Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01954/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01954-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO RANGEL GONZALEZ,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-1954 LKK GGH P

vs.

DAVID L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Background

Petitioner, proceeding with appointed counsel, has filed a petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2254. Petitioner challenges his April 3, 2001, San Joaquin County jury trial conviction

for three counts of attempted murder (with weapon enhancements found true); two counts of

shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, for which he was sentenced to a term of 35 years, 4

months. First Amended Petition (FAP), filed on March 6, 2006, pp. 1-3. Petitioner raises the

following grounds for relief: 1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present a

defense and for his advice to petitioner that the offered 16-year plea bargain should be rejected;

2) right to due process violated by trial court’s refusal to instruct on petitioner’s theory of defense

that firearm discharge was grossly negligent, not intentional; 3) due process violation due to

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26 Claims 4, 5 and 6 of the original petition have been abandoned. FAP, p. 19. 1

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insufficient evidence to support the three attempted murder counts. FAP, pp. 6-18. 1

At a July 20, 2006, hearing on respondent’s June 5, 2006, motion to dismiss the

first amended petition as barred by the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations, petitioner sought

an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate a basis for equitable tolling, in light of Mendoza v. Carey,

449 F.3d 1065 (9 Cir. 2006), wherein the Ninth Circuit found that a non-English speaking th

petitioner’s alleged lack of access to Spanish language materials or translation assistance during

the limitations period could entitle the petitioner to equitable tolling. See Order, filed on July 26,

2006. The court directed petitioner’s counsel to file an English translation of petitioner’s

declaration in Spanish (maintaining the original) and with 60 days to file a stipulated motion to

expand the record by declaration and any other documents or, if not by way of stipulation, to file

a motion on behalf of petitioner, informing the court of the basis for any need beyond expanding

the record for an evidentiary hearing. Id. Petitioner’s October 20, 2006, unopposed motion for

an evidentiary hearing came on for hearing on December 14, 2006; the motion was unopposed

and was granted at the hearing, along with petitioner’s motion to expand the record with

petitioner’s declaration in the original and in the English version. See Order, filed on December

20, 2006. The evidentiary hearing was scheduled for February 26, 2007, before the undersigned. 

Id. The court permitted the evidentiary hearing to be twice re-scheduled. See Orders, filed on

February 7, 2007, and on June 24, 2007. The evidentiary hearing ultimately commenced on

November 19, 2007. Following the hearing, the court directed the parties to file further briefing 

on a specific issue (see, infra), which petitioner filed on November 28, 2007, and respondent

filed on November 29, 2007.

In the court’s July 26, 2006, Order, pp. 1-2, the following was previously stated:

Respondent sets forth that the applicable statute of limitations (28

U.S.C. § 22449d)(1)(A)) was tolled from September 9, 2003 (the

date the judgment of conviction became final, petitioner having

filed his first California Supreme Court, if anything, prematurely,

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 Although not noted by petitioner, application of the mailbox rule would appear to

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require the court to recognize the original petition as having been filed on August 3, 2005. 

However, if respondent’s argument prevails, an additional nine or ten days taken off the filing

date would not be particularly significant. 

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on July 16, 2004) until April 14, 2004 (when the petition was

denied). Although, according to respondent, there was no tolling

between that time, April 14, 2004, until petitioner embarked on a

second round of state habeas corpus petitions, on May 6, 2004,

when petitioner filed another habeas petition, this time in the

superior court, respondent concedes that tolling is applicable not

only until May 21, 2004, when the petition was denied, but also for

the period from May 21, 2004, to June 7, 2004, when the state

court of appeal habeas petition was filed and until July 8, 2004,

when that petition was denied. However, respondent contends that

petitioner was not entitled to tolling from the time of the state court

of appeal denial (July 8, 2004) until the August 16, 2004, filing of

his second petition in the state supreme court. Nor, respondent

argues, was petitioner entitled to tolling for the period of time from

the August 16, 2004 filing until July 13, 2005, when the second

state supreme court petition was denied (with citation to In re:

Clark, 5 Cal. 4 750 (1993)). If respondent is correct, then th

petitioner’s federal habeas petition, filed on August 12, 2005, was 2

untimely.

In opposition to respondent’s motion, petitioner’s counsel sought an evidentiary

hearing to demonstrate a basis for equitable tolling, in light of Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065

(9 Cir. 2006), a relatively recent case in which the Ninth Circuit found that a non-English

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speaking petitioner’s alleged lack of access to Spanish language materials or translation

assistance during the limitations period could entitle the petitioner to equitable tolling. 

