Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00399/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00399-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CALVIN LEON MASSEY, # 155562, )

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:14cv399-WHA 

 ) (WO)

LEEPOSEY DANIELS, et al., )

 )

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter concerns a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by 

Alabama inmate Calvin Leon Massey (“Massey”). Doc. No. 1.1

I. BACKGROUND

Massey pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to two counts of attempted

murder, a violation of §§ 13A-4-2 & 13A-6-2, Ala. Code 1975. On April 5, 2012, that court 

sentenced Massey to concurrent terms of life in prison.

Massey appealed, raising these claims:

1. The indictment was void because the copy provided to his counsel during 

discovery was not signed by the grand jury foreman.

2. There was an insufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea because the 

victims’ injuries did not evidence an intent to kill.

3. His trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate 

medical evidence and secure expert testimony to assist his defense.

Doc. No. 7-3 at 14-31.

 1 Document numbers (“Doc. No.”) are those assigned by the Clerk of Court in this civil action. 

Page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF.

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On November 30, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued an unpublished 

memorandum opinion affirming Massey’s conviction and sentence. Doc. No. 7-5. Massey applied 

for rehearing, which was overruled by the appellate court on January 4, 2013. See Doc. No. 7-1

at 2. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court, which that 

court denied on March 15, 2013. Id. A certificate of judgment was entered that same date. Id.

On June 24, 2013, Massey, proceeding pro se, filed what he styled as a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the Elmore County Circuit Court. See Doc. No. 7-7 at 22. He filed an amendment 

to that petition on July 10, 2013. Id. at 10. Because Massey’s self-styled habeas petition presented 

claims challenging his convictions and sentence, it was transferred to the Montgomery County 

Circuit Court, the court of conviction, to be treated as a petition for post-conviction relief under 

Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 30-31. After his petition, as amended, 

was before the Montgomery County Circuit Court, Massey again amended to add additional 

claims. Doc. No. 7-8 at 22-30.

Massey’s twice-amended Rule 32 petition set forth these claims:

1. Massey was wrongfully convicted of attempted murder because that crime 

was not included in the Alabama criminal code at the time of Massey’s 

offense.

2. The indictment was void, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict 

and sentence Massey, because the indictment was not signed by the grand 

jury foreman.

3. The indictment was void because it contained conflicting and/or ambiguous 

language.

4. Massey’s guilty plea was involuntary because he entered it without 

understanding the elements of attempted murder.

5. The State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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6. His trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and prepare for 

trial and for failing to object to his void indictment.

7. His appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the issue of his 

void indictment for appellate review.

8. His life sentence exceeded the maximum allowed by law because his prior 

federal conviction was wrongfully used to enhance his sentence.

9. There was insufficient evidence to support the charges of attempted murder.

Doc. No. 7-7 at 8-9, 19-21; Doc. No. 7-8 at 22-30.

On November 21, 2013, the trial court denied Massey’s Rule 32 petition. Doc. No. 7-8 at 

45. Massey appealed, mostly reiterating the claims he raised in his Rule 32 petition but raising for 

the first time a double jeopardy claim and an additional allegation of ineffective assistance by his 

appellate counsel. See Doc. No. 7-10. On February 28, 2014, the Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals issued an unpublished memorandum opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment denying 

Massey’s Rule 32 petition. Doc. No. 7-12. Massey applied for rehearing, which was overruled 

by the appellate court on March 21, 2014. See Doc. No. 7-6 at 2. He then filed a petition for writ 

of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court, which that court denied on May 16, 2014. Id. A 

certificate of judgment was entered that same date. Id.

On May 27, 2014, Massey initiated this habeas action by filing a § 2254 petition asserting 

these claims:

1. His trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (a) obtain a 

ballistics expert, (b) object to the victim’s exaggeration of her injuries, (c) 

call the doctor who cared for the victim, and (d) object to the void 

indictment.

2. His appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (a) 

preserve a challenge to the void indictment and (b) ensure that a copy of the 

indictment served on him was in the appellate record.

3. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him because the 

indictment was void.

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4. The Stated failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

5. His convictions for two counts of attempted murder violated his double 

jeopardy rights because the counts arose from the same course of events.

