Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02566/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02566-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

S. R. Moore, Warden (A), Deuel Vocational Institution, is substituted for Claude E. Finn, 1

Warden, Deuel Vocational Institution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(d).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE RAY BEASLEY,

Petitioner,

vs.

S. R. MOORE, Warden (A), et al.,

1

Respondents.

No. 2:03-cv-02566-JKS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Willie Ray Beasley, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this

application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Beasley is currently in the

custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation incarcerated at the Deuel

Vocational Institution.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On April 20, 1980, Beasley was convicted after a jury trial in the San Francisco Superior

Court of violating California Penal Code § 187 [first-degree murder], § 245(a) [assault with a

deadly weapon], § 220 [assault with intent to commit mayhem], and § 12021 (possession of a

firearm by an ex-felon]. He was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life for the murder;

the five-year sentence on the remaining counts to run concurrent. He also received a two-year

enhancement for use of a firearm, resulting in an aggregated term of twenty-seven years to life.

In August 2001 Beasley appeared before the Board of Prison Terms (Board) for his fourth

parole consideration hearing. The Board found him not suitable for parole and deferred his next

hearing for one year. On December 9, 2001, Beasley filed an administrative appeal, which was

denied October 8, 2002. In February 2003, Beasley filed a petition for habeas relief in the

California Superior Court, San Francisco County, which was denied on March 24, 2003, as

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 1 of 15
 Beasley had filed an earlier petition for habeas relief in the San Francisco Superior Court while 2

his administrative appeal was still pending that was denied on procedural grounds before the Board had

rendered a decision on Beasley’s administrative appeal.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Beasley v. Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS 2

procedurally deficient. He then filed another petition in the San Francisco County Superior 2

Court, which was denied in a written decision on the merits on July 16, 2003. Beasley filed a

petition for habeas relief in the California Court of Appeal on September 5, 2003, which was

summarily denied without opinion or citation to authority on September 11, 2003. Beasley’s

petition for review was filed in the California Supreme Court on September 22, 2003 and

summarily denied without opinion or citation to authority on November 12, 2003. Beasley

timely filed his petition for habeas relief in this Court on December 23, 2003.

After this Court granted Beasley’s request to stay this matter until he exhausted his state

court remedies with respect to his claim that the Board’s denial of parole violated the Eighth

Amendment, Beasley filed a request in the California Supreme Court to exhaust his state

court remedies with respect to that claim. On July 13, 2005, the California Supreme Court

summarily denied Beasley’s petition with citation to In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005);

In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993); and In re Miller, 17, Cal. 2d 734 (1941). Beasley then filed

his Second Amended Petition in this Court on September 22, 2005 (file stamped September 26,

2005).

II. GROUNDS PRESENTED/DEFENSES

In his Second Amended Petition Beasley raises four grounds: (1) the Board violated due

process by relying on the crime and his social history, the so-called immutable factors; (2) the

Board violated due process when it failed to comply with California Penal Code § 3041; (3) the

Board’s decision finding him unsuitable for parole violated his due process rights because the

decision lacked evidentiary support; and (4) denying him parole and retaining him in prison

beyond the Board’s estimated maximum release date violates the Eighth Amendment. 

Respondent concedes that Beasley has exhausted his state court remedies.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the standard of

review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 2 of 15
 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–406 (2000); see Lockyer v. 3

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (explaining this standard). 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412. 4

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, ___, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654 (2006) (alterations by the Court); see 5

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746-47 (2008) (per curiam).

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520–21 (2003). 6

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (2007).

7

Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007) (adopting the standard set forth in 8

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993)).

Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Beasley v. Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS 3

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the

California Court of Appeal was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” at the time the

state court renders its decision or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” The Supreme Court has 3

explained that “clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) “refers to the holdings, as

opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.4

Thus, where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are

lacking, “it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established

Federal law.’” When a claim falls under the “unreasonable application” prong, a state court’s 5

application of the Supreme Court precedent must be “objectively unreasonable, “not just

incorrect.” The Supreme Court has made clear that the objectively unreasonable standard is a 6

substantially higher threshold than simply believing the state court determination was incorrect.7

Finally, in a federal habeas proceeding, the standard under which this Court must assess the

prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial is whether the error had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.8

