Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00464/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00464-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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1 08cv464-BTM (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GURDEV SINGH,

Petitioner,

Case No. 08cv464-BTM (JMA)

ORDER RE SECOND AMENDED

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

v.

JANET NAPOLITANO, et al.,

Respondents.

The Court denied Petitioner’s first amended habeas petition on April 23, 2009. Dock.

# 33. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, vacating the dismissal

of Petitioner’s habeas petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Singh v.

Napolitano, 09-56567, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9821, at *2 (9th Cir. May 13, 2011). The Ninth

Circuit directed that the Court allow Petitioner to file a second amended petition and

instructed that “[t]he district court should consider the merits of that amended petition in light

of relevant authority, including V. Singh v. Holder, [638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011)].” Id. at *5.

Respondent argues that V. Singh is not yet binding law in this circuit because the

mandate has not been issued and therefore, should not be followed. The Court does not find

this argument to be persuasive. As recognized by Respondent, the Ninth Circuit has

previously stated that its opinions become binding precedent regardless of whether a

mandate has issued. See Hoeun Yong v. Ins, 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit specifically directed this Court to consider the merits of

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Petitioner’s amended habeas petition in light of V. Singh. The Court follows this directive and

applies V. Singh as binding authority. 

Petitioner’s second amended petition challenges his prolonged immigration detention

without bond. Petitioner contends that his Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland

Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008) bond hearing violated due process. Petitioner also

argues that the length of his detention and the purported lack of periodic custody review also

violate due process. Because the Court grants the writ unless Petitioner is afforded a new

bond hearing consistent with the procedures set forth in V. Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196

(9th Cir. 2011), the Court does not reach these latter arguments. See Lyng v. Northwest

Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and

long-standing principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional

questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”).

A. Errors At Bond Hearing

Petitioner argues that the immigration judge erred by: (1) considering the strength of

petitioner’s underlying immigration appeal at the bond hearing; (2) failing to use the “clear

and convincing” evidence standard; and (3) failing to record the proceedings.

This first contention is beyond the scope of the court’s habeas review. The Court’s

jurisdiction is limited to reviewing whether the denial of discretionary relief involved a violation

of federal law or the constitution. Gutierrez-Chavez v. Ins, 298 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Court’s habeas review of the Attorney General’s discretionary authority, as well as that

of employees of the Attorney General, is precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).

Consideration of the strength of petitioner’s appeal is neither unlawful nor

unconstitutional. Petitioner cites to no authority for the proposition that consideration of a

factor not listed in In re Guerra, 2006 BIA LEXIS 19, at *7-8 (B.I.A. 2006) violates his due

process rights. To the contrary, Guerra, provides that an “Immigration Judge has broad

discretion in deciding the factors that he or she may consider in custody redeterminations.”

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 The parties recently learned of a new bond hearing that took place on July 19, 2011.

Counsel for both parties have limited information as to what took place at this hearing, and

it is unclear whether the clear and convincing standard was applied at this hearing or whether

the hearing was recorded. 

3 08cv464-BTM (JMA)

In re Guerra, 2006 BIA LEXIS 19, at *8. 

The Court does not find consideration of this factor, in particular, to be improper. The

likelihood of success of an alien’s appeal impacts the risk of flight, as someone with a strong

case has less incentive to flee. The Court notes that in the context of the Bail Reform Act,

the weight of the evidence against the defendant is a relevant consideration, albeit the least

important one, as to whether he may be released on bond. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2);

United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). If the likelihood of success may

be considered in the context of a bail proceeding for a criminal defendant, who is afforded

a constitutional right to bail and the presumption of innocence, then, a fortiori, consideration

of this factor at a Casas hearing does not violate due process.

Petitioner's remaining arguments were squarely addressed in V. Singh, 638 F.3d

1196. There, the Ninth Circuit held that the government must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that continued detention is justified. Id. The Ninth Circuit also held that the

immigration court is required to make a contemporaneous record of Casas hearings. Id. In

lieu of a transcript, an audio recording would suffice. Id. at 1208.

Respondent does not challenge Petitioner’s contention that these two requirements

were not met at Petitioner's bond hearings.1

 Accordingly, the Court holds that the

immigration judge’s failure to apply a clear and convincing evidence standard and to record

the proceedings constitutes a violation of Petitioner's due process rights. 

B. Prejudice

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that these errors were prejudicial. See

Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (subjecting due process

violations in immigration proceedings to harmless error analysis). First, the clear and

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convincing standard requires the government to prove that a factual contention is “highly

probable.” Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984). The Court cannot conclude

whether the application of this standard would have affected the outcome of the bond

hearing. 

Second, Petitioner argues that the immigration judge impermissibly failed to address

the Guerra factors at the November 24, 2008 bond hearing. Petitioner filed a notice of

appeal approximately one month after this hearing and an amended petition for habeas

corpus on December 12, 2008. The immigration judge filed a memorandum decision on

January 30, 2009. Petitioner contends that this memorandum decision addresses arguments

raised in the notice of appeal and amended habeas petition that were not addressed at the

bond hearing and that this decision addresses the Guerra factors for the first time. The

memorandum decision is an inadequate “[p]ost-hoc reconstruction” that is not the functional

equivalent of a transcript. V. Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208. Because the hearing was not

recorded, the Court cannot address the merit of Petitioner’s argument that the memorandum

decision responds to issues that were raised after the hearing took place.

C. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the writ, unless within 45 days

Petitioner is afforded a new Casas hearing that complies with the procedures set forth in V.

Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). The parties shall file a status update within

thirty days of entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 8, 2011

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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