Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01549/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01549-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GABRIELA NARANJO, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, ET AL.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 19-cv-01549-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 11

Plaintiff Gabriela Naranjo, individually and as guardian ad litem for her three minor 

children J.B., A.B., and D.B., brings this civil rights action against defendants San Mateo County

(the “County”), City of Redwood City, detective Michael Ruybal, officer Richard Santiago, 

special agent Amanda Meier, special agent Jeffrey Clements, special agent Michael Leishman, 

police chief JR Gamez, Sheriff Carlos Bolanos, and Does 1-25, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 

for violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”).)1

Now before the Court is the County, Sheriff Bolanos, and special agents Clements and 

Leishman’s (together, the “County Defendants”) motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 11 (“Motion”).) Having carefully considered 

the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART County Defendants’ motion.

2

 

1

 On July 29, 2019, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the State of California, California 

Highway Patrol, and commissioner Joe Farrow from the action. (Dkt. No. 37.)

2

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 

finds the motion appropriate for decision without oral argument.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges as follows:

On March 28, 2019, at approximately 7:10 a.m., detective Ruybal, officer Santiago, and 

special agents Meier, Leishman, Clements (together, “Officer Defendants”) executed a signed 

warrant authorizing the search of plaintiffs’ home at 238 Park Street, Redwood City, California. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 26-27.)3 The home is a single story. (Id. ¶ 28.) Ms. Naranjo lived there with her three 

children, also plaintiffs, as well as her boyfriend Jesus Bustos. (Id.) Ms. Naranjo rented a room in 

the home to an individual named Marcellino Barragan. (Id.)

At the time the search warrant was executed, plaintiffs were present in the home. (Id. 

¶ 29.) Officer Defendants entered the residence without knocking and with their guns drawn. (Id. 

¶ 31.) J.B. (15 years old) was in the living room of the home, with the family dog, getting ready 

for school. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 32.) Officer Defendants pointed their guns at J.B. and ordered him to control 

the dog or the dog would be shot. (Id.). J.B. complied with the order. (Id.)

Officer Defendants also entered the bathroom where Ms. Naranjo was taking a shower. 

(Id. ¶¶ 33-34.)4 They pointed a gun at Ms. Naranjo and ordered her not to move. (Id. ¶ 34.) Ms. 

Naranjo was naked and asked an officer if she could retrieve a towel to cover herself because she 

was wet and cold. (Id.) She was told not to move until a female officer arrived. (Id.) Ms. 

Naranjo remained in the shower, with an officer pointing his gun at her. (Id.) After a few 

minutes, special agent Meier, a female officer, arrived and ordered Ms. Naranjo to get out of the 

shower. (Id.) Mr. Naranjo complied with the order. (Id.) Special agent Meier then handcuffed 

Ms. Naranjo, placed a bathrobe over her shoulders, and led her to the front yard of the home. (Id. 

¶¶ 35-39.) Ms. Naranjo’s repeated requests for clothing were denied, and her bathrobe remained 

 

3

 Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the complaint allege that the search warrant was “authored” on 

March 27, 2017 and executed on March 28, 2019. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-27.) The Court understands this 

to be a typographical error, however, plaintiffs should clarify this point as needed in any amended 

complaint.

4

 Plaintiffs claim that Officer Defendants entered the bathroom while Ms. Naranjo was in 

the shower. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Given that special agent Meier arrived several minutes later, however, 

it appears that only certain of Officer Defendants were initially present in the bathroom with Ms. 

Naranjo. (Id.) Plaintiffs should clarify this point in any amended complaint.

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untied and open in the front, exposing Ms. Naranjo’s breasts, stomach, and pubic area. (Id. ¶¶ 37-

38.)

Twenty minutes later, after repeatedly asking about her children, Ms. Naranjo was escorted 

back inside the home and into the master bedroom. (Id. ¶ 40.) She was then uncuffed and told to 

get dressed. (Id.) Once dressed, she was told to wake up her two other children and take them 

outside. (Id.) Thereafter, Officer Defendants placed plaintiffs in a van. (Id. ¶ 41.) Despite the 

cold temperature in the van, plaintiffs were not permitted to retrieve shoes, sweaters, or blankets. 

(Id.) Ms. Naranjo asked whether D.B. (10 years old) and A.B. (6 years old) could use the 

bathroom and was told they needed to wait, which they did for over 30 minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 42.)

