Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02204/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02204-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 38:4323 USERRA - Enforcement of rights with respect to state or private employer

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLYSON REYNANTE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-02204-BAS-NLS

FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

SEASIDE INTEGRATIVE 

MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

On August 31, 2016, Plaintiff Allyson Reynante (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint 

against Defendants Seaside Integrative Medical Center, Inc. (“Seaside”), Steven 

Williamson, and Linette Williamson, which alleged violations of the Uniformed 

Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. 

§§4301–4335 and the California Military and Veteran’s Code, §394. (ECF No. 1

Complaint.) Proceeding pro se in this action, Defendants Steven and Linette 

Williamson answered the Complaint. (ECF Nos. 6, 13.) 1 

 

An answer by Seaside filed by the Williamsons was rejected due to a Local 

Rule requiring a corporate defendant to be represented by counsel. (ECF No. 16.) At 

the request of the Plaintiff, the Clerk of the Court entered default against Seaside. 

(ECF Nos. 18, 19.)

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This matter was set for a bench trial, which took place on April 3, 2018. The 

Court heard and took evidence presented at trial. Based upon the stipulations of fact 

by the parties, the testimony and exhibits received into evidence at trial, and after full 

consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, the Court issues the 

following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

I. STIPULATIONS OF FACT AND LAW2

1. The jurisdiction of this court is founded on federal question jurisdiction, 

28 U.S.C. §1331, as conferred by 38 U.S.C. §4323(b)(3), and jurisdiction as to the 

remaining Counts is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §1367(a).

2. Venue is proper because Seaside Integrative Medical Center, Inc. 

(“Seaside”) maintains a place of business in this district, as provided in 38 U.S.C 

§4323(c)(2), 28 U.S.C. §1391(b).

3. Plaintiff, Allyson Reynante, is a citizen of the United States and a 

resident of the State of Virginia. 

4. Plaintiff was a Specialist (paygrade E-4) in the Washington Army 

National Guard.

5. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a qualified employee and member of 

the uniformed services for purposes of 38 U.S.C. §§4303(3), (9), and (16).

6. Seaside is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of 

California. Seaside’s principal place of business is Encinitas, California. At all 

relevant times, Seaside was and is an employer for purposes of 38 U.S.C. 

§4303(4)(A) and §4323(i).

7. Defendant Steven Williamson is an individual who at all times relevant 

 

2 Although the parties denoted their stipulations as “stipulations of fact,” 

several stipulations are stipulations of law, including stipulations regarding 

jurisdiction, venue, that Plaintiff qualified as an “employee” under USERRA and

Defendants were an “employer” under USERRA. Accordingly, the Court refers to 

this section as “stipulations of fact and law.”

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herein was a resident of the County of San Diego, State of California. At all relevant 

times, Steven Williamson was and is an owner, officer, or director of Defendant 

Seaside. At all relevant times, Steven Williamson was and is an employer for 

purposes of 38 U.S.C. §4303(4)(A) and §4323(i).

8. Defendant Linette Williamson is an individual who at all times relevant 

herein was a resident of the County of San Diego, State of California. At all relevant 

times, Linette Williamson was and is an owner, officer, or director of Defendant 

Seaside. At all relevant times, Linette Williamson was and is an employer for 

purposes of 38 U.S.C. §4303(4)(A) and §4323(i).

9. Plaintiff first came into contact with Defendants Steven and Linette

Williamson when she applied in July 2015 for a position as a medical assistant with 

Coast Medical Center, Inc. (“Coast”).

10. Coast was a California corporation that was owned by Defendants 

Steven and Linette Williamson, was incorporated in November 2000 and was 

dissolved in or about August 2015.

11. Plaintiff notified Defendants Steven and Linette Williamson of her 

ongoing military service obligations prior to being hired in July 2015.

12. Shortly after beginning work with Coast, Plaintiff signed an IRS form 

W-4.

13. On August 7, 2015, Steven Williamson held a meeting at Coast with the 

staff, to include Plaintiff, and explained that due to an ongoing lawsuit from a former 

employee, that Coast would likely declare bankruptcy and might close the business.

14. On August 10, 2015, Brenda Kough, Coast’s office manager, informed 

Plaintiff that she would no longer be employed by Coast due to the ongoing litigation. 

Ms. Kough, Steven and Linette Williamson asked Plaintiff if she would return to 

work with them after the situation had resolved. Plaintiff replied affirmatively that 

she would return to work. 

15. On August 13, 2015, Defendant Steven Williamson left a voicemail for 

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Plaintiff asking if she could fill in at Coast for one day for another employee who 

was out sick.

16. On August 14, 2015, Plaintiff worked one day for Coast and was paid 

for that day’s work.

17. On August 29, 2015, Defendant Linette Williamson left Plaintiff a 

voicemail asking if she could work for a few hours to help Defendants move to a new 

office location. 

18. On August 30, 2015, Plaintiff worked for Defendants Steven and Linette 

Williamson as requested and was paid for that day’s work.

19. On September 4–5, 2015, Defendant Steven Williamson left a voicemail 

and texted Plaintiff asking if she would come back to work for Defendants.

