Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01288/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01288-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LEON JACKSON, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

ROBERT FOX, WARDEN 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 16cv1288-AJB (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

[ECF No. 9] 

 Petitioner, Leon Jackson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction and sentence 

imposed by San Diego Superior Court in case number SCE320691. (EFC No. 1.) 

Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition asserting it is time barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d). (ECF No. 9.) Petitioner has filed an opposition, and Respondent has not replied. 

(ECF No. 11.) 

After a thorough review of the pleadings and all supporting documents, the Court 

finds the Petition is statutorily barred by the expiration of the limitations period. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be 

GRANTED. 

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On September 21, 2012, Petitioner was convicted of one count of robbery, and was 

sentenced to a prison term of 9 years on November 1, 2012. (Respondent’s Lodgment 

(“Lodgment”) No. 7 at 132.) On March 19, 2013, appellate counsel filed Petitioner’s direct 

appeal. (Lodgment No. 6.) On November 6, 2013, the California Court of Appeal affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction. (Lodgment No. 1.) On November 25, 2013, appellate counsel 

filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No 2.) On January 

15, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied review. (Lodgment No. 3.) 

On January 8, 2015, Petitioner constructively filed his first federal writ of habeas 

corpus.1 2

 (ECF No. 1 at 5; Jackson v. Tampkins, Case No. 15cv0069-JAH-JMA, ECF 

No.1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2015).) On January 22, 2015, the United States District Court 

dismissed the petition without prejudice for lack of subject jurisdiction. (Jackson v. 

Tampkins, Case No. 15cv0069-JAH-JMA, ECF No. 3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2015).) 

On March 8, 2015, Petitioner constructively filed a writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 4.) On June 10, 2015, the California Supreme 

Court denied review of the petition without comment. (Lodgment No. 5.) 

On May 24, 2016, Petitioner constructively filed the instant Petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner raises five grounds for relief: (1) actual innocence, (2) 

Brady violation, (3) invalid enhancements, (4) improperly imposed restitution fine, and (5) 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) 

                                                                

1

 For purposes of determining the date on which an incarcerated pro se habeas petitioner files a document 

with the court, courts generally apply the prison “mailbox rule” under which a petitioner is deemed to 

have filed the document on the date he deposited it to prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 

487 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2000). The “mailbox 

rule” “applies to prisoners filing habeas petitions in both federal and state courts.” Huizar v. Carey, 273 

F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Therefore, when referring to documents filed by Petitioner, the Court will cite to the signature date, rather 

than the date the documents were filed on the courts’ dockets. 

2

 Petitioner mentioned in his Petition that he previously filed a federal petition under civil action number 

15cv0069-JAH-JMA. 

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Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 12, 2016. (ECF No. 9.) On 

October 17, 2016, Petitioner filed an opposition and supplemental exhibits. (ECF No. 11.) 

II. DISCUSSION

 Respondent argues the Court should dismiss the Petition because it is time barred by 

the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner counters the 

Petition is timely on grounds that he is entitled to a later start date for commencement of 

the limitations period, statutory tolling, equitable tolling, and the actual-innocence 

gateway. 

 Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a oneyear statute of limitation applies to an application for writ of habeas corpus filed “by a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The 

limitations period begins to run on “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of “direct review” under Section 2244(d)(1)(A) 

includes the 90-day period within which Petitioner could have filed a petition for a writ of 

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

In this case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on 

direct appeal on January 15, 2014. (Lodgment No. 3.) Petitioner did not file a petition for 

a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, his conviction became 

final 90 days later, on April 15, 2014. Absent any tolling, Petitioner had one year – until 

April 15, 2015 – to file his federal petition. Petitioner filed the instant Petition on May 24, 

2016, approximately 13 months (405 days) after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations 

had expired. 

Therefore, the Petition is not timely, unless Petitioner is entitled to a later start date 

for commencement of the limitations period, AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision applies, 

or the doctrine of equitable tolling extends the filing deadline. 

/ / / 

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A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

 Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run on the day following finality of the 

judgment. 28 U.S.C. §2224(d)(1)(A). Section 2244(d)(1) provides three exceptions which 

permit the statute of limitations to commence at a later date: (1) if there was a state created 

impediment that prevented timely filing; (2) if a new constitutional right was recognized 

and retroactively applied by the United States Supreme Court; or (3) if the factual predicate 

of the claim was discovered after the conviction was final. §2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). 

 Plaintiff argues the date he exhausted his habeas claim in state court should trigger 

the statute of limitations. Thus, he contends the statute of limitations did not begin running 

until June 10, 2015, when the California Supreme Court denied his habeas petition. 

Petitioner is incorrect. As mentioned above, the limitations period begins to run on “the 

date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run on April 15, 2014. 

