Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02994/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02994-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2994

JAMES BLASIUS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

ANGEL AUTOMOTIVE, INC.,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 13‐CV‐00046‐JVB‐CAN — Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 19, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 12, 2016

____________________

Before MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and BLAKEY,

District Judge.

*

BLAKEY, District Judge. In July 2009, Appellant James

Blasius purchased a used 2005 Ford Excursion. In June 2012,

Blasius entrusted Appellee Angel Automotive, Inc. (“AAI”)

with upgrading the vehicle to make it “safe” and “reliable.”

                                                  * Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

Case: 15-2994 Document: 34 Filed: 10/12/2016 Pages: 27
2 No. 15‐2294

Blasius alleges that AAI negligently betrayed that trust

when, one day and about 200 miles after pick up, the vehicle

caught fire and was destroyed. The district court granted

summary judgment for AAI after concluding that: (1) Blasius

failed to present evidence that AAI’s work proximately

caused the fire; and (2) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did

not apply. Blasius appealed. For the reasons explained be‐

low, the decision of the district court is REVERSED.

Background & Procedural History

In July 2009, Blasius, a resident of Michigan, purchased a

used 2005 Ford Excursion for towing his motorcycle racing

trailer. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 1;

Blasius Dep. 19:1–7. Over the next three years, Blasius in‐

vested in approximately $70,000 worth of parts, accessories,

and modifications to the vehicle.1 Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot.

Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 4.  

In the summer of 2012, Blasius next contacted AAI, an

automotive repair shop located in Elkhart, Indiana, to fur‐

ther improve the Excursion’s performance. Blasius outlined

several components he wanted inspected and improved and

gave AAI an “open checkbook” for the repairs. Pl.’s Resp.

Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 8; Blasius Dep. 37:19–

22. These components included, among others, the vehicle’s

engine, suspension, turbocharger, intake and exhaust mani‐

folds, exhaust, transmission, brakes, spark plugs, and oil

pump. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 8.

                                                 

1 These improvements included, among others, a new sound system,

tires, suspension, fuel system, batteries, transmission, and turbocharger.

Blasius Dep. 15:1–36:25. These initial modifications were completed by

the end of May 2012. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 8.

Case: 15-2994 Document: 34 Filed: 10/12/2016 Pages: 27
No. 15‐2294 3

AAI not only agreed to Blasius’ requests, but also “gave the

truck a complete once‐over” and recommended additional

modifications, which Blasius approved. Angel Dep. 14:2–3,

44:11–15.  

In June 2012, AAI mechanics Thomas Angel and Daniel

Fine performed the desired work. Id. at 11:10–13; Fine Dep.

62:20–22. Due to the extent of Blasius’ requested modifica‐

tions, AAI first removed the Excursion’s body from its chas‐

sis. Angel Dep. 14:2–22; Fine Dep. 43:14–15. This process in‐

volved disconnecting (and eventually reconnecting) the ve‐

hicle’s various fluid transfer lines, including coolant lines,

brake lines, and power steering hoses. Angel Dep. 15:11–15.

After removing the vehicle body, AAI’s overhaul includ‐

ed replacing the Excursion’s fuel pump, auxiliary fuel filter,

and fuel lines. Id. at 19:6–9, 19:23–20:3, 27:2–4, 43:11–20; Fine

Dep. 23:18–20, 29:6–11, 36:22–37:2, 39:20–40:5. The new fuel

lines ran from the fuel tank at the rear of the vehicle to the

newly installed fuel pump, to an auxiliary fuel filter, and

then finally to the topside of the driver’s side of the engine.

Angel Dep. 22:9–23:20. A return line was run out of the en‐

gine back to the fuel tank. Id. at 24:1–6.

AAI originally promised to complete work by Thursday,

June 21, 2012. Id. at 44:20–46:2; Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ.

J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 12. On June 20, 2012, however, AAI in‐

formed Blasius that the Excursion was not ready for pick up.

Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 12. Aware

that Blasius desired to take the truck on an upcoming trip to

northern Michigan, Angel promised Blasius that the vehicle

would be available the following Thursday, June 28, 2012.

Angel Dep. 45:1–3, 47:3–10. At his deposition, Angel testified

that these circumstances created a “heightened sense of ur‐

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4 No. 15‐2294

gency” within AAI to complete the repairs. Id. at 48:9–16.

Angel testified that, by the time AAI finished working on the

Excursion, there was little additional work that could have

been done to the vehicle. Id. at 46:24–47:2.

On June 28, 2012, Blasius picked up his Excursion and

drove approximately 200 miles back to his Michigan home.2

Id. at 48:17–19; Blasius Dep. 44:17–19. Upon arrival, Blasius

emailed AAI and complained of new or persisting issues

with the vehicle’s performance. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot.

Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 13. Blasius described “limited pull

off the line,” heavy exhaust smoke, and a “rattling or ping‐

ing or knocking” at low rpm’s. Angel responded on the

morning of June 29, 2012 and promised to resolve the issues,

but did not discourage Blasius from driving the truck in the

interim. Id.; Angel Dep. 51:12–18.  

Later on June 29, 2012, Blasius left his home in the Excur‐

sion with his motorcycle trailer in tow. Blasius Dep. 46:12–

21. Blasius’ adult son and his son’s friend were passengers.

Id. at 5:13–17. At his deposition, Blasius testified that, after

traveling approximately 12 miles, Blasius’ son observed

smoke emanating from the vehicle’s interior vents. Id. at

47:1–7. As a result, after approximately 30 seconds, Blasius

began to pull over to the shoulder. Id. at 47:15–17. As Blasius

looked in his review mirror, he observed additional smoke

behind the vehicle. Id. at 47:18–23. Blasius also discovered

that his parking, emergency, and trailer brakes were non‐

responsive. Id. at 48:6–49:15. Smoke billowed into the vehicle

                                                 

2 Angel testified that, prior to transferring the Excursion back to Blasius,

he and Fine also test drove the vehicle. Angel Dep. 47:15–25.

Case: 15-2994 Document: 34 Filed: 10/12/2016 Pages: 27
No. 15‐2294 5

cabin as Blasius swerved on and off the shoulder in an at‐

tempt to slow the vehicle. Id. at 49:16–23.

The Excursion eventually came to a stop after approxi‐

mately three‐quarters of a mile. Id. at 50:1–3. After escaping

the vehicle, Blasius specifically observed burning diesel fuel

running along the bottom and sides of the vehicle. Id. at

50:14–52:1. Blasius unsuccessfully attempted to subdue the

fire with multiple fire extinguishers. Id. at 52:23–55:14. Sadly,

by the time firefighters arrived, the vehicle was destroyed

and the motorcycle trailer was damaged. Id. at 68:13–14; Pl.’s

Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 14.  

After the fire was finally extinguished, the Excursion was

loaded onto a flatbed wrecker and taken to a nearby storage

facility. Blasius Dep. 66:3–6. When Blasius notified Angel of

the situation, Angel admitted to Blasius that he believed a

fuel leak may have caused the fire. Id. at 55:1–5.

Shortly thereafter, James Raad, a certified vehicle fire in‐

vestigator, conducted an inspection of the vehicle remnants.

Raad Aff. 1. Raad determined that the fire originated under

the vehicle, but could not ascertain conclusive evidence of its

exact cause. Id.  

On January 22, 2013, Blasius filed suit against AAI in the

Northern District of Indiana for negligence and breach of

contract. Compl., ECF No. 1. In July 2013, Blasius’ own ex‐

pert, Adam Hooker, inspected the disassembled remains of

the vehicle, and rendered various conclusions about the

cause of the fire. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53,

Ex. 11 at 1. Among the conclusions in his report, Hooker

found that the diesel and brake fluid systems (worked on

during AAI’s overhaul) were “more likely related to the

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6 No. 15‐2294

cause of the fire” and the “diesel fuel or brake fluid” was the

“first fuel(s) ignited during the progression of the fire.” Id.

On March 4, 2015, the district court granted AAI’s mo‐

tion for summary judgment. Op. and Order, ECF No. 68. In

its ruling, the court found that Blasius “failed to present evi‐

dence showing that [AAI’s] modification to the [Excursion]

caused the fire.” Id. at 5. Additionally, the court held that the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply. Id. at 6–7. Blasius

challenges both aspects of the district court’s ruling.

Discussion

We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐

ment de novo. Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Nat’l Ret. Fund,

778 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is ap‐

propriate only where there are no genuine issues of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination,

we view all evidence in the light most favorable to, and de‐

rive all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving par‐

ty. Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016). Sum‐

mary judgment is warranted only if, after doing so, we de‐

termine that no jury could reasonably find in the nonmoving

party’s favor. McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir.

2016).

A. Proximate Cause

Under Indiana law, proximate cause “is an essential ele‐

ment of a negligence action.” Carson v. ALL Erection & Crane

Rental Corp., 811 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hassan

v. Begley, 836 N.E.2d 303, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).  

Proximate cause in Indiana negligence law has

two aspects. The first—causation in fact—is a

Case: 15-2994 Document: 34 Filed: 10/12/2016 Pages: 27
No. 15‐2294 7

factual inquiry for the jury. If the injury would

not have occurred without the defendant’s

negligent act or omission, there is causation in

fact. A second component of proximate cause

is the scope of liability. That issue, which is al‐

so for the trier of fact, turns largely on whether

the injury is a natural and probable conse‐

quence, which in the light of the circumstances,

should have been foreseen or anticipated. Un‐

der this doctrine, liability may not be imposed

on an original negligent actor who sets into

motion a chain of events if the ultimate injury

was not reasonably foreseeable as the natural

and probable consequence of the act or omis‐

sion.  

