Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02626/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02626-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAQ BEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JARED MALEC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-02626-SI 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 117

On May 11, 2020 plaintiff Raq Bey filed the instant motion to alter judgment regarding this 

Court’s April 28, 2020 order. Having considered the papers submitted, pursuant to Local Rule 7-

1(b) and General Order 72-3, the Court hereby VACATES the June 26, 2020 hearing and DENIES 

plaintiff’s motion.

BACKGROUND

The Court’s April 28, 2020 order provides the relevant factual background regarding 

plaintiff’s October 31, 2017 arrest and excessive force claim, the underlying incident of this case. 

Dkt. No. 115 at 1-5 (Order). The Court decided the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment 

without oral argument, analyzing six alleged instances of excessive force and finding each instance 

was reasonable and not excessive. Id. The Court further found: (1) defendants had probable cause 

to use force and (2) even if defendants’ use of force was excessive, the officers were entitled to

qualified immunity. Id.

On May 11, 2020 plaintiff filed the instant motion to alter judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. 

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Civ. Pro. 59(e). Dkt. No. 117 (Mot.). On May 26, 2020 defendants filed their opposition to the 

motion to alter judgment. Dkt. No. 118 (Opp’n). Plaintiff did not file a reply to the defendants’ 

opposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

Motions to alter or amend judgments can be brought pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 59(e). It 

is appropriate for a court to grant Rule 59(e) motions if it determines doing so is necessary to “rectify 

its own mistakes in the period immediately following the entry of judgment.” White v. N.H Dep’t. 

of Emp. Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982). While the Court is given considerable discretion in granting 

or denying such motions, altering a judgment is an “extraordinary remedy” and is seldom done

unless the need to uphold the finality of judgments is outweighed by a clear injustice. Kona Enters.’

v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9

th Cir. 2000) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s 

Federal Practice § 59.309[4] (3d ed. 2000)). An altered judgment is proper if it (1) corrects an error 

of law or fact made by the Court in the original judgment, (2) allows a party to present evidence that 

was previously unavailable or undiscoverable, (3) corrects a manifest injustice, or (4) incorporates

intervening and controlling case law. 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed. 2020); see also Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740

(9

th Cir. 2001). The Court construes the plaintiff’s motion to implicate all four of these 

considerations. 

The moving party must meet a “high hurdle” in order to show that alteration of judgment is 

warranted. Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9

th Cir. 2001). It is inappropriate for the Court to 

grant a motion to alter judgment if the moving party uses the motion to “relitigate old matters.”

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, at 127-128 (2d ed. 1995)). Such 

motions “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could 

reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona, 229 F.3d at 890; see also Zimmerman, 

255 F.3d at 740.

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks an altered judgment arguing (1) the Court committed clear error by only 

considering defendants’ evidence; (2) the Court needs to consider evidence about plaintiff’s 

subjective fear of defendants and needs to hear oral testimony to properly evaluate plaintiff’s state 

of mind and defendants’ reasonableness; (3) the Court’s order granting summary judgment is a

manifest injustice; and (4) the Court did not consider relevant and controlling case law.

Plaintiff’s motion fails because (1) the Court considered all submitted evidence and Mr. Bey

does not identify clear errors made by the Court ; (2) Mr. Bey does not present any new or previously 

undiscoverable evidence, nor would the evidence he presents have altered the Court’s decision had 

it been timely submitted; (3) Mr. Bey fails to show the Court’s previous order amounts to manifest 

injustice; and (4) Mr. Bey does not cite new and controlling law warranting an altered judgment.

I. Correcting Errors of Law or Fact

While courts within the Ninth Circuit have not strictly defined what constitutes clear error 

for Rule 59(e) motions, courts have generally found that “[m]ere doubts or disagreement about the 

wisdom of a prior decision of . . . [the] court will not suffice.” Teamsters Local 617 Pension and 

Welfare Funds v. Apollo Grp., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 216, 231 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012) (quoting Campion 

v. Old Republic Home Protection Co., No. 09–CV–748–JMA(NLS), 2011 WL 1935967, at *1 (S.D.

