Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04174/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04174-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties who have

appeared in this action have expressly consented that all proceedings may be heard and

finally adjudicated by the undersigned. Those defendants who have not been served are not

deemed to be “parties” to the action within the rules requiring consent to magistrate judge

jurisdiction. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995); see also United States

v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1998).

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CHRISTINA SANCHEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SUZETTE Z. TORRES, FIRST AMERICAN

TITLE, JANE E. BEDNAR, NAM NGUYEN,

HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK,

CITIMORTGAGE, INC., JEFFERY H.

LOWENTHAL, BRYAN M. KRAFT,

ANGELO PAUL RUSSO, SUPERIOR COURT,

HON. ROBERT O’FARRELL, ANDY PHAM,

CHICAGO TITLE, LEANNA PETERSEN,

EXECUTIVE TRUSTEE SERVICES LLC,

Defendants. /

No. C07-04174 HRL

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS; (2) WARNING

RE PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO

PROSECUTE; AND (3) RE-SETTING

CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

[Re: Docket No. 15]

Presently before the court is the “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint” filed by defendants Suzette Torres, First American Title Insurance Co., Nam

Nguyen, Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., Citimortgage, Inc., Jeffrey H. Lowenthal and

Bryan Kreft.1

 The docket shows that the motion was duly noticed and served on plaintiff at her

address of record. However, she did not file any response. Nor did she appear at the 

*E-FILED 4/10/2008*

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2

February 5, 2008 motion hearing. Upon consideration of the papers submitted, as well as the

arguments of counsel, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denies the

motion in part. Additionally, as discussed more fully below, plaintiff is warned that she is in

danger of having her lawsuit dismissed for failure to prosecute.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on August 14, 2007, alleging that defendants violated her civil

rights and wrongfully caused her to lose title to the real property at 834 Tumbleweed Drive in

Salinas, California. She claims to hold title to the property along with an individual named

Andrew Corson. The crux of her complaint concerns an underlying state court action in which

the Monterey County Superior Court granted summary judgment and quieted title in favor of an

individual named Nam Nguyen (one of the named defendants here). Plaintiff seems to contend

that the state court judge (and all others who had any involvement in the state lawsuit) violated

her rights because the state court’s judgment was issued despite a stay of proceedings as to

Corson, who reportedly filed for bankruptcy just two days before the hearing on Nguyen’s

summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on November 13, 2007. Then, about

a week later, on November 19, 2007, she tried to file a Second Amended Complaint. However,

she did not have leave of court (or consent of the defendants) to do so. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)). 

Thus, the FAC remains the operative pleading. Instead of setting out each claim separately in

the complaint, plaintiff merely listed in the caption of her FAC those claims which she

apparently intends to assert – that is, federal claims for violation of her civil rights (42 U.S.C. §

1983), conspiracy to interfere with civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1985) and violation of 11 U.S.C. §

362, as well as state law claims for fraud, slander, malpractice, conversion, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

On November 21, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to

prevent Executive Trustee Services from proceeding with a trustee’s sale which reportedly was

set for November 30, 2007. That motion was denied.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2 Although plaintiff has filed for bankruptcy, the automatic stay under 11

U.S.C. Section 362 does not apply to actions initiated by a debtor. See Martin-Trigona v.

Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989) (“For in any event the

automatic stay is inapplicable to suits by the bankrupt (‘debtor’ as he is now called).”); see

also White v. City of Santee, 186 B.R. 700, 704 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The trustee or debtor in

possession is not prevented by the automatic stay from prosecuting or appearing in an action

which the debtor has initiated and that is pending at the time of bankruptcy.”); In re Merrick, 175 B.R. 333, 336 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e could find no case that supports the proposition

that the automatic stay prevents a defendant from continuing to defend against a prebankruptcy lawsuit. To the contrary, there is substantial authority that the stay is

inapplicable to postpetition defensive action in a prepetition suit brought by the debtor.”). 

This court is unaware of any information suggesting that it should not proceed to rule on

defendants’ pending motion to dismiss.

3 There are two statutory exceptions to Rooker-Feldman: “First a federal

district court has original jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus brought by state

prisoners who claim that the state court has made an error of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Second a federal bankruptcy court has original jurisdiction under which it is empowered to

3

On November 28, 2007, plaintiff filed a notice advising that she had filed for bankruptcy

in this district. (See Docket No. 14). The bankruptcy court dismissed that action two weeks

later. (See Docket No. 16). This court is informed that plaintiff subsequently filed a second

bankruptcy petition which has also been dismissed. Since then, plaintiff has filed a third

bankruptcy petition. This court is informed that a motion to dismiss that proceeding is

pending.2

The defendants who have appeared in this action now move to dismiss the FAC on two

grounds. They contend that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. Alternatively, they argue that the FAC fails to state a claim for relief under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1))

Defendants contend that the instant action merely is a collateral attack on the state

court’s judgment. As such, they argue that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court has

no jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from the two Supreme Court cases upon

which it is based. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Under this doctrine, and with certain exceptions3 inapplicable

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28 avoid state judgments.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted). Neither exception applies here.

