Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_14-cv-00303/USCOURTS-alsd-2_14-cv-00303-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

RICHARD EVANS, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 14-0303-CG-M

 :

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Commission of Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Pending before the Court is Evans’s Attorney’s Application 

for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter EAJA), with supporting Documentation (Doc. 23), and 

Defendant’s Response (Doc. 24). After considering the pertinent 

pleadings, it is ORDERED that the Motion be GRANTED and that 

Plaintiff be AWARDED an EAJA attorney’s fee in the amount of 

$2,066.42 and $492.96 in court costs and litigation expenses. 

Plaintiff filed this action on June 30, 2014 (Doc. 1). On 

March 12, 2015, the undersigned Judge entered a Memorandum 

Opinion and Order, reversing the decision of the Commissioner, 

and remanding this action for further proceedings (Doc. 21). 

Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant 

Case 2:14-cv-00303-M Document 25 Filed 05/08/15 Page 1 of 10
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(Doc. 22).

On April 10, 2015, William T. Coplin, Jr., Plaintiff’s 

Attorney, filed an EAJA Fee Application requesting a fee of 

$2,066.42, computed at an hourly rate of $189.58 for 10.9 hours 

spent in this Court; additionally, Coplin requests $492.96 in 

court costs and expenses (Doc. 23). Defendant, in her Response

filed on April 20, stated that she had no objection to the 

requested fee, noting that payment should be made to Plaintiff 

rather than to her Attorney (Doc. 24).

The EAJA requires a court to

award to a prevailing party . . . fees and 

other expenses . . . incurred by that party 

in any civil action . . . including 

proceedings for judicial review of Agency 

action, brought by or against the United 

States . . . unless the court finds that the 

position of the United States was 

substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). EAJA further requires that a 

prevailing party file an application for attorney’s fees within 

thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d)(1)(B). The court’s judgment is final sixty days after 

it is entered, which is the time in which an appeal may be taken 

pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

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Procedure. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).

 As set out above, three statutory conditions must be 

satisfied before EAJA fees may be awarded. See Myers v. 

Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 (11th Cir. 1990). First, the 

claimant must file a fee application within the thirty-day 

period; also, the claimant must be a prevailing party. Finally, 

the Government’s position must not be substantially justified. 

 Defendant apparently concedes all three EAJA requirements 

(see Doc. 24). The Court finds that they have been met.

 Having found the prerequisites satisfied, the Court will 

discuss the fee to be awarded. EAJA is a fee-shifting statute. 

The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful starting 

point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the 

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied 

by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 

1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985 (EAJA) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt, 

461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (§ 1988)). In describing this lodestar 

method of calculation, the United States Supreme Court stated:

This calculation provides an objective basis 

on which to make an initial estimate of the 

value of a lawyer’s services. The party 

seeking an award of fees should submit 

evidence supporting the hours worked and the 

rates claimed. Where the documentation of 

hours is inadequate, the district court may 

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reduce the award accordingly. The district 

court also should exclude from this initial 

fee calculation hours that were not 

“reasonably expended.” . . . Cases may be 

overstaffed, and the skill and experience of 

lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the 

prevailing party should make a good-faith 

effort to exclude from a fee request hours 

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private 

practice ethically is obligated to exclude 

such hours from his fee submission. In the 

private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an 

important component in fee setting. It is 

no less important here. Hours that are not 

properly billed to one’s client also are not 

properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant 

to statutory authority.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use 

professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should 

only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he 

would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on 

vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836 

F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).

 After examining Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Application, and 

supporting documentation, and considering the reasonableness of 

the hours claimed, the Court finds that the 10.9 hours Coplin 

spent prosecuting this action is reasonable.

 In determining the hourly rate to apply in a given EAJA 

case, statutory language states as follows:

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The amount of fees awarded under this 

subsection shall be based upon prevailing 

market rates for the kind and quality of the 

services furnished, except that . . . 

attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess 

of $125 per hour unless the court determines 

that an increase in the cost of living or a 

special factor, such as the limited 

availability of qualified attorneys for the 

proceedings involved, justified a higher 

fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1997).

 In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the 

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step 

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be 

applied in calculating attorney’s fees under the Act:

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to 

determine the market rate for “similar 

services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skills, experience, and 

reputation.” . . . The second step, which is 

needed only if the market rate is greater 

than $75 per hour, is to determine whether 

the court should adjust the hourly fee 

upward . . . to take into account an 

increase in the cost of living, or a special 

factor.

Meyer, 958 F.2d at 1033-34 (citations and footnote omitted).1 

The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory 

 1

Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour to 

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evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing 

market rates. NAACP V. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 

(11th Cir. 1987). Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more 

than the affidavit of the attorney performing the work. Blum v. 

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). Where the fees or time 

claimed seem expanded or there is lack of documentation or 

testimony in support thereof, the court may make an award on its 

own experience. Norman v. City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 

1303 (11th Cir. 1988). Where the documentation is inadequate, 

the court is not relieved of its obligation to award a 

reasonable fee, but, traditionally, it has had the power to make

an award with no need of further pleadings or an evidentiary 

hearing. Id.

