Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00727/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00727-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EDDIE LEE BELL, 

Petitioner,

v. 

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

Case No.: 16cv0727-BAS (PCL) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE RE: DENYING PETITION 

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Eddie Lee Bell (hereinafter “Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and 

in forma pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is serving a sentence of 29 years-to-life imposed as a 

result of a 1997 conviction for making a terrorist threat, enhanced under California’s Three 

Strikes law by three prior felony convictions. (Pet. at 1-2.) He challenges here the denial 

of his Proposition 36 petition to recall his sentence.1

 (Id. at 6-23.) His commitment offense 

                                                                

1

 Proposition 36 “diluted the three strikes law by reserving the life sentence for cases where the current 

crime is a serious or violent felony . . . [and] created a postconviction release proceeding whereby a 

prisoner who is serving an indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to the three strikes law for a crime 

that is not a serious or violent felony and who is not disqualified, may have his or her sentence recalled 

and be sentenced as a second strike offender unless the court determines that resentencing would pose an 

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” People v. Yearwood, 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 167-68, 151 

Cal.Rptr.3d 901, 904 (2013). 

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was not a serious felony for purposes of the Three Strikes law when he was convicted, but 

had become one by the time Proposition 36 was enacted. He claims that the finding by the 

state court that he is ineligible for relief because his offense is now a serious felony is based 

on an erroneous statutory interpretation of Proposition 36 (claim one), and violates state 

and federal ex post facto principles (claim two). (Id.) 

Respondent has filed an Answer with an attached Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support. (ECF No. 13.) Respondent argues that federal habeas relief is not 

available as to claim one because it presents only an issue of state law. (Memorandum of 

Points and Authorities in Support of Answer [“Ans. Mem.”] at 12-13.) Habeas relief is not 

available as to claim two, Respondent contends, because the denial by the state court, on 

the basis that ex post facto principles are not implicated here, is neither contrary to, nor 

involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Id. at 13-15.) 

 For the following reasons, the Court finds that federal habeas relief is unavailable as 

to Petitioner’s claims because the state court adjudication of them is neither contrary to, 

nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court also finds that even if 

Petitioner could satisfy those standards, habeas relief is not available because he has not 

shown that he is in custody in violation of the federal Constitution, or the laws or treaties 

of the United States, as a result of the denial of his petition to recall his sentence. The 

Court therefore recommends the Petition be denied. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On July 31, 1997, a San Diego County Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty 

of the felony of making a terrorist threat in violation of California Penal Code § 422, along 

with misdemeanor violations of false imprisonment in violation of Penal Code § 236, and 

battery in violation of Penal Code § 242. (Lodgment No. 1, People v. Bell, No. D029617, 

slip op. at 5-6 (Cal.Ct.App. Apr. 15, 1999); Lodgment No. 3, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 8.) In 

a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found Petitioner had suffered three prior strike 

convictions within the meaning of Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i) and 1170.12, and had served 

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four prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code § 667.5(b). (Id.) Petitioner was 

sentenced to a mandatory term of 25 years-to-life under California’s Three Strikes law, 

along with four consecutive one-year terms, one for each of the prior prison terms. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s offense is summarized as follows: 

Bell met Rory Hawk toward the end of 1996. The two lived together 

in various Chula Vista motels for a period of approximately two months. They 

had an agreement whereby Bell sold cocaine and Hawk worked as a prostitute, 

giving him the money she earned. On at least three occasions, Hawk left Bell 

for periods of several days but always returned. During these times Hawk 

would go on drug binges, using crack cocaine and prostituting herself to pay 

for it. 

On March 20, 1997, Hawk again left Bell and started a drug binge. She 

left because she was jealous of Bell’s relationships with two other women 

including Martin, Bell’s codefendant in the trial court. Hawk went on a drug 

and prostitution binge for three days, during which she did not see Bell. She 

did not immediately return to Bell because he did not approve of her drug use. 

On March 23, 1997, at approximately 8 p.m., Bell arrived in a van on 

Market Street, where Hawk was getting into a customer’s car. Bell pulled 

Hawk away from the car and forced her into the van against her objections. 

Inside the van were Alvin Roberts, sitting in the front passenger seat, and Alex 

Garcia, asleep in the back. 

Bell drove the van to the Vagabond Inn in Chula Vista, where upon 

arrival he asked Hawk why she had left. Using profanity, Bell told Hawk she 

had made a mistake by leaving. At Bell’s instruction, Roberts went inside the 

motel room and told Martin, who was in the room, to go out to the van. Martin 

entered the back of the van and began to hit Hawk, while asking Hawk why 

she had left. Bell pulled Martin away from Hawk and the three went into the 

motel room. 

