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Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 

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'• . PILED 

Umted States Court of A~ 

Tenth Ci~cuir 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN 9 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk DANIELS INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

HERITOR SQUARE JOINT VENTURE; WILLARD R. ) 

BAKER; GEORGE C. WAYNE; SAMS. KLINK, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants, ) 

) 

and ) 

) · 

RICHARD L. HART, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 89-2128 

(D.C. No. 87-1429-JP) 

(D. N.M.) 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,** 

District Judge. 

**Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of μtah, sitting by 

designation. 

This appeall arises out of the sale of an office complex by 

plaintiff-appellee Daniels Insurance Agency, Inc. (DIA) to 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-2128 Document: 010110069680 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 1 
defendant-appellant Heritor Square Joint Venture (Joint Venture). 

After the Joint Venture halted payment on a $600,000 promissory 

note executed pursuant to this transaction, DIA brought this 

action to collect on the note. The Joint Venture counterclaimed 

for rescission or reformation of the sales contract and damages on 

theories of "fraud and misrepresentation," failure of 

consideration and mutual mistake relating to the amount of 

rentable square footage in the office complex. After a three-day 

trial, the district court entered judgment for DIA on all counts. 

The Joint Venture appeals, and we affirm. 

Background 

In May 1984, DIA entered into a contract with the Joint 

Venture (1984 contract) .for the sale of an office complex in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. The contract provided for a total 

purchase price for the property of $3,650,000. DIA agreed to 

accept $600,000 of this amount in the form of a promissory note 

executed by the Joint Venture and guaranteed by the four 

individual joint venturers. 

In the 1984 contract, which was drafted by the Joint Venture, 

DIA warranted that the complex contained "approximately 69,860 

rentable square feet" of space. The Joint Venture had derived 

this figure from a 1984 appraisal DIA had ordered on the property 

and provided to the Joint Venture during the negotiations leading 

to the sale. This appraisal stated that the five buildings on the 

property contained "approximately 69,860 square feet." At trial, 

Martin Molloy, the independent appraiser who prepared the 1984 

appraisal, testified that he had arrived at this figure by 

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.. 

measuring the exterior dimensions of each of the five buildings. 

This total, therefore, included common areas and interior and 

exterior walls. Molloy also testified that at the time he 

performed the appraisal, it was common practice in the area to use 

such "gross" square footage totals to determine the amount of 

space on which rent could be collected in commercial office 

buildings. In fact, DIA's rent rolls for the period immediately 

preceding the sale of the property showed a total of 70,009 square 

feet on which rent was or could be collected in the complex. 

Before entering into the 1984 contract, the Joint Venture 

visited and inspected the office complex and made its own 

calculations as to its square footage. These calculations, which 

were made in connection with the Joint Ventura's preparations to 

landscape the property and were based on DIA plans and blueprints 

that are not in dispute, were provided to an independent firm 

hired by the Joint Venture to appraise the property. This firm 

concluded that the complex contained "a gross area" of 70,009 

square feet and a net leasable area of 69,221 square feet. Ex. 18 

at 17. The "rentable" square footage identified in the Joint 

Ventura's appraisal, therefore, is 639 feet (.9%) less than that 

stated in the 1984 contract. 

In September 1985, the Joint Venture became aware that the 

actual physical space available to individual tenants in the 

complex might be less than the approximately 69,860 square feet of 

"rentable" space stated in the 1984 contract and the DIA rent 

rolls. An interior designer hired by the Joint Venture measured 

the interior dimensions of the complex's five buildings and 

3 

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.. determined that the "net rentable square feet" of the complex 

using this method, which excluded conunon areas, exterior walls and 

possibly some interior walls, was approximately 64,666 square 

feet. Including conunon areas, this total came to 66,974 square 

feet, a difference of 2886 square feet or just more than four 

percent of the amount calculated and employed by DIA in 

determining the space on which it collected rent in the complex. 

