Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02050/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Dora B. Schriro has been automatically substituted for Defendant Ryan in his official capacity.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald Flood, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, Conrad Luna, 

Barbara Shearer, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 03-02050-PHX-DGC (VAM)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 24) and

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 28). For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment will be denied

Background

Plaintiff has been incarcerated for approximately three years in Special Management Unit

Two (“SMU-II”) of the Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence, Arizona. Plaintiff filed a pro

se complaint (Doc. 1) naming Defendants Charles Ryan, Conrad Luna, and Barbara Shearer in

their individual and official capacities.1

 Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that his transfer to and

continued confinement in SMU-II violates his right to due process (Count I) and his right to be

free of cruel and unusual punishment (Count II). Plaintiff also alleges his confinement in SMUII constitutes retaliation for the exercise of his constitutional right to be free of self-incrimination

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-2-

and that Defendants are using excessive force to induce him to incriminate himself (Count III).

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and a separate statement of facts (Doc.

24 & Doc. 25) in support of their motion. Defendants assert Plaintiff receives due process

through periodic reviews of his housing status and that he received due process prior to being

placed in SMU-II. Defendants argue that the conditions of SMU-II do not constitute cruel and

unusual punishment because Plaintiff has not been denied any basic necessity of life and because

all of the challenged restrictions serve legitimate security interests. Defendants also contend that

Plaintiff has not stated a retaliation claim as a matter of law because his periodic classification

reviews do not implicate his Fifth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and an accompanying statement of facts

(Doc. 27 & Doc. 28). Plaintiff contends that “the ongoing indefinite confinement of

Plaintiff . . . in SMU 2 is an exaggerated response to security concerns and additional evidence

that the confinement is being used as a tool of retaliation to encourage debriefing and not further

a security interest.” Doc. 28 at 4. 

Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 30) in support of their motion for summary judgment and

in response to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Discussion

I. Standard for granting summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2005); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union,

24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). The initial burden is on the moving party to show an

absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Substantive law

determines which facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome

of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. Similarly, to preclude

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-3-

summary judgment the dispute must be genuine, that is, the evidence must be “such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Where the moving party has met its initial burden with a properly supported motion, the

party opposing the motion “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,

but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. Summary

judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Id., 477 U.S. at 322. See also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d

960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994).

II. Factual background.

The following material facts are not genuinely disputed.

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”),

housed in SMU-II. Defendant Schriro is the director of ADOC. Defendant Luna is the Deputy

Warden responsible for SMU-II. Defendant Shearer is an ADOC Correctional Classification

Specialist.

On November 7, 2002, Plaintiff was validated by ADOC as a member of a “Security

Threat Group” (“STG”), the Aryan Brotherhood. Plaintiff was given notice of the impending

validation hearing seven days before the hearing. Doc. 25, para. 9. The notice included a

statement of the evidence that ADOC intended to use to implicate Plaintiff as a member of the

Aryan Brotherhood and stated Plaintiff could appear at the hearing and present a defense. Id.,

para. 10-11. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing and denied membership in the STG. Id., para. 13.

The STG Hearing Committee relied on the following evidence to validate Plaintiff as a

member of the Aryan Brotherhood: two pieces of paper seized from Plaintiff containing the

names and ADOC inmate numbers of eighteen validated members of the Aryan Brotherhood;

a letter, seized from Plaintiff, “believed to have been authored by a validated Aryan Brotherhood

member referencing other suspected and validated Aryan Brotherhood members”; an Aryan

Brotherhood membership list recovered from a validated Aryan Brotherhood member listing

Plaintiff’s name and ADOC inmate number in addition to those of approximately 135 other

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-4-

inmates, 113 of which “are suspected or validated Aryan Brotherhood members.” Id., para. 14.

Plaintiff’s STG validation was pursuant to ADOC Department Order 806, adopted to

minimize prison gang activity and the threat posed by this activity to the “safe, secure and

efficient operation of Arizona’s prisons.” Id., para. 3. Plaintiff appealed his validation, and the

appeal was denied on January 22, 2003. Id., para. 16. As a result of his validation as a member

of a STG, Plaintiff has been housed at SMU-II since June 6, 2003. Id., para. 1

Plaintiff receives reviews of his STG classification approximately every 180 days. Id.,

para. 18. Plaintiff may be reclassified and released from SMU-II to less restrictive conditions

only if he “debriefs,” i.e., admits gang membership and supplies ADOC officials with

information about gang activity. Id., para. 23. Plaintiff may be present and speak on his own

behalf at each reclassification hearing, and is given the opportunity to debrief at each hearing.

