Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01571/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01571-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH BECKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

P. COWAN, Chief Deputy Warden;

ALVAREZ, Correctional

Counselor,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 07cv1571-RBB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

DISMISS [DOC. NO. 15]

Plaintiff Joseph Becker, a state inmate proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint [doc. no. 1] on August 8,

2007, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff later submitted an

additional exhibit to his Complaint, which was filed nunc pro tunc

to September 11, 2007 [doc. nos. 7, 8]. Becker’s Complaint alleges

that on August 1, 2007, Defendant P. Cowan approved a

recommendation to transfer Plaintiff from Richard J. Donovan state

prison to another prison facility. (Compl. 3.) Becker further

asserts that he has many inmate enemies which place him at risk of

being harmed. (Id.) Knowing of this risk, however, Defendants

failed to document the names of Plaintiff’s known enemies in his

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1 Although this case was originally assigned to Judge Whelan, the parties

consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (See Compl. 7; Order of Reference [doc. no.

16] 1.) Accordingly, on November 13, 2007, the case was reassigned to this

Court for all further proceedings. (Order of Reference 1.)

2 07cv1571 RBB

central file, and also failed to integrate names of enemies from

his former central file into his current file. (Id. at 3-3b.) 

Becker asserts that Defendants have violated their duties by

failing to identify and locate each of Plaintiff’s enemies before

approving his transfer to another prison. (Id.) His Complaint

seeks an injunction preventing his transfer until all of his inmate

enemies are listed in his central file, including enemies listed in

his central file from a prior period of incarceration. (Id. at 7.) 

He also requests punitive damages and costs of suit.1 (Id.)

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint

[doc. no. 15], which was filed on November 5, 2007. The Motion was

accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the

Declaration of Custodian of Records R. Cobb, and a Request for

Judicial Notice with Exhibits A through C. Defendants move to

dismiss the Complaint on three grounds: (1) Defendants are immune

from liability for damages for actions taken in their official

capacities; (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment because his claim should be analyzed under the

Eighth Amendment; and (3) Becker fails to plead facts that would

entitle him to relief under the Eighth Amendment. (Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss 1.) Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Complaint [doc. no. 19] was filed nunc pro tunc to November

26, 2007.

For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) in San Diego, California. (See

Compl. 3.) Becker arrived at Donovan on October 12, 2006. (Defs.’

Req. for Judicial Notice Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. C at 1.) During

his reception processing, he was concerned for his safety in the

general population. (Compl. 3a.) Accordingly, Becker was placed

in the Administrative Segregation Unit. (Id.) His placement in

administrative segregation was reviewed several times after the

initial placement, and each classification decision was to keep

Plaintiff in administrative segregation due to concerns that he

would be harmed in the general population because he had enemies in

the facility. (Id.) 

Becker alleges that Defendant Alvarez completed Plaintiff’s

processing when he was received at Donovan. (Id.) He contends

that Alvarez failed to list his inmate enemies in his central file,

although she had a legal duty to do so. (Id.) He further alleges

that Defendant Alvarez recommended that Becker be transferred from

Donovan to Sierra Conservation Center, but she made the

recommendation without first determining whether his enemies are

currently housed there. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff contends Alvarez

“is fully aware” that he has a separate central file from a

previous period of incarceration within the California Department

of Corrections (“CDC”) which lists several inmate enemies, yet the

Defendant failed to integrate those inmates’ names into Becker’s

current central file. (Id. at 3a-3b.) His former central file

contains the names of confidential enemies from 1998 when he was

sexually assaulted at Salinas Valley State Prison, whose names are

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unknown to Plaintiff. (Id. at 3b.) “[T]hose inmate aggressors

could be most anywhere in the system including the intended arrival

destination where Defendant Alvarez processed and approved

Plaintiff’s transfer to.” (Id.)

Plaintiff submitted an Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form (commonly

known as a “602 form”) on January 10, 2007, requesting that the

information about inmate enemies from his former central file be

integrated into his current file. (Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice

Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A at 1.) Informal review of the appeal

was bypassed, and it was forwarded directly for a response at the

first formal level. (Id. at 1-2.) The 602 was granted in part at

the first level. (Id. at 2.) Becker was informed that the archive

file for his previous CDC number was ordered, and as soon as it was

received at Donovan, the information would be merged into his

current file. (Id.) 

