Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08046/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08046-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Phillip A. Smith and Amy R. Smith,

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

JP Morgan chase Bank; Washington Mutual 

Bank, FA; Green Tree Servicing, LLC; and 

Does 1 through 10, inclusive, 

Defendants.

No. CV11-8046-PCT DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant Green Tree Servicing, LLC (“Green Tree”) filed a motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ complaint on May 20, 2011. Plaintiffs did not file a response, and on July 28, 

2011, the Court summarily granted Green Tree’s motion. On August 9, 2011, Green Tree 

filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. Doc. 21. The motion has been fully briefed. Docs. 24, 

25. For the reasons stated below, the court will deny Green Tree’s motion. 

I. Legal Standard. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule 54(d)(2), a request for attorneys’ fees must be filed by 

motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Among other requirements, the motion must “specify 

the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award.” 

Id. Additionally, Local Rules 54.2 requires that “at a minimum” the motion include “the 

applicable judgment and the statutory or contractual authority entitling the party to the 

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award.” LRCiv 54.2(b)(A). Local Rules 54.2 also requires the moving party to submit a 

memorandum in support of the fees, setting forth, in order and under separate headings, 

the eligibility, entitlement, and reasonableness of the requested award. LRCiv 54.2(c)(1)-

(3). The moving party must also provide supporting documents, including (1) a statement 

of consultation, (2) the attorneys’ fee agreement, (3) a “task-based itemized statement of 

fees and expenses,” and (4) an affidavit of moving counsel attesting to the reasonableness 

of rate and reasonableness of time spent and expenses incurred. LRCiv 54.2(d)(1)-(4). 

II. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. 

 Defendant’s motion refers to the Court’s July 28 order granting its motion to 

dismiss as the applicable judgment for which it requests fees. Doc. 21 at 1. The motion 

also includes a task-based statement itemizing relevant attorneys’ fees and expenses and 

an affidavit from moving counsel containing a statement that, based upon his experience, 

the fees and time spent are reasonable and appropriate. Doc. 22, 22-1, Ex. A. In 

substance, however, the motion does not come close to meeting the pleading 

requirements of Rule 54 and Local Rules 54.2. First, the motion states no statutory basis 

for recovery of fees as minimally required by both rules. Second, the motion contains no 

separate memorandum setting forth the eligibility, entitlement, and reasonableness of the 

award, as required by Local Rules 54.2(c)(1)-(3). Third, the motion contains no 

statement of consultation as required by Local Rules 54.2(d)(1). 

 Defendant concedes, as it must, that the motion “was not the bastion of 

compliance with Rule 54(d) and LRCiv 54.2.” Doc 25 at 2 n. 1. Defendant concedes this 

in a footnote in which it then dismisses its failings as “technical difficulties.” Id. 

Defendant argues that it should not be punished for “a slight procedural malady” because 

it has demonstrated “overall conformity” with the rules. Id. The Court disagrees. 

 Defendant admits that it left out “a citation to the exact statute” under which it was 

entitled to relief. In fact, Defendant cited to no rule or statute as a basis for relief. 

Instead, Defendant asks the Court to infer from its allegations stating that it was the 

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prevailing party to a contract claim and that the motion stated a plea for relief under 

A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Doc. 25 at 8. In the alternative, Defendant argues that it referenced 

Rule 11 sanctions in its initial motion to dismiss and that this should serve as an adequate 

basis for its entitlement to attorneys’ fees. Doc. 25 at 3. The Court will not reach so far 

to import legal bases that the relevant pleading rules require to be stated in the instant 

motion. 

 Defendant also argues that because Plaintiffs did not dispute the reasonableness of 

attorneys’ fees when they faulted Defendant’s motion as lacking a statutory basis for 

relief, Plaintiffs “appeared to have accepted the justification [of fees] provided,” and the 

motion should be granted. Doc. 25 at 2. Plaintiff, however, had no obligation to dispute 

the appropriateness of fees when it argued that Defendant had yet to make an appropriate 

statutory claim. 

 As Plaintiffs note, Defendant also failed to provide a memorandum setting forth its 

eligibility, its entitlement, and the reasonableness of its requested fees. Doc. 24 at 3. 

Defendant argues that the declaration of its counsel, David Allen, addressed these points. 

Id. Even if the Court were to accept this declaration as a substitute for the three-part 

memorandum required by Local Rule 54.2(c), it simply is not the case that the declaration 

discusses either Defendant’s eligibility or entitlement to fees as required by Local Rules 

54.2(c)(1) & (2). Additionally, although the declaration contains a summary statement 

that the fees and time spent were reasonable, it discusses none of the factors bearing on 

reasonableness contained in Local Rule 54.2(c)(3). Defendant claims to cure any 

deficiencies in its reply. Doc. 25 at 3-4. Regarding the reasonableness of the requested 

award, however, the reply also fails to discuss any factors under Local Rule 54.2(3); 

instead, it states a summary conclusion that “[w]hen considering the factors articulated by 

Local Rule 54.2(c)(3), it is clear that the undertaking of counsel . . . was reasonable and 

appropriate for the results obtained.” Id. at 4. Even if the Court were to accept new 

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arguments raised in the reply, Defendant fails substantively to satisfy Local Rule 

54.2(c)(3). 

 Defendant also omitted any statement of consultation even though Local Rule 

54.2(d)(1) expressly states that “no motion for award of attorneys’ fees will be considered 

unless a separate statement of the moving counsel is attached.” LRCiv 54(d)(1). This is 

to certify that the parties have already made a good-faith effort to resolve the fee issues 

without success. Id. Defendant attempts to cure this deficiency by submitting a 

supplemental declaration of its attorney, David Allen, recounting a discussion he initiated 

with Plaintiffs’ counsel requesting payment of fees on September 1, 2011. Doc 25 at 8. 

Courts have discretion to allow a party to supplement required documents to a motion 

(See Schrum v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Railway Co., No. CV 04-0619-PHX-RCB, 2008 

WL 2278137, at *2; (D. Ariz. May 30, 2008) (making a one-time allowance for the late 

submission of a statement of consultation in the reply brief); accord, Aillo v. Windham 

Prof”ls, No. CV 10-1005-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 4942755 (D. Ariz. Nov., 24, 2010) 

(allowing late submission of the required fee agreement where fees were not in dispute). 

Here, however, Defendant’s late submission fails to satisfy the Local Rule requirements 

because the only consultation it alleges consists of an unanswered request for fees 

Defendant made to Plaintiffs’ counsel after the submission of its motion. See Societe 

Civile Succession Richard Guiono v. Beseder Inc., No. CV 03-1210-PHX-MHM, 2007 

WL 3238703, at *8 (D. Ariz. Oct. 31, 2007) (“[A]fter the fact communication or 

consultation is clearly contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the Rule which requires 

the statement of consultation to be attached to the supporting memorandum certifying 

that a good faith effort was made to resolve the disputed issues.”). 

 The requirements of both Federal Rule 54 and Local Rules 54.2 are not mere 

suggestions, but requirements to provide the Court with a substantive basis upon which to 

decide the eligibility and appropriateness of granting the requested relief. “[T]hese 

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requirements are not advisory, but are mandatory to support an award of attorneys’ fees.” 

Societe Civile, WL 3238703, at *7. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. 21) is denied. 

 Dated this 26th day of September, 2011. 

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