Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00074/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ishmael Abdul-Haqq, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

A.D.W. Cluff, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-08-74-PHX-EHC (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in

State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (docket # 1) Respondents filed an Answer

(docket # 9) to which Petitioner replied. (docket # 10) Because Petitioner’s Reply expanded

on his claims and added several new claims, the Court permitted Petitioner to supplement his

Petition with those claims and ordered additional briefing. (docket # 11) Respondents

subsequently filed a Supplemental Answer (docket # 12) to which Petitioner has not replied

and the deadline has passed. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The following events gave rise to Petitioner’s challenged conviction and sentence. 

A. Factual Background

In late September or early October 2001, Donald Hines, Jr. and his girlfriend, Latisha,

where visiting friends at the Roeser Apartments in Phoenix, Arizona. (Respondents’ Exh. A,

Tr. 8/13/02 at 73-74, 122; Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 6) While Latisha was inside an apartment,

Petitioner, who Donald knew “from the neighborhood,” and another person started a fight

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with Donald. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 5-7) Petitioner struck Donald in the eye

and the back of the head. Donald backed away from Petitioner and the other assailant. (Id.

at 7-8) When Latisha came outside, she saw Donald “backing up” from Petitioner and

another person. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 121, 123) Latisha saw Petitioner hit

Donald in the face and saw Petitioner “pull a gun out” and “point it at the back of Donald’s

head.” (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 123-24) After Donald retreated, he and Latisha

walked to his grandmother’s house nearby. (Respondents’ Exh. A Tr. 8/13/02 at 124; Exh.

B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 8) 

Several weeks later, on the evening of October 20, 2001, Latisha and Donald’s sister,

Stacy, were driving Donald’s car when it got a flat tire. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02

at 8-9) Donald’s father, Donald Hines, Sr., and Donald’s uncle, Darrell, drove Donald to his

car. Donald called “roadside assistance,” and later rode in the tow truck which towed the car

to his grandmother’s house. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 9, 28-29; Exh. A, Tr.

8/13/02 at 73, 75, 98-99) On the way to his grandmother’s house, Donald noticed a party at

the Roeser Apartments. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 10) Donald called a friend

who picked up Donald, Latisha, and Stacy and drove them to Roeser Apartments. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B Tr. 8/14/02 at 9-10; Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 125-26; Exh. C, Tr.

8/15/02 at 118) 

Upon arriving at the Roeser Apartments, Donald stood near the driveway of the

complex talking to several people. Latisha and Stacy stood a few feet behind Donald, in

between two cars, talking to each other. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 127-28; Exh.

B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 12-17) A few minutes later, Latisha saw Petitioner approach from her left

and walk in front of her holding a handgun in his right hand, partially hidden by his shirt. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 128-29, 156; Exh. C, Tr. 8/15/03 at 110-11, 113)

Latisha saw Petitioner approach Donald from behind and “tap[] him on the shoulder.”

(Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 129-30; Exh. C, Tr. 8/15/02 at 113-14)

After feeling a tap on his shoulder and hearing Petitioner’s voice, Donald looked over

his shoulder and saw Petitioner’s face. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 130; Exh. B,

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Tr. 8/14/02 at 17-18; Exh. C, Tr. 8/15/02 at 114) Petitioner immediately began shooting

Donald. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 18, 36; Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 131) Donald

tried to get away, but was shot in the leg and fell to the ground face first. (Respondents’

Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 131; Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 18-19) Donald turned his head and saw

Petitioner walking towards him pointing a gun towards Donald’s head. (Respondents’ Exh.

B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 20) Donald “turned” or “jerk[ed]” his head to the right as Petitioner aimed

the gun at this head and fired another shot. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 21; Exh. A,

Tr. 8/13/02 at 132-22) After Petitioner fired a shot at Donald’s head, Donald turned and saw

Petitioner running towards 18th Street. Donald tried to crawl but couldn’t move his leg. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 21-24) Latisha saw Petitioner aim and shoot at

Donald’s head. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 132-33) Petitioner then ran from the

scene. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 134; Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 21) 

During this same time, Donald’s father and uncle Darrell were at the Roeser

Apartments where Darrell was visiting his daughter. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at

75) Donald, Sr. parked west of the complex, facing east toward 18th Street. He waited in his

car while Darrell went inside. While waiting, he observed a young man approach another

man and shoot him in the back. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 75-80) He saw the

victim fall to the ground and then observed the shooter shoot the victim “five or six more

times.” (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 78-80) Donald, Sr. saw the shooter run past

his car about 20 to 50 feet away from him. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 79-82)

Donald, Sr. recognized Petitioner, the shooter, who he knew as “Crimson,” (Respondents’

Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 82-83, 112-113) Donald, Sr., however, did not immediately realize

the victim was his son. Donald, Sr. and Darrell returned to the car and started to leave.

(Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 78, 83) While driving away, Donald Sr. realized that

the victim was his son and went to help him. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 83-84,

94) Donald Sr. picked up his son and then he and Darrell drove him to County Hospital. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 8/13/02 at 85, 110) 

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Donald suffered two gunshot wounds to the back, two to the left side of his chest, one

to the arm, and one to the leg. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 22-23, 40-44) Donald

also sustained a collapsed lung and a fractured femur. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at

24) He had surgery to insert a metal rod in his leg and spent two weeks in the hospital. (Id.)

