Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00760/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00760-26/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JON CHRIST, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

R. BLACKWELL, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:10-cv-0760-EFB P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.1 Currently pending are: (1) defendants’ response to the court’s December 3, 2015 

order to show cause (ECF No. 194); (2) defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 

193); and (3) various motions and objections filed by plaintiff in response to the motion for 

summary judgment (ECF Nos. 197, 199, 204-206). For the following reasons, the court will 

impose sanctions on defense counsel for failing to adhere to the schedule without good cause, 

deny plaintiff’s motions, and grant the motion for summary judgment in part and deny it in part. 

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 The case is before the undersigned by the consent of the parties. ECF Nos. 4, 14, 134. 

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I. Defendants’ Response to the Order to Show Cause 

A. Background 

Plaintiff filed this action in Santa Clara County Superior Court on January 5, 2010. ECF 

No. 1-1. Defendants removed the case to federal court. ECF No. 1. The case progressed through 

discovery, and defendants allowed the dispositive motion filing deadline (April 22, 2011) to pass 

without filing a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 19. In May 

2013, after reviewing the pretrial statements filed by the parties, the court discovered that two 

named defendants – Weiglein and Roszko – had not responded to the complaint. See ECF No. 

101. Plaintiff informed the court that he was pursuing his claims against Weiglein in a separate 

action and the court accordingly dismissed Weiglein from this action. ECF No. 106. After a long 

process that need not be recounted here (see id. at 2), defendant Roszko was properly served with 

the complaint. ECF No. 135. The court then issued a revised schedule governing discovery and 

dispositive motions “so that plaintiff and defendant Roszko may engage in discovery and pretrial 

motions with respect to plaintiff’s claims against defendant Roszko.” ECF No. 145 at 1. 

On December 30, 2014, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment addressing all of 

plaintiff’s claims against all defendants. ECF No. 159. Defendants did not seek relief from the 

schedule that governed all of them except Roszko, under which the dispositive motion filing 

deadline had passed. ECF No. 19 (providing a dispositive motion deadline of April 22, 2011). 

Defendants argued that that they filed a motion addressing all claims against all defendants 

because they “were unable to determine which claims or causes of actions were directed to which 

defendant.” ECF No. 161. The court found this representation disingenuous. Because 

defendants Blackwell, Broyles, Lopez, Voight, and Zuniga did not show good cause why they did 

not seek summary judgment on or before April 22, 2011, the court declined to consider their 

arguments. ECF No. 176 at 2-3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified 

only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”) and Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 

975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a motion to modify the schedule must be 

supported by a showing of good cause; i.e., that the schedule could not have been met despite the 

moving party’s diligence)). The court noted that, if these defendants wished to seek summary 

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judgment on plaintiff’s claims against them, they were required to file a motion for modification 

of the schedule, supported by a showing of good cause. Id. 

Defendants filed such a motion. ECF No. 179. The court concluded that the non-Roszko 

defendants had not shown good cause for their failure to comply with the April 22, 2011 

dispositive motion deadline. ECF No. 190. Nevertheless, the court allowed these defendants to 

file a motion for summary judgment outside that deadline because the court cannot waste 

resources trying claims that may be resolved on summary judgment. Id. The court ordered 

defense counsel to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for violating the scheduling 

order. Id. The court has received counsel’s response. ECF No. 194. 

B. Analysis 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) provides that the court may, on its own motion, 

issue “any just order,” including sanctions, where a party “fails to obey a scheduling order.” In 

the response to the order to show cause, defense counsel states that they allowed the April 22, 

2011 deadline to pass in a “good faith—although obviously mistaken—assumption about how to 

best proceed in an effort to save the Court’s time and resources.” ECF No. 194 at 1. According 

to counsel, they knew that defendant Roszko might eventually be served and were waiting until 

that time to file a summary judgment motion addressing plaintiff’s claims against all defendants. 

Id. at 2. 

The court has reviewed the docket in this action and finds defense counsel’s proffered 

reason for allowing the dispositive motion deadline to pass difficult to believe. To credit 

counsel’s story, the court would have to believe that counsel was willing to forego filing a 

potentially successful summary judgment motion on behalf of five defendants because there was 

a chance that a sixth defendant (who had not been served and was not participating in the case) 

would later be given an opportunity to file such a motion. If defense counsel had truly wanted to 

save the court’s time by filing a single motion for all defendants, counsel could have alerted the 

court to the fact that plaintiff’s attempt to serve Roszko prior to removal had been unsuccessful 

and resolved the question of whether he would be added to the case before the April 22, 2011 

deadline passed (by, for example, filing a motion to dismiss Roszko under Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 4(m)). It appears that, instead, counsel hoped that plaintiff and the court would not 

notice Roszko’s sudden disappearance from the case and that the case would conclude without his 

further participation. Once that was no longer possible, counsel tried to piggyback a nowextraordinarily-late motion for summary judgment for the five pre-existing defendants onto 

defendant Roszko’s motion. 

