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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUL O 1° 1992 

ROBERT L, HOECI{E~ 

LINDEN ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v . 

SPRING CREEK INVESTORS, LTD., an 

Oklahoma Limited Partnership; CAN-CO 

PROPERTIES, INC . , an Oklahoma 

corporation; FENTON R. RAMEY, an 

individual; LINDA S. RAMEY, an 

individual; HAROLD E. DUNHAM, an 

individual; HARRIET J . DUNHAM, an 

individual; FIRST NATIONAL BANK, OF 

EDMOND; NEW-GENERAL PARTNER, INC., 

Defendants, 

and 

RAYMONDE . WRIGHT, an individual; 

CLARENCE R. WRIGHT, III, an individual, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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Clerk " 

) No. 91-6030 

) (D.C . No . CIV-88-1408-R) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and 

District Judge. CONWAY,** 

**Honorable John E. Conway, District Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 1 0th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-6030 Document: 010110259011 Date Filed: 07/01/1992 Page: 1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Clarence R. Wright, III (Wright), appeals the district 

court's judgment against him following a jury trial on liability 

claims arising from his guaranty of a defaulted note. 1 At trial, 

Wright defended on two theories: oral modification of the 

guaranty agreement and estoppel . The district court, applying 

Oklahoma law, determined that the elements of the estoppel defense 

were subsumed in the elements of the oral modification defense. 

The court refused to instruct the jury on Wright's oral 

modification theory, reasoning that such an instruction would 

provide Wright no additional benefit over the instruction on 

estoppel. Transcript, Appellant's App. at 66-68. The jury 

returned a verdict for Appellee Linden Asset Management Company. 2 

On appeal, Wright asserts error in the court's refusal to 

instruct on oral modification and in the court's instruction on 

estoppel. "When examining a challenge to jury instructions, we 

1 Raymond E. Wright joined Clarence R. Wright, III, in the 

notice of appeal but did not file a brief, apparently abandoning 

his appeal. 

2 The original suit on 

guaranty was brought by the 

following the insolvency of 

Company of Oklahoma City. 

following its purchase of the 

and guaranty agreement. 

the note, security agreement, and 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

the First National Bank & Trust 

Linden was substituted for the FDIC 

note, mortgage, security agreement 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-6030 Document: 010110259011 Date Filed: 07/01/1992 Page: 2
review the record as a whole to determine whether the instructions 

state the law which governs and provided the jury with an ample 

understanding of the issues and the standards applicable." Heqgy 

v. Heqgy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1542 (10th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted), 

cert. denied, 112 s. Ct. 1514 (1992); ~ Palmer v. Krueger, 897 

F.2d 1529, 1532 (10th Cir. 1990)(state law governs substance of 

jury instructions, federal law controls procedural determinations 

such as grant or denial of instructions). Exercising our 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

Wright first argues that the court's refusal to instruct on 

his defense of oral modification of the guaranty agreement was 

error because 1) he was entitled to an instruction on oral 

modification where the facts supported that theory, and 2) it was 

prejudicial in that it "left an inference in the jury's mind that 

the judge had eliminated [the oral modification defense]" after 

Wright had proceeded through trial on two defense theories. 

Appellant's Brief at 8 . 

Linden suggests that Wright's objection to the court's 

refusal to instruct on oral modification does not "affirmatively" 

appear in the record, therefore we should decline to reach this 

issue. Appellee's Brief at 9. We disagree. Although the word 

"object" does not appear in the record, the district court noted 

"some difference in opinion" about the proposed instructions. 

Transcript, Appellant's App. at 66. The court mentioned Wright's 

proposed instruction on oral modification and stated that such 

instruction might not be necessary. Wright then was allowed to 

argue 1) why an oral modification instruction was necessary and 2) 

3 

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why the failure to so instruct would be prejudicial. Finally, the 

court ruled that it would instruct only on estoppel. Id. at 

66-68. Given this showing in the record, we cannot credit 

Linden's argument that Wright's objection does not "affirmatively" 

appear in the record. See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(e); Comcoa, Inc. v. 

