Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01741/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01741-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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 Plaintiff David Johnson was not a named Plaintiff when this action was originally filed. He

intervened in this action, with the consent of Sony.

- 1 - 05 CV 1741 WQH(NLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THEODORE ARABIAN, MARTIN SAUER,

EKREM SARAC, STEVE VARADI, and

DAVID JOHNSON, On Behalf of

Themselves Individually and All Others

Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 05-CV-1741 WQH (NLS)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

CLASS CERTIFICATION

(Doc. # 43)

vs.

SONY ELECTRONICS INC.,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Certification of Action As a Class

Action” (“Motion for Certification”). (Doc. # 43.)

I. Background

On September 8, 2005, Plaintiffs1

 filed this action for monetary damages and injunctive relief

against Defendant Sony Electronics, Inc. (“Sony”) on behalf of (1) “[a] nationwide Class of all

persons in the United States who purchased Sony Vaio GRX laptops”; and (2) “[a] Class of all persons

in the United States and Canada who purchased Sony Vaio FX laptops.” (Compl. ¶ 18.) Additionally,

Plaintiffs have proposed the following sub-class: “All Class members who purchased the FX series

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2

 In Hapner, the trial court declined plaintiff’s request to certify a class of all United States

purchasers of Vaio GRX Series Notebook computers because of insufficient commonality of claims.

Instead, the trial court certified the following limited class:

All persons or entities in the United States who are original purchasers of Sony Vaio

GRX Notebook computers from Sony or from an authorized reseller, and in which the

memory connector pins for either of the two memory slots were inadequately soldered,

impeding the recognition of installed memory causing boot failures, and other

problems.

Sony Elecs. Inc. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 4th 1086, 1091 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). The California

Court of Appeals subsequently overturned the trial court’s certification of this limited class. See id.

at 1096-97.

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of Laptops in the State of California.” (Mem. Supp. Mot. Class Certification at 7.) 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that “Sony has marketed, advertised, sold, and serviced its Sony

Vaio GRX and FX series laptop/notebook computers ... through the use of misleading information

concerning the memory capacity of the machines.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the

Sony Vaio GRX and FX series computers are normally sold with either 128 or 256 megabytes (“MB”)

but include the specific feature that the memory is expandable to 512 MB of RAM, configured over

two memory slots. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs allege that the second memory slot of these computers contain

a manufacturing defect which can result in the computer being unable to read the second slot’s

available memory, thus making half of the advertised memory capacity of 512 MB of RAM

unavailable to the user. (Id. ¶¶ 29-33.) 

Based upon these allegations, Plaintiffs make the following claims under California law: (a)

violations of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; (b) False and

Misleading Advertising, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq.; (c) violations of the Consumer

Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq.; (d) violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer

Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790, et seq; (e) breach of express warranty pursuant to Cal.

Commercial Code § 2313; and, (f) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to Cal.

Commercial Code § 2314. (Compl. ¶ 7.)

On July 3, 2006, this Court stayed the portion of this action dealing with the GRX series of

laptop computers because of the pendency of a state court proceeding, Hapner v. Sony Electronics,

Inc., Cause No. GIC839244 (Superior Court of San Diego County, California), where a class had been

certified with respect to the alleged GRX series memory-slot defect.2

 (Doc. # 38.) As the Hapner

action did not involve the FX series computers, this action was not stayed as to that series. 

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3

 Plaintiffs assert that since certification is conditional and may be altered before final

judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C), “a court should err in favor of, not against, allowing

certification.” (Plfs.’ Reply Mem. at 1.) However, the Ninth Circuit has taught that a district court

should not avoid its responsibility to conduct a rigorous analysis because certification is conditional:

Conditional certification is not a means whereby the District Court can avoid deciding

whether, at that time, the requirements of the Rule have been substantially met. The

purpose of conditional certification is to preserve the Court’s power to revoke

certification in those cases wherein the magnitude or complexity of the litigation may

eventually reveal problems not theretofore apparent. But in this case the District Court

seemed to brush aside one of the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) by stating that at this

time ‘analysis of the individual versus common questions would be for the Court to act

as a seer.’ However difficult it may have been for the District Court to decide whether

common questions predominate over individual questions, it should not have

sidestepped this preliminary requirement of the Rule by merely stating that the

problem of individual questions ‘lies far beyond the horizon in the realm of

speculation.’

In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974).

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On July 31, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Certification pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23, asking this Court to certify this action to proceed as a class action on behalf of all

persons in the United States and Canada who purchased Sony Vaio FX series laptop computers. Sony

opposes the Motion. On January 16, 2007, after receiving written briefs and evidentiary materials

from both sides, the Court heard oral argument from counsel.

