Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01003/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01003-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR WYATT, MARSHALL K. )

McMURRAY, CHARLES MITCHELL, EDGAR ) 2:06-CV-1003 GEB-JFM

M. COLLINS, and TERRANCE )

HALTIWANGER, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

COUNTY OF BUTTE and DEPUTY PATRICK )

McNELLIS, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) claims, which are based on Plaintiffs’ arrests and

incarceration in Butte County Jail. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are Victor Wyatt (“Wyatt”), Marshall McMurray

(“McMurray”), Charles Mitchell (“Mitchell”), Edgar Collins (“Collins”)

and Terrance Haltiwanger (“Haltiwanger”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). 

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2

Defendants are County of Butte (“the County”) and Deputy Patrick

McNellis (“McNellis”) (collectively, “Defendants”).

Several of Plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed by this Court

in an order issued April 11, 2007. The claims that remain are: (1)

Wyatt’s claim against the County that his incompetency determination

violated the Equal Protection Clause (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 19); (2)

Wyatt’s claim against the County that he was arrested in retaliation

for filing a civil complaint (Id. ¶ 20); (3) McMurray’s claim against

the County that the Oroville Police Department violated his Fourth

Amendment rights (Id. ¶ 34); (4) Mitchell’s claim against the County

that the Oroville Police Department used excessive force while

arresting him (Id. ¶¶ 16, 36); (5) Collins’s and Haltiwanger’s claims

against the County that they were denied telephone access while

awaiting their state criminal trials (Id. ¶ 39); (6) Collins’s claim

against the County that the Oroville Police Department used excessive

force while arresting him in 2004 (Id. ¶ 26); (7) Collins’s claim

against Defendants that McNellis used excessive force while arresting

him in 2006 (Id. ¶¶ 26, 31-32); (8) Collins’s claim against Defendants

for IIED against McNellis relating to the 2006 arrest (Id. ¶ 63); (9)

Plaintiffs’ claims against the County that they received inadequate

medical attention while incarcerated at Butte County Jail (Id. ¶¶ 26-

28, 36, 40-41, 43); (10) Wyatt’s claim against the County that a

prison guard used excessive force while restraining him (Id. ¶ 43);

(11) McMurray’s claim against the County that a Consent Decree in

place at Butte County Jail is unconstitutional (Id. ¶ 46); and (12)

Plaintiffs’ claim that the County has failed to train its correctional

officers (Id. ¶ 47).

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3

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if, when viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is

no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The moving party has

the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact, and

“may discharge this burden by either submitting affirmative evidence

negating an essential element of the non-movant’s claim,” or “by

demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence itself is

insufficient to establish an essential element of its claim.” 10A

Wright, Miller & Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2727, at 471-72 (1998),

citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

II. Claims Against Non-County Actors

The County seeks summary judgment on Wyatt’s Equal

Protection Clause claim, Wyatt’s retaliatory arrest claim, McMurray’s

Fourth Amendment claim, Mitchell’s excessive force claim, and

Collins’s excessive force claim concerning his 2004 arrest, arguing

that these claims are based on conduct not attributable to County

actors. (Mot. at 11:20-12:24, 19:15-20, 22:15-20, 27:4-13.) 

To state a § 1983 claim, the violation must have been

committed by a “person.” Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d

1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). A county is a “person” under § 1983, but

a state and its officials are not, due to Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity. Id. Consequently, whether Plaintiffs may maintain a § 1983

claim against the County depends on whether the actor responsible for

the constitutional violation was a County actor. See id.

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A. Wyatt’s Equal Protection Clause Claim

Wyatt alleges that a psychologist’s determination that he

was incompetent to stand trial was a delay of trial tactic that

resulted in a violation of his Equal Protection Clause rights. (SDUF

¶ 71.) Wyatt avers that while he was in Butte County Jail awaiting

trial for state criminal charges of domestic violence, his “courtappointed attorney” said Wyatt “must be crazy to refuse” a plea he had

been offered, so he was examined by Dr. Paul Wuehler, a psychologist

in Marysville. (Decl. Wyatt ¶ 6.) Dr. Wuehler found Wyatt was not

competent to stand trial, which resulted in a delay of “many months”

while Wyatt waited for an opening in Napa State Hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 6,

9.) Once Wyatt was transferred to Napa State Hospital, the

psychologist there found Wyatt was not incompetent. (Id. ¶ 9.)

