Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00321/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00321-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lorraine Patterson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona Department of Economic Security, 

et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00321-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court are two of Plaintiff’s motions (Docs. 63, 64), respectively 

entitled (verbatim): 

(1) “Motion/Petition FOR Recusal/Removal OF Judge Neil Wake28 U.S.C. § 144 

: US Code – Section 144: Bias or prejudice of judge Rule 60. Relief from a Judgment 

(s)or Order based on fraud,” and 

(2) “2nd MOTION FOR RECUSAL for Recusal of Judge Neil Wake; Voiding 

Rulings made on Fraud Upon the Court and Change of Venue Due to federal Court Clerk 

Misconduct.” 

The Court construes these as motions for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 

motions for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). For the reasons that 

follow, the motions will be denied. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff represents herself in this action and submits and receives filings by mail. 

On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a 198-page complaint against seventeen named 

Defendants. (Doc. 1, 1-1, 1-2.) On February 25, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show 

cause why her complaint should not be dismissed as inadequately pleaded or, in the 

alternative, to file an amended complaint by March 25. (Doc. 3.) 

On March 2, Plaintiff filed a substantially similar complaint. (Doc. 4.) But then 

she explained that, at the time she filed this new complaint, she had not yet received the 

Court’s February 25 order. (Doc. 6 at 1.) So the Court gave Plaintiff leave to file another 

complaint by March 25. (Doc. 7.) 

On March 26, Plaintiff filed a 113-page amended complaint (Doc. 10) and a 

motion to extend the March 25 deadline by one day (Doc. 9). The Court granted the 

motion and deemed the amended complaint timely. (Doc. 11.) But then the Court 

dismissed the amended complaint as still inadequately pleaded. (Doc. 13.) The Court 

permitted Plaintiff to move for leave to amend the complaint again. (Id.) 

On May 13, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend again (Doc. 14) and filed a 

redlined proposed further amended complaint (Doc. 15). The Court, cautiously noting an 

improvement, ordered Plaintiff to file the further amended complaint. (Doc. 16.) 

Plaintiff filed the further amended complaint, now 110 pages, on May 29. (Doc. 17.) 

In July, most of the Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

(Docs. 23, 26, 30.) One Defendant, Carol Stiles, waited until August 10 to move to 

dismiss. (Doc. 40.) On August 12, the Court granted the July motions to dismiss and 

therefore denied Stiles’ motion as moot. (Docs. 41, 42, 43, 44.) The Court gave Plaintiff 

one final opportunity to amend the complaint, this time by September 2. (Doc. 41 at 6; 

Doc. 42 at 7; Doc. 43 at 6; Doc. 44 at 1.) 

On August 21, Plaintiff filed a document (“the Document”) that at first glance 

looked like another amended complaint. (Doc. 45.) For example, the Document’s typeCase 2:15-cv-00321-NVW Document 66 Filed 11/04/15 Page 2 of 7
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written title contained the word “Complaint,” like in the previous amended complaint. 

(Compare Doc. 45 at 1 with Doc. 17 at 1.) And the Document contained allegations in 

numbered paragraphs, like in the previous amended complaint. (Compare Doc. 45 with

Doc. 17.) But there were differences too. For example, in the top-right corner of the 

Document’s first page were the hand-written words “Opposition to Defendant Az [sic.] 

Bar Counsel Carol Dahle Stiles,” which were absent in the previous amended complaint. 

(Compare Doc. 45 at 1 with Doc. 17 at 1.) And the Document was only 19 pages long 

excluding attachments, much shorter than the previous amended complaint. (Compare

Doc. 45 with Doc. 17.) Despite these differences, the Document was labeled an 

“Amended Complaint” in the Court’s electronic docket. Accordingly, the Court and 

Defendants treated the Document as an amended complaint. (Docs. 46, 52, 55, 56, 58, 

60.) Defendants renewed their motions to dismiss. (Docs. 46, 52, 58, 60.) The Court 

granted two of these motions (Doc. 56) but has not yet ruled on the other two. 

On August 31, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Reconsideration.” (Doc. 47.) In it, 

Plaintiff acknowledged she had been “ordered to amend her Civil Complaint for a fourth 

time” but decided to “submit[] this Motion for relief instead of another complaint.” (Id.

at 2.) The Court summarily denied the motion. (Doc. 52.) 

On October 2, a month after the final deadline for amending the complaint, 

Plaintiff filed a proposed further amended complaint. (Doc. 57.) The Court dismissed 

the proposed complaint because it was unaccompanied by a motion for leave to amend. 

(Doc. 59.) 

