Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07121/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07121-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 2, 2008 Decided December 23, 2008

No. 07-7121

SALLIE L. JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

v.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv00250)

Mattie P. Johnson argued the cause for the appellant.

Holly M. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for the appellee District of Columbia. Peter J. Nickles, Attorney

General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M.

Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief. James C.

McKay, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, entered an

appearance. 

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Sallie L.

Johnson, a former officer in the Youth Services Administration

of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services

(DCDHS), appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint

against the District of Columbia (D.C. or District) for wrongful

termination and denial of due process in violation of the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Johnson v.

District of Columbia, 244 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (Johnson II).

The district court dismissed the action on the ground that

Johnson failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as

required by the District Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act

(CMPA), D.C. Code §§ 1-601.01 et seq. See Johnson v. District

of Columbia, 368 F. Supp. 2d 30, 51-52 (D.D.C. 2005) (Johnson

I). We conclude that Johnson was required to pursue her

remedies under the CMPA and under the collective bargaining

agreement (CBA) between her union and the District—and, in

particular, to petition the District Public Employee Relations

Board (PERB) for relief when the District refused to arbitrate

her grievance. Because she failed to do so, we affirm the

dismissal.

I.

On November 12, 2001, three youths escaped from the Oak

Hill Youth Center while Johnson was on duty. The following

day, Johnson was placed on administrative leave pending an

investigation of the escape. On December 13, 2001, the Deputy

Administrator of Secure Facilities presented Johnson with a

fifteen-day advance notice of proposal to remove her from her

position, which referenced nine “attachments” that were not, as

it turned out, attached. Compl. ¶ 21, Johnson v. District of

Columbia, No. 04-cv-00250 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2004) (Compl.).

Working with her union, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP),

Johnson attempted to obtain the missing attachments from

DCDHS and finally succeeded on January 22, 2002.

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3

A DCDHS hearing examiner reviewed the proposal to

remove and issued an Administrative Review on March 8, 2002.

Administrative Review, Adverse Personnel Action, CMPA No.

1022 (DCDHS Mar. 8, 2002). The hearing examiner concluded

that, given Johnson’s long employment history and favorable

evaluations, she “should not receive the harsh penalty of

removal.” Id. at 10. Later the same day, however, the DCDHS

Director issued a notice of final decision “sustain[ing] the

proposal to remove [her] from [her] position for ‘Inexcusable

Neglect of Duty.’ ” Letter from Carolyn W. Colvin, Director,

DCDHS, to Sallie Johnson (Mar. 8, 2002). Johnson’s removal

was effective March 15, 2002.

On March 27, 2002, Johnson’s union commenced a

grievance procedure on Johnson’s behalf pursuant to the CBA

negotiated in 1994 between the District and the American

Federation of Government Employees, which was then the

collective bargaining representative of Johnson’s bargaining

unit. See Master Agreement Between Am. Fed’n of Gov’t

Employees and Gov’t of the District of Columbia (1994 CBA).

The 1994 CBA offers an aggrieved employee the option to

pursue either the statutory or the CBA grievance procedure.

1994 CBA art. 24, § 1, ¶ 3. The 1994 CBA procedure requires

that the aggrieved employee and his union submit a written

grievance to the head of the agency involved within 45 calendar

days of the final notice of adverse action and that the agency

respond within 15 working days. Id. art. 30, § 5, ¶ A. If the

grievance is not “satisfactorily settled” at that stage, “the Union

can invoke arbitration.” Id. art. 30, § 5, ¶ B. Following an

arbitration award, “[e]ither party may submit the award for

reconsideration by filing an Arbitration Review Request with the

[PERB] within the time prescribed by law and regulation.” Id.

art. 30, § 8, ¶ 5.

In a letter dated June 19, 2002 and addressing Johnson’s

grievance, the District informed FOP General Counsel Harold

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M. Vaught that it “declined to participate in any further

arbitrations with the [FOP] until such time as the [FOP] and

[DCDHS] have, through negotiations, reached some agreement

to arbitrate grievances.” Letter from Mary E. Leary, Attorney,

D.C. Office of Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining, to

Harold M. Vaught, General Counsel, FOP/DCDHS Labor

Committee (June 19, 2002). In November 2002, because her

union representative “was not returning her calls,” Johnson

contacted Vaught about the status of her grievance. Compl. ¶

41. Vaught informed her he was no longer FOP General Counsel

and referred her to her union representative who, he said, had all

of her files. Between November 2002 and January 2003

Johnson attempted repeatedly but unsuccessfully to contact her

union representative.

