Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01676/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01676-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

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and Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMON BIRL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF PAROLE )

HEARINGS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-01676 LJO NEW (DLB) HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #10]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is presented in this action by the Federal Defender.

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections at Avenal

State Prison serving a term of 15 years to life for his 1989 conviction of second degree murder. See

Exhibit 1, Petition. Petitioner is challenging decisions of the Board of Prison Terms (hereinafter

“Board”) on August 19, 2003, and November 15, 2004. At the conclusion of both hearings,

Petitioner was deemed unsuitable for parole. 

With respect to the 2003 decision, Petitioner filed an administrative appeal with the Board.

See Exhibit 9, Petition. The appeal was denied on December 14, 2004. Id. 

As to the 2004 decision, Petitioner was notified at the hearing that the decision would not

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U.S. District Court

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become final until March 15, 2005. See Exhibit 8, Petition. The Board did not modify or alter the

decision and so it became final on March 15, 2005. 

On June 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. See Exhibit 28, Petition. The petition challenged the Board’s 2003 and 2004

decisions. See Exhibit 28 at 3, Petition (“[The 2003] hearing, as well as the subsequent one in 2004,

are the subjects of this habeas petition.”). The California Supreme Court denied the petition on

February 22, 2006.

On November 20, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. On April 23, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss that portion of the petition that

challenges the 2003 parole hearing as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner filed his

opposition on April 26, 2007.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Therefore, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss

pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

///

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on November 20, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In a situation such as this where the petitioner is challenging a parole board

decision, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded and the statute of limitations

commences when the final administrative appeal is denied. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077,

1079 (9 Cir.2003) (holding that § 2241(d)(1)(D) applies in the context of parole decisions and that th

the Board of Prison Term’s denial of an inmate’s administrative appeal is the “factual predicate” of

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In retrospect, two separate petitions should have been filed with each one challenging a different state decision.

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In any case, because the 2003 challenge is untimely and should be dismissed, the problem will be addressed by this Findings

and Recommendation.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

the inmate’s claim that triggers the commencement of the limitations period). 

Here, Respondent only challenges as untimely that portion of the petition as it relates to the

2003 hearing. Respondent has conceded that the challenge to the 2004 hearing is timely. Petitioner

opposes the separation of the petition on this point. Petitioner contends the petition essentially 

challenges his unconstitutional confinement and the 2003 and 2004 decisions are merely evidentiary

for purposes of habeas review. This argument is unavailing. 

“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody

pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petition is not challenging his underlying state

court conviction.’” Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), th

quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9 Cir.2004). Under the AEDPA, an application th

for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In the context of reviewing parole decisions, due process requires

that: 1) the inmate must receive advance written notice of a hearing, Pedro v. Oregon Parole Bd., 825

F.2d 1396, 1399 (9 Cir.1987); 2) the inmate must be afforded an "opportunity to be heard," th

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979); 3) if the inmate is

denied parole, the inmate must be told why "he falls short of qualifying for parole,” Id.; and 4) the

decision of the Board must be supported by "some evidence" having an indicia of reliability,

Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703,

705 (9th Cir.1987). Therefore, the 2003 and 2004 decisions are not merely evidence; they are the

subject of the petition.2

Therefore with respect to the 2003 parole decision, the triggering event under

§ 2244(d)(1)(D) was the Board’s August 19, 2003, denial of parole. Pursuant to Redd, the limitations

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Petitioner proposes the limitations period commence following the final decision of the Board on March 15, 2005. 3

This argument is without merit because this date is irrelevant to the 2003 parole decision. On March 15, 2005, the 2004

hearing, not the 2003 hearing, became final. See Exhibit 8, Petition. 

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

period commenced on December 15, 2004, the day after Petitioner’s appeal of the Board’s 2003

decision was denied. 343 F.3d at 1079; see Exhibit 9, Petition. Under Section 2244(d)(1), Petitioner 3

had one year until December 14, 2005, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition

for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner did not file his federal petition until November 20, 2006, almost

one year after the limitations period had expired.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214 (2002).

As stated above, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court on June 3, 2005. At that point, 171 days of the limitations period had expired.

Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), Petitioner is entitled to tolling for the time this petition was pending. The

California Supreme Court denied the petition on February 22, 2006. The limitations period recommenced and expired 194 days later on September 5, 2006. Thus the federal petition, having been

filed on November 20, 2006, remains untimely.

Nevertheless, Petitioner argues the limitations period should be tolled for the time he was

pursuing administrative remedies with the California Board of Parole with respect to his 2004

hearing and 2005 hearing. This argument is not persuasive. As stated above, § 2244(d)(2) provides

that the “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the

one year limitation period. The key language here is “pertinent judgment or claim.” Petitioner was

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

not pursuing his remedies with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim, to wit, the 2003 parole

hearing. As Petitioner states, he was pursuing his remedies for the 2004 and 2005 hearings.

Accordingly, he should not be granted statutory tolling for these time periods. Holding otherwise

would frustrate “AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay the

resolution of the federal proceedings,” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005), because the 

limitations period could be forestalled interminably by a petitioner challenging his parole decision

merely by claiming he was litigating his subsequent parole hearings.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), th

citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. th

814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 th

(9th Cir.1993). 

Petitioner claims he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and he claims extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way. He argues he has not slept on his rights but has been pursuing his

remedies in all forums. In addition, he claims he was pursuing his rights in a different forum at the

time the limitations period was running and therefore should be granted equitable tolling during this

period. As to the 2003 parole hearing, the Court does not find Petitioner acted diligently. Petitioner

appears to have acted diligently in seeking his remedies for the 2004 and 2005 parole hearings;

however, the 2004 and 2005 decisions are separate and distinct from the 2003 decision. Although

Petitioner sought the same relief in his subsequent challenges, to wit, to be declared suitable for

parole, he was challenging completely separate and different decisions by the State. Petitioner’s

delay in pursuing his remedies with respect to his 2003 hearing do not show diligence. As previously

discussed, granting tolling for all subsequent parole hearings and the collateral challenges to each,

merely because he seeks the same ultimate relief, would only frustrate AEDPA’s goals and stands at

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 7

odds with 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2).

In addition, Petitioner has not shown that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way

and prevented him from timely filing his federal petition. He claims the State acted to prevent him

from timely pursuing his remedies because the State had not decided his appeal by the time his

subsequent 2004 hearing was held. He claims he opted to delay in pursuing his 2003 remedies at that

point to see if the 2004 decision would moot his earlier challenge. Essentially, he sat on his rights on

the chance the 2004 decision would provide his remedy. He states he did the same thing with respect

to this 2005 decision. This does not bespeak diligence and it assuredly does not demonstrate the

State stood in his way.

Petitioner further argues he relied on the State’s direction that he wait until a final parole

decision was made before pursuing his rights. In support of this argument, he points to the decision

of the Board on November 15, 2004, which provided: “This decision will be final on: March 15,

2005. You will be promptly notified if, prior to that date, the decision is modified.” Again, this has

no relevance to the 2003 decision as it refers only to the 2004 decision.

Finally, Petitioner claims he should be granted equitable tolling because of the California law

requirement that he avoid piecemeal litigation. He argues it was necessary for him to wait until his

2004 hearing was finalized before he could attack his 2003 hearing since the 2004 hearing could

moot the 2003 hearing. This argument is also without merit. As discussed above, the 2003 and 2004

hearings were separate state decisions each with its own separate remedy. In Robbins, the California

Supreme Court held that “[g]ood cause for substantial delay may be established if, for example, the

petitioner can demonstrate that because he or she was conducting an ongoing investigation into at

least one potentially meritorious claim, the petitioner delayed presentation of one or more other

known claims in order to avoid the piecemeal presentation of claims.” In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th

770, 780 (1998). However, Robbins is unavailing in this case because the good cause exception was

discussed in the context of a habeas petition challenging a single underlying conviction, not multiple,

distinct parole decisions. The rationale in Robbins is inapplicable in the context of separate

judgments. To illustrate, the California Supreme Court did not wait for the outcome of the 2005

hearing before rendering a decision on his 2005 habeas petition, nor did the California Supreme

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Court fault Petitioner for bringing his habeas challenge to the 2004 hearing before the 2005 hearing

concluded even though the 2005 hearing could have mooted the habeas proceeding. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the portion of the habeas corpus petition challenging the 2003 parole hearing be

DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year

limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 12, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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