Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02867/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02867-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

r· FILED 

l omxl Statef,> (h1u.c of Appeals 

Tcmth Cir;,i,iit 

APR 2 t3 1990 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBE,R ~ 

. TL l·IOECKER 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT (Jerk 

MARY BECENTI, as Trustee for the ) 

Testamentary Trust known as ) 

"Randy's Laundry," and individually, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

SHERYL VIGIL and RAYMOND BROOKS, ) 

) 

Defendants~Appellees. ) 

No. 88-2867 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. NO. 87-1254-JP) 

Bernice G. Muskrat, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. · 

Jacques B. Gelin and Edward J. Shawaker, Attorneys, Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C. (Donald Carr, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, Herbert A. 

Becker, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

and Kathleen P. Dewey, Attorney, Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C., with Gelin on the brief), Attorneys for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Mary Becenti appeals the district court's order dismissing 

her action against Vigil and Brooks for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Because implicitly the district court's order 

Appellate Case: 88-2867 Document: 01019626992 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 1 
imp~ovidently upheld the removal of this case from the Jicarilla 

Apache Tribal Court in which it .was- -originally ,commenced, we 

vacate the district court's order and remand with directions to 

remand the case to the tribal court. 

BACKGROUND 

This dispute arose over the administration of a loan obtained 

by Becenti's son for the purchase and operation of a laundry business located within the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. The loan 

was made by the tribal credit committee in 1982. Becenti's son 

died in August 1985 and his estate eventually sold his share of 

the business to a willing buyer who agreed to continue servicing 

the tribal loan. Becenti, who owned a ten percent interest in the 

laundry, brought this action after Brooks, a loan specialist 

employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, allegedly re~used to 

accept payments proffered by the substitute obliger, and 

instructed the tribal credit committee to foreclose on the loan. 

Becenti commenced her suit in the Jicarilla Apache Tribal Court, 

claiming that Brooks, and his supervisor Vigil, had committed 

various wrongs against herself and the beneficiaries of a trust 

created by her son's will. 

The complaint dated June 1, 1987 identified Brooks and Vigil 

as BIA employees and asserted that the "defendants, in their 

capacities as trustees for federal and tribal monies, have 

violated the trust responsibility and breached the standard of 

care owed to plaintiff as a member of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe-" 

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·On" September 29, 1987 -the. government filed a petition for 

- removal ~o·:the District Court fo~ the District of New Mexico 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1442(a)(l). The removal petition stated 

that the complaint filed in tribal court sought injunctive and 

monetary relief against individual defendants for actions taken 

under color of their off ice and in the performance of their 

official duties. The case was then removed to district court. 

The government moved the district court to dismiss the case 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to join an 

indispensable party, and for failure to prosecute. The government 

asserted that Becenti's suit operated against the United States 

because it was a suit against federal officers for actions taken 

within the scope of their employment and should be dismissed on 

sovereign immunity grounds. Becenti opposed the government's 

motion and also moved the district court to "dismiss" the case for 

lack of removal jurisdiction. 1 On October 20, 1988 the district 

court entered its judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. The court found that 

sovereign immunity barred suit where the relief requested would 

1 Becenti's motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper 

removal was filed on August 2, 1988. She made this motion in her 

first substantive pleading to the district court. At the time of 

her motion to dismiss, 28 u.s.c. § 1447(c) provided "If at any 

time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed 

improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall 

remand the case •.•. " (amended November 19, 1988). Although 

she delayed over ten months from the date of the removal petition 

to raise her objection, we find that she adequately preserved her 

right to raise the issue of the fundamental deficiency in the 

removal process. Likewise, although she couched her objection in 

terms of a motion to dismiss, she clearly described the deficiency 

in the removal procedure which warranted remand to the tribal 

court. 

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-· operate against the sovere-ign -and that any judgment against Brooks 

and Vig i1 would, in effect, be a . .-judgment~- against the United 

States. 

Becenti now appeals the district court's dismissal, contending that removal from the tribal court is impermissible under 28 

U.S.C. § 1442, which provides for removal from state courts only. 

For the reasons discussed below, we agree. 

DISCUSSION 

The government relies on the following provision authorizing 

removal in cases involving federal officials: 

"A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a 

State court against any of the following persons may be 

removed by them to the district court of the United 

States for the district and division embracing the place 

wherein it is pending: • • • Any officer of the United 

States or any agency thereof, or person acting under 

him, for any act under color of sw;:h off ice . . . . " 

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(l). This provision, like the removal jurisdiction granted in Sections 1441 and 1443(1) of _Title 28, speaks 

only of removal of actions brought in "State" courts. Several 

courts have interpreted the "State court" language in both Section 

1441 and 1443(1) as not encompassing actions commenced in courts 

other than those of the fifty states. See, ~, Guam v. 

Landgraf, 594 F.2d 201, 202 (9th Cir. 1979) ("We cannot read 

congressional references to an action in 'State' court as including an action in the courts of the Territory of Guam. When 

Congress has intended to extend § 1443(1) to an entity other than 

one of the fifty states, it has done so expressly."). -- ..(. ~ 

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The government urges a broader interpretation of § 1442 based 

primariLy on the essential reasons behind the grant of federal 

jurisdiction embodied in this section. As the Fourth Circuit has 

noted: 

"(T]he central and grave concern of the statute is that 

a Federal officer or agent shall not be forced to answer 

for conduct assertedly within his duties in any but a 

Federal forum." 

