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Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 24, 2014 Decided December 12, 2014

No. 13-7095

PATRICK RUSSELL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF

AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

APPELLANT

v.

HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cv-02212)

Thomas J. McKenna, pro hac vice, argued the cause for 

the appellant. Toyja E. Kelley and John B. Isbister were with 

him on brief.

Sara Pikofsky argued the cause for the appellees. Evan 

Miller was with her on brief. Thomas F. Cullen, Jr. entered 

an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: This appeal

involves the conversion process set forth in Rule 12(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides:

If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters 

outside the pleadings are presented to and not 

excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as 

one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All 

parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to 

present all the material that is pertinent to the 

motion.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). Patrick Russell, the appellant, 

complains that the district court converted the appellees’

motion to dismiss and granted them summary judgment 

without giving him a “reasonable opportunity” to present 

evidence. But we do not reach that issue because, assuming 

arguendo that the district court violated Rule 12(d), the error 

would be harmless in this case. For that reason, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Patrick Russell is a former employee of Harman 

International Industries, Inc. Russell participated in Harman’s

401(k) plan, which invests primarily in Harman common 

stock. In April 2007, Harman issued a press release claiming 

that two investment firms had agreed to acquire the company. 

That deal ultimately fell through, triggering a corresponding 

decline in the value of Harman’s stock. Russell alleges that 

the deal failed because agents of Harman made false and 

misleading statements to the investment firms. He contends 

that these statements constituted a breach of fiduciary duty in 

violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 

(ERISA). In December 2007, Russell filed a class-action 

complaint against Harman and various individuals associated 

with the company (collectively, Harman).

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When he filed suit, Russell no longer worked for

Harman. Six months earlier, Russell had signed a severance 

agreement that included the following release of liability:

Release of Known and Unknown Claims.

Employee . . . releases and forever discharges the 

Company, its affiliates, and all of their agents . . . of 

and from any Claim (as defined below) which have 

[sic] arisen on or before the date that this Agreement 

becomes effective. . . . The Claims released by this 

agreement include, but are not limited to, Claims 

arising out of, based upon, or relating to . . . the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act . . . .

Employee expressly acknowledges, agrees and 

recites that: (i) this Agreement is written in a manner 

he understands; . . . (iii) he has entered into and 

executed this Agreement knowingly and voluntarily; 

(v) [sic] he has read and understands this Agreement 

in its entirety; and (vi) he has not been forced to sign 

this Agreement by any employee or agent of the 

Company.

Aug. 5, 2008 Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1 (emphasis added). In 

return for his signature, Harman gave Russell severance 

payments he was not otherwise entitled to receive. The 

severance agreement advised Russell to consult a lawyer 

before signing and gave him seven days to do so. Russell did 

not avail himself of that opportunity.

Harman used the severance agreement’s release as the 

basis for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The 

motion contended that Russell gave up his right to bring an 

ERISA action. To support this defense, Harman attached the

severance agreement as an exhibit to the motion. After 

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holding the case under advisement for some time, the district 

court ordered supplemental briefing and asked the parties to 

address the meaning of the phrase (emphasized above) “any 

Claim . . . arisen on or before the date that this Agreement 

becomes effective.” The order did not expressly mention 

Rule 12(d) or the possibility of converting Harman’s motion 

to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Harman and 

Russell promptly submitted their supplemental briefs. 

Although the district court asked the parties to address only 

one issue, Russell’s brief addressed many more. He argued 

that (1) his claims did not “arise[]” under the terms of the 

severance agreement, (2) he did not knowingly and 

voluntarily waive his ERISA rights, (3) the severance 

agreement could not waive the claims of other plan members

and (4) the severance agreement was void as against public 

policy. See Feb. 28, 2013 P’s Opp. to D’s Supp. Memo. 2–7.

The district court rendered its decision in May 2013. For 

the first time, the district court expressly invoked Rule 12(d) 

and converted Harman’s motion to dismiss into one for 

summary judgment. In its decision, the district court 

determined, among other things, that Russell had knowingly 

and voluntarily waived his ERISA rights by signing the

severance agreement. The district court relied on the 

following factors:

the Agreement states clearly the consideration 

Russell received for entering into the Agreement, 

highlights the rights that Russell released, uses clear 

and precise language to describe the scope of that 

release, provides that Russell had time to consider 

the Agreement, and counsels him to consult an 

attorney.

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Russell v. Harman Int’l Indus., Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 68, 76 

(D.D.C. 2013). The district court then entered summary 

judgment for Harman. 

Russell timely appealed. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291.

II. DISCUSSION

Russell properly raises one argument on appeal.

1

 He 

contends that the district court violated Rule 12(d) by entering 

summary judgment without giving him a “reasonable

opportunity” to present evidence. But we do not decide 

whether the district court violated Rule 12(d) because, 

assuming it did, the error would be harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2111. 

A district court’s failure to comply with the procedural 

safeguards of Rule 12(d) does not constitute reversible error if 

it did not prejudice the parties. See Holy Land Found. for 

Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 

Hollis v. Dep’t of Army, 856 F.2d 1541, 1544 (D.C. Cir. 

1988). Here, Russell suffered no prejudice because, even had

he obtained his now-desired discovery, he could not 

demonstrate a “genuine issue of material fact” sufficient to 

prevail at summary judgment. See Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 

158, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 165; 

Hollis, 856 F.2d at 1544 n.34.

 1 Russell also attempts to argue—for the first time in his reply 

brief—that the severance agreement covers only Harman itself, not the 

individual defendants. We decline to consider this argument because 

Russell forfeited it. See Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 

1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (arguments raised for first time in reply brief are 

forfeited).