II. Legal Standard for Class Certification

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”) governs class actions. “As the party seeking

class certification, [plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating that she has met each of the four

requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b).” Zinser v. Accufix

Research Inst., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citing Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992)). Before certifying a class,

“the trial court must conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’” to determine whether a plaintiff has met the Rule

23 requirements.3

 Id. (quoting Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 1996)).

The four requirements of Rule 23(a) are: “(1) numerosity (a class [so large] that joinder of all

members is impracticable); (2) commonality (questions of law or fact common to class); (3) typicality

(named parties claims or defenses are typical ... of the class); and (4) adequacy of representation

(representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class).” Mego Fin. Corp. Sec.

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4

 Rule 23(a) provides:

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be

sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common

to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

5

 Rule 23(b) states, in pertinent part: 

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the

prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

. . .

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally

applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or

corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class

action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of

the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of

members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate

actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already

commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability

of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties

likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). The parties agree that the provisions of Rule 23(b)(1) are inapplicable to this

action.

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Litig. v. Nadler, 213 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).4 

In addition to showing that each of Rule 23(a)’s requirements are met, Plaintiffs also must

show they satisfy Rule 23(b) in one of two ways: (1) under subsection (b)(2), if the party opposing

the class has acted or refused to act on grounds applicable to the class generally, thereby making

injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole; or, (2) under

subsection (b)(3), if the questions of law or fact common to the class “predominate” over questions

affecting individual members, and, on balance, a class action is superior to other methods available

for adjudicating the controversy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).5

In analyzing whether a plaintiff has met his burden to show that the above requirements are

satisfied, a court is to “analyze[] the allegations of the complaint and the other material before [the

court] (material sufficient to form reasonable judgment on each [Rule 23] requirement).” Blackie v.

Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 900-01 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting further that a court is to take the substantive

allegations in the complaint as true); see also Hanon, 976 F.2d at 509 (finding that the court may

consider evidence to ascertain whether Rule 23 has been met although the evidence relates to the

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merits); Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 229, 233 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[B]ecause ‘the

class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues

comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action,’ a court must often look behind the pleadings ‘to evaluate

carefully the legitimacy of the named plaintiff’s plea that he is a proper class representative under Rule

23(a).’”) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted)). And while a court should not conduct a hearing on the merits of the

plaintiffs’ claims when determining class certification, see Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1232, the issue of

certification “generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues

comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978).

In summary, “notwithstanding its obligation to take the allegations in the complaint as true, the Court

is at liberty to consider evidence which goes to the requirements of Rule 23 even though the evidence

may also relate to the underlying merits of the case.” In re Unioil Secs. Litig., 107 F.R.D. 615, 618

(C.D. Cal. 1985).

A district court is granted “broad discretion” to determine whether the Rule 23 requirements

have been met. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186; see also In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454,

461 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The district court’s decision certifying the class is subject to a very limited

review and will be reversed only upon a strong showing that the district court’s decision was a clear

abuse of discretion.”) (quotations omitted).

III. Discussion

In their Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the following Class

and Sub-Class:

Class: All persons or entities in the United States and Canada, who purchased FX

series of Laptops. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its affiliates, employees,

officers and directors, persons or entities which distribute or sell the Laptops, the

Court, and the legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns of any such excluded

party.

Sub-Class: All Class members who purchased the FX series of Laptops in the State

of California. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its affiliates, employees,

officers and directors, persons or entities which distribute or sell the Laptops, the

Court, and the legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns of any such excluded

party.

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6

 Plaintiffs proposed the Sub-Class because the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal.

Civil Code §§ 1790 et seq., only applies to goods purchased in California. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Class

Certification at 8 n.6.)

- 6 - 05 CV 1741 WQH(NLS)

 (Mot. Class Certification at 1 (emphasis in original).)6 Plaintiffs further ask the Court to certify

Plaintiff David Johnson (a California resident) as representative of the Class and Sub-Class, Plaintiff

Ekrem Sarac (a Canadian resident) as representative of the Class, and Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class

Counsel. 

The Court now turns to an analysis of the requirements of Rule 23.

A. Rule 23(a) Requirements

1. Rule 23(a)(1) - Numerosity

The “numerosity” requirement is satisfied if “the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit has held that this requirement

can be satisfied with a class of as little as 39 members, particularly if it is impracticable for the class

members to be joined in the suit (e.g., because the size of each individual claim is relatively small or

because the members are geographically diverse). See Jordan v. Los Angeles County, 669 F.2d 1311,

1319 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810 (1982); cf. Doe v. Los Angeles Unified

Sch. Dist., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1239 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“The exact size of the class need not be known

so long as general knowledge and common sense indicate that it is large.”). Plaintiffs submit evidence

indicating that Sony sold hundreds of thousands of FX laptops in the United States. (Ferguson Decl.

