Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02008/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02008-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DANIEL CUERO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

RE: DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER

DENYING EVIDENTIARY HEARING

vs.

MATTHEW CATE,

Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Michael Daniel Cuero (hereinafter “Cuero” or “Petitioner”), a California state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 29, 2008. (Doc. No. 1.) In his petition, Cuero claims he is entitled

to federal habeas relief because: (1) he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial

and appellate attorneys; (2) his negotiated plea agreement was violated by the trial court; and (3)

his sentence was unlawfully enhanced by prior convictions. Petitioner also requests an evidentiary

hearing. (Id.)

Respondent Matthew Cate, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Petitioner’s traverse also contains claims not set forth in the petition. This court, however,

does not reach the merits of those claims, which were improperly raised for the first time in the

traverse. See, e.g. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A traverse is not a proper

pleading to raise additional grounds for relief.”); Breverman v. Terhune, 153 Fed.Appx. 413 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Habeas court had discretion to consider claim raised for the first time in petitioner’s

traverse.”). Even assuming this court reviewed Petitioner’s new claims on the merits, they would be

barred for lack of exhaustion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

- 2 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

Rehabilitation, has filed an answer. (Doc. No. 35.) Respondent contends the petition should be

denied because: (1) Cuero has failed to state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel;

(2) Cuero’s plea agreement was not violated; and (3) Cuero’s sentence was correctly enhanced by

his prior convictions. (Id.)

Cuero subsequently filed a traverse to Respondent’s answer, where he recites the

allegations contained in the petition.1 (Doc. No. 41.) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Barry Ted

Moskowitz pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule H.C.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. After reviewing the Petition, Respondent’s

Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof (hereinafter “Answer”),

and all the supporting documents submitted by the parties, the Court recommends the Petition be

DENIED for the reasons stated below.

II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State court proceedings

On October 18, 2005, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed a felony

complaint against Petitioner for: (1) causing bodily injury to another while driving under the

influence of alcohol or drugs when Petitioner already had a prior DUI within 10 years (CAL. VEH.

CODE § 23153(a), § 23560); (2) possessing a firearm (CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(a)(1)); and (3)

being under the influence of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE § 11550(a). (Lodgment No. 1 at 1.)

On October 23, 2005, the District Attorney amended the complaint to include a special

allegation: Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a), a sentencing enhancement for causing great bodily

injury during the commission of a felony. (Id. at 6.) 

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

On December 8, 2005, Cuero entered guilty pleas with respect to the first two charges of

the District Attorney’s amended complaint, and also admitted one prior strike. (Id. at 11.)

On January 11, 2006, the District Attorney moved the trial court to allow an additional

amendment of a prior strike and two prior felonies. The trial court granted this request on

February 2, 2006. (Lodgment No. 3 at 13.)

On March 27, 2006, the trial court allowed the District Attorney to file a third amended

complaint, charging Cuero with causing great bodily injury while operating a motor vehicle under

the influence of alcohol or drugs, and also alleging Cuero’s two prior strikes. The same day,

Cuero withdrew his previous guilty plea, and entered into a negotiated plea to the charges

contained in the District Attorney’s third amended complaint, admitted two prior felonies

contained therein, and stipulated to a 25-years-to-life sentence. (Lodgment No. 5 at 62, 67-71.) 

On April 20, 2006, the trial court sentenced Cuero to 25-years-to-life pursuant to the

negotiated plea agreement. (Lodgment No. 6.)

On January 23, 2007, Cuero’s appellate counsel filed a Wende brief with the California

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District. (Lodgment No. 7.) Cuero was also granted permission

to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf, but failed to respond. (Id.) 

On March 21, 2007, after concluding that no reasonably arguable appellate issue existed,

the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. (Lodgment No. 8 at 3-4.)

On August 29, 2007, Cuero filed for habeas relief in the San Diego County Superior Court,

alleging he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. (Lodgment No. 10 at 3.)

On October 2, 2007, the San Diego County Superior Court denied Cuero’s petition for

habeas relief on the merits. (Lodgment No. 11.)

On November 14, 2007, Cuero filed his habeas petition with the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, where he claimed: (1) he was provided ineffective assistance of

counsel; (2) the trial court violated his negotiated plea agreement; and (3) his sentence was

unlawfully enhanced by prior convictions. (Lodgment No. 12 at 5-8.)

