Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00986/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00986-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT SCHUTZA,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNION CITY INVESTMENTS LLC, a 

California Limited Liability

Company; SHAWN LARKIN; and DOES 

1-10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-00986-AJB-WVG

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT (Doc. No. 4)

Presently before the Court is Defendant Union City Investments LLC’s motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 4.) 

The motion is joined by Defendant Shawn Larkin. (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff Scott Schutza 

(“Plaintiff”) opposed the motion. (Doc. No. 8). Defendant Union City Investments LLC 

filed a reply, which was also joined by Defendant Shawn Larkin. (Doc. Nos. 9–10.) For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

This case is an action alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990 (“ADA”) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”). For the purpose of resolving 

the instant motion, the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint are taken as true. Gilley v. 

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JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 12-CV-1774-AJB-JMA, 2012 WL 10424926, at 

*1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2012). 

Plaintiff is a paraplegic and uses a wheelchair for mobility. (Complaint “Compl.” 

¶ 1.) Defendant Union City Investments LLC owns real property located at or about 214 

Town Center Pkwy, Santee, California. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant Shawn Larkin owns Growler’s 

Sub Shack (“the Restaurant”) located at or about 214 Town Center Pkwy, Santee, 

California. (Id. ¶ 5.)

In October 2018, Plaintiff visited the Restaurant with the “intention to avail himself 

of its goods and to assess the business for compliance with the disability access laws.” (Id. 

¶ 10.) On the date of the visit, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to provide accessible and 

ADA compliant: (1) parking spaces, (2) dining tables, and (3) paths of travel. (Id. ¶ 12–

20.) Plaintiff states he personally encountered these barriers. (Id. ¶ 21.) Additionally, 

Plaintiff alleges that even though he did not personally enter the restroom, Defendants also 

failed to provide an accessible ADA compliant restroom. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff says he “will 

return to the Restaurant to avail himself of its goods and to determine compliance with the 

disability access laws once it is represented to him that the Restaurant and its facilities are 

accessible.” (Id. ¶ 28.)

Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants on May 27, 2019. (Doc. No. 1.) On 

June 26, 2019, Defendant Union City Investments LLC filed a motion to dismiss, which 

was joined by Defendant Shawn Larkin. (Doc. Nos. 4,10.) On July 11, 2019, Plaintiff 

opposed the motion, and Defendants replied on July 18, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 8, 9.) This order 

follows. 

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant Union City Investments, LLC requests judicial notice of the complaint 

filed in Scott Schutza v. William B. Cuddeback, Case No. 16-CV-2746-BAS-KSC, (S.D. 

Cal. Nov. 7, 2016). (Doc. No. 4-2 at 2.) Plaintiff does not oppose this request. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of an 

adjudicative fact if it is “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A fact is 

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“not subject to reasonable dispute” if it is “generally known,” or “can be accurately and

readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. 

R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2). Under this rule, a court may “take judicial notice of matters of 

public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment,” but it “cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public 

records.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018).

Under Rule 201, judicial notice of the complaint in Scott Schutza v. William B. 

Cuddeback is appropriate. “Courts have consistently held that courts may take judicial 

notice of documents filed in other court proceedings.” See NuCal Food, Inc. v. Quality Egg 

LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 977, 984 (E.D. Cal. 2012). However, “[w]hile the authenticity and 

existence of a particular order, motion, pleading or judicial proceeding, which is a matter 

of public record, is judicially noticeable, veracity and validity of its contents . . . are not.” 

United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 974 (E.D. Cal. 2004). Based on 

this authority, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request to the extent it seeks judicial notice 

of the existence of the complaint in Scott Schutza v. William B. Cuddeback. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests 

whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. While lack of “statutory standing” 

requires dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), lack of Article III 

standing requires dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See 

Nw. Requirements Utilities v. F.E.R.C., 798 F.3d 796, 808 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unlike Article 

III standing, however, ‘statutory standing’ does not implicate our subject-matter 

jurisdiction.”) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 

128 n.4 (2014)); Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). 

