Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04922/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04922-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DERRICK JESUS ODEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. VOONG, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-04922-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed by Plaintiff, a state 

prisoner currently incarcerated at California State Prison-Sacramento. He alleges constitutional 

rights violations at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) where he was previously incarcerated. 

Dkt. 1 at 6, 8.1 He has named the following Defendants: Office of Appeals (“OOA”) Chief M. 

Voong and Acting Chief R. L. Briggs. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.

Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendants have prevented him from filing certain grievances 

in which he complained that SVSP Correctional Officer E. Santana filed a false Rules Violation 

Report (“RVR”) against him in 2013.2 Thus, in essence, Plaintiff claims Defendants’ actions have 

violated his rights under the First Amendment to meaningful access to the courts, and he accuses

Defendants of obstructing his access to SVSP’s grievance procedures.

In an Order dated January 14, 2019, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and 

determined that he stated a cognizable claim under the First Amendment that Defendants

obstructed his access to grievance procedures. Dkt. 7 at 2. The Court then directed the Clerk of 

1 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by the parties.

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a previous action in this Court, which is now closed, 

in which he pursued various claims relating to the alleged 2013 false RVR, including First 

Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims against Officer Santana for authoring the false RVR, 

among others. See Case No. C 17-5853 YGR (PR). On September 6, 2019, the Court granted 

Defendants’ Combined Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment upon 

reaching the merits of his claims. See Dkt. 60 in Case No. C 17-5853 YGR (PR). 

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the Court to serve the complaint and issued a briefing schedule for the served Defendants to file a 

dispositive motion. See id. at 3-6.

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

Dkt. 20. Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against 

them on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as required 

by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and even if he did exhaust Defendants did not 

cause an actual access-to-courts injury because they had no involvement in processing the 

grievances complained of, and in any case, Plaintiff’s subsequent appeals were properly rejected, 

cancelled, or denied; and (2) based on qualified immunity. Id. at 5. Plaintiff has filed an 

opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 31. Defendants have filed a reply 

to Plaintiff’s opposition. Dkt. 32. 

Having read and considered the papers submitted in connection with this matter, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

One of the issues presented in Defendants’ summary judgment motion is whether Plaintiff 

properly exhausted his administrative remedies as to his First Amendment claim against 

Defendants. Before turning to the facts of this case, the Court briefly reviews the requirements of 

the PLRA and administrative review process applicable to California prisoners.

A. Legal Framework for Exhaustion of Available Administrative Remedies

The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust all available administrative remedies before 

bringing an action with respect to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s 

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies neither need to meet 

federal standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy, and effective.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 

731, 739-40 (2001). The PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies. Woodford 

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s 

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deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function 

effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-

91. Thus, compliance with prison grievance procedures is required by the PLRA to exhaust 

properly. Id. 

The CDCR provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively “any 

departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an 

adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also provides its 

inmates the right to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by correctional officers. Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(e). 

On January 28, 2011, certain revisions to the California prison regulations governing 

inmate grievances became operative. See History, Note 11, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2. In 

order to exhaust all available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must submit 

his complaint on CDCR Form 602 (“602 appeal”) and proceed through three levels of appeal: 

(1) first formal level appeal filed with one of the institution’s appeal coordinators, (2) second 

formal level appeal filed with the institution head or designee, and (3) third formal level appeal 

filed with the CDCR director or designee (i.e., “Director’s level”). Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§§ 3084.1(b), 3084.7. Under specific circumstances, the first level review may be bypassed. Id. 

The third level of review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the CDCR and exhausts a 

prisoner’s administrative remedies. Id. § 3084.7(d)(3). A California prisoner is required to submit 

an inmate appeal at the appropriate level and proceed to the highest level of review available to 

him. Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

The level of detail in an administrative grievance necessary to exhaust a claim properly is 

determined by the prison’s applicable grievance procedures. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 

(2007). The level of specificity required in the appeal is described in the California Code of 

Regulations as follows:

The inmate or parolee shall list all staff member(s) involved and shall 

describe their involvement in the issue. To assist in the identification 

of staff members, the inmate or parolee shall include the staff 

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member’s last name, first initial, title or position, if known, and the 

dates of the staff member’s involvement in the issue under appeal. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3) (emphasis added). 

The initial grievance must be filed within thirty calendar days of the action or event being 

protested, and inmates must seek review at each successive level within thirty calendar days of 

receiving an adverse decision at a lower level. Id. § 3084.8(b)(1). 

An inmate appeal may be cancelled for any of the eight reasons listed in the regulation. 

See id. § 3084.6(c).3 Among the reasons for cancellation is that the inmate appeal is failure to 

comply with the time limits or duplication of a previous appeal. See id. § 3084.6(c)(2), (4). A 

cancellation decision under section 3084.6(c) does not exhaust administrative remedies. Id.

§ 3084.1(b). An inmate can appeal that decision to cancel his appeal by appealing the application 

of § 3084.6(c) to his original appeal; if he prevails on that separate appeal, the cancelled appeal 

later can be considered at the discretion of the appeals coordinator or the third level appeals chief. 

Id. § 3084.6(a)(3) and § 3084.6(e).

B. Factual Background4

1. The Parties

At the time of the events set forth in his complaint, Plaintiff was a state prisoner who was 

incarcerated at SVSP. See Dkt. 1 at 1. During the time frame at issue, Defendants Voong and 

Briggs acted as OOA Chief and Acting Chief, respectively. Voong Decl. ¶ 1; Briggs Decl. ¶ 1.

3 An inmate appeal also may be screened out, or rejected, for any of the sixteen defects listed 

in the regulation. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(b). The defects that may cause an inmate 

appeal to be screened out are capable of being corrected—e.g., the inmate may be required to add 

information or documents, or make the appeal legible—and the inmate may resubmit the appeal 

after correcting the defect. See id. § 3084.6(a)(2). A rejection decision under § 3084.6(b) does not 

exhaust administrative remedies. Id. § 3084.1(b). 

