Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02812/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02812-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Foreclosure

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEN MACKENSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-02812-JSC 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Plaintiff Ken Mackenson brings this action seeking to prevent foreclosure of his home. 

He sues Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”) contending that Nationstar’s handling 

of his loan modification applications violates the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights. Now pending 

before the Court is Nationstar’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. (Dkt. No. 15.) After carefully considering the arguments and briefing submitted,

the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-l(b), and DENIES 

Nationstar’s motion to dismiss. 

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the owner of real property located at 92 Santa Maria Dr., Novato, California 

94947. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 3.) After purchasing the property in 2002, he 

refinanced in 2006 executing a Deed of Trust and Promissory Note in favor of GreenPoint 

Mortgage Funding LLC. (Id. ¶ 8.) The loan was subsequently assigned to Aurora Loan Services, 

a.k.a. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, and in December 2009, Plaintiff and GMAC entered into a 

modification agreement whereby Plaintiff and GMAC agreed that Plaintiff’s total principal 

balance would now be $642,506.52, with $70,439.01 deferred as a balloon payment upon maturity 

of the loan. (Id.) Then, in July 2012, Defendant Nationstar became the beneficiary and the

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servicer under Plaintiff’s Deed of Trust and Promissory Note. (Id. ¶ 10.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff sought a loan modification of his first lien deed of trust with 

Nationstar, and in March 2013, he requested that Nationstar assign him a single point of contact to 

assist with the modification process. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Nationstar notified Plaintiff that Anthony 

Johnson had been assigned as his single point of contact, but Plaintiff was never able to contact 

Mr. Johnson. (Id. ¶ 11.)

On March 27, 2013, Plaintiff received a letter notifying him that he had received a loan 

modification and that to accept the modification he needed to send, via Fed-Ex, one original, 

notarized copy of the modification by April 29, 2013. (Id. ¶ 12.) The letter indicated that 

Plaintiff’s principal balance would be increased to $741,977.84. (Id.) “Plaintiff was unsure 

whether this new principal balance accounted for the $70,439.01 balloon payment that was a part 

of the 2009 modification, or whether, if he accepted this modification with the increased principal 

balance, he would still owe $70,439.01 at the end of the loan.” (Id.) He therefore attempted to 

contact Mr. Johnson beginning on April 4 to inquire as to the precise terms of the loan. (Id.) He 

was unable to reach Mr. Johnson via telephone or in writing and neither Mr. Johnson nor 

Nationstar acknowledged his contact attempts. (Id.) Because he had not received a response, on 

April 29 (the deadline to accept the loan modification), Plaintiff faxed a signed and notarized copy 

of the agreement and a copy of a check for $5,862.00 (the first payment amount due under the 

modification) along “with a letter indicating that he would like to accept the modification and 

would send the originals once Nationstar responded to his questions about the principal balance.” 

(Id. ¶ 13.) Despite Plaintiff’s multiple attempts to contact Mr. Johnson or anyone else at 

Nationstar from April 2014 through August 2014 (presumably 2013), no one responded to 

Plaintiff’s inquiries regarding the loan modification amount. (Id.) 

Plaintiff did receive other communications from Nationstar during this time, including a 

notification in May 2013 that he had been assigned new single point of contact, Duane Fenton; 

however, as with Mr. Johnson, Plaintiff was never able to contact Mr. Fenton. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff 

also received requests for additional documents between April and September 2013 as Nationstar 

indicated that Plaintiff’s loan modification application was still under review. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff 

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complied with all these requests. (Id.) Further, during this time Plaintiff’s monthly income 

changed significantly “as he received a substantial raise at his employment whereby his monthly 

salary increased over $2,000.00 per month, which Plaintiff documented in his loan modification 

application.” (Id.) 

