Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02317/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02317-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS BRITT,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-06-2317 RRB KJM P 

vs.

D. L. RUNNELS, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is serving a sentence of seventeen years’

imprisonment in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Respondent has

filed a motion asking that the court dismiss this matter as time-barred. Oral argument was heard

with respect to respondent’s motion on October 17, 2007.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides as follows:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner’s conviction became final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) on

May 20, 2003 when time expired to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 3; Supreme Court Rule 13; Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). The limitations period began running the next day on May 21, 2003. 

Petitioner filed several applications for collateral relief in California state courts. 

The first was filed on February 23, 2004, and petitioner received word that the last was denied on

July 14, 2006. Mot. at 2:4-6; Opp’n at 2:17-19, 5:25-6:12, Exs. 3-4; Reply at 5:4-7; Resp’t’s

Lodged Docs. 4-13. This action was filed on October 19, 2006. Title 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2)

provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” In light of what follows, the

court need not decide whether and to what extent petitioner should receive tolling under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

A review of the record before the court discloses there does not appear to be any

arguable basis to toll the limitations period between May 21, 2003 and February 22, 2004;

petitioner concedes as much. Between those dates, the limitations period ran for 278 days. 

There also does not appear to be any basis to toll the limitations period between July 15, 2006

and October 19, 2006. Petitioner asserts there was some confusion as to who was going to

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 At hearing, petitioner’s counsel effectively conceded that once the question of 1

representation was resolved, and counsel began to work on petitioner’s federal petition, counsel

was unaware of the prior delays associated with petitioner’s state court filings and did not take

steps to clarify whether there had been delays. 

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represent petitioner in this action and that confusion delayed filing after petitioner received word

that his final state application for collateral relief had been denied. But it appears the confusion

lasted for only about two weeks toward the end of July 2006, Opp’n at 7:14-21, and petitioner

fails to present anything indicating that this short delay made it impossible for petitioner to file in

this court within 87 days of July 15, 2006 -- by October 10, 2006 -- as required to equitably toll

the limitations period. See, e.g., Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9thCir.

2005). Petitioner also asserts he should receive equitable tolling for the same two week period

because he is a sex offender, which makes his participating in his legal proceedings more

difficult than other prisoners; thus he says it is unreasonable to expect he could “carry the ball”

while the question of who was representing him was being resolved. Opp’n at 8:5-28. Assuming

this is true, petitioner still has not shown that this fact made it impossible for petitioner to file by

October 10, 2006.1

Finally, petitioner argues that the court should waive the statute of limitations

with respect to his indecent exposure conviction because he has made a showing of actual

innocence. See Opp’n at 9-13. In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995), the Supreme Court

held that an otherwise procedurally defaulted habeas petition could be heard on the merits if the

habeas petitioner presents evidence of innocence “so strong that a court cannot have confidence

in the outcome of trial.” However, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has held that

a showing by a habeas petitioner meeting the Schlup standard would be sufficient to deem the

limitations period inapplicable. See, e.g., Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775-77 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner does not point to any evidence other than the evidence presented at trial in support of

his argument. 

Petitioner’s argument that he is innocent of indecent exposure centers around the

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fact that there was no evidence presented at trial that the victim actually saw his genitals. But

there is no such requirement for a conviction of indecent exposure. Under California law, a

conviction for indecent exposure requires evidence that a defendant actually exposed his or her

genitals in the presence of another person. People v. Carbajal, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 211 (2004). 

There is no requirement that the victim see the defendant’s genitalia as long as there is sufficient

circumstantial evidence that exposure occurred. Id. at 211-12. Petitioner does not dispute that a

witness testified that petitioner unzipped his pants, moved his hand to the area of his genitalia

and began moving his arm up and down. Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. #1 at 3. The existence of this

evidence, and the lack of a showing that such evidence is not credible, precludes the court from

finding that evidence of innocence is “so strong that the court cannot have confidence in the

outcome of [petitioner’s] trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. 

For all the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that the respondents’

motion to dismiss be granted. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ June 29, 2007 motion to dismiss be granted; 

2. Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed; and

3. This case be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 20, 2007.

1/brit2317.157

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