Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00684/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00684-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony James Merrick, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-15-00684-PHX-SPL (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 On May 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement the pleadings pursuant to 

Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 52.) On June 15, 2016, 

Defendants filed a response in opposition to that motion. (Doc. 63.) Plaintiff has not 

filed a reply and the time to do so has passed. See LRCiv 7.2(d). For the reasons below, 

the Court recommends that the motion to supplement the pleadings be denied. 

I. Background

 Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 24, 

2015, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 14.) The Court screened the 

Second Amended Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), and found that Plaintiff 

stated Eighth Amendment medical-treatment claims against Corizon in Count One, Ryan 

in Count Two, and Dr. Barcklay in Count Five. (Doc. 18 at 8-9.) The Court dismissed 

the retaliation claim against Dr. Barcklay in Count Six.1

 (Id. at 8.) In Count Six, Plaintiff 

 

1

 The Court also dismissed Counts Three, Four, Seven, and Eight for failure to state a claim, and dismissed Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim in Count One. 

(Doc. 18 at 7, 10.) 

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alleged that Dr. Barcklay falsified his medical records in retaliation for Plaintiff’s failure 

to compliment her hair. (Doc. 14 at 16.) The Court found that Plaintiff did not 

adequately link the alleged falsification of medical records with the alleged confrontation 

between Plaintiff and Dr. Barcklay. The Court also found that Plaintiff failed to show 

that he suffered more than minimal harm or that Dr. Barcklay’s actions chilled his 

exercise of his First Amendment rights. (Doc. 18 at 8.) 

II. Motion to Supplement the Pleadings 

 On May 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed the pending motion to supplement pursuant to 

Rule 15(d) and a proposed supplemental pleading. (Docs. 52, 53.) Plaintiff asserts that 

his Second Amended Complaint alleges events that occurred prior to January 2016, but 

he intended to allege continuing violations. (Id. at 2.) He seeks to supplement the 

pleadings with transactions, occurrences, and events that happened after he filed his 

Second Amended Complaint. (Id.) 

 In his proposed supplemental pleading, Plaintiff adds factual allegations to Counts 

One, Two, Five, and Six. (Doc. 53.) Plaintiff alleges that on January 11, 2016, he 

submitted a Health Needs Request (HNR) complaining of a cluster headache. (Id. at 1.) 

On January 15, 2016, a nurse practitioner prescribed Plaintiff Excedrin for fifteen days 

and instructed him to notify medical if his headaches persisted so medical staff could 

order Imitrex. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff also alleges that between January 28 and February 

26, 2016, he submitted several HNRs complaining that Excedrin did not help and he was 

still suffering from headaches. (Id. at 2.) Between February 18 and March 25, 2016, 

Plaintiff allegedly submitted four complaints to medical for not being seen, evaluated, or 

treated for his headaches and spinal pain. (Id.) Medical staff responded to the HNRs and 

complaints by informing Plaintiff that he was scheduled to be seen by medical. (Id.) 

 On April 8, 2016, Plaintiff saw Dr. Barcklay for his headaches and spine pain. 

(Id.) She instructed Plaintiff to notify correctional staff immediately of any further spinal 

injuries and they would schedule an emergency appointment for Plaintiff to see 

Dr. Barcklay on the day of the injury. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Dr. Barcklay ordered 

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“standard treatments” for the migraine headaches, including Imitrex. (Doc. 53 at 2.) 

Plaintiff states that he no longer had cluster headaches. (Id.) Dr. Barcklay also gave 

Plaintiff a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) for his spine. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff further alleges that on April 24, 2016, he suffered “at least one herniated 

disc in his lower back.” (Id. at 3.) On April 25, 2016, he notified correctional staff and 

Nurse Millard treated him after she consulted a Nurse Practitioner, because Dr. Barcklay 

did not answer her phone. (Id.) Nurse Millard issued a Special Needs Order (SNO) for 

medical ice for seventy-two hours and a lay-in for thirty days and “requested an urgent 

provider visit.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Dr. Barcklay rescinded the SNO on April 26, 2016 

and told a correctional officer that she did not care about Plaintiff’s pain. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges that he “then complained of an emergency and requested to be seen by medical,” 

and a correctional officer told him that Dr. Barcklay stated he would be seen in a couple 

hours by “Dr. Suit.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts there is no Dr. Suit at the facility where he is 

housed, and he believes this was a reference to this lawsuit, and that Dr. Barcklay 

rescinded the SNO in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a lawsuit against her. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that, as of May 5, 2016, he had not been seen, evaluated, or 

treated for his herniated discs. (Id.) He contends his herniated discs have not healed, and 

he has been unable to complete activities of daily living and has been in great pain. (Id.

at 4.) 

