Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02021/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02021-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Edward Pingel, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-2021-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before this Court is an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by

Petitioner James Pingel. (Doc. 6). Magistrate Judge Jay Irwin has issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R & R”) in which he recommended that the Court deny the petition with

prejudice; Petitioner has objected to the R & R. (Docs. 36 and 37). Because objections have

been filed, the Court will review the petition de novo. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). For the following reasons, the Court accepts the

R & R in part and denies it in part, and denies the petition with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

On October 4, 1988, a Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on one count of Molestation of

a Child in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-1410 and one count of

Sexual Contact with a Minor in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1405. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. B). According

to the indictment, Petitioner had molested his four-year-old stepdaughter, N.J.L., on

September 26, 1988. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. B, Doc. 17-1, Ex. F, Doc. 17-3, Ex. X at 9:20-22). On

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1

 At the sentencing hearing, the probation officer testified that she had originally

calculated the sentence date from April 9, 2001, but had been informed by her supervisor that

“the statute states that he can’t have credit for that time because he was convicted of a new

crime.” (Doc. 17-1, Ex. H at 13:13-17). When the prosecutor was asked if he knew of any

reason that Petitioner should not be given credit beginning on April 9, 2001, he replied, “No,

Your Honor, I sure don’t.” (Doc. 17-1, Ex. H at 15:14). The judge rejected the

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December 5, 1988, he pleaded guilty to one count of Attempted Sexual Contact with a Minor

and the other charge was dismissed. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. C). On February 3, 1989, he was

sentenced to three months in jail and lifetime probation. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. D). He was

registered as a sex offender pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3821(c). (Id.). On August 26, 1997, the

terms of Petitioner’s probation were modified so that he could accept employment that had

been offered to him in the state of Wisconsin, where he then moved with his wife and their

two children, along with his wife’s two other daughters, A.M.L and N.J.L. (Doc. 17-1, Ex.

E).

On March 18, 2001, N.J.L. told her mother that Petitioner had entered her bedroom

and molested her on a continuing basis after the family moved to Wisconsin. The Marathon

County Sheriff’s Department investigated the allegations, which led them to allegations that

Petitioner had also been molesting his other stepdaughter, A.M.L. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. F). On

March 28, a four-count criminal complaint was filed against Petitioner, and on May 3 an

Information was filed containing the same counts. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. G). The State of Arizona

placed a detainer on petitioner on April 9, 2001. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. H, at 11). Petitioner was

convicted after a jury trial and began serving his sentence in Wisconsin.

On December 4, 2003, Petitioner appeared in Maricopa County Superior Court at a

disposition hearing regarding his probation violation. He acknowledged that he had been

convicted of the Wisconsin charges, and admitted to violating the terms of his parole. (Doc.

17-1, Ex. H at 7:7–24). He was given a ten-year sentence, with a five-year enhancement

based upon the fact that the victim was the same as the victim in his Arizona conviction, and

given credit for his Wisconsin incarceration from April 9, 2001, the day on which Arizona

placed a detainer on him.1

 Petitioner was given a total sentence, therefore, of fifteen years,

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recommendation of the probation officer’s supervisor and gave Petitioner credit for his entire

Wisconsin incarceration. In fact, the probation officer’s supervisor had been correct. When

a person is incarcerated based on a conviction for a crime in another state, that time is not

“spent pursuant to his Arizona offense . . . and there is no reason to credit him with the time.”

State v. Horrsiberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (App. 1982).

2

 It is not clear from the record on what grounds the original conviction was vacated.

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with 1,061 days credit for the combined time he had served in Arizona and Wisconsin. (Doc.

17-1, Ex. H at 17:20–24). The sentence was to be served consecutively to his Wisconsin

incarceration. (Id.).

On January 5, 2004, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) in

Maricopa County Superior Court, noting that both the District Attorney and the Probation

Department had recommended he be sentenced to only ten years, to run concurrently with

his Wisconsin conviction. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. I). Petitioner was provided counsel, who filed a

petition on August 10, 2004 that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which had

been decided since Petitioner’s sentencing, prohibited the judge from enhancing the sentence

based on an aggravating factor—namely, that the victim was the same as in the original

case—that had been found by the judge rather than a jury. (Doc. 17-2, Ex. K). On March 11,

2005, with Petitioner’s PCR challenging the sentencing enhancement still pending, his

Wisconsin conviction was vacated and a new trial was ordered.2

 (Doc. 17-3, Ex. P).

