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Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 21, 2003 Decided January 23, 2004

No. 03-7030

WAYNE TURNER, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND ETHICS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02634)

Arthur B. Spitzer argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Graham A. Boyd.

William K. Shirey II argued the cause for appellee. With

him on the brief were Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Donna M. Murasky, Senior Litigation Counsel,

Glen D. Nager and Jennifer L. Merzon.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-7030 Document #799013 Filed: 01/23/2004 Page 1 of 14
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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and TATEL,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal requires the court to

determine what is a fully compensatory award under the Civil

Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, where

the original defendant, aligning with the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to a federal statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

leaves defense of the statute to the United States, as defendant-intervenor. The district court apportioned the requested § 1988 attorney’s fees and expenses between the original

defendant and the immune defendant based on considerations

of comparative fault. In doing so, the district court approved

a partial award to the prevailing plaintiffs only for the time

prior to the original defendant’s alignment with the plaintiffs’

position, and no fees and expenses for the merits litigation

thereafter. The district court also limited the award for the

litigation to collect fees and expenses to the plaintiffs’ efforts

to collect under § 1988, excluding fees and expenses arising

from efforts to collect from the immune defendant under the

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). On

appeal, the prevailing plaintiffs contend that they were entitled to a ‘‘fully compensatory fee,’’ Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 435 (1983), in light of their complete success on the

merits, notwithstanding the original defendant’s failure to

oppose their lawsuit. We agree. The original defendant

continued to deny the plaintiffs the only relief they sought

throughout the litigation, and was jointly and severally liable

with the United States for fees and expenses on the nonfractionable claims. Accordingly, we hold that the district

court erred as a matter of law in apportioning fees and

expenses on non-fractionable claims in the § 1983 litigation,

and we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the

district court to enter a fully compensatory award to the

prevailing plaintiffs.

I.

A brief recitation of the underlying lawsuit giving rise to

the request for attorney’s fees is necessary. See Turner v.

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D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 77 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C.

1999). When District of Columbia voters went to the polls on

November 3, 1998, the ballot included Initiative 59, the Medical Marijuana Initiative, which sought voters’ approval to

legalize medical uses of marijuana for the chronically ill. Id.

at 27. Two weeks before the election, on October 21, 1998,

Congress enacted and the President signed the Barr Amendment to the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for

Fiscal Year 1999. See Pub. L. No. 105–277, § 171, 112 Stat.

2681–150 (1998). The Barr Amendment prohibited use of the

appropriated funds to ‘‘conduct any ballot initiative which

seeks to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties associated

with’’ a controlled substance. Id. The ballots for the November 3 election had been printed before enactment of the

Barr Amendment, however, and District of Columbia voters

voted on Initiative 59. Turner, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 27.

When the Board of Elections and Ethics refused, in light of

the Barr Amendment, to release and certify the results of the

vote on Initiative 59, five District of Columbia voters, including Wayne Turner, the official sponsor of Initiative 59 (hereinafter, together, ‘‘Turner’’), sued the Board under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint, filed October 30, 1998, and Turner’s subsequent briefing alleged in the alternative that first, the Barr Amendment

only limited the Board’s capability to act until November 3,

Election Day, and, therefore, the Board was required under

D.C. Code Ann. § 1–1306 (1981) (now codified at D.C. Code

Ann. § 1–1001.05 (2001)) to certify the results thereafter, see

Turner, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 27, and second, to the extent the

Barr Amendment prohibited the Board from performing its

duty, the Amendment violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Three days after

the election, Turner filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (‘‘TRO’’) and a preliminary injunction. The same

day, November 6, the Board filed a motion for a declaratory

judgment supporting Turner’s argument that the Barr

Amendment was unconstitutional; the Board did not join the

statutory argument.

