Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03869/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03869-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The factual background information is taken fromCheema’s Petition and the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals’ decision in this matter. See Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2004).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARPAL S. CHEEMA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-03869 SI

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Harpal S. Cheema, an Indian national in custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”),

filed this actiononSeptember 14, 2004,seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. After

reviewing the papers submitted, the Court GRANTS the petition for the reasons discussed below.

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner Harpal Singh Cheema (“Cheema”or “petitioner”) is an Indian national and a baptized Sikh

who has been in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and its predecessor, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) since November 3, 1997. He is a “central figure” in the

movement to establish an independent Sikh state, Khalistan, and was subjected to persecution in India as a

result. He fled to Canada in August 1990, and came to the United States two months later, where he joined

the Sikh Youth of America and participated in lobbying efforts for the cause of Sikh independence. He

returned to India inFebruary1992, upon learning that his wife was ill, and was arrested and tortured uponhis

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2 The IJ denied petitioner asylumbecause she did not find himcredible onthe subject ofhisfundraising

activitiesinthe United States between1990 and 1992. Petitioner raised money in the United States for families

in the Punjab and for individuals injured while trying to cross betweenPakistanand India, and he put potential

donors in contact with Daljit Singh Bittu, a leader of the militant wing of the Sikh Student Federation in India,

whom petitioner knew as a student inIndia. He also took phone calls from individuals in India and connected

themwithBittuinPakistan. In addition, in 1995, while in the U.S., petitioner had contact with the head of the

militant Khalistan Commando Force, Paramjit Singh Panjwar.

3 Technically, the IJruled thatCheema was entitled to withholding of deportation but was barred from

this relief as a danger to the U.S. because he had engaged in terrorist activities. However, the IJ found that

Cheema was subject to a discretionary waiver.

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arrival. He was released on bail three months later, and remained in hiding in India until May 1993, when he

and his wife arrived in New York City. They were paroled into the United States but not admitted. Both

petitioner and his wife applied for asylum, withholding of deportation, and relief under Article 3 of the U.N.

ConventionAgainstTorture (“CAT”). An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted petitioner’s wife asylum and found

her eligible for withholding ofdeportationand relief under CAT. The IJ denied petitioner’s asylumapplication

and his application for withholding of deportation,2 but granted the application for “deferral of removal”

(“DOR”) under the CAT.3 See Petition, Ex. 3 at 000510. 

Both the DHS and petitioner appealed to the Board ofImmigration Appeals (“BIA”), the DHS from

the withholding of deportation, and petitioner from the denial of asylum. The BIA issued a decision on May

8,2002,inwhichit did not disturb the IJ’sfindings concerning withholding ofdeportationand reliefunderCAT.

The BIA held that petitioner had engaged in terrorist activitybysoliciting fundsfor “individuals and groups, i.e.

Bittu and Panjwar, that he knew or reasonably should have known or at least had reason to believe had

committed terrorist activity,” and had given material support to these individuals. Cheema, 383 F.3d at 853.

The BIA held that these findings barred withholding of deportation for petitioner, because giving financial

support to terrorists and facilitatingtelephone callsfromIndia “necessarily endanger[ed] the lives, property and

welfare of United States citizens and compromise[d] the defense ofthe United States.” Id. The BIA held that

petitioner was “ineligible for all forms of relief except deferral of removal under the Convention Against

Torture.” Petition, Ex. 2 at 000018.

Petitioner appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

BIA’s finding that some of Cheema’s acts constituted terrorist activity, and affirmed the BIA’s determination

that full relief under CAT was barred. Cheema, 383 F.3d at 859. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the

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BIA’s holding granting deferral of removal to Cheema. Id. The Court of Appeals remanded Cheema’s

petitions for withholding of deportation and asylum, holding that the BIA’s conclusion that petitioner was a

danger to national security was not supported by “substantial evidence.” Id. at 857. The court criticized the

BIA’s statement that it was “self-evident” that Cheema’s activities “inherently involve this country in [foreign]

conflicts without our leave or agreement” and “create the veryrealpossibilitythatsuchconflicts willbe brought

home to us by their warring factions,”because “[s]ubstantialevidence isrequired to link the finding of terrorist

activity affecting India with one of the criteria relating to our national security.” Id. at 857-58. The Court of

Appeals remanded Cheema’s withholding of deportation and asylum petitions in order for the BIA “to make

that determination using the correct inquiry.” Id. at 859. 

