Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03395/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03395-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lori E. Didway, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-3395-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff brought this action seeking review of the Social Security Administration's

decision that plaintiff is not eligible for benefits after November 26, 2003. The court has

before it plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (doc. 14), defendant's response (doc. 19)

and cross-motion for summary judgment (doc. 20), and plaintiff's response and reply (doc.

25). 

I

Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits on August 9, 2002, alleging that

she became disabled on February 21, 2002, based on a combination of physical and

psychological impairments, including severe degenerative disease with neck pain, migraine

headaches, fibromyalgia, poor memory and concentration, anxiety and depression.

Following a hearing on February 1, 2005, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a

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decision finding plaintiff disabled for a closed period of time, from February 21, 2002

through November 26, 2003. Tr. at 14. The ALJ concluded that beginning November 26,

2003, the plaintiff exhibited the ability to return to light work and was no longer disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Id. The decision became the final decision

of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review.

Plaintiff contends that her disability extends beyond November 26, 2003, and therefore she

filed this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

A district court may set aside a denial of benefits "only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954

(9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence which, considering the record as

a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Where the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the

ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Id. (citation omitted). 

II

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the combination of

impairments at step three of the sequential evaluation process when he concluded that the

impairments are not severe enough to meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed

in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. At step three, if the medical severity of a claimant's

impairments meet or equal one of the listings in Appendix 1 of the regulations, then the

claimant is conclusively disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that plaintiff did not meet the

requirements of Listing 12.05C, entitled "Mental Retardation." In order to meet Listing

12.05C, a claimant must have a valid IQ below 70 and another physical or other mental

impairment that imposes additional and significant work-related limitations. The evidence

shows that plaintiff's full scale IQ is 75. Therefore, from the face of the regulation, plaintiff

cannot meet Listing 12.05C because her IQ is greater than 70. 

Plaintiff, however, relies on Program Operation Manual System ("POMS") section

DI 24515.056(D)(1)(c), an internal Social Security document, which provides that "slightly

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1

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's failure to discuss each of the factors set forth in 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) is legal error. But plaintiff has cited no authority (nor have we found

any) to support the proposition that the ALJ must independently and expressly discuss each

of the factors for his consideration of a treating source opinion to pass muster. 

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higher IQ's (e.g., 70-75) in the presence of other physical or mental disorders that impose

additional and significant work-related limitation of function may support an equivalence

determination." Plaintiff contends that her full scale IQ is 75, and that she suffers from

affective disorder, anxiety disorder, cervical spine disorder, fibromyalgia and a history of

headaches, and therefore she fits within the description set forth in the POMS. But this

provision is contrary to the plain language of the regulation. The POMS, while persuasive

authority, was promulgated "without Congressional authorization or the protections

surrounding formal rule making" and does not have the force of law. Briggs v. Sullivan, 886

F.2d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 1989); Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1005

(9th Cir. 2006). Policies authorized by the POMS that "go beyond the SSA's governing

statute and regulations" are not valid. Warre, 439 F.3d at 1005 n.3 (citing Briggs, 886 F.2d

at 1144). These internal guidelines cannot raise the bar in the regulations from 70 to 75. The

ALJ did not err at step three of the sequential evaluation process.

III

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the opinion of Dr.

Williams, her treating physician. Because the medical opinion of a claimant's treating

physician is entitled to special weight, an ALJ may reject controverted testimony of a treating

physician only if he provides "specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record for so doing." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quotation omitted). In making his determination, the ALJ will consider the factors set forth

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).1

The ALJ concluded that plaintiff was disabled from her alleged onset date until

November 26, 2003, acknowledging that her neck pain was serious enough to require surgery

on June 20, 2003. However, based on the record as a whole, the ALJ concluded that

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2

Though the January 29, 2004 letter contains Dr. Williams' name, it is only signed by

a physician's assistant. 

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following surgery plaintiff improved to the point that she could perform sedentary and light

work. Tr. at 21. This conclusion conflicts with Dr. Williams' June 3, 2004 opinion that

plaintiff could sit, stand and walk less than one hour each in a workday and lift and carry less

than ten pounds. Tr. at 163. The ALJ's conclusion also conflicts with a January 29, 2004

letter from a physician's assistant in Dr. Williams' office, stating that plaintiff was "100%

disabled."2

 Tr. at 165. 

The ALJ discounted Dr. Williams' opinion because it was inconsistent with the

remainder of the record. For example, Dr. Timothy Harrington, plaintiff's surgeon, reported

that following surgery she was "back to normal" neurologically, her X-rays looked "quite

good," and her neck had a "good range of motion." Tr. at 16, 136, 138. He recommended

only massage therapy for plaintiff's complaints of pain and stiffness and an evaluation for her

headaches. Tr. at 136, 138. On November 26, 2003, consultative physician, Malcom

McPhee, M.D., concluded that plaintiff was capable of performing light work, lifting 20

pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, standing or walking 6 hours in an 8-hour day,

sitting for 6 hours with changes in position briefly every hour because of her subjective pain.

