Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02208/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02208-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER ROSE; ASHLEY ROSE, a minor, ) 

by and through her Guardian Ad )

Litem, her custodial parent, Peter ) 2:05-cv-2208-GEB-PAN(JFM)

Rose; BRITNEY ROSE, a minor, by )

and through her Guardian Ad Litem, )

her custodial parent, Peter Rose; )

and PETER ROSE JR., a minor by and ) ORDER*

through his Guardian Ad Litem, his )

custodial parent, Peter Rose, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY; SAN JOAQUIN )

COUNTY DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY )

KEVIN MAYO; and DOES 1 THROUGH 25, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Defendants argue, inter alia, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred

by collateral estoppel, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, various

immunities, and state law. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

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Defendants request judicial notice of a number of court 1

documents. (See Defs.’ Req. Judicial Notice filed Feb. 10, 2006.)

Plaintiffs do not object. It is appropriate to take judicial notice of

such matters of public record. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Lee v. City of

L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wilson, 631

F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, Defendants’ request is

granted. 

The prosecutor dismissed two counts of aggravated sexual 2

assault and an enhancement allegation for the forcible rape and forcible

oral copulation counts after the jury returned its verdict. 

2

BACKGROUND1

In December of 1994, Plaintiff Peter Rose (“Rose”) was

arrested for the sexual assault of a thirteen-year-old girl in Lodi,

California. At his arraignment on March 1, 1995, Rose was found to be

indigent and Harry Hudson (“Hudson”) was appointed to represent him. 

Defendant Kevin Mayo (“Mayo”) represented the People of California in

the criminal proceedings against Rose in the San Joaquin County

Superior Court (“the Superior Court”). 

On November 3, 1995, a jury convicted Rose of kidnapping a

child under the age of fourteen, kidnapping for sex, lewd and

lascivious acts with a person under fourteen years of age, forcible

rape, and forcible oral copulation. Rose was sentenced to twenty- 2

seven years in prison. 

Rose appealed his conviction. Rose’s conviction was

affirmed by the California Third District Court of Appeal (“the Court

of Appeal”) on December 22, 1997.

In March 1998, Rose filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the Court of Appeal based on ineffective assistance of

counsel. The Court of Appeal referred the petition to the Superior

Court for a hearing. After conducting a hearing, at which testimony

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was taken and exhibits were received, the Superior Court denied habeas

relief.

On June 7, 2004, “DNA testing was conducted on a semen

sample that was extracted from [the victim’s] underpants following the

sexual assault [for] which [Rose] was convicted.” (Compl. ¶ 20.) “As

a result of more advanced DNA testing since 1995,” the testing in 2004

“conclusively excluded [Rose] as the donor of the semen.” (Defs.’

Req. Judicial Notice, Ex. 8 at 4.) Based on the results of the “more

advanced DNA testing” conducted in 2004, the Superior Court granted

Rose’s subsequent habeas petition on October 29, 2004, and on

February 18, 2005, declared him factually innocent of the crimes for

which he was convicted.

On November 11, 2005, Plaintiffs brought this action raising

federal and state constitutional tort claims based on the alleged

actions of Defendants which led to Rose’s wrongful conviction. 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains six counts, all of which stem from

either the “investigative activities” of Mayo or the alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel Rose received because of Defendant

San Joaquin County’s (“the County”) policy for appointing defense

counsel. Count One alleges the County violated Rose’s Sixth Amendment

right by having a policy that denied him effective assistance of

counsel. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Count Two alleges the County violated Rose’s

right under the California Constitution because its policy denied him

effective assistance of counsel. (Id. ¶ 27.) Count Three alleges the

County violated Rose’s substantive due process right under the

Fourteenth Amendment because it “knew or should have known that

[Mayo’s investigative activities] would and did yield false

information . . . .” (Id. ¶ 29.) Count Four alleges Defendants

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violated Rose’s right to due process under the California Constitution

since Defendants “knew or should have known that the [investigative

activities of Mayo] would and did yield false information . . . .” 

