Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06414/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06414-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN JOHNSON,

 Plaintiff,

 v

PATRICK CONNOLLY,

 Defendant.

 

No C 06-6414 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff alleges that defendant infringes his trademark

rights under the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1114, and violates the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 USC § 1125(d). 

Doc #1. Plaintiff now moves for default judgment, seeking

statutory damages, injunctive relief and attorney fees. Doc ##18,

19. For the reasons that follow, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s

motion for default judgment, GRANTS injunctive relief, DENIES

statutory damages and GRANTS an award of attorney fees and

expenses. 

//

//

Case 3:06-cv-06414-VRW Document 28 Filed 04/18/07 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff asserts that he created Cowboy’s Fuzzy Duds, a

line of clothing made entirely of patterned and solid fleece cloth. 

Doc #1, ¶ 1. After creating a prototype, Doc #22, ¶ 2, plaintiff

registered “Cowboy’s Fuzzy Duds” as a business name with the Contra

Costa County clerk’s office on March 20, 2002. Doc #22, Ex B. 

Plaintiff then registered the domain name www.cowboysfuzzyduds.com

with Network Solutions on October 14, 2002. Doc #22, ¶ 9. Two

months later, plaintiff filed an application for federal trademark

registration for “Cowboy’s Fuzzy Duds,” which was granted on August

23, 2005. Doc #22, ¶ 10; id, Ex C. Plaintiff’s clothing line

displays this trademark in the lower right hand corner of the

clothing. Doc #1, ¶ 1. 

Defendant, who met plaintiff during the development of

plaintiff’s product, Doc #22, ¶ 11, registered the domain name

www.fuzzyduds.com on June 29, 2003, id, Ex F, and allegedly began

producing nearly identical patterned fleece clothing bearing the

mark “Fuzzy Duds.” Doc #1, ¶ 1. Plaintiff’s prior counsel sent

defendant two cease-and-desist letters in early 2004, Doc #22, Ex

G-H, but plaintiff received no reply from defendant, Doc #22, ¶¶

15-16. On September 17, 2006, defendant allegedly contacted

plaintiff and demanded $20,000.00 in exchange for transfer of

defendant’s domain name. Doc #1, ¶ 24.

Plaintiff asserts that defendant infringes his trademark

rights by selling identical clothing via the domain name

www.fuzzyduds.com. Doc #1. Although served with summons and

complaint on November 11, 2005, see Doc #13, defendant never filed

an answer or responsive pleading. Upon plaintiff’s motion, the

Case 3:06-cv-06414-VRW Document 28 Filed 04/18/07 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

clerk entered default on December 28, 2006, in accordance with FRCP

55(a). Doc #16. 

Subsequently, plaintiff moved for default judgment on

February 8, 2007, requesting that defendant pay $50,000.00 in

statutory damages pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1114, and

that defendant transfer ownership of the domain name

www.fuzzyduds.com pursuant to the Federal Anti-cybersquatting

Privacy Act, 15 USC § 1125(d). Doc #18. Plaintiff also seeks to

recover attorney fees and costs. Id.

I

A

The court first addresses plaintiff’s motion for default

judgment. “Courts have inherent equitable powers to dismiss

actions or enter default judgments for failure to prosecute,

contempt of court, or abusive litigation practices.” Televideo

Systems, Inc v Heidenthal, 826 F2d 915, 917 (9th Cir 1987) (citing

Roadway Express, Inc v Piper, 447 US 752, 764 (1980); Link v Wabash

RR, 370 US 626, 632 (1962); United States v Moss-American, Inc, 78

FRD 214, 216 (ED Wis 1978)). 

