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Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 2, 2024*

Decided December 3, 2024 

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge

No. 24-1675 

LOGAN DYJAK,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

STACEY HORSTMAN, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 21-3151-JES

James E. Shadid, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Logan Dyjak, 1 a civil detainee at the McFarland Mental Health Center, sued 

employees of the facility for due process violations in connection with limitations on 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

1 As in Dyjak’s previous appeals, we continue to use the they/them pronouns 

that Dyjak uses. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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access to certain facility privileges. The district court granted summary judgment for the 

defendants because Dyjak could not link any alleged deprivation to the defendants’ 

actions. We affirm.

We recount the undisputed facts, drawing reasonable inferences in Dyjak’s favor. 

Rakes v. Roederer, 117 F.4th 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2024). Dyjak is civilly detained at 

McFarland, having been found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. In mid-2018, 

Dyjak was diagnosed by a staff psychiatrist as having schizoaffective disorder “in 

sustained remission.” On August 15, 2019, Dyjak was evaluated by another staff 

psychiatrist, Stacy Horstman, who prepared a comprehensive report six days later that 

modified Dyjak’s diagnosis to schizoaffective disorder “in partial remission.”2

Horstman’s report was relied upon by McFarland’s clinical director, Jo-Ann Lynn, who 

updated the state court judge on Dyjak’s psychiatric needs and McFarland’s proposed 

treatment plan. Dyjak believes that Horstman and Lynn “arbitrarily altered” the

diagnosis, which led the hospital to limit Dyjak’s access to computers, educational 

programs, and the facility’s café.

Patients at McFarland can be assigned one of several privilege levels that 

determines their freedom of movement. While a court order is required for the more

expansive privilege levels, hospital staff may independently assign others, including 

“staff supervision,” which permits patients to visit non-forensic or secure areas. Dyjak 

has remained at the staff supervision level since September 2018, even after the 

modified diagnosis. Horstman testified that Dyjak’s diagnosis did not affect the 

privilege level, but Dyjak asserts that their privileges were tightened around the time of 

COVID-19’s outbreak, when staff restricted their diet, access to gym facilities, and 

access to educational opportunities. 

In July 2021, Dyjak sued Horstman and Lynn, along with hospital administrator 

Lana Miller, for violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Dyjak asserted, first, that Horstman and Lynn acted with deliberate indifference when 

they arbitrarily modified Dyjak’s diagnosis. Dyjak also asserted that Miller failed to 

exercise professional judgment when she conditioned the restriction of privileges upon 

a “blanket administrative policy.” 

2 This diagnosis could be viewed as inconsistent with the defendants’ statement 

in their answer “that on August 16, 2019, Defendant Horstman conducted a mental 

health evaluation and reaffirmed Plaintiff’s original diagnosis of schizoaffective order in 

remission.” 

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After the defendants moved for summary judgment, Dyjak sought extensions for 

the time to respond. The court granted Dyjak three extensions, warning in its third 

order that no further extensions would be granted. After Dyjak made their sixth request 

for an extension, the court denied the request and stated that it would rule on the 

defendants’ motion without Dyjak’s response. 

Dyjak moved to reconsider that order, attributing the delay to (1) the court’s 

earlier directive to prioritize responding in a different case, and (2) conditions of 

confinement that made a timely response more difficult. Dyjak separately moved under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) for the court to postpone ruling on the summary 

judgment motion until they could present additional facts in opposition. The court 

denied both motions, noting the prior extensions given.

The court then granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

Regarding Dyjak’s claim about the modified diagnosis, the court found that the 

evidence did not show that the defendants provided Dyjak with mental health 

treatment that was objectively unreasonable—the standard for a pretrial detainee’s 

claim of inadequate medical care. See McCann v. Ogle County, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 

2018). As for the claim about restricted privileges, the court concluded that the 

defendants’ failure to give Dyjak access to non-secure settings did not constitute an 

atypical and significant hardship that would deprive Dyjak of a state-created liberty 

interest. See Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Dyjak then moved to alter the judgment. Dyjak argued that the court violated 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2) by granting summary judgment on grounds not 

raised by the defendants. Dyjak maintained that the defendants’ summary judgment 

motion treated his medical-care claim as grounded in procedural due process, while the 

court granted summary judgment under an objective-reasonableness standard. In 

Dyjak’s view, the court needed to provide notice of its intent to grant the motion on this 

alternative ground, and time to respond. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f)(2). 

