Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02024/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02024-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAUNCEY M. MAHAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JUAN PEREZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.16-cv-02024-JST 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

Re: ECF Nos. 24, 27, 86, 88

Before the Court are four separate motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 24, 27, 86, 88, and 

several related requests for judicial notice, ECF Nos. 26, 85, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 108. For the 

reasons stated below, the motions to dismiss and the requests for judicial notice are granted.

I. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Two of the four motions to dismiss are accompanied by requests for judicial notice. 

Although a court’s review on a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the allegations in the 

complaint, the Court may properly take judicial notice of material attached to the complaint and of 

matters of public record pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). A court may thus take judicial notice of matters of public 

record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, but it may not 

take judicial notice of a fact that is subject to reasonable dispute. Id. at 689. A court “must take 

judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. 

R. Evid. 201(c)(2); see Sato v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, No. 11–cv–00810–EJD (PSG), 2011 WL 

2784567, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011).

In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants Reed Smith, LLC, Miles Cooley, and 

Jordan Siev request that the Court take judicial notice of various court documents filed in Mahan 

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v. Roc Nation, No. 14-cv-5075, a related case before Judge Lorna Schofield in the Southern 

District of New York (the “SDNY litigation”), and Mahan v. City of Los Angeles, No. PC 58925, 

a related case Mahan filed in California state court. ECF Nos. 26, 85. Defendant Juan Perez 

makes a similar, though more expansive, request. ECF No. 87, 108. Finally, Plaintiff Chauncey 

Mahan filed several documents styled as requests for judicial notice, which contain a variety of 

court filings and emails. ECF Nos. 89, 90, 91, 92, 93.

1

To the extent the parties seek judicial notice documents filed by the parties or the court in 

either the SDNY litigation or the related California state court case, the Court finds the documents 

appropriate for judicial notice as documents in the public record not reasonably subject to dispute,

because their accuracy can readily be determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 

be questioned. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ requests for judicial notice, ECF Nos. 

26, 85, 87, 108; grants Mahan’s request at ECF Nos. 89 and 90; grants in part and denies in part 

Mahan’s request at ECF No. 91; denies Mahan’s request at ECF No. 92; and denies Mahan’s 

request at ECF No. 93.

II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

A. Factual Background

For purposes of deciding these motions to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the following 

allegations from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 3. Moyo v. Gomez, 40 

F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff Chauncey M. Mahan is a sound engineer. ECF No. 3 at 7. From August 1999 to 

November 2000, “agents” of non-party Universal Music Group (“UMG”), including Roc-A-Fella

Records, LLC and Shawn Carter (popularly known as Jay Z), commissioned Mahan as “an 

independent contractor.” In this capacity, Mahan “contributed to the making of forty-one (41) 

individual sound recordings.” Id. at 9. In November 2000, Mahan allegedly “transmitted a 

notification” to various UMG agents that he possessed various “multi-track sound records”2

 

1 Docket No. 93 was also filed as a request for judicial notice but is actually a certificate of 

service.

2

The Court refers to these recordings as “the Media” for purposes of this order. 

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related to this work, but received no response. Id. at 10. 

Fourteen years later, Mahan contacted Roc Nation, LLC, a “full service entertainment 

company” organized by Carter, about the recordings he still had in his possession.3 In response,

Miles Cooley, a Reed Smith, LLC attorney representing Roc Nation, met with Mahan at his Los 

Angeles storage unit to “catalog[] the valuable items that were in [Mahan’s] possession.” ECF 

No. 3 at 10. The next day, a Cooley lawyer called the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) 

“and convince[d] them (somehow) that [Mahan] should be arrested for being in ‘Possession of 

Stolen Property.’” Id. at 11. LAPD then seized the Media from Mahan’s storage unit. Id. 

