Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_02-cv-01219/USCOURTS-almd-1_02-cv-01219-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CURTIS RAY SMITH, )

)

 Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:02-CV-1219-F

) WO

)

J. C. GILES, et al., )

)

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 p etition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Curtis Ray Smith (“Smith”), a state inmat e, on November 4, 2002. In this petition,

Smith challenges a conviction for aggravated stalking entered against him by the Circuit

Court of Houston County, Alabama on April 16, 1999. The trial court sentenced Smith as

a habitual offender to life imprisonment for this conviction. 

Smith filed a direct appeal of his aggravated st alking conviction in which he raised

the following claims for relief: (1) double jeopardy prohibited the State from charging him

with aggravated stalking; (2) t he trial court erred in its denial of his motion for new trial and

motion for judgment of acquittal in light of the State’s failure to present evidence as to

petitioner’s knowledge of a restraining order; (3) t he trial court erred in its refusal to

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instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of menacing and harassment ; and (4) the

trial court violat ed his right to a fair trial by denying him the opportunity to question a

material witness, the victim, on informat ion relevant to her credibility. On January 12, 2001,

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Smith’s aggravated stalking conviction

in a memorandum opinion. See Respondents’ Exhibit A-2 - Memorandum Opinion on

Direct Appeal. In detailing some of the evidence presented against Smith, the appellate

court stated that: 

 The evidence at trial tended to show the following. In February of 1997,

Grace McLaughlin, Smith’s girlfriend, forced Smith to move out of her

apartment in Dothan, Alabama. The two had been living t oget her for

approximately five years after having met in a drug counseling program.

After moving out, Smith regularly went to McLaughlin’s apartment late at

night and knocked on the door. McLaughlin repeatedly told Smith to stay

away or she would call the police. Smith’s late night visits continued,

prompting McLaughlin to file a comp laint with the Dothan Police

Department. During this period, Smith repeatedly telephoned McLaughlin

at her place of employment, despite being told by McLaughlin and her coworkers that she did not want to speak to him. Somet ime during t his period,

Smith forged McLaughlin’s name on a check and withdrew $100 from her

bank account without her permission. On March 21, 1997, Smit h climbed

ont o McLaughlin’s balcony in the middle of the night and tapped on the

glass door. On March 29, 1997, Smith forced his way into McLaughlin’s

apartment and refused to leave. When McLaughlin attempted to telephone

the police, Smith ripped t he t elephone cord out of the wall. Smith threw

McLaughlin on the bed and held her down, bruising her arms. Smith

threat ened McLaughlin with a kitchen knife to keep her from leaving the

apartment. Smith kept McLaughlin in the apartment overnight, allowing her

to leave for work the next morning. 

 On April 1, 1997, Smith again climbed onto McLaughlin’s balcony and

tapped on the sliding glass door, begging to be let inside. McLaughlin

called the Dot han police and Smith was arrested. In the period between

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The indictment charges that “ C urtis Ray Smith . . . in violation of a court order or injunction did

intentionally and repeatedly follow or harass another person, to-wit: Martha Grace McLaughin, and

make a credible threat, either expressed or implied, with the intent to place that person to-wit: Martha

Grace McLaughin, in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm, in violation of 13A-6-91 of the

Code of Alabama . . . ” Respondent’s Exhibit A at 6. Under applicable Alabama law, a person commits

the crime of aggravated stalking when he “ intentionally and repeatedly follows or harasses another

person and . . . makes a credible threat, either expressed or implied, with the intent to place that person

in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm” and “ whose conduct in doing so also violates any

3

Smith’s arrest and appearance in municipal court, he rep eat edly telephoned

McLaughlin at work and left notes on her car. Several days before Smit h was

to appear in municipal court to answer the charges from his April 1, 1997

arrest, he went to McLaughlin’s p lace of employment and waited for her to

come outside. 

 On April 3, 1997, Smit h was convicted of harassment in Dothan municipal

court for his behavior at McLaughlin’s apartment on March 29, 1997. On

May 8, 1997, Smith was convicted of menacing for the March 29, 1997

incident, and for harassing communications for a telephone call he placed to

McLaughlin on April 1, 1997. Smith was ordered to serve 130 days in the city

jail, and was placed on probation for two years. One of t he t erms of Smith’s

probation was t o refrain from any contact with McLaughlin. Nevertheless,

Smith sent McLaughlin numerous letters from jail, some of which were

hostile and threatening. 

