Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05459/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05459-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The City and County of San Francisco filed an objection to Plaintiffs’ joinder, arguing that it

should be stricken as untimely because it was filed after briefing on the Motion was completed and did

not allowed Defendant the opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs’ arguments. The Court overrules

Defendant’s objection and declines to strike the joinder. Because the hearing was continued for a week

and The City and County of San Francisco was permitted to file a supplemental brief, Plaintiffs’ joinder

does not prejudice Defendant.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARYLON BOYD, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

ET AL.,

Defendants. _____________________________________/

No. C-04-5459 MMC (JCS)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

QUASH OR MODIFY SUBPOENA AND

FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER BY

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS [Docket No. 64]

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 4, 2005, Defendant City and County of San Francisco served on the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) two subpoenas for the medical records of

Cammerin Boyd, whose death is the subject of this civil rights action. CDCR brings a Motion to

Quash or Modify Subpoena and for a Protective Order (“the Motion”), in which Plaintiffs have

joined.1

 The Court finds that the Motion is suitable for disposition without oral argument, pursuant

to Local Rule 7-1(b). Accordingly, the hearing on the Motion scheduled for May 26, 2006 at

9:30 a.m. is vacated. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Plaintiffs allege that on May 5, 2004, Cammerin Boyd, who was an African-American man

and a double amputee with prosthetic legs below the knee, was shot to death by officers of the San

Francisco Police Department. Complaint at ¶ 17, 20. According to Plaintiffs, Cammerin Boyd, after

being pursued in his car by police, stopped and exited his car on a residential street in order to

surrender. Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19. Plaintiffs allege that although Boyd told police officers that he had no

legs, and although Boyd could neither run nor get down on the ground, the officers shot him. Id. at ¶

20. 

Plaintiffs assert federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with

Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.), as well as state law claims for wrongful death (Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60), negligence and negligent hiring, supervision and retention. Plaintiffs are

the mother and children of Cammerin Boyd. 

On November 4, 2005, Defendant served CDCR with two subpoenas seeking production of

records pertaining to Cammerin Boyd. See Declaration of Suzanne Foley Sprague in Support of

Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena and for a Protective Order (“Sprague Decl.”), ¶ 3 & Exs. A

and B. The first subpoena was served on the CDCR Archive Unit and seeks the following

documents:

Any and all medical records pertaining to Cammerin Boyd, DOB:

02/04/1975, SS#:, including any and all billing records, including

payments received, write-offs and adjustments, [a]ny and all original

xrays, MRI films and CT scans, including all records from California

Dept of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . 

Id., Ex. A. The second subpoena was served on CDCR’s California Institution for Men and seeks

the following documents:

Any and all medical records pertaining to Cammerin Boyd,

DOB:02/04, SS#:, including any and all billing records, including

payments received, write-offs and adjustments. Any and all original

xrays, MRI films and CT scans.

Id., Ex. B. In connection with the subpoenas, the City and County of San Francisco sought a release

from Plaintiffs allowing CDCR to produce the requested records. Declaration of Scott Wiener in

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Support of Defendants’ Opposition to California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations’

Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena and for a Protective Order (“Wiener Decl.”), ¶¶ 5, 6 & Exs.

C, D. However, Plaintiffs did not respond and have not agreed to a release. Id. at ¶ 7. 

Consequently, CDCR refused to produce the records sought in the subpoenas. Wiener Decl., ¶ 4 &

Ex. B.

B. The Motion

In its Motion, CDCR asserts that the subpoenas should be quashed, or in the alternative,

modified, because they are overbroad and request information that is protected as private. CDCR

cites to California Civil Code section 56 (the “Confidentiality of Medical Information Act”),

California Health and Safety Code § 121070 and the federal Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), Pub.L. No.104-191, 110 Stat.1936 (1996). CDCR also requests that

the Court issue a protective order if it is required to produce any medical records. Finally, it

suggests that it may be appropriate for the Court to conduct an in camera review of the documents.

