Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04064/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04064-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VALLIENT C. MOORE, 

Petitioner,

v.

A.K. SCRIBNER,

Respondent.

_____________________________

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No. C 04-4064 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On September 27, 2004, petitioner Vallient C. Moore, a California prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. On December 14, 2004, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why the

petition should not be granted based on petitioner’s three cognizable claims for relief. 

Respondent filed an answer accompanied by a memorandum and exhibits, and petitioner

filed a traverse. 

BACKGROUND

On June 10, 2002, petitioner was charged in Alameda County Superior Court with one

count of second degree robbery and one count of assault by force likely to produce great

bodily injury, as well as a sentence enhancement on each count for personally inflicting great

bodily injury. A jury found him guilty on both counts, but did not find the enhancements to

be true. The trial court thereafter found allegations that petitioner had two prior “strike”

convictions to be true. The trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of 35 years to life in

state prison on the robbery conviction, and stayed a concurrent sentence of 25 years to life on

the assault conviction. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of

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California summarily denied the petition for review. 

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts adduced at trial as follows:

James Murphy [“Murphy”] was known as “Watchman.” Among other

odd jobs, he bought watches at a flea market and sold them in and around his

neighborhood in Oakland. On May 2, 2002, a man (the first suspect)

approached Murphy to buy some watches, and asked Murphy to drive him to

an address a few blocks away to complete the sale. Murphy, together with his

girlfriend Charlesetta Blow [“Blow”], drove him to this address. Once there,

Murphy stood in front [of] the house as the first suspect called out to its

occupants. Blow remained in Murphy’s vehicle. A second man (the second

suspect) emerged from the house and struck Murphy in the face with his fist. 

Blow did not see this first blow, but seconds later looked over and saw both

suspects hitting and kicking Murphy on the sidewalk. They took Murphy’s

watches and watch case, his mobile telephone, a ring, and some cash, and then

ran from the scene. Blow drove Murphy to a nearby hospital, where he was

treated for a broken nose and other injuries. While at the hospital, Blow and

Murphy each gave physical descriptions of the suspects to a police officer. 

People v. Moore, No. A102720, slip op. at 1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. April 29, 2004) (hereinafter

“Slip Op.”) (attached as Resp.’s Ex. 3).

In the instant petition, petitioner raises the following claims of constitutional error:

(1) the use of identification evidence resulting from an unduly suggestive identification

procedure violated his right to due process; (2) his statement to the police regarding his

residence was taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the

admission of this statement violated his right against self-incrimination; and (3) the denial of

his counsel’s request to omit a flight instruction interfered with counsel’s strategy and

violated petitioner’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a district

court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a

claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of

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the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the

decision of the highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a reasoned

decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). In the instant case,

because the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review, the highest

state court decision to address the merits of petitioner’s claims was the California Court of

Appeal’s affirmance of petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if

it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases”

or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 413; Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s

decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application”

inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to [the Supreme]

Court’s jurisprudence.” Id. “Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

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Evidence was admitted at trial that Blow likewise identified petitioner in the

photographic lineup and again at trial; petitioner does not challenge the admission of such

evidence. 

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Court of the United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme]

Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 412. A state

court decision no longer may be overturned on habeas review simply because of a conflict

with circuit-based law, although circuit decisions remain relevant as persuasive authority to

determine whether a particular state court holding is an “unreasonable application” of

Supreme Court precedent or to assess what law is “clearly established.” Clark v. Murphy,

331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2003). “A federal court may not overrule a state court for

simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court]

is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

If the state court decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law, within the meaning of AEDPA, habeas relief is still only

warranted if the constitutional error at issue had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001)

(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). 

