Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00620/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00620-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Brown,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-00620-TUC-MSA

ORDER 

Plaintiff Michael Brown filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking 

judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security. (Doc. 1.) 

Before the Court are Brown’s opening brief, the Commissioner’s response brief, and 

Brown’s reply brief. (Docs. 18, 19, 20.) For the following reasons, the Court will reverse 

and remand for reevaluation of Brown’s application.

Background

I. Procedural History

Brown applied for supplemental security income on November 10, 2014, claiming 

the same date as his disability onset date. AR 67, 253.1 His application was denied on 

April 20, 2015, and again on reconsideration on October 7, 2015. AR 66, 79. On 

November 17, 2015, Brown requested a hearing before an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”). AR 113. At the hearing, held on November 1, 2017, Brown and a vocational 

expert (“VE”) appeared and testified. AR 33–65. On January 4, 2018, the ALJ issued a 

1

“AR” refers to the Certified Administrative Record.

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written decision finding Brown not disabled. AR 16–26. On October 30, 2018, the 

Appeals Council denied review. AR 1–4. Brown filed this lawsuit on December 28, 2018, 

seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 1.)

II. Factual Background

Brown underwent a laminectomy and lumbar fusion in 2006. AR 275. He has a 

history of moderate levoscoliosis. AR 1317. He has had three surgeries on his left knee. 

AR 408, 466. He needs a full right-knee replacement, but his hepatitis C has delayed the 

surgery. AR 247, 1100. Brown also has a history of mental illness, including bipolar 

disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, anger problems, and auditory 

hallucinations. AR 1277, 1977, 1989. He has a history of alcohol abuse and daily 

intravenous use of methamphetamine. AR 328, 375, 380. He completed high school and 

has an associate’s degree in Sociology. AR 40, 589. Brown, who is 51 years old, has spent 

approximately 20 years in prison. AR 67, 252.

III. ALJ Hearing

At the hearing, Brown testified that he suffers from both physical and mental 

symptoms. AR 43. As to his physical symptoms, Brown explained that he has undergone 

back surgery and three surgeries on his left knee, and that he needs a total surgical 

replacement of his right knee. AR 45, 47. He stated that he can lift between 20 and 40 

pounds but that he feels pain every time he lifts something, and that he can stand for 

“maybe” 15 to 20 minutes at a time. AR 45. As to his mental symptoms, Brown testified 

that he experiences paranoid delusions, including a belief that the government is “plotting” 

to harm him. AR 43. He stated that although his medications help, his paranoid thoughts 

do not completely disappear. AR 43. Brown explained that he has significant problems 

focusing and that he cannot sit for lengthy periods of time because his mind races 

constantly. AR 52, 54.

The ALJ asked the VE about two hypothetical claimants with Brown’s age, 

education, and work history. AR 58–60. The first claimant could perform light work with 

the following exertional limitations: he could push and pull with his right lower extremity 

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only occasionally; he must be allowed the use of a cane; he could be exposed to uneven 

terrain, unprotected heights, extreme cold, or vibration only seldomly or rarely; he could 

climb ramps and stairs only occasionally and never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and 

he could frequently balance, stoop, bend at the waist, and crouch. AR 58. The first 

claimant also had non-exertional limitations: he could be assigned only simple tasks which 

can be learned in 30 days or less or by a brief demonstration; the tasks assigned must be 

subject to minimal change; and he could have only occasional contact with coworkers and 

supervisors and no contact with the public. AR 58. The VE testified that the first claimant 

could not perform Brown’s past work but could perform other work in the national 

economy, including hand packager, laundry folder, and small parts assembler. AR 58–59.

The second claimant had the same limitations as the first, except that the second 

claimant was limited to sedentary work. AR 59. The VE testified that the hypothetical 

claimant could not perform Brown’s past work but could perform work as a document 

preparer, final assembler, and bench hand. AR 59–60. The VE confirmed that her 

testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and Selected 

Characteristics of Occupations. AR 60.

IV. ALJ Decision

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process for determining 

whether an individual is disabled. AR 17–26. At step one, the ALJ found that Brown had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date of his application. AR 18. At 

step two, the ALJ found that Brown has the following severe impairments: bipolar, anxiety, 

substance abuse, and personality disorders, lumbar degenerative disc disease, and 

osteoarthritis. AR 18–19. At step three, the ALJ found that Brown does not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of 

one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 19–20.

