Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05455/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05455-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TYRONE REED, Sr., 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MARTIN BITER, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 13-cv-5455-TEH 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner Tyrone Reed, Sr., a state prisoner, proceeds with 

a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition 

should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer and 

Petitioner filed a reply. For the reasons set forth below, the 

petition is DENIED. 

I 

Petitioner was found guilty after a jury trial of numerous 

charges of child molestation against a child under the age of 14, 

and the trial court found that Petitioner had two prior strike 

convictions. People v. Reed, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1139 (2010) 

(Reed I). He was sentenced to 230 years to life in prison. Id. 

at 1140. 

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Petitioner appealed and the California Court of Appeal 

reversed, stating: 

The judgment is reversed with directions to 

the trial court to make further inquiry into 

Reed's claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. If, after further inquiry, the 

court determines good cause exists for 

appointment of new counsel to fully 

investigate and present defendant's motion 

for new trial, the court shall appoint new 

counsel for that purpose and conduct further 

proceedings as necessary. If, on the other 

hand, the court determines after further 

inquiry that good cause does not exist for 

appointment of new counsel to fully 

investigate and present defendant's new trial 

motion, the court shall rule on the motion as 

presented by Reed. If the court denies the 

motion for new trial, the court shall 

reinstate the judgment. 

Reed I, 183 Cal. App. 4th at 1149-50. 

 On remand, the trial court appointed new counsel who filed a 

motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of the 

original trial attorney. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 86-94; 

People v. Reed, No. A133225, 2013 WL 1276015, at *5 (Cal. Ct. 

App. March 28, 2013) (Reed II). On July 8, 2011, the trial court 

chose to not rule on the motion for a new trial and reaffirmed 

the judgment. CT at 106; Reed II, 2013 WL 1276015, at *7. 

Petitioner appealed again and argued that: (1) the trial 

court violated the California Court of Appeal’s directions in 

Reed I and abused its discretion in failing to rule on his motion 

for new trial; and (2) the trial court improperly limited the 

scope of appointed counsel's representation, depriving Petitioner 

of his right to counsel and due process. Reed II, 2013 WL 

1276015, at *1. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the 

judgment. Id. The California Supreme Court denied a petition 

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for review that raised the claim that the trial court’s 

limitations on the appointment of counsel on remand deprived 

Petitioner of effective assistance of counsel on the motion for a 

new trial. Docket No. 1-5 at 7; Docket No. 5, Ex. 1. 

Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in this court on 

November 25, 2013. Several claims were previously dismissed as 

unexhausted or procedurally defaulted. Docket Nos. 13, 47. The 

case continues solely on the claim that the trial court’s 

limitations on the appointment of counsel on remand deprived 

Petitioner of effective assistance of counsel on the motion for a 

new trial. 

II 

The following factual background is taken from the order of 

the California Court of Appeal.1

Trial 

Dianne [the 13 year-old victim] testified 

that the alleged offenses occurred while she 

was sharing a room at the California Hotel 

with Reed, his “baby mama” (Bahati), and 

Bahati's father in late 2006 and early 2007. 

Dianne said Reed had sexual intercourse with 

her for the first time on October 8, and they 

were interrupted when Bahati knocked on the 

door of the hotel room. Dianne recalled the 

date because Reed had told her Bahati was 

getting out of jail on October 8. 

Dianne testified that, the next night, Reed 

tried to put his penis in her anus, and that 

it went in a little, but “didn't go all the 

way in.” She said a couple of nights later, 

Reed woke her up, got up off the bed and made 

a circular motion with his finger that 

indicated to Dianne she should get up and 

turn around. When she bent over and put her 

hands on the bed, Reed put his penis in her 

 

1

 This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 

1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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vagina from behind. Bahati and her father 

were asleep in the room at the time of both 

these incidents. 

During that same week or two-week period, 

while Bahati and her father were absent, Reed 

grabbed Dianne and put her on the bed, pulled 

her pajama pants down, and touched her vagina 

with his tongue. 