Finally, a federal court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual

findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Admission of Eyewitness Identification Evidence

Petitioner claims the admission of evidence of Murphy’s identification of petitioner

violated his right to due process. Evidence was admitted that Murphy identified petitioner in

a photographic lineup the day after the incident, and thereafter identified him in court, as the

man who initially approached Murphy and rode in the car with Murphy and Blow to the

house where the assault and robbery took place.1

 The California Court of Appeal set out the

pertinent background for this claim as follows:

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The day after the assault and robbery, an investigating officer prepared a

six-photographic lineup that included a photograph of Moore. The officer

showed it to Blow and Murphy, and each identified Moore as one of the two

perpetrators. Moore moved in limine to exclude any identifications by Blow or

Murphy, either these out-of-court lineup identifications or any subsequent incourt identifications, on the ground that the lineup had been unduly suggestive

in violation of his constitutional due process rights. At an evidentiary hearing

on the issue, the prosecution submitted the photographic lineup into evidence,

and both parties examined the investigating officer concerning the

circumstances surrounding his preparation of the lineup and the manner in

which he presented it. The trial court denied Moore’s motion to exclude

identifications by Blow and Murphy. . . .

In Moore’s view, the lineup was unduly suggestive because his

photograph was made to “stand out” from the others. Specifically, he was the

only one of the six men depicted who was wearing earrings. In addition, the

investigating officer first showed the lineup to Blow, and asked her to sign and

date, on the reverse side, the photograph she had identified. The officer then

showed the same lineup to Murphy. This, Moore urges, improperly gave

Murphy notice of which individual Blow had identified. 

In examining the photographic lineup, the trial court noted that the

photograph of Moore depicted him wearing “a small pair of earrings . . . in his

right ear . . . . [which] the others do not appear to have.” The court also noted,

“[I]f I really look for it, knowing it’s there, if I look around enough, I can see

some indication of a discoloration in [Moore’s] hair” caused by Blow’s writing

on the reverse side of his photograph. The court could not tell whether or to

what extent the effect of the writing may have “changed over a period of time.” 

The court did not find these factors dispositive, however. It stated the lineup

“essentially shows African-American males certainly of a similar age range. 

The hair ranges from pretty short to perhaps an inch or two long . . . [and] in

terms of the variety of faces . . . these individuals all have very similar

characteristics.” The court concluded, “I don’t think this lineup is suggestive at

all,” and on this basis denied the motion. Because it determined the lineup was

not unduly suggestive, the court never reached the issue whether the lineup was

reliable under the totality of the circumstances.

(Slip Op. at 2-4.)

Due process protects against the admission of evidence deriving from suggestive

pretrial identification procedures. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972). 

Unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures alone do not require exclusion of

in-court identification testimony, however; reliability is the linchpin in determining the

admissibility of identification testimony. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 100-14

(1977). Identification testimony is inadmissible as a violation of due process, therefore, only

if (1) a pretrial encounter is so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification, and (2) the identification is not sufficiently

reliable to outweigh the corrupting effects of the suggestive procedure. See Van Pilon v.

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The Court of Appeal’s citation to a decision of the California Supreme Court, rather

than to a decision of the United States Supreme Court, is of no consequence as the standard

set forth in the California Supreme Court decision is the same as the federal standard. See

Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (“Avoiding [AEDPA’s] pitfalls does not require citation of our cases –

indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor

the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”) (emphasis in original).

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Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). The reliability of identification testimony

depends on five factors: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the

incident; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior

description; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of the

identification procedure; and (5) the length of time between the incident and the

identification. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200.

The California Court of Appeal’s denial of petitioner’s claim was not “contrary to”

clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1). The Court of Appeal held that petitioner

must show the identification procedure was unduly suggestive, and also that it was

“unreliable” based on the same five factors set forth in Manson and Neil. (See Slip Op. at 3

(citing People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal.4th 353, 412 (1998)).2

 As discussed above, this is the correct

governing federal standard for determining whether the admission of identification evidence

resulted in a violation of a defendant’s right to due process. Moreover, petitioner does not

cite any United States Supreme Court decision, and this Court is aware of none, that reached

a different result on the basis of a set of facts “materially indistinguishable” from the facts of

this case. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Accordingly, the denial of petitioner’s claim was

not “contrary to” clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1). See Early, 537 U.S. at

8.

