Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01264/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01264-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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KM 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Andre William Armstrong, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Brotherton, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-1264-PHX-DGC (BSB) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Andre William Armstrong, who is confined in the Maricopa County 

Fourth Avenue Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(Doc. 1), an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2), and a Motion to 

Appoint Guardian Ad Litem (Doc. 5). The Court will dismiss the Complaint with leave 

to amend and appoint counsel. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $10.00. The remainder of the fee will 

be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a 

separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the 

fees according to the statutory formula. 

. . . 

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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

III. Complaint

 Plaintiff names the following Defendants in the Complaint: Maricopa County 

Superior Court Judge Brotherton; Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio; and 

Officers of the Court J.S. Jed. and O.E. Smith. 

 Plaintiff raises two claims for relief. In Count One, Plaintiff claims his Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when, on May 20, 2013, Defendant 

Brotherton ordered Defendants Jed and Smith to “jump on [Plaintiff] in the hallway . . . 

after [Plaintiff] informed the clerk that . . . [he] was having a medical problem.” Plaintiff 

claims that he called 911 and the Defendants “jumped on [him] and dragged [him] into 

the court room.” Plaintiff claims that he started crying and blacked out and that “they 

took [his] bond money.” In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges the same facts and claims 

Defendants Jed and Smith used excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 

 The Maricopa County Superior Court docket indicates that on May 20, 2013, the 

Maricopa County Superior Court revoked Plaintiff’s release conditions and remanded 

Plaintiff to the custody of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. On July 2, 2013, the 

Maricopa County Superior Court found Plaintiff criminally incompetent and incompetent 

to refuse treatment and committed Plaintiff to the Maricopa County Correctional Health 

Services Restoration Program.1

 

1 See July 2, 2013 Minute Entry in Arizona v. Armstrong, Maricopa County Superior Court case #CR2010-102059-002 DT, http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/ docs/Criminal/072013/m5842816.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 

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IV. Failure to State a Claim 

A. Defendant Brotherton 

 Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages for their judicial acts 

except when they are taken “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 

435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). 

An act is “judicial” when it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties 

dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Crooks v. 

Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). In this case, Plaintiff’s only allegation 

regarding Defendant Brotherton is that he directed Defendants Jed and Smith to bring 

Plaintiff back into the courtroom. These actions were performed within Defendant 

Brotherton’s judicial capacity and Defendant Brotherton is therefore immune from suit. 

B. Defendant Arpaio 

 To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 

specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 

between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

371-72, 377 (1976). Plaintiff makes no allegations against Defendant Arpaio and 

therefore fails to state a claim against him. 

C. Defendants Jed and Smith 

 The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause, not the Eighth Amendment, 

protects pretrial detainees from excessive force that amounts to punishment. Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]he Fourth Amendment sets 

the ‘applicable constitutional limitations’ for considering claims of excessive force during 

pretrial detention.” Id. (quoting Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th 

Cir. 1996). 

 The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the use of reasonable force. Tatum v. 

City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006). Whether the force 

was excessive depends on “whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ 

in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 

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underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tatum, 

441 F.3d at 1095; Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). The 

Court must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion against the countervailing 

governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Lolli, 351 F.3d at 415. 

Moreover, 

[t]he “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . . 

“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem 

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the 

Fourth Amendment. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted). The due process clause does not protect a 

pretrial detainee form the use of all force, but only from the use of excessive force that 

amounts to punishment. Id. at 395. 

 In evaluating a due process claim alleging excessive force, the court should 

consider: (1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship between the need 

and the amount of force use; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted, and (4) whether force 

was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline. White v. Roper, 901 

F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990). Assuming all facts alleged by Plaintiff are true, 

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to demonstrate that the use of force in this case was 

unreasonable. Plaintiff’s release conditions were revoked, Plaintiff left the courtroom to 

call 911, and Defendants Jed and Smith were directed to bring Plaintiff back to the 

courtroom. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Jed and Smith “dragged” him back to the 

courtroom, he started crying, and then “blacked out.” Plaintiff claims he suffered 

emotional distress and mental anguish, but alleges no physical injury. 