Petitioner testified at trial. He acknowledged having a brief argument with Donald a

few weeks before the shooting. (Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. 8/15/02 at 88) Petitioner testified

that he was at the Roeser Apartments on the evening of October 20, 2001 visiting the mother

of one of his children who “stays in that area.” (Respondents’ Exh. C at 85, 95) Petitioner

first saw Donald when he drove in by the “tow truck.” (Respondents’ Exh. C at 86)

Petitioner testified that he later saw Donald “standing in the middle of the street,” and stated

that they exchanged “acknowledgments.” (Respondents’ Exh. C at 87-88) Petitioner stated

that, at the time of the shooting, “a group of people” were “circling” him while he “was

talking to a female.” (Respondents’ Exh. C at 88) Petitioner described the incident as

follows:

I was at the building between 2 and 3. I was — my back was towards 

18th. And as I am talking to this female, I heard shots. Shots went off 

like, boom, boom, boom, boom. I was not counting, you know what I’m

saying, because shots go off all day, no difference from a prior day. We

stop, drop, and roll. That is immediate. We stopped, dropped, and I rolled. 

That’s what I’m saying.

At the same time, I look up and I see this Suburban. Make sure the 

Suburban goes by before I jump up. As he goes by, I jump up, take off

running towards the gate part. Stop and see everybody move. I am trying 

to figure out what is going on. See everybody moving back and forth. 

Then I made my way to my car. 

(Respondents’ Exh. C at 88-89) Petitioner testified that he drove away in his blue Monte

Carlo and did not know that Donald had been shot until Petitioner was arrested on January 8,

2002. (Id. at 90-91, 94) Petitioner claimed he neither owned nor possessed a gun on

October 20, 2001. (Id. at 90, 103) Petitioner admitted an October 1997 felony conviction. 

(Id. at 91)

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 1 The Honorable Arthur Anderson presided. He is no relation to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge.

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B. Charges and Trial

Based on the foregoing incident, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner with

attempted second degree murder. 

Following a jury trial,1

 on August 16, 2002, Petitioner was convicted of attempted

second degree murder, a dangerous offense. (Respondents’ Exh. E, Tr. 8/16/02 at 3-4)

Before sentencing, on October 21, 2002, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for change of

counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. H) Following a hearing, on November 8, 2002, the court

denied the motion. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 11/8/02 at 5) The court noted that counsel

had submitted evidence regarding treatment and medication Petitioner was receiving while

in jail and, based “partly” on that information, ordered a presentence mental health

evaluation of Petitioner pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 26.5. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 3, 4-6)

The court appointed psychologist Dr. Robert Block to evaluate Petitioner’s competency to

proceed with sentencing. (Id. at 6) 

Dr. Block examined Petitioner and filed a report on December 22, 2002 opining that

Petitioner might not be competent, but that “[t]he possibility exists of a certain amount of

malingering.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 2-3) On January 24, 2003, the court ordered Dr.

Block to conduct a follow-up examination and submit a supplemental report addressing

Petitioner’s ability to communicate with counsel and to participate in sentencing “in a

meaningful way.” (Respondents’ Exh. K at 2) Dr. Block submitted an addendum to his

original report opining that Petitioner was not able to communicate effectively with counsel

or meaningfully participate in sentencing preparation. (Respondents’ Exh. L) The court

subsequently ordered a comprehensive mental health evaluation and transferred the case to

the “Rule 11 Commissioner’s Court for all further proceedings relating to Defendant’s

competency as indicated.” (Respondents’ Exh. M)

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Drs. Anne Harris and Kevin Hoffert examined Petitioner and both recommended that,

although he was likely “malingering,” Petitioner be sent to the Arizona State Hospital for

further examination and, if appropriate, treatment. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 2, 5, Exh. O at

2, 4) The parties stipulated to submit the issue of Petitioner’s competency to the court based

on the reports of Drs. Harris and Hoffert. (Respondents’ Exh. P) Based on those reports, on

June 12, 2003, Commissioner Benjamin Vatz found Petitioner incompetent to be sentenced

and committed him to Arizona State Hospital for evaluation and treatment. (Respondents’

Exh. Q at 2)

Thereafter, in an October 24, 2003 report, Dr. Edward Jasinski opined that Petitioner

was “malingering” symptoms of psychoses and cognitive defects “to avoid dealing with his

current legal situation.” (Respondents’ Exh. R at 3-5) Dr. Jasinski explained that Petitioner

“attempted to present throughout his hospitalization as having little or no understanding of

legal issues” and cognitive deficits. (Respondents’ Exh. R at 4) However, Petitioner was

observed displaying “good cognitive abilities” when interacting in “group activities,” such a

playing chess, when interacting with visitors, and when speaking on the phone. 

(Respondents’ Exh. R at 4) Dr. Jasinski concluded that Petitioner was competent to assist

counsel “should he choose” to do so. (Respondents’ Exh. R at 5) 

 The parties stipulated to submit the issue of competency based upon Dr. Jasinski’s

report. (Respondents’ Exh. S) Commissioner Vatz found that Petitioner was “malingering

symptoms of psychoses and cognitive deficits,” and found him competent to understand the

proceedings and assist counsel with his defense. Commissioner Vatz transferred the case

back to the trial court. (Respondents’ Exh. T)

On April 30, 2004, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a slightly aggravated term of

18 years’ imprisonment. (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/30/04 at 39) 

C. Direct Appeal

Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, claiming that the imposition of

an aggravated sentence, absent jury findings of aggravating factors, violated his Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 7-9) On October 11, 2005, the

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Court of Appeals rejected this claim and affirmed Petitioner’s sentence. (Respondents’ Exh.

W)

D. Post-Conviction Proceedings

On December 28, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Respondents’ Exh. X) Petitioner’s counsel subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction

relief, claiming that Petitioner was “incompetent” to stand trial, and that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing before trial. (Respondents’ Exh. Y)

On July 31, 2006, the trial court denied relief finding that Petitioner failed to allege

colorable claims based upon “Defendant’s participation in trial, his subsequent ability to

recall trial events and the post trial finding of malingering.” (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 2) The

court’s conclusion that Petitioner was able to recall trial events was based on a March 6,

2003 letter Petitioner sent to the trial court two weeks after he was non-responsive to Dr.

