Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01003/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01003-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES E. MOSES, JR., Civil No. 12cv1003-MMA (JMA)

Petitioner, REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

AMEND PETITION; and

(2) DENYING PETITION FOR 

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

DR. JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary,

Respondent.1

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Michael

M. Anello pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California.

I.

FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Charles E. Moses, Jr. (hereinafter “Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody filed

1

 The Warden of the institution where Petitioner is confined was named as the original Respondent, but

has changed during the pendency of this action. See www.cdcr.ca.gov (last visited Dec. 3, 2013); see also

Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of information

posted on government website, the accuracy of which was undisputed). Because a writ of habeas corpus acts

upon the custodian of the state prisoner, see 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, the Court sua

sponte ORDERS the substitution of Dr. Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, as Respondent. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the

respondent in § 2254 proceedings may be the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions).

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Following a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted

in the San Diego County Superior Court of willful infliction of corporal injury upon a

cohabitant. (Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 109-11.) The court made true findings on

sentence enhancement allegations that Petitioner committed the offense while released from

custody on an earlier offense, that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, and

that he had suffered several prior convictions. (Id.) Following the trial, Petitioner’s Marsden2

motion was granted, and replacement counsel filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. 

(CT 114-18.) Petitioner was sentenced to 18 years in state prison. (CT 118.)

Three claims are presented in the Petition: (1) Petitioner received ineffective assistance

of trial counsel; (2) his right to due process was violated due to prosecutorial misconduct; and

(3) his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated due to judicial bias. (Pet. at 6-49.3

) 

Petitioner has also filed a Motion to Supplement the Petition to add a claim alleging ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel, which, for the reasons set forth below, the Court will liberally

construe as a Motion to Amend the Petition. (ECF No. 30.) 

Respondent has filed an Answer to the Petition along with an incorporated Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in support, and has lodged portions of the state court record. (ECF

Nos. 25-26.) Respondent contends federal habeas relief is not available with respect to any

claim presented in the Petition because the adjudication of the claims by the state court was

objectively reasonable, and because the claims are without merit. (Ans. at 11-17.) Petitioner

has filed a Traverse, in which he requests an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 27.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief because the adjudication by the state court of the claims presented here did not involve an

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Court also finds that

2

 People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118, 123 (1970) (holding that a criminal defendant represented

by appointed counsel or the public defender may request that the court discharge the attorney and

substitute new counsel if the defendant’s right to counsel would be substantially impaired by continuing

with the original attorney).

3

 When citing to documents filed with the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system, such

as the Petition, Answer and Traverse, the Court will refer to the pages assigned by that system. 

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an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS the Petition be

DENIED without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

Motion to Amend be DENIED on the basis that amendment would be futile, as federal habeas

relief is not available with respect to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.

II.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

On October 28, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of grand theft in violation of

California Penal Code section 487(a), and admitted he had suffered a prior conviction which

constituted a “strike” under California’s Three Strikes law. (CT 134-39.) On December 9, 2009,

he was sentenced to a stipulated term of 32 months in state prison, and was scheduled to begin

serving his sentence on January 14, 2010. (CT 140.) 

On December 30, 2009, while Petitioner was released on bail and awaiting execution of

custody on the grand theft conviction, he was charged in a new criminal complaint which alleged

that on December 27, 2009, he willfully inflicted corporal injury upon a spouse or cohabitant in

violation of California Penal Code section 273.5(a). (CT 1-2.) The new complaint contained

sentence enhancement allegations that Petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury on the

victim in violation of Penal Code section 12022.7(e); committed the offense while released from

custody on an earlier offense within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.1(b); and that he

had nine probation denial priors within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203(e)(4), five

prison priors within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667.5(b) & 668, one serious felony prior

within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667(a), 668 & 1192.7(c), and one strike prior within

the meaning of Penal Code sections 667(b)-(i), 668 & 1170.12. (CT 1-6.) Petitioner waived his

right to a jury trial, and following a bench trial was found guilty of willful infliction of corporal

injury to a cohabitant. (CT 111.) The trial judge found true the allegations that the offense was

committed while Petitioner was released from custody on an earlier offense and that he had

personally inflicted great bodily injury; Petitioner admitted the truth of the prior conviction

allegations. (Id.) A new trial motion was denied, and Petitioner was sentenced to 18 years

imprisonment, and fines, a fee and an assessment were imposed. (CT 114-18.)

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Petitioner appealed, raising claims relating only to his fines, fee and assessment. 

(Lodgment Nos. 4-6.) The appellate court affirmed the conviction but remanded for assessment

of new fines and fees. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Moses, No. D057822 (Cal.App.Ct. June 16,

2011).) Petitioner did not petition for review in the state supreme court.

On May 19, 2011, prior to the decision of the appellate court on direct appeal, Petitioner

filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the state appellate court, raising the same claims

presented in the federal Petition, namely, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial

misconduct, and judicial bias. (Lodgment No. 8.) The appellate court construed the petition as

a habeas petition, and, on June 15, 2011, denied relief on the on the basis that Petitioner had

failed to provide factual support for his claims. (Lodgment No. 9.) Petitioner filed a habeas

petition in the superior court on July 18, 2011, raising the same claims. (Lodgment No. 10.) 

That court denied relief on the basis that Petitioner had failed to cure the pleading defect

identified by the appellate court in that he had again failed to allege facts supporting his claim

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Lodgment No. 11.) Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration of that order, contending that the superior court had ignored his claims alleging

prosecutorial misconduct and judicial bias, which was denied on the basis that Petitioner had

failed to provide factual support for those claims as well. (Lodgment No. 16 at 3.)

Petitioner next filed a habeas petition in the state supreme court on October 14, 2011,

supplemented by a request for judicial notice filed on December 1, 2011, which raised those

same claims, as well as the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim he now seeks to

include in the Petition, and for the first time provided detailed factual allegations supporting the

claims. (Lodgment Nos. 12-13.) The state supreme court summarily denied relief on March 28,

2012, without citation of authority or a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 14.) 

On December 28, 2011, while the state supreme court habeas petition was pending,

Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the state superior court, alleging that the trial court

imposed an illegal enhancement. (Lodgment No. 15.) That petition was denied on February 21,

2012, on the basis that Petitioner knew of the claim at the time of trial and unjustifiably delayed

presenting it to the state court. (Lodgment No. 16.) On April 17, 2012, Petitioner filed a habeas

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petition in the appellate court presenting an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, and

a claim alleging he was denied his right of allocution at sentencing. (Lodgment No. 17.) That

petition was denied on May 22, 2012, on the basis that it was procedurally barred as untimely

and successive. (Lodgment No. 18.)

III.

EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL

At the start of his one-day bench trial, Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on the

charged offense of intentional infliction of corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant, and on the

sentence enhancement allegations. (Lodgment No. 3, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 9-10; CT 2.) The

trial judge took judicial notice that on the date of the alleged offense, December 27, 2009,

Petitioner was released on bail with respect to his December 9, 2009, conviction for grand theft,

and was set to begin serving his 32-month sentence on January 14, 2010. (RT 11-12.)

Mary Ann White-Holt testified that she began dating Petitioner in March of 2009, and as

of December 2009, they were planning to marry. (RT 16.) They began living together in April

or May of 2009, in a duplex, where they lived downstairs and Petitioner’s brother William, his

wife Marla, Marla’s sister Elaine, and five children lived upstairs. (RT 17-18.) 

On the evening of December 27, 2009, White-Holt and Petitioner engaged in a verbal

argument in downtown San Diego, which continued on the trolley ride home. (RT 20-21, 52.) 

After they returned home, the argument became mildly physical while they were in their

bedroom, but neither was injured, although White-Holt said Petitioner fell to the floor twice and

she may have scratched and pushed him. (RT 21-23, 30.) White-Holt said she often “tussled”

with Petitioner like that, but Petitioner had never hit her in her face or with his fists in any of

their prior arguments. (RT 23, 68-72, 74.) She said Petitioner had back trouble and difficulty

bending his arms and legs, and occasionally used a wheelchair, and she therefore had a physical

advantage over him and the ability to hurt him if she wished, but she denied ever wanting to hurt

him. (RT 48-50.) White-Holt admitted that she could become quite angry at times, and had hit

Petitioner in the past, including grabbing his neck, and that she carried a knife for her protection

which she had used in the past to threaten to kill him. (RT 46-47.) 

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After they tussled, Petitioner left the bedroom and White-Holt received a telephone call

from her daughter. (RT 21-23.) She went outside to talk on the telephone and saw Petitioner

standing on the sidewalk in front of the house talking with some men. (Id.) As she was talking

on the telephone on the sidewalk, someone threw a full can of beer at her, which hit her hard in

the back. (RT 21-24, 57.) She screamed, “Who the fuck threw the beer can?”, but no one spoke

up. (RT 22-23.) She asked Petitioner if he had thrown it, but he told her no, he would not waste

a full can of beer on her. (RT 25.) 

They began arguing again and Petitioner threw a plastic bottle partially filed with brandy

at her, which missed, and which she picked up and drank from. (RT 25-26, 55.) She threw the

full beer can which had hit her at Petitioner, which hit him below the shoulders. (RT 26-27.) 

White-Holt said she and Petitioner were both intoxicated, but Petitioner was more intoxicated. 

(RT 34, 54.) Petitioner then left the area, White-Holt returned to their bedroom, and Elaine told

her that it was Petitioner who had hit her with the full can of beer. (RT 27, 61.)

White-Holt testified that Petitioner returned to their bedroom about half an hour later. 

(RT 28.) She said they were both angry about the events that evening, and that the mood was

worse for the stress surrounding Petitioner’s upcoming incarceration. (RT 28-29.) White-Holt

told Petitioner it was his fault he was going to prison and he should change his ways. (RT 30.) 

Petitioner wanted to leave the bedroom, but White-Holt wanted him to stay and “get everything

straight, see what was wrong, you know, what was going on.” (RT 31.) White-Holt attempted

to stop Petitioner from leaving the bedroom by putting her hand in front of him and blocking his

path. (RT 31-32.) Petitioner told her to move but she refused. (RT 32.)

White-Holt said she did not remember what happened next, but that the next thing she

remembered was being in a daze and hearing Petitioner upstairs saying, “You all need to come

down and check on that bitch. I might have killed her.” (RT 33.) Petitioner’s brother and his

wife came down, and Petitioner’s brother had an angry confrontation with Petitioner. (RT 34-

35.) Petitioner’s brother and wife took White-Holt upstairs, where they helped her change her

bloody clothes, and she waited there until the police and ambulance arrived. (RT 35-36.) She

was taken to the hospital where she stayed for several days. (RT 36-37.) 

