Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02012/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02012-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jim Wyatt Crosby, a married man,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Christopher J.M. Opperman and Cheryl L.

Opperman, husband and wife, individually

and doing business as Predator Aviation, 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 06-2012-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Defendant Cheryl Opperman’s (“Defendant Opperman”)

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue. (Dkt.#8). After

reviewing the pleadings and finding oral argument to be unnecessary the Court issues the

following Order. 

I. Background

On August 18, 2006, Plaintiff Jim Wyatt Crosby (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant Complaint

against Defendant Christopher J.M. Opperman and Defendant Opperman (collectively

“Defendants”), husband and wife, alleging claims of Fraudulent Misrepresentation (Count

I); Violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (Count II); Breach of Contract (Count III); Breach

of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count IV); Conversion (Counts V and

VI), Negligence (Count VII); and Punitive Damages (Count VII). (Dkt.#1). Plaintiff invokes

this Court's jurisdiction based upon diversity of the Parties, or 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

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Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that on or about June 28, 2004, Plaintiff and Defendants entered

into an agreement (the “Agreement”) for the assembly of a custom Van's RV-10 Aircraft (the

“Aircraft”) by Defendants for Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶¶ 9-12). According to Plaintiff, the

Agreement was executed in Maricopa County, Arizona. (Id. ¶10). Plaintiff alleges that on

July 2, 2004, Plaintiff provided Defendants funds to be used for the purchase of parts, tools

and supplies necessary to build the Aircraft. (Id. ¶14). After the Defendants relocated to

Idaho, Plaintiff alleges that complications arose with respect to completing the Agreement.

Specifically, in late 2004 and early 2005 there were “a number of significant disputes

between the [Defendants] and [Plaintiff]. (Id. ¶19). After threats by the Defendants to seize

work on the Aircraft, and in an effort to “clarify and confirm the obligations required by the

Agreement” Plaintiff alleges that he and the Defendants entered into a “Manufacture

Agreement” on or about June 1, 2005 (the “Manufacture Agreement.”). (Id. ¶21). According

to Plaintiff, the Manufacture Agreement provided for additional payments to Defendants as

well as additional obligations upon Defendants, such as completion of the project at the end

of 12 months and monthly photographic updates. (Id. ¶¶ 23,26). Plaintiff asserts that upon

receiving such updates regarding the progress of the Aircraft, Plaintiff made twelve monthly

payments of $2,999.25 required by the Manufacture Agreement and two additional payments

of this amount demanded by the Defendants pursuant to an “Addendum.” (Id. ¶31). In total,

Plaintiff estimates that he paid the Defendants at least $47,859.30 for labor and $87,855.75

for parts. (Id. ¶¶32-33). Sometime in July of 2006, Plaintiff asserts he was notified by

Defendant Opperman that Defendant Christopher J.M. Opperman had passed away and that

the Aircraft would not be completed. (Id. ¶ 34). Plaintiff then traveled to Idaho to retrieve

the Aircraft only to find “a collection of almost entirely unassembled airplane parts” and that

the parts were apparently for the subject Aircraft. (Id. ¶36). Plaintiff alleges that either the

Defendants misrepresented their progress on the Aircraft or that the Defendants attempted

to return a different aircraft than the Aircraft bargained for. (Id. ¶¶37-39). 

In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Opperman filed the instant Motion to

dismiss challenging this Court's personal jurisdiction. Defendant Opperman avows that prior

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to moving to Idaho in September, 2004, Defendants were not engaged in the business of

assembling or manufacturing of aircraft. (Defendant Opperman Affidavit. (Dkt.#10) ¶ 6).

Defendant Opperman asserts that the only relevant contract is the “Manufacture Agreement”

which was executed on June 1, 2005, after the Defendants had moved to Idaho and all

negotiations leading up that agreement occurred while Defendants resided in Idaho, other

than telephone calls and emails between Plaintiff and Defendants. (Id. ¶ 11). While

Defendant Opperman concedes that the Parties did engage in negotiations regarding the

construction of the subject Aircraft while Defendants resided in Arizona, no agreement was

ever reached. (Id. ¶19). Further, Defendant Opperman asserts that to the extent any such

relationship existed, it was unequivocally terminated as evidenced by the letter dated

February 13, 2005. (Id. ¶21). Only after that relationship was terminated, did Plaintiff and

Defendants enter into the “Manufacture Agreement.” As such, Defendant Opperman

contends that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over her because the economic

relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant Opperman was created and fulfilled entirely

outside the state of Arizona. Defendant Opperman asserts that the mere existence of a

contract between Plaintiff, an Arizona resident, and Defendant Opperman, residing in Idaho,

without more, is insufficient to justify personal jurisdiction. 

