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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-20756

F.N. WILLIAMS, SR.; HOUSTON AREA PASTORS COUNCIL; 

HERNAN CASTANO; MAGDA HERMIDA; KHANH HUYNH, 

 Plaintiffs–Appellants,

versus

ANNISE D. PARKER, 

 Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

A group of Houston-area pastors and a council representing the interests 

of Houston-area pastors challenge the dismissal of their claims against Annise 

Parker, the former mayor of Houston. The district court found, variously, that 

plaintiffs lacked standing, that they failed to state a claim under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), that they failed to show Parker was not immune 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 13, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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from suit, and that res judicata barred their claims. Because the claims are 

non-justiciable, we affirm the dismissal.

I.

This case stems from a heated dispute surrounding the Houston Equal 

Rights Ordinance (“HERO”), enacted by the city council in 2014.1 HERO was 

controversial; its supporters claimed it was a garden-variety non-discrimination ordinance mainly designed to prohibit discrimination against lesbian, gay, 

bisexual, and transgendered (“LGBT”) persons,2 while its opponents maintained that it granted LGBT individuals special privileges3 and that, to avoid 

rejection, it was rammed through the council instead of being put to 

referendum.4

Plaintiffs opposed the passage of HERO and sought to have it repealed. 

They attempted to gather petition signatures in sufficient number that the city 

council would be forced either to repeal HERO or to place it on the ballot as a 

referendum. The Houston Area Pastors Council (“HAPC”), one of the plaintiffs,

funded the signature drive. Plaintiff F.N. Williams, Sr., a Houston resident,

 

1 Ordinance No. 2014-530 banned discrimination on the bases of “Protected Characteristics” defined as “sex, race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, familial status, marital 

status, military status, religion, disability, sexual orientation, genetic information, gender 

identity, or pregnancy.”

2 See, e.g., Manny Fernandez & Mitch Smith, Houston Voters Reject Broad AntiDiscrimination Ordinance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/us

/houston-voters-repeal-anti-bias-measure.html?_r=0. 

3 The plaintiffs’ brief claims that “[f]ar from creating equality, ‘HERO’ created special 

rights, not equal rights, for biological males to enter the public restrooms reserved for adult 

women, adolescent girls, and infants. On November 3, 2015, Houston voters resoundingly 

defeated passage of HERO by a margin of 69% against and 31% in favor.” We set forth the 

contentions of the two sides not for their accuracy vel non but to describe the intensity of the 

controversy.

4 See, e.g., Leslie Loftus, Houston Rejects Special LGBT Privileges by Huge Margin, 

THE FEDERALIST (Nov. 4, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/11/04/houston-rejects-speciallgbt-privileges-by-huge-margin/. 

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signed the petition. Along with plaintiffs Hernan Castano, Magda Hermida, 

and Khanh Huynh, Williams helped to circulate the petition and gathered signatures. The petitions were then turned in to the City Secretary, Anna Russell, whose ministerial duty was to make sure the signatures were valid and, 

if so, to certify the results. Russell adjudged the petition to have 17,846 signatures, more than the minimum required number of 17,269.5 

Nevertheless, Parker and the then-City Attorney, David Feldman, held 

a press conference a few days later, stating that the petitions had been rejected

for fraudulent signatures. In response, Williams and other plaintiffs filed a 

variety of actions in state court asking that Parker be forced to act in accordance with the city charter and either repeal HERO or put it to referendum. 

HAPC funded that litigation. The Texas Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus requiring Parker to obey the city charter by either repealing the ordinance or scheduling the referendum. In re Woodfill, 470 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2015) 

(per curiam). 

During that process, Parker, through attorney Feldman, issued subpoenas to five Houston-area pastors (including plaintiffs Castano, Hermida, 

and Huynh), requiring production of speeches and sermons related to HERO 

and communications with their congregations concerning HERO. Parker defended the subpoenas on Twitter and also in state court, where they had been 

challenged as unlawful.6 In the resulting referendum in November 2015, the 

 

5 Russell did not count every signature but only enough—roughly a third of the total—

to be certain that the petitions had enough signatures to succeed; she then ceased tallying.

