Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-05327/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-05327-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEON LEE MEYERS,

Petitioner,

 v.

ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C-11-5327 TEH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING

MOTION FOR MARTINEZ/TREVINO

EVIDENTIARY HEARING; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Leon Lee Meyers, a state prisoner incarcerated at Solano

State Prison, has filed this pro se petition seeking a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has filed an

answer and Petitioner has filed a traverse. Petitioner has also

filed a motion for a Martinez/Trevino hearing and to defer ruling on

the final amended petition. Docket No. 84. For the reasons

discussed below, both the petition and the request for a

Martinez/Trevino hearing are DENIED.

I

On October 16, 2009, an Alameda County jury found

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1

The Clerk’s Transcript is located at Docket No. 82 (“Answer”),

Ex. A. 

2

Petitioner guilty of assault on a police officer resulting in great

bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 245(c)), battery on a person with

whom Petitioner had a dating relationship (Cal. Penal Code §

243(e)(1)), and resisting a police officer resulting in serious

bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 148.10(a)). Clerk’s Transcript1

(“CT”) at 1822-25. The jury also found the following enhancement

allegations to be true: one prior serious felony conviction within

the meaning of section 667(a) of the California Penal Code; nine

prior strike convictions within the meaning of sections 667(e)(2)

and 1170.12(c)(2)of the California Penal Code; four prior prison

terms within the meaning of section 667.5(b)of the California Penal

Code. CT at 1826-27. On December 18, 2009, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate term of 33 years to life. 

CT at 1995-97.

Petitioner appealed his conviction in the California Court

of Appeal. CT 1999 and Answer, Ex. C. On March 4, 2011, the

California Court of Appeal filed an unpublished opinion affirming

the judgment. People v. Meyers, No. A127223, 2011 WL 766932 (Cal.

Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2011) and Answer, Ex. F. On June 8, 2011, the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. 

Answer, Ex. H. Petitioner also filed a number of other petitions

for review with the California Supreme Court. Docket No. 54, Exs.

A-H.

 On November 2, 2011, Petitioner filed the instant federal

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2

This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d

1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

3

petition. Docket No. 1. Petitioner sought to amend his petition

multiple times. Docket Nos. 12, 16, and 19. The Court instructed

Petitioner to file a final amended petition encompassing all claims

he wished to present. Docket No. 21. On July 27, 2012, per the

Court’s order, Petitioner filed a final amended petition. Docket

No. 26. On May 15, 2014, the Court granted Respondent’s motion to

dismiss 44 claims for failure to exhaust state remedies and issued

an order to show cause as to why the remaining 10 claims of the

final amended petition should not be granted. Docket No. 65. 

II

The following factual background is taken from the order

of the California Court of Appeal.2

Prosecution Case

In 2006, Debra Ann Singletary was dating appellant and

living at his house. On June 6, 2006, appellant drove

Singletary to San Francisco so she could pick up and cash

her brother’s social security check for nearly $900. After

Singletary cashed the check, appellant drove to what

appeared to be a dead-end street and punched her in the

face, demanding $200. When Singletary refused, appellant

choked her and bit her arm. Singletary reached for a gun

under the seat; appellant responded by throwing Singletary

out of the car. As Singletary tried to walk down the

street, appellant blocked her path with his car. Then

appellant got out of the car and began chasing Singletary.

Appellant caught Singletary and forced her back into the

car. [FN 3]

FN 3: At trial, Singletary testified that she lied

during a police interview on June 8, 2006 because she

“had a warrant and the police officer said that if

[she] was to make a written statement and testify,

that they wouldn’t take [her] to jail.” Singletary

testified appellant did not hit, choke, or bite her

and that she did not scream or cry out for help. She

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explained she received the bite marks during a fight

in a casino. The prosecutor, however, impeached

Singletary with a transcript of the police interview

and with a letter Singletary wrote to the police in

September 2009.

On the evening of June 6, 2006, Officer McNeely responded

to a report of a Black male “that was possibly hitting” a

woman in a Camaro. McNeely and another officer, Officer

Diane Jim, responded to the call. McNeely stopped the car.

Jim approached the passenger side of the car where

Singletary was sitting and told appellant to turn off the

car. He complied. Before Jim could say anything, appellant

“said that he and [Singletary] had just been arguing.”

Appellant “was sweating and he looked really nervous.”

Singletary seemed “very nervous ... or very afraid. She

was very upset. And she looked like she was going to cry.”

Singletary asked Jim if she could get out of the car, and

Jim granted her request because Singletary seemed afraid

of appellant.

McNeely approached appellant in the driver’s seat of the

Camaro. He requested appellant’s identification and asked

appellant whether he was on probation or parole. Appellant

lied, telling McNeely that he “just got off of probation

for the sales of narcotics” when he was actually still on

probation. McNeely explained to appellant he was

investigating a report of domestic violence and that

appellant’s car matched the description in the report.

McNeely also explained that appellant’s car did not have

license plates. Appellant seemed nervous. He was sweating,

his hands were shaking, and he was “stalling a little bit”

when he answered McNeely’s questions. 

McNeely then began a records check on appellant. As he

waited for the results, Jim told him that appellant had

hit and bitten Singletary and that there was a gun under

the driver’s seat of the car. At that point, McNeely

decided to arrest appellant. He approached appellant, who

was still sitting in the driver’s seat of the car.

Appellant’s arm was hanging out of the window, and McNeely

thought it would be “fairly easy” to handcuff appellant.

McNeely grabbed appellant’s wrist and told him to put his

other hand behind his back. In a calm voice, McNeely

explained that appellant was being detained “for further

investigation of domestic violence.” 

At that point, appellant tried to get out of the car,

which made McNeely concerned that appellant would get the

gun “to engage in a gun fight.” The car door was open and

McNeely was standing “pretty much in the middle of the

doorway of the vehicle.” McNeely grabbed appellant by the

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back of the neck and pushed him back into the car to “gain

control of him and push his head towards the steering

wheel.” McNeely instructed appellant to slowly put his

right hand behind his back; in response, appellant said, “

‘All right, [a]ll right, [a]ll right.’ “ But as appellant

began to comply with McNeely’s order, he suddenly started

the ignition and put the car into drive. Appellant’s car

began to “accelerate[ ] at a high rate of speed” but

McNeely was unable to get away from the door. When McNeely

felt a hard tug on his gun holster, he realized he was

caught in the door; he tried to run to keep up with the

car and began to yell, “Stop the car, stop the car.”

Appellant did not stop the car. 

As the car accelerated, McNeely lost his footing and fell.

McNeely continued to yell at appellant to stop the car,

but appellant did not stop. Eventually, McNeely was able

to free his gun holster from the frame of the door. As he

dislodged the holster, he fell to the pavement as

appellant accelerated to approximately 30 miles per hour.

McNeely faded in and out of consciousness and awoke in the

hospital. 

After the incident, Jim found Singletary hiding behind a

parked SUV. The officers eventually subdued appellant with

a taser, arrested him, and searched him. They found a

crack pipe and rock cocaine. 

Defense Case

On June 6, 2006, appellant and Singletary were driving in

appellant’s Camaro when they got into a disagreement.

Appellant decided to end his relationship with Singletary

and told Singletary to get out of the car. She did not,

and appellant “physically force[d] her out of the car.” He

did not bite or punch her; he “only forced her to get out

of the car because she refused to get out.” Appellant then

drove to a friend’s house. Singletary walked up to the

house and started “yelling for [appellant] to take her to

get her clothes now.” Appellant and Singletary got back

into the car; almost immediately thereafter, police

officers stopped appellant’s car. Appellant did not have a

gun in his car, but he did have access to one at home. 

McNeely walked up to appellant’s side of the car and stood

next to the door. He explained that he was responding to a

domestic violence report. After he obtained appellant’s

driver’s license and information and performed a records

check, McNeely grabbed appellant’s wrist, pulled it back,

and opened the car door. Appellant turned away to try to

alleviate the pain and said, “‘You don’t have to twist my

arm like this. Am I under arrest?’” 

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McNeely grabbed appellant’s neck and “slammed” appellant’s

head against the steering wheel. [FN 4] Appellant saw

“darkness and stars.” As appellant told McNeely that he

“didn’t ... deserve this,” McNeely kneed him in the side

several times. Appellant did not try to get out of the

car, but after McNeely kneed him, appellant “slammed [his

car] into gear.” “The car took off....” As the car

accelerated, McNeely “made a quick attempt to snatch

[appellant] out of the car” by grabbing appellant’s jeans

and the back of his shirt. Appellant was “looking straight

ahead” and could hear his car’s tires “screeching.” He did

not hear McNeely yelling at him to stop the car. Appellant

drove off because McNeely “wouldn’t get off me. He

wouldn’t let up.” He explained that he did not remember

dragging McNeely; he had “no idea” McNeely was running to

try to keep up with the car, or that McNeely was dragging

behind the car. 

