Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03377/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03377-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose Antonio Aguilera, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Golden Eagle Distributors, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 05-3377-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Plaintiff Jose Antonio Aguilera claims that his former employer, Defendant Golden

Eagle Distributors, Inc. ("Golden Eagle"), discriminated against him on the basis of national

origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Aguilera admits that he lied

to his supervisor and broke a company rule. He argues, however, that Golden Eagle would

have given him a second chance instead of immediately terminating him if he was not

Mexican-American. Golden Eagle has moved for summary judgment. Because Aguilera has

failed to present evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Golden Eagle

acted with discriminatory intent when it fired him, the Court will grant Golden Eagle's

motion.

I. Background

Aguilera is a Mexican-American. He worked at Golden Eagle's Holbrook, Arizona

facility for twenty-seven years. At the time Golden Eagle fired him, Aguilera was one of the

company's bulk delivery drivers. On Mondays, Aguilera delivered Budweiser beer to several

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Golden Eagle customers in Winslow, Arizona. The Winslow Wal-Mart was not one of these

customers.

On Monday, May 23, 2005, Aguilera was seen behind the Winslow Wal-Mart

transferring twenty-five to thirty cases of Budweiser beer from his delivery truck to a white

pickup truck. After Golden Eagle learned of the incident, Aguilera's supervisor, Dale Klein,

asked him why his delivery truck had been parked behind Wal-Mart. Aguilera told Klein

that he was at Wal-Mart buying a belt. Later, Aguilera admitted to transferring the beer and

claimed that he was doing a favor for a friend and did not steal anything. An inventory

revealed that Aguilera had not stolen the beer from the Holbrook warehouse, but Golden

Eagle continued to suspect Aguilera of stealing the beer from its customers. Following a

subsequent investigation, Golden Eagle terminated Aguilera for the stated reasons of

dishonesty and suspicion of theft.

II. Legal Standard

The standard for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Under this rule, summary judgment is appropriate when no "genuine issue"

of "material fact" remains and "the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter

of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

III. Discussion

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the

basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To prevail on

a Title VII claim, the plaintiff must prove that an adverse employment action was taken

"because of" unlawful discrimination. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 857 (9th

Cir. 2002). Title VII disparate-treatment claims, like Aguilera's, "require the plaintiff to

prove that the employer acted with conscious intent to discriminate." McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805-06 (1973). The plaintiff can show discriminatory intent

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1

 The Court has serious doubts about whether Aguilera's evidence even meets the

"minimal" standard necessary to establish the prima-facie case under Title VII. Wallis v. J.R.

Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). But since Aguilera uses the same evidence

to show pretext that he uses to establish the prima-facie case, the Court will simply assume

the evidence meets the "minimal" standard and will proceed to analyze the evidence under

the more demanding pretextual standard.

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by proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas framework or by presenting other sufficient

evidence of intent. Costa, 299 F.3d 855. In this case, Aguilera proceeds under the burdenshifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas.

Under McDonnell Douglas, 

the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff

succeeds in doing so, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory conduct.

If the defendant provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff

to show that the employer's reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2004). Assuming for the sake

of argument that Aguilera has established a prima-facie case of national-origin

discrimination,1

 Golden Eagle has clearly articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for Aguilera's termination: dishonesty and suspicion of theft. Aguilera concedes as much

[Plaintiff's Response at 14]. The burden, then, is on Aguilera to present evidence sufficient

to show that Golden Eagle's proffered reasons for the termination are a pretext for

discrimination.

"A plaintiff can show pretext directly, by showing that discrimination more likely

motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the employer's explanation is

unworthy of credence." Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. Direct evidence of discriminatory motive

creates a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer even if the evidence is not

substantial. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998). "To show

pretext using circumstantial evidence," on the other hand, "a plaintiff must put forward

specific and substantial evidence challenging the credibility of the employer's motives."

Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641.

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2

 Whether Klein actually made the termination decision is a matter in dispute. Golden

Eagle claims that Cyndy Valdez, its Hispanic vice president and general counsel, made the

termination decision without any recommendation from Klein. For the purposes of this

order, the Court will assume that Klein was the decisionmaker.

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Aguilera contends that a certain statement made by Klein, the person Aguilera alleges

made the decision to terminate him,2

 is direct evidence of discrimination. Specifically,

Aguilera alleges that on several occasions Klein told him, "I think it's time for you to start

looking for another job" [Defendant's Statement of Facts ("DSOF"), Ex. 1 at 100]. This

statement, however, is not the kind of remark that qualifies as direct evidence of

discrimination. Cf. Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000)

(holding that the statement "two chinks . . . were more than enough" is direct evidence of

discrimination); Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997)

(holding that the statement "dumb Mexican" is direct evidence of discrimination). "Direct

evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without

inference or presumption." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(alteration in original). Klein's statement is only discriminatory if one presumes that Klein

thought Aguilera should look for another job because he is a Mexican-American. It is,

therefore, not direct evidence of discrimination. To the extent the statement qualifies as

circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the Court finds that it is insufficient to establish

pretext.