The County has demonstrated that Wyatt’s evidence is

insufficient to establish that any County actor was responsible for

intentionally causing a delay trial by having Wyatt found incompetent. 

The only persons Wyatt alleges had any role in the event were his

public defender and Dr. Wuehler. Wyatt presents no evidence that

either of these persons is a County actor. See Polk County v. Dodson,

454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under

color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as

counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”). Therefore, the

County’s motion for summary judgment is granted on Wyatt’s Equal

Protection Clause claim based on his incompetency hearing. 

B. Wyatt’s Retaliatory Arrest Claim

Wyatt alleges that he was arrested by the Chico City Police

for filing his civil rights complaint against the County. (SDUF ¶

73.) Since the Chico City Police Department is not a County actor,

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McMurray also alleges that his children’s Fourth Amendment 1

rights were violated. However, his children are not plaintiffs in this

action, and McMurray cannot assert violations of constitutional rights

on their behalf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978) (“Fourth

Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted

vicariously.”).

5

the County is not liable on this claim under Monell. Hence, the

County’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to Wyatt’s

retaliatory arrest claim against the County.

C. McMurray’s Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Claim,

Mitchell’s Excessive Force Claim, and Collins’s Excessive Force Claim

McMurray alleges that the Butte Interagency Narcotics Task

Force violated his Fourth Amendment right against illegal search and

seizure. (Id. ¶ 104.) However, in his deposition, McMurray stated 1

that the Oroville Police Department was responsible for the illegal

search and seizure. (Decl. Scott Cavanaugh in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot.

for Summ. J. (“Cavanaugh Decl.”), Ex. D at 27:5-7.) Mitchell alleges

that two officers from the Oroville Police Department used excessive

force while arresting him. (SDUF ¶¶ 117-18.) Collins alleges that

the officers who arrested him in 2004 used excessive force. (Id. ¶

147.) In his deposition, Collins states that the officers were from

the Oroville Police Department. (Cavanaugh Decl., Ex. I at 22:1-7.) 

Since the Oroville Police Department is not a County actor,

the County is not liable on these claims under Monell. Therefore, the

County’s motion for summary judgment is granted on McMurray’s Fourth

Amendment search and seizure claim, Mitchell’s excessive force claim,

and Collins’s excessive force claim regarding his 2004 arrest.

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II. Claims Barred by the Heck Rule

A. Collins’s and Haltiwanger’s Telephone Access Claims

The County seeks summary judgment on Collins’s and

Haltiwanger’s telephone access claims, arguing that the claims are

barred by the Heck rule. See Heck v. Humphries, 512 U.S. 477, 486

(1994). (Mot. at 8:3-13; 9:25-4.) Collins and Haltiwanger allege

that lack of access to a telephone while they were pre-trial detainees

in Butte County Jail impaired their ability to act in their own

defense at their trials. (SDUF ¶¶ 55, 67.) Collins and Haltiwanger

aver that “[a]t the jail there is only a monitored phone where inmates

can call out collect,” and that “[d]ue to [their] inability to use a

telephone . . . privately, [Collins and Haltiwanger were] unable to

talk to witnesses who would have aided in the presentation of [their]

defense at trial.” (Haltiwanger Decl. ¶ 14; Collins Decl. ¶ 17.) 

Under Heck, a prisoner’s civil rights suit is barred if it

would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s conviction,

unless the prisoner’s conviction has been overturned or invalidated. 

512 U.S. at 486. Since lack of telephone access during and before

trial implicates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, these claims

necessary imply the invalidity of Collins’s and Haltiwanger’s

subsequent convictions, which have not been overturned or otherwise

invalidated. See Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir.

2002) (dismissing Sixth Amendment claim for lack of telephone access

because the claim was barred under Heck). Therefore, the County’s

motion for summary judgment is granted on Collins’s and Haltiwanger’s

telephone access claims.

