Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06957/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06957-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

San Francisco Division 

TONI V. BROWN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANDREW SAUL,1

Defendant. 

Case No. 18-cv-06957-LB 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

Re: ECF No. 22 

 

INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Toni Brown seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration denying her claim for social-security disability insurance (“SSDI”) 

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”).2

 The plaintiff moved for summary 

judgment.3 The Commissioner opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for summary 

1

 Andrew Saul is now the Commissioner of Social Security and is automatically substituted as a party 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (action survives regardless of any 

change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security). 

2

 Motion for Summary Judgment (“Mot.”) – ECF No. 22. Citations refer to material in the Electronic 

Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 

3

Id.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 2

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judgment.4 Under Civil Local Rule 16–5, the matter is submitted for decision by this court without 

oral argument. 

The court grants the plaintiff’s motion, denies the Commissioner’s motions, and remands for 

further proceedings. 

STATEMENT 

1. Procedural History 

On March 31, 2015, the plaintiff, then age 56, filed a claim for SSDI benefits under Title II of 

the SSA.5 The plaintiff alleged post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and a torn ligament in her 

right ankle.6 The Commissioner denied the plaintiff’s SSDI claim initially and on reconsideration.7

The plaintiff timely requested a hearing.8 

On May 30, 2017 an Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) held a hearing and heard 

testimony from the plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”).9 On October 6, 2017, the ALJ issued 

an unfavorable decision.10 The plaintiff timely appealed the decision to the Appeals Council on 

November 29, 2017.11 The Appeals Council denied her request for review on September 21, 

2018.12 

4

 Cross-Mot. – ECF No. 23. 

5

 AR 94. Administrative Record (“AR”) citations refer to the page numbers in the bottom-right hand 

corner of the AR. 

6

 These are the impairments that the plaintiff asserted in her initial Disability Determination 

Explanation. AR 94. In the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, she added back pain, which she 

alleged started in April 2015. AR 110. The ALJ found that the plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: affective disorders, anxiety disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, cervical and lumbar 

degenerative disc disease, history of ankle sprain, and substance abuse disorder. AR 18, 38. The 

plaintiff’s motion alleges degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, chronic rightankle pain, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and depression.” Mot. – ECF No. 22 at 6. 

7

 AR 106, 122 (initial determination); 125, 133 (reconsideration). 

8

 AR 140–141. 

9

 AR 57–90. 

10 AR 13, 33. 

11 AR 186–187. 

12 AR 1–6. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 3

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On November 16, 2018, the plaintiff timely filed this action for judicial review and 

subsequently moved for summary judgment on June 13, 2019.13 The Commissioner opposed the 

motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 11, 2019.14 The plaintiff filed a 

reply on August 8, 2019.15 All parties consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction.16 

2. Medical Records 

Mental-Health Records 

The plaintiff submitted the following mental-health records to support her claim for disability: 

(1) notes from CURA, a residential-drug-rehabilitation clinic where the plaintiff stayed and was 

treated from August to December 2014;17 (2) records from the Schuman-Liles Clinic where, from 

December, 2014 to August, 2015, the plaintiff saw psychiatrist, Kermit Johnson, M.D., for 

anxiety, depression, and PTSD;18 (3) notes from the Portia Belle Hume Center where the plaintiff 

was treated by doctors (including Nithya Narayan, Psy.D., and Nancy Morgan, Ph.D.) and social 

workers from December 2014 to March 2015;19 (4) notes from the John George Psychiatric 

Pavilion where the plaintiff was held under a psychiatric hold (or 5150 under the California Health 

and Safety Code) in January 2015 and was treated for suicidal ideations in 2017;20 notes from 

Kambiz Sakhai, Psy.D., who treated the plaintiff in weekly psychotherapy sessions from January 

2016, to at least May 2017, and who filled out a mental-impairment questionnaire for the 

plaintiff;21 records form Pathways to Wellness, where the plaintiff was treated for, among other 

13 Compl. – ECF No. 1; Mot. – ECF No. 22. 

14 Cross Mot. – ECF No. 23. 

15 Reply – ECF No. 26. 

16 Consent Forms – ECF Nos. 9, 11. 

17 AR 316414 

18 AR 570602. 

19 AR 452480. 

20 AR 415451, 815839. 

21 AR 658701, 840845.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 4

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things, depression, PTSD, and bipolar disorder from several doctors from January 2016 to 

February 2017;22 records from the Bay Area Community Services SAGE Program from February 

2016 to April 2017, where the plaintiff received counseling from social workers and marriagefamily therapists; 23 and a March 2017 psychological examination and medical-source statement 

from Ute Kollath, Ph.D..24

Physical-Health Records 

The plaintiff submitted the following physical-health records to support her claim for 

disability: (1) treatment notes from the Highland Hospital Emergency Department for pain she had 

in her right hand and right ankle in August 2014;25 (2) notes from her primary-care physician, 

Mythri Gollapalle, M.D., at Tri-City Health, from September 2014, to February 2017;26 (3) 2014 

records from Mission Peak Orthopedics where the plaintiff was treated for pain in her right 

ankle;27 (4) notes from Nguyen Chiropractic where the plaintiff was treated for back pain resulting 

from a car accident from May 2015 to August 2015 by Linh Nguyen, M.D.;28 and a March 2017 

physical examination and medical-source statement from Eugene McMillan, M.D..29

3. Administrative Proceedings 

Disability Determination Explanations 

During the administrative process, non-examining doctors generated two disabilitydetermination explanations (“DDE”), one on July 25, 2015, for the plaintiff’s initial application, 

and another October 8, 2015, for the reconsideration level. 

