Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-24-60080/USCOURTS-ca5-24-60080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ No. 24-60080 ____________ Gabino Ramos Hernandez, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, versus

Phillip Causey, 

Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi 

USDC No. 2:17-CV-123 ______________________________ Before Elrod, Chief Judge, Dennis and Higginson, Circuit Judges. Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge: 

This appeal arises from a traffic-stop-turned-officer-shooting. After 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agent Phillip Causey shot plaintiffappellant Gabino Ramos Hernandez, Hernandez sued Causey under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens. The district court granted Causey’s motion to dismiss and denied Hernandez’s motion for leave to amend the complaint. Hernandez timely appealed. 

The district court correctly recognized that finding the availability of 

a Bivens remedy here would expand Bivens to a new context in contravention 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

December 23, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk 

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2 

of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Egbert. The court also correctly found 

that, even though Hernandez had properly pled an excessive force claim for 

the shooting, Causey did not act under color of state law as is required to 

sustain a claim under § 1983. We accordingly AFFIRM the dismissal of the 

appealed claims and AFFIRM the denial of leave to amend the complaint as 

further amendment would be futile. 

I.

On July 20, 2016, Laurel Police Department Officer David Driskell 

observed Hernandez fail to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. Officer 

Driskell observed the vehicle behind Hernandez’s appeared to have an intoxicated driver; the vehicle was being driven by Hernandez’s brother, Jose 

Mendoza. Officer Driskell stopped both vehicles and initially tried to question Mendoza while Hernandez spent “time standing by and waiting.”1

 After 

verbally requesting clarification on Mendoza’s answers several times, Officer 

Driskell called ICE Agents McGhee and Sharff; the body camera footage 

showed Officer Driskell asking, “Can you assist me with some Spanish?” to 

request interpretation services for his questioning of Mendoza. 

Officer Driskell then saw Hernandez approaching and shouted, “Do 

you speak English?” Hernandez responded, “What’s the problem?” Officer 

Driskell indicated Mendoza and replied, “He’s drunk.” Officer Driskell and 

Hernandez continued speaking for a few seconds but had trouble understanding each other. Officer Driskell said, “I tell you what, I got somebody who 

don’t understand you. So, hang tight right there, okay?” As the ICE Agents _____________________ 1 Hernandez describes his amended complaints as “supplemental and amended” 

complaints. His allegations in prior complaints—such as the First Amended Complaint 

quoted here—therefore remain live. 

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arrived, Hernandez left the area of the traffic stop. Hernandez alleges that, at 

some point around the time of Agent McGhee’s arrival, he “decided to leave 

the scene, initially intending to simply enter his residence, but then deciding 

to go to his uncle’s home nearby.” 

Officer Driskell observed to Agent McGhee, “He’s going down the 

block! He’s running south!” Agent McGhee pursued on foot, shouting, 

“Get down! Get the f**k down!” Officer Driskell appeared to shine his flashlight at Hernandez. At the same time, other ICE agents, including Agent 

Causey, converged on the scene while Agent McGhee shouted directions. At 

minute 17:14 of Officer Driskel’s body camera video, a shot is heard on the 

footage; at 18:03, Officer Driskell arrived on the scene and witnessed Agent 

Causey shouting, “Man, you shouldn’t have put your hand in your f**king 

pocket!” The district court noted that other law enforcement witnesses corroborated Agent Causey’s testimony that Hernandez was reaching into his 

pocket. Hernandez alleges that he “had his hands raised in surrender” when 

Agent Causey shot him in the right arm. 

Hernandez filed suit on July 20, 2017. Hernandez initially brought 

claims against Causey under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Mississippi 

tort law. He later amended his complaint to allege negligence and intentional 

tort claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The 

district court denied summary judgment to Causey on qualified immunity, 

concluding that there was “a material factual dispute to resolve” as to where 

Hernandez’s hands were positioned and whether Causey’s use of force was 

reasonable. 

In 2022, Causey filed for reconsideration, arguing that the Supreme 

Court’s ruling in Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), limited Bivens claims 

such as Hernandez’s. The district court agreed that post-Egbert,

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Hernandez’s claim presented a new distinct context from prior Bivens claims 

and that Hernandez’s claim was now foreclosed. The defendants then moved 

to dismiss Hernandez’s remaining claims against Causey pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted Causey’s motion 

to dismiss from the bench, concluding that, to the extent Hernandez alleged 

Causey was acting under color of federal law, Hernandez’s § 1983 claim must 

be dismissed. But the court granted Hernandez leave to file a motion to 

amend his complaint to replead his § 1983 claim that Causey acted under 

color of state law.

