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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-3630 

MOLLY JOLL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

VALPARAISO COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. 

No. 2:16-cv-00338-JEM — John E. Martin, Magistrate Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 20, 2020 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Molly Joll is an accomplished runner and an experienced running coach. She applied for a job as the assistant coach of a high school girls’ 

cross-country team. The high school hired a younger man for 

the job but invited Joll to apply for the same position on the 

boys’ team. So she did—and the high school hired a younger 

man again. She filed this suit for sex and age discrimination. 

After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment 

Case: 18-3630 Document: 34 Filed: 03/20/2020 Pages: 46
2 No. 18-3630 

for the school district, concluding that Joll had not offered 

enough evidence of either form of discrimination to present 

to a jury. 

We reverse the dismissal of Joll’s sex discrimination claim. 

The district court appears to have erred by doing what we 

have repeatedly said a court should not: “asking whether any 

particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself,” rather 

than aggregating the evidence “to find an overall likelihood 

of discrimination.” Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 

760, 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). Joll offered evidence that would 

allow a reasonable jury to find that the school district used 

hiring procedures tilted in favor of the male applicants, applied sex-role stereotypes during the interview process, and 

manipulated the criteria for hiring in ways that were inconsistent except that they always favored the male applicants. A 

reasonable jury might also find no sex discrimination, but on 

this record, the decision belongs to a jury. 

I. Facts for Summary Judgment

We state the case in the light reasonably most favorable to 

Joll, giving her the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence, but without vouching 

for the objective truth of any fact or expressing any opinion 

on the weight of the evidence. Garofalo v. Village of Hazel Crest, 

754 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 2014); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 

F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Defendant Valparaiso Community Schools operates Valparaiso High School and Thomas Jefferson Middle School, 

two public schools in northwestern Indiana. Joll has been a 

teacher at the middle school for more than twenty-five years. 

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No. 18-3630 3

For twelve years, from 2005 to 2013, she co-coached the middle school boys’ and girls’ cross-country team. In 2013 she resigned the middle school coaching position to better support 

her two daughters in their high school and college running 

careers. “It wasn’t fair” to the cross-country program, as Joll 

thought and explained at the time, for her to divide her time 

between the program and her daughters.

By 2014 her older daughter’s running career had come to 

a close, so Joll again had the time to devote to coaching. Her 

old position at the middle school had been filled, but the high 

school was hiring an assistant coach for the girls’ cross-country team. On June 17, Joll sent letters of interest in the position 

to high school principal Reid Amones and high school athletic 

director Herb Hofer. That was “the normal process” for applying, according to Hofer.

At first Joll heard nothing back. Around the end of June, 

she emailed Hofer and enlisted the help of her union president and vice-president. Finally, on July 3, Joll received a text 

message from the girls’ head coach, Adam Nellessen, asking 

whether she would be available for an interview two days 

later, on July 5. Joll said she would be. While athletic director 

Hofer ordinarily would have conducted the interview with 

coach Nellessen, knee surgery prevented Hofer’s attendance 

on July 5. His place was taken by principal Amones. 

Normally, according to Hofer, interviewers would ask applicants “what their qualifications are,” “what experiences 

they have, what drew them to the job.” Joll has substantial experience both as a coach and as a runner herself. She ran crosscountry and track all four years of high school and attended 

Indiana State University, an NCAA Division I school, on a full 

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4 No. 18-3630 

athletic scholarship for both sports. After receiving her master’s degree in education, Joll spent about five years as the 

girls’ track coach at a junior high school in central Indiana, 

with a one-year stint as a volunteer track coach at a school in 

the United Kingdom as part of a Fulbright teachers’ exchange 

program. 

Joll then began her more than twenty years with Valparaiso Community Schools and its athletics programs. From 

1991 to 1995, Joll was the assistant girls’ track coach at Valparaiso High School; she was the co-coach of the girls’ track 

team at Thomas Jefferson Middle School from 1995 to 2005. 

For part of the same period, from 1994 to 2004, she was an 

assistant women’s and men’s cross-country coach at Valparaiso University, also a Division I school. Finally, as mentioned above, Joll co-coached the middle school’s cross-country team from 2005 until 2013, when her daughters’ athletic 

careers led her to resign that position. Throughout this period 

Joll also coached a local youth running club as a volunteer. 

There is no evidence, however, that this wealth of experience was discussed much during Joll’s July 5, 2014 interview 

with coach Nellessen and principal Amones for the position 

with the high school girls’ team. Rather, Joll fielded questions 

about resigning her middle school coaching position in 2013 

and whether her parenting duties would permit her to devote 

sufficient time to coaching at the high school. She was emphatic that they would. 

Given Joll’s 2013 resignation from the middle school 

coaching position, such questions might have seemed unremarkable. In this case, however, the only other applicant was 

John Arredondo, a forty-year-old man who was eventually 

hired for the position. Arredondo had also resigned a crossCase: 18-3630 Document: 34 Filed: 03/20/2020 Pages: 46
No. 18-3630 5

country coaching position in 2013 for family reasons. During 

his interview with Nellessen and Amones, however, Arredondo was not asked about his family life. He was asked instead about his “coaching experience, what my coaching philosophy is, a lot of shop talk.” In other words, the three men 

“talked shop.” Joll had to talk parenting. 

The differences in the high school’s hiring process did not 

end there. According to athletic director Hofer, the school’s 

ordinary course was to check an applicant’s references only 

after the decision had been made to recommend his hiring to 

the school board, the school district’s final decision-maker on 

personnel matters. That is how the school proceeded with Arredondo. Joll’s references, however, were contacted within 

days of her interview on July 5. 

The high school heard from at least three of Joll’s seven 

references. Two gave her unqualified recommendations, submitting lengthy narratives praising her as a “respected 

leader” and a “great role model.” Aaron Crague, head coach 

of the high school’s boys’ cross-country team, whom Joll had 

coached when he was a student-athlete at Valparaiso University, pointed to Joll’s “authentic knowledge gleaned” as a runner herself. He said “she would do a fine job collaborating 

with Coach Nellessen.” It had been Crague’s experience that 

Joll had “always done a great job supporting and complimenting [sic] the head coach.” 

A third reference was generally strong but less favorable 

on the latter point. Jim Polite, the middle school’s principal, 

opined in a brief, three-point email to Amones that Joll’s fitness to serve in a subordinate role “would be my only concern.” Joll, thought Polite, “has a dominate [sic] personality.” 

(The parties assume he meant “dominant personality.”) 

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Amones forwarded Polite’s email to Hofer with the one-sentence comment, “The 3rd one I got,” seemingly referring to 

the “dominate personality” comment, the third of Polite’s 

comments.

On July 18, Hofer called Joll to tell her the school had chosen Arredondo because he had “more current experience 

working with high school age athletes.” That was true as far 

as it went, despite Joll’s much more extensive experience as a 

coach and runner. Arredondo had coached the boys’ crosscountry team at a different high school outside the school district from 2008 to 2013. Joll had last professionally coached 

high schoolers in 1995. There is no evidence of how the difference between middle school and high school athletes or between high school and college athletes was material to the assistant coach position, and Polite saw “no reason” why Joll’s 

middle school experience “wouldn[’]t translate to the HS 

level.” 

In the meantime, Joll had learned that there would also be 

a not-yet-publicized opening for an assistant coach of the 

boys’ high school cross-country team. She told athletic director Hofer that she intended to apply for that position as well. 

Around the end of July, Joll received a message from Crague, 

the boys’ head coach, asking her to interview for the position 

on the boys’ team. 

The interview was conducted by athletic director Hofer 

and coach Crague. Again Joll was called on to convince her 

interviewers that she was willing to devote the necessary time 

to coaching, notwithstanding her family responsibilities. 

Again there is no evidence she was asked to “talk shop” with 

the two men interviewing her. Again Joll lost out to a younger 

man who was the only other applicant, a twenty-eight-yearCase: 18-3630 Document: 34 Filed: 03/20/2020 Pages: 46
No. 18-3630 7

old named Ben Kerezman. Again Joll’s references were handled differently than the successful applicant’s. Kerezman’s 

references were not checked at all because, according to Hofer, “he was a teacher within our system” (so was Joll) and 

because Hofer knew him personally (as Crague knew Joll personally; he had been a reference for her for the girls’ team job).

