Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02814/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02814-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Vincent Brandon,

Plaintiff,

v.

L. Carmichael et al.,

 Defendants. 

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Civil No. 15cv2814 WQH (PCL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

Plaintiff Vincent Brandon, a prison inmate currently housed at Calipatria State Prison, filed a

civil rights action for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the denial of

medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment,

and under California Law. (Doc. 1, at 1-2.) Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state any viable claims for relief. (Doc. 20.)

This Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ motion to dismiss is submitted to United

States District Judge William Q. Hayes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

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I. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Vincent Brown, an inmate at Calipatria State Prison, is suing prison officials there for

alleged violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of treatment Plaintiff received at

Calipatria for his hepatitis-C infection, which was diagnosed at Ironwood State Prison in 2013. (Doc. 1,

at 4.) Plaintiff states that he was placed under the care of Defendant Dr. Estock, who sent Plaintiff for

laboratory testing of his liver and ultrasound of his abdomen area. (Doc. 1, at 4.) Based on the results,

Defendant Estock referred Plaintiff to a specialist, Hepatologist Dr. Alexander Shpaner, for two

consultations via video. (Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff states that Dr. Shpaner gave a detailed evaluation of

Plaintiff’s case in writing, where he concluded that although he would not normally recommend

treatment to a person with stage 1 fibrosis, he found Plaintiff’s case quite different and recommended

treatment to start immediately to prevent cirrhosis of the liver. (Doc. 1, at 5-6.) Plaintiff states that Dr.

Shpaner would prescribe Sovaldi daily, Pegasys, injected weekly, and Ribavirin twice a day for a 12-

week duration. (Doc. 1, at 6.) Dr. Shpaner’s recommendation was sent to Defendant Dr. Estock, who

then commented that Dr. Shapner “has a propensity to overexaggerate” and that CDCR reserves the type

of medical treatment suggested by Dr. Shpaner for those with liver disease at stages three and four due

to the high cost of the medications. (Doc. 1, at 6.) Dr. Shpaner’s recommendation was sent to the

California Correctional Health Care Services’ central Oversight Committee, headed by Defendant L.

Carmichael, which denied Plaintiff the treatment suggested by Dr. Shpaner. (Doc. 1, at 6-7.) Plaintiff

filed a series of 602 appeals with Defendants David Hjerpe, Dr. Ball, Kevin Reilly, and J. Lewis to

reverse the denial of treatment, to no avail. (Doc. 1, at 7-8.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Carmichael, Estock, Hjerpe, Reilly, Ball, and Lewis all violated

Plaintiff’s rights “by intentionally interfering with treatment once prescribed” in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 9.) Plaintiff also claims that all Defendants committed the tort of negligence

under California state law, violated Plaintiff’s Due Process rights, and violated Plaintiff’s Equal

Protection rights. (Doc. 1, at 9-10.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that all Defendants violated his First

Amendment rights when they stopped monitoring Plaintiff’s chronic care condition in retaliation for his

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filing the 602 appeals. (Doc. 1, at 10.) Plaintiff requests injunctive relief as well as compensatory and

punitive damages. (Doc. 1, at 10-11.) 

II. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a section 1983 Complaint, listing six

Defendants and five causes of action as described above. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff also filed an “Order to Show

Cause for a Preliminary Injunction,” which the Court construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction.

(Doc. 18.) Thereafter, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for

failure to state any claim for relief. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss. (Doc.

23.) For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

III. 

DISCUSSION

 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) expressly enumerates a list of six defenses that can be asserted in a motion

to dismiss, including for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6). Under 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable legal theory or

for failure to state sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9th Cir. 2001). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must assume the truth of all

factual allegations and construe them in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v.

Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). The court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint,

documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters

of which the court takes judicial notice. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9thCir. 2003). However,

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Also, “when the allegations of the

complaint are refuted by an attached document, the Court need not accept the allegations as being true.” 

Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, “[i]f the pleadings

establish facts compelling a decision one way, that is as good as if depositions and other expensively

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obtained evidence on summary judgment establishes the identical facts.” Weisbuch v. County of Los

Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). 

A. Plaintiff Has Stated an Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim Against Defendants.

In order to state a section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate medical care,

plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To prevail, plaintiff must show that

both his medical needs were objectively serious, and that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1991). 

A physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate the inmate’s Eighth

Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A failure to

competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is prescribed, may constitute

deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id. However, mere differences of medical opinion concerning the appropriate treatment cannot be the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation. Jackson v.

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). The “more serious the medical needs of the prisoner, and the

more unwarranted the defendant’s actions in light of those needs, the more likely it is that a plaintiff has

established ‘deliberate indifference’ on the part of the defendant.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

1061 (9th Cir.1992). Superimposed on these Eighth Amendment standards is the fact that in cases

involving complex medical issues where plaintiff contests the type of treatment he received, expert

opinion will almost always be necessary to establish the necessary level of deliberate indifference.

