Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02754/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02754-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ewing Redmond Samuels,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-02754-PHX-ROS (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Ewing Redmond Samuels’ (“Petitioner”) First 

Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “First Amended Petition”) (Doc. 5). 

After reviewing the parties’ briefing (Docs. 5, 7, 8, 25, 26),1the undersigned finds that all 

of the grounds are procedurally defaulted without excuse. It is therefore recommended 

that the First Amended Petition (Doc. 5) be dismissed with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On February 2, 2017, a jury siting in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for 

Maricopa County convicted Petitioner on two counts of aggravated assault and unlawful 

1

In its July 24, 2019 Order (Doc. 9), the Court screened the First Amended 

Petition (Doc. 5) and construed Petitioner’s two additional filings (Docs. 7, 8) as 

supplements to the First Amended Petition.

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imprisonment. (Bates Nos. 17-18, 35).2 The jury also found that the offenses were 

dangerous because they involved the discharge, use, or threatening exhibition of a deadly 

weapon or dangerous instrument. (Bates No. 49). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a 

total of 7.5 years in prison. (Bates Nos. 76-77). 

Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal. (Bates Nos. 82-83). Petitioner’s 

appointed appellate counsel could not find a colorable claim to raise on direct appeal.

(Bates No. 86). Petitioner did not file a pro se brief. (Id.). However, Petitioner did seek 

to supplement the record on appeal with additional items. The Arizona Court of Appeals

denied Petitioner’s request. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Arizona 

Court of Appeals denied. (Bates No. 197-99). Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Supreme 

Court for review of the Court of Appeals’ denial of his motion to supplement the record. 

(Bates Nos. 200-06). The Arizona Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review, which 

it construed as a Petition for Special Action. (Bates No. 207). On August 16, 2018, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences after 

independently reviewing the record for fundamental error. (Bates Nos. 85-88). The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. (Bates No. 84). 

Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.).

On March 2, 2018, while Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a 

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Bates Nos. 89-91). The trial court dismissed 

the PCR proceeding with leave to re-file after the conclusion of Petitioner’s direct appeal. 

(Bates No. 94). Petitioner did not initiate a PCR proceeding after the Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences.

Petitioner timely initiated this federal habeas proceeding in April 2019. (Doc. 1). 

Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 25) on September 27, 2019. Petitioner filed a 

Reply (Doc. 26) on October 15, 2019. 

2 Citations to the state court record submitted with Respondents’ Limited Answer 

(Doc. 25) refer to the Bates-stamp numbers affixed to the lower right corner of each page 

of the record.

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

It has been settled for over a century that a “state prisoner must normally exhaust 

available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the federal 

courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 

U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 

734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state 

judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). 

The rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 

U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to 

review and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s words, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 

federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 

courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); 

see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some 

circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 

criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner 

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“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”).

B. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state 

procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal 

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the 

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine 

is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 

based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 

(2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirements 

for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 

address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See id. at 729-30. An 

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

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Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. All Five Grounds are Procedurally Defaulted

As detailed in the Court’s July 24, 2019 Screening Order, the First Amended 

Petition presents the following five claims:

In Ground One, Petitioner claims that his due process and 

equal protection rights were violated when he was indicted 

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based on hearsay and perjured testimony. In Ground Two, 

Petitioner claims that his due process and equal protection 

rights were violated when the state concealed impeachment 

and exculpatory evidence. In Ground Three, Petitioner 

alleges that his due process rights, equal protection rights, 

privacy rights, and right to be protected from unreasonable 

searches and seizures were violated by the false statements of 

and “illegal eviction” by police officers and the “overall 

cover-up” and “encroachment of substantive rights” by the 

state’s attorneys. In Ground Four, Petitioner claims that his 

due process, equal protection, and Confrontation Clause 

rights were violated by numerous acts of prosecutorial 

misconduct, including (1) selective prosecution, (2) racial 

discrimination, (3) the use of involuntary statements, (4) the 

use of hearsay, (5) perjury and subornation, and (6) the 

issuance of erroneous jury instructions. In Ground Five, 

Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance: from 

trial counsel when his attorneys failed to challenge the grand 

jury proceedings, understand the law, “protect substantial 

Constitutional rights,” investigate, call certain witnesses,

object to prosecutorial misconduct and file pretrial motions; 

from appellate counsel when his attorney failed to raise any 

claims on behalf of Petitioner; and from post-conviction 

counsel when she “fractured” the attorney-client relationship, 

resulting in a “total breakdown” of communication and 

dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction petition.

(Doc. 9 at 2). 

Respondents correctly assert that all five grounds are unexhausted. (Doc. 25 at 5-

7). Petitioner’s appointed counsel could not find any colorable claims to raise on direct 

appeal. (Bates No. 86). Petitioner did not file a pro se appellate brief. Petitioner also did 

not initiate a PCR proceeding following the conclusion of his direct appeal. The 

presentation of any habeas claims in Petitioner’s Petition for Review filed in the Arizona 

Supreme Court cannot serve to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine. (Bates Nos. 200-06).