Plaintiff appealed the response, complaining that he never

received an interview regarding his 602 and stating that his

concerns were particularly serious because he was classified as

“Sensitive Needs Yard,” as were some of his enemies. (Id.) Becker

was then interviewed by J. T. Stovall on April 5, 2007. (Id.

Attach. Mem. of Apr. 19, 2007, at 1.) He again asserted that the

classification staff had not made any efforts to update his central

file with enemy information from his previous file. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s appeal was partially granted at the second formal

level. (Id. at 6.) As of April 19, 2007, when the appeal response

was given, the prison had not yet received Becker’s previous file

from the archives. (Id.) He was informed that as soon as the file

was received, all listed enemies would be included in his current

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central file. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed to the director’s level of

review [doc. no. 8, Ex. H]. The appeal was denied on August 7,

2007, because Becker had received an adequate response at the

second level of review. (Id. at 1.)

Plaintiff’s previous central file was received at Donovan and

reviewed by Defendant Alvarez on September 21, 2007. (Defs.’

Request for Judicial Notice Ex. B at 1.) Incidents of violence

involving Becker were reviewed and listed on an “Archive File

Review” form. (Id. at 1-2.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Davis v. Monroe County

Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). The plaintiff must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.

1955, 1974 (2007). The Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The question is not whether the plaintiff will “ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

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A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where

there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient

facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Clegg v.

Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994))

(stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not required to

accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged[]”). “Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the Court may not generally consider materials

outside the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

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plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal

Practice § 12.34[2], at 12-90 (3d ed. 2007) (“The court may not

. . . take into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum

opposing the motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not

constitute pleadings under Rule 7(a).”). 

But “[w]hen a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484

(citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

The Court may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged

in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the pleading.” Branch v. Tunnell,

14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002);

Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14

(9th Cir. 1996). 

These Rule 12(b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

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complaint, however, the Court may not “supply essential elements of

claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” 

Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint unless it is “absolutely clear that the

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the Court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. Where amendment

of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave

to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077

(9th Cir. 2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

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(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

III. MERITS OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be

dismissed for three reasons. First, all monetary claims against

Defendants sued in their official capacities are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. (Mot. to Dismiss 1.) Second, Becker does not

properly allege a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.) 

Third, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of the Eighth

Amendment. (Id.) 

A. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of

three exhibits attached to the Declaration of Custodian of Records

R. Cobb filed in support of the Motion to Dismiss: (1) Becker’s

602 inmate appeal bearing log number RJD-07-83, with the first and

second level responses attached; (2) an Archive File Review

chronological notation dated September 21, 2007, from Plaintiff’s

central file; and (3) a computer printout dated June 7, 2007,

showing Becker’s movement history within the CDC. (Defs.’ Req. for

Judicial Notice Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 1-2.)

The Court may take judicial notice of any fact that is “not

subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(b). “A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a

party and supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(d).

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Judicial notice may be taken of records of state agencies and

other undisputed matters of public record. Disabled Rights Action

Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th

Cir. 2001)). But the Court should not take judicial notice of

agency records when the facts contained in them are subject to

reasonable dispute. Brown, 422 F.3d at 931 n.7 (quoting City of

Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004));

Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. Also, a court should only take judicial

notice of facts contained in agency records that bear “sufficient

indicia of reliability . . . .” United States v. Perez-Corona, 295

F.3d 996, 1001 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The Court will take judicial notice of Defendants’ Exhibit A,

which is a 602 inmate grievance form bearing log number RJD-07-83,

with several exhibits attached including the Chief Deputy Warden’s

April 19, 2007, letter granting the 602 in part at the second level

of review. (Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice Supp. Mot. to Dismiss

Ex. A.) The fact that this 602 was submitted and partially granted

at the second level is not disputed by either party. Several of

the documents attached to the 602 were submitted as Exhibits E, F,

and G to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (See Compl. Exs. E, F, G.) 

Additionally, Becker’s Complaint contains a summary of the 602 and

its disposition through the first and second levels of review. 

(Compl. 6-6a.)

The Court also will take judicial notice of the fact that the

Archive File Review form submitted as Exhibit B to Defendant’s

Request for Judicial Notice was completed by Defendant Alvarez on

September 21, 2007. The Archive File Review slip bears Defendant

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Alvarez’s signature. (See Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice Supp.

Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B at 1.) Plaintiff does not dispute that the

form was created by Alvarez. He does dispute, however, that

factual information contained in the review form is complete and

correct. (Becker Decl. Supp. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 1-2.) 

Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice only of the fact that

the review form was completed, but not the facts contained in the

form. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 690 (finding it appropriate to take

judicial notice of undisputed facts contained in public records,

but error to take judicial notice of disputed facts). 

The Court will also take judicial notice of Exhibit C, a

computer printout showing that as of June 7, 2007, Becker was

housed in the administrative segregation unit of Donovan prison. 

(See Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. C.) Plaintiff does not

dispute that he is currently incarcerated at Donovan.

Becker asks the Court to “totally disregard” the Declaration

of R. Cobb, the Custodian of Records, which was submitted in

support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Pl.’s Opp’n 6.) He

claims that the declaration is irrelevant because R. Cobb is not a

defendant in this case and does not have control over the decision

to transfer Plaintiff to a different prison. (Id.) Becker’s

objection to Cobb’s Declaration is OVERRULED. A declarant does not

need to be a defendant in order for the facts contained in his

declaration to be relevant. 

Cobb’s Declaration explains the purpose of a central file and

states that a prisoner’s central file is transferred with the

inmate to the institution housing the prisoner. (Cobb Decl. Supp.

Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 3.) Cobb declares that the documents contained

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in a central file are prepared by persons with knowledge of the

events they describe. (Id. ¶ 4.) The Declaration also states that

the CDC maintains computer records of a prisoner’s movements within

the system, and the computer system shows the institution at which

an inmate is housed. (Id. ¶ 2.) These facts are not irrelevant

because they provide a foundation for the exhibits submitted by

Defendants.

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment grants the states immunity from private

civil suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Henry v. County of Shasta, 132

F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.

1998). This immunity applies to civil rights claims brought under

§ 1983, so an inmate cannot recover damages from the state under §

1983 unless the state waives its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). A federal court only has

jurisdiction over a suit against a state when the relief sought is

“prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing

violation of federal law.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019,

1025 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials

sued in their official capacities. “[A] suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” 

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471

(1985)). “As such, it is no different from a suit against the

State itself.” Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-

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66 (1985); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,

690 n.55 (1978)).

Defendants Cowan and Alvarez were sued in both their official

and their individual capacities. (Compl. 2.) Becker’s Complaint

asks for both prospective injunctive relief and monetary relief. 

(See Pl.’s Opp’n 2-3; Compl. 7.) He clarifies in his Opposition to

the Motion to Dismiss that he seeks injunctive relief from

Defendants in their official capacities and monetary damages from

them in their individual capacities. (Pl.’s Opp’n 2-3.)

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official

capacities constitute claims against the State of California, which

is absolutely immune from liability for damages. See Brandon, 469

U.S. at 471. Becker may, however, proceed with his claim for

injunctive relief against Defendants in their official capacities. 

Likewise, Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages is properly

alleged against Defendants in their individual capacities. See

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Becker’s Complaint

alleges that each of the Defendants personally took action that put

Plaintiff in serious danger -- Defendant Alvarez recommended

Becker’s transfer from Donovan before integrating enemy information

into his central file, and Defendant Cowan approved the transfer

recommendation with knowledge that it could lead to Plaintiff being

harmed. (Compl. 3-3b.) Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED

to the extent that Plaintiff may only pursue monetary claims

against Defendants in their individual capacities, but he may

pursue injunctive relief against Defendants as officers of the

State of California.

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C. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Becker’s Complaint purports to state claims under both the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Compl. 3.) Defendants do not

discuss procedural due process, but they assert that the Fourteenth

Amendment claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s allegations

are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. (Defs.’ Mem. of

P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 5.) They claim that the Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause is only used to analyze conditions-ofconfinement claims for detainees who have not yet been convicted,

while the Eighth Amendment is used for convicted prisoners. (Id.) 

Becker contends that he properly states a claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment for a violation of due process in addition to

his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. (Pl.’s Opp’n

3-4.)

