Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00543/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00543-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Anthony R. Turner,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 02-0543 MCE PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Cheryl Pliler, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner without counsel prosecuting a

civil rights action.

The action proceeds on the July 8, 2003, amended complaint

against defendants Vernon and Dixon. 

Plaintiff, who is psychotic, alleges defendants violated his

right to constitutionally adequate medical care. Plaintiff

alleges under penalty of perjury that defendant Vernon

intentionally poured the wrong medication down plaintiff’s throat

while plaintiff’s hands were cuffed behind his back, causing

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plaintiff to collapse into a “seizure, blackout and a serious

painful migraine, head injury, severe stomach[] and abdominal

cramps, and sharp severe internal pains.” Amended Complaint at

10. Vernon informed Dixon of the error, and Dixon failed to

order appropriate emergency treatment. In an effort to conceal

the error, Dixon dosed plaintiff with Benadryl, failed to order

plaintiff’s stomach pumped, and injected plaintiff with a

“knockout” drug. Vernon and Dixon entered a “conspiracy” to hide

the problem. 

March 18, 2005, defendant Vernon moved for summary judgment.

Plaintiff did not oppose. 

In seeking summary judgment the moving party must establish

that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes issues upon which the movant bears the burden of

proof; if the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 324 (1986). To avoid summary judgment on an issue upon

which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the opponent must

present affirmative evidence sufficiently probative such that a

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jury reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

588 (1986). When the conduct alleged is implausible, stronger

evidence than otherwise required must be presented to defeat

summary judgment. Id. at 587. 

In considering summary judgment, this court should view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the

nonmoving party is pro se this court should “consider as evidence

in his opposition to summary judgment all . . . contentions

offered in motions and pleadings, where such contentions are

based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be

admissible in evidence . . . attested under penalty of perjury

. . . as true and correct.” Id.

“The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a

violation of the Eighth Amendment . . .” McGuckin v. smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991). A violation of the Eighth

Amendment occurs when prison officials deliberately are

indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs. Id. As the Ninth

Circuit recently stated in Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051 (9th

Cir. 2004), the threshold for a medical claim under the Eighth

Amendment is extremely high:

A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference .

. . only if [he] knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under

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this standard, the prison official must not only “be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

that person “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was

not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290

F.3d at 1188 (citation and footnote omitted). This

“subjective approach” focuses only “on what a

defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 839. “Mere negligence in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition, without more, does not

violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.” 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (citation omitted).

In seeking summary judgment, Vernon submits his own

declaration that he followed prison procedures in giving

plaintiff the medicine, which was dispensed by others and

distributed to Vernon in an envelope, and he gave the medicine

after plaintiff identified himself and examined the contents of

the cup. Vernon declares plaintiff voluntarily swallowed the

pills and Vernon believes plaintiff received the proper

medication. He declares his duties do not include providing

medical care or treatment and he had no control over how

plaintiff was treated after the medication was ingested. He has

not had any conversation or communication with Dixon regarding

the allegations of the pleading and he did not conspire with

Dixon to “cover up” anything. Vernon meets his burden in seeking

summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s statement about what Vernon intended is not

competent evidence because plaintiff cannot directly know

Vernon’s intent except through Vernon’s admissions or the

circumstances. Vernon denies mal intent and the only

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circumstantial evidence provided by plaintiff is of negligence,

at worst. 

Accordingly, the court concludes defendant Vernon is

entitled to summary judgment and recommends that his March 18,

2005, motion be granted.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: June 2, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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