Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00513/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

KAUSIWA ARSHAD, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE NO. 2:13-cv-513-MHT 

 ) 

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 Before the court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9), and Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Relief from Judgment/Order and Motion for Order (Doc. 17). For the reasons 

that follow, it is the Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge that this case 

be DISMISSED under the doctrine of res judicata, the Motion to Dismiss be DENIED as 

MOOT, and the Motion for Relief From Judgment/Order and Motion for Order be 

DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Alabama Department of 

Corrections and several individual defendants. See Arshad v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., et 

al., 2:12-CV-635-MHT-WC (“Arshad I”). That case proceeded to summary judgment, 

where this court found in defendants’ favor and judgment was issued. During the 

pendency of that action, Plaintiff filed the present case, to which the court will refer as 

Arshad II. 

Case 2:13-cv-00513-MHT-WC Document 18 Filed 02/24/14 Page 1 of 8
2 

 In Arshad I, Plaintiff named the State of Alabama Department of Corrections, 

Carter Davenport, Ronald Carter, and Carl Sanders as defendants. In Arshad II, Plaintiff 

has named the State of Alabama Department of Corrections, Carter Davenport, Ronald 

Carter, and Kenneth Peters as defendants. The counts in Arshad I, which were brought 

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, were as follows: (1) Gender 

Discrimination; (2) Harassment/Hostile Work Environment; (3) Neglect; (4), Unlawful 

Termination; Retaliation/Reprisal; (5) Failure to Prevent Conspiracy; and (7) Making of 

Willfully False Statements. See Arshad I Compl. (Doc. 1) at 10-11. Similarly, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint in Arshad II contains seven counts. Counts One through Three are brought 

pursuant to Title VII and the Eighth Amendment and are as follows: (1) Gender 

Discrimination; (2) Harassment; (3) Neglect. Count Four, Retaliation/Rerisal, is brought 

solely pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. Count Five, titled Failure to Prevent 

Conspiracy, is brought pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Count Six, Making of 

Willfully False Statements, is brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242, 42 U.S.C. § 1602.33, 

18 U.S.C. § 1001, and Title VII, all “[i]n violation of the plaintiff’s 5th Amendment 

rights.” Compl. (Doc. 1) at 7. Count Seven, titled Unlawful Termination, is brought 

pursuant to Title VII and “Libel Slander in violation of plaintiff’s 1st Amendment rights.” 

Id. at 5. 

 Defendants’ filed their Motion to Dismiss based on judicial economy and 

duplicative litigation. Specifically, Defendants asserted that Plaintiff’s complaint in 

Arshad II was almost identical to the complaint and allegations made in Arshad I, and 

should therefore be dismissed. Because that case is now closed, the basis for Defendants’ 

Case 2:13-cv-00513-MHT-WC Document 18 Filed 02/24/14 Page 2 of 8
3 

request, judicial economy, is now moot. However, in reviewing the Motion to Dismiss 

and the Complaint, the court became concerned regarding the viability of this action. 

Thus, the court notified Plaintiff of its concerns and required Plaintiff to address them. 

Instead, Plaintiff filed the Motion for Relief from Judgment/Order and Motion for Order 

(Doc. 17), which did nothing to alleviate the court’s concerns. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Title VII Claims & Res Judicata 

 As an initial matter, all claims brought against the individual defendants under 

Title VII are properly dismissed because “[t]he relief granted under Title VII is against 

the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the 

Act.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991). Thus, the only Title 

VII defendant in Arshad II, is the Alabama Department of Corrections, which is the same 

Defendant as in Arshad I. A review of the complaint here, and the one in Arshad I, lead 

this court to the determination that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims are due to be dismissed 

pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. 

 The doctrine of res judicata “bars the filing of claims which were raised or could 

have been raised in an earlier proceeding.” Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 

1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). Res judicata applies when “(1) there is a final judgment on 

the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the 

parties, or those in privity with them, are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of 

action is involved in both cases.” Id. Although the doctrine is classified as an affirmative 

defense under Rule 8(c) under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]t also may be 

Case 2:13-cv-00513-MHT-WC Document 18 Filed 02/24/14 Page 3 of 8
4 

raised sua sponte when ‘both actions were brought before the same court.’” Blevins v. 

City of Tuskegee, Ala., 2011 WL 855334, *1 (March 11, 2011) (C.J. Watkins) (quoting 

Shurick v. Boeing Co., 623 F.3d 1114, 1116 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010)). 

 First, a final judgment on the merits was entered in Arshad I. Second, the decision 

was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Third, privity exists between the 

defendants, as they are the same. Fourth, the same cause of action was involved in both 

cases because both arise “out of the same nucleus of operative fact” and are “based upon 

the same factual predicate.” Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 Only the fourth factor—same cause of action—merits any explanation by the 

court. In both Arshad I and Arshad II, Plaintiff complains that she suffered 

discrimination at the hands of Defendant, starting in February 2011. More specifically, 

Plaintiff’s claims center around her actions, or inaction, as a prison guard during the 

“kitchen riots” of 2011 and her subsequent discipline and termination. The only point of 

the current complaint appears to be that Plaintiff wants to add additional facts in support 

of her earlier claims. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants provided “false testimony” during 

her termination hearing. However, this court has already determined that Plaintiff was 

unable to show that her termination was wrongful. Moreover, the “false testimony” to 

which Plaintiff alludes (Peters’s testimony that she did nothing during the “kitchen riots” 

of 2011) squarely aligns with this court’s findings of fact and Plaintiff’s admissions in the 

Case 2:13-cv-00513-MHT-WC Document 18 Filed 02/24/14 Page 4 of 8
5 

previous case.1

 Thus, Arshad II arises “out of the same nucleus of operative fact” as 

Arshad I and both are “based upon the same factual predicate.” Thus, Arshad II is barred 

by res judicata. 

