Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00924/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00924-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER TRAYERS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

DEBORAH K. JOHNSON, Warden, 

et al., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 15-cv-00924-H-BLM 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

[Doc. No. 1] 

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; AND 

[Doc. No. 15] 

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

 On April 20, 2015, Petitioner Jennifer Trayers, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, 

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging her 

state court conviction for second degree murder. (Doc. No. 1.) On January 14, 2016, 

Respondent filed a response to the petition. (Doc. No. 12.) On February 8, 2016, Petitioner 

filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 14.) On May 10, 2016, the magistrate judge issued a report and 

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recommendation recommending that the Court deny the petition. (Doc. No. 15.) After 

careful consideration, the Court denies Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and 

adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 

Background 

I. Factual History

 The Court adopts the facts from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion denying 

Petitioner’s direct appeal and affirming her conviction. (See Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment 

No. 7.) This Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), presumes the following relevant 

facts to be true: 

A. The People’s Case

Dr. Trayers was an emergency medicine physician at the Balboa Naval 

Medical Center in San Diego. When Jennifer killed him on December 4, 

2010, they had been married for 18 years. 

1. Stabbing death of Dr. Trayers 

After he attended a holiday party on the night of December 3, Dr. 

Trayers worked a night shift at the Balboa Naval Hospital until 6:00 o’clock 

the next morning. He was next scheduled to work at 11:00 a.m. on Sunday, 

December 5, and coworkers became worried when he did not come to work. 

They began attempting to reach him by phone on Sunday evening. Friends 

went to the Trayers’ home, and, although both of the Trayers’ cars were there, 

they saw no sign of anything out of the ordinary other than that the Trayers 

were not at home. Coworkers called police late Sunday night. 

Police officers went to the Trayers’ home on Sunday night to conduct 

a welfare check, but observed that everything was quiet. Officers returned the 

next morning, December 6, and one of them looked through a window into a 

bedroom and saw a female (Jennifer) lying face up on the floor, with her 

clothing covered in blood, next to the left (or east) side of the bed (viewing 

the scene from the foot of the bed). 

The officers forcibly entered the Trayers’ home and found that Jennifer 

was barely alive with what were later determined to be self-inflicted knife 

wounds. A military-style knife with a blade about seven inches in length was 

found on the floor under the edge of the left (east) side of the bed very close 

to where Jennifer was found. 

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Dr. Christina Stanley, a forensic pathologist who examined Jennifer in 

the hospital, testified that Jennifer had suffered about three dozen stab wounds 

or sharp force injuries primarily over a small area of her chest, many of which 

were superficial, and she had lost a significant amount of blood and was in 

shock. Her most significant injury was to an artery in the wall of her abdomen, 

but the wound did not go inside her abdomen. 

Dr. Michael Sise, a vascular surgeon and trauma medical director at 

Scripps Mercy Hospital who treated Jennifer’s multiple knife wounds, opined 

that the wounds were self-inflicted. Dr. Sise explained that he found no 

wounds of self-defense, which are usually on the hands. He also explained 

that the multiple wounds in the central area of Jennifer’s chest were 

“hesitation marks,” a term that trauma surgeons use to describe superficial 

wounds that may have penetrated the skin but had not penetrated deeply. 

The police officers who entered the Trayers’ home found Dr. Trayers 

dead and face down on the floor on the right (or west) side of the bed—

opposite where Jennifer was found on the floor on the left side of the bed—in 

a fetal position facing the bed and leaning against the side of the bed with the 

bedding around his lower extremities. The bedding around Dr. Trayers’s 

body, as well as the pillows and the fitted sheet on the bed in the area near the 

headboard, were cut. A kitchen or chef’s knife was found near Dr. Trayers’s 

left calf under the bedding. He had a strand of hair—later determined to be 

Jennifer’s—in his left hand. 

According to a deputy medical examiner for the County of San Diego 

who examined Dr. Trayers’s body at the scene of the killing, Dr. Trayers had 

suffered numerous stab wounds: two in the chest, six in the back, one in the 

back of the head, one in the right forearm, one on the tip of the right index 

finger, one on the tip of the right middle finger, and another by the left thumb. 

One of the chest wounds, which could have been a fatal wound, went through 

the heart and the right lung. The multiple superficial incised wounds to Dr. 

Trayers[‘s] hands were consistent with defensive wounds inflicted as he was 

attempting to block or grab the knife. 

A large saturation of Dr. Trayers’s blood was found on the pillows, 

sheets, and mattress on Dr. Trayers’s right (west) side of the bed, and his blood 

spatter was on the west side of the headboard, the wall, and the nightstand on 

his side of the bed. A blood spatter expert found the blood evidence was 

consistent with Dr. Trayers’s having been stabbed while lying on the bed 

under the bedding, having flung a hand that was cut from the palm to the 

forearm, and having moved and ended up on the floor where the officers found 

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him with the bedding (a comforter and sheet) around him. 

The results of forensic toxicology testing indicated the presence of 

Zolpidem, a prescription sleep aid, in both Jennifer’s system and that of Dr. 

