Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01375/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01375-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

A.G.,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SISKIYOU, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01375-DJC-CKD

ORDER

As a child, Plaintiff A.G. and her siblings were removed from her biological 

parents. Plaintiff and her siblings were placed in foster care and later adopted by their 

foster family. Plaintiff and her siblings were allegedly subject to sexual, physical, and 

emotional abuse in that household. Plaintiff is now proceeding with this action against 

Defendants County of Siskiyou, Jennifer Moody, and Children First Foster Agency 

based on allegations that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s civil rights and acted 

negligently in failing to ensure Plaintiff’s safety in Plaintiff’s foster home.

County Defendants (Defendant County of Siskiyou and Defendant Moody) seek 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as time-barred and Plaintiff’s Monell

claims fail as a matter of law. (Mot. (ECF No. 13-1).) County Defendants also argue 

that the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction and strike Plaintiff’s request for 

punitive damages against Defendant County of Siskiyou. (Id.)

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For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims with leave to amend and grants Defendants’ Motion to 

Strike. As leave to amend will be granted, the Court denies as moot Defendants’ 

request for the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

I. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted if the complaint 

lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a 

cognizable legal theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

The Court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 

919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give 

rise to an entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed 

factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule 

demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the 

claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or 

formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). This evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

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II. Discussion

A. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

1. Applicable Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 

The Supreme Court has clearly instructed that when there are multiple statutes of 

limitations, courts “should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury 

actions . . .” as the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 actions. Owens v. 

Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). Based on this, for claims arising in California, courts 

consistently apply California’s two-year statute of limitations found in Code of Civil 

Procedure section 335.1. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims are subject to a 

two-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. The 

abuse underlying Plaintiff’s claims allegedly occurred between 2005 and 2014. 

(Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 15–16.) The present action was initially filed on May 10, 2024. 

(See Compl.) If Plaintiff’s claims accrued in 2014 and were not tolled, the statute of 

limitations would have run at some time in 2016 and the Complaint would be 

untimely. Thus, to proceed on these claims, Plaintiff must either establish that her 

claims accrued at a later date and/or that those claims were tolled.

2. Date of Accrual

While Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of 

limitation, that limitation period runs from the date of accrual. When a section 1983 

claim accrues is “a matter of federal law, ‘governed by federal rules conforming in 

general to common-law tort principles.’” Gregg v. Hawaii, Dept. of Pub. Safety, 870 

F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017). Accrual of section 1983 claims is thus dictated by the 

“discovery rule” which determines a claim has accrued “when the plaintiff knows or 

has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action and the cause of that 

injury.” Id. This does not mean that a plaintiff must be aware of the full extent of the 

injuries for accrual to occur and a plaintiff must still be “diligent in discovering the 

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critical facts.” Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Rsch. Found. Inc., 188 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 

1999).

When exactly a plaintiff’s claims accrued is generally a question of fact. Polar 

Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff argues that 

County Defendants’ Motion should be denied as her Complaint does not, on its face, 

show that Plaintiff’s claims had already accrued and fully run by the time of filing. 

However, Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks any information from which a date of accrual 

could be determined. A plaintiff must allege facts that support that a complaint is 

timely filed. See Chestra v. Davis, 747 Fed. Appx. 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing 

Gregg, 870 F.3d at 887). This necessarily requires that Plaintiff plead facts that 

support a date of accrual that establishes the complaint is timely filed.

Given Plaintiff has not included any factual allegations in this regard, County 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend 

as it is not apparent at this stage that amendment would be futile.

3. Tolling

Though Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support delayed accrual, 

the Court applies state tolling rules to the extent they are consistent with the 

Constitution and laws of the United States. Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 

651 (1983). Plaintiff argues that her claims are tolled under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 340.1 and Insurance Code section 11583.

i. Insurance Code Section 11583

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support the applicability of Insurance

Code section 11583. This statute only tolls the running of a limitations period where 

the recipient of advance or partial payment for damages has not been notified of the 

relevant statute of limitations period for any claims the recipient may have. See Cal. 

Ins. Code § 11583. Plaintiff has not alleged that she received an advance or partial 

payment, thus this tolling statute does not apply. (See Compl.)

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ii. Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1

Until January 1, 2024, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 contained both 

statute of limitations provisions and tolling provisions. The version of section 340.1 

that was in effect between 2003 and 2018 as well as the version in effect in 20191

provided in Subsection (a):

In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of 

childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of 

the action shall be within eight years of the date the 

plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of 

the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have 

discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring 

after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, 

whichever period expires later, for any of the following 

actions:

(1) An action against any person for committing an act 

of childhood sexual abuse.

