Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03335/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03335-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The immigration statutes at issue in this order address detention by the Attorney General. After their

enactment, however, immigration-enforcement duties were transferred from the Attorney General to the

Department of Homeland Security. 6 U.S.C. 251(2) (enacted 2002). The immigration statutes have not been

amended to reflect this change (Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ¶ 9). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMIH HUSSEIN ZABADI,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security; ALBERTO

GONZALES, U.S. Attorney General; NANCY

ALCANTAR, San Francisco Field Office

Director, U.S. Bureau of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement; and TOBY WONG,

Correctional Captain, Santa Clara County,

Respondents. /

No. C 05-03335 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Samih Hussein Zabadi has been held in federal custody for the past twenty-one months

during deportation proceedings. The government contends that a federal statute requires the

petitioner’s detention. This order holds that the Department of Homeland Security was not

authorized under the statute in question to arrest petitioner given the government’s two-year

delay in seeking to take him into custody.1

 His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

GRANTED. The government is ORDERED TO RELEASE him on the bond previously set. 

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STATEMENT

Petitioner is a stateless Palestinian. He was born in Kuwait. Because his parents were

Palestinian, he was not made a Kuwaiti citizen. He has never been to Jordan, Israel or its

occupied lands. Petitioner entered the United States in February 1990 with a Jordanian tourist

visa that expired in 1994. He has lived here ever since. Zababi, File No. A70 830 132 at

6 (Immigration Ct. May 28, 2004). 

On May 9, 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization Service placed petitioner in

deportation proceedings on grounds that he had overstayed his visa. In March 1997,

Immigration Judge Dana Leigh Marks concluded that petitioner was eligible for suspension of

deportation. Immediate suspension was not available, however, due to annual caps on the

number granted. Judge Marks therefore took the case under submission. Id. at 1–2. 

Before petitioner received a grant of suspension, Congress amended the immigration

statutes to make aliens such as petitioner ineligible, requiring an alien who is not a permanent

U.S. resident and seeks suspension to establish, among other things, seven years of continuous

presence in the United States before the initiation of deportation proceedings. See 8 U.S.C.

1229b(a)(2). Petitioner fell short by one year.

Petitioner was convicted in 2001 of committing a lewd act against a child. He spent

311 days in jail. He was released December 19, 2001. Zababi at 7–8 (Immigration Ct. May 28,

2004). 

More than two years after his release from incarceration, agents of the U.S. Bureau of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested petitioner during Operation Predator, a

program to apprehend and remove aliens convicted of sex offenses. Petitioner was placed in

detention February 5, 2004. Zababi at 5 (Immigration Ct. Apr. 25, 2005). There is no evidence

that the agents did not know his whereabouts at any time between his release from jail and

Operation Predator, or that petitioner had been hiding. In fact, it appears that the bureau could

have found him easily using public and law-enforcement records. He was on probation during

this time, and contends that he complied fully with its terms (Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ¶

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22). He married his wife during this period. Zababi at 7 (Immigration Ct. May 28, 2004). For

all the record shows, the agents were just not interested in him until Operation Predator. 

While in detention, Judge Marks waived petitioner’s inadmissibility and made him a

lawful permanent resident on the basis of his marriage in 2003 to a United States citizen. 

Zababi at 9, 18 (Immigration Ct. May 28, 2004). The Board of Immigration Appeals, however,

reversed those decisions. It held that petitioner did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion

because of his child-molestation conviction. The BIA remanded the case to Judge Marks to

consider petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

United Nations Convention Against Torture. Zabadi at 2 (BIA Feb. 17, 2005). 

Judge Marks then denied a bureau motion to lodge an additional ground for deportation,

that petitioner was an aggravated felon. She also denied petitioner’s application for relief under

the Convention Against Torture, determining that evidence did not show that he likely would be

tortured in Kuwait, and ordered him deported to Kuwait. Additionally, the immigration judge

rejected the bureau’s request to designate Israel and the Occupied Territories as an alternate

country of deportation and vacated the prior designation of Jordan as a country of deportation. 

Zabadi at 3, 5, 9, 11 (Immigration Ct. Apr. 19, 2005). 

Later that month, Judge Marks ruled that, although petitioner had been detained properly

in the first instance, his “prolonged . . . detention without bond [wa]s not constitutionally

proper” and found that he was not a flight risk or a danger. She ordered the government to

release him upon posting of a $2500 bond. Zabadi at 4–6 (Immigration Ct. Apr. 25, 2005). 

His release was automatically stayed because respondents filed a notice of intent to appeal the

bond decision to the BIA (Shugall Decl., Exh. 14). This Court ruled that the automatic-stay

regulation, 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2), was unconstitutional and ultra vires and vacated the stay. 

