Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00923/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00923-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

KEVIN C. BYRD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:10cv923-CSC

) (WO)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This is the plaintiff’s second case before this court. Byrd filed applications for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on August 11, 2005, alleging

disability since July 1, 2005. (R. 182). After an unfavorable administrative decision, he had

a hearing before an ALJ who rendered an unfavorable decision on June 27, 2007. After the

Appeals Council denied review, Byrd appealed to this court which remanded the case to the

Commissioner on November 10, 2008. Byrd v. Astrue, Civ. Act. No. 2:08cv67-SRW (M.D.

Ala. 2009). Following the Appeals Council’s remand of the case, an ALJ held a hearing and

issued an unfavorable decision on November 25, 2009. The Appeals Council subsequently

denied Byrd’s request for review. The ALJ’s decision consequentlybecame the final decision

Case 2:10-cv-00923-CSC Document 15 Filed 01/12/12 Page 1 of 8
of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1

129, 131 (11 Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. th

§§ 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to

entry of final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge. Based on the court's review

of the record in this case and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the decision

of the Commissioner should be affirmed.

II. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months...

To make this determination the Commissioner employs a five step, sequential

2

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person's impairment severe?

(3) Does the person's impairment meet or equal one of the specific

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. 1

No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

A "physical or mental impairment" is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or

2

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.

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Case 2:10-cv-00923-CSC Document 15 Filed 01/12/12 Page 2 of 8
An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of "not

disabled."

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11 Cir. 1986). th 3

The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court

must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ingram v. Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11 Cir. th

2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11 Cir. 2004). A reviewing court may not look only to those th

parts of the record which supports the decision of the ALJ but instead must view the record

in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the

ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11 Cir. 1986). The court “may not decide th

the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute . . . [its] judgment for that of the

[Commissioner].” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n. 8 (11 Cir. 2004) (alteration th

in original) (quotation marks omitted).

[The court must, however,] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine

the reasonableness of the [Commissioner's] . . . factual findings . . . No similar

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11 Cir. 1986) is a supplemental security income case

3 th

(SSI). The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are

appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See e.g. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5 Cir.

th

1981) (Unit A).

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Case 2:10-cv-00923-CSC Document 15 Filed 01/12/12 Page 3 of 8
presumption of validityattaches to the [Commissioner's] . . . legal conclusions,

including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating

claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11 Cir. 1987). th

III. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction. The plaintiff was 38 years old at the time of the second hearing

before the ALJ. (R. 272). He completed the 11 grade. (R. 157). The plaintiff’s prior work th

experience includes work as welder. (R. 158, 188). Following the administrative hearing,

the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff has severe impairments of “historyof grand mal seizures,

hypertension, alcoholic pancreatitis, status post splenectomy and mulitple substance abuse.” 

(R. 184). The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work,

but, using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 2, as a

framework and relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, he also concluded that there

were significant number of jobs in the national economy that the plaintiff could perform. (R.

188-89). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 189). 

B. The Plaintiff’s Claim. As stated by the plaintiff, the sole issue before the court

is “[t]he Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ failed to consider the

effects of Mr. Byrd’s medications on his ability to work.” (Pl’s Br. at 10, doc. 12). It is to

this issue that the court now turns.

Byrd argues that this matter must be remanded so the ALJ can consider whether the

side effects of his medications about which he testified to at his administrative hearing impair

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Case 2:10-cv-00923-CSC Document 15 Filed 01/12/12 Page 4 of 8
his ability to work. (Pl’s Br. at 10, doc. # 12). At his second administrative hearing, Byrd

testified that his medication makes him “kind of drowsy,” (R. 274, 277) and that he “can’t

hardly stay awake.” (R. 277). Byrd and his attorney engaged in the following colloquy.

Q: Pretend that I could snap my fingers, Kevin, and make your seizure

disorder go away forever, but you would still have to take your present

medication, would the medications themselves keep you fromworking?

A: Yes, because I would be drowsy, like that just a few minutes ago, I was

sleepy, you know, I can’t hardly stay awake to keep – I forget a lot of

stuff.

Q: Memory?

A: Yes.

Q: How about concentration, do you believe that’s –

A: I totally lose it. Can’t even keep a conversation sometimes without

going to sleep or nodding off.

