Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02626/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02626-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAQ BEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JARED MALEC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-02626-SI 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO DISMISS THE THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 61

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) filed by 

individual Emeryville Police Officers Jared Malec, Kevin Goodman, Ronald Sheperd, Dino 

Cristiani, and Andrew Yu (“Defendants”). The lawsuit arises out of plaintiff’s October 31, 2017 

arrest while driving in Emeryville, California. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds 

this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing set for 

March 22, 2019. The Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all claims except the 

excessive force claims against defendants. 

BACKGROUND

The operative facts are recounted in the Court’s prior Order. Dkt. No. 31. On July 31, 2018, 

the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and motions to strike, with leave to amend certain 

claims. Id. On August 9, 2018, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint and defendants again 

moved to dismiss. Dkt. No. 36. With respect to the motion to dismiss the second amended 

complaint, the Court ordered the following dismissed with prejudice: 

(1) All claims premised upon the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, United Declaration of Human 

Rights, United Nations Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and AJR: 42 

Case 3:18-cv-02626-SI Document 66 Filed 03/05/19 Page 1 of 4
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United States District Court

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Indigenous Peoples: Declaration of Rights (2014);

(2) The first cause of action for “extreme negligence”;

(3) The second cause of action for “invasion of privacy/false arrest”;

(4) The fourth cause of action for unlawful search and seizure;

(5) The fifth cause of action relating to a blood test;

(6) The sixth cause of action for prolonged detention;

(7) The seventh cause of action for emotional distress;

(8) The Section 1983 respondeat superior/Monell liability against the City of Emeryville;

(9) The City of Emeryville as a defendant.

See Dkt. No. 49. The only claim that survived the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint 

was the third cause of action for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution. Id. 

On January 28, 2019, plaintiff filed his TAC. Dkt. No. 58. The TAC realleges all of the 

causes of action, including those that the Court dismissed with prejudice. The TAC is identical to 

the second amended complaint but with several paragraphs re-ordered and some additional 

language. On February 8, 2019, defendants filed their motion to dismiss the TAC, arguing (1) the 

TAC violates Rule 8, (2) all but one of the TAC’s causes of action were previously dismissed with 

prejudice; and (3) the TAC exceeds the Court’s previous order. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if 

it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires 

the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened 

fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 

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United States District Court

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In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences 

in the plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 

1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the 

Court has an obligation to “construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the [plaintiff] the benefit 

of any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, pro 

se pleadings must still allege facts sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine whether a claim 

has been stated. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). If the 

Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend.

DISCUSSION

The Court has already issued an order (1) dismissing all but one cause of action with 

prejudice; (2) dismissing the City of Emeryville as a defendant with prejudice; and (3) denying the 

motion to dismiss with respect to the third cause of action for excessive force under the Fourth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 

Plaintiff’s TAC discusses the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 

Dkt. No. 58 ¶23. The Court dismisses all claims premised upon the ICCPR with prejudice.1

With respect to the third cause of action, the TAC states: “Here the court agrees with the fact 

that the EPD employees used unwarranted excessive force during the stop.” Dkt. No. 58 at 15. This 

is incorrect. Denying the motion to dismiss with respect to the third cause of action does not mean 

the Court agrees that the police officers used unwarranted excessive force. Rather, plaintiff has 

adequately pled a claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 

 

1

In the Court’s November 29, 2018 order, it stated that Plaintiff “must not bring claims ... 

under international treaties” and ordered all references to such be removed. Dkt. No. 49 at 2. 

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CONCLUSION

Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. All claims 

except the excessive force claim against the defendant officers are dismissed with prejudice, as is 

the City of Emeryville. All claims premised on the ICCPR are dismissed with prejudice. The Court 

will consider the only remaining claim, excessive force, on the merits on a more fully developed 

record. Defendants’ answer is due on March 15, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2019

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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