Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00197/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00197-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENISE SCHMIDT,

Plaintiff,

v

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY et al,

Defendants. /

No C-05-0197 VRW

ORDER

In response to the court’s order dated January 26, 2006

(Doc #34), plaintiff Denise Schmidt (“plaintiff”)filed her second

amended complaint (“SAC”) against defendants Ken Torre, Thomas

Maddock and Laurel Brady. Doc #41. The SAC listed two causes of

action: (1) violations of 42 USC section 1983 and (2) violations

of rights secured by the California Constitution. Doc #41 at 10-

13. The defendants once again move to dismiss. For the reasons

set forth herein, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss

with prejudice. 

I

Plaintiff initially filed suit against Contra Costa

County (“the county”); four Contra Costa superior court judges,

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namely Brady, Maddock, Lois Haight and Barry Baskin; and Torre, the

chief executive officer of the Contra Costa superior court. First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) Doc #14. The FAC alleged that the

county, the judicial defendants and Torre terminated plaintiff’s

employment as acting court commissioner (FAC ¶15) in violation of

the United States Constitution, the California Constitution and

California public policy. 

The gravamen of plaintiff’s FAC was that defendants

adopted a new “personnel rule” requiring all subordinate judicial

officers to hold active bar status (the “new personnel policy”) and

then relied on this policy to terminate plaintiff, who was on

inactive status. FAC ¶21. A subordinate temporary judicial

officer at the time, plaintiff sought to avoid termination by

reactivating her bar status but was informed that the new personnel

policy was “retroactive,” so that returning to active status would

not enable her to remain employed. Doc #34 at 3. Plaintiff

alleged that the new personnel policy was enacted as “a result of

her candidacy for a position as Superior Court Judge in the March

2004 election and the fear that she would run in a future

election.” FAC ¶15. 

On January 26, 2006, the court dismissed with prejudice: 

(1) all claims against the county; (2) all claims against the

judicial defendants that were predicated on the judicial

defendants’ role in promulgating the new personnel policy; and (3)

the claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy

against Torre and Maddock in their official capacities. Doc #34 at

20. Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Torre and Maddock in

their official capacities were dismissed without prejudice. Id.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On April 12, 2006, plaintiff filed her SAC, naming as

defendants: Torre, in both his individual capacity and official

capacity as chief executive officer of the Contra Costa superior

court; Maddock, in both his individual capacity and official

capacity as presiding judge of the Contra Costa superior court; and

Brady, in her individual capacity. Doc #41. The SAC alleges (1)

“violations of 42 USC § 1983” and (2) violations of rights secured

by the California Constitution. Doc #41 at 10-13.

Defendants move to dismiss the SAC to the “extent that it

is inconsistent with the January 26 order,” or in the alternative,

to strike certain allegations from the SAC to the “extent that it

is inconsistent with * * * the January 26 Order.” Doc #42 at 2. 

Defendants do not seek to dismiss plaintiff’s claims that

application of the personnel policy to her was unfair or

retaliatory. Id. Although the court does not find defendants’

arguments for dismissal of the SAC persuasive, it grants the motion

to dismiss because plaintiff failed to plead adequately that

defendants violated her federal Constitutional rights or her state

constitutional rights.

II

Defendants Torre, Maddock and Brady seek to dismiss the

SAC to the extent that the SAC seeks relief based on defendants’

enactment and/or promulgation of the personnel policy at issue. 

Id. Defendants also seek to dismiss plaintiff’s claims that

defendants’ discretionary act of applying the personnel policy to

her violated plaintiff’s state constitutional rights. Doc #42 at

2. The court’s January 26 order distinguished two types of

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relevant claims. The first type are claims “predicated on [Maddock

and Brady’s] involvement in promulgating the new personnel policy.”

Doc #34 at 17 (emphasis added). The second type, as defendants

have correctly understood, are claims “that application of this

personnel policy to [plaintiff] was unfair or retaliatory.” Doc

#42 at 2 (emphasis added). Plaintiff may not re-plead claims of

the first type, but has leave to amend claims of the second type.

The arguments on these motions devote considerable space

to semantics, in large part due to plaintiff’s widespread use of

the word “policy” throughout her SAC. Defendants argue that

“policy” refers to the new personnel policy and raises first-type

claims. Plaintiff counters that, for the purposes of her SAC,

“policy” refers to “defendants’ policy of retroactive application

and enforcement of the new personnel rule to fire plaintiff” (Doc

#45 at 14) and permissible second-type claims. 

