Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00320/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00320-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ERIKA GREGORY and LOREN 

MOLLNER, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF VALLEJO, et al., 

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-00320-KJM-KJN

ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ August 7, 2014 request to seal. ECF 

No. 35. On August 12, 2014, the court issued a minute order directing defendants to respond to 

the request no later than August 15, 2014. ECF No. 40. Defendants did not file a reply. The 

court considers the request unopposed but now DENIES it. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiffs seek to seal two exhibits in support of their opposition to defendants’ 

July 25, 2014 motion for summary judgment. They also seek to redact portions of the following 

opposition papers to defendants’ motion for summary judgment that reference these exhibits: 

(1) the memorandum of points and authorities, (2) response to defendants’ separate statement of 

undisputed facts; and (3) separate statement of undisputed material facts. ECF No. 35. The 

exhibits concern twenty-eight pages of defendant Calhoun’s personnel file that are related to an 

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internal investigation and reasons for his termination. See ECF No. 28 at 2. Plaintiffs contend 

sealing is appropriate because the parties have entered into a protective order signed by the 

magistrate judge assigned to this action. ECF No. 35 at 1 (citing ECF Nos. 17, 28). Plaintiffs 

also argue in support of sealing based on a police officer’s reasonable expectation of privacy of 

information contained in his personnel file and internal affairs materials under California Penal 

Code section 832.7, California Government Code section 6254 and California Evidence Code 

section 1043; and because public access to the documents would “remove the protections for 

officers to be candid in order to improve the department.” 

II. AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER 

 On June 19, 2014, the magistrate judge assigned to this action entered an amended 

stipulation and protective order designating the following records subject to the protective order: 

a. Critical Incident Report- CI 2012-02 

b. Internal Affairs Files Report as to Officer Calhoun in the last five 

years, related to excessive force, if any exists. 

c. A selected portion of Officer Calhoun’s personnel file related to 

the investigation and reasons for his termination. 

ECF No. 28. These designated confidential materials may only be disclosed to specified 

individuals. Id. ¶ 2. Any individual to whom disclosure is made shall, inter alia, be provided 

with a copy of the amended protective order. Id. ¶ 3. Following the conclusion of the trial the 

confidential materials shall be delivered back to the City of Vallejo. Id. ¶ 4. With regard to 

sealing, the amended protective order provides: 

In the event that either party wishes to file Confidential Material 

with the court, as an exhibit to a pleading or otherwise, the filing 

party shall first seek an order to file under seal pursuant to Local 

Rule 141. The Request to Seal Documents shall refer to this 

stipulation and protective order. 

Id. ¶ 5. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 As a threshold matter, the parties are reminded of this court’s standing order 

regarding sealing motions, which provides: 

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Sealing and Protective Orders: No document will be sealed, nor 

shall a redacted document be filed, without the prior approval of the 

court. . . . All requests to seal or redact shall be governed by Local 

Rules 141 (sealing) and 140 (redaction); protective orders covering 

the discovery phase of litigation shall not govern the filing of sealed 

or redacted documents on the public docket. The court will only 

consider requests to seal or redact filed by the proponent of sealing 

or redaction. If a party plans to make a filing that includes material 

an opposing party has identified as confidential and potentially 

subject to sealing, the filing party shall provide the opposing party 

with sufficient notice in advance of filing to allow for the seeking 

of an order of sealing or redaction from the court. 

Civil Standing Orders of Judge Kimberly J. Mueller (available on the court’s web page); see also

ECF 15 at 3-4. Here, the documents plaintiffs seek to seal are related to defendant Calhoun’s 

personnel records. Thus, defendants, and more specifically defendant Calhoun, are the proper 

proponents of sealing or redaction. Id. Plaintiffs had a duty to provide defendants with sufficient 

notice in advance of filing their opposition papers so defendants could elect to seek an order of 

sealing or redaction. Id. Instead, plaintiffs, who did not identify the documents at issue as 

confidential during discovery, filed the instant request to seal. Nevertheless, considering the 

posture of plaintiffs’ request at the impending hearing date of August 29, the court declines to 

strike plaintiffs’ request to seal and addresses the merits of the request. 

 The Local Rules of the Eastern District of California provide that “[d]ocuments 

may be sealed only by written order of the Court.” L.R. 141(a). A request to seal “shall set forth 

the statutory or other authority for sealing, the requested duration, the identity, by name or 

category, of persons to be permitted access to the documents, and all other relevant information.” 

Id. 141(b). 

There is a strong presumption in favor of public access to court records. See 

Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “access to judicial 

records is not absolute.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 

2006). The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between the public’s interest in accessing court 

records filed in connection with nondispositive and dispositive motions. See Phillips, 307 F.3d 

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1206; Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); Kamakana, 447 

F.3d at 1172; In re Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 686 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 To seal documents filed in connection with a dispositive motion, parties must 

show there are “compelling reasons” for doing so. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180, 1182 (“[T]he 

proponent of sealing bears the burden with respect to sealing.”). To demonstrate compelling 

reasons, a party is “required to present articulable facts identifying the interests favoring 

continued secrecy and to show that these specific interests [overcome] the presumption of access 

by outweighing the public interest in understanding the judicial process.” Id. at 1181 (internal 

citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). “When sealing documents attached to a 

dispositive pleading, a district court must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate 

the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. at 1182 (internal 

citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted); see also Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 

F.3d 665, 679 (9th Cir. 2007, amended 2010), cert. denied, Experian Info. Solutions, Inc. v. 

