Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02034/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02034-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IRENE CABUANG,

Plaintiff,

 v

JO ANNE BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. /

No C 04 2034 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff appeals from the decision of the Social

Security Administration (“SSA”) denying plaintiff social security

disability benefits. The court now considers cross motions for

summary judgment. Doc #10; Doc #13. For the reasons stated below,

the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS defendant’s motion.

I

A

To qualify for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)

under Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act), plaintiff must

have been disabled within the meaning of the Act on or before June

30, 1996, the date she was last insured for the purpose of DIB. 

Doc #8, Administrative Record (AR) 16-17.

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 1 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff was thirty-two years old on January 1, 1996,

the disability onset date she alleges. AR 79, 102. Plaintiff has

graduated from high school and thereafter became a licensed dental

assistant. AR 92. Plaintiff last worked outside the home in 1991,

at which point she devoted all of her time to raising her children

and homemaking. AR 81, 92.

On September 4, 1996, plaintiff underwent a diagnostic

laparoscopy to explore suspected endometriosis. AR 144-45. Dr

Norman Takaki noted in his preoperative report that plaintiff

described “long duration right quadrant pain.” AR 144. While

evidence of early stage endometriosis was observed, it was

apparently “fulgurated without difficulty,” (i e removed) leading

to a positive resolution. Id.

In her application for DIB, plaintiff claimed that she

became “too disabled to work” on September 4, 1996, after

“complications” during her laparoscopy led to a tremendous increase

in pain. AR 81, 87. In two other blanks on the same application,

plaintiff wrote September 4, 1996 as her date of disability onset,

although these entries were crossed out and replaced with January

1, 1996. AR 87. Plaintiff further reported in her application

that following her laparoscopy, she could no longer interact with

her children or lift fifty pounds, as she could before the surgery. 

AR 91, 93. Prior to her laparoscopy, plaintiff had reported

occasional instances of pain in her back, abdomen and hands. AR

279A, 281, 286. Plaintiff also stated she had suffered from

dysphagia, migraines, low back pain and muscle spasms since January

1, 1996. AR 87. At two separate hearings in connection with

plaintiff’s application for DIB, she stated that she had suffered

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 2 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

from pain in her right hip and leg and low back since 1992. AR 37,

43-44, 471-72. 

Since her laparoscopy, plaintiff has seen more than

twenty medical doctors regarding her pain symptoms. AR 112, 120,

121, 132, 144, 150, 162, 167, 168, 177, 191, 192, 196, 213, 224,

244, 245, 259, 289, 271, 276, 442, 456. To relieve her pain,

plaintiff had received chiropractic and podiatric treatment,

psychological counseling, acupuncture and physical therapy. AR

152, 157, 216, 259, 295. The administrative record contains

considerable evidence that plaintiff consistently reported to her

care providers that her pain resulted from medical error during her

laparoscopy. AR 132, 149, 150, 155, 171, 173, 188, 190, 195, 213,

222, 243, 249, 259, 295. Similarly, the record contains several

reports documenting plaintiff’s statements to physicians that she

suffered no serious medical ailments prior to her laparoscopy. For

example, in December 1996 Dr Marilyn Devries reported that

plaintiff “gives a long history of problems since she had a pelvic

laparoscopy about two months ago,” and that her “medical history

* * * was negative” prior to the laparoscopy. AR 132. In December

1996 Dr Anne O’Duffy reported: “She states that she never had

headaches before this [laparoscopy].” AR 173. In a September 1997

letter Dr James Davis wrote to Dr Richard Cohen: “As you know, she

was in generally excellent health until September of 1996 when she

had laparoscopic surgery.” AR 249. In September 1999, Dr Peter

Alevizos, a clinical psychologist, reported that “[b]efore the

operation, she was an active and vibrant mother, looking forward to

having a third child.” AR 295.

\\

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 3 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Plaintiff apparently placed the lion’s share of blame for

her pain symptoms on Dr Paul Alway, the attending anesthesiologist

during her laparoscopy. AR 144, 149, 464. The record indicates

that plaintiff has contemplated and possibly has instituted legal

action against Dr Alway and Alameda Hospital, where Dr Alway

practiced. AR 149, 464.

