Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01489/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01489-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY LEE PICKARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARCUS HOLTON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-01489-JST 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Re: ECF No. 81

On January 6, 7, and 8, 2015, the Court heard a jury trial in this excessive force case. 

Plaintiff rested his case on January 8, 2015 after having introduced evidence from only one 

witness, Defendant Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy Marcus Holton (“Deputy Holton”). Because 

Plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to render a verdict in 

his favor, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this case on March 26, 2012, alleging eight causes of action. ECF Nos. 1, 3. 

On June 17, 2013, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which the Court 

granted on September 16, 2013, dismissing Plaintiff’s sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action. 

ECF Nos. 22, 34.

Defendants then filed a second motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s 

remaining claims. ECF No. 43. The Court denied that motion in part and granted it in part. ECF 

No. 53. The Court found disputes of material fact related to the alleged excessive force incident, 

based in large part on deposition testimony by Plaintiff and his wife, D’Mitria WilliamsonCase 3:12-cv-01489-JST Document 83 Filed 02/11/15 Page 1 of 8
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Pickard’s. Id.

At the pre-trial conference on December 19, 2014, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all thenexisting claims for relief except his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. ECF No. 67 at 2. Trial proceeded on 

that claim alone. 

Jury trial commenced on January 6, 2015. ECF No. 74. On that date, the parties 

completed juror selection and the Court seated nine jurors. Id. The following day, both sides gave 

opening statements, and Plaintiff called his first witness, Deputy Holton. ECF No. 75. Deputy 

Holton’s testimony continued into and concluded on January 8, 2015. ECF No. 78. 

Plaintiff’s counsel had informed the Court and Defendants that Plaintiff and WilliamsonPickard would both testify at trial, but neither Plaintiff nor Williamson-Pickard were present in 

court on January 8, 2015. ECF No. 78 at 4. In the parties’ joint pretrial statement, Plaintiff also 

proposed to call the following persons: CHP Officer Sean Harvey; Sonoma County Sheriff’s 

Office employee Debbie Little; Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy Dave Pedersen; Sonoma 

County Sheriff’s Deputy Brian Keen; Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy Travis Koeppel; Sonoma 

County Sheriff’s Deputy Vance Eaton; Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy Joe Dulworth; Sonoma 

County Sheriff’s Office employee Orlando Rodriguez; Sonoma County Sheriff’s Detective 

Brandon Cutting; Dr. Scott Benninghoven; Dr. Chris Kosakowski; and Olesya Plisovskijh.

1

 ECF 

No. 56 at 5-6. But none of those persons was present in court, either. 

Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to contact Plaintiff and Williamson-Pickard, but couldn’t 

locate them. Id. Plaintiff’s counsel then moved unsuccessfully for permission to read Plaintiff 

and Williamson-Pickard’s deposition testimony into evidence. Id.; ECF No. 80 at 10:14-13:6.

Having no further witnesses, Plaintiff’s counsel then rested his case. Id. Plaintiff’s 

counsel neither sought a continuance nor provided an explanation for Plaintiff or WilliamsonPickard’s absence. 

Without testimony from either Plaintiff or Williamson-Pickard, Deputy Holton’s 

testimony ‒ unlike the situation at summary judgment ‒ stood un-rebutted.

 

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Plaintiff also proposed to call Dr. Eugene Belogorsky, but the Court excluded his testimony in 

limine. ECF No. 69. 

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Defendants then moved orally for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a). 

Defendants argued that the unrebutted evidence showed that Plaintiff posed a substantial threat to 

both law enforcement and to the community as a whole, and under both the general reasonableness 

test supplied by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), as well as under the fleeing felon

doctrine, Defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law.

B. Trial Evidence

Deputy Holton’s testimony established the following facts: 

Shortly before the incident that is the subject of this action, members of the Sonoma 

County Sheriff’s Department, including Deputy Holton, were advised that Plaintiff was a parolee 

at large and that he was armed with a pistol and ammunition. Members of the Sheriff’s 

Department were also told that Plaintiff had stated on June 22, 2011 that he would “shoot it out 

with law enforcement” if and when police apprehended him. A “be on the lookout” bulletin 

(“BOLO”) contained this information and was issued to all on-duty Sheriff’s deputies, including 

Deputy Holton, on June 23, 2011. The Sheriff’s Department updated the BOLO on June 24, 2011, 

with information that Plaintiff had returned to 878 Yuba Drive, his mother’s residence and his last 

known residence address, to retrieve ammunition, and had fled on foot from two deputies who 

were in the area. 

Holton made no efforts to search for Pickard on June 23, 2011, because he was too busy 

with other calls for service. On the morning of June 24, 2011, however, after learning at the 

morning briefing that Plaintiff had retrieved more ammunition from 878 Yuba Drive and evaded 

law enforcement, Deputy Holton drove by that address. Deputy Holton did not find him at that 

address in the morning. 

