Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_09-cv-01294/USCOURTS-alnd-5_09-cv-01294-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

FLOYD JONES, JR., as the

personal representative of the

Estate of TRAVORIS HOOD, 

Plaintiff,

vs.

CITY OF DECATUR,

ALABAMA, et al., 

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. CV-09-S-1294-NE

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Floyd Jones, Jr., the personal

representative of the estate of Travoris Hood, deceased, who committed suicide on

June 28, 2007, while incarcerated as a pre-trial detainee in the municipal jail of the

City of Decatur, Alabama. The case is before the court on three motions to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint: the first filed by the defendant City of Decatur (doc. no. 22); the

second filed by defendants KennethCollier, Joel Gilliam, Christopher Matthews, and

Michael Harvey (doc. no. 24); and the third filed by defendants Michael Harvey,

Vernon Davis, Sharon Latham, and Eric Brown (doc. no. 26). 

FILED

 2010 Jul-28 PM 02:33

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 1 of 36
I. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a

complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with Rule 8(a), 1

which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that 2

 In full text, Rule 12(b) provides that: 1

Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive

pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the

option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject

matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency

of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19. A motion

making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is

permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other

defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a

claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive

pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that

claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for

failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters

outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall

be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and

all parties shall be given reasonable opportunityto present all material made pertinent

to such a motion by Rule 56. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 

With few exceptions (fraud claims being one, see Fed. R. Civ. P. (9)(b)), there are only 2

three requirements for pleading a claim in a federal action: “(1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends . . ., (2) a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader

seeks.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Further, as the First Circuit observed in Gorski v. New Hampshire

Dept. of Corrections, 290 F.3d 466 (1st Cir. 2002): 

2

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 2 of 36
pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 544 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. —, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citations omitted). 

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly,

550 U.S., at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked

assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

There are two other provisions of Rule 8 that are pertinent: “Each averment of a

pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading are

required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1); and “All pleadings shall be so construed as to do

substantial justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f). 

Gorski, 290 F.3d at 473 n.5. Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit observed in Brooks v. Blue Cross

and Blue Shield of Florida, 116 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1997):

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the facial sufficiency of the

statement of [a plaintiff’s] claim for relief. It is read alongside Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a),

which requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” The rule is not designed to strike inartistic pleadings or

to provide a more definite statement to answer an apparent ambiguity, and the

analysis of a 12(b)(6) motion is limited primarily to the face of the complaint and

attachments thereto. . . .

Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1368-69 (citation omitted); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48

(1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep

by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is

to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”). 

3

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 3 of 36
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at

557 (brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint astrue, we “are not bound to accept astrue a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure fromthe hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will, asthe Court of Appeals observed,

be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

4

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 4 of 36
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at —, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (emphasis added). 

Such pleading standards may be heightened, however, with respect to some

claims based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When determining whether increased specificity

is required, a distinction first must be drawn between the pleading requirements for

§ 1983 claims asserted against, on the one hand, state or municipal governmental

entities and, on the other hand, individual governmental officials sued personally, “in

their individual capacities.” With regard to the former category of claims, the

Supreme Court has held that a court may not impose a pleading requirement that is

“more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules

ofCivilProcedure” to § 1983 claims asserted against municipal governmental entities.

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507

U.S. 163, 164 (1993). The Leatherman Court instructed federal courts to use the

mechanisms ofsummary judgment and discovery to “weed out unmeritorious claims”

against municipalities, and affirmed that notice pleading is all that is required for

claims of municipal liability under § 1983. Id. at 168. 

3

On the other hand, the Leatherman Court specifically declined to extend its

holding to claims against individual governmental officials. See id. at 166-67 (“We

thus have no occasion to consider whether our qualified immunity jurisprudence

Even so, a plaintiff must at least put the municipality on notice of the particular custom or 3

policy that is alleged to have caused the plaintiff’s injury. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. 

5

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 5 of 36
would require a heightened pleading in cases involving individual government

officials.”). The Court’s subsequent decision in Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574

(1998), also did not make that extension. Instead, the Crawford-El opinion reaffirmed

the Court’s refusal to “revise established rules that are separate from the qualified

immunity defense,” including “requiring pleadings of heightened specificity in cases

alleging municipal liability,” id. at 595 (citing Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164-69)

(emphasissupplied), and did not discuss the pleading requirementsfor casesinvolving

the personal liability of individual government officials. 

4

Thus, because Leatherman and Crawford-El do not require a contrary result,

“the heightened pleading requirement [remains] the law of this circuit” with regard to

a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against individual governmental actors. GJR Investments,

Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998). See also, e.g.,

Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003) (“In examining the factual

allegations in the complaint, we must keep in mind the heightened pleading

requirements for civil rights cases, especially those involving the defense of qualified

immunity.”); Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003) (same);

See also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002), holding in the context of a suit 4

brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1967, and the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967, that “the Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for employment

discrimination suits.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515. That holding has no bearing on a claim against

an individual government official pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

6

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 6 of 36
Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e want

to use this opportunity to repeat that, ‘in an effort to eliminate nonmeritorious claims

on the pleadings and to protect public officials from protracted litigation involving

specious claims, we, and other courts, have tightened the application of Rule 8 to §

1983 cases.’”) (quoting Arnold v. Board of Education of Escambia County, 880 F.2d

305, 309 (11th Cir. 1989)). 

In Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d at 1235, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the

heightened pleading requirement in the following manner:

In examining the factual allegations in the complaint, we must

keep in mind the heightened pleading requirementsfor civil rights cases,

especially those involving the defense of qualified immunity. GJR

Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th

Cir.1998). The complaint must allege the relevant facts “with some

specificity.” Id. “[M]ore than mere conclusory notice pleading is

required. . . . [A] complaint will be dismissed as insufficient where the

allegations it contains are vague and conclusory.” Fullman v. Graddick,

739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Veney v. Hogan, 70

F.3d 917, 922 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that complaint must “include the

specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact that will enable the district

court to determine that those facts, if proved, will overcome the defense

of qualified immunity”). Moreover, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, we

need only accept “well-pleaded facts” and “reasonable inferences drawn

from those facts.” Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481,

1485 (11th Cir. 1992). “[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of mixed

fact and law have long been recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal.” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n. 16 (11th

Cir.2001). We must also keep in mind the fact that “[w]e generally

accord . . . official conduct a presumption of legitimacy.” United States

Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179, 112 S. Ct. 541, 550, 116 L. Ed.

7

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 7 of 36
2d 526 (1991).

Id.

II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS5

Travoris Hood (“Hood”) was a twenty-seven-year-old black male who had a

long history of arrests by Decatur police officers. He was last arrested by Decatur

6

police on June 23, 2007, on a warrant for domestic violence in the third degree and

two bond revocation warrants. He was placed in the City Jail, where he had a history

7

of behavioral problems during previous incarcerations. 

8

Hood was booked into the jail at 8:35 p.m. on June 23, 2007. Following the

9

booking process, Corporal Tina Scott completed a medical intake report and initial

classification listing for Hood. In order to complete the report and classification, Scott

wasrequired to assess Hood’s medical and mental status by following a medical intake

checklist. Eleven of the thirty-eight questions on the medical intake checklist dealt

10

specifically with suicidal ideation. When Scott asked Hood questions regarding his

11

The following facts are taken exclusivelyfrom the allegations of fact contained in plaintiff’s 5

complaint (doc. no. 1).

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 15. 6

Id. 7

Id. 8

Id., ¶ 16. 9

Id. 10

Id., ¶ 17. 11

8

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 8 of 36
medical and mental status, however, he was combative and refused to respond. Even

12

so, Scott determined, based on her observations during the interview, that Mr. Hood

did not pose a risk of harm to himself or others.

13

Due to Hood’s combative behavior, he was initially placed in a one-man cell.14

After he calmed down, Hood was transferred to “North Block,” a multiple-occupancy

cell that housed twenty-four other inmates. Each cell in the jail was equipped with

15

video surveillance cameras. As a result, jailers could observe activities in a given

16

cell by looking at sixteen video screens contained on a bank of monitors in the jail’s

booking area. The surveillance video images were recorded, and could be played 17

back at any time.18

At 12:41 a.m. on June 28, 2007, five days after Hood was booked into the city

jail, there was a disturbance in North Block which was recorded by the video

surveillance system. Corporal Tina Scott was on duty for the night shift at the time

19

of the disturbance, and when she played back the video of the incident, she observed

Doc. no. 1, ¶ 17. 12

Id. 13

Id., ¶ 18. 14

Id. 15

 Id., ¶ 19. 16

 Id. 17

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 19. 18

Id., ¶ 20. 19

9

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 9 of 36
Hood jumping on and punching another inmate. Scott made a report of the

20

incident. 

21

The next shift began at 6:00 a.m. on June 28, 2007. Lieutenant Christopher 22

Matthews, the Jail Administrator, was responsible for jail operations on that date.

23

His office was not located at the jail, however, and he did not continuously monitor

or supervise the activities of jail staff. Four jailers, including the Jail Supervisor,

24

Sergeant Michael Harvey, worked the day shift from6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Sergeant

25

Harvey’s office was located inside the jail. In addition to Sergeant Harvery, three

jailers, Officers Sharon Latham, Eric Brown, and Vernon Davis, were on duty on June

28, 2007. Sharon Latham was the senior officer and, therefore, supervised the

26

activities of the two junior officers.

27

Sergeant Harvey arrived at work at 6:00 a.m. on June 28th and, after reviewing

the report of the incident from the night shift, ordered that Hood be removed from the

general population and placed in Male Cell 3, one of the jail’s three-man cells.

28

Id. 20

Id. 21

Id., ¶ 21. 22

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 22. 23

Id. 24

Id., ¶ 23. 25

 Id. 26

Id. 27

Id., ¶ 24. 28

10

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 10 of 36
However, Sergeant Harvey did not order the white inmate with whom Hood had been

fighting to be taken out of the general population.

