Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-15-02801/USCOURTS-ca2-15-02801-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)

National Football League Management Council et al. v. National Football League Players Association et al.

1 In the

2 United States Court of Appeals

3 for the Second Circuit

4 ________

5 August Term, 2015

6 No. 15‐2801 (L), No. 15‐2805 (CON)

7 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL,

8 Plaintiff‐Counter‐Defendant‐Appellant,

9 and

10 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE,

11 Defendant‐Appellant,

12 v.

13 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, on its own

14 behalf and on behalf of Tom Brady,

15 Defendant‐Counter‐Claimant‐Appellee,

16 and

17 TOM BRADY,

Counter‐Claimant‐Appellee.* 18

19 ________

20 Appeal from the United States District Court

21 for the Southern District of New York.

22 Nos. 15‐5916, 15‐1982 (RMB) ― Richard M. Berman, Judge.

23 ________

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

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1 Argued: March 3, 2016

2 Decided: April 25, 2016

3 ________

4 Before: KATZMANN, Chief Judge, PARKER and CHIN, Circuit Judges.

5 ________

6 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for

7 the Southern District of New York (Richard M. Berman, Judge).

8 Following an investigation, the National Football League imposed a

9 four‐game suspension on New England Patriots quarterback Tom

10 Brady.  The suspension was based on a finding that he participated

11 in a scheme to deflate footballs used during the 2015 American

12 Football Conference Championship Game to a pressure below the

13 permissible range.    Brady requested arbitration and League

14 Commissioner Roger Goodell, serving as arbitrator, entered an

15 award confirming the discipline.  The parties sought judicial review

16 and the district court vacated the award based upon its finding of

17 fundamental unfairness and lack of notice.    The League has

18 appealed.

19 We hold that the Commissioner properly exercised his broad

20 discretion under the collective bargaining agreement and that his

21 procedural rulings were properly grounded in that agreement and

22 did not deprive Brady of fundamental fairness.    Accordingly, we

23 REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND with

24 instructions to confirm the award.

25 Chief Judge Katzmann dissents in a separate opinion.

26 ________

27 PAUL D. CLEMENT (Erin E. Murphy, Michael H.

28 McGinley, on the brief), Bancroft PLLC,

29 Washington, D.C.; Daniel L. Nash, Pratik A. Shah,

2

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1 Stacey R. Eisenstein, Gregory W. Knopp & James

2 E. Tysse, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP,

3 Washington, D.C., on the brief, for Plaintiff‐Counter‐

4 Defendant‐Appellant and Defendant‐Appellant.

5 JEFFREY L. KESSLER (David L. Greenspan, on the

6 brief), Winston & Strawn LLP, New York, NY;

7 Steffen N. Johnson, Winston & Strawn LLP,

8 Washington, D.C., on the brief; Andrew S.

9 Tulumello, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,

10 Washington, D.C., on the brief, for Defendant‐

11 Counter‐Claimant‐Appellee and Counter‐Claimant‐

12 Appellee.

13 ________

14 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

15 This case involves an arbitration arising from New England

16 Patriots quarterback Tom Brady’s involvement in a scheme to

17 deflate footballs used during the 2015 American Football Conference

18 Championship Game to a pressure below the permissible range.

19 Following an investigation, the NFL suspended Brady for four

20 games.    Brady requested arbitration and League Commissioner

21 Roger Goodell, serving as arbitrator, entered an award confirming

22 the discipline.    The parties sought judicial review and the district

23 court vacated the award, reasoning that Brady lacked notice that his

24 conduct was prohibited and punishable by suspension, and that the

25 manner in which the proceedings were conducted deprived him of

26 fundamental fairness.    The League has appealed and we now

27 reverse.

28 The basic principle driving both our analysis and our

29 conclusion is well established: a federal court’s review of labor

30 arbitration awards is narrowly circumscribed and highly

31 deferential—indeed, among the most deferential in the law.    Our

3

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1 role is not to determine for ourselves whether Brady participated in

2 a scheme to deflate footballs or whether the suspension imposed by

3 the Commissioner should have been for three games or five games

4 or none at all.    Nor is it our role to second‐guess the arbitrator’s

5 procedural rulings.    Our obligation is limited to determining

6 whether the arbitration proceedings and award met the minimum

7 legal standards established by the Labor Management Relations Act,

8 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (the “LMRA”).  We must simply ensure that

9 the arbitrator was “even arguably construing or applying the

10 contract and acting within the scope of his authority” and did not

11 “ignore the plain language of the contract.”  United Paperworks Int’l

12 Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).  These standards do not

13 require perfection in arbitration awards.    Rather, they dictate that

14 even if an arbitrator makes mistakes of fact or law, we may not

15 disturb an award so long as he acted within the bounds of his

16 bargained‐for authority.  

17 Here, that authority was especially broad.  The Commissioner

18 was authorized to impose discipline for, among other things,

19 “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence, in the

20 game of professional football.”    In their collective bargaining

21 agreement, the players and the League mutually decided many

22 years ago that the Commissioner should investigate possible rule

23 violations, should impose appropriate sanctions, and may preside at

24 arbitrations challenging his discipline.    Although this tripartite

25 regime may appear somewhat unorthodox, it is the regime

26 bargained for and agreed upon by the parties, which we can only

27 presume they determined was mutually satisfactory.  

28 Given this substantial deference, we conclude that this case is

29 not an exceptional one that warrants vacatur.    Our review of the

30 record yields the firm conclusion that the Commissioner properly

31 exercised his broad discretion to resolve an intramural controversy

32 between the League and a player.    Accordingly, we REVERSE the

4

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1 judgment of the district court and REMAND with instructions to

confirm the award.1 2

3 BACKGROUND

4 On January 18, 2015, the New England Patriots and the

5 Indianapolis Colts played in the American Football Conference

6 Championship Game at the Patriots’ home stadium in Foxborough,

7 Massachusetts to determine which team would advance to Super

8 Bowl XLIX.    During the second quarter, Colts linebacker D’Qwell

9 Jackson intercepted a pass thrown by Brady and took the ball to the

10 sideline, suspecting it might be inflated below the allowed minimum

11 pressure of 12.5 pounds per square inch.  After confirming that the

12 ball was underinflated, Colts personnel informed League officials,

13 who decided to test all of the game balls at halftime.  Eleven other

14 Patriots balls and four Colts balls were tested using two air gauges,

15 one of which had been used before the game to ensure that the balls

16 were inflated within the permissible range of 12.5 to 13.5 psi.  While

17 each of the four Colts balls tested within the permissible range on at

18 least one of the gauges, all eleven of the Patriots balls measured

19 below 12.5 psi on both.

20 On January 23, the National Football League announced that it

21 had retained Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Esq., and the law firm of Paul,

22 Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison to conduct an independent

23 investigation into whether there had been improper ball tampering

24 before or during the game.  That investigation culminated in a 139‐

25 page report released on May 6, which concluded that it was “more

26 probable than not” that two Patriots equipment officials—Jim

27 McNally and John Jastremski—had “participated in a deliberate

1 We affirm the district court’s denial of Michelle McGuirk’s motion to intervene, No.

1:15‐cv‐05916‐RMB‐JCF, ECF No. 90, in a summary order filed simultaneously with this

Opinion.  Below and on appeal, McGuirk offers no explanation of her right or need to

intervene, beyond a desire to prevent “fraud” on the court.  The relevant Federal Rules

of Civil and Appellate Procedure do not permit parties with a mere academic interest

in a litigation to insert themselves into the dispute.