(2) An action for liability against any person or entity 

who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a 

wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity 

was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse 

which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.

(3) An action for liability against any person or entity 

where an intentional act by that person or entity was 

a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which 

resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.1 (2018); see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.1 (2019).

As discussed by the California Supreme Court in Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1, 3 Cal.

5th 903 (2017), this subsection (a) provision, as it existed at that time, provided both a 

limitation period for claims based on childhood sexual abuse and a basis for tolling 

such claims. This version of Section 340.1 tolls a plaintiff’s claims until they reach the 

1 The Complaint does not contain a specific statement of Plaintiff’s birth date but states she was 24 

years old at the time of filing. This would put either the 2003–2018 version or the 2019 version of 

Section 340.1 as the version in effect at the time Plaintiff reached 18 years old. Subsection (a) of both 

the 2018 and 2019 versions is identical though, so the distinction between the versions is not 

meaningful. While several different versions of Section 340.1 were enacted in the intervening years

between 2018/2019 and the date of filing, the tolling portions of Section 340.1 remained the same

across these versions except for the version enacted this year (2024). As such, it is unimportant at this 

stage, to distinguish between these different versions of Section 340.1.

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date of majority or until the plaintiff “discovers or reasonably should have discovered 

that psychological injury or illness” after the date of majority. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 340.1 (2018); see Quarry v. Doe I, 53 Cal. 4th 945, 981 (2012) (stating that Section 

340.1 “recognize[d] that a delayed awareness that adult psychological injury was 

caused by childhood abuse would justify tolling the limitations period for the 

underlying claim against the perpetrator.”) The 2018 and 2019 versions of Section 

340.1 also apply a statute of limitations of eight years or three years, depending on 

how the claim accrued. See Rubenstein, 3 Cal. 5th at 909 n.1 (describing the eight 

and three year periods for commencement of an action as a limitation period). Thus, 

section 340.1, as it was in effect at that time Plaintiff became 18 years old, contained 

both a statutory tolling provision and a statute of limitations.2

As discussed, in a section 1983 action the Court only applies the general twoyear statute of limitations for personal injury actions. However, the Court does apply 

state tolling provisions, provided they are consistent with the Constitution and federal 

law. Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906, 907 (9th Cir. 1989). Defendants argue that no 

court has applied Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 as a tolling statute for section 

1983 claims. This appears to be true3, but it is not immediately apparent that the 

2 The Court notes that a new version of section 340.1 was enacted on January 1, 2024. This is the 

presently operative version of section 340.1. Unlike prior version, this current version does not contain 

the tolling provisions that were previously present. Instead, it simply states that “there is no time limit 

for the commencement of any action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual 

assault . . . .” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.1 (2024). However, even if the removal of the tolling language 

applies to Plaintiff and ceased the tolling of her action, it would not affect Plaintiff’s claims given she has 

brought these claims within the two-year limitation period. Thus, the Court need not address how to 

handle the fact that the 2024 version of section 340.1 appears to only function as a statute of limitations.

3 One district court rejected application of section 340.1 as a statute of limitations for section 1983 

claims and thus found this to be inapplicable under Owens. Dutro v. County of Contra Costa, No. 12-cv02972-NC, 2013 WL 5444431, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013). However, that decision does not 

address the tolling portion of Section 340.1. Additionally, the district court appears to rely heavily on 

the fact that the Supreme Court in Owens cited Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 in a 

“nonexhaustive list” of states with multiple statutes of limitations. But the district court failed to 

recognize that the version of section 340.1 cited by Owens is from 1989. This version is substantially 

different in form from the more recent incarnations of section 340.1 and serves only a vaguely similar 

function in setting the statute of limitations for “actions based on incestuous relationship with a minor[.]” 

Owens, 488 U.S. at 244 n.8; see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.1 (1989). As such, Dutro is not helpful or 

applicable to any question presently before the Court.

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tolling provisions of section 340.1 would be inconsistent with the Constitution or the 

laws of the United States and thus, they may properly apply.

This point is ultimately irrelevant though. It is already undisputed by the parties 

that Plaintiff’s claims would be tolled until she reached the age of majority under a 

separate provision of the California Code of Civil Procedure, section 352. (See Mot. at 

4; Opp’n at 4.) As a result, the portion of section 340.1 that would toll Plaintiff’s claims 

until she was 18 would have no distinct effect. The second tolling provision — tolling 

Plaintiff’s claims until they discover or reasonably should have discovered a 

psychological injury or illness caused by sexual abuse — seems to have substantial 

overlap with the “discovery rule” discussed above, see supra I.B. The same lack of 

factual allegations supporting a later accrual date under the discovery rule also 

renders this tolling provision of section 340.1 presently inapplicable.

