Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01262/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01262-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

 DAVID SERENA, RYAN GOMEZ, 

 CHRIS ROCHA, MANUEL 

 ESCAMILLA, CARMEN ALVAREZ AND 

 ALEJANDRA HERNANDEZ,

NO. CIV. S-06-1262 FCD KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 STEPHEN L. MOCK, Presiding 

 Judge, Superior Court of Yolo 

 County, individually and in 

 his official capacity; THOMAS 

 WARRINER, Judge, Superior 

 Court of Yolo County, 

 individually and in his 

 official capacity; ROBIN 

 WEAVER, Yolo County Jury 

 Commissioner, individually 

 and in her official capacity, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ and

defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule

56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court heard oral 

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1 The facts are undisputed, except where otherwise noted. 

(See Pls.’ Responses to Defs.’ Stmt. of Undisp. Facts (“PUF”),

filed Dec. 04, 2006; Defs.’ Response to Pls.’ Stmt. of Undisp.

Material Facts (“DUF”), filed Dec. 1, 2006).

2

argument on the motions on December 15, 2006. For the reasons

set forth below, defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiffs brought this action, seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief for the alleged underrepresentation of Hispanic

individuals on the Yolo County Grand Jury. (Pls.’ 1st Am. Compl.

(“FAC”), filed June 30, 2006). Plaintiff David Serena is the

former executive director of the Yolo County Housing Authority. 

(PUF ¶ 47). Serena and the housing authority had been the

subject of several grand jury investigations over many years. 

(PUF ¶ 48). Plaintiff Carmen Alvarez is Serena’s wife, plaintiff

Alejandra Hernandez is Alvarez’s daughter, and plaintiff Manuel

Escamilla is engaged to Serena’s daughter. (PUF ¶¶ 49-51). None

of the plaintiffs in this case applied to serve on the Yolo

County Grand Jury. (PUF ¶ 52). Plaintiffs contend that Hispanic

individuals do not receive equal notice of the opportunity to

apply for grand jury service, to participate in the grand jury

selection process, to serve on the grand jury, and to serve as

foreperson on the grand jury. (Id.) 

The Superior Court’s jury commissioner, defendant Robyn

Weaver, coordinates the recruitment process for the Yolo County

Grand Jury. (PUF ¶ 4). Jury recruitment is executed through a

variety of different means. The jury commissioner sends a letter

to 52 different Yolo County community organizations, inviting

their members to apply for the grand jury. (PUF ¶ 5). A

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pamphlet with information about the grand jury and an application

for grand jury service, which can be photocopied and distributed

to the organization’s members, are enclosed with each letter. 

(PUF ¶ 5). The 52 organizations include ethnic community groups

and other organizations with varying political views and

representing different occupations. (PUF ¶¶ 6-7). Each year,

the jury commissioner issues a press release to local newspapers

circulating in Yolo County, announcing that applicants are being

solicited to serve on the Yolo County grand jury. (PUF ¶ 8). 

Following publication of the press release, the jury commissioner

typically received numerous phone calls from members of the

public, requesting that an application for grand jury service be

sent to them. (PUF ¶ 10). No invitations are sent to Spanish

language newspapers or television stations. (DUF ¶ 18).

Information about applying for the grand jury is also posted

in two locations in the Superior Court’s main jury room in the

Woodland courthouse. (PUF ¶ 16). The postings indicate that

anyone interested in serving on the grand jury should contact the

jury commissioner for an application. (PUF ¶ 17). Each year,

the Yolo County Grand Jury issues a final report that includes an

introductory section discussing the purpose of the grand jury,

the qualifications for grand jury service, and information on how

to apply to the grand jury. (PUF ¶ 25). Copies of this report

are available in the Yolo County public libraries. (PUF ¶ 26). 

This report is also published, with the application information,

in local Yolo County newspapers every year. (PUF ¶ 27). The

Superior Court’s website has a webpage dedicated to providing

information on the qualifications for grand jury service and

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information on how to apply; the website also allows a person to

download and print an application. (PUF ¶¶ 28-29). 

