Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01026/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01026-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ROBERT SCHMIDT and THOMAS WALSH,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

LEVI STRAUSS & CO., LAURA LIANG, and

DOES 1-50,

Defendants. /

No. C04-01026 RMW (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT LEVI STRAUSS & CO.’S

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER

DEPOSITION TESTIMONY

[Re: Docket No. 75]

Defendant Levi Strauss & Co. (“LS&Co.”) moves for (1) an order compelling further

deposition testimony from plaintiffs and (2) a protective order prohibiting plaintiffs’ counsel

from engaging in improper deposition conduct. It contends that during each plaintiff’s

deposition, plaintiffs’ counsel made improper objections and engaged in conduct designed to

disrupt the examination. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. They argue that their counsel’s

objections were entirely justified and that any delay in their depositions is the fault of defense

counsel. They request that the court issue an order terminating their depositions. Upon

consideration of the papers filed by the parties, as well as the arguments presented at the

December 5, 2006 motion hearing, this court grants the motion in part.

1. Plaintiffs’ Procedural Objection

Preliminarily, plaintiffs argue that LS&Co. failed to meet-and-confer before filing the

instant motion. They also contend that LS&Co. deliberately chose a December 5, 2006 hearing

*E-FILED ON 12/26/06*

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date, knowing that it would not be convenient for plaintiffs’ counsel to file the opposition

papers. The record presented indicates that LS&Co. did meet-and-confer about the issue of

counsel’s instructions not to answer certain deposition questions. (See, e.g., Schwing Decl., Ex.

AA). Additionally, in view of the colloquy on the record during the depositions in question, it

does not appear that further meet-and-confer negotiations would have resolved the issues

between the parties. Moreover, it appears that LS&Co. did confer with plaintiffs about an

agreeable hearing date and set the matter for a December 5, 2006 hearing without objection

from plaintiffs. (See Suppl. Schwing Decl., ¶¶ 2-3). Accordingly, the court declines to deny

the motion on this basis.

2. LS&Co.’s Procedural Objection

The briefing on the instant motion closed on November 21, 2006. However, without

leave of court, plaintiffs’ counsel, Joseph Ainley, filed a supplemental declaration on November

29, 2006. Then on November 30, 2006, without leave of court, LS&Co.’s counsel, Austin

Schwing, filed a declaration objecting to Mr. Ainley’s supplemental declaration as irrelevant

and untimely.

Suffice to say, both supplemental filings were improper. See CIV. L.R. 7-3(d) (“Before

the noticed hearing date, counsel may bring to the Court’s attention a relevant judicial opinion

published after the date the opposition or reply was filed . . .. Otherwise, once a reply is filed,

no additional memoranda, papers or letters may be filed without prior Court approval.”). This

court might well have disregarded both supplemental declarations, which largely contain more

quibbling by the parties on matters that are not before the court; but it has read and considered

them insofar as they discuss matters pertinent to the resolution of the instant dispute. 

Nevertheless, it does not condone the failure to comply with the court’s Local Rules and warns

against future non-compliance.

3. Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Instructions Not to Answer Deposition Questions

LS&Co. contends that during plaintiffs’ depositions, plaintiffs’ counsel improperly

instructed the deponent not to answer several questions on grounds other than privilege. (See

Motion, Appendix A). Plaintiffs argue that their counsel’s instructions were justified because

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United States District Court

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(a) plaintiffs are obliged to assert objections, or risk waiving them; (b) plaintiffs answered ten of

the twenty-two or so questions identified by LS&Co. as having been unanswered; and (c)

defense counsel’s questions sought information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the

work product doctrine.

With respect to plaintiffs’ argument concerning waiver, the issue before the court is not

whether plaintiffs may assert objections, but whether they properly may instruct a deponent not

to answer questions based upon those objections. Rule 30(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that “[a] person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary

to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation directed by the court, or to present a motion

under Rule 30(d)(4).” FED.R.CIV.P. 30(d)(1) (emphasis added).

Here, the cited deposition transcript excerpts indicate that all of plaintiffs’ counsel’s

instructions not to answer were improper. Plaintiffs’ counsel objected to a number of questions

on the grounds that they were, for example, vague, hypothetical, speculative, harassing,

pertained to the allegations in the complaint, or called for expert testimony – none of which are

contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(1) as proper grounds for an instruction not to answer. 

Moreover, plaintiffs have not convincingly demonstrated that the questions posed about the

allegations in the complaint call for privileged or work product information. The complaint is a

publicly filed document which is intended to put defendants on notice as to the nature of the

claims being made against them. LS&Co. is entitled to obtain testimony from plaintiffs as to

their understanding or appreciation of the allegations and any facts of which they are aware that

support those allegations. Further, on the record presented, the court is unpersuaded that any

other questions (as phrased) impinged upon privileged or work product information.

Nevertheless, the cited deposition testimony indicates that plaintiffs did (eventually)

answer several questions in substance. Those questions, as identified in LS&Co.’s motion,

Appendix A are as follows:

• Walsh Deposition at 386:2-18;

• Walsh Deposition at 444:5-16;

• Walsh Deposition at 445:2-16;

• Walsh Deposition at 446:5-12;

• Walsh Deposition at 448:21-449:2;

• Walsh Deposition at 470:10-17;

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• Schmidt Deposition at 368:3-10; and

• Schmidt Deposition at 626:3-15.

(See LS&Co. Motion, Appendix A).

