Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03249/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03249-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIE MINNS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ADVANCED CLINICAL EMPLOYMENT 

STAFFING LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-03249-SI 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 

MOTION FOR CLASS 

CERTIFICATION

Re: Dkt. No. 111

On May 29, 2015, the Court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 

After consideration of the parties' papers and the evidence before the Court, the Court hereby 

GRANTS plaintiffs' motion, with the following modification: the meal and rest period claims 

alleged in the fourth, fifth seventh and eighth causes of action are certified on behalf of the 

requested class through April 30, 2015.1

BACKGROUND

Named plaintiffs Marie Minns, Kemberly Briggs, and Douglas Cameron are health care 

providers who worked for defendant Advanced Clinical Employment Staffing, LLC (“ACES”), a 

temporary services provider that provides “strike replacement nurses” to its health care provider 

clients during labor disputes. The Fifth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges that ACES 

contracted with defendant Sutter East Bay Hospitals (“Sutter”) to provide temporary employees to 

 

1

 As set forth in this order, the Court grants plaintiffs leave to add an additional subclass 

representative who alleges meal and rest break claims for the pre-May 2013 time period.

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the facility during labor disputes between Sutter and its permanent employees. FAC ¶ 16.2 The 

FAC also alleges that defendant HRN Services Inc. (“HRN”) contracted with ACES to provide 

nurses to ACES to assist ACES in meeting Sutter’s personnel needs. Id. ¶ 15. 

Plaintiffs have moved to certify the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, 

eleventh and twelfth causes of action on behalf of a class defined as:

All present and former nurses who were placed to work by 

Advanced Clinical Employment Staffing LLC (“ACES”) in 

California health care facilities on a temporary basis during labor 

disputes at any time during the four years preceding the filing of this 

action through such time as this action is pending3;

and a subclass defined as:

All present and former nurses who were hired by HRN Services, 

Inc. to be placed to work by ACES in California health care 

facilities on a temporary basis during labor disputes at any time 

during the four years preceding the filing of this action through such 

time as this action is pending.

The first through third causes of action allege that defendants have failed to pay strike 

replacement nurses for all hours worked; the fourth and fifth causes of action allege that 

defendants have failed to pay class members a premium wage for missed meal and rest periods; 

the seventh and eighth causes of action allege that defendants have failed to provide class 

members the requisite number of meal and rest periods; and the ninth, eleventh, and twelfth causes 

of action allege that defendants failed to provide accurate wage statements, engage in unfair 

competition, and seek declaratory relief based on the underlying wage and hour violations.

In support of the motion for class certification, plaintiffs have submitted copies of the 

contracts between defendants as well as “strike scripts” and contracts between ACES and strike 

replacement nurses, declarations from the named plaintiffs, deposition testimony from various 

defense witnesses, defendants' discovery responses, and other documents produced by the parties 

in discovery. Plaintiffs have also submitted declarations from the proposed class counsel attesting 

 

2

 Plaintiffs state that defendant Sutter East Bay Hospitals, dba Alta Bates/Summit Medical Center 

(“Sutter”), has entered into a memorandum of understanding with plaintiffs to settle the class-wide 

claims against Sutter and, on that basis, Sutter does not oppose the motion for class certification.

3

This case was originally filed in state court on May 1, 2013 by plaintiff Marie Minns, and thus 

the class period begins May 1, 2009.

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to their experience. 

Defendant HRN has filed an opposition to plaintiffs' motion, to which ACES has filed a

single paragraph joinder (ACES has not filed a separate opposition).

4

 HRN opposes certification 

on numerous grounds, and HRN challenges the adequacy and typicality of named plaintiff 

Cameron, the only named plaintiff who worked for both HRN and ACES. HRN has submitted the 

declaration of Arthur Flaster, the president and CEO of HRN. Copies of Mr. Cameron's 

employment records are attached as an exhibit to the Flaster declaration. The Flaster declaration 

and exhibit is the only evidence submitted by either defendant in opposition to class certification.5

I. Contractual relationships between defendants

Plaintiffs assert, and HRN agrees, that ACES controlled the working conditions for all of 

the putative class members, including those who were hired by HRN. Plaintiffs have submitted 

copies of the contract between ACES and HRN. Gildor Decl. Ex. 1. That contract states that 

ACES has entered into an exclusive agreement (the "Master 

Agreement") with Sutter Health System, East Bay Region, dba Alta 

Bates Summit Medical Center (the "Client") to act as its Master 

Vendor and to act as the single point of contract for the provision of 

temporary healthcare and administrative staffing services at the 

Client's facility . . . 