Defense counsel’s conduct placed the court in the untenable position of either dispensing 

with Rule 16’s good cause standard or holding a possibly needless trial. The court’s docket is far 

too impacted to allow a case to proceed to a jury trial when it could have been resolved by 

summary judgment. But the court must ensure that parties adhere to schedules or provide good 

cause when they depart from them. Accordingly, the court will impose monetary sanctions of 

$500 jointly and severally on current defense counsel Jeffrey E. Beeson, Michael A. Terhorst, and 

Beeson Terhorst LLP. 

II. Plaintiff’s Motions and Objections to the Motion for Summary Judgment 

Plaintiff has filed a number of objections to defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

and requests that the court deny the motion for technical reasons. ECF Nos. 197, 199, 204-206. 

Plaintiff contends that defendants violated the court’s order that their motion be filed within 30 

days of December 3, 2015. ECF Nos. 197, 199, 204, 206. The docket in this action shows that 

defendants filed the notice to plaintiff informing him of his obligations in responding to the 

motion, the points and authorities in support of the motion, the exhibits, and the statement of 

undisputed facts on December 28, 2015, within the 30-day deadline. ECF No. 193. Defendants 

served these same documents by mail the same day. However, the 3-paragraph notice of motion 

was not filed until January 8, 2016, for reasons defendants have not explained. ECF No. 195. 

Defendants filed the substantive portions of their summary judgment motion within the 

30-day time limit set by the court. While the notice of motion was filed four days outside the 30-

day window, plaintiff has not shown that the tardy notice caused him any prejudice. Accordingly, 

plaintiff’s request that the court deny the motion for summary judgment due to untimeliness is 

denied. 

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Plaintiff argues that defendants were late in responding to the court’s order to show cause. 

ECF No. 197. The docket shows that defendants timely filed their response on December 28, 

2015. ECF No. 193. 

Plaintiff also objects that defendants have not been consistent in including defendant 

Roszko’s name in various places in the motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 199. Plaintiff is 

aware that defendant Roszko has already been granted summary judgment. ECF No. 176. 

Defendants’ lack of care in listing the defendants who now seek summary judgment is not a basis 

for denying the motion. 

Plaintiff further requests that the court deny the motion because defendants have not filed 

a reply brief. ECF No. 205. While reply briefs are almost always helpful, and when submitted 

must be filed timely, defendants were not obligated to file a reply brief. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(d) 

(the moving party “may” file a reply, but is not required to). 

Lastly, plaintiff “requests to settle this case.” ECF No. 205 at 2. One of plaintiff’s claims 

survives summary judgment (see below). Accordingly, the court will refer the case to a 

randomly-assigned magistrate judge for a settlement conference. 

III. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

A. General Summary Judgment Principles 

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary 

judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases in which the parties do not dispute the facts relevant 

to the determination of the issues in the case, or in which there is insufficient evidence for a jury 

to determine those facts in favor of the nonmovant. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 

(1998); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). At bottom, a summary judgment 

motion asks whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury. 

The principal purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims 

or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus, the rule functions to 

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“‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Procedurally, under summary 

judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its 

motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; 

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving party meets 

its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to 

present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248; Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A clear focus on where the burden of proof lies as to the factual issue in question is crucial 

to summary judgment procedures. Depending on which party bears that burden, the party seeking 

summary judgment does not necessarily need to submit any evidence of its own. When the 

opposing party would have the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the moving party 

need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See, e.g., Lujan v. National 

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Rather, the moving party need only point to matters 

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-

24 (“[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a 

summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. In such a 

circumstance, summary judgment must be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is 

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

To defeat summary judgment the opposing party must establish a genuine dispute as to a 

material issue of fact. This entails two requirements. First, the dispute must be over a fact(s) that 

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is material, i.e., one that makes a difference in the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). Whether a factual dispute is material is 

determined by the substantive law applicable for the claim in question. Id. If the opposing party 

is unable to produce evidence sufficient to establish a required element of its claim that party fails 

in opposing summary judgment. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 322. 

Second, the dispute must be genuine. In determining whether a factual dispute is genuine 

the court must again focus on which party bears the burden of proof on the factual issue in 

question. Where the party opposing summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial on 

the factual issue in dispute, that party must produce evidence sufficient to support its factual 

claim. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by evidence are insufficient to defeat the motion. 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, the opposing party must, by affidavit 

or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue 

for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. More significantly, to 

demonstrate a genuine factual dispute, the evidence relied on by the opposing party must be such 

that a fair-minded jury “could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248, 252. Absent any such evidence there simply is no reason for trial. 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s 

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See id. at 249, 255; 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the 

proponent must adduce evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. Am. Int'l 

Group, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at issue, summary 

judgment is inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). On 

the other hand, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead 

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a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary 

judgment. 

Concurrent with the motion for summary judgment, defendants advised plaintiff of the 

requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

ECF No. 193-2; see Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 

952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 

849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 

B. The Parties’ Factual Assertions 

1. The Complaint 

Plaintiff’s verified complaint alleges as follows: On May 1, 2008, plaintiff went to the 

Facility 4 Medical Annex at California State Prison, Solano (“CSP-Solano”) and presented a blue 

medical pass to defendant, correctional officer Broyles. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. Broyles voided the 

pass and ordered plaintiff to return to his building. Id. Despite being in severe pain, plaintiff 

complied. Id. Before leaving, however, plaintiff told Broyles that if Broyles again failed to call 

plaintiff’s building for plaintiff to pick up his pain medication, plaintiff would file a staff 

complaint. Id. at 4-5. Thereafter, whenever Broyles saw plaintiff, he would whistle. Id. at 5. 

