Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05038/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05038-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 12, 2012 Decided July 23, 2013

No. 12-5038

EARLE ARTHUR PARTINGTON,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES W. HOUCK, VICE ADMIRAL, JAGC, USN, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-01962)

Earle Arthur Partington, pro se, argued the cause for

appellant. On the briefs were Charles W. Gittins and Jeffrey A.

Denner.

Arthur B. Spitzer and Daniel M. Gluck were on the brief for

amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's

Capital, et al. in support of appellant.

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney.

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Before: TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Attorney Earle Partington

brought this action against the Judge Advocate General of the

Navy and other naval officials, alleging violation of his

constitutional rights in an administrative decision which

suspended him from practice before naval courts. His action

purported to set forth four causes of action. The district court

entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to part

of the action and dismissed the rest. Partington v. Houck, 840

F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2012). Partington seeks review,

alleging various errors in the grant of the judgments against him. 

We conclude that the district court committed no reversible

error, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Events

Appellant Partington is an experienced practicing lawyer

and retired member of the Army Judge Advocate Generals

Corps, who, as a part of his practice, has engaged in the

representation of military personnel before military courts,

including those of the Navy. In May 2006, he represented

Stewart Toles, an Aviation Structural Mechanic with the United

States Navy, in a General Court-Martial at Pearl Harbor. Toles

faced four charges, including sexual harassment and video

voyeurism, stemming from his frequent, covert recordings of

females in various states of undress, and other similar

misconduct on or near a Navy base in Hawaii. Pursuant to a

pretrial agreement with the prosecution, Toles entered guilty

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pleas to two of the charges and their specifications and to all but

two specifications under the video voyeurism charge, while

pleading not guilty to one charge. Under the applicable military

court procedure, a military judge conducted a providence

inquiry. The providence inquiry is a more elaborate relative of

the Rule 11 proceeding under the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. In the conduct of such an inquiry, the military judge

has a duty to ensure that a plea is voluntary and that there is a

factual basis for the plea. See Rules for Courts-Martial

910(d),(e); United States v. Hartman, 69 M.J. 467, 468 (CAAF

2011). Before taking Toles’s pleas, the military judge had asked

counsel to raise any motions before the entry of the plea. 

Nonetheless, Partington waited until virtually the end of the

providence inquiry—after the military judge had found that

Toles “knowingly, intelligently, consciously waived [his] rights

against self incrimination,” and his rights to trial and

confrontation—to make a motion to dismiss. That motion,

which concededly was well taken, was based on a jurisdictional

defect in the charges of video voyeurism, in that the charges and

specifications did not allege that the offenses took place within

the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” of the United

States, an element of the crime defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1801. 

While it is undisputed that Partington’s motion on behalf of

Toles was well taken, it is equally undisputed that Partington

was aware of the defect before the entry of the plea and the

providence inquiry.

Unsurprisingly, some confusion ensued. The military judge

set aside Toles’s guilty pleas and the pretrial agreement, finding

that Toles could not have given a provident plea while knowing

he would challenge the sufficiency of the video voyeurism

specifications. After the military judge entered his ruling, trial

counsel for the prosecution agreed that if Toles was willing to

enter a guilty plea to a lesser included offense and be bound by

the earlier pretrial agreement, the government would also agree

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to adhere to the pretrial agreement and withdraw some of the

other charges, including video voyeurism. The military judge

then accepted the plea. Thereafter, Toles was sentenced to a bad

conduct discharge and five years confinement. Toles retained

Partington to represent him during the automatic appeal of the

courts martial conviction. See 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1).

