Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02130/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02130-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

Before the Court are Petitioner Gary Thomas Kelley’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and Motion for Stay (Doc. 11). The 

Honorable Bridget S. Bade, United States Magistrate Judge, has issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) as to each (Docs. 18, 26), recommending that they be denied. 

Petitioner has objected to both R&Rs. (Docs. 23, 27). For the reasons that follow, the 

Court accepts and adopts the R&Rs, and denies the petition and motion. 

I. Background 

On May 13, 2010, Petitioner was indicted for one count of second-degree murder 

and one count of aggravated assault in the Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. 

CR2010-123572. (Doc. 16-1, Exh. B.) Following a second jury trial, the first having 

resulted in a mistrial by a hung jury, Petitioner was found guilty on both charges. (Doc. 

16, Exhs. C and D.) Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated 25-year term of 

imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction, and a consecutive 7.5-year term 

of imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction on July 5, 2011. (Doc. 16-1, Exh. 

Gary Thomas Kelley, 

 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Laura Escapule, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-14-02130-PHX-SPL

ORDER 

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E.) Petitioner sought direct review of his convictions and sentences, which were 

ultimately affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court on March 27, 2013. (Docs. 16-1, 

Exhs. A, F, G; 16-2, Exhs. H, I.) Petitioner filed a Rule 32 Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief and a State Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which were denied in 2014. (Doc. 

16-2, Exhs. J-O.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on September 24, 2014, raising 

four claims for relief. (Doc. 1.) In Ground One, Petitioner claims the Arizona Supreme 

Court violated his due process rights by failing to consider the merits of the claims raised 

in his state petition for writ of habeas corpus. In Ground Two, Petitioner claims the trial 

court interfered with his ability to obtain transcript excerpts and the state appellate court 

denied him counsel, both in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. In Ground Three, Petitioner claims this first trial court denied him 

due process by constructively amending the indicted charge by giving a “defective jury 

instruction on the charge of second-degree murder excising its two clauses for the 

consideration of self-defense, which confounded the jurors and caused their inability to 

reach a verdict.” In Ground Four, Petitioner claims the first trial court improperly 

declared a mistrial in violation of his due process rights. (Doc. 1 at 6-9.) Respondents 

filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 16), in which they argue that Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally barred. (Doc. 16.) 

II. Standard of Review 

 The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court 

must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific 

objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a petitioner is not entitled as of right to de 

novo review of evidence and arguments raised for the first time in an objection to the 

R&R, and whether the Court considers the new facts and arguments presented is 

discretionary. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621-622 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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III. Discussion 

A. Respondents’ Answer 

First, in his reply in support of his petition, Petitioner moves to strike 

Respondents’ limited answer as nonresponsive to a rule or order under Rule 12(f) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to comply with Rule 5 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases, and because it is a disguised motion to dismiss. (Doc. 22 

at 1.) Petitioner has objected to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling denying this request. 

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge and finds Petitioner’s arguments are 

without merit. As addressed by the Magistrate Judge, this Court’s October 30, 2014 

Order (Doc. 4) specifically permitted Respondents to file an answer limited to affirmative 

defenses, including procedural bar. As cited by Petitioner (Doc. 27 at 3-4), Rule 5 of the 

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires “[t]he answer [to] respond to the allegations of 

the petition.” Respondents’ Limited Answer (Doc. 16) did just that by “fram[ing] the 

issues in dispute.” Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1482 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Further, Petitioner’s objections concerning the Attorney General’s conflict of 

interest are also rejected. Petitioner previously moved for disqualification of the Attorney 

General’s Office from this case because Attorney General Mark Brnovich is married to 

Judge Susan Brnovich, who presided over Petitioner’s criminal proceedings. (Doc. 10.) 

First, as the Magistrate Judge noted, Mark Brnovich was not the Attorney General at the 

time of Petitioner’s conviction, as he was sworn in on January 5, 2015. (Doc. 19 at 4.) 

Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge specifically ordered that Attorney General Brnovich 

be screened from personally participating or discussing this matter. (Doc. 19 at 6.) Thus, 

the Court finds that there are sufficient safeguards in place to protect Petitioner’s interests 

in light of any possible conflict that would arise in this action. Therefore, the Court 

adopts the Magistrate Judge’s denial of Petitioner’s request to strike the answer. 

