Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-00582/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-00582-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1

 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

2

 Although Petitioner includes Claims 14 and 30 on the first page of his motion for

discovery and evidentiary hearing, he does not address the claims therein. (Dkt. 113 at 1.)

Accordingly, the Court summarily denies evidentiary development of these claims.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eugene Allen Doerr, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 02-0582-PHX-PGR

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Petitioner Eugene Allen Doerr (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner sentenced to death.

Pending before the Court are Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing and

Petitioner’s First Motion to Expand the Record Under Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases. (Dkts. 113, 115.)1

 Petitioner requests evidentiary development with regard to

Claims 1, 6, 8, 10, 13, 28, 29 and 32-35.2

 Respondents filed responses, and Petitioner filed

replies. (Dkts. 123-124, 127-128.)

Pursuant to the Court’s general procedures governing resolution of capital habeas

proceedings, the parties have completed briefing of both the procedural status and the merits

of Petitioner’s claims. Therefore, the Court will first determine whether the claims for which

Petitioner seeks evidentiary development are appropriate for review on the merits by a

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3

 “ROA” refers to a three-volume record on direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme

Court (No. CR 94-08531/CR-96-679-AP). “Instr.” refers to one volume of Photostated

Instruments of the Record on Appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court (CR94-08531). “ME”

refers to one volume of Photostated Minute Entries of the Record on Appeal (CR94-8531).

“ROA doc.” refers to documents in the one-volume record of Petitioner’s supplemental

appeal (CR96-679). “PCR” refers to the one-volume record of Petitioner’s PCR proceedings

(CR 94-08531). “PR doc.” refers to documents in the record on appeal from denial of PCR

relief (CR 01-308-PC). “RT” refers to reporter’s transcript. The original reporter’s

transcripts and certified copies of the trial and post-conviction records were provided to this

Court by the Arizona Supreme Court on June 28, 2005. (Dkt. 131.) 

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federal habeas court, and also will address the merits of claims as appropriate.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 15, 1996, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of the premeditated and felony

first degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault of Karen Bohl. (ROA 105-107.)3

Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Ronald Reinstein sentenced Petitioner to death for

the murder and to terms of imprisonment for the other counts. (ROA 147.) The Arizona

Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 969

P.2d 1168 (1998). Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief (“PCR”) with the trial

court (“PCR court”), which denied it without an evidentiary hearing. (PCR pet. filed

9/29/00; PCR ord. filed 6/29/01.) In March 2002, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily

denied a petition for review from the denial of post-conviction relief. (PR doc. 12.)

Petitioner thereafter commenced this action for a writ of habeas corpus. (Dkt. 1.)

PRINCIPLES OF EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“AEDPA”). Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003). The AEDPA

requires that a writ of habeas corpus not be granted unless it appears that the petitioner has

properly exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). To

properly exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims to the state’s

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4

 Resolving whether a petitioner has fairly presented his claim to the state court, thus

permitting federal review, is an intrinsically federal issue which must be determined by the

federal court. Wyldes v. Hundley, 69 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1995); Harris v. Champion, 15

F.3d 1538, 1556 (10th Cir. 1994).

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highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

848 (1999).

 A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78

(1971).4

 If a petitioner’s habeas claim includes new factual allegations not presented to the

state court, the claim may be considered unexhausted if the new facts “fundamentally alter”

the legal claim presented and considered in state court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,

260 (1986).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman,

501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if the

petitioner failed to present the claim in any forum and “the court to which the petitioner

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would

now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1. This is often referred to as

“technical” exhaustion – although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the

petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152,

161-62 (1996) (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets

the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’

to him.”). 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs when petitioners may

seek relief in post-conviction proceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to their

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convictions or sentences in state court. Rule 32.2 provides, in part:

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this

rule based upon any ground: . . . .

(2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous

collateral proceeding;

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding.

b. Exceptions. Rule 32.2(a) shall not apply to claims for relief based

on Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). When a claim under [these sub-sections]

is raised in a successive or untimely petition, the petition must set forth the

reasons for not raising the claim in the previous petition or in a timely manner.

If meritorious reasons do not appear substantiating the claim and indicating

why the claim was not stated in the previous petition or in a timely manner, the

petition shall be summarily dismissed. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (2002) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 32.2, petitioners

may not be granted relief on any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32

petition for post-conviction relief. Similarly, pursuant to Rule 32.4, petitioners must seek

relief in a timely manner. Only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d)

through (h) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a

prior petition or was not presented in a timely manner will the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2

be avoided. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) (3), 32.4(a).

Therefore, in the present case, if there are claims which have not been raised

previously in state court, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has state remedies

currently available to him pursuant to Rule 32. If no remedies are currently available,

petitioner’s claims are “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501

U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. In addition, if there are claims that were fairly presented in state court

but found defaulted on state procedural grounds, such claims also will be found procedurally

defaulted in federal court so long as the state procedural bar was independent of federal law

and adequate to warrant preclusion of federal review. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262

(1989). A state procedural default is not independent if, for example, it depends upon an

antecedent federal constitutional ruling. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per

curiam). A state bar is not adequate unless it was firmly established and regularly applied

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at the time of application by the state court. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not review the merits of

procedurally defaulted claims unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure

to properly exhaust in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or

shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on

the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. Petitioner does not argue that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice excuses any default found as to the claims at issue herein.