This petition followed, and is now before the Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Cheema’s petition for habeas corpus relief was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. To obtain relief

underthis statute, petitioner must demonstrate that “he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contendsthat he is under a finalorder of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C § 1231, and because

hisremovalis notreasonably foreseeable,his continueddetentionbythe DHS is no longer authorized bystatute

or under the Supreme Court’s decisioninZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). According to petitioner,

the BIA’s May8, 2002 decisionwas anadministratively finalorder ofremovaltriggering the statutory removal

period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B), during which an alien who is ordered removed must be removed by

the Attorney General within a period of ninety days. Petitioner was detained throughout this 90-day period

(from May 8, 2002 to August 6, 2002), and he remains detained today, even though the removal period

expired approximately three years ago. Applying Zadvydas, he argues that there is no possibility that he will

be removed to India in the reasonably foreseeable future because the Ninth Circuit, the BIA, and the IJ have

all agreed that he will be tortured there and that CAT prohibits his removal to India. Accordingly, he seeks

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release, contending that his continued detention is no longer authorized.

The government opposesCheema’spetitionongroundsthat he is notsubject to anadministratively final

order ofremoval, and therefore Zadvydas does not apply. According to the government, because of the Ninth

Circuit’s remand of his case to the BIA, Cheema is still in “pre-removal order” – rather than “post-removal

order” – detention, whichis constitutionally permissible. The government also suggests that, because Cheema

isinthe process ofremoval proceedings, his request for release amounts to a request for judicialreview ofhis

denial of parole into the United States, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such a request.

A. Deferral of removal.

The BIA found that petitioner was “ineligible for all forms of relief except deferralofremovalunderthe

Convention Against Torture.” Petition, Ex. 2 at 000018. The threshold issues are: (1) whether a deferral of

removal (“DOR”) is governed by8 U.S.C. § 1231, and (2) ifso, whether petitioner’s DOR is a final order of

removal.

1. Deferral of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

Before the Court determines whether petitioner’s DORis a finalorder ofremoval, the Court mustfirst

consider whether a DOR is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) provides:

(A) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered

removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a

period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal period”).

Section 1231 places a requirement on the government to remove an alien subject to a final order of removal

within the 90-day removal period. However, DHS regulations contain conflicting language on whether the

government is required to remove an alien granted DOR. 

The DHS regulations governing DOR state that, although the government isrequired to deferremoval

to the countrywhere the alienis more likely than not to be tortured, “the alien may be removed at any time to

another country.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(b)(1), (2) (emphasis added). This language suggests that, although

DORmaybe a final order of removal, the government is notrequired to effectuate the removal. Furthermore,

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4 8 U.S.C. § 1231 governs aliens ordered removed who are inadmissible under section 212 of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), or removable under INA § 237(a)(1)(c) (violated nonimmigrant

status or condition of entry), INA § 237(a)(2) (criminal offenses), or INA § 237(a)(4) (security and related

grounds). 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a).

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DOR does not confer a right to release for aliens in DHS custody. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(c) (“Nothing in this

section shall alter the authority of the Service to detain an alien whose removal has been deferred under this

sectionand who isotherwise subject to detention.”);see Gordon, Mailman, & Yale-Loehr, 3 ImmigrationLaw

and Procedure § 33.10[4][b] (2002). After granting a DOR, the immigrationjudge “shallinformthe alienthat

deferral of removal will not necessarily result in the alien being released from the custody of the Service if the

alienissubject to suchcustody.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(b)(1)(ii). In petitioner’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the

Court ofAppeals apparently recognized that its order remanding the case would not itselfresult inpetitioner’s

release:“respite fromtorture is limited if the consequence is that a petitioner is deliberately detained in custody

in this country. To be offered indefinite imprisonment as an alternative to likely torture is to be offered a

harsh choice.” Cheema, 383 F.3d at 859 (emphasis added).