Petitioner supplemented his PCR to argue for vacating his Arizona sentence based upon the

fact that the Wisconsin conviction had been the only ground upon which he had been found

to violate parole. (Id.). On July 26, 2005, the Arizona Department of Corrections wrote the

Marathon County Sheriff’s Department, noting that Petitioner had been sentenced for his

parole violation and that Arizona had begun his sentence on April 13, 2002. (Doc. 23-1, Ex.

A). On October 3, 2005, the superior court ruled that the colloquy at his disposition hearing

constituted an admission of wrongdoing sufficient to demonstrate that he had violated the

terms of his parole, even absent a conviction. (Doc. 17-3). It further found, however, that

Blakely did not permit the five-year enhancement, and scheduled a new sentencing hearing.

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Before being re-sentenced in Arizona, Petitioner pled guilty to two of the four counts

in the Wisconsin proceeding; the other two were dropped. (Doc. 17-3, Ex. V). On November

16, he was sentenced to one thirty-year sentence and one twenty-year sentence, to run

concurrently, and was given credit for 1700 days in prison, dating back to his original arrest

in March of 2001. (Id.).

Petitioner was re-sentenced in Arizona on June 8, 2006. (Doc. 17-3, Ex. X). At his

hearing, his counsel argued that he should receive credit for incarceration dating back to

April of 2001, based on the reasoning the judge had used in the December 4, 2003 hearing.

Alternatively, his counsel argued that he should be granted credit for any time served prior

to November 15th, 2005, because his original conviction had been vacated and he was only

being incarcerated based on the probation violation until his conviction at the new trial. (Doc.

17-3, Ex. X at 16–17). The State noted that Wisconsin had given him full credit for his 1700

days incarceration when he was sentenced after his new trial, and that under Arizona law, a

consecutive sentence was mandatory. (Id. at 17:22–18:9). The court issued a ten-year

sentence, consecutive to his Wisconsin sentence, with 92 days credit based upon his previous

incarceration in Arizona and no credit for the time he served in Wisconsin. (Id. at 21:11–19).

On July 10, 2006, Petitioner filed a PCR in regards to the new sentence; his assigned

attorney moved to withdraw so that Petitioner could bring an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim without conflict. (Doc. 17-4, Ex. CC). Petitioner’s new counsel notified the Court that

he was “unable to find any facially colorable claims,” and requested the Court grant

Petitioner additional time to file a pro se petition. (Doc. 17-4, Ex. EE). Petitioner filed his pro

se PCR on February 20, 2007. (Doc. 17-4, Ex. FF). Relief was denied on August 13, 2007.

(Doc. 17-4, Ex. II). On November 6, Petitioner mailed a document to the Court of Appeals,

but attached a cover letter to the Clerk of Court stating that he intended the document as a

Petition for Rehearing and Review of the Superior Court decision, not a Petition for Review

to the Court of Appeals. (Doc. 17-4, Ex. JJ). If this document was ever filed as a Petition for

Rehearing, or any action was ever taken on it, there is no evidence of it in the record.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals on December 27, 2007, and the

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3

 Petitioner claims that since the December 4, 2003 sentence was to run “consecutively

to any sentence you are currently serving,” it began to run as soon as his first Wisconsin

sentence was vacated, since that was the sentence he was currently serving when sentenced.

(Doc. 6 at 8).

4

 The section has been renumbered as A.R.S. § 13-712.

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Court of Appeals denied review on November 12, 2008. (Doc. 17-4, Ex. NN).

