Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02279/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02279-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 06cv2279

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL WALLACH,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06cv2279-LAB (LSP)

ORDER OVERRULING

OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; AND

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

ROBERT HERNANDEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus (“Petition”) seeking relief from

denial of parole by the Board of Parole Hearings (the “Board”). The Board found him

unsuitable for parole and scheduled his next hearing in three years. The Petition was

referred to Magistrate Judge Leo S. Papas for report and recommendation in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 72.3. Judge Papas issued his report and

recommendation (the “R&R”) concluding the Petition did not support issuance of the writ and

recommending denial of the writ. Petitioner filed written objections.

I. Legal Standards

A district court has jurisdiction to review a Magistrate Judge’s report and

recommendation on dispositive matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). “The district judge to whom

the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional

evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to which specific written

Case 3:06-cv-02279-LAB-LSP Document 23 Filed 08/29/08 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 06cv2279

objection has been made in accordance with this rule.” Id. “A judge of the court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court reviews de novo those portions of

the R&R to which specific written objection is made. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). “The statute makes it clear that the district judge must review

the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not

otherwise.” (en banc).

Petitioner has had his day in state court. In determining whether to issue the writ of

habeas corpus, the Court is examining whether the state court’s decision and ultimately, the

Board’s should be set aside for the limited grounds on which the writ is available. The

Court’s role is not to make its own factual determination regarding the nature of the

commitment offense, but to determine whether Plaintiff’s claim, which was adjudicated on

the merits in state court:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Irons, 505 F.3d at 852–53.

The R&R pointed this out, citing Locker v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003). (R&R at

5:2–7.) 

II. Discussion

Petitioner objected only to the R&R’s recommendation that his denial of parole or the

Board’s decision to hold a hearing in three years rather than one was based on “some

evidence,” and concluded that the denial of parole was impermissibly based solely on the

bare fact of his commitment offense. (Obj. to R&R, ¶¶ 2–9). Petitioner points specifically

to the determination that he posed a low likelihood of becoming involved in a violent offense

if he were released into the community. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6.) 

Petitioner did not object to the R&R’s findings of facts, which the Court therefore

ADOPTS. The following facts are taken from those findings. Petitioner pleaded guilty in

Case 3:06-cv-02279-LAB-LSP Document 23 Filed 08/29/08 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Petitioner’s objections add the detail that Petitioner is entitled to 80 months of postconviction credit, which the Court will assume for purposes of this order to be true. (Obj. to

R&R at 8 n.2.)

2

 The Board’s hearing transcript indicates this was done by children. (Pet., Ex. C

(Board Hrg. Tr.) at 11.)

- 3 - 06cv2279

1984 to first degree murder and was sentenced to 25 years to life with the possibility of

parole, plus a two-year weapon enhancement. He was awarded 318 days of pre-sentencing

term credit and was committed to prison on May 2, 1984.1 His indeterminate sentence

commenced on December 25, 1984. He reached his minimum eligible parole date on May

25, 2000. The details of the crime were as follows:

Wallach had been in a longstanding dispute with victim Richard Wescott, the

president of a printing shop. Wescott held property that belonged to Wallach

which he had not returned. The dispute resulted in a civil action. Around that

time, someone2 damaged Wallach’s car with a water balloon. Kenneth House

witnessed the act but when House refused to reveal who threw the balloon,

Wallach shot House in the foot. House ran and Wallach shot him in the back.

Wallach then drove to the printing shop and confronted Wescott with a gun.

The police were called to the scene and had telephone contact with Wallach.

However, contact was lost and Wallach shot Wescott twice in the face, killing

him.

. . .

[H]e confronted and held Westcott against his will, demanded Westcott return

property that was the subject of civil litigation pending between them, and

ultimately shot Westcott twice in the face after the property had been

delivered to Petitioner’s home as demanded.

(R&R at 3:9–13, 10:10–12.) The forensic psychological report includes more details showing

Petitioner’s calculations and the escalation of violence. (Pet., Ex. D (Report of Dr. Mura

dated June 9, 2004) at 2, 14.)

Petitioner’s record since being incarcerated has been generally good and he has been

discipline-free since 1987. The psychological determination noted a “low likelihood of

becoming involved in a violent offense if released into free community,” but also indicated

that Petitioner appeared to be “grappling with issues of self-awareness and selfunderstanding.” (R&R at 9:16–18.) The District Attorney’s Office and San Diego Police

Department both adamantly opposed Petitioner’s release. (Id. at 9:18–24.) 

The Board based its finding of unsuitability for parole on the nature of the commitment

offense including his behavior around the time of the crime and the unpredictable nature of

Case 3:06-cv-02279-LAB-LSP Document 23 Filed 08/29/08 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 06cv2279

the crime, as well as the Board’s opinion he needed additional therapy, self-help and

programming to cope with stress and to gain insight into his crime. (R&R at 9:13–20.)

