Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00249/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00249-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 30:1201 Environment: Review of Agency Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

----oo0oo---- 

CONSERVATION CONGRESS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, 

and UNITED STATES FISH AND 

WILDLIFE SERVICE, 

Defendants. 

CIV. NO. 2:15-00249 WBS AC 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 

----oo0oo---- 

 Plaintiff Conservation Congress brought this action 

against the United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”) and 

the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), alleging 

that defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act 

(“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, the Endangered Species Act 

(“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, the National Forest Management 

Act of 1976 (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614, and the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, in 

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approving the Harris Vegetation Management Project (“Harris 

Project”) in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest. In October 

2015, after plaintiff had initiated its lawsuit, the Forest 

Service voluntarily reinitiated ESA section 7 consultation on the 

potential impacts of the Harris Project on the gray wolf and 

prepared a BA Addendum finding that the Harris Project “may 

affect, but is not likely to adversely affect” the gray wolf, and 

the FWS concurred. (Myers Decl. ¶ 18 (Docket No. 54).) Both 

parties agreed that plaintiff’s gray wolf ESA claims were mooted 

by this voluntary action and, as a result, the court dismissed 

the two ESA claims. (Pl.’s Reply to Mot. for Summ. J. at 2 

(Docket No. 27); Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 13 (Docket No. 41-

1); Feb. 23, 2016 Order at 15-16 (Docket No. 49).) The court 

granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the remaining 

claims. (Feb. 23, 2016 Order.) 

 In March 2016, plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees and 

costs pursuant to section 11(g)(4) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1540(g)(4), arguing that it was the prevailing party on its 

gray wolf ESA claims for the purposes of receiving attorney’s 

fees under the catalyst theory. (Pl.’s Notice of Mot. & Mot. for 

Att’y’s Fees (“Pl.’s Mot.”) (Docket No. 51).) As the court 

explained in its June 2, 2016 Order, an evidentiary hearing was 

necessary to determine whether plaintiff’s lawsuit was a catalyst 

because the court could not undertake the factbound inquiry 

necessary to determine which party was more credible based solely 

on the contradicting pleadings and declarations. (June 2, 2016 

Order at 12 (Docket No. 60).) The court held an evidentiary 

hearing on July 28, 2016. 

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 The ESA citizen suit provision provides that a court 

“may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and 

expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines 

such award is appropriate.” 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4). This 

“whenever appropriate” language “‘was meant to expand the class 

of parties eligible for fee awards from prevailing parties to 

partially prevailing parties--parties achieving some success, 

even if not major success.’” Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies v. 

Evans, 386 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ruckelhaus v. 

Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 (1983) (interpreting the Clean Air 

Act’s identical fee-shifting provision)). 

 When a plaintiff does not win a final judgment on the 

merits, the two-part “catalyst theory” test determines whether 

that plaintiff nonetheless prevailed for the purpose of receiving 

attorney’s fees. The district court must determine that (1) the 

lawsuit accomplished, at least in part, what it sought to 

accomplish and there was a “‘clear, causal relationship between 

the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized,’” and 

(2) “‘the benefit achieved was required by law and was not a 

gratuitous act of the defendant.’” Id. at 885-86 & n.3 (citation 

omitted).1 

 In deciding whether there is a clear, causal 

relationship between the litigation brought and the practical 

outcome realized, the court “inquires whether the suit was at 

 1

 In its June 2, 2016 Order, this court found that 

plaintiff received most of the benefits it was seeking in its ESA 

claims as to the gray wolf but left undecided the question of 

whether there was a clear causal relationship between the 

litigation brought and benefits obtained. (June 2, 2016 Order at 

3-4.) 

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least a material factor or played a catalytic role in bringing 

about the desired result.” Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 

F.2d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). While the litigation need not be the “sole 

cause” of the outcome, it must at least be a “contributing 

factor.” Id. (citing Am. Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 

184, 187 (9th Cir. 1981)). “‘At a minimum, the lawsuit must have 

been a catalyst that prompted the opposing party to take 

action.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also McQuiston v. Marsh, 

790 F.2d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding a finding that the 

plaintiff was not a prevailing party when the district court 

“specifically found that no causal nexus existed between” the 

lawsuit and the defendant’s action and that his lawsuit “did not 

prompt” the defendant’s action); Harris v. McCarthy, 790 F.2d 

753, 759 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A district court may award attorney’s 

fees to a plaintiff whose suit has prompted defendants to take 

action to satisfy his demands.”); Am. Constitutional Party, 650 

F.2d at 188 (“[T]he causal relation between the lawsuit and the 

relief received ‘must be more than simple knowledge that 

litigation may occur.’” (citation omitted)). 

 “[C]hronological events are important, although not a 

definitive factor, in determining whether or not a defendant can 

be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to 

a plaintiff’s lawsuit.” Braafladt v. Bd. of Governors of Or. 

State Bar Ass’n, 778 F.2d 1442, 1444 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming 

the district court’s finding of no causal connection where an 

earlier suit had already raised similar constitutional questions 

and prompted the Oregon Supreme Court to act); see also Sablan v. 

