Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08057/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

V-1 OIL COMPANY, a corporation, and, 

WILLIAM RICHARDS, 

Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 

FILED 

11ni&cd States Court of Appeals Tentb Circuit 

AUG 26 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Qerk 

v. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

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) 

) 

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No. 95-8057 

ROGER MEANS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. 94-CV-745) 

F .M. Andrews, Jr. (Robert 0. Anderson with him on the brief), of Andrews and 

Anderson, P.C., of Riverton, Wyoming, for the appellant. 

Terry L. Armitage, of Cheyenne, Wyoming, for the appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs V -1 Oil Company and William Richards sued Sergeant Roger Means of 

the Wyoming Highway Patrol under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Means violated their 

Fourth Amendment rights by stopping a V -1 propane truck driven by Richards and 

ordering Richards to drive the truck to a port of entry for a safety inspection. Means 

moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion, concluding that 

Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 1 
Means was entitled to qualified immunity because the stop and inspection did not violate 

clearly established law. Although we do not agree with the district court's conclusion that 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-701 ( c ) 1 applies to these facts, or that this inspection was not 

within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment, we affirm on other grounds the district court's 

conclusion that Means was entitled to qualified immunity because the stop and inspection 

did not violate clearly established law. 

Means stopped the V-1 truck at approximately 8:47a.m. on May 5, 1994, because 

the front placard required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-959(b f to be on all vehicles 

transporting hazardous materials was peeling and becoming hard to read, contrary to 49 

C.F .R. § 172.516( c )3• This initial stop took ten or fifteen minutes. Means told Richards 

the truck was looking a "little rough" and that he wanted to perform a safety inspection of 

the truck. At Means' direction, Richards drove the truck three to five miles to a port of 

1 Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-18-701 (c) provides: 

The highway patrol division and such other enforcement officers as the 

department designates are charged with the duty of policing and enforcing the 

provisions of this act. The enforcement officers have authority to make arrests for 

violation of any of the provisions of this act. The enforcement officers may 

require the driver to exhibit the permit issued for the vehicle, to submit to the 

enforcement officer for inspection any and all bills of lading or other evidences of 

the character of the lading being transported in the vehicle and require the vehicle 

to proceed to the nearest department check station or county seat, on the route of 

the carrier, where the officer may inspect the contents of the vehicle for the 

purpose of comparing same with bills of lading or other evidences of ownership 

or of transportation for compensation. 

2 Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-5-959(b) provides: "The vehicle shall be marked or placarded at 

such places and [in] such manner as prescribed by regulations adopted by the superintendent." 

3 49 C.R.F. § 172.516( c) provides in part: "Each placard on a transport vehicle ... must 

-- ... (6) Be maintained by the carrier in a condition so that the format, legibility, color, and 

visibility of the placard will not be substantially reduced due to damage, deterioration, or 

obscurement by dirt or other matter." 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 2 
.. 

entry. Means testified it was safer to inspect the truck at the port of entry than on the 

roadside. He also testified he believed he had authority to make random safety 

inspections without cause and to order a driver to drive a truck to a port of entry for a 

safety inspection, but he could not cite any specific statutes for that authority. 

Means inspected the truck at the port of entry by walking around it and by 

weighing it, but he did not open any truck doors. The inspection report revealed 

violations of safety regulations--placard peeling, markings peeling on all sides of the 

truck, no battery cover, broken windshield, inoperable left side rear marker lamp, and 

inoperable rear I.D. lamps. Means issued a citation for the peeling placard. Richards 

alleged the process took about two and a half hours, but Means testified it took about an 

hour. Means' inspection report, which Richards signed, stated the inspection began at 

9:15a.m. and ended at 9:55a.m. The citation was later dismissed at Means' request 

because he had not put the same date on the citation and the inspection report, and 

because photographs taken of the truck did not develop. 

The district court concluded Means had probable cause to stop the truck and arrest 

the driver for the placard violation, and that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-701 (c) authorized 

Means to order the driver to drive the truck to the port of entry for a safety inspection. 

The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the warrantless inspection violated Fourth 

Amendment rights, concluding the inspection was not a search because it was limited to 

the exterior of the truck and a warrant was unnecessary. 

Plaintiffs do not challenge the legality of the initial stop, but contend Means lacked 

authority to order Richards to drive the truck to the port of entry to conduct a warrantless 

safety inspection, and that this action violated their clearly established rights under the 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 3 
Fourth Amendment. We disagree. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard 

used by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). ~Thompson v. City of 

Lawrence, 58 F.3d 1511, 1515 (lOth Cir. 1995). We analyze qualified immunity claims 

decided on summary judgment under the framework set out in Woodward v. City of 

Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1396-97 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied 509 U.S. 923 (1993). 

