Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05169/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05169-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUE ROSANNE TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, and DAVID LARSON,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-05169 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this civil rights action, defendant City of Oakland moves for summary judgment on

all of plaintiff’s Monell claims. Triable issues of fact remain as to whether plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment and substantive due-process rights were violated. In turn, defendant has failed to

eliminate all triable issues of fact on plaintiff’s custom or policy claim and failure to train claim. 

Plaintiff, however, has not shown a triable issue of fact regarding whether City officials ratified

its employees’ decisions or failed to discipline them. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

STATEMENT

At the time of the events in question, plaintiff Sue Rosanne Taylor was 57 years old and

was physically disabled because she was suffering from cancer. On April 5, 2004, she was

involved in a minor, non-injury traffic accident at the intersection of 29th and Harrison Streets

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in Oakland, California. Her car collided with a commercial van driven by Salim Zahraoui. 

Officer Angela Coaston, who was later dispatched to the scene, concluded that the accident was

Taylor’s fault (Rosen Decl. Exh. 1, 44:20–22). Plaintiff offered to exchange information with

Zahraoui (Chanin Decl. Exh. 2, ¶¶ 3–5). Zahraoui refused, and plaintiff testified at her

deposition that he was angry and yelling after the accident (Rosen Decl. Exh. 2, 30:4–16). 

Thereafter, Taylor called Oakland police dispatch to report the accident. In these calls,

Taylor identified herself to the dispatcher and gave her cell phone number (Chanin Decl.

Exh. 3). Because the officers did not arrive on the scene for some time, Taylor became

concerned for her safety. She testified in her deposition that Zahraoui was using foul language,

refused to give her information, and attempted to solicit witnesses to support his version of

events (Rosen Decl. Exh. 2, 34:12–35:5). She also testified that she felt unsafe because after

the accident her car was parked in a red zone in an area on the street where she feared being rear

ended (id. at 57:20–58:10). Despite this, Taylor testified that Zahraoui did not directly threaten

her verbally or physically (id. at 58:20–59:10). 

During one of the calls, Taylor spoke with dispatcher Drew Knight. She asked him

whether she could leave the scene of the accident, and whether she would be violating any law

if she did so (Chanin Decl. Exh. 2, ¶¶ 9–10, Exh. 3). Knight told her to use her judgment. He

also told her that she should exchange information, but if the other driver was not willing, then

she could make a report at a later time. The conversation with dispatcher Knight went as

follows (id. at Exh. 3):

Taylor: Alright, what damage do I do myself by getting my

Triple A on the phone and getting out of here. I

took some photographs of the location of his car,

of my car, of him because he refuses to identify

himself. I got a description of the man who picked

up his courier materials. He wouldn’t give me his

name because this man just came at us and shouted

“Don’t tell her anything.” Um.

Dispatch: Well.

Taylor: Can you, can you advise me on that?

Dispatch: Ma’am, if you don’t feel safe, you have to use your

judgment on that. If you don’t feel safe then you

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might want to leave, is, as uh you go with the

information you have, but uh . . . 

Taylor: Okay, I don’t violate any law by getting out of

here, do I?

Dispatch: Well, well you’re supposed to exchange

information. If under the circumstances, he’s not

willing to exchange information . . . 

Taylor: Uh, huh . . . 

Dispatch: . . . then if you leave you can always, always make

a report at a later time.

Taylor: Oh, I could come down to you and make the

report, couldn’t I?

Dispatch: Yeah, yeah . . . police report is not required by law

unless there is a crime or injury involved.

***

Dispatch: So, are you gonna wait, or what?

Taylor: Well, I don’t know. I’m going to determine

whether I can move my car at all. I don’t know

that.

Dispatch: Yeah, if you, if you leave, then you call us back,

Okay?

Taylor: Oh, I will do that, sure.

