Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01736/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01736-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Judy Dufour, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Home Show Mortgage Inc., Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 

(“MERS”); Nationstar Mortgage, LLC; and 

et al., 

 Defendants. 

No. CV-12-01736-PHX-GMS 

ORDER 

 

 Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) filed by Defendant Nationstar 

Mortgage, LLC. Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) 

has joined the Motion. (Doc. 18.) The Court grants the Motion for the reasons discussed 

below. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff pro se Judy Dufour alleges that she owns real estate located at 16672 

North 182nd Lane, Surprise, Arizona 85388. (Doc. 1 ¶ 2.) On July 2, 2007, Dufour 

executed a promissory note that was secured by a deed of trust (DOT) on her property. 

(Doc. 9-2, Ex. B at 53-62.)1

 Under the terms of the DOT, the lender was Defendant The 

 

1

 Generally, a court may not consider evidence or documents beyond the complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. See Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.1990) (amended 

decision). This general rule, however, has two specific exceptions. First, a court may 

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Home Show Mortgage, Inc., and the Trustee was Chicago Title Insurance Co. (Id. at 53.) 

The beneficiary under the DOT was MERS. (Id.) MERS eventually assigned its 

beneficial interest to Nationstar. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B at 69-70.)2

 At some point, Dufour 

defaulted on her loan obligation. (Doc. 1 ¶ 57.) It does not appear from the allegations of 

the Complaint that foreclosure has occurred. 

Dufour brought suit against Home Show Mortgage, MERS, Nationstar, and other 

unnamed Defendants on August 14, 2012. She asserts six causes of action: Wrongful 

Foreclosure; Fraud; Quiet Title; Declaratory Relief; Violation of the Real Estate and 

Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, and the Federal Reserve Acts, 24 

C.F.R. § 3500; and Violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g). 

(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 55-107.) To support her claims, Dufour advances a number of allegations, 

including the following: the no Defendant can present a valid note (Id. ¶¶ 3, 55-56), the 

assignments were unlawful (Id. ¶¶ 19, 64), there was a “split” in the ownership of the 

note and the DOT that voids any interest (Id. ¶¶ 3, 34, 55-56), she is entitled to the 

property free and clear because Home Show Mortgage was paid by the purchaser of the 

note and the subsequent note holder was paid by the insurance company upon her default 

(Id. ¶¶ 26, 63, 72), and the securitization of the note was improper and destroyed any 

interest in the property (Id. ¶¶ 6, 34). Nationstar filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 

22, 2012. (Doc. 9.) MERS joined the Motion on November 13, 2012. (Doc. 18.) 

 consider documents “whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff's] pleading,” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Silicon Graphics 

Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original). Second, a court may take judicial notice of “matters of public record outside the pleadings.” Mack v. S. 

Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991). Even when 

considering a public record, however, judicial notice is limited to those facts that are “not 

subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court takes judicial notice of the Deed of Trust under these standards. 

2

 The Court also takes judicial notice of the Assignment of Deed of Trust. 

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DISCUSSION 

 Nationstar moves to dismiss Dufour’s Complaint on three grounds: it is barred by 

the doctrine of res judicata, it fails to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8 

and Rule 10(b), and the complaint fails to state a claim. Because the Court determines 

that the claims raised in the Complaint are foreclosed under res judicata, it declines to 

consider the other rationales with respect to Nationstar. MERS, however, was not a 

defendant to the prior action. Nevertheless, the Court determines that the Complaint fails 

to state a claim against MERS as a matter of law. 

I. Claims against Nationstar 

 Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure denotes res judicata as an 

affirmative defense. Ordinarily, affirmative defenses may not be raised in a motion to 

dismiss. Res judicata, however, may be asserted in a motion to dismiss so long as it does 

not raise any disputed issues of fact. Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 

1984); Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992). Nationstar bases its res 

judicata argument on Dufour’s Complaint in this case, the complaint in case number 

2:12-cv-01579-FJM, and the Order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss in that case. 

Thus, Nationstar’s res judicata argument does not present any disputed issues of fact, and 

consideration of it on a motion to dismiss is appropriate. 

