Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07117/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 14, 2004 Decided July 30, 2004

No. 03-7117

BLAKE KILBURN, INDIVIDUALLY ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND AS

EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PETER C. KILBURN, DECEASED,

APPELLEE

v.

SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA AND

LIBYAN EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv01301)

Arman Dabiri argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

Douglas Hallward–Driemeier, Attorney, U.S. Department

of Justice, argued the cause for amicus curiae United States

of America in support of appellee. With him on the brief

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-7117 Document #839656 Filed: 07/30/2004 Page 1 of 22
2

were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Douglas N. Letter, Counsel, and

Mark Clodfelter, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of

State.

Stuart H. Newberger argued the cause for appellee Blake

Kilburn. With him on the brief were Clifton S. Elgarten and

Michael L. Martinez.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and GARLAND and ROBERTS,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: This case arises out of the kidnaping and murder of an American citizen in Lebanon between

November 1984 and April 1986. Libya appeals from the

denial of its motion to dismiss the case, arguing that sovereign immunity protects it from suit and that the plaintiff lacks

a viable cause of action. We reject the first contention,

concluding that the ‘‘terrorism exception’’ of the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7),

strips Libya of the shield of sovereign immunity. We decline

to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the second.

I

Blake Kilburn brought suit against the Socialist People’s

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya), the Libyan External Security Organization (LESO), the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the

Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, seeking damages on his own behalf and as executor of the estate of his

brother, Peter Kilburn (together, the plaintiff), for Peter’s

kidnaping, sale, torture, and death. The allegations of the

complaint, as further detailed in district court pleadings and a

declaration, are as follows.

Peter Kilburn was an American citizen who lived in Lebanon and worked as an instructor and librarian at the American University of Beirut. On November 30, 1984, he was

abducted from his apartment; Hizbollah, a terrorist organization funded by Iran, claimed responsibility. In late 1985, the

American government was approached by an intermediary

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who claimed to be acting on behalf of Kilburn’s captors and

who sought a ransom for his return. For the next several

months, the United States negotiated for Kilburn’s release.

On April 14, 1986, while Kilburn was still in captivity, the

United States conducted airstrikes on Tripoli, Libya, in retaliation for Libya’s involvement in the bombing of a Berlin

nightclub that killed two American soldiers. Thereafter,

Libya made it known that it wanted to purchase an American

hostage to murder in revenge for the airstrikes. Sometime

between April 14 and 17, the Arab Revolutionary Cells

(ARC), a terrorist organization sponsored by Libya, bought

Kilburn from Hizbollah for approximately $3 million and

subsequently tortured him. On or about April 17, 1986, ARC

murdered Kilburn and left his body by the side of a road near

Beirut, alongside the bodies of two British hostages. In a

note found nearby, ARC claimed responsibility.

Blake Kilburn’s complaint, filed on June 12, 2001, alleged

that his brother was the victim of hostage taking, torture, and

extrajudicial killing, for which the defendants were responsible. The complaint sought recovery through multiple causes

of action, including the Flatow Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1605

(note), and theories of wrongful death, battery, assault, false

imprisonment, slave trafficking, torture, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although the complaint did not

specify the legal sources of the latter causes of action, later

pleadings asserted that they arose under state common law,

foreign law, and international law, and that additional federal

statutory causes of action might also be available.

The Iranian defendants did not appear, and the plaintiff

sought a default judgment against them. That motion remains pending in the district court. The Libyan defendants

did appear, and the parties agreed to a limited course of

jurisdictional discovery. Thereafter, the Libyan defendants

filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), contending that their sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction, and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), contending that the

plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

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granted. The district court denied both requests. Sua

sponte, the court also considered a question not raised by the

parties — whether the plaintiff could assert a claim for

punitive damages against defendant LESO — and answered

in the affirmative. This appeal followed.1

II

We begin with the question of the Libyan defendants’

sovereign immunity. The district court’s decision to deny

their motion to dismiss plainly did not end the case; to the

contrary, it permitted the case to go forward. Ordinarily,

that would preclude our hearing this interlocutory appeal,

because our jurisdiction is generally confined to ‘‘final decisions of the district court.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see id. § 1292

(permitting interlocutory appeals in certain circumstances not

present here). Under the collateral order doctrine, however,

an order qualifies as ‘‘final’’ under § 1291 if it: ‘‘(1) conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, (2) resolve[s] an

important issue completely separate from the merits of the

action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a

final judgment.’’ Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.

Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The denial of a motion

to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity satisfies all

three criteria, and is therefore subject to interlocutory review. See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Jungquist v.

Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1025–

26 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Foremost–McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In

1 The defendants also sought, and the district court denied,

dismissal on the ground that the court’s exercise of personal

jurisdiction over them violated the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment. Although the defendants recognize that this circuit

has held that ‘‘foreign states are not ‘persons’ protected by the

Fifth Amendment,’’ Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002), they raise the issue solely

to preserve the possibility of further appellate review.

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particular, with respect to the last criterion, an ‘‘order denying dismissal for immunity is effectively unreviewable on

appeal because ‘sovereign immunity is an immunity from trial

and the attendant burdens of litigation, and not just a defense

to liability on the merits.’ ’’ Jungquist, 115 F.3d at 1026

(quoting Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 443).

Under the FSIA, a foreign state is immune from the

jurisdiction of American courts unless the case falls within

one of a list of statutory exceptions (or as provided by

international agreements). 28 U.S.C. § 1604; see id.

§§ 1605–1607. If no exception applies, the district court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 1604. If an exception

does apply, the district court has jurisdiction. Id. § 1330(a);

see World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan,

296 F.3d 1154, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Phoenix Consulting,

Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Congress amended the FSIA in the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, adding an additional

exception colloquially known as the ‘‘terrorism exception.’’

That exception denies sovereign immunity in any case:

in which money damages are sought against a foreign

state for personal injury or death that was caused by an

act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,

hostage taking, or the provision of material support or

resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for

such an act if such act or provision of material support is

engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such

foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her

office, employment, or agencyTTTT

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). This exception applies only if three

additional criteria are also satisfied: the foreign state was

designated a ‘‘state sponsor of terrorism’’ at the time the act

occurred; the foreign state was given a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate a claim regarding an act that occurred within

the state’s borders; and the claimant or victim was a national

of the United States. Id. § 1605(a)(7)(A), (B). There is no

dispute that these criteria are satisfied here. The only

question is whether the plaintiff’s claims fall within the main

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body of the exception, upon which the jurisdiction of the

district court depends.

‘‘In order to preserve the full scope of sovereign immunity,

the district court must make the ‘critical preliminary determination’ of its own jurisdiction as early in the litigation as

possible.’’ Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 39 (quoting Foremost–McKesson, 905 F.2d at 449). In making that determination, the nature of the court’s inquiry depends on the

nature of the defendant’s challenge. ‘‘If the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional

allegations, then the district court should take the plaintiff’s

factual allegations as true and determine whether they bring

the case within any of the [FSIA] exceptions to immunity

invoked by the plaintiff.’’ Id. at 40. But if the defendant

challenges ‘‘the factual basis of the court’s jurisdiction, the

court may not deny the motion to dismiss merely by assuming

the truth of the facts alleged by the plaintiff and disputed by

the defendant. Instead, the court must go beyond the pleadings and resolve any disputed issues of fact the resolution of

which is necessary to a ruling upon the motion to dismiss.’’

Id.

In their motion to dismiss, the Libyan defendants challenged both the legal and factual sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

claims. For the sake of clarity, we address these challenges

separately in Parts III and IV. Our standard of review is de

novo. See Price, 294 F.3d at 91.

III

The Libyan defendants maintain that, even if the allegations of the complaint are true, they fail to bring this case

within the compass of the terrorism exception. That contention is founded on two legal arguments regarding the scope of

the exception.

A

The defendants’ first argument is that § 1605(a)(7) requires, as a matter of jurisdiction, a causal connection between the foreign state’s alleged acts and the victim’s alleged

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injuries. Stated at that level of generality, the defendants

are plainly right. The section provides an exception to

sovereign immunity in any case in which money damages are

sought for injury or death ‘‘that was caused by an act of

torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources TTT for

such an act.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (emphasis added). As

we are generally required to give effect to every statutory

term, Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001), we cannot

ignore the phrase ‘‘caused by.’’ Moreover, because

§ 1605(a)(7) is a jurisdictional provision, see Cicippio–Puleo v.

Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir.

2004), causation is indeed a jurisdictional requirement.

It is here, however, that we part company with the defendants. They contend not merely that § 1605(a)(7) requires a

causal connection, but that it specifically requires ‘‘but for’’

causation: that is, an allegation (and, ultimately, evidence)

that ‘‘but for’’ Libya’s actions, Peter Kilburn would not have

been purchased, tortured, or killed. The defendants apparently regard ‘‘but for’’ as a particularly restrictive standard of

causation, and insist that nothing less will do.2

As a moment’s inspection of § 1605(a)(7) makes clear, there

is no textual warrant for this claim: the words ‘‘but for’’

simply do not appear; only ‘‘caused by’’ do. Cf. Republic of

Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (rejecting the suggestion that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), which requires a ‘‘direct effect’’

in the United States for acts performed elsewhere, ‘‘contains

2 ‘‘But for’’ causation may be restrictive in some circumstances,

such as the multiple actors example discussed in the text below.

