Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-00851/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-00851-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 01cv0851 J (POR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAI TAN NGUYEN,

Petitioner,

v.

DON TAYLOR, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 01cv0851 J (POR)

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO RETAX

Before the Court is Respondent’s Motion to Retax Costs. [Doc. No. 89.] Petitioner Tai

Tan Nguyen has filed an Opposition to the Motion. [Doc. No. 90.] The Court has determined

that the issues presented herein are appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Civil

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Respondent’s

Motion to Retax Costs. 

Background

The underlying facts of this case are set forth in detail in the Court’s Order Conditionally

Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and need not be recounted here. (See Order Cond.

Grant. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (“Order”) at 2-3, 5-7.) On June 13, 2006, this Court

conditionally granted Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 71.] On

October 27, 2006, this Court ordered entry of final judgment in favor of Petitioner. [Doc. No.

82.] On November 11, 2006, Petitioner submitted an Application for Bill of Costs. [Doc. No.

84.] On December 5, 2006, the Clerk of the Court taxed costs in favor of Petitioner in the

Case 3:01-cv-00851-J-POR Document 93 Filed 04/27/07 Page 1 of 4
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amount of $2,112.15. (See Order Taxing Costs at 2.) Respondent now brings this timely Motion

to Retax Costs on the basis that costs are “not available to a petitioner in a federal habeas corpus

case.” (Mot. Retax at 2.)

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that “costs other than attorneys’ fees

shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(d)(1); see also Civil Local Rule 54.1(a) (“Unless otherwise ordered by the court, or

stipulated by the parties, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs.”). Rule 54(d) creates a

presumption in favor of awarding costs to prevailing parties, and it is incumbent upon the losing

party to demonstrate why the costs should not be awarded. Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit,

335 F.3d 932, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2003); Stanley v. Univ. of Southern California, 178 F.3d 1069,

1079 (9th Cir. 1999); Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 51 F.3d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.

1995). It is within the discretion of the district court to refuse to award costs. Champion

Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003). If a district court

elects not to award costs, the court must “specify reasons” for its refusal to tax costs to the losing

party. Assoc. of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In other words, the court must “explain why a case is not ordinary’ and why, in the

circumstances, it would be inappropriate or inequitable to award costs.” Champion Produce,

342 F.3d at 1022. 

Discussion

Respondent argues that a “bill of costs is not available to a petitioner in a federal habeas

corpus case.” (Mot. Retax at 2.) Petitioner argues that “as the prevailing party in this habeas

proceeding, [Petitioner] is entitled to costs awarded by the Clerk of the Court because (1) habeas

proceedings are generally subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) . . . [Rule] 54(d)

provides for an award of costs to the prevailing party as a matter of course absent a rule to the

contrary[,] and (3) no rule or statute or other authority provides otherwise.” (Opp’n at 2.) 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts, the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent

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1

 Respondent cites cases for the proposition that certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not

apply to habeas corpus proceedings, such as Rule 33 or Rule 12(b)(6). (See Mot. Retax at 2.) However,

Respondent fails to provide any authority indicating that Rule 54(d) does not apply to such proceedings. 

3 01cv0851 J (POR)

with these rules, may be applied, when appropriate, to petitions filed under these rules.” Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2); Reutter v. Solem, 736 F.

Supp. 1028, 1029 (D.S.D. 1990) (“There is no rule dealing explicitly with costs in a Federal

habeas corpus action, therefore, the general rules of Civil Procedure apply.”), aff’d, 923 F.2d 860

(8th Cir. 1990). As indicated above, Rule 54(d)(1) provides that “[e]xcept when express

provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other

than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court

otherwise directs; but costs against the United States, its officers, and agencies shall be imposed

only to the extent permitted by law. ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Here, costs were not granted

against the United States, its officers, or agencies, attorneys’ fees were not requested, and

Respondent has failed to show and the Court is unaware of any statute expressly providing that

costs may not be awarded in cases brought pursuant to Section 2254.1

 Accordingly, a facial

review of the relevant statutory authority indicates that costs may be awarded to prevailing

petitioners under Section 2254. 

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, in Sengenberger v. Townsend, 473 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.

2006), refused to award the State of Idaho costs as the prevailing party in a Section 2254

proceeding on the basis that courts should consider the financial resources of the plaintiff and

adequate mechanisms are in place, such as the certificate of appealability, to preclude the taking

of frivolous appeals. The Ninth Circuit indicated that “we do not suggest that there is an

absolute prohibition on costs in all circumstances.” Id. at 915. Accordingly, if there is not an

absolute prohibition on awarding the state costs in Section 2254 proceedings, such must also be

the case for a successful petitioner challenging his confinement. See also Reutter, 736 F. Supp.

at 1029 (denying costs in a Section 2254 proceeding to prevailing petitioner for costs incurred

during state trial and state habeas proceeding, but allowing costs for the transcript for federal

habeas corpus hearing, clerk’s fees for the federal action, and miscellaneous fees). 

Respondent’s reliance on Sloan v. Pugh, 351 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 2003) and O’brien v.

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Moore, 395 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2005) is misguided. Both Sloan and O’brien dealt with a

prevailing federal prisoner who sought attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to

Justice Act (“EAJA”). In deciding that the EAJA did not provide for attorneys’ fees and costs,

the Tenth Circuit drew a distinction between the EAJA being “designed primarily to provide

financial incentives for contesting unreasonable government action” and the lack of a need for

such incentive in challenging review of individual criminal confinement. See Sloan, 351 F.3d at

1322-23. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that since the EAJA operates as a “waiver of

sovereign immunity,” the term “civil action” within the EAJA must be construed strictly. See id.

at 1322. Likewise, the Fourth Circuit held that “sovereign immunity is presumed and cannot be

overcome without an express and unequivocal statutory waiver,” and “all ambiguities [must be]

resolved in favor of the sovereign.” O’brien, 395 F.3d at 503 (citing Research Triangle Inst. v.

Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 132 F.3d 985, 987 (4th Cir.1997); Lane v. Pena, 518

U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). Accordingly, both the Forth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit refused to

extend the EAJA’s waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity to awards fees in habeas

corpus proceedings. See O’brien, 395 F.3d at 508; Sloan, 351 F.3d at 1323. 

Lastly, Respondent fails to explain “why, in the circumstances, it would be inappropriate

or inequitable to award costs.” Champion Produce, 342 F.3d at 1022. Accordingly, finding no

statute or other authority expressly providing that costs may not be awarded in cases brought

pursuant to Section 2254 and finding that Respondent has failed to rebut the strong presumption

in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party, the Court DENIES Respondent’s Motion to

Retax Costs.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Respondent’s Motion to Retax Costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 27, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Porter

 All Counsel of Record

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