Hoffert during his Rule 26.5 examination. (Respondents’ Exhs. CC, Z at 2) In the letter,

Petitioner reviewed trial testimony and cited to personal background issues. (Id.) 

Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals which was denied on July

12, 2007. (Respondents’ Exhs. AA, BB) 

E. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On January 11, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus

raising the following claims: 

Constitution[al] rights of D[ue] Process because the state took [him] throw (sic)

Rule 11 after [his] trial.

Fact One: I had a nervous brake (sic) down dureing (sic) trail (sic) after seeing 3 

doctors I was sent to state hospital. Doctors said I suffered from depression 

and post [traumatic] stress and [should not have] went throw trail. (sic)

Fact Two: My fast and speedy trail (sic) was violated after state took same

charges back to grand jury to get higher charge.

Fact 3: No one on jury was African Amarican (sic).

(docket # 1 at 2) Respondents filed an Answer, arguing that Petitioner’s speedy trial and

jury-related claims are procedurally barred and that his competency claim lacks merit. 

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(docket # 9) With leave of Court, Petitioner subsequently supplemented his Petition to

include the following claims:

1. Appellate counsel was ineffective because he had a conflict of interest;

2. Petitioner’s aggravated sentence violates Blakely;

3. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Rule 11 motion before trial;

4. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain expert testimony regarding the

weapon that was used in the shooting;

5. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach the victim and eyewitnesses;

and

6. The trial court erred in giving a flight instruction. 

(see dockets ## 10, 11) Thereafter, Respondents filed a Supplemental Answer. (docket #

12) Petitioner did not file a reply to the Supplemental Answer despite the Court’s order

advising him that he could do so. (docket # 11) The Court will now consider Petitioner’s

claims after setting forth the relevant law regarding exhaustion and the standard of review

governing § 2254 petitions. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The exhaustion

inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). The prisoner

“shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to

raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). In other

words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state courts one full opportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One complete round”

includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary

appellate review procedure in the State.” Id.

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to

rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest”

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court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989);

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate

state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona,

unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d

925 (D.Ariz. 2007)(discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

In addition to presenting his claims to the proper court, a state prisoner must fairly

present his claims to that court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Fair presentation

requires a petitioner to describe both the operative facts and the federal legal theory to the

state courts. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support

the federal claim were before the state court or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim

was raised. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28 (stating that a reference to ineffective assistance of

counsel does not alert the court to federal nature of the claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner

must cite in state court to the specific constitutional guarantee upon which he bases his claim

in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general

appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the

right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional

claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds,

247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such

as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial”). 

Likewise, a mere reference to the “Constitution of the United States” does not preserve a

federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of a

federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim would be decided “on the same considerations”

under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal nature of the claim “explicit

either by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts . . . .” Lyons, 232 F.3d at

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668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court if the court must read

beyond the pleadings filed in that court to discover the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at

27. 

In sum, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2)

through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

Procedural Default

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds such as

waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. Thus, a state prisoner may be barred from raising federal claims that he did not

preserve in state court by making a contemporaneous objection at trial, on direct appeal, or

when seeking post-conviction relief. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995)

(stating that failure to raise contemporaneous objection to alleged violation of federal rights

during state trial constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court of

Appeals held that habeas petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct

appeal or in first petition for post-conviction relief.) If the state court also addressed the

merits of the underlying federal claim, the “alternative” ruling does not vitiate the

independent state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carringer

v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found ineffective assistance

of counsel claims “barred under state law,” but also discussed and rejected the claims on the

merits, en banc court held that the “on-the-merits” discussion was an “alternative ruling”

and the claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review). A higher

court’s subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court’s application of a

procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

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The second procedural default scenario arises when a state prisoner failed to present

his federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the

state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the

previously unraised claims. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart,

303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035,

1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (postconviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court's decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal

of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule

32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion because

although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an

available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no

remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). 

Excusing Procedural Default

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Cook v.

Schriro, 516 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2008); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004);

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must

establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply

with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective factors may constitute cause:

(1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

Ordinarily, the ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings does not constitute

cause because “the right to counsel does not extend to state collateral proceedings or federal

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habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a habeas petitioner

bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not

reach the prejudice prong. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if

the petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. To satisfy the “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” standard, petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). Even if petitioner asserts a

claim of actual innocence to excuse his procedural default of a federal claim, federal habeas

relief may not be granted absent a finding of an independent constitutional violation

occurring in the state criminal proceedings. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94.

III. Standard of Review

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

("AEDPA") which “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court

convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 693 (2002). 

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner “whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in

state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638 (2003). Thus, a state prisoner is not

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entitled to relief unless he demonstrates that the state court’s adjudication of his claims

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

75-76 (2003); Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether

a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application” of federal

law, courts must look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court which existed at the

time of the state court’s decision. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-15 (2003);

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged that it cannot reverse a state court decision merely because that decision

conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Even if the state court neither explained its ruling nor cited United States Supreme

Court authority, the reviewing federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court

precedent to determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that

citation to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does not

even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Id. 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

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A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the

court identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a

particular case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An

incorrect application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado,

541 U.S. 652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the

state court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”) “It is not enough that a federal habeas

court, in its independent review of the legal question,” is left with the “firm conviction” that

the state court ruling was “erroneous.” Id.; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. Rather, the petitioner

must establish that the state court decision is “objectively unreasonable.” Middleton v.

McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

Where a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

application of” clearly established federal law, the reviewing court must next determine

whether it resulted in constitutional error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th

Cir. 2002). Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993). In § 2254 proceedings, the federal court must

assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding

under Brecht’s more forgiving “substantial and injurious effect” standard, whether or not the

state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the

“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.