Now Plaintiff moves for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 as well as relief under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). (See Doc. 63 at 1; Doc. 63-1 at 1; Doc. 64 at 2, 

24.) She requests recusal and relief primarily on the ground that the Court erroneously 

labeled the Document filed on August 21 as an amended complaint. (See Doc. 63 at 2 

(alleging that the Court “in conspiracy with Federal Court Clerk Doe” “issued rulings on 

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a document that does not exist”); Doc. 64 at 3 (alleging that the Court ordered Plaintiff’s 

submission “to be fraudulently changed to an Amended Complaint”)). 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Recusal 

Section 144 of Title 28, U.S.C., requires a judge to recuse himself if a party files 

an affidavit that is (1) timely, (2) accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record 

stating that it was made in good faith, and (3) sufficient in its allegation that the judge has 

a “personal bias or prejudice” against the movant. The statute provides in full: 

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes 

and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before 

whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice 

either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge 

shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be 

assigned to hear such proceeding. 

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief 

that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than 

ten days before the beginning of the term at which the 

proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for 

failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one 

such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a 

certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good 

faith. 

As a threshold issue, therefore, it must be determined whether Plaintiff has submitted a 

timely and sufficient affidavit. 

1. Timeliness 

Section 144’s requirement of a timely filing “ensures that a party may not wait and 

decide whether to file based on whether he likes subsequent treatment that he receives.” 

SEC v. Loving Spirit Found., 392 F.3d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The filing is not timely “unless filed at the earliest moment after the 

movant acquires knowledge of the facts demonstrating the basis for such 

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disqualification.” United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Typically, affidavits in support of recusal are untimely 

under § 144 only when filed after substantial period of delay. See, e.g., Sykes, 7 F.3d at 

1339 (finding an affidavit untimely when it was filed over two months after the judge 

made prejudicial remarks). 

Here, Plaintiff filed her motions for recusal on October 14 and 19, complaining of 

behavior that took place nearly two months earlier on August 21. However, because 

Plaintiff represents herself and receives filings and orders by mail, she might not have 

been fully aware of the complained-of behavior until recently. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

recusal motions are deemed timely. 

2. Certification of Good Faith 

Under § 144, a movant’s affidavit in support of recusal “shall be accompanied by 

a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.” Strict compliance 

with this provision is required as to both the form and sufficiency of the certification 

because, when the truth of the factual averments in the affidavit must be assumed, the 

certificate is the only guard against the use of a false affidavit. See Loving Spirit, 392 

F.3d at 496; Sykes, 7 F.3d at 1339; Robinson v. Gregory, 929 F. Supp. 334, 337 (S.D. Ind. 

1996); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 507-08 (D.S.C. 1975). 

Counsel’s failure to provide a valid certificate is an independent basis for denying a 

recusal motion. United States v. Miller, 355 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (D.D.C. 2005). 

Here, Plaintiff provides no certification that her motions for recusal are made in 

good faith. Therefore, the motions are inadequate under § 144. 

3. Sufficiency 

To warrant recusal under § 144, the movant must allege that the judge has “a 

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” “The 

factual averments must show that the bias is personal rather than judicial.” U.S. v. 

Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1072 (7th Cir. 1990). “[O]pinions formed by the judge on the 

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basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or 

of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they 

display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 

impossible.” Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Court falsely labeled the Document she filed on 

August 21 as an amended complaint. This allegation clearly does not amount to 

“personal bias or prejudice” on the part of the judge. First, the judge is not the individual 

who assigns labels to filings for the Court’s electronic docket, so such labels reflect 

nothing about the judge personally. Second, labeling the Document as an amended 

complaint is understandable because the type-written title includes the word “Complaint” 

and the allegations are in numbered paragraphs. Therefore the label reflects nothing 

more than a good faith attempt to interpret an ambiguous filing. Third, labeling the 

Document as an amended complaint helped Plaintiff maintain her moribund lawsuit. The 

Document was filed in the window of opportunity in which the Court had allowed 

Plaintiff to amend her deficient complaint for the fourth, and final, time. (Docs. 3, 7, 13, 

41-44.) And the Document was the only thing resembling an amended complaint filed in 

that window. Had the Document not been labeled an amended complaint, the entire case 

would have been subject to dismissal. Therefore the label does not reflect “personal bias 

or prejudice” toward Plaintiff any more than the performance of CPR reflects animosity 

toward a person in cardiac arrest. 

Because Plaintiff’s motions for recusal do not include a certification of good faith 

and do not sufficiently allege that the undersigned judge has a personal bias or prejudice 

against Plaintiff, the motions will be denied. 

B. Rule 60(b)(3) 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), the Court “may relieve” a party 

from a final judgment, order, or proceeding in cases of “fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or 

misconduct by an opposing party.” Here, Plaintiff offers no reason to think an opposing 

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party has committed fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. Therefore her motions for 

relief under Rule 60(b)(3) will be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions for recusal under 28 

U.S.C. § 144 and relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) (Docs. 63, 64) are 

denied. 

DATED this 4th day of November, 2015. 

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