Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00878/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00878-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DONALD RAY SANDERSON, )

#263986 )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:10-cv-878-SRW

 ) [WO]

SHERIFF D. T. MARSHALL, )

)

 Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Donald Ray Sanderson [“Sanderson”] is a former inmate of the Montgomery

County Detention Facility in Montgomery, Alabama, who is now housed at the Limestone

Correctional Facility in Harvest, Alabama. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Sanderson

challenges the medical treatment he received and the conditions of confinement to which he

was subjected during his confinement at the Montgomery County Detention Facility from

approximately December 29, 2009 until January 26, 2010. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 

8. The remaining defendant is Sheriff D. T. Marshall [“Marshall”]. Sanderson seeks 1

declaratory relief and money damages. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 8 at 4. Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. LR 73.1, the parties have consented to a United States

This Memorandum is limited to the defendant and issues presented by Sanderson in the Amended 1

Complaint, as previously ordered by the Court. Order of June 7, 2011 – Doc. No. 22 at 1-2.

Case 2:10-cv-00878-SRW Document 31 Filed 09/04/13 Page 1 of 18
Magistrate Judge’s conducting all proceedings in this case and ordering the entry of final

judgment.

The defendant filed a special report, supplemental special report, and supporting

evidentiary materials addressing Sanderson’s claims for relief. Doc. No. 18, Doc. No. 26. 

In these documents, the defendant denies Sanderson’s allegations that he violated

Sanderson’s constitutional rights. Additionally, the defendant asserts that the complaint is

due to be dismissed because Sanderson failed to exhaust an administrative remedy available

to him at the Montgomery County Detention Facility with respect to the claims presented in

this cause of action. The defendant bases his exhaustion defense on the plaintiff’s failure to

lodge a grievance with the jail before filing the claim presently pending before this court. 

Pursuant to the orders entered in this case and governing case law, the court deems it

appropriate to treat the defendant’s reports as a motion for summary judgment. Order of

June 7, 2011 - Doc. No. 23. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion and the evidentiary materials filed

in support thereof, the court concludes that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

with respect to the exhaustion defense is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

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genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11 Cir. th

2007) (per curiam) (citation to former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)

(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).2

The partymoving for summaryjudgment “always bears the initial responsibilityofinforming

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record,

including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating

there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to

present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden

of proof. Id. at 322-24. 

The defendant has met his evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any

genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. 

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and 2

deciding summary-judgment motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision,

“[s]ubdivision (a) carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c),

changing only one word -- genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of

a summary-judgment determination.” Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary

judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and,

therefore, all cases citing the prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; th

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to

properly address another party’s assertion of fact [by citing to materials in the record

including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary

judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered undisputed

-- show that the movant is entitled to it.”). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the

nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a

verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to

survive the defendant’s properly supported motion for summary judgment, Sanderson is

required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial

supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 249 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party

relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may

be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the

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opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier

of fact] could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th

Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Conclusory allegations based on subjective

beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do

not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,

1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions . . . , in the absence th

of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment”);

Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate th

where inmate “produced nothing, beyond his own conclusory allegations” challenging

actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“[M]ere th

verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. . . .”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported

by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case

and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to

be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. th

1987) (if on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to

require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is

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appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami, th

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the th

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the

Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only th

factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude

entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome

of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11 Cir. 2003) th

(citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing

summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the

evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to

admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party moving

for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary

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materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a requisite material

fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001) th

(To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving partymust produce evidence

such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a

pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th

Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard

of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Sanderson fails

to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary

judgment. Matsushita, supra. 

III. DISCUSSION

On December 29, 2009, Sanderson was transferred from the Limestone Correctional

Facility to the Montgomery County Detention Facility so that he could attend a court

proceeding. He was transferred back to Limestone Correctional Facilityon January26, 2010. 

Robinson Aff. at 1, Def.’s Special Report - Doc. No. 18-4 at 1. The evidentiary materials

submitted by the defendant establish that Sanderson did not file a request to see a doctor and

he did not file a grievance with jail personnel challenging his medical treatment or conditions

of confinement before filing his original complaint in this suit in October 2010. Id. at 2. 

