Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-07155/USCOURTS-caDC-01-07155-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 22, 2002 Decided February 14, 2003

No. 01-7155

JOSE BEN–KOTEL,

APPELLANT

v.

HOWARD UNIVERSITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01968)

Kay Leslie Ackman argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant. Maxwell O. Chibundu entered an appearance.

Daniel I. Prywes argued the cause for appellee. On the

brief was Sheila Lowery Ferguson. Phillip A. Lattimore III

entered an appearance.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-7155 Document #732130 Filed: 02/14/2003 Page 1 of 7
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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit Judge,

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Jose Ben–Kotel, a native of Chile,

claims that Howard University denied him employment because of his national origin, in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and of the D.C. Human Rights Act.

The district court, holding that Ben–Kotel had not made out a

prima facie case of discrimination, granted summary judgment in favor of the University. On appeal Ben–Kotel argues

that the district court misconceived the law, improperly

weighed the evidence against him, and denied him due process. Because Ben–Kotel did not raise the first argument

before the district court, it is forfeit. The other arguments

have no merit.

I. Background

Except as otherwise noted, we recount the facts in the light

most favorable to Ben–Kotel. Prior to the Fall 1999 semester Howard University advertised a part-time position for a

Spanish instructor, to which Ben–Kotel, a Chilean-born citizen of the United States, responded. Ben–Kotel was at the

time a Ph.D. candidate in Spanish Literature at the University of Maryland; he had a master’s degree in Spanish and had

more than three years’ experience teaching Spanish to high

school and college students.

After Ben–Kotel telephoned Dr. Aleida Rodriguez, the

contact person for the advertised position and a professor at

Howard, he had a series of interviews with representatives of

the University. In addition to Rodriguez, Ben–Kotel spoke

with Dr. Amelia Mondragon, the Spanish language coordinator; Dr. Alphonse Frost, chairman of the Department of

Modern Languages and Literatures; and Associate Dean

Paul Logan. The conversations with Rodriguez and Mondragon were entirely in Spanish, those with Frost and Logan in

English. Rodriguez and Mondragon were pleased with Ben–

Kotel’s qualifications. Although Frost thought Ben–Kotel’s

command of English was ‘‘flawed,’’ he was nevertheless ‘‘quite

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comfortable in envisioning him in the classroom teaching [the

University’s] students.’’

Dean Logan, whose approval was necessary for Ben–Kotel

to be hired, was not so comfortable. Logan claims that in

their telephone conversation Ben–Kotel had difficulty communicating in English. In particular, Ben–Kotel ‘‘had difficulty

expressing himself coherently in English and misunderstood

some of the questions which I asked.’’ Ben–Kotel states that

he and Logan ‘‘fully understood each other.’’

Following his conversation with Ben–Kotel, Logan informed Frost of his misgivings about Ben–Kotel’s facility in

English. According to Logan, Frost shared this concern.

Logan therefore suggested that Frost ‘‘ask existing faculty to

teach [extra] courses on an overload basis,’’ and Frost agreed.

Frost then contacted Ben–Kotel and told him the University

would not be offering him a job. Frost told Ben–Kotel,

Mondragon, and Rodriguez that Ben–Kotel was denied the

position for reasons related to his accent. The University

solicited its existing faculty to teach the extra courses, and

some of them, including several instructors who, like Ben–

Kotel, are natives of primarily Spanish-speaking nations, did

so.

The parties dispute whether the University ever filled the

part-time position Ben–Kotel sought. Ben–Kotel claims the

position was eventually filled by Kadidia Thiere, an African–

American woman. As evidence, he points to Logan’s deposition testimony that the University hired Thiere to teach

Spanish ‘‘I think TTT in 1999.’’ The University asserts that

Thiere was hired in 1998 and did not fill the position advertised in 1999; it points to payroll and other personnel records

and to three affidavits.

Upon complaining to and receiving a right-to-sue letter

from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Ben–

Kotel brought an action in the district court alleging discrimination on the basis of his national origin, in violation of both

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the D.C. Human

Rights Act, D.C. Code Ann. § 2–1401.01 et seq., as well as

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following discovUSCA Case #01-7155 Document #732130 Filed: 02/14/2003 Page 3 of 7
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ery the district court granted the University’s motion for

summary judgment on all counts. Ben–Kotel v. Howard

Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 8 (2001). With regard to the Title VII

claim, the district court concluded Ben–Kotel had not made

out a prima facie case of discrimination because he failed to

show that ‘‘after [his] rejection, the position remained open

and the employer continued to seek applicants.’’ Ben–Kotel,

156 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).

The district court rejected Ben–Kotel’s argument that the

University must have continued to seek applicants for the

position he sought because it hired Thiere to teach Spanish in

1999 after it had refused to hire Ben–Kotel. Instead, the

district court found the University had hired Thiere in 1998;

Logan’s statement that he thought Thiere had been hired in

1999 was unpersuasive in the light of all the evidence indicating otherwise. 156 F. Supp. 2d at 14.

This court summarily affirmed the judgment for the University on the claim for emotional distress. Because the

standards applicable to Ben–Kotel’s claims under Title VII

and under the D.C. Human Rights Act are the same, the sole

issue now before the court is whether the district court erred

in granting summary judgment on the Title VII claim.

