Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_22-cv-00027/USCOURTS-akd-3_22-cv-00027-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 46:1156 Administrative Procedure Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 

KANAWAY SEAFOODS, INC., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

PACIFIC PREDATOR, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:22-cv-00027-SLG-KFR 

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT RE CONVERSION, INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE, 

AND ALASKA UTPA COUNTERCLAIMS 

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment re Counterclaims for Conversion, 

Intentional Interference, and Violation of Alaska Unfair Trade Practices Act (“Motion”), filed 

by Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Kanaway Seafoods Inc., doing business as Alaska General 

Seafoods (“AGS”), and Liberty Packing LLC (“Liberty”).1 Defendants/Counterclaimants 

Pacific Predator, Bryan Howey, Dana Howey, and Alaska Wild Exports LLC (“AWE”) filed a 

response in opposition to the Motion,2 to which Plaintiffs filed a reply.3 The Court finds that 

there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on Defendants’ 

conversion counterclaim, but that no genuine issues of material fact exist and Plaintiffs are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Defendants’ (1) intentional interference with 

prospective economic advantage and (2) Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 

Protection Act (“UTPA”) counterclaims. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Motion 

be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and that the Seventh and Tenth Causes of 

Action in Defendants’ Countercomplaint be DISMISSED. 

// 

1

 Docket 148. For the sake of simplicity, the Court will refer to these parties as “Plaintiffs.” 

2

 Docket 163. The Court will refer to these parties as “Defendants.” 

3

 Docket 171. 

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Starting in 2019, Defendants entered into a series of agreements with Plaintiffs. First, 

on April 17, 2019, the Howeys entered into a loan and security agreement with Liberty (“Liberty 

Loan Agreement”); the parties documented the $800,000 loan by a promissory note (“Liberty 

Note”) reciting the loan’s terms.4 In exchange for this loan, the Howeys agreed to enter into a 

fishing agreement to deliver and sell seafood products to AGS for a fixed period.5 Second, on 

June 30, 2019, Bryan Howey entered into a promissory note with AGS (“AGS Note”) for a 

loan from AGS to Howey in the amount of $23,949.32.6 And third, between 2019 and 2021, 

AGS also loaned or advanced Bryan Howey and the Pacific Predator (“the Vessel”)—a 58-foot 

seiner that the Howeys used to commercially fish Alaskan waters—additional funds that were 

used to pay various expenses associated with Defendants’ fishing operations.7 These sums 

were added to an “open account” with AGS that was used to track ongoing debits and credits, 

including credits for Defendants’ fish deliveries.8

1. The Howeys’ default on the Liberty loan

The Liberty Loan Agreement and Note included terms that set forth how payments 

would be made on the loan and that required the Howeys to meet certain obligations. First, 

the Liberty Note provided that the Howeys were to pay off the loan in 15 annual installments, 

due to Liberty each year on September 30 starting in 2019.9 The parties agreed that “[a]ll 

payments . . . other than Fishing Proceeds Payments, [would] be made in immediately available 

funds: (a) by wire transfer to [Liberty]; or (b) by check payable to [Liberty] . . . or (c) out of 

funds owed to [the Howeys] for [fish deliveries] as provided in Section 4(A)” of the Liberty 

Note.10 Section 4(A) of the Liberty Note, titled “Fishing Proceeds Payments,” provided that 

4

 Docket 145-1; Docket 145-2. 

5

 Docket 145-1 at 1; Docket 172-1. 

6

 Docket 64-3. 

7

 Docket 64 at 6–7, ¶ 3.13; Docket 75 at 9–10, ¶ 26. 

8

 Docket 64-4; Docket 75 at 9, ¶ 26. 

9

 Docket 145-2 at 2, ¶ 4. 

10 Id.

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“[25%] of the gross proceeds from [any fish delivery] . . . [would] be deducted from any 

payment due to [the Howeys] for such delivery and applied to the [Liberty Loan] Payments 

due.”11 

Second, the Liberty Note required the Howeys to “immediately register the Vessel in 

Washington and maintain that registration . . . during the [loan] term.”12 In addition to 

requiring the Vessel’s registration in Washington, the Liberty Note required the Howeys in the 

registration documents to identify themselves as the Vessel’s registered owner and Liberty as 

the Vessel’s legal owner.13

The Liberty Loan Agreement and Note provided that any failure to make a full annual 

payment or to “perform any of [the Howeys’] obligations” under the Loan Agreement—

including the obligation to “properly register” the Vessel—would constitute a default on the 

loan.14 Under the Liberty Note, in the event of a default the full amount of the loan would be 

immediately due and payable, and Liberty could pursue all remedies available.15 

The Howeys remained current on the Liberty loan until 2021. On August 31, 2019, 

after accounting for Defendants’ fish credits, AGS transferred $72,150.76 to Liberty to satisfy 

the Howeys’ first payment on the Liberty loan.16 In 2020, no loan payment was made, but the 

nonpayment was excused because Liberty granted and the Howeys exercised a one-time loan 

payment deferral due to the effects of COVID-19 on fisheries and fishers.17 In 2021, no loan 

payment was made by the September 30 due date and Liberty declared a default.18 Also in 

2021, after a court judgment for damages was issued against Bryan Howey in a separate case, 

