Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01294/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01294-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN MATTHEW RAY,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-1294 FCD JFM P

vs.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, 

Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1994 conviction on

charges of second degree murder with use of a firearm and assault with a firearm. He seeks relief

on the grounds that his trial counsel and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Upon

careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that

petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 10 p.m. on June 16, 1993, Kevin Glavin, Vincent

Dostal, and Chad Norris walked to the shopping center across the

street from Glavin’s apartment in Fairfield, California, to rent a

video. After renting the video, they went to Albertson’s to buy

some beer. While in Albertson’s, they encountered [petitioner] and

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 Frazier was tried for felony assault with a firearm, and misdemeanor assault, but was 1

acquitted of both charges.

 Dostal is 6 feet, 4 inches tall and weighs 270 pounds. At the time, he was on the local 2

college football team.

2

his codefendant, Rodney Frazier. [Petitioner] and Frazier had been 1

drinking at Frazier’s wife’s house, and had gone to Albertson’s to

buy more beer before the store closed at 11 o’clock.

As Dostal was walking down the aisle toward the beer cooler,

[petitioner] and Frazier were coming toward him, walking side by

side. Dostal walked between them, turning his shoulders to get

through without touching them. Apparently offended that Dostal

did not walk around him and his friend, Frazier told Dostal to

“excuse” himself. Dostal turned around and asked Frazier what he

had said. Frazier told Dostal that he “wasn’t shit” and that, just

because he was big, he could not walk between [petitioner] and 2

Frazier like that. Dostal started to respond but Glavin grabbed his

arm and told him it wasn’t worth it. Dostal and Glavin then went

to the beer cooler and selected a 12-pack of beer.

While Glavin, Dostal and Norris were selecting their beer,

[petitioner] and Frazier went to the checkout. [Petitioner]

purchased two 40-ounce bottles of beer. Rita Golden and her three

children got in line behind [petitioner] and Frazier. Ms. Golden

testified that [petitioner] and Frazier had red eyes and appeared to

be drunk, and that [petitioner] was arguing with the clerk about the

validity of his driver’s license.

Glavin, Dostal, and Norris got into the checkout line behind the

Goldens. Before they got in line, Frazier made a comment about

how large they were but the men did not respond at that point. 

Frazier continued talking, saying how he “love[d] to beat up

people’s children” and, apparently challenged the three men by

saying, “We will each take one and a half of you.” [Petitioner] said

“Yeah” after Frazier made these comments. Again, Glavin, Dostal,

and Norris did not respond, but they did go to a different

checkstand that had opened. Frazier called out, saying “We will

see you outside.” Ms. Golden testified that Frazier was being

really rude and obnoxious, and that his comments were

“threatening” to the men behind her in line. She stated that Glavin,

Dostal, and Norris were not being obnoxious or rude, and that she

did not see them make faces at [petitioner] or Frazier.

When they were finished at the checkstand, [petitioner] and Frazier

left through the “right-hand door” of Albertson’s. As they left,

[petitioner] called out to the three men saying, “If you pussies want

some, we will be outside on the bench.” Glavin, Dostal, and

Norris were still making their purchase when [petitioner] and

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 The plate number reported by the Goldens was 3AJY012, only one digit different than 3

the 3AJY062 plate on [petitioner’s] BMW. It was stipulated at trial that police department

records showed there was a phone call at 10:51 p.m. about a fight in Albertson’s parking lot,

another call at 10:52 p.m. saying the fight was breaking up, and a third call at 10:53 saying the

people who were fighting had left in their cars. 

 Two other witness, [sic] Rick Cirillo and Danielle Collier, also saw [petitioner] and 4

Frazier driving in [petitioner’s] car without headlights in the area near Albertson’s on the night of

June 16, 1993. Cirillo testified that he and Collier left a pizza parlor in the Albertson’s shopping

3

Frazier left. Rather than go out the door used by [petitioner] and

Frazier, they went out the “left” door of Albertson’s so as to “avoid

a confrontation.” As Glavin, Dostal, and Norris walked back

towards Glavin’s apartment, they heard voices calling out to them,

saying “Good night, ladies,” and “a bunch of garbage.” Glavin and

Dostal denied that they responded to these taunts.