 Up on release from jail, Smith left notes on McLaughlin’s car and apartment

door. On September 11, 1997, Smith confronted McLaughlin at a local gas

station and threatened to kill her if she “put him back in jail.” On October 3,

1997, Smith was waiting for McLaughlin outside her apartment when she

ret urned home from work. McLaughlin told Smith that she had to make a

telephone call from a nearby pay telephone. Smith, unwilling to allow

McLaughlin to go by herself, went with her. M cLaughlin used the pay

telephone to send a prearranged signal to a co-worker’s pager, alerting the

co-worker to summon the police to McLaughlin’s ap art ment. When

McLaughlin and Smith returned to the ap artment, police officers were waiting

in t he p arking lot. Smith attempted to flee but was apprehended. He was

charged with harassment and convict ed in municipal court on November 7,

1997. 

 In February of 1998, the Houston County grand jury returned an

indictment charging Smith with aggravated stalking. 1 An arrest warrant was

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court order or injunction . . .” Ala.Code § 13A-6-90(a) and § 13A-6-91(a). 

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issued for Smith on March 3, 1998, and he was committed to the Houston

County Jail on March 6, 1998. 

Respondents’ Exhibit A-2 - Memorandum Opinion on Direct Appeal at 1-2 (citations to

trial transcript and court record omitted) (footnote added). 

With respect to its determination of t he issues presented by Smith, the relevant

portion of the opinion issued by Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reads as follows: 

I.

 Smith asserts that his conviction of aggravated stalking violated the

prohibition against double jeopardy, because he had already been convicted

in Dothan municipal court for harassment, harassing communications, and

menacing. Smit h contends that the conduct used to support the charge of

stalking included conduct used to support his prior misdemeanor

convictions. 

 “[T]he test in determining whether the charges run afoul of

the Double Jeopardy Clause is whether each crime contains a

statutory element not contained in the other. Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), 52 S.Ct. 180;

See also United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 125 L.Ed.2d 556

(1993), 113 S.Ct. 2849 (a plurality of the Unit ed States Supreme

Court reaffirmed the Blockburger test as the sole criterion for

judging double jeopardy claims); Seritt v. State, 647 So.2d 1

(Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 647 So.2d 1 (Ala.Cr.App.1994). 

Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 1276, 1321, (Ala.Cr.App. 1996), aff’d, 710 So.2d

1350 (Ala. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2325, 141 L.Ed.2d 699, 66 U.S.L.W.

3789 (1998). See also, Bertram v. State, 733 So.2d 921 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998);

Borden v. State, 711 So.2d 498 (Ala.Cr.App. 1997), aff’d, 711 So.2d 506 (Ala.

1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 113, 142 L.Ed.2d 91, 67 U.S.L.W. 3232 (1998);

Leighton v. State, 645 So.2d 354 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994). 

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* * * 

 Smith’s double jeopardy argument is premised on his previous municipal

court convictions of harassment and harassing communications [in violation

of the provisions of] Section 13A-11-8, Ala.Code 1975 . . .

* * * 

 Smith had also previously been convicted in municipal court of menacing.

Section 13A-6-23(a), Ala. Code 1975, states that “[a] person commits the

crime of menacing if, by physical action, he intentionally p laces or attempts

to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury.”

 Employing a Blockburger analysis requires an examination of the

offenses to ensure that each requires p roof of a statutory element that the

other does not. Blockburger v . United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180,

182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). A conviction of aggravated st alking requires proof

of the statutory elements of repeated following or harassment, and the

violation of any court order or injunction. These elements are separate and

distinct from those found in the harassment statute. A conviction of

harassment requires proof of the alternative elements of physical contact

with the victim, or the use of obscene or abusive language or gestures.

These distinct elements are absent from the stalking statute. Therefore,

Smith’s previous convictions of harassment, do not bar his present

conviction of aggravated stalking. 

 Unlike aggravated stalking, a conviction of harassing communications

does not require proof of the violation of a court order or of repeated

conduct. A conviction of stalking does not require proof of written or

electronic communications, necessary for a harassing communications

conviction. Accordingly, Smith’s previous conviction of harassing

communications does not bar his present conviction of aggravated stalking.

 The statute proscribing the offense of menacing does not require the

State to prove repeated conduct or t he violation of [a] court order. Both

must be proven to support a convict ion of aggravated stalking. The stalking

statute does not require the physical contact element found in the menacing

statute. Hence, Smith’s previous conviction of menacing does not bar his

present conviction of aggravated stalking. 

 Therefore, aft er applying the principles of Blockburger, it is apparent that

the prohibition against double jeopardy was not violated in the present case.

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The conviction of aggravated stalking required proof of an element not

present in the other offenses for which Smith had been previously convicted.

Each offense for which Smith was convicted in municipal court required

proof of an element not present in the stalking statute. Accordingly, Smith

did not suffer double jeopardy when he was convicted of aggravated

stalking in circuit court, despite his contention t hat the charge encompassed

conduct for which he was previously convicted in municipal court of

harassment, harassing communications, and menacing. 