Hernandez then moved for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, 

but the district court denied the motion, holding that Hernandez “fail[ed] to 

state an unlawful seizure claim against Causey and d[id] not allege that Causey was acting under color of state law for purposes of his excessive force 

claim.” The district court found that Hernandez alleged no facts to support 

an inference that Officer Driskell conspired with ICE to request interpretation services as a pretext, including no facts to show that Causey was part of 

such an alleged agreement. The district court held that Hernandez had failed 

to plead a constitutional violation because he did not allege that he was improperly detained prior to ICE’s arrival and did not allege the initial traffic 

stop lacked probable cause. The court held that although Hernandez had 

plausibly alleged a claim that Causey violated his right to be free from excessive force, any amendment would be futile because § 1983 “does not apply to 

 [] taken pursuant to federal law by federal agents.’” Although federal officials may act under color of state law in rare circumstances, such as 

when the federal officials acted “in conspiracy with state officials,” Hindes v. 

FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 1998), the district court found that the 

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amended complaint did not plead any such circumstances. The court dismissed all claims against Causey with prejudice.2

Hernandez filed a notice of appeal from the court’s partial judgment 

on February 15, 2024. On March 12, 2024, the district court certified its partial judgment for immediate appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), dismissing all claims against Causey and concluding that there 

was “no just reason to delay the appeal of Hernandez’s claims against Causey 

under Bivens and [42] U.S.C. Section 1983.” The notice of appeal matured 

on March 12, 2024. Brown v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 311 F.3d 328, 332 

(5th Cir. 2002). Only Hernandez’s claims against Causey in his individual 

capacity are at issue in this appeal. 

II. 

“We review a district court’s dismissal of claims under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo.” Clyce v. Butler, 876 F.3d 145, 148 (5th 

Cir. 2017). A court must dismiss a complaint as a matter of law when the 

plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain 

tate a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court “accept[s] 

well-pleaded facts as true” and “view[s] them in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.” Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 

(5th Cir. 1986)). Dismissal is appropriate if the facts pled are not enough to 

state a facially plausible claim for relief. Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 410 _____________________ 2

 Hernandez’s intentional tort claims against the United States remain pending 

before the district court. 

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(5th Cir. 2013). Plausibility is not akin to probability, but instead, “it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Walker, 938 F.3d at 735 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “All questions of fact and 

any ambiguities in the current controlling substantive law must be resolved 

in the plaintiff’s favor.” Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2001).3

III. 

Hernandez appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Bivens claim 

against Causey, arguing that his claim does not present a new Bivens context. 

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court authorized damages actions against federal officers for 

arresting an individual in his home and searching the home “from stem to 

stern” without a warrant. 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). Bivens “broke new 

ground by holding that a person claiming to be the victim of an unlawful arrest 

and search could bring a Fourth Amendment claim for damages against the 

responsible agents even though no federal statute authorized such a claim.” 

Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 99 (2020). In the decade following Bivens, the Supreme Court expanded Bivens actions to encompass a former congressional staffer’s sex discrimination claim under the Fifth Amendment, Davis 

v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and a federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendment 

claim based on inadequate healthcare, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 

But over the next 42 years, the Supreme Court “declined 11 times to 

imply a similar cause of action for other alleged constitutional violations.” 

Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 486 (2022); see also Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102. 

Reflecting on Bivens actions, the Supreme Court has explained that Bivens _____________________ 3

 In reviewing the district court’s determinations de novo, we consider the 

allegations presented in the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint in addition to the 

operative complaints. 

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was decided at a time where, “as a routine matter with respect to statutes, 

the Court would imply causes of action not explicit in the statutory text itself.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 132 (2017). But “[i]n cases decided after 

Bivens, and after the statutory implied cause-of-action cases that Bivens itself 

relied upon, the Court adopted a far more cautious course before finding implied causes of action.” Id. “[E]xpanding the Bivens

vored’ judicial activity.” Id. at 135 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). The 

Court’s precedent has “made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” 

Egbert, 596 U.S. at 486. “Congress is best positioned to evaluate whether, 

and the extent to which, monetary and other liabilities should be imposed 

upon individual officers and employees of the Federal Government’ based on 

constitutional torts.” Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 101 (2020) (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 134). “[I]f [the Supreme Court] were called to decide Bivens today, [it] would decline to discover any implied causes of action in the Constitution.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 502. 

