Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02670/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02670-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 45:51 Railways: Fed. Employer's Liability Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

RAFAEL TORRES,

NO. CIV. S-04-2670 FCD GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD

COMPANY,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

The court has reviewed the parties’ letter briefs, filed at

the court’s direction, and hereby DENIES plaintiff’s request to

supplement his expert’s opinions. The court cannot find that

plaintiff was “substantially justified” in failing to disclose

his expert’s opinions earlier, nor that the non-disclosure was 

“harmless,” as at this juncture, defendant would be prejudiced by

the late disclosure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 

In granting defendant’s motion in limine #2, the court

precluded plaintiff from using his railroad wages at Union

Pacific Railroad (“UP”) as the foundation for his

post-termination wage loss claim. The court ruled that 

Case 2:04-cv-02670-FCD-GGH Document 112 Filed 09/28/07 Page 1 of 4
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plaintiff may not base his wage loss claim on his UP-wages

post-termination because regardless of defendant’s admitted

negligence, plaintiff could not continue to work at UP, due to

plaintiff’s own misconduct which caused his termination. In so

ruling, the court indicated that plaintiff could base his posttermination wage loss claim on wages he could have made at

another railroad but for defendant’s negligence.

Plaintiff’s experts, however, did not perform this analysis;

instead, they based their opinions on plaintiff’s UP-wages alone. 

Thus, plaintiff now seeks, after commencement of trial, to

supplement his expert disclosures, by offering the supplemental

opinion of Dr. Rick Sarkisian. Plaintiff proffers that Dr.

Sarkisian will testify that during the applicable time, there was

ample job growth in the industry and conductor craft to have

allowed plaintiff to find employment with another railroad in the

Sacramento area and that the wages at these other railroads were

comparable to those at UP. (Docket #108 at 2:18-20.) Plaintiff

agrees to make Dr. Sarkisian, and his economist, Mr. Ted

Vavoulis, available immediately for deposition by defendant. 

Plaintiff asserts that his failure to supplement his

expert’s opinions which were based solely on plaintiff’s UP-wages

was due to an “unintentional misunderstanding” of the court’s

November 20, 2006 Order. Plaintiff contends, pursuant to that

Order, he believed he could base his wage loss claim on his UPwages as the court found that plaintiff’s termination did not

preclude him from making a post-termination wage loss claim in

this FELA action. There is no reasonable basis for plaintiff’s

belief. The Order dealt with the legal issue of preclusion not

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what evidence would be admissible to prove plaintiff’s posttermination wage loss claim. 

More importantly, the issue of a post-termination wage loss

claim was never addressed by the parties during the course of

this litigation until the court raised the issue at the Final

Pretrial Conference in September 2006. Neither party brought a

dispositive motion in this case, but after review of the parties’

joint final pretrial conference statement, the court determined

that a central legal issue remained regarding whether plaintiff

could press a wage loss claim post-termination. The court, sua

sponte, modified its pretrial scheduling order and permitted the

parties to brief this dispositive issue, despite the fact that

discovery and the dispositive motion deadline had long since

passed in late 2005. Thus, up until the Final Pretrial

Conference, plaintiff had no basis to assume that he would be

permitted to prove his post-termination wage loss claim based on

his UP-earnings. Moreover, based on the parties’ joint final

pretrial conference statement, plaintiff knew his termination was

critical to the calculation of these damages. Despite the above,

plaintiff proceeded to trial on the assumption that he could

prove his post-termination wage loss claim based solely on his

UP-earnings. Given these circumstances, the court cannot find

that plaintiff was substantially justified in failing to disclose

Dr. Sarkisian’s further opinions.

Plaintiff’s late supplemental disclosure would also severely

prejudice defendant. Trial has begun in this nearly three year

old case. The lawyers have prepared for trial and given their

opening statements, and plaintiff has called his first witness. 

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More significantly, defendant’s vocational expert, Dr. John

Janzen, attests that it would take him a significant period of

time to verify the new data relied upon by Dr. Sarkisian. 

Specifically, Dr. Janzen attests that he would need to conduct a

labor market analysis, including contacting at least 8 to 10

railroad companies throughout the State of California to

determine specific information regarding available positions,

skills requirements, wages for selected positions, and job

qualifications. (Docket #109 at Janzen Decl. ¶ 4.) Dr. Janzen

also states that he would need time to consider the issue of

plaintiff’s employability at another railroad in light of his

termination. (Id. at ¶ 5.) For these reasons, the court cannot

find that plaintiff’s non-disclosure of the supplemental opinions

of Dr. Sarkisian is “harmless.” 

There is accordingly no basis for granting relief pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) (“A party that

without substantial justification fails to disclose information

required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), . . . , is not, unless such

failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial . . .

any witness or information not so disclosed.”) Plaintiff’s

request to supplement his expert opinions is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: September 28, 2007

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