Dianne testified that all four of the 

incidents described above occurred before her 

14th birthday in mid-November. Dianne stated 

that the following incidents occurred after 

her 14th birthday: 

Reed whipped her with a belt approximately 25 

times after she was suspended from school, 

leaving bruises on her thighs and arms and a 

knot on her head. The next day, she did not 

go to school. Reed bought some new panties 

for her and had her model them. He then put 

his mouth on her vagina. 

On the night of February 4, 2007, while 

everyone else in the room was asleep, Reed 

forced his penis inside Dianne's vagina. 

This time, Reed was rougher and it “[d]idn't 

feel so good.” Dianne asked Reed to stop, 

but he did not. Afterwards, Dianne 

experienced pain when she closed her legs and 

a burning sensation while urinating. 

On February 5, 2007, Dianne reported the 

abuse, gave a statement to police, and 

submitted to a sexual assault exam. 

Photographs of her body showed bruising on 

her right arm, at the bicep and forearm. The 

sexual assault examiner noted these bruises, 

as well as resolving bruises on the inside of 

both of Dianne's knees, a lump on her 

forehead, and an abrasion to her cervix. The 

underpants she had been wearing the night 

before were collected, along with vaginal and 

oral swabs. 

Reed was arrested that evening at the hotel. 

Officers collected a pair of red pajama 

bottoms and a T-shirt from the hotel room. 

An oral swab was collected from Reed and 

provided to the Oakland Police Department. 

The criminalist at the Oakland Police 

Department Crime Laboratory who performed the 

DNA analysis in this case testified that 

sperm and epithelial cells were found on 

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Dianne's underpants; DNA was extracted from 

the sperm and analyzed; and a genetic profile 

for the sperm was generated and compared to a 

known DNA profile for Reed. The profiles 

matched. The DNA profile of the epithelial 

cells matched a known DNA profile for Dianne. 

Sperm and epithelial cells were also found on 

one of the vaginal swabs. The criminalist 

was able to obtain a partial profile for the 

male donor, which was consistent with Reed's 

reference profile. Sperm and epithelial 

cells were also found in two stains on the 

pajama pants. DNA was extracted and 

analyzed. The profiles were consistent with 

the reference profiles for Dianne and Reed. 

The evidence varied as to the time period 

Dianne lived with Reed. Dianne testified 

that she moved from Reno to Oakland in 

September 2006, and stayed with her maternal 

grandmother for a couple of days. After 

that, she stayed a week with Reed and then 

went to stay with Reed's sister, Keisha. 

Dianne could not recall how long she stayed 

with Keisha but believed it was about a month 

or two. She then went to live with Reed 

again at the California Hotel, where she 

remained until February 5, 2007. She could 

not remember exactly when she returned to the 

hotel but said she did so before her 14th 

birthday. 

Reed's grandmother, Lois, testified Dianne 

came to Oakland “around September” and stayed 

at her house for a few days, then went to 

live with Reed's sister, Keisha. Keisha 

testified she was “not sure” how long Dianne 

stayed with Lois, but it could have been 

“about a month” or a little shorter. Keisha 

said Dianne lived at her house for “[t]wo 

months, roughly” before she went to stay with 

Reed. 

The parties stipulated that Dianne became 

enrolled in school on September 26, 2006. 

Keisha said she registered Dianne for school 

“[a]bout two weeks” after Dianne began living 

with her. Dianne said she was enrolled in 

school about a month after she arrived from 

Reno. 

Keisha's daughter, Unique, testified that on 

her birthday, October 7, Dianne was living 

with her and Keisha. Unique remembered this 

because she and Dianne went to a concert for 

her birthday. Unique said Dianne stayed at 

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her house for “[p]robably about two months” 

after October 7. 

Reed did not testify. 

Posttrial Proceedings 

After a verdict had been rendered, Reed's 

counsel filed a written motion for new trial, 

arguing that there was insufficient evidence 

for the jury to find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that any offenses occurred before 

Dianne's 14th birthday. On January 16, 2009, 

after the trial court considered and denied 

Reed's motion for new trial, Reed's counsel, 

Deborah Levy, indicated to the trial court 

that Reed wanted to file “a motion for 

incompetence of counsel,” but she did not 

“know what vehicle to do.” The court 

continued sentencing to January 30, 2009, to 

allow Reed and Levy to talk. 

