Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02575/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02575-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sheldon Roy Hanshaw, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02575-PHX-NVW (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Sheldon Roy Hanshaw has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

On September 13, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced. The trial court dismissed 

Petitioner’s PCR petition on November 24, 2009. Petitioner did not submit a timely 

petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s limitations period was tolled until 

December 29, 2009. The instant petition was due on December 29, 2010, absent equitable 

tolling, but it was not filed until November 21, 2014. Because there are no grounds for 

equitable tolling, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are untimely. Therefore, 

the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

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II. BACKGROUND

a. Facts of the Crimes 

The Presentence Report includes a summary of the underlying facts of Petitioner’s 

crimes:1

 On October 26, 2007, Phoenix Police Officer B. Huskisson, working as part of a task force with the federal Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

department, was on surveillance. He was sitting in his undercover vehicle as officers waited to contact the defendant, who was believed to be 

associated with a criminal prison gang. The defendant’s car was then reported to be entering an alley, and Officer Huskisson drove his vehicle 

down the alley, then parked his vehicle to one side. The officer stated he 

then saw six federal agents with their guns drawn pointing at the defendant’s car, which was moving down the alley. The defendant then accelerated to 20 to 30 m.p.h. and came to Officer Huskisson’s vehicle. The 

defendant’s car, a passenger car, struck the undercover vehicle in the front 

passenger side. (Counts I & II) The defendant’s car then tipped over on the driver’s side, and the defendant got out and ran, dropping a handgun as he ran. (Count IV) A.T.F. Officer P. Forcelli’s vehicle was also possibly struck by the defendant’s vehicle. (Count III) No further information was given in the police departmental report. 

 Officer Huskisson told an investigating officer that his vehicle had not been blocking the alley, and there had been room for the defendant to 

pass him. The officer reported he had pain in his knee, ankle, back and neck 

and went to a hospital to be evaluated. 

(Doc. 14-1, Ex. F, at 23.) 

b. Charges, Convictions, and Sentencing of Petitioner 

 On February 28, 2008, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner with three counts of 

class 2 dangerous Aggravated Assault, and one count of Misconduct Involving Weapons. 

(Doc. 14-1, Ex. A, at 3.) The State also alleged Petitioner had seven prior felony 

convictions. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. C, at 11.) 

 On July 30, 2008, Petitioner pleaded guilty to all four counts, without a plea 

agreement. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. E, at 19; Doc. 14-2, Ex. W, at 121-22.) The trial court 

advised Petitioner he could receive a total sentence of 120 years imprisonment, and that 

there were no agreements or assurances as to the sentence to be imposed. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. 

W, at 117.) The court also advised Petitioner: “You also understand that by entering into 

 

1

 In Arizona, the factual basis for a guilty plea “may be ascertained from the record including presentence reports, preliminary hearing reports, admissions of the defendant, and from other sources.” State v. Varela, 587 P.2d 1173, 1175 (1978). 

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this plea, your only right to seek review of these proceedings is to file a petition for Post 

Conviction Relief within 90 days of sentencing, and if that is denied your only other 

avenue for relief would be the Court of Appeals. Do you understand that?” (Doc. 14-2, 

Ex. W, at 121.) Petitioner told the court he understood. (Id.) After conducting a plea 

colloquy, the trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea to all four counts as charged. 

(Doc. 14-2, Ex. W, at 128.) 

 On September 30, 2008, the court sentenced Petitioner. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. X, at 

134.) Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 21 years’ imprisonment for Counts 

1, 2, and 3. (Id. at 166.) The court sentenced Petitioner to a consecutive term of 12 years 

imprisonment for Count 4. (Id.) 

c. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On October 22, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Notice. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. H, at 

34.) On May 19, 2009, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a memorandum in support of the 

petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. J, at 42.) Petitioner challenged the 

sufficiency of the factual basis of his plea and alleged that trial counsel provided deficient 

advice regarding the elements of the offenses. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. J, at 44-49.) On November 

24, 2009, the court denied the petition. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. M, at 87-88.) No petition for 

review was filed. 

d. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On November 29, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion for Correction of Error, pursuant 

to Rule 24.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. N, at 3.) 

Petitioner challenged his flat-time sentence, community supervision, the court’s reliance 

on his prior felony convictions, the imposition of a consecutive sentence, and the failure 

of the court to announce a minimum sentence. (Id.) On January 11, 2013, the trial court 

ruled that Petitioner’s motion was a successive Rule 32 proceeding and dismissed the 

proceeding. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. O, at 22.) 