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The defendant therefore maintains that this case is subject to dismissal because Sanderson

failed to exhaust the administrative remedy provided at the Montgomery County Detention

Facility prior to filing this complaint as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

A. Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”] compels exhaustion of available

administrative remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court on a section 1983

complaint. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” “Congress has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an

inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through

administrative remedies.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). “[T]he PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve

general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all available

administrative remedies is a precondition to litigation and a federal court cannot waive the

exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325

(11 Cir. 1998); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 101 (2006) (“the PLRA exhaustion th

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requirement is not jurisdictional, and thus allowing a district court to dismiss plainly

meritless claims without first addressing what may be a much more complex question,

namely, whether the prisoner did in fact properly exhaust available administrative

remedies”). Moreover, “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.” 

Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93 (emphasis added). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an

agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit in

federal court] because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing

some orderly structure on the courts of its proceedings. . . . Construing § 1997e(a) to require

proper exhaustion . . . fits with the general scheme of the PLRA, whereas [a contrary]

interpretation [allowing an inmate to bring suit in federal court once administrative remedies

are no longer available] would turn that provision into a largely useless appendage.” Id. at

90-91, 93. The Court reasoned that because proper exhaustion of administrative remedies

is necessary an inmate cannot “satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion

requirement . . . by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative

grievance or appeal[,]” or by effectively bypassing the administrative process simply by

waiting until the grievance procedure is no longer available to him. Id. at 83-84; Johnson v.

Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11 Cir. 2005) (inmate who files an untimely grievance or th

simply spurns the administrative process until it is no longer available fails to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement of the PLRA). “The only facts pertinent to determining whether a

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prisoner has satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he filed

his original complaint.” Smith v. Terry, 491 Fed. Appx. 81, 83 (11 Cir. 2012) (per curiam)

th

(unpublished) (inmate’s “attempt to amend or supplement his original complaint did not

change the important historical fact: his administrative remedies were unexhausted when he

filed his original complaint. Therefore, he cannot cure the exhaustion defect”).

 The record in this case establishes that the Montgomery County Detention Facility

provides a grievance procedure for inmate complaints. Def.’s Special Report - Doc. No. 18-3

at 14. The relevant portion of the grievance procedure reads as follows:

You are entitled to voice any grievance to the Jail Administration. You are

encouraged to put the grievance in writing on the Inmate Grievance Form and

place it in the mailbox located in the dayroom of your cellblock. The

Administration will give prompt and fair consideration to any grievance and

will take appropriate action when warranted. 

Id. Sanderson does not dispute the existence of the grievance procedure, but he claims that

he did not receive a copy of the handbook containing the rule. Id. Doc No. 18-4 at 24. 

The court entered orders allowing Sanderson the opportunity to respond to the

defendant’s special reports. Order of June 7, 2011 - Doc. No. 23; Order of June 5, 2013 -

Doc. No. 27. In his July 5, 2011, affidavit, Sanderson states that when he arrived at the

MontgomeryCountyDetention Facility, officials confiscated the back brace and medication

prescribed for him at the Limestone Correctional Facility. Sanderson maintains that his

prescription medicine was withheld byjail personnel under the supervision of Marshall. Pl.’s

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Resp. - Doc. No. 24 at 4. He states that jail officials told him he had to “toughen up,” and

a doctor said, “Oh well, this is jail, right now no meds,” even when Sanderson was in great

pain that could have been alleviated by his medicine. Id. Sanderson states that he tried to

exhaust his remedies, but “Marshal [sic], Medical Health care providers for Montgomery

County Jail would not provide any grievance forms to plaintiff.” Id. at 7. 

In his July 8, 2013, response, Sanderson refers to exhibits and affidavits attached to

the response, but the filing included no such attachments, and the document itself is not

notarized or sworn to under penalty of perjury. Pl.’s Resp. - Doc. No. 30 at 4. In the July 8,

2013, response, Sanderson describes in detail the number of times over the course of his

nearly month-long stay that he asked for medical help. Id. at 4-6. He alleges that the

defendant is withholding evidence. Id. at 5. Sanderson states that an officer said that

Sanderson would get his back brace and his pills when he left the jail after his court hearing. 

