Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03744/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03744-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Interscope Records, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Lindsey Duty, 

Defendant. 

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No. 05-CV-3744-PHX-FJM

ORDER

I

Developments in internet-based technology, including the use of online peer-to-peer

networks, have dramatically increased the speed and ease with which information can be

shared worldwide. These networks have been substantially used for the rapid transfer of

copyrighted works, leading to "infringement on a gigantic scale," Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer

Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (2005), and creating a flurry of federal

litigation. Here, plaintiffs–various recording companies ("the Recording Companies")–allege

that Lindsay Duty ("Duty") used a peer-to-peer network called Kazaa to download and

distribute copyrighted music in violation of federal law. Duty counterclaims, seeking a

declaratory judgment that she did not violate the copyright laws, and raising state common

law tort claims for invasion of privacy and abuse of legal process. The court has before it

Duty's motion to dismiss (doc. 8), the Recording Companies' amended opposition (doc. 20),

and Duty's reply (doc. 22); the Recording Companies' motion to dismiss counterclaims (doc.

Case 2:05-cv-03744-FJM Document 34 Filed 04/14/06 Page 1 of 8
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21), Duty's opposition (doc. 24), and the Recording Companies' reply (doc. 26); and the

Recording Companies' motion to disregard Duty's affidavit, or in the alternative, to treat her

reply brief as a motion for summary judgment (doc. 25) and Duty's response (doc. 30).

II

Duty moves to dismiss the Recording Companies' copyright infringement claim

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., contending that A) the Recording Companies

failed to satisfy the pleading requirement in Rule 8(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., and B) the

Recording Companies provide no evidence of dissemination. Duty also moves to dismiss

the claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), Fed. R. Civ. P., for the failure to join an indispensable

party. We disagree with all three contentions, and accordingly deny Duty's motion to dismiss

(doc. 8).

A

Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a plaintiff need only set forth "a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Such a statement must simply

give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998 (2002)

(quotation omitted). "The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a

simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim."

Id. (citation omitted).

The essential elements of a copyright infringement claim are A) plaintiff's ownership

of a valid copyright and B) defendant's unauthorized copying of constituent elements of the

work that are original. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,

361, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1296 (1991) (citation omitted). The Recording Companies allege that

they own the copyrights to various songs, and that "Defendant, without the permission or

consent of Plaintiffs, has used, and continues to use, an online media distribution system to

download the Copyrighted Recordings, to distribute the Copyrighted Recordings to the

public, and/or to make the Copyrighted Recordings available for distribution to others."

Complaint at 3.

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1

 "A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof

for all purposes." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Accordingly, we consider exhibits A and B herein.

2

 Moreover, we conclude below that the mere filing of a copyrighted work in a peerto-peer network share folder may constitute distribution and therefore infringement.

Therefore, the existence of any of the Recording Companies copyrighted recordings in Duty's

share file as represented in exhibit B to the complaint may constitute copyright infringement.

Therefore, additional date or time information may not be necessary to the Recording

Companies' claims.

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Attached to the complaint are exhibits A and B.1

 The complaint is clear that exhibit

A is a list of recordings which are copyrighted by the Recording Companies, and that some

of the recordings on exhibit B are copyrighted by the Recording Companies. The complaint

fails, however, to explicitly identify the relevance of the two exhibits to this copyright

infringement action.

In context, however, the relevance of the two exhibits is clear. Duty is alleged to have

illegally used Kazaa to download and distribute various copyrighted works. Therefore, based

upon the complaint alone, it is clear to the court that exhibit B is an alleged representation

of Duty's Kazaa share folder, and that exhibit A is a list of some songs that the Recording

Companies claim were illegally downloaded or distributed by Duty through her Kazaa share

folder. Moreover, it is clear from Duty's motion to dismiss that she thoroughly understands

the claims against her. Therefore, the complaint satisfies the liberal notice pleading standard

of Rule 8(a). To the extent that there remains confusion with regard to the exact date or time

of the incidences of alleged infringement, that can be clarified during discovery.2

B

Duty also argues that "Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendant merely made recordings

available for distribution to others fails to state a copyright claim" because "[t]here is no

liability for infringing upon the right of distribution unless copies of copyrighted works were

actually disseminated to members of the public. Duty's Memorandum in Support of her

Motion to Dismiss at 3 (emphasis in original). We disagree.

