Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02308/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02308-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 23, 2016*

Decided June 24, 2016

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐2308

ANTHONY MCFARLAND,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

TRICAM INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 4576

Susan E. Cox,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Anthony McFarland appeals a judgment following a jury verdict for Tricam

Industries, Inc., in his diversity action asserting product‐liability claims. McFarland had

been using a stepladder manufactured by Tricam that became unhinged and collapsed

beneath him, causing severe injuries to his face and neck. We affirm.   

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐2308    Page 2

One issue that arose before trial was whether McFarland intended to pursue a

design or manufacturing‐defect theory of liability with regard to the collapsed ladder.

He eventually abandoned his manufacturing‐defect theory in favor of one asserting

defective design. In its final pretrial order, the district court characterized his position:

“[T]he [ladder] is defective in design[,] and the defect in design rendered the [ladder]

unreasonably dangerous and caused his injury.” And at the final pretrial conference,

the court confirmed that the case presented “a design defect allegation, but not of

manufacture.”

During opening statements, however, McFarland’s lawyer referred not only to

the ladder’s defective design but also its defective manufacture. Tricam at the time did

not raise any objection, but after the jury had recessed for the day, Tricam objected to

the opening statement and argued that McFarland’s expert should not be allowed to

testify about any potential manufacturing problems. The judge agreed and ruled that

McFarland could proceed only on the design‐defect theory that was included in the

final pretrial order.   

McFarland’s expert later took the stand and testified about possible ways that the

stepladder’s spreader mechanism came disengaged. When the expert appeared to wade

into a discussion about a manufacturing defect, Tricam immediately objected. The judge

sustained the objection and told the jury that “[t]he issue of a manufacturing defect ... is

not before you.”

The jury found in Tricam’s favor, and McFarland moved for a new trial on

grounds that (1) the judge had improperly excluded the expert’s testimony regarding

potential manufacturing defects; and (2) Tricam’s lawyers undermined the fairness of

the trial through “obstructive, unprofessional, and unethical conduct.” The district

court denied the motion, explaining that McFarland had abandoned his manufacturing‐ 

defect theory by failing to include it in the final pretrial order and that he had not been

prejudiced by any alleged misconduct on the part of Tricam’s lawyers.   

On appeal McFarland, now proceeding pro se, recycles his lawyer’s argument

before the district court that he should have been permitted to pursue a manufacturing‐ 

defect theory at trial. But as the court explained, pretrial orders supersede the pleadings

and narrow the issues for trial. See DeliverMed Holdings, LLC v. Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d

616, 628 (7th Cir. 2013); Gorlikowski v. Tolbert, 52 F.3d 1439, 1443–44 (7th Cir. 1995). The

district court was not obliged to permit McFarland to pursue a claim he had abandoned

because doing so “would undermine the vital function that pretrial conferences and

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No. 15‐2308    Page 3

orders serve in conserving judicial resources.” See DeliverMed Holdings, 734 F.3d at 628–

29.   

McFarland also continues to press his complaints about the conduct of Tricam’s

lawyers. He invokes an episode from his cross‐examination when one of Tricam’s

attorneys asked whether he had made “a claim for neck injuries” as a result of two prior

car accidents. McFarland’s attorney promptly objected, and the judge sustained the

objection, warning Tricam’s lawyer not to discuss any of McFarland’s prior litigation.   

But we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying

McFarland’s motion for a new trial. As the court noted, counsel’s fleeting reference to

an unspecified “claim for neck injuries” was fairly benign, and the court shut down the

impermissible line of questioning before it could do any harm. See United States v. Olson,

978 F.2d 1472 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding no prejudice where district court sustained

objection to impermissible testimony before witness could answer question); United

States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 292 (7th Cir. 1979) (same). We have considered the rest

of McFarland’s contentions and none has merit.    

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED, and Tricam’s motion for sanctions is

DENIED.

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