Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_03-cv-05216/USCOURTS-arwd-5_03-cv-05216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JUAN VEGA, JR. PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 03-5216

NURSE SUE MCDONALD; JONELLE

O’DELL, Substitute Nurse; SHERIFF KEITH

FERGUSON; DEPUTY FALKENBERRY;

and DEPUTY McLESTER DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Juan Vega, Jr., currently an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Correction, brings this

pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Vega contends his constitutional rights were

violated while he was detained at the Benton County Detention Center.

On May 5, 2005, the defendants filed a motion forsummary judgment (Docs. 23-25), as

directed by the court (Doc. 20). By order entered on May 17, 2005, Vega was directed to

complete, sign, date, and return an attached questionnaire that would serve as his response to the

summary judgment motion. (Doc. 26.) On June 3, 2005, plaintiff's response (Doc. 28) to the

defendant's summary judgment motion was filed. The summary judgment motion is currently

before the undersigned for issuance of this report and recommendation. 

I. Background

According to his complaint (Doc. 1), addenda (Docs. 6-8, 17), and response (Doc. 28),

the plaintiff contends that some defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs, that he was denied access to the detention center trustee program and other benefits such

as recreational time and clergy visits due to his pending charges, and that he was discriminated

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against in the medical treatment he received due to his race. 

Vega was booked into the Benton CountyDetention Center (BCDC) on or about August

17, 2003. In medical forms dated August 25, August 28, and September 1, 2003, Vega

complained about dry skin on his feet. (Doc. 28 at ¶ 2.) This complaints were forwarded to the

nurse, and Vega was seen by two members of the medical staff. (Doc. 28 at ¶ 3.) When he was

seen by medical staff, they examined his feet and informed Vega that the medical staff did not

dispense lotion as a medication at the BCDC. (Doc. 28 at ¶ 3.) Vega contends that because the

medical staff refused to provide him with lotion for his feet, he suffered from dry feet and

"couldnt [sic] walk for some days because [his] feet would bleead [sic]." (Doc. 28 at ¶ 5.) Vega

also described his condition as causing "severe pain and nominal bleeding." (Doc. 17 at ¶ 4.) 

Vega also contends that he was discriminated against due to his charges as a "sex

offender" in that he was denied the opportunity to participate in the trustee program at the

BCDC. (Doc. 17 at ¶ 10.) Vega states that Deputy Falkenberry was directly responsible for

denying him the opportunity to participate in the trustee program, but also notes that as

Falkenberry's decision was BCDC policy, everyone from Falkenberry to Sheriff Ferguson was

responsible. (Doc. 17 at ¶ 11.) The BCDC does not allow inmates or detainees who have been

classified as "sex offenders" to serve as trustees. (Doc. 28 at ¶ 7.) The defendants contend that

this policy is in place because of the risk sex offender detainees face from other inmates or

detainees. (Doc. 23 at ¶ 4.) The defendants further contend that the BCDC distributes games,

newspapers, and the like on a regular, equal basis without regard to offenses for which the

inmates or detainees are held. (Doc. 23 at ¶ 5.) In response to these contentions, the plaintiff

indicates that he is without knowledge to agree or disagree with those assertions. (Doc. 29 at

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¶¶ 8-9.) Vega also alleges that Deputy Falkenberry told visiting ministers to "pick another

barracks" because the sex offenders were hopeless cases. (Doc. 17 at ¶ 12.) 

Vega claims that defendant nurse Sue McDonald discriminated against him because of

his race, Hispanic, when "she refused to write the same order (med. sheet) for me that she had

written for other "white" inmates [he knew] of in [his] barracks (D-149)." (Doc. 17 at ¶ 5.)

Although asked to provide the names of all of the white inmates who received preferential

treatment, the plaintiff lists only his cell mate, Erik Dark, as the "other 'white' inmates." (Doc.

28 at ¶ 10A.) Vega claims that Dark told Vega he was suffering from dry skin, that McDonald

had provided the medical order for Dark's dry skin, and that this was racially motivated because

Dark was given the medical sheet for dry skin and Vega was refused the medical sheet. (Doc.

