Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02397/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02397-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision *

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

All references to Rules herein are to the Federal Rules 1

of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAINA GLASSON, )

) 2:05-cv-02397-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

RES-CARE CALIFORNIA, INC. )

d.b.a. RCCA SERVICES, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s discrimination claim

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively, for

a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(e). (Def.’s Mot. at 1.) Defendant also moves under Rule 12(e) 1

for a more definite statement on Plaintiff’s claims for failure to

provide reasonable accommodation on the basis of disability, and

failure to engage in the interactive process to identify and provide a

reasonable accommodation. (Id.) Plaintiff opposes the motions. 

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ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff worked for Defendant from February 1997 through

September 2005. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 8, 37.) In May 2005, Plaintiff

informed her manager Jacqueline Smith (“Smith”) that she required

gastric bypass surgery to reduce her chronic hypertension condition. 

(Id. ¶¶ 29, 33.) Plaintiff had been suffering from hypertension

caused by serve obesity for several years. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff’s

hypertension and obesity caused symptoms including fatigue, headaches,

anxiety, insomnia, chronic pain, and lapses in concentration. (Id.

¶ 31.) Her obesity and hypertension limited her ability to walk,

climb, complete household chores, shop, socialize, sleep, and

concentrate. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff informed Smith that her symptoms

would be reduced or eliminated if she underwent gastric bypass

surgery. (Id. ¶ 33.) Smith attempted to discourage Plaintiff from

having the surgery and taking medical leave. (Id. ¶ 34.) 

Plaintiff began extended medical leave to undergo gastric

bypass surgery on August 8, 2005; her leave was scheduled to extend

through September 19, 2005. (Id. ¶ 35.) On September 13, 2005, Smith

sent Plaintiff a letter terminating her employment. (Id. ¶ 37.) The

letter cited “inefficiency in job performance” as grounds for the

termination. (Id. ¶ 38.) The stated basis for Plaintiff’s

termination was false because prior to her medical leave, Smith

advised her that she was performing at a high level. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 39.) 

Plaintiff was fired due to her health condition and in retaliation for

her requesting and taking an extended medical leave as accommodation

for her health conditions. (Id. ¶ 39.) 

 On November 23, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging,

inter alia, (1) disability discrimination in violation of the

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California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California

Government Code § 12940(a), (2) failure to provide reasonable

accommodation for disability in violation of FEHA, California

Government Code § 12940(m), and (3) failure to engage in the

interactive process to identify and provide a reasonable accommodation

for a disability in violation of FEHA, California Government Code

§ 12940(n). (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 41-63.) 

MOTION TO DISMISS

 Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s disability 

discrimination claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Dismissal is appropriate

under Rule 12(b)(6) if the claim either (1) fails to present a

cognizable legal theory, or (2) fails to contain sufficient facts to

support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). When considering a motion

to dismiss, all material allegations in the complaint must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In addition, the plaintiff is given the benefit of every reasonable

inference that can be drawn from the allegations in the complaint. 

Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Accordingly, a motion to dismiss must be denied “unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

Defendant argues Plaintiff “has not pled sufficient facts to

indicate whether she is disabled or not.” (Def.’s Mot. at 2.) 

Defendant acknowledges Plaintiff has pled “that she suffer[ed] from

hypertension and obesity conditions,” and that “she need[ed] gastric

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bypass surgery,” but argue Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged

whether these conditions “are in fact what she considers

disabilities.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff counters she has alleged

sufficient facts supporting her disability claim because she

“specifically alleged that [she] was an individual with a disability,”

and has “identified two health conditions . . . which constitute

disabilities: obesity and hypertension.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1, 7.) 

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that she suffered from

hypertension caused by her obesity for several years. (Pl.’s Compl.

¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges her hypertension and obesity caused various

symptoms and limited her daily activities. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) Plaintiff

further alleges she “was at all times . . . [an] employee with a

disability,” and “Defendant discriminated against [her] because of

[her] disability . . . .” (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.) Construing these

allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and giving her

the benefit of every reasonable inference, Plaintiff has alleged

sufficient facts that she suffers from a disability, and has

specifically alleged she suffers from two disabilities in particular,

obesity and hypertension. 