Trayers. The amount in Dr. Trayers’[s] system was within the normal 

therapeutic range for a single dose. Zolpidem is commonly used by 

emergency physicians as a sleep aid because they work different shifts and 

sometimes have trouble falling asleep. One empty bottle of Zolpidem, which 

had been prescribed for Dr. Trayers, was found on the left side of the bed 

within three or four feet of the military-style knife in the area where Jennifer 

was found, and another nearly empty bottle was found in a medicine box. 

Three of four stacked manila envelopes found on a shelf near the 

Trayers’ kitchen contained 218 pages of printouts of screen captures and 

numerous text messages to and from Dr. Trayers’s phone, e-mails, and 

photographs of Dr. Trayers. Most of the documents were correspondence 

between Dr. Trayers and Danielle Robins (discussed, post) discussing how 

much they loved each other and their future plans together. There was also a 

lengthy e-mail from Jennifer to Robins. 

2. Dr. Trayers’[s] relationship with Danielle Robins and the events 

culminating in his death 

Robins testified that she met Dr. Trayers in August 2010 on a Mercyclass hospital ship when she was a medical student, and they developed a 

friendship. They both returned to San Diego County after their journey on the 

ship. Robins eventually started an emergency room rotation at Balboa Naval 

Medical Center where Dr. Trayers worked, and they began to have an affair 

at the end of September. They exchanged numerous e-mail and text messages 

in which they expressed their love for each other. 

During this same time period, Dr. Trayers and Jennifer attended 

marriage counseling, and Dr. Trayers was conflicted about whether he should 

continue his affair with Robins. In late November or early December, he told 

Robins a false story that Jennifer was pregnant, and Robins told him they 

would have to end the affair. Unbeknownst to Dr. Trayers and Robins, 

Jennifer was reading their e-mail communications. 

Early in the morning on December 4, Dr. Trayers texted Robins, who 

was in Maryland, that he had finished his shift and had about 30 minutes of 

dictation to complete. At around 7:15 a.m., Dr. Trayers, who was at home, 

sent his last text message to Robins telling her he was going to sleep. He took 

some Zolpidem to help him sleep. 

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About an hour later, Jennifer replaced her husband’s photographs on 

Facebook with photos of themselves in happier times. Shortly thereafter, 

using her husband’s e-mail account, Jennifer sent Robins two e-mails with 

attachments, one of which was a lengthy eight-page letter written by Jennifer 

and addressed to “Little Miss Grass is Not Greener on My Side.” In her letter, 

Jennifer accused Robins of having ruined her husband’s marriage, career, and 

future. Jennifer wrote, “I was the last person he was with.” 

Within minutes of sending the e-mail to Robins, Jennifer deleted Dr. 

Trayers’s Gmail account. On a shelf near the kitchen, Jennifer left manila 

envelopes containing copies of her e-mailed letter to Robins and e-mails 

between Dr. Trayers and Robins. It is undisputed that Jennifer killed Dr. 

Trayers that morning with a knife. 

3. Additional evidence 

Jennifer’s mother, Deborah Smith, testified that she spoke with Jennifer 

by telephone on the morning of December 4 right after she texted Jennifer at 

around 9:00 a.m. Jennifer told her she and Fred (Dr. Trayers) were sleeping 

in. 

a. Evidence of Jennifer's extramarital affair 

Orvill Webb testified he met Jennifer in Florida in 2001 or 2002, and 

they [had] a sexual affair that began around 2002 and ended in late 2004 or 

2005. 

B. Defense Case

Jennifer testified on her own behalf. She and Dr. Trayers, who was in 

the Navy training to be a pilot, met in 1991 and married in 1992. In 1997, 

they moved to Fallon, Nevada, so Dr. Trayers could teach at the Top Gun 

flight school. In Fallon, Dr. Trayers met Danielle Merket, a civilian who was 

conducting some sort of psychological research on pilots. The two continued 

to have contact after Merket left Fallon. 

Jennifer testified that she and her husband moved to Fort Lauderdale in 

2001, and her husband started medical school. Dr. Trayers contacted Merket, 

who lived in Orlando, and they started spending time together. Jennifer 

eventually became convinced they were having an affair. 

Jennifer began to have a sexual relationship with Webb in early 2003 

because she was upset her husband was in love with Merket and felt their 

marriage was over. Dr. Trayers learned about the relationship a couple 

months after it started and blamed himself for not paying attention to Jennifer 

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and not being home. The couple stayed together, but the marriage was under 

strain. 

Jennifer testified that when they moved from Florida to San Diego in 

2005, they agreed to put the affairs behind them and renewed their vows in 

2007 on their 15th anniversary. Jennifer became angry when she caught Fred 

e-mailing Merket late in 2007, but she remained in the marriage. She testified 

that her relationship with Dr. Trayers from early 2010 to early August of that 

year was good, there was never a time when she used physical violence against 

him, and he did not use physical violence against her. 

