Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01567/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01567-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE MORRIS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-1567 DAD P

vs.

R. A. CASTRO, et al.,

Respondents. ORDER 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the judgment of conviction

entered against him in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of residential robbery,

assault with a deadly weapon, reckless driving while eluding a pursuing peace officer, and

beating a police dog. The third amended petition, on which this action is proceeding, presents

the following claims: (1) the trial court error in allowing the prosecution to call Deputy

Anderson as a rebuttal witness; (2) petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when

trial counsel failed to interview Deputy Anderson before trial; (3) the state coerced petitioner into

abandoning his right of self-representation by providing him with inadequate legal materials; (4)

the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to timely disclose court ordered discovery; (5)

the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by employing unfair surprise in calling Deputy Anderson

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 1 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 This summary is drawn from the December 8, 1999, opinion on rehearing by the 1

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 1-11,

filed on January 8, 2004. (See Answer, Exhibit E.) The court stayed the sentence imposed on

one of the counts against petitioner and affirmed the judgment of conviction in all other respects. 

 Codefendant Gerald Benoit was charged with and convicted of several counts growing 2

out of the same events. He is not a party to this appeal.

2

as a rebuttal witness and using false testimony to secure a conviction; (6) the trial court denied

petitioner the opportunity to offer testimony favorable to his defense; (7) the prosecutor engaged

in misconduct by informing a witness of petitioner’s criminal history and aiding in the changing

of other witnesses’ testimony; (8) trial court committed error in not allowing questions regarding

“masked suspects” during trial, in violation of petitioner’s rights to confront and cross-examine

witnesses; (9) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when the prosecutor and police suppressed

exculpatory evidence regarding a 911 tape and police dispatch communications; (10) petitioner

was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to investigate and utilize

experts; and (11) the trial court committed error in failing to suppress the in-court identification 

of petitioner by witnesses, which was suggestive and tainted. Upon careful consideration of the

record and the applicable law, petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief will be denied.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Defendant Wayne Evan Morris was convicted by jury of two

counts of residential robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; all further

undesignated section references are to the Penal Code), one count

of assault with a deadly weapon, a knife (§245, subd. (a) (1)), one

count of reckless driving while evading an officer (Veh. Code, §

2800.2), and one misdemeanor count of maliciously striking and

kicking a police dog (§ 600, subd. (a)). The jury also found that

defendant used a knife in the residential robbery (§ 12022, subd.

(b)).

2

In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court thereafter found that

defendant had sustained eight prior felony convictions within the

meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (a) and (b) - (I), 667.5,

subdivision (b), and 1170.12.

The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 81

years to life in state prison, plus 22 years and 4 months consecutive

on the priors.

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 2 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

* * *

Prosecution case-in-chief

Around 2:40 a.m. on March 13, 1997, Dana Sutton was driving

home from work when he noticed a large dark-red car parked in

front of the driveway of a utility pumping station on Auberry

Drive, an otherwise residential street in his neighborhood. He

considered this suspicious because a stolen car had been

abandoned around the corner from his nearby home a week before.

As Sutton approached the car, he saw two men get out and walk

away, wearing dark baggy clothing that looked “gang-type.” One

appeared around six feet tall, the other shorter. Although it was

too dark for Sutton to see their faces clearly, he thought both

looked black or Hispanic. Because of his suspicion and his sense

that they looked out of place in the neighborhood, he decided to

keep watching them. After driving past, he turned around, came

back with his lights off, and parked at the corner.

Sutton watched the two men walk down to Timber Cove Way and

disappear between two houses. Sutton wrote down the address of

the house they appeared to be heading for, 8278 Timber Cove

Way, then drove back to the parked car and wrote down its license

number. No one was in the car.

Seconds later, Sutton heard glass breaking. Spotting a nearby

house with its lights on, he banged on the door and told the

occupant to call 911 because someone was breaking in at 8278. 

Then he returned to the parked car and sat in his own car awaiting

further developments.

Carlito and Dolores Pimentel, their daughter Annabelle, and their

three-year-old grandson lived at 8278 Timber Cove Way. The

family was asleep when defendants broke into their house by

shattering a sliding glass door. The house was dark except for a

nightlight in one bedroom.

Carlito awoke, confronted the intruders in the hallway, threw a

flower pot at them, and yelled for them to go away. He also

shouted at Dolores and Annabelle to call the police. Annabelle

went to her room, locked the door, and called 911. Dolores left to

calm her grandson in his room, but then returned to the hallway.

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 3 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Carlito told investigating officers that this robber was wearing gloves and a green

3

jacket. When defendant was captured, he was wearing a jacket (introduced into evidence as an

exhibit) which he described as maroon or burgundy.

4

Carlito tackled defendant. After a brief struggle, defendant pulled

out a knife, cut Carlito, put the knife to his throat as he demanded 

all the cash in the house, then held him down while codefendant

Benoit ransacked the house.

3

Benoit slapped Dolores and knocked her to the floor, then held his

foot on her as he repeatedly demanded money. She heard Carlito

tell her to give them all the money. She told them to take the

money from her bedroom. After ordering her to stay in that room

with her grandson, they took her purse, which contained credit

cards and $140 in cash, and $160 from Carlito’s wallet. The

intruders then left the house. Carlito saw them running toward

Auberry Drive.

As defendant and Benoit ran to their parked car, Dana Sutton saw

them. They were carrying things Sutton could not identify. They

seemed excited and out of breath. Sutton heard one of them say

“We did it” or We got him.” They jumped in the car and started to

drive off. Sutton followed.

Sacramento County Deputy Sheriff Todd Gooler, working the

night shift with his canine partner “Argo,” a 90-pound German

shepherd, responded to the radio call of a residential robbery in

progress at the Pimentel residence. As Gooler reached Auberry

Drive, he saw a maroon vehicle with two men in it stopped on

Auberry at the Calvine Road stop sign. Defendant was driving;

codefendant Benoit was in the front passenger seat. Sutton, close

behind in his car, flashed his high beams, leaned out his window,

and shouted to Gooler that the perpetrators were in the maroon car. 

Seeing no other cars in the area, Gooler made a U-turn, turned on

his flashing lights and siren, and began to pursue the maroon car. 

Sutton followed until both cars exceeded 75 miles per hour.

Defendant’s car turned north onto Calvine and headed for Highway

99, reaching speeds of over 90 miles per hour, with Deputy Gooler

close behind. On the freeway, defendant drove up to 128 miles per

hour, swerving around other cars and two 18-wheeler trucks. 

Other police cars joined the chase with their lights flashing. 

Throughout the chase, Gooler saw only two men in the maroon car.

Defendant drove off the freeway, ran a stop sign and a stop light,

tried to make a left turn at 105 miles per hour, and crashed into a

brick wall. He jumped out of the car and ran. Deputy Gooler

followed in his car and struck defendant with his bumper;

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 4 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Carlito told the police the other robber was approximately 5'10" tall and had a “very 4

heavy build,” perhaps 200 pounds. This description fit defendant. He also told the police,

according to the investigating officer’s testimony, that that robber was “Mexican,” though he

denied having done so at trial; Dolores admitted telling the police something similar, and

testified at trial that that robber was white with a fair complexion. (Booking photographs of

defendant in the section 969b packet offered to prove his priors show that, although black, he is

light-skinned.)

Both victims testified that the first robber had a small mustache and a slight or trimmed

beard. Deputy Gooler testified that when arrested defendant had a light beard, as if he had not

shaved for several days.

Codefendant Benoit, like the second robber as described by the Pimentels, and like the

getaway car’s passenger as described by Gooler, is black.

5

defendant rolled off the hood and resumed running. Gooler and

Argo then pursued him on foot.

As defendant ran back toward his car, Deputy Gooler gave Argo

the command to bite. Argo bit him on the back, throwing him to

the ground. Defendant struggled with the dog, kicking and

punching him. Gooler knocked defendant down with his

flashlight. Another officer joined in the attempt to subdue

defendant, who was still forcibly resisting the deputies and Argo. 

Finally, defendant lay down and seemed to give up, and Argo was

called off. But when an officer tried to handcuff defendant, he

stood up, apparently ready to resist again.

Gooler ordered Argo to attack. Argo bit defendant in the buttocks

and knocked him down. Mace was also sprayed without effect. 

Finally, three deputies succeeded together in subduing and

handcuffing defendant. Defendant was brought back to the crash

scene, then taken to the hospital by paramedics.

After defendant was subdued, Deputy Gooler inspected Argo and

determined that the dog had sustained an injury in the rib cage area,

which remained sensitive to the touch for several days.

Codefendant Benoit, who had also fled on foot after the crash, was

subdued, arrested and placed in the back of a patrol car. Carlito

Pimentel was brought to the scene. After being told the police

“might” have the suspects, he viewed Benoit in the patrol car and

immediately identified him as the one who ransacked the house

and accosted his wife.

4

Searching defendant’s car, the officers found white socks on the

floor and a large kitchen knife on the driver’s side; they also found

a wallet containing the Pimentels’ identification cards and

approximately $123 in cash. Carlito Pimental recognized the knife

as the one defendant held on him during the robbery.

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 5 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Dana Sutton, also brought to the scene of the arrests, could not identify codefendant 5

Benoit, though he believed Benoit’s clothing was similar to what he had seen earlier on the

suspects. At trial, he identified defendant’s voice as that of the person he heard talking as the

two men ran to their parked car.

6

In a subsequent lineup at the jail, both Carlito and Dolores picked a

person other than defendant. According to the evidence at trial, the

person they identified closely resembled defendant, and Carlito

hesitated for a long time before picking him instead of defendant. 

Furthermore, although defendant was wearing some sort of hat

during the robbery, none of the persons in the lineup had on a hat. 

At trial, both Carlito and Dolores identified defendant in court as

the robber who attacked Carlito.5

Defense case

Defendant testified that on the night of the crimes he and his wife

were in the process of moving. Alone in the car, which was full of

clothes and kitchen items, after leaving his wife at her parents’

home in Elk Grove, he was making one last trip to drop off

possessions at their new residence when he stopped for a red light

on Calvine Road at Power Inn Road. A black man in a red and

black 49ers jacket approached and asked if defendant would give

him and his friends a ride to Oak Park. The man was in his 20's,

5'6" or a little taller, and short-haired (a description fitting that of

the second robber, according to the victims’ testimony). Defendant

agreed to give the men a ride in exchange for gas money. After

giving him $10, the man and his two friends got into the car. The

first man got in the front passenger seat; a light-skinned black or

Samoan man in his 30's, 5'8" to 6' tall, wearing a green and white

Green Bay Packers jacket, sat in the right rear passenger seat; and

codefendant Benoit, in a black sweatshirt, sat behind defendant.

As defendant was on the freeway heading to Oak Park, he noticed a

sheriff’s vehicle behind him with its emergency lights on, but he

heard no siren because he was playing his audio system loudly. He

did not think the deputy was after him because he was driving

about 70 miles per hour; his car is old and cannot go faster than 85. 

When he got off the freeway at Martin Luther King Jr. Drive, he

stopped at the stop light and noticed that the deputy was still

behind him with emergency lights on. It finally occurred to him

that the deputy night be pursuing him. He decided to test this

theory by pulling away abruptly and accelerating. Since it looked

as though the deputy was trying to pull him over, he started to slow

down. The passenger in the 49ers jacket told him to keep driving if

he knew what was good for him, then reached over with his foot

and smashed defendant’s foot down on the gas pedal. Believing

the passenger had a weapon, defendant kept driving at about 30

miles per hour. He never ran any red lights or stop signs.

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 6 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

Eventually the deputy rammed the back of defendant’s car, causing

him to lose control and crash. He got out with his hands up, trying

to surrender, but was run into by the deputy’s car and knocked to

the ground. Then a police dog went for his throat. He was fighting

for his life against the dog and against several officers who beat

him with flashlights, kicked him, and sprayed pepper spray in his

eyes. After he gave up and was handcuffed, the officers sicced the

dog on him again; when he fell, they beat and kicked him some

more.

Defendant testified that he was never in the Pimentels’ house, took

no part in the robbery, and did not run from the police. The

kitchen knife identified by Carlito Pimental was part of the

property defendant was moving to his new residence. Defendant

acknowledged that Carlito’s wallet was found in his car, but

explained its presence as part of a police conspiracy to cover up the

fact that they had beaten an innocent man. Because he was

attacked immediately after getting out of his car, defendant never

saw or found out where the other three men in the car went after

the crash. All the witnesses whose testimony contradicted his were

mistaken (except Deputy Gooler, who was lying).

