Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01433/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01433-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLERMO OLVERA, Civil No. 12-cv-01433-WQH (MDD)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

DAVID LONG, Warden

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

States District Judge William Q. Hayes in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d) of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. After reviewing the

Petition (ECF No. 1), Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in support thereof (ECF No. 8), Petitioner’s Traverse

(ECF No. 15), and the supporting documents and pertinent state court

Lodgments, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED for

reasons stated below. 

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 29, 2009, a jury convicted Guillermo Olvera (“Petitioner”)

of second degree murder and found true an allegation that he personally

used a knife when he committed the offense. (See Lodgment 6 at 1). On

July 28, 2009, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 15 years to life in

prison for the murder conviction and a consecutive one year term for the

weapon use enhancement. (Id.). 

On appeal, Petitioner contended that the trial court’s instruction on

voluntary intoxication misled the jury. (Id. at 2). Petitioner also

contended there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s true

finding on the weapon use enhancement. (Id.). On May 12, 2011, the

California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment. (Id.).

Petitioner, making the same claims, appealed to the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment 7). On August 17, 2011, the California

Supreme Court denied the appeal without comment or citation. 

(Lodgment 8). 

Petitioner filed the instant petition in this Court on June 12, 2012. 

(ECF No. 1). Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his due

process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by not

properly instructing the jury. (Id. at 12–13).

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The court must be

“particularly deferential to [its] state-court colleagues.” Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we presume

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the following facts taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion to

be correct:

Prosecution Evidence 

Maria Ortega and her husband Gabino Rosas hosted a

party in the courtyard of their apartment building. Among

the attendees were Ortega’s brothers; Ortega’s sister and her

family, including her common-law husband Jose Velasquez;

and [Petitioner] and his family, including his common-law

wife, his two brothers, and his brother-in-law. Ortega’s

teenage neighbor, D.F., and her family also attended the

party. Rosas, [Petitioner], Velasquez, and most of the other

men at the party were drinking beer. A neighbor thought

everyone appeared drunk. 

At some point, several men, including Rosas,

[Petitioner]’s brothers, and [Petitioner]’s brother-in-law,

started pushing and punching one another. There was

conflicting evidence about whether [Petitioner] and Velasquez

joined in the fight. There was no dispute, however, that both

[Petitioner] and his wife attempted to break up the fight, that

[Petitioner] was ultimately successful in ending it, and the

parties reconciled. 

After the fight, Ortega told her brothers and Velasquez

to leave. They and Ortega’s sister went out to the alley.

[Petitioner], his brothers, and his brother-in-law went to

[Petitioner]’s apartment. [Petitioner]’s father, who also lived

there, told [Petitioner]’s brothers and brother-in-law to leave

and escorted them outside. [Petitioner] left with them. 

Meanwhile, D.F. and her family started cleaning up the

courtyard. [Petitioner]’s wife subsequently joined them. 

While they were cleaning, they heard a loud crash coming

from the front of the apartment building. D.F. went with

[Petitioner]’s wife to see what happened. D.F. saw Velasquez

on his knees. She also saw [Petitioner] punch Velasquez in

the back and shoulder on the left side about five times. D.F.

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did not see a knife, weapon, or anything else in [Petitioner]’s

hand. There were three other men in the area, including

[Petitioner]’s brother-in-law. One of them, [Petitioner]’s

father, tried to pull the other two away. 

D.F. briefly turned away because she did not want to see

what was happening. When she looked back again, she saw

Velasquez, who was bleeding, stand up and then fall

sideways. [Petitioner] and the other men were gone. 

. . . .

Around the same time D.F. and her family were cleaning

up the courtyard, Loc Lai arrived to visit a friend who lived in

an apartment building across the street from [Petitioner]’s

apartment building. Lai saw a woman standing by the

passenger side of Velasquez’s truck. The two were talking

loudly with each other through the open passenger side

window. A man ran from the parking lot of [Petitioner]’s

apartment building to the driver’s side of the truck. The man

spoke briefly to Velasquez and then punched Velasquez

through the driver’s side window. A short time later, two

other men came running to the truck from the same direction

as the first man. They also punched Velasquez and tried to

pull him out of the truck. 

