Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00566/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00566-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JI SUN KIM,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-00566-BAS-WVG

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO 

STATE COURT

v.

JORGE CAMACHO; ANNA M. 

CAMACHO-TIZNADO, 

Defendants.

On March 22, 2017, Defendant Jorge Camacho, proceeding pro se, removed 

this unlawful detainer action from San Diego County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.)

Camacho argues that removal is proper based on federal question jurisdiction, 

presumably because he intends to assert a counterclaim under the Protecting Tenants 

at Foreclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5220. (Id.) Concurrent with his notice of removal, 

Camacho filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 

3.)

The Court finds that this case was improperly removed. Although a defendant 

may remove a civil action by filing a notice of removal with the relevant federal 

district court within 30 days after receiving the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441, 

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removal does not by its own force confer federal jurisdiction. Rather, with exceptions 

not applicable here, only cases that could originally have been filed in federal court 

may be properly removed. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 

808 (1986). 

The question whether a case could originally have been filed in federal court

is determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule. The well-pleaded complaint rule

holds that the basis for federal jurisdiction must be found in plaintiff’s statement of 

his or her own cause of action, rather than in defendant’s anticipated defenses or 

counterclaims. See Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 

Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 

211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). In other words, the grounds for federal jurisdiction must 

be rooted in the complaint itself, rather than defendant’s anticipated response to the 

complaint. See, e.g., Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 

1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he federal question on which jurisdiction is premised 

cannot be supplied via a defense; rather, the federal question must ‘be disclosed upon 

the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer.’”) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. 

v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1974)).

Here, no such basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Defendant invokes federal 

question removal presumably on the basis of a defense or counterclaim based on the 

Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act. But this argument fails because Plaintiff’s

complaint states a single claim for unlawful detainer, a state law cause of action. That 

Defendant intends to assert a federal defense or counterclaim does not establish 

removal jurisdiction because such assertions do not form an essential part of 

plaintiff’s complaint. See, e.g., Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 

Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (“[A] counterclaim—which appears as part of the 

defendant’s answer, not as part of the plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the basis 

for [federal question removal] jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted); Merrell Dow, 478 

U.S. at 808 (“A defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal 

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jurisdiction.”) (citing Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152). Further, in this case, plaintiff’s right 

to relief does not depend on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. 

See Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1219 (9th Cir. 2009).

Therefore, Defendant has not stated a proper grounds for removal, and the Court 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court REMANDS this matter to San Diego 

County Superior Court. Defendant’s motion for leave to proceed IFP (ECF No. 3) 

and Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to shorten time (ECF No. 6) are TERMINATED AS 

MOOT. The Clerk of the Court shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 7, 2017

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