NEC Tels., Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir. 199l)(grounds for 

objection must be clear). We note also that Linden does not 

contend that Wright failed to object to the court's refusal to 

instruct on oral modification. 

Case law suggests that Wright was entitled to jury 

instructions on all legal theories applicable to the facts of his 

defense. See Justice v. Harrison, 569 P.2d 439, 441 (Okla. 1977) . 

But see Lee v. Cotten, 793 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Okla . Ct . App . 

1990)(court has duty to instruct on decisive issues) . 

Nonetheless, even were the judge's elimination of Wright's oral 

modification defense error, our review of the record convinces us 

that no prejudice arose from the judge's decision. "[A]n error in 

jury instructions will mandate reversal of a judgment only if the 

error is determined to have been prejudicial, based on a review of 

the record as a whole." Street v. Parham, 929 F.2d 537, 539-40 

(10th Cir. 199l)(citations omitted). 

Wright does not dispute the district court's determination 

that, under Oklahoma law, the elements of estoppel are subsumed 

within the elements of oral modification of a contract. The judge 

specified that his elimination of the oral modification defense 

would "not be mentioned by either side" in closing. Transcript, 

Appellant's App. at 68. Wright points to no evidence of jury 

4 

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misunderstanding or prejudice outside of an inference that the 

jury would gain a negative perception from the judge's failure to 

instruct on one of two defense theories. See Luck v. Baltimore & 

Ohio R.R., 510 F.2d 663, 668 (D . C. Cir. 1974)(mere speculation 

that jury reached verdict improperly not sufficient) . Finally, 

the jury found against Wright on his estoppel defense. In light 

of these considerations, if the district court erred in refusing 

to instruct on Wright's oral modification defense, it was 

harmless . 

Second, Wright argues that the court's estoppel instruction 

was insufficient in light of its refusal to instruct on oral 

modification . 

whether the 

He points out that evidence was admitted regarding 

bank received any benefit from the alleged 

modification because that evidence would have been relevant to an 

element of the oral modification defense. Appellant's Brief at 

9-11. In absence of an instruction on that defense, therefore, 

Wright contends that the court's instruction on estoppel should 

have included a provision telling the jury that a benefit to the 

bank was not required. 

Linden again asserts that, because Wright's objection to the 

court's proposed instruction on estoppel does not appear in the 

record, we should not review this contention of error. The record 

is void of any reference to an objection to this instruction. 

However, Wright states that he objected to the instruction in 

chambers, a portion of the proceeding not transcribed by the court 

reporter, as indicated in the transcript. Appellant's Brief at 

12; Transcript, Appellant's App. at 149-50. Linden again does not 

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assert that Wright did not object to the proposed estoppel 

instruction. 

Tenth Ci rcuit Rule 28.2{e) requires a party in Wright's 

position to "state where in the record a proper objection was made 

to the ruling and whether the objection is recorded and ruled 

upon . " Despite his allegations, Wright's failure to make any 

record of his objection to the court' s proposed estoppel 

instructi on precludes our review of this issue on the merits, 

absent plain error, which is not alleged. See Fox v. Ford Motor 

Co., 575 F.2d 774, 786 {10th Cir. 1978); Fed . R. Civ. P . 51; see 

also Dixon v . City of Lawton, Okla., 898 F . 2d 1443, 1447 (10th 

Cir. 1990)(better practice is to put instruction conferences on 

record where disagreement anticipated) . Were we to reach the 

merits, however, we see no error in the court's instruction on 

estoppel . 3 

3 As with his first assignment of error, Wright points to no 

evidence of prejudice outside of an inference that the jury might 

give weight to the evidence regarding benefit, see Luck, 510 F.2d 

at 668, nor has he contended that the estoppel instruction 

otherwise did not comport with the applicable law, see Brown v. 

Reames, 364 P . 2d 906, 909 (Okla. 196l)(not reversible error to 

refuse specific instruction when instruction given adequately and 

correctly stated applicable law). We presume that the jury 

followed the instructions given by the district court. United 

States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484, 1498 {10th Cir. 1989){citing 

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S . 200, 211 {1987)), cert. denied, 493 

U.S. 1059 (1990). 

6 

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The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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