Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03087/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT D. PEDRANTI JR., 

Plaintiff.

v.

JOANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C 04-3087 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment in a Social Security appeal

brought by Robert Pedranti (“Plaintiff”) and Joanne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration (“Defendant”). These motions require the Court to determine if (1)

substantial evidence exists in support of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, and (2)

correct legal standards were applied. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff completed his education through the eighth grade. As a result of his chronic lack of

attendance noted throughout his academic records, his reading, writing and math skills are poor. 

After leaving school in 1991, Plaintiff held various short-term, temporary jobs such as a bell ringer
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for the Salvation Army and various landscaping and warehouse jobs, but he has not worked since his

last warehouse job in 1998. Plaintiff filed his application alleging disability due to non-exertional

disabilities, specifically depression, cognitive impairment, anxiety, and dyslexia. Plaintiff alleges

that the severity of his disability prevents him from performing basic work activities because he is

unable to concentrate and has a deficient short-term memory. Plaintiff testified, as did his father and

grandmother, that Plaintiff is unable to hold a job because of his lack of concentration and slow

performance. 

Plaintiff does not take any medications for his alleged depression and anxiety, and is not

pursuing mental health counseling because he cannot afford it. As he has no treating physician, his

medical record consists of three opinions from examining physicians, one opinion from the

reviewing state agency physicians, and the opinion of a medical expert during his hearing. 

Dr. Laurie R. Weiss examined Plaintiff on January 17, 2000. In this “limited” evaluation,

Dr. Weiss found Plaintiff to have low-average to average cognitive potential, and concluded Plaintiff

was capable of “perform[ing] simple and uncomplicated one and two step instructions.” 

(Administrative Record (“AR”) at 222.) Dr. Weiss also asserted that it “appears that [Plaintiff] is a

poor candidate for the work environment.” (AR at 223.) She attributed this assessment at least

partly to a seeming lack of motivation. She also noted that Plaintiff appeared to have poor

concentration and memory skills, perhaps due to the “symptoms of anxiety” and “indicators of

depression present” in the test results. 

Dr. Morey Weingarten conducted a psychiatric examination of Plaintiff on August 30, 2002. 

Dr. Weingarten found no symptoms of anxiety and could not confirm the existence of any depressive

disorder. He also concluded there was no “notable evidence of any cognitive impairment,” learning

disorder, or attention deficit disorder. As a result, Dr. Weingarten felt Plaintiff could function

effectively in a “typical workplace.” (AR at 251.)

State agency physicians reviewing these two evaluations concluded that while Plaintiff’s

ability to carry out detailed instructions was moderately limited, his concentration, attention, and

ability to carry out simple instructions were not significantly limited. (AR at 226.) 

Dr. Lloyd Meadows, who testified as a medical expert during Plaintiff’s hearing, utilized
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these sources and the record as a whole to conclude that any cognitive impairment suffered by

Plaintiff was not clearly established. Dr. Meadows concluded that Plaintiff’s learning deficits were

attributable to his chronic lack of attendance while in school. Dr. Meadows also noted that Dr.

Weiss did not conduct all the necessary testing and therefore found her findings to be speculative. 

However, Dr. Meadows did conclude, similarly to Dr. Weiss, that Plaintiff may suffer from a

depressive disorder and/or anxiety. 

After the hearing and subsequent denial, Plaintiff received another medical evaluation by Dr.

Terrance Riley on June 5, 2003, which was added to the record and considered with his request for

review of the ALJ’s decision. Riley concluded Plaintiff had an IQ in the low-average range. He

also found Plaintiff had a “marked weakness” in his auditory working memory, and had “severe

learning deficits in reading, writing and math skills.” (AR at 259.)

Plaintiff lives with his grandmother, and spends a majority of his time playing video games,

working out, socializing with others, completing chores, and attending community festivals. (AR at

148). His chores include cooking, doing laundry, going to the grocery store, and assisting his

grandmother around the house. (AR at 54.) 

B. Procedural Background

On December 10, 1999, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The SSA denied the application

initially on February 10, 2000, and upon reconsideration on May 10, 2000. On June 3, 2000,

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, and Plaintiff appeared with counsel before an ALJ on

October 30, 2000. On December 20, 2000, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. The case was

later remanded after the Office of Hearings and Appeals (“OHA”) conducted a review of the

decision. 

On June 10, 2002, a second hearing was held by a different ALJ. At that hearing, Dr.

