Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00193/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00193-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On December 19, 2007, Plaintiff notified the Court that he is

now housed at California State Prison at Corcoran.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN KEITH BARNETT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL EVANS, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-0193 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN

FORMA PAUPERIS, REVIEWING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT,

ORDERING SERVICE OF

COGNIZABLE CLAIMS AND

DISMISSING NONCOGNIZABLE CLAIMS

Plaintiff Brian Keith Barnett, a state prisoner incarcerated

at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) at the time of the events at

issue,1

 filed this pro se civil rights complaint alleging SVSP

officials improperly confiscated his personal property and denied

him access to the courts by not allowing him to use his legal

papers. On March 30, 2007, the Court issued an Order Denying

Without Prejudice Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [and]

Dismissing Complaint With Leave to Amend (March 30, 2007 Order)

(Docket #13). On May 25, 2007, Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint (FAC) (Docket # 19), and on September 6, 2007, Plaintiff

filed a document titled, "Notice to the Court of Facts and Issues

for the Record and Exhibits A-D Attached Hereto," which the Court

Case 4:06-cv-00193-CW Document 22 Filed 01/09/08 Page 1 of 18
United States District Court

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construes as a supplement to the FAC (Supplement) (Docket

# 20). The Court now reviews the FAC and Supplement to determine

whether they state cognizable claims for relief.

In the March 30, 2007 Order, the Court indicated that, in his

original complaint, Plaintiff had attempted to state two claims

against Defendants: (1) denial of procedural due process rights for 

deprivation of property and (2) denial of access to the courts. 

The Court dismissed with leave to amend the deprivation of property

claim because "Plaintiff does not allege whether Defendants were

acting in conformity with an established state procedure." The

Court concluded that Plaintiff had stated a claim for denial of

access to the courts based on his allegations that certain

Defendants ignored his requests for access to two boxes containing

legal documents which resulted in his inability to present a habeas

petition to the state court. However, the Court noted that

Plaintiff had not named the individuals responsible for denying him

access to his legal documents and thus it could not serve the

responsible defendants. This claim also was dismissed with leave

to amend. 

In the March 30, 2007 Order, the Court noted that Plaintiff

had failed to set forth specific facts describing the actions of

each named Defendant and how these actions violated Plaintiff's

constitutional rights. The Court instructed Plaintiff, in his

amended complaint, to allege facts supporting his claim against

each individual Defendant by listing the constitutional right that

Defendant violated, describing what each Defendant did or failed to

do, and how each Defendant's acts or omissions caused him injury. 

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The Court also noted that Plaintiff had not shown that he had

exhausted administrative remedies on his claims, which must be

done prior to filing them in federal court. The Court granted

Plaintiff leave to amend to provide copies of denials of his

appeals at the Director's level of review which would indicate

administrative exhaustion or to provide evidence showing that he

should be excused from the exhaustion requirement because prison

officials refused to process his appeals. 

On May 25, 2007, Plaintiff filed his FAC, but advised the

Court that he had not had the opportunity to obtain all the

documentation regarding exhaustion of his claims. In a declaration

attached to his FAC, Plaintiff states that he submitted to the

third level of review administrative appeal number 04-3996

regarding deprivation of property and appeals 02-04397 and 04-01451

regarding the denial of access to legal materials. Therefore, he

alleges, these claims are exhausted. He also states that, although

he filed many requests for copies of these appeals, prison

officials have not provided them to him even though he needs the

appeals in order to “set forth the dates, times and names of the

defendants in addition to the acts and omissions” which resulted in

a violation of his constitutional rights. 

In his FAC, Plaintiff alleges the following. Prior to being

transferred to SVSP in October, 2002, Plaintiff began preparing his

pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus using legal materials

contained in six boxes. After he arrived at SVSP, he was told that

he could only have "six cubic feet" of his property, and that he

had to submit an "inmate request for interview" form to access the

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2

The CDC is now the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR).

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rest of his property. This meant that Plaintiff had access to four

of the six boxes of legal material. Plaintiff wrote a request for

access to all his legal materials explaining why it was necessary

for him to have immediate access to them while he was writing his

habeas petition. Plaintiff also completed and filed the "request

for interview" form, as instructed by prison staff. Plaintiff

alleges that on December 10, 2002, he was interviewed by G.K.

Crawford, Supervisor of Vocational Instruction, who said that he

spoke with Sgt. Mantel who confirmed that Plaintiff had two

additional boxes of legal material in storage. Supervisor

Crawford, although sympathetic to Plaintiff’s problem, did not

obtain the legal materials for Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff alleges that, after he was unsuccessful at obtaining

access to his legal materials through Supervisor Crawford, he 

filed administrative appeals. Plaintiff pursued the matter to the

third level review which was denied by N. Grannis, Chief of the

Inmate Appeal Branch (IAB). Plaintiff is suing Grannis for her

failure to instruct the SVSP Warden to provide Plaintiff access to

his legal materials. 