20. On September 5, 2015, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Steven 

Williamson on the phone and accepted Steven Williamson’s offer to return to work 

full time, beginning on September 14, 2015.3

21. At some point in September 2015, Defendant Steven Williamson

informed Plaintiff that Coast was shut down due to the ongoing lawsuit, had moved 

to a new location and changed its name to Seaside.

22. After Plaintiff returned to work with Seaside, she gave advance verbal 

notice of an upcoming military service obligation to Defendants that would begin on 

or about October 5, 2015. Plaintiff also gave advance verbal notice of her intent to 

return to Washington on or about September 25, 2015 to get the gear and equipment 

necessary to attend the October military service obligation.

23. On September 23, 2015, Defendant Linette Williamson asked Plaintiff 

to work overtime. Plaintiff stayed in the office until after 11:00 p.m. and worked 

 

3 Although the parties stipulated that Plaintiff accepted an offer to work fulltime at Seaside, the parties also agreed that a remaining issue for trial was whether 

Plaintiff was ever offered a full-time position at Seaside. (Compare Final Pretrial 

Conference Order, ECF No. 42 III ¶20 with id. IV ¶2.) 

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more than 14 hours. 

24. On September 25, 2015, Plaintiff asked Ms. Kough if she could pay 

Plaintiff before she went to Washington in preparation for her upcoming military 

service obligations. Ms. Kough responded that Defendant Steven Williamson would 

pay Plaintiff. Steven Williamson paid Plaintiff for the work performed to date.

25. On October 3, 2015, Plaintiff received written orders from her military 

command and verbally notified Ms. Kough and Robin Flaugher, another Seaside 

employee, of her upcoming military service.

26. Plaintiff’s military service obligation was from October 4, 2015–

February 19, 2016, with a break for the holidays from November 16, 2015–January 

2, 2016.

27. Prior to departing for her military service obligation, Plaintiff informed 

Defendants through Ms. Kough and Ms. Flaugher of her intent to be re-employed 

during the break from November–January. Ms. Kough and Ms. Flaugher expressed 

their gratitude to Plaintiff because Seaside was short on personnel and Ms. Kough 

was working from home.

28. On November 16, 2015, Plaintiff sent a text message to Defendants 

Steven and Linette Williamson that she would be home on November 17 and asking 

about her work shift on November 18.

29. Defendant Steven Williamson replied to Plaintiff’s text message and 

informed Plaintiff that Seaside had hired “two young ones right out of MA school” 

and that Plaintiff’s position was no longer available.

30. Plaintiff responded to Steven Williamson’s text message informing 

Steven Williamson of Seaside’s obligations under USERRA and her right to be 

reemployed to her previous position. To date, Defendants have not responded to 

Plaintiff’s text.

31. On February 19, 2016, Plaintiff completed her military service 

obligation.

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32. On February 22, 2016, Plaintiff sent a text message to Defendants 

informing them that she had not received a W-2 from Seaside, although she had 

received a W-2 from Coast.

33. On February 22, 2016, Plaintiff exchanged text messages with Ms. 

Flaugher who informed Plaintiff that she had received W-2s from Seaside and Coast.

34. On February 23, 2016, Plaintiff received a phone call from Ms. Kough 

informing Plaintiff that she had not received a W-2 because she had not filled out a 

W-9. Ms. Kough then emailed Plaintiff a W-9, to which Plaintiff responded that she 

previously had completed a W-4 and was informed by Defendant Steven Williamson

that she was a full-time employee of Seaside.

35. Plaintiff has had no contact with Defendants or Ms. Kough since the 

February 26, 2016 email exchange with Ms. Kough.

II. COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT4

1. Plaintiff only worked at Coast for three weeks before she was laid off. 

The Williamsons did not lay off Plaintiff from her job at Coast because of her military 

service but because Coast was declaring bankruptcy, and they could not afford to

continue to employ Plaintiff. Plaintiff was not the only employee laid off at Coast 

because of these financial limitations. Other, non-military individuals were similarly 

laid off.

2. After Coast closed, the Williamsons reconfigured the business under the 

name Seaside Integrative Medical Center (“Seaside”). When the Williamsons offered 

Plaintiff employment at Seaside, because of financial concerns, they only offered her 

temporary employment for a brief, nonrecurrent period.

3. Plaintiff only worked eight days at Seaside from September 14–25, 2015

before she left for four months of military training. Plaintiff had no reasonable 

expectation that her employment at Seaside would continue indefinitely or even after 

 

4 The Court’s finding of facts are based on the testimony and exhibits received 

at trial from Plaintiff and Defendants Steven and Linette Williamson.

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her last day at Seaside on September 25, 2015.