 Furt hermore, the State’s evidence enumerated sufficient additional

incidents of stalking behavior that even if Smith’s t hree municipal court

convictions were excluded from consideration, the State nevertheless would

have established a case of aggravated stalking. 

 Smith’s municipal court convictions arose out of three incidents. On April

3, 1997, Smith was convicted in municipal court of harassment for the events

that took place on March 29, 1997. Specifically, Smith forced himself into

McLaughlin’s apartment and held her overnight at knife point. On May 8,

1997, Smith was convicted of menacing for the March 29, 1997 incident, and

he was convicted of harassing communications for a telephone call he made

on April 1, 1997. On November 7, 1997, Smith was convict ed of harassment

for the incident that took place on October 3, 1997 when McLaughlin used

a pay telephone to signal a co-worker to summon the police. 

 In addition to the conduct that led to these convictions, Smith carried on

a pattern of behavior over the course of 1997 for which he was never arrested

or convicted. The record revealed numerous t elep hone calls placed by Smith

to McLaughlin at her p lace of employment. Despite repeated requests to

st op , Smith continued to call McLaughlin at work, often employing a ruse to

get her to answer t he t elep hone. Unlike the telephone call Smith placed on

April 1, 1997, which formed the basis of his municipal court conviction, Smith

was never arrested or convicted of any offense relating to this series of

harassing telephone calls. 

 McLaughlin testified about different occasions when Smith waited

outside her place of employment , or appeared unexpectedly at her apartment

lat e at night. Similarly, Smith was never arrested or convicted of any offense

related to his climbing onto McLaughlin’s balcony in the middle of the night

on March 21, 1997. Although this activity took place before t he issuance of

a restraining order, it nonetheless illuminates the pattern of stalking

McLaughlin was forced to endure, which continued after the restraining

order was issued.

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 Smith was never criminally sanctioned for the many letters he sent

McLaughlin from jail in violation of the municipal court’s order that he not

communicate wit h her. Likewise, Smith was never arrested or convicted of

any offense for his threatening behavior when he threatened McLaughlin at

a gas station on September 11, 1997. Despite Smith’s assert ion t o the

contrary, he was not “previously convicted and punished for each of t he

charges alleged by the state.”

 These incidents alone would have been sufficient to supp ort Smit h’s

conviction of aggravated stalking. Because Smith had not been previously

convicted of any offense for these violations, the prohibition against double

jeopardy could not act to bar his present conviction of aggravated stalking.

 The only incidents for which Smith had been previously convicted

occurred specifically on March 29, 1997, April 1, 1997, and October 3, 1997.

The resulting municipal court convictions were unrelated to the multitude of

stalking activities which Smith carried on over the course of 1997, and for

which he was never criminally sanctioned. At most, the State’s int roduction

of Smith’s municipal court convictions merely served as evidence of specific

incidents in a larger course of conduct constituting the offense of stalking.

See Culbreath v. State, 667 So.2d 156 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995), abrogated on other

grounds, Hayes v. State, 717 So.2d 30 (Ala.Cr.App. 1997). 

 Accordingly, even if this court went beyond the principles set forth in

Block burger and employed a more strenuous conduct-based analysis to

determine if the prohibition against double jeopardy had been violated, we

would nevertheless find that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that

the conduct which gave rise to the present conviction was sep arat e from the

conduct that supp ort ed Smith’s convictions in municipal court. Smith has

not been punished twice for the same criminal transactions, and the

prohibition against double jeopardy has not been violated. 

II.

 Smith asserts that the t rial court erred when it denied his motion for a

judgment of acquittal and his mot ion for a new trial. Specifically, Smith

argues that the Stat e failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him of

aggravated stalking because, he assert s, the State failed to prove that Smith

was aware of the court order requiring him to refrain from contact with the

victim. Smith contends that wit hout such knowledge he could not have had

the requisite intent to commit the offense of aggravated stalking. The State

maint ains that there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence from which

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the jury could conclude that Smith was aware of t he municipal court’s order.

 “‘In reviewing a convict ion based on circumstantial

evidence, this court must view that evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution. The test to be applied is whether

the jury might reasonably find t hat the evidence excluded

every reasonable hypothesis excep t that of guilt; not whether

such evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis but guilt,

but whether a jury might reasonably so conclude.’” 

Woods v. State, 724 So.2d 40, 48 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998), quoting Cumbo v. State,

368 So.2d 871, 874 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 877 (Ala. 1979).

Circumstantial evidence must be given the same weight as direct evidence.