Once inside the room Bell told Hawk to “break” herself, which meant 

to “give him (all) the money (she had),” and Hawk put the little money she 

had in her possession on the counter. Bell then ordered Hawk to remove all 

of her clothes in front of himself, Martin, and Roberts, which she did. Bell 

asked Hawk why she had left and told her he “thought (they) were supposed 

to be a family.” Hawk assured Bell that she would stay with him. At that 

point, Hawk thought she did want to stay with him “in a way” because she felt 

that he was the only person who cared about her. 

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Bell removed the belt from his pants and tossed it to Martin, who swung 

the belt at Hawk. Bell then took the belt and swung it at Hawk, striking her 

on the thigh with the metal buckle. Hawk believed this was punishment for 

her leaving and that she had let Bell down because she had not been honest 

with him. 

After being struck with the belt, Hawk began screaming. Bell and 

Martin told Hawk to be quiet and Bell put a sock in Hawk’s mouth. While 

the sock was in Hawk’s mouth Bell told her that she was going to choke on 

her own vomit and die. Bell also told her that there would be no proof because 

there was be no marks and that he would put her dead body under the bed. 

Martin said they should put Hawk in a dumpster or feed her to dogs. 

When Hawk began to choke, Bell removed the sock from her mouth 

and Hawk, still naked, lay down on the bed. Using shoestrings, Bell tied 

Hawk’s hands behind her back and moved her to the floor. Hawk remained 

naked on the floor, with her hands tied, for over a half hour. During this time, 

Bell told Hawk that she had let him down. Wearing cowboy boots, Bell stood 

on Hawk’s back while speaking with Martin. Bell asked Martin to bring him 

a meat cleaver with which he attempted, unsuccessfully, to cut Hawk’s hair. 

Bell untied the shoelaces binding Hawk’s wrists. Bell instructed 

Roberts to stay awake and make sure Hawk did not leave during the night. 

Hawk heard this and felt she could not freely leave the motel room. Hawk 

fell asleep on the floor by the bed. 

The next morning Bell asked Hawk if she had “learned (her) lesson 

about being honest” and if she was going to stay or go. Hawk told him that 

she would stay and agreed to work as a prostitute that morning. Hawk asked 

Bell to drive her to a friend’s house to pick up her clothes, which he did, 

instructing her not to pull anything funny. Once at her friend’s house, Hawk 

called the police while Bell remained parked outside. When the police 

arrived, Bell left, but he was arrested later that day. 

A joint jury trial against Bell and Martin began on July 21, 1997. At 

trial Hawk testified that she called the police on March 24, 1997, because she 

was concerned for her safety. She testified that although Bell had hit her in 

the past, nothing like the incidents on the night of March 23, 1997, had 

occurred previously. 

Hawk gave conflicting testimony regarding whether she believed Bell 

and Martin would follow through on their threats to her. On direct 

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examination, Hawk testified she thought she was going to die. On crossexamination, Hawk testified she believed Bell always wanted the best for her 

and that he had protected her. She testified that she had not taken Bell’s and 

Martin’s threats seriously and that she viewed the incident on March 23, 1997, 

as a “lesson” and, “(t)o a certain extent,” a game. 

 

(Lodgment No. 1, People v. Bell, No. D029617, slip op. at 2-5 (footnotes omitted). 

On January 10, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition to recall his sentence pursuant to 

Proposition 36, pointing out that his 1997 offense was not a serious or violent offense for 

the purposes of California’s Three Strikes law at the time it was committed. (CT 1-8.) He 

argued, as he does here, that the verb tense in the statutory language of Proposition 36 

provided that relief is available if his commitment offense was considered serious or violent 

at the time it was committed, and, alternately, that the failure to provide relief would violate 

ex post facto principles. (Id.) 

The People conceded that Petitioner’s commitment offense, a violation of California 

Penal Code § 422, was not a serious felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law at 

the time it was committed, but pointed out that it had become a serious felony when that 

law was amended in 2000, and was therefore a serious felony for the purposes of that law 

by the time Proposition 36 was passed in 2012. (CT 9-13.) The People contended that ex 

post facto principles were not implicated because Proposition 36 did not increase any 

sentences, but decreased many, and argued that Petitioner was disqualified for relief due to 

the verb tense in the statutory language of Proposition 36 which states: “an inmate is 

eligible for resentencing if . . . the inmate is serving an indeterminate term of life 

imprisonment . . . for a conviction of a felony or felonies that are not defined as serious 

and/or violent felonies by [California Penal Code § 1197.7(c)].” (Id., quoting Cal. Penal 

Code § 1170.126(e)(1), and citing Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(38) (listing as a serious 

felony “criminal threats, in violation of [Penal Code] Section 422.”) 

