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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Courl or A.pp,-.13 T~nth Cfreult 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR tS 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ANTHONY ROZELLE BANKS, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

DAN M. REYNOLDS, Warden, Oklahoma 

State Penitentiary McAlester, 

Oklahoma; SUSAN B. LOVING, 

Attorney General of Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellants. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-5156 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. 92-C-747-E) 

Sandra D. Howard, Assistant Attorney General (Susan B. Loving, 

Attorney General, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Appellants. 

James T. Priest, McKinney, Stringer & Webster, P.C., Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Appellee. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Anthony Rozelle Banks was convicted of first-degree murder 

for the 1978 shooting of David Fremin, and he presently is 

incarcerated at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary under a sentence 

of death. Mr. Banks filed this, his first federal habeas corpus 

petition, raising twenty-seven claims. The district court entered 

Appellate Case: 94-5156 Document: 01019283704 Date Filed: 04/26/1995 Page: 1 
judgment in favor of Mr. Banks on three of these claims: (1) that 

the prosecution had suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation 

of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) that Mr. Banks 

received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel; and (3) 

that he received ineffective assistance from his appellate 

counse1.1 The court ordered that Mr. Banks was to be retried 

within 120 days or the writ of habeas corpus would issue. The 

State has appealed.2 

After careful review of the record in this case, we hold that 

the prosecution's failure to disclose material exculpatory 

evidence to the defense rendered the jury's verdict and death 

sentence constitutionally infirm. Accordingly, exercising 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

On April 11, 1978, David Fremin, the night clerk at a 

Git-N-Go convenience store in Tulsa, Oklahoma, was shot and killed 

during an armed robbery. Approximately one week later, a 

preliminary information was filed against Terrence Wallace Dean, 

and he was arrested for the crime. Two witnesses, William Gullick 

1 Because the court disposed of Mr. Banks' petition on these 

grounds, the court did not reach most of the remaining claims. 

The court did, however, address his contention that Oklahoma's 

"continuing threat" aggravating factor is facially unconstitutional. R. Vol. I, Doc. 39 at 14-15. That issue is not before 

us. 

2 The district court granted the State's motion to stay the 

judgment "pending the resolution of this matter on appeal." See 

R. Vol. I, Doc. 41. 

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and Thomas Landsaw, identified Dean, through a photographic 

lineup, as having been in the store just prior to the murder.3 

On May 31, 1978, the charges against Dean were dropped and an 

indictment was obtained against another man, Norman Lee Hicks. 

Hicks' name had been inserted as the payee on one of the money 

orders taken in the Git-N-Go robbery. At the preliminary hearing, 

Gullick and Landsaw both testified that they had misidentified 

Dean as the individual they had seen in the store the morning of 

the murder, and that it had in fact been Hicks whom they had 

witnessed.4 In addition, Wayne Conn testified that Hicks had 

confessed the crime to him while the two were in jail together. 

Following the preliminary hearing, Hicks was bound over for trial 

on the first-degree murder charge. Several months later, however, 

the State amended the indictment to possession of a forged 

instrument and dropped the first-degree murder charge. Hicks pled 

guilty to the forgery charge. Throughout the proceedings, Hicks 

was represented by Leslie Earl, an attorney with the Tulsa County 

Public Defender's Office. 

3 Mr. Landsaw testified that he was in the store at 

approximately 2:45 a.m. and Mr. Gullick testified to having been 

in the store a few minutes later. R. Vol. II, Hicks Prelim. at 5, 

28. A silent alarm, activated by the removal of the last bill 

from the cash register, was received by the Tulsa police at 

approximately 2:52 a.m. R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 8. 

4 Although he did not testify at the preliminary hearing, the 

preliminary information filed against Hicks listed Michael Wayne 

Ganner as a prosecution witness. According to the district 

attorney's file, Mr. Ganner reported having been in the Git-N-Go 

shortly before the murder and having seen three black males in the 

store. Although Mr. Ganner was unable to identify Norman Hicks as 

one of the individuals he had seen, police records reflect that he 

was able to identify two "associates" of Hicks, Frankie Jones and 

Richard Lee Briggs. See R. Vol. II, Hicks File (Prosecution 

Report) . 

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On November 7, 1979, eighteen months after the crime, while 

in the Tulsa County jail on an unrelated charge, Anthony Banks 

gave a recorded statement to a Tulsa County assistant district 

attorney, Ron Shaffer, implicating Billy James McClure as the 

individual who had murdered David Fremin.5 During the course of 

this statement, Mr. Banks acknowledged his own presence at the 

scene of the crime, but denied any involvement in the robbery or 

the murder. Two days later, Anthony's brother, Walter Thomas 

Banks, also gave a statement to the district attorney's office 

implicating McClure. The State filed murder charges against 

McClure on November 14, 1979. 

The information was amended on July 29, 1980, to include 

charges against Anthony and Walter Banks, as codefendants in the 

Fremin murder. On September 9, 1980, following a preliminary 

hearing, Anthony and Walter Banks were bound over for trial. The 

court granted a demurrer with respect to McClure, however, finding 

insufficient evidence to bind him over. R. Vol. II, Banks Prelim. 

at 197-98. 

The Tulsa County Public Defender's Office had been appointed 

to represent both Anthony and Walter Banks. However, because of a 

conflict of interest, the office withdrew as counsel to Walter. 

He was represented at trial by Howard Sell, a private Tulsa 

attorney. Anthony Banks was represented by Leslie Earl, the same 

5 Mr. Banks testified that the reason he came forward with the 

information was because "it's common knowledge in the jail system 

that if you have some knowledge of a crime that some deals can be 

made if you testify in another case; you can get leniency on what 

you are arrested for." R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 194-95. 