22 AR 620646. 

23 AR 702778. 

24 AR 612–619. 

25 AR 317–322. 

26 AR 481569, 779802. 

27 AR 302315. 

28 AR 846870. 

29 AR 603611. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 5

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At the initial level, the plaintiff was found to have affective disorders, anxiety disorders, and 

“Drugs, Substance Addiction Disorders” which were severe, and spine disorders, which were nonsevere.30 Hillary Weiss, Ph.D., developed a mental residual-functioning capacity (“RFC”) 

determining that the plaintiff was moderately limited in her abilities to carry out detailed 

instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, complete a normal 

workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, perform at a 

consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, interact appropriately 

with the general public, get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting 

behavioral extremes, and respond appropriately to changes in the work setting.31 Dr. Weis 

determined that the plaintiff was not significantly limited in any other area.32 Based on these 

findings, Alan Coleman, M.D., determined the plaintiff was not disabled.33

On reconsideration, JoAnne Coyle, Ph.D., had the same mental RFC findings as Dr. Weiss, 

except she determined that the plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to understand and 

remember detailed instructions, accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

supervisors and set realistic goals or make plans independently of others.34 She also found that the 

plaintiff was “not disabled.”35

Administrative Hearing 

On May 30, 2017, the ALJ held a hearing at which the plaintiff and a vocational expert 

testified.36 

30 AR 101. 

31 AR 104–105. 

32 Id. 

33 AR 106107. 

34 AR 120–121. 

35 AR 123. 

36 AR 52–92. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 6

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Plaintiff’s Testimony 

The plaintiff said she worked for Wells Fargo for two years, until Wells Fargo fired her (about 

thirty years ago).37 Thereafter, she worked as an escort (as a sex-worker) but has not engaged in 

prostitution since entering CURA in 2014.38

The plaintiff stated she was in a car accident that exacerbated her back and neck problems and 

revealed arthritis was in 90% of her back.39 She had “a hard time lifting things, turning [her] neck, 

and [she’s] in pain most of the time.”40 The heaviest thing she could carry was “two or three 

pounds.”41 Her neck pain felt “really sharp and it’s like somebody pulling your hair.”42 The pain in 

her back was “dull, aching pain.”43 The pain limited her, she “can’t think straight....”44 She cannot 

“go [thirty] minutes after waking up without taking a pain pill” and had a torn ligament in her 

ankle; an orthopedic surgeon gave her a hydraulic boot but it was not working.45 She was taking 

“five psych meds and three pain killers an [she was] losing the lining in [her] stomach.”46 She said 

that her “neck [was] getting worse” and was going to look into physical therapy.47

The plaintiff said many of her issues stemmed from being a victim of child molestation and 

being abused by her adoptive parents.48 While she was a sex worker, she took crack cocaine to 

help her “get through a few clients” and began to use more and more.49 Her clients Tried to kill her 

37 AR 59–60. 

38 AR 71. 

39 AR 61. 

40 Id.

41 AR 81. 

42 AR 80. 

43 AR 81. 

44 Id.

45 AR 62, 64. 

46 AR 64. 

47 AR 68–69. 

48 AR 62, 68. 

49 AR 63. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 7

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two or three times, held a gun to her head, robbed her, beat her up, and thrown her out of cars.50

She was being treated for PTSD and bipolar disorder. 51 She had a lot of nightmares, could not 

concentrate well, and tried to kill herself twice.52 She had been sober for eighteen to nineteen 

months and attended NA meetings.53 Her prior “brushes with the law” was for “petty stuff; petty 

theft. Nothing big.”54 

On an ordinary day, the plaintiff wakes up and takes her pain medication and her “psych” pills 

at night; the medications kept her “comatose” and made it hard to “do too much of anything.”55

She “can’t really help with a lot of stuff around the house anymore.”56 She wrote in her journal, 

watched a lot of TV, talked to her aunt, talked to her sponsor, and went to meetings.57 Her “back 

hurt[] all the time” and the “medicine’s not working as well as it used to;” she was “building up a 

resistance.”58 The plaintiff saw a therapist once a week, a psychiatrist once a month, and her 

primary-care physician every two weeks.59 She went to the grocery store once or twice a month.60

When she tried to carry her laundry basket, “pain shot up her back....”61

The plaintiff went to “the Box program” for therapy.62 She no longer socialized because she 

had “no friends really,” she had a family, her sponsor was her friend, and she had difficulty 

trusting people.63 When she felt anxious — which was “[a]ll the time, ... six out of seven days a 

