Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-02024/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-02024-34/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RADWARE, LTD., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

F5 NETWORKS, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:13-cv-02024-RMW 

ORDER ON: (1) RADWARE’S MOTION 

TO STRIKE; (2) F5’S MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; (3) 

F5’S MOTION TO AMEND

INVALIDITY CONTENTIONS; (4) F5’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

OF INVALIDITY; (5) RADWARE’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT ON INVALIDITY; (6) 

RADWARE’S MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS; (7) RADWARE’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

OF INFRINGEMENT; (8) F5’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NONINFRINGEMENT; (9) F5’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 

DAMAGES

Re: Dkt. Nos. 180, 182, 183, 187, 189, 190,

201, 207, and 212

Defendant F5 Networks, Inc. (“F5”) and plaintiffs Radware, Inc. and Radware Ltd. 

(collectively “Radware”) bring the following motions: (1) Radware’s Motion to Strike, Dkt. No. 

201; (2) F5’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt. No. 180; (3) F5’s Motion to Amend 

Invalidity Contentions, Dkt. No. 212; (4) F5’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity, Dkt. 

Redacted Public Version

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No. 183; (5) Radware’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Motion Against F5’s Affirmative 

Defense of Invalidity, Dkt. No. 189; (6) Radware’s Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 207; (7) 

Radware’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement, Dkt. No. 182; (8) F5’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement, Dkt. No. 190; and (9) F5’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment on Damages Issues, Dkt. No. 187. The court has reviewed the papers filed and heard the 

argument of counsel. The court rules on the motions as set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Asserted Patents

Radware brings this patent infringement action against its competitor F5, alleging 

infringement of claims 1–7, 9–19, and 21–32 of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,319 (“’319 Patent”) and 

claims 1–4, 6–12, 14, and 15 of U.S. Patent No. 8,484,374 (“’374 Patent”) (collectively “Asserted 

Patents”).1 Both Asserted Patents are entitled “Load Balancing” and relate to “computer networks 

in general, and in particular to load balancing client requests among redundant network servers in 

different geographical locations.” ’319 col.1 ll.13–16; ’374 col.1 ll.17–20. The ’374 Patent is a 

continuation of the ’319 Patent. The ’374 Patent shares the same specification as the ’319 Patent, 

other than the “Summary” section. 

The technology at issue relates to link load balancing in a multi-homed environment. A 

“multi-homed” network is a network with multiple connections to the Internet. ’319 col.15 ll.34–

37. “Link load balancing” is a process for allocating network communications across these 

connections. 

The Asserted Patents relate to techniques and systems for selecting a specific route from 

the multi-homed network to the Internet and from the Internet into the multi-homed network. The 

claimed inventions describe both “outbound” and “inbound” link load balancing. Outbound link 

load balancing deals with requests sent from a host that are destined for an external network via 

 

1 Radware previously asserted infringement of claims 1, 2, 6–9, 13 and 14 of U.S. Patent No. 

6,665,702 (“’702 Patent”), but the court granted F5’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement of the ’702 Patent. See Dkt. No. 145. 

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the Internet. Inbound link loading involves inbound requests for services received by the host via 

the Internet. Claims 24-28 of the ’319 Patent are directed to outbound link load balancing. Claims 

1-23 and 29-32 of the ’319 Patent and all claims of the ’374 Patent are generally directed to 

inbound link load balancing. 

The Asserted Patents claim link load balancing as both a method and system. 

Representative Claim 26 of the ’319 Patent describes a method for outbound link load balancing:

26. A method for routing data via a network from a first node to a 

second node, said network having a plurality of available routes 

from said first node to said second node and the plurality of routes 

are assigned with respective IP addresses, said method comprising 

the steps of:

selecting one of said routes for sending data between the first 

node and the second node on the basis of costing information 

of said respective routes;

receiving a packet having a source IP address; and

translating the source IP address to an IP address 

corresponding to the selected route of the plurality of routes.

Representative Claim 13 of the ’319 patent describes a method for inbound link load 

balancing:

13. A method for managing a computer network having a device 

connected to the Internet through a plurality of routes, wherein the 

plurality of routes are assigned with respective IP addresses, 

comprising:

receiving a DNS2resolution query from a remote computer 

for a domain name within the computer network;

selecting one of a plurality of routes connecting said device 

to the Internet in accordance with one or more criteria of the 

plurality of routes; 

responding to the DNS resolution query with an IP address 

associated with the selected route, said IP address is used for 

resolution of said domain name, receiving a packet having a 

destination IP address corresponding to one of the plurality 

of routes; and 

translating the destination IP address to an IP address within 

the computer network.

B. Accused Products

Radware accuses F5’s “BIG-IP Application Delivery Controller” of infringement. Specific 

 

2 DNS is an acronym for “Domain Name System.” See, e.g., Dkt. No. 179-26 ¶ 51.

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accused models are listed at Dkt. No. 182 at 10 n.4. F5’s BIG-IP device is 

Dkt. No. 179-4 at 10 (citing Stamm Rep.). The 

infringement issues focus on three modules within the TMOS: the Link Controller, Local Traffic 

Manager (“LTM”), and Global Traffic Manager (“GTM”). Id. at 10-11. All three 

 must be activated through the purchase of a license from F5. Id. 

at 11. “LTM’s primary functionality is local server load balancing, not ISP load balancing. In 

particular, an LTM can sit between a local network and the internet, and control the routing of 

incoming messages to different servers.” Dkt. No. 184-4 (Brewer Decl.) ¶ 8. “GTM’s primary 

functionalities are to provide DNS-related services and global server load balancing (‘GSLB’). 

DNS services relate to responding to client requests for IP addresses associated with a domain 

name (e.g., ‘Amazon.com’).” Id. ¶ 9. 

F5 acknowledges that the Link Controller’s “primary purpose is to provide, in part, ISP 

link load balancing functionality.” Dkt. No. 190 at 3. However, in December 2014 F5 

implemented a “hotfix” that made certain changes to its source code for the LTM, GTM and Link 

Controller that, according to F5, 

Id. at 4; see 

also Dkt. No. 188-6 (Thornewell Decl.) ¶ 11. Since removing the Link Controller load balancing 

functionality, F5 has 

Brewer Decl. ¶ 16. 

C. Procedural History 

The court previously held a joint Markman hearing in this case and in the related case 

Radware v. A10, 13-cv-2021, on April 8, 2014 and issued its Claim Construction Order on April 

18, 2014. Dkt. No. 122. The court also considered motions for summary judgment related to claim 

construction issues in May 2015, and issued an order on the motions on June 11, 2014. Dkt. No. 

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145. The parties in the A10 case filed a Joint Notice of Settlement on August 29, 2014. 

13-cv-2021, Dkt. No. 252. 

Having held a hearing on July 24, 2015, the court addresses the parties’ various motions: 

(1) Radware’s Motion to Strike, Dkt. No. 201, F5’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt. 

No. 180, and F5’s Motion to Amend Invalidity Contentions, Dkt. No. 212; (2) F5’s Motion for

Summary Judgment of Invalidity, Dkt. No. 183, and Radware’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment Motion Against F5’s Affirmative Defense of Invalidity, Dkt. No. 189; (3) Radware’s 

Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 207; (4) Radware’s Motion for Summary Judgment of 

Infringement, Dkt. No. 182, and F5’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement, Dkt. 

No. 190; and (5) Motion for Summary Judgment on Damages Issues, Dkt. No. 187.

II. RADWARE’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF F5’S MOTION FOR 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 

INVALIDITY, AND DECLARATION OF DR. ALEXANDER IN SUPPORT 

THEREOF

Radware moves to strike: (1) F5’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2) those portions 

of F5’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity that rely on Global Server Load Balancing 

(“GSLB”); (3) those portions of F5’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity that rely on 

Border Gateway Protocol (“BGP”); and (4) the May 28, 2015 declaration of Dr. Peter Alexander 

submitted in support of F5’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity. Dkt. No. 201. 

A. F5’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and its Section 101 Invalidity Defense

Radware moves to strike F5’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that F5 

failed to disclose 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter ineligibility as a basis for finding the Asserted 

Patents invalid in its invalidity contentions. Id. at 1. 

F5 served its preliminary invalidity contentions on September 30, 2013, Dkt. No. 189-9, 

and, after obtaining the court’s leave, see Dkt. No. 157, served amended invalidity contentions on 

May 16, 2014, Dkt. No. 189-10. The preliminary invalidity contentions state only that: (1) several 

asserted claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for mixing statutory claim classes, Dkt. No. 

189-9 at 59 n.1, and that because discovery had then only recently commenced, it was at that time 

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“premature for F5 to determine whether there are issues related to . . . improper inventorship [and] 

derivation under 35 U.S.C. § 101/102(f).” Id. at 59. F5’s amendments did not add any invalidity 

contentions related to Section 101. Only after Radware filed the instant motion to strike F5’s 

Section 101 invalidity defense did F5 move to amend its invalidity contentions to include the 

defense of lack of subject matter eligibility. Dkt. No. 212.

Under Patent L.R. 3-3(d), a party’s invalidity contentions must disclose “[a]ny grounds of 

invalidity based on 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . of any of the asserted claims.” “Any invalidity theories 

not disclosed pursuant to Local Rule 3-3 are barred, accordingly, from presentation at trial 

(whether through expert opinion testimony or otherwise).” MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale 

Semiconductor, Inc., Case No. 11-5341, 2014 WL 690161, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) 

(citation omitted). This District’s patent local rules are designed “to balance the right to develop 

new information in discovery with the need for certainty as to the legal theories.” O2 Micro Int’l 

Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The rules accomplish 

this by requiring parties to “provide early notice of their . . . invalidity contentions, and to proceed 

with diligence in amending those contentions when new information comes to light in the course 

of discovery.” Id. at 1365–66. As Judge Grewal stated in a recent decision denying a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings for failure to disclose Section 101 invalidity as required by Patent L.R. 

3-3, “[t]his district’s patent rules only work if there are consequences for failing to comply.” Good 

Technology Corp. v. MobileIRON, Inc., Case No. 12-5826, Dkt. No. 298 at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 

2015). 

F5 does not dispute that it failed to disclose Section 101 as an invalidity theory as required 

under the Patent Local Rules. Rather, F5 argues that the court should deny Radware’s motion to 

strike F5’s Section 101 defense because: (1) the defense is based on new legal authority developed 

within the last year, subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp v. CLS Bank Int’l, 

134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); and (2) the defense is not based on claim construction or fact issues 

subject to discovery, so Radware will not suffer any prejudice should the court permit F5’s 

Section 101 defense. Dkt. No. 213 at 2. Neither argument is persuasive.

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As to the first, F5 waited too long following Alice to seek amendment of its invalidity 

contentions to assert a Section 101 defense, and an intervening district court application of Alice

does not constitute sufficient change in the law to permit amendment so late in the case. 

Intervening change in the law can constitute good cause to amend invalidity contentions. F5 cites 

a decision from the Central District of California permitting the amendment of claims in light of 

Alice. Dkt. No. 213 at 3. However, the defendant in that case served its amended invalidity 

contentions on August 15, 2014, less than two months following Alice. See Mortgage Grader, Inc. 

v. Costco Wholesale Corp., Case No. 13-0043, Dkt. No. 97 at 2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014). Here, 

F5 waited far longer—nearly a year—before filing its motion for judgment on the pleadings 

asserting invalidity under Section 101. In addition, the issue of what constitutes patentable subject 

matter has been hotly debated since the Federal Circuit’s 2013 en banc decision in CLS Bank 

Intern. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).

F5 also bases its motion on Intellectual Ventures v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., Case No. 13-

3777, 2015 WL 1941331 (S.D.N.Y. April 28, 2015). See Dkt. No. 180. According to F5, 

Intellectual Ventures, as “the first post-Alice decision addressing patentability of networking 

methods and technologies,” constitutes “intervening law” which supports late amendment to assert 

a Section 101 defense. Dkt. No. 213 at 3. However, Intellectual Ventures is not controlling 

authority: Alice marked the shift in Section 101 invalidity analysis; Intellectual Ventures merely 

applied Alice to the field of networking methods and technologies. Accordingly, Intellectual 

Ventures does not constitute the kind of “intervening law” that would support amendment at this 

late hour. As Radware notes, the defendant in Good Technology submitted the Intellectual 

Ventures decision in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting a previously 

undisclosed Section 101 defense. See Good Technology Corp., Case No. 12-5826, Dkt. No. 281-1. 

Despite the Intellectual Ventures decision being even more recent at that point than it is now, 

Judge Grewal nonetheless refused to excuse noncompliance with the Patent Local Rules and allow 

a previously undisclosed Section 101 theory. See id., Dkt. No. 298.

As to F5’s second argument, the court need not reach the question of prejudice to Radware 

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because F5 has not shown good cause to permit amendment of its invalidity contentions. Patent 

L.R. 3-6 provides for amendment of invalidity contentions “only by order of the Court upon a 

timely showing of good cause.” “[G]ood cause requires a showing of diligence,” and it is the 

movant’s burden to establish diligence. O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1366. As discussed above, F5 has 

not shown diligence, so the court need not consider the prejudice to Radware that would flow from 

F5’s untimely assertion of a Section 101 invalidity theory.

Radware’s motion to strike F5’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, and 

F5’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. For the same reasons, F5’s motion to 

amend its invalidity contentions to add Section 101 subject matter ineligibility as a defense is 

DENIED.

B. Global Server Load Balancing and Cisco DistributedDirector

Radware also moves to strike those portions of F5’s motion for summary judgment of 

invalidity that rely on Global Server Load Balancing (“GSLB”) because F5 failed to disclose 

GSLB as prior art in its invalidity contentions as required by Patent Local Rule 3-3(c). Dkt. No. 

201 at 3. 

F5 does not dispute that the term GSLB does not appear in its invalidity contentions but 

states that its summary judgment motion of invalidity is based on a specific embodiment of GSLB, 

Cisco’s DistributedDirector (“Cisco DD”), not the general concept of GSLB itself. Dkt. No. 213 at

4. According to F5, all aspects of GSLB relied upon in its summary judgment motion are 

disclosed by Cisco DD, and Cisco DD forms the entire basis for its analysis regarding invalidity 

based on GSLB. Id. at 5. F5 asserts that it both identified and charted Cisco DD as invalidating 

prior art in both its preliminary invalidity contentions and in Dr. Alexander’s invalidity report. Id. 

at 6. 