In his appellate brief for Toles, Partington made assertions

that the military judge had “acquitted” appellant on some of the

offenses and had “dismissed” some specifications—

representations which the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal

Appeals (NMCCA) found to be misleading and not consistent

with the record. Indeed, the appellate court described various

arguments proffered by Partington in his brief to be

“disingenuous,” clear misrepresentations of the record, and

“wholly unsupport[able]” by the record. The court described

itself as specifically “troubled by . . . appellant’s wholly

unsupported allegations of error . . . .” These allegations, raised

by Partington in the Toles brief, included that the military judge

“dismissed” the video voyeurism specifications under charges

1 and 4; that the military judge “acquitted” appellant as to those

offenses; that the judge “ruled” that the video voyeurism

specifications did not allege that offense; and, that the appellant

“moved for neither an acquittal nor a dismissal of those

specifications.” All these arguments the appellate court

described as disingenuous. So disturbed was the court that it

ordered a copy of its opinion to be forwarded to the “Judge

Advocate General of the Navy and the Navy’s Rules Counsel for

review and action as appropriate.” The clerk of court of the

NMCCA forwarded the court’s opinion as a professional

responsibility complaint against Partington.

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B. The Navy JAG Disciplinary Proceedings

In October of 2008, the Office of the Rules Counsel of the

Navy Judge Advocate General Corps notified Partington that it

had received the opinion of the NMCCA as a complaint against

Partington in his capacity as defense counsel in the Toles case. 

It further notified him that the Rules Counsel was conducting an

inquiry to determine whether he had violated rules of

professional responsibility, particularly Rules 3.1 through 3.3. 

The notice invited Partington to “provide written comment on

the issues raised” by the complaint, and advised him that his

written comment must be provided within ten working days of

the receipt of the letter from the Rules Counsel. By letter of

October 26, 2008, Partington made responsive comments. On

June 18, 2009, the Rules Counsel appointed Captain Robert

Porzeinski, a Navy JAG officer, to conduct a preliminary

inquiry into the allegations of professional responsibility

violations against Partington. On June 29, Captain Porzeinski

informed Partington of his investigation and afforded him an

opportunity to submit any written statement or other written

material he wished Porzeinski to consider. Partington’s

response to the letter offered nothing substantive, but requested

a “charge sheet.” 

Captain Porzeinski forwarded his report to the Rules

Counsel on July 16, 2009, concluding that, based on a

preponderance of the evidence, Partington had violated Rules

3.1 and 3.3 of the Navy’s Rules of Professional Responsibility.1

1

Those Rules provide:

RULE 3.1 MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND

CONTENTIONS. A covered attorney shall not bring or

defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,

unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which

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includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification,

or reversal of existing law. A covered attorney representing

an accused in a criminal proceeding or the respondent in an

administrative proceeding that could result in incarceration,

discharge from the naval service, or other adverse personnel

action, may nevertheless defend the client at the proceeding

as to require that every element of the case is established. 

RULE 3.3 CANDOR AND OBLIGATIONS

TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL

a. A covered attorney shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of material fact or

law to a tribunal;

(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal

when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or

fraudulent act by the client;

(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal

authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the covered

attorney to be directly adverse to the position of the client and

not disclosed by opposing counsel;

(4) offer evidence that the covered attorney

knows to be false. If a covered attorney has offered material

evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the covered

attorney shall take reasonable remedial measures; or

(5) disobey an order imposed by a tribunal

unless done openly before the tribunal in a good faith

assertion that no valid order should exist.

b. The duties stated in paragraph a continue to the

conclusion of the proceedings, and apply even if compliance

requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by

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After further correspondence between Porzeinski and

Partington, Porzeinski sent the Rules Counsel two supplements

to his July 16 report affirming his earlier recommendation to

open an ethics investigation against Partington. The Rules

Counsel subsequently appointed Captain Robert Blazewick, a

Navy JAG officer, to conduct an ethics investigation of

Partington, and informed Partington of the investigation. 

In October and November of 2009, Captain Blazewick sent

Partington multiple letters in which he attempted to set a hearing

and included a charge sheet with specifications for Partington’s

alleged violations of Rules 3.1 and 3.3. In December 2009,

Captain Blazewick sent Partington a letter stating that he had

substantially completed the ethics investigation. The letter also

set a hearing date. Partington responded by letter that he did not

see the point in attending a hearing if the Navy did not intend to

provide him basic due process. Although Captain Blazewick

held a hearing, Partington did not appear. 