City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801

N.E.2d 1222, 1243–44 (Ind. 2003) (internal citations and quo‐

tations omitted). Proximate cause “must be based upon

provable facts and cannot be based upon mere guess, conjec‐

ture, surmise, possibility or speculation.” Collins v. Am. Op‐

tometric Assʹn, 693 F.2d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1982). In other

words, the factual evidence supplied must reflect some “rea‐

sonable certainty or probability.” Mr. Bults, Inc. v. Orlando,

990 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

In support of its summary judgment ruling, the district

court cited the “dearth of evidence” connecting Blasius’ ve‐

hicle fire with AAI’s repair work, and stated that

“[h]ypothesis alone is not enough to subject [AAI] to liabil‐

ity.” Op. and Order 5, ECF No. 68. Our review of the record,

however, demands a different conclusion.  

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8 No. 15‐2294

Hooker’s written report—which accompanied Blasius’

response to AAI’s summary judgment motion—noted the

“extent of the disassembly work that Angel Automotive had

to perform in order to install various upgraded components

and to replace the fuel lines.” Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ.

J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 11 at 1. According to Hooker, to achieve

this requisite level of disassembly, numerous connections

“had to be disconnected and reconnected.” Id. Hooker’s ob‐

servations were confirmed by both Angel and Fine. Angel

Dep. 14:2–22, 15:11–15; Fine Dep. 43:14–15. Hooker further

noted that these connections “were located within numerous

fluid moving systems within the vehicle” and that the fluids

contained therein—diesel fuel, power steering fluid, brake

fluid, motor oil, window washer fluid, and anti‐freeze—“can

all be ignited via hot engine and exhaust components.” Pl.’s

Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 11 at 1.  

Hooker opined that these fluid systems “were all inter‐

acted with during the process of Angel Automotive complet‐

ing their work,” and that the misalignment, forcing, cross‐

threading, over torqueing, or under torqueing of any fluid

system connections “could lead to a leak that under the

proper conditions ... would produce a fire.” Id. Hooker con‐

cluded that, absent “documentation that the proper torque

values were applied to all connections within the vehicle, the

potential of a leak in one of these systems cannot be elimi‐

nated as a possible cause of this fire.” Id. at 2.

Hooker’s report further concluded that the fire originated

“in an area that encompasses the left rear portion of the en‐

gine compartment, the bulkhead area, and the area in be‐

tween the transmission and the left side body and door pan‐

els.” Id. at 2. The report highlighted that “the fuel lines lead‐

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No. 15‐2294 9

ing from the fuel tank to the fuel injection pump are located

in this area,” as are the “brake system master cylinder and

reservoir”—all of which were “manipulated and/or removed

and reinstalled” during AAI’s work on the vehicle. Id. Ac‐

cording to Hooker, as noted above, these systems were

“more likely related to the cause of the fire” and “diesel fuel

or brake fluid” was the “first fuel(s) ignited during the pro‐

gression of the fire.” Id.

The district court’s ruling failed to address any portion of

this written report. Instead, the court highlighted a selective,

two‐page portion of Hooker’s 59‐page deposition transcript

in which Hooker did not pronounce, in response to certain

questions, that the fire was “more likely than not” caused by

AAI’s repair work. Op. and Order 5, ECF No. 68. This under‐

inclusive analysis misconstrues Hooker’s overall assessment.  

A comprehensive reading of Hooker’s deposition, on the

other hand, confirms that, time and again, his testimony re‐

inforced the expert opinions set forth in his written report.

During questioning, Hooker maintained that a fluid system

leak constituted the “most likely scenario” for the June 29,

2012 fire. Hooker Dep. 45:13–46:1. He further agreed that

“[b]ut for the removal and the manipulation and disassem‐

bly” of fluid transfer lines by AAI, the fire would not have

occurred. Id. at 53:24–54:3.

Admittedly, Hooker also noted some limits to his overall

assessment. Hooker acknowledged, for example, that due to

the delayed nature of his examination, he did not possess

definitive proof of causation:

Q. In your expert opinion, what caused this

fire?

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10 No. 15‐2294

A. I feel that this fire was caused by a possible

leak in the fluid system that came in contact

with a heated portion of the exhaust system.

Q. So is it your testimony that you were able to

determine a cause of this fire?

A. No, I was not. I have no proof of that and

that’s why I did not.

Q. So it is not your expert opinion that the fire

was caused by a leak in the fluid system?

A. I feel it’s potentially caused by that, but I

don’t know that because I didn’t see any of this

for myself.

...  

Q. I’m just trying to determine whether or not

your report is just listing a possible cause of the

fire or it’s your expert opinion based on your

experience that this is the cause of the fire in

your opinion.