[Petitioner] and Frazier then charged Dostal, throwing their full

bottles of beer at his head. Dostal dodged the bottles, threw Frazier

off of him, then tackled [petitioner]. Dostal and [petitioner] fought

on the ground. Dostal plainly got the better of [petitioner], at one

point banging [petitioner’s] face onto the pavement. Frazier fought

with Norris, then ran over to [petitioner] to help him in his fight

with Dostal. When Dostal got off [petitioner], [petitioner’s] face

was “covered with blood.” At that point, the two groups separated,

and Glavin, Dostal, and Norris ran back to Glavin’s apartment.

Ms. Golden and her children witnessed the aftermath of the fight. 

Just before 11 p.m., as she was leaving Albertson’s, Ms. Golden

saw [petitioner] in the parking lot. He had removed his T-shirt and

was holding it to his face, which was all bloody. He looked “very

angry.” Ms. Golden went to a nearby phone and called 911 to

report a fight. She then saw [petitioner] and Frazier get into a

black car and begin driving. She told her daughters to get the

license plate number, then drove to a nearby K-Mart to call 911

again to report the license number. She then returned to the 3

Albertson’s parking lot.

When Glavin, Dostal, and Norris reached Glavin’s apartment, they

realized the videotape they rented had been dropped during the

fight. Glavin wanted to go back for the video because he was

afraid [petitioner] or Frazier might find it, learn his address from

Blockbuster, then “mess with” him. Norris and Dostal would not

let Glavin go back alone and so, after Glavin put on a sweatshirt

and different shoes, the three men headed back to the shopping

complex.

As Glavin, Dostal, and Norris walked across the street and onto a

grassy area on the edge of the parking lot, they saw a black car with

its headlights off entering the shopping center parking lot.

4

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center between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., and were about a quarter mile away when they saw a black

BMW “coming up on us and it was coming rather fast and kind of swerving at us.” The BMW

pulled up alongside Cirillo’s car and he heard [petitioner] yell, “Where are they? Where are

they? in an “agitated” tone of voice. Cirillo said he didn’t know what [petitioner] was talking

about. Cirillo then heard the passenger say, “Oh, that’s not them. That’s not them.” The BMW

then turned around and headed back toward Albertson’s. Fearing that the occupants of the BMW

were looking for their friends, who were still at the shopping complex, Cirillo and Collier also

returned to Albertson’s. They waited until the BMW was safely away from them to enter the

store to find their friends. While waiting, they could see the BMW cruising around the parking

lot, going 40 to 45 miles per hour. After determining that their friends were safe, Cirillo and

Collier started to leave but, as they did, they “heard several gunshots ringing out” near the Home

Savings building. They also saw the BMW driving between the Home Savings and Blockbuster

Video store.

 When the shooting started, Ms. Golden’s children began screaming and she was 5

panicking so she drove home and called the police again to report the gunshots. Ms. Golden and

one of her daughters subsequently identified [petitioner] and Frazier in a photo line-up. It was

stipulated at trial that police department records showed a 11:02 p.m. phone call reporting

gunshots. Thus, approximately 10 minutes passed between the end of the fight and the time the

shooting was reported.

4

[Petitioner] was driving the car. Glavin saw the car first and

yelled, “Oh, shit. That’s them.” The three men started running

back toward the apartment complex. As they were running, Glavin

and Dostal heard gunshots. Both men dove onto the ground. 

Glavin heard a total of six or severn shots that appeared to come

from [petitioner’s] car. Ms. Golden, who by this point had just

returned to the Albertson’s parking lot, also said she heard seven

gunshots. When the shooting stopped, Glavin looked up and saw 5

the black car pulling out of the shopping center parking lot. Glavin

was not hit, but Dostal was wounded in the right foot. Glavin and

Dostal crawled over to Norris, who was “just laying there” on his

chest, and saw a bullet hole in Norris’ back. Norris had also

sustained a bullet wound to his buttocks. Glavin and a bystander

administered first aid to Norris, but he did not survive.