 On February 11, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. P, at 25.) The court granted review, but summarily denied 

relief. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. R, at 50.) The court held that Petitioner’s “claims extended beyond 

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correction of clerical mistakes; therefore, the trial court correctly addresses his motion as 

a petition for post-conviction relief.” (Doc. 14-2, Ex. R, at 52.) The court further noted 

that because the “proceeding is successive and untimely, any claim other than one 

pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h), is barred or precluded.” (Id., citing Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) and 32.4(a).) The court held that Petitioner had “not established that any 

of his claims fall into the above exceptions.” (Id.) On May 27, 2014, Petitioner filed a 

petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. S, at 54.) The petition 

was summarily denied on October 20, 2014. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. U, at 103.) 

e. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition 

 On November 21, 2014, Petitioner filed this habeas Petition. (Doc. 1.) On May 1, 

2015, Respondents filed a Limited Answer to the Petition. (Doc. 14.) On June 26, 2015, 

Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 17) and Memorandum (Doc. 18). Petitioner raises the 

following grounds for relief: 

1. Trial counsel was ineffective in connection with sentencing in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights based upon a failure to advise of consecutive sentencing, flat- time sentencing, and oral pronouncement of community supervision; 

2. The trial court failed to verbally announce Petitioner’s consecutive 

sentence of community supervision in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, 

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; 

3. The trial court failed to announce whether Petitioner’s “sentence was 

flat time or an 85% requirement” in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth, 

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and 

4. The trial court incorrectly interpreted Petitioner’s Motion for Correction as a second Rule 32 petition in violation of Petitioner’s 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

(Doc. 1.) 

III. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY. 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

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a. Time Calculation 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

 On September 13, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to his pleas of guilty. 

(Doc. 14-2, Ex. X, at 166.) Petitioner had 90 days from that date to timely file an “ofright” petition for post-conviction relief. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“In a Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding, the notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and 

sentence”). See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (“[W]ith respect to a state 

prisoner who does not seek review in a State’s highest court, the judgment becomes 

‘final’ under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking such review expires . . . .”). 

b. Statutory Tolling 

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona 

Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

(“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). 

 On October 22, 2008, Petitioner filed a timely PCR notice. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. H, at 

34.) The one-year deadline to file a federal habeas will be tolled while “a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction . . . review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

The trial court denied the petition on November 24, 2009. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. M, at 87-88.) 

Petitioner had 35 days to file a timely petition for review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (providing a 30-day deadline from “the final 

decision of the trial court on the petition for post-conviction relief or the motion for 

hearing”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a) (providing “five calendar days shall be added to the 

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prescribed period” after service by mailing). Petitioner did not file a petition for review 

with the court of appeals. Petitioner’s limitations period was tolled until December 29, 

2009. 

 The statute of limitations was not tolled by Petitioner’s Motion for Correction of 

Error filed on November 29, 2012. The Arizona Court of Appeals found this motion was 

“successive and untimely.” (Doc. 14-2, Ex. R, at 52.) This filing was not a “properly 

filed” state action for post-conviction relief because it was untimely. See Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“[W]e hold that time limits, no matter their 

form, are ‘filing’ conditions. Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition 

as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 

2244(d)(2).”). Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed state 

post-conviction proceeding cannot restart the statute of limitations. Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 2244(d) “does not permit 

the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was 

filed”). 

 Here, the instant petition was due December 29, 2010, absent equitable tolling. 

c. Equitable Tolling 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1–year filing deadline must 

show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and 

(2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 

S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 

2015). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling 

is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, 

account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 

1048–49 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–

Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 

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circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Marcello, 212 F.3d at 1010). 

 In his Petition, Petitioner asserts he was “not aware that his sentence(s) were 

considered as flat-time . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 5.) In his Reply, Petitioner “denies he is not 

entitled to equitable tolling.” (Doc. 17 at 2.) In his Points and Authorities, Petitioner 

asserts that his claims are newly discovered. (Doc. 18 at 7.) Whether equitable tolling is 

applied is reviewed on a claim-by-claim basis. Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1171 

(9th Cir. 2012) (“AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1) applies to each 

claim in a habeas application on an individual basis”); Butler v. Long, 752 F.3d 1177, 

1181 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that petitioner was “entitled to equitable tolling” because § 

2244(d)(1) applies to each claim on an individual basis). 

i. Grounds One through Three are not newly discovered. 

