Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01154/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01154-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT EUGENE ROWE, 

Petitioner,

 v

ANTHONY KANE, Acting Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No C 06-1154 VRW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the

California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, California, seeks

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254 challenging the

California Board of Prison Terms' ("BPT") January 6, 2005 decision

to deny him parole. 

Per order filed on July 6, 2006, the court found that

petitioner's claim that the BPT's decision finding him not suitable

for parole does not comport with due process appears colorable

under § 2254, when liberally construed, and ordered respondent to

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 1 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause and

petitioner has filed a traverse.

I 

In 1980, petitioner pleaded guilty to first degree murder

in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the

County of Orange and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25

years to life in state prison. 

Petitioner has been found not suitable for parole each

time he has appeared before the BPT. On January 6, 2005,

petitioner appeared before the BPT for the sixth time. The BPT

again found him not suitable for parole and denied him a subsequent

hearing for one year.

Petitioner then challenged the BPT's January 6, 2005

decision in the state superior, appellate and supreme courts. 

After the Supreme Court of California denied his final state habeas

petition on December 21, 2005, the instant federal petition for a

writ of habeas corpus followed. 

II

A

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

("AEDPA"), codified under 28 USC § 2254, provides "the exclusive

vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody

pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction." White v

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 2 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Lambert, 370 F3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir 2004). Under AEDPA, this

court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a

California state inmate "only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." 28 USC § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court's

adjudication of any claim on the merits: "(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." Id at § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard,

federal habeas relief will not be granted "simply because [this]

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable." Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 411 (2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in

determining whether the state court made an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, the only definitive source

of clearly established federal law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the

time of the state court decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331

F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir 2003).

\\

\\

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 3 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

B

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the

BPT's January 6, 2005 decision finding him not suitable for parole,

and denying him a subsequent hearing for one year, on the ground

that the decision does not comport with due process. Petitioner

claims that the BPT improperly based its decision on the unchanging

facts of his commitment offense and that the evidence cited by the

BPT is not reliable evidence that he poses a current danger to

society. Petitioner also claims that his continued incarceration

violates the terms of his plea agreement.

California's parole scheme provides that the board "shall

set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period

of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date,

therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal Penal Code §

3041(b). In making this determination, the board must consider

various factors, including the prisoner's social history, past

criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including

behavior before, during and after the crime. See Cal Code Regs tit

15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

California's parole scheme "gives rise to a cognizable

liberty interest in release on parole" which cannot be denied

without adequate procedural due process protections. Sass v

California Bd of Prison Terms, 461 F3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir 2006);

McQuillion v Duncan, 306 F3d 895, 902 (9th Cir 2002). It matters

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 4 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

not that, as is the case here, a parole release date has never been

set for the inmate because "[t]he liberty interest is created, not

upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the

inmate." Biggs v Terhune, 334 F3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir 2003). 

Petitioner's due process rights require that "some

evidence" support the parole board's decision finding him

unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F3d at 1125 (holding that the

"some evidence" standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in

Superintendent v Hill, 472 US 445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole

decisions in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334 F3d at 915 (same);

McQuillion, 306 F2d at 904 (same). This "some evidence" standard

is minimally stringent and ensures that "the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were without

support or otherwise arbitrary." Hill, 472 US at 457. Determining

whether this requirement is satisfied "does not require examination

of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of

witnesses, or weighing of the evidence." Id at 455-56 (quoted in

Sass, 461 F3d at 1128). 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying

the parole board's decision have some indicia of reliability. 

Biggs, 334 F3d at 915; McQuillion, 306 F3d at 904. Relevant in

this inquiry "is whether the prisoner was afforded an opportunity

to appear before, and present evidence to, the board." Morales v

California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir 1994),

rev'd on other grounds, 514 US 499 (1995). In sum, if the parole

board's determination of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due

process, there must be some evidence, with some indicia of

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 5 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v Nielsen, 428 F3d

1229, 1232 (9th Cir 2005).

The record shows that the BPT afforded petitioner and his

counsel an opportunity to speak and present their case at the

hearing, gave them time to review petitioner's central file,

allowed them to present relevant documents and provided them with a

reasoned decision in denying parole.

The board explained that it found that the crime was

carried out "in an especially cruel and callous * * * dispassionate

and calculated manner." Hr’g Tr at 49 (Resp't Ex F). Petitioner

stabbed and killed the victim during a robbery, and there was

evidence that the victim was abused during the offense. The board

found that petitioner had a history of substance abuse, which it

considered an unstable social factor. Id at 50. The board found

that petitioner’s parole plans were “grossly short” because he had

not connected his residential plans and employment plans together. 

Id at 51. The board noted that petitioner had excellent job

skills, a good psychological evaluation, and a low prediction of

future violence. Id at 50. The board commended petitioner for his

participation in several self-help programs and gave him credit for

reducing drug use in a prison dormitory. Id at 52, 54. 

Nonetheless, the board concluded that “those positive aspects of

your behavior [do] not outweigh the factors of unsuitability at

this time.” Id at 53. 