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The United States, having been notified of the lawsuit

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), filed an opposition to the

TRO on November 9, pending a decision by the Solicitor

General as to whether the United States would seek to

intervene. The district court denied the TRO on November

10 and consolidated the preliminary injunction with the merits. The United States’ unopposed motion to intervene, filed

November 23, was granted on November 30. Following a

hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment,

the district court, on September 17, 1999, granted summary

judgment to Turner, adopting his statutory argument in light

of the principle of constitutional avoidance, for otherwise, the

court opined, the Barr Amendment would have violated Turner’s First Amendment rights. Turner, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 35.

Neither the United States nor the Board appealed. Shortly

thereafter, the Board counted the ballots and certified the

results, which indicated that Initiative 59 had passed by 69%

of the vote. See District of Columbia Board of Elections and

Ethics, November 3, 1998 General Election, Election Results,

Initiative Measure #59 (votes counted Sept. 20, 2003), at

http://www.dcboee.org/information/elec 1998/ini59 98.htm.

On March 31, 2000, after fee negotiations had proved

unsuccessful, see Local Rule 215(b), Turner filed a motion for

attorney’s fees and expenses of approximately $134,000. Asserting that the Board and the United States were jointly and

severally liable, Turner sought fees from the United States

under the Equal Access to Justice Act (‘‘EAJA’’), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(A), and, in light of EAJA’s statutory cap on

hourly rates, see id. § 2412(d)(2)(A), also sought fees from the

Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for any amount exceeding the

award under EAJA. A magistrate judge dismissed the

EAJA request as untimely, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), a

determination to which Turner did not object, but permitted

Turner to amend his motion to request an award of all of his

attorney’s fees and expenses from the Board. Turner v.

District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 183 F. Supp.

2d 22, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2001).

Addressing Turner’s § 1988 request, the magistrate judge,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(D) & 72(b), found that Turner was

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a prevailing party and did not question the reasonableness of

his counsel’s hours and rates. The magistrate rejected, however, the view that the Board and the United States could be

jointly and severally liable for Turner’s attorney’s fees and

therefore apportioned fees and expenses based on comparative fault. Turner v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections &

Ethics, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–7 (D.D.C. 2001). The magistrate

concluded that Turner was entitled to recover only $2,616 in

fees for the period between October 30, 1998, when Turner

filed his complaint, and November 6, 1998, when the Board

filed its motion for a declaratory judgment (‘‘pre-alignment

period’’). Id. at 8. For the pre-alignment period, the magistrate apportioned 90% of the culpability for the merits litigation to the United States inasmuch as the Board’s decision to

enforce the Barr Amendment was, in view of the District of

Columbia’s unique relationship with Congress, understandable. Id. at 7, 8. For the post-November 6 merits litigation

(‘‘post-alignment period’’), the magistrate apportioned 100%

of the culpability for that litigation to the United States. The

magistrate reasoned that it was unfair to force the Board to

pay attorney’s fees and expenses for this period when Turner

and the Board sought the same relief and Turner’s counsel’s

work was directed against arguments presented only by the

United States. Id. at 6. Finally, the magistrate awarded

Turner fees of only $1,497 incurred in litigating the request

for fees (‘‘fees-for-fees’’). Id. at 9. Because Turner had not

allocated his counsel’s time between the EAJA and § 1988

claims, the magistrate used the number of pages in Turner’s

fee motions directed at each claim as a proxy for allocating

the fees-for-fees to the United States and to the Board,

finding that only 46% of Turner’s counsel’s fees work could be

ascribed to the Board. Id. The magistrate again, however,

in light of his culpability finding, awarded Turner only 10% of

the fees-for-fees incurred against the Board. Id. at 9. Turner, but not the Board, filed objections to the magistrate’s

partial award.