Id. at 1. 

The contract specifies, inter alia, that HRN "shall, and shall require its . . . personnel to 

comply with Client and ACES policies and procedures," § 5.3; states that Sutter “shall have the 

sole discretion to determine the duties, shifts, units and assignments of agency [HRN] personnel 

 

4

 ACES joins in the opposition filed by HRN except as to certain portions of HRN's opposition in 

which HRN (1) quotes provisions of the HRN/ACES contract; (2) asserts that HRN did not have 

control over the activities of the replacement workers once they reported for work; and (3) asserts 

that Sutter and ACES are co-employers with HRN of the HRN replacement employees. See Dkt. 

116 at 2:1 (listing portions of HRN's opposition in which ACES does not join). ACES did not 

appear at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

5

 HRN's opposition brief contains numerous factual assertions for which there is no evidentiary 

support. For example, HRN repeatedly asserts that it co-employed less than 5% of the putative 

class, yet HRN does not cite any evidence in support of the assertion. See Dkt. 115 at 1:3. 

Similarly, HRN has not provided any evidence support of its assertion that it "is not an operating 

entity, having sold its business and assets to a competitor, Accountable Healthcare Staffing in 

December 2013," and thus that the declaratory relief requested against HRN is inappropriate. Id. 

at 1:23-2:1. 

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during hours worked for [Sutter], § 4.4;” sets forth the ACES’ requirements that HRN personnel

must meet, §§ 4.1-4.18; and states that the HRN employees will be “assigned” to ACES. Id. §§

4.2, 4.4, 6.2. The contract also states that ACES reserved the right to remove any HRN 

employee. Id. § 5.15. 

Plaintiffs have also submitted a copy of the contract between ACES and Sutter. Id. Ex. 

18.6 That contract provides, inter alia, that “[Sutter] has final approval and direction of duties of 

all staffing assigned,” § 1.1; “[Sutter] in consultation with [ACES] shall arrange for and provide 

all transportation between Replacement Workers’ hotels and facility,” § 1.5, and that [ACES shall 

inform each of its Employees of the requirement to take all appropriate meal and rest period 

breaks as assigned by [Sutter] and further that [Sutter] is not financially responsible for missed 

breaks." Id. § 3.c. 

Although ACES appears to dispute that it controlled the working conditions for the 

putative class and subclass members, ACES has not submitted any evidence showing otherwise. 

II. Claims regarding "work time"

Plaintiffs’ first through third causes of action allege that defendants have failed to pay 

strike replacement nurses for all hours worked. 

A. “Checking in” time

Plaintiffs contend that “work time” includes time spent by class members “checking in” at 

the beginning of each assignment. Plaintiffs have submitted evidence showing that before any 

strike replacement nurses could start working (or get a key to their hotel room)7they would have 

to go through a check-in process that would begin once the nurse arrived at the command center 

 

6

 It does not appear that there was a contract directly between HRN and Sutter.

7

 Plaintiff Minns lives in Long Beach, California, plaintiff Briggs lives in Chicago, Illinois, and 

plaintiff Cameron lives in San Jose, California. Id. Ex. 4 (Minns Decl. ¶ 3); Ex. 5 (Briggs Decl. ¶ 

4); Ex. 6 (Cameron Decl. ¶ 4). Plaintiffs state that when they worked as strike replacement nurses 

they were required to stay in hotels assigned by ACES. For example, plaintiff Cameron states that 

he had to stay at a hotel in Walnut Creek while he was working a May 2013 strike at Alta Bates 

Summit Medical Center's Herrick Campus in Berkeley, California. Id. Ex. 6 (Cameron Decl. ¶ 4).

