Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01053/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01053-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THERESA HUNTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, 

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01053-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

COMPEL ARBITRATION

Re: Dkt. Nos. 27, 28

Plaintiff Theresa Hunter brings this class case against defendants Kaiser Foundation Health 

Plan, Inc. (“Kaiser”) and its debt collector USCB, Inc. (“USCB”) under California and federal law 

based on defendants’ debt collection and credit reporting practices. Complaint, Dkt. No. 1. 

Hunter alleges that defendants regularly seek to unlawfully collect alleged balances from MediCal beneficiaries for Medi-Cal covered services and furnish information about those alleged debts 

to consumer credit reporting agencies. The question here on defendants’ motions to compel

arbitration is whether the arbitration provisions in Hunter’s contracts with Kaiser (that are 

identical in all respects) are valid. Federal law preempts California Health and Safety Code 

section 1363.1, so the arbitration provision applies, and it is neither procedurally or substantively 

unconscionable. It does not clearly contemplate class arbitration and does not prohibit the 

arbitrator from issuing public injunctive relief. For the reasons discussed below, the motions to 

compel arbitration by Kaiser and USCB are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

I. ALLEGATIONS

Medi-Cal, California’s medical assistance program, pays medical costs for eligible people 

of limited financial means. Compl. ¶ 12. A medical service provider that accepts Medi-Cal 

payments (a “Medi-Cal provider”) may not directly seek from the beneficiary any balance in 

excess of the amount approved by Medi-Cal; payment by Medi-Cal to the provider constitutes 

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payment in full. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Therefore, there can never be a remaining balance due by a 

beneficiary for Medi-Cal covered charges. Id. ¶ 15. Medi-Cal providers and debt collectors are 

also prohibited from furnishing information regarding the rendering of any Medi-Cal covered 

service to any consumer credit reporting agency. Id. ¶¶ 16-18.

In 2012, Hunter was a Medi-Cal beneficiary. She received medical services from Kaiser. 

Id. at ¶ 22. Despite that, Kaiser sought to collect from Hunter charges related to her Medi-Cal 

covered services. Id. at ¶ 25. It engaged third-party debt collector USCB to assist it. Id. at ¶ 26. 

In early 2018, Hunter reviewed copies of her credit files from three national consumer credit 

reporting agencies, Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union, because she was attempting to obtain a 

mortgage to assist with the financing of a home purchase. Id. at ¶ 28. At that time, she discovered 

USCB collection entries showing that she had an unpaid balance to Kaiser in excess of $9,000 for 

the Medi-Cal covered services from 2012. Id. at ¶ 29. 

Hunter disputed the appearance of the USCB entries with the credit reporting agencies and 

made several unsuccessful attempts to have the entries removed. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34. Experian 

contacted USCB about Hunter’s dispute and USCB contacted Kaiser, who confirmed to USCB 

and Experian that Hunter was responsible for the charges. Id. at ¶¶ 36-39. Hunter alleges that 

Kaiser also verified the debt to Trans Union and Equifax. Id. at ¶ 40.

Hunter then filed a complaint with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) 

which contacted the three credit reporting agencies, USCB, and the Office of the California 

Attorney General (the “AG”). Id. at ¶¶ 42-43. USCB responded to the CFPB that it would verify 

the debt again with Kaiser, that it had not bought Hunter’s debt, and that it was acting only as a 

third-party debt collector contracted by Kaiser. Id. at ¶¶ 44-47. The Public Inquiry Unit of the 

AG also notified Kaiser of Hunter’s charges. Id. at ¶ 48. On May 30, 2018, Kaiser admitted to the 

AG that Hunter had active Medi-Cal coverage when she received Kaiser’s services in 2012, that it 

had assigned the charges to collection, that Kaiser (not Hunter) was responsible for the bill, and 

that it had the power to “recall” the charges. Id. at ¶¶ 49-53.

Hunter states that she has been injured because she had lost the opportunity to secure 

financing for a home purchase and suffered harm to her credit score, harm to her reputation, 

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emotional distress, and time lost disputing Kaiser’s charges with USCB and the reporting 

agencies. Id. at ¶¶ 55-56. Hunter claims that Kaiser regularly attempts to collect money from 

Medi-Cal beneficiaries for covered services. Id. at ¶¶ 57-59, 63. She brings claims under the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681- 1681x, the Fair Debt Collection Practices 

Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p, the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies 

Act (“CCRAA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1785.1-1787.3, the California Unfair Competition Law 

(“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices 

Act (“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788-1788.33, and California common law, and seeks relief 

on a class-wide basis. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 74-164. 

II. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND ENROLLMENTS

Hunter has been a member of Kaiser since 2012. Between 2012 and 2017, she was 

enrolled in Kaiser’s Medi-Cal Managed Care in Contra Costa County. Declaration of Christine 

Nelson in Support of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration 

(“Nelson Decl.”) ¶ 10 [Dkt. No. 27-4]. In order to choose Kaiser as a health care provider through 

Medi-Cal, Hunter was required to fill out, sign, and return a “Medi-Cal Choice Form” to 

California Department of Health Care Services (“DHCS”). Id. ¶¶ 5,10. The Form states:

NOTICE: I have read the plan description. I understand that Kaiser 

requires the use of binding neutral arbitration to resolve certain 

disputes. This includes disputes about whether the right medical 

treatment was provided (called medical malpractice) and other 

disputes relating to benefits or the delivery of services. If I pick 

Kaiser, I give up my right to a jury or court trial for those certain 

disputes. I also agree to use binding neutral arbitration to resolve 

those certain disputes. I do not give up my right to a State hearing of 

any issue, which is subject to the State hearing process.

