Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01570/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01570-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL JAMES,

Petitioner,

v.

J. GASTELLO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01570-H-NLS

ORDER:

(1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

[Doc. No. 25]

(2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION 

TO STAY PROCEEDINGS AND 

MOTION TO EXPAND THE 

RECORD

[Doc. Nos. 29, 32] 

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

On August 3, 2017, Petitioner Darryl James (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner challenges his San Diego Superior 

Court convictions in case numbers SCD255814 and SCD259896. (Id. at 1.) On January 

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16, 2018, Respondent J. Gastello (“Respondent”) filed a response and the Lodgment. 

(Doc. Nos. 15–16.) Petitioner filed a Traverse on March 28, 2018. (Doc. No. 22.) On July 

24, 2018, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation recommending that

the petition be denied. (Doc. No. 25.) Petitioner filed nunc pro tunc on September 4, 2018 

a motion to stay proceedings in order to exhaust unexhausted claims. (Doc. No. 29.) 

Petitioner then filed nunc pro tunc on October 5, 2018 a motion to expand the record in 

support of his motion to stay proceedings. (Doc. No. 32.) Petitioner did not file an 

objection to the Report and Recommendation, although such objection was due by or on 

September 24, 2018. For the following reasons, the Court denies Petitioner’s petition and 

adopts the Report and Recommendation. The Court also denies as moot Petitioner’s 

motion to stay proceedings to amend and Petitioner’s motion to expand the record.

BACKGROUND

This Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), presumes as true the following 

relevant facts from the California Court of Appeal. (Doc. No. 16-10.) The two criminal 

convictions for which Petitioner is challenging his sentence are summarized in one 

consolidated appellate decision:

A. San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD255814

On July 21, 2014, James pled guilty to second degree burglary [(Cal. 

Penal Code § 459)] and petty theft with a prior theft conviction [Cal. Penal 

Code § 484)]. He also admitted that he had served three prior prison terms 

and had 15 prior robbery convictions and two prior attempted robbery 

convictions, which constituted strikes. When James failed to appear for the 

scheduled sentencing hearing, the trial court issued a bench warrant for his 

arrest.

B. San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD259896 

In November 2014, a police officer contacted James at a shopping 

center while the officer was investigating another matter. The officer 

checked James’s record and learned that James was required to register as a 

sex offender. The registration requirement arose out of James’s conviction of 

forcible rape in Missouri in 1977, which was based on a guilty plea that he 

entered when he was 17 years old. (See § 290.005, subd. (a).) The officer 

arrested James. 

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James later admitted to another police officer that he had missed his 

annual sex offender registration requirement. Officers also determined that 

James may have failed to update his registration upon changing his address. 

In March 2015, the People charged James with committing petty theft 

with a prior theft conviction [(Cal. Penal Code §§ 484, 666(a)–(b))] and two 

counts of failing to register as a sex offender [(Cal. Penal Code §§ 290.012, 

290.013)], one for missing his annual registration requirement and the other 

for failing to register when he changed his address. On both counts, the 

People alleged that James committed the offenses while he was out on bail. 

The People also alleged that James had served three prior prison terms and 

had 17 prior strike convictions.

James pled guilty to the count of petty theft with a prior theft conviction. 

After the trial court denied James’s motion in limine seeking to invalidate 

the 1977 Missouri forcible rape conviction, a jury found James guilty of 

failing to complete his annual registration as a sex offender and not guilty of 

failing to register upon changing his address. After the jury returned its 

verdicts, in a bifurcated proceeding James admitted that he was out on bail 

when he committed the failure to register offense, that he had been convicted 

of forcible rape in Missouri in 1977, that he had 11 robbery convictions and 

one attempted robbery conviction in 1985, that he had four robbery 

convictions and one attempted robbery conviction in 1992, and that he had 

served three prior prison terms.

(Doc. No. 16-10 at 3–4.) On April 8, 2016, the trial court exercised its discretion to strike 

all but one prior strike and sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate prison term of 13 years, 8 

months. (Id. at 4.)

On May 16, 2016, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the California Court of 

Appeal. (Doc. No. 16-11 at 10.) Petitioner’s court-appointed appellate attorney filed a 

brief pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979). (Id. at 14.) While his direct 

appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Diego 

County Superior Court on July 11, 2016. (Doc. No. 16-12 at 1–7.) There, Petitioner 

argued that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his 1977 Missouri case 

because his counsel failed to advise him of the lifetime requirement to register as a sex 

offender; (2) his guilty plea in that case was invalid because he was not properly advised; 

and (3) for those reasons, his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender should be 

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set aside. (Id. at 3–4.) The superior court denied the habeas petition, holding that it lacked 

jurisdiction because Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending. (Doc. No. 16-13.)