In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state court,

9

which in this case was that of the San Francisco County Superior Court, except as to the fourth

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 3 of 15
 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 10

See Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2005). 11

Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

12

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (construing Williams, 529 U.S. at 400). 13

Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 14

742 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 

See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). 15

Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)

16

(a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court's interpretation and application of state law);

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (it is presumed that the state court knew and correctly

applied state law) overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Beasley v. Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS 4

ground. In addition, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the

petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.10

AEDPA’s deferential standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is inapplicable,

however, where there was no reasoned state court decision. The Board of Parole Hearings Office

of Policy and Appeals is an administrative body not entitled to deference under AEDPA. This 11

Court must review the last state court decision that adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the

merits. Here, with respect to Beasley’s fourth ground, that is the decision of the California

Supreme Court, which did not provide any reasoning to support its denial of relief. Therefore,

this Court must “independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly

erred in its application of Supreme Court law,” “through the ‘objectively reasonable’ lens 12

ground by Williams.” When there is no reasoned state court decision denying an issue 13

presented to the state court and raised in a federal habeas petition, this Court must assume that

the state court decided all the issues presented to it and perform an independent review of the

record to ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable.14

To the extent that Petitioner raises issues of the proper application of State law, they are

beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. It is a fundamental precept of

dual federalism that the States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal

law. A federal court must accept that state courts correctly applied state laws. A petitioner 15 16

may not transform a state law issue into a federal one by simply asserting a violation of due

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 4 of 15
Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996).

17

See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). 18

 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006).

19

 Respondent candidly acknowledges that his contrary position is foreclosed by controlling 20

authority and only raises it in order to preserve the issue for appeal.

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128–29 (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)).

21

 Under California law, “[t]he nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient 22

basis for denying parole.” In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 682 (2002). The Board must, however,

“point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed” that

demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of the suitability hearing, present a danger to society if released.

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1071, 1095 (Cal. 2005). “Factors beyond the minimum elements of

the crime include, (1) the commitment offense, where the offense was committed in ‘an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner’; (2) the prisoner’s previous record of violence; (3) ‘a history of

unstable or tumultuous relationships with others’; (4) commission of ‘sadistic sexual offenses’; (5) ‘a

lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense’; and (6) ‘serious misconduct in prison

or jail.’” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 n.4 (citing Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c)).

 334 F.3d 910, 916–17 (9th Cir. 2003).

23

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Beasley v. Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS 5

process. Nor may a federal court issue a habeas writ based upon a perceived error of state law 17

unless the error is sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment.18

IV. DISCUSSION

Ground 1 (Reliance on Immutable Factors); Ground 2 (Failure to Comply with California

Penal Code § 3041); and Ground 3 (Lack of Evidentiary Support).

Because they are inextricably intertwined, consolidating discussion of his first, second

and third grounds is appropriate. 

Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, settled the issue that a California prisoner has 19

a liberty interest in parole protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. It is equally as well settled that a decision of the parole board to 20

deny a prisoner parole must be supported by some evidence in the record. Beasley challenges 21

the refusal of the Board to grant him a parole on the basis that the decision was based primarily,

if not wholly, upon the nature of his commitment offense. In Biggs v. Terhune, the Ninth 22 23

Circuit indicated that although the commitment offense provides some evidence of unsuitability

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 5 of 15
 505 F.3d 846, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2007).

24

 Sass was convicted of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter, hit and run death, 25

causing injury while driving under the influence, and felony drunk driving, arising out of an automobile

accident in which a death occurred. He was sentenced to 15 years to life with the possibility of parole.

Prior to his conviction of second degree murder, Sass had been convicted on seven separate occasions for

DUI.

Irons was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 17 years to life in prison with the

possibility of parole. After an angry confrontation with the victim, Irons went to his room, retrieved his

gun, and then went to the victim’s room where he fired 12 rounds into the victim and, after the victim

complained that he was in pain, stabbed him twice in the back. He then wrapped the victim’s body in a

sleeping bag and left it in the room for the ten days it took him to procure a car. Irons then took the body

to the coast, weighed it down, and disposed of it in the ocean. Prior to his conviction, Irons had no

criminal record.