18, 24 (1967).” Fry v. Pliler, ___ U.S.___, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007). The Brecht

harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is

whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v.

Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on

constitutional error in capital penalty phase, error must have had substantial and injurious

effect on the jury's verdict in the penalty phase.); Hernandez v. LaMarque, 2006 WL

2411441 (N.D.Cal., Aug. 18, 2006) (finding that even if the evidence of three of petitioner’s

prior convictions was insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by the court's consideration

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of those convictions because the trial court found four other prior convictions which would

have supported petitioner's sentence.) The Court will review Petitioner’s claims which are

properly before the Court under the applicable standard of review. 

IV. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claims

Below, the Court will determine whether Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred

from federal habeas review and, if appropriate, consider the merits of the claims that are

properly before the Court.

A. Speedy Trial and Jury-Related Claims

Liberally construing the Petition (docket # 1), Petitioner asserts a speedy trial

violation and argues that he was denied his right to an impartial jury due to the lack of

African-Americans on the jury. (docket # 1 at 2) 

Respondents assert that these claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from

federal review because Petitioner did not present such claims to the state courts either during

trial, direct appeal, or post-conviction review. The Court agrees. Petitioner never raised a

speedy trial claim or a jury-related claim to the state courts. Any attempt to return to state

court to present these claims would be futile because the claims would be procedurally

barred pursuant to Arizona law. First, Petitioner is time-barred under Arizona law from

raising his claims in a successive petition for post-conviction relief because the time for

filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4

(a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in

the direct appeal, whichever is later.”) Although Rule 32.4 does not bar dilatory claims if

they fall within the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through (h),

Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions apply to him. Moreover, a state postconviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th

Cir. 2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing

untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition

for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). 

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Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in

any previous collateral proceeding. See also Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d

1149, 1151 (1995) (capital defendant’s early petition for post-conviction relief raised limited

number of issues and waived other issues that he could have then raised, but did not); State

v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112,113, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (App. 1995) (“Defendants are precluded

from seeking post-conviction relief on grounds that were adjudicated, or could have been

raised and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or prior petition for post-conviction relief.”); State

v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (App. 1994) (defendant’s claim that his

sentence had been improperly enhanced by prior conviction was precluded by defendant’s

failure to raise issue on appeal). The aforementioned claims could have been raised either on

direct appeal or in Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceeding. Consequently, the state

court would find these claims procedurally barred. In section C, infra, the Court will

address whether Petitioner has established a basis for overcoming the procedural bar. 

B. Supplemental Claims asserted in Petitioner’s Reply 

Petitioner asserts the following claims in his Reply: (1) appellate counsel was

ineffective because he had a conflict of interest; (2) Petitioner’s aggravated sentence violates

Blakely; (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Rule 11 motion before trial; (4)

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain expert testimony regarding the weapon that

was used in the shooting; (5) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach the victim

and eyewitnesses; and (6) the trial court erred in giving a flight instruction. (docket # 10) 

Respondents assert that Claims 1, 4, 5, and 6 are procedurally defaulted because

Petitioner did not present those claims on direct appeal or in his petition for review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. (docket # 9,

Respondents’ Exhs. V, W, Y, and AA) The Court agrees. 

The record reflects that Petitioner never presented these claims to the Arizona Court

of Appeals. Any attempt to return to state court to present Claims 1, 4, 5 and 6 would be

futile because the claims would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. Petitioner

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is time-barred under Arizona law from raising his claims in a successive petition for postconviction relief because the time for filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long

expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the

issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.”) Although Rule

32.4 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of claims specified in

Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions

apply to him. Moreover, a state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred.

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410

(9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for

dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under

Rule 32.2(a)). 

Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in

any previous collateral proceeding. See also Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d

1149, 1151 (1995) (capital defendant’s early petition for post-conviction relief raised limited

number of issues and waived other issues that he could have then raised, but did not); State

v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112,113, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (App. 1995) (“Defendants are precluded

from seeking post-conviction relief on grounds that were adjudicated, or could have been

raised and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or prior petition for post-conviction relief.”); State

v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (App. 1994) (defendant’s claim that his

sentence had been improperly enhanced by prior conviction was precluded by defendant’s

failure to raise issue on appeal). The aforementioned claims could have been raised either on

direct appeal or in Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceeding. Consequently, the state

court would find these claims procedurally barred. In section C, infra, the Court will

address whether Petitioner has established a basis for overcoming the procedural bar. 

///

///

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C. Excusing Procedural Bar 

Because Petitioner’s speedy trial violation and jury-related claims asserted in his

Petition (docket # 1) and claims 1, 4, 5, and 6 asserted in his Reply (docket # 10) are

procedurally defaulted, habeas review of those claims is barred absent a showing of “cause

and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94.

To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to

the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The

following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a

showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3)

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Prejudice is actual harm resulting

from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.

1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the court need not

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Petitioner does not assert any cause to excuse his failure to properly exhaust his state

remedies. As a general matter, Petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance of the law do not

satisfy the cause standard. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th

Cir. 1986). “[I]t is well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro

se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217,

1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Petitioner’s ignorance of the law and indigent status do not distinguish him from the great

majority of inmates pursuing habeas corpus relief. Such circumstances are not extraordinary

and do not justify tolling the limitations period. “If limited resources, lack of legal

knowledge, and the difficulties of prison life were an excuse for not complying with the

limitation period, the AEDPA’s limitation period would be meaningless since virtually all

incarcerated prisoners have these same problems in common.” Bolanos v. Kirkland, No.

