Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04545/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04545-37/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TVIIM, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MCAFEE, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 13-cv-04545-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

SEAL 

Re: Dkt. No. 309 

Pending before the Court is Defendant McAfee, Inc.’s motion to seal portions of its reply 

in support of its motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Dkt. No. 309. No opposition to the motion 

to seal was filed, and the time to do so has passed. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

“[A] ‘compelling reasons’ standard applies to most judicial records. This standard derives 

from the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 

records and documents.’” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7). “[A] ‘strong presumption in 

favor of access’ is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 

1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th 

Cir. 2003)). To overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record 

related to a dispositive motion must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual 

findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, 

such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” 

Id. at 1178-79 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). “In general, 

‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing 

court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ 

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United States District Court 

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such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous 

statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). “The mere fact 

that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure 

to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.

The court must “balance the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to 

keep certain judicial records secret. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal 

certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual 

basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. at 1179. Civil Local Rule 

79-5 supplements the compelling reasons standard set forth in Kamakana: the party seeking to file 

a document or portions of it under seal must “establish[] that the document, or portions thereof, 

are privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law. . . . 

The request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-

5(b). 

Records attached to nondispositive motions are not subject to the strong presumption of 

access. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Because the documents attached to nondispositive 

motions “are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action,” 

parties moving to seal must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1179–80 (internal quotation marks omitted). The “good cause” 

standard requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the 

information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 

1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad 

allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not 

suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Because Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is a nondispositive motion, the 

Court applies the “good cause” standard to the pending motion to seal. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Defendant seeks to file under seal certain portions of its reply brief that reference 

information already sealed by this Court. See Dkt. No. 300. The Court agrees that the proposed 

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United States District Court 

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redactions related to Defendant’s counsel’s fee arrangements contain sealable material. The Court 

further finds that the proposed redactions are “narrowly tailored” to seal only sealable material, as 

required by Civil Local Rule 79-5. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to seal the 

proposed redactions on page 15 of Defendant’s reply brief. Within four days of the date of this 

Order, Defendant shall file under seal the unredacted version of its reply in support of its motion 

for attorney’s fees and costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 17, 2015 

______________________________________ 

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 

United States District Judge 

Case 4:13-cv-04545-HSG Document 316 Filed 09/17/15 Page 3 of 3