1. Substantive Due Process

“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives and the conditions under

which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The

Eighth Amendment “requires that inmates be furnished with the basic

human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety.’” Id. at 33

(quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489

U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). Claims that Defendants failed to protect

Plaintiff from a substantial risk of serious harm at the hands of

other inmates are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment

because Becker is a state inmate incarcerated pursuant to a valid

conviction. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)

(citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 35); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

303 (1991); Robinson v. Prunty, 249 F.3d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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While the Eighth Amendment governs claims brought by convicted

prisoners, the Due Process Clause governs failure-to-protect claims

filed by pretrial detainees and civilly-committed individuals. See

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977); Jones v. Blanas,

393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831

F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987)). The due process standard is more

protective than the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference

standard. Jones, 393 F.3d at 931. The more protective standard

applies to pretrial detainees because they have only been accused

of crimes but not convicted, so they cannot be subjected to

treatment that would “amount to punishment.” Id. at 932 (quoting

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979)). 

Plaintiff agrees that his failure-to-protect claim should be

analyzed under the Eighth Amendment, but he argues that his

allegations should also be analyzed under the Due Process Clause. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n 3.) This is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. 

In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989), the Supreme Court

was presented with a § 1983 complaint that purported to raise

claims under both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment based on a police officer’s use of

excessive and unreasonable force. The Court found that only the

Fourth Amendment claim was properly raised: “Because the Fourth

Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental

conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these

claims.” Id. at 395; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.

259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a

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specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth

Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard

appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of

substantive due process.”).

Becker has attempted to raise a claim under the Eighth

Amendment and a claim under the Due Process Clause based on the

same conduct by the Defendants. His Complaint alleges that

Defendants put him in danger by recommending and approving a

transfer out of Donovan without first documenting all of his inmate

enemies in his central file. (Compl. 3-3b.) Because the Eighth

Amendment provides an explicit source of protection from the type

of conduct Plaintiff alleges, his claim is properly stated under

the Eighth Amendment rather than as a more general substantive due

process claim. See Wolff v. Hood, 242 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819 (D. Or.

2002) (finding that plaintiff could not state a substantive due

process claim for prison officials’ failure to protect him from

violence by other inmates because that was the sort of government

behavior against which the Eighth Amendment provides explicit

constitutional protection). To the extent Becker is alleging a

substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the

claim is DISMISSED. The allegations are properly analyzed under

the Eighth Amendment.

2. Procedural Due Process

From the allegations in his Complaint, it is unclear whether

Becker is attempting to state a procedural due process claim. He

does allege that Defendant Cowan “approved Plaintiff to be

transferred without documenting any of the enemies in Plaintiff’s

file.” (Compl. 3.) Becker states that Cowan had a duty to

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document Plaintiff’s enemies on form CDC 812. (Id.) He also

alleges that Defendant Alvarez “completed the Plaintiff’s reception

processing and failed to list the inmate enemies in Plaintiff’s

central file and recommended Plaintiff be transferred to Sierra

Conservation Center (Jamestown).” (Id. at 3a.) Becker appears to

claim that Alvarez made her transfer recommendation without

examining his former central file and listing his enemies on form

CDC 812. (Id. at 3a-3b.)

The Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

claim must be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment, but they do not

discuss whether Becker’s allegations are sufficient to allege a

procedural due process claim. (Mot. to Dismiss 5.) The Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from

being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To invoke the

Due Process Clause, Becker must establish that one of these

interests is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221

(2005). If Plaintiff’s allegations can give rise to a procedural

due process claim, they must show that Becker was deprived of a

liberty interest. This liberty interest may arise from the

Constitution or from state laws or policies. Id. 

The Supreme Court has found that “the Constitution itself does

not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more

adverse conditions of confinement.” Id. at 221-22 (citing Meachum

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). A prisoner does not have a

constitutional right to a particular classification status. Moody

v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976). But prisoners do have a

liberty interest in not being transferred for involuntary

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psychiatric treatment. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980). 

The Ninth Circuit has found that prisoners have a liberty interest

in not being transferred in retaliation for exercising their First

Amendment rights. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.

1995). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that prisoners may have 

“a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of

confinement [which] may arise from state policies or regulations,

subject to the important limitations set forth in Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472 (1995).” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221-22. “Under

Sandin, a prisoner possesses a liberty interest under the federal

constitution when a change occurs in confinement that imposes an

‘atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d

443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 

Sandin, however, explained that “[t]hese interests will be

generally limited to freedom from restraint . . . .” Sandin, 515

U.S. at 482 (internal citations omitted). 

