Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00286/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

CHARLES W. HORN, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:15-cv-286-WC 

 ) 

ALABAMA POWER CO., et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 Before the court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s State Law Claims, 

Claims for Punitive and Extra-Contractual Damages, and to Strike Demand for Jury Trial 

Pursuant to ERISA (Doc. 4) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 7). The motions are 

briefed and are ripe for decision. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is due to be denied and that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

is due to be granted. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in the Circuit Court of 

Montgomery County, Alabama, alleging state law claims of fraud by misrepresentation 

and breach of fiduciary duty. Compl. (Doc. 3-1). On April 29, 2015, Defendant 

Southern Company Services, Inc. (“SCS”), with the consent of co-defendant Alabama 

Power Company (“APC”), removed the action to this court, asserting federal question 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), due to the 

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preemption of Plaintiff’s state law claims by the Employment Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Not. Rem. (Doc. 3) at 1. 

Also on April 29, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff’s 

complaint should be dismissed because his “state law claims are completely preempted 

by” ERISA and because Plaintiff “failed to plead that he exhausted his mandatory 

administrative remedies under ERISA.” Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 4) at 1. Defendants also 

move the court to dismiss Plaintiff’s “claims for extra-contractual and punitive damages 

and to strike [Plaintiff’s] demand for a jury trial under ERISA.” Id.

 On May 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Count II 

(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) of Complaint (Doc. 6), in which Plaintiff purports to 

voluntarily dismiss, “pursuant to Rule 41(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.,” his claim alleging breach 

of fiduciary duty by Defendants. In addition, on May 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Motion 

to Remand (Doc. 7) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), arguing that, given his dismissal of 

his breach of fiduciary duty claim, “Defendants have failed to meet their burden of 

establishing that the fraud claim is preempted by ERISA” and, consequently, 

“Defendants have failed to establish the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction 

and this action is due to be remanded to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, 

Alabama.” Pl.’s Mot. Rem. (Doc. 7) at 8. On June 12, 2015, Defendants filed their Brief 

in Opposition to Motion to Remand (Doc. 11). Plaintiff has not filed a reply to 

Defendants’ response in opposition to his Motion to Remand and, apart from the 

arguments made in his Motion to Remand, has not responded to Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss. 

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II. MATERIAL FACTS

 The court relies upon the following facts in its disposition of the motions presently 

pending before the court. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant APC. Compl. 

(Doc. 3-1) ¶ 5. Defendant SCS is the Plan Administrator for the pension plan APC offers 

its employees. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff was vested in the pension plan offered by APC. Id. ¶ 5. 

On January 27, 2010, Plaintiff obtained a divorce from his wife which, in pertinent part, 

required him to pay alimony to his wife in the amount of $2,000.00 per month and further 

directed that his alimony payments would cease when his ex-wife began collecting 

monthly payments from Plaintiff’s pension. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. The state court which entered the 

divorce judgment later entered a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) that was 

served on Defendants and advised them about the court’s judgment concerning Plaintiff’s 

retirement benefits. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff’s ex-wife thus became an alternate payee under the 

pension plan. Id.

 In contemplating retirement, Plaintiff reviewed materials provided to him by SCS 

pertaining to his pension benefits, including a document titled “Retirement Plan 

Guidelines – Your Guide to Benefits.” Id. ¶ 11. “In particular, Plaintiff reviewed the 

Guide to determine whether the Wife was compelled to start receiving his retirement 

benefits upon his retirement.” Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff relied on the following passage in the 

document, under the section heading “PAYMENTS UNDER A QDRO,” in deciding 

whether, and when, to retire: 

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A court cannot require that any of your benefits be paid to your alternate 

payee at any time or in any form that is not otherwise authorized under the 

Plan. The Plan provides, however, that payments can be made under a 

QDRO to your alternate payee beginning at the earliest date you could have 

commenced receiving benefits. These payments can be made even if you 

have not separated from your Employing Company. Payment of an 

alternate payee’s benefit must begin by the time your benefit payments 

begin. 

Id. ¶ 13; Retirement Plan Guidelines, ex. 3 to Declaration of Matthew S. Bobar (Doc. 3-

5) at 24. Plaintiff concluded that, based upon this passage, his ex-wife was compelled to 

begin receiving his retirement benefits as an alternate payee upon his retirement and that, 

consequently, pursuant to the terms of the divorce judgment, he was no longer required to 

make the court-ordered alimony payments upon his retirement. Compl. (Doc. 3-1) ¶ 14. 