“A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for 

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).“In a facial attack, the challenger 

asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke 

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federal jurisdiction.” Id. The court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6): accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court determines whether the allegations are 

sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 

1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014).

“[I]n a factual attack,” on the other hand, “the challenger disputes the truth of the 

allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for 

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving such an attack, unlike with a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “may review evidence beyond the complaint without 

converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Moreover, the 

court “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. Once the 

defendant has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), 

the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that 

the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

A complaint or counterclaim generally must satisfy the minimal notice pleading 

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to evade dismissal under a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion. A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 

2012). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need 

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

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544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of 

‘further factual enhancement,’” and the reviewing court need not accept “legal 

conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Hartmann v. Cal. 

Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a 

cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo 

v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). “[C]ourts must consider 

the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling 

on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the 

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, 

Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint based on Plaintiff’s lack of 

standing, and also Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 4-1.) Defendants also asks 

that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim for relief. 

(Id.) The Court addresses each ground of dismissal below.

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) For Lack of 

Standing

First, Defendants urges dismissal based on Plaintiff’s alleged lack of standing. (Doc. 

No. 4-1 at 10.) In particular, Defendants take issue with Plaintiff’s failure to explicitly 

claim he encountered a barrier to accessibility. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff disagrees, arguing 

instead that he has standing because he has pled he personally encountered the ADA 

violations, and he intends to return to the Restaurant, but is deterred from visiting until the 

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violations are remedied. (Doc. No. 8 at 14.) The Court concludes there are adequate facts 

demonstrating Plaintiff’s standing.

Federal courts must “take a broad view of constitutional standing in civil rights 

cases, especially where, as under the ADA, private enforcement suits are the primary 

method of obtaining compliance with the act.” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 

1039–40 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). Unlike challenges to a complaint for 

failure to state a claim, challenges to constitutional standing fall under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Accordingly, a plaintiff’s statement of subject-matter jurisdiction 

is not governed by the strict pleading standard of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) 

and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007). See Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067. To 

be sure, “this is not to say that a plaintiff may rely on a bare legal conclusion to assert 

injury-in-fact, or engage in an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable to explain 

how defendants’ actions caused his injury.” Id. at 1068 (internal quotations omitted). But 

each element of standing need only “be supported . . . with the manner and degree of 

evidence required at the successive stages of litigation.” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Accordingly, the Court must, at this stage, accept as 

true all material allegations of the complaint and construe those allegations in favor of the 

complaining party. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).

A disabled individual claiming access discrimination must establish Article III 

standing to maintain a suit under the ADA. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 

F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). To demonstrate Article III standing, Plaintiff must plead 

facts showing he suffered “an injury-in-fact, that the injury is traceable to the [defendant’s] 

actions, and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 946. Because 

injunctive relief is the only remedy available to private plaintiffs alleging ADA violations, 

Plaintiff must also demonstrate a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Id. Each 

element is addressed in turn below. 

//

//

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1. Injury-in-fact

To establish standing, Plaintiff must first sustain an injury-in-fact. Article III 

“requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.” Sierra Club v. 

Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972). A plaintiff has sustained an injury-in-fact only if 

she can establish “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 

particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 560 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In order to establish an injury 

in fact, Plaintiff must plead that he encountered alleged ADA violations that “affect[] the 

plaintiff’s full and equal enjoyment of the facility on account of his particular disability.” 

Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947 (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has offered enough facts to demonstrate injury-in-fact. Defendants 

argue Plaintiff “never explicitly alleges he encountered a barrier to accessibility” and “does 

not explain how any barrier relates to his disability.” (Doc. No. 4-1 at 11–12.) To the 

contrary, Plaintiff does allege he “personally encountered” inaccessible parking spaces, 

dining tables, and paths of travel in violation of the ADA standards. (Compl. ¶¶ 13–21.) It 

is true that there are not an abundance of details, but Plaintiff does claim “the parking stalls 

reserved for persons with disabilities were about 108 inches in width while the shared 

access aisle that accompanied the parking stalls was only about 60 inches in width. These 

are not van accessible.” (Id. at 3 n.1.) Additionally, Plaintiff adds “[t]he lack of accessible 

facilities created difficulty and discomfort for the Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 23.) While Defendants 

argue Plaintiff does not detail with specificity the ADA violations (Doc. No. 4-1 at 11–12), 

painstaking specificity is not required to assert standing. See Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. 

Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2007) (allegations that Plaintiff 

encountered barriers to access, and that Plaintiff was deterred by accessibility barriers from 

visiting the establishment, was enough for standing to sue for violations of the ADA); 

Langer v. 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1790-GPC-NLS, 2020 WL 353601, at 

*2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2020) (stating that for purposes of standing, “[u]nder the more 

relaxed pleading standards of the ADA, Plaintiff need not articulate how the Restaurant’s 

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parking specifically violated the ADA Accessibility Guidelines. . . .”). Therefore, Plaintiff 

has pled enough in his Complaint to show an injury-in-fact. 

2. Injury Traceable To Defendants’ Actions

Next, Defendants aver Plaintiff fails to explain how his injury is traceable to the 

challenged conduct of Defendants. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 12.) Specifically, Defendants state 

Plaintiff “does not allege that the Defendant has control over the Restaurant or the parking 

space or path of travel where Plaintiff thinks there are ADA violations.” (Id.) However, 

Defendants’ argument is misplaced because the issue of control is irrelevant to this 

analysis. Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that the ADA’s prohibitions against 

discrimination apply to “any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of 

public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). There is no mention of control in the 

statute, and the ADA’s express terms hold a landlord who owns a place of public 

accommodation may be liable for violations of the statute. See Botosan v. Paul McNally 

Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832–834 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff adequately alleges

Defendant Union City Investments LLC at all relevant times “owns the real property 

located at or about 214 Town Center Pkwy, Santee, California.” (Compl. ¶ 3.) Likewise, 

Plaintiff asserts “Defendant Shawn Larkin owns Growler’s Sub Shack (“Restaurant”) 

located at or about 214 Town Center Pkwy, Santee, California, currently.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Lastly, 

Plaintiff states he went to the Restaurant in October 2018. (Id. ¶ 10.) Accordingly, the 

second element of standing is satisfied as Plaintiff sufficiently pleads that Defendants “own 

the real property that houses the restaurant which discriminated against him.” Langer v. 

Kamad LLC, Case No. 18-CV-00126-BEN-KSC, 2018 WL 6651536, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 

18, 2018). 

3. Redressability and Threat of Future Harm

Lastly, to complete the analysis for standing, Plaintiff must allege a threat of future 

injury in order to assert redressability. This is because where, as here, a party seeks 

injunctive relief, “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 

controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (alteration omitted). 

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Instead, the plaintiff must allege “continuing, present adverse effects” stemming from the 

defendant’s actions. Id. Thus, “a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must additionally 

demonstrate a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.” 

Chapman, 631 F.3d at 948 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff can 

demonstrate sufficient injury to pursue injunctive relief when discriminatory architectural 

barriers deter him from returning to a noncompliant accommodation.” Id. at 950.

Plaintiff alleges sufficient injury to pursue injunctive relief. Defendants attempt to 

argue Plaintiff cannot show a threat of continued harm because he does not show intent to 

return to the Restaurant. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 13.) Plaintiff, however, claims he intends to return 

to the Restaurant, but he is deterred from doing so “because of his knowledge of the 

existing barriers.” (Compl. ¶ 28.) Under Ninth Circuit authority, “[a] plaintiff experiences 

continuing adverse effects where a defendant’s failure to comply with the ADA deters her 

from making use of the defendant’s facility.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953. “[W]hen a 

plaintiff who is disabled within the meaning of the ADA has actual knowledge of illegal 

barriers at a public accommodation to which he or she desires access, that plaintiff need 

not engage in the ‘futile gesture’ of attempting to gain access in order to show actual injury. 

. . . ” Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)).

