Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00636/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00636-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ROSIE HARRIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:16-cv-636-TFM

) [wo]

ACCC INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action is assigned to the undersigned magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings 

and order entry of judgment by consent of all the parties (Docs. 17-19, filed 9/1/16) and 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the Court are Defendant Potts’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5, filed 

8/22/16) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 11, filed 9/2/16). The motions have been fully 

briefed and is ripe for review. Having considered the motions and relevant law, the Court finds 

the motion to dismiss is due to be GRANTED and the motion to remand is due to be DENIED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Rosie Harris (“Harris” or “Plaintiff”) filed this a complaint in the Circuit Court 

of Lowndes County, Alabama on September 23, 2015. See Doc. 1, Atch 1, Complaint. Harris is 

an Alabama citizen. The suit alleged breach of contract and bad faith against Defendants ACCC 

Insurance Company, ACCC Claims, Central Alabama Insurance Agency, Inc., and Steve Cole. 

The allegations against all Defendants involved solely Alabama state law issues and relate to the 

denial of Plaintiff’s insurance claim for the loss of her vehicle. 

 Central Alabama Insurance Agency, Inc. and Steve Cole were both considered Alabama 

citizens. As such, the case was not removable due to lack of diversity in citizenship. On July 11, 

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2016, Harris filed a second amended complaint which added Defendant James A. Potts (“Potts”) 

as a defendant and asserted two Alabama state law claims against him. Specifically, the claims 

against Potts were Interference with a Contractual Relationship and Outrage. See Doc. 1, Atch 

10, Second Amended Complaint. As part of the claims process, the ACCC Defendants hired 

Defendant Potts – a licensed Alabama attorney – to represent ACCC Insurance for the limited 

purposes obtaining an examination under oath from Plaintiff Harris. Defendant Potts sent 

Plaintiff numerous letters which attempted to schedule the examination under oath and required 

her to bring certain documents to the examination. Plaintiff refused to attend the examination. 

The ACCC Defendants denied her car insurance claim. A few weeks later, Plaintiff filed the 

instant suit. 

On August 2, 2016, shortly after Plaintiff’s dismissal of Central Alabama Insurance 

Agency, Inc. and Steve Cole, Defendants ACC Insurance Company and ACCC Claims Service, 

Inc. (collectively “the ACCC Defendants”) filed a Notice of Removal in this court based on an 

assertion of diversity jurisdiction. See Doc. 1, generally. Defendants state in their Notice of 

Removal that the case is properly removable under 28 U.S.C. §1441 because the United States 

District Court now has original jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. §1332.

Specifically, the ACCC Defendants assert diversity jurisdiction exists in this case because 

the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold and complete diversity of 

citizenship exists among the “true parties” when considering Defendant Potts has been 

fraudulently joined and Defendants Central Alabama Insurance Agency, Inc. and Steve Cole had 

previously been voluntarily dismissed. Plaintiff is a citizen of Alabama. The ACCC Defendants

are citizens of Texas. Defendant Potts – the defendant which has allegedly been fraudulently 

joined – is a citizen of Alabama. The case had not been originally removable because 

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Defendants Central Alabama Insurance Agency, Inc. and Steve Cole were citizens of Alabama 

which thereby destroyed diversity of citizenship among the parties.

Shortly after removal, Defendant Potts filed a motion to dismiss based on fraudulent 

joinder on August 22, 2016. See Doc. 5. On September 2, 2016, Plaintiff timely filed her 

motion to remand. See Doc. 11. In the motion to remand, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Potts was 

not fraudulently joined and therefore this case was not removable as there is not complete 

diversity of citizenship since Plaintiff and Defendant Potts are both Alabama citizens. 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues “there has been no allegations by the Defendants of ‘outright fraud’ 

in Plaintiff[’s] pleadings of jurisdictional facts...and no dispute that Defendant Potts is a citizen 

of Alabama.” See Doc. 11 at p. 3. Plaintiff also filed a response to Defendant Potts’ motion to 

dismiss for fraudulent joinder. See Doc. 9. In the response, Plaintiff argues that she does have 

viable causes of action for tortious interference with a contract and outrage. Specifically, 