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Dep’t of Fin. of the Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Islands, 856 

F.2d 1317, 1326 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Clues to the provocative 

effects of the plaintiffs’ legal efforts are often best gleaned 

from the chronology of events.”). 

 “‘Whether a litigant has shown a sufficient causal 

relationship between the lawsuit and the practical outcome 

realized is a pragmatic factual inquiry for the district court.’” 

Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Cal. Native Plant Soc., 182 F. 

Supp. 2d 944, 950 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citation omitted). 

“[C]redibility choices in the resolution of conflicting testimony 

are the district court’s province as fact finder.” Sablan, 865 

F.2d at 1326 (citation omitted). 

 For example, in American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 

the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the 

plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees because the plaintiffs 

failed to show that their suit played “a sufficiently influential 

role” in the outcome. 650 F.2d at 188. The plaintiffs filed a 

suit challenging the constitutionality of a Washington statute 

and the statute was amended one year later, mooting the 

plaintiffs’ complaint. Id. at 186. The plaintiffs nonetheless 

moved for attorney’s fees, arguing that their suit contributed to 

the legislative action taken. Id. at 188. The only evidence the 

plaintiffs submitted was an affidavit created a year after the 

amendment from a legislator who stated that he was aware of the 

suit during the legislative process and the suit was discussed in 

House meetings. Id. at 186. The house and senate journals 

during the months when the legislation was considered did not, 

however, mention the plaintiffs’ suit. Id. Moreover, there was 

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significant evidence in the record that amendments to the statute 

had been proposed and meetings with the Secretary of State had 

taken place for years before the plaintiffs filed their suit. 

Id. at 188. Lastly, the legislator’s after-the-fact affidavit 

was not reliable and it stated “only that the suit was 

‘discussed,’ not that it played a causal role in passage of the 

amendment.” Id. at 188. 

 In this case, the Forest Service called two Forest 

Service employees as witnesses at the July 28, 2016 evidentiary 

hearing: (1) Christine Jordan, a wildlife biologist for the 

Shasta-Trinity National Forest; and (2) David R. Myers, the 

Forest Supervisor for the Shasta-Trinity National Forest who is 

responsible for assuring compliance with section 7 of the ESA and 

for the decision authorizing the Harris Project. Both Jordan and 

Myers credibly testified that while they were aware of 

plaintiff’s suit and the claim regarding the gray wolf, the suit 

had no impact on the Forest Service’s decision to reinitiate 

consultation and prepare a BA Addendum. (See also Myers Decl. 

¶ 5.) 

 Instead, both witnesses represented that the Forest 

Service reinitiated consultation because of two press releases 

issued by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (“CDFW”) 

in August 2015 about the “Shasta Pack”--a reproducing pair of 

wolves and five pups observed within ten to fifteen miles of the 

Harris Project area. (See Myers Decl. Attach. B (Docket No. 54-

2).) Jordan testified that on August 21, 2015, a day after this 

significant press release, she began seeking further information 

about the location of the Shasta Pack, consulting with biologists 

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with experience with gray wolves, and preparing a Consideration 

of New Information. (See Second Ogden Decl. Ex. 1 at 81, 

Consideration of New Info. (Docket No. 36).) The Shasta Pack’s 

presence was important new information, according to Jordan, 

because it was the first evidence of a breeding pack of gray 

wolves, an endangered species, in California in a hundred years. 

Jordan explained that the earlier presence of OR7, a radiocollared lone wolf, was very different as he had already returned 

to Oregon, was not reproducing, and lone wolves often rove 

hundreds of miles. 

 Jordan recommended that the Forest Service reinitiate 

consultation with the FWS because of the proximity of the Shasta 

Pack detection area to the Harris Project; the suitable potential 

habitat within the Harris Project area for both dens and 

rendezvous sites--large, grassy, meadow areas where adults take 

pups after leaving the den; and the possible disturbance that 

ongoing Harris Project activity could cause to the wolves. 

Project activity thus far had involved the operation of loud, 

heavy logging equipment in order to cut down trees and pile wood. 

Jordan testified that her decision to recommend reinitiation of 

consultation was therefore “purely based on biology”--the 

appearance of this new endangered species within close proximity 

to an active project area--and plaintiff’s suit did not influence 

her decision in any way. 

 Myers, the deciding officer on the Harris Project, also 

testified that his decision to adopt Jordan’s recommendation and 

reinitiate consultation was in no way influenced by plaintiff’s 

suit. Myers had been aware of plaintiff’s claims regarding the 

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gray wolf since plaintiff had filed its First Amended Complaint, 

three-and-a-half months prior to the Shasta Pack press releases. 

Myers did not decide to reinitiate consultation during this time. 

Instead, Myers decided to reinitiate consultation only after 

receiving the “extremely important” news of the Shasta Pack and 

the recommendation of his biologist. 

 Myers stated that there was pressure to quickly 

reinitiate consultation and examine the impacts of the Harris 

Project on the gray wolf because the Harris Project logging was 

ongoing and the project was in close proximity to the Shasta Pack 

detection area and had the potential to disturb the wolves. 

