Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01526/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01526-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ESFANDIAR NIKBAKHSH-TALI,

Petitioner, 

vs.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-1526-PHX-NVW (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On August 8, 2007, Esfandiar Nikbakhsh-Tali, (“Petitioner”), currently

confined in the Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus by A Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”), pursuant to Title 28,

U.S.C. § 2241. 

On September 4, 2007, the District Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for

Emergency Adjudication, and, pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, referred

this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation.

On December 13 2007, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation, recommending that the District Court deny the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. (Doc. No. 20.) 

Petitioner filed an Objection, along with additional evidence on December 23,

2007. (Doc. No. 21.) The District Court ordered additional briefing and heard oral

argument on the matter on February 14, 2008. 

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1 Exhibit numbers 1 through 15 in this Report and

Recommendation are references to the exhibits attached

to Respondent's "Response in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus" previously filed with this Court

under Esfandiar Nikbakhsh-Tali v. Alberto Gonzales, et

al., CV 06-2121-PHX-NVW (BPV), (Doc. No. 19). 

Exhibit numbers 16 through 19 in this Report and

Recommendation are references to the exhibits attached

to Respondent's "Response in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus" (Doc. No. 17) from the

immediate litigation, CV 07-1526-PHX-NVW (BPV)

All lettered exhibits make references to the exhibits

found attached to the instant Petition. 

-2-

The District Court heard argument and ordered additional briefing, and took

the objections to the Report and Recommendation under advisement. (Doc. No. 25.)

On April 2, 2008, the District Court rejected the Report and Recommendation,

referring the matter back to the Magistrate Judge to “consider whether, in light of this

new evidence, Petitioner’s removal will likely be effectuated in the reasonably

foreseeable future.” (Doc. No. 30.) 

For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court grant Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a citizen and native of Iran. (Ex. 1.)1 On June 16, 1972,

Petitioner's status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident pursuant to

Section 245 of the Immigration and National Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1255. (Id.) 

On February 3, 2003, Petitioner was convicted in the California Superior

Court, Santa Clara County, upon entry of a guilty plea, of one count of Inflicting

Corporal Injury on Spouse/CoHabitant/Former Spouse or Fiancee, in violation of

California Penal Code § 273.5(a). (Ex. 3.) On August 27, 2003, Petitioner was

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sentenced to four months imprisonment in the county jail. (Id.) On December 3,

2003, after violation of probation, Petitioner was sentenced to two years

imprisonment. (Id.) 

On August 19, 2004, Petitioner was referred to Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) by a referral from the California Department of Corrections

(“CDC”). (Ex. 2). On or about October 4, 2004, the United States served Petitioner

with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings, charging Petitioner as subject to

removal pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), in that he, at any time after admission, was convicted of an

aggravated felony as defined in section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, and pursuant to

section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), in that he, at any time

after admission, was convicted of a crime of domestic violence. (Ex. 7.)

 On October 4, 2004, Petitioner was served a Notice of Custody Determination,

informing Petitioner that pursuant to section 236 of the INS, and 8 C.F.R. 236, the

reviewing officer had determined that Petitioner was to be detained pending a final

determination by the immigration judge (“IJ”) in his case. (Ex. 8.) Despite several

requests, Petitioner’s detention status has not changed since this initial determination.

On October 20, 2004, Petitioner, represented by counsel, appeared in front of

an IJ for a removal hearing. (Ex. 10, p.1) Petitioner admitted the factual allegations

and charges of removability, and the IJ found Petitioner subject to removal as

charged. (Id, p.2.) Petitioner declined to designate a country of removal, expressing

a fear of return to Iran. (Id., p.3.) Petitioner moved to apply for withholding, and for

relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). (Id.) Additionally, Petitioner

informed the IJ that his criminal conviction was being challenged as well, so that there

was a possibility that he might be qualified for 240A relief if that were to occur. (Id.)

Petitioner's removal hearing, after a short continuance due to a medical

emergency and subsequent substitution of counsel, was set for November 24, 2004,

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2 Petitioner's appeal to the BIA is not included in the

record submitted to this Court, but a review of the

decision of the BIA indicates that he did not challenge

his previous concession of removability. 