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public defender who previously had represented Norman Hicks on the 

Fremin murder charge. 

During pretrial discovery, defense counsel sought from the 

Tulsa County ")istrict Attorney's Office and the Tulsa Police 

Department any materials "which could reasonably affect the 

determination of the Defendant's guilt or innocence ... whether 

or not the State feels the material is exculpatory in nature." R. 

Vol. II, Motion to Produce (Sept. 12, 1980) at 1. At a motion 

hearing, in response to defense counsel's inquiry as to whether 

all exculpatory or mitigating evidence had been turned over, the 

prosecuting attorney responded, "I do not know of anything in my 

file that would mitigate punishment that they [defense counsel] 

don't already have." R. Vol. II, Motion Hearing (Feb. 9, 1981) at 

8 . 

Notwithstanding the request from defense counsel and the 

affirmative representations of the prosecuting attorney, the 

prosecution failed to disclose any information regarding the prior 

arrests of Dean and Hicks, the eye witness accounts, the testimony 

of Wayne Conn that Hicks confessed the crime to him, the fact that 

Hicks had been bound over for the Fremin murder on a finding of 

probable cause, or Hicks' guilty plea on the possession of a 

forged instrument charge. 

Anthony and Walter Banks were tried in February 1981. The 

following evidence was presented at trial: 

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(1) Traci Banks, who had been Anthony Banks' girlfriend at 

the time of the murder6 and who had been living with him at 

Walter's apartment, testified that at approximately 3:00 a.m. on 

the morning of April 11, 1978, Anthony, Walter, and a friend, Val 

Gene Hicks,? had left the apartment to "go do something" at the 

Git-N-Go store on 64th and Peoria. R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 126. 

She testified that Anthony and Walter returned at approximately 

5:00 a.m. and that Anthony had with him a small brown box 

containing paper money, coins, food stamps, money orders, and a 

wallet belonging to David Fremin. Id. at 128-29. She testified 

that she took note of Mr. Fremin's age, twenty-one, because he 

"had just had a birthday in February." Id. at 140. 

Ms. Banks testified that Anthony told her he and Walter had 

robbed the Git-N-Go. According to her account, Walter kept watch 

outside while Anthony went in, robbed the store, and shot Mr. 

Fremin. She testified that Anthony told her he shot Fremin 

because he wanted to avoid being identified. Id. at 130-31. 

Finally, Traci testified that Anthony and Walter left at 

approximately 5:30 a.m. to go to "the north side" in order to 

dispose of the brown box, money orders, and wallet. Id. at 131-

32. 

(2) Walter Banks testified that he and Anthony had left the 

apartment at approximately 2:00 a.m. in order to take Val Gene 

6 Traci and Anthony subsequently were married. At the time of 

trial, however, they were divorced. 

7 The record is unclear as to this indivi1ual's actual name. 

He is on occasion referred to as Val Gene H~~ks, while at other 

times he is referred to as Val Gene Daniels. 

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Hicks to his apartment. He disputed Ms. Banks' testimony that he 

and Anthony had discussed going to the Git-N-Go store, however. 

Walter testified that after the two men dropped Hicks off at his 

apartment, Anthony told him that he intended to "make some kind of 

hustle," which Walter took to mean steal some money. Id. at 275, 

298. Walter claimed that he did not want to be involved and that 

he, therefore, had Anthony drop him off at his girlfriend's 

apartment.8 According to Walter, Anthony returned approximately 

thirty minutes later, at which time the two of them returned to 

Walter's apartment. Although he testified that he observed a 

brown paper sack and a tray in the back seat of the car, Walter 

claimed he and Anthony did not discuss the items or where Anthony 

had obtained them. Walter stated that upon return to the 

apartment, he observed Traci and Anthony counting money. Again, 

however, Walter claimed that he made no inquiry regarding the 

money. 

(3} Robert Yerton, a fingerprint expert, testified that 

eighteen latent prints had been lifted from the crime scene. Of 

those, one palm print, lifted from the counter at the convenience 

store, was identified as belonging to Anthony Banks. 

(4} Anthony Banks testified in his own behalf, relating the 

same story he previously had told police. He testified that at 

approximately 2:15 a.m. on the morning of April 11, he and Walter 

took Val Gene Hicks home. Afterwards, they stopped at the 

8 This apartment was approximately six blocks from Walter's 

apartment. Walter's girlfriend, Becky, was not at her apartment 

however. She was asleep at Walter's apartment. R. Vol. II, Trial 

Tr. at 275-76. 

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Git-N-Go, a store that Anthony claimed he frequented, in order to 

get some beer and a sandwich. He claimed that as he stood at the 

counter talking to Fremin, whom he had known for some time, Billy 

McClure entered the store carrying a handgun and motioned for 

Anthony and Walter to leave.9 He testified that as they were 

exiting the store, they heard a gunshot. McClure then came out of 

the store carrying the cash drawer and forced the Banks brothers, 

at gunpoint, to drive him to north Tulsa, where McClure got out 

and the Banks brothers drove on. Anthony testified that a few 

days later, as he and Walter cleaned out the car, they found some 

money orders, apparently left by McClure, which Anthony took to 

Norman Hicks. Hicks was going to pass the money orders and split 

the proceeds with Anthony. 

Following eight hours of deliberation, the jury found both 

Anthony and Walter guilty of first-degree murder. During the 

penalty phase of the trial, the jury found three statutory 

aggravating factors against Anthony Banks: (1) he had previously 

been convicted of a violent felony involving the use or threat of 

violence to the person; (2) the murder was committed for the 

purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; 

and (3) the existence of a probability that he would commit 

criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 

threat to society. R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 448-49. The jury 

fixed punishment for Anthony Banks at death. The jury fixed 

punishment for Walter Banks at life imprisonment. 