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White-Holt said her eyes were swollen shut that night and had to be opened at the hospital

by cutting underneath them, and several of her teeth were loosened. (RT 38-39.) At the time

of trial, her sight was still affected, she suffered headaches, had lost a tooth, and had follow-up

appointments scheduled with a plastic surgeon and an eye doctor. (RT 40-43.) She said

Petitioner had never hit her with his fists before, but he had in the past told her that he had quick

hands and could knock her out quickly with his hands, like he had once knocked someone else

out. (RT 74-76.) 

Homayoun Nabizadeh, a City of San Diego Police Officer, testified that he was in

uniform on patrol driving a marked police car at 9:15 p.m. on December 27, 2009, when he saw

Petitioner staggering in the street, jaywalking, attempting to get the officer’s attention. (RT 81-

82.) Petitioner told Officer Nabizadeh that “he just beat up his wife.” (RT 83.) Petitioner’s eyes

were bloodshot, his knuckles were swollen and cut, he was bloodstained, smelled of alcohol, and

appeared heavily intoxicated. (RT 83, 99.) Another officer waited with Petitioner while Officer

Nabizadeh responded to the address provided by Petitioner. (RT 84.) 

When Officer Nabizadeh arrived at the residence, he observed White-Holt being escorted

down a flight of stairs; her eyes were closed and swollen, she was bleeding from her right eye

and mouth, and he immediately called the paramedics. (RT 85.) White-Holt told the officer that

Petitioner “got angry and punched her.” (RT 86.) Later that evening at the hospital, White-Holt

gave a statement consistent with her trial testimony, with the exception that she told Officer

Nabizadeh that she was on the bed when she told Petitioner he needed to change his ways, and

that Petitioner then “jumps on the bed, on top of her, and starts punching away at her. And then

for some reason, he stops. That’s when, you know, the family members come in, and he leaves

the house.” (RT 87-88.) Officer Nabizadeh said he took a knife from Petitioner that night, but

could not recall if Petitioner had surrendered it or it was taken during a pat-down, and could not

recall if Petitioner said it belonged to White-Holt. (RT 108-09.)

Christopher Pavle, a City of San Diego Police Officer, testified that he detained Petitioner

while Officer Nabizadeh investigated. (RT 102-03.) Officer Pavle gathered evidence from the

scene, including bloody clothing from a trash can in the upstairs unit, but failed to locate the beer

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can used in the assault or any additional witnesses. (RT 103-06.) Sedonia Weathersby, a City

of San Diego Police Officer, testified that she contacted White-Holt in the hospital about twentyfour hours after the assault, and observed that her eyes were almost closed, her front teeth were

very loose, and that she was bruised and angry. (RT 114.) Officer Weathersby testified that

additional photographs were taken of the victim eleven days after the incident at the prosecutor’s

request, which were admitted into evidence. (RT 115-19.) 

Jay Joseph Doucet, an associate clinical professor of surgery at the University of

California San Diego Medical Center, testified that he treated White-Holt the morning after she

sustained her injuries. (RT 125-26.) White-Holt had bruising and contusions along both eyelids

and both sides of her face, a cut on her gum, a ridge fracture of the bone just above her teeth, a

hematoma behind her left eye, a contusion of a retina, swelling of her right ear, blood coming

from her right nostril, and loose teeth, all due to blunt trauma consistent with impact by a closed

fist, although he noted she had loose teeth to begin with. (RT 128-31, 134.) The trial on the

prior conviction allegations was bifurcated, and the People rested. (RT 138.)

Petitioner was the only defense witness called, and he testified that he and White-Holt had

been together for about a year, that they had a “very beautiful” relationship, and were planning

on marrying. (RT 140.) He said White-Holt often grabbed him by the throat and slapped him,

although he never hit back. (RT 141.) She once threatened to kill him on a bus with a knife she

carried in her purse when he declined to accompany her on an errand, as a result of her being

jealous, as she thought if he left him alone he would become involved with someone else. (RT

141-42.) Petitioner was five-feet, seven-inches tall and weighed 194 pounds, and White-Holt

was five-feet, four-inches tall and weighed 165 pounds, but due to his physical disabilities she

was able to subdue him when they wrestled and she could beat him up. (RT 74, 140, 143.) He

said his arms and legs do not bend, and it is hard for him to maneuver, as a result of a five-month

coma he was in due to pneumonia in 1990. (RT 143.)

Petitioner said that earlier on the evening of the incident they got into an argument

downtown, which was renewed on the trolley ride home when Petitioner spoke to another

woman. (RT 144-45.) Petitioner had been drinking at that point but White-Holt had not. (RT

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145.) Petitioner said he was not upset, but that White-Holt, as was her custom, refused to stop

talking about their dispute. (Id.) They went to their bedroom where Petitioner poured brandy

into a plastic bottle for her, and then told her he was going to go outside to have a beer. (RT

146.) White-Holt threatened to go to her granddaughter’s house if Petitioner left. (Id.) 

Petitioner then went outside to have a beer with some people who were standing around, but who

he “really couldn’t see” because it was so dark. (RT 147.) Petitioner saw White-Holt walk out,

and when he turned to go back inside, he heard her say that someone had hit her with a beer. 

(Id.) He did not see who threw the beer at her. (Id.) She grabbed him by his collar and asked

if he had thrown the beer. (Id.) Petitioner told her, “I didn’t hit you with no beer. I wouldn’t

waste no beer like that.” (Id.) Petitioner turned to go inside and White-Holt threw the beer can

at him and hit him in the arm. (RT 148.) He denied throwing the plastic bottle partially filled

with brandy, or anything else, at White-Holt. (Id.)

Petitioner was lying on the bed when White-Holt entered their bedroom and criticized

him for allowing someone to throw a bottle at her. (Id.) Petitioner got up and said he was

leaving, at which point White-Holt blocked the door and grabbed Petitioner by the throat. (RT

148-49.) Petitioner asked if he could go to the bathroom, at which point White-Holt “scratched

the shit out of me, all down my neck.” (RT 150.) Petitioner testified that “I must have blacked

out, because when I came to, she was getting up off the ground, saying ‘wait until I get up.’” 

(RT 150-51.) He saw that her knife and telephone were on the bed within her reach, and he

“knew she was probably going to kill me.” (RT 150-51, 172.) Petitioner stood up and hit her

twice with an open hand, which broke his thumb. (RT 150.) He said he is not able to bend his

arms in a manner which would allow him to punch with a closed fist, but when asked why his

knuckles were swollen and cut, he said “I don’t know.” (RT 166-67, 172-73.) He grabbed the

knife and phone and went upstairs to get his brother. (RT 150.) When asked how many times

he thought he hit White-Holt in total, he said “probably three.” (RT 152.) 

Petitioner testified that he left the residence and flagged down a police officer because

he was concerned for White-Holt’s welfare, and that he placed her telephone and knife on the

ground at the officer’s feet and told him, “me and my wife just got into a fight.” (RT 152-53,

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173.) Petitioner denied ever being angry or upset that night, denied being stressed out about

going to jail, stated that he just wanted to get away from White-Holt’s continued fussing and

arguing, and said that if he had not hit her so severely she would have chased him down. (RT

159-60, 163.) 

The defense rested and there was no rebuttal. (RT 173.) The attorneys presented closing

argument, with Petitioner’s trial counsel focusing on self-defense, in particular the amount of

force used, arguing that two or three hits was reasonable to disable an opponent who had a

physical advantage and access to a knife which she had admitted using to threaten to kill him

with in the past. (RT 174-79.) The trial judge found Petitioner guilty, stating:

I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the

offense as charged and the allegations that are attendant to the charge are true. 

In particular, in regard to the issue of self-defense, I don’t think the belief

that there was imminent danger of violence, based on all of the facts and

circumstances that have come out of the evidence, is reasonable. 

Additionally, I think there was an excessive amount of force. And I don’t -

- and for those reasons, I don’t believe that the right of self-defense would apply

in this case. 

And I’ve considered all of these circumstances and facts in the testimony,

including listening to the witnesses and judging the credibility of their stories as

well.

(RT 180.)

Petitioner then admitted the truth of the prior conviction allegations. (RT 181-83.) At

the time scheduled for sentencing, the trial judge noted that he had received numerous letters

from Petitioner complaining of the quality of representation from his trial counsel, a public

defender, and requesting appointment of new counsel to look into whether trial counsel provided

sufficient representation. (RT 187-88.) In those letters, Petitioner complained that his trial

counsel failed to: (1) object when the prosecutor badgered him on the stand and mocked and

misstated his testimony; (2) photograph Petitioner’s injuries; (3) meet with Petitioner to hear his

version of the events until a week before the bench trial, which counsel had insisted upon;

(4) investigate White-Holt’s criminal record or her inconsistent versions of what happened that

evening; (5) introduce letters she had written to Petitioner; (6) call any witnesses, including a

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doctor to testify that it is possible to be rendered unconscious by neck trauma and to testify

regarding the extent of Petitioner’s disabilities; and (7) adequately prepare for the sentencing

hearing. (CT 35-28, 60-70; Pet. Ex. N-1.) The trial judge granted the Marsden motion and

appointed the alternate public defender to determine whether Petitioner received effective

assistance of trial counsel. (RT 188.) 

A new trial motion was filed by the appointed alternate public defender, who contended

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) employ an investigator to investigate the case;

(2) employ medical experts who could have corroborated Petitioner’s testimony that he passed

out when he was grabbed by the throat by the victim, and that his physical disabilities prevented

him from assaulting the victim in the way she claimed; (3) impeach the victim with her prior

convictions for disorderly conduct in 2004 and shoplifting in 1981 and 1982, as well as with her

arrests for assault with a deadly weapon in 1995 and fraud in 1990; and (4) consult with the

defendant adequately regarding his defense. (CT 74-79.) The People filed an opposition to the

new trial motion (CT 81-90), supported by the affidavit of Petitioner’s trial counsel, who stated:

I have completed over a [sic] 100 jury trials and 50 bench trials during my career. 

I have handled thousands of cases during my career as a defense attorney. The

cases I have dealt with has [sic] involved a wide variety of crimes, consisting of

both simple and very complex issues.

I have been employed as a deputy public defender at the San Diego Public

Defender’s Office since 1988. At that office, I have supervised and helped train

several attorneys.

I, being the assigned attorney to Mr. Moses, thoroughly evaluated his case. After

careful consideration and evaluation of the facts and circumstances, I did not

believe further investigation was needed.

If I had decided to employ an investigator for this case, it would have been to

interview the gentlemen who were standing outside the house during the beer

throwing incident. I asked Mr. Moses about the people’s identities, but he stated

he did not know them or where they resided.

Regarding the failure to employ medical experts to corroborate Mr. Moses’

testimony, I did not believe hiring such experts would have contributed to his

defense. Mr. Moses admitted he did strike her and explained how he did it. There

was no evidence that Ms. Holt received additional injuries from someone or

something else, so this expert testimony does not seem relevant. Further, it his

[sic] extremely unlikely a medical expert would have been able to testify to the

fact that Mr. Moses did in fact pass out during the assault.

