Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01758/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01758-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVIS RAY THOMPSON, Civil No. 06cv1758-JAH (NLS)

 Petitioner, REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE DENIAL OF PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge John A.

Houston pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California.

I.

FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

On August 28, 2006, Travis Ray Thompson (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person

in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner claims his federal

constitutional rights were violated because: (1) he received ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel; (2) the trial court improperly revoked his self-representation status; (3) the trial court

interfered with his ability to present a defense by restricting and disparaging his evidence; and

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(4) due to jury misconduct. (Pet. at 6-10.) Petitioner has also filed two Notices of Lodgment.

(Doc. Nos. 5, 13.) Respondent Jeanne Woodford (hereinafter “Respondent”) has filed an

Answer to the Petition, accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support,

and has lodged portions of the state court record. (Doc. No. 6.) Respondent contends Petitioner

is not entitled to habeas relief because the state court’s denial of his claims was neither contrary

to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of Answer [“Ans. Mem.”] at 7-22.) Following an

enlargement of time, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (Doc. No. 14.) 

II.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

In a one-count Information filed in the Imperial County Superior Court on January 5,

2004, Petitioner was charged with assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to produce great

bodily injury in violation of Cal. Penal Code section 245(A)(1). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

at 7.) The Information further alleged that Petitioner had personally used a deadly weapon, and

had suffered two prior felony convictions. (Id. at 8-9.) On June 4, 2004, a jury found Petitioner

guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, and returned a true finding on the allegation that he had

personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. (Id. at 515-16.) In a

bifurcated bench trial, the trial court found true the allegation that Petitioner had suffered two

prior serious felony convictions. (Id. at 521.) Petitioner was sentenced to thirty years to life in

state prison. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Thompson, No. D044829, slip op. at 18 (Cal.Ct.App.

Aug 12, 2005).)

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One, raising, inter alia, the same claims presented in his federal habeas

Petition here, with the exception of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Lodgment Nos.

2-4.) Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the appellate court raising, inter alia, the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim presented here. (Lodgment No. 6.) His conviction was affirmed in

an unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 5.) The habeas petition was denied in a separate order.

(Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for review of the appellate court opinion

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affirming his conviction. (Lodgment No. 8.) That petition was denied by an order which stated

in full: “Petition for review DENIED.” (Lodgment No. 9, People v. Thompson, No. S137191,

slip op. (Cal. Nov. 22, 2005).) He filed a separate petition for review of the appellate court order

denying his habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 13.) That petition was denied by an order which

stated in full: “Petition for review DENIED.” (Lodgment No. 15, In re Thompson, No. S144233

(Cal. June 26, 2006).)

III.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Ruben Ramos, an Imperial County Sheriff’s Department Correctional Officer, testified

that he was on duty November 1, 2003, at the Regional Adult Detention Facility in El Centro,

California, which is a branch of the Imperial County Jail. (Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s Tr. at

1208-10.) At about 10:00 a.m. that day, Ramos was escorting inmate Cooper from the shower

on the first floor of the Bravo Module back to cell number three on the second floor, where

Cooper was housed. (Id. at 1210, 1235.) The Bravo Module is an administrative segregation

unit housing inmates who are highly prone to escape and/or assaultive toward staff or other

inmates. (Id. at 1235.) There are five cells on the second floor with one inmate per cell;

Petitioner was housed in cell number four. (Id. at 1211.) Cooper requested to be moved from

cell three to cell two, so Ramos received permission from Sergeant Figuroa to rehouse Cooper,

directed Officer Tabarez to open cell three, told Cooper to gather his belongings, and then

signaled Tabarez to open cell two. (Id. at 1213-15.) 

The door to cell two never opened, and instead Ramos heard Tabarez yell down to him:

“Close that cell door.” (Id. at 1215.) Unsure which cell Tabarez was referring to, Ramos

instinctively reacted by walking toward cell four, Petitioner’s cell. (Id. at 1215-16.) As Ramos

approached cell four, the door was pushed open, and Petitioner rushed out of the cell and pushed

Ramos to the floor. (Id. at 1216-17.) When Ramos got up he saw Petitioner in Cooper’s cell

making slashing-type motions at Cooper. (Id. at 1217-18.) Cooper was handcuffed and holding

his hands in front of him trying to block his face and body. (Id. at 1219.) Ramos gave a

command for both inmates to stop, and repeated the command several times but neither

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complied. (Id. at 1220.) He sprayed pepper spray into the eyes of both inmates but it had no

effect. (Id. at 1220-21.) Ramos was joined by Tabarez as they entered the cell and pulled

Cooper out; he was bleeding from his chest, stomach and forearm and was very bloody. (Id. at

1222.) Ramos escorted Cooper to the medical department while several other correctional

officers responded to the altercation. (Id. at 1223.) Ramos later searched Cooper’s cell with

Tabarez and Officer Valdez; on the floor of the cell Tabarez found the razor portion of a

disposable shaving razor with blood on it and tape on its tip. (Id. at 1224-25.) Ramos saw

Petitioner make twenty to thirty slashing motions at Cooper in all, and observed blood on the

floor and walls of Cooper’s cell. (Id. at 1218, 1225.)

Rodrigo Valdez, an Imperial County Sheriff’s Department Correctional Officer, testified

that he was on duty at the Regional Adult Detention Facility on November 1, 2003, and that he

responded to a panic alarm sounded mid-morning in the Bravo Module. (Id. at 1255.) When

Valdez arrived at the Bravo Module he saw Officer Ramos escorting inmate Cooper down the

stairs; Valdez then ran upstairs where he saw Officer Tabarez on top of Petitioner. (Id. at 1256.)

Valdez and Tabarez handcuffed Petitioner, escorted him to a holding cell to be examined by

medical staff, and searched the cell where the altercation took place. (Id. at 1257.) A few feet

inside the cell door Valdez found a razor blade taken from a shaving razor issued at the facility,

which had been removed from its plastic hardware and wrapped with tape allowing it to be held

safely. (Id. at 1257-58.)

Isaac Tabarez, a Correctional Officer employed at the Imperial County Jail, testified that

he was working at the Regional Adult Detention Facility on November 1, 2003, standing just

outside the Bravo Module near the control panel which opens the cell doors. (Id. at 1269-71.)

Officer Ramos called out to open cells two and three to rehouse inmate Cooper. (Id. at 1272-73.)

Tabarez opened cell three, and then accidentally opened cell four instead of cell two. (Id. at

1273.) When Tabarez noticed he had opened cell four, he yelled at Ramos to close the door.

(Id. at 1274.) Ramos acknowledged the command and walked toward cell four. (Id. at 1275.)

Petitioner ran out of cell four, pushed Ramos down and entered cell three. (Id.) Tabarez pushed

his panic alarm and ran into the module. (Id. at 1277.) When he reached cell three, Ramos had

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pepper-sprayed Petitioner and Cooper, who were fighting. (Id. at 1278.) Petitioner was moving

his fists and punching Cooper while Cooper was handcuffed and trying to protect himself. (Id.)

Ramos removed Cooper, and Tabarez entered the cell and placed a body lock on Petitioner;

Office Valdez helped Tabarez handcuff Petitioner. (Id. at 1279.) When Tabarez and Valdez

later searched the cell, Valdez found a razor. (Id. at 1280.)

The jury was shown photographs taken at the hospital emergency room of Cooper’s

wounds. (Id. at 1302.) Cooper received wounds to his left arm, neck, chest and abdomen. (Id.

at 1302-08.) The People rested. (Id. at 1498.)

Petitioner, representing himself with the aid of standby counsel, called Santa Figueroa,

a Classification Sergeant with the Imperial County Sheriff’s Department, who testified that it

is his job to review the background of inmates in order to determine their appropriate placement

in the segregation modules at the Regional Adult Detention Facility. (Id. at 1456-57.) Figueroa

was working as the Watch Commander on November 1, 2003, and responded to the medical

ward after being informed of an altercation between inmates. (Id. at 1458-59.) While Cooper

was receiving medical treatment, Figueroa asked Cooper what happened. (Id. at 1459.) Cooper

told him that as he was being rehoused an officer opened the wrong door and Petitioner ran out

and attacked him. (Id.) Figueroa then interviewed Tabarez, who said that he had opened the

wrong door by mistake, that Petitioner ran out and attacked Cooper, and that they found the

weapon used, a razor. (Id. at 1460-61.) Figueroa testified that there had been a fight between

a Black and an Hispanic inmate in the Bravo Module the day before Petitioner’s incident, and

that one additional Black/Hispanic assault had taken place within the previous few days. (Id.

at 1466, 1475.) Inmate Walker assaulted inmate Salazar in one of those incidents, and inmate

Gastelum assaulted inmate Walker in the other. (Id. at 1476.)

Randall Covin, a Recreational Officer with the Imperial County Sheriff’s Department,

testified that in his seven years with the Department there has always been a conflict between

Black and Hispanic inmates at the main jail. (Id. at 1502.) About eighty percent of the inmates

at the jail are Hispanic, and Covin stated that in his opinion many of the Black prisoners who are

housed in the Bravo Module are not treated fairly by the jail administration or the guards because

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they are such a minority. (Id. at 1512.) Covin said that inmates in the Bravo Module are usually

held there temporarily while they were awaiting trial for offenses committed while in prison, and

that the tension between Black and Hispanic inmates on the Bravo Module had been going on

“for a while” but had just escalated around the time Petitioner arrived. (Id. at 1512, 1516.)