Allegedly, this was Broyles’s way of letting a prisoner know that he was targeting the prisoner. 

Id. Plaintiff claims that Broyles then retaliated against plaintiff by filing a false CDC form 128-B 

informative chrono2 documenting that plaintiff had threatened to sue him and was trying to 

manipulate and provoke him. Id. at 5. 

On February 9, 2009, plaintiff returned to prison from an outside hospital and headed to 

the dining hall. Id. at 6. Defendant correctional officer Lopez called plaintiff from the line and 

said, “You already ate, Christ. Go back to your building.” Id. Plaintiff told Lopez that he had 

not eaten but had just returned from the hospital and had gone to get his medication before eating 

because he was in extreme pain from surgery. Id. Nevertheless, Lopez denied plaintiff his 

 2

 A “chrono” is a document made by a prison official concerning an inmate and placed in 

the inmate’s file. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1205 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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dinner. Id. Plaintiff told Lopez he would file a staff complaint against him. Id. Plaintiff claims 

that Lopez retaliated by authoring a false CDC form 128-A counseling chrono documenting his 

version of the encounter and that plaintiff “constantly attempts to intimidate staff with legal 

action.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff responded by filing a grievance against Lopez. Id. at 7-8. At the 

grievance’s second level of review, the warden removed the 128-A from plaintiff’s file and made 

Lopez apologize to plaintiff. Id. at 8. 

Defendant correctional officers Blackwell and Voight allegedly retaliated against plaintiff 

for his grievance against Lopez by transferring plaintiff to an upper bunk in violation of plaintiff’s 

medical chrono and an injunction issued by Judge Claudia Wilken. Id. In collusion with 

Blackwell and Lopez, Voight authored a false CDC form 115 disciplinary report accusing 

plaintiff of obstructing a peace officer by faking illness to avoid the move. Id. As investigative 

employee for the hearing on the disciplinary report, defendant correctional officer Zuniga refused 

to interview plaintiff’s witnesses, who would have established that the report was bogus and that 

plaintiff actually had been sick. Id. at 11. Plaintiff claims that Zuniga refused because he was 

colluding with Voight to ensure a guilt finding. Id. 

2. Defendants’ Proffered Facts 

On May 7, 2008, defendant Broyles issued a CDC form 128-B chrono documenting his 

dealings with plaintiff when plaintiff complained about a long line and a delay in calling his 

building for administration of medication. ECF No. 193-3, Defendants’ Undisputed Material 

Facts ISO Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter, “DUF”) No. 25. The chrono stated: 

On 05-01-2008, approximately 1835 hours, while working as Medical Annex 

Officer, I called on my institutional radio for the release of Diabetic inmates. I 

observed Inmate Christ . . . walking towards the diabetic line. I told Christ only 

inmates from 19 building [were released] and wait to be called. Inmate Christ 

stated “If you don’t call me I will file a lawsuit against you.” He then returned to 

his building. On another occasion Christ made a statement that I did not like 

Veteran’s [sic], because I denied him access to the Education Building. I feel 

Christ is trying to provoke me into some type of altercation. I think Christ thinks 

he does not have to follow the rules and regulations other inmates have to follow. 

He tries to manipulate staff and continues to question authority. 

DUF No. 24. 

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Plaintiff responded by filing a grievance against Broyles in which he claimed that Broyles 

treated him rudely and was part of a scheme against him. DUF No. 25; ECF No. 193-1 at 54. 

The grievance was denied. DUF No. 25; ECF No. 193-1 at 54. 

Defendants do not dispute that defendant Lopez erroneously ordered plaintiff to return to 

his housing unit without dinner on February 9, 2009. DUF No. 19. Lopez mistakenly believed 

that plaintiff had already eaten because he saw him coming from the medical annex, where he and 

others in his housing unit normally went after eating dinner. Id. Defendants claim that plaintiff 

did not tell Lopez that he was returning from an outside hospital and had not eaten. Id. The 

parties also do not dispute that the informative chrono Lopez wrote about the incident was 

removed from plaintiff’s file after plaintiff grieved the incident. DUF No. 21. According to 

defendants, there is no evidence that plaintiff suffered any other adverse action as the result of the 

chrono or that Lopez authored the chrono for an improper purpose. DUF Nos. 22-23. 

According to defendants, plaintiff told defendant Lopez on April 29, 2009 that he did not 

want to move to a new facility not because he was sick, but because he had had a fight in the 

other facility years earlier. DUF No. 9. Lopez checked with defendant Blackwell and then told 

plaintiff that he had to move. Id. Plaintiff stalled and delayed packing his things. Id. When an 

officer went to check on his progress, plaintiff was not in his bunk area. Id. Plaintiff walked out 

of the bathroom holding his side while looking away from the officer. Id. Defendant Voight told 

plaintiff he needed to pack because he was delaying two new arrivals assigned to the building. Id. 