Id. at 5. Sanderson maintains that he was never called to go to court, and he lay on the floor

in pain, hardly able to walk because officers did not return his back brace to him. Id. He

asserts that during the first week of his stay at the Montgomery County Detention Facility,

he sent four written requests for his pain medication. Id. He states that he sent a total of

eight requests for help during the time he was at the facility and gave them to nurses and

officers, but they “apparently never made it to [the] person in charge of the jail . . . or they

were just thrown away when they arrived at her office.” Id. at 6. He states that there are

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pages missing from the defendant’s submitted documents, including Sanderson’s statement

to officers that he “was dying without” his back brace and medication. Id. at 7. Sanderson

states that he could not climb to the top bunk and was forced to sleep on the floor, among

rodents and spiders, because he could not climb to the top bunk. Id. at 10, 14. 

Sanderson has not submitted evidence beyond his own, self-serving statements to

prove that he tried to submit a grievance or medical request to jail personnel regarding his

back brace, medication, pain, inability to climb to the top bunk, and filthy living conditions. 

A self-serving statement may, if adequately detailed and objective, be sufficient to create a

fact question that precludes summary judgment. See Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707

F.3d 1244, 1253 (11 Cir. 2013). In Feliciano, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff

th

generated a fact question for trial with sworn statements that were self-serving, but not

conclusory, as theywere “descriptions ofspecific, discrete facts of the who, what, when, and

where variety. They describe the external world as [plaintiff] observed it at the time and are

based on her first-hand personal knowledge, not her subjective beliefs. And they directly

contradict the officers' assertions about what they observed before and after they entered the

apartment.” Id.

Here, Sanderson’s most detailed statements, filed July 8, 2013, were not made under

penalty of perjury. Thus, they may not be considered in opposition to defendant’s summary

judgment motion. See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564. The remaining admissible evidence

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before the court is both self-serving and conclusory, and it does not create a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Sanderson attempted to, but was prevented from, filing a

grievance regarding his medical care before he filed suit in this case. Based on the record

before the court, it is undisputed that Sanderson failed to exhaust an administrative remedy

available to him, which is a precondition to proceeding in this court on his claims. 

Specifically, Sanderson did not file a grievance with respect to the claims presented in this

cause of action, as allowed by the grievance procedure in effect at the Montgomery County

Detention Facility, before filing this case. The court therefore concludes that the claims

presented in this cause of action are subject to dismissal. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 87-94. 

Sanderson is no longer at the Montgomery County Detention Facility; thus, the

administrative remedy provided by the defendant for the instant claims is no longer available

to Sanderson. Under these circumstances, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Bryant

v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 & n.11 (11 Cir. 2008) (Although an exhaustion defense “is not th

ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment[,]” the defense is appropriate for

summaryjudgment when the evidence demonstrates administrative remedies “are absolutely

time barred or otherwise clearly infeasible.”); Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1157; Marsh v. Jones,

53 F.3d 707, 710 (5 Cir. 1995) (“Without the prospect of a dismissal with prejudice, a

th

prisoner could evade the exhaustion requirement by filing no administrative grievance or by

intentionallyfiling an untimelyone, therebyforeclosing administrative remedies and gaining

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access to a federal forum without exhausting administrative remedies.”); Berry v. Kerik, 366

F.3d 85, 88 (2 Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted) (inmate’s “federal lawsuits . . . properly nd

dismissed with prejudice” where previously available administrative remedies had become

unavailable). 

B. No Personal Involvement by Defendant Marshall

Even if the court considered all the statements in Sanderson’s response to the

summary judgment motion, his claims against defendant Marshall would not entitle him to

relief. An official may be held liable under the United States Constitution for acting with

“deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s safety when the official knows that the inmate faces

“a substantial risk of serious harm” and with such knowledge disregards that risk by failing

to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 

Based on the record before the court, however, Marshall had no personal involvement with

Sanderson, and

[t]he law does not impose upon correctional officials a duty to

directly supervise health care personnel, to set treatment policy

for the medical staff or to intervene in treatment decisions where

they have no actual knowledge that intervention is necessary to

prevent a constitutional wrong. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550

F.2d 926 (4 Cir. 1977) (a medical treatment claim cannot be th

brought against managing officers of a prison absent allegations

that they were personally connected with the alleged denial of

treatment). Moreover, “supervisory [correctional] officials are

entitled to rely on medical judgments made by medical

professionals responsible for prisoner care. See, e.g., Durmer v.

