Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03155/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03155-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:553 Unauthorized Reception of Cable Service

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-03155 MCE DAD

v.

GRAIG JERROLD POLLARD, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Individually and d/b/a BOGEY’S

LOUNGE

Defendant.

 /

This matter came before the court on March 19, 2010, for hearing of plaintiff’s

motion for default judgment against defendant Graig Jerrold Pollard, individually and doing

business as Bogey’s Lounge. (Doc. No. 8). Thomas P. Riley appeared telephonically on behalf

of plaintiff. No appearance was made by or on behalf of defendant at the hearing. 

Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that following some early contact with defendant

Pollard regarding possible settlement, there had been no further contact. The court’s docket

reflects that defendant has not filed any motion for relief from the Clerk’s Entry of Default on

January 6, 2010, nor any opposition to plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment despite

being served with both. Upon hearing argument, the court took plaintiff’s motion under

submission and granted plaintiff leave to file a supplemental declaration regarding the request for

Case 2:09-cv-03155-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 07/22/10 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

award of attorney fees and costs within one week of the hearing. On March 24, 2010, plaintiff’s

counsel filed a declaration addressing those matters.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s 

motion be granted and that default judgment be entered against defendant.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. is an international distributor of sports and

entertainment programming. Defendant Pollard operates a commercial establishment called

“Bogey’s Lounge” in Stockton, California. By contract, plaintiff was granted the proprietary

rights to distribute via closed-circuit television the “Ultimate Fighting Championship 91: Couture

v. Lesnar” event (the “Program”) which was telecast nationwide on Saturday, November 15,

2008. Defendant intercepted and exhibited the program in his commercial establishment without

authorization to do so.

The record reflects that service of process was effected on defendant Pollard on

December 12, 2009, by personal service. (Doc. No. 5.) After defendant failed to file an answer,

plaintiff filed a request for entry of default on January 5, 2010. (Doc. No. 6.) The Clerk entered

default against the defendants on January 6, 2010. (Doc. No. 7.) On February 16, 2010, plaintiff

filed its motion for default judgment with a proof of service reflecting service of the motion on

defendant.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) governs applications to the court for

entry of default judgment. Upon entry of default, the complaint’s factual allegations regarding

liability are taken as true, while allegations regarding the amount of damages must be proven. 

Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983)

(citing Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944); Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557 (9th

Cir. 1977)); see also DirectTV v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2007); TeleVideo Sys., Inc.

v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987).

Case 2:09-cv-03155-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 07/22/10 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Where damages are liquidated, i.e., capable of ascertainment from definite figures

contained in documentary evidence or in detailed affidavits, judgment by default may be entered

without a damages hearing. Dundee, 722 F.2d at 1323. Unliquidated and punitive damages,

however, require “proving up” at an evidentiary hearing or through other means. Dundee, 722

F.2d at 1323-24; see also James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310-11 (5th Cir. 1993).

Granting or denying default judgment is within the court’s sound discretion. 

Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d. 1089,

1092 (9th Cir. 1980). The court is free to consider a variety of factors in exercising its discretion. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Among the factors that may be

considered by the court are

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint,

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a

dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due

to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (citing 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 55-05[2], at 55-24 to 55-26).

ANALYSIS

I. Whether Default Judgment Should Be Entered

The factual allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, taken as true pursuant to the entry

of default against defendant Pollard individually and d/b/a/ Bogey’s Lounge, establish the

following circumstances: (1) defendant Pollard is the owner, operator, licensee, permitee, person

in charge, or person with control over the commercial establishment doing business as Bogey’s

Lounge in Stockton, California; (2) by contract, plaintiff was granted the exclusive nationwide

commercial distribution rights to distribute via closed-circuit television the “Ultimate Fighting

Championship 91: Couture v. Lesnar” event which was telecast nationwide on Saturday,

November 15, 2008; (3) pursuant to the contract, plaintiff entered into sublicensing agreements

with various commercial entities throughout North America by which it granted those entities

Case 2:09-cv-03155-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 07/22/10 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 At the hearing on the motion counsel for plaintiff noted that because the Program in 1

question was a cable television broadcast and not a satellite television broadcast, only 47 U.S.C.

§ 553 (Count Two) was implicated. See J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Manzano, NO. C 08-

01872 RMW, 2008 WL 4542962, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (“A signal pirate violates

section 553 if he intercepts a cable signal, he violates section 605 if he intercepts a satellite

broadcast. But he cannot violate both by a single act of interception.”) Accordingly, counsel for

plaintiff withdrew the request for entry of default judgment on the cause of action brought

pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Count One).