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I did not feel as if I needed to impeach the victim, Ms. Holt. Ms. Holt’s story was

consistent with Mr. Moses’ self-defense claim. It was my intention to have the

court believe Ms. Holt. Therefore, I did not want to discredit her. This was a

logical strategy choice that I believed would serve to benefit the defendant.

While this case was pending, I met with Mr. Moses on at least three occasions to

discuss the trial and possible strategies to employ.

(CT 88-89) (italics in original). 

The trial judge denied the new trial motion on the basis that trial counsel “did more than

an adequate job representing” Petitioner, that counsel’s conduct was “within the range of

reasonable assistance,” and because, “I don’t think the proceedings would have been different,

had he chosen other tactics.” (RT 198.) Petitioner was sentenced to six years on the corporal

injury count, four years on the great bodily injury enhancement, two years for committing the

offense while released from custody, five years for the serious felony prior, and one year for the

prison priors, for a total sentence of 18 years imprisonment. (RT 201.)

IV.

PETITIONER'S CLAIMS

(1) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed

to conduct a reasonable pre-trial investigation, acted under a conflict of interest, coerced

Petitioner into waiving his right to a jury trial, and committed numerous instances of deficient

performance. (Pet. at 6-33.)

(2) Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated due to

numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct. (Pet. at 34-41.)

(3) Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated due to

judicial bias. (Pet. at 42-49.)

(4) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel

refused to raise on direct appeal the claims presented here, and refused to raise a claim alleging

the trial transcripts had been altered.4

 (Mot. to Amend Pet. [ECF No. 30-1] at 6-15.)

/ / /

/ / /

4

 Claim 4 is presented in Petitioner’s Motion to Amend the Petition.

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V.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the Court finds that the adjudication by the state court of the

claims raised in the Petition did not involve an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. The Court also finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary because

Petitioner’s claims can be adequately addressed based on the current state of the record. The

Court therefore RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED. The Court also finds that

amendment of the Petition to include the proposed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

claim would be futile because the claim does not merit habeas relief, and RECOMMENDS

Petitioner’s Motion to Amend the Petition be DENIED.

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, provides that:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). 

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court

decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably

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applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. A decision may also

involve an unreasonable application “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal

principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United

States Supreme] Court’s decisions . . .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. In order to satisfy section

2254(d)(2), a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which

the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest, assuming it rests upon a determination of the

facts, are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

B. Claim 1 - Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner alleges in his first claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel

because his trial counsel was preparing to go to trial in another case while representing Petitioner

and did not have time to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation, which also amounted to a

conflict of interest and led to counsel coercing Petitioner into waiving his right to a jury trial. 

(Pet. at 6.) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in that counsel:

(a) said he was going to send an investigator to photograph the bruise on Petitioner’s arm where

he was hit with a full can of beer thrown by White-Holt, but failed to do so; (b) failed to

investigate White-Holt’s injuries or bring to the court’s attention Petitioner’s broken thumb,

which would have shown that White-Holt’s injuries were consistent with Petitioner’s version

of how he hit her; (c) misstated facts during closing argument by saying that Petitioner struck

White-Holt three times rather than twice; (d) failed to present evidence regarding White-Holt’s

prior arrest for assault with a deadly weapon, or a letter she wrote to Petitioner stating that she

was angry with him that night for speaking to another woman on the trolley; (e) failed to

investigate whether it is possible for someone to be rendered unconscious due to trauma to the

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neck, including failing to ask the prosecution’s expert medical witness to opine on that subject

and refusing to call as a witness Dr. Granger from the George Bailey Detention Facility who told

Petitioner it was possible to be rendered unconscious by neck trauma; (f) failed to introduce

Petitioner’s medical records or call his doctor to testify regarding the severity of his disability;

(g) came to see Petitioner at the detention facility “for the first and only time to sit down and

actually discuss my side of the incident seven days” prior to the start of trial, and therefore

represented Petitioner at the readiness hearing and the preliminary hearing without “knowing

the defendant’s version of what happened that evening,” leaving Petitioner effectively

unrepresented at those proceedings; (h) failed to object to introduction by the prosecutor of

photographs of the victim taken eleven days after the incident, which were introduced as a result

of a discovery violation, and conducted no investigation regarding what may or may not have

happened to the victim during those eleven days; (i) failed to investigate or cross-examine

White-Holt regarding a statement she made to the police and later repudiated that Petitioner

jumped on top of her in the bed and punched her several times; (j) failed to investigate or

question White-Holt about Petitioner’s contention that “her street name was Razor Mary”

because she always carried a knife, or that she suffered from paranoia, schizophrenia and

“delusional jealousy”; (k) failed to object at the preliminary hearing when White-Holt said

Petitioner threw “another” bottle at her, when the evidence was that only one can and one bottle

had been thrown at her; and (l) failed to present mitigating evidence that Petitioner was acting

under the evolutionary “fight or flight syndrome.” (Pet. at 7-33; Traverse at 13-17.) Petitioner

also alleges that an actual conflict of interest was essentially conceded when his Marsden motion

was granted and the alternate public defender was appointed to replace trial counsel, and that the

appointed alternate public defender met with Petitioner only once, did not file a motion for a

mistrial as requested, and failed to subject Petitioner’s prior convictions to adequate adversarial

testing. (Pet. at 28-29.)

Respondent answers that the state courts cited and applied the applicable clearly

established federal law and there is no reason to permit Petitioner to relitigate his claims in

federal court. (Ans. at 13.) Respondent also contends that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

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counsel claim is without merit because: (a) the record is devoid of evidence that Petitioner was

coerced into a bench trial; (b) the record shows Petitioner’s trial counsel represented him to the

best of his abilities given that Petitioner had admitted he punched White-Holt in the face several

times with both hands while she was unarmed and getting up off the floor, and counsel was

therefore constrained in his ability to present a defense of self-defense by the facts of the case

and Petitioner’s admissions; (c) counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to impeach

White-Holt with her criminal record and her letter to Petitioner because her testimony in large

part supported Petitioner’s claim of self-defense, and because she admitted on the stand that she

had written the letter apologizing to him, and had admitted that she had grabbed him, scratched

him a number of times, threw a can of beer at him, and told him she would stab him with a knife;

and (d) there was no reason to employ a medical expert to testify that Petitioner could have lost

consciousness as a result of the pain inflicted by White-Holt on his neck because it was

extremely unlikely that a medical expert would testify that Petitioner did in fact lose

consciousness. (Ans. at 14.) 

Claim 1 was presented to the state supreme court in a habeas petition filed on October 14,

2011, in the same manner it is presented in the federal Petition here. (Lodgment No. 12 at 3-8.) 

That petition was summarily denied on March 28, 2012, without citation of authority or a

statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 14.) Petitioner had previously presented an ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claim in a petition for a writ of mandate filed in the state appellate

court on May 19, 2011, but did not support the claim with factual allegations or exhibits as he

has done here and in the state supreme court. (Lodgment No. 8.) The appellate court construed

the petition for a writ of mandate as a habeas petition, and denied relief on the on the basis that

Petitioner had failed to provide factual support for his claims. (Lodgment No. 9.) Petitioner

filed a habeas petition in the superior court several days later raising the same claims, but once

again failed to provide sufficient factual support. (Lodgment No. 10.) The superior court denied

relief, noting that Petitioner had failed to cure the pleading defect identified by the appellate

court in that he had failed to allege facts supporting his claims. (Lodgment Nos. 11, 16.) 

The silent denial by a state supreme court is presumed to be a denial on the merits.

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Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011). “The presumption may be

overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is

more likely.” Id. In this case, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was

presented to the state supreme court in a very different manner than it was presented to the lower

state courts. Petitioner did not support his claim with factual allegations in the lower courts, and

the claim was denied on the basis that it was unsupported by factual allegations. When he

presented the claim to the state supreme court, it was supported by detailed factual allegations

as it is here. Accordingly, the Court will apply the Richter presumption that the state supreme

court denied Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits rather than on the

basis given by the lower court, that it was not sufficiently supported by factual allegations. See

id. (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied

relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence

of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”); see also Harris v. Superior

Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that because the California courts each

have original jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions, a denial by the state supreme court which

is not accompanied by citation of authority or a statement of reasoning should be treated as an

adjudication on the merits for purposes of exhaustion rather than an adoption of a lower court’s

procedural bar).

When reviewing a silent denial of a claim by the California Supreme Court, a federal

habeas petitioner “can satisfy the ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) only by

showing that ‘there was no reasonable basis’ for the California Supreme Court’s decision.” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011), quoting Richter, 131 S.Ct. at

784. “Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories . . . could

have supported the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior

decision of this Court.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786; Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1402 (“Section

2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial.”), citing Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786. 

“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must

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show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking

in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. The Supreme Court

has stated that “[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be . . . [as

it] preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists

could disagree that the state court decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” Id. at 786

(“Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions

in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through

appeal.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for habeas relief, Petitioner must

demonstrate two things. First, he must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, he must show counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

the defense. Id. This requires showing that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive

[Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong,

Petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would

have been different absent the error. Id. at 694. A reasonable probability in this context is “a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Petitioner must establish

both deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Id. at 687. 

“A lawyer who fails to adequately investigate, and to introduce into evidence, records that

demonstrate his client’s factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt as to that question to

undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient performance.” Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d

1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular

investigations unnecessary.”) A decision not to investigate “must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

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judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.

__, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). “The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are

both highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 131

S.Ct. at 788 (citations omitted). These standards are “difficult to meet” and “demands that state

court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Federal habeas

relief functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,”

and not simply as a means of error correction. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786, quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979). “Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if

it ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the defendant was

denied a fair trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

Petitioner first alleges that his trial counsel said he was going to send an investigator to

photograph the bruise on Petitioner’s arm where he was hit with a full can of beer thrown by

White-Holt, but failed to do so. (Pet. at 7; Traverse at 32.) Both White-Holt and Petitioner

testified at trial that she threw a full beer can at Petitioner and that it hit him. (RT 26, 148.) In

light of that undisputed testimony, and the “heavy measure of deference” courts must give to

counsel’s judgments, it would have been reasonable for the state court to find that counsel’s

decision not to document the bruise Petitioner received as a result of being hit by the beer can

was not an error “so serious as to deprive [Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The state supreme court may also have reasonably found

that even if counsel’s failure to document the bruise was not a tactical decision, the error did not

prejudice Petitioner because, in light of the undisputed testimony that he was hit with the can,

the absence at trial of photographic evidence that he was hit by the can did not “undermine

confidence in the outcome” of his trial. Id. at 694.