On February 19, 2010, Blazewick submitted an ethics

investigation report to the Rules Counsel in which he opined that

Partington had violated Rules 3.1 and 3.3, and recommended

Partington’s indefinite suspension. A summary of the

investigation of Partington was forwarded to Vice Admiral

Rule 1.6.

c. A covered attorney may refuse to offer evidence

that the covered attorney reasonably believes is false.

d. In an ex parte proceeding, a covered attorney shall

inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the covered

attorney which are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an

informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

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James W. Houck, Judge Advocate General of the Navy. In May

of 2010, Admiral Houck notified Partington by certified mail of

his conclusion that Partington had intentionally misrepresented

the posture of the Toles case on appeal. Admiral Houck’s notice

went on to explain that although the military judge at Toles’s

court martial had said he was entering a “finding” of not guilty,

the military judge had clearly misspoken in the context of the

proceedings, and Partington grossly exaggerated the import of

those statements on appeal. The letter informed Partington that

he was indefinitely suspended from practicing law before the

Navy. The Navy also notified other jurisdictions of its

suspension of Partington, leading to disciplinary measures

before the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and at least

one state jurisdiction where Partington was licensed. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review summary judgments de novo and consider

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 

In reviewing a district court’s ruling on summary judgment, we

have discretion to uphold its judgment under a different legal

theory than that applied by the trial court, as long as the record

supports our reason for affirmance and we “avoid denying the

opposing party a fair opportunity to dispute the facts material to

the new theory.” United States v. General Motors Corp., 518

F.2d 420, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

A. The Navy Judge Advocate General’s Authority to

Discipline Partington

Partington contends that the Judge Advocate of the Navy

had no statutory authority to impose discipline upon civilian

defense attorneys appearing at naval courts-martial, and that

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therefore, the entire proceedings against him and the action

taken are void. The district court rejected this contention and

held that the Judge Advocate General had authority to discipline

Partington based on the Uniform Code of Military Justice and

the Manual for Courts-Martial. We agree. The Uniform Code

of Military Justice, Article 36, authorizes the President to

prescribe “[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures” for cases

arising under the Uniform Code of Military Justice “triable in

courts-martial.” 10 U.S.C. § 836(a). Under that authority, the

President prescribed the Manual for Courts-Martial by

Executive Order. See Prescribing the Manual for CourtsMartial, United States, 1951, 16 Fed. Reg. 1,303 (Feb. 10,

1951). The Manual for Courts-Martial includes the Rules for

Courts-Martial. See M.C.M. at II-1 (2012).

Rule 109(a) of the Rules for Courts-Martial states that

each Judge Advocate General “is responsible for the

professional supervision and discipline of . . . judge advocates,

and other lawyers who practice in proceedings governed by the

[Uniform Code of Military Justice] and [the Manual for CourtsMartial].” Each Judge Advocate General may prescribe rules of

professional conduct, and those rules may include sanctions for

violating the rules, including indefinite suspension. R.C.M.

109(a). Acting within the authority granted by R.C.M. 109(a),

the Judge Advocate General promulgated an Instruction on

“Professional Conduct of Attorneys Practicing Under the

Cognizance and Supervision of the Judge Advocate General.”

See JAGINST 5803.1C (Nov. 9, 2004); 32 C.F.R. Part 776. This

instruction includes within the definition of “covered attorneys”

“[a]ll civil service and contracted civilian attorneys who practice

law or perform legal services under the cognizance and

supervision of the JAG.” JAGINST 5803.1C ¶ 4(c); 32 C.F.R.

§ 776.2(b)(iii). 

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Under a plain reading of R.C.M. 109(a)’s phrase, “other

lawyers who practice in proceedings governed by the [Uniform

Code of Military Justice] and [the Manual for Courts-Martial],”

“other lawyers” includes civilian attorneys who defend military

servicemen tried in courts-martial. Thus, R.C.M. 109(a)

delegates to each Judge Advocate General the professional

supervision and discipline of military and civilian attorneys who

represent clients in courts-martial, rendering JAGINST

5803.1C’s definition of “covered attorneys” a valid exercise of

the Navy Judge Advocate General’s delegated authority. 

