Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01488/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01488-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KELSEY BRUST; JESSICA BULALA;

LAURA LUDWIG; and all those

similarly situated,

NO. 2:07-cv-1488 FCD/EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA; LARRY VANDERHOEF;

and GREG WARZECKA,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

 This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs oppose defendants’ motion. For

the reasons set forth below,1

 defendants’ motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

/////

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2 The following facts are primarily derived from

plaintiffs’ complaint filed July 24, 2007.

2

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs Kelsey Brust (“Brust”), Jessica Bulala

(“Bulala”), and Laura Ludwig (“Ludwig”) are women and current

students at the University of California, Davis (“UCD”). (Pls.’

Compl. [Docket #1] (“Compl.”), filed July 24, 2007, at ¶ 11). 

All are highly skilled athletes who participate in club sports at

UCD and who desire and are eligible to participate in sports at

the varsity level. (Id.) Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf

of themselves and a putative class on July 24, 2007, contending

that defendants have engaged in systemic discrimination on the

basis of gender at UCD by failing to provide equitable varsity

athletic opportunities for women and by eliminating existing

female varsity athletic participation and scholarship

opportunities at UC Davis. (Id. ¶ 1).

Plaintiff Brust enrolled at UCD in September 2006. (Id. ¶

11(a)). Plaintiff Bulala enrolled at UCD in September 2005. 

(Id. ¶ 11(b)). Both Brust and Bulala are a field hockey players

who have been involved in the sport since childhood and who

played at a high level competitively in high school. (Id. ¶¶

11(a)-(b)). Both have played field hockey on the UCD field

hockey club team. (Id.) Plaintiff Ludwig enrolled at UCD in

2004. (Id. ¶ 11©). She is a wrestler and rugby player who

wrestled in all four years of highschool. (Id.) She wanted to

wrestle at UCD, but was unable to do so because UCD eliminated

women’s varsity wrestling. (Id.) Ludwog currently plays rugby

on the UCD rugby club team. (Id.)

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3

Plaintiffs bring claims against defendant Regents of the

University of California (“Regents” or “UCD”), defendant Larry

Vanderhoef, Ph.D. (“Vanderhoef”), the Chancellor of UCD, and

defendant Greg Warzecka (“Warzecka”), the athletic director at

UCD. (Id. ¶¶ 14-16). Plaintiffs allege that Vanderhoef and

Warzecka have authority over the athletic programs at UCD and

that each has participated in or is otherwise responsible for the

discriminatory actions and decisions alleged, including the

continued inequitable provision of athletic participation

opportunities and scholarships to female students. (Id. ¶ 17).

Plaintiffs contend that UCD has a continuing practice of

providing its male students with greater athletic opportunities. 

(Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiffs allege that during the 2005-2006 academic

year women comprised approximately 56% of the student population,

but that women comprised only 50% of the participant on

intercollegiate varsity teams offered by UCD. (Id. ¶ 22). 

Plaintiffs also allege that UCD previously cut women from the

varsity wrestling team on the basis of their gender, that UCD has

failed to effectively respond to interest expressed by several

women’s sports club to obtain varsity status, that many women

student athletes have an interest in varsity athletic

opportunities and financial assistance that has not been

satisfied, and that many prospective UCD students have similar

interests that UCD has not addressed. (Id. ¶ 25). 

Plaintiffs bring four claims for injunctive and monetary

relief: (1) a claim against UCD for violation of Title IX for

failure to provide equal athletic opportunities and athletic

financial assistance for women; (2) a claim for injunctive relief

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4

against UCD and for injunctive and monetary relief against the

individual defendant for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on

the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution; (3) a claim

against all defendants for violation of the California Unruh

Civil Rights Act; and (4) a claim against all defendant for

violation of public policy based upon violations of the

California Constitution and the California Education Code. (Id.

¶¶ 26-89). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on October 26, 2007. 

(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [Docket #20-26], filed October 26, 2007). 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v.

Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

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3 Defendants request that the court take judicial notice

of certain documents. These documents are not relevant to the

court’s analysis. As such, defendants’ request is DENIED.