50 Id.

51 Id.

52 Id.

53 AR 6566. 

54 AR 66. 

55 AR 70. 

56 AR 69–70. 

57 AR 70. 

58 Id.

59 AR 71. 

60 AR 70, 72. 

61 AR 72. 

62 AR 73. 

63 Id.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 8

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week” — she would “go under the covers” and “lay down and pray she would go to sleep[.]”64

The plaintiff missed appointments, did not want to deal with the public, had nightmares three 

times a week, woke up in the middle of the night, and took hours-long naps every day due to her 

anxiety.65 She was building a resistance to the medication she took for her nightmares.66 The 

plaintiff experienced depression and felt irritable or angry every day and had trouble concentrating 

and focusing.67 She needed reminders to take her medication and pick up refills.68 

After she stopped using crack, “[e]verything got worse. [Her] outlook got better until [she] 

started having all the problems and getting help for different things and then started going 

downhill.”69

Vocational Expert Testimony 

The VE said that the plaintiff had “no legitimate or legal past work.”70

The VE testified that a hypothetical person of the plaintiff’s age and education — who was 

limited to standing for four hours, walking for two hours, operating foot controls with her right 

foot and left foot occasionally, climbing ramps and stairs occasional but never ladders, ropes or 

scaffolds, and could not work at unprotected heights — could work as a linen attendant (DOT 

222387010), senior industrial (DOT 381687018), and a ticket taker (DOT 344667010).71 The VE 

said there were no jobs in the national economy for a second hypothetical individual, who was the 

same as the first, but would be “absent one day per month” and “late for work two days per 

64 AR 74. 

65 AR 73. 

66 AR 74–76. 

67 AR 77−79. 

68 AR 80. 

69 AR 81–82. 

70 AR 85. 

71 AR 85−86. 

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month” by thirty minutes on an unscheduled basis” because the individual would “get laid off or 

let go or fired.”72 

The plaintiff’s attorney asked the VE a hypothetical that assumed the plaintiff’s age and 

education and a long list of limitations.73 The VE could not take the entire list of limitations as a 

whole into consideration, but responded that the following limitations, taken individually, would 

preclude an individual from work: being absent four times a month, being off task consistently 30 

percent of the day, responding to requests, suggestions, criticisms from supervisors if they had a 

hard time or an outburst more than twenty percent of the time, and adapting to changes.74

Administrative Findings 

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether the 

plaintiff was disabled and concluded she was not.75

At step one, the ALJ found that that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since her application date of March 31, 2015.76

At step two, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “Affective 

Disorders; Anxiety Disorder; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD); Cervical and Lumbar 

Degenerative Disc Disease; History of Ankle Sprain; and Substance Abuse Disorder[.]”77

At step three, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment.78 Specifically, the 

“paragraph A” criteria were satisfied because her mental impairments, including the substance use 

disorders, met the listings 12.04 affective disorder, 12.06 anxiety related disorders, and 12.15 

72 AR 86−87. 

73 AR 88. 

74 AR 89–90. 

75 AR 13–28, 33–49. 

76 AR 18, 38. 

77 Id.

78 AR 19, 39. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 10

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trauma- and stressor-related disorders.79 The plaintiff satisfied “paragraph B” criteria because the 

plaintiff’s mental impairments cause at least two “marked” limitations or one “marked” 

limitation.80 The ALJ found that she had a marked limitation in (1) understanding, remembering, 

and applying information; (2) in interacting with others; in concentrating, persisting, or 

maintaining pace; and (3) in managing herself.81 When the plaintiff was under the influence of 

substances, she had “marked limitations in all areas of mental functioning.”82

The ALJ found that if the plaintiff stopped using illicit substances, the remaining limitations 

would cause more than a minimal impact on her ability to perform basic work activities; therefore, 

she would continue to have a severe impairment or combination of impairments.83 The ALJ stated 

that the plaintiff’s “mental condition significantly improved following medication management 

and abstinence from drugs,” but “even during periods of sustained sobriety, the claimant continued 

to be treated for affective and PTSD related symptoms,” and “there is no evidence that the 

claimant’s physical impairments are neither caused nor exacerbated by her substance use, and they 

remain at the same level of severity.”84

The ALJ held that if the plaintiff stopped using illicit substances, the remaining impairments or 

combination of impairments would not meet or medically equal any of the impairments in the 

“paragraph B” criteria.85 For the plaintiff’s physical impairments, there was insufficient evidence 

to satisfy the pertinent requirements under 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint(s)) and 1.04 

(disorders of the spine).86 The plaintiff did not have the “manipulative restrictions to meet listing 

79 Id.

80 Id.

81 Id.

82 Id.

83 AR 20, 40. 

84 Id.

85 Id.

86 Id.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 11

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level severity” and would “not result in an extreme limitation of the ability to walk.”87 For the 

plaintiff’s mental impairments, there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the pertinent 

requirements under 12.04 (depressive, bipolar, and related disorders), 12.06 (anxiety and 

obsessive-compulsive disorders), or 12.15 (trauma- and stressor-related disorders).88 The plaintiff 

would have moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information and 

