Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05294/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05294-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK CUMMINGS, CASE NO. CV-F-03-5294-DLB

Plaintiff, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

NEW TRIAL

vs.

DERRAL ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and with a civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. section 1983. This action proceeded to trial on plaintiff’s claims against defendants Hegge

and Ruff for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment

and against defendant Villalobos for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c) and F.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties consented to proceed before a United States

Magistrate Judge, and by a September 7, 2005 order, this action was assigned to United States

Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck for all further proceedings. Document No. 107. Following a jury

trial, on November 9, 2005, judgment was entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff

pursuant to the jury verdict rendered on November 4, 2005. Document No. 155. On November 16,

2005, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. Document No. 158. On November 14, 2005 and December

Case 1:03-cv-05294-DLB Document 181 Filed 02/21/06 Page 1 of 8
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2, 2005, plaintiff filed motions for a new trial. Document Nos. 156, 165. In a December 21, 2005

Order, the Court advised plaintiff that because plaintiff had filed a notice of appeal, the Court was

without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiff’s motions for a new trial. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer

Discount Co. 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); Stein v. Wood, 127 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9 Cir. 1997). th

On December 27, 2005, the Court of Appeal issued an Order holding the appeal in abeyance

pending this Court’s resolution of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Document No. 179. Defendants

have not filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or to the Court of Appeal’s Order. 

Accordingly, this Court now issues its ruling and for the reasons discussed below, DENIES

plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 59(a) authorizes granting a new trial and provides in pertinent part:

A new trial may be granted . . . on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in

which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have

heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States . . .

The Ninth Circuit has held that a new trial may be granted if “the verdict is contrary to the

clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or to prevent, in the sound

discretion of the trial court, a miscarriage of justice.” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot

Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9 Cir. 2001). A District Court may not grant a new trial simply

th

because it would have arrived at a different verdict. Id. “[W]hen an appellate court ponders the

probable effect of an error on a civil trial, it need only find that the jury’s verdict is more probably

than not untainted by the error.” Abromson v. American Pacific Corp., 114 F.3d 898, 903 (9 Cir. th

1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110, 118 S.Ct. 1040 (1998) (quoting Haddad v. Lockheed Calif.

Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9 Cir. 1983)). th

Plaintiff moves for a new trial on the following grounds: (1) that certain statements made by

jurors after the verdict was rendered require the Court to grant a new trial to prevent a miscarriage of

justice; (2) the Court improperly denied plaintiff’s request for transportation of four additional

incarcerated witnesses; and (3) the Court improperly denied his requests for impeachment evidence

and discovery by defendants. 

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A. Jurors’ Post-Verdict Statements

Plaintff argues that statements made by jurors after the verdict establish that there was false

testimony offered by the defendants and therefore, in fairness and to prevent a miscarriage of justice,

the Court should grant a new trial. The Court rejects plaintiff’s argument. Plaintiff has submitted no

evidence to support his allegation and the Court finds no basis for questioning the unanimous verdict

rendered by the jury, either from the jurors’ statements or otherwise. 

After the verdict was rendered and the jurors were excused, three (3) jurors voluntarily stayed

behind to talk to the parties. The undersigned was present and heard the statements made by the

jurors. The statements were not inconsistent with the verdict and gave this Court no reason to

believe there was any misconduct, or any basis to question the fairness of the proceedings. The

statements reflected the jurors’ concern with the prison health care system in general and were not

contrary to their verdict in favor of defendants.

Moreover, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prevents jurors from testifying as to any matter

or statement occurring during their deliberations or the effect of anything on their mental processes. 

This includes testimony, affidavits and evidence of any statement made by the juror when offered for

the purpose of impeaching the verdict. Accordingly, plaintiff’s attempt to use juror statements to

impeach the verdict in this case is improper. 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any abnormality in the proceedings and he certainly has

failed to make a showing necessitating a new trial. 

B. Denial of Witnesses

Plaintiff also argues this Court improperly denied his motion for the attendance of four (4)

additional incarcerated witnesses, Matthew Feldmeth, Donald Leach, Jerry Wayne Lund and Vincent

Garcia. 

Witnesses who are held in state custody are beyond the reach of subpoena process under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Subpoena process, which runs only to the witness, cannot be

effective. See Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176, 1179 (3d Cir. 1982). Statutes therefore grant

federal courts the express authority to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum for the

production of state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(5); see Story v.