4 This Order contains a few acronyms. Here, in one place, they are:

CDCR California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

CMF California Medical Facility

RJN Request for Judicial Notice

OOA Office of Appeals

RVR Rules Violation Report 

SVSP Salinas Valley State Prison 

TLR Third Level Review

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Defendants were in charge of overseeing staff who receive, screen, log, route, and assign the third 

level grievances that are submitted by inmates. Id. Their duties also included monitoring the 

dispositions of these inmate appeals. Id.

2. Plaintiff’s Version

The following background relating to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is taken from 

the Court’s January 14, 2019 Order:

Plaintiff claims that Defendants have obstructed his access to 

grievance procedures at SVSP based on the following actions:

(1) Use of inmate appeals screening form (CDC 695) to 

manipulate improper, excessive, and repetitive delays[;]

(2) Dishonest and unethical methods in screening out and 

cancelling 602 appeal for the purpose to never be processed[;]

(3) Reporting deliberate false information in the course of 

responding to 602 appeal.

Dkt. 1 at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have 

prevented him from filing . . . certain staff complaint[s], [e.g.,] log 

no. SVSP 14-02020, in which he complains that SVSP 

Correctional Officer E. Santana filed a false [RVR] against him in 

2013. Thus, in essence, Plaintiff claims Defendants’ actions have 

violated his rights under the First Amendment.

Dkt. 7 at 2 (brackets added).

3. Defendants’ Version

a. Plaintiff’s RVR For Indecent Exposure

On October 15, 2013, Plaintiff received an RVR for indecent exposure stemming from an 

incident that occurred on October 6, 2013, when he allegedly exposed his genitals during a search 

by Officer Santana. Cho Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6, Ex. B, C.

On October 8, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to California Medical Facility (“CMF”). Id., 

¶¶ 6, 7, Ex. C, D. A senior psychologist at CMF reported that Plaintiff would be “unable to 

participate in a disciplinary hearing while in his current elevated level of care” and recommended 

that the RVR hearing be postponed. Id., ¶ 8, Ex. E. On December 27, 2013, Plaintiff transferred 

to California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). Id., ¶ 7, Ex. D. On January 13, 2014, CHCF 

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officials sent a memorandum to SVSP requesting that SVSP hold the RVRs until Plaintiff’s 

discharge from CHCF. Id., ¶¶ 7, 9, Ex. D, F.

On March 3, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred back to SVSP. Id., ¶ 7, Ex. D. Chief 

Disciplinary Officer R. Binkele issued a memorandum recalculating the time limit to hold 

Plaintiff’s RVR hearing in light of the exceptional medical circumstances due to Plaintiff’s mental 

health conditions and determining that the new deadline was April 2, 2014. Id., ¶¶ 7, 10, Ex. D, 

G.

On April 1, 2014, the RVR hearing was held on the indecent exposure RVR before the 

hearing officer, Lieutenant P. Sullivan. Id., ¶ 11, Ex. H. Lieutenant Sullivan considered 

statements from Officer Santana and Plaintiff and the written testimony of Correctional Officer J. 

Castillo and kitchen employee A. Romero. Id. Lieutenant Sullivan noted that “[a]ccording to 

Inmate ODEN’s statement made during the Investigative Employee’s report and the questions 

asked to Officer Castillo it appears that Inmate ODEN acknowledged that he did in fact pull down 

his shorts and exposed himself to Officer Santana,” and found Plaintiff guilty of indecent

exposure. Id.

b. Defendants’ Roles in the Administrative Appeals Process

Defendants have never worked at SVSP and were employed at the OOA in Sacramento, 

where they adjudicated appeals brought to the third level. Lomeli Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7, Ex. A; Briggs 

Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. B. Appeals adjudicated at the first and second levels of review occur at the 

institution, and Defendants were never involved in determining any of Plaintiff’s administrative 

appeals determined at the first two levels at SVSP. Lomeli Decl. ¶¶ 4, 10-21, Ex. B-L; Voong 

Decl. ¶ 4, Briggs Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7.

c. Plaintiff’s Inmate Appeals

From October 2013 (when the aforementioned RVR for Indecent Exposure was issued) to 

August 2018 (when Plaintiff filed the instant complaint), Plaintiff had administratively exhausted 

three administrative appeals arising from the constitutional violations at SVSP—SVSP-L-13-

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2804,

5 SVSP-L-14-2256, and SVSP-L-18-03264. Voong Decl. ¶¶ 11, 12, 16, Ex. B; Lomeli Decl. 

¶¶ 12, 19, Ex. D, K. Because SVSP-L-13-2804 (relating to his classification score) is unrelated, 

see Voong Decl. ¶ 11, the Court turns to the remaining two. In SVSP-L-14-2256, Plaintiff alleged 

that SVSP counselors had improperly rejected an appeal (SVSP-L-14-2020) as a duplicate of a 

previous appeal (SVSP-L-14-01989), which contested the RVR he had received for the indecent 

exposure charge. Id., ¶ 12. Meanwhile, in SVSP-L-18-03264, Plaintiff contested the cancellation 

of a previous appeal (SVSP-L-18-01723), which also related to the indecent exposure charge. 

Lomeli Decl. ¶ 19. While Defendants were involved in handling the review at the third level of 

appeal for both SVSP-L-14-2256 and SVSP-L-18-03264, the record shows that neither appeal 

dealt with any alleged denial of access to the courts by the named Defendants. See id., Exs. D, K. 

