Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02154/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02154-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HOLCOMB, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF 

PSYCHOLOGY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-02154-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Peggy Holcomb’s Motion for 

Temporary Restraining Order barring the California Board of Psychology from continuing to 

withhold her license to practice psychology. ECF No. 21. As explained below, the court 

DENIES plaintiff’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Licensing Background 

The following facts are based on a review of the unverified Complaint, ECF No. 1, 

plaintiff’s declaration, Holcomb Decl., ECF No. 21-2, and plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary 

Restraining Order and Brief in support thereof, ECF Nos. 21 & 21-1, and given the state of the 

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record give plaintiff the benefit of the doubt as to certain facts.1 Plaintiff earned a Master’s of 

Science in Psychology from California State University Sacramento in January 1999. Compl. 

¶ 8, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”); ECF No. 21-1 at 2. She became a Licensed Educational Psychologist 

(LEP) in California on July 1, 2002, license Number 2586. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 18; ECF No. 21-1 at 2. 

An LEP is a master’s degree license under the authority of the Board of Behavioral Sciences. 

ECF No. 21-1 at 2. Plaintiff worked as a school psychologist at the San Juan School District 

from 2000 until June 2012, eventually serving as the lead school psychologist for the autism team 

in the district. Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff then worked at the Twin Rivers School District from 

October 2013 until November 2014. Id. The complaint alleges that in the time plaintiff worked 

as an educational psychologist, she conducted approximately 4,500 evaluations and never had any 

adverse action taken against her. Id. ¶¶ 9, 18. Plaintiff’s declaration says she has evaluated more 

than 2,500 children. Holcomb Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 21-2. She also avers she is the “only school 

psychologist in the nation who participated in the DSM5.” Id. Through her work, plaintiff often 

testified against Alta Regional Center in proceedings that resulted in rulings ordering Alta to 

provide educational services for a particular student with disabilities. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 16; Holcomb 

Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 21-2. 

Plaintiff decided to pursue a doctoral degree and license of psychology, which is 

under the authority of the California Board of Psychology (BOP). See ECF No. 21-1 at 2. An 

applicant must fulfill a number of requirements to become eligible for BOP licensure as a 

psychologist. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2914, et seq. Plaintiff completed her pre-doctoral 

hours in July 2011, and completed her post-doctoral hours in May 2013. Compl. ¶ 28. She 

earned a doctoral degree in Clinical Psychology from the Fielding Institute of Graduate Studies in 

June 2013. ECF No. 21-1 at 4. She eventually met the education, experience, fingerprint and 

pre-licensure coursework requirements for licensure. See Ex. E, ECF No. 1-2; Holcomb Decl. 

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 Given the procedural history of this case so far, and the state of the current filings, it 

appears to the court that plaintiff’s counsel, despite the credentials he holds out, is not familiar 

with the requirements imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court’s Local Rules, 

and federal law generally with respect to temporary injunctive relief. He may wish to consult 

with counsel who has the expected familiarity if he proceeds with litigation of this case. 

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¶ 9, ECF No. 21-2. On July 1, 2013, plaintiff filed an application for licensure with the BOP. 

Compl. ¶ 27. Plaintiff passed the Examination for Professional Practice in Psychology (EPPP) on 

July 27, 2014. Id. ¶ 28; Holcomb Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 21-2. She took the California Psychology 

Law and Ethics Exam (CPLEE) on July 6, 2015, Compl. ¶ 33, and was told she had received a 

passing score on August 3, 2015, Holcomb Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, ECF No. 21-2; ECF No. 21-1 at 5. 

On August 6, 2015, Audrey Watkins, an employee of the BOP, informed plaintiff 

that her license was ready and that she could pick it up from the BOP office. Compl. ¶ 25. Ms. 

Watkins told plaintiff she would print the actual license, but then told plaintiff she could not find 

the passing score on the California exam. Id.; Holcomb Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 21-2. 