4. The Williamsons did not refuse to reemploy Plaintiff after her military 

service because of her military service but because they could not afford to continue 

to employ her. In fact, another medical assistant at Seaside, Robin Flaugher, who had 

more longevity with the Williamsons than Plaintiff did, was laid off while Plaintiff 

was completing her military service. The two new employees who were “right out of 

MA school” were hired at lower salaries than either Plaintiff or Ms. Flaugher received

in an attempt to keep Seaside financially solvent. Incidentally, that attempt was 

ultimately unsuccessful.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. USERRA prohibits discrimination against any individual based on her 

membership in the uniformed services. 38 U.S.C. §4301; see also Townsend v. Univ. 

of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff contends that “Defendants, 

and each of them, knowingly and willfully violated USERRA by, among other ways, 

discriminating against Plaintiff, and by denying her employment benefits and 

reemployment ‘on the basis of’ her ‘obligation to perform service in a uniformed 

service.’” (Compl. ¶54.) 

2. Under USERRA’s anti-discrimination provision, a person who has an 

obligation to perform service in the uniformed services shall not be denied 

reemployment, retention or any benefit of employment on the basis of that military 

obligation. 38 U.S.C. §4311(a). An employer is deemed to have violated Section 

4311 if a person’s membership, service, or obligation for service in the military is a 

“motivating factor” for the employer’s action “unless the employer can prove that 

the action would have been taken in the absence” of such military service. 38 U.S.C. 

§4311(c)(1). Plaintiff contends that her “protected status as a WARNG member was 

a substantial and motivating factor in Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s benefits of 

employment without good cause, including but not limited to, failing to reemploy 

Plaintiff after a period of military service.” (Compl. ¶45.)

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3. “Any person whose absence from a position of employment is 

necessitated by reason of service in the uniformed service shall be entitled to 

reemployment rights and benefits . . . if—” the person gives the employer notice of 

such service, the cumulative service in the uniformed services does not exceed five 

years, and the employee submits a timely application for reemployment. 38 U.S.C. 

§4312(a). Plaintiff contends that she provided such notice to Defendants. (Compl. 

¶29.)

4. “An employer is not required to reemploy a person . . . if—(A) the 

employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make such reemployment 

impossible or unreasonable; (B) . . . such employment would impose an undue 

hardship on the employer; or (C) the employment from which the person leaves to 

serve in the uniformed services is for a brief, nonrecurrent period and there is no 

reasonable expectation that such employment will continue indefinitely or for a 

significant period of time.” 38 U.S.C. §4312(d)(1). The employer has the burden of 

proving impossibility or unreasonableness, undue hardship, or the brief, nonrecurrent 

nature of the employment. 38 U.S.C. §4312(d)(2).

5. Defendants’ actions did not violate USERRA. Plaintiff was not denied 

reemployment, retention or any benefit of employment on the basis of her obligation 

to perform service in a uniformed service. Plaintiff’s service in the military was not 

a factor in Defendants’ decision to lay Plaintiff off from Coast or not to reemploy her 

at Seaside. Defendants have proved that the actions they took would have been taken 

in the absence of Plaintiff’s military service. See 38 U.S.C. §§4311(a), (c).

6. Defendants have met their burden of proving that their circumstances 

had changed such that reemployment of Plaintiff at either Coast or Seaside would 

have been impossible and unreasonable and would have imposed an undue hardship 

on the Williamsons. See 38 U.S.C. §§4312(d)(2)(A), (B).

7. Defendants have met their burden of proving that Plaintiff’s 

employment at Seaside was for a brief, nonrecurrent period, and she had no 

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reasonable expectation that such employment would continue indefinitely or for a 

significant period of time. See 38 U.S.C. §§4312(d)(2)(C).

8. Under California law, an employer may not discharge a person because 

of any ordered military duty and may not discriminate against a member of the 

military because of that membership. CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §394. Plaintiff 

contends that “Defendant’s motive for failing to reemploy Plaintiff was her 

participation in National Guard duty, in violation of §394.” (Compl. ¶61.) Plaintiff’s 

claim under Section 394 is based on the same facts as those supporting her USERRA 

claim. (Id. ¶58.)

9. Claims brought under Section 394 are analyzed under the framework 

applicable to claims brought under USERRA. See Flores v. Von Kleist, 739 F. Supp. 

2d 1236, 1257–58 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Bursese v. Paypal, Inc., No. C-06-00636 RMW, 

2007 WL 485984, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (citing Tarin v. Los Angeles, 123 

F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1997)).

10. Defendants did not violate Section 394 of the California Military and 

Veteran’s Code because Plaintiff was not discharged or discriminated against 

because of her military service or membership in the military.

11. In view of the Court’s conclusions regarding Defendants Steven and 

Linette Williamson, both of who were the owners, officers, or directors of Seaside,

there is good cause to set aside the prior entry of default against Seaside. FED. R.

CIV. P. 55(c); Lemiuex v. Lender Processing Center, No. 16-cv-01850-BAS-DHB, 

2018 WL 637945, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018) (identifying “good cause” factors 

for setting aside entry of default).

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that: 

1. The Court VACATES the entry of default against Seaside. (ECF No. 

19.)

2. Judgment SHALL BE ENTERED against Plaintiff and in favor of

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Defendants Seaside, Steven Williamson, and Linette Williamson.

3. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint.

(ECF No. 1.) The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 5, 2018

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