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for the particular strike. Gildor Decl. Ex. 3 (Allcorn Dep. at 190:9-193:2). Nurses who flew in 

were transported by bus to the command center. Id. Ex. 3 (Allcorn Dep.at 197:17-198:15). 

During the check-in process, the strike replacement nurses would take a drug test and visit a 

number of stations where they would, inter alia, have their credentials checked, fill out forms, 

pick up timesheets, get security badges, apply for reimbursement for travel expenses, and get 

housing and work assignments. Id. Ex. 3 (Allcorn Dep. at 190:25-193:2, 195:5-196:2; Ex. 4 

(Minns Decl. ¶¶ 4-5); Ex. 5 (Briggs Decl. ¶ 4); Ex. 6 (Cameron Decl. ¶ 5.). Named plaintiff 

Briggs describes the process as follows:

Before I got to my assigned hotel—in fact, before I could even find 

out where I would be staying—I had to go through a check in 

process at one of ACES’ command centers. When I got there, there 

was normally a very long line, where I would have to wait to get my 

name checked in. Once checked in, I would then have to wait while 

ACES personnel reviewed all of my documentation and 

immunization records to make sure everything was on file and 

proper. I then would go to another room where I would wait again to 

give a urine test. I would have to fill out some paperwork after that 

too, swearing that the sample I’d just given was mine. Then I would 

go into another room and get processed as far as what hospital I 

would be working at, the department, and the shift. Finally, I would 

find out where I would be staying and what time I would have to 

leave the hotel each morning. I would also submit a W-4 form and 

review and sign a form from the hotel at which I would be staying 

at, get my timesheet and orientation packet. Sometimes this process 

took as long as six hours because a lot of the nurses arrived at the 

same time. Generally, it could take as long as three to four hours, 

with an average of about two hours once the ACES staff got more 

up to speed on what they were doing.

Id. at Ex. 6 (Briggs Decl. ¶ 5). Class members were not paid for this time. Id. Ex. 3 (Allcorn Dep. 

at 199:2-5); Ex. 7 (Response to Special Interrogatory 9); Ex. 8 (Response to Request for 

Admission 6).

Plaintiffs contend that the time spent during the check in process is compensable because 

under California law, an employer must pay its employees for all hours worked. Armenta v. 

Osmose Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 460, 468 (2005) (“California’s labor statutes reflect a strong public 

policy in favor of full payment of wages for all hours worked.”). In the healthcare industry, 

“hours worked” is to be interpreted in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 251 et seq. See Cal. Wage 

Order 5-2001 § 2(K), Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050(2)(K). Plaintiffs contend that whether the 

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check-in activities constitute work is a common question because either these activities are 

compensable for all strike nurses or these activities are not compensable for all putative class 

members. 

B. Transportation time

Plaintiffs also contend that "work time" includes the time the strike replacement nurses 

spend being transported to and from the hotels at which they are staying and the assigned 

hospitals, as well as the time they must wait at the hospital upon arriving before their shift starts 

and the time they at the end of the shift wait prior to departure. Plaintiffs have submitted evidence 

showing that to get to and from the hospitals to which they were assigned, strike replacement 

nurses took vans and shuttle buses that were arranged for them. Id. Ex. 9 (Navellier Dep. at 187:9-

189:4); Ex. 10 (Response to Request for Admission 5 (“SEBH admits that when it negotiated the 

staffing agreement with ACES, it expected that ACES would transport most of the strike 

replacement nurses to and from the workplace by bus or other collective means.”); Ex. 14 (ACES 

“strike scripts” and contracts with nurses stating that “[t]ransportation will be provided to and 

from facility each day crisis staffing is in progress for each shift.”). The evidence submitted by 

plaintiffs shows that depending on where class members were housed and their particular 

assignment, the time it would take for the strike replacement nurses to get from hotel to hospital 

and vice versa could vary between 5 minutes to more than 30 minutes one way. Id. Ex. 2

(Kriegler Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. C). 

Plaintiffs contend that the busing time is compensable because busing the strike 

replacement nurses is a “principal activity” associated with the work a strike replacement nurse is 

hired to perform. Under the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers are not required to pay 

employees for “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the 

principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform,” or for “activities 

which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities.” 29 U.S.C. §

254(a). However, employers must pay compensation for “principal activities,” or for those 

activities that are integral and indispensable to the principal activities. 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a). 

