Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04713/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04713-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN CANINE FOUNDATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BEN SUN, D.V.M., THE PUBLIC HEALTH

VETERINARIAN FOR THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-06-4713 MMC

ORDER GRANTING STATE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Docket No. 36)

Before the Court is the motion filed September 21, 2006 by defendants Ben Sun,

D.V.M., the Public Health Veterinarian for the State of California (“Dr. Sun”), the California

Department of Health Services (“CDHS”), and the California Health and Human Services

Agency (“CHHSA”), (jointly, “State Defendants”), to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction all causes of action asserted against them in the Second Amended Complaint,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff American

Canine Foundation (“ACF”) has filed opposition to the motion; the State Defendants have

filed a reply. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the

motion, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

In 2005, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill 861 (“SB 861"), which

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 Such statistics must “identify dog bites by severity, the breed of the dog involved,

whether the dog was altered, and whether the breed of dog was subject to a [breed-specific

mandatory spay or neuter] program.” See id.

2

 Title 10 regulates animals generally and encompasses more than a spay or neuter

program. Although one section of Title 10 establishes mandatory spaying or neutering of

dogs, that section is not breed-specific; rather, it mandates spaying or neutering of all dogs,

subject to certain exceptions unrelated to breed. See Los Angeles County Code

§ 10.20.350.

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amended Food and Agriculture Code § 31683 to permit cities and counties to enact breedspecific programs for the control of potentially dangerous or vicious dogs, but only to the

extent permitted under Health and Safety Code § 122331(a). See Cal. Agric. Code 

§ 31683. Section 122331(a) permits cities and counties to enact “dog breed-specific

ordinances pertaining only to mandatory spay or neuter programs and breeding

requirements, provided that no specific dog breed, or mixed dog breed, shall be declared

potentially dangerous or vicious under those ordinances.” See Cal. Health & Safety Code §

122331(a). Cities and counties that implement such programs must compile statistics on

dog bites and submit them to the State Public Health Veterinarian. See Cal. Health &

Safety Code § 122331(b).1

 ACF alleges the City and County of San Francisco enacted

pursuant to § 122331(a) a breed-specific mandatory spay or neuter ordinance, specifically

San Francisco Health Code, Article I, § 43.1, and that Los Angeles County also passed

such an ordinance, by amending Title 10 of the Los Angeles County Code.2 (See Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) at 6:23-25, 7:1-21.) 

ACF asserts ten federal and state law causes of action against the State Defendants

and seeks, inter alia, an “[o]rder for prospective injunctive relief preventing application of

SB 861 or the enforcement of any laws drafted as a result of its enactment.” (See SAC at

25:17-19.) 

By the instant motion to dismiss, the State Defendants contend they are immune

under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court and that, in any event, ACF lacks

standing to assert a claim against the State Defendants.

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 This rule is subject to three exceptions. First, a state and its agencies may waive

their Eleventh Amendment immunity, provided they “express [their] consent to suit

unequivocally.” See Hibbs v. Dept. of Human Resources, 273 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir.

2001). Second, Congress may abrogate states’ immunity by unequivocally expressing its

intent to do so in a statute enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Finally, state agencies that operate

independently of the state are not immune from suit in federal court. See Hess v. Port

Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 50 (1994). There is no contention that any of

these exceptions is applicable to the instant action. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

Where, as here, “defendants have made a facial rather than a factual attack on

subject matter jurisdiction,” pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must “take the allegations

in the plaintiff’s complaint as true” and “draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s]

favor.” See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Savage v.

Glendale Union High School, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts are not

required “to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents

referred to in the complaint,” or to “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because

they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.,

328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity: CDHS and CHHSA 

As noted, the State Defendants contend CDHS and CHHSA are immune, under the

Eleventh Amendment, from suit in federal court. 

Regardless of the nature of the claim or the relief sought, a federal action “in which

the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by

the Eleventh Amendment.” See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89, 100 (1984); see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996).3

CDHS and CHHSA are state agencies and thus are immune from suit in federal court. See

Biomedical Patent Management Corp. v. California, Dept. of Health Services, No. C

06-00737, 2006 WL 1530177, at *2, *7 (N.D. CA June 5, 2006) (dismissing suit against

CDHS pursuant to Eleventh Amendment); see also Cal. Gov. Code § 12800 (identifying

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CHHSA as state agency).

Accordingly, to the extent the State Defendants seek dismissal of the causes of

action asserted against CDHS and CHHSA, the motion will be granted. 

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Dr. Sun

As noted, the State Defendants also seek dismissal, pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment, of all causes of action asserted against Dr. Sun.

Under the Eleventh Amendment, state officers are immune from suit in federal court

for violations of state law. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106. Thus, to the extent the State

Defendants seek dismissal of the state law causes of action asserted against Dr. Sun, the

motion will be granted.

The Court next turns to the federal claims against Dr. Sun. In that regard, the

Eleventh Amendment does not bar, and federal courts have jurisdiction to hear, a suit

against a state officer under only two limited exceptions. As discussed below, neither

exception is applicable to Dr. Sun. 

First, where a plaintiff alleges enforcement of a state law violates federal law, and

seeks to enjoin such enforcement, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal action

against a state official who has a duty to enforce the challenged state law. See, e.g., Ex

Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 161 (1908) (holding state attorney general with duty to

enforce challenged statute not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). Here, although

ACF alleges Dr. Sun is “specifically charged with the responsibility and authority to ensure

that all cities and counties that create ordinances under SB 861 comply with its

requirements,” (see SAC at 3:15-17), neither § 31683 nor § 122331 provides for

enforcement by Dr. Sun, and ACF cites no other legal authority imposing such duties on Dr.

Sun. Consequently, the Court need not accept as true ACF’s conclusory allegation as to

Dr. Sun’s enforcement responsibilities. See Warren, 328 F.3d at 1139.

Second, where the state statute challenged as contrary to federal law does not “give[

] rise to enforcement proceedings,” federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a suit for

prospective injunctive relief against a state officer where the statute is “being given effect”

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 In light of the above rulings, the Court does not reach the State Defendants’

additional arguments in support of dismissal.

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by such officer. See Los Angeles County Bar Assoc. v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704-05 (9th Cir.

1992) (denying Eleventh Amendment immunity; finding California Governor and Secretary

of State, based on their respective roles in appointing judges and certifying subsequent

elections for judicial positions, had sufficient “specific connection” to state statute

prescribing number of judges on Los Angeles County Superior Court). Here, the Court

need not determine whether either § 31683 or § 122331 is or is not “the type of statute that

gives rise to enforcement proceedings,” see id. at 704, because Dr. Sun’s only connection

to the challenged law is the receipt of statistics with respect to dog bites. Neither § 31683

nor § 122331 requires him to recommend or approve local spay or neuter programs or to

take any action with respect to the statistics submitted. Consequently, Dr. Sun cannot be

said to have “given effect,” see id., to the challenged statutes. 

Accordingly, the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims asserted against Dr.

Sun will be granted.4

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby

GRANTED, and each of the causes of action asserted against CDHS, CHHSA and Dr. Sun

in the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice to ACF’s refiling said

claims in state court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 16, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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