 505 F.3d 853–54.

26

 In Irons, as well as Sass and Biggs, the determination denying parole was made prior to the 27

time that the petitioner had served the minimum term to which he was sentenced.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Beasley v. Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS 6

for parole, “[a] continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstances of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by

the system and could result in a due process violation.” It is this principle that Beasley has drawn

into issue in this case.

There is, as this Court has noted in other cases, a lack of clear guidance from the Court of

Appeals on this issue. Where the line of demarcation that triggers a violation of the Due Process

Clause referred to in Biggs lies is unknown. Irons v. Carey, appears to make it dependent, at 24

least in significant part, upon the gravity of the commitment offense, how heinous it was, e.g.,

the extent to which the prisoner acted in callous disregard for human life, the degree of depravity

or cruelty shown, and the nature of the victim. The holding in Irons established a bright-line test

of sorts, i.e., a crime that is more heinous, atrocious, callous, or cruel than that committed by

Sass, is sufficient to satisfy due process, despite evidence of exemplary behavior in prison and 25

evidence of rehabilitation and the lack of a prior criminal record. Irons did not, however,

26

address the question posed by Biggs—at what point in time does the nature of the commitment

offense becomes so attenuated that it no longer constitutes “some evidence”?

27

From Biggs, Sass, and Irons, a district court can glean certain guiding principles in ruling

on a California prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus addressed to the denial of

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 6 of 15
Biggs, 343 F.3d at 916, 28

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Beasley v. Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS 7

parole. First, a California prisoner has a liberty interest in parole protected by the Due Process

Clause. Second, the test to be applied is whether some evidence indicates a parolee’s release

unreasonably endangers public safety, not whether the findings of the Board are supported by

evidence. Third, at least until such time as the prisoner has served the minimum sentence

imposed, denial of a parole date solely upon the basis of the commitment offense more likely

than not does not violate the Due Process Clause. Fourth, a district court must examine the

record for sufficient evidence to support the findings of the Board that release unreasonably

endangers public safety. Fifth, the extent to which the gravity of the commitment conviction is

attenuated by time, assuming that all other factors properly considered are either neutral or

positive, is dependent upon (1) the nature of the commitment offense and (2) whether there has

been a significant time lapse since the offense was committed.

In this case, the crime occurred more than 20 years before the hearing; however, like

Biggs, Sass, and Irons, Beasley had not yet completed his minimum term. Beasley, who was

convicted of first degree murder, illegally entered his ex-wife’s apartment and waited in hiding

for her return. He first shot her boyfriend in the chest, killing him, then shot his ex-wife in the

face, and shot her again in the back as she ran away. This crime, found by a jury to constitute

first degree murder, is certainly more heinous and atrocious than the second degree murder

convictions found sufficient in Sass and Irons to constitute a sufficient basis for the Board’s

decision. As was the panel in Irons, this Court is bound by Sass and must find that Beasley’s due

process rights were not violated. 

Beasley’s argument that the decision of the Board lacks evidentiary support lacks merit. 

Beasley focuses on a single factor, the nature of his crime, as being the basis for denial of parole;

however, as the decision of the San Francisco County Superior Court found, the Board tailored

its decision to the totality of Beasley’s individual circumstances. While continued reliance on the

unchanging circumstances of Beasley’s offense, standing alone, may have implicated his liberty

interest in parole, that did not happen in the course of the Board’s 2001 parole denial. 28

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 7 of 15
 Findings that this Court must accept unless shown to be incorrect by clear and convincing 29

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cochrell, supra. A burden Beasley has failed to carry.

 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir.2002) (applying standard outlined by the Supreme Court in 30

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)).

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 31

Lockyer–Williams–Schriro.

32

See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1991).

33

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Beasley v. Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS 8

In addition to the specific offense of which he was convicted, which is not in dispute, the

Superior Court found that the Board considered: Beasley’s criminal history, unstable social

history, law enforcement’s opposition to his release, and suggested that Petitioner present a better

plan for his release. Under McQuillion v. Duncan, these unquestionably constitute “‘some 29 30

evidence’ having ‘some indicia of reliability.’”

In light of Hill, Irons, Sass, and McQuillion, this Court cannot say that the decision of the

San Francisco County Superior Court, which applied the same “some evidence” test applied in

Hill, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or was “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Nor 31

can this Court find that the Superior Court unreasonably applied the correct legal principle to the

facts of the Beasley’s case, i.e., the state court decision was more than incorrect or erroneous, its

application of clearly established law was objectively unreasonable. 