On January 30, 2009, Reed's counsel again 

advised the court that Reed was asking her to 

request a new trial “based on [her] 

incompetence.” Levy stated she had told him 

“he is much better ... off having his 

appellate attorney argue any issues of 

incompetence,” but “Mr. Reed would like to 

make that motion. I cannot make it for 

him.... So, I am at a loss what to do.” The 

court said, “Let's take one thing at a time” 

and returned to the sentencing proceeding. 

Later in the sentencing proceeding, Levy 

stated that Reed was “again indicating ... he 

wants to bring that motion regarding [her] 

incompetence.” The court responded: “Mr. 

Reed, ... [t]here are procedures of which I 

have to adhere to, and when you are making a 

motion to set aside this case based on your 

counsel's incompetency, she's correct, that 

is not something that I can take into 

consideration at this time. It is something 

[that] an appellate lawyer will review with 

you and will go over with you in detail what 

your concerns are. [¶] But at this time you 

are before this court for a report and 

sentencing, and so the purview and things 

that I have to take into consideration are 

those things that are before me, the issues 

that were presented to me in open court. And 

any dialogue you may have had with your 

attorney, any preparation that may have taken 

place for your case is something that is not 

in the realm of things that I am privy to. 

So, someone else will have to examine what 

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she did in preparation of your case, the 

presentation of it, as well as my ruling. [¶] 

So, I am not in the position to evaluate 

whether she was effective counsel or not, and 

turn around and review whether I am making an 

effective decision or not. Someone else will 

be in a position to do that.” 

Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Reed 

under the “three strikes” law to an aggregate 

prison term of 230 years to life. 

The Prior Appeal: Reed I (A123967) 

Reed appealed from the judgment of 

conviction. Among other arguments, he 

asserted that “the trial court erred by 

failing to inquire into the reasons for his 

desire to move for a new trial on the basis 

of incompetence of counsel,” and that the 

case must be remanded to the trial court “for 

a full Marsden inquiry into the basis for 

[his] allegations of trial counsel's 

incompetence.” In Reed I, a panel of this 

court agreed. (Reed I, supra, 183 Cal. App. 

4th at p. 1140.) We concluded the trial 

court erred in failing to make any inquiry 

into Reed's reasons for believing he was 

ineffectively assisted at trial, including 

the requisite Marsden inquiries on such 

issues, as required by People v. Stewart 

(1985) 171 Cal. App. 3d 388 and People v. 

Mejía(2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 1081.8 (Reed I, 

at pp. 1144–1145, 1148.) We were unable to 

conclude the error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt “because it remains 

impossible on this record to determine 

whether further inquiry would have led the 

court to grant a new trial motion.” (Id. at 

p. 1149.) 

Accordingly, this court reversed the judgment 

“with directions to the trial court to make 

further inquiry into Reed's claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. If, after 

further inquiry, the court determines good 

cause exists for appointment of new counsel 

to fully investigate and present defendant's 

motion for new trial, the court shall appoint 

new counsel for that purpose and conduct 

further proceedings as necessary. If, on the 

other hand, the court determines after 

further inquiry that good cause does not 

exist for appointment of new counsel to fully 

investigate and present defendant's new trial 

motion, the court shall rule on the motion as 

presented by Reed. If the court denies the 

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motion for new trial, the court shall 

reinstate the judgment.” (Reed I, supra, 183 

Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1149–1150.) 

The remittitur issued on June 23, 2010. 

Proceedings on Remand 

Appointment of New Counsel 

On August 13, 2010, the trial court heard 

Reed's Marsden motion in a closed session. 

Reed appeared with his trial counsel. The 

trial court asked Reed to state the basis for 

his claim of incompetence of counsel, 

specifically, the reasons he felt his counsel 

did not present his case adequately and the 

areas where she failed to represent him. 

Reed said Levy [the trial counsel]: (1) 

failed to subpoena Bahati, his “alibi 

witness”; (2) failed to inform the jury, as 

he requested, that the prosecutor had 

released him twice on these charges for lack 

of evidence; (3) was unaware of documents 

indicating that Reed was not a DNA match and 

that the People's DNA expert lied on the 

stand; (4) failed to call a DNA expert to 

rebut the People's DNA witness, as he 

requested; and (5) failed to object to 

damaging testimony from Dianne's mother. 

