Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00874/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00874-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER GRANT,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 15-cv-874 WQH (BLM)

ORDER

v.

HON. JEFFREY BOSTWICK,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are: (1) the Motion to Dismiss Complaint with

Prejudice (ECF No. 9) filed by Defendant Honorable Jeffrey Bostwick and (2) the

Motion to Issue a Preliminary Injunction to Stay State Probate Court Proceedings (ECF

No. 15) filed by Plaintiff Jennifer Grant.

I. Background

On April 21, 2015, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing the Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No.

1). On July 15, 2015, Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice. 

(ECF No. 9). On August 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. (ECF No.

10). On August 17, 2015, Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 13). On September 15,

2015, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Issue a Preliminary Injunction to Stay State Probate

Proceedings pending the resolution of this case. (ECF No. 15).

II. Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff Jennifer Grant is the trustee of the “B (administrative) subsection of the

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Schwichtenberg Revocable Trust (“trust”), dated July 28, 1982, an ABC trust that is

currently the subject of proceedings in San Diego Superior Court’s Central Probate

Division.” (ECF No. 1 at 2). Defendant Jeffrey Bostwick is the judge presiding over

the administration of the Trust in San Diego Superior Court’s Central Probate Division. 

Id.

In “July 2010, Plaintiff was left a condo as a life estate by her mother.” Id. In

August 2010, Plaintiff’s mother died. Id. at 4. The “[c]ondo is in subsection A” of the

trust and “is currently insolvent.” Id. at 3. “Trust subsection B has been subject to

brokerage fraud and monies paid out of it against court order.” Id. at 3. Defendant has

been presiding over administration of the trust in probate court since September 2012. 

Id. “Defendant has presided over a total of seven petitions” and multiple oral hearings. 

Id.

Prior to becoming a judge, “Defendant rented from and shared office space with”

attorney Constance Larsen, who is representing the former trustee of subtrust A, Rusty

Grant (no relation to Plaintiff). Rusty Grant also “shared office space” with Larsen in

the past and Plaintiff is uncertain whether Defendant and Rusty Grant ever shared office

space. Id. at 4. “Defendant did disclose his previous relationship with Larsen but

refused to recuse himself stating that he could ‘be fair.’” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that she relied upon Defendant’s representation that he could be

fair, and “therefore fail[ed] to make a timely peremptory challenge.” Id. Plaintiff

alleges that the preexisting relationships between Defendant, Rusty Grant, and Larsen

create conflicts of interest in her probate case. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant

conducted a “partial and unjust tribunal . . . .” Id. at 14. “Defendant conducts partial

Case Management conferences where he includes attorneys of former trustees . . . [and]

allows them to give input on Petitions to which they were never legal parties.” Id. at

15. “Defendant ignores Plaintiff at conferences, giving preference to the desires of

[former trustees’ attorneys].”

Plaintiff alleges Defendant “deprived Plaintiff of a hearing on her allegations of

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[Rusty Grant’s] breaches of fiduciary duty . . . .” Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant’s failure to “sua sponte dismiss illegally plead petitions” deprived Plaintiff

of access to the condo for the last four years and created “circumstances leading to

imminent forced sale and ongoing deterioration” of the condo because Subtrust A

became insolvent. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “unlawfully suspended

Plaintiff, without notice or opportunity to put on a defense, from her trust bestowed

trusteeship of sections B and C” for hostility between Plaintiff and her brother and

opposing counsel. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant abused his power by

appointing a private fiduciary as a temporary trustee. . .” because this appointment

“violated trust terms . . . .” Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hen Plaintiff attempted

to . . . exercise her trust given right of removal through an ex parte [motion], Defendant

denied it.” Id. at 13. 

Plaintiff requests declaratory relief that Defendant violated her Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Plaintiff requests the Court to declare that Defendant refused to

timely hear Plaintiff’s petitions and motions and conducted a biased tribunal. Plaintiff

requests the Court to declare that the acts of the Defendant are just cause for

disqualification. Id. at 16-17. Plaintiff seeks a declaration “that supervisory control

outside San Diego Superior Courts, or removal to another county, is necessary to

protect Plaintiff’s and the trust beneficiaries’ Fourteenth Amendment right to an

impartial tribunal.” Id. at 17. Plaintiff seeks an award of costs. Id.