Taylor made one more attempt to exchange information with Zahraoui. He told her not to talk

to him, called her a “bitch” and said he did not want her information, nor would he give her his

information (id. at Exh. 10, 55:1–13). She called dispatch back after she left the scene. She

spoke to another dispatcher, Sunny Reese (id. at Exh. 3):

Taylor: Hi, I just spoke to an officer, I uh, was hit on

Harrison Street, and I told him I felt very unsafe. 

Was gonna try to get the man to identify himself

and he refused to and I have now left the scene. 

And he just asked me to call you back.

Dispatch: You left the scene?

Taylor: Yes, he told me it was alright. There was no

injury.

Dispatch: Okay, but you’re gonna have to go to the Traffic

Division to make a report then. We don’t send

officers out. 

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Taylor: Right.

Dispatch: Ok, do you know where the police station is at?

Taylor: I do. Yeah, now I’m gonna get home and address

the damage to my car first. So, is that alright with

you?

Dispatch: Yeah, that’s fine. I mean once you’ve left the

scene you have to go to the Traffic Division. I

mean, it could be a week later, a month later —

but, by law you don’t have to have a report. But

um . . . 

Taylor: Well . . . well, I think we’re going to want one. 

Dispatch: Yeah, if your insurance requires it, you could go

down the Traffic Division . . . and make a report in

person. 

Regarding this call, Reese testified at her deposition that she believed that Taylor had spoken to

a police officer, not a civilian police dispatcher (Rosen Decl. Exh. 3, 11:21–12:12). Since she

believed that a police officer had told Taylor that it was ok to leave the scene, she did not make

a notation in her computer that plaintiff had called dispatch and had left the scene (id. at

50:9–20). Regina Harris-Gilyard, Reese’s supervisor at the time, testified that she should have

made such a notation. Harris-Gilyard later spoke to her about not making the notation, but did

not discipline her (id. at Exh. 4, 14:21–16:2). 

At the time of the incident, officers in the field could not access the CAD

purge — which contained records of all calls made to dispatch — from their cars (id. at

11:22–18:7). They could, however, later access the CAD purge because it was printed out each

day. Personnel at the communications center, such as operators, dispatchers, and their

supervisors, could access the computer information by entering in an incident number (id. at

Exh. 5, 20:20–23:21). Even if Reese had made the notation in the computer that Taylor had left

the scene, officers in the field would not have had access to that information. Other dispatchers,

however, could have seen the notation as soon as the entry was made. 

After Taylor left, Officer Angela Coaston arrived on the scene of the accident. Zahraoui

was still there. A witness on the scene told her that Zahraoui had been angry, yelling, and using

foul language while Taylor was there (id. at Exh. 1, 33:15–34:6). Zahraoui gave Coaston his

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license, registration, and insurance information (id. at 23:25–24:25). Coaston determined that

Taylor had not left such information at the scene of the accident before she left. She got

Taylor’s license plate number from Zahraoui and asked the dispatcher to run the license

number. Thereafter, either Coaston or defendant Sergeant Larson advised over the radio that

Taylor had left the scene of the accident without exchanging information (id. at 27:4–10;

32:20–33:3).

Officer Murray Hoyle heard the report and spotted plaintiff’s car on Broadway Terrace

in Oakland. While he drove behind her, he noticed that her registration was not current. He

pulled her over into the driveway of her home (Hoyle Decl. ¶¶ 2–4). Hoyle asked plaintiff for

her license, registration, and proof of insurance. She told him that she did not have insurance

and that her registration had lapsed. She also told him that she had called the dispatcher who

had told her that she could leave the scene. After this, Taylor asked if she could go into her

house to call the dispatcher to verify her version of the events, but he refused to let her (Rosen

Decl. Exh. 2, 83:20–85:22; 93:16–94:25). In his testimony at Taylor’s criminal trial, Hoyle

testified that he was not paying much attention to what Taylor was saying and that he did not

hear her say that she had obtained permission to leave the scene of the accident (Chanin Decl.

Exh. 17, 22:25–28; 26:1–25). Later in his declaration, Hoyle stated that he feared that he

somehow could not continue his investigation if she went into the house (Hoyle Decl. ¶ 7). 