Petitioner filed his initial habeas corpus petition on October 5, 2009. (Doc. 1). The

petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on

January 5, 2010. (Doc. 6). Petitioner asserts six grounds for relief, namely: (1) by not

crediting him at his June 8, 2006 sentencing with the 1,061 days it had credited him with at

his December 4, 2003 sentencing, the court violated Petitioner’s Due Process and Double

Jeopardy rights, (2) the June 8, 2006 sentence constituted a second consecutive sentence on

top of the sentence he had received and been serving since December 4, 2003; since it was

in effect a second sentence for the same conviction, it violated him of his rights under the

Double Jeopardy clause, (3) by not allowing Petitioner to serve the sentence under the terms

imposed on December 4, 2003,3

 the court denied Petitioner his Due Process and Equal

Protection rights, (4) Petitioner’s Due Process rights were violated because the court applied

the wrong section of A.R.S. § 13-709 at his re-sentencing, (5) Petitioner’s Due Process rights

were violated because the court misapplied A.R.S. § 13-709 at his re-sentencing,4

 (6)

Petitioner’s Due Process rights were violated because he was detained in Wisconsin from the

time his sentence was overturned until the time he was re-convicted under the Arizona

sentence (and therefore could not post bail prior to trial as he would have been otherwise

been able to do) but was never given credit for incarceration on his Arizona sentence during

this period.

On October 17, 2011, Magistrate Judge Irwin issued his R & R, finding that

Petitioner’s claims had not been fairly presented as federal claims during his state court

proceedings, and that he had therefore not exhausted his state court remedies, and now had

procedurally defaulted on the claims. (Doc. 36). Petitioner filed objections on November 3,

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5

 The letter in the record is dated July 26, 2005. (Doc. 23-1, Ex. A). Elsewhere,

Magistrate Judge Irwin references the letter by its correct date. (See Doc. 36 at 4).

6

 On December 15, 2011, Petitioner filed a supplemental briefing noting that the state

had not responded to his objections within 14 days, and claiming that this action should be

viewed as a waiver of any defense to the objections. (Doc. 38). The federal rules provide that

“[a] party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days,” but do not require a

response; choosing not to respond does constitute a waiver. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2)

(emphasis added).

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2011 objecting to the following: (1) that the R & R refers to a letter sent by the Arizona

Department of Corrections on July 25, 2006, when in fact it was sent on July 25, 2005,5

 (2)

that the Magistrate Judge was not, according to Petitioner, aware that “the Wisconsin

Conviction and Sentence were VACATED AND THEREFORE EXPIRED in JAN. of 2005”

(emphasis in original), and (3) that the July 26, 2005 letter had not been made available to

him prior to September of 2010, which he claims renders it newly discovered evidence for

the purposes of Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1. (Doc. 37).6

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). The writ

may be granted by “the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit

judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Review of Petitions for

Habeas Corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244 et seq. (2006).

A. Statute of Limitations under AEDPA

Under AEDPA, petitions for habeas corpus are governed by a one-year statute of

limitations. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005) (AEDPA “establishes a

1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition”) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)). The limitation period begins to run when the state conviction becomes

final—either “upon ‘the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

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7

 Failure to exhaust state court remedies does not prevent a court from denying a

petition on the merits should it deem such denial proper. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); see Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 183 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the “AEDPA gives

a district court the alternative of simply denying a petition containing unexhausted but

nonmeritorious claims”).

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such review.’” White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A)).

B. Exhaustion of State Procedures

Habeas relief is not available to petitioners who do not properly exhaust their state

court procedural remedies prior to filing their federal petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). To

satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must give state courts the opportunity to pass

upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoner’s federal rights. Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)); see Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (holding that “a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition

should be dismissed if the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies as to any of

his federal claims”) (citations omitted); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“A habeas petitioner must give the state courts the first opportunity to review any claim of

federal constitutional error before seeking federal habeas review of that claim.”) (citing Rose

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982)). Except in cases “carrying a life sentence or the

death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for the purposes of federal

habeas once the Arizona State Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden,

399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999).7

1. Fair Presentation

To provide the state with the necessary opportunity to review the claim, a petitioner

must fairly present the claim in each appropriate state court. A claim is not fairly presented

unless a petitioner “explicitly indicated” that “the claim was a federal one” in the state court

litigation. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended, 247 F.3d 904

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(9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). A petitioner explicitly indicates that a claim is federal

by including “reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement

of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–63

(1996). A petitioner does not fairly present a state court with a federal claim merely by

including “general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial.” Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106 (citing Gray, 518 U.S. at

162–63).

