Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02227/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02227-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

 Before the Court is Petitioner Christopher Adam Pena’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1), and Motion for DNA Testing 

(Doc. 22). The Honorable Bridget S. Bade, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a 

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 34), recommending that the petition and 

motion be denied; Petitioner has objected to the R&R (Doc. 35). For the following 

reasons, the Court accepts and adopts the R&R, and denies the petition. 

I. Background 

In 2006, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. 

CR 2006-145534, of five counts of aggravated assault. (Doc. 21-1, Exh. A.) Each count 

corresponded with one of five different victims, referred here to as: B.W. (Petitioner’s 

downstairs neighbor), T.B. (B.W.’s sister), M.J. (T.B.’s boyfriend), M.H. and M.B. 

(T.B.’s two minor children). Petitioner was found guilty by jury trial on all counts, and on 

May 14, 2007, he was sentenced to a combination of terms totaling fifteen years of 

imprisonment. (Doc. 21-1, Exh. B.) 

Christopher Adam Pena, 

 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-13-02227-PHX-SPL

ORDER 

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 On October 30, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in 

District Court (Doc. 1), raising ten claims for relief. Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 

21), in which they argue that the petition should be dismissed as untimely, and 

alternatively, that Petitioner’s claims are either not cognizable or are procedurally barred 

from federal habeas corpus review. 

II. Standard of Review

 The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by a magistrate judge in a habeas case. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). The Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to 

which specific objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. 

Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a petitioner is not entitled 

as of right to de novo review of evidence and arguments raised for the first time in an 

objection to the R&R, and whether the Court considers the new facts and arguments 

presented is discretionary. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621-622 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

III. Discussion 

 Having reviewed the objected to recommendations de novo, the Court finds that 

the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner’s claims are time-barred. 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Such petitions are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).1

 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

The AEDPA imposes a 1-year statute of limitations in which “a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court” can file a federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

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 The AEDPA applies to federal habeas petitions filed after its effective date, April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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A. Commencement of Limitations Period 

 Petitioner was sentenced in 2007. Following a timely direct appeal, on May 27, 

2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences. (Doc. 21-3, 

Exh. L.) Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court and therefore, his 

judgment became final on June 28, 2008. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (the 1-year 

limitations period runs from the date on which judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review); Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (where a state prisoner does not seek 

review in the State’s highest court, the judgment becomes final on the date the time for 

seeking such review expires). Absent any tolling, the one-year limitations period would 

have commenced the following day, and expired on June 29, 2009. 

B. Statutory and Equitable Tolling of Limitations Period 

 Petitioner’s first notice of post-conviction relief was not filed until August 10, 

2009, after the one-year statute of limitations period had expired on June 29, 2009. (Doc. 

21-3, Exh. M.) As a result, neither the first notice of post-conviction relief, nor 

subsequent notice or petition, statutorily tolled the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (once the AEDPA 

limitations period expires, a subsequently filed petition for post-conviction relief cannot 

restart the statute of limitations); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 

2003) (state petition filed after the expiration of AEDPA’s one-year period does not 

revive a limitations period that ended before state petition was filed). Further, because 

Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief was denied as untimely (Doc. 21-3, Exh. N), 

it would not have tolled the limitations period. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 

417 (2005) (“Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it 

was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)”). 

 Petitioner also does not show that he is entitled to equitable tolling. See Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (“a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he 

shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

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circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing” his federal habeas petition) 

(internal quotations omitted). Petitioner’s objections challenge the unreasonableness of 

the state courts’ failure to consider the merits of his claims and provide him with an 

evidentiary hearing. He does not show however, that the state courts’ actions, or inaction, 

prevented him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Therefore, because the instant 

habeas petition was not filed until 2013, more than four years after the limitations period 

expired, Petitioner’s claims are time-barred. 

C. Innocence Exception to Limitations Period 

 Petitioner objects to the R&R on the basis that his credible claim of actual 

innocence entitles him to have the merits of his petition considered. In doing so, 

Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s factual summary, and offers his own as 

follows: 

This is a case of self-defense. A case of two different stories. 

A case of who? Is robbing who? For what? And where? Peña 

was convicted on the testimony of two convicted felons, MJ 

and BW that Peña pulled an $800.00 pistol that was legally registered to himself and robbed both BW & MJ for 3 bottles 

of beer outside of Peña’s leased apt. 

Further, both MJ and BW state that after Peña had robbed 

them, Peña then ran down two flights of stairs chasing and 

firing randomly at a group of women and children which 

caused the lacerations to both MJ[’s] left finger and 5 year child [sic] MJ clearly stated that he (MJ) jumped out the window with... Thus convicting Peña of 5 counts of agg assault. 