(Dkt. 105 at 22-34.) 

Ordinarily “cause” to excuse a default exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that “some

objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s

procedural rule.” Id.. at 753. Objective factors which constitute cause include interference

by officials which makes compliance with the state’s procedural rule impracticable, a

showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel,

and constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional error. Magby

v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice resulting from a

procedural default, a habeas petitioner bears the burden of showing not merely that the errors

at his trial constituted a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimension.

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).

PROCEDURAL STATUS OF CLAIMS

The Court reviews the procedural status of the claims for which evidentiary

development is sought: Claims 1, 6, 8, 10, 13, 28, 29 and 32-35. Respondents concede that

Claims 6, 8 (in part), 10, 13 (in part), 28 (in part) and 32 are properly exhausted. (Dkt. 99

at 1.) Respondents contest exhaustion, and in one instance, ripeness, of the remaining claims.

With respect to the claims that Respondents argue are procedurally defaulted, Petitioner

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generally argues that he can establish cause for the default based on the ineffective assistance

of counsel (“IAC”) in PCR proceedings. (Dkt. 105 at 22-105.) The Court first addresses this

argument because it is relevant to numerous claims.

IAC can establish sufficient cause only when it rises to the level of an independent

constitutional violation. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755. Thus, before ineffectiveness may be

used to establish cause for a procedural default, it must have been presented to the state court

as an independent claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-53 (2000)

(“ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of

another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted”); Murray, 477 U.S. at 489-90 (“the

exhaustion doctrine . . . generally requires that a claim of ineffective assistance be presented

to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a

procedural default.”); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (exhaustion

requires petitioner to first raise ineffective appellate counsel claim separately in state court

before alleging it as cause for default). However, when a petitioner has no constitutional

right to counsel, there can be no constitutional violation arising out counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. There is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of

counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555

(1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1989) (the Constitution does not require

states to provide counsel in PCR proceedings even when the putative petitioners are facing

the death penalty); Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that IAC

in PCR proceeding cannot constitute cause); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429-30 (9th

Cir. 1993) (refusing to extend the right of effective assistance of counsel to state collateral

proceedings); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The fact that the PCR proceeding was Petitioner’s first and only opportunity to assert

claims of IAC at trial and on appeal does not change the analysis. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469

U.S. 387, 396 (1985), the Court held that a petitioner is entitled to effective assistance of

counsel on a first appeal as of right. However, since Evitts was decided, the courts have

clarified that the holding in Evitts applies strictly to a first appeal as of right, even if

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particular types of claims could not have been raised in that appeal, because there is no

constitutional right to counsel in state PCR proceedings. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 558; Moran

v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1996); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1159

(9th Cir. 1996) (IAC claim defaulted for not being raised in first habeas petition, even though

the same counsel represented petitioner in both proceedings, because no right to counsel in

habeas proceedings); Jeffers v. Lewis, 68 F.3d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (plurality)

(ruling an Arizona petitioner had “no Sixth Amendment right to counsel during his state

habeas proceedings even if that was the first forum in which he could challenge

constitutional effectiveness on the part of trial counsel”); see also Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396 n.7

(noting that discretionary appeals are treated differently because there is no right to counsel).

Petitioner’s argument fails because there is no constitutional right to counsel for PCR

proceedings even if it is an Arizona petitioner’s first opportunity to raise an IAC claim. 

The Court is also unpersuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Arizona court rules

render the PCR proceeding part of a mandatory bifurcated appellate process for capital cases

with a statutory right to counsel and, therefore, due process requires such counsel to be

effective. Petitioner cites no case, and the Court has found none, which holds that a state is

required by the federal constitution to provide counsel in PCR proceedings. The fact that a

state may, “as a matter of legislative choice,” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618 (1974),

provide for counsel in discretionary appeals following a first appeal of right does not extend

the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective counsel to discretionary appeals. See Evitts,

469 U.S. at 394, 397 n.7; Finley, 481 U.S. at 559 (where a state provides a lawyer in a state

post-conviction proceeding, it is not “the Federal Constitution [that] dictates the exact form

such assistance must assume,” rather, it is in a state’s discretion to determine what

protections to provide). Further, the Ninth Circuit has held explicitly that “ineffective

assistance of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings does not present an independent violation

of the Sixth Amendment enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bonin, 77 F.3d at 1160. Because Petitioner’s PCR proceeding

took place after his appeal of right, it was a discretionary proceeding that did not confer a

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constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Thus, even assuming PCR

counsel’s performance did not conform to minimum standards, it did not violate the federal

constitution and cannot excuse the procedural default of any claims. 

Further, even if cognizable, ineffective assistance of PCR counsel cannot constitute

cause to excuse a procedural default when it has never been presented as an independent

claim in state court. See Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451-53; Murray, 477 U.S. at 489-90; Tacho,

862 F.2d at 1381. Petitioner did not present any independent claim of ineffectiveness

regarding PCR counsel in state court. Thus, the alleged ineffectiveness of PCR counsel

cannot constitute cause to excuse any procedural default found by the Court and such

assertions are not further considered herein.

Claim 1

Claim 1 alleges the trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by admitting testimony from Phoenix Police Detective Charles Gregory

that he believed Petitioner untruthfully claimed to have no memory of the events the night

of the murder. (Dkt. 82 at 42-47.) Respondents contend these allegations were not presented

to the state court as violations of federal law but only as violations of state evidentiary rules.

