Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01418/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01418-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH LAVERY,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 11cv1418-WQH (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: 

(1) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS;

(2) DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE, FOR DISCOVERY,

FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING,

AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL; AND

(3) DISMISSING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH

PREJUDICE

vs.

VIMAL SINGH, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Petitioner Joseph Lavery (hereinafter “Petitioner”), is a California prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner was convicted in the San Diego County Superior Court in

2001, following a jury trial, of armed robbery and attempted armed robbery, and was sentenced

to 84 years-to-life in state prison under California’s Three Strikes law after the trial court found

that he had suffered ten prior felony convictions. (Pet. at 1-2.) Petitioner challenges only his

sentence here, contending that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the prior conviction

-1- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

findings; (2) California’s Three Strikes law is unconstitutional; (3) his sentence amounts to cruel

and unusual punishment; (4) use of the prior convictions to enhance his sentence amounts to a

breach of the plea bargains under which the prior convictions were imposed; and (5) the failure

of his appointed appellate counsel to raise these claims in the state courts, other than the cruel

and unusual punishment claim which was presented to the state appellate court but not the state

supreme court, amounts to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel to the extent it has

caused the claims to be procedurally barred. (Pet. at 16-36.) 

Respondent Warden Vimal Singh (hereinafter “Respondent”), has filed a Motion to

Dismiss the Petition with an incorporated Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support

thereof, and has lodged portions of the state court record. (ECF Nos. 15-16.) Respondent argues

that the Petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas

petitions, and that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted as a result of the state court’s

denial of the claims as untimely. (MTD at 3-7.) 

Petitioner has filed an Opposition to Respondent’s Motion arguing that he is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to the fact that he suffers from a mental disease

or disorder which prevented him from bringing his claims in a timely fashion. (ECF No. 17.) 

Petitioner also argues that he can establish cause and prejudice to excuse any procedural default

based on his mental condition, and that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the

Court dismisses the Petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. (Id.) Petitioner has also

filed a Motion for an order to show cause in which he requests the Court to order Respondent

to file a return to his Petition, to permit discovery, to appoint him counsel, and to conduct an

evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 18.)

The Court finds, for the following reasons, that habeas relief is unavailable because the

Petition is untimely and the claims are procedurally defaulted. The Court also finds that

Petitioner’s Motion for an order to show cause should be denied for the same reasons the Court

previously denied an identical motion filed by Petitioner. Accordingly, the Court recommends

DENYING Petitioner’s Motion for an order to show cause, GRANTING Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss, and DISMISSING the Petition with prejudice. 

-2- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted on January 26, 2001, following a jury trial in the San Diego

County Superior Court, of two counts of robbery in violation of California Penal Code § 211,

and one count of attempted robbery in violation of California Penal Code §§ 211 & 664; the jury

found that Petitioner had personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of each crime

in violation of California Penal Code § 12022(b)(1). (Lodgment No. 3, People v. Lavery, No.

D037566, slip op. at 1 (Cal. App. Ct. Oct. 25, 2001).) The trial court found that Petitioner had

suffered ten prior felony convictions which constituted “strikes” within the meaning of

California’s Three Strikes law, and sentenced him to three consecutive terms of twenty-five

years-to-life, with an additional nine years of enhancements. (Id. at 1-2.)

Petitioner, through his appointed appellate counsel, filed a direct appeal on July 10, 2001,

which raised a single claim alleging that his sentence violated state and federal constitutional

prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. (Lodgment Nos. 1-2.) The appellate court

denied the claim on its merits and affirmed the judgment of conviction in an unpublished opinion

filed on October 25, 2001. (Lodgment No. 3, People v. Lavery, No. D037566, slip op. at 3-5.) 

Petitioner did not seek review in the state supreme court, and his conviction became final on the

last day he could have done so, December 4, 2001. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813 (9th

Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

Petitioner waited over eight years before next challenging his conviction or sentence. He

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court on June 11,

2010, in which he presented the same claims he presents here. (Lodgment No. 4.) That petition

was denied on August 5, 2010, on the basis that Petitioner’s claims lacked factual or legal

support. (Lodgment No. 5.) He filed a habeas petition in the appellate court on August 18,

2010, presenting the same claims. (Lodgment No. 6.) The appellate court denied the petition

as untimely in a one-page opinion filed October 19, 2010. (Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner filed

a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on November 2, 2010, which was denied on

May 11, 2011, in an order which stated in full: “The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 

(See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780.)” (Lodgment Nos. 8-9.)

