Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01901/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01901-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE VELEZ, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

CLOGHAN CONCEPTS, LLC; and 

DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-1901-BTM-BGS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

[ECF No. 11]

Pending before the Court is Defendant Cloghan Concepts, LLC’s Motion to 

Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 

(ECF No. 11). Plaintiff Jose Velez opposed the Motion, and Defendant replied. 

(ECF Nos. 19, 16). For reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 11). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action on August 15, 2018. (ECF 

No. 1). The original Complaint alleged violations of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act 

(“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51. (ECF No. 1 “Compl.”). Defendant timely 

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moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction.1(ECF No. 3). On October 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) again alleging violations under the ADA and Unruh 

Act. (ECF No. 7 “FAC”). The FAC alleges that Plaintiff is disabled because his 

morbid obesity, a byproduct of his Binge Eating Disorder (BED), limits his 

mobility. (FAC ¶¶ 6, 7). The FAC further alleges that while patronizing 

Defendant’s restaurant, located at 640 Tenth Ave, San Diego, CA 92101, Plaintiff 

encountered barriers at the reception area, the sales and service counter, and in 

the table arrangements that render the property inaccessible for disabled 

persons. (FAC ¶ 24). Plaintiff alleges that these architectural barriers prevented 

Plaintiff from enjoying full and equal access to the restaurant. (FAC ¶ 32). 

Defendant again timely moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged a 

disability under the ADA and consequently, that the Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over the action. (ECF No. 16). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests 

the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 

1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 

2001)). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘a plaintiff must allege 

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Turner v. City 

and County of San Francisco, 788 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lazy 

Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008)). A claim is plausible 

on its face if it pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

 

1 The original Complaint named additional defendants, all of whom have since been dismissed from the case.

(See ECF Nos. 37, 42). For clarity, the Court details only the procedural history relating to the remaining 

Defendant, Cloghan Concepts, LLC.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

Although the court “will assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual 

allegations,” conclusory statements are not entitled to this assumption of truth. 

Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2017). “Legal 

conclusions may provide a framework for a complaint but ‘they must be 

supported by factual allegations.’ ” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The 

plausibility standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed me accusation,” and a “pleading that offers ‘labels and 

conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). 

III. DISCUSSION

The FAC alleges violations of the ADA and Unruh Act. Each will be 

addressed in turn. 

A. ADA CLAIM

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities 

by public accommodations, stating:

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability 

in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 

accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or 

operates a place of public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To prevail on a discrimination claim under Title III, a 

plaintiff must show that: (1) the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the 

ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place 

of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations 

by the defendant because of his disability. Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins 

Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Molski v. 

M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007)). The parties dispute the first 

prong, i.e., whether Plaintiff has alleged that he is disabled within the meaning of 

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the ADA. 

Plaintiff alleges he is disabled because he has “mobility-related limitations” 

resulting from “morbid obesity and a binge-eating disorder.” (FAC ¶ 6). The 

additional weight on his frame allegedly “makes it more difficult to breathe, walk, 

stand and bend,” and his binge-eating disorder “affects his ability to concentrate 

and think.” (FAC ¶ 6). Plaintiff alleges that the underlying cause of his morbid 

obesity, the binge-eating disorder (BED), is “physiological and/or psychological.”

(FAC ¶ 7). The FAC elaborates that BED is classified as a mental disorder in the 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). (FAC ¶ 8). 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege a disability under the ADA 

because Plaintiff has failed to set forth an underlying physiological, rather than 

psychological, cause for his morbid obesity, which some circuits have concluded 

is required for obesity to qualify as a disability. (ECF No. 11-1 at 12). 

The ADA defines “disability” as a “physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual . . . .” 42 

U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). After a series of Supreme Court decisions that narrowly 

defined “disability,” Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (the 

Amendment Act) in an effort to broaden the scope of protection the ADA affords. 

