Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05506/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05506-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 “CT” refers to the Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal lodged with the Court by Respondent. 1

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY BELTRAN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES YATES, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:04-CV-05506 OWW SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, following his conviction by jury

trial of one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter in violation of California Penal Code §§ 664,

192(a) with a finding that Petitioner personally used a firearm resulting in great bodily injury for the

benefit of a criminal street gang in violation of California Penal Code §§ 12022.5(a), 12022.7(a), and

186.22(b)(1). (CT 320-321.) In addition, Petitioner was found guilty of assault with a firearm in 1

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

violation of California Penal Code §§ 245(a)(2), 12022.5(a). (CT 322.) On March 21, 2001,

Petitioner was sentenced to a total determinate term of twenty-five years and ten months in state

prison. (CT 567-569.)

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “Fifth DCA”), on April 19, 2001. (CT 570.) On January 23, 2003, the Fifth DCA

affirmed the judgment in all respects. See Exhibit A, Respondent’s Answer. 

Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. See Exhibit B,

Petitioner’s Amended Petition. The petition for review was summarily denied on April 9, 2003. See

Exhibit A, Petitioner’s Amended Petition.

On March 30, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. On

June 24, 2004, Respondent moved for summary dismissal of the petition. The District Court granted

Respondent’s motion on October 20, 2004, and granted Petitioner leave to file an amended petition.

On December 9, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant amended petition. The petition presents the

following four claims for relief: 1) “Judgment should be reversed because the motion to sever

Petitioner’s two (2) cases was wrongly denied”; 2) The judgment should be reversed because the

prosecutor elicited inadmissible evidence, improperly drew attention to Petitioner’s failure to testify,

and misled the jury about the duties of a defense attorney”; 3) The gang enhancement should be

reversed because of Sengpadychith error”; and 4) “Petitioner contends that California State Supreme

Court abused its discretion.” Following a preliminary review of the petition, on January 7, 2005,

then-Magistrate Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill issued a Findings and Recommendation which

recommended Grounds Three and Four of the amended petition be dismissed. The District Court

adopted the Findings and Recommendation on March 15, 2005.

On June 3, 2005, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Respondent concedes Petitioner

has exhausted his state remedies as to the two remaining claims. However, Respondent contends that

the two claims are conclusory and unsupported by evidence such that they should be dismissed.

Petitioner filed a traverse on August 5, 2005.

///

///

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court hereby adopts the factual summary of the case as set forth by the 5 DCA in its

th

opinion of January 22, 2003:

On April 18, 1999, Martin Ramirez was shot at and narrowly escaped being wounded

while standing in the front yard of Michelle R.’s home on Illinois Street in Fresno. On May 2,

1999, Gilbert Arteaga and Richard Cruz were shot near Illinois Street. Arteaga was wounded

in the head and lost his right eye. Cruz was fatally shot three times in the back.

[Petitioner] Henry Beltran was charged with assault with a firearm on Martin

Ramirez, attempted murder of Gilbert Arteaga, and murder of Richard Cruz. He was

convicted of the assault charge, found guilty of the lesser offense of attempted voluntary

manslaughter, and found not guilty of murdering Cruz.

On appeal, [Petitioner] contends the court improperly granted the prosecution's

motion to consolidate the assault case with the murder and attempted murder charges; the

prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct; and the jury was incorrectly instructed as to

consideration of the gang enhancement.

Count III - April 18, 1999

In April 1999, Michelle R. lived on East Illinois Street in Fresno with her siblings,

Myra and Eduardo. Augustine “Augie” Perez, her boyfriend, was a member of the West

Fresno Nortenos (WFN) gang and affiliated with the Chicale Boys (TCB) gang.

On April 18, 1999, Michelle R. had a fight with “Jessica” around 3:00 p.m. or 4:00

p.m. The fight occurred near Seventh and Nebraska Streets, about three blocks from her

house. Michelle admitted she used to associate with the Bulldog gang, but denied gang

membership at the time of the fight. Michelle testified there were several people at the fight

who were associated with gangs, including Gilbert Arteaga, who was a member of TCB, and

Augie Perez. Michelle's siblings were present but they were not gang members. Michelle

testified Jessica claimed membership in the Bulldog gang. Michelle thought her friends got

into another fight with an unknown “kid” at the scene.

Michelle testified that after the fight, everyone went to her house on Illinois Street,

except for Gilbert Arteaga. Around 6:30 p.m. or 7:00 p.m., Michelle was in the front yard

with her siblings, Myra and Eduardo; her boyfriend, Perez; and Gilbert’s brother, J.A., who

was a member of TCB. Michelle observed [Petitioner] Henry Beltran approach the house and

stand in the middle of Illinois Street. Michelle knew [Petitioner] as “Stump,” and testified he

had a dog paw tattoo on his ear which associated him with the Bulldog gang. She also knew

[Petitioner] had an “MSD” tattoo for the McKenzie Street Dogs, a gang associated with the

Bulldogs.

Michelle testified [Petitioner] was standing in the street with another person, who

pulled out a gun. She did not know this person’s identity, but recognized him as the person

who was with Jessica earlier that day. Michelle testified when this person pulled the gun, he

either handed it to [Petitioner] or [Petitioner] took it from him. Michelle testified [Petitioner]

fired the gun in the direction of Martin Ramirez, who was running toward Michelle's house

from his girlfriend’s house, across the street. Michelle believed [Petitioner] fired the gun

twice from about 30 feet away, and testified Ramirez was “scraped” by a bullet.

Martin Ramirez initially fell to his knees, then scrambled to his feet and tried to chase

[Petitioner]. Augie Perez and J.A., who were inside Michelle R.’s house when the shots were

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U.S. District Court

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fired, ran out with sticks and baseball bats and chased the gunman.

Michelle didn't think [Petitioner] intentionally meant to shoot at anyone because he

didn't aim and point the weapon at a particular person. Instead, Michelle believed [Petitioner]

just meant to scare them. Michelle testified [Petitioner] didn't shout anything, and no one ran

toward him as he fired. Michelle was nervous about testifying because she was afraid of

retaliation from [Petitioner]'s gang, the Bulldogs. Michelle believed Martin Ramirez went to

Mexico after he was shot.

Eduardo R. testified that his sister Michelle was standing in the front yard of their

house with Martin Ramirez, J.A., and some friends of Augie Perez. Michelle was standing

behind Martin Ramirez, who had been at their house for about 30 minutes. Eduardo observed

six to seven people walk down the street and stand in the middle of Illinois Street, and he

identified [Petitioner] as one of the people in this group. Eduardo testified that someone in

the group produced a handgun from his waistband and gave it to [Petitioner]. [Petitioner]

fired one or two shots at the people in Eduardo R.’s front yard. Martin Ramirez fell to the

ground, and [Petitioner] and his associates ran away. Martin and his friends immediately

chased the group through the neighborhood.

Eduardo believed [Petitioner] used a black handgun. Eduardo also believed a person

known as “Puppet” gave [Petitioner] the handgun before he fired. Eduardo further testified

J.A., Gilbert Arteaga, Martin Ramirez, and Augie Perez were TCBs.