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Russell complains that the district court did not afford 

him discovery on whether he knowingly and voluntarily 

consented to the severance agreement. We generally require

waivers of liability to be “knowing and voluntary” in the 

context of Title VII. See United States v. Trucking Emp’rs, 

Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing Alexander v. 

Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974)). Most of 

our sister circuits have extended the knowing-and-voluntary 

requirement to the ERISA context as well. See, e.g., Smart v. 

Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 181 (1st 

Cir. 1995); Laniok v. Advisory Comm. of Brainerd Mfg. Co. 

Pension Plan, 935 F.2d 1360, 1367 (2d Cir. 1991); Jakimas v. 

Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 781 (3d Cir. 2007); 

Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 373 n.6 (5th 

Cir. 2002); Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d 552, 559 (7th 

Cir. 2011); Leavitt v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 921 F.2d 160, 162 

(8th Cir. 1990); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 

1012 (9th Cir. 1997); Wright v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 

1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 1991). Our precedent is unclear. 

Compare Trucking Emp’rs, 561 F.2d at 318 (Title VII 

waivers must be knowing and voluntary), and Brown v. 

Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 456 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Title VII 

jurisprudence is instructive in interpreting ERISA), with

Makins v. Dist. of Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (declining to apply knowing-and-voluntary requirement

to Title VII waiver in settlement agreement). We see no 

reason to take a position in this case because the parties agree 

that the knowing-and-voluntary standard applies. We will 

therefore assume, arguendo, that an employee must 

knowingly and voluntarily consent to a waiver of ERISA 

liability.

Our sister circuits rely on a non-exhaustive list of factors 

to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, 

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an ERISA waiver is knowing and voluntary. The following

list from the Second Circuit is representative:

1) the plaintiff’s education and business experience, 

2) the amount of time the plaintiff had possession of 

or access to the agreement before signing it, 3) the 

role of plaintiff in deciding the terms of the 

agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement, 5) 

whether the plaintiff was represented by or consulted

with an attorney, as well as whether an employer 

encouraged the employee to consult an attorney and 

whether the employee had a fair opportunity to do so

and 6) whether the consideration given in exchange 

for the waiver exceeds employee benefits to which 

the employee was already entitled by contract or law.

Laniok, 935 F.2d at 1368 (brackets omitted).

Russell contends that he needed discovery on each and 

every one of these factors. But at least two of the factors—

Factors 4 and 6—are apparent from the face of the severance 

agreement. Granted, the remaining factors ordinarily require 

the district court to evaluate not only characteristics unique to 

the employee but also the circumstances surrounding his 

assent to the waiver. But here, those factors are all matters 

within Russell’s own knowledge. Russell knows his 

education and business experience, the role he played in 

deciding the terms of the agreement and whether he consulted 

counsel. If Harman had pressured or coerced Russell into 

signing the release, Russell would undoubtedly be aware of it. 

Despite the length of this litigation, Russell has never 

proffered any evidence to undermine the knowing-andvoluntary nature of his consent or identified a plausible line of 

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inquiry for discovery that might lead to evidence creating a 

disputed issue of material fact.

2

Accordingly, Russell was not prejudiced by his lack of

discovery. Russell’s failure to suggest any reason why his 

consent to the severance agreement was unknowing or 

involuntary convinces us that discovery would be futile. We 

decline to remand a case when discovery would amount to 

“nothing more than a fishing expedition” because the 

appellant is “unable to offer anything but rank speculation.” 

Bastin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 104 F.3d 1392, 1396 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997). Thus, the district court’s violation of Rule 12(d), 

assuming it occurred, would be harmless error. See Colbert, 

471 F.3d at 168–69; Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 165–66.

Of course, our harmless-error analysis is confined to the 

unique circumstances of this case. It bears repeating:

We do not propose that in every case in which a 

district court improperly goes beyond the pleadings 

 2 In his reply brief, Russell makes two challenges to the severance 

agreement—both of which border on the conspiratorial. First, Russell 

complains that the Harman agent who signed the severance agreement 

signed her name with one pen but dated her signature with another pen. 

Putting aside an obvious, innocent explanation for this discrepancy—that 

the first pen ran out of ink—the sufficiency of Harman’s consent to the 

severance agreement says nothing about the sufficiency of Russell’s

consent. Only the latter matters under the knowing-and-voluntary 

standard. 

Second, Russell notes that he signed the severance agreement the 

same day he received it, even though Harman gave him seven days to 

consider it. Russell appears to be suggesting that Harman pressured him 

into signing the severance agreement before he could fully examine it. 

Yet, if such pressure occurred, Russell would know about it. His failure to 

come forward with any evidence of such pressure further convinces us that 

Russell is merely grasping at straws.

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in granting a motion to dismiss without affording the 

protections contemplated in Rule 12[(d)], a losing 

party will lose once more on appeal because of its 

inability to show what it would have produced had it 

been given the opportunity. In a general case, 

perhaps the opportunity for discovery might have 

produced precisely that which was lacking.

Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 166. This case is not a “general case,” 

however, because Russell neither proffered evidence nor 

identified a plausible line of inquiry regarding the matters on 

which he says discovery is needed. Stated differently, Russell

“had every opportunity and incentive to produce the evidence 

sufficient to rebut the ample evidence supporting the [district 

court’s] conclusion.” Id. Because Russell has failed to show 

prejudice resulting from his lack of discovery, we conclude 

that the district court’s assumed error was harmless.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment.

So ordered.

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