2. Excuse from Exhaustion Requirement

In certain limited circumstances, habeas petitions may be considered by the federal

court, even if the petitioner did not exhaust the claims by fairly presenting them in state

court. Excuse from exhaustion is available when either “(i) there is an absence of available

State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to

protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). The Ninth Circuit has held

that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) may be satisfied when “the highest state court has recently

addressed the issue raised in the petition and resolved it adversely to the petitioner.” Sweet

v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981). It may also be satisfied when “there is no

opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient

as to render futile any effort to obtain relief.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981).

C. Procedural Default

Habeas review is not available to petitioners whose claims are procedurally defaulted.

A claim may be procedurally defaulted in one of two ways. First, a claim is procedurally

defaulted when it was raised in state court, but the state court denied relief based upon “an

independent and adequate state procedural rule.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750

(1991). Second, claims that were not exhausted in state court are procedurally defaulted if

the district court determines that a return to state court would be futile because procedural

rules would eliminate “the likelihood that a state court will accord the habeas petitioner a

hearing on the merits of the claim.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268–70 (1989) (O’Connor,

J., concurring). A federal court may only hear a claim that has been procedurally defaulted

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if a petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the

alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

1. Cause and Prejudice

Cause for procedural default exists when “some objective factor external to the

defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501

U.S. at 753 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). When a state court

petition is denied because of a procedural rule that was violated because a petitioner’s

attorney was merely negligent—for example, when an attorney “misses a filing deadline”

through “oversight”—the petitioner has not shown cause for the procedural default, since the

attorney remains the agent of the petitioner. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012).

However, when an attorney “abandons his client without notice, and thereby occasions the

default” the agency relationship is severed, and a petitioner may show cause for procedural

default. Id.

Even if a petitioner can show cause for the procedural default, federal habeas review

is not proper unless the petitioner can also demonstrate prejudice. A petitioner suffers no

actual prejudice when “[t]he other evidence of guilt presented at trial . . . was substantial to

a degree that would negate” the alleged prejudice caused by the allegedly constitutional

action. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).

2. Miscarriage of Justice

Absent cause and prejudice for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that

failing to consider a habeas petition would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To

meet this standard, a petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327

(1995) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). A miscarriage of justice claim

is not a constitutional claim for relief, but merely “a gateway through which a habeas

petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the

merits.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)).

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D. Merits Review

A court reviewing a petition on the merits can grant relief only if the state court

decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of”clearly established

law. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 391. Clearly established federal law consists of “the

governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court

renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003) (citing Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002)). Habeas is not granted merely when a federal court disagrees with

a state court’s constitutional interpretation: “the most important point is that an unreasonable

application of federal law is different than an incorrect application of federal law.”Williams,

529 U.S. at 410.

II Analysis

Magistrate Judge Irwin found that Petitioner failed to present his claims as federal

claims in his state court proceedings, and Petitioner does not address the issue of exhaustion

in his objections. Instead, he raises a number of claims involving the letter that was produced

on September 15, 2010, including an argument that the letter constitutes newly discovered

evidence. (Doc. 37 at 1). Even though Petitioner did not object to Magistrate Judge Irwin’s

exhaustion determination, this Court will review the determination de novo before addressing

the question of the letter. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121.

A. Timeliness, Exhaustion, and Procedural Default.

There is no question that the petition is timely under AEDPA, as Respondents

concede. In his state court filings, however, Petitioner did not fairly present the federal nature

of his claims. The PCR he filed after resentencing refers almost exclusively to state law, and

contains only the following phrases that could arguably be considered federal claims:

Equal protection. in Regard’s to a Defendants ability to pay bail

and move forward with per existing sentences?

Does a Defendant have equal protection under the law if, the

unability of the defendant to make or pay bail. stop’s denie’s or

delays the defendants right to serve the sentences imposed upon

him in a timely manner. While he is in custody. Like any other

similarly sentenced defendent would whom is able to post a

bond would have.