Defendant argues “assuming that Plaintiff’s hypertension and

obesity conditions are her alleged disabilities . . . what she has

pled are not disabilities.” (Def.’s Mot. at 3.) Defendant contends

Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that her obesity is a disability

because she has not alleged “her obesity is a result of a

physiological, systemic disorder.” (Id. at 3.) Defendant further

argues Plaintiff’s hypertension disability “fails as well” because

“Plaintiff admits that her hypertension caused her obesity.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff rejoins that “at the pleadings stage,” she is not required

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to “allege expert medical opinions regarding the clinical causes of

[her] obesity or hypertension conditions.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.) 

Plaintiff also argues there is no authority “that the potential

relationship between [her] hypertension condition and her obesity

condition automatically precludes [her] hypertension condition from

being a protected disability.” (Id.) 

In California, obesity is a recognized disability if the

plaintiff “adduce[s] evidence of a physiological or systemic basis for

the condition.” Cassita v. Community Foods, 5 Cal.4th 1050, 1062-65

(1993) (holding that the plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence

at trial to support her disability claim based on obesity). 

Therefore, it is possible Plaintiff can prove facts in support of her

claim which would entitle her to relief. See Conley, 355 U.S.

at 45-46. Furthermore, at the pleading stage, Plaintiff need not

specifically allege her obesity has a physiological or systemic basis

because “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a

[plaintiff] to set out in detail the facts upon which [she] bases

[her] claim.” See id. at 47. 

In addition, hypertension is a recognized disability under

California law. American National Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment

and Housing Commission, 32 Cal.3d 603, 610 (1982). Defendant has

provided no authority that suggests hypertension is not a disability

if it is caused by obesity. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is denied because Plaintiff has

sufficiently pled she is disabled.

MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Defendant seeks a more definite statement of Plaintiff’s

claims for disability discrimination, failure to reasonably

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accommodate disability, and failure to engage in a good faith

interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation. (Def.’s

Mot. at 1.) “[A] party [is entitled] to . . . a more definite

statement . . . when [the complaint] is so vague or ambiguous that the

party cannot reasonably be [expected] to frame a responsive pleading.” 

Davison v. Santa Barbara High School District, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1225,

1228 (C.D. Cal. 1989). An issue considered when deciding a Rule 12(e)

motion is whether the pleading is unintelligible, rather than merely

lacking detail. Id. If sufficient information is provided in the

complaint and the movant can “obtain the missing detail through

discovery, the motion should be denied.” Id.

Defendant argues it cannot “frame a responsive pleading” to

Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim because it must have

knowledge of the disability about which Plaintiff complains. (Def.’s

Mot. at 2.) However, since Plaintiff has sufficiently pled this

claim, Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement of this claim

is denied. 

Defendant also argues it cannot frame a responsive pleading

to Plaintiff’s claim for failure to accommodate because “Defendant is

left to speculate what sort of accommodation Plaintiff requested and

for what reason, as well as whether the Plaintiff’s request was

reasonable.” (Def.’s Mot. at 5.) Defendant further argues it cannot

frame a responsive pleading to Plaintiff’s claim for failure to engage

in a good faith interactive process because Plaintiff did not plead

whether she requested an interactive fact gathering process, to whom

she made the request, and when she made the request. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that she told Smith she

needed gastric bypass surgery to reduce her chronic hypertension

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condition, but Smith discouraged her from taking medical leave for the

surgery and then fired her when she took medical leave. (Pl.’s Compl.

¶¶ 29, 33-37.) Plaintiff alleges “Defendant failed and refused to

provide [her] reasonable accommodation for [her] disability,” and

“Defendant failed and refused to engage in [the] good faith . . .

interactive, fact gathering process with [her] to ascertain the scope,

nature and extent of Plaintiff’s need for reasonable accommodation.” 

(Id. ¶¶ 52, 59.) These allegations are not so vague or ambiguous as

to preclude Defendant from framing an answer; any lack of detail can

be obtained through discovery. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for a

more definite statement of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to

accommodate and failure to engage in the fact gathering process is

denied.

Lastly, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims for

discrimination, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in the

interactive process are “indecipherable” because “[f]or each cause of

action Plaintiff alleges and reincorporates all preceding paragraphs.” 

(Def.’s Mot. at 6.) Since these claims are not unintelligible, the

motion is denied. 

 CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Defendant’s motions are denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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