Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00717/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00717-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VOULA PAPPAS and CHRISA PAPPAS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STARWOOD HOTELS & RESORTS

WORLDWIDE, INC., 

Defendant. 

CIV-S-05-717 DFL GGH

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Defendant Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.

(“Starwood”) moves to dismiss the negligence claims of plaintiffs

Voula Pappas (“Voula”) and Chrisa Pappas (“Chrisa”) (collectively

“plaintiffs”) on four grounds: (1) forum non conveniens; (2)

failure to sue a proper defendant; (3) failure to state a claim;

and (4) lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

For the reasons stated below, the court: (1) DENIES

Starwood’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens; (2) DENIES

Starwood’s motion to dismiss for failure to sue a proper

defendant; (3) DENIES Starwood’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

claim for negligence; (4) GRANTS Starwood’s motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress

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(“NIED”) and deems the claim part of plaintiffs’ negligence

claim; and (5) DENIES Starwood’s motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

I.

Plaintiffs are a mother and daughter, both residents of

California, who traveled to Greece. (FAC at 2.) On August 26,

2003, plaintiffs stayed at the Hotel Grande Bretagne in Athens,

Greece. (Id.) That night, while plaintiffs slept, they allege

that someone entered their room and stole $15,000 from Voula’s

purse. (Id.) Plaintiffs claim the thief gained access to their

room through a defective door lock. (Id.) 

On April 13, 2005, plaintiffs brought this suit against

Starwood. On September 14, 2005, plaintiffs filed a first

amended complaint (“FAC”). Plaintiffs allege that the Hotel

Grande Bretagne is a Starwood “facility” managed by Starwood. 

(Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Starwood was negligent in

“constructing, maintaining, managing, designing, and otherwise

providing a purportedly safe environment.” (Id.) As a result of

Starwood’s negligence, plaintiffs claim that they have suffered

emotional distress and a “severe shock to their nervous systems.” 

(Id. at 3-5.) 

Based on these allegations, plaintiffs bring two causes of

action: (1) negligence; and (2) NIED. (Id.) Under the

negligence claim, Voula seeks damages for the $15,000 taken from

her purse. (Id. at 3.) Under the NIED claims, each plaintiff

seeks general damages in excess of the minimum jurisdictional

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limits of the court. (Id. at 4-5.)

II.

A. Forum Non Conveniens

Starwood argues that plaintiffs’ suit should be dismissed

because Greece provides a more convenient forum. (Mot. at 9.) A

court may decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case where

litigation in a foreign forum would be more convenient for the

parties. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504, 67 S.Ct.

839 (1947). When considering a motion to dismiss under forum non

conveniens, a court must examine: “(1) whether an adequate

alternative forum exists; and (2) whether the balance of private

and public interest factors favors dismissal.” Luek v.

Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001). To make

its determination, a court may consider declarations outside the

pleadings. U.S. Vestor, LLC v. Biodata Info. Tech. AG, 290

F.Supp.2d 1057, 1062 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing AT & T v.

Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 589-591 (9th Cir.

1996)). 

Under the first part of the test, “[t]he defendant bears the

burden of proving the existence of an adequate alternative

forum.” Cheng, 708 F.2d at 1411. An adequate alternative forum

ordinarily exists when: (1) the defendant is amenable to service

of process in the foreign forum; and (2) the foreign forum

provides the plaintiff with some remedy for his wrong. Luek, 236

F.3d at 1143. However, even if there is an adequate alternative

forum, “[o]rdinarily, a plaintiff’s choice of forum will not be

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 The court notes that Starwood provided a cursory analysis 1

of the choice of law issue in a supplemental brief. (See Def.’s

Reply to Pls.’ Obj. to Decl. Rodriguez.) However, plaintiffs did

not have an opportunity to respond.

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disturbed unless the ‘private interest’ and the ‘public interest’

factors strongly favor trial in a foreign country.” Id. at 1145

(citation omitted). In addition, a plaintiffs’ choice of forum

is entitled to greater deference when he chooses his home forum. 

Id. at 1143 (citation omitted).