6 The subpoenas were highly controversial and made national news. See, e.g., Sarah 

Bailey, Houston Subpoenas Pastors’ Sermons in Gay Rights Ordinance Case, WASH. POST

(Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/houston-subpoenaspastors-sermons-in-gay-rights-ordinance-case/2014/10/15/9b848ff0-549d-11e4-b86d184ac281388d_story.html. 

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voters ordered HERO’s repeal.7

Shortly after the conclusion of Woodfill, plaintiffs sued in state court

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Parker had deprived them of their First

Amendment rights to freedom of speech, religion, and association, as well as 

their right to vote. Parker removed to federal court. After briefing, the district 

court entered a judgment of dismissal “for Lack of Standing and Failure to 

State a Claim.”

Plaintiffs claim injury from three distinct actions they attribute to Parker: first, that HAPC “had to” pay attorney’s fees in the Woodfill litigation and 

other state-court litigation to remedy Parker’s unlawful conduct; second, that 

the issuance of subpoenas for sermons violated their First Amendment Rights; 

and third, that Parker’s actions in contesting the propriety of the signatures 

violated their First Amendment rights. Because none of these claims suffices

to establish standing, the district court correctly dismissed the action.

II.

Federal courts have jurisdiction only over “cases” or “controversies.” 

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, 

cl. 1). There is no case or controversy without standing to sue. Id. Standing 

is a threshold issue that we consider before examining the merits. Cibolo 

Waste, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 718 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2013). We review 

dismissals for lack of standing de novo. Ballew v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 668 F.3d 

777, 781 (5th Cir. 2012). 

To demonstrate standing, these plaintiffs must show “(1) that they suffered an injury in fact, which is a concrete and particularized invasion of a 

legally protected interest; (2) that the injury is traceable to the challenged 

 

7 See Fernandez & Smith, supra note 2.

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action of the [defendant]; and (3) it is likely, rather than merely speculative, 

the injury will be redressed by a particular decision.”8 Claimed injuries in fact 

must be “fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant.” Bennett v. Spear, 

520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). “The triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, and 

the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its 

existence.”9 If the party invoking federal jurisdiction fails to establish any one 

of injury in fact, causation, or redressability, then federal courts cannot hear 

the suit. Rivera, 283 F.3d at 319. 

A.

Per the plaintiffs, HAPC has standing to seek reimbursement of all of its 

fees, expenses, and costs in funding the various state-court suits. HAPC had 

to spend the money to finance that litigation, so the reasoning goes, to force 

Parker to obey the city charter, and therefore HAPC is entitled to recover that 

money in a separate suit. This circuit has repeatedly rejected that precise 

argument. See, e.g., Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now [“ACORN”] v. Fowler, 

178 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1999). In ACORN, we held, with no room for distinction, 

that the payment of attorney’s fees in previous cases—even where the litigation was to enforce federal rights—is not an injury in fact for subsequent 

litigation.10 That was because the injury to ACORN was fundamentally selfinflicted—no one forced it to sue, just as no one forced HAPC to finance the 

 

8 Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 

9 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1998) (footnote omitted); 

accord, e.g., Servicios Azucareros de Venezuela, C.A. v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc., 702 F.3d 

794, 800 (5th Cir. 2012); Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2002). 

10 ACORN, 178 F.3d at 358 (“An organization cannot obtain standing to sue in its own 

right as a result of self-inflicted injuries.”).

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Woodfill lawsuit. The injury there, similar to the damage here, was not “fairly 

traceable to the actions of the defendant,” so ACORN’s claimed infirmities were

insufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.11 We and other circuits 

have held similarly in other cases.12 

Additionally, permitting HAPC to recover would eviscerate the “American Rule” that, absent a superseding statute or ruling, each party is responsible for its own attorney’s fees, regardless of result. See, e.g., Alyeksa Pipeline 

Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 257 (1975). HAPC seeks to 

evade that requirement by filing a separate suit to recoup fees it previously 

expended. That rationale has no support in the law of federal justiciability; as 

one example, the Supreme Court has rejected an analysis that would “authorize the recovery of attorney’s fees in every case where the plaintiff has prevailed against the defendant in prior litigation involving the same issues.”13 

Recognizing standing for HAPC would do just that.14

 

11 Id. (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162). 

12 See, e.g., Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of Dall. v. Dallas Cty. Mental Health & Mental 

Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trs., 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The mere fact that an organization redirects some of its resources to litigation and legal counseling in response to actions 

or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart standing upon the organization.”); 

accord, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of Suburban Phila. v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 

80 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We hold . . . that the pursuit of litigation alone cannot constitute an injury 

sufficient to establish standing under Article III.”).