The confusion may be further attributed to plaintiff’s

erroneous belief that “for 42 USC § 1983 liability to obtain,

plaintiff must allege and prove that the relevant practice is

widespread enough to have the force of law.” Id (citing Davis v

City of New York, 228 F Supp 2d 327 (SD NY 2002)). But Davis holds

only that “in order for an individual deprived of a constitutional

right to have recourse against a municipality under section 1983,

she must show that she was harmed by a municipal ‘policy’ or

‘custom.’” Id at 336 (emphasis added)(citing Monell v New York

City Dept of Social Svcs, 436 US 658, 690-91 (1978)). Because the

county is no longer a party, plaintiff’s extraordinary attempts to

characterize the retroactive application of the new personnel

policy as itself a “policy” serves no useful purpose. 

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In determining whether a complaint states a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all material allegations in the complaint are taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 

See In re Silicon Graphics Inc Securities Litigation, 183 F3d 970,

980 n10 (9th Cir 1999). The court agrees that defendant’s motion,

in pertinent part, is “flawed by * * * a willful misreading of the

[SAC].” Doc #45 at 13. Paragraph 11 of the SAC clearly states

that “the SAC does not posit liability on the promulgation of the

policy, but rather on the policy’s use to fire Schmidt.” Moreover,

under the 12(b)(6) standard, the court must accept plaintiff’s

reasonable reading of her SAC. Accordingly, plaintiff may raise

claims that do not address the promulgation of the new personnel

policy.

In its January 26 order, the court characterized the

promulgation of the new personnel policy as legislative and

therefore entitled to immunity. The court, however, did not reach

whether the decision to apply the new personnel policy

retroactively was legislative and likewise immune. If this

decision, as plaintiff contends, was “ad hoc” and “applie[d] only

to a few individuals,” then it was not legislative in nature. San

Pedro Hotel Co, Inc v City of Los Angeles, 159 F3d 471, 476 (9th

Cir 1998). 

Plaintiff claims that application of the personnel policy

to her was unfair or retaliatory and in violation of state

constitutional rights. Defendants urge the court to dismiss

plaintiff’s state constitutional claims, arguing that the

California Tort Claims Act (Cal Gov’t Code § 820.2) immunizes

public employees from suit, even for constitutional violations. 

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Doc #42 at 3. Defendants cite Yee v Mobilehome Park Rental Review

Bd, 62 Cal App 4th 1409 (1998), for the proposition that a city is

immune, even from federal and state constitutional claims. (Doc

#46 at 2) Defendants’ argument proves too much. Although the Yee

court upheld “the trial court's determination that damages could

not be recovered under state statutes because the Board was

immune,” id at 1427 (emphasis added), the court rejected the Yees’

federal constitutional claims on their merits and thus never

addressed the applicability of section 820.2 to such claims. Id.

To the contrary, California jurisprudence indicates that

claims “based upon the [California] Constitution * * * [are] not

subject to the immunities set forth within Government Code section

820.2.” Odello Bros v County of Monterey, 63 Cal App 4th 778, 793

(1998). Moreover, while the California Supreme Court has

apparently not spoken directly on the issue, its decisions are

nonetheless consistent with the aforementioned conclusion. 

For example, in Customer Co v City of Sacramento, 10 Cal

4th 368, 392-93 (1995), plaintiff brought common law negligence and

inverse condemnation claims under Article I, section 19 of the

California Constitution. While plaintiffs did not appeal the lower

court’s decision holding defendant immune from the negligence claim

under section 820.2, the California Supreme Court nonetheless drew

a distinction between liability for violating the California

Constitution and “the government's potential liability for

[negligence],” which “should be evaluated, as it always has been in

the past, under the provisions of the Tort Claims Act.” Customer

Co, 10 Cal 4th at 391. Accordingly, there is no governmental

immunity when the right violated is a constitutional right.

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In order for her claims to go forward, plaintiff still

faces the challenge of pleading an actionable violation of her

state constitutional rights. See part II B, infra. Furthermore,

as discussed in the next section, plaintiff must plead a violation

of a constitutionally protected federal right in order for her

section 1983 claim to go forward. 

A

The court will now turn to plaintiff’s section 1983

claims alleging violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights, her Fifth Amendment due process rights and her claim of an

unlawful bill of attainder before returning to plaintiff’s state

constitutional claim. Even though defendant’s motion does not

adequately address plaintiff’s section 1983 claims, the court sua

sponte dismisses these claims. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated section 1983 by

“conspiring to fire and firing plaintiff in retaliation for her

protected free speech and political activities.” Doc #41 at 10. 

This allegation fails adequately to plead a section 1983 conspiracy

or retaliation claim.

