Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05283/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05283-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 3, 2000 Decided June 27, 2000

No. 99-5283

Hordon H. Evono,

Appellant

v.

Janet Reno,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01893)

Brian C. Kalt argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs was Langley R. Shook.

David T. Smorodin, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

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Before: Silberman, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Hordon H. Evono, a former Deputy United States Marshal, appeals the dismissal of his employment discrimination complaint against the United States

Marshals Service for lack of jurisdiction. In Butler v. West,

164 F.3d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the court held that Congress

intended to permit a federal employee to proceed to district

court where the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB")

fails to issue a final decision on the employee's "mixed case

appeal"1 within 120 days. Id. at 641.2 Under Butler, the

district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims

asserted in Mr. Evono's complaint. To the extent that the

district court ruled that Mr. Evono waived his right to sue in

district court on the basis of his pro se statements to the

MSPB suggesting that the relief he sought in court differed

from the relief sought in administrative proceedings, the

district court erred. Accordingly, because the district court

had original subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Evono's

"mixed case," it retained original jurisdiction over his retaliation claims, and we reverse.

I.

Hordon H. Evono was employed in 1970 as a Deputy

United States Marshal. The Marshals Service discharged

him in 1972 for alleged misconduct, but that discharge was

held to have been animated by racial discrimination against

him. Evono v. Civiletti, C.A. No. 74-19 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 1980),

aff'd sub nom. Evono v. Smith, No. 80-1366 (D.C. Cir. June 8,

1981). After having been reinstated in 1980, and after addi-

__________

1 "A mixed case appeal is an appeal filed with the MSPB that

alleges that an appealable agency action was effected, in whole or in

part, because of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, handicap or age." 29 C.F.R. s 1614.302(a)(2).

2 Butler was decided on January 8, 1999, approximately five

months after the district court dismissed Mr. Evono's discrimination claims and approximately seven months before it dismissed his

retaliation claims.

tional litigation to enforce the district court's 1980 judgment,

Mr. Evono was diagnosed in 1983 with a hearing loss, subsequently determined to have been job-related, that rendered

him unfit for his position. He was forced to retire in March

1984. In 1993, Mr. Evono formally requested reemployment

in accordance with the Priority Placement Referral System of

the Department of Justice. The Marshals Service denied

that request, and Mr. Evono filed an Equal Employment

Opportunity ("EEO") complaint alleging violations of the Civil

Service Reform Act and racial and disability discrimination

and retaliation. When the Department of Justice failed to act

on his "mixed case" complaint within 120 days, he appealed to

the MSPB on September 16, 1994.3

When no final decision was forthcoming from the MSPB,

Mr. Evono, acting pro se, filed suit on August 20, 1997, in the

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district court, alleging discriminatory and retaliatory actions

by the Marshals Service.4 Thereafter, the district court

granted the government's motion to dismiss Mr. Evono's

discrimination claims.5 The district court, citing 5 U.S.C.

__________

3 A "mixed case" complaint is "a complaint of employment

discrimination filed with a Federal agency based on race, color,

religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap related to or stemming from an action that can be appealed to the Merit Systems

Protection Board (MSPB)." 29 C.F.R. s 1614.302(a)(1). Where a

federal agency fails to act on a mixed case complaint within 120

days, the matter may be appealed to the MSPB. 29 C.F.R.

s 1614.302(d)(1)(i).

4 Mr. Evono filed an amended pro se complaint on December 8,

1997, for equitable relief and damages for racially discriminatory

and retaliatory actions in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Acts of 1964 and 1991, 42 U.S.C. s 2000e et seq., and s 1981, the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. s 791 et seq., and the Constitution. His amended pro se complaint essentially restated the

allegations in his original complaint. After the MSPB issued a final

decision on June 24, 1999, Mr. Evono appealed to the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

s 7702(b)(1), where the matter was pending at the time briefs were

filed in this court.

5 The district court's opinion, filed July 27, 1998, stated that the

dismissal was without prejudice to the refiling of Mr. Evono's Title

s 7702, acknowledged that Mr. Evono generally would have a

statutory right to file a "mixed case" where the MSPB had

not issued a final decision on the underlying administrative

action within 120 days, but ruled that he had waived his right

to pursue his discrimination claim in court before exhausting

his administrative remedies. The district court relied on the

fact that Mr. Evono did not refute the government's assertions that Mr. Evono had represented to the MSPB "that he

ha[d] no intention of interfering with [the] administrative

proceedings" and that he was not seeking judicial review of

his full "mixed case," and on the fact that he sought summary

judgment only on the retaliation claims. The district court

retained jurisdiction over Mr. Evono's retaliation claims and

appointed counsel for him in light of "the complexity of

litigating the remaining retaliation claim." Counsel filed a

second amended complaint alleging retaliatory acts only.6

On the eve of trial, the government moved to dismiss the

second amended complaint on the ground that the district

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the retaliation

claims, reading the district court's dismissal of Mr. Evono's

discrimination claims to have been based on the district

court's conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction,

and arguing that hence, the district court could not exercise

"supplemental jurisdiction" over Mr. Evono's unexhausted

retaliation claims. Mr. Evono responded, by counsel, that

under Butler, subject matter jurisdiction was proper and

exhaustion established. The government replied that Mr.

