Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02349/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02349-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HMONG I, a fictitious name, on behalf of 

herself and as representative of members of 

a class of similarly situated claimants, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC 

REPUBLIC; et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-2349 TLN AC 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff has moved for entry of default judgments. ECF Nos. 7, 11, 19, 22. This matter 

was accordingly referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. (“Local Rule”) 302(c)(19). For the 

reasons that follow, the undersigned will recommend that no default judgments be entered, and 

that the district court issue an Order to Show Cause why this complaint should not be dismissed 

for lack of federal jurisdiction.1

I. BACKGROUND / COMPLAINT 

 This lawsuit was filed by “Hmong I,” alleged to be a fictitiously named real person. 

 

1

 After the hearing on the motion, plaintiff submitted over 580 pages of exhibits and unsworn 

statements, and requested that the court consider them in support of her motion. ECF Nos. 28, 

29. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned will deny the requests to consider those 

statements and documents. 

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Complaint ¶ 6. Hmong I “resides in an unspecified location in Southeast Asia.” Id. ¶ 21. 

Plaintiff’s husband was killed as part of “the official campaign in Laos to terminate Hmong 

people.” Id. ¶¶ 19, 55. She sues under the Alien Tort Statute (the “Act” or “ATS”), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1350, for the wrongful death of her husband, and seeks an injunction to, among other things, 

“allow the Hmong people to reside in Laos in peace.” Id. ¶¶ 70, 78. 

 Although plaintiff alleges that she sues “on behalf of herself and as representative of 

members of a class of similarly situated claimants,” she has not moved to certify a class, which 

would be required if this action were to proceed as a class action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 23 

(parties may sue as “representative parties” of a class only if the requirements of 

Rule 23(a)(1)-(4) are satisfied).2

 At oral argument, counsel for plaintiff acknowledged that 

plaintiff had not moved for class certification and moreover, that plaintiff was proceeding at this 

point only on behalf of herself, Hmong I. Counsel asserted that plaintiff would consider the 

Rule 23 issues after the motion for default judgment had been resolved with regard to Hmong I. 

Accordingly, the undersigned does not here consider any issues regarding class representation or 

Rule 23. Such matters, in any event, have not been referred to the magistrate judge. 

 Plaintiff sues the country of Laos, its sitting President and Prime Minister, the Ministers of 

Defense, Justice and Public Security, and “General Bounchanh.” Complaint ¶¶ 24-35. The 

complaint alleges that defendants engaged in a campaign of atrocities (including murder, torture, 

rape, maiming and poisoning and destroying “the jungle/their environment”) against a group of 

Hmong people in Laos, after the Vietnam War. Complaint ¶¶ 3, 56. This campaign was intended 

to achieve the extermination of those among the Hmong people who had joined, or who had some 

connection with, the “Secret Army.” Complaint ¶¶ 4, 35, 56, 58, 59, 64. The Secret Army is 

alleged to be a group of Hmong whom the “USA/CIA” recruited, during the Vietnam War from 

1960-75, to fight the Pathet Lao and the Vietcong in Laos and Vietnam, and “to rescue US 

 

2

 See also, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (“The class action is an 

exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named 

parties only. To come within the exception, a party seeking to maintain a class action must 

affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with Rule 23”) (citations and internal question marks 

omitted). 

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soldiers that were in the Laotian/Vietnam border area.” Complaint ¶¶ 57-59. 

 The complaint alleges that defendants’ conduct was undertaken in violation of 

“international law,” and in violation of following treaties: the 1962 Geneva Convention; the 1966 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the 1973 Vientiane Ceasefire 

Agreement. Complaint ¶¶ 15, 16, 39, 45-47, 48, 49; see also Complaint ¶ 78 (requesting 

injunction requiring defendants to abide by the cited treaties). The complaint also alleges that 

defendants’ conduct violated various Laotian laws (“Decree[s] of the President of the Lao 

People’s Democratic Republic on the Promulgation of the Penal Law”). See Complaint ¶¶ 51-54. 