Id., para. 20.

Plaintiff and the other validated STG members lead a heavily restricted life in SMU-II.

Plaintiff’s cell is illuminated twenty-four hours per day to allow security checks, although the

lights are dimmed at night. The cell contains a sink, a toilet and a bed. Although Plaintiff may

speak with inmates in other cells, he is allowed no face-to-face communication with them, nor

can he pass notes or share legal documents. Plaintiff is allowed only one visit per week for a

maximum of two hours. During that time, Plaintiff is separated from his visitors by glass.

Plaintiff is allowed one five-minute phone call per week and is ineligible for compassionate

escorted leave. He may send and receive mail. Plaintiff is permitted three showers per week,

which coincide with the three, one-hour, out-of-cell exercise sessions he is permitted each week.

These exercise sessions occur in a recreation area with a cement floor, twenty-foot high cement

walls, and a steel mesh top. Only one inmate at a time is allowed in the recreation area. Inmates

are permitted unlimited in-cell exercise.

Plaintiff receives three meals a day on weekdays and two per day on weekends. Plaintiff

cannot purchase food from the commissary, but may purchase hygiene-related items, vitamins,

a television, a walkman, and clothes. Plaintiff may speak to the prison staff several times per

day, and he has access to counselors, with whom he may speak face-to-face up to five times per

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 See Koch v. Lewis, 96 F. Supp. 2d 949 (D. Ariz. 2000), Koch v. Lewis, 216 F. Supp. 2d 994,

1000 (D. Ariz. 2001), and Koch v. Lewis, 2001 WL 1944737, all orders vacated by Koch v.

Schriro, 399 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2005).

-5-

week. Plaintiff is ineligible for work and vocational, recreational or education programs, but is

allowed in-cell programs.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants know the conditions of SMU-II cause psychological

harm to inmates and that, in response to Koch,

2

 Defendants “made the conditions in SMU 2 even

more extreme – knowing (by their own expert witness’s admissions), that permanent

psychological harm loomed in the future for all prisoners indefinitely confined to SMU 2.”

Doc. 28 at 7. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ culpable mental state is evident because they

have been repeatedly advised about the potential risk of psychological and physical harm to

SMU-II inmates and yet continue to impose these conditions. Id. Plaintiff avers that, absent his

“debriefing,” he will remain in SMU-II until his release date of November 19, 2017, resulting

in approximately 14 years of confinement in SMU-II. Id., para. 5.

Plaintiff further asserts that prisoners placed in SMU-II for disciplinary charges or

classification overrides are permitted the opportunity for a reclassification hearing every 180

days and do not have to debrief or admit any overt act of misconduct to be reclassified and

released from SMU-II. Id., para. 21. Plaintiff does not assert that he has experienced any

physical or psychological deterioration as a result of being placed in SMU-II. His primary

complaint is the requirement that he debrief in order to be reclassified.

III. Count I.

In Count I, Plaintiff contends that his initial and continued confinement in SMU-II violate

his right to due process. The Court engages in a two-step process to determine whether a

plaintiff’s procedural due process rights have been violated. First, the Court must determine if

the plaintiff possessed a liberty interest with which the state interfered. See, e.g., Serrano v.

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 43 (2004); Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 2003). If the plaintiff had a protected liberty interest, the

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-6-

Court must determine if the state’s action was preceded by sufficient procedural and evidentiary

safeguards. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Serrano, 345

F. 3d at 1078-79. 

One of the liberty interests retained by prisoners is the right to be free from the imposition

of “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, (1995) (citations omitted). The Court concludes that

Plaintiff possesses a liberty interest implicated by his continued detention in SMU-II. See

Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394 (2005) (concluding that assignment to a “super max”

prison facility constitutes “an atypical and significant hardship under any plausible baseline.”).

