Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06218/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06218-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and F.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties consented to proceed before a United States

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Magistrate Judge, and by a January 20, 2006 order, this action was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence J.

O’Neill for all further proceedings.

This Court carefully reviewed and considered all argument, points and authorities, declarations, depositions,

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exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, objections and other papers filed by the parties. Omission of

reference to an argument, document, paper or objection is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did not consider

the argument, document, paper or objection. This Court thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it deemed

admissible, material and appropriate for summary judgment/adjudication.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT RODRIGUEZ, CASE NO. CV-F-04-6218 LJO 

Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION

vs. (Doc. 16.)

PRAXAIR DISTRIBUTION, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

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Defendant Praxair Distribution, Inc. (“Praxair”) seeks summary judgment/adjudication on

plaintiff Robert Rodriguez’ (“Mr. Rodriguez’”) employment discrimination, termination and failure to

rehire claims on grounds they are barred by a release which Mr. Rodriguez signed and lack supporting

evidence. This Court considered Praxair’s summary judgment/adjudication motion on the record and 2

without oral argument or the February 10, 2006 hearing, pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(h).

For the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS Praxair summary judgment.

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Mr. Rodriguez proceeds on his first amended complaint, which he filed on July 6, 2004 before his state 3

court action was removed to this Court. For convenience, Mr. Rodriguez’ first amended complaint will be referred to as his

“complaint.”

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BACKGROUND

Mr. Rodriguez’ Employment With Praxair

Praxair supplies atmospheric, process and specialty gasses, high-performance coatings, and

related services and technologies. In his declaration and complaint, Mr. Rodriguez notes that, in 1988, 3

he began as a dock worker for a Praxair predecessor and received successive promotions with increased

responsibilities along with favorable performance reviews. Mr. Rodriguez further notes that beginning

in 1998, he was assigned demanding inventory and parts numbering projects and claimsthat in 2001 his

work was “overwhelming” to cause him to smoke more and to develop insomnia. 

As of 2002, Mr. Rodriguez was a cylinder inventory analyst with Praxair. Mr. Rodriguez claims

that in early 2002, he experienced “overwhelming stress and anxiety,” constant focus on work, coping

difficulty, and sleep and concentration difficulties and believed he “knew he couldn’t function anymore.”

Mr. Rodriguez claims that he began “to fear looking at e-mails or answering phones.” According to Mr.

Rodriguez, his physicians removed him from work during March-September 2002, and he was

diagnosed with severe depression.

Mr. Rodriguez declares that he “wanted to continue my career with Praxair and wanted

desperately to come back to work.” Mr. Rodriguez notes that in August 2002, he met with Praxair

managers, including Dena Singleton (“Ms. Singleton”), a human resources director, to indicate he

“would be willing to work 8 to 10 hours a day, but []was not going to miss any more vacation or work

evenings and weekends as a normal part of his work week. [Mr. Rodriguez] asked for an accommodation

that would allow him to accomplish his tasks within a reasonable time frame.” According to Mr.

Rodriguez, on September 16, 2002, Ms. Singleton informed Mr. Rodriguez that Praxair “had no legal

obligation to take him back, and that [he] would have to go on long term disability. [Mr. Rodriguez] was

told that after he obtained a doctor’s release to return to work, he was welcome to reapply for a position,

and if one was available, they may rehire him.” 

The complaint alleges that on September 20, 2002, Ms. Singleton left Mr. Rodriguez a message

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Mr. Rodriguez characterizes the $23,000 payment as a “salary continuation.” 4

Mr. Rodriguez inserted the italicized wording in his handwriting.

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“saying there was an opportunity for him.” The complaint further alleges that in October 2002, Dave

Wilson (“Mr. Wilson”), Mr. Rodriguez’ former supervisor and Praxair’s hard goods director, offered

Mr. Rodriguez a position and “said he would call [Mr. Rodriguez] back after speaking with Dena

Singleton. An offer was then never furnished to [Mr. Rodriguez]. He was denied employment, and did

not receive any accommodation.” 