-3- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Discussion

For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Petition is untimely, as it was filed over

eight years after expiration of the statute of limitations, and that tolling is unavailable. The Court

also finds that even if equitable tolling is available and the Petition is considered to be timely,

federal habeas relief is unavailable because the claims are procedurally defaulted.

A. Statute of Limitations

Respondent contends that the one-year statute of limitations began to run on Petitioner’s

claims on December 5, 2001, the day after his conviction became final following the conclusion

of direct appeal. Because Petitioner did not file the instant federal Petition until June 23, 2011,

Respondent contends it is nearly ten years late. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable

tolling of the limitations period due to his mental condition. For the following reasons, the Court

finds that the Petition is untimely and Petitioner is not entitled to tolling.

1. Triggering Dates of the Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas petitions pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 begins to run at the latest of— 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006). 

Because Petitioner did not appeal the appellate court’s opinion affirming his conviction,

the conviction became final within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(A) on December 4, 2001, the

last day he could have filed a petition for review in the state supreme court. Duncan, 297 F.3d

-4- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 813. The statute of limitations began to run the next day, December 5, 2001. Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The instant federal Petition was constructively

filed on June 23, 2011, the date Petitioner indicates he handed it to the prison officials for filing. 

(EFC No. 1 at 12); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2000). Because no other

triggering provision applies, the Court finds that the one-year statute of limitations was set to

expire on December 5, 2002, and the Petition, filed more than eight and one-half years later, is

untimely absent tolling of the limitations period.1

 

2. The Limitations Period was not Statutorily Tolled

The statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” habeas petition is “pending”

in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Because Petitioner did not begin to exhaust his state

court remedies as to the claims presented here until more that eight years after the limitations

period expired, statutory tolling is not available. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.

2001) (holding that state post-conviction petition which was filed after expiration of the statute

of limitations cannot toll the limitations period). In any case, Petitioner’s state habeas petitions

were denied by the state appellate and supreme courts as untimely, precluding statutory tolling. 

See DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. at 413-14 (holding that denial of petition by California Supreme

Court as untimely precludes statutory tolling). 

3. The Limitations Period was not Equitably Tolled

The statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.

___, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560-63 (2010). However, a petitioner must show: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and

prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562. Petitioner bears the burden of showing “extraordinary

1

 To the extent that Petitioner’s Opposition could be liberally construed to present an argument

that § 2244(d)(1)(B) applies because the state created an impediment to his filing by not properly

treating his mental illness, he is not entitled to a later triggering date because § 2244(d)(1)(B) requires

a showing which is “far higher” than the standard for demonstrating an entitlement to equitable tolling. 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner is entitled to rely on

§ 2244(d)(1)(B) only if the circumstances alleged “altogether prevented him from presenting his claims

in any form, to any court.” Id. (italics in original), citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). 

For the reasons set forth in the body of this Report and Recommendation regarding why Petitioner is

not entitled to equitable tolling, § 2244(d)(1)(B), which requires a far higher showing, does not apply. 

Yates, 571 F.3d at 1000-01. 

-5- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

circumstances” were the proximate cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of

diligence on his part. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003).

Respondent contends that Petitioner has not identified any extraordinary circumstances

which were the “but for” cause of his untimeliness. (MTD at 7.) Petitioner argues that he is

entitled to equitable tolling “based on the fact that he suffers from a mental disease/disorder

which prevented him from filing a timely 1-year petition when the state appeal/writ expired in

2001 and the current action being filed in 2011.” (Opp. at 2.) 

Petitioner attached medical records and other documents dated from 1992 and 1994 to

his Petition in support of his argument that he requires the assistance of counsel to prosecute this

action. (Pet. at 14; Pet. Ex. C.) Contemporaneous with the filing of the Petition, Petitioner filed

a Motion for an order to show cause, for discovery, for an evidentiary hearing, and for

appointment of counsel, which is nearly identical to Petitioner’s current Motion. (Compare ECF

No. 3 with ECF No. 18.) The only difference between the two motions is that in his original

motion, Petitioner asked the Court to take judicial notice of the medical records attached to the

Petition, and contended that they show:

Petitioner is suffering from organic dementia, organic hallucination, schizophrenia

disorder, organic affective disorder, organic personality disorder, due to a severe

head injury suffered in the U.S. Navy in 1981, and Petitioner has been committed

to various (DMH) mental state hospitals (i.e. Metropolitan DMH, Atascadero

DMH, Patton DMH, etc.) and continues to suffer today within the (CDCR) state

prison. The court is moved to toll any deficiencies due to petitioner’s unstable

mental state in which he is not cognizant or aware of appeal/writ litigation and is

currently being assisted by another inmate in presenting his case. The Court is

moved to grant counsel appointment and expert witness to adjudicate habeas

proceedings.