A pathologist testified at trial that Norris was killed by a .45-

caliber bullet, which entered the back of his neck and severed his

spinal cord. The bullet was a hollow-point “Black Talon,” a type

of ammunition which is “designed to expand in soft tissue,”

causing more damage than an ordinary bullet. Seven .45 caliber

shell casings were found at the scene.

[Petitioner] testified in his own defense. He stated that he and

Frazier had gone to Cordelia on the afternoon of June 16, 1993, to

buy two Maxfield Parish prints as a birthday gift for [petitioner’s]

mother. After delivering the gift to his mother’s house, [petitioner]

and Frazier decided to buy some beer at Albertson’s. They bought

four 40-ounce bottles of beer, then went to Frazier’s wife’s house,

arriving at approximately 8 p.m. After consuming two bottles of

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beer each, [petitioner] and Frazier decided to return to Albertson’s

to buy more beer. [Petitioner] testified that he had eaten only one

meal that day and was “sure [he] was legally drunk” when he went

to Albertson’s. 

[Petitioner’s] account of his interaction with Glavin, Dostal, and

Norris in the grocery store was, in most material respects,

consistent with that of other witnesses. However, [petitioner] said

Dostal had bumped into both Frazier and him when they passed

each other near the beer cooler. As to the instigation of the

altercation in the parking lot, [petitioner] said Dostal replied to

Frazier’s taunts by saying, “Bye, bitches.” He also said that the

two groups of men approached each other, and that Dostal and

Frazier started to fight. [Petitioner] claimed that Dostal then “came

straight at me,” so he threw his 40-ounce beer bottle at Dostal. 

After he threw the bottle, [petitioner] said Dostal tackled him,

punched him as they wrestled to the ground, and began slamming

his head onto the ground.

[Petitioner] admitted that, after the fight broke up, he told Frazier

he “wanted to find Vince [Dostal] and smash his head in the street

like he did to me.” He and Frazier got into his car and began

driving around “trying to find them.” [Petitioner] also admitted that

he was “furious” as he and Frazier looked for the other men. He

was “kind of surprised, and then mad” when he saw Glavin, Dostal

and Norris walking across the grass at the outskirts of the

Albertson’s parking lot. He “started to approach them,” and “the

next thing [he] knew,” he took a loaded .45-automatic handgun out

of the door panel of his car and started shooting at the group of

men. He testified that, when he pointed and fired the gun, “it was

like without thought. I did not have an intent.” After firing the

gun, [petitioner] drove away, still feeling “mad” and “pissed off.”

After the shooting, [petitioner] and Frazier drove to Frazier’s

wife’s house, where [petitioner] heard on a police scanner the [sic]

“somebody was down” and “somebody was DOA.” [Petitioner]

realized he had shot someone, and that the victim was probably

dead. He left the house, and went to Vacaville to visit his infant

daughter. He turned himself into [sic] the police on June 18, 1993,

after dumping the gun in a motel trash bin.

At trial, [petitioner] claimed he did not remember aiming the gun

at anyone, but acknowledged that he was a good shot. He testified

that he had used the .45 for target practice and that he “pretty

much” hit whatever he aimed at when shooting at targets. He

claimed he kept the .45 in the car “for [his] own protection,” citing

an incident where he had been threatened by a man with a baseball

bat.

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 This statement of facts is taken from the April 13, 1995, opinion by the California 6

Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-7, appended as

Exhibit C to Respondent’s Answer, filed on December 23, 2002. 

6

After a two-week trial, the jury deliberated for one week and

reached a verdict on February 14, 1994. As to count 1 of the

information, the jury found [petitioner] not guilty of first degree

murder, but guilty of second degree murder for the killing of Chad

Norris. As to count 2 of the information, the jury found

[petitioner] not guilty of the attempted murder of Vincent Dostal,

but guilty of assaulting Dostal with a firearm. As to the remaining

counts, for the alleged assault by [petitioner] (count 3) and Frazier

(count 4) on Dostal with their beer bottles in the Albertson’s

parking lot, the jury found both defendants not guilty.6

(Opinion at 2-7.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at

different result. Early v. Packer, 573 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-406 (2000)).