Howey amended the Vessel’s registration to replace his name with AWE’s as the registered 

owner.19

11 Id.

12 Docket 145-1 at 6, ¶ 6. 

13 Id.

14 Id. at 6, ¶ 7. 

15 Id. at 3–4, ¶ 7; Docket 145-1 at 6. 

16 Docket 64-4 at 2; Docket 145 at 3, ¶ 4. 

17 Docket 145 at 3, ¶ 5. 

18 Id. at 3–4, ¶¶ 6–7. 

19 Docket 172-2 at 3–4. 

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2. Repair of the Howeys’ skiff

 In 2019, the Howeys asked AGS to help fix a “minor overheating issue” in the engine 

of the skiff used by the Vessel in seining operations.20 AGS assigned its port mechanic to 

repair the skiff.21 According to Defendants, soon after the port mechanic handed the skiff 

back over to them, the engine “threw a rod and blew a hole in the top of the block.”22 The 

parties arranged for AGS to repair or replace the skiff’s engine.23 According to Defendants, 

the mechanic who AGS hired to perform this task “completely dismantle[d] or disassemble[d]” 

the skiff without Defendants’ authorization.24 In addition, Defendants contend that AGS 

promised to install a “remanufactured” engine for the repair, but that the engine that was 

actually installed was not remanufactured and was instead a “running take out” engine made of 

“old used parts.”25 According to Defendants, AGS charged them a total of over $20,000 for 

the engine, unnecessary parts, and labor for the repair.26

3. Bait herring fishing

From 2017 to 2019, one source of the Howeys’ income was bait herring fishing during 

the winter season.27 In each of those years, the Howeys engaged in the open area bait herring 

fishery in Southeast Alaska and delivered their catch to Sitka Sound Seafoods (“Sitka Sound”) 

for processing and shipment to a bait wholesaler.28 The Howeys fished under bait herring 

permits issued to Bryan Howey.29 

In 2021, the Howeys were interested in harvesting bait herring again to supplement their 

income.30 At this point, Sitka Sound and AGS had become corporate affiliates.31 AGS 

20 Docket 75 at 12, ¶ 37. 

21 Id. at 12, ¶ 38. 

22 Id. at 12, ¶ 39. 

23 Id. at 13, ¶¶ 41–42. 

24 Id. at 13–14, ¶¶ 43–44. 

25 Id. at 16, ¶ 56. 

26 Id. at 14, ¶ 48. 

27 Id. at 17–18, ¶ 61; Docket 151 at 2, ¶ 5. 

28 Docket 75 at 18, ¶¶ 62–63; Docket 151 at 2, ¶ 5. 

29 Docket 164 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket 164-2 at 1–3. 

30 See Docket 75 at 19, ¶ 66. 

31 Id.; Docket 151 at 3, ¶ 8. 

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communicated with Sitka Sound about the possibility of the Howeys delivering bait herring to 

Sitka Sound that year for processing.32 However, Sitka Sound did not reciprocate the Howeys’ 

interest in working together because the bait herring the Howeys had delivered in 2019 were 

“underweight and very poor quality.”33 As a result, the Howeys did not engage in the open 

area bait herring fishery in 2021. 

However, Brad Haynes—another AGS fisher—obtained a bait herring permit in 2021 

and Sitka Sound accepted and processed his bait herring deliveries that year.34 Like the 

Howeys, Haynes had a long-term loan with Liberty and an open account with AGS and was 

struggling to manage these debts.35 In May 2020, AGS had internal discussions regarding these 

struggles and the “immediate threat” of AGS’s competitors attempting to poach Haynes and 

his family’s boats.36 

B. Procedural History

In February 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in rem and in personam against Defendants, 

alleging that Defendants failed to comply with the terms of each of their loans with Plaintiffs: 

the $800,000 Liberty loan, the $23,949.32 AGS loan, and the AGS open account loan for 

ongoing expenses.37 In September 2022, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint.38 The 

Amended Complaint contains claims for breach of contract and promissory note, foreclosure 

of maritime and state law liens, and corporate disregard.39 Defendants filed an Answer and 

Countercomplaint in which they asserted numerous counterclaims, including for (1) 

conversion, (2) intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, and (3) 

violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“UTPA”).40 

32 Docket 151 at 3, ¶ 9. 

33 Id. at 3, ¶¶ 7, 9. Docket 75 at 19, ¶ 66. 

34 Docket 164 at 2, ¶ 4; see also Docket 163 at 9. 

35 Docket 156-2 at 1–3. 

36 Id. at 1. 

37 Docket 1. 

38 Docket 64.3 

39 Id.

40 Docket 75 at 25–27, 29, ¶¶ 93–103, 113. 

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In the Motion, Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on each of these three 

counterclaims.41 In support of the Motion, Plaintiffs submit declarations by (1) Leauri Moore, 

an Officer and Vice President of AGS,42 (2) William Grant, Plant Manager of Sitka Sound,43

and (3) Plaintiffs’ attorney, with various attached exhibits including excerpts from the transcript 

of a deposition of Bryan Howey.44 Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Motion.45

In support of their response, Defendants rely primarily on two declarations by their attorney 

with attached exhibits pertaining to bait herring fishing.46 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

