Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01098/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01098-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WYNATHEN KETCHUM, ANA MENJIVAR, 

acting for themselves and 

others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CITY OF VALLEJO, 

 Defendant. / 

No. Civ. S-05-1098 RRB JFM

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Before the court is Wynathen Ketchum (“Ketchum”) and Ana 

Menjivar’s (“Menjivar”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) motion for 

reconsideration of this court’s October 15, 2007, Memorandum and 

Order (“Order”) pursuant to Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1

 The City of Vallejo 

 

1

 On October 15, 2007, the court issued an Order granting in 

part and denying in part Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, and granting Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary 

adjudication. Defendant’s motion was granted insofar as it 

sought a determination that the instant action has not been 

properly commenced under 29 U.S.C. § 216. It was denied in all 

other respects. Plaintiffs’ cross-motion was granted insofar as 

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(“Defendant”) opposes the motion and filed a cross-motion for 

reconsideration pursuant to Eastern District Local Rule 78-

230(k).2

 For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ motion is 

GRANTED and Defendant’s cross-motion is DENIED.3

 

I. 

A. Legal Standard 

 Although there is no “motion for reconsideration” specified 

in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) is a 

procedural vehicle by which a party may achieve the effect of 

 

it sought a determination that the time spent by Mounted Patrol 

Unit (“MPU”) officers training and transporting their horses is 

compensable work under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 

The court further determined that a genuine issue of material 

fact exists as to whether Defendant willfully violated the FLSA. 

2

 Plaintiffs have inappropriately brought their motion for 

reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) (motion to alter or amend 

judgment) and Rule 60(b) (relief from judgment) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure as these rules only provide the 

procedural vehicle for filing a motion for relief from a final 

judgment. See Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d 

461, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); see also United 

States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048, n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(Rules 59(e) and 60(b) only apply to motions seeking to alter or 

amend a final judgment (i.e., an appealable final order)). 

Therefore, because this court’s Order was not a final judgment 

as it did not adjudicate all the claims or the rights or 

liabilities of the parties, either Rule 54(b) or Local Rule 78-

230(k) is the appropriate procedural vehicle for Plaintiffs’ 

motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Local Rule 78-230(k). 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is construed 

as a motion filed pursuant to either Rule 54(b) or Local Rule 

78-230(k), not Rules 59(e) and 60(b). 

3

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 

the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. Local 

Rule 78-230(h). 

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reconsideration of a non-final order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(b). Rule 54(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “any order 

or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates 

fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 

than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of 

the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision 

is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 

adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 

all the parties.” District courts have inherent authority to 

reconsider their own orders before they become final, absent 

some applicable rule or statute to the contrary. Martin, 226 

F.3d at 1048-49. 

 Local Rule 78-230(k) provides that motions for 

reconsideration may be brought for “any motion . . . granted or 

denied in whole or in part . . .” “Local Rule 78-230(k) 

requires that a party seeking reconsideration of a district 

court’s order must brief the ‘new or different facts or 

circumstances . . . which . . . were not shown upon such prior 

motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.’ Generally 

speaking, before reconsideration may be granted, there must be a 

change in the controlling law or facts, the need to correct a 

clear error, or the need to prevent manifest injustice.” 

Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 268 F. Supp. 2d 

1172, 1195 n.18 (E.D. Cal. 2002). To succeed in a motion to 

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reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly 

convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior 

decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of 

Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in 

part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988). 

B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration 

 Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of this court’s Order 

insofar as it determined that the instant action has not been 

properly commenced under § 216(b) because Plaintiffs did not 

file consent to suit forms with the court.4 Plaintiffs argue 

that the court erred in this regard because it failed to 

consider Plaintiffs’ consent to suit as set forth in their 

declarations filed on November 15, 2006, April, 11, 2007, 

 

4

 The FLSA provides that no party may join a collective 

action “unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a 

party and such consent is filed in the court in which such 

action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Under the FLSA, a 

“collective action” is considered to be commenced with respect 

to any individual claimant “on the date when the complaint is 

filed, if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the 

complaint and his written consent to become a party plaintiff is 

filed on such date in the court in which the action is brought.” 

29 U.S.C. § 256(a). When a “collective action” is filed under 

§ 216(b) all plaintiffs, including named plaintiffs are required 

to file a consent to suit form with the court in which the 

action is brought. Harkins v. Riverboat Services, Inc., 385 

F.3d 1099, 1101 (6th Cir. 2004); Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 

61 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133 (D. Nev. 1999). A “collective action” 

is not deemed commenced with respect to each individual 

plaintiff until his or her consent has been filed. Harkins, 385 

F.3d at 1101; Bonilla, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 (citing cases).