See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 66–67 (5th ed. 1984).

Often, however, it is viewed as an expansive theory. See, e.g.,

Pryor v. American President Lines, 520 F.2d 974, 978 n.4 (4th Cir.

1975) (describing ‘‘but for’’ causation as a potentially ‘‘limitless’’

standard under which ‘‘Eve’s trespass caused all our woe’’ (citing 2

HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1108 (1956))); see generally

PROSSER & KEETON, at 266 (noting that the breadth of ‘‘but for’’

causation may depend on whether it is employed as a rule of

inclusion or exclusion).

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any unexpressed requirement of ‘substantiality’ or ‘foreseeability’ ’’). In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge

& Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 536–38 (1995), the Supreme Court

interpreted ‘‘caused by’’ in another jurisdictional statute to

require only a showing of ‘‘proximate cause.’’ We follow the

Court’s example here.

In Grubart, jurisdiction turned on the meaning of the

Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, which provides that

the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States ‘‘shall extend

to TTT all cases of damage or injury TTT caused by a vessel on

navigable water.’’ 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (emphasis added).

Rejecting the contention that ‘‘caused by’’ means that the

damage must be close in time and space to the activity that

caused it, the Court held that the phrase means only ‘‘what

tort law has traditionally called ‘proximate causation.’ ’’ Grubart, 513 U.S. at 536. As the Court explained, ‘‘this classic

tort notion normally eliminates the bizarre.’’ Id.; see generally PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984)

(noting that an ‘‘essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of

action’’ for any tort ‘‘is that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the

damage which the plaintiff has suffered,’’ a ‘‘connection usually TTT dealt with by the courts in terms of what is called

‘proximate cause’ ’’). ‘‘There is no need or justification,’’ the

Supreme Court said, ‘‘for imposing an additional nonremoteness hurdle in the name of jurisdiction.’’ Grubart, 513 U.S.

at 538.

The essence of the Libyan defendants’ argument is that

here there is a ‘‘need or justification’’ for imposing an additional hurdle beyond proximate cause, and that ‘‘but for’’

cause is the appropriate hurdle. They offer the following

hypothetical:

A terrorist organization is supported by two foreign

states. One specifically instructs the organization to

carry out an attack against a U.S. citizen. Can the state

which only provides general support, but was not involved with the act giving rise to the suit, also be

stripped of its immunity?

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Reply Br. at 13. ‘‘The answer’’ to this hypothetical, the

defendants assert, ‘‘clearly must be no.’’ Id. Libya’s argument fails to persuade for several reasons.

First, we are not moved by the plight of Libya’s hypothetical foreign state. We see no reason why there would be a

greater justification for — or why Congress would have a

greater interest in — protecting a party haled into court

under § 1605(a)(7) than one trying to resist admiralty jurisdiction. After all, the only defendants that are subject to

§ 1605(a)(7) in the first place are those that the State Department has designated as ‘‘state sponsor(s) of terrorism.’’ 28

U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(7)(A).

Second, § 1605(a)(7) permits actions for injuries caused by

‘‘material support’’ of terrorist acts by such state sponsors,

and, as Congress recognized, such support is difficult to trace.

As the House Report on the terrorism exception stated:

[S]tate sponsors of terrorism include Libya, Iraq, Iran,

Syria, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan. These outlaw

states consider terrorism a legitimate instrument of

achieving their foreign policy goals. They have become

better at hiding their material support for their surrogates, which includes the provision of safe havens, funding, training, supplying weaponry, medical assistance,

false travel documentation, and the like. For this reason, the Committee has determined that allowing suits

in the federal courts against countries responsible for

terrorist acts TTT is warranted.

H.R. Rep. No. 104–383, at 62 (1995) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the more likely situation is not Libya’s hypothetical, involving one direct and one general state sponsor, but

rather the case in which multiple foreign states claim to be

providing only ‘‘general support.’’ Such a case, in which

application of a ‘‘but for’’ standard to joint tortfeasors could

absolve them all, is precisely the one for which courts generally regard ‘‘but for’’ causation as inappropriate. See PROSSER

& KEETON, at 266–67.