Pintos, 131 S.Ct. 900 (2011) (vacating and remanding district court’s denial of sealing where 

court applied good cause standard to documents filed in connection with summary judgment 

motions). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 

disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might become a vehicle 

for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, 

circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting 

Nixon v. Warner Communs., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 589 (1978)). “The ‘compelling reasons’ standard 

is invoked even if the dispositive motion, or its attachments, were previously filed under seal or 

protective order.” Id.

IV. ANALYSIS 

 To the extent plaintiffs argue that sealing is proper in light of the parties’ existing 

protective order, this argument is without merit. Here, the issuance of the protective order under 

which plaintiffs seek to seal the discovery documents at issue did not involve the court identifying 

and discussing the “compelling reasons” standard. Accordingly, the presumption of access to 

court records is not rebutted simply because the court has entered the stipulated protective order. 

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Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 (concluding that “[a]lthough the magistrate judge expressly 

approved and entered the protective order, the order contained no good cause findings as to 

specific documents that would justify reliance by the United States” and, therefore, “the claimed 

reliance on the order is not a compelling reason that rebuts the presumption of access” (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136, 1138.

 Plaintiffs also argue in favor of sealing based on a police officer’s reasonable 

expectation of privacy of information contained in his personnel files. While courts have 

recognized police officers’ privacy interest in their personnel files, a generalized assertion of a 

privacy interest is not sufficient to bar disclosure of a judicial record. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 

1184 (“Simply mentioning a general category of privilege [such as privacy], without any further 

elaboration or any specific linkage with the documents, does not satisfy the burden” to show 

compelling reasons to seal information from public access.). This argument too fails to establish 

a sufficient basis for sealing. 

 To the extent plaintiffs rely on California Penal Code section 832.7,1

 California 

Government Code section 62542

 and California Evidence Code section 10433 for the proposition 

these statutes protect defendant Calhoun’s right to privacy, this argument also fails. This action 

seeks damages for the violation of plaintiffs’ “rights protected by the Fourth Amendment” and is 

brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. First Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 10. “Plaintiffs also seek 

damages under California State law against those defendants whose conduct gave rise to claims 

cognizable by California law.” Id. In a federal question case, however, federal common law 

1

 Section 832.7 of the California Penal Code provides: “Peace officer or custodial officer 

personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency . . ., or information 

obtained from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil 

proceeding, [with some exceptions].” CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7. 

2

 Section 6254(c) of the California Government Code provides that “this chapter does not require 

the disclosure of . . . [p]ersonnel, medical, or similar files , the disclosure of which would 

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(c). 

3

 Section 1043 of the California Evidence Code requires a party seeking discovery of peace or 

custodial officer personnel records to file a motion with the appropriate court identifying the 

discovery sought, the party seeking discovery, the officer whose records are sought, and the 

agency which has custody and control of the records, along with an affidavit showing good cause 

for the discovery. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043. 

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applies and a state statute, without more, does not shield disclosure in federal court or rebut the 

strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial records. Garrett v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,

818 F.2d 1515, 1519 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (rejecting claim 

that documents relating to “law enforcement” and “official information privileges” are 

categorically exempt from the compelling interest test). 

 Other than their reliance on the stipulated protective order and state statutes, 

plaintiffs fail to articulate any support for, or point to any authority in support of, their remaining 

conclusory argument that “[p]ublic filing of these records would chill that [privacy] interest and 

remove the protections for officers to be candid in order to improve the department.” See

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1182 (when ruling on a request to seal a court must not base its decision 

on “hypothesis or conjecture”). Without more, plaintiffs have failed to meet the requirement that 

a party make a particularized showing that demonstrates compelling reasons to seal documents 

submitted in connection with a dispositive motion. Cf. Pryor v. City of Clearlake, No. C 11–0954 

CW, 2012 WL 2711032, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2012) (noting “a generalized assertion of a 

privacy interest is not sufficient to warrant barring disclosure of a judicial record” but finding 

sealing proper where it concerned information that was irrelevant to the dispositive motion, 

sensitive, private and where there was a likelihood that “it was filed . . . because of private spite 

or a desire to scandalize the public”). Unlike the moving party in Pryor, plaintiffs failed to 

articulate any specific reasons for sealing the exhibits. Nor did defendants file a reply despite 

being provided the opportunity to do so. 

 Because plaintiffs have not borne the burden of establishing a compelling reason 

for the court to grant their request to seal the two exhibits and redact references to these exhibits 

in their opposition papers, the court DENIES the request. 

 At the same time, the court is cognizant of the potential that limited information in 

the documents covered by plaintiffs’ request may serve to circulate libelous statements regarding 

third parties. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Therefore, the court will permit redaction of the two 

exhibits and plaintiffs’ opposition papers only to the extent the documents set forth the names of 

third parties. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiffs’ request to seal and to redact portions of the opposition papers is 

DENIED. 

 2. The Clerk of the Court “will return to the submitting party the documents for 

which sealing has been denied,” L.R. 141(e)(1), and any electronically transmitted documents are 

deemed returned, United States v. Chanthaboury, No. 2:12–cr–00188–GEB, 2013 WL 6404989, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2013). 

 3. Within one day from the date of this order, plaintiffs shall file their opposition 

papers in accordance with this order, redacting only the names of third parties. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 20, 2014.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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