In addition to his appeals, Plaintiff alleges that he wrote

letters to then-Warden of SVSP A.A. LaMarque and California

Department of Corrections (CDC)2 Director E.S. Alameida and his

successor Jeanne Woodford. These letters resulted in an inquiry by

Captain A. Hedgpeth, who interviewed Plaintiff. Captain Hedgpeth

informed Plaintiff that all of Plaintiff's property had been issued

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3Plaintiff does not name CO Hausmann as a Defendant.

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to him. When Plaintiff insisted there were two more boxes, Captain

Hedgpeth said he would make further inquiry into the matter. 

Plaintiff is suing Captain Hedgpeth because he had the power and

authority to remedy the alleged constitutional violation, but

elected not to act and thus allowed the constitutional violation to

continue. Plaintiff sues LaMarque, Alameida and Woodford on the

same ground.

Plaintiff began working on this civil complaint using legal

practice guides he had in his cell which taught the proper way to

write a § 1983 complaint. While he was writing his complaint,

prison officials ordered a mass search of the facility in which

Plaintiff was housed and Correctional Officer (CO) Hausmann

confiscated Plaintiff's law books on the premise that Plaintiff

possessed too many books. This obstructed Plaintiff from filing

his civil rights complaint in federal court. Plaintiff filed

administrative appeal number 04-01451 in which he requested that

his legal books be returned to him.3 

Approximately eighty days after he filed his appeal, Plaintiff

was told by CO S. Younce that the only legal materials he could

have were those pertaining to an active case that had already been

docketed in the courts. This meant that Plaintiff could not work

on his criminal appeal, habeas petition or the instant civil rights

complaint. 

Also, CO Younce took Plaintiff’s postage stamps and some items

of food which were never returned to Plaintiff. In response,

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Plaintiff filed appeal number 04-03996 in which he stated that,

because he was now living in the general prison population, a new

director's rule required that all his property be returned to him

and that the reason his property was not returned to him was the

failure of the institutional officials properly to update

institutional operational procedures and to train subordinates. 

Appeal number 04-03996 was denied at all three levels of review. 

On pages two and three of the FAC, Plaintiff names the

individuals he is suing: Michael Evans, who replaced A.A. LaMarque

as Warden of SVSP; E.S. Alameida Jr. and Jeanne Woodford, former

Directors of the CDCR; K.J. Allen, Appeals Examiner; T. Surges

(signed for N. Grannis); CO S. Younce; G.K. Crawford, Supervisor of

Vocational Instruction; J. Allison, Correctional Administrator; and

Sergeant Mantel. In the caption of the FAC, Plaintiff additionally

names as Defendants L.E. Scribner, Deputy Warden (Acting); Captain

A. Hedgpeth, Correctional Administrator; and N. Grannis, Chief IAB. 

The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s FAC to name as Defendants

the individuals he lists in the caption as well as the individuals

he lists on pages two and three. 

Plaintiff states that, due their rank and position, these

individuals "had the ability or authority or was [sic] in position

to exercise their official power to remedy the problem of the

stored property . . . Such Defendants as having [sic] a role either

directly or via the administrative appeal process or as a result of

a communication sent to them informing the individual of the

problems . . . each accordingly knew or reasonably should have

known the violations being perpetrated against the Plaintiff's

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constitutional rights to access the courts.”

DISCUSSION

Instead of following the instruction in the March 10, 2007

Order to list against each Defendant separately the constitutional

right violated, describe what each Defendant did or failed to do,

and how each Defendant's acts or omissions caused him injury, the

FAC consists of one long chronological narrative with Defendants’

actions described within the context of the narrative. Therefore,

it is difficult to ascertain who Plaintiff is suing on each cause

of action. However, in the interest of resolving the issues

presented in a timely manner, the Court will construe this pro se

FAC liberally and attempt to determine which individuals are being

sued on each cause of action. Also, based on Plaintiff’s

declaration regarding his administrative appeals, the Court

concludes that, for the purposes of this preliminary review of

Plaintiff’s complaint, he has satisfactorily shown that he has

exhausted his claims. 

I. Deprivation of Personal Property

In the March 10, 2007 Order, the Court noted that Plaintiff

had not indicated whether he was being deprived of his property

negligently or pursuant to a state regulation. Based on the FAC,

it appears that Plaintiff is alleging that CO Younce intentionally

took Plaintiff’s property from him pursuant to a regulation and

that Plaintiff’s appeals of this alleged taking were denied on the

basis of a misunderstanding of state or prison regulations. 