On de novo review, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(D) & 72(b),

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the district court adopted the magistrate’s comparative-fault apportionment but increased TurUSCA Case #03-7030 Document #799013 Filed: 01/23/2004 Page 5 of 14
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ner’s partial award against the Board to $39,815. The district

court concluded, in recognition of § 1988’s purpose of encouraging private attorneys general to bring meritorious lawsuits

to vindicate citizens’ rights, that the reasonable amount of

fees should be reduced only minimally. The district court

awarded Turner 87% of his fees request ($24,000) for the prealignment period plus expenses of $569. The district court

denied Turner any award for the post-alignment period for

the remainder of the merits litigation. For the fees-for-fees

period, the district court awarded Turner 46% of his request,

or $15,246, based on the pages proxy, absent a complete

allocation by Turner of time between the § 1988 and EAJA

claims, but with no reduction for comparative fault. Upon

reconsideration, the district court awarded Turner $21,714 for

fees-for-fees work following the magistrate’s decision, bringing the total partial award to $61,529.

II.

On appeal, Turner contends that the district court erred as

a matter of law in awarding only a portion of his request for

attorney’s fees and expenses under § 1988 based on apportioning most of the fees to an immune defendant. Because

the Board did not object either to his status as a prevailing

party or to the reasonableness of his counsel’s rates or hours,

and did not cross-appeal on these issues, Turner maintains,

and we agree, that there are no disputed issues of fact before

this court. Thus, the only question before the court is for

which parts of Turner’s § 1983 lawsuit the Board may properly be held accountable for attorney’s fees and expenses, and

whether joint and several liability applies.

Longstanding precedents establish that plaintiffs who have

achieved excellent results in civil rights litigation should

normally receive a fully compensatory attorney’s fee. Section

1988 provides in pertinent part that in any suit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, ‘‘the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable

attorney’s fee as part of the costs.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

The plaintiff, however, bears the burden of establishing both

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entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees as well as the

amount properly due. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; Covington

v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

The Supreme Court has described § 1988’s purpose as safeguarding ‘‘effective access to the judicial process’’ for persons

with civil rights grievances such that a prevailing plaintiff

‘‘should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special

circumstances would render such an award unjust.’’ Hensley,

461 U.S. at 429 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94–1558, at 1 (1976);

S. Rep. No. 94–1011, at 4 (1976)). In order to attract

competent counsel to serve as private attorneys general on

behalf of plaintiffs, who are ‘‘the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate a policy that Congress considered of the

highest priority,’’ Miller v. Staats, 706 F.2d 336, 340 (D.C.

Cir. 1983) (citations omitted), it has long been established that

‘‘[i]n computing the [§ 1988] fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, ‘for all time reasonably expended

on a matter.’ ’’ Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.4 (quoting S. Rep.

No. 94–1011, at 6 (1976)). Thus, § 1988 ‘‘grants the successful civil rights plaintiff a ‘fully compensatory fee.’ ’’ Missouri

v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 286 (1989) (quoting Hensley, 461

U.S. at 435); see also Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109.

Although ‘‘a request for attorney’s fees should not result in

a second major litigation,’’ and ‘‘the district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award’’ because of its

‘‘superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability

of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are

factual matters,’’ Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added),

‘‘[i]t is now axiomatic that TTT the discretion of a district court

in deciding whether to award such fees to a prevailing party is

narrowly limited.’’ Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 688 F.2d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing

Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979)) (emphasis

added); accord Miller, 706 F.2d at 340. Where, as here, the

issues involved are not questions of fact but of law regarding

the appropriateness of apportionment, this court’s review is

de novo. See Jacobs v. Schiffer, 204 F.3d 259, 264 (D.C. Cir.

2000).

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This court normally would defer to a thoughtful rationale of

the district court so long as it achieved a result that was fair

to the parties, see Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors

Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000), but we are constrained to take a closer look at this § 1988 fees appeal in

light of the novel application of a comparative fault theory

based on tort law, see Turner, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 5–6 (citing

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 192). Here, the district

court, in adopting the magistrate’s analysis, see id. at 6–9,

applied its view of comparative fault in the sense that the

Barr Amendment placed the Board in a difficult position of

either having to enforce the Amendment or risk defying

Congress to which it is ultimately responsible, see U.S. Const.

art. I, § 8, cl. 17, and which controls its appropriations, see

D.C. Code § 1–204.46. The district court concluded that a

reasonable fee must take into account the fact that the United

States was primarily at fault. In developing this comparative

fault theory, the magistrate and the district court relied on

Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 960 (1st Cir.