 A. Rule 15(d) Standard to Supplement Pleadings

 Rule 15(d) provides that the court may “permit a party to serve a supplemental 

pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of 

the pleading to be supplemented. The court may permit supplementation even though the 

original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The 

court has broad discretion in deciding whether to permit a plaintiff to supplement a 

pleading. Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988). “The rule is a tool of 

judicial economy and convenience.” Id. “While leave to permit supplemental pleading is 

favored . . . , it cannot be used to introduce ‘a separate, distinct and new cause of action.’” 

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Planned Parenthood v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Berssenbrugge 

v. Luce Mfg. Co., 30 F. Supp. 101, 102 (D. Mo. 1939)) ; but see Eid v. Alaska Airlines, 

Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 874 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that “Rule 15(d) provides a mechanism 

for parties to file additional causes of action based on facts that didn’t exist when the 

original complaint was filed.”). 

 When determining whether to allow supplementation under Rule 15(d), courts use 

the standard used to evaluate a motion to amend under Rule 15(a). Torres v. Ryan, 2013 

WL 4026870, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 7, 2013). Thus, a court should grant leave to 

supplement “unless there is undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 

movant, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or the supplement would be futile.” Id.

(quotation omitted). Futility alone can justify denial of a motion to supplement. Id.

(citing Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement Should be Denied

 Defendants argue that the motion to supplement should be denied because it would 

unduly prejudice Defendants by delaying resolution of this matter and would be futile. 

(Doc. 63.) 

 1. Prejudice and Delay 

 As Defendants note, the deadline for amending pleadings was February 29, 2016. 

(Doc. 31 at 1.) The deadline for serving discovery requests was May 28, 2016. 

(Docs. 31, 48.) Because discovery is now closed, Defendants would be unable to 

investigate Plaintiff’s new allegations. Additionally, this case has been pending since 

2015 and extending the discovery deadlines at this late date would delay resolution of this 

matter. Accordingly, delay and prejudice to Defendants weigh against permitting 

Plaintiff to supplement the Second Amended Complaint. 

 2. Futility 

 Defendants also argue that the motion to supplement should be denied as futile 

because Plaintiff’s supplemental allegations fail to state a claim. (Doc. 63 at 7.) 

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 a. Defendant Ryan 

 The proposed supplemental pleading does not make any specific allegations 

against Defendant Ryan. (See Doc. 53.) Therefore, none of the proposed allegations 

state a claim against Defendant Ryan. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) 

(holding that allegations of personal participation are required to state a § 1983 claim). 

 b. Defendant Corizon 

 The supplemental pleading alleges that in January, February, and on April 1, 2016, 

Plaintiff submitted HNRs to Corizon complaining of pain in his spine and requesting 

treatment.2

 (Doc. 53 at 1.) Plaintiff also alleges that on January 11, 2016, he submitted 

an HNR to Corizon complaining of a cluster headache and requesting treatment. (Id.) 

Plaintiff states that he saw a nurse practitioner on January 15, 2016 and was given 

Excedrin for his headaches. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff asserts that between February 18, 2016 

and March 25, 2016, he submitted four complaints to Corizon about not being seen or 

treated for his headaches or spine pain. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that “medical staff” 

responded to the HNRs and complaints and stated that Plaintiff was scheduled to be seen. 

(Id.) Plaintiff saw Dr. Barcklay for his headaches and spine pain on April 8, 2016. (Id.) 

Defendant Barcklay gave Plaintiff “standard treatment” for his headaches and a NSAID 

for his spine. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff’s allegations against Corizon could be construed as asserting a claim of 

deliberate indifference based on the delay in seeing Dr. Barcklay about his headaches and 

spine pain. To the extent Plaintiff alleges Corizon is responsible for any acts or 

omissions of the medical staff, these are allegations of respondeat superior liability that 

fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 

(1978) (stating that to bring a § 1983 claim against a municipality or private entity 

 

2

 Defendants assert that the supplemental pleading does not include any allegations against Corizon. (Doc. 63 at 7.) Upon review of the supplemental pleading, the Court finds that it makes several allegations that pertain to Defendant Corizon. (Doc. 53.) 