Deputy Holton returned to the area at approximately 2:00 p.m. that afternoon. Just before 

Deputy Holton turned onto Yuba Drive, he hit a key on his mobile computer notifying the 

Sheriff’s Department personnel via dispatch that he was creating an event entitled “Gary Lee 

Pickard Junior, parolee at large.” 

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After Deputy Holton turned onto Yuba Drive, a vehicle that appeared to be Plaintiff’s2

turned from a driveway directly in front of Deputy Holton’s patrol car. Deputy Holton 

immediately notified dispatch that he had encountered Plaintiff. He requested a “Code 20,” 

meaning that he needed emergency backup and that other deputies should come to Deputy 

Holton’s location immediately, with lights and sirens activated. He confirmed, using the last three 

digits of the vehicle’s license plate number, that the vehicle was the one identified as Plaintiff’s in 

the morning BOLO. Shortly after confirming that he was following Plaintiff’s car, Deputy Holton

advised dispatch that he planned to have other units assist in executing a high-risk traffic stop of 

Plaintiff at the intersection of Todd Road and Highway 101. Deputy Holton believed that

intersection was suitable for multiple patrol cars to converge and apprehend Plaintiff. 

Deputy Holton followed Plaintiff along Yuba Drive, then onto Stony Point Road, and 

finally onto Todd Road. Deputy Holton followed Plaintiff for approximately two or three

minutes, during which time he constantly updated Sheriff’s dispatch as the events unfolded.

Deputy Holton was also receiving communications from other deputies that they were en route, 

and learned that a helicopter had been summoned to the intersection of Todd Road and Highway 

101. 

But Plaintiff never made it to the intersection, because he ran out of gas and pulled into a 

residential driveway. The residence, located at 534 Todd Road in Santa Rosa, was in a rural 

residential neighborhood. Worried about the safety of the home’s occupants, Deputy Holton 

pulled his patrol car in behind Plaintiff, and again radioed a Code 20 to dispatch, informing 

dispatch that he was pulling into the driveway on Todd Road.

Asked why he did not proceed to the Highway 101 intersection, Deputy Holton explained 

that he could not just drive by Plaintiff at this point and meet up with other deputies before 

attempting to arrest Plaintiff. Doing so would permit Plaintiff—who Deputy Holton believed 

would be willing to harm civilians, given his apparent willingness to shoot it out with police—to 

escape into the community, where he could do harm to citizens or take hostages. Deputy Holton 

 

2 Roll marks on the side of the vehicle and blue painters’ tape on the edges of the windows 

suggested the car had been painted recently.

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also explained that he would have potentially been a “sitting duck,” with his back to Plaintiff, had 

he driven past and not stopped Plaintiff in the driveway on Todd Road. 

After Deputy Holton pulled his vehicle into the driveway behind Plaintiff’s, Deputy Holton 

exited his vehicle, and stood behind the driver’s door of his vehicle, pointing his gun at the rear of 

Plaintiff’s vehicle. Deputy Holton identified himself as a Sheriff’s Deputy and ordered Plaintiff to 

put his hands up. Deputy Holton repeatedly yelled these commands. 

Through the tinted rear glass of Plaintiff’s vehicle, Deputy Holton could see head 

movement on the driver’s side and in the right front passenger area. Plaintiff’s car briefly rolled 

backward a couple of feet. In response, Deputy Holton backed away from his vehicle, thinking 

that Plaintiff might ram his patrol car.

Deputy Holton then observed the driver’s door of Plaintiff’s vehicle open and Plaintiff’s 

left foot come out of the vehicle. At this time, Deputy Holton also could see, through the driver’sside passenger rear window of Plaintiff’s car, Plaintiff digging around in the center console area of 

his car. Deputy Holton believed that Plaintiff was arming himself.

As Deputy Holton continued to shout commands, Plaintiff exited his vehicle and closed the 

driver’s door behind him. Plaintiff began moving around the driver’s side of his vehicle, with his 

hands up near his shoulders. His left shoulder was facing Deputy Holton, and he began to laugh. 

Deputy Holton described Plaintiff as skipping or dancing around, as though he was about to run, 

with his empty hands in Deputy Holton’s view.

Thereafter, Plaintiff moved with one hand to reopen his car door and hid behind it. 

Simultaneously, with his other hand, Plaintiff made a movement toward his waistband, as though 

reaching for a weapon. In response, Deputy Holton shot at Plaintiff, but missed. At the time, 

Deputy Holton was only aware of hearing a shot; he was not sure who had fired the shot until he 

looked at his weapon and saw the hammer cocked in a position showing that he had fired. 