Martin Ramirez testified he was visiting his girlfriend, Taina, who lived across the

street from Michelle R.’s house. Martin and Taina were standing outside when his friends,

J.A. and Augie Perez, asked him to come over to Michelle R.'s house because they had

problems. Martin ran over and noticed Michelle R. was hiding behind her friends. Martin

testified there was a group of six or seven people standing in the middle of Illinois Street in

front of Michelle R.’s house, and identified [Petitioner] as part of this group. Martin testified

[Petitioner]’s group was looking for problems with his friends, and someone asked Martin if

he was a Bulldog. Martin replied no.

Martin testified that a light-complexioned person with [Petitioner]'s group produced a

handgun but seemed too afraid to fire it. Martin testified [Petitioner] said, “‘Let me have the

gun to fire at him.’” [Petitioner] took the gun and fired two shots at Martin. Martin testified a

bullet grazed his shirt and left a hole in it, but Martin’s body was not hit by any bullets.

Martin hit the ground to avoid the gunshots then ran away.

At trial, Martin positively identified [Petitioner] as the man who shot him. At the time

of the shooting, Martin associated with the Norteno gang, which was affiliated with the

TCBs. Martin did not have any prior problems with the Bulldogs but his TCB friends were

having problems.

Martin testified he spoke to Michelle R. later that night, and learned the police wanted

to speak with him about the shooting. However, Martin’s family sent him to Mexico because

they didn't want him involved with the gangs. Martin later called the police from Mexico and

returned to Fresno County to testify in the case.

Taina R. testified Martin visited her that evening, and they were outside her house

when he asked for some water. Taina went inside and returned with the water, but Martin had

gone down the street to Michelle R.'s front yard. Taina testified that [Petitioner] was standing

in Illinois Street with two friends. [Petitioner] was arguing with J.A., who was standing in

Michelle's front yard. Taina testified one of [Petitioner]'s friends produced a small chrome

gun and handed it to [Petitioner]. Taina testified [Petitioner] aimed the weapon toward

Martin, J.A., and several others who were standing in front of Michelle's house, and

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28 J.A. was impeached with his convictions for automobile theft in 1997 and 2000. 2

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

[Petitioner] fired the gun one time. [Petitioner] and his friends ran past Taina as they fled the

scene, and Taina could still see the gun in [Petitioner]'s hand. Taina also observed

[Petitioner]'s tattoos over his eyebrows. At trial, Taina positively identified [Petitioner] as the

gunman.

J.A. testified he was a member of TCB with his brother, Gilbert, and Martin Ramirez.

At the time of the April 1999, incident, the Norteno TCBs were having problems with the

rival Surenos and Bulldogs. The problems involved verbal altercations, “just like talking

trash to each other,” and fights. J.A.'s friend, Richard Cruz, told J.A. that he had a problem

with [Petitioner], who was with the Bulldogs.

J.A. testified he was in Michelle R.'s front yard with Augie Perez and Eduardo R.

when [Petitioner] and four or five members of the Bulldogs arrived on Illinois Street. Martin

Ramirez was at Taina's house but ran over to help them. [Petitioner] asked J.A. about his

gang affiliation, and J.A. replied he was with TCB. [Petitioner] turned to one of his younger

associates and said, “‘Handle him, dog.’” J.A. described this person as a “kid” who was

known as “Puppet.” Puppet produced a gun but seemed too scared to shoot and just stood

there. [Petitioner] said, “‘Let me see the gun’” and took it from Puppet and fired once or

twice at J.A. and his associates.2

Fresno Police Officer Alfred Avila responded to Michelle R.'s residence and found a

single spent .25-caliber shell casing in the middle of Illinois Street. Officer Avila interviewed

Michelle R. about the shooting. Michelle identified the gunman as “Stump,” a Hispanic male

she had seen in the neighborhood, and she described his distinctive tattoos. Michelle stated

Martin Ramirez had been standing next to her when Stump appeared with the gun. Stump

yelled, “Why are you boxing with my homeboy” and fired one shot. Martin fell down and

held the right side of his ribs, then got up and chased Stump. Several people who had been in

her house joined the chase, and they were carrying baseball bats and sticks. Michelle

described [Petitioner]'s weapon as a small handgun. Michelle stated the shooting was related

to a gang fight which had occurred earlier in the day.

Officer David Surabian interviewed Eduardo R., who stated that “Stump” had been

standing in the middle of the street when he fired one shot at the group outside his house.

Eduardo believed the weapon was a small black revolver, and stated that Martin Ramirez fell

to the ground and said he was shot. 

Around 10:30 p.m. on April 18, Officer Robert Lincoln received a dispatch about a

fight and responded to a residence on East Illinois, which was the home of Freddie M.'s aunt.

Officer Lincoln contacted two juveniles who identified themselves as Freddie M. and

Michael C. Michael stated they had been jumped and beaten by some subjects who lived

down the street. Michael and Freddie specifically pointed out Michelle R.'s house on East

Illinois as the location of the fight. Michael stated the group asked them about their gang

affiliation and commented on the color of their clothing, then jumped them.

Officer Lincoln drove to Michelle R.'s house and spoke to the two sisters and their

older brother. They informed Officer Lincoln about the shooting which occurred earlier that

evening. Lincoln didn't know about the shooting and contacted the police department to learn

the details. Officer Lincoln then spoke with Michelle R.'s family and learned the two sisters

“were kind of playing both sides of the fence, so to speak, as far as these two rival street

gangs.” The girls were hanging out with both the Bulldogs and the TCBs. Their older brother

tried to supervise them but he didn't have a lot of control over their behavior. Officer Lincoln

contacted their mother by telephone and explained the situation to her, “but she didn't realize

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U.S. District Court

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the magnitude of what was going on.” Their mother was upset about the shooting but

explained she worked at night and had a hard time with childcare. Officer Lincoln warned her

about the situation because the sisters could end up victims on the street.

Officer Lincoln returned to the other house and again spoke with Freddie and

Michael, and confronted them with the details about the shooting. Freddie and Michael

admitted they failed to mention the shooting, and stated they saw a person known as

“Stumpy” pull out a gun and shoot at another individual associated with Michelle R.'s house.

Freddie and Michael described Stumpy's distinctive tattoos on his face and neck. They were

surprised when Stumpy pulled the gun and fired, and they split up and ran away. Freddie and

Michael admitted they were affiliated with the Fresno Bulldogs.

Officer Lincoln testified Michael also described another altercation which occurred

that day, prior to the shooting. Michael and his girlfriend were walking in the neighborhood

when they were confronted by a group of males. The men asked whether Michael was in the

Bulldogs and he admitted it. Michael stated they jumped him and roughed him up. He and his

girlfriend ran to the girlfriend's house. Michael left her there and ran into Freddie and

Stumpy. Michael stated that he joined Freddie and Stumpy as they walked to a house on

Illinois, where a group of males was standing in the front. There was an exchange of

“gang-type dialogue” between them. Stumpy pulled a small, chrome semi-automatic pistol

from his waistband and fired one shot at the group.

At trial, Michael C. testified he spent April 18, 1999, with his friend, Freddie M.

Freddie was staying with his aunt, who lived a few blocks away from Michelle R. Freddie

was also known as “Puppet,” and was a member of the Bulldogs. Michael testified he was

not in a gang but he associated with Bulldog members, and he used to be known as “Psycho.”

Earlier in the day, Michael's girlfriend was attacked by another girl, who ran up behind her

and pulled her hair. Michael was jumped by the girl's friends, who displayed TCB colors.