In January 2003, the new FOP General Counsel informed

Johnson that an arbitrator had issued a favorable arbitral award

but that the District refused to comply with it. On August 25,

2003, however, the FOP General Counsel told Johnson’s

counsel that her grievance had in fact been “tied up in a dispute

over whether the District has an obligation to arbitrate her

discharge grievance” under the 1994 CBA, which the District

maintained was not in effect. Compl. ¶ 49; see 1994 CBA at

46-47. In October 2003, Johnson learned that, while grievances

from other members of her bargaining unit had gone to

arbitration, hers had not. 

On February 17, 2004, Johnson filed this action against the

District and individual District officials, alleging causes of

action for (1) violating her right to procedural due process by

failing to provide timely notice of the proposal to remove and by

refusing to arbitrate her grievance, (2) defamation, (3) wrongful

termination and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The district court subsequently dismissed the action against the

District and against the individual defendants in their official

capacities. The court concluded that Johnson “d[id] not allege

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any facts in her complaint to rebut the District’s contention that

Johnson’s arbitration is merely ‘on hold’ while the dispute over

the validity of the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining

agreement is resolved.” Johnson I, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 35. Thus,

the court reasoned, “Johnson’s arbitration remedy has yet to be

finalized, either by the completion of an arbitration or the

District’s final refusal to arbitrate” and “[u]ntil such time as one

of these two ‘finalizing events’ occurs, Johnson’s administrative

remedies for the claims she asserts here simply cannot have been

exhausted.” Id. The court further noted that “even if . . . the

District refuses to abide by a valid term of the collective

bargaining agreement, it is likely that the plaintiff could seek

[to] petition the PERB for relief.” Id. at 50 n.8.

On November 22, 2005, Johnson filed motions to compel

the District to arbitrate, to stay the action pending resolution of

the motion to compel and to amend the complaint to allege that

arbitrators in two other cases had determined the 1994 CBA’s

arbitration procedure was binding on the District (one of whom

was upheld by the D.C. Superior Court) but that the District

“still refuses to participate in arbitration of [her] grievance.”

Johnson II, 244 F.R.D. at 8 (citing Proposed Mot. to Amend

Compl. ¶¶ 39-40, Johnson v. District of Columbia, No. 04-cv00250 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2005)). The court construed the motion

to amend as an “attempt[] to plead futility by alleging that the

dispute has been resolved and that the District still refuses to

engage in arbitration,” id., and concluded that the motion itself

was futile because “the claims against the District in Johnson’s

amended complaint suffer from the same flaw that fatally

afflicted her original complaint,” namely, they do not

demonstrate either “administrative exhaustion through

completion of the grievance process” or “that resort to

administrative remedies would be futile.” Id. at 7-8. The court

noted that “ ‘appeal to the PERB on the grounds that the

District’s refusal to abide by a valid collective bargaining

agreement constitutes an unfair labor practice’ is Johnson’s

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1

Johnson did not appeal the dismissal of her complaint as to the

individual District officials.

‘appropriate remedy’ at this stage.” Id. at 9 (quoting Johnson I,

368 F. Supp. 2d at 45 n.5). Accordingly, the court denied all

three motions as to the District and dismissed the action in its

entirety. Id. at 10. Johnson filed a notice of appeal on August

16, 2007.1

II.

Johnson contends the district court erroneously dismissed

her action against the District because she was not required

under District law to exhaust her remedies by petitioning the

PERB for relief. We conclude the district court properly

dismissed the action because Johnson failed to exhaust the

remedy she elected pursuant to D.C. Code

§ 1-616.52(e)—namely the CBA grievance procedure—which

became her exclusive remedy under the CMPA and District case

law. 