A. This is my opinion of what potentially may

have taken place. I don’t know what took place

and I don’t know what it looked like because

there was nothing for me to really look at. Does

that, does that help?

Q. Yeah, I believe so. So just so we’re clear, you

believe that it is possible that a fuel leak caused

the fire but you were unable to determine

whether or not that actually occurred in this

case.

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No. 15‐2294 11

A. I believe a fluid leak, not a fuel. A fluid leak.

One of them.

Q. Possibly caused the fire.

A. Correct.

Hooker Dep. 45:13–46:1, 46:14–47:4 (emphasis added). Upon

further questioning, however, Hooker clarified both the

scope and basis of his position:

Q. Is it fair to say that something that Angel

did was not done properly to cause this fire?

A. That’s my, that’s my thoughts on this, is that

some of the work that Angel did led to this

event taking place.

Q. “This event” being the fire.

A. Yes.

Q. But because you didn’t have an opportunity

to actually inspect the vehicle intact, you can’t

say 100 percent what it was.

A. No.

Q. So what, what would you say your opinion

is as to the cause of the fire in this case?

A. My, my opinion of what may have caused

this is a leak in one of the fluid systems that

were involved in Angel Automotive’s disas‐

sembly, replacement, and reassembly of those

fluid moving systems causing a leak. Not caus‐

ing a leak; having a leak. And finding an igni‐

tion source within that vehicle. My, my [sic]

thought is is [sic] that there’s a portion of the

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12 No. 15‐2294

exhaust that I saw in one of, those are Angel

Automotive’s photos I think, of the work done

that shows a portion of the exhaust that wasn’t

insulated? So that, also coupled with what

kind of damage I could see on some of Mr.

Raad’s photos kind of, of [sic] gave me that

very broad area where I felt the fire may have

come from.

Q. Is it true in speaking with Mr. Blasius that

he told you he saw diesel fuel leaking from the

engine?

A. Yes, and that also—I should have said that.

And also that Mr. Blasius’ conversation with

me, it also plays to leading me back into that

area which helps me find kind of increased

damage in that area, plus that one portion of

exposed exhaust system in there.

Q. So just to be clear, is it your opinion that if

diesel fuel or one of the other liquids, whether

it be coolant or brake fluid or oil, if one of those

fluids leaked ... that those fluids could be ig‐

nited by the exhaust, the exposed exhaust?  

A. Yes, I think that is possible.

Q. And is it your opinion that that is more than

likely what occurred in this case?

A. Yes, that’s my most likely thought on what led

this fire to happen.

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No. 15‐2294 13

Q. If Angel had not done the work on this ve‐

hicle that it did, do you believe that this vehicle

would have caught fire as it did where it did?

...

A. Yeah, I donʹt know that but it, in the chain of

events it, with all of that stuff being manipulat‐

ed by them and then shortly after this fire tak‐

ing place, when I look at that as a whole, yes. I

think that if that work hadn’t had been done, this

exact thing probably would not have happened.

Hooker Dep. 53:24–56:4 (emphasis added).  

When Hooker’s deposition testimony is considered in its

entirety, his reluctance to use the exact phrase “more likely

than not” better reflects confusion regarding the adverse

questioning (and the legal nuance of burdens of proof) ra‐

ther than any meaningful hesitancy on the reasonable prob‐

ability of causation:

Q. So in your opinion is it more likely than not

that Angel Automotive’s work caused the sub‐

ject fire?

A. I think it’s possible, yes.

Q. So your testimony is it’s possible that they

were the cause of the subject fire, not that it’s

more likely than not. Is that correct?

A. I didn’t understand that question. Is it pos‐

sible versus more likely than not? What’s the

difference?

Q. Possible means it’s a possibility.

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14 No. 15‐2294

A. It absolutely is a possibility.

Q. And that’s your testimony. It’s a possibility.

Or is it more likely than not the cause?

...

A. I, I don’t see—I’m struggling with the two.

They kind of seem very close to me. “More

likely than not” is a “possibility.” I don’t, I

don’t understand the question, I guess. I abso‐

lutely think it’s possible, if that’s what you’re

asking. I absolutely think it’s possible.

Q. More likely than not simply means that it’s

more than 50 percent likely that that occurred.

Or is it still your testimony that—

A. Can I think it’s possible and more likely

than not?

[Blasius’ attorney]: I don’t think he under‐

stands the question.

[Hooker]: I don’t. I do not understand that. I

absolutely think it’s possible. Are we going to

put a percentage on how [confident] I am in

thinking it’s possible?

Q. I’m just trying to determine whether or not

you believe it’s a possibility that their work

caused it.

A. I absolutely believe that.

Q. Or that it’s your expert opinion that their

work did cause it.

A. I don’t know if it caused it.

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No. 15‐2294 15

Q. It’s just that it’s possible based on the time‐

line that it caused the fire?