Following oral argument, petitioner’s counsel was directed to file an English

translation of petitioner’s declaration in Spanish (while maintaining the signed original) with

respect to the impediments to timely filing that he faced with regard to the lack of access to

assistance from bilingual inmates or others during the relevant period. 

In addition, the court directed the parties to coordinate their efforts with respect to

providing a factual basis demonstrating petitioner’s access, or lack thereof, to translation

assistance for timely filing. Petitioner was directed within 60 days of the date of the hearing to 

file a stipulated motion to expand the record by declaration and any other documents, or, if not by

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 Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275-76, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988); Koch v. Ricketts,

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68 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223(9th Cir. 2001) (“A

prisoner who delivers a document to prison authorities gets the benefit of the prison mailbox

rule, so long as he diligently follows up once he has failed to receive a disposition from the court

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stipulation, to file such a motion on behalf of petitioner alone, and to inform the court of any

need beyond an expansion of the record for any witness and an evidentiary hearing and the basis

therefore.

Motion to Dismiss

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2):

The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any

period of limitation under this subsection.

In evaluating the timeliness of the instant petition, the court has afforded

petitioner the maximum latitude by applying the mailbox rule throughout. On direct appeal, 3

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petitioner’s petition for review was denied on June 11, 2003. Respondent’s Lodged Document

(hereafter, Lodg. Doc.) 9. Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 9, 2003, ninety

(90) days after the state supreme court denied his petition for review. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (“holding] that the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A) includes the [ninety-day] period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a

writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually

files such a petition.”). Petitioner, however, filed a habeas petition in the state supreme court

before that date, on July 16, 2003, which was denied on April 14, 2004. Lodg. Docs. 10 & 11.

The statute was therefore tolled for 224 days, until April 14, 2004. 

Petitioner then commenced a new round of habeas petitions in the state superior

court on April 28, 2004, which was denied on May 21, 2004. Lodg. Docs. 12 & 13. While

petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the fourteen (14) days from April 14, 2004, when

his initial state supreme court petition was denied, until April 28, 2004, when he filed his

superior court habeas petition, he is entitled to tolling for the time that petition was pending, that

is, until May 21, 2004. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (the statute of

limitations is tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) during the time properly filed state postconviction proceedings are pending, and that tolling applies from the time the first state habeas

petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge). 

Thus, at the point at which petitioner filed his habeas petition in the state court of

appeals, on June 1, 2004, only fourteen days had run and petitioner had 351 days left to run on

the AEDPA statute. Lodg. Doc. 14. As to petitioner’s subsequent petition to the state court of

appeals, petitioner is entitled to tolling for the entire period from the April 28, 2004, habeas filing

in the state superior court, resulting in a reasoned decision, through the July 8, 2004, silent denial

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of the state appellate court. Lodg. Doc. 15. 

Petitioner is not, however, entitled to tolling either from the July 8, 2004, denial

of the state appellate court habeas petition to the filing on August 9, 2004, of the second state

supreme court habeas petition or from the period of time that that petition was pending, as the

July 13, 2005, state supreme court denial (Lodg. Docs. 16 & 17), cited In re: Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750

[21 Cal. Rptr.2d 509] (1993), as that petition was not a “properly filed” application so as to

provide tolling within the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 414, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2005) (“[w]hen a postconviction petition is untimely under state

law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”) Petitioner makes the

argument that the state supreme court’s citation to In re Clark, supra, without comment or a

specific page citation, makes it “impossible to determine if that court found the petition untimely

or denied it as a successive petition.” Opposition (Opp.), pp. 2. Respondent argues that whether

the state’s high court intended the In re Clark citation to signify either that the petition was

untimely or successive, the result is the same. Reply, p. 3. As the state supreme court made clear

in In re: Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 770, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 509): “a successive petition presenting

additional claims that could have been presented in an earlier attack on the judgment is, of

necessity, a delayed petition.” Under Pace, the Supreme Court held “that time limits, no matter

their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state court’s rejection of a habeas petition as

untimely, signifies that it was not “‘properly filed,’” and petitioner therefore “is not entitled to

statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).” 544 U.S. at 417, 125 S. Ct. at 1814. 