Defendant admitted he had suffered three felony convictions for

burglary in 1984 and 1987, and for receiving stolen property in

connection with one of those counts.

Defendant’s wife also testified, generally corroborating his story

that they were moving and that their car was full of clothing and

kitchen utensils on the night of the crimes.

Rebuttal

Deputy Scott Anderson, called as a rebuttal witness by the

prosecution, testified that he participated in the high-speed chase of

defendant, driving a car behind Deputy Gooler’s. During the

chase, Anderson drove at speeds up to 120 miles per hour.

Anderson’s car was the second on the scene after the crash. He

saw the crash and pulled up right behind defendant’s car. He

watched as defendant ran off and Deputy Gooler followed in his

car until defendant disappeared from view. Anderson saw that

there was only one other person in defendant’s car, who turned out

to be codefendant Benoit; no one else left the car. When Benoit

took off and ran, Anderson caught him and grabbed him by the

49ers jacket he was wearing. Benoit escaped temporarily, but

Anderson hung onto the jacket. Benoit was apprehended by other

deputies.

Anderson made no written report or notes, merely reporting orally

to Deputy Gooler.

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 7 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

Surrebuttal

Called by the defense, Deputy Gooler testified that he had not told

Deputy Anderson he should not write a report (contrary to

Anderson’s testimony). Gooler also stated, contrary to Anderson’s

testimony, that Anderson had not told him about Benoit’s jacket.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 8 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Trial Court Error

Petitioner raises three claims of trial court error. Specifically, he claims that the

trial court erred when it: (1) allowed the prosecution to call Deputy Anderson as a rebuttal

witness over a defense objection; (2) denied petitioner the opportunity to offer testimony

favorable to his defense and refused to allow the examination of trial witnesses regarding

whether the perpetrators wore masks, in violation of petitioner’s rights to confront and crossexamine witnesses; and (3) refused to suppress the in-court identification of petitioner by

witnesses, which was suggestive and tainted. The court will analyze these claims in turn below.

1. Deputy Anderson

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial when it allowed

the prosecution to withhold part of its case-in-chief until after the defense had rested and present 

the testimony of Deputy Anderson in rebuttal. He argues that the prosecution used Deputy

Anderson to bolster its case with respect to the crucial issue of the number of persons in

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 9 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

petitioner’s vehicle, making Anderson’s corroborating testimony an “unfair surprise.” (Third

Amended Pet. (hereinafter Pet.) at consecutive p. 4.) Petitioner raised this claim on appeal in

state court, arguing that: 

(1) Anderson’s testimony was properly part of the prosecution

case-in-chief because the prosecutor knew or should have known

before trial that Anderson was part of the arresting team and could

give evidence outside Deputy Gooler’s knowledge. (2)

Defendant’s testimony did not constitute new evidence which the

prosecutor could not have anticipated or offer new assertions

which were not implicit in defendant’s denial of guilt. (3) By

withholding Anderson’s testimony for rebuttal, the prosecutor got

an unfair opportunity to make defendant appear to be a liar. (4) If

defendant had not testified and been subjected to Anderson’s

rebuttal, he would have had a strong chance of a more favorable

outcome because the prosecution’s case-in-chief left the jury ample

room for reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.

(Opinion at 12.) 

The California Court of Appeal fairly summarized the facts surrounding this claim

as follows:

On the afternoon of Wednesday, July 1, 1998, the prosecutor called

the last witness of the day. The trial court asked counsel outside

the jury’s presence about scheduling for the next day. The

prosecutor said he had two more witnesses to call, CSI Officer

Goodnow (who had taken photographs of the car and booked the

evidence) and Deputy Anderson, who had not been subpoenaed. 

The prosecutor added that Anderson’s name had not appeared in

the police reports, but that it had subsequently come up in

testimony and discussions with the officers. The prosecutor had

not yet been able to contact Anderson or find out what his

testimony might be, but promised to inform defense counsel when

he learned more.

Defense counsel then argued over which defendant should put on

his case first, each preferring that the other do so. The trial court

ruled that defendant would go first because of a potential Aranda

problem (People v. Aranda (1963) 63 Cal.2d 518) involving a

statement made to police by codefendant Benoit. The trial court

adjourned for the day with the scheduling of Goodnow’s and

Anderson’s testimony (if any) unresolved.

The next morning the prosecutor declared he was prepared to rest,

subject to calling Goodnow and Anderson on Monday. 

Defendant’s counsel stated he was not ready to proceed with his

case because defendant was unwilling to decide whether to testify

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 10 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

until all of the People’s evidence was in. The trial court replied

that it did not want to send the jury home for the day; therefore, it

had to “either deny [] the DA’s request for continuance, or order []

the defense to proceed because of the nature of what is left to

testify to.”

The court asked the prosecutor for an offer of proof as to Deputy

Anderson’s testimony. The prosecutor said he had still not been

able to talk to Anderson, but that it appeared Anderson was one of

the first officers at the crash scene, was involved in the

apprehension of codefendant Benoit, and might be able to explain

two things: (1) how the 49er jacket and the utility knife found lying

on the ground near the car got there, and (2) “that no one else was

seen leaving the vehicle when Defendant Benoit jumped over the

fence.” The trial court commented that it “sounds like it’s

speculation that [Anderson] would have anything at all.” The court

and the prosecutor then discussed the testimony of Officer

Goodnow. 

Ultimately, the court granted the prosecutor’s request to call

Goodnow on Monday in his case-in-chief and rest subject only to

calling him; denied the prosecutor’s request to call Anderson on

Monday in his case-in-chief, but reserved judgment on whether

Anderson’s testimony would be admissible as rebuttal; and

directed defendant to proceed with his case. After further

argument about Goodnow, the prosecutor agreed to rest without

calling him. Defendant thereupon testified, followed by his wife. 

He then rested.

On Monday morning, outside the jury’s presence, both defense

counsel objected to the prosecutor’s plan to call Anderson as a

rebuttal witness, complaining they had not had discovery about his

testimony. The prosecutor stated that Anderson would testify as

follows: he was the second officer in the pursuit, he saw the crash;

he saw Deputy Gooler chase defendant; he stayed with the car at

the crash scene and saw only one person still in the car, sitting in

the right front passenger seat; he saw that person get out and try to

escape by scaling a fence while waving a utility knife; he failed to

stop the suspect from scaling the fence, but got hold of his 49ers’

jacket; he continued the chase on the other side of the fence;

finally, another deputy tackled the suspect. The prosecutor argued

that this evidence would rebut defendant’s testimony in two

respects: it would show that Benoit was wearing the 49ers jacket

and was sitting in the right front passenger seat.

The prosecutor added that he had been able to talk to Anderson

only that morning, that he had told defense counsel the substance

of Anderson’s proposed testimony as soon as he learned it himself,

and that he had had no idea what defendant would testify to before

he took the stand. The court asked: “He had not given a statement 

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 11 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

at any time to the police about the four occupants of the car? The

prosecutor answered “No.” (Italics added.)

Defendant’s counsel said that this testimony was inappropriate on

rebuttal because it pertained to the prosecution’s case-in-chief. 

The trial court ruled:

“I agree with Mr. Staats [defendant’s counsel] and Mr. Kirby

[Benoit’s counsel] . . . to the extent that had Mr. Blazina [the

prosecutor] known about the content of Officer Anderson’s

testimony, he could have and should have presented it in his case

in chief.

“On the other hand, Mr. Blazina had no idea what [defendant’s]

testimony would contain, and no reason to believe that there was

going to be a claim of more than just the two occupants in the car,

those two by inference, and direct evidence being the two

defendants.

“Once [defendant] testified that there were other occupants in the

car, certainly behooved Mr. Blazina to find out what, if anything

Officer Anderson could add. And he’s outlined what Officer

Anderson had claimed. It clearly is rebuttal, and it can be

considered by the jury, to whatever extent they want to consider it,

as against one or both defendants.

“I deny the motion to exclude the evidence. It’s common in the

course of a trial as witnesses testify, whether they are testifying for

one’s own side or someone else, new information is developed that

causes people to scurry to find out whether or not someone can

support or rebut that, and that’s what happened here.”

Benoit’s counsel argued that the prosecutor could have discovered

the “newly developed evidence” long ago because Deputy

Anderson’s name showed up in another officer’s report about the

case. The court replied that if defense counsel knew of that report,

they too could have contacted Anderson earlier. Benoit’s counsel

disagreed, saying that officers will not generally speak to defense

investigators, defense counsel cannot generally get addresses or

telephone numbers for officers, and asking the police liaison to

have the officer contact them usually does not work either. The

trial court stood by its ruling that the prosecutor could call

Anderson in rebuttal.

(Id. at 13-17.)

Citing California law, the state appellate court rejected petitioner’s arguments

concerning the rebuttal testimony of Officer Anderson. (Id. at 17-18.) That court reasoned that

petitioner’s testimony presented new unanticipated evidence regarding the number of persons in

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 12 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

petitioner’s vehicle which the prosecutor was entitled to rebut with the testimony of Officer

Anderson. (Id. at 13, 20-21.) The appellate court explained:

No evidence suggesting the presence of four men in defendant’s

car on the night of the crimes was known before defendant

testified. The prosecutor could not have anticipated that defendant

would tell such a story, and to assert that it was implicit in his

denial of guilt is ludicrous. Because defendant’s story presented

genuinely new evidence, the prosecutor was entitled to rebut that

story through the testimony of Deputy Anderson.

(Id. at 20.) 

Respondents argue that petitioner’s claim in this regard fails to present a federal

question. This court agrees. As explained above, a writ of habeas corpus is not available for

alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. The

state trial and appellate courts rejected petitioner’s arguments on state law grounds, finding that

the admission of Deputy Anderson’s testimony in rebuttal rather than during the case-in-chief did

not violate state evidentiary rules. Absent some federal constitutional violation, a violation of

state law does not provide a basis for habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

A state court’s evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal habeas

relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. 

Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2000); Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977-78

(9th Cir. 1999); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); Pike v. Dickson,

323 F.2d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 1963) (“It is only where criminal trials in state courts are conducted

in such a manner as amounts to a disregard of that fundamental fairness essential to the very

concept of justice that due process is offended and that federal court interference is warranted.”) 

“A habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden in showing a due process violation based on an

evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, a

federal court may not grant habeas relief for trial errors without a showing of actual prejudice,

defined as a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” 

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 13 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In support of his claim regarding Sergeant Cooper, petitioner has submitted a 6

newspaper article in which a statement is attributed to “spokesman Sgt. Jim Cooper” that “the

masked suspects randomly targeted a home.” (Traverse, Exhibit A at last page.) 

14

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.

750, 776 (1946)). See also Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). 

This court concludes that the trial court did not commit constitutional error in

allowing the prosecutor to present the testimony of Deputy Anderson in rebuttal. As explained

by the state appellate court, petitioner’s testimony raised for the first time a question regarding

the number of passengers in his vehicle at the time of his apprehension. Although the prosecutor

could have called Deputy Anderson in his case-in-chief, he was not required to do so. However,

after petitioner’s direct examination the prosecutor was virtually compelled to call Deputy

Anderson in order to rebut the new claim presented by petitioner through his testimony. Further,

the defense had already been apprised of the substance of Anderson’s testimony and could not

have been surprised that he testified there were only two people in petitioner’s car during the

pursuit. (Opinion at 14.) For these reasons, the state court decision denying this claim is not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of the federal due process principles set forth above. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

2. Precluding Questioning About Whether the Suspects Wore Masks

Petitioner next claims that the trial court erred when it sustained a hearsay

objection to testimony by Officer Gooler that the suspects of the home invasion robbery were

“masked,” and when it refused to allow the defense to call Officer Jim Cooper, who told the

Sacramento Bee that the suspects wore masks. (Pet. at consecutive p. 9 (claim 6).) Petitioner 6

also claims that the trial court erred when it sustained hearsay objections to “all questions about

the ‘masked suspects.’” (Id. at consecutive p. 12 (claim 8).) Petitioner argues that testimony

indicating the suspects wore masks would have cast doubt on the victims’ identification of him

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 14 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

as one of the perpetrators of the robbery, because “if the suspects were masked, there could not

be any identification whatsoever.” (Id. at consecutive p. 9.)