Generally, a petitioner cannot exhaust a habeas claim by circumventing a state’s lower 

courts and going directly to the state’s higher courts. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 

915-18 (9th Cir. 2004) (habeas claim presented by petitioner to state supreme court was 

unexhausted because the petitioner did not fairly present the claim to the state’s court of 

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appeals); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (“[W]here the claim has been 

presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be 

considered unless ‘there are special and important reasons therefor,” . . . . Raising the 

claim in such a fashion does not, for the relevant purpose, constitute ‘fair presentation.’”); 

Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Submitting a new claim . . . in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered absent special circumstances 

does not constitute fair presentation.”); Childers v. State of Arizona, No. 05–2010–PHX–

ROS, 2006 WL 1543986, *5 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2006) (claim not raised in petitioner’s PCR 

Notice but raised in petition for review filed with the Arizona appellate court was not 

properly exhausted). The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s habeas claims are 

unexhausted.

If Petitioner returned to state court and presented his habeas claims in a PCR

Petition, the PCR Petition would be untimely. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a 

petition for post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of 

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate 

in the direct appeal, whichever is later”). Although Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.4 does not bar untimely PCR claims that fall within the category of claims specified 

in Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted 

that any of these exceptions apply to him and the undersigned does not find that any of 

the exceptions would apply. A state post-conviction action is futile where it is timebarred. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Moreno v. 

Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, 

distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)).

Further, under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(1) and (3), a defendant 

is precluded from raising claims that were adjudicated or could have been raised and 

adjudicated on direct appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding. Curtis, 912 P.2d at 

1342; Berryman, 875 P.2d at 857. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) would 

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preclude Petitioner from returning to state court to exhaust his unexhausted habeas 

claims. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) constitutes an “adequate and

independent” state ground for denying review. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860

(2002) (per curiam) (preclusion of issues for failure to present them at an earlier

proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) “are independent of

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the

merits”); Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.2(a)(3) is independent of federal law and has been regularly and 

consistently applied, so it is adequate to bar federal review of a claim.”); Murray v. 

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] claim that has been ‘waived’ under 

[Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3)] is procedurally defaulted and therefore barred from federal 

court consideration, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage 

of justice.”) (quoting Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

For the above reasons, the undersigned finds that all of Petitioner’s habeas claims

are procedurally defaulted.3 See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a claim is procedurally defaulted 

“if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner 

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the requirement would now find 

the claims procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1)). 

B. Petitioner’s Procedural Defaults Are Not Excused

The merits of a habeas petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims are to be 

reviewed if the petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to consider the federal 

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 

903, 913 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Petitioner’s status as a pro se litigant does not exempt Petitioner from the “cause 

3

 This type of procedural default is often referred to as “technical” exhaustion 

because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, Petitioner no longer 

has an available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has 

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for 

exhaustion; there are no remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”).

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and prejudice” standard. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 

(9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner's lack of legal assistance did not amount to 

cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 

1988) (petitioner’s arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse 

lawyers did not constitute cause). 

Petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 

failing to find a colorable claim to raise on direct appeal. (Doc. 5 at 10; Doc. 5-1 at 120; 

Doc. 26 at 5). To the extent that Petitioner asserts that his procedural defaults should be 

excused under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the assertion is without merit.

4

 

In Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2062–2063, 2065-66 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court 

held that Martinez does not apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Petitioner has not shown that an objective factor external to Petitioner impeded his 

efforts to file a PCR Petition. Petitioner has therefore failed to show cause for his 

procedural defaults. Where a petitioner fails to establish cause, the Court need not 

consider whether the petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Accordingly, the 

undersigned finds that Petitioner has not satisfied the “cause and prejudice” exception to 

excuse his procedural defaults.

To satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, Petitioner must show 

that “a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who 

is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Petitioner asserts that he is innocent. 

(Doc. 26 at 6). Yet Petitioner does not proffer any new reliable evidence to support 

actual innocence. Petitioner’s conclusory statements that he was unlawfully accused are 

insufficient to satisfy the miscarriage of justice exception. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (“To 

be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional 

error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, 

4

In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that “inadequate assistance of counsel at 

initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural 

default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” 132 S.Ct. at 1315. 

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trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.”). Because Petitioner has

failed to satisfy his burden of producing “new reliable evidence” of his actual innocence, 

the undersigned recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the 

actual innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse his procedural defaults. See Smith v. Hall, 

466 F. App’x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to pass through the Schlup 

gateway, a petitioner must first satisfy the “threshold requirement of coming forward 

with ‘new reliable evidence’”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“To meet [the Schlup gateway standard], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new reliable 

evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.’”) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

Consequently, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss the First Amended 

Petition with prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the First Amended Petition (Doc. 5) be 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the First Amended 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and the undersigned finds that jurists of 

reason would not find it debatable whether the Court was correct in its procedural ruling.5

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report & Recommendation 

5

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without 

reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [Certificate of Appealability] 

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

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within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a 

response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 6th day of March, 2020.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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