Plaintiff states Defendant Potts was a stranger to the contract (not an agent) and therefore could 

meet the elements of tortious interference with a contract. Potts was brought in after the claim 

had arisen. She further argues that Potts’ sole purpose was to make it impossible for Plaintiff to 

comply with the terms of the examination under oath. Plaintiff also asserts Potts’ letters were 

intentionally calculated to inflict emotional distress and prevent her from being able to enjoy the 

benefits of her insurance contract which establishes the outrage claim. Finally, Plaintiff also 

filed a motion to stay proceedings pending review of the motion to remand. See Doc. 10. In the 

motion, Plaintiff argued all other motions should defer to her motion to remand (including 

Defendant Potts’ motion to dismiss). In that motion, Plaintiff also separately asserted that the 

ACCC Defendants’ notice of removal was procedurally defective because the notice did not 

include a signature from all named parties – specifically Defendant Potts. On September 2, 

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2016, the Court denied the motion to stay stating the following:

At this stage in the process the Court has made no substantive rulings on any 

matters in this case. The Plaintiff can be assured that the Court will certainly 

address jurisdictional matters – including the motion to remand – first prior to any 

other substantive rulings. From a very brief review of the motion to dismiss 

based on fraudulent joinder (Doc. 5, filed 8/22/16), it does, however, appear to be 

intertwined with the very issues presented in the motion to remand. In short, both 

matters are jurisdictional in nature. Further, Plaintiff already filed her brief in 

opposition to the motion to dismiss. See Doc. 9. As such, the Court declines to 

enter a stay of proceedings in this matter, but will withhold briefing on the nonjurisdictional motions pending the Court’s determination on jurisdiction. 

See Doc. 12. Despite the denial of the motion to stay, the Court will consider the procedural 

defect arguments raised in the motion. 

The ACCC Defendants responded to the motion to remand arguing that Potts was 

fraudulently joined because Plaintiff could not recover against him under Alabama law. See

Doc. 15. Therefore, if fraudulently joined, the Court must disregard his citizenship when 

considering the existence of diversity of citizenship. The ACCC Defendants also address the 

procedural defect argument by arguing that a fraudulently joined defendant need not join in or 

consent to removal. 

Defendant Potts filed a response to the motion to remand which also constitutes his reply 

for the motion to dismiss. See Doc. 16. In the response, Potts argues that general agency is not 

required to be a stranger to the contract. Rather, if the alleged interferer’s acts were within the 

scope of the duties as an agent, then he is not a stranger to the contract. Next, Potts asserts the 

letters, even if not reasonable within the insurance industry, still did not rise to the level of 

extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to establish a claim of outrage under Alabama law. 

Finally, with regard to the procedural defect argument, Potts makes the same arguments as the 

ACCC Defendants in that he is not a properly joined defendant and therefore not required to join 

in or consent to removal. Further, Potts asserts Harris waived the procedural defect because he 

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raised the argument on September 2, 2016 which is more than 30 days after the August 2, 2016 

notice of removal.

After review of the various pleadings, motions, and responses, the Court determines the 

jurisdictional issue is fully briefed and no oral arguments are necessary. The jurisdictional issue 

is ripe for review. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts have a strict duty to exercise jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress. 

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716, 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1720, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 

(1996). However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 

375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Insurance Co., 31 

F.3d 1092, 1095 (1994). Defendant, as the party removing this action, have the burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction. See Leonard v. Enterprise Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (citing Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001)). Further, the 

federal removal statutes must be construed narrowly and doubts about removal must be resolved 

in favor of remand. Allen v. Christenberry, 327 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Diaz v. 

Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996)); Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095 (citations omitted).