Tr. at 145. On January 8, 2004, the state agency reviewing physician also opined that

plaintiff was capable of performing light work. Tr. at 17, 198-205. 

Moreover, the treatment notes from Dr. Williams' clinic, Squaw Peak Family

Physicians, did not show significant treatment for fibromyalgia, headache or joint pain after

November 26, 2003. Tr. at 267-72. In fact, plaintiff was often treated for conditions

unrelated to her disability claim. None of the treatment notes from the Squaw Peak clinic are

indicative of total disability. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001)

(treating physician's opinion properly rejected where treatment notes failed to present "the

sort of description and recommendations one would expect to accompany a finding that [the

claimant] was totally disabled under the Act"). 

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3

We also note that physician's assistant Smerko is not an acceptable medical source

whose opinion is entitled to controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a).

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The ALJ also considered plaintiff's mental condition and noted that Dr. John Storie

made findings indicating that plaintiff could perform more than simple work. Tr. at 155. On

January 9, 2004, a state agency physician concluded that plaintiff was not significantly

limited by any mental impairment. Tr. at 194-96. The ALJ disregarded the conclusions of

Kathleen Smerko, a psychiatric nurse practitioner, who submitted inconsistent mental

impairment reports. On December 4, 2002, Ms. Smerko opined that there were no limitations

whatsoever. Tr. at 159-61. On April 8, 2004, Smerko's report indicated moderately severe

limitation in the ability to understand, carry out, and remember instruction and severe

impairment in the ability to deal with customary work pressures. Tr. at 156-57. Smerko's

January 20, 2005 report indicated more moderate limitations. Tr. at 240-41. Based on the

significant inconsistencies among the reports, without any objective basis for the

discrepancies, the ALJ properly disregarded Smerko's conclusions entirely.3

 Tr. at 20. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record to reject the opinion of plaintiff's

treating physician. 

IV

We next consider whether the ALJ properly determined that plaintiff's subjective

complaints of pain and functional limitations were not wholly credible for the period

beginning November 26, 2003. An ALJ is entitled to use ordinary techniques of credibility

evaluation. However, because pain testimony is inherently subjective, the ALJ may not

reject such testimony unless he makes specific factual findings that support the conclusions.

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th Cir. 1991). "When evidence reasonably

supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ's decision, we may not substitute our

judgment for that of the ALJ." Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196

(9th Cir. 2004). 

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Here, the ALJ set forth sufficiently specific findings in support of the credibility

determination. First, the ALJ found that the medical evidence did not fully support plaintiff's

allegations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b) (medical evidence must reasonably support

subjective claims). Plaintiff's surgeon found her to be neurologically normal by September

2003, and two examining and two reviewing physicians made findings indicative of an

ability to work. Based on the medical records regarding mental impairments, her testimony

that she was disoriented and could not drive for fear she would not be "able to find her way

home" was exaggerated. Tr. at 20. Plaintiff reported that she had no limitations in her

activities of daily living, Tr. at 18, 151, that she cooked and shopped with her husband's

assistance, Tr. at 151, and that she was able to drive. See SSR 95-5p; Batson, 359 F.3d at

1196 (daily activities is a permissible factor to consider in evaluating subjective complaints

of pain). The ALJ also noted that within a year of her surgery she went back to work. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the ALJ permissibly found that plaintiff's

testimony was not wholly credible. 

V

Finally, plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly rely on the vocational expert's

(VE) testimony. In particular, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the VE's

conclusion that if plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain were considered in full, she would

be unable to perform her past work or any other work. But as previously discussed, the ALJ

properly discounted plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ's conclusion that she could perform her past relevant

work is inconsistent with the VE's testimony that an IQ of 75 would preclude a person from

performing as a bookkeeper. Tr. at 347. But this conclusion is belied by the fact that

plaintiff had in fact performed work as a bookkeeper for fifteen years. Moreover, the VE

also testified that an IQ score alone is not determinative of functional ability. Tr. at 349.

Finally, the ALJ also concluded that even if plaintiff could not return to her past relevant

work, that someone with her residual functional capacity could perform other jobs, such as

a cashier. The court properly relied on the VE's testimony. 

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VI

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports

the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff was not disabled after November 26, 2003.

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendant's cross-motion for summary

judgment (doc. 20) and DENYING plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (doc. 14). IT

IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING plaintiff's motion to enlarge time (doc. 23). 

DATED this 2nd day of March, 2007.

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