Evono could not split his "mixed case" between the MSPB

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__________

VII and Rehabilitation Act claims after exhaustion of his MSPB

remedy. The district court dismissed with prejudice Mr. Evono's

constitutional discrimination claims on the ground that Title VII

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provide the exclusive remedies

for his employment discrimination claims. The court denied without prejudice Mr. Evono's motion for summary judgment and

declaratory relief.

6 The second amended complaint, filed by counsel, alleges that

Mr. Evono's forced retirement and the thwarting of his efforts to

obtain reinstatement were in retaliation for his EEO activities,

which began in the 1970s and continued in the early 1980s.

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and the court. After initially denying the government's motion to dismiss as moot, the district court, on August 2, 1999,

granted the government's motion to reconsider and dismissed

Mr. Evono's second amended complaint without prejudice on

the ground that the court lacked supplemental jurisdiction

over his retaliation claims.

II.

In contending that the district court erred in dismissing his

retaliation claims, Mr. Evono maintains that Butler controls,

and that because he was entitled to file his "mixed case" in

the district court when the MSPB failed to issue a final

decision within 120 days of his appeal, the district court had

original jurisdiction over his discrimination and retaliation

claims and thus retained original jurisdiction over his retaliation claims after dismissing his discrimination claims for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We agree.

5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1) provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if at any

time after--

....

(B) the 120th day following the filing of an appeal with

the [MSPB] under subsection (a)(1) of this section, there

is no judicially reviewable action....

....

an employee shall be entitled to file a civil action to the

same extent and in the same manner as provided in

section 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964....

5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1). Mr. Evono's appeal to the MSPB was

a "mixed case appeal", alleging "that an appealable agency

action was effected, in whole or in part, because of discrimination," 29 C.F.R. s 1614.302 (a)(2), and thus began the process

described in s 7702(e)(1)(B). Consistent with Butler v. West,

164 F.3d at 638, the government agrees that, ordinarily, the

district court would have had original jurisdiction over Mr.

Evono's entire "mixed case," because the MSPB had not

issued a final decision within 120 days of Mr. Evono's appeal,

notwithstanding the fact that this would result in simultaneous administrative and judicial proceedings. See Butler,

164 F.3d at 642-43. What distinguishes Mr. Evono's case, in

the government's view, is Mr. Evono's pro se statement in the

MSPB proceeding that he was not pursuing in the district

court the full "mixed case" that was pending before the

MSPB. In other words, the government contends, Mr. Evono attempted to split his claims, keeping his discrimination

claims in the MSPB and his retaliation claims in the district

court. Relying on Smith v. Chicago School Reform Board of

Trustees, 165 F.3d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir. 1999), applying the law

of claim preclusion in interpreting the compensation cap in 42

U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(3), the government maintains that because

there is "but one subject matter transaction, i.e., Mr. Evono's

non-restoration", he "may not split [it] into multiple packages

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of different claims, i.e., retaliation, handicap discrimination,

racial discrimination, Civil Service merits. etc.". While acknowledging that there can be no res judicata bar until a first

judgment is rendered, the government urges that splitting of

this nature should be discouraged as wasteful of judicial

resources.

Of course, the difficulty with the government's position is

clear from Butler, where the court, in holding that the

existence of simultaneous district court and administrative

proceedings could not serve as the basis for dismissal of a

complaint filed pursuant to s 7702(e)(1), noted that the pendency of simultaneous proceedings was what Congress contemplated. 164 F.3d at 640-41. To that extent it is clear, as

the government concedes, that the district court had original

jurisdiction over both Mr. Evono's discrimination claims and

his retaliation claims, his pro se complaint containing the

same claims that had been pending before the MSPB for over

120 days without a final decision.7 Although Butler did not

__________

7 In view of the unequivocal holding in Butler, that the existence of simultaneous district court and administrative proceedings

could not serve as a basis for dismissal of a complaint filed pursuant

to s 7702(e)(1), it is unclear why the government did not file a

notice of error with the district court regarding dismissal of Mr.

Evono's discrimination claims or confess error in this court.

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address a situation in which the district court dismisses part

of a "mixed case" and s 7702 jurisdiction is asserted with

respect to the remaining claims, the government has cited no

authority, and we see no basis as a matter of statutory

interpretation, for treating a "mixed case" over which the

district court properly had jurisdiction but which it dismissed

in part, any differently from a "mixed case" that proceeds in

full in the district court. Section 7702(e)(1) provides an

employee with a right to file a "mixed case" in the district

court and does not suggest that the jurisdiction thereby

conferred on the district court dissolves upon dismissal of one

claim where original jurisdiction otherwise properly exists.

