Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01267/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01267-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEONARD EUGENE WARD

Plaintiff,

v.

M. H. VALADEZ, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv1267-LAB (WVG)

ORDER OVERRULING 

OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, AND 

ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; AND

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Plaintiff Leonard Eugene Ward, who is proceeding pro se, brings civil rights 

claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and supplemental state claims arising 

in connection with his previous incarceration. He originally filed his complaint in the 

Central District of California, but the case was transferred to this Court on July 10, 

2019. Shortly after the transfer, Defendants moved to dismiss, raising a statute of 

limitations defense, among others. The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge 

William Gallo for report and recommendation. 

After receiving briefing, Judge Gallo issued his report and recommendation 

(the “R&R”) on October 16, 2019, recommending that the motion be granted. Ward 

filed written objections. (Docket no. 52.)

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A district court has jurisdiction to review a Magistrate Judge's report and 

recommendation on dispositive matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b). “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's 

disposition that has been properly objected to.” Id. Section 636(b)(1) similarly 

requires that a district judge “make a de novo determination of those portions of 

the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection 

is made.” “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, 

the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. 

The Court has reviewed Ward’s objections, and has conducted a de novo 

review of those portions of the R&R he specifically objected to.

Discussion

Ward’s objections focus on only a few portions of the R&R. For the most part, 

he agrees with its factual findings and its statement of the law. The R&R correctly 

sets forth the governing law on statutes of limitations, accrual of claims, and tolling, 

as well as standards for dismissal based on a statute of limitations defense, which 

the Court ADOPTS and does not repeat here. Although the R&R does not 

specifically say so, the statute of limitations for Ward’s § 1985 claim is the same 

as for his § 1983 claim. See McDougal v. Cnty. of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673–74 

(9th Cir. 1991). The R&R also provides a factual procedural history of the case, to 

which Ward does not object. The Court modifies one portion of the R&R for clarity, 

as discussed below. So modified, the Court also ADOPTS the R&R’s procedural 

and factual findings. The following background is taken from that unobjected-to 

portion of the R&R.

Defendant’s motion included requests for judicial notice. The R&R, without 

expressly saying so, granted the request and relied on the noticed documents. 

Ward did not object to this, and does not question the authenticity of any of the 

documents. In fact, he cites and relies on them himself in his objections. 

/ / /

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In 2009, Ward was sentenced to a term of fifty years to life, and was 

incarcerated in Centinela State Prison. In October of 2013, the California Superior 

Court vacated his sentence. He was released from prison on July 21, 2015, but 

now claims he should have been released in May of 2014. 

Ward claims Defendants violated his rights by incarcerating him longer than 

the law permitted. He alleges Defendants incorrectly calculated the time he should 

have served, failing to give him credit for good time or work time; failing to give him 

credit under California’s Three Strikes law, Penal Code § 667; and failing to 

calculate properly the time he actually served. He also claims they retaliated 

against him for filing a grievance while in prison, and violated his procedural rights 

in various ways, and conspired to deprive him of his civil rights in violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 1985. 

In January of 2015, while he was still in prison, Ward filed an appeal seeking 

relief from his continued detention. His petitions were denied at the third level of 

review on July 31, 2015. 

Ward also filed a series of claims with the California Victim Compensation 

and Government Claims Board (VCGCB) beginning on April 7, 2015, for overdetaining him. On April 21, 2015, the VCGCB told him his claim had not been 

accepted because he had neither paid the filing fee nor requested a fee waiver. 

On May 7, 2015 he resubmitted his claim with a fee waiver. On May 15, the 

VCGCB denied any timely claims and advised him to file a late claim application 

as to any late claims. On May 25, 2015, he resubmitted his claim. The VCGCB 

acknowledged receipt of his claim, and agreed to treat it as a late claim. On July 

21, 2015, the VCGCB sent him a notification that staff were recommending denial 

of his claim. He was released that same day. The VCGCB formally denied him 

leave to present a late claim on August 20, 2015 and also rejected the claim itself. 