1984), in which the First Circuit suggested relevant factors

for allocating fees among defendants. While a source of

guidance for jointly and severally liable defendants, Grendel’s

Den provides no support for apportioning § 1988 fees liability

so as to deny the prevailing plaintiff a fully compensatory fee

on a common set of claims against the defendants. Id.

Indeed, the First Circuit, in citing its own authority, among

others, recognized that it was not unjust to assess fees

against a governmental entity stuck with enforcing a law

ultimately found to be unconstitutional on its face even where

it did not enact the law and where some other entity may be

more culpable or causally responsible. Id. (citing Venuti v.

Riordan, 702 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1983)).

Turner contends that the district court abused its discretion, see Jacobs, 204 F.3d at 264; Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v.

D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 168 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir.

1999), by failing to award him a ‘‘fully compensatory award’’

where there are no ‘‘special circumstances [that] would render such an award unjust.’’ Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 429.

Specifically, Turner maintains that for the pre-alignment

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period the district court erred as a matter of law in denying

his full fees even though the Board was the only defendant.

For the post-alignment period, Turner contends that the

Board, notwithstanding its alignment with his constitutional

challenge, continued to be his adversary throughout the merits litigation because, although it could have settled in light of

its position that the Barr Amendment was unconstitutional, it

continued to enforce the Amendment, denying Turner his

sought relief. Moreover, while acknowledging that for the

fees-for-fees period he seeks to recover against the Board

only the fees that are attributable to his efforts under § 1988

and not for time devoted to EAJA collection from the United

States, Turner contends that there is no authority to apportion § 1988 fees and expenses when the result is, as here, to

deny a successful plaintiff any fees for his attorneys’ work on

the merits, other than a fractional fee for the first week after

the complaint was filed. By so doing, Turner maintains the

district court’s fee award undermines ‘‘the premium that the

Civil Rights Act places on litigants as private attorneys

general,’’ Boos v. Barry, 704 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1989), by

enabling ordinary citizens to obtain counsel to litigate meritorious civil rights cases.

Although the Board attempts for the first time on appeal to

contend that it, too, was a prevailing party, that argument is

not properly before the court. See United States v. Hylton,

294 F.3d 130, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2002). There is no basis to

conclude that the Board was not ‘‘the party legally responsible for relief on the merits,’’ Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 164 (1985), as only it, and not the United States, could

certify the votes on Initiative 59. Results, not litigating

positions, are determinative of prevailing party status. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Turner incurred and continued to incur

attorney’s fees and expenses because the Board refused to

certify the election results. See Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1977)

(citing Communist Party of U.S. v. Department of Justice,

No. 75–1770, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1976)); see also

Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1977),

overruled on other grounds by Burka v. United States Dept.

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of Health and Human Services, 142 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C.

Cir. 1998). Hence, the Board’s claim of ‘‘alignment’’ with

Turner in challenging the Barr Amendment fails to show

exceptional circumstances to excuse its failure to raise this

argument in the district court. See Hylton, 294 F.3d at 135.

Our analysis of Turner’s § 1988 request proceeds on the

basis of four well-settled propositions of law on which Turner

relies. First, because an award of attorney’s fees under

§ 1988 ‘‘is not meant as a ‘punishment’ for ‘bad’ defendants

who resist plaintiffs’ claims in bad faith[,] [but] is meant to

compensate civil rights attorneys who bring civil rights cases

and win them,’’ Coalition for Basic Human Needs v. King,

691 F.2d 597, 602 (1st Cir. 1982), the fact that it was not the

‘‘fault’’ of the Board of Elections that the Barr Amendment

was enacted by Congress and that Turner had to litigate to

get the Board to count the votes on Initiative 59 is not a

‘‘special circumstance’’ warranting denial of a fully compensatory fee. Second, it is irrelevant for purposes of § 1988 that