Covin said it is unusual for Black and Hispanic inmates to be together on the recreation yard,

and the April 25, 2002, assault on Petitioner, who is Black, by inmate Serrato, who is Hispanic,

was caused when Serrato was released onto the yard with Petitioner; Covin said he “felt it was

wrong” for the guards to have placed them on the yard together on that occasion. (Id. at 1503-

07, 1519-20, 1524.) Covin had warned Petitioner and the other Black inmates prior to the

Walker assault that there was an “attack a Black” rumor going around the jail that Black inmates

may be assaulted by Hispanic inmates. (Id. at 1520-21, 1533-34.) Covin also testified that the

majority of Hispanic inmates at the Imperial County Jail are from Southern California, that to

the extent they belong to or associate with gangs, they belong to or associate with the Southern

Hispanic prison gang, and that inmate Cooper associated with the Southern Hispanic gang. (Id.

at 1526-27, 1533-34.)

Kamaron Lamont Walker testified that he was an inmate housed in the Alpha Module at

the Imperial County Jail on November 1, 2003. (Id. at 1537.) Walker knew inmate Cooper

because they had been at Calipatria State Prison together, and Walker, who is Black, was moved

to the Alpha Module from the Bravo Module about two weeks after Cooper came to the Bravo

Module due to incidents between Black and Hispanic inmates. (Id. at 1537-38.) Walker said

that while he was housed in the Bravo Module he was attacked twice by Hispanic inmates, and

that he had attacked an Hispanic inmate once. (Id. at 1539.) The first assault happened when

Walker was being escorted back from a court appearance and a guard opened an Hispanic

inmate’s cell door and the inmate rushed Walker. (Id. at 1539-40.) The jury was shown a

portion of a video of that incident. (Id. at 1550-51.) After that assault, and just prior to Walker

being removed from the Bravo Module, Walker was giving water to an Hispanic inmate through

the food port on October 28, 2003, when the Hispanic inmate slashed Walker’s arm with a razor.

(Id. at 1540-42.) Walker ran to Petitioner’s cell after being cut and Petitioner wrapped Walker’s

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arm in a wet towel just before he was taken for medical treatment. (Id. at 1541.) Walker

testified that the Black inmates involved in assaults at the jail were treated unfairly because they

were charged with misconduct but the Hispanic inmates were not. (Id. at 1544-45.) He also

stated that both of the assaults on him were by Southern Hispanic gang members, and that inmate

Cooper is a member of that gang. (Id. at 1552-53.)

On cross-examination the prosecutor elicited from Walker that he had “taken a deal” and

pled guilty to felony assault on a correctional officer. (Id. at 1554.) On re-direct, Walker stated

that the conviction arose from an incident where he assaulted an Hispanic inmate in retaliation

for being assaulted by an Hispanic inmate. (Id. at 1555.) Petitioner then asked Walker how he

had come to be charged with assaulting a correctional officer, but the judge sustained the

prosecution’s objection to that line of questioning, ruling that the conviction was admissible for

impeachment purposes only. (Id. at 1557.) In response to Petitioner’s continued questioning

along that line (id. at 1557-58), the following exchange took place:

The Court: I’m ruling: No more on that. We are going to move along. We are wasting

valuable time.

Petitioner: Mr. Walker, you indicated that the main reason that you had took that deal – what

was the reason –

Prosecutor: Objection. That’s beyond the scope.

The Court: I’m not going to allow you to ask anymore questions on that. [¶] If you insist on

doing that, if you insist on disobeying my rulings, I’ll have to take some action to

bring in your standby counsel and to replace you.

Petitioner: Then that’s what you [are] going to have to do, Your Honor. That’s what you

[are] going to have to do.

The Court: I’m sorry, what?

Petitioner: Then that’s what you [are] going to have to do, Your Honor.

The Court: Mr. Yturralde [standby counsel], come on up. [¶] All right, you are now going

to be the primary attorney for the defense.

Mr. Yturralde: No further questions, Your Honor.

(Id. at 1558-59.)

A hearing was immediately held outside the presence of the jury where the trial judge

stated that his reasons for revoking Petitioner’s pro per status was his repeated failure to follow

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the judge’s rulings and continuing of a line of questioning which the judge had ruled was

cumulative and irrelevant. (Id. at 1559-60.) It was Friday afternoon, and the trial was continued

until the following Wednesday afternoon in order to allow standby counsel to prepare. (Id. at

1562.) Upon reconvening, defense counsel made a motion for mistrial on the basis that

Petitioner had failed to adequately prepare for trial and had prejudiced himself by the manner

in which he had conducted his defense. (Id. at 1704-07.) The motion was denied, as was a

motion for a continuance in order to conduct additional discovery. (Id. at 1707.) 

Petitioner testified on his own behalf. He said that he is the second oldest of nine

siblings, that he completed the eleventh grade and received his GED while in prison, and that

he had been incarcerated since 1995. (Id. at 1710-13.) He stated that he has been a member of

the East Coast Crips gang since birth, as are all his family members, and that he continued his

gang association while in prison. (Id. at 1712.) He said there is a code of behavior for inmate

gang members in prisons and jails which is based on respect, and inmates are sometimes directed

to carry out assaults on rival gang members and have a duty to commit retaliatory assaults. (Id.

at 1714-19.) Black inmates are at a serious disadvantage to Hispanic inmates at the Imperial

County Jail, both because they are outnumbered and because there are few Black guards. (Id.

at 1720-21.) The guards at the jail treat Black inmates unfairly by cutting the telephone off on

Black inmates without notice, and allowing less than the scheduled hour in the dayroom for

Black inmates, whereas Hispanic inmates were often allowed to spend several hours in the

dayroom. (Id. at 1725.)

Petitioner testified that soon after he arrived at the Imperial County Jail on February 4,

2002, Officer Covin told him to “watch out” because the guards would try to intimidate and

provoke him. (Id. at 1719-20, 1728.) Petitioner was attacked by an Hispanic inmate on April

25, 2002, the first time he was placed on the yard with an Hispanic; up until then he had always

been on the yard alone. (Id. at 1729-30.) He was attacked from behind on that occasion as he

was walking out to the yard and the guards released the inmate behind him. (Id. at 1731-32.) 

In the days preceding Petitioner’s November 1, 2003 assault on Cooper, Petitioner

witnessed three assaults involving Walker. The first was the October 28, 2003, incident when

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Walker was cut by an inmate while giving the inmate water, and although Petitioner did not see

the assault, he assisted Walker in stopping the bleeding from his injuries immediately afterwards.

(Id. at 1733-34.) Walker, who was the only Black inmate on the Bravo Module other than

Petitioner at the time, told Petitioner that he had been stabbed by a member of the Southern

Hispanic prison gang. (Id. at 1735.) The second assault involving Walker which Petitioner

witnessed took place when Walker was in the dayroom and an Hispanic inmate returning from

court was in the hallway waiting for Walker to be placed in his cell, as only one inmate at a time

is allowed in the dayroom. (Id. at 1737-38.) As the guards opened the door leading into the

dayroom of the Bravo Module, Walker ran out and assaulted the Hispanic inmate in retaliation

for the prior assault on Walker. (Id. at 1738.) The third incident involving Walker took place

on October 31, 2003; the guards had handcuffed Walker and were escorting him down the stairs

when they opened the door of a cell in the lower level of the Bravo Module, which allowed an

Hispanic inmate to run out and assault Walker. (Id. at 1739-40.)

Petitioner stated that he believed he was going to be the subject of an assault by an

Hispanic inmate based on his conversations with Officer Covin, who told him there would be

an assault on a Black inmate, and due to the prior assaults on Walker. (Id. at 1742-43.)

Petitioner knew that due to the high level of security in the Bravo Module the only way he could

be attacked was if the guards provided the opportunity for an Hispanic inmate to do so, as they

had for the previous assaults between Black and Hispanic inmates. (Id. at 1744-45.) Petitioner

said that he had armed himself with a razor in anticipation of the guards providing an Hispanic

inmate an opportunity to attack him, although he actually anticipated that such an attack would

happen when he was shackled, unarmed and unable to defend himself. (Id. at 1747.) 

Petitioner spoke to inmate Cooper earlier in the day of the incident, and noticed he had

a state-issued shaving razor in his shorts. (Id. at 1757.) Cooper was unusually withdrawn and

edgy that day. (Id. at 1748.) Petitioner was preparing his shower materials when the guards

brought Cooper back to the module from the shower. (Id. at 1759.) He felt something was

going to happen and was watching the panel which controlled the cell doors. (Id.) When

Petitioner’s cell door opened he thought that Cooper was coming to attack him and that the

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guards had set it up. (Id. at 1760.) When his cell door opened Petitioner grabbed his razor, and

when Officer Ramos came towards his cell, Petitioner pushed his cell door open; Ramos fell

down attempting to close the door, and Petitioner ran into Cooper’s cell. (Id. at 1761-63.)

Petitioner thought Cooper was playing possum and wanted Petitioner to go into his cell to avoid

the cameras. (Id. at 1763.) Petitioner initiated the assault because he believed that sooner or

later that day the guards would set up an assault on him when he was unable to defend himself,

and because he thought the guards were conspiring to have him murdered. (Id. at 1764, 1768.)

