Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00909/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00909-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dennis Shamar Gooden, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV 13-00909-TUC-CKJ (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

On August 9, 2013, Petitioner Dennis Shamar Gooden, who is no longer confined, 

filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.)1

On September 18, 2013, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition and a supplement. (Doc. 8, 

9.) On November 7, 2013, Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition without seeking 

leave of Court, (Doc. 10), and on November 21, 2013, Petitioner filed a memorandum 

(Doc. 11). 

The Court ordered the Second Amended Petition stricken for failure to seek leave 

of Court and dismissed the Amended Petition for failure to use the court-approved form 

petition and granted Petitioner leave to file a second amended petition using the courtapproved form petition. (Doc. 12.) Petitioner filed a new Second Amended Petition using 

the court-approved form (“Second Amended Petition”). (Doc. 13) Respondents have filed 

an answer to the petition (“Answer”) with Exhibits A through AA2

 attached. (Doc. 25.) 

 

1

 “Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. 

2

 Respondents’ exhibits attached to the Answer are hereafter referred to as (Resp. Ex. ---). 

Case 4:13-cv-00909-CKJ Document 29 Filed 10/08/14 Page 1 of 7
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner filed a reply on May 22, 2014 (“Reply”) with Exhibits A through D attached. 

(Doc. 26.) 

On June 9, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion for the production of transcripts. (Doc. 

27.) The undersigned rules on this non-dispositive motion in an order filed concomitant 

with this report and recommendation. 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 5.) 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court enter an order DISMISSING the Second Amended. 

I. Background and Petition

 Petitioner has filed other cases in federal court and the Court draws from 

documents attached by Petitioner in one of those cases for background. Gooden v. State, 

No. CV13-0238-TUC-CKJ (D. Ariz. 2013). 

 On October 24, 2006, in Pima County Superior Court case number CR20052741, 

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to an amended count of 

attempted transportation of a narcotic drug for sale and one count of possession of a 

deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor. (Resp. Ex. B and C.) On February 15, 2007, 

the trial court sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive term of imprisonment of 3.5 years 

for attempted transportation of a narcotic drug for sale. (Resp. Ex. D, at 2.) The trial court 

also sentenced Petitioner to a 4–year term of probation, following his release from the 

Department of Corrections, for possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor. 

(Resp. Ex. D, at 2–3.) 

 On July 12, 2012, after Petitioner’s release on probation, he was charged with new 

criminal offenses in Pima County Superior Court, case CR20122309. Gooden v. State, 

No. CV13-0238-TUC-CKJ (D. Ariz. 2013), doc. 10 at 10, 30, 31. On July 16, 2012, a 

probation revocation petition was filed seeking revocation of probation in the 2005 case. 

(Resp. Ex. F.) Prior to the trial court’s revocation of probation, Petitioner, acting on his 

own behalf, filed letters, motions, petitions and applications to the court, in addition to a 

notice of appeal. See (Resp., Ex’s. H, I, J, K, L, S, and T), The trial court struck or denied 

Case 4:13-cv-00909-CKJ Document 29 Filed 10/08/14 Page 2 of 7
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

these motions as Petitioner was represented by counsel. See (Resp. Ex. M, N, and U). The 

Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the notice of appeal as premature. (Resp. Ex. Y.) 

 On May 6, 2013, Petitioner entered an admission to allegation 2 contained in 

the petition to revoke probation dated July 16, 2012. (Resp. Ex. P.) The trial court 

found Petitioner in violation of the conditions of his probation as set forth in 

allegation 2 and dismissed allegations 1, 3 and 4 contained in the petition to revoke 

probation. (Exh. P.) On June 27, 2013, Petitioner, acting on his own behalf, filed a 

“Post Conviction Relief Rule 32.” (Resp. Ex. W.) Respondents assert that this petition 

was never ruled on. See Answer, at 11. Petitioner does not dispute this assertion, and a 

review of the state court’s docket3

 supports this assertion. See Attachment A. On August 

7, 2013, the trial court proceeded with disposition on the probation revocation matter, 

terminating Petitioner’s probation and imposing a sentence of incarceration of 2.5 years, 

to be followed by a term of community supervision. (Resp. Ex. Z, at 2.) Petitioner filed a 

motion to vacate judgment on August 20, 2013. (Second Amended Petition, Attachment 

B). Petitioner’s motion to vacate was denied by the trial court on September 10, 2013. 

(Id.) 

 On October 8, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate with respect 

to Petitioner’s notice of appeal. (Resp. Ex. AA.) On December 26, 2013, Petitioner filed 

the instant Second Amended Petition. (Doc. 13.) In his Second Amended Petition, 

Petitioner raises 12 grounds for relief. (Id.) 

 A review of the state court’s docket4

 in this case suggests that not only is 

Petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief awaiting a ruling, in addition, 

Petitioner has filed a “2nd Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in 

State Custody.” See Attachment A, Petition filed in state court on January 6, 2014. 

II. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

 A Federal District Court is not authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus sought 

 

3

 http://www.agave.cosc.pima.gov/PublicDocs/GetCase2.aspx?ID=761829 

4

 http://www.agave.cosc.pima.gov/PublicDocs/GetCase2.aspx?ID=761829 

Case 4:13-cv-00909-CKJ Document 29 Filed 10/08/14 Page 3 of 7
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

by someone in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court “unless it appears that that 

the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the court of the State.” See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). If an appeal or collateral-review proceeding is pending in state 

court, a petitioner has not exhausted his remedies until the completion of those 

proceedings. See Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983). Petitioner’s 

petition for post-conviction relief and his petition for writ of habeas corpus remain 

pending, despite the trial court never having ruled on the merits of these petitions. See 

e.g. Pauley v. Ryan, 2013 Wl 663606 (January 22, 2013) (in the context of consideration 

of habeas limitations period, until an application in state court achieves final resolution 

through the State’s post-conviction procedures, “by definition it remains 

‘pending.’”)(citing Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court 

acknowledges Respondents’ argument that the trial court would likely have denied and 

dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because it was premature, and filed on 

Petitioner’s own behalf, but declines to adopt this presumption as fact absent a ruling by 

the trial court. 

 The failure to exhaust subjects the Petitioner to dismissal. Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 

F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1983). Petitioner does not dispute Respondents’ assertion that the trial 

court has not yet ruled on Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief filed on June 27, 

2013. Additionally, Petitioner acknowledges in his Second Amended Petition (doc. 13, at 

8) that he has not presented any grounds for relief to the court of appeals. 

 Although Petitioner has not raised the argument, the undersigned has considered 

whether the existence of an “inordinate delay” should excuse the exhaustion requirement 

in this case, or shift the burden to the state to demonstrate why exhaustion should still be 

required. See Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530-33 (9th Cir. 1990). If “there is either an 

absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering 

such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner,” exhaustion is not required. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). Excessive delay in the appellate process may render a state 

corrective process ineffective and thus waive the requirement for exhaustion of remedies 

at the state level. Coe, 922 F.2d at 530–531. To determine when delay becomes 

Case 4:13-cv-00909-CKJ Document 29 Filed 10/08/14 Page 4 of 7
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

excessive and thus a due process violation, the Ninth Circuit considers: “the [l]ength of 

delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 

defendant.” Id. at 531 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). 

 Petitioner does not allege that the state court has unduly delayed disposition of his 

appeal and thus the exhaustion requirement should be excused. Indeed, Petitioner asserts 

that he has essentially abandoned his state court proceedings by not filing anything in the 

state appellate courts, choosing instead “to go federal” by filing a federal habeas petition 

prior to the state court’s ruling, and arguing, incorrectly, that the exhaustion requirement 

is satisfied by his presentation to the trial court of his petition for writ of habeas corpus 

and motion to vacate. See Reply, at 2. The Ninth Circuit has held that a prisoner in 

Arizona does not exhaust a claim for federal review until he has presented it to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in a petition for review. See, e.g., Castillo v. McFadden, 399 

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To exhaust his Arizona remedies, Castillo had to give the 

Arizona courts a ‘fair opportunity’ to act on his federal due process claim before 

presenting it to the federal courts. . . . We consider Castillo’s briefing to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals to determine whether he fairly presented his federal due process claim 

to the Arizona courts.”) (citations omitted); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (except in cases in which life sentences or the death penalty has been imposed, 

Arizona state prisoners properly exhaust their claims for the purpose of federal habeas 

corpus by presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals) 

 Moreover, the District Court previously dismissed a federal habeas petition filed 

by Petitioner prior to the Petitioner’s disposition hearing, acknowledging that Petitioner 

had prematurely filed a petition for writ of habeas in state court, but noting that Petitioner 

has not had the opportunity to “properly exhaust state court remedies.” Gooden v. State, 

No. CV13-0238-TUC-CKJ (D. Ariz. 2013), Doc. 12 at 7. Subsequently, Petitioner filed 

the petition for writ of habeas corpus before the trial court in January, 2014, which 

remains pending. A nine-month delay is not unusual or unacceptable, and does not meet 

the threshold requirement of establishing undue delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 

514, 530 (1972) (“Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is 

Case 4:13-cv-00909-CKJ Document 29 Filed 10/08/14 Page 5 of 7
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”). Moreover, 

Petitioner has not established that he has diligently asserted his rights in the state court. 

Thus, were the Court to consider the timing issue, Petitioner has failed to establish 

unusual or excessive delay in the processing of his petition. 

 Because Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief is still apparently pending 

in Pima County Superior Court, in addition to a possible second, or amended petition, 

filed on January 6, 2014, Petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies, and his 

habeas petition is premature. This action should be dismissed. The Court recommends a 

dismissal without prejudice, so as not to preclude Petitioner from refiling his federal 

petition upon exhaustion of post-conviction proceedings in state court. 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Petition (Doc. 13) and this 

action be dismissed without prejudice to Petitioner filing a new petition and action after 

he has exhausted his state court remedies. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. If 

objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 13-00909-

TUC-CKJ. 

 If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 8th day of October, 2014. 

Case 4:13-cv-00909-CKJ Document 29 Filed 10/08/14 Page 6 of 7
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Case 4:13-cv-00909-CKJ Document 29 Filed 10/08/14 Page 7 of 7