Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01594/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01594-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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1 The Order denying the motion to consolidate stated: “The Court agrees with the

government that neither consolidation of the cases nor a stay and transfer to a single judge

is appropriate, and will deny the motions to consolidate . . . The government is correct that

although the thirteen petitioners initially filed habeas petitions seeking immediate release

from custody, alleging that their continued detention was unlawful, in all thirteen cases their

current status differs from that described in their original petitions. Specifically, either the

authority under which the petitioners are being detained by the government has changed or

their custody status has changed.” (Doc. 39 at 4-5)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Chuang Chol Dong,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-1594-PHX-JWS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking immediate release from custody and a declaration

that his detention is unlawful. (Doc. 1) Petitioner moved to consolidate this proceeding

with twelve other actions wherein petitioners request immediate release from custody and

a declaration that their detention is unlawful. After several amended motions and

voluminous briefing, in accordance with LRCiv 42.1, Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan

denied the motion to consolidate on September 2, 2010.1

 (Doc. 39) Accordingly, this

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matter is ripe for review.

I. Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Sudan who was admitted into the United States

as a refugee on August 6, 2002. (Doc. 15, Exh. 1) Several years later, on November 19,

2008, Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, of

theft and was placed on probation for two years. (Doc. 15, Exh. 2) 

On March 19, 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) placed

Petitioner in removal proceedings by issuing a notice to appear (“NTA”). DHS alleged

that Petitioner was subject to removal under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as amended, as an alien who

has been convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts

which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a

purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime. (Doc. 15,

Exh. 3) DHS also charged Petitioner as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I),

INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is

not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing

card, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality if such

document is required under the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section

211(a) of the Act. (Doc. 15, Exh. 3) 

On May 6, 2009, Petitioner appeared before an immigration judge (“IJ”) for a

custody redetermination hearing. The court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to

set bond because Petitioner was an arriving alien and because his theft conviction is a

crime involving moral turpitude. (Doc. 15, Exh. 4) On May 7, 2009, the Government

moved to dismiss the NTA without prejudice because Petitioner is a refugee who has not

applied to adjust status to that of a lawful permanent resident. (Doc. 15, Exh. 5) On May

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 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) from the IJ’s order denying bond. (Doc. 15, Exh. 7) On July 16, 2009, the BIA

dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s decision finding that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to

grant him bond or redetermine his custody status pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)

because Petitioner’s removal proceedings had been terminated. (Doc. 15, Exh. 8) 

On May 15, 2009, Petitioner submitted an I-485 application to adjust status and

request waiver for inadmissibility. (Doc. 15, Exh. 7) Petitioner did not have the funds to

pay for the required medical examination for his adjustment application. The assigned

Deportation Officer made efforts to find a family member or private organization to pay

for the examination which delayed the adjudication of the adjustment application. 

While his adjustment application was pending, on August 3, 2009, Petitioner filed

the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. When

Petitioner filed his Petition, he was in DHS custody in Florence, Arizona pending the

adjudication of his application to adjust status. His custody was pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1159 which provides that if an alien who was admitted conditionally as a refugee fails to

adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident within one year, he must be

returned to the government’s custody for inspection and examination regarding

admission. 8 U.S. C. § 1159. Petitioner’s Petition asserts three grounds for relief: (1) his

ongoing detention, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159, is not authorized by the Immigration and

Nationality Act; (2) his continued detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159 violates the Fifth

Amendment’s substantive Due Process Clause because his continued detention is not

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, is arbitrary, and lacks adequate

procedural safeguards; and (3) his continued detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159

violates his right to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment because he has

been deprived of the adequate and meaningful procedures guaranteed by the Due Process

Clause. (Doc. 1 at 7-9) Petitioner seeks immediate release from custody and a

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declaration that his detention by Respondents is contrary to law and unconstitutional.

(Doc. 1 at 9) 

After Petitioner commenced this § 2241 proceeding, on August 18, 2009, the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”) agreed to begin the

adjudication process without the medical examination. (Doc. 15, Exh. 10) On October

14, 2009, the DHS placed Petitioner in removal proceedings by issuing, serving, and

filing a NTA with the immigration court. (Doc. 24, Exh. 2) The NTA refers to

Petitioner’s 2008 felony conviction for theft. (Doc. 24, Exh. 2; Doc. 15, Exh. 2) On

October 22, 2009, Petitioner was released on his own recognizance. (Doc. 24, Exh. 1) 

There are no conditions, aside from Petitioner appearing at required removal proceedings

or interviews with DHS, governing his release. (Doc. 24, Exh. 1) Respondents argue

that, because Petitioner is no longer in custody and has been placed in removal

proceedings, the Court can no longer grant the relief Petitioner seeks and the Petition

should be denied as moot. Petitioner opposes this assertion. 