 Summary judgment is appropriate when a “movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 47 A 

fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.48 A 

dispute is “genuine” as to a material fact if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to decide in favor of the nonmoving party.49 In determining whether a genuine dispute 

of material fact exists, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.50

The party moving for summary judgment bears both (1) the ultimate burden of 

persuasion on the motion and (2) the initial burden of producing evidence that shows the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.51 To satisfy its initial burden of production, a 

moving party that will not have the burden of persuasion at trial “must either produce evidence 

41 Docket 148; Docket 171. 

42 Docket 150. 

43 Docket 151. 

44 Docket 149; Docket 149-1–2; Docket 172; Docket 172-1; Docket 172-2. 

45 Docket 163. 

46 Docket 156; Docket 156-1; Docket 156-2; Docket 164; Docket 164-1; Docket 164-2; see also Docket 

163 at 4–5. 

47 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

48 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that might affect 

the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.”). 

49 Id. at 248. 

50 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy 

Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009). 

51 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

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negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the 

nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate 

burden of persuasion at trial.”52 If a moving party successfully carries this burden, the 

nonmoving party “must produce evidence to support its claim or defense.”53 It is not the task 

of the court to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.”54 Rather, the 

nonmoving party must “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes 

summary judgment.”55 “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a 

genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.”56

Supplemental jurisdiction allows a district court that has jurisdiction over a federal claim 

to hear related claims over which it would otherwise lack jurisdiction.57 When, as here, a district 

court hears state law claims based on supplemental jurisdiction, the court applies state 

substantive law to the state law claims.58 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Defendants’

Conversion Counterclaim.

“Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so 

seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required 

to pay the other the full value of the chattel.”59 Under Alaska law, a conversion claim has four 

elements: “(1) that [the plaintiff] had a possessory interest in the property; (2) that the defendant 

52 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

53 Id. at 1103. 

54 Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v. Combined Ins., 55 F.3d 247, 251 

(7th Cir. 1995)). 

55 Id. (quoting Richards, 55 F.3d at 251). 

56 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins., 210 F.3d at 1102. 

57 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

58 Mason & Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Int’l LLC, 632 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2011). Although 

parties to a contract may include a choice-of-law provision in the contract, any such provision does 

not govern tort claims. See Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage Selections, Ltd., 971 F.2d 401, 407–08 (9th 

Cir. 1992). Thus, although the various loan documents in this case provide for the application of 

Washington law when interpreting and construing these documents, Washington law does not apply 

to the counterclaims at issue here. See Docket 145-1 at 9; Docket 172-1 at 3; Docket 64-3 at 2. 

59 Societe Financial, LLC v. MJ Corp., 542 P.3d 1159, 1169 (Alaska 2024) (quoting Silvers v. Silvers, 999 

P.2d 786, 793 (Alaska 2000)).

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interfered with the plaintiff’s right to possess the property; (3) that the defendant intended to 

interfere with [the] plaintiff’s possession; and (4) that the defendant’s act was the legal cause of 

the plaintiff's loss of the property.”60 The plaintiff bears the burden of proof for each 

element.61

Defendants allege in their Countercomplaint that AGS committed conversion by using 

fish credits in the open account to make an “excessive payment” to Liberty, to pay “AGS’ own 

agents who damaged [Defendants’] skiff,” and to pay for other costs associated with repairs to 

the skiff.62 Defendants suggest that the skiff-related debts belonged solely to AGS and its 

“own agents and third-party vendors.”63

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ conversion counterclaim fails as a matter of law 

because Defendants cannot demonstrate that (1) Bryan Howey had a possessory interest in the 

fish credits and payments delivered to AGS for purposes of debt repayment, or that (2) 

Plaintiffs intended to interfere with any such interest, to the extent one existed.64 Plaintiffs 

maintain that, due to their status as lenders and creditors, they were entitled to apply payments 

as they saw fit, and the AGS and Liberty Notes made clear that Plaintiffs “intended to be 

reimbursed for costs associated with any open account of Mr. Howey’s including advances.”65

And in any event, Plaintiffs argue, “misapplication of credits” does not amount to a deprivation 

of any right to possess these funds.66

Defendants respond that the Court’s disposition of Plaintiffs’ argument is governed by 

its previous findings that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the interpretation of the 

AGS and Liberty Notes, and as to the operation of the AGS open account.67 Defendants 

further contest Plaintiffs’ assertion that there is no evidence that Plaintiffs intended to deprive 

60 Id. (quoting Silvers, 999 P.2d at 793). 

61 Id. 

62 Docket 75 at 25, ¶¶ 93, 95. 

63 Id. at 25, ¶ 94. 

64 Docket 148 at 14. 

65 Id. at 14–15. 

66 Id. at 16; see also Docket 171 at 8 (arguing that “a creditor repaying a debt from credits [does not] 

show[] an intent to deprive a debtor of their property”). 

67 Docket 163 at 6; see also Docket 115. 

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Defendants of a possessory interest, arguing that “Plaintiffs[’] entire purpose in this litigation 

is to deprive Defendants of their funds.”68

The Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants 

had a possessory interest in any of the funds that AGS transferred to Liberty in August 2019. 