Turning now to the other appeals submitted by Plaintiff at the lower levels of appeal, 

SVSP Inmate Appeals Coordinator V. Lomeli claims that the following appeals “are connected to 

the aforementioned alleged obstruction of [Plaintiff’s] right to file a staff complaint” and to 

Plaintiff’s challenge to his indecent explosive charge: SVSP-L-14-01989; SVSP-L-14-02020;

SVSP-L-14-02256; SVSP-L-14-02718; SVSP-L-14-03035; SVSP-L-14-03199; SVSP-L-14-

03279; SVSP-L-14-03346; LAC-X-15-01228; LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721; SVSP-L-18-

01723; and SVSP-L-18-03264. Lomeli Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10-20, Ex. B-K; Voong Decl. ¶ 14. 

The Court shall elaborate on each of the relevant appeals in chronological order below.

1) SVSP-L-14-01989

On May 6, 2014, Plaintiff submitted SVSP-L-14-01989, contesting the RVR he had 

received for indecent exposure on October 6, 2013. Lomeli Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. B. In this appeal, 

Plaintiff denied that he had exposed himself to Officer Santana, the RVR proceeding misstated the 

identity of the individual who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on him, the psychiatric 

evaluation was improperly performed, the regulatory time limits for the RVR had been violated, 

5 The Court notes that in its previous orders in Case No. C 17-5853 YGR (PR), it 

inadvertently referred to this appeal as “SVSP-L-14-2804.” See Dkt. 60 at 8 in Case No. C 17-

5853 YGR (PR). The parties failed to point out the typographical error, but nonetheless this 

appeal was not relevant to the Court’s decision in that case. The Court acknowledges that the 

correct appeal number is “SVSP-L-13-2804.” See Voong Decl. ¶ 11.

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and the RVR hearing was held while he was admitted to a mental health crisis bed. Id. On May 

20, 2014, Plaintiff was informed that SVSP-L-14-01989 had been rejected because it involved 

multiple issues that did not derive from a single event or could not be reasonably addressed in a 

single response pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations § 3084.6(b)(8). Id.

Plaintiff was instructed to file separate appeals regarding his denial of the indecent exposure 

charge and the alleged rescission of a mental health assessment. Id. Instead, Plaintiff wrote a letter 

to the OOA in Sacramento, inquiring about the status of the appeal while it was pending at SVSP. 

Voong Decl., Ex. A, B. The OOA informed Plaintiff in a letter that he must inquire about the 

appeal’s status at the institution. Id., Ex. B. Plaintiff’s records show he did not obtain a 

substantive decision at the third level. Id., Ex. A.

2) SVSP-L-14-02020 

On May 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed SVSP-L-14-02020, in which he contested the veracity of 

the indecent exposure RVR. Lomeli Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. C. On May 9, 2014, Plaintiff was instructed 

to explain how this appeal was not duplicative of SVSP-L-14-01989. Id. Plaintiff responded with 

a CDCR Form 22, in which he wrote, “[t]his is a staff complaint it has to do with unprofessional 

conduct which I’m reporting and which caused adverse actions against me.” Id. On May 15, 

2014, the appeal was cancelled for duplicating SVSP-L-14-01989 and for untimeliness because it 

had exceeded 30 days from when the allegedly false RVR was issued on October 6, 2013. Id. 

Neither Defendant was involved in determining this appeal while it was pending at SVSP. Id. 

There is no indication that this appeal reached the third level. Voong Decl. ¶¶ 10, 17.

3) SVSP-L-14-02256 

On May 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed SVSP-L-14-02256, contesting the cancellation of SVSPL-14-02020. Lomeli Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. D. This appeal bypassed the first level of review, and was 

denied at the second level on July 7, 2014 on the grounds that the cancellation of SVSP-L-14-

02020 was proper for duplicating SVSP-L-14-01989. Id. At the third level, Defendant Briggs 

denied the appeal and upheld the ruling made at the second level. Voong Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. B; 

Briggs Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A. Defendant Briggs also found that there had been insufficient evidence to 

prove Plaintiff’s claim that the cancellation was improper because Plaintiff had been experiencing 

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mental issues that prevented him from properly filing his appeals. Briggs Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A. 

4) SVSP-L-14-02718 

On June 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed SVSP-L-14-02718, claiming that the Appeals Office at 

SVSP was harassing Plaintiff and improperly refusing to process appeal numbers SVSP-L-14-

01989 and SVSP-L-14-02020. Lomeli Decl. ¶ 13. Ex. E. This appeal bypassed the first level and 

proceeded to the second level, where it was partially granted on August 5, 2014 in that any 

properly filed appeals would be processed. Id. The second level reviewer also found that the 

Appeals Office had not harassed Plaintiff or improperly refused or rejected any appeals, and did

not reinstate appeal numbers SVSP-L-14-01989 and SVSP-L-14-02020. Id. There is no

indication that this appeal reached the third level. Voong Decl. ¶¶ 10, 17. 

5) SVSP-L-14-03035 

On July 15, 2014, Plaintiff filed SVSP-L-14-03035, claiming that C. Barela of the Appeals 

Office at SVSP acted with deliberate indifference and denied him his due process rights by 

intentionally rejecting or cancelling SVSP-L-14-02020. Lomeli Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. F. He further 

claimed that other inmates had been treated harshly by the Appeals Office as well. Id. This 

appeal was rejected at the first level because he could only appeal on his behalf and not for other 

inmates, he had not attached the cancelled appeal, and he could not appeal a rejected appeal. Id. 

There is no indication that this appeal reached the third level. Id., ¶¶ 10, 17. 

6) SVSP-L-14-03199 

On July 27, 2014, Plaintiff submitted SVSP-L-14-03199, alleging that he had not seen his 

legal appeal documents regarding the indecent exposure RVR since the return of SVSP-L-14-

01989. Lomeli Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. G. This appeal was bypassed at the first level of review. Id. On 

August 8, 2014, the second-level reviewer partially granted the appeal because he still had an 

appeal pending, SVSP-L-14-03346, regarding the RVR determination. Id. There is no indication 

that this appeal reached the third level. Voong Decl. ¶¶ 10, 17, Ex. A. 

