Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01059/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01059-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert D. Lemke, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections; and the Attorney 

General of the State of Arizona, 

 Respondents. 

No. CV-09-1059-PHX-DGC 

ORDER 

 The victim in this case was robbed and shot to death at a hotel in Tempe, Arizona. 

Petitioner Robert Lemke was indicted on charges of first degree felony murder, armed 

robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. A state court jury convicted on the 

lesser included offenses of theft and conspiracy to commit theft, but was unable to reach 

a verdict on the murder charge. Petitioner received concurrent 25 and 27-year sentences. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s double jeopardy challenge to a retrial 

on the murder charge, Lemke v. Rayes, 141 P.3d 407 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007), and the 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Plaintiff thereafter pled guilty to the murder 

charge in exchange for a concurrent life sentence with the possibility of parole after 25 

years. 

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 On May 18, 2009, Petitioner filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin has filed a report 

and recommendation (“R&R”) that the petition be denied. Doc. 20. Petitioner has filed 

objections (Doc. 23), to which a response has been filed (Doc. 28). For reasons stated 

below, the Court will accept the R&R and deny the petition. 

I. Legal Standard.

 A party may file specific, written objections to an R&R within ten days after being 

served with a copy the R&R. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court 

must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific 

objections are made. See id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate 

judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

II. Discussion.

 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person 

shall “be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb” for the same offense. This constitutional 

protection against double jeopardy encompasses principles of res judicata and collateral 

estoppel, commonly referred to, respectively, as claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 

See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (claim preclusion); Ashe v. 

Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (issue preclusion). Where separate prosecutions are for 

the “same offense,” that is, neither offense requires proof of a fact which the other does 

not, the claim preclusion component of the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the successive 

prosecution. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Where a jury by its verdict has finally 

determined an issue of ultimate fact, the issue preclusion component of the Double 

Jeopardy Clause bars the State from haling the defendant “before a new jury to litigate 

that issue again.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446. 

 The instant habeas petition asserts four grounds for relief. Doc. 1. The first three 

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combine to assert a claim based on the claim preclusion component of double jeopardy. 

Petitioner argues that his conviction on the lesser included offense of theft constitutes an 

implicit acquittal of armed robbery, that armed robbery is the same offense as felony 

murder predicated on armed robbery, and that his conviction for theft therefore 

terminated jeopardy on the felony murder charge. Doc. 1 at 6-8. The fourth ground for 

relief raises the issue preclusion component of double jeopardy, that is, Petitioner argues 

that the jury’s silence as to felony murder while convicting on the lesser included offense 

of theft constitutes a valid and final judgment in his favor on the felony murder charge. 

Id. at 9. 

 By pleading guilty to the charge of felony murder, the Magistrate Judge 

concluded, Petitioner has waived his double jeopardy claims. Doc. 20 at 6-16. The 

Court agrees. 

 “[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in 

the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court 

that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter 

raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred 

prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). It is 

“well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, 

who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.’” United 

States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989) (citation omitted). 

 Petitioner entered a counseled, knowing, and voluntary plea of guilty on the 

charge of felony murder. The right to collaterally attack that charge on double jeopardy 

grounds was not explicitly reserved in the plea agreement. Nor is conscious waiver 

necessary with respect to each potential defense relinquished by a guilty plea. This is so 

because waiver “derives not from any inquiry into a defendant’s subjective understanding 

of the range of potential defenses, but from the admissions necessarily made upon entry 

of a voluntary plea of guilty.” Broce, 488 U.S. at 573-74. Petitioner has therefore 

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waived his double jeopardy claims absent some valid exception to the waiver doctrine. 

 Petitioner asserts that this case fits within the exception set forth in Menna v. New 

York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975). Docs. 19 at 2, 23 at 2. He is incorrect. 