After review of the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has pled “continuing, present 

adverse effects” stemming from the defendant’s actions. Plaintiff has alleged the 

inaccessible barriers (i.e., inaccessible parking spaces, dining tables, paths of travels, and 

restrooms), how his disability was affected by it (i.e., “difficulty and discomfort”), and how 

the alleged barriers deter him from revisiting the Restaurant because “[i]f the barriers are 

not removed, the plaintiff will face unlawful and discriminatory barriers again.” (Compl. 

¶¶ 13, 16, 19, 23, 28.) These allegations are enough to constitute redressability and threat 

of future harm. See Doran, 524 F.3d at 1041 (plaintiff had standing where plaintiff visited 

a public accommodation on prior occasion and was deterred from visiting that 

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accommodation by accessibility barriers); see also Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. 

Props. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1011 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). 

Accepting as true the allegations in the Complaint, and construing the allegations in 

favor of Plaintiff, the Court holds Plaintiff has standing to bring this claim. Accordingly, 

to the extent Defendants seek dismissal based on Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) For Failure to State 

a Claim

1. Whether Plaintiff Has Plausibly Alleged an ADA Claim For Relief

While Plaintiff may have offered enough to show standing to assert his claims, 

whether he has adequately pled viable causes of action is a completely separate question. 

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal 

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of 

any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or 

operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). “To prevail on a 

discrimination claim under Title III, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled within 

the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates 

a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations 

by the defendant because of his disability.” Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement 

Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 

724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007)). “Discrimination” under Title III of the ADA is defined in part to

include “a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . where such removal is readily 

achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). “[A] plaintiff need not show intentional 

discrimination in order to make out a violation of the ADA.” Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the 

Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2004).

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a disabled individual under the ADA. 

However, Defendants challenge the second element by arguing Plaintiff only offers “mere 

conclusions” that Defendants own or operate a place of public accommodation. (Doc. No. 

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4-1 at 14.) The Ninth Circuit has explained that the phrase “place of public 

accommodation” refers to a physical place, and includes sales establishments. Weyer v. 

Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that 

places of public accommodation are “actual, physical places”); see 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12181(7)(E) (defining a place of public accommodation to include any “sales. . . 

establishment”). Here, Plaintiff alleges both that Defendants “own” the real property he 

encountered the ADA violations on, and also that “[t]he Restaurant is a facility open to the 

public, a place of public accommodation, and a business establishment.” (Compl. ¶ 11.)

More is not necessary at the pleading stage to allege that Defendants own a place of public 

accommodation and so, the second element of an ADA claim is satisfied. 

As to the third element—whether Plaintiff was denied public accommodations by 

Defendants because of his disability—Defendants contend the assertions in the Complaint 

are conclusory and thus fail to plausibly allege they denied Plaintiff public accommodation 

based on his disability. (Doc. No. 401 at 14.) Taking all material allegations of fact as true, 

the Complaint shows Plaintiff personally encountered1inaccessible: (1) parking spaces, (2) 

dining tables, and (3) paths of travel, and these barriers caused him “difficulty and 

discomfort” as a disabled individual. (Compl. ¶ 12–21). However, Plaintiff does not 

provide sufficient factual allegations as to how he was denied accommodation because he 

is in a wheelchair. Plaintiff provides some facts as to the parking spaces, but for the dining 

tables and paths of travels, Plaintiff only states that Defendants “did not provide accessible” 

“dining tables” and “paths of travel.” But were the dining tables too high? Were they too 

low? Where were the paths of travel? How were they inaccessible? Plaintiff leaves 

 

1

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that even though he did not personally go into the restroom, 

Defendants provided inaccessible restrooms. For example, he claims “there is no clear floor space in front 

of the disposable toilet seat cover dispenser because it is mounted on the wall behind the toilet.” (Compl. 

¶ 24–25.) “Although Plaintiff may seek remediation of barriers he did not personally encounter, he must 

provide facts demonstrating that he personally encountered at least one barrier, related to his personal 

disability, to satisfy the standing requirements.” Velez v. Il Fornanio (Am.) Corp., No. 18-CV-1840-CABMDD, 2018 WL 6446169, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018). 