Meadows testified as a medical expert. Dr. John Velton testified as a vocational expert (“VE”), and

indicated claimant could successfully perform four occupations: Construction laborer, gardener,

automobile detailer, and any simple, repetitive occupation, such as wall cleaner. Dr. Velton based

his assessment on a person with mild limitations on daily activities, social functioning,
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concentration, persistence and pace, who could complete one to two step instructions and had a

limited ability to read and write. The ALJ again found that Plaintiff was not disabled because he

was able to perform simple, entry-level occupations existing in significant numbers, and he therefore

denied the application on November 22, 2002. 

The ALJ’s decision became final when the OHA declined Plaintiff’s request for review on

May 28, 2004. In its explanation denying the request for review, the SSA stated that the posthearing psychological report conducted by Dr. Riley and added to the record contained “no

indication of how [Plaintiff’s] scores would or would not affect work-related functional activities.” 

Therefore, the OHA concluded that the additional information did not provide evidence requiring the

reversal of the ALJ’s decision. After receiving this denial, Plaintiff filed the current action for

judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The Court may

disturb the Commissioner’s final decision “only if it is based on legal error or if the fact findings are

not supported by substantial evidence.” Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Magallanes v.

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). “[C]onsidering the entire record, [substantial evidence]

is relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1993). Determinations of credibility, resolution of

conflicts in medical testimony and all other ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. Magallanes,

881 F.2d at 750. The decision of the ALJ will be upheld if the evidence is “susceptible to more than

one rational interpretation.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995).

To qualify for Title XVI benefits, a claimant must establish a medically determinable

physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at

least twelve months that prevents him from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1)(A). In addition, to establish a disability, an individual “must show that he is precluded

from engaging not only in his ‘previous work,’ but also from performing ‘any other kind of
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substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy.’” Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680; 42 U.S.C.

§§ 423(d)(2) (A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B).

ANALYSIS

To determine whether a claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits, the Commissioner of

Social Security conducts a five-step sequential inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. 

Under the first step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial

gainful activity. If not, the second step asks whether the claimant has a severe impairment. In step

three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a condition which meets or equals the conditions

outlined in the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520. If the claimant does not have such a condition, step four asks whether the claimant has

the RFC to perform his past relevant work. If not, in step five, the ALJ considers whether the

claimant has the ability to perform other work which exists in substantial numbers in the national

economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f); 404.920(b)-(f). While the burden is on the claimant to

demonstrate the first four requirements, the burden shifts to the Secretary in step five. Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995).

The ALJ considered the first four steps of the five-step sequential process and found that

Plaintiff was disabled. At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity because he had not worked since applying for disability benefits. At step two, he

found Plaintiff suffered from a severe depressive disorder which limited his ability to perform basic

work activities. At step three, he found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the listed

impairments located in the Listing of Impairments, Appendix 1, and thus Plaintiff could not be

labeled as conclusively disabled. At step four, the ALJ could not determine if Plaintiff had the RFC

to perform his past relevant work because there was no relevant prior work experience. However, at

step five, the ALJ found that because Plaintiff was capable of performing occupations existing in

significant numbers, he was not disabled by SSA standards. 

Plaintiff contends that (1) the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff has an Residual Functional

Capacity (“RFC”) to perform simple, entry-level work is not supported by substantial evidence; and

(2) the ALJ improperly relied on the VE’s testimony at the hearing, during which he asserted that a
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 The ALJ resolved any conflict in Dr. Weiss’s two statements by finding that “while Dr. Weiss

characterized the claimant as a ‘poor candidate for the work environment,’ she also found that he could

perform simple one-step work[.]” (AR at 21.)

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significant number of occupations existed in the local economy that Plaintiff could perform.

A. The Medical Evidence, Testimony of Expert, and the Record Provide Substantial

Evidence Supporting the ALJ’s Denial.

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence

because the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Weiss’s finding that he is a poor candidate for the work

environment. Defendant argues that the ALJ did not reject Dr. Weiss’s opinion, but rather properly

exercised his authority to interpret ambiguities in the medical evidence. Therefore, Defendant

asserts that the medical evidence, including Dr. Weiss’s opinion, is consistent with the ALJ’s

decision, and, along with other evidence submitted, provides substantial evidence for the denial.

The opinion of an examining physician is ordinarily entitled to substantial weight. Morgan

v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600-02 (9th Cir. 1999). If the ALJ chooses to

reject such an opinion, he must set forth “specific and legitimate reasons” for doing so which are

“supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.

1995). However, where medical evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the

ALJ’s chosen interpretation is not a rejection of the opinion, and it should therefore be upheld. 

Magellenes, 881 F.2d at 750. 

