Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01658/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01658-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NO. CIV.S-03-1658 LKK DAD PS

ex rel. GENE L. ROGERS, M.D.,

CONSOLIDATED CASES

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,

ORDER AND

Defendants.

_____________________________/ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ex rel. GENE L. ROGERS, M.D.,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 

Defendants.

_____________________________/

These consolidated cases are before the court on

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Also pending is the court’s

order to show cause why this qui tam action should not be dismissed

without prejudice due to plaintiff’s status as a pro se relator. 

Case 2:03-cv-01658-LKK -DAD Document 274 Filed 06/23/06 Page 1 of 8
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 The court finds that oral argument on the order to show cause 1

would not assist the court in resolving the issue posed.

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Both matters have been fully briefed. Plaintiff Gene L. Rogers, M.D.

is proceeding pro se. Claire I. Van Dam represents the named

defendants. Kendall Newman represents the United States. Deputy

Attorney General Anthony M. Bova represents the State of California. 

Having considered all written materials submitted in connection with

the motion and order to show cause, and after hearing oral argument

on the motion for summary judgment, for the reasons set forth below, 1

the undersigned will recommend that this qui tam action be dismissed

without prejudice due to plaintiff’s lack of proper representation.

These consolidated qui tam actions allege that the County

of Sacramento is violating the federal Personal Responsibility and

Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) by providing nonemergent health care to undocumented immigrants under the County

Medically Indigent Services Program. Both actions allege that such

care amounts to the fraudulent misappropriation of federal, state and

county funds under both the federal False Claims Act and the

California False Claims Act.

The nature of a qui tam action such as this one has been

summarized as follows:

A qui tam action is brought by a private party,

called the “relator,” on behalf of the

government. If a qui tam suit under the False

Claims Act succeeds, the relator obtains a reward

of 25 to 30 percent of the judgment or

settlement. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). The

government gets the rest. Because the government

thus has the primary stake in the suit, it is

empowered to take it over and prosecute it

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itself. The complaint is initially filed under

seal and served only on the government, which

then has 60 days in which to inform the district

court that it plans to take over the prosecution

of the suit. § 3730(b)(4).

United States ex rel. Lu v. Ou, 368 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir.

2004)(Posner, J.).

Of course, as a general rule a pro se litigant cannot

represent anyone but himself. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114

F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“While a non-attorney may appear pro

se on his own behalf, he has no authority to appear as an attorney

for others than himself.”) (internal quotations and citation

omitted); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697

(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a pro se litigant may not appear as an

attorney for others). Therefore, while the Ninth Circuit does not

appear to have addressed the precise issue in a published opinion,

two other circuits have recognized that a relator in a qui tam action

cannot proceed pro se. See United States ex rel. Lu, 368 F.3d at 775

(“The relator is not technically the government's lawyer; but the

same policy that forbids litigants, whether they are corporations, or

other organizations, or individuals, such as members of a class or

shareholders, to be represented by nonlawyers, is applicable to qui

tam suits.”); United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1951)

(“[W]e do not think that Congress could have intended to authorize a

layman to carry on such suit as attorney for the United States.”). 

See also Safir v. Blackwell, 579 F.2d 742, 745 n.4 (2d Cir.

1974)(recognizing the holding in Onan that a relator in a qui tam

action cannot proceed pro se). 

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In keeping with this line of authority, a number of

district courts have dismissed qui tam actions brought by a pro se

relator without prejudice to renewing the action by and through

counsel. United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 2006 WL

880044, at *1, Case No. 05 Civ. 4921 (HB)(S.D. N.Y. April 6,

2006)(“Plaintiff is not an attorney and therefore is not qualified to

represent the interests of the United States.”); United States ex

rel. Fisher v. Network Software Assocs., 377 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196-97

(D. D.C. 2005)(holding that plaintiff may not maintain suit as a qui

tam relator without the assistance of counsel); United States ex rel.

Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12, 16 (D.

D.C. 2003) (granting motion to dismiss False Claims Act (FCA) and

common law claims because a relator in a qui tam FCA action cannot

proceed pro se and plaintiff lacked standing to pursue common law

claims for injuries allegedly sustained by the United States); United

States ex rel. Stronstorff v. Blake Med. Ctr., 2003 WL 21004734, at

*1, Case No. 8:01-CV-844-T23MSS (M.D. Fla. 2003)(“a pro se litigant

cannot represent the United States in a qui tam action”); United

States ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 991, 994-96

(C.D. Cal. 2000)(holding that non-lawyer proceeding pro se could not

represent the United States in qui tam action under the False Claims

Act); United States ex. rel Tyler v. California, 1999 WL 33456979, at

*1-2, Case No. S-98-2130 GEB JFM (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1999)(holding

that a qui tam relator could not proceed in propria persona). 