Officer Defendants then escorted plaintiffs back inside the home. (Id. ¶ 43.) They were 

placed in the living room. (Id.) When A.B. attempted to enter the kitchen to get food, Officer 

Defendants yelled at him to get out. (Id.) Officer Defendants eventually completed their search of 

the residence and left. (Id. ¶ 44.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, the 

plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the 

plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In deciding whether the plaintiff has 

stated a claim, a court must assume that plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 

F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Leave to amend must be 

granted unless it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas 

v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiffs bring a single cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging in 

part that Officer Defendants violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures and for sufficient probable cause to exist for said searches and 

seizures. (Compl. ¶ 51.)5 The instant motion is similarly short. County Defendants argue that the 

Fourth Amendment claim should be dismissed simply because plaintiffs’ home was searched 

pursuant to a valid search warrant supported by probable cause. (Motion at 4.) Specifically, 

County Defendants aver that because the complaint alleges that “[a] search warrant was signed by 

[a state court judge], authorizing the search of [plaintiffs’] home,” plaintiffs “ha[ve] admitted that 

the search of [their] home was conducted with a valid warrant.” (Id.) Thus, County Defendants 

argue, plaintiffs fail to state a claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.

County Defendants’ argument fails to persuade. The Fourth Amendment proscribes 

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Where, as alleged here, a search is 

conducted pursuant to a warrant, plaintiffs bringing a Fourth Amendment claim must show “either 

that the warrants were invalid under the Fourth Amendment or that, even if valid, the warrants 

were executed in a manner that rendered the searches unreasonable.” United States v. Artis, 919 

F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis supplied); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 

7-8 (1985) (holding that the reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on, among other things, 

“how it is carried out”) (emphasis in original). Here, plaintiffs frame their Fourth Amendment 

claim as challenging not the validity of the warrant but the way it was executed. (Dkt. No. 38 

(“Opp.”) at 5.)6Indeed, the complaint states that it “arises from conduct by [Officer Defendants] 

 

5

 Plaintiffs advance Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, as well as Monell claims, 

against various sub-groups of defendants, all under a single cause of action. (Compl. ¶¶ 46-69.) 

Any amended complaint should separate plaintiffs’ claims and theories of liability into different 

causes of action.

6

 In their opposition, plaintiffs note that they “do challenge the validity of the search 

warrant and do not agree with the [d]efendant[s’] characterization that the search warrant was 

‘valid.’ For purposes of this [m]otion, however, the validity of the search warrant is not the 

primary issue.” (Opp. at 5, n.1.) As explained herein, the Court does not read the complaint as 

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during the execution of a search warrant,” and nearly all of the factual allegations in the complaint 

center around this conduct. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27-45.) Accordingly, even if plaintiffs had admitted 

the warrant was valid, which the Court is not persuaded they have, plaintiffs allege a plausible 

Fourth Amendment violation based on the manner in which Officer Defendants executed the

warrant. See Pierce v. Cty. of Marin, 291 F. Supp. 3d 982, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting 

argument that plaintiff’s detention “was pursuant to a facially valid warrant and was therefore 

reasonable” where complaint alleged that “defendants[’] conduct after plaintiff’s wrongful 

booking . . . caused the subsequent wrongful arrests and detentions”).

County Defendants’ motion to dismiss is therefore denied with respect to their argument 

that the Fourth Amendment claim should be dismissed based on the validity of the warrant. 

B. Qualified Immunity

Next, County Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim must be 

dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity. (Motion at 4-6.)7

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil 

damages ‘unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or 

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged 

conduct.’” Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 745 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 

735 (2011)). “Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense from suit, not merely from 

liability, ‘[u]nless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a 

defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of 

discovery.’” Doe By and Through Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

 

challenging the validity of the warrant, which is currently under seal. If plaintiffs wish to advance 

this theory, they must amend the complaint accordingly.

7

 Although the motion in one instance asserts that qualified immunity bars plaintiffs’ 

Fourteenth Amendment claim (Motion at 4), the remainder of the briefing, including the cases 

cited by both parties, concern qualified immunity as it applies to Fourth Amendment claims (see, 

e.g., Motion at 6). Accordingly, the Court focuses its analysis on determining whether plaintiffs’ 

Fourth Amendment claim is barred by qualified immunity.