On March 6, 2008, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, denied

Cuero’s petition for habeas relief on the merits. (Lodgment No. 13.)

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

On April 28, 2008, Cuero filed for habeas relief with the Supreme Court of California,

which was summarily denied on October 1, 2008. (Lodgment No. 15.)

B. Federal Court Proceedings

Cuero filed for federal habeas relief on October 29, 2008. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent filed

an answer on February 9, 2009. (Doc. No. 35.) Cuero filed a traverse to Respondent’s answer on

March 18, 2010. (Doc. No. 41.)

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a

State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); See also

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Principles of comity and federalism

counsel against substituting our judgment for that of the state courts, a deference that is embodied

in the requirements of the federal habeas statute, as amended by AEDPA.”). Accordingly, the

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion in Cuero’s direct appeal.

(Lodgment No. 8.)

On October 14, 2005, Petitioner veered his car off a roadway and struck the driver of a

pickup truck, who was standing beside his parked trailer. The driver sustained severe injuries,

including a ruptured spleen, brain damage, and facial disfigurement. Petitioner subsequently

tested positive for methamphetamine. A loaded firearm was also found at the scene. (Id.)

Prior to this incident, Petitioner served four prison terms for numerous felonies, including

two strikes. 

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code section 2254 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), codified at Title 28, United States Code section 2254,

subpart(d)(1), sets forth the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. [. . .] 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d)(1)-(2).

When determining what constitutes “clearly established federal law” under section

2254(d)(1), federal courts look to United States Supreme Court holdings at the time of the state

court’s decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412) (2000)); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Andrade to

explain clearly established federal law is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the

U.S. Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision). In addition, Ninth Circuit law

may be considered for its “persuasive authority in applying Supreme Court law.” Lewis v. Mayle,

391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir.

2000)), overruled in part on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)); see also, Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting while circuit law may be persuasive

authority, “only the [United States] Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and

only those holdings need be reasonably applied”). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses contained in section 2254(d)(1)

have independent meaning. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974; Van Lynn v.

Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court if (1) the state court

applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state

court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case, but

reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 412; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694

(2002); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974; Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. A state court

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

is not required to be aware of clearly established applicable Supreme Court cases, so long as

“neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law if (1) the

state court identifies the correct governing rule, but unreasonably applies the rule to a new set of

facts, or (2) “the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new

context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520

(2003); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974; Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. For a state

court decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the state court

decision must be more than simply incorrect or erroneous; instead, the state court’s decision must

be “objectively unreasonable.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2009) (citing Wiggins, 539

U.S. at 520-21); Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Vasquez, 572 F.3d 1029, 1035 (citing Andrade, 538

U.S. at 75); see also, Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal habeas

courts determine the reasonableness of the state court’s decision, not its reasoning). Thus, this

Court will not disturb the decisions of the California state courts with respect to Petitioner’s claims

unless the state courts’ resolutions of those claims were “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d); see also, Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks

through” to the last reasoned state court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06

(1991); Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006); Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 1035;

Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738. However, if the relevant state court decision does not provide an

adequate explanation or a discernable basis for its reasoning on a particular claim, the federal court

must conduct “an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision

was objectively unreasonable.” Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006)); accord Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

2000).

V.

DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel by both his trial and

appellate attorneys. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) In support of this contention, Petitioner claims his

attorneys: (1) failed to investigate; (2) failed to file for full discovery; (3) failed to prepare for trial;

(4) failed to interview potential witnesses; (5) failed to request a continuance; (6) failed to object

to the District Attorney’s filing an amended complaint; (7) failed to provide counsel at sentencing;

(8) failed to preserve appeal rights; (9) had a conflict of interest; (10) and denied him choice of

counsel. (Id.)

Respondent observes both the trial court and state appellate court denied Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it failed to state a prima facie case for relief; and

Petitioner has failed to allege any new facts supporting his claim. (Doc. No. 35 at 7.)

The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), set forth a twopronged standard for establishing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a defendant

must show “counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. at 687. “This requires showing that counsel

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. In other words, counsel’s performance must fall below an

“objective standard of reasonableness.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). In reviewing

counsel’s performance for deficiency, courts must be “highly deferential, and avoid the temptation

to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable simply because in

hindsight the defense has proven to be unsuccessful.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “The proper

measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional

norms.” Id. at 687. Further, the defendant bears the burden of overcoming the strong presumption

counsel performed adequately. Id.

