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Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

COLUMBIA VENTURE, LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEWBERRY & DAVIS, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Party-in-Interest.  No. 08-1318

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF ENGINEERING

COMPANIES; AMERICAN COUNCIL OF

ENGINEERING COMPANIES OF

METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON;

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL

ENGINEERS; ASSOCIATION OF

FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS,

Amici Supporting Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.

(3:06-cv-02525-MBS)

Argued: October 27, 2009

Decided: May 12, 2010

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Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and

Jane R. ROTH, Senior Circuit Judge

of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Senior Judge Roth joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Manton McCutchen Grier, HAYNSWORTH,

SINKLER & BOYD, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for

Appellant. Sharon Swingle, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for the United States

of America, Amicus Supporting Appellee; James F. Lee, Jr.,

LEE & MCSHANE, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Hamilton Osborne, Jr., James Y. Becker, Sarah

Michaels Montgomery, HAYNSWORTH, SINKLER &

BOYD, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan P. Rolfe, LEE & MCSHANE, PC, Washington, D.C.;

Francis M. Mack, David A. Anderson, Mason M. Summers,

RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, PA, Columbia,

South Carolina, for Appellee. Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant

Attorney General, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., W. Walter Wilkins, United

States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Michael Jay

Singer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Washington, D.C., for the United States of America, Amicus

Supporting Appellee. E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Robert L.

Hodges, Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Erin M. Sine, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for American Council of

Engineering Companies, American Council of Engineering

Companies of Metropolitan Washington, American Society of

Civil Engineers, Amici Supporting Appellee. David K. Mears,

2 COLUMBIA VENTURE v. DEWBERRY & DAVIS

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VERMONT LAW SCHOOL, Environmental and Natural

Resources Law Clinic, South Royalton, Vermont; Jon Kusler,

Associate Director, ASSOCIATION OF STATE WETLAND

MANAGERS, Berne, New York, for Association of Floodplain Managers, Amicus Supporting Appellee. 

OPINION

SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

Columbia Venture, LLC appeals an order of the district

court dismissing its second amended complaint with prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court concluded that

Columbia Venture’s state law claims are preempted by the

National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 ("NFIA"), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4001 et seq. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I.

A.

We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See

Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F.3d

769, 772 (4th Cir. 2003); see also AES Sparrow Point LNG,

LLC v. Smith, 527 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that

federal preemption is a legal question that we review de

novo). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must

allege enough facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and must provide "enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). When considering an

order dismissing a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), we assume all

factual allegations in the pleadings to be true. Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

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B.

Columbia Venture owns a large parcel of property along

the Congaree River in South Carolina. In 1998, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") began a reassessment of flood elevation maps of this area. Pursuant to the

NFIA, FEMA hired Dewberry & Davis, LLC ("Dewberry") as

an independent contractor to provide engineering and related

services to assist in the remapping effort. Dewberry provided

the hydraulic model used to designate a large portion of

Columbia Venture’s property as part of the floodway. This

designation prevented Columbia Venture from developing

much of its property, thereby greatly reducing the property’s

value. Columbia Venture filed an administrative appeal of

FEMA’s determination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4104 that was

ultimately unsuccessful. See Columbia Venture, LLC v. SC

Wildlife Fed., 562 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)

(holding that FEMA’s failure to timely publish notice in

accordance with § 4104 was harmless and did not warrant

vacating FEMA’s final determination).1

Columbia Venture then brought this action against Dewberry, alleging state law claims of professional malpractice,

civil conspiracy, injurious falsehood, and violation of the

South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("SCUTPA").

Columbia Venture contends that the hydraulic model provided by Dewberry, which was used to determine the flood

elevations, is flawed and inaccurate. Columbia Venture also

argues that FEMA concealed this information and the reasons

for the changes in the floodway determination when it pursued its administrative appeal.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Dewberry moved to dismiss the

first amended complaint on the ground that the statute of limi1We note that, although not alleged in its complaint, Columbia Venture

also filed a lawsuit against Richland County, South Carolina on August

19, 2004, for injuries allegedly caused by the final determinations. 

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tations had run on Columbia Venture’s claims. The district

court denied the motion, holding that Columbia Venture had

alleged sufficient facts to support a finding that it did not have

notice of its potential cause of action against Dewberry.

