Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00007/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00007-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AT&T MOBILITY, LLC, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

GENERAL CHARLES E. “CHUCK” 

YEAGER (RET.), et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-00007-KJM-DB 

ORDER 

Victoria Yeager previously intervened in this action, which concerns the 

distribution of an interpleaded damages award and attorneys’ fees. She moves now for an order 

appointing her as a representative of her joint interests with her husband, General Charles E. 

“Chuck” Yeager (Ret.), who is also a party in this case and is among the several defendants who 

claim an interest in the interpleaded funds. Neither Mrs. Yeager nor General Yeager is 

represented by counsel, although a guardian ad litem has been appointed to represent General 

Yeager: James Houpt, an attorney. 

Parsons Behle & Latimer, a law firm that intervened to claim an interest in the 

interpleaded funds, opposes Mrs. Yeager’s motion. The court held a hearing on July 29, 2016. 

Mrs. Yeager appeared representing herself, and General Yeager appeared with Mr. Houpt. 

Parsons Behle was represented by Brook Bond and Kennedy Luvai, who appeared by telephone. 

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Mrs. Yeager’s motion is denied to the extent the court declines to appoint Mrs. Yeager as a joint 

representative of her interests with General Yeager but granted to the extent she asks to intervene 

in an additional capacity. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In 2012, General Yeager prevailed in part in a lawsuit filed in this court, Yeager v. 

AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 07-2517 (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 21, 2007). A jury awarded him 

$135,000, and the court then awarded him approximately $170,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 

See Verdict, Case No. 07-2517, ECF No. 227; Order Dec. 19, 2012, Case No. 07-2517, ECF 

No. 270.1

In January 2013, AT&T filed a complaint in interpleader, depositing the amount of 

the award and fees with the court. ECF No. 1. AT&T’s complaint described claims to that 

money, including from General Yeager and several attorneys. Id. at 2–3. The law firm that 

represented General Yeager in the AT&T trial, Parsons Behle, also intervened and made a claim 

based on fees incurred during the trial. ECF No. 91. 

A new trial very nearly began on the fee dispute between Parsons Behle and 

General Yeager, but General Yeager and Parsons Behle notified the court they had settled, and 

the trial was vacated. ECF No. 127. At the time, General Yeager was represented by Parker 

White. ECF No. 100. General Yeager refused to sign the settlement agreement, however, 

declaring he had not agreed to its terms, and Parsons Behle sought an order enforcing the 

agreement. ECF No. 128. Parker White then withdrew. ECF Nos. 129, 145. The court found 

the settlement agreement would be enforceable if Parker White had possessed authority to agree 

to it and set an evidentiary hearing on that question. ECF No. 139. 

Before the evidentiary hearing, the court granted Mrs. Yeager’s motion to 

intervene so that she could protect her own interests. Order Mar. 5, 2015, ECF No. 164. The 

court clarified that she would not be permitted to “assert defenses on General Yeager’s behalf or 

speak for him.” Id. at 6 (citing E.D. Cal. L.R. 183(a) (“Any individual who is representing 

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 Unless otherwise noted, as for example in this citation, references to electronic case file 

numbers are to the docket in the case captioned above, No. 13-0007. 

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himself or herself without an attorney must appear personally or by courtesy appearance by an 

attorney admitted to the Bar of this Court and may not delegate that duty to any other individual, 

including husband or wife, or any other party on the same side appearing without an attorney.”)). 

General Yeager’s demeanor and behavior at the evidentiary hearing caused the 

court to be concerned that he was not competent to appear in this case without a lawyer. After 

several conferences and a further hearing, the court determined the appointment of a guardian ad 

litem was necessary. Order Nov. 10, 2015, ECF No. 223. The court declined to appoint 

Mrs. Yeager because she is not an attorney. A guardian ad litem who is not an attorney must find 

representation in turn, and General and Mrs. Yeager had been attempting to hire a lawyer for a 

year without success. Id. at 13–14, 16–17. Given her intervention, Mrs. Yeager also has interests 

in this litigation that potentially conflict with General Yeager’s interests, and she has taken 

inconsistent positions about his competence. See id. at 16. The court therefore appointed 

Mr. Houpt. Order Dec. 28, 2015, ECF No. 227. 