In August, Judge Martone granted a Motion to Dismiss filed by Nationstar against 

Dufour. See Dufour v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. CV-12-01579-FJM (D. Ariz. Aug. 

24, 2012). In that case, Dufour brought a similar action to avoid foreclosure and obtain 

clear title to the Surprise property.3

 Judge Martone noted Dufour’s lack of response to the 

motion in the Order, but ultimately granted the motion on the merits, albeit in cursory 

fashion: “We agree with defendants that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendants’ motions to 

 

3

 The address in the other complaint (Doc. 1-1 ¶ 4.1 in CV-12-01579-FJM) matches the address in the instant Complaint. The Court takes judicial notice of the other complaint as a public record whose contents are not subject to reasonable dispute. 

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dismiss. Because any amendment to the complaint would be futile, the order dismissing 

this case is with prejudice. The clerk shall enter final judgment.” Id. at 1. (internal 

citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Nationstar argues that this decision bars Dufour’s 

claims here. 

 Dufour asserts that this Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 because her Complaint raises claims under various federal statutes. The federal 

law of res judicata therefore governs Nationstar’s defense. “Res judicata is applicable 

whenever there is (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) 

privity between parties.” Stratosphere Litig. L.L.C. v. Grand Casinos, Inc., 298 F.3d 

1137, 1143 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 

F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001)). Word-for-word similarity is not necessary to show 

identity of claims. “Res judicata bars relitigation of all grounds of recovery that were 

asserted, or could have been asserted, in a previous action between the parties, where the 

previous action was resolved on the merits. . . . [T]he relevant inquiry is whether the[ 

claims] could have been brought.” United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 

F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 For purposes of res judicata, the claims Dufour brings here are identical to those 

Judge Martone dismissed in September. The Court notes at the outset that Dufour does 

not contest Nationstar’s res judicata argument in her Response, which is instead devoted 

to restating the allegations of her Complaint. Nevertheless, a comparison of the claims 

raised in the earlier complaint and the Complaint in this action demonstrates that the 

actions were functionally identical. In the previous action, Dufour, among other things, 

denied the legitimacy of the assignments (Doc. 1-1 in CV-12-01579-FJM at 3), claimed 

that no Defendant could foreclose because they could not produce the “wet ink” note (Id.

at 4, 9, 13), asserted claims under TILA and RESPA (Id. at 13), and sought to quiet title 

in the property and declaratory relief (Id. at 15-16). Not only are many of the claims 

indistinguishable, but the relief Dufour sought in both cases was identical: she sought to 

gain clear title to his property. The differences between the complaints are not sufficient 

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to create different claims under res judicata principles. Any difference qualifies as a 

“ground[] of recovery that . . . could have been asserted,” in the previous action. Barajas, 

147 F.3d at 909. 

 The remaining elements of res judicata are also met. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for 

failure to state a claim is a final judgment for purposes of res judicata. See Stewart v. U.S. 

Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6) is a judgment on the merits to which res judicata applies.”) Although 

Judge Martone referenced Dufour’s failure to file a Response and Local Rule 7.2(i), the 

language of his Order makes clear that the dismissal was on the merits: “We agree with 

defendants that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendants’ motions to dismiss.” The brevity 

of his dismissal order does not rob it of its force for purposes of res judicata. Its brevity is 

explained by the nature of the cut-and-paste claims made by Dufour, claims that have 

been rejected countless times by federal and state courts throughout Arizona. Finally, 

Nationstar was a named defendant in the previous action. All of the elements necessary to 

invoke res judicata are present. 

II. Claims against MERS 

MERS was not a defendant in the previous action, nor was it in privity with any of 

those defendants. It cannot therefore assert the defense of res judicata. See Headwaters 

Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2005). MERS does, however, 

join Nationstar’s attack on Dufour’s Complaint for failure to state a claim as a matter of 

law. The entire premise of Dufour’s claims against MERS has been rejected by the 

Arizona state and federal courts. That alone provides reason for dismissal. In addition, 

however, each of Dufour’s claims fail as a matter of law with respect to MERS. 