7) SVSP-L-14-03279 

On July 27 and 28, 2014, Plaintiff submitted SVSP-L-14-03279, alleging that C. Barela 

and the Appeals Office continued to deny his due process rights by erroneously rejecting and 

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cancelling his appeals of the indecent exposure RVR. Lomeli Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. H. This appeal was 

cancelled on August 1, 2014 at the first level because Plaintiff had not submitted the appeal on the 

CDCR 602 form. Id. There is no indication that this appeal reached the third level. Voong Decl. 

¶¶ 10, 17, Ex. A. 

8) SVSP-L-14-03346 

On July 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed SVSP-L-14-03346, contending that he had not engaged in 

the offense of indecent exposure and that Officer Santana had been harassing him, and he 

requested that the RVR be dismissed. Lomeli Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. I. This appeal was bypassed at the 

first level of review and proceeded to the second level. Id. On August 14, 2014, the second-level 

reviewer denied the appeal, finding that the RVR hearing had been fair and unbiased and that 

Plaintiff had committed the charged offense. Id. This appeal was initially rejected by Defendant 

Briggs at the third level on September 30, 2014 for failure to provide supporting documents. 

Voong Decl. ¶ 13; Briggs Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. B. Specifically, Plaintiff was required to submit a CDCR 

Form 128-B, General Chrono from the RVR proceedings. Briggs Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6. Plaintiff

resubmitted the appeal to the third level, where it was received on November 17, 2014 and then 

cancelled on March 5, 2015 for untimeliness. Voong Decl. ¶ 13; Briggs Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. B. 

9) LAC-X-15-01228

On March 31, 2015, Plaintiff filed LAC-X-15-01228 while he was housed at California 

State Prison-Los Angeles County. Voong Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. B. The appeal was forwarded to SVSP 

on April 20, 2015 for processing. Voong Decl., Ex. B. In this appeal, Plaintiff appealed the thirdlevel cancellation of SVSP-L-14-03346, and argued that no employee within CDCR’s Appeals 

Offices, including Defendants, would process his administrative appeals and needed to stop 

denying him his due process rights. Voong Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. B. LAC-X-15-01228 was received at 

the third level on May 4, 2015 and was cancelled on June 26, 2015 because Plaintiff had exceeded 

the prescribed thirty-day deadline to appeal a cancellation. Id. 

10) LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721

On June 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed LAC-X-16-02456 while housed at California State PrisonLos Angeles County, claiming that Defendants had deliberately denied his due process rights to 

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appeal the indecent exposure RVR and that the RVR was false. Voong Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. B. It was 

transferred to SVSP for processing on June 13, 2016, and was designed as SVSP-L-16-03721. Id. 

On June 28, 2016, the appeal was rejected at the first level at SVSP because Plaintiff was 

appealing a third-level decision. Voong Decl., Ex. B. This appeal was cancelled at the third level 

on November 23, 2016 because it was a duplicate of LAC-X-15-01228, in which Plaintiff also 

claimed Defendants violated his due process rights to appeal the indecent-exposure RVR. Id.,

¶¶ 14, 15, Ex. B. 

11) SVSP-L-18-01723

On March 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed SVSP-L-18-01723, again claiming that Officer Santana 

had submitted a false RVR for indecent exposure and for threatening the officer. Lomeli Decl. 

¶ 18, Ex. J. This appeal was rejected at the first level on March 21, 2018 because Plaintiff’s 

allegations were five years old and untimely and because the appeal had not been submitted on an 

approved CDCR 602 form. Id. It was cancelled on April 13, 2018, and on May 7, 2018, it was 

rejected again because Plaintiff was attempting to resubmit an appeal that had been previously 

cancelled. Id. Plaintiff was advised that he could appeal a cancelled appeal by submitting a 

separate CDCR 602 form and attaching his cancelled appeal. Id. Neither Defendant was involved 

in determining this appeal while it was pending at SVSP. Id. There is no indication that this 

appeal reached the third level. Voong Decl. ¶¶ 10, 17, Ex. A.

12) SVSP-L-18-03264

On May 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed SVSP-L-18-03264, contesting the cancellation of SVSPL-18-01723 and requesting compensation for his loss of salary, the termination of Officer Santana 

and a correctional sergeant, and an investigation of his staff complaint allegations in connection 

with the indecent exposure RVR. Lomeli Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. K. This appeal was bypassed at the first 

level of review and proceeded to the second level of review. Id. On June 14, 2018, the secondlevel reviewer partially granted the appeal, finding that Plaintiff’s requests for an investigation 

were addressed by appeal numbers SVSP-L-14-01989 and SVSP-L-14-02020. Id. The reviewer 

denied Plaintiff’s requests for compensation, the staff terminations, and the witness interviews, 

and found that SVSP-L-18-01823 was appropriately cancelled because Plaintiff had filed it 

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outside the 30-day time constraints. Id. This appeal was accepted at the third level on June 27, 

2018 and was denied in a letter signed by Defendant Voong on October 2, 2018 because the 

cancellation of SVSP-L-18-01723 had been proper. Voong Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. B.

13) Summary of Relevant Appeals

In sum, Plaintiff submitted the aforementioned relevant twelve appeals. Lomeli Decl. ¶¶ 9, 

10-20, Ex. B-K; Voong Decl. ¶ 14. Of these twelve appeals, SVSP-L-14-02256, SVSP-L-14-

03346, and SVSP-L-18-03264 reached the third level. Voong Decl. ¶¶ 14-16, Briggs Decl. ¶¶ 4-

6, Ex. A, B. However, of the three appeals that reached the third level, only SVSP-L-14-02256 

and SVSP-L-18-03264 received a substantive decision, which was a denial, at the third level. 

Voong Decl. ¶¶ 12, 16; Briggs Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A. (SVSP-L-14-03346 was cancelled on March 5, 

2015 for untimeliness. See Voong Decl. ¶ 13; Briggs Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. B.) However, in neither 

SVSP-L-14-02256 nor SVSP-L-18-03264 did Plaintiff raise any claims of denial of access to the 

courts by the named Defendants. See Voong Decl. ¶¶ 14-16, Briggs Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, Ex. A, B. 