Medi-Cal Choice Form attached as Ex. A to Nelson Decl. [Dkt. No. 27-5]. This form has been 

used since at least 2012. Nelson Decl. ¶ 5. Hunter does not dispute that she signed this Medi-Cal 

Choice Form.

In 2018, Hunter enrolled in Kaiser through Covered California. Declaration of Vonya E. 

Taylor in Support of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Taylor 

Decl.”) ¶¶ 8-10 [Dkt. No. 27-6]. According to Kaiser, individuals may enroll in health benefit 

plans by accessing Covered California’s online enrollment system (“CalHEERS”) and may do so 

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directly or utilize the assistance of a certified agent in person or by telephone. Id. ¶ 5. 

If an enrollee utilizes the assistance of a certified agent, the agent will walk through the 

online enrollment forms and disclosures with the enrollee. Id. As part of Covered California’s 

online enrollment process, the enrollee receives a separate screen regarding binding arbitration 

that read in 2018 as follows: 

I understand that every participating health plan has its own rules for 

resolving disputes or claims, including, but not limited to, any claim 

asserted by me . . . against a health plan . . . about the membership in 

the health plan, the coverage for, or the delivery of, services or items 

. . . I understand that, if I select a health plan that requires binding 

arbitration to resolve disputes, I accept, and agree to, the use of 

binding arbitration to resolve disputes or claims (except for Small 

Claims Court cases and claims that cannot be subject to binding 

arbitration under governing law) and give up my right to a jury trial 

and cannot have the dispute decided in court, except as applicable law 

provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. I understand 

that the full arbitration provision for each participating health plan, if 

they have one, is in the health plan’s coverage document, which is 

available online at CoveredCA.com for my review, or I can call 

Covered California for more information. 

Covered California E-Signature Report from Enrollment attached as Ex. A to Nelson Decl., ¶ 5, 

Ex. A [“Covered California Form,” Dkt. No. 27-7]. Immediately after the enrollee is presented 

with the above text, the enrollee must provide an “eSignature” upon enrollment that states: “□ I 

Have Read And Agree To The Binding Arbitration Agreement.” Taylor Decl. at ¶ 6; Covered 

California Form. The enrollee cannot proceed further with enrollment if the enrollee does not 

attest to having read and agreed to the Binding Arbitration Agreement. Taylor Decl. ¶ 6. 

The Covered California enrollment system records and stores the electronic eSignature of 

the enrollee and the date on which the disclosure was signed. Id. The system also provides a 

record of that enrollment information to Kaiser. Id. Kaiser asserts, and Hunter does not dispute, 

that Hunter accessed CalHEERS with the assistance of a certified agent and that Kaiser accepted 

her membership application through Covered California in 2018. Taylor Decl. ¶ 8.

Kaiser claims that every Membership Agreement that is provided to or made available to 

participants following their enrollment includes a binding arbitration provision. Nelson Decl. ¶ 8.

The Arbitration Agreement in the 2018 Membership Agreement provides:

Arbitrations shall be governed by this “Binding Arbitration” section, 

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Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, and the California Code of 

Civil Procedure provisions relating to arbitration that are in effect at 

the time the statute is applied, together with the [Rules for Kaiser 

Permanente Member Arbitrations Overseen by the Office of the 

Independent Administrator], to the extent not inconsistent with this 

“Binding Arbitration” section. In accord with the rule that applies 

under Sections 3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, the right to 

arbitration under this “Binding Arbitration” section shall not be 

denied, stayed, or otherwise impeded because a dispute between a 

Member Party and a Kaiser Permanente Party involves both arbitrable 

and nonarbitrable claims or because one or more parties to the 

arbitration is also a party to a pending court action with a third party 

that arises out of the same or related transactions and presents a 

possibility of conflicting rulings or findings. 

2108 Individual Plan Combined Membership Agreement, Disclosure Form, and Evidence of 

Coverage for Kaiser Permanente for Individuals and Families (“Membership Agreement”) 

attached as Ex. C to Taylor Decl. [Dkt. No. 27-9]. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs motions to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 

1 et seq. Under the FAA, a district court determines: (i) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate 

exists and, if it does, (ii) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. Lifescan, Inc. v. 

Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). “To evaluate the validity of 

an arbitration agreement, federal courts should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the 

formation of contracts.” Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the court is satisfied “that the making of the 

arbitration agreement or the failure to comply with the agreement is not in issue, the court shall 

make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 

agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 

resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 

1, 24-25 (1983).

DISCUSSION

Kaiser and USCB move to compel Hunter to arbitrate her claims individually pursuant to 

an arbitration provision contained in Kaiser’s Membership Agreements to which Hunter agreed

every year since 2012. Kaiser’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Kaiser MTC”) [Dkt. No. 27-1]; 

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USCB, Inc. Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration (“USCB MTC”) [Dkt. No. 28].1 

I. THE APPLICABILITY OF CALIFORNIA HEALTH & SAFETY CODE SECTION

1363.1

Hunter counters, first, that no agreement to arbitrate was formed because Kaiser did not 

comply with Section 1363.1 of the California Health & Safety Code. Plaintiff’s Opposition 

(“Oppo.”) at 2-7 [Dkt. No. 33]. Section 1363.1 reads:

Any health care service plan that includes terms that require binding 

arbitration to settle disputes and that restrict, or provide for a waiver 

of, the right to a jury trial shall include, in clear and understandable 

language, a disclosure that meets all of the following conditions:

(a) The disclosure shall clearly state whether the plan uses binding 

arbitration to settle disputes, including specifically whether the plan 

uses binding arbitration to settle claims of medical malpractice.