9 Anthony testified that he knew McClure from prison, but that 

he had not seen him in over a year. R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 189-

91. 

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On direct appeal, both Anthony and Walter were represented by 

Steve Lowery, an attorney with the Tulsa County Public Defender's 

Office. Mr. Banks' conviction was affirmed. Banks v. State, 701 

P.2d 418 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). Mr. Banks then filed his first 

application for post-conviction relief in state court, still 

represented by Mr. Lowery. The court denied post-conviction 

relief, and the court of criminal appeals affirmed. Banks v. 

State, No. PC-86-765 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). 

In 1989, Mr. Banks, represented by Jim T. Priest, his current 

counsel, moved to strike the first application for post-conviction 

relief. He also filed a second amended application for postconviction relief, raising twenty-nine claims. For the first 

time, Mr. Banks claimed that the prosecution had withheld 

exculpatory information in violation of Brady, and that he had 

received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. Mr. Banks 

claimed that his failure to raise these claims on direct appeal 

was due to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

The state district court denied both his motion to strike and 

his application for post-conviction relief. The court of criminal 

appeals affirmed, Banks v. State, 810 P.2d 1286 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1991), concluding that Mr. Banks had failed to establish adequate 

cause for his failure to raise nineteen of his claims on direct 

appeal or in his first application for post conviction relief.10 

10 The court of criminal appeals held that most of the claims, 

including Mr. Banks' Brady claim and his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, were barred because they were not raised on direct 

appeal. Banks v. State, 810 P.2d 1286, 1289, 1297 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1981). The court held that Mr. Banks' incomplete appellate 

record claim normally should be raised in the first application 

(continued on next page) 

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The court specifically addressed Mr. Banks' contention that 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel had "caused" his 

default, finding that Mr. Lowery provided constitutionally 

effective assistance on direct appeal. Id. at 1297. 

Having exhausted his state court remedies,11 Mr. Banks filed 

the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal 

district court held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Banks' 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the Brady claim. 

Among those testifying on Mr. Banks' behalf were Leslie Earl and 

Frank McCarthy, Mr. Banks' trial counsel; Jonnie O'Neal, another 

attorney in the public defender's office at the time of Mr. Banks' 

trial; and Don Ed Payne, a former district attorney who testified 

as an expert on attorney ineffectiveness. Jerry Truster, the 

prosecuting attorney in Mr. Banks' case, testified for the State. 

Mr. Earl testified that at the time he represented Anthony 

Banks, he had no recollection of his prior representation of 

Norman Lee Hicks. Mr. McCarthy and Mr. O'Neal also testified that 

they had no knowledge of the Dean/Hicks information at the time of 

the Banks trial. All three testified that, given the work load of 

each public defender at the time (350-400 cases per attorney per 

year), it would not have been unusual for an attorney in the 

(continued from previous page) 

for post-conviction relief. The court noted, however, that "in 

this case where appellate counsel also filed the first application 

for post-conviction relief, we find that it is unreasonable to 

impose the waiver doctrine." Id. at 1289 n.2. 

11 "A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in 

state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there 

are no state remedies any longer 'available' to him." Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). 

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public defender's office to have forgotten the name of a person he 

or she previously had represented at a preliminary hearing. 

The district court found that, at the time of the Banks 

trial, Mr. Earl did not have any knowledge of his prior 

representation of Norman Lee Hicks, nor was it reasonable to 

expect that he would have remembered representing Hicks. The 

court concluded that exculpatory evidence had been suppressed by 

the prosecution in violation of Brady. The court also concluded 

that Mr. Banks received ineffective assistance from both his trial 

and appellate counsel and that his claims were not procedurally 

barred. Accordingly, the court ordered the writ of habeas corpus 

to issue unless the State retried Mr. Banks within 120 days. 

DISCUSSION 

The State initially argues that the district court erred in 

reaching the merits of Mr. Banks' Brady and ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel claims because, according to the State, these 

claims are procedurally barred. As to Mr. Banks' substantive 

claims, the State argues that the prosecution did not have a duty 

under Brady to disclose the Dean/Hicks information because Mr. 

Banks' counsel either knew, or should have known, about the 

evidence. The State claims, in any event, that the evidence was 

not "material" under Brady. With respect to the ineffective 

assistance claims, the State argues that, in analyzing counsel's 

effectiveness, the district court failed to properly apply the 

standard established under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). We address each of these issues in turn. 

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I. Procedural Bar 

The State argues that Mr. Banks' Brady and ineffectiveness 

claims are procedurally barred because he failed to raise these 

issues on direct appeal. Thus, according to the State, these 

issues "can only be considered on habeas review if Petitioner 

demonstrates cause and prejudice for his failure to raise the 

issue[s] ." Appellant's Br. at 33. 

In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), the Supreme 

Court made it explicit that 

[i]n all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted 

his federal claims in state court pursuant to an 

independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal 

habeas review of the claims is barred unless the 

prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and 

actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of 

federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the 

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. 

Id. at 750. 

Under Oklahoma law, "[m]atters which have or could have been 

raised on direct appeal but were not will not be considered in 

post-conviction proceedings." Fisher v. State, 845 P.2d 1272, 

1274 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). In this case, the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals held that by failing to raise his Brady and 

ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal, Mr. Banks waived 

collateral review of those issues. Banks v. State, 814 P.2d 1286, 

1289 n.2, 1297 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). Thus, the procedural bar 

applied by the court of criminal appeals clearly was an 

"independent" state ground as it was the exclusive basis for the 

state court's holding. See Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 

1363 (lOth Cir. 1994); Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1521 (lOth 

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Appellate Case: 94-5156 Document: 01019283704 Date Filed: 04/26/1995 Page: 12 
Cir. 1993). We need not decide whether the procedural bar was 

"adequate,nl2 however, because we hold that Mr. Banks has, in any 

event, established "cause" for any procedural default and he has 

demonstrated actual "prejudice" as a result. See United States v. 