The trial court asked Levy to respond and 

discuss her trial preparation. Levy said she 

did not interview Bahati because it was her 

impression Bahati “was not a friendly 

witness,” “was a prosecution witness,” and 

“would not have been a good witness for the 

defense.” As to the DNA evidence, Levy said 

she did not have her paperwork with her but 

was “99.9 percent sure that there was DNA 

testing done and some secretions from the 

victim and they came back to Mr. Reed without 

any question.” She believed Reed was 

referring to a DNA test that failed to 

establish he was Dianne's father. Levy 

acknowledged, “[T]here was a lot of 

contention between Mr. Reed and I in my 

attempts to get him to take the deal that was 

on the table prior to the trial,” and “there 

was some tension and some disagreement,” but 

she could not recall any specific 

disagreements. 

The trial court concluded it was appropriate 

to appoint counsel for Reed in two areas in 

which it could not make a conclusive 

determination based upon Levy's response: the 

DNA results, and “whether the failure to 

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interview the witness prior to trial in any 

way had a material impact on the outcome.” 

The trial court relieved Levy and appointed 

Attorney Lorna Patton Brown to meet with 

Reed, review his case, and determine whether 

it was appropriate to file a motion for new 

trial. Notwithstanding its statements to 

Reed indicating counsel's representation 

would be limited to two issues, the trial 

court appears to have asked Patton Brown to 

investigate all of the ineffective assistance 

claims Reed asserted. 

On October 25, 2010, Patton Brown moved to 

withdraw as Reed's counsel, as she was 

resigning from the California State Bar. A 

different superior court judge, Judge Morris 

Jacobson, granted the motion and appointed 

Attorney Thomas Broome to represent Reed. 

Reed's Motion for New Trial 

On June 2, 2011, Broome filed a motion for 

new trial on Reed's behalf. The motion 

alleged that Reed was denied a fair trial 

because trial counsel failed to properly 

investigate the case and prepare a defense. 

Specifically, Reed contended trial counsel 

(1) failed to investigate an incident in 

which Dianne was allegedly found performing 

oral sex on a boy in a closet at the youth 

center (the closet incident) and (2) failed 

to subpoena independent witnesses to lay a 

foundation regarding this incident, resulting 

in its exclusion from evidence. In a related 

argument, Reed alleged defense counsel failed 

to call him to testify regarding the 

discipline he administered to Dianne as a 

result of the closet incident. Reed argued 

his testimony, in conjunction with evidence 

regarding the closet incident, would have 

impeached the victim's credibility by 

establishing her motive to falsely accuse 

him, particularly if it was “shown to be 

close in time to the delayed report to the 

police ... and remote in time as to when the 

alleged sexual acts occurred.” 

Reed also alleged that Levy failed to secure 

the records showing when Bahati was released 

from jail, and failed to obtain Dianne's 

birth certificate to show her age at the time 

of the alleged incidents. Finally, Reed 

contended Levy failed to preserve the record 

on appeal regarding the composition of the 

jury. 

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Reed submitted declarations from Keisha, 

Unique, and trial counsel. Keisha stated 

that some teenagers told her Dianne was 

giving oral sex to a boy in the closet at the 

youth center, but Dianne denied this. Keisha 

also said Dianne came home late one night and 

lied about where she had been; Dianne said 

she was at the library, but there is no 

library near where Keisha lived. Unique 

stated when she and Dianne were 14 or 15 

years old, a friend at the youth center told 

her Dianne was giving a boy a blowjob. 

Unique saw Dianne getting up from her knees 

next to a boy who was trying to “put himself 

back in his pants.” Unique said she then 

walked home with Dianne and the boy, who had 

his hand down the front of Dianne's pants. 

Unique said Dianne “was always telling [her] 

about her ‘sex’ adventures: how many boys she 

had sex with” and “how good their sex was.” 