Partington, disputing the natural reading of R.C.M.

109(a), maintains that the term “other lawyers” in R.C.M. 109(a)

refers to non-JAG active duty attorneys. Appellant Br. at 30. 

He also contends the President does not have authority under

Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to prescribe

rules governing civilian attorneys, claiming that Congress’s

delegation of rule-making authority to the President in Article

36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice “can only relate to

areas of court-martial procedure, not to matters of substantive

law.” Id. at 27 (citing Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90, 92–93)

(C.M.A. 1988)).

 

We do not find Partington’s arguments persuasive. He

cites no case supporting his cramped interpretation of R.C.M.

109(a), but instead argues that “when Congress grants executive

officials the authority to discipline civilian attorneys, it does so

expressly, not sub silentio.” Appellant Br. at 22, 31. In support

of this statement, he cites two statutes in which Congress

expressly gave agencies the authority to discipline attorneys who

appear before them. See id. at 22–24 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 32

(authorizing the Patent and Trademark Office to discipline

attorneys appearing before it); 31 U.S.C. § 330 (authorizing the

Department of Treasury to discipline attorneys appearing before

it)). We are not convinced. The fact that Congress has

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expressly given authority to other agencies to discipline

attorneys does not prove that an agency may only have that

authority by way of an explicit statutory provision. To the

contrary, Congress gave the President broad authority to

prescribe court-martial procedures in the Uniform Code of

Military Justice, see 10 U.S.C. § 836, and his delegation of

professional supervision over all lawyers who practice before

court-martial proceedings does not contravene any cited

statutory provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Partington’s related argument—that the President’s

delegated rule-making authority “can only relate to areas of

court-martial procedure, not to matters of substantive law,”

Appellant Br. at 27—assumes that the JAG’s rules of

professional conduct and disciplinary procedures are matters of

substantive law and not, as the phrase “Complaint Processing

Procedure” implies, procedures. See JAGINST 5803.1C,

Enclosure (2) (Nov. 9, 2004). But Partington provides no

authority to support this assumption, and the cases he cites are

not on point. Each case explains that the President may not

prescribe binding rules in areas of substantive criminal law, such

as the definition of “distribute” in a narcotics case, United States

v. Omick, 30 M.J. 1122, 1124 (N.M.C.M.R. 1989), the rules for

proving or rebutting a defendant’s intent when it is an element

of a crime, Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90, 91–93 (C.M.A. 1988), or

whether a conspirator may be held liable for overt acts that

occurred before joining a conspiracy. United States v. Johnson,

25 M.J. 878, 884 (N.M.C.M.R. 1988). Because the disciplinary

procedure is an area of court-martial procedure, Partington’s

argument that the President did not have authority to delegate

responsibility for professional supervision to the Judge

Advocate General is incorrect. Accordingly, we conclude that

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the district court did not err in holding that the Navy Judge

Advocate General had authority to discipline Partington.2

B. Fifth Amendment Claim

Partington next contends that the proceedings against him

conducted by the Judge Advocate Generals Corps did not afford

him due process in violation of his rights under the Fifth

Amendment. The district court dismissed Partington’s Fifth

Amendment claim on the rationale that Partington had “not

identified an actionable liberty or property interest in the

practice of law before naval courts.” Partington v. Houck, 840

F. Supp. 2d at 242 (D.D.C. 2012). On appeal, Partington and

amici ACLU argue that the district court erred in determining

that Partington had no protectable property interest. See

Appellant Br. at 32–34; Amici Br. at 4–11. They rely on

numerous cases that have recognized a property interest in an

attorney’s license to practice law that cannot be taken away “in

a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process”

protection of the Constitution. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee

on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102–03 (1963). 

Appellees argue, as the district court held, that the cases relied

upon by appellant and amici are inapposite, as the Navy JAG

“neither suspended nor revoked Partington’s license to practice

law.” Appellees Br. at 24. This may constitute a distinction

without a difference. The revocation of an attorney’s license

might often affect only his privilege to practice before the courts

of the licensor, and to recognize the distinction argued by the

appellees might create an exception to a recognized property

interest which would substantially devour the recognized

2

In concluding that the NJAG had authority to discipline

Partington, we note that Partington’s argument to the contrary is

particularly specious in light of the consent form he signed, in which

he agreed to abide by the Navy’s rules and regulations for courtmartial proceedings.

