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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED FIL L D STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeal, 

Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

REGGIE BANKS, SR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

KCTV-5, MEREDITH CORP., PHIL JONES, 

JOE SNELSON, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

DC:C 1 7 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER Clerk . 

No. 92-3152 

(D.C. No. 90-2261-0) 

(D. Kan.) 

Before BALDOCK and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge.*** 

**Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, District Judge, 

District Court for the District of Colorado, 

designation. 

United States 

sitting by 

Plaintiff-appellant Reggie Banks worked as a projectionist in 

the engineering department of KCTV-5, a television station owned 

* This order and j udgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within t he Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines o f the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

*** After examining the briefs and appellate r ecord, this panel 

has de termined unanimously that oral argument would not materi a lly 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9 . The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-3152 Document: 010110152656 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 1 
by the Meredith Corporation, from 1972 until he was fired in 1989. 

Banks brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17, alleging race 

discrimination in promotion, discipline, terms and conditions o f 

employment, and discharge. Banks also complained that he was 

discharged in retaliation for asserting his rights under Title 

VII. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, 

KCTV-5, the Meredith Corporation, Phil Jones, and Joe Snelson. 

Banks, proceeding prose, appeals the district court's decision. 

We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

Our review of summary judgment is de nova. We apply the same 

legal standard used by the district court, namely Rule 56 (c ) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola 

Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992), petition for 

cert. filed, 61 U. S . L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992 ) (No. 92 - 581 ) . 

Under Rule 56 (c ) , summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." We view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 

judgment. Deepwater Invs .• Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 

F . 2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 

The party moving for summary judgment must inform the court 

of the basis for its motion, and must "point to those portions o f 

the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue o f 

material fact given the relevant substantive law. " Thomas, 9 68 

F . 2d at 1024 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322-23 (1986 )) . The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party t o 

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"make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of a n 

element e ssential to that party's case, and on which that part y 

will bear the burden of proof at trial. 11 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 

at 322 . The nonmoving party must designate "specific facts 

showing there is a genuine issue for trial . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56 (e ). To withstand summary judgment, the nonmoving party must 

identify sufficient evidence "by reference to an affidavit, a 

deposition transcript or a specific exhibit " Thomas, 968 

F.2d at 1024. 

Banks claims defendants discriminated against him when they 

repeatedly denied him a promotion. In their motion for summary 

judgment, defendants argued the promotion claim is barred because 

Banks failed to file a complaint with the EEOC within the 

appropriate time limits. The district court found the promotion 

claim was untimely unless Banks could show a continuing violation. 

The court concluded that Banks failed to show a cont inuing 

violation because, although he alleged several instances of 

disc riminatory conduct, he offered no evidence that the alleged 

disc riminatory acts were related. We have reviewed the record and 

we agree that Banks has failed to show the alleged discriminatory 

a c ts were related in any way. See Allen v. Denver Pub. Sch . Bd . , 

928 F.2d 978, 984 (10th Cir. 1991) (court upheld grant of summary 

judgment to defendants when plaintiff failed to produce evidence 

that act occurring outside statuto ry period was related to o ther 

alleged acts) . 

On appeal 

disc rimination 

Banks 

support 

argues 

his 

that multiple and related acts of 

continuing violation t heory, but 

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"substantiating evidence was omitted by inadequate legal 

representation." We find no legal support, however, for the 

proposition that ineffective assistance of counsel can relieve a 

party to a civil suit from the burdens associated with opposing a 

motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e ) (party 

opposing a motion for summary judgment "must set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" ). 

Moreover, there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in 

a civil lawsuit. MacCuish v. United States, 844 F.2d 733, 735 

(10th Cir. 1988). We hold the alleged incompetence of Banks' 

attorney provides no basis for reversing the district court's 

grant of summary judgment to defendants on the promotion claim. 1 

Banks also challenges the district court's analysis of 

disparate treatment. He cites McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 

Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), for the proposition that 

an employer must apply its rules equally to employees of different 

races. The scope of his challenge, however, is not entirely clear 

from his brief. Banks brought each of his Title VII claims, with 

the exception of the retaliatory discharge claim, under a theory 

of disparate treatment by the defendants. In his statement of 

the issue on appeal, however, Banks appears to challenge only the 

1 By merely listing the terms "discipline, discharge, terms and 

conditions of employment and retaliation" in his brief immediately 

following his ineffective- assistance argument, Banks appears to 

raise this same argument as to each of his claims against the 

defendants . We will not, on the basis of ineffective assistance 

of counsel, relieve Banks from any adverse rulings of the district 

court. 

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district court's disposition of his promotion and discharge 

1 ' 2 c aims. We will only address the discharge claim because we have 

already concluded the promotion claim was untimely, and because 

neither Banks' statement nor argument of this issue discusses any 

of his other claims. 