Even if complete diversity is lacking “on the face of the pleadings,” a defendant may 

remove “an action...if the joinder of the non-diverse party...[was] fraudulent.” Triggs v. John 

Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (citing Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp., 77 F.3d 

1353, 1355 (11th Cir. 1996)). The action is removable because “[w]hen a plaintiff names a nondiverse defendant solely in order to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction, the district court must 

ignore the presence of the non-diverse defendant.” Henderson v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 

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1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006). “Fraudulent joinder is a judicially created doctrine that provides an 

exception to the requirement of complete diversity.” Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287. The Eleventh 

Circuit has recognized three situations in which joinder may be deemed fraudulent: (1) when 

there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause of action against the resident (or nondiverse) defendant; (2) when there is outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional 

facts; and (3) when there is no real connection to the claim and the resident (or non-diverse) 

defendant. Id.

“[T]he determination of whether a [non-diverse] defendant has been fraudulently joined 

must be based upon the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented by any 

affidavits and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.” Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 

1322 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 

1998)). “The proceeding appropriate for resolving a claim of fraudulent joinder is similar to that 

used for ruling on a motion for summary judgment under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56].” 

Id. at 1322-23. Accordingly, all contested issues of substantive fact and any uncertainties as to 

the current state of the law must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See id. at 1323; see also 

Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989).

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Since this lawsuit began in state court, the court’s jurisdiction depends on the propriety of 

removal.

A. Procedural Defect in Removal 

The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s procedural defect argument. The case was removed 

on August 2, 2016. See Doc. 1. “A motion to remand on the basis of any defect other than lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of 

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removal under [28 U.S.C.] § 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Thirty days from August 2, 2016 is 

September 1, 2016. Plaintiff filed her motion to stay proceedings and motion to remand on 

September 2, 1016. See Docs. 10-11. As such, Plaintiff is outside the 30-day window on 

procedural defects and the argument has been waived. See Wilson v. Gen. Motor Corp., 888 

F.2d 779, 781 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Grubbs g. Gen. Elec. Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702, 92 S. 

Ct. 1344, 1347, 31 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972)); see also Ammedie v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 485 Fed. Appx. 

399, 400-01 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Wilson and stating same). 

even if it was not waived, Defendant Potts’ signature and/or consent would not be 

required as the unanimity rule applies only to defendants properly joined and served. In cases 

involving a question of fraudulent joinder, the application of the unanimity rule would create a 

nonsensical loop. If fraudulently joined, a signature or consent would not be required. But, if 

not fraudulently joined the signature and consent would be required, yet that would mean that the 

court would not have diversity anyway thereby destroying subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, the 

simple common-sense answer in cases involving a question of fraudulent joinder is that a 

signature or consent of the alleged fraudulently joined defendant is not procedurally required for 

removal. See, e.g. Maxwell v. E-Z-Go, 843 F. Supp.2d 1209, 1213 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (citations 

omitted). 

B. Fraudulent Joinder – State Law Claims

Diversity jurisdiction exists where there is diversity of citizenship and the amount in 

controversy exceeds $ 75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Section 

1446(b) then answers the question of when an action is removable, setting forth the 

preconditions for removal in two types of cases: (1) those removable on the basis of an initial 

pleading; and (2) those that later become removable on the basis of “a copy of an amended 

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pleading, motion, order or other paper.” Normally, the notice of removal must “be filed within 

thirty days after the receipt by the defendant ... of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the 

claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

“A party removing a case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship bears the 

burden of establishing the citizenship of the parties.” Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast 

SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). Therefore, removal jurisdiction 

based upon diversity requires: (1) a complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff(s) and 

the defendant(s) and (2) satisfaction of the amount in controversy requirement. The amount in 

controversy is not at issue, thus the Court looks to the diversity of citizenship and whether 

fraudulent joinder has occurred.

Plaintiff is “the master of the complaint and is free to avoid federal jurisdiction, by 

structuring [her] case to fall short of a requirement of federal jurisdiction. [Courts] permit this so 

long as the method of avoidance is not fraudulent.” Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 

882 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Defendants have alleged that 

Potts has been fraudulently joined under the “no cause of action” theory of fraudulent joinder.1 

This theory requires the defendants to prove that there is “[no] possibility that a state court would 

find that the complaint states a cause of action against . . . the [non-diverse] defendant[].” Crowe 

v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted); see also Restivo v. 