Further, the Court of Appeal did not “unreasonably” apply federal law in denying

petitioner’s claim. Petitioner argues here, as he did before the trial court and the Court of

Appeal, that the photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive because petitioner was

the only person depicted wearing an earring in both ears, and because Blow had signed and

dated the reverse side of his photograph when she viewed the lineup before Murphy. The

Court of Appeal found these factors did not render the photographic lineup impermissibly

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suggestive, as follows:

In our view, Moore does not “stand out from the rest” in this

photographic lineup. It depicts on a single page six computer-generated

photographs of African-American males. All photographs are in color. All the

individuals appear to be wearing civilian clothing. All appear to be similar in

age. All have the same hair and eye color. All have light-to-heavy mustaches,

and only two are clearly without facial hair on the chin. All have similar hair

styles, four of which are short and trimmed and very similar in appearance. 

Moore is the only individual shown with small hoop earrings in both ears, but

three others are depicted with one earring in the left ear. There is a range of

complexion and facial features, but these differences do not make Moore’s

“photograph stand out from the rest.” Blow’s handwriting behind Moore’s

photograph is not visible, and does not appear to display any discoloration,

unless it is held up to backlighting. At the evidentiary hearing, the

investigating officer testified that he ensured Murphy viewed the lineup only

while it was placed on a folder that prevented backlighting. We conclude the

trial court correctly determined the photographic lineup was not unduly

suggestive. 

(Slip Op. at 5.) Given the similarity among the individuals depicted in the photographs with

respect to their race, gender, clothing, facial hair, and hair styles, the fact that Moore had two

earrings whereas others had one or none is a relatively minor discrepancy that did not

impermissibly suggest Moore was the suspect. See, e.g., United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d

352, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding placement of photograph and differences in skin tone

and facial expression insubstantial and not sufficient to create impermissible suggestion that

defendant was offender). Further, there is no showing that Murphy was aware of Blow’s

signature on the back of the photograph at the time he selected it. Any “discoloration” was

only visible under backlighting, and the evidence was uncontradicted that the photograph

was not backlit when it was shown to Murphy. Moreover, as further noted by the Court of

Appeal, (see Slip Op. at 5), petitioner does not claim, and there is no evidence indicating, the

investigating officer said or did anything suggesting a particular suspect to either Murphy or

Blow at the time he displayed the photographic lineup, or, for that matter, at any other time.

 The Court of Appeal also reasonably found Murphy’s identification of petitioner to be

reliable. Petitioner argues Murphy’s identification was unreliable because Murphy initially

provided to the police, while at the hospital on the day of the incident, a description of the

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At the hospital, Murphy described the suspect as 6' tall, weighing 180 pounds, darkcomplected, and without facial hair, and did not mention jewelry, tattoos, or a gap in the

suspect’s front teeth. (Resp.’s Ex. 2, Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 49, 261-62.) Petitioner

is 5'9" - 5'10" tall; at the time in question, he weighed 220 pounds, and had a mustache,

pierced ears and tongue, tattoos, and a gap in his front teeth. (RT at 33, 152, 167, 224, 261-

62.)

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Murphy testified he had seen petitioner a “few times” at a local Carl’s Jr. (RT at 106),

had seen him in the neighborhood at least five times (RT at 231), and had been to petitioner’s

house and spoken to petitioner on that occasion (RT at 233). The record does not reflect

whether Murphy knew petitioner’s name, however, and Murphy did tell the officer that the

man whom he later identified as petitioner had “looked familiar.” (RT at 234.)

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suspect that did not match petitioner.3 Petitioner also cites the fact that Murphy knew

petitioner previously but did not immediately identify him to the police as the suspect.4

 In

finding the identification to be reliable, the California Court of Appeal reasoned as follows:

Moore attempted to show the lineup was not only suggestive but

otherwise unreliable because there were inaccuracies in the descriptions

Murphy and Blow provided the preceding day. He attempted to elicit this

evidence on his cross-examination of the investigating officer. This was not,

however, the only evidence relevant to the reliability of their identifications. 

