Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-02039/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-02039-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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1 04cv2039 J (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHUONG DOAN, et al.,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security Administration,

 Defendant.

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Case No. 04cv2039 J (RBB)

Case No. 04cv2039 J (RBB)

1) DISMISSING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS AND MOTION IN LIMINE

TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF BIAS; OR

ALTERNATIVELY MOTION TO

REMAND TO COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY; 

2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS AND/OR DISQUALIFY

PHUONG DOAN AND JOSE HERNANDEZ

AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVES; 

3) DISMISSING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO

DISMISS ALL POTENTIAL CLASS

MEMBERS WHO FAILED TO COMPLY

WITH STATUTES OF

LIMITATION/ADMINISTRATIVE

EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENTS

Before the Court is Defendant Michael J. Astrue’s, Social Security Administrator 

(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Bias; or

Alternatively, Motion to Remand to Commissioner of Social Security; (2) Motion to Dismiss and/or

Disqualify Phuong Doan and Jose Hernandez as Class Representatives ; and (3) Motion for

Case 3:04-cv-02039-DMS-RBB Document 153 Filed 01/29/08 Page 1 of 11
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Summary Judgment to Dismiss All Potential Class Members who Failed to Comply with Statutes

of Limitation/Administrative Exhaustion Requirements. After careful review of the moving papers

and the argument presented at a hearing held before the Court on January 22, 2008, the Court

DISMISSES without prejudice Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine to Exclude

Evidence of Bias; or Alternatively, Motion to Remand to Commissioner of Social Security,

GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and/or Disqualify Phuong Doan and Jose Hernandez as

class representatives, and DISMISSES without prejudice Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment to Dismiss all Potential Class Members who Failed to Comply with Statutes of

Limitation/Administrative Exhaustion Requirements. 

Background

Plaintiff Doan is a claimant for federal Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. 

(See Order Grant’g Mot. to Amend. Compl. at 1.) Her application for SSI benefits was denied

by Administrative Law Judge New (“ALJ New”). (See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Certific’n at 2.) On

October 12, 2004, after having exhausted all administrative remedies, Plaintiff Doan challenged

Defendant’s adoption of ALJ New’s decision by filing the instant class action on behalf of

herself and “all claimants for ... [SSI] benefits whose claims had been assigned to [ALJ New] ...

and had their claims denied or dismissed by ALJ [New].” (Compl. at 11-22.) ALJ New, who

separated from the Social Security Administration in May of 2003, is now deceased. (See Def.’s

Mem. Opp’n Certific’n at 1.). 

On January 18, 2005, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for lack of

jurisdiction and failure to meet the class certification requirements. [Doc. No. 9.] The Court

denied the Motion, finding that jurisdiction exists under the Social Security Act Section 405(g)

and that Plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for class certification. (See Order Denying

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6, 11-12.) On June 10, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend

Complaint to add additional representatives. [Doc. No. 21.] Additionally, on November 30,

2005, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification, asking that the Court certify the class as:

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“All claimants for Title II Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits or Title XIV

Supplemental Security Income whose claims were denied or dismissed by ALJ New.” (Pls.’

Mem. Supp. Mot. for Certific’n of Class at 3.)

On January 23, 2006, the Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint. [Doc. No. 54.] The Court found that two of the

proposed representatives’, Ms. Huynh and Ms. Lam, claims were barred by the doctrine of res

judicata because they were plaintiffs in a previously litigated class action suit, La v. Barnhart,

03cv1375-W(AJB) (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2003). This suit, which also alleged bias by ALJ New,

was dismissed. (See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Pl.’s Mot. to Amend. Compl. at

4, 8.) However, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion as to Plaintiff Hernandez, adding him as a

class representative. (See id. at 11.) On August 21, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion

for Class Certification, certifying the class as:

[A[ll claimants for Title II Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits or Title XIV

Supplemental Security Income whose claims had been assigned to ALJ New and have

had their claims denied or dismissed by ALJ New, with the exception of claimants

whose claims are time barred under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(Order Granting Pls.’ Mot. for Class Certific’n at 9-10) (emphasis added)) 

After Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration pertaining to the scope of the defined

class, the Court modified its ruling on March 5, 2007 explaining as follows:

the statute-of-limitations issues is not so clear-cut as to justify a resolution without

affording Plaintiffs the opportunity to delineate further a factual basis for equitable

tolling with respect to the unnamed Plaintiffs . . . . Accordingly, at this point, the

Court FINDS it unnecessary to include the time-barred exception for purposes of the

class definition. 