B. Related Litigation in the Southern District of New York

In 2014, Mahan filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York against Roc 

Nation, Rock-A-Fella Records, and Carter based on this series of events. ECF No. 87-1. Mahan 

sought a declaratory judgment that he was the author and copyright owner of the Media, and 

claimed that the defendants had conspired to commit conversion and had committed trespass to 

chattel. Id. In his complaint, Mahan stated that he “was not arrested by police in connection with 

the April 18, 2014 incident.” Id. In April 2015, the SDNY court dismissed all of Mahan’s claims, 

concluding that they were untimely. ECF No. 87-2. The parties dispute whether this order 

expressly decided who owned the Media. The Second Circuit affirmed the court’s dismissal

order, but did not address ownership of the Media. ECF No. 87-4. Back in district court, Rock-AFella requested a final determination awarding it the ownership of the Media, which Mahan 

opposed. On August 9, 2016, the district court issued an order concluding that Mahan had “no 

ownership interest in the copyrighted sound recordings contained in the media” and granting

Rock-A-Fella ownership and possession of the Media (the “SDNY Ownership Order”). ECF No. 

87-15. 

 

3

The parties dispute the content of this communication. Perez claims Mahan “demanded that Roc 

Nation pay him a $100,000 ‘storage fee’ for keeping the [Media], or else Mahan would auction off 

the songs.” ECF No. 87-4. Mahan claims he simply notified Defendants that the Media was in his 

possession and might soon be auctioned off from his storage unit. ECF No. 98 at 49. The Court 

assumes as true Mahan’s version of the facts for purposes of this order.

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C. Procedural Background

Meanwhile, in April 2016, Mahan filed the instant action in the Northern District of 

California. Although the facts alleged are nearly identical to those in the New York case, Mahan 

names a different set of Defendants: 1) Juan Perez, an executive officer of Roc Nation; 2) the law 

firm Reed Smith, LLC, and two of its then-attorneys (the “Reed Smith Defendants”); 3) the City 

of Los Angeles and four LAPD officers (the “LAPD Defendants”); and 4) the City of New York 

and three New York Police Department (“NYPD”) officers (the “NYPD Defendants”). ECF No. 3 

at 1. Mahan claims these parties violated his equal protection and due process rights under the 

United States, New York, and California Constitutions and seeks over one hundred million dollars 

in damages. Id. at 13-14. At bottom, Mahan alleges that he was falsely arrested and that his 

property was wrongfully confiscated, and that each Defendant played a role.

Defendants have filed four motions to dismiss. First, on June 3, 2016, the Reed Smith 

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that 1) Mahan’s various constitutional claims fail because 

the Reed Defendants are not state actors, 2) the SDNY Ownership Order collaterally estops Mahan 

from any claims arising out of his alleged property loss, and 3) Mahan cannot make any claims 

arising out of his alleged arrest because he “twice claimed in court papers that he was not 

arrested.” ECF No. 24. Second, the LAPD Defendants moved to dismiss a few days later, 

claiming that Mahan’s complaint should be dismissed for improper venue. ECF No. 27. Third, 

Defendant Perez filed his motion to dismiss on September 12, 2016. ECF No. 86. Perez’s motion 

makes many of the same estoppel arguments as the Reed Smith Defendants’ motion, and also 

asserts that res judicata bars Mahan’s claims against Perez because he already unsuccessfully sued 

Perez’s employer, Roc Nation, in the Southern District of New York. Id. Fourth, the NYPD 

Defendants moved to dismiss on September 12, 2016. ECF No. 88. That motion argues that 

Mahan’s New York state law claims must be dismissed for failure to comply with a state law 

requiring him to file a “notice of claim” within 90 days of the alleged incident. All four motions 

additionally argue that Mahan’s complaint is “devoid of factual allegations that would plausibly 

entitle [him] to relief.” See, e.g., id. at 4. 

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D. Legal Standard

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court must “accept all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).

E. Analysis

Mahan’s claims all rest on two alleged incidents: 1) the confiscation of his property from 

the Los Angeles storage unit, and 2) his false arrest.” ECF No. 3. The Court grants the motions to 

dismiss as to all Defendants because Mahan is barred from making claims arising out of either 

incident.

1. Property Confiscation

The Court concludes that the SDNY Ownership Order collaterally estops Mahan from 

making any claims stemming from the LAPD’s confiscation of the Media from his storage unit. 