Unlike Arredondo, Kerezman did not have more recent 

professional experience coaching high school cross-country 

runners compared to Joll. But for this hiring decision, recency 

of professional experience with high school athletes was no 

longer the relevant criterion. Instead, Hofer told Joll at the 

time, Kerezman had been preferred because he had “better 

rapport with the boys.” Kerezman was a teacher at the high 

school and so, says the school district, “was familiar with 

many of the cross-country [team] members,” though there is 

otherwise no evidence of what Kerezman’s “rapport with the 

boys” was. 

There is also no evidence and no explanation why “rapport with the girls” did not assume similar importance in hiring the assistant for the girls’ team. That would have been bad 

for Arredondo and good for Joll: Arredondo was a teacher at 

an out-of-district high school whose only opportunity to build 

“rapport with the girls” had been a five-week stint as a volunteer coach on the girls’ team beginning June 2014, just before 

he was hired. Joll, on the other hand, had coached many of the 

high school runners, both boys and girls, as middle schoolers. 

As it turns out though, “rapport with the boys” may not 

actually have been all that relevant to Crague and Hofer’s decision about the boys’ team. Rather, Hofer later testified, the 

“only factors” considered in hiring the boys’ assistant were 

“being a teacher within the building, the HS building,” and 

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8 No. 18-3630 

“recent coaching experience in the high school ranks.” At least 

with respect to professional coaching (both Joll and Kerezman 

had recent volunteer experience with high school cross-country runners), the latter cannot be squared with the school district’s own account of Kerezman’s resume, nor with Hofer’s 

own statement that “coaching experience” was not considered in the hiring process “because we already decided from 

working in the building as being [sic] a very valuable thing for 

our program.” 

As for “being a teacher within the building,” as with “rapport,” there is no evidence or explanation why the putative 

single most important qualification for the boys’ assistant apparently played no role at all in hiring the girls’ assistant. 

Again that would have been bad for Arredondo and good for 

Joll. Though neither taught at the high school, Joll at least 

taught within the school district and as noted had already 

coached many of the high school runners as middle schoolers. 

In July 2016, Joll brought this suit against the school district in the Northern District of Indiana alleging violations of 

her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Magistrate Judge Martin 

heard and decided the case with the parties’ consent under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). After discovery, the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on both counts of 

the complaint and entered final judgment against Joll. After 

the court denied her motion to reconsider, Joll appealed. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

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No. 18-3630 9

II. Analysis 

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Garofalo v. Village of Hazel Crest, 754 F.3d 428, 430 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no 

genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Garofalo, 

754 F.3d at 430. The maxims of summary judgment are familiar—no weighing the evidence, no credibility determinations, 

draw all non-speculative inferences in favor of the nonmovant—but they are more easily recited than applied. Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hosp. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893–94 (7th 

Cir. 2018). They define the outer limits of Joll’s right to “the 

commonsense judgment of [her] community,” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975), and to the generous latitude the 

court accords it. We entrust a great deal to the jury’s human 

experience: that “strong drink strips the mind of its pretences 

and brings out into the open what is hidden in a man’s heart,” 

for example, United States v. Bloch, 718 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 

2013); that four days shackled to the wall of an interrogation 

room is unreasonable policing, Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 

F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 2006); that “a 16-year-old girl in the 

company of three adult men” is “the least likely of the four to 

be carrying ... heavy handguns.” County Court v. Allen, 442 

U.S. 140, 163–64 (1979). We allow a jury to infer a great deal 

without mathematical precision. Standard Oil Co. v. Van Etten, 

107 U.S. 325, 334 (1882). “It is always possible for ... logicians 

to examine what appears to be a reasonable inference and to 

show how that inference is actually the sum of several shorter 

inferential steps,” but it “would ignore common sense” to 

prohibit all inferences “except those which cannot be broken 

down any further.” United States v. An Article of Device, 731 

F.2d 1253, 1263 (7th Cir. 1984). In short, trials are stories, not 

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10 No. 18-3630 

syllogisms. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–89 

(1997). Accordingly, the court must try to focus on the most 

persuasive story possible on the non-movant’s behalf when 

asking whether a verdict in her favor would be reasonable or 

could result only from irrational speculation. 

Before answering that question here, however, we try to 

clear up some confusion that has so far affected the arguments 

in this case. 

A. Scope of Review 

When the school district moved for summary judgment, it 

addressed essentially the same arguments to both of Joll’s 

claims for sex and age discrimination, arguing that both 

claims were subject to the same standard and analysis and 

that both failed to satisfy the familiar standard, stemming 

from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Joll 

might have opposed the motion in part by pointing out that 

the McDonnell Douglas test is only one means, not an end in 

itself; that Title VII and ADEA causation standards are not always the same because of the availability of mixed-motive 

claims under Title VII but not the ADEA; and that determining whether one factor was causal demands a different factual 

analysis than determining whether a different factor was 

causal. 

That is not how Joll argued the case in the district court. 

Instead, her opposition picked up where the school district 

left off—without distinguishing between Title VII and the 

ADEA or between sex and age. She argued that evidence of 

sex stereotyping and pretextual justification presented triable 

issues under McDonnell Douglas, with one fleeting reference 

to “mixed-motives.” See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 

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No. 18-3630 11

167, 173–76 (2009) (Title VII allows “mixed-motive” claims, 

but with limited remedies, while ADEA requires plaintiff to 

prove “but-for” causation). 

On appeal, Joll has spent a good bit of energy arguing that 

the district court “improperly applied the outdated McDonnell Douglas framework to this mixed motive case of sexual 

[sic] discrimination.” This assertion is triply curious given 

Joll’s exclusive reliance on that same framework at summary 

judgment, its plaintiff-friendly operation in the ordinary case, 

and our recent reaffirmation of its continuing vitality. See 

Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766. In any event, Joll’s waivers “in the truest 

sense” here and in the district court, G & S Holdings LLC v. 

Cont’l Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2012), preclude our 

review of the ADEA claim at all and of the Title VII claim under a mixed-motive standard. We are left with her argument 

on appeal that a reasonable jury could find Joll would have 

been hired as an assistant cross-country coach if she were 

male “and everything else had remained the same.” Ortiz, 834 

F.3d at 764. On that score, we agree with Joll. 

B. Title VII

In general, Title VII prohibits intentional discrimination in 

employment on the basis of statutorily proscribed factors, including sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 

773 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2014); Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 

671–72 (7th Cir. 2008). In this case, as in many discrimination 

cases, “the sole question that matters” is causation: whether a 

statutorily proscribed factor caused a failure to hire. Ortiz v. 

Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764–65 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Direct as well as circumstantial evidence may support an inference of causation, and thus intent. Id. at 764; Troupe v. May 

Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994). “To clarify 

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12 No. 18-3630 

and to simplify” her task, a plaintiff may choose to enlist the 

burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. Coleman v. 

Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring); accord, Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766. 

“In order to make out a case of sex discrimination without 

resorting to McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must provide either 

direct or circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of 

intentional discrimination.” Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 

578 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). We have identified three 

broad types of circumstantial evidence that will support an 

inference of intentional discrimination: ambiguous or suggestive comments or conduct; better treatment of people similarly situated but for the protected characteristic; and dishonest employer justifications for disparate treatment. Troupe, 20 

F.3d at 736. Joll has offered some of each type. Taken together, 

her evidence would permit a reasonable jury to infer “an overall likelihood of discrimination” that merits a trial, not summary judgment. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 763. 