29

Pursuant to Sergeant Harvey’s directive, Officers Eric Brown and Vernon Davis

took Hood out of the general population at 7:19 a.m. and moved him to Male Cell 3.30

There were two other inmates in that cell when Hood was transferred. However, one

of the inmates was removed shortly thereafter, at 7:26 a.m. The remaining inmate, 31

William Swoopes (“Swoopes”), was a 22-year-old black male.32

During the course of being transferred, Hood allegedly became incensed about

being removed from general population while the white male with whom he had been

fighting was allowed to remain. As soon as Officers Brown and Davis placed him

33

in Male Cell 3, Hood began kicking and beating the door, as well as screaming,

yelling, and cursing. He kept repeating that the jailers had left the “white boy” in 34

general population, and accused them of being racists and treating him differently

from the white inmate.35

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 24. 29

Id., ¶ 25. 30

Id. 31

Id. 32

Id., ¶ 26. 33

Id. 34

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 26. 35

11

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 11 of 36
Hood continued his verbal outbursts and began crying. He repeatedly yelled

36

that he was “tired of this stuff,” and that he would commit suicide if he had to stay in

the smaller cell. He continued to call the jailers racists. He specifically threatened 37 38

to kill himself if he was allowed to remain in the smaller cell “for at least an hour and

a half.” Swoopes tried to calm him, but Hood would not listen. He was crying and

39 40

talking about his daughter. Hood told Swoopes that he had written a letter to the

41

judge in an effort to obtain a bond reduction, in order to be released from jail, and

stated repeatedly that he would kill himself if he had to stay in that cell.42

Officer Davis also attempted to calm Hood, but he would not listen and

remained highly agitated. Hood told Davis repeatedly that the jailers were racists, 43

that he was being treated differently, that he was tired of being treated unfairly, and

that he would commit suicide if he had to remain in the smaller cell.44

After Hood failed to comply with the jailers’ instructions to calm down, a

Id., ¶ 27. 36

Id. 37

Id. 38

Id. 39

Id., ¶ 28. 40

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 29. 41

Id. 42

Id., ¶ 30. 43

Id. 44

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Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 12 of 36
restraint chair was brought to his cell at 8:11 a.m., and he was strapped into it. Even

45

after being placed in restraints, Hood continued to yell. Among other things, he 46

stated that the jailers were racists, that he wasn’t going to eat anything, and that he

would commit suicide if he was not moved from the smaller cell. 

47

Officers Brown and Davis were instructed by Officer Latham that they should

check on Hood’s condition every fifteen minutes. On each occasion that Davis 48

checked on him, Hood again said that his treatment was due to his race, and that he

would kill himself rather than put up with it. Davis told Hood that the best thing he 49

could do was to calm down, and that he would be released from the restraint chair if

he did so.50

Hood asked to speak with Sergeant Harvey, who walked to Hood’s cell. Hood

51

told Harvey, among other things, that he was being treated unfairly, and that he would

commit suicide if he had to stay in the smaller cell. After speaking with Hood, 52

Sergeant Harvey left to Officer Latham the decision of how long Hood was to remain

Id., ¶ 31. 45

Id., ¶ 32. 46

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 32 47

Id., ¶ 33. 48

Id. 49

Id. 50

Id. 51

Id., ¶ 34. 52

13

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 13 of 36
in the restraint chair. 

53

Hood allegedly calmed down after approximately thirty to forty-five minutes,

but remained in the restraint chair for at least another one and a half hours. Hood

54

was allegedly released fromthe chair at 10:26 a.m., after two hours and fifteen minutes

of restraint.55

At 11:15 a.m., Officer Brown went to Hood’s cell to deliver lunch to him.

56

Hood allegedly refused the lunch. Brown contacted Latham by radio and informed 57

her that Hood had refused his lunch. 

58

At 12:18 p.m., Hood began removing the sheet from the top bunk of the overunder bed unit in his cell. He twisted the sheet to make a rope, tied the sheet to the

59

bars of the cell, stood on the bunk, and placed the sheet around his neck. At 12:25, 60

Hood stepped off the bunk. By 12:27, there was no more movement by Hood.

61 62

Hood’s body was discovered hanging from the bars in his cell at 1:33 p.m., by Officer

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 34. 53

Id., ¶ 35. 54

Id. 55

Id., ¶ 36 56

Id. 57

 Id., ¶ 37. 58

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 37. 59

Id. 60

Id. 61

Id. 62

14

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 14 of 36
Brown.63

During the three hour period from10:26 a.m. until Hood’s body was discovered

at 1:33 p.m., the other inmate in Male Cell 3, William Swoopes, allegedly had been

lying on the bottom bunk of the over-under bed unit with a blanket pulled over his

head. Swoopes allegedly was asleep during this time, and did not awake until the

64

jailers came into the cell after the discovery of Hood’s body.65

Even though, as previously discussed, the jail was equipped with video

surveillance, and the jailers had access to live footage of Hood’s cell, none of the

jailers on duty allegedly observed the eventsthat led to Hood’s death. Officer Davis 66

was the jailer who wassitting at the monitor desk during the relevant time period, and

he allegedly did not see any of the events that occurred. 