(Dkt. 99 at 22.) 

Petitioner presented this claim on direct appeal, alleging a violation of his federal due

process and impartial jury rights. (Opening Br. at 9.) Therefore, the Court finds this claim

exhausted to the extent Petitioner alleges violation of the due process and impartial jury

provisions of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. However, the Fifth and Eighth

Amendment aspects of this claim are not cognizable. It is the Fourteenth Amendment, not

the Fifth Amendment that protects a person against deprivations of due process by a state.

See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law”); Castillo v. Mc Fadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving persons

of due process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without

due process by the several states.”). In addition, the right to be free from cruel and unusual

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punishment, by definition, is a protection related to the imposition or carrying out of a

sentence. In other words, the protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment does not attach

until a person is convicted and subject to punishment by the state. See Ingraham v. Wright,

430 U.S. 651, 664, 667, 671 n.40 (1977): Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979).

Because Claim 1 is a conviction-related claim, the Eighth Amendment does not provide a

cognizable ground for relief. The Fifth and Eighth Amendment aspects of Claim 1 will be

dismissed.

Claim 8

Claim 8 alleges the sentencing court violated Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by improperly refusing to accord mitigating weight to

proffered evidence that he cooperated with the police. (Dkt. 82 at 89-92.) At sentencing,

Petitioner argued that his “cooperation with law enforcement and calling ‘911’ to turn

himself in” was a non-statutory mitigating factor. (ROA 143.) The trial court found that

Petitioner’s cooperation was motivated by self-interest and that he had not proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that his cooperation warranted mitigating weight, which the

Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. (RT 11/27/96 at 13; dkt. 99, ex. A at ¶¶ 66-67.) 

Regardless of exhaustion, the Court will dismiss this claim because it is plainly

meritless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (allowing denial of unexhausted claims on the merits);

Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1535 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal

court to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under (b)(2)

as “plainly meritless.”). The Constitution requires only that the sentencing court hear and

consider all evidence proffered as mitigation; it does not require the sentencer to accord any

particular weight to such evidence. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149

F.3d 928, 943 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no constitutional violation where sentencing court

considered evidence but found it inadequate to justify leniency; “a sentencer is free to assess

how much weight to assign to such evidence”); Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (1998)

(finding it within trial court’s discretion to consider but reject particular evidence as

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mitigating). The trial court stated on the record that it considered Petitioner’s cooperation

but found it was motivated by self-interest and, therefore, did not warrant mitigating weight.

(RT 11/27/96 at 13.) The court’s consideration of the evidence proffered in mitigation

satisfied its constitutional duties. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05. Accordingly, Claim 8

will be denied on the merits.

Claim 13

Claim 13 alleges that Petitioner’s right to a fair trial was violated by the trial court’s

rejection of brain damage as non-statutory mitigation. (Dkt. 82 at 111.) Specifically,

Petitioner faults the trial court for rejecting defense expert testimony that he had brain

damage in favor of contrary findings by a prosecution expert. (Id. at 111-15.) At sentencing,

the court found that the defense experts’ opinions were speculative and that, even if brain

damage had been established, the damage was minimal and did not affect Petitioner’s ability

to appreciate either right from wrong or the wrongfulness of his conduct under A.R.S. § 13-

703(G)(2). (RT 11/27/96 at 10-11.)

Regardless of exhaustion, the Court will dismiss this claim because it is plainly

meritless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Rhines, 125 S. Ct. at 1535. There is no federal

constitutional requirement that a sentencer find proffered evidence mitigating or assign any

particular weight to it in the sentencing calculus. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15. Here,

Petitioner is not asserting that the state courts failed to consider proffered mitigating evidence

at sentencing. Rather, the core of his complaint is that the sentencing court did not find

proffered evidence mitigating. Such a claim does not provide a basis for federal habeas

corpus relief. Id. The record demonstrates that the trial court considered Petitioner’s

proffered evidence of brain damage but found it speculative and not mitigating. This

consideration complied with the court’s federal constitutional duties. Accordingly, Claim

13 will be denied on the merits.

Claim 28

Claim 28 alleges that Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights to the effective assistance of counsel were violated by trial counsel’s failure to:

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(a) present a reasonable defense at trial, and (b) adequately investigate mental impairments

and to present evidence of the same at trial and sentencing. (Dkt. 82 at 161-90; 105 at 116.)

Trial

 The core of Petitioner’s IAC claim with respect to counsel’s representation at trial

is that counsel failed to adequately investigate evidence that he was an alcoholic subject to

blackouts, had been intoxicated at the time of the crime, had brain damage and was subject

to impulsive violence whether intoxicated or sober. Petitioner asserts that, had counsel fully

investigated these facts, he could have presented a defense based on impulsivity caused by

a brain seizure disorder. (Dkt. 82 at 170.) He further asserts that this evidence would have

raised a reasonable doubt about Petitioner’s “ability to form the requisite intent to justify a

first degree murder conviction.” (Id. at 172.) The parties dispute whether this claim was

properly exhausted; regardless, the Court will dismiss it because it is plainly meritless. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Rhines, 125 S. Ct. at 1535. 

The PCR court ruled that because Petitioner’s intoxication was voluntary, it could not

be relied on to rebut or negate evidence of premeditation. (PCR ord. filed 6/29/01 at 2-3.)