B. Denial of License 

In or about July 2015, Cynthia Root, Ph.D., a psychologist employed by Alta 

Regional Center, obtained two reports prepared by plaintiff on patient John Doe, a minor. See 

Compl. ¶ 14; see also Ex. A, ECF No. 1-2. Based on the reports, Dr. Root filed a complaint with 

the California Board of Behavioral Sciences against plaintiff. Compl. ¶¶ 12–13; see Ex. A, ECF 

No. 1-2. The case before the Board of Behavioral Sciences is currently pending. See ECF No. 

21-1 at 7. According to plaintiff, Dr. Root alleged the following: 

1) Dr. Holcomb acted outside the scope of her license in 

conducting an evaluation of patient Doe; 

2) The evaluation was inappropriate because Dr. Holcomb used 

DSM5 coding; 

3) The evaluation was somehow not proper because it was 

somehow not about the educational needs of the patient; 

4) Dr. Holcomb inaccurately represented her credentials in the 

reports; and 

5) There is a question why Dr. Holcomb provided two reports in 

four months to Alta Regional Center. 

Compl. ¶ 12; see Ex. A, ECF No. 1-2. Plaintiff asserts that Licensed Educational Psychologists, 

such as herself, have the authority to conduct psychometric testing and to use DSM5 diagnoses. 

Compl. ¶ 43. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Root maliciously filed the complaint “as part of a 

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conspiracy by Alta Regional Center, Dr. Root and others to silence Dr. Holcomb and her 

advocacy for educational services for those children suffering from Autism.” Id. ¶ 16. 

At some point, Cynthia Root and Alta Regional Center sent the two reports 

prepared by plaintiff on patient John Doe to the BOP, in violation of HIPAA. Id. ¶¶ 14, 37; ECF 

No. 21-1 at 6. Without any notice or opportunity to respond, the BOP sent plaintiff’s file from its 

licensing department to its enforcement department and concluded that her application should be 

denied. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 41. On August 27, 2015, the BOP’s Enforcement Program Manager, 

Sandra Monterrubio, sent plaintiff a letter denying her application for licensure as a psychologist, 

with reference to California Business and Professions Code “section 489(3)(A).”2 Id. ¶ 38; ECF 

No. 21-1 at 6. The letter offered plaintiff a hearing under California Government Code section 

11500, et seq. See Compl. ¶ 38; ECF No. 21-1 at 6. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Monterrubio 

misinterpreted the law by offering plaintiff the hearing procedures for an applicant, rather than 

those required for individuals who already have a license. Compl. ¶¶ 38–43. 

Plaintiff further alleges that plaintiff’s counsel received a threatening e-mail from a 

special investigator for the BOP on or around October 9, 2015, which interfered with plaintiff’s 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. ¶¶ 81–85; ECF No. 21-1 at 7. 

C. Irreparable Harm 

On November 25, 2014, plaintiff entered into a contract with the state of California 

to perform services in the Department of Juvenile Justice, which is a part of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Holcomb Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 21-2. One 

condition of the contract was that plaintiff would become fully licensed as a psychologist within 

one year, by November 25, 2015. Id. Plaintiff claims absent a temporary restraining order, she 

will lose her job and will be unable to find other employment due to her age. See ECF No. 21-1 

at 12; Compl. ¶ 93. As a result, she will be unable to pay for the necessities of life, because she is 

the sole provider for her family; her husband is disabled and she supports her daughter and 

provides financial support for grandchildren. See Holcomb Decl. ¶ 12; ECF No. 21-1 at 2, 11–

 2

 As noted below, there is no such section of the Business and Professions Code. 

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15. The motion briefing also argues she will suffer emotional harm, reputational damages, and 

injuries to her health, including from the release of Cortisol in the bloodstream. ECF No. 21-1 at 

12. Her declaration does not reference Cortisol. 

D. Procedural History 

On October 14, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint requesting declaratory relief, the 

return of the files for John Doe to the parents, a temporary restraining order restraining the BOP 

from withholding plaintiff’s license, an order taking the BOP into federal receivership, damages, 

costs, and attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 1. The complaint asserts seven causes of action: violation of 

procedural due process based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983; age discrimination based on § 1983; violation 

of substantive due process based on § 1983; violation of right to association under the First 

Amendment; conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s rights; intentional infliction of emotional distress; 

and interference with right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Id. 