On September 5, 2013, Plaintiff was notified that he was not qualified for a HAMP 

modification because the “proposed monthly payment...was either less than 10% OR greater than 

55% of [Plaintiff’s] monthly gross income.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff appealed this denial and 

submitted proof of his new monthly income. (Id.) On September 19, 2013, Plaintiff received a 

letter notifying him that he was not eligible for an in-house modification because the “net present 

value” was negative. (Id. ¶ 17.) The letter stated that he had 30 days to appeal and indicated that 

if he sought to dispute the valuation on appeal he would need to submit a check for $200 for the 

appraisal fee. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted his appeal and a check for $200 on October 18, 2013. (Id.)

A Notice of Trustee Sale was recorded on November 15, 2013—prior to a decision on 

either of Plaintiff’s appeals. (Id. ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff filed the underlying lawsuit in the Superior Court for the County of Marin in May 

2014 alleging two causes of action under the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights: (1) violation of 

California Civil Code Section 2923.6’s dual tracking prohibition, and (2) violation of Section

2923.7’s requirement that the mortgager establish, upon request, a single point of contact. 

Nationstar thereafter removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction and moved to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim.1(Dkt. Nos. 1 & 9.) In response to the motion to dismiss, 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 12.) Nationstar thereafter renewed its 

motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 15); however, the parties agreed to stay proceedings while they 

attempted to resolve the matter with the assistance of the court’s ADR unit (Dkt. No. 21). As this 

effort was unsuccessful, the Court lifted the stay and now considers the pending motion to dismiss.

//

//

 

1

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 10 & 14.) 

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LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the 

sufficiency of the complaint where the action fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that 

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations 

omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) a party is only required to make “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 554 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual allegations in 

the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 

However, even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels 

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 663-64 (2009).

DISCUSSION

The California Homeowner Bill of Rights (“HBOR”) is a “state law designed to both 

provide protections for homeowners facing [non-judicial] foreclosure and reform aspects of the 

foreclosure process.” Shapiro v. Sage Point Lender Servs., No. 14-1591, 2014 WL 5419721, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2014) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.4(a)). The HBOR took effect on January 

1, 2013. Among its protections to home borrowers, the HBOR “attempts to eliminate the practice, 

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commonly known as dual tracking, whereby financial institutions continue to pursue foreclosure 

even while evaluating a borrower’s loan modification application.” Rockridge Trust v. Wells 

Fargo, N.A., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.4 (noting 

that the purpose of the act is to ensure that borrowers are “considered for, and have a meaningful 

opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options” in order to avoid foreclosure).

Thus, while a borrower’s complete application for a first lien loan modification is pending

(including an appeal of the denial thereof), the servicer may not record a notice of default, notice 

of trustee’s sale, or conduct a trustee’s sale. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(c), (e). 

A. HBOR Applies to the Subject Property

Section 2924.15(a) states that HBOR “shall apply only to first lien mortgages or deeds of 

trust that are secured by owner-occupied residential real property containing no more than four 

dwelling units.” Nationstar first contends that the entire action must be dismissed because 

Plaintiff has failed to allege that the property at issue is a single-family residence of no more than 

four dwelling units. Nationstar’s argument is not well-taken. Although Plaintiff did not 

specifically plead that the residence at issue contains no more than four dwellings, Nationstar—as 

the beneficiary and servicer of Plaintiff’s loan—is well aware of the number of dwelling units on 

the subject property. Even if this were not the case, the Deed of Trust establishes that it is a 

single-family residence.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff has adequately pled that HBOR applies to the 

 

2

Plaintiff submitted a Request for Judicial Notice of the Deed of Trust with his opposition brief. 