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace and mild limitations in interacting with others and 

adapting or managing oneself. 89 

The ALJ also found that the “paragraph C” criteria would not be satisfied.90 The plaintiff 

showed adequate mental functioning “outside inpatient treatment/hospitalization adjusted to 

various life stressors, and with medication compliance” and that “no State agency psychological 

consultant concluded that a mental listing is medically equaled if the claimant stopped the 

substance use.”91

At step four, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff had the residual-functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform a medium range of work at all exertional levels limited to simple, routine, and 

repetitive tasks if she stopped the substance use.92 

At step five, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had no past relevant work to examine and so 

transferability of job skills was not relevant.93 The plaintiff was defined as an individual of 

advanced age on the date the application was filed.94 She had a high-school education and can 

communicate in English.95 Considering the plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work experience 

87 Id.

88 Id.

89 AR 20–21, 40–41. 

90 AR 22, 42. 

91 Id.

92 Id.

93 AR 27, 47. 

94 Id.

95 Id.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06957-LB 12

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in conjunction with the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, the ALJ concluded she was “not disabled” 

under the framework of section 203.14.96 The ALJ concluded that the substance-abuse disorder 

was a contributing factor material to the determination of disability because the plaintiff would not 

be disabled if she stopped the substance use, and thus she was not disabled.97

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), district courts have jurisdiction to review any final decision of the 

Commissioner if the claimant initiates a suit within sixty days of the decision. A court may set 

aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits only if the ALJ’s “findings are based on legal error or 

are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 

586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The reviewing court should uphold “such 

inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence.” Mark 

v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). If the evidence in the administrative record 

supports the ALJ’s decision and a different outcome, the court must defer to the ALJ’s decision 

and may not substitute its own decision. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097– 98 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Finally, [a court] may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). 

GOVERNING LAW 

A claimant is considered disabled if (1) she suffers from a “medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected 

to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months,” and (2) the “impairment or 

96 AR 28, 48. 

97 Id.

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impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but 

cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy....” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) & 

(B). The five-step analysis for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of 

the Social Security Act is as follows. 

Step One. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, then 

the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to benefits. If the claimant is not working 

in a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step one, 

and the evaluation proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 

Step Two. Is the claimant’s impairment (or combination of impairments) severe? If not, 

the claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 

Step Three. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specified impairments 

described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is disabled and is entitled to benefits. If the 

claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the impairments listed in the 

regulations, then the case cannot be resolved at step three, and the evaluation proceeds to 

step four. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 

Step Four. Considering the claimant’s RFC, is the claimant able to do any work that he or 

she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is not disabled and is not entitled to 

benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then the case cannot 

be resolved at step four, and the case proceeds to the fifth and final step. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

Step Five. Considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, is the 

claimant able to “make an adjustment to other work?” If not, then the claimant is disabled 

and entitled to benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is able to do 

other work, the Commissioner must establish that there are a significant number of jobs in 

the national economy that the claimant can do. There are two ways for the Commissioner 

to show other jobs in significant numbers in the national economy: (1) by the testimony of 

a vocational expert or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R., 

part 404, subpart P, app. 2. 

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). 

For steps one through four, the burden of proof is on the claimant. At step five, the burden 

shifts to the Commissioner. Gonzales v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 784 F.2d 1417, 1419 

(9th Cir. 1986). 

ANALYSIS 

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly weighing medical-opinion 

evidence, (2) finding that her testimony was not credible, (3) improperly assessing the materiality 

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of drug and alcohol abuse, (4) failing to base the plaintiff’s RFC on substantial evidence; and (5) 

failing to base his step-five findings on substantial evidence.98 

For the reasons below, the court grants the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denies 

the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remands for further proceedings 

consistent with this order. 

1. Whether the ALJ Erred in Weighing Medical-Opinion Evidence 

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting the opinion of consultative examiner 

Dr. McMillan, (2) rejecting the opinions of treating psychiatrists Dr. Newsom and Dr. Chopra, (3) 

rejecting the opinion of treating psychologist Dr. Sakhai, (4) ignoring the opinions of treating 

clinicians Dr. Johnson, Dr. Narayan, Dr. Morgan, and Dr. Caruso-Maxey, and (5) rejecting the 

opinions of treating social workers Chika and A’za Williams.99 

The court holds that the ALJ erred in weighing the opinions of Drs. Newsom, Chopra, Sakhai, 

Narayan, Morgan, and Caruso-Maxey. 