II. DEFAULT JUDGMENT STANDARDS 

 A motion for entry of a default judgment involves “the two-step process” set out by 

Rule 55. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 6 Moore's Federal Practice 

¶ 55.02[3], at 55-8). The first step is for plaintiff to ask the Clerk of the Court to enter a default. 

Rule 55(a). The Clerk must enter the default if plaintiff makes a showing “by affidavit or 

otherwise,” that the “party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 

plead or otherwise defend.” Id. For reasons that plaintiff failed to explain in her motion or at oral 

argument, she never took this first step. 

 Skipping instead to the second step, plaintiff now moves the court for the entry of a 

default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2). However, even if plaintiff had taken the first step and 

obtained entry of a default, that would not automatically entitle her to a court-ordered default 

judgment, since the decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies within the 

district court’s sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 

 In making this determination, the court may consider the following factors: (1) the 

possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the 

sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and 

(7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the 

merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. 

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III. ANALYSIS 

 An analysis of the Eitel factors, as set forth below, shows that plaintiff is not entitled to a 

default judgment. The undersigned accordingly does not address the issues involved in 

determining whether plaintiff has achieved proper service on the sovereign nation of Laos, its 

sitting head of state, its sitting head of government, several of its sitting government ministers, 

and a general. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) (specifying manner of service upon a foreign state); cf. 

Autotech Techs. LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737, 748 (7th Cir. 2007) (“In 

fact, service through an embassy is expressly banned both by an international treaty to which the 

United States is a party and by U.S. statutory law. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 

Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, prohibits service on a diplomatic officer.”), cert. 

denied, 552 U.S. 1231 (2008). 

 As further discussed below, the undersigned finds that this case is not within the 

jurisdiction of the district court. Thus, even if service has been properly effected, no default 

judgment could be entered. Moreover, if service was not properly effected, it would be futile for 

plaintiff to attempt proper service of a complaint that is not within the jurisdiction of this court. 

For the same reason, the undersigned does not recommend ordering plaintiff to engage in the 

futile act of obtaining an entry of default from the Clerk of the Court. 

 A. Prejudice, Material Disputes, Excusable Neglect 

 Plaintiff has not mentioned or addressed any of the Eitel factors in requesting a default 

judgment. Accordingly, the undersigned cannot determine whether plaintiff would be prejudiced 

if the court declines to enter a default judgment. Moreover, since the defendants have not 

appeared, the undersigned cannot determine whether they would dispute material facts of the 

complaint, nor whether their failure to appear is the result of excusable neglect (even assuming 

they had been properly served). 

 B. Amount in Controversy and the Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 

 Plaintiff seeks a judgment “in excess of $5 million.” Complaint ¶ 69. This large amount 

tends to disfavor a default judgment. See Eitel, 782 at 1472 (“because Eitel was seeking almost 

$3 million in damages from McCool and because the parties disputed material facts in the 

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pleadings, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the default 

judgment”). 

 As for the policy favoring decisions on the merits, the analysis starts with “the general 

rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored,” and that “[c]ases should be decided upon 

their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. That rule is particularly 

weighty here, where default judgments are sought against a foreign nation, its sitting head of 

state, its sitting head of government, and several of its government ministers. See Practical 

Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, 

Cir. Judge) (“[i]ntolerant adherence to default judgments against foreign states could adversely 

affect this nation's relations with other nations”). 

 C. The Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint 

 Examination of the second and third Eitel factors -- the merits of plaintiff’s claims and the 

sufficiency of the complaint -- establish that no default judgment is warranted here. Where the 

complaint lacks merit, it is well within the court’s discretion to deny a default judgment on that 

ground alone. Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092-93 (“[g]iven the lack of merit in appellant’s substantive 

claims, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in declining to enter a default 

judgment”). In this case, to say that the complaint “lacks merit” is not to say that plaintiff’s 

allegations of atrocities are untrue or unsubstantiated, it is to say that those allegations do not 

appear to confer jurisdiction on this court or entitle plaintiff to obtain the relief she seeks by way 

of litigation. 