1:06-cv-00808-AWI-TAG HC, 2008 WL 928252, * 4 (E.D.Cal. April 4, 2008). See also,

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of equitable

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tolling because neither the district court’s failure to advise the petitioner of the right to

amend his petition to include unexhausted claims nor petitioner’s inability to correctly

calculate the limitations period were extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable

tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that delays caused

by prison inmate law clerk and law library closures do not justify equitable tolling). 

Likewise, Petitioner’s lack of legal assistance is not an extraordinary circumstance. See,

Ballesteros v. Schriro, CV-06-675-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927 (D.Ariz., February 26,

2007) (noting that a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation

during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances) (citing Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 170, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1999)); Shoemate v.

Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004)(holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of

state’s “rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not justify equitable tolling.”).

A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. Petitioner does not argue that

failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

In summary, federal review of Petitioner’s speedy trial and jury claims (docket # 1)

and Claims 1, 4, 5 and 6 (docket # 10) is procedurally barred. Petitioner has not established

any basis to overcome the procedural bar, therefore, the Court will not reach the merits of

those claims. 

D. Competency to Stand Trial 

Liberally construing the Petition, Petitioner also asserts a due process violation based

on the trial court’s failure to examine Petitioner’s competency to stand trial pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 11. (docket # 1 at 2) Petitioner presented this claim on post-conviction

review. (Respondents’ Exhs. Y, AA) As discussed below, Petitioner fails to establish that

the state court’s resolution of this claims rests on an “unreasonable determination of the

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facts” or is “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” federal law. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). 

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “prohibits the criminal prosecution

of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439

(1992). The controlling Supreme Court law regarding competency is Dusky v. United

States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) where the Court held that a defendant is competent to stand trial

if he has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.” Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (internal citations omitted). The test for

determining whether the trial court violated Due Process by failing to sua sponte inquire into

defendant’s competency to stand trial, is whether the objective facts known to the trial court

at the time created a “bona fide doubt” as to defendant’s competency to stand trial. Pate v.

Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). To give rise to a “bona fide doubt,” there must be

“substantial evidence of incompetence.” Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir.

1995), superseded on other grounds, Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000); see

also Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1987). In determining whether the trial

court should have sua sponte ordered a competency hearing, a federal court may consider

only the evidence that was before the trial judge at that time. Williams v. Woodford, 306

F.3d 665, 702 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The issue is not whether Petitioner was in fact incompetent to stand trial, but whether

the presiding judge had evidence before him which should reasonably have caused him to

doubt petitioner’s competence. If so, the failure to hold a competency hearing violated due

process. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 174-175 (1975). “Although no particular facts

signal incompetence, suggestive evidence includes a defendant’s demeanor before the trial

court, previous irrational behavior, and available medications.” Moran, 57 F.3d at 695. The

Ninth Circuit has stated that the “most telling evidence” that a defendant was competent to

stand trial is the fact that his counsel, “who would have every incentive to point out that his

client was incapable of assisting with his defense,” never raised the claim. Boyde v. Brown,

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404 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005), amended, 421 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005). The fact that

trial counsel did not raise the issue of competency at trial is “powerful evidence” that

defendant was competent. Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 297-98 (3rd Cir. 2001); Beck v.

Angelone, 261 F.3d 377, 389 (4th Cir. 2001). 

Here, Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated because the trial

court did not order a Rule 11 examination of his competency before trial. Defense counsel

did not request a Rule 11 examination. Petitioner does not offer any evidence indicating that

at the time of his trial there was any information before the trial judge that would have

created a “bona fide doubt” about Petitioner’s competency to stand trial. Pate, 383 U.S. at

385; Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. To the contrary, the record contains evidence which supports a

finding that Petitioner was competent to stand trial and to participate in his defense. For

instance, on the third day of trial, defense counsel conveyed that Petitioner was involved in

preparing his defense and helped locate a potential witness several days before trial. 

Counsel engaged in the following exchange with the trial court:

Judge, the facts — you know, I spoke to my client last week and we 

were talking about the various witnesses who [were] going to testify, and 

reviewing the police summaries. I advised him if he had any witnesses, let 

me know. I know that I had asked him previously. And he didn’t — couldn’t

remember—didn’t know of anybody that was there that evening. But Jamal 

Moore is a gentleman that he ran into at the Madison Street jail because Mr. 

Moore is currently in custody currently on unrelated charges. And my client 

told me, know, there is a guy over here that says X, Y, and Z. I said what’s his 

name. He says I don’t know his full name; let me talk to him and I will tell you.

That was last Thursday or Friday. When I saw him Monday, he gave me 

the booking number. I immediately disclosed that to Ms. Kay. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 159-60) 

Petitioner’s participation on the fourth day of trial also weighs against a finding that

there could have been a “bona fide doubt” regarding Petitioner’s competency to stand trial. 

Specifically, Petitioner testified in his defense and, as set forth above, his testimony was

coherent. (Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. 8/15/02 at 84-92) Petitioner was active during crossexamination and challenged the prosecutor. (Id. at 92-100) A defendant’s ability to testify

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cogently at trial without any indicia that he “was not completely aware of what was going

on” is strong evidence of competency. Boyde, 404 F.3d at 1167. 