Defendants’ entitlement to such a possessory interest depends on whether AGS needed and 

received express authorization from the Howeys to transfer the entire Liberty loan payment 

for the 2019 calendar year, given that the transferred sum exceeded the amount that—under 

the Liberty Note—could be automatically “deducted from any payment due to [the Howeys] 

for [fish] deliver[ies] and applied to the Payments due for that calendar year.”69 When 

Defendants brought their motion for summary judgment earlier in this case, the Court 

determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether AGS’s $72,150.76 debit 

of the open account in August 2019 was an “unauthorized overpayment” based on the Liberty 

Note’s ambiguous provisions regarding payments.70 It is clear that the parties still dispute 

whether AGS needed or actually received the Howeys’ authorization to perform this specific 

debit.71 Until the propriety of the August 2019 transfer is resolved, the Court cannot determine 

whether the Howeys had a possessory interest in any of those transferred funds. Plaintiff’s 

reliance on the proposition that a lender may generally apply a debtor’s payments to any part 

of the debt owed to that lender does not resolve the issue here, where the Howeys owed debts 

to two separate lenders, one of which transferred funds to satisfy the Howeys’ annual loan 

obligation to the other. 

The Court similarly finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to AGS’s intent 

in making the August 2019 transfer to Liberty. Conversion does not require fault or knowledge 

of a superior possessory interest.72 “For the purposes of conversion, ‘[t]he intention required 

is an intention merely to exercise a dominion or control over the chattel which in fact seriously 

68 Docket 163 at 6–7. 

69 See Docket 145-2 at 2, ¶ 4. 

70 Docket 115 at 11–13. 

71 See Docket 148 at 15–16; Docket 163 at 5–6; see also Docket 75 at 10, ¶ 29; Docket 79 at 4, ¶ 6. 

72 Societe Financial, LLC, 542 P.3d at 1170. 

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interferes with the right of another to control it.’”73 If AGS’s August 2019 transfer was not 

authorized and the Howeys had a possessory interest in some of the transferred funds, then 

Liberty’s knowing receipt of the disputed funds is sufficient proof of intent to obtain a 

permanent right of ownership in those funds.74 

In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence does not negate the 

possessory interest element of Defendants’ conversion counterclaim premised on AGS’s 

application of fish credits toward skiff-related costs. Plaintiffs reference portions of the AGS 

and Liberty Notes that purportedly show that “both Liberty and AGS intended to be 

reimbursed for costs associated with any open account of Mr. Howey’s including advances.”75

However, these documents do not get at the heart of Defendants’ counterclaim, which appears 

to be whether AGS properly sought reimbursement from fish credits for costs associated with 

damage that AGS allegedly caused to Defendants’ skiff (as opposed to whether AGS properly 

sought reimbursement from fish credits for costs as a general matter). Defendants’ theory 

appears to be that AGS alone was responsible for these particular costs, so AGS’s use of 

Defendants’ fish credits to pay for these costs interfered with a possessory right that 

Defendants otherwise might have had in these funds.76 Given the parties’ factual dispute over 

the balance on the Open Account at all relevant times, and the lack of evidence offered to 

support any understanding of the parties with respect to allowable costs on the open account, 

the Court is unable to conclude that Defendants did not have a possessory interest in fish 

credits that AGS applied toward the disputed skiff-related costs.77 

The Court therefore recommends denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment 

on Defendants’ conversion counterclaim. 

73 Id. at 1171 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 224 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1965)). 

74 See id. at 1171 n.62 (“Summary judgment can be based on [the defendant’s] receipt of the disputed 

deposits alone . . . .” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1965) 

(explaining that “one receiving a chattel from a third person with intent to acquire a proprietary interest 

in it is liable without a demand for its return by the person entitled to possession”))). 

75 Docket 148 at 15–16. 

76 Docket 75 at 14, ¶¶ 46–48. 

77 Consequently, the Court is also unable to conclude that AGS lacked the requisite intent to deprive 

Defendants of any possessory interest that they had in these disputed funds. 

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B. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Defendants’

Intentional Interference Counterclaim.

Under Alaska law, the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic 

advantage protects “a person who is involved in an economic relationship with another, or 

who is pursuing reasonable and legitimate prospects of entering such a relationship, . . . from 

a third person’s wrongful conduct which is intended to disrupt the relationship.”78 To prove 

a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must 

show: 

(1) an existing prospective business relationship between it and a

third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the relationship and

intent to prevent its fruition; (3) failure of the prospective

relationship to culminate in pecuniary benefit to the plaintiff; (4)

conduct of the defendant interfering with the prospective

relationship; (5) damages caused by the defendant; and (6) absence

of privilege or justification for the defendant’s conduct.79

Defendants allege in their Countercomplaint that Plaintiffs intentionally interfered with 

the Howeys’ prospective relationship with the wholesaler to whom they sold bait herring.80

Defendants allege that from 2017 to 2019, the Howeys arranged to sell bait herring to this 

wholesaler and separately entered into agreements with Sitka Sound for processing of the bait 

herring and shipment to the wholesaler.81 Defendants allege that in 2021, “[a]fter Sitka 

Sound . . . came under the AGS corporate ownership umbrella,” Sitka Sound refused to 

process or ship bait herring for the Howeys.82 According to Defendants, that year AGS 