Plaintiff then ran around the front of his vehicle, and away from the vehicle, toward the 

corner of the residence’s garage and a fence and an open field beyond. Deputy Holton testified 

that as Plaintiff was running, he continued to twist his body and move his hand toward his 

waistband, and appeared to be reaching for or holding a gun. Deputy Holton was concerned that 

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Plaintiff would escape into the community, potentially take hostages, or otherwise harm or kill 

members of the community, and/or shoot him. Accordingly, Deputy Holton fired four further 

shots at Plaintiff, at least one of which hit Plaintiff, causing him to go to the ground.

Back up law enforcement officers arrived one or two minutes after shots were fired.

In connection with this incident, Plaintiff pled no contest to a charge that he: 

unlawfully attempt[ed] by means of threats and violence to deter and 

prevent Deputy Holton, who was then and there an executive 

officer, from performing a duty imposed upon such officer by law 

and did knowingly resist by use of force and violence said executive 

officer in the performance of his duties.

On that basis, he was convicted of violating California Penal Code section 69. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “a party has been fully heard on an issue 

during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient 

evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); see also Reeves 

v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000) (citations omitted). If the evidence, 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable 

conclusion—that the moving party is entitled to judgment—the court may grant the moving party 

judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986).

III. ANALYSIS

Excessive force claims like Plaintiff’s are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s 

reasonableness standard as enunciated in Graham. Blanford v. Sacramento Cnty., 406 F.3d 1110, 

1115 (9th Cir. 2005). Per Graham, determining whether law enforcement’s use of force is 

reasonable requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including “the severity of 

the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 

others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.

(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Under this rubric, Tennessee v. Garner, 417 U.S. 1 (1985),

defined another category of excessive force cases, namely, fleeing felon cases. 

In Garner, the Supreme Court explained that if a law enforcement officer 

has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious 

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physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not 

constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly 

force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or 

there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime 

involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical 

harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and 

if, where feasible, some warning has been given.” 

471 U.S. 11-12; see also Forett v. Richardson, 112 F.3d 416, 420 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Garner). 

In this case, at both times that Deputy Holton fired his weapon, the evidence adduced at 

trial showed that he reasonably believed Plaintiff was armed and dangerous, and that he was 

ready, willing, and able to use his handgun, either against Deputy Holton or against members of 

the community. This was evidenced by Plaintiff’s statement that he would shoot it out with the 

cops; his conviction for using force or violence to resist Deputy Holton’s execution of his duties; 

and Deputy Holton’s testimony that Plaintiff was reaching for his waistband as he was running 

away from the Deputy. Given this evidence, which was unrebutted, no reasonable jury could 

conclude that Deputy Holton’s belief that Plaintiff posed an immediate threat of deadly force 

either to law enforcement or to community members was unreasonable. 

Plaintiff argues that Deputy Holton’s use of force was unreasonable because the deputy

could have either remained in his vehicle and waited for back up, or simply gone by and not 

stopped behind Plaintiff in the driveway on Todd Road. See Coles v. Eagle, 704 F.3d 624, 630 

(9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the existence of reasonable alternatives to the use of deadly force 

factors into the Graham analysis).

These arguments impose on Deputy Holton a burden the law does not require him to bear. 

Deputy Holton testified that confronting Plaintiff in the driveway of the Todd Road residence was 

the only way in which he could ensure that more lives would not be put at risk. Deputy Holton 

reasonably believed Plaintiff was armed and dangerous, and that he posed a significant threat to 

the community, to people in surrounding residences, and to other law enforcement officers. By 

confronting Pickard and attempting to bring him into custody, Deputy Holton was merely doing 

the job he was sworn to do. A law enforcement officer confronted with a threat to his community 

is not obligated to do nothing, or worse, run away. 

Further, and independently, the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under

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Garner and the fleeing felon doctrine. 

Here, Deputy Holton reasonably believed that Plaintiff was armed and dangerous and that 

his use of force was necessary to prevent Plaintiff’s escape into a rural residential neighborhood, 

and he repeatedly identified himself as a Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy and ordered Plaintiff to 

put his hands up. Deputy Holton reasonably believed that if Plaintiff was willing to shoot police, 

he could be willing to shoot members of the public or otherwise put other people’s lives in danger. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s conviction established that he made a threat or act of violence against 

Deputy Holton in connection with the shooting. Ultimately, Deputy Holton reasonably believed 

that Plaintiff’s flight posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to Deputy Holton or to 

other community members. 

Given the undisputed evidence, Deputy Holton was lawfully entitled to use deadly force 

both in response to an imminent threat of great bodily harm and/or death, and under the fleeing 

felon doctrine. For those reasons, Deputy Holton also is entitled to qualified immunity for his 

conduct: his use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under clearly established law. See

Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1119 (concluding that, because officers’ actions in shooting a suspect were 

not objectively unreasonable under clearly established law, the deputies were entitled to qualified 

immunity).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby grants Defendants’ motion for judgment as a 

matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 50(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 11, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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