Plaintiff’s doctors and health care providers have been

unable to reach a consensus as to the cause or a diagnosis of her

symptoms. Some doctors concluded that plaintiff was suffering from

various acute ailments, including gastroesophageal reflux disease,

chronic pain syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome, esophageal

dysphagia or myofascial pain. AR 244, 250-253, 298. Other

doctors, however, were unable to determine any medical basis for

plaintiff’s pain symptoms. AR 149, 193, 222, 238, 255 and 295-96. 

For example, one doctor noted that no test results or findings

“correlate[] in any way, shape or form with [plaintiff’s] plethora

of symptoms.” AR 443. Another doctor concluded that “it is

difficult to reach a definitive opinion regarding causation * * *.”

AR 464. Finally, some doctors concluded that her symptoms were at

least partially psychosomatic. AR 133, 171, 218, 258.

B

On September 11, 1998, plaintiff filed an application for

DIB. AR 79. The SSA denied plaintiff’s application initially and

on reconsideration. AR 61-65, 66-69. Plaintiff then requested a

hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). AR 70-71.

On September 2, 1999, the ALJ opened plaintiff’s hearing;

plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified that she had been

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 4 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

disabled since January 1, 1996 due to muscle spasms and pain in her

back, joints, right hip, and neck. AR 21, 36. Plaintiff testified

that some of her pain had been present since 1992, while other pain

had presented only after her laparoscopy in September 1996. AR 37-

39, 43. Plaintiff’s husband, Arnold Cabuang, also testified,

stating that plaintiff’s pain began in 1992, “decline[d]” through

1996, and then “dramatically” worsened after plaintiff’s

laparoscopy. AR 48. On October 29, 1999, the ALJ denied benefits

finding that plaintiff’s “disability began after June 30, 1996.” 

AR 20.

In general, to determine whether a claimant is entitled

to DIB, an ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation of

plaintiff’s disability. 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(1). Once the ALJ 

determines that a claimant is or is not disabled, the inquiry stops

at that step. 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4). At the first step, the ALJ

considers whether the claimant is currently “doing substantial

gainful activity.” If not, then the ALJ inquires at the second

step whether the claimant has a “severe medically determinable

physical or mental impairment * * * or a combination of impairments

that is severe.” If so, then at the third step, the ALJ determines

whether the claimant has a condition which meets or equals the

conditions outlined in the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1,

Subpart P. If the claimant does not have such a condition, at step

four the ALJ asks whether the claimant can perform her past

relevant work. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers whether the

claimant can make an adjustment to perform other work which exists

in substantial numbers in the national economy. 20 CFR

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v); § 404.1560(c). 

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 5 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Applying this five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ in

this case denied plaintiff benefits at the second step, and

accordingly did not consider steps three through five. AR 16-20. 

The ALJ found that if plaintiff was not disabled before June 30,

1996, she could not be found eligible for DIB. AR 16. The ALJ

further found that “[p]rior to June 30, 1996, the evidence fail[ed]

to establish that [plaintiff] suffered from any severe impairments,

let alone that she was disabled.” AR 18. Because “the objective

medical evidence clearly indicate[d] that [plaintiff] never had any

problems prior to September 4, 1996,” the ALJ deemed it unnecessary

to determine whether plaintiff’s “alleged impairments” were severe. 

Id. Plaintiff unsuccesfully requested Appeals Council review of

the ALJ’s denial of benefits. AR 5-6.

On March 26, 2001, plaintiff appealed the SSA’s decision

to this court in an action entitled Cabuang v Halter, Civ No

01-1228-MMC. On September 6, 2001, pursuant to stipulation between

the parties, the court remanded the matter to the SSA for the

purpose of granting plaintiff a new hearing, at which the ALJ was

to evaluate the testimony of plaintiff’s husband. AR 340-41.

On September 5, 2002, the ALJ held a second hearing. 

Plaintiff’s testimony was similar to her testimony at the September

2, 1999 hearing, although she emphasized her pain symptoms prior to

June 30, 1996. AR 471-79. The following exchange between

plaintiff and her attorney, discussing plaintiff’s postnatal state

in 1992, is representative:

Q: Okay. And how about afterwords going through the end 

 of the pregnancy. Was there any problem then?

A: Yes.

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 6 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Q: What sort of problems?

A: Started not being able to step on my right leg, right 

 foot at times. And I would have sharp pain.

Q: Where would the pain be?

A: Right hip area.

AR 471. Plaintiff’s husband also testified again, offering his

recollection of how plaintiff’s pain symptoms had progressed. AR

481-84.

