Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_03-cv-01480/USCOURTS-alnd-4_03-cv-01480-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

VAE NORTRAK NORTH AMERICA,

INC., et al.

Plaintiffs and CounterDefendants,

v.

PROGRESS RAIL SERVICES

CORPORATION, 

Defendant and CounterClaimant

v.

MERIDIAN TRACK PRODUCTS

CORP., et al.

Counter-Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

03-AR-1480

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before coming to grips with the motions for summary judgment

pending in the above-entitled patent infringement case, the court

laments the fact that the House Judiciary Committee did not sooner

do what it did on September 13, 2006 (H.R. 5418), namely, approve

legislation creating a ten-year pilot program permitting the random

assignment of patent cases to “designated judges” who request to

hear such cases. If such a program had been enacted and

implemented before this court was assigned the above-entitled case,

this court would not only have not requested to be designated to

hear patent cases, but, in recognition of what Congress correctly

perceives as the inadequacy of non-specialist judges in patent

FILED

 2006 Oct-25 PM 02:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 1 of 55
2

cases, would expressly have requested the case to be reassigned to

one of those “designated” judges. This court hopes that its

admitted inadequacy may have been somewhat ameliorated by the fact

that it appointed a knowledgeable expert to help him understand the

technical aspects of this dispute.

Despite its self-doubt, the court proceeds to rule upon the

pending motions, the most important of which are three motions for

summary judgment filed by the sole defendant, Progress Rail

Services Corporation (“Progress”). The first of these seeks a

declaration that, contrary to the allegations in the complaint,

Progress did not infringe U.S. patent No. 5,176,318 (the “‘318

patent”). This motion, if granted, will cause a dismissal of the

action by VAE Nortrak North America, Inc. (“Nortrak”) against

Progress. The second, which if granted will also call for a

dismissal of the action against Progress, seeks a declaration that

the ‘318 patent is unenforceable due to the patent applicants’

alleged inequitable conduct before the United States Patent and

Trademark Office (“PTO”). Third, and alternatively, Progress asks

the court to limit Nortrak’s claims for damages alleged to have

been caused by the alleged infringement. 

Also before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed

by Nortrak, as a counter-defendant, and by the other counterdefendants, Meridian Track Products Corp., Meridian Rail

Information Systems Corp. (together, “Meridian”), and VAE GmbH,

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 2 of 55
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seeking dismissal of Progress’s antitrust counterclaim against

these parties. Counter-defendants suggest that Progress’s

counterclaim is merely a defensive ploy, whereas Progress counters

with the suggestion that Nortrak beat it to the courthouse. 

For the reasons that follow, the court finds that no genuine

issues of material fact exist as to dispositive questions regarding

infringement and inequitable conduct and that Progress is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on both of its motions that raise

these issues. Entry of summary judgment in favor of Progress will

moot its request for a limitation of Nortrak’s claim for damages.

Because genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to

some but not all of Progress’ antitrust counterclaim, the court

will grant-in-part and deny-in-part counter-defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. 

There are also miscellaneous motions, that will be granted and

denied in accordance with the discussion in part V below.

Procedural History 

The procedural posture of this case is complicated. A brief

recounting of the proceedings to date will help to clarify the

relative situations of the parties and to frame the relevant

issues. Nortrak and Meridian filed the original complaint against

Progress on June 19, 2003, alleging that Progress infringed the

‘318 patent and U.S. Patent No. 5,148,980 (the “‘980 patent”). At

that time, VAE GmbH owned the ‘980 patent, Nortrak was its licensee

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 3 of 55
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as to the ‘980 patent, and Meridian was the owner of the ‘318

patent. On May 12, 2004, nearly one year after the complaint was

filed, Progress filed its first motion for summary judgment. In

that motion, Progress claimed that Nortrak lacked standing to sue

for infringement of the ‘980 patent, and that Progress did not

infringe Meridian’s ‘318 patent as a matter of law. On August 12,

2004, the court entered an order in which it agreed that Nortrak

lacked standing to sue on the ‘980 patent, but that this defect was

remediable under Rule 19, Fed.R.Civ.P. The court further explained

that it would defer ruling on Progress’ motion with regard to the

‘318 patent until after the Markman hearing.

On September 9, 2004, in order to remedy the defect in

standing, Nortrak and Meridian amended their complaint to add VAE

GmbH as a plaintiff. In its answer to the amended complaint,

Progress denied that it infringed either the ‘980 or the ‘318

patent, and asserted, inter alia, the affirmative defense that both

patents were unenforceable by reason of inequitable conduct arising

from alleged misrepresentations to the United States Patent Office.

Progress also filed counterclaims for a declaration of

noninfringement and patent invalidity, patent misuse, and

conspiracy to dominate market through improper means. On October

13, 2004, Nortrak filed a motion seeking an order to a separate

trial of Progress’s patent misuse and antitrust counterclaim. As

the court indicated in an order issued on May 3, 2006, that motion

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 4 of 55
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has, until now, been under the advisement.

Beginning on December 3, 2004, the court held a three-day

Markman hearing. As explained in its memorandum opinion and

accompanying order of March 1, 2005, the court concluded that the

following disputed terms of claim 1 of the ‘318 patent were to have

the following meanings for the remainder of the case:

• The “horizontal hook support” must be a part of the

“support bracket” element of the device. It can be any

horizontal surface “support bracket” which supports the

bottom surface of the hook. The “support block” must

include a “horizontal hook support.” 

• The “support block” must include two distinct sides to

engage the fastener. Those two distinct sides must be

“vertical” as opposed to “horizontal.” 

Following entry of this claim construction order, and after

permitting the parties to submit supplemental argument regarding

Progress’s summary judgment motion in light of the court’s Markman

rulings, the court on June 23, 2005 found that no genuine issues of

material fact existed with respect to any claim based on the ‘980

patent, or to any claim based on the ‘318 patent insofar as such

claim relied on a theory of literal infringement. (Dkt. # 98).

Accordingly, the court granted Progress’s Rule 56 motion on these

claims. The only possible infringement-related issue left for jury

determination was whether Progress infringed the ‘318 patent under

the doctrine of equivalents. The court granted certification for

interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b), but the Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined a review.

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 5 of 55
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On April 7, 2006, Nortrak and Meridian submitted a motion

seeking a dismissal of Meridian from the action, because Meridian

had transferred to Nortrak certain assets, including ownership of

the ‘318 patent. On May 3, 2006, the court granted the motion,

eliminating the Meridian entities as plaintiffs, but made clear

that they would continue in the action as counterclaim defendants.

After the court entered its June 23, 2005 order, the parties

continued to conduct discovery and to work toward obtaining expert

reports. On July 28, 2006, Progress filed the three separate

motions for summary judgment now under consideration. On August

25, 2006, counter-defendants submitted their motion for summary

judgment on Progress’s antitrust counterclaim.

Summary Judgment Facts

Nortrak’s remaining claim of infringement is based on the

‘318 patent, which, similar to the ‘980 patent, covers a

boltless, adjustable guard rail devices for use in the railroad

industry. The ‘318 patent was issued on January 5, 1993, to

Meridian’s predecessor-in-interest, ABC Rail Corporation (“ABC”),

based on a patent application that was filed on January 24, 1992. 

Thereafter, Meridian obtained ownership of the ‘318 patent. 

Prior to the filing of this action, Nortrak and Meridian entered

into a cross-license of both the ‘980 patent and the ‘318 patent. 

After this action was commenced and before April 7, 2006,

Meridian transferred certain of its assets, including ownership

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 6 of 55
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of the ‘318 patent, to Nortrak. (See Dkt. # 118).

If this court has learned anything about the subject matter

of this controversy, it is that the function of railroad

guardrails is to keep the wheels of a train on a particular path,

protecting both the train itself and the surrounding track work. 

The primary benefit of the combination of items embodying the

’318 patent is that they are put in place without the use of

bolts, making them less prone to unwanted movement and permitting

them to be adjusted after wear and tear with less work than their

bolted counterparts. The ‘318 patent contains two independent

claims (claims 1 and 11) and nine dependent claims (claims 2

through 10), and Nortrak alleges that Progress infringed claims

1, 5, 9, and 10. 

