Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-02562/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-02562-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alec Jordan Holtz,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-17-02562-PHX-JAT (MHB)

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s appeal (Doc. 55) of the Magistrate Judge’s 

Order (Doc. 50) denying his renewed motion to amend his petition (Doc. 48).

I. Legal Standard

When a Magistrate Judge issues a pretrial order, this Court may reconsider the order 

“where it has been shown that the magistrate’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to 

law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Barten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CZV-12-

0399-TUC-CKJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133569, at *10 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2014) (quoting 

Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2010)). The Court will overturn a Magistrate Judge’s decision only if it is the result of 

“clear error.” Maisonville v. F2 America, Inc., 902 F.2d 746, 747 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations 

omitted). Under this standard of review, the Magistrate Judge’s decision is “not subject to 

de novo determination,” and the Court “may not simply substitute its judgment for that of 

the deciding court.” Grimes v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th 

Cir. 1991). In order to find clear error, the Court must have a “definite and firm conviction 

Case 2:17-cv-02562-JAT Document 56 Filed 08/27/19 Page 1 of 8
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that a mistake has been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001).

II. Claims of Error

Petitioner makes two procedural arguments in this appeal: one under the Local 

Rules of Civil Procedure and one under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. First, 

Petitioner argues that, under the Local Rules, the Magistrate Judge denied his motion 

before he had time to Reply. Petitioner argues that waiting for his Reply (which was due 

June 4, 2019, but not filed until June 17, 2019) would have changed the result because he 

would have discussed Ramirez v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 

2015) (holding that a stipulation to amend the complaint did not “count” as the amendment 

as a matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)(1)(B) nor preclude 

the as a matter of course amendment at a later time). However, this argument is without 

merit because Petitioner cited to Ramirez in his motion to amend (Doc. 48) so citing to it 

again would not have impacted the decision. Thus, relief on this basis is denied.

Second, Petitioner argues that he should be able to amend his habeas petition “as a 

matter of course” under Rule 15(a)(1)(B).

1

 To reach this result, Petitioner interprets several 

ambiguous Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in his favor. 

One, Petitioner argues that his first amended petition (Doc. 12) should not “count” 

as his one “as a matter of course” amendment because he amended only because the Court 

required it. Two, Petitioner seems to argue that Respondents supplementing their first 

answer/response (Doc. 44) to the habeas petition triggered a new 21 days for his “as a 

matter of course” amendment because he never “used up” his “as a matter of course”

amendment previously. Three, Petitioner impliedly argues that while the Court requiring 

him to amend his petition cannot “count” against him under Rule 15 (i.e. count as his “as 

a matter of course” amendment), the Court requiring Respondents to supplement their 

answer should count against them under Rule 15 for purposes of triggering a new 21 days 

 

1

 Rule 15(a)(1)(B) states, “[A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course 

within:] if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after 

service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after a motion under 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever 

is earlier.” Notably the Rule does not include or exclude service of an amended responsive 

pleading.

Case 2:17-cv-02562-JAT Document 56 Filed 08/27/19 Page 2 of 8
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for Petitioner to “use up” his “as a matter of course” amendment.

III. “Responsive Pleading”

Preliminarily, the Court notes that some courts have held that habeas petitions are 

not subject to Rule 15(a)(1)(B). See Ramos v. Poore, No. 3:15-CV-518 (VAB), 2017 WL 

1362017, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 11, 2017) (“Those types of pleadings to which a responsive 

pleading is not required include an answer to a complaint and a habeas petition. See

Argraves v. United States, No. 3:1 l-CV-1421, 2013 WL 1856527 at *2 (D. Conn. May 2, 

2013) (applying Rule 15(a)(1)(A) to request for leave to amend habeas petition and finding 

‘Rule 15(a)(1)(B) is inapplicable to habeas petitions because responsive pleadings are not 

required.’”); compare Rule 5(a) of the Rules Governing 2254 Proceedings (“[t]he 

respondent is not required to answer the petition unless a judge so orders”) with Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) (requiring a defendant to serve a responsive pleading without 

any order of the Court).

To be sure, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Rule 15 as a whole 

applies to habeas cases. James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 

28 U.S.C. § 2242. However, this Court has not located a case wherein the Court of Appeals 

specifically addressed whether a “responsive pleading” is filed in habeas cases such that 

the 21-day amendment as a matter of course portion of Rule 15(a)(1)(B) is ever triggered. 

Nonetheless, for purposes of this Order, this Court has assumed Rule 15 applies in its 

entirety. See Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005).