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interest. Nonetheless, we reach the same conclusion as the

district court, albeit for a different reason. Assuming that

Partington did have a protectable property interest in practicing

before the naval courts, the district court nonetheless correctly

entered judgment against him on his Fifth Amendment claim

because the Judge Advocate General provided Partington ample

due process before imposing discipline upon him.

Due process at its core requires notice and hearing. “The

fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be

heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In attorney disbarment proceedings

the Supreme Court has explained that “‘notice should be given

to the attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded

him for explanation and defence.’” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,

550 (1968) (quoting Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 540

(1868)). Thus, in determining whether the JAG afforded

Partington due process in his disciplinary proceedings, we

review the record to determine whether Partington received

notice and an opportunity to be heard. The record is replete with

communications between the JAG and Partington in which the

JAG gave Partington notice it was pursuing an ethics

investigation against him and gave Partington opportunity to be

heard, beginning with the Rules Counsel’s letter to Partington in

October 2008. This letter explained that the Rules Counsel

viewed the NMCCA opinion as a complaint, and that an inquiry

would be conducted to determine whether there was probable

cause to believe that Partington had violated any rules of

professional responsibility, “in particular, Rules 3.1 through

3.3.” Joint Appendix 275. In that letter, the Rules Counsel also

explained that “you may provide written comment on the issues

raised” by NMCCA opinion. Id.

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After the Rules Counsel appointed Captain Porzeinski to

conduct a preliminary investigation, Captain Porzeinski

informed Partington of the preliminary investigation, explaining

in a June 2009 letter that “[t]he purpose of this letter is to afford

you an opportunity, as required by [JAGINST 5803.1C], to

review all evidence that I consider in my inquiry and provide

you a reasonable period of time to submit a written statement or

other written material that you would like me to consider.” Id.

317. Captain Porzeinski, in a July 2009 letter responding to

statements Partington had written, again gave Partington the

opportunity to submit “any written statement or other written

material that you would like me to consider.” Id. 336–37.

On October 22, 2009, after Captain Porzeinski had

submitted his preliminary investigation report to the Rules

Counsel, the Rules Counsel again wrote to Partington,

explaining that the preliminary investigation had determined, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that violations of the Rules of

Professional Conduct had occurred, and that Captain Blazewick

had been appointed to conduct the ethics investigation. 

Enclosed with that letter were a list of professional conduct

violations Partington was alleged to have committed, and the

preliminary inquiry prepared by Captain Porzeinski, which

exhaustively reviewed the trial court record and compared it to

the statements Partington made on appeal, and which reviewed

Partington’s correspondence after the Rules Counsel received

the complaint. See id. 310–35. The Rules Counsel’s October

2009 letter also explained the ethics investigation procedure and

informed Partington of his rights, including the right to elect a

hearing. On October 22, 2009, Captain Blazewick also sent

Partington a letter informing him of his rights and attempting to

set a date for a hearing, and a week later sent another letter

giving Partington additional time to schedule a hearing and a list

of the specific rules Partington was alleged to have violated,

with supporting factual allegations. After a few months’

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additional correspondence, Partington wrote to Captain Morin

that he was refusing to attend the hearing, alleging that the JAG

had been consistently depriving him of due process and

explaining that he had “no intention in participating in this

blatant violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id.

405. Shortly after this correspondence, Captain Blazewick

completed his ethics investigation. Based on that ethics

investigation the Judge Advocate General decided to indefinitely

suspend Partington. 

In reviewing this exhaustive record, it is clear to us that

Partington received ample due process. He was informed

numerous times of the specific violations of the NJAG’s Rules

of Professional Conduct alleged against him and was provided

with several opportunities to respond, including an opportunity

for a hearing that he effectively waived. It is therefore apparent

that Partington was not deprived of the fundamental due process

rights of notice and hearing under Mathews v. Eldridge. 