32

To the extent that Beasley argues that the failure to set a parole date is contrary to the

provisions of California Penal Code § 3041, that argument, involving the proper interpretation

and application of a state statute, is an issue beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas

proceeding. The question to be decided by a federal court on a petition for habeas corpus is not

whether the Board committed state-law error in relying upon the commitment offense. Rather,

the federal, constitutional question is whether such reliance is so arbitrary or capricious as to

constitute an independent due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if the 33

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 8 of 15
 Under California law, a proportionality analysis is not required until after a prisoner is found 34

suitable for parole. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1097–98 (2005); In re Stanworth, 33 Cal.3d 176,

183 (1982); Cal. Code Reg., tit. 15, § 2280.

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983) (internal alternations and emphasis omitted). 35

Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Bland, 36

961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992).

 485 F.3d 432, 438–39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 404 (2007). 37

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Beasley v. Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS 9

California Superior Court erred in applying California, which it did not, that error was not so

34

arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a violation of due process.

Beasley is not entitled to relief on his first, second and third grounds.

Ground 4: Eighth Amendment.

As there was no reasoned state court decision addressing this ground, this Court must

decide the issue de novo on the record before it. While the Eighth Amendment prohibits

sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime, “outside the context of capital

punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences will be

exceedingly rare.” The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘only extreme sentences that are grossly

35

disproportionate to the crime’ violate the Eighth Amendment.” In Nunes v. Ramirez-Palmer,

36 37

the Ninth Circuit stated:

[T]he Supreme Court has noted that proportionality analysis under the Eighth

Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including: “(i) the gravity of

the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other

criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission

of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103

S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Despite this, the Supreme Court has not

uniformly applied this three step analysis. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501

U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); Rummel v. Estelle, 445

U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980).

In an attempt to resolve this inconsistency, the Supreme Court has

explicitly identified that which constitutes “clearly established federal law” in its

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for the purpose of habeas review. Specifically,

in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003),

after conceding that its “precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity,”

the Court held that “one governing legal principle emerges as ‘clearly established’

under § 2254(d)(1): A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 9 of 15
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72–77. 38

Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 2005).

39

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Beasley v. Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS 10

for terms of years.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72, 123 S.Ct. 1166. In so holding, the

Court made no mention of any constitutional imperative requiring that courts

make the various intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons recommended by the

Solem court. See id. Instead, the Supreme Court held that “the only relevant

clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application

of’ framework is the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of

which are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.”

Id. at 73, 123 S.Ct. 1166.

Beasley (1) was lying in wait providing him time for reconsideration and (2) there were

two victims. Thus, this case does not present an “exceedingly rare” and “extreme” case where

the failure of the Board to find Beasley suitable for parole, thereby continuing his term of

imprisonment, runs afoul of Eighth Amendment law as established by the Supreme Court of the

United States. Beasley is not entitled to relief under his fourth ground. 38

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Beasley is not entitled to relief under any ground raised in his petition. Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ

of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT no Certificate of Appealability is required.39

The Clerk of the Court to enter final judgment accordingly.

Dated: September 30, 2008

s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 10 of 15
MEMORANDUM DECISION – APPENDIX

Beasley v Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Page 1 of 5

APPENDIX

Petitioner first became eligible for parole in 1995, but was found unsuitable. In 1997 and

1999, Petitioner was again considered and rejected for parole.

In August 2001, the Board of Prison Terms found Petitioner unsuitable for parole, and an

unreasonable threat to public safety. The Board based the decision on its findings that: 1) he

poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety; 2) the crime was

carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner demonstrating disregard for human

suffering; 3) the motive was inexplicable or very trivial; 4) he has a record of violence or

assaultive behavior and an escalating pattern of criminal conduct; 5) he had a history of unstable

and tumultuous relationships with others; and 6) he has failed to profit from society’s previous

attempts to correct his criminality. The Board also requested more information regarding

Defendant’s post-parole plans and attempts to find employment.

Petitioner contends that 1) the BPT’s decision finding him unsuitable for parole is not

supported by the record; 2) the BPT’s refusal to set parole release dates violates the mandate of

PC § 3041; and 3) the BPT has imposed excessive punishment on Petitioner by failing to fix his

primary term of imprisonment.