5

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1 effort to release air from Patriots game balls after the balls were

examined by the referee.”  Joint App. at 97.2 2   Specifically, the Report

3 found that McNally had removed the game balls from the Officials

4 Locker Room shortly before the game, in violation of standard

5 protocol, and taken them to a single‐toilet bathroom, where he

6 locked the door and used a needle to deflate the Patriots footballs

7 before bringing them to the playing field.  

8 In addition to videotape evidence and witness interviews, the

9 investigation team examined text messages exchanged between

10 McNally and Jastremski in the months leading up to the AFC

11 Championship Game.   In the messages, the two discussed Brady’s

12 stated preference for less‐inflated footballs.  McNally also referred to

13 himself as “the deflator” and quipped that he was “not going to

14 espn . . . yet,” and Jastremski agreed to provide McNally with a

15 “needle” in exchange for “cash,” “newkicks,” and memorabilia

16 autographed by Brady.  Joint App. at 99–102.  The Report also relied

17 on a scientific study conducted by Exponent, an engineering and

18 scientific consulting firm, which found that the underinflation could

19 not “be explained completely by basic scientific principles, such as

20 the Ideal Gas Law,” particularly since the average pressure of the

21 Patriots balls was significantly lower than that of the Colts balls.

22 Joint App. at 104–08.  Exponent further concluded that a reasonably

23 experienced individual could deflate thirteen footballs using a

24 needle in well under the amount of time that McNally was in the

bathroom.3 25

26 The investigation also examined Brady’s potential role in the

27 deflation scheme.    Although the evidence of his involvement was

28 “less direct” than that of McNally’s or Jastremski’s, the Wells Report

29 concluded that it was “more probable than not” that Brady had been

2 The Report assessed the evidence under the “more probable than not” standard,

which applies to violations of this kind. 3 The Wells Report concluded that the evidence did not establish that any other Patriots

personnel participated in or had knowledge of these actions.

6

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1 “at least generally aware” of McNally and Jastremski’s actions, and

2 that it was “unlikely that an equipment assistant and a locker room

3 attendant would deflate game balls without Brady’s” “knowledge,”

4 “approval,” “awareness,” and “consent.”    Joint App. at 112, 114.

5 Among other things, the Report cited a text message exchange

6 between McNally and Jastremski in which McNally complained

7 about Brady and threatened to overinflate the game balls, and

8 Jastremski replied that he had “[t]alked to [Tom] last night” and

9 “[Tom] actually brought you up and said you must have a lot of

10 stress trying to get them done.”  Joint App. at 112.  The investigators

11 also observed that Brady was a “constant reference point” in

12 McNally and Jastremski’s discussions about the scheme, Joint App.

13 at 112, had publicly stated his preference for less‐inflated footballs in

14 the past, and had been “personally involved in [a] 2006 rule change

15 that allowed visiting teams to prepare game balls in accordance with

16 the preferences of their quarterbacks,” Joint App. at 114.

17 Significantly, the Report also found that, after more than six

18 months of not communicating by phone or message, Brady and

19 Jastremski spoke on the phone for approximately 25 minutes on

20 January 19, the day the investigation was announced.  This unusual

21 pattern of communication continued over the next two days.  Brady

22 had also taken the “unprecedented step” on January 19 of inviting

23 Jastremski to the quarterback room, and had sent Jastremski several

24 text messages that day that were apparently designed to calm him.

25 The Report added that the investigation had been impaired by

26 Brady’s refusal “to make available any documents or electronic

27 information (including text messages and emails),” notwithstanding

28 an offer by the investigators to allow Brady’s counsel to screen the

29 production.  Joint App. at 116.

30 In a letter dated May 11, 2015, NFL Executive Vice President

31 Troy Vincent, Sr., notified Brady that Goodell had authorized a four‐

32 game suspension of him pursuant to Article 46 of the Collective

33 Bargaining Agreement between the League and the NFL Players

7

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1 Association (the “Association” or the “NFLPA”) for engaging in

2 “conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the

game of professional football.”  Joint App. at 329.4 3   The disciplinary

4 letter cited the Wells Report’s conclusions regarding Brady’s

5 awareness and knowledge of the scheme, as well as his “failure to

6 cooperate fully and candidly with the investigation, including by

7 refusing to produce any relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts,

8 etc.) despite being offered extraordinary safeguards by the

9 investigators to protect unrelated personal information.”  Joint App.

10 at 329.

11 Brady, through the Association, filed a timely appeal of the

12 suspension, and the Commissioner exercised his discretion under

13 the CBA to serve as the hearing officer.  The Association sought to

14 challenge the factual conclusions of the Wells Report, and also

15 argued that the Commissioner had improperly delegated his

16 authority to discipline players pursuant to the CBA.    Prior to the

17 hearing, the Association filed several motions, including a motion to

18 recuse the Commissioner, a motion to compel NFL Executive Vice

19 President and General Counsel Jeff Pash to testify regarding his

20 involvement in the preparation of the Wells Report, and a motion to

21 compel the production of Paul, Weiss’s internal investigation notes.  

4 Article 46, Section 1(a), reads, in full:

All disputes involving a fine or suspension imposed upon a

player for conduct on the playing field (other than as described in

Subsection (b) below) or involving action taken against a player by the

Commissioner for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public

confidence in, the game of professional football, will be processed

exclusively as follows: the Commissioner will promptly send written

notice of his action to the player, with a copy to the NFLPA.  Within three

(3) business days following such written notification, the player affected

thereby, orthe NFLPA with the player’s approval, may appeal in writing

to the Commissioner.

Joint App. at 345.  Article 46 further provides that “the Commissioner may serve as

hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his discretion.”  Joint

App. at 346.

8

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1 The Commissioner denied the motions in decisions issued on

2 June 2 and June 22, 2015. He reasoned that his recusal was not

3 warranted because he did not “delegate [his] disciplinary authority

4 to Mr. Vincent” and did “not have any first‐hand knowledge of any

5 of the events at issue.”   Special App. at 67–68. The Commissioner

6 also declined to compel Pash’s testimony, saying that Pash did not

7 “play a substantive role in the investigation,” and that the Wells

8 Report made clear that it was “prepared entirely by the Paul Weiss

9 investigative team.”  Special App. at 63.  The Commissioner offered

10 to revisit his ruling “should the parties present evidence showing

11 that the testimony of [Pash] . . . is necessary for a full and fair

12 hearing,” Special App. at 64, but the Association never asked him to

13 reconsider.    As to the Paul, Weiss investigation notes, the

14 Commissioner ruled that the CBA did not require their production

15 and, in any event, the notes played no role in his disciplinary

16 decision.