(b) The disclosure shall appear as a separate article in the agreement 

issued to the employer group or individual subscriber and shall be 

prominently displayed on the enrollment form signed by each 

subscriber or enrollee.

(c) The disclosure shall clearly state whether the subscriber or 

enrollee is waiving his or her right to a jury trial for medical 

malpractice, other disputes relating to the delivery of service under 

the plan, or both, and shall be substantially expressed in the wording 

provided in subdivision (a) of Section 1295 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure.

(d) In any contract or enrollment agreement for a health care service 

plan, the disclosure required by this section shall be displayed 

immediately before the signature line provided for the representative 

of the group contracting with a health care service plan and 

immediately before the signature line provided for the individual 

enrolling in the health care service plan.

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1363.1.2 Courts have held that non-compliance with Section 1363.1 

 

1 Hunter does not oppose USCB’s motion to compel on any ground other than there is no 

enforceable agreement to arbitrate between herself and Kaiser. Dkt. No. 34. Accordingly, if I find 

that Hunter must arbitrate her claims against Kaiser, her claims against USCB will also be 

arbitrable.

2 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1295(a) provides: 

(a) Any contract for medical services which contains a provision for 

arbitration of any dispute as to professional negligence of a health 

care provider shall have such provision as the first article of the 

contract and shall be expressed in the following language: “It is 

understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as 

to whether any medical services rendered under this contract were 

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renders an arbitration provision in an enrollment form unenforceable. See Malek v. Blue Cross of 

California, 121 Cal.App.4th 44, 62-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 

Hunter argues that Kaiser fails to show that either of its enrollment processes -- the MediCal Choice Form used from 2012-2017, “Medi-Cal period”) or the CalHEERS online enrollment 

portal (used in 2018, “ACA period”) -- met the requirements of Section 1363.1. Oppo. at 4.3 

Kaiser counters that Section 1363.1 is irrelevant because it is preempted by the Patient Protection 

and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq. (“ACA”) with respect to the CALHEERS 

enrollment/ACA period and by the federal Medicaid Act with respect to the Medi-Cal period. 

Kaiser Reply at 5-8. Kaiser also argues that if Section 1363.1 applies, the Medi-Cal Choice Form 

and the CalHEERS portal disclosures comply with Section 1363.1 Id. at 2-5.

A. Preemption in General

Courts have consistently held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not preempt 

Section 1363.1 because the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. § 1011 et. seq.) preserves the 

ability of states like California to regulate the insurance industry. See Brown v. Kaiser Found. 

Health Plan, Inc., No. E069356, 2019 WL 2539179, *4 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2019); Imbler v. 

PacifiCare of Cal., Inc., 103 Cal.App.4th 567, 571-573 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (purpose of the 

McCarran-Ferguson Act was to insure that states would continue to enjoy broad authority over

regulating dealings between insurers and their policyholders); Smith v. PacifiCare Behavioral 

Health of Cal., Inc., 93 Cal.App.4th 139, 152-162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same). Nonetheless, 

Kaiser argues that Section 1363.1 is preempted because the insurance contracts at issue here are 

 

unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly, negligently or 

incompetently rendered, will be determined by submission to 

arbitration as provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or 

resort to court process except as California law provides for 

judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this 

contract, by entering into it, are giving up their constitutional right 

to have any such dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, 

and instead are accepting the use of arbitration.” 

3 Hunter notes and Kaiser admits that Kaiser does not possess a copy of any Medi-Cal Choice

Forms signed by Hunter because all such forms are sent directly to the California Department of 

Health Care Services (“DHCS”). Oppo. at 4; Kaiser 2 n.1. She does not dispute (by declaration 

or otherwise) that she signed the generic Medi-Cal Enrollment Form produced by Kaiser in 

support of its motion.

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governed by federal law--namely, ACA during the ACA period and the federal Medicaid Act and 

its regulations during the Medi-Cal period—and not state law. Kaiser Reply at 5-8. 

B. ACA Period

In order to receive federal insurance premium assistance in 2018, Hunter selected and 

secured coverage – required under the ACA – through the CalHEERS portal. The ACA provides 

that “[n]othing in this title shall be construed to preempt any State law that does not prevent the 

application of the provisions of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d). But Kaiser argues that the 

requirements of Section 1363.1 actually conflict with and prevent the application of numerous 

mandates of the ACA, particularly the provisions requiring state exchanges like CalHEERS to 

allow enrollment online and with the use of call center agents.

4 Therefore, Section 1363.1’s 

requirements regarding how arbitration agreements must be disclosed and agreed to are preempted 

and cannot apply to Hunter’s ACA enrollment.

5

 

A recent unpublished California Court of Appeal decision is consistent with Kaiser’s 

argument and is persuasive. Simon v. Blue Cross of California, B292118, 2019 WL 5677552 

(Cal. App. 2d Dist. Nov. 1, 2019) (unpublished) concluded that enrollment through California’s 

online portal preempted application of Section 1363.1’s requirements. The court explained that as 

part of California’s creation of its ACA exchange, several statutes and promulgating regulations 

were passed by the California legislature. Id. *6. In particular, the “Covered California board” in 

 

4 The requirements of the ACA and its implementing regulations that Kaiser contends conflict 

with Section 1363.1’s requirements are: requiring websites to provide standardized information 

and access to the health plan’s written policy, approved by HHS, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 18083(b), 42 U.S.C § 300gg-15(b)(3)(A); requiring the website to provide information that 

assists consumers with submitting the eligibility application, clarifying the distinctions among 

health coverage options, including [Qualified Health Plans (“QHP”), helping consumers make 

informed decisions during the health coverage selection process,” 45 C.F.R. § 155.210(e)); 

requiring state-based exchanges utilize a website to allow consumers to apply and enroll in 

exchange coverage, 45 C.F.R. § 155.205(b)(7); requiring exchanges to allow applicants to enroll 

through call centers with the help of agents, 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.220(c)(1) & 155.405(c); and 

requiring exchanges to use a single, streamlined application process approved by HHS. 45 C.F.R. 