The jury commissioner also sends an e-mail to the judges and

commissioners of the Superior Court, asking that they provide the

names of persons whom the judges believe would be interested in

receiving a grand jury application. (PUF ¶ 18). The jury

commissioner sends a letter to each member of the Yolo County

Board of Supervisors, requesting that the supervisor provide the

names of persons whom the supervisor believes would be interested

in receiving a grand jury application. (PUF ¶ 20). The letter

to the supervisors specifically asks that names be submitted with

an eye toward diversity on the grand jury. (PUF ¶ 21). The

individuals identified by the judges, commissioner, and

supervisors are mailed a pamphlet describing the function of the

grand jury and an application to serve on the grand jury. (PUF ¶

22). The jury commissioner also identifies persons with ethnicsounding last names, including Hispanic surnames, who have

recently completed petit jury service and mails them a pamphlet

and application. (PUF ¶ 14). Pamphlets and applications are

also sent to former petit jurors who live in smaller towns and

communities of Yolo County to gain geographic diversity. (Decl.

of Robyn Weaver in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J (“Weaver

Decl.”), filed Nov. 17, 2006, ¶ 7). Over the past decade the

Superior Court has mailed 1,444 grand jury applications to

///

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///

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2 Plaintiffs do not dispute these facts, but assert that

37.3% of the mailing group for this years grand jury were

Hispanic, “thereby skewing the total statistics and attempting to

give cover to a long-term system of under representation.” (PUF

¶ 32). Plaintiffs imply that defendants have manipulated the

number of applications sent to Hispanics in response to the

current lawsuit. Defendants assert that the applications were

primarily mailed in April and May 2006, before plaintiffs filed

their suit in June. (Defs.’ Reply, filed Dec. 8, 2006, at 10). 

However, neither party presents admissible evidence to support

these assertions. 

5

individuals. (PUF ¶ 31). Of these 1,444 potential applicants,

25.1% were persons with Hispanic surnames. (PUF ¶ 32).2

Yolo County grand jurors are selected from the individuals

who apply for grand jury service. (PUF ¶ 33). If a person

submitting an application indicates that he or she meets the

statutory requirements for service and indicates that he or she

has sufficient time necessary to serve on a grand jury, the

applicant is scheduled for an interview with a judge, or

occasionally a commissioner of the Superior Court. (PUF ¶ 34). 

Each judge, or occasionally a commissioner, will typically

interview two to three applicants. (PUF ¶ 35). Defendants

assert that the interviewing judge or commissioner determines

whether the applicant possesses the legal qualifications to serve

as a grand juror; the applicants found legally qualified to serve

are then listed on a public court order indicating that the

individuals listed are candidates for grand jury selection. (PUF

¶¶ 36-37). Plaintiffs contend that not all legally qualified

applicants are listed as candidates. (PUF ¶ 37). Specifically,

plaintiffs assert that potential grand jurors have been

eliminated by judges at this stage of the process for reasons

such as: “a nice man, but fairly shy, a follower, not a leader”;

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“nice lady, well-meaning, but no special expertise”; or simply

perfunctorily rejected with no reason given by the judge on the

interview form. (PUF ¶ 36).

The Yolo County Grand Jury consists of 19 grand jurors and

serves a one year term, generally beginning on July 1 and ending

on June 30 of the following year. (PUF ¶ 38). The grand jury

for each year comprises both new members and members who served

on the grand jury in the preceding year. (PUF ¶ 39). In Yolo

County, serving grand jurors may elect to serve on the succeeding

grand jury (“holdovers”) by indicating their interest to the Jury

Commissioner. (DUF ¶ 27). Up to ten grand jurors serving on the

current grand jury can be held over to serve an additional term

on the next grand jury. (Weaver Decl. ¶ 14). The number of new

grand jurors selected is 19 minus the number of holdover grand

jurors. (PUF ¶ 44). The new grand jurors are randomly selected

by having their names pulled from a wooden box with a lid (the

“grand jury box”). (PUF ¶ 40). The grand jury box contains the

names of the candidates who were placed on the list after the

interview with the judge or commissioner as well as the names of

current alternate grand jurors who did not serve on the grand

jury for the current year but are interested in serving during

the upcoming year. (PUF ¶ 41). These names are written on a

piece of paper which is folded in half and placed in the grand

jury box. (PUF ¶ 42). The Clerk of the Superior Court pulls one

name out of the grand jury box at a time until the grand jury

panel of 19 is filled. (PUF ¶ 43). Thereafter, every remaining

name in the grand jury box is pulled one at a time and each of

///

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3 The Declaration of Peter Morrision, filed Nov. 17,

2006, provides that the proportion of Hispanic individuals

(continued...)