When a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, plaintiff must show the law 

was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred and must come forward with 

facts or allegations sufficient to show the official violated the clearly established law. 

Defendant bears the normal summary judgment burden of showing no material facts that 

would defeat the qualified immunity defense remain in dispute. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 

1515. For the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth 

Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts 

must be as the plaintiff maintains. Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1397. 

The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an . 

official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question 

has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting 

law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987). 

We conclude plaintiffs failed to establish that Means' actions violated clearly 

established law. It was not clearly established that a warrantless safety inspection of a 

commercial truck carrying hazardous material by a highway patrol officer at a port of 

entry, after a valid traffic stop on a nearby road, violated the Fourth Amendment. 

We reject plaintiffs' argument that Means lacked any statutory authority for the 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 4 
safety inspection. Plaintiffs assert that Means concedes he relied only on Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 31-18-70 1 (c) for his authority to conduct warrantless safety inspections, but we find no 

such concession in the record. It is true that was the only statute relied on by the district 

court for Means' authority to require Richards to travel to the nearest check station for a 

safety inspection. It is also true that § 31-18-70 I (c) does not authorize a highway patrol 

officer to order a driver to drive a truck to a department check station for a safety 

inspection. The statute authorizes officers to order a driver to drive a truck to a check 

station only for inspection ofthe contents to determine ifthey match the bills of lading. 

However, we may affirm the judgment of the district court on any grounds for 

which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied 

upon by the district court. See Medina v. City and County ofDenver, 960 F.2d 1493, 

1495 n. 1 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-301 (c) authorizes highway patrol officers and other 

agents and employees of the state Department ofTransportation to inspect commercial 

vehicles operated by motor carriers but, under Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 31-18-103(a)(xii), it is 

inapplicable to private motor carriers operating vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 

26,000 pounds or less. V -1 is a private motor carrier as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-

18-101(a)(x)(D), and the record shows the V-1 truck weighed 24,460 pounds. However, 

§ 31-18-1 03(a)(xii) also provides that all private motor carriers must comply with the 

hazardous materials regulations contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-303. That section 

requires the state transportation department to adopt rules and regulations consistent with 

comparable regulations of the United States Department of Transportation, and the 

department has done so. See Wyoming Environmental, Health and Safety Regulations, 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 5 
Transportation Department; Motor Carriers, Chapter I, appendix,§ 27(b) and (c) (ERM 

Computer Services, Inc., 1996). 

The federal regulations governing transportation of hazardous materials by motor 

carrier apply to private carriers. 49 C.F.R. § 177.800(a). 49 C.F.R. § 177.804 requires 

motor carriers transporting hazardous materials to comply with the general federal motor 

carrier safety regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§ 390 through 397. 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 defines any 

motor vehicle transporting hazardous materials as a commercial vehicle subject to the 

general safety regulations. 49 C.F.R. § 393 sets safety standards for truck equipment. 

49 C.F.R. § 396.9 specifically authorizes special agents of the Federal Highway 

Administration to conduct safety inspections of motor carriers' vehicles in operation. 

Although Means was not a special agent of the Federal Highway Administration, state 

regulations give the same authority to highway patrol officers. Wyoming Environmental, 

Health and Safety Regulations, Transportation Department; Motor Carriers, Chapter I, 

appendix, § 27, part 1 (e), provides that references in the federal regula~ions "to such 

federal persons and entities as 'Secretary,' 'Federal Highway Administrator' or 

'Administration,' 'Regional Director,' 'District Director' or other similar references shall 

mean the Wyoming Department of Transportation, its employees, and its duly designated 

agents, including the Wyoming Highway Patrol enforcing these Rules pursuant to W.S. 

37-8-501(b) [now Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 31-18-701]." By that regulation, Wyoming highway 

patrol officers have the same authority to conduct truck safety inspections that special 

agents ofthe Federal Highway Administration have under 49 C.F.R. § 396.9. 

We must determine whether, in light of the statutes and regulations authorizing 

truck inspections, Means' actions violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. 

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Means argues a search warrant was not required because the safety inspection was limited 

to the exterior of the vehicle and was not a search. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 

114-115 (1986); United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 754 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Consequently, a search warrant was not required for the inspection. Moreover, even if 

the inspection was a search, a warrant is generally not required to search motor vehicles 

because their inherent mobility makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant and because 

there is a reduced expectation of privacy in motor vehicles, which are subject to pervasive 

regulation and are driven in plain view on public highways. See California v. Carney, 

471 U.S. 386, 390-93 (1985); South Dakota v. Qgperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976). 

ln. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 n.2, the Court noted the warrant requirement has never 

been held applicable to automobile inspections for safety purposes. A warrant was not 

required even if the inspection ofthe V-1 truck wasa search. 