(Id. ¶ 32.) Count Five alleges Defendants violated Plaintiffs’

substantive due process rights to familial companionship, society, and

support under the Fourteenth Amendment since Defendants caused Rose to

be wrongfully incarcerated for ten years. (Id. ¶ 35.) Count Six

alleges Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights

to familial companionship, society, and support under the Fourteenth

Amendment since Defendants “knew or should have known that [Mayo’s

investigative activities] would and did yield false information” that

caused Rose to be wrongfully incarcerated for ten years. (Id. ¶¶ 37,

38.) 

DISCUSSION

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, all

material allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and are

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus.,

Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, the

plaintiff is given the benefit of every reasonable inference that can

be drawn from the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint. Retail

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). “[A]

complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless

it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). “A complaint may be dismissed

[under Rule 12(b)(6)] for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal

theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory.” 

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Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.

1984).

I. Collateral Estoppel

Defendants argue the Complaint must be dismissed because

Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by collateral estoppel. Defendants

argue this bar applies because all Plaintiffs’ claims are based on

theories of “ineffective assistance of defense counsel” or

“prosecutorial misconduct,” both of which were decided “adversely to

[Rose] in the course of his criminal appeal and [state] habeas

proceedings.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 4-5.)

Federal courts will apply the collateral estoppel doctrine

to issues decided in a state court habeas proceeding if (1) the state

court afforded the federal plaintiff a “full and fair” opportunity to

litigate the issues, Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341,

1346-47 (9th Cir. 1981), and (2) California courts would give

collateral estoppel effect to the issues decided in the habeas

proceeding. Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n v. City of San Marcos, 989

F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1993).

The record reflects that the Superior Court fully considered

Rose’s ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct

claims before it denied Rose’s habeas petition on the merits. 

Therefore, Rose was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate

these issues in the prior state court proceeding. See id. at 365

(holding plaintiff had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues

where the “state court[] fully considered [plaintiff’s] rights under

the Constitution”).

California courts will give collateral estoppel effect to a

decision in a prior proceeding if: (1) the issue sought to be

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precluded from relitigation is identical to that decided in a former

proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the former

proceeding; (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the former

proceeding; (4) the decision in the former proceeding was final and on

the merits; (5) the party against whom preclusion is sought is the

same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding; and

(6) preclusion “in [the] particular circumstance would be fair to the

parties and constitute[] sound judicial policy.” Lucido v. Superior

Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341-43 (1990). 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Plaintiffs concede that Rose’s state habeas petition

“raise[d] the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 5.) However, Plaintiffs argue collateral estoppel is

inappropriate because (1) “the facts surrounding th[e] issue[] [of

ineffective assistance of counsel] have markedly changed” since

conclusion of the former proceeding, rendering the issue in this

proceeding distinct from that decided by the Superior Court, and (2)

application of collateral estoppel would be contrary to public policy. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, 7.)

“The ‘identical issue’ requirement addresses whether

‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two

proceedings . . . .” Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 342. “If new facts or

changed circumstances have occurred since the prior decision[,]” the

issue in the later proceeding may be different from the issue

previously decided, thus preventing the application of collateral

estoppel. Melendres v. City of L.A., 40 Cal. App. 3d 718, 730 (1974). 

Plaintiffs argue the new “conclusive evidence” of Rose’s innocence

shows Rose’s trial “was unreliable or unfair” and makes “the facts in

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this [proceeding so] markedly different from those at issue in . . .

[Rose’s] habeas proceeding[]” that the issue of ineffective assistance

of counsel in this proceeding is different from what was litigated in

state court. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) 

“To succeed [on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim]

under the Sixth Amendment or [the California Constitution] a defendant

must show (1) deficient performance [by defense counsel] under an

objective standard . . . and (2) prejudice under a test of reasonable

probability of an adverse effect on the outcome.” People v. Berryman,

6 Cal. 4th 1048, 1081 (1993) (emphasis added), overruled by People v.

Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800 (1998) on other grounds. In Rose’s state habeas

proceeding, the Superior Court determined, under an objective

standard, that Hudson did not perform deficiently when representing

Rose. (Defs.’ Req. Judicial Notice Ex. 7 at 6-7, 13-14.) Since Rose

had to show deficient performance and prejudice, this determination

was fatal to any ineffective assistance of counsel claim Rose sought

to maintain. 

