Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00215/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00215-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACK L. BOWEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-0215 DAD

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.1 For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is 

denied, defendant’s cross-motion is granted, and the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security (“Commissioner”) is affirmed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 27, 2010, plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) 

under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) and for Supplemental Security Income 

(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act alleging disability beginning on April 26, 2005. (Transcript 

(“Tr.”) at 25, 217-29.) Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially, (id. at 150-53), and upon 

 

1

 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See Dkt. Nos. 3 & 10.)

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reconsideration. (Id. at 161-63.) 

Thereafter, plaintiff requested a hearing which was held before an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”) on September 17, 2012. (Id. at 43-71.) Plaintiff was represented by an attorney 

and testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. at 43-44.) In a decision issued on September 24, 

2012, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 37.) The ALJ entered the following 

findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2009.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since April 26, 2005, the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 

404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has severe impairments related to chronic back 

pain post lumbar discectomy and degenerative disc disease of the 

cervical spine (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 

and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform at least sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) 

and 416.967(a). He can lift and carry at the light exertion level, that 

is, he can lift and carry up to 10 pounds frequently and up to 20 

pounds occasionally. He should never climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds. He can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl 

and climb ramps and stairs. He would need to change position from 

sitting to standing for a few minutes every half hour. He should 

avoid concentrated exposures to vibration. 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any of his past relevant work 

(20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant was born on December 14, 1975 and he was 29

years old, which is defined as a “younger individual age 18-44,” on 

the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has a limited education and he is able to 

communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR82-

41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

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10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from April 26, 2005, through the date of this 

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

(Id. at 27-36.)

On November 25, 2013, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s September 24, 2012 decision. (Id. at 4-6.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on January 23, 2014.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

two.

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Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 

to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If 

not, the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

In his pending motion plaintiff asserts the following two principal claims: (1) the ALJ 

improperly rejected plaintiff’s own subjective testimony; and (2) the Vocational Expert’s (“VE”) 

testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”).2 (Pl.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 

16) at 4-20.

3

) 

I. Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting plaintiff’s testimony concerning the 

severity of his impairments. (Id. at 9-20.)

The Ninth Circuit has summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s 

credibility as follows:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

 

2

 The court has reordered plaintiff’s claims for purposes of efficiency. 

3

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged.

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so . . . .

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “At the same time, the ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, 

or else disability benefits would be available for the asking . . . .” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

“[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id.

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s “allegations of disabling pain and limitations” were 

“not consistent with objective findings on examination after his surgery in August 2005,” or the 

reports and opinions of a treating physician and two examining physicians. (Tr. at 30.) The 

ALJ’s decision then discussed, in detail, the items of evidence and medical opinions that 

contradicted plaintiff’s testimony. (Id. at 30-33.) Nonetheless, plaintiff argues that “a rejection 

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of a claimant’s testimony based on a lack of objective evidence is always legally insufficient.” 

(Pl.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 16) at 13.) 

It is true that “after a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of 

medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 

(9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Here, the ALJ appears to have relied on evidence that 

affirmatively contradicted plaintiff’s testimony, not simply the lack of supporting evidence, in 

rejecting plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“These inconsistencies [lab reports contradicting plaintiff’s subjective complaint] constitute 

significant and substantial reasons to find Parra’s testimony less than completely credible.”).

Even were that not the case, however, “[a]lthough lack of medical evidence cannot form 

the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his 

credibility analysis.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. Here, the ALJ’s credibility analysis also 

considered the fact that plaintiff’s “treatment has been conservative and relatively minimal . . . .” 

(Tr. at 30.) In this regard, that ALJ noted that plaintiff’s symptoms had essentially been treated 

“with Vicodin at times,” although plaintiff “reported obtaining relief from pain with medical 

marijuana.” (Id. at 33.) The ALJ also noted that “[t]he record contains no evidence of any 

medical treatment,” related to plaintiff’s back pain or degenerative disc disease from February 

2006 to June 7, 2008. (Id. at 31.) 

The ALJ may consider a plaintiff’s conservative medical treatment, or lack of treatment,

in making a credibility determination. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2008) (“The record reflects that Tommasetti responded favorably to conservative treatment 

including physical therapy and the use of anti-inflammatory medication, a transcutaneous 

electrical nerve stimulation unit, and a lumbosacral corset. Such a response to conservative 

treatment undermines Tommasetti’s reports regarding the disabling nature of his pain.”); Parra, 

481 F.3d at 751 (“We have previously indicated that evidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is 

sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.”); Burch, 400 

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F.3d at 681 (“The ALJ is permitted to consider lack of treatment in his credibility 

determination.”). 

For all of the reasons stated above, the court finds that in this case the ALJ offered 

specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s subjective testimony about the 

severity of his symptoms. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to 

this claim.

II. Conflict With The DOT

Plaintiff also argues that the VE’s testimony that the identified jobs “would allow for a 

sit/stand option” conflicted with the DOT and that this conflict was unexplained “warranting 

reversal.” (Pl.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 16) at 6.) 

SSR 00–4p unambiguously provides that “[w]hen a [vocational 

expert] . . . provides evidence about the requirements of a job or 

occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask 

about any possible conflict between that [vocational expert] . . . 

evidence and information provided in the [Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles ].” SSR 00–4p further provides that the 

adjudicator “will ask” the vocational expert “if the evidence he or 

she has provided” is consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles and obtain a reasonable explanation for any apparent conflict.

Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original). 

The DOT, however, does not discuss the availability of a sit/stand option and “the Ninth 

Circuit has not considered whether a sit/stand option creates a conflict with any of the 

occupations in the DOT.” Gilmour v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-0553 BAM, 2014 WL 3749458, at *8 

(E.D. Cal. July 29, 2014). A number of courts have found that because the DOT does not discuss 

the availability of a sit/stand option, a VE’s testimony regarding the availability of jobs with a 

sit/stand option does not raise an apparent conflict with the DOT. Id.; see also Forrest v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec., 591 Fed. Appx. 359, 364 (6th Cir. 2014) (“But the DOT does not 

discuss whether jobs have a sit/stand option . . . and therefore the vocational expert’s testimony 

supplemented, rather than conflicted with, DOT job descriptions.”)4; Zblewski v. Astrue, 302 

Fed. Appx. 488, 494 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Because the DOT does not address the subject of sit/stand 

 

4

 Citation to this unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 

32.1. 

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options, it is not apparent that the testimony conflicts with the DOT.”)5; Strain v. Colvin, No. CV 

13-1973 SH, 2014 WL 2472312, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2014) (“Because the DOT does not 

address the subject of sit/stand option, it is not apparent that the testimony of the VE conflicts 

with the DOT.”); McBride v. Commissioner of Social Sec., No. 2:12-cv-0948 CMK, 2014 WL 

788685, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (“The DOT does not address the issue of a sit/stand 

option for these positions, but there does not appear to be any conflict with plaintiff’s need to sit 

after an hour of standing, as the VE testified. Therefore, the undersigned sees no apparent 

conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT.”); Conn v. Astrue, 852 F.Supp.2d 517, 528 

(D. Del. 2012) (“the VE’s testimony and the DOT are not in conflict; the DOT simply does not 

address sit/stand options”); Harvey v. Astrue, No. 09-2038 CW, 2010 WL 2836817, at *14 (N.D. 

Cal. July 16, 2010) (“Where the DOT does not include information about a particular aspect of a 

job – such as the existence of a sit/stand option – it is proper to consult with a VE, as SSR 83–12 

instructs. Such testimony supplements the DOT, rather than conflicting with it.”). 

Moreover, at the September 17, 2012 administrative hearing the ALJ asked the VE about 

any “deviations” from the DOT and the VE explained that she made an “adjustment” to account 

for the diminished number of available jobs in light of plaintiff’s need for a sit/stand option. (Tr. 

at 68.) After identifying the jobs of Sporting Good Assembly and Small Product Assembly, the 

VE testified

And there are jobs in the local and national economy – where you 

sit all day. There are jobs where you stand. And there are those 

jobs where you can sit/stand. But they’re more limited. So I would 

. . . . decrease the numbers to about 2,500 regionally and 250,000 in 

the national economy.

(Id. at 67.) The VE identified the job of Electronics Worker and testified that, “in [her]

vocational opinion, there are sufficient jobs in this industry with some sit/stand options, 1,200 

regionally, 200,000 in the national economy.” (Id. at 68.) A number of courts have found that 

were the VE has reduced the number of available jobs to account for the sit/stand option, any 

error stemming from such testimony is rendered harmless. See Flores v. Colvin, 546 Fed. Appx. 

 

5 Citation to this unpublished Seventh Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Seventh Circuit 

Rule 32.1. 

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638, 641 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding harmless error where “VE testified that although the DOT does 

not discuss a sit-stand option, his testimony was limited to positions with that option”); BucknerLarkin v. Astrue, 450 Fed. Appx. 626, 628-29 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The vocational expert in this case 

found that the recommended jobs would allow for an at-will sit-stand option. The vocational 

expert noted that although the DOT does not discuss a sit-stand option, his determination was 

based on his own labor market surveys, experience, and research. Therefore, the conflict between 

the DOT and the vocational expert was addressed and explained by the vocational expert, and the 

ALJ addressed this in the decision.”); Cole v. Astrue, 395 Fed. Appx. 387, 390 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“Additionally, the expert testified that significant numbers of ‘sit/stand option’ cashier and small 

products assembler jobs existed that Cole could perform. The expert’s testimony showed there 

were over 25,000 jobs in Washington state in these three categories combined. Any error was 

therefore rendered harmless.”)6; Gilmour v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-0553 BAM, 2014 WL 3749458, 

at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2014) (finding harmless error where the VE considered the sit/stand 

option and reduced number of jobs available as part of that consideration); Herrera v. Colvin, No. 

EDCV 13-1734 SP, 2014 WL 3572227, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (“The VE thus rendered 

an expert opinion on the lack of occupational erosion caused by the sit/stand option as to the hand 

bander and table worker jobs. While the VE did not detail the reasons for this determination, she 

was not required to. Accordingly, the ALJ met his burden for obtaining persuasive evidence to

support the deviation.”).

Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, the court finds that plaintiff 

has failed to demonstrate any non-harmless error. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff is 

also not entitled to relief with respect to this claim.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, the court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to summary 

judgment in his favor with respect to either of his arguments.

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6 Citation to these unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit 

Rule 36-3(b).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 16) is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 17) is granted; and

3. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed.

Dated: September 4, 2015

DAD:6

Ddad1\orders.soc sec\bowen0215.ord.docx

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