On October 16, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction. ECF No. 4. On October 19, 2015, the court denied plaintiff’s motion 

without prejudice for failure to provide the required documents in compliance with Local Rule 

231(c). ECF No. 7. On November 6, 2015, plaintiff moved ex parte for an order that service of 

process be effected by a United States marshal, ECF No. 9, which the court granted on November 

10, 2015, ECF No. 12. 

On November 13, 2015, plaintiff again moved ex parte for a temporary restraining 

order. ECF No. 13. On November 17, 2015, the court again denied plaintiff’s motion for failure 

to provide the required supporting documents. ECF No. 17. The court ordered that any renewed 

motion for temporary restraining order be filed no later than close of business on November 19, 

2015, and include the required supporting documents. Id. On November 19, 2015, plaintiff filed 

the renewed motion for temporary restraining order that is before the court. ECF No. 21. 

Plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel each now have submitted a declaration in support of the motion. 

ECF Nos. 21-2, 21-3. The motion appears to seek an order restraining the BOP from withholding 

plaintiff’s psychology license, which she contends she has effectively obtained. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Because plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order against the BOP, the court 

analyzes her request as such, although it is unclear that a temporary restraining order is actually 

the relief plaintiff requires – as opposed to a writ or some other form of order -- even if she were 

to prevail. 

A temporary restraining order may be issued upon a showing “that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard 

in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). In determining whether to issue a temporary 

restraining order, a court applies the factors that guide the evaluation of a request for preliminary 

injunctive relief: whether the moving party “is likely to succeed on the merits, . . . likely to suffer 

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, . . . the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, 

and . . . an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 

U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 

(9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary 

injunctions is “substantially identical”). The Supreme Court has characterized injunctive relief 

“as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 

entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Irreparable Harm 

Plaintiff contends she will suffer irreparable harm if the temporary restraining 

order is not granted because she will lose her job at the California Department of Juvenile Justice 

if she does not receive her license to practice psychology by November 25, 2015. Holcomb Decl. 

¶ 12, ECF No. 21-2; ECF No. 21-1 at 11–15. As noted, plaintiff alleges she is the sole provider 

for her family, and would not be able to find alternative employment due to her age. See Compl. 

¶ 93; ECF No. 21-1 at 2, 14. As a result, if the court does not issue a temporary restraining order, 

plaintiff’s brief argues she would be unable to pay for the necessities of life and may become 

homeless. ECF No. 21-1 at 12, 14. 

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Although the economic harm plaintiff alleges is severe, she has not provided 

factual support showing a likelihood that it will occur. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (irreparable 

injury must be likely in the absence of an injunction). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges she would be 

unable to find alternative employment because she is fifty years old, Compl. ¶ 93, but she is a 

Licensed Educational Psychologist with extensive experience and prior to her current job enjoyed 

employment as a school psychologist at the Twin Rivers School District from October 2013 until 

November 2014, see id. ¶ 8. Nothing before the court supports the conclusion that plaintiff is 

being blackballed such that, despite the credentials she presents, she has been rendered 

unemployable. Additionally, plaintiff’s brief describes her expenses but neither it nor her 

declaration provides specific financial information showing that plaintiff would be unable to pay 

for the necessities of life before obtaining alternative employment. See ECF No. 21-1 at 14. 

Without such a showing, the court cannot conclude any harm plaintiff would suffer could not be 

compensated through monetary damages. Cf. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90, 92 n.68 

(1974) (holding plaintiff’s discharge from governmental job does not constitute irreparable harm, 

and explaining “the temporary loss of income, ultimately to be recovered, does not usually 

constitute irreparable injury”). Plaintiff’s brief itself cites case law holding that a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that the injury is actual and imminent, rather than remote or speculative. ECF No. 