Plaintiffs join in CDCR’s motion. In addition to the arguments raised by the CDCR,

Plaintiffs cite to the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence as a basis for granting the Motion. Plaintiffs assert that that privilege applies because

Plaintiffs have not waived it by placing Cammerin Boyd’s mental state in issue. Plaintiffs further

assert that Defendant’s theory of relevance concerning Boyd’s state of mind – that at the time of the

relevant events he was attempting to commit “suicide by cop” – fails because there is no competent

evidence that this was his intent.

In its opposition to the motion, the City and County of San Francisco asserts that the

documents it seeks should be produced because they are relevant and are not privileged, and all

HIPAA requirements have been met. Defendant advances three theories of relevance. First,

Defendant asserts that Boyd’s medical records are relevant to damages that may be claimed under

California’s Wrongful Death statute, including financial support Boyd would have contributed to his

family over the course of his life, the value of his household services and loss of his love and

companionship. In particular, California law allows a jury to consider the decedent’s life

expectancy, taking into account his health habits and lifestyle as well as any suicidal or selfCase 3:04-cv-05459-MMC Document 91 Filed 05/18/06 Page 3 of 10
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destructive impulses in determining these amounts. Second, Defendant asserts that the records

sought are relevant to Boyd’s ability to drop to the ground in response to police commands, as well

as his ability to flee from the scene, which is directly relevant to Boyd’s state of mind at the time he

was shot. Third, Defendant asserts that these documents (particularly the mental health records) are

relevant to the question of whether Boyd may have committed “suicide by cop.”

On the question of privilege, Defendant divides the records sought into two categories:

medical records and psychotherapist-patient records. With respect to the former, Defendant asserts

that federal law applies because Plaintiffs assert both federal and state law claims, and that under

federal law, there is no physician-patient privilege. With respect to the psychotherapist-patient

records, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has waived that privilege by placing Boyd’s mental state at

the time of the shooting in issue and by seeking damages that could be affected by his mental

condition.

Defendant asserts that to the extent HIPAA may limit disclosure of medical records,

Defendant has complied with its requirements and therefore, HIPAA does not prevent disclosure of

the documents. In particular, Defendant notes that it issued valid subpoenas for the records, that it

served copies of the subpoenas on Plaintiffs and that at the time of Defendant’s Opposition,

Plaintiffs had not filed a motion for a protective order or opposed the subpoenas. In addition,

Defendant asserts that disclosure complies with the relevant requirements of Rule 26 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure because the documents are relevant and any privilege that might have

obtained has been waived.

Finally, Defendant argues that the Motion should be denied because it is untimely. In

particular, CDCR did not object to the subpoenas within fourteen days of the date on which they

were served or prior to the noticed depositions.

In its supplemental brief addressing the arguments raised in Plaintiffs’ joinder, Defendant

argues that there is already some evidence that Cammerin Boyd committed suicide by cop and

therefore, that the psychotherapist-patient records are relevant. Defendant further asserts that

Plaintiffs waived any privilege when they asserted that Cammerin Boyd was attempting to surrender

rather than committing suicide by cop.

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Choice of Law

Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows:

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States

or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme

Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness,

person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be

governed by the principles of the common law as they may be

interpreted by the Courts of the United States in the light of reason and

experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to

an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the

rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State,

or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with

State law.

Fed. R. Evid. 501. Thus, under Rule 501, it is clear that federal claims asserted in a federal question

case are governed by federal common law. Further, it is been held that where state law claims

overlap with federal claims in a federal question case such that particular documents are relevant to

both the state and the federal claims, federal privilege law also applies. Wm. T. Thompson, Co. v.

Gen. Nutrition Corp., Inc., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3rd Cir.1982); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp.,

77 F.R.D. 455, 458-459 (N.D. Cal. 1978). On the other hand, where the documents sought are

relevant only to pendant state law claims and not to the federal claims in a federal question case, at

least one court has held that state privilege law applies. See Platypus Wear, Inc. v. K.D. Co., Inc.,

905 F. Supp. 808, 811 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that state privilege law applied to state law claim in

federal question case where the evidence sought went only to state law theories of liability and the

plaintiff had advanced no theory under which the evidence could be relevant to the federal claims in

the case). 

B. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may obtain

discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” 

Rule 26(b)(1) further provides that “[r]elevant information need not be admissible at trial if the

discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” 

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 To the extent that any medical records involve mental health treatment, they are considered

psychotherapist-patient records for the purposes of this motion.

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C. Medical Records2

The City and County of San Francisco seeks medical records based on two theories of

relevance: 1) Cammerin Boyd’s ability to run away from the scene and/or to comply with police

demands that he drop to the ground are relevant to the reasonableness of the police officers’ actions;

and 2) Cammerin Boyd’s health and lifestyle are relevant to damages on Plaintiff’s wrongful death

claim. With respect to the former theory, the Court concludes that at least some medical records,

namely, those that are related to Boyd’s mobility, are relevant to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. A central

issue raised by those claims is whether the police officers acted reasonably in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that all

§ 1983 excessive force claims involving arrests and investigatory stops are governed by the

reasonableness standard that applies to Fourth Amendment violations). Plaintiffs have suggested the

officers did not act reasonably because they knew Boyd had prosthetic legs and therefore could not

run away or drop to the ground. Thus, medical records relating to Boyd’s mobility may be relevant

to the outcome on these claims.

Boyd’s medical records may also be relevant to the damages sought by Plaintiffs on their

wrongful death claim. Under California law, medical conditions that might affect life expectancy

can be considered in determining wrongful death damages. See Allen v. Toledo, 109 Cal. App. 3d

415, 424 (1980) (“the life expectancy of the deceased is a question of fact for the jury to decide

considering all relevant factors including the deceased’s health, lifestyle and occupation”). 

Therefore, Boyd’s medical records are relevant to Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim.

Because the documents sought are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, they must be produced

unless they are privileged. In determining whether the medical records sought by the City and

County of San Francisco are privileged, the Court must determine whether state or federal privilege

law applies. As discussed above, to the extent the documents sought are relevant to a federal claim

or to both a state and federal claim, it is established that federal privilege law applies. Because

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 In light of the Court’s finding that disclosure is required under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, disclosure of Cammerin Boyd’s medical records does not violate HIPAA. Under

HIPAA, “a covered entity may use or disclose protected health information to the extent that such use

or disclosure is required by law and the use or disclosure complies with and is limited to the relevant

requirements of such law.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(1).

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documents relating to Cammerin Boyd’s mobility are relevant to Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, it is clear that these documents are governed by federal privilege law. See Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. at 395 (holding that reasonableness inquiry requires “careful attention to the facts

and circumstances of each particular case, including . . . whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting

to evade arrest by flight”). Because there is no physician-patient privileged under federal law, see

Hutton v. City of Martinez, 219 F.R.D. 164, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2003), these documents must be

produced.

On the other hand, the only theory of relevance advanced by Defendant as to medical records

unrelated to Boyd’s mobility is based on Plaintiffs’ state law wrongful death claim. The Court finds

no clear Ninth Circuit authority addressing whether, under these circumstances, federal or state

privilege law should be applied. The Court concludes, however, that the documents should be

produced regardless of whether state or federal privilege law applies. First, as stated above, there is

no physician-patient privilege under federal law. Second, even if state privilege law applies,

California courts have held that under California law the physician-patient privilege is waived

where, as here, a plaintiff has placed those records in issue by seeking damages that may be affected

by the patient’s medical condition. See In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 433-434 (1970). Therefore,

any privilege that might exist under California law as to Boyd’s medical records has been waived.

Accordingly, the CDCR is required to produce all of the medical records sought by the City

and County of San Francisco.3

C. Psychotherapist Records

The City and County of San Francisco asserts that Boyd’s psychotherapist records are

relevant to both Plaintiffs’ damages on the wrongful death claim (because any fault on the part of

Boyd is attributable to the surviving plaintiffs in a wrongful death action) and to Boyd’s state of

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mind at the time of the events, which in turn goes to whether the officers involved acted reasonably

for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. The Court agrees. Because these records are relevant

to both Plaintiffs’ state and federal claims, federal privilege law applies. 