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Telling a defendant at resentencing that you are not going to

accredit previously accredited time. and that they will have to do

that credited time again is double Jeopardy in its purest form and

should not be allowed to happen.

(Doc. 17-4, Ex. FF at 1, 6, 6 [sic]).

As Magistrate Judge Irwin noted, “Petitioner’s references to ‘equal protection’ and

‘double jeopardy’ offered no clue whether he was raising a claim under Arizona’s equal

guarantees, or the U.S. Constitution’s guarantees.” (Doc. 36 at 10). Petitioner did not fairly

present claims arising under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by

“general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and

the right to a fair trial.” Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106.

Petitioner’s reference to Double Jeopardy does not signal that he was presenting a

federal Double Jeopardy claim rather than a state one. Arizona’s Double Jeopardy provisions

are more generous to defendants than those of the federal constitution. In Oregon v. Kennedy,

456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982), the Supreme Court held that mistrials granted on Defendant’s

motion are subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause “[o]nly where the governmental conduct

in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” As the Ninth

Circuit recently noted, “the Kennedy standard is rarely met.” U.S. v. Lopez-Avila, ___ F.3d

___, 2012 WL 450314, at *7 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2012). The Arizona Supreme Court has

overtly adopted a stricter standard when interpreting the Arizona State Constitution’s Double

Jeopardy Clause, holding that prosecutorial misconduct short of goading a mistrial may result

in Double Jeopardy when it “amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to

be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with

indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial or reversal.” Pool v. Superior Ct. In

and for Pima Cty., 139 Ariz. 98, 108–109, 677 P.2d 261, 271–72 (1984). Petitioner

referenced Double Jeopardy in a PCR that otherwise mentioned state law almost exclusively;

a state court would presumably believe that he was referencing the Double Jeopardy clause

in the Arizona state constitution. “[R]aising a state claim that is merely similar to a federal

claim does not exhaust state remedies.” Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir.

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2005).

As noted by Magistrate Judge Irwin, Petitioner may have cited federal law in his reply

brief to the PCR, if he filed one (there is no reply brief in the record). Furthermore, he cited

federal law in the “Petition for Rehearing or Review,” which may never have been filed and

was never ruled on, and in his Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. (Doc. 17-4,

Exs. JJ, KK). Since he did not fairly present his claims as federal claims to the trial court in

his PCR, it does not matter that he raised them in later filings, because in order for a

petitioner to exhaust a claim he “must properly raise it on every level of direct review.”

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, had he included federal claims

in a reply brief to his PCR, the court would not have been able to rule on it, because the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure require that every ground for relief be included in “the

petition itself.” State v. Lopez, 223 Ariz. 238, 239, 221 P.3d 1052, 1053 (App. 2009). See

also Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. United States Forest Serv.,189 F.3d 851, 858 n. 4 (9th Cir.

1999) (Petitioner waives argument by failing to raise it in the opening brief and cannot raise

argument for the first time in the reply brief).

Magistrate Judge Irwin noted that Petitioner is both precluded and time-barred from

returning to state court. (Doc. 36 at 15–16). Petitioner does not object to this conclusion,

except as it pertains to his objections regarding the July 25, 2005 letter, which would provide

an exception to default were it to be found to be “new evidence.” (Doc. 37). This objection

will be discussed below.

B. Petitioner’s Objections - The July 26, 2005 letter and New Evidence

Petitioner raises three objections to the R & R, all relating to the July 26, 2005 letter.

(Doc. 37).

1. Date of the Letter

First, Petitioner notes that Magistrate Judge Irwin refers to the letter as a “July 25,

2006” letter, and thereby suggests that it was written after Petitioner’s June 8 resentencing.

Petitioner claims that Magistrate Judge Irwin’s analysis—that the letter from the ADOC

cannot revise the judge’s June 8 sentence—misconstrues Petitioner’s argument. Instead,

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 According to the record, Petitioner’s Wisconsin conviction was in fact vacated on

March 11, 2005. (Doc. 17-3, Ex. P)

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Petitioner claims that the letter demonstrates that he was serving his Arizona sentence in

Wisconsin while he was awaiting his new trial after the first sentence was vacated. Since he

was serving his Arizona sentence, he could not post a bond to be free on bail in Wisconsin

while awaiting his second trial. Petitioner claims that when the Arizona court denied him

Arizona credit for the time served, it violated his rights under the Due Process and Double

Jeopardy clauses.