Columbia Venture then filed a second amended complaint,

and Dewberry filed another motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). In this motion, Dewberry argued that the

claims were preempted by the NFIA. Additionally, Dewberry

argued that all of Columbia Venture’s claims were timebarred and, alternatively, that the claims otherwise failed

because Dewberry did not owe a duty of care to Columbia

Venture. Dewberry also argued that Columbia Venture failed

to properly allege a conspiracy claim, failed to properly allege

an injurious falsehood claim, and did not state a claim under

SCUTPA. 

The district court dismissed the second amended complaint,

holding that the NFIA preempts Columbia Venture’s state law

claims under a theory of obstacle preemption, which is a subset of implied conflict preemption. Specifically, the court held

that permitting landowners to bring state law tort claims

against FEMA’s independent contractors would obstruct the

purposes of the NFIA because such litigation would increase

the cost to FEMA and hinder its efforts to implement the

flood insurance program. Further, the court held that such

claims would destroy the balance struck by Congress in establishing the limited administrative appeals process under 42

U.S.C. § 4104. Because it held that Columbia Venture’s

claims are preempted, the court did not reach Dewberry’s

alternative theories for dismissal. 

II.

The initial question we have to address is one we raised at

oral argument: whether the district court addressed the issue

of preemption prematurely under constitutional avoidance

principles. We have held that federal preemption of state law

is a constitutional question because it is premised on the

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Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and

when a party provides alternative independent state law

grounds for disposing of a case, courts should not decide the

constitutional question of preemption before considering the

state law grounds. See Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. Prince George’s

County, 212 F.3d 863, 865 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Ashwander

v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346-47 (1936)

(Brandeis, J., concurring)); see also H & R Block E. Enter.,

Inc. v. Raskin, 591 F.3d 718, 723-24 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying

Bell Atlantic to remand the case for consideration of whether

the statute applied to the plaintiff before deciding whether it

was preempted). In this context, "an independent state law

ground is one that allows us to avoid deciding a constitutional

question." MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257

F.3d 356, 361 (4th Cir. 2001).

Here, Dewberry asserts five state law grounds for dismissal. Three of these grounds — that Columbia Venture

failed to state a conspiracy claim, an injurious falsehood

claim, or South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices claim — are

clearly not independent state law grounds that allow us to

avoid deciding the preemption issue because they only relate

to one of the five claims. See id. at 361. Accordingly, we need

not address these issues under Bell Atlantic.

Dewberry also argues that Columbia Venture’s claims fail

because it did not owe a common law duty of care to Columbia Venture. However, Columbia Venture’s SCUTPA claims

are not governed by a common law duty of care but by S.C.

Code Ann. § 39-5-140. Therefore, the lack of duty defense is

not an independent state law ground because a holding that

Dewberry owed no common law duty to Columbia Venture

would still leave the preemption issue to be resolved with

respect to the SCUTPA claim. See MediaOne Group, Inc.,

257 F.3d at 361. Accordingly, we need not address this theory

under Bell Atlantic.

Finally, Dewberry argues that all of Columbia Venture’s

claims are time-barred. Unlike Dewberry’s other grounds for

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dismissal, this ground is potentially dispositive of all of the

claims because all claims are governed by a three-year statute

of limitations period. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-3-530(5), 39-5-

150. Under Bell Atlantic, this independent state law ground

must be addressed before we reach preemption. Although we

have discretion to address this issue or to remand it for consideration by the district court, the district court already

denied Dewberry’s motion to dismiss on this ground with

regard to the first amended complaint. Because we see no distinction between the amended complaint and the second

amended complaint as they relate to the statute of limitations

defense, we now address it on appeal.

Dewberry bears the burden of establishing that the claims

are barred by the statute of limitations, and where the material

facts are in dispute, the issue becomes one for the jury. Brown

v. Finger, 124 S.E.2d 781, 786 (S.C. 1962). Pursuant to South

Carolina’s discovery rule, the three-year limitations period

begins to run "where the facts and circumstances of an injury

would put a person of common knowledge and experience on

notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some

claim against another party might exist." Wiggins v. Edwards,

442 S.E.2d 169, 170 (S.C. 1994) (citing Snell v. Columbia

Gun Exchange, Inc., 278 S.E.2d 333, 334 (S.C. 1981)); see

Graniteville Co., Inc. v. IH Serv., Inc., 447 S.E.2d 226, 228

(S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that plaintiff could not have

known of its potential cause of action until an expert determined the cause of the fire). Under this rule, the statute of

limitations is triggered when the plaintiff discovers the injury,

not when he discovers the identity of another alleged tortfeasor. See Wiggins, 442 S.E.2d at 170. 