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Plaintiffs contend that whether traveling by bus to cross picket lines is one of a strike replacement 

nurse’s principal activities (or integral and indispensable to one of a strike replacement nurse’s 

principal activities) is a common question that predominates over individualized inquiries. 

C. Time spent waiting before shift begins and after shift ends

Plaintiffs also contend that they should be compensated for the time spent after nurses 

arrive at the facility before their shifts begin, and the time spent waiting at the facility to be 

transported back to their hotels after their shifts ended. The buses transporting the nurses were 

scheduled to arrive at the facilities by 6:30 a.m. on a typical strike day with the strike replacement 

nurses’ shift starting at 7:00 a.m. Id. Ex. 12 (Lawson Dep. at 103:4-7). The buses were also only 

supposed to leave the facilities to return back to the hotels once everyone scheduled to be on the 

bus was on the bus. Id. Ex. 12 (Lawson Dep. at 107:18-23).

Plaintiffs contend that because the waiting occurs after the first principal activity of the day 

(being bused to the facility) and before the last principal activity in the day (being bused back to 

the hotel), such time should be compensable. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a) (“Periods of time between 

the commencement of the employee’s first principal activity and the completion of his last 

principal activity on any workday must be included in the computation of hours worked to the 

same extent as would be required if the Portal Act had not been enacted.”). Plaintiffs contend that 

whether the waiting time is a compensable is a common question that predominates any 

individualized inquiry.

III. Claims regarding meal and rest periods

A. Premiums for missed breaks

Plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth causes of action allege that defendants have failed to pay class 

and subclass members a premium wage for missed meal and rest periods. Strike replacement 

nurses who missed meal or rest periods are entitled to a premium wage. Wage Order 5-2001, Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050(11)(B), (12)(B).

Plaintiffs contend that it was ACES' policy to not pay any premium for missed meal and 

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rest periods prior to May 2013. Plaintiffs have submitted contracts for strikes in 2011 and 2012 

which state that employees will work 12 hour shifts unless otherwise directed by the facility, and 

provide the following with regard to breaks: 

MEAL/BREAKS: by California wage and hour laws professionals 

are required to take a 30 minute lunch. You MUST take your meal 

breaks. THERE WILL BE NO PAY FOR MISSED MEALS & 

BREAKS. It is imperative that you must take your breaks and meals 

by CA State Law. [some contracts also state that employees should 

bring their meals] 

Id. Ex. 14 at ACES/Minns 000083, ACES/Minns 000088, ACES/Minns 000094, ACES/Minns 

000099, ACES/Minns 000110, ACES/Minns 000112, ACES/Minns 000117. The policy was 

repeated in the written instructions that ACES provided replacement nurses informing them of 

how to fill out the timesheets. Id. Ex. 15 (Payroll and Timesheets Instructions stating "MISSED 

MEALS OR BREAKS WILL NOT BE PAID PER CONTRACT!").

8

Plaintiffs argue that although Regina Allcorn, the Executive Director of Clinical 

Operations for ACES, testified that ACES would pay for missed meal periods, this testimony is 

belied by the fact that there is no record in the payroll data that ACES has produced showing any 

such payments. According to plaintiffs, ACES payroll records account only for payments in the 

following categories: Strike Reg Hrs, Strike OT Hrs, Strike DT Hours, Strike GT Hours, 

Guaranteed Hrs., Charge Pay, On Call Pay, Strike-GT Hours, Call Back OT, Overtime Pay, 

Double Overtime, Personal Leave, Call Back Pay. Id. Ex. 2 (Kriegler Decl. ¶ 9a).