Jennifer testified that when Dr. Trayers returned from the Mercy ship 

cruise in early September, she became suspicious over the amount of time he 

spent sending text messages to someone else on his phone. She became 

anxious because she felt something was wrong and started losing weight and 

not sleeping. The couple began going to counseling in late September, but 

Dr. Trayers continued to deny anything was happening. 

Jennifer stated she installed spyware software on their home computer 

and Dr. Trayers's laptop in early October that allowed her to see what he was 

communicating by e-mail. The first e-mail she read was from Dr. Trayers to 

another woman about what he had done with her that day. She mistakenly 

thought Dr. Trayers was communicating with Danielle Merket. Jennifer 

testified she felt sick when she read that e-mail, and she began to print the emails. She confronted Dr. Trayers in mid-October about the hundreds of text 

messages the phone bill showed he had sent to a phone number in Maryland, 

and he told her he was simply helping a medical student (Danielle Robins) in 

Maryland. 

Jennifer testified she read one e-mail from Danielle Robins that called 

Dr. Trayers “Mr. Wonderful” and suggested he was with Robins exclusively. 

Jennifer started feeling better when she deduced from the e-mails that Dr. 

Trayers’s relationship with Robins was ending, but then in late November she 

saw one informing Dr. Trayers that Robins was returning to Camp Pendleton. 

Jennifer testified she continued feeling anxious and losing weight. In late 

November, Dr. Trayers removed photos of the two of them from his Facebook 

page. 

The eight-page e-mail that Jennifer sent to Robins was actually a 

journal Jennifer began in October. She testified she made her last entry on 

December 1. She made no entry on the morning of December 4. She stated 

that when she wrote her entries—such as, “I will have the joy of knowing I 

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got to spend quality time with him,” and “I got to see him every day,” which 

she acknowledged seemed to be in the past tense—she had no plan to kill her 

husband, but was considering suicide. By the end of November, she was 

sleeping only one or two hours a night. 

Jennifer also testified that on December 3, before Dr. Trayers left for 

the holiday party and then work, he sat down on the couch with her and told 

her he would never leave her and that he wanted to start being honest with her 

and communicating more. Jennifer wanted him to admit his affair with 

Robins, but did not confront him about it because she had not told him she 

was reading his e-mail. She did not sleep at all that night; she was awake 

worrying about their relationship. 

Dr. Trayers came home from work at around 7:30 a.m. (Dec. 4), and 

talked about the Christmas party the night before. He said there would be 

pictures from it on Facebook. Jennifer said to him, “Speaking of Facebook,” 

and asked what had happened to the missing photos of the two of them on his 

Facebook page. Jennifer testified he claimed he did not know what she was 

talking about, and she became angry that he was “playing dumb.” They went 

to the computer and Dr. Trayers pretended he did not know how the pictures 

had disappeared. He posted some pictures of the two of them, and said, “Now 

are you happy?” in a voice that sounded like he was disgusted with her. 

Jennifer testified that, while Dr. Trayers was in the bathroom, she 

stayed at the computer and found 12 to 15 new e-mails that she believed were 

from Robins and deleted all of them without reading them. She then sent an 

e-mail to Robbins from Dr. Trayers’s account with photos attached showing 

him wearing his wedding ring. She also sent screen prints of pornography and 

herpes Web sites Dr. Trayers had visited. Finally, in a second e-mail, Jennifer 

pasted the journal she had been keeping and sent it as the eight-page e-mail to 

Robins using Dr. Trayers’s account. 

According to Jennifer, when Dr. Trayers came out of the bathroom she 

repeatedly asked him to talk to her about what he had said the night before, 

about being honest and communicating more. Dr. Trayers told her to calm 

down, said they should first take a nap, and told her they should both take 

Ambien and get some sleep. During this time, Dr. Trayers received a phone 

call he said was from a Virginia area code, and Jennifer assumed it was 

Robins. Dr. Trayers let the call go to voice mail. 

Jennifer testified that Dr. Trayers crushed more than one Ambien pill, 

put them in orange juice, and they each drank half. She did not know how 

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many Ambien pills he put in the juice. She became increasingly anxious and 

angry, and Dr. Trayers kept saying he wanted to take a nap before talking. 

Jennifer retrieved the manila envelopes in which she had been keeping the emails and other documents and showed them to Dr. Trayers, who shook his 

head and said that he did not want to see them, he was going to bed to read, 

and they could talk after lunch. 

Jennifer testified she became [angrier], went to the kitchen, slammed 

down the envelopes, and grabbed a butcher knife. She thought if she 

threatened to hurt herself she would get him to talk to her. She took the knife 

into the bedroom where Dr. Trayers was lying on the right side (as viewed 

from the foot of the bed), got into the middle of the bed by his right arm, held 

the blade of the knife to her wrist, and asked him whether that was the way to 

cut her wrists. She had no intention to kill or hurt Dr. Trayers, but assumed 

he would stop her if she tried to hurt herself. He started laughing at her. Dr. 