When DIA failed to adjust the sales price to correct for the 

alleged discrepancy in "rentable square feet," the Joint Venture 

halted payments on its $600,000 note with DIA. DIA responded by 

bringing this action against the Joint Ventures and the individual 

joint venturers. 2 The Joint Venture answered and counterclaimed, 

alleging "fraud and misrepresentation," failure of consideration 

and mutual mistake and seeking damages and 

reformation of the 1984 contract. 

rescission or 

On March 7, 1989, trial in this action began before a jury. 

Before beginning proceedings, the court rejected the Joint 

Ventura's attempt to assert a negligent misrepresentation claim on 

the ground that it had not been properly raised by the pleadings. 

Tr. 3/7/89 at 5; ~ Order at 5 (May 17, 1989) (May Order). At 

the close of the Joint Ventura's case, the district court directed 

a verdict against the Joint Venture on its fraudulent 

misrepresentation claim. Tr. 3/9/89 at 11, 27-34. As a result of 

these actions, only the Joint Ventura's mutual mistake claim 

2 All references hereinafter to "Joint Venture" shall refer 

both the Joint Venture and the individual joint venturers. 

4 

to 

Appellate Case: 89-2128 Document: 010110069680 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 4 
remained at . 3 issue. Because the Joint Venture sought only 

equitable relief for this claim, the district court dismissed the 

jury and continued trial on this claim to the bench. After an 

additional day of testimony, the court held that the Joint Venture 

had failed to prove mutual mistake by a preponderance of the 

evidence and entered judgment on all counts for DIA. Findings of 

Fact and Conclusion of Law and Order (March 31, 1989)(March 

Order). In so holding, the district court noted that the Joint 

Venture may have been unilaterally mistaken as to the meaning of 

the phrase "approximately 69,860 rentable square feet." March 

Order at 4. 

The Joint Venture then filed a motion for new trial, alleging 

among other things, that the court had erred in failing to grant 

relief for the Joint Ventura's unilateral mistake regarding the 

rentable square footage in the complex. The district court denied 

this motion, rejecting the Joint Ventura's unilateral mistake 

claim on the ground that the Joint Venture had no right to relief 

for such a claim absent proof that DIA had acted fraudulently with 

respect to the amount of rentable square footage in the property. 

May Order at 4-5. The Joint Venture timely appealed the district 

court's judgment. 

Discussion 

The Joint Venture raises five issues on appeal: (1) whether 

the district court erred in entering a directed verdict on its 

3 The district court held that the Joint Ventura's failure of 

consideration claim dissolved when it found no proof of fraud. 

May Order at 4. The Joint Venture has not challenged this holding 

on appeal. 

5 

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fraudulent misrepresentation claim; (2) whether the district court 

erred in refusing to submit the issue of negligent 

misrepresentation to the jury; (3) whether the district court 

erred in finding that the Joint Venture had failed to prove a 

mutual mistake of fact regarding the "rentable square feet" in the 

office complex; (4) whether the district court erred in refusing 

to grant relief for the Joint Venture's alleged unilateral mistake 

regarding this fact and (5) whether the district court abused its 

discretion in refusing to admit the Joint Venture's Exhibit CE 

into evidence. We examine each of these issues in turn. 

A. Fraudulent misrepresentation claim 

The Joint Venture initially challenges the district court's 

directed verdict against its claim that DIA frau_dulently 

misrepresented the amount of rentable square footage existing in 

the office complex. We review the district court's decision on 

this issue de novo under the same standard applied by the district 

court. 4 Guilfoyle ex rel. Wild v. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. R.R. Co., 

812 F.2d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1987). This standard permits us to 

affirm the district court only if we determine, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Joint Venture, that 

"the proof is all one way or so overwhelmingly preponderant in 

favor of [DIA] as to permit no other rationale conclusion." 

4 The Joint Venture quotes selectively from the district 

court's bench ruling to argue that the court failed to follow this 

standard and impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of 

the jury on this claim. The full text of the district court's 

bench ruling on this issue does not support this claim, however. 

In addition, the standard used by the district court in reaching 

its decision, improper or otherwise, is of little import to our 

deliberations given our mandate to review the propriety of the 

directed verdict de nIDm• 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-2128 Document: 010110069680 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 6 
Wilson v. Al McCord Inc., 858 F.2d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 

1988)(quoting J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Crites, 851 F.2d 309, 311 

(10th Cir. 1988)). 