6. His guilty plea was involuntary because his trial counsel failed to explain 

the elements of attempted murder to him.

7. There was insufficient evidence to support the charges of attempted murder.

Doc. No. 1 at 2-12.

In October 2014, Massey amended his § 2254 petition to add a claim that the trial the court 

lacked jurisdiction because his indictment was void, in that it was “fraudulent and manufactured 

by the Montgomery County, Alabama District Attorney’s Office.” Doc. No. 14 at 1-2.

The respondents maintain that, with three exceptions, Massey’s § 2254 claims were fully 

litigated in the state courts and the state courts correctly determined that the claims entitle Massey 

to no relief. See Doc. Nos. 7 & 18. The respondents contend that Massey’s claims that (1) his 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that a copy of the indictment served on him 

was in the appellate record, (2) his convictions violated his double jeopardy rights, and (3) his 

indictment was fraudulent and “manufactured” by the Montgomery County District Attorney’s 

Office are procedurally defaulted because he did not properly present the claims to the state courts 

when he had the opportunity to do so and he cannot now return to state court to exhaust them. Id. 

After careful review of the § 2254 petition, the parties’ submissions, and the record in this case, 

the undersigned finds that Massey’s petition should be denied without an evidentiary hearing. See

Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Habeas Review for Claims Adjudicated on Merits by State Courts

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“When it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

Congress significantly limited the circumstances under which a habeas petitioner may obtain 

relief.” Hardy v. Allen, 2010 WL 9447204, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 21, 2010). To prevail on a 

§ 2254 claim adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, a petitioner must show that a decision 

by the state courts was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was “based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 & 412-

13 (2000).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law either if it fails to apply the correct 

controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts “materially 

indistinguishable” from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-06; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court’s decision is 

an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it either correctly identifies the governing rule but 

then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively 

unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. “Objectively unreasonable” means something more than 

an “erroneous” or “incorrect” application of clearly established law, and a reviewing federal court 

may not substitute its judgment for the state court’s even if the federal court, in its own independent 

judgment, disagrees with the state court’s decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003). The reviewing court “must determine what arguments or 

theories supported or ... could have supported[ ] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask 

whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are 

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inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). “This is a ‘difficult to meet,’ and ‘highly deferential standard for 

evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 536 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal citations omitted).

Federal courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court based its findings 

on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s determinations of fact shall be “presumed 

to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of 

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

1. Massey’s Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Massey asserts several grounds of allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel by the

lawyers who represented him during proceedings in the trial court and on appeal. Doc. No. 1 at 5-

6. Massey raised these claims in his Rule 32 petition and pursued them on appeal from the trial 

court’s denial of that petition. Addressing the claims in its memorandum opinion affirming the 

trial court’s judgment, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

Massey contends that the circuit court erred “by not declaring trial counsel 

and appellate counsel ineffective.” (Massey’s brief, p. 17.)

“‘To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a [Rule 32] petitioner must show (1) that his counsel’s performance 

was deficient, and (2) that he was prejudiced by the deficient 

performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. 

Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d 

1370, 1372 (Ala. 1987). In the context of a guilty-plea proceeding, 

a petitioner must show that, but for counsel’s errors, the petitioner 

would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on 

proceeding to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 

366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985).’”

Ex parte Coleman, 71 So. 3d 627, 632 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Winbush v. State, 18 

So. 3d 423, 423 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)).

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Massey, in his Rule 32 petition, alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective 

because, he said, his trial counsel “failed to order a balistics [sic] report from a[n] 

expert due to the fact that there was another shooter on the scene, along with two 

different gun casings”; “failed to thoroughly research the motion of discovery to 

also review the medical reports and see that the victim never received a direct shot 

and that her injuries were not life threatening”; “failed to seek the opinion of the 

medical doctor who saw the victim”; “let him plead guilt [sic] to attempted murder 

against Carvis Jones ... who said he felt bullets go by his head and he tried to shield 

his mom from being shot”; and for not challenging a void indictment. (C. 100-01.)

 

Although Massey alleged that his trial counsel was deficient, Massey failed 

to plead facts establishing prejudice. Specifically, Massey did not allege that but 

for his trial counsel’s errors he “would not have pleaded guilty but would have 

insisted on proceeding to trial.” Ex parte Coleman, supra. Consequently, Massey 

failed to meet his “heavy” burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and 32.6(b), 

Ala.R.Crim.P. Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 356 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). 

