Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00828/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00828-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SUKHWINDER KAUR, et al., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF LODI, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-0828 GEB AC 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF 

ATTORNEY’S FEES 

 This is an excessive force action brought by the estate of Parminder Singh Shergill (the 

decedent), Sukhwinder Kaur (decedent’s mother), and decedent’s two siblings, against Scott 

Bratton, one of the two City of Lodi police officers who shot the decedent to death, along with the 

other officer, the City, its police department and the Chief of Police. The case is proceeding on 

the Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 47. 

 On March 16, 2015, the undersigned denied defendant Bratton’s motion to quash plaintiff 

Sukhwinder Kaur’s subpoena, which subpoena was directed to non-party City of Manteca. ECF 

No. 71. Defendant Bratton was further ordered to show cause why the court should not order him 

to pay plaintiff’s attorney fees in connection with the motion.1 Plaintiff was directed to submit 

 

1

 The order to show cause mistakenly referred to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A), which governs 

attorney’s fees for parties successfully moving to compel discovery. However, the parties appear 

to have correctly argued the attorney’s fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B), which governs the 

award of attorney’s fees to the party successfully resisting the discovery motion, here, the motion 

to quash. 

Case 2:14-cv-00828-TLN-AC Document 76 Filed 05/20/15 Page 1 of 3
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

her request for attorneys’ fees. 

 The declarations of defendant’s attorneys in opposition to the order to show cause 

(“OSC”) offer no facts or arguments to address the concerns the undersigned expressed in 

denying the motion to quash. See Declaration of Mark Berry (ECF No. 74); Declaration of 

Derick E. Konz (“Konz Decl.”) (ECF No. 74-1). Specifically, the court had already held, in 

connection with discovery involving the City of Lodi defendants, that past training records and 

other personnel records could not categorically be ruled to be not relevant, even if the chances of 

finding relevant documents might diminish with time. See ECF No. 62. Also, Bratton sought a 

blanket protective order for City of Manteca personnel records, even though the court had already 

rejected Bratton’s prior request for a blanket protective order for City of Lodi personnel records. 

See ECF No. 31. In addition, Bratton failed to explain why he refused to produce a single 

document even after plaintiff agreed to accept redacted versions of some of those documents. 

Instead, the declarations principally assert that counsel had a “good faith belief” that the 

subpoenaed documents should be withheld. 

 Nevertheless, defendant’s counsels’ declarations, and subsequent filings by both parties, 

strongly suggest that plaintiff could have significantly narrowed the scope of this dispute if she 

had conceded earlier, rather than later, that specified documents in the personnel file – such as the 

credit report and birth certificate – need not be produced. It appears that rather than narrow the 

issues they needed to bring to the court, both sides instead dug in, with defendant refusing to 

produce anything at all and plaintiff insisting that nearly everything be produced (other than 

redacted portions). Both sides eventually – after the hearing – presented a narrower controversy 

for the court’s review. See ECF No. 69 (Supplemental Joint Statement). The narrowing of the 

dispute should have occurred during the meet and confer process. 

 The court will accordingly reduce plaintiff’s attorneys’ fee request to reflect, very 

roughly, the excess work plaintiff’s counsel could have avoided by narrowing the scope of the 

subpoena after receiving defendant’s February 2, 2015 letter identifying the documents in the 

requested personnel file. See Konz Decl., Exh. A (ECF No. 74-1). Since the undersigned has no 

sensible way to determine which hours were spend on which requested documents, the fees will 

Case 2:14-cv-00828-TLN-AC Document 76 Filed 05/20/15 Page 2 of 3
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

be reduced instead by the amount of time plaintiffs’ counsel spent initially and directly on the 

February 2, 2015 letter, their first opportunity to avoid the excess work. According to the 

declarations of plaintiff’s attorneys, those fees total $2,700 (2 hours of Merin’s time on February 

2nd and 3rd, 2015, and 7.2 hours of Masuhara’s time on February 2nd and 3rd, 2015). See 

Declaration of Mark E. Merin (ECF No. 75-1); Declaration of Paul H. Masuhara (ECF No. 75-2). 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s request for $18,135.00 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 37(a)(5)(B), is GRANTED, except that it is reduced by $2,700.00, for an award of $15,435.00; 

 2. Within fourteen days from the date of this order, defendant Bratton’s counsel shall pay 

to plaintiff’s counsel $15,435.00; and 

 3. Within fourteen days from the date of this order, defendant’s counsel shall serve and 

file a sworn affidavit or declaration stating that the above payment has been made, and that it was 

not billed to any defendant. 

DATED: May 19, 2015 

Case 2:14-cv-00828-TLN-AC Document 76 Filed 05/20/15 Page 3 of 3