Trayers told her the butcher knife was not sharp enough, and then reached 

down and opened the bottom drawer of the nightstand to show her his military 

knife. Jennifer testified she jumped over him and grabbed it, put the butcher 

knife on the nightstand, and returned to the middle of the bed. Jennifer put 

the military knife against her left wrist and again asked him how to hold the 

knife to cut her wrist. Dr. Trayers told her that, if she wanted to kill herself, 

she needed to cut an artery that ran down her arm, and she started poking at 

that artery with the knife. 

According to Jennifer’s testimony, Fred did not respond, and she grew 

angrier. She poked herself harder and started to bleed and from Dr. 

Trayers’[s] reaction she believed he thought it was funny. Jennifer held the 

knife to her chest and asked where she should stab herself, and he said, 

“Lower.” Jennifer testified she became angrier than she had ever been. 

Jennifer, while still being questioned by her counsel on direct 

examination, testified that Dr. Trayers, using his left hand, grabbed her wrist 

to try to take the knife from her. She also stated that Dr. Trayers was righthanded, and he used his left hand because she was kneeling on his right hand. 

Jennifer testified she did not intentionally kneel on his right hand to pin it 

down. 

Jennifer’s counsel asked her, “And at this point right as he starts to grab 

toward the knife, do you recall whether you were feeling the effects of the 

Ambien or not?” Jennifer replied, “I don’t recall that I am.” 

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Jennifer indicated she and Dr. Trayers started wrestling when she was 

still on top of his right hand, but he got his right hand out from under her, and 

then they struggled over the knife. During the struggle, the knife remained 

pointed in Jennifer’s direction even though her arms were swinging. To force 

Dr. Trayers to release his grip on her right wrist, Jennifer leaned over him and 

banged his left arm on the side of the mattress. She testified that, even though 

Dr. Trayers was stronger, she was able to free her wrist from his grip. Dr. 

Trayers then sat up and reached with his right hand for the butcher knife on 

his nightstand. Jennifer testified that Dr. Trayers touched the handle of the 

knife, and she stabbed him with the military knife in the back of the neck 

because “[i]t was the first place I saw skin” and she aimed for it. The butcher 

knife fell to the floor. 

Dr. Trayers then stood up by the nightstand, facing her and pulling the 

comforter and flat sheet from underneath her. Jennifer testified that Dr. 

Trayers bent down and then she blacked out. She stated she did not remember 

stabbing Dr. Trayers a second time, and she had no memory of stabbing him 

multiple times in the chest and back. Jennifer also testified she did not 

specifically intend to kill her husband that morning, and she never thought 

that morning that she was so jealous of his seeing Robins that she wanted him 

dead. 

(Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 3–14 (footnotes omitted).) In addition, the Court 

adopts the detailed discussion of the evidence presented at Petitioner’s trial set forth in the 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. (Doc. No. 15 at 3–17.)

II. Procedural History

 On February 8, 2012, a jury convicted Petitioner of second degree murder in 

violation of California Penal Code § 187(a), and returned a true finding on the allegation 

that she used a deadly weapon within the meaning of California Penal Code § 12022(b)(1). 

(Doc. No. 13-11, Lodgment No. 2-2 at CT 146.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 

sixteen years to life. (Doc. No. 13-12, Lodgment No. 2-3 at CT 163.) 

Petitioner appealed her conviction, arguing that: (1) the trial court erroneously 

admitted evidence of Petitioner’s extramarital affair with Webb at trial; (2) the evidence 

presented at trial was insufficient to support a conviction of any crime greater than 

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voluntary manslaughter; and (3) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by 

misstating the law during closing arguments. (See Doc. No. 13-15, Lodgment No. 4.) On 

January 31, 2014, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s arguments on the 

merits and affirmed the judgment. (Doc. No. 3-18, Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner then filed 

a petition for review in the California Supreme Court raising the same claims. (Doc. No. 

3-19, Lodgment No. 8.) On April 16, 2014, the California Supreme Court summarily 

denied the petition in an order stating: “The petition for review is denied.” (Doc. No. 3-20, 

Lodgment No. 9.) 

On April 20, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a federal habeas petition before this Court, 

alleging violations of her constitutional rights on the same three grounds as raised in her 

direct appeal. (Doc. No. 1 at 6–8.) On January 14, 2016, Respondent filed a response to 

the petition. (Doc. No. 12.) On February 8, 2016, Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 14.) 

On May 10, 2016, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending 

that the Court deny the petition. (Doc. No. 15.) 

Discussion

I. Legal Standards for 35 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition

A federal court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in 

custody pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 

accord Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does 

not lie for errors of state law.” (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). “Habeas corpus is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ available 

only to those ‘persons whom society has grievously wronged . . . .’” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 

F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633–34 

(1993)). Because Petitioner filed the present petition after April 24, 1996, the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs the petition. See 

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Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322–23 (1997); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (en banc). 

Under AEDPA, a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to a state court judgment “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim”: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). “This is a ‘difficult 

to meet,’ and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands 

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 

(citations omitted). “Section 2254(d) thus demands an inquiry into whether a prisoner’s 

‘claim’ has been ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court; if it has, AEDPA’s highly 

deferential standards kick in.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015). “The 

petitioner carries the burden of proof.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. 

Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision was “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The 

Supreme Court has explained that “§ 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable 

application’ clauses have independent meaning.’” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); 

see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404–05 (2000) (distinguishing the “contrary to” and 

the “unreasonable application” standards). “A state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ [the 

Supreme Court’s] clearly established precedents if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in our cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

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from our precedent.’” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 405–06). A state court decision is “an unreasonable application” of the Supreme Court’s 

clearly established precedent if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule 

from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular 

state prisoner’s case” or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle 

from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or 

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. Under the “unreasonable application” prong, “the state court’s 

decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 

510, 520 (2003). The state court’s application of the relevant precedent must have been 

objectively unreasonable. Id.; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003); see also 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011) (“A state court’s determination that a claim 

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on 

the correctness of the state court’s decision.”). 

 “Section 2254(d)(1)’s ‘clearly established’ phrase ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed 

to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court 

decision.’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71; accord Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); see 

also Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (“[C]ircuit precedent does not 

constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.’”). 

Further, “review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the 

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. 

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Under this provision, 

“a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas 

court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 

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U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (“[E]ven if ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree’ 

about the finding in question, ‘on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial 

court’s . . . determination.’”). “Instead, § 2254(d)(2) requires that [the federal habeas court] 

accord the state trial court substantial deference.” Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 

(2015). 

 In conducting an analysis under AEDPA, the federal habeas court looks to the last 

reasoned state-court decision. Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Where there is an unexplained 

decision from the state’s highest court, the federal habeas court “looks through” to the last 

reasoned state court decision and presumes that the unexplained opinion rests upon the 

same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801–06 (1991); see, e.g., Brumfield, 135 

S. Ct. at 2276. Where no state-court decision furnishes a basis for the state court’s 

underlying reasoning, the court must engage in an independent review of the record and 

ascertain whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Castellanos, 766 

F.3d at 1145; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (“Where a state court’s decision is 

unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by 

showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”). 

 In addition, even if a federal habeas petitioner has established that a constitutional 

error occurred, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on a trial error unless the 

petitioner can establish that the error “resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 

637; accord Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197. “Under that standard, an error is harmless unless it 

had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Fry v. 

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, 

“[t]here must be more than a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the error was harmful.” Ayala, 

135 S. Ct. at 2198. 

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 A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(3). If a party objects to any portion of the magistrate’s report, the district court 

reviews de novo those portions of the report. Id.; see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“The statute makes it clear that the district 

judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if 

objection is made, but not otherwise.” (emphasis in original)). 

II. Petitioner’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim 

 As the first ground of her habeas petition, Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor’s 

misstatement of the law at closing argument violated her due process rights.1

 (Doc. No. 1 

at 6.) Petitioner contends that the prosecutor misstated the law on the provocation element 

required to mitigate the offense from second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter, in 

violation of her due process rights. (Id.) Petitioner also argues that the California Court 

of Appeal applied the wrong harmless error standard when reviewing this claim on appeal. 

(Id.) 

This claim was raised on direct appeal and denied by the state courts. (See Doc. 

Nos. 13-17, 13-18, 13-19, 13-20, Lodgment Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9.) Thus, in conducting the habeas 

review, the Court looks through the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of 

Petitioner’s petition for review and evaluates the California Court of Appeal’s reasoned 

decision denying Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim. See, e.g., Brumfield, 135 S. 

Ct. at 2276. The California Court of Appeal’s opinion provided the following background 

                                                                

1

 Respondent argues that Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is procedurally 

barred from habeas review due to her failure to object at trial. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 9–10.) However, 

a state court’s judgment on the merits despite procedural defaults lifts any bar to federal habeas 

reviews. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801. The California Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to 

adjudicate the claim on the merits despite Petitioner’s failure to object at trial because it involved 

an important question of constitutional law. (Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 35.) 

Accordingly, this Court reviews the claim on the merits. 

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facts for this claim:

The court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on heat 

of passion by giving CALCRIM No. 570. The court's instruction stated in 

relevant part: 

“In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider 

whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation 

and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion 

rather than from judgment.” (CALCRIM No. 570, italics added.) 

During her closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the heat of 

passion form of voluntary manslaughter and what constituted sufficient 

provocation. She then made the following statements that Jennifer now 

claims, for the first time, misstated the law regarding provocation: 

“You decide whether the provocation was sufficient. 

“What does [Jennifer] tell you about it? 

“You decide whether a person of average disposition in the same 

situation, knowing the same facts, knowing the same 

circumstances, would that person, that average person, have 

reacted in the same manner from passion, rather than 

judgment[.] [¶] . . . 

“Well, would a person of average disposition kill if under those 

circumstances this husband, who had been an ideal husband as 

described in this letter. . . . [¶] . . . 

“If that were to occur where a person were to say ‘Don't do it like 

this. Cut it that way,’” laugh, get up. Get up off that bed. Get 

out of that room. Get out of that condo and leave that marriage. 