B. Habeas Petition 

Next, Petitioner has objected to the R&R’s finding that his claims are procedurally 

defaulted and barred from review. Petitioner’s objection however, does not point to any 

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specific flaw in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis or findings. Instead, he offers only 

general objections. To that end, these objections largely consist of criticisms of the justice 

system and a general reiteration of the complaints that were addressed by the Magistrate 

Judge, but without any reference to the Magistrate Judge’s findings with regard to those 

complaints. 

 Under Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district judge must 

review de novo those portions of the R&R that have been “properly objected to.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). A proper objection requires “specific written objections to the 

proposed findings and recommendations.” Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (emphasis 

added). The inherent purpose of this requirement is judicial economy. See Thomas v. Arn, 

474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. Because de novo review of an 

entire R&R would defeat this purpose, a general objection serves to have the same effect 

as if Petitioner had failed to object entirely. As a result, the Court has no obligation to 

review Petitioner’s general objection to the R&R. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149 (no 

review at all is required for “any issue that is not the subject of an objection.”). Thus, the 

Court could summarily adopt the R&R in full. However, out of an abundance of caution, 

the Court will review de novo the R&R’s conclusion on each of Petitioner’s claims. 

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Ground One 

fails because it is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 

497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state 

law). Petitioner challenges the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Arizona law to 

dismiss his state petition for writ of habeas corpus. This claim turns on the interpretation 

and application of state law, and Petitioner’s due process characterization does not 

transform it into a federal claim. 

The Court further finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly found that Petitioner 

did not exhaust his claims in Grounds Two, Three, and Four, and they are procedurally 

barred from review. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(addressing the full and fair presentation of claims in state court for purposes of the 

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exhaustion requirement). Petitioner did not appeal the denial of his Rule 32 Petition, and 

thereby did not present his claims in Ground Two to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Petitioner did not present his claims in Grounds Three or Four on direct appeal or in postconviction relief proceedings. Petitioner’s subsequent state habeas petition, which was 

dismissed because it was not the proper mechanism for presenting his claims, did not 

serve to fairly present Petitioner's claims for purposes of the exhaustion requirement. See

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Therefore, Petitioner did not exhaust these claims and they are procedurally 

barred. 

While Petitioner challenges the fairness of the legal system, believing among other 

things that its officers have been infected with “legal glaucoma” (Doc. 27 at 9), he does 

not assert any basis to establish cause for the procedural default of his claims, nor does he 

maintain a claim of actual innocence. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 

(1991) (discussing “cause” and “prejudice”); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) 

(discussing “fundamental miscarriage of justice”). Therefore, the Court will adopt the 

R&R recommending that the petition be denied. 

C. Motion to Stay 

 Lastly, Petitioner has filed a Motion to Stay State Court Civil Proceeding (Doc. 

11), in which he requests that this Court stay the wrongful death action pending in the 

Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. CV2012-093251, which arises from the death 

of the victim at issue in Petitioner’s underlying convictions. 

Assuming, without deciding, that 28 U.S.C. § 2251 authorizes this Court to stay 

his state court civil proceeding, which Petitioner argues, he fails to show that such a stay 

is justified. Petitioner primarily objects to the R&R on the basis that if he were to prevail 

on the instant habeas petition, it would foreclose the availability of civil remedies against 

him for the death of the victim. This argument fails. While Petitioner’s federal habeas 

petition challenges the validity of his conviction, he does not claim that he is innocent of 

the crime. The outcome of this action therefore has little bearing on any wrongful death 

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action pursued against Petitioner. And, for the reasons above, the Court concludes that 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. Thus, the Court will also adopt the R&R 

recommending that Petitioner’s Motion to Stay be denied. Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. That Magistrate Judge’s Reports and Recommendations (Docs. 18, 26) are 

accepted and adopted by the Court; 

2. That the Motion to Stay (Doc. 11) is denied; 

3. That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(Doc. 1) is denied and dismissed with prejudice; 

4. That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

on appeal are denied because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain 

procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable and 

because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right; and 

5. That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 31st day of August, 2015.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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