7

these persons is designated as an alternate grand juror. (PUF ¶

45).

Both parties have retained experts in demography to opine

regarding the representation of Hispanic individuals on the Yolo

County Grand Jury in recent years. Plaintiffs’ expert, John R.

Weeks, Ph.D., presents evidence that between 1997 and 2006, the

proportion of the jury-eligible population that is Hispanic is

15.4%. (Am. Decl. of John R. Weeks, Ph.D. (“2d Am. Weeks

Decl.”), filed Dec. 8, 2006, at 5). The proportion of Hispanic

individuals in the grand jury pool is 8.9%. (Id.) Therefore,

the absolute disparity over a ten year period is 6.5%. (Id.) 

Weeks also opines that “the most recent set of grand juries

demonstrates large absolute disparities with respect to

Hispanics.” (Am. Decl. of John R. Weeks, filed Nov. 17, 2006

(“1st Am. Weeks Decl.”), ¶ 6). Between 2004 and 2007, the

proportion of the jury eligible population that is Hispanic is

17% and the proportion of Hispanic individuals in the grand jury

pool is 3.5%. (2d Am. Weeks Decl., at 5). Therefore, the

absolute disparity over the last three years is 13.5%. (Id.) 

Defendants’ expert, Peter A. Morrison, Ph.D., presents evidence

that between 1997 and 2006, the proportion of the jury-eligible

population that is Hispanic is 14%, the proportion of Hispanic

individuals initially selected as Grand Jurors is 10%, and that

the absolute disparity over a ten year period is 4%. (Dep. of

Peter Morrison, Ph.D. (“Morrison Dep.”), Ex. 9, ¶ 12).3 For the

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3(...continued)

initially selected as Grand Jurors is 10.5%, and therefore, the

absolute disparity is 3.5%. However, in their opposition,

defendants asserts that “after correction of a minor error,” the

appropriate percentages are 10% and 4%, citing Ex. 9 to the

Deposition of Peter Morrison. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), filed Dec. 1, 2006, at 3-4 n.2). 

4 On the date of the hearing, plaintiffs filed a

declaration, informing the court that additional documents

relating to the recruitment and holdover process for the Yolo

County Grand Jury were turned over by defendants minutes before

the hearing. (Decl. of G. Whitney Leigh re. Defs.’ Repeated

Discovery Violations (“Discovery Decl.”), filed Dec. 15, 2006). 

Plaintiffs’ counsel was granted leave to file a motion based upon

defendants’ untimely disclosure of these documents. On December

22, 2006, plaintiffs filed a submission, requesting the court to

consider documents from the newly disclosed evidence and giving

notice to the court and defendants that they would not be filing

any further motions. (Pls.’ Submission, filed Dec. 22, 2006, at

2-3). The court has reviewed and considered plaintiffs’

submissions.

On December 28, 2006, defendants filed a response and

declaration, explaining that the untimely disclosure of the

documents was inadvertent. The court takes such discovery

conduct very seriously. Defendants have caused unnecessary delay

and inconvenience to plaintiffs and the court. However, there is

no evidence that this was a willful effort by defendants to

prevent discovery or to gain a tactical advantage. While the

court finds defense counsel’s inadvertence highly disconcerting,

it does not rise to the level of sanctionable behavior. 

8

purposes of this motion, however, defendants do not dispute the

statistics presented by plaintiffs’ expert.4 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

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identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

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that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

///

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Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.

ANALYSIS

A. Standing

The issue of standing is a threshold determination of

“whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the

merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Steel Co. v. Citizens For A Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). “The judicial power of the United

States defined by Art[icle] III is not an unconditioned authority

to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive

acts.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United For

Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). 

Rather, Article III limits “the federal judicial power ‘to those

disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a

system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to

be capable of resolution through the judicial process.’” Id. at

472 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)); Steele, 523

U.S. at 102. “Those who do not possess Article III standing may

not litigate as suitors in the Courts of the United States.” Id.

at 476. 

The Supreme Court has set forth that “[t]he ‘irreducible

constitutional minimum of standing’ contains three requirements.” 