North Carolina v. Carr, 386 F.2d 129, 131 (4th Cir. 1967). 

We agree with the government's contention that the power to 

remove cases involving government officials is essential to our 

system of government. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 

Wheat.) 304, 363 (1816) (Johnson, J., concurring) (The federal 

government "must cease to exist whenever it loses the power of 

protecting itself in the exercise of its constitutional powers."). 

Thus we have stated that. § 1442 should be interpreted broadly to 

-

fully protect the important governmental interests involved. See 

City of Aurora ex rel. Colorado v. Erwin, 706 F.2d 295, 296 (10th 

Cir. 1983) (removal under § 1442 is a matter of considerable 

importance to the United States; the policy favoring removal 

'"should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of 

§ 1442(a)(l).'") (quoting Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 

(1981), quoting in turn, Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 

(1969)). The same risk of unwarranted interference by state 

courts into the operation of the federal government is present 

with regard to Indian tribal courts. The government must be free 

to protect itself from the delays and abuses which may arise from 

such local proceedings. 

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'!'he question befor.e us, however, is not whether ·congress has 

the power to authorize.removal of actions. commenced in tribal 

courts against federal officials, b~t rather whether Congress has 

in fact done so. We must be careful not to expand the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond Congressional mandates. See 

American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951) ("The 

jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against 

expansion by judicial interpretation •.•. "); Basso v. Utah 

Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1974). With this in 

mind, we conclude that the statutory language referring to actions 

commenced in "State court" does not extend to an action in the 

Jicarilla Apache Tribal Court. 

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, where Congress has intended 

to permit removal from courts other than state courts it has 

expressly said so. Thu~ Congress provided that the Superior Court 

of the District of Columbia is included among the "State" courts 

referenced in the provisions of Section 1441, 1442, and 1443. See 

28 u.s.c. § 1451; Guam v. Landgraf, 594 F.2d at 101. Likewise, 

Congress has provided, in express terms, that actions commenced in 

the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico are removable 

under the federal removal statutes. See 48 U.S.C. § 864. 

Congress did not necessarily intend by § 1442 to guarantee 

every federal employee sued in any court other than a United 

States district court an alternative federal forum in which to 

defend themselves. See Mesa v. California, 109 s. Ct. 959, 968-69 

(1989) (discussing the distinction between "pure jurisdictional 

statutes'' such as § 1442(a) and federal laws under~which an action 

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may :-arise so as to .support Article III "arising under" jur isdiction.) •. ·The historical development of this provision amply 

demonstrates that Congress has at times provided some federal 

employees alternative federal forums while simultaneously leaving 

many others no such protection. Section 1442 slowly evolved from 

a very narrow exception tailored for a limited number of government officials. See H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and 

the Federal System 1336-37 (2d ed. 1973). 2 

2 The historical development of § 1442 federal official removal 

jurisdiction has been summarized: 

"These four specialized grants of jurisdiction in 

§ 1442(a) are the residue of a long series of enactments. The series begins in 1815. Prompted by New 

England's resistance to the War of 1812, Congress 

inserted in an act for the collection of customs duties 

a provision--of limited duration--for the removal to the 

federal circuit dourt of any suit or prosecution begun 

in a state court against federal officers or other · persons as a result of enforcement of the act. The 

first permanent legislation in the series--and the 

antecedent of the last clause of§ 1442(a)(l)--was the 

'Force Bill' of 1833, passed in response to South 

Carolina's threats of nullification. This authorized 

the removal of all suits or prosecutions against 

officers of the United States or other persons on 

account of any acts done under the customs laws. Then, 

with the Civil War, came a wave of removal acts. In 

1863, Congress authorized, for the period only of the 

rebellion, the removal of cases brought against the 

United States officers or others for acts committed 

during the rebellion and justified under the authority 

of the President or Congress. Soon afterward, permanent 

legislative policy was further developed by the extension of the removal provisions of the 'Force Bill' to 

cases involving the collection of internal revenue as 

well as import duties. What is now the last clause of 

§ 1442(a)(l) continued through successive codifications 

to be thus limited to cases growing out of the revenue 

laws until 1948 ...• " When the latest revision was 

enacted, "No argument apparently was needed to induce 

Congress to generalize a principle of federal protection 

which was first invoked in times of crisis and thereafter always limited-to special situations deemed to 

[footnote continued] 

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.. Throughout our 'history, Congress has ~'expanded and restricted 

<.federal· official removal jurisdiction as;.circumstances and relations with the stat~s have changed. Although the need may arise 

to expand § 1442 to authorize removal from tribal courts, Congress 

has not yet seen fit to incorporate tribal court actions such as 

the one involved here in its grant of removal jurisdiction to the 

federal district courts. Until Congress authorizes the removal of 

such tribal court proceedings, the federal courts may riot exercise 

jurisdiction over them. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 

Wheat.) at 349 ("The time, the processj and the manner [of 

removal] must be subject to [Congress'] absolute legislative 

control."). 

CONCLUSION 

Becenti's action was improvidently removed from the tribal 

court. We therefore vacate the district court's order and remand 

this case to the district court with directions to remand it to 

the Jicarilla Apache Tribal Court. 

[footnote continued] 

present special needs." 

H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 

1335-37 (2d ed. 1973). 

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