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April 25, 2007, and May 9, 2007. Plaintiffs argue that these 

declarations are sufficient to properly commence their 

respective actions because they substantially comply with 

§ 216(b)’s consent to suit requirement. Alternatively, 

Plaintiffs argue that the Order should be modified to reflect 

that Ketchum’s action was properly commenced on May 21, 2007, 

when he filed a formal written consent to suit form/pleading 

with the court.5 

 After careful review of the record in this matter, the 

court finds that Menjivar’s action was properly commenced on 

April 11, 2007. On this date, Menjivar filed an amended 

declaration with the court attesting that: “I indicated my 

consent to be a party plaintiff to this lawsuit by agreeing to 

 

5

 As a preliminary matter, the court notes that Plaintiffs 

advanced the following arguments in support of their opposition 

to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding 

commencement of the instant action: (1) Plaintiffs were not 

required to file written consents with the court to commence 

their respective actions because they were named plaintiffs; (2) 

Plaintiffs were not required to file written consent forms with 

the court because their action is a joint action alleging 

individual claims, not a “collective action”; and (3) Plaintiffs 

substantially complied with § 216(b)’s written consent 

requirement by participating in discovery and by filing 

declarations (dated November 15, 2006) indicating their consent 

to suit. Notably, however, Plaintiffs did not cite to, nor did 

they rely upon, the language in their amended declarations 

(filed on April, 11, 2007, and May 9, 2007) to support their 

substantial compliance argument. Nor did Plaintiffs argue that 

Ketchum’s action was properly commenced on May 21, 2007, when he 

filed a formal written consent to suit form/pleading with the 

court. 

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be an original named plaintiff. Therefore, I have already 

indicated my consent, and I continue to consent to participate 

in this action.” Amended Decl. of Menjivar at 1:10-13, Exh. M 

to Decl. of Will M. Yamada (“Yamada”) (Docket at 87). The court 

finds this statement sufficient to satisfy § 216(b)’s consent to 

suit requirement because it clearly establishes Menjivar’s 

intent to become a plaintiff in this action. See Montalvo v. 

Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1970) 

(finding that the a consent form consisting of a typewritten 

statement requesting that “legal action be taken to secure my 

claim for me due me under the Fair Labor Standards Act,” 

followed by the plaintiff’s signature, sufficient to constitute 

written consent because it clearly established an intent to 

become a party plaintiff);6

 see also Lima v. Int’l Catastrophe 

Solutions, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 793, 802 (E.D. La. 2007) 

 

6

 In Montalvo, the plaintiffs were maids and janitors 

seeking unpaid wages from their employer. Montalvo, 426 F.2d at 

1137. The plaintiffs signed a document that requested only that 

“legal action be taken to secure my claim for me due me under 

the Fair Labor Standards Act.” Id. at 1148. A xerox copy of 

this document was filed with the complaint. Id. Subsequently, 

the plaintiffs produced the original document. Id. The court 

held that this original document “demonstrated clearly that the 

plaintiffs, by signing their names, had in fact given their 

consent to becoming plaintiffs in a suit for recovery under the 

[FLSA].” Id. The court found further support for its 

conclusion based on the fact that “the only testimony adduced on 

this point indicated that the plaintiffs, though unschooled in 

legal technicalities, had a basic understanding of the nature of 

the consent they were giving by their signatures.” Id. 

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(approving consent to sue form consisting of a paragraph stating 

that by signing the form, the opt-in authorizes the filing and 

prosecution in his or her name, consents to become a party 

plaintiff in the action, and authorizes the Plaintiffs’ various 

attorneys to represent, to proceed, and to settle on his or her 

behalf and others similarly situated with regard to their 

collective claims);7 Schute v. New York, 533 F. Supp. 31, 34-35 

(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (in order to commence an action under the Equal 

Pay Act incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 256, a named plaintiff was 

required to file a written consent or a verification under oath 

that would serve as its substantial equivalent); Kulik v. 

Superior Pipe Specialties Co., 203 F. Supp. 938, 941 (D.C. Ill. 

1962) (observing that written consent to become a party 

plaintiff referred to in 29 U.S.C. § 256(a), is a document 

signed by the person whose consent it purports to be). 

Additionally, the court finds that Ketchum’s action was properly 

commenced on May 9, 2007. On this date, Ketchum filed an 

amended supplemental declaration with the court attesting: “I 

have indicated my consent to be a party plaintiff to this 

lawsuit by agreeing to be a named plaintiff. Accordingly, I 

have already indicated my consent, and I continue to consent to 

 

7

 In Lima, the court observed that in order to join a 

collective action under FLSA, little more is needed than a 

statement indicating plaintiff’s intent to participate in the 

litigation and their signature. Lima, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 802. 