-4-

and was continued at that time due to the late submission of filings and inadequate

time on the court's calendar to complete the hearing. (Id., p.7, 9, 21.) The IJ entered

his decision on January 20, 2005, ordering Petitioner removed to Iran, denying

Petitioner's application for Asylum, denying Petitioner's application for withholding

of removal, and denying Petitioner's application for deferral of removal under the

Convention Against Torture. (Ex. 12.) 

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner's appeal on

April 26, 2005.2

 (Ex. 13.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review and Request for Stay

of Removal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 4,

2005. (Ex. 14.) On that same date, the Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner a temporary

stay of removal, pending further briefing. See Nikbakhsh-Tali v. Gonzales, No. 05-

72621. 

On September 6, 2006, the Petitioner filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus before this Court. See Nikbakhsh-Tali v. Long, et al., CV 06-2121-PHXNVW, Doc. No. 1. (See also Ex. I) 

On December 29, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss his Stay of

Removal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Ex. 16.) The Ninth Circuit

construed Petitioner’s “motion to dismiss stay of removal” as a “motion to withdraw

the previously-filed motion for stay of removal pending review,” and, so construed,

granted the motion, and vacated the court’s July 29, 2005 order, further directing the

temporary stay of removal, and, if applicable, the voluntary departure no longer in

effect. (See Nikbakhsh-Tali v. Gonzales, No. 05-72621, Docket Entry January 17,

2007; Ex. J) 

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On May 10, 2007, this Court entered an order to show cause why Petitioner's

federal habeas should not be dismissed, granting Petitioner a period of time to file a

writing with this Court addressing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals order dated

January 17, 2007, and the conclusion reached by this Court that Petitioner has entered

the "removal period" under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and, subsequently, has not exceeded the

presumptively reasonable period of detention. (CV 06-2121-PHX-NVW, Doc. No.

20.) 

On May 25, 2007, Petitioner filed a response to the order to show cause. (CV

06-2121-PHX-NVW, Doc. No. 21.)

On June 4, 2007, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court

deny Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, finding that Petitioner's

detention during the removal period, had not exceeded the presumptively reasonable

period, and Petitioner had not met his burden of showing that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. (CV 06-2121-PHX-NVW,

Doc. No. 24.) 

No objections to the Report and Recommendation were filed and the District

Court entered an order accepting the Report and Recommendation, and denying the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (CV 06-2121-PHX-NVW, Doc. No. 25.)

On March 1, 2007, Petitioner’s travel application was submitted to the

Embassy of Pakistan. (Ex. 17) Respondent advises that the reason the request was

submitted to the Embassy of Pakistan is that Iran does not have an embassy in the

United States, therefore, Iran travel documents are submitted through the Embassy of

Pakistan. (Response, p.3.) 

On December 12, 2007, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation, finding that Petitioner had entered the “removal period,” under 8

U.S.C. § 1231(a), on January 17, 2007, when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lifted

his stay of removal. (CV 07-1526-PHX-NVW, Doc. No. 20) The Magistrate Judge

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recommended denying the Petition, finding that, although Petitioner had been

detained for a period of time longer than the six months the United States Supreme

Court found presumptively reasonable in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001),

Petitioner had not met his burden of demonstrating good reason to believe that there

was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. (CV

07-1526-PHX-NVW, Doc. No. 20.) 

II. DISCUSSION

1. Indefinite Detention

Petitioner is subject to an administratively final order of removal. See CV 07-

1526-PHX-NVW, Doc. No. 20, 24, 25 (finding same); See also 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(47)(B)(defining final order of deportation). After completion of

administrative removal proceedings, the detention and release of an alien who has

been ordered removed are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 683 (2001) (referring to section 1231 as the "post-removal-period detention

statute"). 

Petitioner is now in the “removal period,” and has been since January 17, 2007.

When a final order of removal has been entered, the Government ordinarily secures

the alien’s removal during a subsequent 90-day statutory removal period. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(1)(A) (1996). Where, as here, removal is not accomplished within the 90-

day removal period, the government may detain the alien past the removal period for

a period reasonably necessary to accomplish the removal. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.

Thus, detention for more than 90 days pending removal is clearly authorized,

however, it is not without Constitutional limitation. Id.

 Interpreting 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6), the United States Supreme Court concluded

that six months is a "presumptively reasonable" period of detention pending removal.

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Extended detention beyond the removal period violates

due process; after six months, the government's authority to continue the detention

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depends on whether there is a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future." Id.