Claim 1 of the ‘318 patent reads as follows: 

1. A guard rail assembly for mounting a guard bar having a

vertical body element, a guard face which extends laterally from

said body element and a horizontal foot which extends laterally

from said body element comprising:

a guard rail plate;

a support bracket affixed to said guard rail plate having a

front shelf adapted to mount a guard bar, a horizontal hook

support, a front surface which faces said guard bar, a rear

surface which faces away from said guard bar and a rear shelf

adapted to receive a support block;

a hook having a front end adapted to engage one of a lower

horizontal foot and a vertical front surface of the guard bar, a

bottom surface adapted to engage said horizontal hook support and

a fastener receptacle at the rear end thereof;

a support block having a bottom surface adapted to engage

said rear shelf, a first vertical surface adapted to engage a

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 7 of 55
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body portion of an elastic fastener, a second vertical surface

adapted to engage a toe end of said fastener and a rear surface

which faces said rear surface of said support bracket; and

the elastic fastener having a first end adapted to be

received in said fastener receptacle of said hook, a second body

portion adapted to contact said first vertical surface and said

toe end adapted to contact said second vertical surface of said

support block to simultaneously draw said hook and said guard bar

toward said front surface of said support bracket.

Claims 5, 9, and 10 of the ‘318 patent are dependent on, and are

thus narrower than, claim 1.

Similar to the invention claimed in the ‘318 patent, the

allegedly infringing device sold by Progress is a boltless,

adjustable guardrail assembly. Although Progress’s device is

somewhat reminiscent of the ‘318 patented device, the Progress

design holds a number of distinctive features. First, in the

Progress device, the first and second surfaces of the support

block which engage the body and toe portions of the elastic

fastener are horizontally oriented. James Remington, one of the

two named inventors on the ‘318 patent, had considered such

horizontal orientations during the development of the guard rail

protected by the ‘318 patent, but the patent eventually disclosed

and claimed only vertical surfaces. Second, the support bracket

of the Progress design does not contain a “horizontal hook

support.” Mr. Remington testified that two functions of the

horizontal hook support are to “provide[] a way of welding the

side struts and acts as a spacer to accurately position them in

distance from one to another,” and to “act[] as a support for the

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 8 of 55
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hook when the clip is being driven to keep the hook from moving

during application of the clip.” Third, the hook which engages

the guardrail in the Progress design contains a hole through the

rear end of the hook, and that hole then accepts the first end of

an elastic fastener in order to hold the hook fast against the

guardrail. Rather than claiming a hole through the end of the

hook, the ‘318 patent claims a “fastener receptacle” that

receives the first end of the Pandrol clip.

Although Nortrak and Meridian brought this suit against

Progress in 2003, Nortrak and Meridian’s predecessor-in-interest

were well-acquainted long before this litigation commenced. Less

than three weeks after the ABC’s ‘318 patent issued in the United

States, ABC on January 21, 1993 applied for a European patent

covering the same invention. The European equivalent to the ‘318

patent was granted on October 30, 1996 as European patent No. EP

0553055. After ABC obtained the European patent, VAE GmbH filed

an opposition in the European Patent Office (EPO). In that

opposition, VAE GmbH objected to the issuance of the European

patent in light of European patent No. EP 402351, the European

equivalent of the ‘980 patent. As a result of this opposition,

ABC had to distinguish several features of European patent No. EP

0553055 over the cited reference. ABC accordingly advanced,

inter alia, the following arguments before the EPO:

• “The support bracket (36) and support block (100) of

ABC’s invention provides a means for securely

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 9 of 55
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supporting the hook (70) in such a position that the

elastic fastener (150) may be quickly and easily driven

into place by its being received in fastener receptacle

(88) of hook (70).”

• “In . . . the opponent’s statement it is stated that

the feature of claim 2 in EP 553 055 is disclosed in

the opponent’s reference. Again, the patentee

disagrees in that the reference of the opponent fails

to show or disclose ABC’s horizontal hook support

element. This element acts to support hook (70) when

the elastic fastener is driven into place.”

• “[T]he opponent states that the stepped vertical bore

for receiving a fastener formed in one end of hook (70)

is not inventive in view of the horizontal bore shown

in EP 402 351. ABC disagrees, the horizontal bore of

the cited reference forces an element to be inserted in

a horizontal orientation as opposed to the vertical

orientation of the structure of EP 553 055.”

The EPO ultimately accepted at least some of ABC’s arguments

(most of which are not listed here), rejecting VAE GmbH’s

opposition and concluding that the European counterpart to the

‘980 patent was not invalidating prior art.

ABC was obliged to distinguish the European patents in 1998,

but at least one of the co-inventors named on the ‘318 patent was

aware of the devices described in the ‘980 patent several years

before that. Mr. Remington testified that he had seen the

Nortrak design – i.e., the embodiment of what would eventually

issue as the ‘980 patent – likely in 1990 but certainly before he

filed the U.S. patent application in January 1992. Although the

‘980 patent application was filed on June 4, 1990 and the patent

issued on September 22, 1992, Mr. Remington testified that he was

not aware that Nortrak had either applied for or been granted

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 10 of 55
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patent protection on its device when he filed his U.S. patent

application. Despite Mr. Remington’s and his now-deceased coinventor, Keith Young’s, knowledge of the Nortrak design, the

applicants did not cite the Nortrak design as prior art at any

time during the prosecution of the ‘318 patent.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (Fed.

Cir. 2006). The court must resolve reasonable factual inferences

in favor of the non-moving party and then decide whether a

reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-movant. IMS

Technology, Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429

(Fed. Cir. 2000). In order to defeat a motion for summary

judgment, the non-movant must “come forward with specific facts

showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

Analysis

I. Progress’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to 

Infringement of the ‘318 Patent Under the Doctrine of

Equivalents

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Progress’ motion for summary judgment with respect to

infringement is the second such motion filed by Progress. On June

23, 2005, the court granted Progress’s previous motion with respect

to Nortrak’s and Meridian’s claims of literal infringement and

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents of the ‘980 patent,

as well as with respect to the allegation of literal infringement

of the ‘318 patent. The court also found, however, that genuine

issues of material fact remained with regard to the allegation that

Progress infringed the ‘318 patent under the doctrine of

equivalents. In particular, the court “[could not] conclude that

a movement of the horizontal hook support to the support block

element from the support bracket constitutes a violation of the

‘all elements rule’ [of the doctrine of equivalents],” and further

found that an issue of material fact existed as to whether the

difference between the “vertical” surfaces of the support block

described in claim 1 of the ‘318 patent and the horizontal surfaces

of the accused devices was insubstantial. Accordingly, the court

denied Progress’s motion for summary judgment with respect to

Nortrak’s and Meridian’s claim for infringement of the ‘318 patent

under the doctrine of equivalents. After having engaged in

additional fact discovery, Progress now presents a second motion

for summary judgment, contending that undisputed evidence now

renders the scope of possible equivalents so narrow that the

accused device cannot infringe.

In its claims construction, the court endeavored to determine

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 12 of 55
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“the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be

infringed.” Markman v. Westview Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976

(Fed. Cir. 1995). Patent infringement occurs “when a device (or

composition or method), that is literally covered by the claims or

is equivalent to the claimed subject matter, is made, used, or

sold, without the authorization of the patent holder, during the

term of the patent.” Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,

133 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271).

Progress, in its present motion, contends that the undisputed facts

preclude a reasonable juror from finding that its boltless

adjustable guard rails infringe the claims of the ‘318 patent under

the doctrine of equivalents. In response, Nortrak argues it has

proffered evidence raising a genuine issue as to whether such

infringement has occurred. In light of its claim construction

order and of the now undisputed evidence, the court agrees with

Progress’ position and now concludes there is no material issue of

fact.

Summary judgment of noninfringement is proper when no

reasonable jury could find that every limitation recited in a

properly construed claim is found in the accused device either

literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Bai v. L & L

Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Nortrak

characterizes the following as material disputed facts, precluding

summary judgment:

1. Nortrak claims that the support block of the Progress device

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has “vertical” surfaces even though the horizontal dimension

of those surfaces is greater than the vertical dimension.

2. Nortrak says that the word “vertical” in claim 1 means “up and

down” or “perpendicular to a horizontal plane” rather than

“vertically elongated.”

3. Nortrak claims that the purpose and function of the horizontal

hook support element of claim 1 of the ‘318 patent is to

support the hook during assembly of the parts, regardless of

the orientation or direction of insertion of the Pandrol clip.

4. Nortrak says that Mr. Remington’s testimony as to additional

functions of the horizontal hook support is extrinsic evidence

and should not be given any weight. 

5. Nortrak claims that the Progress device incorporates a

“fastener receptacle,” or the equivalent thereof, as claimed

in claim 1 of the ‘318 patent.

6. Nortrak says that there is no prosecution history estoppel

against applying the “fastener receptacle” element of claim 1

of the ‘318 patent onto the part of the hook of Progress’s

device that engages a Pandrol clip.