However, detention of the truck and the driver was a seizure subject to Fourth 

Amendment requirements. See United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 55~, 561 (lOth Cir. 

1994). Ordinarily, a brief investigative detention must be based on reasonable articulable 

suspicion. See McSwain, 29 F.3d at 561. Probable cause is required for a more intrusive 

seizure that rises to the level of an arrest. See United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 

1046, 1053 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

Means had probable cause to believe plaintiffs were violating the placard 

requirement and could have taken Richards into formal custodial arrest for that violation. 

Instead, he used his discretion to issue a citation rather than arrest the driver for that 

violation. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1204(d)(ii) (giving police officers discretion to 

issue citations or to arrest persons for violating regulations relating to vehicles 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 7 
transporting hazardous materials under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-959). The purpose of the 

continued detention was to conduct a safety inspection. Ordinarily, a detention must be 

reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place, 

and a detention that exceeds the scope of the underlying justification for the initial stop 

violates the Fourth Amendment. See McSwain, 29 F.3d at 561. 

The placard violation observed by Means did not give him reason to believe the 

truck was unsafe, and it could not provide reasonable articulable suspicion to detain the 

truck and the driver for a safety inspection. There was some evidence that Means thought 

the inspection was warranted. After the stop for the placard violation, Means told 

Richards the truck looked a "little rough" and that he wanted to perform a safety 

inspection. However, this is insufficient to establish on summary judgment that there was 

probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion to justify an inspection. Whether 

Means had probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion to inspect the truck was a 

question of fact on the record presented that could not be resolved on ~ummary judgment. 

Moreover, Means testified at his deposition that he conducts safety inspections of stopped 

trucks whenever he has time, and that he has authority to conduct random truck safety 

inspections. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence suggests that 

Means' inspection of the truck was not based on reasonable suspicion. 

Means argues the inspection was a valid warrantless administrative inspection of 

property used in a closely regulated industry. Warrantless inspections of commercial 

premises used in closely regulated industries are permissible if authorized by statute or if 

necessary to further a substantial state interest, and if the statute provides a 

constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. A statute must sufficiently inform the 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 8 
commercial property owner that his property will be subject to periodic inspections 

undertaken for specific purposes, and must limit the discretion of inspectors in time, 

place, and scope. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 701-03 (1987). Burger addressed 

only whether a warrant was required, not whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion 

was required. Although Means' inspection of the exterior of the truck was not a search 

subject to the warrant requirement, we conclude the principles of Burger are applicable 

here. 

In Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 

( 1967), the Court held a warrant was required to conduct a regulatory inspection of an 

apartment for housing code violations, but that a lessened probable cause standard applied 

to regulatory inspections. The Court concluded that articulable individualized suspicion 

of code violations was not required, stating that "[p ]robable cause" for such a warrant 

exists 

"if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area 

inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards ... 

may be based upon the passage oftime, the nature of the building (e.g., a multifamily apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not 

necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition ofthe particular 

dwelling." 

387 U.S. at 538. See also Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 (traditional probable cause 

requirements have lessened application in context of inspection of closely regulated 

industry). 

Here, although a warrant was not required, reasonable legislative or administrative 

standards were required because traditional probable cause and reasonable suspicion were 

lacking. The proper test for whether legislative or administrative standards for a 

regulatory inspection are reasonable is whether the inspection satisfies the requirements 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 9 
ofBurger. The random detention and inspection of a vehicle used in a closely regulated 

industry therefore must meet essentially the same requirements as a warrantless 

regulatory search ofbusiness premises. See,~' United States v. Shaefer. Michael and 

Clairton Slag, 637 F. 2d 200 (3d Cir. 1980); State v. A-1 Disposal, 415 N.W. 2d 595 

(Iowa 1987); State v. Moore, 701 P. 2d 684 (Kan. 1985). See generally. 4 Wayne R. 

LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 10.2(d) (1996). 

There are no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit cases addressing the constitutionality 

of a random safety inspection of a commercial vehicle under the regulatory inspection 

doctrine. In United States v. Seslar, 996 F. 2d 1058 (lOth Cir. 1993), the court held a 

random stop of a rental truck to check for required permits was unconstitutional, but the 

regulatory search doctrine was inapplicable because the truck was not a commercial 

vehicle. 