As they were doing that, the first man ran over to the

passenger side. He tried to open the passenger side door and

punch through the now-closed passenger side window with his

elbow. Velasquez tried to back up the truck and almost hit

another car. The men then pulled Velasquez from the stillrunning truck and started hitting and kicking him. 

Velasquez did not fight back. He tried to get up and get

away, but one of the men knocked him down by striking him

in the head with a metal bar as the other men continued

hitting and kicking him. The three men then ran to the

parking lot of [Petitioner]’s apartment complex. Two of the

men got into a van and drove off. The other man got into a

sedan and drove off in the same direction as the van. The

woman got into another car and drove off, following them. 

. . . . 

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When police officers arrived at the scene, they found

Velasquez lying face down in the street. Velasquez had blood

coming from his mouth and on his chest. Police officers found

a baseball cap and a closed folding knife lying in the street

approximately five feet from Velasquez.1

 Both items had

blood on them. In addition, police officers found a trail of

blood from Velasquez’s body to the bedroom in [Petitioner]’s

apartment, and a set of bloody footprints leading from the

apartment to the parking lot. They also found a two-foot-long

metal bar in the bushes near [Petitioner]’s apartment. 

Velasquez was the major contributor to the DNA mixture in

the blood on the folding knife and he could not be excluded as

a source of the DNA on the shaft of the metal bar. [Petitioner]

was excluded as a source of the DNA on the shaft of the metal

bar; however, his DNA matched the DNA in the blood on the

baseball cap and in the blood trail. 

While police officers were investigating what happened

to Velasquez, a man reported a collision involving a sedan two

blocks down from [Petitioner]’s apartment building. When

police officers arrived at the collision scene, [Petitioner] was

sitting in the driver’s seat of the sedan, bleeding from his

right leg. The trauma surgeon who treated [Petitioner]

testified [Petitioner] had a stab wound on his right leg about

two inches above the knee on the outside of his thigh. He had

no defensive or other wounds. His blood alcohol level at the

time of treatment was .15 percent. Although he was slightly

drowsy, he could answer questions appropriately and did not

appear to have any neurologic deficit. His Glascow Coma

Score, which is used to evaluate mental status, was 15. This

is the best possible score and is given to “someone awake like

all of us.” 

In the front driver side of the sedan, police officers found

a 13-inch knife with blood on it. Velasquez’s DNA matched

the DNA in the blood on one part of the knife blade. Neither

Velasquez nor [Petitioner] could be excluded as contributors to

1 Velasquez’s belt had a knife holder on it. The knife holder was 

unsnapped and the folding knife fit inside it. 

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the DNA mixture in the blood on another part of the knife

blade. [Petitioner] was excluded, but Velasquez could not be

excluded as a contributor to DNA found on the knife handle. 

Police officers also found blood on [Petitioner]’s shirt and

shoes. [Petitioner] was included as a major contributor and

Velasquez was included as a minor contributor to the DNA

mixture in the blood on [Petitioner]’s shoes. Velasquez’s DNA

matched the DNA in two bloodstains found on the front of

[Petitioner]’s shirt. Velasquez was included as a major

contributor to the DNA mixtures in bloodstains found on the

lower left front, the left shoulder, and the right sleeve of the

shirt. 

A deputy medical examiner determined Velasquez died

from multiple stab wounds to the torso. The wounds included

a two and three-quarter inch deep stab wound on his

abdomen, a six and one-quarter inch deep stab wound on his

left back near his shoulder, and a nine and three-quarter inch

deep stab wound slightly below his left nipple that went

through his heart and into his left lung. In addition, he had

been struck in the head twice with a blunt object consistent

with being the metal bar that police found in the bushes near

[Petitioner]’s apartment. Velasquez also had several scrapes,

bruises, and knife cuts, which were consistent with being

defensive wounds. The knife found in the sedan [Petitioner]

was driving was consistent with having caused Velasquez’s

stab wounds and knife cuts, as well as the stab wound on

[Petitioner]’s leg.2

Velasquez’s blood alcohol level when he died was .26

percent. He also had .02 milligrams per milliliter of cocaine

and .06 milligrams per milliliter of methamphetamine in his

system. These levels are consistent with recent use. 