(Docket No. 84, pg. 9). Based on that reasoning, the Court temporarily re-defined the class as:

all claimaints for Title II Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits or Title XIV

Supplemental Security Income whose claims had been assigned to ALJ New and have

had their claims denied or dismissed by ALJ New, except that the class shall not

include any person who has prosecuted any action in federal court in which the issue

of ALJ New’s alleged bias or predisposition to deny claims was addressed and

determined. (Docket No. 84, page 10, lines 4-9). 

Plaintiff’s are currently seeking a “declaratory judgment that ALJ New was biased against

them and had deprived them of their right to fair hearings before an impartial judge in violation

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of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 551 et seq., and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (Pls.’ Mem. Supp.

Certific’n at 2.) Moreover, Plaintiffs seek an order directing Defendant to assign new social

security administrative law judges for de novo hearings of their applications for SSI benefits.

(Id.) 

Legal Standards

a. Motion to Dismiss

Dismissal of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate only

where it “‘appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A complaint may be

dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2)

insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.

2001). In reviewing the motion, the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and

must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Gompper v. VISX,

Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 

b. Motion in Limine

“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the

practice has developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of

trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held:

There is no need in this case to decide when, during the pretrial proceedings or the

trial a motion in limine should be made, or when it should be ruled upon. The matter

should be left to the discretion of the trial court with a reminder that advance planning

helps both parties and the court. Trial by ambush may produce good anecdotes for

lawyers to exchange at bar conventions, but tends to be counterproductive in terms

of judicial economy. . . . Motions in limine have proven their value in litigation. They

save jury time, and avoid the waste that sometimes results from haste when side-bar

matters have to be urged in the course of the trial. 

Accordingly, it is appropriate to grant a motion in limine if it limits the waste of judicial

resources. 

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5 04cv2039 J (RBB)

c. Motion to Remand

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may “at any time order additional

evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security” upon a showing that there is

new evidence which is material, and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such

evidence into the record in a prior proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Furthermore, “[s]uch

additional or modified findings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the extent

provided for review of the original findings of fact and decision.” Id.

d. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure on “all or any part” of a claim where there is an absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (c);

see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the

governing substantive law, the fact might affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735

(9th Cir. 1997). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

When making its determination, the Court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying

facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy

this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

showing sufficient to establish an element to that party’s case on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to discharge this initial

burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving

party’s evidence. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

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If the moving party meets the initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to

“set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is not

sufficient.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (if the moving party meets this

initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by merely demonstrating

“that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”). It is insufficient for the party

opposing summary judgment to “rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(3). Rather, the party opposing summary judgment must “by her own

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e)). “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude

a grant of summary judgment.” See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, the Court is not obligated “to scour the records in

search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing Richards v. Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)). “[T]he district court

may limit its review to the documents submitted for purposes of summary judgment and those

parts of the record specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sc. Dist.,

237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).

 “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing First

Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). Moreover, “[a] district

court must enter summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish an essential element of a claim, even if genuine factual disputes exist regarding other

elements of the claim.” Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (E.D.

Wash. 2002) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.)

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1 [See e.g., Doc. No. 117.] In this Minute Order, Magistrate Judge Brooks orders Defendant to

provide responses to Plaintiffs’ three remaining interrogatories upon receiving an order from this Court

on Defendant’s instant motions. These interrogatories require Defendant to provide the names and

contact information of ALJ New’s former law clerks, former secretaries, and former colleagues, all

information that may provide further insight into ALJ New’s administrative record. 