Trial counsel stated she could not recall 

specifically whether Reed told her he wanted 

to testify, but if he had, she “would have, 

for certain, without a doubt, tried very 

strongly to convince him to change his mind.” 

The People filed an opposition to the motion, 

contending Reed had waived his attorneyclient privilege as to matters he had placed 

at issue in his motion and the information in 

trial counsel's file was not protected to the 

extent it related to the issues raised by 

Reed's motion. The People asked the trial 

court to review trial counsel's file in 

camera and make the relevant information 

available. 

The trial court heard Reed's motion on July 

8, 2011. Noting the Court of Appeal had 

directed it to make further inquiry into 

Reed's ineffective assistance claim and to 

appoint new counsel to investigate and 

present his motion for new trial if it found 

good cause to do so, the court stated: “So we 

have already passed that juncture.” “Now the 

next level of inquiry is that good cause does 

exist. The court is only determining whether 

further proceedings are necessary at this 

stage. [¶] If the court determines that 

further proceedings are not necessary, and 

that after full investigation there are no 

grounds for a new trial, the court will then 

reinstate the judgment.” “[We are] now at 

that juncture where the court is seeking to 

determine whether, in fact, there are grounds 

for new trial and the basis therein. [¶] The 

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court has already complied with the first 

portion of the remittitur.” 

After hearing argument from Reed's counsel, 

however, the trial court changed course. 

Turning to the transcript of the January 30, 

2009 sentencing hearing, the court noted 

that, when Levy advised the court that Reed 

wanted to bring a motion regarding her 

incompetence, “[t]he word Marsden and no 

other words were used.” The court concluded, 

that, in advising Reed in the earlier 

proceedings that his “motion to set aside 

this case based on [his] counsel's 

incompetence [was] not something [it could] 

take into consideration” and was “something 

that an appellate lawyer will review with 

you,” it “basically was referring to what we 

call a Strickland error.” The trial court 

stated: “I believe that the Court of Appeal 

[in Reed I], in reading that portion of the 

transcript, rather than taking the position 

that it was, in fact, a motion for 

incompetency of counsel, seems to be 

indicating to this court that that was 

alerting the court that it was a Marsden 

motion that they want—that Mr. Reed wanted to 

substitute counsel as opposed to 

incompetency. But that was perhaps based on 

the totality of the circumstances.” The 

trial court noted it was to determine “what 

is the appropriate standard of review, what 

is the areas in which we must focus, and 

whether there is legal cause for this court 

to determine that a Marsden motion should be 

held. And then based on that Marsden motion, 

if it had been granted, what would have been 

the court's actions at that juncture ... 

having already had a jury determine the 

defendant's guilt or innocence.” 

The court listed the issues Reed had raised, 

stating it was “distill[ing its] 

understanding of the topics that [it] must 

focus upon in terms of the Marsden motion.” 

In addition to the grounds asserted in Reed's 

motion for new trial and affidavits, the 

court noted “there is some reference to 

[Bahati], indicating that her testimony was 

not sought.” 

After hearing argument from the People, the 

trial court held, “Based on the totality of 

the circumstances, the review of today's 

hearing by way of motion, declaration, 

affidavit and record, ... the January 30, 

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2009 findings shall remain. [¶] There does 

not appear to be grounds to set aside that 

order based upon grounds for a Marsden 

motion.” The court again noted “the January 

30th 2009 transcript in which counsel clearly 

indicated that it was a motion for 

incompetence. [¶] And so, the court does not 

reach the portion of the People's motion ... 

that [Reed] had waived his attorney-client 

privilege with regards to his motion for new 

trial. It is still this court's position 

that if there is Strickland error, that will 

take place on the appellate level. [¶] This 

hearing was really to determine whether there 

had been grounds for a Marsden motion.... [¶] 

Based on what I heard today, it appears a 

number of issues have to either do with 

admissibility of some items, foundational 

issues, and then finally perhaps tactical 

issues exercised by the defendant's counsel. 

And again, it is my position that that is 

something that, based on Strickland, would be 

reviewed by a higher court than this because, 

otherwise, we are entertaining the suggestion 

[in] the People's motion. And I don't 

believe that the directive of the Court of 

Appeal was to in any way invade upon the 

attorney-client privilege for the purpose of 

a new trial, but to determine whether there 

were grounds to substitute counsel at that 

juncture of the trial....” 