Legal Standard 

The ALJ is responsible for “‘resolving conflicts in medical testimony and for resolving 

ambiguities.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d 

at 1039). In weighing and evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider the entire case record, 

including each medical opinion in the record, together with the rest of the relevant evidence. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b); see Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] reviewing 

court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific 

quantum of supporting evidence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“In conjunction with the relevant regulations, [the Ninth Circuit has] developed standards that 

guide [the] analysis of an ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 

98 Mot. – ECF No. 22 at 13–28. 

99 Id. at 13–20. 

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F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527).100 Social Security regulations 

distinguish between three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians; (2) examining physicians; 

and (3) non-examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c), (e); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995). “Generally, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining 

physician’s, and an examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a reviewing [nonexamining] physician’s.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

An ALJ, “may disregard the opinion of a treating physician, whether or not controverted.” 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. “To reject [the] uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining 

doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence.” Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). By contrast, if the ALJ finds that the opinion of a treating physician is contradicted, a 

reviewing court will require only that the ALJ provide “specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (“If a treating or 

examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it 

by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians 

may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical 

findings or other evidence in the record.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

An ALJ errs when he “rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight” without explanation 

or without explaining why “another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticiz[es] it with 

boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.” Garrison, 759 F.3d 

at 1012–13. “[F]actors relevant to evaluating any medical opinion, not limited to the opinion of the 

treating physician, include the amount of relevant evidence that supports the opinion and the 

100 The Social Security Administration promulgated new regulations, including a new § 404.1521, 

effective March 27, 2017. The previous version, effective to March 26, 2017, applies here. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.614(a). 

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quality of the explanation provided[,] the consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a 

whole[, and] the specialty of the physician providing the opinion....” Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. (citing 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)–(6)); see also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 

1989) (an ALJ need not agree with everything contained in the medical opinion and can consider 

some portions less significant than others). 

“A treating physician’s opinion is not binding on the Commissioner with respect to the 

existence of an impairment or the ultimate issue of disability.” Alcala v. Colvin, SACV 12–0626 

AJWW, 2013 WL 1620352, at *5 (C.D. Cal., Apr. 15, 2013) (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 

F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001)). “However, a treating physician’s medical opinion as to the 

nature and severity of an individual’s impairment is entitled to controlling weight when that 

opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.” Id.

(citing Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 

F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Even when not entitled to controlling weight, ‘treating source 

medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed’ in light of (1) the length of 

the treatment relationship; (2) the frequency of examination; (3) the nature and extent of the 

treatment relationship; (4) the supportability of the diagnosis; (5) consistency with other evidence 

in the record; and (6) the area of specialization. Id. (quoting Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1157 & n.6). 

The ALJ must consider the opinions of other “medical sources who are not acceptable medical 

sources and [the testimony] from nonmedical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f). The ALJ is 

required to consider observations by “other sources” as to how an impairment affects a claimant’s 

ability to work. Id. Nonetheless, an “ALJ may discount [the] testimony” or an opinion “from these 

other sources if the ALJ gives ... germane [reasons] for doing so.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “[A]n opinion from a 

medical source who is not an acceptable medical source may outweigh the medical opinion of an 

acceptable medical source[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1). “For example, it may be appropriate to 

give more weight to the opinion of a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source if he 

or she has seen the individual more often than the treating source, has provided better supporting 

evidence and a better explanation for the opinion, and the opinion is more consistent with the 

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evidence as a whole.” Id.

Dr. McMillan 

Dr. McMillan examined the plaintiff and filled out a medical-source statement opining that the 

plaintiff was limited to the full range of light-exertional work in March of 2017.101 The ALJ gave 

little weight to his opinion, and the plaintiff contends this was error.102

Dr. McMillan is an examining physician and his opinion is contradicted. Thus, the ALJ was 

required to give specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence to discount his 

opinion. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 

The ALJ gave Dr. McMillan’s opinion little weight because of the following: 

Dr. McMillan limited the claimant to the full range of light exertion, and able to engage in 

activities that require stooping, kneeling, and crouching for more than one third of a 

workday.... The undersigned gives little weight to this assessment because her conservative 

yet infrequent treatment for her physical impairments, and her good response to 

chiropractic treatment, show that she is not as limited as alleged or assessed by Dr. 

McMillan.103 

This is a specific and legitimate reason that is supported by substantial evidence. 

 Dr. Nguyen, a chiropractor, treated the plaintiff for neck and back pain between May and 

August 2015 following her car accident.104 Notes from the plaintiff’s appointments with Dr. 

Nguyen indicate the plaintiff improved to mostly normal ranges of motion in her back and selfreported 90% improvement on her last appointment. The above reasons the ALJ provided are 

based on these findings. Because Dr. Nguyen is a treating source, with specialized knowledge, 

who treated the plaintiff multiple times, her opinion and findings trump those of Dr. McMillan.

Holohan, 246 F.3d 1195 (A treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining 

physician’s.). The ALJ did not err here. 

101 AR 603–605. 

102 AR 45; Mot.  ECF No. 22 at 1416. 

103 AR 25, 45. 

104 AR 851–862, 863–864, 865–866, 867–868. 

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Dr. Newsom and Dr. Chopra 

Peter Newsom, M.D., and Kapil Chopra, M.D., among others, treated the plaintiff from 

January 2016 to February 2017 at Pathways to Wellness and diagnosed her with PTSD and bipolar 

disorder.105 The ALJ gave little weight to their opinions.106 The plaintiff argues this was error.107

The opinions of the providers at Pathways to Wellness are contradicted by the non-examining 

sources of record, and therefore the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons 

based on substantial evidence in the record to reject them. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. 