On March 21, 2017, Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal, again while his direct appeal was still pending. (Doc. No. 16-

14 at 1–16.) There, he argued that: (1) the Missouri court failed to advise him of his 

constitutional rights during his 1977 guilty plea; (2) he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel in his 1977 Missouri case; and (3) his conviction for failure to register as a sex 

offender violates double jeopardy. (Id. at 9–14.) The appellate court denied the habeas 

petition on March 30, 2017, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the Missouri case and 

that the double jeopardy claim was meritless. (Doc. No. 16-15.)

On March 8, 2017, the California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s direct appeal

and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction, stating that the case presented “no reasonably 

arguable appellate issue.” (Doc. No. 16-10 at 5–7.) Then on June 9, 2017, Petitioner filed 

a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, in which he argued that: (1) the 

appellate court incorrectly applied the standard of review under Wende; (2) there was no 

law requiring him to register as a sex offender at the time of his 1977 Missouri 

conviction; (3) his conviction for failure to register violates the Equal Protection and Ex 

Post Facto Clauses. (Doc. No. 16-16 at 3.) The California Supreme Court denied the 

petition for review without comment on July 12, 2017. (Doc. No. 16-17.)

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR § 2254 HABEAS PETITION

Federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996 are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 

1214. If an applicant challenges the legality of their confinement arising from a state 

court judgment, federal courts may only review whether the confinement violates “the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); accord Lewis 

v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors 

of state law”). A writ will only issue if the adjudication of the state judgment “(1) 

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resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved the unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

This standard is “difficult to meet,” “highly deferential,” and “demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 

(2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[t]he petitioner 

carries the burden of proof.” Id. Thus, “[h]abeas corpus is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ 

available only to those ‘persons whom society has grievously wronged . . . .’” Juan H. v. 

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 633–34 (1993)).

Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1). Section 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses 

have independent meanings. Bell v. Cone, 353 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). Under the “contrary 

to” clause, a court may issue a writ if “the state court applies a rule different from the 

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than 

[the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 694. 

In contrast, a court may issue a writ under the “unreasonable application” clause if 

“the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [the Supreme 

Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a particular case.” Id. To 

satisfy this unreasonable application prong, the state court’s decision must have been 

more than “just incorrect or erroneous”; it must have been “objectively unreasonable.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 

101 (2011) (“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision.”). Under either the “contrary to” or “unreasonable application” prong, 

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the “clearly established” phrase refers only to “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the 

Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court determination.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

412 (2000)). Circuit court precedent does not satisfy the “clearly established” element. 

Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012). In reviewing claims under 

§ 2254(d)(1), a federal court “is limited to the record that was before the state court that 

adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181–82. 

Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). Section 2254(d)(2) “requires that [the federal habeas court] accord the state 

trial court substantial deference.” Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). “[A] 

state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas 

court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 

558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). So long as reasonable minds reviewing the record could agree 

with the finding in question, the trial court’s determination will stand, id., and a petitioner

bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence,” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Under either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2), a federal habeas court looks to the last 

reasoned state-court decision. Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, when there is an unexplained 

decision from the state’s highest court, the federal habeas court “looks through” to the 

last reasoned state court decision and presumes that the unexplained opinion rests on the 

same grounds. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801–06 (1991). And even if the state 

court’s decision is entirely void of an explanation, “the habeas petitioner’s burden still 

must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.

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Federal habeas courts apply a harmless error-standard when reviewing 

constitutional error committed by the state trial court. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38. A 

habeas petitioner is only “entitled to habeas relief based on trial error [if] they can 

establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 

U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). Put another way, petitioner must show there is more than a 

“reasonable possibility” that the trial error had a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 

U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); accord Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007); Davis v. Ayala, 

135 S.Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015) (“There must be more than a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the 

error was harmful.” (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637)).

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(3). If a party objects to any portion of the magistrate’s report, the district court 

reviews de novo those portions of the report. Id.; see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“The statute makes it clear that the 

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo 

if objection is made, but not otherwise.” (emphasis in original)).