7. Nortrak claims that the hole in Progress’s hook that receives

the center leg of a Pandrol clip performs substantially the

same function, in substantially the same way, to obtain

substantially the same result, as the fastener receptacle of

claim 1 of the ‘318 patent.

Because the court previously entered judgment in favor of Progress

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on the issue of literal infringement, the patent infringement

inquiry now is whether a reasonable jury could find that the

Progress device contains the equivalent of every limitation recited

in claim 1 of the ‘318 patent. See Freedman Seating Co. v. Am.

Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Nortrak

contends that issues 1 and 2 defeat Progress’s argument that

Progress’s devices do not include a support block with “vertical”

surfaces (or its equivalent), that issues 3 and 4 defeat Progress’s

argument that Progress’s devices do not contain a horizontal hook

support (or its equivalent), and that issues 5, 6, and 7 defeat

Progress’s argument that Progress’s devices do not include a

fastener receptacle (or its equivalent). To clarify Nortrak’s

argument, Nortrak submits that the foregoing “issues of material

fact” defeat Progress’s motion as to different claim limitations.

Accordingly, if the court agrees with Nortrak on some, but not all,

of the seven issues identified, such would not necessarily preclude

a finding of summary judgment for Progress. In order for Progress

to prevail, the court need only find that issues 1 and 2 , or

issues 3 and 4, or issues 5, 6, and 7, are – contrary to Nortrak’s

assertions – not genuine issues of material fact. See id.

(explaining that in order to prove infringement, a patent holder

must show that the accused device contains each element, literally

or by equivalence, of the asserted claim).

A. Doctrine of Equivalents Generally

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The doctrine of equivalents holds that, for every claim

element not literally present, the accused product must contain an

equivalent element. Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,

520 U.S. 17 (1997). Equivalence may be found where the relevant

part of the accused product performs the same function in the same

way to achieve the same result as the corresponding element in the

patent claim. Alternatively, equivalence may be found where the

differences between the relevant part of the accused product and

the corresponding element in the patent claim are insubstantial.

However, if even one element of a claim does not appear in an

accused device, either literally or by equivalents, there is no

infringement as a matter of law. Lockheed Martine Corp. v. Space

Systems/Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

The Federal Circuit has summarized the burden of establishing

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as follows:

[A] patentee must . . . provide particularized testimony

and linking argument as to the “insubstantiality of the

differences” between the claimed invention and the

accused device or process, or with respect to the

function, way, result test when such evidence is

presented to support a finding of infringement under the

doctrine of equivalents. Such evidence must be presented

on a limitation-by-limitation basis. Generalized

testimony as to the overall similarity between the claims

and the accused infringer’s product or process will not

suffice.

Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d

1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

B. Vertical vs. Horizontal Surfaces of the Support Block

Neither issue 1 nor issue 2 amounts to a disputed, genuine

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issue of material fact. With respect to both, Nortrak makes

arguments that it has already made in its opposition to Progress’s

first summary judgment motion, and that the court both previously

and subsequently rejected. In that opposition, Nortrak argued that

any object with a finite vertical dimension can properly be

characterized as “vertical,” regardless of the values or

proportions of the object’s various dimensions. See Plaintiffs’

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed and

Expanded Motion for Summary Judgment, at 7-10 (Dkt. # 95). The

court already rejected this argument in the memorandum opinion

accompanying its Markman order, explaining that:

Nortrak claims that if the block is rotated exactly

ninety degrees, its surfaces are still “substantially

vertical” across its width. However, “vertical” is used

not only to describe the orientation of the block (i.e.

“vertical across its width” from Nortrak’s brief), it is

the only descriptor of any kind given to the surface.

Otherwise, it would just be a “surface adapted to engage

a toe end of said fastener.” The use of a different word

(perhaps “rectangular” or “flat”), or no word at all,

might have allowed for Nortrak’s interpretation of the

orientation of the support block . . . . Thus, while

turning the support block ninety degrees would still

yield some vertical component to the surface of the

support block, that surface would not be accurately

“described” as being “vertical anymore.”

Memorandum Opinion dated March 1, 2005, at 22-23 (Dkt. # 91).

Moreover, in its memorandum opinion regarding Progress’s first

motion for summary judgment, the court once again rejected

Nortrak’s argument, explaining that:

Progress argues that, even under the doctrine of

equivalents, the horizontal surfaces of its support block

cannot infringe the 318's requirement of a first and

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second ‘vertical surface.’ The court agrees that the

Progress device does not literally infringe on the 318

patent. However, under the doctrine of equivalents, the

court is required to go through a more thorough analysis

of the competing devices.

Memorandum Opinion dated June 23, 2005, at 9 (Dkt. # 97).

Apparently not satisfied with the court’s prior explanation that

Progress’s device does not literally infringe the ‘318 patent

because, inter alia, the Progress support block has two horizontal

– not vertical – surfaces, Nortrak now attempts to resurrect the

argument that the surfaces of the Progress device’s support block

are indeed “vertical,” albeit not “vertically elongated.” Nortrak

wants this court to revisit an issue that it decided, and as to

which it unsuccessfully attempted to provide a vehicle for its

appellate review. 

The court reaffirms its prior ruling that the horizontal

surfaces of the Progress support blocks do not literally infringe

claim 1 of the ‘318 patent, which includes a “first vertical

surface” and a “second vertical surface” as claim limitations

(emphasis added). To further clarify what was implicit in its June

23, 2005 opinion, the court expressly rejects Nortrak’s apparent

argument that anything other than a paper-thin object, having width

and length dimensions exactly parallel to the ground, is by

definition just as “vertical” as the Washington Monument or the

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 18 of 55
 The court is advised that the average thickness of a standard sheet 1

of copy-machine paper is roughly 0.1 millimeter, so accepting Nortrak’s

argument would actually mean that even a flat-lying sheet of paper is properly

characterized as “vertical,” albeit not “vertically elongated,” since it has

some finite vertical dimension. Putting forward such an argument subtracts

from other arguments that have colorable merit.

19

Eiffel Tower. The two “genuine issues of material fact” regarding 1

the orientation of the support block surfaces identified by

Nortrak should no longer be disputed, because the court in previous

opinions has already decided them. Moreover, issue 2 is an issue

of law, not fact. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52

F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370

(1996) (explaining that construing the meaning of patent claim

terms is a matter of law). The only genuine issue of material fact

that was left on the table after the court’s June 23, 2005 opinion

and accompanying order was whether the Progress support block –

which consists of two horizontal surfaces – is substantially

different from the support block consisting of vertical surfaces as

claimed in the ‘318 patent. See June 23 order, at 9 (citing

Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-41). Progress, in its present

motion for summary judgment on noninfringement, argues that

evidence discovered since it submitted its first summary judgment

motion reveals that the scope of equivalents is so narrow that the

differences between its support block and that claimed in the ‘318

patent cannot possibly be “insubstantial.” Nortrak does not

respond to Progress’s said arguments, but relies instead on the

same literal infringement arguments that the court has already

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 19 of 55
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rejected.

The court agrees with Progress that the scope of possible

equivalents prevents the Progress devices from infringing the ‘318

patent. First, Mr. Remington – a co-inventor named on the ‘318

patent – had considered the horizontal design before applying for

the patent, but neither disclosed nor claimed it in his

application. He drew sketches of the horizontal design during the

development of the invention but did not identify it in the patent

specification, and he testified in his deposition that he has

“always felt that the vertical [design] was a better application.”

None of these facts are disputed. Mr. Remington’s sketches and

remarks indicate that he was fully aware of the possibility of

using a support block having horizontal rather than vertical

surfaces – such that those surfaces engaged the portions of the

elastic fastener in a way that the fastener would be inserted

horizontally and situated with a horizontal rather than vertical

orientation – when he and his co-inventor applied for the patent.

Mr. Remington’s pre-application consideration and rejection of

a horizontally oriented elastic fastener, and his belief that the

vertical orientation was a superior design, indicate that he did

not view the different support-block designs to be equivalents.

See Tanabe Seiyaku Co., Ltd. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n,

109 F.3d 726, 732-33 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding pre-application

experiments to be relevant in determining the scope of potential

equivalents). Nortrak does not disagree with this analysis or

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 20 of 55
21

conclusion, and conspicuously fails to respond to Progress’s

argument on this point. Moreover, since Mr. Remington had

affirmatively considered the horizontal orientation before applying

for the patent, such an orientation was clearly a forseeable

variation of the design when the inventors applied for the patent.

A support block having horizontal surfaces adapted to support the

horizontal orientation of the elastic clip, therefore, can not be

considered the equivalent of a support block with vertical

surfaces. See Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d

1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding no infringement under the

doctrine of equivalents when the allegedly infringing device was a

foreseeable variation of the invention as claimed in the asserted

patent).