“Plaintiff retired from Alabama Power in March 2014, and began receiving his retirement 

benefits in April 2014.” Id. ¶ 15. Likewise, Plaintiff ceased making monthly alimony 

payments in March 2014. Id. ¶ 17. 

 In May 2014, Plaintiff’s ex-wife initiated contempt proceedings against Plaintiff 

due to his failure to make alimony payments. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff learned during the 

contempt proceedings that his retirement benefits were not paid to his ex-wife as he had 

expected based upon the quoted passage from the Retirement Guide. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff 

incurred approximately $8,000 in attorney’s fees and expenses in defending against the 

contempt proceeding and suffered mental anguish in being confronted with the prospect 

of being incarcerated if found in contempt. Id. ¶ 20. Likewise, Plaintiff “continues to be 

obligated to pay the Wife periodic alimony which, based upon his diminished income in 

retirement, he is unable to afford.” Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Plaintiff maintains that, “[b]ut for the 

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false information in the Guide, Plaintiff would not have retired from Alabama Power[,]” 

and that the “financial burden now placed on Plaintiff as a result of the misrepresentation 

has, and continues, to place an extreme financial hardship on Plaintiff and has, and 

continues, to cause him severe mental anguish.” Id. ¶¶ 22-23. 

III. MOTION TO REMAND

 Because the court must first determine that it may exercise subject matter 

jurisdiction in this case, and because Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is premised on his 

contention that the court lacks such jurisdiction, the court first considers the Motion to 

Remand. As noted above, Defendants removed this action to this court on the theory that 

federal question jurisdiction exists due to the complete preemption of Plaintiff’s claims 

by ERISA. 

 In general, a “party seeking to remove a case to federal court bears the burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 

1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2013). When considering whether to remand a removed action 

back to state court, “[a]ny doubts about the propriety of federal jurisdiction should be 

resolved in favor of remand to the state court. The existence of federal jurisdiction is 

tested at the time of removal. In determining whether jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331, a court must look to the well-pleaded complaint alone.” Adventure Outdoors, 

Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). For this 

reason, “events occurring after removal . . . do not oust the district court’s jurisdiction.” 

Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2000). In other 

words, to establish federal question jurisdiction, “defendants must show that [Plaintiff’s] 

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complaint, as it existed at the time of removal, provides an adequate basis for the exercise 

of federal jurisdiction.” Bloomberg, 552 F.3d at 1295 (emphasis supplied). 

 Although Plaintiff’s complaint ostensibly presents only state law claims for fraud 

by misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty, and hence does not present any wellpleaded claim invoking federal law, Defendants argue that federal question jurisdiction 

exists because Plaintiff’s state law claims are completely preempted by ERISA. 

“Complete preemption [also frequently referred to as “superpreemption” in case law] is a 

narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule and exists where the preemptive 

force of a federal statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state law claim 

into a statutory federal claim.” Connecticut State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, 

Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2009). “Complete preemption under ERISA derives 

from ERISA’s civil enforcement provision § 502(a), which has such ‘extraordinary’ 

preemptive power that it ‘converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one 

stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’ Consequently, 

any ‘cause[] of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) 

[is] removable to federal court.’” Id. at 1344 (quoting Metro Life Ins. Co v. Taylor, 481 

U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987)). 

 Complete preemption differs from the related concept of defensive preemption 

under ERISA. Complete preemption is narrower than defensive preemption and is 

jurisdictional in nature; that is, where a claim is subject to complete preemption under 

ERISA, a federal court is conferred with jurisdiction over the claim notwithstanding the 

requirement of a well-pleaded claim under federal law. Defensive preemption, on the 

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other hand, is express within § 514(a) of ERISA, and is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 

That provision dictates that any and all state law claims are preempted “insofar as they 

may now or hereafter relate to” an ERISA plan. § 1144(a). “Defensive preemption 

provides only an affirmative defense to certain state-law claims. As an affirmative 

defense, defensive preemption does not furnish subject matter jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331[.]” Butero v. Royal Maccabes Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th 

Cir. 1999). As another court has observed, “[b]ecause complete preemption is narrower, 

a state law claim may be defensively preempted but not completely preempted.” Dye v. 

Hartford Life & Accident Co., Civ. No. 5:13-cv-428-MTT, 2014 WL 1379246, at *2 

(M.D. Ga. April 8, 2014) (citing Anthem, 591 F.3d at 1343); Cotton v. Massachusetts 

Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1281 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Therefore, a state-law claim 

may be defensively preempted . . . but not completely preempted . . . .”). 