Cal. May 20, 2011)). Rather, for there to be clear error, the previous decision “must strike [a court] 

as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.” Id.

A. The Court Considered Both Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ Evidence 

In ruling on the parties’ summary judgment motions, the Court considered all evidence 

offered by plaintiff and defendants. The Court repeatedly cited plaintiff’s complaint, declaration,

and opposition to summary judgment. Dkt. No. 115 at 1-6, 8-12 (Order). The Court used this 

evidence, along with the documents submitted by defendants, the body camera footage, and relevant 

case law, to determine whether defendants’ use of force was reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. at 7-13.

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B. Excessive Force Analysis

Plaintiff argues the Court’s excessive force analysis was incorrect because an illegal U-turn 

is not a serious offense, therefore the force used by the officers was disproportionate and 

inappropriate for the nature of the offense. Dkt. No. 117 at 16 (Mot.). However, the Court 

acknowledged that while each of plaintiff’s traffic offenses viewed individually would not typically 

be considered severe, taken together, plaintiff’s continuous disregard for defendants’ orders after 

making the illegal U-turn justified defendants’ use of force. Dkt. No. 115 at 11-12 (Order). The 

Court’s analysis was not in error. 

C. Probable Cause

Plaintiff argues defendants did not have probable cause to stop or arrest him and thus it was 

erroneous to grant their summary judgment motion. Dkt. No. 115 at 16 (Mot.). The Court found 

probable cause existed for plaintiff’s arrest based on defendants’ declarations and the body camera 

footage. Dkt. No. 115 at 10 (Order). Again, plaintiff has not presented proof of clear error by the 

Court.

D. Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff argues defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because he was never 

charged with a crime and because defendants did not explain the reasons for his arrest. Dkt. No. 

117 at 17-18 (Mot.). However, the fact that plaintiff’s charges were dismissed does not negate the 

existence of probable cause for the arrest. Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9

th Cir. 

1989). Further, a qualified immunity analysis for unlawful arrest is dependent upon the “‘objective 

legal reasonableness’ of the action [under scrutiny], assessed in light of the legal rules that were 

‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). “[E]xisting precedent” is an important 

aspect of determining whether the right in question was clearly established. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 

131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011); see also White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 522 (2017); see also Shafer 

v. Cty. Of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9

th Cir. 2017).

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The Court’s finding of qualified immunity was thoroughly supported by caselaw. Hope v. 

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (explaining that official action is not protected by qualified 

immunity only if “in light of the pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the action is] . . . apparent”) 

(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 

(2009) (holding that for a qualified immunity analysis, courts can first address either whether a 

constitutional right was violated or whether the right was clearly established, receding from the “the 

two-step rule” mandated by the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001)). The 

cases cited by plaintiff in the instant motion are inapposite. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 

388-389 (1989) (stating that municipalities can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to 

adequately train municipal employees); Cervantez v. J.C. Penny Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 592 (1979) 

(holding that the defendant has the burden of justifying an arrest when a plaintiff brings a cause of 

action for false imprisonment and proves that their arrest was without process and was followed by 

imprisonment and damages), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (West, Westlaw 

through Ch.3 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). There is no evidence that the defendants were improperly trained, 

no evidence that the arrest was without process, and the City of Emeryville has been dismissed as a 

defendant. Thus, the Court’s prior order is correct regarding qualified immunity and does not 

warrant an altered judgment.