The General Release

In connection with severance of his Praxair employment, Praxair paid Mr. Rodriguez $23,000,4

and Mr. Rodriguez signed a General Release – California (“release”) on November 11, 2002. The

release states in pertinent part:

. . . I release and discharge Praxair, Inc. . . . from all claims and causes of action

whatsoever to the extent arising from my separation from employment. These include,

but are not limited to, claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

and other federal, state, and local laws prohibiting age, race, sex, religious, national

origin, handicap, or other discrimination. I am not releasing claims for my pension and

other benefits payable in the ordinary course, including but not limited to benefits under

California workers compensation laws, or payment due under any prior agreement with 5

or policy, plan or program of the Company and not granted me . . .

The release further provided that Mr. Rodriguez acknowledged that the release “is intended to include

and discharge all claims that I do not know or suspect to exist at the time of execution of this document

relating to my separation from employment.” Pursuant to the release, Mr. Rodriguez acknowledged and

understood that he had no less than 21 days to consider the release and to revoke it in writing within

seven days of its execution.

Prior to signing the release, Mr. Rodriguez consulted with an attorney for legal advice about the

release. Mr. Rodriguez declares that Ms. Singleton “called me numerous times to sign” the release and

that he told her that “she was pressuring me to sign.” 

Post-Severance Contact With Mr. Wilson

In November 2002, Mr. Wilson informed Mr. Rodriguez of a potential new position in Mr.

Wilson’s division and in which Mr. Rodriguez might be interested. Mr. Wilson later indicated that he

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Mr. Wilson reported directly to Janet Coffman (“Ms. Coffman”), Praxair’s marketing vice president and 6

who reported directly to Praxair’s president.

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had cleared creation of the position with Ms. Singleton and needed to prepare a job description and to

clear it with Mr. Wilson’s supervisors. Mr. Rodriguez attributes Mr. Wilson as indicating on December

6, 2002, that Mr. Wilson received approval of senior management and Mr. Wilson’s superior for Mr. 6

Rodriguez to return and that Mr. Wilson continued to prepare the job description. Mr. Rodriguez

declares: “I considered this a formal job offer because in the past when I was promoted to or hired into

a position, management would review the job description and the responsibilities upon making the offer

and then later formalize it onto paper.” Mr. Rodriguez further attributes Mr. Wilson as indicating that

Mr. Wilson needed to consult with Ms. Singleton “to make it formal” and “that it was dependent on

her.” Mr. Rodriguez claims Ms. Singleton sabotaged his return to work and declares:

My feelings of hopelessness were based on the negative attitude I received from

her after leaving on disability. When I was trying to make the decision to either return

or be medically severanced she told me that a severance was the only option. She was

also pressuring me to sign the severance agreement, callingme a least half a dozen times.

She had previously told me that the company was in no way obligated to take me back.

She was telling me to forget about coming back.

Mr. Rodriguez further declares: “I believe [Ms. Singleton] did not want to bring me back because of my

disability.” Mr. Rodriguez points to Ms. Singleton’s deposition testimony that she was aware that Mr.

Rodriguez received mental health treatment.

According to Praxair, Mr. Wilson did not make a firm employment offer to Mr. Rodriguez.

Praxair points to Mr. Rodriguez’ testimony that he lacks evidence that Mr. Wilson spoke to Ms.

Singleton:

Q. Did Dave Wilson ever tell you that he actually did speak with Dena Singleton

about your potential reemployment with Praxair?

A. No, because I never spoke to him after that. He told me he was going to talk to

her.

Q. Do you have any information from any source that Dave Wilson actually did

speak with Dena Singleton after November 11, 2002 about your potential

reemployment with Praxair?

. . .

A. Well, other than knowing Dave Wilson, he told me he was going to do it. I

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To attempt to raise doubts as to a hiring freeze, Mr. Rodriguez points to Ms. Singleton’s deposition

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testimony that she did not know if see saw a document regarding the hiring freeze.

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believed him.

. . .