II. Analysis

“Historically, the function of the writ [of habeas corpus] is to secure immediate

release from illegal physical custody.” Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir.

1991) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1973), overruled by Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)). Under certain circumstances, however a petitioner who

has been released may meet the “case or controversy” requirement by establishing that an

exception to mootness applies. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 376 n. 3 (2005). In this

case, Petitioner has been released, but argues he is at risk of future detention. Petitioner

asserts that his Petition is not moot because the “capable of repetition” and “voluntary

cessation” exceptions apply. 

A. Capable of Repetition Exception 

The case or controversy provision of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution “subsists

through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate . . .The parties must

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continue to have a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the lawsuit.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523

U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-478

(1990)). This means that, throughout the litigation, Petitioner “must have suffered, or be

threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the [Respondent] and likely to be redressed

by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477). Whether a case

does not meet the case or controversy requirements of Article III, and is thus moot, is a

question of federal law upon which the federal court “must pronounce final judgment.”

Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301, 304 (1964) (citing Love v. Griffith, 266 U.S. 32 (1924)).

A claim which is rendered moot may, nonetheless, survive dismissal if it is

“capable of repetition yet evading review.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17. Such a claim,

however, is only recognized in “exceptional situations.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461

U.S. 95, 109 (1983). “‘[I]n the absence of a class action,’” the capable of repetition

exception is limited to the situation where the following two criteria are present: “‘(1) the

challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or

expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party

would be subjected to the same action again.’” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)

(quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). “Reasonable expectation”

does not refer to a “mere physical or theoretical possibility,” but to a “demonstrated

probability.” Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482.

Under § 1159(a), a refugee who has been physically present in the United States

for at least one year and has not acquired permanent resident status must “return or be

returned to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security for inspection and

examination for admission to the United States as an immigrant.” Id. Petitioner argues

that Respondents have a longstanding policy of detaining refugees under 8 U.S.C. § 1159,

but because the average length of detention under § 1159 is less than the amount of time

required to adjudicate a habeas petition, he and other refugees will be deprived of any

opportunity to seek judicial review of their detention. Petitioner argues that “where

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constitutional rights are allegedly at issue, a case is not moot when a procedure cuts off

the possibility of appeal by the shortness of the sentence being appealed.” (Doc. 30 at 3)

(citing U.S. v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 2009)). Petitioner also argues

that his case is not moot because the continuing threat of detention under § 1159 is a

collateral consequence. In Roblero-Solis, the Ninth Circuit considered whether an

ongoing procedure adopted by the District of Arizona, Tucson, for taking pleas en masse

of defendants charged with illegal entry complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. 588 F.3d at 693-98. Before conducting the Rule 11 analysis, the

court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the specific appeals of the defendants in

question were moot because each defendant had served his sentence and had been

deported. Id. In finding that the defendants’ challenge to the district court’s procedure

was not moot, the court explained that defendants were challenging an ongoing policy

involving a procedure that is of so short duration that it evades review. Id. The court also

found that the defendants faced collateral consequences such as longer periods during

which they would be ineligible to enter the United States legally. Id. 

Unlike Roblero-Solis, although the challenged policy in this case is of short

duration, the Government has made assurances that the allegedly unconstitutional policies

have been discontinued. Specifically, On November 10, 2009, Katrina S. Kane, Field

Office Director of the Phoenix Field Office, Office of Detention and Removal Operations,

issued a guidance memorandum clarifying Field Office policy regarding custody

decisions of unadjusted refugees. (Doc. 24, Exh. 3) The memorandum explains that

decisions concerning detention must be made in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8

C.F.R. § 287.3(d), which requires that, “in the absence of an emergency or other

extraordinary circumstances, a determination must be made within 48 hours whether or

not to release such aliens (and if so, under what conditions), and whether to place them in

removal proceedings.” (Id.) Additionally, after briefing closed in this matter, on May 10,

2010, James Chaparro, ICE’s Executive Director of Enforcement and Removal

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Operations, issued a guidance memorandum to all ICE Field Offices throughout the