Bank of Am. Corp., 618 Fed. Appx. 537, 539 (11th Cir. July 8, 2015) (quoting Crowe). “The 

plaintiff need not have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant; he need only 

have a possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be legitimate.” 

 1 In her motion to remand, Plaintiff states “there has been no allegation by Defendants of ‘outright 

fraud’ in the Plaintiff[’s] pleadings of jurisdictional facts...” See Doc. 11 at p. 3. However, that is not the 

sole theory required for fraudulent joinder and it is crystal clear that Defendants are alleging the “no cause 

of action” theory of fraudulent joinder. 

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Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287. The “potential for legal liability must be reasonable,” however, “not 

merely theoretical.” Legg, 428 F.3d at 1325 n.5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Stated differently, a court may deny the motion to remand only if there was no possibility that 

the plaintiff could have maintained a cause of action. Henderson, 454 F.3d at 1281-82. The 

court’s “task is not to gauge the sufficiency of the pleadings in this case. [The] inquiry is more 

basic: [The court] must decide whether the defendants have proven by clear and convincing 

evidence that no Alabama court could find this complaint sufficient...” Id. at 1284; see also 

Gonzalez v. J.C. Penney Corp., 209 Fed. Appx. 867, 869 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The burden of 

establishing fraudulent joinder is a heavy one.”).

The question which remains before the Court is whether or not there is any possibility 

that Plaintiff could maintain either of her causes of action against Defendant Potts.

i. Tortious Interference with a Contract

The Alabama Supreme Court held that “properly stated, the elements of the tort are (1) 

the existence of a protectable business relationship; (2) of which the defendant knew; (3) to 

which the defendant was a stranger; (4) with which the defendant intentionally interfered; and (5) 

damage.” Walter Energy, Inc. v. Audley Capital Advisors, LLP, 176 So. 3d 821, 828 (Ala. 2015) 

(quoting White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5 (Ala. 2009)). All five elements 

must be established. In the case at hand, the third element – whether defendant was a stranger –

is the primary element at issue. 

The Alabama Supreme Court has squarely addressed the “stranger” requirement of the 

tort. The Alabama Supreme Court explained “a defendant need not be a signatory to the subject 

contract or one of the primary actors in the business relationship to effectively be a party to it, 

but that a defendant is a party in interest to a relationship if the defendant has any beneficial or 

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economic interest in, or control over, that relationship.” Walter Energy, 176 So. 3d at 828 

(quoting Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875 So. 2d 1143 (Ala. 2003) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also White Sands, 32 So. 3d at 14 (citations omitted) (“In 

the process of defining the tort of wrongful interference with a business relationship, we deem it 

prudent to reiterate that one of the elements is that the defendant be a stranger to the 

relationship.”). Further, “[a] tortious interference claim requires, among other things, wrongful 

conduct by the defendant without privilege; ‘privilege’ means legitimate economic interests of 

the defendant or a legitimate relationship of the defendant to the contract, so that he is not 

considered a stranger, interloper, or meddler. A person with a direct economic interest in the 

contract is not a stranger to the contract. Parties to an interwoven contractual arrangement are not 

liable for tortious interference with any of the contracts or business relationships.’” Id. at 828-29 

(quoting Waddell, 875 So. 2d at 1157). In short, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the term 

“participant to describe an individual or entity who is not a party, but who is essential, to the 

allegedly injured relationship and who cannot be described as a stranger.” Id. at 829 (quoting 

Waddell, 875 So. 2d at 1157). “One cannot be guilty of interference with a contract even if one 

is not a party to the contract so long as one is a participant in a business relationship arising from 

interwoven contractual arrangements that include the contract. In such an instance, the 

participant is not a stranger to the business relationship and the interwoven contractual 

arrangements define the participant's rights and duties with respect to the other individuals or 

entities in the relationship.” Id. 