Walk out. Go. 

“But stab a man in the head, in the chest, in the back nine times 

for that? Is that sufficient provocation? Is that sufficient reason 

to kill?” (Italics added.) 

Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor argued, “Again, the defendant cannot 

set her own standard. It has to be how a person of average disposition would 

react.” (Italics added.) 

(Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 33–34.) On appeal, Petitioner argued, and the 

Government conceded, that the prosecutor misstated the law on provocation at closing 

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argument. (Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 36.) Under California law, the proper 

standard for finding sufficient provocation to reduce an unlawful killing from murder to 

manslaughter is not whether an ordinary person of average disposition would kill under the 

circumstances, but whether such a person would react from passion rather than from 

judgment under the circumstances. See People v. Beltran, 56 Cal. 4th 935, 942, 949 (2013). 

As a result, the prosecutor misstated the standard by asking the jury to decide whether a 

person of average disposition would “have reacted in the same manner” or would “kill” 

under the same circumstances. (Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 33.) 

Nonetheless, the California Court of Appeal determined that the prosecutor’s 

misstatement of the law did not warrant reversal of Petitioner’s conviction. (Id. at 37.) The 

Court of Appeal noted that the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 570, 

which is consistent with Beltran’s standard for provocation. See 56 Cal. 4th at 954 n.14. 

(Id. at 33.) The Court of Appeal also noted that the trial court instructed the jury to follow 

the court’s instructions if the attorneys’ comments on the law conflicted with the court’s 

instructions. (Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 37.) The Court of Appeal presumed that 

the jury understood the trial court’s instructions and followed the proper standard set forth 

in CALCRIM No. 570, citing People v. Hinton, 37 Cal. 4th 839, 871 (2006). (Id. at 38.) 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal found the prosecutorial error harmless because Petitioner 

failed to show “a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the 

complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.” (Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 

at 37.) 

A. Standard of Review 

A prosecutor’s improper or incorrect statements during a trial constitute a due 

process violation only if they “‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process.’” Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2153 (quoting Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). In determining whether a due process violation 

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occurred, the court must examine the misconduct in the context of the entire proceedings. 

See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). Moreover, under AEDPA’s 

highly deferential view, a federal habeas court may not grant habeas relief unless the state 

court’s harmless error determination is so unreasonable that no fairminded jurist could 

agree with it. See Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199. 

B. Analysis 

Under AEDPA’s deferential standard, Petitioner’s first claim fails because the 

California Court of Appeal’s harmless error determination was objectively reasonable. 

Clearly established Supreme Court precedent provides for a presumption that jurors follow 

a trial court’s instructions and disregard the prosecutor’s arguments to the extent they are 

inconsistent. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is presumed to 

follow its instructions.”); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990) (“[A]rguments of 

counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court. The 

former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument . . . and are likely 

viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter . . . are viewed as definitive and binding 

statements of the law. Arguments of counsel which misstate the law are subject to 

objection and to correction by the court.”). 

Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury to follow CALCRIM No. 570, which 

sets forth the correct standard to evaluate provocation. (Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 

at 37.) The trial court also instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 200 to follow the law 

as the court explained it and to follow the court’s instructions if the attorney’s comments 

on the law conflict with the court’s instructions. (Id.) Further, there is nothing in the record 

showing that the jurors failed to follow the trial court’s instructions. Therefore, the 

California Court of Appeal’s determination that the jury followed the trial court’s 

instructions, ignored the prosecutor’s misstatements, and applied the correct standard for 

provocation was a reasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent 

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and a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence in the record. 

Accordingly, the Court denies this claim on the merits. 

III. Petitioner’s Admission of Evidence Claim 

In ground two, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated her due process rights 

by erroneously admitting evidence of her affair with Orvill Webb. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) 

Petitioner argues that this evidence should not have been admitted because it was irrelevant 

and any probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial impact. (Id.; 

Doc. No. 14 at 6.) 

This Court again looks to the California Court of Appeal’s reasoned decision. See 

Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2276. Petitioner filed a motion in limine and renewed the objection 

at trial seeking to exclude evidence of her affair with Webb that ended around 2005 as 

irrelevant and prejudicial, but also argued that evidence of Dr. Trayers’s first affair with 

Danielle Merket in 2007 should be admitted as it related to her state of mind at the time of 

the killing. (Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 14–16; Doc. No. 13-10, Lodgment No. 

2-1 at 46–49.) The trial court ruled on both occasions to admit the evidence of Petitioner’s 

affair with Webb because it was relevant for the jury to understand the true state of 

Petitioner’s marriage and “what the emotions were and what Jennifer was feeling on 

December 4 when she killed Dr. Trayers.” (Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 17.) 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the 

trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence, and that the 

admission of the evidence did not violate Petitioner’s due process rights. (Id. at 20, 23.) 

The Court of Appeal reasoned that “[Petitioner] placed at issue the state of her marriage 

with Dr. Trayers, and thus her motive in killing him, by arguing that evidence of Dr. 