...  

A. More than just the timeline. The timeline

and the extent of the work that’s been done,

yes. I, yes. I absolutely think it’s possible.

Hooker Dep. 57:1–58:15. In assessing the above testimony,

we must remember that Hooker’s expertise lies in the field

of fire investigation, not law. As such, it is improper to reject

the fair import of his testimony based upon an apparent ina‐

bility to decipher legal intricacies with which trained attor‐

neys so often struggle.  

Moreover, we must remain cognizant of the proper pur‐

pose for which Blasius offers Hooker’s expert opinions re‐

garding causation. At the summary judgment phase, Hooker

merely helps Blasius get to a fact finder; Hooker does not,

however, serve as the fact finder. To achieve the former, a

plaintiff need only produce evidence sufficient to potentially

persuade any reasonable jury. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)

(“[S]ummary judgment will not lie ... if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmov‐

ing party.”) (emphasis added). In essence, Appellee asks us

to raise this standard and require that a plaintiff, at the

summary judgment stage, show actual persuasion of a par‐

ticular person to a particular degree of certainty. Obviously,

we decline that invitation here.  

At summary judgment, Hooker’s expert opinions regard‐

ing causation remain sufficient, especially since they find

further support in the record, including Angel’s own admis‐

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16 No. 15‐2294

sion to Blasius that Angel thought a fuel leak may have

caused the fire (a conclusion based upon Angel’s personal

involvement in working on the vehicle). Angel Dep. 55:1–5.

Such evidence, in conjunction with Hooker’s written report

and Blasius’ personal observations of the fire on scene, goes

well beyond the district court’s characterization of Blasius’

evidence of causation as only “speculation” or mere “hy‐

pothesis.” See Newell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 36 F.3d 576,

579 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A probability of negligence may be

supported by expert testimony or common sense infer‐

ence.”). Construing all reasonable inferences in Blasius’ fa‐

vor, as we must, such evidence furnishes a sufficient factual

basis from which a reasonable jury could find in favor of

Blasius on the causation element of his negligence action.

Appellee’s contrary reliance on Kincade v. Mac Corp., 773

N.E.2d 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) is misplaced. In Kincade, a

store clerk sued the designers, manufacturers, and installers

of a trash compactor system for injuries she received from a

fall on a set of access stairs. Id. at 911. At the summary

judgment stage, defects in the clerk’s case were two‐fold.

First, the clerk admitted that she did not know what caused

her feet to slip out from under her, and even worse, present‐

ed conflicting testimony regarding possible culprits. Id. at

912. Second, the clerk’s theories narrowed responsibility to

the platform and access stairs leading to the trash compactor,

not the compactor itself. Id. The defendants at issue, howev‐

er, only had personal involvement in the latter. Id. As a re‐

sult, no question of material fact existed as to whether the

clerk’s injuries were proximately caused “by any action or

inaction on the part of any of the three defendants.” Id. at

913.  

Case: 15-2994 Document: 34 Filed: 10/12/2016 Pages: 27
No. 15‐2294 17

Here, unlike the store clerk, Blasius provided a specific,

consistent theory—supported by expert testimony and other

evidence—regarding the cause of his vehicle fire: a leak in

the Excursion’s fluid systems that came in contact with a

heated portion of the exhaust system. Hooker Dep. 45:14–16.

Furthermore, Blasius tied the source of his injury directly to

AAI. The record shows that, to complete the extensive up‐

grades to Blasius’ vehicle, AAI disconnected and reconnect‐

ed the fluid moving systems. Angel Dep. 15:11–15. Although

uncertainty remains as to which fluid first ignited, such am‐

biguity is immaterial since AAI interacted with all of them

immediately preceding the fire.  

Appellee’s reference to our decision in Trask‐Morton v.

Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2008), is equally

unavailing. In Trask‐Morton, the plaintiff checked into an In‐

dianapolis Motel 6 alone. Id. at 674. Once inside, she took a

dose of muscle relaxant and fell asleep. Id. The plaintiff had

no memory of what occurred between the time she fell

asleep and when she regained consciousness the following

evening. Id. Nevertheless, two days later, the plaintiff re‐

ported that she had been sexually assaulted. Id. at 676. The

plaintiff filed suit against Motel 6, alleging that the hotel

failed to provide adequate security. Id. Due to the plaintiff’s

lack of direct memory and the absence of other circumstan‐

tial evidence, however, the district court found there was in‐

sufficient proof for a reasonable jury to conclude that a sex

crime had actually been committed. According to the court,

without “facts to support [the plaintiff’s] allegation that an

assault occurred in the first place,” the plaintiff “could not

connect the injuries she alleged occurred as the result of the

assault to any breach of duty by Motel 6.” Id. Affirming the

lower court’s decision, we held that “a jury could not find

Case: 15-2994 Document: 34 Filed: 10/12/2016 Pages: 27
18 No. 15‐2294

that Morton was sexually assaulted ... without resorting to

impermissible speculation.” Id. at 679.  