B. Failure to provide requisite number of meal and rest periods

Plaintiffs’ seventh and eighth causes of action allege that defendants have failed to provide 

the class and subclass members the requisite number of meal and rest periods. Putative class 

members are assigned to work 12 hour shifts, and as such they would be entitled to two 30-minute 

 

8

 The parties' papers state that ACES changed its meal and rest break policy in May 2013 in 

response to this lawsuit. HRN has submitted the employment records from named plaintiff 

Cameron, who worked the May 2013 strike. Cameron's contract differs from the earlier contracts 

in that it contains a section whereby employees who can waive their right to take a second meal 

break. Flaster Decl. Ex. A. Cameron's daily time record sheets, on ACES letterhead, inform 

employees that they are entitled to rest periods of 10 minutes for each four hours worked or major 

fraction thereof, and also contain a "waiver of second meal period." Id. 

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meal periods and three 10-minute rest periods. Cal. Wage Order 5-2001, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 

11050(11)(A), (12)(B).

Plaintiffs contend that prior to the filing of the complaint in this action, ACES never 

informed the strike replacement nurses about their entitlement to any rest periods in the course of 

their shift, and only informed strike replacement nurses that they were entitled to one meal period 

unless they were working a 16-hour shift. For instance, the strike contracts that ACES had with 

each class and subclass member prior to May 2013 only informed the strike replacement nurses 

that they are “required to take a 30 minute lunch” and said nothing about rest periods. Gildor 

Decl. Ex. 14. Plaintiffs note that the timesheets that ACES gave the strike replacement nurses 

provided space for recording only one meal period and no rest periods. Plaintiffs also cite the 

deposition testimony of Ms. Allcorn, ACES’ designated witness on the subject of ACES’ meal 

and rest period policies, in which she could not recall any instance of anyone informing a strike 

replacement nurse prior to May 2013 that they were entitled to a second meal period in a 12-hour 

shift. Id. Ex. 3 (Allcorn Dep. at 177:5-13, 178:1-5). According to plaintiffs, starting in May 2013, 

ACES began to collect written waivers regarding a second meal period from strike replacement 

nurses. d. Ex. 9 (Navellier Dep. at 91:14-92:2, 148:2-6); see also Flaster Decl. Ex. 1 (Cameron's 

contract and time sheets). 

LEGAL STANDARD

Class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs 

bear the burden of showing that they have met each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at 

least one subsection of Rule 23(b). Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2014), citing Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

Court's “class certification analysis must be rigorous and may entail some overlap with the merits 

of the plaintiff's underlying claim.” Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 

133 S.Ct. 1184, 1194 (2013), quoting Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 

(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). These analytical principles govern both Rule 23(a) and 

23(b). Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). However, “Rule 23 grants courts 

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no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.” Amgen, 133 S.Ct. 

at 1194-95. “Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they 

are relevant to determining whether Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Id.

Under Rule 23(a), the class may be certified only if: (1) the class is so numerous that 

joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) questions of law or fact exist that are common to the 

class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 

of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 

class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). A plaintiff must also establish that one or more of the grounds 

for maintaining the suit are met under Rule 23(b): (1) that there is a risk of substantial prejudice 

from separate actions; (2) that declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting the class as a whole 

would be appropriate; or (3) that common questions of law or fact predominate and the class 

action is superior to other available methods of adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

DISCUSSION

I. Rule 23(a) Requirements

HRN contends that the subclass of HRN employees is not sufficiently numerous and that 

its employees are not geographically dispersed. As an initial matter, the Court notes that there is 

no requirement that class members be geographically dispersed in order to maintain a class action. 

In any event, plaintiffs have submitted evidence showing that there are over 1,400 class members, 

149 of whom were employed by HRN during the class period, and that these individuals travelled 

to California from 32 different states. Gildor Decl. Ex. 3 (Kriegler Decl. ¶ 10); Gildor Reply Decl. 

Ex. 2 (Kriegler Supp. Decl. ¶ 4). Defendants have not submitted any evidence to the contrary, and 

the Court concludes that the proposed class and subclass are sufficiently numerous such that 

joinder of each class member would be impracticable. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of 

Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (numerosity presumed where plaintiff class consists 

of forty or more members); Newberg on Class Actions § 3:12 (5th ed.) (more than 40 class 

members “raises a presumption of impracticability of joinder based on numbers alone”).

HRN also contends that the class “is defined too broadly” and thus that it is unmanageable. 