The VCGCB’s letter (Lodgment 47-1 at 21) dated August 28, 2015 notified him of 

this, and told him that he would need to petition an appropriate court for an order 

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relieving him of Cal. Government Code § 945.4’s claims presentation requirement, 

citing Cal. Govt. Code § 946.6. The VCGCB’s letters were addressed to Ward’s 

mailing address as provided on his claim form. (See Lodgment 47-1 at 6.) Ward 

then, represented by counsel, filed a second claim with a late application on 

February 19, 2016. On April 21, 2016, the VCGCB notified him the staff was 

recommending that the late claim petition be denied. The VCGCB formally denied 

the late claim on May 19, 2016, and rejected the claim. (Lodgment 47-1 at 36.) 

The notification letter, dated May 27, 2016, included the same advice about the 

need to petition an appropriate court for relief from the claims presentation 

requirement.

Still represented by counsel, Ward filed suit in the Central District against 

various state government defendants in 16cv1582-BRO-SP, Ward v. Cal. Dept. of 

Corr. & Rehabilitation, et al., (C.D. Cal., filed July 20, 2016).1 On June 9, 2017, he

asked the court to dismiss that case without prejudice because the complaint did 

not name the proper defendants. (See Docket no. 33 in case 16cv1582-BRO-SP.) 

The court granted the request for voluntary dismissal on June 14, 2017. (See 

Docket no. 36 in case 16cv1582.) The R&R characterizes this case as unrelated, 

which is true in a sense. That case and this were deemed administratively related. 

In addition, Ward raised his over-incarceration claims in that case as well, albeit 

against a completely different set of defendants.

2 The R&R’s characterization of 

 

1 Ward alleges the basic facts of this filing and his voluntary dismissal. (Compl. at 

1.) The Court has taken judicial notice of the docket in that case, as provided by 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), for the purpose of providing additional detail. See United 

States v. Raygoza-Garcia, 902 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2018) (court may take 

judicial notice of court records available through PACER). If Ward wishes to be 

heard on the propriety of the Court’s notice of the docket, he may file a request 

within seven calendar days of the date this order is issued. See Fed. R. Evid. 

201(e).

2 In 16cv1582, Ward sued the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and 

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the cases as unrelated should not be understood as saying the factual premises 

of the cases are unrelated. This is important because Ward was on notice of 

everything that happened in case 16cv1582, including the basis for the claims he 

was attempting to raise there. It is also relevant that he was represented by counsel 

in that case.

The R&R determined that Ward’s federal claims accrued, at the latest, on 

July 21, 2015, when he was released from prison. As of that date, he was no longer 

subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA’s) exhaustion requirements, 

and was not subject to any of the other conditions that provide a basis for tolling 

under California law. Ward objects to this for several reasons.

Ward disputes that as of the date he was released, he was no longer subject 

to the PLRA, and argues that he was still required to exhaust his administrative 

remedies even after being released. (Obj. at 8:1–9:25.) He argues that because 

prison officials continued to review his request, and only finally denied it after his 

release, he was still subject to exhaustion requirements and therefore entitled to 

tolling. 

This argument is based on a misunderstanding of the law. Only prisoners, 

not former prisoners, are subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. 

Talamantes v. Leyva, 575 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009). And under California 

law, he is entitled to tolling only while he is in custody. See Ellis v. City of San 

Diego, Cal., 176 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that limitations period ran 

from the date prisoner was released from custody). The fact that officials continued 

to consider his appeal even after his release does not affect federal exhaustion 

 

the Warden of Centinela Prison (the head official) in both his individual and official 

capacities. In this case, Ward has sued different officers at Centinela who he 

believes were directly involved in violating his rights. The Defendants in this case 

include some deputy wardens, but not the principal warden.

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requirements. And even supposing the objection were correct, it would not render 

his claims timely, because his administrative claims were denied just ten days after 

his release.