During the next 20 minutes, plaintiff went back to the bathroom three times. Id. Voight again 

told plaintiff to stop stalling. Id. An officer saw plaintiff going to the bathroom again. Id. Then 

an inmate yelled to Voight that someone was lying on the bathroom floor. Id. Voight approached 

plaintiff and saw him pull his finger out of his mouth in the manner for inducing vomiting. Id. 

Voight asked plaintiff if he needed medical attention, and plaintiff nodded yes. Id. Voight called 

a medical code, and medical personnel arrived and evaluated plaintiff. Id. While being watched, 

plaintiff did not vomit. Id. Nor had plaintiff sought medical attention before he was told to pack 

his belongings. Id. Officers concluded that plaintiff had faked a medical issue to avoid moving. 

Id. Voight prepared a rules violation report. DUF No. 6. 

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Plaintiff grieved the rules violation report and the resulting finding that he was guilty of 

impeding a peace officer. DUF No. 10. The grievance was denied. Id. The appeals reviewer 

concluded that plaintiff’s claims that defendant Blackwell wished to retaliate against him for his 

grievance against Lopez was unsubstantiated, that defendant Zuniga had “addressed” all of 

plaintiff’s requested witnesses, and that plaintiff had not provided any compelling evidence of 

retaliation. ECF No. 193-1 at 57. 

Defendants concede that plaintiff was placed in the wrong bunk for three days. DUF Nos. 

16-18. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Facts 

Plaintiff contends that he was truly sick on the day of the cell move and has submitted 

evidence from witnesses who saw him sick. ECF No. 201 at 2, 4. He also states that defendant 

Lopez was not present on that day. Id. at 3-4. 

According to plaintiff, defendant Zuniga did not interview any of his witnesses in 

connection with the disciplinary hearing. Id. at 5. He asks defendants to point to paperwork 

showing that Zuniga interviewed his witnesses. Id. at 7. (Defendants have filed no reply brief.) 

Plaintiff also contends that he did, in fact, tell Lopez on February 9, 2009 that he was 

returning from an outside hospital. Id. at 5. 

V. Analysis 

Plaintiff’s claims are of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment against defendants 

Blackwell, Broyles, Lopez, Voight, and Zuniga, and for violation of his right to due process in 

connection with his disciplinary hearing against defendant Zuniga. The court will address the 

claims in the chronological order in which the events they are premised on occurred. 

A. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim against Broyles 

Plaintiff claims that defendant Broyles unlawfully retaliated against him in May 2008 by 

authoring a false informative chrono after an interaction regarding plaintiff’s pain medication. To 

establish this claim, plaintiff must prove: (1) that Broyles took some adverse action against him 

(2) because of (3) his protected conduct, (4) that such action chilled his exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) that the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional 

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goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff need not 

demonstrate that his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed, but merely that the defendant’s 

conduct was such as would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 

Amendment activities. Id. at 568-69. Conduct protected by the First Amendment includes 

communications that are “part of the grievance process.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 

n. 4 (9th Cir. 2009). 

It is undisputed that the basis of the chrono was plaintiff’s statement to Broyles that he 

intended to file a staff complaint and/or a lawsuit against Broyles when Broyles refused to allow 

plaintiff to obtain his medications early. ECF No. 1-1 at 4-5; ECF No. 29-1 at 2, 44-46. Broyles 

argues that plaintiff has no evidence that Broyles authored the chrono with the intent to retaliate 

against plaintiff or that the chrono did not advance the legitimate correctional goal of maintaining 

prison order. Retaliatory intent is rarely shown by direct evidence, however. Watison v. Carter, 

668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). A chronology of events from which retaliation can be 

inferred provides circumstantial evidence of retaliation. Id.; Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 

(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that “timing can properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of 

retaliatory intent”). It is undisputed that Broyles issued the chrono shortly after plaintiff 

threatened to file a grievance against him. This timeline raises a disputed material fact regarding 

Broyles’s intent. Further, summary judgment is not appropriate where there is a dispute 

regarding whether a defendant used a legitimate penological purpose as a pretext for retaliatory 

conduct. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that prison officials who 

were alleged to have abused the gang validation process to retaliate against the plaintiff could not 

assert that the validation served a legitimate penological purpose even if the inmate arguably 

should have been validated absent retaliation). That Broyles issued the chrono shortly after 

plaintiff threatened to file a grievance against him provides some circumstantial evidence that the 

chrono was issued to retaliate against plaintiff instead of to maintain prison order. 

Broyles also argues that plaintiff’s threat to file a grievance is unprotected by the First 

Amendment. Most courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that an inmate’s threat to 

file a grievance constitutes protected speech unless it is delivered in an argumentative, 

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confrontational, or disorderly manner. Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2006); 

Garcia v. Strayhorn, No. 13-CV-807-BEN (KSC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123660, at *15-17 

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014) (collecting cases). The court agrees with these authorities that a 

prisoner’s complaint does not lose its status as protected conduct simply because it is stated 

verbally rather than submitted in writing. Pearson, 471 F.3d at 741. The evidence submitted by 

the parties does not establish whether plaintiff stated his intent to file a grievance against Broyles 

in a manner that would make it unprotected. Accordingly, the court cannot grant summary 

judgment to defendant Broyles on the ground that plaintiff’s threat to file a grievance against him 

was not protected by the First Amendment. 