After the 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that

there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the

Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Zadvydas,

533 U.S. at 701. The burden then shifts to the government, which must respond with

evidence sufficient to rebut Petitioner's showing. Id. 

To benefit from the holding in Zadvydas, the alien must cooperate with the

government’s efforts to remove him. “[W]hen an alien refuses to cooperate fully and

honestly with officials to secure travel documents from a foreign government, the

alien cannot meet his or her burden to show there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Lema v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 853, 856 (9th

Cir. 2003). Respondents, however, do not contend that Petitioner has not

cooperated in obtaining travel documents to assist with his removal. (Doc. No. 26,

at 3.) 

In the instant case, Petitioner has been detained beyond the six-month period.

He argues that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future because Petitioner is in possession of a fax, dated December 13,

2007, that states that the Islamic Republic of Iran “would not be able to issue a travel

document for the above-mentioned person.” (Doc. No. 21, at 1.) 

The Respondents argued initially, in opposition, that, to the extent the

document submitted by Petitioner is admissible, its weight is limited. (Doc. No. 23,

at 2) Respondents further argued that this “cryptic sentence copy of a letter signed

by one person for another ... does not show that the Iranian government has declined

to issue a travel document at all. The Iranian government has not stated that it rejects

petitioner’s citizenship, that it has rejected any of the identity documents or passports

submitted by the government or that it, in fact will not issue a travel document.” (Id.)

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3 Petitioner’s complete application for the issuance of a travel

document to effect Petitioner’s removal was forwarded to the

Embassy of Pakistan on March 2, 2007. (Doc. No. 23, Ex. 2,

Declaration of Susan Lambert-Ray, at ¶ 8.) 

-8-

Detention and Deportation Officer Jaime C. Alfaro, in the Travel Document

Unit with the Headquarter’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations, U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, within the Department of Homeland Security

in Washington, D.C., contacted Mr. Sajjadi, a Consular Officer in the Iranian Interest

Section, on December 13, 2007, and requested an update on the status of the travel

document request for Petitioner. (Doc. No. 23, Ex. 1, Declaration of Jaime C. Alfaro,

¶ 1, 7, 8.) Mr. Sajjadi agreed to research the case and call Mr. Alfaro back. (Id., at

¶ 8.) On January 14, 2008, Mr. Janahsoozan, an official of the Embassy of Pakistan,

Interest Section for the Islamic Republic of Iran, called Mr. Alfaro, and informed him

that Petitioner’s travel document application3

 was forwarded to Tehran, Iran, for

review and verification by the Iranians. (Id., at ¶ 9.) Mr. Alfaro was informed by Mr.

Janahsoozan that this phase of the application takes at least six months. (Id.) It is Mr.

Alfaro’s personal experience that the Iranian Interests Section normally takes from

six to eight months to respond to a travel document request, but can take longer. (Id.,

at ¶ 10.)

 Following oral argument on February 14, 2008, Respondents clarified that a

record search revealed that the detention center in Eloy did not receive in the mail the

letter from the Iranian Interests Section of the Pakistan Embassy dated December 13,

2007, the letter faxed to Petitioner’s counsel. (Doc. No. 26, at 1 and Attachment 2,

Declaration of Susan Lambert-Ray, ¶ 6.) Respondents did determine that the Pakistan

Embassy did recall sending the letter. (Doc. No. 26, at 2.) The detention facility did

receive a second letter on February 26, 2008, dated February 4, 2008, with a postmark

of February 21, 2008. (See Doc. No. 26, at 2, and Attachment 2, letter dated 2/4/08.)

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The letter states that because of an inability to authenticate a birth certificate, a travel

document will not be issued. (Id.) 

Respondents concede that presently, both the December 13, 2007 letter, and

the February 4, 2008 letter are in the format that appears to be the same as other final

decisions received from the Iranian Interests Section. (See Doc. No. 26, Attachment

3, Declaration of Jaime C. Alfaro, ¶ 3.) 

Respondents submit that, despite the apparent final denial letters, this Court

should be persuaded by the detailed declarations from Susan Lambert-Ray and Jaime

Alfaro regarding the government’s extensive contact with the Iranian Interest Section

of the Embassy of Pakistan regarding its progress in obtaining travel documents to

remove Petitioner from the United States. Respondents further argue that, when

determining the reasonableness of a time lapse after the six-month presumptively

reasonable period, this Court should take into account that the government of the

United States is dealing with a government with whom it does not have direct

diplomatic relations and must go through a third party, and should also take into

account the government’s persistence in approaching the Iranian Interest Section at

the Embassy of Pakistan to assist upon their action in forwarding these documents.