As to Plaintiff’s appeals that specifically named Defendants as denying him due process 

because they would not process his administrative appeals—LAC-X-15-01228 and LAC-X-16-

02456/SVSP-L-16-03721—neither appeal received a substantive decision at the third level. See 

Voong Decl. ¶¶ 14-15, Exs. A, B. In LAC-X-15-01228, Plaintiff appealed the cancellation of 

SVSP-L-14-03346 but also specifically raised the issue that employees working in the Appeals 

Offices within the CDCR, including Defendants, were denying him due process because they 

would not process his administrative appeals. Id., Ex. B. LAC-X-15-01228 was received at the 

third level on May 4, 2015 and cancelled by Defendant Voong on June 26, 2015 because Plaintiff 

had exceeded the prescribed 30-day deadline to appeal a cancellation. Id. In LAC-X-16-

02456/SVSP-L-16-03721, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants had denied his due process rights to 

appeal the indecent-exposure RVR. Voong Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. B. It was ultimately cancelled by 

Defendant Voong on November 23, 2016 at the third level of review for duplicating another 

appeal (LAC-X-15-01228), which had been cancelled as untimely. Id.

Lastly, the only involvement either Defendant had in connection with any of the 

aforementioned appeals challenging the indecent exposure charge was when Defendant Briggs 

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served as the third level reviewer to deny SVSP-L-14-02256 (contesting the cancellation of SVSPL-14-02020, in which he contested the veracity of the indecent exposure RVR), see Voong Decl. 

¶ 12; Briggs Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A, and to initially reject and eventually deny as untimely SPVP-14-

03356, see Voong Decl. ¶ 14, Briggs Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; and when Defendant Voong served as the third 

level reviewer to cancel the two relevant appeals LAC-X-15-01228 and LAC-X-16-02456/SVSPL-16-03721 (both relating to the access to the courts claim), see Voong Decl. ¶¶ 14-15, Ex. B, and 

to deny as proper SVSP-L-18-03264, which was appealing the cancellation of SVSP-L-18-01723 

(relating to the indecent exposure RVR), see Voong Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. B.

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment 

on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in 

the record”). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 

(1986). 

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised 

in a motion for summary judgment. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc). The defendants have the initial burden to prove “that there was an available administrative 

remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 1172. If the 

defendants carry that burden, “the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence 

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The ultimate burden of 

proof remains with defendants, however. Id. “If material facts are disputed, summary judgment 

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should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id. at 1166. 

A district court may consider only admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In support of the motion for summary judgment, Defendants have presented their own declarations 

and supporting exhibits (Dkts. 20-2, 20-5) as well as declarations and supporting exhibits from

their attorney, Deputy Attorney C. Hay-Mie Cho, and Appeals Coordinator Lomeli. Dkts. 20-3, 

20-4.

Defendants have also filed a Request for Judicial Notice (“Defs. RJN”) in support of their 

Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 20-6. A district court “may take notice of proceedings in 

other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct 

relation to matters at issue.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted) (granting request to take judicial notice in section 1983 

action of five prior cases in which plaintiff was pro se litigant, to counter her argument that she 

deserved special treatment because of her pro se status). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial 

notice of: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint filed in his previous action, Case No. C 17-05853-YGR (PR), 

and the civil docket sheet from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records, attached as Exhibit 

A to Defs. RJN; (2) his petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number HC 8338, filed with the 

Monterey County Superior Court on October 20, 2014, attached as Exhibit B to Defs. RJN; and 

(3) the Monterey County Superior Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, case number HC 8338, on November 6, 2014, attached as Exhibit C to Defs. RJN.

Plaintiff’s opposition is not verified and will not be considered because it was not signed 

under “penalty of perjury.” Dkt. 31. Because the complaint is verified, dkt. 1 at 3, the Court will 

construe it as an opposing affidavit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as it is based 

on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. 

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). 

IV. ANAYLSIS

Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to his 

access to the courts claim in the complaint in the present action. Dkt. 20 at 15-17. Specifically, 

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Defendants assert that Plaintiff “has raised a freestanding claim against Defendants Voong and 

Briggs that he did not properly raise in an administrative appeal.” Dkt. 32 at 3. Defendants argue 

as follows:

In Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth 

Circuit held that an inmate-plaintiff raising a freestanding claim 

against the prison’s appeals coordinator for improper screening must 

separately pursue his administrative remedies for that problem before 

filing suit. The Court explained that although the inmate claimed his 

grievances about medical care were improperly screened, he could 

not rely on those grievances to put the prison on notice about his 

specific claim against the appeals coordinator. Id.

Oden has presented an analogous situation in this case. Oden filed 

two grievances about Defendants Voong and Briggs’s conduct—

SVSP-L-16-03721 and LAC-X-15-01228. In appeal number SVSPL-16-03721, Oden claimed that Defendants Voong and Briggs denied 

his due process rights to appeal the indecent-exposure rules violation 

report. (ECF No. 20-5, ¶ 15, Ex. B.) That grievance was cancelled 

at the third level of review for duplicating another appeal—LAC-X15-01228—which was cancelled as untimely. (Id., ¶ 14, Ex. B.) In 

appeal number LAC-X-15-01228, Oden argued that Defendants 

Voong and Briggs and other employees working in the Appeals 

Offices denied him due process because they did not process his 

administrative appeals. (Id., Ex. B.) Neither appeal was properly 

exhausted appeal because neither received a substantive decision at 

the third level. (Id.)

Dkt. 32 at 3.