Defense Evidence

[Petitioner]’s father, brothers, and brother-in-law have

2 The prosecutor’s theory was that [Petitioner] accidentally 

stabbed himself while he was stabbing Velasquez. 

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not been seen or heard from since the night of Velasquez’s

death. They are believed to be in Mexico.

[Petitioner]’s sister heard the fighting on the street and

was in the apartment when [Petitioner], their brothers, their

brother-in-law, and their father came in afterward. She heard

them and [Petitioner]’s wife arguing. She saw [Petitioner]

bleeding, but she did not see him with a knife. Her father,

brothers, and brother-in-law left. Then, [Petitioner] left. 

Rosas testified he did not see not see [sic] anyone with a

knife or a metal bar during the initial altercation. Ortega’s

brother testified Velasquez was upset that night because

Ortega’s brother told Velasquez that Velasquez’s wife was

going to leave him. Velasquez was acting “weird,” as he does

when he has been drinking. Ortega’s brother did not see

Velasquez using drugs. 

A forensic chemist testified about the effects of alcohol,

cocaine and methamphetamine on the nervous system. He

explained that a person with a .15 blood alcohol level would

have impaired judgment and exaggerated emotional states. A

person with a .26 blood alcohol would have even more

impaired judgment and exaggerated emotional states. In

addition, the person would experience short-term memory

loss. A person with a .26 blood alcohol level plus .02

milligrams per milliliter of cocaine and .06 milligrams per

milliliter of methamphetamine in his or her system would

experience gross mental impairment, be unable to control any

aggressive tendencies, make poor decisions, and have poor

judgment. The person would also be completely unable to

mentally or physically perform motor skills. 

[Disputed] Jury Instruction 

Using a tailored version of CALCRIM No. 625, the trial

court instructed the jury: You may consider evidence, if any, of

the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. 

You may consider that evidence only deciding whether the

defendant acted with the intent to kill or the defendant acted

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with deliberation and premeditation. A person is voluntarily

intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using

any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance, knowing that

it could produce an intoxicating effect or willingly assuming

the risk of that effect. You may not consider evidence of

voluntary intoxication for any other purpose. (Emphasis

added).3

 

The trial court [also] instructed the jury to consider

evidence of provocation in deciding whether [Petitioner]

committed first versus second degree murder, and whether he

committed murder versus voluntary manslaughter. The trial

court further instructed the jury to consider “all the

circumstances as they were known or appeared” to Petitioner

in deciding whether Petitioner acted in self-defense or

imperfect self-defense.

(Lodgment 6 at 2–9 (as quoted by the Court of Appeal, with minor edits

for clarity)).

//

//

3 In its untailored form, CALCRIM No. 625 provides: 

“You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s

voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may

consider that evidence only in deciding whether the

defendant acted with an intent to kill[,] [or] [the

defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation[,]]

[[or] the defendant was unconscious when (he/she)

acted[,]] [or the defendant <insert other specific intent

required in a homicide charge or other charged offense>.] 

[¶] A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she

becomes intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating

drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could

produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the

risk of that effect. [¶] You may not consider evidence of

voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.” 

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), provides the scope of review for federal habeas

corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgement of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States. 

As amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. § 2254

provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim– 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

When determining what constitutes “clearly established federal

law” under § 2254(d)(1), federal courts look to United States Supreme

Court holdings at the time of the state court’s decision. Lockyer v.

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Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003). A state court’s decision is “contrary

to” clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent if (1) the

state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in

Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case, but still

reaches a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06

(2000). An unreasonable application of federal law requires the state

court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 76. Instead, the state court’s application must be “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. Petitioner bears the burden of proving the state court

acted in an unreasonable, or contrary manner. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537

U.S. 19, 21 (2002). A state court decision does not have to demonstrate

an awareness of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, so long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradict

such precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

 When a petition for review is made to the highest state court and

the court responds with a silent denial, the federal habeas court can “look

through” the silent denial to the last reasoned state court decision in

order to consider whether habeas relief is warranted. Ylst v.

Nunnenmaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991). When a state court does not

supply reasoning for a decision, an independent review of the record is

required to determine if the court clearly erred in applying controlling

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federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). In the

instant case, Petitioner submitted a petition for review to the California

Supreme Court, and the California Supreme Court issued a silent denial. 

(Lodgment 8). Therefore, we look through to the decision of the

California Court of Appeal. 

“Failure to give [a jury] instruction which might be proper as a

matter of state law,” by itself, “does not amount to a federal

constitutional violation” meriting federal habeas relief. Miller v. Stagner,

757 F.2d 988, 993 (9th Cir.1985). Rather, the Court would have to

conclude that the error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violate[d] due process.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154

(1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). Due

process is violated if there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the

instruction in a way that violated the Constitution. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 68 (1972).

V. DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends the trial court violated his due process rights

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by providing misleading

instructions to the jury. (ECF No. 1 at 12–13). Petitioner contends the

trial court should have made clear that the jury could consider the

relevance of Velasquez’s intoxication and the affect it may have had on

Petitioner’s state of mind. (Id. at 15). Petitioner maintains that

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additional instruction was important because once the jury decided that

Petitioner had stabbed Velasquez, they were required to determine

Petitioner’s intent at the time of the stabbing. Petitioner’s intent at the

time of the stabbing bears on Petitioner’s degree of legal culpability. 

(Id.). 

Petitioner claims that the instructions given to the jury erroneously

precluded consideration of how Velasquez’s intoxication may have caused

Petitioner to act in self-defense or induced Petitioner to fight. The

instruction Petitioner finds fault in reads as follows:

You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s

voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may

consider that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant

acted with an intent to kill or the defendant acted with

deliberation and premeditation. A person is voluntarily

intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using

any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance, knowing that

it could produce an intoxicating effect or willingly assuming

the risk of that effect. You may not consider evidence of

voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.

(Lodgment 6 at 8–9) (ECF No.1 at 15–16).

Petitioner contends that the last line of the instruction is

misleading. When the trial judge stated “[y]ou may not consider evidence

of voluntary intoxication for any other purpose,” Petitioner claims such

instruction precluded the jury from considering the role Velasquez’s

intoxication played in the altercation between Velasquez and Petitioner. 

Therefore, according to Petitioner, he did not have the opportunity to

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present a complete defense. Further, Petitioner claims that this alleged

error had a substantial effect on the verdict. (ECF No.1 at 24). 

Due Process Standard

A criminal defendants due process right to a trial requires that they

be given a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). “As a general

proposition a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized

defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to

find in his favor.” Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).

However, in order to merit federal habeas relief, alleged errors in state

court jury instructions must have “so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the failure to instruct on a defense

theory is only grounds for habeas relief if the theory is legally sound and

there is supporting evidence. Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577

(9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, even where constitutional error is found,

“in § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of

constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial

and injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht.” Fry v. Piller, 551 U.S.

112, 121–22 (2007) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623

(1993)). “Under [the Brecht] standard, an error requires reversal only if

it ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631 (quoting Kotteakos v. United

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States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).

State Decision on Appeal

The Court of Appeal reviewed Petitioner’s claim and found it

meritless.4

 (Lodgment 6 at 9). The Court reviewed the disputed

instruction as a whole and concluded that the challenged language,

considered in context, only related to Petitioner’s voluntary intoxication. 

(Id. at 10). As such, the Court found that the limitation expressed in the

voluntary intoxication instruction would not have misled the jury with

regard to Velasquez’s intoxication. 

The Court of Appeal noted that the trial court also instructed the

jury to consider “all the circumstances as they were known or appeared”

to Petitioner in deciding whether Petitioner acted in self-defense or

imperfect self-defense. (Id.). Furthermore, the trial court instructed the

jury to consider evidence that Velasquez provoked Petitioner when

determinating of Petitioner’s degree of legal culpability. (Id.). The Court

of Appeal found that these instructions could only be reasonably

understood as relating to the affect of Velasquez’s conduct on Petitioner. 

These instructions did not limit the jury’s consideration of Velasquez’s

intoxication. Thus, reading the jury instructions together, the Court of

Appeal held that a reasonable jury would not understand the challenged

4

As an initial matter, the Court of Appeal concluded that Petitioner

forfeited his jury instruction claim when trial counsel did not offer a

timely objection to the instruction. Despite concluding that the claim

was forfeited, the Court reviewed the claim on the merits.