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Third, Libya’s hypothetical (and its argument) deals solely

with a claim based on a state’s general ‘‘material support’’ for

a terrorist organization. But ‘‘the provision of material support’’ for a terrorist act is only one of the predicates for the

§ 1605(a)(7) exception. Foreign states also lose immunity for

acts (of torture, extrajudicial killing, or hostage taking) ‘‘engaged in by an official, employee, or agent’’ of the state itself.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). Libya makes no argument at all as to

why a restrictive standard of causation should be imposed in

direct action cases, yet the statutory phrase ‘‘caused by’’

applies equally to every § 1605(a)(7) case.3

Finally, we underline that the only issue before us here is

jurisdictional causation, because § 1605(a)(7) is solely a jurisdictional provision. Cicippio–Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1032. To

succeed in the end, the plaintiff must go beyond jurisdiction

and provide proof satisfying a substantive cause of action.

Id. The plaintiff has alleged a number of sources that could

provide a cause of action, including state, federal, foreign, and

international law. Whatever the ultimate source may be, it

will no doubt carry with it — as a matter of substantive

law — its own rules of causation. Of these, there are a large

variety. See PROSSER & KEETON, at 266–68, 273. Any concerns about reaching too far to charge foreign states with the

attenuated impact of their financial activities are better addressed as questions of substantive law. Indeed, to go further as a matter of jurisdiction — to accept Libya’s contention that § 1605(a)(7) requires a single causation standard

that is more restrictive than the base-line standard of proximate cause — runs afoul of the FSIA’s injunction that a nonimmune ‘‘foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and

to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1606.

3 Prosser suggests that a standard like ‘‘but for’’ is particularly illsuited to direct action cases. See PROSSER & KEETON, at 266

(stating that the ‘‘but for’’ rule fails in the following case: ‘‘A stabs

C with a knife, and B fractures C’s skull with a rock; either wound

would be fatal, and C dies from the effects of both’’).

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In this case, there is no doubt that the plaintiff’s allegations

satisfy the proximate cause standard. The complaint alleges

that, after the United States bombed Tripoli, ‘‘Libyan agents

in Lebanon made it known that they wanted to purchase an

American hostage to murder in retaliation.’’ Compl. ¶ 13. It

specifically asserts that Peter Kilburn ‘‘was purchased and

killed by members of the Arab Revolutionary Cells,’’ id. ¶ 21,

‘‘whose acts were funded and directed by Libya,’’ id. ¶ 26

(emphasis added). A subsequent declaration makes clear

that the plaintiff’s allegation is not just that ARC was ‘‘supported’’ and ‘‘funded’’ by the Libyan government, but that it

was ‘‘directed’’ by that government ‘‘and acted as its agent in

Lebanon to carry out terrorist activities, including the purchase and assassination of Peter Kilburn.’’ Decl. of Ambassador Robert Oakley (Ret.) ¶ 14 (hereinafter ‘‘Oakley Decl.’’).

If proven, these allegations are more than sufficient to establish that the acts of the Libyan defendants were the proximate cause of Peter Kilburn’s injury and death.

B

The Libyan defendants also advance a second argument in

favor of a restrictive view of § 1605(a)(7). Noting that the

statute denies sovereign immunity for claims involving injury

caused by ‘‘an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft

sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support

or resources TTT for such an act,’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)

(emphasis added), they insist that to come within this provision, a state’s material support must go directly for the

specific act (e.g., torture) that gives rise to the claim. In the

instant case, the defendants contend that § 1605(a)(7) requires the plaintiff to allege (and, ultimately, to prove) that

Libya directly funded ARC’s purchase, torture, and murder

of Peter Kilburn — not just that Libya provided material

support to ARC.

Although the defendants pose this as an independent restriction on the scope of § 1605(a)(7), it is closely tied to their

causation argument and suffers from some of the same

defects. On the one hand, imposing a jurisdictional requireUSCA Case #03-7117 Document #839656 Filed: 07/30/2004 Page 11 of 22
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ment that a state sponsor’s financial assistance to a terrorist

organization must be directly traceable to a particular terrorist act would likely render § 1605(a)(7)’s material support

provision ineffectual. Money, after all, is fungible, and terrorist organizations can hardly be counted on to keep careful

bookkeeping records. On the other hand, the requirement

that the plaintiff’s injury be ‘‘caused by’’ the provision of

material support — in the sense of proximate causation, see

supra Part III.A — should ameliorate most concerns about

remoteness. Any further concerns will likely be addressed

by the substantive law that governs the applicable cause of

action. See generally Doe v. Dominion Bank of Washington,

N.A., 963 F.2d 1552, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that it ‘‘is

axiomatic that under a negligence regime, one has a duty to

guard only against foreseeable risks’’); Boim v. Quranic

Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 291

F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that, to establish a

private cause of action for material support of terrorism

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333, 2339A, ‘‘the plaintiffs must be able

to show that [the murder of their son by Hamas] was a

reasonably foreseeable result of [defendants’] making a donation’’ to Hamas).