Second, Petitioner must show counsel’s deficient performance “prejudiced the defense.” Id.

This requires showing counsel’s errors “were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To satisfy this prong, Petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676, 685 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

“It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the

outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. The prejudice inquiry “must be

considered in light of the strength of the [prosecution]’s case.” Rhoades v. Henry, 596 F.3d 1170,

1193 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 808-09 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

When a “habeas petitioner asks a federal court to review a state court’s application of the

Strickland standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, under AEDPA, the

federal court must give state courts even more latitude than is typical under AEDPA to reasonably

determine that a defendant has not satisfied the Strickland standard.” Cheney v. Washington, 614

F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2010). When a “federal court reviews a state court’s Strickland determination

under AEDPA, both AEDPA and Strickland’s deferential standards apply; hence, the standard is

described as doubly deferential.” Id., citing Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 6. 

When raised on collateral review, the California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it “failed to state a prima facie case for relief” and

was “wholly unsupported by facts or any explanation for the basis of the allegations.” (Lodgment

No. 13 at 3.) In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner merely recites the same laundry list of

counsel’s alleged shortcomings without any explanation as to why they were “deficient” or

deprived Petitioner of a fair trial as required by Strickland. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held

that vague and conclusory ineffective assistance of counsel allegations do not warrant federal

habeas relief. See, e.g., Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (“unsupported

speculation and conclusory allegations regarding an attorney’s substandard performance are not

sufficient to show either deficient performance or prejudice.”); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486

(9th Cir. 2000) (“factually unfounded claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel presents no

basis for federal habeas relief.”); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20 (9th Cir. 1995) (“conclusory

allegations which are not supported by statement of specific facts do no warrant habeas relief.”).

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

Hence, the California Court of Appeal’s denial is not “contrary to” or the result of an

“unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law. § 2254(d). In accordance with the

“doubly deferential” standard set forth by Strickland and AEDPA, we affirm the state appellate

court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, it is

recommended federal habeas relief be DENIED on this claim.

B. Violation of Plea Agreement

Petitioner claims his plea agreement was violated by the trial court’s “failure to keep a

commitment concerning a sentencing recommendation on a guilty plea.” (Doc. 1 at 13.). In

support, Petitioner cites the report of a probation officer who recommended a total prison term of

14 years and 4 months. (Doc. No. 1 - Appendix D at 46.) Petitioner further claims his consent to

the plea agreement was “made on involuntariness”, and that any constitutional waivers made in

accordance with the plea are invalid. (Doc. 1 at 14.)

Respondent argues Petitioner was counseled extensively at his plea hearing, and therefore

entered into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily (Doc. No. 35 at 11.) Further,

Respondent observes Petitioner has misrepresented to the court the probation officer’s report,

which was subsequently revised to include a recommended prison term of 25-years-to-life after the

District Attorney filed its third amended complaint. Id.

Petitioner failed to raise this claim on habeas review in the trial court. When Petitioner

raised this claim for the first time in the California Court of Appeal, the Court held:

“Petitioner’s contention that he should have been able to withdraw his plea fails because it

was not properly presented to the trial court in the first instance. Petitioner filed a pro se

motion to withdraw his guilty plea on September 6, 2007, well after the judgment in his

case had been affirmed on appeal. However, petitioner did not raise the issue in either of

the two consecutive habeas petitions he filed in the trial court. We decline to address it here

for the first time.” (Lodgment No. 13 at 4.)

Summary denials of habeas claims are considered decisions “on the merits”. See Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005). When a state court reaches a decision on the merits but

provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, the federal court conducts an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling

federal law. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Delgado v. Lewis,

223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

California state law requires “an application for state habeas relief [to] be filed as promptly

as the circumstances of the case allow.” In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal.3d 391, 397 (1986). “Any

significant delay must be explained and justified with particularity by the petitioner.” In re Clark,

5 Cal.4th 750, 786 (1993). A prisoner whose habeas petition was denied by the Superior Court

can obtain review of his claims only by filing a new petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. The new

petition, however, must be confined to claims raised in the initial petition. See In re Martinez, 46

Cal.4th 945, 956 (2009). If the claims have not first been brought in the lower court, the Court of

Appeal has discretion to deny the petition. In re Hillery, 202 Cal.App.2d 293, 294 (1962).