New Mexico law provides that a party alleging fraudulent 

misrepresentation must prove each of the following elements by 

clear and convincing evidence: (1) a representation of an untrue 

fact (2) knowingly or recklessly made (3) with the intent to 

deceive and to induce reliance (4) on which the other party relied 

to his detriment. N.M. Sup. Ct. R. Ann., Uniform Jury 

Instructions-Civ. 13-820 (1986); See Rodriguez v. Horton, 

622 P.2d 261, 263-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Cargill v. Sherrod, 631 

P.2d 726, 727-28 (N.M. 1981). This standard is met only "[i]f the 

evidence leaves in the factfinder's mind an abiding conviction 

that fraud has been established." Snell v. Cornehl, 466 P.2d 94, 

95 (N.M. 1970); Ledbetter v. Webb, 711 P.2d 874, 878 (N.M. 1985). 

The district court directed a verdict against the Joint 

Venture on this claim upon finding that the Joint Venture had 

failed to present sufficient evidence to create a jury question on 

DIA's alleged intent to deceive the Joint Venture. The Joint 

Venture relies on two exhibits to argue against this conclusion. 

The first of these, Exhibit CF, is a February 1982 letter and 

attachments prepared by a former manager of the complex. It 

provides separate square footage totals for the different rental 

units in the office complex that, when added together, total 

68,956 square feet, 904 square feet (1.3%) less than the 69,860 of 

rentable square feet stated in the 1984 contract. The second 

exhibit, Exhibit CG, consists of two letters, dated March 1983, 

7 

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again prepared by the former complex manager, which together 

provide similar square footage figures, totalling 68,967 square 

feet, for the five buildings in the complex. Both of these 

letters and attachments came into DIA's possession when it 

acquired the office complex in July 1983. 

The Joint Venture argues that DIA's possession of these two 

exhibits creates a triable issue of fact under New Mexico law as 

to whether DIA knew that the complex contained less than the 

"approximately 69,860 rentable square feet" warranted in the 1984 

contract and intended to deceive the Joint Venture as to that 

fact. We cannot agree. No finder of fact considering this 

evidence could be left with an "abiding conviction" that DIA had 

misrepresented the approximate rentable square footage for the 

complex with the necessary intent to deceive. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court's directed verdict against the Joint 

Venture on its fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 

B. Negligent misrepresentation claim 

The Joint Venture also challenges the district court's 

refusal to submit its claim of negligent misrepresentation to the 

jury. The district court held that the claim was untimely raised 

because the Joint Venture failed to include it in its pleadings or 

to allege sufficient facts to provide DIA with fair notice of the 

claim. May Order at 5. To the extent that determination of this 

issue depends on the sufficiency of the pleadings, we review the 

pleadings de .nQYQ. See Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 

978 (10th Cir. 1986). To the extent that this issue requires us 

to consider the district court's implicit decision not to grant 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-2128 Document: 010110069680 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 8 
the Joint Venture leave to add this claim to their pleadings, we 

review that decision for abuse of discretion. See Las Vegas 

Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 

(10th Cir. 1990). 

Under New Mexico law, a party asserting a claim for negligent 

misrepresentation must allege and ultimately prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence, State ex rel. Nichols Machinery Co. 

v. Safeco Ins. Co., 671 P.2d 1151, 1154 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. 

denied, 670 P.2d 581 (N.M. 1983), that another party (1) made a 

false statement (2) without having any reasonable basis for 

believing that statement to be true or without exercising 

reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the 

information, (3) that the false statement was material, i.e., that 

the suing party relied upon the false statement in entering into 

the contract and would not have entered into the contract but for 

that statement and (4) that the false statement was the proximate 

cause of damages incurred by the suing party. See N.M. Sup. Ct. 