§ 155.405(a)-(b)).

5 For example, 1363.1(d) requires that “the disclosure required by this section shall be displayed 

immediately before the signature line.” See also Rodriguez v. Blue Cross of California, 162 Cal. 

App. 4th 330, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that each disclosure required by Section 1363.1 

must be contained where the enrollee signs, so that evidence of coverage, such as the membership 

agreement here, cannot be incorporated by reference).

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charge of setting up the exchange “promulgated regulations describing the enrollment process the 

exchange would follow in exhaustive detail,” including “the requirements for the ‘single, 

streamlined application’” and “the specific language the Covered California application was to use 

when disclosing binding arbitration requirements that may be incorporated in health plans that 

would be offered on the exchange.” Id. The court held that the regulations enacted by California 

to operate the exchange, including those that “establishe[d] Covered California’s mandated 

arbitration disclosure [ ] limit the extent of Section 1363.1’s applicability.” Id. at *7.

I agree with this reasoning. Given the extensive regulation under both the ACA itself and 

its implementation by the State of California that govern how applicants can enroll and the 

mandated methods of disclosing the existence of arbitration required by the underlying health care 

plans, I hold that the requirements of Section 1363.1 do not apply to Hunter’s enrollment and her 

agreement to the arbitration provisions of the Kaiser health plan during the ACA period.

C. Medi-Cal Period

Kaiser also argues that the Federal Medicaid Act preempts Section 1363.1 with respect to 

the Medi-Cal Choice Forms executed by Hunter between 2012 and 2017. Kaiser Reply at 7-8. In 

support, Kaiser relies on decisions from this District that conclude in light of extensive 

implementing regulations adopted under the Medicare Act that the requirements of Section 1363.1

were preempted for Medicare Advantage enrollees in Kaiser plans. In Clay v. Permanente Med. 

Grp., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106-11 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Conti, J.) the court noted that the 

Medicare Act preempts all state regulations of Medicare Advantage plans not relating to licensing 

or plan solvency, including marketing materials, election forms, and disclosure requirements.6

The court found that the arbitration provision, contained in the evidence of coverage (“EOC”), was 

“marketing material” approved by the body charged with issuing regulations under the Medicare 

Act (CMS). Because Section 1363.1 purported to regulate the adequacy of the arbitration

disclosures in the EOC, it was preempted. Id.

Kaiser argues that based on the reasoning in Clay, the Medicaid Act should have a similar 

 

6 The second case cited by Kaiser is Drissi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 

1077 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Conti, J.). It is a follow-up to Clay and mirrors the same analysis.

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preemptive effect because it has similar standards and disclosure requirements. Hunter counters

that Clay (and Drissi) are inapposite because those decisions rely on the exhaustive regulations 

and CMS review and approval of materials for plans under the Medicare Act, which were not 

similarly adopted or utilized for plans funded through Medi-Cal. I need not resolve this dispute.

Assuming that the Medicaid Act and its regulations do not have the same preemptive effect as the 

Medicare Act and its implementing regulations, as discussed below I conclude that the Medi-Cal 

Choice Form satisfies Section 1363.1.

II. COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 1363.1

Kaiser argues that if Section 1363.1 applies to the Medi-Cal period, the Medi-Cal Choice 

Form satisfies those requirements. The Medi-Cal Choice Form Hunter signed (or does not dispute 

she signed) provides the following “notice” almost immediately above the signature line:

NOTICE: I have read the plan description. I understand that Kaiser 

requires the use of binding neutral arbitration to resolve certain 

disputes. This includes disputes about whether the right medical 

treatment was provided (called medical malpractice) and other 

disputes relating to benefits or the delivery of services. If I pick 

Kaiser, I give up my right to a jury or court trial for those certain 

disputes. I also agree to use binding neutral arbitration to resolve 

those certain disputes. I do not give up my right to a State hearing of 

any issue, which is subject to the State hearing process.

CHOICE STATEMENT: I/We have made the written choice to 

receive Medi-Cal benefits through the medical plans as I/we have 

indicated on this form. I/We have read and understand the conditions 

of this agreement. I/we understand that in order to change my/our 

current Medi-Cal Health plan, I/We must complete this form.

[SIGNATURE LINE].

Medi-Cal Choice Form, Dkt. No. 27-5.

Hunter argues that the arbitration agreement does not satisfy Section 1363.1 because it is 

not “prominently displayed” as required by 1363.1(b); does not include wording required by 

1363.1(c); and is not “immediately” above the signature line as required by 1363.1(d). I disagree. 

The NOTICE is prominently displayed as it is set off from prior section on the page, the word 

“NOTICE” is in bold and all caps, and the section regarding disputes is underlined. This satisfies

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the prominent display requirement. 7 The NOTICE is also, effectively, immediately above the 

signature line, satisfying (d). 