“[T]he factual basis for a Board [of Prison Terms] decision granting or denying parole is

subject to a limited judicial review under the ‘some evidence’ standard of review.” In re

Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 652. “Judicial oversight must be extensive enough to protect

the limited right of parole applicants ‘to be free from an arbitrary parole decision . . . and . . .

something more than mere pro forma consideration.’ The courts may properly determine

whether the Board’s handling of parole applications is consistent with the parole policies

established by the Legislature. While courts must give great weight to the Board’s interpretation

of the parole statutes and regulations, final responsibility for interpreting the law rests with the

courts. Courts must not second-guess the Board’s evidentiary findings. However, it is the proper

function of judicial review to ensure that the Board has honored in a ‘practical sense’ the

applicant's right to ‘due consideration.’ This function is best served by examining the Board's

parole suitability rulings under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. The Board’s decision

should not be disturbed unless it has acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Particular deference must

be accorded to the Board’s factual determinations, which need only be supported by some

evidence.” In re Ramirez (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 549, 564 [citations omitted].

The Board’s regulations for setting parole release dates are found in title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations. Section 2401 provides: “ ‘A life prisoner shall be considered for

parole for the first time at the initial parole consideration hearing . . . . A parole date shall be

denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A parole date shall

be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A parole date set under

this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity

and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public. ‘In setting the parole date the panel shall

consider the Sentencing Rules for the Superior Courts. The panel shall also consider the criteria

and guidelines set forth in this article for determining the suitability for parole and the setting of

Case 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 11 of 15
MEMORANDUM DECISION – APPENDIX

Beasley v Moore, 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Page 2 of 5

parole dates, considering the number of victims of the crime for which the prisoner was

sentenced and any other circumstances in mitigation or aggravation.’ ” In re Ramirez, supra, 94

Cal.App.4th at p. 565.

Subdivision (a) of section 2402 of title 15 of the Code of Regulations provides in part that

“a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” Subdivision (b) provides that “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available to the panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall include the circumstances of

the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state; past criminal history, including

involvement in other criminal misconduct . . .; the base and other commitment offenses,

including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime;

any conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the

prisoner may safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish

unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability.”

Subdivision (c) of section 2402 of title 15 of the Code of Regulations sets forth circumstances tending to indicate unsuitability for parole. Those circumstances include:

“(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered include: (A) Multiple victims

were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate incidents. (B) The offense was

carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder. 

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense. (D) The

offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering. (E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial

in relation to the offense.

(2) Previous record of violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim . . . .

(3) Unstable Social history. The prisoner has a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others . . . .”

In subdivision (d) of section 2402 of title 15 of the Code of Regulations, circumstances

tending to show suitability for parole are delineated. Those include:

“(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of assaulting others as a

juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to victims.

(2) Stable social history. The prisoner has experienced reasonably stable relationships with

others.

(3) Signs of remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to indicate the presence of

remorse, such as . . . indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense.

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(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as the result of significant

stress in his life, especially if the stress had built over a long period of time . . .

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant history of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for the future. The prisoner has made realistic plans for

release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to function

within the law upon release."

As explained in In re Ramirez, “the gravity of the commitment offense or offenses alone

may be a sufficient basis for denying a parole application, so long as the Board does not fail to

consider all other relevant factors. Nevertheless, the circumstances of any past offense, even any

murder, are not necessarily a sufficient ground for the Board to refuse to set a parole release date. 

All violent crime demonstrates the perpetrator’s potential for posing a grave risk to public safety,

yet parole is mandatory for violent felons serving determinate sentences. And the Legislature has

clearly expressed its intent that when murderers--who are the great majority of inmates serving

indeterminate sentences--approach their minimum eligible parole date, the Board ‘shall normally

set a parole release date.’ Penal Code § 3041(a). The Board’s authority to make an exception

based on the gravity of a life term inmate’s current or past offenses should not operate so as to

swallow the rule that parole is ‘normally’ to be granted . . . . Therefore, a life term offense or any

other offenses underlying an indeterminate sentence must be particularly egregious to justify the

denial of a parole date.” In re Ramirez, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 569-570 [citations omitted].

