Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01590/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01590-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THERESA LUCARELLI,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PAUL DILLARD, LETHEL POLK, and DOES

ONE THROUGH TEN, inclusive,

Defendants /

No. C-05-1590 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT;

DENYING AS MOOT REQUEST FOR

STAY; VACATING HEARING

Before the Court is the motion, filed August 9, 2005 by defendants Paul Dillard

(“Dillard”) and Lethel Polk (“Polk”), to dismiss plaintiff Theresa Lucarelli’s complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has filed

opposition, to which defendants have replied. Having read and considered the papers filed

in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for

decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for October 7, 2005, and rules as

follows:

1. Defendants’ request for a stay until the Court has considered defendants’ motion

to disqualify plaintiff’s counsel is hereby DENIED as moot, as the Court, by separate order,

has denied defendants’ motion to disqualify.

2. Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the First and Second Causes of

Action, each alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dillard and Polk, on the

Case 3:05-cv-01590-MMC Document 27 Filed 09/28/05 Page 1 of 4
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If, in the future, plaintiff were to seek leave to amend to substitute one or both of

such defendants for a “doe” defendant, any substantive or procedural deficiencies could be

addressed at that time. See, e.g., Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F. 2d 765, 768-69

(9th Cir. 1989) (directing district court to consider whether plaintiff’s motion to amend to

substitute name of actual defendant for “doe” in § 1983 claim was proper under California

relation-back law).

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ground such claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Because California has

“multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions,” the applicable statute of

limitations for purposes of § 1983 is the “residual statute for personal injury actions.” See

Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 and n. 8 (1989). The “residual statute” is § 335.1 of

the California Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a two-year statute of limitations for a

claim for “assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the

wrongful act or neglect of another.” See McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F. 2d 668,

672 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding “residual statute for personal injury actions” is statute including

“catchall” provision, i.e., provision covering injury “caused by the wrongful act or neglect of

another”). Because the earliest act on which plaintiff bases her claims occurred less than

two years before she filed her complaint, (see Compl. ¶ 9), plaintiff’s First and Second

Causes of Action are timely.

3. With respect to plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action, alleging a § 1983 claim against

“supervisory doe defendants” for failure to properly train Dillard, defendants argue such

claim should be dismissed as against them because they are not named therein. Given

that the Third Cause of Action is not alleged as against the moving defendants, however,

there is nothing for the Court to dismiss as against the moving defendants.1

4. Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action, alleging a violation of the California

Whistleblower Protection Act (“CWPA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8547-8547.12, is subject to

dismissal, without prejudice, because plaintiff has not alleged that she filed a complaint with

the State Personnel Board and that such entity has issued or failed to issue findings in

connection therewith. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 8547.8(c) (setting forth prerequisites to filing

claim for damages under CWPA). In light of plaintiff’s representation, in her opposition, that

she has not exhausted her administrative remedies, (see Pl.’s Opp., filed September 16,

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Further, plaintiff’s request for leave to amend to allege a claim for injunctive relief

under the CWPA will be denied, because the only relief available under the statute is

damages. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 8547.8(c) (providing for “action for damages”).

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The Court takes judicial notice of plaintiff’s claim, dated March 7, 2005 and received

March 8, 2005 by the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. 

See Oregon Ass’n of Homes for the Aging, Inc. v. Oregon, 5 F. 3d 1239, 1243 n.2 (9th Cir.

1993) (holding district court may take judicial notice of records of administrative body).

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2005, at 5:18-19), leave to amend to allege exhaustion would, at the present time, be

futile.2

5. The parties agree that each remaining state law claim is subject to the

presentation requirement set forth in the California Tort Claims Act. See Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 910(e). Where a plaintiff has not satisfied the presentation requirement before

commencing suit, the plaintiff’s state law claims are subject to dismissal. See

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F. 2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Further,

where a plaintiff has presented a claim, “the factual circumstances set forth in the written

claim must correspond with the facts alleged in the complaint,” and, thus, a complaint

based on facts not set forth within the written claim is subject to dismissal. See Fall River

Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 431, 434 (1988).

a. Plaintiff’s tort claim makes no reference to any conduct by Polk. (See

Lamerdin Decl., filed August 9, 2005, Ex. A).3 Consequently, plaintiff has not complied with

the presentation requirement with respect to any claim against Polk, and such claims are

subject to dismissal. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F. 2d at 627.

b. Plaintiff’s tort claim alleges Dillard “has routinely and repeatedly harassed

[plaintiff] verbally and, on one occasion, physically, and has further obstructed her career

opportunities,” and that Dillard engaged in such conduct for the “sole reason [ ] that

[plaintiff] asserted her legal right to report his unlawful conduct.” (See Lamerdin Decl. Ex. A

¶ 18.) Plaintiff further represented that such conduct had not occurred “more than six

months” earlier than March 7, 2005. (See id. ¶¶ 13, 22.) In her complaint, by contrast,

plaintiff seeks relief based on an allegation that Dillard engaged in tortious conduct on April

30, 2003 and May 1, 2003. (See Compl. ¶ 9-22.) Because plaintiff chose to limit her tort

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claim to conduct occurring no earlier than six months before March 7, 2005, she has failed

to present any claim against Dillard based on conduct occurring in 2003, and such claims

are subject to dismissal. See Fall River Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 206 Cal. App. 3d at 434. 

Plaintiff’s complaint, however, can be liberally construed as alleging acts of harassment,

retaliation, and defamation by Dillard occurring within six months of March 7, 2005, (see

Compl. ¶¶ 23-27), and, as a consequence, Dillard is not entitled to dismissal of the state

law claims against him in their entirety, although such claims will be limited in scope to

conduct occurring within six months of March 7, 2005.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, defendants’ request for a stay is hereby DENIED as moot,

and defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint is hereby GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part, as follows:

1. The Seventh Cause of Action is dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice.

2. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth

Causes of Action are dismissed, as against Polk, without prejudice.

3. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth

Causes of Action are dismissed, as against Dillard, to the extent such claims are based on

conduct occurring more than six months before March 7, 2005.

4. In all other respects, the motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2005 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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