Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01057/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Barry Addison Gray, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

J. T. Shartle, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. CV-13-01057-TUC-JAS (BGM) 

AMENDED REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

(Amended as to current place of 

incarceration only) 

 Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Barry Addison Gray’s pro se

Second Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a 

Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”) (Doc. 8). Respondent has filed his Return and 

Answer to Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to 

Dismiss Petition (“Response”) (Doc. 17) and Petition replied (Doc. 20).1

As an initial matter, the Court takes judicial notice that Louis W. Winn, Jr. is no 

longer warden of United States Penitentiary–Tucson (“USP–Tucson”). The Court will 

substitute the new Warden of USP–Tucson, J. T. Shartle, as Respondent pursuant to Rule 

 1

 Although Respondent’s Response (Doc. 17) is properly an Answer as directed by the 

Court’s January 22, 2015 Order (Doc. 13), the caption incorrectly asserts that it is also a “Motion 

to Dismiss.” 

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25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure,2

 this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition (Doc. 8). 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary–Coleman I 

(“USP–Coleman”) in Sumterville, Florida. See BOP Inmate Locator, available at

http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited May 27, 2016). On November 27, 1995, 

Petitioner was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in Las Vegas 

Nevada. Response (Doc. 17), Woods-Coleman Decl. (Exh. “A”), United States Marshals 

Service Prisoner Tracking System (Attach. “1”) at 1. At the time of Petitioner’s arrest, he 

was an escaped prisoner from the State of Tennessee, where he had been serving a life 

sentence. Id.; see also Petition (Doc. 8) at 4. On May 7, 1996, Petitioner pleaded guilty 

to one count of Bank Robbery with a Weapon in violation of Section 2113(a) and (d), 

Title 18 of the United States Code. Response (Doc. 17), Exh. “A,” USDC Nevada 

Judgment – Case No. 2:95CR00324-001 (Attach. “3”) at 1. He was sentenced to 235 

months in prison. Id., Attach. “3” at 2. On June 10, 1996, Petitioner was designated to 

the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia (“USP–Atlanta”). Response (Doc. 17), 

Exh. “A,” Inmate History 1/29/2015 (Attach. “4”) at 3. 

 On December 6, 1996, Petitioner was released from USP–Atlanta on a Federal 

2

 Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. 

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Writ. Id. On May 22, 1997, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Bank Robbery with a Firearm 

and Aiding and Abetting in violation of Section 2113(a) and (d) and Section 2, Title 18 of 

the United States Code. Response (Doc. 17), Exh. “A,” USDC N. Dist. of Ala. Judgment 

– Case No. CR-96-S-49-NE (Attach. “5”) at 1. Petitioner was again sentenced to 235 

months imprisonment. Id., Attach. “5” at 2. The Court further directed that: 

[T]his sentence shall run consecutively to the undischarged terms of 

imprisonment in the following cases: (1) Fulton County Superior Court, 

Atlanta, Georgia, Case # 95338; (2) Davidson County Criminal Court, 

Nashville, Tennessee, Case # C-6057; (3) Davidson County Criminal 

Court, Nashville, Tennessee, Case # 86-W-563; (4) Polk County 10th 

Circuit, Bartow, Florida, Case CF-85-4644A1-XX; and (5) U.S. District 

Court, Las Vegas, Nevada, Case CR-S-95-324-PMP. 

Id. On June 11, 1997, Petitioner returned to USP–Atlanta and has remained in the 

custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) since that date. Id., Attach. “4” at 1–3. On 

January 26, 1999, the State of Tennessee lodged a detainer with BOP indicating its intent 

to take custody of Petitioner at the end of his Federal prison term to serve the remainder 

of his life sentence. Response (Doc. 17), Exh. “A,” Sentence Monitoring Computation 

Data 1/29/2015 (Attach. “6”) at 4. On May 16, 2000, the State of Georgia’s Board of 

Pardons and Paroles also lodged a detainer with BOP related to a parole violation in that 

state. Id.

 BOP has aggregated Petitioner’s two 235-month sentences into a single 470-

month sentence. Response (Doc. 17), Exh. “A,” Attach. “6” at 3. Based on Petitioner’s 

prior credit time and assuming that he earns all of the Good Conduct Time (“GCT”) for 

which he is eligible, Petitioner’s projected release date is July 28, 2030. Id., Attach. “6” 

at 1. 

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 Petitioner filed his initial petition (Doc. 1) on August 30, 2013, which was 

subsequently amended pursuant to Order of this Court. See Order 12/5/2013 (Doc. 4); 

Order 6/4/2014 (Doc. 7). Petitioner seeks to serve his sentence with the State of 

Tennessee prior to his Federal sentences. Petition (Doc. 8) at 4–5. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Jurisdiction 

 “Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction,’ . . . and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no 

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 

(1990), overruled in part on other grounds by City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, 

L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004)). “Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence 

must be filed under § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the 

manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution must be brought pursuant to § 

2241 in the custodial court.” Id. at 864. Therefore, a proper characterization of the 

petition is necessary to a determination of jurisdiction. Id.

 Here, Petitioner is challenging the manner, location or condition of the execution 

of his sentence. See e.g., Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 1999) (section 

2241 petition is appropriate vehicle to challenge the correctness of a jail-time credit 

determination, once administrative remedies have been exhausted); Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2003) (“a prisoner may seek a writ of habeas corpus under 28 

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U.S.C. § 2241 for ‘expungement of a disciplinary finding from his record if expungement 

is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for parole’”) (quoting Bostic v. Carlson, 

884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989)); Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 

1991) (a prisoner’s challenge to the “manner in which his sentence was executed . . . [is] 

maintainable only in a petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241”); 

Weinstein v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 902 F.2d 1451, 1452 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district 

court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review a claim by a federal 

prisoner challenging a decision of the United States Parole Commission”); Bostic v. 