 The double jeopardy claim in Menna was a “strong one on the merits” given that 

the defendant had served jail time on a contempt charge for refusing to give testimony 

before a grand jury and later was indicted for the same refusal to answer grand jury 

questions. 432 U.S. at 61-62 & n.2. Menna explicitly did not hold that a double jeopardy 

claim may never be waived. Id. at 63 n.2. Instead, the case stands only for the 

proposition that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that judged on its 

face the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” Id. (emphasis 

added). The double jeopardy claim in Menna was deemed not waived because the 

indictment to which the defendant pled guilty “was facially duplicative of the earlier 

offense of which the defendant had been convicted and sentenced so that the admissions 

made by [the] guilty plea could not conceivably be construed to extend beyond a 

redundant confession to the earlier offense.” Broce, 488 U.S. at 575-76. Petitioner, by 

contrast, was not convicted and sentenced for felony murder before pleading guilty to that 

charge. His double jeopardy claim, therefore, does not fall within the narrow Menna

exception. See id. at 576 (exception inapplicable where the defendants “pleaded guilty to 

indictments that on their face described separate conspiracies”). 

 In deciding whether the Menna exception applies, the Magistrate Judge essentially 

resolved the merits of Petitioner’s double jeopardy claims. The Court finds that analysis 

unnecessary to the waiver issue. The jury did not convict Petitioner on the charge of 

felony murder, nor did it explicitly acquit him of that charge. On its face, the felony 

murder charge is not clearly “one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” 

Menna, 423 U.S. at 63. 

 Even if the Court were to find that Petitioner has not waived his double jeopardy 

claims, habeas relief would still be denied as the claims are without merit. Jeopardy 

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does not terminate, but rather continues, following a mistrial justified by a hung jury. See 

United States v. Bates, 917 F.2d 388, 392-93 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. 

Perez, 22 U.S. (Wheat. 9) 579, 580, 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824)). Indeed, “a jury’s inability to 

reach a decision is the kind of ‘manifest necessity’ that permits the declaration of a 

mistrial and the continuation of the initial jeopardy that commenced when the jury was 

first impaneled.” Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2009) (citations 

omitted). This Circuit has specifically held that where a defendant is tried on greater and 

lesser included offenses under the same indictment, and jeopardy terminates on the lesser 

offense by acquittal or conviction but continues as to the greater offense pursuant to a 

mistrial, “the government is not barred from retrying the defendant, notwithstanding that 

jeopardy has terminated on the [lesser] offense.” United States v. Jose, 425 F.3d 1237, 

1243 (9th Cir. 2005). “And this is true even though the greater and lesser offenses are the 

‘same offense’ for purposes of double jeopardy.” Id. at 1243-44. Petitioner’s first three 

grounds for relief based on the claim preclusion component of double jeopardy must fail. 

 With respect to the issue preclusion component of double jeopardy, neither a 

conviction on a lesser included offense, nor the jury’s silence on a greater charge has 

collateral estoppel effect “unless the record establishes that the issue was actually and 

necessarily decided in the defendant’s favor.” Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 236 

(1994). “The burden is ‘on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation 

he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.’” Id. at 233 (citation 

omitted). The Magistrate Judge concludes, correctly, that Petitioner has not met his 

burden. 

 Petitioner presents no evidence that the jury actually decided that he did not 

commit armed robbery. The trial court’s instructions explicitly permitted a conviction on 

the lesser included offense of theft if the jury could not agree on the armed robbery 

charge. See Lemke v. Rayes, 141 P.3d 407, 410 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing the socalled “LeBlanc instruction”). In light of that instruction, and absent some evidence to 

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the contrary, the Court is bound to conclude that “the jury could have ‘grounded its 

verdict upon an issue other than that which [Petitioner] seeks to foreclose from 

consideration.’” Schiro, 510 U.S. at 236 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444). Petitioner’s 

fourth ground for relief based on the claim preclusion component of double jeopardy is 

without merit. 

 Nothing in Petitioner’s objections (Doc. 23) undermines the reasoning of the 

Magistrate Judge or the conclusions reached in this order, that is, that Petitioner has 

waived his double jeopardy claims and those claims otherwise are without merit. The 

petition for habeas relief will be denied. 

 The Court has considered whether a certificate of appealability should issue under 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), and concludes that it should not. Petitioner has not shown that 

“jurists of reason” would find it debatable whether the Court is correct in its procedural 

(waiver) ruling. Nor has Petitioner made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 IT IS ORDERED:

 1. The Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation (Doc. 20) is accepted

as set forth in this order. 

 2. Petitioner Robert Lemke’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is 

denied. 

 3. A certificate of appealability is denied. 

 4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 15th day of March, 2011. 

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