The investigating officer testified that he knew from the police report that the

first suspect “rode in a car with Mr. Murphy to the location where he was

assaulted and robbed.” Murphy and Blow thus had a good opportunity to view

this suspect. There was no evidence their attention was distracted or impaired

at the time of the crime. The officer also testified that both Blow and Murphy

identified Moore immediately as one of the perpetrators and evinced certainty

in their choice. Finally, he conducted the lineup only one day after the crime. 

This evidence does not, overall, support a determination that the lineup

identifications were unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. While

Murphy and Blow may have initially failed to describe accurately such things

as Moore’s height, weight, and darkness of skin, other evidence, relating to

their opportunity to view him at the time of the crime, their degree of attention,

the level of their certainty at the confrontation, and the time between the crime

and the confrontation, all tended to support a determination of reliability.

(Slip Op. at 5-6.) On balance, although there were inaccuracies in petitioner’s initial

description of the suspect, the other four factors strongly indicate the identification of

petitioner was reliable. In particular, Murphy had more than ample opportunity to view

petitioner at the time of the incident, there was no indication that Murphy’s attention was

poor or impaired, Murphy was immediately certain about the identification, and only one day

passed between the incident and the photographic identification. See, e.g., United States v.

Wang, 49 F.3d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding identification of defendant in photographs

reliable where witness had ample opportunity to view defendant and actually spoke with

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him). Consequently, the Court of Appeal reasonably concluded Murphy’s identification of

petitioner was reliable. 

In sum, the photographic lineup was not impermissibly suggestive and Murphy’s

identification of petitioner was sufficiently reliable. Consequently, the admission of

Murphy’s identification evidence did not violate petitioner’s right to due process, and the

state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

federal law. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

2. Admission of Petitioner’s Statement to Police Regarding His Residence

Petitioner claims his statement to the police regarding his residence was taken in

violation of Miranda v. Arizona, and thus the admission of such statement violated his right

against self-incrimination. The California Court of Appeal set forth the background for this

claim, as follows:

After conducting the photographic lineup, the police issued a bulletin

describing Moore as a robbery suspect. At 3:00 a.m. on May 8, 2002, an

officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation some six blocks from the scene

of the crime. The officer recognized the driver, Moore, from the bulletin, and

arrested him. The investigating officer interviewed Moore at the police station

soon afterwards. It appears that, at 5:17 a.m., Moore told the investigating

officer “he was staying at the Broadway Motel, Room Number 207 by

himself.” At 5:30 a.m., the investigating officer gave Moore a Miranda

warning. Later the same day, the arresting officer checked this address and

learned the motel had no such room number. Moore made a motion in limine

to exclude any reference to his statement about his address. The court ruled it

was admissible as a response to a routine booking question. During trial, when

the arresting officer testified concerning this statement and the results of his

efforts to verify the address, the court overruled Moore’s renewed objection. 

Meanwhile, Moore’s two alibi witnesses testified that Moore often stayed at the

address where the assault and robbery occurred, although they gave conflicting

accounts about whether he was staying there at the time of assault and robbery.

The prosecution argued that Moore had lied about his address because, being

one of the perpetrators, he knew where the crime had been committed and

sought to disassociate himself from that address. Moore’s counsel objected to

his argument but did not request any curative instruction.

(Slip op. at 7.)

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that certain warnings must be given

before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation can be admitted in evidence.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. "[I]nterrogation means questioning or 'its

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functional equivalent,' including 'words or actions on the part of the police (other than those

normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to

elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.'" Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). There is an exception

to the general rule regarding interrogation, such that “words or actions on the part of the

police” that are “normally attendant to arrest and custody” do not need to be preceded by

Miranda warnings. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301; see United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179,

1186 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has further recognized “a routine booking

exception which exempts from Miranda’s coverage questions to secure the biographical data

necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582,

601 (1990) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The police may not, however, “ask

questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions.” Id. at

602 n.14. In Muniz, the Supreme Court found the officer’s questions as to the suspect’s

name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth and current age fell within the “routine

booking exception” to Miranda. Id. at 601-02. 