This case is not Trask‐Morton. There, plaintiff was unable

to prove that an injury actually occurred, and, without a

predicate injury, there can be no proximate cause. Here, AAI

does not contest that Blasius’ Excursion was destroyed by

fire. Thus, while a genuine issue of material fact remains

concerning causation, the undisputed presence of an actual

injury places the current controversy beyond the import of

Trask‐Morton.  

B. Res Ipsa Loquitur

Cases such as Kincade highlight that “negligence may not

be inferred from the mere fact that an injury occurred.”

Maroules v. Jumbo, Inc., 452 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2006). Nev‐

ertheless, under certain circumstances, negligence “may be

inferred from the circumstances surrounding the injury.” Id.

(emphasis added). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur—

translated, “the thing speaks for itself”—recognizes that

“certain accidents are so unusual that the party shown to be

in exclusive control of the injuring object ought to be held

responsible unless that party can offer a reasonable explana‐

tion.” Newell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 36 F.3d 576, 579 (7th

Cir. 1994).

In other words, res ipsa loquitur “is a shortcut to a negli‐

gence claim.” Maroules, 452 F.3d at 642. It “does not require a

plaintiff to submit evidence of causation” because it is “a

doctrine of common sense. It allows a trier of fact to draw an

inference of negligence when evidence of causation is lack‐

ing.” Id. at 644. As we said in Maroules,  

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No. 15‐2294 19

[t]o establish this inference of negligence, the

plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the injuring

instrumentality was within the exclusive man‐

agement and control of the defendant, and (2)

that the accident is of the type that does not

ordinarily happen if those who have the man‐

agement and control exercise proper care ...

Once the plaintiff has met the burden of

demonstrating the control and due care prongs

of res ipsa loquitur, the doctrine operates to

permit an inference of negligence based upon

the circumstantial evidence.  

Id. at 642. Satisfying the prima facie elements, however, does

not automatically “hand victory” to the plaintiff. Id. at 643.  

The inference ... is just that—a plaintiff does

not win [his] case merely because [he] has met

the res ipsa loquitur requirements. A successful

res ipsa loquitur showing simply creates an in‐

ference which the trier of fact may choose to

accept or not.

Id. at 642–43 (internal citations omitted); Sweeney v. Erving,

228 U.S. 233, 240, 33 S. Ct. 416, 418, 57 L. Ed. 815 (1913) (“In

our opinion, res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the oc‐

currence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they

compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial

evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be

lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to

be accepted as sufficient; that they call for explanation or re‐

buttal, not necessarily that they require it; that they make a

case to be decided by the jury, not that they forestall the ver‐

dict.”).

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20 No. 15‐2294

In the end, whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ap‐

plies is a mixed question of law and fact. Maroules, 452 F.3d

at 643. The question of law is whether the plaintiff’s evi‐

dence includes all of the underlying elements of res ipsa lo‐

quitur; the ultimate determination for the trier of fact at trial

“is whether the permissible inference is to be drawn.” Id.

1.   Exclusive Management and Control

Here, the district court held that res ipsa loquitur did not

apply because the Excursion was in Blasius’ possession on

June 29, 2012 and thus not “under the exclusive control of

[AAI] at the time of the fire[.]” Op. and Order 7, ECF No. 68.

Such a holding misinterprets the first prong of the res ipsa

loquitur test.  

The “concept of control under Indiana’s res ipsa loquitur

case law is expansive.” Maroules, 452 F.3d at 643. To prove

“exclusive control,” a plaintiff “simply is required to show

either that a specific instrument caused the injury and that

the defendant had control over that instrument or that any

reasonably probable causes for the injury were under the control of

the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added).  

Notably, when “used in the res ipsa loquitur context, the

term ‘control’ does not require actual physical dominion

over an object.” Newell, 36 F.3d at 580. Thus, “a defendant

need not be in control of the causative instrumentality at the

exact moment of injury, provided the defendant was the last

person in control.” Maroules, 452 F.3d at 643 (emphasis add‐

ed). A “product which explodes long after its shipment from

the manufacturer may still be, for purposes of res ipsa loqui‐

tur, in the control of the manufacturer if the probability of

other causes is small.” Newell, 36 F.3d at 580.  

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No. 15‐2294 21

In Newell, the plaintiff filed suit against Westinghouse

Electric Corporation, an elevator maintenance company, af‐

ter a malfunctioning elevator in the Indiana Bell Telephone

Building slammed shut on her. Id. at 577. Westinghouse ar‐

gued that, because several Indiana Bell employees main‐

tained access to the elevator control room between the de‐

fendant’s maintenance calls, the plaintiff could not establish

that Westinghouse “was in sole control of the elevators” at

the time of her accident. Id. at 580. According to Westing‐

house, such joint control raised “the possibility of negligence

by another party,” and thereby barred an inference of negli‐

gence on the part of the defendant. Id.  