“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual

allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount

of damages, will be taken as true.” Televideo Systems, 826 F2d at

917-18 (quoting Geddes v United Financial Group, 559 F2d 557, 560

(9th Cir 1977)). “Upon entry of default judgment, facts alleged to

establish liability are binding upon the defaulting party, and

those matters may not be relitigated on appeal.” Danning v Lavine,

572 F2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir 1978)(citations omitted). Following

Case 3:06-cv-06414-VRW Document 28 Filed 04/18/07 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

default judgment, a defendant is deemed to have admitted the wellpleaded allegations in the complaint. Benny v Pipes, 799 F2d 489,

495 (9th Cir 1986), amended, 807 F2d 1514 (9th Cir 1987) (citing

Thomson v Wooster, 114 US 104, 114 (1884); In re Visioneering

Construction, 661 F2d 119, 124 (9th Cir 1981)).

Defendant responded to neither plaintiff’s complaint, the

clerk’s entry of default nor plaintiff’s motion for default

judgment. By refusing to defend this suit, defendant leaves no

other remedy to plaintiff than default judgment. Plaintiff’s

motion for default judgment is therefore GRANTED and the court

takes the well-pleaded allegations in plaintiff’s complaint as true

and binding upon defendant. Danning, 572 F2d at 1388; Geddes, 559

F2d at 560. 

B 

 Liability for infringement of a registered trademark is

created by § 32 of the Lanham Act, which forbids a person from

using a mark in commerce that is confusingly similar to a

registered trademark. 15 USC § 1114(1)(a). Plaintiff alleges that

defendant knowingly sells and distributes infringing clothing and

uses the Cowboy’s Fuzzy Duds mark to advertise these goods in a

manner that is likely to cause consumer confusion. Doc #1, ¶¶ 25-

30. Accordingly, the factual allegations of plaintiff’s complaint,

admitted by defendant through default, establish that defendant

violated the plaintiff’s rights under § 1114(a) of the Lanham Act.

To remedy trademark infringement under § 1114, the Lanham

Act authorizes a plaintiff to recover defendant’s profits; this

award may be trebled if the defendant’s conduct qualifies as

Case 3:06-cv-06414-VRW Document 28 Filed 04/18/07 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

willful. 15 USC § 1117(a)-(b). Alternatively, § 1117(c) permits a

plaintiff to elect statutory damages in cases involving the use of

counterfeit marks in connection with the sale of goods. 15 USC §

1117(c).

Plaintiff elects to recover statutory damages but

misapprehends the statutory prerequisites. The Lanham Act does not

provide statutory damages to all victims of infringement, only

those whose goods have been counterfeited. To be eligible for the

special civil monetary remedies against counterfeiting, the

defendant’s non-genuine mark must be “identical with or

substantially indistinguishable from” the plaintiff’s registered

mark. 15 USC § 1116(d)(1)(B). The Lanham Act distinguishes

between counterfeiting and mere “colorable imitation,” which occurs

when a mark so resembles a registered mark “as to be likely to

cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.” 15 USC § 1127. Apart

from omitting the word “Cowboy’s,” defendant’s mark also uses block

font, as opposed to plaintiff’s jagged font. See Doc #22, Ex A &

E. Hence, although defendant’s mark amounts to “colorable

imitation,” as plaintiff alleges, it is not a counterfeit of

plaintiff’s mark. Accordingly, the court DENIES plaintiff’s

request for statutory damages. 

C

Plaintiff also claims that defendant’s website,

www.fuzzyduds.com, violates the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer

Protection Act (ACPA), 15 USC § 1125(d), which aims to prevent the

use of domain names that are confusingly similar to registered

trademarks. See Sporty’s Farm v Sportsman’s Market, 202 F3d 489

Case 3:06-cv-06414-VRW Document 28 Filed 04/18/07 Page 5 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

(2d Cir 2000). Section 1125(d) provides that “[a] person shall be

liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark * * * if * * * that

person has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark [and] * * *

registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that * * * in the

case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of

the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark.” 