Hernandez claims that his “case is distinguishable from Egbert” because “when Causey shot Plaintiff herein, he was actively participating as a 

law enforcement officer in a purely local law enforcement operation” while 

“Egbert was performing his duties as a Border Patrol officer to secure the 

border.” He claims 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) and the FTCA show a Congressional intent for Bivens actions by entitling “the victim of an assault and battery by a law enforcement officer . . . to a Bivins [sic] action.” He raises the 

same grounds in his reply brief. Section 2680(h), however, does not contain 

language authorizing Bivens actions. As for the FTCA, the Supreme Court 

has previously held that the provision in question “does not suggest . . . that 

Congress intended for a robust enforcement of Bivens remedies. . . . It is not 

a license to create a new Bivens remedy in a context we have never before 

addressed.” Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 111 n.9 (internal quotation marks and 

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citation omitted). Hernandez’s claim must instead be analyzed under the typical Bivens rubric. 

The Supreme Court has “framed the inquiry as proceeding in two 

steps.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492. First, we must determine whether Hernandez’s claim 

presents a new Bivens context—i.e., is it meaningfully different 

from the three cases in which the Court has implied a damages 

action.” Id. (cleaned up). The Supreme Court has previously 

detailed “differences that are meaningful enough to make a 

given context a new one”: “the rank of the officers involved; 

the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of 

the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an 

officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the 

officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence 

of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not 

consider. 

Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 139–40. The Court’s “understanding of a new context’ 

is broad.” Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102. Second, if the claim implicates a new 

context, “a Bivens remedy is unavailable if there are special factors indicating 

that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to weigh 

the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Egbert, 596 

U.S. at 492 (cleaned up). Although the “Court has not defined the phrase 

,’” it has explained “that the inquiry 

must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of 

allowing a damages action to proceed.” Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 136. And the 

Court’s recent decision in Egbert makes clear that a Bivens action should not 

proceed where “there is any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress

is better suited” to make that determination. Egbert, 596 U.S. at 496. 

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In applying the Supreme Court’s precedent disfavoring Bivens actions, we have limited Bivens claims to three narrow circumstances: 

(1) manacling the plaintiff in front of his family in his home and 

strip-searching him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see 

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90, 91 S.Ct. 1999; (2) discrimination 

on the basis of sex by a congressman against a staff person in 

violation of the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 

U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); and (3) failure 

to provide medical attention to an asthmatic prisoner in federal 

custody in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. 

Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). 

Oliva v. Nivar, 973 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2020). Outside of these three narrowly defined categories, “[v]irtually everything else is a new context.’” Id.

Hernandez seems to argue that his claim falls within the first, original 

Bivens context. In Bivens, the plaintiff alleged that federal agents from the

Federal Bureau of Narcotics violated his Fourth Amendment rights with an 

unlawful search—searching his home without a warrant or probable cause—

and excessive force—handcuffing him in front of his family. Bivens, 403 U.S. 

at 389. Here, both the type of defendant and type of unconstitutional conduct 

differ from Bivens. Hernandez brings his claim against an ICE agent. The Court in Egbert

held that “the Judiciary is comparatively ill suited to decide whether a damages remedy against any Border Patrol agent is appropriate.” Egbert, 596 U.S. 

at 495. Unlike the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which falls under the Department of the Treasury, both ICE and Border Patrol fall under the Department 

of Homeland Security—a “new category of defendants.” See Abbasi, 582 

U.S. at 135 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)). 

Although this circuit has not reached the question of whether to apply Bivens

to ICE agents, other circuits have held that ICE agents are new defendants 

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for the purposes of Bivens. See Alvarez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 818 

F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2016) (no Bivens remedy in immigration context); TunCos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514 (4th Cir. 2019); Barry v. Anderson, No. 22-3098, 

2023 WL 8449246 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2023); see also De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 

367 (5th Cir. 2015) (declining to extend Bivens to CBP agents for illegal stops 

and arrests). 