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Defendant also argues that the proposed class includes a “great number” of individuals who could 

not have been harmed by HRN’s allegedly unlawful conduct, and that the class and subclass are 

improperly based on “subjective criteria.” Dkt. 115 at 6:23-25. 

Defendant does not explain what it means by these arguments. Contrary to defendant's 

assertions, the class and subclass are defined in objective terms based on employment with HRN 

and/or ACES and placement in California during a labor dispute, and class members can be 

identified from defendants' employment records. Plaintiffs' class and subclass definitions do not 

rely on any subjective criteria. See Lyon v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 

300 F.R.D. 628, 635 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting contention that class definition was improper 

where it did not “use subjective standards or terms that depend on the resolution of the merits”).

The Court also finds that the class and subclass definitions are not overbroad because the 

challenged practices apply to the entire class and subclass. In re AutoZone, Inc., Wage & Hour 

Employment Practices Litig., 289 F.R.D. 526, 533 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (rejecting contention that 

class challenging rest break policy was overbroad where policy applied to entire class). 

HRN contends that plaintiff Cameron is not typical because his "claim is against a different 

defendant than the defendants against whom other class members’ claims lie." Dkt. 115 at 11:18-

19. HRN also contends that Plaintiff Cameron is not typical because he only worked the May 

2013 strike, and he signed waivers of his second meal break and signed an acknowledgment of the 

need to take meal and rest breaks. Neither defendant challenges the adequacy or typicality of 

plaintiffs Minns and Briggs.

The Court finds that defendant's challenges to plaintiff Cameron's typicality are not 

persuasive. The fact that the class does not allege claims against HRN does not undermine the 

propriety of certifying a subclass of employees who, like plaintiff Cameron, allege claims against 

HRN, ACES and Sutter on the ground that those defendants were his joint employers during the 

course of strike assignments. As discussed infra, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not met their 

burden to show that the meal and rest break claims should be certified for the time period 

beginning May 2013 when defendants changed their meal and rest break policies. Accordingly,

the fact that plaintiff Cameron worked the May 2013 strike and signed a waiver of his second meal 

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break does not render him atypical because Cameron is not representing the subclass on the meal 

and rest break claims, and he shares the same "hours worked" claims as the rest of the subclass.

Defendants do not challenge adequacy of plaintiffs' counsel to represent the class. See

Rule 23(a)(4). The Court has reviewed the declarations submitted by plaintiffs' counsel and finds 

that counsel has demonstrated adequacy sufficient for Rule 23(a)(4).9

II. Rule 23(b) Requirements

Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that common 

questions of law or fact predominate and that a class action is superior to other available methods 

of adjudication. 

Plaintiffs contend that common issues predominate and that plaintiffs can prove their 

claims through common proof. Plaintiffs contend that there are questions of law or fact that are 

common to the class and subclass, including but not limited to (1) whether ACES and HRN 

Services are joint employers of the class and subclass, and as such liable for the violations of the 

others; (2) whether traveling by bus to cross picket lines is a principal activity and therefore 

compensable; (3) whether waiting at the hospital upon arrival and prior to departure is 

compensable; (4) whether time spent during the check-in process is compensable; (5) whether 

ACES has failed to compensate members of the class and subclass for missed meal and rest 

periods; and (6) whether ACES has failed to provide members of the class and subclass the 

requisite number of meal and rest periods.

The Court finds that these issues can be established through common proof. For example, 

whether defendants were joint employers can be determined based upon the contracts between 

defendants and with class members. Defendants’ liability for transit time and the waiting time 

depends on whether traveling by bus to cross a picket line is a principal activity of a strike 

replacement nurse. That question will be determined based on an evaluation of the nature of the 

work that the class members perform. The same is true for whether the time spent in the check-in 

 

9

 The Court combines the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality and the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 

analyses into a single discussion.