Accordingly, the circuit court did not err when it summarily dismissed Massey’s 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.

With regard to Massey’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim, 

Massey, in his Rule 32 petition, alleged that his appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea “the fact that [his] 

indictment was void.” (C. 101.) Because we concluded in part II of this 

memorandum, however, that Massey’s void-indictment claim was, on its face, 

without merit, Massey’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim is also 

without merit. See Jackson v. State, [Ms. CR-06-1026, Nov. 13, 2009] ___ So.3d

___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (“‘Because the substantive claim underlying the 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has no merit, counsel could not be 

ineffective for failing to raise this issue.’ Lee v. State, 44 So. 3d 1145, 1173 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2009).”). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err when it summarily 

dismissed Massey’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim.

Doc. No. 7-12 at 11-12.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be evaluated against the two-part test 

announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that 

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 689. Second, 

the petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Scrutiny 

of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential,” and the court indulges a “strong presumption” 

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that counsel’s performance was reasonable. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th 

Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prejudice prong of Strickland does not focus 

only on the outcome; rather, to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that counsel’s 

deficient representation rendered the result of the trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See 

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (“[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome 

determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair 

or unreliable, is defective.”). Unless a petitioner satisfies the showings required on both prongs of 

the Strickland inquiry, relief should be denied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Once a court decides 

that one of the requisite showings has not been made, it need not decide whether the other one has 

been. Id. at 697; Duren v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1998).

The Strickland standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was held 

applicable to guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). A petitioner alleging 

ineffective assistance in this context must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient (i.e., 

professionally unreasonable) and that counsel’s deficient performance “affected the outcome of 

the plea process.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. To establish prejudice, then, a petitioner “must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would ... have pleaded [not] guilty 

and would ... have insisted on going to trial.” Id. A mere allegation by a defendant that he would 

have insisted on going to trial but for counsel’s errors is insufficient to establish prejudice; rather, 

the court will look to the factual circumstances surrounding the plea to determine whether the 

defendant would have proceeded to trial. See Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th Cir. 

2001); United States v. Arvantis, 902 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1990).

Here, because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals ruled on the merits of Massey’s

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court’s § 2254 review under Strickland is another 

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step removed from the original analysis, or as the Supreme Court puts it, “doubly deferential.” 

Burt v. Titlow, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S.Ct. 10, 13 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted); 

see Tanzi v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 772 F.3d 644, 652 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Burt). The 

state-court decision finding that Massey failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from his trial 

counsel’s allegedly deficient performance was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application 

of clearly established federal law. As the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found, Massey, in 

his Rule 32 petition, did not allege that but for his trial counsel’s purported errors, he would have 

pleaded not guilty and would instead have insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

Thus, Massey did not establish prejudice under the standard of Strickland and Hill. Consequently, 

he is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

As for Massey’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve a 

challenge to his allegedly void indictment, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief 

based on its determination that Massey’s void-indictment claim was without merit, and therefore 

any claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve and pursue the voidindictment claim would also lack merit. Doc. No. 7-12 at 12. Elsewhere in its opinion affirming 

the trial court’s denial of Massey’s Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

addressed the void-indictment claim:

Massey contends that the circuit court erred “by not declaring the indictment 

void” because, he says, the indictment was “unsigned.” (Massey’s brief, pp. 12-

13.)

Massey’s claim, however, is refuted by the record on direct appeal. The 

record in Massey’s direct appeal includes a copy of the indictment charging Massey 

with two counts of attempted murder. (Record on Direct Appeal, C. 6.) That 

indictment is signed by the grand jury foreperson, a Montgomery County circuit 

judge, and the Montgomery Circuit Clerk. Thus, contrary to his assertion, Massey’s 

indictment was, in fact, signed. Because Massey’s claim is clearly refuted by the 

record on direct appeal, the circuit court did not err when it summarily dismissed 

this claim. See McNabb v. State, 991 So. 2d 313, 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) 

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(holding that “because [McNabb’s] claim was clearly refuted by the record, 

summary denial was proper pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), Ala.R.Crim.P.”).