Petitioner raised these claims for the first time in a petition for writ of habeas

corpus filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. O.) The Superior Court

rejected petitioner’s arguments on the ground that they should have been raised on direct appeal. 

(Answer, Ex. P at 2.) On August 28, 2000, petitioner raised the same claims in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed in the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. K.) That petition was

denied with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293 (1962). (Answer, Ex. L.) On July

24, 2002, petitioner raised the same claims in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in

the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. Q.) That petition was summarily denied by order

dated August 1, 2002. (Answer, Ex. R.) On September 13, 2000, petitioner raised the identical

claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer,

Ex. M.) That petition was denied by order dated May 23, 2001, with citations to In re Dixon, 41

Cal. 2d 756 (1953), In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218 (1965), In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947),

and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 304 (1949). (Answer, Ex. N.) On December 30, 2002, petitioner

raised the claims in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme

Court. (Answer, Ex. S.) That petition was denied by order dated July 30, 2003, with citations to

In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993), In re Miller, 17 Cal. 2d 734 (1941), In re Dixon, In re

Waltreus, and In re Lindley. (Answer, Ex. T.) Under these circumstances, it is unclear whether

the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s claims on the merits or on purely procedural

grounds. However, the claims must be rejected even if a de novo standard of review is

employed.

The background to petitioner’s claims regarding potential testimony that the

robbers wore masks is as follows. In Officer Gooler’s crime report, he stated that the suspects

“wore masks and were armed with knives when they forced entry into the victims’ residence.” 

(Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 595.) In support of a motion to continue the trial date,

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 15 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As will be addressed in more detail below, petitioner was represented by a deputy 7

public defender at his preliminary hearing and through his arraignment in Superior Court. 

Thereafter, petitioner’s Marsden motion was denied and shortly thereafter he exercised his right

to represent himself. Petitioner eventually obtained a four-month continuance of his trial date. At

the time of this hearing petitioner was representing himself. On April 13, 1988, the trial court

granted petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel and a new attorney was appointed to

represent him. New counsel obtained a two-month continuance on petitioner’s behalf and

represented him at trial. (See Opinion at 23-26.) 

16

petitioner requested several items of discovery from the prosecution, including photographs of a

ski mask and a knife reportedly found in petitioner’s vehicle after it was stopped by police. (Id.

at 37-38.) At the hearing on this motion held on March 5, 1998, the prosecutor stated that he had

given to petitioner all of the photographs taken in the case, but that none of the photographs

depicted a mask. (Id. at 38.) The trial court ordered the prosecution to produce to petitioner all

of the photographs in this case. The following colloquy then took place:

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Morris, let me ask you this: If what

you’re saying is in part of the police report says there was a ski

mask in those photographs and there’s not now a ski mask in those

photographs, then there’s nothing we can do.

DEFENDANT MORRIS: So no way I can get them?

THE COURT: There appears to be no photograph that contains

that ski mask unless it’s already in your possession.

DEFENDANT MORRIS: Okay.

(Id. at 39.)7

Subsequently, petitioner brought a motion to suppress all physical evidence found

in his vehicle. (Id. at 122.) After a hearing, the trial court summarily denied petitioner’s motion

“to exclude any evidence pertaining to the car and the car’s contents.” (Id. at 172.) The

following colloquy then took place:

THE COURT: . . .The last item I believe is the black pullover ski

mask, unless there are additional items. Is that the last item?

THE DEFENDANT MORRIS: No, there’s also something on the

dispatch tape.

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 16 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

THE COURT: Okay. The ski mask was on the front seat area of

the vehicle. What happened to that?

MR. BLAZINA (the prosecutor): The ski mask was – I can’t

remember specifically where it was. It was somewhere in the front

area of the vehicle. The ski mask was collected. It was booked

into evidence. It’s in evidence right now. It was viewed by one or

both of the defense investigators. We had a photograph taken of it. 

I think they took photographs of it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BLAZINA: I think that the issue that the defendants have is

that one of the reports, I believe by the CSI officer, indicates that a

photograph was taken of that area of the car that was – that would

show I think it was the knife, something else, and the ski mask. 

And when you look in the photograph, you don’t see the ski mask

in the photograph.

I don’t know if it’s because the angle of the photograph you don’t

see it. I think it’s a shot looking down at the front seat, and then

the floorboard area. And if it’s tucked underneath the seat, I don’t

know, or if it had been collected. The officer went by, saw

everything that was there, took notes, somebody collected the ski

mark (sic), and then the officer took the photograph. I don’t know. 

But no evidence has been destroyed regarding that.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have anything to add on that

issue, Mr. Morris?

THE DEFENDANT MORRIS: Yes. It says on page fifty-nine of

the initial police report, line three through six, that the CSI Officer

Goodnow made observations upon arriving at the scene. He stated

he observed on the front floorboard area of the vehicle, near the

center area, was a large-bladed knife and a black pullover ski mask.

On page fifty-nine of discovery on line nine, CSI Officer Goodnow

stated using color point thirty-five millimeter film and ASA 200

camera, I took the following photographs, closeup views of this

evidence in this case.

And on page sixty of discovery, line four, I took closeup views of

evidence stand number five showing a large steel-bladed woodenhandle knife on the floorboard area of the vehicle, and a black

pullover type ski mask on the front seat area near the floorboard.

Also on page sixty-one, line twenty-five and twenty-eight, also

states photographs were taken of the ski mask.

Failure to disclose photographs of the ski mask in the defendant’s

car violate due process of law. All other evidence in this case is

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 17 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

photographed then booked into evidence, except the ski mask. It

was (sic) already been a problem in this case regarding evidence,

and where’s the ski mask from? I don’t know where it came from.

Like I said, I was took (sic) to the hospital. And all I know that

they said, there’s evidence all over your car. And this man says he

took photographs. He’s the CSI officer in charge of this crime

scene. He said he took photographs of this in many areas of this

police report, and we don’t have the photographs. I don’t know

where the ski mask came from. And that’s what I’m saying.

THE COURT: If, in fact, there are no photographs of the ski mask,

that doesn’t preclude reference to the ski mask and the admission 

into evidence of the ski mask.

Do you intend to admit it into evidence, Mr. Blazina?

MR. BLAZINA: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. STAATS (petitioner’s counsel): Your Honor, just to preserve

the record, we may object on other grounds at the appropriate time

to admission of the ski mask during testimony about that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STAATS: In fact, we might raise it now, since you’re on the

issue, and that is, that there is no evidence of a ski mark (sic) being

used in the commission of this crime. And I think that if the

prosecution was allowed to question witnesses about finding such

an item in the car, it would be unduly prejudicial without any

probative value without some sort of minimal showing that this is

connected with the crime at all.

THE COURT: Do you have anything in response to that?

MR. BLAZINA: Yes, your Honor. My understanding of the ski

mask, if I remember correctly, is that it’s actually a knit cap, the

type that you could pull over your face, and there were hand-cut

eye holes into it. I don’t think it was a standard ski mask that has a

large opening that’s sewn into it when you purchase it. I think it

was hand done, which I think indicates a certain premeditation and

planning and sophistication on the part of the defendant.

Furthermore, I believe testimony will show that Mr. Morris wore

some type of beanie or cap on his head when he went in and did the

home invasion robbery. If I remember correctly, the witnesses had

difficulty identifying how long his hair was because he had some

type of cap on, and that would be consistent with a ski mask or a

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 18 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

knit cap that one would have on that would roll up and would be

worn on the head.

So I think the evidence would support it not only as being involved

with the home invasion robbery, but showing planning on Mr.

Morris’s part to commit the home invasion robbery. Whether or

not he remembered or chose to pull his mask down over his face

during the home invasion robbery will be another issue, but I think

there is sufficient evidence to show its involvement in this crime.

THE COURT: The motion to exclude the ski mask is denied as far

as Mr. Staats’ arguments as well.

(Id. at 172-76.)

During trial, counsel for petitioner’s co-defendant asked Detective Gooler whether

he had “any information that the suspects – both suspects wore masks in the home invasion?” 

(Id. at 582.) The trial court sustained a hearsay objection to this question, and after argument by

counsel for petitioner’s co-defendant, the trial judge agreed to “put [his] ruling on the record.”

(Id. at 583.) Subsequently, the court heard additional argument on the admissibility of evidence

regarding whether the perpetrators wore masks during the robbery. (Id. at 594-95.) The court

read from Officer Gooler’s crime report, which stated that both suspects “wore masks and were

armed with knives when they forced entry into the victims’ residence.” (Id. at 595.) The trial

court questioned Officer Gooler, as follows:

THE COURT: While the jury is absent, let me ask the officer: Did

you prepare that report?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And what was your source of information

concerning [suspect 1] and [suspect 2] wearing masks and being

armed with knives?

THE WITNESS: That information I would have received from

other officers or another officer. And I don’t remember which

officer or officers that I talked with to get that information.

THE COURT: All right. Now, from our side bar conference, it

appears that it’s hearsay if the purpose is to prove either that

suspect number one and two, in fact, wore masks and both 

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 19 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

apparently, in fact, were armed with knives. It’s hearsay if that’s

the intent of the questioning.

It’s also hearsay if the purpose is to prove that somebody else told

this to this officer, in other words, the purpose being to prove that

this was stated to the officer, and that’s why he put it on his report.

Seems to me that it’s hearsay in that respect, too, proving that

someone said this to the officer, even regardless of whether it’s

true or not.

Now, if, among other things, the victims can be impeached with

ever telling anyone that the suspects wore masks and both were

armed with knives, that certainly is appropriate. But it would need

to require calling the officer or officers who interviewed the

victims to see what they said, what they told him about masks and

knives, before inquiring of this officer, who apparently got it

second, third, or even more than that, relayed information, since

this officer didn’t talk to the victim.

(Id. at 596-97.) After further questioning from the trial judge, Officer Gooler stated that he did

not see either suspect wearing a mask or carrying a knife. (Id. at 597.) The officer also stated

that he did not question the victims himself, but that he had received his information from other

officers. (Id. at 597-98.) The trial court concluded that the information in Officer Gooler’s

report was hearsay, ruling as follows:

THE COURT: Again, counsel, from the side bar conference, my

ruling is that what he has in his report is hearsay. And the only

relevant purpose would be to prove that the suspects wore masks

and both were armed with knives, or that someone told this officer

that. Such information and all of that is hearsay.

* * *

– the fact that a mask is found in a vehicle, if that was the case, that

can be presented as evidence. Anything that was found in the car, I

assume, can be offered by the DA or either defense counsel to try

to prove something directly or inferentially from that. 

(Id. at 598-99.) Neither petitioner’s counsel nor counsel for his co-defendant questioned any

witnesses further about the presence of a mask nor did the defense seek to introduce a mask into

evidence at. Finally, neither of the victims testified that the robbers wore masks. 

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 20 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings with respect to the

questioning of witnesses regarding whether the perpetrators wore masks violated his right to due

process. To evaluate whether exclusion of evidence reaches constitutional proportions, the court

must balance five factors: “(1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on the central issue;

(2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the

sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part of the

attempted defense.” Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1990). A criminal defendant

must demonstrate that his interest in presenting evidence in his favor outweighs the state’s

interest in reliable and efficient trials before a court should interfere with routine evidentiary

matters. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530;

Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1985). Only “particularly crucial and reliable

evidence” will satisfy this test; “[e]vidence of little importance, whether merely cumulative or of

little probative value, will almost never outweigh the state interest in efficient judicial process.” 

Perry, 713 F.2d at 1453. 

Applying these factors to the case at bar, this court finds that the trial court did not

commit constitutional error in sustaining the hearsay objection in question. Evidence contained

in Officer Gooler’s report that the suspects wore masks and carried a knife was based on multiple

hearsay and was therefore presumptively unreliable. Because Officer Gooler could not

remember who told him about the masks, the evidence was not capable of evaluation by the jury. 