The court denied this motion, too. The court explained that it based its ruling on 

grounds that Dyjak had raised—the alleged disregard of Dyjak’s mental-health needs 

upon the diagnosis being changed from “in remission” to “in partial remission.” The 

court also pointed out that the defendants had raised the issue when they argued in 

their motion that there was no evidence that the diagnosis was erroneous. Regardless, 

the court added, Dyjak—having not responded to the summary judgment motion or 

contested defendants’ evidence—could not show prejudice from not having an 

opportunity to respond to the court’s analysis. 

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On appeal, Dyjak challenges the court’s decision to enter summary judgment 

without a response, and revives the arguments made while seeking 

reconsideration—e.g., the difficult circumstances that pro se litigants face while 

confined. But while a court should consider all relevant circumstances surrounding a 

party’s failure to respond to a motion, the determination whether to excuse a missed 

deadline is left to the district court’s discretion. See Miller v. Chicago Transit Auth., 

20 F.4th 1148, 1153. (7th Cir. 2021). Given that the court had granted Dyjak three 

extensions and warned Dyjak that no further extension would be forthcoming, we see 

no abuse of discretion to deny a fourth. 

Dyjak also renews the argument that the district court failed to provide adequate 

notice before granting summary judgment on grounds not raised by the defendants. But 

a court need not provide additional notice under Rule 56(f) when the parties are 

aware—as here—of the factual issues the court intends to rule on. See Haley v. Kolbe & 

Kolbe Millwork Co., 863 F.3d 600, 613 (7th Cir. 2017); Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island 

County, 850 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2017). The defendants apprised Dyjak of the relevant 

facts that supported their argument for summary judgment—the psychiatric evaluation

reports and the defendants’ declarations—so Dyjak cannot claim to be surprised by the 

outcome. 

Dyjak next raises a procedural challenge to the court’s basis for entering 

summary judgment on the medical-needs claim. Invoking the principal pleadings, 

Dyjak argues that the court should have held the defendants to the admission in their 

answer that “on August 16, 2019, Defendant Horstman conducted a mental health 

evaluation and reaffirmed Plaintiff’s original diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder in 

remission.” But while a concession in an answer is a binding judicial admission, see 

Tibbs v. Admin. Off. of the Ill. Courts., 860 F.3d 502, 508 n.1 (7th Cir. 2017), Horstman 

prepared a report several days later, on August 21, in which she diagnosed Dyjak’s 

remission as only partial. The district court was entitled to consider this later report, 

and Dyjak has not offered any evidence to refute Horstman’s modified diagnosis or 

show that it was objectively unreasonable. 

As for the second claim regarding the restriction on privileges, Dyjak appears to 

argue that the district court applied an incorrect standard in assessing a civilly confined 

person’s fundamental liberty interest. The court applied the “atypical and significant 

hardship” standard used in Thielman, 282 F.3d at 484 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 

472 (1995)), but Dyjak argues the applicable standard should be one of professional 

judgment, as set forth in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1982). Under 

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Youngberg, a civil detainee is entitled to the exercise of professional judgment when the 

state subjects him to confinement. Id. Dyjak believes that Miller’s conduct did not satisfy 

this standard because she (1) failed to petition the court to grant Dyjak greater 

privileges and (2) adopted blanket policies limiting Dyjak’s privileges.

But even under Youngberg, Dyjak could not have prevailed. Dyjak cites no 

authority to suggest that the Constitution required Miller to present such a petition, let 

alone introduce any evidence that Miller adopted a blanket policy. 

We have considered Dyjak’s remaining arguments, and none has merit.

AFFIRMED

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