4

here, “a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal

from the final judgment of a state court. The United States Supreme Court is the only federal

court with jurisdiction to hear such an appeal.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.

2003). A federal district court does have jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges. 

However, “[a] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto

appeal from a judicial decision of a state court must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal.” Id. at

1158. “As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is

‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Id.

Nevertheless, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to a federal action filed by a

non-party to the state court suit. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006 (1994); Noel, 341

F.3d at 1159. In the instant case, plaintiff was not a party to the underlying state court action to

quiet title. As such, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply; and, defendants’ motion to

dismiss cannot be granted on this ground.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6))

Defendants nonetheless maintain that they are not proper defendants and that the FAC

fails to state a claim for relief in any event. This court agrees.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In such a

motion, all material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the claimant. See id. at 699. “However, the court is not required to accept

legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably

be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th

Cir. 1994). Moreover, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)

(citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if

doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). Documents which properly are the subject of judicial

notice may be considered along with the complaint when deciding a motion for failure to state a

claim. See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).

1. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request judicial notice of papers and orders filed in the state court action to

quiet title as well as in the bankruptcy court. The court properly may take notice of such

records, see Fed.R.Evid. 201(b), and defendants’ request is granted. The court takes notice of

these records, not as to the truth of the contents or any party’s assertion as to what the contents

mean, but rather as to the existence and authenticity of the documents, what has been

represented, what has been decided and the status of certain proceedings at a given time as

reflected in the documents.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.

1987).

Here, plaintiff does not identify what constitutional right, if any, has been violated. In

any event, based on the current pleading, it is not apparent that any of the named defendants

properly can be sued under section 1983.

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4 This court finds sua sponte dismissal of the claims against these defendants

appropriate. See Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua

sponte under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). . . .Such a dismissal may be made without notice where

the claimant cannot possibly win relief.”)

6

a. Judge O’Farrell and Superior Court4

Plaintiff seems to allege that Judge O’Farrell (and, apparently by extension, the Superior

Court) violated her civil rights by adjudicating the underlying state action to quiet title. 

Plaintiff has never served these defendants and the time for service has run. See FED.R.CIV.P.

4(m). In any event, a state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts

performed in his judicial capacity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (applying

judicial immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.

349, 362 (1978) (holding that a judge is absolutely immune from liability for judicial acts);

Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (ruling on a motion and

exercising control over a courtroom are normal judicial functions for which a judge is absolute

immune). Moreover, section 1983 contemplates judicial immunity from suit for injunctive

relief for acts taken in a judicial capacity. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 366 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)).

Judicial immunity generally is overcome only in two sets of circumstances. First, a

judge is not immune from liability for actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. That is

clearly not the case here. The second is when the judge acts in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction. “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error,

was done maliciously, or in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only

when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 (citing

Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)); Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079

n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (mistake alone is not sufficient to deprive a judge of absolute immunity). As

long as the judge has jurisdiction to perform the “general act” in question, he is immune

however erroneous the act may have been, however injurious the consequences of the act may

have been, and irrespective of the judge’s claimed motivation. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210

F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Judge O’Farrell is entitled to judicial immunity because his alleged acts were judicial in

nature and were not done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Indeed, all the acts about

which plaintiff complains fall squarely within his duties as a judicial officer – that is, granting

default judgment, denying requests to intervene, and granting summary judgment. He is

therefore not a proper defendant, and this is not something which may be cured by any further

amendment of the pleadings. Accordingly, the FAC is dismissed WITHOUT leave to amend as

to Judge O’Farrell. The FAC is also dismissed WITHOUT leave to amend as to the Superior

Court insofar as the allegations against it appear to be based entirely on the alleged conduct of

Judge O’Farrell.

b. Other Defendants

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the other defendants also fails. The FAC indicates

that all of the other named defendants are private individuals or entities (attorneys, brokers,

trustees and the like) who were somehow involved in the underlying action to quiet title. It is

not apparent that any of these defendants acted under color of state law.

A private individual or entity does not act under color of state law, an essential element

of a § 1983 action. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Purely private conduct, no

matter how wrongful, is not covered under § 1983. See Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505

F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). Simply put: There is no right

to be free from the infliction of constitutional deprivations by private individuals or entities. 

See Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996).

Similarly, attorneys in private practice are not state actors. See Simmons v. Sacramento

County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). Services performed by a private

attorney in connection with a lawsuit do not constitute action under color of state law and,

consequently, cannot be challenged in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702,

707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) (“private parties are not generally acting under color of state law, and we

have stated that conclusionary allegations unsupported by facts, will be rejected as insufficient

to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.”); Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir.

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1977) (“We have repeatedly held that a privately-retained attorney does not act under color of

state law for purposes of actions brought under the Civil Rights Act.”).

A plaintiff seeking to hold private individuals or entities liable under section 1983 must

allege facts showing that “there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged

action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” 

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the FAC contains no facts suggesting that any of the

private individuals or corporate defendants were or could be considered state actors.

Although it is highly doubtful that plaintiff will be able to state a section 1983 claim as

to these defendants, it is also not certain that granting an opportunity to amend her pleading will

be futile. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND. However, plaintiff is advised that conclusory allegations will not satisfy

this requirement and are insufficient to survive a challenge at the pleading stage. See Price, 939

F.2d at 707-08 ( “we have stated that conclusionary allegations unsupported by facts, will be

rejected as insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.”). Instead, “the facts that are

pleaded must provide a basis for reasonable inference of state action, for the Court is not

obliged to draw unreasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor or to accept plaintiff’s conclusions

of law.” Rivoli v. Gannett Co., 327 F. Supp.2d 233, 239 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003)). Additionally, as noted above, plaintiff has merely

listed her claims in the caption of the FAC and ascribes conduct to defendants collectively. 

This is not sufficient. Plaintiff must set out each claim separately, supported by facts showing

that she is entitled to relief as to each defendant.

3. 42 U.S.C. Section 1985

Because the FAC does not state a claim under section 1983 claim for civil rights

violation(s), there is no basis for her conspiracy claim. Accordingly, this claim is also

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

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4. 11 U.S.C. § 362

Plaintiff alleges that, by litigating the state court action to summary judgment in

Nguyen’s favor, defendants violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 that was

triggered when Corson filed for bankruptcy. Her claim appears to be premised upon the belief

that, because she is an alleged co-owner of the subject property, she properly may attack the

alleged violation of the automatic stay. It is not at all clear that plaintiff is an owner of the

property at issue. For the purposes of resolving this motion, however, the court assumes that

she can legitimately claim that status and further assumes that the subject property was

identified by Corson as part of the estate. Even so, the court finds that she does not have

standing to challenge the alleged violation of the stay.

Section 362 provides, in relevant part, that:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under

section 301, 302 or 303 of this title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities

of – 

(1) the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial . . . action or

proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before

the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the

debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;

* * * *

(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the

estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;

(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (3), (4).

Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because Corson was not a party to

the underlying action to quiet title and section 362(a)(1) applies only to actions against the

debtor. As noted above, however, section 362(a) imposes an automatic stay as to an array of

acts with respect to property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (4). Nevertheless, in the

Ninth Circuit, section 362 has been held to apply only to the benefit of the debtor estate. 

Owners (other than the debtor) of the property at issue in a bankruptcy action do not have

standing to assert violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. See In re Globe

Investment & Loan Co., Inc., 867 F.2d 556, 559-60 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that co-owners of

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5 The record indicates that the bankruptcy court dismissed Corson’s bankruptcy

petition several months after it was filed due to the failure to file a credit counseling

certificate with the voluntary petition for bankruptcy. (Mot., Ex. 10). Corson subsequently

filed another petition for bankruptcy that was dismissed in June 2007; and, Corson was

barred from filing any bankruptcy case for a period of three years. (Mot., Ex. 11).

10

the subject property lacked standing to assert a violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.

§ 362); see also In re Brooks, 79 B.R. 479, 481 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (“if the debtor or the

trustee chooses not to invoke the protections of § 362, no other party may attack any acts in

violation of the automatic stay”); In re Stivers, 31 B.R. 735 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1983) (“I

conclude that the automatic stay operates in favor of debtors and estates (represented by trustees

and debtors-in-possession) only and that it gives junior lienholders and other parties interested

in the property no substantive or procedural rights”); Burcena v. Bank One, No. CV-06-00422,

2007 WL 2915621 at *5 (D. Hawaii, Oct. 1, 2007) (holding that non-debtor co-owners of the

subject real property lacked standing to challenge the annulment of the automatic stay under 11

U.S.C. § 362).