Nevertheless, defendant Broyles must be granted qualified immunity. “The doctrine of 

qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Resolving the defense of qualified immunity 

involves a two-step process; the court must determine (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged or 

shown a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly 

established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001)). These steps may be analyzed in any order. Id. at 

236. 

“Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly 

established constitutional right.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. To be clearly established “[t]he 

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 

what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

“[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 906 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (“The proper inquiry focuses on . . . whether the state of the law [at the relevant time] 

gave ‘fair warning’ to the officials that their conduct was unconstitutional.”) (quoting Saucier, 

533 U.S. at 202). 

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The court reluctantly concludes that, at the time of the incident underlying this action 

(2008), it was not firmly established that a prisoner’s threat to file a grievance (as opposed to a 

written grievance or lawsuit) constituted conduct protected by the First Amendment. As was 

recently well-stated by another magistrate judge of this court: 

To date, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has held that mere oral 

complaints by a prisoner can form the basis of a retaliation claim within the prison 

context. See, e.g., Teahan v. Wilhelm, No. 06cv15 JM (PCL), 2007 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 97539, 2007 WL 5041440 at *9 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2007) (“the Ninth 

Circuit has never had cause to determine whether oral complaints concerning a 

prisoner’s individual circumstances are protected by the First Amendment.”). In 

addition, although some unpublished decisions from this court have recognized 

that a prisoner’s oral complaint constitute such protected conduct, there is by no 

means “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” so recognizing. alKidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084. Compare West, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25537, 2014 

WL 794335 at *5-*6 (protected speech includes a prisoner’s verbal expression of 

an intent to submit a formal written grievance); Hackworth, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 5476, 2011 WL 1811035 at *1 (rejecting defendant’s argument that 

prisoner's verbal objections to a prison policy during housing classification 

committee meeting with prison staff was not protected by the First Amendment 

because the inmate had not filed a written grievance); Uribe, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 133, 2011 WL 9640 at *12 (prisoner’s attempt to report a prison official’s 

misconduct, either “verbally or in writing, constitutes speech or conduct entitled 

to First Amendment protection.”), with Johnson v. Carroll, No. 2:08-cv-1494 

KJN P, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79380, 2012 WL 2069561 at *34 (E.D. Cal. June 

7, 2012) (a prisoner’s verbal statements and challenges made to defendant 

incident to challenged strip search fall outside of First Amendment protection and 

therefore plaintiff failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim). See also 

McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855, 858-59 (7th Cir. 2005) (to support a retaliation 

claim a prisoner’s speech “must relate to a public concern and not just a personal 

matter to receive First Amendment protection”). 

Ahmed v. Ringler, No. 2:13-cv-1050 MCE DAD P, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14139, at *16-18 

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015); see also Turner v. Zuniga, No. CV 13-1787-MMM (AGR), 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 120824, at *7-10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015) (granting qualified immunity to prison 

official because it was not well-established in 2009 that an inmate’s threat to file a grievance 

constituted protected conduct). Because it was not well-established in 2008 that a verbal 

statement of intent to file a grievance constituted conduct protected by the First Amendment, 

plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendant Broyles, which is based solely on such a statement, 

must be adjudicated in Broyles’s favor on the basis of qualified immunity. 

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B. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim against Lopez for the Counseling Chrono 

Defendants also argue that plaintiff cannot establish the elements of his retaliation claim 

against defendant Lopez for issuing the counseling chrono after plaintiff threatened to file a 

grievance against him in February 2009 after Lopez denied him dinner. 

The court need not analyze whether plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to raise 

triable issues on the elements of this claim, however, because defendant Lopez must be afforded 

qualified immunity for the same reason discussed above with respect to defendant Broyles: it was 

not well-established in 2009 that a prisoner’s threat to file a grievance constituted conduct 

protected by the First Amendment. Turner, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120824, at *7-10; Williams v. 

Bahadur, No. 2:13-cv-2052-TLN-EFB P, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24062, at *13-16 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 25, 2016). It is undisputed that the basis for this claim against Lopez is plaintiff’s statement 

that he intended to file a grievance against Lopez rather than plaintiff’s written grievances against 

Lopez (and there is no evidence that Lopez was aware that plaintiff had actually filed a written 

grievance against him at the time he issued the chrono). ECF No. 1-1 at 6-7 (alleging that 

“Lopez, out of reprisal, for Plaintiff’s protected speech, where Plaintiff informed defendant Lopez 

that Plaintiff would be filing a grievance on him for refusing Plaintiff dinner . . . chilled the effect 

and exercise of Plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights . . . by concocting a false CDC-128-A 

Counseling Chrono[.]”); see also ECF No. 29 at 23 (Lopez’s counseling chrono, which is 

undated), 26 (document indicating that Lopez stated that the chrono was written on February 9, 

2009), 42 (plaintiff’s grievance against Lopez for denying him dinner, also dated February 9, 

2009), and 21 (plaintiff’s grievance against Lopez for issuing the chrono, dated February 12, 

2009). Because plaintiff alleges that Lopez retaliated against him for his verbal threat to file a 

grievance rather than the filing of a written grievance, the court will grant Lopez qualified 

immunity on plaintiff’s claim against him for the February 2009 counseling chrono. 

