Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01938/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01938-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO NEWSOME,

CDCR #E-58084,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DAVID M. GILL, Superior Court Judge; 

MARK PETTINE, Deputy District 

Attorney; JUDGE JUDITH 

McCONNELL, Presiding Judge; 

CYNTHIA AARON, Associate Judge; 

JUDITH HALLER, Associate Judge; 

STEVEN STONE, Superior Court Judge

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS; (2) DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE 

A CLAIM AND FOR SEEKING 

DAMAGES FROM IMMUNE 

DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 

§ 1915A(b); AND (3) DENYING AS 

MOOT MOTION FOR SERVICE

(ECF Nos. 1, 2)

Mario A. Newsome (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison 

(“CEN”) located in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, has initiated this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did not 

prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his Complaint; 

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a), (ECF No. 2).

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 10
2

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, —U.S.—, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 

(9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance 

in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no 

assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate

Statement Report as well as a Prison Certificate completed by an accounting specialist at 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 10
3

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CEN. (See ECF No. 4); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. Civ. LR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d 

at 1119. These statements show that Plaintiff had no available balance on the books at the 

time of filing. (See ECF No. 4 at 1, 3.) Based on this accounting, no initial partial filing 

fee is assessed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner 

be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment 

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial 

filing fee”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based 

solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 

ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), 

declines to exact any initial filing fee because his prison certificate indicates he has “no 

means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the CDCR, or his 

designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment 

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 10
4

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 

context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. Detailed factual 

allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 

see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims that when he was sentenced in May 2001, San Diego Superior Court 

Judge David Gill and San Diego Deputy District Attorney Mark Pettine “imposed a 

$12,968.99 restitution fine” on Plaintiff “a full twelve years after the crime had occurred.” 

(Compl. 4.) Plaintiff claims his sentence was “unauthorized and violated the State and 

Federal ex post facto prohibition laws.” (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks to hold Appellate Court 

Justices McConnell, Aaron, and Haller” liable for affirming Plaintiff’s criminal conviction

and restitution fine. (Id. at 5.) 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 

263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive 

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 10
5

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a 

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 

698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

D. Criminal Proceedings—Heck’s “Favorable Termination” Requirement

There are two methods for state prisoners to raise complaints related to their 

imprisonment in federal court. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) 

(“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to 

imprisonment . . . .” (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973))). In general, 

claims of constitutional violations related to the “circumstances” of a prisoner’s 

confinement must be brought in a civil rights action under section 1983, see id., while 

constitutional challenges to the validity or duration of a prisoner’s confinement which seek 

either “immediate release from prison” or the “shortening of [a state prison] term” must be 

raised in a petition for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or through appropriate 

state relief. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78–79 (2005) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 

(“The Court has long held that habeas is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state 

prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 

action.”) (citing Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81–82), cert. denied, (Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-6556).

First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief based on claims that 

judicial officers or prosecutors imposed an “unauthorized” sentence in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, (see Compl. 4–5), he may not pursue those claims in a civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing his conviction has already been 

invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 10
6

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal 

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 

§ 1983.

Id.; Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2016).

“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 

‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner 

who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the 

fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003)

(emphasis added) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498–99 (holding that a writ of habeas 

corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the 

“exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court)).

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on an allegedly unlawful sentence and 

restitution fine imposed in San Diego Superior Court, he may not proceed pursuant to

§ 1983, unless that conviction and/or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 

U.S. at 486–87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner 

who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983.’”

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489)). 

Thus, because Plaintiff does not claim to have already invalidated his sentence by 

way of direct appeal, executive order, or through the issuance of either a state or federal

court writ of habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, his current Complaint must be 

dismissed in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1).

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 10
7

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

E. Judicial Immunity

Second, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against judicial officers for imposing 

and affirming an “unauthorized” sentence, (see Compl. 4–5), his claims are legally 

frivolous, for “[j]udges are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in 

their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) 

(“A judge lacks immunity where [s]he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, or 

performs an act that is not judicial in nature.” (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted)); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 

F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). The imposition of a criminal sentence is unquestionably

an act performed in a judge’s official capacity. See, e.g., Hawes v. Brown, No. 17-CV02400-WHO (PR), 2017 WL 2500905, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2017); Pattillo v. 