In the instant action, there is no indication that plaintiff filed or joined in Corson’s

bankruptcy petition. To the contrary, the record presented shows that the petition was filed only

by Corson.5

 Plaintiff may not properly attack acts allegedly in violation of the automatic stay

triggered by that petition. Because summary judgment in the quiet title action was granted long

before plaintiff filed her own petition for bankruptcy, the entry of that judgment did not violate

the automatic stay imposed by her filing. The court finds that plaintiff has not and cannot state

a claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, and that it would be futile to permit an amendment for that

purpose. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed WITHOUT leave to amend.

5. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

The remainder of plaintiff’s claims are based entirely on state law. “Where a district

court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims for resolution, it should decline

jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.” Wade v. Regional Credit

Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996). In view of its disposition of the section 1983 claim,

the only apparent basis for federal jurisdiction, this court will defer a decision as to the

propriety of her state law claims until such time as she files a viable federal claim.

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28 6 Those defendants who have appeared did so voluntarily after learning of the

existence of the suit, apparently through routine monitoring of court filings.

11

C. Plaintiff’s Failure to Prosecute

As noted above, plaintiff’s original complaint was filed on August 14, 2007 and her

FAC was filed on November 13, 2007. A plaintiff must effect service of the complaint and

summons within 120 days from the filing of the complaint. FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m). Generally, the

120-day period runs from the filing date of the original complaint, not the amended complaint. 

See Finch v. George, 763 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

By the November 20, 2007 initial case management conference, plaintiff still had not

served any defendant.6

 Additionally, she did not confer with the appearing defendants on the

preparation of a joint statement, did not file a separate statement of her own, and did not review

defendants’ statement in preparation for the conference. Her only explanation for these failures

was that she is not an attorney and that, while she lives at her address of record and receives

mail there, she does not read or check her mail everyday.

At the conference, this court advised plaintiff that she is responsible for properly

effecting service and otherwise managing her case. The court also stated that, although plaintiff

is not an attorney, she is nonetheless obliged to follow rules that all litigants must obey –

namely, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court’s Civil Local Rules and this court’s

standing orders. Further, the court suggested that plaintiff obtain a copy of the court’s

handbook for pro se litigants from the Clerk’s Office or from the court’s website. The court

warned plaintiff that if she failed to follow these rules and the court’s orders, she might be in

danger of having her case dismissed. Plaintiff was admonished to serve her FAC promptly in

view of the deadline for service. Because the appearing defendants indicated that they would

move to dismiss the FAC, the court advised plaintiff that, if she opposed such a motion, she was

responsible for filing timely opposition papers with the court.

To date, there is no indication that plaintiff has made any effort to effect service on any

defendant. She did not respond to defendants’ motion to dismiss and failed to appear at the

motion hearing.

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Plaintiff is reminded that, although she is representing herself, she remains responsible

for diligently prosecuting her case and for adhering to rules that all litigants are required to

follow. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that pro per litigants

must follow the same procedural rules as represented parties). While the court generally prefers

to resolve matters on the merits, it takes a dim view of the repeated failure to comply with its

rules and orders. Moreover, fairness dictates that there be reasonable limits to the number of

procedural failings that can be countenanced by the court. Based on her performance to date,

plaintiff is advised that she is in danger of having her lawsuit dismissed for her lack of attention

to it.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is denied.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is granted as

follows:

a. The motion is granted WITHOUT leave to amend as to Judge O’Farrell

and the Superior Court.

b. The motion is granted WITHOUT leave to amend as to plaintiff’s claim

under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

c. The motion is granted WITH leave to amend as to the claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985.

d. The court defers a decision as to plaintiff’s state law claims.

3. Plaintiff has until May 9, 2008 in which to file her amended complaint. The

amended complaint shall be titled “Second Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff must set out each

claim separately, supported by facts showing that she is entitled to relief. Plaintiff remains

responsible for effecting service of her amended pleading and shall have 30 days from the filing

of her amended complaint in which to do so. Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file her

amended complaint by the May 9, 2008 deadline and to timely effect service upon

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defendants will be considered additional grounds for dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute.

4. The case management conference set for April 29, 2008 is continued to July 8,

2008, 1:30 p.m.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

April 10, 2008

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5:07-cv-4174 Notice electronically mailed to: 

Citimortgage, Inc. jlowenthal@steyerlaw.com 

Jessica Carolyn Grannis jgrannis@steyerlaw.com 

Edward Egan Smith esmith@steyerlaw.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have

not registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

5:07-cv-4174 Notice mailed to: 

Christina Sanchez

834 Tumbleweed Drive

Salinas, CA 93905

Pro Se Plaintiff

Case 5:07-cv-04174-HRL Document 22 Filed 04/10/08 Page 14 of 14