4 Plaintiffs concede that they cannot seek punitive

damages against defendant UCD. (Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss (“Pls. Opp’n”) [Docket #30], filed Nov. 30, 2007, at 1). 

Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for

punitive damages is GRANTED.

5

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Only where a plaintiff has not

“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. “[A] court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)). 

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).3

ANALYSIS

I. Title IX

Plaintiffs contend that defendant UCD4

 intentionally

discriminates against female students by, inter alia, choosing to

make fewer athletic opportunities available to female students

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6

than to male students. (Compl. ¶ 38). Claims brought under an

effective accommodation theory stem from the implementing

regulations that provide:

in determining whether equal athletic opportunities for

members of both sexes are available, the Office of

Civil Rights of the Department of Education (the office

charged with enforcement of Title IX) will consider,

among other factors, “[w]hether the selection of sports

and levels of competition effectively accommodate the

interests and abilities of members of both sexes.”

Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 865 n.4 (5th

Cir. 2000) (citing Boucher, Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d

113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)). In

deciding whether a plaintiff can state an “ineffective

accommodation” claim, courts look to the three part compliance

test set forth in 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418. Roberts v. Colorado State

Bd. of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1993). This

provision sets forth that the analysis should include:

(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation

opportunities for male and female students are

provided in numbers substantially proportionate to

their respective enrollments; or

(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are

under represented among intercollegiate athletes,

whether the institution can show a history and

continuing practice of program expansion which is

demonstrably responsive to the developing interest

and abilities of the members of that sex; or

(3) Where the members of one sex are under represented

among intercollegiate athletes, and the

institution cannot show a continuing practice of

program expansion such as that cited above,

whether it can be demonstrated that the interests

and abilities of the members of that sex have been

fully ant effectively accommodated by the present

program.

44 Fed. Reg 71, 418 (1979). The “substantial proportionality”

prong “provides a safe harbor for recipients under Title IX.” 

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7

Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’

claim for ineffective accommodation must fail as a matter of law

because the 6% disparity between female enrollment and female

varsity-level athletic participation alleged in the complain is

substantially proportionate for purposes of Title IX. 

Courts have followed the Office for Civil Rights

instructions to its Title IX investigators that “[t]here is no

set ratio that constitutes ‘substantially proportionate’ or that,

when not met, results in a disparity or a violation.” Id.

(quoting Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education, Title

IX Athletics Investigator’s Manual 24 (1990)); Beasley v. Alabama

State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1335 (M.D. Ala. 1998). However,

“substantially proportionate” does require a “fairly close

relationship” between undergraduate enrollment and athletic

participation.” Id. at 830.

Plaintiffs contend that the actual disparity between the

number of women enrolled at UCD and the number of women

participants in varsity athletics at UCD is inherently a matter

of fact. The 6% disparity alleged in the complaint and relied

upon in defendants’ motion to dismiss is based upon statistics

disclosed by UCD pursuant to the Equity in Athletics Disclosure

Act (“EADA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1092, during the 2005-2006 academic

year. (Compl. ¶ 22). Plaintiffs do not contend that this number

is necessarily accurate. Moreover, plaintiffs contend that even

if the 6% statistic is accurate, this disparity is not

“substantially proportionate” because, given the large size of

UCD’s enrollment, more than 80 women are denied equal athletic

opportunity. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22). 

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5 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim under

Title IX based upon unequal financial assistance. In their

opposition, plaintiffs clarify that they are not alleging a

separate claim or an element of a claim based upon unequal

financial assistance, but rather, that the factual allegations

relating to financial assistance support their ineffective

accommodation claim. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 1, 11). Therefore, because

plaintiffs are not pressing an ineffective accommodation claim,

defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED as MOOT.