Jones v. State, 572 So.2d 504, 507 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990); Dooley v. State, 575

So.2d 1191, 1196 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990); Ward v. State, 557 So.2d 848, 850

(Ala.Cr.App. 1990). 

 In the present case, the State’s evidence demonstrated that as part of

Smith’s probation for his April 3, 1997, harassment conviction, Smith was

ordered to “[n]ot assault, communicate with or be in the presence of Grace

McLaughlin.” The municipal court form recording this condition of

probation indicated that Smith appeared in op en court and “knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently” entered a guilty plea to the harassment charge.

McLaughlin’s t estimony confirmed that Smith was in court and pleaded

guilt y t o the charges against him. The record shows that the municipal

court’s order that Smith refrain from contact with McLaughlin, was

incorporated into Smith’s May 8, 1997 convict ions of harassing

communications and menacing. The municipal court judge reiterated this

order on August 7, 1997, when he wrote in the case action summary that

Smith was “ ordered to stay away from Grace McLaughlin.” The jury could

have reasonably inferred from this evidence that the municipal court judge

apprised Smith of the conditions of his probat ion. This circumstantial

evidence supported an inference that Smith was aware of the municipal

court’s order that he refrain from contact with McLaughlin. 

 The State also present ed a number of letters Smith sent to McLaughlin

while in jail indicating that he knew that he had been ordered to refrain from

contacting McLaughlin. . . .

 [The] statements by Smith [cont ained in these letters] created the

reasonable inference that he was aware of the municipal court’s order to

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refrain from seeing McLaughlin. 

* * *

 Based on the evidence presented by the State, the jury could have

reasonably concluded that Smith knew that there was a court order requiring

him to refrain from contact with McLaughlin. The trial court did not err in

denying Smit h’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial

on this basis.

III.

 Smith assert s that the trial court erred in denying his request for jury

instructions on the lesser included offenses of menacing and harassment.

* * *

 Our review of the record convinces us that the evidence did not support

a theory of menacing or harassment. The testimony established that Smith

engaged in a pattern of repeated conduct that took place between February

and October of 1997. In addition to the isolated incidents for which Smith

was convicted of harassment and menacing in municipal court, he also

engaged in an on-going course of stalking behavior. Evidence of this long

course of stalking was presented to the jury. McLaughlin testified about

numerous harassing telephone calls. She also enumerated multiple

occasions when Smith waited for her outside her apartment and place of

business. Additionally, the record contains over 30 pages of let t ers Smith

sent McLaughlin from jail after he had been ordered not to communicate with

her.

 The evidence in the present case did not support any reasonable theory

t hat Smith’s conduct was restricted to isolated incidents of menacing or

harassment. When it is clear that there is no evidence t ending to bring the

offense within the definition of the lesser offense a court may properly refuse

to charge on lesser included offenses. Such a refusal is also appropriate

when, as here, the requested charge would have a tendency to mislead or

confuse the jury. Petway, 690 So.2d at 533. T he t rial court did not err in

refusing to instruct the jury on menacing and harassment. Jury charges on

menacing and harassment were not sup p orted by the evidence in the present

case. 

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IV. 

 Smith asserts that the trial court erred when he was not allowed to

question the victim about medical records that had been admitted into

evidence by stipulation of the parties. 

 The record shows t hat during the presentation of his defense, Smith

called the victim, Grace McLaughlin, as a defense witness. McLaughlin had

previously testified as a witness for the State. During Smith’s quest ioning

of McLaughlin, he asked her about her use of prescription drugs:

“A. To the best of my knowledge, I had just answered your

question in saying that if under the circumstances if a doctor

prescribed me medicine, I would, in fact, take it if it was

necessary.

“Q. Okay. Ms. McLaughlin, since you came in this morning,

you’ve been made aware of the fact that I have some medical

records on you, haven’t you?

“A. Yes, sir.

“Q. And you’ve been made aware of the fact that those

medical records apparently show a good bit of narcotics –

“ ....

“Q. Ms. McLaughlin, are you telling the ladies and gentlemen

of this jury that yesterday you didn’t testify that you didn’t

regularly use narcotics?

“A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Okay. And that is still the truth today; is that right?

“A. Are you asking me if I regularly use drugs outside of a

doctor prescribing them to me? I don’t underst and the

question.

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“Q. I’m saying, even if a doctor prescribed y ou narcotic drugs,

you use them every time they prescribe them, don’t you?

“A. If it was necessary, yes.”

 Smith then attempted to quest ion McLaughlin on the contents of her

medical records t hat were admitted into evidence by stipulation of the

parties. The State objected and the following exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: Okay. The records do speak for themselves.