Steele, 523 U.S. at 102-03 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of

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Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). First, plaintiff must

allege an “injury in fact – a harm suffered by the plaintiff that

is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural, or

hypothetical.” Id. at 103 (internal quotations and citations

omitted). A claim must be for an injury to the plaintiff’s own

legal rights and interests, rather than the legal rights and

interests of third parties. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist v.

Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004). Second, plaintiff must allege

causation – “a fairly traceable connection between the

plaintiff’s injury and the complained-of conduct of the

defendant.” Steele, 523 U.S. at 103 (citing Simon v. E. Ky.

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). The injury must

not be the result of some third party not before the court. 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42). Third,

the injury must be redressable – there must be “a likelihood that

the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. Steele,

523 U.S. at 103 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 45-46). 

Defendants argue that since plaintiffs have not applied to

become Yolo County grand jurors or forepersons, they lack

standing to bring their claims that they have been systematically

excluded from the grand jury selection process. The court

previously addressed this issue in its August 4, 2006 Memorandum

and Order, finding that plaintiffs had standing sufficient for

the pleading stage because plaintiffs had alleged that they had

been systemically excluded from the grand jury recruitment

process. (Docket #33). In order to claim redress for an injury

from this process, which occurs prior to the grand juror

///

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5 Further, plaintiffs do present evidence, in the form of

the expert opinion of Michael N. Burt that the notice and

recruitment procedures employed by defendants leads to the

alleged under representation of Hispanic individuals on the Yolo

County Grand Jury. (Decl. of Michael N. Burt, Esq. (“Burt

Decl.”), filed Nov. 1, 2006, ¶¶ 6-10). Burt asserts that he is

“familiar with the methods and practices used across the state of

California to populate grand juries due to [his] litigation

experience on this issue,” and opines that the methods and

practices used to populate the Yolo County Grand Jury “are

leading to [] disparity” in the representation of Hispanic

individuals. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7). Burt also asserts that the evidence

he has reviewed “indicates that the Yolo County Grand Jury

Commissioner arbitrarily sends out emails and letter [sic] to

persons requesting if they have anyone to recommend for the Yolo

County Grand Jury.” (Id. ¶ 9). Burt opines that this method is

problematic in light of the fact that “[s]ince 1981, California

has mandated the use of two DMV and voter registration source

lists to be used by the courts in many districts.” (Id. ¶ 10). 

Based upon such evidence, there is a triable issue of fact

regarding whether the notice given to plaintiffs by defendants’

recruitment procedure was constitutionally sufficient. 

6 Because of the court’s ruling, infra, based upon the

(continued...)

13

application and selection process, plaintiffs need not have

applied for grand jury service. 

Defendants now contend that there is no evidence to support

plaintiffs’ allegations of unequal notice in the recruitment

process. This argument, however, asks the court to address the

merits of plaintiffs’ claims. It is undisputed that plaintiffs

are members of an identifiable group of individuals, Hispanics,

that are allegedly injured through underrepresentation on the

Yolo County grand jury. Plaintiffs assert that such

underrepresentation results inter alia from unequal notice

procedures in the recruitment process.5 Therefore, on a motion

for summary judgment, plaintiffs have standing to assert claims

relating to alleged constitutional violations resulting from

defendants’ recruitment procedures.6

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(...continued)

parties’ evidence of the degree of representation, the court does

not decide whether plaintiffs may assert a claim for alleged

violations in other aspects of the Yolo County Grand Jury

selection process. The court also does not reach plaintiffs’

alternative argument that plaintiff Serena has standing, separate

and apart from the other plaintiffs, because he was investigated

by the Yolo County Grand Jury and subsequently criminally

indicted.

14

B. Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiffs assert that defendants have violated their right

to equal protection through the systemic exclusion of Hispanic

individuals from the Yolo County Grand Jury. Courts have rarely

had occasion to sanction lawsuits by persons claiming that they

had been unconstitutionally excluded from grand jury service. 

See Quadra v. Superior Court of the City and County of San

Francisco, 378 F. Supp. 605, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (citing Carter

v, Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 , 329-30

(1970). “The same standards apply, however, whether a person is

claiming such exclusion from grand-jury service or whether one

criminally accused challenges the grand jury that indicted him.” 

Id. at 613-14 (citing Carter, 396 U.S. at 329 (“People excluded

from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those

indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of racial

exclusion.”)). 

