Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00101/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00101-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DAVID M. FRIEDMAN et al., 

On behalf of all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Defendants. /

NO. CIV. 2:00-101 WBS DAD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES,

COSTS, AND EXPENSES

----oo0oo----

As the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs

(Docket No. 277) on claims 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of their Complaint

in accordance with the Order Staying Further Proceedings Pending

Conclusion of Related Case of August 14, 2001 (Docket No. 261),

the Memorandum and Order of November 15, 2000 (Docket No. 255),

the Court’s Memorandum and Order of June 20, 2006 in the related

case, Cummings v. Connell, No. 99-2176, 2006 WL 1716160 (E.D.

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Cal. 2006) (Cummings Docket No. 270) and the Amended Judgment

therein (Cummings Docket No. 272), plaintiffs now move for an

award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1988, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(h) and

54(d)(2) and Local Rule 293. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants on January 18,

2000, on behalf of themselves and a class of approximately 10,000

nonunion employees of the California State University in

bargaining units 2, 5, 7, and 9 represented by defendant

California State Employees Association (“CSEA”), alleging, inter

alia, that as of January 1, 2000 CSEA would improperly withhold a

portion of union dues from their paychecks without providing them

with the procedural safeguards required by Chicago Teachers Union

v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). Between November 1999 and

January 2000, CSEA mailed three notices–-referred to in this

litigation as the Original, Amended, and January notices--to all

nonunion members of bargaining units 2, 5, 7, and 9 informing

them of their “fair share fee” and their right to object and pay

a reduced fee. Plaintiffs alleged that all three notices failed

to meet Hudson’s requirements because they failed to include a

copy of the related financial audit or did not provide nonmembers

a reasonable opportunity to object. 

On November 15, 2000, the court granted defendants’

motion for summary judgment with respect to claims one and two of

the Complaint (Docket No. 255). Those claims challenged the

facial constitutionality of section 2583.5 of the California

Government Code, which required nonmembers to either join the

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union or pay a “fair share service fee.” On August 14, 2001, the

court granted a joint motion to stay the remainder of plaintiffs’

claims pending final resolution of the related case of Cummings

v. Connell, No. 99-2179 WBS DAD (E.D. Cal.). (Order Staying

Further Proceedings (Docket No. 261).) The parties agreed: 

to be bound by the legal principles finally established

in Cummings and apply them to the present case in a good

faith effort to resolve the case . . . . This includes,

but is not limited to, an agreement that if it is

ultimately determined in Cummings that one or more of

CSEA’s Hudson notices in that case were legally

deficient, then CSEA will accept, for settlement

purposes, that the corresponding one or more of CSEA’s

Hudson notices in this case were similarly deficient. 

(Id. at 1-2.) The court determined that the notices at issue in

Cummings–-April 1999, June 1999, and two January 2000 notices--

were constitutionally deficient for various reasons and granted

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment with respect to all four

notices. Cummings, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064-68 (E.D. Cal.

2001). 

The notices at issue in this litigation suffered from

the same alleged procedural deficiencies that the court found in

the Cummings litigation to be, and the Ninth Circuit upheld as,

constitutionally deficient under Hudson. Pursuant to the

parties’ prior agreement, the rulings in Cummings, and

plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for entry of final judgment (see

Docket Nos. 267, 271, 274), on February 24, 2010 the court

entered final judgment in favor of plaintiffs as to claims 3, 4,

5, 7, and 8 of the Complaint and awarded each plaintiff and class

member nominal damages in the amount of $1.00, entered final

judgment in favor of defendants with respect to claims 1 and 2 of

the Complaint, and dismissed as moot claims 6, 9, and 10 of the

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Complaint. (Docket No. 277.) 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h)(1),

the parties drafted a class notice regarding the attorneys’ fee

agreement, which was approved by the court on April 28, 2010

(Docket No. 291), and dispatched the notice to all class members

on May 28, 2010 and June 7, 2010. (June 16, 2010 Certification of

Mailing (Docket No. 292).) Three class members have filed written

objections to the notice of motion regarding attorneys’ fees. 