The jury can see the records. I’m sure nobody disp utes it.

That why y’all stipulated to it; right?

“[Prosecutor]: Right.

“THE COURT: She doesn’t dispute it, Mr. Mendheim (District

At t orney) doesn’t dispute it, you don’t dispute it. The records

go in, and let them sp eak for themselves, and your objection is

sustained. 

“[Defense Counsel]: I appreciate that, and I just need to make

sure I’m following your Honor’s Orders. Are you saying I

can’t ask her quest ions about the other incidents where she

was prescribed narcotics?

“THE COURT: If its in those records, you can’t. Is it in those

records? 

“[Defense Counsel]: Yes, sir, it’s in these records.

“THE COURT: Okay. Sust ained. Nobody disputes them. So,

why ask questions about them? 

“[Defense Counsel]: Because yesterday , I think, she did

disp ut e what is now in the records that we have. And that is

why I wanted to offer them, and that’s why I want to ask her --

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“THE COURT: Well, I think y’all stipulated t o t he fact that

they are admissible, and even M r. Mendheim stipulated to

them. So, what’s to dispute? 

“ ....

“THE COURT: I don’t think there is any dispute from those

particular records that she has taken drugs as those records

reflect by a doctor. Nobody disputes that. So, you know, why

get into all this stuff about -- The State has agreed to it, and

you have agreed to it. The jury can see t hem. They can make

whatever judgment they want to about it.

“ ....

“THE COURT: The State has stipulated to the fact t hat they

do not dispute that, in fact, she went to the doctor on those

occasions and got prescribed drugs. They don’t dispute that.

This witness doesn’t dispute it. So, why are we going through

this?

“[Defense Counsel]: Because yesterday, she did dispute it

before the records were here. 

“THE COURT: Well, now they don’t dispute it. You can argue

that to the jury. Okay.” 

***

 The trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding Smith’s questioning

of McLaughlin concerning stipulated medical records. Smith wished to

examine McLaughlin concerning those records in order to demonstrate that

the records contradicted her earlier statement denying her use of narcotics.

In addition to attacking McLaughlin’s credibility, the revelation that she was

t aking prescribed drugs had the potential to erode the jury’s confidence in

McLaughlin’s ability to accurately remember the events of 1997.

Nevertheless, as the trial court noted, the evidence that McLaughlin was

taking prescription drugs was already before t he jury in the form of

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McLaughlin’s testimony and her medical records. The jury heard

McLaughlin admit that she had taken prescription drugs. Further, the jury

was able t o examine the records and determine for themselves if McLaughlin

testified truthfully. The jury was also able to rely on the medical records in

making determinations about McLaughlin’s abilit y t o remember the events

of 1997.

* * * 

 . . . Any questioning of McLaughlin about the contents of the st ip ulat ed

medical records would have been merely cumulative. The jury was able to

determine from the medical records t hemselves whether McLaughlin was

credible. The trial court did not err when Smith was not allowed to question

the victim about medical records that had been admitted into evidence by

stipulation of the parties.

 Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Respondents’ Exhibit A-2 - Memorandum Opinion on Direct Appeal 2-10 (citations t o t rial

transcript, court record and appellant’s brief omitted). On April 27, 2001, the Alabama

Supreme Court denied Smith’s petition for writ of certiorari. Ex parte Smith, 824 So.2d 88

(Ala. 2001). 

In July of 2001, Smith filed a state post-conviction petition pursuant to Rule 32,

Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. On the standard form, Smith placed check marks

beside the following grounds for a petition listed on the form: (i) t he Constitution requires

a new trial, a new sentence or other relief; (ii) the court was without jurisdiction to render

judgment or to impose sentence; (iii) the sentence imposed exceeds the maximum

authorized by law; and (iv) newly discovered facts exist which require that the conviction

or sentence be vacated. A brief submitted by Smith in support of this state petition raised

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these claims for relief:

1. Conviction obtained when petitioner was not

allowed to properly and fully question Martha

Grace McLaughlin and Mills Hornsby. 

2. Conviction obtained t hrough a defective

indictment because the indictment failed to state

a time frame for the offense. 

3. Conviction obtained through failure t o instruct

the petitioner of probat ion conditions and

knowledge of a restraining order.

4. Conviction obt ained through the refusal of the

t rial court to instruct the jury on lesser included

offenses of harassment and menacing. 

5. Conviction obtained in violation of t he

protection against double jeopardy. 

6. Conviction obtained through violat ion of

petitioner’s constitutional rights protected under

the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

7. Conviction obtained through violation of right to

a fair trial due to the prosecutor’s misconduct in

violating the rules of professional conduct

through the solicitation of testimony regarding

petitioner’s criminal record and implication that

letters to the victim contained threats. 