(Dkt. No. 17.) The Court may take judicial notice of a fact “that is not subject to reasonable 

dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). There is no rule that a request for 

judicial notice may only be made by the moving party. Nationstar’s citation to Branch v. Tunnell

is misplaced. See, Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e hold that documents 

whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which 

are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in Ruling on a 12(b) motion to 

dismiss.”); see also Bhardwaj v. Pathak, No.13-3807, 2013 WL 5958145, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 

2013) (“This Court may take judicial notice of documents in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where those 

documents are “central to a plaintiff's claim” and where those documents, while not physically 

attached to plaintiff’s complaint, are referenced in the complaint.”) Here, the Deed of Trust was 

referenced in the First Amended Complaint and Nationstar does not dispute its authenticity, just its 

admissibility. As judicial notice is appropriate for “materials incorporated into the complaint or 

matters of public record,” Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice of the Deed of Trust—a public

record not subject to reasonable dispute—is granted. Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2010). The title of the document reflects that it is for a single-family residence; the 

Court may take judicial notice of the title without considering the truth of the contents of the 

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subject property. 

B. Plaintiff has Stated a Claim for Violation of the HBOR § 2923.6

Plaintiff contends that Nationstar violated Section 2923.6’s dual tracking prohibition when 

it recorded the Notice of Trustee Sale on November 15, 2013 while his appeals of the denials of 

his loan modification applications were pending. (FAC ¶ 24.) Section 2923.6(c) provides that:

If a borrower submits a complete application for first lien loan 

modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage 

servicer, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or 

authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of sale, 

or conduct a trustee’s sale, while the complete first lien loan 

modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, 

mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record 

a notice of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until 

... [the servicer] makes a written determination that the borrower is 

not eligible for a first lien loan modification.

If a borrower’s application is denied, the borrower is entitled to at least 30 days from the date of 

the written denial to appeal and provide evidence that the denial was in error. Id. § 2923.6(d). 

Further, if a borrower’s application is denied, the servicer must not record a notice of sale until the 

later of (1) 31 days after notifying the borrower of the denial in writing; or (2) the 15 days after the 

appeal taken is denied. Id. § 2923.6(e). In addition:

In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple 

applications for first lien loan modification for the purpose of delay, 

the mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate applications 

from borrowers who have already been evaluated or afforded a fair 

opportunity to be evaluated for a first lien loan modification prior to 

January 1, 2013, or who have been evaluated or afforded a fair 

opportunity to be evaluated consistent with the requirements of this 

section, unless there has been a material change in the borrower's 

financial circumstances since the date of the borrower's previous 

application and that change is documented by the borrower and 

submitted to the mortgage servicer.

Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(g).

Nationstar contends Section 2923.6 does not apply because Plaintiff already obtained a 

successful loan modification on his first lien mortgage prior to January 1, 2013 and there is no 

evidence that Plaintiff thereafter submitted a complete loan modification application based on a 

material change in his circumstances. Although Nationstar concedes that Plaintiff has pled a 

 

Deed.

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“material change” in his financial circumstances, it contends that Section 2923.6 does not apply 

because Plaintiff has not (1) specified when exactly he notified Nationstar of this change, (2) 

shown that the changed circumstances were adequately documented, or (3) that he submitted a 

complete loan modification application based on the material change.

There is no dispute that Plaintiff received a first lien loan modification prior to January 1, 

2013; thus, HBOR only applies if Plaintiff can allege a “material” change in his financial 

condition which was documented and submitted to Nationstar after January 1, 2013. According to 

the First Amended Complaint, during the time Plaintiff was actively pursuing a loan modification

with Nationstar from April through September 2013, Plaintiff’s monthly income increased over 

$2,000 per month and he “documented [this] in his loan modification.” (FAC ¶ 15.) During this 

same period, he was also submitting other requested documentation to Nationstar in support of his 

loan modification application. (Id.) 

These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to show “that there has been a 

material change in the borrower’s financial circumstances since the date of the borrower’s 

previous application and that change is documented by the borrower and submitted to the 

mortgage servicer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(g). Plaintiff has alleged that he submitted 

documentation to Nationstar regarding his significant change in monthly income between April 

and September 2013. See Dias v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., No. 5:13-CV-05327-EJD, 2015 WL 

1263558, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (concluding that plaintiffs’ allegation that “their

application contained a documented material change in income due to a $2,000 decline in their 

monthly income” “sufficiently pled a material change in financial circumstances that places them 

within the scope of Section 2923.6(g).”).