The issue here is whether Hudson’s unawareness of DNA

testing that was “more advanced” than the DNA testing in existence

when he represented Rose satisfies the deficient performance element. 

It does not because Hudson was not expected to be aware of that more

advanced testing and the DNA testing in existence when Rose was tried

was part of Rose’s first habeas petition that the Superior Court

denied. Therefore, the issue of Hudson’s performance raised in

Plaintiffs’ Complaint is the same issue, for collateral estoppel

purposes, that was decided adversely to Rose in his first state habeas

proceeding. See Younan v. Caruso, 51 Cal. App. 4th 401, 414 n.7

(1996) (issues are the same for purposes of collateral estoppel “where

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the . . . complaint is based on the same factual allegations of

attorney neglect which were actually determined after a full

evidentiary hearing in the habeas proceeding.”)

The record reveals Defendants have met their burden of

establishing that the identical issue of ineffective assistance of

counsel was “actually litigated” and “necessarily decided” as part of

Rose’s first habeas petition; that the relationship between Rose and

his three children is “‘sufficiently close’ so as to justify

application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel” to Rose and his

plaintiff children, People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 486 (1982),

superceded by statute in Cal. Vehicle Code § 13353.2 on other grounds,

and that the Superior Court’s rejection of Rose’s ineffective

assistance claim was a final decision on the merits. 

Plaintiffs also argue in a conclusory manner that, not

withstanding the above, application of collateral estoppel is

inappropriate because it will not serve “public policy.” However, the

policies supporting collateral estoppel--preventing litigation of

identical issues, conserving judicial resources, and preventing

inconsistent judgments--are served by applying collateral estoppel in

this instance. Younan, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 414-15. The record

reveals Rose had an opportunity to fully litigate the issue of

Hudson’s performance. Under the circumstances, preventing Plaintiffs

from relitigating the issue of Hudson’s performance as defense counsel

is both fair and sound judicial policy. Therefore, Plaintiffs are

collaterally estopped from relitigating the adequacy of Hudson’s

performance as defense counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on

Hudson’s representation of Rose. 

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Since Counts One and Two are predicated on alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel that Plaintiffs cannot establish due

to the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine, they are

dismissed with prejudice.

Collateral estoppel also requires Count Five, which alleges

Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights to

familial companionship, society, and support under the Fourteenth

Amendment, be dismissed. Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights

are derived from Rose’s Constitutional rights; therefore, Plaintiffs

cannot prevail on such a claim unless they establish an underlying

violation of Rose’s Constitutional rights. Estate of Torres v.

Terhune, 2002 WL 32107991, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2002). Although

Count Five does not specify the Constitutional violation on which it

is predicated, there are only two Constitutional violations alleged in

the Complaint: ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the

Sixth Amendment, and prosecutorial misconduct in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Since Count Six, which specifically alleges

prosecutorial misconduct as the underlying Constitutional violation,

is also a substantive due process claim, Count Five can only be

understood to allege ineffective assistance of counsel as the

underlying Constitutional violation. Since collateral estoppel

prevents Plaintiffs from establishing the underlying Constitutional

violation in Count Five, Count Five is also dismissed with prejudice. 

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Plaintiffs argue their prosecutorial misconduct claims are

not barred by collateral estoppel because the claims are based on

Mayo’s pretrial “investigative activities,” while Rose’s habeas

proceedings “only raised the issue of prosecutorial misconduct . . .

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during the criminal trial.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.) Defendants dismissal

motion on this ground is denied since they have not shown Mayo’s

alleged pretrial investigative misconduct was litigated in a prior

state proceeding.

II. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendants also argue the Complaint should be dismissed

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine prohibits a federal

district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit

that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment. Mothershed v.

Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005). 

However, the remaining three claims in the Complaint are premised on

Mayo’s alleged prosecutorial misconduct in pretrial “investigative

activities.” These claims concern an issue that has not been shown to

have been litigated in any prior state court proceeding. 

Consequently, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has not been shown

applicable, and Defendants’ dismissal motion on this ground is denied.

III. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants argue to the extent the remaining claims under 42

U.S.C. section 1983 (“section 1983"), Counts Three and Six, name Mayo

in his official capacity, they must be dismissed because they seek

damages for actions taken by Mayo in his capacity as a state officer,

and are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution. Count Three seeks damages against the County for

Mayo’s “investigative activities” and Count Six seeks damages against

both Defendants for those same “investigative activities” that

deprived Plaintiffs of their substantive due process rights. 

Defendants contend that since the claims are based on Mayo’s actions

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in his capacity as a state officer, Mayo is immune from suit, and the

County cannot be liable for Mayo’s actions.

“[T]he County can be held liable only if [Mayo] acted as a

county officer. If [Mayo] was a state officer when he engaged in the

acts of which [Plaintiffs] complain[], he is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity (to the extent that he is sued in his official

capacity) and the County cannot be held liable for those acts. Thus

liability for both [D]efendants depends on the same question: whether

[Mayo] acted on behalf of the state or the county.” Ceballos v.

Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1182 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted),

rev’d by Garcetti v. Ceballos, --- U.S. ---- (2006) on other grounds. 

Whether a prosecutor acts on behalf of the state or the

county depends on his “actual function . . . in a particular area.” 

Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting McMillian v. Monroe County Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 785

(1997)). A prosecutor acts on behalf of the state “[w]hen [he]

engages in prosecutorial conduct, . . . but at other times, he should

be characterized as a county officer.” Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County

of Inyo, 275 F.3d 893, 906 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and remanded by

Inyo County, Cal. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community

of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003) on other grounds. When

determining whether a prosecutor was engaged in prosecutorial or nonprosecutorial conduct the inquiry is whether he was acting in the role

of “advocate” or “detective,” because “[t]here is a distinction

between the advocate’s role in evaluating evidence and interviewing

witnesses as he prepares for trial, . . . and the detective’s role in

searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable

cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested . . . .” Bishop, 275

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F.3d at 909 (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273

(1993)). When acting in the former role prosecutors are engaged in a

prosecutorial function and are officers of the state; in the latter

role they are engaged in an investigatory function and are officers of

the county. Id.; see Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1183 (stating prosecutors

“performing investigatory and other functions . . . are officers of

the county”). 

Plaintiffs allege “Mayo . . . participated in investigative

acts which he knew or should have known would and did yield false

information, including, but not limited to, the [wrongful]

identification of [Rose as the] perpetrator.” (Compl. ¶ 13.) 

Plaintiffs allege Rose was identified by the victim as her assailant

“[o]nly after the police accused [the victim] of manufacturing her

story and then told her that they already knew [Rose was the

assailant].” (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs have alleged Mayo was involved

in these actions with knowledge that Rose would be wrongly identified

as the victim’s assailant. (Id. ¶ 14.)

Mayo’s alleged misconduct occurred while he was

investigating and seeking to identify the perpetrator of a sexual

assault. Mayo was not prosecuting or preparing to prosecute a

criminal violation at the time of his alleged misconduct since the

prosecution of Rose had not commenced. Therefore, Mayo was performing

the non-prosecutorial, investigative role of a “detective” on behalf

of the County rather than the prosecutorial role of an “advocate.” 

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ dismissal motion on this ground is

denied. 

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IV. Individual Immunities

Mayo argues to the extent he is sued under section 1983 in

his individual capacity he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial and

qualified immunity. Mayo contends these immunities require dismissal

of Count Six, which is the only section 1983 claim remaining against

him personally. 

A prosecutor is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity

from liability under section 1983 for violating an individual’s

federal constitutional rights when he engages in activities

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). However, a

prosecutor is entitled to claim only qualified immunity if he “is

performing investigatory or administrative functions, or is

essentially functioning as a police officer or detective.” Id. 

“Thus, immunity decisions regarding the liability of a state

prosecutor depend on ‘the nature of the function performed, not the

identity of the actor who performed it.’” Id. at 1029 (quoting Kalina

v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997)).

A. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

Since the actions of Mayo upon which Plaintiffs’ claims are

based were investigatory in nature, he is not entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity. Therefore, his dismissal motion on this

ground is denied. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1184 (“[W]hen a prosecutor

acts as an investigator . . . he [may] receive[] only qualified

immunity.”).