Zabadi v. Chertoff, No. C 05-1796, 2005 WL 1514122 at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2005). The

BIA granted respondents an emergency stay. On July 8, 2005, the BIA reversed the

immigration judge’s decision. It concluded that petitioner was subject to the Immigration and

Nationality Act mandatory-detention provision and that Judge Marks therefore had no power to

release him on bond (Shugall Decl., Exh. 21, 22). 

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Petitioner and the bureau appealed the immigration judge’s April 19 order. The BIA

held that she erred in denying the bureau’s motion to lodge an additional ground for

deportation. It upheld the rulings that denied petitioner’s application for relief under the

Convention Against Torture and that refused to designate Israel and the Occupied Territories as

an alternate country of deportation. The BIA also dismissed petitioner’s request for a ruling

that he was eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. Zabadi at 2–3 (BIA Nov. 16, 2005). 

Petitioner appealed the BIA’s rulings to the Ninth Circuit. Pet. for Review and Mot. for Stay of

Deportation with Req. to Supplement Stay Mot. in 14 Days, Zabadi v. Gonzales (9th Cir. Nov.

16, 2005). This appeal automatically stayed the order of deportation until further order of the

Ninth Circuit. See Ninth Cir. Gen. Order 6.4(c)1.

Petitioner now requests that this Court rule that the detention mandated by former

8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2) (1996) does not render him ineligible for bond. Petitioner asks that the

Court order him released from detention upon posting the $2500 bond set by Judge Marks. 

ANALYSIS 

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a person claiming to

be “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3). The parties agree that the Court has jurisdiction over petitioner’s

detention. 

When a court reviews the interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency, such as

the BIA, established canons of statutory construction apply. For example, the words used are

given their ordinary meaning. Where the intent of Congress is clearly expressed, “that is the end

of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress.” If the congressional intent is ambiguous, then the court must

defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. An agency’s interpretation in such

circumstances may be overturned only if it is arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to law. 

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 & n.9, 860

(1984). 

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The first question to answer in the instant case is which of two very similar statutes

applies. The government states that it is detaining petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) but

refers to Section 1226(c) and former 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2) interchangeably (Return in Opp. to

Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 7, n.6). Petitioner seems indifferent as well. He contends that

former Section 1252(a)(2) applies but suggests there is no material difference here between the

provisions. 

Prior to passage of the Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,

detention of criminal aliens following release from incarceration was governed by

Section 1252(a)(2), which mandated that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any

alien convicted of [certain crimes] upon release of the alien from incarceration, [and] shall deport

the alien as expeditiously as possible.” The Act’s prospective reach, however, was explicitly

limited. Section 309(c)(1) provided that “in the case of alien who is in exclusion or deportation

proceedings as of [April 1, 1997] . . . the amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and

the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without regard

to such amendments.” This limitation was inapplicable to certain provisions. They are not

relevant, however, to the petition. This limitation exempted petitioner from the new law in his

deportation proceedings. His removal proceeding commenced before the transition date of

April 1, 1997. See Vasquez-Zavala v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (“For cases

where deportation proceedings commenced prior to April 1, 1997 but remained ongoing on

April 1, 1997, IIRIRA [the Act] includes transitional rules providing that, for the most part, the

new provisions of IIRIRA do not apply.”). Section 1226(c) is inapplicable. The old provision

— Section 1252(a)(2) — applies. 

Section 1252(a)(2) provided (emphasis added):

The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien convicted

of any criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B),

(C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for

which both predicate offenses are covered by section

241(a)(2)(A)(i), upon release of the alien from incarceration, [and] shall deport the alien as expeditiously as possible. 

Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or subsections (c) and (d) of this

section[], the Attorney General shall not release such felon from

custody.

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28 2 Quezada-Bucio interpreted Section 1226(c). It therefore analyzed the language of that subsection

(“when . . . released”) rather than the language of Section 1252(a)(2) (“upon release”). 

6

Section 1252(a)(2) directed the Attorney General to detain a criminal alien “upon release of the

alien from incarceration.” It did not authorize a taking into custody more than two years after

the individual had been released from incarceration. Because the Department of Homeland

Security declined to take petitioner into custody upon release from incarceration or within a

reasonable period thereafter, Section 1252(a)(2) did not authorize petitioner’s later arrest and

detention. 

Two district court decisions within this circuit concluded that a long delay makes

Section 1252(a)(2) or Section 1226(c) inapplicable. Pastor-Camarena v. Smith held that “[t]he

plain meaning of this language is that it applies immediately after release from incarceration,

not to aliens released many years earlier.” 977 F. Supp. 1415, 1417 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (alien’s

detention began at least ten years after release from incarceration); see also Quezada-Bucio v.