Both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and, most recently, the United States Supreme

Court, have upheld California state court discretion to deny habeas corpus petitions for

untimeliness. “A Court of Appeal has discretion to deny without prejudice a habeas corpus

petition that was not filed first in a proper lower court (i.e. in a Superior Court), but the Court of

Appeal need not do so.” Gaston,, 417 F.3d at 1035, (quoting In re Steele, 32 Cal.4th 682 (2004))

(citing, inter alia, In re Ramirez, 89 Cal.App.4th 1312 (2001)) (“Court of Appeal has discretion to

refuse to issue the writ as an exercise of original jurisdiction on the ground that application has not

been made...in a lower court in the first instance.”) (quoting In re Hillery, 202 Cal.App. at 294). 

“California courts have discretion to bypass a timeliness issue and instead, summarily reject the

petition for want of merit.” Walker v. Martin, - - - S. Ct. - - -, No. 09-996, 2011 WL 611627 at *6

(Feb. 23, 2011). “Absent a showing of cause and prejudice, federal habeas relief will be

unavailable when (1) a state court has declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the

petitioner has failed to meet a state procedural requirement”; and (2) the state judgment rests on

independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Id., quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state procedural rule rests on independent

and adequate grounds if it is “firmly established and regularly followed”. Id. at *7, quoting Beard

v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612 (2009). In Walker, supra, the Supreme Court held California’s

procedural rule was firmly established and regularly followed, satisfying the “independent and

adequate grounds” standard. Id.

When “a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); See also, Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630

(9th Cir. 1985) (“As a general rule, fundamental fairness requires that promises made during a plea

bargaining...must be respected.”). “[In] deciding whether a plea agreement has been breached, the

court considers what the defendant reasonably understood when he pled guilty.” U.S. v. Packwood,

848 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1988). “Guilty pleas are valid if made voluntarily and intelligently.”

Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In determining whether Petitioner’s consent to the plea

agreement was valid, the test is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice

among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563,

568 (9th Cir. 2007). The “record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty

entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.” Id.

First, as Respondent observes, Petitioner misrepresented the probation officer’s report

cited. After the District Attorney filed its third amended complaint, which included Petitioner’s

two prior strikes, the probation officer released a subsequent report on April 20, 2006, which

indicates Petitioner stipulated to a 25-years-to-life prison term with the possibility of parole.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 100.) Hence, the plea agreement entered into by Petitioner contained no

promise that he would be sentenced to a 14 years and 4 months prison term. Moreover, at the

March 27, 2006 plea proceedings, Petitioner repeatedly acknowledged that the plea agreement

stipulated a 25-years-to-life prison term:

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Cuero, do you understand that if you plead guilty to

this felony offense and admit those two prison priors, you face a mandatory prison

sentence of 25 years to life in prison, no more and no less?

CUERO: And I will be eligible after 25 years for parole?

THE COURT: Eligible, but there are no guarantees that you will get it.

CUERO: Right. (Lodgment No. 5 at 66, paras. 19-28.)

- - -

THE COURT: And then by admitting the second strike prior, it then mandates a

sentence of 25 years to life with no credits for those 25 years but you become

eligible for probation after 25 years. Do you understand that?

CUERO: Yes. (Id. at 66, paras. 3-8.)

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

Second, Petitioner’s contention his consent to the plea agreement was “involuntary” is

baseless. A review of the state court record shows Petitioner was counseled by his attorney, and

indicates on multiple occasions his consent to the negotiated plea agreement was made “knowingly

and voluntarily”. Further, Petitioner initialed the plea flea form to indicate: “I have not been

induced to enter this plea by any promise or representation of any kind, except ‘Stipulate to 25 yrs.

to life with parole eligibility in 25 yrs.’.” (Lodgment No. 1 at 81.) 

Third, as discussed above, California’s procedural mandates pertaining to habeas claims

are consistent with controlling federal law. Petitioner failed to raise this claim in his first two

habeas petitions in Superior Court, and provided no justification for waiting until filing for habeas

relief in the state appellate court before raising this claim for the first time. Hence, this court finds

the state court’s ruling was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. Therefore, it is recommended that federal habeas relief be DENIED on this claim.