“contacted the wholesaler directly,” used AGS’s own boats to fish for bait herring, and 

processed and shipped the bait herring from AGS’s Kodiak plant, all with knowledge of the 

Howeys’ relationship with the wholesaler and with Sitka Sound.83

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ intentional interference counterclaim fails as a matter 

78 Ellis v. City of Valdez, 686 P.2d 700, 707 (Alaska 1984). 

79 K & K Recycling, Inc. v. Alaska Gold Co., 80 P.3d 702, 717 (Alaska 2003). 

80 Docket 75 at 17–20, ¶¶ 61–68. 

81 Id. at 18–19, ¶¶ 62–65. 

82 Id. at 19, ¶ 66. 

83 Id. 

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of law because (1) there is no evidence that the Howeys had a prospective economic 

relationship that could have been interfered with, (2) the evidence shows that Sitka Sound was 

not obligated to process or ship bait herring for the Howeys in 2021, and (3) the evidence 

shows that Sitka Sound had “no plan to purchase bait herring from [the Howeys] for totally 

independent business reasons.”84 In support of these arguments, Plaintiffs refer to a 

declaration by AGS Officer and Vice President Leauri Moore, who denies that AGS processes 

bait herring, “has [any] involvement with the bait herring fishery in Alaska,” or “dictate[s] to 

Sitka Sound whether and how to operate its bait herring operations.”85 Moore further testifies 

that AGS inquired about Sitka Sound’s interest in purchasing bait herring from Defendants in 

2021, but Sitka Sound “responded that it was not interested in accepting additional deliveries 

from [the Howeys].”86 This testimony is corroborated by a declaration by Sitka Sound Plant 

Manager William Grant, who testifies that Sitka Sound was “not interested in purchasing any 

more bait herring from [the Howeys]” after 2019 because the fish Defendants delivered that 

year were “underweight and very poor quality.”87 

Defendants respond that summary judgment on their intentional interference 

counterclaim is not appropriate because Plaintiffs wrongfully disrupted the Howeys’ 

“expectancy of bait herring revenue.”88 Defendants’ theory appears to be that Plaintiffs 

persuaded Sitka Sound to give the Howeys’ bait herring fishing opportunity to Brad Haynes, 

another fisher in the AGS fleet who was having trouble keeping up with his loan obligations.89

Defendants assert that AGS wanted Haynes to have this opportunity because it was worried 

that Haynes and his family’s boats would leave the AGS fleet if his debt could not be 

managed.90 In support of this argument, Defendants submit evidence indicating that Haynes 

did not obtain any bait herring permits before 2021, and that AGS’s competitors were 

84 Docket 148 at 18–19. 

85 Docket 150 at 2, ¶¶ 4–5. 

86 Id. at 2–3, ¶ 6. 

87 Docket 151 at 3, ¶ 7. 

88 Docket 163 at 8. 

89 Id. at 7–8. 

90 Id. at 9. 

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“aggressively pursu[ing]” the Haynes group to join their fleets while AGS was trying to figure 

out a solution to Haynes’ debt woes.91

In reply, Plaintiffs contend that Sitka Sound’s decision to contract with Haynes for bait 

herring in 2021 was “wholly separate” from Sitka Sound’s decision not to work with the 

Howeys that year, and that, in any case, the former decision did not interfere with any “actual 

prospects” the Howeys had.92 Plaintiffs maintain that the facts that the Howeys wished to 

harvest bait herring and had done so a few times before “did not entitle [them] to future 

contracts, and there is no evidence that this was contemplated by Sitka Sound or anyone else.”93

Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue, even if the Howeys had a legitimate business expectancy in the 

bait herring fishing opportunity involving Sitka Sound, they cannot prove any other elements 

of their intentional interference claim.94

Assuming for purposes of argument that the Howeys had a qualifying prospective 

business relationship with the bait herring wholesaler or Sitka Sound,95 the Court finds that 

Defendants have failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the causal link 

between Plaintiffs’ actions and the Howeys’ loss of the bait herring fishing opportunity. The 

fourth and fifth elements of an intentional interference claim require the plaintiff to 

demonstrate that the defendant’s interference caused the plaintiff to suffer a pecuniary loss, 

91 Id. at 8; Docket 156-2 at 1; Docket 164-2 at 5. 

92 Docket 171 at 10 (emphasis omitted). 

93 Id.

94 Id. at 11. 

95 To satisfy the first element of an intentional interference claim, a plaintiff must show that they had 

a “continuing business or customary relationship” or a “prospective business or contractual 

relations[hip] which, absent interference, would culminate in pecuniary benefit to the plaintiff.” Ellis, 

686 P.2d at 707. The plaintiff’s prospects of entering into such a relationship must be “reasonable and 

legitimate.” Id. Although Defendants’ Countercomplaint alleges intentional interference with the 

Howeys’ relationship with the wholesaler, Defendants do not correct Plaintiffs’ apparent assumption 

that the interference was actually with the Howeys’ relationship with Sitka Sound. See Docket 148 at 

18–19; Docket 163 at 7–9. Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the Court notes that aside from the fact 

that the Howeys engaged in the bait herring fishery from 2017 to 2019 and entered into agreements 

with Sitka Sound to process the bait herring they caught in those years, Defendants offer no evidence 

to support that they had a qualifying relationship with either entity. The Howeys may have hoped that 

Sitka Sound would agree to process bait herring for them in 2021, as Sitka Sound had done before. 