B. Other Bases of Claims 

 As to Plaintiff’s claims under the Eight Amendment, including count Four whih 

was solely brought pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, these claims must be dismissed 

because only a prisoner may bring a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. See Bell 

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). 

 As to count Five, which was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, this claim, is 

barred under the doctrine of res judicata because it was, or could have been, brought in 

Arshad I. Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1238 (“Res judicata bars the filing of claims which were 

raised or could have been raised in an earlier proceeding.”). To the extent Plaintiff 

argues that she could not have brought these claims in the prior action, her claim under 

this statute would still fail under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. As the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has said: 

This doctrine stems from basic agency principles that “attribute the acts of 

agents of a corporation to the corporation, so that all of their acts are 

considered to be those of a single legal actor.” The reasoning behind the 

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is that it is not possible for a single legal 

entity consisting of the corporation and its agents to conspire with itself, 

just as it is not possible for an individual person to conspire with himself. 

This doctrine has been applied not only to private corporations but also to 

public, government entities. 

 

1

 See a more detailed discussion of this infra. 

Case 2:13-cv-00513-MHT-WC Document 18 Filed 02/24/14 Page 5 of 8
6 

Dickerson v. Alachua Cnty. Comm’r, 200 F.3d 761, 767 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal 

citations ommitted). The individual defendants were employees of defendant Alabama 

Department of Corrections, thus, “under the doctrine, a corporation cannot conspire with 

its employees, and its employees, when acting within the scope of their employment, 

cannot conspire among themselves.” McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 

1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 2000)(en banc). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim under this statute is 

due to be dismissed. 

 As to count Six, Making of Willfully False Statements, brought pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 242, 42 U.S.C. § 1602.33, and 18 U.S.C. § 1001, those are criminal statutes and 

do not create a private right of action. Plaintiff’s allegation that this was all done in 

violation of her Fifth Amendments rights does not state a claim, and, even if it did, the 

claim would be barred under res judicata, as it is the same claim brought in Arshad I. 

 Finally, as to count Seven which was brought pursuant to “Libel Slander in 

violation of plaintiff’s 1st Amendment rights,” such a claim would also barred pursuant 

to res judicata. The court already determined that Plaintiff could not show that her 

termination was unlawful. The “libel” Plaintiff claims, Peters’s statement that she did 

nothing during the kitchen riots is squarely in line with this court’s previous findings, 

Arshad I, Rec. (Doc. 38) at 5 (“During the riot, Plaintiff made a radio call for backup, 

then retreated to a nearby bathroom to avoid being hit by the dining trays.”), and 

Plaintiff’s admissions, Id. at 6 ( “Warden Davenport asked each supervisor present during 

the incident to state what they did in response. Plaintiff stated that she made a radio call 

and did nothing further.”). “The purpose behind the doctrine of res judicata is that the 

Case 2:13-cv-00513-MHT-WC Document 18 Filed 02/24/14 Page 6 of 8
7 

‘full and fair opportunity to litigate protects [a party’s] adversaries from the expense and 

vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on 

judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.’” Ragsdale, 193 

F.3d at 1238 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979). As the court 

has already determined there was no unlawful termination, this claim is precluded. 

Moreover, this claim was brought pursuant to Alabama state law and as Plaintiff’s federal 

claims are properly dismissed, the court should refrain from exercising pendent 

jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff’s state law claims. See L.A. Draper & Son v. 

Wheelabrator Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414 (11th Cir. 1984). 

 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint can find no bases to continue. 

C. Plaintiff’s Motion 

 The court is not exactly sure as to what Plaintiff is requesting in the Motion for 

Relief from Judgment/Order and Motion for Order (Doc. 17). To the extent Plaintiff is 

simply requesting that the court not recommend the dismissal of her action, this request is 

due to be denied. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION 

Undersigned Magistrate Judge that this case be DISMISSED under the doctrine of res 

judicata, that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) be DENIED as MOOT, and the Motion for 

Relief From Judgment/Order and Motion for Order (Doc. 17) be DENIED. 

 It is further 

Case 2:13-cv-00513-MHT-WC Document 18 Filed 02/24/14 Page 7 of 8
8 

 ORDERED that on or before March 10, 2014, the parties may file objections to 

the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the 

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or 

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised 

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not 

appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the 

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by 

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from 

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the 

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. 

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 

(11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en 

banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

 Done this 24th day of February, 2014. 

 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

 

Case 2:13-cv-00513-MHT-WC Document 18 Filed 02/24/14 Page 8 of 8