(EFC No. 3 at 5.)

Prior to ruling on Petitioner’s original Motion, the Court found that the records upon

which Petitioner relied did not demonstrate a current mental condition sufficient to require a

competency hearing. (ECF No. 8.) However, recognizing the importance of an accurate

determination regarding Petitioner’s competence, the Court ordered Petitioner to provide any

and all “evidence, facts, and medical records” which support Petitioner’s claim that he is

currently suffering from a mental illness, and whether such illness has prevented him from being

-6- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

able to understand and respond to the Court’s orders. (Id. at 2-3) In addition, Respondent was

directed to file a response to Petitioner’s anticipated submission, and to “include the results of

Respondent’s independent investigation into Petitioner’s competence, including relevant medical

records, as well as legal argument.” (Id. at 3.)

Petitioner did not file a response as ordered. Respondent, however, filed a response to

the Court’s Order, and lodged voluminous mental health records pertaining to Petitioner,

amounting to over 700 pages of documents. (ECF Nos. 10-11.) Respondent argued that there

were no records available which show that Petitioner has complained of or sought treatment for

any mental illness since 2004, and that the records which are available establish that at least

three doctors or mental healthcare professionals opined in 1995, 2002 and 2004 that Petitioner

was malingering or exaggerating his symptoms. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2-4.) Petitioner filed a reply

to Respondent’s submission, which included his own declaration, but which did not include any

new facts, exhibits or medical records in support of his contentions. (ECF No. 12.) Rather,

Petitioner indicated that he is not currently receiving treatment or taking any medication for a

mental disorder, and has refused treatment for years, because he has chosen to “self heal” due

to his dislike of counseling, group therapy, and medication. (Id. at 2-5.) Petitioner contended

then, as he contends now in support of his equitable tolling argument, that Respondent has failed

to produce additional, relevant medical records, and that this Court should allow discovery or

conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to develop the record to include medical records from

his time in the Navy and at Atascadero Hospital as historic proof of his mental condition. (Id.

at 3; Opp. at 2.) 

On November 29, 2011, this Court denied Petitioner’s original Motion for an order to

show cause, for discovery, for an evidentiary hearing, and for appointment of counsel. (EFC No.

14.) The Court found that Petitioner had failed to submit substantial evidence of incompetence,

other than his own declaration which is refuted by the medical records. (Id. at 3-9.) On that

basis, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for a competency hearing, to compel respondent to

file a Answer to the Petition, for discovery, for an evidentiary hearing, and for appointment of

counsel. (Id.) Based on those same findings, the Court recommends that Petitioner’s instant

-7- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Motion for an order to show cause, for discovery, for an evidentiary hearing, and for

appointment of counsel, which is identical to his original Motion, be DENIED for the same

reasons set forth in the Court’s November 29, 2011 Order. 

The Court also finds that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling on the basis of his

mental condition. Because statutory tolling is unavailable due to the denial of his state habeas

petitions on timeliness grounds, in order for the Petition to be timely, the limitations period

would need to be equitably tolled for over eight years from on or before December 5, 2002, the

date the limitations period was set to expire, until June 23, 2011, the date the instant Petition was

filed. Petitioner has presented no evidence that he suffers from any mental disorder which

precluded him from filing a federal petition during that time. Rather, the record indicates that

he was able to file several state habeas petitions, as well as the instant federal habeas action

(which includes his Petition, four Motions, and several responses to submissions by

Respondent), while suffering from the same mental condition he was allegedly suffering from

in 2001. Even if his medical condition somehow impacted his ability to litigate his claims,

which appears unlikely based on the evidence in the record, Petitioner has not carried his burden

of showing that his medical condition was the proximate cause of his untimeliness, rather than

merely a lack of diligence on his part. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799; see also Miles v. Prunty, 187

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that equitable tolling “is unavailable in most cases.”);

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling (under AEDPA) is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”). 