Ward also contends Defendants committed a continuing wrong by 

unjustifiably withholding records pertaining to his administrative appeals, 

preventing him from naming the proper defendants. He argues this either 

prevented his claim from accruing, or entitles him to tolling. This argument is 

meritless for several reasons. First, he knew he had filed administrative appeals, 

and he was on notice of what he said in them. He obviously was aware of the 

denials at the first and second level of review; otherwise, he would not have 

continued to appeal. If, as he now implies, he did not receive the third level denial, 

he was on notice that it was likely forthcoming. Furthermore, Ward has attached 

the third level response as an exhibit to his complaint (Docket no. at 49–50) and it 

is unremarkable. The response does not identify any Defendants, other than the 

appeals examiner (Defendant Allen), and even then it does not suggest any basis 

for holding Allen or anyone else liable. To the extent Ward thought he needed 

some related records and did not receive them at the time, he could have 

requested them. Moreover, in his first lawsuit he was represented by counsel who 

could have asked for the records (if they were in fact necessary), or who could 

even have sought discovery so they could name the correct defendants in an 

amended complaint. And the notice of voluntary dismissal in June of 2017 

recognizes that Ward hadn’t named the correct defendants and didn’t yet know 

who (if anyone) was a proper defendant. (See Docket no. 33 in case 16cv15282.) 

The facts cannot reasonably be construed to show that anyone concealed 

documents or information from Ward, or otherwise prevented him from filing suit.

Ward does not allege he took any steps before March 14, 2018 to seek out 

the records he now contends were wrongly withheld from him. Even in his 

objections, he remains silent on that point. Instead, he argues the R&R incorrectly 

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placed the burden of pleading facts establishing tolling on him. But when, as here, 

the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of the complaint, 

the burden of alleging facts to support tolling falls on the plaintiff. Hinton v. Pac. 

Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The R&R points out that Ward failed to comply with the California 

Government Code’s requirements for bringing state law claims against public 

officials or entities, giving another reason those claims were barred. Ward argues 

that VCGCB letters were incorrectly mailed to his old prison address, apparently 

suggesting that he had no notice of what they said. This is beside the point, 

however, because later letters were sent to his attorney at the address the attorney 

provided on the claim form. The final denial letter, which includes advice about the 

petitioning requirement, was sent to his attorney on or around May 27, 2016. Under 

Cal. Govt. Code §§ 945.4 and 950.2, Ward had six months from the date of denial 

to file suit against public entities, or public employees acting within the scope of 

their duties. Neither Ward nor his attorney decided to petition a court for relief from 

the timeliness requirement, and Ward did not file this action until long after the six 

month limitations period had passed. 

The R&R also correctly determined that Ward’s voluntary dismissal of his 

earlier case meant that it did not operate to toll any statutes of limitations. See 

Jonson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008). While 

Ward did not object to this, it is mentioned here for the sake of completeness.

The R&R recommended dismissal of the § 1985 claim because the § 1983 

claim on which it was based was untimely, citing Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 

425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005). The holding of Thornton and of Caldeira v. 

County of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989), which it relies on, appear to 

focus on the factual basis for claims, as opposed to their timeliness. That being 

said, Thornton and Caldeira probably apply with equal force where, as here, the 

statute of limitations is the same for the § 1983 and § 1985 claims.

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The § 1985 claim is also dismissed on the merits. Ward claims all 

Defendants conspired to obstruct justice, deny him equal protection, and deter him 

from vindicating his rights under the law. The motion to dismiss correctly cites the 

applicable pleading standards, which Ward’s § 1985 claim fails to meet. The 

complaint is devoid of factual allegations showing a conspiracy among 

Defendants, and instead relies on highly generalized conclusions that all 

Defendants were conspiring together. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 

363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal of § 1985 conspiracy claim proper 

where plaintiff failed to plead agreement among defendants adequately); Burns v. 

County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he plaintiff must state specific 

facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.”) But granting Ward leave 

to amend to re-plead would be futile, because his § 1985 claim is time-barred just 

as his § 1983 claims are.

Conclusion and Order

For these reasons, the Court OVERRULES Ward’s objections. With the 

modifications and additional discussion set forth above, the R&R is ADOPTED and 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2020

Honorable Larry Alan Burns

Chief United States District Judge

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