17 On June 23, the Commissioner held a hearing involving nearly

18 ten hours of sworn testimony and argument and approximately 300

19 exhibits.  Shortly before the hearing, it was revealed that on March

20 6—the same day that he was to be interviewed by the Wells

21 investigative team—Brady had “instructed his assistant to destroy

22 the cellphone that he had been using since early November 2014, a

23 period that included the AFC Championship Game and the initial

24 weeks of the subsequent investigation,” despite knowing that the

25 investigators had requested information from the phone several

26 weeks before.  Special App. at 42.  Although Brady testified that he

27 was following his ordinary practice of disposing of old cell phones

28 in order to protect his personal privacy, he had nonetheless retained

29 phones that he had used before and after the relevant time frame.

30 On July 28, the Commissioner issued a final decision affirming

31 the four‐game suspension.  Based upon the newly revealed evidence

32 regarding the destruction of the cell phone, the Commissioner found

33 that Brady had not only failed to cooperate with the investigation,

9

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1 but “made a deliberate effort to ensure that investigators would

2 never have access to information that he had been asked to

3 produce.”    Special App. at 54.    The Commissioner consequently

4 drew an adverse inference that the cell phone would have contained

5 inculpatory evidence, and concluded:

6 (1) Mr. Brady participated in a scheme to tamper with

7 the game balls after they had been approved by the

8 game officials for use in the AFC Championship Game

9 and (2) Mr. Brady willfully obstructed the investigation

10 by, among other things, affirmatively arranging for

11 destruction of his cellphone knowing that it contained

12 potentially relevant information that had been

13 requested by the investigators.

14 Special App. at 54.    Finally, the Commissioner analogized Brady’s

15 conduct to that of steroid users, whom he believed seek to gain a

16 similar systematic competitive advantage, and consequently

17 affirmed that, in his view, the four‐game suspension typically

18 imposed on first‐time steroid users was equally appropriate in this

19 context.

20 The League commenced an action the same day in the United

21 States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Berman,

22 J.), seeking confirmation of the award under the LMRA.    The

23 Association brought an action to vacate the award in the United

24 States District Court for the District of Minnesota, which was

25 subsequently transferred to the Southern District.  

26 On September 3, the district court issued a decision and order

27 granting the Association’s motion to vacate the award and denying

28 the League’s motion to confirm.  Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council

29 v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449 (S.D.N.Y.

30 2015).  The court reasoned that Brady lacked notice that he could be

31 suspended for four games because the provisions applicable to his

32 conduct provided that only fines could be imposed.  The court also

10

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1 held that the award was defective because the Commissioner

2 deprived Brady of fundamental fairness by denying the

3 Association’s motions to compel the production of Paul, Weiss’s

4 internal notes and Pash’s testimony regarding his involvement with

5 the Wells Report.  The League timely appealed, and we now reverse.

6 STANDARD OF REVIEW

7 We review a district court’s decision to confirm or vacate an

8 arbitration award de novo on questions of law and for clear error on

9 findings of fact.  Wackenhut Corp. v. Amalgamated Local 515, 126 F.3d

10 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1997).  Because this dispute involves the assertion of

11 rights under a collective bargaining agreement, our analysis is

12 governed by section 301 of the LMRA.  Major League Baseball Players

13 Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).  

14 The LMRA establishes a federal policy of promoting

15 “industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining

16 agreement,” with particular emphasis on private arbitration of

17 grievances. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363

18 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).   The Act embodies a “clear preference for the

19 private resolution of labor disputes without government

20 intervention.”    Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Niagara Mohawk Power

21 Corp., 143 F.3d 704, 714 (2d Cir. 1998).  

22 Under this framework of self‐government, the collective

23 bargaining agreement is not just a contract, but “a generalized code

24 to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly

25 anticipate.”    Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578.    Collective bargaining

26 agreements are not imposed by legislatures or government agencies.

27 Rather, they are negotiated and refined over time by the parties

28 themselves so as to best reflect their priorities, expectations, and

29 experience.    Similarly, the arbitrators are chosen by the parties

30 because of their expertise in the particular business and their trusted

31 judgment to “interpret and apply [the] agreement in accordance

32 with the ‘industrial common law of the shop’ and the various needs

11

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1 and desires of the parties.” Alexander v. Gardner‐Denver Co., 415 U.S.

2 36, 53 (1974).  The arbitration process is thus “part and parcel of the

3 ongoing process of collective bargaining.”  Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.

4 Our review of an arbitration award under the LMRA is,

5 accordingly, “very limited.”    Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509.    We are

6 therefore not authorized to review the arbitrator’s decision on the

7 merits despite allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or

8 misinterprets the parties’ agreement, but inquire only as to whether

9 the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority as defined by

10 the collective bargaining agreement.    Because it is the arbitrator’s

11 view of the facts and the meaning of the contract for which the

12 parties bargained, courts are not permitted to substitute their own.

13 Misco, 484 U.S. at 37–38.    It is the arbitrator’s    construction of the

14 contract and assessment of the facts that are dispositive, “however

15 good, bad, or ugly.”    Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct.

16 2064, 2071 (2013).  Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not

17 consider whether the punishment imposed was the most

18 appropriate, or whether we are persuaded by the arbitrator’s

19 reasoning.  In short, it is not our task to decide how we would have

20 conducted the arbitration proceedings, or how we would have

21 resolved the dispute.  

22 Instead, our task is simply to ensure that the arbitrator was

23 “even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting

24 within the scope of his authority” and did not “ignore the plain

25 language of the contract.”    Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.    Even failure to

26 “follow arbitral precedent” is no “reason to vacate an award.”

27 Wackenhut, 126 F.3d at 32.  As long as the award “‘draws its essence

28 from the collective bargaining agreement’ and is not merely the

29 arbitrator’s ‘own brand of industrial justice,’” it must be confirmed.

30 Niagara Mohawk, 143 F.3d at 714 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter.

31 Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)); see also Garvey, 532 U.S.

32 at 509; 187 Concourse Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 527 (2d Cir.

12

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2005).5 1    If the arbitrator acts within the scope of this authority, the

2 remedy for a dissatisfied party “is not judicial intervention,” but “for

3 the parties to draft their agreement to reflect the scope of power they

4 would like their arbitrator to exercise.”  United Bhd. of Carpenters v.

5 Tappan Zee Constr., LLC, 804 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal

6 quotation marks omitted) (quoting T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe

7 & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 345 (2d Cir. 2010)).   Against this legal

8 backdrop, we turn to the decision below and the arguments

9 advanced on appeal.

10 DISCUSSION

11 Article 46 of the CBA empowers the Commissioner to take

12 disciplinary action against a player whom he “reasonably judge[s]”

13 to    have engaged in “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or

14 public confidence in, the game of professional football.”  Joint App.

at 345, 353.6 15     A disciplined player is entitled to appeal to the

16 Commissioner and seek an arbitration hearing, and the

17 Commissioner may appoint either himself or someone else to serve

18 as arbitrator.   Article 46 does not articulate rules of procedure for

19 the hearing, except to provide that “the parties shall exchange copies

20 of any exhibits upon which they intend to rely no later than three (3)

21 calendar days prior to the hearing.”  Joint App. at 346.

22 On this appeal, the Association does not contest the factual

23 findings of the Commissioner.    Nor does the Association dispute

24 that the Commissioner was entitled, under Article 46, to determine

25 that Brady’s “participat[ion] in a scheme to tamper with game balls”

5 This deferential standard is no less applicable where the industry is a sports

association.  We do not sit as referees of football any more than we sit as the “umpires”

of baseball or the “super‐scorer” for stock car racing.  Otherwise, we would become

mired down in the areas of a group’s activity concerning which only the group can

speak competently.  See Crouch v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 845 F.2d 397,

403 (2d Cir. 1988); Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 536–38 (7th Cir.

1978).

6 Players are put on notice of the Commissioner’s Article 46 authority by way of the

League Policies for Players and the NFL Player Contract.

13

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1 was “conduct detrimental” worthy of a four‐game suspension.  The

2 parties disagree, however, as to whether other aspects of the CBA

3 and the relevant case law require vacatur of the award.  

4 The district court identified three bases for overturning

5 Brady’s suspension: (1) the lack of adequate notice that deflation of

6 footballs could lead to a four‐game suspension, (2) the exclusion of

7 testimony from Pash, and (3) the denial of access to the investigative

8 notes of the attorneys from Paul, Weiss who prepared the Wells

9 Report.   We conclude that each of these grounds is insufficient to

10 warrant vacatur and that none of the Association’s remaining

11 arguments have merit.

12 I. Lack of Adequate Notice

13 The parties agree that the “law of the shop” requires the

14 League to provide players with advance notice of “prohibited

15 conduct and potential discipline.”    The district court identified

16 several grounds for concluding that Brady had no notice that either

17 his conduct was prohibited or that it could serve as a ground for

18 suspension.

19 A. The Player Policies

20 The Association’s chief ground for vacatur, relied upon by the

21 district court, is that the Commissioner improperly suspended Brady

22 pursuant to the “conduct detrimental” clause of Article 46 because

23 Brady was only on notice that his conduct could lead to a fine under

24 the more specific “Discipline for Game‐Related Misconduct” section

25 of the League Policies for Players (the “Player Policies”). These

26 Policies, which are collected in a handbook distributed to all NFL

27 players at the beginning of each season, include a section entitled

“Other Uniform/Equipment Violations.”7 28

7 The “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations” section reads, in full:

The 2014 Uniform Policy, the 2014 On Field Policy, and the enforcement

procedures for these policies are attached at the end of this section.

A League representative will conduct a thorough review of all players in

14

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1 The Association argues that the Commissioner was not

2 permitted to impose a four‐game suspension under Article 46

3 because the Player Policies mandated only a fine for equipment

4 infractions.    The Association further contends that the award is

5 additionally defective because the Commissioner failed to make

6 findings as to the applicability or interpretation of the Player

7 Policies.  See Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Dist. 28, United Mine Workers, 720

8 F.2d 1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Where . . . the arbitrator fails to

9 discuss critical contract terminology, which terminology might

10 reasonably require an opposite result, the award cannot be

11 considered to draw its essence from the contract.”).  

12 This argument by the Association has a tortured procedural

13 history.    During arbitration, the Association disclaimed the

14 applicability of the Player Policies, saying “we don’t believe this

15 policy applies either, because there is nothing here about the balls.”

16 Joint App. at 956.    This change of position is itself grounds for

uniform during pregame warm‐ups.

All uniform and On Field violations detected during the routine pregame

check must be corrected prior to kickoff, or the offending player(s) will

not be allowed to enter the game.  A violation that occurs during the

game will result in the player being removed from the game until the

violation is corrected.

League discipline may also be imposed on players whose equipment,

uniform, or On Field violations are detected during postgame review of

video, who repeat violations on the same game day after having been

corrected earlier, or who participate in the game despite not having

corrected a violation when instructed to do so.  First offenses will result

in fines.

In addition, in accordance with Article 51, Section 13(c) of the NFL‐

NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, all players will be required to

wear a non‐obtrusive sensor or GPS tracking device during NFL games.

League discipline will be imposed on any player who refuses to wear

such a device, or after having such a device affixed to his equipment,

removes the device prior to or during a game.  First offenses will result

in fines.

Joint App. at 384.

15

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1 rejecting the Association’s argument. See York Research Corp. v.

2 Landgarten, 927 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] party ‘cannot

3 remain silent, raising no objection during the course of the

4 arbitration proceeding, and when an award adverse to him has been

5 handed down complain of a situation of which he had knowledge

6 from the first.’” (quoting Cook Indus., Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.) Inc.,

7 449 F.2d 106, 107–08 (2d Cir. 1971))).   We nonetheless exercise our

8 discretion to address it.  We conclude that the equipment provision

9 does not apply and, in any event, the punishments listed for

10 equipment violations are minimum ones that do not foreclose

11 suspensions.

12 1. Applicability of the Player Policies

13 The Association primarily relies on a statement in the “Other

14 Uniform/Equipment Violations” section, which provides that “First

15 offenses will result in fines.”    It argues that equipment violations

16 include “ball or equipment tampering” and “equipment tampering

17 such as ball deflation.”    But the Association finds language in the

18 “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations” provision that we cannot

19 locate.    The provision says nothing about tampering with, or the

20 preparation of, footballs and, indeed, does not mention the words

21 “tampering,” “ball,” or “deflation” at all.    Moreover, there is no

22 other provision of the Player Policies that refers to ball or equipment

23 tampering, despite an extensive list of uniform and equipment

24 violations ranging from the length of a player’s stockings to the color

25 of his wristbands.

26 On the other hand, Article 46 gives the Commissioner broad

27 authority to deal with conduct he believes might undermine the

28 integrity of the game.  The Commissioner properly understood that

29 a series of rules relating to uniforms and equipment does not repeal

30 his authority vested in him by the Association to protect professional

31 football from detrimental conduct. We have little difficulty in

32 concluding that the Commissioner’s decision to discipline Brady

33 pursuant to Article 46 was “plausibly grounded in the parties’

16

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1 agreement,” which is all the law requires.  See Wackenhut, 126 F.3d at

2 32.

3 2. 2014 Schedule of Fines

4 Even were the district court and the Association correct, and

5 they are not, that Brady could be punished only pursuant to the

6 Player Policies and its “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations”

7 provision, it would not follow that the only available punishment

8 would have been a fine.   While the Player Policies do specify that,

9 with regard to “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations,” “[f]irst

10 offenses will result in fines,” the 2014 Schedule of Fines, which

11 appears five pages later and details the fines for these violations,

12 makes clear that the “[f]ines listed below are minimums.”  Joint App.

13 at 384, 389. The Schedule of Fines goes on to specify that “[o]ther

14 forms of discipline, including higher fines and suspension may also

15 be imposed, based on the circumstances of the particular violation.”

16 Joint App. at 389.  Read in conjunction, these provisions make clear

17 that even first offenders are not exempt from punishment, and

18 serious violations may result in suspension.    But even if other

19 readings were plausible, the Commissioner’s interpretation of this

20 provision as allowing for a suspension would easily withstand

21 judicial scrutiny because his interpretation would be at least “barely

22 colorable,” which, again, is all that the law requires.  See In re Andros

23 Compania Maritima, S.A., 579 F.2d 691, 704 (2d Cir. 1978).

24 B. Steroid Comparison

25 The district court also took issue with the comparison drawn

26 by the Commissioner between Brady’s conduct and that of steroid

27 users.    In his arbitration award, the Commissioner noted that the

28 four‐game suspension typically imposed on first‐time steroid users

29 was a helpful point of comparison because, like Brady’s conduct,

30 “steroid use reflects an improper effort to secure a competitive

31 advantage in, and threatens the integrity of, the game.”    Special

17

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1 App. at 57.    Finding such a comparison inappropriate, the district

2 court held:

3 [N]o player alleged or found to have had a general

4 awareness of the inappropriate ball deflation activities

5 of others or who allegedly schemed with others to let air

6 out of footballs in a championship game and also had

7 not cooperated in an ensuing investigation, reasonably

8 could be on notice that their discipline would (or

9 should) be the same as applied to a player who violated

10 the NFL Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related

11 Substances.

12 Nat’l Football League, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 465.    The Association

13 approaches this comparison somewhat differently, contending that

14 the Commissioner’s failure to punish Brady pursuant to the Player

15 Policies “is only underscored by his reliance on the Steroid Policy.”

16 Appellees’ Br. 45.

17 We are not troubled by the Commissioner’s analogy.    If

18 deference means anything, it means that the arbitrator is entitled to

19 generous latitude in phrasing his conclusions.    We have little

20 difficulty concluding that the comparison to steroid users neither

21 violated a “right” to which Brady was entitled nor deprived him of

22 notice.   While he may have been entitled to notice of his range of

23 punishment, it does not follow that he was entitled to advance notice

24 of the analogies the arbitrator might find persuasive in selecting a

25 punishment within that range.  

26 The dissent contends that we must vacate the award because

27 the Commissioner failed to discuss a policy regarding “stickum,”

28 which the dissent views as “a natural starting point for assessing

29 Brady’s penalty.”    Dissenting Op. at 7.    We do not believe this

30 contention is consistent with our obligation to afford arbitrators

31 substantial deference, and by suggesting that the stickum policy is

32 the more appropriate analogy, the dissent improperly weighs in on a

18

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)

1 pure sports question—whether using stickum by one player is

2 similar to tampering with footballs used on every play.  And even if

3 the fine for stickum use is the most appropriate analogy to Brady’s

4 conduct, nothing in the CBA or our case law demands that the

5 arbitrator discuss comparable conduct merely because we find that

6 analogy more persuasive than others, or because we think the

analogy the arbitrator chose to draw was “flawed” or “inapt.”8 7   Nor

8 does the CBA require the arbitrator to “fully explain his reasoning,”

9 Dissenting Op. at 6; it merely mandates that the hearing officer

10 render a “written decision,” Joint App. at 346.   The Commissioner

11 not only did just that, but he also explained why he found the

12 analogy to steroid use persuasive.    Not even the Association finds

13 defect in the award on this point—this argument was never raised

14 by the Association, either below or on appeal.  While we appreciate

15 that our dissenting colleague might view the penalty meted out to

16 Brady as harsh, we do not believe that view supplies a sufficient

17 basis to warrant vacatur.

18 Accordingly, we believe the Commissioner was within his

19 discretion in drawing a helpful, if somewhat imperfect, comparison

20 to steroid users.    In any event, we believe this issue is much ado

21 about very little because the Commissioner could have imposed the

22 same suspension without reference to the League’s steroid policy.

23 C. General Awareness

24 The district court also concluded that the award was invalid

25 because “[n]o NFL policy or precedent provided notice that a player

26 could be subject to discipline for general awareness of another

27 person’s alleged misconduct.”  Nat’l Football League, 125 F. Supp. 3d

28 at 466.    This conclusion misapprehends the record.    The award is

29 clear that it confirmed Brady’s discipline not because of a general

30 awareness of misconduct on the part of others, but because Brady

8 This is especially true here given that, despite knowing that Brady had been

suspended four games, the Association never attempted to draw an analogy to the

punishment for stickum users.

19

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)

1 both “participated in a scheme to tamper with game balls” and

2 “willfully obstructed the investigation by . . . arranging for

3 destruction of his cellphone.”  Special App. at 54.  

4 The Association takes a somewhat different tack and argues

5 that the Commissioner was bound to the Wells Report’s limited

6 conclusion that Brady was at least “generally aware” of the

7 inappropriate activities of Patriots equipment staff.    But the

8 Association offers no persuasive support for its contention that the

9 universe of facts the Commissioner could properly consider was

10 limited by the Wells Report.    Nothing in Article 46 limits the

11 authority of the arbitrator to examine or reassess the factual basis for

12 a suspension.  In fact, in providing for a hearing, Article 46 strongly

13 suggests otherwise.    Because the point of a hearing in any

14 proceeding is to establish a complete factual record, it would be

15 incoherent to both authorize a hearing and at the same time insist

16 that no new findings or conclusions could be based on a record

17 expanded as a consequence of a hearing.  

18 Additionally, it was clear to all parties that an important goal

19 of the hearing was to afford the Association the opportunity to

20 examine the findings of the Wells Report, and the Association

21 availed itself of that opportunity. See Joint App. at 952 (“[W]e are

22 about to tell you why we thing [sic] the Wells report is wrong . . . .”;

23 “[W]e believe you are going to conclude when you hear [Brady’s

24 testimony] that he is not somebody who was responsible for

25 anything . . . .”), 953 (“What it turns out is there are so many

26 unknowns which are in the Wells report.”).  In light of Brady’s effort

27 to challenge the factual conclusions of the Wells Report by

28 presenting exculpatory evidence, it would make little sense to accept

29 the Association’s contention that the introduction and consideration

30 of inculpatory evidence violates the Commissioner’s broad authority

31 to manage the hearing.

32 The issue before the Commissioner was whether the discipline

33 imposed on Brady was warranted under Article 46, and that was the

20

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1 issue he decided.   The Commissioner did not develop a new basis

2 for the suspension, nor did he deprive Brady of an opportunity to

3 confront the case against him.    We see nothing in the CBA that

4 suggests that the Commissioner was barred from concluding, based

5 on information generated during the hearing, that Brady’s conduct

6 was more serious than was initially believed.

7 Moreover, the Wells Report did not limit itself to a finding of

8 “general awareness.”  It also found that “it is unlikely that [McNally

9 and Jastremski] would deflate game balls without Brady’s

10 knowledge and approval” or that they “would personally and

11 unilaterally engage in such conduct in the absence of Brady’s

12 awareness and consent.”    Joint App. at 114.    The Commissioner’s

13 shift from “knowledge and approval” to “participation” was not, as

14 the Association argues, a “quantum leap,” but was instead a

15 reasonable reassessment of the facts that gave rise to Brady’s initial

16 discipline, supplemented by information developed at the hearing.  

17 Unprompted by the Association, our dissenting colleague

18 contends that because the Wells Report “never concluded that it was

19 ‘more probable than not’ that the gifts Brady provided were

20 intended as rewards or advance payments for deflating footballs in

21 violation of League Rules,” Dissenting Op. at 3, the Commissioner

22 deprived Brady of notice by concluding that he “provided

23 inducements and rewards in support of [the] scheme,” Special App.

24 at 51.  

25 But the Wells Report was clear that its conclusion was

26 “significantly influenced by the substantial number of

27 communications and events consistent with [its] finding, including

28 that [McNally] . . . received valuable items autographed by Tom

29 Brady the week before the AFC Championship Game.”  Joint App. at

30 108.  With specific regard to Brady’s involvement, the Wells Report

31 noted that “Brady [was] a constant reference point in the discussions

32 between McNally and Jastremski about . . . items to be received by

33 McNally.”    Joint App. at 112–13.    And as the dissent admits, the

21

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1 Association questioned Brady at the hearing on this very point, and

2 the Commissioner determined that Brady’s testimony was not

3 credible.  The record establishes that Brady was on notice from the

4 outset that the Wells Report’s conclusions were “significantly

influenced” by his providing McNally9 5 with autographed

6 memorabilia, the Association confronted this allegation at the

7 hearing, and the Commissioner rejected Brady’s explanation.  Brady

8 knew that the factual predicates of his discipline (the text messages,

9 the phone calls, the autographed memorabilia, etc.) would be at

10 issue in the arbitration.  That he chose to focus on some more than

11 others simply reflects his own tactical decision as to how to present

12 his case.  And again, the Association never put forth this contention,

13 either before us or in the district court below.

14 We therefore find that the Commissioner was within his

15 discretion to conclude that Brady had “participated in a scheme to

16 tamper with game balls.”    Because the parties agree that such

17 conduct is “conduct detrimental,” the district court erred in

18 concluding that the Commissioner’s deviation from the Wells

19 Report’s finding of general awareness was a ground for vacatur.

20 D. Discipline for Non‐cooperation

21 The district court held and the Association contends that

22 Brady’s suspension cannot be sustained on the grounds that he

23 obstructed the Commissioner’s investigation.    The court reasoned

24 that “[n]o player suspension in NFL history has been sustained for

25 an alleged failure to cooperate with—or even allegedly

26 obstructing—an NFL investigation.”    Nat’l Football League, 125 F.

27 Supp. 3d at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted). The League, on

28 the other hand, argues that not only is the deliberate obstruction of a

29 league investigation “conduct detrimental” within the meaning of

30 Article 46, but also the destruction of the cell phone permitted the

9 The Commissioner never referenced the gifts Jastremski received from Brady.

22

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)

1 Commissioner to draw an adverse inference against Brady that

2 supported the finding that he participated in the deflation scheme.

3 The Association’s argument is essentially procedural.    The

4 Association does not dispute that the Commissioner properly used

5 the destruction of the cell phone to draw an adverse inference

6 against Brady.  In the face of this concession, the Association insists

7 that because the award is invalid in light of the Commissioner’s

8 failure to discipline Brady under the Player Policies, the award

9 cannot be salvaged on the alternative theory that Brady could have

10 been suspended for his obstruction of the investigation.  Specifically,

11 the Association contends that “once it becomes clear that Brady’s

12 non‐cooperation led to the adverse inference about ball tampering,

13 it’s back to square one: The only penalty of which Brady had notice

14 was the collectively bargained fine for equipment violations.”

15 Appellees’ Br. 51.  This argument fails for the simple reason that, as

16 we have explained, the Player Policies are inapplicable and, in any

17 event, suspensions may be imposed for violations of the League’s

18 equipment policies.

19 At oral argument, the Association contended, for the first

20 time, that Brady had no notice that the destruction of the cell phone

would even be at issue in the arbitration proceeding.10 21    Ordinarily,

22 an argument such as this that is not raised in the briefs is waived

23 and thus not appropriate for consideration on appeal.   Littlejohn v.

24 City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 313 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015).    However,

25 because the parties discussed this issue at length during oral

26 argument, we exercise our discretion to address it.

27 For a number of reasons, the Association’s assertion that

28 Brady lacked notice that the destruction of the cell phone would be

10 By contrast, in its brief, the Association argued only that “Brady had no notice that he

could be suspended for declining to produce his private communications.”  Appellees’

Br. 51.  Because the parties agree that the Commissioner properly drew an adverse

inference based on the destruction of the cell phone, we need not confront this

argument.

23

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1 an issue in the arbitration has no support in the record.    The

2 League’s letter to Brady notifying him of his suspension pointed to

3 Brady’s “failure to cooperate fully and candidly with the

4 investigation, including by refusing to produce any relevant

5 electronic evidence (emails, texts, etc.).”  Joint App. at 329.  Having

6 been given clear notice that his cooperation with the investigation

7 was a subject of significant interest, we have difficulty believing that

8 either Brady or the Association would have been surprised that the

9 destruction of the cell phone was of importance to the

10 Commissioner.    The notion that Brady was unfairly blindsided by

11 the Commissioner’s adverse inference is further belied by the

12 opening statement of the Association’s counsel at the arbitration,

13 who defended Brady’s handling of electronic evidence:

14 We are also going to put in a

15 declaration from a forensic person who

16 dealt with the issue of e‐mail and texts.

17 And you know from your decision that

18 [this] was an aspect of the discipline. . . .

19 . . . .

20 [T]here were no incriminating texts

21 being withheld or e‐mails, and there never

22 have been any incriminating texts or e‐

23 mails.  And now he has gone through and

24 produces exactly what Ted Wells had asked

25 for at the time that existed at the time and

26 exists today.

27 . . . He was following the advice of

28 his lawyers and agents at the time.  

29 Joint App. at 953.    Counsel for the Association later went further,

30 directly acknowledging the destruction of the cell phone and

31 referencing an expert declaration submitted in support of Brady.

32 Whatever it may say now about its expectations for the hearing, the

24

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)

1 Association had at least enough notice of the potential consequences

2 of the cell phone destruction to retain an expert in advance of the

3 arbitration to assist counsel in explaining why an adverse inference

4 should not be drawn.

5 At oral argument, the Association further contended that the

6 Commissioner was improperly punishing Brady for destroying his

7 cell phone because he was required to institute a new disciplinary

8 action (so that Brady could then appeal any determination that he

9 had destroyed his cell phone).   This argument fails because, as set

10 forth in the original disciplinary letter, Brady was punished for

11 failing to cooperate, and it is clear from the Commissioner’s decision

12 that Brady’s cell phone destruction was part and parcel of the

13 broader claim that he had failed to cooperate.  Further, as we stated

14 with regard to general awareness, nothing in Article 46 limits the

15 arbitrator’s authority to reexamine the factual basis for a suspension

16 by conducting a hearing.   Additionally, the Commissioner did not

17 increase the punishment as a consequence of the destruction of the

18 cell phone—the four‐game suspension was not increased.    Rather,

19 the cell phone destruction merely provided further support for the

20 Commissioner’s determination that Brady had failed to cooperate,

21 and served as the basis for an adverse inference as to his

22 participation in the scheme to deflate footballs.

23 Finally, any reasonable litigant would understand that the

24 destruction of evidence, revealed just days before the start of

25 arbitration proceedings, would be an important issue.    It is well

26 established that the law permits a trier of fact to infer that a party

27 who deliberately destroys relevant evidence the party had an

28 obligation to produce did so in order to conceal damaging

29 information from the adjudicator.  See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp.

30 v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2002); Byrnie v.

31 Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107–12 (2d Cir. 2001); Kronisch v.

32 United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998).  These principles are

33 sufficiently settled that there is no need for any specific mention of

25

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1 them in a collective agreement, and we are confident that their

2 application came as no surprise to Brady or the Association.

3 E. Competitive Integrity Policy

4 The final ground for vacatur due to inadequate notice

5 identified by the district court was Brady’s purported lack of notice

6 of the Competitive Integrity Policy, which authorized the initial

7 investigation.    The district court reasoned that Brady was

8 improperly suspended pursuant to the Competitive Integrity Policy,

9 which is distributed only to teams, and not to players.    This

10 conclusion is incorrect because, as we have seen, Article 46 properly

11 supplied the basis for the suspension.

12 Tellingly, the Association does not defend the district court’s

13 analysis on appeal.    The League in its initial punishment and the

14 Commissioner in his arbitration award were both clear that Brady

15 was being disciplined pursuant to Article 46, not the Competitive

Integrity Policy.11 16 The Competitive Integrity Policy, which says

17 nothing about disciplining players, merely supplied the

18 Commissioner with the authority to conduct an investigation and to

19 require the Patriots’ cooperation.  The operative question for notice,

20 as the parties agree, is whether Brady was aware that his conduct

21 could give rise to a suspension.  Article 46 put him on notice prior to

22 the AFC Championship Game that any action deemed by the

23 Commissioner to be “conduct detrimental” could lead to his

suspension.12 24

11 See Joint App. at 329–30 (explaining twice that the source of the discipline was the

Commissioner’s authority under “Article 46 of the CBA”); Special App. at 58–59 n.19

(“As the discipline letter makes clear, Mr. Brady was suspended for conduct

detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the game of professional

football, not for a violation of the [Competitive Integrity Policy].”). 12 The dissent emphasizes at various points that Brady’s four‐game suspension was

“unprecedented.”  E.g., Dissenting Op. at 1, 6, 9.  But determining the severity of a

penalty is an archetypal example of a judgment committed to an arbitrator’s discretion.

The severity of a penalty will depend on any number of considerations, including the

culpability of the individual, the circumstances of the misconduct, and the balancing of

interests inherently unique in every work environment.  Weighing and applying these

26

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)

1 II. Exclusion of Testimony from NFL General Counsel

2 Prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings, the

3 Commissioner denied the Association’s motion to call NFL General

4 Counsel Jeff Pash to testify at the arbitration concerning his role in

5 the preparation of the Wells Report.   The Commissioner did so on

6 the grounds that Pash did not “play a substantive role in the

7 investigation” and the Wells Report made clear that it was

8 “prepared entirely by the Paul Weiss investigative team.”    Special

9 App. at 63.  As an independent ground for vacatur, the district court

10 held that it was fundamentally unfair to exclude Pash from

11 testifying because “it is logical that he would have valuable insight

12 into the course and outcome of the Investigation and into the

13 drafting and content of the Wells Report.”  Nat’l Football League, 125

14 F. Supp. 3d at 471.  Again, we cannot agree with this conclusion.

15 It is well settled that procedural questions that arise during

16 arbitration, such as which witnesses to hear and which evidence to

17 receive or exclude, are left to the sound discretion of the arbitrator

18 and should not be second‐guessed by the courts.   Misco, 484 U.S. at

19 40.    Arbitrators do not “need to comply with strict evidentiary

20 rules,” and they possess “substantial discretion to admit or exclude

21 evidence.”   LJL 33rd St. Assocs., LLC v. Pitcairn Props. Inc., 725 F.3d

22 184, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of

23 Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989).

24 However, a narrow exception exists under the Federal

25 Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which provides that an award may be

26 vacated where “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in

27 refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy.”

28 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).  We have held that vacatur is warranted in such a

29 circumstance only if “fundamental fairness is violated.”  Tempo Shain

Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997).13 30     There is little

factors is left not to the courts, but to the sound discretion of the arbitrator. 13 The FAA does not apply to arbitrations, like this one, conducted pursuant to the

LMRA, “but the federal courts have often looked to the [FAA] for guidance in labor

27

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1 question that the exclusion of the testimony was consistent with the

2 Commissioner’s broad authority to regulate procedural matters and

3 comported with the CBA.  Thus, the Commissioner’s ruling can be

4 revisited in court only if it violated fundamental fairness, and we see

5 no such violation.

6 The central issue in the arbitration was whether Brady had

7 engaged in conduct detrimental to the League.  The “insights” Pash

8 might have had and the role he might have played in the

9 preparation of the Wells Report were concerns that were collateral to

10 the issues at arbitration.  The CBA does not require an independent

11 investigation, and nothing would have prohibited the Commissioner

12 from using an in‐house team to conduct the investigation.    The

13 Association and the League bargained for and agreed in the CBA on

14 a structure that lodged responsibility for both investigation and

15 adjudication with the League and the Commissioner.  Moreover, the

16 Commissioner made clear that the independence of the Wells Report

17 was not material to his decision, thus limiting any probative value

18 the Pash testimony may have had.

arbitration cases.”  Misco, 484 U.S. at 40 n.9.  However, we have never held that the

requirement of “fundamental fairness” applies to arbitration awards under the LMRA,

cf. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516 Int’l Union, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir.

1974) (applying, without explanation, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (formerly § 10(c)) to an

arbitration under the LMRA), and we note that the circuits are divided on this question,

compare Lippert Tile Co., Inc. v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 724 F.3d 939, 948 (7th Cir. 2013)

(“[LMRA] review simply does not include a free‐floating procedural fairness standard

absent a showing that some provision of the CBA was violated.”), with Carpenters 46 N.

Cal. Ctys. Conference Bd. v. Zcon Builders, 96 F.3d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Although

deference must be given to an arbitrator’s decisions concerning procedural issues, it is

generally recognized that the courts may consider a claim that a party to an arbitration

has been denied a fundamentally fair hearing.”).  While the League does not explicitly

dispute the applicability of the “fundamental fairness” standard here, it also does not

contest the Association’s arguments regarding fundamental unfairness, and instead

only argues that the Commissioner’s procedural rulings did not violate the terms of the

CBA.  Regardless of which position we adopt, our result is the same, and thus we need

not decide whether the “free‐floating procedural fairness standard” of the FAA ought

to be imported to our review of arbitrations conducted pursuant to the LMRA.

28

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1 In any event, the Commissioner did receive extensive

2 testimony from Troy Vincent regarding the initiation of the

3 investigation and its initial stages, and from Theodore Wells

4 regarding the investigation itself and the preparation of the report.

5 All of this is compounded by the fact that when initially denying the

6 Association’s request to call Pash, the Commissioner noted that

7 “should the parties present evidence showing that the testimony of a

8 witness . . . is necessary for a full and fair hearing,” he would be

9 willing to “revisit the NFLPA’s motion to compel [the] testimony.”

10 Special App. at 64.  The Association never renewed its objection or

11 further pursued the issue.    We thus conclude that the

12 Commissioner’s decision to exclude the testimony fits comfortably

13 within his broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and raises

14 no questions of fundamental fairness.  

15 III. Denial of Access to Investigative Files

16 The district court’s third and final ground for vacatur is that

17 Brady was entitled under the CBA to the interview notes and

18 memoranda generated by the investigative team from Paul, Weiss,

19 and that the denial of those notes amounted to fundamental

20 unfairness.  The League argues that this is not a ground for vacatur

21 because the CBA does not require the exchange of such notes.