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everyone guessing. As Plaintiff’s allegations are only “naked assertions devoid of further 

factual enhancement, and the Court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true, the Court 

finds Plaintiff’s allegations for this element of an ADA claim insufficient. Ashcroft, 556 

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In conclusion, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks sufficient facts to 

support a cognizable ADA claim. 

2. Whether the Court Will Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over 

Plaintiff’s Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim

Defendants also urge the Court to decline to exercise supplement jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s second cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh 

Act”). (Doc. No. 4-1 at 17.) Plaintiff argues there is no basis for the Court to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction over the claim. (Doc. No. 8 at 20.) The Court agrees with 

Defendants.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over a state law claim if: (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state 

law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 

district court has original jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over 

which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other 

compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The decision to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) should be informed by the values 

of economy, convenience, fairness and comity. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 

U.S. 715, 726 (1996). 

Plaintiff’s state law claim arises under California’s Unruh Act. The Unruh Act 

provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no 

matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical 

condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full 

and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 

establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). “A violation of the right 

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of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (P.L. 101–

3361) shall also constitute a violation of this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). “A violation 

of the Unruh Act may be maintained independent of an ADA claim where a plaintiff pleads 

‘intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the Act.” 

Earll v. eBay, Inc., 5:11–cv–00262, 2011 WL 3955485, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) 

(quoting Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 668 (2009)).

Defendants present two arguments as grounds to decline supplemental jurisdiction. 

First, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s inclusion of his Unruh Act claim constitutes 

impermissible forum shopping because it is an end-around to California’s heightened 

pleading standards requiring disability access plaintiffs to verify their complaints in state 

court. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 17–18.) And for the second ground, Defendants contend that 

because Unruh Act claims allow damages of $4,000 per violation, whereas the ADA only 

permits injunctive relief, the California claim predominates over the ADA claim. (Id. at 

18.)

As to Defendants’ first argument, the Court agrees and declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction out of deference to California’s heightened pleading 

requirements for disability lawsuits, and in the interest of comity, as California courts 

should interpret the state’s disability laws. Indeed, the Court will join other California 

district courts that have identified these factors as a “compelling reason” to decline to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over disability claims arising under the Unruh Act. See 

Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030-31 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (“[A]s a matter of 

comity, and in deference to California’s substantial interest in discouraging unverified 

disability discrimination claims, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim.”); Molski v. Hitching Post I Restaurant, Inc., No. 04-cv-1077-

SVWRNBX, 2005 WL 3952248 at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2005) (“Because the California 

courts should be given an opportunity to interpret California’s disability laws, because the 

calculated effort to avoid having California courts decide issues of California law is to be 

discouraged, and because the parties themselves are entitled to a surer-footed interpretation 

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of California’s disability laws, the Court finds that compelling reasons exist to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction over [Plaintiff’s] state law claims.”).

Lastly, the Court agrees with Defendants’ argument that state law issues will 

predominate over ADA claim issues. If the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over 

the Unruh Act claim, (1) Defendants’ intent, (2) monetary damages, and (3) Plaintiff’s 

emotional distress would be extraneous issues that would have to be litigated and yet not

relevant to the federal claim. As such, given these additional elements necessary for an

Unruh Act claim, the Court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim. 

See Feezor v. Tesstab Operations Grp., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1224 (S.D. Cal. 2007) 

(“Given the disparity in terms of comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, state law claims 

substantially predominate over the ADA for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).”). 

The Court thus DISMISSES the Unruh Act claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

Plaintiff, if he likes, may assert his state claim in state court.

V. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN 

PART AND DENIED IN PART. To summarize, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 

DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal based on lack of subjection matter jurisdiction. 

However, because Plaintiff’s fails to adequately plead an ADA violation, Plaintiff’s ADA 

claim is DISMISSED. But appearing that amendment would not be futile, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend his ADA claim. Lastly, Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim is 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Plaintiff is to file an amended complaint consistent with this order by March 16, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2020

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