Plaintiff objects that the Board’s conclusions about his need for additional therapy was

impermissible speculation in view of the psychological determination of low risk, citing In re

Smith, 114 Cal.App.4th 343, 369 (2003) and In re Roderick, 154 Cal.App.4th 242, 272 n.27

(2007). Neither of these cases stands for the proposition that a psychologist’s ultimate

recommendation is binding on the Board, but merely that the Board’s subjective speculation

did not constitute evidence and did not, by itself, undermine a psychologist’s opinion.

The recommendations of forensic psychological reports regardingsuitability for parole

are not, as Petitioner seems to suggest, conclusive. If they were, there would be little need

for lengthy, detailed reports; a parole candidate could merely present a psychologist’s letter

giving the “bottom line” recommendation that he was a low parole risk. Petitioner

emphasizes the evaluation’s positive points, but the Board may, and did, consider other

details. These show some problems and reservations about Petitioner’s judgment and the

possibility of future violence, and some disagreement between the evaluators, which

Petitioner fails to acknowledge fully. Illustrative of what the Board apparently feared are Dr.

Mura’s observations that Plaintiff “seems to be the poster boy for the passive underdog who

explodes when ‘one more straw is added to the camel’s back’ and he ‘goes postal.” (Pet.,

Ex. D at 14.) She also observed:

[I]t was not until just before the controlling offense that his defenses and

coping skills began to crumble — with the result that he lashed out violently

in a poorly judged rampage of violence. In fact, in some ways his crime

was reminiscent of those committed by postal workers or other disgruntled

employees who were seen as quiet and passive but suddenly exploded into

unbridled violence over a final event which may have seemed trivial to

others.

(Id. at 12.)

The Board considered Petitioner’s unpredictability and the apparent need for further

psychotherapy, (Pet., Ex. C at 38, 84), as well as many positive factors, including Dr. Mura’s

note that recommendations for further therapy that should not be held against him. (Id. at

40.) Bearing in mind Dr. Mura’s observations about the sudden and unforeseen onset of

Case 3:06-cv-02279-LAB-LSP Document 23 Filed 08/29/08 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 The statute explains: “To prove the killing was ‘deliberate and premeditated,’ it shall

not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the

gravity of his or her act.”

- 5 - 06cv2279

Petitioner’s violent rampage, even bearing in mind the amount of time that has passed since

then and Petitioner’s good progress, the Board was not unreasonable to be wary.

Even if the Court were to reject the Board’s opinion about Petitioner’s need to learn

to cope with stress and gain insight into his crime, the finding of unsuitability was not solely

premised on this. California law directs the Board to consider the facts of commitment

offense. 15 Cal. Code Regs § 2402(c). The Board in fact found Petitioner murdered his

victim “in a dispassionate and calculated manner and the motive for the crime was

inexplicable and trivial in relationship to the offense.” (R&R at 11:2–3.) 

The Board could permissibly rely on the facts of the commitment offense to find a

prisoner is too dangerous to be found suitable for parole, but only if the Board could ““‘point

to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed’

that demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of the suitability hearing, present a danger to

society if released.” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1071 (2005)).

In an attempt to show his crime involved only the minimum elements, Petitioner

argues that under California law the crime of first degree murder necessarily includes

callousness, dispassion, or calculation as elements. (Obj. to R&R, ¶ 7) The crime of first

degree murder under California law is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with

malice aforethought, which is perpetrated by “any kind of willful, deliberate,and premeditated

killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape,

carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or [certain other crimes].”

Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 189. Cruelty, callousness, and dispassion are thus not elements

of the crime. While premeditation is an element of one formulation of the crime, calculation

is not.3

The Board extensively discussed the details of Petitioner’s crime, pointing out the

degree of planning and deception required, the many reasons and opportunities he had to

Case 3:06-cv-02279-LAB-LSP Document 23 Filed 08/29/08 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 06cv2279

desist, the apparent triviality of his motives for shooting Mr. House and killing Mr. Wescott,

and his minimizing of certain aspects of his crimes. (See, e.g., Pet., Ex. C at 11–13, 86-88

(description and general discussion of crimes); 17, 19–20 (discussing Petitioner’s inability

to recall or analyze, in retrospect, his thinking during the incident); 18, 81–82, 86–87

(disputing Petitioner’s description of the killing as resulting from a struggle between himself

and the victim); 18–20 (discussing Petitioner’s refusal to be dissuaded by the victim’s

pleading and several attempts to appease Petitioner); 47–49 (discussingtranscript of lengthy

9-1-1 call in which dispatcher attempted to persuade Petitioner to desist after Petitioner knew

the disputed property had already been returned); 62–65, 81–82 (discussing triviality of water

balloon incident); 81, 86–88 (noting Petitioner’s failure to acknowledge harm done to Mr.

House).)

