Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-01554/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-01554-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DAVID A. DESHLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 04-1554 PCT MEA

) 

PINON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

)

 Defendant. )

_________________________________)

All of the parties have consented to the exercise of

magistrate judge jurisdiction over this case, including the

entry of final judgment. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment (Docket No. 30). The Court heard oral

argument from counsel for the parties regarding the motion for

summary judgment on March 29, 2006. 

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff’s pro per complaint, filed July 29, 2004,

alleged Defendant wrongfully discriminated against him based on

his gender, i.e., male, and his race, i.e., white, in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).

Plaintiff further asserted Defendant retaliated against him, in

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1 The complaint also alleged state causes of action for

gender and race discrimination in violation of the Arizona Civil

Rights Act, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, negligent supervision, and violation of Arizona

Revised Statutes Annotated § 23-350, i.e., that Defendant failed to

timely pay Plaintiff wages due Plaintiff. On February 16, 2005, the

Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law

claims.

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violation of Title VII and state law.1 Plaintiff contends he was

constructively discharged by Defendant on February 25, 2004,

when he was placed on administrative leave. See Complaint at

paras. 14, 26. Plaintiff acquired counsel on or about December

2, 2004. See Docket No. 4.

A scheduling order (Docket No. 20) was issued in April

of 2005. Defendant proposed an offer of judgment to Plaintiff

in May 2005. See Docket No. 21. Plaintiff was deposed.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on January 6,

2006, and a separate statement of facts in support of the

motion. Docket No. 30 & Docket No. 31. Plaintiff filed a

response to the motion for summary judgment and a separate

statement of facts on January 27, 2006. Docket No. 33 & Docket

No. 34. Defendant filed a motion to strike portions of

Plaintiff’s statement of facts on February 14, 2006. See Docket

No. 38. Plaintiff responded to the motion to strike on February

16. Docket No. 39. 

The Court heard oral argument from counsel for the

parties regarding the motion for summary judgment and the motion

to strike on March 29, 2006, at which time the Court denied the

motion to strike and took the motion for summary judgment under

advisement. 

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II. Standard for granting summary judgment

 Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that summary judgment shall be entered if the

pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file show that there is no genuine dispute

regarding the material facts of the case and the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509-10

(1986). 

For purposes of deciding a motion for summary

judgment, “genuine” means that the evidence

about the fact is such that a reasonable jury

could resolve the point in favor of the

non-moving party, and “material” means that

the fact is one that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law. 

United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. with Bldgs., 960 F.2d

200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992). See also Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri

Pac. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 2001).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial

burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the

absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553

(1986). Where the moving party has met its initial burden with

a properly supported motion, the party opposing the motion “may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,

but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

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genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct.

at 2510.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that when a

party moving for summary judgment has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), “its opponent must do more than simply show that

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586,

587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). (“[I]f the factual context

renders respondents’ claim implausible ... respondents must come

forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim

than would otherwise be necessary.”) The party opposing the

motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of her

pleadings, but instead must produce some significant, probative

evidence tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations,

thereby creating a genuine question of fact for resolution at

trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256-57; 106 S. Ct. at 2510,

2513-14 (holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative

evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for

summary judgment). 

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323-24, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Id., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; see also

Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

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1994). Because plaintiffs bear the burden of proof at trial,

defendants have no burden to negate plaintiffs’ claims to

prevail on their motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2552- 53. A defendant moving for

summary judgment does not have the burden to produce any

evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Id. at 325, 106 S. Ct. at 2553-54. Instead, Defendant’s

burden, as the party seeking summary judgment, may be discharged

by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support each

of Plaintiff’s claims. See id.

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there

must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the

plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512.

Additionally, the evidence presented in opposition to a motion

for summary judgment must be probative and properly supported:

“A party may not prevail in opposing a motion for summary

judgment by simply overwhelming the district court with a

miscellany of ‘ersatz evidence.’” Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp.,

693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982).

The Court must consider Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment construing all alleged facts with all reasonable

inferences favoring Plaintiff. See, e.g., Genzler v.

Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 749 (2005). 

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III. Statement of facts

The following facts are not disputed by the parties.