Plaintiff appears to be suing the following Defendants on this

claim: Captain Hedgpeth, Deputy Warden L.E. Scribner, Appeals

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Examiner K.J. Allen, N. Grannis, T. Stugis, and CO S. Younce.

Ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an

opportunity for some kind of hearing prior to the deprivation of a

significant property interest. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.

Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978). Neither the negligent nor

intentional deprivation of property states a due process claim

under § 1983 if the deprivation was random and unauthorized,

however. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 (1981) (state

employee negligently lost prisoner's hobby kit), overruled in part

on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986);

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional destruction

of inmate's property). 

If the deprivation is not random and unauthorized, but the

result of "established state procedure," the availability of a

post-termination tort action does not necessarily provide due

process. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-37 (1982)

(failure on part of state commission to hold hearing within

statutory time limits not permitted to terminate timely filed

claim). In those instances, the Fourteenth Amendment requires "'an

opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner,'. . . for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the

case.'" Id. at 437.

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under

section 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant

proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City

of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person

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deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of

section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in

another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the

plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633; see, e.g., Robins v.

Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (prison official's

failure to intervene to prevent Eighth Amendment violation may be

basis for liability). The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each

individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have

caused a constitutional deprivation. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633.

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing

of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or

(2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v.

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)

(citation omitted). A supervisor therefore generally "is only

liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). An administrator may be

liable for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, for

instance, if he or she fails to respond to a prisoner’s request for

help. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). 

"'Supervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory official

in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction

in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates, for

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his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the

complaint is made, or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous

indifference to the rights of others.’” Preschooler II v. Davis,

479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Evidence

of a prisoner’s letter to an administrator alerting him to a

constitutional violation is sufficient to generate a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the administrator was aware of the

violation, even if he denies knowledge and there is no evidence the

letter was received. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1098. Evidence that a

prison supervisor was personally involved in an unconstitutional

transfer and denied all appeals of the transfer, for example, may

suffice. Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992);

see also Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.

1998) (supervisor who signed internal affairs report dismissing

complaint against officer despite evidence of officer's use of

excessive force may be liable for damages).

Read liberally, the allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC may state a

claim against CO Younce for intentionally depriving Plaintiff of

his property pursuant to a state regulation without a predeprivation hearing. Plaintiff also states claims against those

Defendants who reviewed Plaintiff’s appeals and did not remedy the

constitutional violation. These Defendants are Captain Hedgpeth,

Deputy Warden Scribner, Appeals Examiner Allen, and N. Grannis. 

Plaintiff does not state a claim against Sturgis because the only

allegation is that he signed the appeal denial on behalf of

Grannis. Therefore, this claim may proceed against the above-named

Defendants and it is dismissed against Sturgis.

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II. Denial of Access to Court

In the March 30, 2007 Order, the Court ruled that Plaintiff

had successfully alleged a due process violation based on denial of

access to the court, but had failed to allege sufficient facts

indicating how each Defendant had caused this violation.

Plaintiff appears to be suing the following Defendants on this

claim: Warden Michael Evans, former Warden A.A. LaMarque, former

CDCR Directors Jeanne Woodford and E.S. Alameida, CO Younce, G.K.

Crawford, Captain Hedgpeth, and N. Grannis.

Plaintiff successfully alleges a claim against Captain

Hedpeth, N. Grannis and CO Younce.

Plaintiff alleges that Captain Hedgpeth was designated to

investigate Plaintiff’s claim of denial of access to his legal

materials, that Captain Hedgpeth met with Plaintiff and told him

that according to property inventory form, CDC 104, all of

Plaintiff’s property had been issued to him. Plaintiff alleges

that when he told Captain Hedgpeth that he never received the last

two boxes, Captain Hedgpeth said he would investigate further, but

no further action was taken. Plaintiff claims that because Captain

Hedgpeth knew about the constitutional violation and did nothing to

remedy it, he directly participated in it. Because Plaintiff

alleges that Captain Hedgpeth knew of the alleged constitutional

violation, had the power to remedy it, but chose not to act, he has

sufficiently alleged a claim against Captain Hedgpeth.

Regarding N. Grannis, Plaintiff alleges that she denied

Plaintiff’s third level appeal and that because she knew of the

alleged constitutional violation and did nothing to remedy it, she

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is liable. This is sufficient to state a claim against Grannis.

Plaintiff alleges that CO Younce told Plaintiff he could only

have legal materials that related to a pending case and only gave

Plaintiff papers related to a pending case. This prevented

Plaintiff from working on his criminal appeal, habeas petition and

this case. FAC at 3-H. These allegations are sufficient to state

a claim against CO Younce. 

Plaintiff does not state a claim against the following named

Defendants: Warden Evans, former Warden LaMarque, former CDCR

Directors Woodford and Alameida, G.K. Crawford, and Sgt. Mantel.