II. ANALYSIS

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner argues that: (1) the California 

Court of Appeal failed to properly review his appeal under Wende; (2) “there was no law 

requiring him to register as a sex offender” at the time he pled guilty in Missouri; and (3) 

his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender violates the Ex Post Facto and 

Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. No. 1 at 12.) The Court denies 

the habeas petition because Petitioner’s claim regarding the Wende procedure alleges no 

federal cause of action, and Petitioner’s claims regarding his conviction for failure to 

register as a sex offender fail on the merits.

/ / /

/ / /

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A. Petitioner’s Claim Regarding Wende Review

In Petitioner’s first claim, he argues that the California Court of Appeal failed to 

properly review his appeal. (Id.) Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to state a 

legally cognizable claim. (Doc. No. 15 at 2.) The Court denies Petitioner’s first claim 

because he has failed to allege any claim arising under federal law.

On December 16, 2016, Petitioner’s court-appointed appellate attorney filed a brief

in the California Court of Appeal pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979). 

(Doc. No. 16-11.) The appellate court then reviewed the record and affirmed Petitioner’s 

conviction. (Doc. No. 16-10 at 5–7.) In such a Wende brief, “counsel, upon concluding 

that an appeal would be frivolous, files a brief with the appellate court that summarizes 

the procedural and factual history of the case, with citations of the record. He also attests 

that he has reviewed the record, explained his evaluation of the case to his client, 

provided the client with a copy of the brief, and informed the client of his right to file a 

pro se supplemental brief. He further requests that the court independently examine the 

record for arguable issues.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000). Counsel is then 

“silent on the merits of the case and expresses his availability to brief any issues on which 

the court might desire briefing.” Id. Upon review of the entire record, if the appellate 

court concludes that the appeal is frivolous, it will affirm the lower court. Id. (citing 

Wende, 25 Cal. 3d at 441–42). If the appellate court finds any nonfrivolous issue, it will 

order briefing on that issue. Id. (citing Wende, 25 Cal. 3d at 422, n.3).

Petitioner fails to allege any specific federal constitutional claim. Petitioner’s claim 

can either be construed as challenging the Wende procedure itself or challenging the 

California Court of Appeal’s application of the Wende procedure. First, if Petitioner is 

challenging the constitutionality of the Wende procedure, his claim fails. In Smith, the 

Supreme Court held that California’s Wende procedure is constitutional because it 

“affords adequate and effective appellate review for criminal indigents.” 528 U.S. at 284. 

The Court stated that there is “no constitutional violation in this case simply because the 

Wende procedure was used.” Id.

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Alternatively, if Petitioner’s argument is construed as challenging the manner in 

which the California Court of Appeal applied the Wende procedure, his habeas claim 

fails because it is a matter of state law. The Supreme Court has “stated many times that 

federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Rather, “a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction 

violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241). The Court in its review of a habeas petition does not “reexamine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions.” Id. Accordingly, the Court may not review the 

California Court of Appeal’s conclusion under the Wende procedure that Petitioner’s 

appeal was frivolous. Thus, the Court denies Petitioner’s first claim.

B. Claims Arising From Sex Offender Registration

Petitioner’s grounds two and three concern his 1977 Missouri conviction and his 

subsequent conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. (Doc. No. 1 at 12.)

Petitioner argues that at the time of his conviction in 1977, there was no law requiring 

him to register as a sex offender. (Id.) Petitioner also argues that California’s sex offender 

registration requirement violates the Ex Post Facto and Equal Protection Clauses of the 

U.S. Constitution. (Id.) The Court will address the two claims in tandem because ground 

two asserts no constitutional violation, but rather, appears to be a part of Petitioner’s 

argument in ground three that his conviction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. For the 

reasons below, the Court denies Petitioner’s second and third claims because Petitioner’s 

conviction for failure to register as a sex offender is valid under both the Ex Post Facto 

Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

1

 

1 The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation recommends denying Petitioner’s claims two and 

three on both exhaustion and the merits. (Doc. No. 25 at 11–15.) Generally, a claim is unexhausted if it 

was raised before the state courts for the first and only time in a petition to the state’s highest court on 

discretionary review. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Petitioner first raised 

his claims under the Ex Post Facto and Equal Protection Clauses before the California Supreme Court. 