 Beginning in 2001, the prevailing market rate in the 

Southern District of Alabama was $125.00 per hour. See, e.g., 

Smith v. Massanari, Civil Action 00-0812-P-M (S.D. Ala. October 

25, 2001); and Square v. Halter, Civil Action 00-0516-BH-L (S.D. 

Ala. April 12, 2001). However, in 2007, U.S. Magistrate Judge 

Cassady fashioned a formula to adjust the prevailing market 

hourly rate to account for the ever increasing cost-of-living. 

Lucy v. Barnhart, Civil Action 06-0147-C (S.D. Ala. July 5, 2007

 $125.00 per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

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(Doc. 32)). As set out in Lucy, the formula to be used in 

calculating all future awards of attorney’s fees under the EAJA 

is as follows: “‘($125/hour) x (CPI-U Annual Average “All Items 

Index,” South Urban, for month and year of temporal 

midpoint2)/152.4, where 152.4 equals the CPI-U of March 1996, the 

month and year in which the $125 cap was enacted’” (Lucy, Doc. 

32, at p. 11) (quoting Lucy, Doc. 31, at p. 2). The undersigned 

also adopts this formula in EAJA fee petition actions for use in 

arriving at the appropriate hourly rate.

 The complaint was prepared on June 17, 2014 (Doc. 23, 

Attachment 3) and the Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and 

Order and Judgment on March 12, 2015 (Docs. 23-24), so the 

temporal midpoint in this action was October 29, 2014. The CPIU for October 2014 was 231.13. Plugging the relevant numbers 

into the foregoing formula renders the following equation: 

$125.00 x 231.13/152.4, the computation of which renders an 

hourly rate of $189.58. This hourly rate for 10.9 hours equals 

$2,066.42.

 The Court notes that, in the application for Attorney’s 

 2

“The appropriate endpoint for computing the cost of living 

adjustment is the temporal midpoint of the period during which the 

compensable services were rendered[;] . . . [t]he temporal midpoint is 

calculated by computing the number of days from the date the claim 

was prepared until the date of the Magistrate or District Judge’s 

Order and Judgment.” Lucy v. Barnhart. Civil Action 06-0147-C (S.D. 

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Fees, Counsel for Plaintiff requests that any award of 

attorney’s fees be paid to him rather than to Plaintiff (Doc. 

23, p. 1). The Government argues that payment should only go to

the Plaintiff (Doc. 24). 

 As noted earlier, EAJA allows a Court to make an “award to 

a prevailing party.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In Panola Land 

Buying Ass’n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988), the 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “[i]t is readily 

apparent that the party eligible to recover attorneys’ fees 

under the EAJA as part of its litigation expenses is the 

prevailing party.” See also Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738 

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1072 (2008) (“We conclude the 

EAJA means what it says: attorney’s fees are awarded to the 

‘prevailing party,’ not to the prevailing party’s attorney”). 

The United States Supreme Court, in the unanimous decision of 

Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010), held “that a § 

2412(d) fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore 

subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt 

that the litigant owes the United States,” removing any doubt as 

to whom the award should be paid. Under the reasoning of Reeves

and Ratliff, the Court finds that the award should be paid to 

 Ala. Doc. 31, at p. 3). 

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Plaintiff Richard Evans and not to his Attorney.

 The Court further notes that Coplin also seeks 

reimbursement for the $400.00 filing fee paid on Evans’s behalf

when the complaint was filed (see Doc. 23, Attachment 3; see 

also Docket Sheet Entry for Doc. 1). Counsel also seeks 

expenses in the amount of $80.00 for service of process on the 

United States Attorney, $6.48 for certified mail to the Regional 

Chief Counsel, and $6.48 for certified mail to the Attorney 

General; this totals $92.96 in expenses (Doc. 23, Attachment 3). 

 It is clear that court costs and expenses are compensable 

under EAJA. Davis v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1658575, *4 (M.D. Fla. 

August 14, 2000) (“The EAJA also authorizes the award of ‘costs’ 

and ‘expenses.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) & ((d)(1)(A). It is 

undisputed that Davis incurred $150.00 in costs in the form of 

the filing fee. She is entitled to recover this amount”); see 

also Huitt v. Apfel, 2000 WL 726914, *3 (S.D. Ala. May 25, 2000) 

(“[P]laintiff is entitled to court costs of $150.00 and expenses 

of litigation in the amount of $56.40” for service of process 

and certified mail postage). Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled 

to recover the $400.00 filing fee and the $92.96 in litigation 

expenses paid in this action. The filing fee portion and 

litigation expenses of the EAJA award are to be reimbursed from 

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the Judgment Fund administered by the United States Department 

of Treasury. See Reeves v. Barnhart, 473 F.Supp.2d 1173, 1174 

(M.D. Ala. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732 

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1072 (2008). 

 In conclusion, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application 

be GRANTED as set out above and that Plaintiff be AWARDED an 

EAJA Attorney’s fee in the amount of $2,066.42 plus $492.96 in 

court costs and litigation expenses.

DONE this 8th day of May, 2015.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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