Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02270/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02270-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DERRYL TYRONE FOSTER,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11-cv-2270-LAB (WMc)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

vs. AND RECOMMENDATION

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, California

Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

Foster filed a habeas petition on September 28, 2011, and a first amended petition

on July 5, 2012. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) and (d) it was

referred to Magistrate Judge McCurine for a Report and Recommendation. Now before the

Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss. He argues that the petition is barred by AEDPA’s

one-year state of limitations. 

Judge McCurine issued an R&R on May 10, 2013 agreeing with Respondent, which

the Court must now review. “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the

magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The district court may

accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return

the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). See also 28

U.S.C. § 636(b). If no objection is made, however, this de novo determination isn’t required. 

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United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Because

Foster is a prisoner and is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally and

affords him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). That said, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure

that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Judge McCurine’s R&R couldn’t be more thorough. It details to the day the rather

complex history of Foster’s habeas petitions in state court, and it even includes a very useful

timeline that shows exactly where the clock was ticking on Foster’s right to seek federal

habeas relief. (R&R at 12.) It explains where (and why) Foster is entitled to statutory tolling,

but also where (and why) he isn’t. (R&R at 13–15.) It addresses head-on (and rejects)

Foster’s claim that ineffective assistance of counsel, limited time and resources in prison to

do legal work, and his own diminished capacity entitle him to equitable tolling. (R&R at

15–17.) The Court has carefully reviewed Foster’s objection to the R&R and finds that it is

hardly an objection at all. Rather than take issue with R&R’s detailed analysis, Foster more

or less recycles the same conclusory arguments from his underlying opposition to

Respondent’s motion to dismiss. He simply has no specific rebuttal to the substance of the

R&R for the Court to even consider.

The Court finds Judge McCurine’s R&R to be well-reasoned and correct. It is

therefore ADOPTED, and Respondent’s motion to dismiss Foster’s habeas petition is

GRANTED. The Court also DENIES Foster a certificate of appealability. See Lambright v.

Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 23, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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