Partington attempts to buttress his claim of deprivation of

due process by a scattershot, twelve-point attack, which he

asserts demonstrates that he was “clearly denied procedural due

process in the NJAG proceeding.” Appellant Br. at 34. None of

the points reflect a deprivation of due process. Some are

conclusory allegations that the Navy “made no effort to follow

its own regulations.” Some deal with substantive decisions of

the Navy. Some are trivial and contrived.

The fall of Partington’s general argument of due process

deprivation takes with it his assertion of a claim for

constitutional tort under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,

403 U.S. 388 (1971). His whole Bivens claim is based on the

due process arguments which we have already rejected. 

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C. APA Claim

Partington also asserts a claim for review under the

Administrative Procedure Act. In this claim he asserts that “the

decision of the NJAG was arbitrary, capricious, and based upon

improper interpretation of the pertinent facts and legal

standards.” Joint Appendix 37. The district court dismissed

Partington’s claim under the APA because it determined that

neither the NJAG nor the Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces was an “agency” within the meaning of the APA. See

Partington, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 244. Although the district court

correctly held that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is

not an agency, see Shaw v. United States, 209 F.2d 811, 813

(D.C. Cir. 1954), we hold that its determination that the NJAG’s

indefinite suspension of Partington was not agency action was

erroneous.

Under the APA, an “agency” “means each authority of the

Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or

subject to review by another agency, but does not include . . . the

courts of the United States [or] . . . courts martial and military

commissions.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 701. Although “[t]he statutory

definition of ‘agency’ is not entirely clear, . . . the APA

apparently confers agency status on any administrative unit with

substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific

functions.” Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir.

1971).

In concluding that the NJAG was not an agency, the district

court relied on another district court case, McKinney v. Caldera,

141 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d sub nom., McKinney v.

White, 291 F.3d 851 (D.C. Cir. 2002), in which the district court

held that the Judge Advocate General of the Army was not an

agency. See Partington, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 243. In McKinney,

the plaintiff, a Sergeant Major of the Army, was tried in courtUSCA Case #12-5038 Document #1447998 Filed: 07/23/2013 Page 16 of 20
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martial and filed various post-trial petitions alleging

prosecutorial misconduct. McKinney, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 

The Judge Advocate General, after ordering an investigation

into the allegations and reviewing the record, denied the

plaintiff’s petitions without providing any reasoning for his

decision. Id. at 28–29. The McKinney district court, after

reviewing the case law on the definition of “agency” and the

Judge Advocate General’s relationship to other components of

the army, concluded that it was not clear whether the Judge

Advocate General was vested with substantial independent

authority. Id. at 34.

On appeal, we did not discuss whether the Judge

Advocate General is an agency, instead addressing the threshold

issue of whether we could review Judge Advocate General

decisions reviewing courts-martial in light of the APA’s express

exclusion of “courts martial and military commissions” from its

definition of “agency.” McKinney, 291 F.3d at 853. Ultimately,

we determined that Congress’s decision to establish a separate

judicial system for courts-martial review, of which the Judge

Advocate General’s “final and conclusive” review was a part,

together with the exclusion of courts martial from the APA’s

definition of “agency,” precluded APA review of the Judge

Advocate General’s decision. Id. at 854–56. 

This case is factually distinct from McKinney, where the

plaintiff sought to have us review a decision by the Judge

Advocate General made pursuant to his review under Article 69

of the UCMJ of a court martial decision. See 10 U.S.C. § 869. 

In contrast to McKinney, the disciplining of Partington did not

involve any aspect of the criminal justice procedure established

by the UCMJ, but was instead an ethics investigation undertaken

pursuant to the Judge Advocate General’s responsibility for the

professional supervision of attorneys. See R.C.M. 109(a). 