Michael testified that later in the day, he was walking through the neighborhood when

he encountered Freddie with another person, known as “Stump,” who had distinctive tattoos

on his neck. A tall, skinny man was also with them. Michael testified that he joined the three

people as they walked to Illinois Street. They stood in the middle of the road and Freddie

shouted “Eastside Fresno Bulldogs” at the group of people who were outside Michelle R.'s

house. The people standing outside of the house cursed Michael and his associates. Michael

testified Stump reached into his jacket and pulled out a small handgun, possibly a .22-caliber.

Stump aimed at the group across the street and fired the weapon once or twice. Michael

testified that everyone ran after the shooting, and they were chased by people with baseball

bats and sticks. Michael never saw Freddie or the other person hand the gun to Stump before

he fired.

Michael admitted that he told Freddie about the earlier incident between his girlfriend

and another girl, but denied that he participated in the shooting in retaliation for the attack on

his girlfriend.

At trial, Michael admitted that when he was initially questioned by the police, he gave

a false last name, claimed the group outside the house had thrown beer bottles at his friends,

and failed to mention anything about the shooting. Michael was unwilling to identify

[Petitioner] as Stump, but admitted [Petitioner]'s tattoos were very similar to those on

Stump's neck.

Freddie M. testified he was known as “Puppet” and was a member of the East Side

Fresno Bulldogs. Freddie identified [Petitioner] as “Stump.” Freddie lived with his aunt on

Illinois Street. Freddie testified he was present when shots were fired on Illinois Street in

April 1999. Freddie, Michael C., and [Petitioner] stood in the middle of Illinois Street, across

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the street from a house where there were several TCB members. The Bulldogs were not

getting along with the TCBs at the time. Freddie testified [Petitioner] produced a small

handgun and fired twice. He denied handing the gun to [Petitioner]. Freddie denied

exchanging any words with the TCBs before the shooting, and claimed he didn't know why

[Petitioner] fired or where he aimed. Freddie admitted they failed to mention the shooting

and gave a different story when they initially spoke to a police officer that night.

Detective Albert Murrietta interviewed Martin Ramirez about the April 1999,

shooting. Martin stated he was visiting his girlfriend when he noticed his friends were having

some trouble at Michelle R.'s house. Martin stated he ran over there and saw [Petitioner] and

two other associates standing in the street. [Petitioner] produced a gun from his pants pocket,

pointed at Martin, and fired the weapon one time. [Petitioner] and his associates ran away.

Detective Murrietta also interviewed Martin's girlfriend, Taina, who stated that one of

[Petitioner]'s associates produced the gun and handed it to [Petitioner]. Taina further stated

that [Petitioner] and his associates ran past her house after the shooting, and [Petitioner] was

holding a small silver handgun. Taina stated Martin had been afraid to speak to the police

after the shooting. Murrietta testified that both Martin and Taina were sure [Petitioner] had

fired the weapon.

Detective Danny Martin separately interviewed Michelle R. and Michael C., and

showed them a photograph of [Petitioner]. They identified [Petitioner] as the person known

as Stump, and stated [Petitioner] fired at Martin Ramirez.

Detective Martin also interviewed J.A., who identified [Petitioner]'s photograph as

Stump. J.A. stated there were problems between the Bulldogs and TCBs, and there had been

some fist fights between the two gangs. J.A. identified Stump, “Puppet,” and an unknown

male as the three people who stood in front of Michelle R.'s house. J.A. stated Stump asked

him, “‘What do you bang?’” J.A. replied he was with TCBs, and Stump turned to Puppet and

said, “‘Handle them, Dogs.’” Puppet produced a handgun but didn't shoot it, and Stump took

it from him and fired at Martin Ramirez.

Counts I and II - May 2, 1999

Gilbert Arteaga (J.A.'s brother) and Richard Cruz were friends and lived near each

other in the Illinois Street neighborhood. Gilbert was a member of the Norteno TCBs.

Richard was not in the gang but associated with TCB members. On the evening of May 1,

1999, Gilbert and Richard used J.A.'s red bicycle and went to the house of Gilbert's

girlfriend, who lived two miles away from their neighborhood. Richard rode the bicycle and

Gilbert sat on the handlebars. Around 12:30 a.m. or 1:00 a.m. on May 2, Gilbert and Richard

left the girl's house and headed back to their neighborhood. Richard again rode the bicycle

and Gilbert sat on the handlebars. Neither Richard nor Gilbert were armed with any type of

weapon.

Gilbert testified they were riding on Seventh Street, approaching the intersection at

Illinois, when he saw five guys standing on the corner. There was another group of six or

seven guys standing on the opposite corner. Both groups were wearing red and one person

was wearing a Bulldog shirt. Gilbert believed the two groups were together and consisted of

the rival Bulldogs. Gilbert was wearing a red shirt because TCBs also claimed that color, but

he was afraid something was about to happen.

Gilbert testified he rode through the intersection with Richard, between the two

groups. [Petitioner] was standing with the Bulldogs and shouted, “‘There goes the TCBs,

Dogs’” and “‘Get ‘em.’” Gilbert recognized [Petitioner] from the neighborhood, and knew

him as Stump. Gilbert also knew [Petitioner] was a Bulldog and had an “MSD” tattoo for the

McKenzie Street Dogs. [Petitioner] was dressed in a white shirt and white shorts. Gilbert

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28 Gilbert was impeached with his prior conviction for auto theft. 3

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 8

testified the two groups rushed toward the bicycle and knocked them down. Five or six of the

Bulldogs beat up Gilbert and Richard in the street and the front yard of a house on Illinois.

Gilbert testified that during the fight, [Petitioner] produced a small, sawed off shotgun

from his pants, pointed it at him, and fired. Gilbert was sure that [Petitioner] fired the

shotgun at him. [Petitioner] was about eight to ten feet away from Gilbert when he fired.

Gilbert testified he was shot once in the face, near his right eye. Gilbert tried to stop the

bleeding with his clothes. Gilbert started to run away but looked back and saw Richard was

still being beaten. Gilbert testified that [Petitioner] ran toward the area where the others were

beating Richard. Gilbert again looked back and saw Richard running on Seventh Street,

toward the alley between Nevada and Illinois. Gilbert kept running and headed for his house,

but he heard two more gunshots as he fled the scene.

3

Freddie M. testified he was riding his bicycle that night when he went by a house on

Illinois where [Petitioner] and six other Bulldogs were drinking beer. Freddie testified that he

observed two TCBs riding a bicycle in front of the house. One boy seemed to be giving a ride

to the other boy. Freddie admitted he recognized the TCBs as Richard Cruz and Gilbert

Arteaga. 

Freddie testified he did not hear any verbal exchanges between the Bulldogs and the

TCBs. Freddie testified that one of the Bulldogs pulled the boys off the bicycle and a fistfight

started between the six Bulldogs and the two TCBs. As the fight continued, Freddie observed

[Petitioner] produce a shotgun and fire at Richard Cruz and Gilbert Arteaga. [Petitioner] shot

one boy in the eye and the other in the head. Freddie immediately fled the scene.

Freddie felt like “shit” to testify in [Petitioner]’s trial, and had lied when he gave

statements to the investigators. Freddie was in custody at juvenile hall and had been

convicted of burglary.