Petitioner contends he testified that he hit White-Holt only twice, but his trial counsel

misstated the number of times he hit her during closing argument. (Pet. at 8-9; Traverse at 32.) 

Petitioner points to counsel’s statement in closing argument that, “He admits he hit her. How

many times he hit her - - I think the doctor said it’s consistent with three times, the two times

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when she went down on the ground and the third time when she was trying to get up.” (RT 179.) 

Petitioner testified that White-Holt had grabbed him by the neck, and that when she scratched

his neck “it seems like the lights went out. And when I came to, she was trying to get off the

ground.” (RT 151.) He testified that when he regained consciousness, White-Holt was on the

ground trying to get up, saying “wait until I get up,” which Petitioner took as a threat, and then

he hit her “again” to “make sure she didn’t get up and kill me.” (RT 152.) When asked on direct

examination how many times he hit her in total, he said, “Probably three.” (Id.) On crossexamination, Petitioner similarly testified that, “She was getting up. So I hit her two more times,

bam, bam, like that.” (RT 162.) A reasonable interpretation of Petitioner’s own testimony was

that he hit White-Holt three times. His trial counsel therefore did not misstate the number of

times Petitioner hit her. The state supreme court could have reasonably rejected this contention

on the basis that it was unsupported by the record, or could have reasonably found that it was

sound trial strategy for counsel to refrain from arguing that Petitioner hit the victim only twice,

as that could have been seen as a distortion of the evidence and may have diminished the

credibility of counsel’s closing argument. 

 Petitioner alleges counsel failed to investigate White-Holt’s injuries and failed to bring

to the court’s attention that he broke his thumb hitting her, which would have shown that WhiteHolt’s injuries were consistent with Petitioner’s version of how he hit her (two blows with an

open hand, not with a closed fist), thereby supporting his claim of self-defense. (Pet. at 7-8;

Traverse at 16, 32.) The doctor who treated White-Holt did not testify that she was hit with a

closed fist, merely that it was “possible” that her injuries could have been caused by a closed fist,

and that her injuries were consistent with as few as three blows. (RT 131, 135.) Petitioner

testified that he broke his thumb when he hit White-Holt open-handed (RT 150), and that he was

unable to hit with a closed fist due to his disabilities (RT 172-72), so the trial judge was aware

of his claims in that regard. Although Petitioner contends he told trial counsel that his knuckles

had been deformed several years before he met the victim (Pet. at 21), at trial he tried to explain

how he might have cut his knuckles when he hit White-Holt open-handed, but eventually said

“who knows” what caused his knuckles to be swollen, and answered, “I don’t know,” when

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asked “how do you explain the swollen, cut knuckles you had?” (RT 166-67.) 

The trial judge was also aware of the nature and severity of White-Holt’s injuries through

her description of them and her testimony that she was in the hospital for several days, as well

as through the testimony of her treating doctor and the two officer witnesses who testified

regarding her appearance. The doctor who treated her the next day said she was struck hard

enough to cause a ridge fracture in the bone above her teeth, which is a “pretty dense” part of

the skull, and that there was a worry about a possible loss of vision due to the contusion of her

retina. (RT 129-30.) It is therefore clear that Petitioner’s claim of self-defense did not turn on

whether he hit White-Holt open-handed or with a closed fist, but, as indicated by the trial judge,

by insufficient evidence of imminent danger and the amount of force used as reflected in the

severity of her injuries. (RT 180.) Petitioner’s testimony that he was unable to explain why his

knuckles were cut and swollen, and was unable to say how White-Holt ended up on the floor as

a result of Petitioner “probably” hitting her as he lost or was losing consciousness, along with

evidence of his severe intoxication, prevents him from being in a position to say for certain how

he hit her. The medical records he submits in support of his contention that he was physically

incapable of hitting with a closed fist (Pet. Ex. V), which he says sat unused on counsel’s table

during the trial (Traverse at 17), do not establish an inability to hit with a closed fist. Rather,

Petitioner merely speculates that a medical expert might have been found to support his

testimony that his disability prevented him from hitting with a closed fist. Speculative and

conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove that counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994);

see also Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (speculation that counsel could

have retained an expert does not establish prejudice where there was no evidence that an expert

would testify favorably to petitioner). Thus, the state court could reasonably have found that

Petitioner’s trial counsel did not err with respect to investigating White-Holt’s injuries or in

presenting Petitioner’s version of how she was injured. 

Furthermore, even assuming medical evidence or expert testimony could have been

introduced to support Petitioner’s contention that he could not hit with a closed fist, whether

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Petitioner struck White-Holt with an open hand or a closed fist was never relevant to his claim

of self-defense, and even if it was, it was overshadowed to the point of irrelevance by the

severity of the injuries he inflicted upon her. See People v. Minifie, 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064-65

(1996) (holding that to support a claim of self-defense, the threat of bodily injury must be

imminent, and “any right of self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under

the circumstances.”) The state court could have reasonably found that any error in failing to

investigate White-Holt’s injuries to show they were consistent with being hit open-handed did

not “undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94.

Petitioner contends trial counsel failed to call Petitioner’s doctor to testify regarding the

severity of his disabilities, and failed to introduce his medical records. (Pet. at 13-14; Traverse

at 17.) Both Petitioner and White-Holt testified regarding Petitioner’s disabilities, and there was

no dispute that they rendered him vulnerable to, and at a physical disadvantage with, White-Holt. 

As set forth above, Petitioner merely speculates that an expert could be found to testify that he

is incapable of hitting with a closed fist. He contends that a competent counsel would have put

together a defense based on a disabled man afraid of being attacked by someone who has a

physical advantage over him, has attacked him before, and has threatened his life with a knife

in the past. (Pet. at 13-14.) That was in fact the defense which was presented at trial, and the

nature and extent of Petitioner’s physical disabilities were undisputed. 

Even if Petitioner is correct that a reasonable person could find that he used reasonable

force in the face of a reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger, the state court’s opposite

conclusion is still entitled to deference as long as it, too, is objectively reasonable. Renico v.

Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 777-78 (2010). It would have been objectively reasonable for the state court

to find that trial counsel’s decision not to hire a medical expert to testify regarding a subject that

was not contested at trial (the extent to which Petitioner was vulnerable as a result of his

disability), was not an error “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” or that it “so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the defendant was denied a fair trial.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. Petitioner contends that if medical evidence of his disabilities had been admitted,

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the trial judge might never have found that Petitioner did not have a reasonable belief he was in

imminent danger. However, the state supreme court could have found that the evidence

regarding the severity of White-Holt’s potentially permanent injuries, and the fact that she was

hit so hard that Petitioner broke his thumb and broke a dense bone in her skull, indicated that

excessive force was used, defeating his claim of self-defense irrespective of whether he believed

he was in imminent danger. Id.; Minifie, 13 Cal.4th at 1064-65. 

Petitioner next contends his trial counsel failed to present evidence regarding WhiteHolt’s arrest for assault with a deadly weapon in 1995, about fifteen years before Petitioner’s

trial. (Pet. at 9-11; Traverse at 32.) White-Holt, who first met Petitioner about one year before

trial, admitted that she had a physical advantage over Petitioner and the ability to hurt him if she

wanted to, admitted that she had a history of becoming quite angry at times, and admitted that

she had hit Petitioner in the past, including grabbing his neck and threatening in public to kill

him with her knife. (RT 46-50.) Trial counsel indicated that it was a tactical choice not to

impeach White-Holt because he wanted the trial judge to believe her when she testified that she

had used her physical advantage to prevent Petitioner from leaving the bedroom, and to have the

judge believe her testimony that she was capable of great anger, capable of beating up and

hurting Petitioner, and had in the past grabbed his neck and threatened to kill him with her knife. 

Her credibility in that respect was an important part of Petitioner’s self-defense claim, because

it provided a basis for arguing that when she said “wait until I get up,” it caused in him a concern

for his own safety, and supported his testimony that he believed he needed to hit her to make his

escape and prevent her from attacking him with her knife. Evidence that White-Holt had been

arrested fifteen years earlier for, but not convicted of, assault with a deadly weapon, would have

added little to her own admission at trial that she had in fact assaulted Petitioner with a deadly

weapon sometime during the past year. In addition, the trial judge was aware of White-Holt’s

entire criminal history when he denied the new trial motion, and observed that the outcome

would have been the same had counsel chosen other tactics. (RT 198.) Trial counsel’s decision

not to attack White-Holt’s credibility fell within the “wide latitude counsel must have in making

tactical decisions.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The state court could reasonably have found

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that even if counsel’s decision was not tactical, the failure to impeach White-Holt with evidence

that she had been arrested fifteen years earlier for assault with a deadly weapon, when she had

admitted at trial she had assaulted Petitioner with a deadly weapon within the past year, did not

“undermine confidence in the outcome” of Petitioner’s trial. Id. at 694.

 Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to introduce a letter White-Holt wrote to

Petitioner stating that she was angry with him that night for speaking to another woman on the

trolley. (Pet. at 9-11.) When White-Holt was asked at trial what had happened on the trolley

that evening that made her so angry, she explained that their argument had started before they

got on the trolley, and that it was exacerbated by another incident which happened after the

alleged incident where Petitioner supposedly spoke to another woman on the trolley. (RT 52.) 

She did not exactly deny at trial that she was upset with Petitioner for flirting with a woman on

the trolley, she merely stated that, “I didn’t say anything to him about him flirting with anybody

or anything like that.” (Id.) The prosecutor asked White-Holt if she had maintained contact with

Petitioner after the incident, and she testified that they had written each other constantly and both

said in their letters they were sorry. (RT 19-20.) Even if the letters contained an admission that

White-Holt became upset on the trolley ride home because Petitioner spoke to another woman,

it would not have directly impeached her trial testimony that she did not say anything to him

about it on the trolley, and it would have added little if anything to her trial testimony that she

was angry and upset with Petitioner for the entire series of events that evening. The state court

could reasonably have found that her admission in her letter had little or no impeachment value,

and that it was not error for trial counsel to fail to present it at trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

The state court could also have reasonably found that even if counsel’s decision was not tactical,

White-Holt’s admission in the letter was cumulative to the evidence that she was angry and upset

with Petitioner that night for other reasons, and therefore the failure to admit the letter into

evidence did not “undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Id. at 694.