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process is compensable. See Cervantez v. Celestica Corp., 253 F.R.D. 562, 572 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 

(holding that question of whether time is compensable under the California Labor Code is a 

common question); see also Rai v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth., No. 5:12-CV-004344-PSG, 

2015 WL 860761, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2015); Schulz v. QualxServ, LLC, No. 09-CV-17-AJB 

MDD, 2012 WL 1439066, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2012) (holding commonality satisfied where 

plaintiffs “challenge uniform policies and systemic practices that apply to this class of employees” 

and where “[e]ach claim is based on a specific statutory requirement”); Dilts v. Penske Logistics, 

LLC, 267 F.R.D. 625, 633 (S.D. Cal. 2010).

With regard to the meal and rest break claims, the Court finds that plaintiffs have 

submitted evidence that prior to May 2013, defendants had a policy not to pay for missed meal 

and rest breaks prior, defendants did not inform class members of their entitlement to take a 

second meal break, and defendants did not inform class members of their entitlement to take rest 

breaks. Although plaintiffs' papers state that defendants' policy with regard to meal and rest breaks 

changed in May 2013, plaintiffs have not detailed precisely how that policy changed nor have 

plaintiffs explained how they would prove their meal and rest break claims on a class basis for the 

period beginning May 2013. The primary evidence that the Court has regarding the revised meal 

and rest break policy consists of plaintiff Cameron's contract and time records for the May 2013 

strike. See Flaster Decl. Ex. 1. Based upon the record before the Court, the Court concludes that 

the meal and rest break claims can be litigated on a class basis from the beginning of the class 

period through April 30, 2013. See Bradley v. Networkers International, LLC, 211 Cal.App.4th 

1129, 1150 (2012) (holding meal and rest break claims should have been certified where, inter 

alia, "plaintiffs presented evidence that under Networkers' uniform practice, none of the workers 

was provided, or given authorization to take, the required meal or rest breaks" and defendant 

"acknowledged it did not have a policy and did not know if the employees took meal or rest 

breaks").10 

HRN asserts that individual issues predominate. HRN contends that individualized proof 

 

10 The Court grants plaintiffs leave to add an additional subclass representative who alleges meal 

and rest break claims for the pre-May 2013 time period.

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will have to be obtained from each class member to determine questions such as "[w]hich 

defendant(s) did they work for (Sutter, ACES, HRN, or someone else)?" and "[w]hich strikes did 

they work, as each strike had different circumstances and paperwork? How many strikes did they 

work?" Dkt. 115 at 8:13-16. However, the necessity of making individualized factual 

determinations does not defeat class certification if those determinations are susceptible to 

generalized proof like employment and payroll records. See Newberg on Class Actions § 4:50 

(5th ed.) (common issues predominate when “individual factual determinations can be 

accomplished using computer records, clerical assistance, and objective criteria—thus rendering 

unnecessary an evidentiary hearing on each claim”); see also Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile 

Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003). In addition, even though HRN asserts that each strike 

had different circumstances and different paperwork, HRN has not specified what these 

differences are or how they are relevant to the class certification analysis. Further, a number of 

the questions that HRN identifies are irrelevant because they relate to claims that have been 

dismissed (such as whether class members were provided adequate break facilities), or they relate 

to the sixth cause of action alleging failure to pay daily pay for which plaintiffs do not seek 

certification. Similarly, the individual issues that HRN identifies with regard to determining 

whether class members waived meal and rest breaks for strikes beginning in May 2013 are 

irrelevant because the Court is not certifying the class or subclass for that time period.

The Court also finds that although the calculation of damages may require some 

individualized inquiry, “the presence of individualized damages cannot, by itself, defeat class 

certification under Rule 23(b)(3).” Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 

2013). Numerous courts have certified class actions where the damages were to be calculated on 

an individual basis where the damages were calculated based on the wages each employee lost due 

to the defendant's unlawful practices.. See, e.g., Rosales v. El Rancho Farms, No. 1:09-cv-00707-

AWI–JLT, 2014 WL 321159, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) report and recommendation adopted, 

2014 WL 631586 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014) (listing and discussing cases); Quezada v. Con-Way 

Freight, Inc., No. C 09-03670 JSW, 2014 WL 186224, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2014). 