Defendant, the Pinon Unified School District, hired

Plaintiff in March of 2003, to teach third grade. Plaintiff was

one of approximately six white male teachers working at an

elementary school where the other approximately 19 teachers were

Navajo females.

Prior to being employed by Defendant, Plaintiff was

employed by a school district in California, the Konocti school

district. In October 2002, in response to “some complaints,”

Konocti informed Plaintiff they intended to dismiss him after a

hearing. Plaintiff resigned his position and the hearing was

never conducted. 

Prior to being employed by the Konocti district,

Plaintiff was employed by another school district in California,

the Santa Rita district, where he was the subject of a “lengthy

investigation” into a complaint that he had sexually harassed a

student. The Santa Rita district informed Plaintiff he would

not be rehired because of parent and student complaints in March

2002. 

Plaintiff did not put his employment with the Konocti

district on his Pinon school district job application under the

heading of his most recent employment. On his application,

Plaintiff asserted the reason for his termination of employment

with the Santa Rita school district was his “relocation.” Pinon

school district policy provides that submitting an incomplete or

inaccurate job application is grounds for dismissal. Cf. Ariz.

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Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-512(F) (1991 & Supp. 2005) (requiring

Arizona school districts to make a good faith effort and to

adopt procedures to allow them to obtain information relevant to

an applicant’s fitness for employment as a teacher).

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant in March 2003 to teach

for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year. At the end of

that school year, Defendant renewed his contract for the 2003-

2004 school year.

In June 2003, after Plaintiff’s teaching contract with

Defendant was renewed for the following full school year, the

school district administration received a report that Plaintiff

had engaged in inappropriate conduct with students, i.e.,

inappropriately hugging students and having students take candy

from his pants pocket. The district superintendent met with

Plaintiff and warned him about his conduct and warned him future

complaints could result in termination of his employment.

In February of 2004, the Pinon school district

administration received a report that Plaintiff had engaged in

inappropriate conduct with students. The principal of the

elementary school, Ms. Johns, who had hired Plaintiff and

recommended renewal of his contract, placed Plaintiff on

administrative reassignment to his home pending an

investigation. Students, teachers, and parents were interviewed

and the school district administration concluded, on the basis

of the interviews, that Plaintiff had engaged in inappropriate

conduct with students.

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Ms. Johns informed Plaintiff she was going to recommend

to the district school board that his contract not be renewed.

The Pinon Unified School District Board adopted that

recommendation. Plaintiff served the remainder of his contract

for the 2003-2004 school year, February through May of 2004, at

his home. His employment was, therefore, formally terminated in

June 2004 when his contract expired.

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the

EEOC in March 2004, alleging discrimination based on his race,

i.e., white, ethnicity, i.e., non-Navajo, and gender, i.e.,

male. The EEOC dismissed the charge after an investigation.

Plaintiff did not assert a retaliation claim in his EEOC charge.

IV. Substantive law

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)

provides in relevant part that it is an unlawful employment

practice for an employer to discharge an individual based on the

individual’s race or gender. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003

& Supp. 2005). The Court must evaluate a plaintiff’s claim of

racial and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII

employing the “McDonnell Douglas” burden-shifting analysis. See

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505-06, 113 S. Ct.

2742, 2746-47 (1993), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). 

A plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a

prima facie case that a defendant terminated his employment

based on his race or gender. See, e.g., Wallis v. J.R. Simplot

Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). If the plaintiff

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2

 Plaintiff’s counsel allowed in oral argument that

Plaintiff has no direct evidence of a discriminatory motive for

Defendant’s employment decisions.

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succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination,

the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination. See

Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.

2003). 

If the defendant proffers a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the

plaintiff must produce a preponderance of evidence to support a

finding that the defendant’s proffered reason for the action is

pretextual, “either directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or

indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation

is unworthy of credence.” Chuang v. University of Cal. Davis,

225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d

989, 994 (2d Cir. 1985).2 Although the burden of production

shifts to the defendant if the plaintiff establishes a prima

facie case, the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff at

all times. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.

248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).

V. Analysis

1. The merits of Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination

claim

To establish his prima facie race case of racial and

gender discrimination, Plaintiff must provide evidence that:

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(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he performed his

job adequately; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment

action; and (4) that he was treated differently than similarly

situated employees. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit

Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2006); Leong v. Potter, 347

F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air,

Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). “The requisite

degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for

Title VII ... on summary judgment is minimal and does not even

need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.”

Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. However, Defendant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law unless Plaintiff can produce

evidence in support of specific facts, as opposed to

speculation, upon which a jury could conclude that Defendant

took an adverse employment action against Plaintiff because of

his race or gender. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507,

113 S. Ct. at 2747-48; Noland v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812 (9th

Cir. 1982).

The basis for Plaintiff’s conclusion that Defendant

discriminated against him because he is a white male is

Plaintiff’s belief that female Navajo employees were treated

differently, a belief not supported by any evidence presented by

Plaintiff. Cf. Forsberg v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d

1409, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding in the context of a

gender discrimination suit that “purely conclusory allegations

of alleged discrimination, with no concrete, relevant

particulars, will not bar summary judgment.”). 

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As evidence of Defendant’s discriminatory motive for

placing Plaintiff on leave and then terminating his employment,

Plaintiff points to what he believes was discriminatory conduct

during his employment. Plaintiff “has identified several

instances of discriminatory conduct on the part of Defendant

towards him”:

1. Plaintiff alleges no Navajo teachers were placed on

administrative leave during Plaintiff’s tenure with the

district.

2. Plaintiff asserts that the school’s dress code was

only enforced with regard to non-Navajo teachers.

3. Plaintiff alleges that only white male teachers

were disciplined for not attending parent-teacher conferences.

4. Plaintiff asserts disparity in the allowance of the

use of school vehicles based on race.

5. Plaintiff contends that Navajo staff were allowed

to take time off from work and Plaintiff was not allowed time

off from work when he requested leave.

6. “Plaintiff was subjected to certain requirements by

Defendant in order to attend educational classes when Navajos

were not subjected to the same requirements in order to leave

early.”

7. Plaintiff asserts Navajo staff were allowed input

regarding school activities and non-Navajo staff did not have

the same input.

8. Plaintiff alleges that school property, i.e.,

stereos, were “distributed” with preference given to Navajo

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personnel based on their race.

9. “Navajo staff did not receive reprimands when nonNavajo staff did for similar conduct.”

Plaintiff offers only his own deposition testimony as

support for these assertions of fact from which the inference of

an unlawful discriminatory motive is to be drawn. Plaintiff

does not offer affidavits from other white or male teachers at

the school, or the statements of any other employees or staff at

the school, regarding Defendant’s alleged specific acts of

discrimination against Plaintiff based on his gender or race, or

discrimination against any other white male based on their

gender or race, which would provide some circumstantial evidence

of an unlawful motive. Cf. Casillas v. United States Navy, 735

F.2d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Although not determinative

alone, admissible [disparate] impact evidence can be relevant,

though often weak, circumstantial evidence of discriminatory

intent.”). Plaintiff concedes throughout his deposition that he

did not really know whether each of these decisions or acts by

Defendant was predicated on a discriminatory motive, rather than

a legitimate motive. Plaintiff concedes that, in some of these

situations, female Navajo teachers were not treated differently

from white male teachers. 

Although the standard of production to establish a

prima facie case is minimal, Plaintiff has failed to provide any

evidence of a discriminatory motive. Plaintiff has failed to

establish a prima facie case that his rights pursuant to Title

VII were violated because his has not met his burden of

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3

 The Court notes that, in order to succeed in a Title VII

case, the Plaintiff must also establish that he was qualified for the

relevant employment or performing adequately in the relevant

employment. See, e.g., Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1113 (9th

Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s past employment history and his failure to

renew his teaching certificate also weigh against a conclusion that

Plaintiff has established a prima facie case alleging a violation of

Title VII.

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providing any evidence from which an inference could be drawn

that Defendant had a discriminatory reason for placing Plaintiff

on leave and then terminating his employment. Plaintiff has

failed to meet the evidentiary burden necessary to defeat

Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding

Plaintiff’s claims of racial discrimination. See Lyons v.

England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1113 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that a

plaintiff’s failure to offer evidence in support of an element

of his Title VII claim must result in summary judgment for the

defendant).

Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of

discrimination,3 Defendant has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment actions and

Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that the stated

reason is a pretext for discrimination. Although a plaintiff

may rely on circumstantial evidence to show pretext, such

evidence must be both specific and substantial. See Villiarimo,

281 F.3d at 1062; Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217,

1222 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff does not offer any specific

evidence, much less substantial evidence, which would allow a

reasonable fact-finder to even infer that Defendant’s motive for

placing Plaintiff on leave and then terminating his employment

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was for any reason other than the stated reason.

The Court notes that Ms. Johns both hired Plaintiff and

recommended his termination. Discussing the “same actor

inference,” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found it

“nonsensical” for a court to conclude that a supervisor who

hired someone in a protected class then developed an aversion to

this individual presumably on their race or gender within a

short period of time. See Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. LLC,

413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the point of the

same-actor inference is that the evidence rarely is ‘sufficient

... to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false’

when the actor who allegedly discriminated against the plaintiff

had previously shown a willingness to treat the plaintiff

favorably. ... if a plaintiff can muster the extraordinarily

strong showing of discrimination necessary to defeat the

same-actor inference, then the case likely must go to the

jury.”).

Because Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendant’s

legitimate reason for placing Plaintiff on administrative leave

and then terminating his employment by offering even a scintilla

of evidence that Defendant’s motive was inconsistent or unworthy

of credence, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law with regard to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant took adverse

employment action against Plaintiff based on his race or gender.

Compare McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1115, 1123-

24 (9th Cir. 2004).

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4 Plaintiff asserts he was retaliated against for making

critical comments at a meeting regarding school training methodology

and materials, which “irritated” Ms. Johns. Docket No. 31, Exh. A

(deposition of Plaintiff) at 127-28; Docket NO. 33 at 6-7. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 provides: 

 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for

an employer to discriminate against any of his

employees ..., or for a labor organization to

discriminate against any member thereof ...,

because he has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,

or because he has made a charge ... under this

subchapter. 

An employee complaining about an employer’s unlawful

employment practice (age discrimination, gender or race

discrimination, disability discrimination) is “protected activity,”

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B. Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is

barred because he did not raise a retaliation claim with the

EEOC, an administrative prerequisite to a Title VII suit.

Plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument that Plaintiff did

not raise a retaliation claim in his EEOC complaint. Because

Plaintiff did not raise his retaliation claim in his EEOC

complaint prior to bringing suit, the Court does not have

subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of this

claim. See, e.g., Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d

634, 645 (9th Cir. 2004); Paige v. California, 102 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Additionally, the Court concludes that, as a matter of

law, Plaintiff has not asserted that he engaged in a protected

act as that term is defined by Title VII and, therefore, that

the retaliation claim could also be dismissed for Plaintiff’s

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.4 

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whether or not the employee’s complaint is informal or formal, written

or not. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 545-46

(6th Cir. 1993). Clearly, Plaintiff’s alleged protected activity,

i.e., criticizing a decision by the school administration regarding

a training methodology and materials, was not a “protected act.” See

E.E.O.C. v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 29, 37

(W.D.N.Y. 1994).

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VI. Conclusion

The only reasonable inference which can be drawn from

undisputed facts supported by the record in this case is that

there was no unlawful discriminatory motive for Defendant’s

decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff’s own

statements in his deposition belie his position that he was

treated differently from other teachers employed by Defendant

because of his gender or his race. Plaintiff provides no

evidence that teachers who were white and male were treated

differently from female Navajo teachers. Plaintiff provides no

specific or substantial evidence that Defendant’s decisions, to

place Plaintiff on administrative leave and to not re-hire

Plaintiff, were predicated on any unlawful discriminatory motive

rather than Defendant’s asserted legitimate motive, i.e., that

students, teachers, and parents had raised concerns about

Plaintiff’s inappropriate conduct with students. Plaintiff’s

conclusory statements and personal beliefs are insufficient to

sustain his burden of proof with regard to the elements of his

Title VII claims and, therefore, Defendant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law with regard to Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendant.

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THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment (Docket No. 30) is GRANTED. Judgment as a

matter of law shall be entered in favor of Defendant and against

Plaintiff with regard to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a result of summary

judgment having been granted, the Clerk of the Court shall enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 11th day of April, 2006.

Case 3:04-cv-01554-MEA Document 41 Filed 04/13/06 Page 17 of 17