¶ 6, Ex. D.) Because of the immense size of the proposed Class (and Sub-Class), and the obvious

impracticability of joining all purchasers of FX laptops into a single suit, the Court finds that the

numerosity requirement is satisfied.

2. Rule 23(a)(2) - Commonality

A class has sufficient commonality “if there are questions of fact and law which are common

to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). According to the Ninth Circuit:

The commonality preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less rigorous than the companion

requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Indeed, Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permissively.

All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence

of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common

core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).

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In its briefing, Sony does not challenge the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), instead

saving its arguments for the related, but more rigorous, “predominance” requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

Plaintiffs also focus their arguments on the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement (i.e., whether the questions of

law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only

individual members). Given the permissive construction of Rule 23(a)(2), the Court likewise will

assume that Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement has been satisfied.

3. Rule 23(a)(3) - Typicality

The typicality prerequisite of Rule 23(a) is fulfilled if “the claims or defenses of the

representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).

“The purpose of the typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative

aligns with the interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.

1992) (citation omitted). According to the Ninth Circuit, “[t]ypicality refers to the nature of the claim

or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief

sought.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[R]epresentative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably

co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon

v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). “The test of typicality is whether other

members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique

to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of

conduct.” Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508 (quotation omitted).

Sony contends that each of the proposed Class representatives, Johnson and Sarac, are subject

to unique defenses, such that they fail to meet the typicality requirement. For instance, Sony argues

that both proposed representatives will be subject to the following unique defenses: failure to qualify

as a “consumer” under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act because both purchased their laptops for

commercial purposes; and failure to satisfy California’s vertical privity requirement (because they

bought their computers from third parties, rather than from Sony) as required for a claim of breach of

the implied warranty of merchantability. Sony further argues that Johnson’s claims are subject to a

statute-of-limitations defense (i.e., Johnson purchased his FX laptop on August 23, 2001 and filed suit

September 8, 2005, allegedly after the four-year limitations period expired) as well as unique defenses

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 Plaintiffs dispute that any of the defenses are actually meritorious. But that inquiry is not

before the Court at this time.

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regarding his self-professed sophistication as a computer expert. Sony further contends that Sarac is

subject to unique causation and comparative fault defenses because he made repeated failed attempts

to “re-melt” the memory connector pins on his laptop without having it examined by an expert. Sony

finally contends that Sarac is subject to a unique spoilation of evidence defense because he destroyed

and discarded relevant evidence (i.e., he “re-melted” the memory connector pins, he discarded the

original RAM module, and he erased information from his hard drive (Sarac Dep. at 30-32, 48-49))

after he contemplated litigation and again after he filed suit. 

Plaintiffs offer specific rebuttals to some of these arguments. For instance, they argue that

Sony fraudulently concealed the memory slot defect, therefore the accrual of the statute of limitations

was tolled as to Johnson and as to all Class members. Sony responds that such an argument still leads

to individual considerations of when Johnson (as well as other Class members) learned of the alleged

defect. More generally, Plaintiffs argue that the defenses named by Sony are likely to be shared by

many of the prospective Class members, making those defenses more typical than atypical.7

 They

posit that many members of the proposed Class might face a statute of limitations defense, many might

have attempted to solder their computers, many might have discarded their RAM modules, many

might have a similar computer sophistication as Johnson, and many (or most) might have bought their

computers from a third party.

When the alleged defenses applicable to each representative are considered in combination,

there is a significant danger that absent Class members would suffer by the time and preoccupation

both Johnson and Sarac would have to devote to the defenses unique to them. See State of Alaska v.

Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 123 F.3d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen named plaintiffs are

subject to unique defenses which could skew the focus of the litigation, district courts properly

exercise their discretion in denying class certification.”). This conclusion is reinforced when

considering the contrasting facts of two of the leading Ninth Circuit cases on the issue, Hanon v.

Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1992) and Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th

Cir. 1998). 

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In Hanon, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a denial of class certification on the basis that the

proposed class representative failed to meet the typicality requirement. In so holding, the Court stated:

“a named plaintiff’s motion for class certification should not be granted if there is a danger that absent

class members will suffer if their representative is preoccupied with defenses unique to it.” Id. at 508

(quotation omitted). Specifically, the Court found that the proposed class representative’s reliance

on integrity of the market (an element of his securities fraud action) “would be subject to serious

dispute, not typical of defenses which could be raised against other members of the proposed class,

as a result of his extensive experience in prior securities litigation, relationship with his lawyers,

practice of buying a minimal number of shares of stock in various companies, and uneconomical

purchase of only ten shares of stock in defendant corporation.” Id. (citation omitted). “Because of

[the proposed representative]’s unique situation,” the Court concluded, “it is predictable that a major

focus of the litigation will be on a defense unique to him. Thus, [the proposed representative] fails

to satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a).” Id. at 509. 