Trayers’s first affair—with Merket before she had her own affair with Webb—was relevant 

to her state of mind at the time she killed Dr. Trayers. Webb’s testimony about his affair 

with [Petitioner] while she was married to Dr. Trayers was relevant to both the state of her 

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marital relationship with Dr. Trayers and her motive at the time she killed him.” (Id. at 

21.) Furthermore, “Jennifer portrayed herself in the eight-page email she sent to Robins as 

a wife who had been dedicated to Dr. Trayers over the years and had sacrificed for him 

despite his two extramarital affairs. Webb’s testimony that [Petitioner] had her own affair 

with him undermined her self-portrayal in that letter and had some tendency in reason to 

call her credibility into question.” (Id. at 21–22.) Finally, the Court of Appeal rejected 

Petitioner’s contention that the evidence was unduly prejudicial because Webb’s testimony 

was short and did not uniquely evoke an emotional bias against Petitioner as an individual 

with very little effect on the issues. (Id. at 22.) 

A. Standard of Review 

“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle, 502 U.S. 

at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief based on a claim that the trial court violated a state evidentiary rule. See id.; see also 

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[F]ailure to comply with the 

state’s rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting habeas 

relief.”). Rather, to establish entitlement to habeas relief, a petitioner must show that the 

trial court’s evidentiary ruling constituted a violation of constitutional rights. See Estelle, 

502 U.S. at 67–68; see also Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Even 

where it appears that evidence was erroneously admitted, a federal court will interfere only 

if it appears that its admission violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair 

trial.”). 

The erroneous admission of evidence violates due process only where the evidence 

“is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.” 

Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). The admission of evidence that is 

relevant to an issue in a case does not violate the Due Process Clause. See Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 69–70 (finding no due process violation where evidence was relevant to an issue in 

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the case). 

B. Analysis 

The California Court of Appeal’s determination that the admission of evidence of 

Petitioner’s affair did not violate due process was a reasonable application of clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent. Webb’s testimony about Petitioner’s affair was 

relevant to Petitioner’s credibility, in particular Petitioner’s portrayal of her marriage with 

the victim. It was also relevant to understanding her state of mind when she killed Dr. 

Trayers and evaluating how Dr. Trayer’s affair with Robbins affected her. Because the 

evidence in question was relevant to issues in the case, the trial court’s admission of the 

evidence was not so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. 

at 69–70. As a result, the Court rejects Petitioner’s second claim on the merits. 

IV. Petitioner’s Insufficiency of Evidence Claim

 Finally, Petitioner challenges her conviction of second degree murder on the ground 

that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of anything greater 

than voluntary manslaughter. (Doc. No. 1 at 8.) She argues that no reasonable juror would 

have found that she killed her husband with malice rather than in the heat of passion. (Id.) 

A. Standard of Review 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979) sets forth the standard for a federal 

habeas court to review the sufficiency of evidence. The Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof 

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Under Jackson, a habeas petitioner challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support his state criminal conviction may obtain relief 

only if “it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial no rational trier of fact 

could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324. Therefore, “the 

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

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beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. 

 “Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are 

subject to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 

(2012) (per curiam). First, on direct appeal, a reviewing court can only set aside the jury’s 

verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence if no rational trier of fact could have agreed 

with the jury. See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam). Second, on 

collateral review, a federal court can only overturn a state court’s decision rejecting a 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge if the state court’s decision was objectively 

unreasonable, but can not do so simply because the federal court disagrees with the state 

court. See id. The Ninth Circuit also adopts an additional degree of deference when 

applying Jackson’s standard on sufficiency of evidence in habeas petitions. See Boyer v. 

Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2011); Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. 

In applying Jackson’s standard, federal courts must look to state law for the 

substantive elements of the criminal offense. See 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. Under California 

law, criminal homicide is divided into murder and manslaughter. Beltran, 56 Cal. 4th at 

941. “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.” Cal. 

Penal Code § 187(a). Malice may be express or implied. Id. § 188. “Express malice is an 

intent to kill. . . . Malice is implied when a person willfully does an act, the natural and 

probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the person knowingly 

acts with conscious disregard for the danger to life that the act poses.” People v. Gonzalez, 

54 Cal. 4th 643, 653 (2012). Murder is further divided into first and second degree murder. 

See Cal. Penal Code § 189. “Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human 

being with malice, but without the additional elements (i.e., willfulness, premeditation, and 

deliberation) that would support a conviction of first degree murder.” People v. Chun, 45 

Cal.4th 1172, 1181 (2009); see also Cal. Penal Code § 189. 

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On the other hand, “[m]anslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without 

malice.” Cal. Penal Code § 192. Manslaughter is voluntary when the killing is “upon a 

sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” Id. “Heat of passion is a mental state that precludes 

the formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from murder to [voluntary] 

manslaughter.” Beltran, 56 Cal. 4th at 942. “The heat of passion requirement for 

manslaughter has both an objective and a subjective component.” People v. Steele, 27 Cal. 