Q. Any other reason?

A. No.

Praxair points to Mr. Rodriguez’ further deposition testimony:

Q. . . . But other than your familiarity and your prior relationship with Dave Wilson,

and other than the fact that he said he was going to call Dena Singleton, you

don’t have any information that he actually did call Dena, right?

A. Well, no. I can’t produce something that says he talked to her. But in my heart

I know Dave talked to her because he told me he was going to, and Dave is a

straight-shooter.

Praxair notes that it implemented a company-wide hiring freeze in November and December 2002 to

prevent authorization or creation of the potential position which Mr. Wilson had discussed with Mr.

Rodriguez. Mr. Wilson testified: 7

We – we were told not to add additional employees to the corporate payroll, okay? The

time period we’re talking about is our annual budgetary time period; goes on for about

three months, starts in September, usually concludes sometime in December, okay? It

goes through a hierarchy of approval processes, okay? And we were told we’re not

hiring anybody corporately, and that’s when the ball stopped rolling. 

In fact, a year later, two positions in the same group that I was intending to bring [Mr.

Rodriguez] into were eliminated. So, there was no one hired and two positions were

eliminated a year later.

Praxair further points to Ms. Coffman’s deposition testimony:

Q. . . . when the president of Praxair Distribution, Inc. told you to hold steady, did

you understand that that was a hiring freeze, at least for you organization?

. . .

A. What I understood is that I was not going to be allowed to add any additional

headcount to my group.

Q. And did you communicate that information to Dave Wilson?

A. Yes.

. . .

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Q. And the president of the company told you not to hire any headcount during . .

. the budget preparation process for 2003, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And part of the budget preparation process occurred in 2002, correct.

A. Absolutely.

According to Praxair, Mr. Rodriguez’ mental health condition was neither a consideration nor

factor as to Praxair’s decision not to create the new position or not to hire Mr. Rodriguez for a potential

position under Mr. Wilson. In her deposition, Ms. Singleton testified that she neither told Mr. Wilson

not to rehire Mr. Rodriguez nor discouraged Mr. Wilson to rehire Mr. Rodriguez. According to Mr.

Wilson, Ms. Singleton noted that Mr. Rodriguez’ employment had been severed due to a “personal

issue.” Ms. Singleton testified that “we had a hiring freeze between November and December at the very

least during that time period . . . [and Mr. Rodriguez’] management team all agreed that if there was an

opportunity that was appropriate for him that they would be willing to hire him into that opportunity.”

Mr. Rodriguez’ Claims

Mr. Rodriguez filed a September 9, 2003 complaint with the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) to allege discrimination claims under the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 12900, et seq. More specifically, the

DFEH complaint alleged that during November 12, 2002 to December 12, 2002, Mr. Rodriguez was

denied employment and accommodation because of Mr. Rodriguez’ “perceived and actual disabilities”

and depression. DFEH issued Mr. Rodriguez a right-to-sue letter, and Mr. Rodriguez filed a state court

action which was removed as this pending action.

In this action, Mr. Rodriguez’ complaint alleges discrimination and FEHA claims. The gist of

Mr. Rodriguez’ claims is that Praxair failed to accommodate his mental health condition and retaliated

against Mr. Rodriguez for seeking an accommodation. The complaint’s first cause of action for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy alleges that Praxair failed to afford Mr. Rodriguez’

requested accommodation and terminated his employment because of his age (over 40 years) and

disability (industrial injury, anxiety and depression). The complaint’s second cause of action alleges

Praxair retaliated against Mr. Rodriguez “based on requesting accommodation for disability” and

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discriminated against Mr. Rodriguez due to his disability and age to violate FEHA. The complaint’s

third cause of action alleges further FEHA violation due to Praxair’s retaliation against Mr. Rodriguez

“based on his health condition by first refusing to accommodate his disability, and then by refusing to

hire [Mr. Rodriguez].” The third cause of action references Praxair’s failure to engage in a good faith

interactive process to determine if Mr. Rodriguez’ disability could be accommodated. The complaint’s

fourth cause of action alleges that Praxair violated Mr. Rodriguez’ implied-in-fact contract to be

dismissed only for good cause in light of hislongevity of employment, promotions, raises and favorable

performance reviews, and Praxair’s policies and officials’ statements of company practices.