The petition to recall the sentence was denied at a hearing in the superior court on 

October 28, 2013, where the judge stated: “Based upon my review of the applicable statutes 

for the purposes of Penal Code Section 1170.126, the conviction under Penal Code Section 

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422 is a serious felony as defined by law and renders Mr. Bell ineligible.” (Lodgment No. 

4 at 4-5.) Petitioner appealed on November 13, 2013, arguing, as he does here, that the 

trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous statutory construction and violated ex post 

facto principles. (CT 15-16; Lodgment Nos. 5-10.) The appellate court stayed the appeal 

pending the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Johnson, 61 Cal.4th 674 (Cal. 

2015) (recognizing an ambiguity in the verb tense used in Proposition 36’s statutory 

language, but holding that resentencing is not authorized where the commitment offense 

“is now considered serious or violent.”) (Lodgment No. 8.) The appellate court denied 

relief on December 9, 2015, in a written opinion which, as set forth below, relies primarily 

on Johnson. (Lodgment No. 11.) Petitioner then sought relief in the state supreme court, 

which summarily denied relief on February 24, 2016. (Lodgment Nos. 12-13.)

II. DISCUSSION 

Because Petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, federal 

habeas relief is only available if he shows that the state court adjudication of the claims: 

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) 

(West 2006). Even if the petitioner can satisfy § 2254(d), or show that it does not apply, 

he still must show a federal constitutional violation occurred. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 

119-22 (2007); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Petitioner 

must also demonstrate that any constitutional error is not harmless, unless it is of the type 

included on the Supreme Court’s “short, purposely limited roster of structural errors.” 

Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1015 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 

279, 306 (1991) (recognizing that “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”) 

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth 

in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

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indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). Relief 

under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only if, it is 

so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be 

no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-

07 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). The Supreme Court 

has stated that “[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be . . . 

[as it] preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded 

jurists could disagree that the state court decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” 

Id. at 102-03 (“Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against 

extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary 

error correction through appeal.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In order to satisfy the unreasonable determination of the facts prong of § 2254(d)(2), 

Petitioner must show that the factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of 

his claim rests are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 

(2003). 

A. Claim One 

 Petitioner contends in claim one that the denial of the petition to recall his sentence 

relies on an erroneous statutory interpretation of Proposition 36, and under a proper reading 

of the statute relief is available when a commitment offense was not a serious or violent 

offense at the time it was committed, rather than at the time Proposition 36 was enacted. 

(Pet. 6-17.) Respondent answers that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas because 

it presents an issue of state law only. (Ans. Mem. at 12-13.) Respondent acknowledges 

that a cognizable federal habeas claim can arise from a state sentencing error which “was 

so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute an independent due process violation,” but 

argues that the denial of the petition to recall the sentence is not arbitrary. (Id. at 13-15.) 

 “Before we can apply [28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)’s] standards, we must identify the state 

court decision that is appropriate for our review. When more than one state court has 

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adjudicated a claim, we analyze the last reasoned decision.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). “Where there has been one reasoned state judgment 

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the 

same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991). 

 Petitioner presented his claims in a petition for review filed in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied. (Lodgment Nos. 12-13.) He had previously 

presented the claims to the state appellate court. (Lodgment Nos. 6-10.) The appellate 

denied claim one, stating: 

“The Act [Proposition 36] amended the Three Strikes law with respect to 

defendants whose current conviction is for a felony that is neither serious nor 

violent. In that circumstance, unless an exception applies, the defendant is to 

receive a second-strike sentence of twice the term otherwise provided for the 

current felony, pursuant to the provisions that apply when a defendant has one 

prior conviction for a serious or violent felony.” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th 

at pp. 681-682.) In addition, “the Act provides a procedure by which some 

prisoners already serving third-strike sentences may seek resentencing in 

accordance with the new sentencing rules. (Citation.) ‘An inmate is eligible 

for resentencing if . . . (¶) . . . (t)he inmate is serving an indeterminate term of 

life imprisonment imposed pursuant to (the Three Strikes law) for a conviction 

of a felony or felonies that are not defined as serious and/or violent . . . .’” (Id. 

at p. 682.) 