Rejecting this argument, we held that Westinghouse’s

negligence constituted the “most probable cause” of the

plaintiff’s injuries. Id. Although Indiana Bell employees pos‐

sessed access to the elevator control room, only Westing‐

house conducted service and maintenance on the elevator. Id.

Because the accident derived from a mechanical failure, ac‐

cess alone was “of little significance” absent evidence that

that the employees “in fact engaged in any repair or mainte‐

nance themselves.” Id.  

Here, as in Newell, AAI was the sole provider of service

and maintenance of the Excursion within the relevant time

frame. Although Blasius held possession of (and thus access

to) the vehicle at the time it ignited, the record is devoid of

any evidence that anyone other than AAI performed any

material repair or maintenance work of their own between

the time Blasius picked up the Excursion on June 28, 2012

and the moment it burst into flames. Moreover, while the

parties dispute the precise cause of the ignition, there is no

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22 No. 15‐2294

evidence indicating that the failure, and resulting fire, were

anything but mechanical in nature.  

Regardless, “the possibility of multiple causes or multiple

defendants does not automatically defeat the application of

res ipsa loquitur.” Maroules, 452 F.3d at 643 (emphasis added).

In Maroules, a motorist brought suit against the owner of a

trucking company and its driver after a wheel broke free

from a truck trailer and crashed through the front passenger

side of the plaintiff’s car. Id. at 641. The defendants denied

that they possessed exclusive control of the injuring instru‐

mentality and contended that they “had no role in manufac‐

turing the trailer or its wheel studs”; “had no control over

the inspection and maintenance of the trailer or its wheel

studs prior to the time that [the defendants] purchased the

trailer”; and “did not maintain, service, or repair its trailers

and their parts, but instead relinquishe[d] control every time

it sen[t] its trailers to an outside third party maintenance

company to do this work.” Id.  

We conceded that these facts presented “any number of

alternative theories for the accident: the stud manufacturer

could have negligently or knowingly manufactured defec‐

tive studs, the maintenance business could have used a

faulty power tool to tighten the bolts, or a vandal could have

sabotaged the truck wheels.” Id. Nonetheless, we held that

“the possibility that a third party may have negligently

manufactured, installed, or maintained the studs does not

preclude a finding that [the defendant] had control over the

injuring instrumentality.” Id. at 644. We stated that res ipsa

loquitur does not demand that the plaintiff “exclude every

other possibility other than the defendant’s negligence as a

cause of the injury.” Id. Instead, “a plaintiff may point to

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No. 15‐2294 23

several alternative causes of injury and allow the jury to de‐

termine which, if any, instrumentality caused the injury.” Id.  

Ultimately, at trial, a plaintiff “must show only that the

likelihood of other causes is so reduced ‘that the greater

probability lies at the defendant’s door.’” Newell, 36 F.3d at

580 (quoting Fowler V. Harper, The Law of Torts § 19.7, at 46

(2d ed. 1986)). Indeed, to hold otherwise “would emascu‐

late” the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Id. at 581 (quotations omit‐

ted). It is only when a plaintiff cannot “identify any potential

causes and show that they were in the exclusive control of

the defendant” that res ipsa loquitur fails to apply. Maroules,

452 F.3d at 644 (emphasis added).  

In this case, Hooker stated in his written report that the

Excursion’s fuel and brake systems were “more likely” the

cause of the fire. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No.

53, Ex. 11 at 2. During his deposition, Hooker reiterated that

a fluid system leak constituted the “most likely scenario” for

the June 29, 2012 blaze, and agreed that “[b]ut for the re‐

moval and the manipulation and disassembly” of fluid

transfer lines by AAI, the fire would not have occurred.

Hooker Dep. 45:13–46:1, 53:24–54:3. Hooker deemed this the

“most likely” cause of the fire and opined that, had AAI’s

repair work not been done, the accident “probably would

not have happened.” 55:17–56:4. For the purposes of sum‐

mary judgment, the record in this case clearly satisfies the

requirements outlined in Maroules and Newell.

Appellee’s reliance upon Slease v. Hughbanks, 684 N.E.2d

496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), is also misplaced. In Slease, the

plaintiff, a steelworker, underwent ankle surgery after a

workplace fall. Id. at 498. The next evening, the plaintiff no‐

ticed a burn on his left thigh. Id. Believing that the burn oc‐

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24 No. 15‐2294

curred during the surgery, the plaintiff filed a suit against

the hospital for medical malpractice. Id. The Court of Ap‐

peals of Indiana granted summary judgment to the hospital

because the plaintiff failed to “point to an instrument in the

control of the defendant which was a probable cause of his

burn.” Id. at 500. Although the plaintiff pointed to a “bovie

pad” as a potential culprit, the court found that “there [was]

nothing in the designated evidence to show that this instru‐

ment [had] the potential to cause a burn such as [the plain‐

tiff] received.” Id.  