Mr. Houpt prepared a report, ECF No. 245, and the court held a status conference 

to discuss his findings, Minutes, ECF No. 254. Mr. Houpt was unable to make a concrete 

recommendation about how General Yeager’s interests could best be protected or about the 

fairness of the allegedly unauthorized settlement agreement. Mr. Houpt noted Mrs. Yeager’s 

suggestion that she could represent the joint interests of herself and General Yeager in total or be 

substituted as his guardian ad litem, Status Report at 7, ECF No. 245, which he confirmed at the 

hearing. Mr. Houpt opined that this change would leave General Yeager in no worse a situation 

than he is in now, but he believes General Yeager ideally would be represented by counsel. 

See id. 

After Mr. Houpt filed his report and before the most recent status conference, 

Mrs. Yeager moved to “intervene in all respects.” See Mot. Intervene, ECF No. 248; Mem. 

P. & A., ECF No. 248-1. She asks the court for an order allowing her “to protect and defend the 

interests of her husband.” Mem. at 2. She proposes two vehicles for her motion. 

First, she cites a document filed previously in this case, an “assignment of 

interest.” It purports to memorialize a June 2012 verbal assignment of General Yeager’s “rights 

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and interests in his name, image, and trademarks as it relates to his claims and causes of action 

against and by AT&T” from himself to Mrs. Yeager and himself “in joint ownership with rights 

of survivorship,” in exchange for $100. Yeager Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 222. The assignment is 

dated September 2, 2015, and bears two signatures, one identified as General Yeager’s and one as 

Mrs. Yeager’s. Id. Under Mrs. Yeager’s signature and typed signature line the following letters 

are written out in hand: “C. GCYI.” Id.

Second, Mrs. Yeager cites two sections of the California Code of Civil Procedure: 

(1) section 370, which provides, “A married person may be sued without his or her spouse being 

joined as a party, and may sue without his or her spouse being joined as a party in all actions”; 

and (2) section 371, which provides, “If a husband and wife are sued together, each may defend 

for his or her own right, but if one spouse neglects to defend, the other spouse may defend for that 

spouse’s right also.” 

Parsons Behle opposes Mrs. Yeager’s motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 256. It argues the 

motion is an improper request for reconsideration of the court’s previous orders. It also argues 

the assignment of rights is not enforceable and the statutory provisions are inapplicable to this 

situation, and that in any event, the motion is untimely. Mrs. Yeager filed a reply brief, 

explaining her disagreement on each point. ECF No. 257. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Whether Mrs. Yeager’s motion is better understood as a motion for 

reconsideration or as a motion to intervene in an additional capacity, the decision to grant or deny 

it is one of discretion. See Opp’n at 8–9 (arguing the motion is untimely); United States v. Alisal 

Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2004) (the timeliness of a motion to intervene is a 

“flexible concept” whose “determination is left to the district court’s discretion”); City of 

Los Angeles v. Santa Monica BayKeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (a district court has 

the authority and discretion to reconsider any previous non-final order). Given the delay already 

introduced to this case, the incremental prejudice caused by Mrs. Yeager’s delayed motion, if 

any, is minimal and does not by itself preclude its success. 

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As noted above, Mrs. Yeager suggests two means of asserting a joint marital 

interest: California Civil Code sections 370 and 371 and the assignment of rights. The court turns 

first to sections 370 and 371. 