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In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged

approach for analyzing qualified immunity. First, the Court must determine whether the facts 

alleged, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, establish the violation of a 

constitutional right. Id. at 201. Second, the Court decides whether the right is “clearly 

established” such that a reasonable government official would have known that “his conduct was 

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202.8 A “clearly established” constitutional right 

must not be stated as a general proposition, but rather, must be “particularized” to the facts of the 

case. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 

640 (1987)); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (“[A] defendant cannot be 

said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently 

definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was 

violating it.”).

The Court considers each prong of the qualified immunity analysis in turn.

1. Violation of a Constitutional Right

First, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable 

to plaintiffs, state a plausible claim for violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

County Defendants argue plaintiffs fail to allege a constitutional violation because 

plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim that (i) the search warrant was invalid or (ii) Officer 

Defendants used “excessive force” when executing the warrant. (Motion at 5.) With respect to 

the first argument, as previously explained, plaintiffs’ claims are based on the manner in which the 

search warrant was executed, not the validity of the warrant. See supra Section III.A. Executing a 

search warrant in an unreasonable manner may violate an individual’s constitutional rights. See

Artis, 919 F.3d at 1128 (allegations that “warrants were executed in a manner that rendered the 

searches unreasonable” constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (notwithstanding the existence of a valid warrant, “a detainee 

has a constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been 

 

8

In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified that 

courts may exercise discretion in deciding which of the two prongs should be addressed first.

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known that the detainee was entitled to release”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gant v. Cty. 

of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 619 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] public entity can be liable under the 

Fourteenth Amendment for failing to institute readily available procedures for decreasing the risk 

of erroneous detention[.]”).

County Defendants’ second argument likewise fails to persuade. Although plaintiffs allege 

Ms. Naranjo was “assault[ed]” and “batter[ed]” (Compl. ¶ 36), the gravamen of the complaint is 

that Officer Defendants’ alleged conduct was constitutionally unreasonable not because it 

involved excessive force, but because it was “unnecessarily degrading, prolonged, and an invasion 

of [plaintiffs’] privacy.” (Opp. at 7, quoting Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 

1994).)9 Indeed, plaintiffs allege that Officer Defendants held Ms. Naranjo at gunpoint while 

“stood in the shower, wet, cold[,] and fully exposed in front of the male officer,” and later forced 

Ms. Naranjo to stand in her front yard with her breasts, stomach, and pubic area fully exposed for 

approximately 20 minutes. (Compl. ¶¶ 34, 39-42.) Thus, even absent allegations of excessive 

 

9

 For this reason, County Defendants’ reliance on Hansen v. Schubert, 459 F. Supp. 2d 

973 (E.D. Cal. 2006) is unavailing. County Defendants point out that in Hansen, officers were not 

entitled to qualified immunity where they “kicked the door in, dragged [plaintiff ] out of bed, [] 

handcuffed him . . . pushed him up against his entertainment center[,] and placed a shotgun against 

the back of his head.” (Motion at 5-6, quoting Hansen, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 982.) County 

Defendants seem to argue that plaintiffs’ allegations in this action do not rise to the level of the 

allegations in Hansen with respect to excessive force, and therefore, do not establish a 

constitutional violation. However, as explained herein, plaintiffs allege not that they were subject 

to excessive force, but rather, that Officer Defendants’ conduct was “unnecessarily degrading, 

prolonged, and an invasion of [plaintiffs’] privacy.”

Moreover, other parts of Hansen actually lend support to plaintiffs’ position that qualified 

immunity does not apply. Specifically, a different plaintiff in Hansen alleged that officers 

“grabbed” her, ripping her shirt so that her breast was exposed, and then would not allow her to 

change her shirt or cover herself for several hours. 459 F. Supp. 2d at 994-995. With respect to 

these allegations, the court held that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because 

“at the time of the search, the law was sufficiently clearly established to place a reasonable law 

officer on notice that using this type of force against an individual who was complying with a 

search and the failure to allow her to cover her exposed breast for several hours while she was 

detained is unlawful.” Id. at 995. Here, like in Hansen, plaintiffs allege that Officer Defendants 

“grabb[ed]” Ms. Naranjo and “did not allow Ms. Naranjo to put clothing on,” leaving her “fully 

exposed” for a significant amount of time. (Compare Compl. ¶¶ 36-37, with Hansen, 459 F. Supp. 

2d at 995.) Thus, Hansen indicates that qualified immunity does not bar plaintiffs’ claims.