In the meantime, Gilbert's family was worried because it was very late and he wasn't

home yet. Around 1:00 a.m. on May 2, 1999, Gilbert staggered into his home on East Grant,

covering his right eye with his hand. Gilbert had been shot in the face and his eye was full of

blood. Gilbert told his mother, “Look what they did to me.” Gilbert's brother, Esteban, tried

to keep Gilbert conscious so he wouldn't die, and asked him what happened. Gilbert wasn't

able to talk very much and it was hard to understand what he was saying. Esteban testified

Gilbert “was trying to say something to me like ‘Tom’ or - or ‘Stom’ or ‘Tom’, but I didn't

understand what he was trying to say.” Gilbert testified his brother, J.A., asked who shot him,

and Gilbert replied “‘Stump did.’”

Officer Edward Osuna arrived at the Arteaga residence while Gilbert was being

treated by the paramedics. Gilbert's face and upper body were covered in blood, and his right

eye was swollen. Officer Osuna testified that as Gilbert was being treated, he said: “‘They

shot me in my right eye.’” The officers recovered the red shirt Gilbert had been wearing. The

paramedics treated Gilbert and transported him to the hospital, where the shotgun pellets

were removed from his head. Gilbert lost his right eye and had to wear a glass eye, and also

lost the feeling on one side of his face.

Officer Donna Valentino interviewed Esteban Arteaga, who stated the family tried to

comfort Gilbert until the paramedics arrived and Gilbert had been unable to speak. Estaban

didn't say that Gilbert identified the gunman.

Officer Michael Maciel accompanied Gilbert to the hospital and spoke with him in

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the emergency room. Gilbert stated he was returning from his girlfriend's house with his

friend when the Bulldogs jumped them on the bicycle. Gilbert stated one of the Bulldogs

said, “‘What's up, Dog,’” and “‘Are you TCB?’” Gilbert heard a loud bang when he was shot.

Gilbert gave a brief description of one of the Bulldogs as a Hispanic male in a red shirt and

baggy pants, but didn't give the name of the gunman. Officer Maciel testified the medical

personnel continued to work on Gilbert and he became dreary and tired, and he ended the

interview.

Later that morning, Richard Cruz's family contacted the Arteagas and asked if

Richard was there. The Arteagas became concerned because Richard had been with Gilbert

that night. Esteban went outside and discovered Gilbert left a trail of blood which led into the

street. Esteban and his father followed the blood trail to an alley near Seventh and Illinois

Streets, where they found Richard Cruz's body.

Esteban and his father immediately contacted Richard's grandfather and drove him to

the alley. As they were driving back to the alley, Mr. Arteaga and Mr. Cruz noticed a young

man riding a small red bicycle on the street. Mr. Arteaga and Mr. Cruz both recognized it as

the bicycle which Gilbert and Richard used that night. At trial, Mr. Arteaga testified the

bicyclist turned onto another street and he was unable to see his face. However, Mr. Cruz

testified that he kept watching the bicyclist and recognized him as “Stump.” Mr. Cruz

testified that Mr. Arteaga also recognized Stump because they looked at each other and

commented that Stump was on the bicycle.

Mr. Arteaga drove to the alley and Mr. Cruz turned over the body, and immediately

realized his grandson was dead. Mr. Cruz stayed with the body until the police arrived. Mr.

Arteaga testified he returned to his vehicle and drove around the neighborhood, but he never

saw the bicyclist again and Gilbert's bicycle was never recovered.

At trial, Mr. Cruz identified [Petitioner] as the person riding Gilbert's bicycle, and

testified he had known “Stump” since he was a child. Mr. Cruz testified [Petitioner]'s mother

used to be friends with Richard's mother, and the two families lived together for a brief time.

They were no longer friends at the time of the shooting. Mr. Cruz admitted he didn't tell the

officers about Stump that night, but testified that he was "out of it" once he found his

grandson's body. “I was off. I lost it, you know, seeing my grandson dead there.” Officer

Conrad Clay confirmed Mr. Cruz was very emotional when the police responded to the alley.

Mr. Cruz cradled his grandson's body in the arms and was very angry.

The police found four spent Remington 12-gauge shotgun shells near the corner of

Seventh and Illinois. There were three shotgun waddings about 10 to 15 feet away from the

spent shells. There were no shell casings or waddings in the alley.

Richard had suffered three shotgun wounds in the back, which spread pellets

throughout his body. There were no exit wounds. The first shot was to the left back side of

the chest, and approximately 90 pellets spread through his chest and penetrated his liver, left

kidney, left lung, and left ventricle of the heart. The pellets were lodged in the lung and heart.

These wounds resulted in extensive internal bleeding in the chest cavity, and were the fatal

wounds. The second shot was to the right rear side of the chest, and the pellets spread

throughout Richard's right side, including his right arm, right side of his head, right ear, and

right eye. The third shot was to the back of Richard's lower legs, and the pellets spread

through an 11 inch area. None of the wounds left any blackening or tattooing on Richard's

body, which indicated the weapon was not fired at close range.

Detective Danny Martin testified that based on his review of the scene and the

physical evidence, Richard Cruz was shot in the street and managed to make it into the alley,

where he collapsed and died. Based on the location of the pellet wounds, it appeared Richard

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was looking back over his right shoulder when he was hit by the second gunshot. There were

also abrasions and injuries on Richard's face and arms, consistent with falling on a hard

surface.

Additional Trial Testimony

At trial, Gilbert positively identified [Petitioner] as the person who shot him in the

face. Gilbert knew about the shooting in April 1999, at Michelle R.'s house, where he hung

out with his friends, but he was not present when Martin Ramirez was shot. Gilbert also

knew that [Petitioner] and Richard Cruz had problems and used to fight. Gilbert knew that

Richard beat [Petitioner] every time they fought, and Richard wasn't afraid of [Petitioner].

Detective Danny Martin tried to interview Gilbert three times while he was in the

hospital, but Gilbert was still being treated and on medication. In one hospital interview,

Gilbert stated he was with Richard on the bicycle when they were jumped by several males,

who yelled “‘What's up, Dogs?’” Gilbert further stated that they were fighting and he heard

several gunshots and felt the pain. Gilbert ran home and didn't see what happened to Richard.

Gilbert had not yet been told that Richard was dead.

Detective Martin finally conducted a complete interview with Gilbert after he went

home from the hospital. Gilbert was much more awake and alert than when Martin spoke

with him in the hospital. Gilbert again stated he was with Richard on the bicycle when they

were jumped by two groups of individuals on Seventh and Illinois. Gilbert stated Stump was

in one of the groups, and shouted at them. Gilbert stated Stump grabbed Richard and knocked

them off the bicycle, and Stump's group started to beat them. Gilbert and Richard tried to

avoid the beating, and Gilbert saw Stump pull a pump-action shotgun from his pants. Gilbert

stated Stump shot him and he immediately fell down. Gilbert stated the rest of the group

followed Richard, who ran down the street. Gilbert ran away and headed for his house, and

saw Richard turn into the alley. Gilbert heard two more shots fired as he ran. Gilbert

identified [Petitioner]'s photograph as Stump. Gilbert stated he didn't see Richard being shot.

Detective Martin testified Gilbert never said that he actually saw Richard being shot.

Detective Martin interviewed Freddie M., and determined he was known as Puppet.