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performing a government function, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official 

policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains). 

 Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege how the alleged delay in treatment caused 

him any harm, let alone the “substantial harm” required to state a claim of deliberate 

indifference based on a delay in receiving medical care. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 

F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that for delay in treatment to constitute an Eighth 

Amendment violation, “the delay must have caused substantial harm.”). Therefore, 

Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant Corizon. 

 c. Defendant Barcklay 

 Plaintiff’s supplemental pleading also fails to state a claim against Dr. Barcklay. 

In his proposed supplemental pleading, Plaintiff alleges that he complained of cluster 

headaches on January 11, 2016 and saw a nurse practitioner and was given Excedrin on 

January 15, 2016. (Doc. 53 at 1-2.) He alleges that in February and March 2016 he 

wrote medical several HNRS and complaints stating that the Excedrin was not working. 

(Id. at 2.) On April 8, 2016, he saw Dr. Barcklay for headaches and spine pain. (Id. at 2.) 

 To the extent Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference due to the delay in seeing 

Dr. Barcklay, he fails to state a claim. There is no indication that Dr. Barcklay knew 

about or had anything to do with any delay, and thus she had no personal participation or 

subjective knowledge of a risk of harm. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff also fails to 

allege how the alleged delay caused him any harm, and therefore does not allege the 

“substantial harm” required to state a claim for deliberate indifference based upon a delay 

in receiving medical treatment. See Wood, 900 F.2d at 1335. 

 Plaintiff further alleges that at an April 8, 2016 appointment, Dr. Barcklay 

instructed him to immediately notify correctional staff of any further spinal injuries and 

they would schedule an emergency appointment with her that same day. (Doc. 53 at 2.) 

He alleges Dr. Barcklay “ordered standard treatments for the migraine headaches” and 

gave him a NSAID for his spine and Imitrex for migraines. (Id.) These allegations do 

not state a claim that Dr. Barcklay was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious 

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medical needs. Rather, these allegations indicate that on April 8, 2016, Dr. Barcklay 

provided medical treatment for Plaintiff’s headaches and spinal pain, and instructed him 

to notify correctional officers of any further spinal injuries so she could see and treat him 

immediately. These allegations fail to state a claim because they allege that Dr. Barcklay 

addressed Plaintiff’s medical issues. See Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Plaintiff also alleges he suffered a herniated disc on April 24, 2016, and notified 

correctional staff of that injury the next day. (Doc. 53 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges he was 

“seen, evaluated and treated” by Nurse Millard after she consulted with a nurse 

practitioner because Dr. Barcklay did not answer her phone. (Id.) To the extent Plaintiff 

alleges Dr. Barcklay was deliberately indifferent for failing to answer her phone, he fails 

to state a claim. Deliberate indifference requires subjective knowledge of a risk of harm 

and disregard of that risk. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. If Dr. Barcklay did not answer 

her phone, she could not have been aware of any risk of harm to Plaintiff and, therefore, 

could not have ignored the risk. Accordingly, these allegations do not state an Eighth 

Amendment claim of deliberate indifference. Moreover, Plaintiff admits he was “seen, 

evaluated and treated,” and therefore, does not allege that he suffered any harm from this 

incident. 

 Plaintiff further alleges Nurse Millard issued an SNO for medical ice and a thirtyday lay-in, but Dr. Barcklay rescinded the SNO. (Doc. 53 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges he 

complained of an emergency and requested to be seen by medical, and a correctional 

officer stated that Dr. Barcklay said that he would be seen in a few hours by Dr. Suit. 

Plaintiff alleges there is no Dr. Suit, and he believes this was a reference to this lawsuit, 

and that Dr. Barcklay rescinded the SNO as retaliation for him filing complaints and this 

lawsuit against her. (Id.) 

 To the extent Plaintiff alleges Dr. Barcklay was deliberately indifferent for 

rescinding the SNO, he fails to state a claim. Defendant Barcklay may have rescinded 

the SNO based on her different medical opinion about the course of treatment. “A 

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difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner — or between medical 

professionals — concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to 

deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled 

in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); see 

also Ramirez v. Bartos, 2007 WL 2725246, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2007) (finding that 

a nurse’s modification of an SNO was “nothing more than a difference of medical 

opinion”). 