Cook, Nos. 93-5279, 94-5007, 94-5041, 1995 WL 24338, at *3-7 (lOth 

Cir. Jan. 23, 1995). 

A habeas petitioner may establish cause for his procedural 

default by showing that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Murray v. Carrier, 

477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986); Cook, 1995 WL 24338, at *3; see 

Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 505-06 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

"To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must show that (1) his counsel's performance was 

constitutionally deficient, and (2) counsel's deficient 

performance was prejudicial." Cook, 1995 WL 24338, at *3 (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); see also United States v. Dixon, 1 

F.3d 1080, 1083 (lOth Cir. 1993). The performance and prejudice 

components of the Strickland analysis present mixed questions of 

law and fact which we review de novo. Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1365-

66. 

When a habeas petitioner alleges that his counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal, we examine 

the merits of the omitted issue. Cook, 1995 WL 24338, at *4; 

12 The test for adequacy is whether the Oklahoma courts' "actual 

application of the particular procedural default rule to all 

'similar' claims has been evenhanded 'in the vast majority' of 

cases," Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1191 (lOth Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110 (1992); that is, whether the rule has 

been "strictly or regularly followed." Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1353; 

see Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

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Dixon, 1 F.3d at 1083. Failure to raise an issue that is without 

merit "does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance 

of counsel," id. at 1083 n.S, because the Sixth Amendment does not 

require an attorney to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal. 

See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Thus, counsel 

frequently will "winnow out" weaker claims in order to focus 

effectively on those more likely to prevail. Smith v. Murray, 477 

U.S. 527, 536 (1986); see Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1564 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991). However, "an 

appellate advocate may deliver deficient performance and prejudice 

a defendant by omitting a 'dead-bang winner,' even though counsel 

may have presented strong but unsuccessful claims on appeal." 

Cook, 1995 WL 24338, at *6 (citing Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 

300, 302 (7th Cir. 1989)) .13 

In this case, Mr. Banks' appellate counsel failed to raise 

either the Brady claim or the ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim on direct appeal.l4 These were not frivolous or 

13 While we have not defined the phrase "dead-bang winner" with 

precision, we have concluded that it is an issue which is obvious 

from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted 

in a reversal on appeal. Cook, 1995 WL 24338, at *6. 

14 Mr. Banks has framed his Brady and ineffective assistance 

arguments before this court in the alternative. He argues that 

the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady. 

Alternatively, he argues that if the State did not withhold the 

evidence, then his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

use the evidence in his defense. Under either analysis, our final 

inquiry is the same: has our confidence in the outcome been 

undermined? See Strickland, 466 u.s. 694 (ineffective assistance 

of counsel); United States v. Agurs, 427 u.s. 97, 104 (1976) 

(Brady violation) . 

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weak claims amenable to being winnowed out of an otherwise strong 

brief. They were clearly meritorious.15 

Mr. Lowery argued on direct appeal that Leslie Earl's prior 

representation of Norman Hicks presented a conflict of interest. 

See Banks v. State, 810 P.2d 1286, 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). 

Thus, Mr. Lowery obviously was aware that Norman Hicks had been 

arrested for the Fremin murder and bound over for trial. 

Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Earl requested, but did not receive 

from the prosecution, any information relating to Hicks' arrest 

and bind over was "obvious from the trial record."l6 Cook, 1995 

WL 24338, at *6. Thus, viewed "'from the perspective of counsel 

at the time,'" Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1365 (quoting Porter v. 

Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 

S. Ct. 532 (1994)), it is clear that Mr. Lowery had available to 

him all information necessary to raise the Brady and ineffective 

assistance claims on direct appeal. By failing to do so, his 

representation of Mr. Banks fell below "an objective standard of 

reasonableness." Id.; see Osborn v. Schillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 

625 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Having determined that Mr. Lowery's performance was 

deficient, we now must consider whether Mr. Banks has shown 

15 In arriving at this conclusion, we have avoided "'the 

distorting effects of hindsight.'" Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 

1510 (lOth Cir. 1987) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

16 Mr. Earl had requested any information "which could 

reasonably affect the determination of the Defendant's guilt or 

innocence," R. Vol. II, Motion to Produce (Sept. 12, 1980) at 1. 

While the prosecution's obligation to disclose exculpatory 

evidence is not dependent upon the defendant's request, United 

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), Mr. Earl's request 

obviously was broad enough to encompass the Hicks information. 

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prejudice as a result. Mr. Banks bears the burden of establishing 

that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 

466 u.s. at 694; Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1365; Stafford v. Saffle, 34 

F.3d 1557, 1564 (lOth Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 

(Mar. 10, 1995) (No. 94-8411). 

The question of "prejudice" in the context of an ineffective 

assistance claim necessarily requires a reviewing court to look at 

the merits of the underlying claim. Dixon, 1 F.3d at 1083. This 

places us in an awkward position. We must review the merits of 

Mr. Banks' claims in order to determine whether he received 

ineffective assistance from his appellate counsel. Assuming he 

demonstrates ineffective appellate assistance, his procedural 

default will be excused and we may then review the merits of his 

claims. See Ruff v. Armantrout, 993 F.2d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 

1993); Hudson v. Whitley, 979 F.2d 1058, 1064 (5th Cir. 1992). 