As discussed more fully below, Plaintiff firmly disputes the sworn statements of

Defendant Opperman and submits his own declaration regarding the relevant events.

(Plaintiff's Response, Dkt#14, and Plaintiff's Declaration, Dkt.#15). 

II. Standard of Review

To establish personal jurisdiction plaintiff has the burden of showing that: (1) the forum

state's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant; and (2) the

exercise of jurisdiction comports with principles of due process. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip

& Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1995). Arizona's long-arm statute confers

jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution. Ariz.R.Civ.P. 4.2(a) (2004); Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048,

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1050 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the only issue here is whether the exercise of jurisdiction

over Defendants accords with due process. See Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 269. 

Where an evidentiary hearing is not held, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is

appropriate only if the plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.

Fields v. Sedgwick Associated Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1986).

“[U]ncontroverted allegations in [plaintiff's] complaint must be taken as true, and ‘conflicts

between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiff's] favor for

purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.’” American

Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.

1996) (citing WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1989)). 

III. Discussion

A. Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants

Due Process requires that the nonresident defendant have “certain minimum contacts with

[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945) (internal citation omitted). There are two types of personal jurisdiction, general and

specific. General jurisdiction exists where a non-resident defendant engages in substantial,

continuous or systematic activities within the forum. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining,

Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 72 S.Ct. 413 (1952). When a defendant’s contacts with the forum

do not rise to the level required for general jurisdiction, a court may exercise specific

jurisdiction over a claim when it arises from the defendant’s activities within that forum.

Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990) rev’d on other grounds,

499 U.S. 585, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991). 

In the instant case, Plaintiff does not argue that general jurisdiction exists with respect to

Defendant Opperman, but rather argues that this Court possesses specific jurisdiction over

her. Therefore, the Court will address only the issue of specific jurisdiction. The Ninth

Circuit utilizes a three-prong test to evaluate the nature and quality of a defendant's contacts

for purposes of specific jurisdiction; the test provides:

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1) the nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some

transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he

purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities

in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections; 2) the

claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant

forum related activities; and 3) exercise of the jurisdiction must be

reasonable. 

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). 

All three factors must exist for personal jurisdiction to apply. Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 270.

(1) Three-Prong Analysis of Specific Jurisdiction

(i) Purposeful Availment

The first step of the relevant inquiry in determining if this Court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over Defendant Opperman is to determine if she has purposefully availed herself

of the privileges of conducting activities in Arizona. This requirement ensures that a

defendant is not “haled into court as the result of random, fortuitous or attenuated contacts,

or on account of the unilateral acts of third parties.” Shute, 897 F.3d at 381. To satisfy this

prong, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that Defendant Opperman has, “performed

some act or consummated some transaction within the forum or otherwise purposefully

availed [herself] of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum.” Bancroft, 223 F.3d

at 1086.

Based upon the allegations and evidence presented, the Court finds that Plaintiff is able

to satisfy this prong. First, there is directly contradictory evidence regarding Defendant

Opperman’s assertion that Defendants were not engaged in the airplane manufacturing

business while residing in Arizona. Notably, Plaintiff attaches an advertising brochure and

other soliciting information of Predator Aviation, Defendants' d/b/a, disclosing an address

in Peoria, Arizona. (Plaintiff's Declaration, (Dkt.#15) Exhibits A-C). As such, it appears that

Defendants were conducting airplane construction and manufacturing in Arizona prior to

relocating to Idaho. Second, it appears that Plaintiff provided partial payment of $8,594 to

Defendants with regard to construction of the subject Aircraft while the Defendants were

residing in Arizona and that certain parts for use in the project were delivered to Defendants

at their Arizona location. (Id. ¶¶8-11). Third, even if the relationship between Defendants

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and Plaintiff temporarily broke down on February 13, 2005 with Defendants' termination

letter, it appears that the relationship may have continued with the subsequent Manufacture

Agreement. (Id. ¶¶16-17). The fact that the Manufacture Agreement may have been

executed while the Defendants resided in Idaho does not somehow bar Plaintiff’s ability to

satisfy the purposeful availment prong. For instance, the circumstances surrounding the

Manufacture Agreement and prior negotiations suggest that the Defendants availed

themselves of the privilege of conducting business within the state of Arizona. In viewing

the contradictory statements between the Parties in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,

it appears that the Manufacture Agreement was a continuation or extension of the original

Agreement entered into between the Parties in June of 2004, while Defendants resided in

Arizona. (Id. ¶16). Importantly, the Defendants and Plaintiff appear to have negotiated the

terms of the Agreement in Arizona. Moreover, even after Defendants moved to Idaho they

continued to transact business with Plaintiff. For instance, it appears that Defendants

received substantial payments from Plaintiff with regard to the construction of the Aircraft.

