Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03244/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court or Appeals Tenth Cireult 

OCT 1 21995 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER 

C!erk TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN K. BALL, JAMES A. BURKHARD and 

ROBERT F. STRADER, II, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly 

situated, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

and 

JOAN M. ADDISON, NEIL A. BALTAZOR, 

ERIC S. BATES, DENNIS M. CORK, 

MARICLAIRE E. KRAFT, GARY LEE KRAGH, 

MARTIN L. LEWIS, JAMES P. LYALL, 

EDWARDO MARTINEZ, ERNEST J. MAZZA, 

CRAIG A. MELLECKER, GARY S. NELSON, 

SUSAN D. PICKLE, GLEN W. RAKES, 

GAYLON L. ROSE, FRANKIE G. SANCHEZ, 

STEVEN F. SCHWIERING, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE CITY OF DODGE CITY, KANSAS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 94-3244 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 91-CV-1493) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Ray E. Simmons, Derby, Kansas, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Edward L. Keeley, Rupe & Girard Law Offices, Wichita, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 94-3244 Document: 01019280249 Date Filed: 10/12/1995 Page: 1 
Before TACHA, LOGAN, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs-appellants, all current or former police officers 

of defendant Dodge City, appeall from a partial summary judgment 

rejecting their claim for unpaid wages allegedly due under the 

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.2 The claim 

was directed at City Resolution 85-24, adopted in December 1985 to 

establish a pay schedule for police officers in anticipation of 

the FLSA's application to state and local governments commencing 

April 15, 1986. See generally Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 

1145, 1149-50 (lOth Cir. 1992) (summarizing legislative and 

judicial history culminating in extension of FLSA to state and 

local governments), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1414 (1993). By 

placing City police officers on a regular pay schedule of 170 

hours per four-week period, Resolution 85-24 takes advantage of 

the Act's exemption of law enforcement personnel from the 

prescribed forty-hour workweek, see Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1150 

(discussing 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) and 29 C.F.R. § 553.230). But that 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34{a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 This interlocutory order became final and appealable after 

plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their remaining claims and the 

district court denied their motion to alter or amend judgment 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-3244 Document: 01019280249 Date Filed: 10/12/1995 Page: 2 
is not the focus of plaintiffs' claim. Rather, they contend the 

Resolution also constitutes an illegal attempt to circumvent 

required meal and meeting time pay3 (one-half hour at regular wage 

per shift, or ten hours per pay period) by simply extending the 

workday by one-half hour without compensation. On cross-motions 

for summary judgment and essentially undisputed facts, the 

district court ruled for the City, holding that Resolution 85-24 

was a valid implementation of FLSA compensation options and, in 

any event, was passed at a time when the Act did not yet apply to 

the City. See Ball v. City of Dodge City, 842 F. Supp. 473 

(D. Kan. 1994), reconsideration denied, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8849 

(June 22, 1994). We affirm by relying on the district court's 

alternative theory that the City passed Resolution 85-24 at a time 

when the Act did not yet apply to the City and, therefore, the 

City's passage of the resolution was not a violation of the Act. 

We review summary judgment determinations de novo, applying 

the same standard used by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 997-98 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). Thus, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment 

"if 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" 

Hagelin for President Comm. v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956, 959 (lOth Cir. 

1994) (quoting Rule 56(c)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995). 

Further, we need not agree with all of the district court's 

reasoning, but may affirm on any proper legal ground. 

3 The parties stipulated that in-shift meal periods and 

pre-shift squad meetings were "hours worked" under the FLSA. See 

Appendix (App.) Vol. I at 50. 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-3244 Document: 01019280249 Date Filed: 10/12/1995 Page: 3 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. FSLIC, 25 F.3d 1493, 1503 (lOth Cir. 

1994) . 

The district court expressly relied on our opinion in Lamon 

to reject plaintiffs' FLSA claim: "Contrary to plaintiffs' 

argument, the City's adoption of a§ 207(k) plan is not a sham. 

Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1152. Even if the effect of the City's 

adoption of a § 207(k) plan is to reduce the amount of 

compensation plaintiffs would have received [otherwise] , the FLSA 

is not violated. Id." Ball, 842 F. Supp. at 475. While this 

reference to Lamon is correct as far as it goes, it omits an 

important distinction which is pertinent here. 