The Court has adequately developed the record regarding Petitioner’s mental condition,

and finds that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary because Petitioner’s allegations regarding

his medical condition, even if true, do not provide a basis for equitable tolling. See Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a habeas petitioner is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing when his or her allegations, if true, would support equitable tolling). In any

case, even if further development of the record could establish that Petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling, federal habeas relief is independently not available because, as set forth below,

the claims presented in the federal Petition are procedurally defaulted.

-8- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4. Conclusion re: statute of limitations

The Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, and that his

federal Petition was filed over eight years after expiration of the limitations period. The Court

therefore recommends GRANTING Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the

Petition is untimely. For the same reasons set forth in the Court’s November 29, 2011 Order

denying Petitioner’s previous, identical Motion, the Court recommends DENYING Petitioner’s

Motion for an order to show cause, for discovery, for an evidentiary hearing, and for

appointment of counsel.

B. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted in this Court

because the state court found them to be untimely, citing Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. ___, 131

S.Ct. 1120 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness rule is clearly established and

consistently applied). (MTD at 3-4.) Respondent also argues that Petitioner is unable to show

cause and prejudice, or the existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice, necessary to

overcome the procedural default. (Id. at 4.)

Petitioner argues that he has shown cause to excuse the default because his mental disease

and disorder prevented him from filing a federal habeas petition after the conclusion of his state

appeal in 2001. (Opp. at 2.) He also contends that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will

result if he is not appointed counsel, if the Court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, or if

discovery regarding equitable tolling is not permitted. (Id. at 2-3.)

Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in an unpublished opinion filed October 25, 2001. 

(Lodgment No. 3, People v. Lavery, No. D037566, slip op. at 3-5.) Petitioner did not seek

review in the state supreme court, but waited nearly nine years before filing a habeas petition in

the San Diego County Superior Court on June 11, 2010, in which he presented the same claims

he presents here. (Lodgment No. 4.) That petition was denied on August 5, 2010, on the basis

that Petitioner did not provide sufficient legal or factual support for this claims. (Lodgment No.

5, In re Lavery, No. HC20028, order at 1-4 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Aug. 5, 2010).) Petitioner filed a

habeas petition in the appellate court presenting the same claims on August 18, 2010. 

-9- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Lodgment No. 6.) The appellate court denied the petition on October 19, 2010, on the basis that

it was untimely, that Petitioner had failed to establish an exception to the procedural bar, and that

the claim that his sentence was cruel and unusual had been raised and rejected on direct appeal. 

(Lodgment No. 7, In re Lavery, No. D058073, slip op. at 1 (Cal.App.Ct. Oct. 19, 2010.) 

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on November 2, 2010, which

was denied on May 11, 2011, in an order which stated: “The petition for writ of habeas corpus

is denied (See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780.)” (Lodgment Nos. 8-9.)

In Walker v. Martin, the petitioner presented his claims to the California Supreme Court

nearly five years after his conviction became final, without providing any reason for the long

delay, and, as here, the petition was denied with a citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780

(1998). See Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1124. The Walker Court recognized that page 780 of the

Robbins opinion (which was cited by the California Supreme Court both here and in Walker),

is cited by the California Supreme Court when that court signals “that a habeas petition is denied

as untimely.” Id. That is, by providing such a citation, the California Supreme Court has

signaled that the petitioner had failed to seek habeas relief without “substantial delay” as

“measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of

the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,” and had failed

to carry “the burden of establishing (i) absence of delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that

the claim falls within an exception to the bar of timeliness.” Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1125, quoting

Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780, 787. The Supreme Court held that California’s timeliness rule is

clearly established and consistently applied. Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1128-31.

When a state court rejects a federal claim based upon a violation of a state procedural rule

which is adequate to support the judgment and independent of federal law, a habeas petitioner

has procedurally defaulted his claim in federal court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729-30 (1991). A state procedural rule is “independent” if it is not interwoven with federal law. 

LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001). A state procedural rule is “adequate”

if it is “clear, consistently applied, and well-established” at the time of the default. Calderon v.

