Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00268/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00268-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEVIN SITTO, 

CDCR # F-55813 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

ROGER CARL CHRISTIANSON, 

Defendant. 

Civil llcv0268 BEN (POR) 

No. 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, 

IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL 

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING 

$350.00 BALANCE FROM 

PRISONER TRUST ACCOUNT 

[Doc. No.2]; 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

[Doc. No.3] 

AND 

(3) DISMISSING ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A 

CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 

& 1915A(b) 

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at High Desert State Prison located in 

Susanville, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a) [Doc. No.2], along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. No.3]. 

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I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe United 

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party's failure to pay only if the party is 

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 

FJd 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in 

installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.c. 

§ 1915(a)(I), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. ClvLR 3.2. Plaintiff's trust account statement shows that 

he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No.2] and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further 

orders the Secretary of the California Department ofCorrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") 

to garnish the entire $350 balance ofthe filing fees owed in this case, collect and forward them 

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.c. 

§ 1915(b )(1). 

II. MOTION FOR ApPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [Doc. No.3] 

Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil 

action. The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, 

unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty ifhe loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. 

o/Social Services, 452 U.S. 18,25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district 

courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be 

exercised only under "exceptional circumstances." Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th 

Cir. 1991). "A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the 

'likelihood ofsuccess on the merits and the ability ofthe plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se 

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in light ofthe complexity ofthe legal issues involved.' Neither ofthese issues is dispositive and 

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision." Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986». 

The Court denies Plaintiffs request without prejudice, as neither the interests ofjustice 

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 

827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. 

III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA")'s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also 

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like 

Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or 

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, 

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after docketing." 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua 

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who 

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;Lopezv. Smith, 203 FJd 1122, 1126­

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2»; Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2000) (§ 1915A). 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte 

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F .3d at 1126, 1130. However, 28 

U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate thatthe court reviewing an IFP or prisoner's suit 

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the Complaint be served by the 

U.S. Marshal pursuantto FED.R.CIV.P.4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 ("[S]ection 1915(e)notonlypermits, 

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 

claim."); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 

§ 1915A). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff." Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) 

"parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). Here, however, even 

presuming Plaintiff's factual allegations true, the Court finds his Complaint both fails to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted and seeks monetary relief from defendants who are 

immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 

F.3d at 446, n.l. 

First, Plaintiff names as the only Defendant Roger Christianson, the attorney who 

represented him during his criminal proceedings. However, a person "acts under color ofstate 

law [for purposes of § 1983] only when exercising power'possessed by virtue ofstate law and 

made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law. '" Polk 

Countyv. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981)(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 

326 (1941»). Attorneys representing criminal defendants during trial and pretrial proceedings, 

do not generally act under color ofstate law because representing a client "is essentially a private 

function ... for which state office and authority are not needed." Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319; 

United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433,1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, when counsel are 

performing as advocates, i. e., meeting with clients, investigating possible defenses, presenting 

evidence at trial and arguing to the jury, they do not act under color ofstate law for section 1983 

purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,53 (1992); Polk County, 454 U.S. at 320-25; 

Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465,468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that public 

defender was not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 because, so long as he performs a 

traditional role of an attorney for a client, "his function," no matter how ineffective, is "to 

represent his client, not the interests ofthe state or county."). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Christianson must be dismissed for failing to state 

a claim upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 

1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446. 

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Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the 

alleged ineffectiveness assistance of his trial counsel, his claim amounts to an attack on the 

validity ofhis underlying criminal proceedings, and as such, is not cognizable under 42 U.S.c. 

§ 1983 unless and until he can show that conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 

2003) ("Absent such a showing, '[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state 

remedies has no cause ofaction under § 1983 ....",) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 

124 S. Ct. 2388 (2004). Heck holds that "in order to recover damages for allegedly 

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plainti ffmust prove 

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. 

A claim challenging the legality of a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is 

not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997). 

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the 

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor ofthe 

plaintifJwould necessarily imply the invalidity ofhis conviction or 

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the 

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already 

been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the 

plaintiffs action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the 

Invalidity ofany outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, 

the action should be allowed to proceed. 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff s right to file a new action ifhe succeeds 

in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649. 

Here, Plaintiffs ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Christianson 

"necessarily imply the invalidity" of his criminal proceedings and continuing incarceration. 

Heck, 512 U. S. at 487 . Were Plaintiff to succeed in showing that Defendant rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel, an award of damages would "necessarily imply the invalidity" of his 

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conviction. Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (to succeed on 

ineffective assistance claim petitioner must show that counsel's performance fell below objective 

standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel's errors the result of the trial would have 

been different); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F .2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1992) (remedy for ineffective 

assistance of counsel is a conditional writ granting petitioner's release unless state retries him 

or allows him to pursue an appeal with the assistance of counsel within a reasonable time). 

Thus, because Plaintiff seeks damages for an allegedly unconstitutional criminal proceedings 

in a criminal case, and because he has not alleged that his conviction has already been 

invalidated, a section 1983 claim for damages has not yet accrued. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489­

90. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs entire Complaint must be dismissed sua 

sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). SeeLopez,203F.3dat 1126-27;Resnick,213F.3dat446,n.1. 

III. 	 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. 	 Plaintiffs Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. No.3] is DENIED without prejudice. 

2. Plaintiffs Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No.2] 

is GRANTED. 

3. The Secretary ofCalifornia Department ofCorrections and Rehabilitation, or his 

designee, shall collect from Plaintiffs prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee 

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty 

percent (20%) ofthe preceding month's income and forward payments to the Clerk ofthe Court 

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.c. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION. 

4. The Clerk ofthe Court is directed to serve a copy ofthis Order on Matthew Cate, 

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502, 

Sacramento, California 95814. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

5. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.c. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However, 

Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is "Filed" in which 

to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. 

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded 

pleading. See S. D.CAL. ClvLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in 

the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See Kingv. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 

567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, if Plaintiff's Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be 

counted as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenryv. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

6. The Clerk ofthe Court is directe to mail a form civil rights Complaint to Plaintiff. 

DATED: 

o . ROGER T. BENITEZ 

United States District Judge 

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