II. Presenting Unavailable or Undiscovered Evidence

An altered judgment is not warranted if the moving party bases its Rule 59(e) motion on 

evidence previously available to him or that he could have discovered had he exercised due 

diligence. Stevens v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, No. 16-cv-07175-EMC, 2017 WL 1330511, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

2017), aff’d, 911 F.3d 1249 (9

th Cir. 2018). Further, for such motions to succeed based on newly 

discovered evidence, the evidence must be “of such magnitude that production of it earlier would 

have been likely to change the disposition of the case.” Id. (quoting Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 

563, 573 (9

th Cir. 2008) (abrogated on other grounds by Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224 

(2014)). Courts both within and outside the Ninth Circuit have held “that the failure to file 

documents in an original motion or opposition does not turn the late filed documents into ‘newly 

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discovered evidence.’” Sch. Dist. No. 1J., Multnomah Cty., Or. v. AcandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 

(9

th Cir. 1993); see also Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473-474 (5th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff has not presented evidence that was previously unavailable, undiscovered, or that 

would have changed the outcome of the case had it been considered in earlier proceedings. Rather,

plaintiff contends that the Court must consider the rationale behind his subjective fear of defendants. 

Dkt. No. 117 at 12 (Mot.). In support thereof, plaintiff includes articles about police brutality and 

citizens pretending to be police that were published before March 18, 2020, the date on which 

plaintiff filed his opposition to summary judgment. Id. at 6, 12. The Washington Post article1

plaintiff cites was published in 2017 and last updated in January 2020, and the Komo article2cited 

was published in February 2020. Plaintiff cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion to introduce evidence 

that could have been presented in his opposition to summary judgment. Frederick S. Wyle Prof’l

Corp. v. Texaco Inc., 764 F.2d 604, 609 (9

th Cir. 1985). Further, even if this evidence was timely 

offered, summary judgment would have still been granted. Plaintiff’s fear of police officers may 

have influenced his behavior during the incident. However, an excessive force analysis asks

whether defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable. Despite plaintiff’s subjective fear, his 

continuous disregard of the defendants’ orders rendered their use of force reasonable. 

Plaintiff also contends the judgment should be altered to allow for oral testimony to “clear 

up any confusion and misunderstanding about the TRUE STATE OF MIND of all parties involved 

and the TRUE REASONABLENESS meant or not meant to be applied on the night in question.”

Dkt. No. 117 at 5-6, 12 (Mot.). But plaintiff had the opportunity to both include such testimony in 

his sworn deposition and to include a sworn declaration when filing his opposition to the summary 

judgment motion. Dkt. No. 119 at 8 (Opp’n). Plaintiff also thoroughly expressed himself in his 

moving papers. For example, in his opposition to summary judgment, he described his feelings 

1 Police Shootings 2017 Database, Wash. Post, (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2017/.

2 Associated Press, Michigan Man Charged After Sherriff Stops Phony Police Car, Komo 

News (Feb. 8, 2020), https://komonews.com/news/offbeat/michigan-man-charged-after-sheriffstops-vehicle-resembling-cop-car. The link plaintiff included in his motion did not work, but based 

on the text of the URL, this is the article he intended to reference.

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when being pulled over: “My heart was pounding and I could not concentrate, I was nervous and 

feared I could be murdered.” Dkt. No. 110 at 7 (Opp’n). He also explained how “Halloween as we 

know it today can be very dangerous, many people dress up as cops, presidents, celebrities, and 

monsters for fun and games” and how “when the car got behind me and demanded that I stop 

traveling to my destination and pull over immediately[,] I became overwhelmed with fear, I called 

the 911 operators to report being harassed and stalked.” Dkt. No. 110 at 5-6. Further, he noted that 

“I have become aware of people who were not threatening or committing any crimes who were 

pulled over in a similar way and afterwards murdered unjustly.” Dkt. No. 110 at 6 (Opp’n). The 

Court took these statements into account when rendering its decision.

