Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01382/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01382-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 18 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jorge Ernesto Madueno, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CIV 13-1382-PHX-SRB (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Jorge Ernesto Madueno, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 18), and despite having an opportunity to do

so, Petitioner has not filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND1

On December 29, 2004, the Pinal County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner with one

count of first degree murder. (Exh. A.) The offense was described in the presentence report

as follows:

On December 5, 2004, Deputy Langan responded to a call at the Queen Valley

Golf Course concerning a deceased person. Upon Deputy Langan’s arrival he

met with Ryan Devinny, who said that he had come across human remains

while hunting in a desert location adjacent to Hewitt Station Road. Mr.

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Devinny had located a deceased person and summoned detectives and an

identification technician.

Further police investigation determined the identity of the deceased to be that

of Daniel Rojo Tavira. On December 16, 2004, the PCSO was informed by

the Grants Police Department in New Mexico, that they had identified a

wanted vehicle, along with several subjects, in connection with their

investigation. A cover warrant was issued by Pinal County.

On December 16, 2004, Detective Rankin interviewed Jose Cervando Ortega

and Jorge Ernesto Rodriguez Madueno, at the Grants Police Station. Mr.

Ortega told Detective Rankin that he had been at a house with Mr. Madueno

and Mr. Tavira, and that there had been an argument over drugs and cash. Mr.

Ortega said that Mr. Madueno struck Mr. Tavira in the face with a gun, and

that Mr. Tavira was not moving. Mr. Ortega then told Detective Rankin that

he assisted Mr. Madueno with cleaning up the blood from the floor and

moving Mr. Tavira’s body into the desert using Mr. Madueno’s pickup truck.

Mr. Ortega then told Detective Rankin that he returned to the house and

assisted Mr. Madueno with cleaning up the blood from the floor and bathroom.

(Exh. B at 2.)

Additional facts as recounted in Petitioner’s counsel’s notice of completion of review

reveal that after knocking the victim unconscious with the blow to his head with the pistol,

the victim was dragged to the bathroom where he lay bleeding on the floor. (Exh. I at 2.)

At some point, the victim regained consciousness and walked into the living room, where

Petitioner “struck him once or twice in the back of the head with a baseball bat.” (Id.) After

these blows, Petitioner and Ortega rolled the victim up in a blanket and placed his body in

a large mobile trash can before driving the trash can out into a desert area east of Apache

Junction to dump the body. (Id.) To ensure the victim was dead, Petitioner “fired one round

from a hand gun into the victim’s head.” (Id.)

On May 17, 2006, Petitioner pled guilty to an amended count of second degree murder

pursuant to an agreement with the State, in which Petitioner would be sentenced to the

mitigated term of 13 years’ imprisonment. (Exhs. C, D.) Accordingly, on June 13, 2006, the

trial court sentenced Petitioner to 13 years’ imprisonment. (Exh. E.) In conjunction with the

sentencing proceeding, Petitioner received and signed a “Notice of Rights After Conviction.”

(Exh. F.)

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On September 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, and on

September 14, 2006, the trial court appointed post-conviction counsel for Petitioner. (Exhs.

G, H.) On April 9, 2007, counsel filed a notice indicating that she had reviewed the record

and found no colorable claims to raise in a post-conviction proceeding. (Exh. I.)

On April 11, 2007, the trial court granted Petitioner additional time within which to

file a pro se petition. (Exh. J.) On June 8, 2007, because Petitioner had not filed a

supplemental pro se Rule 32 petition, the trial court dismissed the post-conviction

proceeding. (Exh. K.)

On March 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a “Re-Sentencing Memorandum,” which the trial

court treated as a successive notice of post-conviction relief. (Exhs. L, M.) The trial court

summarily dismissed this successive petition, concluding:

On March 5, 2012, the Petitioner, submitted a “Re-sentence Memorandum,”

which Judge Johnson directed be treated as a successive petition for

post-conviction relief. Judge Johnson directed the Petitioner to prepare and

file a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief within thirty days.