Taylor also testified in her deposition that Hoyle first confronted her regarding the

accident, stating that she was the hit-and-run suspect. He blocked her path in the driveway

while she was speaking to him. He asked for her license, and she retrieved it from her purse

which was still in the car. Plaintiff testified that he told her to place her wallet on the trunk of

the car. When she dropped her shoulder and made a small gesture, according to plaintiff, Hoyle

wrenched her wrist over her head, shoved her up the driveway and over the roof of his police

car (Chanin Decl. Exh. 10, 95:1–97:23). She testified that he then placed a handcuff tightly on

her right wrist (id. at 100:19–101:18). 

Hoyle declares that he told plaintiff that she was being detained for her expired

registration, lack of insurance, and suspected involvement in a hit-and-run accident. He

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believed that she was resisting arrest at the time, so he responded by applying a compliance

hold. At the time, Taylor was approximately 5’9” tall and weighed approximately 200 pounds. 

Hoyle also reports that it ultimately took the combined efforts of another officer, Officer Odom,

to subdue plaintiff sufficiently to place her in handcuffs (Hoyle Decl. ¶¶ 6–10). At the time,

Taylor was suffering from cancer (and still is) and it will be up to the jury to decide if she was

as fit as alleged. 

Plaintiff testified in her deposition that Officer Odom told her to get into Officer Hoyle’s

police vehicle. She asked them for help because she could not lower herself into the car without

using her hands. Eventually, the officers got her into the car, and while she was sitting in the

car, she yelled for help (id. at 106:2–109:25). 

Officer Coaston heard over the radio that Taylor had been detained and asked Zahraoui

to follow her to the location on Broadway Terrace so he could identify plaintiff. Sergeant

Larson had arrived before Officer Coaston and told her to wait before writing up a hit and run

report (Rosen Decl. Exh. 1, 59:28–25; 73:1–11). Officer Hoyle also declares that Larson told

him that there might be a problem with the hit-and-run charge (Hoyle Decl. ¶ 12). Larson

arrested plaintiff under California Penal Code § 148, for resisting arrest, and she was later

booked on charges under California Vehicle Code § 4000(a) and § 16028(a), for having expired

registration and driving without insurance. 

Taylor was taken to the hospital after she was arrested, complaining of pain in her back,

arm, and sides. At the hospital, her arm was placed in a removable cast, and she was

transported to the Oakland city jail. She remained there until she was released on bail early the

next morning. The Oakland district attorney subsequently charged plaintiff for leaving the

scene of an accident, but she was eventually tried only for resisting arrest. About two years

later, on May 24, 2006, the Alameda Superior Court granted Taylor’s motion for acquittal after

the close of evidence in her trial. The entirety of the action was resolved in her favor. 

***

Defendant presents considerable evidence regarding training procedures at the Oakland

Police Department. As to the handling of Taylor’s calls to police dispatch, Knight testified that

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the City of Oakland had trained him to tell motorists that they had discretion to leave the scene

of an accident if they felt unsafe (Chanin Decl. Exh. 11, 43:13–48:22). His supervisor, William

Valladon, testified in a deposition that Knight followed procedure in responding to Taylor’s

call. Valladon did not know of any disciplinary actions or remedial training that took place

because of this incident (id. at Exh. 12, 58:1–6; 65:11–66:1).

Complaint operators, who handle 911 calls to Oakland’s communications center, attend

a 40-week training academy and receive regular on-the-job training and evaluations. The City

of Oakland also has telephone communications guidelines, procedures, and responsibilities

(Rosen Decl. Exhs. 7, 8). The procedures tell complaint operators that if a caller believes

himself or herself to be in a dangerous situation, the operator should advise the caller to use his

or her judgment in deciding whether or not to leave. Operators should not tell callers to remain

in dangerous situations. 

The City of Oakland also has in place policies regarding the use of physical force. 