Plaintiff alleges that when he first arrived at SVSP, he was

interviewed by G.K. Crawford, Supervisor of Vocational Instruction,

who was sympathetic to Plaintiff’s situation but who did not obtain

for Plaintiff access to his two boxes of legal materials. These

allegations fail to state that Crawford deprived Plaintiff of his

constitutional right to access the courts.

Regarding Sgt. Mantel, Plaintiff merely alleges that he told

Crawford that Plaintiff had two boxes of legal materials stored in

R&R. This allegation fails to state a claim against Sgt. Mantel.

Regarding J. Allison, Correctional Administration, Plaintiff

merely alleges that Crawford failed to inform him of Plaintiff’s

situation. This allegation fails to state a claim against J.

Allison.

Plaintiff alleges that he sent former CDCR Directors Alameida

and Woodford letters regarding his situation and they requested

that the Warden investigate. Because Alameida and Woodford took

appropriate action when informed of the alleged constitutional

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violation, Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim against

them. The same is true regarding Warden Evans and Acting Deputy

Warden L.E. Scribner, who Plaintiff alleges ordered an

investigation when they were made aware of the alleged

constitutional violation.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is

GRANTED. (Docket # 2).

2. Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for deprivation of

personal property against CO Younce, Captain Hedgpeth, Deputy

Warden Scribner, Appeals Examiner Allen and N. Grannis. Plaintiff

states a cognizable claim for lack of access to the courts against

Captain Hedgpeth, N. Grannis and CO Younce. The claims against all

other Defendants are dismissed. The dismissals are with prejudice

because, even construed liberally, Plaintiff’s amended complaint

fails to state a claim against them after having been given an

opportunity to amend to do so.

3. The Clerk of the Court shall mail to CO Younce, Captain

Hedgpeth, Deputy Warden Scribner, Appeals Examiner Allen, and N.

Grannis a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of

Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of

the complaint (Docket #1) and the amended complaint (Docket #19),

the supplement and all attachments thereto, and a copy of this

Order. The Clerk shall also mail copies of these documents to the

Attorney General of the State of California. In addition, the

Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order on Plaintiff.

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4. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary

costs of service of the summons and complaint. Pursuant to Rule 4,

if any Defendant, after being notified of this action and asked by

the Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons,

fails to do so, said Defendant will be required to bear the cost of

such service unless good cause be shown for his failure to sign and

return the waiver form. If service is waived, this action will

proceed as if Defendant had been served on the date that the waiver

is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will

not be required to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days

from the date on which the request for waiver was sent. (This

allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal

service of summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the

statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that more

completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to

waiver of service of the summons.

5. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court

orders as follows:

a. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, no later

than ninety (90) days from the date of this Order, Defendants shall

file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. 

The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and

shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be

resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior

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to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed

with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall

be filed with the Court and served on Defendants no later than

sixty (60) days after the date on which Defendants' motion is

filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice

regarding summary judgment motions should be given to plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. 

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end

your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue

of material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute

about any fact that would affect the result of your case,

the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided

in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted in favor of

defendants, your case will be dismissed and there will be

no trial.

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.

Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment

must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material

fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is

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cautioned that because he bears the burden of proving his

allegations in this case, he must be prepared to produce evidence

in support of those allegations when he files his opposition to

Defendants' dispositive motion. Such evidence may include sworn

declarations from himself and other witnesses to the incident, and

copies of documents authenticated by sworn declaration. Plaintiff

will not be able to avoid summary judgment simply by repeating the

allegations of his complaint.

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall

do so no later than thirty (30) days after the date Plaintiff's

opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date

the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion

unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

8. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Leave of Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2)

is hereby granted to Defendants to depose Plaintiff and any other

necessary witnesses confined in prison.

9. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be

served on Defendants, or their counsel once counsel has been

designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or

their counsel.

10. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address and

must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure

to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

Case 4:06-cv-00193-CW Document 22 Filed 01/09/08 Page 16 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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11. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable

extensions will be granted. However, the party making a motion for

an extension of time is not relieved from his or her duty to comply

with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having made a motion

for an extension of time. The party making the motion must still

meet the deadlines set by the Court until an order addressing the

motion for an extension of time is issued. Any motion for an

extension of time must be filed no later than fifteen days prior to

the deadline sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/9/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-00193-CW Document 22 Filed 01/09/08 Page 17 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN K. BARNETT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL EVANS et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-00193 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on January 9, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Brian Keith Barnett T-38323

Facility 4A2R-005L

California State Prison-Corcoran SHU

4001 King Ave.

P.O. Box 3476

Corcoran, CA 93212-3476

Dated: January 9, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-00193-CW Document 22 Filed 01/09/08 Page 18 of 18