Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01738/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01738-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 The parties dispute whether the state habeas petitions were properly filed within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). For purposes of the present order, the court assumes that Petitioner is

entitled to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for the period from September 7, 2005

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD ROMERO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 05cv1738 JM(AJB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AS

MODIFIED; DISMISSING TIMEBARRED CLAIMS 1, 2, 3, 9, AND 10

vs.

STUART J. RYAN,

Respondent.

 On December 26, 2007, Magistrate Judge Battaglia entered a Report and

Recommendation Denying Motion to Dismiss and Setting Briefing Schedule for

Response to the Petition (“R & R”). Respondent has filed Objections to the R & R and

Petitioner, represented by counsel, a response to the Objections. For the reasons set

forth below, the court adopts the R & R as modified herein and dismisses claims 1, 2,

3, 9, and 10 as time-barred. Petitioner may proceed with the remainder of his claims.

In his Objections, Respondent argues that even if Petitioner were entitled to

statutory tolling for the period during which Petitioner had pending state court collateral

proceedings (as set forth in the R & R), the limitations period on claims 1, 2, 3, 9, and

10 had expired. The R & R did not address this argument.1

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through May 24, 2006, the date the California Supreme Court denied the state habeas petition.

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In order to focus the issues raised in the Objections, the court highlights pertinent

events. On September 7, 2005, one day before the expiration of the one year statute of

limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner filed a federal

petition containing unexhausted claims 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10. Also on the same date,

Petitioner sought to exhaust these claims in state court. On September 13, 2005

Magistrate Battaglia issued an Options Order informing Petitioner of several options

with respect to his mixed Petition. The Options Order informed Petitioner that his

Petition was subject to dismissal because it contained unexhausted claims. Petitioner

elected to pursue the stay and abey option. Shortly thereafter, on May 12, 2006 this

court denied Petitioner’s motion to stay and abey. The California Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s state habeas petition on May 24, 2006 and Petitioner filed with this

court a Notice of Exhausted Claims (Docket No. 18) on June 2, 2006. Petitioner

contends that he fully exhausted his claims by May 24, 2006 and therefore the court

should consider all claims alleged in the Petition. This argument misses the mark.

Two issues have not been fully addressed by the parties. First, what is the case

status of the Petition at the point in time when the court denied Petitioner’s motion to

stay and abey. Second, does the Notice of Exhaustion (if treated as an amended

Petition) relate back to the filing of the original Petition under Rule 15. 

To answer the first question, the court briefly reviews exhaustion principles under

AEDPA. It is well-established that exhaustion of available state judicial remedies in

state court is a prerequisite to consideration of claims presented in a federal habeas

corpus proceeding. Rose v. Lundy, 28 U.S.C. §2254(b); 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).

Here, on September 7, 2005, Petitioner filed his Petition with only one day remaining

on the statutory one-year clock. The court provided Petitioner with notice that the

Petition was subject to dismissal because it contained unexhausted claims (“Notice”).

(Docket No. 2). The Notice also identified four options available to Petitioner.

Petitioner elected to seek to stay and abey the Petition and, on May 12, 2006, the court

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2

 The court is mindful that the Ninth Circuit requires the court to provide legal advisements

to Petitioners proceeding in propria persona. See Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005)

(dismissal after expiration of the statute of limitations without providing a second options order was

“extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling of the statute of limitations). However, as

Petitioner is represented by counsel, such legal advisements are not required. Furthermore, in Rhines

and Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004), the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s broad efforts

to require district courts to provide detailed notice and legal advice concerning statute of limitations

issues. 

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denied Petitioner’s motion to stay and abey the Petition pending exhaustion of claims

1, 2, 3, 9, and 10. The court concluded that Petitioner failed to establish the

prerequisites for the stay and abey procedure under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269

(2005). Once the court denied the motion to stay and abey, the Rose v. Lundy bar on

consideration of mixed petitions applies. “Because a total exhaustion rule promotes

comity and does not unreasonably impair the prisoner's right to relief, we hold that a

district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted

claims.” Rose, 455 U.S. at 522. 

Further, upon denial of the motion to stay and abey, Petitioner had only three

options: (1) exhaust the claims in state court and return to federal court within one day,

before expiration of the statute of limitations (a nearly impossible task) to file an

amended petition; (2) voluntarily dismiss the petition or (3) formally abandon the

unexhausted claims. (Options Order, Docket No. 2). The court notes that Plaintiff did

not formally elect any option yet, through his conduct, he pursued option one.2

 By

filing an unexhausted Petition one day before the expiration of the statute of limitations,

the court notes that it was virtually certain that the unexhausted claims would be timebarred absent application of the stay and abey procedure. 

Once Petitioner no longer had a properly filed post-conviction application

pending before the state court, the statutory clock began to tick on May 25, 2006 and

the statute of limitations ran on May 26, 2006. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Prior to

January 1, 2003, the California Supreme Court’s denial of a habeas petition continued

to toll the statute of limitations for a 30 day period because the order did not become

final until 30 days after entry. Cal. Rule of Court 24 (2002); Bunney v. Mitchell, 262

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3

 With respect to the filing of a Notice of Exhaustion, the court concludes that the Notice of

Exhaustion, even if it were timely filed, functions as neither an amended petition nor a motion to

amend the petition. Petitioner fails to identify any authority construing a generalized notice as an

amended petition or as a motion to amend within the meaning of Rule 15. Accordingly, the court

declines to treat the Notice of Exhaustion as an amended petition.

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F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001). Under the old rule, the filing of the Notice of Exhaustion

(if treated as an amended Petition), would have been timely because it was filed within

the 30 period before the order became final, prior to the expiration of the federal statute

of limitations. However, under the current rule, renumbered Cal. Rule of Court Rule

8.264 (2007), the order of the California Supreme Court became final immediately upon

filing on May 24, 2006. Consequently, for purposes of the one year statutory period of

28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period began to run again on May 25, 2006.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. By the time Petitioner filed the Notice of Exhaustion (if treated as

an amended Petition) on June 2, 2006, the statute of limitations had expired unless (1)

equitable tolling principles apply or (2) the entry of the final order on May 24, 2006 by

the California Supreme Court somehow relates back to the filing date of the original

Petition. As Petitioner fails to identify any applicable tolling principle, the Notice of

Exhaustion (if treated as an amended Petition) was not timely filed.3

As of that point in time when the court denied Petitioner’s motion to stay and

abey, the court concludes that Rose v. Lundy required that the “district court must

dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.” 455 U.S.

at 522. Such a dismissal is consistent with AEDPA’s twin purposes to (1) “reduce

delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences” and (2) require prisoners

to seek state relief first, thereby “streamlining federal habeas proceedings.” Rhines, 125

S.Ct. at 1535. Notwithstanding, the court concludes that it would be manifestly unjust

for Petitioner to be precluded from pursing those claims properly exhausted at the time

he filed his Petition on September 7, 2005. Consequently, the court concludes that

Petitioner may pursue all claims identified in the Petition with the exception of claims

1, 2, 3, 9 and 10.

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In sum, the court adopts the R & R as modified herein and dismisses claims 1,

2, 3, 9, and 10 as time-barred.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 5, 2008

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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