The CMPA, which governs personnel management,

provides that an employee may, alternatively and at his

discretion, (1) “appeal from a removal . . . to the Office of

Employee Appeals’’ (OEA), D.C. Code § 1-616.52(b), or (2)

use any grievance procedure set out in an applicable CBA “but

not both,” id. § 1-616.52(e). If an employee chooses the

applicable CBA grievance procedure, its provisions “take

precedence over” the statutory procedure. D.C. Code

§ 1-616.52(d). An OEA decision is appealable to the D.C.

Superior Court, id. § 1-606.03(d), while an arbitration award

under a CBA grievance procedure is appealable to the PERB, id.

§ 1-605.02(6), and thence to the D.C. Superior Court, id.

§§ 1-605.02(12), 1-617.13(c). See generally District of

Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 626-27 (D.C. 1991).

There the D.C. Court of Appeals concluded that the CMPA was

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2

“Exhaustion of administrative remedies” generally refers to one

of two concepts: (1) a nonjurisdictional, judicially created doctrine

which “requir[es] parties who seek to challenge agency action to

exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing their case

to court,” Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C.

Cir. 2004); and (2) a jurisdictional doctrine under which the Congress

“requires resort to the administrative process as a predicate to judicial

review,” id. The District exhaustion doctrine is jurisdictional as

applied by the D.C. Court of Appeals. It requires that an employee

exhaust the administrative remedies prescribed in either the CMPA or

a CBA before obtaining judicial review in the Superior Court. See,

e.g., Bd. of Trustees, Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia v. Myers, 652

A.2d 642, 645 (D.C. 1995). Under the prescribed and exclusive

CMPA procedure, judicial review occurs generally only in the D.C.

courts at the culmination of the administrative appeal or grievance

procedure. See Robinson v. District of Columbia, 748 A.2d 409, 411

n.4 (D.C. 2000) (“The [CMPA] is jurisdictional and provides the

exclusive remedy for almost all claims against public employers, with

an opportunity to appeal to the Superior Court.”). The procedure’s

exclusivity and exhaustion requirements do not, however, necessarily

foreclose a subsequent suit in local or federal court challenging the

adequacy of the process itself. See Thompson v. District of Columbia,

428 F.3d 283 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reversing dismissal of terminated

employee’s pre-termination due process claim notwithstanding CMPA

stripped federal court of jurisdiction over claim that discharge

constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress). Without

resolving whether this D.C. exhaustion requirement is better

understood as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional in federal court, we

have no trouble concluding that it applies here. As we note below,

Johnson has waived any challenge to the district court’s conclusion

that each of her claims is subject to the exhaustion requirement.

See infra note 8.

“intended . . . to provide District employees with their exclusive

remedies for claims arising out of employer conduct in handling

personnel ratings, employee grievances, and adverse actions.”

Id. at 635 (emphasis added).2

 Accordingly, an employee

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3

Section 1-616.52(e) provides: “Matters covered under this

subchapter that also fall within the coverage of a negotiated grievance

procedure may, in the discretion of the aggrieved employee, be raised

either pursuant to § 1-606.03, or the negotiated grievance procedure,

but not both.” Section 1-606.03 sets out the procedure for appealing

to the OEA and then to the D.C. Superior Court.

grieving an adverse action must exhaust the remedies prescribed

either by the statute or, under D.C. Code § 1-616.52(e), by the

1994 CBA.3 Thus, once Johnson elected to pursue her CBA

grievance procedure, she was required to exhaust its remedies by

completing arbitration and, if necessary, appealing to the PERB,

id. art. 30, § 8, ¶ 5. Moreover, when the District refused to

arbitrate and the FOP failed to pursue arbitration, Johnson could

not circumvent the procedure prescribed in the CBA—namely,

arbitration and review by the PERB—by filing a lawsuit. See

Bd. of Trustees, Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia v. Myers, 652

A.2d 642, 645 (D.C. 1995) (“Generally, a District employee,

subject to the [CMPA], or to a CMPA-sanctioned collective

bargaining agreement, may not maintain a common law action

in court to remedy a grievance against the employer cognizable

under CMPA, or under such an agreement, unless the employee

has exhausted the administrative procedures provided in that

agreement.”); Robinson v. District of Columbia, 748 A.2d 409,

411 (D.C. 2000) (D.C. Superior Court “is not an ‘alternative

forum’ in this scheme, but rather serves as a ‘last resort’ for

reviewing decisions generated by CMPA procedures.” (quoting

Stockard v. Moss, 706 A.2d 561, 565 (D.C. 1997) (quoting

Thompson, 593 A.2d at 634))). As the D.C. Court of Appeals

has made clear, Johnson’s sole remedy lay in filing an unfair

labor practice complaint with the PERB to obtain relief. 