8

The court agrees that the inquiry into substantial

proportionality in this case presents issue of fact not

appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs may be

able to offer evidence that the disparity is greater than that

disclosed by UCD. Plaintiffs may also be able to present

evidence that a 6% disparity has a disproportionate impact on

women enrolled at UCD due to the size of its enrollment and

athletic program; this disproportionate impact may affect the

court’s analysis of whether the athletic opportunities are

“substantially proportionate.” Viewing the allegations of the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and

drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, plaintiffs have

sufficiently pled a violation of Title IX based upon ineffective

accommodation. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ Title IX claim is DENIED.5 

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against UCD

for injunctive relief and against the individual defendants for

injunctive and monetary relief based upon alleged violations of

the Equal Protection Clause. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ §

1983 claim must be dismissed because it is subsumed by Title IX. 

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9

Plaintiffs claim that their section 1983 claim is not subsumed,

but can coexist with their Title IX claims. 

There is presently a split in circuit authority as to

whether Title IX subsumes a claim under § 1983. Compare

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 179-80 (1st

Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based upon

alleged Equal Protection Clause violations were precluded by

Title IX’s remedial scheme); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent.

Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] § 1983 claim

based on the Equal Protection Clause is subsumed by Title IX),

and Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir.

1996) (holding that a plaintiff may not claim that a single set

of facts leads to causes of action under both Title IX and

section 1983), and Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917

F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990) (same), and Travis v. Folsom Cordova

Unified Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11566 (E.D. Cal. 2007)

(holding that “Title VI is sufficiently comprehensive to evince

congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983 remedy”), with

Communities for Equity v. Mich. Hish Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459

F.3d 676, 683-86 (6th Cir. 2006); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d

1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Title IX has no

preemptive power over section 1983 claims), and Seamons v. Snow,

84 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiff has

independent rights under Title IX and under § 1983), and Lillard

v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 722-23 (6th Cir.

1996) (holding that a § 1983 claim seeks to enforce distinct and

independent substantive due process rights).

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10

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but

provides the procedural framework for a plaintiff to bring suit

for violations of federal rights. “Section 1983 supplies a cause

of action to a plaintiff when a person acting under the color of

state law deprives that plaintiff of any ‘rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States.’” Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 756 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

However, § 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of all

federal statutes. “When the remedial devices provided in a

particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice

to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of

suits under § 1983.” Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l

Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). In determining if

Title IX precludes resort to § 1983, courts consider (1) whether

plaintiffs’ Title IX claims are “virtually identical” to their

constitutional claims, and (2) whether the remedies provided in

Title IX indicate that Congress intended to preclude reliance on

§ 1983. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984);

Communities for Equity, 459 F.3d at 685. While the Ninth Circuit

has not decided the specific issue of whether § 1983 claims are

subsumed by Title IX, it has recognized that federal statutes may

preclude a § 1983 remedy if they are sufficiently comprehensive. 

See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir.

1999); Dep’t of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 820 (9th

Cir. 1983). The court agrees with the reasoning of the Second

Circuit in Bruneau that, under the Sea Clammers doctrine, Title

IX’s enforcement scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to subsume

plaintiffs’ virtually identical § 1983 claims and demonstrate

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that Congress intended to preclude § 1983 claims when it enacted

this statute. See Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 756-57. Contra

Communities for Equity, 459 F.3d at 685-86.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendants violated the

Equal Protection rights of UCD female students “by offering them

fewer athletic participation and scholarship opportunities than

males” and by offering more scholarship opportunities to men.” 

(Compl. ¶ 53). Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is based upon the same

factual predicate as their Title IX claim. As such, their claims

are under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause are virtually

identical. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009; Bruneau, 163 F.3d at

758. 

Moreover, Title IX’s administrative enforcement scheme is

complex and designed to ensure compliance with its mandates. 

Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 756. Under the enforcement scheme, injured

persons can file a complaint with the Department of Education

(“DOE”), see 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (1997), and the DOE must then

investigate the allegations. Id. § 100.7(c); Bruneau, 163 F.3d

at 756. The DOE may also periodically conduct its own compliance

reviews without a complaint. Id. § 100.7(a); Bruneau, 163 F.3d

at 756. If the DOE concludes that a complaint has merit or

discovers violations stemming from its own reviews, the DOE will

notify the institution and attempt to reconcile the situation

through informal means. Id. § 100.7(d); Bruneau, 163 F.3d at

756. If the DOE is unsuccessful, it may ultimately terminate

federal funding to the institution after an administrative

hearing. Id. § 100.8; Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 756. As such, Title

IX provides a comprehensive administrative remedial scheme.