O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3 Cir. 1993); White v. Farrier, 849 rd

F.2d 322, 327 (8 Cir. 1988).” Williams v. Limestone County, th

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Ala., 198 Fed. Appx. 893, 897 (11 Cir. 2006). th

Cameron v. Allen, 525 F. Supp.2d 1302, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 2007). 

To the extent that Sanderson seeks relief from defendant Marshall for the treatment

provided by jail medical personnel or actions taken by jail personnel due to the defendant’s

position as sheriff, assuming arguendo that Marshall exerted some authority over the manner

in which those persons responsible for the provision of medical treatment rendered such

treatment, the law is well settled “that Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior [or

vicarious liability]. . . . Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1888) (‘A public officer

or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances,

or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly

employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties’). Because vicarious

liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,

1360 (11 Cir. 2003) (“[S]upervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the th

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability.”); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11 Cir. 2003) (concluding supervisory th

officials are not liable on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability); Marsh v.

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Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1035 (11 Cir. 2001) (A supervisory official “can have th

no respondeat superior liability for a section 1983 claim.”); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d

1263, 1269 (11 Cir. 1999), citing Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11 Cir. th th

1994) (§ 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions

of their subordinates under either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.). 

“Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only

liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Thus, liability for medical

treatment provided to Sanderson could attach to defendant Marshall only if he “personally

participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal connection

between [his] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at

1360. 

Sanderson, however, has offered no evidence which would create a genuine issue of

disputed fact with respect to the claims presented against defendant Marshall. The record

is devoid of evidence indicating that Marshall personally participated in or had any

involvement, direct or otherwise, with the medical treatment provided to Sanderson during

his confinement at the Montgomery County Detention Facility; rather, it is undisputed that

Marshall did not participate in the provision of treatment to Sanderson. The evidentiary

materials before the court demonstrate that medical personnel made all decisions relative to

the course of treatment provided to Sanderson, that they provided treatment to Sanderson in

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accordance with their professional judgment upon assessment of his condition, and that jail

officers assisted in carrying out the medical treatment. Marshall did not participate in the

treatment of Sanderson, nor did he ever receive notice of any concern regarding Sanderson’s

treatment. 

In light of the foregoing, defendant Marshall can be held liable for decisions of

medical personnel only if his actions bear a causal relationship to the purported violation of

Sanderson’s constitutional rights. To establish the requisite causal connection and therefore

avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of Marshall, Sanderson must present sufficient

evidence which would be admissible at trial of either “a history of widespread abuse [that]

put[] [the defendant] on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and [he] fail[ed]

to do so. . . .” or “a . . . custom or policy [that] result[ed] in deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights, or . . . facts [that] support an inference that [Marshall] directed the

[facility’s health care or jail staff] to act unlawfully, or knew that [the staff] would act

unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (alterations

added, internal punctuation and citations omitted). A thorough review of the pleadings and

evidentiary materials submitted in this case demonstrates that Sanderson has failed to meet

this burden.

The record before the court contains no probative evidence to support an inference

that Marshall directed medical or jail personnel to act unlawfully or knew that they would

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act/acted unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In addition, Sanderson has presented no

evidence of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration in the face of which

Marshall failed to take corrective action. Finally, the undisputed evidentiary materials

submitted by defendant Marshall demonstrate that the challenged actions did not occur

pursuant to a policy enacted by Marshall. Thus, the requisite causal connection does not

exist in this case, and liability under the custom or policy standard is not warranted. 

Summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of defendant Marshall. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

A separate Final Judgment will accompany this memorandum opinion. 

DONE, this 4 day of September, 2013. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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