Petitioner is correct that Magistrate Judge Irwin’s description of the letter relies on an

apparent mistake regarding its date, although elsewhere in the R & R the letter is properly

identified as dated July 26, 2005. (Doc. 36 at 4). The section to which Petitioner objects is

the discussion of whether the letter qualifies as “newly discovered evidence” under Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.1, and thereby excuses procedural default in state court. Magistrate Judge Irwin’s

discussion of the letter as though it post-dated the June 8, 2006 sentencing will not be

referenced when that substantive issue is discussed below.

2. Vacated Sentence

Next, Petitioner argues that Magistrate Judge Irwin did not know that Petitioner’s first

Wisconsin sentence was vacated in January of 2005.8

 (Doc. 37 at 4). Petitioner argues that

because his first Wisconsin conviction was vacated, he was serving only his Arizona

sentence between March 11, 2005 and November 16, 2005, giving him “legitimate

expectations” regarding the length of his incarceration. U.S. v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,

137 (1980). Had Magistrate Judge Irwin not known that Petitioner’s first Wisconsin sentence

was vacated, it may have in fact been relevant to the analysis. The R & R states, however,

that “[i]n the midst of Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding, his conviction in the Wisconsin

prosecution was vacated, and a new trial ordered.” (Doc. 36 at 3). It is clear that Magistrate

Judge Irwin was aware of the fact that Petitioner’s sentence was vacated. Petitioner’s claim

that the R & R does not acknowledge that his original Wisconsin sentence was vacated is

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without merit.

3. Newly Discovered Evidence

Petitioner claims that the fact that the letter from the ADOC was not produced until

September of 2010 qualifies it as “newly discovered evidence” under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1,

and thereby excuses his procedural default in state court. The letter, sent from the Arizona

Department of Corrections to the Marathon County Sheriff’s Department on July 26, 2005

is a codification of the sentence imposed for Petitioner’s parole violation in December of

2003, sent after Petitioner’s Wisconsin sentence had been vacated. (Doc. 23-1, Ex. A).

Magistrate Judge Irwin states that the letter does not provide cause to excuse Petitioner’s

procedural default. (Doc. 36 at 18). In his analysis as to whether the letter provides Petitioner

the right to return to state court and pursue an otherwise untimely petition under Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.1, however, Magistrate Judge Irwin describes the impact the letter would have

had if it had been issued after Petitioner’s June 8, 2006 sentence. (Doc. 36 at 16).

As it stands, the letter is the only evidence in the record that the State of Arizona

actively asserted custody of Petitioner under his Arizona sentence while he was incarcerated

in Wisconsin after his first sentence was vacated and before his second trial. According to

Petitioner, the letter demonstrates that he was serving an Arizona sentence during period he

was incarcerated in Wisconsin after his first sentence was vacated and before his second was

imposed. He claims that he was prevented from posting bond prior to his second trial only

because of the Arizona Department of Corrections. It is possible that the Arizona state courts

may consider the letter to be “newly discovered” evidence sufficient to excuse an untimely

filing under Rule 32.1(d). Petitioner claims that he “asked every appealate [sic] attorney and

checked every file for this letter from the ADOC and none of us could find it,” and that he

“wrote to the ADOC Records department myself, but I never received an answer from them.”

(Doc. 37 at 6). Therefore, although Petitioner’s claims are not exhausted, this Court cannot

determine whether claims that depend on the July 26, 2005 letter are truly procedurally

defaulted, because if the state courts were to grant him the opportunity to bring the claim

under Rule 32.1, he could exhaust it at some point in the future.