Nationstar’s reliance Withers v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A., No. 14-0351, 2014 WL 

3418367, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014), is misplaced. There, the plaintiff merely alleged that he 

had promptly submitted “all documentation requested” and did not specifically allege that he had 

submitted documentation reflecting a change in income as a result of his return to the workforce or 

rental income. Id. at *4; see also Ware v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 13-1310, 2013 WL 

6247236, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2013) (concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately 

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document a material change in their financial condition where their counsel merely submitted a 

letter stating that “borrowers’ financial circumstances have materially changed as their income and 

expenses have changed since they last submitted an application for foreclosure alternatives.”). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he specifically submitted documentation of his change in income. 

While Plaintiff does not allege precisely what documentation was submitted, at the motion to 

dismiss stage he is not required to do so. 

Nationstar’s argument that Plaintiff has not alleged that he submitted a “complete” loan 

modification application is no more persuasive. Pursuant to the statute, an application is “deemed 

‘complete’ when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all documents required by 

the mortgage servicer within the reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.” Cal. 

Civ.Code § 2923.6(h). Completeness of a loan modification application should be considered at 

the time the notice of trustee sale is recorded. Here, Plaintiff alleges both that he “submit[ted] all 

required documents requested by Nationstar” (FAC ¶ 15), and that he timely submitted appeals of 

the denials of his loan modification applications (Id. ¶¶ 16-17); nonetheless, a notice of trustee sale 

was recorded prior to a decision on his appeals (Id. ¶ 18). These allegations are sufficient to show 

that Plaintiffs’ application was complete prior to September 2013—it is unclear otherwise how 

Nationstar could have denied the application. See, e.g., Dias, 2015 WL 1263558 at *5 (“Allowing 

Chase to declare three months after recording a Notice of Trustee Sale that a loan modification is 

incomplete would permit any mortgage servicer to circumvent the protections afforded by the 

statute. Mortgage servicers cannot manipulate the statute to immunize themselves from liability by 

recording a notice of trustee sale and then stating that the loan modification application was 

incomplete.”) The allegations are also sufficient to invoke Section 2923.6(e)(2) prohibition on 

recording a notice of sale until “thirty-one days after notifying the borrower of the denial [of his 

appeal] in writing” as Plaintiff has alleged that he submitted appeals with the necessary 

documentation.

Accordingly, Nationstar’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under Section 2923.6 is 

denied.

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C. Plaintiff has Stated a Claim for Violation of the HBOR § 2923.7

“In connection with its enactments to address dual tracking, the California legislature also 

enacted a single point of contact provision [SPOC] to prevent borrowers from being given the runaround.” Rockridge Trust v. Wells Fargo NA, No. 13-01457, 2014 WL 688124, at *23 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 19, 2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In particular, Section 2923.7 of the 

California Civil Code provides that upon a borrower’s request for a foreclosure prevention 

alternative, the servicer must promptly designate one person to be the point of contact to 

communicate directly with the borrower. Cal. Civ.Code § 2923.7(a). The SPOC is responsible 

for doing all of the following:

(1) Communicating the process by which a borrower may apply for 

an available foreclosure prevention alternative and the deadline 

for any required submissions to be considered for these options.

(2) Coordinating receipt of all documents associated with available 

foreclosure prevention alternatives and notifying the borrower of 

any missing documents necessary to complete the application.

(3) Having access to current information and personnel sufficient to 

timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of the 

current status of the foreclosure prevention alternative.

(4) Ensuring that a borrower is considered for all foreclosure 

prevention alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage 

servicer, if any.

(5) Having access to individuals with the ability and authority to 

stop foreclosure proceedings when necessary.

Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7(b). 

Plaintiff contends that Nationstar violated Section 2923.7 “when it purported to assign 

Plaintiff several different points of contact while Plaintiff had an open loan modification

application pending, and following Plaintiff’s written request for a knowledgeable single-point of 

contact.” (FAC ¶ 30.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that while he made repeated efforts to contact 

his so-called points of contact “none of the supposed points of contacts ever contacted Plaintiff, or 

made attempts to do so, in order to adequately inform Plaintiff of the current status of his account 

and his concerns.” (Id.)