In order to show that an equal protection violation has

occurred in the context of the grand jury recruitment and

selection process, the plaintiffs “must show that the procedure

employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race

or of the identifiable group to which he belongs.” Castaneda v.

Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). The Supreme Court has

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articulated a three-step process for establishing a prima facie

case in such an equal protection challenge. Id. First,

plaintiffs must establish that the group, of which plaintiffs are

members, “is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled

out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as

applied.” Id. Second, “the degree of underrepresentation must

be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total

population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors,

over a significant period of time.” Id. Third, plaintiffs must

present evidence of discriminatory intent. Id.; United States v.

Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 1996). A procedure that is

“susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports the

presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing.” 

Id.; Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 725. Once the plaintiff has shown

“substantial underrepresentation of his group, he has made out a

prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden then

shifts to the State to rebut that case.” Id. “In order to rebut

the presumption of unconstitutional action, the state must show

‘that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and

procedures have produced the monochromatic result.’” Esquivel, 88

F.3d at 725 (quoting Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494).

As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that

Hispanic individuals are a distinctive, cognizable class for

purposes of this inquiry. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495;

Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727.

The plaintiffs, however, then have the burden to demonstrate

that Hispanics were subject to “substantial underrepresentation”

over a significant period of time. See id.; Ramseur v. Beyer,

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983 F.2d 1215, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992). This prong generally

requires statistical data that the jury pool does not adequately

represent the distinctive group in relation to the number of such

jury-eligible persons in the community. See id. at 495-96. The

Ninth Circuit has addressed identical statistical evidence in the

context of criminal defendants’ challenges that the grand jury

did not constitute a fair-cross section of the community in

violation of their Sixth Amendment rights. See United States v.

Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 2006); Esquivel, 88

F.3d at 726 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879

F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1989). In analyzing this evidence, the

Ninth Circuit “favor[s] the ‘absolute disparity’ test for

measuring the representativeness of a distinctive group in a jury

pool.” Id.; Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 726; Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at

547. The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[w]hen represented

with various types of data to determine whether Hispanics are

underrepresented on grand jury venires, a court must rely on the

statistical data that best approximates the percentage of juryeligible Hispanics in the district.” Id.

In this case, both plaintiffs and defendants have proffered

statistical evidence. Plaintiffs present evidence that over the

last 10 years, there has been an absolute disparity of 6.5%

between the number of Hispanics in the grand jury pool and the

number of jury-eligible Hispanics in the community. Defendants

present evidence that the absolute disparity over this period of

time is 4%. The Ninth Circuit has held that a 7.7% absolute

disparity is considered “insubstantial” underrepresentation for

the purposes of a challenge to grand jury selection procedures

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under the 5th and 6th Amendments. United States v. Suttiswad,

696 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Thomas v. Borg, 159

F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). Even using

plaintiffs’ evidence of a 6.5% absolute disparity over a ten year

period, plaintiffs have failed to set forth evidence sufficient

to meet the second prong of their prima facie case.

Plaintiffs assert that the court should not apply the Ninth

Circuit’s holding in Suttiswad, that a 7.7% absolute disparity

does not establish a constitutional violation, to this case

because the Suttiswad court compared grand jury composition to

the age-eligible population data and in this case the court must

compare grand jury composition to the jury-eligible population

data. Plaintiffs contend that the Ninth Circuit has not held

that a 7.7% absolute disparity is permissible when making an

analysis of jury-eligible population data. Plaintiffs argue that

larger disparities are tolerated in cases that analyze general

population data or age-eligible population data because the

disparities necessarily included large groups of ineligible

persons. Therefore, plaintiffs argue that these accepted larger

disparities should not be applied in cases that analyze juryeligible population data.

Plaintiffs have cited no case law to support their

proposition that absolute disparities previously found

constitutionally permissible should be applied differently based

upon the type of population data used in the analysis. Nor has

the Ninth Circuit made such a distinction. See Esquivel, 88 F.3d

at 727 (analyzing jury-eligible population data and citing the

Suttiwad court’s acceptance of a 7.7% absolute disparity in

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support of the court’s holding); see also United States v.

Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing

absolute disparities previously found constitutionally

permissible and impermissible by the Ninth Circuit without noting

a distinction between general population data, age-eligible

population data, and jury-eligible population data). However, in

order to avoid the potential for exaggeration through the

interpretation of statistics, the Ninth Circuit has “adopted a

test for substantiality which judges the effect of any deviation

not in terms of percentages, but in terms of its impact on the

absolute numerical composition of the grand jury. . . . That is,

to determine substantiality we look to people, not percentages.” 

United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1977);

see United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir.

1980).

Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs figures are accurate,

Hispanic individuals are underrepresented in an absolute sense by

6.5%. Looking only at people, in an array of 100 jurors, the

absolute numerical effect of the underrepresentation of Hispanics

would be that the array would include 6.5 fewer Hispanics. A

grand jury of 19 drawn from this array on the average would

underrepresent Hispanics by little more than one juror (1.235). 

See Kleifgen, 557 F.2d at 1297. This is not substantial

underrepresentation. See id. (holding that underrepresentation

that amounts to approximately one juror on a grand jury panel of

23 is not substantial); see also Suttiswad (holding that

underrepresentation that amounts to almost 2 jurors on the grand

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jury panel (1.761) was similar to the underrepresentation in

Kleifgen and thus, insubstantial). 

Plaintiffs also contend that the court should not look at

the disparity over the past ten years, but, rather, should

analyze the disparity over the past three years, which, according

to plaintiffs’ expert, reflects a 13.5% absolute disparity. 

Plaintiffs argue that the increase in absolute disparity

demonstrates a trend that the underrepresentation of Hispanics is

growing worse in recent years. Defendants contend that

plaintiffs “arbitrarily select grand juror data for only the last

three years when a decade worth of data is available to slant

data to falsely suggest significant underrepresentation of

Hispanics on the grand jury.” (Defs.’ Reply, filed Dec. 8, 2006,

at 6). Defendants argue that not only is the 10 year period

relevant to the “significant period of time” requirement in

establishing a prima facie case, but that 10 years is also the

relevant time period because it is the approximate length of time

that the Superior Court’s current recruitment and selection

process has been in place. (Id. at 7). 

The Equal Protection clause analysis requires evidence of

underrepresentation over a “significant period of time.” 

Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit

has not specifically addressed the span of time necessary to

constitute a “significant” period. But see United States v.

Quinones, 46 F.3d 1148, 1995 WL 29500, *10 (9th Cir. Jan. 25,

1995) (finding that evidence as to one year is insufficient to

satisfy the second prong of an equal protection challenge). 

However, the Third Circuit has addressed this issue, and held

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that studies conducted over a two year period were insufficient

to satisfy Castaneda’s requirement of “a significant period of

time.” Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F. 2d 1215, 1233 (3d. Cir. 1992). 

The Ramseur court found that “those studies which have been found

to satisfy Castaneda’s requirement . . . have covered periods

substantially longer than the two years covered by this study.” 

Id. (citing Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 341 (1984) (7

years); Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 487 (11 years); Hernandez v.

Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481 (1954) (25 years)); c.f. Enriquez v.

Procunier, 752 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1984) (3 years

insufficient). But see United States v. Perez, 672 F.2d 1380,

1387 (11th Cir. 1982) (criticized on other grounds by Hobby v.

United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984)) (4 years).

Supreme Court precedent and cases addressing this issue in

other Circuits indicates that a “significant period of time” for

purposes of the Castaneda analysis means more than a handful of

years. In this case, measurement over a ten year period is

particularly compelling because that is the approximate number of

years that the contested grand jury recruitment system has been

in place. (Dep. of Robyn Weaver, Nov. 3, 2006, 55:4-12). 

Therefore, the court finds that the underrepresentation of

Hispanic individuals on the Yolo County Grand Jury is

appropriately measured in this case over a ten year period. As

such, for the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs fail to

demonstrate that Hispanics were subject to “substantial

underrepresentation” over a significant period of time. 

In their reply, plaintiffs contend that the court should

consider plaintiffs’ statistical evidence for disparities over

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the last 4, 5, or 6 year period. Accepting arguendo plaintiffs’

contention, plaintiffs have still failed to demonstrate absolute

disparities that demonstrate “substantial underrepresentation.” 

Plaintiffs present evidence that over the past 4 years, the

absolute disparity was 10.4%, over the past five years, the

absolute disparity was 8.3%, and over the past six years, the

absolute disparity was 8.6%. In terms of people, in a panel of

19 grand jurors, Hispanics would be underrepresented by, at most,

approximately 2 jurors (1.976, 1.577, and 1.634, respectively). 