Petitioner said he was acting in self-defense, and that he swung his razor at Cooper only three

or four times while Cooper was near the toilet where he might have retrieved a razor of his own.

(Id. at 1765-69.) Petitioner also stated that he believed he would be in danger of being assaulted

in the future by Black and Hispanic inmates if he did not attack Cooper when provided the

chance, because he would be perceived to be weak and a coward. (Id. at 1770-71, 1782.) On

cross-examination, Petitioner admitted that among the reasons he attacked Cooper was the

disrespect shown when Cooper, who had not been on the module as long as Petitioner, was

moved to a cell with a better view of the dayroom television. (Id. at 1780-82.)

James Esten, a retired California Department of Corrections employee currently working

as a correctional consultant, testified that he was familiar with prison gangs and their activities.

(Id. at 1800-06.) Esten said there is an obligation on members of a prison gang to bring balance

to the prison environment when it has become unbalanced by a disproportionate number of

assaults on one race by another. (Id. at 1809-10.) That obligation falls on the senior member

of the race which has been disproportionately assaulted, which in this case was Petitioner

because he was the only remaining Black inmate in the Bravo Module and was already serving

a prison term. (Id. at 1811-12.) Esten believed Petitioner would be the subject of an attack

under the circumstances testified to at trial, and said the administration of the jail should have

realized there was a threat and moved Petitioner to another module. (Id. at 1812.) In Esten’s

opinion Petitioner had no choice but to attack Cooper, given the fact that Petitioner was not

moved, and would have certainly been retaliated against by his own gang for failing to attack

Cooper. (Id. at 1813, 1824-25.) In Esten’s experience guards and correctional officers become

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involved in inmate assaults by staging fights, housing enemies next to each other in order to

release them on the yard together, providing inmates with alcohol and other contraband in

exchange for the inmate attacking other inmates, and by the accidental opening of cell doors.

(Id. at 1814-15.) The defense rested and there was no rebuttal. (Id. at 1847.)

Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations, and was

allowed to present closing argument himself. (Id. at 1955-56.) The jury was instructed (id. at

1957-84), the prosecutor presented closing argument (id. at 1984-95), followed by Petitioner’s

argument (id. at 1995-2010), and the prosecutor’s rebuttal (id. at 2010-16.) After deliberating

about four hours the jury found Petitioner guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, and found true

the allegation that he had personally used a deadly weapon while committing the offense. (Id.

at 2020-22, 2055-58.) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial judge found the prior conviction

allegations to be true. (Id. at 2064-65.)

Petitioner brought a motion for a new trial based on misconduct by two jurors who were

former correctional officers. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 526-40.) Petitioner argued that

one of those jurors described the layout of the jail to the other jurors during deliberations and

told them that the inmates control the jail by flexing their muscles because they outnumber the

guards, and that the other juror described how the control panels for the cell doors worked. (Id.)

The trial judge denied the motion, finding that although “it probably was misconduct” for the

two jurors to make the statements, there was no prejudice because it was undisputed at trial that

Petitioner’s cell door was opened through the fault of the guard. (Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s

Tr. at 2161-62.) Petitioner was sentenced to a state prison term of thirty years-to-life, ordered

to run consecutively to the term he was serving. (Id. at 2168; Lodgment No. 5, People v.

Thompson, No. D044829, slip op. at 18.)

IV.

PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

1. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment because appellate counsel failed to preserve for appeal federal constitutional claims

relating to his discriminatory prosecution defense. (Pet. at 6-6c.)

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2. The trial court abused it discretion in revoking Petitioner’s pro per status, resulting in

a denial of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. (Pet. at 7-7b.)

3. The trial court’s restriction of, and negative comments on, Petitioner’s evidence,

deprived Petitioner of his right to present a defense, to a fair trial and to due process, in violation

of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Pet. at 8-8a.)

4. Juror misconduct during deliberations demonstrates actual bias requiring reversal of

the conviction. (Pet. at 9-9a.)

V.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims do not merit habeas

relief. The Court therefore recommends that judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

A. Standard of Review.

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 1994) (emphasis added).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d):

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (1)-(2) (West Supp. 2006). 

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent: (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

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indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A decision may

involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case,” or “if the state court either unreasonably extends

a legal principle from precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. at 407.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.”

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United

States Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

Habeas relief is also available if the state court’s adjudication of a claim “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2) (West Supp. 2006). In order to satisfy this

provision, Petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state court’s

adjudication of his claims rest, assuming they rest on a factual determination, are objectively

unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

B. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to claim one.

In claim one, Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation

of the Sixth Amendment because his appellate counsel failed to preserve for appeal federal

constitutional claims relating to his discriminatory prosecution defense. (Pet. at 6-6c.)

Specifically, he argues that the Imperial County Sheriff’s administration fostered racial violence

at the jail, but shielded Hispanic gang members from criminal prosecution arising from incidents

such as the ones testified to at trial and the one he was involved in, whereas the Black inmates

would be prosecuted, even though the incidents were all videotaped. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner

contends his case would have been dismissed prior to trial on his pre-trial motion to dismiss on

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the basis of discriminatory prosecution but for the fact that the prosecution withheld evidence

relevant to that issue. (Id. at 6a.) He contends the trial judge was biased against him due to his

pro per status, and demonstrated that bias by restricting his ability to introduce evidence of

political motivation for the assaults by limiting his ability to question inmate Walker on direct

examination regarding that issue, and by stripping Petitioner of his power to subpoena relevant

records. (Id. at 6a-6b.) Petitioner states that his appellate counsel was non-responsive to his

numerous requests to raise these issues on appeal as federal constitutional claims, and to

investigate his allegation that the prosecution withheld evidence. (Id. at 6c.) He attributes

appellate counsel’s inaction “to a conflict of interest upon recognizing the economic feasability

of the conspiracies of law enforcement in the exploitation of the Black inmate population, and

the politics involved.” (Id.) 

Respondent contends that the denial of this claim by the state court on the basis that

Petitioner had failed to present a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel was

neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court

precedent. (Ans. Mem. at 7-8.) Respondent also argues that the claims which Petitioner

contends should have been raised by appellate counsel are based on matters outside the trial

record, and as such could only have been raised in the state appellate court in a habeas petition.

(Id. at 9-10.) Thus, because Petitioner has no right to counsel on collateral review, Respondent

argues that appellate counsel could not have violated Petitioner’s right to counsel by failing to

raise such claims, and that in any case appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise

claims which are without merit. (Id. at 9-10.)

Petitioner presented claim one to the state supreme court in a petition for review of the

opinion of the appellate court denying his habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 13.) That petition

was denied by an order which stated in full: “Petition for review DENIED.” (Lodgment No.

15, In re Thompson, No. S144233 (Cal. June 26, 2006).) Claim one was also presented to the

state appellate court in a habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 6.) That petition was denied in a twopage per curiam opinion. (Lodgment No. 7, In re Thompson, No. D046375 (Cal.Ct.App. June

20, 2005).)

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In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), the Court adopted a presumption which

gives no effect to unexplained state court orders but “looks through” them to the last reasoned

state court decision. The Court will therefore look through through the silent denial by the state

supreme court to the appellate court opinion. The appellate court stated:

In this petition, Thompson is again challenging his conviction. He asserts

various grounds for relief all of which stem from his claim that his assault crime

was provoked by prison guards for political reasons. We conclude Thompson has

failed to state a prima facie case for relief.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus must state a prima facie case for relief

or it will be denied. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 475.) To satisfy this

requirement, the petition must state fully and specifically the facts justifying relief.

It must also include reasonably available supporting evidence, including trial

transcripts and/or affidavits or declarations. (Id. at p. 474.) Conclusory

allegations made without any explanation of the basis for them do not support the

granting of relief or even an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)

In this case, the only evidence Thompson provides to support his political

provocation claim is newspaper articles and editorials. These documents are not

evidence. Even if these documents were evidence, they do not support

Thompson’s claim. At most, they show that some prison guards are corrupt. They

do not show that the prison guards involved in Thompson’s case were corrupt or

that they provoked his assault. [¶] The petition is denied.

(Lodgment No. 7, In re Thompson, No. D046375 at 1-2.) 

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective assistance

of counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that Strickland “has long been clearly

established federal law”); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (the Strickland standard

applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate and trial counsel). For ineffective

assistance of counsel to provide a basis for habeas relief, Petitioner must demonstrate two things.

First, he must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

“This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, he must show

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This requires a showing of a

reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on appeal. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285-86;

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001).

/ / /

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Respondent first argues that the issues encompassed in claim one could only have been

presented to the state appellate court in a habeas petition since they rely on matters outside the

trial record, and because Petitioner has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in his state habeas

proceedings, his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is without merit. (Ans. Mem.

at 9-10.) In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel “extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.” Id. at 555.