Second, the prosecution history of the ‘318 patent’s European

counterpart indicates that the scope of equivalents to the

invention does not extend to a design incorporating a support block

with horizontal surfaces. After ABC obtained the European

equivalent to the ‘318 patent, VAE GmbH filed an opposition in the

EPO. During the course of the opposition proceedings, VAE GmbH

argued that “the horizontal bore of [the European equivalent to the

‘980 patent] forces [the elastic fastener] to be inserted in a

horizontal orientation as opposed to the vertical orientation of

the structure of EP 553 055.” Nortrak points out that ABC made

these arguments to distinguish the “vertical bore” of the European

counterpart to dependent claim 4 of the ‘318 patent from the

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 21 of 55
 Incidentally, ABC’s efforts before the EPO to distinguish the 2

“vertical bore” of the ‘318 counterpart patent from the horizontal bore of the

‘980 counterpart patent defeat Nortrak’s erroneous argument that the Progress

support-block surfaces are indeed “vertical,” albeit not “vertically

elongated.” If Nortrak’s “vertical vs. vertically elongated” argument is

accepted, then ABC’s argument to the EPO would have been based on a factual

inaccuracy because, although the “vertical bore” of the ‘318 patent might also

be “vertically elongated,” it has a horizontal dimension across its diameter

in addition to the vertical dimension along its length. 

22

horizontal bore shown in the ‘980 patent’s European counterpart,

and should therefore not be relevant to determinations regarding

independent claim 1 of the ‘318 patent. Claim 4 of the ‘318 2

patent reads:

4. The guard rail assembly of claim 1 in which said fastener

 receptacle of said hook has a stepped vertical bore.

The court agrees with Nortrak that “foreign estoppel,” if such

a doctrine exists (a doubtful proposition), would not necessarily

apply to ABC’s statements since they were not made in the context

of distinguishing horizontal vs. vertical surfaces of the support

block. Indeed, as Nortrak explains, the European counterpart to

the ‘980 patent does not even claim a support-block element. That

notwithstanding, ABC’s statements do indicate that the original

assignee of the ‘318 patent believed that a structural limitation

which requires an elastic fastener to be inserted vertically is

patently different from one requiring horizontal insertion. In

likewise manner, the horizontal surfaces of the Progress support

block require the elastic fastener to be inserted and oriented

horizontally, rather than vertically. The Federal Circuit has

explained that “[r]epresentation[s] to foreign patent offices

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 22 of 55
23

should be considered . . . when [they] comprise relevant evidence.”

Tanabe Sieyaku Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d at 733 (citing Caterpillar

Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A., 714 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir.

1983)). In this case, the statements ABC made to the EPO indicate

that even the original assignee of the ‘318 patent would believe

that the differences between horizontal and vertical surfaces on a

support block are beyond “insubstantial.”

Third, recent persuasive authority shows that the terms

“horizontal” and “vertical” are so inherently at odds with each

other such that one cannot be deemed the equivalent of the other.

Citing the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions in Bicon, Inc. v.

Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and V-Formation,

Inc. v. Benetton Group SPA, 401 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005),

Progress argues that the range of equivalents cannot extend to the

horizontal surfaces the Progress support block because the word

“vertical” in claim 1 of the ‘318 patent is a narrowly-drafted

functional limitation, and is therefore inherently limiting. In a

related argument, Progress tellingly points to recent federal

precedent, including that of the Federal Circuit, that reveals that

“horizontal” and “vertical” are opposite terms and thus cannot be

equivalents. Nortrak has not responded to either of these

arguments. The court is persuaded by Progress’s analysis. As

Progress observes, the Federal Circuit has determined since the

court’s claim construction order and since Progress submitted its

first summary judgment motion that a part with a concave shape is

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 23 of 55
24

contrary to, and thus can not be the equivalent of, a part with a

convex shape, Bicon, F.3d at 955-56, and a district court has

recently determined that “[a]pplying a broad definition of vertical

to include horizontal would vitiate the limitation.”

STMicroelectronics, Inc v. Sandisk Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

42469, at *24 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2006) (emphasis added).

Moreover, the Federal Circuit has determined in an unpublished

opinion that a part of an allegedly infringing device having a

vertical orientation cannot be the equivalent of a claim limitation

properly construed to mean “horizontal orientation.” See

Magnivision, Inc v. Bonneau Co., 2000 WL 772323, at *7 (Fed. Cir.

June 15, 2000). Accordingly, Progress’s support block element,

which has horizontal surfaces adapted to support the horizontal

orientation of an elastic fastener, cannot be the equivalent of the

‘318 patent’s support block, which claims vertical surfaces.

Progress finally argues that its support block with horizontal

surfaces cannot infringe under the doctrine of equivalents because

the design does not satisfy the function/way/result test, which was

discussed at length in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). Progress asserts that the

function of both support blocks might be the same (providing

surfaces to engage the elastic fastener), but that the way in which

the Progress design fulfills this function is by providing

horizontal – as opposed to vertical – surfaces, and that the result

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 24 of 55
25

is a horizontally – not vertically – oriented elastic fastener.

Nortrak does not respond to this argument, but the court is still

not necessarily persuaded by Progress’s unanswered analysis. For

example, it would seem that, arguably, regardless of the

orientation of the support-block surfaces, the function of the

support block in both designs could be to maintain a force

sufficient to permit the hook to engage and hold fast the guard

bar; that the way in which both support blocks provide the force

could be by creating a space of a designated dimension between the

support bracket and the rear end of the hook; and that the result

could be a complete assembly in which the guard bar stays in

position as though it were permanently affixed to the support

bracket. In any event, the court need not adopt Progress’s

function/way/result analysis in order to conclude that the Progress

design does not infringe the ‘318 patent as a matter of law,

because Nortrak does not attempt to refute and cannot refute

Progress’s analysis or show that only insubstantial differences

exist between the ‘318 patent claims and the relevant element of

the accused device. Instead, Progress has proffered undisputed

evidence revealing that the scope of possible equivalents is so

narrow that no reasonable jury could find that the differences

between its horizontal support-block surfaces and the vertical

surfaces claimed in the ‘318 patent are “insubstantial.” See

Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40 (finding that “[a]n analysis of

the role played by each element in the context of the specific

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 25 of 55
26

patent claim will thus inform the inquiry as to whether a

substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the

claimed element, or whether the substitute element plays a role

substantially different from the claimed element.”) (emphasis

added); Oak Tech., Inc. v. ITC, 248 F.3d 1316, 1331 (Fed. Cir.

2001) (finding that the function/way/result test is but one way to

determine whether differences are “insubstantial”). Moreover,

issues 1 and 2 identified by Nortrak are not disputed, genuine

issues of material fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment –

they are rather issues on which the court has already ruled. On

the basis of the foregoing, Progress is entitled to judgment that

its device does not infringe independent claim 1 – and by

implication, dependent claims 5, 9, and 10 – of the ‘318 patent

under the doctrine of equivalents.

C. Horizontal Hook Support in Support Bracket vs. Horizontal

Hook Support in Support Block

Next, Progress asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment

on Nortrak’s infringement claim because its device does not have

the “horizontal hook support,” or its equivalent, of claim 1 of the

‘318 patent. As a basis for its assertion, Progress argues that

the plain language of claim 1 precludes a finding of literal

infringement and that there is nothing in the Progress device which

performs substantially the same functions as do the ‘318 patent’s

horizontal hook support. In response, Nortrak argues that the

Progress device incorporates a horizontal hook support, but that

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 26 of 55
27

such element is located in the support block in the Progress

design, and that even if this is not the case, the Progress design

incorporates the equivalent of the horizontal hook support.

The court agrees with Progress that no reasonable jury could

find that the Progress design satisfies the function/way/result

test. Nortrak contends that the following language from the

specification of the ‘318 patent proves that the sole function of

the horizontal hook support is to “position the hook during the

assembly process”:

[G]uard bar (12) is placed on support bracket (36) such

that the bottom surface (44) of horizontal foot (46)

rests upon front shelf (42). *** Hook (70) is moved

horizontally until the curved outer end (140) of

horizontal leg (86) engages either the vertical front

surface (142) or the horizontal foot (46) of guard bar

(12). In this position, the bottom surface (82) of hook

(70) rests upon the top surface (58) of horizontal shelf

(56) . . . .