By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Hanlon affirmed a finding of typicality because of the “broad

composition of the representative parties” and the “narrow focus” of the relief sought. Hanlon, 150

F.3d at 1020. The Court stated:

In this instance, the broad composition of the representative parties vitiates any

challenge founded on atypicality. The representative parties comprise persons from

every state, representing all models of Chrysler minivans and include minivan owners

whose latches remain operable. The narrow focus of the proposed class was to obtain

a defect-free rear liftgate latch in Chrysler minivans owned by class members, or

receive adequate non-personal injury compensatory damages. Given these limited

objectives and the broad composition of the representative parties, the representative

claims were sufficiently typical to pass muster under Rule 23(a)(3).

Id.

The situation here is closer to that in Hanon than to that in Hanlon. The combination of

potential defenses Johnson and Sarac are likely to face appears to be similarly unique as those facing

the plaintiff in Hanon. And here, Plaintiffs have not supplied a “broad composition” of representative

parties to vitiate the atypicality challenge, as was the case in Hanlon. Therefore, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement.

This finding alone requires the Court to deny the Motion for Class Certification. See Zinser,

253 F.3d at 1186 (“As the party seeking class certification, [plaintiff] bears the burden of

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demonstrating that she has met each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the

requirements of Rule 23(b).”) (emphasis added). However, the Court will continue its analysis of the

Rule 23 requirements.

4. Rule 23(a)(4) - Adequacy

The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “To satisfy constitutional due process

concerns, absent class members must be afforded adequate representation before entry of a judgment

which binds them.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940)).

“Resolution of two questions determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel

have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their

counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Id. (citing Lerwill v. Inflight Motion

Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978)).

While Sony does not challenge the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ counsel or of Johnson, Sony does

challenge Sarac’s adequacy on the basis that he has stated that he would not attend any trial in this

matter, due to work obligations. Sarac, a Canadian resident, indicates that although he will not attend

a trial in California, he is willing to give video or tele-conference testimony at trial and he is otherwise

“willing to give any time necessary outside of my working hours to further the prosecution of this

case.” (Sarac Decl. ¶¶ 2 & 4.) Sarac further notes that he attended a full-day deposition and has

responded to Sony’s discovery requests. (Id. ¶ 5.)

When determining adequacy, courts consider whether the named representative “will ... serve

the necessary role of ‘check[ing] the otherwise unfettered discretion of counsel in prosecuting the

suit.’” Welling v. Alexy, 155 F.R.D. 654, 659 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (quoting Weisman v. Darneille, 78

F.R.D. 669, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). Here, it is difficult to see how a representative would be able to

check the discretion of trial counsel when the representative is in a different country for the trial’s

entire duration. For this reason, the Court finds that Sarac does not satisfy the adequacy requirement.

However, Plaintiffs’ submissions, see Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Class Cert. at 17-21, demonstrate

that Johnson (who is proferred as a representative for the entire proposed Class and Sub-Class), as

well as Plaintiffs’ counsel, satisfy the adequacy requirement.

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B. Rule 23(b) Requirements

As set out above, in order for a class to be certified, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the

requirements of one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b) are satisfied. Here, Plaintiffs assert that

certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), as well as Rule 23(b)(3).

1. Rule 23(b)(2) - Primarily Injunctive or Declaratory Relief

Rule 23(b)(2) provides that an action may be maintained as a class action if “the party

opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby

making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class

as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “Although the rule is silent as to this issue, ... ‘[c]lass actions

certified under Rule 23(b)(2) are not limited to actions requesting only injunctive or declaratory relief,

but may include cases that also seek monetary damages.’” Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 947 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986)). However,

“in order to permit certification under this rule, the claim for monetary damages must be secondary

to the primary claim for injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id. (citing Probe, 780 F.2d at 780; Linney

v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1240 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1998)). Stated differently, Rule

23(b)(2) “does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or

predominantly to money damages.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note (1966).

In this case, Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief lists two substantive remedies:

B. Damages for injuries suffered by Plaintiffs and the Class in the maximum

amount permitted by applicable law;

C. An order requiring Sony to immediately cease its wrongful conduct as set forth

above; enjoining Sony from continuing to falsely market and advertise, conceal

material information, and conduct business via the unlawful, unfair, and

deceptive business acts and practices complained of herein; ordering Sony to

engage in a corrective notice campaign; and requiring Sony to refund to

Plaintiffs and all members of the Class the funds paid to Sony for these

defective products ....