United States. Gelee v. Kane, No. CV-10-388-PHX-PGR (MHB), 2010 WL 5535059, *

2 n. 2 (D.Ariz., Dec. 13, 2010). The memorandum clarifies that an unadjusted refugee’s

failure to adjust status alone is not a sufficient basis for placing him in removal

proceedings or a proper ground for detention. Id. The May 10, 2010 memorandum

further states that unadjusted aliens must be detained in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226

and 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d), and that a determination must be made within 48 hours whether

to release an alien or place him in removal proceedings if a violation of the INA can be

established that is unrelated to the alien’s failure to adjust. Id. The 2009 and 2010

memoranda establishing the current policy regarding the detention of unadjusted refugees

undermine Petitioner’s speculation about future detention under § 1159. 

Further, contrary to Roblero-Solis, in his habeas petition, Petitioner sought

individual relief in the form of release from alleged unauthorized, indefinite detention.

Although he claims that the average length of detention under § 1159 is less than the

amount of time required to adjudicate a habeas petition, he has not described any adverse

consequences stemming from the basis for his previous detention. And, the Ninth Circuit

in Roblero-Solis did not hold that an attenuated and speculative possibility of future

detention is sufficient to overcome mootness.

Petitioner also relies on U.S. v. Brandau, 578 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth

Circuit in Brandau remanded the defendants’ challenge to a policy of full shackling at

initial court appearances adopted by the Eastern District of California in order to

determine mootness by conducting an evidentiary hearing on the nature of the current

shackling policy in the various district courts in the Eastern District. Brandau, 578 F.3d

at 1065-68. Although, after the defendants made their initial appearances, the shackling

policy had been changed in writing to provide for individualized determinations regarding

the necessity of full shackling, the Court of Appeals could not determine whether, in

practice, there was an “ongoing policy” of full shackling. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that

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there was information “that strongly suggest[ed]” that the policy at issue was ongoing,

including statements made by government counsel confirming the status of the policy.” 

Brandau, 578 F.3d at 1068. 

Unlike Brandau, the Government’s 2010 written guidance memoranda governing

the detention of unadjusted refugees demonstrates the absence of an ongoing policy of

indefinitely detaining unadjusted refugees pursuant to § 1159, and Petitioner fails to

present any evidence to indicate otherwise. Petitioner relies on: (1) a July 1, 2009

declaration of a former Arizona immigration attorney who describes her first encounter

with unadjusted refugees in 2002; (2) a February 10, 2008 article printed in the Arizona

Daily Star on the practice of detaining unadjusted refugees; (3) a June 18, 2009 letter to

Janet Napolitano regarding the policy of detaining refugees; and (4) a December 2009

report from Human Rights Watch on the detention of unadjusted refugees. (Doc. 30 at 5,

citing exhibits to Doc. 3) Any declaration, article, letter, or report describing events

which pre-date the guidance memoranda issued by DHS in 2009 and 2010 fails to support

a current ongoing policy of indefinitely detaining unadjusted refugees under § 1159.

Petitioner speculates that he will be detained under § 1159 in the future. Such speculation

does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden. Because Petitioner cannot show that he will again be

detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1159, and there is no evidence of any “ongoing policy” of

alleged unlawful detention, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his claims fall under the

“capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness, or that the threat of

detention under § 1159 is a collateral consequence. 

B. Voluntary Cessation 

Under the voluntary cessation exception “‘a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a

challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality

of the practice,” unless the party alleging mootness shows that the “allegedly wrongful

behavior could not be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

Environmental Services, Inc. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). In such cases, the

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defendant bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that the conduct at issue cannot

reasonably be expected to recur. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189-90. Defendants

have been found to satisfy their burden by, for example, submitting an affidavit

disavowing any intent to ever repeat the challenged conduct. See, e.g., Picrin-Peron v.

Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir.1991) (declaration of director of Los Angeles district

office of INS swearing to statement that habeas petitioner would continue to be paroled

and would not be re-detained absent his reinvolvement with criminal justice system); see

also Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 629 n. 8 (1982) (habeas petition found moot upon

State’s representation in its brief that petitioner had been “totally discharged,” and upon

Court’s “understanding that the State may not subject [petitioner] to any further detention

or restraint”). The Ninth Circuit has recently reiterated that “where there is ‘no

reasonable . . . expectation that the alleged violation will recur,’ and where ‘interim relief

or events have completely eradicated the effects of the alleged violation,’ the case is

moot.” Am. Cargo Transp. Inc. v. U.S., 625 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting County of

Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). 