However, the regulations also provide that decisions pertaining to the detention and release ofanalien

granted DOR“shall be made according to part 241 ofthis chapter.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(c). 8 C.F.R. § 241,

which generally governs the detention and removal of aliens ordered removed, explicitly includes DOR with

removal orders pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231.4 Section 241.4 applies to “aliens granted . . . withholding or

deferralofremovalunderthe ConventionAgainstTorture . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(3). Under section 241.4,

DOR is subject to a 90-day removalperiod and “the district directorshall continue to undertake appropriate

steps to secure travel documents for the alien both before and after the expiration of the removal period.” 8

C.F.R. § 241.4(g)(1)(C)(ii), (g)(2)(emphasis added). This section requires the government to try and continue

to try to secure removal for the alien granted DOR during and after the removal period in 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

Thus, it appears that the DHS regulations intend to apply 8 U.S.C. § 1231 to grant of DOR. 

A memorandum from the DHS (then INS) General Counsel suggests that the agency also interprets

the regulations so that the removal period and detention of aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 applies to aliens

granted DOR:

Section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act(INA) [codified as 8 U.S.C. §

1231] establishes a 90-day “removal period” that generally commences on the date a

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 The Ninth Circuit sustained the grant of DOR, and thus regardless of the BIA’s disposition on

remand, petitioner’s DOR will remain intact. Id. 

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removal order becomes administratively final. . . . The memorandum addresses the

authorityofthe Immigrationand NaturalizationService (INS) under certain circumstances

to release an alien who has a final order of removal, and who has also been granted

withholding or deferral of removal, before the 90 day removal period has expired. . . . An

alien who has been granted . . . deferral of removal to a specific country under the

Convention Against Torture, remains an alien who is subject to a final order of removal.

Mem. from Bo Cooper, No. HQCOU 50/1/1, Detention and Release during the Removal Period of Aliens

Granted Withholding or Deferral of Removal (Apr. 21, 2000). “During the 90-dayremoval period, the INS

must seek to remove the alien [with final orders of removal].” Mem. fromBo Cooper, No HQCOU 50/1/1,

Detention and Release of Aliens with Final Orders of Removal (Mar. 16, 2000).

Based on 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, the Court concludes that detention and removal of aliens granted DOR

is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and therefore that these aliens are subject to the 90-day removal period. 

2. Petitioner’s DOR is a final order of removal.

Petitioner argues that his DOR is a final order ofremovalunder 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i) because

it is a finaladministrative decision. Therefore, hisremovalperiod beganonMay8, 2002, the date ofthe BIA’s

decision. The government contends that the grant of DOR is not final because the Ninth Circuit remanded the

case to the BIA for reconsideration of the question of withholding of deportation and asylum, where it is still

pending. See Cheema, 383 F.3d 848.

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 The issue this Court must address is whether the Ninth Circuit’s

remand to the BIA affected the finality of petitioner’s order of removal. 

A DOR is granted to an alien who (1) has been ordered removed, (2) is entitled to protection under

the Convention Against Torture, and (3) is subject to mandatory denial of withholding of removal. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.17(a). An DOR becomes a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B) on the latest of

the following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

(ii) Ifthe removalorder is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stayofthe removalofthe

alien, the date of the court’s final order.

(iii) Ifthe alienis detained or confined (except under animmigrationprocess), the date the alienisreleased from

detention or confinement.

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The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the specific issue presented here of whether a final order of

removalthat has beenappealed to the Court of Appeals and sustained inpart and remanded inpart to the BIA

is considered a finalorder ofremoval. Here, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decisiongrantingDOR, and

only remandedCheema’s petitions for withholding ofdeportationand asylum. See Cheema, 383F.3d at 859-

60. Thus, the decision with respect to DOR is final in that it cannot be disturbed onremand. For that reason,

the Court concludes that Cheema is subject to a final order of removal, and that his continued detention is

reviewable by this Court.