United States District Court, 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). The federal habeas court may

-10- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

still reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can demonstrate cause

for his failure to satisfy the state procedural rule and prejudice arising from the default, or if he

can demonstrate that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from the Court not

reaching the merits of the defaulted claims. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Petitioner cannot successfully challenge the independence of the timeliness rule in this

Court because the Ninth Circuit has held that California’s timeliness bar is independent, and this

Court is bound by that holding. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We

conclude that because the California untimeliness rule is not interwoven with federal law, it is

an independent state procedural ground, as expressed in Clark/Robbins.”) 

However, the adequacy of a state procedural rule “is not within the State’s prerogative

finally to decide; rather, adequacy ‘is itself a federal question.’” Lee v. Kemma, 534 U.S. 362,

375 (2002), quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965). Although Walker found

California’s timeliness rule to be clearly established and consistently applied, the Walker Court

noted that a petitioner might be able to show the rule to be inadequate in his or her own case by

showing that “the California Supreme Court exercised its discretion in a surprising or unfair

manner.” Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1130 (“A state ground, no doubt, may be found inadequate when

discretion has been exercised to impose novel and unforeseeable requirements without fair or

substantial support in prior state law.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Kemma, 534 U.S. at 376 (recognizing exceptions where “exorbitant application of a generally

sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.”)

There is nothing in the record here to suggest that the imposition of the timeliness bar by

the California Supreme Court was an “unexpectedly or freakishly” applied state procedural rule. 

Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1130. Nor does Petitioner suggest this is the case. Rather, Petitioner

alleged in the state trial, appellate and supreme courts that his medical condition was the reason

for his failure to timely present his claims. (Lodgment No. 4 at 11; Lodgment No. 6 at 11;

Lodgment No. 8 at 6.) The state court opinions do not support a finding that those courts

approved any reason for excusing Petitioner’s delay, and the fact that the superior court reached

the merits of his claims does not affect this Court’s determination regarding procedural default. 

-11- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (holding that “a procedural default does not bar

consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court

rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state

procedural bar.”); see id., 489 U.S. at 264 n.10 (holding that “as long as the state court explicitly

invokes a state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for its decision,” the fact that the state

court also reached the merits of the claims does not prevent the claims from being procedurally

defaulted.) Rather, the rejection of Petitioner’s excuse by the state courts is consistent with this

Court’s finding that Petitioner’s medical condition did not prevent him from timely presenting

his claims. There is, therefore, no basis in the record to find that the California Supreme Court’s

imposition of the state timeliness bar was in any manner surprising, exorbitant, or unfair. 

Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1130; Kemma, 534 U.S. at 376.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. This

Court can reach the merits of the claims only if Petitioner can establish cause and prejudice to

excuse the default, or if a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from the failure to

reach the merits of the defaulted claims.

1) Cause

The cause prong can be satisfied if Petitioner demonstrates some “objective factor” that

precluded him from raising his claims in state court, such as interference by state officials or

constitutionally ineffective counsel. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991). The

Supreme Court has generally defined “cause” in relation to the procedural default doctrine as

an objective factor external to Petitioner which gave rise to the default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at

730. Petitioner’s mental disorder cannot constitute cause to excuse the default. See Schneider

v. McDaniel, __F.3d__, 2012 WL 1109989 at *8 (9th Cir. April 4, 2012) (holding that “a pro

se petitioner’s mental condition cannot serve as cause for a procedural default, at least when the

petitioner on his own or with assistance remains ‘able to apply for post-conviction relief to a

state court.’”), quoting Hughs v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.

1986). Petitioner’s numerous filings here and in the state court, along with his statement quoted

above that he is proceeding with the assistance of another inmate (see ECF No. 3 at 5), indicates

-12- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that Petitioner has failed to establish cause sufficient to excuse the default based on his mental

condition. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 493-94; McDaniel, 2012 WL 1109989 at *8.

Petitioner also contends that any procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel in failing to raise his claims on direct appeal. (See Pet. at 34-36.) The

Supreme Court has stated: 

Although we have not identified with precision exactly what constitutes

“cause” to excuse a procedural default, we have acknowledged that in certain

circumstances counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing properly to preserve the claim

for review in state court will suffice. [Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89

(1986)] Not just any deficiency in counsel’s performance will do, however; the

assistance must have been so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution. 

Ibid. In other words, ineffective assistance adequate to establish cause for the

procedural default of some other constitutional claim is itself an independent

constitutional claim. And we held in Carrier that the principles of comity and

federalism that underlie our longstanding exhaustion doctrine. . . require that

constitutional claim, like others, to be first raised in state court. “(A) claim of

ineffective assistance,” we said, generally must “be presented to the state courts

as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural

default.” Carrier, supra, at 489.