Petitioner argues that, even if the Court finds that Respondents have discontinued

the policy of detaining refugees under § 1159, the “voluntary cessation” exception to

mootness applies. Petitioner asserts that the mere cessation of illegal activity in response

to pending litigation does not moot a case unless the party alleging mootness can show

that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.

As previously stated, on November 10, 2009, Katrina S. Kane, Field Office

Director of the Phoenix Field Office, Office of Detention and Removal Operations, issued

a guidance memorandum clarifying Field Office policy regarding custody decisions of

unadjusted refugees. (Doc. 24, Exh.3) The memorandum explains that decisions

concerning detention must be made in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 C.F.R. §

287.3(d), which require that, “in the absence of an emergency or other extraordinary

circumstances, a determination must be made within 48 hours whether or not to release

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such aliens (and if so, under what conditions), and whether to place them in removal

proceedings.” (Id.) Additionally, on May 10, 2010, James Chaparro, ICE’s Executive

Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, issued a guidance memorandum to all

ICE Field Offices throughout the United States. Gelee, 2010 WL 5535059, at * 2 n. 2. 

The memorandum clarified that an unadjusted refugee’s failure to adjust status alone is

not a sufficient ground to place him in removal proceedings or a proper ground for

detention. (Id.) 

Petitioner, referring to the 2009 memorandum, argues that it “falls far short” of

meeting Respondents’ burden to persuade the Court that the challenged conduct cannot

reasonably be expected to recur because the memorandum is unenforceable insofar as it

violates current Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and circuit case law and because

Respondents have failed to comply with their own memorandum. (Doc. 30 at 8) 

As to Petitioner’s contention that the “voluntary cessation” exception to mootness

applies to this case, the Court finds that Respondents have met their burden and

demonstrated that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to

recur. The guidance memoranda issued by DHS articulating the nationwide policy that

unadjusted refugees will not be detained merely for failure to adjust status supports

Respondent’s assertion that the allegedly wrongful conduct cannot reasonably be

expected to recur. See America Cargo Transport, Inc. v. U.S., 625 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.

2010) (finding voluntary cessation argument unpersuasive where government had

changed its policy and noted that the policy was in line with plaintiff’s position). 

Citing to Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I. & N. Dec. 407 (BIA 1986) and

Romanishyn v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 455 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2006), Petitioner

argues that, even if Respondents have discontinued the policy of detaining refugees

pursuant to § 1159, that is not enough to render the Petition moot because the memoranda

are unenforceable insofar as they “violate[ ] current BIA and circuit case law by placing

refugees in removal proceedings prior to a decision by an immigration official on

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inadmissibility.” (Doc. 30 at 8) The Court finds Petitioner’s argument, and cases in

support thereof, misplaced.

To the extent Petitioner argues that the memoranda are unenforceable because they

place other refugees in removal proceedings prior to a decision by an immigration official

on inadmissibility, his claim fails. As set forth previously, on May 10, 2010, James

Chaparro, ICE's Executive Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, issued a

guidance memorandum to all ICE Field Offices throughout the United States. In

clarifying “when and under what circumstances [ICE] Field Offices may detain refugees

who have failed to adjust to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status,” Chaparro

specifically stated, inter alia, that

Accordingly, upon taking an unadjusted refugee into custody based upon a

reasonable belief that he or she is removable, the DRO Field Office first

must finalize its determination whether to place the individual in removal

proceedings under INA § 240 and, if so, whether to continue detention. A

refugee may not be placed in removal proceedings based on a failure to

adjust status or to apply for adjustment of status because an alien's failure to

adjust status or apply for adjustment under INA § 209(a) is not a ground for

removability. Therefore, the only way DRO may place an unadjusted

refugee in [removal] proceedings is if a violation of the INA can be

established that is unrelated to the alien’s failure to adjust, such as fraud or

a criminal conviction that forms the basis for a charge under INA §§ 212 or

237.