A jury could reasonably infer that athletic director Hofer 

and principal Amones simply did not want to hire a woman 

for either assistant coach position, and that they did what they 

could, short of admitting it, to ensure that the only woman 

applicant would not be hired. (Employers long ago “taught 

their supervisory employees not to put discriminatory beliefs 

or attitudes into words oral or written.” Troupe, 20 F.3d at 

736.) Looking at the evidence as a whole, as we must, a jury 

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No. 18-3630 13

could reasonably find that Hofer and Amones bent the rules 

in Arredondo and Kerezman’s favor and to Joll’s detriment.1

We can begin with differential treatment in the selection 

process itself. Joll had trouble simply securing an initial interview for the girls’ job, suggesting a baseline reluctance to entertain her candidacy. After the interview, her references were 

contacted sooner than was ordinary (with important consequences for her), while Arredondo’s were contacted later, as 

was usual, and Kerezman’s not at all—suggesting a higher 

baseline of scrutiny for Joll. 

1 We agree with the dissenting opinion that discrete adverse employment actions give rise to discrete claims that must be evaluated individually. Post at 32. The jury accordingly may find the school district liable for 

one, both, or neither of the two failures to hire alleged here. Nevertheless, 

the closeness in time and the similarity of the positions permit, indeed invite, a useful comparison between the two hiring processes in determining 

what inferences the evidence reasonably permits. 

As for the identity of the decisionmaker, see post at 32 n.2, the record 

permits the reasonable inference that Hofer and Amones made both hiring 

decisions, with Hofer as the more active partner. Though there is a bit of 

conflicting evidence on this point, some of which is pointed out below, 

according to the school district the hiring decision for the girls’ position 

“was made by” Nellessen, Hofer, and Amones; the hiring decision for the 

boys’ position “was made by” Hofer and Crague. While Amones filled in 

for Hofer at the interview for the girls’ position, it was usually Amones’s 

more limited role to approve and forward Hofer’s hiring recommendations to the school board. With respect to the head coach’s usual role, Hofer’s testimony that a head coach had “never” disagreed with his hiring 

recommendation suggests the decision was effectively Hofer’s, subject 

generally to Amones’s approval and, exceptionally in this case, his somewhat greater involvement in hiring the girls’ coach. 

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Evidence about the interviews does not require, but certainly permits, an inference that the decision-makers were indulging sex-role stereotypes as they approached the decisions. As Joll told the school district at the time, she resigned 

the middle school position in 2013 precisely from a desire not 

to give the program less than its due. Yet her 2014 declaration 

of full commitment to coaching was met with skepticism and 

discounted. Job interviewers are of course entitled to probe 

applications in relevant ways, and they are not required to 

take an applicant’s answers at face value. Those questions by 

themselves would not necessarily show bias. But the telling 

twist in this case is that, although family matters had recently 

prompted his resignation from a similar position, Arredondo’s commitment was not questioned. He “talked shop,” 

not kids, with the interviewers. 

Basing an employment decision on an employer’s notions 

of how women do or ought to behave—the employer’s sexrole stereotypes—is discrimination “because of sex.” See 

Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345–47 (7th 

Cir. 2017) (en banc), discussing among others Price Waterhouse 

v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The notion that a woman is or 

ought to be dedicated to family above work is one long-standing such stereotype. Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 

U.S. 721, 731, 736 (2003) (holding FMLA family leave provision validly abrogated state sovereign immunity: “pervasive 

sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is 

women’s work,” in turn “foster[ing] employers’ stereotypical 

views about women’s commitment to work and their value as 

employees”). 

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No. 18-3630 15

A jury could find that the interviewers’ questions, at least 

when they were asked only of Joll and not of a similarly situated male applicant, reflected such stereotyping. See Lust v. 

Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (sustaining jury 

verdict for plaintiff: “Most important, Penters admitted that 

he didn’t consider recommending Lust for the Chicago position because she had children and he didn’t think she’d want 

to relocate her family, though she hadn’t told him that.”); 

Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 362 (7th Cir. 1991) 

(reversing jury verdict on other grounds, but acknowledging: 

“The fact that Pyle asked only Bruno family-oriented questions reveals that those questions were based on sex stereotypes—namely, that females are the primary care providers 

for children ... .”); id. at 365 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“paternalistic questions” about husband’s views of job application and plans to have additional children supported inference of sex discrimination so that verdict should have been 

upheld). 

As noted, Joll’s references were contacted more quickly 

than usual. A jury could find that this deviation from standard procedures also lends support to her claims. See, e.g., 

Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 664 (7th Cir. 2017) (reversing summary judgment); Coleman, 667 F.3d at 858 (reversing 

summary judgment; explaining that selective enforcement of 

company policy can establish pretext); Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 891–92 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); see also 

United States ex rel. Hamrick v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 814 F.3d 

10, 22 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[D]eviations from standard procedures 

can give rise to an inference of pretext.”) (quotations omitted); 

Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992) 

(affirming jury verdict for age-discrimination plaintiff where 

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employer fired him without following its standard procedures, including helping employees overcome deficiencies), 

citing among others Johnson v. Lehman, 679 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. 

Cir. 1982) (“departure from internal hiring procedures is a factor that the trier of fact may deem probative”). 

With respect to the references, a jury could find further evidence that the school district strained to reject Joll’s applications based on sex-role stereotypes. The decision-makers discounted the two long and positive narratives from a runner 

coached by Joll and from Crague, the head coach of the high 

school boys’ team (whose opinion, recall, was that Joll had 

“always done a great job supporting and complimenting [sic] 

the head coach”), in favor of middle school principal Polite’s 

isolated comment that Joll has a “dominate personality.” 

A jury could think that Polite’s phrase was an odd way to 

say “insubordinate,” if that was what was understood. Indeed, at the risk of indulging in some other stereotypes, it’s 

easy to think that a dominant personality is often viewed as a 

virtue of at least male athletic coaches. The point is not that the 

school district hired “dominant” male coaches but not “dominant” female coaches. The point is that a jury could draw on 

its experience to conclude that the same behavior may be labeled “assertive” in a man and “aggressive” in a woman. In 

other words, a reasonable jury could conclude that Joll was 

being penalized for transgressing the age-old stereotype that 

women are or ought to be submissive. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 

250 (plurality) (“[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not 

be, has acted on the basis of gender.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 

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(“Such stereotypes include, for example, ... that women are 

less capable of aggressive salesmanship.”).2 

A jury could infer further that the signal was received immediately by principal Amones and athletic director Hofer 

(“The 3rd one I got.”) and operated so powerfully that it overrode the contrary opinion of coach Crague (who would have 

been the one to deal with any insubordination or “domination” by Joll, at least on the boys’ team) and even the more 

complete and balanced opinion of Polite, which was that if Joll 

“already has a good relationship with the head coach,” as she 

did with Crague, “it would probably be fine.” Of course, we 

agree with the dissenting opinion that a jury could reasonably 

conclude that what we have characterized as evidence of sexstereotyping was in fact entirely innocent conduct. Some ambiguity inheres in all employer remarks that fall short of admitting discrimination while still supporting an inference of 

it. This ambiguity is the very reason the jury must be called. 

Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044–45 (7th Cir. 1999) 

(affirming plaintiff’s verdict for pregnancy discrimination; 

jury was not required to accept proffered innocent interpretation of remarks that could also be understood as reflecting 

sex-role stereotypes).

The evidence reviewed so far is sufficient to warrant a 

trial, but there is more support from comparing the hiring criteria for the boys’ and girls’ team jobs. The defendant’s stated 

2 In the district court and on appeal, the parties have argued a good 

deal about Joll’s proffered expert on implicit bias, but mutatis mutandis “[i]t 

takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an 

aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a course at charm school.’” Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 256 (plurality). 

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reasons for hiring for these nearly identical jobs were inconsistent with each other. What was consistent was that, in each 

case, the stated reasons and criteria favored the male applicant. From the shifting criteria that favored the male applicants, a jury could infer that the different stated reasons were 

not honest and were pretexts for sex discrimination. 

When the male applicant for the girls’ job (Arredondo) 

had more recent experience than Joll professionally coaching 

high school cross country (though much less experience overall), the school district said that was the controlling factor. 

When the male applicant (Kerezman) was “in the building” 

during the school day with the opportunity to build “rapport 

with the boys,” that became the controlling factor instead. 