The Ramirez court continued: “In order to comply with the parole policy established by

the Legislature in Penal Code section 3041, the Board must weigh the inmate's criminal conduct

not against ordinary social norms, but against other instances of the same crime or crimes . . . . 

The Board must also consider the length of time the inmate has served in relation to the terms

prescribed by the Legislature for the offenses under consideration, in order to arrive at a ‘uniform’ term as contemplated by Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (a).” In re Ramirez, supra,

94 Cal.App.4th at p. 570.

Petitioner contends that in denying him parole, the BPT relied exclusively on the

circumstances of his offense, which will never change, and the decision finding him unsuitable is

not supported by the record. Though Petitioner appears to have an exemplary record as a

prisoner, the BPT does not appear to abuse its discretion.

The BPT did weigh the commitment offense heavily in making its determination. 

Petitioner illegally entered his ex-wife’s apartment and waited in hiding for her return. He then

shot her boyfriend in the chest, killing him, and shot his ex-wife in the face. He shot her again in

the back as she ran away. However, the BPT also relied on Petitioner’s prior record, both as a

juvenile and as an adult, and his failure to correct his criminal conduct. Petitioner was first

arrested as a juvenile in 1960 for robbery. In 1966, Petitioner was arrested on four counts of a

traffic violation as a juvenile, and wardship was declared. The following year, while on probaCase 2:03-cv-02566-JKS Document 41 Filed 09/30/08 Page 13 of 15
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tion, he was arrested for car stripping and committed to a County Boys Ranch. In 1969,

Petitioner was arrested for petty theft and put on probation, and was then arrested for robbery and

assault with a deadly weapon and receiving stolen goods later that year. After CDC evaluation,

Petitioner was sentenced to eight months in County Jail and then placed on probation. Based on

that information, the BTP found that Petitioner had on previous occasions inflicted or attempted

to inflict serious harm on a victim and had exhibited an escalating pattern of criminal conduct.

Petitioner was further found to have a history of unstable and tumultuous relationships

with others. Though in his psychological evaluations Petitioner was found to have a violence

potential below average to the male prison population, the psychologist also noted that if

Petitioner were to return to a pattern of dysfunctional social relationships, the potential for

violence could increase. The BPT also noted the strong opposition of the San Francisco District

Attorney, and suggested that Petitioner present a better plan for his release. Petitioner's contention that the BPT may only consider the gravity of his offense at the initial parole hearing is

without support or merit. Penal Code § 3041(a) sets out a structure detailing the dates for a

prisoner's initial hearing and the criteria to be used by the Board. Subsection (b) merely

mandates that a release date must be set unless the Board determines that gravity of the offense,

or the timing and gravity of current or past convictions, is such that public safety requires a

lengthier period of incarceration, and a parole date cannot be fixed at that time. Penal Code §

3041.5 provides for annual review except in certain circumstances. Petitioner basically repeats

his first contention that the BPT's determination that he poses an unreasonable threat to public

safety is unfounded.

Lastly, Petitioner contends that under In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, indeterminately sentenced inmates have an right to have their terms of imprisonment fixed at a number of

years proportionate to their sentence. Rodriguez was decided at a time prior to the Determinate

Sentencing Law, and its holding is limited. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has

recently granted review in In re Danneberg, previously published at 102 Cal.App.4th 95, to

answer whether “[a]t a parole suitability hearing that is held pursuant to Penal Code section

3041, must the Board of Prison Terms generally engage in a comparative proportionality analysis

with respect to offenses of similar gravity and magnitude and consider base term matrices used

by the Board in setting release dates and deny a parole date solely on the basis of the circumstances of the offense only when the offense is particularly egregious, or may the Board first

determine whether the inmate is suitable for parole because he or she is no longer a threat to

public safety and engage in a proportionality analysis only if it finds the inmate suitable for

parole?" 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 653. Further consideration of this question is not appropriate at this

time.

Petitioner further argues that because he has served 23 years in prison and has accumulated eight years of credits, when a total period of imprisonment is set, he may have exceeded

that period already. Petitioner further contends that under his version of the facts, his total base

term should fall between 27 and 29 years, in which case he should have been released already.

Application of the matrix, however, is not appropriate until Petitioner has been found suitable for

parole. In this case, he has not.

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For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

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