In the instant case, the California Court of Appeal’s denial of petitioner’s claim was

not “contrary to” federal law under § 2254(d)(1); the Court of Appeal cited the appropriate

standards from Miranda, Innis and Muniz (see Slip Op. at 7), and petitioner points to no

Supreme Court decision, and this Court is aware of none, in which a Miranda violation was

found on a set of facts materially indistinguishable from the instant case.

Further, the denial of petitioner’s claim was a “reasonable” application of federal law

under § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner argues that when the officer asked for petitioner’s address, the

question was designed to elicit an incriminating response, not simply routine biographical

information for booking purposes. The Court of Appeal found to the contrary, as follows: 

Moore was entitled to, but did not, request an evidentiary hearing on the

issue of his pre-Miranda statement. (See Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (b).) Thus,

for example, he never examined the investigating officer concerning the

particular circumstances surrounding his question concerning Moore’s address. 

The only facts considered by the trial court may be regarded as undisputed. 

These were cited by Moore’s counsel from an investigation report, which was

not itself admitted into evidence at the time Moore’s counsel argued the merits

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of the motion in limine to exclude Moore’s statement. As noted above, these

facts indicated only that Moore made the statement to the investigating officer

at the station, two hours and 17 minutes after his arrest and 13 minutes before

he received a Miranda warning.

Moore argues the investigating officer should have known the question

was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response because that officer

had already learned that Moore was “associated” with the address where the

attack occurred. We note, however, that Moore did not mention this or any

other fact except those mentioned above, either in arguing the motion in limine

or in his later objections relating to the admission of his statement. The

investigating officer did not testify about Moore’s association with this address

until several days after the motion in limine to exclude Moore’s statement. 

During a subsequent evidentiary hearing concerning Moore’s motion to

suppress the photographic lineup identifications, the investigating officer

explained that he had selected Moore as the primary suspect in part because of

the results of a computer search that “associated” Moore’s name with the

address where the assault and robbery occurred. Even then, the officer could

not say how Moore was “associated” with the address – the results of his

computer search essentially showed only that Moore’s name and the address

appeared together on at least one police report filed within the preceding five

years. 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a question concerning

a suspect’s address was subject to the Miranda warning rule when the

circumstances showed it was not a routine booking question. The question in

that case was posed by an agent near the scene of the crime being investigated. 

The suspect was under arrest but had not yet been transported to any station for

booking. The agent asked the question not in the context of other questions

designed to elicit biographical data, but in the context of other questions that

were clearly investigatory in nature. Further, the question was very closely

related to an element of the crime the agent was investigating. The agent’s

object was to find and arrest the occupant of an apartment for possession of

illegal drugs found within it. (See United States v. Disla (9th Cir. 1986) 805

F.2d 1340, 1347.)

By contrast, Moore here made the statement about his address at the

police station. He made it a little over two hours after his arrest. Although it

was elicited by the investigating officer, there is nothing to indicate Moore had

previously been questioned by a booking officer. Nor is there any indication of

the content of context of the officer’s question that might show it was intended

or perceived to be investigatory in nature. The fact the officer knew Moore

was somehow associated with the address where the attack and robbery

occurred is not sufficient, without more, to establish that his question was

investigatory under these circumstances. In sum, Moore’s statement was made

in response to a question typically regarded as one within the routine booking

exception to Miranda, and the circumstances surrounding the question do not

establish that it was “designed to elicit incriminatory admissions”

(Pennsylvania v. Muniz, supra, 496 U.S. at p[ ]. 602, fn. 14) rather than “to

secure [‘]the biographical data necessary to complete booking[’]” (id. at p.

601). We conclude there was no error admitting Moore’s statement. 

(Slip Op. at 8-10.) 

The Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that the officer’s question was not part of

an interrogation, but rather a routine booking question. To begin with, as noted by the Court

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Petitioner does not allege any facts outside the record concerning the circumstances

of the police questioning, nor does he seek an evidentiary hearing on this issue. In any event,

as petitioner did not pursue his opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on this issue in state

court (see Slip Op. at 8 (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 402(b)), an evidentiary hearing is not

available to petitioner in this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (providing federal court may

not hold evidentiary hearing on claim for which petitioner failed to develop factual basis in

state court except in limited circumstances).