In addition, the circumstances of the alleged constitutional violations 

in this case are “meaningfully different” than those in Bivens. While Bivens’s 

home was searched without a warrant, Hernandez was legally stopped for a 

traffic violation. Bivens claimed there was no probable cause to detain him; 

Hernandez claims Causey’s use of force in pursuing Hernandez was unconstitutionally excessive. We have recognized in the context of Bivens claims 

that “ [j]udicial guidance’ differs across the various kinds of Fourth Amendment violations—like seizures by deadly force, searches by wiretap, Terry

stops, executions of warrants, seizures without legal process ( false arrest’), 

seizures with wrongful legal process ( malicious prosecution’), etc.” Cantú 

v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 423 (5th Cir. 2019). We explained in Cantú that just 

as “[n]o one thinks Davis . . . means the entirety of the Fifth Amendment’s 

Due Process Clause is fair game in a Bivens action,” even a violation of the 

same clause of the same amendment does not authorize a Bivens action if the 

factual circumstances are different. Id. at 422. We have held that a claim 

where a Department of Homeland Security officer drew a gun and threatened 

the plaintiff, Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 880 (5th Cir. 2021), and a claim 

where Veterans Affairs police put the plaintiff in a chokehold, Oliva, 973 F.3d 

at 440, presented new contexts under Bivens. In both cases, we declined to 

extend Bivens to encompass these Fourth Amendment excessive force 

claims. 

In Egbert, the Supreme Court noted that “a court may not fashion a 

Bivens remedy if Congress already has provided, or has authorized the 

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(quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 137). Alternative remedies existed for the plaintiff in Egbert: under 8 C.F.R. § 287.10, the Department of Homeland Security 

was required to “investigate[] expeditiously” any “[a]lleged violations of the 

standards for enforcement activities” reported by “[a]ny persons wishing to 

lodge a complaint.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.10; Egbert, 596 U.S. at 497. This same 

grievance procedure applies here because ICE is part of the Department of 

Homeland Security. Causey also correctly points out that Congress has authorized the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to investigate “noncriminal allegations of misconduct” and “impose disciplinary action on any employee of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.” 6 

U.S.C. §§ 253–254. “So long as Congress or the Executive has created a remedial process that it finds sufficient to secure an adequate level of deterrence, the courts cannot second-guess that calibration by superimposing a 

Bivens remedy.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 498. 

Finally, Hernandez points to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for certain tort suits. He argues that because the Westfall Act modified 

the FTCA to create an exception to the FTCA’s exclusivity provision for 

“suits against federal employees for constitutional violations,” this is akin to 

Congressional authorization for his Bivens claim. But this is a misreading of 

the statute. The Supreme Court has explained that the FTCA “is not a license to create a new Bivens remedy in a context we have never before addressed” but instead “left Bivens where it found it.” Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 

111 n.9. 

Hernandez’s claim does indeed present a new context for Bivens—it 

implicates new defendants, presents a different basis for a Fourth 

Amendment violation, and has an alternative remedial structure provided by 

Congress. The district court properly dismissed the Bivens claim against 

Causey. 

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IV. 

Hernandez also appeals the district court’s dismissal of his § 1983 

claim. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of 

a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must 

show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under 

color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

A. 

At oral argument, Hernandez’s counsel argued that the stop, questioning, and request for translation all amounted to a pretextual seizure separate from the excessive-force claim arising from the shooting. But Hernandez’s briefing does not address the district court’s finding that Hernandez 

failed to allege that he “was improperly detained pending the arrival of ICE 

agents.” ROA.2077. “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects against detention, 

not questioning.” United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir.), opinion 

modified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010). In fact, although Hernandez states “the pretext alleged was the supposed need for translation assistance,” he acknowledges that he is not alleging a pretextual stop. 

In general, “[a] party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered 

to have abandoned the claim.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 

1994); see Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397–98 (5th Cir. 2021). 

“To be adequate, a brief must address the district court’s analysis and explain how it erred.’” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th 

Cir. 2022) (quoting Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397 n.1); see Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. 

Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 751 (5th Cir. 2023) (the appellant should “attempt to 

rebut [the] judgment”). Where a party’s “opening brief barely addresse[s] 

the district court’s analysis’ and wholly neglect[s] to explain how it erred,’” 

Smith, etc. v. Sch. Bd. of Concordia Par., 88 F.4th 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2023) 

(quoting Russell, 59 F.4th at 751), the party forfeits that argument. 

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Hernandez’s opening brief discussed only “the constitutional right to 

be free from an unreasonable seizure by the use of excessive force”—that is, 

the claim arising from the shooting. He did not address the district court’s 

finding that there were “no allegations that Hernandez was improperly detained pending the arrival of ICE agents.” Because Hernandez did not explain how the district court’s detention-as-seizure analysis erred, his claim is 

forfeited, if not relinquished. Even if the claim was not forfeited or relinquished, his unlawful detention-as-seizure claim would still fail for the reasons below—Hernandez did not allege that Causey acted under color of state 

law. 

B. 

Section 1983 applies “only when the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority.’” Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 198 (2024) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)

private

pant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents’.” Cornish v. Corr. Servs. 

Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Dennis 

v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). Hernandez challenges the district court’s 

dismissal of his excessive-force claim from the shooting under § 1983 on the 

proposition that the “joint action test” should apply to federal officers as well 

as private individuals and also argues that the district court erred in requiring 

evidence of a conspiracy. 

“[W]hen federal officials conspire or act jointly with state officials to 

deny constitutional rights, the state officials provide the requisite state action to make the entire conspiracy actionable under section 1983.’” Knights 

of Ku Klux Klan, Realm of La. v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 895, 

900 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 (7th 

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Cir. 1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980)). Hernandez 

points to Knights to argue that so long as Causey “willful[ly] participat[ed] 

. . . in a joint activity with local police,” Causey acted under the color of state 

law. But in Knights, the acting authority responsible for the constitutional 

deprivation was a local school board. “Whether the Board was willing to risk 

loss of federal funds to allow the Klan to hold their meeting . . . was a decision 

made under color of state law.” Knights, 735 F.2d at 900. Hernandez cites 

other cases applying the joint-action test, but both similarly involve private

actors working with state actors to deprive a plaintiff of their constitutional 

rights—and in both, the court still found the private actor did not act under 

color of state law. See Earnest v. Lowentritt, 690 F.2d 1198, 1226 (5th Cir. 

1982); Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1983).4

This case law aligns with Lindke’s emphasis that “state action exists 

only when” the constitutional deprivation “ha[s] its source in state authority.” Lindke, 601 U.S. at 198 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. 939).5 As cases cited _____________________ 4

 Hernandez also argues that Rodriguez v. Handy, 873 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1989) 

applied § 1983 to federal Border Patrol agents assisting local law enforcement officials. But 

Rodriguez actually concerns application of the Federal Tort Claims Act and only mentions 

in passing that the agents “were acting under color of state law and could be found liable 

under § 1983.” Id. at 817 n.3. Because no § 1983 claim was briefed before this court in 

Rodriguez, the court’s footnote statement, in dicta, is hypothetical. 

5

 Hernandez further claims that the Supreme Court authorized suits against federal 

officers under § 1983 in Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020). Tanzin held that “[b]ecause 

RFRA uses the same terminology as § 1983 in the very same field of civil rights law, it is 

reasonable to believe that the terminology bears a consistent meaning.’” Id. at 48 (quoting 

A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 323 (2012)). 

Hernandez argues that “[i]t would be quite inconsistent for the Court, on the one hand, to 

allow damage suits against federal officials under one federal statute by relying on § 1983 

jurisprudence . . . but to then disregard important parts of that very same § 1983 

jurisprudence so as to shield federal officials from damage suits under § 1983.” But this is 

a fundamental misreading of Tanzin

under RFRA, extends . . . to include officials.” Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 47. Looking to § 1983 

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by Hernandez confirm, a federal officer acting under his agency’s authority 

but assisting a state officer generally acts under color of federal law. See Big 

Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Rhodes, 843 F.3d 853, 870 n.8 (10th Cir. 2016) 

(recognizing a “presumption that where federal and state actors come together, they are acting pursuant to supreme [federal] law.”); Case v. 

Milewski, 327 F.3d 564, 567-68 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Case’s argument that the 

[federal] defendants[] ceased to be operating under color of federal law once 

they left the federally owned [property] is without merit,” even when the 

federal officers cited Case for state crimes); Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 

743 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We have not found a single precedent which would 

support a holding that a federal agency acting under its own guidelines could 

induced by the actions of a state actor . . . .”).

Even if we were to apply Hernandez’s proposed “joint action test,” 

which is applicable to private actors not federal actors, to determine ICE 

Agent Causey’s liability, willful participation alone is insufficient. Hernandez 

would still be required to allege some agreement, whether explicit or implicit, 

between Causey and state officers to deprive Hernandez of his rights in order 

to claim liability under § 1983. We have held that, to satisfy the joint action 

test for a private actor, a plaintiff must plead “facts showing an agreement or 

meeting of the minds between the state actor and the private actor to engage 

in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, and that the 

private actor was a willing participant in joint activity with the state or its 

agents.” Pikaluk v. Horseshoe Ent., L.P., 810 F. App’x 243, 247 (5th Cir. 

2020) (quoting Polacek v. Kemper Cnty, 739 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 (S.D. Miss. 