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Robinson, supra, citing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 221, 72 S.Ct. 263, 273 (1952);

Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 274, 63 S.Ct. 236, 239. Such process runs to the

custodian, and there is no requirement that the custodian be compensated for compliance with the

writ. Story v. Robinson, supra.

The determination whether to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum rests within the

sound discretion of the district court. Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F. Supp. 77, 80 (C.D. Cal. 1981), rv’d

in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9 Cir. 1985). Factors to be weighed include: th

[T]he costs and inconvenience of transporting the prisoner, potential danger from

the inmate's presence in court, the substantiality of the matter at issue, the need for

an early determination of the matter, the possibility of delaying trial until the

prisoner is released, the probability of success on the merits, the integrity of the

correctional system, and the interests of the inmate in presenting his testimony in

person rather than by deposition.

Id.; see also Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1983). The standards

guiding the court's discretion are the same regardless of whether the inmate in question is the

plaintiff, or a non-party witness. See Maurer v. Pitchess, supra at 80, n. 3. In sum, the court should

conduct a cost-benefit analysis regarding whether the inmate should come to court. See e.g., Walker

v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court must determine not only whether the

inmate witnesses’ testimony is relevant, but also whether such testimony is necessary. This

determination depends ultimately upon whether the probative value of the testimony justifies the

expense and security risk associated with transporting an inmate witness to court from a correctional

facility. See Atkins v. City of New York, 856 F. Supp. 755, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Muhammad v.

Warden, Baltimore City Jail, 849 F.2d 107, 112 (4 Cir. 1988); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, th

5 (1 Cir. 1986). st

On July 13, 2005, plaintiff submitted his motion for the attendance of incarcerated witnesses

as required by the Court’s June 10, 2005 Second Scheduling Order. See Document No. 81. In his

motion, he requested the attendance of fifteen incarcerated witnesses, including witnesses Feldmeth,

Leach, Lund and Garcia. At the Pretrial Conference held on September 2, 2005, defendants objected

to the attendance of this number of incarcerated witnesses arguing the proposed testimony was

cumulative and the transportation of this number of incarcerated witnesses was overly burdensome

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While plaintiff objected to the Court’s failure to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for John Hendricks, he did not 1

object as to any other witnesses. Plaintiff had admittedly been unable to contact Mr. Hendricks and had failed to supply a declaration from

him. 

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and created numerous security concerns. 

The Court determined that only six of the proposed incarcerated witnesses appeared to have

relevant testimony and further that all six were expected to testify on the same issue, namely, the

denial of medical care to plaintiff on April 16-18, 2001. The Court advised plaintiff that because of

the cumulative nature of the proposed testimony, in addition to the burdens and security risks

associated with transporting this many incarcerated witnesses for trial, the Court would allow

plaintiff to identify three of the six witnesses to have transported for trial. Plaintiff indicated that he

was having difficulty in making contact with some of the inmate witnesses who were in other

institutions and defense counsel agreed to assist to the extent possible. The Court ordered plaintiff to

attempt to contact his witnesses and thereafter identify three to be transported for trial. The Court

scheduled an additional telephonic trial confirmation hearing for September 27, 2005. 

On September 26, 2005, plaintiff submitted revised declarations for two (2) of the

incarcerated witnesses, James Ely and Michael Brambles and he requested that the Court issue writ

of habeas corpus ad testificandum for these witnesses. At the final Pretrial Conference on September

27, 2005, the Court granted plaintiff’s request to issue writs for Mr. Ely and Mr. Brambles. Due to

the pending November 1, 2005 trial date, the Court set a deadline of October 14, 2005 for plaintiff to

identify one additional incarcerated witness. On September 29, 2005, the Court issued the Pretrial

Order reflecting the orders made at the conference. See Document No. 124. The Court granted the

parties ten (10) days in which to file any objections to the Pretrial Order. 

Plaintff subsequently submitted requests for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for two

(2) additional inmate witnesses, Vincent Garcia and Lee Pugh. Defendants objected to the

transportation of these witnesses, arguing their proposed testimony was duplicative of the testimony

of Mr. Brambles and Mr. Ely.

On October 7, 2005, plaintiff filed objections to the Pretrial Order which were unrelated to

the issues which are the subject of this motion for new trial. 