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Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of

his failure to investigate and present an adequate defense. He also claims that his appellate

counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of his failure to raise on appeal a claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After setting forth the relevant legal principles, this court

will analyze these claims in turn below. 

A. Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. After a petitioner

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identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally, competent assistance. 

Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). In assessing an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide

range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised

acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d

695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224

F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691. It has been recognized that “the adversarial process will not function normally unless the

defense team has done a proper investigation.” Siripongs v. Calderon (Siripongs II), 133 F.3d

732, 734 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384). Therefore, counsel must, “at a

minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about

how best to represent his client.” Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1995)

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(quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation and quotations

omitted). On the other hand, where an attorney has consciously decided not to conduct further

investigation because of reasonable tactical evaluations, his or her performance is not

constitutionally deficient. See Siripongs II, 133 F.3d at 734; Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170,

1173 (9th Cir. 1998); Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1995). “A decision not to

investigate thus ‘must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances.’” 

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). See also Kimmelman, 477 U.S.

at 385 (counsel “neither investigated, nor made a reasonable decision not to investigate”);

Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1173-74. A reviewing court must “examine the reasonableness of counsel’s

conduct ‘as of the time of counsel’s conduct.’” United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1461

(9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Furthermore, “‘ineffective assistance

claims based on a duty to investigate must be considered in light of the strength of the

government’s case.’” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Eggleston

v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). See also Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d

1054, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002).

B. Trial Counsel

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of

his failure to investigate and present evidence in support of either a “heat of passion” or

“diminished actuality” defense. He explains his claim as follows:

In the instant case, trial counsel was presented with abundant

evidence that the killing was committed in the “heat of passion”

and/or “diminished actuality.” Counsel chose to argue this defense

in his closing without pursuing the available viable evidence to

realize the strength of it. There was no way that trial counsel could

adequately advise petitioner on this strategy without further

pursuing the facts which might support the defense of “heat of

passion” and “diminished actuality.” Defense counsel simply

provided ineffective assistance by failing to fully investigate the

best available defenses.” 

(Points and Authorities attached to Pet. (P&A) at 3.) Petitioner also contends that the evidence

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available to defense counsel prior to trial would have supported “an unconsciousness or mental

defense to second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon, or even to voluntary

manslaughter.” (Id. at 11.) Petitioner argues his counsel should have arranged for him to

undergo a mental and physical examination because counsel knew that petitioner was intoxicated

during the events in question and had sustained head injuries during his fight with Dostal. 

Petitioner also faults counsel for failing to “support his theory of defense” by offering the

testimony of witnesses who would have testified that petitioner had difficulty speaking, walking

and remembering the events in question shortly after the shooting. (Pet. at 4a.) He argues that

the lack of any defense witnesses “left the jury to believe petitioner’s testimony” (id.) and

“shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant.” (Traverse at 3.) In short, petitioner argues

that his trial counsel improperly failed to investigate and support either the defense he chose to

offer (“heat of passion”) or a defense involving the theory that petitioner was unable to form

intent because of intoxication and head injuries. 

In support of his claim, petitioner has submitted: (1) his declaration, in which he

states that he discussed with trial counsel his “state of mind” and the injuries he suffered in the

beating and that counsel told him he “would be hiring an expert witness (Neurologist) to testify

to my head injuries, concussion and the inability to reason at the time of the shooting” (Pet., Ex.

B); (2) declarations from several friends and family members who saw petitioner shortly after the

incident or the next day and observed that petitioner had received injuries from the beating, his

speech was slowed, and he appeared confused or slow (Pet., Exs. C-E, H - K, N, P, Q); (3) the

declaration of one of petitioner’s jurors, who states that he believes he and “at least three other

jurors” would have “voted for voluntary manslaughter” if there had been evidence of “head

injury or psychological or psychiatric condition” (Pet., Ex. F); (4) the declaration of petitioner’s

co-defendant, Rodney Frazier, who states that petitioner was dazed and injured after the beating

and the next morning (Pet., Ex. G); (5) the declaration of a criminal defense lawyer who states

that a reasonably competent defense attorney would have had “a psychiatrist, psychologist or