FN 4: In appellant’s booking photograph, which was

admitted into evidence, the area around appellant’s

eyes is swollen.

Appellant testified that Singletary lied to police and

that the police report was inaccurate and “false.”

Appellant admitted suffering prior convictions for

possession of a controlled substance, possession of a

controlled substance for sale, second degree burglary, and

escape by a convicted felon.

Meyers, 2011 WL 766932, at *1-*3.

III

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the

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state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the

constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the

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“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in conducting

its analysis, the federal court must presume the correctness of the

state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden

of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas

review, AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct.

1305, 1307 (2011). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly

established law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of

[the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant

state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different

from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at

best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. See Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion

from the state’s highest court, the court “looks through” to the

last reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. 

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3

Citations to pages in the parties’ filings will be to the page

numbers applied by the Court’s docketing system, which are found at

the top of each page, and not to the page numbers assigned by the

parties or found at the bottom of each page.

9

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and

scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses Petitioner’s

claims. 

IV

A

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it

refused to allow him to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of

insanity. Docket No. 26 (“Amended Pet.”) at 11.3

 The state

appellate court denied this claim as follows:

In September 2006, appellant pleaded not guilty to the

charges. Over three years later – on the third day of

trial - appellant moved to change his plea of not guilty

to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The

prosecutor opposed the motion, noting that appellant had

entered a not guilty plea three years earlier and

“[t]here has been no indication in the last three years,

despite his obvious reference[s] to his own mental state,

that he wished to proceed by not guilty by reason of

insanity. We are now in a trial court, moments away from

picking a jury.” In response, defense counsel argued the

new plea was necessitated by the court’s denial of

appellant’s motion to admit evidence of his mental state.

The court denied the motion, concluding appellant had not

demonstrated good cause to change the plea. 

A trial court may allow a defendant to change a plea

after the commencement of trial only where the defendant

demonstrates good cause for the change of plea. (§ 1016,

subd. (6); People v. Boyd (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 901, 908;

People v. Lutman (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 64, 66; 4 Witkin &

Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Pretrial

Proceedings, § 284, p. 497.) A defendant demonstrates

good cause by showing “a plausible reason for delay in

tendering any plea.” (Lutman, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at p.

68.) Here, counsel for appellant conceded the court’s

ruling excluding evidence of appellant’s mental state

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prompted the change of plea. As the trial court

recognized, this does not constitute “good cause.”

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by

denying appellant’s motion to change his plea. (Witkin &

Epstein, supra, § 284 at p. 497 [noting that “[t]he

court’s discretion in denying permission to add an

insanity plea will normally be upheld” and citing

cases].)

Meyers, 2011 WL 766932, at *3-*4.

To the extent that Petitioner is arguing that the trial

court erroneously applied or interpreted state law, e.g., that the

trial court incorrectly found that he had not demonstrated the good

cause required by section 1016 of the California Penal Code, no

federal habeas relief is available. The Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that federal habeas writ is unavailable for

violations of state law or for alleged error in the interpretation

or application of state law. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216,

222 (2011). 

However, when a state statute creates a protected “liberty

interest,” the violation of that state law raises federal

constitutional concerns on federal habeas corpus. See Bonin v.

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 841 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Bonin I”). A protected

liberty interest may be created by state law, but only in limited

circumstances. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,

460-63 (1989). In order for a state law to create a “liberty

interest” protected by the Due Process Clause, the state law must

meet two requirements: the law must set forth “substantive

predicates” governing official decision making and must contain

“explicitly mandatory language,” i.e. a specific directive to the

decision-maker that mandates a particular outcome. Id.; see also

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Bonin I, 59 F.3d at 842. Neither of these requirements were met in

this instance. Section 1016 states in relevant part: “A defendant

who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity shall be

conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the

commission of the offense charged; provided, that the court may for

good cause shown allow a change of plea at any time before the

commencement of the trial.” There are no substantive predicates

that govern the trial court’s decision as to whether to allow a

defendant to change a not guilty plea to a plea of not guilty by

reason of insanity. Nor is there explicitly mandatory language

regarding the change of plea. On the contrary, section 1016 allows

trial courts the discretion to allow a change of plea if good cause

is shown. Section 1016 does not create a federal liberty interest. 

Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 747 (1990) (no liberty

interest where state did not create entitlement). Therefore,

section 1016 does not create a federal liberty interest. 

Petitioner has cited no United States Supreme Court

authority for the proposition that a criminal defendant has a

constitutional right to change a plea from not guilty to not guilty

by reason of insanity after the commencement of trial but prior to

the empanelment of the jury. Nor is the Court aware of any such

authority. 

Accordingly, the state appellate court’s denial of the

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law. Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim. 

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B

Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his Marsden motions for new counsel, thereby

denying him his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Amended

Pet. at 11. The state appellate court denied his claim as follows:

Appellant made 12 Marsden motions to discharge his

appointed counsel. Appellant challenges the court’s

denial of nine of the Marsden motions he made during

trial and one post-trial Marsden motion. [FN 5] 

FN 5: Appellant does not challenge the court’s

denial of three Marsden motions he made in 2007.

On September 17, 2009, appellant complained that

appointed counsel failed to prepare adequately for trial,

specifically that counsel failed to contact witnesses and

obtain documents relevant to his defense. During a closed

Marsden hearing, appointed counsel explained that he had

filed approximately 20 motions regarding “the areas that

Mr. Meyers has concern about.... And those range from an

argument that the detention wasn’t proper, the arrest

wasn’t proper for a variety of reasons, and any number of

issues that I have been able to satisfy myself had legal

merit.” Counsel conceded that he had some questions about

appellant’s mental state and could have obtained expert

testimony about appellant’s mental state notwithstanding

the fact that the court had declared appellant competent.

The court denied the Marsden motion because, among other

things, appellant had not demonstrated “incompetence of

appointed counsel.” The court determined “there has not

been a breakdown in the relationship between [appointed

counsel] and Mr. Meyers which would make it impossible

for [appointed counsel] to effectively represent Mr.

Meyers.”

On September 28, 2009, appellant filed another Marsden

motion complaining that appointed counsel had: (1)

withdrawn a meritorious Pitchess motion; (2) failed to

file a motion in limine to exclude hearsay and other

evidence; (3) failed to properly articulate the arguments

in favor of entering a late plea of not guilty by reason

of insanity; and (4) refused to take his telephone calls.

Following a Marsden hearing, the court denied the motion.

The court concluded appellant had not demonstrated

appointed counsel was incompetent and explained that

appellant’s “lack of confidence in the performance of

appointed counsel is not a basis for a substitution” of

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counsel. 

Two days later, on September 30, 2009, appellant made two

additional Marsden motions claiming that appointed

counsel failed to seek appellate review of motions the

trial court denied, did not contact witnesses, and “[was]

not professionally articulating hi[m]self to the people,”

causing everyone in the courtroom “to laugh at him.”

Counsel conceded that his communication with appellant

was not as complete as appellant would like. On October

1, 2009, appellant made another Marsden motion,

complaining that appointed counsel had not allowed him to

participate in the trial, would not communicate with him,

and would not ask questions appellant proposed. Following

a Marsden hearing, the court rejected these arguments and

denied the motions. The court noted that a disagreement

about “trial tactics” did not require a substitution of

counsel. 

On October 5, 2009, appellant made another Marsden

motion, this time complaining about appointed counsel’s

refusal to cross-examine witnesses in the manner

appellant proposed. Appellant also claimed counsel failed

to tell the jurors about an “uncharged offense that was

refused by the District Attorney’s Office.” The court

denied the motion. It noted the difficulty appointed

counsel was having questioning witnesses when appellant

was “talking, talking, talking” in counsel’s ear and

explained that any disagreement between counsel and

appellant concerned trial strategy. The court also

determined the motion was untimely. 

Two days later, appellant made another Marsden motion. He

complained that appointed counsel failed to object to

certain evidence and failed to present evidence to the

jury. The next day, on October 8, 2009, appellant

requested a substitution of counsel because appointed

counsel would not let him testify. Appellant also

complained that appointed counsel failed to present

certain evidence and failed to object to other evidence.

