Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00122/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00122-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KURT MICHAELS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 04cv0122 JAH (JLB)

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER ON PETITIONER’S

BRIEF AND ALTERNATIVE

REQUEST TO AMEND PETITION

vs.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden of California

State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

On August 8, 2014, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Brief and Alternate Request to Amend

Petition, arguing that the recent decision in Jones v. Chappell, ___ F.Supp.2d, ___, No. 09CV2158-

CJC, 2014 WL 3567365 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2014), supported several other claims raised in the First

Amended Petition, specifically Claims 68, 70-73 and 75, and alternatively requested that the Court

allow amendment of the First Amended Petition to include a Jones claim. (ECF No. 142.) On August

22, 2014, Respondent filed a Response, asserting that Jones did not support Petitioner’s claims and

opposing the request to amend the petition, contending that amendment would be futile because the

new claim is unexhausted, is barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and is untimely. (ECF

No. 146.) On August 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply. 

The parties also addressed this issue at the Group Three Oral Arguments, held on November

12, 2014. 

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For the reasons discussed below, the Court rejects Petitioner’s contention that the claims in

the First Amended Petition sufficiently raise a claim under Jones and DENIES Petitioner’s request

to amend the petition.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner first contends that “Jones supports the constitutional attacks on California’s death

penalty system raised by Mr. Michaels,” and asserts that “his constitutional attacks on California’s

death penalty system sufficiently raise a claim under Jones.” (ECF No. 142 at 2, 3.) Specifically,

Petitioner contends that Claims 68, 70-73 and 75 involve constitutional challenges to California’s

capital sentencing and appellate systems and lethal injection procedures similar to the issues addressed

in Jones. (Id.) However, a comparison of the claim at issue in Jones and those cited from the First

Amended Petition clearly show that while all of the claims concern aspects of California’s death

penalty system, the proposed claim and pending claims do not share a legal or factual basis. In Jones,

the petitioner asserted “that as a result of systemic and inordinate delay in California’s post-conviction

review process, only a random few of the hundreds of individuals sentenced to death will be executed,

and for those that are, execution will serve no penological purpose.” Jones, 2014 WL 3567365 at *6. 

Meanwhile, none of Petitioner’s claims present a similar challenge: Claim 68 challenges the

constitutionality of the capital charging and sentencing system for failing to narrow the class of deatheligible defendants, Claim 70 contends that the lack of proportionality review at trial or on appeal

violates constitutional guarantees, Claim 71 asserts that Petitioner’s execution would be

disproportionate to his culpability, Claim 72 asserts that Petitioner’s death sentence was based on

unreliable evidence and is disproportionate to his culpability, Claim 73 alleges flaws in California’s

capital system as a result of the discretion afforded to prosecutors in the charging decision, and Claim

75 asserts that California’s method of execution, lethal injection, violates the constitution. (See FAP

at 290-96, 299-308.) As such, Petitioner’s claims involve alleged errors in his trial and sentencing,

or alleged defects at other stages of his proceedings, such as the charging decision or on appeal, while

Jones involved a wholly different issue, a constitutional claim based upon the systemic delay in

California’s post-conviction proceedings. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that Claims

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68, 70-73 and 75 are supported by Jones, much less that these cited claims sufficiently raise a claim

akin to the one at issue in Jones.

Petitioner alternatively requests to amend the federal petition to add a Jones claim. However,

even setting aside Respondent’s contentions that such a claim would be unexhausted and barred under

Teague, it is clear that amendment would be untimely. Petitioner asserts that amendment would not

be futile and that the claim is not without merit. He argues that “the factual predicate for the

constitutional violation at issue occurs as time goes by,” and notes that at the time the original petition

was filed, Petitioner had been on death row 14 years and executions were taking place in California,

while at the present time, Petitioner has been on death row for 24 years and there is an injunction

against executions in this state. (ECF No. 142 at 4.) Petitioner contends that “Jones makes clear that

it is only now, after the system has devolved into such dysfunction and delay, that it must be declared

unconstitutional.” (Id.) Yet, as Respondent points out, “[t]he federal injunction on executions in

California has been in effect since 2006.” (ECF No. 146 at 17.) Indeed, Petitioner filed a First

Amended Petition in this Court in 2009, when he had been on death row for 19 years and the

injunction against executions in California had been in effect for three years, but that filing did not

include any claim of systemic delay. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides that:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Only 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) is potentially applicable in the instant case,

and Petitioner fails to provide a persuasive reason as to why this claim could not have been raised

before the present time or that the factual predicate could not have been discovered until now. As

such, to the extent Petitioner contends that this claim is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D),

the Court remains unpersuaded. 

Finally, because the statute of limitations has run, the proposed claim is nevertheless untimely

because it does not relate back to any of the claims contained in the First Amended Petition. Under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the

original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,

transaction, or occurrence set out - - or attempted to be set out - - in the original pleading.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(c)(1); see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (“Amendments made after the statute of

limitations has run relate back to the date of the original pleading if the original and amended

pleadings ‘ar(i)se out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence.’”)

Petitioner contends that the proposed claim “relates back to Mr. Michaels’ constitutional

attacks based on the arbitrariness of California’s death penalty system and the invalidity of the lethal

injection method.” (ECF No. 142 at 4.) As discussed above, while the proposed claim and pending

claims both involve various challenges to the constitutionality of California’s capital system or method

of execution, the similarities end there. The basis for the proposed claim is state delay in postconviction proceedings, while the majority of the cited claims in the First Amended Petition involve

allegations concerning the charging decision (Claims 68 and 73) and the trial and sentencing

proceedings (Claims 71 and 72). Meanwhile, Claim 70, which asserts that California’s capital statute

is unconstitutional for failing to provide for proportionality review at trial and on appeal, has an

appellate dimension, but does not arise from the “same conduct, transaction, or occurrence” as the

proposed claim. Nor does Claim 75, alleging that California’s method of execution, lethal injection,

violates the Constitution, share such a nexus with the proposed claim. 

“An amended habeas petition . . . does not relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year

time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type

from those the original pleading set forth.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. “[T]he ‘time and type’ language

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in Mayle refers not to the claims, or grounds for relief. Rather, it refers to the facts that support those

grounds.” Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). The

proposed claim involves facts concerning delays in the processing of California capital appeals and

habeas petitions, while Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the claims in the First Amended Petition

involve facts of similar time or type.

Petitioner asserts that his constitutional challenges to California’s capital sentencing statute

and execution method support the relation back of an entirely new challenge to the constitutionality

of California’s death penalty system, but this is simply not the case, especially when the facts

supporting these claims differ in such a manner. “A holding that relation back is available in that

circumstance would stand the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayle on its head.” Schneider v.

McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that “the assertion of any claim

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based upon the failure to raise an issue or issues on direct

appeal thereafter supports the relation back of any and every claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel thereafter may decide to raise.”) Accordingly, as Petitioner fails to show that the

proposed claim relates back to the claims pending in the First Amended Petition, amendment is

untimely and not warranted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s request to amend the petition is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 12, 2014 __________________________________

HONORABLE JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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