(Supp. Chappell Decl. (Docket No. 294).) Plaintiffs now move for

an order awarding fees and costs of $45,500.00 as agreed to by

the parties. Defendants have filed a statement of non-opposition

to plaintiffs’ motion. (Docket No. 293.) 

II. Discussion

 Plaintiffs request–-and defendants agree to pay--

$45,500 in attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)

provides for reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party

in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Rule 23(h)

provides for attorney’s fees and costs in class action suits. 

Additionally, out-of-pocket litigation expenses are reimbursable

as a part of attorneys’ fees. Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16,

19 (9th Cir. 1994). Although Rule 23(h) provides that attorneys’

fees in class actions cannot be paid except pursuant to a Rule

54(d)(2) motion, the commentary to Rule 23(h) and Rule

54(d)(2)(B) make clear that fee agreements are relevant to what

amount of fees should be awarded. Where, as here, the amount of

fees to be paid has been agreed upon subject to court approval,

the court must ensure that the interests of the class are

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protected and have not been sacrificed to the advantage of the

defendant and the plaintiff’s attorneys. See, e.g., Zucker v.

Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1397 (9th Cir. 1999)

(noting that class action suits create “opportunities for

collusive arrangements” among the parties and their attorneys). 

In this case, the court can not conceive of any danger

of collusion between the parties with regard to the settlement

agreement for attorneys’ fees. All of the claims in this

litigation were either decided on summary adjudication by this

court, settled in favor of plaintiffs due to the rulings in the

Cummings litigation, or eventually mooted by defendants’

subsequent notice that complied with Hudson. The attorneys’ fees

claim was not part of the settlement of any other claim and,

hence, the agreed-upon amount is unaffected by any compromise of

the claims of the class. Payment of an agreed-upon amount of

attorneys fees is therefore not contrary to the interests of the

class. 

Furthermore, the parties agree–-and the court so

finds–-that plaintiffs qualify as a “prevailing party” for § 1988

purposes and are presumptively entitled to attorneys’ fees

because they prevailed on at least some of their claims under §

1983. See Sable Commc’ns v. Pac. Tel. & Tel., 890 F.2d 184, 193

(9th Cir. 1989) (“Plaintiffs prevailing in a civil rights action

should ordinarily receive attorney’s fees unless special

circumstances would render such an award unjust.”). This court

is not aware of any special circumstances which would justify

denying an award of fees and costs.

To determine a reasonable attorney fee in this case,

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the court must first calculate the lodestar by taking the number

of hours reasonably expended by the litigation and multiplying it

by a reasonable hourly rate. Fisher v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d

1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 433 (1983)). There is a strong presumption that the

lodestar amount is reasonable. Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 n.4

(citation omitted). The district court may exclude from the

initial fee calculation hours that were “excessive, redundant, or

otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The court may

then adjust the lodestar based on an evaluation of the factors

articulated in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 536 F.2d 67

(9th Cir. 1975) that are not subsumed under the lodestar

calculation.1

 Id. The fee applicant bears the burden of

documenting the appropriate hours expended in the litigation and

must submit evidence in support of those hours worked. Hensley,

461 U.S. at 433. 

“The extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial

factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. Hensley

prescribed a two-step process for calculating attorney’s fees in

a case of partial or limited success. A court must consider (1)

1 The factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Kerr

are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill required to

perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other

employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the

customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7)

time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8)

the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience,

reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the

“undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in

similar cases. Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. 

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whether “the plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were

unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded,” and (2) whether

“the plaintiff achiev[ed] a level of success that makes the hours

reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Deductions based on limited success

are within the discretion of the district court. Watson v.

County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A. Lodestar Calculation

Plaintiffs propose that a base lodestar figure of

$129,342.50 would be an appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees in

this case. This amount accounts for the hours principally

expended by Milton L. Chappell, a staff attorney at the National

Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation (the “Foundation”), and by

Dylan B. Carp, who was then a second- and third-year attorney at

the Foundation. (Docket No. 281.) This amount also includes

fees generated by the Foundation’s paralegal. (Id.) 