Joll’s long presence in the middle school and in the school system with opportunity to build “rapport with the girls” was 

not considered in her favor vis-à-vis Arredondo. Her more extensive and apparently more recent professional experience 

coaching high schoolers was not considered in her favor visà-vis Kerezman. Further, Polite’s opinion, given such weight 

as to Joll’s “dominate personality,” was apparently given no 

weight at all as to the transferability of Joll’s middle school 

experience to the high school setting. These inconsistent 

choices of criteria for nearly identical jobs are not necessarily 

decisive in Joll’s favor, but they could certainly support a 

jury’s inference that the real reasons for the decisions were 

based on sex. 

Employment discrimination law has long recognized that 

an employer’s dishonest explanation of a decision can support an inference that its real reason was unlawful. If the jury 

does “not believe the employer’s explanation for its decisions, 

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No. 18-3630 19

it may infer that the employer is trying to cover up ... discrimination,” Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994), 

“particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of 

mendacity.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 

(1993). See generally McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–05 

(suggesting types of evidence that would support finding of 

pretext). In other words, the jury may infer that “the real reason was a forbidden one.” Testerman v. EDS Tech. Prods. Corp., 

98 F.3d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736. 

Again, however, we emphasize that Joll does not rest her case 

on pretext alone. A plaintiff is required to show pretext when 

her only other evidence of discrimination is the prima facie 

McDonnell Douglas showing. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare 

Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123–24 (7th Cir. 1994). Where the plaintiff

does not rely solely on McDonnell Douglas, she may survive 

summary judgment even without evidence that the employer’s explanation is dishonest. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 

F.3d 956, 974 (7th Cir. 1997). 

A further indicator of less than perfect forthrightness is 

Hofer’s fluctuating accounts of his involvement in hiring the 

girls’ coach. See, e.g., Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 

285, 291 (7th Cir. 1999) (reversing summary judgment for employer); E.E.O.C. v. C.G. Schmidt, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 858, 869 

(E.D. Wis. 2009) (denying summary judgment: “CGS has 

shifted their story on who was involved in the decision to lay 

off Jackson, providing some evidence, albeit not very strong 

evidence on its own, that retaliation occurred.”). In his deposition, Hofer testified that “Dr. Amones and the head coach 

Adam Nellessen made that decision.” In his affidavit, he testified: “The decision as to which candidate to recommend for 

the position was made by all three of us,” that is, Hofer, 

Amones, and Nellessen. 

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20 No. 18-3630 

Another indicator of pretext are the shifts in relevant qualifications outlined above, with their consistent operation in 

the men’s favor, both as between the girls’ and boys’ positions 

and as between the event and the litigation. See, e.g., Stalter, 

195 F.3d at 291 (“Stalter presents one more piece of persuasive 

evidence, and that is that Wal-Mart changed its story between 

the time of the state administrative proceeding and the federal 

action.”), citing Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chi., 95 F.3d 

627, 634 (7th Cir. 1996), and Perfetti v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 

950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1991). We have said time and again 

(in more than one hundred reported opinions, by our count) 

that we are not a super-personnel department that will substitute our criteria for an employer’s for hiring, promoting, or 

disciplining employees. See, e.g., Grant v. Trustees of Indiana 

Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 570 (7th Cir. 2017); Dale v. Chicago Tribune 

Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986). That hesitation and the 

often subjective character of many employment decisions can 

make it difficult for a lone plaintiff to show that a single employment decision was made for unlawful reasons. But inconsistent explanations, especially from the same decision-makers about similar decisions near the same time, can support an 

inference of unlawful intent. 

We conclude with a few observations on the district 

court’s analysis. First, as a general matter it cannot be emphasized too strongly: “Evidence must be considered as a whole, 

rather than asking whether any particular piece of evidence 

proves the case by itself ... . Evidence is evidence. Relevant 

evidence must be considered and irrelevant evidence disregarded,” and the case must be assessed for an “overall likelihood of discrimination.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765, 763. 

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No. 18-3630 21

More specifically, the district court quoted our opinion in 

Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1180–81 (7th Cir. 2002): 

“where an employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason 

for its employment decision is that it selected the most qualified candidate, evidence of the applicants’ competing qualifications does not constitute evidence of pretext unless ... no 

reasonable person ... could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question” (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We have tried to make clear that the Millbrook rule applies 

only where “the plaintiff relies exclusively on evidence of the 

applicants’ comparative qualifications.” David v. Caterpillar, 

Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added); see 

also, e.g., Robertson v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 

F.3d 371, 381 (7th Cir. 2020) (“the plaintiff’s qualifications 

alone do not establish evidence of pretext”). This is not such 

a case. Joll has presented much more evidence beyond the 

comparison of qualifications. And again, Joll would be required to show pretext only if she were proceeding under 

McDonnell Douglas and had no evidence of discrimination beyond her prima facie case. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123–24. 

Second, in response to Joll’s evidence of the shifting criteria for the two hiring decisions, the district court cited two 

non-precedential orders of this court for the proposition that 

no inference of discrimination arises where the successful applicant turns out to have self-evidently better or broader qualifications that merely happened not to be listed in the initial 

job solicitation. Tai v. Shinseki, 325 F. App’x 444, 447 (7th Cir. 

2009) (chosen applicant had “a more diverse range of experiences and showed more enthusiasm”); Currie v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 202 F. App’x 120, 122 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Ropson 

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22 No. 18-3630 

claimed in his application that he could operate both a jig bore 

and a boring bar.”) These non-precedential orders are—well, 

non-precedential. On the relevant point of comparative qualifications, however, both orders quoted Mlynczak v. Bodman, 

442 F.3d 1050, 1059 (7th Cir. 2006), which in turn quoted 

Millbrook. In Millbrook, as noted, the comparative qualifications were the plaintiff’s only evidence of unlawful motive in 

addition to the prima facie case. Again, that does not describe 

the facts of this case; evidence of Joll’s stronger qualifications 

is only part of her evidence of sex discrimination. Neither of 

the cited non-precedential orders involved inconsistent 

changes in hiring criteria that had the effect of favoring one 

sex or race over another across multiple decisions. 

Finally, the district court also erred to the extent it dismissed Joll’s evidence of sex-role stereotyping as mere “stray 

remarks” that were not probative of unlawful intent in the hiring decision. The “stray remarks” rationale can be applied 

only to remarks that are not part of the decision-making process itself. See, e.g., Overly v. KeyBank, N.A., 662 F.3d 856, 865 

(7th Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment where highly 

offensive remark was made after plaintiff resigned); Davis v. 

Time Warner Cable of Southeastern Wis., L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 672–

73 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 

649, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2000) (warning against over-reading 

“stray-remarks” cases: “All that these cases hold—all that they 

could hold and still make any sense—is that the fact that 

someone who is not involved in the employment decision of 

which the plaintiff complains expressed discriminatory feelings is not evidence that the decision had a discriminatory motivation.”). But Joll’s evidence comes from the decision-makers during the decision process. 

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No. 18-3630 23

In considering a defendant’s attempt to neuter a sexist or 

racist comment as a stray remark, a court deciding a summary 

judgment motion must keep in mind its duty to consider the 

evidence as a whole and to do so in the light reasonably most 

favorable to the non-moving party. A remark or action by a 

decision-maker reflecting unlawful animus may be evidence 

of his or her attitudes more generally. See Emmel, 95 F.3d at 

632 (“Emmel does not rely on these remarks alone to prove 

anything. The remarks are evidence, which together with the 

other evidence in this case could lead a jury to conclude ... 

that the company engaged in unlawful discrimination... . 

[T]he statements in question are more than just stray comments ... . They are from the top policymakers in the company 

... . They directly address the policy at issue ... .”), discussing 

Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 820 (7th 

Cir. 2012) (“same actor” inference permits but does not require inference that attitudes of person who hired plaintiff, for 

example, would not have changed by time same person fired 

plaintiff). Similarly, the district court strayed outside the 

bounds of summary judgment practice by accepting that the 

“dominate personality” comment spoke simply and innocently to the employer’s nondiscriminatory interest in “personality fit” and could not support an inference of discrimination. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 256 (plurality) (“[I]f an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a 

soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn 

the criticism.”). 

