Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04562/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04562-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP)

on November 24, 2008. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for

reconsideration of the terms of the Court's Order granting Plaintiff

IFP status on terms applicable to prisoners. Plaintiff argued that

because he was in custody pending an involuntary civil commitment

proceeding pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA), he

was a civil detainee. The Court granted Plaintiff's motion and

allowed him to complete a non-prisoner IFP application. (Jul. 1, 2009

Order at 4.) However, Plaintiff had actually paid the full filing fee

on February 27, 2009.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROYCE T. BRANINBURG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MONTEREY COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 08-04562 CW (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff Troyce T. Braninburg, currently incarcerated at

Coalinga State Hospital, filed the present pro se civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional rights

violations. Plaintiff has paid the full filing fee.1

The Court conducted an initial screening of the complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff asserted that jail

officials and medical staff at the Monterey County Jail (MCJ) were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The following

background was taken from the Court's July 1, 2009 Order:

According to the allegations in the complaint, between May

1, 2007 and December 10, 2007, Plaintiff was held as a

civil detainee at the Monterey County Jail. (Compl. at

3.) During this time, Plaintiff alleges he did not

receive HIV/AIDS medications for four months, and he spent

"the entire time in a unsanitary cell with little or no

medical attention." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he "became

ill and built up resistance to current . . .

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meds . . . [and] deteriorated medically-mentally." (Id.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that he filed numerous grievances,

which were never addressed or returned. FN. (Compl. at

1.) 

Plaintiff names the "Monterey County District

Attorney's Office" and the "Monterey County Jail Staff as

correctional and medical staff" as defendants in this

case. He seeks monetary damages.

FN. Plaintiff contends he has filed administrative appeals

(grievances) on this issue which have never been answered. 

It thus appears he has not exhausted his administrative

remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If the

allegations that his appeals have not been answered are

true, however, it may be that administrative remedies are

not "available" within the meaning of the statute. This

is an issue better resolved at a later stage of the case.

(July 1, 2009 Order at 1-2 (footnote in original).) The Court

found that Plaintiff's allegations presented a cognizable

deliberate indifference claim. However, the Court determined that

he failed to allege facts identifying which individuals violated

his constitutional rights. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff named "Monterey

County Jail Staff"; however, he failed to name any specific

defendants. The Court informed Plaintiff that there "is no

respondeat superior liability in Section 1983 cases; therefore,

jail staff cannot be held liable simply because they are in charge

of the jail." (Id.) The Court further noted that a supervisor

generally may be liable under § 1983 only "upon a showing of

(1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation." (Id.) The Court

dismissed Plaintiff's claim with leave to amend, stating:

"Plaintiff may file an amended complaint that names specific

defendants who violated his constitutional rights, or that alleges

supervisory liability under the standards explained above, or

both." (Id.) The Court granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an

Case 4:08-cv-04562-CW Document 13 Filed 01/25/10 Page 2 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff's amended complaint includes two attachments to page

"3." The first of these attachments includes four pages; therefore,

the Court will refer to these four pages as "3.1.1" through "3.1.4."

The second of these attachments includes three pages; therefore, the

Court will refer to these three pages as "3.2.1" through "3.2.3."

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amended complaint to cure the pleading deficiencies, or to suffer

dismissal of the action.

Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint. He names

the following Defendants: Monterey County Sheriff Mike Kanalakis;

MCJ Commander Barrera; and MCJ Director of Medical Services Taylor

Fithian, M.D. He also names the following as Doe Defendants: three

MCJ sergeants, twelve MCJ deputies; and MCJ Isolation Unit

supervisors and deputies.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fithian "was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs." (Am. Compl. at 3.2.3.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim

against Defendant Fithian.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Kanalakis and Barrera failed

"to adequately train and supervise [their] subordinate

deputies . . . who were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's

medical needs." (Am. Compl. at 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.)2

 

"'Supervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory

official in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or

inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his

subordinates, for his acquiescence in the constitutional

deprivations of which the complaint is made, or for conduct that

showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of

others.'" Preschooler II v. Davis, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir.

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2007) (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim for supervisory liability

against Defendants Kanalakis and Barrera.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff also presents new claims. 

Plaintiff states that a variety of the conditions of his

confinement at the MCJ violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights as a civil detainee under the Sexually Violent Predators Act

(SVPA). Plaintiff alleges that as a civil detainee in custody

pending a Sexually Violent Predator Commitment Proceeding, "he was

entitled to more considerate conditions of confinement in Monterey

County Jail and the actions of the Defendants were punitive in

nature." (Am. Compl. at 3.1.3.) Among his conditions of

confinement, Plaintiff complains of excessive "solitary

confinement," mechanical restraints during transport, inadequate

bedding, routine withholding of meals, and limited access to

telephones and visiting privileges. (Id. at 3-3.1.3.) Plaintiff

also contends that he was "illegally strip search[ed] upon entering

[MCJ]." (Id. at 3.1.4.) 

There is no per se prohibition on housing sexually violent

predators (SVPs) in facilities, such as county jails, where

criminal detainees or convicts are also housed. In Jones v.

Blanas, the Ninth Circuit declined to hold that SVPs may not,

consistent with the Constitution, be held in jail facilities,

finding instead that the dispositive question when assessing an

SVP's constitutional challenge to his conditions of confinement is

whether those conditions are punitive. 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir.