2010)). Hernandez argues that Pikaluk is “nonauthoritative” because it is _____________________ for guidance, the Supreme Court concluded that it did. This analysis does not speak to the 

availability of a § 1983 cause of action against federal officials. 

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unpublished and contradicts prior case law. But our older, published case law 

actually supports the standard articulated in Pikaluk—for example, we 

looked for “evidence to establish a conspiracy” in Knights, 735 F.2d at 900, 

and affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 against a private actor 

when “the evidence was insufficient to show that [the private actor] and the 

[state actors] had agreed to commit an illegal act” in Mylett v. Jeane, 879 F.2d 

1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989). 

Hernandez argues that we did not explicitly search for a conspiracy in 

the more recent private-actor case Cherry Knoll, L.L.C. v. Jones, 922 F.3d 309 

(5th Cir. 2019). But the issue in Cherry Knoll was whether the pleadings were 

sufficient to state a claim that a private actor was a “willful participant in joint 

action” with state actors in the complained-of deprivation. Id. at 319–20. The 

district court “determined that . . . [the private actor] should be dismissed 

because it was not part of a conspiracy.” Id. at 316. But we found that several 

specific allegations in the pleadings, including the fact that the private actor 

“was hired by the City to handle all aspects of the City’s acquisition of property from the various landowners affected,” combined with a long history of 

interactions between the private and state actors, were sufficient to state a 

claim. Id. at 319–20. Our decision in Cherry Knoll reflects the requirement 

that a plaintiff must plead some type of agreement to pursue a § 1983 claim 

against a private actor. 

Applying § 1983 liability to a federal actor requires further allegations 

that place the constitutional deprivation under state rather than federal law. 

Where the federal actor could have derived their authority to act under federal law, the consensus of circuit courts is that § 1983 necessitates evidence 

of a conspiracy between the federal actor and a state actor to deprive the 

plaintiff of his rights under color of state law. See Hindes, 137 F.3d at 158 

(“[F]ederal officials are subject to section 1983 liability . . . where they have 

acted under color of state law, for example in conspiracy with state 

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officials.”); Strickland ex rel. Strickland v. Shalala, 123 F.3d 863, 868 (6th Cir. 

1997) (“Without proof of . . . a conspiracy, the federal officials cannot be 

found to have acted under color of state law.” (cleaned up)); Olson v. Norman, 830 F.2d 811, 821 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Where federal officials conspire 

with state officials . . . they may be held liable” under § 1983.). We agree. 

Although the conspiracy need not be explicit, a § 1983 plaintiff suing a federal 

actor must show some evidence of an agreement between the federal and 

state actors to undertake the unconstitutional acts. 

Hernandez points to his allegation that “there was a pretextual request for translation assistance” and argues this is sufficient to allege such an 

agreement. But his claims are conclusory. His proposed amended complaint 

states that “Causey[] was aware” of “the pretext of a need for translation 

assistance to question any Hispanic male.” In support, he states that Officer 

Driskell was able to use a few Spanish words to communicate with Mendoza 

and administer a breathalyzer before the ICE officers arrived and that this 

implies pretext. Even if Officer Driskell’s call to ICE was pretextual—and 

the fact that some words of Spanish and English were exchanged is not 

enough to support this inference—Hernandez’s allegations do not support 

an agreement with Causey. Crucially, Hernandez’s proposed complaint admits that Causey not only was called in by other ICE agents but then also was 

instructed to pursue Hernandez by ICE Agent McGhee. As the district court 

correctly observed:

[N]owhere in his proposed fourth amended complaint does 

Hernandez allege any facts that Causey came to an agreement 

or meeting of the minds with Laurel police officers to seize 

Hernandez—much less to shoot him. In fact, each allegation 

concerning the shooting focuses solely on Causey’s conduct, 

which gives rise to the inference that the decision to shoot Hernandez was Causey’s decision alone, not the result of some 

prior agreement. 

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Federal officers who are called in to assist a state officer can be liable 

under § 1983 when there is evidence of a conspiracy to deprive and the constitutional deprivation “ha[s] its source in state authority.” Lindke, 601 U.S. 

at 198 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939). But because Causey did not act under 

color of state law, and because Hernandez has alleged neither details of a conspiracy between Causey and the state officials nor any agreement with them 

to use excessive force, much less any state authority directive to do so, the 

district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s § 1983 claims. 

* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal 

of both the Bivens and § 1983 claims against Causey. We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hernandez’s motion for leave to amend the complaint 

as further amendment would be futile. 