Although "there is nothing improper about a state or 

local-government employer adopting the subsection (k) framework in 

order to take advantage of that subsection's provisions," Lamon, 

972 F.2d at 1152 (emphasis added), "an employer may not impose 

sham changes in its employment scheduling and compensation 

policies so as to evade the Act," id. (emphasis added). As we 

have already noted, plaintiffs do not object that the City 

(properly) exploited the employer-favorable overtime provisions in 

§ 207(k); they complain, rather, that the City concomitantly 

lengthened the regular workshift with no incremental increase in 

pay so as to nullify the FLSA's employee-favorable meal and 

meeting time pay requirements. In Lamon, this court adopted the 

view that such strategic, uncompensated extensions of the work day 

"weigh[] in favor of finding [a pay schedule] change not to be 

bona fide." Id. at 1152-53 nn.9, 10. We need not remand this 

matter for consideration of additional factors in evaluating the 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-3244 Document: 01019280249 Date Filed: 10/12/1995 Page: 4 
City's conduct, however, as the district court's alternative 

rationale provides a sound legal basis for disposition of this 

case. 

A number of courts have held that a government employer's 

allegedly FSLA-defeating wage adjustment, resulting, as here, in a 

pay system that is itself in compliance with the Act,4 cannot 

constitute a violation of § 207 if the change was effected before 

April 15, 1986, i.e., at a time when that provision did not govern 

the employer's pay practices.5 See. e.g., York v. City of Wichita 

Falls, 48 F.3d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1995); Anderson v. City of 

Bristol, 6 F.3d 1168, 1173-74 (6th Cir. 1993); Wethington v. City 

of Montgomery, 935 F.2d 222, 225-30 (11th Cir. 1991). The 

following passage from the seminal Wethington case fully explains 

the rationale underlying this body of case law: 

This case . . . does not present an issue of 

whether the Act barred the [allegedly sham] calculation 

of the regular rate [of pay], because here Congress 

delayed application of the Act until April 16, 1986, ten 

months after the calculation took place .... Because 

4 We note that, notwithstanding the insidious motive plaintiffs 

espy in the surrounding circumstances, there is nothing improper 

in the fact that the City continues to pay its police officers an 

overtime wage higher than the FLSA formula would require, based on 

their regular (170-hour) pay. See Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1154. 

5 We consider only whether plaintiffs have substantiated a 

claim under § 207. Plaintiffs specifically disavowed "any claim 

that defendant violated . . . Section 8 of the FLSA Amendments of 

1985," App. Vol. I at 51, which, unlike§ 207, expressly applies 

to one category of wrongful conduct (retaliatory discrimination) 

engaged in by government employers before April 15, 1986, see 

29 U.S.C. § 215 note (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 8, 99 Stat. 

791, for prohibition on "discriminat[ion] against an employee with 

respect to the employee's wages or other terms or conditions of 

employment because on or after February 19, 1985, the employee 

asserted [FLSA rights]"). Compare Anderson, 6 F.3d at 1170-73 

(discussing § 8 liability) with id. at 1173-74 (discussing § 207 

liability) . 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-3244 Document: 01019280249 Date Filed: 10/12/1995 Page: 5 
the calculation occurred prior to the Act's effective 

date, [plaintiffs] cannot argue the Act governs those 

calculations. 

[Plaintiffs] also argue that even if the 

calculations made by the City were not invalid because 

the Act was not yet in effect, ... the resulting 

system implemented based on the calculations became 

invalid as soon as it was covered by the Act. Although 

[plaintiffs] cite cases in which creative calculations 

. . . were invalidated, even if the resulting system 

appeared to comply with the FLSA, all of these cases 

. . . involved calculations of the regular rate 

occurring after the application of the Act. Neither the 

Supreme Court nor our circuit has held that calculations 

occurring prior to the Act tainted the otherwise valid 

system employed under the Act. Rather, the Supreme 

Court has found that the calculations themselves, and 

not the systems produced from the calculations, were the 

source of the violation of the FLSA. That is, if [sham] 

calculations occur after the Act, ... the 

calculations, as opposed to the [resulting] system, 

violate the Act. In this case, however, the 

calculations simply were not covered by the Act in June 

1985. We can find no authority for finding an otherwise 

valid system invalid because it was based on 

calculations made prior to the Act. 

Wethington, 935 F.2d at 228 (footnotes and citations omitted). We 

join our sister circuits in embracing this common-sense view. 

Plaintiffs argue that the City violates their FLSA rights 

anew with each paycheck. See Brief of Appellants at 46-49. Under 

the analysis adopted herein, such a "continuing violation" theory 

is plainly inapposite: 

For there to be a continuing violation, there must be at 

least a violation. The plaintiffs' argument assumes 

that the City's calculation of the regular hourly rate, 

which was lawful in ... 1985, somehow became unlawful 

after April 15, 1986 .... We cannot use a continuing 

violation theory to make a discrete lawful act unlawful 

upon a change in the applicable law. 

York, 48 F.3d at 922-23. Accordingly, we hold that the City did 

not violate § 207 when it extended plaintiffs' regular workshift 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-3244 Document: 01019280249 Date Filed: 10/12/1995 Page: 6 
by one-half hour in anticipation of the impending application of 

the FLSA. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-3244 Document: 01019280249 Date Filed: 10/12/1995 Page: 7