The undersigned agrees with the reasoning of these cases. 

Since a pro se litigant can represent no one but himself, plaintiff

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 The court and the parties have identified only one case where 2

a relator was permitted to proceed without counsel. See United

States ex rel. Trice v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 2000 WL 34024248,

at *11, Case No. 96-CS-171-WFN (E.D. Wash. March 1, 2000)(“In light

of the Ninth Circuit's view that FCA claims are fraud claims assigned

by the Government to the private litigant when the Government

declines to intervene, Trice is allowed to proceed pro se.”). 

However, that decision is not binding on this court and the

undersigned is persuaded by the reasoning of the cases cited above

which adhere to the principle that a pro se litigant may not appear

as an attorney for others.

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should not be permitted to proceed as the relator in this qui tam

action without being represented by a licensed attorney.2

In addition to running afoul of the general rule that a pro

se litigant cannot represent anyone but himself, permitting plaintiff

to proceed pro se in these wide-ranging consolidated actions exposes

the United States and the State of California to considerable risks

in terms of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See United States

ex rel. Fisher, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (“Because the outcome of such

an action could have claim- or issue-preclusive effect on the United

States, the need for adequate legal representation on behalf of the

United States is obviously essential.”)(internal quotations and

alterations omitted). Permitting plaintiff to proceed pro se in this

qui tam action would also continue to unnecessarily tax the resources

of all those involved in this action, including plaintiff,

defendants, the United States, the State of California, and the

court. Although plaintiff is educated and presumably proceeding in

good faith, his numerous lengthy filings and oral arguments

demonstrate that he has struggled to litigate these complex

consolidated actions at his own expense and on his own time as a pro

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se litigant. See United States ex rel. Schwartz, 118 F. Supp. 2d at

995 (“In addition, the pro per litigant's lack of skill is also an

issue of concern in cases as complicated as qui tam actions. ... The

lay litigant frequently brings pleadings that are awkwardly drafted,

motions that are inarticulately presented, and proceedings that are

needlessly multiplicative.”)(internal quotations and alterations

omitted).

 Requiring a relator to proceed with counsel also is

consistent with the rules precluding pro se litigants from appearing

on behalf of others in lawsuits of a similar nature. For example,

plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits must be represented by

counsel. See Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1976)

(holding that a stockholder cannot represent the corporation without

an attorney). Likewise, the named plaintiff in a class action must

be represented by counsel. See McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d

286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966). Similarly, “a parent or guardian cannot

bring an action on behalf of a minor child without retaining a

lawyer.” Johns, 114 F.3d at 877.

Finally, the court has considered whether these

consolidated actions concern any personal claims plaintiff might have

against defendants such that he may be able to proceed on those

claims pro se. However, a careful review of the complaints reveals

no such claims. Nor is the court persuaded by the plaintiff’s

suggestion in his brief that this action concerns a hostile work

environment claim, personal injury claim, a claim regarding the 

/////

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“[m]oral dilemma of violating laws,” or any other such claim. (Brief

of Plaintiff Gene L. Rogers, M.D. filed March 13, 2006, at 16-17.)

For all of these reasons, the undersigned will recommend

that this qui tam action be dismissed without prejudice due to

plaintiff’s lack of representation by a licensed attorney. See

Johns, 114 F.3d at 876-78 (affirming sua sponte dismissal of pro se

father’s complaint brought on behalf of minor son but directing that

dismissal be without prejudice). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. All remaining dates in these consolidated actions are

vacated; and

2. Defendants’ recently filed ex parte application

regarding scheduling is denied as moot.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. These consolidated actions be dismissed without

prejudice to renewal by plaintiff through a licensed attorney, or by

the United States or the State of California; and

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied as

moot.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty (20) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

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 Beyond the time allowed for the filing of objections and 3

replies to these findings and recommendations, and the passage of

time while the assigned district judge determines whether to adopt or

reject them, the undersigned is disinclined to grant plaintiff still

more time to attempt to secure counsel. The order to show cause was

filed on February 22, 2006 and thus the parties have been aware of

the issues addressed in these findings and recommendations for

several months. Therefore, plaintiff’s request that he be allowed an

additional ninety days to obtain counsel prior to any dismissal

without prejudice is denied.

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objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).3

DATED: June 23, 2006.

DAD:th

Ddad1\orders.prose\rogers1658.f&r.dismiss

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