Radware, while acknowledging that Cisco DD was previously disclosed, nevertheless 

argues that “any argument that GSLB, other than [Cisco DD], constitutes invalidating prior art 

should be stricken,” and that F5 “should be precluded from referring to GSLB functionality as 

invalidating prior art, whether or not it is a functionality performed by [Cisco DD].” Dkt. No. 224

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at 5. However, Radware leaves unrebutted F5’s contention that Cisco DD is a specific 

embodiment of GSLB and cites no authority for precluding mention of GSLB as implemented in 

Cisco DD. While some of the language in F5’s motion does imply that GSLB systems other than 

Cisco DD also constitute anticipating prior art, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 183 at 14 (“The asserted claims 

are invalid based on GSLB systems, such as the Cisco DistributedDirector . . . .”), Radware 

identifies no portion of F5’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity that relies on an aspect of 

GSLB not disclosed by Cisco DD. 

Accordingly, because F5’s motion for summary judgment is based on Cisco DD, rather 

than GSLB generally, and Cisco DD was previously disclosed as allegedly anticipating prior art, 

Radware’s motion to strike those portions of F5’s motion based on GSLB is DENIED.3

C. Border Gateway Protocol

Radware moves to strike those portions of F5’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity 

that rely on BGP because F5 failed to disclose BGP as prior art in its invalidity contentions. Dkt. 

No. 201 at 3.

Like GSLB, BGP is a general protocol, rather than a specific implementation or 

embodiment. However, whereas F5’s motion for summary judgment makes clear that Cisco DD is 

a specific implementation of GSLB and that Cisco DD itself is the prior art reference upon which 

its invalidity theory is based, F5 does not dispute that it failed to disclose BGP as a prior art 

reference and has not identified a specific BGP reference. Instead, F5 argues that BGP was 

discussed in both parties’ expert reports, and that Radware cannot claim that it will suffer any 

undue prejudice from its consideration as prior art. Dkt. No. 213 at 7. F5 states that its summary 

judgment motion regarding BGP is “based entirely on Radware’s expert’s own admissions from 

his April 17, 2015 deposition,” and that “[p]rior to conducting the deposition, F5 could not have 

anticipated that Dr. Rubin would make these admissions, and thus could not have presented them 

 

3

To be clear, F5 would not be able to assert another embodiment of GSLB as anticipating prior art 

at trial, nor would it be able to simply argue that GSLB, unmoored from its implementation in 

Cisco DD, anticipates.

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in its contentions.” Id.

F5 does not explain precisely how the testimony of Dr. Izhak Rubin, Radware’s technical 

expert, somehow enabled its BGP invalidity argument.4 Based on F5’s argument, it appears that 

F5 either: (1) knew BGP was anticipating prior art before Dr. Rubin’s deposition but chose not to 

disclose it as a prior art in its invalidity contentions, perhaps because before Dr. Rubin’s alleged 

admissions F5 felt it was an argument not worth making; or (2) F5 was aware of BGP but unaware 

that it was an anticipating prior art reference until Dr. Rubin’s deposition. Whatever the case, F5 

has not shown good cause to excuse its failure to comply with Patent Local Rule 3-3(c). F5 cites 

no authority for the proposition that an opposing expert’s admissions can constitute good cause to 

allow the assertion of previously undisclosed prior art, and even if it could, F5 has not explained 

how Dr. Rubin’s alleged admission somehow rendered BGP anticipating prior art that F5 could 

not have discovered in an earlier diligent search. This is particularly true in light of the fact that 

F5’s expert discussed BGP in his expert report.

As with F5’s Section 101 invalidity argument, because F5 has not shown good cause 

amend its invalidity contentions, the court need not reach the question of prejudice. 

 

4 Dr. Rubin’s expert report regarding BGP in full states that:

37. A number of the systems and references that Dr. Alexander relies on relate 

to Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), or require BGP; a technology unrelated to the 

Radware Patents. The link load balancing systems and methods disclosed in the 

Radware Patents do not relate to BGP. The solutions taught by the Radware 

Patents for inbound and outbound link load balancing were devised as an 

improved solution to multihoming [rather] than BGP. During prosecution, the 

patent applicants made clear that the multihoming solution described by the 

Radware Patents did not relate to BGP:

Additional, other prior art submitted in an IDS currently with this 

preliminary amendment describes a multi-homed environment, 

which is based on BGP. The BGP mechanism fails to suggest the 

feature of the applicant’s claimed invention of resolving a DNS 

resolution query in the context where the device is connected to the 

Internet through a plurality of routes and the plurality of routes are 

assigned with respective IP addresses.

38. Thus, from the outset, the patent applicants distinguished their load 

balancing solution from BGP. Dr. Alexander’s reliance on BGP is misplaced 

because Radware’s solution solves a multihoming problem in a different way.

Dkt. No. 213-2 at ECF p.4. 

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F5’s invalidity contentions do not disclose BGP as anticipating prior art as required under 

Patent Local Rule 3-3, and F5 has not shown good cause to amend its invalidity contentions. 

Radware’s motion to strike those portions of F5’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity 

based on BGP is therefore GRANTED.

D. May 28, 2015 Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Alexander 

Finally, Radware moves to strike the supplemental declaration of F5’s expert, Dr. 

Alexander. Dkt. No. 201 at 12. Radware argues that in his supplemental declaration Dr. Alexander 

provides additional opinions regarding the Cisco DD system that were not provided in his expert 

report as required by Rule 26. Dr. Alexander provided his expert report on invalidity on January 

20, 2015. In it, he identified and explained the Cisco DD test-bed system he had created as a 

demonstration that Cisco DD anticipates the Asserted Patents. On March 2, 2015 Dr. Rubin 

provided his rebuttal expert report on invalidity, pointing out what are, in his opinion, flaws with 

the test-bed system. Specifically, Dr. Rubin opines that: (1) the test bed was not connected to the 

Internet, as required by the claims; (2) certain components of the test bed (a networking switch 

and configuration files) were not in existence as of the priority date of the patents; and (3) the test 

bed system, as configured by Dr. Alexander, still could not perform inbound or outbound link load 

balancing as required by the asserted claims. Dkt. No. 189-29 ¶¶ 96-109. Radware contends that 

because Dr. Alexander created the test-bed, he had all of the evidence at his disposal when he 

wrote his initial expert report. Dkt. No. 201 at 13. According to Radware, to allow Dr. 

Alexander’s supplemental declaration would prejudice Radware by permitting F5 an improper 

rebuttal to Dr. Rubin’s rebuttal. 

F5 contends that the supplemental declaration contains no new opinions, but rather simply 

addresses the purported flaws with the test-bed system, which are simply factual issues raised by 

Radware. Dkt. No. 213 at 8. F5’s position is that an expert cannot be reasonably expected to 

anticipate every counterargument that could possibly be made and preemptively discuss them in 

his report. Id. Moreover, F5 argues that Radware has had substantial opportunity to conduct 

discovery into these alleged flaws, including deposing Dr. Alexander about the substance of the 

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declaration. 

The court agrees with F5. Radware identifies no prejudice other than the general assertion 

that “it would prolong Radware’s day in Court and the cessation of F5’s infringing conduct.” Dkt. 

No. 201 at 14. Moreover, the court agrees that an expert cannot reasonably be expected to 

anticipate every criticism and argument that an opposing expert will level, and preemptively 

respond to each and every one. Finally, the court notes that Radware cites no authority in support 

of its argument, beyond citing Rule 26 itself. Accordingly, the court DENIES Radware’s motion 

to strike the supplemental declaration. However, F5 cannot offer new opinions of Dr. Alexander 

that go beyond merely responding to Dr. Rubin’s criticisms of the test bed systems.

III. THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY AND 

TO DISMISS F5’S INVALDITY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 

Each party moves for summary judgment regarding invalidity. F5 moves for summary 

judgment that the asserted claims are invalid as anticipated by prior art GSLB and BGP, or, in the 

alternative, that the asserted claims are obvious in light of those references. Dkt. No. 183. Radware 

moves for partial summary judgment against F5’s affirmative defense of invalidity on the grounds 

that F5 has failed to demonstrate that the asserted references constitute invalidating prior art. Dkt. 

No. 189. 

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits demonstrate 

that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the Court “does not assess credibility or weigh 

the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. 

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559–60 (2006). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the 

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is 

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party. Id.

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Patents are presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). However, an invention is not 

patentable if “(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 

described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the 

applicant for patent, or (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this 

or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date 

of the application for patent in the United States” or if “(e) the invention was described in (1) an 

application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before 

the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by 

another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. 

§ 102(a), (b), (e) (2006). A party challenging the validity of a patent bears the burden of proving 

invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 

2242 (2011).

B. Prior Art References

Radware moves for partial summary judgment that: (1) F5 abandoned a number of prior art 

references previously cited in its invalidity contentions; (2) the “test-bed” systems created by F5 

are not prior art; (3) the Maki-Kullas patent is not prior art; and (4) the Cisco DistributedDirector 

White Paper (“DD white paper”) is not prior art. See Dkt. No. 189. The court first addresses the 

allegedly abandoned prior art references and test-bed systems before turning to the Maki-Kullas 

patent and the DD white paper. 

1. Abandoned Prior Art References

Radware first moves for partial summary judgment on twenty-six alleged anticipating prior 

art references and nine alleged obviousness combinations. Id. at 11. Radware argues that despite 

identifying these prior art references and combinations in its invalidity contentions, F5’s expert 

failed to offer any opinions based on these references. Id. The result, according to Radware, is that 

F5 has no evidence in support of its claim that these references and combinations invalidate the 

Asserted Patents, and therefore Radware is entitled to partial summary judgment that these 

unsupported references do not invalidate the Asserted Patents. Id. at 13.

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F5 does not dispute that Dr. Alexander did not rely or offer an opinion on these references 

but argues that “a district court should not exclude prior art evidence simply because such 

evidence is not in an expert’s report.” Dkt. No. 196-4 at 18 (citing Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. 

v. Bodum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). F5 agrees that it may not raise such prior art at 

trial through expert testimony but argues that regardless of whether F5 intends to use the twentysix prior art references and nine combinations, there is no basis for granting summary judgment in 

Radware’s favor.

F5 has not necessarily abandoned the asserted prior art references by failing to introduce 

any expert opinions based on these references. See In re Brimonidine Patent Litig., 643 F.3d 1366, 

1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“There is no invariable requirement that a prior art reference be 

accompanied by expert testimony.”). Accordingly, Radware’s motion for summary judgment that 

F5 abandoned the prior art references on which it did not offer an expert opinion is DENIED. 

However, Radware may move to exclude these references if F5 later seeks to introduce them 

through lay witness testimony, should the particular references F5 seeks to introduce contain 

matter that is complex and requires expert testimony to explain. See, e.g., Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT 

Corp., 715 F.3d 1336, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In addition, Radware may move to limit the 

number of prior art references asserted as anticipating or as part of an obviousness combination. 

2. Cisco and BIG-IP Test-Bed Systems

Radware also moves for partial summary judgment that F5’s Cisco DD and BIG-IP testbed systems do not anticipate or render obvious the asserted claims as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 

189 at 14. Radware advances two arguments: (1) the test-bed systems did not exist as configured 

before the priority date of the patents because they incorporate components and configuration files 

that did not exist as of the priority date of the patents; and (2) the test-bed systems were not known 

or used to practice link load balancing before the priority date of the patents. Id. However, F5 

appears to agree with Radware that the test-bed systems, rather than the underlying 3-DNS and 

DistributedDirector products, are not prior art. See Dkt. No. 196-4 at 16 (“F5 has never asserted 

that all of the components of the Test-Bed System were used together in the prior art. Instead, the 

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Test-Bed System simply evidences that the prior art 3-DNS and DistributedDirector systems could 

perform ISP load balancing.”). Accordingly, because it is undisputed that the test-bed systems are 

themselves not prior art, Radware’s motion for summary judgment that the test-bed systems 

neither anticipate nor render obvious the asserted claims is GRANTED.5

3. The Maki-Kullas Patent

Radware moves for summary judgment that the Maki-Kullas patent is not prior art. See

Dkt. No. 189. The Maki-Kullas patent, filed on October 5, 1999, pre-dates the December 20, 1999 

effective filing date of the ’319 (and ’374) patents.6 However, the person “who first conceives, 

and, in a mental sense, first invents . . . may date his patentable invention back to the time of its 

conception, if he connects the conception with its reduction to practice by reasonable diligence on 

his part, so that they are substantially one continuous act.” Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 

1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, to 

overcome the Maki-Kullas prior art reference, Radware must demonstrate that it conceived of the 

inventions disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 patents prior to the Maki-Kullas priority date, October 5, 

1999, and diligently reduced the inventions to practice after conception.

7 Radware asserts that the 

invention disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 patents was conceived by April 1, 1999, and reduced to 

practice at least as early as October 4, 1999. Dkt. No. 186-4 at 17–19.

Although F5 has the burden of establishing invalidity, Radware has the burden of proving 

that it conceived of the alleged inventions before the filing date of the patent application and 

 

5

In its reply, Radware also moved in limine to exclude the use of the test-bed systems as 

demonstrative evidence that the prior art 3-DNS and Cisco DD systems could perform ISP load 

balancing. Dkt. No. 209 at 12. However, the court disagrees with Radware that the issue has been 

fully presented in the context of this briefing, and declines to reach the issue at this juncture. 

6

The ’319 Patent was filed on June 2, 2003, but it enjoys the filing date of December 20, 1999, 

because the ’319 patent is a division of application No. 09/467,763 (now Patent No. 6,665,702).

Dkt. 24 at Ex. B. The ’374 Patent was filed on August 3, 2012, but also enjoys the filing date of 

December 20, 1999, because it is a continuation of the ’319 Patent application filed on June 2, 

2003, which in turn is a division of application No. 09/467,763, filed on December 20, 1999. See

id. at Ex. C.

7

F5’s expert, Dr. Alexander, conceded that the Maki-Kullas patent is Section 102(e) art and thus

not entitled to a priority date earlier than its October 5, 1999 filing date. Dkt. No. 189-7 at 163; 

Dkt. No. 186-10 at 160:15–161:6.

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diligently reduced the inventions to practice. Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 

1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir 2013) (“After an accused infringer has put forth a prima facie case of 

invalidity, the burden of production shifts to the patent owner to produce sufficient rebuttal 

evidence to prove entitlement to an earlier invention date.”). To do so, Radware must corroborate 

its alleged conception and reduction to practice dates. Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 576 F. 

Supp. 2d 1030, 1045-46 (D. Minn. 2008), aff’d, 649 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The patentee 

must do more than offer some evidence (such as an affidavit) supporting his pre-patent application 

invention date; the patentee must offer corroboration of that invention date.”) (emphasis in 

original). “The issue of the conception date of an invention is a legal conclusion based on 

underlying factual findings.” Taurus IP, 726 F.3d at 1322. 

a. Conception 

Radware asserts that the invention disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 patents was conceived by 

April 1, 1999, see Dkt. No. 186-4 at 17–19, and offers the following evidence in support of this 

date:



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As an initial matter, Dr. Rubin’s expert testimony is based solely on his review of “the 

inventor testimony and various documents cited and referenced in the depositions.” Id.