But given that this hope was undisputedly one-sided, any prospects the Howeys had of entering into a 

bait herring processing agreement with Sitka Sound in 2021 were not reasonable or legitimate. 

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which requires proof of what the defendant did to interfere and that the interference caused 

damages.96 Here, the undisputed evidence is that Sitka Sound lost interest in processing “any 

more” bait herring from the Howeys after its experience working with the Howeys in 2019.97

Even if Plaintiffs ultimately convinced Sitka Sound to give the 2021 bait herring fishing 

opportunity to Haynes, as Defendants suggest, this fact does not contradict the evidence that 

Sitka Sound had already decided not to work with Defendants for an entirely different and 

legitimate reason.98 Thus, Plaintiffs’ alleged acts done for the benefit of Haynes did not cause 

the Howeys to lose the bait herring fishing opportunity because the evidence demonstrates that 

opportunity was not available to them. Defendants identify no other acts that might have 

affected Sitka Sound’s decision not to process bait herring for the Howeys in 2021. 

The Court therefore recommends granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on 

Defendants’ intentional interference counterclaim. 

C. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Defendants’ UTPA

Counterclaim.

The Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“UTPA”) makes 

unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 

conduct of trade or commerce.”99 The UTPA provides a private right of action by “person 

who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of another person’s act or 

practice declared unlawful [under the UTPA].”100 To establish a prima facie case of unfair or 

96 See J & S Servs. v. Tomter, 139 P.3d 544, 551 (Alaska 2006); Oaksmith v. Brusich, 774 P.2d 191, 198 

(Alaska 1989). 

97 Docket 151 at 3, ¶ 7. 

98 See Ellis, 686 P.2d at 708 (“The only act of [defendant’s] which ‘interfered’ with [plaintiff’s] 

prospective advantage was [defendant’s] decision not to purchase [plaintiff’s] terminal on [plaintiff’s] 

terms. This ‘arms-length’ dealing is not the type of conduct proscribed by the tort. . . . A party who 

backs away from a developing economic relationship cannot be held liable in tort for inducing himself 

to sever the relationship.”). 

99 AS 45.50.471(a); see also Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc., 331 P.3d 342, 353 (Alaska 2014) (noting that UTPA 

was “designed to meet the increasing need in Alaska for the protection of consumers as well as honest 

businessmen from the depredation of those persons employing unfair or deceptive trade practices” 

(citations omitted)). 

100 AS 45.50.531(a); accord Alaska Interstate Const., LLC v. Pac. Diversified Invs., Inc., 279 P.3d 1156, 1162 

(Alaska 2012).

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deceptive acts or practices under the UTPA, a plaintiff must prove two elements: “(1) that the 

defendant engaged in trade or commerce; and (2) that in the conduct of trade or commerce, 

an unfair act or practice has occurred.”101 To satisfy this second element, the plaintiff must 

show that the defendant’s acts and practices “ha[d] the capacity or tendency to deceive.”102 

Defendants allege that Plaintiffs violated the UTPA by failing to repair Defendants’ 

skiff with a remanufactured engine as agreed.103 Defendants allege that they authorized AGS 

to install a remanufactured engine, but that AGS instead installed an engine made of “old used 

parts” that had to be replaced, resulting in significant delays that prevented the Vessel from 

operating.104 Defendants allege that AGS’s actions constitute a violation of the UTPA’s 

prohibition of the “representation that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, 

altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, secondhand, or seconds.”105

Plaintiffs argue that there is no evidence that AGS entered into an agreement with 

Defendants in which it warranted the condition of the replacement parts for the engine, and 

that Defendants’ understanding that the engine would be “remanufactured” does not violate 

the UTPA.106 Plaintiffs further contend that to the extent Defendants’ UTPA claim arises from 

a belief that Plaintiffs in bad faith included an “illegal” registration requirement as a term of 

the Liberty Loan agreement, this claim cannot be sustained.107 Plaintiffs explain that in 

response to an interrogatory, Bryan Howey stated that part of the factual basis for Defendants’ 

UTPA counterclaim was that the Liberty Note unlawfully required him to register and maintain 

101 State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 534 (Alaska 1980). 

102 Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1255 (Alaska 2007). Intent to deceive is not required. 

ASRC Energy Servs. Power & Commc’ns, LLC v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 267 P.3d 1151, 1159 (Alaska 

2011). 

103 Docket 75 at 16–17, 29, ¶¶ 55–57, 113. 

104 Id. at 14, 16, ¶¶ 46–48, 56. 

105 Id. at 17, ¶ 57. 

106 Docket 148 at 20. 

107 Id. at 21–22; see also AS 45.40.471(b)(14) (prohibiting the “represent[ation] that an agreement confers 

or involves rights, remedies, or obligations that it does not confer or involve, or that are prohibited by 

law”). Although Defendants’ Answer contained a “den[ial] that there was a legal obligation to register 

the vessel in Washington[,]” their Countercomplaint did not reference the registration requirement at 

all. See Docket 75 at 2, ¶ 3.2. 