In any event, Libya’s textual argument has no application

here. The plaintiff does not allege that Libya merely provided material support to ARC, but rather that it specifically

funded and directed Peter Kilburn’s purchase and murder.

See Oakley Decl. ¶ 16; see also id. ¶¶ 6, 11–14; Compl. ¶ 23.

Indeed, the plaintiff’s claims rest not only on a theory of

material support, but also on a theory of agency. The

plaintiff asserts that ARC was not just some independent

organization that Libya provided with funds, but rather an

‘‘agent’’ of Libya. See Oakley Decl. ¶ 14. In statutory terms,

plaintiff’s allegation is that Peter Kilburn’s injuries and death

were caused by terrorist acts ‘‘engaged in by an TTT agent of

[a] foreign state’’ — and not merely by ‘‘provision of material

support TTT for such an act.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (emphasis added). The ‘‘for such an act’’ language that Libya

highlights plays no textual role with respect to those kinds of

allegations. To the contrary, Libya is responsible for the acts

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of its agent ‘‘within the scope of TTT [its] agency,’’ id.,

regardless of whether Libya financed those acts — provided,

of course, that the elements of agency are established. See

Foremost–McKesson, 905 F.2d at 445 (holding that a foreign

state is responsible for the actions of a commercial entity if it

‘‘exercise[s] the necessary degree of control over [it] to create

a principal/agent relationship’’); see also Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848–49

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (same); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682

F.2d 1022, 1026 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same).

IV

We turn next to defendants’ challenge to the factual basis

for the district court’s jurisdiction. As explained above, if a

defendant invoking sovereign immunity challenges ‘‘the factual basis of the court’s jurisdiction,’’ the court ‘‘must go beyond

the pleadings and resolve any disputed issues of fact the

resolution of which is necessary to a ruling upon the motion

to dismiss.’’ Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40. To resolve

such a factual dispute, however, the court ‘‘retains ‘considerable latitude in devising the procedures it will follow to ferret

out the facts pertinent to jurisdiction.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Prakash v. American Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1179–80 (D.C. Cir.

1984)); see Grubart, 513 U.S. at 537 (noting that ‘‘any litigation of a contested subject-matter jurisdictional fact issue

occurs in comparatively summary procedure’’).

Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the district court understood its responsibilities in this regard. See Kilburn v.

Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d. 24, 29–30, 33 (D.D.C. 2003)

(citing Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40). In this case, the

parties agreed to limited jurisdictional discovery, pursuant to

which the plaintiff provided the defendants with supporting

documents from the CIA and State Department, and with a

declaration by retired Ambassador Robert Oakley. Oakley

was the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism during the period of Peter Kilburn’s kidnaping and

murder. Plaintiff also produced a list of witnesses who would

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testify to Libya’s responsibility. No depositions were conducted or sought. After reviewing these materials, the district court concluded that denial of the motion to dismiss was

warranted. We agree.

‘‘ ‘In accordance with the restrictive view of sovereign

immunity reflected in the FSIA,’ the defendant bears the

burden of proving that the plaintiff’s allegations do not bring

its case within a statutory exception to immunity.’’ Phoenix

Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40 (quoting Transamerican S.S.

Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1002

(D.C. Cir. 1985)); see Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1994). We have never

decided whether, in addition to the ultimate burden of persuasion, the defendant also bears the initial burden of production.4

 But even if the plaintiff has the burden of production,

he has satisfied it. Ambassador Oakley’s declaration states

that he would testify — both as an expert and based on firsthand knowledge of some of the events in question — that

ARC was an agent of Libya, that it purchased, tortured, and

killed Peter Kilburn, and that the Libyan government expressly provided the funds for the purchase and directed the

killing. See Oakley Decl. ¶¶ 11–17. Given that the only

discovery to date has been that which the plaintiff has

voluntarily accorded the defendants, and that the plaintiff has

not yet had an opportunity to conduct any, that is more than

sufficient to satisfy any possible burden of production at this

stage of the litigation.5

4 Compare Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann & Trefimetaux, 853 F.2d 445, 451 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1988) (indicating that the

foreign state defendant bears the burden of going forward with

evidence that the alleged act does not come within an exception to

sovereign immunity), and H.R. Rep. No. 94–1487, at 6616 (1976)

(same), with Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of South Africa,

300 F.3d 230, 241 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the burden of

production shifts to the plaintiff if the defendant presents a prima

facie case that it is a foreign sovereign).