8. Conviction obtained in violat ion of the Ex Post

Fact o Clause as the sent ence imp osed

represented an additional sentence for crimes on

which petitioner had previously been convicted

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Although presented by Smith in terms of an ex post facto violation, it is clear that this claim

alleges a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. On appeal from the trial court’s denial

of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals properly construed this claim as one

alleging a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

15

and sentenced.2

On August 6, 2001, the trial court dismissed Smith’s Rule 32 petition because the

“[i]ssues raised by the petitioner were or could have been raised on direct appeal.”

Respondents’ Exhibit B at 115. The petitioner appealed this decision. The Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Smith’s Rule 32 petition. 

In addressing Smith’s claims regarding (i) his limited abilit y to question the victim,

(ii) the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial

based on the State’s failure to prove specific intent to violate a court order, and (iii) double

jeopardy violations, the appellate court held that t he trial court properly precluded these

issues as they had been addressed adversely to the p et it ioner on direct appeal.

Respondents’ Exhibit B-2 - Memorandum Opinion on Appeal of Rule 32 Petition at 2-4.

With respect to Smith’s claim that the prosecutor’s actions forced him to dismiss M ills

Hornsby as a witness, the court determined t hat “[t]his issue was properly precluded

pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(5), for it could have been, but was not, presented on appeal. . . .”

Id. at 2. The court further determined that the “ circuit court could have properly precluded

[the deficient indictment] claim pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(2)” because Smith raised this claim

in a motion to dismiss the indictment. Id. As for Smith’s claims that (i) the trial court erred

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in failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, (ii) his conviction violated the

First and Fourteenth Amendments, and (iii) the actions of the prosecutor violated the rules

of professional conduct, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that these issues

were procedurally defaulted because Smith could have but did not raise such claims on

direct appeal. Id. at 2-3. Additionally, the appellate court concluded that the issues by

which a “check” mark appeared on the printed form provided no basis for relief as Smith

failed to support these claims with specific facts nor did he present evidence that met

requirements for newly discovered evidence. Id. at 4.

Smith filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition on November 4, 2002. In this federal habeas

action, Smith presents the same eight claims which he raised in the brief filed in support of

his Rule 32 petition.

Upon review of the § 2254 petition, the answers of the respondents, Smith’s

resp onses to the answers, and the opinions issued by the state courts, the court concludes

that no evidentiary hearing is required and that the petition is due t o be denied in

accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in

United States District Courts.

II. DISCUSSION

A. State Law Claims

To the extent that Smith’s claims challenging his ability to cross examine material

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witnesses and the trial court’s failure to provide jury instructions on lesser included

offenses are based on alleged violations of state law, the petitioner is entitled to no relief

as a state court’s interpretation of its own laws and rules provides no basis for federal

habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct . 475, 480 (1991) (“[I]t is not

the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a

conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); Lewis v.

Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of

state law.”).

 B. Claims Adjudicated by the State Courts

The petitioner’s request for federal habeas relief is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Price v . Vincent, 538

U.S. 634, 638, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 (2003) (“A habeas petitioner whose claim was

adjudicated on t he merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he

meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120

S.Ct. 1495, 1518 (2000). Under the requisite provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), with respect

to a claim adjudicat ed on t he merits in state court, federal habeas relief from a state court

judgment may not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary t o, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

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determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determinat ion of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

In Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413 (2000), the Supreme Court held that:

Under the “contrary to” clause a federal court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion op posite to that

reached by this Court on a question of law or if the stat e court

decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant t he writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from t his Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

The Court explained that habeas relief is appropriate when a petitioner demonstrates

“that a decision by a state court is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established [Supreme Court ] law

if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s]

cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indist inguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme] Court and nevert heless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court]

precedent.’ Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed. 2d 389

(2000).” Price, 538 U.S. at 640, 123 S.Ct. at 1853 (2003). Additionally , federal review in a

habeas action “is limited to whet her t he state court's decision was objectively

unreasonable in the light of clearly est ablished federal law. Williams, [529 U.S. at 409],120

S.Ct. at 1521.” Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003); Parker v. Head,

244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2001), citing Williams, supra (“[F]ederal habeas relief [is]

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available under the ‘unreasonable application’ standard only if t he st at e court’s application

of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”). A federal district court

is not to decide “the correctness per se . . . of t he st at e court decision” but only the

“objective reasonableness” of such decision. Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.

2001). Moreover, “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct . at 1522 (emphasis in

original). “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, . . . a federal habeas

court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 529 U.S.

at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522. 