Due process requires that an inmate receive notice of a hearing regarding his protected

interest, an opportunity to present his views to the hearing officers, and an explanation of the

decision to continue his segregation. See Wolff v. McDonell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974);

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff does not dispute that he

received these protections at his initial STG classification hearing and at the periodic reviews

of his classification. Plaintiff therefore fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether he was afforded due process. 

Additionally, to comport with due process, the deprivation of the plaintiff’s liberty

interest must be supported by “some evidence in the record.” Superintendent Mass. Corr. Inst.,

Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). This standard is only “minimally stringent.” Cato

v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (examining the standard in the context of a parole

revocation). The relevant inquiry is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the prison decision-makers. Id. See also Powell v. Gomez,

33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, Plaintiff’s STG validation is supported by evidence

in the record, as described above. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s initial STG classification did not deprive him of due

process. See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2003); Wolff v. Hood, 242 F. Supp.

2d 811 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Additionally, Plaintiff continues to receive due process regarding his

periodic reclassification hearings. His continued confinement in SMU-II therefore does not

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-7-

violate his right to procedural due process. 

Plaintiff also argues that his right to due process is violated because he is being

disciplined for a status offense, i.e., being a gang member, as opposed to his actual conduct

while in prison. The undisputed facts recounted above demonstrate, however, that Plaintiff is

being subjected to discipline not for any involuntary status, but because Defendants have

determined, through procedures that comport with due process, that Plaintiff joined a prison

gang and refuses to terminate that relationship.

IV. Count II.

In Count II, Plaintiff asserts that SMU-II’s conditions of confinement violate his right to

be free of cruel and unusual punishment. To prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must establish that

he is denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834-35 (1994); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must also

demonstrate that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In order to state a claim of constitutional significance regarding prison

living conditions, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the conditions violated contemporary standards

of decency and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to those conditions. See Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991). Additionally, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to

show either that he has sustained a serious or significant mental or physical injury as a result of

the challenged conditions, or that the conditions have created an unreasonable risk of serious

damage to his future health. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Strickler v. Waters,

989 F.2d 1375, 1380-1381 (4th Cir. 1993).

An Eighth Amendment claim that a prison official has deprived inmates of

humane conditions of confinement must meet two requirements, one objective and

one subjective. Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or

omissions must deprive an inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities. The subjective requirement, relating to the defendant’s state of mind,

requires deliberate indifference. 

Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

See also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (holding that a plaintiff satisfies the objective element of the

analysis by establishing the deprivation of a basic human need); Gibson v. County of Washoe,

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-8-

Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002).

In describing the state of mind necessary for deliberate indifference, the Supreme Court

has held that a prison official must disregard “a risk of harm of which he is aware.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837. A defendant 

cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate

humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Id. 

Plaintiff contends that prison officials expose him to a substantial risk of serious harm by

forcing him to live in unconstitutionally harsh conditions which could result in psychological

and physical harm. Plaintiff specifically complains of the following conditions: 24-hour

illumination of his cell, extremely limited opportunities to exercise, a limited-calorie diet, limited

ability to socialize with other inmates, and limited use of the telephone. The Court must

consider each of these conditions separately because a plaintiff may not prevail on an Eighth

Amendment claim by asserting that the totality of the conditions constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment. See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1982). 

A. Cell illumination.

Requiring inmates to live in constant illumination can violate an inmates’ Eighth

Amendment rights. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996). Constant

illumination is not a constitutional violation, however, if the inmate is not harmed by the light,

i.e., when the lighting of the cell is not an extreme condition of confinement causing the inmate

to endure more than routine discomfort. See Wills v. Terhune, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 (E.D.

Cal. 2005). 

 The lights in Plaintiff’s cell are dimmed at night. Plaintiff does not claim or present

evidence that he suffers sleeping problems or any physical or psychological harm as a result of

the illumination, as did the plaintiff in Keenan. Plaintiff has not presented evidence that he has

been deprived of sleep, and Defendants produce evidence of a legitimate penological purpose

for maintaining the illumination. Because Plaintiff has not presented evidence to establish an

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-9-

Eighth Amendment violation, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law onwith

regard to this claim. Cf. Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 977 (7th Cir. 2006); Chavarria v.