Freddie stated he was riding his bicycle when he observed Stump and his associates beating

two TCBs, and he recognized them as Richard and Gilbert. Freddie stated Stump told the

Bulldogs to let the TCBs go. Stump then pulled a shotgun out of his pants and fired it twice

at one boy, who was hit in the head. Freddie thought the other boy ran into the alley. Freddie

heard two more shots but did not see who fired the additional shots or who was injured.

Officer Johnny Soto interviewed Mr. Arteaga, Gilbert's father, at the hospital. Mr.

Arteaga stated that he saw someone riding Gilbert's bicycle but he couldn't see that person's

face. Officer Soto returned to the scene and looked for the bicycle. He was approached by

Salvador Muratella, who asked the officer to call him later. During a subsequent telephone

conversation, Muratella stated that a Hispanic male had been walking around the

neighborhood with a shotgun the previous night. Muratella stated he could identify the

individual but he was afraid.

Detective Martin subsequently interviewed Muratella, who stated he was staying with

some friends in the area when Stump arrived at the house with some associates. Stump

displayed two guns, and stated the police were looking for him because he had shot someone

a few days earlier. Stump and his friends left the house, and Stump said, “‘Let's go jack some

fools.’” Muratella stated he heard gunshots about 20 minutes later. Muratella identified

[Petitioner] from a photograph as Stump.

Detective Martin interviewed Gloria Gonzales, the person with whom Muratella had

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methamphetamine. Muratella was in custody, and admitted he was afraid to testify.

U.S. District Court

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been staying. She lived at Eighth and Illinois, and stated Stump arrived at her house the night

before the shooting and displayed a sawed-off shotgun. Gonzales stated Stump was very

proud about the weapon, but Gonzales told him to immediately leave the house. Gonzales

identified [Petitioner]'s photograph as Stump.

Detective Martin also interviewed Georgina R., Gonzales's daughter, when she was in

custody in juvenile hall. She identified [Petitioner]'s photograph as Stump, and confirmed

that Stump visited her house the night before the shooting and displayed a sawed-off shotgun

and a small revolver. Her mother became upset and told him to leave. Georgina further stated

that Stump and his friends returned to her house around 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m. that morning.

They didn't stay long and seemed to be drunk. Georgina stated she heard four gunshots a few

minutes after [Petitioner] and his friends left. Georgina saw Stump a few days later and asked

if he did the shootings. Georgina stated that Stump said yes, “that he had shot one of them in

the face and that he had killed the other one, his cousin.” Georgina asked why, and Stump

replied “he had to shoot his cousin [Richard Cruz] because he wouldn't learn. He continued

by saying that he had ‘punked’ [beaten] him but he wouldn't learn.” Georgina stated Stump

had beaten Richard on prior occasions. Stump further stated “his cousin wouldn't leave him

alone and was always talking TCB stuff.”

At trial, Salvador Muratella testified he was staying with Gloria Gonzales and her

daughter, Georgina R., at their house on East Illinois, on May 1, 1999. Around 9:30 p.m. or

10:00 p.m., [Petitioner] arrived with a group of friends. [Petitioner] showed everyone that he

was carrying two weapons: a small handgun, which he produced from his pocket, and a

19-inch shotgun, which he partially raised from his waistband. The shotgun barrel was

hidden by [Petitioner]'s pants. Muratella testified [Petitioner] and his friends left the house,

and [Petitioner] said “he was gonna go jack some fools” which, according to Muratella,

meant he was going to commit a robbery. Muratella testified he heard four or five gunshots

about 35 to 45 minutes after [Petitioner] and his friends left the house.4

Gloria Gonzales testified [Petitioner] was at her house on the evening of May 1, 1999,

the night before Richard Cruz was killed. Gonzales testified [Petitioner] showed her the

handle of a long gun or rifle, and Gonzales told [Petitioner] to leave because it was late and

she had been asleep.

Georgina R. admitted she knew [Petitioner] as “Stump,” and she was afraid to testify

because of [Petitioner]'s family. Georgina also admitted [Petitioner] visited her house the day

before Richard Cruz was killed. [Petitioner] stayed for about 10 minutes until Georgina's

mother became angry at him and made him leave. Georgina did not know why her mother

was angry at [Petitioner].

Georgina either denied or couldn't remember that she spoke with the police in June

1999, about Richard's death, when she was in juvenile hall. She heard rumors that

[Petitioner] admitted he killed one guy and shot another in the face. She also admitted she

had a dog paw tattoo behind her right ear for the Bulldogs, but claimed she was no longer a

gang member. Georgina claimed she lost most of her memory because she suffered head

injuries in a car accident in October 1999.

On May 4, 1999, [Petitioner] surrendered to the police and was arrested for both

shooting incidents.

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Gang Expert Testimony

Officer Michelle Ochoa testified as the prosecution's expert on criminal street gangs.

There were approximately 5,000 members of the Fresno Bulldogs and related neighborhood

gangs, which were based on geographic areas of the city. The McKenzie Street Dogs were

related to the East Side Fresno Bulldogs. [Petitioner] was considered a hard core member of

the Bulldogs. The Chicale Boys (TCBs) were a much smaller gang and rivals of the Bulldogs.

Gilbert Arteaga claimed affiliation with TCB. Martin Ramirez was not a member of TCB but

associated with them. Officer Ochoa testified that based on the circumstances, [Petitioner]

shot Richard and Gilbert for the benefit of the East Side Fresno Bulldogs.

Defense Evidence

[Petitioner] did not testify at trial. Maria H., [Petitioner]'s former girlfriend, testified

they lived together on Bond Street in May 1999. Maria testified [Petitioner] spent the evening

of May 1, 1999, at their apartment. They watched "Mad T.V." on Channel 26, which started

at 11:00 p.m. and lasted one hour. Sometime around midnight, their neighbors, Greg and

Teddy Null, came to their apartment and asked for some cigarettes. [Petitioner] went outside

and smoked with them, and Maria could hear [Petitioner]'s voice. Maria received a telephone

call around 2:00 a.m., at which time [Petitioner] returned to the apartment and they went to

bed. Maria testified [Petitioner] left the apartment some time after 9:00 a.m. the next

morning. Maria admitted she had never given this information to the police or the district

attorney's office. She only talked to [Petitioner]'s first defense attorney, Franz Criego, and

later spoke to the defense investigator.

Brenda Null testified that in May 1999, she lived with her sons in the same apartment

complex as [Petitioner] and Maria H. Brenda testified that around midnight on May 1, 1999,

she sent her sons to [Petitioner]'s apartment to get a cigarette from him. The boys returned

with the cigarette then stayed outside with [Petitioner] until around 2:00 a.m. Teddy and Greg

Null also testified they were smoking cigarettes with [Petitioner] on the night that he was

supposed to have shot Gilbert and Richard. [Petitioner] returned to his apartment around 2:00

a.m.

Franz Criego, a deputy public defender, testified he was initially appointed to

represent [Petitioner] in May 1999. In the course of his investigation, Criego interviewed

Maria H., who stated [Petitioner] had spent the evening smoking cigarettes with their

neighbors. Criego testified he also interviewed the neighbors. Criego's office subsequently

declared a conflict and he withdrew from the case. He turned over his file to the court but

purged his notes as confidential work product, and he did not have any notes about his

conversations with Maria and her neighbors.