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Although the NJAG’s authority to discipline attorneys may

derive from the UCMJ, see 10 U.S.C. § 836, Partington’s

proceedings are not part of the “separate justice system”

Congress provided for in the UCMJ for military personnel, and

Partington’s APA claim is not “an attempt to end run a military

justice system” in which Congress established procedures for

review. McKinney, 291 F.3d at 855–56. Instead, Partington’s

disciplinary proceeding is peripheral to the adjudication of

criminal liability in the military justice system, and pertains

solely to the Judge Advocate General’s responsibility to ensure

attorneys act ethically and to maintain the integrity of the courtsmartial. This case is more similar to Piersall v. Winter, 435 F.3d

319 (D.C. Cir. 2006), in which we explained that decisions

rendered by the Board for Correction of Naval Records, “a

civilian administrative board established by the Congress

separate and apart from the system of military courts,” were

reviewable under the APA because such review did not breach

the statutory prohibition which controlled in McKinney. Id. at

324. Just so here. The Judge Advocate General’s Office, when

it is operating outside the statutory exclusion for courts-martial,

fits comfortably within the statutory definition of agency stated

above. Accordingly, we conclude that the Judge Advocate

General took agency action in the disciplinary proceedings

against Partington and that the decision in those proceedings is

subject to review under the APA. Notwithstanding our

conclusion that the district court erred in the ground upon which

it dismissed Partington’s APA claim, we will nonetheless affirm

the judgment on a different ground, that is, that the Judge

Advocate General’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.

Partington asserts that the Judge Advocate General’s

decision violated the APA because: (a) JAGINST 5803.1C does

not establish a standard of proof; and (b) the record was

insufficient to support the Judge Advocate General’s findings

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that Partington misrepresented the trial court proceedings on

appeal before the NMCCA. We disagree with both assertions.

First, JAGINST 5803.1C does establish standards of proof. 

Under JAGINST 5803.1C’s Complaint Processing Procedure,

“The [Preliminary Inquiry Officer] shall personally review the

results of the preliminary inquiry to determine whether, by a

preponderance of the evidence, a violation of the Rules or the

Code of Judicial Conduct has occurred.” JAGINST 5803.1C,

Enclosure (2), at 8. This procedure also directs the Judge

Advocate General, when receiving an ethics investigation, to

either: (1) direct further inquiry; (2) determine that the

allegations are unfounded or no further actions warranted; or (3)

determine that the allegations are supported by clear and

convincing evidence, and take appropriate action. JAGINST

5803.1C, Enclosure (2), at 13–14. Thus, Partington’s assertion

that the JAGINST did not establish standards of proof is

incorrect.

Second, we conclude that the Judge Advocate General’s

decision that Partington misrepresented the military judge’s

statements in his appellate brief was not arbitrary or capricious,

and was supported by substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. 

Indeed, the Judge Advocate General’s ultimate decision came

after a preliminary inquiry and ethics investigation, both of

which extensively cited the record of trial and compared it to the

statements in Partington’s appellate brief to support their

respective author’s conclusions that Partington had made

misstatements on appeal. See Joint Appendix 283–314, 319–35. 

These investigations reasonably determined that the military

judge, in the context of the proceedings, did not “acquit” Toles

or dismiss the charges against him, see id. 309–10, 331–33, and

that Toles had moved to dismiss, in contradiction to Partington’s

statement before the NMCCA that “Toles had moved for neither

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an acquittal nor a dismissal of these specifications.” See id. 310,

331.

In reviewing Partington’s APA claim, we note that we do

not substitute our judgment for that of the agency or evaluate de

novo whether Partington misrepresented the plea proceedings,

but instead determine “whether the agency’s decisionmaking

was reasoned.” National Treasury Employees Union v. Helfer,

53 F.3d 1289, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Motor Vehicle

Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,

463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 

We conclude that the NJAG, in explaining that he found

that Partington filed an appellate brief containing statements

Partington knew were false and misleading, see Joint Appendix

434–35, articulated a “rational connection between the facts

found and the choice made.” Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.

United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). Because the record

does not support Partington’s APA claim, we affirm the district

court’s judgment dismissing that claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

order entering judgment in favor of the defendants. Because we

affirm the dismissal of all claims alleged by Partington, we also

deny Partington’s request for mandamus review.

So ordered.

 

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