Turning to the claims by Harris against Potts, the Court must determine whether he is a 

“stranger” to the contractual relationship between Plaintiff and the ACCC Defendants. In 

applying a summary judgment standard, the undisputed facts are that Defendant Potts is an 

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Alabama attorney hired by the ACCC Defendants to conduct an examination under oath as a 

result of Harris’ claim against her automobile policy. After being hired, Defendant Potts sent 

Harris several letters scheduling the examination under oath and requesting a list of documents 

from Plaintiff to be brought to the examination. Harris did not attend the examination under oath 

nor did she provide the requested documents. Ultimately Harris’ claim under the policy was 

denied. In her response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that Potts was not a general 

agent for the insurance company and that he was brought in only after the claim was filed with 

the insurance company. However, Plaintiff cites no Alabama case law to support her argument 

that Potts was a stranger to the contract. Rather Plaintiff relies upon general assertions of agency 

theory and excerpts from American Jurisprudence research to argue Potts was a stranger. 

In looking to the Alabama Supreme Court’s analysis in Waddell, Walter Energy, and 

White Sands, this Court finds it clear that Defendant Potts was NOT a stranger to the contract. 

Rather, Defendant was a participant brought in by the ACCC Defendants to act on their behalf in 

conducting the examination under oath. His legal status was tied to conducting acts requested by 

the ACCC Defendants. As such, Potts cannot be considered a stranger and this claim fails as a 

matter of law without even examining the remaining elements of the tort. 

ii. Outrage

“[T]he tort of outrage is viable only when the conduct is ‘so outrageous in character and 

so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.’” Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d 40, 52 (Ala. 

2012 (citations omitted); Little v. Robinson, 72 So. 3d 1168, 1173 (Ala. 2011). To recover on the 

tort of outrage, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct: (1) was intentional or 

reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no 

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reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Little, 72 So. 3d at 1172 (quoting Green Tree 

Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So. 2d 38, 44 (Ala. 1990)).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ arguments on what was “reasonable in the insurance 

industry” is a question that the litigation seeks to answer. See Doc. 9 at p. 5; Doc. 11 at p. 4. 

However, at issue on the fraudulent joinder question is whether Potts’ letters and conduct 

towards Harris fell outside all bounds of decency and thus utterly intolerable to a civilized 

society. In looking at the three elements established by the Alabama Supreme Court, even 

considering all facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this Court cannot conclude that 

Potts’ letter rise to the level required by the tort of outrage. Plaintiff seemingly conflates her 

claims against the ACCC Defendants and Defendant Potts when arguing they created “an 

arbitrary set of standards calculated to make it impossible for someone like Rosie Harris to ever 

collect on an insurance claim.” See id. However, the outrage claim was asserted solely against 

Defendant Potts. The question at issue on fraudulent joinder is not whether the application of the 

insurance contract by the ACCC Defendants was reasonable, but rather were Defendant Potts’ 

actions such that shock the conscious and go beyond the bound of decency. A review of the 

letters sent by Potts to Harris fall well short of that criteria. 

In the Second Amended Complaint, Count VI asserts a claim for Outrage. See Doc. 1, 

Atch 10. Paragraph 2 states “[t]his amended Complaint applies to Defendant James A. Potts II.” 

While the remainder of the Second Amended Complaint’s allegations clearly state they relate to 

Defendant Potts, the Court notes Count VI’s Outrage claim states “Defendants’ DCH, Douglas 

and Jeb, extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally and/or recklessly caused severe 

emotional distress to Plaintiffs.” Id. at ¶ 17 (emphasis added). Though no party mentions this 

discrepancy, the Court wishes to note it as further support that the pleading is insufficient as it 

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pertains to Defendant Potts and describing how the claim could be sustained against him. 

Applying the summary judgment standard as required in a fraudulent joinder context, the 

Court finds the claim cannot stand against Defendant Potts. 

IV. CONCLUSION

When considering the motion to remand and applying the summary judgment standard by 

resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, it is clear under Alabama law that 

Plaintiff’s asserted claims against Defendant Potts fail as a matter of law. The Court finds that 

Defendants have met their heavy burden on removal to prove Plaintiff fraudulently joined 

Defendant Potts. 

Pursuant to the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, the Court GRANTS the Motion to 

Dismiss Based on Fraudulent Joinder (Doc. 5) and DENIES the Motion to Remand (Doc. 11).

DONE this 28th day of November, 2016.

/s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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