7 04cv2039 J (RBB)

Discussion

I. Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Bias; or

Alternatively, Motion to Remand to Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant argues that the express language of Section 405(g) limits the Court’s review of

ALJ decisions. [Doc. No. 121 at 3.] In support of his argument, Defendant cites Richardson v.

Perales which provides that in a Section 405(g) lawsuit, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of

Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....” 402 U.S.

389, 399-400 (1971). Defendant interprets this to preclude a district court from assuming a factfinding role in the determination of bias on the part of an ALJ. [Doc. No. 121 at 3.] Instead, a court

must apply a substantial evidence standard when reviewing the record for bias. Id. Defendant

argues that this Court is unable to apply this standard to the instant action because the Commissioner

was never afforded the opportunity to develop evidence of the presence or absence of bias on the

part of ALJ New. (Id.) Accordingly, Defendant argues, the Court is statutorily prohibited from

admitting or considering any evidence of bias raised by Plaintiffs. (Id.)

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that Defendant’s motion is improper because Plaintiffs have

not been afforded the opportunity to discover what practices or steps have been taken with regards

to ALJ’s administrative record. [Doc. No. 137 at 14.] Plaintiff requests that the Court allow the

parties to continue discovery before reaching a determination on this motion. (Id. at 7.) The Court

finds Plaintiffs’ argument to be persuasive. As the Court noted in its Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Modification of the Class, the procedures undertaken with regards to ALJ New’s administrative

record are not so clear-cut as to justify a resolution against Plaintiffs in the preliminary stages of this

action. [Doc. No. 84 at 9.] This is especially the case because there is still discovery to be

completed.1

 Defendant’s motion is premature and, accordingly, the Court DISMISSES without

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prejudice Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Bias, or

Alternatively, Motion to Remand to Commissioner of Social Security. 

II. Motion to Dismiss and/or Disqualify Phuong Doan and Jose Hernandez

as Class Representatives

Defendant claims that Plaintiffs Phuong Doan and Jose Hernandez, who have filed

individual actions against Defendant, are barred from this class action by the doctrine of res

judicata. [Doc. No. 122 at 5.] The doctrine of res judicata is applicable when there exists: (1) an

identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) identity or privity between the

parties. (Id.) Defendant argues that prior judgments have already been rendered against

Plaintiffs Doan and Hernandez in individual lawsuits that brought forth similar complaints as the

instant class action. (Id. at 6.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff has made the following same

allegations in both the individual lawsuits and the instant class action: that ALJ New was

“biased” or “prejudiced” against them, that he failed to provide them with a full and fair hearing,

that he violated their rights to due process, that he wrongfully found the plaintiffs to be not

credible, that he discounted their complaints of pain, that he improperly chastised them or

intimidated them, that he placed inadequate weight in their treating physicians’ testimony, etc. 

(Id. at 7.) 

Defendant is correct in his assertion that Plaintiffs Phuong Doan and Jose Hernandez

have both received adverse rulings in individual actions that have identical claims to those

presented in the class action. For example, Plaintiff Doan alleged in both her individual lawsuit

and the class action lawsuit that ALJ New “intimidated” her and wrongfully disregarded the

testimony of her treating physicians. [See Doc. No. 122 at 8.] Similarly, Plaintiff Hernandez

alleged in both his individual lawsuit and the class action that ALJ New failed to provide him

with a full and fair hearing thereby violating his right to due process. (Id. at 10.)

On September 28, 2005, United States District Court Judge Miller granted Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Doan in her individual action. Doan v.

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Barnhart, S.D. Cal. Case No. 04cv1824-M (AJB). On June 15, 2007, the Ninth Circuit affirmed

Judge Jeffrey Miller’s decision dismissing Plaintiff Doan’s individual lawsuit. Doan v. Astrue,

No. 05-56695, 2007 WL 1729924, at *1 (9th Cir. June 15, 2007). On March 29, 2006, the

Honorable John Houston of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

California granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Doan. 