Petitioner contends trial counsel failed to investigate the fact that it is possible to be

rendered unconscious due to trauma to the neck, and failed to ask the prosecution’s medical

witness to opine on that subject. (Pet. at 11-13; Traverse at 32.) He contends that Dr. Granger

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from the George Bailey Detention Facility told Petitioner it was possible to be rendered

unconscious due to neck trauma, but counsel did not call him because counsel believed he would

not be a credible witness. (Id.) Trial counsel explained in his post-trial affidavit that such an

expert would not contribute to the defense because Petitioner testified that he hit the victim and

testified as to why he hit her, and that in any case it was unlikely a medical expert would have

testified that Petitioner did in fact pass out. (CT 89.) The trial testimony of both Petitioner and

White-Holt is unclear exactly what happened at the moment Petitioner first hit White-Holt, but

Petitioner’s testimony suggests he hit her once while she had her hands on his neck, causing her

to release him and for her to fall to the floor, and then struck her twice more as she was getting

up off the floor. (RT 151-52, 162, 179.) In light of White-Holt’s own admission at trial that she

grabbed Petitioner’s neck and physically prevented him from leaving the bedroom, and her

uncontested testimony that she had a physical advantage over him and was able to beat him up,

evidence that it was medically possible for him to have passed out from being grabbed around

the neck, or evidence that he actually passed out, would have provided little, if any, support for

his contention that he needed to hit her twice more after he regained consciousness in order to

make his escape. The state supreme court could reasonably have found that trial counsel’s

decision not to introduce medical testimony regarding whether it is possible for someone to pass

out from neck trauma was not an error so serious as to deprive Petitioner of a fair trial. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Petitioner contends counsel came to see him “for the first and only time to sit down and

actually discuss my side of the incident seven days” prior to the start of trial, and counsel

therefore represented Petitioner at the readiness hearing and the preliminary hearing without

“knowing the defendant’s version of what happened that evening,” leaving Petitioner effectively

unrepresented at those proceedings. (Pet. at 15-17; Traverse at 26-27.) Trial counsel stated in

his post-trial declaration that, “While this case was pending, I met with Mr. Moses on at least

three occasions to discuss the trial and possible strategies to employ.” (CT 89.) Petitioner

contends that his efforts to procure the visitation logs where he was confined at the time were

thwarted, and that he could use those logs to show counsel visited him only once. (Pet. at 15.) 

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However, Petitioner admits that he also met with counsel prior to the readiness hearing, when

counsel told Petitioner the prosecution was offering a plea deal for eight years and recommended

they go to trial instead. (Id. at 31; Traverse at 32.) 

Although Petitioner indicates that counsel was unable to adequately represent him at the

readiness hearing or the preliminary hearing because he had not yet heard Petitioner’s side of

the story, he does not indicate what counsel should have done differently at either hearing, with

two exceptions. He contends trial counsel failed to object at the preliminary hearing when

White-Holt said Petitioner threw “another” bottle at her, when the evidence was that only one

can and one bottle had been thrown at her. (Pet. at 20.) Taken in context it appears this was

merely an inadvertent reference to two items, the can and bottle, being thrown at her, not two

bottles. (Lodgment No. 1, Preliminary Hearing Tr. at 8, 25, 32.) Defense counsel in fact argued

at the end of that hearing that White-Holt had not testified she had been hit with a bottle, merely

that Petitioner had thrown one at her, and the preliminary hearing judge responded by saying that

the testimony regarding the bottle was not clear, that it had changed and was fluid, and was in

any case not pertinent to the ruling. (Id. at 49.) The state court could have reasonably found that

this minor failure to correct the record at the preliminary hearing was not a serious error and did

not result in prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94. 

Petitioner also argues that the preliminary hearing judge had no factual basis upon which

to make the finding that Petitioner was not in imminent fear of immediate injury, because

Petitioner’s side of the story was not presented at the preliminary hearing. (Pet. at 23; Pet. Ex.

V.) The only witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing were White-Holt and Officer

Nabizadeh, who were called by the prosecution and cross-examined by defense counsel. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Preliminary Hearing Tr. at 1-47.) Although the defense did not call any

witnesses or introduce any evidence, after the prosecution rested, defense counsel stated:

Obviously, your Honor, there is a lot of factual issues here that are going

to have to be discussed in front of a jury. Only issue I think - - I mean, there is an

issue of self-defense and others. But great bodily injury, I’m not sure if that has

been shown. I ask the court to dismiss that allegation.

(Id. at 47.) The preliminary hearing judge then rejected a self-defense claim based on the

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evidence presented at the hearing, with the understanding that facts regarding self-defense might

be developed at trial. (Id. at 48-49.) Thus, the record suggests that Petitioner’s trial counsel was

aware of the self-defense claim, but chose not to present it at the preliminary hearing. It is also

clear from the trial testimony that the only way to establish Petitioner’s self-defense claim was

to have Petitioner testify as to his subjective belief in the need to protect himself. Although

Petitioner has “a fundamental constitutional right to present affirmative defenses” at the

preliminary hearing, Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal.2d 867, 874-76 (1967), the state court

could reasonably have found that Petitioner had not overcome the strong presumption that trial

counsel had a tactical reason for not presenting evidence of self-defense at the preliminary

hearing, and instead saving for trial Petitioner’s contention that he hit White-Holt only to save

his life. See California Criminal Law Practice and Procedure, 2012 Ed., § 8.13 (noting that

although a defendant has an absolute right to testify at the preliminary hearing, it is unusual for

a defendant to testify or to put on a defense at the preliminary hearing because it would provide

the prosecution with discovery.) The state court could also have reasonably rejected Petitioner’s

contention that the same evidence which the trial judge relied upon to find him guilty would

have led the preliminary hearing judge to dismiss the charges had it been presented.

Petitioner alleges that counsel had not heard his side of the story when counsel advised

him to reject the eight-year plea offer at the readiness conference, and that he was not given the

opportunity to accept or deny the offer because counsel immediately left after telling Petitioner

they were going to go to trial instead of accepting the offer. (Pet. at 31; Mot. to Amend Pet.

[ECF No. 30-1] at 11; Traverse at 32.) Petitioner has maintained throughout the state court

proceedings, as he does here, that he is the victim of an assault by White-Holt, and that the

prosecutor brought unwarranted charges against him. (Pet. at 34; Pet. Ex. N-1.) In light of his

lack of an indication, here or in the state court, that he would have accepted an eight-year plea

bargain for a crime he has always maintained he did not commit and did not occur, and in light

of his contention, both here and in the state court, that he would not have been convicted but for

a total breakdown in the adversarial process, it would have been reasonable for the state supreme

court to find that he has not shown prejudice arising from his counsel’s conduct in relation to the

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plea offer. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (holding that the

two-part Strickland test applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during pleabargaining, and in order to establish prejudice, “a defendant must show the outcome of the plea

process would have been different with competent advice.”) 

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel failed to object to the introduction by the prosecutor

of photographs of the victim taken eleven to thirteen days after the incident, because a report

prepared by Officer Weathersby regarding the photographs had not been disclosed to the defense

through discovery, and because counsel conducted no investigation regarding what may or may

not have happened to the victim during that time. (Pet. at 17-18; Traverse at 17, 33.) Officer

Weathersby testified that photographs were taken of the victim eleven days after the incident at

the prosecutor’s request. (RT 115-19.) Defense counsel indicated that he did not have a copy

of a portion of Weathersby’s report she submitted to the district attorney (RT 119), but there is

no indication in the record that the photographs were not produced prior to trial. In fact, a

photograph of White-Holt taken about a week and a half after the incident was introduced into

evidence at the preliminary hearing. (Lodgment No. 1, Preliminary Hearing Tr. at 20.) Thus,

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the photographs were withheld from the defense by the

prosecution, and has failed to show how or why he was prejudiced by a delay in obtaining a

portion of Weathersby’s report regarding the taking of the photographs. 

Petitioner contends he was prejudiced by the introduction into evidence of the

photographs because the doctor who treated White-Holt the day after she was injured testified

that her injures were of the type that would heal in a week or so, yet the photographs showed she

had not yet recovered nearly two weeks after she was injured. (Pet. at 19; Traverse at 18.) The

doctor testified at trial that many of White-Holt’s injuries were serious, and could eventually

lead to a loss of vision (RT 131), but that “the other injuries, the contusions and whatnot, we

expected those would all go away eventually.” (RT 132.) White-Holt’s appearance eleven days

after the incident did not mislead the trial judge regarding her injuries because the doctor who

treated her the day after the incident testified regarding the extent of her injuries (RT 125), the

responding police officer testified regarding her appearance several minutes after the incident

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(RT 85), and another police officer testified regarding the injuries as she observed them less than

twenty-four hours after they were inflicted. (RT 114.) Petitioner has shown no prejudice as a

result of counsel’s failure to object to the introduction of photographs which the trial judge knew

were taken eleven days after the incident (RT 115-19), and which, as discussed below in Claim

2, were not introduced as a result of a discovery violation.

Petitioner contends trial counsel failed to investigate or cross-examine White-Holt

regarding a statement she made to the police and later repudiated that Petitioner had jumped on

top of her in their bed and punched her several times. (Pet. at 19, 21.) Petitioner contends that

trial counsel’s error in failing to point out that White-Holt’s statement was false, and in allowing

the introduction of the photographs taken of her injuries eleven days after the incident, “were

the root of my conviction.” (Pet. at 19.) When White-Holt was asked at trial what had happened

after Petitioner got upset when she refused to allow him to leave the bedroom, she stated, “Oh,

to tell you the truth, I can’t remember. Only thing I remember - - oh, wow, I don’t remember.” 

(RT 32.) When asked if Petitioner had hit her, she testified that, “I guess he did. Because I

don’t remember.” (RT 33.) Officer Nabizadeh testified that White-Holt told him that night that

Petitioner “got angry and punched her,” and that he jumped “on the bed, on top of her, and starts

punching away at her. And then for some reason, he stops. That’s when, you know, the family

members come in, and he leaves the house.” (RT 87-88.) 

Petitioner has not explained how additional investigation or cross-examination of WhiteHolt with respect to her inconsistent statements would have helped his case. To the extent he

contends counsel could have shown that her statements to the police were false by pointing out

that she had changed her story, it is more likely that her original statements were true and her

trial testimony false. See e.g. People v. Brown, 33 Cal.4th 892, 899 (2004) (discussing reasons

for frequent recantation by victims of domestic violence). Because her trial testimony was much

more conducive to the self-defense claim than her police statements, it appears defense counsel

may have had a strong tactical reason for not inquiring into why she was unable to remember

at trial what had happened yet was able to tell the police that night that Petitioner had punched

her in anger. See id. (“[A] victim who reports an abusive family member to police may later

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protect the person by denying, minimizing, or recanting the report.”) Even if there was some

tactical advantage to impeaching White-Holt with her prior inconsistent statements, such a

strategy would likely have been unavailing in light of her testimony that she was sorry for what

had happened and still loved Petitioner. Id. Thus, the state court could reasonably have found

that counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to impeach White-Holt with her statements

to the police, either to avoid calling attention to her recantation, or for the reasons given in

counsel’s post-trial declaration, that he wanted the trial judge to believe her trial testimony.