Case 2:05-cv-03744-FJM Document 34 Filed 04/14/06 Page 3 of 8
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3

 To be clear, we do not conclude that the mere presence of copyrighted sound

recordings in Duty's share file constitutes copyright infringement. We have an incomplete

understanding of the Kazaa technology at this stage, and the ultimate issue of liability is more

appropriately considered on a motion for summary judgment where the parties will have an

opportunity to fully explain the Kazaa technology, and the means by which a file can be

made available for public download on Kazaa.

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Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), the owners of a copyright have the "exclusive right[]"

to "distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other

transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." "Distribute" is not defined under the

Copyright Act, but the right of distribution is synonymous with the right of publication, Ford

Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 1991), and "publication"

is defined under the Copyright Act. "Publication" is defined to include "[t]he offering to

distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution,

public performance, or public display." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). Moreover, the

Court of Appeals has stated that "Napster [a peer-to-peer file sharing company] users who

upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate plaintiffs' distribution rights."

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the

mere presence of copyrighted sound recordings in Duty's share file may constitute copyright

infringement. Accordingly, Duty's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted is denied (doc. 8).3

C

Duty also argues that the alleged infringement would not have been possible without

the use of Kazaa, and therefore the owner of Kazaa, Sharman Networks, Ltd. ("Sharman"),

is a necessary and indispensable party to this suit. We disagree. The Recording Companies

may have a viable claim against Sharman for direct, contributory or vicarious infringement.

See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2776. Furthermore, following this

action, Duty may have a viable claim against Sharman for contribution. However, the

possibility of related third-party liability does not preclude us from according complete relief

among those already named as parties, nor does it represent sufficient harm to either Sharman

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or Duty to require joinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); see Temple v. Synthes Corp., Ltd., 498 U.S.

5, 7-8, 111 S. Ct. 315, 316 (1990) (holding that joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties).

Duty argues that to the extent copyright infringement took place, it was not caused by

her because Kazaa has an automatic upload feature which causes any user to unknowingly

distribute computer files over the internet. To the extent this is true, it might be a valid

defense. However, for the reasons stated, it does not make Sharman a necessary party.

Therefore, Duty's motion to dismiss for the failure to join an indispensable party is denied

(doc. 8).

III

Duty counterclaims A) seeking a declaratory judgment that she did not commit

copyright infringement; B) claiming that the Recording Companies are liable for the invasion

of privacy in accessing her computer files and C) publically identifying her as a file-sharer;

and D) claiming that the Recording Companies are liable for the abuse of legal process. The

Recording Companies move to dismiss each cause of action.

A

The Recording Companies sole claim is that Duty committed copyright infringement.

Duty counterclaims, seeking a declaratory judgment that she did not commit copyright

infringement. The issue of copyright infringement will be decided by this court regardless

of the declaratory judgment claim unless the parties stipulate to settlement, or the Recording

Companies move to voluntarily withdraw their complaint and the court so orders pursuant

to Rule 41(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. Therefore, Duty's claim for a declaratory judgment is

redundant and unnecessary, and the Recording Companies motion to dismiss it is granted

(doc. 21).

B

Duty claims that the Recording Companies are liable for the tort of intrusion upon

seclusion. A person is liable for that tort if he "intentionally intrudes, physically or

otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns . . . if

the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc.,

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190 Ariz. 272, 279, 947 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 652B (1977)). Therefore, a defendant is liable "only when he has intruded into a private

place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his

person or affairs." Id. (citing Restatement § 652B cmt. c).