Thus, while “an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone [cannot] automatically

establish sufficient minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction” McGlinchy v. Shell

Chemical Co, 845 F.2d 802, 816 n.9 (9th Cir. 1988), courts also look to the circumstance

surrounding such contracts, such as “prior negotiations and contemplated future

consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing...”

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985). In doing so, it appears that

Defendant Opperman purposefully availed herself of the privileges of conducting business

in Arizona with Plaintiff.

(ii) “Arising Out Of” Requirement

The “arising out of” requirement is also referred to as the “but for” test. “[A] claim arises

out of the forum related activities if it would not have happened “but for” the forum related

activities.” Shute, 897 F.2d at 387. 

In applying this factor to the circumstances of the instance case, it is apparent that this

factor supports this Court's personal jurisdiction over Defendant Opperman. For instance,

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the alleged cause of action appears to arise out of the Defendants having negotiated,

executed, and at least partially performed the Agreement they formed with Plaintiff in

Arizona and subsequent Manufacture Agreement. It is these agreements regarding the

subject Aircraft that directly implicate Defendant Opperman’s contacts with Arizona and that

the instant cause of action arises from. In other words, “but for” these forum related

activities, the instant claims would not have been asserted. As such, this factor supports this

Court's personal jurisdiction.

(iii) Reasonableness

For specific jurisdiction to be reasonable, “it must comport with fair play and substantial

justice.” Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,

476, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985)). Several factors are to be considered in determining the

reasonableness of exercising specific jurisdiction: (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful

interjection into the forum state; (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum;

(3) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum

state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient use of judicial resolution of

the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and

effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.” Id. 

In reviewing these factors, the Court finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is

reasonable. First, it is important to note that because the Court has found that the “purposeful

availment” prong has been established, “the forum's exercise of jurisdiction is presumptively

reasonable. To rebut the presumption, a defendant ‘must present a compelling case’ that the

exercise of jurisdiction would, in fact, be unreasonable.” Shute, 897 F.2d at 386 (quoting

Burger King, 741 U.S. at 476). To rebut this presumption, Defendant Opperman argues that

litigation of the instant dispute in this District would cause a significant burden on her as she

has since moved to Portland, Oregon since the passing of her husband. Moreover, Defendant

Opperman contends that Arizona likely has little interest in litigating this dispute. However,

the Court does not find Defendant Opperman’s arguments persuasive. While, the Court

recognizes the burden of travel to and from Arizona, the Court does not find that this presents

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a compelling case defeating personal jurisdiction. With the existence and advantages of

modern communication means, the Court believes that travel for Defendant Opperman can,

at least, be reasonably minimized. In addition, contrary to Defendant Opperman’s argument,

the Court believes the state of Arizona has a significant interest in litigating this dispute. For

instance, the dispute appears to have its genesis out of negotiations and an agreement entered

in Arizona. Also, the Plaintiff still resides in Arizona and it appears that the subject Aircraft

has since been relocated to Arizona. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 387 (“A state is deemed to have

a strong interest in protecting its citizens against the tortious acts of others.”). As such, in

weighing all the relevant factors regarding reasonableness, the court finds that the exercise

of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Opperman is reasonable.

B. Venue

Defendant Opperman contends in her Motion to dismiss that the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona is an improper venue for this suit. Specifically, Defendant

Opperman asserts that venue is proper either in Idaho, where the Manufacture Agreement

was executed or in Portland, Oregon, where Defendant Opperman currently resides. The

Court does not agree. 

United States Code 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) provides that a civil action founded only on

diversity of citizenship may be brought only in, “a judicial district in which a substantial part

of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property

that is the subject of the action is situated.” Here, as discussed above, it appears that a

substantial part of the events or omissions occurred in Arizona. Moreover, the subject

Aircraft and accompanying parts appear to be located in Phoenix, Arizona. Under such

circumstances, the Court finds that venue is proper in this District. The fact that certain

events also occurred in Idaho and that Defendant Opperman resides in Portland, Oregon does

not somehow make venue in this District improper. 

IV. Conclusion

The Court finds that based upon the allegations and evidence presented, Plaintiff has met

his prima facie burden demonstrating the propriety of personal jurisdiction over Defendant

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Opperman by this Court. Additionally, the District of Arizona is an appropriate venue to

litigate this dispute. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Defendant Opperman’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue. (Dkt. #8)

DATED this 5th day of July, 2007.

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