Reed filed a timely amended notice of appeal 

from the judgment. 

Reed II, 2013 WL 1276015, at *1-7 (footnotes omitted). 

III 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal 

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless 

the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

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facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, habeas relief 

is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of 

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under 

the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court 

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether 

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in 

conducting its analysis, the federal court must presume the 

correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the 

petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by 

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clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the 

Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas review, AEDPA ‘imposes a 

highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ 

and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of 

the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly 

established law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the 

dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the 

relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A 

federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a 

view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme 

Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 

12, 17 (2003). 

When applying these standards, the federal court should 

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no 

reasoned opinion from the state’s highest court, the court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 

804. 

IV 

A 

 Petitioner argues that the trial court’s limitations on the 

appointment of counsel on remand deprived Petitioner of effective 

assistance of counsel with respect to the motion for a new trial 

which the trial court chose not to rule on. 

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 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim: 

Reed contends Judge Jacobson deprived him of 

his right to counsel by limiting the scope of 

Broome's [remand counsel’s] investigation of 

his ineffective assistance claim. (U.S. 

Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 

15; Mempa v. Rhay (1969) 389 U.S. 128, 134 

[“appointment of counsel for an indigent is 

required at every stage of a criminal 

proceeding where substantial rights of a 

criminal accused may be affected”].) 

“[T]he right to the assistance of counsel has 

been understood to mean that there can be no 

restrictions upon the function of counsel in 

defending a criminal prosecution in accord 

with the traditions of the adversary 

factfinding process....” (Herring v. New 

York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 857; accord, United 

States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 656, 

fn. 15 (Cronic).) “Government violates the 

right to effective assistance when it 

interferes in certain ways with the ability 

of counsel to make independent decisions 

about how to conduct the defense.” 

(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686.) 

Thus, “‘[t]o satisfy the Constitution, 

counsel must function as an advocate for the 

defendant, as opposed to a friend of the 

court.’” (Cronic, at p. 656, fn. 17, quoting 

Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 758, 

dis. opn. of Brennan, J.) Nonetheless, “the 

right to the effective assistance of counsel 

is recognized not for its own sake, but 

because of the effect it has on the ability 

of the accused to receive a fair trial. 

Absent some effect of challenged conduct on 

the reliability of the trial process, the 

Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not 

implicated. [Citations.]” (Cronic, at p. 

658.) 

On November 1, 2010, Judge Jacobson appointed 

Broome to represent Reed when Patton Brown 

withdrew from the case. The following 

exchange occurred: 

“THE COURT: ... I've had the opportunity to 

speak with you informally. I'm providing you 

with a copy of the Court of Appeal opinion. 

[¶] The Court of Appeal sent this back for a 

very, very narrow issue, which is to 

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investigate for the trial court . . . to make 

an initial determination about whether 

there's a possible ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim as to a single witness in the 

case. And [the trial court] previously 

appointed Lorna Brown to do that 

investigation. Ms. Brown is resigning from 

the Bar and has now withdrawn from this 

endeavor. [¶] Court Appointed sent another 

attorney who came last Friday, Mr. Hetrick. 

Mr. Hetrick was unwilling to accept any 

limitation on his appointment whatsoever. I 

tried to explain to him that the Court of 

Appeal has defined the limits of this 

representation at least initially, and [the 

trial court] has made orders consistent with 

that. So Mr. Hetrick was unwilling to accept 

such limitations, so I declined to appoint 

him. [¶] Mr. Broome, I've explained all that 

to you informally and now on the record as 

well. Are you prepared to accept appointment 

for this limited issue? 

“MR. BROOME: I am. 

“THE COURT: Okay. You are appointed for that 

purpose. . . .” 