Petitioner, however, seeks to transmute the statutory timeliness issue into an

argument that somehow petitioner is being charged with a procedural default that is defectively

grounded. Petitioner, assuming the In re Clark citation to be a denial on the basis of the petition

being successive, argues that a denial on that specific basis would not constitute a ground that

was firmly established and regularly followed by state courts at that time (that is, when

petitioner’s application was denied). Opp., p. 4, citing Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 389, 122 S.

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Ct. 877 (2002) (citing to dissenting opinion for the principle that state procedures must be firmly

established and regularly followed to constitute an adequate state ground to bar federal review);

Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787, 790 (9 Cir. 2003). However, under Pace, whether the state supreme th

court meant to indicate that the petition was untimely or successive would be essentially a

distinction without a difference in the context of statutory untimeliness under AEDPA. 

Moreover, whatever procedural hurdles the state must jump when asserting procedural default,

no such hurdles have been imposed in the Pace context of refusing to find a state petition timely

for federal statutory tolling purposes.

The period of time from July 8, 2004, through July 13, 2005, amounts to 370

days. Subsequently, petitioner’s application in this court was filed on August 3, 2005, after an

additional 21 days; thus, 391 days elapsed before petitioner filed the instant petition, for which

petitioner was only entitled to 351 days of tolling; thus, this petition was filed 40 days beyond the

AEDPA statute. 

As noted, the second California Supreme Court habeas petition was denied on

July 13, 2005. However, the statute had run, minus tolling, a short time earlier, as of June 24,

2005. Therefore, petitioner must show that “extraordinary circumstances” inhibited him just

prior to and around that precise time period up to August 3, 2005, the date on which his petition

was filed here.

Thus, petitioner’s argument for timeliness rests solely on petitioner’s claims of

entitlement to equitable tolling. “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden

of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, supra, at 418, 125 S. Ct. at 1814; Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (a habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that

equitable tolling should apply to avoid dismissal of an untimely petition). “Equitable tolling is

unavailable in most cases,” and is only appropriate “if extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Miranda, supra, at 1066

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(internal quotations/citations omitted [emphasis added in Miranda]). A petitioner must reach a

“very high” threshold “to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA]...lest the exceptions swallow

the rule.” Id. 

In Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. U.S. District Court for Cent. Dist. of CA. (Kelly), 163

F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), itself abrogated by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S.202, 123

S. Ct. 1398 (2003), the Ninth Circuit found that the statute of limitations could be equitably

tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control made it impossible to file the

petition on time. “In addition, ‘[w]hen external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling may be appropriate.’”

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999).

Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because tolling should only

be granted if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible for him

to file a petition on time. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89. As held in Beeler, “[w]e have no doubt

that district judges will take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process,

and will only authorize extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” 128 F.3d at 1289. 

“Mere excusable neglect” is insufficient as an extraordinary circumstance. Miller v. New Jersey

Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 619 (3rd Cir. 1998). Moreover, ignorance of the law does

not constitute such extraordinary circumstances. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections,

800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). 

In the Calderon (Beeler) case, the Court of Appeals held that the district court

properly found equitable tolling to allow Beeler more time to file his petition. Beeler’s lead

counsel withdrew after accepting employment in another state, and much of the work he left

behind was not usable by replacement counsel – a turn of events over which the court found

Beeler had no control. The Court of Appeals held that the district court properly found these

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 See also Baskin v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 188 (D. Conn. 1998), wherein the court

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applied equitable tolling where petitioner’s attorney failed to notify him of the denial of a petition

for certiorari until thirteen months after the denial was entered.

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were “extraordinary circumstances” sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The Ninth 4

Circuit also found extraordinary circumstances in Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), supra, 163

F.3d 530. The three reasons given which independently justified tolling were: a district court

stay which prevented petitioner’s counsel from filing a habeas petition, mental incompetency

until a reasonable time after the court makes a competency determination, and the fact that

petitioner did at one time have timely habeas proceedings pending which were mistakenly

dismissed, not as a result of any doing by petitioner. Id. at 541-42. See also Corjasso v. Ayers,

278 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (clerk’s unjustified rejection of a petition justified partial tolling);

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d at 1107 (delay by prison in withdrawing funds from prisoner’s trust

account, preparing and mailing filing fee were circumstances beyond his control, qualifying him

for equitable tolling).