In her motion, arguments at hearing, and post-hearing submissions, plaintiff seeks to 

present evidence of the alleged treaty violations and human rights abuses committed against 

members of the putative class. The undersigned rejects these requests.3 Where the complaint 

 

3

 “Whether to receive evidence going to liability on a default judgment motion is within the 

discretion of the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(C); Parker W. Int’l, LLC v. Clean Up Am., 

Inc., 2009 WL 2916664 at *4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86346 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009) (the 

court “retains the authority to require a plaintiff to ‘establish the truth of any allegation by 

evidence’”). However, such evidence is taken to allow plaintiff to prove an allegation actually 

contained in the complaint; the evidence is not a substitute for missing allegations. See Fed. R. 

(continued...) 

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fails to support jurisdiction, the court lacks the authority to entertain evidence. This court’s 

jurisdiction turns not on proof of treaty violations and human rights abuses, but on the provisions 

of the Alien Tort Statute as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. 

The undersigned accordingly turns to that issue. 

 1. Jurisdiction to consider this case 

 The Alien Tort Statute provides: 

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 

by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 

nations or a treaty of the United States 

28 U.S.C. § 1350; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction 

. . . against a foreign state . . as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the 

foreign state is not entitled to immunity”). “[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new 

causes of action.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). However, “[t]he 

jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law 

would provide a cause of action . . ..” Id. at 724. 

 It is clear in this Circuit that, in general, a cause of action will lie under the Act when an 

alien sues for violations of international law. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1018 

(9th Cir. 2014) (“under Sosa, the federal courts are available to hear tort claims based on 

violations of international law”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 798 (2016). However, because all the 

conduct alleged in the complaint takes place wholly within the territory of Laos,4 the court must 

first address the question of whether the statute that confers subject matter jurisdiction upon this 

court, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, reaches claims for conduct that occurs entirely outside of the United 

 

Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(C) (“[t]he court may conduct hearings . . . to . . . establish the truth of any 

allegation by evidence”) (emphasis added); Bd. of Trustees of Pipe Trades Dist. Council No. 36 

Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Clifton Enterprises, Inc., 2013 WL 2403573 at *8, 2013 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 77068 at *26 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2013) (“while CRB’s liability is not established 

through its default [because the allegations were legal conclusions], the Court may accept 

affidavits and other evidence to establish the truth of Plaintiffs’ allegations”). 4

 The undersigned briefly discusses below the argument that plaintiff’s counsel asserted for the 

first time at oral argument, namely, that conduct underlying plaintiff’s claim did occur in the 

United States. 

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States, and wholly within the territory of a foreign nation. 

 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., plaintiffs were “Nigerian nationals residing in 

the United States.” 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013). They filed suit under the Alien Tort Statute, 

alleging that defendant Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations “aided and abetted the Nigerian 

Government in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.” Id. The question 

presented to the Court was “whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause 

of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the 

territory of a sovereign other than the United States.” Id. at 1662. 

 The Court concluded that “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims 

under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.” Id. at 1669. The 

presumption arises from a canon of statutory construction that reflects “the ‘presumption that 

United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.’” Id. at 1664 (quoting 

Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)). Because there is no indication that 

Congress intended this Act to apply to conduct occurring entirely in another country, the Court 

held that “petitioners’ case seeking relief for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the 

United States is barred.” Id. at 1669. Despite its broad language, however, Kiobel also indicated 

that extraterritorial claims could be asserted “where the claims touch and concern the territory of 

the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 

application.” Id. at 1669. 

 In Doe I, the lawsuit was brought by three Malian “former child slaves who were forced to 

harvest cocoa in the Ivory Coast.” 766 F.3d at 1016, 1027. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the 

defendants argued that the action was properly dismissed because “the plaintiffs’ complaint 

improperly seeks extraterritorial application of federal law contrary to the Supreme Court's recent 

decision” in Kiobel. Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1020. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal, and 

remanded to the district court so that plaintiffs could attempt to amend their complaint in light of 

the “touch and concern” language of Kiobel. Id. at 1027 (in Kiobel, the Court articulated “a new 

‘touch and concern’ test for determining when it is permissible” for a claim under the Act to seek 

the extraterritorial application of federal law”). 