Carlson, 884 F.2d at 1269 (“Habeas corpus jurisdiction is also available for a prisoner’s 

claims that he has been subjected to greater restrictions of his liberty, such as disciplinary 

segregation without due process of law”). Such a challenge must be brought pursuant to 

§ 2241 in the custodial court. At the time of filing the Petition, Petitioner was 

incarcerated at USP–Tucson in Arizona. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over 

this matter. Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990). 

B. Exhaustion 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 

[28 U.S.C. § 2241] does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust 

direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus. [Footnote omitted.] 

However, we require, as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 

available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 

2241. 

Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds 

by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323 (2006). 

“The requirement that federal prisoners exhaust administrative remedies before filing a 

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habeas corpus petition was judicially created; it is not a statutory requirement.” Brown v. 

Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 

515 U.S. 50, 54–55, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 2023–24, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995). “Nevertheless, 

‘[p]rudential limits like jurisdictional limits and limits on venue, are ordinarily not 

optional.’” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) 

(quoting Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other 

grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 

323 (2006)). 

 “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if ‘(1) agency expertise makes agency 

consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) 

relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative 

scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own 

mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.’” Id. (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. 

Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust 

administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition 

without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, 

unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 

2011) (citations omitted). Exhaustion may be excused if pursuing an administrative 

remedy would be futile. Fraley v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th 

Cir. 1993). 

 If a prisoner is unable to obtain an administrative remedy because of his failure to 

appeal in a timely manner, then the petitioner has procedurally defaulted his habeas 

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corpus claim. See Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Francis, 

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 

571 (9th Cir. 1986)). If a claim is procedurally defaulted, the court may require the 

petitioner to demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the 

alleged constitutional violation. See Francis, 894 F.2d at 355 (suggesting that the cause 

and prejudice test is the appropriate test); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492, 106 

S.Ct. 2639, 2647–48, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to 

procedural defaults on appeal); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 

906–08 (9th Cir. 1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to pro se litigants). 

 The BOP has established an administrative remedy process permitting an inmate 

to seek review of an issue relating to “any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. 

§ 542.10(a). Here, the record reflects that Petitioner has filed several requests for 

administrative remedies regarding his federal confinement. Response (Doc. 17), Exh. 

“A,” Admin. Remedy Generalized Retrieval 1/29/2015 (Attach. “7”) at 1–4. These 

requests were denied. See id. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner has 

exhausted his administrative remedies. 

C. Priority of Jurisdiction 

 Petitioner asserts that “the District Court exceeded its authority when it sentenced 

the petitioner and retained him in federal custody when he was previously serving an 

undischarged state sentence[.]” Reply (Doc. 20) at 3. Petitioner’s argument 

misapprehends the priority of jurisdiction and the District Court’s authority to order him 

to serve his federal sentence prior to completion of his undischarged sentence in the State 

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of Tennessee. 

 Petitioner’s argument requires the Court to determine whether the state or federal 

government had primary jurisdiction over him at the time his federal sentence was 

imposed on May 7, 1996. “The term ‘primary jurisdiction’ in this context refers to the 

determination of priority of custody and service of sentence between state and federal 

sovereigns.” Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 

Here, Petitioner was serving time in the State of Tennessee, escaped, and then was 

arrested by federal authority in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 

unequivocally addressed this factual scenario explaining: 

Even though a person has been physically seized, his body must be held in 

manual custody. Otherwise, the officers and the court may lose jurisdiction 

of his person. If defendant escapes, is released on bail or probation or 

parole and does not present himself in court, the proceedings must, in 

strict construction, cease. The only method by which the tribunal may 

reassert jurisdiction is by ‘arrest.’ In the meantime, if the accused comes 

within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign, the latter may seize 

his body and continue him in physical custody if he be accused of an 

offense against the peace and dignity thereof. Seizure of the body by the 

latter postpones all claims based upon prior initiation of the 

proceedings or previous arrest by another sovereign until in some way 

possession may be resumed by the latter.

Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590, 599–600 (9th Cir. 1957) (emphasis added). 

 “Determination of priority of custody and service of sentence between state and 

federal sovereigns is a matter of comity to be resolved by the executive branches of the 

two sovereigns.” United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684 (9th Cir. 1980). “The 

sovereign who lacks possession of the body ‘permits’ another to proceed against the 

accused, not through grace, but by necessity.” Strand, 251 F.2d at 606. Moreover, “so 

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long . . . as either sovereign has possession of the body of accused, it may proceed until 

judgment is satisfied.” Id. at 604. 

 In the instant case, Petitioner was in the custody of the State of Tennessee, 

escaped, and subsequently arrested by federal authorities in Nevada. Petitioner’s escape 

caused Tennessee’s jurisdiction to cease pending re-arrest by the State of Tennessee. 

Petitioner’s arrest by federal authorities gave the United States priority of jurisdiction 

over Petitioner for the federal crimes he committed. See Strand, 251 F.2d at 604. The 

State of Tennessee has appropriately lodged its detainer with BOP indicating its intent to 

take custody of Petitioner upon completion of his federal sentence. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that the United States has primary jurisdiction over Petitioner and his Petition 

is without merit. 

D. Conclusion 

 In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 8) is 

without merit and shall be denied. 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Judge enter an order: 

(1) SUBSTITUTING J.T. Shartle, Warden, as Respondent for Charles E. 

Samuels, Jr. pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; 

(2) DENYING Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

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for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 8); and 

(3) DENYING Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District 

Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-13-

1057-TUC-JAS. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court 

shall send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties. 

 Dated this 27th day of May, 2016. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald

United States Magistrate Judge

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