II. Analysis

Ben–Kotel first argues that the district court erred by

requiring him to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, as specified in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Referring to Frost’s statements that

the University did not hire him because of his accent, he

argues that because he ‘‘produce[d] direct evidence of discrimination, he may prevail without proving all the elements

of a prima facie case.’’ Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534

U.S. 506, 511 (2002). If he must make out a prima facie case,

Ben–Kotel maintains the district court formulated the requirement too narrowly. The court should not have required

him to show that ‘‘after his rejection, the position remained

open and the employer continued to seek applicants,’’ McDonUSCA Case #01-7155 Document #732130 Filed: 02/14/2003 Page 4 of 7
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nell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, but instead should have permitted him to show other circumstances that ‘‘give[ ] rise to an

inference of discrimination.’’ Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446,

452 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510

(‘‘[T]he prima facie case relates to the employee’s burden of

presenting evidence that raises an inference of discrimination’’). Here the circumstance from which he would have us

infer discrimination is that, even if the position did not

technically remain open, the need for a qualified employee to

teach extra Spanish classes remained, as evidenced by the

University’s arranging for incumbent faculty members to

teach the classes. ‘‘There is simply no legal basis,’’ he says,

‘‘for holding that an employer[ ] who fills an advertised vacancy with a hitherto non-employee[ ] might be liable for a Title

VII violation, but that one who fills the same position from

among preexisting employees would never be liable.’’

We have no occasion to decide whether any of Ben–Kotel’s

interesting propositions are correct because he did not raise

them first in the district court. District of Columbia v. Air

Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984). On the

contrary, Ben–Kotel clearly accepted the applicability of the

McDonnell Douglas framework and made his arguments

within that framework; he did not discuss the significance of

‘‘direct evidence’’ of discrimination at all. Nor did he argue

there, as he does here, that the use of existing faculty to

teach the classes filled the position in a legally relevant way.

See Pl.’s Opp. To Def.’s Mot. For Summ. J. at 13 (‘‘The parttime position for a Spanish language instructor remained

open the course of the semester’’). Finally, Ben–Kotel did

not argue to the district court that, if it found the University

did not continue to look for someone outside the department

to fill the position, then it should have gone on to determine

whether the University’s actions gave rise to an inference of

discrimination in some other way. Although we can entertain

a newly-raised issue ‘‘where injustice might otherwise result,’’

Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1085, Ben–Kotel has not proffered

any reason for our doing so in this case.

Next, Ben–Kotel argues the district court improperly

weighed the evidence in a manner unfavorable to him when it

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found that Thiere was not hired in 1999. He points out,

correctly to be sure, that when there is conflicting evidence of

a disputed fact, summary judgment is ordinarily inappropriate. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States Envtl.

Prot. Agency, 856 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (‘‘[I]f material facts are genuinely in issue TTT summary judgment is not

available’’). In this regard he posits that Logan’s testimony

suggesting that Thiere was hired in 1999 precludes summary

judgment. But that is too facile.

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must

point to more than just ‘‘a scintilla of evidence’’ supporting his

position; ‘‘there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the plaintiff.’’ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). ‘‘If the evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may be granted.’’ Id. at 249–50 (citations omitted). In this

case, Logan’s vague statement regarding when he interviewed Thiere – ‘‘I think it took place in 1999’’ – would not

support a jury finding that the University hired Thiere in

1999; there is overwhelming documentary evidence – three

affidavits and two separate business records – indicating the

University hired Thiere on August 16, 1998. The district

court was entitled to conclude ‘‘that Dean Logan was simply

mistaken when he said he thought that he interviewed Ms.

Thiere in 1999.’’ Ben–Kotel, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 14.

Finally, Ben–Kotel claims the grant of summary judgment

deprived him of his right to due process of law under the

Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Ben–Kotel first learned of the affidavits and records concerning the date of Thiere’s hire when the University replied to

his opposition to its motion for summary judgment; that was

the last pleading concerning the motion scheduled by the

district court. Ben–Kotel argues that therefore he had no

opportunity to rebut the University’s evidence; and given

such an opportunity, he would have pointed to evidence

suggesting that Ms. Thiere may have left the University after

August 16, 1998 and been re-hired for the Fall 1999 semester.

Read charitably, his brief also suggests the University’s

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failure to make the records and affidavits available to him

earlier violated the rules of discovery.

Ben–Kotel’s arguments are unavailing because he did not

seek relief in the district court. As the University points out,

Ben–Kotel could have apprised the district court of his evidence of Ms. Thiere’s possible re-employment by moving for

leave to file a sur-reply. The district court routinely grants

such motions when a party is ‘‘unable to contest matters

presented to the court for the first time’’ in the last scheduled

pleading. Lewis v. Rumsfeld, 154 F. Supp. 2d 56, 61 (D.D.C.

2001). Ben–Kotel’s claim that he was denied due process

must fail because he did not take advantage of the process

that was available to him. Similarly, to the extent Ben–Kotel

argues he was prejudiced by the University’s violation of the

rules of discovery, his failure to pursue a remedy in the

district court precludes our consideration of the issue. Air

Florida, 750 F.2d at 1084.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district

court is

Affirmed.

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