However, Mr. Remington testified in his deposition that two

functions of the horizontal hook support are to “provide[] a way of

welding the side struts and act[] as a spacer to accurately

position them in distance from one to another” and to “act[] as a

support for the hook when the clip is being driven to keep the hook

from moving during application of the clip.” Nortrak does not

contend that Mr. Remington’s testimony was wrong or that the

horizontal hook support of the ‘318 patent does not actually

perform these functions. Instead, Nortrak argues that the

testimony is extrinsic evidence, and that it therefore cannot be

used as a basis for ascertaining the function of the horizontal

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 27 of 55
28

hook support, based on the familiar maxim in patent law that

“[w]hen intrinsic evidence is unambiguous, it is improper for the

court to rely on extrinsic evidence to contradict the meaning of

the claims.” Georgia Pacific Corp v. United States Gypsum Co., 195

F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Nortrak’s argument on this point is deficient because, as

Progress notes, the function of a particular claim element is not

the same as the meaning of a claim term – and the court is unaware

of any principle of patent law which precludes the use of sworn

testimony to determine the function of a claim element as opposed

to its meaning. Even if the rule regarding extrinsic evidence were

to apply to a determination of a claim element’s function, the

court is not convinced that the portion of the ‘318 patent

specification to which Nortrak cites explains or defines the

function without ambiguity or incompleteness. The portion of the

patent specification which provides that “the bottom surface (82)

of hook (70) rests upon the top surface (58) of horizontal shelf

(56)” does not necessarily explain, in unambiguous and complete

terms, that the sole function of the claim element is to support

the hook for assembly of the parts of the guard rail assembly.

Certainly Mr. Remington’s testimony, which consists of a direct

answer to a straight question regarding the function of the claim

element at issue, is more unambiguous and complete than the

language of the patent specification.

Nortrak does not dispute Progress’s contention that the

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 28 of 55
29

Progress support block does not perform the functions that Mr.

Remington identified as to the horizontal hook support of the ‘318

patent. And because Nortrak does not attempt to attack the

substance of Mr. Remington’s deposition testimony, the statements

regarding the functions of the horizontal hook support in the ‘318

patent are also undisputed. Therefore, the third issue identified

by Nortrak – that the purpose and function of the horizontal hook

support element is to support the hook during assembly of the parts

– is insufficient to overcome summary judgment. In addition,

Nortrak’s fourth identified issue – that Mr. Remington’s testimony

as to the functions of the horizontal hook support is extrinsic

evidence and should not be given any weight – is not a genuine

issue of material fact. Nothing in the law precludes the court

from considering Mr. Remington’s statements made during his

deposition, and Nortrak does not dispute the testimony’s substance.

Under the “all-elements rule,” an accused product is not

infringing unless it contains each limitation of the claim, either

literally or by an equivalent. Freedman Seating Co., 420 F.3d at

1358 (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29). Accordingly, the

all-elements rule requires that equivalence be assessed on an

element-by-element basis, as opposed to from the perspective of the

invention as a whole. Id. Nortrak cannot satisfy the all-elements

rule with regard to the Progress device, because it is undisputed

that the Progress device contains no element that performs

substantially the same functions as does the horizontal hook

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 29 of 55
 The court did explain in its opinion accompanying its claim- 3

construction order that claim 1 of the ‘318 patent does not require the

“fastener receptacle” element to be vertically oriented, but it did not go

beyond that explanation and discuss the meaning of the term.

30

support element of claim 1 of the ‘318 patent. Moreover, the

Progress device cannot literally infringe, because it is undisputed

that the alleged “horizontal hook support” element of the Progress

design is not part of the Progress support bracket, as expressly

required by claim 1. Finally, as discussed above, neither issue 3

nor issue 4 identified by Nortrak constitutes a genuine, disputed

issue of material fact. Progress is therefore entitled to judgment

that it did not infringe claims 1, 5, 9, and 10 of the ‘318 patent,

whether literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.

D. Fastener Receptacle vs. Horizontally Bored Hole 

Finally, Progress asserts that its device does not have the

equivalent of the “fastener receptacle” element of the ‘318 patent,

and that it is therefore entitled to judgment of noninfringement.

Nortrak responds that a reasonable jury could easily find that the

hole through the back end of the Progress hook performs

substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to

achieve substantially the same result as the “fastener receptacle,”

and therefore infringes the ‘318 patent under the doctrine of

equivalents.

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that it did not

construe the term “fastener receptacle” in its claim-construction

order of March 1, 2005. That is because neither of the parties 3

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 30 of 55
31

requested it to do so in their claim-construction briefs or at the

Markman hearing. Progress now suggests that the court should adopt

a dictionary definition of the word “receptacle” – that is,

“something that receives or contains something; container.”

Nortrak counters that the court should not even consider Progress’s

noninfringement argument with respect to the fastener receptacle

element, because Progress did not identify “fastener receptacle” as

a disputed claim term. The court recognizes that it “may engage in

rolling claim construction, in which [it] revisits and alters its

interpretation of the claim terms as its understanding of the

technology evolves,” Jack Guttman, Inc v. Kopykake Enters., Inc.,

302 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002), but here, the court never

interpreted the term “fastener receptacle” in the first place. In

any event, the court need not, and therefore does not, construe the

now-disputed term in order to find that Progress would not be

entitled to summary judgment on the basis of any differences

between the hole in the Progress device and the invention claimed

in the ‘318 patent.

Even if the court were to accept Progress’s proposed

definition of the term “receptacle,” it would find that, as applied

to the “fastener receptacle” element of the ‘318 patent, genuine

issues of material fact exist with regard to both literal

infringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

There may be no dispute that the hole in the Progress device does

not “contain” a section of an elastic fastener in order to draw a

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 31 of 55
 To reiterate, claim 4 of the ‘318 patent reads: “The guard rail 4

assembly of claim 1 in which said fastener receptacle of said hook has a

stepped vertical bore.”

32

hook against a guard bar, but a reasonable jury might find that the

hole in the Progress device “receives” a section of the elastic

fastener. Even if a jury were to conclude otherwise, it could

certainly find that the hole performs substantially the same

function, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially

the same result as does the fastener receptacle element of the ‘318

patent. The court disagrees with Progress that the all-elements

rule would preclude a jury from reaching such a conclusion.

Moreover, Progress’s argument that the statements made by ABC

during the EPO opposition proceeding narrow the scope of

equivalents is equally unavailing. While ABC did argue before the

EPO that the device of the ‘318 patent “has a vertically oriented

fastener receptacle for receiving one end of the Pandrol clip,” and

while the hole in the Progress device is horizontally, not

vertically, oriented, claim 1 of the ‘318 patent does not limit the

“fastener receptacle” to a vertical orientation. Indeed, unlike

it does for the vertical surfaces of the support block element,

claim 1 does not specify any orientation for the fastener

receptacle. Progress should have already been aware of this fact,

as it was one subject of the court’s March 1, 2005 claimconstruction opinion.

Perhaps ABC’s statements would preclude Progress from having

infringed claim 4 of the ‘318 patent, but claim 4 is not at issue 4

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 32 of 55
33

in this action. Accordingly, Nortrak is correct that issues 5 and

7 above constitute genuine issues of material fact. Issue 6 is not

an issue of “fact” for jury determination, but Nortrak is correct

that prosecution history estoppel would not preclude a jury from

finding that the hole in the Progress device is equivalent to the

“fastener receptacle” of the ‘318 patent. 

E. Progress’s Motion For Summary Judgment with Respect to

Infringement Will be Granted.

Although Nortrak has properly raised two genuine issues of

material fact, those issues are insufficient to overcome Progress’s

motion for summary judgment on all noninfringement theories.

Regardless of how those issues would be resolved, there are no

genuine issues of material fact to avoid the conclusion that the

Progress device does not include, literally or by equivalence, a

“horizontal hook support” or a support block with vertical surfaces

adapted to engage an elastic fastener. Because the Progress

device lacks certain elements of claim 1 of the ‘318 patent,

Progress is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that its device

does not infringe that claim. See, e.g., Kustom Signals, Inc. v.

Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

(explaining that under the all-limitations rule, an accused product

does not infringe unless it contains each limitation of the

asserted claim, either literally or by an equivalent). Since

claims 5, 9, and 10 – the remaining claims which Nortrak has

asserted – are dependent on claim 1, Progress is also entitled to

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 33 of 55
34

judgment that it did not infringe those claims.

II. Progress’ Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to

Inequitable Conduct

As an alternative ground for relief, Progress argues that the

‘318 patent is unenforceable because of the applicants’ inequitable

conduct, attributable to Nortrak as the assignee of the patent.

Progress affirmatively alleges and offers evidence that during the

prosecution of the ‘318 patent, ABC and/or the named inventors

intentionally failed to disclose material prior art in the form of

Nortrak’s boltless guard rail which was the embodiment of the ‘980

patent.