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-52 (2000); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (holding

that a petitioner cannot establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in state postconviction proceedings because there is no constitutional right to counsel in such proceedings). 

Petitioner presented his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim to the state courts

in his state habeas petitions. (Lodgment No. 4 at 34-36; Lodgment No. 6 at 34-36; Lodgment

No. 8 at 28-30.) The state supreme court denied the ineffective assistance of counsel claim as

untimely, and it is procedurally defaulted for the reasons discussed above. Petitioner cannot

establish cause to excuse the default based on that defaulted claim because, “[w]hile it is true

that ineffective assistance of counsel may satisfy the cause requirement to overcome a

procedural default, it cannot serve as cause if that claim is itself procedurally defaulted.” 

Moraga v. McDaniel, 415 Fed.Appx. 784, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished memorandum),2

cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 166 (2011), citing Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451-53 (“The purposes of the

exhaustion requirement . . . would be frustrated were we to allow federal review to a prisoner

2

 Unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions may be cited commencing with decisions issued in 2007. 

(See Ninth Cir. Rule 36-3.) Although still not binding precedent, unpublished decisions have persuasive

value and indicate how the Ninth Circuit applies binding authority.

-13- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

who had presented his claim to the state court, but in such a manner that the state court could

not, consistent with its own procedural rules, have entertained it.”)

Petitioner could rely on his procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim

to demonstrate cause to excuse his procedural default only if he can establish cause and

prejudice, or the existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice, sufficient to excuse the

procedural default of that claim. See Edwards, 529 U.S. at 453 (“To hold, as we do, that an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another

claim can itself be procedurally defaulted is not to say that that procedural default may not itself

be excused if the prisoner can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to that

claim.”) Petitioner has not established cause to excuse his failure to timely present his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, because his only excuse for failing to timely present any

of his claims to the state courts is his medical condition, which, as discussed above, cannot be

relied upon to establish cause. McDaniel, 2012 WL 1109989 at *8; Hughs, 800 F.2d at 909. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has not established cause sufficient to excuse the

procedural default.

2) Prejudice

In order to establish prejudice to overcome a procedural default, Petitioner must show

“not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to

his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimensions.” See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (discussing prejudice where

defendant failed to object to jury instructions in proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). “Prejudice

[to excuse claims procedurally barred in a habeas case] is actual harm resulting from the alleged

error.” Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The state superior court examined each of Petitioner’s claims regarding the legality of his

sentence and found them to be without legal or factual support. (Lodgment No. 5, In re Lavery,

No. HC20028, order at 1-4.) The state appellate court rejected, on the merits on direct appeal,

Petitioner’s claim that his sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, and the superior

court rejected his remaining claims on their merits. Even if Petitioner could demonstrate that

-14- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

his claims are sufficiently meritorious so as to establish prejudice from this Court’s failure to

address them on their merits, which is unlikely, he has not established the requisite cause for the

reasons set forth above, which is also required to overcome the default.

3) Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Finally, Petitioner can avoid a procedural default if he can demonstrate that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice would result from the failure of the Court to reach the merits of his claims. 

The United States Supreme Court has limited the “miscarriage of justice” exception to

petitioners who can show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). “Actual

innocence” means factual innocence, not legal insufficiency; a mere showing of reasonable

doubt is not enough. See Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1997). In order to establish

actual innocence, Petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Petitioner here challenges only

his sentence. He has therefore failed to demonstrate factual innocence sufficient to excuse the

procedural default.

4) Conclusion re: procedural default

The Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and that Petitioner has

not established cause, prejudice, or the existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice to

excuse the default. Accordingly, the Court recommends GRANTING Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss on the basis that the claims presented in the Petition are procedurally defaulted.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) directing that

Petitioner’s Motion for an Order to Show Cause, for Discovery, for an Evidentiary Hearing, and

for Appointment of Counsel be DENIED; (3) directing that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

be GRANTED; and (4) directing that judgment be entered DISMISSING the Petition with

prejudice. 

/ / /

-15- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 1, 2012 any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than June 22, 2012. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections 

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 7, 2012

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

-16- 11cv1418

Case 3:11-cv-01418-WQH-BLM Document 19 Filed 05/07/12 Page 16 of 16