On October 26, 2009, appellant made his final Marsden

motion, restating many of the same complaints about his

appointed counsel. The court denied these motions for the

reasons discussed above. 

“When a defendant seeks new counsel on the basis that his

appointed counsel is providing inadequate representation

- i.e., makes what is commonly called a Marsden motion

[citation] - the trial court must permit the defendant to

explain the basis of his contention and to relate

specific instances of inadequate performance. A defendant

is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that

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the appointed counsel is not providing adequate

representation or that defendant and counsel have become

embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that

ineffective representation is likely to result.

Substitution of counsel lies within the court’s

discretion. The court does not abuse its discretion in

denying the motion unless the defendant has shown that a

failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the

defendant’s right to assistance of counsel. [Citation.]”

(People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604; People v.

Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 803; People v. Taylor

(2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599.) 

The trial court “did not abuse its discretion by

concluding that it was unnecessary to substitute

counsel.” (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp.

803-804.) It is well settled that disagreements over

trial tactics do not warrant a substitution of counsel

under Marsden. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701,

728-729, overruled on other grounds as stated in People

v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 90-91; People v.

Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905; 5 Witkin & Epstein,

Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 159, p.

250.) Appellant’s complaints that appointed counsel did

not call appellant’s witnesses and failed to properly

investigate and present the evidence are disagreements

over trial tactics. Numerous courts have upheld the trial

court’s denial of a Marsden motion where the defendant

and appointed counsel disagree about how the case should

be tried. (People v. Carr (1972) 8 Cal.3d 287, 299;

People v. Hisquierdo (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 397, 403;

People v. Rhines (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 498, 505.) 

“A defendant does not have the right to present a defense

of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate

and competent defense. [Citations.] Tactical

disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do

not by themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable

conflict.’ “(People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp.

728-729 .) “There is no constitutional right to an

attorney who would conduct the defense of the case in

accord with the whims of an indigent defendant.

[Citations.] Nor does a disagreement between defendant

and appointed counsel concerning trial tactics

necessarily compel the appointment of another attorney.”

(People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281-282.) 

Nor did appellant’s claims that he “did not trust”

appointed counsel and “believed that counsel had not

represented him properly” require the trial court to

substitute counsel. A defendant’s lack of confidence in

appointed counsel is insufficient to warrant a

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substitution. (People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694,

704-705, overruled on another point in People v. Wheeler

(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 287, fn. 36.) Finally, appellant’s

reliance on a single case - People v. Crandell (1988) 46

Cal.3d 833, 854, overruled on other grounds in People v.

Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364-365 - is misplaced. In

Crandell, the California Supreme Court concluded that

“the Marsden procedures were not required” because “no

request for substitute counsel was made in [the trial]

court.” (Id. at p. 855.) Crandell has absolutely no

application here.

Meyers, 2011 WL 766932, at *4-*6. 

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and is properly

considered in federal habeas. Bland v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 20 F.3d

1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The ultimate

inquiry in a federal habeas proceeding is whether the trial court’s

denial of the motion “actually violated [petitioner’s]

constitutional rights in that the conflict between [petitioner] and

his attorney had become so great that it resulted in a total lack of

communication or other significant impediment that resulted in turn

in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required

by the Sixth Amendment.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026. If a serious

conflict resulted in the constructive denial of counsel, no further

showing of prejudice is required and the petitioner’s trial is

presumed to have been unfair. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1027. But if a

serious conflict did not rise to the level of a constructive denial

of counsel, the petitioner must prove that he was prejudiced by the

conflict. Id. at 1028.

The state appellate court’s denial of this claim was not

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an unreasonable determination of the facts. Nor was the denial

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law. The record supports the trial court’s finding that

Petitioner’s complaints about appointed counsel were disagreements

over trial tactics. The record shows that Petitioner disagreed with

counsel as to what additional investigation should be undertaken;

whether additional motions should be filed; which arguments should

be presented; which additional witnesses should be presented; the

questions asked on cross-examination; and the failure to object to

certain evidence. A difference of opinion as to trial tactics does

not constitute denial of effective assistance. See United States v.

Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981). Petitioner has not

established that trial counsel’s performance was deficient. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (the proper standard for attorney

performance is that of reasonably effective assistance). 

Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s Marsden

motions did not deny Petitioner his right to counsel. 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to establish a reasonable

probability that he was prejudiced by the denial of the Marsden

motions. Petitioner has not established that trial counsel’s

performance was deficient, or that another attorney would have

conducted the trial as Petitioner wished. Habeas relief is denied

on this claim.

C

Petitioner contends that the trial court prejudicially

erred when it allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence of a

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prior incident involving San Leandro police officers. Amended Pet.

at 11. The state appellate court denied the claim as follows:

Before trial, the prosecution moved to admit evidence of

appellant’s 2002 assault on a police officer (2002

incident) [FN 6] to negate appellant’s claim that “he was

reacting in self-defense to an unlawful and excessive use

of forced by [ ] McNeely” and that “it was only a matter

of accident or mistake that [ ] McNeely got stuck in the

car and dragged.” The prosecution argued the evidence was

relevant to show intent, motive, and common scheme or

plan. Appellant opposed the motion. After a hearing, the

court admitted the evidence, determining it was relevant

to prove appellant’s “motive, his intent, his common

scheme and plan and his knowledge, the fact that under

these circumstances the police officer would, in fact,

have been injured.” The court also determined the

probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice

to appellant. We review the court’s ruling for abuse of

discretion. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369;

People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal .4th 610, 637.) 

FN 6: Appellant was arrested on October 10, 2002 and

charged with possession of cocaine base for sale

(Health & Safety Code, § 11351.5) and resisting

arrest (§ 148, subdivision (a)(1)). Appellant pled

guilty to the narcotics offense.

At trial, San Leandro Police Officer Brian Anthony

testified that he and his partner, Officer Derrick Schutz,

were patrolling an area of San Leandro on October 10, 2002

in a marked patrol car. Both officers were dressed in

uniform. The officers saw a man, later identified as

appellant, driving a Lincoln Town Car with expired

registration and no front license plate. The officers

stopped appellant’s car and Schutz told appellant “why he

was pulled over.” Appellant said “Yes, I am on probation”

in a voice that indicated “he was bothered” by the

officers’ presence. Appellant was “getting kind of tensed

up” and began to “raise his voice at Officer Schutz.” He

said, “‘Just leave me alone, just leave me alone. Can’t

you guys just leave me alone....’” 

Schutz repeatedly asked appellant to turn off the

ignition, but appellant refused. Schutz reached into the

car to turn off the ignition so the officers could take

appellant out of the car to conduct a probation search. At

that point, appellant grabbed Schutz’s arm with both hands

and appellant’s car began to move forward. Schutz had

about half of his body in the car while appellant was

holding his arm. While Schutz was “trying to break free of

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[appellant’s] grasp of his arm,” appellant “was trying to

put the car into drive again.” Both officers yelled at

appellant to turn off the car; Schutz began hitting

appellant in the head with his fist “because he wanted to

break free of the grasp and actually get out of the car

window so he wouldn’t be [dragged].” Anthony was concerned

that if appellant put the car in drive, both officers

would have been dragged and injured, so he sprayed

appellant with pepper spray. In response, appellant

released Schutz’s arm and Anthony removed the keys from

the ignition. Appellant scooted across the bench seat, got

out of the passenger side door, and tried to run away from

the officers. 

Appellant contends the court “prejudicially erred” by

admitting evidence of the 2002 incident because the two

incidents were not sufficiently similar and because the

evidence was more prejudicial than probative. Pursuant to

Evidence Code section 1101, [FN 7] evidence of other

crimes or bad acts is inadmissible when offered to show a

defendant had the criminal disposition or propensity to

commit the crime charged. (§ 1101, subd. (a).) Evidence of

other crimes or misconduct by a defendant is admissible,

however, to prove a fact (i.e., motive, intent, or absence

of mistake or accident) other than a disposition to commit

such acts and may be admissible to negate a claim of

good-faith belief or other innocent mental state. (§ 1101,

subd. (b); People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402

(Ewoldt).) Evidence of an uncharged crime is admissible

only if it has “substantial probative value that is not

greatly outweighed by the potential that undue prejudice

will result from admitting the evidence. [Citations.]”

(People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1123.) 

FN 7: Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory

references are to the Evidence Code. Section 1101,

subdivision (b) provides: “Nothing in this section

prohibits the admission of evidence that a person

committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when

relevant to prove some fact (such as motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether

a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual

act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not

reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim

consented) other than his or her disposition to

commit such an act.”