The state superior court upheld the decision of the BPT

and the state appellate and supreme courts summarily affirmed. The

superior court stated:

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 6 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

If the BPT determines consideration of the

public safety requires more incarceration based on

the commitment offense alone, it may deny parole

without considering the other suitability factors. 

(In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1071.) 

Thus the BPT may cite facts of the crime beyond the

minimum elements and need not accept the trial

court’s findings. Here the BPT noted the victim’s

death occurred as the result of a stabbing in the

course of a robbery. Aside from the commitment

offense, however, the BPT also found an ‘unstable

social factor’ and a lack of viable residential

parole plans. In light of In re Dannenberg’s holding

the petition is denied.”

In re Robert Rowe, No. m-10558, slip op at 2 (Cal Super Ct May 20,

2005) (Resp't Ex E).

The state court's rejection of petitioner's due process

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the

Hill standard, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d). The BPT's January 6, 2005 decision

to deny petitioner parole after his sixth parole consideration

hearing is supported by some evidence in the record and that

evidence bears some indicia of reliability. See, eg, Rosas, 428

F3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial of parole based on gravity of

offense and psychiatric reports); Biggs, 334 F3d at 916 (upholding

denial of parole based solely on gravity of offense and conduct

prior to imprisonment); Morales, 16 F3d at 1005 (upholding denial

of parole based on criminal history, cruel nature of offense, and

need for further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry under Hill is

simply "whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the [BPT]." Hill, 474 US at

455-56 (emphasis added). There is – the facts surrounding the

crime reasonably suggest that it was carried out in a cruel and

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 7 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a

parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the

prisoner's conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that, over

time, denying a prisoner parole strictly because of the nature of

his offense and his prior conduct "would raise serious questions

involving his liberty interest in parole * * * and could result in

a due process violation." Biggs, 334 F3d at 916-17.

8

callous fashion; petitioner has a history of substance abuse and

did not present a plan for a self-help program after release; and

petitioner did not have firm residence plans in any of the

communities where he had been offered employment. Cf Cal Code Regs

tit 15, § 2402(c) & (d) (listing circumstances tending to show

unsuitability for parole and circumstances tending to show

suitability). It is not up to this court to "reweigh the

evidence." Powell v Gomez, 33 F3d 39, 42 (9th Cir 1994). 

Petitioner argues that the BPT relied on the unchanging

facts of his commitment offense in determining that he is not

suitable for parole which conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling

in Biggs.1

 He also argues that his commitment offense cannot

provide a basis for that determination because his offense is not

reliable evidence that he poses a current danger to society and the

circumstances of his offense did not exceed the minimum necessary

to sustain his conviction. None of these arguments compel federal

habeas relief because the BPT did not base its decision solely on

the facts of petitioner’s commitment offense. The BPT found that

petitioner’s parole plans were “grossly short,” noting that

petitioner did not have sufficient residential plans in California. 

The BPT also noted that petitioner did not present a plan for

continuing a self-help program for substance abuse, which was a

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 8 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

particular concern in light of his history of drug addiction. 

These findings alone constitute some evidence under Hill. See 28

USC § 2254(d); Hill, 474 US at 455-56.

Petitioner claims that his continued incarceration

violates the terms of his plea agreement. The claim is without

merit. The record shows that petitioner was sentenced pursuant to

a plea agreement to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. See 

Sentencing Tr at 2 (Resp't Ex H). Nothing in the record indicates

that petitioner is entitled to release at any time prior to a

finding by the BPT that he is suitable for parole.

Petitioner argues that he relied on California’s uniformterm matrices when he agreed to plead guilty and, that under those

matrices, he should only serve 17 years of his sentence. 

Unfortunately for petitioner, there is no indication in the record

that a 17-year sentence under a matrix calculation was part of his

plea agreement. Moreover, the Supreme Court of California has made

clear that the BPT need not evaluate an inmate's crime against the

sentencing matrices because, unless and until the prisoner is found

suitable for parole, a date for the inmate's release need not be

set. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal 4th 1061, 1070-01 (2005). This

court is bound by the Supreme Court of California's interpretation

of California law. See Bradshaw v Richey, 546 US 74, 76 (2005)

(state court's interpretation of state law binds a federal court

sitting in habeas corpus); Hicks v Feiock, 485 US 624, 629 (1988)

(same).

Petitioner also argues that the BPT violated his plea

agreement by relying on findings regarding the nature and

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 9 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

seriousness of the commitment offense that went beyond the trial

court’s findings. Nothing in the record indicates that doing so

violated the terms of the plea agreement. Moreover, as the

superior court noted, under California law the BPT does not have to

accept the trial court’s findings and may rely on facts beyond the

minimum elements of the offense. In re Robert Rowe, No. m-10558 at

2 (citing In re Dannenberg, 24 Cal 4th 1061, 1071 (2005)).

The state court’s rejection of petitioner’s plea

agreement claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or

involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 USC §

2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

the claim.

III

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ

of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and

close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01154-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/28/07 Page 10 of 10