Respondents further argue that, following receipt of the February 4, 2008

letter, Mr. Jahansoonzan of the Iranian Interests Section initiated a phone call on

February 26, 2008 to speak to Mr. Alfaro, and it was during this phone call initiated

by the Iranian Interests Section that Mr. Jahansoozan reassured Mr. Alfaro that

verification and review was continuing. (Doc. No. 26, Attachment 3, Updated

Declaration of Jaime C. Alfaro, ¶¶ 1, 5) Thus, Respondents submit that, based upon

these personal representations, which should carry more weight than the “cryptic”

letters, this Court should not consider that a final decision has been made by the

Iranian government on whether to issue travel documents in this case. 

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Mr. Alfaro received a return telephone call from Mr. Jahansoonzan on March

25, 2008. (Doc. No. 29, Attachment 1, Updated Declaration of Jaime C. Alfaro, ¶ 3.)

Mr. Alfaro directly asked Mr. Jahansoozan why the February 4, 2008 letter was issued

stating that a travel document would not be issued if verification was still pending.

(Id., at ¶ 4.) Mr. Jahansoozan replied that it confused him, and that as far as he was

concerned, the Section is still awaiting verification of the birth certificate and that no

final decision about a travel document being issued has been made. (Id.) Mr. Alfaro

also asked if Mr. Jahansoozan could provide him with an exact date that the original

travel document request, original passport, and original birth certificate were

submitted to Tehran, but Mr. Jahansoozan could not provide him with a date. (Id., at

¶ 5.) Mr. Jahansoozan could not explain why the verification was still ongoing and

refused to give any timeline for completion. (Id., at ¶ 6.) 

The Supreme Court, in Zadvydas, found that once removal is “no longer

reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.”

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (citations omitted). “In answering that basic question, the

habeas court must ask whether the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably

necessary to secure removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of

the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of

removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold

continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699-

700. 

The presumptively reasonable six month period has been exceeded, and

Petitioner has met his burden of demonstrating good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Two

documents, although one with somewhat questionable pedigree, have been received

in the form of what Respondents concede is considered a final decision denying travel

documents. Furthermore, although the December 13, 2007 letter was not received by

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the detention facility, the Iranian Interest Section of the Pakistan Embassy has verified

that it did in fact send the letter. The second letter was both sent and received in the

course of regular diplomatic business, and, but for further communications between

Mr. Jahansoozan and Mr. Alfaro, would be considered a final decision in and of itself.

Respondents present evidence in rebuttal, that these communications between

Mr. Jahansoozan and Mr. Alfaro are sufficient to demonstrate that removal is

imminent, and further submit that Petitioner has not provided any evidence of a

permanent obstruction to his deportation. 

As the Supreme Court has explained, however, “for detention to remain

reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the

‘reasonably foreseeable future’ would conversely have to shrink.” Zadvydas, 522

U.S. at 701. As of completion of this Report and Recommendation, Petitioner has

been in the removal period for approximately one year and four months, or nearly ten

months beyond the period found presumptively reasonable in Zadvydas. No doubt,

upon completion of objections to this Report and Recommendation, and consideration

by the District Court, that period will increase by, at a minimum, nearly another

month. 

According to the affidavits submitted by Respondents, both Mr. Alfaro, and

Mr. Jahansoozan appear to be in agreement that it typically requires six months, or as

many as eight months, in some cases longer, for review and verification of travel

documents in response to a travel document request. This is in conformity with the

six months reasonably presumptive period prescribed in Zadvydas. Id. at 701. The

Supreme Court recognized, however, that this presumption did not mean that “every

alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may

be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” The Supreme Court

cautioned, however, that requiring continued detention as long as “good faith efforts

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to effectuate ... deportation continue and [petitioner] failed to show that deportation

will prove ‘impossible” ...” would demand more than the Supreme Court’s reading of

the statute could bear.” Id. at 702 (internal citations omitted). 

In this case, it is not entirely clear when the travel documents were delivered

to Iran. Mr. Alfaro’s typical expectancy, however, is that the typical decision period

is six to eight months from the period of delivery of documents to the Pakistan

Embassy, which occurred on March 2, 2007. It has been over fourteen months, since

the delivery of documents to the Iranian Interests Section of the Pakistan Embassy,

and travel documents have not been issued. 