2004). A restriction is punitive where it is intended to punish,

or where it is excessive in relation to its non-punitive purpose,

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United States District Court

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or is employed to achieve objectives that could be accomplished in 

alternative and less harsh methods. Id. at 933-34 (citations

omitted). The conditions and duration of confinement must "bear

some reasonable relation" to legitimate, non-punitive government

interests." Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 997 (9th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). Legitimate,

non-punitive government interests include ensuring a detainee's

presence at trial, maintaining jail security, and effective

management of a detention facility. Jones, 393 F.3d at 932. 

Further, individuals who have not yet been civilly committed at

trial under the SVPA are entitled to protections at least as great

as those afforded to civilly committed individuals and to

individuals accused but not convicted of a crime. Id. at 931-32. 

For such individuals, a presumption of punitive conditions arises

where the individual is detained under conditions identical to,

similar to, or more restrictive than those under which pretrial

criminal detainees are held, or where the individual is detained

under conditions more restrictive than those he or she would face

upon commitment. Id. at 934; cf. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 997 (after

trial and civil commitment under SVPA, presumption switches, and

conditions of confinement are presumed non-punitive unless proven

otherwise). The government must be afforded an opportunity to

rebut this presumption by showing legitimate, non-punitive

interests justifying the conditions of detainees awaiting SVPA

proceedings, and to show that the restrictions imposed on such

detainees were not excessive in relation to these interests. See

Jones, 393 F.3d at 934-35.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Here, Plaintiff claims that his conditions of confinement were

"worse than those of the overwhelming majority of criminal process

prisoners held in [MCJ]." (Am. Compl. at 3.1.1.) He alleges that

Defendants' actions "were punitive in nature." (Id. at 3.1.3.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff states cognizable Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment claims against Defendants Kanalakis, Barrera and Fithian. 

Plaintiff names multiple Doe Defendants in his amended

complaint. The use of Doe Defendants is not favored in the Ninth

Circuit. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.

1980). However, where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be

known prior to the filing of a complaint the plaintiff should be

given an opportunity through discovery to identify them. Id.

Failure to afford the plaintiff such an opportunity is error. See

Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, the claims against the Doe Defendants are DISMISSED

from this action without prejudice. Should Plaintiff learn their

identities through discovery or otherwise, he may move to file an

amendment to the complaint to add them as named defendants. See

Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1195-98 (9th Cir.

2003).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs against Defendant

Fithian.

2. Plaintiff states cognizable supervisory liability claims

against Defendants Kanalakis and Barrera.

3. Plaintiff states cognizable Fourth and Fourteenth

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Amendment claims against Defendants Kanalakis, Barrera and Fithian.

4. Plaintiff's claims against the Doe Defendants are

DISMISSED from this action without prejudice. 

5. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and

Request for Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver

of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint (docket no. 1), the

amended complaint (docket no. 9) and all attachments thereto along

with a copy of this Order to: Monterey County Sheriff Mike

Kanalakis; MCJ Commander Barrera; and MCJ Director of Medical

Services Taylor Fithian, M.D. The Clerk shall also mail copies of

these documents to the Attorney General of the State of California. 

In addition, the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order on

Plaintiff.

6. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary

costs of service of the summons and complaint. Pursuant to Rule 4,

if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the

Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons,

fail to do so, they will be required to bear the cost of such

service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign and

return the waiver form. If service is waived, this action will

proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date that the

waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B),

Defendants will not be required to serve and file an answer before

sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver was

sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required

if formal service of summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked

to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that

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more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to

waiver of service of the summons. If service is waived after the

date provided in the Notice but before Defendants have been

personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the

date on which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days

from the date the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. 

7. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The following briefing

schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than ninety (90) days from the date their

answer is due, Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment

or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by

adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants are of the

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they

shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment

motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly

served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion

shall be filed with the Court and served on Defendants no later

than sixty (60) days after the date on which Defendants' motion is

filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should

be given to pro se plaintiffs facing a summary judgment motion:

The defendants have made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. 

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end

your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue

of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute

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about any fact that would affect the result of your case,

the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided

in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted [in favor of the

defendants], your case will be dismissed and there will

be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en

banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)

(party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence

showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element

of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the

burden of proving his allegations in this case, he must be prepared

to produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files

his opposition to Defendants' dispositive motion. Such evidence

may include sworn declarations from himself and other witnesses to

the incident, and copies of documents authenticated by sworn

declaration. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment

simply by repeating the allegations of his complaint.

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall

do so no later than thirty (30) days after the date Plaintiff's

opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date

the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.08\Braninburg4562.service.wpd 10

unless the Court so orders at a later date.

8. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant

to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to depose

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

9. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be

served on Defendants, or Defendants' counsel once counsel has been

designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or

Defendants' counsel.

10. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address and

must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion

11. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable

extensions will be granted. Any motion for an extension of time

must be filed no later than fifteen (15) days prior to the deadline

sought to be extended.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 1/25/10 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.08\Braninburg4562.service.wpd 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROYCE T. BRAININBURG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MONTEREY COUNTY et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-04562 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on January 25, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Troyce Tabatha Braninburg 754-2

Coalinga State Hospital

24511 Jayne Avenue

P.O. Box 5003

Coalinga, CA 93210

Dated: January 25, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:08-cv-04562-CW Document 13 Filed 01/25/10 Page 11 of 11