The only suggestion that Petitioner may have lacked competency surfaced several

months after trial in the form of a letter Petitioner sent to the trial court along with his

motion for change of counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 5-7) Based on that information, the

court ordered a presentence mental health examination to determine Petitioner’s competency

to be sentenced. (Respondents’ Exh. F) Three doctors examined Petitioner and suspected

that he was “malingering.” However, the doctors recommended sending Petitioner to

Arizona State Hospital for a more comprehensive examination and, if necessary, treatment. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J at 2-3, Exh. N at 2, 5; Exh. O at 2, 4) Dr. Jasinski from Arizona State

Hospital determined that Petitioner was “malingering” symptoms of cognitive deficiencies

and psychoses to “avoid dealing with his current legal situation,” and was competent to

assist counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. R at 3-5) Based on Dr. Jasinski’s report, Commissioner

Vatz found that Petitioner was “malingering symptoms of psychoses and cognitive defects,”

and that he was competent to be sentenced. (Respondents’ Exh. T) 

On post-conviction review, Petitioner argued that he was “incompetent” to stand trial,

and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing before trial. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Y) The trial court denied relief, finding that Petitioner failed to allege

colorable claims based upon “Defendant’s participation in trial, his subsequent ability to

recall trial events and the post trial finding of malingering.” (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 2) The

court’s conclusion that Petitioner was able to recall trial events was based on a March 6,

2003 letter Petitioner sent to the trial court two weeks after he had been non-responsive to

Dr. Hoffert during his Rule 26.5 examination. (Respondents’ Exhs. CC, Z at 2) In the

letter, Petitioner reviewed trial testimony and cited to personal background issues. (Id.) 

The factual findings of the trial court are presumed correct and are supported by the

state court record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735

(1990) (stating that a state court finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial is a

finding of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1));

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Sandgathe v. Maas, 314 F.3d 371, 380 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner bears the burden of

rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Petitioner has not offered any evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness. Upon

review of the record, the trial court’s rejection of Petitioner’s competency claim is neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law, accordingly, Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas corpus relief based on that claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

E. Claim 2 - Blakely Violation 

In Claim 2 of his Reply (docket # 10), Petitioner asserts that the imposition of an

aggravated sentence violates the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 (2004). Petitioner presented this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct

review. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 7-9) Therefore, as Respondents concede, this claim was

fairly presented and is properly before this Court. 

Here, the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment. See,

A.R.S. §§ 13-604(J), 13-1001(c)(1), 13-1104(B) (the presumptive sentence is 15 and 3/4

years’ imprisonment, and the maximum sentence is 28 years’ imprisonment). The court

found no mitigating circumstances and the following aggravated circumstances: “The

number of shots that occurred here, the injuries to the victim, and looking at Mr. Haqq’s

prior history of violence.” (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/30/04 at 38-39) On direct appeal,

the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the aggravated sentence complied with Blakely

because the trial court’s finding of Petitioner’s “prior history of violence” was predicated

upon Petitioner’s 1997 conviction for aggravated assault involving a gun and his 1993

juvenile adjudication for aggravated assault involving a gun. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 4-7)

The State court’s determination is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

Blakely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Petitioner argues that his aggravated sentence violates Blakely in which the Supreme

Court held any factor which leads to a sentence greater than would be imposed based on the

jury’s finding of guilt must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (docket # 10) 

Before Blakely, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court held

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“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court specifically

carved out an exception for prior convictions. Id.; United States v. Maria-Gonzalez, 268

F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding prior aggravated felony conviction did not constitute

an element of the offense where base sentence for illegally reentering the United States

following deportation is enhanced if deportation was subsequent to conviction for

aggravated felony); United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding the district court could consider defendant’s prior conviction in imposing sentence

enhancement even though such conduct had not been charged in the indictment, presented to

the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d

411, 415 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting Apprendi held all prior convictions are exempt under 

Apprendi’s new rule, therefore, district court properly considered prior convictions in

sentencing); United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2001)(same). 

As previously stated, under Blakely, any factors which lead to a sentence greater than

that which would be imposed based on the jury’s finding of guilt must be found by the jury. 

542 U.S. at 301. Blakely reaffirmed the exemption for prior convictions and reiterated that

they may serve as aggravating factors without further proof. United States v. QuintanaQuintana, 383 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303). Blakely

also clarified that the “statutory maximum” sentence is initially the presumptive term and is

the “maximum sentence the judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in

the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant ‘statutory

maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts,

but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-

04 (emphasis in original). The Blakely Court concluded that, before a trial court can impose

a sentence above the statutory maximum, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt, or

defendant must admit, all facts “legally essential to punishment.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313

(emphasis added). 

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In this case, the state court’s decision that Petitioner’s aggravated sentence did not

violate the Sixth Amendment was neither an unreasonable application of, nor contrary to,

the Blakely decision. The Arizona Supreme Court considered the impact of Blakely on

Arizona’s sentencing scheme in State v. Martinez II, 210 Ariz. 578, 583, 115 P.3d 618, 623

(Ariz. 2005)(Martinez II). In Arizona, the statutory maximum sentence in a case where no

Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt aggravating factors are present is the presumptive

term.. Martinez II, 210 Ariz. at 583, 115 P.3d at 623; State v. Price, 217 Ariz. 182, 184-85,

171 P.3d 1223, 1225-26 (2007). However, because an Arizona defendant may receive an

aggravated sentence based on only one aggravating factor, A.R.S. § 13-702(B), a single

Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt aggravating factor establishes the facts “legally

essential” to punishment. Once such a factor is established, the trial court is free to consider

additional facts to determine where to sentence a defendant within the aggravated range. 

Martinez II, 210 Ariz. at 584-585, 115 P.3d at 625; Price, 217 Ariz. 182, 185, 171 P.3d at

1226 (stating that “[i]f there is one Apprendi-compliant aggravating factor, “a defendant is

exposed to a sentencing range that extends to the maximum punishment available under

section 13-702.”) 

In view of the foregoing, Petitioner’s prior conviction for aggravated assault and his

prior juvenile conviction for aggravated assault involving a gun exposed Petitioner to the

aggravated sentencing range. Petitioner’s prior conviction for aggravated assault is exempt

from the rule of Apprendi/Blakely. Blakely, 42 U.S. at 301(retaining Apprendi’s exception

for prior felony convictions). The Supreme Court has not resolved whether the “prior

conviction” exception applies to juvenile adjudications. Boyd v. Newland, 455 F.3d 897,

909-10 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ holding that Petitioner’s

juvenile adjudication was Blakely-exempt was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 910. 