8 Radware 

does not specifically identify the documents reviewed by Dr. Rubin, but the documents appear to 

include only the above inventor testimony and the . As a result, Dr. Rubin’s 

expert testimony adds nothing beyond the inventor testimony in this case, and does not constitute 

evidence of conception. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1068 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005) (rejecting expert testimony in support of conception that simply pointed to the 

inventor’s notebook and concluded that various entries demonstrated conception without 

providing any further explanation).9

 

8 Dr. Rubin’s full conception opinion states:

9 Radware’s attempt to distinguish Invitrogen fails. See Dkt. No. 209 at 5. The court’s discrediting 

of the proffered expert testimony in that case was not due to the fact that the inventor’s notebook 

entries contradicted his deposition testimony, as Radware claims. Id. Rather, the court found that 

“Clontech nowhere provides the court with expert testimony that properly explains the technical 

notebook entries advanced in support of its conception arguments.” Invitrogen, 429 F.3d at 1068. 

The expert’s declaration in Invitrogen provided the court “no substantive factual guidance,” as the 

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What this leaves is the testimony of Zisapel and Peles, co-inventors of the Asserted 

Patents, and the email from Zisapel to Fuks, who is also a co-inventor of the asserted patent. The 

testimony of Zisapel and Peles cannot alone show conception, and must be corroborated. See, e.g., 

Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It is well established that a 

party claiming his own prior inventorship must proffer evidence corroborating his testimony.”). 

When evaluating corroboration, courts apply a “rule of reason” that examines “all pertinent 

evidence so that a sound determination of the credibility of the inventor’s story may be reached.” 

Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Although under a rule of reason analysis 

all the pertinent evidence is considered, it “does not dispense with the requirement for some 

evidence of independent corroboration.” Coleman, 754 F.2d at 360. Corroboration of inventor 

testimony requires evidence beyond an inventor’s own statements and documents. See Hahn v. 

Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“the inventor . . . must provide independent 

corroborating evidence in addition to his own statements and documents.”); Golden Bridge Tech. 

Inc. v. Apple, Inc., Case No. 12-4882, 2014 WL 1928977, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) 

(“[E]vidence of conception and reduction to practice must be ‘independently corroborated’ beyond 

the inventor’s own statements and documents, and must be ‘evidence that would be available to a 

jury’ to support its factual positions.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Even viewing all of Radware’s proffered evidence together, the court cannot conclude that 

Radware has sufficiently proven its entitlement to a conception date of . To the 

extent that Radware’s proffered 

 A jury 

could reasonably conclude that Radware had not conceived of the invention by , and 

the court finds that there is a genuine issue of fact as to the conception date of the inventions 

 

expert stated only that “It is clear from [the inventor’s] testimony and his lab records that he 

conceived of the invention in 1984.” Id. Like Dr. Rubin, the expert in Invitrogen cited various 

documents (in that case, notebook entries), and concluded that “[t]hese representative entries 

demonstrate Goff's conception, diligence and reduction to practice.” Id. The court found that “such 

wholly conclusory assertions on a legal issue cannot carry [a party’s] burden on summary 

judgment,” and the court so finds in this case as well. 

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disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 patents. 

b. Reduction to Practice 

Radware asserts that the inventions disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 patents were reduced to 

practice at least as early as October 4, 1999, one day prior to the filing date of the Maki-Kullas 

patent. See Dkt. No. 186-4 at 17–19. Although the court found that Radware has not proven its 

claimed conception date of , because an inventor cannot reduce to practice an 

invention of which he has not conceived, the court proceeds to examine whether Radware can 

demonstrate that the inventions disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 patents were reduced to practice by 

October 4, 1999. Proof that the inventions were reduced to practice by October 4, 1999 would also 

serve as proof that the invention was conceived prior to the filing date of the Maki-Kullas patent, 

and therefore that the ’319 and ’374 patents claim priority over the Maki-Kullas patent. 

Radware offers the following evidence in support of its claimed reduction to practice date: 

 Radware press release issued on or about October 4, 1999 announcing LinkProof as 

“the first IP load balancing solution for networks with multiple ISP connections.” 

See Dkt. No. 189-6. 

 Testimony of co-inventor Peles. 

. Dkt. No. 186-9 at 84:14–18.10

To demonstrate actual reduction to practice,11 a party must show that the inventor: (1) 

constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the claimed limitations; and (2) 

determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose. Z4 Technologies, Inc. v. 

 

10 Radware also offers the expert testimony of Radware’s technical expert, Dr. Rubin. Dkt. No. 

186-4 at 19. However, this testimony does not constitute evidence of reduction to practice for the 

same reason Dr. Rubin’s conception opinion failed to do so: Dr. Rubin merely cites Radware’s 

other evidence, without adding any substantive analysis or explanation, before stating his 

conclusory opinion that after 

 Dkt. No. 186-24, ¶ 40. 

11 The parties agree that Radware constructively reduced the invention to practice on December 

20, 1999, the date on which it filed the ’702 patent application. See Dkt. Nos. 189 at 19; 196-4 at

7.

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Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 

1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oréal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 592–95 (Fed. 

Cir. 1997) (holding that reduction to practice does not occur until inventor knows embodiment 

will work for its intended purposes). Like conception (and diligence in reducing an invention to 

practice), inventor testimony of reduction to practice must be corroborated. In re NTP, 654 F.3d 

1279, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“An inventor cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony to establish a 

prior invention date . . . . It has long been the case that an inventor’s allegations of earlier 

invention alone are insufficient—an alleged date of invention must be corroborated.) (citations 

omitted); Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330 (“In order to establish an actual reduction to practice, an 

inventor’s testimony must be corroborated by independent evidence.”). Courts apply a rule of 

reason approach to the question of reduction to practice, but as with conception, “evidence of 

corroboration must not depend solely on the inventor himself.” Id. at 1330. 

Radware argues that Peles’ testimony is corroborated by the LinkProof press release, 

which Radware argues is direct, independent, and contemporaneous evidence of the claimed 

October 4, 1999 date. Dkt. No. 209-4 at 6–7. However, Peles’ testimony is limited to the assertion 

that October 4, 1999 was the earliest date for which evidence of reduction to practice could be 

found. See Dkt. No. 186-9 at 84:14–18 

 It does not appear that Peles 

affirmatively testified that October 4, 1999 was the date by which Radware had reduced its 

invention to practice. The court therefore finds that his testimony does not constitute evidence of 

Radware’s claimed date for reduction to practice.

The question of whether Radware reduced the invention disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 

patents to practice by October 4, 1999 therefore largely hinges on the LinkProof press release. 

Because the court finds that Radware has not established as undisputed that the press release was 

issued on October 4, 1999, the court finds the press release insufficient to demonstrate reduction to 

practice. Radware asserts in its motion for summary judgment that the press release was issued 

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“on or about” October 4, 1999. Dkt. No. 185-4 at 3. While the press release itself includes the date 

“October 4, 1999,” the document produced by Radware also contains the following handwritten 

notation: “Issued Oct 1999.” Dkt. No. 189-6 at ECF p. 2. Radware produces no corroborating 

evidence that the press release was actually issued on October 4, 1999. In its reply, Radware 

argues that the document speaks for itself, and is consistent with the testimony of others who 

recall that the LinkProof product was being offered for sale at least by October 4, 1999. Dkt. No. 

209-4 at 6–7. However, the testimony Radware cites does not necessarily support a publication 

date of October 4, 1999. Radware first cites the deposition testimony of Zack Cherkassy,12 who 

testified that 

 Dkt. 209-12 at 37:19. But Radware does not explain how Cherkassy’s 

recollection that LinkProof was released in September or October, 1999 is consistent with its 

contention that LinkProof was announced on or around October 4, 1999, and the press release to 

that effect. Radware also cites Dr. Rubin’s supplemental declaration, in which he opines that 

 Dkt. No. 210-11, ¶ 6. The court fails to see how Dr. Rubin’s supplemental declaration 

helps establish that Radware issued the press release on October 4, 1999. 

In sum, the court finds that a reasonable juror, based on the evidence provided by Radware, 

could conclude that the invention disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 patents was not reduced to 

practice by October 4, 1999. Although Radware has submitted some evidence that it reduced the 

invention to practice in October, 1999, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether it did so by 

October 4, 1999. 

Because the court finds that Radware has not conclusively shown that it either conceived 

of the invention disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 patents by April 1, 1999, or that Radware reduced 

 

12 In its administrative motion seeking leave to file portions of its reply brief under seal, Radware 

identifies Cherkassy as “an engineer at Radware who offered testimony regarding the conception 

and reduction to practice of the claimed inventions.” Dkt. No. 209-1 at 2. 

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its invention to practice by October 4, 1999, the court hereby DENIES Radware’s motion for 

summary judgment that the Maki-Kullas patent is not prior art as a matter of law.

13

 

4. Cisco DistributedDirector White Paper

Finally, Radware moves for summary judgment that both versions of the Cisco DD white 

paper produced by F5 are not prior art. Dkt. No. 189 at 19–22. Two versions of the of the DD 

white paper have been produced in discovery: (1) a version bearing a “1999” copyright notice 

which was authenticated by its author, Kevin Delgadillo (the “’99 DD white paper”); and (2) a 

second version, which apparently has not been authenticated, and which bears a copyright date of 

1997 (the “’97 DD white paper”). See Dkt. Nos. 189-15, 186-13. F5 asserts that both documents 

are anticipating prior art references and support a finding that the ’319 and ’374 patents are invalid 

for obviousness. 

The parties’ dispute regarding the ’99 DD white paper largely concerns whether F5 has 

shown that it was published prior to April 1, 1999—the date by which Radware contends the 

inventions disclosed in the ’319 and ’374 patents were conceived. However, as discussed above, 

Radware has not shown that the Asserted Patents are necessarily entitled to a priority date of April 

1, 1999. F5 has introduced evidence that the ’99 DD white paper was released at least sometime in 

April of 1999, and possibly in March of that year: (1) the document bears a “1999” copyright on 

every page, and bears the notation “3/99” on the final page, which Cisco employee and author of 

the document Kevin Delgadillo testified indicates the document was available publicly in March 

1999, see Dkt. No. 189-18 at 17:19–18:22; and (2) Delgadillo testified that the document was 

published to the Cisco website in March 1999 (or, at the latest, April 1999), Dkt. No. at 3:16–18, 

11:23–12:2, 13:11–24; and 16:3–15. Accordingly, the court finds that there is a genuine issue of 

fact as to the publication date of the ’99 DD white paper, and DENIES Radware’s motion for 

summary judgment that the ’99 DD white paper is not prior art as a matter of law.

 

13 As the court concludes that Radware has failed to show that it reduced the inventions disclosed 

in the ’319 and ’374 patents to practice by October 4, 1999, the court need not reach the parties’ 

arguments regarding diligence.

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The second version, the ’97 DD white paper, bears a “1997” copyright on each page, but 

has not been authenticated by Delgadillo. This version is also “mutilated,” according to Radware, 

in that it has several blank spaces throughout. Dkt. No. 209-4 at 9. Radware contends that the 

court should grant summary judgment that this version is not prior art because there is no evidence 

in the record that the document was ever publicly available. However, although it is currently 

unauthenticated and F5 chose not to depose Delgadillo about the document, Radware provides no 

reason to preclude F5 from potentially introducing the document as evidence on the basis of 

Delgadillo’s trial testimony. Moreover, Radware concedes the ’99 and ’97 documents contain 

some of the same material, see Dkt. No. 186-4 at 22, which, along with the “1997” copyright date, 

at least raises an issue of fact as to the document’s authenticity and publication date. Accordingly, 

the court DENIES Radware’s motion for summary judgment that the ’97 DD white paper is not 

prior art as a matter of law.

C. Anticipation

F5 moves for summary judgment of invalidity, arguing that all asserted claims of both the 

’319 and ’374 patents are invalid as anticipated by Cisco DD. Dkt. No. 183 at 14–20.14 For the 

reasons set forth below, the court finds that F5 has not shown by clear and convincing evidence 

that Cisco DD anticipates the asserted claims, and that a reasonable jury could find that the Cisco 

DD system does not disclose ISP link load balancing. Accordingly, F5’s motion for summary 

judgment that the asserted claims are invalid as anticipated by Cisco DD is DENIED. 

1. Legal Standard

A claim is anticipated under § 102, and thus invalid, “if each and every limitation is found 

either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben 

Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); accord Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 

 

14 F5 also moves for summary judgment that the asserted outbound claims in both patents are 

invalid as anticipated by BGP. Dkt. No. 183 at 20–21. However, because the court granted 

Radware’s motion to strike those portions of F5’s motion for summary judgment that rely on 

BGP, F5’s motion for summary judgment that BGP anticipates is DENIED.

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2006). Put simply, “[t]hat which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.” Peters v. Active 

Mfg., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) (internal quotation mark omitted). To show anticipation under 35 

U.S.C. § 102, the moving party must “identify each claim element, state the witnesses’

interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in 

the prior art reference.” Schumer v. Lab. Computer Systems, Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315–16 (Fed.

Cir. 2002). A reference can also anticipate “if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or 

inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 

1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Anticipation under § 102 is a two-step inquiry. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 

F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The first step is claim construction. Id.; see Amazon.com, Inc. v. 

Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“‘claim must be construed 

before determining its validity just as it is first construed before deciding infringement.’” (quoting 

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 996 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., 

concurring), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). The second step is a comparison of the properly 

construed claim to the prior art. Medichem, 353 F.3d at 933. 

2. Analysis

The Court previously construed the claims in its claim construction order. See Dkt. No. 

122. As relevant here, the Court construed the following terms:

Claim Language Construction

“[one load balancing] 

criterion” and “one or more 

criteria”

A standard on which a decision about load balancing may be based, 

such as hops, latency, TTL, cost, link pricing, load on the route, data 

content, data packet loss, availability, current load, round robin, or 

random. 

Multi-homed [network] A network that has two or more connections to the Internet at a single 

geographic location, each through a discrete ISP link. 

A plurality of routes Two or more pathways connecting a source and a destination.

For claims 24-28 of the ’319 Patent, the source is ‘the client computer 

network’ and the destination is ‘the remote server computer.’ 