R. Ann., Uniform Jury Instructions-Civ. 13-819 (1986); Restatement 

(Second) of Torts S 552 (1979). The New Mexico courts have also 

made it clear that negligent misrepresentation is "a tort 

determined by the general principles of the law of negligence and 

.•. is an action separate from the action of fraud or deceit" 

generally, Maxey v. Quintana, 499 P.2d 356, 360 (N.M. Ct. App.), 

cert. denied sub nom. Jack Dailey Realty. Inc. v. Maxey, 499 P.2d 

355 (N.M. 1972), and from the action of fraudulent 

misrepresentation more particularly. See Nichols Machinery Co., 

671 P.2d at 1154. 

9 

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The Joint Venture concedes that it did not allege negligent 

misrepresentatfon or negligence more generally by name at any 

point in its pleadings, pretrial order or initial set of proposed 

jury instructions. The Joint Venture argues that this omission is 

not determinative, however, becadse it nonetheless alleged 

sufficient facts in its answer and counterclaim and the merged 

pretrial order to give the DIA fair notice of its intent to pursue 

this claim. See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 

1375, 1382 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 

(1979)(pleadings must, at minimum, give fair notice of the 

allegations and claims that have been brought). As support for 

this argument, the Joint Venture points to the following language 

in its first amended answer and counterclaim: 

The Promissory Note and Note Guaranty mentioned in 

the complaint were obtained from Defendants by the 

Plaintiff by fraud and misrepresentation in that 

Plaintiff, as shown in the Contract of Sale, falsely and 

fraudulently represented to the Defendants that the 

office complex had approximately 69,860 rentable square 

feet. The Defendants relied upon the false 

representations so made, and believed them to be true, 

and so relying and believing were thereby induced to 

execute and deliver the said instruments, and not 

otherwise. 

Doc. 69 at 2; see also id. at 3 (using almost identical language 

in the Joint Venture's counterclaim). The only other reference to 

"fraud and misrepresentation" or related facts in the Joint 

Venture's pleadings is its denial of liability to the DIA "due to 

failure of consideration and fraud in the inducement of the 

contract all as more fully hereinafter alleged." Id. at 1. In 

the pretrial order, which merged with the pleadings by its terms, 

the Joint Venture repeated these allegations virtually verbatim, 

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.. 

but added a notation that the contested facts in the case included 

"[w]hether [DIA] knew or had reason to know the square footage 

representation was a misstatement" and "[w]hether [DIA] knew or 

should have known that the square footage set forth in the [1984 

contract] was inaccurate." Doc. 75 at 9. 

Although it is a close question, we cannot agree that these 

allegations, with their repeated references to fraud and 

fraudulent misrepresentations, can reasonably be construed as 

putting the DIA on notice of a claim based on the distinct theory 

of negligent misrepresentation. See Maxey, 499 P.2d at 360; 

Nichols, 671 P.2d at 1154. Only the references in the pretrial 

order to whether the DIA "had reason to know" or "should have 

known" that it had misrepresented the complex's rentable square 

footage hint at a claim based on a negligence theory. See N.M. 

Sup. Ct. R. Ann., Uniform Jury Instructions-Civ. 13-819 

(1986)(defining a negligent misrepresentation as "one where the 

speaker has no reasonable ground for believing that the statement 

made was true"). We do not believe that this hint, in the context 

of the pleadings and pretrial order as a whole, provided the 

necessary "fair notice" of the negligent misrepresentation claim 

to the DIA and to the district court. Our conclusion on this 

point is buttressed by the fact that even the Joint Venture 

apparently failed to recognize its supposed negligent 

misrepresentation claim until the day before trial, when it 

submitted a supplementary jury instruction on this claim. 5 

5 The pretrial 

instructions on 

order in this case required proposed jury 

all issues raised by the pleadings and pretrial 

(continued on next page) 

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.. Accordingly, we affirm both the district court's legal 

determination that the Joint Venture did not allege or otherwise 

give fair notice of a negligent misrepresentation claim in its 

pleadings and its discretionary decision not to permit the Joint 

Venture to amend its counterclaim on the eve of trial to add this 

claim. 

