Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02232/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02232-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARKE SHELDON LOWE,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07cv2232-LAB (CAB)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b)(6)

vs.

WILLIAM KNIPP, Warden,

Defendant.

Nearly a decade ago, on April 1, 2004, petitioner Clarke Sheldon Lowe was convicted

in San Diego County Superior Court of several rape charges, kidnapping, and indecent

exposure, and he was sentenced to a determinate term of eight years and an indeterminate

term of 25 years to life. After years of appeals and collateral attacks, including an

unsuccessful appeal to the Ninth Circuit in this particular habeas case, Lowe’s case

appeared to be closed once and for all. But then, on October 27, 2012, Lowe filed a motion

to set aside the judgment in this case based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6),

which allows courts to set aside a final judgment if a party makes a showing of “extraordinary

circumstances” justifying such action. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005); 

Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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I. Background

The California Court of Appeal affirmed Lowe’s criminal conviction on May 25, 2005. 

The Supreme Court of California, on August 24, 2005, denied Lowe’s petition for review. On

November 9, 2006, Lowe petitioned the California Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus,

and his petition was denied on January 4, 2007. He turned next to the Court of Appeal, filing

a petition on April 4, 2007, three months after his previous petition was denied. That was

denied on August 22, 2007. Lowe then filed a petition with the California Supreme Court on

August 31, 2007. That petition was denied on November 14, 2007. 

The statute of limitations began to run on November 22, 2005, 90 days after the

California Supreme Court denied Lowe’s petition for direct review. See Tillema v. Long, 253 1

F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, when Lowe filed his petition in California Superior Court

on November 9, 2006, only 13 days remained until the AEDPA statute of limitations would

expire. Filing the petition in Superior Court tolled the statute of limitations. See Artuz v.

Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 7-8 (2000). The problem for Lowe arose in the three-month

period—January 4, 2007 to April 4, 2007—between when the Superior Court denied his

petition and when he filed in the Court of Appeal. 

Lowe filed his petition with this Court on November 21, 2007 , seven days after being

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denied by the California Supreme Court. The issue before this Court was whether the threemonth delay between filing in the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal was reasonable

so that the tolling period should have continued during that time, of if it was unreasonable

so that the statute of limitations ran 13 days after the Superior Court denied Lowe’s petition. 

Lowe argued that the delay was reasonable because he was waiting to see how the

Supreme Court of the United States would rule in a case with similar underlying facts. (Dkt.

No. 13 at 5.) The Court held that it was unreasonable delay to simply wait for a potentially

The 90-day period allows the party to seek review from the Supreme Court of the 1

United States. 

At that point, if the statute had been tolled for the entirety of time period comprising 2

the collateral attacks in state court, Lowe would have had six days to spare. (Dkt. No. 11 at

3.) 

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advantageous shift in the law, so the statute of limitations was not tolled and the one year

time limit had passed. (Id. at 2-3.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on July 19,

2010, and the Supreme Court denied Lowe’s petition for a writ of certiorari on April 25,

2011.3

That brings the Court to the pending motion, which Lowe filed on November 2,

2012—nearly two-and-a-half years after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s dismissal of

Lowe’s federal habeas petition and a year-and-a-half after the Supreme Court declined to

review his case. In contrast to his previous arguments opposing dismissal of this petition, 4

Lowe now concedes that the three-month delay between his petitions in Superior Court and

the Court of Appeal was unreasonable, but he blames his former attorney, John Lanahan,

for the decision to wait and see how the Supreme Court ruled on another case before filing

in the Court of Appeal. He argues that Lanahan’s error amounts to an extraordinary

circumstance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) that entitles him to relief from

a final judgment. 

To support this argument, Lowe has submitted an affidavit from Lanahan in which he

explains why he chose to wait three months to file a habeas petition in the Court of Appeal

after his petition in Superior Court was denied. (Dkt. No. 27 at 34-37.) 

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Lowe, thinking his motion was denied based on a procedural technicality, filed an 3

additional habeas petition in this district, Case No. 12cv2398 H (PCL). That petition was

dismissed on October 4, 2012, because it was a successive habeas petition for which he did

not have permission to file from the Ninth Circuit, which is required by the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(3)(A).