On April 2, 2012, the Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. The

notice included two claims: 1) newly discovered evidence, and 2) a change in

the law which, if applied to the Petitioner’s case would probably have changed

the verdict or sentence.

As to the claim of newly discovered evidence, the Petitioner claims that the

testimony of one Steve Soto. The evidence consists of testimony which was

given on December 17, 2004. The Petitioner claims that trial counsel either

chose to ignore this evidence or perhaps did not see its relevance. He claims

that trial counsel’s decision not to present this evidence is evidence of deficient

performance. This argument presupposes that the evidence was known to trial

counsel prior to the change of plea and sentencing in this matter and is,

therefore, not newly discovered evidence.

The change in the law of which the Petitioner complains is a change in the

statutory requirements as to self defense which the Petitioner claims would

have changed the outcome of his case. Changes in the statutory area are not

normally retroactive and the Petitioner’s case must be governed by the law in

effect when the acts with which he was charged were committed.

Rule 32.2(b) requires that successive petitions alleging either of these grounds

must demonstrate meritorious grounds for relief. The Petitioner has presented

no meritorious grounds and the petition is subject to summary dismissal.

(Exh. M at 1-2.)

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On August 8, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider, specifically asking the

trial court to address his “miscalculated sentence” issue. (Exh. N.) On August 13, 2012, the

trial court ruled, dismissing the sentencing issue as follows:

The Court has reviewed the Motion to reconsider filed by the Petitioner herein,

in which he argues that the Court did not specifically address the issue of the

Department of Corrections calculation of his sentence expiration.

The Petitioner is correct in stating that the Court did not specifically address

this issue and he did not set it forth in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

Petitioner apparently believed that that claim was incorporated by its inclusion

in what was subsequently designated as his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief.

The Court has reviewed the initial “Re-sentencing Memorandum” and the file

in this matter. The sentence was properly imposed and the Department’s

calculations are correct.

(Exh. O at 1-2.)

On August 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing. (Exh. P.) On August 29,

2012, the trial court denied the motion for rehearing. (Doc. 1 at 39.)

Petitioner apparently filed a petition for review in the court of appeals, and on

December 27, 2012, the court of appeals granted review but denied relief from the denial of

Petitioner’s successive post-conviction proceeding. The court reasoned:

In his petition for review, [Madueno] repeats his claim that his release date has

been miscalculated and asserts the trial court erred in failing to appoint him

counsel.[] He requests that this court review his filings below and instruct the

trial court to order “specific performance” of the sentence provided for in his

plea agreement. But Madueno’s attempt to incorporate by reference his filings

below is not permitted by our rules. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(iv). And

his failure to comply with our rules or to provide meaningful argument in his

petition for review would itself justify our summary refusal to grant review.

See State v. Bolton, 182 290, 298, 896 P.2d 830, 838 (1995) (insufficient

argument waives claim on review); State v. French, 198 Ariz. 119, ¶ 9, 7 P.3d

128, 131 (App. 2000) (summarily rejecting claims not complying with rules

governing form and content of petitions for review), disapproved on other

grounds by Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002).

In any event, we agree with the trial court that ADOC has calculated correctly

Madueno’s release date based on the sentence imposed and the 167 days of

presentence incarceration credit found by the court. The essence of

Madueno’s claim instead appears to be that he was entitled to additional credit.

That claim, however, is precluded because it could have been raised in his first

Rule 32 proceeding but was not. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). Madueno

has not identified, either below or in his petition for review, any exception to

Rule 32.2(a) applicable to the claim. Thus, the court did not err in summarily

rejecting it. Nor has Madueno cited any authority suggesting he was entitled

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to have counsel appointed; we therefore do not address that argument. See

Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 298, 896 P.2d at 838.

(Exh. Q at 3-4.) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court, and the court

of appeals issued its mandate on May 3, 2013. (Exh. R.)

On July 10, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition raising only one ground

for relief. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner alleges that the state violated his federal due process rights

by breaching a term of the plea agreement. (Id. at 6.) On March 3, 2014, Respondents filed

an Answer. (Doc. 18.) Petitioner has not filed a traverse despite having the opportunity to

do so.