Upon review of Dr. Weiss’s findings, the Court finds that the ambiguity of the various

conclusions within her evaluation of Plaintiff could lead to different interpretations of her ultimate

assessment. While Dr. Weiss found Plaintiff to be a “poor candidate for the work environment,” she

also concluded that Plaintiff is capable of performing simple one and two step work, and also noted

that “any difficulty functioning in employment, would be a function . . . of a lack of motivation.” 

(AR at 21.) Considering Dr. Weiss’s findings in their entirety, the ALJ consequently chose to

interpret Dr. Weiss’s findings as meaning that while Plaintiff is a poor candidate for the workplace

in general, in part because of his motivational problems, Plaintiff is nonetheless capable of certain

simple, entry-level work.1

 Therefore, rather than rejecting Dr. Weiss’s opinion that Plaintiff was

unsuitable for the workplace, the ALJ fulfilled his duty to “resolve conflicts and ambiguities in the
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 In Plaintiff’s brief, he emphasizes that Dr. Riley recorded the same IQ scores as Dr. Weiss and

verified his memory weaknesses. However, these findings, without more, do not address Plaintiff’s

work ability. Furthermore, while the record indicates that a career assessment inventory was completed

with the study, Plaintiff failed to submit this part of the evaluation to the Court. 

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medical evidence” by rationally interpreting Dr. Weiss’s evaluation in such a way that made her

findings within the evaluation consistent with each other. Magellenes, 881 F.2d at 750.

The ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Weiss’s findings was rational not only because it remedied

possible inconsistencies between Dr. Weiss’s various conclusions, but also because it minimized

conflicts with the other medical evidence. In the other medical evaluation provided, Dr. Weingarten

found Plaintiff only had “mild short term memory problems” and “no deficits in concentration,” and

concluded that Plaintiff should “have no difficulty functioning effectively in the workplace.” (AR at

21.) As these findings conflict with Dr. Weiss’s “poor candidacy” assessment, the ALJ exercised his

authority to resolve the conflicts between these two evaluations. 

However, Plaintiff argues Dr. Riley’s post-hearing evaluation demonstrates that the ALJ’s

interpretation of Dr. Weiss’s findings was incorrect. The OHA considered Dr. Riley’s evaluation

and determined that Dr. Riley’s findings did not affect the ALJ’s decision because “there was no

indication of how [the evaluation] would or would not affect work-related functional activities.” 

(AR at 8.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff fails to indicate any finding by Dr. Riley that supports the

conclusion that he is unable to work, and the study itself does not even discuss how Plaintiff’s

impairments affect his work ability.2

 Therefore, the ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Weiss’s statements

is not affected by Dr. Riley’s study.

The ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Weiss’s findings is also supported by testimony regarding his

daily activities. Plaintiff and his family members testified to his ability to engage in daily activities

such as cooking, shopping, playing video games, exercising, and attending community festivals. 

The ALJ noted this testimony in his decision. (See AR at 21 ("[Claimant’s] activities suggest an

ability to focus on activities on a sustained basis.”)). This, in addition to the lack of medical

evidence, allowed the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff’s depressive disorder does not sufficiently

interfere with his ability to focus on and engage in activities. 

However, Plaintiff contends that his sporadic work history supports his interpretation of Dr.
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Weiss’s opinion that he is unsuitable for the workplace. At his hearing, Plaintiff confirmed that he

had been fired from previous jobs because of his slow pace and making too many mistakes, and both

his father and grandmother confirmed this. However, he also admitted that he was laid off from the

warehouses because they did not have any more work for him at that time. Furthermore, at the

landscaping job where he was fired for not keeping pace, Plaintiff asserted that his boss was

“basically firing everybody left and right,” indicating that his firing was perhaps attributable to an

overzealous employer rather than his shortcomings. Therefore, although Plaintiff provides evidence

that he has difficulty functioning in some workplaces, there is also evidence that he is able to

succeed in others, and the ALJ did not err by interpreting Dr. Weiss’s findings as indicating that

Plaintiff is able to perform certain occupations.

In sum, although there is some evidence supporting Plaintiff’s contention that his disorder

renders him unable to work, there is substantial evidence both from the medical evaluations as

properly interpreted by the ALJ, and from the record as a whole, that Plaintiff is capable of

performing simple, entry-level work.

B. The Vocational Expert Erred by Supplying Occupations That Were Unsuitable

For Plaintiff, But There Are Still Significant Numbers Of Available Occupations

To Support the ALJ’s Conclusions.

As mentioned, once the claimant’s RFC is determined, the burden shifts to the Commissioner

to prove that the claimant is capable of performing occupations which are available in sufficient

numbers in Plaintiff’s local region. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997). 

