Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_16-cv-01609/USCOURTS-alnd-7_16-cv-01609-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY DEMPSEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 7:16-cv-01609-VEH-JEO

)

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation on November 21, 2016,

recommending that this action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, be dismissed under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claimupon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 29).

The plaintiff filed objections to the report and recommendation on December 5, 2016.

(Doc. 31). He has also filed a motion to have the magistrate judge assigned this case

recused. (Doc. 32). Having considered the plaintiff’s objections, the court finds as

follows:

The plaintiff’s objectionsfocus on whether the State of Alabama properly convicted

the plaintiff. (Doc. 31). He asserts that the State should not have proceeded with its trial

against him until the issues in his then pending habeas petition, filed in this court, were

addressed. (Id., at 1). He seeks a copy of the Federal Wire Tap Order that the State of

Alabama violated. (Id., at 3). He objects to the magistrate judge’s failure to address false

FILED

 2016 Dec-14 PM 03:39

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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evidence used in his state court trial, the false transcript, and false statements made by

detectives. (Id., at 3-4). He complains that the magistrate judge failed to address his claim

that the Alabama Supreme Court denied himaccess and refused his extraordinarywrit.(Id.,

at 4). The plaintiff assertsthat the magistrate judge erred in hisreport and recommendation

because a prosecutor lied and a judicial officer is bound by law to testify honestly. (Id., at

5). Moreover, the plaintiff claims this court’s failure to report the judicial officers to the

personnel board and state bar is misprision of a felony. (Id.). Finally, the plaintiff objects

to the characterization of his complaint as wholly frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

(Id.).

The plaintiff’s objections do not address the basis for the magistrate judge’s finding

that this action is due to be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Specifically, the

magistrate judge noted that the plaintiff failed to name a defendant who is subject to suit.

(Doc. 29 at 7-8). The plaintiff sued only the State of Alabama and Jefferson County,

Alabama. The State is wholly immune fromsuit underthe Eleventh Amendment, Alabama

v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978), and the plaintiff failed to allege any wrongdoing

cognizable in a § 1983 action against Jefferson County, Alabama. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

Regardless of the wrongs the plaintiff believes the State of Alabama committed

during his criminal prosecution, a § 1983 action may not serve as an appeal of a state court

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action to address those wrongs. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“a state

prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought

(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct

leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would

necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”). To the extent the

plaintiff believes he was wrongfully imprisoned, he must appeal the finding of guilt against

him through the court system of the State of Alabama, or bring a habeas action in federal

court. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973). What he may not do is use §

1983 to have this court review the propriety of the state court evidence or procedures.

“[A]mong the federal courts, Congress authorized only the Supreme Court to reverse or

modify a state court decision.” Helton v. Ramsay, 566 F. App’x 876, 877 (11th Cir. 2014)

(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). To the

extent that the plaintiff attemptsto use a § 1983 action to have this court invalidate hisstate

court convictions, this court lacks jurisdiction over his claims.

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held 

. . . in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, orfor other harmcaused by actions whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ

of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that

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relationship to a conviction orsentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.

Id., 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

“[A]llow[ing]the plaintiffto circumvent applicable state procedures and collaterally

attack [his] convictions in federal court is the precise situation that Heck seeks to

preclude.” Domotor v. Wennet, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2009). In short, the

Court in Heck held that “a state prisoner may not maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 if the direct or indirect effect of granting relief would be to invalidate the state

sentence he is serving.” Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 (1998)). Because the plaintiff’s claims would plainly

impugn the validity of his convictions, which have not been invalidated or otherwise set

aside, all of his claims are barred under Heck. See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637,

643 (2004) (stating that claims challenging the fact of conviction “fall within the ‘core’ of

habeas corpus and are thus not cognizable when brought pursuant to § 1983.”).

Although the plaintiff believes his 2010 habeas petition was wrongfully held to be

moot, this court may not review that decision either. A § 1983 action is not a vehicle

through which to obtain review of a decision in a habeas corpus action, nor may one judge

in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama review the

decisions of another judge in this court. 

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While the plaintiff’s arguments clearly reflect his belief that he has been wrongfully

incarcerated, a § 1983 action is not the proper forum for redress of these grievances. The

plaintiff’s attempts to use this action to obtain additional review of his state court

convictions beyond that provided in his direct appeal and habeas corpus proceedings is

inappropriate. See e.g., Pugh v. Smith, 333 F. App’x 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A

plaintiff seeking relief based on the premise that he was the victim of an unconstitutional

conspiracy to falsely convict him is merely attempting to overturn his conviction and is

barred by Heck from proceeding.”) (citations omitted).

Having carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the court file,

including the report and recommendation and the objections thereto, the Court is of the

opinion that the magistrate judge’s report is due to be and is hereby is ADOPTED and the

recommendation is ACCEPTED. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s amended complaint is due

to be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failing to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. A Final Judgment Order will be entered.

DONE this the 14th day of December, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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