General Order K-3 permits the use of reasonable force under some circumstances. Officers are

to select options from a continuum of force, mandating that officers will not employ a more

forceful measure unless it is judged necessary under the circumstances, or a lower level of force

was attempted and was unsuccessful (Downing Decl. Exh. 1. 1–3). Defendant also has in place

a system for reporting and investigating the use of less-than-lethal force, as set out in General

Order K-4 (id. at Exh. 2). The order requires periodic reports on the use of force, sets out

procedures for investigating incidents in which force was used, and discipline and training for

officers. The City also has an Early Intervention System in place to identify and correct

conduct and performance problems by officers. Investigations and inquiries under this system

can be triggered by complaints, resisting arrest claims, and large numbers of incidents in certain

categories (id. at Exh. 9). 

* * * 

This action was filed on August 24, 2006. Plaintiff alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983

against both defendant Larson and defendant City of Oakland. On July 19, 2007, plaintiff filed

a motion to have averments deemed admissions and for partial summary judgment against

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defendant Larson. An order dated September 7, 2007, denied in part and granted in part the

motion to have averments deemed admissions and denied the motion for partial summary

judgment. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed on September 11, 2007. Trial

in this action is set for December 3, 2007. 

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment should be granted where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits

show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of

production to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Playboy

Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24

(1986). “If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts’ that show a genuine

issue for trial.” Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted).

Municipalities and local governments can be sued directly for violations of

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 where government officials were acting pursuant to

an official policy or recognized custom. Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv. of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978). To directly sue a municipality under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must show

that (1) he or she had a constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) the

municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s

constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 

Oviatt v. Pierce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Taylor argues that the City of

Oakland had a policy under which dispatchers told callers that they could leave the scene of an

accident. This was done even though there was no way of alerting officers in the field that a

caller had been told it was ok to leave the scene of an accident. Officers were not required to

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ask dispatchers if this had occurred before issuing a hit-and-run broadcast. Plaintiff argues that

this policy was the motivating force in depriving her of her constitutional rights. 

1. UNDERLYING VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

Taylor must first show that there was a violation of her constitutional rights. Oviatt,

954 F.2d at 1474. First, she argues that Officer Hoyle’s arrest violated her Fourth Amendment

rights. Second, she argues that Officer Hoyle used excessive force against her. Third, she

argues that she was maliciously prosecuted. Finally, she argues that her substantive dueprocess rights were violated under a state-created danger theory. 

A. Unreasonable Seizure.

Plaintiff claims that Officer Hoyle had no probable cause to arrest her. Probable cause

requires a fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, as determined by the

totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time. United States v. Alaimalo, 313

F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002). Defendant presents evidence that Officer Hoyle noticed that

plaintiff’s registration was expired before pulling her over. He had heard the radio bulletin

saying that she had left the scene of an accident, but also saw her expired registration. The

expired registration alone, according to defendant, gave Hoyle probable cause to arrest her. 

Taylor does not dispute that her car’s registration was expired or that she was driving

without insurance. She contends instead that under California law, Officer Hoyle should have

at most given her a written citation. Plaintiff cites People v. Medina, 110 Cal. App. 4th 171,

176 (2003), for the proposition that drivers stopped for a traffic violation should only receive a

written notice to appear, or citation; they should not be physically detained unless there are

specific and articulable facts indicating their involvement in another crime. The Medina

decision also cites California Vehicle Code § 40500, which states “[w]henever a person is

arrested for any violation of this code not declared to be a felony . . . the arresting officer shall

prepare in triplicate a written notice to appear in court . . . .” Both driving with an expired

license and driving without proof of insurance fall under that code section. Defendant did not

present evidence that Taylor refused to give her name or identifying information. At least under

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California law, Hoyle should have issued her a citation for driving without insurance and an

expired registration. 

Police officers may not place a person under custodial arrest when they only have

probable cause to cite them for an infraction. Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco, 495

F.3d 645, 653–54 (9th Cir. July 17, 2007). Here, however, Taylor argues that Hoyle actually

pulled her over with the intention of arresting her for leaving the scene of the accident. Taylor

testified that, to the extent Hoyle asked her questions before placing her under arrest, they were

about leaving the scene of the accident, not about her expired registration. Plaintiff also

testified that she called dispatch and was given permission to leave the scene of the accident. 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could

conclude that Hoyle did not have probable cause to arrest her. 