Moreover, it is questionable whether the language required by 1363.1(c) applies at all

because Kaiser is a licensed health care service plan under the Knox-Keene Health Care Service 

Plan Act and Section 1295(a) applies to disputes “as to professional negligence of a health care 

provider.” See Code Civ. Proc. § 1295(a). Because this is not a medical malpractice claim 

asserted against a provider, the fact that the Medi-Cal Choice Form does not include the language 

mandated by Section 1295(a) is not relevant. In any event, the language actually used in the 

Medi-Cal Choice Form substantially complies with (c), which is all that is required because it 

clearly informs the reader that the medical malpractice and other claims are subject to arbitration.

If not preempted, I conclude that the requirements of Section 1363.1 were satisfied in the 

Medi-Cal Choice Form.

III. UNCONSIONABLITY

Hunter also argues that the Arbitration Agreement should not be enforced because it is 

both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Whether a contract is unconscionable is a 

question of law. Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1659, 1663 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1993). In California, unconscionability includes an “absence of meaningful choice on the 

part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the 

other party.” Lhotka v. Geographic Expeditions, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 4th 816, 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2010) (citation omitted). Accordingly, unconscionability has both a “procedural” and a 

 

7 Hunter relies on Burks v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 160 Cal. App. 4th 1021 (Cal. App. 3d 

Dist. 2008), which affirmed a trial court finding that an arbitration provision contained in the one 

page Kaiser enrollment form was not “prominently displayed.” There, however, “the arbitration 

disclosure [was]printed in typeface that is substantially the same or smaller than the typeface used 

on the rest of the enrollment form, and that typeface is not highlighted, italicized, or bolded. The 

notice also lacks any kind of heading. It is simply a paragraph of small text at the end of the 

enrollment form immediately above the space for the enrollee's signature.” Id. at 1025. Here, the 

Medi-Cal Choice Form uses a bolded NOTICE and underlined text to draw attention to the 

agreement to arbitrate, and the font size is consistent with the majority of the font size in the Form. 

Dkt. No. 27-5. See also Imbler v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc., 103 Cal. App. 4th 567 (Cal. App. 4th 

Dist. 2002) (agreement does not satisfy Section 1363.1’s prominence requirement where sentence 

was written in the middle of the authorization for the release of medical records, was in the same 

font as the rest of the paragraph, and was not bolded, underlined or italicized).

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“substantive” element. Id. 

Procedural unconscionability occurs where a contract or clause involves oppression, 

consisting of a lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, or surprise, such as where the term at 

issue is hidden within a wordy document. Id. “California law treats contracts of adhesion, or at 

least terms over which a party of lesser bargaining power had no opportunity to negotiate, as 

procedurally unconscionable to at least some degree.” Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks 

Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). Substantive unconscionability occurs where 

the provision at issue “reallocates risks in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.” 

Lhotka, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 821 (citation omitted). “Substantive unconscionability focuses on the 

one-sidedness or overly harsh effect of the contract term or clause.” Id. at 824-25 (citation 

omitted). Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be found before a term will be 

deemed unenforceable, but both need not be present to the same degree. Rather, “the more 

substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is 

required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” Armendariz v. 

Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (Cal. 2000).

Hunter contends that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it was a 

contract of adhesion that she was forced to enter (as she had only limited choice, and under the 

ACA had to select at least one plan) and because the actual terms of the Agreement were not 

provided until after she agreed to arbitration through the one page form or online enrollment 

portal. The Agreement is substantively unconscionable, she argues, because: (1) it prevents her

from recovering attorney fees if successful, which would be available to her under the consumer 

protection statutes she invokes; (2) it forces her to share costs of arbitration with Kaiser, which she 

would not normally bear in litigation; and (3) its rules of arbitration are skewed in favor of Kaiser, 

which helped develop the rules.

A. Procedural Unconscionability

Hunter asserts that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it resulted from 

a contract of adhesion forced upon her by a substantially more powerful party. Oppo. at 9-10. 

She claims that as a person of limited means who was required to maintain minimum effective 

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coverage under the ACA, she only had three health plans from which to select coverage. Id. The

absence of meaningful choice, she argues, supports a finding of procedural unconscionability. Id. 

She also asserts that the arbitration provision’s terms were disclosed in a confusing way within a 

lengthy (111-page) document that covered a wide array of subjects and was provided to her only 

after she had purportedly agreed to them. Id. Therefore, she claims that she was not given a fair 

opportunity to review the full nature and extent of the arbitration provision before she signed it. 

Id.

Kaiser counters that Hunter had a meaningful choice between three plans. She chose 

Kaiser each year since at least 2012, showing that she preferred Kaiser over other health plan 

options. Kaiser Reply at 9-10. She also had the opportunity to review her Medi-Cal Choice Form 

and Membership Agreement each year since 2012; each Membership Agreement contained the 

same binding arbitration clause. Nelson Decl., ¶¶ 8, 10. The Membership Agreement clearly 

labels the “Binding Arbitration” clause, describes the terms in plain language, and lists the clause 

in the table of contents. Membership Agreement [Dkt. No. 27-9] at TOC, 65. Additionally, the 

Medi-Cal Choice Form that Hunter filled out each year from 2012 to 2017 provided “NOTICE . . . 

that Kaiser requires the use of binding arbitration to resolve certain disputes. . . .” And when she 

enrolled through Covered California in 2018, she was prompted to review and check a box 

acknowledging that “the full arbitration provision for each participating health plan . . . is in the 

health plan’s coverage document, which is available online at CoveredCA.com for [her] review, or 

[she] can call Covered California for more information.” Id. (citing Medi-Cal Choice Form; 

Covered California E-Signature Report from Enrollment, attached as Ex. A to Taylor Decl. [Dkt. 

No. 27-7]).