An alleged patent infringer may assert the affirmative defense

of inequitable conduct by claiming that the patentee obtained the

patent by improper conduct. Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139

F.3d 1470, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998). If improper conduct on the part

of the patentee is found, an affirmative defense is provided,

namely, finding the patent unenforceable. Id. “Inequitable

conduct occurs when a patentee breaches his or her duty to the

[PTO] of ‘candor, good faith, and honesty.’” Warner-Lambert Co v.

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

“Affirmative misrepresentations of a material fact, failure to

disclose material information, or submission of false information,

coupled with an intent to deceive” the PTO may constitute

inequitable conduct. Id. Determining inequitable conduct requires

a two-step analysis: (1) the court must determine whether the

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 34 of 55
35

withheld information meets a threshold level of materiality and an

intent to mislead the PTO; and (2) the court must weigh “the

materiality and intent in light of all the circumstances to

determine whether the applicant’s conduct is so culpable that the

patent should be held unenforceable.” Ferring B.V. v. Barr Lab.,

Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Clear and convincing

evidence is required to establish inequitable conduct of the type

necessary to bar enforcement. Id. With respect to materiality,

information is considered material if there is a substantial

likelihood that a reasonable patent examiner would have considered

the information in deciding whether to issue patent. Id. at 1187.

With respect to an intent to deceive, that intent need not be

proven by direct evidence. Id. at 1191. In the absence of a

credible explanation by the patentee, intent to deceive may be

generally inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding a

knowing failure to disclose material information. Id. It is

important to note that “materiality does not presume intent, which

is a separate and essential component of inequitable conduct.” Id.

at 1190.

The defense of inequitable conduct is “entirely equitable in

nature, and thus not an issue for a jury to decide.” PerSeptive

Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmaci a Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1318

(Fed. Cir. 2000). However, the Federal Circuit has urged caution

in the granting of summary judgment based on the affirmative

defense of inequitable conduct. Id. at 1186-87; Paragon Podiatry

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 35 of 55
36

Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F. 2d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir.

1993); Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422

(Fed. Cir. 1988); KangaROOS USA, Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d

1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985). “If the facts of materiality or

intent are reasonably disputed, the issue is not amenable to

summary judgment.” Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1190. Nevertheless,

summary judgment is appropriate on the issue of intent when there

has been a failure to supply highly material information and “(1)

the applicant knew of the information; (2) the applicant knew or

should have known of the materiality of the information; and (3)

the applicant has not provided a credible explanation for the

withholding.” Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1191.

Progress asserts that the patent applicants did not inform the

PTO of material prior art in the form of VAE GmbH’s boltless guard

rail assembly being in existence at the time they filed the ‘318

patent application. Nortrak does not dispute that the ‘980 patent

and its commercial manifestation constitute relevant prior art,

that the applicants had knowledge of the Nortrak device when they

applied for the ‘318 patent, that the prior art is material, or

that the applicants did not disclose the information to the PTO

when they applied for the patent. Rather, the only disputed issue

of fact is that of intent. If the circumstances create no genuine

issues of material fact with regard to intent, Progress is entitled

to summary judgment.

Nortrak first argues, without at first citing any case law in

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 36 of 55
37

support, that the prior art identified by Progress is material, but

that is not invalidating, so there could not have been inequitable

conduct during the prosecution of the ‘318 patent. In a

subsequently filed surreply, Nortrak cites Bruno Indep. Living Aids

Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Serv. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir.

2005), for the proposition that prior art must be invalidating in

order to render the patent unenforceable due to inequitable

conduct. Nortrak’s argument is somewhat difficult to follow,

because the Federal Circuit in Bruno seems to be saying that

whether prior art is material and whether it would be invalidating

can be the same inquiry, while Nortrak now concedes materiality but

asserts that the prior art would not be invalidating. In Bruno,

the Federal Circuit explained that “[i]n evaluating materiality,

[it has] consistently referred to the definition provided in 37

C.F.R. § 1.56, by which the PTO has promulgated the duty of

disclosure.” Id. at 1352. The Federal Circuit then referred – as

Nortrak now does – to the 1992 version of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, which

provides that information is material to patentability when:

[I]t is not cumulative to information already of record

or being made of record in the application, and

(1) It establishes, by itself of in combination with

other information, a prima facie case of

unpatentability of a claim; or

(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position

the applicant takes in:

(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied

on by the Office, or

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 37 of 55
38

(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.

37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (January 17, 1992). In Bruno, the Federal

Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the prior art

was material, since the prior art satisfied the criteria for

materiality specified in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2)(ii). 394 F.3d at

1353. Nortrak contends that the standard for materiality set forth

in the 1992 version of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, and applied in Bruno,

controls in this case because that version became effective before

the inventors filed their application for the ‘318 patent.

Progress counters, urging the court to apply the standard for

materiality that the Federal Circuit applied in Digital Control

Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006),

that prior art is material if a reasonable examiner would have

considered such prior art important in deciding whether to allow

the patent application. The Federal Circuit in Digital Control

explained that the applicable standard is based in part on the

standard for materiality set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, and it

noted that the 1992 version of § 1.56 “creat[ed] an arguably

narrower standard for materiality.” 437 F.3d at 1314. After a

lengthy discussion of the different standards for materiality that

have been applied in inequitable conduct cases, however, the

Federal Circuit concluded that the “invalidating” standard and the

“reasonable examiner” standard can – and do – coexist. See id. at

1316. In particular, the Federal Circuit explained that “if a

misstatement or omission is material under the new Rule 56 [37

Case 4:03-cv-01480-WMA Document 207 Filed 10/25/06 Page 38 of 55
39

C.F.R. § 1.56] standard, it is material. Similarly, if a statement

or omission is material under the “reasonable examiner” standard or

under the older three tests, it is also material.” Id. The

Federal Circuit expressly declared that “the ‘reasonable examiner’

standard and [its] case law interpreting that standard were not

supplanted by the PTO’s adoption of new Rule 56 . . . .” Id.

Given the binding opinion of the Federal Circuit that the

“invalidating” and “reasonable examiner” standards are not mutually

exclusive, the court will apply the latter standard. The court

does not endeavor to determine whether or not the cited prior art

is “invalidating,” because the court has not been presented with

persuasive argument on the esoteric subject and because it does not

need to do so in order to undertake the inequitable-conduct

analysis. Applying the same standard used by the Federal Circuit

in its very recent Digital Control opinion, the court finds that

the commercial embodiment of the ‘980 patent was material prior

art, because there is no doubt that a reasonable examiner would

have considered the device important in deciding whether to issue

the ‘318 patent. Indeed, Nortrak does not dispute Progress’s

assertion that the prior art Nortrak device was more relevant than

the prior art actually cited against the ‘318 patent. And although

Nortrak does not address whether the prior art Nortrak device

constituted material prior art under the “reasonable examiner”

standard – it instead dedicates the entirety of its response to

Progress’s motion to urging the court to apply the “invalidating”

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This particular undisputed fact also renders the Nortrak prior art 5

device non-cumulative of any prior art actually cited during the prosecution

of the ‘318 patent. 

40

standard – it does not dispute that its own technical and patentlaw expert conceded that the prior art should have been disclosed

under the “reasonable examiner” standard. Moreover, Nortrak does

not dispute that the Nortrak prior art device was a boltless,

adjustable guard rail – as is the invention claimed in the ‘318

patent – but that none of the cited prior art consisted of or

described boltless, adjustable guard rails. Finally, it is 5

undisputed that VAE GmbH, a plaintiff in this case, believed its

‘980 patent and the ‘318 patent to be so similar that it filed an

opposition to ABC’s European patent equivalent to the ‘318 patent

based on those similarities. This may explain why VAE GmbH was not

an original plaintiff. Accordingly, the court finds that there is

no issue of material fact with regard to whether the prior art

Nortrak device was “material” for the purposes of Progress’s

inequitable conduct claim. Regardless of whether the Nortrak prior

art device would invalidate the ‘318 patent, no reasonable jury

could fail to conclude that a reasonable patent examiner would have

considered the device important in deciding whether to grant the

‘318 patent. To ask this court to fill the shoes of a reasonable

patent examiner is a leap of faith, but this court is more

confident in its ability to do so than it is in a jury’s ability to

do so.

Having determined that the prior art Nortrak device was, as a

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41

matter of law, “material” for purposes of the inequitable-conduct

inquiry, the court must now look to the intent of the inventors in

failing to disclose it during the prosecution of the ‘318 patent.

