Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01750/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01750-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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 Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses ASU and his claim for punitive damages. See

Plaintiff’s Response at 4.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Salvatore P. Marasco, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona Board of Regents et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-12-01750-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. 8), plaintiff’s response

(doc. 11), and defendants’ reply (doc. 12). 

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq., alleging that he has suffered ongoing discrimination as an employee of

Arizona State University (“ASU”) since January 2011 through at least April 2012.1

 In his

complaint, plaintiff alleges that his supervisor referred to him using a derogatory name for

Italians, that he reported the conduct to human resources on several occasions, and that

instead of stopping the discrimination, ASU transferred him to another department.

Complaint ¶¶ 8-15. Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

for failure to state a claim. 

Case 2:12-cv-01750-FJM Document 14 Filed 05/02/13 Page 1 of 3
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Defendants argue that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s claims because he did not timely exhaust his administrative remedies with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Defendants’ argument confuses

an affirmative defense with subject matter jurisdiction. Although some cases discuss the

Title VII exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional, see, e.g., Vasquez v. County of Los

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003), the Supreme Court has stated that “filing a

timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in

federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver,

estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102

S. Ct. 1127, 1132 (1982). While an untimely claim may be barred, untimeliness does not

deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction. See generally, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.

Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 511, S. Ct. 1235, 1242 (2006).

Nevertheless, in order to survive dismissal, plaintiff must have exhausted his

administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5.

Title VII requires plaintiffs raising claims of discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts to file

a charge with the EEOC either 180 or 300 days after the “alleged unlawful employment

practice occurred.” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 122 S. Ct.

2061, 2071 (2002). “[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even

when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Id. at 113, 122 S. Ct. at 2072.

On the other hand, a hostile work environment claim will not be time barred as long as one

of the acts constituting the claim falls within the filing period. Id. at 116-117, S. Ct. at 2074.

Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the timely filing period, we may

consider the entire time period of the hostile work environment for purposes of determining

liability. Id. To establish that a hostile environment claim exists plaintiff must show that:

(1) he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of his national origin; (2) the

conduct was unwelcome; and (3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

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conditions of his employment. Kang v. U. Lim Am. Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on April 30, 2012. Defendant argues that

plaintiff’s claims fail because the alleged actions that occurred before March 2011 are time

barred, and because he fails to plead sufficient facts to support a claim of discrimination after

July 2011. Plaintiff’s claims are barred to the extent they are based on discrete

discriminatory acts that occurred before July 5, 2011, 300 days before plaintiff filed his

charge with the EEOC. Plaintiff argues that his claims are valid because defendants’ actions

created a hostile work environment which continued until he filed his charge with the EEOC.

However, plaintiff’s complaint does not contain allegations of any specific discriminatory

conduct occurring after March 2011. Plaintiff’s broad allegation that discrimination against

him continued through April 2012 is a legal conclusion that does not satisfy the pleading

standard of Twombly and Iqbal. The complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

But because plaintiff may be able to plead sufficient facts within the 300 day window, we

will allow leave to amend. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED GRANTING defendant's motion to dismiss

without prejudice (doc. 8). Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within twenty days

of the docketing of this order. 

DATED this 1st day of May, 2013.

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