As explained above, Defendants’ burden is to prove that there was an available 

administrative remedy and that Plaintiff did not exhaust that available administrative remedy. 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172; see id. at 1176 (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

defendants on issue of exhaustion because defendants did not carry their initial burden of proving 

their affirmative defense that there was an available administrative remedy that prisoner plaintiff 

failed to exhaust); see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005) (as there can be 

no absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, movant claiming lack of 

exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available, whether at unexhausted 

levels or through awaiting results of relief already granted as result of that process). Once 

Defendants have carried that burden, Plaintiff has the burden of production. Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1172. That is, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to come forward with evidence showing that there is 

something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative 

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remedies effectively unavailable to him. Id. But as required by Jones, the ultimate burden of 

proof remains with Defendants. Id. 

A. Defendants’ Initial Burden of Proving Unexhaustion

In an effort to carry out their initial burden of proving unexhaustion, Defendants argue as 

follows:

Oden’s complaint alleges that Defendants Voong and Briggs 

interfered with his access to the prison grievance system. Oden’s 

claim against them has nothing to do with his underlying challenges 

to the merits of the indecent-exposure RVR. Rather, he is raising a 

freestanding claim against Voong and Briggs in their roles as appeal 

reviewers concerning subsequent challenges to prior appeal 

cancellation decisions. But Oden did not sufficiently address this 

alleged wrongdoing through the administrative appeal process, and 

accordingly, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

against Defendants.

Id. at 16. Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff filed two relevant grievances to the access to the 

courts claim against Defendants—LAC-X-15-01228 and LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721—

but contend that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies because Plaintiff did not 

receive a decision (i.e., a denial) at the highest level of appeal. Id. at 16-17. Therefore, 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to 

exhaust his administrative remedies as to the access to the courts claim. Id.

Defendants have met their initial burden as the moving party by setting forth evidence to 

demonstrate Plaintiff’s non-exhaustion as to Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim, specifically by 

conducting a search of the CDCR’s records and finding no grievances submitted to the Director’s 

level by Plaintiff concerning the such a claim. See Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th 

Cir. 2015). Defendants cite the declarations of Defendants Voong and Briggs as well as Appeals 

Coordinator Lomeli, who have reviewed Plaintiff’s grievances and concluded that: (1) Plaintiff 

only submitted three grievances during time period at issue that were pursued to the Director’s 

level and for which he obtained final administrative decisions (i.e., denials)—SVSP-L-13-2804, 

SVSP-L-14-2256, and SVSP-L-18-03264—but none of the three related to the aforementioned 

access to the courts claim; and (2) the grievances relating to Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim

against Defendants were cancelled as either untimely (LAC-X-15-01228) or duplicative (LAC-XCase 4:18-cv-04922-YGR Document 33 Filed 03/20/20 Page 16 of 24
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16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721) and thus Plaintiff never obtained a final administrative decision

because neither were accepted for substantive review at the third level.

B. Plaintiff’s Burden of Proving Unavailability of Administrative Remedies

Defendants have adequately shown that there were available administrative remedies that 

Plaintiff did not fully exhaust. As such, the burden shifts to Plaintiff “to come forward with 

evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and 

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1166. Improper screening of a prisoner’s administrative grievances may excuse a failure to 

exhaust. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010). The prisoner must 

demonstrate “(1) that he actually filed a grievance or grievances that, if pursued through all levels 

of administrative appeals, would have sufficed to exhaust the claim that he seeks to pursue in 

federal court, and (2) that prison officials screened his grievance or grievances for reasons 

inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable regulations.” Id. at 823-24.

Plaintiff relies on appeal number SVSP-L-14-3346 to support his claim that he was 

excused from the exhaustion requirement. Dkt. 31-1 at 3. However, such an argument does not 

address Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff did not exhaust his freestanding claim against Defendants 

Voong and Briggs. As explained above, in SVSP-L-14-3346, Plaintiff claimed that he had not 

committed the offense of indecent exposure, that Officer Santana had been harassing him, and that 

the indecent exposure RVR should be dismissed. Briggs Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. B (Dkt. 20-2 at 59, 61). 

On September 30, 2014, Defendant Briggs sent Plaintiff a letter rejecting the appeal for failure to 

provide supporting documents, namely the CDCR Form 128-B, General Chrono. Briggs Decl.

¶¶ 5-6, Ex. B (Dkt. 20-2 at 63). Plaintiff alleges in his opposition that he was unable to provide 

such documents and thus unable to exhaust this appeal because he was unable to obtain the 

documents from SVSP and because the appeals coordinators at SVSP held the appeal for over 30 

days. Dkt. 31-1 at 3. However, Defendant Briggs’s September 30, 2014 letter did not preclude 

Plaintiff from completing the appeal process, as Plaintiff was allowed to resubmit to correct the 

defect, and the record shows that SVSP-L-14-3346 was again received at the third level on 

November 17, 2014. Briggs Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. B (Dkt. 20-2 at 58). Plaintiff then failed to correct and 

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return his appeal within 30 days of September 30, 2014 as required by California Code of 

Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.6(c)(10), and it was cancelled on March 5, 2015, for untimeliness. 

See id. In addition, Defendant Briggs’s September 30, 2014 letter informing Plaintiff about the 

cancellation of SVSP-L-14-03346 cannot exhaust Plaintiff’s freestanding claim against Defendant 

Briggs for improper screening. As Sapp provides, Plaintiff was required to separately grieve his 

claim against Defendant Briggs because a proper screening decision does “not foreclose the 

possibility that exhaustion might also be excused where repeated rejections of an inmate’s 

grievances at the screening stage give rise to a reasonable good faith belief that administrative 

remedies are effectively unavailable.” Sapp, 623 F.3d at 826. Such an excuse is not available to 

Plaintiff here, however, as the record shows that SVSP-L-14-03346 were screened out only once 

at the third level of review and then it was ultimately cancelled as untimely. The issue here is that 

after SVSP-L-14-03346 was screened out, Plaintiff could still separately grieve his access to the 

courts claim against either Defendant Briggs or Defendant Voong. Consequently, the Court 

concludes Plaintiff could not have had a reasonable good faith belief that further administrative 

remedies were effectively unavailable. 