5 See Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40 (holding that the district

court ‘‘must give the plaintiff ample opportunity to secure and

present evidence relevant to the existence of jurisdiction’’) (citation

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15

It is equally plain that the Libyan defendants have so far

satisfied neither a burden of production nor their required

burden of persuasion. They submitted no affirmative evidence whatsoever to show that they fall outside the terrorism

exception. They did not, for example, file an affidavit denying that their agents purchased or killed Peter Kilburn. Cf.

Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 39 (noting that, by filing a

sworn declaration that an alleged written contract was a

forgery, the foreign state defendant disputed the plaintiff’s

claim that it had waived sovereign immunity through the

contract). They did not proffer testimony denying that they

had provided material support for those acts. They did not

even deny that ARC was their agent.

What the defendants did do, instead, was to point out what

they see as ‘‘contradictions’’ between the plaintiff’s claims and

some passages in the CIA and State Department documents.

These asserted contradictions primarily involve reports that

multiple terrorist organizations had claimed responsibility for

hostage taking in Lebanon during the relevant period. Although the defendants do not explain the significance of these

reports or what they contradicted, presumably the defendants

believe the reports suggest that a Libyan-sponsored organization did not carry out the acts in question. But the reports

do not deny that a Libyan-sponsored organization purchased

or killed Peter Kilburn; nor do they suggest that such an

organization was not a proximate cause of those acts, even if

not the sole cause. In fact, it is not apparent that the

asserted ‘‘contradictions’’ have any relevance at all to this

case.6

and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grubart, 513 U.S.

at 537–38 (‘‘Normal practice permits a party to establish jurisdiction

at the outset of a case by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of

jurisdictional elements TTT and any litigation of a contested subjectmatter jurisdictional fact issue occurs in comparatively summary

procedure before a judge alone (as distinct from litigation of the

same fact issue as an element of the cause of action, if the claim

survives the jurisdictional objection).’’) (citations omitted).

6 Some of those asserted contradictions do not appear to relate to

Peter Kilburn. For example, although the defendants point to a

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In short, the defendants have failed to satisfy their ‘‘burden

of proving that the plaintiff’s allegations do not bring its case

within a statutory exception to immunity.’’ Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40. The district court was therefore right to

deny their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under

Rule 12(b)(1).

V

In addition to challenging the district court’s jurisdiction,

the Libyan defendants also sought dismissal pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), contending that the plaintiff had failed to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court

denied that motion and, at the same time and sua sponte, held

that defendant LESO could be subject to punitive damages if

it were ultimately found liable. The Libyan defendants seek

review of both decisions. In particular, they note that this

circuit has recently held that one of the causes of action

plaintiff asserted, the Flatow Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1350

(note), does not ‘‘creat[e] a private right of action against a

foreign government.’’ Cicippio–Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1033.

The Libyan defendants further argue that no other cause of

action is available to plaintiffs who bring suit under

§ 1605(a)(7). But cf. id. at 1035 (declining to decide whether

terrorism victims invoking § 1605(a)(7) have other causes of

action).

CIA report that five terrorist organizations had claimed responsibility for hostages taken in Lebanon in March of 1984, see CIA,

Terrorism Review 735 (Apr. 8, 1985) (attached to Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss, App. D), Kilburn was not kidnaped until November of that

year. Others do not appear to relate to the Libyan defendants.

For example, although the defendants stress a State Department

document stating that Kilburn was originally kidnaped by Islamic

Jihad (presumably in contradiction to the allegation that the original kidnaping was by Hizbollah), see Department of State, Unclassified Documents 3 (attached to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, App. F), the

complaint does not allege that Libya played a role in the original

kidnaping. Nor does the document address the complaint’s contention that Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah are one and the same. See

Compl. ¶ 4.

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Denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(6) is not ordinarily subject to interlocutory

appeal. It is neither a final decision nor a proper subject for

appeal under the ‘‘collateral order’’ doctrine. Price, 294 F.3d

at 91. Whether conclusive or not, it plainly is not separate

from the merits. And it is eminently reviewable on appeal

from the final judgment; indeed, that is the usual way in

which Rule 12(b)(6) decisions are appealed. See generally

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 541. The defendants do not disagree.

Instead, they urge us to assume jurisdiction over the nonimmunity issues as ‘‘pendent’’ to the sovereign immunity

decision over which we have interlocutory jurisdiction.