Becker complains that the process of assembling of information

to decide his placement was flawed. Nevertheless, he has not

alleged facts supporting the existence of a protected liberty

interest. The Complaint does not allege that he has been

transferred to another institution, and the allegations do not

support the conclusion that any transfer would be punitive. 

Consequently, even if the Court assumes that a liberty interest is

at stake, the administrative gathering of information preceding a

decision to transfer Becker does not require the more extensive

procedural requirements imposed on disciplinary proceedings. 

Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997). Finally,

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Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no facts indicating that the

incomplete collection of information about his enemies or

adversaries before recommending that Becker be transferred “imposes

an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to

the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.

Neither the Constitution nor state laws and regulations create

a liberty interest that permits Becker to state a Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim under the facts alleged

here. His claim, therefore, must be analyzed under the provisions

of the Eighth Amendment. The procedural due process claim is

DISMISSED.

D. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim

Becker’s Complaint alleges that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his safety, and thus subjected him to cruel and

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, when Defendant

Alvarez recommended a prison transfer and, on August 1, 2007,

Defendant Cowan approved the transfer before documenting

Plaintiff’s enemies in his central file and ensuring that he would

not be transferred to a facility housing those enemies. (Compl. 3-

3b.) Defendants move to dismiss this claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on

the ground that Plaintiff does not allege facts that would entitle

him to relief under § 1983. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Mot. to

Dismiss 6-9.)

Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence

at the hands of other prisoners, and a violation of that duty can

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-

33; Fitzharris v. Wolff, 702 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1983). In

order to establish liability under the Eighth Amendment for a

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prison official’s failure to protect an inmate from harm, the

prisoner must establish that the official was deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. This is a two-part inquiry, consisting of

an objective and a subjective component. First, Plaintiff must

establish a “sufficiently serious” risk of harm to his safety. Id.

at 834 (citations omitted). Second, he must show that Defendants

acted with deliberate indifference to his safety, meaning they were

subjectively aware of the risk but failed to take reasonable

measures to abate it. Id. at 834, 837-38.

1. Serious Risk of Harm to Plaintiff’s Safety

Defendants assert that Becker has not alleged facts sufficient

to establish the first element –- a significant risk of harm –-

because the evidence shows his safety concerns have already been

addressed. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 8.) They

claim that contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, his archive file has

been reviewed and the enemies listed in it have been merged into

his current file. (Id.) Thus, “there is no credible allegation

that Becker will be transferred before his files are merged.” 

(Id.) “Becker will eventually be seen by the appropriate

classification committee to review his transfer status based on the

merged file.” (Id.) Defendants therefore argue Plaintiff’s

allegation that he will be transferred to a facility that

jeopardizes his personal safety is too speculative to meet the

objective element of an Eighth Amendment violation. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he has many inmate enemies,

some of which are currently housed at Donovan and some of which are

housed in other prisons throughout California. (Compl. 3-3b.) 

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Some of these inmates assaulted Becker in the past. (Id. at 3b.) 

He asserts that if he is placed in a prison population with any of

these known enemies, he is at a serious risk of being physically

harmed again. (Id. at 3-3a.) If the enemies are not properly

documented in his central file before he is transferred to a

different prison facility, Plaintiff claims that he will likely be

housed with inmates who are hostile towards him and likely to cause

him harm. (Id.) 

A substantial risk of being physically attacked, beaten, or

raped is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective element of

an Eighth Amendment claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; Schwenk v.

Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). In Santiago v.

Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 222-23 (7th Cir. 1990), the court reversed

summary judgment for the defendants under facts that are similar to

the allegations in Becker’s Complaint. In that case, the plaintiff

stated a deliberate indifference claim where he alleged that the

prison officials subjected him to harm by transferring him to

another prison without notifying the new facility that he was being

transferred for safety reasons and belonged to a class of inmates

that was at risk of attack. (Id. at 223.) Similarly here,

Plaintiff alleges that there are particular inmates who wish to

harm him and Defendants are exposing him to a substantial risk of

attack by recommending his transfer to another prison where he

would be placed in the general prison population with his enemies. 

(Compl. 3.)

To meet the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim,

however, Plaintiff must allege that he is actually at a substantial

risk of harm, not simply that he believes he is at risk. See Young

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v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2007); Pinkston v. Madry, 440

F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that to establish a failureto-protect claim, there must be a strong likelihood, rather than a

mere possibility, that an inmate will be attacked). Defendants

argue that Becker cannot meet this element because his allegations

of risk of harm are not credible and are contradicted by the

exhibits to his Complaint. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 8.) 