This is not to say the evidence was entirely or even mostly negative. It is apparent

Petitioner has a good deal in his favor, and the Board acknowledged this. Among other

things, the Board set his next parole hearing three years out, rather than the maximum of

five. (R&R at 13:10–12.) The large amount of favorable evidence does not, however,

negate evidence from which the Board could conclude Petitioner presented an ongoing

danger. Even if the Board overlooked positive aspects of Petitioner’s record, it is not the

Court’s role to reweigh the evidence. See Chichil v. Kane, 255 Fed.Appx. 194, 194 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)). Based on the Board’s

consideration of the facts of Petitioner’s crime, however, coupled with some documented

reasons for concern about Petitioner’s psychological readiness, the Board therefore relied

on “some evidence” to reach its conclusions.

Petitioner contends the Board may not continue to rely on his commitment offense

to deny him parole. The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536

(9th Cir. 2008), when issued, offered some support for Petitioner’s position. Two facts

prevent Petitioner from benefitting from this. First, Hayward relied on “extraordinary

circumstances,” see Trujillo v. California, 2008 WL 344107, slip op. at *5 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 6,

2008) (discussing the unusual circumstances of Hayward), which are not present here.

Case 3:06-cv-02279-LAB-LSP Document 23 Filed 08/29/08 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 06cv2279

Second, the Ninth Circuit has granted rehearing of Hayward en banc, 527 F.3d 797,

rendering it nonprecedential. While the Ninth Circuit in Irons expressed the hope that parole

boards would “come to recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on

an inmate's commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some

point violate due process,” 505 F.3d at 854, the Ninth Circuit has not held that clearly

established federal law, as established by the Supreme Court of the United States, sets a

limit on the number of times parole may be denied on this basis. See Medway v.

Schwarzenegger, 257 Fed.Appx. 44, 45 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).

The Board relied on essentially the same evidence to delay his next parole hearing

for three years, so the same analysis supports this decision. Another tribunal besides the

Board might have made a different determination, but in light of the record, the Court cannot

agree the Board’s determinations were unsupported by some evidence.

III. Other Remarks

The objections to the R&R close with an expression of dissatisfaction with Magistrate

Judge Papas’ handling of the R&R, and a rebuke to the Court:

Although this Court denies these claims as a matter of routine and in this

fashion, because the [R&R] ignored the substance of Mr. Wallach’s

constitutional claims and failed to apply the some evidence standard to

review the decision that his parole currently poses an unreasonable public

safety risk and that he cannot achieve parole suitability in one year, these

issues should be explicitly addressed in the de novo review. Said review will

be equally unavailing if it fails to articulate a nexus between the two-to-three

decades old offense facts or to cite any evidence to override the conclusive

forensic determinations of Mr. Wallach’s low current parole risk.

(Pet. A at 7:24–8:4). Petitioner was represented by counsel, Attorney Marc Grossman, who

signed the objections. Because Mr. Grossman signed the objections, the Court will assume

they are his own, and will not attribute them to Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

These remarks are inaccurate as concerns the R&R, which went into great detail to

discuss Petitioner’s Constitutional claims. Though Petitioner urged him to apply the

“preponderance” or “substantial evidence” standard (Pet. at 25:13–30:12), the R&R

expressly did apply the “some evidence” standard, discussing its application at length. (R&R

at 7:22–13:14 (holding “some evidence” was correct standard, and applying it to Petitioner’s

Case 3:06-cv-02279-LAB-LSP Document 23 Filed 08/29/08 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 See Roger A. Hanson & Henry W. K. Daley, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Habeas

Corpus Review: Challenging State Court Criminal Convictions 17 (1995) (98% of issues

raised in federal habeas petitions are dismissed or denied).

- 8 - 06cv2279

due process claims).) To the extent Petitioner’s counsel believed the R&R failed to analyze

them accurately, he could have objected (and did). But it is simply wrong to say the R&R

ignored Petitioner’s claims altogether when this is patently not so.

As discussed above, the “some evidence” standard requires the Court to examine

whether the Board’s decision was supported by some evidence, which the Court has done.

It is not appropriate to insist that the Court conduct its own analysis of the evidence and

articulate its own reasoning for finding Petitioner parole, or that the Court’s review of those

portions of the R&R to which he has objected is somehow improper if the Court declines to

adopt this approach.

But more than that, it is out of order — and unprofessional conduct — for Mr.

Grossman to suggest, with no basis, that the Court unthinkingly denies petitions for writs of

habeas corpus as if by force of habit. Judges and courts are of course fallible. But if Mr.

Grossman believes this or any other court has erroneously denied any petition, his remedy

is to appeal, not to make insulting asides in his briefing.

The Court recognizes it is counsel’s duty to represent his client zealously, and it is

likely a source of frustration to him that most habeas petitions are denied.4 That said,

intemperate and baseless accusations against the Court do not serve the interest of Mr.

Grossman’s clients or any other proper purpose and Mr. Grossman is admonished to desist,

and warned that any repetition of such conduct in future filings before this Court will result

in the imposition of sanctions and referral to the Standing Committee on Discipline. See Civil

Local Rule 83.5(a), (c).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:06-cv-02279-LAB-LSP Document 23 Filed 08/29/08 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 06cv2279

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED. The Court

ADOPTS the R&R. The Petition is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 29, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02279-LAB-LSP Document 23 Filed 08/29/08 Page 9 of 9