Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-1_13-cv-00006/USCOURTS-ared-1_13-cv-00006-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

KATHERINE MAE SANDERS PLAINTIFF

v. No. 1:13CV00006‐SWW‐JJV

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner,

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

Instructions

The following recommendeddisposition was preparedforU.S.DistrictJudge Susan

W. Wright.  A party to this dispute may object to this recommendation in writing.  An

objection must be specific and state the factual and/or legal basis for the objection.  An

objection to a factual finding must identify the finding and the evidence supporting the

objection.  Objections must be filed with the clerk of the court no later than 14 days from

the date of this recommendation.1

  The objecting party must serve the opposing party with

a copy of an objection.  Failing to object within 14 days waives the right to appeal questions

of fact.2  If no objections are filed, Judge Wright may adopt the recommended disposition

without independently reviewing the record evidence.  An objecting party who seeks to

submit new, different, or additional evidence, orto obtain a hearing forthat purpose, must

address the following matters as part of written objections: (1) why the record before the

1

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

2

Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure to file objections waives

right to de novo review and to appeal magistrate judge’s findings of fact).

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magistrate judge was inadequate,(2) why the evidence was notpresentedto the magistrate

judge, and (3) details and/or copies of any testimony and/or documents to be proffered at

a hearing.  Based on this submission, Judge Wright will determine the need for a hearing.

Recommended Disposition

Katherine Mae Sanders seeks judicialreview of the partial denial of her application

for social security disability benefits.3

  Ms. Sanders last worked in May 2008 as a store

clerk.4  She bases disability on neck injury, depression, priorlung failure, priorliverfailure,

prior kidney failure, chronic headaches,right side paralysis, and shortness of breath.5  She

maintains she has been disabled since May 2008.

TheCommissioner’sdecision.  After consideringthe application,the Commissioner

determined Ms. Sanders was disabled beginning February 15, 2010, based on the residual

effects of pneumonia and the H1N1 virus.6  Prior to that date, the ALJ determined Ms.

Sanders could have done some light work, to include her past work as a laborer on a

3

SSA record at p. 147 (applying for disability benefits on May 18, 2010 and alleging

disability beginning July 10, 2008), p. 154 (changing onset date to Jan. 9, 2008) and p. 33

(amending onset date to May 1, 2008).

4

Id. at pp. 169, 177 & 189.

5

Id. at p. 168.

6

Id. at p. 12 (identifying dysthymic disorder, status post multiple organ failure due

to H1N1 virus, and disorder of the cervical spine as severe impairments beginning Feb. 15,

2010), p. 15 (determining Ms. Sanders could do some light work, but would be off task one‐

third of workday beginning Feb. 15, 2010) and p. 19 (concluding that Ms. Sanders became

disabled on Feb. 15, 2010).

2

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poultry processing line.7

  Because a person who can do her past work is not disabled under

social security law, the ALJ determined Ms. Sanders was not disabled before February 15,

2010.8

  Thus, the ALJ awarded benefits beginning February 15, 2010.  Because Ms. Sanders

sought earlier benefits, she asked the Appeals Council to review her case.9

After the Appeals Council denied review,10 the ALJ’s decision became the

Commissioner’s final decision for the purpose of judicial review.11  Ms. Sanders filed this

case to challenge the denial of earlier benefits.12  In reviewing the decision, the court must

determine whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whetherthe ALJ made

a legal error.13  

7

Id. at p. 18.

8

Id. at p. 19.

9

Id. at p. 84.

10Id. at p. 1.

11See Anderson v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1992) (“the Social Security Act

precludes general federal subject matter jurisdiction until administrative remedies have

been exhausted” and explaining that the Commissioner’s appeal procedure permits

claimants to appeal only final decisions).

12Docket entry # 1.

13See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring the district court to determine whether the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the

Commissioner conformed with applicable regulations); Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187

(8th Cir. 1997) (“We will uphold the Commissioner’s decision to deny an applicant

disability benefits if the decision is not based on legal error and if there is substantial

evidence in the record as a whole to support the conclusion that the claimant was not

disabled.”).

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Ms. Sanders’s allegations.   Ms. Sanders challenges the determination that she

wasn’t disabled before February 15, 2010.  She says the medical evidence about the date of

the onset of her disability is ambiguous and the ALJ should have asked a medical expert

about the date.  She insists she was disabled before February 15, 2010, due to depression,

neck pain, and pancreatitis.  Forthese reasons, she maintains substantial evidence does not

support the unfavorable aspect of the ALJ’s decision.14

Applicable principles.    For substantial evidence to support the decision, a

reasonable mind must accept the evidence as adequate to show Ms. Sanders could have

done some light work, to include her past work as a laborer on poultry processing line,

before February 15, 2010.15  “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time

with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.”16  The ALJ placed

the following limitations on light work: (1) occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling,

crouching, crawling, and climbing; (2) simple, routine, repetitive tasks; (3) simple work‐

related decisions; and (4) incidental contact with co‐workers, supervisors, and the general

public.17  The court must determine whether a reasonable mind would accept the evidence

as adequate to show Ms. Sanders could have done worked within these parameters before

14Docket entry # 12.

15Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009); Britton v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 328,

330 (8th Cir. 1990).

1620 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) & 416.967(b).

17SSA record at p. 13.

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February 15, 2010.

After carful consideration ofthe record,the Court concludes that a  reasonable mind

would accept the evidence as adequate because the medical evidence shows little physical

or mental impairment before February 15, 2010.  Therefore, the Court recommends that

the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.