John Donnelly, a psychiatrist at University Medical Center, examined Gilbert Arteaga

while he was hospitalized to determine the impact of his head wounds. Donnelly testified

Gilbert had lost his right eye and underwent a craniotomy to remove pressure from his brain.

Donnelly determined Gilbert's short-term memory was intact and he was fully oriented.

Donnelly asked Gilbert about the shooting, and Gilbert stated he was shot when he rode

home on his bicycle from his girlfriend's house. Gilbert suspected the shooting was the result

of gang retaliation, and stated the gang members “jumped and beat him and some of his

friends.” Gilbert had just learned about Richard's death when Donnelly examined him.

J.A. testified about the night when Gilbert staggered home with the gunshot wound to

his head. J.A. testified that he asked Gilbert, “‘Was it Stump,’” and Gilbert said yes.

Francisco M. testified [Petitioner] was his friend, and occasionally lived at his house.

He also knew Gilbert Arteaga, and that Gilbert claimed [Petitioner] shot him. In November

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1999, Francisco was with his friends, Joseph C. and Israel R., as they were riding their

bicycles on Sixth and Illinois. Francisco fell off his bike and his friends stopped and laughed

at him. While he was getting up, Gilbert Arteaga appeared on the street and yelled, “‘Fuck

Bullfrogs,’” meant as an insult to the Bulldogs, and “‘TCB Westside.’” Gilbert was with four

or five associates, who tried to chase Francisco and his friends. Gilbert and his associates

caught up with them, and Gilbert told Francisco, “‘You guys are the ones that shot me.’”

Francisco and his friends denied it, and Gilbert replied: “‘Well, I didn't know who shot me. It

was somebody from Illinois Street Dogs.’” Gilbert let them leave. Francisco testified he told

[Petitioner] about Gilbert's statements, but admitted he never told the police department.

[Petitioner]'s wife helped Francisco contact [Petitioner]'s attorney.

Joseph C. testified he was with Francisco when Gilbert Arteaga accused them of

shooting him. However, Joseph believed the incident occurred in the summer of 1999. Joseph

never told the police about Gilbert's statement. Joseph testified that he frequently saw

[Petitioner] at Francisco's house, and [Petitioner] was his friend. [Petitioner] had called

Joseph from jail and encouraged him to testify in the case.

Myrl Stebens, the defense investigator, testified he interviewed Freddie M. in juvenile

hall in November 2000, and Freddie stated he was not present when Gilbert Arteaga and

Richard Cruz were shot. Freddie said he repeatedly told Detective Martin he was not there,

but Martin threatened to charge him with Richard's murder. Freddie claimed he fabricated his

statement to the police as a result of the threats, and his story about the shooting was based

on rumors he heard in the street.

Stebens testified he interviewed Salvador Muratella in jail. Muratella stated that he

saw [Petitioner] on the evening of May 1, 1999, and [Petitioner] displayed a shotgun.

Muratella stated that after [Petitioner] left, he heard two loud shots in the neighborhood,

followed by three shots from a smaller caliber weapon.

James Hernandez, a professor of criminal justice, testified as a defense expert on

gangs. Hernandez conceded the shootings of Richard Cruz and Gilbert Arteaga ostensibly

appeared to be gang-related. However, Hernandez testified it was not unusual for gang

members to testify against other gang members to obtain benefits for themselves from law

enforcement officers. Hernandez was particularly concerned about Freddie M.'s testimony,

because Freddie was a Bulldog and it was very unusual for a gang member to testify against a

member of the same gang. However, members of the same gang could testify against each

other to eliminate rivals from that gang and minimize their own involvement in the crime.

Hernandez believed that if [Petitioner] was the gunman, the shooting of Richard Cruz was

more of a personal matter between [Petitioner] and his relative, Richard, than a gang-related

incident.

Mark Coleman, an attorney, testified he was an expert in ballistics and shotgun scatter

patterns, but conceded he had never testified as an expert witness in a trial. Coleman testified

Gilbert Arteaga was shot with different types of pellets than those which were removed from

Richard Cruz's body, and they might have been fired from different weapons.

Cecil Collier testified he was housed next to Gilbert Arteaga in the Fresno County Jail

in November 2000. Collier knew Gilbert was a Norteno TCB. Collier overheard Gilbert

speaking to a group of Surenos in jail about how he lost his eye. Gilbert stated he had been

cruising around with his homeboy when they stopped to talk to some girls. The Bulldogs

became upset because the girls went with Gilbert and his homeboy, and a fight started.

Gilbert stated someone yelled gun, and his homeboy was shot with a shotgun. As he went to

help his homeboy, Gilbert was also shot with the shotgun. According to Collier, Gilbert

stated he didn't know who shot him. Collier later told Gilbert that he shouldn't be speaking

with the Surenos about the shooting.

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Collier testified Gilbert talked about this case with him. Gilbert stated a police

detective showed him a photograph and asked if this was the person who shot him. Gilbert

said no, but the detective insisted this was the person who shot him. Gilbert alternatively

stated he was going to testify that Stump did or did not shoot him. Gilbert further stated the

detective was going to help him get into school when he was released from jail.

[Petitioner] was acquitted of the murder of Richard Cruz. As for Gilbert Arteaga,

[Petitioner] was found not guilty of attempted murder, but guilty of the lesser related offense

of attempted voluntary manslaughter. [Petitioner] was convicted of assault with a firearm on

Martin Ramirez. The personal use, great bodily injury, and gang enhancements were found

true.

See Exhibit A at pp. 3-23, Respondent’s Answer.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. th th

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

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Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

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 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One

In his first claim for relief, Petitioner alleges his motion to sever the two counts was wrongly

denied in violation of his due process rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution. He argues the joinder of the two separate indictments deprived him

of a fair trial because evidence was introduced that was not cross-admissible and the prosecutor

repeatedly urged the jury to consider the similarity of the crimes. 

This claim was first presented on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA. On January 22, 2003, the

Fifth DCA denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. See Exhibit A, Respondent’s Answer. Petitioner

then presented the claim in a petition for review in the California Supreme Court where it was

summarily denied. See Exhibits A and B, Petitioner’s Amended Petition. The California Supreme

Court, by its “silent order” denying review of the Fifth DCA’s decision, is presumed to have denied

the claims presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion of the Fifth DCA. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

The Fifth DCA analyzed the claim as follows:

The law prefers consolidation of charges. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353,

409.) Joinder of criminal charges for trial benefits the public by reducing delay in the

disposition of criminal charges, and it benefits the state by conserving judicial resources and

public funds. (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 939-940; see also People v. Mason

(1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 935.) “Whenever a defendant is tried for multiple crimes of the same

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class, the jury will be presented with evidence that the defendant committed multiple

offenses. This necessary concomitant of joinder is not sufficient to render the joinder unduly

prejudicial. If it were, joinder could never be permitted. The danger to be avoided in joinder

of offenses is that strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory crime might be used to bolster

a weak case on another crime.” (People v. Hill (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 727, 735-736.)

Where the offenses charged are of the same class, joinder is proper under section 954.

(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1030.) Section 954 states that “[a]n accusatory

pleading may charge ... two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or

offenses, under separate counts, ... provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the

interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different

offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately ....”