According to Myers, the approaching November 6, 2015 summary 

judgment deadline in plaintiff’s case did not, as plaintiff 

suggested, drive the expedited timeline. Myers testified that he 

does not even recall being aware of the summary judgment deadline 

when he was conferring with the FWS about a quick turnaround and 

securing a letter of concurrence by October 2015. (See Third 

Suppl. Ogden Decl. Ex. 2-K.) This makes sense to the court, 

considering all of the other, more pressing, matters Myers 

testified he had to attend to at the time, as well of the fact 

that Myers is not a lawyer. 

 Furthermore, both Myers and Jordan testified that it is 

not unusual for the FWS to issue a letter of concurrence within a 

week or two of receiving a BA Addendum because the FWS is already 

familiar with the project and has generally been working with the 

Forest Service to develop the project for some time already. 

 Plaintiff did not call any of its own witnesses but 

rather attempted to highlight in its cross-examination of Jordan 

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and Myers their coordination with the Office of General Counsel 

and the chronology of events to demonstrate that its suit played 

a role in the Forest Service’s decision to reinitiate 

consultation. For example, plaintiff questioned Jordan about a 

high priority email she sent out shortly after the press releases 

notifying other Forest Service employees and Ritu Ahuja, the 

assigned counsel in the Office of General Counsel, that she was 

developing a general approach for addressing the new information 

on the Shasta Pack “for the Porcupine and Harris Projects that 

are in active litigation.” (Second Suppl. Ogden Decl. Ex. 2 

(emphasis added).) Similarly, plaintiff asked Jordan about a 

September 2015 email to her line officer, Carolyn Napper, 

summarizing a conversation Jordan had had with Ahuja, (Third 

Suppl. Ogden Decl. Ex. 2-D), and another informing Myers that 

Jordan and Emelia Barnum, the supervisory natural resource 

planner on the Shasta-Trinity National Forest unit, had 

“continued to work with Ritu [Ahuja] on the process for 

documenting the presence of the wolf and the pups somewhere 

around the unit.” (Id. Ex. 2-F.) In response to this line of 

questions, Jordan explained that she was in touch with Ahuja to 

keep her and the Office of General Counsel up to date on how the 

Forest Service planned to handle the new information regarding 

the Shasta Pack. She was familiar with plaintiff’s suit and the 

claims alleged but this did not impact her recommendation. 

 Plaintiff also argued that the Forest Service’s 

decision to reinitiate consultation on the Harris Project but not 

the Porcupine Project, which is also within foraging range from 

the Shasta Pack detection area, demonstrates the impact of its 

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suit. Jordan, however, testified that she did not complete a 

Consideration of New Information, recommend that the Forest 

Service reinitiate consultation, or prepare a BA Addendum on the 

Porcupine Project because it was farther away from the Shasta 

Pack detection area and has no suitable habitat for gray wolves. 

The Porcupine Project has no water, open lava rock, and little to 

no prey or forage base for gray wolves. In contrast, the Harris 

Project has springs, areas with higher elevation, buttes with 

large fir and pine trees, and grassy areas. The different 

habitats within the Porcupine and Harris projects, Jordan 

testified, warranted different approaches. 

 After listening to the witnesses’ testimony, observing 

their demeanor, and reviewing the declarations and email evidence 

submitted, the court finds Jordan and Myers’ testimony to be 

credible. No one can better assess Jordan’s thought process in 

recommending reinitiation of consultation or Myers’ in accepting 

this recommendation than the two individuals themselves. In 

addition, the court did not detect from their testimony any 

motivation to lie about whether plaintiff’s suit influenced them. 

The witnesses are not personally responsible for paying 

plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and would not therefore suffer any 

financial harm from acknowledging plaintiff’s suit was a 

catalyst. Further, it could even be in both witnesses’ best 

interests to acknowledge that they carefully considered 

plaintiff’s claims and changed their course of action in part 

because of plaintiff’s allegations. Nonetheless, both 

unequivocally denied being influenced by the suit and 

persuasively testified that the Forest Service reinitiated 

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consultation because of a clear intervening event--new 

information about a reproducing pack of gray wolves in 

California. 

 Further, while the Office of General Counsel was 

included in discussions of the Shasta Pack and kept up-to-date on 

the Forest Service’s consultation process, this does not 

demonstrate that plaintiff’s suit was a catalyst to the Forest 

Service’s decision. There is an important distinction between 

communicating with counsel because a project is in active 

litigation as a matter of protocol and making decisions because 

of the pending litigation. As in American Constitutional Party, 

the fact that the suit was discussed is not evidence that it 

played a causal role. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that its 

suit played even the smallest role in the outcome achieved. 

 The court therefore finds that there is no “‘clear, 

causal relationship between the litigation brought and the 

practical outcome realized.’” Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies, 386 

F.3d at 885-86. Accordingly, the court must deny plaintiff’s 

motion for attorney’s fees. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for 

attorney’s fees (Docket No. 51) be, and the same hereby is, 

DENIED. 

Dated: June 30, 2016 

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