B. Excessive Force.

“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on

the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests

at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). Determining whether the force used was reasonable “requires careful attention to the

facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Ibid. “The

reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . .” Id. at 396–97. “In

some cases . . . the availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a suspect may be

a factor to consider.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 349 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Taylor also argues that Hoyle used excessive force by wrenching her arm over her head,

pushing her down on the car, and applying handcuffs too tightly. Defendant presents Officer

Hoyle’s declaration, in which he stated that at the time he believed that Taylor had no intention

of going into her house to call the dispatcher to clear up the situation. Hoyle purportedly could

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not follow her into her house, so he detained her at her car. Plaintiff disagrees, and testified at

her deposition that Hoyle was agitated and aggressive when speaking to her. She also testified

that he attacked her when she dropped her shoulder and made a small gesture. Viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to Taylor, a reasonable jury could find that Hoyle used

excessive force. 

To maintain a Monell claim, however, plaintiff must show that a City custom or policy

was the moving force behind her injuries. Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv. of New York, 436

U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force fails (against Oakland) because she

has not shown how Hoyle’s alleged use of excessive force could have been caused by a City of

Oakland custom or policy. As this order explains below, Taylor argues that her injuries were

caused by the City of Oakland’s policy of telling callers that they could leave the scene of the

accident without alerting officers in the field that the caller had been given permission to leave. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Hoyle’s use of excessive force was caused by the

policy. A reasonable jury could conclude that Hoyle arrested Taylor because he did not know

that she had already called dispatch, but there is no evidence that it was the “moving force”

behind his alleged use of excessive force. Indeed, plaintiff never argues that defendant’s

policies and procedures on the use of force are inadequate. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ excessive

force claim cannot form the basis of her Monell claim. Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED as to Taylor’s Monell claim based on excessive force. 

B. Malicious Prosecution.

Next, Taylor argues that she was subjected to malicious prosecution because she

complained about Hoyle’s use of excessive force. To prevail on a claim for malicious

prosecution, plaintiff must show that the defendant caused her to be prosecuted with malice and

without probable cause, and that he did so for the purpose of denying the plaintiff a specific

constitutional right. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In opposing defendant’s motion, plaintiff repeats a number of the arguments she made in

support of her motion for partial summary judgment against defendant Larson. Specifically, she

argues that she was prosecuted with the intention of depriving her rights under the First

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Amendment. To show this, plaintiff must show that her protected speech was a motivating

factor in defendant’s wrongful conduct. Id. at 1071. A First Amendment malicious prosecution

claim must be based on something more than a speculative chilling of speech based on

legitimate and generalized law enforcement initiatives. A showing of specific, targeted police

surveillance and action intended to suppress protected speech is sufficient. Mendocino

Environmental Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457, 464 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff argues that her rights were violated because Larson knew that she had

complained about Hoyle’s conduct and that she was injured during the incident. Plaintiff does

not clarify to which “complaint” she referred, though she did testify that she protested while

being arrested and while Hoyle allegedly used excessive force against her. Plaintiff also

presents evidence that Larson told Hoyle at the time of her arrest that there was a problem with

arresting her on the hit-and-run charge. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, in his report, Larson misrepresented that Taylor was not given permission to leave the

scene of the accident, and recommended that she be prosecuted for leaving the scene of an

accident. Accordingly, defendant has not eliminated all triable issues of fact regarding

plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 

C. Substantive Due Process.

“[T]he Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it can properly be

characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Lewis v. County

of Sacramento, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). The Supreme Court has “spoken of the cognizable

level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.” Id. at 846. It is clear

that mere negligence or liability grounded in tort does not meet the standard for a substantive

due process violation. Id. at 849. 