Here, plaintiffs have shown that damages can be calculated through payroll, time, and 

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employment records, which track the class members' hourly rates paid, hours that each class 

member worked, the meal periods that each class member took, the hotels at which each stayed, 

and the locations at which they worked. Gildor Decl. Ex. 2 (Kriegler Decl. ¶ 9). For the one 

claim where the amount of unpaid wages is not susceptible to common proof (the claim for time 

spent during the check-in process), plaintiffs have set forth a plausible method through random 

sampling and representative testimony to measure the impact of defendants’ failure to compensate 

class members for this time on a class-wide basis. See id. (Kriegler Decl. ¶¶ 13-15). Defendants 

have not challenged the adequacy of plaintiffs' proposed methodology.

HRN also contends that a class action would be unmanageable because "[h]ow will all of 

these different class members be notified? Will they have to 'opt in' or 'opt out?' And, quite 

frankly, what is the benefit of certifying the classes here?" Dkt. 115 at 16:13-14. However, as 

plaintiffs note, the questions that HRN raises are routine in the context of any class action. Class 

members will be notified using the best practicable means of providing notice once the Court 

approves the notice to be provided. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Because the class and subclass 

are being certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), class members will have to opt out. See Fed. R. Civ. 

Proc. 23(c)(2)(B).

Finally, HRN contends that class treatment is inappropriate in the present case because 

“there are alternative venues by which Plaintiffs can seek relief that are available such as the 

Labor Board and the hearings therein which are more economically feasible for a small claim.” 

Dkt. 115 at 16:4-7. However, the availability of administrative proceedings before the Labor

Commissioner does not defeat class certification of wage and hour claims such as those alleged in 

this case. See Otsuka v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 251 F.R.D. 439, 448-49 (N.D. Cal. 2008)

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that the first, second, third, ninth, 

eleventh and twelfth causes of action in the fifth amended complaint filed August 25, 2014, be 

certified for class treatment on behalf of a class defined as:

All present and former nurses who were placed to work by 

Advanced Clinical Employment Staffing LLC (“ACES”) in 

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California health care facilities on a temporary basis during labor 

disputes at any time during the four years preceding the filing of this 

action through such time as this action is pending;

and a subclass defined as:

All present and former nurses who were hired by HRN Services, 

Inc. to be placed to work by ACES in California health care 

facilities on a temporary basis during labor disputes at any time 

during the four years preceding the filing of this action through such 

time as this action is pending.

The Court hereby ORDERS that the fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action in 

the fifth amended complaint filed August 25, 2014, be certified for class treatment on behalf of a 

class defined as:

All present and former nurses who were placed to work by 

Advanced Clinical Employment Staffing LLC (“ACES”) in 

California health care facilities on a temporary basis during labor 

disputes at any time during the four years preceding the filing of this 

action through April 30, 2013;

Marie Minns and Kemberly Briggs are hereby appointed representatives of the class as 

defined above. Douglas Cameron is hereby appointed representative of the subclass defined 

above. The Court grants plaintiffs leave to add an additional subclass representative who alleges 

meal and rest break claims for the pre-May 2013 time period. If plaintiffs wish to add an 

additional subclass representative, plaintiffs shall meet and confer with defendants to see if 

defendants will stipulate to adding an additional subclass representative. If the parties reach a 

stipulation, they shall file it with the Court in advance of the July 10, 2015 case management 

conference. If the parties cannot reach such a stipulation, they shall address this issue in the 

parties' joint statement for the July 10, 2015 case management conference.

Jonathan E. Gertler and Dan L. Gildor of Chavez & Gertler LLP and Lori E. Andrus of 

Andrus Anderson LLP are appointed class counsel.

Plaintiffs shall serve a proposed class notice form and a proposed order re notice 

procedures upon defendants no later than June 15, 2015;

The parties shall conclude meet-and-confer efforts as to any disputed issues related to the 

form and procedures for class notice no later than June 22, 2015;

If the parties reach a stipulation as to the form and procedures relative to class notice, they 

shall file such a stipulation by June 25, 2015. If the parties do not reach such a stipulation, the 

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parties shall file and serve competing proposed class notice forms and procedures, a supporting 

brief, if any, not to exceed ten pages, on or before June 29, 2015. The Court will address any 

disputes regarding the class notice forms and procedures at the July 10, 2015 case management 

conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2015 ________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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