Notwithstanding the apparent circularity of this review, our 

ultimate inquiry is central and straightforward: is our 

confidence in the outcome of Mr. Banks' conviction and sentence 

undermined by the fact that the Dean/Hicks information was not 

presented at trial, whether through prosecutorial nondisclosure or 

because of counsel's error. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 489; 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 

104 (1976). As discussed more fully below, we answer this 

question affirmatively. Thus, we hold that Mr. Banks received 

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constitutionally ineffective assistance from his appellate counsel 

and he has, therefore, sufficiently established prejudice so as to 

excuse his state procedural default. We turn now to the merits of 

his claims. 

II. Brady Claim 

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court 

held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 

Id. at 87; see Kyles v. Whitley, No. 93-7927, 1995 WL 227644, at 

*8 (April 19, 1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 

(1985); United States v. Robinson, 39 F.3d 1115, 1118 (lOth Cir. 

1994); Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 602 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986). 

In order to establish a Brady violation, a habeas petitioner 

must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the 

evidence was favorable to the accused; and (3) the evidence was 

material to the defense. Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1472 (lOth 

Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, (Jan. 26, 1995) (No. 

94-7904); United States v. DeLuna, 10 F.3d 1529, 1534 (lOth Cir. 

1993). Whether the government was required to disclose certain 

evidence under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact which we 

review de novo. United States v. Hughes, 33 F.3d 1248, 1251 (lOth 

Cir. 1994); Ballinger v. Kerby, 3 F.3d 1371, 1375 (lOth Cir. 

19 9 3) . 

-17-

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In reviewing Mr. Banks' Brady claim, we must bear in mind 

that the primary consideration under Brady is fairness. Thus, we 

"should af!irm the federal district court only if 'the omission 

deprived the defendant of a fair trial.'" Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 

1377 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108). 

In this case, the State readily admits that it did not 

disclose the Dean/Hicks information to the defense. However, the 

State maintains that Brady only requires the prosecution to 

disclose information which is otherwise unknown to the 

defendant.17 Because Mr. Banks' trial counsel knew or should have 

known that Dean and Hicks previously had been arrested for the 

crime, the State maintains that the prosecution had no obligation 

to turn over the Dean/Hicks information. We disagree. 

Whether the defense knows or should know about evidence in 

the possession of the prosecution certainly will bear on whether 

there has been a Brady violation. Obviously, if the defense 

already has a particular piece of evidence, the prosecution's 

disclosure of that evidence would, in many cases, be cumulative 

and the withheld evidence would not be material. See Mustread v. 

Gilmore, 966 F.2d 1148, 1152 (7th Cir. 1992); Hughes v. Hopper, 

629 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 953 

(1981). 

17 See Castleberry v. Crisp, 414 F. Supp. 945, 948 (N.D. Okla. 

1976); see also United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 493.U.S. 932 (1989). In Meros, the Eleventh 

Circuit established the rule that the prosecution has no obligation to turn over that evidence which the defense either possess 

or could obtain with reasonable diligence. Id. 

-18-

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However, the prosecution's obligation to turn over the 

evidence in the first instance stands independent of the 

aefendant's knowledge. Simply stated, "[i]f the prosecution 

possesses evidence that, in the context of a particular case is 

obviously exculpatory, then it has an obligation to disclose it to 

defense counsel whether a general request is made or whether no 

request is made.". Smith v. Secretary of N.M. Dep't of 

Corrections, No. 93-2218, 1995 WL 104660, at *21 (lOth Cir. 

Mar. 7, 1995); see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (Blackmun, J.); id. at 

685 (White, J.). In this case, the fact that defense counsel 

"knew or should have known" about the Dean/Hicks information, 

therefore, is irrelevant to whether the prosecution had an 

obligation to disclose the information. The only relevant inquiry 

is whether the information was "exculpatory.nl8 

The prosecution is not required under Brady to "make a 

complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police 

investigatory work on a case," Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 

795 (1972), nor must the prosecutor "disclose possible theories of 

the defense to a defendant." United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 

1110, 1115 (lOth Cir. 1988). It must only disclose exculpatory 

evidence. The exculpatory nature of particular evidence, however, 

"can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is 

complete." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108. 

18 The second Brady factor, whether the withheld evidence was 

"favorable" to the defense, is frequently cast as whether the 

evidence was "exculpatory." We consider these terms 

interchangeable. See Smith, 1995 WL 104660, at *20 n.37. 

-19-

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The prosecution will necessarily have to exercise some 

discretion in determining whether evidence in its possession is 

exculpatory, and therefore subject to disclosure under Brady. The 

prosecutor must exercise this discretion carefully, however, 

because he alone "can know what is undisclosed," and it is to he 

alone that we assign "the consequent responsibility to gauge the 

likely net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when 

the point of 'reasonable probability' is reached." Kyles, 1995 WL 

227644, at *11. Moreover, given the prosecutor's unique role in 

our criminal justice system,19 he must resolve close cases and 

"doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.n20 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 

108; see Kyles, 1995 WL 227644, at *11. 

This is not a close case. The State maintains that the Dean/ 

Hicks evidence was not disclosed to Mr. Banks' defense counsel 

because it was not exculpatory.21 The prosecution, however, had 

information that at least three men had been arrested for the 

19 "[T]he prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary" 

because the prosecutor, acting as a representative of the 

sovereign, has an obligation to ensure "'not that it shall win a 

case, but that justice shall be done.'" Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 

n.6 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)); 

Smith, 1995 WL 104660, at *19. 

20 " [A] prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind 

will disclose a favorable piece of evidence. This is as it should 

be." Kyles v. Whitley, No. 93-7927, 1995 WL 227644, at *12 (April 

19, 1995) (citations omitted). 

21 According to the State, the evidence was not exculpatory 

because the murder charge against Norman Hicks had been dropped. 

