Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00573/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00573-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Diana Medina,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Brithe & Associates, PLC, 

Defendant.

No. CV-2013-00573-PHX-BSB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Plaintiff Diana Medina filed a complaint against Defendant Brithe & Associates, 

PLC on March 19, 2013, asserting violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 

(FDCPA). (Doc. 1.) After Defendant failed to respond to the Complaint, Plaintiff filed 

an application for entry of default (Doc. 8) and the Clerk entered default on July 23, 

2013. (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment on August 8, 2013 

(Doc. 10), which the Court denied without prejudice. (Doc. 11.) Plaintiff filed a renewed 

motion for default judgment on August 26, 2013. (Doc. 12.) For the reasons below, the 

Court recommends that default judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against 

Defendant.1

 Because Defendant’s default has been entered under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 55(a) (Doc 9), the Court has discretion to grant default judgment against 

Defendant pursuant to Rule 55(b). See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 

 

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 On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c). However, because Defendant has not appeared or consented to 

magistrate judge jurisdiction, the Court proceeds by a Report and Recommendation to the Honorable Stephen M. McNamee. See General Order 11-03. 

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1980); Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court considers the 

following factors in deciding whether to grant default judgment (1) the possibility of 

prejudice to Plaintiff, (2) the merits of the claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the amount of money at stake, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material 

facts, (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the policy favoring a 

decision on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 Having considered Plaintiff’s motion and supporting declaration, which address 

each of the Eitel factors (Doc. 12, Ex. 1), and having reviewed the well-pled factual 

allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1), the Court concludes that default judgment is 

appropriate in this case. See Nero v. Law Office of Sam Streeter, P.L.L.C., 2009 WL 

2981973, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009) (granting default judgment on FDCPA 

claims). 

 Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be granted to the extent 

that she seeks $1,000.00 in statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). See 

Harper v. Better Bus. Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 1992) (Section 

1692k(a)(2) provides that a plaintiff may recover statutory damages of up to $1,000.00 

for noncompliance per FDCPA action). Because Plaintiff has sufficiently documented 

her request for attorney’s fees and costs, and requests a reasonable amount for fees and 

costs, the Court recommends that Plaintiff be awarded $2,862.00 in attorney’s fees and 

$500.00 in costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). See Ortega v. Griggs & Assocs. LLC, 

2012 WL 2913202, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 13, 2012) (entering default judgment in an 

FDCPA case and awarding the plaintiff $5,146.00 in attorney’s fees); see also 15 

U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (directing the court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing consumer). 

 Because the FDCPA does not provide for prejudgment interest, and Plaintiff does 

not provide any arguments in support of her request for prejudgment interest, the Court 

recommends that Plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest be denied. See Schwarm v. 

Craighead, 2008 WL 3286797, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2008) (stating that the FDCPA 

act does not provide for prejudgment interest and that “whether plaintiffs are entitled to 

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prejudgment interest under the FDCPA is determined by statutory interpretation and 

federal common law); see also In re Exxon Valdez, 484 F.3d 1098, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 

2007) (noting that “prejudgment interest is a substantive aspect of a plaintiff’s claim”). 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 12) 

be GRANTED and that default judgment in the total amount of $4,362.00 be entered in 

favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on the FDCPA claim asserted in the Complaint 

(Doc. 1). Specifically, it is recommended that Plaintiff be awarded $1,000.00 in statutory 

damages, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), $2,862.00 in attorney’s fees, and $500.00 in 

costs, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s request for prejudgment 

interest be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to respond to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Report and Recommendation may 

result in the District Court’s acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 19th day of September, 2013. 

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