Going back to the two requirements under Sapp, the Court points out that Plaintiff could 

meet the first Sapp factor, as shown by his attempts to file LAC-X-15-01228 and LAC-X-16-

02456/SVSP-L-16-03721, which, as construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff above, 

would have sufficed to exhaust his access to the courts claim because they both claim that 

Defendants Voong and Briggs denied Plaintiff’s due process rights to appeal the indecentexposure RVR. See Voong Decl., Ex. B. However, as explained above, neither appeal was

accepted for substantive review at the third level because they were both cancelled as either 

untimely (LAC-X-15-01228) or duplicative (LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721). Therefore, in 

order to satisfy the second Sapp factor Plaintiff must show that prison officials rejected LAC-X15-01228 and LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721 for reasons inconsistent with applicable 

regulations. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823-24. 

The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to present evidence showing LAC-X-15-01228 and 

LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721 were improperly cancelled at the third level of review, as 

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explained below. Moreover, even after LAC-X-15-01228 and LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-

03721 were properly cancelled, Plaintiff had various options to move the appeals process forward 

and exhaust his administrative remedies, i.e., he could have appealed the cancellation of both 

appeals. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(e). But the record shows that Plaintiff did not pursue 

such an options as further explained below. 

1. Cancellation of LAC-X-15-01228 as Untimely

In LAC-X-15-01228, in which Plaintiff appealed the third-level cancellation of SVSP-L14-03346 in addition to claiming Defendants violated his due process rights to appeal the 

indecent-exposure RVR, the third level appeal decision pointed out that LAC-X-15-01228 had 

been cancelled. Voong Decl., Ex. B (Dkt. 20-5 at 305). Specifically, on June 26, 2015, Plaintiff 

was sent a letter from Defendant Voong, stating: 

Your appeal is being cancelled pursuant to the California Codes of 

Regulations, Title 15, Section (CCR) 3084.6(c)(4). Time limits for 

submitting the appeal are exceeded even though the inmate or parolee 

had the opportunity to submit within the prescribed time constraints.

[SVSP-L-14-03346]

6 was cancelled at the third level on March 5, 

2015, and mailed to you on March 19, 2015. Your CDCR 602 

appealing the cancellation was not received in our office until May 4, 

2015 (46 days after third level mailed the cancelled appeal to you). 

This exceeds time constraints to submit for third level review.

Id. (footnote added). 

At the bottom of the letter, there are further instructions, stating:

Be advised that you cannot appeal a rejected appeal, but should take 

the corrective action necessary to resubmit the appeal within the 

timeframes, 30 calendar days as specified in CCR 3084.6(a) and CCR 

3084.6(b). Pursuant to CCR 3084.6(e), once an appeal has been 

cancelled, that appeal may not be resubmitted. However, a separate 

appeal can be filed on the cancellation decision. The original appeal 

may only be resubmitted if the appeal on the cancellation is granted.

Id.7

6 Defendant Voong’s June 26, 2015 letter refers to SVSP-L-14-03346 using its Third Level 

Review (“TLR”) number, “Appeal TLR 1402438.” See Voong Decl., Ex. B (Dkt, 20-5 at 305). In 

order to remain consistent, the Court refers to the original appeal number at the lower levels of 

appeal—SVSP-L-14-03346. 

7 This same instruction is located at the bottom of every letter relating to the 

rejection/cancellation of an appeal sent to Plaintiff from the OOA at the third level of review.

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Title 15, California Code of Regulations § 3084.6 is entitled, “Rejection, Cancellation, and 

Withdrawal Criteria.” Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.6. According to section 3084.6(c)(4):

(c) An appeal may be cancelled for any of the following reasons, 

which include, but are not limited to:

. . . .

(4) Time limits for submitting the appeal are exceeded even though 

the inmate or parolee had the opportunity to submit within the 

prescribed time constraints. In determining whether the time limit has 

been exceeded, the appeals coordinator shall consider whether the 

issue being appealed occurred on a specific date or is ongoing. If the 

issue is ongoing, which may include but is not limited to, continuing 

lockdowns, retention in segregated housing, or an ongoing program 

closure, the inmate or parolee may appeal any time during the 

duration of the event; however, the inmate or parolee is precluded 

from filing another appeal on the same issue unless a change in 

circumstances creates a new issue.

Id. Furthermore, section 3084.1(g) states, “An appellate shall adhere to appeal filing time 

constraints as defined in section 3084.8.” Id., § 3084.1(g). And, section 3084.8(a)(b)(1)(2): 

“Time limits for reviewing appeals shall commence upon the date of receipt of the appeal form by 

the appeals coordinator. An inmate or parolee must submit the appeal within 30 calendar days of: 

The occurrence of the event or decision being appealed, or; upon first having knowledge of the 

action or decision being appealed.” Id., § 3084.8(a)(b)(1)(2) (emphasis added). These regulations 

make clear that it is not the date of submission but the date of receipt by the appeals coordinator 

which defines the time constraints. Id. The Court notes that other than civil filing deadlines and 

service deadlines, the Ninth Circuit has found that the “mailbox rule” does not apply to 

administrative filing deadlines such as those required of federal prisoners under 28 C.F.R. 

§§ 542.0-.16. See Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 993-97 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or 

otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84. 