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medical personnel” evaluate petitioner and would have called witnesses to testify to petitioner’s

head injuries and subsequent mental state and that if counsel had done this, petitioner would

“likely” had been convicted of manslaughter (Pet., Ex. L); and (6) a psychological evaluation of

petitioner dated January 6, 1999, in which the evaluating counselor concludes that although there

was no indication of current or earlier brain trauma or impaired brain function, she could not

definitively rule out prior brain trauma as a result of the beating petitioner received immediately

before the shooting or that an injury had a negative impact on petitioner’s behavior. (Pet., Ex. M

at 6, 7 , 8.) 

Petitioner’s claim in this regard was rejected by the Solano County Superior Court

in a written decision on petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Answer, Ex. I.) The

claim was summarily denied by the California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court on habeas

review. (Answer, Exs. J, L.) Respondents urge that the claim be denied on the merits.

In response to petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, the California Superior Court

issued an order to show cause “on the sole issue of whether or not petitioner received ineffective

assistance of trial counsel if counsel failed to investigate, research or present evidence in support

of a mental defense.” (Pet., Ex. A; Answer, Ex. I at 1.) The court also appointed counsel and

granted leave to file amended pleadings. (Id.) Ultimately, the Superior Court rejected

petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, stating as follows:

The court after having read and considered all documents and

pleadings on file herein, finds that the petitioner has failed to meet

his burden of proving that he received ineffective assistance from

his trial counsel. The facts as set forth by the Court of Appeal in

its decision filed April 13, 1995, describe a purposeful, vengeful,

angry petitioner set on righting the perceived wrong which he had

received, i.e., physical injuries from a fist fight. Petitioner by his

own testimony was a proficient marksman who took a lethal

weapon loaded with bullets designed to inflict more damage to a

human body than regular bullets and stealthily drove around at

night with his car’s headlights out seeking his victims (participants

in a fist fight). When he found them, he approached them, took his

gun, which he knew was loaded, aimed at them and shot one

victim dead and wounded the other. At his trial, he further testified

that although he had been drinking alcohol and described himself

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as “legally drunk” ten minutes before the shooting and,

additionally, that he had received blows to the head in a fist fight

with the victims, he remembers and is able to relate the facts step

by step and with clarity leading up to the shooting, at the time of

the shooting and after the shooting.

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient

in that he failed to consult an expert in psychiatric trauma and

investigate the validity of or present defenses of either diminished

actuality or heat of passion, which might arguably have convinced

the jury to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter rather than

second degree murder. However, when presented with the detailed

recitation of facts testified to by the defendant at trial, his defense

attorney cannot be criticized when factually it is not clear that his

attorney had reason to believe that such expert testimony would

have been warranted. As stated in Wilson v. Henry 185 F.3d 986

at 990, “A decision not to pursue testimony by a psychiatric expert,

when no mental state defense seems likely, is not unreasonable

under Strickland. (Referring to our controlling authority on the

issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052.) Given the vengeful,

purposeful, enraged actions of the petitioner after the fist fight with

his ultimate victims, his action in retrieving his car, driving around

the area seeking out his victims with his lights out, arming himself

with a gun, firing the weapon at the victims knowing that he would

probably hit what he aimed at, and knowing that the gun was

loaded, would not lead a reasonable attorney to conclude that the

petitioner did not actually have the capacity to form the necessary

intent to do what he did. Trial counsel presented what he was

reasonably able to present to the trier of facts in order to reduce

defendant’s liability from first degree murder to second degree

murder, and this court finds no ineffective assistance of [sic] as

claimed by the petitioner.

(Id. at 2-3.)

Petitioner’s trial counsel was faced with evidence giving rise to two possible

defenses: (1) heat of passion; and (2) a lack of intent due to head injury or intoxication. He chose

to rely on the former, arguing that petitioner deliberately shot the victims in an enraged state and

only the next day “came to his senses” and turned himself in. (RT at 914-48.) The record in this

case discloses a reasonable strategic explanation for counsel’s decision to choose this defense. 