Based on “the present verb tense in describing the character of the current 

offense, the parallel structure of the sentencing and resentencing provisions, 

and the ballot arguments in support of Proposition 36” our high court 

concluded that “the classification of an offense as serious or violent for 

purposes of resentencing is based on the law as of November 7, 2012, the 

effective date of Proposition 36.” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 683.) 

Here, Bell’s offense of making a criminal threat was not a serious felony 

at the time Bell committed his offense, but was added to the list of serious 

felonies by Proposition 21, effective March 8, 2000. (Manduley v. Superior 

Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 577; § 1192.7, subd. (c)(38).) Because making 

a criminal threat was classified as a serious felony on the Act’s effective date, 

Bell was ineligible for recall of his sentence under section 1170.126, and the 

trial court did not err in denying his petition. 

(Lodgment No. 11, People v. Bell, No. D064935, slip op. at 3-4) 

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 “In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a 

conviction violated the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in the 

interpretation or application of state law. Id. at 67-68. However, with respect to alleged 

state sentencing errors, “the question to be decided by a federal court on petition for habeas 

corpus is . . . whether [the error] is so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent 

due process or Eighth Amendment violation.” Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992) 

(internal citation and quote marks omitted); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 

448 (1972) (finding a due process violation where federal sentence was enhanced by the 

use of unconstitutionally obtained prior convictions). 

As set forth above, claim one was denied by the state appellate court on the basis 

that the California Supreme Court has decided “that ‘the classification of an offense as 

serious or violent for purposes of resentencing is based on the law as of November 7, 2012, 

the effective date of Proposition 36.’” (Lodgment No. 11, People v. Bell, No. D064935, 

slip op. at 3, quoting Johnson, 61 Cal.4th at 683.) In fact, the appellate court stayed 

Petitioner’s appeal until Johnson was decided. (Lodgment No. 8.) The United States 

Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state law, 

including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal 

court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam). 

This Court must defer to the state court’s construction unless it is “untenable or amounts 

to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional violation.” Oxborrow v. 

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 Petitioner has failed to show that it was in any way arbitrary for the state court to 

conclude that a serious felony for purposes of Proposition 36 includes crimes which were 

listed as serious felonies when it was passed in 2012, even though they were not serious 

felonies when they were committed. Petitioner does not dispute that California’s Three 

Strikes law was amended in 2000 to include his commitment offense as a serious felony, 

so there is no factual dispute with respect to this claim. Petitioner has not shown any 

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arbitrariness in the state appellate court rejection of his statutory construction argument 

regarding the verb tense of the provision providing whether a crime is a serious felony 

when it was committed or when Proposition 36 was passed. Rather, the record shows the 

opposite, that the rejection of his claim was based on a considered, well-reasoned opinion 

from the California Supreme Court. See e.g. Black’s Law Dictionary, at p. 119 (10th ed. 

2014) (defining arbitrary in part as “founded on prejudice or preference rather than on 

reason or fact.”) 

Petitioner’s failure to identify any arbitrariness in the statutory interpretation by the 

state court, and his failure to show that the state supreme court’s Johnson opinion is 

“untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional violation,” 

precludes a finding that the state court adjudication of the claim is either contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Oxborrow, 877 

F.2d at 1399; White, 134 S.Ct. at 1706-07; Richter, 562 U.S. at 103; Bradshaw, 546 U.S. 

at 76; Richmond, 506 U.S. at 50; Tucker, 404 U.S. at 448. Neither has Petitioner 

demonstrated that the state court adjudication rests on an objectively unreasonable finding 

of fact. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. Moreover, even assuming Petitioner could satisfy the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) or show they do not apply, he must still establish that a 

federal constitutional violation occurred in order to obtain habeas relief. Fry, 551 U.S. at 

119-22. As set forth above, Petitioner has not shown that the denial of his petition to recall 

his sentence was in any way arbitrary or capricious. Thus, he has failed to show that a 

federal due process violation occurred. Richmond, 506 U.S. at 50; Tucker, 404 U.S. at 

447. 

The Court finds that federal habeas relief is unavailable as to claim one because the 

state court adjudication of the claim is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 

The Court also finds that even assuming Petitioner could satisfy those provisions, habeas 

relief is precluded because he has failed to show that his federal due process rights were 

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violated by the state court statutory interpretation of Proposition 36. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a) (“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant 

to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”) 

B. Claim Two 

Petitioner contends in claim two that state and federal ex post facto principles were 

violated by the denial of his petition to recall his sentence. (Pet. at 18-23.) He argues that 

the state appellate court’s determination that ex post facto principles are not implicated 

because the change in law did not increase his sentence, but in fact decreased the sentence 

of many offenders, is too narrow an interpretation of the state and federal ex post facto 

clauses. (Id.) 