Petitioner contends counsel failed to investigate or question White-Holt that “her street

name was Razor Mary” because she always carried a knife, which would have supported his

contention that he needed to hit her in order to protect himself from a person ready, willing and

able to attack him with a knife. (Pet. at 20.) As discussed above, White-Holt testified that she

often carried a knife and had used it to threaten Petitioner’s life in public. There is no indication

that evidence she had a reputation for behavior she admitted to at trial would have bolstered the

self-defense claim. Petitioner also contends he told counsel that White-Holt suffered from

paranoia, that she was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, which is characterized by

delusional jealousy, and that she had not been taking her medication that evening, but that

counsel did not bring these things to the judge’s attention. (Pet. at 32-33; Traverse at 17.) The

state court could have reasonably determined that White-Holt’s own admissions at trial regarding

her propensity to get angry and to get violent with Petitioner when she gets angry, her admission

that she was in fact angry that night and had hit and grabbed Petitioner in anger that night as she

had done during their previous arguments, and had threatened to kill him in public, along with

her uncontested physical advantage over Petitioner, was sufficient evidence of the danger she

presented to Petitioner to evaluate the level of force, if any, Petitioner needed to use to protect

himself, so as to render evidence of her mental health status unnecessary or cumulative. See

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (the “standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are both

highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem,” review is doubly deferential); Pinholster,

121 S.Ct. at 1398 (the Strickland and AEDPA standards are “difficult to meet” and “demand that

state court decision be given the benefit of the doubt.”)

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Petitioner contends counsel failed to present mitigating evidence that he was acting under

the evolutionary “fight or flight syndrome.” (Pet. at 24-28; Traverse at 33.) The state court

could have reasonably found that such evidence would not have assisted the trial judge in

determining whether Petitioner was in imminent danger from White-Holt or whether he had used

a reasonable amount of force. 

Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel, “brought me before a women [sic] judge that I’m

not familiar with and told [sic] if I went to trial in front of this woman I wouldn’t stand a chance. 

But there’s a man judge I know that would be more so in my favor. This is how the court

appointed attorney coerced me into a bench trial with Judge Kenneth K. So. Not knowing its

[sic] the jury who makes the decision not the judge I became fearful about having my trial in

front of a women [sic] judge this being the first time I ever thought about going to trial.” (Pet.

at 31; Traverse at 16.) The state court could have reasonably found that there was no evidence

that Petitioner was coerced into giving up his right to a jury trial by accepting counsel’s advice

to proceed to a bench trial in front of a judge with whom counsel believed the self-defense claim

would stand a better chance. Petitioner has not overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s

advice in this regard can be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“There

are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal

defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.”) 

Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was acting under a conflict of interest. (Pet. at 6,

28.) A criminal defendant is entitled under the Sixth Amendment to representation free from

conflicts of interest. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). In order to demonstrate a

conflict of interest which rises to the level of a federal constitutional violation, Petitioner must

show that his trial counsel actively represented conflicting interests and the conflict adversely

affected counsel’s performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). 

Petitioner’s allegation that his assigned public defender was too busy to give his case the

proper amount of attention because he was preparing to go to trial in another matter with another

client while he was representing Petitioner (Pet. at 6), does not satisfy this standard. Neither has

Petitioner alleged that counsel’s performance was adversely affected in any way by that alleged

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conflict. Petitioner contends that the granting of his Marsden motion shows that a conflict of

interest existed. (Pet. at 28.) The Marsden motion was not granted on the basis of a conflict of

interest, but as a result of Petitioner’s complaints that his trial counsel failed to object when the

prosecutor badgered Petitioner and mocked and made fun of his testimony, and when his defense

attorney failed to call witnesses, present medical testimony, photograph his injuries, investigate

or impeach the victim, and failed to visit Petitioner before trial to discuss strategy or after trial

to discuss sentencing issues. (RT 187-88; CT 60-70.) The state court could reasonably have

found that Petitioner had presented no evidence that his trial counsel actively represented

conflicting interests or that any alleged conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. 

Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350. 

Petitioner contends that his appointed alternate public defender met with him only once,

did not file a motion for a mistrial as Petitioner requested, and failed to point out that because

Petitioner’s prior strike conviction was not considered a strike at the time he was convicted, its

use to enhance his sentence violated ex post facto principles. (Pet. at 28-29.) Petitioner does

not explain why he was prejudiced when his appointed alternate public defender filed a motion

for a new trial rather than a motion for a mistrial. Petitioner’s contention that it is a violation of

ex post facto principles to use a prior conviction as a strike when the conviction was not a strike

when it was committed, is erroneous as a matter of law. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732

(1948) (“The sentence as a fourth offender or habitual criminal is not to be viewed as either a

new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened penalty for the latest

crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.”); Russell v.

Gregorie, 124 F.3d 1079, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1997) (“It is hornbook law that no ex post facto

problem occurs when the legislature creates a new offense that includes a prior conviction as an

element of the offense, as long as the other relevant conduct took place after the law was

passed.”) 

The Court finds that Petitioner has not identified errors by his trial counsel which, either

individually or cumulatively, “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the defendant was denied a fair trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Although Petitioner

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requests an evidentiary hearing, one is not necessary where, as here, the federal claim can be

denied on the basis of the state court record, and where the petitioner’s allegations, even if true,

do not provide a basis for habeas relief. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS denying habeas relief with respect to Claim 1 on the

basis that the silent denial of the claim by the state supreme court involved an objectively

reasonable application of clearly established federal law. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788; Pinholster,

121 S.Ct. at 1398; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94.

C. Claim 2 - Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Petitioner alleges in Claim 2 that his federal constitutional right to due process was

violated due to prosecutorial misconduct. (Pet. at 35.) Specifically, he alleges the prosecutor:

(a) failed to disclose to the defense the photographs taken of the victim eleven to thirteen days

after the incident in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.”); (b) presented false

testimony, and failed to correct testimony the prosecutor knew to be false, by arguing that

Petitioner left the premises immediately after hitting the victim; (c) improperly mischaracterized

evidence during closing argument by stating that White-Holt had testified that Petitioner was

outside in the driveway drinking beer with friends when there was no such testimony, by stating

that Petitioner had to lean over to punch the victim while she was on the ground, and by arguing

that Petitioner “snapped” and “pummeled” the victim, which also constituted slander;

(d) personally vouched for the victim’s honesty by arguing that her version of the events was

more believable that Petitioner’s version, and that Petitioner had a bigger motivation to lie;

(e) falsified statements in the People’s response to the motion for a new trial; and (f) brought

charges against Petitioner for which the prosecutor knew there was insufficient support. (Pet.

at 34-415

; Traverse at 18-19.) Respondent answers that Petitioner has not shown that the

prosecutor’s actions amounted to misconduct or resulted in prejudice. (Ans. at 15-16.)

5

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Claim 2 was presented to the state supreme court in a habeas petition in the same manner

as Claim 1, and denied without citation of authority or a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment 12

at 9-13; Lodgment No. 14.) For the reasons set forth above, the Court “must determine what

arguments or theories . . . could have supported the state court’s decision; and then it must ask

whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of the Supreme Court. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at

786; Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1402.

Clearly established federal law provides that “[t]o constitute a due process violation, the

prosecutorial misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the

defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987), quoting United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). The alleged misconduct must be reviewed in the

context of the entire trial. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). 

Petitioner contends the prosecutor presented false testimony, and failed to correct

testimony the prosecutor knew to be false, in several respects during closing argument. (Pet. at

36-42.) The prosecutor gave a brief closing argument, and stated in full:

Your Honor, it seems as if we have a relationship here that seemed to have

a turbulent past. Yes, they argued quite a bit. But when we focus on this date,

they were arguing all day, pretty much, going downtown. And they headed back

to the home, arguing about food, whatever the arguments were on the trolley.

And things were just tense to begin with. The defendant was facing

incarceration the next couple months. The victim testified how he was fairly tense

about that. 

Then we have this incident where the defendant is outside, hanging out

with some people in front of the residence. And Miss White-Holt walks out. 

She’s talking to her daughter on the phone, and she gets hit by a beer can. And

that sort of sparks another thing on this already kind of tense day.

She confronts, “Hey, who the fuck hit me with a beer can?” 

The defendant adamantly denies. Whatever. She throws the beer can back

at him at some point, and she goes in the bedroom. It’s after some period of time,

about 20, 30 minutes, she’s inside the bedroom. Yeah, she’s still a little heated

about what happened outside. And the defendant comes in, and they again sort

of resume their argument.

It seems what happens is, during this argument, she’s talking about his

incarceration, saying, “Hey, it’s your fault. You need to change your ways.”

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And in the midst of all of this, the defendant sort of snaps. He can’t take

it anymore. He can’t take the fact that she wants to talk about it more. 

He snaps and pretty much unloads on her. Looking at the injuries depicted

in court’s Exhibit 1, basically pummels her, causes both her eyes to swell up

within a matter of a few minutes, causes a fairly significant fracture to her mouth,

a cut, some swelling to her ear, some of her teeth to be, I guess, loosened some

more that they already were.

And what does the defendant do? [¶] He takes off. He takes off and kind

of staggers down the street. He’d been drinking significantly. [¶] The officer

talks about what his high level of intoxication is. [¶] And he makes a statement

to the officer, just candidly, “Look, I just beat up my wife.” 

Not, “I was protecting myself,” “I accidentally did this,” “I don’t know

what really happened,” “It was just a big milieu.”

“I just beat up my wife.” 

And from that investigation, that’s when Miss White-Holt was discovered

and seen with all the significant injuries. [¶] I think the defendant’s testimony,

as he’s testified, is completely incredible.

He wants to tell the court that the officer is lying, saying, “No, I didn’t say

I beat up my wife. I didn’t say that at all.” 

And the fact of the observations of his cut and swollen knuckles - - “well,

maybe I got it” - - “This is how I really hit it, by hitting the top part of my fist, but

maybe I could have gotten them otherwise.” [¶] Or maybe those observations

were totally incorrect by the officer. 

And then, obviously, his testimony that he blacked out at the most, you

know, convenient time is - - just for a matter of seconds, where he blacks out and

sees the victim on the ground - - okay. 

His testimony is, “Well, I had to hit her in self-defense. I don’t know if I

hit her then, but she was just on the ground, and I was scared for my life.” 

And instead of - - I don’t know - - taking the phone and the knife that he

testifies to - - we’ve heard no other testimony - - that he says that was on the bed -

- instead of just grabbing those things and leaving, he said, “Well, I thought she

was going to grab them. So I had to lean over and punch her,” while she was on

the ground, not attacking him, while she was on the ground. 

“I had to punch her twice, and then I could leave. And then I could take the

knife and the phone.”

I think, if Mr. Moses wants to get a proper self-defense claim, its certainly

not by the scenario that he described in this situation. 