Conversely, in U.S. v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp. 1108, 1110-11(C.D. Cal. 1997),

the court found that a petitioner’s circumstances were not extraordinary in the following

circumstances: inability to obtain transcripts from court reporters, and general prison lockdowns

preventing the prisoner’s access to the library and a typewriter which were necessary to his

motion. See also Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9 Cir. 1988) (reliance on th

incompetence of jailhouse lawyer not sufficient to justify cause to excuse procedural default);

Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5 Cir. 1999) (prisoner’s unfamiliarity of law did not toll th

statute); Eisermann v. Penarosa, 33 F.Supp.2d 1269, 1273 (D.Haw. 1999) (lack of legal expertise

does not qualify prisoner for equitable tolling); Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F.Supp.2d 650, 656

(N.D. Tex. 1998) (same); Fadayiro v. United States, 30 F.Supp.2d 772, 779-80 (D.N.J. 1998)

(delay in receipt of transcripts does not justify equitable tolling). 

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 The court has also elsewhere seen this acronym applied to the term “Priority Library 5

User.”

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As noted, the Ninth Circuit has found that a non-English speaking petitioner’s

alleged lack of access to Spanish language materials or translation assistance during the

limitations period could entitle the petitioner to equitable tolling. Mendoza v. Carey, supra, 449

F.3d 1065.

Evidentiary Hearing

At the hearing, Irene Reyes testified that she had been employed from August 23,

2004 to September, 2006, at the HDSP B-Facility library and was the only library employee

qualified as bilingual (English/Spanish) during that period. She testified that she did not have

time to translate legal documents, just to answer quick questions, that the library was usually full

and that part of her job was to supervise inmates and to monitor the library users. Ms. Reyes did

not recall seeing legal books/references written in Spanish. She also testified on direct that there

were three inmate clerks who worked in the library, one of whom, Renato Obando, spoke

Spanish. On cross-examination, Ms. Reyes testified that the three clerks were not always in the

library but that Obando could provide language assistance. On re-direct, Ms. Reyes made clear

that her other duties, such as preparing the ducat list, compelled her to close the library by 2:30

p.m., where she worked from Tuesday to Saturday. 

During her testimony, it was made clear that in order to obtain P.L.U. (Preferred 5

Legal User) status, an inmate would have to show proof of a court deadline within thirty days. 

Lockdowns inhibited use of the library. When there was no lockdown, an inmate could give up

yard time and [be ducated to] the library on “open line.”

Petitioner was provided an interpreter at the hearing. The court accepted

petitioner’s declaration as direct testimony. Petitioner testified that he had had five years of

school in Mexico and did not attend school in the U.S. He had no instruction in English in the

county jail, but had some five to seven months of such instruction at HDSP. He testified that he

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 All exhibits were submitted as respondent’s exhibits. Exhs. A, B & C are inmate 6

request forms wherein petitioner, in English, appears to have filed requests for library access.

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cannot read or write in English, but that he does not have difficulty reading or writing in Spanish. 

Petitioner testified that correctional officers often did not allow library access, that he was often

on lockdown, that he never filled out paperwork to show that he was subject to a specific court

deadline. Other people helped him fill out paperwork. Using a dictionary and the help of others,

he copied what someone else had done. Exhs. A, B & C. When he went to the library, he was

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trying to meet people who could help him. Inmate Renato Obando was the only person who

spoke Spanish to help him. He had to borrow $150.00 from his sister to pay for Obando’s help. 

On cross-examination, petitioner confirmed that there was a lockdown in 2004,

that he thought covered a three to four-month period. Exh. E, p. 2, on the log showed that on

April 27, 2004, petitioner went to the library. Respondent’s Exhibits F, G & H showed three

different filings in state court during the period. Exh. F shows petitioner’s signature on his state

superior court habeas petition as dated April 28, 2004; Exh. G shows the petition to the state

appellate court as signed and dated June 1, 2004. (It was stipulated as filed on June 7, 2004, but

this court has given petitioner the benefit of the mailbox rule, see discussion, infra). Exh. H, the

second state supreme court habeas petition, is file-stamped August 16, 2004, and the parties

stipulated to its having been signed on August 9, 2004. Petitioner averred that he signed his

petitions but neither wrote nor understood what was written in the petitions, relying entirely on

Renato Obando. 