For relief, the complaint seeks damages for emotional distress and loss of earnings and benefits,

punitive damages, an injunction to reinstate his employment and not to further discriminate based on

his age and/or disability, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest.

Mr. Rodriguez’ Agreement To Dismiss Claims

At Mr. Rodriguez’ July 8, 2005 deposition, Mr. Rodriguez and his counsel agreed on the record

to dismiss the complaint’s first, second and fourth causes of action “entirely . . . with prejudice” as well

as the third cause of action, except its FEHA failure to rehire claim based on conduct after Mr.

Rodriguez signed the release on November 11, 2002. In short, Mr. Rodriguez and his counsel agreed

to dismiss all wrongful termination claims and to pursue only failure to rehire claims.

In response to written discovery, Mr. Rodriguez admitted that the release discharged Praxair of

liability for conduct prior to Mr. Rodriguez’ November 11, 2002 signature of the release.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment/Adjudication Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 56(b) permits a party against whom a claim is asserted to seek “summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Summary judgment/adjudication is appropriate when

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. F.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106

S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9 Cir. 1987). The purpose of summary judgment/adjudication is to “pierce the pleadings and assess th

the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586,

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n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348; International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405

(9 Cir. 1985). th

On summary judgment/adjudication, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to

any material fact,” not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of contested matters. F.R.Civ.P. 56(c);

Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9 Cir. 1997); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress th

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464,

467, 82 S.Ct. 486 (1962); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th

Cir. 1984). The evidence of the party opposing summary judgment/adjudication is to be believed and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts before the court must be drawn in favor of

the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as

a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

To carry its burden of production on summary judgment/adjudication, a moving party “must

either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or

show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210

F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000); see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d th

563, 574 (9 Cir. 1990). “[T]o carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party

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must persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102;

see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 

“If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no

obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-1103; See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598.

“If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce

evidence to support its claim or defense.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

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at 574. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make

the showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”) “But if the nonmoving party produces enough

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Nissan

Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The amount of evidence

necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.’” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9 Cir. th

1983) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592

(1968)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be

insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Under F.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a summary judgment/adjudication motion, interlocutory in character,

may be rendered on the issue of liability alone. “In cases that involve . . . multiple causes of action,

summary judgment may be proper as to some causes of action but not as to others, or as to some issues

but not as to others, or as to some parties, but not as to others.” Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123

(5 Cir. 1981); see also Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9 Cir. 1990); Cheng v. th th

Commissioner Internal Revenue Service, 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9 Cir. 1989). th

As discussed below, Mr. Rodriguez has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding

his remaining failure to rehire claims, and Praxair has demonstrated an absence of evidence for elements

of Mr. Rodriguez’ remaining failure to rehire claims.

Release

Praxair contends that Mr. Rodriguez’ execution of the release bars all of his claims except those

arising from failure to rehire after he signed the release on November 11, 2002. Praxair explains that

the release bars all but the failure to rehire claims in that the non-rehire claims arise “directly” from Mr.

Rodriguez’ employment orseparation from employment. Praxair points out that Mr. Rodriguez and his

counsel concede as much with their offer to dismiss all but failure to rehire claims.

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California Civil Code section 1541 provides: “An obligation is extinguished by a release

therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor, upon a new consideration, or in writing, with or without

new consideration.” Generally, “a written release extinguishes any obligation covered by the release’s

terms, provided it has not been obtained by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress or undue

influence.” Skrbina v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 (1996)

(general release of employment law claims included FEHA claims); see Linsley v. Twentieth Century

Fox Film Corp., 75 Cal.App.4th 762, 769, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 429 (1999) (“A release of unlawful

discrimination claims under the FEHA under the circumstances present here was fully enforceable.”);

Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2 Cir. 1998) (“Accordingly, we hold that the nd

release is unambiguous, was knowingly and voluntarily entered into, and therefore bars the plaintiff from

bringing the present action.”); Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Cty. Soil & Water Conserv., 133 F.3d 816, 819

(11 Cir. 1998) (“an employee can waive his ‘cause of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary th

settlement agreement’ if ‘the employee’s consent to the settlement was voluntary and knowing.’”)