Hernandez v. Barnhart, S.D. Cal. Case No. 04cv0055-H (LSP) Plaintiff Hernandez’s appeal of

Judge Houston’s Order is currently pending in the Ninth Circuit. [Doc. 122 at 5.] 

Plaintiffs do not argue in opposition that Plaintiffs Doan and Hernandez are alleging

different claims in the class action than they alleged in their individual actions. Nor do Plaintiffs

argue that the decisions of the district courts in their individual actions were not final and on the

merits. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the suits are not barred under the doctrine of res judicata

because Plaintiffs are now alleging generalized bias as opposed to individualized bias in the

class action. [Doc. No. 146 at 4.] Plaintiffs argue that this distinction allows this Court to

consider more evidence in the class action than the courts were allowed to consider in their

individual actions. (Id. at 5.) The Court does not find Plaintiff’s argument persuasive. In order

to establish generalized bias on the part of ALJ New it will be necessary for the Court to

determine, to some degree, if ALJ New was biased towards each Plaintiff. Additionally, many

of the claims presented in the class action refer to the individual experience of either Plaintiff

Doan and Plaintiff Hernandez. [See Doc. No. 122 at 7-10.] The sufficiency of this evidence to

establish bias would be considered under the same “substantial evidence” standard for either

individualized or generalized bias. Judge Miller and Judge Houston have already reached

decisions contrary to Plaintiff’s claim with regards to the sufficiency of this evidence. 

Accordingly, this Court will not reconsider these already-litigated claims. As such, this Court

FINDS that Plaintiffs Phuong Doan and Jose Hernandez are barred from presenting this action

under the doctrine of res judicata and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and/or

Disqualify Plaintiffs Phuong Doan and Jose Hernandez as Class Representatives. 

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III. Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss all Potential Class Members

who Failed to Comply with Statute of Limitation/Administrative

Exhaustion Requirements. 

Defendant argues that, based on the Court’s March 5, 2007 Order Temporarily Expanding

the Class, it appears that all 886 claimants whose benefits were denied during ALJ New’s tenure

with the Agency are potential class members in this action. [Doc. No. 125 at 1.] Section 405(g)

provides that Social Security claimants may obtain judicial review of any final decision of the

Commissioner by filing a civil action “within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of

such decision or within such further time as the [Commissioner] may allow.” 42 U.S.C. §

405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c). (Id. at 3.) In order to obtain a “final decision,” a claimant is

required to first exhaust his or her administrative remedies by proceeding through a three stage

administrative process that includes (1) seeking reconsideration of the denial of their benefits by

the Agency, (2) requesting a hearing before an ALJ, and (3) seeking review of the ALJ’s

decision before the Agency’s Appeals Council. (Id.) Defendant argues that the following

categories of claimants should be dismissed from the class at this stage for the sake of judicial

efficiency: (1) claimants who did not file a district court action within 60 days of the final

decision denying their benefits; (2) claimants who did not request review by the Agency’s

Appeals Counsel; (3) claimants who did not request an administrative hearing; and (4) claimants

who have subsequently applied for benefits with the SSA or who have already received a

remand to the Agency. (Id. at 1-2.) Defendant argues that any of the 886 potential class

members who did not exhaust administrative review procedures are procedurally barred from

filing this suit unless the Plaintiff makes the necessary showing of “extraordinary circumstances”

to excuse the potential claimants from the rule. [Doc. No. 142 at 4-5.]

Defendant’s motion is again premature. With discovery still pending, the Court cannot

with any confidence dismiss any potential claimant. As stated above, completed discovery will

provide a clearer understanding of what administrative processes have been completed by each

claimant. As such, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

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all Potential Class Members who Failed to Comply with Statute of Limitation/Administrative

Exhaustion Requirements. 

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Bias; or Alternatively Motion

to Remand to Commisioner of Social Security; GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and/or

Disqualify Phuong Doan and Jose Hernandez as Class Representatives; and DISMISSES

without prejudice Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss All Potential Class

Members who Failed to Comply with Statute of Limitation/Administrative Exhaustion

Requirements. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 29, 2008

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Brooks

 All Parties of Record

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