Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04984/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04984-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALVIN TODD, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TEMPUR-SEALY INTERNATIONAL, 

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-04984-JST (MEJ)

DISCOVERY ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 99

BACKGROUND

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs1bring claims against Defendants Tempur-Sealy 

International, Inc. and Tempur-Pedic North America, LLC (“Defendants”) arising out of 

Defendants’ marketing and sale of mattresses, pillows, and other bedding products containing 

TEMPUR® material. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ representation of their 

Tempur products as “formaldehyde free,” “free of harmful (volatile organic compounds) VOCs,” 

“allergen resistant,” and “hypoallergenic” are false and misleading, because “reliable testing of 

Tempur-pedic products reveals that formaldehyde and other potentially harmful VOCs, that can 

trigger allergy and asthma symptoms, are present in Tempur-pedic products and in the chemicals 

off-gassing from Tempur-pedic products.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. The Court entered a Stipulated 

Protective Order in this case on September 16, 2014. Dkt. No. 68.

Plaintiffs now move to compel production of the formula for Defendants’ TEMPUR® 

 

1 On August 29, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint which

named 24 class representatives representing 11 states. Dkt. No. 63. Since that filing,

several plaintiffs have been voluntarily dismissed, and 18 plaintiffs representing 10 states

remain. The remaining plaintiffs are Alvin Todd, Robbie Simmons, Tina White, Keith Hawkins, 

Thomas Comiskey, Patricia Kaufman, Johnny Martinez, Toni Kibbee, Alan Kaufman, Sara Stone, 

Jerry Kucharski, Julie Davidoff, Ericka Anderson, Kurt Anderson, Melody Todd, Diane 

Kuckarski, Tracey Palmer, and Brian Stone.

Case 3:13-cv-04984-JST Document 100 Filed 02/02/15 Page 1 of 7
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material. Jt. Ltr., Dkt. No. 99. The present dispute concerns Defendants’ responses to Plaintiffs 

Tina White and Patricia Kaufman’s First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, 

specifically requests regarding the production of the chemical formulation/ingredients of 

Defendants’ products. The following requests are at issue:

Tina White’s Interrogatory No. 7: Please list the chemical 

ingredients that are included in Tempur-pedic mattresses 

manufactured during the Relevant Time that were sold in the 

Pertinent States. If different chemicals are involved based on the 

model of the mattress, please specify and describe those differences 

in your response.

Patricia Kaufman’s Request for Production No. 2: Copies of 

documents [...], since January 1, 2001 related to the raw materials 

used in producing Tempur-pedic mattresses and/or pillows, 

including foam type and/or TEMPUR®, TEMPUR® and/or foam 

supplier, chemicals used to make the TEMPUR® and/or foam, the 

MSDS for the materials and/or components in the foam, the 

chemical additives in the foam. 

Jt. Ltr. at 2.2 Defendants’ objections read in part: “Plaintiff seeks the exact formula of TEMPUR® 

material, and Defendant3objects to producing this information as the closest held trade secret of 

Defendant’s business. Only a handful of people in Tempur-Pedic know the formula for 

TEMPUR® material. Disclosure of this information, accidental or otherwise, could destroy 

Defendant’s business.” Id. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery 

“regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(b)(1). “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears 

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. A court “must limit 

the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by [the Federal] rules” if “(i) the discovery 

sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that 

is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had 

 

2

The parties did not include copies of Plaintiffs’ requests, but Plaintiffs state that Interrogatories 

Nos. 4, 6, 8, 10, and 11 are similar to Interrogatories No. 7; and Request for Production Nos. 3, 4,

and 14 are similar to Request for Production Nos. 2 and 3. Id. 

3

The parties refer to “Defendant” and “Defendants” interchangeably.

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ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the burden or 

expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, 

the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 

action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 

“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including by (1) prohibiting 

disclosure or discovery; (2) conditioning disclosure or discovery on specified terms; (3) 

preventing inquiry into certain matters; or (4) limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to 

certain matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to 

decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle 

Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).

“Trade secrets” and other “confidential research, development, or commercial 

information” are explicitly addressed in Rule 26. The Court, for good cause, may issue a 

protective order to protect this information. To obtain a protective order based upon a trade secret, 

the party seeking protection “must first establish that the information sought is a trade secret and 

then demonstrate that its disclosure might be harmful.” Trevino v. ACB Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 612, 

617 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citations omitted). The burden then shifts to the party seeking the discovery 

to demonstrate that the information is relevant and “necessary to prepare the case for trial.” Id.

