Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06415/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06415-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN WARDZALA,

Plaintiff, CV F 04 6415 AWI WMW P

vs. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

J. PROVINCE, et al.,

Defendants.

This action proceeds on the May 13, 2005, first amended complaint. The first

amended complaint is filed in response to an earlier order dismissing the original complaint and

granting plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections at CSP Sacramento, brings this civil rights action against defendant

correctional officials employed by the Department of Corrections at Pleasant Valley State

Prison.

The original complaint on consisted of a rambling narrative recounting incidents

that occurred while plaintiff was housed at Pleasant Valley State Prison. Though difficult to

discern, it appeared that plaintiff was contesting a disciplinary action taken against him. Plaintiff

also appeared to challenge the loss or confiscation of his personal property. 

To warrant relief under the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege and show that

defendant’s acts or omissions caused the deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights. 

Case 1:04-cv-06415-AWI-WMW Document 13 Filed 10/31/05 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). In order to state a claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege that: (1) a person was acting under color of state law at the time the

complained of act was committed; and (2) that person’s conduct deprived plaintiff of rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Paratt

v.Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). 

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required

to do that causes the deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

As to any claim regarding disciplinary action, In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.

 641, 644 (1997), the United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine articulated in Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), to prison disciplinary hearings. In Heck, the Court held

that a state prisoner’s claim for damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment is not

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in favor of plaintiff would necessarily imply

the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated. 512 U.S. at 487. In applying the

principle to the facts of Balisok, the Court held that a claim challenging the procedures used in a

prison disciplinary hearing, even if such a claim seeks money damages and no injunctive relief,

is not cognizable under § 1983 if the nature of the inmate’s allegations are such that, if proven,

would necessarily imply the invalidity of the result of the prison disciplinary hearing. 520 U.S.

at 646. Because such a challenge, if successful, would invalidate the duration of the inmate’s

Case 1:04-cv-06415-AWI-WMW Document 13 Filed 10/31/05 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

confinement, it is properly brought as a habeas corpus petition and not under § 1983. Heck, 512

U.S. at 487; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

As to a claim regarding the loss of property, “An unauthorized intentional

deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural

requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

Thus, where the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, only authorized, intentional

deprivations constitute actionable violations of the Due Process Clause. An authorized

deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or statutes. 

Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Knudson v. City of

Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987).

On the order dismissing the original compliant, plaintiff was advised that the 

court found the allegations in the original complaint to be vague and conclusory. The court 

determined that the complaint did not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must

give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community

Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff was specifically advised that he

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that

support plaintiff's claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to

file an amended complaint.

In the May 13, 2005 first amended complaint, plaintiff restates the allegations of

the original complaint. Plaintiff does add the allegation that “one of the named officers” filed

false charges against plaintiff in retaliation for the filing of an “inmate complaint.” As noted

above, any challenge to plaintiff’s prison disciplinary process that (as here) implies the invalidity

Case 1:04-cv-06415-AWI-WMW Document 13 Filed 10/31/05 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

of his conviction is not cognizable under section 1983 until the conviction has been reversed,

expunged or otherwise invalidated. There are no allegations that the conviction has been

reversed or otherwise invalidated. 

As to any claim for retaliation, an allegation of retaliation against a prisoner's

First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is sufficient to support claim under Section

1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.2003). “Within the prison context, a viable

claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights,

and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v.

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The court must " 'afford appropriate deference

and flexibility' to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for

conduct alleged to be retaliatory." Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)). The burden is on plaintiff to

demonstrate "that there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions he

complains of." Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808.

Here, there are no allegations that plaintiff was actually impaired in his ability to

pursue inmate grievances. That an action was taken in response to the filing of an imate

grievance does not, of itself, subject any of the defendants to liability. Further, plaintiff refers to

an un-named correctional officer. In order to state a claim, plaintiff must identify a particular

individual defendant, and allege facts indicating that the defendant subjected plaintiff to

retaliation, as that term is defined above. Plaintiff has failed to do so. The first amended

complaint should therefore be dismissed. The court will, however, grant plaintiff a further

opportunity to cure the noted defects. Plaintiff is therefore granted leave to file a second

amended complaint.

Case 1:04-cv-06415-AWI-WMW Document 13 Filed 10/31/05 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

second amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must

bear the docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "Second Amended Complaint";

plaintiff must file an original and two copies of the amended complaint; failure to file an

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action

be dismissed.

Case 1:04-cv-06415-AWI-WMW Document 13 Filed 10/31/05 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 31, 2005 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06415-AWI-WMW Document 13 Filed 10/31/05 Page 6 of 6