Exhibit H to Plaintiff’s Complaint is the director’s level

appeal decision on his 602, dated August 7, 2007. (See Compl. Ex.

H.) This document states that Becker’s previous central file was

ordered, and “[o]nce the file is received, the appellant’s assigned

Correctional Counselor I will review his information and merge the

two files.” (Compl. Ex. H at 1.) Subsequently, on September 21,

2007, Defendant Alvarez completed an “Archive File Review” form

listing the inmate enemies and prior incidents of violence. 

(Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B at 1-

2.) In his Declaration, the Custodian of Records for Donovan

prison states that this document was placed in Becker’s current

central file. (Cobb Decl. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 8.) 

The fact that Defendant Alvarez has reviewed Becker’s archive

file, H-16467, and listed his inmate enemies from that file on an

Archive File Review form makes Plaintiff’s allegations of a

substantial risk of harm less credible. The names of several

inmate enemies are now included in his current central file, so

they can be used in evaluating his forthcoming transfer. Contrary

to Defendants’ argument, however, this fact does not undermine all

of Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his risk of harm. 

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The Complaint alleges not only that Plaintiff is at

substantial risk of harm because the enemies from his previous file

were not integrated into his current file, but he also alleges that

Defendants have failed to document current enemies that are hostile

to him. (Compl. 3a.) Additionally, Plaintiff points out that many

of the enemies listed on the Archive File Review form are not

identified with their CDC numbers or current locations, but instead

their names are listed with the notation “unable to I.D.” (See

Pl.’s Opp’n 7; Compl. 3a; Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice Supp.

Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B at 2.) Becker contends that Defendants have

a responsibility to determine the location of these inmates before

transferring him because his enemies will attempt to harm him if he

is transferred to the prison where any of them are housed. (Compl.

3a.) Plaintiff’s allegations of a continuing risk that he will be

placed in a prison population with known enemies are sufficiently

serious to satisfy the objective element of an Eighth Amendment

claim.

2. Deliberate Indifference

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to

state an Eighth Amendment claim because Becker does not plead

sufficient facts to show that Cowan and Alvarez acted with

deliberate indifference to his safety. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A.

Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 8.) They contend that the first and second

level responses to Plaintiff’s 602, attached as exhibit A to

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, belie any claim that

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Instead, Defendants

assert they responded appropriately to Becker’s safety concerns by

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ordering his archive file and assuring Plaintiff it would be merged

with his current file before he was transferred. (Id. at 8-9.)

Deliberate indifference occurs if the prison official “knew

that [the inmate] faced a substantial risk of serious harm and

‘disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to

abate it.’” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). “[P]rison officials who

actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may

be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the

risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 830. The “requisite state of mind is akin to recklessness,

which is ‘more blameworthy than negligence,’ yet less blameworthy

than purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial

risk of serious harm to the inmates.” Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991

(8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835), cert. denied,

128 S. Ct. 504 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant Cowan, the acting

Chief Deputy Warden, approved a recommendation that Becker be

transferred from Donovan to another prison even though Cowan knew

Plaintiff was at risk of being victimized by other inmates. 

(Compl. 3.) He further alleges that Cowan “deliberately shirked”

his responsibility to ensure all enemies were properly documented

in Becker’s central file. (Id.) Defendant Cowan also failed to

ensure that the enemies documented in Plaintiff’s archived central

file were incorporated in his new file, even though “Defendant

knows that several more names of inmates are documented in

Plaintiff’s former central file #H-16467 that will cause harm to

Plaintiff, and have already done so once before.” (Id.)

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Becker’s Complaint asserts that Defendant Alvarez, a

Correctional Counselor, knows Plaintiff’s safety is at risk due to

enemies currently known to him and enemies listed in his previous

central file. (Compl. 3a.) Alvarez is aware that Becker was

placed in administrative segregation at Donovan because he was a

safety risk and had many enemies there. (Id. at 3b.) Becker

contends that those enemies will also be transferred out of Donovan

to other facilities, yet Defendant prepared the paperwork to

transfer Plaintiff to another prison knowing that some of his

enemies may be transferred to the same place. (Id.) Becker

asserts that Alvarez was deliberately indifferent to his safety

because she recommended his transfer “knowing that Plaintiff will

arrive at the transfer and have no means to be able to substantiate

enemies and be forced to be placed in amongst inmate enemies, and

exposed to severe risk of harm.” (Id. at 3a.)