Ridge, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which

substitutes “when . . . released” for “upon release,” does not apply to a petitioner who was

detained three years after release from incarceration). “[I]f Congress had intended for

mandatory detention to apply to aliens at any time after they were released, it easily could have

used the language ‘after the alien is released’ or ‘regardless of when the alien is released,’ or

other words to that effect. Instead, Congress chose the word ‘when,’ which connotes a much

different meaning.” Quezada-Bucio, 317 F. Supp. at 1231.2

 Similarly, Grodzki v. Reno held

that the “language ‘upon release . . . from incarceration’ at least implies that custody commence

within a reasonable time after release from incarceration.” 950 F. Supp. 339, 342 (N.D. GA.

1996). This Court is aware of no court decisions to the contrary. 

Respondents cite Rojas, in which the BIA held that a criminal alien was subject to

mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) even though he was not immediately taken into

custody when released from criminal incarceration. 23 I. & N. Dec. 117 (BIA 2001) ( “[W]e

discern that the statute as a whole is focused on the removal of criminal aliens in general, not

just those coming into Service custody ‘when . . . released’ from criminal incarceration.”). 

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Rojas, however, concerned an alien detained by immigration authorities only two days after he

was freed from incarceration for his criminal conviction. Ibid. Here, by contrast, petitioner was

free for more than two years before he was detained. Two days is nothing like two years. Thus,

Rojas did not consider the point raised here. Even if the statute were ambiguous, therefore, the

Rojas decision would not be entitled to deference. Rojas did not even consider and address the

point of statutory interpretation controlling in this order. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429

U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (holding that the amount of deference due an administrative decision “will

depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration”). In addition, the BIA’s Zabadi

decisions were unpublished. They therefore are neither precedent nor definitive agency

interpretations. See Chan v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1068, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 1987) (cautioning against

use of unpublished BIA decisions to define the agency’s interpretation of a statute); 8 C.F.R.

1003.1(g) (stating that published decisions “shall serve as precedents in all proceedings

involving the same issue or issues”); BIA, Practice Manual at 8–9 (June 15, 2004)

(“Unpublished decisions . . . are not considered precedent for unrelated cases.”). 

This order holds that the Department of Homeland Security need not act immediately

but has a reasonable period of time after release from incarceration in which to detain. The

government’s contention, however, that it can wait, without good cause, for more than two

years before detaining an alien is unreasonable and will not be followed by this order. As

recognized even by the BIA, “[t]he statute does direct the attorney general to take custody of

aliens immediately upon their release from criminal confinement.” Rojas, 23 I. & N. 117. The

Court thus concludes that the petition of writ for habeas corpus must be granted and orders

petitioner released pursuant to the bond set by Judge Marks. The interpretation of Section

1252(a)(2) by the BIA is not entitled to deference because the congressional intent to authorize

detention only immediately upon release, or within a reasonable period thereafter, is

unambiguous. 

* * * 

Given that the BIA has recently affirmed the removal order, the government argues that

the foregoing discussion has been mooted. It alleges that petitioner is no longer being detained

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pursuant to Section 1252(a)(2) but instead pursuant to yet a different provision,

Section 1231(a)(2), which covers detention during the “removal period” after a deportation

order. (The government claims that Section 1252(a)(2) applies only to aliens awaiting a BIA

decision on whether they will be deported. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(1) (“[p]ending a determination

of deportability”).) The government then argues that petitioner is no longer awaiting such a

decision because his deportation order became final upon the BIA dismissal of his appeal a few

days ago. See 8 C.F.R. 1241.1 (making order of removal final upon dismissal of appeal by the

BIA); 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(47)(B) (stating that an “order of deportation” becomes final upon “a

determination by [BIA] affirming it). The government argues that because the detention order

is final, petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to Section 1231(a)(2) while he

awaits removal. Significantly, this last step in the argument is incorrect. Section 1231(a)(2),

which requires detention pending removal, applies only “[d]uring the removal period.” 

However, the “removal period” in petitioner’s case will not begin until the Ninth Circuit issues

its “final order” in his case. 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii); see also Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d

130, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]here a court issues a stay pending its review of an administrative

removal order, the alien continues to be detained under [Section 1226] until the court renders its

decision.”). 

Mandatory detention is simply not authorized in petitioner’s case by Section 1231(a)(2)

or by Section 1252(a)(2). It is unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues. This ruling, of

course, is without prejudice to detention under former Section 1252(a)(1), which authorizes

“detention upon warrant of the Attorney General.” 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.

Petitioner shall be released immediately pursuant to the bond previously set. The effectiveness

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of this order is stayed until November 30 to allow the government to seek emergency relief

from the Ninth Circuit. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 22, 2005. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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