Moreover, the Court concludesthat the fairly unusualposture ofthis caseweighsinfavor of concluding

thatCheema issubject to a final order of removal. Onremand,Cheema is only eligible formore relief, not less,

under his petitions for withholding of deportation and asylum. Indeed, at oral argument, the government

conceded that, had petitioner lost his appeal at the Ninth Circuit, the May 8, 2002 decisionwould have been

a finalorder of removal; but it took the positionthat because petitioner partially prevailed and the NinthCircuit

remanded the case to the BIA, petitioner no longer has a final order, and therefore 8 U.S.C. § 1231 does not

apply. As petitioner points out, this logic would produce the absurd result that an alien who loses his appeal

would be released, while an alien who seeks and obtains the relief provided by law is subject to indefinite

detention. Cheema has been detained for approximately eight years, and regardless of how the BIA handles

Cheema’s petitions for withholding of deportationand asylumon remand, Cheema is now and will always be

subject to the deferral of removal order. 

The Court also concludes that Cheema’s petitionto the NinthCircuit did not destroythe finality of the

removal order. Once the BIA issued itsremovalorder, the DHS had full authority to remove petitioner from

the United States, evenduring petitioner’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B). Had

the government attempted to remove petitioner, he could have filed for a stay of removal, which, if granted,

would have destroyed the finalityofthe order ofremoval, but only untilthe court granting the stayissued itsfinal

ruling. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii). However, that is not the present case. Petitioner never filed for a

stay of removal, so the finality of the order was never destroyed.

This Court finds that petitioner’s May 8, 2002 DOR issued by the BIA is a final order of removal

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and his 90-day removal period began on May 8, 2002.

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 The USA PATRIOT Act limitsthe application of Zadvydas, providing for the mandatory detention

ofsuspected terrorists. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a. In order for the Act to apply to an alien, the Attorney General may

certify that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the alien(A)is[engaged interrorist activities]; or (B)

is engaged inany other activitythatendangersthe nationalsecurityofthe United States.”§ 1226a(a)(3). Under

§ 1226a, an alien who has not been removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 “and whose removal is unlikely in the

reasonably foreseeable future, maybe detained for additionalperiods ofup to six months only if the release of

the alienwillthreatenthe national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person.”

§ 1226a(a)(6). The Act does not apply to petitioner because he has not been certified under the Act.

The Zadvydas decision was limited to excludable aliens (aliens who have gained initial entry or have

been admitted into the United States). Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. The Supreme Court has since extended

Zadvydasto inadmissable aliens (aliens who have not gained initialentry). Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716

(2005). 

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B. Post-removal period detention and applicability of Zadvydas.

Petitioner argues that since he is subject to a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, his

post-removalperiod ofdetentionis also governed by that statute. Because his 90-day removalperiod ended

more thantwo years ago, and because there is no significantlikelihoodofremovalinthe reasonably foreseeable

future, petitioner contendsthat his detentionis no longerauthorizedbystatuteorbythe Supreme Court decision

inZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The government argues that petitioner is in stillinpre-removal

proceedings, and therefore neither section 1231 nor Zadvydas applies. It contends that pre-order detention

is constitutional under DeMore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), and release ofpetitioner onparole during preorder detentionis entirelywithin the discretionofthe AttorneyGeneral. Because the Court has determined that

8 U.S.C. § 1231 applies, it will now consider the applicability of Zadvydas. 

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that when removal of an alien is no longer reasonably

foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. 533 U.S. at 699. Zadvydas

involved two habeas petitions by noncitizenpermanent residents who were deportable but remained detained

after their 90-day removal period had expired. The Supreme Court held that allowing indefinite detention

seriously implicated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 690. It established a burden shifting

analysis, so that “[a]fter the 6-month period, once an alien provides good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must furnish evidence

sufficient to rebut that showing”; otherwise, the alien should be released. Id. at 701.6

The Supreme Court in Zadvydas addressed how a habeas court should proceed when determining

“whether a set of particular circumstances amounts to detention within, or beyond, a period reasonably

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necessary to secure removal . . . [and] whether the detention is, or is not, pursuant to statutory authority. . . .