Evidence of the 2002 incident was relevant to prove the

absence of mistake or accident, because appellant claimed

he accidentally dragged McNeely. [FN 8.] In both

incidents, appellant was uncooperative with police

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officers during a traffic stop. In both incidents, police

officers were reaching into appellant’s car to restrain

him or stop him from leaving; in both incidents, appellant

tried to escape by driving away with a police officer

hanging from his car. The incidents are sufficiently

similar to support an inference that appellant

intentionally assaulted McNeely rather than mistakenly

dragging him in his attempt to escape. “‘[T]he recurrence

of a similar result ... tends (increasingly with each

instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or

self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state,

and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though

not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal,

intent accompanying such an act....’ [Citation.] In order

to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct

must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that

the defendant ‘”probably harbor[ed] the same intent in

each instance.” [Citations.]’” (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th

at p. 402.)

FN 8: The trial court admitted the evidence to prove

appellant’s “motive, his intent, his common scheme

and plan and his knowledge ... that under these

circumstances, the police officer would, in fact,

have been injured.” “When the evidence is properly

received the basis for the court’s ruling is not

material.” (People v. Williams (1984) 44 Cal.3d 883,

911.)

Appellant argues that evidence of the 2002 incident was

extremely prejudicial as a matter of law. From this

premise, he reasons that the trial court prejudicially

abused its discretion in finding the probative value of

the evidence outweighed the prejudice under section 352.

We disagree. “‘In applying section 352, “prejudicial” is

not synonymous with “damaging.”’” (People v. Callahan

(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 356, 371.) “‘Undue prejudice’ refers

not to evidence that proves guilt, but to evidence that

prompts an emotional reaction against the defendant and

tends to cause the trier of fact to decide the case on an

improper basis: ‘The prejudice which exclusion of evidence

under ... section 352 is designed to avoid is not the

prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from

relevant, highly probative evidence. “[A]ll evidence which

tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the

defendant’s case. The stronger the evidence, the more it

is ‘prejudicial.’”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Walker (2006)

139 Cal.App.4th 782, 806; People v. Killebrew (2002) 103

Cal.App.4th 644, 650-651.)

The evidence was harmful to appellant, but it was not

prejudicial in the sense that it would cause the jury to

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decide the case on an improper basis. Moreover, the court

instructed the jury on how to evaluate the evidence of

appellant’s prior acts to avoid the possibility of undue

prejudice. As a result, we conclude the court did not

abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the 2002

incident.

Meyers, 2011 WL 766932, at *6-*8. 

A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to

federal habeas review unless the ruling violates federal law, either

by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory

provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair

trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,

41 (1984); see also Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir.

1999) (“Even where it appears that evidence was erroneously

admitted, a federal court will interfere only if it appears that its

admission violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair

trial.”). Even if an evidentiary error is of constitutional

dimension, the court must consider whether the error was harmless

under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

Petitioner argues that the admission of the 2002 incident

was improper because the San Leandro officers unlawfully arrested

him; because the 2002 incident was not sufficiently similar to be

admissible under section 1101 of the California Evidence Code; and

because the probative value of the 2002 incident did not outweigh

the prejudice. Petitioner also alleges, in a conclusory fashion and

without explanation, that the introduction of the 2002 incident was

unconstitutionally prejudicial and violated his due process rights,

his right to a fair trial, and the fundamental fairness guaranteed

by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

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Constitution. Docket No. 83 (“Traverse”) at 6. To the extent

Petitioner is arguing that state law was violated, e.g. that the

2002 incident was inadmissible under section 1101 of the California

Evidence Code or that the incident was more prejudicial than

probative under section 352 of the California Evidence Code, these

claims are not cognizable in federal habeas. Swarthout, 562 U.S. at

222, and Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41. The admission of the 2002

incident, if erroneous, is cognizable in federal habeas only if it

violated federal law. 

After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the

admission of the prior incident involving San Leandro police

officers did not deprive Petitioner of the fundamentally fair trial

guaranteed by due process. As an initial matter, the state

appellate court’s determination that the 2002 incident was properly

admitted is supported by the record. The 2002 incident was admitted

to show Petitioner’s motive to harm the victim and that Petitioner

was aware that the victim would be dragged if the car moved forward

while the victim was reaching into the car. The incident was

relevant because Petitioner claimed that it was an accident or

mistake that the victim was dragged, and that he did not intend to

harm the victim but was acting in self-defense. The incident was

similar in that in both cases the police officer was halfway in the

vehicle and the vehicle moved forward, causing the officer to be

dragged along with the car. Petitioner’s allegations that the San

Leandro officers unlawfully stopped him and that they were not

abiding by official procedures have no bearing on the incident’s

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4

The jury was instructed, in relevant part, as follows: “And

evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the

defendant committed an act similar to constituting a crime other than

22

admissibility. Since the 2002 incident was properly admitted, it

does not implicate due process or Petitioner’s right to a fair

trial.

Assuming arguendo that the 2002 incident was erroneously

admitted, it would only violate due process “if there are no

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.” Jammal

v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (admission of

prior bad acts only violates due process if there are no permissible

inferences). In this instance, the evidence was admitted to show

Petitioner’s intent to harm the victim and to show knowledge of the

consequences of allowing the car to move forward. These are

permissible inferences. See, e.g., Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159,

1172-73 (9th Cir. 2005) (constitutionally permissible way to show

that defendant committed crime is to show that crime shared the same

characteristics of defendant’s previous crimes); Houston v. Roe, 177

F.3d 901, 910 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (prior bad acts properly admitted

to show motive and intent); Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357-58

(9th Cir. 1995) (evidence that defendant used same ploy in prior

kidnapping and rape was admissible to show intent). Nor does the

record support a finding that this alleged evidentiary error had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” The jury was instructed on how to properly

evaluate the 2002 incident so as to avoid the possibility of undue

prejudice,4

 and courts presume that juries follow curative

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that for which he is on trial. This evidence, if believed, may not

be considered by you to prove that the defendant is of bad character

or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. It may be considered

by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show

a motive for the commission of the crime charged, or a characteristic

method, plan, or scheme in the commission of criminal acts similar to

the method, plan or scheme used in the commission of the offense in

this case, which would further tend to show the existence of lack of

mistake, accident, or self-defense in the crime charged, and that the

defendant had knowledge or possessed the means that might have been

useful or necessary for the commission of the crime.” Docket No. 82,

Ex. B (“RT”) at 1329-30. 

5

Petitioner argues that the evidence is unreliable or misleading

for various reasons. However, it is the function of the jury -– not

of Petitioner -- to determine how much weight should be given to the

admissible testimony and evidence. 

23

instructions. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987);

Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1270 (9th Cir.

2000). And there was overwhelming evidence that supported a finding

of Petitioner’s guilt on all three charges.5 There was testimony

that Petitioner turned on the car ignition and accelerated the car

as Officer McNeely attempted to detain him. There was evidence

presented that Officer McNeely was physically injured due to being

dragged by the car. There was testimony that Petitioner then fled

the car and continued to evade arrest. There was an anonymous phone

call that described an altercation between Petitioner and

Singletary; and Singletary’s statements to the police officers

immediately during and after the incident corroborated the

allegations of assault. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

on this claim.

D

Petitioner contends that the trial court prejudicially

erred when it excluded evidence regarding police training and

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practices. Amended Pet. at 11. The state appellate court denied

his claim as follows:

Appellant sought to introduce Oakland Police Department

Training Bulletins on handcuff techniques and high risk

vehicle stops to support his claim that McNeely “used

excessive force and was not acting in the performance of

his duties.” The prosecution objected, contending the

evidence was irrelevant and would “only serve to confuse

the issues and mislead the jury as to the law upon which

the Court will so instruct. This case is not a civil

employment action involving the adherence, or lack

thereof, to an employer’s handbook of policies.” 

The court excluded the evidence, determining the evidence

was more prejudicial than probative under section 352. The

court explained, “I just think that’s much more

prejudicial than probative because under [section] 352, it

would ... absolutely confuse the issues and mislead the

jury. There would be a substantial creation of undue

prejudice if I were to tell the jury that somehow these

manuals, despite a modicum of probative value on training

techniques, would, in fact, be something they should think

about or even ... use to decide what happened on June 6,

2009.... [U]nder [section] 352, I do find that the use

[or] any mention of these training manuals would be more

prejudicial than probative inasmuch as they do not state

the law. They merely indicate the potential techniques and

guidelines for ... officers and hence, it’s much more

prejudicial [than] probative because it would create

substantial danger of undue prejudice by confusing the

issues and by misleading the jury.” The court, however,

permitted appellant to cross-examine McNeely on the

training he received regarding high-risk vehicle stops and

to argue during closing argument that McNeely “did not

follow his training.” 

