Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03323/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03323-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cfrcuit 

UIIITBD STA.TBS COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TDTII CIRCUIT FEB 6 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

GEORGE W. JOHNSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

ROBERT W. MATTHEWS; UNITED 

STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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No. 90-3323 

(D. C. No. 89-3173-R) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGIIBlff* 

Before LOGAH, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Mr. Johnson, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his 

petition for habeas corpus. We grant Mr. Johnson permission to 

proceed with this appeal in forma pauperis. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3323 Document: 010110098455 Date Filed: 02/06/1991 Page: 1 
In March 1985, Mr. Johnson entered guilty pleas to four 

separate felonies, which were two counts of bank robbery and two 

counts for the use of a dangerous weapon. Mr. Johnson was 

sentenced to a term of twenty years on each bank robbery count to 

run concurrently. Mr. Johnson received a mandatory, non-parolable 

sentence of five years on each weapons count. These non-parolable 

sentences, in accordance with the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 

of 1984 (18 u.s.c. S 924(c)), were to run consecutively, both as 

to the bank robbery sentences and to each other. 

Mr. Johnson was then transferred to the federal correctional 

institution in Memphis. :A parole hearing was held there in 

December 1985 and notice was sent to Mr. Johnson informing him 

that he had a presumptive parole date of August 13, 1991. This 

calculation was based upon the premise that Mr. Johnson would 

first serve the concurrent twenty-year bank robbery sentences. 

This notice clearly advised Mr. Johnson that this date was only 

the presumptive parole date prior to his beginning to serve the 

ten-year consecutive, non-parolable term for the two weapon 

charges. 

Mr. Johnson was subsequently 

penitentiary at Leavenworth. This 

transferred to 

prison staff 

the federal 

reviewed Mr. 

Johnson's sentence computation and discovered the Bureau of 

Prisons Program Statement 5880.27 required a sentence calculation 

based upon Mr. Johnson first serving the two consecutive five-year 

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Appellate Case: 90-3323 Document: 010110098455 Date Filed: 02/06/1991 Page: 2 
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terms before service of the two concurrent twenty-year terms. 

After discovering this fact, the United States Parole Cononission 

reopened Mr. Johnson's case and modified his presumptive parole 

date to· April 28, 1998. Mr. Johnson was so notified. 

Mr. Johnson filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2255. The primary thrust of this petition 

was that Mr. Johnson felt the parole commission was changing the 

sentence imposed upon him by the district court (Traverse, p. 2.), 

and that he was being deprived of his right to the initial 

presumptive parole date without a hearing. 

The district court concluded that the law (18 u.s.c. 

S 924(c)) and the applicable legislative history clearly provide 

that a mandatory sentence must be served prior to the service of 

an additional sentence; that there was no error in the revised 

sentence computation; and that the revised sentence calculation 

was not contrary to the order of the sentencing court. 

Mr. Johnson now appeals, pro se, arguing that once a 

presumptive parole date is set, a prisoner has a vested and 

protected right to that date and it cannot be changed or if it can 

be changed, the prisoner must be afforded a prior hearing. 

Initially, we note there exists a distinction between an 

early release date and a presumptive parole release date. 

who have only a presumptive parole release date are not 

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Inmates 

entitled 

Appellate Case: 90-3323 Document: 010110098455 Date Filed: 02/06/1991 Page: 3 
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to the same procedural 

release date has been set. 

Cir. 1987). 

protections as those for whom an early 

Green v. McCall, 822 F.2d 284, 292 (2d 

In the case before us, the inmate's presumptive parole date 

was changed. This means only that his release is contingent upon 

a later affirmative finding of the parole commission that his 

conduct has been good and that he has an acceptable plan for the 

period following his release. Green, 822 F.2d at 293. In short, 

Mr. Johnson has yet to earn or have vested a date certain for his 

release. 

Mr. Johnson relies upon two cases to support his position, 

Drayton v. McCall, 584 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), and Lanier v. 

Fair, 876 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1989). In Drayton, the inmate had 

been granted a firm early release date. In Lanier, which involved 

a state prisoner and a state parole system, the inmate had 

received a "reserve parole date" and was living outside of the 

prison walls in a "halfway house." Id. at 244. We therefore 

believe both cases are 

Johnson's case. We 

distinguishable from the facts of Mr. 

also note that both these cases involved an 

intervening factual dispute involving the inmate's conduct. In 

the case before us, the inmate's conduct is not involved or in any 

way relevant to the issues at hand. 

When an inmate has been granted a firm early release date, he 

has earned it based upon his prior conduct. Depriving an inmate 

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Appellate Case: 90-3323 Document: 010110098455 Date Filed: 02/06/1991 Page: 4 
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of something he has earned obviously requires certain procedural 

rights be complied with. On the other hand, Mr. Johnson received 

only a presumptive parole date derived by an erroneous 

mathematical calculation upon his arrival at the Memphis prison. 

At that stage Mr. Johnson had done nothing to earn this 

presumptive parole date by his conduct or otherwise. Mr. Johnson 

had gained, at most, a remote expectation of parole that was 

contingent on a continued record of future good conduct, upon an 

acceptable plan for the period following his release, and upon an 

affirmative finding of the parole commission of each. 28 C.F.R. 

S 2.12(d). A mere unearned expectation of future early release 

does not create any right to which due process attaches. Mr. 

Johnson correctly contends _that the result may be that he will 

serve an additional nineteen months in prison. However, this 

result was due to an undisputed erroneous method of calculation 

initially made, without any input by Mr. Johnson, and which gave 

to Mr. Johnson something he had not earned and something to which 

he had no arguable right to receive. Mr. Johnson was not entitled 

to a hearing under the facts and circumstances of this case. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADBBRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

-sAppellate Case: 90-3323 Document: 010110098455 Date Filed: 02/06/1991 Page: 5