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B. Qualified Immunity 

“To decide whether a defendant is protected by qualified

immunity, a court must first determine whether, ‘taken in the light

most favorable to the party asserting injury, . . . the facts alleged

show the [defendant’s] conduct violated a constitutional right.’ If

the plaintiff’s factual allegations do add up to a violation of the

plaintiff’s federal rights, then the court must proceed to determine

whether the right was ‘clearly established,’ i.e., whether the

contours of the right were already delineated with sufficient clarity

to make a reasonable [person] in the defendant’s circumstances aware

that what he was doing violated the right.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263

F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

Mayo argues his “allegedly unconstitutional conduct [is] not

altogether clear” from the Complaint. (Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) However,

Plaintiffs’ Complaint can be read as asserting a claim for violation

of Rose’s substantive due process right not to be subjected to

criminal charges based on deliberately fabricated evidence. “[T]o

support such a claim, [Plaintiffs] must, at a minimum, [allege facts

that support] at least one of the following two propositions: (1)

[Mayo] continued [the] investigation of [Rose] despite the fact that

[he] knew or should have known that [Rose] was innocent; or (2) [Mayo]

used investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive that

[he] knew or should have known that those techniques would yield false

information.” Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. 

Plaintiffs allege Mayo engaged in improper investigatory

activities, “including, but not limited to[,] directing that witnesses

be interrogated in such a fashion so as to elicit false incriminating

statements against [Rose].” (Compl. ¶ 7.) As an example of the

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improper investigative techniques Mayo engaged in, Plaintiffs allege

that “following the reported rape, [the victim] stated that she did

not see her assailant’s face” and “continually asserted that she did

not know who assaulted her.” (Id. ¶ 12.) But “after the police

accused her of manufacturing her story and [] told her that they

already knew it was [Rose], . . . [the victim] tentatively suggest[ed]

that [Rose] might have been her assailant.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege

Mayo “knew or should have known that his investigatory activities

. . . would and did yield false information, including, but not

limited to, the identification of the wrong perpetrator.” (Id. ¶ 7.) 

Finally, Plaintiffs allege Mayo’s misconduct resulted “in the wrongful

conviction of [Rose].” (Id. at 2.) Such allegations, when accepted

as true and taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, support a

claim for violation of the “constitutional due process right not to be

subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was

deliberately fabricated by the government” under the second

proposition. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1074-75. 

Nor has Mayo shown that he prevails on the second inquiry

under the qualified immunity analysis. Devereaux holds that the

“constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal

charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately

fabricated by the government” is “clearly established.” Id. This

right was “clearly established” at the time of Mayo’s alleged

misconduct. See id. at 1075. Therefore, Mayo has not shown he is

entitled to qualified immunity, and his dismissal motion on this

ground is denied.

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Section 4904 provides: 3

If the evidence shows that the crime with which the claimant

was charged was either not committed at all, or, if committed,

was not committed by the claimant, and that the claimant did

not, by any act or omission either intentionally or

negligently, contribute to the bringing about of his or her

arrest or conviction, and that the claimant has sustained

pecuniary injury through his or her erroneous conviction and

imprisonment, the State Board of Control shall report the

facts of the case and its conclusions to the next Legislature

of this state, with a recommendation that an appropriation be

made by the Legislature for the purpose of indemnifying the

claimant for the pecuniary injury; but the amount of the

appropriation recommended shall be a sum equivalent to one

hundred dollars ($100) per day of incarceration served

subsequent to the claimant’s conviction and that appropriation

shall not be treated as gross income to the recipient under

the provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

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VI. Penal Code section 4904

Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be

dismissed because California Penal Code section 4904 (“section 4904")3

is the only remedy for wrongful conviction in California. Defendants

have cited no authority indicating that section 4904 is the exclusive

remedy available to a wrongfully convicted criminal defendant. 

Therefore, Defendants’ dismissal motion on this ground is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Counts One, Two, and Five

are dismissed with prejudice, and the other portions of Defendants’

dismissal motion are denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-02208-GEB-PAN Document 34 Filed 06/28/06 Page 16 of 16