67

The complaint filed by Floyd Jones as a personal representative of the estate of

Travoris Hood asserts claims against the City of Decatur and seven individuals. With

regard to the claims against the City, plaintiff alleges that, because of the obvious

dangers inherent in the City’s repeated failures, year after year, to provide funding to

adequately train jail personnel and to adequately staff the jail, the City was

Id. 63

Id., ¶ 38. 64

 Doc. no. 1, ¶ 38. 65

Id. 66

Id. 67

15

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 15 of 36
deliberately indifferent to the rights of inmates to the protections which would be

afforded them by adequately trained jail personnel.68

In addition, plaintiff’s complaint asserts official capacityand individual capacity

claims against seven individual defendants including: Kenneth Collier, who became

the City of Decatur’s acting Chief of Police in January 2007, and who was named

permanent Chief in March 2007; Joel Gilliam, who was the City’s Chief of Police

until his retirement in January 2007; Christopher Matthews, a Lieutenant in the City

police department who was directly responsible for the operation of the jail; Michael

Harvey, the police sergeant stationed inside the jail; and Officers Sharon Latham, Eric

Brown, and Vernon Davis, each of whom was working as a jailer at the jail on the day

of Hood’s suicide.

69

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against the City of Decatur 

1. Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Eleventh Circuit has noted that the “Supreme Court has placed strict

limitations on municipal liability under Section 1983.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151

F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). There are only “limited circumstances in which an

Id., ¶¶ 88-95. 68

Id., ¶¶ 9-13. 69

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Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 16 of 36
allegation of ‘failure to train’ can be the basis of liability under § 1983.” City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). Those limited circumstances occur only

where the municipality inadequately trains and supervises employees, the failure to

train or supervise is a city policy, and that city policy causes the employees to violate

a citizen’s constitutional rights. Gold, 151 F.2d at 1350.

The Supreme Court has held that

only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant

respect evidences a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of its

inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly though of as a city

“policy or custom” that is actionable under § 1983. . . . “Municipal

liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where— a deliberate

choice to follow a course of action is made from among various

alternatives” by city policymakers. 

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,

483-484 (1986) (plurality opinion)). In order to establish “deliberate indifference,”

a plaintiff must present some evidence that the municipality knew of the need to train

and/orsupervise in a particular area, and the municipalitymade a deliberate choice not

to take any action. Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350.

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that, “without notice of a need to train

or supervise in a particular area, a municipality is not liable as a matter of law for any

failure to train or supervise.” Id. at 1351. To prove such notice, a § 1983 plaintiff

must show a “history of widespread prior abuse” before a policymaker can be “put on

17

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 17 of 36
notice of the need for improved training or supervision.” Id. (quoting Wright v.

Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665, 674 (11th Cir. 1990)). “The deprivations that constitute

widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official[s] must be obvious,

flagrant, rampant, and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” 

Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008). See Church v. City of

Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342-46 (11th Cir. 1994) (preliminary injunction reversed

because plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of a failure to train claim

without proof that the City was aware of a prior incident in which constitutional rights

were violated); Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1654-65 (11th Cir. 1990)

(finding no liability in jailsuicide case for failure to train where no pattern of incidents

put the City on notice of a need to train).

In jail suicide cases specifically, “to prevail under section 1983 for violation of

substantive rights, under . . . the . . . Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff must show

that the jail official displayed ‘deliberate indifference’ to the prisoner’s taking his own

life.” Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 986 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Edwards v.

Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir.1989) (ellipsis in original). Deliberate

indifference requires that the defendant deliberately disregard “a strong likelihood

rather than a mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will occur.” Id. 

The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that there must be a long history of many

18

Case 5:09-cv-01294-CLS Document 46 Filed 07/28/10 Page 18 of 36
suicides in a jail before policymakers can be placed on notice that additional funding

or new or different training or staffing was required. See Cagle, 334 F.3d at 988-89.

In Cagle, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a case in which the plaintiff had sought to

hold Winston County liable for a suicide on a theory of inadequate funding of the

county jail by failing to hire a second, nighttime jailer. Id. The Cagle Court held that

there was no evidence that the County was aware of any “strong likelihood ofsuicide.” 

Id. at 988. The Court noted that, “before the [inmate’s suicide, no] prisoner had ever

committed suicide in Winston County Jail” and, consequently, “nothing in the record

required County officials to conclude that . . . prisoners in the Winston County Jail

were substantially likely to attempt suicide.” Id. at 987. The Court held that, because

there were no facts that showed that “the County was truly aware that prisoners in the

Winston County Jail were likely to attemptsuicide, . . . [t]he County’s decision to fund

no additional nighttime watcher was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial

likelihood of detainee suicide.” Id. at 988.

As in Cagle, there is no evidence showing that the City of Decatur was aware

that prisoners in its municipal jail were likely to attempt suicide. Plaintiff makes no

allegation in the complaint that any suicides occurred in the city jail prior to the one

at issue here. Plaintiff argues, nevertheless, that he need not show any prior instances

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of suicide in order to prevail on his § 1983 claim. In support of that argument, 70

plaintiff cites the City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989), in which the

Supreme Court recognized that the failure to train can create liability under § 1983

without a history of constitutional violations when the need for training is “obvious.”71

Even so, the Supreme Court also has noted that the situations in which the need to

train is “obvious” are limited to “a narrow range of circumstances.” Board of County

Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). To date, the Supreme Court has

noted only one example of a need to train that is so “obvious” as to not require proof

of prior constitutional violations: i.e., the use of deadly force where firearms are

provided to police officers. Id. at n.10. 