A. California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 370 and 371 

Sections 370 and 371 cannot support Mrs. Yeager’s request. Assuming for sake of 

argument that these sections do not conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, see Shady 

Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398–99 (2010), and 

assuming they embody substantive California law, see In re Cty. of Orange, 784 F.3d 520, 527 

(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd. v. Cty. of Orange, Cal., 

136 S. Ct. 808 (2016), they would not apply to this case. 

Section 370 provides that a married person “may be sued” and “may sue” without 

his or her spouse. That has already happened: AT&T named General Yeager as a defendant in 

interpleader, and Mrs. Yeager intervened; neither General Yeager’s nor Mrs. Yeager’s 

appearance was a prerequisite for the other’s presence. Second, section 371 applies only “[i]f a 

husband and wife are sued together.”2

 That has not occurred. AT&T sued General Yeager 

separately, and Mrs. Yeager intervened independently and by her own conation. Nothing in these 

sections suggests that California law endows spouses with the substantive right to represent one 

another or a joint spousal interest in every action. 

Mrs. Yeager’s motion cannot be granted on the basis of these sections. 

B. The Assignment of Rights 

The assignment of rights could support Mrs. Yeager’s request if it is an 

enforceable contract. It evidences an assignment of General Yeager’s rights and interests in this 

case to himself and Mrs. Yeager jointly. See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 

1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011) (an interest is sufficiently protectable, such that intervention is 

appropriate, if it is “protectable under some law” and is related to the claims in the present 

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 On July 1, 2016, the Governor of California approved and the Secretary of State 

chaptered an amendment to section 371, which will replace the phrase “a husband and wife” with 

the word “spouses.” See 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 50 (West) (Senate Bill No. 1005). This 

change is intended to have only technical and nonsubstantive effect. See id. § 125. 

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litigation). But General Yeager’s diminished capacity, at least as early as March 2015, suggests 

caution. 

A contract is formed when two or more parties who are capable of contracting give 

consent, provided their agreement pursues a lawful object and is supported by “sufficient cause or 

consideration.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1550; accord, e.g., Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., 

118 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1230 (2004). In California, everyone is capable of contracting “except 

minors, persons of unsound mind, and persons deprived of civil rights.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1556. 

California law creates a rebuttable presumption that a person’s mind is unsound “if the person is 

substantially unable to manage his or her own financial resources or resist fraud or undue 

influence.” Id. § 39(b). These provisions should not be understood in an overly literal or extreme 

sense. Many people with very limited capacity understand their surroundings generally; rather, 

the “understanding” in question is an understanding of a contract’s subject matter and purpose. 

See Jacks v. Estee, 139 Cal. 507, 511 (1903). Incompetency to enter a contract may arise by age, 

physical condition, emotional state, or a combination of these factors. Smalley v. Baker, 

262 Cal. App. 2d 824, 834–35 (1968), disapproved of on other grounds, Weiner v. Fleischman, 

54 Cal. 3d 476 (1991). 

A person’s ability to enter a contract is related to his ability to give consent. 

Consent must be freely given. Cal. Civ. Code § 1565. For this reason a person “cannot be said to 

assent unless he is endowed with such degree of reason and judgment as will enable him to 

comprehend the subject of negotiation.” Jacks, 139 Cal. at 512–13 (citation, quotation marks, 

and alterations omitted). 

Here, during the March 2015 evidentiary hearing, the court developed substantial 

concerns that General Yeager did not understand the nature of this litigation and the underlying 

litigation with AT&T. See Order Mar. 26, 2015, ECF No. 169. Mrs. Yeager informed the court 

during the hearing that this was her fear as well. See Hr’g Tr. 106, ECF No. 178. The court’s 

concerns were amplified in the months leading up to the formal hearing on General Yeager’s 

competence in September 2015. See Order Nov. 10, 2015, at 2–9, ECF No. 223. These 

concerns—General Yeager’s age and his physical condition, the complicated nature of this case, 

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and Mrs. Yeager’s potentially conflicting interests—cast doubt on whether the assignment is an 

enforceable contract under California law. 