Shaver v. Runnels, 2005 WL 1837131, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2005). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Carmichael, Estock, Hjerpe, Reilly, Ball, and Lewis all

violated Plaintiff’s rights “by intentionally interfering with treatment once prescribed” in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 9.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff “has not suffered any harm, other

than his general speculation that his general medical condition could eventually lead to harm.” (Doc. 20-

1, at 12.) However, Plaintiff has alleged that one physician has recommended that Plaintiff start an

expensive medical treatment to avoid cirrhosis of his liver and that Defendants have refused to fulfill the

doctor’s prescription. Cases such as this involving complex medical issues where Plaintiff contests the

type of treatment he should receive requires expert opinion to establish if there was deliberate indiffer4 15cv2814 WQH (PCL)

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ence to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. See Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th

Cir. 1988). As noted, the court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true on this motion to dismiss and

construe them in light most favorable to Plaintiff, resolving all doubts in his favor. Therefore, the court

will recommend denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. 

B. Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim against Defendants under California Law. 

California Government Code § 845.6 provides, in relevant part:

Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the

failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, ... a

public employee ... is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in

need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical

care. 

To state a claim under § 845.6, a prisoner must establish the following: “(1) the public employee

knew or had reason to know of the need (2) for immediate medical care, and (3) failed to reasonably

summon such care. ‘Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions

requiring immediate care.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 

Again, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff’s negligence claim is based upon Defendants’

alleged denial of medical care to Plaintiff for a chronic condition and is not a serious need requiring

immediate medical care as defined by § 845.6, his California tort claim should be dismissed. However,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim under California law because Plaintiff basically alleges

that he is in immediate need of the treatment recommended by Dr. Shpaner. It would be up to Plaintiff to

prove such a claim with expert opinion and, in turn, for the Court to later decide whether Plaintiff’s

claim falls under the wording of the California Government Code § 845.6 . Thus, the Court does not

recommend dismissing Plaintiff’s California Law claim against Defendants. 

C. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claims against Defendants Should Be Dismissed.

Although “‘certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more

than one of the Constitution’s commands,’” Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted), the Supreme Court has held that where a claim can be analyzed under “an explicit

textual source” of rights in the Constitution, a court may not also assess the claim under another, “more

generalized” source. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989); see Chrisman v. Smith, 2010 WL

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503043, *7 (S.D. California February 5, 2010) (ruling that the court must evaluate the plaintiff’s claims

under the standards applicable to the Eighth Amendment and not under the Due Process clause). 

In this case, the Eighth Amendment provides specific limits on the type of government conduct

complained of by Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim should be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment

and not under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process provisions. Accordingly, it is

recommended that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

claims as to all Defendants be granted. 

D. Plaintiff Fails to State an Equal Protection Claim against all Defendants. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants’ actions denying him medical treatment which is given to

those with liver disease in the later stages violated his right to fair and equal treatment under the Equal

Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

“‘The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every

person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’”

Sioux city Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) (citation omitted); Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Conclusory allegations of discrimination are

insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, unless the plaintiff alleges facts which may prove

invidious discriminatory intent. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development

Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977). The plaintiff must plead facts to show that the defendant “acted in

a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.” FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465,

471 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). “‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as

volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected or

reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse

effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279

(1979) (citations omitted). Identifiable groups that are protected by the Equal Protection Clause include

those grouped by race, religion, and national origin. Damiano v. Florida and Probation Com’n, 785 F.2d

929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1986). For example, “[p]risoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause

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of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s status as having stage 1 hepatitis C does not place him in a suspect class.

In fact, Plaintiff alleges that, as a stage 1 hepatitis inmate, he is being treated exactly the same as all the

other inmates who have stage 1 hepatitis and is likewise not permitted to take medications reserved for

those who are suffering in the later stages of the disease. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that he is a

member of a protected class or facts that would allow the Court to infer discriminatory intent. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause must be dismissed. 

E. Plaintiff Fails to State a First Amendment Retaliation Claim.

Prison inmates have a First Amendment right to be free from retaliation by prison officials for

engaging in protected speech. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). Protected speech

includes submitting grievances regarding prison conditions. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th

Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A viable First Amendment retaliation claim entails five basic elements:

(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Id. at 567-68.

The inmate bears the burden of setting forth facts that satisfy each and every element necessary for a

prima facie case of retaliation, including that his rights were chilled and the absence of legitimate

correctional goals for the conduct about which he complains. Id. at 569. 

Here, Plaintiff’s retaliation allegations fail to show that his rights were chilled. This is the

entirety of Plaintiff’s retaliation allegations: “The plaintiff is a chronic care inmate, whose health is to be

continually monitored, and in retaliation to the plaintiff filing a 602 health care appeal the defendants

have failed to monitor the progress of this potentially deadly disease.” (Doc. 1, at 8.) As Plaintiff fails to

adequately plead that the retaliatory conduct alleged had a chilling effect upon him, Plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim must be dismissed. 

///

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IV. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court RECOMMENDS denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims and California law claims. The Court also RECOMMENDS that

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Due Process, Equal Protection, and First Amendment claims

against all Defendants be GRANTED. 

IT IS ORDERED that, no later than November 10, 2016, the parties may file written objections

to this Report and Recommendation. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be filed on or before November 18, 2016. The

parties are advised that failure to file either of these documents within the specified time periods may

waive the right to raise objections to the magistrate judge’s findings of fact. See Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DATED: October 28, 2016

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court 

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