“For purposes of joinder, offenses are deemed to have been connected together in

their commission, where there exists ‘a common element of substantial importance in their

commission,’ even though the offenses charged do not relate to the same transaction and

were committed at different times and places against different victims. [Citations.] Offenses

are of the ““same class”” if they possess ‘common characteristics or attributes.’ [Citation.]”

(People v. Poon (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 68, disapproved on other grounds in People v.

Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 292; see also People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188;

People v. Leney (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 265, 269; People v. Windham (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d

1580, 1591.)

“[S]ection 954 permits joinder of all assaultive crimes against the person, all of them

being considered ‘of the same class.’” (Coleman v. Superior Court (1981) 116 CaI.App.3d

129, 135.) There is no question that murder, attempted murder, and assault with a firearm, as

charged in this case, are assaultive crimes against the person and are offenses of the same

class. (People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 622; People v. Stewart (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d

1050, 1058; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1243; People v. Hill, supra, 34

Cal.App.4th at p. 734.) The trial court properly granted the prosecution's motion in the instant

case to consolidate counts I and II with count III. 

This conclusion does not end the analysis. Even where joinder is statutorily

authorized, severance may be constitutionally required if joinder of the offenses would be so

prejudicial that it would deny a defendant a fair trial. (People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17

Cal.4th at pp. 1243-1244; Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 447.) We review

the denial of defendant's motion for an abuse of discretion, that is, whether the denial fell

“‘outside the bounds of reason.’” (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 408, quoting

People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226.)

This court examines a pretrial severance ruling on the record before the court at the

time of the motion. (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 127.) However, even if the trial

court's ruling is correct at the time when made, this court must reverse the judgment if the

defendant shows failure to sever actually resulted in a “‘“gross unfairness”’” amounting to a

denial of due process under federal law. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 162.)

In Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d 441, the California Supreme Court

stated several factors to be considered in deciding whether charges should be joined: (1) the

lack of cross-admissibility of evidence; (2) the prejudicial effect of joining one charge with a

more inflammatory charge; (3) the prejudicial effect of joining a weak case with a strong

case; and (4) whether the People sought to join a charge with a capital offense. (Id. at p. 452.)

Cross-admissibility concerns whether evidence on each of the joined charges would

be admissible, under Evidence Code section 1101, in separate trials on the other charges.

(People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 171-172.) Evidence Code section 1101,

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subdivision (b) allows the admission of evidence of the defendants’ past conduct, including

uncharged crimes, where the evidence is relevant to prove some fact other than the

disposition to commit the crime such as, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

identity or knowledge. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) If the evidence is cross-admissible,

then any inference of prejudice is dispelled, and denial of severance is proper. (People v.

Kraft, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1030.)

Although both parties herein discuss the cross-admissibility of evidence as an

additional consideration, section 954.l expressly permits joinder of offenses even when the

evidence is not cross-admissible. (People v. Hill, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 734735; see

also People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 111, fn. 3; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th

1229, 1314, fn. 13.) Section 954.1, which was enacted with the passage of Proposition 115 in

1990, states that “... evidence concerning one offense or offenses need not be admissible as to

the other offense or offenses before the jointly charged offenses may be tried together before

the same trier of fact.” Section 954.1 thus expressly permits joinder of offenses even when

the evidence is not cross-admissible. (People v. Hill, supra, at pp. 734-735; Belton v.

Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1284.)

[Petitioner] insists the discussion of cross-admissibility in Williams was grounded in

federal constitutional law and survived the enactment of Proposition 115. [Petitioner]’s

interpretation of Williams and Proposition 115 confuses prejudice and cross-admissibility:

“While Proposition 115 did not discard all prior case law regarding joinder, it did

specifically limit the treatment of cross-admissibility of evidence as a primary factor

for determining prejudice as set forth in Williams. Under Penal Code section 954.1,

enacted as part of Proposition 115, evidence concerning one offense need not be

admissible as to the other offense before the two offenses may be tried together. This

limitation is a codification of several Supreme Court cases decided after Williams that

hold that while cross-admissibility may be considered as a factor suggesting possible

prejudice, the absence of cross-admissibility does not, by itself, suffice to demonstrate

prejudice. [Citations.] Proposition 115 also precludes any possible future judicial

construction (unless compelled by the federal Constitution) to the effect that

cross-admissibility of evidence is a requisite of joinder (or the denial of a motion for

severance.)” (Belton v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286.)

While the lack of cross-admissibility no longer is an obstacle to joinder or consolidation, it is

still an important consideration because if the evidence is cross-admissible, that dispels any

inference of prejudice. (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1315-1316.) An absence

of cross-admissibility, however, does not in itself demonstrate prejudice. (People v. Memro

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 850.)

Thus, the sole question upon review of the denial of a motion for severance is

whether the prejudice to the defendant from joinder of the cases outweighed the benefits.

(People v. Hill, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 735; Belton v. Superior Court, supra, 19

Cal.App.4th at p. 1286.) In determining the question of prejudice, evaluation is made in light

of the showings made and facts known at the time the motion for severance is made. (People

v. Gomez (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 22, 27; People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 171.)

Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that denial of severance was a prejudicial abuse

of discretion. (People v. Gomez, supra, at p. 27.) Prejudice must be proved, and “‘[a] bald

assertion of prejudice is not enough.’” (Ibid.)

“The determination of prejudice to the defendant from joinder is necessarily

dependent upon the particular circumstances of each individual case, but certain criteria have

emerged to provide guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever. The denial of

severance may be an abuse of discretion if: (1) highly inflammatory offenses were joined

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with noninflammatory crimes; (2) a relatively weak case was joined with a relatively strong

case so that the aggregate evidence had a spillover effect and altered the outcome on the

relatively weak charges; and (3) one of the charges carried the death penalty. [Citations.]”

(People v. Hill, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 735.)

Given that the death penalty is irrelevant in this case, we note the benefits to the

public and state outweighed the prejudice to [Petitioner] from joinder of the counts by

reducing delay in the disposition of criminal charges and by conserving judicial resources and

public funds. (People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 935.) In examining the relevant

factors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying [Petitioner]'s severance motion.

The danger to be avoided in joinder of offenses is that strong evidence of a lesser but

inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak case in another crime. (Id. at p. 934.)

That danger was not present here where neither case was significantly stronger or more

inflammatory than the other. All three charges involved an unprovoked shooting at an

unarmed victim in the course of an exchange of verbal insults between members of rival

gangs. There were numerous eyewitnesses to the April 18, 1999, incident who identified

[Petitioner] as the person who stood in the middle of the street and either produced a weapon

or took it from one of his associates. The witnesses also testified, without contradiction, that

[Petitioner] fired at Martin Ramirez, who fell to the ground and narrowly escaped being

wounded.

As for the May 2, 1999, murder and attempted murder charges, Gilbert Arteaga and

Freddie M. testified that [Petitioner] produced a shotgun and fired at Gilbert's head. Neither

Gilbert nor Freddie saw the fatal shots being fired at Richard Cruz. Gilbert was literally

running for his life when he heard additional shots being fired, and Freddie had also left the

scene when he heard the other shots. While no one saw the gunman who fired the fatal shots,

Gilbert and Freddie testified [Petitioner] was the person who was holding the shotgun when

they fled the area.