For the’374 Patent and claims 1-23 and 29-32 of the ’319 Patent, the 

source is the ‘remote computer’ and the destination is the ‘device’ or 

‘system’ in the ‘computer network’ or ‘multi-homed network.’ 

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ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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[Internet Service Provider 

(ISP)] Links

A pathway connecting to or from an ISP.

Configured to Programmed to [perform certain functions]. 

This does not require user intervention if the feature claimed is 

included in the product as supplied. 

The asserted claims in this case comprise two types: claims that are directed to selecting a 

route for inbound messages from a remote computer to the multi-homed network (claims 1–23 and 

29–32 of the ’319 patent and claims 1–4, 6–12, and 14–15 of the ’374 patent), and those directed 

to selecting one of multiple routes for outbound messages, where the client computer is located on 

a multi-homed network and is sending communications out to a remote server (claims 24–28 of 

the ’319 patent). See Dkt. No. 122 at 17–19. The inbound claims all contain a multi-homing 

limitation, a limitation for resolving a DNS query from a remote computer for a domain name 

within the multi-homed network, and, critically, a limitation for selecting one of a plurality of 

routes through one of the ISPs to send a response to the DNS query. Some inbound claims also 

include a limitation that the route selection be based on one or more metrics or criteria, such as 

latency, hops, costing, load, or data packet loss.15 Finally, some of the inbound claims contain a 

limitation requiring the translation of IP addresses for packets received on the multi-homed 

network to an IP address within that network, known as network address translation (“NAT” or 

“NATing”). Like the inbound claims, each outbound claim contains a multi-homing limitation and 

the limitation of selecting one of the plurality of routes. However, for the outbound claims, the 

client is located at the multi-homed network and is sending packets to a remote server. 

Additionally, the outbound claims include the limitation that route selection must be based on 

costing information of the routes and NATing. Although F5 contends that Cisco DD/GSLB 

anticipates all asserted claims, the court discusses the inbound claims before turning to the 

outbound claims.

 

15 The court previously construed “Proximity/proximities” to mean “a measurement or 

measurements based on hops, latency, TTL, or a combination thereof.” Dkt. No. 122 at 6. The 

court also construed “Costing information” and “cost” as “plain and ordinary meaning [but] not 

limited to monetary price.” Id. at 25-26. The court observed that “cost” “can represent an array of 

non-monetary resources. Something can ‘cost’ bandwidth or be expensive in terms of time.” Id. at 

26.

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a. Inbound claims

F5 contends that Cisco DD anticipates all inbound claims of the ’319 and ’374 patents as it 

discloses each limitation required by the inbound claims. Radware disputes that Cisco DD meets 

the route selection limitation, and argues that the prior art does not disclose “route metrics” with 

regard to dependent claims, but otherwise does not dispute that Cisco DD discloses the other 

inbound claim limitations. See Dkt. No. 202-4.

i. Route Selection Limitation

Each claim requires the selection of either “one of a plurality of routes” connected to the 

internet (in the case of the ’319 patent) or the selection of “one ISP link from the plurality ISP 

links” (for the ’374 patent). The court previously construed ISP link to mean “a pathway 

connecting to or from an ISP.” Dkt. No. 122 at 20. The court stated that an “ISP link” is a subpart 

of a “route,” id. at 21, and the parties treat the route selection limitations of the two patents as 

functionally equivalent in the context of this motion.

In its reply, F5 concedes that GSLB did not select between different routes having the 

same destination, but rather between routes that had different destinations. Dkt. No. 211 at 6. 

(“Radware’s argument essentially boils down to the fact that prior art GSLB selected between 

routes had different destinations, not a single destination. This is true . . . .”). F5 argues that this is 

a distinction without a difference: “[t]he concept of choosing a server based on well-known route 

metrics for GSLB is the same as choosing a route based on the same metrics for ISP link load 

balancing.” Dkt. No. 183 at 15. Furthermore, F5 argues that it has introduced direct evidence that 

Cisco DD was capable of comparing various routes to the same destination, and that it had been 

sold for that purpose. Id. According to F5, the result is that Cisco DD discloses the route selection 

limitation required by the asserted inbound claims.

F5’s evidence consists of the expert testimony of Dr. Alexander and his demonstration 

Cisco DD test-bed, and the witness testimony of Kevin Delgadillo and Dean Darwin. Dkt. No. 183

at 15. Dr. Alexander opined that “The [Cisco] DD System was capable of receiving a DNS 

resolution query from a remote computer for a domain name within the enterprise LAN computer 

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network, selecting one of the plurality of routes connecting said device to the Internet, and 

responding to the DNS resolution query with an IP address associated with the selected route.” 

Dkt. No. 183-11 ¶ 173. According to Dr. Alexander, Cisco DD systems available as early as 

December 1998 “provided a plurality of routes for an enterprise Local Area Network (“LAN”) to 

connect to the Internet such that each of the plurality of routes could be assigned ISP specific IP 

addresses.” Id. ¶ 163. According to Dr. Alexander, Cisco DD can allocate each ISP “a virtual IP 

address from its pool of addresses so as to uniquely identify the respective ISPs.” Id. ¶ 183. Dr. 

Alexander explains that he was able to configure Cisco DD to perform the role of “a network 

controller receiving a DNS resolution query from a remote computer,” id. ¶ 181, and to “respond 

to the DNS query with one of a plurality of the virtual IP destination addresses associated with 

each of the respective ISP links.” Id. ¶ 184. Furthermore, his configuration of the Cisco DD 

system can “select, based on at least one load balancing criterion, one ISP link from the plurality 

ISP links.” Id. F5 further supports its argument with witness testimony. First, Kevin Delgadillo 

testified that Cisco DD could accomplish ISP load balancing, and was likely used for that purpose. 

Dkt. No. 183-5 at 41:18–23. Second, Dean Darwin, a former Cisco employee, testified that he sold 

Cisco DD in 1997 and 1998 “to balance between [] ISP links” as an ISP link load balancing 

solution. Dkt. No. 183-10 at 257:10–258:19.

Radware disagrees with F5’s analysis, and contends that GSLB, and by extension Cisco 

DD, “uses a routing protocol that does not consider multiple candidate routes to a destination for 

the purpose of providing load balancing among associated attached ISP links.” Dkt. 195-1 at ¶ 6. 

According to Radware, this means that GSLB/Cisco DD chooses the best server, not necessarily 

the best route. Dkt. No. 202-4 at 17. Radware argues that the fundamental difference between 

prior art GSLB systems like Cisco DD and inbound ISP LLB as claimed by the ’319 and ’374 

patents is that inbound LLB does not make a selection between different destination servers; 

rather, the destination server remains the same, and the LLB system chooses the route (or ISP 

link) used to reach that server. Id. at 18. Furthermore, Radware’s expert takes issue with several 

aspects of the test-bed system, and contends that it fails to show that Cisco DD discloses the 

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limitations of the asserted inbound claims. 

The court finds that F5 has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the Cisco DD 

system anticipates the asserted inbound claims. First, while Delgadillo does testify that Cisco DD 

could accomplish “ISP load balancing,” he also testified that he was “not aware of” any Cisco 

products, including the Cisco DistributedDirector, that would “enable a company or enterprise to 

do link load balancing.” Dkt. No. 203-6 at 31:2-32:11. Delgadillo also testified that Cisco “never 

marketed Distributed Director as a link load balancing solution.” Id. at 41:25-42:10. In his 

testimony, Delgadillo distinguishes between “ISP load balancing” and “link load balancing,” a 

distinction which F5 does not explain. Second, Darwin testified that he sold Cisco DD for the 

purpose of providing ISP redundancy: “the ability to move traffic if . . . an ISP was failing or 

failing to provide the performance, if it was slow or if it was congested or it was overused, to be 

able to balance between the ISP links.” Dkt. No. 183-10 at 257:16–20. While his testimony may 

provide some support for F5’s position, he does not testify as to how Cisco DD “moved traffic” 

between links, and whether it did so by performing route selection akin to that taught by the 

Asserted Patents. 

Finally, the parties have provided conflicting expert testimony on whether the test-bed 

system demonstrates the ability to perform inbound ISP link load balancing. While Dr. Alexander 

asserts that his test-bed system demonstrates Cisco DD is capable of performing ISP link load 

balancing, Dr. Rubin opines that even if all components of the Cisco DD System had pre-dated the 

priority date of the patents-in-suit,16 the Cisco DD System still would not anticipate because the 

system could not perform either inbound or outbound link load balancing. Dkt. No. 186-24 at ¶¶ 

97–109.

17 Both experts appear to present reasonable analyses of whether the Cisco DD system 

anticipates the asserted inbound claims software, and reach opposite conclusions. Summary 

judgment is therefore improper. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–32.

 

16 The parties dispute the relevance of the presence of a networking switch in the test-bed system, 

as well as configuration files written by Dr. Alexander in 2014. 

17 In fact, Dr. Rubin testified that GSLB cannot even perform outbound server load balancing, let 

alone link load balancing. Dkt. 195-1 ¶ 6.

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ii. Route Metrics Limitation

F5 also asserts that the inbound dependent claims are anticipated because such dependent 

claims require route metrics and such route metrics were known in the prior art and not invented 

by Radware. The inbound dependent claims all require either that the route selection be: (1) 

“based on the proximity determination”; or more generally (2) “in accordance with one or more 

criteria of the plurality of routes.” See, e.g., ’319 col.19 ll.35–36, 64–66. Although F5 argues that 

Cisco DD included the use of various metrics, including availability, proximity, and latency, Dkt. 

No. 183 at 18, Radware correctly notes that F5 fails to prove that such route metrics were used by 

a “device for managing a computer network, said device connected to the Internet through a 

plurality of routes,” wherein that device then “select[s] the one of the plurality of routes” for 

purposes of link load balancing in a multi-homed environment, Dkt. No. 202-4 at 19. For each 

type of criterion or metric required by the asserted claims, F5 simply notes that Cisco DD 

“includes” that criterion or metric, but does not “explain in detail how each claim element is 

disclosed in the prior art reference.” Schumer, 308 F.3d at 1315–16.

b. Outbound Claims

The parties’ arguments regarding the outbound claims mirror those advanced for the 

inbound claims. F5 states that like with the inbound claims, “as the outbound claims recite nothing 

more than these known GSLB techniques applied in the context of multi-homed networks, they 

are invalid.” Dkt. No. 183 at 20. Radware argues that “the outbound claims have a multi-homing 

route selection limitation that is not met by GSLB.” Dkt. No. 202-4 at 20.

The outbound claims require route selection in a multi-homing network environment like 

the inbound claims, with the difference that the client, not the server, is located at the multi-homed 

network and is sending packets to a remote server, rather than a remote client. Accordingly, the 

court finds that for the reasons discussed above in connection with the inbound claims, F5 has not 

shown by clear and convincing evidence that Cisco DD anticipates the outbound claims. The 

outbound claims all also require the use of costing information, and for the same reasons stated in 

the court’s discussion of route metrics for inbound claims, the court finds that F5 has not 

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explained in detail how Cisco DD discloses the use of costing information in the context of the 

asserted outbound claims.

In sum, the court finds that F5 has failed to carry its burden of showing by clear and 

convincing evidence that each limitation in the asserted claims is disclosed in a single prior art 

reference, Cisco DD. The court therefore DENIES F5’s motion for summary judgment that the 

Asserted Patents are invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102.

D. Obviousness

The final issue to resolve is whether the asserted claims are obvious in light of the prior art. 

A patent is obvious if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 

prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 

invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 

pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).

What a particular reference discloses is a question of fact, see Para–Ordnance Manufacturing, 

Inc. v. SGS Importers International, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1995), as is the question 

of whether there was a reason to combine certain references, see Transocean Offshore Deepwater 

Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Under the 

four part test for obviousness detailed in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 

17-18 (1966), the court must consider (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the difference 

between the prior art and the claimed invention; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) 

any objective evidence of nonobviousness. The party asserting invalidity bears the burden of 

proving “by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to 

combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the 

skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Procter & 

Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).

The scope and content of the prior art is set forth above. The parties agree on the level of 

ordinary skill in the art. See Dkt. No. 183 at 21 n.12. Radware has submitted evidence on objective 

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indicia of nonobviousness.18 Although F5 relies on both GSLB/Cisco DD and BGP in support of 

its obviousness arguments, the court granted Radware’s motion to strike those portions of F5’s 

motion for summary judgment that rely on BGP. The court therefore does not consider F5’s 

arguments based on BGP.

F5 asserts that all the core networking technology functionality of the claims existed in the 

prior art, and that to repurpose those principles and apply them in multi-homing network use cases 

proposed by its customers, rather than in a geographically distributed server network, is nothing 

more than an application of well-known networking techniques that would have been obvious to a 

person of ordinary skill in the art. Dkt. No. 183 at 21. In support of its obviousness argument, F5 

offers the testimony of Kevin Delgadillo and Dean Darwin that GSLB could potentially be 

repurposed for ISP link load balancing, as well as its assertion that Radware “directly lifted source 

code from its GSLB product, WSD, for inclusion in its ISP link load balancing product.” Id. at 21–

22. F5 does not offer any expert testimony regarding obviousness. 

Radware’s expert disputes F5’s contention, opining that the “core networking 

functionality” that existed in the prior art does not disclose, teach, or suggest ISP load balancing. 

Dkt. 195-1 ¶¶ 9-11. As discussed above, Radware maintains that GSLB server load balancing is 

distinct from ISP load balancing. Dr. Rubin also opines that repurposing software modules is 

common in the software development industry, as such modules are universally shared through 

designs implemented by networking equipment, which has been done by F5 itself. Id. ¶ 12.

On this record, the court cannot say as a matter of law that it would have been obvious to 

one of ordinary skill in the art to repurpose the existing “core networking technology” for use in a 

multi-homing network environment. F5 bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing 

evidence that it would have been within the skill of an ordinary artisan to do so, and F5 has not 

met that burden. The evidence F5 does present is contradicted by Dr. Rubin’s expert opinion, and 

F5’s cursory assertion that it would be obvious to repurpose “core networking technologies” and 

 

18 Because the court finds that F5 has not met its burden of showing obviousness by clear and 

convincing evidence, the court need not reach objective indicia of nonobviousness.

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apply them in a multi-homing network environment is insufficient to carry its burden on summary 

judgment. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (a party must 

provide “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of 

obviousness.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the court finds that 

inconsistencies among the expert testimony introduced by Radware and F5’s evidence raise 

questions of credibility and weight. Therefore, issues of material fact remain with respect to 

obviousness. Accordingly, the court therefore DENIES F5’s motion for summary judgment that 

the Asserted Patents are invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

IV. RADWARE’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 37 

Radware moves to exclude two categories of evidence under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 37 based on F5’s alleged discovery violations: (1) evidence, especially source code,

relating to F5’s “hotfix” and (2) evidence relating to F5’s February 2015 review of its “QK view”

files. For the reasons explained below, the court DENIES the motion for sanctions. 

