Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00093/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00093-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONSERVATION CONGRESS, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, 

Defendants. 

 CIV-S-05-0093 DFL JFM

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

This action is brought under the National Environmental

Policy Act (“NEPA”), challenging the process used to approve

three timber sales. The American Forest Resource Council

(“AFRC”) moves under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b) to permissively intervene

as a defendant. 

AFRC represents “wood products companies” throughout the

west. (Mot. at 1.) AFRC asserts an interest in the disposition

of this lawsuit because it: (1) has been involved in management

and policy debates over procedures for timber sales; and (2) its

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members were the purchasers of the three challenged sales. 

(Partin Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4-5.) 

Rule 24(b) provides that anyone “may” be permitted to

intervene when “an applicant’s claim or defense and the main

action have a question of law or fact in common.” Historically,

two additional requirements -- an independent basis for

jurisdiction and a timely motion to intervene -- have been

imposed as threshold requirements for granting permissive

intervention. Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir.

1998); Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825,

839 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the court has discretion to deny

intervention even if the threshold requirement of a common

question of law or fact is met. Id.. 

The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Kootenai Tribe of

Idaho v. Veneman calls into question the necessity of an

independent basis for jurisdiction. 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.

2002). The Kootenai court held that, beyond the necessity of a

common question of law or fact, the decision to grant or deny

permissive intervention is wholly within the discretion of the

district court judge. Id. at 1110-11. Kootenai may also call

into question a prior line of cases holding that the federal

government is the only proper defendant in the liability phase of

a NEPA suit. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc. v. Hodel, 866 F.2d

302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989); Sierra Club v. U.S.E.P.A., 995 F.2d

1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993); Churchhill County v. Babbitt, 150

F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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Although AFRC’s claim or defense and the main action have a

question of law or fact in common, namely, whether the procedure

used was sufficient under NEPA, the court declines to grant the

motion for permissive intervention. There is no indication that

AFRC would, through its intervention, raise any new issues or put

forth any arguments that the government will not vigorously

assert. AFRC’s interests, such as they are, will be protected by

the federal defendant. In considering whether to permit

intervention, the court may consider whether the intervenor’s

participation will contribute to equitable resolution of the suit

and whether judicial efficiency and economy are served by

permitting intervention. Id. at 1111; Venegas v. Skaggs, 867

F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1989). Because AFRC’s intervention is

not necessary for equitable resolution of this suit, the motion

to intervene in the liability phase of the suit is DENIED.

However, the court will permit AFRC to file an amicus brief

in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The amicus

brief shall be filed by the June 8, 2005 deadline for defendant’s

opposition and shall be limited to twenty pages. Plaintiffs may

respond to the amicus brief in their reply. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/19/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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