 Petitioner does not establish equitable tolling because Grounds One through Three 

are not newly discovered. These claims concern (1) whether counsel was ineffective by 

failing to advise Petitioner of the importance of oral pronouncement at sentencing and the 

possibility of consecutive or flat-time sentences, and (2) whether the trial court erred by 

failing to make oral pronouncements at sentencing. Here, the trial court advised 

Petitioner at his plea hearing that he could receive a sentence “of up to 120 years” 

imprisonment if the judge “stacked everything.” (Doc. 14-2, Ex. W, at 116-17.) Petitioner 

was informed of the potential of community supervision when the trial court told him that 

“you would have to do a consecutive term of community supervision, which is like what 

we used to call parole . . . .” (Id. at 118.) During sentencing, the court announced “[w]ith 

regard to Count 4; however, I do think that a consecutive sentence is warranted in that 

matter.” (Doc. 14-2, Ex. X, at 166.) The imposition of community supervision is 

explicitly stated in the sentencing minute entry. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. G, at 30.) Petitioner had 

the ability to ask his attorney and the court whether he was eligible for community 

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supervision and whether the court was required to announce its application at sentencing. 

See Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Time begins when the 

prisoner knows (or through reasonable diligence could discover) the important facts, not 

when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.”).” 

 Petitioner’s claim that he was unaware the trial court was required to make oral 

pronouncements, even if true, does not justify equitable tolling. A petitioner’s pro se

status, ignorance of the law, and lack of representation during the applicable filing period 

do not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because such circumstances 

are not “extraordinary.” See Waldron–Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 n.4 (“a pro se 

petitioner’s confusion or ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting 

equitable tolling”), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 897 (2009); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, 

an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); Johnson v. United States, 

544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (“[W]e have never accepted pro se representation alone or 

procedural ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy 

calls for promptness.”). 

ii. Ground Four 

 Petitioner is not eligible for equitable tolling on Ground Four because it concerns a 

state legal ruling, not a “factual predicate of the claim” as required by in § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

d. Petitioner’s claims regarding a flat-time sentence are not cognizable. 

 Petitioner’s claims concerning sentencing are also not cognizable because they 

concern applications of state law. The gravamen of the Petition is that Petitioner recently 

learned he was subject to a flat-time sentence. Petitioner states that when he was “advised 

by the Arizona Department of Corrections” that his sentences would be served “flat 

time,” he “immediately sought intervention from the trial court.” (Doc. 18 at 8.) Whether 

Petitioner is subject to a flat-time sentence under state law is not cognizable on habeas 

corpus review. The habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “unambiguously provides that a 

federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground 

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that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a)). 

 Whether Petitioner is subject to a flat-time sentence under Arizona law is a statelaw question. “[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). 

Whether the trial court was required to advise him of his eligibility for community 

supervision under state law is a state procedural question. See Poland v. Stewart, 169 

F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Federal habeas courts lack jurisdiction . . . to review state 

court applications of state procedural rules.”). The Court is mindful that the grounds for 

equitable tolling under § 2244(d) are highly fact-dependent and considered on a case-bycase basis. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010); Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 

919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner has not established that equitable tolling is warranted 

in this proceeding. 

 The Petition is untimely because it was not filed within the deadline established by 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Absent equitable tolling or other exception, the Petition will be 

dismissed with prejudice, regardless of the margin of untimeliness. See United States v. 

Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas petition submitted one day 

late was properly dismissed as untimely under AEDPA, noting that a “missed” deadline 

“is not grounds for equitable tolling”); Hartz v. United States, 419 Fed. Appx. 782, 783 

(9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of federal habeas petition where 

petitioner “simply missed the statute of limitations deadline by one day”); Lookingbill v. 

Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[w]e consistently have denied tolling even 

where the petition was only a few days late”); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 100–

01 (1985) (“If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late filings might be equally 

acceptable, and so on in a cascade of exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the 

filing deadline . . . A filing deadline cannot be complied with, substantially or otherwise, 

by filing late––even by one day.”). 

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 This Petition was due on December 29, 2010. It was filed on November 21, 2014. 

The Petition is untimely. 

IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

An evidentiary hearing is not warranted regarding Petitioner’s claims, including 

equitable tolling, because the record is sufficiently developed to resolve this question. A 

habeas petitioner asserting equitable tolling “should receive an evidentiary hearing when 

he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’” 

Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 

919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner has not asserted grounds for equitable tolling, and an 

evidentiary hearing is not mandatory. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 16th day of December, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

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