The Court must then weigh the risk of disclosure of the trade secret to unauthorized parties with 

the risk that a protective order will impede prosecution or defense of the claims. Id. Once the 

moving party has established relevance and necessity, “the discovery is virtually always ordered.” 

Id. (quoting Compaq Computer Corp. v. Packard Bell Elecs., Inc., 163 F.R.D. 329, 338 (N.D. Cal.

1995) (additional citations omitted)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend that the TEMPUR® formula is relevant because their claims revolve 

around Defendants’ advertising campaign, which consisted of “numerous affirmative 

misrepresentations” on Defendants’ marketing materials. Jt. Ltr. at 3. They argue that discovery 

of the formula used in Defendants’ products would show whether they knowingly made the 

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affirmative misrepresentations about their products and failed to disclose material information of 

which they had actual knowledge. Id. Plaintiffs maintain that they “are entitled to know whether 

Defendant’s products start with and/or contain substances that pose the same or similar risks as 

those substances that the Defendants stated their products were ‘free’ of, and whether such 

substances were intentionally added to Defendants’ product formulas.” Id.

In response, Defendants note that Plaintiffs’ claims in the Second Amended Complaint 

concern alleged misrepresentations and omissions regarding the off-gassing of potentially harmful 

VOCs and formaldehyde. Id. at 5 (citing Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6, 50, 56, 58). They maintain 

that information regarding the formula and ingredients used to manufacture TEMPUR® foam is 

irrelevant to the issue of off-gassing and unnecessary and cumulative in light of Plaintiffs’ 

numerous other discovery requests seeking specific information regarding off-gassing, VOCs, and 

testing. Id. However, after the parties met and conferred, Defendants agreed to disclose the 

formula ingredients used in the manufacture of its pillows and mattresses from 2007 to 2013, but 

only if Plaintiffs would agree to additional safeguards which would protect their trade secret. 

Specifically, Defendants requested that they be notified of the name of any expert or consultant to 

whom Plaintiffs intend to disclose the formula components before any disclosure. Id. 

First, having reviewed the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that discovery of the 

TEMPUR® formula is appropriate. Plaintiffs have shown the relevance of the information 

because their claims revolve around Defendants’ advertising campaign, which consisted of 

“numerous affirmative misrepresentations” on Defendants’ marketing materials, such as 

Defendants’ products were “hypoallergenic,” “resistant to allergens,” and “free of harmful VOCs 

(volatile organic compounds) such as formaldehyde and CFC (chlorofluorocarbon)—harsh 

chemicals that can trigger allergies and asthma.” Jt. Ltr. at 3. They have made a prima facie 

showing of the need for the formula, alleging it would show whether Defendants knowingly made 

the affirmative misrepresentations about their products and failed to disclose material information 

of which they had actual knowledge. Id. Finally, a stipulated protective order is already in place 

in this action, and the parties agree that the formula is entitled to protection. 

There remains, however, the issue of whether the existing protective order provides 

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adequate protection. The court has discretion in determining whether or not to amend or modify a 

protective order. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 601 F.2d 949, 955 (8th Cir. year?), cert. 

denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Marilley v. McCamman, 2012 WL 4120633, at *6 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 19, 2012) (ordering amendment of protective order to cover documents for which defendant 

claimed a deliberative process privilege); Sanchez v. Johnson, 2001 WL 1870308, at *7 n.8 (N.D. 

Cal. Nov. 19, 2001) (same). Defendants maintain the current protective order is not sufficient to 

protect their trade secret because Plaintiffs could potentially disclose Defendants’ formula to an 

unknown “consultant” whose identity may not be disclosed to Defendants for years. Jt. Ltr. at 5. 

Without knowing the identity of this consultant and any potential ties to a competitor, Defendants 

argue they may suffer irreparable harm before the consultant is revealed to them at the conclusion 

of the case. Id. They maintain that notification of the expert’s or consultant’s name before 

disclosure is the only way to sufficiently protect their trade secret. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that the discovery requests seeking Defendants’ product formula were 

outstanding at the time of the entry of the stipulated protective order, and the modifications sought 

by Defendants at this juncture are not reasonable and were previously rejected by Plaintiffs. Id. at 

3-4. They note that the current protective order already provides that documents designated as 

“Confidential” or “Highly Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” may only be disclosed to 

Experts4 who have signed the “Acknowledgment and Agreement to Be Bound.” Stip. Prot. Order 

¶¶ 7.2, 7.3. The protective order additionally requires that “Highly Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes 

Only” documents may not be viewed by an expert until after the receiving party has completed a 

reasonable investigation to determine that the Expert is not a current or past employee, nor 

anticipates being a future employee, of a party or a party’s competitor. Id. at 7.4(a)(2). Plaintiffs 

argue that requiring them to disclose, in advance, the identity of anyone they might consult about 

Defendants’ formulas invades the attorney work product doctrine and eliminates the possibility for 

Plaintiffs to have non-disclosed consulting experts. Jt. Ltr. at 4.

