Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00672/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00672-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Richard Brinsfield 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 07-0672-PHX-ROS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the court is Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. #1. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in 1990 and sentenced to twenty

years in prison. Doc. #20, Exh. B at 2. The Arizona Court of Appeals subsequently reversed

the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. While Petitioner was on release

pending retrial, he was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to 13 years in prison

on October 20, 1993. Doc. #20, Exh. B at 2, Exh. N, Exh. M at 14. Petitioner was retried

in 1997 and again convicted of second degree murder. Doc. #20, Exh. B at 2. He was

sentenced to an aggravated term of 25 years in prison to be served consecutively to the

sentence for the assault conviction. Id. 

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Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the aggravated assault case, and on November 14,

1996, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in a Memorandum

Decision. Doc. #20, Exh. N. Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which

was denied on November 24, 1997. Doc. #20, Exh. L at 4.

Petitioner also filed a direct appeal in the second degree murder case, and on March

26, 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Doc. #20,

Exh. B. Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court but the request was denied

on October 31, 2002. Doc. #20, Exh. E.

After Petitioner filed his notice of appeal in the murder case but before the Court of

Appeals issued its decision, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Doc. #20,

Exh. F. On May 22, 2001, the trial court summarily denied the petition. Doc. #20, Exh. G.

After Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, the Court

consolidated the petition for review in the post-conviction proceedings with the direct appeal

and denied all relief. Doc. #20, Exh. B. The post-conviction relief petition for review in the

Arizona Supreme Court, which was also consolidated with the direct appeal petition for

review, was denied on October 31, 2002. Doc. #20, Exh. E. 

Petitioner also sought post-conviction relief in the aggravated assault case. According

to the Pinal County Superior Court docket, Petitioner filed either a notice of post-conviction

relief or a petition for post-conviction relief on November 22, 1994, January 23, 1996,

January 15, 1998, and March 12, 1999. Doc. #20, Exh. M at 15-17. On July 22, 1999,

Petitioner was granted permission to withdraw his last petition for post-conviction relief.

Doc. #20, Exh. M at 18. 

Petitioner also filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the aggravated assault

case on September 8, 2006. Doc. #20, Exh. I. Petitioner apparently filed it in the Arizona

Supreme Court because on October 19, 2006, Justice Ryan wrote an order dismissing the

petition because Petitioner should have filed it as a petition for post-conviction relief and

presented it first to the trial court and then to the Court of Appeals. Doc. #20, Exh. J.

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On March 23, 2007, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

court. Doc. #1. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

October 11, 2007. Doc. #20. On November 9, 2007, Petitioner filed a Reply to

Respondents’ Answer. Doc. #22.

DISCUSSION

Respondents contends in their answer that the petition should be dismissed because

it was filed after the statute of limitations expired. Petitioner does not address the statute of

limitations defense in his reply. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the

habeas petition was not filed within the statute of limitations period and is therefore untimely.

As a result, the court need not address the merits of the claims.

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A state prisoner must file a federal petition within one year from

"the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). "[T]he period of 'direct review' in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files

such a petition." Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). 

"The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward" the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Lott, 304 F.3d at

921. However, a state petition that is not filed within the state's required time limit is not

"properly filed" and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1812 (2005). "When a post-conviction petition is untimely

under state law, 'that [is] the end of the matter' for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)." Id. Moreover,

filing a petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations period that ended

before the petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

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The statute of limitations under AEDPA may be subject to equitable tolling. Corjasso

v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002). However, as a general rule, equitable tolling is

not available in most cases and may be applied only when "extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Miles v. Prunty,

187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).

1. Second Degree Murder Conviction

In Petitioner’s second degree murder case, the Arizona Supreme Court denied direct

review on October 31, 2002, and under Supreme Court Rule 13, Petitioner had ninety days

from that date to file a petition for writ of certiorari. As a result, the period of "direct review"

for statute of limitations purposes ended on January 29, 2003, and the one year limitations

period began to run the next day. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

at 1158-59. Therefore, absent any tolling, the statute of limitations period expired on January

29, 2004.

 Petitioner’s state petition for post-conviction relief in the murder case had already

been denied by the time the statute of limitations period began to run because, as explained

above, the petitions for review in the post conviction proceedings and the direct appeal were

consolidated in the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court. Therefore,

once the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, no post-conviction proceedings were

pending. Because there was no state post-conviction proceeding or other collateral review

pending at any time during the limitations period, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory

tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, when Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition

in this court on March 23, 2007, more than four years had passed since the statute of

limitations deadline for the second degree murder case. 

Additionally, Petitioner has presented nothing to support the application of equitable

tolling to his case. Petitioner has not shown that extraordinary circumstances beyond his

control made it impossible to file his petition on time. For these reasons, the court finds that

the petition as it pertains to the second degree murder conviction is untimely.

///

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2. Aggravated Assault Conviction

In the aggravated assault case, Petitioner’s petition for review on direct appeal in the

Arizona Supreme Court was denied on November 24, 1997. Doc. #20, Exh. L at 4.

Petitioner had ninety days from that date to file a petition for writ of certiorari. As a result,

the period of "direct review" for statute of limitations purposes ended on February 22, 1998,

and the one year limitations period began to run the next day. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A); Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1158-59. Therefore, absent any tolling, the statute of

limitations period expired one year later on February 22, 1999.

It appears from the Pinal County Superior Court docket that Petitioner had a properlyfiled petition for post-conviction relief pending on February 22, 1999. Doc. #20 Exh. M at

16. However, on July 22, 1999, the post-conviction petition was withdrawn. Doc. #20, Exh.

M at 18. The limitations period was therefore tolled for five months and began to run again

on July 23, 1999. Because no other state post-conviction proceedings subsequently tolled

the limitations period, it expired on July 23, 2000. Petitioner’s state habeas petition, filed on

September 8, 2006, did nothing to further toll the time because the limitations period had

already expired. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823. As a result, when Petitioner filed his federal

habeas petition in this court on March 23, 2007, nearly seven years had passed since the

statute of limitations deadline for the aggravated assault case.

Additionally, as with the deadline applicable to the murder case, Petitioner has

presented nothing to support the application of equitable tolling to his case. He has not

shown that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented him from filing his

petition on time. For these reasons, the court finds that the petition as it pertains to the

aggravated assault conviction is untimely.

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the habeas petition is barred by the

statute of limitations and will recommend that the petition be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

 That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 30th day of May, 2008.

 

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