In a self-translated declaration under penalty of perjury stipulated for admission at

the hearing, Blanca Rangel, petitioner’s sister, confirmed petitioner’s lack of formal education

(beyond the third or fourth grade in Mexico); she stated therein that she was petitioner’s only

family in the U.S., that she is fluent in both English and Spanish, that she lives in Texas, is a

financially struggling single mother of two who earns $8.00 an hour for cleaning houses and that

she sent petitioner two money orders in 2005, one for $150.00 and one for $50, although she

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cannot now locate the receipts. See docket entry # 44. 

Respondent’s witness, Denette Jackson, HDSP Correctional Counselor II, had

been Litigation Coordinator since September, 1998. She testified that to obtain library access,

when not on lockdown, an inmate submits a request form, and a certain number of inmates are

ducated each day to the library. For open line, library hours are posted while inmates are on the

yard. On lockdown, inmates can be ducated to the library and escorted by correctional officers. 

If PLU inmates do not fill the library, then others can go. Respondent’s Exh. L shows a list of

employees who worked in Facility B with bilingual skills. Respondent’s Exhs. A, B and C 7

showed that petitioner was ducated for PLU status on 8/10/04 (stipulated). As to these requests

for library access written in English, as noted, petitioner averred that he had his dictionary to help

write them and copied what others had written. The court found it was undisputed that there

were people who spoke Spanish in the library. 

The undersigned does not reject petitioner’s representations and evidence showing

that petitioner has, if any, a very limited capacity to read or write English, that he had no

education at all in the U.S. prior to what he has received post-incarceration, or that he had to wait

to receive money from his sister in order to pay another inmate to draft or send his petitions. 

The undersigned accepts that petitioner did not understand AEDPA and did not fully understand

how to obtain PLU status, and that he was subject to some lockdowns, in 2004 and 2005.

As has been noted, the Ninth Circuit has found that a “combination of (1) a prison 

law library’s lack of Spanish-language legal materials, and (2) a petitioner’s inability to obtain

translation assistance before the one-year deadline, could constitute extraordinary

circumstances.” Mendoza, supra, 449 F.3d at 1069. The problem for petitioner, however, is that

given all of the impediments to timely filing which petitioner has labored to show, the fact of his

repeated timely filings of his state court habeas petitions fly in the face of any representation that

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his lack of understanding of English, lockdowns, difficulty in obtaining money to pay for

assistance, etc., caused the untimeliness at issue herein. 

To reiterate, petitioner, or someone on his behalf, i.e, evidently an inmate Obando,

filed petitioner’s first state supreme court habeas petition (7/16/03) before his conviction was

even final (9/9/03). Following the denial of that petition (4/14/04), only fourteen days elapsed

before petitioner’s petition to the state superior court was filed (4/28/04). After that denial

(5/21/04), it took petitioner little more than a week (6/1/04) to have his state appellate court

petition on file. Subsequent to the denial of that petition (7/8/04), one month later, petitioner

filed his second state supreme court petition (8/9/04). Once that petition was denied (7/13/05),

petitioner had his federal petition filed within three weeks (8/3/05). Thus, notwithstanding the

obstacles that petitioner has been at pains to set forth before this court, it is apparent by

petitioner’s demonstrated diligence in the filing of his state court petitions that these obstacles

were not the cause of the untimely filing in this court. As the undersigned indicated at the

hearing given petitioner’s continuous diligence, it is only reasonable to find that petitioner was

awaiting the decision by the state supreme court before filing his federal petition. For this

reason, the court sought further briefing post-hearing on the question of whether petitioner could

be entitled to equitable tolling during the period that his second petition was pending in the state

supreme court since Pace, supra, had not yet been decided for most of that period and petitioner

could not have known whether and on what basis the petition would be denied and because he

did, in fact, otherwise exercise diligence in pursuing his claims. 

Petitioner’s counsel conceded finding no case directly on point after exhaustive

research, although she points to authority for the proposition that equitable tolling is available in

extraordinary circumstances where the prisoner exercised diligence, citing Lawrence v.

Florida,__ U.S. __ ,127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007), and Pace itself (at 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 & n.

8). Petitioner’s Further Briefing (PFB), pp. 1-2. 