In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that there is no

right to appointment of counsel in state collateral proceedings or on discretionary appeals, but

left open the question of whether there is a constitutional right to appointment of counsel to

indigent prisoners in state collateral proceedings when collateral review is the first forum in

which a prisoner can challenge a conviction. Id. at 754-56. The Ninth Circuit has since rejected

the argument that because California requires certain claims to be presented in collateral

proceedings, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel on appeal extends to those types of collateral

proceedings. Jeffers v. Lewis, 68 F.3d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1995); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d

425, 429-431 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Accordingly, Petitioner did not have a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel

with respect to those issues which he sought to have appellate counsel raise which were

premised on matters outside the trial record. Included in this category are the allegations that

the prosecution withheld evidence relating to the discriminatory prosecution defense, and how

that affected the resolution of the pre-trial motion to dismiss. However, even to the extent

Petitioner had a right to counsel with respect to such claims, he is not entitled to habeas relief

because the claims are without merit for the reasons discussed below in claim three. 

With respect to the appellate issues which Petitioner requested appellate counsel to raise

which do not rely on matters outside the record, the Strickland standard applies for determining

whether appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present them. Robbins,

528 U.S. at 285. Such issues are included in the claim the trial judge showed bias against

Petitioner due to his pro per status by restricting his ability to introduce evidence of political

motivation for the assaults by limiting his ability to question inmate Walker on direct

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examination regarding that issue and by stripping Petitioner of his power to subpoena relevant

records. Appellate counsel actually raised a claim on direct appeal alleging that the trial judge

improperly interfered with Petitioner’s ability to fully present his defense of self-defense by

abusing his discretion in ruling that the video evidence of Walker’s second assault was

cumulative and would consume an undue amount of time “to very little effect.” (Lodgment No.

2 at 13-20.) Counsel also argued that the trial judge’s comments and criticism with respect to

the manner in which Petitioner presented his defense and with respect to the evidence presented

implied a bias against Petitioner. (Id. at 20-22.) As to these issues, Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because they were actually presented

to the appellate court and adjudicated on their merits. Moreover, for the reasons discussed below

with respect to claim three, which presents these same issues, Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate the existence of a bias by the trial judge or any prejudice to his defense flowing

from the trial judge’s comments or rulings.

To the extent there are additional issues, other than the ones discussed below with respect

to claims two and three, which Petitioner contends should have been raised on appeal but were

not, that is, additional examples of the trial judge making comments on or showing a bias

towards Petitioner’s defense, the state appellate court’s rejection of the claim on the basis that

Petitioner failed to make a prima facie case is an objectively reasonable application of

Strickland. As explained in claims two and three below, where the Court considers examples

given by Petitioner of alleged bias by the trial judge and prejudice to his ability to present his

defense, including those examples identified in claim one, Petitioner has not identified bias or

prejudice with respect to the manner in which he was treated by the trial judge. The Court also

considers in relation to claim three Petitioner’s contention that the trial judge interfered with his

ability to conduct discovery and subpoena records, and his contention that the prosecution

withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.”). Because Petitioner

has not identified any examples of prejudicial bias or interference with his ability to present his

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1

 Petitioner alludes to additional claims he contends his appellate counsel should have raised,

including an Eighth Amendment challenge to the use of California’s Three Strikes Law in imposing

sentence and ineffective assistance of trial counsel in sentencing. (See Pet. at 6a; Traverse at 2.) To the

extent Petitioner intended the vague references to sentencing to be individual examples of his appellate

counsel’s deficient performance, they are entirely conclusory and provide no basis for habeas relief.

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts do

not merit habeas relief). Neither were they raised in the state supreme court. (See Lodgment No. 13.)

In any case, the apparent basis for the sentencing claims appears to be the trial judge’s statement that

he did not prepare in advance of the sentencing hearing due to the unavailability of the court file,

coupled with Petitioner’s refusal to waive time and his demand for immediate sentencing. (Lodgment

No. 16, Reporter’s Tr. at 2166-67.) Petitioner has not alleged any facts regarding why his Eighth

Amendment rights were violated in this regard, nor has he identified any basis for a finding of deficient

performance by his trial counsel in the sentencing proceedings.

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discriminatory prosecution defense, he has not identified prejudice under Strickland flowing

from appellate counsel’s failure to present such claims. Thus, the appellate court’s rejection of

the claim did not involve an unreasonable application of Strickland, and the Court recommends

denying habeas relief. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Robbins, 528

U.S. at 285-86.1

C. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to claim two.

Petitioner contends in claim two that the trial court abused its discretion in prematurely

revoking his pro per status during the trial, resulting in a denial of his right of self-representation.

(Pet. at 7-7a.) Petitioner argues that he responded ambiguously to the trial judge’s warning that

he would lose his pro per status if he continued to disobey the ruling that he could not elicit

further testimony from inmate Walker regarding the political motivation for his prosecution and

guilty plea. (Id.) Petitioner contends the trial judge should have stopped the proceedings and

conducted a hearing to determine whether he intended to obey the ruling before revoking his pro

per status. (Id.) He contends the trial judge acted to protect the interest of the judge’s wife, an

employee of the district attorney’s office, which could have been implicated in civil or criminal

liability arising from a showing that political motivation was behind the discriminatory

prosecution of inmates at the county jail. (Id.) 

Respondent contends that the trial court was extremely patient with Petitioner throughout

the proceedings, which were delayed by a long list of improper procedures by Petitioner,

culminating in his refusal to abide by the trial court’s ruling near the end of the trial. (Ans.

Mem. at 10-14.) Respondent argues that the state court’s denial of the claim on that basis was

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neither contrary to nor involved an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law as set forth in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which Respondent contends

provides that a trial judge may terminate self-representation of a defendant who deliberately

engages in obstructionist misconduct. (Ans. Mem. at 14-15.) 

The Court will look through the silent denial of claim two by the state supreme court to

the appellate court opinion, which stated:

The revocation occurred towards the end of Thompson’s questioning of

inmate Walker. Thompson questioned Walker on direct examination. During

cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Walker about his prior felony conviction

for assault on a correctional officer. On redirect examination, Thompson sought

to elicit details about the incident underlying the felony conviction. The court

sustained the prosecutor’s relevancy objection to the question. Undeterred,

Thompson continued asking questions about Walker’s prior felony conviction.

Sustaining further objections by the prosecutor, the court explained to Thompson

that Walker’s prior conviction was admitted only for impeachment, and ruled that

Thompson could not delve into issues surrounding the prior conviction.

[Footnote: The facts underlying Walker’s prior conviction for assault on a

correctional officer apparently arose in the context of the October 19 retaliatory

assault by Walker on a Hispanic. Thompson’s continued questioning sought to

explore why the prosecutor charged Walker with assault on a correctional officer

and Walker’s motivation for accepting a plea bargain.] The court instructed

Thompson to stop asking questions on the subject.

Thompson persisted and asked another question about the prior conviction.

The court then told Thompson: “I’m not going to allow you to ask anymore

questions on that. [¶] If you insist on doing that, if you insist on disobeying my

rulings, I’ll have to take some action to bring in your standby counsel and to

replace you.” Thompson responded: “That’s what you[‘re] going to have to do.”

The court stated: “I’m sorry, what?” Thompson repeated: “Then that’s what

you[‘re] going to have to do, Your Honor.” The court then revoked Thompson’s

right of self representation and instructed standby counsel to represent him. The

trial court granted defense counsel’s request for a continuance until the following

week to allow counsel time to prepare the remainder of the case.

A trial court must allow a defendant to represent himself if the defendant

knowingly and intelligently makes an unequivocal and timely request. (People

v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 97-98.) However, once granted, the right of selfrepresentation is not a “‘license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural

and substantive law.’” (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 8.) The right of

self-representation may be terminated if a defendant engages in “‘deliberate

dilatory or obstructive behavior’ (that) threatens to subvert ‘the core concept of

a trial’ . . . or to compromise the court’s ability to conduct a fair trial . . . .” (Id. at p. 10.) When determining whether termination is appropriate, the trial court

should consider such factors as the nature of the misconduct, its impact on the trial

proceedings, the availability of alternative sanctions, whether the defendant was

warned that particular misconduct will result in termination, and whether the

defendant intentionally sought to disrupt or delay the trial. (Ibid.) Each case must

be evaluated in its own context, and on appeal we apply the abuse of discretion

standard. (Id. at pp. 10, 12.) 

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Here, Thompson continued a line of questioning he was expressly told to

stop. The court warned him that if he continued to disobey the ruling, standby

counsel would replace him. In response, Thompson plainly told the court to

implement the replacement. Based on his words and conduct, Thompson made

clear to the court that he would not follow the evidentiary ruling, and he would

rather have standby counsel representing him than obey the ruling. Certainly the

“core concept of a trial” is obstructed if the court’s rulings are not obeyed. Given

Thompson’s refusal to comply with the ruling, the court’s decision to revoke his

right of self-representation was a reasonable exercise of its discretion.

The reasonableness of the court’s ruling is further underscored when the

record is viewed in its entirety. Prior to the revocation, Thompson represented

himself during all the pretrial proceedings, the entire prosecution case, and a

substantial portion of the defense case. The court patiently allowed Thompson to

handle his case as he deemed appropriate. There are no indications that the court

considered revoking Thompson’s right of self-representation at any point until

Thompson expressly defied the court’s ruling. Further, the court allowed

Thompson to again represent himself during closing arguments to the jury. It is

evident that the court understood the importance of Thompson’s right of selfrepresentation and only retracted that right temporarily when necessary to

maintain control of the trial.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Thompson, No. D044829, slip op. at 6-8.)