Congress, and not the Council of the District of Columbia,

enacted the Barr Amendment, because under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 the Amendment is treated as a District of Columbia

law. Third, in light of Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 739

(1980), and King, 691 F.2d at 602, because the Board continued to enforce the Barr Amendment throughout Turner’s

§ 1983 litigation, it is irrelevant for purposes of § 1988 that in

court the Board supported Turner’s constitutional challenge

to the Barr Amendment. Fourth, because the Board’s liability for § 1988 fees is not derivative of the United States’, it is

irrelevant that Turner did not timely seek attorney’s fees

under EAJA, for the immunity of one defendant does not

reduce the liability of a non-immune co-defendant. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 164–65; Supreme Court of Va., 446 U.S. at

739.

To ensure that a private attorney general is fully compensated, ‘‘[i]t is frequently appropriate to hold all defendants

jointly and severally liable for attorneys’ fees in cases in

which two or more defendants actively participated in a

constitutional violation.’’ Herbst v. Ryan, 90 F.3d 1300, 1305

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(7th Cir. 1996) (citing Koster v. Perales, 903 F.2d 131, 138 (2d

Cir. 1990)). Moreover, in order to serve the remedial purposes of the Civil Rights Act, ‘‘a number of courts have

upheld the imposition of joint and several liability for a fee

award where there existed a question as to whether the fee

would be collectible from one of the defendants.’’ 90 F.3d at

1306 n.13; see also Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v.

Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 285–86 (3d Cir.

1983); Riddell v. Nat’l Democratic Party, 712 F.2d 165, 168–

169 (5th Cir. 1983). Thus, in this circuit, a plaintiff’s fully

compensatory fee for claims ‘‘centered on a set of common

issues’’ against two or more jointly responsible defendants

should be assessed jointly and severally. Action on Smoking

& Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 216 (D.C.

Cir. 1984) (hereinafter ‘‘ASH’’). On the other hand, if claims

are not attributable to all defendants and are not ‘‘centered

on a set of common issues,’’ i.e., claims that are ‘‘truly

fractionable,’’ id., fees should be apportioned, ‘‘in order to

ensure that a defendant is not liable for a fee award greater

than the actual fees incurred against that defendant,’’ Jones

v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 691 (9th Cir. 1993).

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that ‘‘[f]ee awards

against enforcement officials are run-of-the mill occurrences.’’

Supreme Court of Va., 466 U.S. at 739. ‘‘Mere’’ enforcers of

unconstitutional laws may be held liable for attorneys’ fees

even if their involvement in the litigation has been minor or

they have argued that their enforcement actions are improper

and have lobbied for the underlying law to be changed. See

id.; cf. Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1152 (8th Cir.

1999), aff’d, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). Congress has determined

that the greater wrong would be to leave unpaid the attorney’s fees and expenses of a successful § 1983 plaintiff who

has undertaken significant risks and expenses to vindicate

constitutional rights. See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1152. As this

court observed, ‘‘the determinative factor must be the role of

plaintiffs’ lawsuit, not the motivations of the defendant.’’

Miller, 706 F.2d at 343.

Section 1988 does not permit a court to inquire into defendants’ comparative fault where to do so obstructs Congress’

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purpose of compensating successful private attorneys general.

King, 691 F.2d at 602. Even accepting the district court’s

view that the Board’s blameworthiness was relatively slight

compared to that of the United States, the Board’s § 1988

liability may not, to the prevailing plaintiffs’ detriment, be

reduced on the non-fractionable claims against the defendants. State actors ‘‘may have had good-faith reasons for

their acts, but that is no reason to deny the [plaintiff]

attorney’s fees.’’ Id. The district court’s reservations about

holding District of Columbia officials fully responsible for

their enforcement of the Barr Amendment are therefore

misplaced. The unique relationship between Congress and

the District of Columbia under the Constitution simply means

that there will be occasions when the District of Columbia

government must pay attorney’s fees for successful § 1983

lawsuits challenging laws that the District Government did

not enact, for any Act of Congress that is solely applicable to

the District of Columbia is a law of the District of Columbia

for § 1983 purposes. Consistent with the court’s duty to

ensure that a successful § 1983 plaintiff is awarded a fully

compensatory fee, then, § 1988 fee awards based on a nonfractionable claim may not be apportioned between an immune ‘‘losing party,’’ see Graham, 473 U.S. at 164, who

cannot be made to pay, and a non-immune losing party that is

jointly and severally liable for the former’s share of an

attorney’s fee award.