 

4

The Protective Order Expert defines “Expert” as “a person with specialized knowledge or 

experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who (1) has been retained by a Party or its counsel 

to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this action, (2) is not a past or current employee 

of a Party or of a Party’s competitor, and (3) at the time of retention, is not anticipated to become 

an employee of a Party or of a Party’s competitor.” Stip. Prot. Order ¶ 2.7. 

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Defendants ask the Court to require that Plaintiffs notify them of any person they seek to 

disclose the TEMPUR® formula to before disclosure, arguing that this is the only way to 

sufficiently protect their trade secret. Jt. Ltr. at 5-6. In support, Defendants cite the protective 

orders in Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics, Ltd., No. C-11-1846 LHK (N.D. Cal. Jan 30, 2012), 

Dkt. No. 687, ¶ 12 (requiring prior to disclosure of any protected material to an expert, the party 

seeking to disclose was required to provide the producing party written notice of the expert’s 

name, employers, past employment relationships, and prior cases); Burberry Ltd. v. K-1, Inc., et 

al., 2014 WL 1365702, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2014) (“Unless otherwise ordered by the Court or 

agreed to in writing by the Designating Party, a Receiving Party that seeks to disclose to an Expert 

any information or item that has been designated ‘HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL’ must first make a 

written request to the Designating Party . . .”). However, these cases are easily distinguishable in 

that the parties agreed to the notice provisions as part of a stipulated protective order. Defendants 

cite no authority in which a party, such as the Plaintiffs in this case, opposed such a provision. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that requiring them to disclose in advance the identity of 

anyone they might consult about Defendants’ formula potentially invades the attorney work 

product doctrine and removes Plaintiffs’ ability to have non-disclosed consulting experts. 

Furthermore, the current protective order already requires the reasonable investigation of all 

Experts, including consultants. As there is no indication that Plaintiffs have failed to comply with 

the current investigation requirements, the current protective order is already sufficient to resolve 

both Defendants’ concerns about a non-disclosed expert’s potential ties to a competitor and 

Plaintiffs’ concerns about the ability to utilize non-disclosed expert consultants. 

However, in an abundance of caution, the Court will modify the protective order, 

paragraph 7.4(a)(2). The bolded section below reflects the Court’s modification:

(a)(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to in 

writing by the Designating Party, a Party that seeks to disclose to an 

Expert (as defined in this Order) any information or item that has 

been designated “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES 

ONLY” pursuant to paragraph 7.3(c) first must complete a 

reasonable investigation of the Expert and determined (1) that the 

Expert’s current employer(s) are not competitors of the Receiving 

Party, (2) that the Expert is not a past employee of a Party or a 

Party’s competitor and at the time of retention not anticipated to 

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become an employee of a Party or a competitor; and (3) that the 

Expert, and all persons working with or for the Expert that will 

receive the Protected Material, have executed the “Acknowledgment 

and Agreement to Be Bound” (Exhibit A).

For each such investigation completed, the Party or its 

counsel who conducted the investigation must prepare and sign a 

declaration attesting to the reasonableness of his or her 

investigation and that the investigation determined (1) that the 

Expert’s current employer(s) are not competitors of the Receiving 

Party, (2) that the Expert is not a past employee of a Party or a 

Party’s competitor and at the time of retention not anticipated to 

become an employee of a Party or a competitor; and (3) that the 

Expert, and all persons working with or for the Expert that 

received the Protected Material and executed the 

“Acknowledgment and Agreement to Be Bound” (Exhibit A). The 

Receiving Party shall keep and store all such declarations and 

shall provide them to the Designating Party at the conclusion of 

the litigation if the Court so orders upon showing of good cause by 

the Designating Party.

In addition, the Receiving Party shall maintain a log of all 

persons to whom the Protected Material is provided and shall 

provide such log to the Designating Party at the conclusion of the 

Litigation if so ordered upon good cause showing by the 

Designating Party. The log shall be kept with sufficient detail to 

allow the Designating Party to determine whether the Receiving 

Party has complied with the requirements of this Order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of 

the formula for Defendants’ TEMPUR® material. The Court’s modification of the protective 

order is effective as of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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