Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04223/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04223-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4223

___________

Richard D. Percefull, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Chris Claybaker, Mayor of Camden, * Western District of Arkansas.

AR; Board of Alderman of Camden, *

Arkansas, Marvin Moore, James * [UNPUBLISIHED]

Adcock, Tony Anthony, James *

Dishroom, Preston Woods, Irene *

Galbert, Charles Launius, Zin McRae; *

City of Camden Public Works *

Department; Sam Steelman, *

*

Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: November 3, 2006

Filed: November 9, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, BYE, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Appellate Case: 05-4223 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/09/2006 Entry ID: 2108229
1

The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Arkansas.

-2-

Chris Claybaker, Mayor of Camden, Arkansas, appeals from the district court’s1

interlocutory summary judgment order denying him qualified and legislative

immunity in Richard D. Percefull’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging violations of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on Claybaker’s role in the seizure of

Percefull’s bass boat. Reviewing de novo, see Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d

989, 991 (8th Cir. 2005), we affirm.

Under our limited jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether

Claybaker’s role in the seizure of Percefull’s bass boat violated Percefull’s clearly

established constitutional rights. “‘Beyond this narrow issue, we may exercise

jurisdiction only over issues that are “inextricably intertwined,” meaning the issues

would necessarily be resolved when we resolve the question of qualified immunity.’”

Powell v. Johnson, 405 F.3d 652, 654 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schilcher v. Univ. of

Ark., 387 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 2004)). Thus, we will not consider at this time

Claybaker’s arguments that Percefull’s suit is barred by res judicata, and that Percefull

failed to avail himself of adequate post-deprivation remedies.

Claybaker also questions the sufficiency of Percefull’s evidence on causation

and damages. We have consistently held that sufficiency of the evidence is outside

the scope of our jurisdiction when reviewing an interlocutory appeal from a denial of

qualified immunity. See Nebraska Beef, Ltd. v. Greening, 398 F.3d 1080, 1082-83

(8th Cir. 2005); Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir.

1995).

To the extent Claybaker has properly raised and argued issues relevant to

qualified immunity, we find no error in the district court’s denial of summary

judgment. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990) (procedural due process

Appellate Case: 05-4223 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/09/2006 Entry ID: 2108229
-3-

requires state to provide predeprivation remedy where feasible before taking

property); Dixon v. Lowery, 302 F.3d 857, 862 (8th Cir. 2002) (Fourth Amendment

protects against seizures undertaken without legal authority). Claybaker himself

admitted that there was no legal or judicial authorization for seizing Percefull’s boat,

which undermines his argument that no reasonable person in his position would have

known that he was violating Percefull’s rights. Nor did Claybaker provide any type

of predeprivation hearing, although the evidence is disputed on whether the necessity

of quick action rendered such a hearing impractical. Although Claybaker argues that

Percefull had no protected property interest in his unregistered boat, he does not assert

that the failure to register the boat authorized its seizure. Accord Dixon, 302 F.3d at

862-64 (disputed possessory interest may still be constitutionally protected).

Finally, Claybaker submits that his actions are insulated by legislative

immunity. Legislative immunity is typically reserved for those officials acting in

some sort of legislative capacity, and it has no application where an executive official

orders the performance of executive tasks. Cf. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44,

54-56 (1998) (granting executive official legislative immunity for enactment of

ordinance which “bore all the hallmarks of” traditional legislative action).

The order of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-4223 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/09/2006 Entry ID: 2108229