Between steps three and four, the ALJ found that Brown has the same residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) as the first hypothetical claimant. AR 20–21. In determining 

the RFC, the ALJ found that Brown’s symptom testimony was inconsistent with the 

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medical evidence. AR 21. The ALJ gave “some weight” to the opinion of non-examining 

agency physician Dr. Melvin Roberts that Brown can perform light work with some 

limitations and “less weight” to the opinions of non-examining agency physician Dr. 

Charles Combs that Brown is limited to sedentary work. AR 24. At step four, the ALJ 

found that Brown has no past relevant work. AR 24. At step five, the ALJ, considering 

Brown’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, found that Brown can perform other 

work in the national economy, and, therefore, that Brown is not disabled. AR 25–26.

Legal Standard

A person is “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act if she is unable 

“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). “When considering a claim for disability benefits, the Social Security 

Administration is required to conduct a now-familiar five-step sequential evaluation 

process to determine whether a claimant is disabled and eligible for benefits.” Shaibi v. 

Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2017). The claimant bears the burden of proof at 

steps one through four; the Commissioner bears the burden at step five. Barnes v. Berryhill, 

895 F.3d 702, 703 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th 

Cir. 1999)).

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial 

gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If yes, the ALJ will find the claimant not 

disabled. Id. At the second step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has a “severe” 

physical or mental impairment, or a combination of impairments that is “severe,” that has 

lasted at least one year. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1509. If not, the ALJ will find the 

claimant not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the ALJ considers 

whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the medical conditions listed in 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If yes, the ALJ will 

find the claimant disabled. Id.

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If the ALJ does not find the claimant disabled at the third step, before proceeding to 

the fourth step, the ALJ will determine the claimant’s RFC—i.e., what the claimant can 

still do despite her limitations. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017); 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). At the fourth step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant 

has the RFC to perform her “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If yes, 

the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled. Id. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience and determines whether the claimant 

“can make an adjustment to other work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If yes, the ALJ will find

the claimant not disabled; if not, the ALJ will find the claimant disabled. Id.

The ALJ’s decision to deny disability benefits is subject to harmless-error review, 

Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017), and must be affirmed “unless it is

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on a legal error,” Wellington v. Berryhill, 

878 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 2017). “Substantial evidence ‘is more than a mere scintilla,’ 

but less than a preponderance.” Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). “A reviewing 

court may only consider the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination 

and ‘may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.’” Id. (quoting 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014)).

Discussion

Brown contends that the ALJ erred in discounting his symptom testimony. The 

Court agrees that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s reasoning.

I. Background

With regard to his physical impairments, Brown testified that his knees and back 

contribute to his inability to work. AR 40, 43. Brown explained that he has had back 

surgery and three left-knee surgeries. AR 45, 47. He also explained that he needs a total 

surgical replacement of his right knee because it has “no cartilage or meniscus.” AR 45. 

As a result of his conditions, Brown explained that he is limited to lifting “maybe 20/30 

pounds[,] 40 pounds.” AR 45. However, according to Brown, “[e]very time [he] lift[s] 

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anything, it hurts,” and he is not capable of lifting multiple times over a two-hour period. 

AR 45, 53. Brown further testified that he limps, that he cannot “walk any long distance” 

because even short distances cause pain, and that he can stand for a maximum of “15/20 

minutes, maybe.” AR 45. He further stated that he can do landscaping work for two to 

three hours at most but that he needs one day to recover afterward. AR 53–54.

The ALJ provided three reasons for discounting Brown’s symptom testimony: 

Brown exercised three times per week for one to two hours; Brown sought and received 

only conservative treatment for his back and knees; and Brown’s medical records are 

inconsistent with his claimed symptoms. AR 23–24. Brown argues that these reasons are 

not supported by substantial evidence.

II. Legal Principles

There is a two-step analysis for determining whether to credit a claimant’s symptom 

testimony. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Garrison, 759 

F.3d at 1014 (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

The claimant need not present objective evidence of the symptom itself (e.g., pain), or of 

its severity. Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)). Second, 

if “there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

doing so.’” Id. at 1014–15 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281).

III. Analysis

Here, the ALJ found that Brown had presented evidence of impairments that could 

reasonably be expected to produce his symptoms. AR 21. The ALJ made no finding that 

Brown was malingering. See AR 21. Therefore, the ALJ could reject Brown’s symptom 

testimony only for specific, clear, and convincing reasons.