There is no clear weight of authority from other jurisdictions. Several courts have 

upheld random inspections of commercial vehicles as valid regulatory_ searches. See 

United States v. Burch, 906 F. Supp. 592, 598 (D. Kan. 1995); A-I Disposal, 415 N.W. 

2d at 598; State v. Williams, 648 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Kan. App. 1982); Drive Trans. Corp. 

v. New York City Taxi and Limousine Com'n, 513 N.Y.S. 2d 920, 921 (1987); People v. 

Velez, 441 N.Y.S. 2d 176, 181-82 (1981). See also Moore, 701 P.2d 684 (upholding 

stopping all garbage trucks at temporary weigh station as valid regulatory search). 

Several courts have held that random inspections of commercial vehicles violate the 

Fourth Amendment. See People v. Deacy, 530 N.Y.S. 2d 753 (1988); State v. Myers, 580 

N.E.2d 61 (Ohio App. 1990). Cf. Shaefer, 637 F.2d at 204 (court rejected administrative 

search justification for weighing of trucks without reasonable suspicion because purpose 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 10 
was to investigate possible short-weighting of materials supplied for state road project 

rather than enforcement of truck weight regulations; State v. Clark, 816 P.2d 1122, 1124 

(N.M. App. 1991) (rejecting administrative search justification for random stop because 

such stops were not authorized by statute); State v. Thorp, 856 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Wash. 

App. 1993) (rejecting administrative search justification for random stop to enforce forest 

products regulations because state did not establish that forest products industry was 

closely regulated). Whether the Fourth Amendment permits random inspections of 

commercial vehicles without probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion is not 

clearly established. See 4 LaFave§ 10(c), pp. 686-87. 

The Burger test is clearly established law, but the safety inspection ofthe V-1 

truck is not clearly invalid under Burger. The V-1 truck was subject to inspection 

because it was a commercial vehicle transporting hazardous material. See Wyo. Stat. 

Ann.§§ 31-18-103(a)(xii) and 31-18-303; 49 C.F.R. § 396.9; Wyoming Environmental, 

Health and Safety Regulations, Transportation Department; Motor Carriers, Chapter I, 

appendix, § 27, part 1(e). 

Motor carriers are closely regulated by both state and federal governments. ~ 49 

C.F.R. §§ 101-399; Wyo. Stat. Ann.§§ 31-18-101 through 31-18-902. See also, U,, 

United States v. Domin~mez-Prieto, 923 F. 2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 500 

U.S. 936 (1991); Williams, 648 P. 2d at 1160-61; McCauley v. Com., 435 S.E. 2d 891, 

892-94 (Va. App. 1993), affd on reh'g 443 S.E. 2d 164 (Va. App. 1994). Transportation 

of hazardous materials by motor carriers is even more closely regulated. ~ 49 C.F.R. 

§§ 177 and 397; Wyo Stat. Ann.§§ 31-5-959 and 31-18-303. The state clearly has a 

substantial interest in regulating that industry to protect public safety on the highways. 

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See Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F. 2d at 468; Williams, 648 P. 2d at 1161. It could 

reasonably be concluded that random truck safety inspections are necessary to further that 

interest. Trucks can easily avoid fixed checkpoints and, by use of citizens' band radios, 

can avoid temporary checkpoints. ~A-1 Disposal, 415 N.W. 2d at 599; Williams, 648 

P. 2d at 1161; McCauley, 435 S.E. 2d at 155. 

It could also reasonably be concluded that the statutes and regulations authorizing 

inspection are an adequate substitute for a warrant. 49 C.F.R. § 396.9(a), as modified by 

Wyoming regulations, authorizes highway patrol officers and other transportation 

department agents and employees "to enter upon and perform inspections of motor 

carrier's vehicles in operation." Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-303( c), transportation 

department agents and employees operate ports of entry and other designated locations on 

highways where they may stop and inspect vehicles. Highway patrol officers, by 

definition, patrol the highways. A motor carrier transporting hazardous material on the 

highways in Wyoming "'cannot help but be aware that his property wip be subject to 

periodic inspection."' Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 

594, 600 (1981)). See McCauley, 435 S.E.2d at 152-55 (truck safety inspection at 

temporary checkpoint under state version of 49 C.F.R. § 396.9 held valid under Burger.) 

See generally. A-1 Disposal, 415 N.W.2d at 597, 599-600 (random safety inspection held 

valid under Burger); Williams, 648 P.22 1156 (random safety inspection held a valid 

regulatory inspection). 