R. Vol. IV at 193-94. Based on an assistant prosecuting 

attorney's "assumption" that Norman Hicks was not involved in the 

Fremin murder, id. at 194, and the prosecutor's belief that he had 

"the right defendant" in Anthony Banks, the decision was made that 

the Dean/Hicks information was not exculpatory and, therefore, not 

subject to disclosure. Id. 

-20-

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crime that Mr. Banks was charged with having committed; two eye 

witnesses had reported seeing two black males in the store just 

prior to the crime, and both witnesses positively identified 

Norman Lee Hicks as one of these men; a third witness reported 

seeing three black males in the store shortly before the crime--a 

fact contradictory to the prosecution's theory that Mr. Banks 

entered the store alone; and Wayne Conn testified that Hicks had 

confessed the crime to him. This evidence would clearly tend to 

suggest that Mr. Banks was not the perpetrator of the crime. 

Thus, it was exculpatory22 and the prosecution was obliged to 

disclose the information to the defense. 

Even were we to adopt the State's position, that the 

prosecution has no duty to disclose information which the defense 

knows or reasonably should know about, we would still conclude 

that, in this case, the prosecution breached its duty under Brady. 

The district court specifically found that Leslie Earl did not 

have knowledge of his prior representation of Hicks at the time he 

represented Mr. Banks. R. Vol. I, Doc. 39 at 8-9. The court 

further found that, given the work load of the public defender's 

office, it was not unreasonable that Mr. Earl did not remember his 

prior representation. Id. at 9. Absent clear error, we accept 

the district court's findings of fact. Thomas v. Kerby, No. 

22 The State has steadfastly maintained that the information was 

not exculpatory and, therefore, not subject to disclosure. 

However, at oral argument, counsel for the State acknowledged that 

"if it were me, I would have turned it over. There is no doubt, I 

would have turned it over." It is well settled that "when the 

lawyer responds, he or she speaks for the client." Taylor v. 

Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988). Thus, notwithstanding the 

State's vigorous argument to the contrary, counsel's response 

demonstrates something less than certitude on the subje~t. 

-21-

Appellate Case: 94-5156 Document: 01019283704 Date Filed: 04/26/1995 Page: 21 
93-2323, 1995 WL 3405, at *1 (lOth Cir. Jan. 4, 1995). Finding no 

error in this case, we accept the court's finding that Mr. Earl 

neither knew nor should have known about the withheld evidence. 

In short, the prosecution breached its obligation to disclose 

exculpatory evidence to the defense. We now consider whether the 

withheld evidence was material. 

"[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different." Bagley, 

473 U.S. at 682 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.); Robinson, 

39 F.3d at 1118. A "reasonable probability" is a "'probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Bagley, 473 

U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

In evaluating the materiality of withheld evidence, we do not 

consider each piece of withheld evidence in isolation. Rather, we 

review the cumulative impact of the withheld evidence; its utility 

to the defense as well as its potentially damaging impact on the 

prosecution's case. Kyles, 1995 WL 227644, at *10-12. 

Furthermore, recognizing that, in the usual case, not "every item 

of the State's case" will be undercut if the Brady material is 

disclosed, id. at *17, we evaluate the materiality of withheld 

evidence in light of the entire record in order to determine if 

"the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not 

otherwise exist." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112; Hughes, 33 F.3d at 

1252; cf. United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1441 (lOth 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088 (1990). "What might be 

considered insignificant evidence in a strong case might suffice 

-22-

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to disturb an already questionable verdict." Robinson, 39 F.3d at 

1119 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113). 

Our materiality review does not include speculation. "The 

mere possibility that evidence is exculpatory does not satisfy the 

constitutional materiality standard." United States v. Fleming, 

19 F.3d 1325, 1331 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 93 (1994); 

Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1377 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Agurs, 

427 U.S. at 109-10. However, we do recognize that evidence in the 

hands of a competent defense attorney may be used "to uncover 

other leads and defense theories." Bowen, 799 F.2d at 612. Thus, 

we may draw reasonable inferences as to what those other lines of 

defense may have been. 

In this case, while the testimony of Walter Banks and the 

latent palm print lifted from the Git-N-Go counter are 

corroborative, the State's case against Anthony Banks stands or 

falls on the testimony of his ex-wife, Traci Banks. She testified 

that he confessed the crime to her and she witnessed him counting 

the money taken in the robbery. This was, by far, the most 

damning evidence against Anthony Banks. 

At trial, defense counsel vigorously cross-examined Traci 

Banks and, during his closing argument, attacked her credibility 

as a witness. Among the credibility issues highlighted by counsel 

were the following: At Mr. Banks' preliminary hearing, held in 

September of 1980, Ms. Banks testified that on the morning of the 

crime she had overheard Anthony and Walter discussing going out. 

R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 141. At trial, however, held five months 

later, she was able to recall that Anthony and Walter were 

-23-

Appellate Case: 94-5156 Document: 01019283704 Date Filed: 04/26/1995 Page: 23 
discussing going out to "do something" at "the Git-N-Go Store at 

64th and Peoria." Id. at 126. At the preliminary hearing, she 

testified that her conversation with Anthony (wherein he allegedly 

confessed the crime) had been held in February 1978. At trial, 

however, she testified that the conversation had taken place in 

April of 1978.23 Id. at 140-41. At the preliminary hearing, Ms. 

Banks testified that she could not recall the value of the food 

coupons taken, but at trial she was able to remember that the 

approximate value of the food coupons was one-hundred dollars.24 

At trial, Ms. Banks acknowledged that she did not remember 

testifying at the preliminary hearing held five months earlier. 