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participate in this action as a plaintiff.” Amended Supp. Decl. 

of Ketchum at 2:5-8, Exh. L to Amended Decl. of Yamada (Docket 

at 98). The court finds this statement sufficient to satisfy 

§ 216(b)’s consent to suit requirement because it clearly 

establishes Ketchum’s intent to become a plaintiff in this 

action.8

Accordingly, the court hereby modifies section II.B of its 

October 15, 2007, Order to reflect that Menjivar’s action was 

properly commenced on April 11, 2007, and Ketchum’s action was 

properly commenced on May 9, 2007. Therefore, Menjivar can 

recover damages for any violation of the FLSA accruing within 

either the two-year period from April 11, 2005, to April 11, 

2007, or if Defendant’s violation of the FLSA is found to be 

willful the three-year period from April 11, 2004, to April 11, 

2007. Similarly, Ketchum can recover damages for any violation 

of the FLSA accruing within either the two-year period from 

May 9, 2005, to May 9, 2007, or if Defendant’s violation of the 

 

8

 To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that earlier filed 

declarations were sufficient to commence their respective 

actions, the court disagrees. The court thoroughly reviewed the 

relevant declarations and did not find any statements therein 

expressing a clear intent on the part of either plaintiff to 

participate in this action. 

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FLSA is found to be willful the three-year period from May 9, 

2004, to May 9, 2007.9 

C. Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration 

Defendant seeks reconsideration of this court’s Order 

insofar as it determined that the instant action was not timebarred based on Plaintiffs’ failure to file consent to suit 

forms with the court before the court’s May 12, 2006, deadline. 

Alternatively, Defendant seeks to strike the language in 

Plaintiffs’ amended declarations purporting to provide consent 

to suit on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to seek leave or 

make the requisite good cause showing to justify the untimely 

filing of these consents. 

 Although the court is not unsympathetic to Defendant’s 

position that Plaintiffs should have provided consent to suit in 

a timelier and more straightforward manner, it nonetheless finds 

that modification of its previous Order is necessary to correct 

“clear” error. The language in Plaintiffs’ amended 

declarations10 convinces the court that its earlier determination 

 

9

 Signed consents filed after the filing of the complaint 

do not relate back to the date the complaint was filed. Kuhn v. 

Philadelphia Elec. Co., 487 F. Supp. 974, 975 (D.C. Pa. 1980); 

Cahill v. City of New Brunswick, 99 F. Supp. 2d 464, 479 (D. 

N.J. 2000); Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 199 

(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 

10 The court notes that the relevant language in Plaintiffs’ 

amended declarations was not considered by the court in reaching 

its earlier determination regarding the commencement of the 

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that the instant action has not been properly commenced is not 

an accurate reflection of the evidence before the court. 

Therefore, because Defendant did not cite to any authority 

compelling a contrary result, the court exercises its inherent 

authority to modify its October 15, 2007, Order as set forth 

above. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is 

DENIED.11 

II. 

For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for 

reconsideration is GRANTED and Defendant’s cross-motion for 

reconsideration is DENIED. It is hereby ordered that section 

II.B of this court’s October 15, 2007, Order is modified to 

reflect that Menjivar’s action was properly commenced on 

April 11, 2007, and Ketchum’s action was properly commenced on 

 

instant action because Plaintiffs did not cite to, nor did they 

rely upon, this language in opposing Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment. 

11 To the extent that Defendant suggests that it would 

suffer prejudice if Plaintiffs are permitted to opt-in at this 

stage of the litigation, the court disagrees. Because Defendant 

has been aware of Plaintiffs participation in this litigation 

for some time, it cannot plausibly claim surprise, unfairness or 

prejudice from Plaintiffs opting-in at this stage in the 

litigation. Moreover, the commencement of Plaintiffs’ 

respective actions is consistent with a broad and flexible 

reading of the FLSA and with the court’s discretion in these 

matters. See Kelley v. Alamo, 964 F.2d 747, 749-50 (8th Cir. 

1992) (holding that the FLSA should be read generously in favor 

of those it protects, including “when considering issues of time 

limits and deadlines”).

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May 9, 2007. It is further ordered that Menjivar can recover 

damages for any violation of the FLSA accruing within either the 

two-year period from April 11, 2005, to April 11, 2007, or if 

Defendant’s violation of the FLSA is found to be willful the 

three-year period from April 11, 2004, to April 11, 2007. It is 

further ordered that Ketchum can recover damages for any 

violation of the FLSA accruing within either the two-year period 

from May 9, 2005, to May 9, 2007, or if Defendant’s violation of 

the FLSA is found to be willful the three-year period from May 9, 

2004, to May 9, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2007. 

s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

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