Neither of the victims testified that the suspects wore a mask. On the contrary, both of the

victims testified that their identification of petitioner was based on their viewing of his face

during the robbery. (See RT at 388, 397, 470-72, 484.) In light of this testimony, unreliable

hearsay evidence that someone reported that the suspects wore masks would not appear to be

probative on any issue in this case. In particular, evidence that Officer Gooler heard from some

other officers that the suspects wore masks could not have constituted a major part of petitioner’s

defense that someone else committed the crimes. In addition, as described above, the trial court

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 21 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

22

ruled that petitioner could pose appropriate questions to witnesses about the mask and could offer

the mask itself as evidence. The defense chose not to do so. 

The court also notes that petitioner’s trial strategy with respect to this evidence

appears to have changed during the course of the trial. At first, as related above, petitioner’s

counsel objected to any evidence that a mask was found in petitioner’s car. The defense motion

to exclude the mask from evidence, however, was denied. (RT 176.) Counsel then apparently

decided to seek to highlight the fact that the perpetrators may have worn masks during the

robbery. Petitioner does not explain how, given this change of strategy, the trial court’s ruling

preventing Detective Gooler from being questioned about other officers telling him that the

robbers wore masks resulted in prejudice to his defense. 

In the traverse, petitioner makes the following argument:

First, petitioner contends that there was probative value to the

information that the suspects in the home invasion robbery were

masked. On one hand, neither victim, Carlito or Dolores Pimentel,

or the witness, Dana Sutton, testified that either suspect was

masked. On the other hand, the information that the suspects were

masked was improperly excluded by the court as hearsay as Deputy

Gooler testified that he received that from another unknown

officer. (RT 596-597.) It is very unlikely that officer Gooler did

not know who the officers were when he received that information. 

Therefore, the officers who were on duty should have been

subpoenaed to court to allow officer Gooler to identify that officer. 

Sgt. Jim Cooper of the Sacramento Sheriff’s department in a

statement to the Sacramento Bee Newspaper stated that the

suspects were masked. This statement corroborated officer

Gooler’s information about the suspects were (sic) masked. This

would have also established that petitioner was not involved in the

home invasion. Therefore, the trial court ‘cut off” questioning

regarding the mask as petitioner claims. This was obviously to

prevent petitioner from establishing the fact that he was never

identified as a suspect in the crime. To further prevent petitioner

from establishing that he was never identified as a suspect is the

fact that the trial court denied the defense the right to call Sgt.

Cooper to testify concerning the fact that the suspects were

masked. Therefore, petitioner or his co-defendant were not free to

ask questions about the mask because officer Gooler was not

allowed to be cross examined, and Sgt. Jim Cooper was not

allowed to be called to testify. 

(Traverse at 12.) 

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 22 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

23

Petitioner contends, in essence, that evidence the perpetrators were wearing masks

would have established that he was not one of the perpetrators because the victims testified the

perpetrators were not wearing a mask during the robbery. This convoluted argument does not 

support petitioner’s due process claim. Petitioner also argues that evidence the suspects were

wearing masks would have cast doubt on the victim’s identification of petitioner as one of the

perpetrator because “if the suspects was wearing masks at the time of the crime, there could (not)

be any identification what so ever.” (Pet. at consecutive p. 10.) Petitioner contends that “no

person or persons could have identified the robbers, as they were ‘masked’ and wore hats during

the entire course of the robbery. It would have impeached the victims tainted and suggestive

identifications and would have shown their identifications had no independent source and was

manufactured by misconduct by the police and prosecution.” (Traverse, Ex. A at consecutive p.

5.) This court rejects petitioner’s argument that testimony indicating that a police officer was

told by some other officer that the perpetrators were reportedly wearing masks would have had

any significant impeachment value with respect to the victims’ in-court identification. The

victims had good recall of the events in question and were able to describe the perpetrators’ faces

in some detail. (See RT at 388, 397, 470-71, 484.) Unreliable and attenuated evidence that the

robbers may have worn masks of some kind would not have changed the result in this case.

Petitioner has also failed to establish prejudice resulting from the trial court’s

exclusion of the testimony in question. The case against petitioner, even without the victims’

identification, was overwhelming. Petitioner was seen getting into the getaway car and lead

police on a high speed chase. He then acted in an extremely incriminating manner after being

apprehended. The victims’ wallet and the knife used in the robbery were found in petitioner’s

car. Petitioner’s co-defendant, the only other passenger seen in his car, was identified by one of

the victims at the scene. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s evidentiary ruling with

respect to questions about Officer Gooler’s police report did not have a substantial and injurious

effect on the verdict in this case. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38. 

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 23 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

24

Petitioner’s assertions regarding Officer Cooper and his claim that the trial court

erred in sustaining hearsay objections to “all questions about the ‘masked suspects’” (Pet. at

consecutive p. 12), are vague and conclusory and should be rejected on that basis. See Jones v.

Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994))

(“It is well-settled that ‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief’”). Petitioner has pointed to nothing in the record

indicating that the defense expressed an intention to call Sergeant Cooper as a witness but was

denied the opportunity to do so. 

For all of these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claims that the

trial court’s evidentiary rulings denied him the right to present evidence favorable to the defense

in violation of his right to due process. 

3. In-Court Identification

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to due process when it failed

to suppress the victim’s in-court identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the robbery. 

Petitioner argues that the in-court identification was “suggestive and impermissibly tainted” by a

pretrial identification procedure which, in turn, was “tainted by the prosecution and the

Sacramento Sheriff’s department which helped and aided the victims in the I.D. process.” (Pet.

at consecutive p. 16.) In his traverse, petitioner implies that the police officers included details in

their incident reports which were inconsistent with what they were told by the victims at the

scene, thereby giving the victims the idea that the perpetrators had facial hair. (See Traverse, Ex.

C at 3.) Petitioner also contends that the victims were unable to remember sufficient details

about the perpetrators to make a reliable identification, but that they identified petitioner simply

because they knew he had been arrested for the crime and because he resembled the person they

had picked out of the lineup. (Id. at 1, 7.) Petitioner argues, “the fact that the police showed the

petitioner to victims at preliminary hearing ‘helped’ them make their in-court I.D. by cementing

the man’s face in their memory.” (Id. at 7-8.) 

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 24 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

25

Petitioner notes that after the robbery occurred, Mrs. Pimentel stated she did not

think she could make an identification because everything happened so fast and Mr. Pimentel

stated he could not remember whether the perpetrator had any facial hair. (Id. at 1.) However,

later in the proceedings, Mrs. Pimentel made a positive identification of petitioner as the

perpetrator and Mr. Pimentel stated with certainty that the robber had facial hair. (Id. at 3.) 

Petitioner contends that the circumstances surrounding the identification procedures “made it all

but inevitable that the petitioner would be picked out as the man” and resulted in a “substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” (Id. at 4.) He argues, “the pre-trial confrontations

clearly were arranged as to make the resulting I.D.s virtually inevitable, the eyewitnesses

‘tainted’ I.D. testimony must entirely be excluded.” (Id. at 12-13.) Finally, as in the arguments

described above, petitioner contends that if the suspects were wearing masks the victims would

not have been able to make an identification in any event because they would have been unable

to see the suspects’ faces. (Id. at 7, 12; see also Traverse, Ex. A at consecutive p. 5.)

Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in a petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. O.) The Superior Court rejected

petitioner’s arguments on the ground that they should have been raised on direct appeal. 

(Answer, Ex. P at 2.) On August 28, 2000, petitioner raised the same claim in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed in the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. K.) That petition was

denied with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App.2d 293 (1962). (Answer, Ex. L.) On July

24, 2002, petitioner raised this claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. Q.) That petition was summarily denied by order

dated August 1, 2002. (Answer, Ex. R.) On September 13, 2000, petitioner raised the same

claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex.

M.) That petition was denied by order dated May 23, 2001, with citations to In re Dixon, 41 Cal.

2d 756 (1953), In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218 (1965), In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947), and

In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 304 (1949). (Answer, Ex. N.) On December 30, 2002, petitioner raised

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 25 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Petitioner described his “actual description” as follows: “At the time of the event the 8

defendant was 32 years old, 5'11 weight 240 pounds, is a white male and was arrested with a

maroon or burgundy coat and also was arrested with a full beard and a mustache.” (CT at 396.) 

In his traverse, however, petitioner states that he is black. (Traverse, Ex. C at 13.)

26

the claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Answer, Ex. S.) That petition was denied with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993), In

re Miller, 17 Cal. 2d 734 (1941), In re Dixon, In re Waltreus, and In re Lindley, by order dated

July 30, 2003. (Answer, Ex. T.) Thus, it is again unclear whether the California Supreme Court

denied this claim on the merits or on purely procedural grounds. Regardless, the claim must be

rejected even if a de novo standard of review is applied.

a. Background

The state court record reflects that while proceeding in pro se, petitioner filed a

motion to preclude the in-court identification testimony of victims Mr. and Mrs. Pimental. (CT

at 337, 398.) The motion was eventually argued by petitioner’s counsel, who had been appointed

in the interim between the filing of the motion and the hearing thereon. (RT at 217-19.)

Petitioner’s counsel argued that the victims identified petitioner at his preliminary hearing only 

because he was the person charged with the robbery and not because they actually recognized

him as the perpetrator and that they should be prevented from doing so at trial. (Id. at 228; see

also CT at 348.) Counsel pointed out that the victims had been unable to identify petitioner at

the pretrial lineup, identifying someone else as the perpetrator instead. (Id.) Counsel also

claimed that the victims’ identification of petitioner at the preliminary hearing might have been

improperly influenced by the pretrial lineup. (RT at 226.) Specifically, he argued that because

the victims selected someone with facial hair at the lineup as the perpetrator, they may have

decided that the perpetrator had facial hair at the time of the crime. (Id.) Counsel pointed out

that the victims told the police immediately after the incident that they didn’t remember whether

the perpetrators had facial hair, but at the preliminary hearing they testified the perpetrator had

facial hair. (Id.; see also CT at 347, 349, 351-52, 378.) Counsel argued that it was not logical 8

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 26 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

for the victims to remember at the preliminary hearing that the robber had facial hair when they

were unable to remember that detail immediately after the robbery occurred. Counsel also noted

that Mr. Pimentel stated at the preliminary hearing that he identified petitioner because he knew

he was the person who had been arrested in this case. (RT at 436.) In essence, petitioner’s

counsel argued that the victims identified petitioner simply because the circumstances suggested

he was the perpetrator, even though they were unable to actually recognize him as one of the men

who committed the robbery in their home. 

Petitioner’s position with respect to his motion was summarized by the trial court

at the hearing as follows:

THE COURT: And I don’t think he was really arguing – I could

be wrong – that the lineup was tainted because he wasn’t selected

in the lineup. He was arguing that the witnesses picked somebody

else out of the lineup, and then came into the prelim and selected

him, and he was suggesting and arguing in his motion that they

were manipulated – or suggesting because he was the only one

there at the prelim, and that’s why they would have felt compelled

to select him, even though they selected somebody else at the

lineup.

(Id. at 217-18.) Petitioner’s counsel summarized his own argument in support of the motion as

follows:

Just to give you an example, Mr. Pimentel said he couldn’t tell

whether the person had facial hair or how long his hair was

because of the hat. And yet at the preliminary hearing, I believe he

testified the person has a beard here and here on either side and

then on the chin.

If the Court will note that the number four that he picked out at the

lineup has a beard in all those three places. So what I’m

suggesting to you, this fellow can’t make an identification. He is –

he is going by suggestibility.

He goes to a – he goes to the prelim – I mean, to the lineup and

picks out somebody that has a beard, and so that’s who he thinks

then is the person, and comes to the – comes to the preliminary

hearing and describes the person as having a beard, even though he

couldn’t describe facial hair when he made a report on the night of

the event, and identifies Mr. – Mr. Morris in court at the

preliminary hearing, and admits that he’s doing it because he

knows he’s the accused.

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 27 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

28

So I don’t think the People have even – have evidence that reaches

a threshold that any identification can now be made in court in

front of the jury.

(Id. at 220-21.) 

In response, the prosecutor argued that the preliminary hearing transcript made it

clear that the victims were identifying petitioner because of their recollection of his appearance

on the night of the crime and not because of any overt suggestiveness. (Id. at 221.) The

prosecutor also contended that the opportunity to conduct an in-court identification procedure 

should not be denied because of the mere fact that the victims had the opportunity to view

petitioner at the preliminary hearing as the person accused of the crime. (Id.) 

The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to preclude an in-court identification. 