Id. at 140. Nevertheless, she could remember having seen David 

Paul Fremin's wallet almost three years prior, and she was able to 

recall his full name, that his birthday was in February, and that 

he had turned twenty-one just prior to the crime. Id. at 129. 

Ms. Banks' credibility is further undermined by the fact that she 

admitted being aware of a five-thousand dollar reward being 

offered by Git-N-Go for testimony in the Fremin murder.25 Id. at 

135. 

While Ms. Banks was the key prosecution witness, Walter Banks 

also testified. Although his testimony was consistent with that 

of Traci Banks, the story that he recited to the jury was the 

23 The Fremin murder occurred on April 11, 1978. 

24 At trial, Russell Estes, the Tulsa area supervisor for Git-NGo stores, testified that $91.44 in food stamps had been taken in 

the robbery. R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 47. 

25 Although she initially denied any knowledge of the reward, 

upon further questioning she admitted that she was aware of the 

reward. R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 135. 

-24-

Appellate Case: 94-5156 Document: 01019283704 Date Filed: 04/26/1995 Page: 24 
fourth one he had told. Upon being brought into the Tulsa Police 

Department for questioning, he told investigators that he knew 

nothing of. the Fremin murders. After being informed that he had 

failed a polygraph test, however, he changed that story, relating 

the same story that Anthony had told two days earlier. However, 

upon the officers' suggestion that his version was implausible, 

Walter changed his story yet again. R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 285-

86. He gave a statement, which was recorded, stating that Billy 

McClure had been with him and with Anthony throughout the morning. 

He stated that he and Anthony had gone into the Git-N-Go to 

purchase food and beer while McClure waited in the car. To their 

surprise, McClure came into the store with a gun, robbed the 

store, and shot Fremin. He then had the Banks brothers drop him 

off in north Tulsa. R. Vol. II, Recorded Statement of Walter 

Banks (Nov. 9, 1979). Finally, Walter gave a fourth version. 

Facing a possible death sentence, he testified at trial that his 

brother dropped him off and appeared later with the fruits of the 

robbery. SeeR. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 283-87. According to 

Walter, however, the two brothers never discussed the crime, nor 

did Walter ever inquire as to where the money came from, nor did 

he receive any of the money. R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 276-82. 

The State also introduced the latent palm print lifted from 

the crime scene and identified as belonging to Mr. Banks.26 The 

print had been lifted from the check-out counter of the store. 

26 Mr. Banks testified that he frequently shopped at the Git-NGo between January and the middle of March, 1978. R. Vol. II, 

Trial Tr. at 198-99. 

-25-

Appellate Case: 94-5156 Document: 01019283704 Date Filed: 04/26/1995 Page: 25 
The record does not reveal whether the prints of Norman Lee Hicks 

were compared to the eighteen lifted from the crime scene.27 

In short, the evidence against Anthony Banks was not 

overwhelming and it rested primarily on the shoulders of Traci 

Banks. Mr. Banks' defense was that Billy McClure had committed 

the crime. His only rebuttal to the State's case was his own 

incredible testimony that his prison acquaintance, Billy McClure, 

whom he had not seen in over a year, suddenly appeared out of the 

night, robbed the store, killed Mr. Fremin, car-jacked Anthony and 

Walter Banks, and then disappeared again into the darkness. 

However, Mr. McCarthy testified at the federal hearing that, had 

the defense had the Dean/Hicks information, Mr. Banks would not 

have testified at all.28 R. Vol. III at 29. Instead, the defense 

would have been that Norman Hicks committed the crime. Id. 

Significant evidence supports such a theory. 

Both William Gullick and Thomas Landsaw testified at Hicks' 

preliminary hearing that they had seen two black males in the 

27 The file marked "Norman Lee Hicks," and included as part of 

the appellate record, contains a copy of a fingerprint card dated 

May 20, 1976. R. Vol. II, Hicks File. We presume these 

fingerprints would have been available for comparison to the 

prints lifted from the Fremin crime scene. 

28 Mr. Banks' recorded statement was introduced into evidence 

during the prosecution's case-in-chief through Ron Shaffer, Chief 

Prosecutor for the Tulsa County District Attorney's Office. R. 

Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 166. The State argues that a defense based 

on evidence that Hicks or Dean committed the crime would have been 

wholly inconsistent with Mr. Banks' recorded statement. While 

this is true, Mr. McCarthy testified at the federal hearing that 

he would have reconciled Mr. Banks' inconsistent statement 

implicating McClure as "an attempt to get some slack cut on a 

prior robbery." R. Vol. III at 46. 

-26-

Appellate Case: 94-5156 Document: 01019283704 Date Filed: 04/26/1995 Page: 26 
store, one of whom both witnesses identified as Norman Hicks.29 

In addition, a third witness, Michael Wayne Ganner, gave a 

statement to police that he had been in the Git-N-Go just before 

3:00 a.m. and that he had seen three black males in the store. R. 

Vol. II, Norman Lee Hicks File. Although Mr. Ganner was unable to 

identify Norman Hicks as one of the men he had seen in the store 

that morning, he was able to identify two "associates" of Hicks, 

Frankie Jones and Richard Lee Briggs. Id. Thus, the collective 

testimony of these three witnesses could have placed Norman Hicks 

and two of his associates at the Git-N-Go only moments before the 

Fremin murder. The testimony also would have been directly 

contradictory of Traci Banks' testimony and the State's theory 

that Anthony went into the Git-N-Go alone while Walter Banks 

waited outside.30 

Additional support for the theory that Hicks committed the 

crime is found in the testimony of Hicks' jail mate, Wayne Conn. 