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 37(c)(1):

If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as 

required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that 

information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, 

or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is 

harmless.

Rule 26(e) requires a party to supplement its disclosures and discovery responses if it 

learns of additional or corrective information. Rule 37(c)(1) “gives teeth to these requirements by 

forbidding the use” of any information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) or (e) that is not 

properly disclosed. Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 

2001). Rule 37(c) provides a “self-executing, automatic sanction to provide a strong inducement 

for disclosure of material.” Id. at 1107; Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 

1179 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Under Rule 37 exclusion of evidence not disclosed is appropriate unless the 

failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless.”). “Two express exceptions ameliorate 

the harshness of Rule 37(c)(1): The information may be introduced if the parties’ failure to 

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disclose the required information is substantially justified or harmless.” Yeti, 259 F.3d at1106. It is 

F5’s burden to prove harmlessness or substantial justification. Id. at 1107. 

The duty to disclose documents created after the close of discovery is not clear. Tilton v. 

McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Case No. 06-0098, 2007 WL 3229157, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 

2007).

B. F5’s Hotfix

On November 4, 2014, F5 issued a “hotfix” to remove certain functionality in the accused 

devices, allegedly in order to ensure the accused devices did not infringe Radware’s Asserted 

Patents. Radware asserts that F5 did not promptly disclose the hotfix and did not produce the 

source code underlying the hotfix. Dkt. No. 207 at 3-4.

This court issued its claim construction order on April 18, 2014. Dkt. No. 122. On 

November 4, 2014, Radware requested F5’s counsel to supplement the source code of the accused 

products to the extent there were any material changes to the source code Radware had been 

provided to that point. Dkt. No. 207-2. On November 11, 2014 F5 responded that in lieu of 

producing the source code, Peter Thornewell, F5’s 30(b)(6) witness on the technical operation of 

the source code, would testify as to any material changes at his deposition. Radware deposed Peter 

Thornewell on November 12, 2014, and he did not identify any material changes. On November 

28, 2014, fact discovery closed. However, the parties stipulated that the deposition of certain 

witnesses, including Martin Brewer, could take place after the close of fact discovery due to 

scheduling issues. Dkt. No. 225-3 at 3. On December 4, 2014, the day before Brewer’s deposition, 

F5 sent Radware an email stating that Brewer “will be prepared to give testimony regarding F5’s 

recent ‘End of Life announcement for inbound and outbound cost-based link load balancing and 

inbound link utilization-based load balancing,’” i.e. the hotfix. Dkt. No. 207-3. F5 also included a 

link to F5’s public announcement of the hotfix dated December 4, 2014. Id. 

On December 5, 2014, Brewer was deposed. See Dkt. Nos. 218-6, 218-7. Brewer testified 

about the how the BIG-IP accused products would function after the hotfix was implemented. Dkt. 

No. 218-7 at 240:20–241:21. He also testified to a limited extent as to how a customer could 

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receive a “patch” to re-enable the cost-based link load balancing but noted that F5 had not “quite 

figured through the details about who would be eligible and things like that.” Dkt. No. 198-10 at 

64:13–15. Brewer also “[did] not know” whether the hotfix included “any other features or fixes” 

beyond removing the cost-based link load balancing functionality. Dkt. No. 206-6 at 52:8–13.

Brewer did not produce a copy of the source code for the hotfix or patch. Radware made no 

explicit request following Brewer’s deposition to examine the source code until it filed the current 

motion for sanctions. 

Radware served its opening expert report authored by Dr. Rubin on January 15, 2015. Dr. 

Rubin addressed the hotfix in his report, relying on Brewer’s testimony and F5’s public 

announcement. Dkt. No. 179-26 at ¶ 125, and n.56–58. Dr. Rubin was able to identify the specific 

functionalities that would be disabled by the hotfix: 

Id. ¶ 129 (citing Brewer 

Dep.); see also ¶ 158 (effect of the hotfix on inbound claims). F5 disclosed the report of its expert, 

Dr. Peter Alexander, on March 2, 2015. He also discussed the hotfix. See Dkt. No. 218-8 at 173–

179 (Section 6.3 The F5 Hotfix Configuration). His testimony was general and based upon 

information from F5’s attorneys who presumably got the information from F5’s engineers. The 

experts appear to agree that the hotfix 

Id. at ¶ 494–95, 

citing Rubin Rep. at ¶ 158.19

 

On May 29, 2015 Mr. Thornewell submitted a declaration in support of F5’s motion for 

summary judgment of non-infringement stating that he “designed much of the code for the 

‘hotfix,’ which F5 implemented to disable certain functionalities relating to the ability of the 

products to distribute traffic across ISP links in a multi-homed environment.” Dkt. No. 188-6 ¶ 3. 

Mr. Thornewell had not discussed the hotfix at his November 12, 2014 deposition. 

 

19 The experts disagree on whether the remaining functionality is infringing, as discussed below. 

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F5’s disclosure of the hotfix was purportedly made as soon as it became available: the day 

before Brewer’s deposition. Although the timing of the disclosure of the hotfix appears suspicious, 

there is no direct evidence that it was done to disadvantage Radware. F5 may not have produced 

the source code because it did not believe it would be necessary to use the source code itself to 

show non-infringement. Therefore, F5 may have assumed that Radware did not need or desire to 

review the hot fix source code. Nevertheless, to avoid any possible prejudice, the court orders that 

Radware be given the same opportunity to investigate the hotfix that it would have had if earlier 

disclosure had been made. The court therefore orders F5 to make the relevant source code 

available for Radware’s review and to make Mr. Thornewell available for up to three hours of 

deposition on the design and implementation of the hotfix. Additionally, the court finds that any 

failure by F5 to supplement its disclosures and discovery responses is rendered harmless by this 

order.

C. The QK View Files 

In support of F5’s motion for summary judgment on damages issues, F5 refers to customer 

configuration data found in F5’s QK View files. The QK View files are diagnostic snapshots of 

how a customer uses and configures F5’s BIG-IP products. Dkt. No. 218-3 at 3. Oscar Brain, an 

F5 witness, conducted three reviews of the QK View files: one in May 2014 and two in February 

2015. Mr. Brain was deposed in October 2014 and testified about the May 2014 review, the 

contents of the QK View files, and how reports are generated from the files. See Dkt. No. 218-4 at 

3; Dkt. No. 225-5 at 2. Radware was not informed of the February 2015 reviews until F5 produced 

Laura Stamm’s expert report on damages. 

In her expert report, Ms. Stamm uses the February 2015 customer configuration reports to 

support her contention that there was no demand for the patentable feature of the accused LTM 

and GTM products. Dkt. No. 184-14 ¶ 64. Radware was aware of the QK View database and the 

information available within the database during the discovery period, and deposed an F5 witness 

about the database. Radware also deposed Ms. Stamm about the QK View files. See Dkt. No. 

218-12. However, Radware has not had the opportunity to examine the data underlying Brain’s 

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February 2015 configuration reports, which were created after the close of discovery. 

Accordingly, fairness dictates that F5 produce the data underlying the February 2015 reports on 

which Mr. Brain relied to create his February reports, and make Mr. Brain available for up to 

three hours of deposition testimony directed only at the basis and preparation of the February 2015 

reports. 

Radware’s motion for sanctions seeking exclusions of the source code for the hotfix and 

the February 2015 QK View reports is DENIED subject to F5’s production within thirty days or as 

otherwise agreed by the parties of: (1) the hotfix source code; (2) a deposition of Thornewell not 

to exceed three hours in length and limited to the design and implementation of the hotfix and 

patch; (3) the underlying data supporting the 2015 QK view reports; and (4) three hours of 

deposition from Mr. Brain concerning the creation of the February 2015 QK View reports.

V. THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INFRINGEMENT 

AND NON-INFRINGEMENT 

Each party moves for summary judgment on infringement of various asserted claims. 

Radware moves for summary judgment of infringement on claims 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 24 of the 

’319 Patent and claims 9, 10, and 12 of the ’374 Patent. Dkt. No. 182. For the reasons set forth

below, Radware’s motion is GRANTED for claim 24 of the ’319 Patent for pre-hotfix products 

but DENIED in all other respects. 

F5 moves for summary judgment of non-infringement on five issues: (1) that F5 does not 

directly infringe any of the asserted method claims;

20 (2) that F5’s Local Traffic Manager, 

standing alone, does not infringe any of the claims; (3) that the post-“hotfix” version of the LTM

does not infringe any of the asserted claims; (4) that the post-“hotfix” version of the Link 

Controller does not practice claims 24–28 of the ’319 Patent; and (5) that the post-“hotfix” version 

of the Global Traffic Manager does not infringe claims 3–23, 29, 30, and 32 of the ’319 Patent and 

claims 5 and 13 of the ’374 Patent. Dkt. No. 190. The court GRANTS F5’s motion regarding: (1) 

 

20 The asserted method claims are ’319 Patent claims 13-23 and 26–28; ’374 Patent claims 1–4 

and 6–7.

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no direct infringement of method claims; and (2) no infringement by LTM standing alone. As to 

the post-hotfix products, at the time the parties submitted their motions, F5 had not produced its 

post-hotfix source code to Radware. The court therefore DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE F5’s 

motion for summary judgment of non-infringement regarding post-hotfix products. Nevertheless, 

because the court will provide F5 with the opportunity to renew its motion once supplemental 

discovery is complete, the court discusses several arguments raised in F5’s motion below.

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment on infringement is a two-step analysis. “First, the claims of the patent 

must be construed to determine their scope. Second, a determination must be made as to whether 

the properly construed claims read on the accused device.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett–Packard 

Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted). “[S]ummary judgment of 

non-infringement can only be granted if, after viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable 

to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue whether the accused device is encompassed by the 

claims.” Id. at 1304. 

B. Direct Infringement of Method Claims 

F5 moves for summary judgment of no direct infringement of the asserted method claims. 

Radware, “to conserve judicial resources and simplify the case for trial, . . . agrees to not assert its 

theories of direct infringement for the method claims.” Dkt. No. 200-4 at 3 (Radware Opp. to F5 

MSJ NonInf.). Accordingly, the court GRANTS F5’s motion of no direct infringement of the 

asserted methods claims: ’319 Patent claims 13–23 and 26–28; and ’374 Patent claims 1–4 and 6–

7. 

C. Finjan and Fantasy Sports 

Several of F5’s arguments on infringement depend on how Finjan, Inc. v. Secure 

Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. 

Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2002), apply to the facts of this case. Having 

reviewed the applicable case law, the court concludes that F5’s accused BIG-IP products may 

infringe the Asserted Patents if the products include programs that carry out, or are configured to 

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carry out, the claims of the Asserted Patents.

21 As explained in more detail below, the BIG-IP 

products may be infringing because applications configured to carry out the claimed functions are 

preloaded onto the BIG-IP devices when sold, even though the applications must be enabled 

before use.

In Fantasy Sports the Federal Circuit found that a fantasy football program infringed 

claims directed to a system that awarded “bonus points.” 287 F.3d at 1117-19. The accused 

program was configurable to award bonus points, even though a user had to select various options 

already present in the software to get the bonus points. The Federal Circuit explained:

Although a user must activate the functions programmed into a 

piece of software by selecting those options, the user is only 

activating means that are already present in the underlying 

software. Otherwise, the user would be required to alter the code to 

enable the computer to carry out those functions. Accordingly, in 

order to infringe the ’603 patent, the code underlying an accused 

fantasy football game must be written in such a way as to enable a 

user of that software to utilize the function of awarding bonus points 

for unusual plays such as out-of-position scoring, without having to 

modify that code. In other words, an infringing software must 

include the “means for scoring . . . bonus points” regardless whether 

that means is activated or utilized in any way.

Id. at 1118 (emphasis in original). 

In Finjan the Federal Circuit evaluated claims of direct infringement by

three accused computer security products: a ‘Webwasher’ software 

download, a ‘Webwasher’ hardware ‘appliance’ or server containing 

software, and a ‘Cyberguard TSP’ hardware appliance that also 

contains software. It is undisputed that all three products contain 

source code for eight software modules. Three of those modules—

Anti-Virus, Anti–Malware, and Content Protection—offer proactive 

scanning functionality, in addition to other features. The eight 

modules are ‘locked’ when the three products are sold, requiring a 

customer to purchase a separate key to activate each individual 

module. Therefore, a customer who purchases an accused product 

can activate all, some, or none of the eight modules at different cost.

626 F.3d at 1201-02 (citations omitted). The Federal Circuit first analyzed the specific claim 

language at issue:

 

21 The court emphasizes that the products “may infringe” because the parties have not moved for 

summary judgment on all claims. Furthermore, as discussed below, the court grants summary 

judgment of non-infringement only as to certain claims. 

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Finjan’s non-method claims describe capabilities without requiring 

that any software components be “active” or “enabled.” The system 

claims recite software components with specific purposes: “a logical 

engine for preventing execution”, “a communications engine for 

obtaining a Downloadable”, or “a linking engine ... for forming a 

sandbox package”. . . This language does not require that the 

program code be “active,” only that it be written “for causing” a 

server or a computer to perform certain steps. 

Id. at 1204 (citations omitted). 

Applying the analysis from Fantasy Sports, the Federal Circuit found that the accused 

products, which contained the “software for performing the claimed functions” when sold, 

infringed the Asserted Patents. Id. at 1205. Specifically,

The code for proactive scanning was ‘already present’ in 

Defendants’ accused products when sold. There is no evidence that 

customers needed to modify the underlying code to unlock any 

software modules. The fact that users needed to ‘activate the 

functions programmed’ by purchasing keys does not detract from or 

somehow nullify the existence of the claimed structure in the 

accused software. 

Id.

Here, the device claims, like those in Fantasy Sports and Finjan, describe the capability 

and configuration of the network controller. For example, claim 9 of the ’374 Patent requires “[a] 

device for load balancing client requests among a plurality of internet service provider (ISP) links 

in a multi-homed network, comprising a network controller configured to resolve an incoming 

domain name server (DNS) query.” 

F5’s arguments attempting to distinguish Finjan and Fantasy Sports are not persuasive. F5 

argues that claims 1 and 24 of the ’319 Patent and claim 9 of the ’374 Patent “all require active,

enabled functionality” to be infringed. Dkt. No. 198-14 (F5 Opp. to Radware MSJ Inf.) at 6. F5 is 

correct that the court must look to the specific claim language to evaluate infringement. Here, the 

claim language is not distinguishable from that in Finjan. First, Finjan did not turn on special 

means-plus-function language. F5 Opp. to Radware MSJ Inf. at 8. Second, the court has already 

held that the claims do not require active method steps; rather, the court held that to infringe, an 

accused product must be delivered configured to perform the claimed functions. See Dkt. No. 145 

at 6–9.

