Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00153/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00153-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anil N. Charran, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-0153-PHX-PGR (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Anil N. Charran filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 27, 2014, 

challenging his convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court for two counts of 

burglary in the second degree. His habeas petition raises claims of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel, bias by trial counsel, double jeopardy, prosecutorial misconduct, 

improper jury instructions, and insufficient evidence. As explained below, the Court 

recommends that Charran’s petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

 The operative facts, as described by the Arizona Court of Appeals, are as follows: 

Relatives of the deceased homeowner locked and secured the home at noon 

and again at 5:30 p.m. the day of the burglaries. When they returned at 

7:30 p.m., doors were cracked open. A wet-tile saw, power washer, and 

several welders were missing. There were new tire tracks on the wet grass 

in the front yard. While the relatives were deciding what to do, they saw 

Charran drive his truck slowly past the house with his lights off, disappear 

out of sight, and then return, driving in the opposite direction, still without 

headlights. Charran backed his truck into the driveway and parked in the 

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front yard, in the same spot where a vehicle had parked earlier. Charran 

“nonchalant[ly]” entered the house through the front door, and, in two trips, 

took a vacuum cleaner, a steam cleaner, and a clock to his truck. When one 

of the relatives confronted Charran, he fled and was later found hiding in 

some bushes, where he was flushed out by a police dog. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. M at ¶ 5) On March 8, 2010, Charran was charged by information with 

two counts of burglary in the second degree: one count for the burglary that took place 

between 5:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., and one count for the burglary that took place at 7:30 

p.m. (Doc. 11, Ex. A) On May 14, 2010, during his arraignment, Charran entered a plea 

of not guilty. (Doc. 11, Ex. D at 4:3) At the request of the State, the Maricopa County 

Superior Court provided Charran with an advisory pursuant to State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 

1193 (Ariz. App. 2000). (Id. at 5-10) At the conclusion of the Donald colloquy, the 

Court found that Charran had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently rejected the plea 

offer. (Id. at 10) 

 On July 13, 2010, the Superior Court held a hearing on Charran’s motion for new 

counsel. (Doc. 11, Ex. E) After hearing from Charran and his attorney, the Court denied 

Charran’s motion. (Id. at 7) Subsequently, Charran again moved to change counsel and 

the Court heard argument on his motion during his September 21, 2010 final trial 

management conference. (Doc. 11, Ex. F) After Charran explained that he was 

dissatisfied with his attorney’s services and agreed that he and his attorney had a 

personality difference, the Court denied his motion. (Id. at 7-9) 

 At the start of the trial and outside the presence of the jury, the judge, prosecutor 

and Charran’s attorney each acknowledged that they had recently learned that they all 

knew the wife of a witness/victim in the case. (Doc. 11, Ex. G at 3-4) Charran’s attorney 

stated that he learned of this connection that day and that it would not affect his trial 

preparation; he did not state that he knew the victim. (Id.) 

 On January 25, 2011, at the conclusion of a two day trial, a jury in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court found Charran guilty of two counts of burglary in the second 

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degree. (Doc. 11, Exs. B, G, H) On July 18, 2011, Charran was sentenced to concurrent, 

presumptive sentences of 11.25 years with credit for 386 days. (Doc. 11, Exs. C, I) 

 Charran timely appealed, raising three arguments. (Doc. 11, Exs. J, M) First, he 

argued that he was entitled to additional presentence incarceration credit; the Arizona 

Court of Appeals agreed. Next, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the conviction for the first count of burglary and he objected to the jury instruction on 

concealment. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both of his arguments and affirmed 

his convictions and sentences as modified. (Doc. 11, Exs. K, L) Charran filed a pro per

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 11, Ex. N) On February 15, 

2013, the Supreme Court denied his petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. O) 

 On March 5, 2013, Charran filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court. (Doc. 11, Ex. P) Charran’s appointed counsel reviewed the 

record and was unable to find any colorable claims for relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. Q) Charran 

filed a pro per petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. R) At the conclusion of 

briefing, the Superior Court summarily dismissed his Rule 32 Petition. (Doc. 11, Exs. S, 

T, U) Charran did not appeal this dismissal to the Arizona Court of Appeals or the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 11, Exs. V, W) 

 On January 27, 2014, Charran timely filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

this Court alleging deficiencies with his trial counsel and his trial. (Doc. 1) Respondents 

argue that his claims are either unexhausted and subject to a procedural bar, or meritless. 