The court has not been apprised of any direct evidence to suggest

that the inventors intended to deceive the PTO by not disclosing

the prior art, but intent is most often demonstrated by

circumstantial evidence in inequitable-conduct cases, as in other

cases. See Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1191. Here, the

circumstantial evidence leads to no other conclusion than that the

applicants for the ‘318 patent intended to deceive the PTO by not

disclosing the prior art Nortrak device. Nortrak does not dispute

that ABC, in privity with plaintiffs, was aware that it had a duty

of disclosure during the prosecution of the ‘318 patent, that ABC

was aware of the materiality of the Nortrak device, and that the

‘318 patent was specifically developed as a competitive alternative

to the Nortrak device. Moreover, the specification of the ‘318

patent states that “traditionally guard rails have been nonadjustable” and that “in those assemblies which do provide an

adjustment to compensate for wear of the guard fence, the

adjustment typically is awkward and requires a lengthy disassembly

of the guard rail assembly,” but it is undisputed that the

inventors failed to disclose the one adjustable guard-rail device

of which they were definitely aware. There is simply no reasonable

explanation, except deliberate non-disclosure, as to why the

Nortrak device was not disclosed during the prosecution of the ‘318

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42

patent. Nortrak contends that no intent to defraud the PTO can be

inferred because Mr. Remington “believed that either his counsel or

his co-inventor, who were better informed as to patent and European

device matters, would handle [the duty of disclosure] for the ‘318

patent.” Mr. Remington’s attempt to disclaim responsibility for

failing to disclose the prior art is unavailing, because the

actions and omissions of a applicant’s patent lawyer are chargeable

to the applicant. See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411,

1415 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Moreover, Nortrak’s argument that the

applicants could not have engaged in inequitable conduct because

the applicants’ duty of disclosure was “eased” due to the PTO

having changed the Rule 56 standard from the “reasonable examiner”

test to the “prima facie invalidity” test is also unconvincing in

light of the Federal Circuit’s holding regarding applicable

standards for materiality in Digital Control. In sum, Nortrak has

offered no believable explanation for why the known, material,

prior art Nortrak device was not disclosed during the prosecution

of the ‘318 patent, and Progress has identified sufficient

undisputed circumstantial evidence to prove that the applicants

intended to deceive the PTO through their non-disclosure. See

Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1191.

Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, Nortrak argues that the

following are material disputed facts that preclude summary

judgment:

1. Nortrak claims that neither the inventors of the ‘318 patent

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43

nor their counsel had “an evil motive” in not disclosing the

prior art Nortrak device to the PTO.

2. Nortrak says that the materiality of the prior art Nortrak

device was not so great, in view of the absence from that

device of at least three elements claimed in the ‘318 patent

application, that “evil intent” could be inferred under any of

the PTO Rule 56 standards.

3. Nortrak claims that the finding of the EPO that the ‘318

patent is patentable in Europe over the ‘980 counterpart

effectively negates Progress’s charge of inequitable conduct

by non-disclosure of the Nortrak prior art device in the U.S.

4. Nortrak says that Progress is disabled from asserting

inequitable conduct against it because of Progress’s own

inequitable conduct in (1) “not disclosing the ‘980 and ‘318

patented prior art in its application for its own boltless,

adjustable guardrail patent,” and/or in (2) “repeatedly and

consistently mischaracterizing the claims of the ‘318 patent

in suit in this case as having limitations found only in

dependent claims not asserted against it.”

The court respectfully disagrees with Nortrak’s assertions that any

of these issues constitute genuine issues of material fact that

preclude entry of summary judgment for Progress. First, Nortrak’s

conclusory statements regarding intent and materiality (issues # 1

and # 2) are not evidence and therefore do not create issues of

fact which require resolution by trial. See Moore U.S.A., Inc v.

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44

Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1112-13 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Although Nortrak may purport to dispute the facts regarding

materiality and/or intent, none of the material facts are

reasonably disputed in light of the undisputed evidence, and the

issue of inequitable conduct is therefore amenable to summary

judgment. See Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1190. Second, the fact that

the EPO determined that the ‘318 counterpart patent was patentable

over the ‘980 counterpart in Europe (issue # 3) – after the ‘318

patent was applied for and granted in the United States – is

irrelevant to the questions of materiality and intent with regard

to the prosecution of the ‘318 patent in the United States.

Finally, the court is not persuaded by Nortrak’s unclean hands

defense (issue # 4), because Nortrak’s allegations of inequitable

conduct relate to a patent that is not at issue in this litigation,

and because the court is not persuaded that Progress has

mischaracterized the record in this case.

Being satisfied that there exists undisputed, clear and

convincing evidence that the prior art Nortrak device meets the

threshold level of materiality, that the applicants of the ‘318

patent knew of the Nortrak device when they applied for the patent,

and that the applicants intended – whether or not in such a way

that would indicate criminality – to mislead the PTO by failing to

disclose the Nortrak device, the court finds that, under the

totality of the circumstances, the applicants’ conduct was so

calculatedly misleading that the ‘318 patent should be held

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45

unenforceable. See Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1186. Accordingly, the

court will grant Progress’s motion for summary judgment on

inequitable conduct. This conclusion is, of course, redundant to

the extent that summary judgment is being granted against Nortrak

on other grounds.

III. Progress’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Damages

Progress says that plaintiffs, if they can avoid summary

judgment on Progress’s motions with respect to infringement and

inequitable conduct, are limited to covering a reasonable royalty

for the sales of its allegedly infringing boltless guardrails that

occurred after the filing of their complaint. Because the court

will grant Progress’s motions for summary judgment with respect to

both infringement and inequitable conduct, the question of damages

becomes academic. Progress’s motion for summary judgment on

damages will be denied, without prejudice, as moot. Progress may

renew its motion in the event the Federal Circuit should reverse

this court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Progress.

IV. Nortrak’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to

Progress’s Antitrust Counterclaim

A. Antitrust Standing

Counter-defendants say that they are entitled to summary

judgment on all of Progress’s antitrust claims because Progress

lacks antitrust standing.

Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act set forth potential

remedies for antitrust violations. Section 4 of that act, which

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46

authorizes suits for money damages, states that “any person who

shall be injured . . . by reason of anything forbidden in the

antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold

the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a

reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (emphasis added).

Section 16, which authorizes suits for injunctive relief, states

that “[a]ny person . . . shall be entitled to sue for and have

injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a

violation of the antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 26 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, Progress is entitled to relief under section 4 if it

was actually injured by counter-defendants’ alleged antitrust

violations, and is entitled to relief under section 16 if it was

the object of a threat of injury.

The court agrees with counter-defendants that Progress lacks

antitrust standing to the extent Progress seeks relief under

section 4 of the Clayton Act. In order for Progress to establish

standing under section 4, the court must (1) determine that

Progress has suffered an “antitrust injury,” and (2) that Progress

is “an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws.” Todorov v. DCH

Healthcare Authority, 921 F.2d 1438, 1449 (11th Cir. 1991).

Antitrust injury is defined as “injury of the type the antitrust

laws were intended to prevent,” i.e., injury that “coincides with

the public detriment tending to result from the alleged violation.”

Id. at 1449-50 (citations omitted). Progress contends that it has

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sustained antitrust injury in three respects; namely, (1) that

Nortrak’s intent is to initially keep prices artificially low in

order to freeze Progress out of the market, (2) that it has

experienced a loss of market share as a direct result of the

Nortrak-Meridian asset purchase agreement, and (3) that it will be

forced to buy boltless guardrails from Nortrak in the event Nortrak

succeeds in this patent litigation. Progress’s first contention

does not constitute a possible antitrust injury, because Progress

does not aver that Nortrak has actually kept prices artificially

low or that Progress has actually been frozen out of the market –

it only contends that such is Nortrak’s intent. Without an

allegation that Nortrak actually engaged in any of the malicious

conduct, Progress could not have sustained an actual antitrust

injury. Moreover, Progress’s third contention becomes academic in

light of the court’s rulings on Progress’s motions with regard to

infringement and inequitable conduct. And even if Nortrak were to

prevail on its infringement claims, the court most likely would be

unpersuaded that Progress would thereafter be “forced” to buy

Nortrak’s boltless guardrails or that such would necessarily lead

to an antitrust injury. 

 Progress’s second antitrust contention is the only one that

merits significant discussion, because it alleges an “injury” that

Progress has actually sustained. Progress cites the following

deposition testimony of its expert witness, Steven Wiggins, as its

sole piece of evidence in support of its claim that it experienced

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48

a loss of market share:

Mr. Tankersley [counter-defendants’ counsel]: Well, if

Meridian had gone out of business completely – that is,

if the predictions about their continued operations had

turned out to be wrong and . . . the company failed,

continued on through bankruptcy and sold all its [assets]

so it was no longer a third player, what would that have

done to the relevant market positions of Nortrak and

Progress Rail?