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Further, in addition to the robust administrative remedial

scheme, the Supreme Court has held that Title IX provides

individuals with a private cause of action. See Cannon v. Univ.

of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979). “Once in court, the Title

IX plaintiff has access to a full panoply of remedies including

equitable relief and compensatory damages.” Bruneau, 163 F.3d at

756 (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. 60, 73-76 (1992)). The fact that

Title IX provides a private remedy in the courts provides further

support for Congress’ intent to subsume a § 1983 remedy with

Title IX. Id. at 757 (holding that the legislative history of

Title IX that demonstrates clear Congressional intent to provide

a private right of action as a remedy to secure enforcement also

demonstrates Congressional intent to subsume a § 1983 claim based

upon the same deprivation of rights). 

Therefore, given Title IX’s administrative and judicial

remedies, the court adopts the rationale of the Second Circuit

and finds that it was Congress’ intent “that a claimed violation

of Title IX be pursued under Title IX and not § 1983.” Bruneau,

163 F.3d at 757; see Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 789; Travis, 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 11566 at *15-16 (holding that Title VI precludes

claims brought pursuant to § 1983 arising from the same facts).

Plaintiffs contend that Title IX does not provide a remedy

for constitutional rights and thus, it cannot subsume a claim for

violation of their rights to equal protection. In support of

their assertion, plaintiffs cite the decisions from the Sixth,

Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, which have carved out an exception to

the Sea Cambers doctrine for constitutional rights. See

Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1284; Seasons, 84 F.3d at 1233; Lillard, 76

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6 Congress subsequently amended the EA. to explicitly

provide that the EA. is not the exclusive remedy. 20 U.S.C. §

1415(f). However, this subsequent amendment to statute does not

modify the analysis of the Supreme Court and its clear indication

that there is not a constitutional exception to the Sea Cambers

doctrine.

13

F.3d at 722-23. Generally, these Circuits reasoned that although

the claims may arise from the same factual basis, the Equal

Protection clause gives rise to distinct and independent

substantive due process rights separate and apart from those

rights protected by Title IX.

Plaintiffs’ argument is unpersuasive. In Sea Cambers, the

Supreme Court focused on the available remedies in deciding

whether a claim under § 1983 was precluded by a federal statutory

scheme. 453 U.S. at 13, 20. The constitutional right exception

focuses on the nature of the underlying right, an inquiry not

focused upon by the Court in Sea Cambers. Rather, in Smith v.

Robinson, the Supreme Court found that the Education of The

Handicapped Act (“EA.”) provided a sufficiently comprehensive

enforcement scheme, such that it demonstrated Congress’ intent to

preclude a claim under § 1983 for an alleged Equal Protection

Clause violation. 468 U.S. at 10136 (“We conclude, therefore,

that where the EA. is available to a handicapped child asserting

a right to a free appropriate public education, based either on

the EA. or on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, the EA. is the exclusive avenue through which the

child and his parents or guardian can pursue their claim.”)

(emphasis added). Therefore, the court finds that there is not

an exception to the Sea Cambers doctrine based upon plaintiffs’

assertion of a constitutional right. 

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Plaintiffs also argue that their § 1983 claim cannot be

subsumed by their Title IX claim because their § 1983 claim is

pressed against not only UCD, but also against the individual

defendants who are not named in their Title IX claim. Plaintiffs

misconstrue the doctrine of preemption. See Boulahanis v. Bd. of

Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999). Through the

enactment of Title IX and its remedial scheme, Congress created a

regime “for the redress of sex discrimination in athletic

opportunities at federally-funded institutions.” Id. That

regime need not include the ability to press claims against both

the institution and the individuals involved. Id. Rather,

“[t]he fact that individual claims are not available under Title

IX means that Congress has chosen suits against institutions as

the means of redressing such wrongs.” Id. (citing Sea Cambers,

435 U.S. at 20); see also Fitgerald, 504 F.3d at 178

(“Sanctioning section 1983 actions against individual school

officials would permit an end run around [] manifest

congressional intent” to aim the weaponry of Title IX at the

recipient of federal funds); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91