1. Reasonable Rate

A reasonable rate is typically based upon the

prevailing market rate in the community for “similar work

performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and

reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205,

1210 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895-96 n.11 (1984) (“[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to

produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are

in line with those prevailing in the community.”); Drexler, 22

Cal. 4th at 1095. The relevant community is generally the forum

in which the court sits. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500

(9th Cir. 1997). 

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Chappell seeks an hourly rate of $275 per hour for his

work, $150 per hour for Carp’s work, and $75 per hour for the

work of the paralegal at the Foundation. (Id.) In support of

his requested fee rate, Chappell submits a declaration (Id. Ex.

A) detailing his and Carp’s qualifications and stating that he

has previously been awarded an hourly rate of $275 by Judge

Burrell in the case of Hoirup v. Professional Eng’rs in Cal.

Gov’t, No. 02-662, 2006 WL 2791158 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2006),

which also litigated the adequacy of financial disclosures to

nonunion bargaining unit members under Hudson. But see Eiden v.

Thrifty Payless Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (E.D. Cal. 2005)

(“[J]udges in this district have repeatedly found that reasonable

rates in this district are $250 per hour for an experienced

attorney . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Judge Burrell also awarded a second-year attorney an

hourly rate of $150 and legal assistants an hourly rate of $100,

and–-based on declarations from attorneys competent to testify as

to the prevailing market rates in Sacramento for comparable civil

rights attorneys--found all three rates to be the standard hourly

rate in the Sacramento area for attorneys and legal assistants

with similar qualifications. Id. 

In light of the rulings of other courts in this

district and Chappell’s and Carp’s qualifications, the court

finds that a rate of $275 per hour for Chappell and $150 per hour

for Carp constitute an approximate rate for similar work

performed by attorneys of similar experience and skill to

Chappell and Carp in the Sacramento area. See, e.g., Eiden, 407

F. Supp. 2d at 1171 (stating that a reasonable rate is $175 for

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associates). Likewise, the paralegal rate “favored in this

district” is $75 per hour. See, e.g., Yeager v. Bowlin, No. 08-

102, 2010 WL 2303273, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2010) (citing

cases); see also Eiden, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 (citing cases

stating that reasonable rate for paralegals is $75).

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiffs’ motion submits that a total of 536.20 hours

were reasonably expended in litigation of this case. (Mot. for

Atty Fees, at 7.) Not included in this calculation are 110.8

hours spent on matters plaintiffs found arguably excessive or

duplicitive and 113 hours spent by Foundation research assistants

on various research tasks. (Id. at 7 n.6.) Plaintiffs include

with Chappell’s declaration a detailed billing statement

outlining the tasks performed by Carp, Chappell, and the

foundation paralegal. (Chappell Decl. (Docket No. 281 Ex. A) Ex.

1.) The work in this case was related primarily to motions and

hearings on a temporary restraining order, a preliminary

injunction, class certification, and two motions for partial

summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ counsel also worked on class

notices, negotiating settlement and an entry of judgment postCummings, and the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. After

reviewing the billing statements the court finds the hours

expended to be reasonable. 

The baseline lodestar amount believed by plaintiffs to

be reasonable is as follows:

NAME HOURS HOURLY RATE LODESTAR AMT.

Carp 112.90 $150 $16.935.00

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Chappell 403.30 $275 $110,907.50

Paralegal 20.00 $75 $1,500.00

TOTAL 536.20 $129,342.50

 B. Adjusting the Lodestar Calculation

The court may make deductions from the lodestar

calculation to reflect partial or limited success. See Watson,

300 F.3d at 1096. The Ninth Circuit has approved the use of “a

mathematical formula, even a crude one, to reduce the fee award

to account for limited success.” Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895 904-905 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming

court’s use of mathematical formula to reduce fee award). In

this case, plaintiffs lost on counts 1 and 2 of their Complaint

and were denied a temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction. Plaintiffs did, however, obtain certification of the

class and ultimately prevailed on claims 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 of

their Complaint. Plaintiffs calculate that 383.20 hours were

spent on issues and tasks on which they ultimately prevailed, and

that 153 hours were spent on tasks on which they did not

prevail–-for a total of 71% of time spent on successful tasks. 