A. Legal Standard 

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual 

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allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a complaint need not contain 

detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. When a complaint does not 

“permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 

alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (internal 

quotation omitted). 

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll 

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, 

legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of 

truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not 

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

B. Problematic Theory 

Significant portions of Dufour’s Complaint are dedicated to the idea that the 

various assignments involving MERS violated the law. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33–420 states 

that “[a] person purporting to claim an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real 

property, who causes a document asserting such claim to be recorded in the office of the 

county recorder, knowing or having reason to know that the document is forged, 

groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim or is otherwise invalid is 

liable to the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property.” Her assertion is that 

MERS lacked authority to make assignments. Such an assertion has been directly rejected 

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by both the Arizona Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Hogan 

v. Wash. Mutual Bank, N.A., ––– Ariz. ––––, ––––, 277 P.3d 781, 783 (2012) (“[T]he 

deed of trust statutes impose no obligation on the beneficiary to ‘show the note’ before 

the trustee conducts a non-judicial foreclosure.”); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home 

Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2011) (“None of their allegations indicate that 

the plaintiffs were misinformed about MERS's role as a beneficiary, or the possibility that 

their loans would be resold and tracked through the MERS system. . . . By signing the 

deeds of trust, the plaintiffs agreed to the terms and were on notice of the contents.”) As 

this Court has noted repeatedly, there is no “legal support for the proposition that the 

MERS system of securitization is so inherently defective so as to render every MERS 

deed of trust completely unenforceable and unassignable.” In re Mortgage Elec. 

Registration Sys. (MERS) Litig., MDL 09–2119–JAT, 2011 WL 4550189 at *4 (D. Ariz. 

Oct. 3, 2011). Tellingly, Dufour cites no case law that supports her argument against the 

MERS system. A careful reading of Complaint reveals that this discredited theory serves 

as the factual basis for MERS’s involvement in Dufour’s lawsuit. Nevertheless, the 

claims themselves also fail as a matter of law. 

C. Individual Claims 

 1. Wrongful Foreclosure 

 Those states that recognize the tort of wrongful foreclosure require the trustor to 

prove that either he was not in default at the time of the foreclosure or that the foreclosing 

party caused the default. Contreras v. U.S. Bank as Trustee for CSMC Mortgage Backed 

Pass–Through Certificates Series 2006–5, CV09-0137-PHX-NVW 2009 WL 4827016 at 

*5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2009). Dufour has not made any such assertions in her complaint. 

And, at any rate, Arizona Courts have not yet recognized the tort of wrongful foreclosure. 

Id. Therefore, Dufour has not adequately pleaded such a claim. 

 2. Fraud 

 The factual basis for Dufour’s fraud claim consists of allegations that Defendants 

collected payments from her even though her obligation had been paid off “at least 

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twice”: the lender was paid off by the downstream purchaser of the note, and purchaser 

was paid off by its insurer when Dufour defaulted. (Doc. 1 ¶ 73.) But Home Show 

Mortgage was entitled to sell the note, and the purchaser of the note was entitled to 

receive compensation from its insurer upon Dufour’s default. The fact that the owners of 

the note received compensation from parties other than Dufour does not terminate her 

contractual obligation to perform and make payments. Her obligation to pay remained. 

The facts alleged do not constitute fraud. Nowhere does Dufour allege that she paid off 

her obligation and then was induced to make payments. 

Moreover, Dufour fails to comply with Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure with respect to MERS. “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, 

and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

Under this rule, a plaintiff “must state the time, place, and specific content of the false 

representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.” Schreiber 

Distrib. Co. v. ServWell Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 

Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Averments of 

fraud must be accompanied by the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct 

charged.”) (internal quotations omitted). Dufour has failed to delineate the role of each 

Defendant in the alleged fraud. Rule 9 does not countenance blanket assertions that “all 

Defendants” engaged in fraudulent conduct. For example, she complains that the 

Defendants induced and then received undue payments. But Dufour does not allege how 

MERS, who was the beneficiary of the DOT, was involved in the receipt of undue 

payments, or what MERS did to induce those payments. And, in any event, the factual 

basis articulated in the Complaint is insufficient to support a claim of fraud. That count is 

dismissed. 