Duty alleges that the Recording Companies committed this tort by "inva[ding] [her]

alleged computer." Counterclaim at 7. More specifically, it appears that Duty claims that

the Recording Companies committed this tort by accessing her Kazaa share folder, which is

reproduced as exhibit B to the complaint. The Recording Companies argue that Duty fails

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the information in the share file is

public, and therefore, there is no seclusion. Duty does not dispute this fact; she merely

argues that she did not put the sound recordings in the share file. She argues that Kazaa did

so automatically. However, whether Duty or Kazaa acted, it is undisputed that the share file

is publically available, and therefore Duty cannot show that the Recording Companies

intruded upon her private affairs. Accordingly, the Recording Companies' motion to dismiss

Duty's intrusion upon seclusion claim is granted (doc. 21).

C

Duty claims that the Recording Companies are liable for the tort of false light for

publically disclosing that Duty is a file-sharer by filing this lawsuit. The Recording

Companies move to dismiss this claim arguing that they are protected by the NoerrPennington doctrine. The Recording Companies appear to be correct, but we need not

further consider the substance of their argument because Duty failed to respond to it and,

pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i), we perceive the failure to respond as consent to the granting of the

motion with regard to this issue. Accordingly, the Recording Companies' motion to dismiss

Duty's false light claim is granted (doc. 21).

D

Duty claims that the Recording Companies are liable for the state law tort of abuse

of the legal process, which is defined as "a willful act in the use of judicial process . . . for

an ulterior purpose not proper in the regular conduct of proceedings." Crackel v. Allstate Ins.

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Co., 208 Ariz. 252, 257, 92 P.3d 882, 887 (Ct. App. 2004). To succeed on the claim, "a

plaintiff must show that the defendant's improper purpose was the primary motivation for its

actions, not merely an incidental motivation." Id. at 259, 92 P.3d at 889. Moreover,

[f]or abuse of process to occur there must be use of the process for an

immediate purpose other than that for which it was designed and intended.

The usual case of abuse of process is one of some form of extortion, using the

process to put pressure upon the other to compel him to pay a different debt

or to take some other action or refrain from it.

Restatement § 682 cmt. b.

Here, Duty claims that this is one case in thousands where the Recording Companies

are suing individual users of peer-to-peer networks such as Kazaa in an effort to frighten

users away from the networks, thereby putting the networks out of business. This might be

true. In fact, the Recording Companies state in their briefings that "they face a massive

problem of digital piracy over the Internet" and accordingly they have "sustained and

continue to sustain devastating financial losses." Recording Companies' Amended

Opposition at 2. It is not, however, an abuse of the legal process to organize a large-scale

legal assault on small-scale copyright infringers that together cause devastating financial

losses. Moreover, it is not an abuse of the legal process if the Recording Companies' goal

in bringing these actions is to scare would-be infringers into complying with federal law, and

thereby prevent the networks that allegedly facilitate the alleged infringement from doing so.

It may be an abuse of the legal process for a collection of large corporate entities to use their

substantial financial and intellectual capacities to prey upon less capable individuals and

unfairly pressure them into settlement. However, while Duty sets forth general allegations

with regard to the Recording Companies' overall strategy, she sets forth no allegations with

regard to such heavy-handed tactics in this litigation. Therefore, the Recording Companies'

motion to dismiss Duty's abuse of process claim is granted (doc. 21).

IV

The Recording Companies move to disregard Duty's affidavit attached to her reply

brief, or in the alternative to convert Duty's reply brief to a motion for summary judgment.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we accept the plaintiff's factual

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allegations as true. Anderson v. Clow, 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly,

Duty's contradictory assertions of fact in her affidavit are irrelevant to the analysis.

Moreover, it would be inappropriate to convert Duty's reply into a motion for summary

judgment because the parties have not had an opportunity to conduct discovery and flesh out

the factual issues that are necessary to the infringement claim. Furthermore, the facts set

forth in the affidavit would have no effect on our resolution of Duty's motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7). Accordingly, we grant the Recording Companies' motion to

disregard Duty's affidavit (doc. 25).

V

IT IS ORDERED DENYING Duty's motion to dismiss (doc. 8).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING the Recording Companies' motion to

dismiss the counterclaims (doc. 21).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING the Recording Companies' motion to

disregard Duty's affidavit (doc. 25).

For clarity, only the Recording Companies' copyright infringement claims remain.

DATED this 14th day of April, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-03744-FJM Document 34 Filed 04/14/06 Page 8 of 8