13 Summit Vally Indus. Inc. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 

456 U.S. 717, 725 (1982). Cf. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107 (“[A] plaintiff cannot achieve standing 

to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit.”). 

14 At oral argument, HAPC’s counsel suggested that HAPC can recover fees based on 

42 U.S.C. § 1988. But the plain text of Section 1988 says that it applies only to fees from the 

case at bar—there is nothing to suggest that it permits recovery of fees from previously litigated cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“In any action to enforce a provision of [various federal 

laws], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s 

fee as part of the costs . . . .”). So this court would be authorized to award HAPC its fees only

for this litigation, not previous state-court proceedings, if it were to prevail.

Even that is somewhat irrelevant, however, because HAPC never mentions Sec-

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HAPC claims, additionally, that the money it “had to” spend in organizing the signature drive also is injury in fact. But that contention suffers from 

the same flaw as does the argument over attorney’s fees: The injury is not 

fairly traceable to the defendant. HAPC made the decision, on its own, to pursue a repeal of HERO; no action of Parker’s forced it to spend that money. 

Given that HAPC’s only theory of standing is based on expenditures to litigate 

Woodfill and other state court cases and to organize the signature drive, the 

district court properly dismissed as to HAPC.15

B.

Next, the remaining plaintiffs assert that they have standing based on 

Parker’s failure to certify the petition. They state that each of them helped to 

organize the petition drive, that Williams signed the petition both as a voter 

and as a circulator,16 and that Parker’s actions violated their right to vote, as 

well as their freedoms of speech, association, and petition. 

Plaintiffs filed this action on August 3, 2015. The opinion in Woodfill, in 

which the Texas Supreme Court had granted a writ of mandamus compelling 

Parker to suspend enforcement of HERO and either repeal the ordinance or 

put it to a vote, was issued on July 24, 2015. So, by the time plaintiffs filed 

this complaint, they were not suffering from any injury—it was already certain 

that either the ordinance would be repealed or the referendum would take 

place on time and without further issue. The only possible claim for standing, 

 

tion 1988 in its brief. Failure to raise an issue on appeal is waiver. United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 

1993). 

15 HAPC makes no claim of associational standing on behalf of its members. Its only

theory of standing is the standing-based-on-attorney’s-fees-or-petition-expenditures notion 

that we reject.

16 Castano, Hermida, and Huynh are not residents of the city and did not sign the 

petition.

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given that Woodfill had already been decided, was that plaintiffs were somehow injured by the delay between their submission of the petition and Woodfill’s belated order to Parker to repeal HERO or schedule the referendum. But 

no such claim is made with any specificity here; instead, there is only the unadorned contention that Parker’s failure immediately to certify the referendum 

violated various First Amendment rights. That contention, without more, does 

not meet that burden, given that “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction 

bears the burden of establishing its existence.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103. 

C.

Castano, Hermida, and Huynh also claim standing based on subpoenas 

requiring them to produce sermons and communications with members of their 

congregations related to HERO. The plaintiffs suggest, without elaboration 

beyond a bare assertion, that the subpoenas violated their freedoms of speech, 

religion, association, and petition. As we have said, plaintiffs have the burden 

of establishing standing. Id. But they cite no authority—from this circuit or 

any other—for the proposition that the issuance of a subpoena violates any 

constitutional right. Nor do they explain how, precisely, their rights were 

curtailed—there is no assertion, for example, that their speech or their practice 

of religion was chilled by the receipt of the subpoenas, no assertion that they 

felt compelled to alter their interactions with their congregations because of 

Parker’s actions. Under this record, the plaintiffs have not adequately established an explanation of that alleged harm—it is not sufficient for Article III 

purposes to state that the issuance of a subpoena in and of itself violates a 

constitutional right. That procedural insufficiency alone requires dismissal for 

want of standing. 

The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED. 

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