Petitioner does not allege that any state created impediment, new constitutional right, or 

newly discovered factual predicate of the claim applies to trigger a later start date. 

Therefore, the Court finds no later start date for the limitations period applies. 

B. Statutory Tolling

 AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is tolled during the period of time a petitioner 

seeks post-conviction relief in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Specifically, AEDPA’s 

statutory tolling provision provides: 

The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any 

period of limitation under this subsection. 

228 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

 However, the statute of limitations is not tolled from the date on which the judgment 

became final to “the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case 

‘pending’ during that interval.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), 

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overruled on other grounds by Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Here, the statute of limitations ran for 327 days beginning from the date of the final 

judgment on April 15, 2014 to the date the first state habeas petition was filed on March 8, 

2015. Then, starting on March 8, 2015, the limitations period was tolled until June 10, 

2015, when the California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition. Thereafter, Petitioner 

had 27 days remaining to file his federal petition before the one-year statute of limitations 

expired. However, Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until nearly a year later, on 

May 24, 2016. 

Petitioner contends the filing of his first federal petition on January 8, 2015 should 

have also tolled the statute of limitations. However, statutory tolling only applies to 

pending state post-conviction review. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172-73 (2001) 

(there is no statutory tolling during the pendency of an application for federal habeas 

corpus). 

 Accordingly, the Petition is untimely unless Petitioner can establish he is entitled to 

equitable tolling. 

C. Equitable Tolling

 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations may be tolled for equitable reasons. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 

(2010). See also Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th 

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dis. Ct. (Kelly), 163 

F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). In Holland, the Supreme Court held equitable tolling is 

appropriate when the petitioner can show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented 

timely filing.” Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most 

cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond 

a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 

(quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)). See also 

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Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting equitable tolling “is 

unavailable in most cases”). The “extraordinary circumstances” must be the “but-for and 

proximate cause” of the untimely filing. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest 

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The Ninth Circuit cautioned that district courts must “take serious Congress’s desire to 

accelerate the federal habeas process” and “only authorize extensions when this high hurdle 

is surmounted.” Beller, 128 F. 3d at 1289. The petitioner bears the burden of 

demonstrating that equitable tolling is warranted. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 

(9th Cir. 2005). 

In this case, Petitioner has not met his burden to show that equitable tolling is 

warranted. Petitioner has not shown he has been pursuing his rights diligently. Petitioner 

contends he waited to file the Petition because his attorney misled him to believe the 

attorney would to file a habeas petition in federal court. However, in a letter dated January 

21, 2014, the attorney clearly indicated he would provide Petitioner with sample forms and 

information about deadlines, if Petitioner wished to pursue filing a habeas petition. (ECF 

No. 11 at 17.) Moreover, on February 28, 2014, Petitioner’s attorney informed him that 

the absolute deadline to file a petition in federal court was 90 days plus one year starting 

on January 15, 2014. (ECF No. 11 at 18.) The Court does not find either of these letters 

were misleading. 

Therefore, the Court finds there is no equitable tolling and the Petition is untimely. 

D. Actual-Innocence Gateway 

A claim of innocence is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway 

through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional 

claim considered on the merits.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1998). Thus, a 

convincing showing of actual innocence enables habeas petitioners to overcome the 

expiration of the statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct 1924, 1928 

(2013). There is review only in “extraordinary” cases. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

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324 (1995) (emphasizing that “in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence 

are rarely successful”). “[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless 

he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 329. The “evidence of innocence [must be] so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. “To be credible, such 

a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new 

reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 324. An “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence bears on the determination 

whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing.” McQuiggin, U.S. 133 at 1935. 

In this case, Petitioner has not provided any new reliable evidence indicating actual 

innocence. Petitioner contends he is innocent because there is no evidence to support the 

robbery conviction. Specifically, Petitioner contends the testimony of the store’s theft 

prevention agents, Devin Johnson and Nicholas Hanson, were not credible because they 

had a motive to lie and Petitioner alleges they used racial profiling to target Petitioner. 

However, Petitioner has not provided any new evidence that was not presented at trial. A 

blank assertion that the trial testimony is not credible does not meet the “exacting 

standards” to show that this is an “extraordinary case” in which “it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have convicted [Petitioner] in light of the new evidence. 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

Therefore, Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish the actualinnocence gateway. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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III. CONCLUSION

 After a thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing 

analysis, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be 

GRANTED. 

 The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Anthony J. Battaglia under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d) if 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than January 6, 2016 any party to this 

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed and 

served on all parties no later than ten (10) days after being served with the objections. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 

the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 

158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 7, 2016 

 _________________________ 

 LOUISA S PORTER 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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