4

limited sublicensing rights to exhibit the Program to their patrons within their establishments; (4)

as a commercial distributor of sporting events, plaintiff expended substantial monies marketing,

advertising, promoting, administering, and transmitting the program to its customers; (5) with

full knowledge that the program was not to be intercepted, received, and exhibited by

unauthorized entities, defendant exhibited the program at the time of its transmission and did so

willfully and for purposes of commercial or private gain; (6) defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 553,

et seq., which prohibits the unauthorized interception, exhibition, publication, and divulgence of

programs; (7) by reason of defendant’s violation of § 553, plaintiff has a private right of action;

(8) defendant also tortiously obtained possession of plaintiff’s program and wrongfully converted

it to defendant’s own use and benefit; (9) by reason of defendant’s tortious conversion, plaintiff

is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages; (10) the interception and exhibition of the

Program violated California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq.; and (11) by reason of

defendant’s violation of the Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq., plaintiff is entitled to

such remedies as restitution, disgorgement, and attorney’s fees. (Doc. No. 1 at 3-8.)1

In its complaint, plaintiff prays for statutory damages of $60,000 for the willful

violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553 as alleged in Count Two and for recovery of all costs and reasonable

attorney’s fees. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable

attorney fees, and costs of suit for defendant’s tortious conversion of the Program as alleged in

Count Three. (Id. at 6.) Finally, plaintiff seeks restitution, declaratory relief, injunctive relief,

attorney fees, and costs of suit for defendant’s violation of the California Business & Professions

Code as alleged in Count Four . (Id. at 7-8.)

Case 2:09-cv-03155-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 07/22/10 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Plaintiff’s complaint and summons were served upon defendant Pollard on

December 18, 2009, by personal service. (Doc. No. 5.) The undersigned finds that the defendant

was properly served with the complaint and that the Clerk properly entered the default of the

defendant on January 6, 2010. (Doc. No. 7.) Defendant Pollard was also served with plaintiff’s

request for entry of default and application for default judgment by the court. (Doc. Nos. 6 and

8.). Despite being served with process and all papers filed in connection with plaintiff’s request

for entry of default and motion for default judgment, defendant failed to respond to plaintiff’s

complaint, plaintiff’s request for entry of default, or plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. Nor

did the defendant appear at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion. 

After weighing the Eitel factors, the undersigned finds that the material

allegations of the complaint for the most part support plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff will be

prejudiced if default judgment is denied because plaintiff has no other recourse for recovery of

the damages suffered due to the defendant’s failure to pay for the right to exhibit the Program.

In light of the entry of default against the defendant, there is no apparent

possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts underlying the action. Nor is there any

indication that the defendant’s default resulted from excusable neglect, as defendant was properly

served with plaintiff’s pleading as well as with plaintiff’s request for entry of default and motion

for default judgment. Defendant had ample notice of plaintiff’s intent to pursue a default

judgment against him.

Although public policy generally favors the resolution of a case on its merits, the

defendant’s failure to make a proper appearance and defend against plaintiff’s claims has made a

decision on the merits impossible in this case. Because most of the Eitel factors weigh in

plaintiff’s favor, the undersigned, while recognizing the public policy favoring decisions on the

merits, will recommend that default judgment be entered against the defaulted defendant.

II. Terms of Judgment to Be Entered

After determining that entry of default judgment is warranted, the court must next

Case 2:09-cv-03155-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 07/22/10 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Unfortunately, plaintiff’s argument regarding the amount of statutory damages that 2

should be awarded in this case is focused on the cause of action under 47 U.S.C. § 605, upon

which it no longer seeks default judgement. The request for statutory damages in excess of the

maximum amount allowed under § 553 appears to be based on this same error.

6

determine the terms of the judgment. Upon consideration of all of plaintiff’s briefing, the

undersigned will recommend that damages be awarded but not in the amount requested.

By its motion for default judgment, plaintiff seeks a judgment in the total amount

of $110,875. That sum consists of $110,000 for one violation of 47 U.S.C. 553(b)(2) and

(c)(2)(c); and $875 for the tort of conversion. (Doc. No. 1 (Compl.) at 9; Doc. No. 8 (Decl. of

Thomas P. Riley) at 2; Doc. 11 (Amended Proposed Order).) The undersigned is mindful that

the defendant was served with plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and was placed on notice

of the amount sought by plaintiff. However, granting or denying default judgment is within the

court’s sound discretion, and one of the factors the court is free to consider in exercising its

discretion is the sum of money at stake. See J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Betancourt, No.

08cv937 JLS (POR), 2009 WL 3416431, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2009). 