Mr. Conn testified at Hicks' preliminary hearing that Hicks told 

him 

that him and two of his partners were out smoking and 

taking some Qualudin and that they carne upon this 

Convenience Store, this Quick Trip31 out on Sheridan 

29 At oral argument, the State represented that these two 

witnesses had recanted their identification of Hicks. However, we 

have been unable to locate support for this proposition in the 

record. Accordingly, we disregard it. 

30 Traci Banks testified that Anthony went into the store while 

"Walter stayed outside and watched." R. Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 

130. 

31 From the frequent references in the record to the "Quick. 

Trip," we take it that the Git-N-Go franchise is also known as 

Quick Trip. 

-27-

Appellate Case: 94-5156 Document: 01019283704 Date Filed: 04/26/1995 Page: 27 
[T]he best I can remember, he said that him and 

another guy entered the store, and then they left 

because of this youngster32 who came out and then they 

went back, they went inside and one stayed outside and 

this other guy was in the store and that this kid that 

got shot he freaked and they grabbed the money and the 

money orders. 

R. Vol. II, Hicks Prelim. at 58. This testimony, that at least 

two and perhaps three individuals had entered the store, would 

have been consistent with that of Landsaw, Gullick, and Ganner. 

The State introduced no physical evidence linking Anthony 

Banks to the fruits of the crime. However, the money orders taken 

in the Git-N-Go robbery had been recovered bearing the name of 

Norman Lee Hicks. Handwriting analysis positively identified 

Hicks as the person who signed the money orders and he ultimately 

pled guilty to possession of a forged instrument. Undoubtedly, 

taken in combination with four witnesses who placed Norman Hicks 

at the crime scene, this evidence would have been highly 

significant. 

Medical testimony established that Mr. Fremin died as the 

result of a .22 caliber gunshot wound to the head. R. Vol. II, 

Trial Tr. at 65-67. At trial, the State did not introduce a 

murder weapon or the results of any ballistics testing. However, 

approximately eight months after David Fremin was shot with a .22 

caliber weapon, but prior to Anthony Banks' arrest, Norman Lee 

32 Thomas Landsaw was eighteen at the time, William Gullick was 

sixteen. R. Vol. II, Hicks Prelim. at 6, 26. 

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Appellate Case: 94-5156 Document: 01019283704 Date Filed: 04/26/1995 Page: 28 
Hicks pled nolo contendere to first-degree manslaughter in the 

shooting death of Bill;e Ray Cochran.33 This evidence, had it 

been presented to the Banks jury,34 may have been viewed as 

linking Norman Hicks to the murder of David Fremin, casting 

further doubt on the guilt of Anthony Banks. 

We do not sit to reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of 

witnesses, and decide whether the Dean/Hicks information 

establishes the guilt of Norman Hicks beyond a reasonable doubt or 

exonerates Anthony Banks. See Ballinger v. Kerby, 3 F.3d 1371, 

1376 (lOth Cir. 1993). That is a decision left to the citizen 

jurors of the State of Oklahoma. 

Our task is considerably more narrow. The test is "whether 

we can be confident that the jury would have returned the same 

verdict had the Brady violation not occurred." Bartholomew v. 

Wood, 34 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 

63 U.S.L.W. 3644 (Feb. 14, 1995) (No. 94-1419); see Kyles, 1995 WL 

33 A reading of the record suggests that Hicks used a small 

caliber handgun in the Cochran shooting. R. Vol. II, Hicks 

Prelim. (Nos. 78-3299, 78-3298). The precise caliber of weapon 

used, however, is not discernible from the record before us. 

34 "To be material under Brady, undisclosed information or 

evidence acquired through that information must be admissible." 

United States v. Kennedy, 890 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1989) 

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1008 (1990); see Brady, 373 U.S. at 89-90; 

United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 

United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249-50 (6th Cir. 1991) 

cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1994 (1992); see also Trujillo v. 

Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597, 612 n.8, 613 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

484 U.S. 929 (1987). The State did not argue below, nor has it 

argued to this court, that the testimony of the witnesses, 

evidence relating to Hicks' manslaughter and forgery convictions, 

and evidence relating to the weapon used would not have been 

admissible at trial. In the absence of any argument to the 

contrary, therefore, we accept Mr. Banks' premise that this 

evidence would have been admissible. 

-29-

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227644, at *17 ("[T]he question is not whether the State would 

have had a case to go to the jury if it had disclosed the 

favorable evidence, but whether we can be confident that the 

jury's verdict would have been the same."). Admittedly, on the 

dispositive point, this is a close case. However, the four 

witnesses whose testimony would have implicated Norman Hicks, the 

physical evidence linking him to the crime, and the relative 

strength of the State's case against Anthony Banks, suggest the 

reasonable probability that the wrong man is to be executed. 

"Our duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking 

care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case." Burger 

v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987); see Kyles, 1995 WL 227644, at 

*3. In this case, the State's suppression of exculpatory evidence 

deprived Mr. Banks of a fair trial and it has undermined our 

confidence in the jury's verdict and sentence. See id. at *9. 

Accordingly, we hold that the prosecution's failure to comply with 

the mandate of Brady v. Maryland and to disclose material 

exculpatory evidence violated Mr. Banks' constitutional right to 

due process. 

Because the withheld evidence was exculpatory and material 

under Brady, the prosecution's failure to disclose it was harmful 

as a matter of law. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112. Thus, "there is 

no need for further harmless-error review." Kyles, 1995 WL 

227644, at *10; cf. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995); 

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842-43 n.2 (1993). 

Our disposition of this case on the Brady issue makes 

consideration of Mr. Banks' second proposition, that he received 

-30-

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ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, unnecessary. We 

therefore do not address the issue. 

The district court properly granted the petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

The stay previously entered in this case shall remain in effect 

until further order of the district court. 

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