Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01141/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01141-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE WALLACE,

CDCR #P-48941, Civil No. 15-cv-1141 WQH (RBB)

Plaintiff,

ORDER:

1) DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING 

TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

AND

2) DENYING MOTION FOR

EXTENSION OF TIME TO

AMEND AS MOOT 

[ECF No. 5]

vs.

Dr. DO; 

Dr. CHAU; 

Ms. ABARTO,

Defendants.

Tyrone Wallace (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se in this case

pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. Procedural History

On July 22, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), but simultaneously dismissed his Complaint sua

sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted. See July 22, 2015 Order (ECF No. 3). The Court

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provided Plaintiff with notice of his Complaint’s pleading deficiencies and granted him

45 days leave in which to amend. Id. at 5-10.

On August 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking an extension of time in which

to file his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5). Just ten days later, however, on August 28,

2015, Plaintiff timely filed his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6). Therefore, the Court

DENIES his Motion for extension of time as moot. 

However, because Plaintiff remains a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Amended

Complaint also requires a pre-Answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and

§ 1915A(b). “The purpose of § 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or

malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d

903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as

the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680

F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates

the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff claimed two RJD Doctors and a dietician

provided inadequate medical treatment for his chronic kidney condition by failing to

provide him with an unspecified medication and to order that he be served a special lowprotein, low-salt diet. See Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 3-5. He sought $5million in general and

punitive damages. Id.

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See July 22, 2015 Order (ECF No. 3). Specifically, the

Court found that while Plaintiff listed RJD doctors Do and Chau, and RJD dietician

Abarto as Defendants in the caption of his Complaint, he failed to include any “further

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factual enhancement” to describe how, or to what extent, any of them individually caused

a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 4-5 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 622,

678 (2009) (noting that FED. R. CIV. P. 8 “demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (citation omitted); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628,

633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the

duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are

alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”). The Court further found that

“[e]ven if Plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to connect Dr. Do, Dr. Chau, or Registered

Dietitian Abarto with any suffered injury, he . . . still failed to state a plausible Eighth

Amendment claim against any of them,” because his Complaint did not allege facts

sufficient to show the “deliberate indifference” required to support a plausible claim for

relief. See July 22, 2015 Order at 6-9 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 104

(1976)).

In his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6), Plaintiff again seeks damages against Do,

Chau, and Abarto, continuing to claim their care was inadequate under the Eighth

Amendment. (Id. at 3-5.). This time, Plaintiff alleges it was Dr. Chau, his primary care

doctor, who first diagnosed him with “stage 2” chronic kidney disease on December 24,

2014, and Chau who later referred him to a “nephrologist for consultation to see if there

[wa]s anything else that could be done . . . to slow the progression of [his] chronic renal

insufficiency.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff further contends that when he asked Chau to prescribe

medication, Chau told him “there is no medication that can cure it.” Id.

Plaintiff next contends that when Dr. Do, a “RJD nephrologist and kidney

specialist,” id. at 2, examined him in February 2015, his condition was still “stage 2,” but

was re-assessed as “stage 3” on March 6, 2015. Id. at 4. Plaintiff admits Dr. Do

“recommended” a low protein and low salt diet, but “would not prescribe . . .

medication,” telling him “once your kidneys go bad that can’t be cured.” Id. at 4. 

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Finally, Plaintiff asserts that when he was referred to consult with Registered

Dietician Abarto on March 20, 2015, based on Do’s recommendation, Abarto counseled

him to “eat fish and chicken and vegetables,” and to limit his beef intake, but refused to

place him on a low-protein, low-salt diet because his “creatinine level had to be above

2.0” before a special diet was required. Id. at 5. 

