Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04363/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04363-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT GUICHARD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MANDALAY PICTURES, LLC, d/b/a

MANDALAY ENTERTAINMENT, METROGOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS, INC., et al., 

Defendants. /

No. C 04-4363 JSW

ORDER GRANTING MPAA

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND STUDIO

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Now before the Court is the motion by Defendants Motion Picture Association of

America, Inc., erroneously named as MPAA; Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc.; Warner Bros.

Entertainment, Inc.; Walt Disney Pictures and Television, erroneously named as Buena Vista

Pictures Distribution; Paramount Pictures Corporation; Twentieth Century Fox Film

Corporation; and Universal Studios LLLP (collectively “MPAA Defendants”) to dismiss

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Case 3:04-cv-04363-JSW Document 81 Filed 08/22/05 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Also before the Court is the motion by Defendants Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.

(“MGM”) and Mandalay Pictures LLC (“Mandalay”) (collectively “Studio Defendants”) for

judgment on the pleadings on the fifth sixth, seventh and eighth claims pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(c). 

 Having carefully read the parties’ papers and considered the arguments and the

relevant legal authority, the Court hereby GRANTS the MPAA Defendants’ motion to dismiss

without leave to amend on all claims pending against them and GRANTS the Studio

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the fifth sixth, seventh and eighth claims

against them.

BACKGROUND

In his initial complaint filed on October 15, 2004, Plaintiff named only the Studio

Defendants and asserted claims for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §

1125(a), for breach of confidentiality, common law misappropriation, and violations of

California Business and Professions Code § 17200. In his amended complaint filed December

13, 2004, Plaintiff named the MPAA Defendants for the first time and added claims against

them and the Studio Defendants for violation of the Sherman and Cartwright Acts, as well as for

violation of the California Business and Professions Code § 17200. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Motion Picture Association of America is a “trade association of the American film

industry” and the other MPAA Defendants are six of the seven members of the Association. 

(FAC, ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that MPAA members constitute a majority of the United States

theatrical motion picture production and distribution markets. (FAC, ¶¶ 31, 43.) 

Plaintiff alleges that in 1925 the MPAA established the Title Registration Bureau

(“TRB”) that functions as the central registration bureau for titles of motion pictures in the

United States. (FAC, ¶ 32.) The TRB promulgates a set of rules (“TRB Rules”) which require

all members to register their titles for theatrical motion pictures prior to their release. (FAC, ¶

32; TRB Rules §§ 2.2.3, 3.1 (attached to Motion Brief as Appendix 1).) TRB members are

prohibited from using a particular title unless they have priority granted by prior registration. 

(FAC, ¶ 36; TRB Rules § 5.1.2.) Once a title is registered, an identical title cannot be used for a

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theatrical motion picture by any other MPAA member or signatory without a waiver from the

initial title registrant. (FAC, ¶ 36, TRB Rules § 4.3.) The MPAA members all participate in the

TRB, although the TRB is open to non-members if they sign an agreement to join, agree to

follow the TRB Rules, and pay an annual fee. (FAC, ¶ 30; TRB Rules §§ 2.2.4, 2.4.1.) 

Plaintiff contends that he wrote a screenplay in 1993 called “Into The Blue,” an

underwater action and adventure story about searching the waters off Florida and the Bahamas

for a sunken ship and treasure. (FAC, ¶¶ 21-22.) Plaintiff contends that in 1997 he submitted

his screenplay to Mandalay who declined to pursue its production. (FAC, ¶¶ 24-25.) Plaintiff

claims that the Studio Defendants misappropriated his title, ideas, and elements of the

screenplay by making a similar motion picture and improperly registered the title with the TRB

when they knew, or should have known, that the title belonged to Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶¶ 60-61.) 

In 1999, Plaintiff changed the title of his screenplay to “In2Blue” and claims still to be

developing and producing his theatrical motion picture based on his original script. (FAC, ¶ 21,

5.) 

According to Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendant Mandalay registered the title “Into The

Blue” with the TRB in June 2002 and on MGM registered the identical title in May 2003. 