The leading case on pendent appellate jurisdiction is Swint

v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35 (1995). In

Swint, the Supreme Court expressed some skepticism about

the existence of pendent appellate jurisdiction altogether, and

particularly about a ‘‘ ‘liberal’ or ‘flexible’ approach’’ to the

issue. 514 U.S. at 47 n.5. The Court ultimately concluded

that it ‘‘need not definitively or preemptively settle here

whether or when it may be proper for a court of appeals, with

jurisdiction over one ruling, to review, conjunctively, related

rulings that are not themselves independently appealable.’’

Id. at 50–51. But it held that there was no such jurisdiction

in that case, because the proposed pendent issue and the

properly appealable issue were not ‘‘inextricably intertwined,’’

and because review of the former decision was not ‘‘necessary

to ensure meaningful review’’ of the latter. Id. at 51. Subsequently, in Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707 n.41 (1997), the

Court held that pendent jurisdiction was proper where both

the ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’ and ‘‘necessary to ensure

meaningful review’’ conditions were satisfied.

In Gilda Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, Inc., 85 F.3d

675 (D.C. Cir. 1996), we declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the appeal of an order holding a party liable for

attorney’s fees. We said that we would ‘‘exercis[e] pendent

appellate jurisdiction sparingly,’’ and ‘‘only when substantial

considerations of fairness or efficiency demand it.’’ 85 F.3d

at 678–79. We also said, however, that while ‘‘[s]ome courts

read Swint to permit pendent appellate jurisdiction only

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when the [two Swint conditions] obtain,’’ we did ‘‘not think

[Swint] meant to prescribe a definitive or exhaustive list of

conditions.’’ Id. at 679 n.4.

The other circuits have taken a different path, saying that

they will take pendent appellate jurisdiction only when one or

both of the Swint conditions appear,7

 and criticizing our more

permissive reading of Swint.

8

 But despite using more expansive language, we have so far largely confined the doctrine to

cases that come within one or the other of the Swint conditions,9

 or that involve questions like personal jurisdiction10 or

the statute of limitations11 — which we have described as

‘‘logically antecedent’’ or ‘‘threshold’’ issues. See Barbour v.

WMATA, 2003 WL 22095655, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

7 See Limone v. Condon, 2004 WL 1299980, at *9–10 (1st Cir.

2004); Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162

F.3d 748, 758 (2d Cir. 1998); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.

Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin, 269 F.3d 187, 203 (3d Cir. 2001);

Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 437 (4th Cir. 1996); Thornton v.

General Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 453–54 (5th Cir. 1998); Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 797 (6th Cir.

1998); Jones v. InfoCure Corp., 310 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2002);

Woolfolk v. Smith, 81 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1996); Watkins v.

Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998); Sevier v. Lawrence,

60 F.3d 695, 701 (10th Cir. 1995); Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289,

1294 (11th Cir. 2000).

8 See Rein, 162 F.3d at 758; see also Limone, 2004 WL 1299980,

at *9–10.

9 See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Express Trak,

L.L.C., 330 F.3d 523, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (exercising pendent

jurisdiction where both Swint conditions existed); United States ex

rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 873–86 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (same where the issues were ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’);

Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 574–75

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (same).

10 See Jungquist, 115 F.3d 1020.

11 See Griggs v. WMATA, 232 F.3d 917, 919 & n.2 (D.C. Cir.

2000); Rendall–Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 916–17 (D.C.

Cir. 1997).

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This case does not fit any of those rubrics. Whether state

tort law properly provides the plaintiff with a cause of action,

for example, is not inextricably linked with, or necessary for

meaningful review of, the proper scope of jurisdictional causation under § 1605(a)(7). To the contrary, as we noted in Part

III, these are analytically distinct questions. Nor can the

cause of action question fairly be characterized as an antecedent or threshold issue. The question of whether the plaintiff

has a cognizable cause of action (and what that cause of action

might be) is not a question separate from the merits; it is the

merits. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.

83, 89 (1998). And all of this is, of course, a fortiori regarding

the question of whether LESO, if liable, can be assessed

punitive damages.

It is true that we did, in one case, decide to take pendent

jurisdiction over a merits question (whether the Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was subject to the District of Columbia’s Freedom of Information Act), in order to

avoid what we described as a ‘‘difficult’’ state sovereign

immunity question. See KiSKA Constr. Corp.–U.S.A. v.

