Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00599/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00599-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Mona Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Valley Radiologists, Ltd., 

Defendant.

No. CV-11-00599-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 At the final pretrial conference on November 16, 2012, Plaintiff requested that the 

jury be given instructions reflecting changes to certain definitions in the ADA brought 

about by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”). Defendant objected, and the 

Court requested that the parties submit memoranda on the issue. The parties have 

submitted their memoranda. Docs. 76, 77. For the reasons that follow, the Court will not 

give Plaintiff’s proposed modifications to the jury instructions. 

I. Background. 

The factual background of this case is set forth in the Court’s order on Defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment. Doc. 58. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that 

the complaint contained two counts. Doc. 1. Count one alleged that Defendant 

“discriminated against Smith in violation of the ADA by removing her from her position 

as a Lead Mammographer/Quality Control because of her disability.” Id. at 3. The 

removal occurred “on or about November 11, 2008.” Id. ¶ 12. Count two alleged that 

Defendant reneged on a promise to permit Defendant to perform 100 mammograms each 

year to maintain her license. Id. at 4. This count was eliminated by summary judgment, 

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leaving the change of position in count one as the only remaining claim in the case. 

Doc. 58. 

II. Discussion. 

 The ADAAA became effective on January 1, 2009. In Rohr v. Salt River Project 

Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit 

explained that the ADAAA amendments expand the scope of the term “disability” in the 

ADA. Rohr held that “disability” is to be construed to allow coverage to the “maximum 

extent” allowed by the ADA and the ADAAA. Id. at 861. It also explained that the 

phrase “substantially limits” had been interpreted as requiring a greater degree of 

limitation than Congress intended and that limitations should be evaluated without 

considering the ameliorative effects of corrective measures or devices (e.g. glasses). Id. 

at 861-62. The ADAAA also broadened the scope of the “regarded as” prong of the 

definition of disability by requiring only that an individual “establish[] that he or she has 

been subjected to an action prohibited under the ADA because of an actual or perceived 

physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to 

limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (emphasis added). 

 Plaintiff contends that the model jury instructions should be modified to reflect 

these changes in the law. Defendant argues that the pre-amendment ADA should govern 

this action. 

 The discrimination alleged in count one is said to have occurred when Defendant 

was removed from her position on November 11, 2008. The ADAAA did not take effect 

until January 1, 2009. The ADAAA does not apply retroactively. Becerril v. Pima 

County Assessor’s Office, 587 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Following our sister 

circuits, we conclude that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively.”). Accordingly, the 

ADAAA does not apply to the discriminatory event alleged in count one and at issue in 

the trial. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ADAAA may still apply if she can establish a continuing 

violation of the ADA that extends beyond the statute’s effective date. Ninth Circuit cases 

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defining a “continuing violation” have generally focused on the statute of limitations. 

See, e.g., Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2001); Morgan v. 

Nat’l RR Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Owens-Illinois, 

Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2000). Applying the reasoning in these cases, Plaintiff 

argues that an ADA violation continued after January 1, 2009, and that the entire case 

should therefore be governed by the ADAAA. 

 The Ninth Circuit recognizes two methods of establishing a continuing violation in 

the statute of limitations context. Douglas, 271 F.3d at 822. A “plaintiff may show a 

serial violation by pointing to a series of related acts against one individual, of which at 

least one falls within the relevant period of limitations.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Alternatively, a plaintiff may show a “systematic policy or practice of discrimination that 

operated, in part, within the limitations period – a systemic violation.” Morgan, 232 F.3d 

at 1015-16. 

 Plaintiff does not allege a systemic policy or practice of discrimination. Her claim 

is based on actions directed specifically at her. The only event that allegedly occurred 

after the ADAAA’s effective date was the employer’s refusal to allow her to perform 

additional mammograms, but that refusal formed the basis for count two and was 

eliminated by summary judgment. While it is true that Plaintiff continued to work in her 

new position after the effective date of the ADAAA, she does not allege that additional 

discrimination occurred or that the conditions of employment in the new position were 

discriminatory. She claims that the decision to reassign her to that position was 

discriminatory – a decision that occurred before the ADAAA was effective. The Court 

therefore finds that the alleged discriminatory event took place before the effective date 

of the ADAAA and that Plaintiff has not established an on-going violation after 

January 1, 2009. 

 Plaintiff correctly notes that the Court applied elements of the ADAAA when it 

considered whether there was enough evidence of disability to survive a motion for 

summary judgment. Doc. 76 at 2; See Doc. 58 at 5-8. While count two – which was still 

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active when the Court was considering the motion for summary judgment – was subject 

to the ADAAA, count one was not as explained above. To the extent that the Court cited 

the ADAAA and related regulations with respect to count one, it was in error. 

III. Conclusion 

Because the ADAAA does not apply to the Plaintiff’s case, the Court will not give 

Plaintiff’s proposed amendments to the model jury instructions. If Plaintiff believes that 

the evidence at trial somehow alters the factual basis for this decision, she may raise that 

issue with the Court during trial and before the jury is instructed. 

 Dated this 10th day of January, 2013. 

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