(FAC, ¶¶ 34, 35.) Also, in 2003, Mandalay waived its rights to the title with the TRB, thereby

putting MGM in priority position. (FAC, ¶ 36.) Plaintiff contends that the prior registrations of

the motion picture title preclude Plaintiff from having the member studios produce his

screenplay without receiving a waiver from MGM. (FAC, ¶ 37.) He claims that the TRB Rules

function as a monopoly and unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, as

well as the Cartwright Act and California Business and Professions Code § 17200.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be denied unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief. Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

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80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable

legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court is not, however, bound to

accept as true conclusory allegations of law or legal conclusions couched as a factual allegation. 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Arpin v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d

912, 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). For private antitrust claims, if the facts

“do not at least outline or adumbrate a violation of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs will get

nowhere merely by dressing them up in the language of antitrust.” Rutman Wine Co. v. E&J

Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 736 (9th Cir. 1987). A claimant must, at a minimum, sketch the

outline of the antitrust violation with allegations of supporting factual detail. Les Shockley

Racing, Inc. v. National Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1989).

B. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim Under the Sherman Act.

In order to plead a claim under the Sherman Act, Plaintiff must allege a restraint on

competition that harms competition in the relevant market. See McClinchy v. Shell Chem. Co.,

845 F.2d 802, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It is the impact upon competitive conditions in a

definable market which distinguishes the antitrust violation from the ordinary business tort.

[The] failure to allege injury to competition is a proper ground for dismissal by judgment on the

pleadings.”) 

The essence of Plaintiff’s claims against the MPAA Defendants is that the TRB Rules

serve as a monopolistic structure precluding the production and distribution of motion pictures

by small, independent film makers. However, the uncontested facts are that the TRB Rules do

not prevent members (or non-members) from distributing Plaintiff’s, or any other independent

film maker’s, motion picture. At most the rules restrict MPAA members from producing a

motion picture with a title identical to one accorded priority under the TRB Rules. (FAC, ¶ 36,

TRB Rules §§ 2.2.3, 3.1, 5.1.2.) Restricting the use of a title does not harm competition in the

relevant markets alleged by Plaintiff, the United States motion picture production or distribution

markets. (FAC, ¶¶ 73, 91.) 

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 In his written submissions as well as at oral argument on the motion, Plaintiff asserts

that the TRB Rules effectively create a private Patent and Trademark Office and grant a

“language monopoly” or a “monopoly of words from the dictionary.” (Opp. Br. at 7; FAC, ¶

85.) The MPAA’s private arrangement to prioritize the use of motion picture titles, as

Plaintiff concedes in his complaint, is designed “to avoid confusion in the marketplace

between competing projects with identical or similar marks.” (FAC, ¶ 84.) Such private

arrangement serves its members by prioritizing the right to use a certain title among its

members; it does not constitute a private PTO and such prioritizing does not constitute a

monopoly in the relevant market. There is no relevant market made up of words, or titles,

and the relevant market designated by Plaintiff – the United States motion picture production

and distribution – is not affected by the restrictions imposed by the TRB Rules, as discussed

above.

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The TRB Rules effectively manage, among its members, the priority of rights given to

the users of various titles for motion pictures. Such mechanism for priority of rights is similar

(although not identical) to the assertion of trademark rights.1

 As a matter of law, possessing and

asserting priority of trademark rights does not harm competition in the market associated with

the mark. See Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2nd Cir. 1997) (holding

that a trademark is, by its nature, non-exclusionary, and “does not confer a legal monopoly on

any good or idea; it confers rights to a name only.”) Because a trademark, or in this case, a

priority to use of a motion picture title, “‘merely enables the owner to bar others from use of the

mark, as distinguished from competitive manufacture and sale of identical goods bearing

another mark, . . . the opportunity for effective antitrust misuse of a trademark, as distinguished

from collateral anti-competitive activities on the part of the manufacturer or seller of the goods

bearing the mark, is so limited that it poses a far less serious threat to the economic health of the

nation.’” Id. (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314

(S.D.N.Y. 1969).) A trademark agreement does no more than regulate how a certain name may

be used and does not in any way restrict competition in the production or sale of a competing

good with a different name. Id. at 57; see also California Packing Corp. v. Sun-Maid Raisin

Growers of California, 165 F. Supp. 245, 250-51 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (holding that private

agreement limiting the use of a certain mark does not prevent competitor from engaging in

competitive production and sales in the market, but only restricts the use of the name, and

therefore does not raise antitrust concerns). 