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely

and, as such, must be denied and dismissed. 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

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conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period.

See id. Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a

limitations period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, –––, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560, 177

L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances

stood in his way’” and prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace,

544 U.S. at 418).

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2

 The end date fell on Sunday, July 8, 2007. Petitioner therefore had until Monday,

July 9, 2007, to file a petition for review.

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The Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely.

Petitioner was sentenced under the plea agreement on June 13, 2006. (Exhs. C, D, E.) On

September 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Exh. G.) After

appointed counsel filed a notice indicating that she had reviewed the record and found no

colorable claims, the trial court gave Petitioner until May 15, 2007 to file his pro se petition

for post-conviction relief. (Exhs. H, I, J.) On June 8, 2007, the trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceeding because Petitioner failed to file his pro se

petition. (Exh. K.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review from this summary dismissal

in the Arizona Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court. Thus, Petitioner’s state court

conviction became final on July 9, 2007 – 31 days after the state court dismissed the PCR

proceeding, because the statute was tolled during the time he could have filed a petition for

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.2

 See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c) (“Within thirty days

after the final decision of the trial court on the petition for post-conviction relief or the

motion for rehearing, any party aggrieved may petition the appropriate appellate court for

review of the actions of the trial court.”). The statute of limitations began to run on July 10,

2007 – one day after the 30-day period – and expired one year later – on July 10, 2008.

Petitioner did not file the instant habeas petition until July 10, 2013 – five years after

expiration of the one-year limitations period. Thus, absent any statutory or equitable tolling,

Petitioner habeas petition is untimely.

The Court finds that Petitioner’s commencement of a second or successive PCR

proceeding on March 19, 2012, did not toll the limitations period. (Exhs. L, M.) As

previously stated, the limitations period expired on July 10, 2008. Over three-and-a-half

years after the one-year limitations period expired, Petitioner filed his successive notice of

post-conviction relief. Because the statute of limitations had already run by the time

Petitioner commenced his successive petition for post-conviction relief, statutory tolling will

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not save his habeas petition. Once the limitations period expires, a subsequently filed

petition for post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute of limitations. See Jiminez v.

Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

Moreover, the trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s untimely successive

petition finding that Petitioner failed to satisfy any exception for filing a successive Rule 32

petition. The trial court stated, in pertinent part:

Rule 32.2(b) requires that successive petitions alleging either of these grounds

[newly discovered evidence or a change in law] must demonstrate meritorious

grounds for relief. The Petitioner has presented no meritorious grounds and

the petition is subject to summary dismissal.

(Exh. M at 1-2.) Thus, Petitioner’s second or successive notice of post-conviction relief was

not properly filed.

In sum, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on July 10, 2013 – five years after

expiration of the one-year limitations period. Petitioner’s habeas petition is, therefore,

untimely.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

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a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Petitioner has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify

equitable tolling or demonstrated that an external impediment hindered the diligent pursuit

of his rights. And, in any event, Petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources,

ignorance of the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v.

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”).

And, Petitioner’s conclusory citation to Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182

L.Ed.2d 272 (2012) is unpersuasive. Martinez applies only to excusing procedural default

and/or lack of exhaustion in state court. See id. at 1315. In Martinez, the Court held:

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must

be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will

not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective

assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no

counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.

Id. at 1320. Thus, Martinez has no application to the statute of limitations in the AEDPA

which governs Petitioner’s filing in federal court. See McKinnie v. Long, 2013 WL 1890618

(C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2013) (“Martinez dealt solely with the state procedural default doctrine,

which is entirely different from the issue presented here of whether petitioner's claims are

time barred under the AEDPA statute of limitations.”); Moore v. Williams, 2013 WL 271454

at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 23, 2013) (“Petitioner has conflated the federal timeliness question with

the issue of whether a claim in the federal petition is barred due to procedural default in state

court.”). Accordingly, Martinez does not present a basis for equitable tolling.

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and his habeas petition is

untimely.

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CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 17th day of April, 2014.

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