Nationstar’s arguments in favor of dismissal are two-fold. First, Nationstar contends that 

Plaintiff fails to allege a violation of Section 2923.7 because nothing in the statute requires that a 

borrower communicate with only once point of contact. Second, Nationstar argues that even if 

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Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient, Plaintiff does not allege any economic or material harm. 

The Court is not persuaded by either argument.

Plaintiff alleges that although he was assigned two different single points of contact—

Messrs. Johnson and Fenton—he was never able to speak to either despite his repeated efforts to 

communicate with both telephonically and in writing regarding the status of his loan modification 

application. (FAC ¶¶ 12-14, 30.) In particular, he alleges that although he repeatedly attempted to 

contact Mr. Johnson after he received notice of his March 2013 loan modification approval to 

confirm whether the new principal balance included “the $70,439.01 balloon payment that was a 

part of the 2009 modification” he was “never able to speak with an individual who could tell him 

the total principal balance required of him under the loan modification agreement,” and thus,

unable to accept the loan modification. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) This is sufficient to state a claim under 

Section 2323.7. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7(b)(3) (the SPOC shall “[have] access to current 

information and personnel sufficient to timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of 

the current status”); § 2923.7(b)(4) (the SPOC shall ensure “that a borrower is considered for all 

foreclosure prevention alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer”); see also 

Garcia v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 13–3670, 2014 WL 458208 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014)

(denying motion to dismiss Section 2923.7 claim where plaintiff alleged that her SPOC was 

unresponsive to her phone calls); Mungai v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 14-00289, 2014 WL 2508090, 

at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2014) (“Finding that a mortgage servicer complies with Section 2923.7 

when it assigns an SPOC who fails to communicate with the borrower would render the SPOC 

requirement a nullity.”) (internal citations omitted). Nationstar’s repeated assertion that Plaintiff 

was able to pursue foreclosure options and in fact accepted the offered loan modification is not 

supported by the allegations of the First Amended Complaint which allege that Plaintiff attempted

to accept the modification by faxing the agreement to Nationstar along with a copy of a check for 

the first payment, but he never mailed in the originals of these items because he was unable to talk 

to anyone to confirm the loan amount. 

The Court thus turns to the question of whether Plaintiff’s claim is nonetheless barred 

because he not alleged any material or economic loss under the statute. Section 2924.12 governs 

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relief under Section 2923.7. Subsection (a) provides that if a “trustee’s deed upon sale has not 

been recorded, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material violation” 

whereas subsection (b) authorizes “actual economic damages” if a “trustee’s deed upon sale has 

been recorded.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12. Plaintiff concedes that as no actual trustee sale has 

taken place he is not eligible for actual damages. Thus, the inquiry turns on whether Plaintiff has 

adequately pled entitlement to injunctive relief. 

Plaintiff contends that because of Nationstar’s violation of the statute he was not able to 

accept the loan modification application which has resulted in the “imminent loss of his property, 

the destruction of his credit, and the denial of his loan modification application and the loss of his 

right to appeal.” (FAC ¶ 33.) Nationstar, for its part, has not cited any authority interpreting the 

term “material” for purposes of Section 2924.12. From a Rule 12(b)(6) viewpoint, “[f]actual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555. “Had [Plaintiff] obtained a modification, [he] may have been able to keep [his] house 

and lower [his] mortgage payments. At this stage, the Court cannot say that this alleged violation 

was not material...Plaintiffs’ damages may turn out to be minimal, but that is not something that 

the Court can determine on a Motion to Dismiss.” Segura v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 14-

04195, 2014 WL 4798890, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately pled a claim for relief under 

Section 2923.7. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Nationstar’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 15) is DENIED.

Nationstar shall answer the First Amended Complaint within 14 days.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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