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing the right to selfrepresentation is set forth in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the United

States Supreme Court held that the structure of the Sixth Amendment impliedly grants to the

accused personally the right to make his defense, and that the Sixth Amendment therefore

necessarily implies a right to self-representation. Id. at 819-21. A state violates a criminal

defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation when it forces him to accept a stateappointed attorney after he knowingly and intelligently waives his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel and clearly and unequivocally declares a desire to represent himself. Id. at 835-36.

However, as the state court here correctly recognized, a “trial judge may terminate selfrepresentation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist

misconduct.” Id. at 834 n.46. 

The state appellate court recognized and applied the principles just described. The record

supports the appellate court’s finding that the trial judge was patient with Petitioner. (See e.g.

Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s Tr. at 1522 (“And I want the record to reflect . . . the fact that

[Petitioner] sometimes spends an enormous amount of time between questions. So that the

record itself would read a certain way, but it wouldn’t reflect the amount of time that’s being

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consumed here.”); id. at 1529 (“I am not supposed to treat you any different than if you had an

attorney, and it dawns on me I would never let an attorney drag something like this out this

long.”).) Petitioner was permitted to represent himself for the entire pre-trial process and nearly

the entire trial, with the exception only of that portion of the trial where Petitioner explicitly

refused to abide by the trial judge’s ruling. (Id. at 1557-59.) The trial judge permitted Petitioner

to resume his pro per status and present closing arguments once the trial testimony closed and

Petitioner’s ability to defy the trial judge’s ruling ended. Thus, Petitioner was given more

leeway than an attorney would have been given throughout the trial, and it was only toward the

end of trial that the judge told Petitioner that if he continued to disobey his ruling he would

revoke his self-representation status. In response to the trial judge’s warning that he would

appoint standby counsel to take over the defense if Petitioner refused to obey his ruling,

Petitioner told the trial judge three times: “Then that’s what you [are] going to have to do.”

(Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s Tr. at 1559.) Petitioner contends his response was ambiguous and

the trial judge should have stopped the proceedings and conducted a hearing to determine

whether he intended to obey the ruling. (Pet. at 7.) Petitioner’s response clearly was not

ambiguous.

Revoking Petitioner’s pro per status for directly refusing to abide by the trial judge’s

ruling was consistent with Faretta. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (a “trial judge may terminate

self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist

misconduct.”) Petitioner has not demonstrated bias or pretext by the trial judge in limiting the

scope of Walker’s testimony. Rather, Walker actually testified that in his opinion Black inmates

involved in assaults at the jail were treated unfairly because they were charged with misconduct

but the Hispanic inmates were not. (Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s Tr. at 1544-45.) Walker’s

subjective reasons for accepting the plea deal, even if relevant to the discriminatory prosecution

issue, would, as the trial judge ruled, be cumulative to that testimony. Petitioner’s allegation that

the trial judge harbored bias in order to protect his wife from scandal should it be discovered that

the district attorney’s office was involved in the alleged discriminatory prosecutions, is wholly

unsupported. Petitioner has not demonstrated that his direct and adamant refusal to follow the

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trial judge’s ruling was excusable, was used as a pretext for revoking his pro per status, or was

in any way outside the scope of the discretion set forth in Faretta for revoking a defendant’s pro

per status.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state appellate court’s adjudication of claim two was

neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court therefore

recommends habeas relief be denied as to claim two.

D. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to claim three.

In claim three, Petitioner contends that the trial court’s restriction of, and negative

comments on, his evidence, deprived him of his right to present a defense, to a fair trial and to

due process, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Pet. at 8-8a.)

Specifically, he contends that: (1) the trial judge limited the length of a videotape of the Walker

assault which Petitioner was allowed to show the jury, which prevented the jury from seeing

blood on Petitioner’s hands; (2) the trial judge referred to Petitioner’s evidence of discriminatory

prosecution and his evidence corroborating his version of the assault as marginal, lacking

probative value and wasting time; and (3) Petitioner’s attempt to testify as to his personal

knowledge that the guards “had something to do with” the assaults and with opening the cell

doors, was prevented when the trial judge sustained a prosecution objection that such testimony

was speculative, despite the fact that Petitioner had gained personal knowledge of guard

misconduct through prior civil litigation against the jail administration. (Id. at 8-8a.) The Court

will also consider the contentions raised in claim one that the prosecution withheld evidence

relevant to the discriminatory prosecution defense, and that the trial judge interfered with

Petitioner’s subpoena power. (Id. at 6-6a.)

The Court will look through the state supreme court’s silent denial of this claim to the

appellate court opinion, which stated:

Thompson argues the court erred in excluding evidence regarding violence

by Hispanics against African-American inmate Walker. As noted, Thompson

presented evidence regarding two incidents of violence perpetrated against Walker

by Hispanics: one incident occurring when Walker’s arm was cut through a tray

slot, and the other incident occurring when a cell door suddenly opened and

Walker was attacked in the corridor. The jury was allowed to view a portion of

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a jail surveillance video showing the corridor attack. Thompson asserts the trial

court (1) erroneously excluded the remainder of the corridor video (which video

was about one hour in length), and (2) erroneously excluded a video showing

Thompson helping Walker wrap Walker’s bloody arm after the tray slot cutting

incident.

At trial, Thompson argued that the corridor video was relevant because it

allowed the jury to see the correctional officer’s action of “racking” (i.e., opening)

the cell door to allow the Hispanic inmate out. The court admitted this portion of

the corridor video, but excluded the remainder of the corridor video as well as the

arm-wrapping video on the basis that they were cumulative and unduly timeconsuming under Evidence Code section 352.

We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717.)

Thompson has not described any images in the excluded portions of the

corridor video which support his defense. We have viewed the video and see

nothing helpful to his case other than what was shown to the jury. The court did

not abuse its discretion in excluding the remainder of the corridor video.

As to the arm-wrapping video, Walker testified that when his arm was cut,

Thompson assisted him by providing a wet towel through a tray slot for Walker

to wrap his arm. Thompson argued the video should be admitted because it

showed Thompson “actually bringing in these articles of linen with blood all over

it,” which affected his state of mind at the time he attacked Cooper.

Assuming arguendo that the court should have allowed the jury to see the

arm-wrapping video to support Thompson’s claim that he feared an attack by

Hispanic gang members, including Cooper (see People v. Minifie (1996) 13

Cal.4th 1055, 1065-1069), the error was not prejudicial. Both Walker and

Thompson testified that Thompson assisted Walker when his arm was cut.

Thompson described his observations of Walker’s arm injuries, stating that

Walker’s arm was deeply cut and that he (Thompson) tried to restrict the bleeding

by giving Walker a wet piece of linen from his bed. Photographs of Walker’s arm

injuries were admitted into evidence; Thompson was shown the photographs and

stated he observed the injuries. Thus, the jury was apprised of the extent of

Walker’s injuries, and informed that Thompson saw the injuries. A video showing

Thompson’s observation of Walker’s blood would not have provided the jury with

additional evidence significant enough to affect its ultimate decision in the case.

Because there is no reasonable probability that jury would have reached a

different result had it seen the arm-wrapping video, reversal is not warranted even

if there was error. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089.)

Without any specific citation to the record, Thompson also asserts that the

court restricted his examination of Walker regarding these two incidents. The

argument is unavailing. The record shows the court permitted full questioning of

Walker regarding the incidents.

Thompson argues error arising from exclusion of the videos was

compounded because the court evinced a bias against him by criticizing him for

wasting too much time and by characterizing his evidence as irrelevant. We are

not persuaded. The record shows the court allowed Thompson substantial leeway

in his presentation of evidence, but sought to control the proceedings when the

court ascertained he was belaboring marginally relevant or irrelevant matters. The

jurors would have understood that the court was merely exercising its judicial

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function in the context of a pro per defendant and was not personally criticizing

or showing a bias against Thompson.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Thompson, No. D044829, slip op. at 8-11.)

State evidentiary rulings do not give rise to claims cognizable on a federal habeas

proceeding unless the evidentiary ruling violated Petitioner’s due process right to a fair trial.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991); Gordon. v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir.

1990). In order to establish a due process violation, Petitioner must show that the trial court’s

rulings were so prejudicial that they rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Ortiz-Sandoval v.

Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 1996); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.

1991). 

Petitioner first contends the trial judge limited the length of a videotape of the Walker

assault which Petitioner was allowed to show the jury, which prevented the jury from seeing

blood on Petitioner’s hands. (Pet. at 8.) The appellate court correctly found that such evidence

was cumulative. The trial court allowed the jury to view a video of the assault on Walker when

he was coming back from court and a door was mistakenly opened and another inmate charged

him. (Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s Tr. at 1550-51.) Petitioner testified that he witnessed that

attack, which was depicted in the portion of the video shown to the jury, that the video was an

accurate description of the events, and he described the incident to the jury with the aid of a

photograph of the Bravo Module published to the jury. (Id. at 1740.) Petitioner has failed to

identify here or in state court why the other portions of that video were relevant to his defense.

There is also no indication that Petitioner had Walker’s blood on his hands after that assault.