In addition, plaintiff cannot show any damage from Lopez’s February 2009 chrono, 

because it is undisputed that the chrono carried no attendant discipline and was removed from 

plaintiff’s file in response to plaintiff’s grievance. Plaintiff’s inability to show he suffered any 

damage as a result of the chrono provides an additional basis for summarily adjudicating this 

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claim in favor of defendant Lopez. Allen v. Nimrod, No. C 91-1940 BAC, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

4481, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 1994). 

C. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim against Blackwell and Voight for the Cell Move 

Defendants purport to move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim against 

defendant Blackwell and Voight for placing him in an upper bunk on an upstairs floor in 

retaliation for plaintiff’s grievances against Lopez. However, their brief gives this claim 

remarkably short shrift. Defendants have phrased all of their arguments generally, and, as best 

the court can gather, the only argument advanced by defendants that could pertain to plaintiff’s 

claim regarding the cell move is that plaintiff has no evidence that these defendants put him in the 

upper floor/upper bunk because of plaintiff’s grievances against Lopez. ECF No. 193 at 12. 

Defendants’ brief characterizes the bunk placement as an error that was corrected three days after 

plaintiff complained about it, but defendants provide no evidence of their own pertaining to the 

claim other than plaintiff’s deposition. 

In the deposition, plaintiff testified that he believed that he was moved in retaliation for 

his grievances because defendants would have known from the medical chronos attached to his 

bed card – documents defendants would have reviewed in conjunction with the move – that he 

was not to be placed in an upper floor/upper bunk cell. ECF No. 193-1 at 24 (plaintiff’s 

deposition, pages 74:11-75:1). That defendants nonetheless placed plaintiff in an upper 

floor/upper bunk cell could give rise to the inference that defendants did so for an improper 

purpose, but there is no evidence that defendant Voight knew of plaintiff’s grievances against 

Lopez. 

Plaintiff also indicated that additional evidence in support of his claims had been filed 

with the court as ECF No. 29. That filing contains an inmate appeal filed by plaintiff after the 

cell move in which he stated that, during a different incident with Blackwell prior to the cell 

move, Blackwell had, “on at least one occasion, in a sarcastic manner [told] me why he was doing 

this to me, informed me that when we were finished he was going to interview me on 602’s I had 

on Sgt. Lopez.” ECF No. 29 at 14. In the same grievance, plaintiff wrote that other inmates 

without medical restrictions could have been moved but were not. Id. at 16. This evidence, 

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construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether 

defendant Blackwell moved plaintiff to an upper floor/upper bunk in retaliation for his grievances 

against Lopez. However, because there is no evidence that defendant Voight knew of plaintiff’s 

protected conduct, plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Voight for the cell move should be 

summarily adjudicated in Voight’s favor. 

Defendants raise a broad argument that they should be afforded qualified immunity on all 

of plaintiff’s claims against them, but do not specifically argue why defendant Blackwell should 

be given immunity with regard to the cell move. Unlike the claims discussed above, it is beyond 

dispute that a reasonable official would have known in 2009 that moving an inmate to a location 

that was inappropriate for his medical situation in retaliation for his grievances was 

unconstitutional. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. Defendant Blackwell has not shown that he is 

entitled to qualified immunity on the claim. 

Lastly, all defendants argue that they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh 

Amendment because they were acting within their official capacities during the events giving rise 

to this lawsuit. This argument is premised on a basic misunderstanding of § 1983 litigation, and 

the court accordingly rejects it. 

The Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 damages suits against a state unless the state has 

waived its sovereign immunity. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). A 

suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is treated as a suit against the state and is 

thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 71. Similarly, a state official sued in her official 

capacity, being treated as equivalent to the state, is not considered a “person” who may be sued 

under § 1983. On the other hand, “[c]learly, under § 1983, a plaintiff may sue a state officer in 

his individual capacity for alleged wrongs committed by the officer in his official capacity.” 

Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Defendants’ argument “confuses the capacity in which a defendant is sued with the 

capacity in which the defendant was acting when the alleged deprivation of rights occurred. The 

former need not coincide with the latter.” Id. at 828 (emphasis added). This distinction is crucial, 

because § 1983 requires that defendants have acted under color of state law; that is, under the 

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authority they derive from the state when discharging official duties. Thus, § 1983 actions 

inevitably allege that the challenged action was undertaken in the defendant’s “official capacity.” 

Defendants’ argument, if accepted, would nullify § 1983. 

To the extent that defendants argue that plaintiff has sued them in their official capacities, 

the court finds no support for that argument in the complaint. The complaint instead alleges that 

defendants acted under color of state law and in their official capacities. ECF No. 1-1 at 3, ¶ 7; 

id. at 14, ¶ 5. By seeking damages under § 1983, plaintiff has indicated that he is suing 

defendants in their individual capacities. Price, 928 F.2d at 828. Plaintiff’s claims for damages 

against defendants are therefore not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

Because defendant Blackwell has not demonstrated the absence of a material dispute on 

plaintiff’s claim regarding the cell move or any other basis for adjudicating the claim in his favor, 

this claim must proceed. 

D. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim against Blackwell, Lopez, and Voight for the 

Rules Violation Report 

Defendants raise two arguments in favor of summary adjudication of plaintiff’s claims 

against Blackwell, Lopez, and Voight for the rules violation report authored by Voight after 

plaintiff allegedly delayed his cell move. First, defendants argue that plaintiff lacks evidence that 

his protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor for the report. Second, defendants argue 

that plaintiff lacks evidence that the report was not issued for a legitimate penological purpose. 

As noted in the section above, plaintiff has proffered some evidence that defendants 

placed him in an upper floor/upper bunk cell despite his contrary medical orders after he had filed 

the grievances against Lopez. There is no question that plaintiff’s written grievances constituted 

protected conduct. However, plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Voight knew of the 

grievances when he issued the report. Nor has plaintiff provided evidence indicating that, in 

issuing the rules violation report, defendant Voight was colluding or conspiring with defendants 

Blackwell and Lopez (for whom plaintiff has provided some evidence showing knowledge of 

plaintiff’s grievances against Lopez). In his deposition, plaintiff testified that the constitutional 

violations alleged in the complaint were based on a conspiracy among the defendants, but 

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admitted that he was speculating that there was such a conspiracy. ECF No. 193-1 at 26-27 

(plaintiff’s deposition, pages 85:11-86:10); id. at 30 (plaintiff’s deposition, pages 99:24-100:14). 

Because plaintiff has not provided evidence from which a factfinder could infer that Voight knew 

of his protected conduct when he issued the report or that Lopez and Blackwell somehow 

colluded with Voight in issuing the report, he has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to 

whether these three defendants used the report to retaliate against plaintiff for his grievances. 

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to defendants on this claim. 

E. Plaintiff’s Retaliation and Due Process Claims against Zuniga 

Defendants again argue, correctly, that plaintiff has not proffered any evidence in support 

of his claim that Zuniga’s allegedly improper conduct as plaintiff’s investigative employee was 

motivated by plaintiff’s grievances against Lopez. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that 

shows that Zuniga knew of the grievances, much less that he was conspiring with other 

defendants to retaliate against plaintiff because of them. Accordingly, plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

against Zuniga cannot proceed to trial. 

Defendants further argue that plaintiff’s due process claim against Zuniga fails because 

plaintiff was not deprived of any constitutionally-protected interest in the disciplinary 

proceedings. The court agrees. Prisoners are entitled to certain due process protections when 

subject to disciplinary sanctions that impinge on an interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 

Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2014). To prevail on a claim for 

violation of the right to procedural due process under the 14th Amendment, a plaintiff must show: 

“(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of 

adequate procedural protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). 

A liberty interest triggering procedural protections under the Due Process Clause may 

arise from two sources: the Clause itself or state law. Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 

1062 (9th Cir. 2013). The Due Process Clause of its own force protects prisoners from conditions 

which depart from the sentence imposed on them in a way that is “‘qualitatively different’ from 

the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime [and has] ‘stigmatizing 

consequences.’” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478-79 n.4 (1995) (discussing and quoting 

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Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)). The 

Clause, by itself, confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within the sentence 

imposed. Id. at 480. 

A condition of confinement impinges on an inmate’s state-law-created liberty interest 

(triggering the necessity for procedural protections) if it imposes an atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life (while not departing 

from the sentence in such a manner as to trigger protection under the Due Process Clause by its 

own force). Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Brown, 751 F.3d at 987. To determine whether a liberty 

interest is at stake, the court may consider: “(1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those 

conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; (2) the duration of the condition, and the 

degree of restraint imposed; and (3) whether the state’s action will invariably affect the duration 

of the prisoner’s sentence.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations 

omitted). 

The conditions imposed on plaintiff as a result of the hearing in connection with which 

Zuniga served as investigative employee were: (1) forfeiture of 60 days’ worktime credits (also 

called worktime credits, see California Penal Code § 2933); (2) a loss of privileges to the 

day/night yard, dayroom, telephones, canteen, and quarterly packages for 30 days; (3) a 90-day 

suspension of Friday visits; and (4) plaintiff was counseled and reprimanded. ECF No. 160 at 52. 

Roszko argues that these disciplinary measures did not deprive plaintiff of a constitutionallyprotected interest. 

Defendant is correct that, as a matter of law, these conditions do not impinge on a liberty 

interest created by the Due Process clause of its own force. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

557 (1974) (good-time credits); Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) 

(unfettered visitation); Davis v. Small, 595 F. App’x. 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2014) (phone and yard 

privileges); Koerner v. Angelone, Nos. 97-15681 & 97-15799, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32181, at 

*9 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1999) (canteen). 

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In addition, plaintiff has failed to discharge his burden of showing that the disciplinary 

measures imposed as a result of the hearing impinged on a liberty interest created by state law. 