(Compl. at 16.) The first of these remedies asks for monetary damages, while the second asks for both

injunctive relief and monetary damages (i.e., refunds). It does not appear that the requests for

monetary damages can be fairly termed “secondary” to the requests for injunctive relief. Instead, the

following passage from Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2001) is instructive:

[W]e would be reluctant to allow a request for injunctive relief to provide the basis for

federal jurisdiction in a case, such as this one, where that relief does not appear to be

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the primary object of the litigation. In this case Plaintiffs seek monetary compensation

for consumers who relied on Defendants’ misleading advertising. We recognize that

Plaintiffs also ask the court to enjoin Pfizer and its co-defendants from selling their

anti-lice products in ineffective formulations, or from advertising their products as

effective. But if Plaintiffs succeed in obtaining a significant award of monetary

damages, they will likely accomplish what we believe to be their essential goal in this

litigation without the added spur of an injunction.

We therefore distinguish this case from those in which it is apparent that injunctive

relief is the primary relief sought. Such actions are properly brought under Rule

23(b)(2)....

Id. at 860 (citation omitted). Likewise, in this case, if Plaintiffs succeed in obtaining a significant

award of monetary damages (including refunds), injunctive relief would likely be unnecessary.

Moreover, it has been over four years since Sony sold or marketed the FX series laptops.

(Abary Decl. ¶ 4; Stewart Decl. ¶ 2.) Because of this, it appears there is very little threat of continuing

harm, and therefore, Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief seems largely moot. Cf. MAI Sys. Corp.

v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993) (“As a general rule, a permanent injunction will

be granted when liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing violations.”). In any

event, the request for injunctive relief appears to be of secondary importance to the request for

monetary damages. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the proposed Class and SubClass meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2).

2. Rule 23(b)(3) - Predominance of Common Questions

Rule 23(b)(3) requires that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class

“predominate” over questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is “superior

to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(3). Here, the Court need only consider whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the “predominance”

requirement.

Rule 23(b)(3)’s “predominance” standard requires a stronger showing by plaintiffs than Rule

23(a)’s “commonality” standard. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).

“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to

warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).

“In contrast to Rule 23(a)(2) [i.e., the “commonality” requirement], Rule 23(b)(3) focuses on the

relationship between the common and individual issues. ‘When common questions present a

significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single

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adjudication, there is clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an

individual basis.’” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &

Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1778 (2d ed. 1986)).

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs assume that California law will govern the claims of all members

of the proposed Class, no matter where they live in the United States or Canada; no matter where or

from whom they purchased their FX series laptop; and no matter where they might be if and when

their laptop ceased to function as advertised or expected. Plaintiffs base their contention solely on the

fact that Sony is headquartered in San Diego, California. (Avery Decl., Ex. A.) Otherwise, Plaintiffs

have presented no evidence linking California to the allegations concerning the entire Class. (By

contrast, the proposed Sub-Class is defined as Class members who purchased their computers in

California.)

Defendant submits an affidavit from an employee stating that Defendant assembles, markets

and distributes Vaio laptops “in the United States,” and Defendant also provides technical support and

repair services for Vaio laptops “in the United States.” (Stewart Decl. ¶ 2.) The affidavit does not

specify any further as to where in the United States these activities occur. The affidavit further states

that Defendant did not design or manufacture the FX series laptops; that was done by a Japanese

affiliate of Defendant. (Id.) Also, Defendant does not operate, market or have assembly or service

facilities in Canada. (Id.) Instead, “Sony of Canada Ltd.,” which is not a parent or subsidiary of

Defendant, markets and distributes Vaio products in Canada. (Id.) Based on this latter evidence, Sony

challenges whether California law would apply to those who purchased FX laptops in Canada.

As set out above, Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that class certification is

appropriate. See Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. The Ninth Circuit has stated that “class counsel should be

prepared to demonstrate the commonality of substantive law applicable to all class members.”

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (noting, however, that “[v]ariations in state law do not necessarily preclude

a 23(b)(3) action”). This choice of law inquiry can be a “central issue” to the Rule 23(b)(3) analysis.

Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186.

There is a presumption against California law being given extraterritorial effect when the

wrongful act as well as the injury occurred outside California. See Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v.

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8

 Plaintiffs point to an “extracted ... sampling” of “complaints from Sony’s databases” in an

attempt “to establish ... that hundreds of Canadian residents own a Vaio FX series laptop.” (Ferguson

Decl. ¶ 12.) The fact that the complaints of some Canadian FX laptop owners are in Sony’s database

does not establish where or from whom the residents purchased their laptops. Therefore, it does not

rebut the specific evidence offered by Sony that non-party Sony of Canada Ltd. markets and

distributes Vaio products in Canada. (Stewart Decl. ¶ 2.)