Doc. No. 7-12 at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. United States v. 

Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992). Because Massey’s underlying void-indictment claim 

lacked merit, the state court’s adjudication of his related claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); nor did it involve an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).2 Consequently, Massey is not entitled to 

habeas relief on this claim.

2. Void-Indictment Claim

 2 See copy of indictment in certified clerk’s record, Doc. No. 7-2 at 6-8. On direct appeal, Massey 

raised a claim that the indictment was void because the copy provided to his defense counsel during 

discovery was not signed by the grand jury foreman, while the copy of the indictment in the clerk’s 

record was signed by the grand jury foreman; therefore, there was no way to ascertain the time 

when the grand jury foreman signed the indictment as a true bill. See Doc. No. 7-3 at 16-19. The 

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that this claim was unpreserved for appellate review 

because Massey failed to challenge the indictment by pre-trial motion, as provided by 

Ala.R.Crim.P. 15.2 & 15.3. Doc. No. 7-5 at 2-3. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals also 

noted that, under Alabama law, a defective indictment does not deprive the trial court of 

jurisdiction and instead is a non-jurisdictional error that can be waived if not preserved. Doc. No. 

7-5 at 3 (citing Ex Parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536, 539 (Ala. 2006), also citing Reed v. State, 748 

So.2d 231 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the failure of the grand jury foreman to endorse 

an indictment a “true bill” does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed with the 

prosecution); Smith v. State, 609 So.2d 449, 450 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that the failure 

of the grand jury foreman to endorse the indictment a “true bill” did not affect the fundamental 

power of the court to proceed with the prosecution)). Because, on direct appeal, Massey’s voidindictment claim was found to be waived by his failure to present the claim in a pre-trial motion, 

there is no apparent basis for his claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

preserve the claim for appellate review. At any rate, in Massey’s appeal from the denial of his 

Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reached the merits of both the voidindictment claim and Massey’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

preserve the claim for appellate review. 

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As noted above in the discussion of Massey’s claim that his appellate counsel was 

ineffective, Massey argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him 

because his indictment was void. Doc. No. 1 at 8. He predicates this claim on an assertion that 

the indictment was unsigned by the grand jury foreman. Id. The Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals considered this claim and found it was clearly refuted by the record on direct appeal, 

which established that the indictment was indeed signed by the grand jury foreperson. Doc. No. 

7-12 at 4-5; see Doc. No. 7-2 at 6-8. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision was 

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and it did 

not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1) & (2). Therefore, Massey is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

3. Brady Claim

Massey contends that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, in violation of 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Doc. No. 1 at 7. 

A Brady violation has three components: “[1] The evidence at issue must be 

favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 

impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either 

willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. 

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Evidence 

is not considered to have been suppressed if “the evidence itself ... proves that [the 

petitioner] was aware of the existence of that evidence before trial.” Felker v. 

Thomas, 52 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1995). The prejudice or materiality 

requirement is satisfied if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 

481 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 

L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Materiality is determined by asking whether the government’s 

evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the guilty verdict. See Kyles, 

514 U.S. at 434, 436-37 & n.10, 115 S.Ct. 1555.

Boyd v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 697 F.3d 1320, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2012).

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Massey raised his Brady claim in his Rule 32 petition and pursued it on appeal from the 

trial court’s denial of the petition. Addressing the claim in its memorandum opinion affirming the 

trial court, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

Massey contends that the circuit court erred “by not declaring that the 

conviction was obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to 

disclose to [him] favorable evidence.” (Massey’s brief, p. 16.) Specifically, 

Massey alleged in his Rule 32 petition that 

“[t]he prosecution knew that there was another shooter on the crime 

scene, Shang Thomas, Exhibit F, of the motion of discovery, the 

prosecution was also aware of the fact that two (2) different gun 

casings were on the crime scene, Exhibit G, of the motion of 

discovery. The medical records displayed a victim that never 

sustained a direct shot, only scrapnel [sic] to her leg, Exhibit H, and 

a graze to her left breast, Exhibit I. The motion of discovery from 

the alleged crime date also stated the victim was nonlife [sic] 

threatening condition and that no vitals were hit, Exhibit J. The 

medical doctor even went on to say that the victim was exaggerating 

her injuries and trying to manipulate the medical staff, Exhibit K. 