It further found that the evidence of a prolonged struggle established that Petitioner had the

opportunity to reflect on his actions and refuted the assertion that the victim was killed in the

heat of passion or sudden quarrel. (Id. at 3.) In addition, it found that Petitioner’s

“propounded psychological defense [was] based solely on speculation, conjecture, and

guesswork.” (Id. at 4.) The court continued by stating:

As the Supreme Court pointed out in the Opinion in this case as to the

mitigating factors, the defense overstated the testimony of its witnesses. Dr.

Walter admitted that he didn’t independently evaluate the defendant, and his

testimony was equivocal at best. All of the defense experts at sentencing

attempted to gloss over the results of the PETSCAN, which the defendant

ordered and which showed no evidence of brain damage. All of them relied

heavily on the defendant’s own self-serving statements. While the

psychological testimony was relevant as to the court’s determination in the

A.R.S. Section 13-703 hearing, one reason trial counsel probably did not seek

to utilize a “psychological defense” was that it wasn’t realistic, given the state

of the law on voluntary intoxication, temporary insanity, and premeditation,

as well as the crime scene evidence.

(Id.) Finally, the court found that even if counsel had performed deficiently, overwhelming

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evidence precluded a showing of prejudice. (Id.) A petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court was summarily denied. (PR doc. 12.)

To prevail on a claim of IAC, Petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 690 (1984). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that there is a “reasonable

probability” that, absent counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the trial would have been

different. Id. at 694.

It appears to the Court that Petitioner’s IAC claim confuses a “diminished capacity”

defense with a strategy of presenting character trait evidence to negate premeditation. Under

Arizona law, only the latter is permitted; the state has long rejected the affirmative defense

of diminished capacity. State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540-41, 931 P.2d 1046, 1050-51 (1997)

(citing State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 212-13, 403 P.2d 521, 529 (1965)). The practical

effect is that a defendant cannot, during trial, present evidence of mental disease or defect

to show that he was incapable of forming a requisite mental state for a charged offense.

Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540, 931 P.2d at 1050; Schantz, 98 Ariz. at 213, 403 P.2d at 529. In

addition, effective January 2, 1994, Arizona eliminated voluntary intoxication as an

affirmative defense:

Temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary ingestion, consumption,

inhalation or injection of alcohol, an illegal substance under chapter 34 of this

title or other psychoactive substances or the abuse of prescribed medications

does not constitute insanity and is not a defense for any criminal act or

requisite state of mind.

A.R.S. § 13-503. Therefore, evidence of intoxication is irrelevant to a jury’s determination

of knowledge or intent to commit an offense. 

Arizona law does permit a defendant to present evidence to show that he has a

character trait for acting reflexively, rather than reflectively, for the purpose of challenging

a finding of premeditation, i.e., to show that he did not actually reflect after forming the

requisite intent. See State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 628 P.2d 583-84 (1981);

Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1986); see also State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557,

565, 74 P.3d 231, 239 (2003) (citing cases); State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 427-28, 65

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P.3d 420, 478-79 (2003) (premeditation means that the defendant intended to kill or knew

that he would kill and that, after forming intent or knowledge, he actually reflected on the

decision before killing, thus differentiating premeditated murder from second degree

murder); State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 539, 892 P.2d 1319, 1328 (1995) (same). In

Christensen, the defendant sought, pursuant to Rule 404(a)(1) of the Arizona Rules of

Evidence, admission of expert testimony regarding his tendency to act without reflection.

The Arizona Supreme Court held it was error to exclude such testimony because

“establishment of [this character trait] tends to establish that appellant acted impulsively.

From such a fact, the jury could have concluded that he did not premeditate the homicide.”

Id. at 35, 628 P.2d at 583. The holding was limited, however, in that the expert could not

testify to whether the defendant was acting impulsively at the time of the offense. Id. at 35-

36, 628 P.2d at 583-84.

It is clear from a review of Arizona law that evidence of impulsivity as permitted in

Christensen may not be presented for the purpose of negating a mental state (which would,

in essence, constitute a prohibited diminished capacity defense). Rather, impulsivity is

relevant only to the question of whether a defendant, after forming the necessary knowledge

or intent to commit murder, reflected on the decision to kill and thereby acted with

premeditation. In this case, Petitioner was charged and convicted on separate counts of both

premeditated murder and felony murder, both of which constitute capital-eligible first degree

murder under Arizona law. The jury’s verdict on each count was unanimous. (ROA 105.)

The Court concludes that, regardless of whether counsel performed deficiently with

respect to presenting evidence to negate premeditation, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice.

None of the proffered evidence of Petitioner’s alleged intoxication, blackouts and/or brain

disorder would have been admissible at trial to negate the requisite mental state for felony

murder or its predicate felonies because Arizona does not allow either a diminished capacity

or an intoxication defense. In other words, even had counsel conducted the investigation

now urged, there is no reasonable likelihood that no juror would have convicted Petitioner

of felony murder or its underlying predicates because evidence of impulsivity is irrelevant

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5

 First, Petitioner does not assert that any of the preclusion exceptions enumerated in

Rule 32.2(b)(2) apply, see Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002)

(finding no state court remedies and noting that petitioner did not raise any exceptions to

Rule 32.2(a)), and the Court finds none applicable, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2); 32.1(d)-

(h). Second, Petitioner does not argue that Claim 28 is the type of claim that cannot be

waived absent a personal knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. Cf. Cassett v. Stewart,

406 F.3d 614, 622-23 (9th Cir. 2005) (addressing waiver because raised by petitioner). The

Court finds that Claim 28 does not fall within the limited framework of claims requiring a

knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) cmt. (West

2004) (noting that most claims of trial error do not require a personal waiver); Stewart v.

Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (identifying the right to counsel, right

to a jury trial and right to a 12-person jury under the Arizona Constitution as the type of

claims that require personal waiver); see also State v. Espinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 505, 29 P.3d

278, 280 (Ct. App. 2001) (withdrawal of plea offer in violation of due process not a claim

requiring personal waiver); but cf. Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622-23 (finding claim not defaulted

because unclear whether personal waiver would be required under state law). 

As an additional matter, if different IAC allegations are raised in a first PCR petition

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to those counts. A felony murder finding is sufficient alone to sustain a conviction for first

degree murder, independent of a finding that the murder was premeditated. See State v.

Tucker, 205 Ariz. 157, 167, 68 P.3d 110, 120 (2003) (first degree murder conviction may be

based on either premeditated or felony murder); State v. Smith, 160 Ariz. 507, 513, 774 P.2d

811, 817 (1989) (defendant not entitled to new trial where jury convicted of felony murder

but acquitted of premeditated murder as inconsistent verdicts); cf. State v. Lopez, 158 Ariz.

258, 265-66, 762 P.2d 545, 552-53 (1988) (remand required where jury verdict did not

indicate whether conviction for felony and/or premeditated murder and insufficient evidence

supported predicate felony for felony murder). For these reasons, the Court denies Claim 28,

as to IAC at trial, on the merits.

Sentencing

Petitioner alleges IAC based on trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate and

prepare for the sentencing hearing. (Dkt. 82 at 172, 175-78, 180, 181-84, 188.) However,

Petitioner did not present this issue to the state courts, either on appeal or in his PCR petition.

He is now precluded by Rules 32.2 and 32.4 from obtaining relief in state court, and no

exception to preclusion appears applicable.5

 Therefore, the sentencing portion of this claim

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and a successive petition, the claim(s) in the later petition will be found precluded without

a review of the constitutional magnitude of the claim. See Smith, 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d

at 1071. Petitioner raised other IAC allegations in his first PCR petition; therefore,

successive claims of IAC are necessarily precluded.

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is procedurally barred absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage

of justice. Petitioner only alleges IAC of PCR counsel as cause. As discussed above, IAC

of PCR counsel does not constitute cause to excuse a procedural default. Petitioner does not

assert that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the claim is not heard on the

merits. Accordingly, the Court finds Claim 28, as to IAC at sentencing, procedurally barred.

Claim 29

Claim 29 alleges that police failure to preserve biological evidence by promptly

seeking to obtain a breath, blood or urine sample from Petitioner violated his Sixth, Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Petitioner presented this claim in his PCR petition.

However, in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner simply listed

the claim under the heading, “Issues Raised in PCR and Summarily Denied by the Trial

Court.” (PR doc. 12 at 4.) He did not include the claim in the subsequent, primary section

of the brief, “Issues Presented to this Court for Review and the Facts Material to a

Consideration of Same.” (Id. at 4-24.) The Court therefore finds that Petitioner failed to

fairly present Claim 29 to the State’s highest court as he was required to do. See Baldwin

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). He is now precluded by Rules 32.2 and 32.4 from

obtaining relief in state court, and no exception to preclusion appears applicable. See supra

note 6. Therefore, the claim is procedurally barred absent a showing of cause and prejudice

or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Even if the claim had been fairly presented to the Arizona Supreme Court, it was

dismissed on independent and adequate state grounds by the PCR court. Specifically, the

court ruled:

To the extent that any of the defendant’s claims raise anything but

ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, relief is precluded pursuant

to Rule 32.2 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and A.R.S. Section

14-4232, as those claims either were raised or could have been raised in the

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defendant’s appeal. None of the defendant’s claims constitute exceptions to

the preclusion rule or statute.

The defendant’s claims as to the insufficiency of evidence for the

kidnapping conviction, whether sexual assault and/or kidnapping can be a

predicate felony for a charge of felony murder, and the claims as to the alleged

failure of the state to timely collect biological evidence from the defendant are

all precluded, since they could have been raised on appeal, except as any of

the claims relate to the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

(PCR ord. filed 6/29/01 at 1-2; emphasis added.) Despite Petitioner’s assertion to the

contrary (dkt. 105 at 127), the PCR court clearly delineated the basis for its preclusion ruling.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Claim 29 is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner does

not assert cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default.

Therefore, Claim 29 will be dismissed as procedurally barred.

Claim 33

Petitioner alleges that execution by the State after more than six years on death row

fails to serve any legitimate penological purpose and violates his Eighth Amendment right

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Dkt. 82 at 222.) Petitioner concedes he did

not present this claim to the state courts. (Id.)

Regardless of whether Petitioner properly exhausted this claim, the Court will deny

it as meritless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Petitioner acknowledges the Supreme Court has

not decided whether lengthy incarceration prior to execution can constitute cruel and unusual

punishment. (Dkt. 82 at 223, 230-32, citing Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.)