Rather, Petitioner contends it was the time when Walker reached into an Hispanic inmate’s cell

and was cut with a razor that Petitioner had Walker’s blood on his hands. The trial judge ruled

that the video of that incident was cumulative. (Id. at 1552.) Walker testified that he was giving

water to an Hispanic inmate through a food port when the inmate slashed Walker’s arm with a

razor, and that Petitioner wrapped Walker’s arm in a wet towel just before Walker was taken for

medical treatment. (Id. at 1540-42.) Petitioner testified that Walker came to Petitioner’s cell

immediately after the assault and that he observed Walker’s wounds when he assisted Walker

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in stopping the bleeding. (Id. at 1734.) Petitioner described Walker’s wounds to the jury, and

the jury was shown photographs of the wounds, which Petitioner authenticated. (Id. at 1735-37.)

Thus, consistent with the trial judge’s rulings, the video of Petitioner helping Walker stop

his bleeding was cumulative, and that portion of the video of the Walker assault which did not

depict the actual assault was irrelevant. The state appellate court’s finding that the portion of

the video of the first incident would not have provided “additional evidence significant enough

to affect” the jury’s verdict, and the finding that “there is no reasonable probability that jury

would have reached a different result had it seen the arm-wrapping video,” was therefore neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was

not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Petitioner next argues that the trial judge unfairly referred to his discriminatory

prosecution evidence and the evidence corroborating his version of the assaults, as marginal,

lacking probative value and wasting time. (Pet. at 8.) He also contends his attempt to testify as

to his personal knowledge that the guards “had something to do with” the assaults and with

opening the cell doors, was unfairly prevented when the trial judge sustained a prosecution

objection that such testimony was speculation despite the fact that Petitioner had gained personal

knowledge of guard misconduct through separate litigation brought by Petitioner against the jail

administration. (Id. at 8-8a.) In support of this claim, Petitioner refers to the following passage

when he was on the witness stand giving direct testimony. He contends it shows that the trial

judge limited his ability to present his defense that he was afraid that an assault on his person

was imminent, and that the judge denigrated the defense to the jury:

Defense Counsel: Is it your position that you felt that the guards were – had something

to do with these other assaults?

Petitioner: Yes sir.

Defense Counsel: What did you believe – what role do you believe that they played?

Prosecutor: Objection, lacks foundation, calls for speculation.

Defense Counsel: My next question is going to be foundational.

The Court: Repeat the question.

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Defense Counsel: Why is it that you believe that the guards had anything to do with

these prior racking of the doors?

Petitioner: Well, based upon the fact, like I say –

Prosecutor: Objection, it calls for speculation.

The Court: It is speculation. I would have to sustain that objection.

Defense Counsel: I think it’s a foundational question. If his answer does involve

speculation, the Court can strike it.

Prosecutor: Your Honor, as –

The Court: You are not going to establish that he had knowledge of this before it

happened. He’ll give his theory of what happened, and that’s just

speculation.

Defense Counsel: I believe that he did testify that he personally observed one of the

doors open.

The Court: One of the doors opened. But how does that mean that somebody is

intentionally trying to set up the situation? [¶] That’s the speculation.

Defense Counsel: During your conversation with Officer Covin did he ever say

anything that led you to believe that the guards would assist in any

attack upon you or any other black?

Prosecutor: Objection, calls for hearsay.

Defense Counsel: State of mind, Your Honor.

The Court: I think we’re going – we are getting into a lot of hearsay on this idea of

state of mind – going to the state of mind. But you can’t establish how the

guards acted through his state of mind. [¶] So I’m going to sustain that

objection.

(Id. at 1745-46.) 

Immediately thereafter Petitioner testified that he held the subjective belief, based on his

conversations with and warnings from Officer Covin, and based on the assaults on Walker which

he knew of and those he witnessed, that he was going to be assaulted by another inmate soon,

that the guards were going to set it up, and that he would likely be handcuffed and unable to

defend himself when it happened. (Id. at 1746-47.) He testified that he initiated the assault on

Cooper because he believed that the guards were setting him up to be assaulted by Cooper, or

intended to do so later that day when he was unable to defend himself, and that he thought the

guards were conspiring to have him murdered. (Id. at 1764, 1768.) Thus, the trial judge’s

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2

 The Oxford English Dictionary lists a primary definition of “speculate” as “to theorize upon.”

See Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Ed. 1989). Because Petitioner’s theory was just that, a theory,

which he was attempting to prove to the jury through his own observations and the observations and

opinions of Covin, Walker and his expert witness, the trial judge’s characterization was accurate.

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limitation of Petitioner’s testimony as to his opinion of the subjective state of mind of the guards

did not prevent him from testifying that he believed the guards were planning to set up an

assault. 

The trial judge did, however, characterize as speculation, in front of the jury, Petitioner’s

version of the guards’ involvement in the assaults at the jail. That is, the trial judge announced

that Petitioner’s belief that the guards intentionally opened or “racked” the cell doors in order

to deliberately provide inmates with the opportunity to assault each other, was speculation. The

trial judge’s characterization was neither inaccurate nor prejudicial. Petitioner’s defense was

based on the theory that he was acting in self-defense or was entrapped by the guards, and

Officer Covin provided testimony in support of this theory, as did Petitioner, Walker, and

Petitioner’s expert witness. The jury was instructed on Petitioner’s defense theory and was free

to believe his version. (Id. at 1972-76.) Petitioner argued his theory to the jury. (Id. at 2003-

09.) The trial judge’s observation that Petitioner was speculating that the guards were

intentionally permitting the assaults to occur was an accurate characterization of the state of the

evidence, and the judge’s comments did not preclude the jury from finding Petitioner’s theory

to be true, nor in any way suggested to the jury it was false.2

Petitioner argues that his belief was not speculation because he was at the time of trial,

and is now, in possession of evidence which proves that the guards deliberately racked cell doors

in order to cause assaults. (Pet. at 8-8a.) However, as the state court noted, this “evidence” is

not evidence at all, but consists of opinions in the form of newspaper articles and investigative

reports supported by the same or similar facts which Petitioner used to support his opinion at

trial that the guards deliberately arranged fights. (Id.; see also Attachments to Lodgment Nos.

6, 10-11; Pet’s Notice of Lodgment [Doc. No. 5] Ex. A.) At most these documents support the

speculative, subjective belief that the guards acted intentionally. Absent direct admission by a

guard that he or she deliberately opened a cell door in order to facilitate an assault, Petitioner’s

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opinion, and those of the newspaper reports and other documents alluded to by Petitioner, is

accurately characterized as speculation. 

Petitioner argues that if he had not been denied adequate pre-trial discovery, such as

access to or use of the personnel and disciplinary files of the guards, or if the prosecution had

not unlawfully withheld evidence relating to his theory, his speculation would have ripened into

fact. (Pet. at 8-8a.) However, the state court correctly found that Petitioner was provided a full

and fair opportunity to prove his theory to the jury. The record contains Petitioner’s numerous

motions for discovery, the prosecution’s oppositions to those motions, as well as the motions

to quash Petitioner’s subpoenas, the resolution of which took more than a year. (Lodgment No.

1, Clerk’s Tr. at 13-490.) Standby counsel made a motion for mistrial immediately after taking

over the defense on the basis that Petitioner had failed to bring appropriate discovery motions

or to properly argue the discovery motions he had brought. (Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s Tr.

at 1704.) 

Petitioner refers in particular to a discovery motion he filed in which he sought documents

identifying any incidents in a period of three years where inmates at the Imperial County Jail

were referred to the district attorney’s office for prosecution. (Pet. at 6a; Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. at 324-44.) A hearing was held as to his request where the prosecution indicated it

had turned over records of all referrals from the Imperial County Sheriff’s Office to the district

attorney’s office for evaluation regarding the possibility of prosecution of inmates from

approximately October 2003 to January 2004. (Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s Tr. at 903.) The

prosecution stated that it understood Petitioner was contending that Black inmates were being

prosecuted and Hispanic inmates were not, and stated that although they had initially objected

to Petitioner’s discovery demand on the basis that his request for records from a three-year

period was overly broad and burdensome, they had met and conferred with Petitioner and

narrowed the request down to approximately three months’ worth of information. (Id. at 904-

05.) The prosecution stated that they had turned over the information regarding the referrals and

had identified which inmates were prosecuted. (Id. at 911-12.) Petitioner objected that the

materials he received were “not consistent with the information that was requested,” but did not

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explain why the materials were deficient. (Id. at 910.) The trial judge very patiently allowed

Petitioner several attempts to articulate the basis for his belief as to why the discovery was

incomplete or had otherwise violated the judge’s discovery order. (Id. at 905-12.) The trial

judge then made the following ruling:

The court can only make the following statement: The people are representing

that they have complied with the court’s order regarding discovery. I have

inquired of Mr. Thompson for his position regarding that. As best I can make out,

he’s objecting because the discovery that was ordered has not been provided to

him, but I cannot determine what the basis is for Mr. Thompson’s position nor

what evidence or information exists that would cause him to feel that there has

been lack of compliance. I just cannot say anything more than that. So there’s

insufficient evidence before me to make any ruling that there has not been

compliance.

(Id. at 912.)

