Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00997/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00997-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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1 Plaintiff’s second claim for relief, stylized as a Fair Housing Act claim, also appears to contain a supplemental

state claim. See SAC ¶ 56 (alleging Defendant’s local ordinance is preempted by state law). The court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any state claims in light Plaintiff’s federal claims being dismissed herein. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AKI FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a

Nevada Limited Partnership, dba

LAKEVIEW MOBILE ESTATES,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06 CV 0997 JM (AJB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF

JURISDICTION AND WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND

vs.

CITY OF SAN MARCOS, a municipality,

Defendant.

In its Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action arising under the Fair

Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.

1

 Pending before the court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss the

SAC in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the ground that the SAC fails to allege

a ripe controversy. 

I. BACKGROUND

The following allegations are accepted as true for purposes of the motion. Whisnant v. United

States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff owns a seniors-only mobile park called

Lakeview Mobile Estates (“Lakeview” or “the park”) in defendant City of San Marcos. Plaintiff

desires to convert Lakeview into an all-ages park. On around April 19, 2006, Plaintiff gave written

notice to all Lakeview residents of a proposed amendment to the park’s rules and regulations which

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2

 The court takes judicial notice of Section 16.04.070. Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885).

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would allow residents of any age to live at the park. SAC ¶ 11. At the time of notice, Plaintiff was

aware of the existence of a resident homeowner’s association (“HOA”) consisting of certain Lakeview

residents, but was not aware of any other park committees. Id. ¶12. Thereafter, 85% of the residents

signed a petition protesting the proposed amendment. This petition was served on Plaintiff on around

August 3, 2006 during an all-residents meeting. Id. ¶ 16. Every resident at the meeting expressed

opposition to the proposed amendment and threatened Plaintiff with legal action. Id. ¶ 18. 

Section 16.04.070 of the San Marcos Municipal Code (the “Ordinance”) provides that

c) Review. No Park Owner shall change, add to, delete or modify the Park Rules and

Regulations affecting the residents of a Mobilehome Park unless and until any such

change, addition, deletion or modification shall have first been submitted to, reviewed

and approved by the Park Rules and Regulations Committee. The term “Park Owner”

shall not include any resident-owned mobilehome park.

d) Appeal. In the event that a majority of the members of the “Park Rules and

Regulations Committee” does not approve all or part of a proposed change, addition,

deletion or modification of the Park Rules and Regulations, a Park Owner shall have the

right to appeal by petition to all residents of the Mobilehome Park to seek such

approval. Any rejection of the proposed change, addition, deletion or modification may

be reversed by a petition bearing the signatures of a majority of the residents of the

subject Mobilehome Park approving the proposed change, addition, deletion or

modification.

Id. ¶ 25.2 Thus, the Ordinance contemplates a two-step process: first, the park owner must submit the

proposed rule change to a Rules and Regulation Committee (“RCC”). Second, if the RCC rejects the

proposal, the park owner may appeal to all residents. If a majority of all residents approve the change,

then the RCC’s decision is reversed and the change is implemented.

This is the second motion to dismiss brought in this case. On November 21, 2006, the court

granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness and gave Plaintiff leave to file a SAC

within twenty days, which it did. Defendant now moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule12(b)(1) on the

ground that SAC still fails to allege a ripe controversy. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(1) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A

federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Article III’s Cases and Controversies Clause

when an action is not yet ripe for review. In a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

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the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction. See Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 926, 927 (9th

Cir. 1986). The court must treat all factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Experimental Eng'g, 614 F.2d at 1245; see Concha v. London, 62 F.3d

1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions merely

because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177

(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Claims

should not be dismissed on the pleadings “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957); Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir.

1978). 

III. DISCUSSION: THIS ACTION IS NOT RIPE

An action is unripe, and therefore has not matured into a proper subject for adjudication, when

it involves contingent future events that may or may not occur. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr.

Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985). The ripeness doctrine’s rationale “is to prevent the courts,

through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements[.]” Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). Whether a controversy is ripe depends on the

“fitness of issues for judicial decision” and the “hardship to the parties of withholding court

consideration.” Id. at 149. 

There are two fatal defects in Plaintiff’s conduct as alleged. First, Plaintiff sent the proposed

amendment to all park residents rather than making a separate presentation to an RCC. Indeed, the

SAC utterly fails to give rise to even a scintilla of an inference that Plaintiff sought to determine

whether an RCC existed, if the HOA was acting as the RCC, or if a separate presentation could be

made to any group or committee of Lakeview residents. Plaintiff merely blanketed the park with

copies of the proposed amendment. This conduct does not conform with the Ordinance, nor does it

demonstrate a good faith effort to substantially comply therewith.

Second, even if Plaintiff had substantially complied with the first part of the Ordinance,

Plaintiff has completely ignored the second part regarding appeal. The ordinance requires Plaintiff

to initiate an appeal to all park residents; the fact that upon receipt of Plaintiff’s blanketed notice, the

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residents organized in some kind of grass-roots fashion to drum up a petition in protest does not

change Plaintiff’s affirmative obligation to appeal as set forth in the ordinance. See SAC ¶ 25 (“[A]

Park Owner shall have the right to appeal by petition to all residents of the Mobilehome Park to seek

such approval.”) (emphasis added). It is as yet unknown what the outcome of such an appeal might

be. As such, it is merely speculative at this point whether Defendant’s ordinance deprives Plaintiff

of the relief it seeks. 