Columbia Venture alleges professional malpractice among

other claims. In some professional malpractice cases, South

Carolina courts have found that the potential claim was or

should have been discovered not when the plaintiff had

knowledge of the injury but when the plaintiff had reason to

know that the injury alone was the result of wrongful conduct

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by the professional. See Garner v. Houck, 435 S.E.2d 847,

849 (S.C. 1993) (finding that a jury question was presented as

to when the plaintiff knew or should have known that he had

a cause of action against doctors for negligence that caused a

family member’s death); True v. Monteith, 489 S.E.2d 615,

617 (S.C. 1997) (holding that there was a question of fact as

to when the client learned of the defendant attorney’s ethical

conflict). 

In this case, FEMA adopted its final determination for

Columbia Venture’s property on August 20, 2001. Columbia

Venture brought this action on September 13, 2006. It alleges

that until FEMA disclosed its reliance on the hydraulic model

prepared by Dewberry in April 2005, it did not have reason

to know of Dewberry’s alleged wrongful conduct. Viewed in

the light most favorable to Columbia Venture, the factual allegations of the complaint are sufficient to support a finding

that Columbia Venture did not have notice of its potential

cause of action against Dewberry until FEMA revealed its use

of the hydraulic model provided by Dewberry. Consequently,

it is not appropriate to dismiss the complaint under Rule

12(b)(6) on the ground that the claims are time-barred. Therefore, there are no independent state law grounds on which to

dismiss the complaint.

III.

We now turn to Columbia Venture’s argument that the district court erred in holding that its claims are preempted under

a theory of obstacle preemption. Obstacle preemption is a

type of conflict preemption authorized by the Supremacy

Clause. Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 191-92

(4th Cir. 2007). It applies "where state law ‘stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’" Freightliner Corp. v.

Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). This occurs where state law

"interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was

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designed to reach [its] goal." Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes

Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992) (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted). We have explained that

[a] decision about [obstacle preemption] requires the

court independently to consider national interests

and their putative conflict with state interests. . . .

[P]reemption under [an obstacle preemption] theory

is more an exercise of policy choices by a court than

strict statutory construction. 

Abbot v. Am. Cynamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113 (4th Cir.

1988). Obstacle preemption can apply not only to positive

enactments of state law but also to state tort claims alleging

violation of a common law duty. See, e.g., Geier v. Am.

Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that negligence action against a manufacturer was preempted because

it conflicted with a federal agency standard). 

A.

In considering whether Columbia Venture’s claims are preempted, we must start with the general presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state law. Abbot, 844 F.2d at

1112. This presumption is especially strong against "preemption of state remedies like tort recoveries, when no federal

remedy exists." Id. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). Because "[t]he purpose of Congress is . . . the ‘ultimate touchstone’ of a preemption analysis," we first examine the purposes of the NFIA. See

Anderson, 508 F.3d at 192 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group,

Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). 

In 1968, Congress established the National Flood Insurance

Program ("NFIP") in response to recurring flood disasters that

were "placing an increasing burden on the Nation’s

resources." Studio Frames Ltd. v. Std. Fire Ins. Co., 483 F.3d

239, 243 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a)). In the

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face of the high risk of such disasters, private insurance companies were not offering flood insurance on flood-prone property. Id. Congress responded to this increasing problem by

creating the NFIP "which (1) makes federally subsidized

flood insurance available in flood-prone areas and (2) encourages states and localities to adopt land use policies and regulations that reduce the risk of flood damage." Id. (citing

§ 4001(a)-(e)). In order for communities to be eligible for federal flood insurance under the NFIA, they are required to

adopt community floodplain ordinances in accordance with

flood hazard maps promulgated by FEMA. § 4012(c). 

FEMA is responsible for administering the NFIP and, in

doing so, it maps flood elevations to identify flood hazards.

See Columbia Venture, LLC, 562 F.3d at 292; 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4011, 4101. FEMA is authorized to hire private contractors

to carry out studies and investigations on its behalf. § 4102(a).

