Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08266/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08266-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dale Scott Clement,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-08266-PCT-SRB

ORDER 

Petitioner, Dale Clement filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 

13, 2019 raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and 

of the failure of the state trial court to hold a hearing consistent with State v. Donald, 10 

P3d. 1193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). The Respondents filed their Answer on January 2, 2020 

and Petitioner filed a Reply on March 18, 2020. 

On September 1, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued his Report and 

Recommendation recommending that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied 

and dismissed with prejudice and that a Certificate of Appealability be denied. The 

Magistrate Judge found the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be without merit 

because Petitioner had failed to show that any alleged ineffectiveness resulting in prejudice 

and also found Petitioner’s Donald claim procedurally defaulted. Petitioner filed timely 

written Objections and an Application for Certificate of Appealability on October 22, 2020. 

Respondents filed their Response to the Objections on October 30, 2020.

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Petitioner argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that he was not 

prejudiced by counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness and that the Magistrate Judge erroneously 

concluded that his Donald hearing claim was precluded and also ignored the cause and 

prejudice standard. The Response argues that Petitioner failed to articulate any prejudice 

and characterized proof of prejudice as “amorphous.” Concerning the procedural default,

the Response points to the Arizona Court of Appeals same finding and also argues the

inapplicability of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In this Court and in state court Post-Conviction Relief proceedings, Petitioner 

claimed his trial counsel was ineffective in plea negotiations because, according to 

Petitioner, counsel urged him to reject a 10-year stipulated sentence in favor of a 

discretionary plea which ultimately resulted in a 12-year sentence. The state court held an 

evidentiary hearing on this claim. After hearing testimony from Petitioner and his trial 

counsel, the state court judge found Petitioner’s testimony not credible and his trial 

counsel’s testimony credible. He also explained his reasons for rejecting Petitioner’s 

version of events by referring to records and transcripts which also cast doubt on 

Petitioner’s testimony about the plea discussions with his trial counsel. The Arizona Court 

of Appeals denied relief on the Petition for Review and upheld the rejection of the 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim highlighting the trial judge’s offers to continue the 

plea hearing to give Petitioner more time to consult with counsel, Petitioner’s statements 

that he had talked to his counsel and wished to go forward with the plea, the trial judge’s 

specific advisement that the sentences could be ordered to be served consecutively, and 

Petitioner’s statements to the trial court that he had read the plea agreement and his lawyer 

had explained it to him. 

Citing to specific portions of the transcript of the plea colloquy between the trial 

judge and Petitioner, the Magistrate Judge concluded “Petitioner made clear that he had 

talked to his attorney and understood that the plea offer was to two felony counts, not 

one....[E]ven if [the Court] were to assume that counsel’s performance fell below an 

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objective standard of reasonableness, Petitioner was not prejudiced because Petitioner was 

informed of the nature of the plea agreement and given the chance to reject the agreement 

before he pled guilty.” (Doc.14, Report and Recommendation at 9) Also citing the plea 

colloquy transcript the Magistrate Judge concluded that it also contradicts Petitioner’s 

claim that his trial counsel assured him of concurrent sentences.

In his Objections, Petitioner fails to point to specific evidence in the record to show 

where the Magistrate Judge erred in his conclusions. Petitioner simply repeats his claim 

that his counsel was ineffective in urging him to reject the 10-year plea and in failing to 

explain the risks and benefits of the plea he entered. In repeating his same arguments about 

what counsel did and did not explain, Petitioner ignores his own statements to the trial 

court during the plea colloquy that were relied upon by the Arizona state courts and the 

Magistrate Judge in concluding that Petitioner failed to show prejudice from any alleged 

ineffectiveness of his trial counsel before he entered his plea and the credibility findings 

by the state court. Petitioner’s Objection is overruled.

Failure to Hold a Donald Hearing

In concluding Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was also ineffective because he 

was not provided a Donald hearing was procedurally defaulted, the Magistrate Judge noted 

that this issue was originally raised in his state court Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

but was not raised in his Amended Petition and that the state appellate court found the 

Donald claim abandoned because it was not raised in the Amended Petition. While the 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus only designated one claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, within that claim Petitioner argues that his plea agreement was unknowing and 

involuntary because “[t]he court was concerned and called into question whether the 

Petitioner had ever heard the terms of the plea agreement before. Immediately the court 

should have stayed the change of plea proceedings and engaged in a proper Donald’s 

advisement or Donald’s hearing.” (Doc. 1, Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 23-24). 

In addition to citing the finding of the Arizona Court of Appeals that the Donald

claim was abandoned, the Magistrate Judge also found that the mere citation to Donald in 

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his Amended Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief does not constitute an assertion of a 

separate constitutional violation and therefore there was no fair presentation of this claim 

in state court resulting in a procedural default. The Magistrate Judge also concluded that 

the procedural default could not be excused based on Martinez v. Ryan as a claim of 

ineffective post-conviction counsel because Martinez v. Ryan is not applicable to the claim 

Petitioner tries to raise here. Petitioner alleges this as a mistake of the trial judge not of 

counsel. Because the procedural default is not excused, the Magistrate Judge recommended 

that the claim be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

In his Objections, Petitioner argues that this is an ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim allowable under Martinez v. Ryan. But Petitioner fails to address 

the basis for the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and the inapplicability of Martinez v. 

Ryan to the actual claim raised by Petitioner as one of the trial judge’s alleged denial of a 

constitutional right and not a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. 

Petitioner’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation concerning 

procedural default of the Donald claim is overruled.

Application for Certificate of Appealability

Petitioner also requests a Certificate of Appealability, but the Court agrees with the 

Magistrate Judge that he has not made the necessary showings to merit one.

IT IS ORDERED overruling Petitioner’s Objections to the Report and 

Recommendation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED adopting the Report and Recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge as the order of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and

dismissing it with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying any Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by 

a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable and 

because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

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IT IS FURTTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Application for Certificate of 

Appealability. (Doc. 18)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this 10th day of November, 2020.

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