Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00216/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

ANDREW JACKSON SMITH, #228 252, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-216-WHA 

 ) [WO] 

PRESIDENT OBAMA, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections. He files 

this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that rights, privileges, or immunities afforded him 

under the Constitution or laws of the United States are being abridged by the named defendants. 

Plaintiff names as defendants President Barack Obama, Governor Robert Bentley, Commissioner 

Jefferson Dunn, and Corizon, Inc. Plaintiff requests damages, a safe environment in prison or 

release of prisoners, an allowance for all reasonable forms of communication without restriction, 

transfer of veterans to the V.A. for diagnosis of veteran’s related disabilities, and the provision of 

disability protection, safety, and services to the disabled. Doc. # 13. Upon review, the court 

concludes that dismissal prior to service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B).1

 

                                                            

1 A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint screened in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court 

to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous, 

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a 

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

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I. DISCUSSION 

 This action is before the court on Plaintiff’s amended complaint. Doc. # 13. He challenges 

as a violation of his free speech rights the prison’s: 1) limit on the number of pages an inmate may 

receive in a letter which contains internet information; 2) return of letters for “personal dislike[] 

of content”; 3) limitation on reading material; 4) refusal to transport inmates to court hearings; and 

5) failure to provide storage for his legal material which he was directed to dispose of. Plaintiff 

also complains his right to be free from physical and mental harm has been violated because the 

prison’s environment of “barbarism” has caused “mental deterioration of dementia 

symptomatology and physical ailments.” Finally, Plaintiff asserts a right to proper diagnosis of 

disabilities but complains the prison has failed to transport him to a medical facility for “disabling 

diagnosis confirmation and [ ] to provide care for those.” Doc. # 13 at 3. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[T]he pleading standard Rule 

8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere “labels and 

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if 

it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 

550 U.S. at 557). The court’s April 18, 2016, order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint 

informed him of these requirements. The April 18th order also directed Plaintiff to name as 

defendants only those individuals personally responsible for the alleged violations of his 

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constitutional rights and to specifically describe how each defendant named in the amended 

complaint acted to deprive him of his constitutional rights. See Doc. #7. 

As noted, Plaintiff files his amended complaint against President Obama, Governor 

Bentley, Commissioner Dunn, and Corizon, the prison health care provider. Despite the 

admonitions in the court’s April 18th order regarding the filing of an amended complaint, Plaintiff 

fails to allege what actions or omissions the named defendants took or made which allegedly 

resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights or which claims Plaintiff asserts against each 

defendant. Rather, Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserts in very general terms that the “prison” 

has engaged in conduct which allegedly caused violations of his First and Eight Amendment rights. 

Missing from his contentions is any allegation the named defendants are or were personally 

engaged in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. See Doc. # 13. 

As an initial matter, the court finds Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserts no legal basis 

under which he may sue the President of the United States for the alleged unconstitutional 

conditions of confinement which he claims have or are occurring at the Elmore Correctional 

Facility, a prison administered by the Alabama Department of Corrections. Regarding Plaintiff’s 

amended complaint against the remaining defendants, “section 1983 requires proof of an 

affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person under color of state 

law and the constitutional deprivation.” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This Circuit has held that a court properly 

dismisses defendants where a prisoner, other than naming the defendant in the caption, states no 

allegations that associate the defendants with the alleged constitutional violation. Douglas v. Yates, 

535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Pamel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 

(1st Cir. 1980) (“While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the 

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complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal 

wrong.”)); see also Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). Here, 

Plaintiff has identified no affirmative action taken by Defendants Dunn, Bentley, or Corizon, and 

thus, asserts no connection between the conduct complained of and the actions of these defendant 

regarding the alleged unconstitutional deprivations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570) (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). 

 To the extent the basis for Plaintiff’s amended complaint against Commissioner Dunn, 

Governor Bentley, and Corizon is that they are responsible for the conduct of their subordinates, 

neither supervisory personnel nor corporate medical providers can be held liable under § 1983 for 

a constitutional violation of one of their subordinates via a theory of respondeat superior or on the 

basis of vicarious liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978) (doctrine 

of respondeat superior is inapplicable to § 1983 actions); Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 

1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials 

liable for the actions of their subordinates under either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious 

liability); see also Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a 

supervisory official is liable only if he “personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional 

conduct or [if] there is a causal connection between [his] actions ... and the alleged constitutional 

deprivation.”); see also Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 1986); accord Buckner 

v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452-53 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that § 1983’s municipality law is to be 

applied to a corporate medical provider). Because Plaintiff fails to allege much less indicate 

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Defendants Dunn and/or Bentley were personally involved in the constitutional violations about 

which he complains or a causal connection exists between their actions and the alleged 

constitutional violation or that Corizon’s policy or procedures caused the alleged constitutional 

deprivations, his amended complaint against these defendants is subject to dismissal on that basis 

as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

II. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s 

amended complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

 It is further 

ORDERED that on or before June 30, 2016, Plaintiff may file an objection to the 

Recommendation. Any objection filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which Plaintiff objects. Frivolous, 

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. This 

Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

 Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of 

factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on 

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon 

grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust 

Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 

790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989). 

 

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 DONE, this 16th day of June 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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