III. Contentions of the Parties

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that (1) this

Court lacks jurisdiction under the probate exception, (2) Judge Bostwick enjoys

absolute judicial immunity against Plaintiff’s claim, (3) the Younger abstention doctrine

bars this action, (4) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s action against Judge

Bostwick, and (5) Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief against Judge Bostwick is barred

by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 9-1)

Plaintiff contends that (1) the probate exception does not apply to this case; (2)

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“[j]udicial immunity does NOT extend to 42 USC Section 1983 cases against state

judges” because “Plaintiff is not seeking monetary damages,” (3) this case does not

involve the “circumstances to which the Younger Abstention Doctrine applies,” (4) the

Eleventh Amendment does not apply because “Plaintiff sued Defendant solely under

his individual capacity” and for “equitable relief only,” and (5) Plaintiff “can obtain

declaratory and injunctive relief . . . under the condition that a declaratory decree was

violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 15-25)

IV. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a) provides: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain .

. . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable

legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all

“well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

However, a court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “In sum, for a complaint to

survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the

plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quotations omitted).

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move

for dismissal on grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the court has subject

matter jurisdiction over an action. Assoc. of Medical Colleges v. United States, 217

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F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000). In resolving an attack on a court’s jurisdiction, “the

district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air For Everyone v. Doyle, 373

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be

raised at any time, even on appeal, by motion or sua sponte by the court. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(h)(3); Snell v. Cleveland, 316 F.3d 822, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2002). 

V. Discussion

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed with prejudice

because he enjoys absolute judicial immunity as a judicial officer. (ECF No. 9-1 at 6-

7). Plaintiff contends that judicial immunity does not extend to Section 1983 cases

against state judges seeking only injunctive relief. (ECF No. 10-1 at 17-18). 

Generally, “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable in

civil actions for their judicial acts. . . .” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56

(1978). “Judicial immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a

judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e. actions not taken in the

judge’s judicial capacity. . . . Second, a judge is not immune from actions, though

judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “[A]bsolute judicial immunity does not apply to non-judicial

acts, i.e. the administrative, legislative, and executive functions that judges . . . may on

occasion be assigned to perform.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133

(9th Cir. 2001). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has identified four factors

relevant to resolving whether a particular act is judicial in nature:

(1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then

pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and

immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her official

capacity.

Id. (quoting Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999)). The

inquiry focuses on whether the “nature and function of the act” is normally performed

by a judge, “not the act itself.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13. “[I]f only the particular act in

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question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake of a judge in excess of his authority

would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act, because an improper or erroneous act cannot be said

to be normally performed by a judge.” Id. at 12.

In this case, Plaintiff challenges the decisions of the Defendant to proceed as the

judge in the pending probate case, to suspend Plaintiff as a trustee, and to appoint a

Public Administrator and a private fiduciary as temporary trustee. Plaintiff also

challenges Defendant’s decision to timely hear Plaintiff’s petitions and motions and

Defendant’s failure to rule in her favor. Each of Defendant’s decisions occurred within

the scope of the ongoing state probate proceedings. Defendant’s actions are normal

judicial functions undertaken in state probate court proceedings and arose from

interactions between the Plaintiff and Defendant in state probate court. Plaintiff

challenges actions by the Defendant which are judicial in nature and taken in an

ongoing state proceeding within the court’s jurisdiction.

In Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) the Supreme Court held that while

judicial immunity bars actions against judges seeking monetary damages, “judicial

immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in

her judicial capacity.” Id. at 541-42. After Pulliam, however, Congress narrowed the

judicial immunity exception. Section § 1983 provides that “in any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (as amended by Pub. L. 104–307,

Title III, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3853 (Oct. 19, 1996)). 

Plaintiff challenges actions taken by Defendant Judge Bostwick in his judicial

capacity in ongoing state probate proceedings seeking prospective injunctive relief

under § 1983. The Complaint fails to allege facts to support the conclusion that the

exception to judicial immunity from suit in a § 1983 action for injunctive relief–namely,

violation of a declaratory decree or the unavailability of declaratory relief–would apply

in this case. The facts alleged in the Complaint do not state a plausible claim for relief

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under § 1983.

The Younger abstention doctrine and the probate exception to federal jurisdiction

provide alternate grounds for dismissing Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff’s claim is closely

related to the issues pending in the underlying probate court proceeding. The relief

requested would require the Court to determine issues that fall within the purview of the

state probate court. The Court declines to interfere with ongoing judicial proceedings

in state probate court. See New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (holding that under Younger abstention, federal

courts should not enjoin pending civil proceedings involving “orders that are uniquely

in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions”); Marshall

v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (prohibiting federal courts from adjudicating rights

that would interfere with the state probate court’s administration of a decedent’s estate). 

VI. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant

Honorable Jeffrey Bostwick (ECF No. 9) is granted without prejudice. If no motion for

leave to file a first amended complaint is filed within thirty (30) days of this order, the

case will be closed. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Issue a Preliminary Injunction

to Stay State Probate Court Proceedings filed by Plaintiff Jennifer Grant (ECF No. 15)

is denied as moot. 

DATED: October 22, 2015

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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