Applying Blakely, courts within the Ninth Circuit have held a federal habeas

petitioner’s “prior conviction alone” is sufficient to support the imposition of “a sentence

anywhere within the statutory range.” Jones v. Schriro, No. CV-05-3720-PHX-JAT (DKD),

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2006 WL 1794765, * 3 (D.Ariz. June 27, 2006). In Jones, the court found no Blakely

violation where petitioner’s aggravated sentence was based, in part, on a prior conviction. 

Id. at * 3 n. 2. The court also noted “‘once a jury finds or a defendant admits a single

aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and consider

additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in

that statute.’” Id. at * 2 (quoting State v. Martinez, 115 P.2d 618 (2005)).

In Nino v. Flannigan, No. 2:04cv2298-JWS (CRP), 2007 WL 1412493 (D.Ariz., May

14, 2007), the court found petitioner’s aggravated sentence comported with Blakely because

one of the aggravating factors, a prior conviction, was Blakely-exempt, and the other

aggravating factor was admitted by Petitioner during the plea colloquy. Id. at * 4. The

court explained, under A.R.S. § 13-702, the existence of a single aggravating factor exposes

a defendant to an aggravated sentence. 

Similarly, in this case, Petitioner’s prior convictions exposed him to the aggravated

term of imprisonment. The trial court also found other aggravating factors, the injuries to

the victims and the number of shots. (Respondents' Exh. G at 38-39) However, Petitioner’s 

prior felony convictions alone exposed him to the fully aggravated term. Blakely, 542 U.S.

at 303-04. Therefore, Petitioner’s aggravated sentence comports with the Sixth Amendment.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the state court’s decision that

Petitioner’s aggravated sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment is neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of Blakely. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner’s prior felony conviction and prior juvenile adjudication

were not Blakely-exempt, any resulting error is harmless. See Washington v. Recuenco, 548

U.S. 212 (2006). On federal habeas corpus review, the applicable harmless error standard is

whether the error had a “substantial and injurious effect” upon the sentence. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 616, 623 (1993). 

In this case, no reasonable juror could fail to find beyond a reasonable doubt either of

the two additional aggravating factors which the trial court considered in imposing an

aggravated sentence. Petitioner did not contest the “number of shots” fired. Rather, he

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conceded that “multiple shots” were fired. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 30) The evidence

confirmed that Petitioner fired seven shots. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 22, 79-80,

99) 

Additionally, no reasonable juror could fail to find the “injuries to the victim.” 

Petitioner’s counsel conceded that, “in looking at the six factors that the State listed, I think

probably the one that’s probably not redundant is the issue relative to, and the Court’s (sic)

can consider, the harm to the victim.” (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/30/04 at 30) The victim

suffered significant injuries that were not disputed. He was shot six times - twice in the

chest, twice in the back, once in the arm, and once in the leg. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr.

8/14/02 at 22-23) One bullet passed through the victim’s lung causing it to collapse. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B at 24) The shot to the victim’s leg fractured his femur, requiring that

a “metal rod” be implanted in his leg. (Id.) After being discharged from the hospital, the

victim had to be re-admitted for a “diaphragmatic hernia.” (Id.) At the sentencing hearing,

the victim described his physical injuries:

I would just like to comment about the injuries that I have suffered like 

the multiple surgeries I’ve had to have as a result of this shooting. I’ve had

to have a diaphragmatic hernia repaired. My lung’s collapsed on me. I have 

constant shortness of breath. I have to have another surgery in my leg for 

them to remove the bolts out of my left knee, and my health just seems like

it’s - it’s getting worse, and my leg hasn’t gotten too much better. It constantly

buckles on me when I try to stand more than 30 minutes. It buckles. I just 

start walking and it’s like I’m going to fall. There’s different injuries I’ve been

suffering since this shooting. It’s changed my life dramatically. 

(Respondents’ Exh. E, Tr. 4/30/04 at 32) 

In view of the foregoing, even if Petitioner’s aggravated sentence violated Blakely,

the error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect” upon the sentence and, therefore,

the error was harmless. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. 

F. Claim 3 - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Claim 3 of his Reply, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to file a Rule 11 determination of competency at the time of trial or in failing to move for a

new trial based upon the preliminary finding of the Rule 11 Commissioner regarding

competency for sentencing. (docket # 10) Petitioner presented this claim to the trial court on

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post-conviction review (docket # 9, Exh. Y at 7-8) and to the Arizona Court of Appeals on

review of the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. (Id., Exh.

AA at 9-10) The Court already rejected the basis of this claim in relation to Petitioner’s

claim that he was incompetent to stand trial in Section IV. D, supra. The Court will also

specifically address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d

1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When

reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely

limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). “A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective

assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Acts or omissions

that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691-92; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,147 (2006) (stating that “a violation

of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the

defendant is prejudiced.”) To show prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable

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probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). The Strickland standard applies equally to a

defendant who has been “represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea

upon the advice of counsel . . . .” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1985). A petitioner

who pleads guilty satisfies the prejudice prong by establishing “a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, he would have not pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going

to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Petitioner bears the burden of proving prejudice, the mere

possibility that he suffered prejudice is insufficient to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong. 

Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong. Jackson v. Calderon, 211

F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). The court,

however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. 

Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155. 

On habeas review, the court must give “substantial weight” to the trial judge’s

analysis of a claim of ineffective assistance. Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir.