Respondent answers that the appellate court correctly found that Proposition 36 does 

not provide relief to persons, like Petitioner, who were convicted of criminal offenses 

which were considered serious felonies at the time of its adoption. (Ans. Mem. at 13-15.) 

Respondent argues that no ex post facto concerns arise from that finding because Petitioner 

was neither punished, nor had his punishment increased, for his prior offense due to his 

ineligibility for relief under Proposition 36. (Id.) 

The state appellate court denied claim two, stating: 

“(T)he ban on ex post facto legislation is narrow in scope. Recently, 

the United States Supreme Court restructured its understanding of the ex post 

facto clause by rejecting certain expansive formulations that had developed 

over the years, and by returning the clause to its original meaning at the time 

the Constitution was framed. (Citations.) (¶) As a result, the ex post facto 

clause prohibits only those laws which ‘retroactively alter the definition of 

crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.’ (Citations.) The basic 

purpose of the clause is to ensure fair warning of the consequences of violating 

penal statutes, and to reduce the potential for vindictive legislation. (Citation.) 

The federal and state ex post facto clauses are interpreted identically. 

(Citation.)” (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1170.) 

/ / / 

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Here, at the time the Act [Proposition 36] became effective, Bell had 

already been sentenced for his crime. The Act did not increase that 

punishment or make it greater than when it was committed. “A finding an 

inmate is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.126 does not 

increase or aggravate that individual’s sentence; rather, it leave him or her 

subject to the sentence originally imposed.” (People v. Osuna (2014) 225 

Cal.App.4th 1020, 1040.) Moreover, the Act provides for a decreased

punishment for certain eligible defendants. Thus, the trial court’s denial of 

Bell’s petition to recall his sentence does not raise ex post facto concerns. 

 

(Lodgment No. 11, People v. Bell, No. D064935, slip op. at 4-5) 

The United States and California Constitutions proscribe ex post facto laws, and both 

protect against the adoption of statutes that inflict greater punishment than the law in effect 

at the time the defendant committed the criminal act. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 

42-43 (1990); People v. Grant, 20 Cal.4th 150, 158 (1999). The California courts “interpret 

the federal and state ex post facto clauses identically,” both of which provide in relevant 

part that “Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the 

punishment for criminal acts.” People v. Helms, 15 Cal.4th 608, 614 (1997) (“United 

States Supreme Court precedent not only is binding with respect to the federal clause, but 

is persuasive with respect to the clause in the California Constitution.”) 

As the state appellate court observed, the United States Supreme Court has held that 

the ex post facto clause protects from retroactively altering the definition of criminal 

offenses or increasing punishment for crimes after they have been committed. Collins, 497 

U.S. at 43. Petitioner has not shown that his sentence has been increased, merely that it 

has not been decreased. Neither can he establish that the definition of his crime has been 

retroactively changed. It is true that its status as a serious felony for the purposes of 

California’s Three Strikes law has changed since he committed his offense. However, that 

does not amount to an alteration of the definition of his offense. See id. at 52 (“The Texas 

statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does not punish as a crime an act 

previously committed, which was innocent when done, nor make more burdensome the 

punishment for a crime, after its commission, nor deprive one charged with crime of any 

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defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed. Its application 

to respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of Art. 1, § 10.”) 

Thus, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state court adjudication of this claim is 

contrary to clearly established federal law. See Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 991 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen a state court may draw a principled distinction between the case before 

it and Supreme Court caselaw, the law is not clearly established for the state-court case.”) 

Petitioner has failed to show that the state court determination that ex post facto 

principles are not implicated here “is so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Thus, he has failed to demonstrate that the denial 

of claim two involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Id.; 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; Richmond, 506 U.S. at 50. Neither has he demonstrated that 

the state court adjudication rests on an objectively unreasonable finding of fact. Miller-El, 

537 U.S. at 340. 

The Court finds that federal habeas relief is unavailable as to claim two because the 

state court adjudication is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. The Court also finds 

that even assuming Petitioner could satisfy those provisions, habeas relief is precluded 

because he has failed to show that his federal due process rights were violated by the denial 

of his petition to recall his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (“The Supreme Court, a 

Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties 

of the United States.”) 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and directing 

that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition with prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 10, 2017, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than February 24, 2017. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: January 13, 2017 

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