A. Exercise

The ALJ cited to a treatment note made by one of Brown’s providers on April 6, 

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2017: “Michael current[ly] works out 3x times a week, 1 to 2 hours, [he] will work out and 

work on [his] diet weekly.” AR 616. According to the ALJ, this remark “indicates that 

[Brown] is quite active and is inconsistent with his allegations of disabling work 

limitations.” AR 23. An ALJ may rely upon a claimant’s daily activities to reject the 

claimant’s symptom testimony if the activities either contradict the symptom testimony or 

involve skills that could be transferred to the workplace. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 

(9th Cir. 2007).

Here, however, the cited record contains no details about Brown’s exercise 

activities. See AR 616. As a result, the ALJ had no basis for finding that Brown’s activities 

conflict with or contradict his allegations of disabling pain. Nor is there any basis for 

finding that Brown’s activities involve skills that could be transferred to the workplace. 

See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 682 (holding it was error to discount claimant’s symptom 

testimony based on childcare activities where the record contained “almost no information” 

about the activities).

There is evidence in the record that, at one time, Brown did weightlifting activities. 

Conceivably, this could conflict with Brown’s complaints of knee and back pain. 

However, neither the record cited by the ALJ nor the ALJ’s decision mentions that specific 

activity, nor does the ALJ’s decision contain an explanation why that activity conflicts with 

Brown’s alleged symptoms. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15 (stating that the ALJ must 

provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting claimant symptom testimony 

(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Therefore, the Court may not rely on Brown’s 

weightlifting as support for the ALJ’s conclusion. See Luther, 891 F.3d at 875 (“A 

reviewing court may only consider the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability 

determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Furthermore, it appears Brown’s exercise 

may have consisted of low-impact cardiovascular activities, such as biking and swimming, 

which are not at all inconsistent with his claimed knee and back impairments. See AR 

1100 (treatment note dated March 31, 2017 (one week before the note relied upon by the 

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ALJ) stating Brown was encouraged to engage in low-impact exercises such as biking and 

swimming).

B. Conservativeness of Treatment

The ALJ discounted Brown’s symptom testimony because treatment of his right 

knee “remained conservative consisting of cortisone injections and pain medication.” AR 

24. An ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms if 

her condition responds favorably to conservative treatment, see Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 

742, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2007) (discounting symptom testimony where claimant’s knee pain 

was treated with over-the-counter pain medication), or if she fails to seek more aggressive 

treatment for her allegedly severe condition, see Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 2008) (discounting symptom testimony where claimant “did not seek an 

aggressive treatment program”).

Brown’s case fits into neither circumstance. First, Brown’s knee pain was not 

managed with conservative treatment. His medical records show that he suffered from 

“severe varus knee osteoarthritis which has not responded to conservative measures,” 

including cortisone and Orthovisc injections and pain medications such as Oxycodone, 

Diclofenac, Nambumetone, and Medrol. AR 1707. Second, Brown sought aggressive 

treatment. As the ALJ noted, Brown desired and agreed to a total replacement of his right 

knee. AR 24, 1100. Although Brown’s hepatitis C has so far prevented this surgery from 

taking place, the procedure can hardly be described as conservative. See AR 1100.

The ALJ recited certain facts from Brown’s treatment records, including that Brown 

had normal strength and range of motion in his knees. AR 24. It is error for an ALJ to 

selectively quote from a treatment record to reach a conclusion of non-disability. See 

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014). More generally, it is error to 

isolate treatment notes without considering them “in the broader context of [the claimant’s] 

impairment.” Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, the ALJ not 

only failed to consider Brown’s condition and treatment records as a whole, she 

cherrypicked the foregoing facts from the same treatment records stating that Brown’s knee 

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pain has not responded to conservative measures. See AR 1707–09. Therefore, the ALJ’s 

reasoning is not supported by substantial evidence.

C. Consistency of Medical Record

The ALJ discounted Brown’s symptom testimony because “diagnostic imaging only 

revealed . . . minimal degenerative changes in the bilateral knees, which is inconsistent 

with [Brown’s] allegations of disabling pain.” AR 23. An ALJ may properly reject 

claimant symptom testimony based on inconsistencies between the testimony and relevant 

medical evidence. See Parra, 481 F.3d at 750 (holding ALJ properly rejected claimant’s 

complaints of knee pain based on medical records showing normal knee function).