28 at ¶¶ 10B-E.) 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), the record "show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once a party moving for summary judgment has

made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth specific facts,

by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Nat’l Bank

of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.1999). 

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

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evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d 607 (citing Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). "A case

founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment."

Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 

III. Discussion

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law,

of a citizen's "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the

United States. "To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff] must show [1] a

deprivation [under color of law] of [2] a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution or the laws of the United States." Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.

1999). "[T]o establish a violation of constitutional rights under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove

that the defendant’s unconstitutional action was the 'cause in fact' of the plaintiff’s injury."

Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 669 (8th Cir. 1992).

Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

The plaintiff argues that he had a serious medical need in that he was suffering from dry

skin on his feet and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that serious medical need.

In this case, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee when this alleged violation occurred. Thus, his

claims are more properly analyzed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

than the Eighth Amendment. Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454, 456-457 (8th Cir. 2004).

“The standard to be applied in assessing a pretrial detainee’s claim of due process violations . . .

is not entirely clear.” Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equipment Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir.

1999)(citation omitted). Nevertheless, “[t]he Supreme Court has held that pretrial detainees are

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entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to ‘at least as great’ protection as that afforded

convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting City of Revere v. Massachusetts

Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S. Ct. 2979, 77 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1983). 

In the absence of a clearly binding standard, the Eighth Circuit in analyzing inadequate

medical care claims brought bypretrial detainees has applied the Eighth Amendment's deliberate

indifference standard. See e.g., Hartsfield, 371 F.3d at 456-457; Spencer, 183 F.3d at 905-06;

Hall v. Dalton, 34 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1994) (analyzing a pretrial detainee's claim of

inadequate medical care under the deliberate indifference standard). “In order to state a

cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct.

285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). 

The deliberate indifference standard includes "both an objective and a subjective

component: 'The [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious

medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those

needs.'" Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan,

132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)). Additionally, "'[t]he prisoner must show more than

negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.'" Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Estate

of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1995)). See also Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d

413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000) ("To establish a constitutional violation, it is not enough that a

reasonable official should have known of the risk, a plaintiff must establish that the official in

question did in fact know of the risk.").

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"Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health

care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only

if those needs are 'serious.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.

Ed. 2d 156 (1992). "A medical need is serious if it is obvious to the layperson or supported by

medical evidence." Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

"[T]he failure to treat a medical condition does not constitute punishment within the

meaning of the Eighth Amendment unless prison officials knew that the condition created an

excessive risk to the inmate's health and then failed to act on that knowledge." Long v. Nix, 86

F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1996). In Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1997), the

Eighth Circuit said:

As long as this threshold is not crossed, inmates have no constitutional right to

receive a particular or requested course of treatment, and prison doctors remain

free to exercise their independent medical judgment. Deliberate indifference may

be demonstrated by prison guards who intentionally deny or delay access to

medical care or intentionally interfere with prescribed treatment, or by prison

doctors who fail to respond to prisoner's serious medical needs. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Mere

negligence or medical malpractice, however, are insufficient to rise to a

constitutional violation. Id. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292.

Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1239. See also Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2001). 

First, the condition that Vega suffered from does not constitute a serious medical need.

Vega had dry skin on his feet which led to cracking and "nominal bleeding." Vega contends that

his pain was severe and that he could not walk some days, however he does not state how many

days he could not walk, nor does he provide any evidence, other than his own assertion, of the

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severity of his condition. Dry skin as a medical condition simply does not constitute a serious

medical need. See e.g., May v. Baldwin, 895 F. Supp. 1398, 1408 (D. Or. 1995) (dry skin

problem not a serious medical need); Landfair v. Sheahan, 878 F. Supp. 1106, 1113 (N.D.

Ill.1995) (finding that athlete's foot does not present any significant risk of serious injury or

death). 