Most importantly, it was supported by petitioner’s trial testimony. As discussed by the state

appellate court and confirmed by a reading of the state court record, petitioner recalled the

relevant events in detail and described a scenario that indicated he was acting deliberately but in

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the heat of passion. (See e.g., RT at 646-66.) Specifically, petitioner testified that immediately

after his beating by Dostal he was determined to exact revenge and drove around the parking lot

with a firearm in his car in an attempt to locate the victims. (RT at 652-55, 659, 665-66.) It was

reasonable for counsel to rely on petitioner’s testimony in this regard to establish a “heat of

passion” defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 ("The reasonableness of counsel's actions may

be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions"); Turk v.

White, 116 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1997) (“when the facts that support a certain potential line

of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for

further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether”). Cf. Sanders, 21

F.3d at 1456 (nothing in the record, apart from incompetence, suggested “even a colorable

explanation” for counsel’s decision not to interview critical information from a key exculpatory

witness). The court also notes that the testimony of witnesses regarding petitioner’s demeanor

hours after the shooting took place would have been largely irrelevant to a defense that

petitioner’s actions were committed in the sudden heat of passion. 

Insofar as petitioner argues that a medical expert should have been engaged to

examine him to support a defense that his mental state precluded intent, it is not clear that

counsel had reason to believe that such a defense would have been warranted. Evidence of a

prior physical attack suffered by the defendant does not automatically put counsel on notice of a

potential mental state defense. See Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)

("Although counsel was aware that [petitioner] had been beaten the day before the shooting, that

fact alone does not raise the possibility of a strong mental state defense."). A decision not to

pursue testimony by a psychiatric expert, when no mental state defense seems likely, is not

unreasonable under Strickland. See Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir.1995)

(holding that there was no ineffective assistance from failure to hire psychiatrist where there was

no evidence that defendant was not sane). There is no indication in the record that petitioner 

suffered from a mental disease, other than the fact of the prior assault. In such a situation, a

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 "Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, [Ninth] Circuit precedent 7

remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision is objectively

unreasonable." Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.2003).

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failure to pursue a medical expert is not unreasonable. Henry, 185 F.3d at 990.7

To the extent petitioner is arguing that counsel should have presented both a “heat

of passion” defense and a defense of lack of intent, his claim must be denied. It appears that

counsel made a strategic tactical decision, after assessing the state of the trial evidence, to

proceed solely with the “heat of passion” defense and dispense with any other defenses he may

have prepared for or that may have been available. Specifically, petitioner provides evidence that

counsel called a meeting with the witnesses scheduled to testify and told them that he had

decided not to use their testimony after all. (Pet., Ex. N, P.) Because it appears that counsel’s

decision to rely solely on petitioner’s testimony to support a “heat of passion” defense was a

thoughtful tactical decision, this court must presume that counsel's conduct was within the range

of competency. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (counsel’s tactical decisions are “virtually

unchallengeable”); Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1368 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate prejudice. Notwithstanding the

declarations submitted by petitioner in support of this claim, petitioner has failed to show that the

verdict would have been different had counsel chosen a different defense, obtained a psychiatric

or medical examination, or introduced testimony of witnesses who had observed petitioner’s

behavior hours or days after the events in question. The California Superior Court’s decision

rejecting petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, after reviewing the same

exhibits petitioner has filed in this court, is not an “objectively unreasonable” application of 

Strickland. Rompilla v. Beard, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2005) (citations omitted). 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

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C. Appellate Counsel

Petitioner claims that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of

his failure to raise on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

 The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith

v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed

counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of

professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751

(1983). Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the

ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation

would be “seriously undermined.” Id. See also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th

Cir. 1998) (counsel not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, and is

not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) There is, of course, no obligation to raise

meritless arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a

showing of deficient performance as well as prejudice). Thus, counsel is not deficient for failing

to raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to demonstrate prejudice in this

context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he probably would have

prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434, n.9. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate either incompetence or prejudice with respect

to this claim. Appellate counsel’s decision to reject a claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel and to press only claims with more merit was "within the range of competence demanded

of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). Further, as

discussed above, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel lacks merit.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 23, 2005. 

008:ray1294.hc

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