Dr. Wiggins: They would have ended up closer in market

share to one another, and that would have driven down the

[Herfindahl-Hirschman Index] as compared to where it is

today.

Even if Dr. Wiggins’ speculation as to what “would have” happened

if Meridian had gone out of business is correct, as counterdefendants aptly note, Progress could not have sustained an

“antitrust injury” because no such injury can result from profits

that would have been realized had competition been reduced.

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488

(1977). The Supreme Court in Brunswick explained that such an

“injury” is not “of the type the antitrust laws were intended to

prevent” because the antitrust laws “were enacted for ‘the

protection of competition not competitors,’” Id. (quoting Brown

Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)), and that

“[i]t is inimical to the purposes of these laws to award damages

for the type of injury claimed here.” Id. Accordingly, Progress’s

second contention does not amount to an “antitrust injury” even if

the court takes it for granted as true. Because there are no

genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether Progress

suffered an antitrust injury due to any of counter-defendants’

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alleged antitrust violations, the court will grant counterdefendants’ motion to the extent Progress seeks money damages under

section 4 of the Clayton Act.

A distinct issue is whether Progress has standing to bring

antitrust claims for injunctive relief under section 16 of the

Clayton Act. While a plaintiff (or in this case, a counterclaimant) must show that it sustained an actual antitrust injury in

order to have standing to sue for damages under section 4, section

16 permits a party to seek injunctive relief if there existed a

threatened loss or damage resulting from an alleged antitrust

violation. Here there are sufficient issues of material fact with

regard to whether or not Progress sustained such a threat, and the

court accordingly will deny counter-defendants’ motion to the

extent Progress seeks injunctive relief for any alleged antitrust

violations under section 16 of the Clayton Act. See Todorov 921

F.2d at 1452 (explaining that it is possible to have standing to

bring an antitrust action under section 16 but to lack standing to

bring the action under section 4).

B. Noerr-Pennington Immunity

Counter-defendants also assert that they are entitled to

summary judgment on Progress’s antitrust counterclaim, to the

extent that counterclaim is based on counter-defendants having

brought this lawsuit. They claim immunity from antitrust liability

under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Under that doctrine, bringing

a suit to enforce a patent is protected from antitrust laws, but

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where the litigation is “objectively baseless” and is brought with

a “subjective motivation” to interfere with a competitor, NoerrPennington immunity does not apply. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v Elan

Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2005).

 The court agrees with counter-defendants that the NoerrPennington doctrine applies here. Counter-defendants accurately

point out that this litigation has been active for over three years

and has survived a Markman hearing and one stage of summary

judgment. Progress notes that plaintiffs’ claims for infringement

of the ‘980 patent were dismissed from the case over one year ago,

and argues that such is evidence of an objectively baseless

lawsuit. Even if this fact arguably constitutes such evidence –

and the court has serious doubts that it does – there is no

evidence that bringing the entire lawsuit as a whole was

objectively baseless. Indeed, until the date of this memorandum

opinion, the court was still seriously considering whether genuine

issues of material fact existed with regard to infringement of the

‘318 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. This court’s

understanding of Noerr-Pennington is that the entire lawsuit – not

just certain alleged claims – must be objectively baseless and

brought with the requisite level of subjective mal-motive in order

for the doctrine not to apply. Moreover, without expressly finding

that the ‘318 patent was fraudulently obtained, the court does not

agree with Progress’s reading of In re Ind. Service Org., 203 F.3d

1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000) that Noerr-Pennington immunity is

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 The court acknowledges that the Federal Circuit discussed the 6

implications of obtaining a patent through fraud in the PTO in In re Ind.

Service Org. The court believes, however, that the discussion was made in the

context of a potential analysis under Walter Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food

Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), not in the context of the

Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

51

inapplicable where the asserted patent was obtained through knowing

and willful fraud. Accordingly, the court finds that there are no 6

genuine issues of material fact regarding whether counterdefendants are protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and

will grant counter-defendants motion for summary judgment insofar

as Progress bases its antitrust counterclaim on counter-defendants

filing this action.

C. Section 2 of the Sherman Act

Counter-defendants assert that they are entitled to summary

judgment on Progress’s allegation that they violated Section 2 of

the Sherman Act. The elements of a claim of actual monopolization

under Section 2 of the Sherman Act are “(1) the possession of

monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful

acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from

growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,

business acumen, or historic accident.” Morris Communications

Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2004)

(quoting United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71

(1966). The elements of a claim of attempted monopolization under

Section 2 of the Sherman Act are “(1) the defendant has engaged in

predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to

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52

monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly

power.” Morris Communications, 364 F.3d at 1293 n.10 (quoting

Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993)). The

elements of a Section 2 conspiracy to monopolize are “(1) concerted

action deliberately entered into with the specific intent of

achieving a monopoly; and (2) the commission of at least one overt

act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Levine v. Central Florida

Medical Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1556 (11th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1446-47

(11th Cir. 1991).

Counter-defendants assert that Progress cannot sustain its

Section 2 counterclaim because it (1) has failed adequately to

define the relevant market, (2) has not proven that counterdefendants engaged in predatory behavior, (3) has not proven that

counter-defendants had a specific intent to monopolize a relevant

market, and (4) has not proven that counter-defendants conspired to

monopolize a relevant market. As a preliminary matter, the court

notes that Progress does not need to prove the elements of any

Section 2 violation at this stage in order for the court to deny

counter-defendants’ motion. Instead, Progress must only

demonstrate that there exist genuine issues of material fact.

With the appropriate summary judgment standard in mind, the

court cannot find from the facts submitted to date by the parties

that Section 2 of the Sherman Act was or was not violated. The

decision-maker must be fully informed of all the facts in order to

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53

make such a decision, and there are numerous facts in dispute that

require a jury to hear the evidence at trial. Generally speaking,

these facts may pertain, but are not necessarily limited, to (1)

counter-defendants’ market power, (2) the relevant geographic and

product markets, (3) Nortrak’s intent in obtaining a license to the

‘318 patent from ABC, (4) facts surrounding Nortrak’s obtaining of

a license to the ‘318 patent, and (5) counter-defendants’ intent in

the acquisition of Meridian’s assets by Nortrak. Only after

hearing all the evidence can the court determine under Rule 50

whether facts are in dispute which should be determined by a jury,

as the finder-of-fact, or whether this case must be decided as a

matter of law. Based on the foregoing, Progress’s Section 2

counterclaim cannot be decided under Rule 56. Accordingly,

counter-defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this

counterclaim will be denied, without prejudice to its being refiled if and when the unaddressed material facts become undisputed

or become presented by a Rule 50 motion. 

V. Miscellaneous Motions

In addition to the parties’ summary judgment motions, there

are several motions pending that are disposed by the court’s

summary judgment determinations. The court takes notice that there

will be no claims of patent infringement to be adjudicated at

trial, and that the only claims remaining for jury determination

are certain of Progress’s counterclaims. The court will

accordingly deny as moot Nortrak’s motion to limit non-infringement

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54

issues to those raised at the Markman hearing (Dkt. # 153),

Progress’s motion to strike Nortrak’s surreply brief titled

“Identification of Genuine Issues of Material Fact (Dkt. # 190),

and counter-defendants’ motion to sever and stay the causes of

action in Progress’s counterclaims (Dkt. # 79). As the court has

considered Nortrak’s supplemental evidentiary material in deciding

Progress’s motions for summary judgment, the court will grant

Nortrak’s motion for leave to file such material (Dkt. # 186). 

Conclusion

In light of all of the foregoing, the court expressly holds

that no genuine issue of fact exists and that Progress is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its motions for

summary judgment with respect to infringement and inequitable

conduct, and that Progress’s motion for summary judgment on

damages is moot. The court also finds that there are no genuine

issues of material fact with regard to Progress’s sham litigation

counterclaim and with regard to Progress’s antitrust standing to

the extent Progress seeks damages under section 4 of the Clayton

Act, but that genuine issues of material fact remain to the

extent Progress seeks injunctive relief under section 16 of the

Clayton Act and with regard to Progress’s Section 2 of the

Sherman Act counterclaim. By separate order entered

contemporaneously herewith, Progress’s motions for summary

judgment on infringement and inequitable conduct will be granted,

Progress’s motion for summary judgment on damages will be denied

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without prejudice, and counter-defendants’ motion for summary

judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.

DONE this 25th day of October, 2006.

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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