Any disparity is similar to those previously approved by the

Ninth Circuit in Suttiswad, and thus, considered unsubstantial. 

See Suttiswad, 696 F.2d at 649 (approving underrepresentation of

approximately two Spanish persons).

Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ statistical evidence that

Hispanics have been underrepresented by an absolute disparity of

13.5% over the past three years is troubling to the court. 

Unaddressed or ignored, this continuing disparity is likely to

provide future evidence of systemic underrepresentation of a

constitutional dimension. However, a three year period is

insufficient to constitute a “significant period of time” for

purposes of the Equal Protection inquiry. Further, the 13.5%

absolute disparity is less troubling when analyzing the trend

over the past three years. Importantly, in the 2004-2005 term,

there were zero Hispanic individuals in the Yolo County Grand

Jury Pool and an absolute disparity of 16.5%, equal to the

percent of jury eligible population that is Hispanic. (2d Am.

Weeks Decl., at 5). This underrepresentation demonstrates a

clear problem. In the 2005-2006 term, the absolute disparity was

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14.6%, a statistic that is still troubling, but at least an

increase in representation. (See id.) Finally, in the 2006-2007

term, the absolute disparity was 8.4%, a marked increase in the

representation of Hispanic individuals in the Grand Jury Pool. 

(Id.) 

Plaintiffs argue that the increase in Hispanic

representation in the 2006-2007 Grand Jury Pool is a result of

manipulation by defendants motivated by the filing of this

lawsuit. However, there is no admissible evidence to support

this argument, and it is unclear whether the applications were

mailed to Hispanic individuals before or after this suit was

filed. Moreover, if the representation of Hispanic individuals

on the Yolo County Grand Jury returns to the levels reached in

2004-2005 and 2005-2006, defendants will be laying the foundation

for a future Equal Protection claim, where plaintiffs could make

a showing of “substantial underrepresentation over a significant

period of time.” 

At oral argument, plaintiffs cogently articulated for the

first time their position that the court should not look

systematically at the Castaneda three step analysis, but should

take an “organic, wholistic look at the system.” In essence,

plaintiffs ask the court to conflate the second and third step of

the Castaneda analysis, to look at the procedures employed by

defendants before analyzing the impact of these procedures upon

the representation of Hispanics on the Yolo County Grand Jury. 

Plaintiffs rely primarily upon the Third Circuit’s opinion in

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7 Plaintiffs also rely on the Supreme Court’s statement

in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972), that the

“Court has never announced mathematical standards for the

demonstration of ‘systemic’ exclusion of blacks but has, rather,

emphasized that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case that

takes into account all possible explanatory factors.” The court

agrees that an Equal Protection claim cannot be reduced into a

simple mathematical formula. Nor has the court applied such an

analysis to this case. However, in Castaneda, decided five years

after Alexander, the Supreme Court held that statistical evidence

of substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of

time is required to set forth a prima facie Equal Protection

claim. 430 U.S. at 494. In Castaneda, the Supreme Court also

analyzed the degree of underrepresentation and found that it was

enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimination before

analyzing the procedures challenged by the petitioner. Id. at

495-96. 

8 The Third Circuit cited no authority for its blended

analysis of the second and third prongs of the Castaneda

analysis.

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Ramseur for this novel approach.7 In Ramseur, the court stated

that it was not fully collapsing the inquiries under the second

and third prongs of the Castaneda analysis, but that “it is

logical to view the presence of a non-random disparity as

establishing an ‘underrepresentation,’ while the disparity’s

severity, underlying causes, and documentation would establish

whether it was ‘substantial.’” 983 F.2d at 1232 n.13.8

Plaintiffs interpret Ramseur to support their position that the

court should examine the neutrality of the jury selection

procedures at the second step of the Castaneda analysis. The

Ramseur court found that the underrepresentation of blacks in the

Essex County jury pools was not random based upon on the 14.1%

absolute disparity as well as a 28.9 standard deviation. Id. at

1232. The Third Circuit found that even with a 14.1% absolute

disparity, there was no constitutional violation because the

studies conducted covered only a two year period and because the

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selection lists were facially neutral. Therefore, the court held