With the release, Mr. Rodriguez discharged Praxair of all claims “arising from my separation

from employment,” including federal and state discrimination claims. The release preserved Mr.

Rodriguez’ pension, benefits and workers compensation claims. The complaint’s first, second and

fourth causes of action address Mr. Rodriguez’ alleged wrongful termination under varying theories.

As such, these causes of action arise from Mr. Rodriguez’ “separation from employment” and are subject

to the release given the absence of evidence of fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress or undue

influence. The third cause of action includes pre- and post-severance claims. Plaintiff and his counsel

conceded at Mr. Rodriguez’ deposition and in response to written discovery that only the post-severance

claims survive, that is, those claims arising from failure to rehire Mr. Rodriguez after he signed the

release on November 11, 2002. In his opposition papers, Mr. Rodriguez does not dispute that only his

post-severance claims survive. As such, the release bars all claims but the post-November 11, 2002

failure to rehire claims. 

Merits Of Mr. Rodriguez’ Failure To Rehire Claim

Prima Facie Case Of Disability Discrimination

With the release barring Mr. Rodriguez’ pre-severance claims, this Court turnsto the third cause

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of action’s claim that Praxair violated FEHA by failing to rehire Mr. Rodriguez because of his mental

health condition. FEHA declares “as a public policy of this state that it is necessary to protect and

safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without

discrimination or abridgment on account of . . . physical disability, mental disability, medical condition

. . .” Cal. Gov. Code, § 12920. California Government Code section 12940(a) provides it is unlawful:

“For an employer, because of . . . physical disability, mental disability, medical condition . . . to refuse

to hire or employ the person . . . or to bar or to discharge the person from employment . . . or to

discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”

Disparate treatment claims have shifting burdens of proof. A plaintiff has the initial burden to

prove by a preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of disparate treatment, that is, a plaintiff must

offer evidence that “give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty.

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981); see St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746-2747 (1993). This may be accomplished with direct evidence of

discriminatory intent. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9 Cir. 2003). “‘Direct

th

evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference

or presumption.’” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9 Cir. 1988) (quoting Davis v. th

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1085 (5 Cir. 1994)). th

A plaintiff may also establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination through

circumstantial evidence. To do so, the plaintiff must show that he/she:

1. Suffers from a disability;

2. Is a qualified individual; and

3. Was subjected to adverse employment action because of the disability.

Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 236, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 830, 835 (1997); see McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802; 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973);Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 891

(9 Cir. 1994); Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1343 (9 Cir. 1987), cert. denied,

th th

484 U.S. 1047, 108 S.Ct. 785 (1988). 

“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.” Burdine,

450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089. At summary judgment/adjudication, the “requisite degree proof

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necessary to establish a prima facie case . . . is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of

preponderance of the evidence.” Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889.

If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer “to articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411

U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-253, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-1095; Coleman v. Quaker

Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 950, 121 S.Ct. 2592 (2001); Guz,

th

24 Cal.4th at 355-356, 100 Cal.Rptr. at 379; Brundage, 57 Cal.App. 4 at 228, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d at 835. th

If the employer presents admissible evidence that one of more of plaintiff’s prima facie elements is

lacking or that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the

employer is entitled to summary judgment/adjudication unless the plaintiff produces admissible evidence

to raise a triable issue of fact material as to the employer’s showing. Caldwell v. Paramount Unified

School District, 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 448, 457 (1995). If the employer carries its

burden, plaintiff must have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the legitimate

reasons offered by the employer were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; 93 S.Ct. 1817; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see

Brundage, 57 Cal.App. 4 at 228, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d at 835. th

Despite the burden shifting, the ultimate burden of proof remains always with the plaintiff to

show that the employer intentionally discriminated because of the plaintiff’s disability. See Burdine,

450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089; Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1281; Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417,

1420-1421 (9 Cir. 1990). By applying the shifting burdens of production in the summary judgment th

context, “the judge [will] determine whether the litigants have created an issue of fact to be decided by

the jury.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, n. 8, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, n. 8.