Stacks, 102 Fed. App. 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2004); Shepherd v. Ault, 982 F. Supp. 643, 645-46 &

n.3 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (discussing federal court opinions with regard to illumination of cells).

Compare King v. Frank, 328 F. Supp. 2d 940, 946 (W.D. Wis. 2004).

B. Outdoor exercise.

Exercise is “one of the basic human necessities protected by the Eighth Amendment.”

Lemaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). “Deprivation of outdoor exercise

violates the Eighth Amendment rights of inmates confined to continuous and long-term

segregation.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090.

The parties agree that Plaintiff has been allowed three hours of “outdoor” exercise per

week in a “recreation area” with a cement floor and walls and a steel grate over the top. Plaintiff

contends that three hours are insufficient and result in physical and psychological harm. 

The Ninth Circuit has not established a bright line rule regarding how much outdoor

exercise is required to satisfy the objective component of Eighth Amendment analysis. See

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that denying outdoor exercise

to an inmate confined in a special housing unit for a period of six and one-half months raised a

factual issue regarding violation of the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights); Allen, 48 F.3d at

1088 (concluding that summary judgment was not properly granted where the plaintiff alleged

he was provided 45 minutes of outdoor exercise per week for six weeks); Toussaint v. Yockey,

722 F.2d 1490, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that a substantial constitutional question

was raised by the defendants’ denial of outdoor exercise to inmates confined in segregation for

over one year); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that, in

general and weather permitting, inmates were entitled to one hour of exercise five times per

week). See alsoCaldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 600 (7th Cir. 1986); Davenport v. DeRobertis,

653 F. Supp. 649, 655-56 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (granting injunction requiring more outdoor exercise

after trial where jury heard testimony from medical doctors, psychiatrists, and other

professionals about the effects of exercise, and a lack thereof, on an inmate’s psychological

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-10-

state). 

As a general matter, the federal courts have required at least five hours per week of

outdoor exercise, although in some circumstances courts have approved as little as one hour per

week. Compare Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming

district court injunction requiring five hours per week of outdoor exercise), and Ruiz v. Estelle,

679 F.2d 1115, 1151-52 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court decree requiring at least one

hour per day of exercise for inmates in administrative segregation), and Frazier v. Ward, 426

F. Supp. 1354, 1367-69 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (requiring at least one hour per day of outdoor

exercise), with Bailey v. Shillinger, 828 F.2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that one hour

per week of outdoor exercise does not violate the Eighth Amendment).

These cases suggest that Plaintiff’s allotment of three hours of exercise per week might

raise constitutional concerns. Defendants recently have demonstrated in another case in this

District, however, that the policy regarding the amount of exercise afforded inmates in SMU II

has been changed to six hours per week. See Baptisto v. Ryan, 03 CV 1393 PHX SRB, Doc. 111

at 36. Because of this apparent change in policy, the parties’ motions with regard to this issue

will be denied and Defendants will be allowed a period of thirty days from the date of this order

to file a motion for summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s exercise claim setting forth any

new policies adopted by ADOC. 

C. Caloric intake.

“Adequate food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment.” Keenan,

83 F.3d at 1091 (citations omitted). “The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners

receive food that is adequate to maintain health.” LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1456. Plaintiff offers no

evidence that he has suffered any health problems as a result of his diet, nor does he assert that

his diet might lead to future health problems. Therefore, no material questions of fact remain

and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

D. Socializing with other inmates and telephone privileges.

The Supreme Court considered the permissibility of limitations on prison visitation in

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003). The Supreme Court held that visitation

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-11-

restrictions did not raise cruel and unusual punishment concerns stating, however, that “[if] the

withdrawal of all visitation privileges were permanent or for a much longer period, or if it were

applied in an arbitrary manner to a particular inmate, the case would present different

considerations.” Id. 

Although Plaintiff’s opportunities for communication are limited, Plaintiff is not barred

from all communication, such as speaking to a counselor and members of the staff.

Additionally, Plaintiff offers no evidence indicating that his access to telephone or ordinary

visitation is below the level of access necessary to maintain his mental health. Defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. See Spain, 600 F.3d at 200. Cf. Toussaint,

801 F.2d at 1113 (citing cases indicating there is no constitutional right to contact visitation and

concluding that the limitations were imposed pursuant to a legitimate penological interest). 