The prosecutor knew all of the above and was aware of the fact that 

attempted murder should not have been on the table in this case. The 

fact that Shang Thomas may have committed the crime is a violation 

of Brady v. Maryland [, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),] by the prosecution. 

The evidence did not establish the fact that Petitioner Massey did in 

fact shoot the victim.”

(C. 99.) Massey’s claim, however, is insufficiently pleaded.

In Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), this Court stated: 

“Rule 32.6(b) requires that the petition itself disclose the 

facts relied upon in seeking relief. In other words, it is not the 

pleading of a conclusion which, if true, entitle[s] the petitioner to 

relief. It is the allegation of facts in pleading which, if true, entitle[s] 

a petitioner to relief. After facts are pleaded, which, if true, entitle 

the petitioner to relief, the petitioner is then entitled to an 

opportunity, as provided in Rule 32.9, Ala.R.Crim.P., to present 

evidence proving those alleged facts.”

913 So. 2d at 1125 (emphasis in the original; internal citation and quotations 

omitted).

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Thus, to meet the specificity requirement contained in Rule 32.6(b), 

Ala.R.Crim.P., the petitioner must allege sufficient facts from which the circuit 

court, assuming those facts are true, can determine that the petitioner is entitled to 

relief. If the petitioner fails to allege any fact necessary to establish his entitlement 

to relief, he has failed to meet his burden of full-fact pleading. Ala.R.Crim.P. 

32.6(b). Rule 32.7(d), Ala.R.Crim.P., provides for summary dismissal of a Rule 32 

petition if, among other reasons, the petition “is not sufficiently specific,” pursuant

to Rule 32.6(b), Ala.R.Crim.P. The Alabama Supreme Court has held that a Brady

violation occurs when “the State (1) suppresses (2) evidence favorable to a 

defendant and (3) that evidence is material.” Ex parte Belisle, 11 So.3d 323, 329 

(Ala. 2008) (footnotes omitted).

Here, although Massey alleged that the State “knew” certain things and that 

the ‘‘evidence did not establish the fact that [Massey] did in fact shoot the victim,”

Massey did not allege that the State suppressed evidence, that the evidence was 

favorable to him, and that the evidence was material. Consequently, Massey failed 

to satisfy his burden of pleading, and the circuit court did not err when it summarily 

dismissed this claim. See Rule 32.6(b), Ala.R.Crim.P.

Doc. No. 7-12 at 9-11.

Massey’s allegations in his Rule 32 petition do not reflect that the State suppressed the 

evidence he refers to in the petition or that such evidence was not known to him before he pled 

guilty. Indeed, his petition indicates that the evidence was provided to the defense during 

discovery. Massey’s argument, rather than supporting a claim under Brady, is addressed to how 

he says the evidence - which was known to both the defense and the State - should have been 

interpreted by the State. Essentially, he argues that the evidence could not support the charges of 

attempted murder laid against him. Such an argument, however, does not satisfy the requirements 

of Brady when the defense knew of the evidence before entry of the guilty plea and there is no 

showing that the State suppressed evidence. See Felker v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 

1995). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision denying Massey relief on his Brady

claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

and it did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2). Therefore, Massey is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

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5. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea: Elements of Attempted Murder

Massey claims his guilty plea was involuntary because his trial counsel failed to explain 

the elements of attempted murder to him. Doc. No. 1 at 10-11. He raised this claim in his Rule 

32 petition and pursued it on appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petition. Addressing this

claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

To the extent that Massey contends that he did not understand the “nature 

of the crime [s] with which he is charged,” that claim is without merit. This Court, 

in its memorandum affirming Massey’s convictions and sentences, held that “[t]he 

transcript of Massey’s guilty plea colloquy indicates that Massey understood the 

charges against him and the facts upon which those charges were based.” Massey, 

mem. op. at 5 (emphasis added). Because the transcript of Massey’s guilty-plea 

colloquy demonstrates that Massey understood the nature of the offenses for which 

he was charged, the circuit court did not err when it summarily dismissed this claim.

Doc. No. 7-12 at 7.