In the Ninth Circuit, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of an issue when

three criteria are met:

(1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one alleged in the prior litigation; (2) the issue 

must have been actually litigated by the party against whom preclusion is asserted in the 

prior litigation; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been 

a critical and necessary part of the judgment in the earlier action.

McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and 

alterations omitted). 

First, the issue at stake here – whether Mahan owns the confiscated Media – is identical to 

the issue in the SDNY litigation. In his FAC, Mahan asserts that his “property was illegally 

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confiscated” and that Defendants conspired to “unconstitutionally hold [his] property without due 

process of law.” ECF No. 3 at 12. These arguments are premised on the claim that Mahan owned 

and controlled the Media and the sound recordings contained within them. This is the very issue 

that Mahan litigated and lost in New York. In that case, the defendants (Roc Nation, Roc-A-Fella 

Records, and Carter) filed an application for an order of forfeiture awarding Roc-A-Fella 

possession of the same Media that Mahan alleges belongs to him in the present case. ECF No. 

146. Mahan’s argument that the earlier SDNY order dismissing his claims, later affirmed by the 

Second Circuit, did not address ownership is simply not credible given that the SDNY erased any 

doubt in its subsequent Ownership Order.4 Therefore, the first element is satisfied.

Second, the question of who owned the Media was “actually litigated by” Mahan, the party 

against whom preclusion is asserted.” McQuillion, 369 F.3d at 1096. After the defendants in the 

SDNY litigation filed their application for an order of forfeiture, Mahan responded, and the court 

held a hearing. ECF No. 87-15 at 2. Only then did the court grant the defendants’ application and 

find that “Mahan has no ownership interest in the copyrighted sound recordings contained within 

the Media.” Id. at 5. That this decision resulted from an “adversarial” proceeding weighs in favor 

of the application of collateral estoppel. See In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 

1983). So does the fact that Mahan had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the ownership 

question. Maciel v. C.I.R., 489 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007). Mahan had every reason to 

vigorously contest Rock-A-Fella’s ownership of the Media in response to its application for an 

order of forfeiture. Id. Therefore, the Court need not decide whether the district court had already 

decided the question of ownership in its earlier order, later affirmed, that dismissed Mahan’s 

claims on timeliness grounds. 

Third, the ownership question was a “critical and necessary part of the judgment” in the 

SDNY litigation. McQuillion, 369 F.3d at 1096. In its order granting the SDNY defendants 

possession and ownership of the Media, the court specifically stated that “pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 

 

4 Mahan’s attempt to distinguish the sound recordings contained in the Media versus the Media 

itself likewise fails because the Ninth Circuit has interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) to permit 

confiscation of “the whole of the paraphernalia” even if the items “may be used for other 

purposes.” Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1972).

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§ 503(b), as part of the final disposition of an action brought under the United States Copyright 

Act, this Court may order the reasonable disposition of all ‘masters, tapes . . . or other articles’

from which infringing copies or phonorecords may be reproduced, as well as any equipment that 

may be used for purposes of infringement.” ECF No. 87-15 at 6. Explicitly determining who 

owned of the Media was necessary to fully resolve the dispute between Mahan and the SDNY 

defendants, even after the district court had granted the motions to dismiss. 

Ninth Circuit case law also requires that the issue have been “finally” decided. Luben 

Indus., Inc. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1983). This does not mean final “in 

the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”; rather, “the proper query here is whether the court’s decision on 

the issue as to which preclusion is sought is final.” Syverson v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 472 

F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007). The SDNY Ownership Order satisfies this test. It says: “IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED as a part of the final disposition of this action that ownership and 

possession of [the Media] is awarded to Defendant Rock-A-Fella Records, LLC.” ECF No. 146 at 

5 (emphasis added). The fact that Mahan can appeal this order does not change the Court’s 

analysis because “a final judgment retains its collateral estoppel effect, if any, while pending 

appeal.” Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In sum, Mahan is precluded from arguing that he owned the Media confiscated from his 

Los Angeles storage unit, and by extension from making any claims arising out of that property. 