Plaintiff argues that her substantive due process rights were violated under the

state-created danger doctrine. In general, the government is not liable for the actions of third

parties. DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,195–96 (1989). One

exception is the state-created danger doctrine, in which the government can be liable where its

affirmative conduct a party in danger from a third party that he or she otherwise would not have

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been in. Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1092–93 (9th Cir. July 26, 2007). A plaintiff

must show that government officials “acted with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious

danger.” L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Taylor argues that police dispatchers, by telling her that she was free to leave the scene

of the accident and failing to inform police on patrol that they did so, placed her in danger from

Officer Hoyle. The state-created danger doctrine itself seems to indicate that it applies to

dangers from third parties. See, e.g., Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding

that there was a triable issue of fact where police impounded a woman’s car stranding her in a

high crime area where she was subsequently raped). The question becomes whether the third

party could be another government officer, for instance, where the government’s action or

inaction places a person in harm’s way from other government actors, here, causing them to be

unlawfully arrested or prosecuted. The closest precedent seems to be decisions such as

Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 80–81 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 2007), in which the Second Circuit

noted that a state-created danger claim could arise when government officials gave a plaintiff a

false sense of security from a known, specified danger. This decision seems similar to the facts

at hand. Because Taylor believed she had permission to leave the scene of the accident, she did

so, which placed her at risk of being arrested at her home by Officer Hoyle and later prosecuted. 

Defendant also presents evidence, which plaintiff does not dispute, that dispatcher

Reese’s failure to make the notation was merely an accident. Even if she had made the

notation, however, officers in the field may not have known about it given that they had no

access to the information and no obligation to verify if a driver had called dispatch. Viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the

policy itself constituted deliberate indifference to the risk that plaintiff would be wrongfully

arrested. Accordingly, subject to yet more briefing on this issue at trial, there remain triable

issues of fact as to plaintiff’s state-created danger claim, and summary judgment is not

appropriate. 

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2. CUSTOM OR POLICY AS MOVING FORCE.

Municipalities and local governments can be sued directly for violations of

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 where government officials were acting pursuant to

an official policy or recognized custom. Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv. of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978). The plaintiff must identify the policy or custom which caused the violation. 

“The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was

the ‘moving force’ behind the conduct alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal

action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal

link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of County

Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (emphasis in original). 

A. Custom or Policy.

A custom is a widespread practice that, although not authorized by law or express city

policy, it is so permanent and well-settled that it applies with the force of law. Monell, 436 U.S.

at 690–91. “Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose

liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an

existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal

policymaker.” City of Okalahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985). 

Taylor argues that the City had a custom under which they would train dispatchers to

tell people that they could leave the scene of an accident if they felt unsafe. Dispatchers were

supposed to make a notation in the computer system if a person called in saying that they had

left the scene, but the notation was only available to other dispatchers. Officers could have

found out about the notation, but there was no obligation for them to call dispatch to see if a

driver suspected of leaving the scene of an accident had called in before arresting them. This

policy was a disaster waiting to happen, or so it was argued. It was foreseeable that a caller

would leave the scene of an accident believing that they had permission to do so. The officers

in the field would then not know the caller had called in, and the caller would be arrested for

leaving the scene of an accident. 

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Defendant presents evidence that the City’s actual policy stated that dispatchers could

not tell callers to stay in dangerous situations. Dispatchers should have told callers to use their

judgment in deciding whether or not to leave. Plaintiff testified that she was told that she could

leave. Additionally, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the call with

dispatcher Reese would seem to indicate that Reese approved of her decision to leave. Even

assuming callers were merely told to use their judgment, it is reasonable to think that at least

some callers would conclude that they could leave. It was also foreseeable that callers would

do so. 