Praxair contends that Mr. Rodriguez cannot establish a prima facie claim for disability

discrimination because he lacks evidence that Praxair’s failure to rehire him was based on alleged

disability. Praxair argues that Mr. Rodriguez’ failure to rehire claim is based on Mr. Rodriguez’

speculation that Ms. Singleton instructed Mr. Wilson not to rehire Mr. Rodriguez or discouraged Mr.

Wilson to rehire Mr. Rodriguez. Praxair points out that Mr. Wilson did not extend Mr. Rodriguez a

rehire offer because of Praxair’s company-wide hiring freeze, which prevented creation of Mr.

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Rodriguez’ potential position. Praxair notes that Ms. Singleton, Mr. Wilson and Ms. Coffman testified

that Mr. Rodriguez was not rehired because of Praxair’s hiring freeze, not Mr. Rodriguez’ mental health

condition. Ms. Singleton further testified that she neither told Mr. Wilson not to rehire Mr. Rodriguez

nor discouraged Mr. Wilson to rehire Mr. Rodriguez.

Mr. Rodriguez argues that he establishes a prima facie disability discrimination claim. As to the

first two prima facie elements of disability discrimination, Mr. Rodriguez notes that he has suffered

depression and was given temporary disability leave. Mr. Rodriguez claims that medication improved

his condition so that he could perform the position contemplated by Mr. Wilson. Praxair does not

contest the first two elements of the prima facie case (disability and qualified individual). Praxair

focuses on whether Mr. Rodriguez was subjected to an adverse employment action because of disability.

Praxair argues Mr. Rodriguez fails to establish the third element of the prima facie case in the absence

of “direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that he was not re-hired

by Praxair because of his disability.” (Underlining in original.) 

Mr. Rodriguez contends that he was subjected to adverse employment action in that Ms.

Singleton “showed hostility” toward him during his disability leave, severance and rehire attempt. As

to Ms. Singleton’s alleged hostility, Mr. Rodriguez points to Ms. Singleton’s:

1. Awareness of Mr. Rodriguez’ temporary medical leave and mental health treatment;

2. Presence at a meeting where Mr. Rodriguez requested a lighter work load;

3. Denial of Mr. Rodriguez’ request that his daughter attend a meeting regarding his

condition;

4. Failure to assist Mr. Rodriguez to find a job with Praxair which he could do with

accommodation;

5. Half dozen telephone calls to inquire whether Mr. Rodriguez had signed the release;

6. Failure to facilitate Mr. Rodriguez prompt payment of wages and vacation pay upon

severance; and

7. Comment to Mr. Wilson that Mr. Rodriguez’ severance involved a “personal issue.”

Based on such conduct of Ms. Singleton, Mr. Rodriguez concludes that a jury “could reasonably

conclude” her actions were hostile.

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Inquiry whether employment action is adverse requires a case-by-case determination based upon

objective evidence. Blackie v. State of Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 725 (1 Cir. 1996). A plaintiff’s displeasure st

“by an employer’s act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a materially

adverse employment action.” Blackie, 75 F.3d at 725.

Mr. Rodriguez’ approach to attempt to establish adverse employment action based on disability

is confusing. Mr. Rodriguez mixes pre- and post-severance (November 11, 2002) events to attempt to

demonstrate disability discrimination not to rehire him. Mr. Rodriguez fails to demonstrate adverse

employment action (failure to rehire) based on Ms. Singleton’s awareness of Mr. Rodriguez’ mental

health condition, attendance at a meeting, denial of his daughter’s attendance at a meeting, telephone

calls regarding the release, failure to facilitate prompt final payment of wages and vacation pay, and

“personal issue” comment. Most of such purported conduct arose prior to November 11, 2002, is subject

to the release, and is at best collateral to the issues remaining in this action. As noted by Praxair, Mr.