The record before this Court succeeds where the record

in Slease failed. Here, unlike in Slease, Blasius offered several

sources of evidence indicating that a “leak in the [Excur‐

sion’s] fluid system that came in contact with a heated por‐

tion of the exhaust system” was the cause of the vehicle fire.

Hooker Dep. 45:14–16. For example, Hooker’s report stated

that fluids within the Excursion’s fluid system could “all be

ignited via hot engine and exhaust components.” Pl.’s Resp.

Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 11 at 1. Moreover,

Hooker concluded that the fire originated in the area of the

engine compartment where “the fuel lines leading from the

fuel tank to the fuel injection pump” as well as the “brake

system master cylinder and reservoir” were located—all of

which were “manipulated and/or removed and reinstalled”

during AAI’s work on the vehicle. Id. at 2. Hooker also

pointed to photographs of the vehicle’s exhaust “that

show[ed] a portion of the exhaust that wasn’t insulated” in

that area. Hooker Dep. 54:23–24. In light of the record here,

Slease is irrelevant.

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No. 15‐2294 25

    2.   Nature of Accident   

Because the district court held that Blasius failed to meet

the first prong of the res ipsa loquitur inquiry, it did not ad‐

dress whether the fire at issue ordinarily occurs absent the

exercise of proper care. Based upon the record, we find this

prong satisfied as well.  

It should go without saying that vehicle fires of the kind

seen here do not occur as a matter of course.3 We are uncon‐

vinced by Appellee’s arguments to the contrary. Appellee

claims that “[p]arts wear down. Road hazards loosen con‐

nections, bend parts and can create leaks and openings. The

outdoor elements also affect the operation of the vehicle.”

Appellee’s Br. 15. Appellee ignores that, in this case, the

parts were new, and the record presents no evidence of road

hazards or inclement weather.  

                                                 

3 See, e.g. Alfa Romeo, Inc. v. S.S. Torinita, 499 F. Supp. 1272, 1279 (S.D.N.Y.

1980) (“A car spontaneously starting to burn may give rise to a permissi‐

ble inference that it was defective, and that a defect existed when it left

the hands of the defendant.”); Eversole v. Woods Acquisition, Inc., 135

S.W.3d 425, 429 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (“Common life experience ... sug‐

gests it would be extraordinary for fuel lines to leak and cause a major

fire in a three‐year old vehicle, even with 52,000 miles of use, without an

intervening act of manipulation.”); Lee v. Hollywood Car & Truck Rental,

Inc., 485 So. 2d 843, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Hinckley v. La Mesa R.V.

Ctr., Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[R]elatively new mo‐

tor vehicles are usually not destroyed by fire in the absence of negli‐

gence.”); Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966)

(“We think it is a matter of common knowledge that new automobiles

which have been properly driven for only about 1,600 miles do not sud‐

denly develop a fire in the engine compartment without someone’s neg‐

ligence.”); Seneca Ins. Co. v. Vogt Auto Serv., 573 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ohio

Mun. Ct. 1991); cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex.

2004).

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26 No. 15‐2294

Rather, the record indicates that Blasius drove little more

than 200 miles before his newly overhauled Excursion burst

into flames. It cannot be reasonably said that such an event

constitutes an ordinary occurrence of automotive self‐

combustion. If such were the case, the automobile would

cease to serve as society’s fundamental mode of transporta‐

tion. The Government has a significant interest “in protect‐

ing the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.” Rubin v.

Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485, 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591, 131

L. Ed. 2d 532 (1995). As a result, the design, manufacture,

production, use, and maintenance of vehicles are among

America’s most heavily regulated industries. See, e.g., Na‐

tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as

amended, 49 U.S.C. § 30101, et seq.; Federal Motor Vehicle

Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571, et seq. Government agen‐

cies at the federal, state, and local level sponsor and secure

automobile safety. Given this pervasive level of public use

and attention, we reject AAI’s suggestion that the accident in

this case is a mere fact of everyday life.  

Conclusion

Our ruling, of course, takes no position regarding Appel‐

lant’s ability to link his vehicle fire to AAI’s conduct by a

preponderance of the evidence at trial, nor do we opine up‐

on the strength of Appellant’s negligence claim as a whole.

Such a determination rightfully belongs in the hands of the

fact finder at trial. At present, it is enough to say that a genu‐

ine issue of material fact exists as to the proximate cause of

the fire that consumed Blasius’ vehicle, and that, for the

purpose of settling that dispute, Appellant is entitled to rely

on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  

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No. 15‐2294 27

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings con‐

sistent with this opinion.  

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