In Thompson, for example, the plaintiff, a former District

employee, sued the District for defamation and intentional

infliction of emotional distress based on memoranda written by

her supervisor. Pursuant to the CBA, her union had filed two

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grievances with the District on her behalf but did not take the

grievances to arbitration as the CBA provided. The court held

that because Thompson’s tort claims “clearly f[e]ll within the

scope of” the CMPA’s provisions governing performance

ratings, adverse actions and grievances, the CMPA “preclude[d]

litigation of Thompson’s [tort] claims, in the first instance, in

Superior Court.” 593 A.2d at 635. If Thompson was

“dissatisfied with [her union’s] representation,” the proper

remedy, the court suggested, was “to file a complaint with

PERB, subject to judicial review in Superior Court.” Id. at 628

n.15. Since Thompson, the D.C. Court of Appeals has twice

affirmed this view. 

First, in Board of Trustees, supra, the court affirmed the

Superior Court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to

exhaust. The plaintiff, a professor at the University of the

District of Columbia (UDC), alleged breach of contract and tort

claims arising from a rescinded promotion after his union failed

to take his grievance, filed pursuant to the applicable CBA, to

arbitration. The court explained that “under CMPA and the

[CBA]—and under prevailing case law—a UDC union

employee’s only recourse against the UDC Board is arbitration,

and that if the union is unwilling to take the case to arbitration,

the employee’s only remedy at that point is a complaint against

the union filed with the [PERB].” Myers, 652 A.2d at 646. 

The D.C. Court of Appeals addressed the issue again in Pitt

v. District of Columbia Department of Corrections, 954 A.2d

978 (D.C. 2008), with the same result. The court there affirmed

the Superior Court’s dismissal of an action for review of an

OEA decision. The OEA had dismissed the appeal by a District

employee whose union declined to invoke arbitration of the

employee’s grievance after the District made clear it believed

the applicable CBA had expired. The Pitt court upheld the

OEA’s determination that the CBA remained in force and that

the employee had failed to exhaust his remedies thereunder.

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Citing the just-quoted language from Myers, the court explained:

“Any obstacle that Mr. Pitt had faced in having his claim

reviewed by a ‘neutral decision maker’ ”—which under the

CBA was through arbitration—“could only be resolved in a

claim against the FOP before the PERB.” 954 A.2d at 986.

Likewise here, when the District refused to arbitrate Johnson’s

grievance and the FOP did nothing about it, Johnson’s only

remedy was to file an unfair labor practice complaint with the

PERB. She was not entitled to challenge her removal through

an independent legal action, either in the Superior Court or in

the district court. Notwithstanding the clear District case law,

Johnson offers three arguments why she should not be bound by

the District’s exhaustion of remedies requirement. 

First, Johnson asserts that neither the plain language of the

CMPA nor its legislative history requires that an employee

pursuing a CBA arbitration procedure seek relief from the PERB

and that the district court misconstrued the CMPA in finding

such a requirement. The D.C. Court of Appeals, however,

definitively foreclosed this argument in Thompson, Myers and

Pitt. In each case, the court concluded that a District employee

who pursues a grievance pursuant to a CBA procedure must

complete the prescribed procedure and therefore must file an

unfair labor practice, if necessary, to compel arbitration. Under

those cases, Johnson’s sole remedy too was to file a complaint

with the PERB. 

Second, Johnson argues that the CMPA does not require

administrative exhaustion if an employee opts for the CBA

grievance procedure because the CMPA expressly provides that

the CBA grievance procedure preempts the statutory procedure.