Appellant claims the court erred by excluding the evidence

because it was relevant to his defense that McNeely was

using excessive force. [FN 9] This argument misses the

point. The evidence may have been relevant, but the court

excluded it on the basis that it was more prejudicial than

probative pursuant to section 352. In any event, the cases

upon which appellant relies - ostensibly to demonstrate

the evidence was relevant - are inapposite because they

concern civil lawsuits where the plaintiff alleged the use

of excessive force by police officers. In addition,

several of the cases are from other jurisdictions and are

not binding. (Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th

467, 490.) 

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FN 9: Appellant does not contend he was denied the

right to present a defense.

The court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the

evidence was more prejudicial than probative. The

bulletins, designed to guarantee officer safety, have no

bearing on the impermissible use of unreasonable force and

would have confused the jury. Finally, and even if we

assume the court erred by excluding the police bulletins,

any error was harmless because appellant cannot

demonstrate it is reasonably probable a more favorable

result would have been reached absent the error. (People

v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836; People v. Alcala

(1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 790-791.) The court permitted

appellant’s counsel to cross-examine McNeely about his

training and to suggest during closing argument that

McNeely did not follow that training. In addition, the

evidence at trial demonstrated appellant refused to follow

McNeely’s commands - just as he had done in a prior

incident - and actively resisted arrest, injuring McNeely

in the process.

Meyers, 2011 WL 766932, at *8-*9. 

“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the

Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal

trials.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (holding that due

process does not guarantee a defendant the right to present all

relevant evidence). This latitude is limited, however, by a

defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and to present a

defense, rights originating in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324. “While the Constitution thus prohibits

the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no

legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that

they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence

permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is

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outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at

325-26; see Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 43 (holding that the exclusion of

evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless “‘it offends

some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience

of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’”). But “at times a

state’s rules of evidence cannot be mechanistically applied and must

yield in favor of due process and the right to a fair trial.” 

Lunbery v. Hornbeak, 605 F.3d 754, 762 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding

California’s application of its evidentiary rules to exclude hearsay

testimony that bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and was

critical to the defense violated right to present evidence). The

defendant, not the state, bears the burden to demonstrate that the

principle violated by the evidentiary rule “is so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as

fundamental.” Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 47 (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

In deciding if the exclusion of evidence violates the due

process right to a fair trial or the right to present a defense, the

court balances the following five factors: (1) the probative value

of the excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability;

(3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4)

whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative;

and (5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted

defense. Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court

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must also give due weight to the state interests underlying the

state evidentiary rules on which the exclusion was based. See Chia,

360 F.3d at 1006. The Miller balancing test, however, is a creation

of circuit law and, consequently, is not “clearly established law”

for purposes of habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 760 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus,

because the Supreme Court has considered whether an evidentiary

rule, by its own terms, violated a defendant’s constitutional right

to present evidence, but has not directly considered whether a trial

court’s exercise of discretion to exclude evidence, under a

constitutionally sound evidentiary rule, violated a defendant’s

constitutional right to present evidence, a state court’s failure to

apply the Miller balancing test is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. See id. at 758-59. The due process and Sixth Amendment

limitations on the exclusion of critical corroborative defense

evidence are clearly established federal law under AEDPA. See Chia,

360 F.3d at 1003; DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th

Cir. 2001).

Petitioner does not contend he was denied the right to

present a defense. Meyers, 2011 WL 766932, at *9 n.9. The Court

therefore evaluates whether the exclusion of these training

bulletins denied him the right to a fair trial. The Court finds

that the appellate court correctly concluded that the bulletins had

no bearing on the impermissible use of unreasonable force since the

bulletins focused on officer safety and not what constituted

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excessive force and unlawful performances of one’s duties. The

Court further agrees with the appellate court that the bulletins

would have confused the jury. The jury might have incorrectly

presumed that these manuals set forth what officer actions would be

considered unconstitutional. As the trial court noted, the opposite

is true: “Even if [the jurors] believe that this officer used some

technique other than what is in the two bulletins you're seeking to

present, that does not preclude them from finding that it was

lawful, the conduct, nor that it was reasonable and not excessive.” 

RT at 129. The bulletins were not critical or corroborative defense

evidence. Therefore, their exclusion did not violate Petitioner’s

Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial. Chia, 360 F.2d

at 1003. 

Petitioner argues that even if the exclusion of the police

training bulletins alone did not constitute prejudicial error, the

exclusion of the bulletins combined with jury instruction error

“prevented the jury from determining that training and experience

would apply to any unlawful action committed by the officers,”

thereby denying Petitioner a fair trial. Traverse at 6-7. 

Petitioner’s claim of instructional error has already been dismissed

by this Court as unexhausted. Docket No. 65. Accordingly, for the

purpose of this analysis, the Court examines only whether the

exclusion of the bulletins constituted prejudicial error. Given

that the bulletins wore more prejudicial than probative in that they

went directly to the legal conclusion regarding the lawfulness of

Officer McNeely’s actions, prejudicial error would occur if the

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bulletins were admitted. Moreover, the bulletins were intended to

support the defense theory of the case, that Officer McNeely was not

acting in the performance of his duties when he stopped Petitioner. 

On cross-examination, defense counsel was able to explore Officer

McNeely’s training regarding how to handcuff a suspect in a vehicle. 

RT at 657-62. Under cross-examination McNeely admitted that his

actions had been inconsistent with his training. Id. at 657. He

testified that when trying to handcuff a suspect in a vehicle, he

was never to reach inside the car for any reason; that if he saw a

firearm in the vehicle, he was to retreat and respond to the

incident as a high-risk vehicle-stop; that if the suspect made a

furtive movement during the time the officer was trying to handcuff

the suspect in the car, he was to back away and take cover and then

take appropriate action. McNeely also admitted that his high-risk

vehicle stop training included instructing the suspect to turn off

the ignition, throw the keys out the window, remove the seatbelt,

and raise his or her hands so that the hands were visible. Id. at

657-58. McNeely also testified that he was required by his training

to tell Petitioner what he was arrested for but that he failed to do

so because he never got the chance. Id. at 658. Given the

admissions that were elicited during trial on cross-examination, the

Court finds that the exclusion of the training bulletins did not

result in prejudicial error. 

E

Petitioner contends that the trial court prejudicially

erred when it permitted the prosecutor to introduce evidence of

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prior domestic violence. Amended Pet. at 11. The state appellate

court denied his claim as follows:

After Singletary testified at trial that appellant did not

hit, choke, or bite her during the incident, and that she lied

to police about the incident, the prosecutor moved to impeach

Singletary with a transcript of her June 8, 2006 interview

with the police and with a September 20, 2009 letter

Singletary wrote to the police. In her interview and in her

letter to the police, Singletary stated that appellant beat

her, chased her with a gun, shot her, and took her money. She

also told the police that appellant “tears up her clothes ...

and ‘always takes my money.’ “ The court granted the

prosecutor’s motion and allowed the prosecutor to introduce

the transcript of the police interview and Singletary’s letter

to the police. We review the court’s ruling for an abuse of

discretion. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201.) 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

Singletary’s prior inconsistent statements to the police.

“[S]ections 770 and 1235 except from the general rule against

hearsay a witness’s prior statement that is inconsistent with

the witness’s testimony in the present hearing, provided the

witness is given the opportunity to explain or deny the

statement or the witness has not been excused from giving

further testimony in the action. [Citations.]” (People v.

Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 579.) [FN 10] Singletary’s prior

inconsistent statements to the police were admissible pursuant

to sections 770 and 1235 because they directly contravened her

trial testimony that appellant was “supportive” of her, that

he had never hit, choked, or beaten her, and that he had never

threatened her with a gun or shot her. 

FN 10: Section 770 provides in relevant part: “Unless the

interests of justice otherwise require, extrinsic

evidence of a statement made by a witness that is

inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the

hearing shall be excluded unless: [¶] (a) The witness was

so examined while testifying as to give him an

opportunity to explain or to deny the statement....”

Section 1235 provides: “Evidence of a statement made by a

witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if

the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the

hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770.”

Appellant “does not acknowledge the applicability of ...

sections 770 and 1235.” (People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at

p. 580.) Instead, he contends the evidence should have been

excluded because it would “surely engender great sympathy for

Singletary and significantly bias any juror” against him.