Following oral argument, Starwood submitted an additional

declaration suggesting Greece provides an adequate alternative

forum. (See Rodriguez Decl.) However, Starwood has not shown

that the public and private interest factors strongly favor trial

in Greece. Starwood’s briefing contains no discussion of

possible public interest factors, nor choice of law. At present 1

it appears that many of the liability witnesses reside in Greece

while the damage witnesses -- plaintiffs’ treating doctors --

reside in this district. If further discovery demonstrates that

Sacramento is an inconvenient forum, then the court will permit

Starwood to renew the motion. Therefore, the court DENIES

Starwood’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens without

prejudice to its renewal. 

B. Wrong Defendant

Starwood argues that plaintiffs sued the wrong defendant

because Starwood does not manage or own the Hotel Grande

Bretagne. (Mot. at 4.) Instead, Starwood alleges that CIGA, a

Greek corporation, operates and manages the hotel. (Id. at 5.) 

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Starwood licensed its trademarks to CIGA, and CIGA is a whollyowned fourth-tier subsidiary of Sheraton International, Inc.,

which is a third-tier subsidiary of Starwood. (Id.) Starwood

argues because it is a corporate parent, it cannot be liable for

the acts of its subsidiary, CIGA. (Id. at 6.)

In response, plaintiffs argue that Starwood is liable for

CIGA’s negligence under a theory of ostensible agency. (Opp’n at

6.) They claim that Starwood’s website suggests that Starwood

owns and operates the hotel. (Id.)

In support of their respective arguments, both parties have

cited to declarations and evidence outside the FAC. Starwood

cites a number of declarations to establish that it does not

manage or operate the hotel. (Mot. at 4-6.) Similarly,

plaintiffs base their ostensible agency argument on the contents

of a website that was not attached to, or mentioned, in their

complaint. 

However, on a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6), the court may look only to the facts alleged in the

pleadings, documents attached to the pleadings, or matters of

which the court takes judicial notice. See Lovelace v. Software

Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996). Of course,

the court could convert the motion to a summary judgment motion. 

See Rule 12(b)(6). The court declines to do so here because the

briefing is not adequate. In particular, the briefs do not

address whether Greek or California law applies. Moreover,

Starwood assumes that plaintiffs are claiming that Starwood is

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the principal and the hotel is the ostensible agent. However,

according to plaintiffs, it is the other way around. 

Accordingly, Starwood’s briefing is not directed to plaintiffs’

theory of the case. Therefore, the court DENIES Starwoood’s

motion to dismiss Starwood as the wrong defendant with leave to

renew on a motion for summary judgment. 

C. Failure to State a Claim

Starwood moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for: (1)

negligence; and (2) NIED.

1. Negligence

Starwood argues that plaintiffs cannot state a claim for

negligence because Starwood is not the appropriate defendant. 

(Mot. at 11.) As discussed above, the court cannot resolve that

issue on this motion. Therefore, the court DENIES Starwood’s

motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for negligence.

2. NIED

Starwood argues that plaintiffs’ claims for NIED should be

dismissed because California courts do not recognize NIED as an

independent tort. In addition, it argues that plaintiffs cannot

recover for their emotional distress because: (1) Starwood’s

alleged negligence was not outrageous; and (2) Chrisa Pappas

cannot recover under a bystander theory. (Mot. at 11-12.)

a. NIED

Under California law, there is no independent tort of NIED. 

See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 984

(1993); Lawson v. Mgmt. Activities, Inc., 69 Cal.App.4th 652, 656

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(1999). Rather, NIED is simply a form of negligence, and NIED

claims must satisfy the traditional elements of duty, breach,

causation, and damages. Lawson, 69 Cal.App.4th at 656. 

Therefore, plaintiffs’ separate claims for NIED are included in

their claim for negligence, and their damages for emotional

distress should be pleaded under that cause of action. The court

will deem the separate claim for NIED as a claim for emotional

distress damages due to defendant’s negligence. 

b. Damages for Emotional Distress

i. Outrageous Conduct

Starwood argues that plaintiffs cannot recover for emotional

distress because Starwood’s alleged negligence was not

“outrageous.” (Mot. at 12.) In support of its argument,

Starwood cites to Bro v. Glaser, 22 Cal.App.4th 1398 (1994). In

Bro, the court held that a defendant’s conduct must be

“outrageous” for the plaintiff to recover for emotional distress

caused by negligence. Id. at 1441. In addition, it found that a

court could rule as a matter of law that defendant’s conduct was

not outrageous enough to constitute negligence. Id. Under Bro,

Starwood argues that a negligently defective doorlock is not

outrageous conduct as a matter of law. (Mot. at 12.)