(Mot. for Atty Fees, at 9-10; Chappell Decl. Ex. 2.) As a

result, plaintiffs propose that a reasonable fee award would be

reduced to 71% of the lodestar amount.

In this calculation plaintiffs consider the time spent

on the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as

prevailing tasks, as plaintiffs were ultimately successful on

their claims–-which formed the basis of the motions--that the

notices at issue were deficient under Hudson. See Cummings, 177

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F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1086 & n.6 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that even

though plaintiffs were unsuccessful in pursuing temporary

restraining order and second preliminary injunction, plaintiffs

ultimately prevailed on their claims and that plaintiffs are

“entitled to all attorney’s fees reasonably expended in pursuing

that claim--even though [they] may have suffered some adverse

rulings”) (quoting Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d

1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991)), rev’d in part on other grounds by

Cummings v. Connell, 316 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2003) (Cummings I)

(reversing, inter alia, award of compensatory damages). 

Plaintiffs’ reductions to the lodestar for time spent on

unsuccessful claims is therefore an appropriate method to ensure

the fee award is “reasonable in relation to the results obtained”

in the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 

Furthermore, it is appropriate to adjust the lodestar

calculation to account for the limited monetary relief obtained

by plaintiffs and class members. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.

103, 114 (1992). In this case, each class member received

nominal damages in the amount of $1.00. (Docket No. 277); see

Cummings, 316 F.3d at 893-95 (reversing the court’s award of

compensatory damages for deficient Hudson notices). A further

reduction of 25% of the lodestar amount is reasonable in light of

the limited monetary relief plaintiffs received and consistent

with the deduction calculated in the related Cummings litigation. 

Reducing the adjusted lodestar a further 25% results in a total

reduction to 46% of the lodestar amount. Fourty-six percent of

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the loadstar amount of $129,342.50 is $59,497.55.2 

C. Costs

Plaintiffs also ask that the award include payment for

a number of costs and expenses. Out-of-pocket costs and expenses

incurred by an attorney that would normally be charged to a feepaying client are recoverable as attorneys’ fees. United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th

Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs calculate $3,765.42 primarily in filing

fees, travel-related expenses, and transcripts. (Mot. for Atty

Fees, at 8; id. Ex. 3) Defendants do not object to this

calculation and the court finds the expenses and costs to be

reasonable. 

D. Class Members’ Objections

In late April 2010, an appropriate notice of motion for

attorneys’ fees was approved by this court, and mailed to the

class members pursuant to Rule 23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(2);

(see Notice to the Class (Docket No. 291).) According to Rule

23, as explained in the notice, all class members had the right

to object in writing to the motion for attorneys’ fees. Id.

Accordingly, three class members have timely filed objections

which plaintiffs’ counsel, Milton L. Chappell, submitted to this

2 In his supplemental declaration, counsel for plaintiffs

includes additional billing information for time spent on matters

related to the class notice and motion for attorneys’ fees and

costs since February 28, 2010. (Supp. Chappell Decl. ¶¶ 8-12.) 

Chappell has spent an additional 34.7 hours not already included

in the lodestar calculation above not including the time spent

traveling to the fairness hearing heard on July 19, 2010. 

Because the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs agreed-to by the

parties is already significantly lower than what the court will

conclude is a reasonable award would warrant, the court will not

make further adjustments to the lodestar calculation.

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court on July 12, 2010.3 (Supp. Chappell Decl. Exs. 1-3.)

Class member Diane Slagle objects to the award on the

grounds that the class should not have to pay the attorneys’ fees

and costs. (Supp. Chappell Decl. Ex. 1.)