Defendant argues, and this court agrees, that the need for additional training or

staffing to prevent jail suicides falls short of the kind of “obvious” need for training

that would support a finding of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights on the

part of the City. A lack ofsuicide prevention training is more akin to the areas where 72

a need to train has been held to be not so obvious as to preclude the necessity of proof

of a pattern of prior constitutional violations. See, e.g., City of Canton, 489 U.S. at

396-97 (no obvious need for police officers to be trained in diagnosing mental

See doc. no. 33 (Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Dismiss filed byCity of Decatur), at 6-8. 70

Id. 71

See doc. no. 40 (City of Decatur’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss) , at 8. 72

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illnesses of arrestees); Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160, 1171-72 (11th Cir.

1995) (finding no “obvious need” to train jail employees “to recognize a need to

remove a mentally ill inmate to a hospital or to dispense medication as prescribed”).

Defendant’s argument issupported by the EleventhCircuit’s opinions requiring

proof of a pattern of constitutional violations arising from jail suicides in the context

of failure to train claims. See Cagle, 334 F.3d at 988-89 (“The plaintiffs cite no

authority that supports the argument that the occurrence of two suicides and twentyseven attempted suicides in the jail requires county officials to conclude that all

prisoners of the Jefferson County Jail are substantially likely to attempt suicide.”

(quoting Tittle v. Jefferson CountyCommission, 10 F.3d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994)). 

If, as plaintiff contends, the need for more suicide prevention training qualified as one

of the “ obvious” categories where a constitutional violation could be made out

without proof of a pattern of prior violations, the Cagle and Tittle Courts would not

have needed to evaluate whether the plaintiffs in those cases had successfully shown

a pattern of constitutional violations arising from jail suicides. The opinionsin Cagle

and Tittle clearly imply that the need to provide suicide prevention training is not so

obvious as to bypass the requirement of proving a pattern of previous constitutional

violations. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that, in order for plaintiff to prevail

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on his § 1983 claim, plaintiff must allege the existence of a pattern of constitutional

violations arising from jail suicides in the Decatur City Jail under circumstances that

would constitute a constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s failure to make such an

allegation or to offer such proof is fatal to his complaint against the City.

2. State law wrongful death claim

Although the City argued in the memorandum in support of its motion to

dismiss that plaintiff had failed to state a claim under the State of Alabama’s wrongful

death statute, Ala. Code § 6-5-410 (1975), defendant conceded in its reply brief that

plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to state a vicarious liability wrongful death claim

against the City, premised upon the alleged acts or omissions of defendants Harvey

and Davis. For that reason, the City’s motion to dismiss that claim will be denied. 

73

B. Claims Against Defendants Collier, Gilliam, Matthews, and Harvey

1. Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants Collier, Gilliam, Matthews, Harvey, Latham, Brown, and Davis

have been sued in their individual and official capacities. “Official capacity suits

generally represent only another way of pleading an action against the entity of which

an officer is an agent.” Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472 n.21 (1985). In other

See doc. no. 44, at 13 (“The City essentially agrees with the plaintiff’s observation in this 73

regard and concedes that the complaint is sufficient only to state a vicarious liability wrongful death

claim against it premised upon the alleged acts or omissions of defendants Harvey and Davis.”)

(emphasis supplied).

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words, such actions are actually suits against the government entity that the officer

represents. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55

(1978). Because the City of Decatur is a separately named defendant in this action,

plaintiff’s official capacity claims are redundant and, accordingly, will be dismissed.

The individual capacity claims against defendants Collier, Gilliam, and

Matthews arise solely fromtheir capacity assupervisors or alleged policymakers. The

claims alleged against Sergeant Harvey arise, in part, fromhis role as a supervisor and,

in part, as a jailer who directly participated in the events at issue. 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the supervisory defendants are contained in

CountsII and III of the complaint. Plaintiff alleges in Count II that defendants Collier,

Gilliam, Matthews, and Harvey failed to provide proper training, education, and

policies for jailers in the Decatur City Jail. Count III alleges that Collier, Gilliam,

74

Matthews, and Harvey failed to properly supervise jailers in the Decatur City Jail.

75

The four supervisory defendants assert that the complaint fails to state a claim under

§ 1983 that is sufficient to overcome their assertion of the defense of qualified

immunity. 

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials are not liable for

See Doc. no. 1, at 17. 74

See id. at 17-18. 75

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civil damages if “their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or 

statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009). The qualified immunity doctrine

protects law enforcement officials from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “unless the

law preexisting the defendant official’s supposedly wrongful act was already

established to such a high degree that every objectively reasonable official standing

in the defendant’s place would be on notice that what the defendant official was doing

would be clearly unlawful given the circumstances.” Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d

1275, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).