 Plaintiff’s facts show that although Plaintiff may not have been attempting to 

“escape,” Plaintiff did leave the courtroom after his release had been revoked and that 

Defendants Jed and Smith acted with what appears to be the minimum force necessary to 

return Plaintiff to the courtroom. Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered physical injury 

and it appears that Defendants Jed and Smith acted pursuant to instructions from the court 

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and with the purpose of restoring order. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim 

against Defendants Jed and Smith and these Defendants will be dismissed. 

V. Leave to Amend and Appointment of Counsel 

 As no Defendants now remain, the Court will dismiss the Complaint. Because 

Plaintiff’s claims might be saved by the allegation of other facts, the Court will dismiss 

the Complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. 

VI. Motion to Appoint Guardian Ad Litem 

 On August 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Appoint Guardian Ad Litem 

(Doc. 5) in which he asks that the Court appoint a guardian ad litem for him in this case 

because he is mentally incompetent. Plaintiff’s criminal court records support this 

assertion and indicate that he was formally adjudicated mentally incompetent. 

Consideration of whether to appoint a guardian ad litem is therefore warranted under 

Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Rule 17(c)(2) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure states that the Court “must 

appoint a guardian ad litem – or issue another appropriate order – to protect a minor or 

incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.” The Court will not appoint a 

guardian ad litem, but recognizes that Plaintiff’s mental incompetence renders him unable 

to adequately protect his own interests or file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the 

Court will appoint counsel to represent Plaintiff in this action. Attorney Sara M. Athen 

has volunteered to accept Plaintiff’s case and will be appointed as counsel for Plaintiff in 

this matter. 

VII. Instruction to Appointed Counsel 

 The Court will direct the Clerk of Court to send to Attorney Sara M. Athen copies 

of Plaintiff’s Complaint and this Order. Within 14 days of the filing date of this Order, 

Attorney Sara M. Athen must file a Notice of Appearance. Within 60 days of the filing 

date of this Order, Attorney Sara M. Athen must: 

(a) meet and confer with Plaintiff, 

(b) make a preliminary investigation of Plaintiff’s claims, and 

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(c) either: 

 (1) file an amended complaint; or 

(2) if she determines, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

11(b), that Plaintiff’s claims are not warranted by existing law 

or that his factual contentions lack evidentiary support, file a 

notice explaining her findings and a motion to dismiss. 

VII. Instructions to Plaintiff

 The Court has appointed Attorney Sara M. Athen to represent Plaintiff. 

Therefore, Attorney Sara M. Athen “shall be recognized by the Court and by all the 

parties to the cause as having control of [Plaintiff’s] case, in all proper ways, and shall, as 

such attorney, sign all papers which are to be signed on behalf of the client.” LRCiv 

83.3(c)(2). Moreover, because Attorney Sara M. Athen is representing Plaintiff in this 

case, Plaintiff cannot “appear or act in [his] own behalf in the cause, or take any steps 

therein, unless an order of substitution shall first have been made by the Court after 

notice to the attorney of each such party, and to the opposite party.” LRCiv 83.3(c)(2). 

This means that Attorney Sara M. Athen, not Plaintiff, shall file future documents in this 

case. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing 

fee of $10.00. 

 (3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim, with leave 

to amend. 

 (4) Plaintiff’s August 2, 2013 Motion to Appoint Guardian Ad Litem (Doc. 5) 

is denied in part to the extent that the Court will not appoint a guardian ad litem, and 

granted in part to the extent that the Court appoints counsel to represent Plaintiff in this 

action. 

 (5) Attorney Sara M. Athen is appointed as counsel for Plaintiff in this action. 

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 (6) The Clerk of Court must send to Attorney Sara M. Athen, by certified 

mail, copies of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) and this Order, at the following address: 

 Sara M. Athen 

 Snell & Wilmer, LLP 

 400 E. Van Buren St. 

 Phoenix, AZ 85004-2202. 

 (7) Within 14 days of the filing date of this Order, Attorney Sara M. Athen 

must file a Notice of Appearance. 

 (8) Within 60 days of the filing date of this Order, Attorney Sara M. Athen 

must: 

 (a) meet and confer with Plaintiff, 

 (b) make a preliminary investigation of Plaintiff’s claims, and 

 (c) either: 

 (1) file an amended complaint; or 

(2) if counsel determines, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11(b), that Plaintiff’s claims are not warranted by 

existing law or that his factual contentions lack evidentiary 

support, file a notice explaining counsel’s findings and a 

motion to dismiss. 

 Dated this 5th day of February, 2014. 

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