 Given all of the above, the court must determine whether Plaintiff’s complaint, at 

the time it was removed to this court, presented any claim subject to complete preemption 

under ERISA. If so, then this court is vested with federal question jurisdiction. If not, 

then the court must remand this matter to the state court. In doing so, this court must 

“take pains not to apply the test for defensive preemption” because, at this time, “the key 

question is whether federal question jurisdiction is present based on superpreemption of 

state law claims.” Wilson v. Coman, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2003). 

 As noted above, complete preemption is derived from ERISA’s civil enforcement 

provision, § 502(a), which is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132. The Eleventh Circuit has 

adopted a two-part test to determine whether a claim is subject to complete preemption: 

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“(1) whether the plaintiff could have brought its claim under § 502(a); and (2) whether no 

other legal duty supports the plaintiff’s claim.” Anthem, 591 F.3d at 1345. To satisfy the 

first prong of this inquiry, a defendant must show that (1) the plaintiff’s claim falls within 

the scope of ERISA, and (2) the plaintiff has standing to sue under ERISA. Id. at 1350. 

 Defendants assert that Plaintiff could have brought his claims under § 502(a) of 

ERISA. See Def.’s Mot. to Dis. (Doc. 4) at 3-5. In particular, Defendants argue that the 

“Southern Company Pension Plan is an ERISA plan,” that Plaintiff has standing to sue 

under the Plan as a ‘participant’ in the Plan,” and that “SCS is an ERISA entity” because 

it is the sponsor of the ERISA plan. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff does not appear to contest any of 

these representations. See Pl.’s Mot. to Rem. (Doc. 7) at 3-7. Defendants also contend 

that Plaintiff seeks the type of relief which he could have obtained under ERISA. 

Specifically, Defendants argue as follows: 

Under § 1132(a)(1)(B), a participant or beneficiary may file suit to recover 

benefits due to him under the terms of a plan, to enforce his rights under the 

terms of a plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of 

the plan. Here, Horn claims damages relating to SCS’s alleged failure to 

pay Horn’s pension benefits to his beneficiary—his ex-wife. Horn, as a 

participant, or his ex-wife, as a beneficiary, could seek this relief under § 

1132(a)(1)(B). Horn also asserts a claim for damages for breach of 

fiduciary duty against SCS and Alabama Power based on allegations that 

SCS misrepresented Plan terms. This claim can be asserted under 29 

U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which allows a participant to file suit to obtain other 

appropriate equitable relief. 

Def.’s Mot. to Dis. (Doc. 4) at 4-5 (quotation omitted). It is here that Plaintiff objects, 

focusing only on the nature of his fraud claim and the damages he seeks in conjunction 

with the claim. 

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Clearly, if the fraud claim were premised on a failure to pay benefits, as 

Defendants suggest, the claim would be completely preempted. However, 

this is not the case. In-fact, Plaintiff does not seek to recover benefits due 

him or his ex-wife under the plan; he does not seek to enforce his or his exwife’s rights under the plan; he does not seek to clarify his or his ex-wife’s 

rights to future benefits under the plan; therefore, he does not seek relief 

under § 1132(a). Instead, he complains of, and hopes to recover damages 

for, injuries he suffered as a result of misrepresentations made to him as to 

when his ex-wife must begin receiving his retirement benefits. 

Pl.’s Mot. to Rem. (Doc. 7) at 5. Plaintiff therefore concludes that, because his fraud 

claim could not have been brought under “§ 502(a) of ERISA, Defendants have failed to 

meet part one of [the test adopted in Anthem] and their complete preemption argument 

fails.” Id. at 6. 

 Given Plaintiff’s filing of his Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Count II (Breach 

of Fiduciary Duty) of Complaint (Doc. 6), it is understandable why Plaintiff focuses only 

on his fraud claim in arguing against complete preemption. However, the court is bound 

to consider the complaint at the time it was removed to this court in determining whether 

subject matter jurisdiction exists, and Plaintiff’s post-removal, unilateral attempt to 

narrow his claims against Defendants is immaterial to that inquiry. Poore, 218 F.3d at 

1290-91.1

 At the time it was removed to federal court, the complaint alleged claims of 

 

1

 Furthermore, Plaintiff’s attempt to voluntarily dismiss his breach of fiduciary duty claim 

“pursuant to Rule 41(a),” Pl.’s Not. of Vol. Dis. (Doc. 6), is improper as a matter of procedure. 