Ms. Sanders insists depression, neck pain, and pancreatitis prevented her from

working before February 15, 2010.  But this allegation, alone, isn’t not enough to prove

disability.  The determination about a claimant’s ability to work must be supported by

medical evidence.18  And while the Court is sympathetic to Ms. Sanders’s claims, most of

the medical evidence flowed from a March 2010 hospitalization.

On March 2, 2010, Ms. Sanders was hospitalized for acute respiratory distress

syndrome and multiple organ failure flowing from pneumonia and the H1N1 virus; she

1842 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(5)(A) (“An individual’s statement as to pain or other symptoms

shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability...; there must be medical signs and

findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques,

which show the existence of a medical impairment...which could reasonably be expected

to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which...would lead to a conclusion

that the individual is under a disability”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508 & 416.908 (“A physical or

mental impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting of signs,

symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by your statement of symptoms.”); 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1529 & 416.929 (“[S]tatements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone

establish that you are disabled; there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which

show that you have a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all of the

other evidence (including statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or

other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs

and laboratory findings), would lead to a conclusion that you are disabled.”).

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required extensive mechanical ventilation.19    After she was stabilized, Ms. Sanders

underwent rehabilitation.20    With treatment, rehabilitation, and time, Ms. Sanders

improved.21  To the extent the ALJ erred about the date of the onset of disability, the error

does not act in Ms. Sanders’s favor, because there is no medical evidence showing Ms.

Sanders was disabled as early as February 15, 2010.  Identifying that date as onsetrequires

presuming Ms. Sanders was disabled two weeks before her hospitalization.  There was no

need to consult a medical expert about the possibility of an earlier onset date because there

is no medical evidence from November 2, 2009, to March 2, 2010.

Priorto the March 2, 2010, hospitalization,Ms. Sanders complained about neck pain

and depression.22  Her primary care provider (PCP) prescribed pain relievers and anti‐

depressants, but recommended no speciality care.   Importantly, the medical evidence

reveals thatMs. Sanders’s symptoms respondedto treatment.23  “Animpairment which can

be controlled by treatment or medication is not considered disabling.”24  The PCP’s failure

to recommend speciality care — orthopedic care for neck pain or mental health treatment

19SSA record at pp. 258, 367.

20Id. at p. 523 (hospital discharge summary; discharged April 22, 2010).

21Id. at p. 616 (per agency examiner on Mar. 3, 2011, recovery from multiple organ

failure is very good; mild physical limitations).

22Id. at pp. 284‐92.

23Id. at p. 289 (Dec. 16, 2008, depression is better) and p. 283 (pain medication is

controlling pain well).

24Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2002).

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for depression — also supports the ALJ’s conclusion.  

In May 2009, Ms. Sanders developed acute pancreatitis.25    Realizing acute

pancreatitis can cause intense abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting, the medical records

show that the condition resolved.26    There is no evidence pancreatitis prevented Ms.

Sanders from working for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.27

Pancreatitis provides no basis for disability.

The evidence also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Sanders was capable of

performing her past relevant work before February 15, 2010.    Medical experts twice

reviewed Ms. Sanders’s treatment records: five‐and‐one‐half months after the March 2,

2010, hospitalization and fourteen months after the hospitalization.  Both times, medical

experts agreed that Ms. Sanders could work within the ALJ’s physical limitations.28  Thus,

even though medical experts opined that Ms. Sanders has the physical ability to do light

work, the ALJ gave Ms. Sanders the benefit of the doubt by finding she was disabled after

the hospitalization.

25SSA record at pp. 314‐24 (May 11, 2009) and pp. 410‐20 (May 19, 2009).

26Id. at p. 416 (May 19, 2009, slowly resolving pancreatitis) & p. 310 (July 11, 2009,

probably not pancreatic at this time).

27See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (specifying duration requirement for disability

benefits).  See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (“The law defines disability as the inability to do

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medicallydeterminable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to resultin death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”).

28SSA record at p. 543 (Aug. 20, 2010) and p. 629 (Apr. 25, 2011).

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To the extentMs. Sanders relies ondepression,the psychological examinerreported

no significant limitations in adaptive ability or completing tasks in a timely fashion.29

During the evaluation,Ms. Sanders attributeddepression to the 1998death of her son,30 but

she worked for many years after her son’s death.  She attributed not working to physical

impairment and reported getting along with co‐workers, supervisors, and the public.31  A

mental health expert opined that Ms. Sanders can do unskilled work involving tasks

learned and performed by rote, few variables, little judgment, incidental interpersonal

contact, and simple, direct, concrete supervision.32    That is the type of work the ALJ

required.

In the past, Ms. Sanders worked as a laborer on a poultry processing line.  The ALJ

asked a vocational expert about work for a person with Ms. Sanders’s limitations.33  The

vocational expert testified that a person with those limitations can work as a laborer on a

poultry processing line.  The vocational evidence supports a conclusions that Ms. Sanders

was capable of performing her past work.34

29Id. at p. 587.

30Id. at p. 585.

31Id. at p. 586.

32Id. at p. 596.

33Id. at p. 76.

3420 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4) (“If you can still do your past relevant

work, we will find that you are not disabled.”).

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Conclusion and Recommendation

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision because a reasonable mind would

accept the evidence as adequate to support the decision.  The ALJ made no harmful legal

error.  Forthese reasons,the Courtrecommends DENYINGMs. Sanders’s requestforrelief

(docket entry # 2) and AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s decision.

Dated this 11th day of February, 2015.

____________________________

JOE J. VOLPE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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