22 We agree.  Article 46 specifies that “[i]n appeals under Section

23 1(a), the parties shall exchange copies of any exhibits upon which

24 they intend to rely.”    Joint App. at 346.    The Commissioner

25 reasonably interpreted this provision to not require more extensive

26 discovery.    Significantly, the parties agreed in the CBA to permit

27 more comprehensive discovery in other proceedings, such as those

28 under Article 15, Section 3, which allows “reasonable and expedited

29 discovery upon the application of any party.”  Special App. at 65.

30 The Commissioner further concluded that Brady was not

31 deprived of fundamental fairness because the Commissioner “did

32 not review any of Paul, Weiss’ internal interview notes or any other

29

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1 documents generated by Paul, Weiss other than their final report,”

2 and the League had already “produced all of the NFL documents

3 considered by the investigators.”    Special App. at 65.    The

4 Commissioner pointed out that the Association had not even

5 “identified any material factual dispute that Paul, Weiss’ internal

6 work product would help to resolve.”  Special App. at 66.

7 In making these findings, the Commissioner was, at the very

8 least, “arguably construing or applying the contract,” Misco, 484 U.S.

9 at 38, and he reasonably concluded that he would not require the

10 production of attorney work product he had not relied on, or even

11 seen.  Had the parties wished to allow for more expansive discovery,

12 they could have bargained for that right.  They did not, and there is

13 simply no fundamental unfairness in affording the parties precisely

14 what they agreed on.

15 IV. Additional Issues

16 Because the district court held that Brady was deprived of

17 adequate notice and fundamental fairness, it declined to address the

18 Association’s alternative grounds for vacatur.    Although it is our

19 usual practice to allow the district court to address arguments in the

20 first instance, we choose to address the Association’s arguments here

21 because they were fully briefed below and on appeal and because

22 they are meritless. Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d

23 200, 218 (2d Cir. 2002).  Accordingly, we turn to the two remaining

24 arguments advanced on appeal that (1) the Commissioner deprived

25 Brady of fundamental fairness when he denied an evidentiary

26 hearing on the claim that he delegated his authority to discipline

27 Brady to Vincent in violation of the CBA’s grant of exclusive

28 disciplinary authority to the Commissioner, and (2) the

29 Commissioner was evidently partial because he, rather than some

neutral third party, decided the delegation issue.14 30   

14 In a footnote on the last page of its brief, the Association faults the League for its

“failure to employ testing protocols to ensure ‘fair and consistent’ discipline.”

Appellees’ Br. 62 n.13.  “We ordinarily deem an argument to be forfeited . . . when it is

30

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1 A. Refusal to Hear Evidence on Delegation

2 The Association contends that Brady was deprived of

3 fundamental fairness when the Commissioner chose not to hear

4 evidence on whether he improperly delegated his disciplinary

5 authority to Vincent in violation of Article 46.    The Association

6 offered only two meager pieces of evidence in support.    First, it

7 pointed to a press release in which the Commissioner noted that

8 “Troy Vincent and his team will consider what steps to take in light

9 of the [Wells] report.”    Joint App. at 1207.    Second, it cited the

10 disciplinary letter from the League announcing the four‐game

11 suspension, which was sent and signed by Vincent instead of

12 Goodell.

13 The Commissioner adequately explained that he “did not

14 delegate [his] authority as Commissioner to determine conduct

15 detrimental or to impose appropriate discipline.”  Special App. at 59.

16 Rather, he “concurred in [Vincent’s] recommendation and

17 authorized him to communicate to . . . Mr. Brady the discipline

18 imposed under [the Commissioner’s] authority.”  Special App. at 59.

19 Tellingly, the Commissioner went on to remind the Association that

20 this procedure “ha[d] been employed in numerous disciplinary

21 hearings over the past two decades and ha[d] never before been

22 asserted as a basis for compelling the Commissioner or anyone else

23 to testify in an Article 46 disciplinary proceeding.”  Special App. at

24 62.  

25 We see no impropriety and certainly no fundamental

26 unfairness because the resolution of this matter fell well within the

27 broad discretion afforded arbitrators.  And the allegation lacks merit,

28 as the record is clear that the discipline imposed on Brady was

29 pursuant to the “Commissioner’s authority,” which is what Article

30 46 contemplates.    Where a claim is facially deficient, an arbitrator

only addressed in a footnote,” City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114,

137 (2d Cir. 2011), and hold likewise here.

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1 may summarily dismiss it, so long as doing so does not contravene

2 the collective agreement.  See Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1207

(10th Cir. 2001).15 3     If it is seriously believed that these procedures

4 were deficient or prejudicial, the remedy was to address them

5 during collective bargaining.    Had the parties wished to otherwise

6 limit the arbitrator’s authority, they could have negotiated terms to

7 do so.

8 B. Evident Partiality

9 The Association’s final contention is that the Commissioner

10 was evidently partial with regard to the delegation issue and should

11 have recused himself from hearing at least that portion of the

12 arbitration because it was improper for him to adjudicate the

13 propriety of his own conduct.  This argument has no merit.

14 We may vacate an arbitration award “where there was evident

partiality . . . in the arbitrator[].”    9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).16 15     “Evident

16 partiality may be found only ‘where a reasonable person would

17 have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the

18 arbitration.’”  Scandinavian Reins. Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins.

19 Co., 668 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Applied Indus. Materials

20 Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d

21 Cir. 2007)).  The party seeking vacatur must prove evident partiality

22 by “clear and convincing evidence.”    Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of

23 Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2013).

24 However, arbitration is a matter of contract, and consequently, the

15 The record strongly suggests that the delegation argument was raised by the

Association in order to procure a more favorable arbitrator.  See Joint App. at 1120 (“In

light of the above, the NFLPA believes that neither Commissioner Goodell nor anyone

with close ties to the NFL can serve as arbitrator in Mr. Brady’s appeal.”).  Parties to

arbitration have no more right than litigants in court to force recusals by leveling

meritless accusations against the decision maker. 16 As above, we do not pass on whether the FAA’s “evident partiality” standard applies

to arbitrations under the LMRA.  Because the parties did not brief this issue and

because the resolution of this case is unaffected, we assume that it does.  See supra note

13.

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1 parties to an arbitration can ask for no more impartiality than

2 inheres in the method they have chosen.    Williams v. Nat’l Football

3 League, 582 F.3d 863, 885 (8th Cir. 2009); Winfrey v. Simmons Foods,

4 Inc., 495 F.3d 549, 551 (8th Cir. 2007).

5 Here, the parties contracted in the CBA to specifically allow

6 the Commissioner to sit as the arbitrator in all disputes brought

7 pursuant to Article 46, Section 1(a).  They did so knowing full well

8 that the Commissioner had the sole power of determining what

9 constitutes “conduct detrimental,” and thus knowing that the

10 Commissioner would have a stake both in the underlying discipline

11 and in every arbitration brought pursuant to Section 1(a).  Had the

12 parties wished to restrict the Commissioner’s authority, they could

13 have fashioned a different agreement.

14 CONCLUSION

15 For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the

16 district court and REMAND with instructions for the district court to

17 confirm the arbitration award.

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