The transcript of Massey’s guilty plea hearing reflects that, in setting forth the factual basis 

for the State, the prosecutor explained that Massey was charged with intentionally shooting at the 

two victims with a gun, intending to cause their deaths. Doc. No. 7-2 at 99-100. These were the 

elements of attempted murder as set forth in the indictment. See id. at 6-8. The transcript of the 

guilty plea hearing and the sentencing hearing also reflect that Massey’s trial counsel discussed 

the nature of the charges with Massey before he entered his guilty plea and that it was Massey’s 

hope that the State would reduce the charges from attempted murder to assault in the first or second 

degree, but the State was unwilling to reduce the charges. Id. at 94-96, 103-05. The record further 

reflects that Massey was well aware that the intent element of attempted murder - the intent to 

cause the deaths of the victims - was a characteristic of the offense to which he pled guilty that 

distinguished it from the offense of assault, the reduced charge he unsuccessfully sought from the 

State. Because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision denying Massey relief on this 

claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 

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and it did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, 

Massey is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2). 

6. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Charges of Attempted Murder

Massey claims there was insufficient evidence to support the charges of attempted murder. 

Doc. No. 1 at 11-12.

Massey raised this claim in his Rule 32 petition and pursued it on appeal from the trial 

court’s denial of the petition. Addressing this claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

stated:

Massey contends that the circuit court erred “by not ruling on the fact that 

the evidence was not sufficient enough to warrant attempted murder.” (Massey’s 

brief, p. 22.) Massey’s claim, however, is, on its face, without merit.

“‘A plea of guilty is an admission of whatever is 

sufficiently charged in the indictment. A voluntary 

guilty plea concludes the issue of guilt, dispenses

with need for judicial fact finding, is conclusive as to 

the defendant’s guilt, and is an admission of all facts 

sufficiently charged in the indictment.’

“Morrow v. State, 426 So. 2d 481, 484 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). By 

pleading guilty, [Massey] admitted to all elements of the crime of 

[attempted murder] and relieved the State of its burden of presenting 

any evidence of the crime.”

Whitman v. State, 903 So. 2d 152, 155 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). Accordingly, the 

circuit court did not err when it summarily dismissed this claim.[*]

[*To the extent that Massey’s argument can be construed as a challenge to 

the factual basis for his plea, that claim is also without merit. This Court, 

in its memorandum affirming Massey’s direct appeal, held:

 “The State explained that Massey intentionally shot 

Lavonnette and Carviss Jones with the intent to kill them. 

This was a sufficient factual basis to apprise Massey of 

the charges against him.”

Massey, mem. op. at 5.]

Doc. No. 7-12 at 13-14.

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It is well settled that a voluntary plea of guilty admits all elements of the offense charged 

and is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings. See, e.g., Picard v. 

Allgood, 400 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1968). Massey has not demonstrated that his guilty plea was 

involuntarily entered. Consequently, his guilty plea relieved the State of its burden of presenting 

all its evidence supporting the charges of attempted murder. Further, a sufficient factual basis for 

the charges was presented by the prosecutor at Massey’s guilty plea hearing. The Alabama Court 

of Criminal Appeals’ decision denying Massey relief on this claim was neither contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and it did not involve an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2). Massey 

is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. 

B. Procedurally Defaulted Claims

The respondents contend that Massey’s claimsthat (1) his appellate counsel was ineffective

for failing to ensure that a copy of the indictment served on him was in the appellate record, (2) 

his convictions violated his double jeopardy rights, and (3) his indictment was fraudulent and 

“manufactured” by the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office are procedurally defaulted 

because he did not properly present the claims to the state courts when he had the opportunity to 

do so and he cannot now return to state court to exhaust them. See Doc. Nos. 7 & 18. For the 

reasons set out below, this court agrees with the respondents that Massey has procedurally 

defaulted these claims.

Exhaustion Requirement

Before a § 2254 petitioner may obtain federal habeas corpus review, he must “exhaust” his 

federal claims by raising them in the appropriate court, giving the state courts an opportunity to 

decide the merits of the constitutional issue raised. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. 

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Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178-79 (2001). To exhaust a claim fully, a petitioner must “invok[e] one 

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 

U.S. 838, 845 (1999). In Alabama, a complete round of the established appellate review process 

includes an appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, an application for rehearing to that 

court, and a petition for discretionary review – a petition for a writ of certiorari – filed in the 

Alabama Supreme Court. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 2001); 

Ala.R.App.P. 39 & 40. The exhaustion requirement applies to state post-conviction proceedings 

as well as to direct appeals. See Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 2003).