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registration of the Vessel in Washington.108 Plaintiffs assert that this claim was not adequately 

pled in Defendants’ Countercomplaint, but that even if it had been, the vessel registration 

requirement was not illegal and was inconsequential because Bryan Howey failed to comply 

with the requirement and “operated the [V]essel in Alaska as planned.”109

In response, Defendants appear to abandon their UTPA claim premised on the 

condition of the engine AGS installed when repairing Defendants’ skiff.110 Defendants instead 

focus on the Liberty Note’s vessel registration requirement, arguing that federal regulations 

required the Vessel to be registered in Alaska, not Washington, because Alaska was the Vessel’s 

“state of principal operation.”111 Therefore, according to Defendants, the vessel registration 

requirement was “legally impossible to comply with” and could not have served as the basis 

for a default on the Liberty loan.112

In reply, Plaintiffs reject Defendants’ argument that the vessel registration requirement 

was “impossible” and “illegal,” insisting that “vessels may be registered in Washington and fish 

in Alaska without issue.”113 More importantly, Plaintiffs add, the implications of requiring the 

Vessel’s registration in Washington as opposed to Alaska are immaterial because it was not the 

only basis for Defendants’ default on the Liberty Note: Defendants also failed to repay the loan 

and failed to register the Vessel in Liberty’s name, instead registering the Vessel in the name of 

AWE—a mushroom-harvesting company—“for the sole purpose of evading creditors.”114 

Defendants fail to rebut Plaintiffs’ showing that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact relevant to Defendants’ UTPA counterclaim and that the counterclaim fails as a matter of 

law. First, as to Defendants’ original counterclaim premised on the condition of replacement 

parts for the engine repair, Defendants have produced no evidence (and made no argument) 

to counteract Plaintiffs’ showing that Defendants lack evidence to carry their ultimate burden 

108 Docket 148 at 21. 

109 Id. at 22. 

110 See Docket 163 at 9–12. 

111 Id. at 10–11. 

112 Id. at 11–12. 

113 Docket 171 at 13. 

114 Id. at 13–14 (emphasis omitted). 

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of persuasion for this counterclaim at trial.115

Second, to the extent that Defendants adequately alleged a UTPA counterclaim 

premised on the Liberty Note’s vessel registration requirement, the counterclaim lacks legal 

merit.116 The UTPA contains two sections: (1) one that defines specific acts or practices that 

constitute UTPA violations, and (2) a catchall that generally prohibits “[u]nfair methods of 

competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.”117

Regardless of which of these sections Defendants intend to rely on, the Court finds that 

Defendants’ alleged conduct in including the purportedly unlawful vessel registration term in 

the Liberty Note does not rise to the level of an unfair trade practice under Alaska law. 

Even assuming that Defendants could not legally have complied with the vessel 

registration term, the Court is unaware of any authority suggesting that the mere inclusion of 

an unenforceable term in a contract is sufficient to subject the drafter to UTPA liability.118 In 

analyzing UTPA claims, Alaska courts “focus on the unfairness of the disputed practice under 

the specific circumstances presented,” and may consider the following three factors: 

115 See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins., 210 F.3d at 1102–03. 

116 As Plaintiffs correctly note, Defendants did not indicate in the Countercomplaint that their UTPA 

counterclaim was based on the purported illegality of the Liberty Note’s vessel registration requirement. 

Rather, Defendants explicitly based their UTPA claim on Plaintiffs’ representation of the condition of 

the engine installed in Defendants’ skiff. See Docket 75 at 16–17, 29, ¶¶ 55–57, 113. By failing to 

identify any facts or specific statutory provisions pertaining to a UTPA counterclaim based on the 

vessel registration requirement, Defendants’ Countercomplaint failed to give Plaintiffs fair notice of 

what is now the sole basis for this counterclaim, even under the Federal Rules’ liberal notice pleading 

standard. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Glaser, 945 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure] 8’s liberal notice pleading standard . . . requires that the allegations in the 

complaint ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.’” (quoting Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006))); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement 

to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Although the Court 

will consider the merits of Defendants’ newly asserted UTPA counterclaim, it observes that “summary 

judgment is not a procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings.” Wasco Prods., Inc. v. 

Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 

20, 24 (1st Cir. 1990)). 

117 See AS 45.50.471(a)–(b); Kenai Chrysler Ctr., 167 P.3d at 1255. 

118 Defendants do not identify any facts beyond the inclusion of the purportedly unlawful registration 

requirement that bear on their UTPA counterclaim. 

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(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been

previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has

been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise

whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some

common-law, statutory, or other established concept of

unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or

unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to

consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).119

With this standard in mind, no reasonable factfinder could find a violation of the UTPA based 

solely on the vessel registration requirement. At most, the evidence suggests that the parties 

agreed on the terms of the Liberty loan and that Defendants later realized that they could not 

comply with the vessel registration term.120 But Defendants do not dispute that their failure to 

register the Vessel in Washington was not the sole or even the primary basis for their default 

on the Liberty loan. In short, no harm appears to have resulted from the term’s inclusion and 

the inclusion of the term itself was not an inherently unfair or deceptive act that might give rise 

to UTPA liability. 

The Court therefore recommends granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on 

Defendants’ UTPA counterclaim. 