There is, however, no confirmation that the application was forwarded to

Tehran, Iran, until January 16, 2008. Only four months have lapsed since that date,

but there is no way of knowing from the affidavits if it was submitted at any earlier

time, from March 2, 2007, until January 16, 2008. Presumably the two letters that

were sent denying travel documents were as a result of travel applications having

previously been submitted to Iran, at least sometime prior to December 13, 2007. Mr.

Jahansoozan states that they are typically forwarded to Tehran within two weeks of

receipt. Thus, based on usual practices, they would have been received in Tehran by

the end of March, 2007, and the receipt of the denial letter in December, 2007,

conforms with the experience of Mr. Alfaro in receiving an official response in six to

eight months from submission. 

Although Mr. Alfaro is confident that a final decision has not yet been made,

and travel documents will issue, this confidence is based solely on conversations with

Mr. Jahansoozan, who admits that he is confused as to why a denial letter issued from

the Iranian Interests Section, does not know when the original travel document

request, original passport, and original birth certificate were submitted to Tehran,

could not explain why the verification was still ongoing, and refused to give any

timeline for completion. Mr. Alfaro does not provide any reason, such as prior

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dealings or experience, that he has placed such confidence in one with such an

apparent complete lack of knowledge, nor has he explained why he knows that review

is ongoing. 

Petitioner’s confinement in the removal period is nearing sixteen months, and,

short of proving that his removal is “impossible,” there is little more Petitioner could

demonstrate to show that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future. In light of the two denial letters, and Mr.

Jahansoozan’s inability to even speculate as to when travel documents might be

forthcoming, Respondent’s have not come forth with evidence establishing that it is

clear that there is a significant likelihood of removal, much less in the reasonably

foreseeable future. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order granting Petitioner's Petition. 

2. Bond Determination

Respondents argued, in their Response to Petitioner’s Objection to Notice of

Intent to Deny, that, although regulations do not provide for bonding of aliens subject

to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(A)(6), such as Petitioner, in the event

that some consideration was made for release or on conditions or on bond, Petitioner

would bear the burden of proving that he was not a flight risk or a danger to the

community, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241(d)(1). Respondents argued further, however,

that immigration judges do not have jurisdiction to review bond determinations after

a final order has been entered, nevertheless, such hearings have been held upon order

of either the Ninth Circuit of Appeals or the District Court. Respondents request that,

if this Court would find that Petitioner’s detention violates his rights, counsel urges

the Court to allow an immigration judge in the first instance to hold a bond hearing

to determine Petitioner’s right to release or set the amount of bond.

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Similarly, Petitioner argues that the cases indicate an immigration judge can

hold such a bond hearing. The cases Petitioner cites (Doc. No. 27, at 5), are all

distinguished from this case, however, as they all involved petitioners who had not

yet entered the final removal period, and were granted a bond hearing pursuant to

Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005), which this Court has previously

established is not applicable to this case. Neither Respondents nor Petitioner cited to

this Court any cases wherein a bond hearing was held following a determination,

under Zadvydas, that removal was unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the government may require a detainee to post

bond as a condition of being released pursuant to a determination under Zadvydas that

repatriation is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Doan v.

INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002). In Doan, the Ninth Circuit unambiguously held

that the government may require a detainee to post bond as a condition of being

released pursuant to a determination under Zadvydas that repatriation is not likely to

occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. Doan, 311 F.3d at 1161 ("a bond is well

within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, 533

U.S. at 6SS-69, 695-96... where the Court observed that 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (2001)

establishes conditions of release"). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (2003)

provides that "[a]n officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the

posting of bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure

compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal." 8

C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (2003); see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(1) (making the conditions of

8 C.F.R. § 241.5 applicable to aliens released under sec. 241.13).

a. Public Safety

It is an altogether different matter, from requiring that bond be posted and an

order of supervision be required, to requiring that Petitioner appear before an

immigration judge and bear the burden of demonstrating entitlement to release.

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Respondents assert that, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(1), an alien with a

final order of removal must demonstrate “his or her release will not pose danger to the

community or to the safety of other persons or property...” 

Once it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood that an alien

will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, the regulation that applies to

custody determinations is found at 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, which provides in relevant part

that, if a finding of no significant likelihood of removal is found, the Service “shall

promptly make arrangements for the release of the alien subject to appropriate

conditions, as provided in paragraph (h) of this section. 