Judge Jacobson appears to have been 

attempting to define the scope of Broome's 

representation in a manner consistent with 

[this court's] directions to the trial court 

on remand in Reed I and with the trial 

court's prior orders in the case. To the 

extent he purported to limit the scope of 

this representation beyond [this court's] 

directions in Reed I or in contravention of 

constitutional principles, Reed has not 

established that this amounted to a violation 

of his right to counsel. The record 

demonstrates that Judge Jacobson provided a 

copy of our opinion in Reed I to Broome, and 

that Broome did not limit the scope of his 

representation to the narrow issue defined by 

Judge Jacobson, i.e., “whether there's a 

possible ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim as to a single witness in the case,” 

or, indeed, even the issues the trial court 

asked Patton Brown to investigate. 

We see no indication Judge Jacobson's 

instructions to Broome impacted his 

representation of Reed, produced unfairness 

in the outcome of Reed's motion for new 

trial, or undermined the reliability of the 

adversarial process. We find no merit in 

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Reed's contention his right to counsel was 

violated. As the record shows, Broome did 

not limit his representation of Reed. Reed 

also cannot show prejudicial error as to his 

remaining arguments, and these contentions 

also fail. 

Reed II, 2013 WL 1276015, at *9-10 (footnotes omitted). 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable 

as a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 

which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 

The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 

whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of 

the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as 

having produced a just result. Id. 

 In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of 

counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he 

must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., 

that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” 

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

The Supreme Court in Strickland explained the development of 

the principle that the right to counsel includes the right to 

effective assistance of counsel, and explained that the right 

could be impeded both by the defense attorney as well as by the 

Government. As to the latter, the Government can “violate[ ] the 

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right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways 

with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about 

how to conduct the defense,” e.g., by barring attorney-client 

consultation during a recess, by barring summation at a bench 

trial, by requiring that the defendant be the first defense 

witness, and by barring direct examination of defendant. Id. at 

686 (collecting cases). 

Petitioner has failed to show that the state court denial of 

this claim was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 

authority or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The 

California Court of Appeal remanded the case for the limited 

purpose of inquiring into Petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. On remand the trial court held a 

Marsden hearing where Petitioner stated his reasons why he 

believed trial counsel was ineffective, and trial counsel 

responded. After conducting the inquiry as ordered by the 

California Court of Appeal, the trial court concluded that new 

counsel would be appointed to investigate two areas regarding 

trial counsel’s handling of the case. Reporter’s Transcript 

(“RT”), 8/13/10 at 10. The trial court stated: 

In light of what I have heard today, and 

having completed the inquiry now, as to what 

you feel would have been material in your 

trial and it appears that there may be 

inconclusively, but maybe two areas in which 

it would be appropriate to appoint counsel to 

represent you on the limited areas of the DNA 

and the results and what they mean and 

whether they were material to your trial or 

whether in fact you’re misinterpreting those 

results and they were not material. Those 

are things that a newly appointed counsel 

will look at. 

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The second area that newly appointed counsel 

will look at to determine whether there is a 

basis for a new trial is based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel is whether the failure 

to interview the witness [Bahati] prior to 

trial in any way had a material impact on the 

outcome. So, those are the two areas in 

which the Court cannot make a conclusive 

determination and based upon counsel’s 

response, and the fact that she does not have 

her file with her or her independent memory 

does not serve her well enough to be able to 

firmly respond, I am going to appoint counsel 

on those areas. 

RT, 8/13/10 at 10-11. 

 Despite remand counsel being appointed to only investigate 

the DNA issue and the failure to interview witness Bahati, 

counsel filed a motion for a new trial raising four claims: (1) 

counsel failed to investigate an incident in which Dianne was 

allegedly found performing oral sex on a boy in a closet at the 

youth center;(2) counsel failed to call Petitioner to testify 

regarding the discipline he administered to Dianne as a result of 

incident above at the youth center; (3) counsel failed to secure 

the records showing when Bahati was released from jail, and 

failed to obtain Dianne's birth certificate to show her age at 

the time of the alleged incidents; and (4) counsel failed to 

preserve the record on appeal regarding the composition of the 

jury. CT at 88-91. 