Turning to Aguilera's circumstantial evidence (which must be specific and

substantial), the Court finds that it likewise fails to demonstrate that the proffered reasons for

his termination were pretextual. Aguilera's main contention is that Golden Eagle treated two

similarly situated Caucasian employees more favorably than him by giving them a second

chance instead of immediately terminating their employment. Although such evidence would

certainly support an inference of discrimination, the employees Aguilera refers to are not

"similarly situated." To be similarly situated, an employee must have the same supervisor,

be subject to the same standards, and have engaged in the same conduct. Hollins v. Atlantic

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3

 The other conduct Aguilera offers for comparison involve off-the-clock activities

that resulted in charges of driving under the influence and drug possession. Although

serious, such conduct is fundamentally different than on-the-clock conduct involving

dishonesty and suspicion of theft.

4

 The breakage table is the designated area where broken packages or beers are set

aside for returns or re-usage.

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Co., 188 F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 1999) (cited with approval by Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642

n.17). Only one of the Caucasian employees Aguilera points to engaged in conduct

involving suspicion of theft, and that instance differs substantially from the circumstances

that gave rise to Aguilera's termination.3

 Danny Hill, a former warehouseman at the

Holbrook facility, was caught drinking a couple of damaged beers from the "breakage table"4

after business hours. However, this incident occurred several years before Klein became the

Holbrook branch manager. It was Klein's predecessor who chose to discipline Hill instead

of firing him. Furthermore, it cannot seriously be contended that Hill engaged in conduct of

"comparable seriousness" to that of Aguilera. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. Unlike the two to

three damaged beers that Hill took, Aguilera unloaded twenty-five to thirty cases of

undamaged Budweiser beer — the brand of beer that Golden Eagle distributes — from his

delivery truck to a private vehicle parked behind a noncustomer's place of business, and then

lied when he was confronted about the incident.

Aguilera also contends that Klein's support for English-only initiatives and for efforts

to secure the U.S. borders, as well as his dislike for his daughter's Hispanic boyfriend,

demonstrate that Klein harbors a discriminatory animus toward Mexican-Americans. To the

extent that Klein's political views would even be admissible, Aguilera has presented no

evidence that Klein's position on these issues is animated by a dislike for MexicanAmericans. On the contrary, Klein's undisputed testimony is that he wants to secure all U.S.

borders, not just the country's border with Mexico [Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, Ex. F at 3].

As for his daughter's boyfriend, Klein's undisputed deposition testimony reveals that his

dislike for his daughter's boyfriend stems from the fact that the boyfriend has fathered three

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5

 In addition to completing the transfer of beer behind a noncustomer's place of

business and lying when he was confronted about the incident, two other undisputed facts

stand out: (1) Aguilera had sought and received permission to haul every other personal item

he had ever hauled in the delivery truck [DSOF, Ex. 1 at 68]; and (2) when Klein asked him

where he got the beer, Aguilera responded, "I don't know" [DSOF, Ex. 1 at 80].

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children with Klein's daughter out of wedlock yet still has not married her [DSOF, Ex. 4 at

84].

Lastly, Aguilera argues that Golden Eagle's explanation of the firing lacks credibility

because Aguilera did not in fact steal any beer from Golden Eagle or its customers.

However, whether Aguilera actually stole from Golden Eagle or its customers is not

dispositive. Instead, the issue is whether Golden Eagle "'honestly believed its reason[s] for

its actions, even if its reason[s are] foolish or trivial or even baseless.'" Villiarimo v. Aloha

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the circumstances presented in

this case, a reasonable jury would be compelled to conclude that Golden Eagle honestly

suspected Aguilera of stealing.5

In short, Aguilera has failed to present any direct or "substantial" circumstantial

evidence that casts doubt on the credibility of Golden Eagle's motives. Whatever little value

Aguilera's circumstantial evidence may have is diminished when the Court considers, among

other things, that Klein personally hired one of Aguilera's own sons (and at least one other

Hispanic) [DSOF, Ex. 4 at 83, 84-85], Aguilera's brother was Klein's second-in-command

[DSOF, Ex. 1 at 34; Ex. 4 at 80], and Aguilera worked for the company for twenty-seven

years prior to his termination without incident [PSOF ¶ 4].

IV. Conclusion

Because Aguilera has failed to present sufficient evidence for a jury to find that

Golden Eagle intentionally discriminated,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 29) is

granted, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. # 48) is

denied as moot.

DATED this 4th day of October, 2007.

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