Lombardo, No. 17-cv-1849-JAD-VCF, 2017 WL 3622778, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017)

(“[A] sentencing decision is at its core a judicial act for which [a] [j]udge . . . is entitled to 

absolute judicial immunity.”); see also Mainez v. Gore, No. 3:17-CV-01359-JAH-JLB, 

2017 WL 4005269, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2017) (finding § 1983 claims for monetary 

damages against Superior Court Judge subject to sua sponte dismissal as frivolous pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) & 1915A(b)).

F. Prosecutorial Immunity

Third, to the extent Plaintiff claims Deputy District Attorney Mark Pettine is liable 

for monetary damages for playing a role in Plaintiff’s alleged “unauthorized” sentence,

(see Compl. 4), his Complaint must also be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) & 1915A(b) because Pettine is entitled to absolute prosecutorial 

immunity. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009) (state prosecutors are 

entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for acts taken in their official capacity); Imbler 

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 4302017 WL 362277831 (1976) (holding prosecutors 

absolutely immune from civil suits for damages under § 1983 for initiating criminal 

prosecutions and presenting cases); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 

922 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Absolute immunity is generally accorded to judges and prosecutors 

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 10
8

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

functioning in their official capacities”); Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 

1989) (finding claim against prosecutors with clear immunity legally frivolous within the 

meaning of section 1915).

Thus, for all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint both fails to state a 

claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted, and seeks monetary damages from 

defendants who are immune. Therefore, it must be DISMISSED sua sponte and in its 

entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

11262017 WL 362277827; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121; Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 

1167 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii) requires sua sponte dismissal of 

complaints seeking “monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief,” 

and noting its “appli[cation] to absolute immunity”).

G. Leave to Amend

Finally, while the Court would typically grant Plaintiff leave to amend in light of his 

pro se status, it concludes that doing so under the circumstances would be futile. See Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1127; Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 

824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for dismissal 

without leave to amend).

Amendment is futile because even if Plaintiff could somehow allege facts to show 

Defendants violated his constitutional rights as the result of his “unauthorized” sentence

(see Compl. 4), as well as facts to suggest that Defendants were not somehow absolutely 

immune, his claims for damages under § 1983 could still not yet proceed because his 

several past attempts at invalidating his conviction and/or sentence in by way of direct 

appeal, or through a writ of habeas corpus, have been unavailing. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–

87.

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, No. 3:05-cv452–MMA-WMC, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. 

Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t 

Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take notice of proceedings 

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 10
9

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings 

have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see 

also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 

244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

Here, the Court takes judicial notice of its own records in Newsome v. California 

Superior Court of San Diego County, No. 3:16-cv-01631-WQH-JMA, in which Plaintiff 

filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking to challenge the constitutional validity of his criminal

conviction and sentence, as well as the restitution fine imposed in San Diego Superior 

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on various grounds. See also Newsome v. Madden, 

No. 3:17-cv-01347-WQH-JMA. A review of these matters demonstrates that Plaintiff’s

previous efforts to invalidate his criminal conviction and restitution fine by way of direct 

appeal, and via several state court petitions for habeas corpus, have all proven unsuccessful. 

Therefore, because Plaintiff’s state and federal collateral proceedings reveal he

cannot amend his Complaint to allege the additional facts required to show either that the 

underlying conviction or sentence which forms the basis of his § 1983 claims in this case

has already been invalidated, or that the judicial or prosecutorial defendants he seeks to sue 

for money damages are not absolutely immune, the Court denies leave to amend as futile. 

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(noting that leave to amend is not required if it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of 

the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (citations omitted)).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, (ECF No. 2);

2) DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 10
10

18-CV-1938 JLS (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION;

3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim and for seeking 

damages from defendants who are absolutely immune pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

and § 1915A(b) without prejudice,2 but without leave to amend;

5) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal 

would not be frivolous); and

6) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2018

 

2

See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (court should dismiss claims barred 

by Heck without prejudice “so that [the plaintiff] may reassert his claims if he ever succeeds in invalidating 

his conviction.”); Briggs v. Enriquez, No. CV 17-4615-FMO(E), 2017 WL 6210802, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 

1, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-4615-FMO(E), 2017 WL 6209818 (C.D. Cal. 

Dec. 7, 2017).

Case 3:18-cv-01938-JLS-LL Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 10