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 This case falls squarely within Kiobel, as all the conduct alleged in the complaint occurred 

in Laos. Moreover, the complaint does not allege any facts that might bring it within the “touch 

and concern” language of Kiobel and Doe I. There is no allegation that the plaintiff or any 

defendant has any connection with the United States (except that, by implication, plaintiff or her 

late husband had some connection with the Secret Army in Laos). For example, there is no 

allegation that any defendant fled, or otherwise travelled, to this country. All the conduct set 

forth in the complaint is alleged to have occurred, and to be occurring, within the territory of 

Laos. The complaint contains no allegation of any conduct occurring in the United States, having 

any effect in this country, or being directed at, or affecting, anyone in or from the United States. 

 This recitation is not intended to imply that the existence of any one or group of these 

contacts would be sufficient to permit this action to go forward. However, the absence of any 

possible connection to this country places the case squarely within the bar of Kiobel. Indeed, a 

principal goal of the lawsuit is to enable the Hmong people to live in peace in Laos: 

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief in the form of preliminary or 

permanent injunction requiring Defendants to cease their illegal 

campaign of atrocities against Hmong people in Laos; to require an 

appropriate investigation into all these atrocities; to require Laotian 

government officials to take affirmative steps to declare this 

campaign as over, and to allow the Hmong people to reside in Laos 

in peace . . .. 

Complaint ¶ 78. 

 Plaintiff does not cite or address Kiobel or (Doe I) in her motion for default judgment, and 

at oral argument, counsel informed the court that he was not prepared to address it. Instead 

counsel insisted that the action was governed by Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. 

Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Marcos”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 

972 (1993), and the district court cases plaintiff cited in her motion, all of which pre-date Kiobel. 

Counsel did not respond to the undersigned’s question about the effect Kiobel may have had on 

Marcos. 

 In Marcos, the plaintiff’s son was kidnapped, interrogated, tortured and murdered in the 

Philippines by Philippine military intelligence personnel who were acting under defendant’s 

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direction. Marcos, 978 F.2d at 495-96.5 In analyzing the Alien Tort Statute, the Ninth Circuit 

stated that to state a claim under the Act required only “an alien, a tort, and a violation of 

international law.” Id. at 499. The court went on to reject the argument “that the district court 

erred in assuming jurisdiction of a tort committed by a foreign state’s agents against its nationals 

outside of the United States, and having no nexus to this country.” Id. at 499. It is difficult to see 

how Marcos and Kiobel could be reconciled, when Kiobel held that “petitioners’ case seeking 

relief for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred,” at least 

where the claims do not “touch and concern” the United States. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.6

 Moreover, another Ninth Circuit case further weakens the argument that Marcos governs 

this case, in which there is “no nexus” to the United States. In Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC., 221 F. 

Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002),7 plaintiffs were “current and former residents of the island of 

Bougainville in Papua New Guinea.” They filed a putative class action under the Alien Tort 

Statute, alleging that “defendants’ mining operations on Bougainville destroyed the island's 

environment, harmed the health of its people, and incited a ten-year civil war, during which 

thousands of civilians died or were injured.” On appeal, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon 

Marcos, stating: 

Our circuit has addressed this same issue once before. In In re 

Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig. (Marcos I), 978 

F.2d 493, 499-501 (9th Cir. 1992), we considered an ATS claim 

 

5

 Defendant was the daughter of the former President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos. The 

Ninth Circuit denied defendant’s assertion of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity 

Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11, on the ground that she “admitted acting on her own 

authority, not on the authority of the Republic of the Philippines.” Marcos, 978 F.2d at 496. 6

 The undersigned notes that despite the broad implication in Marcos that there is no need for a 

“nexus to this country” in claims under the Act, such a nexus did in fact exist in that case, because 

defendant had fled to the United States. The question of whether this fact would be sufficient to 

establish that the Marcos claims “touch and concern” the United States is not clear. However, 

that fact would certainly meet that standard under the test used by the concurring Justices in 

Kiobel, who wrote that the federal courts have jurisdiction under the Act where “(1) the alleged 

tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s 

conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, and that 

includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of 

civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.” Kiobel, 

133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, concurring) (emphasis added). 