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state

a claim for relief unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that

would entitle her to relief. Conley v Gibson, 355 US 41, 45-6

(1957). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded facts

in a complaint are accepted as true. Klug v Chicago School Reform

Board of Trustees, 197 F3d 853, 858 (7th Cir 1999)(public

employee’s complaint asserting free speech retaliation claim found

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defective because it failed to set forth the speech claimed to be

protected). 

A conspiracy is not itself actionable under section 1983. 

Rendon v City of Fresno, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 31623 (E D Cal 2005). 

Rather, plaintiff must demonstrate a conspiracy to violate her

constitutionally protected rights. Id. Conspiracy claims, in any

event, are subject to a heightened pleading standard in the Ninth

Circuit. See Harris v Roderick, 126 F3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir 1997). 

Myers v Dean, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 10770 (S D Ohio 2006), a

recent decision by a district court in Ohio, is instructive and

bears many similarities to the instant matter. Plaintiff

challenged her employer by running for an elected office. She

brought suit, alleging that her employment was later terminated in

violation of her rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. 

In Myers, as here, plaintiff argued that candidacy for office

should be protected speech under the First Amendment. Id. The

court granted summary judgment and plaintiff, holding had “no

constitutional right to run against her employer and retain her

employment.” In doing so, the court commented that “whether the

decision to terminate plaintiff was bad public policy or otherwise

noxious is not a question for this court to decide.” Id. The

Myers court also granted summary judgment against Myers’s

Fourteenth Amendment claim because she did not have any protected

interest in her continued employment as a deputy clerk. Myers,

2006 US Dist LEXIS 10770.

When government employees speak as citizens on issues of

public interest, the First Amendment shields them from any

retaliation by their employer. Pickering v Board of Education, 391

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US 563, 567 (1968). The elements of such a section 1983

retaliation claim are: (1) plaintiff suffered an adverse

employment action; (2) the speech involved a matter of public

concern; (3) the employee’s interest in commenting on matters of

public concern outweighed the government employer’s interest in

promoting efficiency; and (4) the employee’s speech motivated the

adverse employment action. Johnson v Louisiana, 369 F 3d 826, 830

(5th Cir 2004). 

Whether the employee’s speech was of public concern

presents an issue of law. Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 148 n7

(1983). This determination is made in light of “the content, form

and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” 

id at 147-48. If the plaintiff’s speech does not address a matter

of public concern, no further inquiry is necessary. Rankin v

McPherson, 483 US 378, 384 (1987). In Klug, the Seventh Circuit

affirmed defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amendment

claim because the court was “struck by the lack of articulation

regarding what the matters of public concern were * * *.” 197 F3d

at 858 (public employee’s complaint asserting free speech

retaliation claim found defective because it failed to set forth

the speech claimed to be protected). 

 Turning to the specifics of the SAC, plaintiff alleges

that defendants violated First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

applying the new personnel policy retroactively in order to

retaliate against her for running for a judgeship. Plaintiff

satisfies the first element because termination is an adverse

employment action. She cannot, however, adequately plead the other

elements.

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Plaintiff has not alleged that she engaged in activity

that related to matters of public concern. The associational

rights of political parties are fundamental rights, but the right

to candidacy is not. Bullock v Carter, 405 US 134, 142-43 (1972). 

The United States Supreme Court has never recognized a fundamental

right to express one’s political views through candidacy. Myers,

2006 US Dist LEXIS 10770. Laws that burden in a limited fashion a

person’s rights to participate in politics and to serve as an

elected official have survived review under the First Amendment. 

See Clement v Fashing, 457 US 957 (1982). In Clement, two sections

of the Texas Constitution were challenged for violating the Equal

Protection Clause and the First Amendment. 457 US at 960. The

first section prohibited certain officials from holding a seat in

the Texas legislature prior to expiration of their terms of office

and the second provision, known as the “resign to run” provision,

required an official to resign from the current office before he or

she could run for an elective office other than the one the

official currently held. id at 960. The court held that both

sections were constitutional. id at 972. 

In this case, plaintiff contends that the retroactive

application of the new policy violated her political participation

rights because it was intended as retaliation for her candidacy for

judgeship. The complaint does not allege that plaintiff lost her

position because of her political beliefs. Rather, the complaint

alleges that plaintiff was terminated because of her decision to

run for elected office. Plaintiff alleged that the public concern

here is the political accountability of the election process. Doc

#45 at 7. Yet here, the rule itself is facially and wholly

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unrelated to the candidacy for public office, in contrast to the

two provisions in Clement. The policy here does no more than

require subordinate judicial officers to hold active state bar

status. Doc #34 at 3. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, it does

not stop anyone from running for any office nor does it prohibit a

broad range of political activities. 