C. Mutual mistake 

The Joint Venture next argues that the district court erred 

in failing to find that the parties were mutually mistaken in 

believing that the office complex contained "approximately 69,860 

rentable square feet" as stated in the sales contract. In order 

to prevail on this claim, the Joint Venture had the burden of 

proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Joint 

Venture and DIA had a "meeting of the minds" regarding the amount 

of "rentable square feet" in the office complex, that they entered 

into an agreement intended to represent that mutual understanding, 

but that the agreement does not express what they really intended, 

see Morris v. Merchant, 423 P.2d 606, 608 (N.M. 1967), with the 

result that "both parties have done what neither intended." 

Cargill, 631 P.2d at 728. We review the district court's finding 

on this factual issue under the clearly erroneous standard. See 

Jacobs v. Phillippi, 697 P.2d 132, 134 (N.M. 1985)(reviewing 

mutual mistake determination under clearly erroneous standard); 

Shearson/American Express. Inc. v. Mann, 814 F.2d 301, 305 (6th 

(continued from previous page) 

order to be submitted to the court ten days in advance of trial. 

Doc. 75 at 14-15. The Joint Venture submitted proposed 

instructions on its fraudulent misrepresentation and other issues 

in compliance with this deadline. 

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.. Cir. 1987) (same); Royal Aviation. Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.· 

Co., 770 F.2d 1298, 1302 (5th Cir. 198S)(same). 

As the district court noted in its orders and at trial, the 

parties presented evidence regarding any number of square footage 

totals for the complex. Reduced to its essence, however, the 

dispute, and the alleged mistake in the contract, relates not to 

the total square footage in the complex, which both parties agree 

is approximately 70,000 square feet, but rather to what portion of 

this gross area is "rentable." As also agreed by both parties at 

trial, the phrase "rentable square feet" refers to the amount of 

space on which rent could be collected. Thus, the question 

presented to the district court for determination was whether the 

Joint Venture showed by a preponderance of the evidence that both 

parties were mistaken in believing that the office complex 

contained approximately 69,860 square feet of space on which rent 

could be collected. 

The district court found that the Joint Venture failed to 

carry this burden because it did not show that DIA shared the 

Joint Venture's view that rent could only be collected on "net" 

rental space, i.e., the space within the building that was 

physically available for individual tenant occupancy. This 

finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The 

DIA's rent rolls, for example, showed that it either was 

collecting or intended to collect rent on approximately 70,000 

square feet in the complex. DIA's appraiser, Mr. Molloy, also 

testified that it was common practice in 1984 for landlords to 

collect rent from commercial tenants based on the total or gross 

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.. 

square footage of the building, rather than on the basis of "net," 

physically occupiable space. Thus, the district court was not 

clearly erroneous in finding that the Joint Venture failed to 

prove that DIA shared its belief that "rentable" space in the 

complex was limited to interior, privately occupiable space and 

hence failed to prove a mutual mistake regarding the 

"approximately 69,860 rentable square feet" stated in the sales 

contract. 

The Joint Venture does not contest any of these conclusions 

directly. Instead, it argues that the district court erred as a 

matter of law in considering the parties' alleged mutual mistake 

because it misconstrued the "ordinary, everyday meaning" of the 

term "rentable square feet," improperly considered extrinsic 

evidence concerning the parties' definition of this phrase without 

finding that the phrase was ambiguous and, if the phrase was 

ambiguous, erred in not submitting the question of the parties' 

intent and their possible mutual mistake to the jury for 

determination. The problem with this series of arguments is that 

all are premised on the assumption that extrinsic evidence 

regarding the meaning of the phrase "rentable square feet" in the 

1984 contract is either not admissible to prove mutual mistake or 

is only admissible if the phrase is first held to be ambiguous. 

This is simply not so. "[P]arole evidence is always admissible to 

establish the fact of the (mutual] mistake, and in what it 

consisted; and to show how the writing should be corrected in 

order to conform to the agreement which the parties actually 

made." Naramore v. Mask, 197 P.2d 905, 908 (N.M. 1948)(quoting 

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.. 

. . 

Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, S 859); see also 13 S. Williston, A 

Treatise on the Law of Contracts S 1552 (3d ed. 1970). The 

district court did not err, therefore, in relying on evidence 

extrinsic to the 1984 contract to determine that the parties were 

not mutually mistaken in the contract's statement of the "rentable 

square feet" present in the office complex. 