He obviously used way more force than was reasonably necessary, even

assuming his set of facts, which we heard only from him. He has the biggest

motivation in this case to lie than say what happened.

/ / /

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I think what really happened is what we heard from Miss White-Holt. Yes,

some of her testimony she admitted, saying, “I don’t remember,” or “I am kind of

mixed up.”

But I think, by considering her demeanor on the stand, her being

completely upset, especially when shown the photos, her expressed still love for

the defendant, how she still cares about him, how she still writes them - - writes

him - - and he’s written her - - I think her demeanor on the stand, taken in

conjunction with all the evidence we heard in this case, that from officer

Nabizadeh, officer Pavle and the detective, all the evidence that was found at the

scene, the immense amount of blood on the sweatshirt, the defendant’s

admissions, all of that, I do believe this is enough evidence to convict the

defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(RT 174-78.)

Petitioner’s contention that the prosecutor misstated the evidence when she said he left

the premises immediately after hitting the victim (Pet. at 40), is simply wrong, because the

prosecutor did not say Petitioner left without going upstairs, and did not say he left immediately. 

The same is true regarding Petitioner’s contention that the prosecutor falsely stated that WhiteHolt testified that Petitioner was outside in the driveway drinking beer with friends (Pet. at 36),

as the prosecutor made no such statement, but stated that Petitioner was outside in front of the

residence hanging out with some people. 

Petitioner contends the prosecutor misstated the evidence by stating that Petitioner had

to lean over to punch White-Holt while she was on the ground, and that he “snapped” and

“pummeled” her. (Pet. at 37-39.) Petitioner testified that he “must have blacked out,” and when

he regained consciousness he looked over and saw White-Holt getting up off the ground, and

he knew if she got up she would probably kill him, so he hit her twice more, and probably hit

her three times in all. (RT 150-52.) White-Holt testified that she did not remember what

happened when Petitioner hit her, but the next thing she remembered was being in a daze and

hearing Petitioner upstairs saying, “You all need to come down and check on that bitch. I might

have killed her.” (RT 33.) Officer Nabizadeh testified that White-Holt told him that Petitioner

“got angry and punched her,” and that she was on the bed when he jumped on top of her and

“starts punching away at her.” (RT 86, 88.) The prosecutor’s closing argument that Petitioner

“snapped” and “pummeled” White-Holt was therefore a proper comment on the trial testimony,

particularly in light of the evidence regarding the nature and severity of White-Holt’s injuries,

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and the fact that neither party testified to the exact circumstances regarding the initial hit by

Petitioner. See United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Prosecutors

can argue reasonable inferences based on the record, and have considerable leeway to strike hard

blows based on the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence.”) 

Petitioner contends the prosecutor personally vouched for the victim’s honesty by arguing

that the victim’s version of the events was more believable than Petitioner’s version, and that

Petitioner had a bigger motivation to lie. (Pet. at 38.) The prosecutor’s argument was proper. 

See Tucker, 641 F.3d at 1120-21 (“A prosecutor may express doubt about the veracity of a

witness’s testimony (and) may even go so far as to label a defendant’s testimony a fabrication.”); 

see also United States v. McChristian, 47 F.3d 1499, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that in order

to prove a claim of improper vouching, petitioner must show that the prosecutor placed “the

prestige of the government” behind the witness by personally assuring the witness’ veracity). 

Petitioner contends the prosecutor falsified statements in the People’s response to the

motion for a new trial by stating that Petitioner was outside with friends drinking in the

driveway. (Pet. at 34, Pet. Exs. 2-3.) However, Petitioner testified at trial that he went outside

to get a beer with some people standing outside, and answered “Yeah” when asked at trial if he

“actually went outside to get a beer?” (RT 146-47.) Thus, the prosecutor’s summarization of

the evidence in the People’s response to the new trial motion did not falsify evidence or amount

to an improper comment on the evidence in that regard. The same is true with respect to

Petitioner’s contention that the prosecutor falsely stated in opposition to the new trial motion that

White-Holt said Petitioner was upset about his upcoming incarceration and that he got angry and

punched her several times in the face (Pet. Exs. 2, 5; RT 29, 152), that both the victim’s eyes

were swollen shut (Pet. Exs. 2, 6; RT 37), and that Petitioner denied telling the police officer that

he had just beat up his wife and could not really explain why his knuckles were bloody. (Pet.

Exs. 2, 9; RT 83, 165-67.)

Petitioner contends the prosecutor misstated evidence when she stated in the opposition

to the new trial motion that Petitioner threw an empty beer bottle at White-Holt. (Pet. at 34; Pet.

Ex. 2, 4; CT 82.) This appears to be a reference to White-Holt’s testimony that Petitioner threw

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a plastic bottle partially filled with brandy at her. (RT 26.) Petitioner does not indicate how

such a minor misstatement in a summarization of the evidence in a post-trial motion filed before

the same trial judge who had heard all the evidence could possibly be “of sufficient significance

to constitute a due process violation.” Greer, 483 U.S. at 765. The same is true of his contention

that the prosecutor stated that Petitioner “had been drinking quite a lot that day and the victim

had not.” (Pet. Exs. 2, 7-8.) The testimony at trial was that Petitioner had been drinking a lot

that day and the victim much less. (RT 34, 54-55.) Even if the statement could be read as

Petitioner contends, that the victim had not been drinking at all, as opposed to the more

reasonable interpretation that the victim had not been drinking as much as Petitioner, there is no

showing that such characterization of the evidence in a new trial motion violated due process. 

Greer, 483 U.S. at 765.

Petitioner contends the prosecutor brought charges which the prosecutor knew had

insufficient factual and legal support, because Petitioner had reported the incident to the police,

because neither he nor White-Holt had pressed charges, and because Petitioner was in fact the

victim of an assault by White-Holt and hit her only in self-defense. (Pet. at 34.) The state court

could reasonably have rejected this contention as legally and factually frivolous.

 Finally, Petitioner contends the prosecutor failed to disclose through discovery the

photographs taken of the victim eleven to thirteen days after the incident, and that the failure to

disclose the photographs before trial amounted to a violation of Brady. (Pet. at 34-36.) Officer

Weathersby testified that additional photographs were taken of the victim eleven days after the

incident at the prosecutor’s request. (RT 115-19.) Defense counsel indicated that he did not

have a copy of a portion of Weathersby’s report she submitted to the district attorney (RT 119), 

but there is no indication in the record that the photographs were not produced prior to trial. In

fact, a photograph of White-Holt taken about a week and a half after the incident was introduced

into evidence at the preliminary hearing. (Lodgment No. 1, Preliminary Hearing Tr. at 20.) 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the photographs were withheld from the defense.

Furthermore, Petitioner can demonstrate materiality under Brady only if the suppression

of the evidence deprived him of a fair trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678; see Kyles v. Whitley, 514

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U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (holding that prejudice under Brady is shown when “there is a reasonable

probability of a different result” as to guilt or penalty.) Several witnesses testified regarding the

extent of White-Holt’s injuries, including White-Holt herself, her treating doctor, and two officer

witnesses. Petitioner agues that the doctor who treated White-Holt the day after she was injured

testified that her injures were of the type that would heal in a week or so, and he was prejudiced

by photographs taken nearly two weeks after she was injured because they showed she had not

yet recovered. (Traverse at 18.) However, the doctor testified at trial that many of White-Holt’s

injuries were serious, and could eventually lead to a loss of vision (RT 131), but that “the other

injuries, the contusions and whatnot, we expected those would all go away eventually.” (RT

132.) The state court could reasonably have found that Petitioner had failed to allege facts

sufficient to support a Brady claim or a claim of prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the

photographs. 

Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner could demonstrate that the state court

adjudication of his prosecutorial misconduct claim is objectively unreasonable within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is only available if he can also establish

that his federal constitutional rights were violated. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-22

(2007) (holding that a federal habeas petitioner must show a constitutional violation even if

§ 2254(d) has been satisfied); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)

(same). For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has not alleged facts which, if true, establish

prosecutorial misconduct. An evidentiary hearing is not necessary where, as here, the federal

claim can be denied on the basis of the state court record, and where the petitioner’s allegations,

even if true, do not provide a basis for habeas relief. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 679. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the silent denial of Claim 2 by the state court was

neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceedings. The Court also finds that an evidentiary hearing is not

necessary to the resolution of Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim. The Court therefore

RECOMMENDS denying habeas relief as to Claim 2.

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D. Claim 3 - Judicial Bias

Petitioner alleges in Claim 3 that he was denied his federal constitutional rights to due

process and a fair trial due to judicial bias. (Pet. at 42.) He contends judicial bias has been

shown because the trial judge: (a) found Petitioner guilty when the evidence established that he

acted in self-defense using no more force than was necessary; (b) did not ask if Petitioner wished

to speak on his own behalf prior to sentencing; (c) denied him access to jail visitation records

necessary to show how often trial counsel visited him; (d) found him guilty on the basis of

photographs taken of the victim eleven to thirteen days after the incident; (e) did not inquire into

the conflict of interest of trial counsel and did not safeguard Petitioner’s right to the effective

assistance of trial counsel; (f) failed to apply the law of self-defense; (g) denied the motion for

a new trial; and (h) allowed the prosecutor to make misstatements and withhold photographs of

the victim. (Pet. at 42-49; Traverse at 19-22.)

Respondent answers that Petitioner has failed to point to anything the trial judge did that

suggests he was biased, because a judge’s judicial rulings can almost never support a finding of

judicial bias. (Ans. at 16-17.) Respondent also contends that because a criminal defendant does

not have a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, Petitioner’s claim that the trial judge

bound him over for trial without sufficient evidence does not state a federal claim. (Id.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in the habeas petition which

contained Claims 1 and 2. (Lodgment No. 12 at 14-15.) The petition was denied without

citation or statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 14.) For the reasons set forth above, in order

to determine whether the silent denial of this claim by the state supreme court involved an

objectively reasonable application of clearly established federal law, the Court “must determine

what arguments or theories . . . could have supported the state court’s decision; and then it must

ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme Court. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at

786; Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1402.

Clearly established federal law provides that, “when a defendant’s right to have his case

tried by an impartial judge is compromised, there is structural error that requires automatic

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reversal.” Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273

U.S. 510, 535 (1927). The Supreme Court has recognized that “the right to an impartial judge

[is] among those ‘constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be

treated as harmless error.’” Greenway, 653 F.3d at 805, quoting Chapman v. California, 386

U.S. 18, 23 (1967).

“A showing of judicial bias requires facts sufficient to create actual impropriety or an

appearance of impropriety.” Greenway, 653 F.3d at 806. These include “circumstances ‘in

which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or

decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,

Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 877 (2009), quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). “The

supreme court has recognized only a few circumstances in which an appearance of bias

necessitates recusal to ensure due process of law,” including pecuniary interest, where the judge

acted as both the grand jury and the trier of fact, where the defendant rudely insulted the judge

who then presided over contempt proceedings, and where a party was a large donor to the

judge’s election campaign. Greenway, 653 F.3d at 806-07. 