Case: 24-60080 Document: 71-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 12/23/2024
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James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

 On July 20, 2016, Officer Driskell of the Laurel Police Department 

pulled over two vehicles, one driven by Plaintiff-Appellant Gabino Ramos 

Hernandez and another driven by his brother, for routine state law traffic 

violations in Laurel, Mississippi. Requiring “translation services” for the 

second time that same day, Officer Driskell called federal U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Agents to the scene. 

 When the ICE van transporting the de facto translators arrived, 

Hernandez—who was not detained by Officer Driskell (only his brother 

was)—left the scene by foot in a hurry. Officer Driskell then instructed his 

translator, ICE Agent McGhee, that Hernandez had “go[ne] down the block! 

He’s running south!” McGhee, in turn, instructed ICE Agent Causey, 

another potential translator, to pursue Hernandez. Causey complied, chased 

after Hernandez, and then seized Hernandez by shooting him in the arm, 

which “obliterat[ed] part of the radius in [his] forearm.” Hernandez filed suit 

against Causey, bringing a Bivens claim1 and a Fourth Amendment excessive 

force claim through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No one challenges the district court’s 

ruling that Causey’s alleged actions constituted excessive force in violation 

of the Fourth Amendment. 

 I agree with the majority that Hernandez’s Bivens claim is foreclosed 

by the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022). 

Ante, at 6–11 (majority opinion). However, and with great respect for my 

esteemed colleagues, I would find that Hernandez has pleaded a § 1983 claim 

upon which relief can be granted. To plausibly plead that Causey acted under 

color of state law, rather than federal law, our cases do not require Hernandez 

1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971). 

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to have alleged a conspiracy between the Laurel Police and ICE officers to 

seize Hernandez. Ante, at 15–18 (majority opinion mistakenly imposing that 

overly exacting standard). Instead, when federal officials either conspire or 

act jointly with state officials to deny constitutional rights, the state officials 

provide the requisite state action to support § 1983 claims against the federal 

officials. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Realm of La. v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir. 1984). 

 Because I would reverse the district court’s dismissal of Hernandez’s 

§ 1983 excessive force claim against Causey,2 I respectfully concur in part 

and dissent in part. 

* * * 

 Section 1983 authorizes a claim for relief only against persons who 

acted under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal officials who act 

pursuant to federal law do not act under color of state law, but rather act 

under color of federal law. Mack v. Alexander, 575 F.2d 488, 489 (5th Cir. 

1978) (holding that § 1983 “provide[s] a remedy for deprivation of rights 

under color of state law and do[es] not apply [to] defendants . . . acting under 

color of federal law”). When a federal official acts together with state or local 

officials, the critical determination is whether she acted under color of state 

or federal law. On this, the majority and I agree. We diverge, however, on the 

test that should apply to answer this question. 

 Contrary to the majority’s view, I read Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Realm 

of Louisiana v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 735 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 

1984), to apply the so-called joint action test to federal officers. Ante, at 13–

2

 I agree with the majority that Hernandez’s § 1983 unlawful detention claim is not 

briefed before us, meaning any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of that claim is 

forfeited. Ante, at 12–13. 

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14. There, we held “when federal officials conspire or act jointly with state 

state action’” for purposes of § 1983. Knights, 735 F.2d at 900 (emphasis 

added) (quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 (7th Cir. 1979), 

rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980)). Despite the use of the 

word “or,” the majority reads Knights to require a conspiracy and rejects 

Hernandez’s argument that the joint action test applies to federal officers. 

Ante, at 14. In my view, Knights explicitly dictates that we find federal officials 

act under color of state law when the federal government “act[s] jointly with 

state officials to deny constitutional rights.” 735 F.2d at 900. Our cases 

following Knights confirm as much. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Handy, 873 F.2d 

814, 817 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that Border Patrol Agents assisting local 

law enforcement officials “were acting under color of state law and could be 

found liable under § 1983”). Given its significant reliance on out-of-circuit 

authority, it is apparent that the majority wants our circuit’s precedents to 

conform with some other circuits’ precedents, which admittedly do impose 

a strict conspiracy requirement. See, e.g., Ante, at 15 (relying on caselaw from 

the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that do not align with Knights); Ante, at 16–17 (similar); but see Jorden v. Nat’l Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 111 n.17 

(3d Cir. 1986) (citing with approval Knights for the proposition that “federal 

officials who conspire or act jointly with state officials may be liable under § 

1983” (emphasis added)). While the pursuit of conformity is an important 

one, under our rule of orderliness, we are duty bound to apply Knights’ explication of the law at this stage. See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 

F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999) (“It is a firm rule of this circuit that in the 

absence of an intervening contrary or superseding decision by this court 

sitting en banc or by the United States Supreme Court, a panel cannot 

overrule a prior panel’s decision.”). I therefore cannot join the part of the 

majority’s opinion that sub silentio overturns a prior published panel opinion. 