Although Petitioner once again contends the prosecution failed to produce the requested

materials (Pet. at 6a), he once again fails to identify any specific errors attributable to anyone

other than himself in the voluminous record of his attempts to obtain discovery of documents

supporting his discriminatory prosecution defense. Rather, it appears any failure in his ability

to conduct discovery was based on his inability to properly seek discovery, for which he cannot

now complain. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (“The right of self-representation is not a . . .

license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”) 

Petitioner has also failed to support his allegation that the prosecution withheld evidence

material to his defense in violation of Brady. Petitioner did in fact present strong evidence that

the only way an attack could happen in the structured setting of the Bravo Module was if the

guards permitted it, either intentionally or accidentally. Although the guard in Petitioner’s

incident claimed the cell door was opened by mistake, the history of “mistakes” by the guards

which led to Petitioner’s incident was well-documented by Petitioner at trial. Both he and

Walker testified that it had happened to them, and the jury was shown a video of it happening

to Walker. Officer Covin testified that one of the assaults on Petitioner by an Hispanic inmate

was caused when the Hispanic inmate was “wrongly” released on the yard behind Petitioner.

(Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s Tr. at 1519-20.) In addition, Petitioner’s expert witness testified

that assaults caused by “accidentally” opening cell doors is one method guards use to assist an

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inmate who wishes to attack another inmate. (Id. at 1815.) Although Petitioner criticizes the

ruling of the trial judge granting a motion to quash subpoenas Petitioner issued on the basis that

they were overly broad and not legally issued (id. at 1007; Pet. at 6a), he once again fails to

identify a basis for his contention that the ruling was erroneous or evinced a bias by the trial

judge. In any case, as discussed below with respect to the juror misconduct claim, it is clear that

the verdict was not effected by a determination whether the guard opened the door to Petitioner’s

cell intentionally or accidentally. Thus, the lack of any objective proof of the subjective state

of mind of the guards, assuming it existed and Petitioner was prevented from presenting it

through an error by the trial court in its rulings on Petitioner’s discovery requests or the

prosecution’s motions to quash his subpoenas or withholding of evidence, was not so prejudicial

that it rendered Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 897; Jammal,

926 F.2d at 919.

Moreover, even if Petitioner were able to come forward with direct evidence of the

guards’ subjective intent, the state appellate court correctly observed that: “[T]he fact that

Thompson initiated the attack against Cooper, under circumstances where Cooper was

handcuffed and made no movements towards Thompson, provided strong evidence to defeat

Thompson’s claim of self-defense. (See People v. Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1068; In re

Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 783 (danger must appear to be immediate and present to

support self-defense).) (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Thompson, No. D044829, slip op. at 15.)

The record contains additional evidence that Petitioner attacked Cooper for reasons other than

self defense. This included testimony by Petitioner and his expert witness that there is a code

of behavior for inmate gang members in prisons and jails which is based on respect, that

Petitioner had a duty to carry out retaliatory assaults on rival gang members, and that he would

have been perceived to be weak and a coward if he didn’t attack Cooper. (Lodgment No. 16,

Reporter’s Tr. at 1714-19, 1770-71, 1782, 1810.) Although Petitioner used this as evidence

supporting the reasonableness of his belief that he would be assaulted or that Cooper would

attack him, it also weakened his self-defense theory by providing another explanation why he

would attack Cooper when he was handcuffed and defenseless. Petitioner also admitted that

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among the reasons he attacked Cooper was the disrespect shown when Cooper, who had not

been on the module as long as Petitioner, was moved to a cell with a better view of the dayroom

television. (Id. at 1780-82.) 

Finally, Petitioner contends the trial judge interfered with his ability to prove that Black

inmates are disproportionately prosecuted compared to Hispanic inmates when prosecutions

arise from assaults at the Imperial County Jail. Specifically, he contends the trial judge refused

to permit Walker to testify as to why the “took the deal” when he was prosecuted for assaulting

a correctional officer, and interfered with his ability to subpoena records which might have

supported the defense or the pre-trial motion to dismiss. (Pet. at 6a-6b.) Assuming Walker

would have testified that he took the deal because he knew, as a Black inmate, that he would be

prosecuted harshly due to the discriminatory prosecution history at the Imperial County Jail, his

subjective belief would not have established discriminatory prosecution. United States v.

Armstrong, 517 U.S 456, 465 (1996) (holding that in order to prevail on a discriminatory

prosecution claim, a defendant must show a prosecutorial policy which had a discriminatory

effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292

(1987) (holding that a defendant “must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with

discriminatory purpose.”) (emphasis in original). 

Even assuming Walker’s testimony was relevant in regard to Petitioner’s discriminatory

prosecution claim or his political motivation argument, Walker actually testified that the Black

inmates involved in assaults at the jail were treated unfairly because they were charged with

misconduct but the Hispanic inmates were not. (Lodgment No. 16, Reporter’s Tr. at 1544-45.)

To the extent Petitioner contends he could have correlated all Black/Hispanic assaults where an

inmate was prosecuted, and shown that because each incident was videotaped there was no

innocent explanation for the district attorney’s decision to prosecute Black inmates more often

than Hispanic inmates, he has, as set forth above, failed to identify any reason for his failure to

obtain such evidence during pre-trial discovery, other than its lack of existence or his own

inability to properly manage discovery procedures. Petitioner has not identified any specific

incident of misconduct by the trial court or the prosecutor in the voluminous record of pre-trial

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discovery which affected his ability to obtain evidence regarding his discriminatory prosecution

or political motivation claims. 

In his Traverse, Petitioner clarifies that his discriminatory prosecution claim was based

on the fact that he had been transferred to the Imperial County Jail for the purpose of being

prosecuted for assaults on prison guards which he allegedly committed while in prison.

(Traverse at 2.) He apparently contends the guards at the jail set up his assault on Cooper as a

result of political motivations driven either by retaliation for Petitioner having assaulted the

prison guards, or in response to Petitioner’s attempt to expose the racial inequity in the decisions

by the jail administration to prosecute Black inmates disproportionately to Hispanic inmates.

(Id.) Although Petitioner contends his motion to dismiss the charges against him on this basis

was denied “arbitrarily” and “without honest or thorough consideration by the court” (id. at 3),

he identifies no specific facts which would support a finding that his motion to dismiss the

charges was improperly denied. Neither does he identify any specific example of bias or

interference with his ability to conduct discovery regarding this aspect of his discriminatory

prosecution defense.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a due process

violation resulting from the alleged manner in which the trial court limited his ability to conduct

his defense, commented at the trial regarding his evidence, or ruled on discovery motions or his

attempts to subpoena records. Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 897; Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. The

state court’s adjudication of claim three on the basis that Petitioner was not prejudiced by any

of the trial court’s rulings or comments was therefore neither contrary to, nor involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-07.

E. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to claim four.

Petitioner contends in claim four that juror misconduct during deliberations demonstrates

actual bias requiring reversal of his conviction. (Pet. at 9-9a.) He claims that two of the jurors

were former correctional officers, and that one described the atmosphere of the jail to the other

jurors during deliberations while the other advised the jury how the control panels for the cell

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doors worked. (Id.) Petitioner argues that these jurors lied during voir dire when they stated

they could set aside their correctional officer experience and prior relationships with the

prosecution’s witnesses with whom they had worked before retiring, which infringed upon his

right to challenge the jurors either for cause or by use of peremptory challenges. (Id.) Petitioner

contends the misconduct established an actual bias, and that the appellate court erred in finding

the misconduct harmless. (Id.) Respondent contends that the findings by the state appellate and

trial courts that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the misconduct are neither contrary to, nor

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Ans. Mem. at 21-22.)

The appellate court denied the claim, stating:

We agree with Thompson that the juror statements referring to their

correctional officer experience constituted the improper presentation of

extrajudicial information to the jury during deliberations. [Footnote: On appeal,

the People argue that the jurors’s statement regarding the inmates controlling the

jail was an inadmissible statement of the juror’s mental processes. To the

contrary, the statement does not describe the juror’s reasoning underlying his vote,

but provides information on the conditions at the jails.] However, we conclude,

as did the trial court, that there is no substantial likelihood of juror bias. As noted

by the trial court, there was no dispute that a correctional officer opened the cell

door, and there was no controversy regarding whether the inmates had more

control over the jail than did correctional officers. The defense case was premised

on the theory that correctional officers were intentionally creating opportunities

for inmate assaults to occur. A comment that inmates, not correctional officers,

control the jails could actually benefit the defense by suggesting that the officers

were compliant and acceded to inmate requests for opportunities to assault each

other, thus adding legitimacy to Thompson’s claimed fear of an assault by Cooper

when a correctional officer opened his cell door.

Thompson argues that reversal is required for juror bias because the

correctional officer who stated his opinion about inmate control of the jails had

represented during voir dire that he would not decide the case based on his

experience as a correctional officer. He posits that the statement during

deliberations referencing his correctional officer experience reveals actual juror

bias. We are not persuaded. When the issues of this particular case are examined,

we are satisfied the comment shows no such bias. As we stated, the comment had

no particular relevance to the issues in the case and it could even be construed as

beneficial to the defense to the extent it suggests Thompson had a legitimate fear

of assault by an inmate.

To the extent Thompson asserts that the correctional officer juror’s

description of how the door control panel worked constituted prejudicial

misconduct, the argument is unavailing. The trial court readily found this

statement caused no prejudice. We agree. A mere description of how the control

panel worked, standing on its own, does not provide any information inherently

likely to have influenced a juror nor does it show a juror was actually biased

against Thompson.

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Finally, the fact that Thompson initiated the attack against Cooper, under

circumstances where Cooper was handcuffed and made no movements towards

Thompson, provided strong evidence to defeat Thompson’s claim of self-defense.