However, numerous courts have rejected Bro’s requirement of

outrageous conduct. See Wooden v. Raveling, 61 Cal.App.4th 1035,

1046 (1998) (finding Bro’s outrageous conduct element

inconsistent with existing law that defines NIED as a form of

negligence); Mercado v. Leong, 43 Cal.App.4th 317, 327 (1996)

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(rejecting Bro’s use of the outrageous conduct element). In

addition, the California Supreme Court has not recognized

outrageous conduct as an element of NIED. See Potter, 6 Cal.4th

at 985. Therefore, the court rejects Starwood’s argument that

plaintiffs cannot recover damages for their emotional distress

without showing that Starwood acted outrageously.

ii. Bystander Claim

Starwood also moves to dismiss Chrisa’s claim for emotional

distress because she fails to plead the elements of a bystander

claim. (Mot. at 12.) However, Chrisa did not raise a bystander

claim. “Bystander cases are cases in which the plaintiff was not

physically impacted or injured, but instead witnessed someone

else being injured due to defendant’s negligence.” Wooden, 61

Cal.App.4th at 1037. Here, Chrisa alleges that Starwood caused

her emotional distress by allowing someone to enter her hotel

room while she slept. (FAC at 2,5.) She does not claim that she

suffered emotional distress by witnessing an injury to Voula. 

Although plaintiffs cannot bring a separate tort for NIED,

Starwood has failed to show that they cannot recover for their

emotional distress. Therefore, the court GRANTS Starwood’s

motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ NIED claims and will deem the

complaint amended to include a prayer for emotional distress

damages as part of the negligence claim.

D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Starwood argues that plaintiffs cannot meet the amount in

controversy requirement for two reasons: (1) their monetary

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losses under California law and Greek law are limited; and (2)

their emotional damages do not exceed $75,000. (Mot. at 15;

Reply at 6-7.)

District courts have jurisdiction in civil cases where there

is complete diversity of citizenship among the parties and the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

Generally, the amount in controversy is determined from the face

of the complaint. Crum v. Circus Circus Enter., 231 F.3d 1129,

1131 (9th Cir. 2000). The amount claimed by the plaintiff in the

complaint controls so long as it is made in good faith. Id. “To

justify dismissal, ‘it must appear to a legal certainty that the

claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.’” Id.

(citations omitted).

1. Innkeeper Statutes

First, Starwood argues that plaintiffs’ recovery is limited

by: (1) California Civil Code section 1859; or (2) Greek Article

8 of Law 1652/1986. (Mot. at 15.) However, even if California

and Greek law limit plaintiffs’ recovery of their lost money,

they still plead damages for emotional distress.

2. Damages for Emotional Distress

Starwood argues that plaintiffs’ damages for emotional

distress do not satisfy the $75,000 requirement. (Mot. at 15.)

Under their claims for NIED, plaintiffs allege that their

“injuries will result in some permanent disability . . . [and]

damage[s] . . . in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of

the court . . . .” (FAC at 4-5.) 

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Although the claim of permanent injury may be difficult to

prove, and may fall out on a summary judgment motion, the

allegation of permanent disability suffices to establish the

jurisdictional amount at this juncture. Because Starwood has

failed to show to a legal certainty that plaintiffs’ claim is for

less then the jurisdictional amount, the court DENIES Starwood’s

motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

III.

For the reasons stated above, the court: (1) DENIES

Starwood’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens; (2) DENIES

Starwood’s motion to dismiss for failure to sue a proper

defendant; (3) DENIES Starwood’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

claim for negligence; (4) GRANTS Starwood’s motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ separate claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress and deems the claim part of plaintiffs’ negligence

claim; and (5) DENIES Starwood’s motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/19/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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