Additionally, LS&Co. cites to several questions which apparently pertain to a Broderick

Street property in San Francisco. LS&Co. moved to compel answers to these questions in the

apparent belief that the property is part of plaintiffs’ claimed damages. However, at oral

argument, plaintiffs’ counsel represented to the court that this property is not a part of their

claimed damages or a component thereof. Accordingly, plaintiffs need not answer the questions

about the Broderick Street property.

4. The Length and Conduct of Plaintiffs’ Depositions

Aside from the improper instructions not to answer, LS&Co. argues that additional time

is needed because plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in improper conduct designed to thwart defense

counsel’s line of questioning. Here, LS&Co. asserts that it needs to depose each plaintiff for

five full days, and it appears that the parties agreed that plaintiffs’ depositions would not be

limited to the presumptive seven-hour limit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30. However, LS&Co. claims

that it has obtained only three days of deposition from Walsh. While Schmidt apparently

appeared for deposition on five days, LS&Co. argues that it obtained little more than 19.5 hours

of testimony from him. LS&Co. asserts that plaintiffs’ counsel unilaterally stopped plaintiffs’

depositions without justification, took long breaks and engaged in other unprofessional conduct

which, in at least one instance, culminated in an altercation between plaintiffs’ counsel and

defense counsel on the record during Walsh’s deposition. LS&Co. requests that plaintiff Walsh

be ordered to appear for an additional 17.5 hours of deposition and that plaintiff Schmidt be

ordered to appear for an additional 14 hours of deposition.

Plaintiffs oppose LS&Co.’s motion, in part, by arguing about alleged misconduct by

defense counsel in connection with discovery matters other than the depositions in question. 

These arguments and materials are irrelevant to the resolution of the matters at hand, and this

court has not considered them in ruling on the instant motion. Plaintiffs nonetheless maintain

that any time wasted during their deposition is due entirely the fault of defense counsel, whom

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they say conducted the examinations in a vexatious and harassing manner. They now request

an order terminating their depositions.

As discussed above, plaintiffs’ counsel’s instructions not to answer were improper; and,

the record before the court indicates that neither side’s conduct has been particularly

commendable. At the same time, however, it is not clear on the present record that Schmidt

took unusually long or improper breaks, as LS&Co. contends. While there apparently is no

dispute that Schmidt’s deposition sessions ended early to accommodate Schmidt, plaintiffs

claim that his deposition sessions ended, at most, thirty minutes shy of the 5:00 p.m. stopping

point. Moreover, when pressed at oral argument to identify how he had been thwarted in his

examination (aside from the improper instructions not to answer the complaint), defense

counsel acknowledged that Walsh had, by and large, answered questions, but they simply ran

out of time. LS&Co. nevertheless maintains that the instant lawsuit involves complex financial

issues, and says that it needs to examine both plaintiffs about the reasons they believe that

defendants’ alleged conduct was illegal. Further, LS&Co. asserts that it needs to further

examine Walsh about the complaint allegations, tax and accounting issues. As for Schmidt,

LS&Co. says that it needs more time to cover a number of tax issues concerning European tax

positions and entities, as well as about an alleged Brazilian tax shelter, bad debt and worthless

stock.

Based on the foregoing, and in view of the record as a whole, LS&Co. shall have an

additional 5 hours to depose Walsh, and an additional 10 hours to depose Schmidt.

The parties next dispute whether plaintiffs’ depositions must proceed on consecutive

days (as plaintiffs request) or whether the depositions may proceed on non-consecutive days (as

LS&Co. desires). There is a history between the parties on this particular issue, and in their

briefs, each side has recited, at length, its version of that history in the apparent hope of

convincing the court that the other side has been unreasonable. As noted at the motion hearing,

the court finds that fair and sensible counsel should have been able to resolve this particular

dispute between themselves. Nevertheless, since the parties have been unable to reach any

agreement: The court believes that the depositions should take place at a date, place and time

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that is mutually agreeable and convenient to the deponents and all counsel. Ideally, plaintiffs’

depositions would be conducted and completed over consecutive days, but the court will not

mandate it here.

Finally, the court notes that the record presented indicates that the parties are unable (or

unwilling) to deal courteously and reasonably with one another. At oral argument, counsel for

both parties stated that they actually get along better than their papers suggest. Nevertheless, as

proposed at the motion hearing, this court will consider recommending the appointment of a

special master if the parties’ relations do not improve. In any event, it is hoped that the parties

and their counsel will deal with one another with respect and courtesy. Further, it appears that

some general guidelines are necessary and bear stating here:

a. Counsel shall refrain from instructing deponents not to answer pending

questions, except as authorized under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1);

b. Breaks taken during the depositions shall not count against the time limit for the

examination;

c. Colloquy between counsel on the record shall not count against the time limit for

the examination;

d. No breaks shall be taken while a question is pending;

e. The depositions shall be recorded in such a way to show the time elapsed on the

deposition transcript.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

December 26, 2006

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5:04-cv-1026 Notice will be electronically mailed to: 

Joseph Heathcliff Ainley JAinley@popelka.com, gsimmons@popelka.com 

Franklin Edward Bondonno fbondonno@popelka.com, dlee@popelka.com 

Philip Edward Kay phil@nosexualharassment.com 

Rebecca Justice Lazarus rjustice@gibsondunn.com, rmcbain@gibsondunn.com 

Jeffry W. Lochner jlochner@popelka.com, kanderson@popelka.com; jlochner@verizon.net 

Sheila Marie Pierce sheila.pierce@bingham.com 

Erin E. Schneider eschneider@gibsondunn.com 

Austin Van Schwing aschwing@gibsondunn.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have

not registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

Case 5:04-cv-01026-RMW Document 93 Filed 12/26/06 Page 7 of 7