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Superior Court, 19 Cal. 4th 1036, 1060, 968 P.2d 539, 554 (Cal. 1999) (citing EEOC v. Arabian

American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). The Unfair Competition Law does not support claims

by non-California residents where none of the alleged misconduct or injuries occurred in California.

See Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 4th 214, 222-23 (1999). “Indeed, beyond

California’s presumption against the extraterritorial application of its laws, a California court’s

adjudication of non-residents’ claims that lack a nexus with California raises significant due process

problems.” Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Elec. Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1126-27 (N.D. Cal.

2000) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810-11 (1985); Norwest Mortgage, Inc.,

72 Cal. App. 4th at 225). In order for California’s “law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible

manner, [California] must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating

state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” Phillips

Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 818 (quotation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that California law would apply to purchasers of

FX laptops in Canada. Plaintiffs submit evidence that Sarac’s FX laptop, purchased in Canada from

a Canadian entity, has “Made in USA” inscribed on it. They also point out that the Sony technical

support phone number for Canadian customers is the same as the number for customers in the United

States. However, Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence indicating that FX series laptops with the

inscription “Made in the USA,” were assembled in or distributed from California. They also fail to

show that the technical support number originates from California. They further fail to show that

Defendant made any representations of fact to Canada. They also do not rebut Defendant’s evidence

that, as a general matter, FX laptops are sold and serviced in Canada by non-party Sony of Canada,

Ltd.8

 In short, Plaintiffs have not made an adequate showing that it would be permissible, under the

United States Constitution or under California law, to apply to law of California to all purchasers of

FX laptops in Canada.

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As relevant to this issue, Plaintiffs offer no discussion of Canadian consumer protection law,

or how that law might be similar to the California consumer protection laws on which they base their

claims. The relevant laws of California and Canada vary significantly. For instance, the limitations

period under the consumer protection statutes of each Canadian Province varies from one to six years,

depending upon--in some cases--when the claim arose, and--in other cases--the nature of the claim.

(Maxwell Decl., Exs. B-E.) In Quebec, vertical privity is not required for implied warranty claims,

see Maxwell Decl., Ex. D, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1 § 53, while California has a vertical privity requirement,

see U.S. Roofing, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 228 Cal. App. 3d 1431, 1441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

Quebec and British Columbia vary on whether proof of reliance is required in false advertising claims

and how it is proven. Compare Maxwell Decl., Ex. D, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1 § 253, with Maxwell Decl.,

Ex. A, Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada, Ltd., 2006 BCCA 235. Meanwhile, the issue is currently

undecided under California law. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 840 (holding that

Proposition 64 added a reliance element to misrepresentation claims brought under either the Unfair

Competition Law or the False Advertising Law), rev. granted, 146 P.3d 1250 (Cal. 2006).

It is the Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate that the common issues predominate, and with regard

to the issues of law facing Canadian Class members, Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden. 

As for those members of the proposed Class who are United States residents, Sony does not

challenge that California law would apply to their claims. Since it is uncontested at this time, the

Court will assume for the purposes of this Motion that California law will apply to all purchasers of

FX laptops in the United States.

Assuming California law applies, Plaintiffs assert that the following of questions of law and/or

fact common to the members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual

members:

(a) whether Sony made false and/or misleading written statements concerning the

defects inherent in the Vaio FX laptops; 

(b) whether Sony knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that its statements about the

performance and reliability of the Vaio FX laptops were false and/or misleading; 

(c) whether the Vaio FX laptops experience memory failure; 

(d) whether the Vaio FX laptops are defective and are not of merchantable quality; 

(e) whether Sony concealed that the Vaio FX laptops experience memory failure at

extraordinarily and unacceptably high rates, are inherently defective, and are not of

merchantable quality; 

(f) whether Sony’s false or misleading statements of fact and Sony’s concealment of

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 Because the document has been sealed at the request of Plaintiffs and without objection by

Defendant (Doc. # 60), the Court does not quote its contents in this Order.

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material facts regarding the performance of Vaio FX laptops were likely to mislead

consumers; 

(g) whether Sony has engaged in unfair, deceptive, or unlawful business practices with

respect to the advertising, marketing, and sale of Vaio FX laptops; 

(h) whether Sony has engaged in unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising

of the Vaio FX laptops; 

(i) whether Sony has breached its warranties, both implied and express, to Plaintiffs

and the members of the Class; and 

(j) whether, as a result of Sony’s misconduct, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to

damages and/or equitable relief, and if so, the amount and nature of such relief.

(Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Certification at 14-15; see also Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs further argue that they

will demonstrate Sony’s unlawful conduct through proof of Sony’s “uniform misrepresentations and

omissions concerning the Laptop’s ability to perform, such as Sony’s own specification sheets

indicating the Laptops were expandable to 512 MB of RAM.” (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Certification

at 15.)

Plaintiffs rely upon an internal Sony document, attached as Exhibit A to the Ferguson

Declaration and sealed without opposition. (Doc. # 60.) Plaintiffs contend that this document

demonstrates Sony’s knowledge of the allegedly uniform defect, and therefore Sony’s course of

conduct of forcing class members to incur the cost of repairing the defect makes Plaintiffs’ claims

uniformly actionable.

Sony, meanwhile, disputes Plaintiffs’ claims of a predominance of common issues, instead

arguing that questions affecting only individual members predominate. Sony asserts that: Plaintiffs

have provided no competent evidence of a common defect; Plaintiffs have provided no evidence of

uniform misrepresentations to the proposed Class; and Plaintiffs’ claims require individualized proof

of reliance, proof of the history of each class member’s use and maintenance of their laptop, and proof

of the purpose for which each class member purchased the laptop.

One of the central tenets of Plaintiffs’ Rule 26(b)(3) argument is that there is a common defect

among all FX laptops. Plaintiffs rely upon the sealed internal Sony document (see Ferguson Decl.,

Ex. A) to demonstrate this. However, the document simply does not support all of the inferences

Plaintiffs make from it to support a common defect. For instance, the document does not show how

frequently the listed models experience the stated symptoms.9

 The document does not even support

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the inference that the listed cause of the symptoms constitutes a “defect.”

Plaintiffs also rely upon an “extracted sampling” of Sony’s repair and customer service records

for the proposition that the FX laptops have a common defect. (Ferguson Decl., Ex. H.) However,

while these records show that many people complained about boot failures and freezing in FX laptops,

they also indicate that these boot failures had a variety of apparent causes, from the use of

incompatible or bad RAM modules (see id. at 195, 198-204, 208, 223-24, 228), to a malfunctioning

LCD screen (see id. at 213), to a software conflict between the BIOS update for new memory and the

operating system (see id. at 231), to an unspecified cause which was resolved by phone technical

support (see id. at 189).

Focusing only on the two proposed Class representatives, there is no expert evidence that the

problems experienced by Johnson and Sarac emanated from the same root cause. Neither Johnson nor

Sarac ever had their laptops professionally examined or diagnosed. (Johnson Dep. at 112; Sarac Dep.

at 48.) Additionally, their user experiences differed significantly: Johnson’s laptop worked without

problems for three years with both memory slots populated, while Sarac experienced performance

problems shortly after installing RAM into the second slot. (Johnson Dep. at 73, 88, 97-98; Sarac

Dep. at 37-38.) In short, without further factual inquiry, it is not clear that the problems with the

laptops of even the two proposed Class representatives were precipitated by the same root cause.

It is important to emphasize that nothing in the record definitively precludes an ultimate

finding of a common defect. The Court makes no determination regarding the merits of Plaintiffs’

claims. Instead, the Court’s task at this stage is to determine whether the Complaint and the submitted

evidence shows that Rule 23's requirements have been met: specifically, whether the common

questions predominate over the individual ones. In this regard, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

that a fact-intensive inquiry will not be required of many, if not all, of the members of the proposed

Class.

As Sony correctly argues, a manufacturing defect, such as what Plaintiffs allege here, can be

significantly different than a design defect, such as what was alleged in Hanon v. Chrysler Corp., 150

F.3d 1011, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1998). Unlike a design defect, which is by its nature ubiquitous, a

manufacturing defect can be ubiquitous or isolated, depending upon the circumstances. Among the

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circumstances relevant for making this determination would be whether the FX laptops were

manufactured in one or multiple factories; whether the same materials, processes and equipment were

used in the manufacture of all FX laptops; whether the same components, RAM modules, software

and operating systems were installed on all FX laptops; whether all or most FX laptops have

experienced or will experience the alleged defect or symptoms. Plaintiffs supply none of this

information. As set out supra, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to supply “material sufficient to form reasonable

judgment on each [Rule 23] requirement.” Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 900-01 (9th Cir. 1975).

Given the evidence that in excess of 300,000 FX laptops were sold in the United States

(Ferguson Decl. ¶ 6), combined with the lack of evidence that a majority of these owners experienced

common problems from a common defect, the following discussion is instructive:

Since it appears that the majority of the putative class members have no legally

recognizable claim, the action necessarily metastasizes into millions of individual

claims. That metastasis is fatal to a showing of predominance of common questions.

Those class members whose tires had performed as warranted would have to be

identified and eliminated from the action. Myriad questions would confront the

survivors, including the manner in which the alleged breach of warranty manifested

itself, and other possible causes of the problem encountered. This situation simply

does not lend itself to class treatment.

Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp. 595, 603 (D.C.N.Y. 1982). Similarly, in Sony

Electronics Inc. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 4th 1086 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), wherein the

California court considered a similar class certification motion alleging a common memory-slot

soldering defect in the Sony Vaio GRX series laptops, the court stated:

[D]oing as [plaintiff] urges would result in the certification of a class of all United

States purchasers of GRX Series Notebook computers, something that he asked for

below and that the trial court specifically declined to do based on the lack of sufficient

commonality among proposed class members’ claims. In the complete absence of

evidence that the alleged manufacturing defect exists in all GRX Series Notebook

computers (most particularly the absence of evidence that the defect exists in the

GRX600 or 700 Series Notebooks), the trial court acted well within its discretion in

denying certification of this ... class.

Id. at 1097; cf. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Our circuit

has recognized the potential difficulties of ‘commonality’ and ‘management’ inherent in certifying

products liability class actions.”) (citing In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,

693 F.2d 847, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Focusing on the Plaintiffs’ specific statutory claims, it again appears that individualized

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inquiries will be necessary. For instance, Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims will likely turn on

whether each laptop was fit for the ordinary purpose(s) for which it was intended and used, see Cal.

Com. Code § 2314(2)(c), and therefore will require an individualized inquiry. See Osborne v. Subaru

of Am., Inc., 198 Cal. App. 3d 646, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). As the court in Osborne stated: 

[W]hether the cars are fit for their ordinary purpose will necessarily vary from vehicle

to vehicle. One plaintiff testified in deposition that she purchased her car in December

1972 when it was new. She drove it approximately 50,000 miles within the first two

years before she had to replace the head gaskets. She had to replace the engine block

at approximately 110,000 miles. These were the major mechanical repairs for which

she sought damages. Other plaintiffs allegedly suffered damages at lower elapsed

mileages. The point derived from this panoply of defect-manifestation scenarios is that

determining whether the Subarus failed to live up to the implied warranty of

merchantability would require proof of the history of each vehicle and its problems.

Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, Plaintiff Johnson’s laptop fulfilled his needs for three years with 512

MB installed (Johnson Dep. at 130), while Plaintiff Sarac testified that his laptop fulfilled his needs

for a period of time with only 128 MB installed (Sarac Dep. at 35-37). It is easy to imagine that

similar variations exist between many of the hundreds of thousands of FX owners.

Similarly, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) only affords remedies to a

“consumer,” defined as “an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or

services for personal, family, or household purposes.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d). Thus, the CLRA

claims of those in the Class who did not acquire their FX laptops for personal use (e.g., those

acquiring the laptop for professional use) would fail. As set out supra, Sony already has made this

argument with respect to both Johnson and Sarac, and even if the argument is ultimately unsuccessful

with respect to the two Class representatives, the analysis demonstrates how this legal requirement

will require an individual examination of the purpose for which each laptop was acquired.

In short, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing that “the

questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting

only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Therefore, neither the proposed Class nor SubClass may be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).

D. Evidentiary Objections

Sony objected to a variety of individual pieces of evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in support

of the Motion for Certification. (Docs. # 63 & 77.) The Court has found that even when considering

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all of Plaintiffs’ evidence, the Motion for Certification should be denied. Therefore, Sony’s

evidentiary objections are DENIED as moot.

E. Application to Seal Documents

Sony asks the Court to seal the exhibits to the Declaration of Paul Stewart, submitted in

support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Certification. (Doc. # 62.) Sony makes the application pursuant to

Local Rule 79.2(c), arguing that the factual information contained therein is Sony’s proprietary and/or

trade secret information, and that the information is of such a commercially-sensitive nature that it

would create a risk of competitive injury to Sony if it were disclosed to the public. Plaintiffs do not

object. As the Court has previously ruled with respect to other similar evidence (see Docs. # 52 &

60), the Application to Seal Documents (Doc. # 62) is GRANTED. 

IV. Conclusion

As set out above, Plaintiffs have failed to show that they satisfy the requirements of Rule

23(a)(3) (“typicality”) and Rule 23(b)(2) (primarily injunctive or declaratory relief) or 23(b)(3)

(“predominance”). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (Doc. # 43) is DENIED.

Sony’s Objections to Evidence Offered in Support of Motion for Class Certification (Docs.

# 63 & 77) are DENIED as moot.

Sony’s Application to Seal Documents (Doc. # 62) is GRANTED. 

On March 9, 2007 at 11:00 a.m., all parties are ORDERED to appear for a telephonic status

conference to discuss how this case will proceed in light of the Court’s ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 22, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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