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of Appeal, an arrestee’s address is the kind of basic biographical information generally

needed for booking. See, e.g, Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601. The Court of Appeal also reasonably

distinguished this case from Disla, in that the question was not posed to petitioner at the

scene of the crime, but rather after petitioner had been transported to the police station. See

Disla, 805 F.3d at 1257. Moreover, petitioner does not allege, and there is no indication in

the record, the police asked the question in the context of investigatory questioning, as

opposed to in the context of routine questions seeking basic biographical information. Cf. id.

Finally, nothing in the record suggests the booking process already had been completed, or

that the officer already knew petitioner’s address, when the question was posed to petitioner. 

As explained by the Court of Appeal, the only association of which the officer was aware

between petitioner and the address at which the crime occurred was that, on one occasion in

the past five years, petitioner’s name appeared in the same police report as that address. 

Such limited information does not show petitioner lived there at the time of the report, much

less that he was living there at the time of the instant incident. In the absence of any facts in

the record5

 indicating the question about petitioner’s address was anything more than a

routine booking question, the Court of Appeal’s finding that petitioner’s response was

admissible at trial was not an “unreasonable” application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1). 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

3. Flight Instruction

Petitioner claims the denial of his counsel’s request to omit a flight instruction

violated his right to assistance of counsel. Evidence was introduced at trial that following the

robbery and assault, the two suspects ran away. The prosecution requested the jury be given

an instruction, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52, that it could consider evidence of flight as

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evidence of guilt, but that such evidence was not in and of itself sufficient to establish guilt. 

Petitioner objected to the instruction on the ground it was inconsistent with his identity

defense. The trial court overruled the objection on the ground the instruction was warranted

in light of the evidence presented at trial. As explained by the Court of Appeal:

The [trial] court did, however, offer to modify the instruction to emphasize to

the jury its applicability only if the jury determined there was sufficient proof

identifying Moore as one of the men who attacked Murphy. Moore’s trial

counsel reiterated his objection for the record, but expressed preference for the

modified version if the court was determined to give a flight instruction in

some form. The modified instruction stated: ‘If you find that the defendant was

a person who ran from the scene of the crime or crimes alleged in the

information, you may consider that the flight of a person immediately after the

commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not sufficient in

itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by

you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding whether the defendant is

guilty or not guilty. The weight to which this circumstance is entitled is a

matter for you to decide.’ (Cf. CALJIC No. 2.52 (italics indicate additional 

language modifying the standard instruction).)

(Slip Op. at 10 n.4.)

Petitioner argues the above instruction “deprived” him of “the assistance of counsel

during a critical stage of the proceeding” because it “interfered with defense counsel’s

strategy to waive the flight instruction” in pursuit of an identity defense. (See Petition at 6.) 

Petitioner cites no Supreme Court authority, however, and this Court is aware of none,

providing that a trial court violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel simply

because a jury instruction does not advance his theory of defense. As discussed above,

federal habeas relief is only available on the basis of a state court ruling that is contrary to or

an unreasonable application of “clearly established federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at

412. Petitioner argues he had a right to “waive,” (see Petition at 6), the instruction and

thereby preclude the jury from being instructed on evidence of flight. In the absence of any

Supreme Court authority recognizing such right, however, or that a jury instruction violates a

defendant’s right to counsel if it is inconsistent with a theory defense counsel is pursuing,

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

Moreover, although petitioner does not allege a due process violation with respect to

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this claim, the Court notes that the flight instruction, as modified by the trial court, did not

prevent petitioner from presenting his identity defense. The instruction was modified to state

explicitly that it only applied “if” the jury found petitioner “was a person who ran from the

scene of the crime.” (Slip Op. at 10 n.4.) In other words, the flight evidence would only be

considered if the jury did not believe petitioner’s identity defense. Consequently, the

instruction in no way deprived petitioner of the opportunity to argue to the jury, as he did,

that he was not one of the men who committed the crime and ran away from the scene. The

record thus indicates the flight instruction did not “interfere” with petitioner’s presentation of

his identity defense at trial. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby

DENIED

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 27, 2007 ____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

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