Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02191/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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-1- 09cv2191 IEG (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELIJAH PASCHELKE,

BOP #05698298

Civil No. 09cv2191 IEG (CAB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING

$350.00 BALANCE FROM

PRISONER TRUST ACCOUNT

[Doc. No. 2]; 

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

FOR FAILING TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

JOHN DOE, San Diego County Sheriff;

SAN DIEGO COUNTY; CENTRAL

DETENTION FACILITY; MEDICAL

STAFF SUPERVISOR,

Defendants.

Elijah Paschelke (“Plaintiff”), a federal inmate currently incarcerated at Federal

Correctional Institution located in Adelanto, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims his constitutional rights were

violated when he was housed in the San Diego Central Jail in 2007. Plaintiff has not prepaid the

$350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

/ / /

Case 3:09-cv-02191-IEG-CAB Document 3 Filed 10/28/09 Page 1 of 7
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-2- 09cv2191 IEG (CAB)

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only

if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however,

remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is

ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must

collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the

entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement

shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil

action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no

assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s

IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when

payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc.

Case 3:09-cv-02191-IEG-CAB Document 3 Filed 10/28/09 Page 2 of 7
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No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire

$350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the

Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) AND 1915A

The PLRA’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also obligate the Court to review

complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated

or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,

violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil

action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the Complaint be served by the

U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits,

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Here, however, even

presuming Plaintiff’s allegations true, the Court finds his Complaint fails to state a claim upon

Case 3:09-cv-02191-IEG-CAB Document 3 Filed 10/28/09 Page 3 of 7
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which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at

1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446, n.1.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct he complains

of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that conduct violated a

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries v. County of Los

Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

B. Inadequate medical care claims

In his Complaint, it is unclear whether Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee or whether he was

serving a sentence following a criminal conviction when he was housed in the Central Jail in

2007. The Ninth Circuit has noted that while different Constitutional provisions may be applied

dependent on whether a plaintiff’s claim arise before or after conviction, a “pretrial detainees’

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth

Amendment,” and therefore, “the same standards apply.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128

(9th Cir. 1998); but cf. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 n.10 (9th Cir. 2002)

(noting that while the Court generally looks to Eighth Amendment cases when reviewing

conditions of confinement claims raised by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment,

“[i]t is quite possible ... that the protections provided pretrial detainees by the Fourteenth

Amendment in some instances exceed those provided convicted prisoners by the Eighth

Amendment.”); see also Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 419 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 n.10). 

In order to assert a claim for inadequate medical care, Plaintiff must allege facts which

are sufficient to show that each person sued was “deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976). Prison officials must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to Plaintiff’s pain or medical

needs; neither an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, nor mere negligence or

medical malpractice constitutes a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. In

addition, a mere difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel

Case 3:09-cv-02191-IEG-CAB Document 3 Filed 10/28/09 Page 4 of 7
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regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate

indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

Thus, to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show both: (1) an

objectively “serious” medical need, i.e., one that a reasonable doctor would think worthy of

comment, one which significantly affects his daily activities, or one which is chronic and

accompanied by substantial pain, see Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994);

and (2) a subjective, and “sufficiently culpable” state of mind on the part of each individual

Defendant. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). 

While Plaintiff alleges facts indicating that a Sheriff’s Deputy refused to allow him to

keep his cane which resulted in a fall that “fractured his neck and compounded his back injury,”

Plaintiff does not identify this individual by name or any other description. (Compl. at 3.) In

addition, while Plaintiff may have stated a claim against this unidentified individual, he fails to

name this person as a Defendant. Instead, Plaintiff names the Sheriff for San Diego County and

the Medical Supervisor as Defendants. Neither of these Defendants are alleged to have direct

knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical condition nor are they alleged to have been involved in the

decision to remove Plaintiff’s cane. Thus, Plaintiff cannot show that either the Medical

Supervisor or the Sheriff for the County of San Diego had a “sufficiently culpable” state of mind

to state a “deliberate indifference” claim. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302. 

C. Municipal Liability Claims

Additionally, Plaintiff has named the County of San Diego, Central Detention Facility as

a Defendant in this matter. An agency or department of a municipal entity is not a proper

defendant under § 1983. Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal.

1996). Rather, the county or city itself is the proper defendant. See Id. “[A] municipality

cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the constitutional deprivation was caused by

the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

Case 3:09-cv-02191-IEG-CAB Document 3 Filed 10/28/09 Page 5 of 7
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officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of

the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997); Navarro v.

Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

To establish municipal liability, plaintiff must show: (1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right; (2) the city had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference

to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind the

constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); see

Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Trevino v.

Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to state a § 1983 claim against San

Diego County, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that his injury was caused by individual

officers whose conduct conformed to an official city policy, custom or practice. See KarimPanahi, 839 F.2d at 624. 

Therefore, even were the Court to liberally construe the Complaint as attempting to state

a claim against San Diego County, Plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim because he has failed

to allege that any individual police officer’s conduct conformed to an official city policy, custom

or practice. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which

section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)(1).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is GRANTED.

(2) The Warden, or his designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust

account the $350 balance of the filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments

from the trust account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s

income credited to the account and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the

amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

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(3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Warden, FCI

Victorville Medium I, Federal Correctional Institution, P.O. Box. 5400, Adelanto, California

92301.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(4) Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b).

However, Plaintiff is further GRANTED sixty (60) days leave from the date this Order is filed

in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his

previous pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, Plaintiff is cautioned that should he elect not to amend, or if his Amended

Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the dismissal of this

action may hereafter be counted as a “strike” against him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996).

DATED: October 28, 2009

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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