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24 No. 18-3630 

Conclusion 

We recognize, of course, that there are ways to tell the 

story of the school district’s hiring process and decision that 

are entirely innocent, involving no unlawful discrimination. 

The dissenting opinion illustrates several ways the defense 

could argue this case to a jury. But because there is at least one

reasonable way to tell the story in favor of Joll’s claim of sex 

discrimination, a jury rather than appellate judges must 

choose among them. 

The grant of summary judgment for the defendant on 

Joll’s age discrimination claim is AFFIRMED. The grant of 

summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim is 

REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for trial on that 

claim. 

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18-3630 25 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. In response to a motion 

for summary judgment, “the non-moving party is required 

to marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 

621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, the question is whether Ms. Joll came forth with sufficient evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could conclude that VCS failed to hire her 

for the girls’ assistant cross-country position or for the boys’ 

assistant cross-country position because she was a woman. 

Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2016). 

On an appeal from the grant of summary judgment, we 

view the record as a whole “and all justifiable inferences 

drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party against 

whom judgment was entered,” here Ms. Joll. Cheek v. W. & S. 

Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Life Plans, 

Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 343, 349 (7th Cir. 

2015). “[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting 

the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, 

at least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 

U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, we have not “interpret[ed] the quoted language so 

broadly as to require a court to ignore the uncontroverted 

testimony of company employees or to conclude, where a 

proffered reason is established through such testimony, that 

it is necessarily pretextual.” Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 

791 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Based on a review of the entire record, I do not believe 

Ms. Joll has come forward with evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that, had she been male, she 

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26 No. 18-3630 

would have been awarded either of the positions for which 

she applied. I therefore respectfully dissent. 

I 

Ms. Joll has coached cross country and track for many 

years and has a long tenure of coaching in Valparaiso. From 

1991 to 1995, she was the assistant girls’ track coach at Valparaiso High School (“VHS”). Beginning in 1994 and continuing through 2004, she was the assistant men’s and women’s 

cross-country coach at Valparaiso University. During the 

same relative time frame (1995 to 2005), she co-coached track 

and field at Thomas Jefferson Middle School in Valparaiso; 

and from 2005 to 2013, she co-coached cross country at 

Thomas Jefferson Middle School. Ms. Joll described her 

coaching responsibilities at Thomas Jefferson Middle School 

accordingly: “The way the middle school program works, ... 

we were both equal coaches and it’s not girls and boys. It’s a 

combined program at the middle school.” R.24-1 at 4 (Joll 

Dep. 12). 

In 2013, Ms. Joll resigned her coaching position so that 

she could travel with and watch both of her daughters compete in cross country and track. At that point, one daughter 

was running at Indiana State University, and one was running at VHS. Ms. Joll felt that the other coach at Thomas Jefferson Middle School “needed somebody who was more 

dedicated at that point in time to coaching.” Id. at 5 (Joll Dep. 

16). In her resignation letter, she told the principal of Thomas Jefferson Middle School, Jim Polite, that she felt that 

“couldn’t devote ... [a] sufficient amount of time to ... adequately do the job.” Id. (Joll Dep. 17). 

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No. 18-3630 27

A. Girls’ Cross-Country Position 

In 2014, Ms. Joll’s older daughter stopped running at Indiana State, and Ms. Joll wanted to coach again. On approximately June 17 of that year, Ms. Joll applied for a position as 

an assistant coach with the VHS girls’ cross-country team. 

See id. at 7 (Joll Dep. 22–23). 

In 2014, VHS did not have a “written hiring procedure 

for coaches.” R.29-4 at 2 (Hofer Dep. 9). Herb Hofer, who 

was Athletic Director of VHS at the time, explained he had a 

“typical ... process” that he “use[d] as an AD” for the hiring 

of assistant coaches. Id. at 5 (Hofer Dep. 12). His “normal 

process for hiring assistant coaches” began when the position was posted on the school system’s website. Id. Resumes 

would come either to him or to the VHS Principal, Dr. Reid 

Amones. Mr. Hofer and the head coach then would review 

the candidates and decide whom to interview. Mr. Hofer 

and the head coach would conduct the interviews and come 

to a consensus as to the best candidate for the position. See 

id. Mr. Hofer contacted a candidate’s references after he and 

the head coach had made a hiring decision, but prior to 

bringing the matter before the school board. Id. at 10 (Hofer 

Dep. 32). 

It is undisputed that Mr. Hofer, the person who usually 

oversaw the hiring process for assistant coaches, “was having knee surgery” at the time the interviews and deliberations for the girls’ assistant cross-country coaching position 

were occurring. Id. at 5 (Hofer Dep. 12); id. at 14–15 (Hofer 

Dep. 36–37). Indeed, Ms. Joll emailed Mr. Hofer “towards 

the end of June” to determine when interviews would be 

held, and Mr. Hofer responded that “they were going to be 

doing it that next week, but he had knee surgery and so he 

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28 No. 18-3630 

was recovering from that.” R.24-1 at 7 (Joll Dep. 23). Instead, 

Dr. Amones and the girls’ cross-country head coach, Adam 

Nellessen, conducted the review of candidates, interviews, 

and follow-up. The following week, Coach Nellessen contacted Ms. Joll to ascertain if she would be available for an 

interview on July 5th. 

Ms. Joll’s interview lasted “[m]ore than half [of an] hour, 

but less than an hour.” Id. (Joll Dep. 24). During her interview, she was asked “[w]hy [she] was ... applying when 

[she] had resigned? What had changed?” Id. (Joll Dep. 25). 

Ms. Joll explained that one of her daughters was no longer 

running at the collegiate level and so she “didn’t feel pulled 

to go and see her compete.” Id. at 8 (Joll Dep. 26). She also 

was asked how being the parent of one of the athletes might 

affect her ability to coach the rest of the team. See id. (Joll 

Dep. 28–29). 

Following the interview, Ms. Joll was asked to provide 

references, and Dr. Amones contacted those references. 

Ms. Joll received favorable recommendations from several 

individuals, including Jim Polite, the principal of Thomas 

Jefferson Middle School, where Ms. Joll taught and where 

she had coached for eighteen years. In emailing Polite, 

Dr. Amones specifically inquired whether Ms. Joll had any 

“past roles serving as an assistant, or other times she has not 

been the one making the final decision.” R.29-6 at 5. Polite 

responded that “[t]his area would be my only concern. She 

has a dominate [sic] personality. If she ... already has a good 

relationship with the head coach, it would probably be fine. 

If not, I could envision some issues arising.” Id. 

There was one other applicant interviewed for this position: John Arredondo. From 2008 to 2014, Arredondo 

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No. 18-3630 29

coached in the boys’ cross-country and girls’ track programs 

at Portage High School.1 From 2008 to 2013, he also coached 

boys’ cross country at Portage High School. He testified that 

he had resigned his positions because he was going through 

a divorce; the record does not reveal whether, in his resignation letter, Arredondo provided a reason for his departure. 

 In the summer of 2014, Arredondo began volunteering 

as a girls’ cross-country coach with VHS. When a paid position came open, Coach Nellessen suggested to Arredondo 

that he should apply. Arredondo testified that, during his 

interview, he was asked about “[c]oaching experience, what 

[his] coaching philosophy is, a lot of shop talk.” R.29-3 at 15 

(Arredondo Dep. 37). Arredondo also was asked about 

whether commuting from Portage to VHS would be a problem. Id. at 16 (Arredondo Dep. 38). There is no evidence in 

the record—or at least none to which Ms. Joll has invited our 

attention—that Arredondo gave Portage High School a specific reason, much less a specific family-related reason, for 

resigning his coaching position. There also is no evidence in 

the record that Arredondo made Coach Nellessen or 

Dr. Amones aware of the reason he had resigned his position 

at Portage. During Arredondo’s deposition, Ms. Joll’s coun1 It is unclear whether Arredondo had head coaching experience. 