“The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) strongly suggests that the PLRA uses the term ‘exhausted’ to 

mean what the term means in administrative law, where exhaustion means proper exhaustion.” Id. 

at 92. The PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion. Id. As explained above, 

proper exhaustion demands “compliance with an agency’s deadlines.” Id. at 90-91. If a prisoner 

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had full opportunity and ability to file a timely grievance but failed to do so, he has not properly 

exhausted his administrative remedies. Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). Finally, a cancellation decision does not exhaust administrative 

remedies. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to provide an explanation as to why he waited forty-six days to appeal 

the third-level cancellation of SVSP-L-14-03346 after that cancellation was mailed to him on 

March 19, 2015. There is no indication that Plaintiff was otherwise incapable of filing the appeal 

sooner in order to meet time constraints. The undisputed facts are that Plaintiff had thirty days 

from the date the cancellation of SVSP-L-14-03346 was mailed to him on March 19, 2015 to file a 

timely appeal, i.e., no later than April 18, 2015, and that appeal was not received by the appeals 

coordinator until May 4, 2015, which was sixteen days after the thirty-day period had expired. 

Thus, the Court concludes that the third level appeal decision correctly found under the regulations 

that LAC-X-15-01228 was filed beyond the time constraints by sixteen days (46 days minus 30 

days) and was therefore properly cancelled as untimely. See Voong Decl., Ex. B (Dkt. 20-5 at 

305). Most importantly, even after LAC-X-15-01228 was properly cancelled, Plaintiff failed to 

appeal the cancellation. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(e). Plaintiff had filed an untimely 

appeal, and it was also his choice to file the instant lawsuit against Defendants without complying 

with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. And Plaintiff provided no evidence that Defendants 

prevented Plaintiff from successfully exhausting his administrative remedies before filing suit. 

Therefore, Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies through inmate appeal 

LAC-X-15-01228 because it was untimely. 

2. Cancellation of LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721 as Duplicative

In LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721, Plaintiff claimed Defendants violated his due 

process rights to appeal the indecent-exposure RVR, and the third level appeal decision pointed 

out that LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721 had been cancelled. Voong Decl., Ex. B (Dkt. 20-5 

at 473). Specifically, on November 23, 2016, Plaintiff was sent a letter from Defendant Voong, 

stating: 

Your appeal has been cancelled pursuant to the California Codes of 

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Regulations, Title 15, Section (CCR) 3084.6(c)(2). The appeal 

duplicates an inmate or parolee's previous appeal upon which a 

decision has been rendered or is pending.

This appeal is a duplicate to [LAC-X-15-01228].8

Id. (footnote added). 

As mentioned above, a grievance may be cancelled for various reasons, including 

duplication of other appeals. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c)(2). And again, a cancellation

decision does not exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at § 3084.1(b). Here, in LAC-X-16-

02456/SVSP-L-16-03721, Plaintiff claimed Defendants violated his due process rights to appeal 

the indecent-exposure RVR. Voong Decl., Ex. B (Dkt. 20-5 at 474). As mentioned above, 

Plaintiff claimed the same issue in LAC-X-15-01228, in which he claimed that “no one wants to 

process and exhaust the Administrative Due Process Procedures” and requested that the OOA 

employees, including Defendants, “stop trying to deny [him] due process . . . .” Id. (Dkt. 20-5 at 

306-308). Thus, the undisputed facts are that Plaintiff had submitted an appeal that was a 

duplicate of LAC-X-15-01228. However, even if Plaintiff disagreed that it was a duplicate of 

LAC-X-15-01228, he could have filed a separate appeal in order to challenge the cancellation 

decision. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(e). Here, Plaintiff was informed that he could appeal 

the cancellation of LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721, but he did not do so. Therefore, Plaintiff 

failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies through inmate appeal LAC-X-16-

02456/SVSP-L-16-03721 because it was duplicative. 

By failing to file a timely grievance relating to his access to the courts claim against 

Defendants, choosing not to appeal the cancellations of LAC-X-15-01228 and LAC-X-16-

02456/SVSP-L-16-03721, and instead filing the instant action in federal court, Plaintiff deprived

prison officials the “time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the 

initiation of a federal case,” which is the purpose of the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Porter, 

534 U.S. at 525. Plaintiff’s inability to exhaust is attributable, in part, to his delay in filing his 

8 Defendant Voong’s November 23, 2016 letter refers to LAC-X-15-01228 using its Third 

Level Appeal number, “appeal log no. OOA-14-02438.” See Voong Decl., Ex. B (Dkt. 20-5 at 

473). Again, to remain consistent, the Court refers to the original appeal number at the lower 

levels of appeal— LAC-X-15-01228. 

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appeal and to the fact that he failed to appeal any cancellations. Lastly, as in Sapp, nothing in the 

record suggests that the CDCR has “created draconian procedural requirements that would ‘trip[ ] 

up all but the most skillful prisoners’” and render administrative remedies effectively unavailable, 

so as to excuse a failure to exhaust. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 827 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 

81, 102 (2006)). Significantly, Defendants have submitted evidence demonstrating Plaintiff has 

prosecuted appeals through the Director’s level of review, both before and after pursuing the 

appeal at issue herein. See Voong Decl., Ex. A. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met his burden to 

show that there was something in his particular case that made generally available administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable to him. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. 

In sum, Defendants have met the ultimate burden of presenting evidence of unexhaustion, 

which Plaintiff has not persuasively disputed. Plaintiff’s filing of untimely (LAC-X-15-01228) or 

duplicative (LAC-X-16-02456/SVSP-L-16-03721) appeals that were eventually cancelled does 

not constitute proper exhaustion. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84. The prison’s requirements define the 

boundaries of proper exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. A grievant must use all steps the prison 

holds out, enabling the prison to reach the merits of the issue. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. The 

undisputed facts show that Plaintiff failed to comply with these requirements, and he has not 

presented evidence that precludes summary judgment. 

Accordingly, the instant motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on the ground that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his access to the courts claim against 

Defendants.9 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Dkt. 20-6.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED based on Plaintiff’s 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Dkt. 20. The access to the courts claim against them is 

9 The Court’s finding that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 

access to the courts claim (based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies) obviates the 

need to address Defendants’ alternative arguments in their dispositive motion.

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DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Albino, 747 

F.3d at 1166. 

3. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close the file.

4. This Order terminates Docket No. 20.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 20,2020

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