Because qualified immunity is a defense not only to liability for monetary

damages, but also from the burdens of litigation, the Supreme Court and Eleventh 76

Circuit often have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions as early

in the lawsuit as possible. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); GJR

Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). “Unless the

plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint state a claim of violation of clearly established

See, e.g., Lassiter v. Alabama A. & M. University, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en 76

banc) (“Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from

civil trials (and the other burdens of litigation, including discovery) and from liability if their conduct

violates no ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.’”) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), and citing Siegert v.

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33 (1991) (holding that no discovery should be permitted if the qualified

immunity question can end the case)). 

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law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the

commencement of discovery.” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1022-23 (11th

Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)). 

The Supreme Court has cautioned against identifying constitutional rights at a

general level in the qualified immunity analysis and, instead, has required plaintiffs

in a § 1983 case to point to case law that fairly warns the government actor of the

unconstitutionality of the challenged conduct to overcome the defense of qualified

immunity. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 604 (1999) (granting qualified

immunity where plaintiff could not point to case law existing at the time of the

incident which clearly established the rule of law upon which the plaintiff sought to

rely). See also Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1351-1353 (11th Cir. 2002)

(recognizing that, unless a constitutional provision directly prohibits the challenged

conduct, or a case had previously held the challenged conduct to be unconstitutional

under any circumstances, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that case law with “a very high

degree of prior factual particularity” had previously determined the conduct to be

unconstitutional before a government actor may be stripped of qualified immunity).

The standard for imposing liability in jail suicide cases within the Eleventh

Circuit has been stated as follows: “In a prisoner suicide case, to prevail under section

1983 for violation of substantive rights, under . . . the . . . Fourteenth Amendment, the

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plaintiff must show that the jail official displayed ‘deliberate indifference’ to the

prisoner’s taking of his own life.” Cagle, 334 F.3d at 986 (quoting Edwards v.

Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 1989)) (omissions in original). “To

establish a defendant’s deliberate indifference, the plaintiff has to show that the

defendant had ‘(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; [and] (2)

disregard[ed] . . . that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.’ ” Id. at

987 (quoting McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)). Under

Eleventh Circuit precedent addressing liability for the suicide of pretrial detainees or

convicted prisoners, deliberate indifference requires proof that the defendant

deliberately disregarded “a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility that the

self-infliction of harm will occur.” Id. at 986 (emphasis in original) (quoting Popham

v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1653 (11th Cir. 1990)). “[T]he mere opportunity

for suicide, without more, is clearly insufficient to impose liability on those charged

with the care of prisoners.” Id. (quoting Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1540).

With regard to the standard for liability of supervisory officials and

policymakers in jail suicide cases, the parties agree that there are two separate and

distinct lines of authority established by the Eleventh Circuit. The first line of cases 77

See doc. no. 25 (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss byCollier, Gilliam, Matthews, and 77

Harvey), at 12; doc. no. 34 (Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Dismiss by Collier, Gilliam,

Matthews, and Harvey), at 5.

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is exemplified by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Cook v. Sheriff of Monroe County,

402 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2005), where the Court required that a supervisory official

not involved in the day-to-day activities involving the decedent must still have

personal knowledge of that inmate’s suicidal tendencies before liability may be

imposed for failing to adopt adequate training and policies to prevent suicides. The

Cook court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the sheriff’s policies themselves

constituted deliberate indifference to a potential class of jailsuicides, and emphasized

that actual subjective knowledge of the suicidal tendencies of the individual who later

committed suicide was required. Id. The Court stated that, “under our precedent, the

defendant must have had notice of the suicidal tendency of the individual whose rights

are at issue in order to be held liable for the suicide of the individual.” Id. at 1117.

The second line of cases is exemplified by the decision in Cagle v. Sutherland,

334 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2003), discussed in greater detail in Part III(A)(1), supra. In

Cagle, the Eleventh Circuit held that liability on the part of a policymaker can exist

if the policymaker was on notice of a number of prior instances of suicides but took

no steps to alleviate the known risk. The Cagle court explained:

As discussed in relation to the County’s liability, no evidence existed that

would indicate to policymakers, such as Sheriff Sutherland, that a strong

likelihood of prisoner suicides existed in the Winston County Jail. The

jail had no history of suicide [and] . . . [b]ecause no evidence shows that

Sheriff Sutherland was aware of a strong risk of suicide at the jail, his

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policy of only having one nighttime jailer cannot be deliberately

indifferent to the risk.

Id. at 988-89.

Under either line of cases, defendants Collier, Gilliam, and Matthews have no

supervisory liability. With regard to the standard announced in Cook, plaintiff does 78

not allege that any of the three purely supervisory defendants had any knowledge of

any suicidal threats on the part of plaintiff’s decedent, Travoris Hood. These

defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity under the standard announced in

Cagle. As discussed with regard to the claims against the City of Decatur, see Part III

(A)(1) supra, the complaint contains no allegation of any prior history of suicides in

the Decatur City Jail.