(Id. at 229.) The court found, and petitioner’s counsel conceded, that the pre-trial lineup was

fair. (Id. at 227.) The court also concluded that any inconsistencies between the victims’

description of the perpetrators to police officers at the scene and their subsequent identifications

at the lineup and the preliminary hearing could be fully explored at trial. (Id. at 228.) The judge

made the following explanatory statements:

My feeling is that I have come to the conclusion in viewing these

photographs and what was said at the prelim and what was said in

the police reports, that it lends itself to a lot of arguments as to why

they did what they did and thought what they thought in making

selections at the lineup, which is obviously coming in.

And it’s up to us to find out what they are going to say here at the

trial. They may or may not again select Mr. Morris, or they – for

all we know, they may say, oh, yeah, he’s the one that I saw that

night. And yeah, he’s the one that I saw at the preliminary hearing. 

And yeah, he’s the one I picked out of the lineup. That remains to

be seen.

So because of how I have seen now what Mr. Morris’s

characteristics were the night of the incident when he was arrested,

how he appeared at booking, and then how he appeared in the

lineup, and how he appears now, from what I’ve been described of

how he appeared at the preliminary hearing, all of that can be

inquired with the witnesses if counsel wants to, so that whatever

level of certainty or uncertainty they have can be determined in

front of the jury.

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 28 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

29

And I’m going to deny the motion and allow them to be asked what

their opinion is regarding Mr. Morris as he looks today . . . together

with everything else that they can be asked about, what their

opinions were at the lineup, and who they think is who in the

lineup.

* * *

And there are all of those features that can be presented to impeach

Mr. Pimentel, including what he said at the preliminary hearing,

which I don’t know if that was the only factor he took into

consideration, as Mr. Blazina argues.

And it certainly will undermine, if he makes an identification at the

trial, certainly will undermine it that he said that at the preliminary

hearing. He acknowledged that, and obviously that he selected

someone other than the defendant at the lineup, but, in my opinion,

someone that resembles the defendant as he appears today.

If I were asked to take a look at this lineup photograph and render

an opinion as to which one of these is the Defendant Morris, I

would easily reach a conclusion or likely reach a conclusion it was

number four, or at least number four as well as number two. All

right.

That is my ruling. The motion is denied, and under Evidence Code

Section 352, I agree with you, Mr. Staats, it necessarily will

involve all of the issues that the jury will be instructed on . . .

(Id. at 228-31.)

During her trial testimony, Mrs. Pimental identified petitioner as one of the

robbers and described his physical appearance at the time she observed him on the night of the

robbery. (Id. at 482-85.) Mr. Pimental also identified petitioner as the perpetrator and described

his appearance from his memory of the robbery. (Id. at 381, 387-88.) Counsel for petitioner and

co-defendant Benoit cross-examined both victims extensively regarding their ability to identify

petitioner, the fact that they selected another person at the lineup, and the inconsistencies in their

statements describing the perpetrators throughout the entire identification process. (Id. at 409-39;

Traverse, Ex. C at 1-9.) When asked whether he identified petitioner at the preliminary hearing

simply because he knew petitioner had been arrested in connection with the robbery, Mr.

Pimentel stated “I do remember distinctly his face as I remember in the house during the

commission of the crime, and now I recognize his face.” (RT at 434.)

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 29 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

30

b. Legal Standards

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the use of

identification procedures which are "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable

mistaken identification." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), overruled on other

grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326 (1987). A suggestive identification violates

due process if it was unnecessary or “gratuitous” under the circumstances. Neil v. Biggers, 409

U.S. 188, 198 (1972). See also United States v. Love, 746 F.2d 477, 478 (9th Cir. 1984)

(articulating a two-step process in determining the constitutionality of pretrial identification

procedures: first, whether the procedures used were impermissibly suggestive and, if so, whether

the identification was nonetheless reliable). Each case must be considered on its own facts and

whether due process has been violated depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding

the confrontation. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968); see also Stovall, 388

U.S. at 302. “At issue is whether the in-court identification is the product of observations at the

time of the crime or impressions made during suggestive pretrial procedures. “ United States v.

Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1985).

If the flaws in the pretrial identification procedures are not so suggestive as to

violate due process, “the reliability of properly admitted eyewitness identification, like the

credibility of the other parts of the prosecution’s case is a matter for the jury.” Foster v.

California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 n.2 (1969). See also Manson v. Brathwaite 432 U.S. 98, 116

(1977) (“[j]uries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of

identification testimony that has some questionable feature”). On the other hand, if an

out-of-court identification is inadmissible due to unconstitutionality, an in-court identification is

also inadmissible unless the government establishes that it is reliable by introducing "clear and

convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect

other than the lineup identification.” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967). See also 

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 30 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

31

United States v. Hamilton, 469 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1972) (in-court identification admissible,

notwithstanding inherent suggestiveness, where it was obviously reliable). 

Factors indicating the reliability of an identification include: (1) the opportunity to

view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention (including any

police training); (3) the accuracy of the prior description; (4) the witness's level of certainty at the

confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification. Manson, 432

U.S. at 114 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200)). Additional factors to be considered in

assessing the reliability of an identification are "the prior opportunity to observe the alleged

criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the

defendant's actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the

identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a

prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification." 

Wade, 388 U.S. at 241. The “central question,” however, remains “whether under the ‘totality of

the circumstances’ the identification is reliable even though the confrontation procedure was

suggestive.” Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. 

c. Analysis

The trial court found that the pretrial identification procedures that occurred in

this case were not unduly suggestive and that the reliability of the Pimentels’ identification of

petitioner as one of the perpetrators was therefore a matter for the jury to decide. This conclusion

is reasonable under the circumstances of this case. At the hearing on petitioner’s motion to

preclude an in-court identification, all parties agreed that the earlier lineup procedure utilized was

not unduly suggestive. Indeed, defense counsel elicited testimony before the jury that at that

lineup the victims had identified another person, and not petitioner, as the robber. (RT at 429-

430, 502-03.) Petitioner’s argument that the identification at the preliminary hearing was based

on improper suggestions arising from the lineup or from the police reports is speculative and

unsupported and is insufficient to establish a due process violation. An identification occurring

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 31 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In this regard, the court notes that the victims were Filipino and English was not their 9

native language. They employed an interpreter at trial. Accordingly, parsing their exact words to

the police on the night of the robbery may be somewhat misleading.

32

at the preliminary hearing is not rendered unduly suggestive simply because the accused

defendant is present at the proceeding. An in-court identification is permissible, so long as the

witness has an independent recollection that is untainted by any police misconduct. See United

States v. Lumitap, 111 F.3d 81, 85 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997). Further, although the victims’ various

statements concerning whether the perpetrators had facial hair were arguably inconsistent and

their identifications may have become more certain over the passage of time, these factors do not

render their subsequent in-court identifications unreliable. In any event, defense counsel were 9

permitted to fully explore any questionable aspects of the identification to the jury at trial. (RT at

419-23, 426-439, 456-57.) Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the in-court identification

procedure was unduly suggestive or that any error in the procedure was conducive to mistaken

identification. The record contains insufficient evidence that the victims’ identification of

petitioner was based on a prior suggestive identification procedure or that it was the product of

any suggestiveness at trial. 

As discussed above, this court rejects petitioner’s claim that testimony indicating

that the robbers reportedly wore masks would have invalidated the victims’ identifications of

petitioner as one of the robbers or would have provided evidence of police misconduct. The

victims testified at length about the facial characteristics of the perpetrators, which they observed

during the robbery. Although Mr. Pimentel testified that petitioner was wearing a knitted hat

(RT 380-81), neither victim testified that the perpetrators wore masks. Hearsay evidence that the

robbers were reported to be masked would have had no significant impact on this testimony. 

Finally, even assuming arguendo that the in-court identification that occurred here

was unduly suggestive, any error was harmless under the circumstances of this case. Whether a

defendant's due process rights were violated by the admission of identification testimony based

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 32 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

33

upon a suggestive pretrial identification procedure is subject to harmless error analysis. Jarrad,

754 F.2d at 1458. Here, the evidence against petitioner was overwhelming. In this regard, as

noted by the California Superior Court, 

a witness observed Petitioner and a co-defendant enter the victim’s

residence and come out carrying items. The witness followed

Petitioner’s car until he flagged down law enforcement and a chase

ensued. Two deputies testified that there were only two occupants

of the car, from which petitioner and the co-defendant eventually

emerged. In the car was the knife used in the robbery. 

(Answer, Ex. P at 2.) In addition, Mr. Pimentel’s wallet was found in petitioner’s car. Under

these circumstances, petitioner cannot demonstrate that any error stemming from the victims’ incourt identification of him had a “substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.” Brecht, 507

U.S. at 637-38. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state courts’ rejection of his claim of

trial court error in denying his motion to suppress “identification evidence” was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because

his attorney failed to interview Deputy Anderson as part of his pretrial investigation and failed to

present expert witness testimony. After setting forth the applicable legal principles, the court

will evaluate these claims in turn below.

1. Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. After a petitioner

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 33 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

34

identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally, competent assistance. 

Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). In assessing an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide

range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised

acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d

695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224

F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691. “This includes a duty to . . . investigate and introduce into evidence records that

demonstrate factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on that question to undermine

confidence in the verdict.” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hart v.

Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999)). In this regard, it has been recognized that “the

adversarial process will not function normally unless the defense team has done a proper

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 34 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

35

investigation.” Siripongs v. Calderon (Siripongs II), 133 F.3d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing

Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384). Therefore, counsel must, “at a minimum, conduct a reasonable

investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about how best to represent his client.” 

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d

1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation and quotations omitted). On the other hand, where

an attorney has consciously decided not to conduct further investigation because of reasonable

tactical evaluations, his or her performance is not constitutionally deficient. See Siripongs II,

133 F.3d at 734; Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998); Hensley v. Crist, 67

F.3d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1995). “A decision not to investigate thus ‘must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 691). See also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 385 (counsel “neither investigated, nor made a

reasonable decision not to investigate”); Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1173-74. A reviewing court must

“examine the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct ‘as of the time of counsel’s conduct.’” United

States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 

Furthermore, “‘ineffective assistance claims based on a duty to investigate must be considered in

light of the strength of the government’s case.’” Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Eggleston v.

United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). See also Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054,

1070 (9th Cir. 2002).

2. Failure to Interview Deputy Anderson

Petitioner claims he was denied effective assistance due to his trial counsel’s

failure to interview Deputy Anderson before calling petitioner to testify. Petitioner states that

Deputy Anderson’s name was contained in discovery materials and was therefore known to

counsel. He contends that the trial court “used defense counsel’s failure to interview Deputy

Scott Anderson as an excuse to admit Anderson’s testimony as rebuttal evidence.” (Pet. at 

/////

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 35 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In rejecting petitioner’s argument in this regard the California Court of Appeal 10

observed that it amounted to an assertion of the right to commit “risk-free perjury.” Opinion at

12-13, n.5.

 Defendant asserts that co-counsel said only that police will not talk to defense

11

investigators, then dismisses this excuse as inadequate because a refusal to talk to defense

investigators could be used to impeach the officer for bias on cross-examination. Actually, cocounsel said more than that: he also said that defense counsel cannot generally get addresses or

phone numbers to contact officers directly and that attempting to reach them through police

liaisons is futile in his experience. Nothing controverting these assertions appears in the record.

 Furthermore, since the record does not show that defendant had ever told counsel the 12

story he told on the stand, we cannot say whether counsel could possibly have known that

defendant’s testimony would open the door to rebuttal evidence.

36

consecutive p. 5.) Petitioner does not state whether he would have elected not to testify had he 

known the substance of Deputy Anderson’s testimony. 

10

Petitioner raised this claim for the first time on appeal. (Answer, Ex. D at 2.) The

California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments with the following reasoning:

Here, the record is insufficient to support defendant’s claim of

deficient performance. First, Benoit’s counsel explained why he

and defendant’s counsel had been unable to interview Anderson,

and (assuming defendant’s counsel may be deemed to have joined

in this explanation) defendant points to no evidence that the

explanation was contrary to fact. Second, so far as defendant 11

contends that counsel advised him to testify, ignorant of the

devastating effect of Anderson’s likely testimony, and that

defendant would not have testified but for counsel’s advice, the

claim fails because counsel was never asked on the record whether

he advised defendant to testify. Since the record sheds no light 12

on this question, this aspect of defendant’s claim cannot be raised

on direct appeal. (citations omitted.)