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Claim One and Claim Two relate to Petitioner’s June 8, 2006 sentencing, which took

place after the second Wisconsin conviction. Even if the letter were to qualify as newly

discovered evidence, it would have no bearing on these claims, which are procedurally

defaulted. Claim Four and Claim Five are state law claims; the fact that Petitioner states that

the violations of state law constituted a violation of due process does not convert them into

federal claims. Only Claim Three and Claim Six, which involve the incarceration during the

time he would otherwise have been free in Wisconsin, rely upon the letter, and therefore only

these two claims may not be procedurally defaulted.

Rather than stay these claims while Petitioner returns to state court to exhaust them,

however, the Court will deny them on their merits. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 183

(“AEDPA gives a district court the alternative of simply denying a petition containing

unexhausted but nonmeritorious claims.”). Petitioner claims that from March 11, 2005, until

November 16, 2005, he was incarcerated solely at the behest of ADOC; had Arizona not held

a detainer on him, he could have posted a bond and been free from incarceration prior to his

sentencing on November 16. Petitioner is correct. He further states that because he had been

told at his first Arizona sentencing that he was receiving Arizona credit based on his

Wisconsin incarceration, he had a “legitimate expectation” that any new sentence imposed

after his appeal would start on the same date. (Doc. 37 at 10). Here he is not correct, because

a defendant’s “legitimate expectations are not defeated if his sentence is increased on appeal

any more than are the expectations of the defendant who is placed on parole or probation that

is later revoked.” DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 137. As the Supreme Court has noted, after a

defendant successfully appeals a sentence, there is “no absolute constitutional bar to the

imposition of a more severe sentence on reconviction.” DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135 (citing

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)). Petitioner’s Arizona sentence for the parole

violation was adjusted only after he filed a PCR claiming the original sentence based on the

parole violation was unconstitutional. Although he did not get credit for the 1,061 days his

original sentence had given him credit for, his sentence was reduced by five years, resulting

on balance in an earlier release date than he would have received without the appeal.

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Denying Petitioner credit for the extra days was not an oversight—the trial court considered

the question, heard arguments from both parties, determined that the original decision had

been incorrect under state law, and corrected the error on resentencing. (Doc. 17-3, Ex. H at

21). “The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong

move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.” DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135 (1980)

(quoting Bozza v. U.S., 330 U.S. 160, 166–67 (1947). Whether the court was correct as a

matter of state law is not cognizable in habeas review; in any event the decision did not result

in a constitutional error.

Nor does Petitioner articulate a constitutional violation regarding the seven months

he spent incarcerated between the time his sentence was vacated and the time he was

resentenced in Wisconsin. Had the state of Arizona credited him with this time, the state of

Wisconsin would have been within its rights not to credit him. As a result, his eventual

release date would have been the same. Had the state of Arizona sought no interest in him

during this time, and he had posted bond before his second sentencing, Wisconsin certainly

would not have given him credit for his incarceration, and his eventual release date would

have been seven months later. In any event, on the date of his actual resentencing, June 8,

2006, the Arizona court was aware that he had been incarcerated in Wisconsin, that the

Wisconsin court had granted him credit for his time, and that Arizona law required that his

sentence for the probation violation be consecutive to his Wisconsin sentence. (Doc. 17-3,

Ex X at 14–21). As noted above, Petitioner could have been given a sentence longer than his

original sentence; the fact that his sentence was not reduced as much as he had expected it

to be does not violate the constitution. The state court did not issue a decision that was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” clearly established law. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 391.

C. Certificate of Appealability

A Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) will issue when counts are dismissed on

procedural grounds so long as “reasonable jurists could debate” whether the decision is

correct. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When a decision issues on the merits,

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a COA will issue when “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. There is no debate that Claims One, Two,

Four, and Five were not exhausted and have been procedurally defaulted. Jurists would not

find it “debatable or wrong” that Claims Three and Six should be dismissed on the merits.

No COA will issue. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED

1. Magistrate Judge Irwin’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 36) is accepted

in part and denied in part.

2. Count One, Count Two, Count Four, and Count Five are dismissed with

prejudice because they have not been exhausted, and Petitioner is procedurally defaulted

from bringing them in state court.

3. Count Three and Count Six are dismissed with prejudice on the merits.

4. Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, no COA

will be issued.

DATED this 19th day of March, 2012.

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