Wherefore, Peña got on the witness stand and faced down a 

135 year prison sentence to challenge this assertion with a claim of self-defense, namely, that it was MJ and BW who, 

whereupon noticing Peña’s customized 45 acp that he kept holstered to himself on display as a deterrent to horseplay and unlawful touching due to his inherit disease of osteogenesis imperfecta or OI [sic] brittle bones, attempted to pry this attractive pistol from Peña’s possession in a strong arm robbery attempt. This is when Peña fired this pistol; this action was not aggravated assault on BW or MJ but instead an 

act of self-defense, because really, who in Arizona is entitled to walk up to someone’s apt. balcony and attempt to pry a 

loaded pistol from a responsible gun owner’s possession? 

The answer is none. 

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(Doc. 35 at 13-14.) 

 “[A]n actual-innocence gateway claim” may serve as an exception to AEDPA’s 

limitations period. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013)

(also referred to as a “fundamental miscarriage of justice exception”) (adopting Schlup v. 

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), holding actual innocence is an exception to 

procedurally defaulted claims). This exception is applied in rare instances, and a “tenable 

actual-innocence gateway” claim will not be found unless the petitioner “persuades the 

district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have 

voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 

(citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. 

Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011); McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1927 (explaining 

the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). 

 First, Petitioner objects to the R&R’s finding that testing of the DNA taken from 

the gun fired does not present a tenable actual innocence gateway claim. Petitioner argues 

that testing the DNA would yield M.J.’s profile, thereby “catalyzing Peña’s claim of selfdefense while shattering the state charges against” him. (Doc. 35 at 15.) Such evidence 

would inherently show that M.J. did not accurately testify regarding how he sustained his 

injury, and prove that M.J.’s injury resulted from his attempt to pry the gun away from 

Petitioner. (Doc. 35 at 15.) Second, Petitioner objects and claims that testing DNA taken 

from the shell casings found at the apartment would also yield M.J.’s profile, showing 

that M.J.’s hands were on the pistol at the time the shots were fired. (Doc. 35 at 16.) 

Third, Petitioner argues that the medical evidence concerning his brittle bone disease 

supports his “version of events, namely, having to act in self defense of his life while 

under attack by two convicted felons,” and shows that he was not physically capable of 

committing the crime as it was described during trial. (Doc. 35 at 24.) In other words, 

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Petitioner argues that there is a variety of evidence that exists that should have been 

presented at trial that would have undercut the victims’ account, and reinforces his theory 

of self-defense. 

 The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning, and finds Petitioner does 

not present a tenable actual innocence claim that meets the Schlup threshold. Assuming, 

without deciding, that the evidence would undermine testimony regarding the sequence 

of events that occurred, it does not prove that the victims’ testimony was false, that all or 

any of the multiple shots were fired in self-defense, and that Petitioner is innocent. In the 

best of light, as phrased by Petitioner, it would only support that this is a “case of two 

different stories.” In order to qualify for the innocence gateway exception however, 

Petitioner must present “evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial,” not evidence that is merely favorable and might 

have lessened the strength of the prosecution’s case. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. This Court 

cannot say that, in assessing the likely impact of this evidence, that no reasonable juror 

could have voted to find him guilty. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 

2011); McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1936. 

 Lastly, Petitioner objects to the R&R by rearguing the underlying merits of his

claims concerning the precluded evidence of the victims’ criminal history, the 911 phone 

call (which was played for the jury), and the self-defense jury instruction. (Doc. 35 at 17-

21.) He maintains that but for these errors, he would not have been convicted, and his 

innocence would have been evident. While many of Petitioner’s arguments may 

challenge the constitutional adequacy of the procedures that led to his convictions and the 

inherent fairness of those convictions, these arguments do not point to evidence of actual, 

factual innocence. Further, this is not new evidence for purposes of the gateway 

exception; Petitioner does not dispute that the evidence and issues were presented at trial. 

See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1935. Therefore, Petitioner has not 

shown that there is new evidence of actual innocence that justifies review of his timebarred claims. 

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IV. Conclusion 

 Having reviewed the record as a whole, and finding none of Petitioner’s objections 

have merit, the R&R will be adopted in full. For the same reasons the Court finds that the 

petition is time-barred and he has not presented a tenable innocence gateway claim, 

Petitioner’s objections to the R&R regarding his request for DNA testing and an 

evidentiary hearing also fail. See Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(evidentiary development is not required where, even if the new evidence is fully 

credited, it would not entitle him to relief). Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That Magistrate Judge Bade’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 34) is 

accepted and adopted by the Court; 

2. That the Motion for DNA Testing (Doc. 22) is denied; 

3. That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(Doc. 1) is denied and dismissed with prejudice; 

4. That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

on appeal are denied because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain 

procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable; and

5. That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 30th day of July, 2015.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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