Rodriguez speculates as to effects of Ms. Singleton’s knowledge of his condition, and such speculation,

without more, fails to raise a sufficient factual issue as to adverse employment action. 

As for Ms. Singleton’s alleged failure to assist Mr. Rodriguez’ return, Mr. Rodriguez points to

Mr. Wilson’s deposition testimony: 

Q. And so, [Ms. Singleton] told you that [Mr. Rodriguez] was no longer with the

company and had certain private issues; is – is that fair?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Do you recall any words that you had for her at that time?

A. I recall that I very strongly communicated to her that I wanted to employ [Mr.

Rodriguez], and I wanted her to do whatever was necessary to help me do that.

And I think that meant – well, I don’t know what it meant, but doing some sort

of reverse severance . . . for lack of a better term.

Q. Do you recall her response, Ms. Singleton’s?

A. Her response was it’s – I don’t recall exact words, but it was something to the

effect of, you know, “There’s some complication in doing that, let me find out

what I need to do,” and she proceeded to do that.

. . .

A. [Ms. Singleton] had some concern with it because of, you know, what she

described as a “private issue.” She did not, you know, disclose much of what

that issue was. I – I recall her describing it as a “private issue.” 

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Q. Okay.

A. And, you know, “Are you sure you want to do this?”

And I said, “Yeah.” And I went through all the reasons that, most of which I have

communicated to you, and [Ms. Singleton] proceeded to start doing whatever she needed

to do.

Q. To get the ball rolling?

A. To get the ball rolling. 

Mr. Rodriguez’ evidence fails to raise a factual issue that Ms. Singleton’s alleged failure to

accommodate Mr. Rodriguez equated to adverse employment action.

Ms. Singleton’s telephone calls to inquire whether Mr. Rodriguez signed the release fail to assist

Mr. Rodriguez to demonstrate adverse employment action. Mr. Rodriguez ultimately signed the release

after consulting an attorney and included language to preserve workers compensation claims.

The third factor of Mr. Rodriguez’ prima facie case rises or falls on Ms. Singleton’s conduct.

The inference most favorable to Mr. Rodriguez from the evidence is that Ms. Singleton apprised Mr.

Wilson ofMr. Rodriguez’ personal issue and questioned Mr. Wilson whether hewished to continue with

Mr. Rodriguez’ potential rehire. Mr. Rodriguez notes that he had informed Mr. Wilson of his prior job

problems to render immaterial Ms. Singleton’s “personal issue” comment. There is no evidence – direct

or indirect – that Ms. Singleton poisoned the well post-severance and in turn, that Mr. Rodriguez, postseverance, was subjected to adverse action because of a disability. According to Mr. Wilson, Ms.

Singleton investigated Mr. Rodriguez’ potential rehire. In the absence of evidence of or a factual issue

regarding adverse employment action, Mr. Rodriguez fails to establish a prima facie case. 

Pretext

Praxair contends that its hiring freeze was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to prevent Mr.

Rodriguez’ rehire. Praxair argues that Mr. Rodriguez lacks evidence to demonstrate that the hiring

freeze was a pretext to discriminate based on Mr. Rodriguez’ mental health condition. Praxair points

to Mr. Rodriguez’ deposition testimony that he lacks evidence that Ms. Singleton talked to Mr. Wilson

about a potential position. 

A plaintiff may establish pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered

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California courts have held that to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must offer substantial evidence that 8

the employer’s stated non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted

with a discriminatory animus, or combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer

engaged in intentional discrimination. Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 357, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 353; Hersant v. Department of Social

Services, 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1004, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 (1997). 

16

explanation is unworthy of credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. “[A] plaintiff at the

pretext stage must produce evidence in addition to that which was sufficient for her prima facie case in

order to rebut the defendant’s showing.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220; see Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890. “When

the plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the actual motivation

of the employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. 

