Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-00890/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-00890-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTIS E. GORHAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. SOLIS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-00890-WHO (PR) 

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND 

GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

ORDER REFERRING THE ACTION 

TO JUDGE VADAS FOR 

SETTLEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Artis Gorham claims that his jailors at Salinas Valley State Prison used 

excessive force against him and then retaliated against him by issuing and processing a 

rules violation report in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move for summary 

judgment (Docket No. 54). There are material facts in dispute on Gorham’s excessive 

force claims against defendants Hernandez and Locke and the retaliation claim against 

defendant Parin, so the motion is DENIED on those claims. It is GRANTED on the

retaliation claim against defendant Hatton because his only role was to review Gorham’s 

complaint for due process violations, and he did nothing constituting retaliation. The 

excessive force claims and the retaliation claim against Parin will be referred to Judge

Nandor Vadas for purposes of settlement. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits 

demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those 

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which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying 

those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of 

a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the 

moving party. On an issue for which the opposing party by contrast will have the burden 

of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need only point out “that there is an 

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go 

beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court is 

concerned only with disputes over material facts and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant 

or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the 

court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with 

reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the 

nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 

a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

In the operative complaint (Docket No. 54), Gorham alleges that (A) correctional 

officers Locke and Hernandez used excessive force against him; and (B) correctional 

officers Hatton and Parin retaliated against him by filing and processing a rules violation 

report. 

I. Excessive Force Claims

Gorham’s factual allegations are taken from his deposition transcript. On May 10, 

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2011, Correctional Officer Hernandez went to Gorham’s cell in Facility B at Salinas 

Valley State Prison to escort him to a medical appointment. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 

(“MSJ”), Gorham Dep. (Docket No. 55) at 10-11.) He said, “Why aren’t you fucking 

ready?” (Id. at 11.) Gorham, who had no idea why Hernandez was in a bad mood, said 

that waist chains were required because he uses a cane. (Id.) Hernandez left, presumably 

to retrieve the chains, returned ten minutes later, and said, “Are you fucking ready?” (Id.) 

Gorham calmly stated that he was, to which Hernandez said, “Make sure you have your 

fucking ID.” (Id.) 

Correctional Officer Sanchez opened the cell door and put the waist chains on 

Gorham, who according to inmate custom, slid the empty morning food trays out of the 

cell with his right foot, so that the porters could pick them up on their rounds. (Id. at 11-

12.) Hernandez pushed them back into the cell, saying, “We don’t have time for that,” and 

Gorham pushed them out again. (Id. at 12.) (Gorham insists that the trays did not touch 

Hernandez either time he pushed it. (Id. at 16, 19).) Hernandez then grabbed Gorham by 

the collar, pulled him out of his cell, “slammed him” against another cell, and kicked his 

left leg three or four times. (Id. at 12.) He then spun Gorham around and brought him 

down to his knees. (Id.) Hernandez called on Sanchez to sound the alarm. (Id. at 24.) 

Correctional Officers Locke and Hernandez each took one of Gorham’s arms and “drove 

[him] face first into the wall.” (Id. at 12.) Locke whispered into Gorham’s ear, “You 

fucked up bitch,” a statement made, Gorham believes, because Locke thinks he assaulted 

one of Locke’s officers. Other officers then took Gorham to get medical treatment. (Id. at 

12, 28.) 

Defendants’ version of events differs. According to Hernandez, after Gorham first 

pushed out the food trays, Hernandez slid the trays back, saying there was no time for that. 

(MSJ, Hernandez Decl. ¶ 6.) Gorham “then looked at me in an aggressive manner and 

kicked the foot tray back out of the cell.” (Id.) Hernandez “attempted to secure the cell 

door but Gorham stepped out of the cell, swinging his cane in an aggressive manner.” (Id.

¶ 7.) Sanchez, a control booth officer, sounded the alarm when she saw Gorham kick his 

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food tray at Hernandez and using his cane to stop Hernandez from closing the door. (Id.) 