Other than citing subsection (a) of Rule 41, which describes when a voluntary dismissal may be 

had without a court order and when it may only be achieved with a court order, Plaintiff’s Notice 

does not clarify precisely what provision of Rule 41 upon which he relies. Rule 41 addresses 

dismissals of “Actions,” meaning all of a plaintiff’s claims against a particular defendant, not 

simply individual claims. See Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 

2004) (“Put simply, Rule 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss all of his claims against a particular 

defendant; its text does not permit plaintiffs to pick and choose, dismissing only particular claims 

within an action.”). Rather, in order for Plaintiff to obtain a dismissal of his breach of fiduciary 

duty claim while continuing to press his fraud by misrepresentation claim, Plaintiff should have 

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both fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Whatever argument Plaintiff might proffer about 

the nature of his fraud claim, and however persuasive a court might find it, the court must 

also consider the breach of fiduciary duty claim in ascertaining whether it may exercise 

jurisdiction. 

 In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that a “fiduciary relationship existed between 

Plaintiff and Defendant Southern Company,” and that SCS “breached its fiduciary duty to 

Plaintiff in making” the alleged misrepresentation concerning when Planitiff’s ex-wife 

was compelled to start receiving Plaintiff’s retirement benefits. Compl. (Doc. 3-1) ¶¶ 31-

32. ERISA requires that 

a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 

interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . for the exclusive purpose of 

. . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries . . . with the 

care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing 

that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 

would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like 

aims. 

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(B). The Eleventh Circuit has held that a fiduciary’s breach of 

these duties in the form of misrepresenting a plan’s terms is actionable under ERISA. 

See Jones v. Am. Gen. Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1065, 1074 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We 

hold that . . . participants in an ERISA-governed plan that rely to their detriment on a 

fiduciary’s representations of the plan’s terms may state a claim for ‘appropriate 

 

amended his complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a). Id. (“A plaintiff wishing to eliminate particular 

claims or issues from the action should amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) rather than 

dismiss under Rule 41(a).”) (quotation and citation omitted). Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff had 

properly amended his complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) rather than relying on Rule 41(a), 

pursuant to the authorities discussed in the text of this Opinion, the court would still be 

compelled to evaluate the existence of subject matter jurisdiction as of the time of removal to this 

court, not at the time of any amendment of the complaint. 

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equitable relief’ under Section 502(a)(3) if they have no adequate remedy elsewhere in 

ERISA’s statutory framework.”). Consequently, there is no doubt that Plaintiff’s breach 

of fiduciary duty claim could have been brought pursuant to the civil enforcement 

provision of ERISA. Indeed, Plaintiff’s effort to voluntarily dismiss that claim and to 

seek remand establishes that even Plaintiff recognizes that the claim could have been 

brought under ERISA and, therefore, is subject to complete preemption because the claim 

is not based upon any other legal duty owed by SCS to Plaintiff.2

 

 For all of the foregoing reasons, the court finds that, at the time the complaint was 

removed to this court, the complaint included a claim—alleging breach of fiduciary duty 

by SCS—which Plaintiff could have brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) and which 

was not based on any legal duty independent of ERISA. Consequently, such claim is 

subject to complete preemption under ERISA, and the court is vested with subject matter 

jurisdiction over that claim and “any claims joined with the preempted claim.” Anthem, 

591 F.3d at 1353. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is due to be denied. 

IV. MOTION TO DISMISS

 Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) because they are preempted by ERISA and because, if treated as claims under 

ERISA, Plaintiff has failed to plead the requisite exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

Defs.’ Mot. to Dis. (Doc. 4) at 1. “Under [Rule 12(b)(6)], whether a plaintiff failed to 

 

2

 There is no dispute that, as Defendants argue, in the context of Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary 

duty claim, “SCS’s fiduciary duties are prescribed by ERISA[,]” as set forth in the text 

previously quoted in this Opinion, and “[a]ny analysis of whether SCS breached fiduciary duties 

necessarily requires consideration of its fiduciary duties under ERISA.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dis. 

(Doc. 4) at 5. 

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state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be ascertained from the face of the 

complaint.” Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1266 n.11 (11th Cir. 

1997). Generally, “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless 

it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitle him to relief.” In re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 349 (11th Cir. 1996). 

In considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept the facts of the 

complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004). 