Again, his argument is unavailing. The prosecution had the

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6

Section 352 of the California Evidence Code allows a trial

court, in its discretion, to exclude evidence “if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will

(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial

danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or misleading the

jury.”

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right to rebut Singletary’s trial testimony with her prior

inconsistent statements to the police pursuant to sections 770

and 1235. That the statements may have been damaging to

appellant does not render them prejudicial in the context of

section 352.

Meyers, 2011 WL 766932, at *10.

Petitioner argues that the admission of the prior domestic

violence evidence was prejudicial error because the admission

violated section 352 of the California Evidence Code because the

evidence was inherently prejudicial and constituted prejudicial

propensity evidence.6

 He also argues that the June 8, 2006 police

interview of Singletary was unlawful and that Singletary’s

statements were untruthful. Traverse at 7-8. 

To the extent that Petitioner argues that admission of the

prior domestic violence evidence violated section 352 of the

California Evidence Code, this claim is not cognizable. The Supreme

Court has repeatedly held that a federal habeas writ is unavailable

for violations of state law or for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Swarthout, 562 U.S.

at 222. 

As to the lawfulness of the June 8, 2006, police interview

and the truthfulness of Singletary’s statements, these assertions

are not relevant in evaluating whether the prior domestic violence

evidence should have been admitted and whether its admission

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violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights. This evidence was

properly admitted to impeach Singletary’s credibility. Singletary

testified that she lied in her prior statements to police. RT at

689, 711-12, 715 and 718. The June 8, 2006 police interview and the

September 20, 2009 letter to the police were admitted to impeach

Singletary’s credibility. The admission of the prior domestic

violence evidence, if erroneous, only violated Petitioner’s

constitutional rights “if it had a substantial and injurious effect

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. As

discussed above, there was overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s

guilt. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

F

Petitioner contends that he was subject to vindictive

prosecution when the trial court allowed the prosecutor to amend the

information to include a charge of great bodily injury and a charge

of resisting a police officer resulting in great bodily injury to

the police officer. Amended Pet. at 10. 

A complaint was filed on June 9, 2006. CT 1-6. After the

preliminary hearing, on September 14, 2006, the prosecutor filed an

information that added a special allegation and a charge that were

not present in the complaint. Id. at 9-19. The information added a

special allegation in connection with Count 1, that Petitioner had

inflicted great bodily injury (on Officer McNeely) within the

meaning of section 12022.7(a) of the California Penal Code. The

information also included a third count, resisting a peace officer

(Officer McNeely) resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation

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7

Petitioner argues that in evaluating this claim, the Court

should consider his argument that the trial court erred in granting

the prosecution a continuance of the preliminary examination, thereby

violating sections 859b (setting time for preliminary examination) and

1050 (procedures for continuance) of the California Penal Code.

Traverse at 9. The Court has already dismissed these claims for

failure to reference any specific federal, constitutional guarantee,

case, or principle in relation to these claims in state court. Docket

No. 65 at 8. The Court declines to reconsider its ruling.

33

of section 148.10(a) of the California Penal Code. Petitioner

argues that the prosecutor included the additional count and special

allegation because Petitioner exercised his right to object and

demand his preliminary examination.7

The state supreme court summarily denied relief on this

claim, and there is no reasoned opinion from the lower court. 

“Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial. 

In these circumstances, [the petitioner] can satisfy the

‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) only by showing

that ‘there was no reasonable basis’ for the California Supreme

Court’s decision. [A] habeas court must determine what arguments or

theories . . . could have supporte[d] the state court’s decision;

and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the

holding in a prior decision of [the U.S. Supreme Court.]” Cullen v.

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011) (omission in original)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). After a thorough

review of the state court record, the Court concludes that

Petitioner has failed to meet this high threshold. 

A prosecutor violates a defendant’s due process rights

when he brings additional charges solely to punish the defendant for

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exercising a constitutional or statutory right. See Bordenkircher

v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). The defendant has the burden to

show that “charges of increased severity were filed because the

accused exercised a statutory, procedural, or constitutional right

in circumstances that give rise to an appearance of vindictiveness.” 

United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.

1982). The defendant must show that the prosecutorial conduct would

not have occurred “but for” the prosecutor’s “hostility or punitive

animus towards the defendant because he has exercised his specific

legal rights.” Id. at 1168-69; see also United States v. Frega, 179

F.3d 793, 802 (9th Cir. 1999) (no vindictiveness where defendant

could not show that but for animus prosecutor would not have filed

superseding indictment). The burden then shifts to the prosecutor

to show a nonvindictive reason for bringing the charges. 

Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d at 1168. 

However, as Respondent correctly points out, in the

pretrial setting, there is no presumption of vindictiveness when the

prosecution increases the charges or the potential sentence. Id. at

1169; see also Frega, 179 F.3d at 801-02 (no presumption of

vindictiveness where prosecutor filed superseding indictment

following defendants’ successful motion to dismiss). The Supreme

Court has recognized the importance of allowing a prosecutor the

freedom to modify the charges against a defendant prior to trial and

does not presume vindictiveness when the prosecution increase the

charges prior to trial:

In the course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor

may uncover additional information that suggests a basis for

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further prosecution or he simply may come to realize that

information possessed by the State has a broader

significance. At this stage of the proceedings, the

prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution

may not have crystallized . . . . A prosecutor should remain

free before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted

to him to determine the extent of the societal interest in

prosecution. An initial decision should not freeze future

conduct.

United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1982). The Supreme

Court specifically noted that a “defendant before trial is expected

to invoke procedural rights that inevitably impose some ‘burden’ on

the prosecutor. Defense counsel routinely file pretrial motions to

suppress evidence; to challenge the sufficiency and form of an

indictment; to plead an affirmative defense; to request psychiatric

services; to obtain access to government files; to be tried by jury.

It is unrealistic to assume that a prosecutor’s probable response to

such motions is to seek to penalize and to deter. The invocation of

procedural rights is an integral part of the adversary process in

which our criminal justice system operates.” Id. at 381. 

Moreover, amending the information to include additional

charges is allowed under California law. Under section 739 of the

California Penal Code, “the law is settled that unless the

magistrate makes factual findings to the contrary, the prosecution

may amend the information after the preliminary hearing to charge

any offense shown by the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing

provided the new crime is transactionally related to the crimes for

which the defendant has previously been held to answer.” People v.

Superior Court (Mendella), 33 Cal. 3d 754, 764 (1983) (internal

quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds. 

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Here, testimony at the preliminary hearing supported the special

allegation and count added by the prosecutor. Officer McNeely

testified that Petitioner inflicted great bodily injury on him by

dragging him from a moving vehicle (CT at 40-43, 73-75, and 83) and

that Petitioner forcibly resisted arrest (CT at 34-37, 63-69, and

82-83). 

The California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim is in

accordance with clearly established federal law and supported by the

record. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show that there was

no reasonable basis for the California Supreme Court’s denial of

this claim. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim.

G

Petitioner contends that the “trial court constitutionally

violated [his] rights when it ‘Failed to conduct a marsden motion,

coerced the petitioner into pro per status, and prejudicially denied

petitioner advisory counsel’ (even thought the court knew that [he]

was mentally disabled, thus also violatinf the law of the ADA.”

Amended Pet. at 10. Petitioner raised these claims to the

California Supreme Court in September 2009, Docket No. 54-2 at 86-

120, and the Court looks to that petition for review in evaluating

Petitioner’s claims. Stated more specifically, Petitioner argues

that the trial court should have held Marsden hearings on October 6,

2006, and October 18, 2007, when he voiced dissatisfaction with his

attorneys and sought to represent himself; that the trial court

erred in allowing him to represent himself; and that the trial court

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erred in denying him advisory counsel.

Marsden Claim: Petitioner contends that the court erred in

failing to hold a Marsden hearing on October 6, 2006, and October

18, 2007, when he sought to represent himself.

Prior to October 6, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion

seeking substitution of counsel, which was denied. CT at 922. In

response, he filed a motion to proceed pro per. Id. On October 6,

2006, Petitioner appeared before the court on this motion. Id. at

917-930. The court emphasized to Petitioner that it would be tough

to proceed pro per; reminded him that there was no law library where

Petitioner was housed; and informed Petitioner that the court could

not guarantee transfer to a jail facility with a law library. He

also warned Petitioner: “you do have the right to [represent

yourself]. But what you don’t have the right to do is flip back and

forth, back and forth on this thing and delay these proceedings by

changing your mind [and later requesting counsel].” Id. at 921. 