On October 4, 2002, the ALJ issued a decision denying

plaintiff benefits. AR 325. After observing that plaintiff must

have established disability prior to June 30, 1996 in order to

claim DIB, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation and

again denied plaintiff benefits at the second step. AR 319-325. 

Noting that mere recitation of symptoms is insufficient to

establish a disability, 20 CFR § 404.1528(a), the ALJ determined

that nothing in the record established that plaintiff was disabled

within the meaning of the Act prior to June 30, 1996. AR 321, 322. 

The ALJ found plaintiff’s hearing testimony to be unhelpful, as

“she focused more on her current situation than on her condition

prior to” her laparoscopy in September 1996, and her recitation of

pre-surgery pain symptoms “fail[ed] to reveal any details of its

functional impact.” AR 323. Testimony by plaintiff’s husband also

failed to “shed any light on this issue.” In fact, the ALJ

commented that “the testimony of [plaintiff] and her husband * * *

both set the date for the worsening of [plaintiff’s] condition

* * * squarely at September 4, 1996.” Id. Regardless of the

weight accorded the testimony of plaintiff and her husband, the ALJ

determined that “substantial other evidence of record * * * shows

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 7 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

that the more than minimal limitations in [plaintiff’s] ability to

perform work-related functions did not arise until after her

September 4, 1996 procedure.” Id.

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was

denied, making the ALJ’s decision final. AR 299-301. On May 25,

2004, plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review.

II

The court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining

whether the SSA’s denial of benefits is supported by substantial

evidence in the administrative record. 42 USC § 405(g). A

district court may overturn a decision to deny benefits only if the

decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on

legal error. See Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir

1995); Magallanes v Bowen, 881 F2d 747, 750 (9th Cir 1989). The

Ninth Circuit defines “substantial evidence” as “more than a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Andrews, 53 F3d at 1039. Determinations of

credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical testimony and all

other ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. See id;

Magallanes, 881 F2d at 750. 

III

A

The Act provides that certain individuals who are

disabled shall receive disability benefits. 42 USC § 423(a). 

Disability is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 8 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months.” 42 USC § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual will

be found disabled if his impairments are such “that he is not only

unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy

* * *.” 42 USC § 423(d)(2)(A) Plaintiff bears the burden of

proving that she was “either permanently disabled or subject to a

condition which became so severe as to disable her prior to the

date upon which her disability insured status expire[d].” Johnson

v. Shalala, 60 F3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir 1995). Mere recitation of

pain symptoms is insufficient to establish disability under the

Act. 20 CFR § 404.1528(a).

B

Plaintiff contends that she is disabled under the Act and

that the ALJ’s decision denying her DIB is flawed for three

reasons. First, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by focusing

almost exclusively on evidence predating plaintiff’s date last

insured, to the exclusion of medical evidence after that date. 

Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consult

with a medical expert to determine plaintiff’s onset date. 

Finally, plaintiff argues the ALJ ignored evidence of plaintiff’s

mental impairment and subjective pain prior to her date last

insured, and that the ALJ ignored the testimony of plaintiff and

her husband.

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 9 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

1

Plaintiff first alleges that the ALJ erred by focusing

almost exclusively on evidence of disability prior to plaintiff’s

date last insured — June 30, 1996. In this regard, plaintiff

points to the ALJ’s finding that there was “nothing in the record

to establish that the claimant had any ‘impairment’ as defined [by

the Act] at any time prior” to plaintiff’s date last insured. AR

322; Doc #10, 6:5-10.

It would indeed be error for the ALJ not to consider

evidence relating to plaintiff’s date of disability onset merely

because that evidence dated from after plaintiff’s date last

insured. Lester v Chater, 81 F3d 821, 832 (9th Cir 1995); see also

Smith v Bowen, 849 F2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir 1988). After all “[i]t

is obvious that medical reports are inevitably rendered

retrospectively * * *.” Smith, 849 F2d at 1225. This court also

recognizes, however, that any “deterioration in [plaintiff’s]

condition subsequent to [the date last insured] is, of course,

irrelevant.” Waters v Gardner, 452 F2d 855, 858 (9th Cir 1971). 

What is relevant is whether plaintiff was disabled within the

meaning of the Act prior to the expiration of her insured status. 

See Morgan v Sullivan, 945 F2d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir 1991).

Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ ignored evidence

generated after the expiration of her insured status does not

withstand scrutiny. To the contrary, the ALJ made extensive

findings as to plaintiff’s evidence of disability generated both

before and after her date last insured. The ALJ’s decision notes

that plaintiff made only limited reports of pain symptoms to her

doctors prior to the expiration of her insured status. AR 322. 

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 10 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

For example, prior to September 4, 1996, the ALJ found only “a few

complaints of low back pain” and a single complaint each of “hand

cramps” and “abdominal pain.” Id. The ALJ further observed that

in regard to plaintiff’s complaints of pain in her neck, shoulders,

upper back, temporomandibular joint, right leg and foot; headaches;

joint swelling and pain; and muscle stiffness and spasms “the

objective medical evidence clearly indicates that the claimant

never had these latter problems until after June 30, 1996 * * *.” 

Id. The ALJ went on to say that no impairment could be “inferred

from the recitation of symptoms after September 4, 1996, both

because symptoms alone are insufficient to establish an impairment

and because there is little connection between the claimant’s preand post-September 4, 1996 symptoms.” Id at 322-23.

Plaintiff carries the burden of proving the onset of a

qualifying disability prior to June 30, 1996, her date last

insured. See Johnson, 60 F3d at 1432. As in Johnson, the “medical

reports during the relevant time period make only limited

references to medically observed limitations on functional

capacity; therefore they fall short of the substantial medical

evidence required to establish a disability” within the meaning of

the act. Id at 1433.

The ALJ duly considered all the evidence in the record,

including evidence post-dating plaintiff’s date last insured, and

concluded that nothing established the existence of a disability

prior to that date. The ALJ’s conclusion is supported by

substantial evidence and is premised on the proper legal standard. 

Plaintiff’s first argument accordingly fails.

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 11 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

2

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred in not

consulting a medical advisor. ALJs are required to adhere to rules

set forth in Social Security Rulings (SSRs). Holohan v Massanari,

246 F3d 1195, 1202, fn 1 (9th Cir 2001). SSR 83-20 requires an ALJ

to consult with a medical advisor in any case where, because of

ambiguity in the evidence, an onset date must be inferred. DeLorme

v Sullivan, 924 F2d 841, 848 (9th Cir 1991). In Armstrong v Comm’r

of Soc Sec Admin, 160 F3d 587 (9th Cir 1998), the Ninth Circuit

ruled that an ALJ’s determination that a claimant had become

disabled at some time after March 31, 1992, his date last insured,

but before August 9, 1994 was erroneous because he failed to set a

specific date of disability onset. Id at 589. The court held:

“where a record is ambiguous as to the onset date of disability,

the ALJ must call a medical expert to assist in determining the

onset date.” Id at 590. 

To qualify for DIB, plaintiff must demonstrate that she

not only has a disabling impairment, but also that her impairment

is “severe.” 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Plaintiff’s impairment

is “severe” if it “significantly limits [her] physical or mental

ability to do basic work activities.” 20 CFR § 404.1520(c). 

Unlike the ALJ in Armstrong, the ALJ here did not find

that plaintiff had a disability within the meaning of the Act at

any time, either before or after June 30, 1996. The ALJ stated: 

“Since the objective medical evidence clearly indicates that the

claimant never had these latter problems until after June 30, 1996,

it is unnecessary for me to dwell in this decision on whether these

latter alleged impairments are ‘impairments’ or ‘severe.’” AR 322. 

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 12 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

The ALJ acknowledged that plaintiff had experienced some postlaparoscopy pain symptoms, but specifically declined to reach

whether such symptoms were either “impairments” or “severe” within

the meaning of the Act. AR 322. Crucially, the ALJ determined

that the evidence could not reasonably support placing the onset of

plaintiff’s current pain symptoms any earlier than September 4,

1996. AR 324.

SSR 83-20, as interpreted by DeLorme and Armstrong,

requires an ALJ to call on a medical expert only when there is

ambiguity as to a date of onset. DeLorme, 924 F2d at 848; Armstrong

at 160 F3d at 590. The ALJ properly determined there was no

ambiguity in this case, noting that “[i]n her ‘Disability Report,’

[plaintiff] dated all problems and functional limitations from

September 4, 1996 onward.” AR 323. Indeed, of all the symptoms

plaintiff experienced after her date last insured (June 30, 1996),

only plaintiff’s back pain was also present prior to this date. AR

323. Further, plaintiff’s back pain was never bad enough prior to

June 30, 1996 to warrant more than a few passing notations in

physicians’ reports, or to prevent plaintiff from being able to lift

fifty pounds. AR 323. The ALJ — permitted to consider a claimant’s

“daily activities” in assessing a claim for DIB, Fair v Bowen, 885

F2d 597, 603 (9th Cir 1989) — made specific note of plaintiff’s

testimony that she could not “interact [with her] children as much

as [she] used to after” her laparoscopy. AR 91, 323. 