The assignment’s timing in this litigation is also concerning. Despite its 

description of an oral agreement struck in 2012, it is dated September 2, 2015. By that time, 

Mrs. Yeager had changed her position with respect to General Yeager’s competency. She argued 

he was competent, whereas a few months before she had asserted he was not. When the 

agreement was signed and filed, Mrs. Yeager had also taken the position that she should be 

appointed as General Yeager’s guardian ad litem, and alternatively, if she was not appointed, no 

appointment was necessary because she could protect his interests by serving as his English-toEnglish translator, a technique the court had tested at one point, and de facto attorney. See Order 

Nov. 10, 2015, at 2, 5, 16, ECF No. 223. 

For these reasons, before the hearing on Mrs. Yeager’s motion, the court asked 

Mr. Houpt to confirm whether General Yeager would challenge the assignment’s enforceability 

and whether the agreement remains in General Yeager’s best interests. At hearing, Mr. Houpt 

responded unequivocally that General Yeager would not challenge the assignment and that 

recognition of the assignment was in General Yeager’s best interests. Mr. Houpt responded that 

he had spoken privately to General Yeager before the hearing and had assured himself that 

General Yeager understood and agreed with the assignment’s purpose. Because it appears the 

assignment is at most voidable rather than void, compare Cal. Civ. Code § 38 with id. § 39(a), 

and General Yeager will not challenge its enforceability, the court concludes Mrs. Yeager 

possesses a joint interest with General Yeager in the damages award and attorneys’ fees awarded 

in the AT&T trial and interpleaded in this case and may intervene to protect that joint interest. 

At hearing, Parsons Behle also argued the assignment could not support Mrs. 

Yeager’s motion because it refers to General Yeager’s “name, image, and trademarks” and his 

“legal causes of action, assets, and rights to his trademarks,” but not to attorneys’ fees. This is an 

artificial distinction. The interpleaded funds include a damages award and an award of attorneys’ 

fees incurred in obtaining that damages award. Parsons Behle has cited no authority to support its 

position in this respect, which it also raised for the first time at hearing. Cf. Air Separation, Inc. 

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v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 45 F.3d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting in an unrelated 

context that “there exists no real distinction between judgments for attorneys’ fees and judgments 

for other items of damages” (citation omitted)). 

The court need not consider whether the interpleaded funds are a part of the 

Yeagers’ community property under California law. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Mrs. Yeager’s motion is granted to the extent she requests to intervene to 

represent her joint interests with General Yeager in this case, as memorialized in the assignment 

of his rights. 

At the status conference in June 2016 and at the hearing on this motion, Mr. Houpt 

reported that if Mrs. Yeager could represent her joint interest with General Yeager, General 

Yeager’s presence would no longer be necessary in this case. A substitution may be appropriate 

after a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c),3

 or General Yeager could be 

dismissed from this case as a defendant in interpleader. Within fourteen days, Mrs. Yeager and 

General Yeager, represented by his guardian ad litem, shall file an appropriate motion and 

proposed order of substitution or dismissal. 

In addition, within fourteen days, General Yeager shall file a notice, via his 

guardian ad litem, briefly explaining whether the General’s interests in this case, considered 

individually or together with Mrs. Yeager, require an expansion of the evidentiary record with 

regard to Parker White’s authority, as his former attorney, to enter the purported settlement 

agreement on his behalf. See generally Order, Nov. 21, 2014, ECF No. 139. By the same date, 

any other party may give notice of its position on this same question. 

A status conference is set for October 13, 2016, at 2:30 p.m. in Courtroom 

Three to set a schedule for the remainder of this case. A joint status report including a proposed 

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 “If an interest is transferred, the action may be continued by or against the original party 

unless the court, on motion, orders the transferee to be substituted in the action or joined with the 

original party. The motion must be served as provided in Rule 25(a)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c). 

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schedule shall be filed no later than October 6, 2016. In the court’s discretion, the matter may be 

submitted on this filing without the need for a conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 12, 2016. 

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