Petitioner has not alleged facts which support a finding that his trial judge was biased. 

Rather, he relies on many of the same instances which he contends resulted in him having an

unfair trial, all of which are without merit for the reasons set forth above. (Pet. at 42-49.) The

only allegation not already addressed in Claims 1 and 2 is the allegation that the trial judge did

not ask Petitioner if he wished to speak on his own behalf prior to sentencing. 

Just prior to announcing sentence, the trial judge asked whether either side would like to

make any further argument. (RT 200.) Petitioner’s counsel argued against a finding of great

bodily injury, and the prosecutor submitted without argument. (Id.) Petitioner was not asked

if he wished to say anything prior to pronouncement of sentence, although the trial judge stated

that he had reviewed the correspondence Petitioner had sent the trial judge. (RT 187, 201.) 

Petitioner sent the trial judge ten letters after trial and before sentencing in which he pointed out

that: (1) he was not the aggressor in the encounter with White-Holt and had tried several times

that night to avoid any confrontation, and the confrontation would have been avoided had she

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allowed him to leave; (2) he had never struck her before that night even though she had often

hurt him, and he was merely protecting himself and acting in self-defense; (3) he immediately

summoned help from his brother and the police, and surrendered her knife to the police: (4) the

deputy district attorney had distorted those facts; (5) his trial counsel had provided incompetent

representation in many of the respects discussed in Claim 1 above; (6) he was a good candidate

to be granted probation, and had been accepted into a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program;

(7) his prior convictions were nonviolent, minor, and attributable to a long history of substance

abuse; (8) he was remorseful, disabled, and capable of putting his life in order and living the rest

of his life as a kind-hearted, sober, law-abiding citizen; and (9) he had been victimized by an

unjust legal system due to inadequate representation and a trial judge who had ignored the

evidence of self-defense, and that his written complaints to that effect had gone unheeded by the

ACLU, the NAACP, the San Diego Union Tribune, the San Quentin Law Office, the San Diego

Mayor, the Turko Files, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the California Bar Association, the

California Governor, and the President of the United States. (CT 35-38, 60-73; Pet. Ex. N-1;

Traverse Ex. J; Mot. to Amend Pet. Ex. G.) 

Petitioner has not indicated what else he had to say to the trial judge, how it would have

affected his sentencing, or why the trial judge’s failure to ask Petitioner if he had anything

additional to say amounted to judicial bias. Because the record reflects that the trial judge read

and considered Petitioner’s letters, the state court could reasonably have found that no evidence

existed to support Petitioner’s claim of judicial bias. To the extent Petitioner intended to bring

an independent claim alleging denial of his right of allocution, it is clear that in light of the fact

that the trial judge reviewed Petitioner’s lengthy and detailed correspondence, and in light of

Petitioner’s failure to identify what else he had to say, any denial of his right of allocution was

clearly harmless. See United States v. Mejia, 953 F.2d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1991) (denial of right

of allocution was harmless because it would not have affected sentence).

The state supreme court’s silent denial of Petitioner’s judicial bias claim was not contrary

to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

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court proceedings. An evidentiary hearing is not necessary where, as here, the federal claim can

be denied on the basis of the state court record, and where the petitioner’s allegations do not

provide a basis for habeas relief. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 679. The Court RECOMMENDS denial

of habeas relief with respect to Claim 3.

E. Claim 4 - Motion to Amend Petition - Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner has filed a Motion to Supplement his Petition to add a claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel. (ECF No. 30.) A claim alleging ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel was presented to the state supreme court along with Petitioner’s other claims. 

(Lodgment No. 12 at 16.) He contends it was inadvertently omitted from the Petition. (ECF No.

30 at 1-2.) Because the claim did not arise after the Petition was filed, it is not a supplemental

claim, and the Court will liberally construe Petitioner’s Motion to Supplement the Petition as a

Motion to Amend the Petition to add the claim. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that, other than when amendment is

available as of right, which does not apply here, “a party may amend its pleading only with the

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when

justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (stating that a habeas petition

“may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil

actions.”). A district court should consider factors such as “bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to

the opposing party, futility of the amendment, and whether the party has previously amended his

pleadings.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

Although Petitioner has not previously amended his Petition and there does not appear

to be any prejudice to Respondent to add a claim that was presented to the state supreme court

along with the other claims which Respondent has already addressed in the Answer, the Court

finds amendment would be futile because the claim is without merit. See Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845

(“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”)

Petitioner alleges that he requested his appellate counsel to include in the direct appeal the

claims he has presented here. (Mot. to Amend Pet. [ECF No. 30-1] at 7-15 & Ex. C.) However,

the claims presented in the Petition here are lacking in merit for the reasons discussed above. 

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Petitioner has attached a letter from his appellate counsel which states that she refused to raise

his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because it was not substantiated by the record,

and that another attorney in counsel’s office had reviewed the record and came to the same

conclusion. (Mot. to Amend Pet. Ex. F.) As set forth above with respect to Claim 1, the state

court record supports that determination. Petitioner has therefore demonstrated neither deficient

performance of appellate counsel nor prejudice as a result of appellate counsel’s failure to

include his claims on direct appeal. See Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1507 (9th Cir.

1991) (where “trial counsel’s performance, although not error-free, did not fall below the

Strickland standard[,] . . . petitioner was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s decision not to

raise issues that had no merit.”); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982)

(stating that an attorney’s failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute

ineffective assistance); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There is

no requirement that an attorney appeal issues that are clearly untenable.”) Amending the

Petition to include such a claim would therefore be futile. 

Petitioner also alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present a claim

alleging that his trial transcripts have been altered. (Mot. to Amend Pet. [ECF No. 30-1] at 7.) 

He alleges here, as he did in the state supreme court (Lodgment No. 13 at 1-2), that he was given

two transcripts of his trial, one beginning on page one and one beginning on page nine. 

(Traverse at 12.) Respondent has lodged with the Court five volumes of Petitioner’s trial

transcript. (Lodgment No. 3.) The first volume includes proceedings on October 28, 2009,

during which Petitioner entered his guilty plea to one count of grand theft in violation of

California Penal Code section 487(a), and admitted he had suffered a prior conviction which

constituted a “strike” under California’s Three Strikes law. (Lodgment No. 3, Reporter’s Tr.,

vol. 1 at 1-5; see also CT 134-39.) The second proceeding recorded in volume 1 of his trial

transcripts is his sentencing on the grand theft conviction, which was held on December 9, 2009. 

(Lodgment No. 3, Reporter’s Tr., vol. 1 at 6-8; see also CT 140.) Volume 2 of his trial

transcripts begins with page 9, and records Petitioner’s March 4, 2010, trial on the charge of

intentional infliction of corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant. (Lodgment No. 3, Reporter’s

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Tr., vol. 2.) It appears clear that Petitioner’s trial transcript began with his grand theft conviction

and sentencing because one of the sentence enhancement allegations in the criminal complaint

upon which the conviction being challenged here was based alleged that he was released from

custody on an earlier felony offense when he committed the new offense. (CT 2.) The transcript

pages which Petitioner provided to the state supreme court (see Lodgment No. 13), and here are

identical in content to the transcripts lodged by Respondent, but include only Petitioner’s trial. 

The transcript Petitioner has used here and in the state court begins on page one, and if the

number eight is added to the page number in Petitioner’s transcript excerpts, it matches the

transcript lodged by Respondent, and there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two.

Petitioner points to numerous instances in his trial transcript, in particular his testimony,

which he contends differs from the testimony actually given at trial, due to misprints, additions

and omissions. (Mot. to Amend Pet. [ECF No. 30-1] at 7-8 & Ex. D; Traverse Exs. A-K;

Lodgment No. 13 Ex. A.) Examples include, but are not limited to, the omission of: (a) WhiteHolt’s admission that she scratched Petitioner’s neck and could toss him around if she liked due

to his disabilities; (b) Petitioner’s reference to White-Holt calling the woman Petitioner spoke

to on the trolley a “white bitch,” which made it sound as though Petitioner referred to her that

way; and (c) Petitioner’s testimony regarding where White-Holt placed her knife and telephone

on the bed before she grabbed his neck, making it appear they were not as close to her as they

were. (Mot. to Amend Pet. Ex. D at 1.) He also contends the transcripts are incorrect in that:

(a) Petitioner was afraid that if White-Holt grabbed her knife he was going to kill him, whereas

the transcript indicates that he was afraid that if she got up off the ground she would kill him,

thus improperly placing her on the ground; (b) the transcript indicates that Petitioner “seen” the

skin on his neck peel rather than “feel” it do so; (c) the transcript states he probably hit her three

times when another part of the transcript states that he hit her twice, apparently proving the trial

transcript must have been altered because he would not have given inconsistent testimony; (d) he

answered “yes, I did” when asked if he “kind of blacked out,” and testified that “I must have

blacked out,” but never said he did in fact black out as allegedly reflected in the transcript; and

(e) when he is demonstrating how he hit White-Holt, the transcript indicates he says “I have to

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hit her like this,” indicating the he usually hits her in that manner, when he actually said “I had

to hit her like this,” indicating that he could not make a fist. (Id. at 1-3.) There are many similar

allegations of supposed alterations, misprints and omissions in the transcripts, and Petitioner’s

arguments are apparently based either on the divergence of what is written and what Petitioner

remembers was said, or on Petitioner’s belief that any example of inconsistent testimony or use

of imprecise English means there must have been an alteration in the transcripts. (Id. at 3-8.)

A criminal defendant has a right to a record on appeal which includes a complete

transcript of the trial proceedings. Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 279-82 (1964). 

Petitioner’s contention that he recalls saying or hearing something different than what was

recorded in the transcript, or that it is not possible for a witness to give inconsistent testimony

or provide ungrammatical answers, does not support a finding of a constitutional violation, as

there has been no showing that he was not provided with a fair opportunity to present his claims

here and to the state courts, and because he has failed to demonstrate prejudice arising from any

alleged alteration or omission. Id.; see also United States v. Anzalone, 886 F.2d 229, 232 (9th

Cir. 1989) (“[A]ssuming there were omissions in the transcripts, appellant cannot prevail without

a showing of specific prejudice.”) 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion to Amend the Petition

be DENIED. Alternately, if the assigned District Judge is inclined to grant Petitioner’s Motion

to Amend, the Court RECOMMENDS that his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel be DENIED on the basis that the state supreme court’s silent denial of the claim did not

involve an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing

that Judgment be entered denying Petitioner’s Motion to Amend the Petition and denying the

Petition. 

/ / /

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 8, 2014, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than January 22, 2014. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 9, 2013

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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