Here, the ALJ’s analysis of the existing medical evidence is not supported by 

substantial evidence. It is error for an ALJ to support an unfavorable decision by 

selectively quoting from a claimant’s medical records while ignoring entries that indicate 

continued, severe impairment. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 

2001). Here, the ALJ’s remark came after discussion of records from March and May 

2015. See AR 23 (citing AR 407–09, 414, 416, 495, 497, 1313). These records indicate 

that Brown had “mild degenerative changes” in his knees and back. See AR 495–97. 

However, the same records also indicate that Brown’s left knee had crepitus (grating or 

popping sounds and sensations due to the presence of air) and an “extremely” limited range 

of motion, and that Brown’s right knee had laxity (looseness of knee ligaments) and 

subluxation (partial dislocation of the kneecap) and was positive for the anterior drawer 

test (indicating an ACL injury). AR 409. The ALJ improperly ignored these notes. See

AR 23; Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1205, 1208 (holding ALJ erred by selectively reading 

treatment records); Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1164 (explaining that it is error to cherry-pick 

from treatment records).

More broadly, “[w]hile ALJs obviously must rely on examples to show why they 

do not believe that a claimant is credible, the data points they choose must in fact constitute 

examples of a broader development to satisfy the applicable ‘clear and convincing’ 

standard.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1018 (emphasis in original). In other words, it is 

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improper to “single[] out a few periods of temporary well-being from a sustained period of 

impairment and rel[y] on those instances to discredit” a claimant. Id. Here, the records 

describing Brown’s mild degenerative changes were created during a two-month period in 

early 2015. Although relevant, these examples are not representative of Brown’s condition 

as a whole.

Between August 2015 and March 2017, Brown sought treatment for his knee pain 

at Sierra Vista Medical Group. The records for those visits consistently note that Brown 

suffered from severe knee impairments, and that Brown’s pain was not being managed with 

conservative treatment. AR 1126–29 (August 2015 note stating that Brown rated his pain 

as a 7 out of 10, and that Brown received a cortisone injection for “right knee severe varus 

osteoarthritis”), 1121–23 (October 2015 note stating that Brown rated his pain as a 7, and 

that conservative treatment had thus far “failed”), 1118–20 (December 2015 note stating 

that Brown rated his pain as a 7, and that Brown received an Orthovisc injection), 1115–

17 (February 2016 note stating that Brown rated his pain as a 6, and that Brown received a 

second Orthovisc injection), 1111–14 (June 2016 note stating that Brown rated his pain as 

a 6, and that Brown received a third Orthovisc injection), 1108–10 (September 2016 note 

stating that Brown rated his pain as a 6, and that Brown was started on a new pain 

medication, Tramadol), 1104–07 (November 2016 note stating that Brown had “tried 

nonsteroidal anti-inflammatories, activity modification, and cortical steroid injections, and 

physical therapy” without success); 1100–03 (March 2017 note stating that Brown would 

be undergoing a surgical replacement of his right knee pending treatment of his hepatitis 

C). In September 2017, a different provider noted that Brown was ambulating with a slight 

limp and had crepitus, stability, and range-of-motion issues in both knees. AR 1887. These 

records indicate a worsening of Brown’s knee conditions, yet the ALJ did not analyze them 

before determining that Brown’s testimony is inconsistent with his medical records.

To summarize, the ALJ made two errors. The ALJ selectively quoted from Brown’s 

medical records to downplay the severity of his knee condition. The ALJ then found those 

selectively read records representative of Brown’s overall condition, when the record as a 

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whole indicates a higher level of severity. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1018. Therefore, the 

ALJ’s reasoning is not supported by substantial evidence.

Conclusion

The ALJ failed to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting 

Brown’s symptom testimony. This error was harmful. The ALJ found that Brown is 

capable of performing light work with some exertional and environmental limitations. AR 

20. However, the ALJ made no specific findings on Brown’s ability to perform the 

standing and walking requirements of light work. See AR 20–21. Contrary to the ALJ’s 

assumption, if Brown’s testimony is credited, he would be incapable of performing these 

requirements. See AR 45, 53–54 (Brown’s testimony that he can stand for 15 to 20 minutes 

at a time for up to three hours); Social Security Ruling 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (Jan. 

1, 1983) (stating that light work “requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of 

approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday”).

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is reversed. This case is

remanded for reevaluation of Brown’s application. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter 

judgment accordingly and close this case.2

Dated this 31st day of January, 2020.

2 Brown has raised another issue regarding the ALJ’s treatment of the opinions of the 

non-examining agency physicians. Given the Court’s findings, review of that issue is 

unnecessary.

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