IV. Amendment as a Matter of Course

One, the Court disagrees that Petitioner amending his Petition by sua sponte Court 

Order does not “count” as his as a matter of course amendment. In the case on which 

Petitioner relies, Ramirez, the complaint was amended the first time by stipulation of the 

parties and therefore did not “count” as an amendment as a matter of course under Rule 

15(a)(1)(B). 806 F.3d at 1006. Here, the Court sua sponte gave Petitioner an opportunity 

to amend because his Petition was unwieldy and inconsistent with Rule 8. (Doc. 9 at 2). 

Specifically, this Court is required to review habeas petitions forthwith after they are filed. 

Case 2:17-cv-02562-JAT Document 56 Filed 08/27/19 Page 3 of 8
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Doc. 9 at 2, n.1.2 Here, the Court discharged that duty and sua sponte ordered Petitioner

to amend. (Doc. 9). This Court interprets “with the Court’s leave” as used in Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) as anticipating a request from the plaintiff; not a statutorily 

mandated screening function. In other words, the Court did not really give Petitioner 

“leave” to amend, as he correctly points out he never requested such leave, but instead 

ordered him to amend or his case would be dismissed. This sua sponte requirement of 

amendment seems to this Court to “count” as the one-time amendment as a matter of 

course. Therefore, this Court overrules Petitioner’s objection that he should be permitted 

to amend because he has preserved his as a matter of course amendment opportunity by 

filing a deficient petition originally that the Court was forced to dismiss upon screening.

Moreover, another distinguishing factor between Ramirez and this case is that 

Ramirez was a civil case subject to a Rule 16 order. Thus, for purposes of managing its 

docket, the district court in Ramirez could have set a deadline for amending the complaint.3 

Conversely, habeas cases are not governed by a Rule 16 scheduling order which would 

make Rule 15, by Petitioner’s interpretation, temporally limitless. Specifically, in this case, 

Petitioner claims his 21 days for his as a matter of course amendment expired May 14, 

 

2

 [28 U.S.C.] Section 2243 provides, in relevant part: 

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the 

respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it 

appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not 

entitled thereto.” 

Rule 4 [of the Rules Governing 2254 Proceedings] provides, in relevant part: 

The clerk must promptly forward the petition to a judge . . . , and the judge 

must promptly examine it. If it plainly appears from the petition and any 

attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, 

the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the 

petitioner.

Doc. 9 at 2, n.1. The fact that 28 U.S.C. § 2243 requires Respondents to “show cause” 

why the writ should not be granted is further support for the Ramos court’s conclusion that 

habeas petitions do not call for a “responsive pleading” as the term is used in Rule 15.

3

 Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(3)(A) requires the Court to set a deadline 

for amending the pleadings.

Case 2:17-cv-02562-JAT Document 56 Filed 08/27/19 Page 4 of 8
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2019, almost two years after he filed his original petition. The Court finds two years to be 

inconsistent with the intent of Rule 15’s strict 21-day deadline.

Two, on the facts of this case, Respondents did not “amend” their response to the 

habeas petition. Thus, even assuming an amended answer revives and retriggers a new 21 

days to amend the complaint under Rule 15,4 here Respondents supplemented and 

expanded their “limited” answer after this Court’s ruling on their statute of limitations 

argument. (Doc. 44). Thus, the Court finds no “amended” answer was ever filed in this 

case that could have triggered a new 21 days to file a second amended petition under Rule 

15(a)(1)(B). 

Further, to the extent Rule 15(a)(1)(B) allows a new 21 days for a not previously 

used amendment as a matter of course any time an amended responsive pleading is filed, 

Rule 15(a)(1)(B) anticipates that such amended “responsive pleading” would be in 

response to an amended pleading. Here, no amended pleading was filed. Thus, the initial 

requirement of Rule 15(a)(1)(B) of a “pleading” that calls for a “responsive pleading” did 

not occur in this case before Respondents supplemented their response (Doc. 44). In other 

words, even if Respondents’ supplement (Doc. 44) could be deemed to be an amended 

responsive pleading, and assuming that an amended responsive pleading triggers a new 21 

days, here, there was technically not a “responsive pleading” because Respondents’ filing 

(Doc. 44) was not responding to a pleading as anticipated by Rule 15(a)(1)(B).

Additionally, allowing amendments to habeas petitions so late in the case also 

implicates the one-year statute of limitations under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act. See Paris v. Neotti, No. 10-CV-1586 JLS, 2013 WL 5322708, at *9 (S.D. 

Cal. Sept. 20, 2013) (“‘the Rule 15 relation back provision is to be strictly construed in the 

habeas corpus context.’ Williams v. Harrison, No. 05CV2150–J (CAB), 2007 WL 

1110910, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar.28, 2007) (Jones, J.) (citing United States v. Ciampi, 419 

F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir.2005)); see also Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657.”). Here, an amendment that 

 

4

 See Duncan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 16-CV-12570, 2016 WL 9223846, at *1 (E.D. 

