Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01249/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THEIN TONY VU, 

Petitioner,

v.

DERRAL G. ADAMS, Warden, et

al., 

Respondents. 

 CIV-S-01-1249 DFL CMK P

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Petitioner Thein Tony Vu was convicted in state court on

December 16, 1998 of numerous crimes, including conspiracy to

commit murder and attempted murder. (Answer at 4.) Vu now

brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, asserting two grounds for relief: (1) on its own

initiative, the trial court should have instructed the jury on

lesser included offenses; and (2) the evidence presented at 

trial was insufficient to support Vu’s conviction for conspiracy

to commit murder. Vu also requests an evidentiary hearing on the

issues he raises here. Respondent has filed an answer, and

petitioner has filed a traverse. 

Case 2:01-cv-01249-DFL Document 16 Filed 06/28/05 Page 1 of 5
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2

The facts of petitioner’s case are well known to the

parties, so the court will not repeat them here. On June 19,

2000, the California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s appeal,

considering and rejecting both of the arguments petitioner raises

here. Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied

petitioner’s request for review, the Court of Appeal’s ruling is

the last reasoned state court decision.

The Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument regarding

the lesser included offense instructions, finding that the

evidence at trial did not support instructions on either

attempted voluntary manslaughter or conspiracy to commit

voluntary manslaughter. (Answer Ex. B at 6.) Although

California state courts must, on their own initiative, instruct

juries on lesser included offenses, they need only do so “when

there is evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude

that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.” 

(Id. at 3.)

According to the court, “[t]he record is devoid of evidence

from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant acted

rashly in a heat of passion at the time of the shooting at the

house.” (Id. at 6.) The alleged “provocation” took place two

days before the shooting and was directed not at Vu, but at the

family he was staying with. (Id.) In addition, Vu’s activities

during the day of the shooting -- including “hanging” and

“kicking back” at his friend’s house and “cruising around” in the

car for several hours -- did not support the theory that he acted

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under provocation. (Id. at 13; Rep.’s Tr. at 232, 235.) 

Finally, neither petitioner nor his friends had been threatened

or otherwise put in immediate danger on the day of the shooting. 

(Answer Ex. B at 13.) 

The court also noted that the evidence of Vu’s intent to

“settle the score” suggested a motive of revenge, which “is not

an acceptable passion under the heat of passion theory.” (Id. at

7.) Rather, it suggested planning on the part of petitioner and

the other perpetrators, “which exemplifies reason rather then

heated passion.” (Id.) For these reasons, the court held that

the trial court did not err in failing to give instructions on

attempted voluntary manslaughter and conspiracy to commit

voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at 7-8.)

The court also found that there was sufficient evidence of

petitioner’s intent to kill to support his conviction for

conspiracy to commit murder. The court focused on four portions

of the statement Vu made to the police on the night of the

shooting: (1) petitioner’s stated reason for shooting at the

house was because “[Saechao] was up in there,” (2) his admitted

role as the “back-up man” who would kill Saechao if he came out

of the house alive, (3) his statement that he only wanted to kill

Saechao, and (4) his expression of his intent to kill Saechao if

he saw him again. (Id. at 9-10.) 

Petitioner’s challenge to the jury instructions fails in the

first instance because a trial court’s decision not to instruct

on lesser included offenses does not present a federal

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 Petitioner’s habeas petition “was filed after the 1

effective date of, and is thus subject to, the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act.” Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359,

362 (9th Cir. 1999).

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constitutional question in non-capital cases, unless the failure

to instruct interferes with the defendant’s “right to adequate

instructions on his or her theory of defense.” Bashor v. Risley,

730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). Here, petitioner neither

requested instructions on voluntary manslaughter nor argued at

trial that he acted in a “heat of passion.” (Rep.’s Tr. at 586-

88, 617, 620, 623, 633.) In such circumstances, the trial

court’s decision not to give the jury voluntary manslaughter

instructions did not hinder petitioner’s ability to present his

theory of the defense. Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1240. Therefore, the

court’s decision on this issue does not present a constitutional

question, and it cannot be challenged in this federal habeas

corpus proceeding. Id.

In addition, the State Court of Appeal’s rulings on both of

petitioner’s arguments are not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. The court 1

reasonably found no evidence of “a sudden quarrel or heat of

passion,” which was required to support an instruction on

voluntary manslaughter. Cal. Penal Code § 192(a); People v.

Breverman, 19 Cal.4th 142, 162-63, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 (1998). 

The court also reasonably found that there was sufficient

evidence of petitioner’s guilt at trial to support his conviction

for conspiracy to commit murder. 

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Finally, neither of the issues raised by petitioner warrants

an evidentiary hearing. There are no disputed issues of fact that

require resolution by evidentiary hearing.

For these reasons, petitioner’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

Case 2:01-cv-01249-DFL Document 16 Filed 06/28/05 Page 5 of 5