Federal district courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court

based its findings on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

present ed in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

determinations of fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petit ioner “shall

have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, even when the state court addresses a

quest ion of law, this court is not authorized “to evaluate [a petitioner’s] claim de novo

rather than t hrough t he lens of § 2254(d).” Price, 538 U.S. at 639, 123 S.Ct. at 1852. The

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As previously noted, Smith’s ex post facto claim alleged that the trial court imposed a life sentence

upon him for aggravated stalking in violation of double jeopardy. The petitioner first raised his claim

in terms of an ex post facto violation in his Rule 32 petition. On appeal from the denial of this petition,

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that “ [t]his claim did not present a possible ex post

fact situation, but a possible double jeopardy issue which” had been addressed in favor of the State on

direct appeal. 

20

Supreme Court admonishes that such evaluation “exceeds the limits imposed on federal

habeas review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) . . .” 538 U.S. at 636, 123 S.Ct. at 1851. 

With respect to Smith’s assertion that the trial court erred in limiting his examination

of the victim, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on the State’s failure

to prove his knowledge of a court order, his claim that the trial court erred in its refusal to

instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, and the double jeopardy/ex post facto via

double jeopardy claims, the record establishes that such claims entitle the petitioner to no

relief in this court as the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals properly adjudicated these

claims on the merits on direct appeal.3

 Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-405, 120 S.Ct. at 1518- 1523

(2000). Specifically, the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on these issues

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law nor an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state courts.

On direct appeal, t he Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that “after

applying the principles of Blockburger, it is ap p arent that the prohibition against double

jeopardy was not violated in the present case.” Respondents’ Exhibit A-2 - Memorandum

Opinion on Direct Appeal at 4. In addressing the petitioner’s attack on the sufficiency of

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the evidence, the appellate court determined that in April of 1997 the municipal court

“ordered [Smith] to ‘[n]ot assault, communicate with or be in the presence of Grace

McLaughlin.’ . . . The record shows that the municipal court’s order that Smith refrain

from contact with McLaughlin, was incorporated into Smith’s May 8, 1997 convict ions of

harassing communicat ions and menacing. The municipal court judge reiterated this order

on August 7, 1997, when he wrote in the case action summary that Smith was ‘ordered to

stay away from Grace McLaughlin.’ The jury could have reasonably inferred from this

evidence that t he municip al court judge apprised Smith of the conditions of his probation.

This circumstantial evidence supported an inference t hat Smith was aware of the municipal

court’s order that he refrain from contact with McLaughlin.” Id. at 5-6 (cit ations to trial

transcript and court record omitted). Additionally, the court noted that letters and

statements of Smith “created the reasonable inference that he was aware of the municipal

court’s order to refrain from seeing McLaughlin.” Id. at 6. As for the claim of entitlement

to instructions on lesser included offenses, the court held “that the evidence did not

support a theory of menacing or harassment” due to Smith’s “on-going course of stalking

behavior” and his continued communication with the victim “after he had been ordered not

to communicate with her.” Id. at 7. Finally, with respect to Smith’s claim that the trial court

improperly denied him an opportunity to question the victim about her use of prescription

drugs as detailed in the medical records admitted into evidence by stipulation of the

parties, the appellate court recounted relevant portions of the transcript and reasoned as

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follows:

 The trial court did not abuse its discret ion regarding Smith’s questioning

of McLaughlin concerning stipulated medical records. Smith wished to

examine McLaughlin concerning those records in order to demonstrate that

the records contradicted her earlier statement denying her use of narcotics.

In addition to attacking McLaughlin’s credibility, the revelat ion t hat she was

taking prescribed drugs had the potential to erode the jury’s confidence in

McLaughlin’s abilit y t o accurately remember the events of 1997.

Nevertheless, as the trial court noted, the evidence that McLaughlin was

taking prescription drugs was already before the jury in the form of

McLaughlin’s testimony and her medical records. The jury heard

McLaughlin admit that she had taken prescription drugs. Further, the jury

was able to examine the records and det ermine for themselves if McLaughlin

testified truthfully. The jury was also able to rely on the medical records in

making determinat ions about McLaughlin’s ability to remember the events

of 1997.

* * * 

 . . . Any questioning of McLaughlin about the contents of the stipulated

medical records would have been merely cumulative. T he jury was able to

determine from the medical records themselves whether McLaughlin was

credible. The trial court did not err when Smit h was not allowed to question

the victim about medical records that had been admitted into evidence by

stipulation of the parties.

Respondents’ Exhibit A-2 - Memorandum Opinion on Direct Appeal at 9-10. The Alabama

Supreme Court denied Smith’s petition for writ of certiorari. This Court must therefore

review the instant claims for habeas corpus relief in accordance with the directives

cont ained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). Price, 538 U.S. at 638-639, 123 S.Ct. at 1852

(2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 402, 120 S.Ct. at 1518. 