Mich. Sept. 28, 2016) (interpreting Ramirez as giving Plaintiff a new 21 days to file a 

second amended complaint after an answer to a first amended complaint was filed).

Case 2:17-cv-02562-JAT Document 56 Filed 08/27/19 Page 5 of 8
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

raised any new claims (the Court will discuss below Petitioner’s argument that he is not 

raising new claims) would likely have to be dismissed as barred by the statute of 

limitations. Such a result would cause an extreme inefficiently in this case where the Court 

has already ruled on the statute of limitations issue. (Docs. 33 and 42). Thus, this practical 

result, i.e. that Respondents were required to supplement their answer only a result of this 

Court ruling on the statute of limitations issue, is further support for the Ramos Court’s 

conclusion that habeas petitions do not call for a “responsive pleading” as the term is used 

in Rule 15.

Further, it is important to note that because this is a habeas case, as opposed to a 

standard civil case, Petitioner was permitted the opportunity to Reply to the Supplemental 

Response and did in fact file a Reply (Docs. 52 and 53). See Rule 5(e) of the Rules 

Governing 2254 Proceedings. Thus, to the extent Petitioner’s first amended Petition or 

Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 23) to the original Limited Response (Doc. 22) did not address 

items raised in the Supplemental Response (Doc. 44), Petitioner did not need to amend his 

Petition to address them, unlike a standard civil case. Accordingly, the fact that a “reply” 

is permitted in a habeas case is further support for the Ramos Court’s conclusion that 

habeas petitions do not call for a “responsive pleading” as the term is used in Rule 15.

Three, as noted above, Petitioner and Respondents find themselves in the same 

procedural posture in that Petitioner amended his Petition because the Court required it 

(Doc. 9) and Respondents Supplemented their answer because the Court required it (Doc. 

43). Petitioner seeks to have these events treated differently for purposes of Rule 15. 

Specifically, Petitioner argues that Court ordered amendments are not voluntary acts by 

Petitioner such that they count against Petitioner for purposes of his as a matter of course

amendment. However, Petitioner argues that Court ordered supplemented or amended 

answers are voluntary acts by Respondents such that they do count in favor of Petitioner 

for purposes of triggering a new 21 days to amend the petition. While Rule 15 is admittedly 

silent on this point, the Court will not interpret the Rule so favorably to one party over the 

other. Thus, on the facts of this case, the Court finds Petitioner’s May 14, 2019 renewed 

Case 2:17-cv-02562-JAT Document 56 Filed 08/27/19 Page 6 of 8
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

motion to amend (Doc. 48) is not an as a matter of course amendment to his habeas petition.

V. Amendment by Leave of Court 

Finally, although Petitioner’s motion to amend sought to amend as a matter of right, 

or alternatively with leave of Court, Petitioner does not object and appeal to this Court the 

denial of his motion to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). 

Nonetheless, the Court notes that any such amendment, regardless of what section it was 

made under, would be futile. See Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2003) (a 

court may deny a motion to amend if it is made in bad faith, there was undue delay, 

prejudice would result to the opposing party, amendment would be futile, or amendment 

would delay the proceeding). Specifically, in his renewed motion to amend, Petitioner 

states, 

... the proposed Amendment does not substantively alter the original 

amendment but seeks to simply add citations to the exhibits filed in this case. 

... While it does correct some minor spelling and grammar errors, and adds 

an alternative title for Ground 2, it does not contain any new factual errors. 

Further, it does not present any new grounds for relief.

(Doc. 48 at 2).

Taking Petitioner at his word regarding what changes he seeks to make, there is no 

reason these issues could not have been addressed in his Reply (Doc. 52). Thus, the 

amendment would be futile in that it does not accomplish anything. Further to the extent 

it raises any issues that might be barred by the statute of limitations, those claims would be 

futile and the Court having to revisit that issue would delay these proceedings. 

Accordingly, although the appeal did not seem to object the denial of leave to amend under 

Rule 15(a)(2), to the extent it could be construed as an appeal of the denial of leave to 

amend in its entirety, the Court finds there was no error in denying leave to amend.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:17-cv-02562-JAT Document 56 Filed 08/27/19 Page 7 of 8
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

VI. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Appeal (Doc. 55) is denied; the decision of the 

Magistrate Judge (Doc. 50) is affirmed.

Dated this 27th day of August, 2019.

Case 2:17-cv-02562-JAT Document 56 Filed 08/27/19 Page 8 of 8