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Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-20847

Summary Calendar

BIRGITT EYSSELINCK, Individually and as Next Friend of TE and NU,

minors, and Timothy A. Eysselinck, deceased,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; RONCO CONSULTING GROUP; FIDELITY

AND CASUALTY COMPANY/CNA INTERNATIONAL,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:07-CV-4589

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Birgitt Eysselinck’s husband, Timothy A. Eysselinck, committed suicide

while home on a leave of absence from his civilian job as a Task Leader for demining operations in Iraq. She sought death benefits under the Longshore and

Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, but her claim was denied at each

administrative level. The district court also denied relief. We AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 16, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 09-20847 Document: 00511204326 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/16/2010
No. 09-20847

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The decedent was responsible for the overall administration and training

of certain personnel who would perform de-mining operation tasks in Iraq. This

included defusing or rendering inoperable unexploded ordinance such as cluster

bombs and improvised explosive devices. He returned home on February 21,

2004 on a three-month leave of absence. On April 23, 2004, he committed

suicide. Eysselinck claims entitlement to death benefits because the workrelated stress and dangerous nature of the decedent’s work caused him to suffer

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) leading to an irresistible impulse to

commit suicide.

These claims are brought under the procedures of the Longshore and

Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50, as

extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-54. An Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) heard competing experts. Each expert reviewed records and

witness interviews. Neither had interviewed the decedent, nor were there any

contemporaneous medical treatment notes or records by a mental health care

professional. Thus, each expert was making a retrospective diagnosis of whether

the decedent suffered PTSD. The expert for the claimant stated the opinion that

the decedent must have suffered from PTSD related to his working conditions

because he could find no other cause. The other expert believed the available

evidence failed to establish that the decedent suffered from PTSD. Rather, the

decedent’s act was due to a combination of non-work related stressors, including

alcohol consumption.

The ALJ concluded that the expert who found insufficient support for a

diagnosis of PTSD was more persuasive. The decedent was found to have

willfully committed suicide, and benefits were denied. The Benefits Review

Board (“BRB”) affirmed. The district court subsequently denied the petition for

review of the BRB decision.

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No. 09-20847

II. DISCUSSION

Our review is of the BRB decision, not that of the district court.

“[A]ppellate court review need accord no particular deference to the district

court’s conclusion as to whether the identical administrative record does or does

not support the administrative determination. . . .” H.B. Zachry Co. v. Quinones,

206 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting La. Envtl. Soc’y, Inc. v. Dole, 707 F.2d

116, 119 (5th Cir. 1983)).

We examine the BRB decision “to determine whether it has adhered to its

proper scope of review – i.e., whether the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by

substantial evidence and are consistent with the law.” Gulf Best Elec., Inc. v.

Methe, 396 F.3d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing H.B. Zachry, 206 F.3d at 477).

“Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence – more than a scintilla but

less than a preponderance – that would cause a reasonable person to accept the

fact finding.” Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v.

Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 125 F.3d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1997). It is “evidence that

‘a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Hall v.

Consol. Emp’t Sys., Inc., 139 F.3d 1025, 1029 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)).

Civilian contractor employees working overseas are entitled to benefits

under the LHWCA. 42 U.S.C. § 1651(c). Even so, “[n]o compensation shall be

payable if the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee

or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.”

33 U.S.C. § 903(c). Eysselinck has the burden of proving the decedent’s suicide

was the result of an irresistible impulse to kill himself. To prove an irresistible

impulse, the claimant must produce expert opinion that the decedent suffered

from a mental disease or impairment that created the impulse leading to the

suicide. Voris v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 190 F.2d 929, 931 (5th Cir. 1951).

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No. 09-20847

On appeal, Eysselinck argues there is substantial evidence in the record

to prove that the decedent suffered from PTSD causing an irresistible impulse

1

to commit suicide, and the ALJ erred in finding the doctor it relied upon was

more credible. Extensive testimony was offered about the decedent’s work and

activities before his death. The ALJ found that the decedent had not been

exposed to life threatening situations in Iraq. After weighing both experts’

testimony, the ALJ concluded one was more credible than the other.

A court may not reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence considered by the

ALJ. La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bunol, 211 F.3d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 2000). “That the

facts may permit diverse inferences is immaterial. The [ALJ] alone is charged

with the duty of selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his

choice, if supported by the evidence, may not be disturbed.” Presley v. Tinsley

Maint. Serv., 529 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted). We accept the

evidentiary choices made by the ALJ.

Eysselinck also argues she was not granted the statutory presumption

that the decedent’s death was not willful. There is such a presumption, but it

applies only “in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . . . .” 33

U.S.C. § 920(d). This presumption’s “only office is to control the result where

there is an entire lack of competent evidence.” Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S.

280, 286 (1935). The ALJ was presented with a voluminous record and

thoroughly reviewed all of the testimony and expert opinions. The presumption

does not control. See id.

AFFIRMED.

1

In the alternative, Eysselinck argues that the decedent “at the least . . . suffered from

depression which could only have resulted from his service in Iraq. The ALJ and the [BRB]

did not formally consider this fact.” Although Eysselinck averred the decedent suffered from

depression, the issue before the ALJ was whether PTSD, not depression, could overcome the

voluntary intentions of the decedent’s suicide such that it could be described as involuntary.

She did not argue depression caused the suicide. There was substantial evidence to support

the ALJ’s decision. 

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