Defendants concede that at the time of this incident, officers in the field did not have

access to the information entered into the system by dispatchers. Under this system, an officer

in the field would not have known if a driver had called in unless the dispatcher had first alerted

him or her to that fact, or the officer had asked the dispatcher. Plaintiffs present evidence that

there was no policy in place that would have required an officer to make any such verification

before arresting someone suspected of leaving the scene of an accident. The officer assigned to

the call may have learned about the notation from the dispatcher, but any other officer who

might have encountered a suspect, such as Hoyle, may not have known after the original hitand-run broadcast had gone out. Accordingly, there still remains a triable issue of fact as to

whether this policy was the moving force behind plaintiff’s alleged unlawful arrest and

malicious prosecution. As described above, however, the dispatch policy could not have been

the motivating force behind Hoyle’s alleged use of excessive force, so defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED as to that theory. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

is DENIED as to plaintiff’s claims based on unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution, and

substantive due procees. 

B. Failure to Train.

“[I]nadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where

the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the

police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Assuming

plaintiff has shown that the training received by employees was inadequate, the question then

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becomes whether inadequate training can be justifiably called municipal policy. Id. at 389–90. 

To show failure to train, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he was deprived of a constitutional

right; (2) the City had a training policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to the

constitutional rights of the persons with whom its police officers are likely to come into contact;

and (3) his constitutional injury would have been avoided had the City properly trained those

officers.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. May 8, 2007). 

Taylor presents two theories on her failure to train claim. First, she argues that

defendant failed to train its employees to verify that a driver had not called in before leaving the

scene of an accident before making an arrest. This operates in the same manner as plaintiffs’

custom or policy claim. Second, she argues that the City failed to train dispatcher Reese to

make a notation that Taylor had called dispatch and had left the scene. Neither party disputes

that Reese failed to make such a notation, or that she was not disciplined for failing to do so. 

Defendants present evidence that Reese thought that Taylor had been given permission to leave

the scene of the accident by an officer. But viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

Taylor, a reasonable trier of fact could still conclude that a failure of training caused Reese not

to make the notation. 

As to deliberate indifference, the City argues that it could not have anticipated these

particular facts or trained its employees for them. In response, plaintiff contends that the City

acted with deliberate indifference to the confusion that could result when officers in the field do

not know whether a driver has actually left the scene of an accident or not. If the officers did

not know, then they could, as here, run the risk of unlawfully arresting someone. Accordingly,

there still remain triable issues of fact in plaintiff’s failure to train claim. Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment is DENIED as to this claim. 

C. Ratification and Lack of Remedial Action.

Under a ratification theory, a plaintiff must show that “authorized policymakers

approve[d] a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” City of St. Louis v. Prapotnick, 485

U.S. 112, 127 (1988). To demonstrate ratification, plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker,

here the Chief of Police, made “a deliberate choice from among various alternatives to follow a

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particular course of action.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992). “A

policymaker’s knowledge of an unconstitutional act does not, by itself, constitute ratification. 

Instead, a plaintiff must prove that the policymaker approved of the subordinate’s act.” Christie

v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1232, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). 

With this theory, it is difficult to discern whom defendant should have disciplined and

for what they should have been disciplined. Plaintiff in her opposition states “the City has not

disciplined any officer or dispatcher, has not taken any other remedial action and has ratified the

unlawful conduct” (Opp. at 24). The City agrees that it did not take any remedial action. Both

sides also agree that the City undertook an investigation after plaintiff filed suit, but the

investigation was closed because final action rested in the hands of the Chief of Police. There is

also no evidence that the City was aware of the incident until plaintiff filed this action. 

At all events, defendant argues that plaintiff has presented no evidence that the City

made a conscious choice approving of the actions of either the dispatcher or the officers

involved and the basis for their actions. The mere fact that there was an investigation that was

later closed is not sufficient. The Ninth Circuit has noted that “to hold cities liable under

Section 1983 whenever policymakers fail to overrule the unconstitutional discretionary acts of

subordinates would simply smuggle respondeat superior liability into Section 1983.” Weisbuch

v. County of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, plaintiff has presented no

facts that would indicate that city officials acted with deliberate indifference to her rights. 

Accordingly, there remain no triable issues of fact regarding plaintiff’s Monell claims under a

ratification theory. Defendant City of Oakland’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as

to plaintiff’s ratification claim. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, defendant the City of Oakland’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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