See D.C. Code § 1-616.52(d) (“Any system of grievance

resolution or review of adverse actions negotiated between the

District and a labor organization shall take precedence over the

procedures of this subchapter for employees in a bargaining unit

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4

Johnson is wrong in asserting that the CMPA “at no point

indicates or states that the PERB is a part of the administrative remedy

for resolving a District of Columbia employee’s grievance pursuant to

an adverse action by a District of Columbia Agency.” Br. of

Appellant at 16. The CMPA expressly confers on the PERB “the

power to . . . [c]onsider appeals from arbitration awards pursuant to a

grievance procedure.” D.C. Code § 1-605.02(6). The 1994 CBA

itself also provides for appeal to the PERB. 1994 CBA art. 30, § 8,

¶ 5.

represented by a labor organization.”).4 The same preemption

clause was in effect when Thompson, Myers and Pitt were

decided and yet the D.C. Court of Appeals concluded that the

employee in each case was required to seek relief from the

PERB. In any event, there is no conflict here between the

CMPA and the CBA, which both prescribe the same procedure.

Under the 1994 CBA, as under the CMPA, Johnson was free to

choose either the statutory appeal process to the OEA or the

1994 CBA grievance procedure which provided for arbitration

subject to appeal to the PERB and only then, by either

procedure, to court. Compare 1994 CBA art. 24, § 1, ¶ 3 and

art. 30 § 8, ¶ 5 with D.C. Code §§ 1-605.02(12) and 1-617.13(c).

Under District case law, in either event, she was bound to follow

the chosen procedure to its conclusion, including resolving the

arbitration impasse that occurred by filing an unfair labor

practice complaint with the PERB. See Thompson, 593 A.2d at

628 n.15; Myers, 652 A.2d at 646-48; Pitt, 954 A.2d at 985-86.

Finally, Johnson argues, as she did before the district court,

that seeking relief from the PERB would have been futile. See

Myers, 652 A.2d at 645 (“employee may be able to bypass

administrative remedies under a collective bargaining agreement

by showing that pursuit of these remedies would be futile”)

(citing Grover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 330 (1969);

Winter v. Local 639, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146,

149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); see also Univ. of Dist. of Columbia

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5

See Butler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 49 D.C. Reg. 1152, 1154

(PERB Feb. 8, 2002) (failure to pay night differential wages under

CBA was ‘‘issue of contract interpretation” and therefore not statutory

unfair labor practice subject to PERB jurisdiction); Am. Fed’n of State,

County & Mun. Employees, D.C. Council 20, Local 2921 v. D.C. Pub.

Sch., 42 D.C. Reg. 5685 (PERB Dec. 4, 1992) (District’s refusal to

provide union with written decision is not statutory unfair labor

practice within PERB jurisdiction because providing decision was

required by CBA); Wash. Teachers’ Union, Local 6 v. D.C. Pub. Sch.,

42 D.C. Reg. 5488, 5489 (PERB Nov. 17, 1992) (“alleged unilateral

change in established and bargainable terms and conditions of

employment” is not statutory unfair labor practice within PERB

jurisdiction).

Faculty Ass’n v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance

Auth., 163 F.3d 616, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Under prevailing

D.C. and federal law, an employee may bypass the agreed-upon

arbitration procedures only by showing that the ‘grievance

procedures are unreasonable or that the hostility of union

officials makes a fair hearing impossible’ or that ‘pursuit of

[administrative] remedies would be futile.’ ” (quoting Jordan v.

Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 548 A.2d 792, 797 (D.C.

1988); Myers, 652 A.2d at 645)) (alteration in original). This

exception, however, requires “a clear and positive showing of

futility,” Winter, 569 F.2d at 149 (internal quotation omitted),

giving rise to a “ ‘certainty of an adverse decision, ’ ”

Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of Am. v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90,

105 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting K. Davis, Administrative Law

Treatise § 20.07 (1958)). Johnson has not made such a showing.