(Doc. 11) 

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

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F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100.

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986);

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

CHARRAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO HABEAS RELIEF 

 Five of Charran’s claims are barred. Charran’s Habeas Petition raised four 

grounds; Respondents’ answer correctly noted that the Petition actually contains seven 

different arguments. (Docs. 1, 11 at 5) Two of these arguments were raised in Charran’s 

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direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, namely that the evidence was insufficient 

to support his conviction and that the jury instructions were improper. (Doc. 11, Ex. J) 

The Court of Appeals evaluated both arguments in its July 19, 2012 memorandum 

decision and, as described further below, the Court will assume they were both properly 

exhausted. (Doc. 11, Ex. M) 

 However, because Charran did not appeal the dismissal of his Petition for PostConviction Relief to the Arizona Court of Appeals, he did not properly exhaust his state 

remedies for any of the other five arguments in his Habeas Petition. Swoopes, 196 F.3d 

at 1010. The five unexhausted arguments are: (1) he received ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel, (2) the trial court should have granted him new trial counsel after trial 

counsel divulged that he knew the victim, (3) the Double Jeopardy clause was violated 

when Charran was charged with two counts of burglary for one crime, (4) the evidence 

only supported a violation of A.R.S. § 13-1506 not A.R.S. § 13-1507, and (5) the 

prosecution improperly told the jury hearsay about his co-defendants. (Doc. 1 at 6-9) 

 These five unexhausted claims are now subject to an implied procedural bar 

because they were not fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain 

available to Charran because he is now precluded or time-barred from raising his claims 

in a successive and untimely Rule 32 petition under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) & (b), or 32.4(a). 

The Court has carefully read Charran’s Petition and Reply. (Docs. 1, 12) Charran 

has not demonstrated either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the 

default, or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court cannot review these five 

claims. 

Charran’s exhausted claims are unpersuasive. Two arguments in Charran’s 

Habeas Petition were properly raised before the Arizona Court of Appeals: whether the 

evidence was sufficient to support his conviction and whether the jury instructions were 

improper. (Doc. 11, Ex. M) Both arguments were found to be unpersuasive. (Id.) 

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 First, Charran argues that the jury instruction was improper. Based on the history 

of the case, the Court assumes that this argument refers to the flight or concealment 

instruction. Respondents argue that this claim was not presented as a federal claim to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals and, therefore, was not exhausted. (Doc. 11 at 9-13) 

Assuming that this claim was exhausted, this argument remains unpersuasive because 

“the fact that [a jury] instruction was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for 

habeas relief.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). “The only question for us 

is ‘whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process.’” (Id. at 72) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 

147 (1973)). 

 Charran has not provided any detailed support for this argument. After a thorough 

review of the record, the Court concludes that Charran has not shown that the jury 

instruction violated his due process rights. Accordingly, this claim is unpersuasive. 

 Next, Charran argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 

Respondents acknowledge that this claim was properly exhausted and argue that it fails 

on the merits. The Court agrees. 

 Habeas review of insufficient evidence claims “face a high bar . . . because they 

are subject to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 

2062 (2012). The first layer of deference is given by the Arizona Court of Appeals to the 

jury which can only set aside the verdict “if no rational trier of fact could have agreed 

with the jury.” Id. (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011)). The second layer 

of deference, given by the federal court to the state court’s decision, requires that a 

federal court find the state court decision “objectively unreasonable” before granting 

relief. Id. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)). 

 Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed Charran’s claim of insufficient 

evidence and found two reasonable inferences that the jury could have made. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. M at ¶ 7) First, “[t]he jury could have reasonably inferred from Charran’s possession 

of property stolen during the first burglary, little more than two hours after it was stolen, 

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that he had stolen it.” Id. Second, “the jury could have reasonably inferred from 

Charran’s conduct during the second burglary, including driving by the house with his 

lights off before parking in the same location a vehicle had earlier been, and nonchalantly 

entering the house through the cracked-open front door to remove items, that he was 

familiar with the home from his presence there at the earlier burglary.” Id. 

 In his habeas reply, Charran “does not deny that he was involved in the taking of 

property from the residence” and he acknowledges that he “possessed stolen property 

belonging to the victim(s).” (Doc. 12 at 2, 4) Instead, he argues that his involvement 

was “unwilling.” Id. However, this argument is not enough to show that the state court’s 

review of the jury’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, this argument 

is unavailing. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Anil N. Charran’s petition for writ 

of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

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be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 29th day of May, 2015. 

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