Petitioner confirmed that he understood the court’s warnings but

also complained that the proceedings had already been delayed for

four months due to “the error of the courts and [appointed]

counsel.” Id. Petitioner contends that this statement should have

triggered a Marsden hearing. 

The transcript of the October 18, 2007 proceedings is not

in the record, but the clerk’s minutes indicate that Petitioner was

granted pro per status after a hearing on his Faretta motion. 

Petitioner appears to argue that when his desire to represent

himself is triggered by his dissatisfaction with counsel’s

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Petitioner’s motion for substitute counsel was granted at least

four times. See CT at 449 (appointment of Patrick Hetrick); 454

(James Giller); 454 (Dave Byron); and 949 (Les Chettle). 

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performance, the trial court should sua sponte inquire as to whether

counsel has been ineffective. 

The Court finds that the state court’s denial of this

claim was not an unreasonable application of, or contrary to,

clearly established federal law. There is no clearly established

Supreme Court precedent imposing such an obligation on trial courts. 

Moreover, on October 6, 2006, there was no reason for the trial

court to inquire into Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with his counsel

since it had been recently addressed in his motion for substitution

of counsel. Habeas relief is denied on this claim.

Coercion into Pro Per Status: Petitioner argues that when

a defendant represents himself because he cannot obtain alternative

counsel, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated. In

essence, he is arguing that his request for self-representation was

not unequivocal. 

Under § 2254(d), habeas relief depends on the holdings of

the U.S. Supreme Court. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

is the only relevant holding, and that case does not elaborate on

any standard for determining whether a request is unequivocal. 

However, the record supports the state court's denial of this claim. 

Petitioner was perpetually dissatisfied with his attorneys8

 and

sought to proceed pro per multiple times, in part hoping to obtain

substitute counsel. The trial court repeatedly found that counsel

had provided effective assistance of counsel and that Petitioner’s

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complaints were disagreements over trial tactics.

Because Faretta’s holding is a generalized one, the state

courts have more leeway in their application of it, see Yarborough

v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004), and the state court

could reasonably conclude that Petitioner’s complaints about

counsel’s performance did not render his requests to proceed pro per

unequivocal. The state court’s denial of this claim was not an

unreasonable application of the holding of Faretta, nor was it an

unreasonable determination of the facts.

Appointment of Advisory Counsel: Petitioner fails to show

that the California Supreme Court’s denial of his claim was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 

There is no Sixth Amendment right to advisory counsel. See McKaskle

v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984); United States v. Moreland; 622

F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010). Habeas relief is therefore denied

on this claim. 

H

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his

rights when it “violated the constitutional mandate prohibiting the

investigatory procedures beyond the 48 hour period, and specifically

to build a case upon [Petitioner].” Amended Pet. at 10. 

On July 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss

for Pre-Arraignment Delay and Failure to Make Timely Probable Cause

Determination.” CT at 1036-1049. Petitioner was arrested on June

7, 2006 at 1:11 a.m. He was arraigned on June 9, 2006 at 2:00 p.m. 

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Section 825 of the California Penal Code requires arraignment

“without unnecessary delay, and in any event, within 48 hours after

[the defendant’s] arrest.” Cal. Penal Code § 825(a)(2).

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Petitioner argues that the 12-hour delay in arraignment was

unreasonable and solely for the purpose of investigation. Id. at

1045. He also argues that the delay prejudiced his ability to alert

his counsel to the need for certain time-sensitive investigations,

e.g. confirming Singletary’s injuries. Id. at 1046. After hearing

argument, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss:

“Essentially, the evil of the detention would be gathering evidence

from the defendant to be used at trial. Since nothing was gathered

from the defendant during that period of time, motion is denied.” 

RT [7/30/2009] at 9-10.

Petitioner appears to be arguing that the arraignment

delay violated section 825 of the California Penal Code,9

 and

violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments, CT at 1036 and 1047, and his Fourth Amendment rights, CT

1038-39. It is true that Petitioner was not arraigned within 48

hours. However, federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for

errors of state law. See Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 222. The Court

therefore turns to Petitioner’s claim of constitutional violations.

“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would

require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that

the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice

to [the defendant’s] right[] to a fair trial and that the delay was

an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.” 

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). The defendant

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must prove that (1) he suffered actual, non speculative prejudice

from the delay and (2) the delay, when balanced against the

prosecution's reasons for it, offends those “fundamental conceptions

of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political

institutions.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90

(1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court presumes

correct the trial court’s factual finding that no evidence was

collected from Petitioner to be used against him at trial during the

delay. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In addition, Petitioner’s claims of

prejudice are speculative. It is unclear how Petitioner’s timely

arraignment would have prevented Singletary from speaking with

police on June 8, 2006, or affected her statements. It is also

speculative to assume that Petitioner was prejudiced by the

inability to tell counsel to immediately investigate Singletary’s

injuries, especially since Singletary testified that Petitioner did

not hit her that day. RT at 683. Petitioner has failed to show

that he suffered actual, non speculative prejudice from the 12-hour

delay. Accordingly, the delay in arraignment did not violate his

due process rights.

The Fourth Amendment requires a “timely judicial

determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention.” 

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975). However, Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 494 (1976), bars federal habeas review

of Fourth Amendment claims unless the state did not provide an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of those claims. Even if

the state courts’ determination of the Fourth Amendment issues is

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10Courts have found no opportunity for full and fair litigation

existed in state court only in exceptional cases. See, e.g., Anderson

v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other

grounds by Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2002).

(petitioner did not benefit from opportunity for full and fair

litigation in California courts because Fourth Amendment claim at

issue did not exist until years after petitioner’s arrest and trials)

42

improper, it will not be remedied in federal habeas corpus actions

so long as the petitioner was provided a full and fair opportunity

to litigate the issue. See Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 408 (9th

Cir. 1983). All Stone v. Powell requires is the initial opportunity

for a fair hearing. Such an opportunity for a fair hearing

forecloses this court’s inquiry upon habeas petition into the trial

court’s subsequent course of action, including whether or not the

trial court made any express findings of fact. See Caldwell v.

Cupp, 781 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1986). The existence of a state

procedure allowing an opportunity for full and fair litigation of

Fourth Amendment claims, rather than a defendant’s actual use of

those procedures, bars federal habeas consideration of those claims. 

See Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (whether

or not defendant litigated 4th Amendment claim in state court is

irrelevant if he had opportunity to do so under California law). 

California state procedure provides an opportunity for full

litigation of any Fourth Amendment claim.10 Petitioner had the

chance to file a motion to dismiss raising this issue, and the trial

court held argument on the motion. Because Petitioner had an

opportunity to fully and fairly litigate this claim, this claim is

not cognizable in federal habeas. 

I

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Petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. In his traverse, he claims that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel from William DuBois, William Cole, and Barbara

Thomas. Traverse at 14 and 19-20. These claims are unexhausted. 

See Docket No. 60. The only exhausted claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel are the ones he has presented to the

California Supreme Court: ineffective assistance of counsel for

purported failure to object to hearsay at Petitioner’s preliminary

hearing (Docket No. 54, Respondent’s Ex. E); and ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to obtain evidence showing that

Petitioner was not the cause of the injury suffered by Singletary

(Docket No. 54, Respondent’s Ex. C). These are the only two

ineffective assistance of counsel claims that the Court may address. 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable

as a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark

for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a

just result. Id. The right to effective assistance of counsel

applies to the performance of both retained and appointed counsel

without distinction. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45

(1980).

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness

of counsel claim, Petitioner must establish two things. First, he

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must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that

it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome. Id.

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims is considered to be “clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. 

See Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1403; Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 404-08 (2000). A “doubly” deferential judicial review is

appropriate in analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims

under § 2254. See Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1410-11; Harrington v.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (same); Premo v. Moore, 131 S.

Ct. 733, 740 (2011) (same). The general rule of Strickland, i.e.,

to review a defense counsel’s effectiveness with great deference,

gives the state courts greater leeway in reasonably applying that

rule, which in turn “translates to a narrower range of decisions

that are objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.” Cheney v.

Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). When § 2254(d) applies, “the

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The

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question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 131 S.

Ct. at 788.

Failure to object: Petitioner argued that had counsel

“objected to Officer McNeely’s testimony about what Debra Singletary

told Officer Jim, that objection would have been sustained and there

would not have been testimony about the domestic violence offense

said to have been suffered by Debra Singletary and there would not

have been a basis for Officer McNeely to have arrested Mr. Meyers

and — unless other testimony had been available, there would have

been no holding order.” Docket No. 54-2 at 15-22. Section 1203.1

of the California Evidence Code allows for hearsay to be offered at

a preliminary examination. Multiple hearsay is not allowed at a

preliminary hearing. See Whitman v. Sup. Ct., 54 Cal.3d 1074

(1991). 