C. Use of Prior Strikes to Enhance Sentence

Finally, Cuero contends his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s use of two

prior felony convictions to enhance his sentence pursuant to California’s Three Strikes Law. (Doc.

No. 1 at 8.) In support, Cuero argues: (1) the two prior felony convictions were improperly

considered by the trial court at sentencing pursuant to People v. Trujillo, 40 Cal.4th 165, 175

(2006), which held a “defendant’s statement in a probation officer’s report, made after a plea of

guilty [has] been accepted, is not part of the record of conviction and therefore may not be

considered in determining whether the prior conviction is a “strike” within the meaning of the

Three Strikes Law”; (2) that any statements or admissions contained in the plea agreements or

probation reports do not describe the nature of the prior convictions and cannot be used to prove

the prior convictions are serious or violent felonies; and (3) that the prior offenses are not serious

felonies under California Penal Code section 667, and therefore are not “strikes” for sentencing

purposes. Id.

Respondent argues (1) Petitioner is precluded from raising such a challenge under

Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403 (2001), which held “a state

conviction is regarded as conclusively valid when it is no longer open to direct or collateral attack

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

because the defendant failed to pursue state remedies while they were available or because the

defendant did so unsuccessfully”; (2) Petitioner’s sentence was correctly enhanced because the

trial court relied on Petitioner’s admission and stipulation to the sentence, not post-plea statements

found in a probation report; and (3) interpreting state sentencing laws is not within the purview of

a federal habeas court. (Doc. 35 at 15.)

Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction does not extend to alleged violations of state law.

Guzman v. Morris, 644 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit has refused to consider

claims of erroneous application of state sentencing law by state courts in habeas corpus review.

See, e.g., Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1989) (“whether assault with a deadly

weapon qualifies as a “serious felony” under California’s sentencing enhancement provisions is a

question of state sentencing law and does not state a constitutional claim.”), Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991), (“It is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court

determinations on state law questions.”). The question to be decided by a federal court on petition

for habeas corpus is not whether the state committed state law error but whether the state court’s

action was so “arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process or Eighth

Amendment violation.” See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992). “A petitioner’s due

process rights have been violated only if the trial court’s error rendered the state proceeding

fundamentally unfair.” Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, Cuero fails to demonstrate the state court’s consideration of his two prior strikes

violates the Constitution or laws of the United States. The state court’s consideration of

Petitioner’s prior strikes is a question of state law not subject to federal habeas review. Even if it

were within the scope of this court’s authority to review questions of state law on habeas review,

the state court’s enhancement of Cuero’s sentence was proper. The California Court of Appeal, in

denying Petitioner’s claim, held:

“[t]he trial court relied on petitioner’s admission and stipulation to the sentence, not postplea statements found in a probation report, to support the determination that his priors

were strikes. Because petitioner admitted his prior convictions and did not otherwise

contest them, Trujillo does not apply, and petitioner’s claim fails.” (Lodgment No. 13 at 5.)

As the California Court of Appeal found, the trial court relied on Petitioner’s admission to 

two prior felonies: first degree burglary (CAL. PENAL CODE § 459, 460); and assault with a 

deadly weapon (CAL. PENAL CODE 245(a)(1)):

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

THE COURT: Were you convicted of first degree burglary in May of 1991, in the County 

of San Diego?

CUERO: Yes, I was.

THE COURT: Were you convicted of assault with a dangerous or deadly weapon in 

violation of [Penal Code section] 245(A)(1) in March of 1992, in the Superior Court of this

county?

Cuero: Yes, I was. (Lodgment No. 5 at 70, paras. 16-23.)

Both of these convictions are “serious felonies” under California Penal Code section

1192.7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(18) (“Any burglary of the first degree.”); CAL. PENAL

CODE § 1192.7(c)(23) (“Any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly

weapon.”) “Serious felonies” are considered “strikes” for sentencing purposes pursuant to

California Penal Code section 1170.12(b)(1). Therefore, the state court’s use of Petitioner’s prior

convictions for sentencing purposes was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that federal habeas relief be DENIED on

this claim.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing Judgment

be entered denying the Petition, evidentiary hearing, and dismissing this action.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 25, 2011 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

//

//

//

//

//

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 - 08cv2008 BTM (WMc)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than May 11, 2011. The parties are advised failure to file

objections within the specified time may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 25, 2011

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC Document 42 Filed 03/25/11 Page 15 of 15