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force, the complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to show a plausible constitutional 

violation with respect to the manner in which the warrant was executed as to Ms. Naranjo.

Moreover, County Defendants’ reliance on Los Angeles Cty., California v. Rettele, 550 

U.S. 609 (2007) fails to persuade. In Rettele, officers executing a valid search warrant found two 

residents who were sleeping unclothed. 550 U.S. at 611. The officers ordered the residents out of 

bed and required them to stand for one to two minutes before they were allowed to dress. Id. 

Within a few minutes, officers realized the residents were not the suspects being sought and left 

the home. Id. In finding plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the court held

that “[t]he orders by the police to the occupants . . . were permissible, and perhaps necessary, to 

protect the safety of the deputies.” Id. at 614. In particular, the court found that “[b]lankets and 

bedding can conceal a weapon, and one of the suspects was known to own a firearm. . . . The 

deputies needed a moment to secure the room and ensure that other persons were not close by or 

did not present a danger. Deputies were not required to turn their backs to allow [the plaintiffs] to 

retrieve clothing or to cover themselves with the sheets.” Id. at 614-615.

Rettele is easily distinguishable from the case at hand. Here, Ms. Naranjo was allegedly 

detained in her front yard for approximately 20 minutes, significantly longer than the Rettele

plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 39-40.) During this time, Officer Defendants allegedly forced Ms. Naranjo 

to stand fully exposed in public view. (Id.) Further, unlike in Rettele, the complaint does not 

allege that Ms. Naranjo was covered by bedding or otherwise had access to a concealed weapon 

when Officer Defendants found her, such that Officer Defendants could not reasonably provide 

Ms. Naranjo with an opportunity to cover herself without compromising their own safety. As 

even the Rettelle court recognized, “special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, 

might render a search unreasonable.” Rettelle, 550 U.S. at 615 (citation omitted). Such is the case 

here, where Officer Defendants’ alleged conduct plausibly exceeded the constitutional bounds of a 

reasonable search and seizure.

Thus, based on the allegations in the complaint, plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim that 

Officer Defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

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2. Violation of “Clearly Established” Law

Next, the Court must determine whether plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating

a violation of “clearly established” law. Generally, a plaintiff satisfies this burden by showing that 

the case involves an “obvious” instance of constitutional misconduct or by identifying a factually 

analogous case that prohibits the conduct. Sharp v. Cty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 922 (9th Cir.

2017) (citing White, 137 S.Ct. at 552). Here, plaintiffs argue that both principles apply. (Opp. at 

8-9.)

In support of their argument that County Defendants’ conduct violated “clearly 

established” law as set forth in a factually analogous case, plaintiffs point to Franklin v. Foxworth, 

31 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1994). (Id. at 9.)10 In Franklin, plaintiffs filed a section 1983 action 

alleging that the manner in which police officers executed a search warrant for plaintiffs’ home 

violated their constitutional rights. 31 F.3d at 875. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that during the 

execution of the warrant, officers entered the bedroom of one of the plaintiffs, an obviously 

disabled man, with their guns drawn. Id. The plaintiff allegedly was lying in bed wearing only a 

t-shirt. Id. The complaint alleged that officers searched the plaintiff for weapons, and finding 

none, handcuffed him, carried him into the living room, and placed him on a couch with his 

genitals exposed. Id. When the plaintiff allegedly complained that the handcuffs hurt his wrists 

and that he was cold and tired from sitting upright on the couch, he was re-cuffed in front of his 

body and given a blanket. Id. However, the plaintiff allegedly was not allowed to return to his

bed for over two hours, well after officers had searched the plaintiff’s bedroom and found no 

weapons or contraband. Id.

On appeal from a judgment entered in the defendants’ favor, the Ninth Circuit held:

It is clear, in light of the district court’s findings of fact, that the officers executing 

the search warrant at the Curry-Franklin home acted unreasonably. They 

executed the warrant in an unreasonable manner, first by removing a gravely ill 

 

10

 County Defendants assert that plaintiffs “cite no precedent establishing that [Officer 

Defendants]’ actions toward Ms. Naranjo or her children during the service of the warrant 

constituted a Constitutional violation.” (Reply at 2.) This assertion is demonstrably false, as 

plaintiffs point to Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1994) in support of their argument 

that qualified immunity does not apply. (Opp. at 9.)