The ALJ gave little weight to their opinions for the following reason: 

The claimant was under sustained remission from drug abuse other than marijuana use 

during this period. The undersigned gives overly restrictive and inconsistent with the GAF 

scores contained in the same treatment notes. The GAF scores[,] ranging between 55 and 

65, indicated only mild and/or moderate limitations in social and occupational functioning 

despite the assessed marked/severe functional limitations.... These marked limitations are 

also inconsistent with the objective findings that consistently document good/fair attention 

and concentration, and intact immediate, remote and recent memory.108

First, the ALJ argues that the assessments were overly restrictive and inconsistent with the 

GAF scores given to the plaintiff. This reason is not supported by substantial evidence. Dr. 

Newsom found that the plaintiff had mild restriction of activities of daily living, marked 

difficulties in maintaining social functioning and relationships and maintaining concentration, and 

extreme episodes of decomposition and increase of symptoms for extended durations.109 Dr. 

Chopra noted that the plaintiff was unable to live independently because of hallucinations and 

limited insight and had a severe difficulty with socialization and medication compliance due to 

missing medication appointments.110 The court does not find that these are overly restrictive 

findings. Although both doctors gave the plaintiff GAF scores ranging from 55 to 65,111 which 

105 AR 624–646. 

106 AR 21, 41. 

107 Mot.  ECF No. 22 at 1617. 

108 AR 21, 41. 

109 AR 628. 

110 AR 644. 

111 See AR 628–629, 634, 636, 642. 

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conflict somewhat with their findings, the plaintiff argues persuasively that those GAF scores, by 

themselves, are not sufficient grounds to discount the treating doctors’ findings. See Macias v. 

Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-00107-SKO, WL 1224067 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016) (“Although the 

ALJ is to weigh the medical evidence and interpret it, ... he or she is not empowered to 

independently assess clinical findings and reject multiple medical opinions based on the ALJ’s 

own independent interpretation of unexplained GAF scores[.]”) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 

110302) (internal citations omitted). This reason was not based on substantial evidence. 

The ALJ’s contentions — that the marked findings from the providers at Pathways to Wellness 

are “inconsistent with the objective findings that consistently document good/fair attention and 

concentration, and intact immediate, remote and recent memory” — lack the specificity required. 

See Williams v. Astrue, No. ED CV 08-549-PLA, 2010 WL 431432, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb 1, 2010) 

(“[T]o the extent that the ALJ determined that Dr. Porcelli’s October 2004 opinion was 

inconsistent with the objective evidence that was an inadequate reason to reject Dr. Porcelli’s 

findings as it fails to reach the level of specificity required for rejecting and opinion of a treating 

physician”) (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421–23 (9th Cir.1988). Furthermore, the ALJ 

does not point to such specific findings of good attention, concentration, or memory in the record; 

he referred to them only generally. This is not a specific or legitimate reason supported by 

substantial evidence. 

The court finds the ALJ erred by weighing the opinions of the treating doctors at Pathways to 

Wellness. 

Dr. Sakhai 

Dr. Sakhai, a psychologist, treated the plaintiff for, among other things, PTSD, depression, and 

anxiety, in weekly psychotherapy sessions from January 2016 to February 2017, and he wrote a 

medical-source statement.112 The ALJ accorded his opinions little weight, and the plaintiff 

contends that this was error.113 

112 AR 659–701. 

113 AR 21, 41; Mot.  ECF No. 22 at 1719. 

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Dr. Sakhai is a treating source, and his opinions are contradicted. Thus, the ALJ was required 

to provide specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record to discount 

his opinions. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. 

The ALJ provided the following reasons to accord Dr. Sakhai little weight: 

Kambiz Sakhai, Psy.D., another treating psychiatrist, indicated mostly marked limitations 

in understanding, remembering, and applying information; in interacting with others; 

adapting and managing oneself, and ability to have only marginal adjustment in daily life 

(Exhibits 16F). This assessment indicating listing level severity is given little weight 

because it is inconsistent with the claimant’s treatment notes following her sustained 

sobriety from substances other than marijuana. First, Dr. Sakhai provided his assessment 

on a check-box form with no explanation for the severity of these limitations or any 

evidence of correlated objective findings that would support the degree of these 

limitations. Second, looking at his treatment notes, other than the initial mental status 

evaluation, he did not provide subsequent objective evaluations to assess her improved 

condition, even though he noted after most sessions that she expressed satisfaction with 

therapy and had improved symptoms.114

These reasons were not specific, legitimate, or supported by substantial evidence. 

First, the ALJ cannot conclude that Dr. Sakhai’s opinions are inconsistent with the plaintiff’s 

treatment notes after her sobriety without identifying the inconsistencies and without referencing 

specific pieces of evidence (e.g. a particular medical-source statement or findings from an 

examination). In Belanger v. Berryhill, the Ninth Circuit found that it was error for an ALJ to 

reject the opinion of a treating physician because it was purportedly “inconsistent with the record 

as a whole,” and it “appeared to be based on [the plaintiff’s] subjective reporting of pain.” 685 

Fed. Appx. 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, the ALJ’s critique was similarly “boilerplate criticism” 

and was “insufficient to reject a treating physician’s opinion....” Id. 