2. False Arrest

Mahan’s claims, however, stem not only from the confiscation of the Media, but also from 

his alleged false arrest. This assertion, too, is barred by Mahan’s own prior representations in 

court. 

“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion. Its purpose 

is to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing 

positions according to the exigencies of the moment.” Ah Quin v. Cty. of Kauai Dep’t of Transp., 

733 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and alterations omitted). The Supreme Court 

has identified three salient considerations that “typically inform the decision whether to apply the 

doctrine in a particular case”: 

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First, a party’s later position must be “clearly inconsistent” with its earlier 

position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in 

persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position, so that judicial 

acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the 

perception that either the first or the second court was misled . . . A third 

consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would 

derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if 

not estopped. 

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001). The Court clarified that these 

considerations are not “inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the 

applicability of judicial estoppel” and that “[a]dditional considerations may inform the doctrine’s 

application in specific factual contexts.” Id. at 751.

Here, all three factors weigh in favor of the application of judicial estoppel. First, contrary 

to Mahan’s current position that he was falsely arrested, in the SDNY litigation and in another 

case he filed in California state court, Mahan claimed that he was not arrested in connection with 

the confiscation of his property. For example, in his First Amended Complaint in the SDNY 

litigation, Mahan alleged that he “was not arrested by police in connection with the April 18, 2015 

incident.” ECF No. 87-1.

5

 Similarly, in the related California state court case, Mahn claimed not 

to have been arrested in both his Complaint and in his response the defendants’ demurrer. ECF 

No. 26-3 at 8, 54. These positions—one that Mahan was arrested and one that he was not—are 

“clearly inconsistent.” Second, Mahan persuaded the SNDY to accept his earlier position that he 

was not arrested. In its order dismissing Mahan’s claims, the court explained that “Mahan was not 

arrested or charged with any crimes related to the incident” where the Media was confiscated. 

ECF No. 87-2 at 3. For this Court to conclude now that Mahan was in fact arrested would “create 

the perception that either the first or the second court was misled.” New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 

751. The third factor weighs less strongly in favor of estoppel. Though common sense suggests it 

would be unfair to Defendants to allow Mahan to change his story about whether he was arrested, 

Defendants make no argument that Mahan would derive any sort of “unfair advantage” from doing 

so, aside from the obvious advantage of preserving his claims arising out of that arrest. 

 

5 Mahan’s response that he meant “not charged” when he said “not arrested” makes little sense 

given that the next paragraph in his SDNY FAC states: “As of the date of the filing of this 

complaint, Mahan has not been charged with any crime . . . .” Id. If Mahan had meant charged, 

when he said arrested, he would not have needed this second, duplicative paragraph. 

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Considering these three factors, two of which weigh strongly in favor of estoppel, the Court 

concludes that Mahan is barred from making any claims arising out of his alleged false arrest. 

To summarize, collateral estoppel bars Mahan’s claims arising out of the seizure of his 

property, while judicial estoppel bars any claims arising out of his false arrest. Mahan’s FAC is 

premised entirely on these two factual allegations. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss.6 

F. Dismissal with Prejudice

“Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 

the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment,” and “a court cannot dismiss a 

pro se complaint without first explaining to the plaintiff the deficiencies of the complaint and 

providing an opportunity to amend.” Frey v. United States, 122 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Moreover, in the absence of factors such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive,” leave to 

amend should be freely given. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

This Order will serve as the Court’s explanation to Mahan of the deficiencies of his 

complaint. The Court is skeptical that Mahan will be able amend to cure these deficiencies given 

that this Order effectively prohibits him from making any claims based on his ownership of the 

Media or his “arrest.” Nonetheless, because Mahan has not yet sought leave to file an amended 

complaint, the Court concludes that providing an opportunity to amend is appropriate. 

Any amended complaint must be filed within twenty-one days of the date of this order. 

Failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

 

6 Because the Court’s estoppel findings apply to all Defendants, the Court does not address the 

various Defendants’ alternative arguments for dismissing Mahan’s FAC. 

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