Plaintiff’s argument that the requirement of active bar

status conflicts with a judge’s ethical responsibility not to

engage in the private practice of law also misses the mark. 

Defendants correctly note that “the policy’s requirement of active

Bar status does not equate to a requirement that Plaintiff, or any

other individual, also engage in private practice.” Doc #46 at 4. 

Id at 5. Active state bar members are eligible to practice law,

but active law practice is not a requirement for active bar status. 

State Bar of California Membership Rules, passim. Morever, whereas

judges are specifically exempt from bar membership (“Every person

admitted and licensed to practice law in this State is and shall be

a member of the State Bar except while holding office as a judge of

a court of record,” Cal Const art VI, § 9), temporary judges must

be “members of the State Bar” (Cal Const art VI, § 21). Temporary

subordinate judicial officer, while not specifically addressed in

the state constitution, are more like the latter than the former. 

Accordingly, plaintiff has pled no issue of public concern about

the political accountability of the election process.

Further, there is no evidence to suggest that plaintiff

was denied equal protection because the new policy was applied

unfairly. Plaintiff does not claim that the policy was applied any

differently to other employees. The complaint does not suggest

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that plaintiff was the only person affected by the new personnel

rule. On the contrary, plaintiff admits that the policy was

applied in an identical fashion to another employee. Doc #41 at 7. 

Plaintiff does not provide any evidence to suggest otherwise that

the policy was applied unevenly or unfairly. Plaintiff’s section

1983 retaliation and conspiracy claims are therefore DISMISSED.

Plaintiff makes a further constitutional argument that

defendants’ actions constitute an unconstitutional “taking of

plaintiff’s property and liberty interests without just

compensation and without due process.” Doc #41 at 11. Because

plaintiff’s SAC is ambiguous, the court assumes that plaintiff

means to contend that the application of the new personnel rule

retroactively constitutes a “taking” of her continued employment.

To establish a protected interest in continued

employment, plaintiff must identify a state statutory or

contractual right that was violated by her termination. See Orloff

v Cleland, 708 F2d 372 (9th Cir 1983). In this case, plaintiff

failed to plead adequately that she has a protected property

interest in continued employment. Plaintiff is a temporary

subordinate judicial officer. Doc #41 at 6-7 (emphasis added). 

Based on the complaint, the fact that plaintiff submitted an

application for a permanent position (id at 6) and because

plaintiff failed to plead a state statutory or contractual right,

the court concludes that plaintiff did not have a protected

property interest in continued employment. 

The court now turns to plaintiff’s final federal

constitutional argument: that the new personnel policy is an

“unlawful bill of attainder targeting plaintiff for punishment by

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governmental action.” Doc #41 at 11. Article I, section 9,

paragraph 3 of the Constitution provides: “No Bill of Attainder or

ex post facto Law will be passed.” A bill of attainder is “a law

that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an

identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a

judicial trial.” Nixon v Administrator of General Services, 433 US

425, 468 (1977). 

In determining whether punishment is inflicted, the court

has three inquiries, one of which is whether the legislative record

evidences an intent to punish. Selective Service System v

Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 US 841, 852 (1984). 

Plaintiff cannot both argue that the decision to apply the policy

retroactively is not legislative and therefore, not entitled to

immunity and also argue it is legislative and therefore, is an

unconstitutional bill of attainder. Furthermore, pursuant to the

January 26 order, plaintiff may not re-litigate any issue

concerning the promulgation of the personnel rule at issue (Doc #34

at 20), including any alleged motivation underlying its

promulgation. Accordingly, the policy applied retroactively is not

an unlawful bill of attainder. 

B

Under 28 USC § 1367(a), supplemental jurisdiction is

proper where the relationship between the federal and state law

claims is such that they form “part of the same case or controversy

under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Plaintiff’s

state constitutional claims involve a “common nucleus of operative

fact” with her federal claims and would be expected to be resolved

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in a single judicial proceeding. United Mine Workers of America v

Gibbs, 383 US 715, 725 (1966). 

Plaintiff claims that defendants violated her rights

secured by the California Constitution, specifically, Article 1,

section 2(a). Article 1, section 2(a) of the California

Constitution states “Every person may freely speak, write and

publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible

for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge

liberty of speech or press.” As discussed supra regarding

plaintiff’s failure adequately to plead a violation of her First

Amendment rights, plaintiff’s state constitutional claim suffers

from the same fatal defects. Plaintiff is unable to plead a state

constitutional violation.

III

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s federal claims under 42 USC § 1983 and plaintiff’s

state constitutional claim with prejudice. 

The clerk is directed to close the file and terminate all

pending motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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