 Defensive preemption requires dismissal of state law claims. Butero, 174 F.3d at 

1212. Moreover, claims which are completely preempted “are also defensively 

preempted and must be dismissed.” Id. at 1215; Cotton, 402 F.3d at 1281. Thus, to the 

extent it was not voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff, his breach of fiduciary duty claim is 

due to be dismissed because it is completely preempted, leaving only Plaintiff’s fraud by 

misrepresentation claim. As set forth above, Defendants argue this claim is also subject 

to complete preemption, while Plaintiff appears to argue that it is not preempted under 

either type of preemption. Ultimately, the court need not determine whether the fraud 

claim meets the more exacting standard for complete preemption3

 because, as has been 

 

3

 Plaintiff makes at least a colorable argument that his fraud claim is not completely preempted 

by ERISA. Compare Pl.’s Mot. to Rem. (Doc. 7) at 5 (“Plaintiff does not seek to recover 

benefits due him or his ex-wife under the plan; he does not seek to enforce his or his ex-wife’s 

rights under the plan; he does not seek to clarify his or his ex-wife’s rights to future benefits 

under the plan; therefore, he does not seek relief under § 1132(a). Instead, he complains of, and 

hopes to recover damages for, injuries he suffered as a result of misrepresentations made to him 

as to when his ex-wife must begin receiving his retirement benefits.”), with Lamonica v. Brown 

Nursing Home, LLC, Civ. No. 3:15-cv-326-SRW, 2015 WL 9008449, at *5-*9 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 

15, 2015) (rejecting argument that Plaintiff’s state law misrepresentation claim was completely 

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established, the court has jurisdiction over the claim and it is apparent that it is at least 

defensively preempted. 

 Defensive preemption is concerned only with whether a state law “relates to” an 

ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The question of whether a state law “relates to” an 

ERISA plan turns on Congressional intent. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 

(1983). With regard to express preemption under ERISA, Congress’ intent to preempt 

state laws is manifestly robust. “[T]he sweep of ERISA preemption is broad, applying 

well beyond those subjects covered by ERISA itself.” Jones v. LMR Intern., Inc., 457 

F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2006). ERISA’s “broad” express preemption reaches state 

laws or claims which have a “connection with or reference to” an ERISA plan. Shaw, 

463 U.S. at 96-97. Hence, courts have long recognized that, “where state law claims of 

fraud and misrepresentation are based upon the failure of a covered plan to pay benefits, 

the state law claims have a nexus with the ERISA plan and its benefits system” and are, 

therefore, subject to preemption. Variety Children’s Hosp., Inc. v. Century Medical 

Health Plan, Inc., 57 F.3d 1040, 1042 (11th Cir. 1995). See also Hall v. Blue Cross/Blue 

Shield of Alabama, 134 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (11th Cir. 1998); Franklin v. QHG of 

Gadsden, Inc., 127 F.3d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir. 1997). 

 Here, there would be no fraud by misrepresentation claim without the alleged 

misrepresentation by an ERISA entity (SCS) in an ERISA Plan document, Plaintiff’s 

 

preempted because “the gravamen of [the plaintiff’s] complaint is not that she was wrongfully 

denied benefits under her employer-provided health insurance plan, but that defendant . . . lied to 

her about when her insurance coverage would be terminated” and the complaint “seeks 

compensation for damages she suffered as a result of defendant’s . . . misrepresentations,” not 

recovery of “plan benefits”). 

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alleged reliance on the misrepresentation in deciding to retire early and begin receiving 

retirement benefits, and the corresponding failure to pay Plaintiff’s retirement benefits in 

a manner consistent with Plaintiff’s reading of the Plan document. Thus, the court must 

conclude that Plaintiff’s fraud by misrepresentation claim “relates to” an ERISA plan for 

purposes of defensive preemption under § 1144(a). See, e.g., Jones, 457 F.3d at 1180; 

Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 1998); 

Sanson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 620-21 (11th Cir. 1992); Cummings v. 

Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 15-cv-271-WHA, 2015 WL 3892756, at *4 (M.D. 

Ala. June 24, 2015) (finding misrepresentation and fraud claims defensively preempted 

because claim is “rooted” in plaintiff’s “allegation that the Defendant denied benefits due 

to her under the ERISA-regulated” plan); Lewis v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, 

Civ. No. 14-cv-316-MHT, 2015 WL 1475610, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2015); and Dye, 

2014 WL 1379246, at *6. 

 Because Plaintiff’s fraud by misrepresentation claim “relates to” an ERISA plan, it 

is defensively preempted and must be dismissed in accordance with ERISA’s express 

preemption provision. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is due to be granted. 

V. CONCLUSION

 For all of the foregoing reasons, it is 

 ORDERED as follows: 

 a. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 7) is DENIED; 

 b. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is 

 GRANTED; 

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 c. Defendants’ separate requests to strike Plaintiff’s claims for punitive and 

 extra-contractual damages and to strike the jury demand, see Mot. to Dis. 

 (Doc. 4), are DENIED as moot; and 

 d. the complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

 Done this 30th day of March, 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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