D. Unilateral mistake 

The Joint Venture next argues that the district court erred 

in refusing to order rescission or reformation of the sales 

contract after finding that the Joint Venture was unilaterally 

mistaken in its understanding of the contract phrase 

"approximately 69,869 rentable square feet." The district court 

refused to order this relief because, in its view, New Mexico law 

requires proof of fraud in connection with unilateral mistake 

before recovery is permitted. Our review of New Mexico case law 

on the issue persuades us that the district court was correct in 

this determination. The New Mexico Supreme Court has consistently 

required proof of "fraud or other inequitable conduct by the other 

party" as a precondition to 

mistake of fact. 6 _s-e=e~,----ae:a..a....q ........ , 

granting relief for a unilateral 

Chroma Mountain Ranch Partnership v. 

Gonzales, 681 P.2d 724, 725-26 (N.M. 1984); Kimberly, Inc. v. 

6 The Joint Venture argues that the New Mexico Supreme Court 

abandoned this requirement in its 1982 decision in Albuqueraue 

Nat'l Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 654 P.2d 548 (N.M. 

1982). The supreme court did not even consider the "fraud or 

other inequitable conduct" requirement in that decision, however, 

and has reaffirmed the continued validity of this requirement on 

several occasions since that case. See Jacobs, · 697 P.2d 

at 134-35; Chroma Ranch, 681 P.2d at 725-26. Accordingly, we have 

little difficulty in holding that New Mexico law still requires 

proof of fraud or other inequitable conduct to obtain relief for 

unilateral mistake. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2128 Document: 010110069680 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 15 
Hays, 537 P.2d 1402, 1405-06 (N.M. 1975). In this case, the Joint 

Ventura's only allegations of the inequitable conduct necessary to 

recover for its alleged unilateral mistake7 were stated in its 

fraudulent misrepresentation claim. Having properly directed a 

verdict against the Joint Venture on this claim, the district 

court was also correct in refusing to grant the Joint Venture 

relief for its alleged unilateral mistake regarding the rentable 

square feet in the office complex. 

E. Failure to admit Exhibit CE 

The Joint Ventura's final challenge is to the district 

court's refusal to admit Exhibit CE into evidence. This exhibit 

consists of a March 12, 1980, transmittal letter and attachments 

describing insurance coverage of the office complex and indicating 

that the "square footage" of the various buildings in the complex 

adds up to 66,370 square feet. The square footage numbers and 

totals stated in the letter are derived from an undated, unsigned 

handwritten attachment to the transmittal letter, which was itself 

signed by a secretary employed by one of the complex's former 

managers. The district court refused to admit this letter and 

attachment into evidence on the grounds that the Joint Venture had 

not timely identified the exhibit as required in the pretrial 

order, that the Joint Venture failed to authenticate the exhibit 

or lay a proper foundation for its admittance and that the exhibit 

7 We note that the district court found only that the Joint 

Venture had shown unilateral mistake "at most" before denying any 

relief for such a claim on the ground that the Joint Venture had 

not proven fraud. May Order at 4-5; March Order at 4 ("there may 

have been a unilateral mistake on the part of [the Joint Venture] 

as to the meaning and calculation of 'rentable square feet' as 

used in the contract"). 

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•• 

, . would tend to create unfair prejudice and confusion in the jury. 

May Order at l; Tr. 3/9/89 at 3-6. We may only reverse this 

decision if, under the abuse of discretion standard, we are left 

with "a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a 

clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible 

choice in the circumstances." United States v. Ortiz, 

804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986)(describing abuse of 

discretion standard); United States v. Alexander, 

849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988)(appellate court reviews 

district court's evidentiary determinations for abuse of 

discretion). Upon review of the record, we find that the district 

court's decision to exclude Exhibit CE did not violate this 

standard. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to 

exclude Exhibit CE from evidence. 

For this reason and those stated above, the judgment of the 

United States District Court for the District of New Mexico is 

AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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