FEMA is expected to constantly reappraise the program and

to expeditiously identify and disseminate information about

flood-prone areas. See §§ 4001(e)(5), 4002(b)(2). 

In creating and updating its flood maps, FEMA is first

required to publish proposed flood elevation determinations

for comment in the Federal Register and in a prominent local

newspaper. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(a). Any property owner affected

by a proposed determination who wants to challenge it is

required to appeal to the local government during the 90-day

period following publication. § 4104(b). A landowner can

appeal on only one basis: that the proposed determination is

"scientifically or technically incorrect." § 4104(b). The chief

executive officer of the community is then required to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify an appeal on

behalf of the community. § 4104(c). Even if the community

does not appeal the determination, the Director of FEMA is

required to review the appeals made by private persons.

§ 4104(d). The Director is required to modify his proposed

determination "as may be appropriate" after considering any

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scientific information presented and to publish a final determination. § 4104(d), (e). 

After receiving notice of the Director’s final determination,

an appellant has 60 days to appeal that determination in federal district court. § 4104(g). Significantly, "the sole relief

which shall be granted . . . is a modification of the Director’s

proposed determination." § 4104(b) (emphasis added). 

Section 4104 is a product of the careful balancing of the

interests of affected landowners and communities and the purposes of the NFIA. The legislative history of the appeals procedure describes Congress’ effort "to provide an equitable

balancing of all of the interests involved in the identification

and the setting of construction elevation standards for floodprone areas." S. Rep. No. 93-583 (1973), reprinted in 1973

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3217, 3230. See Reardon v. Krimm, 541 F.

Supp. 187, 189 (D. Kan. 1982) ("The decision by Congress to

adopt such a limited scope of appeal [under § 4104] was . . .

not a hasty one, nor is it one which may be overlooked by the

Court."). While accommodating landowners’ concerns in the

review process, Congress specifically recognized "the vested

interests of many land developers and others in avoiding or

deferring all limitations on flood plain development as long as

possible." 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3232. This interest conflicts

with the NFIP’s "need for rapid implementation of the flood

insurance program." 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3232. Therefore,

Congress took into account the competing interests when it

set forth the limited appeals process. 

B.

As the district court observed, state law causes of action

against FEMA’s independent contractors undermine the primary purposes of the NFIA to strike a balance between protecting property owners’ right to appeal flood elevation

determinations and the government’s interest in minimizing

the costs inherent in updating flood maps in order to provide

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flood insurance. The cost of defending such claims against

independent contractors in Dewberry’s position will be transferred to FEMA through increased contract fees. See Boyle v.

United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507-508 (1988) (finding

that the imposition of liability on government contractors will

either raise the price of contracts or cause contractors to

decline to contract). This would increase the financial burden

on the Treasury and hinder FEMA’s efforts to implement the

flood insurance program, thus destroying the balance struck

by Congress in promulgating the NFIA. 

Additionally, permitting affected property owners to bring

state law tort claims against independent contractors hired by

FEMA would undermine the limited appeals process chosen

by Congress to enable FEMA to constantly reappraise the

program and to expeditiously identify and disseminate information about flood-prone areas. The appeals provision provides for a review process under which the only basis for

challenging a proposed determination is evidence showing

that the determination is scientifically or technically incorrect,

§ 4104(b), and the only available remedy is modification of

the determination. § 4104(b). 

By bringing this action against Dewberry, Columbia Venture seeks to circumvent the limits imposed under § 4104 in

order to obtain monetary relief based on alleged scientific and

technical errors made by Dewberry and relied on by FEMA

in making its flood elevation determination. As noted above,

Columbia Venture lost its administrative appeal against

FEMA pursuant to § 4104, and it now proceeds against Dewberry for another bite at the apple. Such litigation costs will

certainly be passed on to FEMA, and litigation involving its

flood elevation determinations will likely delay FEMA’s

identification and mapping of flood-prone areas. This result is

precisely what Congress was trying to avoid when it enacted

the limited appeals process of § 4104. We conclude that state

law tort claims against FEMA’s independent contractors

would be an obstacle to the accomplishment of the primary

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purposes of the NFIA and § 4104. Therefore, the district court

properly concluded that Columbia Venture’s claims are preempted.

IV.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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