III. Screening of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

A. Standard of Review

As Plaintiff knows, the Court is obligated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for,

or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of

parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” at the time of filing “as soon

as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under the

PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d

1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

/ / /

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possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler,

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially

pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation

in civil rights violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. Application to Amended Complaint

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”

Campbell v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citing Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

While Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint now alleges some facts to explain what roles

Drs. Do, Chau, and Dietician Abarto individually played in either treating his disease or

otherwise providing him medical care, these facts nevertheless fail to support any Eighth

Amendment violations. See Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In

§ 1983 cases, it is the constitutional right itself that forms the basis of the claim.”); Iqbal,

662 U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must pleas that each Government-official defendant,

though the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”) (emphasis

added).

/ / / 

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In its July 22, 2015 Order, the Court clearly notified Plaintiff of the legal standards

for alleging an inadequate medical care claim under the Eighth Amendment, and found

his original Complaint failed to contain enough “factual content” that might plausibly

show that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

See ECF No. 3 at 7-9 (citing Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106). 

The same is true now. Plaintiff continues to claim he suffers from chronic kidney

disease, which the Court finds an objectively and sufficiently serious medical need. See

Amend. Compl. at 3-5; see also Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012)

(finding prisoner with “numerous medical conditions, including chronic kidney disease”

had “sufficiently facts to show that he had a serious medical need.”). However, neither

his Amended Complaint, nor the medical exhibits he has attached as part of his pleading

documenting his kidney and dietary care at RJD, see FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A copy of

a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all

purposes.”), provide any further “factual content” to explain how Defendants Do, Chau,

or Abarto were deliberately indifferent to his plight, i.e., that they “kn[ew] of or

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

Instead, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges only that Dr. Chau, his primary

care physician, evaluated him, and referred him to a nephrologist, Dr. Do. See Amend.

Compl. at 3. Dr. Do is also alleged to have evaluated Plaintiff, to have recommended he

limit his protein and salt intake, and to have referred him to a dietician, Defendant

Abarto. Id. at 4. Plaintiff further contends only that his doctors failed to prescribe him

medication, indicating that “no medication c[ould] cure [him],” id. at 3, 4, and that the

dietician refused to place him on a renal diet because his blood test results revealed one

was not yet medically indicated. Id. at 5; see also Amend. Compl. at 82-83, Ex. 8 (April

23, 2015, Director’s Level Decision, RJD HC 15052678). 

While Plaintiff describes his treatment as “inadequate” because Defendants failed

to prescribe either the medication or diet he believed was appropriate, see Compl. at 3-5,

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his Amended Complaint, and the exhibits he now attaches, still lack the “further factual

enhancement” which demonstrates any Defendant’s “purposeful act or failure to respond

to [his] pain or possible medical need,” or any “harm caused by [this] indifference.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d

1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096).

As the Court cautioned Plaintiff in its July 22, 2015 Order, “[a] difference of

opinion between a physician and the prisoner–or between medical

professionals–concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate

indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d

at 1122-23. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391

F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to meet this

standard because it lacks facts to “show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was

medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the defendants chose this course

in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988

(citation and internal quotations omitted). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, like his original pleading, must be

dismissed in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be

granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d

at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. While Plaintiff has already been provided an

opportunity to amend his claims, the Court will grant him another opportunity to amend.

See Lucas v. Dept. of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Amend (ECF No. 5)

as moot;

/ / /

/ / /

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(2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) for failing to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); and 

(3) GRANTS Plaintiff 45-days leave from the date of this Order in which to file

a Second Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies of pleading described above.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to

his previous complaints. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012)

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended

pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

Should Plaintiff fail to file a Second Amended Complaint within the time provided,

the Court will enter a final Order of dismissal of this civil action for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and for failure to

prosecute in compliance with a Court Order requiring amendment. SeeFerdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to prosecute permitted if

plaintiff fails to respond to a court’s order requiring amendment of complaint); Lira v.

Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of

the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the

complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”); Edwards v. Marin Park, 356 F.3d 1058,

1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The failure of the plaintiff eventually to respond to the court’s

ultimatum–either by amending the complaint or by indicating to the court that it will not

do so–is properly met with the sanction of a Rule 41(b) dismissal.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 13, 2016

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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