Plaintiff states simply that, “when prisoners lose good time credits because of a disciplinary 

offense, they are entitled to” procedural protections under the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 168 

at 3. The law is not so cut-and-dried. 

It is true that the Supreme Court has held that a state can create a protected liberty interest 

in a shortened prison sentence resulting from good time credits by making the revocation of such 

credits allowable only for major misconduct. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78. 

It is currently an open question in the Ninth Circuit whether California’s scheme of worktime 

credits under California Penal Code § 2933, as amended in 2010, gives rise to a liberty interest. 

Edwards v. Swarthout, 597 F. App’x. 914 (9th Cir. 2014). Absent any further direction from the 

Ninth Circuit, and applying the Supreme Court’s holdings in Wolff and Sandin, the court finds 

that plaintiff here has failed to establish that the deprivation of worktime credits deprived him of a 

protected liberty interest because he has not provided any evidence that the credits that were 

revoked would have shortened his sentence if left in place. The liberty interest recognized by the 

Court in Wolff lay in the shortened sentence generated by the operation of the credit statutes, not 

in the credits themselves. 418 U.S. at 557; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78. It is undisputed that 

plaintiff was serving a term of 25-years-to life, plus 12 years, at the time of the hearing. ECF No. 

160 at 9-10. Plaintiff has made no showing that he would be serving a shorter prison sentence if 

the 60-days’ worth of worktime credits had not been forfeited. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-87 

(finding that a prison disciplinary action did not impinge on a protected liberty interest where it 

would not inevitably affect the duration of the inmate’s indeterminate sentence); Harvey v. Lewis, 

No. 1:12-cv-00904-AWI-DLB (HC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163667, at *5-8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 

2012) (discussing the impact of good time credits on an inmate serving both a determinate and 

indeterminate term of incarceration). Even if plaintiff were to make such a showing, his due 

process claim challenging the loss of credits would not survive in this action, as he would be 

required by the rule of Heck v. Humphrey to secure a finding that the discipline imposed by 

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defendant Roszko was invalid through some other means before pursuing that claim in a § 1983 

action for damages. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644-48 (1997). 

Plaintiff has also failed to show that the remaining disciplinary measures – loss of access 

to some facilities, telephone, canteen, and quarterly packages for 30 days and loss of Friday visits 

for 90 days – presented an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life. See 

Koerner, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32181, at *9 (80-day suspension of canteen privileges was not 

an atypical and significant hardship); Song v. Ignacio, No. 96-15901, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 

2217, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1997) (affirming dismissal of due process claim where the plaintiff 

failed to allege how his temporary loss of access to the canteen, phone, showers, and recreation 

equipment presented a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of prison life). Plaintiff 

provides no evidence from which the court can compare these disciplinary measures to the norms 

of prison life, and has thus fails to provide evidence from which a rational factfinder could 

conclude that the measures departed from those norms in such a significant way as to deprive him 

of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.3 As plaintiff has failed to show that he was 

entitled to procedural protections at the disciplinary hearing, the court need not reach the question 

of whether the assistance provided by Zuniga comported with due process. See Trujillo v. 

Vaughn, 269 F. App’x. 673, 674 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that due process requires assignment of 

an investigative employee only where the inmate is illiterate or the complexity of the issues 

makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present evidence). Summary 

judgment will be granted to Zuniga on plaintiff’s due process claim. 

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 3

 The court notes that the Ninth Circuit held in Funtanilla v. Campbell, No. 96-15439, 

1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22581, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1996) that California Penal Code § 2601 

created a liberty interest in prison visits by stating that such visits were a “civil right” of 

prisoners. The California legislature amended § 2601 in 1996 to delete that provision. Plaintiff 

has not offered any other source of law from which the court can conclude that California has 

created a liberty interest in prison visits. 

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VI. Order 

 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

1. Within thirty (30) days of this order, Jeffrey E. Beeson, Michael A. Terhorst, and/or 

Beeson Terhorst LLP shall pay to the Clerk of the Court $500 in monetary sanctions 

for their failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and the court’s 

scheduling order. Counsel shall also file an affidavit accompanying the payment of 

this sanction which states that it is paid personally, out of personal funds, and is not 

and will not be billed, directly or indirectly, to the clients or in any way made the 

responsibility of his clients as attorneys’ fees or costs. 

2. Plaintiff’s motions, objections, and requests appearing at ECF Nos. 197, 199, 204, 

205, and 206 are denied. 

3. Defendants’ December 28, 2015 motion for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 193, 195) 

is denied as to plaintiff’s claim that defendant Blackwell unlawfully retaliated against 

him by placing him in an upper floor/upper bunk cell and is granted as to all remaining 

claims and defendants. 

4. The case has been randomly assigned to the Honorable Gregory G. Hollows for a 

settlement conference on January 5, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom No. 9, 13th Floor. 

Counsel are directed to submit settlement conference statements to the settlement 

judge not later than seven (7) days prior to the conference. At counsel’s option, such 

statements may be submitted in confidence pursuant to Local Rule 270(d). Each party 

is directed to have a principal capable of disposition at the Settlement Conference or to 

be fully authorized to settle the matter on any terms and at the Settlement Conference. 

DATED: August 3, 2016. 

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