Moreover, even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient in

not interviewing Anderson and allowing defendant to testify, there

is no ineffective assistance of counsel on this record. If neither

defendant nor Anderson would have testified, the case would have

gone to the jury on the evidence contained in the prosecution’s case

in chief. The jury would surely have convicted defendant of all

charges based on that evidence. Hence, defendant cannot show

that a better outcome was reasonably likely in the absence of

counsel’s deficient performance.

(Opinion at 21-22.)

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 36 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

37

The opinion of the state appellate court that petitioner failed to establish deficient

performance or prejudice with respect to this claim is not unreasonable and should not be set

aside. Counsel for petitioner’s co-defendant explained on the record why it would have been

futile to attempt to interview Deputy Anderson prior to trial. Petitioner has not challenged that

explanation in his petition before this court. Further, as explained by the state appellate court,

the evidence against petitioner was overwhelming, virtually forcing him to take the stand in order

to provide an alternative explanation for the damaging evidence already introduced against him. 

Thus, he has failed to establish prejudice as required. For all of these reasons, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this claim. 

3. Failure to Investigate and Use Expert Witnesses

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of

his failure to investigate and use expert witnesses. Petitioner explains that while proceeding in

pro per, he obtained identification and accident reconstruction experts funded through the

Indigent Defense Program and that those two experts were “prepared for trial.” (Pet. at

consecutive p. 15.) Petitioner does not explain the substance of any testimony these experts

would have given. Rather, he merely states:

Due to the circumstantial evidence and failure of any witnesses to

identify petitioner, the experts were needed to educate the jury on

memory and identifications. Also counsel failed to use accident

reconstruction expert Kirk Berry to testify to speeds and road

configurations, also his testimony of the scene of arrest that would

have been used to impeach Officer Gooler and Deputy Anderson. 

It would have shown the jury that Deputy Anderson’s testimony

was manufactured.

(Id.) Petitioner also argues that because the evidence against him was “circumstantial,” he was

not identified at the live lineup, and the in-court identification was “suggestive,” an identification

expert was needed to “educate the jury on memory and identification and its suggestiveness.”

(Traverse, Ex. E at 1.) Finally, petitioner suggests that even the trial judge expressed a belief in

the need for testimony from a defense identification expert. (Id. at 3.) 

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 37 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

38

At the hearing on petitioner’s motion to preclude his in-court identification by the

victims, petitioner’s counsel argued against the court’s position that the credibility of the in-court

identification could adequately be explored through cross-examination. Specifically, counsel

contended that forcing him to cross-examine the victims about their identification of petitioner

would “put the burden on me then to bring an expert in on eyewitness identification to talk about

the inherent suggestibility of in-court identifications.” (RT at 229-30.) In response to this

argument, the trial court merely stated:

And if you have an expert witness to put on the stand, that will all

depend upon what the witnesses say as far as identifying him in

court.

If they come in and readily identify him and stick to that, despite

what obviously you’re going to use to impeach them, depending on

how you assess their credibility on that issue, you can decide you

need to have expert testimony on the issue . . .”

(Id. at 231.) Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion in the traverse, this exchange does not reflect the

trial judge expressing “to petitioner’s trial attorney Mr. Staats that he may need to use an expert

witness.” (Traverse, Ex. E at 3.) Rather, the court was merely responding to counsel’s argument

by indicating that the decision whether to call an identification expert as a defense witness was

one the defense would have to make based upon a number of factors, including whether the

defense believed the victims’ identification testimony was credible or had been adequately

impeached by the victims’ prior inconsistent identification and descriptions of the perpetrators. 

Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in a petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. O.) The Superior Court rejected

petitioner’s arguments on the merits and on the ground that the petition was untimely filed. 

(Answer, Ex. P at 2.) On August 28, 2000, petitioner raised the same claim in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed in the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. K.) That petition was

denied with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App.2d 293 (1962). (Answer, Ex. L.) On July

24, 2002, petitioner raised the claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 38 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

39

California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. Q.) That petition was summarily denied by order

dated August 1, 2002. (Answer, Ex. R.) On September 13, 2000, petitioner raised the same

claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex.

M.) That petition was denied by order dated May 23, 2001, with citations to In re Dixon, 41 Cal.

2d 756 (1953), In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218 (1965), In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947), and

In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 304 (1949). (Answer, Ex. N.) On December 30, 2002, petitioner raised

the claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Answer, Ex. S.) That petition was denied with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993), In

re Miller, 17 Cal. 2d 734 (1941), In re Dixon, In re Waltreus, and In re Lindley, by order dated

July 30, 2003. (Answer, Ex. T.) Under these circumstances, it is unclear whether the California

Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits or on purely procedural grounds. However,

petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim even if it is subject to de novo review.

The California Superior Court denied petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, reasoning as follows:

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate and use expert witnesses on Petitioner’s behalf,

specifically experts on eyewitness identification and accident

reconstruction. Although he claims that the accident

reconstruction expert would have impeached the officers’

testimony about the way that the crash occurred, he provides no

evidence of the proposed testimony. Furthermore, there is no

indication that impeachment on the way the accident occurred

would have substantially affected the trial or the sentence, which

was based primarily on the two residential robberies and prior

conviction enhancements. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show

that counsel was deficient for failing to use the accident

reconstruction expert or that the failure was prejudicial. There is

similarly no evidence of what an identification expert would have

testified to, if called. . . . Even if trial counsel should have called

the identification expert, Petitioner has not shown that it is

reasonably probable that the result would have been different.

(Answer, Ex. P at 2-3.)

This court agrees with the California Superior Court that petitioner has failed to

demonstrate prejudice with respect to this claim. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner’s trial

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 39 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

40

counsel failed to properly investigate the possibility of calling the two expert witnesses to testify

and that this failure was outside "the wide range of professionally competent assistance" that the

Sixth Amendment requires, petitioner has not shown how the calling of these potential witnesses

would have led to a different outcome. Although petitioner broadly asserts that the accident 

reconstruction expert “would have impeached Deputy Scott Anderson that it would have been

impossible for him to see what he testified to in rebuttal,” (traverse at 6), petitioner does not

provide any specifics about this proposed testimony. Nor does he explain how an identification

expert would have affected the outcome of his trial. See Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148,

1159-60 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1072 (2001); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616,

632 (9th Cir. 1997) (petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim denied where he presented no

evidence concerning what counsel would have found had he investigated further, or what

lengthier preparation would have accomplished); United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-

32 (9th Cir. 1988) (no ineffective assistance because of counsel’s failure to call a witness where,

among other things, there was no evidence in the record that the witness would testify); United

States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (appellant failed to meet prejudice prong of

ineffectiveness claim because he offered no indication of what potential witnesses would have

testified to or how their testimony might have changed the outcome of the hearing).

Further, as noted above, “‘ineffective assistance claims based on a duty to

investigate must be considered in light of the strength of the government’s case.’” Bragg, 242

F.3d at 1088 (quoting Eggleston, 798 F.2d at 376). Here, the case against petitioner was

overwhelming. He was observed virtually from the moment he walked toward the victims’

residence at 2:40 a.m. and then ran out of the home carrying items until his car was forcibly

stopped by the police. His vehicle was found to contain the proceeds of the robbery. Under

these circumstances, petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s failure to investigate and present expert witnesses on accident reconstruction and

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 40 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

41

eyewitness identifications, the result of the trial would have been different. Accordingly, for all

of these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

C. Petitioner’s Right of Self-Representation

Petitioner claims that the state coerced him into abandoning his right of selfrepresentation by providing him with inadequate legal materials and refusing to allow him

sufficient time to meet with his proposed expert witnesses. (Pet., consecutive p. 6.) Petitioner

raised this claim on appeal in state court. The California Court of Appeal fairly described the

background facts as follows:

Defendant was arraigned on March 17, 1997, and the public

defender was appointed to represent him. The preliminary hearing

was conducted on May 22, 1997. Defendant was thereafter

arraigned on an amended information on June 4, 1997, and the

public defender was reappointed.

On October 14, 1997, defendant’s Marsden motion was heard and

denied. 

On November 24, 1997, defendant exercised his right to represent

himself under Faretta and the public defender was relieved. The

trial date at that time was December 12, 1997.

On December 2, 1997, defendant orally requested a continuance of

the trial date. The trial court advised him file a written motion. 

When defendant replied that he was not getting access to the jail’s

law library, the court told him to file the motion as soon as he got

access.

On December 4, 1997, defendant filed written motions for

continuance, for pretrial discovery, for production of all physical

evidence, and for independent defense testing of evidence. On

December 8, 1997, the trial date was vacated and reset for March

10, 1998.

Between December 15, 1997, and March 10, 1998, defendant filed

many additional motions, and the trial court held more than one

hearing on them.

On March 5, 1998, the trial court considered inter alia another

motion by defendant for a continuance of the trial date, which the

court had not received. Defendant stated: (1) the jail’s law

librarian had been ill for two weeks; (2) defendant needed the

services of an accident reconstruction expert and an “ID expert”;

(3) he also needed more time for trial preparation. The prosecutor

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 41 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Defendant agreed that his request for phone access was moot if the trial court 13

appointed new counsel.

42

objected to any further continuance, stating that defendant had said

when he went pro per in November 1997 that he would be ready

for trial once he had all discovery and he had it now; both

defendants (Benoit also being pro per at that time) were just

bringing motions for the sake of delay. The trial court stated it had

seen no motion from defendant regarding “accident

reconstruction”; defendant insisted he had filed such a motion. 

The trial court denied defendant’s motion for continuance. 

However, on March 10, 1998, trial was trailed until April 1, 1998.

On March 27, 1998, defendant filed a “Motion to Order Assistance

of Counsel, and Phone Access.” Defendant argued therein that he

was deprived on the means to prepare a defense because (1) he was

given only two hours a week to use the jail law library, its books

were obsolete, the law librarian was still absent due to illness and

his replacement lacked the legal training to assist prisoners; (2) the

absent law librarian was also the court’s assigned runner to deliver

pro per motions to the court and no alternative means of doing this

had been provided; (3) defendant had not been allowed to

communicate with his experts and potential witnesses on

confidential phone lines. He asked the appointment of a paralegal

to assist him.

The court heard defendant’s motion on April 1, 1998. The court

first noted that it had contacted the law librarian/“Pro Per officer’s”

replacement, who reported that he and defendant had been in

regular contact and were well acquainted with each other;

accordingly, the court found that the law librarian’s absence had

not materially harmed defendant. Defendant then said: “I would

also just like to get counsel back then because I can’t function . . .

.” The court asked who had been defendant’s lawyer before he

began to represent himself. Defendant replied that he had been

represented by Peter Vlautin of the Public Defender’s Office, but

had gone pro per because of a conflict with that office. The court

stated it would construe defendant’s motion as a motion for the

appointment of counsel and put over the motion until the next day

so that Vlautin could appear. Defendant did not object to the 

court’s decision to so construe the motion, nor did he insist that the

court reach and decide the merits of his remaining allegations.

13

On April 2, 1998, the trial court continued the motion to April 13,

1998. On that date the court granted the motion and appointed new

counsel, but did not revoke defendant’s pro per status. Finally, on 

/////

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 42 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Petitioner complains that the jail only allowed him to meet with the accident 14

reconstruction expert one time and that it “would not allow the identification expert to get

cleared to visit on various occasions.” (Pet. at consecutive p. 6.)

43

April 15, 1998, the court revoked defendant’s pro per status and

granted counsel’s motion to continue the trial date to June 16,

1998.

(Opinion at 23-26.)

The state appellate court rejected petitioner’s argument that he was coerced into

abandoning his right to self-representation, stating: 

we summarily reject defendant’s assertion that the alleged

restrictions on his pro per privileges and the denial of some of his

pretrial motions amounted to coercing him into abandoning selfrepresentation. There is simply no evidence to support this claim.

(Id. at 28.)

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975), the United States Supreme

Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a right to self-representation inferred from

the Sixth Amendment. However, that right “may be waived through defendant's subsequent

conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether.” Brown

v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765,

774 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner does not claim that the trial court improperly terminated his right

to represent himself, nor does he dispute that he asked the trial court to reappoint counsel. 