Because the Membership Agreement agreed to through Medi-Cal Choice Forms and 

CalHEERS e-signature page was a contract of adhesion, it is “procedurally unconscionable to at 

least some degree.” Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Fran. Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1004 

(9th Cir. 2010) (in California, “contracts of adhesion, or at least terms over which a party of lesser 

bargaining power had no opportunity to negotiate, [are] procedurally unconscionable to at least 

some degree.” ). But that limited degree of unconscionability is as far as it goes. 

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Hunter cites to Stiener v. Apple Computer, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 

2008) for the proposition that a lack of market alternatives demonstrates procedural 

unconscionability. In Stiener, the court held that, at the time, the iPhone was the only 

“breakthrough” device and was unique among wireless products because it combined “into one 

small, lightweight, handheld device . . . desktop-class email, web browsing, searching and Google 

Maps.” Id. There were no alternative smartphones (unlike today) and the court held that this 

added an additional amount of procedural unconscionability. But that is not the case here. At 

least for the ACA period, Hunter had two other alternatives and she does not argue that something 

about these alternatives (or those available to her during the Medi-Cal period) rendered them 

illusory. Moreover, by the time Hunter signed up through CalHEERS in 2018, she had been 

provided an opportunity to review the Membership Agreement containing the same Arbitration 

Agreement for six years. 

Accordingly, the amount of procedural unconscionability is low. Hunter needs to 

demonstrate a high degree of substantive unconscionability in order to prevent enforcement of the 

arbitration provision against her. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114.

B. Substantive Unconscionability 

1. Fee Shifting and the Cost of Arbitration

Hunter contends that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it precludes 

her from seeking her attorney fees if successful and requires her to share the costs of arbitration 

with Kaiser. Oppo. at 10-13. Hunter identifies the problematic portions of the arbitration 

agreement as: (1) “each party shall bear the party’s own attorneys’ fees, witness fees, and other 

expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending against a claim regardless of the nature of the claim 

or outcome of the arbitration,” Membership Agreement at 67;

8

and (2) “[i]n any dispute between a 

Member and [Kaiser], each party will bear its own fees and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, 

 

8

 “Costs. Except for the aforementioned fees and expenses of the neutral arbitrator, and except as 

otherwise mandated by laws that apply to arbitrations under this "Binding Arbitration" section, 

each party shall bear the party's own attorneys' fees, witness fees, and other expenses incurred in 

prosecuting or defending against a claim regardless of the nature of the claim or outcome of the 

arbitration.” Membership Agreement at 67.

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advocates’ fees, and other expenses.” Id. at 70.9 

Regarding attorney fees, Hunter argues that without the fee-shifting incentives present in 

consumer protection statutes she invokes in this case (CCRAA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31(a) and 

FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o), consumers are left to fend for themselves without competent 

representation, undermining the intent of the California legislature and the United States Congress 

to incentivize private enforcement. Oppo. at 11. She asserts that by limiting the remedies 

provided to plaintiffs, the arbitration provision has a chilling effect on consumers’ pursuit of 

statutory consumer-protection claims while insulating Kaiser from liability. Id. She relies on 

Ridgeway v. Nabors Completion & Prod. Servs. Co., where the court held that arbitration 

provisions that “flatly prohibit the arbitrator from shifting discovery costs and expert fees to the

losing party, no matter the circumstances and even when California law dictates a different result,” 

were substantively unconscionable, but severable. Ridgeway v. Nabors Completion & Prod. 

Services Co., 725 Fed. Appx. 472, 474 (9th Cir. 2018). She contends that because the Agreement 

here prohibits fee shifting for various costs as well as attorney fees, the Agreement “effectively 

blocks every forum for the redress of disputes, including arbitration itself.” Oppo. at 10-11 (citing 

Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109, 1148 (Cal. 2013).

Kaiser does not respond to this point other than to argue that Hunter has not shown that she 

will incur more attorneys’ fees in arbitration than in Court. Id. That is not the point. It does not 

matter what fees Hunter incurs during the litigation itself. It matters that if she is successful, under 

California law she could recover her attorney fees. That law incentivizes attorneys and plaintiffs

to bring the consumer protection claims Hunter asserts in this case. See Cal. Civ. Code § 

1785.31(a)); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)(3), 1681o(b). If those incentives are removed, the vindication 

of California’s consumer protection statutes suffers. Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, 

Inc., 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 709–710 (2013) (finding arbitration agreement unconscionable because 

it deprived employee of a favorable fee-shifting rule under the California Fair Employment and 

 

9

“Attorney and Advocate Fees and Expenses. In any dispute between a Member and Health 

Plan, the Medical Group, or Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, each party will bear its own fees and 

expenses, including attorneys' fees, advocates' fees, and other expenses.” Id. at 70.

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Housing Act (FEHA)). To the extent this provision precludes Hunter from recovering attorney 

fees if she is successful, which is what is appears to intend on its face, it is substantively 

unconscionable.

Concerning Hunter’s challenge to the provision of the Arbitration Agreement imposing 

costs of arbitration upon her (that she would not have to bear in traditional litigation), she points to 

language that: “the fees and expenses of the neutral arbitrator shall be paid one-half by the 

Claimants and one-half by the Respondents.” Membership Agreement at 67.10 She contends

these costs can be substantial and that the consumer-protection statutes under which she brings 

suit do not burden consumers with these additional costs. Id. She also points out that in the 

Ridgeway case, the cost of arbitration provision was saved only because the court read it in 

conjunction with other language to conclude the claimant would pay “only $150—the rest of the 

fees ‘shall be borne equally by the Parties who are not Employees/Applicants.’” Id., 725 

Fed.Appx. at 474. As the California Supreme Court has recognized, “‘[I]t is substantively 

unconscionable to require a consumer to give up the right to utilize the judicial system, while 

imposing arbitral forum fees that are prohibitively high. Whatever preference for arbitration might 

exist, it is not served by an adhesive agreement that effectively blocks every forum for the redress 

of disputes, including arbitration itself.’” Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109, 

1144–45 (2013) (quoting Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal.App.4th 77, 90 (2003)).