(See People v. Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1068; In re Christian S. (1994) 7

Cal.4th 768, 783 (danger must appear to be immediate and present to support selfdefense).) The strength of the evidence against Thompson further shows there is

no substantial likelihood that the jurors’ statements referring to their correctional

officer experience influenced the jury’s vote.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Thompson, No. D044829, slip op. at 13-15.)

Petitioner has a Sixth Amendment right to trial by a jury in which the verdict is based on

evidence presented at the trial. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965). This right

is implicated if a jury is “exposed to prejudicial extrinsic information . . . during jury

deliberation.” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002); Sassounian v. Roe, 230

F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). In United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1979), the

Court, in a matter of first impression, announced that when extrinsic evidence is introduced in

the jury room, a defendant is entitled to a new trial “if there existed a reasonable possibility that

the extrinsic material could have affected the verdict.” Id. at 193. The Court noted that a trial

judge has an obligation to determine the extent to which jurors saw or discussed extrinsic

evidence, but should not investigate the subjective effects on the jurors, and should reach the

determination whether there was a reasonable possibility of prejudice “without the benefit of

juror opinions which might negate or affirm a conclusion of actual harm.” Id. at 194.

The Vasquez test was applied to review of state court judgments under section 2254 in

Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1980), decided before AEDPA was enacted. The

Gibson Court recognized that although Vasquez involved a direct appeal of a federal district

court trial, and it was arguable that its holding had been predicated on federal court’s supervisory

powers, the test for determining the effect of impermissibly considered evidence which is set

forth in Vasquez was in fact constitutionally compelled by Supreme Court authority set forth in

Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), Sheppard

v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) and Irvin v. Dowd, 366

U.S. 717 (1961). See Gibson, 633 F.2d at 854. The Court in Gibson also noted that the

“reasonable possibility” test of Vasquez “is equivalent in severity” to the harmless beyond a

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reasonable doubt test of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), which is typically

applied by state trial courts to federal constitutional errors. Gibson, 633 F.2d at 853. The Court

in Gibson concluded that the state trial judge should have applied the Vasquez/Chapman test to

determine whether it could be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt the extrinsic material did

not contribute to the verdict. Id. at 855. Although Gibson simply granted habeas relief once it

found that the trial court had erred in that respect, subsequent Ninth Circuit authority mandates

application of the harmless error test articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623

(1993) after finding that a state court’s adjudication of a claim was contrary to or involved an

unreasonable application of Chapman. Inthavong v. LaMarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1060-61 (9th

Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1660 (2006). 

The Court is compelled by Ninth Circuit authority to apply clearly established federal law

as set forth in Gibson. See LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting

that Ninth Circuit cases may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining what law is

“clearly established.”); see also Mancuso, 292 F.3d at 949-50 (applying clearly established

federal law under AEDPA as found in Gibson and Brecht to a claim that a juror tampered with

trial exhibit to discover defendant had a prior conviction); Sassounian, 230 F.3d at 1108-11

(same with respect to jury discussion of a telephone call which the jury became aware of when

overhearing the sidebar where it was ruled inadmissible). However, even if Petitioner can

demonstrate that the state court’s determination that the error here was harmless is objectively

unreasonable under clearly established federal law as set forth in Gibson, habeas relief is not

available unless Petitioner can also demonstrate that the statements of the jurors had a substantial

or injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Sassounian, 230 F.3d at 1108 (holding that

harmless error standard of Brecht applies to claims of jury’s consideration of extraneous

evidence).

Petitioner presented the declaration of four jurors in support of his motion for a new trial.

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 554-57.) Three of those jurors stated that they and “the vast

majority” of the other jurors believed that the guards intentionally opened Petitioner’s cell door

in order to permit the assault to occur. (Id.) They also stated that one of the jurors had described

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how the control panel for the cell doors worked. (Id.) The fourth juror, one of the former

correctional officers, stated that he “advised the jury how the control door panels worked based

on my experience as a correctional officer.” (Id. at 555.) He also stated that he believed the jail

authorities “were at least negligent” in the handling of the incident. (Id.)

The appellate court found that: “A mere description of how the control panel worked,

standing on its own, does not provide any information inherently likely to have influenced a

juror nor does it show a juror was actually biased against Thompson.” (Lodgment No. 5, People

v. Thompson, No. D044829, slip op. at 14.) The appellate court also found that the statement

regarding the inmates controlling the jail “could actually benefit the defense by suggesting that

the officers were compliant and acceded to inmate requests for opportunities to assault each

other, thus adding legitimacy to Thompson’s claimed fear of an assault by Cooper when a

correctional officer opened his cell door.” (Id.) The declarations of the jurors support these

findings as they indicate that the vast majority of the jurors believed that the guards intentionally

opened cell doors in order to facilitate assaults within the jail. However, consistent with the

controlling federal law discussed above, neither the trial nor appellate court actually relied on

the jurors’ subjective opinions in finding no prejudice, and neither does this Court.

Petitioner has failed to show that the state court’s finding of no prejudice was objectively

unreasonable. His defense was based on the theory that he acted in self-defense in attacking

Cooper, or was entrapped, because he believed the guards were setting him up to be assaulted

by Cooper. As discussed above with respect to claim three, Petitioner presented strong evidence

in support of his contention that the guards intentionally allowed the assaults to occur. His

defense, however, was not dependant on the determination whether the cell doors were opened

accidentally or intentionally. His defense was dependant on the reasonableness of his belief that

his actions were necessary to protect himself. As the appellate court found, the jury rejected the

defense due to the fact that Petitioner initiated the attack against a handcuffed Cooper who was

merely defending himself and was not being aggressive. As set forth above, additional evidence

supported a finding that Petitioner was not acting in self defense. This included testimony by

Petitioner and his expert witness that Petitioner had a duty to carry out retaliatory assaults on

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rival gang members, that Petitioner would have been perceived to be weak and a coward if he

didn’t attack Cooper, and that one of the reasons he attacked Cooper was the disrespect shown

when Cooper was moved to a cell with a better view of the dayroom television. (Lodgment No.

16, Reporter’s Tr. at 1714-19, 1770-71, 1780-82, 1810.) 

Thus, even to the extent the jurors committed misconduct by introducing extrinsic

evidence into the jury deliberations regarding how the panel which opened the cell doors

worked, and/or regarding the general nature of the jail environment, Petitioner has not

demonstrated that the state court’s finding of no prejudice was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Even assuming Petitioner could make such a showing, he has failed

to demonstrate that he is entitled to habeas relief in this Court, because he has not shown the

misconduct had either a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.

LaMarque, 420 F.3d at 1060-61. 

Finally, Petitioner contends that the two former correctional officer jurors were biased

against him, and that their bias is evident by the fact that they lied during voir dire when they

said they could and would set aside their correctional officer experience and decide the case

solely on the evidence presented at trial. (Pet. at 9-9a.) Petitioner also contends the jurors’

dishonesty deprived him of his ability to challenge those jurors for cause, or though use of a

peremptory challenge. (Id.) 

The Ninth Circuit has noted that:

“In most situations, void dire, ‘the method we have relied on since the

beginning,’ should suffice to identify juror bias.” [Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520

(9th Cir. 1990)] at 528 (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct.

2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984)). This is because truthful disclosure of information

during voir dire sets up a challenge for cause (or in less clear-cut cases, a

peremptory challenge) that can be exercised before resources are devoted to trying

the case to verdict. Cause challenges lie for implied (or presumed) bias as well

as for actual bias. See [United States v.] Gonzalez, 214 F.3d [1109 (9th Cir.

2000)] at 1111. Honesty is the heart of the jury-selection process in an adversarial

system; indeed, “voir dire” means “to speak the truth.” The whole point of the

voir dire process is to elicit information from the venire that may shed light on

bias, prejudice, interest in the outcome, competence, and the like so that counsel

and the parties may exercise their judgment about whom to seat and whom to

challenge. [Footnote omitted] Accordingly, when the issue of bias arises after

trial (as it did in McDonough and Tinsley) or, as here, on collateral review of a

conviction in state court, dishonesty in voir dire is a critical factor. As

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McDonough indicates, “it ill serves the important end of finality” to wipe the slate

clean when the potentially disqualifying relationship is disclosed on voir dire

examination. 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S.Ct. 845.

Fields v. Brown, 431 F.3d 1186, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2005)

Here, as in Fields, the potential for bias was revealed on voir dire when the two jurors

honestly answered that they were former correctional officers. Accepting Petitioner’s contention

that they must have lied when they stated they could and would set aside their experience

because they eventually did not do so, would, as Fields noted, “ill serve ‘the important end of

finality’ given the state court judgment.” Id. at 1197 (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555.)

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the jurors were dishonest during voir dire or biased against

him. The state court’s determination that the jurors’ statements did not reveal a bias against

Petitioner is objectively reasonable, and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. See Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002) (stating that despite the existence of other reasonable conclusions,

where, “it is at least reasonable to conclude that [the state court’s conclusion was reasonable]

. . . the state court’s determination to that effect must stand.”) In any case, it cannot be said that

the state court’s finding in this regard is objectively unreasonable. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76

(“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.”).

The Court therefore recommends that habeas relief be denied as to claim four. 

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing

that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 20, 2007 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than May 2, 2007. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 21, 2007

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

CC: HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

ALL PARTIES

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