Rather, petitioner is arguing that he was compelled to request counsel because of difficulties

experienced in gaining access to legal assistance and library time as well as restrictions placed on

visits from his proposed experts at the jail where he was detained. In his claim before this

14

court, petitioner also contends that the overall “circumstances,” including his inability to meet

with his two proposed expert witnesses, forced him to “abandon his defense” and violated his

“right to self-representation.” (Pet. at consecutive p. 6.)

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 43 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

44

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding his request

for the reappointment of counsel violated any of his federal constitutional rights, including the

right to represent himself. Petitioner’s Faretta motion was granted and he continued in pro per

until he chose to obtain the assistance of counsel. It is true that petitioner appeared to be

overwhelmed by the amount of work to be done in order to prepare for trial on his own behalf

and experienced frustration at the realities of carrying out that work in a jail setting. However,

there is no evidence that anyone coerced him to abandon his right to represent himself or that he

was unable to proceed on his own behalf if he wished to do so. For instance, although petitioner

may have found it difficult to arrange visits with his expert witnesses, the record reflects that he

was able to retain witnesses and that they performed work on his behalf. (Traverse, Ex. C to Ex.

E.) With regard to petitioner’s complaints about the inability to meet with his experts, the

California Court of Appeal made the following point:

What defendant overlooks, however, is that most of his allegations

never reached the point of factual findings by the trial court. After

the court found against him on the first point he raised, he

immediately asked that be (sic) allowed to cease representing

himself and be appointed new counsel. The court granted this

request by deeming his motion to be a motion for appointment of

counsel. Thus the prosecution never had the opportunity to put on

evidence in reply to defendant’s allegations and the court never had

the opportunity to find that the allegations were either proven or

unproven. Defendant in effect asks us to take his bare allegations

as true and jump to the legal questions he wishes us to decide. We

may not do so.

(Opinion at 26.) This court agrees with the assessment of the Court of Appeal. Petitioner’s

claim that he was “coerced” to abandon his right to represent himself lacks a factual basis and

must be rejected.

The court also notes that there is no evidence that restrictions imposed by jail

officials on visits from expert witnesses, or the difficulties experienced by petitioner gaining

access to the law library or the librarian, prevented petitioner from accessing the court. See

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (“It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 44 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

45

have a constitutional right of access to the courts"). On the contrary, the record reflects that

petitioner was able to have his many concerns addressed through the trial court by filed or oral

motions. Petitioner has not pointed to any request that he was prevented from presenting to the

trial court as a result of the limitations about which he complains. Further, there is no evidence

in the record that the jail officials arbitrarily withheld from petitioner privileges granted by state

law or otherwise curtailed his right to self-representation, in violation of his due process rights. 

See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) (a substantial state-created right, even though not

constitutionally compelled, may not be arbitrarily withheld). Indeed, the trial court contacted the

law librarian and, after a discussion, determined that petitioner’s access to the law library had not

been “materially harmed” by the absence of the regular librarian. (Opinion at 25.) 

This court concludes that the circumstances presented here did not have a coercive

impact on petitioner’s decision to relinquish the right to represent himself at trial. The decision

of the California Court of Appeals to the same effect is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal law. See Kane v. Espitia, ___U.S.___, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2005) (“[A]s it

is clear that Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se criminal

defendant . . . the court below therefore erred in holding, based on Faretta, that a violation of a

law library access right is a basis for federal habeas relief.”) Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this claim. 

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Petitioner raises several claims of prosecutorial misconduct. After setting forth

the applicable legal principles, the court will evaluate these claims in turn below. 

1. Legal Standards

A defendant's due process rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct

renders a trial fundamentally unfair. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). 

However, such misconduct does not, per se, violate a petitioner's constitutional rights. Jeffries v.

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, and Campbell v.

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 45 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

46

Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1987)). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are

reviewed "'on the merits, examining the entire proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor's

[actions] so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process.’" Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). See also

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974);

Turner v Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). Relief on such claims is limited to cases

in which the petitioner can establish that prosecutorial misconduct resulted in actual prejudice. 

Johnson, 63 F.3d at 930 (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38); see also Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-83;

Turner, 281 F.3d at 868. Put another way, prosecutorial misconduct violates due process when it

has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See OrtizSandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). 

2. Failing to Timely Disclose Court Ordered Discovery

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor deliberately withheld court ordered discovery

in the form of the above-described photograph of a ski mask found in petitioner’s car. Petitioner

contends, as he did in several of his claims addressed above, that information suggesting the

robbers were masked would have undermined the victims’ identification of him as the

perpetrator. (Pet. at consecutive p. 7.) Petitioner argues, “the victims manufactured suggestive

identifications were just that manufactured, the ski masks shows there could have never been any

identifications of the suspects.” (Id.) See also Traverse, Ex. D at p. 9 (“had the jury learned that

the suspects were ‘masked’ the two key witnesses against petitioner would have been impeached

about their identifications and it’s a reasonable probability petitioner could have obtained a

different result”).

In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held “that the suppression

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith

of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. See also Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 46 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

47

2003). The duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by

the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and encompasses impeachment

evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). A

Brady violation may also occur when the government fails to turn over evidence that is “known

only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.” Youngblood v. West Virginia, 126 S. Ct.

2188, 2190 (2006) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437, 438) (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty

to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the

case, including the police”). There are three components of a Brady violation: “[t]he evidence at

issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is

impeaching; the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82

(1999). See also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004); Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 985

(9th Cir. 2005). In order to establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that “‘there is a

reasonable probability’ that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed

documents had been disclosed to the defense.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289. “The question is not

whether petitioner would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the

evidence, but whether “in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a

verdict worthy of confidence." (Id.) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). See

also Silva, 416 F.3d at 986 (“a Brady violation is established where there ‘the favorable evidence

could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine

confidence in the verdict.’”) Once the materiality of the suppressed evidence is established, no

further harmless error analysis is required. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435-36; Silva, 416 F.3d at 986. 

“When the government has suppressed material evidence favorable to the defendant, the

conviction must be set aside.” Silva, 416 F.3d at 986.

Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in a petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. O.) The Superior Court rejected

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 47 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

48

petitioner’s arguments on the merits and on the ground that the petition was untimely filed. 

(Answer, Ex. P at 2.) On August 28, 2000, petitioner raised the same claim in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed in the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. K.) That petition was

denied with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293 (1962). (Answer, Ex. L.) On July

24, 2002, petitioner raised the same claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in

the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. Q.) That petition was summarily denied by order

dated August 1, 2002. (Answer, Ex. R.) On September 13, 2000, petitioner raised the claim in a

petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. M.) That

petition was denied by order dated May 23, 2001, with citations to In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756

(1953), In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218 (1965), In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947), and In re

Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 304 (1949). (Answer, Ex. N.) On December 30, 2002, petitioner raised the

same claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Answer, Ex. S.) That petition was denied with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993), In

re Miller, 17 Cal. 2d 734 (1941), In re Dixon, In re Waltreus, and In re Lindley, by order dated

July 30, 2003. (Answer, Ex. T.) Under these circumstances, it is unclear whether the California

Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits or on purely procedural grounds. However, the

claim must be rejected even if a de novo standard of review is employed.

The facts surrounding the photograph of a ski mask have been set forth above in

connection with petitioner’s claim of trial court error. In a nutshell, although one of the police

reports stated that a ski mask had been found in petitioner’s vehicle and reported that

photographs were taken of all items found in the vehicle, the prosecutor was unable to locate a

photograph of a ski mask to turn over in discovery. According to the report of evidence obtained

from the scene, a ski mask was recovered from petitioner’s car. Even assuming, however, that

the prosecutor deliberately withheld production of a photograph of a ski mask, there is no

evidence in the record suggesting that the photograph was exculpatory or that disclosure of such

a photograph could reasonably have put the case against petitioner in such a different light so as

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 48 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

49

to undermine confidence in the verdict. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435; Silva, 416 F.3d at 986. As

discussed above, evidence that a mask was found in petitioner’s vehicle would not have

undermined the witness identifications because the victims specifically recalled seeing the

perpetrators’ faces. Mr. Pimentel testified that petitioner was wearing a knitted hat during the

robbery (RT 380-81) and the prosecutor took the position that the ski mask referred to in

discovery was actually a knit cap with hand cut eye holes (RT at 175). Thus, petitioner has failed

to demonstrate that the photograph of the ski mask had any exculpatory value. Indeed, petitioner

originally sought to exclude evidence of the mask found in his car. Further, as discussed above,

petitioner’s convictions on the charges against him were supported by overwhelming evidence,

even without the victims’ identification of him. 

Finally, the court notes that petitioner was aware from the police report that a

mask had been found in his vehicle, and he also knew about the news report which mentioned

that the perpetrators had worn masks. Petitioner could have made whatever use of this

information he desired. See United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996) (no

prejudice to defendant from government’s untimely production of officer’s rough notes reflecting

discrepancies with his testimony where the defense eventually received the rough notes and was

able to make use of them to fully cross-examine the officer about the discrepancies in his report);

Cf. Silva, 416 F.3d at 990-91 (prosecutor’s failure to disclose at any time during trial evidence of

an agreement with a star government witness where such evidence could have seriously

undermined mental competence of witness found to constitute a due process violation entitling

petitioner to habeas relief). 

Petitioner has not shown that production in discovery of a photograph of the mask

found in his vehicle would have affected the result of his trial in any way. Accordingly, the state

courts did not commit federal constitutional error in rejecting petitioner’s argument that his

convictions were tainted by the Brady violation. 

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 49 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

50

3. Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence Regarding a 911 Tape and Police Dispatch

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence contained

on the consolidated audio tape of the 911 call placed by the victims’ daughter and the police

dispatch communication. Petitioner contends that the tape recording produced to the defense was

“missing” three minutes and twenty nine seconds and that the missing portion of the tape

contained identifying information about the suspect vehicle that did not match petitioner’s

vehicle. (Pet. at consecutive p. 13-14.) Specifically, petitioner states that when he bought his

vehicle it did not have a front license place. (Id. at 13.) Officer Gooler testified at trial that he

viewed the license plate of petitioner’s vehicle at some point and broadcasted it over his police

radio during the pursuit. (RT at 557.) Petitioner asserts that “the license plate of defendant’s

vehicle had been deleted and the make and model of the car had also been deleted” from the

audio tape of the police dispatch communication. (Pet. at consecutive p. 13.) Petitioner does not

explain how he determined what was deleted from the tape, but he states that “the volume was

turned up and down to delete certain areas that contained exculpatory and material evidence.” 

(Id.)

Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor deliberately tampered with the audiotape of

the victims’ 911 call and dispatch recording to delete exculpatory evidence is conclusory and

unsupported by any evidence in the record and must be rejected on that basis. See Jones, 66 F.3d

at 204; James, 24 F.3d at 26 (vague and conclusory allegations which are not supported by a

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that

there was anything missing from the audio recording produced to him in discovery. He has also

failed to establish that if any portion of the tape was inaudible that there was anything favorable

to his defense in that portion of the transmission. Finally, petitioner has demonstrated neither

that any inaudible portion of the recording reflects suppression of evidence by the prosecution or

that he suffered any prejudice as a result. His unsupported allegations of prosecutorial

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 50 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 15

2254(e)(2), a district court presented with a request for an evidentiary hearing must first

determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support a petitioner’s claims and, if not,

whether an evidentiary hearing “might be appropriate.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078

(9th Cir. 1999). See also Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005). He

must also “allege[] facts that, if proved, would entitle him to relief.” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d

1017, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner has not demonstrated that any additional facts need to be

determined in order to resolve his claim of prosecutorial misconduct on the merits. Even if his

bare and conclusory allegations were sufficient and assuming arguendo that the prosecutor

withheld evidence that the tape recording reflected differences between the police description of

the suspect vehicle and petitioner’s vehicle, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice. 

Again, police officers observed petitioner’s car from the time of the robbery until they forced it to

stop. Under these circumstances, any discrepancies in the description of the vehicle by officers

in pursuit reflected on the police audio tape would not be sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome of petitioner’s trial. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted on this

claim.

51

misconduct are insufficient to support this claim. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief. 