4th 1230, 1252 (2002). The subjective component requires that the defendant “actually, 

subjectively, kill[ed] under the heat of passion.” Id. The objective component requires 

that “at the time of the killing, the reason of the [defendant] was obscured or disturbed by 

passion to such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average 

disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and reflection, and from such passion 

rather than from judgment.” Beltran, 56 Cal. 4th at 942 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Analysis 

Petitioner argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction of 

second degree murder. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner contends that based on the trial evidence, 

no reasonable trier of fact would find that the killing resulted from malice rather than heat 

of passion. (Id.) In conducting habeas review, this Court looks to the substantive 

requirements of California state law and evaluates the objective reasonableness of the 

California Court of Appeal’s sufficiency of the evidence determination under Jackson. See 

443 U.S. at 319, 324 n.16. Thus, for Petitioner to prevail on her claim, the evidence in the 

record must be such that no reasonable trier of fact could find that Petitioner killed her 

husband with malice and that the provocation did not satisfy the heat of passion standard. 

First, the California Court of Appeal concluded that a reasonable juror could find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner killed Dr. Trayers either intentionally or by 

acting with a conscious disregard for his life while knowing she was endangering his life. 

(Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 27.) The Court of Appeal relied on Petitioner’s own 

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testimony establishing that she aimed the first stabbing wound to the part of Dr. Trayers’s 

neck that showed skin: 

Specifically, Jennifer testified she stabbed him “the first time” with military 

knife “in the back of the neck.” Her trial counsel then asked her, “Did you 

aim for the back of his neck or head, or did that just happen that way?” 

Jennifer replied, “It was the first place I saw skin.” Her counsel then asked 

her, “And when you say that was the first place you saw skin, were you aiming

for a part of his body that had skin showing?” Jennifer answered, “Yes.” 

(Id.) “In addition, undisputed medical expert testimony established that Jenifer stabbed 

Dr. Trayers numerous times in vital parts of his body, including twice in the chest and eight 

times in the back.” (Id.) Dr. Trayers’s blood splatter and slashes on the pillows, sheets, 

and mattress on his side of the bed were consistent with Dr. Trayer’s having been stabbed 

while he was lying on the bed under the bedding, and contradicted Petitioner’s testimony 

that Dr. Trayers stood up and pulled off the bedding. (Id. at 5–6, 14.) The multiple incised 

wounds to Dr. Trayers’s hands were consistent with defensive wounds where he was 

attempting to block or grab the knife to defend himself. (Id. at 5.) Most of Petitioner’s 

wounds were superficial, and medical experts opined that those wounds were self-inflicted. 

(Id. at 4–5.) Finally, Petitioner testified that she was not under the effects of the sleeping 

aid at the time of the stabbing. (Id. at 13.) Based on the evidence, a rational trier of fact 

could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner intentionally aimed her first knife 

strike at the back of Dr. Trayers’s neck, and she also intentionally inflicted the subsequent 

knife strikes while Dr. Trayers was lying in bed. (Id. at 27, 29.) 

Furthermore, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the provocation at the 

time of the killing was not sufficient as would cause a reasonable person to act rashly and 

without deliberation and reflection. See Beltran, 56 Cal. 4th at 942. (Id. at 30.) Petitioner 

learned about Dr. Trayers’s affair with Robins almost two months before the day of the 

killing. (Doc. No. 13-18, Lodgment No. 7 at 9–10.) Petitioner claimed that Dr. Trayers 

laughed at her when she poked her wrist with the butcher knife. (Id. at 12.) The jury was 

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not required to find this testimony credible. But, even assuming this testimony was 

credible, a reasonable juror could conclude that Dr. Trayer’s response to Petitioner’s 

escalating behavior was not sufficiently provocative as to cause a reasonable person under 

the circumstances to lose reason and judgment. (Id. at 31–32.) Accordingly, the Court of 

Appeal concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that Petitioner “acted 

with malice when she fatally stabbed Dr. Trayers, and that Dr. Trayers’s conduct was not 

sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to 

act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.” (Id. at 26, internal quotation marks 

omitted.) 

Affording due respect to the fact-finding role of the jury and the state court’s 

judgment, this Court concludes that the evidence at Petitioner’s trial is sufficient to 

establish malice in the killing of Dr. Trayers. See Beltran, 56 Cal. 4th at 942. On the basis 

of the trial evidence, a rational jury could infer that Petitioner intentionally inflicted 

multiple knife wounds aimed at Dr. Trayers’s neck and vital organs, and that she was not 

sufficiently provoked to act out of passion rather than judgment at the time of the killing. 

As a result, this Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence as required by due process 

to support Petitioner’s conviction, and that the California Court of Appeal decision is a 

reasonable application of the Jackson standard. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s 

claim on the merits. 

V. Certificate of Appealability 

 A certificate of appealability may issue only if the petitioner “has made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district 

court has denied the petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner satisfies 

the above requirement by demonstrating “that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not find the 

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Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s claims debatable or wrong. Accordingly, the Court 

declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus and adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. (Doc. Nos. 1, 15.) 

Additionally, the Court denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 1, 2016 

 

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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