[T]he habeascourtmustaskwhetherthe detentioninquestionexceeds a period reasonably necessarytosecure

removal. Itshould measure reasonableness primarily interms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring

the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699-700. Petitioner’s detention of almost three years

beyond the removal period “exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal.” Because petitioner

is a majorfigure in the Sikh movement, and because of the record of torture endured bythe petitionerinIndia

beginning in 1987, there does not seem to be a significant likelihood that petitioner would be able to return to

India in the reasonably foreseeable future. There also does notseemto be a significant chance that petitioner

could be removed to a country other than India in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioner has been in

custodyoversevenyears, almost three yearsfromthe expirationofhisremovalperiod onAugust 6, 2002, and

the government has not secured removal to another country. 

ThisCourtfindsthatpetitionerhas no significant chance ofremovalinthe reasonably foreseeable future,

thus his continued detention is not authorized by statute.

C. Detention or release review procedures.

Post-removal period detention of inadmissable aliens is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which

provides:

An alien ordered removed who is . . . removable under . . . section 237(a)(4) [security

grounds] or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the

community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, maybe detained beyond the

removal period, and if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph

(3) [of this section].

DHS regulations add that after the 90-day removal period, the DHS District Director will review the alien’s

records to determine if further detention is warranted. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(c)(1), (h). Further custody

determinations of any alien who has not been released or removed within three months after the expiration of

the 90-day removal period are made by the Headquarters Post-Order Detention Unit (HQPDU). §

241.4(c)(2). In order to be released, the alien must demonstrate that his release willnot pose a danger to the

community and that he does not present a significant flight risk pending removal. § 241.4(d)(1). In

recommending further detention or release, the HQPDU considers several factors, including: (1) disciplinary

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7 For aliens who have been ordered removed but have been detained on account of security or

terrorism concerns, special review procedures are followed according to § 241.14(d). The review process

includes determinationifthe alien’srelease presents a significant threat to national security and if there are any

conditions of release that can reasonably be expected to avoid such a threat. § 241.14(d)(1). 

10

infractions,(2) criminalconduct, (3) mentalhealthreports, (4) prior immigration violations and history, and (5)

favorable factors, including family ties to the United States. § 241.4(f). If the panel denies release, it must

review the case within one year. § 241.1(k)(iii). The regulations state that if the Service finds that there is no

significant likelihood of the alien’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Service has the authority

to release the alien under an order of supervision. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(i)(7). 

Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zadvydas, the DHS issued new regulations administering

specialreview proceduresfor aliens detained whose likelihood ofremovalwas notsignificant inthe reasonably

foreseeable future. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. In such a case, if during or after the custody review process, “the alien

submits, or the record contains, informationproviding a substantialreason to believe thatremovalof a detained

alienis notsignificantly likely inthe reasonably foreseeable future, the HQPDU shall treat that as a request for

review and initiate the review procedures under § 241.13.” § 241.4(i)(7).7 These regulations were written in

language that tracks the language of Zadvydas, so they exclude “those who have not entered the United

States.” § 241.13(b)(3)(i). In Clark v. Martinez, 175 S.Ct. 716 (2005), the Supreme Court extended

Zadvydas to inadmissible aliens. The regulations have not been changed since the ruling in Clark v. Martinez,

but the Court finds that they should be read to encompass the Supreme Court’s directives in this regard.

Accordingly, this Court finds that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 applies to inadmissible aliens. 

CONCLUSION

This Court hereby finds that: (1) petitioner’s DOR is a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1231, (2) the principles of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zadvydas apply to petitioner’s detention, (3) and

there is no significant chance that petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. 

The Court GRANTS the writ ofhabeas corpus and ORDERS the DHS forthwith to make a custody

determination concerning petitioner’s release under an order of supervision.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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