29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. In relevant part, one express purpose of the 

Amendment Act is: 

“[t]o convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of 

attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities 

covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to 

convey that the question of whether an individual's impairment is a 

disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis . . . .” 

Id. (emphasis added). Although neither the ADA nor the Amendment Act

provides a definition for the term “physical or mental impairment,” the Code of 

Federal Regulations now supplies the following definition:

(i) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic 

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disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body 

systems, such as: Neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense 

organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, 

reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, 

hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or

(ii) Any mental or psychological disorder such as intellectual 

disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, 

and specific learning disability.

(2) Physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to, 

contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions such as 

the following: Orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing 

impairments, and cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, 

multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, intellectual

disability, emotional illness, dyslexia and other specific learning 

disabilities, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Human 

Immunodeficiency Virus infection (whether symptomatic or 

asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism.

28 C.F.R. § 36.105(b)(1). The definition is silent on whether obesity independent 

of an underlying physiological disorder is an impairment under the ADA. 

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal agency 

whose mandate includes enforcing the ADA in the workplace, has taken the 

position that obesity may qualify as an impairment under the ADA, but not 

always. Taylor v. Burlington Northern Railroad Holdings Inc., 904 F.3d 846, 851 

(9th Cir. 2018). The EEOC issued interpretive guidance specifying that “[t]he 

definition of the term ‘impairment’ does not include physical characteristics such 

as . . . weight . . . that [is] within ‘normal’ range and [is] not the result of a 

physiological disorder.” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. 1630.2(h) (alterations and 

emphasis added). The EEOC also submitted an instructive amicus brief before 

the Ninth Circuit further clarifying its position on obesity as a disability:

[W]eight (1) is not an impairment when it is within the “normal” range 

and lacks a physiological cause but (2) may be an impairment when it 

is either outside the “normal” range or occurs as the result of a 

physiological disorder. 

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904 F.3d at 851 (emphasis added). This position is consistent with a compliance 

manual the EEOC withdrew in 2012, which states: “normal deviations in height, 

weight or strength that are not the result of a physiological disorder are not 

impairments . . . . At extremes, however, such deviations may constitute 

impairments.” Id. (citing EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.2(c)(5)) (emphasis 

added). The EEOC has not specified what weight range constitutes “normal” as 

opposed to “extreme.” 

Although the Ninth Circuit found the above EEOC guidance instructive in its 

consideration of a similar issue, the Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether 

obesity without a physiological cause constitutes an impairment under the ADA. 

Id. at 851, 853 (stating “the scope of ADA protection for individuals suffering from 

obesity . . . presents an open question of federal law in this circuit”). The

Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have concluded it does not. See Francis v. 

City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d. Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 

803 (6th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 442-43 

(6th Cir. 2006); Morriss v. BNSF Railway Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 

2016). Other circuits remain undecided. 

In the absence of clear, binding authority, the Court adopts the definition 

the EEOC set forth in its amicus brief and compliance manual: weight may be an 

impairment when it falls outside the normal range or occurs as the result of a 

physiological disorder. See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. United States 

Dep’t of Commerce, 878 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating courts must defer 

to an agency’s “interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations, which controls 

unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ or where there are 

grounds to believe that the interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and 

considered judgment of the matter in question.’”); Velez v. Il Fornanio (America) 

Corp., 18-cv-1840-CAB, 2018 WL 6446169 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018)

(adopting same approach and definition in proceeding involving same plaintiff 

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and legal issues). Under this definition, the Court concludes Plaintiff has alleged 

he has a disability under the ADA. The FAC states Plaintiff’s morbid obesity 

makes it difficult for him to breathe, walk, stand, and bend, all of which are major 

life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(B). As for whether Plaintiff’s weight 

exceeds the “normal range,” Plaintiff has alleged that he has morbid obesity, 

which is sufficient to allege his weight exceeds the normal range.

However, the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has alleged a disability does 

not end the inquiry. Plaintiff must also allege that he was denied public 

accommodations by Defendant because of his disability. Arizona ex rel. 

Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 

2010). The FAC offers only conclusory statements in this regard, and fails to 

state an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports 

(U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]o invoke the jurisdiction of the 

federal courts, a disabled individual claiming discrimination must satisfy the case 

or controversy requirement of Article III by demonstrating his standing to sue at 

each stage of the litigation”). Plaintiff recites the ways in which Defendant’s 

restaurant was out of compliance, stating the reception area lacked a designated 

space “at least 36 inches wide by at least 48 inches long for individuals with 

disabilities,” the sales and service counters were all “higher than 36 inches above 

the floor,” and the fixed tables “with accessible seating locations are not 

dispersed throughout all dining areas.” (FAC ¶ 24). But Plaintiff does not relate

these alleged violations to his particular disability, morbid obesity and his related 

mobility-limitations, or set forth facts showing how any single barrier interfered 

with his full and equal enjoyment of Defendant’s restaurant. Chapman, 631 F.3d 

at 954 (concluding plaintiff lacked Article III standing because plaintiff “never 

allege[d] what [the] barriers were and how his disability was affected by them so 

as to deny him the ‘full and equal’ access that would satisfy the injury-in-fact 

//

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requirement (i.e., that he personally suffered discrimination under the ADA on 

account of his disability)”). 

Although Plaintiff need not encounter every accessibility barrier or even be 

fully prohibited from accessing the non-compliant facility to have standing, 

Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged his personal stake in the outcome of this case 

or controversy to meet the pleading requirements. Because Plaintiff has failed to 

state a cognizable claim under the ADA, the Court dismisses the FAC as to that 

claim. 

B. UNRUH ACT CLAIM 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), Plaintiff asks the Court to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claims, which arise under California 

law. (FAC ¶ 13). 

Section 1367 provides that “in any civil action of which the district courts 

have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction 

over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original 

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of 

the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, a district court 

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if: 

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law; 

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over 

which the district court has original jurisdiction; 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons 

for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Because the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 

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Unruh Act claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3). The Court also declines to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction out of deference to California’s heightened 

pleading requirements for disability lawsuits under the Unruh Act, and in the 

interest of comity, as California courts should interpret the state’s disability laws. 

Other courts have identified these factors as a compelling reasons to decline to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over disability claims arising under the Unruh 

Act. See Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F.Supp.3d 1025, 1030-31 (S.D. Cal. 2017) 

(“[A]s a matter of comity, and in deference to California’s substantial interest in 

discouraging unverified disability discrimination claims, the Court declines 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim.”); Il Fornanio, 2018 WL 

6446169 at *6 (outlining legislative history behind heightened pleading 

requirements for Unruh Act claims as basis for declining to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over disability claim); Molski v. Hitching Post I 

Restaurant, Inc., No. 04-cv-1077-SVWRNBX, 2005 WL 3952248 at *9 (C.D. Cal. 

May 25, 2005) (“Because the California courts should be given an opportunity to 

interpret California’s disability laws, because the calculated effort to avoid having 

California courts decide issues of California law is to be discouraged, and 

because the parties themselves are entitled to a surer-footed interpretation of 

California's disability laws, the Court finds that compelling reasons exist to 

decline supplemental jurisdiction over Molski's state law claims.”). 

The Court accordingly declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and 

dismisses the Unruh Act claim without prejudice as to asserting it in state court.

See Il Fornanio, 2018 WL 6446169 at *6. 

//

//

//

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (ECF No. 11). Because 

amendment is not futile, the Court dismisses the FAC without prejudice and 

grants Plaintiff leave to amend. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (“Leave to amend should be granted unless the pleading ‘could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts,’ and should be granted more 

liberally to pro se plaintiffs.”). Should Plaintiff decide to file a Second Amended 

Complaint, he must do so on or before July 12, 2019. If Plaintiff fails to file a 

Second Amended Complaint by July 12, 2019, a final judgment will be entered 

dismissing the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2019

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