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Restrictions on the use of a title do not ultimately bear on the production or distribution

of the motion picture associated with that title. Even accepting as true all of Plaintiff’s

assertions, the TRB Rules do not function to restrict its members from producing or distributing

Plaintiff’s motion picture project and do not prevent Plaintiff from selling his motion picture

project to member or non-member producers or distributors or from entering those markets

himself. As Plaintiff contends, the TRB Rules are apparently designed to avoid confusion in the

marketplace as to those motion pictures its members or signatories decide to market or

distribute. (FAC, ¶ 84.) The TRB Rules, therefore, have no effect on the motion picture

production or distribution markets. 

Having failed to demonstrate that the rules harm competition in the relevant market,

Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Sherman Act. Because Plaintiff cannot allege facts

sufficient to demonstrate that the MPAA Defendants’ rules harm competition, leave to amend

would be futile and is denied. See Rutman Wine, 829 F.2d at 738 (request for leave to amend

should be denied if amendment would be futile). 

C. Plaintiff Lacks Antitrust Standing.

The fact that Plaintiff lacks antitrust standing serves as an alternate basis for dismissal of

Plaintiff’s claims against the MPAA Defendants. The Clayton Act authorizes a private

individual to bring suit under the antitrust laws if that individual has been “injured in his

business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 15. 

Only individuals who possess antitrust standing by virtue of having suffered such injury may

sue to redress an antitrust violation. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.

California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529-535 (1983); see also Cargill, Inc. v.

Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 103, 113 (1986) (“a private plaintiff must allege threatened

loss or damage ‘of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that

which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.’”) (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,

Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 497 (1977)).

First, as addressed above, restrictions on the use of any particular title do not prevent

Plaintiff, or any other screenwriter, from entering the market for motion picture production or

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 In addition, Plaintiff has not alleged in his complaint that he attempted to register

his title with the TRB and only represented at oral argument that his attempt to register was

frustrated by his own refusal to abide by the terms required for registration. Without having

tried to benefit from the TRB’s registration process, Plaintiff cannot contend that he has

suffered from rejection of the registration of his own title. 

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distribution, and therefore do not restrain competition in those relevant markets. See Clorox,

117 F.3d at 56. Second, Plaintiff cannot allege any specific injury he has suffered as a result of

the MPAA Defendants’ conduct. Plaintiff alleges that he wrote his screenplay nine years before

Mandalay registered “Into The Blue” with the TRB and did not meet with any success

producing or distributing his motion picture project during that time period. (FAC, ¶¶ 21, 34.) 

Further, although Plaintiff contends that film projects often take years to come to successful

fruition, he has not alleged, and cannot allege, that since Mandalay’s registration in 2002 or

MGM’s registration in 2003, any motion picture producer or distributor has rejected Plaintiff’s

project on the basis that a similar title has been granted priority among MPAA members by

virtue of prior title registration. Therefore, there is no factual support for a claim for direct

injury as a result of the MPAA Defendants’ conduct.2

Plaintiff has not alleged, and cannot in good faith allege, facts sufficient to demonstrate

that he has the requisite standing for his federal antitrust claims against the MPAA Defendants. 

Because Plaintiff cannot allege facts demonstrating injury as a result of anticompetitive conduct

by defendants, leave to amend on this basis would also be futile and is denied. See Rutman

Wine, 829 F.2d at 738 (request for leave to amend should be denied if amendment would be

futile). 

D. Other California Causes of Action.

Plaintiff has also alleged two California state law claims against the MPAA Defendants,

under the Cartwright Act and California Business and Professions Code § 17200. In the

absence of anticompetitive conduct capable of harming competition in the relevant market,

Plaintiff’s Cartwright Act claim fails. See, e.g., Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473,

1476-77 (9th Cir. 1986). In addition, the claim falters due to Plaintiff’s lack of standing to

assert antitrust injury. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s state unfair competition claim fails because it is

not based upon “conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the

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policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a

violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” Cel-Tech

Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 187 (1999); see also

Kentmaster Mfg. Co. v. Jarvis Products Corp., 146 F.3d 691, 695 (holding that plaintiff’s

failure to allege harm to competition was fatal to Section 17200 just as it was to Sherman Act,

Section 2 claims). 

E. Studio Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The Studio Defendants join the arguments of the MPAA Defendants and move for

judgment on the pleadings as to the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action pending

against them. Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where, even if all the material facts in

the complaint are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hal Roach

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). For the same

reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

and lacks antitrust standing as to those same claims pending against the Studio Defendants. 

Therefore, the Studio Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the MPAA Defendants’ motion to

dismiss without leave to amend on all claims pending against them and GRANTS the Studio

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the fifth sixth, seventh and eighth claims

against them.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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