Respondent correctly points out that Officer McNeely’s

statement was being conveyed for the non-hearsay purpose of

explaining his decision to arrest Petitioner, and was not being

admitted for the truth of the matter. See, e.g,., Cal. Evid. Code §

1299 (hearsay is evidence of a statement that was made by someone

other than the witness testifying and being offered to prove the

truth of the matter stated). Officer McNeely explained that after

Officer Jim told him that Petitioner had hit and bit Singletary, he

was then required to arrest Petitioner for domestic violence per

Oakland Police Department policy. CT at 76. Officer McNeely’s

testimony about Officer Jim’s statement therefore was not hearsay. 

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See, e.g., People v. King, 140 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4-5 (Cal. Ct. App.

1956) (out-of-court statement admissible not to prove truth of the

matter asserted, but to establish probable cause to effect the

search and seizure). Moreover, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. 

There was other admissible and unchallenged testimony supporting the

domestic violence offense. Officer Jim also testified at the

preliminary hearing as to Singletary’s statements about Petitioner

hitting her and having a gun in the car. CT at 80-81 and 84-86. 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this ineffective assistance

of counsel claim was neither an unreasonable application of, or

contrary to, clearly established Federal law; nor was it an

unreasonable determination of the facts.

Failure to meet: Petitioner contends that his initial

trial counsel’s failure to meet with him for nearly three weeks

constituted ineffective assistance because it prevented him from

advising counsel of important photographs and videos that would

establish that Petitioner had not assaulted Singletary and from

understanding the law regarding the timing of the preliminary

examination. Docket No. 54-1 at 81-86. During that time, another

attorney appeared on behalf of the appointed attorney and handled

court appearances. Petitioner does not explain why he did not ask

this attorney to tell his appointed attorney to obtain the

photographs and videos, and why he did not discuss the preliminary

examination with this attorney. Nor does he establish that the

check cashing place had videos and photos of Singletary. Moreover,

effectiveness of counsel is not measured by the frequency and/or

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duration of the counsel’s meetings with her client. Courts have

held that the “brevity of consultation time between a defendant and

his counsel, alone, cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel.” Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1984);

United States ex rel. Bradley v. McMann, 423 F.2d 656, 657 (2d Cir.

1970) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim even though

“[attorney] did not interview or consult with [defendant] until the

day trial was to begin.”). Finally, Petitioner has not made a

factual showing of prejudice. His assertions are speculative and

conclusory as to what evidence existed and how it would have

supported him. Conclusory allegations not supported by specifics do

not warrant relief. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (1995). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court’s denial of this

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was neither an unreasonable

application of, or contrary to, clearly established Federal law; nor

was it an unreasonable determination of the facts.

J

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated

petitioner’s right “to a speedy preliminary hearing within the 10-

day limit as specified in the California Penal code sec. 859b.” 

Amended Pet. at 9. In relevant part, section 859b states:

Both the defendant and the people have the right to a

preliminary examination at the earliest possible time, and

unless both waive that right or good cause for a

continuance is found as provided for in Section 1050, the

preliminary examination shall be held within 10 court days

of the date the defendant is arraigned or pleads,

whichever occurs later . . . . The magistrate shall

dismiss the complaint if the preliminary examination is

set or continued more than 60 days from the date of the

arraignment [or] plea . . . .

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Cal. Penal Code § 859b. Petitioner entered his plea of not guilty

on July 6, 2006, and waived his right to have a preliminary

examination within 10 days. CT at 174. On August 17, 2006, the

date first set for preliminary hearing, the prosecutor moved for a

continuance under section 1050 of the California Penal Code because

a key witness, the victim Officer McNeely, was on vacation. Id. at

356 and Docket No. 54-1 at 53. Defendant objected to the

continuance, arguing that the prosecutor had not demonstrated good

cause. Docket No. 54-1 at 53. The preliminary hearing was held on

September 1, 2006, 57 days after Petitioner had entered his not

guilty plea. Id. and CT at 21-107.

Petitioner argues that section 859b created a liberty

interest that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that

therefore the violation of section 859b violates Petitioner’s due

process rights. Traverse at 15-16. A state law creates a “liberty

interest” protected by the Due Process Clause if the law: (1)

contains “substantive predicates” governing official decision

making; (2) contains “explicitly mandatory language” specifying the

outcome that must be reached if the substantive predicates are met;

and (3) protects “some substantive end.” See Bonin I, 59 F.3d at

842. Several panels of our court of appeals also have required that

the state law violation result in the deprivation of a substantive

right protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon,

77 F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Bonin II”) (even assuming

violation of state law in setting execution date, no federal habeas

claim because there is no deprivation of federal substantive right);

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Bonin I, 59 F.3d at 842 (California statute which gives defendant in

capital case right to have two defense attorneys argue on his behalf

does not create protected liberty interest cognizable in federal

habeas because it contains neither “substantive predicates” nor

“explicitly mandatory language,” and there is no federal

constitutional right to have two attorneys make closing arguments). 

The state law must provide more than merely procedure. 

See id.. Procedural requirements do not create a liberty interest

unless they cause a “significant substantive reduction” in decision

making or create an imperative that mandates action unless certain

clearly-defined exceptions are found to apply. See Chaney v.

Stewart, 156 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no liberty

interest where Arizona statute provides trial court with broad

discretion to determine whether to appoint expert witnesses). But

cf. id. at 927-33 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that exercise

of discretion alone does not defeat creation of liberty interest and

that Arizona statute creates liberty interest where it imposes an

absolute duty on trial court to appoint expert witnesses who are

“reasonably necessary”). 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Petitioner has

not demonstrated that there was a violation of section 859b. 

Section 859b provides for a “good cause” continuance, as long as the

preliminary examination is held within 60 days of the arraignment or

plea, whichever is longer. Petitioner’s preliminary examination was

held within 60 days of his plea. Petitioner argues that the

prosecutor failed to demonstrate good cause because he failed to

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11In Petitioner’s November 24, 2009, petition for review to the

California Supreme Court, he argues that section 859b should be read

to require a dismissal ten courts days after either a plea or

arraignment has been entered. Docket No. 54-1 at 57.

50

diligently and timely ensure the victim’s presence for the original

trial dates. Docket No. 54-1 at 77. However, whether the

prosecutor demonstrated the good cause necessary under section 859b

is a state law issue, and federal habeas relief is unavailable for

alleged violations of state law or alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law.11 See Swarthout, 562

U.S. at 222.

There is no federal constitutional right to a preliminary

examination within 10 days of either a defendant’s plea or

arraignment. Assuming arguendo that section 859b created a

protected liberty interest, to prove a due process violation,

Petitioner must prove that (1) he suffered actual, non speculative

prejudice from the delay and (2) the delay, when balanced against

the prosecution’s reasons for it, offends those “fundamental

conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and

political institutions.” Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789-90. Petitioner

has only made conclusory statements that he has been prejudiced by

not having a preliminary examination within 10 days of his

arraignment or, in the alternative, within 10 days of his plea. He

has not demonstrated actual, non speculative prejudice. Petitioner

therefore has failed to show a due process violation. Habeas relief

is denied on this claim.

V

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12Petitioner’s confusion perhaps stems from the Court’s May 15,

2014 order denying Petitioner’s motion for a Rhines stay, wherein the

Court noted, without deciding, that it was likely that Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims would be considered untimely, which would require

this Court to deny those claims as procedurally defaulted. 

51

Petitioner requests that the Court hold “an evidentiary

hearing within the means of the Supreme Court’s holding in both

‘Martinez v. Ryan’ and ‘Trevino v. Thaler,’” and defer ruling on his

habeas petition until the hearing has been conducted. Docket No.

84. Petitioner’s request is DENIED. In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.

Ct. 1309 (2012), the Supreme Court held that a procedural default

does not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim

of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review

collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that

proceeding was ineffective and state law requires that an

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim be raised in an

initial-review collateral proceeding. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316-

21. In Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), the Supreme Court

extended its holding in Martinez to include states whose procedural

framework did not expressly require the defendant to raise the claim

in an initial-review proceeding, but, by reason of its design and

operation, make it highly unlikely that in a typical case a

defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise the claim. 

Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921. These cases are inapplicable since

this Court has not found that any of Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally defaulted.12 Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for a

Martinez/Trevino evidentiary hearing is DENIED. 

VI

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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED.

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner

has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as

moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 03/30/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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