On the face of the Complaint, Becker appears to have properly

alleged that each of the Defendants acted with the requisite mental

state to assert a failure-to-protect claim. But, as pointed out by

Defendants, the prison’s response to Plaintiff’s 602 undermines his

contentions. (See Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 8-

9.) 

“In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a

court may look both to the complaint itself and to any documents

attached as exhibits to the complaint.” Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241

F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001). The decision at the director’s

level of review, exhibit H to Plaintiff’s Complaint [doc. no. 8],

summarizes the response that Plaintiff received to his 602 at the

second level of review:

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The reviewer found that the appellant was informed

that his Archive File was ordered and once it arrives,

the information will be merged with his current C-File to

address his enemy concerns and placement needs. He was

given a personal interview and issues were discussed. At

the time of the interview, the archive file had not been

received. The Correctional Case Supervisor for the

Reception Center has submitted a subsequent request for

the archive file in an attempt to expedite the receipt of

the file. Once the file is received, the appellant’s

assigned Correctional Counselor I will review his

information and merge the two files. The appellant’s

appeal is partially granted at the Second Level of Review

(SLR), as he has received a personal interview, and a

subsequent request for the archive file has been

submitted.

(Compl. Ex. H at 1 [doc. no. 8]; see also Defs.’ Req. for Judicial

Notice Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A.) Because the appeal was

partially granted at the second level of review, and the archive

file had not yet been received at the time of the director’s-level

review, Becker’s appeal was denied at the director’s level; no

further action on Plaintiff’s 602 was deemed necessary. (Compl.

Ex. H at 1.)

The response to Plaintiff’s 602 makes clear that the prison

officials ordered a copy of Becker’s archive file on two different

occasions for the purpose of integrating his listed enemies into

his current file as soon as the archive file was received. This

does not, however, end the matter. Becker maintains that inmate

enemies were not listed on the CDC form. (See Becker Decl. Supp.

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 1-2.) Other inmate enemies were described

on the archive file review sheet as “unable to ID.” (Id.) In

connection with this Motion, Defendants have not provided the Court

with a completed “Notice of Critical Information -- Safety of

Person” or “Notice of Critical Information -- Confidential

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2 The Defendants have submitted a completed CDC 812 form in connection with

their opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Cobb Decl.

Supp. Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. A.) Even if this exhibit is considered

in connection with the Motion to Dismiss, the result is the same. 

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Informations,” CDC 812 or CDC 812-C.2 (See Compl. Exs. A, B.) The

sheet titled “Archive File Review,” on its face, is incomplete. 

The document does not explain why CDC form 812-C was not filled

out. Furthermore, as a matter of law, the Court cannot conclude

that entries by Alvarez that she was unable to identify certain

inmates permit it to find that she was not deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff’s safety. After all, deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights frequently cannot be decided on the

pleadings. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175,

1194-95 (9th Cir. 2002).

For example, in Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th

Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that the pro se plaintiff’s

allegations that prison officials knew that Muslim inmates had

previously attacked Hearns, but he was left unsupervised with those

inmates were sufficient to “raise an inference that the prison

officials acted with deliberate indifference, or knew that Hearns

faced a substantial risk of serious harm and ‘disregard[ed] that

risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” The

same rational applies here. See, e.g., Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d

457 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding prima facie case of deliberate

indifference where inmate told prison official his life was in

danger if he went to his work assignment, but the official ignored

his complaint and sent him to work, where he was attacked). Becker

was informed that his correctional counselor, Defendant Alvarez,

“will review his information and merge the two files.” The

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adequacy of her actions cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim.

“[P]rison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 845. Nevertheless, Becker’s Complaint sufficiently alleges that

Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to his safety

needs. The motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) is denied. The Court finds that Plaintiff has

alleged enough facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausible

on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. at __, 127

S. Ct. at 1974.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, with the exception of

Becker’s due process claims, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

DENIED. Plaintiff will not be permitted to pursue a due process

claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, but his Eighth Amendment

claim may go forward. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: March 21, 2008 _______________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

 United States Magistrate Judge

cc: All Parties of Record

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