Class member Paula Zaragoza objects on the grounds that

she was not consulted regarding the representation,4 she does not

believe the class should have to pay the attorneys’ fees and

costs, and on the ground that she disagrees with class action

suits in principle.5 (Supp. Chappell Decl. Ex. 2.)

Class member Salvatore P. Troia objects on the grounds

that the attorneys should not get paid until the class members

are reimbursed the fees paid to CSEA and what appears to be

general disagreement with the fairness of the nominal damages

award of $1.00. (Supp. Chappell Decl. Ex. 3.)

To the extent that the class members may be concerned

that an award of attorneys’ fees will come out of any monetary

3 In addition, one class member, Salvatore P. Troia,

stated his intention to speak at the hearing, but he did not

appear.

4 In response to the objection by Paula Zaragoza, this

court notes that in a class action the issue is “whether the

class as a whole had notice adequate to flush out whatever

objections might reasonably be raised to the settlement. If an

individual [class member] later claims he did not receive

adequate notice and therefore should not be bound by the

settlement, he can litigate that issue on an individual basis

when the settlement is raised as a bar to a lawsuit he has

brought.” Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375

(9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, Zaragoza may pursue an individual

remedy in a separate action, but her asserted lack of notice does

not constitute a substantive objection to the present motion.

5 While Zaragoza might generally object to class action

suits, this general disagreement with the Federal Rules is not a

substantive objection to the present motion for attorneys’ fees

and costs. 

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judgment in their favor, this is not the case. The only award

granted to class members was the nominal damages of $1.00 per

class member, which has already been paid. The attorneys’ fees

referenced in the present application are to come from a separate

fund. To the extent that the class members object because they

have paid money to CSEA, and CSEA is paying for the attorneys’

fees, the court previously explained in the Cummings litigation

that this argument does not constitute a meritorious objection to

the present motion. See Cummings, No. 99-2176, 2006 WL 3951867,

at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2006) (“Although not named plaintiffs,

objecting class members are still parties, represented by

counsel, to a suit seeking monetary damages from CSEA. It is

beyond dispute that a party (even if the party only prevails in

part) may be entitled to attorneys’ fees, Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d)(2), even when the ultimate judgment is for nominal damages

. . . .”). 

To the extent that the class members are dissatisfied

with the final award of $1.00 in nominal damages, this is not a

proper basis for objecting to the present motion for attorneys’

fees. The parties agreed “to be bound by the legal principles

finally established in Cummings and apply them to the present

case.” (Order Staying Further Proceedings, at 1-2.) While the

court sympathizes with the class members’ disappointment with the

award, the issue of damages was decided by the Ninth Circuit in

Cummings I, which held that compensatory damages to the class

were not appropriate because the class members still have the

burden, after receiving a proper Hudson notice, to object to

paying the full fee if they are to receive a refund of the

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nonchargeable portion of the fee. 316 F.3d at 894. 

Out of the approximately 10,000 class members that are

parties to this action, the court does not find merit in the

three objections filed to this motion.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the

lodestar calculation of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses

equals:

Attorneys’ Fees = $59,497.55

Costs = $3,765.42

TOTAL = $63,262.97

The parties to this action have settled this claim in

order to avoid the time, expense, and uncertainty of a dispute

over the appropriate amount. This court concludes that the

unopposed amount sought, $45,500.00, is reasonable and will thus

award it to class counsel. See Cummings, No. 99-2176, 2006 WL

3951867, at *6 (awarding the amount agreed to in a settlement,

$125,000.00, based on a lodestar calculation of $137,143.99);

Hoirup, 2006 WL 2791158, at *5 (awarding the amount agreed to in

a settlement, $110,000.00, based on a lodestar calculation of

$193,889.34).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for

attorney’s fees and costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in

the amount of $45,500.00.

DATED: July 20, 2010

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Case 2:00-cv-00101-WBS -DAD Document 296 Filed 07/21/10 Page 15 of 15