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B. Collins’s Excessive Force Claim for 2006 Arrest

Defendants seek summary judgment on Collins’s excessive

force claim involved with his 2006 arrest, arguing the claim is barred

by the Heck rule. (Mot. at 6:24-7:11.) In 2006, Collins was

convicted of a violation of California Penal Code section 148(a) for

resisting, delaying or obstructing a police officer during his arrest

by McNellis. (SDUF ¶ 50.) This conviction has not been invalidated. 

(Id. ¶ 51.) 

“A conviction for [violation of California Penal Code

section 148(a) . . . may be lawfully obtained only if the officers do

not use excessive force in the course of making that arrest.” Smith

v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 696 (9th Cir. 2005). If Collins’s

excessive force claim is based on McNellis’s conduct that occurred

before Collins’s resistance of the arrest, the claim would implicate

the validity of the conviction and therefore would be barred under

Heck. See id. However, Collins may maintain his excessive force

claim “if the use of excessive force occurred subsequent to the

conduct on which his conviction was based.” Id. at 698.

Defendants have demonstrated that Collins’s evidence is

insufficient to establish that the use of excessive force occurred

after the arrest was made. Collins’s description of the incident in

his deposition demonstrates that McNellis’s conduct that is the basis

for Collins’s excessive force claim occurred during the arrest, not

afterward. (See Collins Depo. at 78:3-99:24.) Likewise, Collins’s

declaration in opposition to the motion for summary judgment does not

state that the excessive force occurred after the arrest. (See

Collins Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.) Collins’s conviction has not been invalidated. 

(SDUF ¶ 51.) Accordingly, since Collins’s excessive force claim

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necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction under Penal Code

section 148(a), Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on

Collins’s excessive force claim concerning his 2006 arrest.

C. Collins’s IIED Claim

Defendants seek summary judgment on Collins’s IIED claim,

arguing that the claim is barred because it implies the validity of

his conviction for resisting arrest. (Mot. at 7:13-23.) Collins’s

IIED claim is based on his arrest by McNellis in 2006. (Id. ¶ 54.) 

However, under California law, Collins may not maintain an IIED claim

based on his arrest because he was convicted of resisting arrest and

the IIED claim would implicate the lawfulness of the conviction. See

Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1412-13 (2002). 

“Permitting [Collins] to pursue state tort claims notwithstanding a

conviction [for resisting arrest] would potentially allow him to

profit by his own wrongdoing.” Id. at 1412-13 (holding that state law

tort claims, including IIED claim, were barred by California Penal

Code section 148(a) conviction). Accordingly, since Collins’s IIED

claim necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction under Penal

Code section 148(a), Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

granted on Collins’s IIED claim.

III. Claims Barred by Failure to Exhaust Remedies

The County seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims that

they received inadequate medical care while in Butte County Jail and

Wyatt’s claim for excessive force, arguing that Plaintiffs have not

exhausted available administrative remedies. (Mot. at 32-33.) 

Each Plaintiff alleges he received inadequate medical care

while in the Butte County jail. (SDUF ¶¶ 74, 96, 120-21, 145, 166.) 

Wyatt also alleges that a guard in Butte County Jail used excessive

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force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when the guard handcuffed

him on July 23, 2006. (Id. ¶ 80.) Wyatt alleges that the guard

“handcuffed [him] too tightly on purpose and pulled [him] by those

cuffs in order to hurt [him]. [The guard] pushed [Wyatt’s] face

against the wall and kept [him] there uncomfortably unable to move and

fearful for what might happen next.” (Wyatt Decl. ¶ 15.)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), provides

that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 (2001). 

Exhaustion is a prerequisite to all prisoner lawsuits concerning

prison life, whether such actions involve general conditions or

particular episodes, whether they allege excessive force or some other

wrong, and even if they seek relief not available in grievance

proceedings, such as money damages. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,

524 (2002); see Booth, 532 U.S. at 734, 741 (PLRA applied to § 1983

claim of inadequate medical care).

Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiffs’ evidence is

insufficient to establish that any Plaintiff has exhausted

administrative remedies concerning these claims. (See SDUF ¶¶ 181,

185, 188, 191-92; Cavanaugh Decl., Ex. M.) Plaintiffs argue that

their grievances “went as far as jail staff allowed.” (SDUF ¶¶ 185,

188, 191-92.) However, no Plaintiff presents evidence showing any

jail official interfered with the pursuit of an administrative

grievance. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ mere argument that prison officials

did not permit Plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies is

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an insufficient basis for denying summary judgment. See Tovar v. U.S.

Postal Serv., 3 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[B]are assertions or

unsupported conclusions are not facts sufficient to support either a

summary or a post-trial judgment.”).

Plaintiffs further argue that they did not receive (or could

not remember receiving) the Jail Information Handbook that describes

how to pursue an administrative remedy. (Wyatt Decl. ¶ 2; Collins

Decl. ¶ 16; Haltiwanger Decl. ¶ 4; Mitchell Decl. ¶ 14; McMurray Decl.

¶ 2.) However, the undisputed facts accompanying Defendants’ motion

evince that each Plaintiff knew about the grievance procedure; and,

therefore, even assuming arguendo no handbooks were received, that

does not defeat Defendants’ motion. See Goebert v. Lee County, 2005

WL 3312333, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2005) (holding that because the

prisoner knew about the grievance procedure, it was immaterial that

the prisoner was not provided an inmate handbook). (See SDUF 184,

187, 190, 191, 193.) 

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the grievance process was a

“sham exercise.” (Id. ¶ 189.) However, “there is no ‘futility

exception’ to the PLRA exhaustion requirement.” Massey v. Wheeler,

221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing prisoner’s claim under

the PLRA despite prisoner’s contention that administrative remedy

process was a “sham”). 

Accordingly, the County’s motion for summary judgment is

granted on Plaintiffs’ claim for inadequate medical care and on

Wyatt’s claim for excessive force.

IV. McMurray’s Consent Decree Claim

The County seeks summary judgment on McMurray’s claim that a

Consent Decree in place at Butte County Jail is unconstitutional. 

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(Mot. at 20:3-21:4.) McMurray alleges that the Consent Decree did not

provide him with an adequate means for redress of his claims of denial

of free exercise of religion and other alleged civil rights

violations. (SDUF ¶ 106.) McMurray alleges that because the Consent

Decree relates only to general jail conditions, and did not address

civil rights issues, it is unconstitutional. (Id. ¶ 110.) 

“The parties to a consent decree expect and achieve a

continuing basis of jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the

resolution of their case in the court entering the order.” Smyth ex

re. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2002). The

Consent Decree was not issued by this Court. Where a claim attacks

the validity of a consent decree entered by another court, the second

court may “refuse entirely to entertain the action if relief in a more

appropriate forum--the rendering court--were available.” Goulart v.

United Airlines, Inc., 1994 WL 544476, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28,

1994), quoting Treadaway v. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis., 783

F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986). This refusal is demanded by

“considerations of comity and orderly administration of justice.” 

Treadaway, 783 F.2d at 1421 (upholding district court’s refusal to set

aside another court’s final order).

This Court will not intrude upon the continuing jurisdiction

of the court that entered the Consent Decree. Accordingly, this claim

is dismissed.

B. Failure to Train

The County seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that

the County has failed to train its correctional officers, arguing

that, under Monell, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that the

training is inadequate. (Mot. at 32:9-21.) 

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There are “limited circumstances in which an allegation of a

‘failure to train’ can be the basis for liability under § 1983.” City

of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). “Only where a

municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect

evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants

can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or

custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 389.

The County has shown it employs a trainer who trains County

correctional officers who interact with inmates in appropriate state

and local laws and regulations. (SDUF ¶¶ 176-78.) Defendants have

demonstrated that Plaintiffs’s evidence is insufficient to establish

that the County’s correctional officer training program is inadequate,

let alone that it evidences a “deliberate indifference” to the rights

of prisoners. Accordingly, the County’s motion for summary judgment

on Plaintiffs’ failure to train claim is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is granted on each of Plaintiffs’ claims. The Clerk shall

enter judgment in favor of Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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