15 USC 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)(I). 

The court agrees with plaintiff that the term “Fuzzy

Duds,” as used in connection with plaintiff’s clothing line, is

inherently distinctive — a finding that accords with the Lanham

Act’s statutory presumption for registered marks. See 15 USC §

1115(a). The well-pleaded allegations in plaintiff’s complaint

that defendant has admitted by default satisfy the remaining

requirements under the ACPA. Namely, defendant registered and used

the name www.fuzzyduds.com in bad faith with the intent to trade

upon the goodwill of plaintiff’s mark and in a manner that is

likely to cause consumer confusion. Doc #1, ¶¶ 34-41. 

Accordingly, the factual allegations of plaintiff’s complaint

establish that defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights under §

1125 of the ACPA.

Upon a finding of liability, the ACPA provides that “a

court may order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name

or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.” See

15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(c). Pursuant to the ACPA, the court finds that

plaintiff is entitled to the transfer of defendant’s domain name. 

//

//

//

Case 3:06-cv-06414-VRW Document 28 Filed 04/18/07 Page 6 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

D

Finally, the court takes up plaintiff’s request for

attorney fees. Section 1117(a) gives the court discretion to award

reasonable attorney fees in “exceptional cases.” 15 USC § 1117(a).

The term “exceptional” is generally accepted to mean cases in which

trademark infringement is “deliberate and willful.” See Lindy Pen

Co v Bic Pen Corp, 982 F2d 1400, 1409 (9th Cir 1993). Yet a case

may also be deemed “exceptional” – and merit an award of attorney

fees under the Lanham Act – when a defendant disregards the

proceedings and does not appear. Taylor Made Golf Co, Inc v

Carsten Sports Ltd, 175 FRD 658, 663 (SD Cal 1997). The court

finds this case exceptional due to the nature of defendant’s

infringement and his unwillingness to appear in this case. 

Plaintiff’s counsel Eric J Farber submits in his

declaration that he worked 24.57 hours on this case, bills $350 per

hour for intellectual property litigation, has over 13 years of

trademark litigation experience and practices in San Francisco. 

Doc #27 (Farber decl ¶¶ 4-6). Farber’s paralegal, James Ball,

spent 7.1 hours on this case at a billing rate of $85 per hour. 

Doc #27. 

The court first evaluates whether the number of hours

expended by counsel are appropriate to the requirements of the

particular case. Plaintiff’s counsel gathered investigative

information, prepared documents and pleadings and moved for default

judgment. Doc #27. Counsel expended a total of 24.57 hours

accomplishing these tasks, which the court finds reasonable. 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s work product was at least of the quality of a

reasonably skilled attorney, and the number of hours expended are

Case 3:06-cv-06414-VRW Document 28 Filed 04/18/07 Page 7 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

reasonable in light of the fairly simple – but not utterly trivial

– nature of the papers that plaintiff needed to file. 

The court further finds the claimed rates of $350/hour

for Farber and $85/hour for Ball reasonable, as they comport with

rates the court has found reasonable in similar circumstances. 

See, e g, Chanel v Brandon Doan, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 22691 *17-*19

(ND Cal 2007) (finding that a billing rate of 350/hour for counsel

with ten years of experience was less than the amount provided

under the Laffey matrix). Accordingly, the court awards attorney

fees in the amount of $9,220.50. 

Finally, plaintiff requests recovery of court costs in

the amount of $765. The plaintiff’s application for default

judgment includes a breakdown of these costs, Doc #27 ¶ 23, which

the court finds reasonable. Accordingly, the court awards

plaintiff his costs in the amount of $765. 

II

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s

motion for default judgment and, pursuant to the ACPA, the court

ORDERS defendant to transfer the domain name www.fuzzyduds.com to

the plaintiff. Additionally, defendant is ORDERED to pay plaintiff

his attorney fees and costs in the amount of $9985.50. The clerk

is DIRECTED to enter judgment for plaintiff, close the file and

terminate all motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-06414-VRW Document 28 Filed 04/18/07 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Case 3:06-cv-06414-VRW Document 28 Filed 04/18/07 Page 9 of 9