D. The Court Declines to Reopen Discovery on the Existing Record or to

Deny Summary Judgment Based on the Curran Declaration.

Finally, the Court addresses the various discovery issues raised in Defendants’ brief in 

opposition to the Motion, as well as Defendants’ recently filed declaration by Melissa Curran. 

First, Defendants request that the Court reopen discovery so that they can 

gather (1) evidence pertaining to transfers of funds made between AGS and Liberty in 

connection with Defendants’ loans and (2) Plaintiffs’ internal communications regarding 

Haynes, Bryan Howey, and bait herring.121 The Court has already denied two motions by 

Defendants to reopen discovery. On April 18, 2024, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to 

119 ASRC Energy Servs. Power & Commc’ns, 267 P.3d at 1159 (quoting O'Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 

535); see also id. at 1164 (reaffirming use of these factors when evaluating UTPA claim). 

120 To the extent that the vessel registration term was unlawful, there is no apparent reason why 

Defendants could not have identified and raised this issue with Plaintiffs before agreeing on the final 

terms of the loan. 

121 Docket 163 at 14. 

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reopen discovery in this case, finding that Defendants had not diligently conducted discovery 

or shown good cause for their failure to do so.122 Observing that the parties’ filings left some 

uncertainty as to the status of fact discovery, the Court directed the parties to file a properly 

supported motion if they wished to take any additional fact discovery in this case.123

Defendants later filed such a motion, but the Court denied it on August 16, 2024, finding that 

reopening discovery was not appropriate for similar reasons as those underlying its previous 

order, including Defendants’ lack of diligence.124

Defendants’ briefing in opposition to the present Motion likewise fails to establish that 

the Court should broadly reopen fact discovery and delay ruling on the Motion. The Court’s 

previous findings concerning Defendants’ diligence in conducting discovery in this case apply 

with the same force here, and Defendants’ unspecific and unpersuasive discovery complaints 

do not warrant denial of or delay in ruling on the Motion. In addition, none of the evidence 

Defendants seek would affect the Court’s recommendations as set forth above.125 

Second, on May 15, 2024, Defendants filed a declaration by Melissa Curran, a former 

AGS employee, along with several attached exhibits.126 Defendants did not indicate that they 

wished this declaration to be considered with their opposition to the Motion. To the extent 

Defendants intend the declaration and exhibits to support their opposition to any of Plaintiffs’ 

122 Docket 175. 

123 Id. at 14. 

124 Docket 192. 

125 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 679 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming denial 

of Rule 56(d) motion to delay decision on summary judgment and permit additional discovery where 

moving party failed to show that “the information sought would . . . illuminate the determinative 

inquiry” on summary judgment). For example, Defendants ask for the opportunity to depose Moore 

and Grant, who were not identified in Plaintiffs’ final witness list, so that Defendants can determine 

“who at AGS supposedly asked Grant if Howey could fish herring for SSS.” Docket 163 at 3; see also

Docket 122. Although Plaintiffs offer no justification for their failure to identify Moore and Grant as 

witnesses, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i), (e), the information Defendants seek would not affect the 

Court’s disposition of Defendants’ intentional interference counterclaim. Cf. Edwards v. Permobil, Inc., 

No. CV 11-1900, 2013 WL 12230856, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 9, 2013) (denying motion to exclude two 

witnesses’ testimony where these witnesses were not identified on witness list, based in part on moving 

parties’ failure to show prejudice). To eliminate any risk of prejudice in other contexts, however, the 

Court will allow Defendants the opportunity to depose Moore or Grant before trial, if Defendants so 

wish. 

126 Docket 179. 

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pending motions for summary judgment, including the present Motion, these documents are 

late and Defendants did not file a motion asking the Court to accept the untimely filing.127 The 

Court has nevertheless reviewed the declaration and attached exhibits and has determined that 

these documents do not change the Court’s recommendations and reasoning for those 

recommendations. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor is appropriate as to 

Defendants’ intentional interference and UTPA counterclaims, but not as to Defendants’ 

conversion counterclaim. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment at Docket 148 be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and that 

the Seventh and Tenth Causes of Action in Defendants’ Countercomplaint at Docket 75 be 

DISMISSED. 

DATED this 16th day of August, 2024, at Anchorage, Alaska. 

s/ Kyle F. Reardon

KYLE F. REARDON 

United States Magistrate Judge 

District of Alaska 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a district court may designate a magistrate judge to hear 

and determine matters pending before the Court. For dispositive matters, a magistrate judge 

reports findings of fact and provides recommendations to the presiding district court judge.128

127 See L. Civ. R. 7.2(b)(1) (setting forth deadlines to file oppositions to summary judgment motions); 

7.3(j) (“A document may be filed after the time for filing has lapsed only by leave of the court.”). 

128 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 

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A district court judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge’s 

order.129 

A party may file written objections to the magistrate judge’s order within 14 fourteen 

days.130 Objections and responses are limited to five (5) pages in length and should not merely 

reargue positions previously presented. Rather, objections and responses should specifically 

identify the findings or recommendations objected to, the basis of the objection, and any legal 

authority in support. Reports and recommendations are not appealable orders. Any notice of 

appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court’s 

judgment.131 

129 Id. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

130 Id. 

131 See Hilliard v. Kincheloe, 796 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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