F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Congress intended to place the

burden of compliance with civil rights law on educational

institutions themselves, not on the individual officials

associated with those institutions.”); Travis, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 11566 at *16 (“Allowing Plaintiffs to plead around the

detailed statutory scheme created by Title VI by pleading a §

1983 claim against [the defendant] in his individual capacity

would be inconsistent with Congress’ creation of restrictions on

Title VI claims.”). As such, plaintiffs’ argument that their §

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7 The court clarifies that it does not address the issue

of whether a plaintiff could bring a § 1983 claim based upon a

separate and independent wrong by an individual defendant

because, in this case, plaintiffs sue the individual defendants

based upon their administration of the Athletic Department at

UCD, the same factual basis for their Title IX claim against the

educational institution. See Fitzgerald, 504 F.2d at 180. 

8 Defendants assert numerous arguments in support of

their assertion that plaintiffs’ state law claims against them

should be dismissed. However, as set forth infra, because the

court finds that discretionary immunity applies to defendants’

alleged conduct, the court does not address the merits of those

arguments.

15

1983 claim is not subsumed by Title IX because and to the extent

it is asserted against the individual defendants is without

merit.7

Therefore, because plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim based upon an

alleged equal protection violation is subsumed by Title IX,

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is

GRANTED. 

III. State Law Claims

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ state law claims

against them should be dismissed because they are immune from

suit. Plaintiffs concede that the Regents (UCD) are immune from

their state law claims. The individual defendants contend that

they are also immune from suit based upon the discretionary

immunity accorded public employees pursuant to California

Government Code § 820.2.8

Section 820.2 provides immunity to a public employee for

injuries resulting from “his act or omission where the act or

omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested

in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Cal. Gov’t

Code § 820.2 (West 2007). Generally, “a discretionary act is one

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which requires the exercise of judgment or choice.” Kemmerer v.

County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1437 (1988). However,

California courts have not set forth a definitive rule which

resolves every case. Id. Rather, the California Supreme Court

has adopted an analysis that relies on the “policy considerations

relevant to the purpose of granting immunity to the governmental

agency whose employees act in discretionary capacities.” Id.

(internal citations omitted).

Immunity is reserved for those basic policy decisions

which have been expressly committed to coordinate

branches of government, and as to which judicial

interference would thus be “unseemly.” Such areas of

quasi-legislative policy-making are sufficiently

sensitive to call for judicial abstention from

interference that might even in the first instance

affect the coordinate body’s decision-making process.

 Barner v. Leeds, 24 Cal. 4th 676, 685 (2000) (emphasis added). 

“Immunity applies only to deliberate and considered policy

decisions in which a conscious balancing of risks and advantages

took place.” Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 981 (1995)

(internal quotation omitted). As such, the California Supreme

Court has drawn a distinction “between the ‘planning’ and

‘operational’ levels of decision-making.” Johnson v. State, 69

Cal. 2d 782, 795 (1968).

The California Supreme Court has also noted that in order

for § 820.2 immunity to apply, a decision by the public employee

need not be “a strictly careful, thorough, formal, or correct

evaluation.” Caldwell, 10 Cal. 4th at 983 (“[C]laims of improper

evaluation cannot divest a discretionary policy decision of its

immunity.”). The Caldwell court reasoned that “[s]uch a standard

would swallow an immunity designed to protect against claims of

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carelessness, malice, bad judgment, or abuse of discretion in the

formulation of policy.” Id. at 983-84. 