Hernandez grabbed Gorham to place him under control, but he “was yelling obscenities at 

me and attempting to get away from my grasp.” (Id.) He told Gorham that if he continued 

to resist, he (Hernandez) “would have to take him to the ground.” Gorham said he did not 

want that because he had a bad shoulder, and agreed to follow orders. (Id.) Hernandez 

held him against the wall next to his cell until other staff arrived. (Id.) Hernandez avers 

that he did not use excessive force, nor did he use force “maliciously and sadistically for 

the purpose” of causing harm. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: 

(1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the 

prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct 

was wanton. Id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1451 

(9th Cir. 1993). When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 

(1986); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2001). In determining whether 

the use of force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline, or for the 

malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate the need for 

application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the 

extent of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, 

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 

Because there is a genuine dispute as to material facts, defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on the excessive force claims is DENIED. The parties offer crucially 

different versions of events. Gorham asserts that Locke and Hernandez used excessive 

force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He alleges that despite his calm demeanor 

and compliant manner (apart from pushing the food trays the second time), Hernandez and 

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Locke were aggressive, hostile, and unnecessarily violent, violence that included smashing 

his head into a wall. These allegations present a situation in which a state prisoner was the 

victim of a (largely) unprovoked and unnecessary beating resulting in significant pain and 

bodily injury. 

Defendants, however, assert that Gorham was oppositional, failed to comply with 

orders, and presented a physical threat, to which they responded with appropriate force. 

The facts as pled by defendants constitute the type of “good-faith efforts” to maintain 

prison order that do not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 

6-7.

The Court is consequently presented with two diametrically opposed sets of facts, 

the differences between which directly relate to whether the force used against Gorham 

was a constitutional violation. Because Gorham has shown a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to his Eighth Amendment claims against Hernandez and Locke, defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment as to these claims is DENIED. The Court will refer these claims 

for settlement as detailed in the conclusion of this order. 

II. Retaliation Claims

Parin, the Facility B lieutenant, states that he wrote an incident report on May 11th 

right after reviewing Hernandez’s report on the May 10th incident. (MSJ, Parin Decl. 

¶¶ 4-5.) He determined that Gorham should be issued a rules violation report (“RVR”) for 

battery on staff. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Gorham disputes this. He asserts that Parin issued the RVR containing the battery 

against staff charge as part of a conspiracy to retaliate against him for complaining about 

Locke and Hernandez. (Pl’s. Opp. to MSJ (“Opp.”) at 7, 20.) Gorham alleges that on May 

10th, Parin first decided to charge him with being a disruptive inmate, an allegation 

supported by Parin’s statements to a prison investigating officer. (Id. at 7; Ex. A at 3.) 

Then another correctional officer, Stepp, emailed Parin on May 10th to inform him about 

Gorham’s complaints against Locke and Hernandez, an allegation that Stepp confirmed. 

(Id. at 5; Ex. A at 5.) According to Gorham, Parin changed the charge to battery on staff

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on May 11th. (Opp. at 5, 7.) Parin, on the other hand, denies that he was aware of 

Gorham’s intention to file a complaint before making his charging decision. (MSJ, Parin 

Decl. ¶ 5.) 

When interviewed by a prison investigating officer, Parin stated that on May 10th 

Hernandez told him that he thought Gorham should be charged with being a disruptive 

inmate, while Locke said that he should be charged with battery on staff. (Opp., Ex. A at

3.) Parin also stated that on May 10th he informed Locke that he had settled on the 

disruptive inmate charge, based on the verbal descriptions of the incident. (Id.) In his 

declaration, Parin says that he spoke with Hernandez on May 10th but did not review his 

written report until May 11th, after receiving an email from Stepp. (MSJ, Parin Decl. ¶ 5.) 

Parin declares that the written report was the basis for his final charging decision. (Id.) 

Pursuant to the RVR, Gorham was placed in administrative segregation, given a 

rules violation report for battery on a peace officer, and found guilty of the charge. Later, 

the charge was reduced to “disruptive inmate” and Gorham’s good-time credits were 

restored. 

Hatton, a correctional captain, reviewed the RVR after the guilty finding. (MSJ, 

Hatton Decl. ¶ 2.) As a captain, he is only authorized to review the reports for due process 

violations. (Id. ¶ 5.) He lacks the authority to overturn a guilty finding or to reduce the 

penalty. (Id.) After concluding that there were no due process violations, he forwarded 

the report to the Chief Disciplinary Officer for final review. (Id.) 

Gorham claims that Hatton’s and Parin’s actions constituted retaliation against him 

for complaining about the actions of Locke and Hernandez. “Within the prison context, a 

viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion 

that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his 

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff 

has the burden of showing that retaliation for the exercise of protected conduct was the 

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“substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant’s actions. Mt. Healthy City Sch. 

Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267–

68 (9th Cir. 1997). In order to create a genuine issue of material fact on retaliatory motive 

in the First Amendment context, a plaintiff must establish “‘in addition to evidence that the 

defendant knew of the protected speech, at least (1) evidence of proximity in time between 

the protected speech and the allegedly retaliatory decision; (2) evidence that the defendant 

expressed opposition to the speech; or (3) evidence that the defendant’s proffered reason 

for the adverse action was pretextual.’” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 568 (9th Cir. 

2009) (internal citation and emphasis omitted). Also, as to the fourth Rhodes element, viz., 

whether the inmate was chilled from exercising his First Amendment rights, a prisonerplaintiff must at least allege that he suffered harm more than minimal. Id., 408 F.3d at 

567–68 n.11. 

Retaliation is not established simply by showing adverse activity by defendant after 

protected speech; rather, plaintiff must show a nexus between the two. See Huskey v. City 

of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (summary judgment proper against plaintiff 

who could only speculate that adverse employment decision was due to his negative 

comments about his supervisor six or seven months earlier; retaliation claim cannot rest on 

the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., “after this, therefore because of 

this”). See also Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(finding no retaliation where plaintiff presented no evidence that defendants gave her a 

traffic citation after reading a newspaper article about her First Amendment activities, 

rather than because she drove past a police barricade with a “road closed” sign on it). 

Summary judgment will not be granted in Parin’s favor. Gorham has presented 

evidence showing a genuine dispute whether Parin’s actions were retaliatory. It is 

undisputed that Parin had first decided to charge Gorham with being a disruptive inmate, 

based on the verbal summaries he had received from Locke and Hernandez. Parin admits 

that after receiving Stepp’s mail and reading Hernandez’s written report, he decided to 

charge Gorham with the more significant charge of battery on staff (although Parin asserts 

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that he did not become aware of Gorham’s complaints against staff until after he decided 

on the higher charge). Parin’s change in decision coupled with the dispute over whether he 

was informed that Gorham intended to file a complaint against staff raises a genuine 

dispute whether the action was an adverse action taken against Gorham’s protected 

conduct. The Court is consequently presented with two diametrically opposed sets of 

facts, the differences between which directly relate to whether the charging decision was a 

constitutional violation. Because Gorham has shown a genuine dispute of material fact as 

to his First Amendment claims against Parin, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as 

to these claims is DENIED. The Court will refer these claims for settlement as detailed in 

the conclusion of this order. 

Summary judgment will be granted in Hatton’s favor. Gorham has not provided 

any evidence to show a genuine dispute as to any material fact. He offers speculation that 

the correctional staff, including Hatton, conspired to retaliate against him. However, the 

record does not support his allegations. Hatton did not author the rules violation report, or 

participate in any of the underlying incidents. He merely reviewed the RVR decision for 

due process violations and furthered the processing of the report. The undisputed facts do 

not show a nexus between Gorham’s allegedly protected speech and Hatton’s allegedly 

adverse actions. “We have repeatedly held that mere speculation that defendants acted out 

of retaliation is not sufficient.” Wood v.Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the claims against Hatton is GRANTED. 

MOTIONS

Defendants’ motion to file certain documents under seal (Docket No. 66) is 

GRANTED. The documents shall remain sealed until the conclusion of this action and 

any appellate proceedings. After those proceedings, the documents shall remain sealed 

until they are destroyed in conformance with the normal records destruction policy of the 

United States Courts. 

Defendants’ motion to strike Gorham’s unauthorized sur-reply (Docket No. 71) is 

GRANTED. 

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CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 54) is DENIED on the 

excessive force claims, DENIED on the retaliation claims against Parin, and GRANTED 

on the retaliation claims against Hatton. Judgment will be entered in favor of Hatton when 

this action is concluded. 

The Clerk shall TERMINATE defendants A. Solis, J. Stevenson, and B. Sanchez 

because the claims against them were dismissed in the Order of Service. (Docket No. 20.) 

This action, which now consists only of the excessive force claims against 

Hernandez and Locke and the retaliation claims against Parin, is REFERRED to 

Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas for purposes of settlement pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner 

Mediation Program. The proceedings will consist of one or more conferences as 

determined by Judge Vadas. They shall take place within 180 days of the date this order is 

filed. Judge Vadas shall coordinate a time and date for the conferences with all interested 

parties and/or their representatives and, within 180 days after the conclusion of the 

conference(s), file a report regarding the settlement proceedings. Gorham must attend 

all conferences scheduled by Judge Vadas. Failure to attend even one conference 

may result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 

The Clerk shall forward a copy of this order to Judge Vadas’s chambers, and 

terminate Docket Nos. 54, 66 and 71. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2015

_________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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