Second, even if the dry skin was considered a serious medical need, Vega admits that he

saw two members of the medical staff who examined his feet and told him that they did not

dispense lotion to prisoners. To the extent that Vega disagrees with those medical

determinations, such a claim, as explained above, does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. See May, 895 F. Supp. at 1407-08 (no constitutional violation where inmate

complained about dry skin and foot problems where he was examined twice by medical officers

who determined there was no need for treatment and recommended drinking more water). The

defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference should

be granted. 

Discrimination Due to Sex Offender Charges

The plaintiff contends that he was subjected to discriminatory actions because he was

being charged as a sex offender. Specifically, he claims that sex offenders were denied access

to the trustee program and were given second-hand games and other materials. Plaintiff further

claims that Deputy Falkenberry discouraged ministers from visiting the sex offenders. 

Defendants should be granted summary judgment on Vega's claim that denying him

access to the trustee program because he was being charged as a sex offender violated his

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constitutional rights. As an equal protection claim, sex offenders are not one of the suspect

classifications set forth by the Supreme Court, and therefore review of the county's decision is

whether there is a rational reason for denying sex offenders the opportunity to serve as trustees.

See Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005). The defendants state that the BCDC

policy is to not allow those charged with sexual offenses to serve as trustees out of concern for

the safety of those inmates. See Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1987) (no

equal protection clause violation where state distinguishes sex offenders as a group from other

inmates and excludes them from work release program). Further, the other claims of differential

treatment, such as not receiving games first-hand, are not so severe as to raise constitutional

concerns, and Vega does not challenge the defendants statement that the BCDC distributes

games, newspapers, and the like on a regular, equal basis without regard to offenses for which

the inmates or detainees are held. 

As for Vega's claim that Deputy Falkenberry discouraged ministers from visiting with

those detained on Vega's cellblock because they were sexual offenders, and thus hopeless cases

is belied by the fact that Vega admits in his other pending case before this court, Vega v. Tharp,

Civil No. 03-5266, that he was given numerous opportunities to attend church services while he

was detained that the BCDC, except while he was serving time in lock down. Therefore, even

if Deputy Falkenberry did make such comments, it does not appear that Vega suffered any injury

as a result of the comments. Defendants should be granted summary judgment on this claim. 

Discrimination Due to Race

Finally, Vega claims that he was subjected to racial discrimination because the medical

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staff provided lotion for treatment of dry skin to his cell mate, Erik Dark, who is white, while

denying such treatment to Vega, who is Hispanic. Vega stated in his addendum that nurse

McDonald had "refused to write the same order (med. sheet) for me that she had written for other

'white' inmates I know of in my barracks (D-149)." In his summary judgment response, Vega

was asked to provide the names of the "other 'white' inmates." The only name he provided was

that of Erik Dark, his cell mate. Also, Vega states that the decision to provide Dark the lotion

while denying it to him was racially motivated because "Erik Dark had been given a med sheet

for his dry skin and [Vega] was refuse[d]." 

Prisoners and detainees are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious

discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). A prisoner

who asserts an equal protection claim, however, must prove the existence of purposeful

discrimination. 

While Vega's allegation is sufficient to state an equal protection claim, see Powells v.

Minnehaha County Sheriff Dept., 198 F.3d 711, 712 (8th Cir. 1999), it is insufficient to prove

that the differences in treatment that Vega received from his cell mate was due to racial animus.

Vega merely concludes that because his cell mate was provided lotion and Vega was not, that

McDonald must have discriminated based on his race. This single incident of different treatment

does not prove racial discrimination or an equal protection violation. See Weiler v. Purkett, 137

F.3d 1047, 1051 -1052 (8th Cir. 1998) (few individual examples of unequal treatment are

"insufficient to provide more than minimal support to an inference of classwide purposeful

discrimination"), quoting Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 567

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F.2d 1368, 1381 (8th Cir.1977). Vega has not provided sufficient evidence to support his claim

of racial discrimination. 

IV. Conclusion

Therefore, I recommend that defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and

that this case be dismissed with prejudice. 

The parties have ten days from receipt of this report and recommendation in which

to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

written objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties

are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court. 

DATED this 1st day of November 2005.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones

_________________________________________

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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