The parties’ true state of mind is not relevant to this inquiry; rather, weighing the nature of 

the intrusion against the government interests at stake is required. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

396 (1989). Nonetheless, the Court did consider plaintiff’s state of mind during the incident when 

granting summary judgment. The Court believes plaintiff was scared and that the incident was 

upsetting. Nonetheless, the use of force was reasonable where plaintiff repeatedly failed to heed 

repeated and explicit commands. Dkt. No. 115 at 2 (Order).

III. Correcting a Manifest Injustice

Courts have not specifically defined what constitutes “manifest injustice” when deciding if 

altered judgment is appropriate. Delta Ltd. v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Bureau, 393 F.

Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2005). And, courts within the Ninth Circuit often do not consider this factor 

explicitly when adjudicating a motion to alter judgment. Kona, 229 F.3d at 890; 398 Orange St.

Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9

th Cir. 1999); Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. Instead, 

Ninth Circuit courts will consider the factor in conjunction with clear error: “alteration is appropriate 

under Rule 59(e) if . . . the district court committed a clear error or made an initial decision that was 

manifestly unjust.” Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 740; see also Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. Some 

courts also consider it necessary to alter a judgment if there has been obvious misconduct by counsel 

or if the decision would cause harm to “innocent third parties.” Dale and Selby Superette & Deli v. 

U.S. Dept. of Agric., 838 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (D. Minn. 1993); Delta Ltd., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 16.

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Plaintiff offers no specific basis showing the Court’s decision was so clearly unjust to 

warrant an altered judgment. Instead, plaintiff makes general statements about why an altered 

judgment is necessary. Dkt. No. 117 at 5, 9, 19 (Mot.). Mr. Bey argues “[a]ll evidence and the lack 

thereof must be considered to prevent manifest injustice and more injury;” “ORAL TESTIMONY 

is necessary to prevent manifest injustice;” “ORAL TESTIMONY from both parties is needed to 

establish true facts and direct evidence and prevent manifest injustice;” and, “it seems as if 

[plaintiff’s] entire DECLARATION OF TRUTH...has been ignored, misconstrued, and only used 

as an admission to being present” on the date of the incident. Id. The court has considered extensive 

evidence from both plaintiff and defendants, along with body camera footage. Dkt. No. 115 at 1-6, 

8-12 (Order). Plaintiff had an opportunity to submit oral testimony at his deposition and submit a 

sworn declaration. Dkt. No. 119 at 8 (Opp’n). Further, plaintiff’s description of the incident was 

carefully considered; indeed, the Court repeatedly cites his complaint, declaration, and opposition 

to summary judgment throughout its order granting summary judgment. Dkt. No. 115, pgs. 1-6, 8-

12 (Order). Plaintiff is representing himself so there could not have been misconduct by counsel, 

and there is no evidence presented of harm to third parties. Plaintiff’s statements are conclusory 

and do not prove that the Court’s contested decision rises to the level of injustice required to make 

an altered judgment appropriate. 

IV. Incorporating Intervening and Controlling Case Law

An altered judgment is warranted if it allows for a party to present “an intervening change 

in controlling law” that challenges the rationale upon which the court’s original decision is based.

Quinones-Ruiz v. U.S., 873 F. Supp. 359, 362 (S.D. Cal. 1995). 

Plaintiff fails to identify case law that justifies a Rule 59(e) motion. Since plaintiff cannot 

use a motion to alter judgment as “a vehicle for . . . taking a second bite of the apple,” the Court 

need not consider cases presented in such a motion unless they are intervening law that have a 

controlling effect on the Court’s legal analysis of the issue in question. Munson v. Murad, No. 

17cv2499-MMA (BGS), 2018 WL 4027007, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2018); see also Rademaker v. Paramo, 

No. 17-cv-02406-JLB-KSC, 2020 WL 819015, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2020); see also Zarcone v. U.S., No. 

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C 04-01428 WHA, 2004 WL 2196560, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Plaintiff’s case citations in the 

instant motion are not controlling, were published before his original complaint, or are not relevant 

to the excessive force claim.

CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for altered judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2020

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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