As previously explained, joint and several liability exists for

all defendants on the non-fractionable claims, see Herbst, 90

F.3d at 1305; it is only when there are fractionable parts of a

lawsuit not fairly attributable to other parties that liability for

attorney’s fees and expenses may be apportioned exclusively

to the party who caused the plaintiff to incur those costs, see

ASH, 724 F.2d at 216. Turner’s § 1983 lawsuit to obtain a

preliminary injunction and declaratory judgment against the

Board and, once it intervened, against the United States

centered on a common set of issues: namely, the Board’s

refusal to count and certify the votes on Initiative 59. While

the United States’ intervention as a defendant affected the

course of the proceedings, there was not a separate claim

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against the United States, compare Southeast Legal Defense

Group v. Adams, 657 F.2d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981); Jones,

10 F.3d at 692 n.2, as is clear from the fact that if the United

States had not intervened, Turner would have been required

to litigate the merits of his § 1983 claim so long as the Board

continued to enforce the Barr Amendment. The magistrate’s

finding, adopted by the district court, stated there is nothing

to indicate that, but for the United States’ intervention, the

Board would have unilaterally stopped enforcing the Amendment. See Turner, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 7. Because the United

States enjoys sovereign immunity over the share of Turner’s

fees it otherwise would bear, the Board, as a jointly and

severally liable losing party, must pay all attorney’s fees

associated with the non-fractionable claim, here consisting of

the entire litigation from the date Turner filed his complaint

to the date he obtained summary judgment.

By contrast, as Turner acknowledges, his fees-for-fees litigation is fractionable. Because it involves distinct claims, i.e.,

different statutes with different standards of proof, Turner

correctly seeks only to recover fees-for-fees from the Board

based on his § 1988 claim against the Board and not based on

his EAJA claim against the United States. Compare 42

U.S.C. § 1988(b) with 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). For the

fees-for-fees litigation, Turner’s counsel engaged in separate

research on each statute and generated a separate argument

about how each party’s role in the suit rendered it liable to a

prevailing party’s claim for attorney’s fees. See Turner, 170

F. Supp. 2d at 9. His counsel’s hours therefore can be ‘‘easily

compartmentalized,’’ ASH, 724 F.2d at 216, preventing Turner from recovering fees-for-fees against the Board for his

EAJA claim.

We therefore hold that the district court (and the magistrate judge) erred as a matter of law by using considerations

of comparative fault in apportioning Turner’s § 1988 request

for attorney’s fees and expenses on a non-fractionable claim

between the non-immune Board and the immune United

States. Because there is no issue regarding the reasonableness of his counsel’s hours and rates, Turner was entitled to

recover 100% of the fees and expenses incurred for the merits

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litigation. In the pre-alignment period, the United States

was not a party and hence there was no basis for limiting

Turner’s recovery to 87%. In the post-alignment period, the

Board continued to enforce the Barr Amendment, denying

Turner the sole relief that he sought in his litigation; the

Board neither certified the results nor settled the case. By

contrast, Turner’s claims for fees-for-fees under § 1988 and

EAJA are fractionable, and the district court, using motions

pages as a proxy for any other allocation, properly apportioned the fees between the Board and the United States.

Accordingly, we vacate so much of the order as awarded

Turner only a partial award of his attorney’s fees and expenses under § 1988 for the § 1983 merits litigation, and

remand the case to the district court to enter a fully compensatory award.

USCA Case #03-7030 Document #799013 Filed: 01/23/2004 Page 14 of 14