Given the above, neither of the bases for tolling that Plaintiff has identified 

apply under the factual allegations in the Complaint and thus the Court will grant 

County Defendants’ motion on this basis.

B. Adequacy of Plaintiff’s Monell Claims

Given the Court has already determined that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be 

dismissed with leave to amend, the Court need not reach the adequacy of Plaintiff’s 

Monell claims as challenged by County Defendant. Even so, the Court will briefly 

address the arguments raised for the efficiency of the parties and the Court.

In order to state a claim against Defendant County of Siskiyou, Plaintiff must 

allege facts that support that the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights was 

pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom of the County. A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. 

County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (2012); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 

658, 691 (1978). In her complaint, Plaintiff lists Defendant County of Siskiyou as a 

defendant to each of her Section 1983 claims (Compl. at 5–11), including one 

expressly for “Monell–related claims” wherein Plaintiff includes specific allegations 

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about the County’s policies and practices (Compl. ¶¶ 38). The other section 1983 

claims contain no such allegations.

The current formulation of the Complaint is unclear as to the policy, custom, or 

practice of Defendant County of Siskiyou that was the moving force behind each 

constitutional violations Plaintiff allegedly suffered. See A.E., 666 F.3d at 636. Plaintiff 

included the County as a defendant to multiple Section 1983 causes of action without 

addressing relevant the policies, customs, and practices that form the basis for the 

claimed constitutional violation. (Compl. at 5–9.) Plaintiff also includes a separate

specific Monell cause of action that contains several allegations about the County’s 

policies, customs, and practices but fails to identify what specific constitutional 

violations were caused by these policies, customs, and practices. (Compl. ¶ 38.)

In opposing the present motion, Plaintiff appears to suggest that Monell’s 

requirements only apply to section 1983 causes of action specifically brought as 

Monell claims and not to other causes of action, such as “Tamas claims” as described 

in Tamas v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2010). This is 

incorrect. The requirements for municipal liability described in Monell apply to all

claims brought against municipalities under section 1983, including Tamas claims for 

failure to adequately protect a foster child's liberty interest in social worker 

supervision and protection from harm inflicted by a foster parent. See A.E., 666 F.3d 

at 636 (stating in connection with Tamas claims that “plaintiffs [in Section 1983 suits 

against local governments alleging constitutional rights violations] must establish that 

the local government had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the moving 

force behind the constitutional violation [they] suffered.” (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted)); see also Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 999 n.5 (2012)

(applying the requirements for municipal liability under Monell to a case involving 

Tamas claims).

In the amended Complaint, Plaintiff must clearly identify claims against County

Defendants and ensure that each of those claims complies with the requirements to 

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allege municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

691 (1978).

4

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction over State Law Claims

In their motion, Defendants request that the Court decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims on the basis that Plaintiff’s 

federal claims “fail as a matter of law.” (Mot. at 5.) Given that the Court will grant 

Plaintiff leave to amend her claims, Plaintiff’s request for the Court to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction is denied as moot without prejudice as Plaintiff may be able 

to state federal claims.

D. Motion to Strike Request for Punitive Damages Against Defendant 

County of Siskiyou

The parties agree that Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages against 

Defendant County of Siskiyou should be stricken. Accordingly, County Defendants’

Motion is granted on this ground.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED IN PART 

and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART as follows:

a. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for failure to adequately allege facts establishing the 

Complaint is timely filed and for failure to adequately allege facts 

supporting Plaintiff’s claims against municipal defendants is 

GRANTED;

4 This is not to suggest that Plaintiff cannot state “Monell-related” causes of action separately, should 

she so choose. The Court simply means to reinforce that any cause of action brought against a 

municipal entity must meet the requirement that any claim that such an entity violated Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights properly identify the policy, practice, or custom that was the moving force behind 

that constitutional violation. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007).

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b. Defendants’ request that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s state law claims is DENIED AS MOOT without 

prejudice; and

c. Defendants’ unopposed request to strike Plaintiff’s request for 

punitive damages against Defendant County of Siskiyou is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. Within twenty-one (21) days of this 

order, Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 4, 2024 

Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DJC1 – AG24cv01375.MTD

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