7

 Aff’d in part, rev’d and remanded in part, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated, 133 

S. Ct. 1995 (2013). 

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based on torture that took place in the Philippines. We 

categorically rejected the argument that the ATS applies only to 

torts committed in this country. We said, “we are constrained by 

what § 1350 shows on its face: no limitations as to the citizenship 

of the defendant, or the locus of the injury.” Id. at 500. 

Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (emphasis added).8 The 

court noted that “[a]lthough the torts alleged all occurred outside of the United States, Rio Tinto 

has substantial operations in this country,” and went on to hold that “[t]here is no extraterritorial 

bar to applying the ATS to the conduct alleged in this case.” Id. at 747. 

 The Supreme Court vacated the decision in Sarei, and remanded “for further consideration 

in light of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).” Rio 

Tinto, PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013). On remand, the Ninth Circuit “voted to affirm the 

district court’s judgment of dismissal with prejudice.” Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 722 F.3d 1109, 

1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Thus, it is even more difficult to view Marcos as stating the 

applicable law regarding the extraterritorial reach of the Act, where, as here, there is “no nexus” 

of any kind to the United States. 

 In light of Kiobel, Doe I, and Sarei, the complaint fails to establish that this court can 

exercise jurisdiction over this case, since it alleges no conduct that could be said to “touch and 

concern” the United States, no matter how that phrase is interpreted, and even if it is assumed that 

Marcos is still good law.9 The remaining cases cited by plaintiff also predate Kiobel, Doe I and 

Sarei, and in addition, some or all involve cases were there was some connection to the United 

States. See, e.g., Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (“Saravia was 

resident in Modesto, California, in the Fresno Division of the Eastern Judicial District of 

California at the time this suit was filed”) (emphasis added); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. 

Supp. 259, 260 (D.D.C. 1980) (a case involving “the bombing deaths of former Chilean 

ambassador Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in September 1976 in Washington, D.C.”) (emphasis 

 

8

 Vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013). 

9

 The undersigned expresses no view on whether Marcos would be decided the same way today, 

given that there was, in fact, a critical nexus to this country in that case, namely, the defendant 

had fled to this country. However, Marcos does not mention this nexus in reaching its conclusion 

that the ATS reached conduct occurring entirely in the Philippines. 

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added); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (involving a lawsuit brought by 

plaintiffs “who had applied for permanent political asylum in the United States,” against a 

defendant “who was in United States on a visitor’s visa”) (emphasis added). 

 At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel asserted for the first time that all the conduct alleged 

in the complaint occurred because of the breach of an “oral treaty,” and that this breach occurred 

in the United States.10 According to counsel, an unidentified President of the United States (since 

identified in a post-hearing submission as Dwight D. Eisenhower, see ECF No. 28 at 2), entered 

into an “oral treaty” with the “King of Laos.” Under this treaty, the Hmong people would assist 

the United States in fighting the Pathet Lao, and the United States would protect the Hmong after 

the war. However, counsel asserted, the United States had no intention of honoring the treaty, 

even at the moment that agreement was reached. In addition, according to counsel, the United 

States left behind weapons that were then used by Laos in the atrocities against the Hmong 

people. It is not at all clear that such allegations, even if they appeared in the complaint, would 

suffice to allow this court to exercise jurisdiction over this case. However, since these allegations 

do not even appear in the complaint, they cannot be used to justify the entry of a default 

judgment. 

 Plaintiff has now submitted two Requests for Leave to file further statements and 

evidence, totaling over 580 pages,11 in a belated attempt to show that the claim has some 

connection to the United States. See ECF Nos. 28, 29. As noted above, even if the submitted 

documents and additional statements would show that the claims are sufficiently connected to the 

United States, no default judgment is warranted at this time because none of this information is in 

the complaint. Under Eitel, the court looks exclusively to the sufficiency of the complaint. See 

also Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (“necessary 

 

10 Counsel did not explain what an “oral treaty” is, or whether it is the type of “treaty” that is 

referred to in the ATS. 