Contrary to the government's position, Mr. Evono was not

obligated to abandon his proceedings before the MSPB.

There thus was exhaustion and subject matter jurisdiction

over Mr. Evono's retaliation claims in the district court

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. s 7702 and 28 U.S.C. s 1331.

To the extent that the government and the district court

relied on Mr. Evono's pro se statements to the MSPB to

conclude that he waived his right to file his "mixed case" in

the district court, or was attempting to split his claims, their

reliance is misplaced. First, there was no waiver of his right

to bring his discrimination claims to the district court. Cf.

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). The

statement at issue arose when Mr. Evono responded to the

government's letter of September 18, 1997, to the MSPB

administrative law judge apparently suggesting that in view

of the pending judicial complaint, Mr. Evono would have to

withdraw his administrative appeal. The government has not

made its letter a part of the record, and for that reason alone

we have no basis to view Mr. Evono's pro se remarks,

attempting to distinguish his MSPB claims and district court

claims in order to avoid dismissal of the MSPB claims, as a

waiver of his right to pursue a "mixed case" under s 7702.8

__________

8 Indeed, Mr. Evono stated to the MSPB that "[i]f it felt that

there is a conflict in some way, that would complicate matters being

decided before the [MSPB], I wish to be informed as much,"

suggesting that in his mind there was no conflict.

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Moreover, Mr. Evono's remarks advised the administrative

law judge that he was seeking judicial review of the "continuing violations of [his] rights," which hardly reflects the language of waiver. Nor do Mr. Evono's statements in the

district court, responding to the government's erroneous arguments about exhaustion and claim splitting, demonstrate

waiver. Cf. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Furthermore, that Mr.

Evono sought summary judgment only on his retaliation

claims reflects at most that he thought there were material

issues of disputed fact on his discrimination claims, not that

he was waiving his right to pursue the latter, much less

voluntarily dismissing them. In any event, as the government acknowledged in its memorandum in support of its

motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and again at oral

argument in this court, the claims raised by Mr. Evono in the

MSPB and the district court were indistinguishable.

Second, Mr. Evono did not split his "mixed case." His pro

se complaint contained discrimination and retaliation claims.

It was the district court that split his case in two, by

dismissing Mr. Evono's discrimination claims for failure to

exhaust and declining to dismiss his retaliation claims. As

Mr. Evono points out, that he proceeded in reliance on the

district's court dismissal, preparing for trial only on the

retaliation claims, has nothing to do with whether the district

court had jurisdiction over his case. Nor does the second

amended complaint filed by counsel after the district court

had dismissed Mr. Evono's discrimination claims, raise claims

of a different nature than those before the MSPB. The

government's reliance on Chicago School Reform Board is

simply misplaced. In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that

the applicable statutory compensation cap did not prevent

multiple suits from being filed, but noted that the doctrine of

claim preclusion would prevent litigants from "splitting into

multiple packages different claims arising out of the same

transaction". 165 F.3d at 1150. Nothing of the sort is at

issue here; as Mr. Evono notes in his reply brief, the

government can raise the defense that Mr. Evono is seeking

to avoid the damages cap if he files a second lawsuit.

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Finally, the government's supplemental jurisdiction contention fares no better. The government contends not only that

the district court lacked original jurisdiction under s 7702(e)

to hear only a part of Evono's "mixed case," but that the only

basis for jurisdiction over his unexhausted retaliation claims

was supplemental jurisdiction, and that the district court

properly ruled it lacked such jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction was never necessary in Mr. Evono's case, nor did he

ever rely upon such a theory, because the district court

always had original jurisdiction over his retaliation claims

under s 7702(e).9 Parallel proceedings in the district court

and the MSPB are contemplated by s 7702. Butler, 164 F.3d

642-43. Insofar as the government was concerned about

wasting judicial resources, the district court could have

stayed or held the judicial proceedings in abeyance pending a

decision by the MSPB.10 Id. at 643.

Accordingly, we hold that where a complaint is properly

filed under 5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1), the district court's dismissal

of some claims does not deprive it of original jurisdiction over

the remaining claims, notwithstanding the pendency of the

same claims before the MSPB, and we reverse the order

dismissing Mr. Evono's complaint alleging retaliation.

__________

9 The cases relied upon by the government stand only for the

unremarkable proposition that a district court need not exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over matters with respect to which it does

not have original jurisdiction, where the matters over which original

jurisdiction could have been exercised have been dismissed, and

only supplemental matters remain. See, e.g., Saksenasingh v.

Secretary of Education, 126 F.3d 347, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Harris

v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 346 (D.C.

Cir. 1997).

10 The government misconstrues Mr. Evono's point that the

district court could have stayed his case, characterizing it as an

argument that Mr. Evono sought a stay, or that the district court

erred in not granting one. To the contrary, Mr. Evono simply

reiterates what the court said in Butler, namely that the district

court may stay its proceedings if it wishes to benefit from MSPB

expertise or avoid simultaneous proceedings. Id.

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