Kaiser counters that Hunter has failed to meet her burden to show that arbitration would be 

prohibitively expensive. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) 

(“[A] party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement because arbitration would be 

prohibitively expensive bears the burden of showing this likelihood.”). It notes that under the 

Rules of the Office of the Independent Administrator (“OIA”), which govern Kaiser arbitrations, a 

 

10

“Payment of arbitrators' fees and expenses. Health Plan will pay the fees and expenses of the 

neutral arbitrator under certain conditions as set forth in the Rules of Procedure. In all other 

arbitrations, the fees and expenses of the neutral arbitrator shall be paid one-half by the Claimants 

and one-half by the Respondents. If the parties select party arbitrators, Claimants shall be 

responsible for paying the fees and expenses of their party arbitrator and Respondents shall be 

responsible for paying the fees and expenses of their party arbitrator.” Id. at 67.

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claimant may shift the obligation of paying fees and expenses, the filing fees and the fees for the 

arbitrator, to Kaiser. Id. (citing OIA Rules 12, 13).11 Rules 12 and 13 allow the claimant to seek a 

waiver of both the $150 filing fee as well as the claimant’s share of the neutral’s fee. Kaiser also 

contends that Hunter can ask Kaiser to pay the entire cost of the arbitration and submits evidence 

that it has paid the entire cost of the neutral arbitration in 93% of cases that closed in 2018. OIA 

Report, p. xi.12

Kaiser’s arguments have some persuasive authority. But as the California Supreme Court 

has explained, “imposing arbitral forum fees that are prohibitively high” is unconscionable. 

Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc., 57 Cal. 4th at 1144–45. That plaintiffs apparently need to proceed to 

arbitration against Kaiser and then see whether they will receive a fee waiver is problematic. 

2. Use of OIA Rules

Hunter also argues that Kaiser’s use of its “own” OIA rules, as opposed to the commonly 

used rules of either the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) or Judicial Arbitration and 

Mediation Services (“JAMS”), is unconscionable. Oppo. at 12-13. She alleges that Kaiser has 

designed the rules and governing body to favor itself because the OIA exists only to “administer [] 

arbitrations between Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and its California health plan members.” 

Id. Even if a non-OIA arbitrator were selected, she would have been vetted and selected by the 

OIA and required to apply the OIA Rules. Id. 

Hunter says that this raises concerns of arbitral bias. See Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 

F.3d 987, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). In Pokorny, the Ninth Circuit considered the mandated use of the 

defendant-trained arbitrators, concluding that use of those arbitrators was to defendant’s 

advantage, a fact about which claimants were not informed. Id. at 1003. The Pokorny court 

concluded that the mandated use of those arbitrators was a contributing factor to the substantive 

unconscionability of the arbitration agreement. 

 

11 Kaiser asks me to take judicial notice of the OIA Rules, available at https://www.oiakaiserarb.com/pdfs/Rules.pdf. That request is GRANTED.

12 Kaiser also asks me to take judicial notice of the OIA Report that plaintiff relies upon in her 

Opposition at https://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/2018-Annual-Report.pdf. That request is 

GRANTED.

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Kaiser counters that Hunter’s suggestions of bias are unfounded. In 2018, 48% of 

arbitration claimants received compensation from Kaiser, either as a result of settlement or

hearing. OIA Report, p. xi. It also notes that the arbitrators on the OIA panel are neutral and have 

plaintiff, defendant, and judicial backgrounds. Id. at xii. It points out that all OIA arbitrators are 

required to follow the Ethics Standards set forth in the California Rules of Court and AAA Code 

of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. OIA Rule 4. It concludes that there is nothing 

substantively unconscionable about requiring arbitration before an OIA arbitrator.

I find that on the limited record before me, the use of OIA rules raises the slight specter of 

arbitral bias. But Hunter has failed to point out any particular OIA rule that would, as she says, 

“place a finger on the scale” in Kaiser’s favor. In addition, she does not identify any particular 

selection criteria or training mandated by Kaiser for OIA arbitrators that was undisclosed or would 

lead to Kaiser’s advantage. Absent additional evidence, I cannot conclude that use of OIA 

arbitrators creates a substantively unconscionable advantage for Kaiser.

3. Severability

Kaiser does not directly address severability of any substantively unconscionable 

provision, but its co-defendant USCB suggests that I sever the unconscionable substantive 

provisions rather than refuse to enforce the Agreement in its entirety. USCB, Inc.’s Reply at 8-9 

[Dkt. No. 40]. Hunter opposes severance, arguing that because the Agreement is “permeated” 

with unconscionability, the whole agreement is “tainted with illegality” and severance is not 

appropriate. However, as noted above, it is only the attorney fees and cost-splitting provisions 

that I have determined are substantively unconscionable. Those discrete provisions can be severed

without rewriting or defeating the purpose of the mutually agreed-to arbitration provision. See, 

e.g., Baker v. Acad. of Art Univ. Found., No. 17-CV-03444-JSC, 2017 WL 4418973, at *5 (N.D. 

Cal. Oct. 5, 2017) (severing was warranted because “California courts prefer to sever provisions 

rather than hold an entire agreement unenforceable[,]” the provision at issue was not integral to the 

remaining terms and was easily severable, and in light of the strong public policy favoring 

arbitration). 