11 The exhibits consist of the following unauthenticated and unexplained documents: newspaper 

articles; pages from treaties, conventions, agreements and resolutions; Congressional testimony; 

photographs; reports on gold reserves; investor forms; analyses of financial statistics; graphs; 

Laotian military orders; maps; and foreign language documents. 

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facts not contained in the pleadings . . . are not established by default.”). It is well established 

that “[a] plaintiff suing in federal court must show in his pleading, affirmatively and distinctly, 

the existence of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction [. . .].” Smith v. McCullough, 270 

U.S. 456, 459 (1926) (emphasis added). This court is not called upon to pore through hundreds of 

pages of documents submitted after it becomes clear that the complaint is insufficient to state a 

claim or establish federal jurisdiction. 

 In summary, the complaint does not support default judgment against any defendant. 

Indeed, Kiobel compels the conclusion that the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over this claim. 

That is sufficient grounds for the court to issue an order to show cause why the entire case should 

not be dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. 

 2. Immunity – People’s Democratic Republic of Laos 

 A foreign state is immune from suit except as specified in the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunity Act (“FSIA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (“a foreign state shall be immune from the 

jurisdiction of the courts of the United States . . . except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of 

this chapter); Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 

131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011). Indeed, the FSIA is “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a 

foreign state in our courts.” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 

434 (1989); Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010) (“[a]fter the enactment of the FSIA, 

the Act – and not the pre-existing common law – indisputably governs the determination of 

whether a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity”). Moreover, “the FSIA ‘must be 

applied by the district courts in every action against a foreign sovereign, since subject-matter 

jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one of the specified exceptions to 

foreign sovereign immunity.’” Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434-35 (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. 

Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983)). 

 The exceptions to this jurisdictional immunity are, 

[1]cases involving the waiver of immunity, [2] commercial 

activities occurring in the United States or causing a direct effect in 

this country, [3] property expropriated in violation of international 

law, [4] inherited, gift, or immovable property located in the United 

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States, [5] non-commercial torts occurring in the United States, and 

[6] maritime liens. 

Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 439 (citations omitted, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a), (b)). 

 None of the above exceptions to the FSIA are alleged in the complaint, none were asserted 

in the motion for default judgment, and none were mentioned at the hearing on this matter. 

Accordingly, the court lacks the authority to enter a default judgment here. Indeed, since the 

immunity is jurisdictional, the court cannot even exercise jurisdiction over the claim against Laos. 

That is sufficient grounds for the issuance of an order to show cause why the claim against Laos 

should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

 3. Immunity – The President and Prime Minister of Laos 

 While the FSIA now governs the immunity of sovereign states, its enactment (in 1972) 

had no effect on the immunity of individual government officials. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 308 

(regarding a suit against petitioner, the former Prime Minister of Somalia, the Court held that “the 

FSIA does not govern the determination of petitioner’s immunity from suit”). 

 Before the FSIA was enacted, the district court was obliged to dismiss a suit against a 

foreign state for lack of jurisdiction, if the State Department filed a “Suggestion of Immunity” on 

behalf of that country. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic Of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (if the State Department filed “a formal suggestion of immunity with the court on 

behalf of the foreign state . . . the district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction”). 

While such Suggestions are no longer binding on the court when filed on behalf of a foreign state 

(because of FSIA), there is “no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to 

eliminate, the State Department’s role in determinations regarding individual official immunity.” 

Samantar, 560 U.S. at 323. 

 The U.S. has filed a “Suggestion of Immunity” in this case on behalf of the President and 

Prime Minister of Laos. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff has not responded to the Suggestion of Immunity, 

and did not argue that it was not binding on the court at the hearing on this matter. Accordingly, 

no default judgment can be entered against the President or Prime Minister of Laos, and the 

Suggestion is grounds for the court to issue an order to show cause why the case against the 

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President and Prime Minister should not be dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s Requests for 

Leave To File additional materials (ECF Nos. 28, 29) are DENIED. 

 Furthermore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 19), should be DENIED in its 

entirety; and 

 2. Plaintiff should be Ordered to Show Cause why this entire action should not be 

dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on all 

parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 11, 2016 

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