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 Furthermore, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s alternative 

holding that the joint action test itself requires evidence of a conspiracy, and 

I find the majority’s reliance on an unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion 

unpersuasive. Ante, at 15–16. Specifically, the majority adverts to Pikaluk v. 

Horseshoe Ent., L.P., 810 F. App’x 243 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished), and 

says “[e]ven if” the joint action test does apply to federal actors, to satisfy 

that test, “a plaintiff must plead facts showing an agreement or meeting of 

the minds between the state actor and the private actor to engage in a 

conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, and that the private 

actor was a willing participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.’” 

Ante, at 15 (quoting Pikaluk, 810 F. App’x at 247) (emphasis added). While 

that is what Pikaluk states, I believe it misstates the standard. 

 Notably, the panel in Pikaluk cited to a district court’s opinion as 

support that the joint action test requires a conspiracy. 810 F. App’x at 247 

(citing Polacek v. Kemper Cnty., 739 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 (S.D. Miss. 2010)). 

The district court’s opinion in Polacek, however, cites to Mylett v. Jeane, 879 

F.3d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added), a precedential opinion 

where our court held “in order to find a private citizen liable under section 

1983, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the citizen conspired with or 

acted in concert with state actors.” Mylett’s recitation of the law jibes with other 

Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court precedents, which hold 

action test,’ private actors will be considered state actors where they are 

[merely] 

Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)); see also Cherry Knoll, L.L.C. v. 

Jones, 922 F.3d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Under Supreme Court precedent, 

to act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the 

defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant 

in joint action with the State or its agents.” (citations and quotations 

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omitted)); accord O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145, 1159 (9th Cir. 2023), 

cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 2715 (mem.) (2024) (explaining how the joint action 

test can be satisfied either by showing a conspiracy or by showing willful 

participation in joint action). Accordingly, I respectfully disagree that the 

joint action test requires allegations of a conspiracy. And to the extent a nonbinding opinion of our court—Pikaluk, 810 F. App’x at 247—holds 

otherwise, I would clarify that the correct standard is found in Cornish, 402 

F.3d at 550 (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27) and Mylett, 879 F.3d at 1275. 

 Applying the joint action test derived from binding precedents to the 

facts of this case, I would find that Hernandez plausibly alleged that translator 

Causey acted under color of state law when he seized Hernandez with a 

gunshot/excessive force. Neither the majority, the district court, nor the 

Government point to any federal law or regulation that Causey acted 

pursuant to when he came to the scene as Officer Driskell’s translator, when 

he began to chase after Hernandez who was leaving a state law traffic 

investigation, or when he eventually shot Hernandez to seize him. To the 

contrary, the Government disavows that the ICE Agents were on the scene 

to perform immigration operations—they were only there as the Laurel 

Police Department’s translators to accomplish the state’s purpose of 

enforcing its traffic laws. Stypmann v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 557 F.3d 

1338 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a towing company acting at the behest of a 

police officer to accomplish the state’s purpose of enforcing its traffic laws 

acted under color of state law) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 

345, 351 (1974))). Further still, according to Officer Driskell, the ICE 

translators were an “additional tool in his toolbox” and he had relied on them 

in the past for translation assistance when stopping Hispanic people. The 

level of interdependence manifested in this case by Laurel Police Department 

Officer Driskell, acting pursuant to state law, instructing ICE Agents to 

partake in a local police matter as translators and then to pursue and seize 

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Hernandez. Causey followed that instruction and seized Hernandez by 

shooting him in the arm, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment’s 

guarantee that individuals be free from an unreasonable government seizure 

by the use of excessive force. Knights, 735 F.2d at 900 (holding federal 

officials act under color of state law when the federal government “act[s] 

jointly with state officials to deny constitutional rights”). 

 Viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Hernandez 

leads me to conclude that Causey was a “willful participant in joint action 

with the State or its agents.” Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27. I would reverse the 

district court’s dismissal of Hernandez’s § 1983 excessive force claim against 

Causey. Still, for the reasons assigned by the majority, I agree that we must 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hernandez’s Bivens claim. I 

respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 

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