Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00183/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00183-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD J. BENFORD,

Plaintiff, CV F 05 0183 LJO WMW P

vs. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

SGT. ALFARO, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

This action proceeds on the May 16, 2005, second amended complaint. Plaintiff,

an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections at Avenal State Prison,

brings this civil rights action against defendant correctional officials employed by the

Department of Corrections at Avenal State Prison. Plaintiff names the following individual

defendants: Kathy Mendoza-Powers, Warden; Associate Warden Sodly; L. Lopez; J. P. Melero;

Sergeant Alfaro. 

To warrant relief under the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege and show that

defendant’s acts or omissions caused the deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights. 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). In order to state a claim under § 1983, a

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plaintiff must allege that: (1) a person was acting under color of state law at the time the

complained of act was committed; and (2) that person’s conduct deprived plaintiff of rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Paratt

v.Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). 

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required

to do that causes the deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff sets forth generalized claims regarding the conditions of his confinement. 

Plaintiff alleges generally that Warden Powers has allowed prison officials to abuse their

authority. Plaintiff alleges that defendant has allowed racial discrimination to occur, job

discrimination, mail tampering, and “outright destruction of the U.S. Mail Process.” Plaintiff

alleges that the prison has operated without a mailroom for twenty years.

As to the mail, Plaintiff alleges that money orders and property have been stolen

from inmates. Plaintiff alleges that property has been taken and destroyed by officers. Plaintiff

is advised that any claim regarding property, where the state provides a meaningful

postdeprivation remedy, only authorized, intentional deprivations constitute actionable violations

of the Due Process Clause. An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established

state procedures, regulations, or statutes. Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). In the

instant case, plaintiff has not alleged any facts which suggest that the deprivation of his personal

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property was “authorized” under the definition above. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding

the mail refer to the inmate population in general, and refer to correctional officers in general. In

order to state a claim under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts indicating that a named

defendant engaged in conduct that deprived Plaintiff of a protected interest. Plaintiff has not

done so here.

Plaintiff also sets forth generalized claims regarding his classification status. 

Plaintiff alleges that he has not had a hearing regarding a change in his custody status since

2002. Plaintiff alleges there is a conspiracy regarding his custody status, including “ a break

down in their system any officer can walk into records and the computer room and do what they

want.” Plaintiff alleges that there is “unfounded information” in prisoner filed. Plaintiff

specifically alleges that Defendant Alfaro’s “sole purpose was to find any information to link

Plaintiff to any wrong doing.” In general, prisoners have no liberty interest in their classification

status. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 457 (9th

Cir. 1996); Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9 Cir. 1987). Therefore, plaintiff’s

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classification allegations do not indicate that Plaintiff has been deprived of any constitutional

right. Plaintiff also alleges conduct regarding “prison politics.” Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Lopez told certain inmates that Plaintiff is a pedophile and a homosexual. 

Plaintiff alleges that this was done “to have Plaintiff hit or killed.” Plaintiff does not allege with

factual specificity what particularized harm he was subjected to. The Eighth Amendment

provides that “cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] inflicted.” “An Eighth Amendment

claim that a prison official has deprived inmates of humane conditions of confinement must meet

two requirements, one objective and the other subjective.” Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087

(9 Cir.) cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1065, (1995). th

The objective requirement is met if the prison official’s acts or omissions

deprived a prisoner of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. (quoting Farmer

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v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To satisfy the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show

more than mere inadvertence or negligence. Neither negligence nor gross negligence will

constitute deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833, & n. 4; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976). The Farmer court concluded that “subjective recklesness as used in the criminal

law is a familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause” and adopted this as the test for deliberate indifference under the Eighth

Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40. 

In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must allege with further

specificity what conduct Defendant Lopez engaged in, and how that conduct harmed Plaintiff. A

generalized fear of harm is insufficient to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff must allege facts

indicating that Defendant Lopez was deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to Plaintiff’s safety,

resulting in injury to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also seeks a transfer to another institution closer to his home, as he has

three years remaining on his sentence. Prisoners have no liberty interest in being housed at a

particular institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano,

427 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1976); United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 105 (9 Cir. 1991)(per

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curiam); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9 Cir. 1991)(per curiam); Coakley v. Murphy, th

884 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9 Cir. 1989). th

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff's complaint vague and conclusory. 

The court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy,

a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support

plaintiff's claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an

amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

first amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "First Amended Complaint." Failure to

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this

action be dismissed.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 16, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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