\\\\\

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Respondent’s counsel, in supplemental briefing, states that she has also been

unable to find any published case speaking directly to the question of whether the lack of

existence of the rule of Pace at the time an untimely petition was pending in state court entitles a

petitioner to equitable tolling. Respondent’s Supplemental Briefing (RSB), p. 2. However, in

addition to citing Pace, itself, as supporting respondent’s position (as petitioner does for his own

position), respondent noted a recent unpublished decision wherein the Ninth Circuit rejected a 8

claim for equitable tolling under Pace. In Harrison v. Campbell, No. 06-17163, 2007 WL

4038722 (9 Cir. Nov. 16, 2007) (unpub.) th

Harrison contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling because

two extraordinary obstacles made it impossible for him to file his

federal habeas petition within the time prescribed under the

AEDPA: (1) the superior court’s “unforeseeable” conclusion that

his state petition was untimely, and (2) the “unforeseeable”

application of Pace to California’s flexible timeliness standard. We

disagree. First, in Pace, the Supreme Court said that a party may

file a “protective petition” in federal court within the AEDPA

deadline in order to ensure against an unforeseeable state court

determination that a state habeas petition, which would otherwise

entitle the petitioner to statutory tolling, was untimely. Pace, 544

U.S. at 416-17. Second, Pace held that “time limits, no matter their

form, are ‘filing’ conditions” and expressly discussed the

application of this rule to a prior decision of the California

Supreme Court. Id. at 413-14, 418. We therefore affirm the district

court’s denial of equitable tolling.

The undersigned has more than passing familiarity with the Harrison case as it was assigned to

the undersigned in district court. In the August 1, 2006 Findings and Recommendations (CIV-S05-1546), the undersigned refused to find that equitable tolling would apply to a “Pace[d]”

statutory tolling situation. However, the circumstances of Harrison were much different than

those in play here. The Harrison petitioner waited nearly a year after his conviction became final

for AEDPA purposes before filing his first state petition. The undersigned reasoned that it made

no sense to apply equitable tolling to a situation where the same argument was precluded for

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statutory tolling. Such a finding made perfect sense in light of Harrison’s lack of diligence. As

the discussion below makes clear, petitioner suffered from the opposite problem – that of too

much diligence, i.e., the filing of a premature habeas petition with the California Supreme Court

even before his conviction was final.

Here, petitioner’s counsel notes, petitioner’s pro se status in proceeding to this

court. PFB, p. 3. The Ninth Circuit has recently:

reaffirm[ed] the clear principle that, even though pro se status

alone is not enough to warrant equitable tolling, it informs and

colors the lens through which we view the filings, and whether

these filings made sufficient allegations of diligence. See Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990) (“This

court recognizes that it has a duty to ensure that pro se litigators do

not lose their right to a hearing on the merits of their claim due to

ignorance of technical procedural requirements.”).

Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9 Cir. 2006). th

Here, this court has more than mere allegations to support petitioner’s diligence,

the undisputed evidence of petitioner’s state court habeas filings are lodged documents that are

part of the record of this case. The Supreme Court decided Pace on April 27, 2005. Petitioner’s

second state supreme court habeas petition was filed on August 9, 2004, and denied as

untimely/successive on July 13, 2005, less than three months after Pace issued. Petitioner filed

his federal petition within three weeks thereafter, as previously noted, on August 3, 2005. The

court recognizes that at the time this was a pro se petitioner who spoke only Spanish and had no

access to legal materials translated from English. However, petitioner, due to his diligent efforts,

evidently made contact with a bilingual inmate to assist him, securing the requisite funds for the

services of the bilingual inmate, such that his filings preceded apace, as his initial state court

habeas petition was filed in a timely fashion and each petition up the state court ladder was filed

very soon after having been denied by the court below. Moreover, the federal pro se petition was

filed very quickly following the state supreme court denial. The court finds in these unique

circumstances – that is, in light of petitioner’s demonstrated and consistent diligence – that it

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would be inequitable for this court to task petitioner with the prescience and foreknowledge to be

able to determine the basis on which his second state supreme court habeas would be denied and

to foresee that a decision not yet rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court for most of the time his

state supreme court petition was pending would have such a preclusive effect on his federal

filing. However, it is the conjunction of petitioner’s diligence with the timing of the issuance of

Pace that leads the court to this conclusion and other petitioners should in no way infer any

entitlement to equitable tolling merely because of the application of Pace to their pre-Pace state

court filings. The court will find that this petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling and will

recommend denial of respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to dismiss, filed

on June 5, 2006, be denied, and respondent be directed to file an answer within thirty days of

adoption of these findings and recommendations, should that occur.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 1/4/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

gonz1954.fr

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