In the absence of direct evidence, “the plaintiff must come forward with circumstantial evidence

that tends to show that the employer’s proffered motives were not the actual motives because they are

inconsistent or otherwise not believable.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has explained:

In response to the defendant’s offer of nondiscriminatory reasons, the plaintiff must

produce “specific, substantial evidence of pretext.” Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d

392, 393 (9 Cir. 1983). In other words, the plaintiff “must tender a genuine issue of th

material fact as to pretext in order to avoid summary judgment.” Id.

Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890-891 (addressing age discrimination).8

 A plaintiff must demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies,

or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder

could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ [citation], and hence infer ‘that the employer did not

act for the [asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’ [citations.]” Fuentes v. Perksie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3

rd

Cir. 1994); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1072 (3 Cir. 1996), cert. rd

denied, 521 U.S. 1129, 117 S.Ct. 2532 (1997); Stewart v. Rutgers, The State University, 120 F.3d 426

(3 Cir. 1997). “If a plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue regarding the authenticity of rd

the employer’s stated motive, summary judgment is inappropriate because it is for the trier of fact to

decide which story is to be believed.” Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9 Cir. 1993). A th

“disparate treatment plaintiff can survive summary judgment without producing any evidence of

discrimination beyond that constituting his prima facie case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of

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The deposition testimony which Mr. Rodriguez belatedly provided fails to raise a factual issue regarding

9

a hiring freeze and indicates Mr. Rodriguez’ potential position was “canceled” by the freeze.

17

material fact regarding the truth of the employer’s proffered reasons.” Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127. A

factual issue can be created only by “a conflict of evidence,” not “by speculation or conjecture.” Horn

v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc., 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 807, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 459 (1999).

Praxair’s rationale not to rehire Mr. Rodriguez is a November and December 2002 hiring freeze.

Inquiry is limited to “whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.” Pollard v. Rea

Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 560 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 488 (1997). Mr. th

Rodriguez contends the hiring freeze is a pretext based on:

1. Ongoing discussions among Ms. Singleton, Mr. Wilson and management to return Mr.

Rodriguez for an “appropriate” job;

2. Mr. Rodriguez’ discussions with Mr. Wilson regarding a potential position during the

hiring freeze;

3. Absence of management discussions of a hiring freeze during discussions regarding a

potential position for Mr. Rodriguez; and

4. Ms. Singleton’s failure to point to documentation of the hiring freeze.

As such, Mr. Rodriguez claims that there is “an inference of discrimination sufficient to survive

summary judgment” and that a jury could find the hiring freeze explanation “implausible.”

As noted above, Mr. Rodriguez has failed to offer direct evidence of a disability discriminatory

motive and relies on inferences, not even circumstantial evidence. The evidence reveals that: 

1. Near the time of Mr. Rodriguez’ severance, Mr. Wilson discussed a “potential” position

for Mr. Rodriguez;

2. Internal Praxair discussions proceeded whether a position was appropriate for Mr.

Rodriguez;

3. The internal process stopped based on what Praxair characterizes as a hiring freeze; and

4. Mr. Rodriguez was not extended an offer.

Mr. Rodriguez offers no specific, substantial evidence to question a hiring freeze. Although ideally for 9

Praxair it would have documented a hiring freeze, Ms. Singleton, Mr. Wilson and Ms. Coffman

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acknowledged the hiring freeze. Mr. Rodriguez offers nothing to challenge their credibility. Mr.

Rodriguez’ most favorable evidence is discussions of a “potential” position during the hiring freeze.

Mr. Rodriguez presents no evidence that the position was created and authorized by Praxair

management. Mr. Wilson noted that the potential position for Mr. Rodriguez has never filled. In the

absence of such evidence, Mr. Rodriguez fails to demonstrate an implausibility or inconsistency in the

hiring freeze explanation. Using the words of Mr. Wilson, the “ball got rolling” but stopped. Based on

the evidence, the process to create a position started but stopped. Mr. Rodriguez fails to raise a genuine

factual issue regarding a hiring freeze. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. GRANTS Praxair summary judgment;

2. DIRECTS this Court’s clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendant Praxair Distribution,

Inc. and against plaintiff Robert Rodriguez; and

3. VACATES the March 1, 2006 pretrial conference and April 10, 2006 trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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