Lowe submitted an affidavit detailing his efforts to get in touch with Lanahan

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regarding the outcome of his petition for a writ of certiorari. (Dkt. No. 27 at 39-40.) Lowe

declares that he did not attempt to contact Lanahan for six months after the petition to the

Supreme Court was filed because he had been instructed that it would take at least that long

for the Court to rule. (Id.) After that, Lanahan would not take his collect calls, ignoring him

for months. (Id. at 40.) Lowe finally had to resort to having his mother and brother contact

Lanahan regarding the outcome of his petition. (Id.) Eventually he learned that the Supreme

Court had rejected his petition. (Id.) That lapse in communication, Lowe argues, explains

the one-and-a-half year delay between denial of his writ of certiorari and filing the present

motion. Because Lowe appears to have acted reasonably in trying to contact his attorney

regarding the outcome of his petition to the Supreme Court, the Court will review Lowe’s

Rule 60 claim despite the substantial elapsed time. 

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II. Discussion

Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for several

enumerated reasons that aren’t implicated here, as well as for “any other reason that

justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Despite the facially broad language, relief under

Rule 60(b)(6) requires a showing of “extraordinary circumstances,” which are rarely

present in habeas cases. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535; Towery, 673 F.3d at 940. 

It is conceivable that attorney misconduct could satisfy the requirements of a Rule

60(b)(6) motion. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that a habeas petitioner may be able to

show extraordinary circumstances as necessary for a Rule 60(b)(6) motion if he has been

abandoned by his attorney, because the principal-agent relationship is severed. See

Towery, 673 F.3d at 941. Because Lowe was not abandoned by his attorney during the

three-month period at issue, the Court does not need to explore that possible exception. 

Lowe cites several cases to support the proposition that unprofessional attorney

conduct could amount to an extraordinary circumstance and toll the AEDPA statute of

limitations, most notably Holland v. Florida. 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010). The attorney in

Holland failed to file a timely habeas petition despite his client’s many letters identifying

the applicable legal rules and repeated emphasis of the importance of timely filing, and

he ignored for years his client’s communications, including requests for updates on the

status of his case. Id. at 2564. The misconduct Lowe alleges doesn’t come close to that,

however. As the Holland decision clarifies, “‘a garden variety claim of excusable neglect,’

(citations), such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline,

(citations), does not warrant equitable tolling.” Id. at 2564. If an honest error doesn’t

warrant equitable tolling, certainly a conscious but misguided strategic decision does not. 

Lowe now hopes the Court will reach the merits of his habeas petition because the

prior dismissal was due to a timing risk—which did not pay off—taken by his attorney. 

Basically, Lowe argues that he should not have to live with the consequences of his

attorney’s strategy. That is more than most habeas petitioners, who don’t even have an

attorney in the first place, can say. Lowe is clearly unhappy with his attorney’s decision-

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making, but he has not nearly raised the specter of egregious misconduct that constitutes

an “extraordinary circumstance” under Rule 60(b)(6). At most, he points to the sort of

garden variety miscalculation that the Supreme Court in Holland held does not warrant

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Holland, of course, addressed the question of whether the statute of limitations

should have been tolled by an attorney’s mistake in the first instance, not whether there

were extraordinary circumstances that warranted reopening judgment under Rule

60(b)(6). But the fact that the conduct complained of—the foundation for Lowe’s

motion—wouldn’t suffice to toll the statute of limitations under Holland shows that there

are no extraordinary circumstances that weigh in favor of granting a Rule 60 motion in

this case.

III. Conclusion

The AEDPA statute of limitations exists to encourage diligence and swift action on

the part of habeas petitioners and to give finality to judgments they challenge. An

attorney’s mistake is not an extraordinary circumstance that warrants circumventing the

purposes the statute of limitations serves. If any simple mistake by an attorney were

enough to reopen judgment, few judgments would ever be final, and habeas petitioners

fortunate enough to retain counsel would essentially get an “undo” option on any strategic

misstep. 

Lowe’s motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is, therefore, DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 23, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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