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The court previously held that the device claims were not invalid for improperly mixing 

statutory classes. The court rejected F5’s argument that the functional language in the device 

claims called for an affirmative method step. Dkt. No. 145 at 6-9. The court found that “the claims 

at issue in this case recite a device or system with various components that perform specified 

functions. There is no confusion over when infringement occurs: “when one makes, uses, offers to 

sell, or sells the claimed apparatus: the [network controller.]” Id. at 9 (citing HTC Corp. v. IPCom 

GmbH & Co., KG, 667 F.3d 1270, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The court also rejected F5’s argument 

that “because the products as sold are not configured to perform the claimed functions” F5’s 

products did not infringe. Dkt. No. 145 at 17. 

The cases that F5 cites in opposition, Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 

F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) are distinguishable from the instant case because the accused devices there were not actually 

configured to perform the claimed functions, but were only capable of being configured (i.e., 

programed) to perform the claimed functions. Telemac, 247 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]hat a device is 

capable of being modified to operate in an infringing manner is not sufficient, by itself, to support 

a finding of infringement. In this case, due to a restriction built into the software program stored in 

the telephone’s memory, a user of Topp’s system is prevented from directly placing international 

calls.”) (citation omitted); Typhoon, 659 F.3d at 1380 (“The district court construed the claim as 

requiring that a device, to be covered by the claim, actually performs, or is configured or 

programmed to perform, each of the functions stated in the claim,” in contrast to merely having 

“the capability of being configured or programmed to perform the stated function, although not so 

structured in the device provided by a defendant.”). 

The court’s construction of “configured” captures this distinction. The court previously 

construed the term “configured to” to mean “‘programmed to [perform certain functions.]’ This 

does not require user intervention if the feature claimed is included in the product as supplied.” 

Dkt. No. 122 at 21. The court noted:

In general, the court agrees with Radware that “configured to” does 

not require user activation, but does require “that the claimed feature 

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be included in the software.” Dkt. No. 136 (Radware Br.) at 

13 (citing Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, 

Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, merely being 

“capable of” performing a function is not enough, but if a device 

comes programmed with specific claimed functions it falls within 

the claims. 

Id. at 22. 

 Thus, like in Fantasy Sports, F5’s products infringe if they contain code “written in such a 

way as to enable a user of that software to utilize the [claimed] function . . . without having to 

modify that code.” 287 F.3d at 1118. What cases like Fantasy Sports, Finjan, and Typhoon Tech

recognize is that nearly all computers can be programed to perform claimed software functions. A 

computer with a memory, keyboard, display, and processor is “capable” of being “configured” to 

carry out infinite software functions. However, selling such a computer does not constitute 

infringement if the purchaser is the one who has to program the computer to carry out the claimed 

functions. If the infringer, on the other hand, sells a computer preloaded with infringing software 

code, the computer is “configured,” or “operable,” to perform the claims, and may be infringing 

under Finjan and Fantasy Sports. Cf. Nazomi Comm., Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 739 F. 3d 1339, 1346 

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he structure (i.e., JTEK software) necessary to enable Jazelle hardware to 

process stack-based instructions (i.e., Java bytecodes) is not only inactive, it is not even present on 

the accused products. The installation of JTEK software is not unlocking existing functionality, 

but adding new functionality not currently present. There is no infringement.”)

 Here, F5 does not dispute that the BIG-IP products are sold and delivered to customer with 

 preloaded, although not accessible until licensed. 

See Dkt. No. 200-4 (Radware Opp. to F5 MSJ NonInf.) at 4. Accordingly, if the software 

preloaded onto the BIG-IP products is configured to perform the claimed functions, the BIG-IP 

products may be infringing. The court now turns to the parties’ arguments regarding infringement 

of specific claims. 

D. Outbound Link Load Balancing: ’319 Patent claims 24–28 

Independent claim 24 of the ’319 Patent recites (emphasis added): 

24. A routing device for routing data via a network from a first node 

to a second node, said network having a plurality of available routes 

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from said first node to said second node and the plurality of routes 

are assigned with respective IP addresses, said routing device 

comprising:

a route selector operable to select one of said routes for sending 

data between said first node and said second node on the basis 

of costing information of said respective routes; and

a network address translator operable to receives a packet having 

a source IP address and translating the source IP address to an IP 

address corresponding to the selected route of the plurality of 

routes.

The court construed “costing information” as having its “plain and ordinary meaning, not 

limited to monetary price.” Dkt. No. 122 at 25–26. 

1. Pre-hotfix: ’319 Patent Claim 24

Radware moves for summary judgment of infringement of claim 24 of the ’319 Patent. 

F5’s non-infringement argument is that the Local Traffic Manager (“LTM”) “standing alone” is 

not capable of infringing the “costing information” element. Dkt. No. 190 (F5 MSJ NonInf.) at 8. 

F5 notes that Radware’s expert cites to Link Controller and GTM functionality to support his 

infringement opinion. Id. At the hearing on this motion, F5 emphasized that whether or not LTM 

“alone” infringes the Asserted Patents was relevant to the parties’ damages analysis. F5 

specifically sought a determination from the court that LTM alone does not infringe. The court 

notes that whatever effect LTM versus LTM plus other modules has on the parties’ damages 

opinions is not relevant to the infringement question. In any event, Radware has not shown that 

LTM “alone” infringes the Asserted Patents. All of the outbound claims at issue require load 

balancing based on cost. The documents that Radware points to suggesting the LTM can load 

balance do not support a finding that LTM can load balance based on cost. Dkt. No. 200-3 at 7–8. 

For example, the “BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager Implementations” document only states that, 

after following various set-up steps, “the virtual server is configured to load balance outbound 

connections to the routers.” Id. (citing Dkt. No. 182-21 at RadwareF500791322). This says 

nothing about load balancing based on cost. Accordingly, the court finds that LTM “alone” does 

not infringe claims 24–28 of the ’319 Patent. 

Nonetheless, the BIG-IP accused products, pre-hotfix, may infringe claims 24–28 of the 

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’319 Patent.22 The fact that LTM “alone” does not infringe is not dispositive of whether the BIGIP products infringe under Finjan because F5 admits that the pre-hotfix BIG-IP products were 

loaded with software that is configured to perform the functions claimed in the ’319 Patent. See 

Dkt. No. 188-6 (Thornewell Decl.) at ¶ 8 (“LTM has never been able, by itself, to load balance 

outgoing messages across ISPs based on cost or costing information, or any route-based metrics, 

without being paired with a GTM or Link Controller”). Accordingly, as F5 does not dispute that 

the pre-hotfix applications preloaded onto the BIG-IP product, considered together, infringe the 

outbound claims, the court GRANTS Radware’s motion for summary judgment of infringement as 

to claim 24 of the ’319 Patent by pre-hotfix products.

2. Post-hotfix: ’319 Patent Claims 24–28

As noted above, to allow for development of the factual record, the court DENIES 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE F5’s motion for summary judgment that F5’s post-hotfix products do 

not infringe. However, were the court to consider F5’s motion with respect to claims 24–28 on the 

present record, material disputes of fact would preclude summary judgment.

Based on F5’s representations of how its post-hotfix products operate, Radware relies on 

the “Least Connections, Observed, Predictive and Bandwidth” metrics to show infringement of the 

“costing” limitations of claims 24–28. Dkt No. 200-3 at 8–10. The parties do not dispute that Least 

Connections is a measure of the number of connections at a particular node. Dkt. No. 190 at 11. 

Both Dr. Rubin and Dr. Alexander, the parties’ infringement experts, describe Least Connections 

as a “relatively simple [method] in that the LTM system passes a new connection to the node that 

has the least number of current connections.” Alexander Decl. ¶ 485 (citing Rubin). 

F5 argues that Least Connections does not measure costing information of the “entire 

route,” as required by the claims. Id. The court agrees that Least Connections is not a measure of 

“costing information of said respective routes,” and therefore does not infringe claims 24–28 of 

the ’319 Patent.

 

22 Claims 26–28 of the ’319 Patent are method claims, and, as noted above, the court grants F5’s 

motion for summary judgment of no direct infringement of method claims.

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As the court explained in its prior summary judgment order, a measurement based on “said 

respective routes” must be taken over the entire route. Dkt. No. 145 at 21–22. In addressing A10’s 

motion for summary judgment of non-infringement on A10’s AX Series product, the court found 

that the AX Series, which only measured “the properties of immediately adjacent routers” did not 

meet the claim limitation of “ratings based on proximity measurement taken through each of the 

plurality of routes.” Id. The court reasoned that “[t]he ’702 Patent contemplates taking proximity 

measurements through at least the entire route to the remote server . . . Radware cannot point to 

any part of the ’702 Patent that discloses polling requests that are directed only at an adjacent 

router as is found in the AX Series products.” Id. The court reaches the same conclusion as to the 

costing claims of the ’319 Patent.23

The claim language as a whole further supports this conclusion. Claim 24 of the ’319 

Patent first defines a route as extending “from said first node to said second node” and then 

specifies that the route selector selects an ISP based on “costing information of said respective 

routes.” The court also construed the phrase “a plurality of available routes from said first node to 

said second node” as “a plurality of available routes connecting said first node to said second node 

through the Internet,” again showing that the route extends from the client computer to the remote 

server. Dkt. No. 122 at 19–20. By defining a “route” as extending from the first node to the second 

node, the claim clearly contemplates the entire route. 

Here, the Least Connections metric does not measure a “cost” of the route—it only 

measures load on one portion of the route.

24 Because the Least Connections metric is not 

representative of “costing information of said respective routes,” where the “route” must 

“connect[] said first node to said second node through the Internet,” Least Connections does not 

infringe claims 24–28 of the ’319 Patent. To show infringement, Radware would need to rely on a 

costing metric other than “Least Connections,” “Observed,” or “Predicted.”

 

23 As noted earlier, the ’319 Patent and the ’702 Patent share the same specification. 

24 According to Radware’s expert, the “Observed” and “Predictive” methods also rely on the 

number of connections at a particular node. See Dkt. No. 179-26 ¶ 128. Accordingly, these 

methods also only measure load on a portion of a route.

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In fact, Radware does rely on another metric to prove infringement, the alleged 

“Bandwidth” method of route selection. See Dkt. No. 200-3 at 8 (citing Rubin Rep., Dkt. No. 182-

34 ¶¶ 126, 128–29). F5 acknowledges that some of its documentation describes a bandwidth 

metric but states that no such metric exists in actual Radware products. Dkt. No. 190 at 11 (citing 

Alexander and Thornewell). F5 further notes that Radware’s expert fails to identify any F5 code—

even pre-hotfix—implementing the supposed bandwidth metric. Id. The court finds that there is a 

material dispute of fact as to whether F5’s BIG-IP product performs a “bandwidth” method of 

route selection. The court therefore DENIES F5’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement as to claims 24–28 of the ’319 Patent as to post-hotfix products.

E. Inbound Link Load Balancing

Radware asserts infringement of claims 1–7, 9–19, 21–23, and 29–32 of the ’319 Patent 

and claims 1–4, 6–12, 14, and 15 of the ’374 Patent. Radware moves for summary judgment of 

infringement on claims 1, 2, 7, 10, 11 and 12 of the ’319 Patent and claims 9, 10, and 12 of the 

’374 Patent. F5 moves for summary judgment of non-infringement on the method claims 

(addressed above), on claims 3–12, 29, 30, and 32 of the ’319 Patent, and claims 5 and 13 of the 

’374 Patent. 

The court groups the device claims together as follows:

o Claims 1, 2, and 12 of the ’319 Patent, and claims 9, 10, and 12 of the ’374 Patent, 

which do not claim selecting a route based on a measurement “of said respective 

route”;

o Claims 3–5, 29, 30 and 32 of the ’319 Patent and claims 5 and 13 of the ’374 

Patent, which claim proximity measurements;

o Claims 6–9 and 11 of the ’319 Patent, which relate to selecting a route based on a 

measurement “of said respective route”; and

o Claim 10 of the ’319 Patent, which requires an Internet connection.

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1. Claims 1, 2, and 12 of the ’319 Patent and Claims 9, 10 and 12 of the ’374 

Patent 

Radware’s expert Dr. Rubin opines that the BIG-IP products infringe claims 1, 2, and 12 of 

the ’319 Patent, and claims 9, 10, and 12 of the ’374 Patent. See Dkt. No. 179-26 (Rubin Rep.) at 

¶¶ 150–152, 154–157, 162–164, 188, 189, 192, 193, 209, 210, 220, 221, 224, 225, 228, and 229. 

In response, F5’s expert Dr. Alexander opines that the GTM and Link Controller do not infringe 

independent claim 1 of the ’319 Patent or independent claim 9 of the ’374 Patent. Dkt. No. 198-12 

(Alexander Rep.) at ¶¶ 41–72, 308–341. Dr. Alexander opines that Dr. Rubin is relying on global 

server load balancing (GSLB) functionality, and not link load balancing functionality, to support 

his infringement opinions. Id. 

Radware argues that Dr. Alexander’s report is not sufficient to rebut Dr. Rubin’s report 

because Dr. Alexander did not perform an infringement analysis. However, Dr. Alexander did 

“review Professor Ruben’s [sic] report and provide a rebuttal” to Dr. Rubin’s infringement 

analysis. Dkt. No. 210-7 (Alexander Dep.) at 12:13–14. Radware’s concerns about the level of 

detail in Dr. Alexander’s report do not address Dr. Alexander’s opinion that Dr. Rubin only 

identified GSLB functionality, and not link load balancing, in his infringement opinions. See 

Radware Reply at 10–11 (criticizing Dr. Alexander’s review of the hotfix). The two expert reports 

both appear to present reasonable analyses of the BIG-IP software, and reach different 

conclusions. Summary judgment is therefore improper. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 322–32.

Accordingly, the court finds that there is a material dispute of fact as to whether F5’s BIGIP product is configured to perform inbound link load balancing, as claimed in claims 1, 2, and 12 

of the ’319 Patent, and claims 9, 10, and 12 of the ’374 Patent. The court therefore DENIES the 

motions for summary judgment as to claims 1, 2, and 12 of the ’319 Patent, and claims 9, 10, and 

12 of the ’374 Patent. 