V. Count III.

In Count III, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are retaliating against him for exercising

his First Amendment rights and for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination by refusing to renounce his gang membership and debrief. “A prisoner suing

prison officials under section 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for

exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance legitimate

penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31

F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment argument fails because he does not identify any “speech” that

has prompted the alleged retaliation. He has not established that Defendants’ actions were in

response to his exercise of a First Amendment right.

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “applies when a defendant is

compelled to be a witness against himself in his own criminal prosecution or when he is called

on to testify in any type of proceeding to answer questions which might serve to incriminate him

in any future prosecution.” United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1999 (9th Cir. 1977). See

also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997); Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 224 (4th

Cir. 1984); Bellum v. Vose, 848 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (D. Mass. 1994); Lippert v. Penfold, 618

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 ADOC Rule 806.06 provides, “[t]he purpose of a debriefing is not to obtain incriminating

criminal information or evidence against the member. The primary objective is to learn enough

about the member and the STG to: [1] convince the Department that the inmate has dropped out

of the STG; [2] provide additional information regarding the STG’s structure, activity and

membership...; [3] provide sufficient information to determine if the inmate may require

protection from other STG members or suspects.” 

4

 The Ninth Circuit has held in an unpublished opinion that prison debriefing requirements do

not violate an inmate’s privilege against self-incrimination. See Castro v. Terhune, 29 Fed.

Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2001).

-12-

F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Ind. 1984). Here, Plaintiff has not been compelled to act as a witness

against himself. Rather, he has been afforded an opportunity to receive more lenient treatment

from prison officials in exchange for information concerning his gang affiliation and gang

activity in prison.3

 The Ninth Circuit has held that a prospect of more lenient treatment in

exchange for admitting fault and providing information does not violate the privilege against self

incrimination. See United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 1018, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1990)

(acceptance of responsibility in exchange for sentencing reduction does not violate the Fifth

Amendment). Other courts have applied this analysis to prison debriefing procedures, holding

that offering a prisoner more lenient treatment in exchange for his renouncing prison gang

affiliations and providing information about gang activities does not violate the Fifth

Amendment. See Baptisto v. Ryan, 2005 WL 2416356 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2005) (discussing

authorities); Galvedon v. Marshall, 1997 WL 765955 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1997).4

Moreover, to establish a violation of the Fifth Amendment, a plaintiff must show more

than a merely trifling or imaginary risk of incrimination. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.

39, 53 (1968); Baptisto, 2005 WL 2416356 at 7. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that

information provided by him in debriefing would be used by Defendants in a subsequent

criminal prosecution. Nor does he provide examples where such incrimination has occurred to

other inmates. Because Plaintiff has not established a real threat that debriefing would result in

self-incrimination, he has failed to establish a Fifth Amendment right not to debrief. See Griffin

v. Gomez, 1995 WL 396857 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1995); Medina v. Gomez, 1997 WL 488588 at

7 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 14, 1997); Castrellon v. Gomez, 1997 WL 361199 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 1997);

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-13-

Garcia v. Gomez, 1996 WL 390320 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 1996); Zarate v. Bunnell, 1994 WL

374547 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 1994). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Plaintiff also contends that Defendants are using the conditions of confinement at SMU-II

as “excessive force” to compel him to incriminate himself. In addition to the fact that Plaintiff

is not being required to incriminate himself, as explained above, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on this claim because Plaintiff presents no evidence that the purpose of

SMU-II conditions is solely to force inmates to debrief or that the conditions are imposed

“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” See LeMaire, 12 F.3d at

1452-53; Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1266 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied in part and granted in

part. The motion is denied with regard to Plaintiff’s exercise claim. The motion

is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s due process claim, Plaintiff’s other Eighth

Amendment claims, and Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied. 

3. Defendants shall have thirty days from the date that this order to submit a motion

for summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s exercise claim. Plaintiff shall

have thirty days from the date the motion to respond, and Defendants shall have

fifteen days to reply.

DATED this 31st day of March, 2006.

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 34 Filed 03/31/06 Page 13 of 13