Regulations provide that the Service may require that the alien submit to a

medical or psychiatric examination prior to establishing appropriate conditions for

release or determining whether to refer the alien for further proceedings under §

241.14 because of special circumstances justifying continued detention. The Service

is not required to release an alien if the alien refuses to submit to a medical or

psychiatric examination as ordered.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g)(1). Section 241.14(a)(2)

grants jurisdiction to immigration judges and the Board to determine whether release

of an alien would pose a special danger to the public, as provided in 8 C.F.R. § 241.14

paragraphs (f) through (k), but do not have jurisdiction with respect to aliens

described in paragraphs (b), (c) or (d). Paragraphs (f) through (k) describe aliens

determined to be specially dangerous; paragraphs (b), (c), and (d), describe aliens who

have highly contagious diseases, risk a serious adverse foreign policy consequence

upon release, or raise security or terrorism concerns. 

Thus, under regulations, the only provision for a bond hearing before an

immigration judge is when there has been a determination that an alien poses

conditions of special danger to the public because of their proven history of violent

criminal activity and mental illness. This condition, however, has been found invalid

in at least two instances. In Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008), the Fifth

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Circuit rejected the government's reading of Zadvydas, and found the Supreme Court

did not create an exception for detention of mentally ill aliens beyond the presumptive

six month post-removal period. Id. at 483. It further held the regulation authorizing

the continued detention of a removable alien having no significant likelihood of being

removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, and who had been determined

"specially dangerous" because of mental illness that would likely cause him to commit

future acts of violence, was not a permissible interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(6)). Id. at 485. In Harnandez-Carrera v. Carlson, ___ F Supp 2d. ___ (2008

WL 913375), the District Court for the District of Kansas found that the Supreme

Court has unequivocally stated that its interpretation and reading of 8 U.S.C. §

1231(A)(6) in Zadvydas “applies without differential to all three categories of aliens

that are its subject. Harnandez-Carrera, 2008 WL 913375 at 3. (quoting Clark v.

Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005)); See also Tuan Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790

(9th Cir.2004) (Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize

continued detention of alien suffering from harm-threatening mental illness for longer

than the presumptive six-month post-removal period authorized in Zadvydas where

the alien’s removal from the United States is not reasonably foreseeable)

This Court finds the District Court’s reasoning in Hernandez-Carrera

persuasive:

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court stated that "once the flight risk

justification [for continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)

evaporates, the only special circumstance present is the alien's

removable status itself, which bears no relation to a detainee's

dangerousness." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691-92. ...

... Once the presumptively reasonable six month period for removal of

such an alien has expired, further detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(6) is improper and the alien must be released subject to

conditions of supervision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 241.5.

See also Tran, 515 F.3d at 485 (while sympathetic to the government's

concern for public safety, the court has no power to authorize the

petitioner's continued detention under § 1231(a)(6)).

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Such conditions clearly can address public safety concerns. ...

Moreover, noncompliance with the conditions of release subjects an

alien to criminal prosecution and penalties, including further detention.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(b). See also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 ("[W]e

nowhere deny the right of Congress ... to subject [aliens] to supervision

with conditions when released from detention, or to incarcerate them

where appropriate for violations of those conditions").

After Zadvydas, Congress acted to further protect the public

from the release of aliens who threaten national security. If further

detention of aliens with mental illness or threat of violence is required

to protect public safety, rather than the supervised release which is

currently authorized, Congress has not yet acted to provide such

additional protection.

Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson WL 913375, 4 -5 (D.Kan.,2008)

It is the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that, should the District Judge

find that Petitioner satisfies the conditions of Zadvydas, there is no authority

establishing that the District Court can order a bond hearing be held to determine

whether or not Petitioner poses a danger to the public. In fact, the Magistrate Judge

finds Zadvydas suggests the opposite, i.e., the District Court must order Petitioner

released. The District Court may order Respondents to release Petitioner under

appropriate conditions of supervision, including the posting of bond or other

reasonable conditions of supervised release, that, if violated, could result in further

detention. See Doan, 311 F.3d 1160. 

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court GRANT Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation.

A party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should

use the following case number: CV 07-1526-PHX-NVW.

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If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by

the District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc). 

DATED this 13th day of May, 2008.

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