In his complaint, Banks claimed defendants discharged him on 

account of his race and color. When alleging disparate treatment 

on the basis of race, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant 

had a discriminatory motive or intent. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 

& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988). An inference of discrimination 

arises if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 

discrimination. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 

187 (1989). To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory 

discharge a plaintiff must show that "(1) she belongs to a 

2 As his statement 

following phrases: 

of this issue, Banks merely lists 

PROMOTIONS-DISCHARGE DISPARATE TREATMENT 

the 

Appellant's Brief at 3. As his argument of this issue, Banks 

briefly discusses McDonald and refers to three sections of his 

brief in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

These three sections relate only to (1) the circumstances 

surrounding his termination, (2) whether his supervisor ever made 

a derogatory remark about blacks, and (3) the hiring and promotion 

of a white employee . Thus, Banks' challenge seems limited to the 

district court's treatment of his promotion and discharge claims. 

Accordingly, we will not consider whether the district court 

correctly granted summary judgment to defendants on Banks' 

discipline and terms and conditions of employment claims. We 

realize that Banks has appealed prose. Nevertheless, we will not 

consider matters omitted on appeal. Drake v. City of Fort 

Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (" [d]espite the 

liberal construction afforded prose pleadings, the court will not 

construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence 

of any discussion of those issues"). 

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protected class or minority; (2) she was qualified for her job; 

(3) she was terminated despite her qualifications; and (4 ) after 

she was fired, her job remained open and the employer sought 

applicants whose qualifications were no better than her 

qualifications. 11 Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Ctr., 928 

F. 2d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 1991) . 

Here, the district court found Banks had not established his 

prima facie case because he failed to show he was qualified f or 

his job. Defendants argued Banks was unqualified because he left 

work early on June 3, 1989, without notifying his supervisor, and 

furthermore, he submitted a time sheet which incorrectly stated 

that he had worked until the end of his shift. Defendants offered 

this same reason to meet their burden to articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for firing Banks. According to the 

district court, Banks failed to offer evidence that defendants 

subjected him to different qualification standards because of his 

race. The district court concluded that it, therefore, must defer 

to defendants' determination that Banks was unqualified for his 

position. 

We disagree with the district court's reasoning. We have 

stated that an employer may decide an employee's failure to follow 

the employer's policies renders the employee unqualified for her 

position, id., as long as the employer applies its policies 

evenhandedly to members of all races, McDonald v . Santa Fe Trail, 

427 U.S. at 283. We have also recognized, however, that a 

plaintiff should not, as part of her prima facie case, be required 

to overcome the employer's stated reason for discharge . See 

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MacDonald v . Eastern Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1119, 

1121 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting an employer's attempt to use its 

stated reasons for discharge to defeat plaintiff's prima facie 

case of discriminatory discharge on the basis of age ) . With 

regard to a plaintiff's burden to establish she is qualified f or 

her position, we explained that 

a plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of 

discrimination in a discharge case by credible evidence 

that she continued to possess the objective 

qualifications she held when she was hired, or by her 

own testimony that her work was satisfactory, even when 

disputed by her employer, or by evidence that she had 

held her position for a significant period of time. 

Id. at 1121 (citations omitted) . The record shows that Banks was 

a projectionist for more than fifteen years. The district court 

incorrectly concluded that Banks failed to show he was qualified 

for his position. 

Nevertheless, for reasons other than those relied upon by the 

district court, we affirm summary judgment on the discharge claim. 

United States v. Corral , 970 F.2d 719, 726 n . 5 (10th Cir. 

1992) (appellate court may affirm judgment on grounds supported by 

the record and law, but not relied upon by the district court). 

Defendants' attack on Banks' prima facia case was not limited t o 

challenging his qualifications. They also charged that Banks 

could not e stablish he was terminated under circumstances which 

give rise to an inference of discrimination. To establish a prima 

facie case of disparate treatme nt, the plaintiff must prove 

circumstances sufficient to give rise to an inference of unlawful 

discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 45 0 

U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981) . In the context of a discriminatory 

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discharge claim, one of the circumstances the plaintiff must prove 

is that after termination, "her job remained open and the employer 

sought applicants whose qualifications were no better than her 

qualifications." Trujillo, 928 F.2d at 977. After reviewing the 

record, we find Banks failed to present any evidence to establish 

this element of his prima facie case. We, therefore, affirm 

summary judgment on the discharge claim on the grounds that Banks 

failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element of his 

prima facie case. 

We find no merit to the remaining arguments Banks raises in 

his prose brief. We need not determine whether Banks could have 

prevailed had he raised his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because 

he did not present a§ 1983 claim to the district court. Farmers 

Ins. Co. v . Hubbard, 869 F.2d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1989 ) (issues not 

properly raised below will not be considered on appeal). 

Regarding Banks' complaint about paying defendants' costs, we 

affirm the district court's order for defendants to recover their 

costs from Banks. Costs are allowed "as of course to the 

prevailing party" under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure . And, finally, regarding Banks' attack on the 

partiality of the district court judge who granted summary 

judgment to defendants, we find no support for this charge in the 

record. 

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The judgment of the United States District Court f or t he 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

Entere d for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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