“[I]f the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner 

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now 

find the claims procedurally barred[,] ... there is a procedural default for purposes of federal 

habeas.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (citations omitted); see Henderson 

v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003). The procedural default doctrine ensures that 

“state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal 

habeas proceeding.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). 

As noted above, Massey contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

ensure that a copy of the indictment served on him was in the appellate record and that his 

convictions violated his double jeopardy rights. He presented both of these claims for the first 

time in his petition for writ of certiorari filed with the Alabama Supreme Court during the appeal 

stage of his Rule 32 proceedings. See Doc. No. 7-13. Because he presented these claims for the 

first time on certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court, he did not subject the claims to a complete 

round of Alabama’s established appellate review process. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845; Smith, 

256 F.3d at 1140-41; Pruitt, 348 F.3d at 1359. As such, the claims were not properly exhausted 

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in state court. Moreover, there remains no avenue for Massey to return to state court to exhaust 

these claims, as it would be too late for him to assert them in a direct appeal, and if asserted in a 

state Rule 32 petition, they would be untimely under Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c)’s one-year limitation 

period and precluded by the successive-petition bar in Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b). Accordingly, these 

claims are procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas review. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

735 n.1; Henderson, 353 F.3d at 891. 

The same is true for Massey’s claim that his indictment was fraudulent and “manufactured” 

by the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office. This claim is raised for the first time in 

Massey’s amendment to his § 2254 petition, and was never presented to the state courts. Because 

state procedural rules would bar Massey from returning to state court to present this claim, the 

claim is procedurally defaulted in this proceeding. 

Exceptions to Procedural Default

This court may reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim in two narrow 

circumstances:

First, a petitioner may obtain federal review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he 

can show both “cause” for the default and actual “prejudice” resulting from the 

default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); [Wainwright v.] Sykes, 

433 U.S. [72,] 87 [(1977) ].... Second, a federal court may also grant a habeas 

petition on a procedurally defaulted claim, without a showing of cause or prejudice, 

to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually 

innocent. Id.

Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.

Cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the petitioner can show that 

some objective factor external to the defense impeded efforts to comply with the state’s procedural 

rules or that the procedural default resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray v. 

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Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). In this 

context, to establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors at trial worked to his actual 

and substantial disadvantage, “infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” 

Frady, 456 U.S. at 170; see Murray, 477 U.S. at 494.

Demonstrated actual innocence may trump a procedural bar in a habeas proceeding to 

provide a gateway to federal review of an otherwise defaulted § 2254 claim. See Murray, 477 U.S. 

at 495-96; Rozzelle v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 672 F.3d 1000, 1011 (11th Cir. 

2012); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001). In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298 (1995), the United States Supreme Court held that prisoners asserting actual innocence as a 

gateway to review of defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, “it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [the] petitioner guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” 513 U.S. at 327. This standard is demanding and permits review only in the 

“extraordinary” case.3 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). A petitioner must show “factual 

innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998).

Massey does not attempt to establish cause excusing the procedural default of the abovediscussed claims. Consequently, the claims are procedurally barred for purposes of federal habeas 

 3 As the Supreme Court observed in Schlup:

[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an 

innocent person is extremely rare.... To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner 

to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence –

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or 

critical physical evidence – that was not presented at trial. Because such evidence 

is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence 

are rarely successful.

513 U.S. at 324.

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review. Nor does Massey attempt to demonstrate his actual innocence consistent with the 

standards set forth in Schlup. Therefore, he is not entitled to benefit from the actual-innocence 

exception to procedural default, and his defaulted claims are not subject to habeas review.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the petition for 

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED and this case be DISMISSED with 

prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to file the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge 

and to serve a copy on the petitioner. The petitioner is DIRECTED to file any objections to this 

Recommendation on or before September 28, 2016. Any objections filed must specifically identify 

the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the 

petitioner objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of 

factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on 

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon 

grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust 

Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 

790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE, this 13th day of September, 2016.

 /s/ Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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