A fair reading of the complaint reveals allegations that the

individual defendants made actual, conscious, and considered

collective policy decision. See id. at 984. Plaintiffs allege

that “each of the individual defendants has authority over the

athletic programs at UC Davis and has participated in or is

otherwise responsible for the discriminatory actions and

decisions” set forth in the complaint. (Compl. ¶ 17). As such,

plaintiffs have alleged that the conduct was within the scope of

the individual defendants’ duties. Plaintiffs also allege that

defendants intentionally discriminated against female students

and that “[e]ach individual defendant had knowledge of,

participated in or otherwise had authority over[,] and approved

the discriminatory decisions made and actions taken that

discriminate against plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 57). These

allegation reveals that the individual defendants’ made actual,

conscious decisions with knowledge of the alleged discriminatory

purpose or effect. 

Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate that the

alleged discriminatory decisions made by the individual

defendants were policy decisions. Plaintiffs allege that

“defendants determine the number of athletic opportunities

available to male and female students by choosing which sports to

offer each sex and by choosing how many athletes they will allow

to participate on each sport team.” (Compl. ¶¶ 37; 65). 

Defendants also decide how much athletic financial assistance to

provide to students. (Compl. ¶ 65). Plaintiffs contend that

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defendants intentionally discriminated against females students

at UCD by choosing to make fewer athletic opportunities available

to female students and by offering less financial assistance to

female students. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 66). As such, the allegations

in the complaint allege that defendants’ conduct resulted in a

wide-spread effect to all current and prospective female students

at UCD. The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claims is that defendants

have the authority to provide equal access to athletic

opportunities to women at UCD and knowingly choose not to do so. 

As such, it is clear from the face of the complaint that the

alleged decisions made by defendants are “sensitive” issues with

“fundamental policy implications.” Caldwell, 10 Cal. 4th at 983. 

Plaintiffs contend that the court cannot find that § 820.2

immunity applies to the individual defendants at the pleading

stage because the allegations in the complaint do not reveal that

defendants’ decisions were basic policy decisions entitled to

immunity as opposed to operational decisions, which are not

entitled to immunity. As set forth above, plaintiff’s complaint

alleges that defendants made basic policy decisions regarding

what athletic opportunities to provide to males and females as

well as what financial assistance to provide to female athletes.

Moreover, the Supreme Court of California has upheld a

court’s determination regarding the applicability of § 820.2

immunity at the pleadings stages. Caldwell, 10 Cal. 4th at 983. 

In Caldwell, the court upheld defendants’ demurrer based upon

discretionary immunity where board members allegedly voted to

replace the superintendent based upon improper motives of race

and age. Id. at 976. The court held that the complaint need not

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9 The Supreme Court has explicitly found that § 820.2

provides immunity against a public policy tort. Caldwell, 10

Cal. 4th at 984. Moreover, § 820.2 immunity will only fail to

apply to basic policy decision where there is a “clear indication

of legislative intent that statutory immunity is withheld or

withdrawn” in a particular case. The court has found nothing in

the Unruh Civil Rights Act which clearly evinces such an intent. 

See id. at 987-88 (finding that FEHA did not carve out an

exception to immunity through the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise

provided by statute”). 

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disclose a “strictly careful, thorough, formal, or correct

evaluation.” Id. at 983. Rather, the court found that the

application of § 820.2 immunity could be decided at the pleading

stage where “a fair reading of the complaint” demonstrate that

the defendant’s conduct “involved an actual exercise of

discretion.” Id. In this case, as set forth above, plaintiffs’

allegations demonstrate that the conduct by defendants

constituted “actual, conscious, and considered” collective policy

decisions. Id. at 984. 

Therefore, because a fair reading of plaintiffs’ complaint

reveals allegations that the individual defendants made actual,

conscious, and considered collective policy decisions, the

individual defendants are entitled to immunity pursuant to 820.2. 

Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims9

is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

(1) Defendant UCD’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for

relief under Title IX based upon a theory of

ineffective accommodation is DENIED.

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(2) Defendant UCD’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for

relief under Title IX based upon a theory of unequal

financial assistance is DENIED as MOOT.

(3) Defendant UCD’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims

for punitive damages under Title IX is GRANTED.

(4) Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED.

(5) Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law

claims is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 12, 2007

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