Defendants further argue, and this court also agrees, that the Eleventh Circuit’s

opinions in Cagle and Cook provide differing standards for supervisory liability in a

§ 1983 jail suicide cases, such that it cannot be said that the law was “clearly

established” on the date of the Hood’s suicide. Because there was no clearly

79

established standard for liability on the part of jailsupervisors and policymakers at the

time of Hood’s suicide, and in light of the fact that the complaint fails to allege facts

The liability of Sergeant Harvey, other than as a supervisor, will be discussed in Part C, 78

infra.

See doc. no. 25 (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss byCollier, Gilliam, Matthews, and 79

Harvey), at 18.

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to show that the supervisory defendants violated either standard, the § 1983 claims

against defendants Collier, Gilliam, and Matthews are due to be dismissed. The claims

against Sergeant Harvey as a supervisory defendant, which are asserted in Counts II

and III of the complaint, also are due to be dismissed. However, in light of Sergeant

Harvey’s unique position, both as a supervisor and as a jailer directly involved with

events at issue in this case, plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Harvey as a jailer merit

further discussion below.

2. State law wrongful death claims

In Count V of the complaint, plaintiff states a wrongful death claim under

Alabama Code § 6-5-410 (1975) against all defendants, alleging that defendants’

wrongful acts or failures to act proximately caused Hood’s death. The supervisory

defendants argue that plaintiff’s wrongful death claims against them should be

dismissed on the grounds that they are entitled to discretionary function immunity

under Alabama Code § 6-5-338(a) (1975), and that the claims asserted against them

do not exist under Alabama law. 

The Alabama Supreme Court has considered the liability of supervisory

employees for suicides in municipal jails arising out of claims of deficiencies in the

training and supervision of jail employees and the establishment of policies at the jail.

See Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 2003). In Howard, the plaintiff

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sought to impose liability against a city police chief for the suicide of an inmate on the

basis that the he “negligently or wantonly failed to implement and/or enforce

proceduresrelating to the identification and handling of potentially suicidal inmates,”

and “negligently or wantonly failed to train [jail officers] in the identification and

handling of potentially suicidal inmates.” Id. at 209. Like the supervisory defendants

in this case, the police chief in Howard asserted that he was entitled to peace officer

immunity under Alabama Code§ 6-5-338(a) (1975). Id. at 2-3. The Howard Court

80

noted that entitlement of a public officer to discretionary function immunity is

governed by the restated formulation of state-agent immunity developed by the

81

 The statute cited in text reads as follows: 80

Every peace officer, except constables, who is employed or appointed

pursuant to the Constitution or statutes of this state, whether appointed or employed

as such peace officer by the state or a county or municipality thereof, or by an agency

or institution, corporate or otherwise, created pursuant to the Constitution or laws of

this state and authorized by the Constitution or laws to appoint or employ police

officers or other peace officers, and whose duties prescribed by law, or by the lawful

terms of their employment or appointment, include the enforcement of, or the

investigation and reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of this state, and who

is empowered by the laws of this state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take into

custody persons who violate, or who are lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or

other lawful process, with violations of, the criminal laws of this state, shall at all

times be deemed to be officers of this state, and as such shall have immunity from

tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary

function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.

Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a) (1975).

Although the Supreme Court refers to the doctrine as “state agent” immunity, it is well 81

settled that the immunity doctrine apply with equal force to city police officers. Shows v. Morgan,

40 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1364 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (noting that state agent or discretionary function

immunity “has been extended to city police officers” by Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a)). 

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Alabama Supreme Court in Ex Parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000). The 82

Supreme Court in Cranman articulated the standard for state-agent immunity as

follows: 

A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her

personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against

the agent is based upon the agent’s 

(1) formulating plans policies or designs;

(2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a

department or agency of government, including, but not

limited to, examples such as:

(a) making administrative adjudication;

(b) allocating resources;

(c) negotiating contracts;

(d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, orsupervising

personnel . . .

Howard, 887 So. 2d at 204-05 (quoting Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405). 

To determine whether a police officer is entitled to discretionary function

immunity, a burden-shifting analysis is employed. The first step in the analysis is to

determine whether the police officer whose conduct is challenged was engaged in the

performance of a discretionary function at the time the alleged tort occurred. See

Cranman was a plurality decision which was adopted by a majority of the Alabama 82

Supreme Court in Ex Parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000), as the restatement of the law of

immunity for state agents in Alabama. 

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Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1303 n.9 (11th Cir. 2001); Sheth v. Webster, 145

F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 1998). If the officer was performing a discretionary act,

the burden shifts to the plaintiff who, in order to deny the officer immunity, must

demonstrate that the officer acted willfully, with malice, or in bad faith. See Sheth,

145 F.3d at 1239. “Acts of such nature are not considered [by Alabama law] to be

discretionary. . . .” Wright v. Wynn, 682 So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala. 1996); see also Couch v.

City of Sheffield, 708 So. 2d 144, 153 (Ala. 1998) (holding that discretionary function

immunity insulates law enforcement officers from tort liability, “unless the officer’s

conduct is so egregious as to amount to willful or malicious conduct or conduct

engaged in bad faith”). 