When a claimant has non-exertional impairments, the ALJ must elicit testimony from a VE in

making this determination. Id.; Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff contends that even if he is capable of simple entry-level work, the ALJ improperly

relied on the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform four occupations available in sufficient

numbers. Plaintiff asserts that the mental capacity required for three of the four suggested

occupations as defined by the DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (4th ed. 1991) (“DOT”)

exceeds Plaintiff’s capacity for simple work, and further asserts that offering only one other

occupational option is insufficient. Defendant counters that the VE may deviate from the DOT
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definitions, and argues that even if the deviation was improper, there are still a significant number of

simple, repetitive jobs in the region for Plaintiff to obtain employment despite his depressive

disorder.

According to the DOT, a reasoning level of 2 is needed to perform three of the occupations

suggested by the VE in the present case (construction laborer, yard worker, and automobile detailer). 

To hold an occupation requiring level 2 reasoning skills, the employee must be able to “apply

commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.” 

DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 915.687-034 (4th ed. 1991). On the other hand, a DOT

reasoning level of 1 requires “apply[ing] commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or

two-step instructions.” DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 381.687-026 (4th ed. 1991). 

In his decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform “simple entry level

work at all exertional levels.” (AR at 22.) In the hypothetical describing Plaintiff’s limitations

posed for the VE during the hearing, the ALJ defined “simple” as work that must be completed in

one- to two-steps, which matches the description of a reasoning level capability of 1 under the DOT. 

(AR at 99.) Further, the ALJ never asserted that Plaintiff has the ability to fulfill detailed

instructions, which is explicitly required for occupations requiring a reasoning level of 2. 

Consequently, the VE deviated from the DOT by suggesting level 2 occupations for Plaintiff.

Vocational Experts may deviate from the DOT when making their assessments, but there is a

rebuttable presumption that the suggested occupations must be equivalent to Plaintiff’s capacity as

determined by the DOT. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the VE

must justify a deviation from the DOT with persuasive evidence from the VE’s testimony and the

record. Id. Here, neither the ALJ nor the VE provided any justification for the VE’s conclusion that

Plaintiff could perform jobs requiring comprehension of detailed instructions. The VE testified that

the occupations of construction laborer, yard worker, and automobile detailer require reasoning

levels of 2, yet failed to explain his deviation from the ALJ’s explicit hypothetical which states that

Plaintiff is only capable of following one or two step instructions. The ALJ also failed to discuss the

VE’s deviation from the DOT. Consequently, because neither party rebutted the presumption set

forth in the DOT that Plaintiff is incapable of performing level 2 occupations, the ALJ improperly
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 In his decision, the ALJ transposed the available numbers of simple, repetitive jobs with the

numbers of automobile detailer jobs. In his initial motion, Plaintiff transposed the numbers as well.

However, in the cross-motion, Defendant corrected the mistake, and Plaintiff was able to address the

implications of the correct numbers in his Reply.

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relied on the VE’s testimony in three of the four suggested occupations.

However, although the ALJ improperly relied upon three of the suggested occupations, the

VE’s fourth suggestion of simple, repetitive “cleaner work,” such as the occupation of “wall

cleaner,” appropriately falls under the DOT reasoning level 1. (AR at 98); DICTIONARY OF

OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 381.687-026 (4th ed. 1991). Plaintiff concedes this point, but argues that

identifying “one occupation is insufficient to sustain the Commissioner’s burden.” (See Reply to

Cross-Motion at 5). Plaintiff’s argument is without merit. According to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A), a

person must be unable to “engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy” to be deemed disabled by Social Security standards. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b)

states that this requirement is fulfilled when “there is a significant number of jobs (in one or more

occupations)” which the claimant can perform. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b). Therefore, the Court find

that the VE need not provide more than one possible occupation, so long as the single occupation

exists in significant numbers in the national economy.

The Court is also satisfied that these simple, repetitive occupations exist in significant

numbers in the national economy. In his testimony, the VE confirmed there are 17,000 of these

occupations available locally and 741,000 nationally.3 (AR at 98.) In Moncada v. Carter, 60 F.3d

521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit held that occupations with over 2,300 jobs locally and

with 64,000 jobs available nationwide met the “significant number” requirement under 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(2)(A). As the number of potential jobs available to Plaintiff greatly exceeds the

occupational numbers discussed in Moncada, the ALJ correctly found that there are a significant

number of jobs in the region for Plaintiff to obtain employment despite his limitations. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August_11__, 2005 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE