable that had

been used to tether the lawn mower to the post.

Later that morning, the victim identified Estrada and his accomplice as

the men she had seen at her house. She was able to make the identification

based upon the clothing both men were wearing.

The following factual history is taken from the Arizona Court of Appeals' separately

filed memorandum decision in State v. Estrada, 1 CA-CR 03-0914 (App. March 4, 2005).

(Id., Exh. C.)

After Estrada was taken into custody and read his Miranda rights he

agreed to speak with the police. Initially, Estrada claimed that he was in the

alley going through a pile of trash, but later stated that he had gone to the

house to pick up a lawn mower for a man named Joe Blanco. Estrada told

police that he had met Joe Blanco a few days earlier but could not provide

Blanco's address or telephone number.

At trial, defense counsel conceded that Estrada had committed criminal

trespass but argued that he was not guilty of burglary because he believed he

had authorization from Joe Blanco to take the lawn mower. At the close of all

the evidence, the court asked counsel for Estrada and the State if they had any

objections to its proposed jury instructions; neither did.

Id. at ¶ 2.

At the close of the evidence the jury was instructed that the crime of theft requires

proof of the following2

: (1) The defendant knowingly controlled another person's property;

and (2) the defendant intended to deprive the other person of the property. (Id., Exh. C at 3.)

This instruction omitted the language in the theft statute, that the defendant "without lawful

authority" knowingly controlled property of another. A.R.S. 13-802(A) (Supp. 2003).

Petitioner was convicted as charged. (Id., Exh. B, C.) A trial to the court on the

allegation of prior convictions commenced on October 16, 2003: the court found that the

Defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, and took the other matters under

advisement. (Id., Exh. A.) On October 22, 2003, the court found that defendant had five

prior felony convictions. (Id.) The court imposed sentence based upon the defendant having

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3

A. R. S. 13-604(C) authorized a presumptive sentence, with two historical priors, of

10 years for the burglary conviction and 3.75 years for the possession of burglary tools

conviction. The maximum sentence authorized is 12 years, and 4.5 years respectively.

4

542 U.S. 296 (2004)

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two historical priors3

, and sentenced defendant to an aggravated prison term of 11 years on

the Burglary charge, and 4 years on the Possession of Burglary Tools charge, and ordered

the terms to be served concurrently. (Id.)

Petitioner timely appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, claiming that the trial court committed fundamental and reversible error by omitting

the language "without lawful authority" from the jury instruction. He based his claim on

Arizona cases interpreting Arizona law. (Id., Exh. D.) Petitioner thereafter filed a

supplemental opening brief, relying on Blakely v. Washington4

, claiming that his Sixth

Amendment rights were violated when the trial court sentenced him to aggravated terms

without a jury determination of the aggravating factors. (Id., Exh. E.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected both claims, publishing an opinion on the

Sixth Amendment sentencing claim, and on the same date, filing a memorandum decision

on the jury instruction issue. (Id., Exh. B, C.) Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Review

to the Arizona Supreme Court, raising only the Sixth Amendment claim. (Id., Exh. F.) The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment. (Id., Exh. G.) 

Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Post-Conviction relief, raising the issue of

ineffective assistance of counsel, and the Blakely sentencing issue. (Id., Exh. J.) His Petition

was denied summarily by the trial court. (Id., Exh. K.) 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A. Relevant Law

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), before a federal court may consider a state

prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must have exhausted, in state

court, every claim raised in his petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991).

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To properly exhaust state remedies, the prisoner must have afforded the state courts the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of his federal constitutional claims by "fairly presenting"

them to the state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.

346, 349 (1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that "[t]o provide the

State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' her claim in each

appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.").

It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before

the state court or that a "somewhat similar" state law claim was raised. Baldwin, 541 U.S.

at 28 (stating that a reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the court to

federal nature of the claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the

specific constitutional guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial,

are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v.

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th

Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner

to have made "a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee," such as a naked reference to

"due process," or to a "constitutional error" or a "fair trial"). Similarly, a mere reference to

the "Constitution of the United States" does not preserve a claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is "self-evident" or if the claim

would be decided "on the same considerations" under state or federal law, the petitioner must

make the federal nature of the claim "explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of

the federal courts . . . ." Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a

claim to the state court if the court must read beyond the petition or brief filed in that court

to discover the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

Where a prisoner fails to "fairly present" a claim to the State courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, state court remedies may, nonetheless, be "exhausted." This type of

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exhaustion is often referred to as "procedural default" or "procedural bar." Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32.

In one category of procedural default, the state prisoner may not have presented the

claim to the state courts, but pursuant to the state courts' procedural rules, a return to state

court would be "futile." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989). Generally, any claim

not previously presented to the Arizona courts is procedurally barred from federal review

because any attempt to return to state court to properly exhaust a current habeas claim would

be "futile." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th

Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (relief is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any

previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for

review must be filed within thirty days of trial court's decision). A state post-conviction

action is futile where it is time barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d

409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis

for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under

Rule 32.2(a)). 

When a claim has been procedurally defaulted, federal review of the claim is barred

absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke

v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To

establish cause, a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded her efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective

factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual

or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id. To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate that the

alleged constitutional violation "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimension." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,

170 (1982). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice

prong. 

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To establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B).

B. Application of Law to Petitioner's Claims

Claim One

Petitioner's first claim that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

by the faulty jury instruction was not fairly presented as a federal claim to the Arizona state

courts. In his appellate brief, Petitioner did not refer to the "specific constitutional guarantee

upon which he bases his claim in federal court." Tamalini, 249 F.3d at 898. He failed to

apprise the state court of the federal nature of his claim: instead, he cited only state authority.

(docket #14, Exh. D.) The Arizona Court of Appeals in its Memorandum Opinion also

reached its decision solely on an analysis of state law. (Id., Exh. C.) Because Petitioner had

not objected to the jury instruction at trial, he couched his issue to the appellate court as

fundamental error under Arizona law. The appellate court reviewed the claim for

fundamental error, and determined, applying state law, that fundamental error had not

occurred. (Id., Exh. C.) 

Petitioner's "mere assertion of a fundamental error does not mean he asserted a federal

constitutional claim; claims subject to fundamental error review may consist entirely of

assertions under Arizona law." Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 933, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004)

Petitioner did not state a federal constitutional basis for his claim: thus, he failed to "fairly

present" this claim to the state courts. Any return to state court would be futile, as his claim

would be time-barred. Rules 32.1, 32.2(a) and (b) and 32.4(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P.

Additionally, Petitioner has made no showing of cause and prejudice, or that there has been

a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Thus, his claim must fail.

Claim Two

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The Sixth Amendment requires that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490

(2000)). An exception has been carved out for prior convictions. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

In Arizona, trial courts "are not authorized to impose sentences beyond the presumptive

terms without making findings of aggravating circumstances and giving reasons in support

of those findings." State v. Williams, 131 Ariz. 411, 412-13 (App. 1981). 

"[O]nce a jury finds or a defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth

Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and consider additional factors relevant to

the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute." State v. Martinez,

210 Ariz. 578, 585 (2005). Thus, upon the finding of an aggravating factor, the statutory

maximum then becomes not the presumptive term, but the maximum aggravated sentence

allowed by the relevant sentencing statute. The United States Supreme Court has affirmed

the discretion of the judges to take "into consideration various factors relating both to the

offense and offender—in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute."

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.

The trial court found that Petitioner had five prior felony convictions, and was on

probation at the time of the offense. With two prior convictions, the sentencing range for the

burglary conviction was 10 to 12 years, and the sentencing range for the Possession of

Burglary Tools Conviction was 3.75 to 4.5 years. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11

and 4 years, respectively. Because even just one of Petitioner's other prior convictions would

have been itself a sufficient aggravating factor to allow him to be sentenced up to the

statutory maximum, the fact that the trial court considered other factors in imposing the

slightly aggravated sentences is of no consequence. As the Arizona Court of Appeals made

clear:

"Under Arizona's statutory scheme Estrada's criminal history

constituted an aggravating circumstance that-without the need for any

additional jury findings-exposed him to being sentenced to 12 and 4.5 years,

respectively, based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdicts. Because

the sentences imposed by the trial court did not exceed these maximums, the

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three additional aggravating circumstances found by the trial court were not

facts legally essential to the punishment; thus, Estrada had no legal right to

have a jury determine their existence." 

(docket #14, Exh. B, State v. Estrada, 210 Ariz. 111, 114 (App. 2005)).

The Arizona Court did not err in its application of Supreme Court precedent.

Petitioner is therefore, not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 18th day of June, 2007.

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