Q: Well let’s talk about that going to sleep, you were telling me one of the

peculiarities resulting from your medication is you just fall asleep in the

middle of the day, in the middle of a sentence, is that –

A: That’s correct.

Q: – is that true?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How often do you just fall asleep for no reason, I mean you’re not

trying to fall asleep, I guess?

A: More than five times a day, I know that.

(R. 277-78).

The ALJ did not fully credit Byrd’s testimony, and Byrd does not challenge her

credibility determination. In her opinion, the ALJ states that when assessing Byrd’s

credibilityregarding hissymptoms and impairments, she considered several factors including

objective medical evidence, dailyactivities, “[t]he location, duration,frequency, and intensity

of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms,” aggravating or precipitating factors, “[t]he type,

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of anymedication,” treatment, and any other measures

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Case 2:10-cv-00923-CSC Document 15 Filed 01/12/12 Page 5 of 8
and factors related to his pain and/or symptoms. (R. 185-86) (emphasis added). In addition,

the ALJ noted that the plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Johnson “stated that the claimant had

no side effects from the claimant’s prescribed medications.” (R. 186). After considering the

objective medical evidence including his treating physician’s statement that he suffered no

side effects from his medications, the ALJ found that Byrd’s statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent

that they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (R. 188). 

The ALJ concluded that Byrd had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of

work at all levels with non-exertional limitations that did not include a limitation due to

drowsiness. (R. 185). 

The ALJ must consider the side effects of plaintiff’s medication where their existence

is supported by substantial evidence. See Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F. 2d 222, 226 (11 Cir. th

1990). The medical records contain no supporting evidence that the plaintiff complained

about the side effects of his medications. Since the plaintiff filed for disability benefits in

2005, not once has he complained to his treating physicians that his medications were

causing the severe drowsiness about which he testified to at the hearing. (R. 224-247). A

review of treatment notes from twenty doctor’s visits reveal not a single notation that the

plaintiff’s medications were causing him to be drowsy or fall asleep. (Id). His treating

physician’s statement dated March 7, 2006, specifically states that Byrd did not report any

significant side effects from his medication. (R 130). Finally, Byrd did not mention any side

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Case 2:10-cv-00923-CSC Document 15 Filed 01/12/12 Page 6 of 8
effects during his first administrative hearing, and there is no mention of side effects in any

of his documentation filed in support of his claim for benefits. In short, the ALJ properly

considered the plaintiff’s complaints about the side effects of his medication, but then

discredited his testimony because the medical records do not support his allegations. (R.

185-88). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s medications

do not cause side effects which prevent him from working.

Byrd’s reliance on McDevitt v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 241 Fed. Appx. 615, 2007 WL

2050910 (11 Cir. 2007), is misplaced because McDevitt is distinguishable from the case at th

bar. In McDevitt, the claimant testified that his medication caused “extreme lack of

concentation.” Id. at 617. The ALJ however specifically stated that “[t]he claimant did not

mention any concentration or memory difficulties at the hearing,” and found that his

testimony was “somewhat exaggerated.” Id. at 619. The Eleventh Circuit found that the

ALJ’s statement regarding MeDevitt’s testimony was inaccurate. Id. Coupled with the

ALJ’s finding that his testimony was “somewhat exaggerated,” the Court concluded that the

ALJ’s failure to resolve the conflict or make specific findings required the case to be

reversed and remanded. Id. Such is not the case here. The ALJ stated that she considered

Byrd’s testimony as well as the objective medical evidence including his treating physician’s

statement that Byrd suffered from no side effects from his medications. (R. 185-86). In her

credibility determination, the ALJ specifically found that the evidence in the record “does

not support the claimant’s allegations of totally incapacitating symptomatology and the

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Case 2:10-cv-00923-CSC Document 15 Filed 01/12/12 Page 7 of 8
claimant’s statements regarding the severity, frequency, and duration of his symptoms are

overstated.” (R. 188). 

To the extent that the plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ should have accepted his

testimony regarding the effects of his medication on him, this court must accept the factual

findings of the Commissioner if, as they are here, supported by substantial evidence and

based upon the proper legal standards. Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622 (11 Cir. 1987). th

IV. CONCLUSION

The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled. Thus, the

court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence

and is due to be affirmed.

A separate final judgment will be entered.

Done this 12 day of January 2012. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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