2000). The habeas court considers only whether the state court applied Strickland

unreasonably:

 For [a petitioner] to succeed [on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim], . . . he must do more than show that he would have satisfied

Strickland’s test if his claim were being analyzed in the first instance,

because under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal 

habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision

applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, he must show that the [state

court] applied Strickland to the facts of the case in an objectively 

unreasonable manner. 

Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99 (citation omitted). See also, Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-

25 (2002) (“Under § 2254(d)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may

not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, it is the habeas applicant’s

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burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an

objectively unreasonable manner.”) (citations omitted).

A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks “sufficient present ability to

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” or lacks “a

rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United

States, 362 U.S. 402 (1996). The standard for competency to stand trial is “modest.” 

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1983) (holding that “[r]equiring that a criminal

defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to

understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.”) 

The record in this matter establishes the Petitioner was not “incompetent.” Rather,

after he was convicted, he began “malingering” symptoms of cognitive deficiencies and

psychoses “to avoid dealing with his current legal situation.” (docket # 9, Exh. R at 3-5) 

On the third day of trial, Petitioner’s counsel indicated that Petitioner was actively

involved in preparing for trial and had helped locate a potential witnesses:

Judge, the facts — you know, I spoke to my client last week and we 

were talking about the various witnesses who [were] going to testify, and 

reviewing the police summaries. I advised him if he had any witnesses, let 

me know. I know that I had asked him previously. And he didn’t — couldn’t

remember—didn’t know of anybody that was there that evening. But Jamal 

Moore is a gentleman that he ran into at the Madison Street jail because Mr. 

Moore is currently in custody currently on unrelated charges. And my client 

told me, know, there is a guy over here that says X, Y, and Z. I said what’s his 

name. He says I don’t know his full name; let me talk to him and I will tell you.

That was last Thursday or Friday. When I saw him Monday, he gave me 

the booking number. I immediately disclosed that to Ms. Kay. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 8/14/02 at 159-60) 

Petitioner’s participation on the fourth day of trial also weighs against a finding that

Petitioner lacked competency to stand trial. Specifically, Petitioner testified in his defense

and his testimony was coherent. (Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. 8/15/02 at 84-92) Petitioner was

active during cross-examination and challenged the prosecutor. (Id. at 92-100) A

defendant’s ability to testify cogently at trial without any indicia that he “was not completely

aware of what was going on” is strong evidence of competency. Boyde, 404 F.3d at 1167. 

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The only suggestion that Petitioner may have lacked competency surfaced several

months after trial in the form of a letter Petitioner sent to the trial court along with his

motion for change of counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 5-7) Based on that information, the

court ordered a presentence mental health examination to determine Petitioner’s competency

to be sentenced. (Respondents’ Exh. F) Three doctors examined Petitioner and all three

suspected that he was “malingering.” However, the doctors recommended sending

Petitioner to Arizona State Hospital for a more comprehensive examination and, if

necessary, treatment. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 2-3, Exh. N at 2, 5; Exh. O at 2, 4) Dr.

Jasinski from Arizona State Hospital determined that Petitioner was “malingering”

symptoms of cognitive deficiencies and psychoses to “avoid dealing with his current legal

situation,” and was competent to assist counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. R at 3-5) Based on Dr.

Jasinski’s report, Commissioner Vatz found that Petitioner was “malingering symptoms of

psychoses and cognitive defects,” and that he was competent to be sentenced. 

(Respondents’ Exh. T) 

On post-conviction review, Petitioner argued that he was “incompetent” to stand trial,

and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing before trial. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Y) The trial court denied relief finding that Petitioner failed to allege

colorable claims based upon “Defendant’s participation in trial, his subsequent ability to

recall trial events and the post trial finding of malingering.” (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 2) The

court’s conclusion that Petitioner was able to recall trial events was based on a March 6,

2003 letter Petitioner sent to the trial court two weeks after he had been non-responsive to

Dr. Hoffert during his Rule 26.5 examination. (Respondents’ Exhs. CC, Z at 2) In the

letter, Petitioner reviewed trial testimony and cited to personal background issues. (Id.) 

The factual findings of the trial court are presumed correct and are supported by the

state court record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735

(1990) (stating that a state court finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial is a

finding of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Sandgathe v. Maas, 314 F.3d 371, 380 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner bears the burden of

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rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Petitioner has not offered any evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness. Upon

review of the record, the trial court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to request a Rule 11 hearing prior to, or during, trial, or moving for a

new trial based on Commissioner Vatz’ preliminary finding that Petitioner was incompetent

to be sentenced, is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

Counsel’s conduct in not requesting a Rule 11 competency hearing, or moving for a new

trial, based on Commissioner Vatz’ preliminary finding that Petitioner was incompetent to

be sentenced was “reasonable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. 

There was no basis for counsel to suspect that Petitioner was “incompetent” to stand trial. 

The state court record, including Petitioner’s assistance to counsel and his trial testimony,

establish that Petitioner was competent throughout trial. Counsel is not required to file a

frivolous motion. Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994).

Moreover, Petitioner cannot establish that he suffered any prejudice as a result of

counsel’s alleged deficient performance. Both the trial court and Commissioner Vatz found

that Petitioner was competent and was malingering symptoms of cognitive deficiencies. 

(Respondents’ Exh. T at 1-2, Exh. Z at 2) Petitioner has not carried his burden of

establishing a “reasonable probability” that had counsel requested a Rule 11 competency

hearing or moved for a new trial, Petitioner would have been found incompetent to stand

trial or that the result of the proceedings would have otherwise been different. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance fails. 

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing, the Petition, including the claims raised in the

Reply (docket # 10), should be denied because Petitioner’s claims are either are procedurally

defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review or lack merit. 

Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket # 1), as

supplemented by his Reply (docket # 10), be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of June, 2008.

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