The Howard Court characterized the plaintiff’s claims against the police chief

as follows: “Simply stated, the claims against Chief McKinley allege faulty training

and supervision.” Howard, 887 So. 2d at 209. The Court held that the actions and

omissions allegedly giving rise to liability on the part of the Chief clearly fell within

Categories 2(b) and (d) of the Cranman listing of discretionary functions that are

protected by the state-agent immunity rule. The Court held that, because the plaintiff

had made no showing that the Chief had acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in

bad faith, or beyond his authority, he was entitled to discretionary function immunity. 

Similarly, in this case, plaintiff alleges that the supervisory defendants failed to

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properly train and supervise corrections officers in suicide prevention at the Decatur

City Jail. These alleged omissions clearly constitute discretionary actions that are

protected by the discretionary function immunity rule. As in Howard, there is no

allegation in this case that in discharging their functions, the supervisory defendants

acted “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith or beyond [their] authority.” 

See Howard, 887 So. 2d at 210. Therefore, the supervisory defendants are entitled to

discretionary function immunity under Alabama Code § 6-5-338(a) (1975), and the

state law wrongful death claims against defendants Collier, Gilliam, and Matthews

will be dismissed.

Having said that, and even though Sergeant Harvey is entitled to discretionary

immunity for any alleged wrongful actions or omissions that he may have made in his

role as a supervisory defendant, that holding does not foreclose plaintiff’s claim

against him with regard to his function as a jailer. Defendants do not seek dismissal

of the state law claims against the jailers. Therefore, the state law claim against

Sergeant Harvey for wrongful death will remain pending. 

C. Claims Against Defendants Harvey, Latham, Brown, and Davis

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Sergeant Harvey and Officer Latham, Brown,

and Davis are contained in Count I of plaintiff’s complaint, which alleges that those

defendants failed to take proper suicide prevention precautions that would have

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prevented Hood from harming himself. Like the supervisory defendants, Sergeant

83

Harvey, and Officers Latham, Brown, and Davis argue that the complaint failsto state

a claim under § 1983 that is sufficient to overcome their assertion of the defense of

qualified immunity. Defendants emphasize that plaintiff cannot meet the heightened

pleading requirements applicable to cases brought under § 1983 when the defense of

qualified immunity has been asserted. 

84

Unlike the standard of liability applicable to supervisory defendants in the

context of jail suicides, however, the standard for line officers is clearly established

in the Eleventh Circuit. As discussed in Parts III (A) and (B), supra, the Eleventh

Circuit has held that, to prevail under § 1983 in a prisoner suicide case, a plaintiff

must show that the jail official displayed “deliberate indifference” to the decendent’s

act of taking his own life. Cagle, 334 F.3d at 986. To establish a defendant’s

deliberate indifference, the plaintiff has to show that the defendant had “(1) subjective

knowledge of a risk of serious harm; [and] (2) disregard[ed] . . . that risk; (3) by

conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Id. at 987 (quoting McElligott, 182 F.3d

at 1255). Deliberate indifference requiresthat the defendant deliberately disregard “a

strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will

See doc. no. 1, at 16. 83

See doc. no. 27 (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Harvey, Latham, Brown, and 84

Davis), at 9-11.

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occur.” Id. at 986 (emphasis in original) (quoting Popham v. City of Talladega, 908

F.2d at 1653). 

Defendants argue that there are no facts alleged in the complaint that would give

rise to the conclusion that the officers were aware that there was “a strong likelihood

rather than a mere possibility” that Hood might take his life. The complaint states in

a conclusory fashion that defendants “Harvey, Latham, Brown, and Davis had

subjective knowledge that Hood was deeply disturbed and that he might attempt to

seriously harm himself or commit suicide.” However, such a conclusory allegation is

not sufficient to meet the heightened pleading standard applicable to a § 1983 claim. 

See Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235.

Although the complaint alleges thatHood specifically told Sergeant Harvey and

Officer Davis that he would commit suicide if he was forced to stay in the three-man

cell, the complaint makes no allegation “by specific facts” that this threat was ever

communicated to Officers Lathamand Brown. Without thatspecific allegation offact,

plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against defendants Latham and Brown under the

heightened pleading standard, because he cannot show that those defendants had

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm. On the other hand, with regard to the

claims against Sergeant Harvey and Officer Davis, the court finds that plaintiff has

alleged sufficient facts from which it can be inferred that there was a “strong

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likelihood” that Hood would commit suicide. Therefore, plaintiff has met the

heightened pleading standard and has overcome the defense of qualified immunity

asserted by Sergeant Harvey and Officer Davis.

IV. CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by the City of

Decatur (doc. no. 22) will be granted as to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, and denied as to

plaintiff’s state law claim for wrongful death. The motion to dismiss filed by

defendants KennethCollier, Joel Gilliam, Christopher Matthews, and Michael Harvey

(doc. no. 24) will be granted as to both plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and the state law

claims against those defendants. The motion to dismiss filed by defendants Michael

Harvey, Sharon Latham, Eric Brown, and Vernon Davis (doc. no. 26) will be granted

as to defendants Sharon Latham and Eric Brown, but denied as to defendants Michael

Harvey and Vernon Davis. 

An appropriate order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be entered

contemporaneously herewith. 

DONE this 28th day of July, 2010. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

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