 The attorney appointed on remand did not raise the issues in 

the new trial motion that he was appointed to investigate. It 

appears that trial counsel’s reasons for not following up on the 

DNA issue-because it was frivolous-and not interviewing Bahatibecause she was a prosecution witness-were justified.2

 The 

 

2 Trial counsel recalled that the DNA evidence definitively linked 

Petitioner to the crime, but the DNA did not identify him as the 

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attorney appointed on remand raised the issues that Petitioner 

urged. Thus, remand counsel could not have been deficient for 

raising the legal issues that Petitioner now argues should have 

been raised. Even if there had been a deficiency due to 

counsel’s failure to comply with the trial court’s instructions, 

Petitioner cannot show prejudice. 

The California Court of Appeal found harmless any error 

related to the trial court not addressing on remand the claims 

made in the motion for a new trial. The California Court of 

Appeal stated: 

A. The Closet Incident/Reed's Failure to 

Testify 

According to Reed's motion, it was his 

discipline that provided Dianne a motive to 

falsify her claims against him; Reed's reason 

for disciplining her was irrelevant and would 

not reasonably have altered the outcome. The 

jury heard evidence that Reed had disciplined 

Dianne severely near the time she reported 

the abuse to police, and specifically, that 

while he was whipping her with a belt, she 

wanted to kill him. Trial counsel urged the 

jury to be skeptical of Dianne's accusations, 

as she had “some motivation” to make a false 

claim because Reed “was trying to be a 

disciplinarian.” 

B. Failure to Call Appellant as a Witness 

Appellant argues trial counsel performed 

inadequately by failing to call him as a 

witness, though he had informed her of his 

desire to testify. To the extent appellant's 

testimony would simply have provided a reason 

for the discipline he imposed on Dianne, it 

would not reasonably have altered the 

outcome. 

 

victim’s biological father. It was not argued at trial that 

Petitioner was the biological father.

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C. Failure to Secure Records 

Reed presented no evidence demonstrating that 

Dianne's date of birth was different than the 

date on which the parties relied at trial and 

did not show that records of Bahati's release 

date would have impacted the outcome, given 

the parties' stipulation she was released a 

month after Dianne's 14th birthday and 

Dianne's testimony this was the only time 

Bahati was in jail. 

D. Failure to Locate Bahati 

Reed did not assert trial counsel's failure 

to locate Bahati in his motion for new trial, 

and he presented no evidence showing what 

testimony Bahati would have given. 

E. Jury Composition 

Reed simply alluded to a “failure to raise 

issues of the jury composition, which trial 

counsel never presented to the court or even 

mentioned during jury selection” and 

concluded “[t]rial counsel failed to preserve 

the record on appeal” as to this issue. He 

presented no evidence regarding the jury's 

composition and did not make any showing he 

was prejudiced by the alleged failure to 

preserve this issue. 

We conclude, accordingly, that even if the 

trial court erred in refusing to decide 

Reed's motion for new trial, he has not shown 

the error was reversible. 

Reed II, 2013 WL 1276015, at *8-9 (footnotes omitted). 

 In Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015), the Supreme Court 

recently clarified the standard to be used on habeas review of a 

state court’s harmlessness analysis. If a state court finds an 

error harmless, that determination is reviewed under the 

deferential AEDPA standard. This means that relief is not 

available for the error “unless the state court’s harmlessness 

determination itself was unreasonable.” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 

2199 (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007)). In other 

words, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s 

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harmlessness determination “was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing 

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. 

(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). And if 

the federal court determines that the state court’s harmless 

error analysis was objectively unreasonable, it also must find 

that the error was prejudicial under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619 (1993) before it can grant relief. See Fry, 551 U.S. at 

119-20 (§ 2254(d)(1) did not displace Brecht). 

 The state court’s determination that any error was harmless 

was not unreasonable. Even if the trial court interfered with 

remand counsel’s ability to effectively make independent 

decisions about how to conduct the investigation into trial 

counsel’s actions, there was no prejudice. This claim is denied.3

V 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. 

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 

11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has 

not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not 

 

3 Nor is Petitioner entitled to relief to the extent he argues that 

the trial court erred by not ruling on the motion for a new 

trial. This claim was not exhausted with the California Supreme 

Court, and the California Court of Appeal held that the trial 

court did not err in its actions following the remand order from 

the California Court of Appeal.

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appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court 

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of 

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions 

as moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 02/09/2016 

________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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