15

4. Employing Unfair Surprise by Calling Deputy Anderson as a Rebuttal Witness

 and Presenting False Testimony

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he called

Deputy Anderson to testify on rebuttal instead of during the prosecutions’s case-in-chief and

elicited testimony from Anderson that was “false and perjured.” (Pet. at consecutive p. 8.) In

support of this claim, petitioner notes that Deputy Anderson testified he did not write a report of

his observations, but reported orally to Deputy Gooler. (Id.) 

Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in a petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. O.) The Superior Court rejected

petitioner’s arguments on the merits and on the ground that the petition was untimely filed. 

(Answer, Ex. P at 2.) On August 28, 2000, petitioner raised the same claim in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed in the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. K.) That petition was

denied with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293 (1962). (Answer, Ex. L.) On July

24, 2002, petitioner raised the claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. Q.) That petition was summarily denied by order

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 51 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

52

dated August 1, 2002. (Answer, Ex. R.) On September 13, 2000, petitioner raised the same

claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex.

M.) That petition was denied by order dated May 23, 2001, with citations to In re Dixon, 41 Cal.

2d 756 (1953), In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218 (1965), In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947), and

In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 304 (1949). (Answer, Ex. N.) On December 30, 2002, petitioner raised

the claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Answer, Ex. S.) That petition was denied with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993), In

re Miller, 17 Cal. 2d 734 (1941), In re Dixon, In re Waltreus, and In re Lindley, by order dated

July 30, 2003. (Answer, Ex. T.) Under these circumstances, it is unclear whether the California

Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits or on purely procedural grounds. However, even

employing a de novo standard of review, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this aspect of his

prosecutorial misconduct claim.

The background to this claim was described by the California Court of Appeal and

has been set forth above on pgs. 10-12. In addition, Deputy Anderson testified on rebuttal as

follows:

Q. Now, Deputy, did you write a report about – on this case?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Any why is that, sir?

A. My involvement in the entire situation was so limited. I was

following the primary pursuit officer. I wasn’t the primary – the

officer involved in the pursuit, and I wasn’t the one that actually

apprehended the passenger.

So the other officers told me at the scene that they would take care

of all the details, and they would just include me into their portion

of the report, what I did.

* * *

Q. Do they or do they not teach you at the academy to write a

report when you’re involved in a criminal investigation or an arrest

in some fashion?

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 52 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

53

A. Not all officers involved need to write one in all cases.

Q. Was there an officer in charge of the crime scene, the crash

site? Was there an officer in charge that you were aware of?

A. In most cases the primary officer in the pursuit takes

responsibility. I don’t know if he did or not.

Q. And who was that in this case?

A. That would have been Todd Gooler.

Q. And did Todd Gooler ever tell you not to write a report?

A. I don’t recall who had told me that. I know there was several

officers there and a couple sergeants on scene. And I remember

being told by a couple people that my portion of the pursuit would

be covered in their reports.

* * *

Q. You indicated, Deputy, that you didn’t write a report. Did you

give an oral report to Deputy Gooler?

A. Yes.

(RT at 914-15, 922-23, 931.) 

Deputy Anderson also testified at trial that, although he considered his

observations “important information for a criminal investigation,” he did not take notes or dictate

anything into a tape recorder. (Id. at 916, 918-19.) Petitioner’s counsel re-called Officer Gooler

in order to impeach the rebuttal testimony of Deputy Anderson. Defense counsel’s reason for

wanting to re-call Officer Gooler was summarized by the trial court as follows: 

there’s no account in any other officers’ report detailing what

Officer Anderson testified to. And Officer Anderson claims in his

testimony he was told the other officers put it in their reports.

It lends itself to the argument that the other officers didn’t put it in

their reports. Either Officer Anderson didn’t tell them, or it just

didn’t happen, or whatever anybody wants to argue about all of

that.

(Id. at 937.) When he was recalled, Officer Gooler testified that “the only time that I would write

a report for another officer is if I actually observed whatever action that officer took.” (Id. at

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 53 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

54

948.) Gooler also testified that he did not tell Deputy Anderson that “he didn’t need to write a

report regarding what he had observed or what he participated in, that it would be included in a

report prepared by you or other officers on the scene.” (Id. at 949.) He stated, however, that he

and Deputy Anderson discussed what had happened at the scene. (Id. at 950-51.) 

Petitioner argues that the foregoing testimony indicates that Deputy Anderson’s

testimony was false and he argues that the prosecutor had a duty to correct it. (Traverse, Ex. F at

8-9.) As discussed previously, the use of Deputy Anderson’s testimony on rebuttal was

reasonable and proper in this case. The defense case presented through petitioner’s own

testimony introduced for the first time the possibility that there were more than two persons in

petitioner’s vehicle. That new evidence compelled the prosecutor to put on evidence rebutting

petitioner’s testimony. The court also notes that the prosecutor sought to call Deputy Anderson

as a witness in his case-in-chief, but the trial court refused to grant a continuance in order to

allow him to do so. There is no evidence the prosecutor manipulated the timing of Deputy

Anderson’s testimony in order to inflict an unfair surprise on the defense. Further, the prosecutor

informed all parties of the substance of Deputy Anderson’s proposed testimony prior to resting

his case. Therefore, that testimony could not have come as a “surprise” to petitioner or his

counsel. In short, petitioner has not demonstrated that the presentation of Deputy Anderson’s

testimony on rebuttal “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a

denial of due process." Johnson, 63 F.3d at 929.

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor presented knowingly

false testimony. “It is an established tenet of the due process clause that ‘the deliberate deception

of the court by the presentation of false evidence is incompatible with the rudimentary demands

of justice.’” United States v. Rewald, 889 F.2d 836, 860 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States

v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1989)). “[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of

perjured testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony

could have affected the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 n.9 (1985).

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 54 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

55

See also Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The due process

requirement voids a conviction where the false evidence is ‘known to be such by representatives

of the State.’”) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). This rule applies even

where the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269;

Mancuso v Olivarez, 292 F. 3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). There are two components to

establishing a claim for relief based on the introduction of perjured testimony at trial. First, the

moving party must establish that the testimony was false. United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d

1543, 1549-50 (9th Cir. 1986). Second, the movant must demonstrate that the prosecution

knowingly used the perjured testimony. Id. Mere speculation regarding these factors is

insufficient to meet movant’s burden. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 766 (9th Cir.

1991). 

In the context of a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has held that proof of knowledge by the prosecution is required to support a

claim of denial of due process based upon the admission of prejudicial perjured testimony in a

criminal trial. See Morales, 336 F.3d at 1151 (“The essence of the due process violation is

misconduct by the government, not merely perjury by a witness.”); Marcella v. United States,

344 F.2d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 1965) (“Before a sentence may be vacated on the ground of perjured

testimony, the movant must show that the testimony was perjured and that the prosecuting

officials knew at the time such testimony was used that it was perjured.”); Taylor v. United

States, 221 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1955). See also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936 (9th Cir.

1998) (“If a prosecutor knowingly uses perjured testimony or knowingly fails to disclose that

testimony is false, the conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the

false testimony could have affected the jury verdict.”). 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate either that Deputy Anderson’s testimony was

false or that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony. The mere fact that the substance

of Deputy Anderson’s testimony was not set out in a written report does not mean that it was

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 55 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The testimony of Officer Gooler that he did not instruct Deputy Anderson not to write 16

a report does not suggest that Deputy Anderson’s testimony was false. Anderson testified that he

didn’t recall which officers told him that his portion of the pursuit would be covered in other

reports and that he need not complete one. (See RT at 922-23.) 

56

false. Petitioner’s speculation that such is the case is insufficient to support a claim of

prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 16

5. Informing a Witness of Petitioner’s Criminal History and Improperly

 Influencing Witness Testimony

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor improperly informed witness Dana Sutton

that petitioner was a “3-strike candidate,” causing Sutton to tailor his testimony to favor the

prosecution. Petitioner also claims the prosecutor improperly coached the victims, resulting in an

in-court identification based on the prosecutor’s descriptions of petitioner and his co-defendant,

and not on the victims’ recollections of the actual robbery. As proof of this latter claim,

petitioner notes that the victims originally told police that the perpetrators were “Hispanic or

Mexican” and did not remember if they had any facial hair, but testified at the preliminary

hearing that the suspect was white and had facial hair. (Pet. at consecutive p. 10-11.) 

Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in a petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. O.) The Superior Court rejected

petitioner’s arguments on the merits and on the ground that the petition was untimely filed. 

(Answer, Ex. P at 2.) On August 28, 2000, petitioner raised the same claim in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed in the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. K.) That petition was

denied with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293 (1962). (Answer, Ex. L.) On July

24, 2002, petitioner raised the claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. Q.) That petition was summarily denied by order

dated August 1, 2002. (Answer, Ex. R.) On September 13, 2000, petitioner raised the same

claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex.

M.) That petition was denied by order dated May 23, 2001, with citations to In re Dixon, 41 Cal.

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 56 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

57

2d 756 (1953), In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218 (1965), In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947), and

In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 304 (1949). (Answer, Ex. N.) On December 30, 2002, petitioner raised

the claim in another petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Answer, Ex. S.) That petition was denied with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993), In

re Miller, 17 Cal. 2d 734 (1941), In re Dixon, In re Waltreus, and In re Lindley, by order dated

July 30, 2003. (Answer, Ex. T.) Under these circumstances, it is unclear whether the California

Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits or on purely procedural grounds. However, the

claim should be denied even under a de novo standard of review.

Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor improperly coached witnesses or allowed

them to give knowingly false testimony is conclusory and unsupported by any evidence in the

record. The claim must be rejected on that basis alone. See Jones, 66 F.3d at 204; James, 24

F.3d at 26. Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor told witness Dana Sutton that petitioner

was subject to California’s Three Strike Law, there is no evidence that Sutton’s testimony at trial

differed in any way from his original statements to police. Although the victims’ descriptions of

the perpetrators may have changed over time, any inconsistencies between the earlier and later

statements were fully explored at trial before the jury. See United States v. Necoechea, 

986 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1993) (presentation of contradictory testimony not improper); United

States v. Tanh Huu Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 861 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 262 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.

2001) (minor inconsistencies in witness testimony “harmless error”); United States v. Zuno-Arce, 

44 F.3d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (no prosecutorial misconduct where petitioner offered no

evidence for prosecutorial misconduct except for the “inference from discrepancies” in witness

testimony). In any event, witness credibility is a matter for the jury to decide. Zuno-Arce, 44

F.3d at 1423. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any testimony presented at his trial was

perjurious or that the government knowingly used false testimony to convict him. Accordingly,

he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 57 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

58

E. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In the traverse, petitioner claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction. (Traverse, Ex. B.) This claim is not contained in the petition. To the extent

petitioner is attempting to belatedly raise a new claim in this manner, it must be rejected. See

Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (a traverse is not the proper

pleading to raise additional grounds for relief); Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d

971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a

party’s opening brief”). Even if this claim had been properly raised, petitioner has failed to

demonstrate a constitutional violation. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There

is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). “[T]he dispositive question

under Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson,

443 U.S. at 318). A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus “faces a heavy burden when

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due

process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274, 1275 & n13 (9th Cir. 2005). In order

to grant the writ, the federal habeas court must find that the decision of the state court reflected

an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Id.

The court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is

challenged in habeas proceedings. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985),

vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev’d, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). It is

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 58 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

59

the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. If the trier of

fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the court in its review will assign the

inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). The

relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether

the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th

Cir. 1991). Thus, “[t]he question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt. It is whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors

reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal habeas court

determines sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the substantive elements of the criminal

offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983. 

After reviewing the record, this court concludes that there was sufficient evidence

introduced at petitioner’s trial to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a principal or an

aider and abettor of the home invasion robbery. The fact that there may have been evidence that 

petitioner believes cast some degree of doubt on aspects of the prosecution’s case is not

dispositive of the issue. Notwithstanding any such evidence, there was clearly substantial

evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

petitioner was guilty of the crimes charged against him. Because there was substantial evidence

presented at trial to support petitioner’s conviction on these charges, the state court’s analysis of

this claim is not “objectively unreasonable.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). See

also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence upon which he was convicted.

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 59 of 60
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

60

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus is denied. 

DATED: September 25, 2006.

DAD:8

morris1567.hc

Case 2:01-cv-01567-DAD Document 46 Filed 09/26/06 Page 60 of 60