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and semi-naked man from his sickbed without providing any clothing or covering, 

and then by forcing him to remain sitting handcuffed in his living room for two 

hours rather than returning him to his bed within a reasonable time after the 

search of his room was completed. None of the officers had any reason to 

believe, on the basis of the information they had prior to the search or their 

observations once in the house, that Curry had committed a crime, or that he was 

armed. In fact, the officers were not even aware that Curry lived in the house 

prior to executing the warrant. It should also have been clear to them that Curry 

was not a gang member. Finally, it should have been obvious to the officers that 

Curry presented little risk of danger to them, that he presented absolutely no risk 

of flight, and that it was highly unlikely that he could interfere with their search in 

any way.

Id. at 876-77 (emphasis supplied).

Here, County Defendants’ alleged conduct while executing the warrant plausibly violated 

clearly established law as set forth in Franklin, in that the search plausibly subjected Ms. Naranjo

to “entirely unnecessary and unjustifiable degradation and suffering.” Id. at 878.11 In particular, 

the complaint alleges that Ms. Naranjo was naked in the shower when County Defendants entered 

her bathroom, with their guns drawn, and placed her in handcuffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 33-35.) Although a 

bathrobe was placed over her shoulders, plaintiffs allege that Ms. Naranjo’s breasts, stomach, and 

pubic area were fully exposed. (Id. ¶ 37.) Further, Officer Defendants allegedly forced Ms. 

Naranjo to stand exposed in her front yard for approximately 20 minutes before she was brought 

back into the house and allowed to get dressed. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40.)12

 

11

 Contrary to County Defendants’ assertions, Franklin did not “center[] around” that 

plaintiff’s “virtual physical incapacitation.” (Reply at 5.) Although the plaintiff’s disability was 

one relevant factor in the Franklin court’s reasonableness analysis, the court also emphasized that 

it could “conceive of no reason why [the plaintiff] was not given clothing or covering before he 

was carried from his bed to the living room, so that his genitals would not be exposed to the view 

of 23 armed strangers.” 31 F.3d at 877 (emphasis in original). Moreover, although none of the 

plaintiffs in this case is alleged to have been disabled, three of the plaintiffs were minors ages six, 

ten, and fifteen, whose detention “raise[s] additional concerns.” Id. at 876. The Court finds 

Franklin sufficiently analogous to this case for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis.

12

 County Defendants did not move separately on the issue of whether qualified immunity 

applies to County Defendants’ alleged specific conduct towards the minor children, and thus, the 

Court focuses its qualified immunity analysis on the allegations regarding Ms. Naranjo. The 

Court notes, however, that it is not aware of any case law stating that detaining minors in a cold 

location or refusing to allow a ten-year-old and six-year-old to use the bathroom upon being 

awaken for approximately 30 minutes violates clearly established law. Should plaintiffs amend 

the complaint, the theory with respect to the minors should be better articulated.

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Based thereon, the Court finds that the complaint alleges a plausible violation of a “clearly 

established” constitutional right, and as such, plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is not barred by 

qualified immunity. Separately, however, the Court notes that plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment 

claim is entirely duplicative of their Fourth Amendment claim. Because the Court finds that the 

Fourth Amendment claim survives, plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim is dismissed as 

duplicative. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“Because the Fourth Amendment 

provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against [unreasonable seizures], that 

Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for 

analyzing these claims.”).

C. Monell Claim

Finally, County Defendants argue that the Monell claim should be dismissed because

plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to support this theory of liability. (Motion at 6.)13

A municipality may be liable under section 1983 when the enforcement of a municipal 

policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutionally protected 

right. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A public 

entity cannot, however, be held liable “solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Id. at 691. Rather, 

to establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that [s]he 

possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a 

policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights; 

and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Oviatt By and 

Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 

489 U.S. 378, 389-391 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A Monell claim for section 

1983 liability may be stated in one of three circumstances: (1) when official policies or established 

 

13 County Defendants aver that “San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office is not a separate legal 

entity from San Mateo County and thus is inappropriately named as such in the [c]omplaint.” 

(Reply at 8, n.2.) However, “San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office” is not named as a defendant in 

this action and is only referenced in the complaint to describe the capacity in which special agents 

Clements and Leishman and Sheriff Bolanos worked. Accordingly, any amended complaint may, 

but is not required to, clarify this point.

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customs inflict a constitutional injury; (2) when omissions or failures to act amount to a local 

government policy of “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights; or (3) when a local 

government official with final policy-making authority ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional 

conduct. Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled 

on other grounds by Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016).

Further, to survive the motion to dismiss stage, a section 1983 claim against a municipality 

“must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively,” and those facts must “plausibly suggest an entitlement 

to relief.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). In AE ex rel. Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit 

affirmed dismissal of a Monell claim brought by a nine-year-old boy alleging that defendants 

followed county “ordinances, regulations, customs, and practices” when they failed to prevent 

plaintiff’s foster brother from sexually assaulting him. Id. at 635-67. Specifically, the plaintiff 

alleged that the municipality “maintained or permitted an official policy, custom, or practice of 

knowingly permitting the occurrence of the type of wrongs” stated in the amended complaint. Id. 

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to provide any facts regarding the specific “policy, 

custom, or practice” at issue, and thus, failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Id. 

Additionally, the factual allegations must be more than a “formulaic recitation of a cause of 

action’s elements.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Here, plaintiffs baldly allege that the County and Sheriff Bolanos “engage[d] in or 

tolerate[d] unreasonable and [] unconstitutional searches and seizures,” and “fail[ed] to institute 

and require proper and adequate training, supervision, [and] policies” related to searches and 

seizures. (Compl. ¶ 55.) Plaintiffs further allege that the County and Sheriff Bolanos “failed to 

properly hire, train, instruct, monitor, supervise, evaluate, investigate, and discipline” special 

agents Leishman, Clements, and Meiers. (Id. ¶ 59.)14 These allegations, and the complaint 

 

14 In their complaint, plaintiffs also allege that special agents Clements and Leishman’s 

conduct was undertaken pursuant to “customs, policies, practices, and/or procedures of the San 

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generally, lack sufficient specificity to support plaintiffs’ Monell claim. The complaint only 

makes a vague reference to the County’s policies regarding “searches and seizures.”15

Plaintiffs’ opposition only confirms the conclusory nature of the allegations related to the 

Monell claim. Rather than point to any factual allegations in the complaint that would support the 

claim, plaintiffs merely argue they have adequately alleged that “there was an inadequate training 

of the officers in the execution of searches and seizures,” “because of the inadequate training, Ms. 

Naranjo’s right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures was deprived, and “the inadequate 

training in the execution of searches and seizures was the primary force behind the violation.” 

(Opp. at 10.) Although plaintiffs are not required to identify the particulars of any specific policy

at this juncture, plaintiffs’ allegations must “give fair notice and . . . enable the [County and 

Sheriff Bolanos] to defend [themselves] effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637. 

Plaintiffs have failed to do so, and thus, the Monell claim as asserted against County Defendants is 

subject to dismissal. Because amendment would not necessarily be futile, however, plaintiffs’ 

Monell claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

 

Mateo County Sheriff’s Department.” (Compl. ¶ 55.) The Court notes that the analysis of an 

unconstitutional “policy” as opposed to an unconstitutional “custom” or “practice” differs under 

Monell. With respect to an adopted municipal policy, a single incident can serve as the basis of a 

Monell claim so long as “proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, 

unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” 

City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985). With respect to customs and practices,

liability may not be premised on an isolated incident. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic 

incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that 

the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out that policy.”); Thompson v. City of 

L.A., 885 F.2d 1439, 1443–44 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Consistent with the commonly understood 

meaning of custom, proof of random acts or isolated events are insufficient to establish custom.”), 

overruled on other grounds, Bull v. City & Cty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

As currently pleaded, the complaint asserts liability based on a single incident, and 

accordingly, plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to support a Monell claim based on any 

“custom” or “practice.”

15

 The complaint also fails to identify whether plaintiffs’ Monell claim is based on (1) the 

County’s official policies or established customs, (2) omissions or failures amounting to deliberate 

indifference, and/or (3) an official’s ratification of a subordinate’s conduct. See Clouthier, 591 

F.3d at 1249-50. Any amended complaint should clarify this point.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, County Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Court ORDERS as follows: (1) County Defendants’ 

motion is DENIED with respect to plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim; (2) plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 

Amendment claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; (3) plaintiffs’ Monell claim is 

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Any Second Amended Complaint must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of issuance 

of this Order. Any response thereto is due fourteen (14) days after plaintiffs’ filing. If a Second 

Amended Complaint is not filed, defendants shall file an answer within thirty-five (35) days of 

this Order.

This Order terminates Docket Number 11.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

August 15, 2019

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