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In refusing Smith relief on his claims, the Alabama Court of Criminal App eals did not

apply “a rule t hat contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” nor

did the state court “confront [] a set of facts . . . materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrive[] at a result different from [Supreme Court]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1519-1520. An assessment of whether

the state court’s denial of Smith’s claims “resulted in a decision that . . . involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States” is therefore warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In so doing, this

Court’s inquiry is limited to “whether the state court ’s application of clearly established

federal law was objectively reasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct . at 1521. Upon

thorough review of the record in this case, it is clear that the state appellate court’s

rejection of Smith’s claims was objectively reasonable. The decision likewise constituted

a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). Consequently, Smith is due no relief from this court on those claims decided

adversely to him on the merits by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.

C. Procedurally Defaulted Claims

The respondents argue that Smith’s claim regarding his decision to dismiss Mills

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Hornsby as a witness, his challenge to the indictment, the issue involving an alleged

violation of the First/Fourteenth Amendments, and his assertion of prosecutorial

misconduct are procedurally defaulted due t o Smith’s failure to present these claims to the

state courts in accordance with the state’s procedural rules. See Teague v . Lane, 489 U.S.

288 (1989); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11th Cir. 2002); Holladay v. Haley, 209

F.3d 1243, 1254 n. 9 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1017 (2000); Collier v. Jones, 901 F.2d

770, 773 (11th Cir. 1990). In support of this argument, the resp ondents maintain that the last

st at e court to render judgment on the Hornsby, First/Fourteenth Amendment and

prosecutorial misconduct claims determined that these claims were procedurally defaulted

under applicable state rules. See Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1992)

(citations omitted) (“Federal review of a petitioner’s claim is barred by the proceduraldefault doctrine if the last state court t o review the claim states clearly and expressly that

its judgment rest s on a procedural bar, and that bar provides an adequate and independent

state ground for denying relief.”). Sp ecifically, on appeal from the denial of his Rule

32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that these claims were

p rocedurally defaulted due to Smith’s failure to raise them on direct appeal. Respondents’

Exhibit B-2 - Memorandum Opinion on Appeal of Rule 32 Petition at 2-3. With respect

to Smith’s challenge to the indictment, the respondents argue t hat t his claim is

procedurally barred from review because the petitioner failed to raise the claim on direct

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appeal.

This court may reach the merits of Smith’s procedurally defaulted claims only if the

petitioner shows either (1) cause for the p rocedural default and actual prejudice arising out

of the violation of federal law, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), or (2) a resulting

fundamental miscarriage of justice if the federal court does not consider the merits of the

claims. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320 (1995). 

The court has thoroughly reviewed the resp onses submitted by the petitioner. In

these documents, Smith has demonstrated neither cause for his failure to present his

federal habeas claims to the state courts in compliance wit h applicable procedural rules nor

t he existence of actual prejudice emanating from infringement of federal law. Nevertheless,

t his court may still reach the merits of his defaulted claims in order to p revent a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. In an effort to meet this exception t o the procedural

default bar, Smith asserts that the violations of his constitutional rights probably result ed

in his conviction for aggravated stalking despite his actual innocence. See Petitioner’s

April 29, 2003 Response - Court Doc. No. 25 at 13. 

The miscarriage of justice standard is directly linked to innocence. Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). Innocence is not an independent claim; rather, it is the “gateway”

through which a petit ioner must pass before a court may consider constitutional claims

which are defaulted. Id. at 315. This exception applies where a petitioner establishes that

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“a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is act ually

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); Schlup v. Delo, supra. “To

establish actual innocence, [a habeas petitioner] must demonstrate that . . . ‘it is more likely

t han not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.’ Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.

614, 623 (1998). “It is important to note in t his regard that ‘actual innocence’ means factual

innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S.Ct.

2514, 2518-2519, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-624. 

Schlup observes that

a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused t he

conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. . . . To be

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his

allegations of const itutional error with new reliable evidence –

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was

not presented at trial.

513 U.S. at 324.

Smith has failed to make the requisite showing of actual innocence. He has

presented no evidence which satisfies the standard set forth in Schlup. Consequently,

Smith’s procedurally defaulted claims are foreclosed from federal habeas review.

III. CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the

petition for habeas corp us relief filed by Curtis Ray Smith be denied and that this case be

dismissed with prejudice. 

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before August 15, 2005 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed shall specifically identify the findings in t he

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure t o file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33

(11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc)

(adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).

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DONE, this 2nd day of August, 2005.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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