 Rather, “[t]o show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff ‘must show that the course 

of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances’ and 

that the defendants ‘chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to 

plaintiff’s health.’” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (quoting Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 

332 (9th Cir. 1996)). The supplemental pleading alleges that Defendant Barcklay did not 

“care about [Plaintiff’s] pain,” but does not allege that she acted with conscious disregard 

of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. (Doc. 53 at 3.) Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state 

a claim of deliberate indifference based on Defendant Barcklay rescinding the SNO. 

 Plaintiff also asserts a retaliation claim based on his allegations that Dr. Barcklay 

rescinded the SNO. (Doc. 53 at 3.) He argues the she rescinded the SNO in retaliation 

for Plaintiff filing complaints and a lawsuit against her. (Id.) Defendants argue that the 

Court should not permit Plaintiff to allege a new cause of action in the supplemental 

pleading. (Doc. 63 at 9.) The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s proposed retaliation 

claim that was based on different facts. (See Doc. 18 at 8.) Thus, the proposed claim of 

retaliation under the First Amendment is a new cause of action. However, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that supplemental pleading “cannot be used to introduce a separate, 

distinct and new cause of action.” Planned Parenthood, 130 F.3d at 402; see also 

Calloway v. Adams, 624 F. App’x 605, 606 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiff’s claims to the extent he sought to add 

new parties and new claims arising out of events “unrelated to the claims upon which he 

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was granted leave to proceed”) (citing Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 

(9th Cir. 1990)). 

 The Court screened the Second Amended Complaint and only permitted Plaintiff 

to proceed on his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims. Therefore, Plaintiff 

should not be permitted to supplement the Second Amended Complaint to add a First 

Amendment retaliation claim, which would be a “separate, distinct and new cause of 

action.” See id. Additionally, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is speculative because it is 

based on his belief that Dr. Barcklay was referring to this lawsuit when a correctional 

officer told Petitioner that Dr. Barcklay stated Plaintiff would be seen by Dr. Suit. 

(Doc. 53 at 3.) These allegations fail to state a claim because they do not rise above the 

speculative level. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that 

“the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above 

a speculative level”). 

 Plaintiff also fails to allege that Dr. Barcklay’s actions chilled his exercise of his 

First Amendment rights. See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(holding that a plaintiff alleging retaliation must allege, inter alia, a causal connection 

between the adverse action and the protected conduct and that the “official’s acts would 

chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities”). 

Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that Dr. Barcklay saw him on April 8, 2016 — after he 

filed his lawsuit against her — and ordered “standard treatments” for his headaches and 

spinal pain. (Doc. 53 at 2.) Thus, there is no evidence that Dr. Barcklay retaliated 

against Plaintiff at that time. Plaintiff has not shown a causal connection between the 

filing of this action against Dr. Barcklay and her rescinding an SNO on April 26, 2016, 

just weeks after she provided care for Plaintiff. Considering that Dr. Barcklay provided 

medical care for Plaintiff after he filed this lawsuit, there does not appear to be a 

plausible connection between the lawsuit and Dr. Barcklay rescinding the SNO. 

/ / / 

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 d. Allegations about Herniated Disc 

 The supplemental pleading further alleges that as of May 5, 2016, Plaintiff had not 

been evaluated or treated for his herniated disc. (Doc. 53 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that on 

February 9 and April 29, 2016, he received passes for medical appointments, but they 

were cancelled by medical. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that his herniated disc has not been 

treated and he has been “unable to do daily life activities and been in great pain.” (Id. at 

3-4.) These allegations are not directed against a particular defendant and, therefore, fail 

to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 

934 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “for a person acting under color of state law to be liable 

under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights 

deprivation; there is no respondeat superior liablity.”). 

 Plaintiff generally asserts that he “wrote” Defendants’ attorneys, Defendant 

Corizon, and Defendant Ryan about “these matters.” (Doc. 53 at 4.) However, Plaintiff 

does not state when he allegedly wrote to the attorneys or parties, or identify the 

particular matters he allegedly wrote about. (Id.) These conclusory allegations fail to 

state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80. 

III. Conclusion 

 The Court recommends that the motion to supplement be denied because 

permitting Plaintiff to supplement his pleadings at this point in the proceeding would 

delay resolution of this matter and prejudice Defendants because the discovery deadlines 

have passed. Additionally, the Court recommends that the motion to supplement be 

denied because Plaintiff’s supplemental allegations fail to state a claim. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Pleadings 

(Doc. 52) be denied. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rule of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

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judgment. The parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 8th day of July, 2016. 

 

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