In V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming Dept. ofEnvironmental Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1487 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied 498 U.S. 920 (1990), the court held that a statute authorizing the 

inspection of any commercial property in the state suspected of causing pollution was not 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 12 
an adequate substitute for a warrant. Because the statute applied to every business in the 

state, it was a statute of"general application" that provided no notice to any owner that 

property would be subject to warrantless inspections, and provided no assurance of 

regularity of inspections. Consequently, the inspections authorized were "'so random, 

infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real 

expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected by government 

officials."' 902 F.2d at 1487, quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599. 

Here, by contrast, the inspections are conducted pursuant to narrow statutes and 

regulations directed at a particular industry. ~ V-1 Oil Co., 902 F.2d at 1487. While 

the statutes and regulations do not establish a fixed number of inspections of a particular 

business during any given time period, that is not essential. In Burger, the court upheld 

inspections conducted under a New York statute that did not require any particular 

number of inspections in any given time. 482 U.S. at 694 n. 1. The Court noted: 

While such limitations, or the absence thereof, are a factor in an analysis of the 

adequacy of a particular statute, they are not determinative of tlie result so long as 

the statute, as a whole, places adequate limits upon the discretion of the inspecting 

officers. Indeed, we have approved statutes authorizing warrantless inspections 

even when such statutes did not establish a fixed number of inspections for a 

particular time period. ~United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 312, n 1 ... 

(1972). And, we have suggested that, in some situations, inspections must be 

conducted frequently to achieve the purpose of the statutory scheme. Id., at 316 

. . . . ("Here, if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, 

unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential") (emphasis added). 

482 U.S. at 711 n. 21. Truck inspections authorized by the statutes and regulations at 

issue here are no more uncertain or irregular than the junkyard inspections authorized by 

the statute in Burw. 

The regulations also place adequate limits on the discretion of inspection officers. 

The regulations provide notice of who is authorized to conduct the inspections. Only 

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special agents of the Federal Highway Administration, Wyoming patrol officers, and 

other employees and agents of the Wyoming Department of Transportation are authorized 

to conduct the safety inspections. See 49 C.F.R. § 396.9; Wyoming Environmental, 

Health and Safety Regulations, Transportation Department; Motor Carriers, Chapter I, 

appendix, §27, part 1 (e). The regulations make it clear the inspections are limited in 

scope to safety concerns. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 396.9- 396.11. They do not authorize a 

general search by any law enforcement officer. 

The regulations limit the place of inspection of vehicles to highways of the state. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 31-18-303, which requires the state transportation department to adopt 

regulations consistent with the federal regulations governing transportation of hazardous 

materials, applies only to vehicles on highways of the state. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-

18-103(a)(xii). Because vehicles are mobile, any further restriction on the place of 

inspection would be impracticable. A restriction on the time of inspection would also be 

impracticable because trucks operate around the clock. See Domingu~z-Prieto, 923 F.2d 

at 470. 

Plaintiffs also contend that Means' order to drive to the port of entry was unlawful. 

Although there was no express statutory authority for Means to order the truck to the port 

of entry three to five miles away for a safety inspection, it was uncontroverted that he 

conducted the inspection there because it was safer than a roadside inspection. Police are 

not required to use the least intrusive means in the course of a stop, only reasonable 

means. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985); Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 

1052. Because the port of entry was only three to five miles from the site of the stop, 

requiring the driver to drive the truck there caused only a limited increase in the 

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Appellate Case: 95-8057 Document: 01019280989 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 14 
intrusiveness ofthe inspection. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) 

(ordering driver out of car during lawful traffic stop is justified by safety concerns and 

causes only a de minimis increase in intrusiveness). Requiring the driver to drive to the 

port of entry where the inspection could be conducted safely was no more intrusive than 

reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the inspection. See United States v. 

Pino, 855 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1090 (1990) (officer's 

request that defendant stopped for traffic violation drive to nearby overpass because 

shoulder was narrow and it was raining was justified by safety concerns and was no more 

intrusive than necessary to effectuate the purposes ofthe stop). See also Florida v. Royer, 

460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983) ("there are undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that 

would justify moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigatory 

detention" without making the detention more intrusive than necessary). 

We conclude the inspection did not violate clearly established law. It was not 

clearly outside the scope of a valid regulatory inspection. We do not h~ld that the truck 

inspection was constitutional, only that it was not clearly unconstitutional.. Under Siegert 

v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991), that is all that is required to determine whether a 

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 

We hold the truck inspection did not violate clearly established law and Means is 

entitled to qualified immunity. The judgment is AFFIRl\ffiD. 

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