The Cable and Television Consumer Protection Act provides that a plaintiff may

elect to seek either actual or statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i) and (ii). Here,

plaintiff appears to seek enhanced statutory damages. Statutory damages for each violation of the

Act may be awarded at a minimum of $250 and a maximum of 10,000, as the court considers

just. 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii). A maximum enhanced damages award of up to $50,000 is

available only where the court finds the violation to have been committed willfully and for the

purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain. 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B). Plaintiff

argues that the amount requested in damages is justified here primarily because of the need to

deter broadcast piracy in light of the harm done to plaintiff’s business as a result of such

activities. The court finds plaintiff’s damages argument to be unpersuasive in light of the record 2

before the court.

/////

Case 2:09-cv-03155-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 07/22/10 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

In this case, plaintiff’s investigator stated that during the “Ultimate Fighting

Championship 91: Couture v. Lesnar” broadcast, he observed forty-seven patrons inside the

establishment. The investigator reported that there was no cover charge for entry. There is no

evidence before the court of any promotion by defendant that the fight would be shown at the

establishment. There is also no evidence before the court that a special premium on food and

drink was being charged at the establishment on the night of the fight. The investigator stated

that the establishment had four 27 inch television sets mounted on its walls and one projection

big screen television displaying the event. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to the court

suggesting that the defendant is a repeat broadcast piracy offenders. Finally, there is also no

evidence before the court suggesting that defendant Pollard is no longer operating Bogey’s

Lounge. 

In light of this record, which fails to establish a particularly egregious violation of

§ 553, the court will recommend that judgment be entered against the defaulted defendant and

that plaintiff be awarded $5,000 in non-enhanced statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §

553(c)(3)(A)(ii). See J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Cardoze, NO. C 09-05683 WHA, 2010

WL 2757106, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2010) (awarding statutory damages of $1,000 and $250

in enhanced damages for a § 553 violation involving a repeat offender in a default judgment)

under similar circumstances to those presented here); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v.

Hernandez, No. 2:09cv3389 GEB KJN, 2010 WL 1980186, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2010)

(awarding the maximum $10,000 in non-enhanced statutory damages under both § 553 and §

605); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Manzano, NO. C 08-01872 RMW, 2008 WL 4542962, at

*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (in a default judgment awarding the minimum statutory damages of

$250 due to evidence that the defendant no longer operated the establishment and therefore a

larger award would have little deterrent effect) 

In his declaration in support of the motion for default judgment, counsel indicates

that plaintiff also seeks the award of $875 in damages for the state law tort of conversion,

Case 2:09-cv-03155-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 07/22/10 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

representing the amount defendant would have paid plaintiff to show the Program lawfully

according to the rate card for the event. Plaintiff is entitled to such an award. See J & J Sports

Productions, Inc. v. Ro, No. C 09-02860 WHA, 2010 WL 668065, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19,

2010); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Montecinos, No. C 09-02604 JSW, 2010 WL 144817, at

*7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2010); but see J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Ferreyra, No. C 08-128

LKK KJM, 2008 WL 4104315, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2008) (“Inasmuch as plaintiff seeks

statutory damages rather than actual damages, plaintiff’s request for damages for conversion

should be denied.”). Therefore, the court will also will recommend that plaintiff be awarded

$875 in damages with respect to the tort of conversion. 

Finally, plaintiff seeks the award of costs and attorney fees. In counsel’s

supplemental declaration filed March 24, 2010 (Doc. No. 10), he seeks an award of attorney’s

fees in the amount of $2,416.40 (6.041 hours at $400 per hour) and costs in the total amount

$1,204.63 ($700 investigator fees, $350 filing fee, $80 service of process charges and $74.63

miscellaneous charges). Except for the investigator fees and miscellaneous costs, the court finds

the amounts sought to be adequately documented and will therefore recommend that attorney

fees in the amount of $2,416.40 and costs in the amount of $430 be awarded as part of the

judgment in this action.

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s August 21, 2009 motion for default judgment (Doc. No. 8) against

defendant Pollard individually and doing business as Bogey’s Lounge be granted;

2. Judgment be entered against the defendants in the sum of $8,721.40, consisting

of $5,000 in statutory damages for violating 47 U.S.C. § 553; $875 in damages for the tort of

conversion; and $2,846.40 in attorneys fees and costs; and

3. This case be closed.

/////

Case 2:09-cv-03155-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 07/22/10 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

twenty-one (21) days after these findings and recommendations are filed, any party may file

written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 21, 2010.

DAD:

Ddad1\orders.civil\joehand3155.oah.31910.mdj

Case 2:09-cv-03155-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 07/22/10 Page 9 of 9