Because there was no ambiguity as to plaintiff’s date of

disability onset, the ALJ was not required to call on the services

of a medical expert. The ALJ’s determination here that no such

ambiguity existed is supported by substantial evidence in the

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 13 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

record, and adheres to the correct legal standard. Plaintiff’s

argument accordingly fails.

3

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly

discounted the import of her testimony and that of her husband, as

well as evidence of plaintiff’s early pain symptoms and her alleged

mental impairments.

In evaluating the testimony of a claimant or other

witness in a DIB proceeding, an ALJ may properly rely on “ordinary

techniques of credibility evaluation.” Fair, 885 F2d at 604, fn 5

(9th Cir 1989). Here, the ALJ noted that most of plaintiff’s

testimony focused on her current pain, rather than on pain or

disability prior to the expiration of her insured status. AR 323. 

Even that testimony that focused on pain symptoms prior to June 30,

1996, was contradicted by two separate sources. First, plaintiff’s

statements in her original application for DIB indicate that all

her current pain symptoms are “all due to complications ever since”

her laparoscopy of September 1996. AR 87. Second, the ALJ noted

that plaintiff reported to numerous doctors and other health

professionals both that her pain started after her laparoscopy, and

that she had experienced no health problems prior to the surgery. 

AR 322.

Similarly, plaintiff’s husband testified that whatever

pain plaintiff was experiencing prior to June 1996, it was in

decline through 1994 and 1995, and had increased “dramatically”

after plaintiff’s laparoscopy in September 1996. AR 323. The ALJ

took note of plaintiff’s husband’s testimony that only after

plaintiff’s laparoscopy did he “become ‘heavily involved’ and ‘more

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 14 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

active’ in the daily household chores because of [plaintiff’s]

decreased capacity to perform work around the home.” Id. Overall,

the ALJ determined that the husband’s testimony did not “shed any

light” on plaintiff’s disability claim. Id.

The ALJ’s decision to discount plaintiff’s and her

husband’s testimony in favor of the “substantial other evidence of

record” showing no disabling impairments prior to September 4, 1996

is supported by substantial evidence. Id.

Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ failed to give

sufficient consideration or weight to plaintiff’s mental

impairments. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that mental

impairments often progress slowly, and a precise date of onset may

be difficult to establish. See Morgan, 945 F2d at 1082 (citing

Blankenship v Bowen, 874 F2d 1116, 1122-23 (6th Cir 1989)). Here,

the ALJ did not err in concluding that plaintiff suffered from no

debilitating mental impairment prior to her date last insured or at

anytime thereafter. Plaintiff reported experiencing “palpitations”

according to a November 1996 report by Dr Stephen Raskin, who

characterized these palpitations are “poorly described and

unassociated with significant symptomatology.” AR 130. While at

least one medical doctor (an orthopedic surgeon) believed plaintiff

suffered from “psychological problems,” AR 255, this view was 

contradicted by Dr Peter Alevizos, a clinical psychologist, who

determined plaintiff had no underlying depression and that what she

required was “help dealing with her distress and coping with the

physical sequelae” flowing from her laparoscopy. In short, there

is nothing in the record to support plaintiff’s contention that she

suffers from a disabling mental impairment. As the ALJ correctly

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 15 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

pointed out, symptoms alone are not enough to establish a

disability. 20 CFR § 404.1528(a); see also 20 CFR § 404.1508 (“A *

* * mental impairment must be established by medical evidence

consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by

your statement of symptoms.”). The ALJ applied the correct legal

standard and his decision was supported by substantial evidence. 

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the court affirms the SSA’s

decision to deny benefits. Accordingly, the court DENIES

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc #10)and GRANTS

defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc #13). The clerk is

directed to close the file and terminate all open motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-02034-VRW Document 16 Filed 03/28/06 Page 16 of 16