Furthermore, the SAC alleges that Defendant’s City Manager Rick Gittings has stated that if

Plaintiff does not follow local law, “‘the City Council will have to consider if it wants to enforce its

ordinance’; and, that Defendant could file a lawsuit against Plaintiff if Plaintiff failed to follow the

law.” SAC ¶ 47. This allegation, if true, bolsters the court’s finding that Plaintiff’s claims lack

ripeness. A court is without power to adjudicate rights and remedies “if” an ordinance will be

enforced, or when a lawsuit “could” be filed. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 580-81. 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges it has substantially complied with the ordinance or that it was excused

therefrom if no RCC existed. SAC ¶ 12. However, this allegation is a legal conclusion, not an

allegation of fact, and therefore it has no bearing on the present motion. See Roberts, 812 F.2d at

1177.

Although there appears to be no Ninth Circuit authority on point, cases from the Sixth,

Seventh, and Eighth Circuits support the court’s findings. For example, in United States v. Village

of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994), plaintiff operated housing for recovering alcoholics and

substance abusers wherein eleven unrelated residents lived together in one dwelling in violation of

local zoning law. Plaintiff could have applied for a special use permit but refused to do so. The

defendant municipality cited plaintiff for the zoning violations and plaintiffs filed suit in federal court

for discrimination in housing based on handicap. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff. On

appeal, the Seventh Circuit held the action was unripe because the plaintiff

never invoked the procedures that would allow the Village to make such an

accommodation . . . . [Plaintiff] has not requested a special use approval from the

Village. Until it does, the Village cannot authorize its current use of the Mallard

Drive property . . . . To the extent that the plaintiff’s federal suit alleges that the

Village did not make a reasonable accommodation in its application of zoning laws

to [plaintiff], the issue is not ripe.

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Id. at 1233. Here, Plaintiff has likewise “never invoked the procedures” that would allow it to convert

Lakeview into an all-ages park. Id.; see also Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351,

1362 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff’s action challenging federal agency’s authority under the

Fair Housing Act was unripe because the agency had never applied the complained-of “disparate

impact analysis” resulting in a final administrative action); Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77

F.3d 249, 253 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claim for housing discrimination

unripe where plaintiff refused to apply for a zoning variance).

Several district courts have also dismissed FHA claims as unripe when the plaintiff has failed

to use available procedures provided for by local law that would allow the plaintiff to obtain relief

from zoning restrictions. Tsombanidis v. City of West Haven, 129 F. Supp. 2d 136, 160-61 (D. Conn.

2001); Marriott Senior Living Serv., Inc. v. Springfield Township, 78 F. Supp. 2d 376, 385-86 (E.D.

Pa. 1999); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1260 (E.D. Va. 1993).

In sum, the weight of authority supports finding Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe.

A review of the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Plaintiff show that none of those cases supports

Plaintiff’s position. In State of Montana v. Johnson, 738 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1984), the

Ninth Circuit found a ripe controversy because the defendant contended it was not required to obtain

environmental certification from plaintiff Montana before building power plants, even though

defendant could have voluntarily obtained such certification. The Johnson court also found ripeness

because the issues raised were purely legal and because withholding court consideration could cause

Montana to waste resources if it was not first determined that federal law required compliance with

Montana law. Id. Here, Plaintiff is not arguing that the ordinance does not apply to it. Further, the

issues are not purely legal. For example, Plaintiff’s first claim for relief is premised on an issue of

fact: whether Defendant interfered with its efforts to provide non-discriminatory housing in violation

of federal law. SAC ¶¶ 36, 49. Moreover, there is nothing in the pleadings that reasonably suggests

that compliance with the ordinance would cause undue hardship on Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s bare

allegation that “[s]eeking a new vote of the park residents would result in less than 50 percent

acceptance of the proposed rules and regulations” is simple speculation, not a well-pleaded allegation

of fact. Id. ¶ 19.

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In Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818, F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1987), the court found the plaintiff’s

takings claim unripe because it had not yet applied for a land development permit or a variance. Id.

at 1455. Similarly here, the SAC fails to allege Defendant has actually denied Plaintiff any right to

change the park’s age restriction.

In State of Arizona v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, 656 F.2d 398 (9th

Cir. 1981), the question presented was whether the lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that

Arizona law was consistent with federal law was ripe in light of the lawsuit having been filed over two

years after passage of the federal law but six months before its effective date. The Ninth Circuit found

the controversy ripe since there was little doubt that the federal law would become effective. Id. at

403. Here, the ripeness issue is different. The issue is not whether the ordinance is in effect or not,

but whether the challenged law has harmed Plaintiff when Plaintiff has not even followed procedures

which could grant the requested relief.

In Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 765 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1985), the plaintiffs had applied for

a land use permit that was actually denied by the defendant city. Id. at 758-59. Here, the SAC fails

to allege that Defendant has actually denied Plaintiff anything. To the contrary, the allegations if true

show that Defendant has not even yet decided whether it will enforce the ordinance against Plaintiff

or not.

Finally, Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997), involved a challenge on Ex Post Facto

grounds to the constitutionality of a state-sponsored rehabilitation program that required sex offender

criminals to undergo counseling before becoming eligible for parole. The prisoner-plaintiffs were not

yet eligible for parole, but the Ninth Circuit nevertheless found the case ripe because the plaintiffs had

already been labeled sex offenders and it was guaranteed that they would not be eligible for parole

without participating in the program. Id. at 825. Here, there is no similar showing that it is guaranteed

Defendant will enforce the ordinance against Plaintiff; the SAC, if true, would only support a finding

that such enforcement is only possible.

//

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

The issues in this case are not fit for judicial decision, nor is there any evidence that the parties

would suffer hardship were the court to withhold its consideration. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.

Therefore, the motion is GRANTED. The SAC is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

and without leave to amend. Any supplemental state claim is likewise DISMISSED pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The clerk is ORDERED to close the file in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 23, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

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