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On October 13, 2005, the Court granted plaintiff’s request as to Mr. Pugh but denied his

request as to Mr. Garcia, determining that his proposed testimony was duplicative and unnecessary. 

On October 13, 2005, plaintiff renewed his request to have incarcerated witness Hendricks

transported for trial, arguing that defendants had hindered his ability to make contact with this

witness.

On October 31, 2005, Plaintff filed a request that witnesses Feldmeth and Clark also be

transported for trial.

On the morning of the first day of trial, plaintiff objected to the Court’s limitation of three (3)

incarcerated witnesses. The Court overruled his objection on the grounds that as ordered several

times, plaintiff’s proposed additional inmate witnesses, and specifically Feldmeth, Clark and

Hendricks, were prepared to give testimony on the issue of the denial of medical care, an issue upon

which plaintiff had four witnesses, including himself, available to testify. The Court therefore ruled

that additional incarcerated witnesses on that issue were commutative. Further, plaintiff had

admittedly been unable to contact Mr. Hendricks and he failed to identify Feldmeth and Clark as

witnesses as ordered.

The trial proceeded through November 4, 2005. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf. 

Plaintiff claimed that following an incident on April 15, 2001 where he was injured during an attack

by another inmate, on April 16, 17 and 18, defendants Hegge and Ruff refused to provide him

medical attention for his injured jaw in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff also claimed

that defendant Villalobos, in violation of his First Amendment rights, retaliated against him for filing

a grievance by threatening and attempting to intimidate him in an interview that Villalobos

conducted with plaintiff as part of an investigation into plaintiff’s claims against Hegge, Ruff and

others. 

Incarcerated witnesses Michael Brambles, Lee Pugh and James Ely testified for plaintiff. As

expected, these witnesses all supported plaintiff’s testimony that he attempted to obtain medical

treatment from the defendants on April 16, 17 and 18 2001, but was denied. th

This Court properly exercised its discretion and declined to issue writs of habeas corpus ad

testificandum for additional incarcerated witnesses as requested. Based on the submissions made by

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 The Court also notes that at the September 27, 2005 Pretrial Conference, plaintiff stated his intention to call an unincarcerated 2

witness whom he believed had personal knowledge of an investigation of the denial of medical care by defendants. Over defendants’

objection, the Court ruled that plaintiff would be allowed to call this witness. In the Pretrial Order, the Court granted plaintiff until

October 14, 2005 to submit the required fees to have the United States Marshal subpoena this witness. Plaintiff failed to do so. 

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plaintiff regarding what the additional witnesses would offer, the additional testimony was

cumulative and therefore unnecessary. In making its ruling, the Court considered the affidavits

submitted by plaintiff for all of the inmates he proposed to bring to trial. The Court determined that

four witnesses, including plaintiff, testifying on the issue of plaintiff’s attempts to obtain medical

treatment from the defendants on April 16, 17 and 18, was sufficient. The Court ordered plaintiff to

identify the witnesses he wanted. When plaintiff identified more than three, the Court considered the

affidavits and issued three writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum for plaintiff’s witnesses. The

actual testimony given by plaintiff’s witnesses was consistent with their affidavits. Consequently, as

the Court anticipated, additional testimony on the issue was unnecessary. The denial of

transportation for witnesses Feldmeth, Leach, Lund and Garcia was not an abuse of discretion and

did not affect the substantial rights of plaintiff sufficient to warrant a new trial. See Ruvalcaba v.

City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1328 (9 Cir. 1995)[new trial granted where ruling “substantially th

prejudiced” moving party.]

C. Denial of Impeachment Evidence

Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the grounds that the Court denied him “valuable

impeachment evidence against the defendants” and “relevant discovery by defendants” is also without

merit. At the September 1, 2005 pretrial conference, the court denied plaintiff’s motions to compel

belated discovery requests. However, the Court also ordered and defendants agreed to provide, much

of the requested information to plaintiff and it was agreed that plaintiff’s complete medical file would

be provided and admissible at trial. See Document No. 107. The Court’s denial of plaintiff’s 2

attempts to use the trial process to conduct discovery well after the discovery cutoff and in violation

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is not grounds for the granting of a new trial. 

III.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the verdict in this case was contrary to the clear weight

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of the evidence, based on false evidence or that a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of

justice. The Court finds no irregularity in the proceedings or in the outcome of the trial. Plaintiff’s

motion is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 17, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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