that the appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to

fulfill the “substantial underrepresentation” requirement of

Castaneda, and did not address the third requirement of

discriminatory intent. However, the Ramseur court only discussed

aspects of the selection process under the second prong after

finding non-random underrepresentation based upon the absolute

disparity of 14.1%. In this case, the absolute disparity over

the relevant time period is 6.5%. As such, unlike in Ramseur,

the statistical evidence does not establish non-random

underrepresentation. Therefore, the Third Circuit’s decision in

Ramseur does not offer a persuasive rationale for conflating the

second and third prong in this case because of the factual

dissimilarities. Plaintiffs have failed to cite the court any

other authority which advocates such an approach to an Equal

Protection claim challenging underrepresentation of an

identifiable group on grand juries. 

Further, while the Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed

this argument, the manner in which the Ninth Circuit has

previously analyzed constitutional challenges to the

underrepresentation of cognizable groups on grand juries does not

support the approach advocated by plaintiffs. The majority of

these cases arise in the criminal context, where the importance

of constitutional representation on a grand jury is arguable even

greater than in the civil context. However, in such cases, the

Ninth Circuit has failed to discuss any aspects of the challenged

selection procedures where the defendant failed to present

sufficient statistical evidence or other data to establish

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constitutionally impermissible underrepresentation. See e.g.

Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699; Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645;

Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951; Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293; see also

Quadra, 378 F. Supp. 605. Such an approach is logical in the

present case because the harm sought to be addressed by plaintiff

is significant underrepresentation of Hispanics on the Yolo

County Grand Jury. If the statistical evidence indicates that

there has not been constitutionally insufficient representation,

then there has been no such harm. 

Finally, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “the most crucial

factor in an equal protection case is a showing of discriminatory

intent.” Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727. In this case, there is no

direct evidence of discriminatory intent by defendants. “If a

selection procedure is susceptible of abuse or is not racially

neutral, then that supports the presumption of discrimination

raised by the statistical showing.” Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727. 

Plaintiffs present evidence to support their assertion that the

Yolo County Grand Jury recruitment and selection procedures are

susceptible to abuse. However, because the statistical showing

does not demonstrate substantial underrepresentation over a

significant period of time, there is no presumption of

discriminatory intent that this evidence can support. 

Therefore, because plaintiffs have failed to set forth

evidence supporting a prima facie case of an Equal Protection

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9 Plaintiffs also present statistical evidence regarding

the representation of Hispanics who served as “holdovers” from a

prior grand jury. However, plaintiffs allege an equal protection

violation based upon the composition of the grand jury. The

representation of Hispanics in the subset of “holdover” grand

jurors is not relevant to this claim; only the total number of

Hispanics in the grand jury pool is relevant. See Castaneda, 430

U.S. at 494 (“The degree of under representation must be proved,

by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population

to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors.”) (emphasis

added). Therefore, the court does not analyze plaintiffs’

statistics relative to this argument. 

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violation, defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim is GRANTED.9

 

C. Due process claim

Plaintiffs also assert that defendants have violated their

due process rights through the systemic exclusion of Hispanic

individuals from the Yolo County Grand Jury. Plaintiffs argue

that, “analogous to the context of a criminal defendant

challenging a grand jury on the basis of due process, plaintiff

Serena was subject to investigation by a racially

underrepresentative grand jury.” (Pls.’ Opp’n, filed Dec. 1,

2006, at 14). 

Lawsuits by persons claiming that they had been

unconstitutionally excluded from grand jury service are brought

under the Equal Protection Clause. See Carter, 396 U.S. 320

(1970); Quadra, 378 F. Supp. 605. Plaintiffs fail to cite to -

and the court has not found - any authority for the proposition

that some unspecified due process right is derived from

appearance before a civil grand jury. Plaintiffs simply ask this

court to apply the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Duren

v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), to adjudicate plaintiffs’ due

process claim. However, the Duren test applies to a defendant’s

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claim that he was denied his 6th Amendment right to a jury

selected from a fair cross-section of the community. Id. The

6th Amendment applies only to criminal proceedings. U.S. Const.,

amend. VI. This is not a criminal proceeding. 

As such, without any legal support to do so, the court

declines to excise a free standing and unspecified due process

right separate and apart from plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiffs’ due process claim is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close

this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 9, 2007

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