As for the gang-related evidence, [Petitioner]’s gang affiliation was going to be

obvious to the jury in both cases based on the distinctive Bulldog tattoos on his face, which

many of the witnesses cited in their description of the gunman in both the April and May

1999, offenses. Thus, it cannot be said that the April 1999, assault offense was more

inflammatory, or based on stronger evidence, than the May 1999, charges, to create a

spillover effect from one case to the other. (Belton v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1287.)

In addition, [Petitioner] has not demonstrated that prejudice actually resulted from the

joinder of the charges at trial. (People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 851; People v. Hill,

supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 735; People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1318.) As

pointed out in People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, where the jury acquits as to one

joined charge and convicts as to the other, there can be no showing of prejudice as to the

joinder since the verdicts make clear that the jury “clearly considered and weighed the

evidence carefully as to each charge separately.” (Id. at p. 1013; cf. Walker v. Superior Court

(1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 938, 942, fn. 1.) The jury herein acquitted [Petitioner] of the most

serious charge of murder, and returned a verdict for attempted voluntary manslaughter as a

lesser related offense of attempted murder. “The acquittals demonstrate a careful sifting of

the evidence and a properly cautious verdict.” (People v. Moore, supra, at p. 1013.)

On balance, we conclude the statutory requirements of joinder were met, and

[Petitioner] has failed to demonstrate undue prejudice resulting from the joinder of the

charges at trial. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of [Petitioner]’s

motion for severance.

See Exhibit A at pp. 26-32, Respondent’s Answer (footnotes omitted).

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Initially, the Court notes that Respondent correctly asserts that the claim as presented fails to

state a cognizable claim for relief. The claim is completely conclusory and unsupported by any

evidence. "Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not

warrant habeas relief." James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 29 (9th Cir.1994); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199,

204-05 (9 Cir.1995) (holding that conclusory allegations made with no reference to the record or th

any document do not merit habeas relief); Allard v. Nelson, 423 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9 Cir.1970) th

(Conclusory allegations in a habeas petition fail to state a claim and do not suffice to shift the burden

to the state to answer an order to show cause.); Campbell v. Wood 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir.1994),

citing Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir.1970) ("An evidentiary hearing is not

required on allegations that are "conclusory and wholly devoid of specifics.'"). 

Moreover, Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases explicitly allows the district

court to dismiss summarily a habeas petition when no claim for relief is stated. See O’Bremski v.

Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir.1990.) Notice pleading is insufficient; the petitioner must state th

sufficient facts. See id. (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977). Petitioner should

not be given an opportunity to amend his claims to state a cognizable claim since he has already been

informed of these deficiencies and granted an opportunity to cure them. His initial petition was

dismissed for the very same reasons.

Here, Petitioner only claims that certain evidence was cross-admissible thereby resulting in

an unfair trial. Unfortunately, he fails to state what evidence elicited on one count was so damaging

to his defense on the other count that it deprived him of a fair trial. Petitioner also alleges the

prosecutor repeatedly urged the jury to consider the similarity of the crimes. Again, Petitioner fails to

support this claim with any specific facts. The Court is left to guess at what evidence Petitioner

believes was so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. Accordingly, the claim should be rejected

for failure to state a claim. In any case, there is no merit to his claim.

 Petitioner contends that misjoinder of the two counts unconstitutionally deprived him of a

fair trial. However, improper joinder, in itself, does not violate the Constitution. United States v.

Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 (1986); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 774-775 (1946).

“Rather, misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice

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so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Lane, 474 U.S. at 446 fn. 8.

In Lane, the Supreme Court held that an “error involving misjoinder ‘affects substantial rights’ and

requires reversal only if the misjoinder results in actual prejudice because it ‘had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id., 474 U.S. at 449, quoting

Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776. In this case, Petitioner has failed to show actual prejudice resulting from

joinder of the two counts or the trial court’s decision denying the motion to sever.

As discussed by the appellate court, there was no danger in this case that strong evidence “of

a lesser but inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak case in another crime.” See Exhibit

A at p. 31, Respondent’s Answer. One case was not stronger than the other. In all three cases,

several eyewitnesses testified that Petitioner was the perpetrator in each. Also, each charge involved

unprovoked shootings at unarmed victims during a confrontation between members of opposing

gangs. The evidence of Petitioner’s gang membership was obvious to the jury in both cases because

of the distinctive Bulldog tattoos on his face. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate actual

prejudice. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the most serious charge of murder and returned a verdict

of guilty of a lesser charge - attempted voluntary manslaughter - as to the second count of attempted

murder. This indicates the jury clearly considered and weighed the evidence as to each charge. Thus,

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice depriving him of a fair trial in violation of the

Constitution. 

Accordingly, the rejection of this claim by the state courts was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, nor an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim should be denied.

B. Ground Two

In his second and final claim for relief, Petitioner asserts the prosecutor committed

misconduct in violation of his due process rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, he alleges the prosecutor elicited

inadmissible evidence, improperly drew attention to Petitioner’s failure to testify, and misled the

jurors about the duties of a defense attorney.

A petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if the prosecutor’s misconduct “so infected the

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trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial

misconduct must be “of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair

trial.” Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. 756, 765 (1987), quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667

(1985). Any claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be reviewed within the context of the entire

trial. Id. at 765-66; United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9 Cir. 1994). The court th

must keep in mind that “[t]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial

misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor” and “the aim of due

process is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair

trial to the accused.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). "Improper argument does not, per

se, violate a defendant's constitutional rights." Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 (9 Cir. th

1996), quoting Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir.1993). If prosecutorial misconduct is

established, and it was constitutional error, the error must be evaluated pursuant to the harmless error

test set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). See Thompson, 74 F.3d at 1577 ("Only

if the argument were constitutional error would we have to decide whether the constitutional error

was harmless.").

This claim was also first presented and denied on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA. It was then

presented in a petition for review before the California Supreme Court where it was summarily

denied. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying review of the Fifth DCA’s

decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion

of the Fifth DCA. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. 

1. Inadmissible Evidence

As with the first claim, Petitioner fails to present a cognizable federal claim here. The claim

as stated is completely conclusory and unsupported by any evidence. Petitioner claims the prosecutor

elicited inadmissible evidence but he does not identify the suspect evidence. Thus, there is no way to

determine whether the alleged misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. The claim should be

denied.

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2. Improper Attention to Failure to Testify

In this claim, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor improperly drew attention to Petitioner’s

failure to testify. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), the Supreme Court held that “the

Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government and in its bearing on the States

by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's

silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.”

As with the previous claims, this claim is totally conclusory and unsupported by any specific

facts. Petitioner claims the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify; however, he fails to

identify any statements made by the prosecution which unconstitutionally drew attention to his

decision not to testify. Therefore, the claim should be rejected for failure to state a claim.

3. Duties of Defense Attorney

Petitioner next argues the prosecutor misled the jury regarding the duties of a defense

attorney. Again, Petitioner’s claim is wholly unsupported by specific facts and should be dismissed

as conclusory. Petitioner fails to state what the prosecutor said that misled the jury or how these

statements prejudiced him. This claim should be rejected as well.

In sum, Petitioner has failed to present cognizable federal claims. In addition, the claims

should be rejected because they are meritless and because there was overwhelming evidence of

Petitioner's guilt. Several eyewitnesses testified watching Petitioner shoot at the victims in this case.

In light of all the evidence presented, Petitioner’s defense theories were hardly believable. The state

court denial of the above claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claims should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

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of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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