Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02324/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02324-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order – Page 1 of 4

United States District Court

Eastern District of California

VICTOR AVALOS,

Petitioner,

 v.

D.K. SISTO, WARDEN, et al.,

Respondents.

CV 07-02324 TJH

Order

The court has considered the petition for writ of habeas corpus of Victor

Avalos, together with the moving and opposing papers. For the reasons set forth

herein, the petition is denied.

Avalos pled guilty in 1991 to the second-degree murder of Alicia Adame with

the use of a firearm and was sentenced to a term of twenty years to life with the

possibility of parole.

The Board of Parole Hearings [“Board”] denied Avalos parole in 2004. The

Board denied Avalos parole for a second time in 2006.

Case 2:07-cv-02324-TJH Document 13 Filed 07/28/10 Page 1 of 4
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Order – Page 2 of 4

Avalos filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court challenging, on

due process grounds, the Board’s 2006 decision to deny him parole. The court

denied the petition, finding there was some evidence to support the Board’s decision

to deny Avalos parole. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, also, denied the

petition, finding in Avalos’s plea agreement no promise of parole by a specified

time, if at all. The California Supreme Court summarily denied Avalos’s petition

for review. Avalos, then, filed for habeas relief in this Court.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, courts may grant habeas relief only where the state

court’s decision to uphold a denial of parole was an “unreasonable application” of

the “some evidence” standard, or was “based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence.” Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 562-63 (9th

Cir. 2010).

Under the “some evidence” standard, due process is satisfied if there is some

evidence to support the Board’s decision to deny parole, i.e., some evidence from

which the Board’s conclusion could be deduced. Superintendent, Mass.

Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 2774,

86 L. Ed. 2d 356, 365 (1985). If there is any evidence in the record to support the

conclusion by the Board that Avalos was unsuited for parole, its decision must stand.

Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S. Ct. at 2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 365.

Evaluated against that deferential standard of review, Avalos’s habeas claim

fails. There is some evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision. The

Board found that the offense was carried out in a “cruel” and “dispassionate”

manner; that Avalos abused his victim’s trust; and that the motive was

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Order – Page 3 of 4

“inexplicable” in light of Avalos’s expressed belief that, due to her religious beliefs,

the victim would not have shot herself had he refused her request that he shoot her.

The Board further relied on an unfavorable psychological report that indicated an

unpredictable potential for violence, citing Avalos’s lack of sophistication and

vulnerability to external pressures, and considered, also, the opposition of the

district attorney and the victim’s family. Taken together, the disposition of these

factors constitutes “some evidence” to support the Board’s decision.

To the extent that Avalos disagrees with the Board’s interpretation or

construction of the evidence, i.e., that certain factors were over emphasized while

others were overlooked or under emphasized – the “some evidence” standard does

not permit this Court to reexamine how the evidence was weighed, just whether the

evidence exists. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S. Ct. at 2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 365.

Because it does exist, the state court properly denied the writ.

Finally, Avalos’s claim that the Board’s decision violated his plea agreement

has no merit. Paragraphs 2 and 8a of Avalos’s plea agreement, both of which he

initialed, explicitly advised him that the maximum penalty as a result of his plea

would be twenty years to life. Life imprisonment is the statutory maximum for

second-degree murder set by California Penal Code § 190. Avalos cannot claim

under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147

L. Ed. 2d 435, 455 (2000), that his penalty was improperly increased beyond the

statutory maximum when the statutory maximum was life.

The matrix of base terms does not apply here since it applies only when the

Board has found an inmate suitable for parole. Since Avalos was not found suitable

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Order – Page 4 of 4

for parole, the matrix does not apply. 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 2401-2403(a). In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1071, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 421 (2005).

It is Ordered that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be, and hereby is,

Denied.

Date: July 27, 2010

____________________________________

Terry J. Hatter, Jr.

Senior United States District Judge

Case 2:07-cv-02324-TJH Document 13 Filed 07/28/10 Page 4 of 4