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IV. CLASS OR INDIVIDUAL ARBITRAITON

Hunter argues that if arbitration of any of her claims is required, the arbitration should be 

on a class-wide basis in light of the clear terms of the applicable Arbitration Agreements. I 

disagree.

The Supreme Court has held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit 

to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” 

Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). This is because “the 

differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, 

consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of 

class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.” Id. at 

687. The Court recently reaffirmed Stolt in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019), 

holding that under the FAA an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary contractual 

basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. “Like silence, ambiguity 

does not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to 

‘sacrifice[ ] the principal advantage of arbitration.” Id. at 1416.

Hunter contends that the arbitration provision expressly contemplates plural and therefore 

class-wide dispute resolution because included within the “Scope of Arbitration” in the Agreement

are claims where, “[t]he claim is asserted by one or more Member Parties against one or more 

Kaiser Permanente Parties or by one or more Kaiser Permanente Parties against one or more 

Member Parties.” Membership Agreement at 67 (emphasis added). She points out that in nine of 

the eleven times the Agreement uses the word “Claimant,” it is the plural “Claimants.”13 

The references to plural parties or claimants, at best, only create the kind of ambiguity that 

the Supreme Court addressed in Lamps Plus. Reading the relevant provisions of the Agreement in 

full, in particular the “Binding Arbitration” section at pages 65-67, there is no clear provision for 

 

13 See Arbitration Agreement at 67 (“Initiating arbitration. Claimants shall initiate arbitration by 

serving a Demand for Arbitration. The Demand for Arbitration shall include the basis of the claim 

against the Respondents; the amount of damages the Claimants seek in the arbitration; the names, 

addresses, and telephone numbers of the Claimants and their attorney, if any; and the names of all 

Respondents. Claimants shall include in the Demand for Arbitration all claims against 

Respondents that are based on the same incident, transaction, or related circumstances.”),

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class-wide or group arbitration. The plural references relied on by Hunter are mostly general 

references to how arbitration of individual claims proceed, not commitments to allowing multiple 

claims to be grouped in one proceeding. Hunter must arbitrate her claims individually.

V. PUBLIC INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Hunter also asks that if she is compelled to arbitrate her claims, I should retain jurisdiction 

over and proceed to litigate her claims in Counts 1, 2, 3, and 8 because they seek “public 

injunctive relief” and are not arbitrable under McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945 (Cal. 

2017).14 In McGill, the California Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement precluding a 

consumer from seeking injunctive relief otherwise authorized by California’s consumer protection 

statutes in any forum was “invalid and unenforceable under state law insofar as it purports to 

waive McGill’s statutory right to seek such relief.” McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 961; see also Blair v. 

Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 928 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming that the FAA did not preempt the 

McGill rule and finding district court did not err by refusing to stay non-arbitrable claims). The

McGill Court explained that “public injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false 

advertising law is relief that has ‘the primary purpose and effect of” prohibiting unlawful acts that 

threaten future injury to the general public.’ . . . Relief that has the primary purpose or effect of 

redressing or preventing injury to an individual plaintiff—or to a group of individuals similarly 

situated to the plaintiff—does not constitute public injunctive relief.” McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 955 

(internal citations omitted). 

Kaiser argues that because the Agreement at issue here does not preclude public injunctive 

relief, the McGill rule is inapposite. It relies on Lee v. Postmates Inc., where a judge in this 

District addressed a similar arbitration agreement. In Lee, the court concluded that because the 

arbitration agreement (which included a class action waiver) did not prevent the arbitrator from 

awarding public injunctive relief, the McGill rule did not apply and the claims were subject to 

 

14 Count 1 alleges Violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1785.25(a); Count 2 alleges Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(b); Count 3 alleges violation of Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210; and Count 8 alleges violation of Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788-1788.33.

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arbitration. Lee v. Postmates Inc., 18-CV-03421-JCS, 2018 WL 4961802, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

15, 2018), motion to certify appeal granted, 18-CV-03421-JCS, 2019 WL 1864442 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 25, 2019); see also Ionescu v. Extra Space Storage Inc., 19-CV-02226-YGR, 2019 WL 

3997480, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2019) (“That the Arbitration Provision prohibits plaintiffs 

from proceeding ‘on a representative basis’ . . . does not mean that an arbitrator cannot award 

injunctive relief benefiting the public at large. As McGill itself makes clear, an action seeking 

public injunctive relief is not a “representative action.”); Garcia v. Kakish, 1:17-CV-00374-JLT, 

2017 WL 2773667, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 1:17-

CV-00374-JLT, 2017 WL 4325777 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017) (declining to invalidate arbitration 

agreement under McGill where there were was no “explicit provision waiving a buyer’s right to 

seek public injunctive relief, and no agreement between the parties regarding whether the effect of 

the provision constitutes such a waiver.”).

Hunter points to nothing in the Agreement here that would preclude the arbitrator from 

awarding public injunctive relief. The McGill rule does not apply. All of Hunter’s claims will be 

sent to arbitration.15

CONCLUSION

Kaiser’s and USBC’s motions to compel arbitration are GRANTED in full, except that the 

substantively unconscionable provisions concerning fee shifting and the costs of arbitration as 

identified above are severed and unenforceable. This case will be administratively closed pending 

completion of the arbitration. Every 180 days from the date below, counsel shall file a joint Status 

Update informing me about the status of the arbitration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2020

William H. Orrick

United States District Judge

 

15 For this reason, I need not determine whether the injunctive relief Hunter seeks is more akin to 

public injunctive relief or private injunctive relief.

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