Second, forms with check-boxes may be persuasive opinion evidence when well supported. In 

Garrison, the Ninth Circuit held that it was an egregious and important error to discount the 

check-list box that was “based on the [treating source’s] significant experience” with the plaintiff 

and “supported by numerous records.” 759 F.3d 1013. Similarly in Fleenor v. Berryhill, the Ninth 

Circuit held it was error for an ALJ to give little weight to a treating source’s check-box 

114 AR 21, 41. 

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assessment without evaluating “length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; frequency 

of examination; supportability; and consistency with the overall record.” 752 Fed. Appx. 451, 452 

(9th Cir. 2018). Dr. Sakhai’s treatment notes for the 13 months that he treated the plaintiff 

provided ample evidence of the plaintiff’s psychological symptoms and how they affected her 

daily life. For example, he detailed how nightmares prevented her from sleeping, which affected 

her ability to function during the day, how apathy and anhedonia prevented her from leaving the 

house, and how her memory and concentration issues worsened over time.115 The ALJ overlooked 

this evidence and did not consider the length, nature, and extent of their treatment relationship or 

consistency with the other opinions. This was error. 

Third, criticizing Dr. Sakhai’s opinions for failing to have objective evaluations is not a 

legitimate ground supported by substantial evidence. As the court held in Ortiz v. Colvin, “courts 

have recognized that a psychiatric impairment is not as readily amenable to substantiation by 

objective laboratory testing as is a medical impairment and that consequently, the diagnostic 

techniques employed in the field of psychiatry may be somewhat less tangible than those in the 

field of medicine.” No. 2:15-cv-1456 AC, 2016 WL 4992674, *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2016) 

(quoting Lebus v. Harris, 526 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Averbach v. Astrue, 731 F. Supp. 

2d 977, 986 (C.D. Cal. 2010). “The report of a psychiatrist should not be rejected simply because 

of the relative imprecision of the psychiatric methodology or the absence of substantial 

documentation, unless there are other reasons to question the diagnostic technique.” Id. 

Furthermore, Dr. Sakhai’s notes contain observations of the plaintiff’s objective symptoms to 

support his restrictive findings.116 

The ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons to accord Dr. Sakhai’s opinions little 

weight and thus, erred 

115 AR 676–79, 682–683, 685–686, 689–690, 692, 694, 698–699, 701. 

116 AR 675–676, 677–701. 

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Dr. Johnson, Dr. Narayan, Dr. Morgan, and Dr. Caruso-Maxey 

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to discuss the opinions of Dr. Johnson, who treated the 

plaintiff at the Schuman-Liles Clinic, or Drs. Narayan, Morgan, or Caruso-Maxey, who treated her 

at the Portia Belle Hume center, and that this was error.117

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[b]ecause a court must give ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ 

for rejecting a treating doctor’s opinions, it follows even more strongly that an ALJ cannot in its 

decision totally ignore a treating doctor and his or her notes, without even mentioning them.” 

Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 117273. (9th Cir. 2015). While the ALJ did discuss Dr. 

Johnson’s findings in his decision,118 the ALJ did not address those of the other three providers at 

issue, and the Commissioner concedes as much.119 This is error. 

Chika and A’Zah Williams 

Chika and A’Zah Williams are social workers for the Sage program, where the plaintiff was 

treated between October 2016 and April 2017.120 They are considered “other sources.” Their 

opinions are contradicted by treating physicians in the record. Thus, the ALJ must provide 

germane reasons for rejecting their opinions. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. 

The ALJ rejected their testimony because: 

Her complaints of uncontrolled PTSD related symptoms to these therapists are 

contradicted by her reports to Dr. Newsom[] regarding her good response to her 

medications, improved symptoms, decreased nightmares, and controlled mood swings (See 

Exhibit 9F/21; 12F/15). Though she voluntarily checked herself into the hospital in 

February 2017, secondary to suicidal ideation and increased depression, on exam, she 

denied any delusions, hallucination, and was cooperative without any evidence of 

psychomotor agitation or retardation. She was started on Depakote, Risperdal, and Prozac 

(Exhibit 15F/2). She was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. After a 

night's sleep, the claimant’s condition improved and she was discharged in stable 

condition....121

117 Mot.  ECF No. 22 at 1920. 

118 AR 24, 44. 

119 Cross-Mot. – ECF No. 23 at 7. 

120 AR 722–727, 73133, 738, 741, 745, 74954, 753–54, 767775. 

121 AR 25, 45. 

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Here, the ALJ rejected the social workers’ opinions because they were inconsistent with the 

opinion of Dr. Newsom, a psychiatrist who is entitled to greater weight. Id. at 1112 (citing 

Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202 (the regulations give more weight to the opinions of specialists 

concerning matters relating to their specialty than they do to opinions of non-specialists)). This a 

germane reason for rejecting their opinion evidence . 