(Stevens, J. & Breyer, J., discussing denial of certiorari and noting the claim has not been

addressed)). In contrast, circuit courts including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals hold

prolonged incarceration under a sentence of death does not offend the Eighth Amendment.

See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493, 1493-94 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc); White v. Johnson,

79 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1996) (delay of 17 years); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028

(10th Cir. 1995) (delay of 15 years). Therefore, habeas relief on Claim 33 will be denied.

Claim 34

Petitioner alleges he will not be competent to be executed. (Dkt. 82 at 244.) Both

Petitioner and Respondents acknowledge this allegation is not ripe and is premature for

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federal review. (Id.; dkt. 99 at 133.) Pursuant to Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d

628, 634 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523 U.S. 637 (1998), a claim of incompetency for execution

“must be raised in a first habeas petition, whereupon it also must be dismissed as premature

due to the automatic stay that issues when a first petition is filed.” If again presented to the

district court once the claim becomes ripe for review, it shall not be treated as a second or

successive petition. See id. at 643-44. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Claim 34 without

prejudice as premature.

Claim 35

Petitioner alleges his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments will

be violated because he will not receive a fair clemency proceeding. In particular, he alleges

the proceeding will not be fair and impartial based on the Board’s selection process,

composition, training and procedures, and because the Attorney General acts as the

Clemency Board’s legal advisor as well as an advocate against the petitioner. Petitioner

concedes he did not fairly present this claim to the state courts. (Dkt. 82 at 247.) More

significantly, however, this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Habeas relief

can only be granted on claims that a prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner’s challenges to state

clemency procedures and/or proceedings do not represent an attack on his detention – his

conviction or sentence – and thus do not constitute proper grounds for relief. See Franzen

v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); see also Woratzeck v. Stewart,

118 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (clemency claims are not cognizable under

federal habeas law). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Claim 35 as not cognizable in a

federal habeas petition.

Summary of Procedural Status Findings

The Court concludes that Claims 8, 13, 28 (in part) and 33 are meritless, that Claims

28 (in part) and 29 are procedurally barred, and that Claims 1 (in part) and 35 fail to state

cognizable grounds for habeas relief. These claims or portions of claims will be dismissed

with prejudice. Claim 34 is premature and will be dismissed without prejudice.

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Accordingly, Petitioner’s motions for evidentiary development as to Claims 1 (in part), 8, 13,

28, 29 and 33-35 will be summarily denied.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING, 

EXPANSION OF THE RECORD AND DISCOVERY

Evidentiary Hearing

The decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing when there are material facts in

dispute is generally at the discretion of the district court judge. See Townsend v. Sain, 372

U.S. 293, 312, 318 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992),

and limited by § 2254(e)(2); Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999); Rule

8, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (providing that the district court

judge shall determine if an evidentiary hearing is required). However, a judge’s discretion

is significantly circumscribed by § 2254(e)(2) of the AEDPA. See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 420 (2000). 

Section 2254 provides that:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

 through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). 

As interpreted by the Supreme Court, subsection (e)(2) precludes an evidentiary

hearing in federal court only if the failure to develop a claim’s factual basis is due to a “lack

of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 432. “The purpose of the fault component of ‘failed’ is to ensure the

prisoner undertakes his own diligent search for evidence.” Id. at 435. The Court found that

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this rule served AEDPA’s goal of furthering comity in that “federal courts sitting in habeas

are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient

effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Id.; see also Cardwell v. Netherland, 971 F. Supp.

997, 1008 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a § 2254 petition is limited to the factual record

developed in state court proceedings”), aff’d Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir.

1998), overruled on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000). In

correlation, subsection (e)(2) allows factual development when a petitioner diligently

attempts to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court and is “thwarted, for example,

by the conduct of another or by happenstance was denied the opportunity to do so.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 432; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078-79.

In compliance with § 2254(e)(2), when the factual basis for a particular claim has not

been fully developed in state court, the first question for a district court in evaluating whether

to grant an evidentiary hearing on the claim is whether the petitioner was diligent in

attempting to develop its factual basis. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Cardwell v.

Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236

F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court set an objective standard for determining

“diligence” – whether a petitioner “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information

available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

435. For example, when there is information in the record that would alert a reasonable

attorney to the existence and importance of certain evidence, the attorney “fails” to develop

the factual record if he does not make reasonable efforts to sufficiently investigate and

present the evidence to the state court. See id. at 438-40 (counsel lacked diligence because

he was on notice of possibly material evidence and conducted only a cursory investigation);

Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2002) (lack of diligence because petitioner

knew of and raised claims of judicial bias and jury irregularities in state court, but failed to

investigate all the factual grounds for such claims). 

Absent unusual circumstances, diligence requires “that the prisoner, at a minimum,

seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Williams,

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529 U.S. at 437; see Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on

denial of reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“inactions show insufficient diligence” on

ineffective counsel claim because petitioner did not request an evidentiary hearing, and

brought claim only on appeal not in a collateral proceeding). What is more, the mere request

for an evidentiary hearing may not be sufficient to establish diligence if a reasonable person

would have taken additional steps. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir.