21-1 at 15–16. The court finds plaintiff has not shown she likely will suffer actual, imminent 

irreparable harm as a result of the loss of income. 

Plaintiff likewise provides no factual support showing she is likely to suffer 

irreparable reputational or emotional harm. Cf. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 91 (holding humiliation and 

reputational damage caused by discharge from job do not constitute irreparable harm). Her 

declaration makes only a very general statement that she is “utterly devastated” by the recent turn 

of events. Holcomb Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 21-2. Her brief is no more detailed, and despite the 

court’s warning in its previous order, plaintiff’s counsel again argues, without citation to 

authority, that the release of Cortisol into the bloodstream constitutes irreparable harm, ECF No. 

21-1 at 12. See also ECF No. 7 at 3 n.1 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). 

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For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes plaintiff has not satisfied the 

irreparable harm requirement for preliminary relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A); Winter, 555 

U.S. at 20. 

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

Plaintiff also has not met her burden of showing likelihood of success on the 

merits. While plaintiff’s legal arguments are not entirely clear, her motion appears to advance 

five legal theories: (1) her evaluations of John Doe and use of a DSM5 diagnostic code were 

within the scope of her license as a Licensed Educational Psychologist, see ECF No. 21-1 at 13; 

(2) Dr. Root and the BOP engaged in a conspiracy to retaliate against plaintiff given her 

testimony adverse to Alta Regional Center, see id. at 1, 3; Compl. ¶ 16; (3) the BOP did not 

provide plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard before denying her application for 

licensure, see ECF No. 21-1 at 17–21; (4) the BOP’s denial of plaintiff’s application under 

California Business and Professions Code section 489(3)(A) was improper, see id. at 6; and 

(5) after denying her application, the BOP improperly offered plaintiff the hearing procedures 

required for an applicant, rather than those required for individuals who already have a license, 

see id. at 7. 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on these theories. With 

respect to her conspiracy theory, the Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 

provide vague, conclusory allegations, rather than specific facts or evidence suggesting the 

existence of a conspiracy. Plaintiff’s own declaration simply states that she “believe[s] in [her] 

heart that the Board of Psychology is complicit in a bizarre scheme of retaliation against [her] by 

Alta Regional Center and Dr. Cynthia Root,” Holcomb Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 21-2. 

Plaintiff has not provided sufficient information for the court to evaluate her 

remaining theories. Plaintiff has not provided the letter from the BOP denying her application for 

licensure. Nor has she provided evidence regarding the evaluations she conducted on patient 

John Doe,3

 or evidence regarding the types of evaluations a Licensed Educational Psychologist is 

 3

 To the extent plaintiff’s complaint seeks return of John Doe’s files to his parents, the 

court has a doubt regarding her standing to present such a request. 

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permitted to conduct. Plaintiff alleges the BOP’s denial letter cited California Business and 

Professions Code section 489(3)(A) as the basis for denial, but such a subsection does not exist. 

If plaintiff intended to cite section 480(a)(3)(A), that provision provides that a board may deny a 

license on the grounds that the applicant has “[d]one any act that if done by a licentiate of the 

business or profession in question, would be grounds for suspension or revocation of license.” 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 480(a)(3)(A). Again, plaintiff has not provided specific legal authority 

and facts showing that any complaint by Dr. Root was baseless. With respect to plaintiff’s claim 

that she should have had the opportunity to challenge the denial of a license utilizing the 

procedures available for individuals who already have a form of license, the only support plaintiff 

provides is a conclusory statement by plaintiff’s counsel that plaintiff “WAS a licensed 

psychologist on August 6, 2015.” Ebert Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 21-3 (emphasis in original). 

Because plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing irreparable harm or 

likelihood of success on the merits, the court does not address the remaining requirements of the 

balance of equities and public interest. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is 

DENIED. If plaintiff wishes to seek a preliminary injunction, she may notice a hearing on an 

available civil law and motion calendar date, in compliance with Local Rule 230. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 23, 2015. 

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