Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02175/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02175-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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(Rev. 8/82)

Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of 1

 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne

 B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

ANTHONY E. SAUM PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-2175

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R

Plaintiff Anthony E. Saum appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On September 6, 2006, a judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff now moves for an award of

$2, 967.40 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 18.50 attorney hours of work before the court

at an hourly rate of $160.40. (Doc. # 14). Defendant has filed a response, objecting to the hourly

rate requested. (Doc. # 18). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a prevailing

social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was substantially

justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for the government's

denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

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judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was

specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S.

789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat.

186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a claimant’s

past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or her expenses

and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under both

acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the prevailing party’s

litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action. Id. See also,

Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the following

factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required to handle

the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits resulting to

the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency or certainty of

compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247

(W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood, 487

U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s services and

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fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand counsel’s

representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary of HHS, 923

F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir.1989). The

court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the absence of an

objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1992)

("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an accurately

calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996, amended

the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to $125.00 per hour.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting statutes

such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time records of

hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work." Id.

Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at $160.40 for the18.50 hours which

he asserts he devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this court. The party seeking attorney fees

bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

at 437. 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum statutory

rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living or a special

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factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains at the

discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v.

Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be increased when

there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney's

fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel

has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit (Doc. # 17) and has presented

evidence of an increase in the cost of living. 

The Commissioner has raised an objection to the hourly rate requested. (Doc. # 18). We

agree that the requested hourly rate is excessive and find that an award based upon an hourly rate

of $150.00 per hour, reflecting an increase in the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly

fee awards in cases in Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990).

Thus, based upon the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of

attorney's fees in this case is $150.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.35 hour on December 19, 2005 (received and served summons with

attached Complaint for review to appropriate parties), from which we deduct 0.35 hour. This time

cannot be compensated under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d

881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is not

compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, 0.35 hour must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.15 hour on December 19, 2005 (correspondence from district

court with consent to proceed before a magistrate judge form. Completed by attorney and returned

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to district court), from which we deduct 0.05 hour; 0.15 hour on January 3, 2006 (received and

reviewed consent to jurisdiction by US Magistrate), from which we deduct 0.05 hour; 0.15 hour on

January 25, 2006 (review of affidavit of service filed in district court by attorney), from which we

deduct 0.05 hour; and 0.15 hour on February 6, 2006 (received and reviewed district court

scheduling order), from which we deduct 0.05 hour. This court concludes that the time submitted

on the above referenced dates, should not have taken an attorney experienced in handling social

security cases more than five or six minutes to review these documents. Bowman v. Secretary of

H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark. 1989). Accordingly, 0.20 hour must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel.

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 17.95

(18.50- 0.55) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $150.00 per hour, for a total attorney's fee

award of $2,692.50. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due

benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 22 day of February 2007. nd

/s/ J. Marschewski 

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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