(Doc. No. 16-16.) A petition for review to the California Supreme Court is a discretionary appeal. See

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i. Ex Post Facto Clause

Petitioner argues that use of his 1977 Missouri conviction as the basis for his 

conviction for failure to register as a sex offender violates the Ex Post Facto Clause 

because the California law requiring registration was not in effect in 1977. (Doc. No. 1 at 

12.) In determining whether a law constitutes retroactive punishment prohibited by the 

Ex Post Facto Clause, courts engaged in a two-step inquiry. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 

92 (2003). “If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the 

inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and 

nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either 

in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it ‘civil.’” Id. (citing Kansas 

v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of Alaska’s sex 

offender registration law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 105–06. Since 

then, the Ninth Circuit has held that the retrospective application of California’s Sex 

Offender Registration Act, California Penal Code § 290, also does not violate the Ex Post 

Facto Clause. Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit 

reasoned that the California legislature’s intent was to inform the public, not to punish

sex offenders. See id. at 961–63. Further, the law was not “so punitive in purpose or 

effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Id. at 967 (citing Smith, 538 

U.S. at 92).

/ / /

/ / /

 

California Rule of Court 8.500(b). Under this Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted, however, the Court 

focuses its denial of the habeas petition on the merits of Petitioner’s claims. A court “may deny an 

unexhausted claim on the merits where it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a 

colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Petitioner raises no colorable federal claim because there is Ninth Circuit case law 

directly on point demonstrating that Petitioner’s Ex Post Facto and Equal Protection claims are invalid, 

as indicated in this Order. See id.; see also Johnson v. Terhune, 184 Fed. Appx. 622, 624 (9th Cir. 

2006); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 968 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Hatton applies here, as Petitioner was convicted under §§ 290.012, 290.013 of 

California’s Sex Offender Registration Act. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s 

claim that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the retroactive application of California’s 

sex offender registration laws.

ii. Equal Protection Clause

Petitioner also argues that his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender 

violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. No. 1 at 12.) The 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to treat all 

similarly situated people equally. Hartmann v. Calif. Dept. of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 

Living Ctr., Inc., 472 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). Laws alleged to violate the Equal Protection 

Clause face strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. Kahawaiolaa 

v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 2004). Strict scrutiny will apply if the claimant 

is a member of a suspect class or otherwise suffers the burdening of a fundamental right. 

Cleburne, 472 U.S. at 439–40. If the claimant is not a member of a suspect or quasisuspect class and no fundamental right is implicated, the court applies rational basis. See

id. The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[s]ex offenders are not a suspect class.” United 

States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, “persons who have been 

convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from [a 

state’s] registration and notification requirements[.]” Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 

(9th Cir. 2004).

Because no suspect class is disadvantaged and no fundamental right is infringed,

California’s sex offender registration is subject to rational basis review. See

Kahawaiolaa, 386 F.3d at 1277. Under rational basis, a law will be upheld if it is 

rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 

1197, 1208 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has stated that California’s sex offender 

registration requirements meet this test because they are rationally related to the State’s

interest in protecting public safety. Johnson v. Terhune, 184 Fed. Appx. 622, 624 (9th 

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Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 412 (9th Cir. 1992)). Thus, the 

Court concludes that Petitioner’s Equal Protection argument is without merit. 

Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s second and third claims on the merits.

C. Motion to Stay and Motion to Expand the Record

Following the magistrate’s issuance of the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner

filed a motion to stay proceedings so that he may exhaust his Missouri conviction claims 

and file an amended habeas petition. (Doc. No. 29.) Petitioner also filed a motion to 

expand the record in support of his motion to stay, requesting that the Court consider: (1) 

a “request for ruling” he made in his Missouri case on July 30, 2018; (2) a letter he wrote 

to the Missouri clerk’s office on December 8, 2017; (3) his motion to withdraw his 

Missouri guilty plea; and (4) the California Court of Appeal’s order on his writ of habeas 

corpus. (Doc. No. 32.)

As discussed above, the Court denies Petitioner’s habeas claims on the merits. 

Accordingly, the Court denies as moot Petitioner’s motion to stay and motion to expand 

the record.

D. Certificate of Appealability

An appeal cannot be taken from the district court’s denial of a § 2254 motion 

unless a certificate of appealability is issued. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A certificate 

may be issued only if the defendant “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district court has rejected 

petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, petitioner “must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner has not 

shown this Court’s conclusion is debatable or wrong and thus, the Court declines to issue 

a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Petitioner’s § 2254 petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, adopts the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation to deny the 

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petition for writ of habeas corpus, denies Petitioner’s motion to stay, and denies 

Petitioner’s motion to expand the record. Finally, the Court denies a certificate of 

appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2018

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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