2000) (petitioner requested hearing but found not diligent because he failed to present

affidavits of family members that were easily obtained without court order and with minimal

expense); see also Koste v. Dormire, 345 F.3d 974, 985-86 (8th Cir. 2003) (lack of diligence

despite hearing request because petitioner made no effort to develop the record or assert any

facts to support claim that his counsel was ineffective for knowing of and failing to

investigate his psychiatric condition), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2070 (2004). If an evidentiary

hearing is requested, a petitioner’s inability to persuade a state court to conduct such a

hearing does not in itself demonstrate lack of diligence. See Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 338.

In sum, if this Court determines that a petitioner has not been diligent in establishing

the factual basis for his claims in state court, then the Court may not conduct a hearing unless

the petitioner satisfies one of § 2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions. If, however, the petitioner

has not failed to develop the factual basis of his claim in state court, the Court will then

proceed to consider whether a hearing is appropriate or required under the criteria set forth

by the Supreme Court in Townsend. 372 U.S. 293; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 (quoting

Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 337).

Expansion of the Record

Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases authorizes a federal habeas court

to expand the record to include additional material relevant to the determination of the merits

of a petitioner’s claims. Rule 7 provides:

The materials that may be required include letters predating the filing of the

petition, documents, exhibits, and answers under oath, to written

interrogatories propounded by the judge. Affidavits may also be submitted

and considered as part of the record.

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Rule 7(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The purpose of Rule 7 “is

to enable the judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings,

without the time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing.” Advisory Committee

Notes, Rule 7, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 81-82

(1977).

Section 2254(e)(2), as amended by the AEDPA, limits a petitioner’s ability to present

new evidence through a Rule 7 motion to expand the record in the same manner as it does

with regard to evidentiary hearings. See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the conditions of § 2254(e)(2) generally apply to petitioners

seeking relief based on new evidence, even when they do not seek an evidentiary hearing)

(citing Holland v. Jackson, 124 S. Ct. 2736, 2737 (2004) (per curiam)). Thus, when a

petitioner seeks to introduce, through a Rule 7 motion, new affidavits and other documents

never presented in state court for the purpose of establishing the factual predicate of a claim,

he must show both diligence in developing the factual basis in state court and relevancy of

the evidence to his claim. If diligence is not shown, the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) must

be satisfied before the Court can consider expansion of the record. To find otherwise would

allow circumvention of the AEDPA’s restriction against federal habeas courts holding

evidentiary hearings in cases where the petitioner is at fault for failing to develop the facts

in state court.

When a petitioner seeks to expand the record for reasons other than to introduce

evidence to bolster the merits of his claim, the strictures of § 2254(e)(2) may not apply. See

Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding it nonsensical to apply §

2254(e)(2) when expansion of the record is used for reasons other than to introduce new

factual information on the merits of a claim). For example, expansion of the record may be

appropriate to cure omissions in the state court record, see Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357, 359

(1993) (per curiam) (reversing for failure to supplement the record with a late-discovered

transcript); see also Rule 5, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (directing

answering party to submit portions of record it deems relevant), or to establish diligence

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pursuant to § 2254(e)(2). See Boyko, 259 F.3d at 792. 

Discovery

Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”) provides that

“[a] judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and may limit the extent of discovery.” Rule 6(a), 28 U.S.C. foll.

§ 2254 (emphasis added). Thus, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, a habeas

petitioner is not entitled to discovery “as a matter of ordinary course,” Bracy v. Gramley,

520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997); see also Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999),

and a habeas court should not allow a habeas petitioner “to use federal discovery for fishing

expeditions to investigate mere speculation.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court for the

Northern Dist. of Cal. (Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Aubut v. State

of Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970) (“[h]abeas corpus is not a general form of relief

for those who seek to explore their case in search of its existence”). Pursuant to Bracy,

whether a petitioner has established “good cause” for discovery requires a habeas court to

determine the essential elements of the petitioner’s substantive claim and evaluate whether

“specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the

facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Id. at

908-09 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)).

MOTIONS DISCUSSION

The Court now assesses whether expansion of the record, discovery and/or an

evidentiary hearing should be granted with respect to the exhausted claims for which

evidentiary development is sought: Claims 1 (in part), 6, 10 and 32. 

Claim 1

Claim 1 alleges that the trial court violated Petitioner’s due process and impartial jury

trial rights by admitting testimony from Detective Gregory that he believed Petitioner

untruthfully claimed to have no memory of the events the night of the murder. Petitioner

seeks discovery in support of this claim; specifically, to depose Detective Gregory regarding

“what qualifications he possesses to be an arbiter of truth: what training or education or

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special skills that enable him to opine” on Petitioner’s truthfulness. (Dkt. 113 at 16.)

Petitioner utterly fails to explain how the requested discovery could be relevant to whether

the trial court erred in failing to sustain the defense objection to this testimony. Petitioner

fails to demonstrate good cause and the motion will be denied. 

Claim 6

Claim 6 alleges that Petitioner’s right to confront witnesses and due process pursuant

to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was violated by the sentencing court’s denial of

discovery with which to impeach a State expert, neuropsychologist Dr. James Youngjohn.

Defense counsel learned that several complaints had been lodged against Dr. Youngjohn with

the Arizona State Board of Psychologist Examiners regarding his professional competence,

including complaints by defense experts, Drs. Walter and Blackwood, as well as other

complaints concerning Dr. Youngjohn’s findings of malingering by subjects. After

reviewing the complaints filed against Dr. Youngjohn in camera, the sentencing court denied

as irrelevant defense counsel’s request for access to those complaints for purposes of

impeachment. 