 3. Quiet Title 

 Dufour next attempts to bring a quiet title claim against MERS. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 

12–1101 states that “[a]n action to determine and quiet title to real property may be 

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brought by anyone having or claiming an interest therein, whether in or out of possession, 

against any person or the state when such person or the state claims an estate or interest 

in the real property which is adverse to the party bringing the action.” Under longestablished Arizona law, however, a plaintiff cannot bring a quiet title action unless she 

has paid off her mortgage in full. Farrell v. West, 57 Ariz. 490, 491, 114 P.2d 910, 911 

(1941)(“[I] f it appears there is an unsatisfied balance due a defendant-mortgagee, or his 

assignee, the court will not quiet the title until and unless [the plaintiff-mortgagor] pays 

off such mortgage lien.”); Eason v. Indymac Bank, CV 09–1423–PHX–JAT 2010 WL 

1962309, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2010) (“[Q]uiet title is not a remedy available to the 

trustor until the debt is paid or tendered.”); Frazer v. Millennium Bank, 2:10–cv–01509 

JWS 2010 WL 4579799, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 29, 2010) (same). In the instant 

case, Dufour has expressly alleged that she defaulted on her loan at some point. (Doc. 1 ¶ 

57.) Furthermore, as discussed above, her claims that MERS lacks an interest in her 

property are based on long-rejected legal theories. She has therefore failed to state a valid 

quiet title claim against MERS. 

 4. RESPA and Federal Reserve Acts Violations 

 Dufour claims that MERS violated RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and the 

Federal Reserve Acts, 24 C.F.R. § 3500, et seq. Dufour, however, does not allege how 

MERS was involved in those violations. All of the allegations are directed at Home Show 

Mortgage and the actions surrounding payments from lenders to mortgage brokers. 

Dufour does not allege any involvement by MERS in those actions. Consequently, those 

claims are dismissed as to MERS. 

 5. TILA Violations

 Dufour also alleges violations of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), claiming that the 

Defendants failed to “notify the borrower in writing of [a] transfer” in ownership of the 

mortgage loan. Id. The TILA claim fails because Dufour has not pled facts sufficient to 

show that MERS is a “creditor[]” under TILA. TILA disclosure requirements only apply 

to “creditors” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (“The 

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creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose ...”); see also Tomkins v. Bank of Am. 

Nat’l Ass’n, CV-09-2014-PHX-GMS (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2010) (dismissing TILA claim for 

failure to plead facts showing defendants to be “creditors” under 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f)). 

In TILA a creditor is defined as: 

[A] person who both (1) regularly extends, whether in connection with 

loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise, consumer credit which is 

payable by agreement in more than four installments of for which the 

payment of a finance charge is or may be required, and (2) is the person 

who the debt arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially 

payable on the face of the evidence of indebtedness or, if there is no such 

indebtedness, by agreement. 

15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). The Complaint does not allege any facts that would show that 

MERS falls within that definition. Instead, Dufour names Home Show Mortgage as the 

party with whom she entered the loan agreement. MERS, the beneficiary under the deed 

of trust, is not alleged to be a TILA creditor and, therefore, cannot be liable to Dufour for 

any violation of TILA. Dufour has failed to state a claim against MERS under TILA 

6. Declaratory Relief

 Because Dufour has not alleged any viable claim against MERS, her claim for 

declaratory relief must also fail. 

CONCLUSION 

Even a pro se litigant like Dufour cannot continuously litigate her claim against 

Nationstar. She raised essentially the same claim against Nationstar just a few months 

ago and that claim was dismissed as a matter of law. That result has conclusive effect 

here. Her claims against MERS fail as a matter of law and mirror claims that have been 

rejected in courts throughout this state. The dismissal is with prejudice because any 

amendment would be futile in light of the previous action and the legal theories 

underlying Dufour’s claims against MERS. The only remaining Defendant is Home 

Show Mortgage. 

/ / / 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Nationstar’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is 

GRANTED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Nationstar and 

MERS from this action. 

Dated this 5th day of December, 2012. 

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