In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court held that there exists a psychotherapist-patient

privilege under federal common law. 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996). Specifically, “confidential

communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or

treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence.” Id. The Court expressly rejected the balancing approach that some courts had taken in

determining whether such a privilege applied. Id. at 17. It acknowledged, however, that the

privilege could be waived. Id. at 15, n. 14.

In the wake of Jaffee, courts have struggled to determine the circumstances under which

waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege occurs. See Fitzgerald v. Cassill, 216 F.R.D. 632,

640 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (reviewing case law addressing waiver). Some courts have taken a broad

approach to waiver, finding, for example, that mere assertion of a claim for emotional distress

damages is enough to justify a finding of waiver. See id. (citing Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co.,

170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Penn. 1997); Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999)). 

These cases focus on fairness considerations. Id. Other courts have taken a narrow approach,

holding that there must be an affirmative reliance on the psychotherapist-patient communication

before the privilege is waived. See id. (citing Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D.

Mass. 1997)). These latter cases are based on the primacy of the privacy interest that is inherent in

the privilege. Id. Finally, some courts have taken a “limited broad view” in which they have found

waiver where a plaintiff has alleged more than “garden variety” emotional distress and has instead

alleged emotional distress that is “complex” or has resulted in specific disorders. Id. at 637 (citing

Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 504.07[8] & n. 22.4).

This court finds persuasive the reasoning in Fitzgerald, in which the court concluded that the

broad and “limited broad” views of waiver are not consistent with Jaffee. Id. at 637-640. Those

approaches are not sufficiently protective of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and come too close

to the type of balancing that the Supreme Court so emphatically rejected in Jaffee. Rather, the

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 The Court also declines to find waiver on the basis that CDCR’s objection was untimely. It

is evident from the record that after the subpoenas were served, CDCR informed Defendant it needed

a release from Plaintiffs. There is no indication that Defendant informed CDCR that such a consent

would not be forthcoming and indeed, Defendant did not send a written request to Plaintiffs for such

a consent until December 16, 2005. In light of the uncertainty surrounding Plaintiffs’ possible release,

the Court concludes that any delay on the part CDCR in objecting the subpoenas does not provide a

sufficient basis on which to find waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See In re DG

Acquisition Corp., 151 F.3d 75, 81 (noting that courts are often reluctant to find waiver of privilege on

the basis of inaction).

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narrow approach best embodies the goals set forth in Jaffee. Applying that approach here, the Court

finds no waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. While documents tending to show that

Cammerin Boyd intended to commit suicide would certainly be relevant to the “suicide by cop”

defense the City and County of San Francisco would like to assert, nothing in Plaintiffs’ own claims

placed such communications in issue.4

 

Accordingly, the Motion is granted as to the psychotherapist-patient records.

D. Protective Order

CDCR and Plaintiffs have requested entry of a protective order if this Court compels the

production of any documents sought by the City and County of San Francisco. The City and County

of San Francisco objects to the terms of the protective order sought by Plaintiffs, arguing that they

are overly restrictive. In particular, Defendant objects to the provisions: 1) prohibiting disclosure to

any defendant; and 2) limiting access to the courtroom if these documents are discussed at trial. 

With respect to the first objection, the Court rules that any medical records produced subject to the

protective order shall be designated Attorneys’ and Experts Eyes Only. Issues regarding access to

the courtroom shall be determined by the trial judge. 

The parties are directed to meet and confer regarding a final form of order for signature by

the undersigned magistrate judge.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The

following documents sought by Defendant City and County of San Francisco shall be produced: all

medical records sought in the subpoenas served on CDCR, dated November 4, 2005, except for

records that contain communications between Cammerin Boyd and any licensed mental health care

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professional made in the course of seeking treatment. The parties are directed to meet and confer

within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order regarding a proposed protective order, which shall

be submitted to the Court for approval no later than twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2006

___________________________ JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

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