Ms. Joll states in her brief that he was the assistant in these positions, but 

that he served one year as head coach of girls’ track in 2010. See Appellant’s Br. 10. In support of this statement, Ms. Joll cites to Arredondo’s 

deposition, see R.29-3 at 2 (Arredondo Dep. 5), and to his resume. However, Arredondo’s resume is not part of the record. In his deposition, 

Arredondo simply states that he “coach[ed]” girls’ track and field and 

boys’ cross country, but he does not specify (at least on the page referenced) whether he served in a head coaching role. Id. 

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30 No. 18-3630 

sel did not ask Arredondo whether he had informed 

Coach Nellessen or Dr. Amones of the reason that he had 

resigned his position. Moreover, Ms. Joll’s counsel did not 

ask Arredondo whether during his interview he was questioned about familial obligations that might interfere coaching responsibilities. Ms. Joll’s counsel simply asked Arredondo to characterize the “type of questions” he was asked 

during his interview. R.29-3 at 15 (Arredondo Dep. 37). Her 

counsel’s only follow-up question regarding what Arredondo was asked during his interview was: “Did they ever ask 

you if the commute would be an issue from Portage to Valparaiso?” Id. at 16 (Arredondo Dep. 38). 

The decision was made by Coach Nellessen, Dr. Amones, 

and Mr. Hofer to hire Arredondo. In his call explaining the 

hiring decision to Ms. Joll, Mr. Hofer stated that Arredondo 

had “more current experience working with high school age 

athletes.” R.29-6 at 7. In his deposition and affidavit, Mr. Hofer testified that Polite’s statement also caused them pause as 

to whether Ms. Joll could serve in the capacity of an assistant, as opposed to head coach. See R.29-1 at 4 (Hofer Aff. 2); 

R.24-2 at 7 (Hofer Dep. 31). 

After the decision was made to hire Arredondo, 

Mr. Hofer checked Arredondo’s references in preparation 

for proposing his appointment to the board. See R.29-4 at 14 

(Hofer Dep. 36). 

B. Boys’ Cross-Country Position 

After Ms. Joll was unsuccessful in obtaining the girls’ 

coaching position, she applied for a position as the assistant 

boys’ cross-country coach at VHS. She was interviewed for 

the position by the head coach of the boys’ cross-country 

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No. 18-3630 31

team, Aaron Crague, as well as Mr. Hofer. Ms. Joll again was 

asked about the reason she had resigned the position of 

cross-country coach at Thomas Jefferson Middle School. See

R.24-1 at 13 (Joll Dep. 70). The other candidate for the position was Ben Kerezman. Kerezman was a teacher at VHS, 

had volunteered with the boys’ cross-country team and had 

served as an assistant coach for the VHS boys’ track team. 

Mr. Hofer and Coach Crague collectively decided to hire Kerezman for the assistant coaching position. 

Mr. Hofer informed Ms. Joll that she did not receive the 

job because Kerezman had better rapport with the boys on 

the team. See id. (Joll Dep. 72). In his affidavit, Mr. Hofer explained that this rapport stemmed from Kerezman’s volunteering with the cross-country team and from his serving as 

a high school teacher in the same building where the team 

members went to school. R.29-1 at 5 (Hofer Aff. 3). According to Mr. Hofer, he and Coach Crague believed that Kerezman’s service on the faculty was “an advantage to building, 

developing and maintaining the necessary relationship with 

high school athletes.” Id. 

Unlike with Arredondo, Mr. Hofer did not check any references for Kerezman. R.29-4 at 17 (Hofer Dep. 49). 

Mr. Hofer explained that Kerezman’s references were not 

checked because “he was a teacher at the high school,” he 

had coached with the cross-country team on a voluntary basis, had been “a paid assistant for our track [program],” and 

Mr. Hofer “personally kn[e]w him as a coach.” Id. 

II 

Ms. Joll contends, and my colleagues conclude, that she 

has come forward with sufficient evidence from which a jury 

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32 No. 18-3630 

reasonably could conclude that her gender was the reason 

that she did not get either position at VHS. In doing so, they 

treat her unsuccessful applications for the girls’ 

cross-country position and for the boys’ cross-country position as a single determination. A “refusal to hire,” however, 

is a “[d]iscrete act,” and “[e]ach incident of discrimination ... 

constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, we must evaluate 

independently each of Ms. Joll’s failure-to-hire claims to determine whether a statutory violation has occurred. Ford v. 

Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 942 F.3d 839, 858–59 (7th Cir. 

2019) (evaluating each of the plaintiff’s four failure-to-promote claims, which involved positions open between March 2016 and February 2017, independently).2

A. Girls’ Cross-Country Position 

My colleagues conclude that, taken collectively, the evidence of sex-stereotyping, deviation from established procedure, changing rationales, and disparity in qualifications 

raise an inference of discriminatory intent. I evaluate each 

category of evidence individually and then consider them 

collectively. 

2 Even if it were not the established rule that we evaluate each failure to 

hire independently, here the facts would warrant such an approach. Although the positions at issue were similar, there were a different set of 

decisionmakers for each position, there were a different set of candidates 

for each position, and, given Mr. Hofer’s knee surgery, there also was a 

different process that governed each decision.

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No. 18-3630 33

1. 

In Ms. Joll’s view, the strongest argument that her gender 

played a role in the decision-making process for the girls’ 

cross-country position was VCS’s reliance on sexstereotypes. According to my colleagues, there is evidence of 

sex-stereotyping both in the way the interviews were conducted and in Polite’s use of the term “dominant” to describe Ms. Joll. 

Turning first to the interview process, my colleagues note 

that the questions asked of Ms. Joll “would not necessarily 

show bias.” Maj. at 14. The problem as they see it is that, 

“although family matters had recently prompted his resignation from a similar position, Arredondo’s commitment was 

not questioned. He ‘talked shop,’ not kids, with the interviewers.” Id. However, there is no evidence in the record 

that Coach Nellessen or Dr. Amones knew of the reason for 

Arredondo’s resignation. Arredondo’s deposition does not 

reveal what he said in his resignation letter, if that letter was 

provided to Coach Nellessen or Dr. Amones, or if Arredondo informed Coach Nellessen or Dr. Amones about the reason for his resignation. By contrast, Coach Nellessen and 

Dr. Amones were aware of Ms. Joll’s specific reason for resigning: she wanted to be able to attend her daughters’ 

meets. Any focus on “kids” in the interview was prompted 

by Ms. Joll’s resignation letter and does not raise an inference of discrimination. 

My colleagues also agree with Ms. Joll that Polite’s email, 

describing Ms. Joll as having a dominant personality, constituted sex-stereotyping that infected the decision-making 

process. There is no question Polite’s evaluation of Ms. Joll 

was at least a factor in the decision-making process. Given 

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34 No. 18-3630 

that Polite had directly supervised Ms. Joll at Thomas Jefferson Middle School (where Ms. Joll worked as a teacher and 

had coached for eighteen years), it is not surprising that Polite’s comments carried weight with Coach Nellessen and 

Dr. Amones not matched by her other recommenders. 

Polite’s comments, however, do not fall into the category 

of “sex-stereotyping,” at least as that term traditionally has 

been understood. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 

(1989), the Court held that the practice of gender stereotyping falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. In Hopkins, a female employee sued Price Waterhouse 

for discrimination when she was not elected as a partner. In 

assessing comments made by partners who evaluated Hopkins, the Court noted that there 

were clear signs ... that some of the partners 

reacted negatively to Hopkins’ personality because she was a woman. One partner described 

her as “macho”; another suggested that she 

“overcompensated for being a woman”; a third 

advised her to take “a course at charm school.” 

Several partners criticized her use of profanity; 

in response, one partner suggested that those 

partners objected to her swearing only “because it’s a lady using foul language.” Another 

supporter explained that Hopkins “ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr 

candidate.” But it was the man who ... bore responsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board’s decision to place 

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No. 18-3630 35

her candidacy on hold who delivered the coup 

de grace: in order to improve her chances for 

partnership, Thomas Beyer advised, Hopkins 

should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 

have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”

Id. at 235 (internal citations omitted). The Court observed 

that “[i]t [took] no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a course at charm school,’” nor “to know that, if an 

employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by 

a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the 

employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has 

drawn the criticism.” Id. at 256. 