Gelee, 2010 WL 553509, at * 7. This statement is consistent with current BIA and

circuit case law. Specifically, in In re Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. 836, 842 (BIA 2005), the

BIA found “no merit to the respondent’s assertion that he is immune from removal on the

basis of his convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude because his refugee status

has not been terminated” under § 1157(c) (4). The agency noted that the statutes

providing for removal refer simply to “[a]ny alien” or “the alien”- they do not distinguish

between aliens admitted as refugees examined for admission as an immigrant within the

general framework for removal proceedings. Notably, [DHS] is directed to consider the

admissibility of such aliens pursuant to sections 235, 240, and 241 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §

§ 1225, 1229a, and 1231 (2000) . . . Section 240, in particular, provides that an alien

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placed in removal proceedings may be charged with ‘any applicable ground of

inadmissibility under section 212(a) or any applicable ground of deportability under

section 237(a).’” Id. at 839.

The Ninth Circuit has agreed with the BIA’s decision in In re Smriko and has held

that refugee status does not afford complete immunity from removal. Kaganovich v.

Gonzales, 470 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding the BIA’s interpretation in view

of “statutory text allowing removal of any alien.” (emphasis in original)). Thus, contrary

to Petitioner’s assertion, the guidance memoranda are consistent with current BIA and

circuit case law. 

Petitioner, however, argues that even if the memoranda do not violate current case

law, Respondents have not complied with their own memoranda. As evidence of

noncompliance, Petitioner refers to “Petitioner Gbotoe [who] was in removal proceedings

for two months before the immigration judge terminated proceedings . . . .” (Doc. 30 at 5;

Gbotoe v. Holder, 2:09cv1855-PHX-NVW (MHB)) Gbotoe was then detained for five

months before again being placed in removal proceedings. (Doc. 30 at 5; Gbotoe,

2:09cv1855 doc. 21 at 4) Petitioner Gbotoe was placed in removal proceedings in

September 9, 2009, before DHS issued the guidance memoranda in November 2009 that

was previously discussed. Additionally, although Petitioner states that Gbotoe was “held

for five months pursuant to § 1159 before again being placed in removal proceedings,”

doc. 30 at 5, the portion of the record which Petitioner cites in support of that statement

indicates that Gbotoe was held pursuant to INA § 236(c), a provision that is not at issue in

this case. (See Doc. 30 at 5; citing Gbotoe, 2:09cv1855 doc. 21 at 4). Petitioner cannot

rely on events which occurred before the issuance of the guidance memoranda to argue

noncompliance. 

As further evidence of the Government’s noncompliance with their own

memoranda, Petitioner refers to Banjeglavic v. Kane, No. 2:09-cv-02523-NVW-ECV, in

which Respondents detained an unadjusted refugee on September 25, 2009, and had not

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issued a NTA by December 3, 2009 - over three weeks after the November 10, 2009

memorandum was issued. Petitioner claims that this demonstrates that nearly one month

after the issuance of the guidelines, Respondents were in direct violation of their own

policy. In Gelee, the District Court reviewed the situation surrounding petitioner

Banjeglavic and found that, on December 3, 2009, the Government reviewed Petitioner

Banjeglavic’s file and determined that the circumstances of his specific case warranted

his release. Gelee, 2010 WL 5535059, at * 8. On December 4, 2009, petitioner

Banjeglavic was served with a NTA for violating INA §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and

212(a)(2)(B)(i). (Id.) That same date, Banjeglavic was released from custody pursuant to

an Order of Release on Recognizance. (Id.) As in Gelee, the Court finds that petitioner

Banjeglavic’s case demonstrates compliance with the guidance memoranda. Although he

was initially detained in excess of the time allotted, once his file was reviewed - pursuant

to the new guidelines - he was promptly released. Gelee, 2010 WL 5535059, at * 8.

Thus, finding that DHS’s guidance memoranda is consistent with current BIA and

circuit case law and that Respondents have complied with their policy, the Court

determines that Respondents have met their burden and demonstrated that the allegedly

wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Friends of the Earth, 528

U.S. at 189. Thus, Petitioner has not met the standard for the voluntary cessation

exception to mootness. See Alizadeh v. Kane, No. CV-09-1942-PHX-GMS (MEA), 2010

WL 5146743, * 3 (D.Ariz., Dec. 13, 2010 ) (finding petitioner’s constitutional challenge

to detention under § 1159 moot where petitioner had been released from ICE custody

without any conditions or restrictions). 

III. Conclusion

In summary, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s habeas petition no longer

presents a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, § 2, of the Constitution.

Petitioner has been released, not subject to any conditions. His habeas claims are moot,

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and none of the narrow exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply to his case. The Court

recommends that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

doc. 1, be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have

fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file

objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2011.

Case 2:09-cv-01594-JWS Document 42 Filed 02/07/11 Page 14 of 14