To support her futility claim, she cites several PERB decisions

in which, she asserts, the PERB has expressed its view that it

“lack[s] jurisdiction over alleged violations that are strictly

contractual in nature,” and that this includes, she claims, a

violation of the obligation to arbitrate under a CBA. Br. of

Appellant at 21-22.5

 None of the cases she cites, however,

addresses the precise issue here, namely, whether the PERB has

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6

Although the D.C. Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue,

we have no cause to believe that it would not similarly find the PERB

has authority to determine whether the District commits an unfair

labor practice by failing to arbitrate a grievance pursuant to a CBA, in

derogation of its duty to bargain in good faith, see D.C. Code

§ 1-617.04(a)(5) (prohibiting District from “[r]efusing to bargain

collectively in good faith with the exclusive representative”). In any

event, under Myers and Pitt, Johnson could have, based on the

allegations in her complaint, sought relief from the PERB on the

ground the FOP committed an unfair labor practice when it processed

her grievance ‘‘in perfunctory fashion.” Myers, 652 A.2d at 646

(internal quotation omitted); see Pitt, 954 A.2d at 985-86 (union’s

discretion to submit employee’s grievance to arbitration is “ ‘limited

by the union’s duty to represent all employees fairly in the

enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement,’ and its

‘obligation . . . to investigate a grievance in good faith’ ” (quoting

Myers, 652 A.2d at 646)).

7

Then D.C. Code § 1-605.2(3) (now D.C. Code § 1-605.02(3))

provided “The Board shall have the power to . . . [d]ecide whether

unfair labor practices have been committed and issue an appropriate

remedial order.”

authority to determine whether a union or the District has

committed an unfair labor practice by failing to pursue—or

submit to—arbitration and, if so, to remediate it. By contrast,

the D.C. Court of Appeals has directly addressed this issue, at

least as to a union,6

 and has held that the PERB has such

authority. The Myers court stated unequivocally: “There can be

no doubt that PERB has the power, under D.C. Code

§ 1-605.2(3), to order the union to pursue arbitration of an

employee’s claim against the employer if PERB concludes that

the union’s refusal to arbitrate amounted to an unfair labor

practice.” Myers, 652 A.2d at 646;7 see also Pitt, 954 A.2d at

985 (quoting and affirming Myers). Given the holdings in these

two cases that the PERB has authority to determine that the

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8

To the extent Johnson may be entitled to file a separate action

asserting her due process claims, see, e.g., Thompson v. District of

Columbia, 428 F.3d at 287-88, supra note 2, she has waived any

argument based thereon because she waited until her reply brief, see

Reply Br. at 9, to challenge the district court’s conclusion that all of

her claims, including the due process claims, are subject to the

exhaustion requirement, Johnson I, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (“The fact

that [the due process] claim is couched in constitutional terms is of no

moment for the exhaustion inquiry.”). This challenge comes too late.

See Worldwide Moving & Storage, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 445

F.3d 422, 427 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In any event, with regard to her

first due process claim—that she did not receive timely notice of the

proposal to remove—Johnson concedes that “[t]he grievance

arbitration process would . . . address whether Ms. Johnson was

illegally terminated pursuant to an untimely and inadequate written

pre-termination notice of proposed termination.” Reply Br. at 9. With

regard to her post-termination claim—based on the District’s refusal

to arbitrate—Johnson acknowledges that she “is not alleging that the

due process procedure she was entitled to pursuant to [the 1994 CBA]

was insufficient or inadequate” but that “in violation of her

constitutional rights the District violated its contractual obligation to

provide the . . . post termination procedural due process rights that she

was entitled to pursuant to the CBA.” Id. As already explained,

however, District law provides a process for Johnson to remedy the

District’s refusal, namely, filing a complaint with the PERB. Thus,

like the employees in Myers and Pitt, Johnson had only to make such

a filing to obtain the process she claims was due. She failed to do so.

failure to arbitrate under a CBA is an unfair labor practice and

to fashion a remedy therefor, it would not have been futile for

Johnson to seek a remedy from the PERB. 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that under District

of Columbia law, the district court correctly dismissed

Johnson’s complaint against the District for failure to exhaust

her remedies.8

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

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9

In light of our conclusion that Johnson’s sole path to relief lay

through filing a complaint with the PERB to compel arbitration, we

need not address her argument that the district court abused its

discretion when it denied her motions to amend the complaint and to

compel arbitration.

district court.9

So ordered.

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