Petitioner seeks to expand the record with new expert opinions regarding the validity

of Dr. Youngjohn’s testing and evaluation of Petitioner. He also seeks permission to depose

Dr. Youngjohn, his graduate assistant, and Drs. Walter and Blackwood, and seeks discovery

of all documentation relating to Dr. Youngjohn’s evaluation of Petitioner. None of the

requested discovery or new expert opinions are relevant to the instant claim. In reviewing

whether the sentencing court’s denial of Petitioner’s discovery request violated Petitioner’s

constitutional rights, this Court must necessarily consider only that information that was

before the state court when it ruled. Therefore, the requests to expand the record and for

discovery of material irrelevant to resolution of the claim will be denied.

Petitioner does not explicitly indicate whether he has copies of the complaints

reviewed in camera by the sentencing court and does not actually move for expansion of the

record to include these complaints. However, in addition to the trial transcript, these

complaints are a relevant part of the state court record because they were reviewed by the

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trial court and considered as a basis for denying Petitioner’s motion for discovery. To ensure

that both Petitioner and this Court have all parts of the record relevant to Claim 6, the Court

will direct Respondents, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, to

provide, under seal, copies of the complaints against Dr. Youngjohn that were reviewed by

the trial court.

Claim 10

Claim 10 alleges a violation of Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights

and his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment based on the

sentencing court’s failure to consider and give mitigating weight to his abusive family history

absent a causal connection or nexus to the crime. (Dkt. 82 at 95-99.) Petitioner seeks an

evidentiary hearing and to expand the record with new affidavits, not presented in state court,

that support a causal connection or nexus between his abusive childhood and the crime. 

Similar to Claim 6, none of the evidence Petitioner seeks to introduce and develop in

these proceedings is relevant to the instant claim. In reviewing whether the sentencing court

failed to consider proffered mitigation evidence, this Court must necessarily consider only

that information that was before the state court when it sentenced Petitioner. See Lockett,

438 U.S. at 604-05; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15. Therefore, the requests to expand the

record and for an evidentiary hearing will be denied.

Claim 32

Petitioner alleges that at the time of execution he will not die instantly and will feel

extreme pain as a result of the mixture of drugs used for lethal injection, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (Dkt. 82 at 205-22.)

Additionally, Petitioner contends that Arizona’s lethal injection procedures pose a severe risk

of error as well as unnecessary pain and prolonged suffering. (Id.)

Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing to present testimony regarding the drugs used

in Arizona’s lethal injection procedure and their effects. Respondents assert lack of diligence

as a barrier to holding a federal evidentiary hearing. Petitioner does not address this

argument in his reply. Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal, however, it does not

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appear he made any attempt to develop the factual basis for the claim during trial or

sentencing. In addition, he did not try to develop the claim in PCR proceedings. Because

Petitioner did not make a reasonable attempt to develop the factual basis of this claim in state

court and does not allege that he can satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(e)(2)(A)

& (B), the Court finds he was not diligent and an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Claim

32 is barred. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 435.

Petitioner also seeks discovery regarding Arizona’s lethal injection protocol and postmortem information of persons executed in Arizona. Petitioner has not established good

cause for the discovery he seeks. The information Petitioner seeks to discover goes far

beyond the scope of the claim raised in state court. Although the general claim as alleged

in the Amended Petition was exhausted, see Doerr, 193 Ariz. at 71, 969 P.2d at 118,

Petitioner did not fairly present in state court any of the specific allegations or operative facts

that he attempts to bolster with discovery. In addition, because Petitioner did not diligently

develop the factual basis of this claim in state court, no information discovered could be

considered by this Court. See Boyko, 259 F.3d at 792 (finding that discovery should not be

allowed to augment the merits of a petitioner’s claims unless he was diligent); Murphy v.

Bradshaw, No. C-1-03-053, 2003 WL 23777736, *2 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (“there cannot be

good cause to discover facts which could not be presented because a petition is barred from

an evidentiary hearing on those facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)”); Charles v. Baldwin,

No. CV-97-380-ST, 1999 WL 694716, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 1999) (no good cause for

discovery to locate evidence in support of the merits of a claim unless petitioner first satisfies

§ 2254(e)(2)). Petitioner’s request for discovery will be denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the following Claims are DISMISSEDWITH PREJUDICE:

(a) Claims 1 (in part) and 35 for failure to state cognizable grounds for habeas relief;

(b) Claims 28 (in part) and 29 based on a procedural bar; and (c) Claims 8, 13, 28 (in part)

and 33 on the merits as a matter of law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim 34 is DISMISSED WITHOUT

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PREJUDICE as premature.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Record Expansion (dkt.

115) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery and an

Evidentiary Hearing (dkt. 113) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fifteen (15) days of this Order,

Respondents shall file under seal copies of the professional complaints lodged against Dr.

James Youngjohn, which were reviewed by the trial court. Respondents shall also provide

copies to Petitioner’s counsel, who shall, absent further Order of the Court, maintain

confidentiality of the documents.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, pursuant to LRCiv. 7.2(g), Petitioner or

Respondents file a Motion for Reconsideration of this Order, such motion shall be filed

within fifteen (15) days of the filing of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a courtesy copy of

this Order to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ

85007-3329. 

DATED this 26th day of September, 2005.

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