2. Claims 6–9 and 11 of the ’319 Patent

Claims 6–9 and 11 of the ’319 Patent require selecting an ISP “in accordance with one or 

more criteria of the plurality of routes.” ’319 Patent cl. 11. As explained above, the court finds that 

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a criteria “of the route” means a measurement taken over the entire route. Radware cannot rely on 

Least Connections or similar measurements that relate only to a portion of the route to show 

infringement. Accordingly, Radware’s motion for summary judgment of infringement regarding 

claims 7 and 11 is DENIED. F5’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 6–

9 and 11 of the ’319 Patent by post-hotfix products is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the 

reasons described above. 

3. ’319 Patent Claims 3–5, 15–17, 29, 30, and 32 and ’374 Patent Claims 5 

and 13: Proximity 

 F5 argues that the post-hotfix GTM does not measure any “proximities” through the ISP 

routes. Dkt. No. 190 (F5 MSJ NonInf.) at 16–17. Claims 3–5, 15–17, 29, 30, and 32 of the ’319 

Patent require, for example, that the network controller determines the “proximities of remote 

computers to the computer network via the plurality of routes and selects one of the plurality of 

routes based on the proximity determination.” ’319 Patent cl. 3. The court construed “proximity”

to mean “A measurement or measurements based on hops, latency, TTL, or a combination 

thereof.” Dkt. No. 122 at 27. As discussed above, if F5’s factual representations about its posthotfix products are true, the post-hotfix Link Controller, GTM, and LTM can 

as 

well as . Rubin Report ¶ 158. 

However, none of these metrics are “proximity” measures. Radware does not offer any counter to 

this conclusion. See Dkt. No. 200-4 (Radware Opp. to F5 MSJ NonInf.) Nevertheless, as 

discussed above, the court is unwilling to grant summary judgment based on an incomplete factual 

record with respect to post-hotfix products. Accordingly, the court DENIES WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE F5’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement that F5’s post-hotfix 

products do not infringe claims 3–5, 15–17, 29, 30, and 32 of the ’319 Patent and claims 5 and 13 

of the ’374 Patent. 

4. ’319 Patent claim 10

Claim 10 of the ’319 Patent requires that the link load balancing device be connected to the 

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Internet:

1. A device for managing a computer network, said device 

connected to the Internet through a plurality of routes, wherein the 

plurality of routes are assigned with respective IP addresses, 

comprising: . . .

10. The device of claim 1, wherein said device is connected within 

the computer network and is further connected to the Internet 

through the plurality of routes.

In the prior motions for summary judgment, F5 moved for summary judgment of noninfringement, arguing that the claims of the ’319 Patent “require, among other things, that the 

claimed apparatus be connected to the Internet through a plurality of routes.” Dkt. No. 91 at 7 (F5 

3/7/14 MSJ). F5 did not specifically address claim 10 of the ’319 Patent, but focused on the 

preamble of certain claims in the ’702 Patent. Id. In denying F5’s motion, the court found that the 

preamble of Claim 1 of the ’319 Patent “does not contemplate that the Internet and multiple[]

Internet connections are structural components of the device.” Dkt. No. 145 at 16. F5 now 

specifically addresses claim 10, and argues that this claim affirmatively requires that the device is 

connected to the Internet. Dkt. No. 198-14 (F5 Opp. to Radware Inf. MSJ) at 2. The court agrees. 

Claim 10 requires that the device be connected to the Internet in the body of claim, requiring more 

than mere capability and describing more than just the “purpose or intended use” of the device. 

Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also MPEP § 2111.02 (9th ed. Mar. 2014). 

As there is no dispute that F5’s device are sold unconnected to the Internet, the court finds that F5 

does not directly infringe Claim 10 of the ’319 Patent by making or selling its BIG-IP products. 

Accordingly, the court GRANTS F5’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement as to 

Claim 10 of the ’319 Patent. This applies to direct infringement of both pre- and post-hotfix 

versions of BIG-IP.25

 

25 At the hearing, F5 suggested that claim 12 of the ’319 Patent, which recites “the device of claim 

1, wherein the plurality of routes each include a respective Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), is 

not infringed for similar reasons. However, this argument was not made in F5’s briefing. 

Accordingly, the court does not consider it. 

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VI. F5’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DAMAGES ISSUES

F5 moves for summary judgment on three damages issues: (1) Radware is not entitled to 

pre-filing damages; (2) there is no willfulness as a matter of law; and (3) Radware is not entitled to 

recover lost profits on the accused LTM and GTM products. Dkt. No. 187 (F5 Damages MSJ). 

The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment as to pre-filing damages and lost profits, 

and DENIES the motion for summary judgment as to willfulness. 

A. Damages for Activities Prior to Filing of Complaint

F5 argues that Radware is not entitled to damages incurred prior to the filing of the 

complaint because Radware did not provide actual or constructive notice of infringement under 35 

U.S.C. § 287. 

1. Legal Standard

In order to recover damages for infringing activities prior to the filing of the complaint, a 

patentee must comply with 35 U.S.C. § 287(a):

Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within 

the United States any patented article for or under them, or 

importing any patented article into the United States, may give 

notice to the public that the same is patented, either by fixing 

thereon the word “patent” or the abbreviation “pat.”, together with 

the number of the patent, or by fixing thereon the word “patent” or 

the abbreviation “pat.” together with an address of a posting on the 

Internet, accessible to the public without charge for accessing the 

address, that associates the patented article with the number of the 

patent, or when, from the character of the article, this can not be 

done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them 

is contained, a label containing a like notice. In the event of failure 

so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any 

action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was 

notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in 

which event damages may be recovered only for infringement 

occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for infringement shall 

constitute such notice.

“Thus, [§ 287(a)] defines that ‘[a patentee] is entitled to damages from the time when it 

either began marking its product in compliance with section 287(a)[, constructive notice,] or when 

it actually notified [the accused infringer] of its infringement, whichever was earlier.’” Maxwell v. 

J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting American Medical Sys., Inc. v. 

Medical Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (formatting in original). In Texas 

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Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., the Federal Circuit noted that 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) “limits 

the extent to which damages may be recovered where products covered by a U.S. patent are sold 

without the notice defined in the statute.” 308 F.3d 1193, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

2. Analysis 

F5 argues that Radware is not entitled to damages incurred prior to the filing of the 

complaint because Radware did not provide actual or constructive notice of infringement under 

§ 287. The parties do not dispute that Radware did not provide F5 with actual notice of 

infringement until the filing of the complaint. F5 argues that Radware also failed to provide 

constructive notice by selling unmarked products in the U.S. prior to the filing of the complaint. 

Radware contends that by marking some, but not all of its products, Radware provided 

constructive notice. 

Radware’s AppDirector, Alteon, and LinkProof products practice one or more of the 

claims of the Asserted Patents. Specifically, the AppDirector and Alteon products practice the 

asserted claims of the ’319 and ’374 Patents. See Dkt. Nos. 184-8 (Trachtman Dep.) at 26–29; 

185-1 (Peles Dep.) at 79–80. The LinkProof product practices the asserted claims of the ’319 

Patent. See Dkt. No. 179-26 (Rubin Rpt.) ¶ 91. Radware began marking the LinkProof on 

December 5, 2012, but did not begin marking the AppDirector and Alteon until August 6, 2013, 

several months after the filing of the complaint. See Dkt. No. 184-8 (Trachtman Dep.) at 186–188. 

Radware therefore sold unmarked AppDirector and Alteon products in the United States prior to 

filing its complaint. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 215-7 

; 215-8 26

Radware argues that this limited marking was justified 

. See Dkt. Nos. 204-7 (Zisapel 02/20/2014 Dep.) at 243:2–10; 204-9 

 

26 The court GRANTS Radware’s Motion for Relief to File Objection to Reply Evidence. Dkt. No. 

226. However, the court OVERRULES Radware’s objection to F5’s reply evidence because the 

evidence submitted with F5’s reply, Dkt. Nos. 215-7 and 215-8, merely provides further context 

for evaluating the evidence presented in F5’s opening brief. See. e.g., Dkt. No. 187.

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(Trachtman Dep.) at 163:14–165:10. Thus, customers who purchased the unmarked products 

would have been directed to purchase a marked product, thereby placing the public on notice of 

the ’319 Patent as of December 5, 2012. Dkt. No. 204-4 (Radware Damages Opp.) at 4. Radware 

argues that this “virtual marking of the LinkProof” constitutes sufficient constructive notice. See

Radware Damages Opp. at 5. However, virtual marking of a product is not “substantially 

consistent and continuous” to constitute constructive notice. See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446–47 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (remanding case to the district court for a factual 

determination regarding whether the patentee complied with the marking statute and when 

compliance was achieved). A patentee must comply with § 287(a) to “obtain the benefit of 

constructive notice.” Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that 

patentee complied with marking statute by diligently attempting to ensure proper marking by 

licensee).

Here, it was Radware’s responsibility to supply constructive notice of infringement via

“substantially consistent and continuous” the marking of the products that practice the Asserted 

Patents. Nike, 138 F.3d at 1446–47. Merely encouraging a customer to buy a marked LinkProof 

product in combination with the unmarked AppDirector and Alteon products is not sufficient to 

constitute constructive notice under § 287(a). Accordingly, the court finds that Radware did not 

supply actual or constructive notice of infringement to F5, as required under § 287(a), and 

therefore Radware is not entitled to pre-suit damages. The court therefore GRANTS F5’s motion 

for summary judgment as to pre-suit damages. 

B. Increased Damages for Willfulness

F5 moves for summary judgment that Radware is not entitled to enhanced damages for 

willfulness as a matter of law. As discussed above, Radware is not entitled to pre-suit damages. 

However, F5’s conduct prior to the filing of the complaint is still relevant to evaluating F5’s postcomplaint conduct. As described below, Radware presents a material dispute of fact as to whether 

F5 was aware of the ’319 Patent and engaged in conduct relevant to willfulness prior to the filing 

of the complaint. Therefore, the rule laid out in In re Seagate Tech, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 

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(Fed. Cir. 2007), which prohibits enhanced damages “based solely on post-filing conduct” absent 

filing a preliminary injunction, does not necessarily bar willfulness in this case. Accordingly, the 

court DENIES the motion for summary judgment as to willfulness. 

1. Legal Standard

The Patent Act requires a court to impose damages “adequate to compensate for the 

infringement.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. The Act also allows enhanced damages for willful infringement. 

Id.; King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947 (Fed. Cir. 1995). To establish willfulness, 

“a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the infringer acted despite an 

objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent,” and (2) the 

objectively-defined risk “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the 

accused infringer.” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374. 

However, “[k]nowledge of a patent does not mean willfulness.” Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. 

Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 585 F. Supp. 2d 636, 644 (D. Del. 2008); see also Norian Corp v. 

Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed Cir. 2004) (“Willful infringement is not established by 

the simple fact of infringement, even though [the accused infringer] stipulated that it had 

knowledge of the [patentee’s] patents.”). The Federal Circuit has stated:

[A] willfulness claim asserted in the original complaint must 

necessarily be grounded exclusively in the accused infringer’s prefiling conduct. By contrast, when an accused infringer’s post-filing 

conduct is reckless, a patentee can move for a preliminary 

injunction, which generally provides an adequate remedy for 

combating post-filing willful infringement. A patentee who does not 

attempt to stop an accused infringer’s activities in this manner 

should not be allowed to accrue enhanced damages based solely on 

the infringer’s post-filing conduct.

In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374. 

Furthermore, “[t]he ‘objective’ prong of Seagate tends not to be met where an accused 

infringer relies on a reasonable defense to a charge of infringement.” Spine Solutions, Inc. v. 

Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Innovention 

Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., Case No. 14-1731, 2015 WL 1917997, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 

2015) (“[W]illfulness is not established where the defendant has a substantial . . . defense.”). 

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Objectively reasonable defenses may include questions of infringement and validity. Bard 

Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

2. Analysis 

F5 argues that Radware is not entitled to seek increased damages for willful infringement 

of the ’319 Patent because: (1) F5 was unaware of the ’319 Patent prior to the filing of the 

complaint; (2) Radware did not seek a preliminary injunction; and (3) F5 has objectively 

reasonable defenses as a matter of law. 

First, F5 argues that Radware is not entitled to enhanced damages for willfulness because 

F5 was not aware of the ’319 Patent prior to the filing of the complaint. Radware argues that F5 

had notice of the ’319 Patent because: (1) F5 had notice of the related ’702 Patent; (2) F5 cited the 

’319 Patent Application in its own patent applications; and (3) the USPTO issued a Notice of 

Allowance to F5 that cited the ’319 Patent. Radware Damages Opp. at 8–10. Specifically, 

Radware points to evidence suggesting that F5 had notice of the related ’702 Patent as of January 

2004, and cited it in connection with F5’s own patent applications. See Dkt. Nos. 204-24 (F5 

internal email containing Radware announcement); 204-19 (F5 Answers to Radware 

Interrogatories) at 21–22. The ’319 Patent was also cited in a Notice of Allowance sent from the 

USPTO to F5’s representative concerning an F5 patent, where it was listed under the category 

“Notice of References Cited.” Id. Finally, F5 also cited the ’319 Patent Application in the course 

of prosecuting its own patents. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 204-10 (Skene Depo Ex.); 204-15 (F5 email 

attaching F5’s U.S. Patent Application 12/259,142).

F5 argues that its notice of the related ’702 Patent and ’319 Patent Application does not 

constitute notice of the ’319 Patent and that even if F5 did indeed receive the Notice of Allowance 

citing the ’319 Patent from its outside counsel, “[t]here is no reason to think that F5 (or even its 

outside counsel) would have reviewed the patent.” Dkt. No. 215-3, F5 Damages Reply at 3, 5. 

Radware’s evidence creates a material dispute of fact as to whether F5 knew about the 

’319 Patent prior to the filing of the complaint. Both parties cite SoftView LLC v. Apple, Inc. in 

support of their respective arguments. Case No. 10-389, 2012 WL 3061027, at *5–7 (D. Del. July 

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26, 2012). In that case, the court granted defendant Kyocera’s motion to dismiss willfulness 

allegations, finding that SoftView’s allegations of pre-suit knowledge due to media publicity did 

not support a reasonable inference that Kyocera was aware of the patent. Id. at *6. However, the 

court did not deny the willfulness allegations against AT&T, finding that there was a “plausible 

basis from which one might reasonably infer that AT&T had knowledge of the patent-in-suit prior 

to his litigation.” Id. The court considered three separate bases for allegations of AT&T’s pre-suit 

knowledge, including AT&T citing a published parent application of the patent in suit while 

prosecuting one if its own patents. Id. at *5. Similarly, here, F5 cited the ’702 Patent and the ’319 

Patent Application while prosecuting its own patents. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 204-15 (F5 email 

attaching F5’s U.S. Patent Application 12/259,142); 204-19 (F5 Answers to Radware 

Interrogatories) at 21–22. 