WMATA, 167 F.3d 608, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1999).12 But that

decision is not precedent for taking pendent appellate jurisdiction here. As we have already decided that Libya lacks

immunity, there is nothing for us to avoid in this case.13 Nor

12 In another interlocutory appeal, Simpson v. Socialist People’s

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 326 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003), we

decided a merits question after deciding an immunity question. We

did not, however, discuss our authority to do so, and ‘‘the existence

of unaddressed jurisdictional’’ questions deprives a decision of

‘‘precedential effect’’ on those questions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 353 n.2 (1996); see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91.

13 Compare also Long, 173 F.3d at 893, 895 (distinguishing Steel

Co. and holding that the availability of a statutory cause of action

may be determined before deciding the ‘‘quasi-jurisdictional’’ question of Eleventh Amendment immunity), with Steel Co., 523 U.S. at

93 (holding that a merits issue may not be determined before a

jurisdictional question), and 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (providing that ‘‘a

foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts’’

unless the FSIA provides an exception) (emphasis added).

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would it be fair to characterize the immunity questions discussed in Parts III and IV as particularly ‘‘difficult.’’ Although we have discussed the legal aspects of causation in

some detail, the allegations that the Libyan defendants were

directly involved in Peter Kilburn’s ordeal make the bottomline conclusion that the defendants lack immunity quite easy.

And, as we said in Gilda Marx, ‘‘parties should not be

encouraged to bring insignificant, but final, matters before

this court as mere vehicles for pendent review of numerous or

complex orders that are not independently appealable.’’ 85

F.3d at 679; see also Swint, 514 U.S. at 49–50 (warning that

‘‘a rule loosely allowing pendent appellate jurisdiction would

encourage parties to parlay Cohen-type collateral orders into

multi-issue interlocutory appeal tickets’’).

The Libyan defendants complain that, if we decline to take

pendent jurisdiction over the non-immunity rulings, they may

be required to go through an entire trial on a complaint that

may eventually be determined to have no cognizable cause of

action. This possibility would concern us, of course, had we

not already concluded that the defendants lack immunity

from this litigation. In light of that conclusion, however, the

Libyan defendants are in the same position as any others.

To permit an appeal of the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

merely because it might spare the defendants the pain of trial

would greatly expand the ‘‘small category of decisions’’ subject to the collateral order doctrine, Swint, 514 U.S. at 42,

and undermine our promise to exercise pendent appellate

jurisdiction ‘‘sparingly,’’ Gilda Marx, 85 F.3d at 679. As the

court said in Swint with respect to the collateral order

doctrine: ‘‘ ‘§ 1291 requires courts of appeals to view claims

of a right not to be tried with skepticism, if not a jaundiced

eye,’ for ‘virtually every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely be described as

conferring a right not to stand trial.’ ’’ 514 U.S. at 43

(quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511

U.S. 863, 873 (1994)).

We do not dispute that both the district court and the

parties would benefit from advance knowledge of this circuit’s

view as to whether the plaintiff has a cause of action against

the defendants. But the Supreme Court has rejected that as

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a sufficient reason to permit appeal on a theory of pendent

jurisdiction.14 And Congress has expressly provided another

route for just such a situation. Section 1292(b) of Title 28

authorizes a district court to certify in writing that an ‘‘order

involves a controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an

immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the

ultimate termination of the litigation.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

When the district court so certifies, the court of appeals ‘‘may

thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken

from such order.’’ Id. Indeed, the Swint court pointed to

§ 1292(b) as a reason for caution regarding pendent appellate

jurisdiction:

Congress thus chose to confer on district courts first line

discretion to allow interlocutory appeals. If courts of

appeals had discretion to append to a Cohen-authorized

appeal from a collateral order further rulings of a kind

neither independently appealable nor certified by the

district court, then the two-tiered arrangement § 1292(b)

mandates would be severely undermined.

Swint, 514 U.S. at 47. The district court has not issued a

§ 1292(b) certification here.

In the final balance, whether or not we have authority to

exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction in this case, there is no

question that we have discretion to decline to do so. See

Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1118 (D.C.

Cir. 2000); Gilda Marx, 85 F.3d at 679–80. For the foregoing reasons, and because taking pendent jurisdiction here

would mean straying far from Swint, we decline to pass on

the rulings of the district court that are not related to the

question of the defendants’ immunity.

14 See Swint, 514 U.S. at 43–44 (rejecting an argument that

judicial economy warranted the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in

that case, notwithstanding that if the defendant were correct,

‘‘reviewing the district court’s order would put an end to the entire

case’’ against it) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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VI

We affirm the district court’s determination that it had

subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff’s claims

against the Libyan defendants. We decline to exercise appellate jurisdiction over defendants’ other challenges.

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