As Hopkins and our later cases make clear, it is an individual’s failure to meet social preconceptions about what is 

“male” or “female” that raises the inference of discrimination. There must be, therefore, some evidence of “preconception.” In Hopkins, as already described, the Court relied on 

overt references to male and female stereotypes. Gender-neutral remarks also might reflect sex-stereotyping, but 

there has to be some evidence that those gender-neutral 

comments reflect preconceptions of how men and women 

should conduct themselves. For instance, in Bellaver v. 

Quanex, 200 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2000), a woman employee was 

disciplined and eventually let go due to her lack of interpersonal skills. We observed that, 

[w]hile it is permissible to evaluate an employee’s interpersonal skills when those skills are 

relevant to the job, evaluations may demonstrate discriminatory intent when employees 

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36 No. 18-3630 

are evaluated on how their interpersonal skills 

match stereotyped, unequal ideas of how men 

and women should behave. ... 

As in Price Waterhouse, the evidence suggests the employer here may have relied on 

impermissible stereotypes of how women 

should behave. Bellaver’s evaluations are 

marred only by the repeated references to her 

interpersonal skills, but these same types of deficiencies seemed to be tolerated in male employees. 

Id. at 492. 

Here, there is no evidence to suggest that Polite’s assessment of Ms. Joll’s personality was based on a preconceived 

notion of how women should behave. Polite was Ms. Joll’s 

direct supervisor at Thomas Jefferson Middle School. He had 

firsthand knowledge of how Ms. Joll interacted with others 

and, specifically, with a supervisor. He provided his assessment in response to a direct question of how Ms. Joll might 

handle being in the role of an assistant, as opposed to being 

in charge of a sports program. Thus, his assessment, based 

on his experience supervising Ms. Joll, spoke directly to a 

quality that would bear on her ability to perform the job for 

which she was being considered. Polite’s use of a linguistically accurate word to describe a job-related trait of Ms. Joll 

does not constitute sex-stereotyping. Indeed, it is difficult to 

conceive of how Polite might have voiced his legitimate concerns without running afoul of the majority’s conception of 

sex-stereotyping. The majority, it would seem, would find it 

equally troubling if Polite had described Ms. Joll as used to 

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No. 18-3630 37

being in charge, accustomed to running a program her own 

way, or not used to being in a subordinate position. 

There also is no evidence in the record that this quality—

a need or desire to be “in charge”—was tolerated in the male 

candidate for the job. My colleagues explain that “it’s easy to 

think that a dominant personality is often viewed as a virtue

of at least male athletic coaches.” Maj. at 16. But there is no 

evidence in the record that Coach Nellessen, Dr. Amones, or 

Mr. Hofer believed this to be the case—especially with respect to professional relationships with other members of 

the coaching staff. Inferences based on speculation and conjecture cannot be used to defeat a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Lavite v. Dunstan, 932 F.3d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 

2019). Additionally, the record does not support (or even 

suggest) that Arredondo, the successful candidate, had a 

“dominant” personality. Indeed, it appears that the wealth 

of his experience was as an assistant coach.

3 Because he had 

not spent significant time in charge of his own program, 

there was no need to question whether he easily could step 

into an “assistant” position. 

At bottom, the comment from Polite is not the kind of 

sex-stereotyping condemned in Price Waterhouse where an 

employment decision was based on the plaintiff’s failure to 

conform to the partners’ view of how a woman should act. 

Instead, Polite’s reference spoke directly to whether Ms. Joll, 

who had been a head coach for several years, could play a 

successful supporting role in someone else’s program. 

3 See supra note 1. 

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38 No. 18-3630 

2. 

Ms. Joll also asserts, and my colleagues accept, that the 

checking of Ms. Joll’s references prior to a hiring decision 

being made was a “deviation from standard procedures” 

which “lends support to her claims.” Maj. at 15. Mr. Hofer 

testified that, at the time VHS was hiring an assistant girls’ 

cross-country coach, there were no written procedures governing the process of hiring assistant coaches. As a matter of 

practice, however, he would check all candidates’ references 

just prior to presenting their candidacies to the board. See

R.29-4 at 14 (Hofer Dep. 36). But it was not Mr. Hofer who 

contacted Polite about a reference for Ms. Joll. Instead, 

Dr. Amones and Coach Nellessen had taken charge of the 

hiring process for the assistant girls’ cross-country position 

while Mr. Hofer was out of the office due to knee surgery. 

Although “[s]ignificant, unexplained or systematic deviations from established policies or practices can no doubt be 

relative and probative circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent,” Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 694 (7th Cir. 

2012), there is nothing inherently suspect about 

Dr. Amones’s proceeding in a different manner than Mr. Hofer. Moreover, there is no reason why Dr. Amones and 

Coach Nellessen should not have contacted candidates’ references if they believed it would inform their hiring decision. Finally, there is no evidence in the record that 

Dr. Amones and Coach Nellessen only contacted Ms. Joll’s 

references. Mr. Hofer testified that both candidates’ references were available to Dr. Amones and Coach Nellessen, 

and Mr. Hofer did not know whether Principal Amones or 

Coach Nellessen contacted Arredondo’s references. R.29-4 at 

15 (Hofer Dep. 37). There is no evidence on this record that 

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No. 18-3630 39

Dr. Amones and Coach Nellessen treated the candidates differently with respect to checking references. 

3. 

Ms. Joll also contends that VCS offered shifting criteria 

for why it did not hire her, and that offering different explanations supports her claim of discrimination. “One can reasonably infer pretext from an employer’s shifting or inconsistent explanations for the challenged employment decision.” See, e.g., Appelbaum v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 

340 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). In Appelbaum, for example, the employer had terminated the plaintiff’s employment and, initially, had told her that it was on 

the basis of a breach of confidentiality and her poor performance. Later, the employer “backed off” the performance 

rationale, calling it just an “aggravating factor” in the decision to terminate her on the basis of the breach of confidentiality. Id. At trial, however, the employer stated that her performance played “zero role” in the decision to terminate her 

employment. The employer’s shifting reason for the same 

employment decision, the court held, raised an inference of 

pretext. Id. 

Here, Ms. Joll does not claim that the defendant’s rationale for not hiring her for the assistant girls’ cross-country 

team shifted over time. Instead, she claims, and my colleagues accept, that VCS’s hiring criteria shifted from one position to another: 

When Ms. Joll did not receive the Girls’ 

Cross Country assistant coach position, the 

school stated it did not hire her because the 

male candidate who worked at Portage High 

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40 No. 18-3630 

School, which was 9.5 miles away, had more 

recent high school coaching experience. However, in subsequently failing to hire Ms. Joll for 

the Boys’ Cross Country assistant coach position at Valparaiso High School, the School stated the male candidate hired worked in the 

building, and that proximity was a most important factor in hiring its coaches. 

Appellant’s Br. 35–36; see also Maj. at 17–18 (“The defendant’s stated reasons for hiring for these nearly identical jobs 

were inconsistent with each other.”). 

However, as noted previously, see supra at 32, we must 

consider each failure to hire as a discrete act. This approach 

is particularly sensible in a case such as this one where there 

were different decisionmakers and candidates for each position. Indeed, Ms. Joll has not come forward with any authority in which we have suggested that different explanations for 

different employment decisions were suspect. 

With respect to the girls’ cross-country position, the stated (and consistent) reason for hiring Arredondo was his 

more recent experience coaching high school. In his affidavit, Mr. Hofer also explained that that there was concern 

about Ms. Joll’s ability to step into the role of an assistant. 

R.29-1 at 4 (Hofer Aff. 2). This supplemental rationale, however, does not raise the specter of pretext. See, e.g., Johnson v. 

Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Nordstrom 

simply supplemented its explanations in the context of 

EEOC charges and litigation; there has been no retraction of 

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No. 18-3630 41

any of its reasons for failing to promote Johnson nor are any 

of its reasons inconsistent or conflicting.”).4 

4. 

Finally, Ms. Joll maintains that her superior qualifications 

raise an inference of discriminatory intent. We have explained that “evidence of the applicants’ competing qualifications does not constitute evidence of pretext ‘unless those 

differences are so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be 

no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment 

that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position 

at issue.” Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1180 (7th Cir. 

2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Ms. Joll has a wealth of experience coaching track 

and cross country at multiple levels. Her most recent experience was as the head coach of Thomas Jefferson Middle 

School, where she served from 2005 to 2013. In making the 

determination that Arredondo was the better choice for the 

girls’ cross-country assistant coaching position, Coach Nellessen, Dr. Amones, and Mr. Hofer relied upon his recent 

experience coaching cross country at the high school level 

4 Even if it were appropriate to evaluate rationales across positions, 

however, VCS’s rationales were not inconsistent. With respect to the 

girls’ position, VCS had to choose between two individuals who did not 

teach at VHS. As between those two individuals, the high school chose 

the individual with the most recent high school coaching experience. 

With respect to the boys’ position, VCS had to choose between an individual who was a teacher at VHS, and therefore had daily contact with 

the athletes he would coach, and an individual who was not a teacher at 

VHS. As between those two individuals, VCS chose the individual in the 

building. 

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42 No. 18-3630 

and the fact that, unlike Ms. Joll who had served as a head 

coach, it would not be difficult for him to serve in an assistant position. These two criteria are directly related to the 

position for which Ms. Joll applied. With regard to the specific positions at issue, therefore, Ms. Joll was not clearly better qualified such that the disparity in qualifications would 

raise an inference of pretext or discrimination. 

The majority notes that “the Millbrook rule applies only 

where ‘the plaintiff relies exclusively on evidence of the applicants’ comparative qualifications.” Maj. at 21 (quoting 

David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2003)). 

The majority believes that Ms. “Joll has presented much 

more evidence.” Id. However, as explained at length, I do 

not believe there is evidence in this record to support the 

other inferences of discrimination that Ms. Joll asks us to 

draw. 

At bottom, based on the evidence presented by Ms. Joll, a 

reasonable jury could not conclude that the decision to hire 

Arredondo as the assistant girls’ cross-country coach was 

based on her gender. I would therefore affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment to VCS on this claim. 

B. Boys’ cross-country position 

Ms. Joll also contends that she suffered discrimination 

when she was not hired for the assistant boys’ cross-country 

position. She relies on many of the same arguments made 

with respect to the girls’ cross-country position: that the decision was affected by the use of sex-stereotypes, that different procedures were followed with respect to checking references, that there were shifting criteria for hiring, and that 

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No. 18-3630 43

she was better qualified. Thus, I address only the evidence 

unique to the boys’ cross-country position. 

Ms. Joll complains that different procedures were used to 

check Kerezman’s references from those used to check hers. 

Mr. Hofer explained that Kerezman’s references were not 

checked because “he was a teacher at the high school,” he 

had coached with the cross-country team on a voluntary basis and had been “a paid assistant for our track [program],” 

and Mr. Hofer “personally kn[e]w him as a coach.” R.29-4 at 

17 (Hofer Dep. 49). Kerezman was a known quantity to 

Mr. Hofer. It indeed would be placing form over substance 

to require Mr. Hofer to go through the motions of checking 

the references of someone whom he knew personally and 

supervised professionally. 

Ms. Joll also complains about shifting criteria for the 

boys’ cross-country position. However, VCS consistently has 

stated its primary reason for the hiring of Kerezman was 

that he had better rapport with the boys on the team due to 

his being a teacher in the building, having volunteered with 

the program, and having been an assistant for the boys’ track 

team. His presence in the building allowed him to build and 

maintain this rapport in a way that a coach from outside the 

building—whether male or female—could not.5

5 As noted previously, see supra at 32, Ms. Joll and the majority want to 

evaluate whether the criteria shifts across positions and before different 

decision-making teams. The majority therefore faults VHS for focusing 

on recent high school experience with respect to Arredondo, but on being “‘in the building’ during the school day with the opportunity to 

build ‘rapport with the boys’” with respect to Kerezman. Maj. at 18. According to the majority, these shifts worked to Ms. Joll’s disadvantage: 

(continued ... ) 

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44 No. 18-3630 

Finally, Ms. Joll compares her experience to Kerezman’s 

and concludes that she clearly is the better qualified candidate. Again, however, the position for which Ms. Joll applied 

was an assistant boys’ cross-country position at VHS. Although she had a longer career coaching than Kerezman, she 

was not a teacher at VHS; Kerezman was. Kerezman had 

regular contact with the students and an opportunity to 

build on this relationship in ways that Ms. Joll could not. It is 

difficult to argue that this consideration is not a legitimate 

one. Many, including Ms. Joll, might believe that Coach Crague and Mr. Hofer should have placed more emphasis on 

experience than presence. However, “[a]n unwise employment decision does not automatically rise to the level of pre-

( ... continued)

“Joll’s long presence in the middle school and in the school system with 

the opportunity to build ‘rapport with the girls’ was not considered in 

her favor vis-à-vis Arredondo. Her more extensive and apparently more 

recent professional experience coaching high schoolers was not considered vis-à-vis Kerezman.” Id. 

As a preliminary matter, Ms. Joll did not have “more recent professional experience coaching high schoolers.” Kerezman recently had 

served as an assistant coach for the VHS boys’ track team. See R.29-1 at 5 

(Hofer Aff. at 3) (“Kerezman had also recently coached boys track as a 

varsity assistant at Valparaiso which we felt was a plus.”); R.29-4 at 16 

(Hofer Dep. 44) (explaining that Kerezman had been “a paid coach for 

our track [program]”). However, even if this had not been the case, the 

fact that Coach Nellessen, Dr. Amones, and Mr. Hofer applied different 

criteria than Coach Crague and Mr. Hofer when faced with two different 

sets of candidates does not suggest discriminatory intent. It is entirely 

possible that, if presented with a qualified, in-building candidate, 

Coach Nellessen, Dr. Amones, and Mr. Hofer would have chosen that 

candidate over either Ms. Joll or Arredondo. This option, however, was 

not available to them. 

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No. 18-3630 45

text.” Teruggi v. CIT Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654, 661 

(7th Cir. 2013). Here, the record does not support an inference that Kerezman’s status as a teacher was not the true 

reason that he was hired, nor does it support an inference 

that Ms. Joll was not hired because she was a woman. Consequently, I would affirm the district court’s summary 

judgment for VHS on this claim as well. 

I close with a final observation concerning the effect of 

our Ortiz decision on summary judgment decisions. We held 

in Ortiz that, for purposes of summary judgment, we could 

not cabin different types of evidence into categories and consider those categories in isolation. We explained that the appropriate legal standard 

is simply whether the evidence would permit a 

reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 

plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other 

proscribed factor caused the discharge or other 

adverse employment action. Evidence must be 

considered as a whole, rather than asking 

whether any particular piece of evidence 

proves the case by itself—or whether just the 

“direct” evidence does so, or the “indirect” evidence. Evidence is evidence. 

Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. However, we also were clear that 

“[r]elevant evidence must be considered and irrelevant evidence disregarded.” Id. Ortiz did not cast aside our wellhoned rules for determining when particular types of evidence (the use of different procedures, shifting rationales, 

etc.) are relevant and probative of discrimination. Today’s 

decision demonstrates graphically how this principle can be 

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46 No. 18-3630 

disregarded when the Ortiz approach is employed to evaluate a summary judgment motion. 

Here, the question is whether Ms. Joll came forth with 

sufficient relevant and probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that VCS failed to hire her for 

the girls’ assistant cross-country position or for the boys’ assistant cross-country position because she was a woman. For 

the reasons set forth above, I do not believe Ms. Joll has met 

her burden with respect to either position, and I therefore 

would affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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