Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01022/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01022-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY DWAYNE BOLDEN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPUTY RUDY PERAZA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01022-AJB-AHG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO STAY (Doc. No. 8)

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Deputy Rudy Peraza’s (“Deputy 

Peraza”) motion to stay proceedings pending resolution of Plaintiff Anthony Dwayne 

Bolden, Jr.’s (“Plaintiff”) criminal prosecution. (Doc. No. 8.) Plaintiff opposed the motion. 

(Doc. No. 15.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Deputy Peraza’s 

motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In brief, this action is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 matter arising out of Plaintiff’s allegations 

that on December 26, 2018, Defendants used excessive force when returning Plaintiff to 

his jail cell. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. No. 19 at 1.) Currently, there is a 

pending criminal prosecution in San Diego Superior Court, involving the same December 

26, 2018 incident. See People of the State of California v. Anthony Dwayne Bolden, San 

Diego Superior Court, Case No. SCD280313. In the criminal action, Plaintiff is charged 

with violating California Penal Code § 69 for allegedly resisting Deputy Peraza during the 

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incident. Id. This Court sua sponte takes judicial notice of the fact that the criminal action 

has not concluded as of the date of this Order. Id.; Bryan v. City of Carlsbad, 297 F. Supp.

3d 1107, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (“The Court may take judicial notice sua sponte, and must 

take notice if a party requests it and if the Court is supplied with the necessary 

information.”). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party has no constitutional right to a stay of civil proceedings during the pendency 

of a criminal investigation. See Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 

902 (9th Cir. 1989) (“While a district court may stay civil proceedings pending the outcome 

of parallel criminal proceedings, such action is not required by the Constitution.”); see also 

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007) (noting “it is within the power of the district 

court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case 

or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended”). After considering “the particular 

circumstances and competing interests involved in the case,” a court has discretion either 

to stay the entire proceeding or fashion some other, less drastic remedy. Id.; see also eBay, 

Inc. v. Digital Point Solutions, Inc., No. 08–4052, 2010 WL 702463, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb.

25, 2010) (considering a plaintiff’s proposed alternatives to a stay, and ultimately denying 

the stay).

In determining whether to stay the proceedings, the court should consider: (1) the 

interest of a plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with the litigation or any particular aspect 

of it, and the potential prejudice to a plaintiff; (2) the burden which any particular aspect 

of the proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the 

management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of 

persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending 

civil and criminal litigation. See Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903.

III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

As a preliminary matter, Deputy Peraza requests judicial notice of (1) the existence 

of and records in the San Diego Superior Court case, People of the State of California v. 

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Anthony Dwayne Bolden, San Diego Superior Court, Case No. SCD280313; (2) the felony 

complaint in Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution, and (3) the San Diego Superior Court’s 

minute order continuing Plaintiff’s trial date. (Doc. No. 8-2.)

Facts proper for judicial notice are those not subject to reasonable dispute and either 

“generally known” in the community or “capable of accurate and ready determination” by 

reference to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201. 

Here, the criminal docket in the court records and the documents contained therein are 

proper subjects for judicial notice. See United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (taking judicial notice of court records in underlying criminal case). Thus, the 

Court GRANTS Deputy Peraza’s request for judicial notice. See Reyna Pasta Bella, LLC 

v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that it is appropriate 

to take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record, such as pleadings 

in related litigation).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. A Stay Will Promote Judicial Economy

Deputy Peraza first argues the stay will promote judicial economy because the 

outcome of the criminal action may completely resolve this action. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 4.) In 

opposition, Plaintiff argues it is possible his conviction in the criminal matter may not bar 

his section 1983 claims because “hypothetically,” Plaintiff can be convicted of resisting a 

peace officer by simply not returning to his cell, with no physical contact involved. (Doc. 

No. 15 at 2.) The Court agrees with Deputy Peraza, and concludes a stay will conserve 

judicial resources as resolution of the criminal matter will help guide and frame this instant 

action. 

In this case, Bolden’s section 1983 claim is premised on Deputy Peraza’s alleged 

unlawful use of force on December 26, 2018. (FAC at 1.) Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution

involves the same incident giving rise to this action, and charges Plaintiff under California 

Penal Code § 69 for resisting a peace officer. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 5.) To prove that a defendant 

is guilty under California Penal Code § 69, the prosecution must prove that “(1) the 

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defendant unlawfully used force or violence to resist an executive officer; (2) when the 

defendant acted, the officer was performing his/her lawful duty; and (3) when the defendant 

acted, he/she knew the executive officer was performing his/her duty.” CACI Cal. Crim. 

No. 2652 (cleaned up). “A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he 

or she is . . . using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties.” Id.

Similarly in this case, whether Deputy Peraza was using unreasonable or excessive 

force is essential to Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims. Specifically, to succeed on a claim of 

excessive use of force, a plaintiff must prove each of the following factors by a 

preponderance of the evidence: “(1) Defendants used force on plaintiff; (2) Defendants’ 

use of force was unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances at the time; (3) 

Defendants knew that using force presented a risk of harm to plaintiff, but they recklessly 

disregarded plaintiff’s safety by failing to take reasonable measures to minimize the risk 

of harm to plaintiff; and (4) Defendants’ conduct caused some harm to plaintiff.” Kingsley 

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). Because the claim at issue here is directly related to 

the criminal proceedings, it would promote judicial economy to stay the matter pending 

resolution of Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393–94 (holding that in 

civil actions that allege a claim or claims “related to rulings that will likely be made in a 

pending or anticipated criminal trial,” “it is within the power of the district court . . . to stay 

the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended”); see, 

e.g., Valdez v. Leeds, No. 117CV00430LJOSAB, 2019 WL 4138945, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

30, 2019) (staying section 1983 action with parallel criminal proceeding); Combs v. Ribac, 

No. 317CV02381WQHBGS, 2018 WL 1185266, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2018) (same).

B. A Stay Will Not Result in Undue Delay or Prejudice

Plaintiff also does not explain why a stay would present hardship or prejudice. There 

is minimal evidence of undue delay as Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings are soon

concluding. Furthermore, Plaintiff will not be unduly prejudiced by a stay because Plaintiff 

primarily seeks monetary relief, and it is not apparent from the Complaint that Plaintiff is 

currently being subject to the continued use of excessive force. See Lockyer v. Mirant 

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Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110–12 (9th Cir. 2005); CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268–

69 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that a stay was appropriate when the party opposing the stay 

sought only monetary damages and did not allege continuing harm or seek injunctive or 

declaratory relief).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Deputy Peraza’s motion to stay 

the proceedings pending resolution of Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution. (Doc. No. 8.) The 

parties are DIRECTED to file a status report within thirty days of the date of this order, 

reporting on the progress of the criminal prosecution and every thirty days thereafter until 

the criminal case is concluded.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 27, 2020

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