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language as limiting its ability to consider evidence of Velasquez’s

intoxication. (Id. at 9–11). 

Finally, the Court of Appeal concluded that even if the trial court

had erred, such error would be harmless. (Id. at 11). The Court of

Appeal based its conclusion on the fact that, despite expert testimony

that a person with Velasquez’s level of intoxication and recent drug use

would have “grossly impaired judgment” and an “inability to control any

aggressive tendencies,” there was no evidence Velasquez did anything to

provoke Petitioner, or to cause Petitioner to reasonably or unreasonably

believe he needed to act in self-defense. (Id.). 

Analysis

The Court of Appeal’s opinion is neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In order for

Petitioner to obtain habeas relief, Petitioner must demonstrate that the

jury instruction foreclosed a defense theory for which there was sufficient

supporting evidence. Beardslee, 358 F.3d at 577. Upon that showing,

Petitioner must further show “that the alleged error had a substantial or

injurious effect on the verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. Petitioner has

not met this burden. 

The Court of Appeal was not unreasonable in its conclusion that the

trial court’s tailored version of CALCRIM No. 625, taken in context, as a

whole, and alongside additionally provided jury instructions, did not limit

the jury’s consideration of evidence that Petitioner was provoked by

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Velasquez. The Court of Appeal also reasonably concluded that the

disputed instruction did not preclude the jury from considering the entire

mix of evidence, including Velasquez’s intoxication, which bore on

Petitioner’s legal culpability. Specifically, the instruction to consider “all

circumstances as they were known or appeared” to Petitioner, placed no

limit on the jury’s consideration of Velasquez’s intoxication and how that

intoxication might have caused Petitioner to act in self-defense. 

(Lodgment 6 at 10). Petitioner’s theory that Velasquez must have been

the aggressor due to his intoxication was fully available for the jury to

consider had there been any evidence before them to support it. 

Even if Petitioner were to show that the trial court erred by not

specifically instructing the jury about Velasquez’s intoxication, Petitioner

has not shown that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637–38. The Court of Appeal, reviewing the trial court record, found no

evidence that Velasquez did anything to provoke Petitioner, or to cause

Petitioner to reasonably or unreasonably believe he needed to act in selfdefense. (Lodgment 6 at 11 (“[T]here is no evidence Velasquez did

anything to provoke [Petitioner], or to cause [Petitioner] to reasonably or

unreasonably believe he needed to act in self-defense.”)) This finding

comports with a reasonable reading of the trial court transcripts. 

(Lodgment No. 2 at 151–60, 191–92, 369–74, 417). 

Petitioner makes two unpersuasive attempts to rebut evidence that

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Velasquez did not act aggressively. First, Petitioner points to the

testimony of his expert witness. Dewayne Beckner, a forensic chemist,

testified that a person intoxicated similarly to Velasquez would

experience “gross mental impairment,” would “be making poor decisions,”

and if “normally [they] would be aggressive but would have those

tendencies under control [they] no longer would have those tendencies

under control.” (Lodgment No. 2 at 911). 

Second, Petitioner attempts to relitigate the facts by introducing

hypotheticals that characterize Velasquez as being the aggressor. (ECF

No. 1 at 15–16, 25). Instead of pointing to evidence in the record showing

Velasquez was the aggressor, Petitioner instead makes the error of

conflating intoxication with aggression. While Petitioner fixates on the

evidence that Velasquez was intoxicated, he ignores the factual finding

that Velasquez never acted in an aggressive manner. (Lodgment 6 at

11–12). The Court finds that the Court of Appeal was not unreasonable

in concluding that even if the trial court erred, the error would be he

harmless. Such error would not have had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence upon the jury’s verdict because there was little if any

evidence that Velasquez acted in an aggressive manner towards

Petitioner. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631; (Lodgment No. 6 at 11–12). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

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States District Judge William Q. Hayes under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and

Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. 

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report

and Recommendation and (2) denying Petitioner’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than June 21, 2013, any

party to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to

Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than July 5, 2013.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 6, 2013

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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