Second, F5 argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on willfulness because Radware 

did not seek a preliminary injunction. F5 Damages MSJ at 2–3. Radware disagrees. Radware 

Damages Opp. at 11–12. Both parties rely on provided language by the Federal Circuit in In re 

Seagate to support their positions. The pertinent language in In re Seagate states that a patentee 

who does not seek a preliminary injunction “should not be allowed to accrue enhanced damages 

based solely on the infringer’s post-filing conduct.” 497 F.3d at 1374 (emphasis added); see also 

SoftView, 2012 WL 3061027 at *8 (denying motion to dismiss plaintiff’s willfulness claim, where 

plaintiff did not move for a preliminary injunction because plaintiff adequately alleged pre-suit 

and post-suit conduct). Here, as discussed above, Radware’s evidence creates a material dispute of 

fact as to whether F5 had pre-suit knowledge of the ’319 Patent. 

Moreover, the Federal Circuit has said that a willfulness analysis should consider the 

“totality of the surrounding circumstances.” Graco, 60 F.3d at 792. Radware raises some evidence 

of F5’s pre-filing conduct that could support willfulness. Hence, Radware’s willful infringement 

claims are not based solely on F5’s post-filing conduct, but are also based on allegations of F5’s 

pre-filing conduct concerning the ’319 Patent. 

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Specifically, Radware alleges that F5’s pre-filing conduct shows an awareness of the’319 

Patent coupled with a desire to enter the field of link load balancing. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 179-7 (F5 

11/20/2000 email chain) at 029107-08; 179-9 (F5 10/2001 document) at 039434, 039442; 204-15 

(F5 email attaching F5’s U.S. Patent Application 12/259,142); 204-19 (F5 Answers to Radware 

Interrogatories) at 21–22. A jury could find evidence of F5’s pre-filing behavior relevant to 

whether post-filing damages should be enhanced. Therefore, because Radware alleges pre-filing 

conduct in addition to post-filing conduct, Seagate is not controlling and Radware did not need to 

file a preliminary injunction in order to seek enhanced damages for willfulness. 

Third, F5 argues that is entitled to summary judgment on willfulness because it has 

objectionably reasonable defenses. F5 Damages MSJ at 4–5. As discussed earlier, F5 may defend 

a willfulness claim by showing objectively reasonable defenses on infringement or invalidity. 

However, 

[a]s the party moving for summary judgment [F5] must do more 

than persuade [the court] that its defenses were reasonable. Instead, 

[F5] must establish that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and that [the accused infringer] is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law—in other words, that no reasonable fact-finder 

could find willful infringement.

HTC Corp. v. Tech. Props. Ltd., Case No. 08-0882, 2013 WL 5225043, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 

2013) (internal citations omitted) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). As explained in this order, the 

court has granted summary judgment of infringement of certain claims of the ’319 Patent based on 

pre-hotfix product. The court also denied in its entirety F5’s Motion for Summary Judgment of 

Invalidity. F5 has not shown that no reasonable fact finder could find willful infringement. 

Because F5 has not met the high burden required to establish that no reasonable jury could find 

willful infringement, the Court DENIES F5’s motion for summary judgment on willfulness. 

C. Damages for Lost Profits 

Radware seeks damages in the form of lost profits of 12% of F5’s GTM and LTM sales. 

Specifically, Radware’s expert Mr. Malackowski opined that:

Radware and its asserted technology meet the Panduit test; 

therefore, 100 percent of the sales are appropriately considered for 

lost profits. 

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I have reduced that analysis by 88 percent to use what I believe to be 

the best available evidence as a conservative measure of what 

apportionment would apply in a lost profits analysis.

Dkt. No. 204-31 (Malackowski Dep.) at 57:11–19; see also Dkt. 185-3 (Malackowski Rep.) at 72 

(“it is reasonable to conclude that at least 12% of F5 customers which purchased BIG-IP [LTM or 

GTM] devices would have, alternatively, turned to Radware in order to obtain this important 

functionality but for F5’s infringement.”). F5 moves to exclude Radware’s lost profits theory on 

the basis that Radware’s evidence showing that Radware would be entitled to 12% of its lost 

profits is unreliable. The court agrees that Radware’s 12% figure is not supported and GRANTS 

the motion for summary judgment of no lost profits on LTM and GTM sales.

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1. Legal Standard

To recover lost profits, a patentee “must prove a causal relation between the infringement 

and its loss of profits” by demonstrating a reasonable probability that that “‘but for’ the 

infringement, it would have made the infringer’s sales.” Bic Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing 

Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A lost profits award cannot be speculative. Id. The 

Panduit factors are commonly, though not exclusively, used to show “but for” causation in a lost 

profits analysis by demonstrating: (1) demand for the patented product; (2) the absence of 

acceptable non-infringing substitutes; (3) manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the 

demand; and (4) the amount of profit the patent owner would have made. See Standard Havens 

Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus. Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Panduit Corp. v. 

Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 

2. Demand for the Patented Product Versus Demand for the Patented 

Feature

Radware and F5 dispute whether the first Panduit factor requires showing demand for the 

patented product or demand for the patented feature. The Federal Circuit resolved this dispute in 

DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The 

Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he first Panduit factor simply asks whether demand existed for 

 

27 This order does not address lost profits related to Link Controller sales. 

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the ‘patented product,’ i.e., a product that is ‘covered by the patent in suit’ or that ‘directly 

competes with the infringing device.’” 567 F.3d at 1330 (citing Rite–Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 

F.3d 1538, 1548–49 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the 

first Panduit factor requires showing demand for the patented feature because that “argument 

unnecessarily conflates the first and second Panduit factors. . . [the first] factor does not require 

any allocation of consumer demand among the various limitations recited in a patent claim.” Id. 

Instead, whether demand exists for the patented feature is analyzed either under the second 

Panduit factor—the existence of non-infringing alternatives—or when the patentee seeks to 

invoke the entire market value rule in the context of lost profits. Id. at 1330-31. The Federal 

Circuit explained this in depth, distinguishing the primary cases on which F5 relies:

Ferguson dealt with lost profits under the “entire market value” rule, 

which permits a patentee to recover the entire value of an apparatus 

that contains both patented and unpatented components, so long as 

the patented component is the basis for customer demand. Ferguson 

Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys., 

LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (vacating and remanding 

lost profits award for entire value of a device containing a first 

component embodying a first patent, found infringed, as well as a 

second component embodying a second patent, found not infringed, 

where profits could fairly be allocated to customer demand for 

second component); see Rite–Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549 (“[T]he entire 

market value rule permits recovery of damages based on the value of 

a patentee’s entire apparatus containing several features when the 

patent-related feature is the ‘basis for customer demand.’ ”) (quoting 

State Indus., Inc. v. MorFlo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed.

Cir. 1989)). 

DePuy, 567 F.3d at 1331. 

Here, Radware argues that it is not relying on the entire market value rule in support of its 

lost profits analysis. That argument is accurate to the extent that Radware is not seeking 100% of 

its lost profits on 100% of F5 sales. However, Radware’s expert testified that “Radware and its 

asserted technology meet the Panduit test; therefore, 100 percent of the sales are appropriately 

considered for lost profits,” suggesting the entire market value rule might apply. Dkt. No. 204-31 

(Malackowski Dep.) at 57:11–19. To the extent that Radware relies on the entire market value rule 

to recover lost profits, Radware must show what portion of sales were driven by demand for the 

patented feature, consistent with application of the entire market value rule in general. See DePuy, 

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567 F.3d at 1331; see also Good Tech. Corp., 2015 WL 3882608 at *4 (“The EMVR requires that 

where damages are based on sales of a multi-component product that includes both infringing and 

non-accused components, in the absence of an apportionment, a patentee must prove that the 

patented features are the primary driver of demand for the entire product.”). Radware has not met 

the burden of showing what portion of sales were driven by demand for the patented feature.

Radware’s expert explained in his report that 12% of customers identified the patented 

functionality as important. Malackowski Rep. at 72. A survey showing that 12% of people found a 

feature important is not, standing alone, proof that the feature drove those individuals’ purchases.

If Radware is simply using the Panduit factors to show the number of sales Radware 

would have made but for F5’s infringement, Radware may either show the absence of noninfringing alternatives under the second Panduit factor, or show what portion of customers would 

have rejected available non-infringing alternatives and purchased Radware’s products. See 

Northern District of California Model Patent Jury Instruction 5.3 (“Lost Profits—Factors to 

Consider”) (Second factor: “that there were no acceptable non-infringing substitutes for the 

[product] [method] for which [patent holder] seeks lost profits, or, if there were, the number of 

sales made by [alleged infringer] that [patent holder] would have made despite the availability 

of any acceptable non-infringing substitutes.”) (emphasis added). Radware is attempting to do 

the latter: to show the number of sales made by F5 that Radware would have made despite the 

availability of acceptable non-infringing substitutes.

The court next examines whether Radware’s evidence purporting to show that Radware 

would have recovered 12% of the sales of GTM and LTM is sufficiently reliable to justify an 

award. 

3. Radware’s Evidence Does Not Support a 12% Lost Profit Award

As just explained, Radware must provide reliable evidence that but for F5’s sales of the 

BIG-IP products, Radware would have made sales of its own device. Radware’s expert opines that 

Radware would have recovered 12% of F5’s sales, once F5 stopped infringing Radware’s patents. 

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Dkt. 185-3 (Malackowski Expert Rpt.) at 71–73. The court finds Radware’s evidence supporting a 

12% lost profit award legally insufficient. 

Radware attempts to justify its lost profits calculation based on a 2011 survey conducted 

by TechValidate.28 The survey targeted F5 customers that used an Oracle solution and had 261 

respondents. Id. at 71. The survey listed seventeen features of F5’s BIG-IP product, including link 

load balancing, compression, and advanced routing, and asked customers to select any and all 

features that they considered important to performance. Id. at 71–72. 12% of respondents selected 

link load balancing as an “important” feature. Based on these results, Malackowski concludes that 

12% of F5 customers who purchased BIG-IP GTM devices would have alternatively purchased 

Radware products but for F5’s infringement. Id. at 72. However, the survey demonstrates that 

multiple features, including features unrelated to the Asserted Patents, drive the demand for the 

accused products. See id. For example, 72% of participants selected “local load balancing 

methods” and 48% of participants selected “SSL offload” as functionalities important to 

performance. Id. Simply put, the survey does not support the conclusion that had F5 exited the 

market, 12% of F5 customers would have turned to Radware. Here, the TechValidate survey does 

not in any way suggest the patented feature was the primary reason that customers purchased the 

infringing product. In other words, the survey is not evidence that but for the infringing sales, 

some consumers would have instead purchased Radware’s products for the reason that they 

offered the infringing feature.

Moreover, Malackowski’s analysis does not attempt to account for the different features 

between the Radware products and F5 accused products. The TechValidate survey listed some 

functionalities that are proprietary to F5, such as iRules and iControl. See Malackowski Rep. at 

72; 184-4 (Brewer Decl.) ¶ 18. But Malackowski’s report offers no evidence addressing the 

significance of these proprietary functions to F5 customers. Interestingly, the survey shows that 

 

28 Although Mr. Malackowski testified that he relied on “the totality of the information in [his] 

report,” the only evidence cited in support of the 12% figure is the TechValidate survey. Compare 

Malackowski Dep. at 52:19–20 to Malackowski Rep. at § 10.4.1.2. 

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39% of participants considered the iRules function important to performance. See Malackowski 

Rep. at 72. F5 points out that under Malackowski’s reasoning, 39% of survey participants would 

not have bought a Radware product because it did not contain the iRules function, suggesting that 

the Radware and F5 products are not interchangeable. F5 Damages MSJ at 17. 

Because Malackowski cannot rely on the TechValidate survey to show that Radware 

would have made 12% of F5’s LTM and GTM sales “but for” F5’s infringement, the court 

GRANTS F5’s motion for summary judgment as to Radware’s entitlement to seek lost profits.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the court orders as follows:

 Radware’s Motion to Strike is:

o GRANTED as to F5’s Section 101 invalidity defense and F5’s Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings;

o DENIED as to those portions of F5’s Motion for Summary Judgment that rely upon 

GSLB;

o GRANTED as to those portions of F5’s Motion for Summary Judgment that rely 

upon BGP; and

o DENIED as to the declaration of Dr. Peter Alexander.

 F5’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

 F5’s Motion to Amend its Invalidity Contentions is DENIED.

 Radware’s Motion for Sanctions under Rule 37 is DENIED subject to the conditions 

specified.

 Radware’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding F5’s invalidity affirmative defense is:

o DENIED as to the allegedly abandoned prior art references;

o GRANTED as to the testbed systems as prior art;

o DENIED as to the Maki-Kullas patent; and

o DENIED as to the Cisco DD white paper references.

 F5’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity is:

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o DENIED that GSLB anticipates the Asserted Patents;

o DENIED that BGP anticipates the Asserted Patents; and

o DENIED that the Asserted Patents are obvious.

 On the infringement motions:

o Per the parties’ agreement, F5’s Motion for Summary Judgment of no direct 

infringement of the asserted method claims29 is GRANTED (pre- and post-hotfix).

o Radware’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement is GRANTED as to 

claim 24 of the ’319 Patent (pre-hotfix).

o F5’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement is GRANTED as to ’319 

Patent claim 10 (pre- and post-hotfix direct infringement).

o Both parties’ motions are DENIED as to the remaining claims/products.

 F5’s Motion for Summary Judgment on damages is GRANTED as to pre-complaint

damages and lost profits on the LTM and GTM sales and DENIED as to willfulness on 

pre-hotfix products. 

 F5 has 30 days from the date of this order to make its updated, post-hotfix source code 

available for inspection to Radware and provide Mr. Thornewell or a mutually agreed 

witness to testify about it. At that point, F5 may renew its Motion for Summary Judgment 

of Non-Infringement as to post-hotfix products.

 The court has filed an unredacted copy of this order under seal. If a party believes that the 

redacted portion discloses confidential information, it must file a version of the order with 

proposed redactions and provide a declaration setting forth the bases for asserting 

confidentiality. The declaration and proposed redactions may be filed under seal. The court 

will evaluate any such confidentiality contention and make a decision whether to approve 

the proposed redaction or to remove it, thus rendering the underlying content public. Any 

proposed redactions and declarations in support must be filed by October 26, 2015. Any 

 

29 ’319 Patent claims 13–23 and 26–28; ’374 Patent claims 1–4 and 6–7.

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responses to the proposed redactions must be filed by November 3, 2015. Thereafter, a 

copy of this order with the approved redactions will be made public.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 15, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

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