2. Whether the ALJ Improperly Rejected the Plaintiff’s Testimony 

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting her testimony, specifically, by failing 

identify what parts of her testimony were not credible and by failing to supply clear and 

convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence.122 

The ALJ found the following about the plaintiff’s testimony: 

[T]he claimant’s medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to 

produce the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent 

with the objective medical and other evidence.123

In assessing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ must make two determinations. Molina, 674 F.3d 

at 1112. “First, the ALJ must determine whether [the claimant has presented] ‘objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged.’” Id. (quoting Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591). Second, if the claimant 

produces that evidence, and “there is no evidence of malingering,” the ALJ must provide 

“specific, clear and convincing reasons for” rejecting the claimant’s testimony regarding the 

severity of the claimant’s symptoms. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“At the same time, the ALJ is not ‘required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(5)(A).’” Id. at 1112 (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Factors 

that an ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s credibility include reputation for truthfulness, 

122 Mot.  ECF No. 22 at 20. 

123 AR 25, 45. 

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inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily activities, and unexplained, 

or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.” 

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation omitted). “[T]he ALJ must 

identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” 

Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 

(9th Cir. 1995)); see, e.g., Morris v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-0674-JSC, 2016 WL 7369300, at *12 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2016). 

The ALJ discredited the plaintiff’s testimony, in part, based on his assessment of the medicalopinion evidence. Because the court remands for reconsideration of that medical evidence, the 

court remands on this ground too. The ALJ can reassess the plaintiff’s credibility in context of the 

entire record. 

3. Whether the ALJ Erred by Assessing the Materiality of the Substance Abuse. 

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred because his materiality finding is not supported by 

substantial evidence.124 The ALJ found that if the plaintiff stopped her substance abuse, then she 

would have the RFC to perform medium work limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks.125

“A finding of ‘disabled’ under the five-step inquiry does not automatically qualify a claimant 

for disability benefits.” Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C), a claimant cannot receive disability benefits ‘if alcoholism or drug 

addiction would... be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s determination that the 

individual is disabled.’” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(2)(C)) (alteration in original). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that when a Social Security disability claim involves substance 

abuse, the ALJ must first conduct the five-step sequential evaluation without determining the 

impact of substance abuse on the claimant. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 954–55. If the ALJ finds that 

124 Mot. – ECF No. 22 at 26. 

125 AR 22, 42. 

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the claimant is not disabled, then the ALJ proceeds no further. Id. at 955. If, however, the ALJ 

finds that the claimant is disabled, then the ALJ conducts the sequential evaluation a second time 

and considers whether the claimant would still be disabled absent the substance abuse. Id. (citing 

20 C.F.R. §§ ; C.F.R. § 404.1535, 416.935); Parra, 481 F.3d. at 747 (under the Social Security 

Act’s regulations, “the ALJ must conduct a drug abuse and alcoholism analysis” to determine 

“which of the claimant’s disabling limitations would remain if the claimant stopped using drugs or 

alcohol.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)). The Ninth Circuit has stressed that courts must not 

“fail to distinguish between substance abuse contributing to the disability and the disability 

remaining after the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol.” Kroeger v. Calvin, 2015 WL 

2398398, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2015) (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th 

Cir. 1998)). “Just because substance abuse contributes to a disability does not mean that when the 

substance abuse ends, the disability will too.” Id. The claimant has the burden to prove that the 

drug or alcohol abuse is not a contributing factor material to disability. Parra, 481 F.3d at 748. 

Because the court remands for a reweighing of medical-opinion evidence and the plaintiff’s 

testimony, and because the materiality of drug and alcohol abuse was based on those assessments, 

the court remands on this ground too. 

4. Whether the ALJ’s RFC is Supported by Substantial Evidence 

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because his RFC determination was not supported by 

substantial evidence.126 The ALJ found that “[i]f the claimant stopped the substance use, the 

claimant would have the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 

CFR 416.967(c) except is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks.”127 Because the court 

remands for a reweighing of medical-opinion evidence and the plaintiff’s testimony, and because 

the RFC was based on those assessments, the court remands on this ground too. 

126 Mot. – ECF No. 22 at 26. 

127 AR 27, 47. 

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5. Whether the ALJ’s Step-Five Finding is Supported by Substantial Evidence 

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when he used the Medical Vocational Guidelines to 

find the plaintiff not disabled.128

At step five, the ALJ said that he “must consider the claimant's residual functional capacity, 

age, education, and work experience in conjunction with the Medical-Vocational Guidelines 

(“MVD”)” to determine whether an adjustment to other work can be made.129 Using the MVD’s 

framework, the ALJ found that: 

If the claimant stopped the substance use, the claimant would not have the residual 

functional capacity to perform the full range of medium work. However, the additional 

limitations that would remain have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled 

medium work. Considering this residual functional capacity, and the claimant's age, 

education and work experience, a finding of “not disabled” is therefore appropriate under 

the framework.130

Because the court remands for a reweighing of medical-opinion evidence and the plaintiff’s 

testimony, and because step-five was based on those assessments, the court remands on this 

ground. 

CONCLUSION 

The court grants the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denies the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment, and remands for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 24, 2020 ______________________________________ 

LAUREL BEELER 

United States Magistrate Judge 

128 Mot. – ECF No. 22 at 27. 

129 AR 27, 47. 

130 AR 28, 48. 

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