Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01608/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01608-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, No. 2:05-cv-1608-MCE-GGH

a California non-profit;

and CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY, a non-profit

corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; 

DALE BOSWORTH, in his official

capacity as Chief of the U.S.

Forest service; and JOHN BERRY,

in his capacity as Forest

Supervisory for the Eldorado

National Forest, 

Defendants.

SIERRA PACIFIC INDUSTRIES,

Defendant-Intervenor,

and

TUOLUMNE COUNTY ALLIANCE FOR

RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT;

SIERRA RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, INC.;

TUOLUMNE COUNTY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE;

and CALIFORNIA FOREST COUNTIES

SCHOOLS COALITION,

Applicants for Intervention.

----oo0oo----

Case 2:05-cv-01608-MCE-GGH Document 82 Filed 09/08/06 Page 1 of 6
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 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

2

Plaintiffs Earth Island Institute and Center for Biological

Diversity (“Plaintiffs”) seek, through the present action, to

preclude Defendants from proceeding with the sale of salvage

timber resulting from the 2004 Freds and Power Fires in the

Eldorado National Forest. While this Court initially denied

Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting any

logging attendant to the salvage project, the Ninth Circuit

subsequently reversed that decision and directed the Court to

issue a preliminary injunction consistent with its opinion. See

Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1178 (9th

Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit ordered that its injunction

pending appeal remain in effect for thirty days following the

July 31, 2006 remand of the case for further disposition.

On July 20, 2006, after the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was

issued but before remand occurred, the Tuolumne County Alliance

for Resources and Environment, Sierra Resource Management, Inc.,

the Tuolumne County Chamber of Commerce, and the California

Forest Counties Schools Coalition (hereinafter collectively

referred to as “Intervenor Applicants”) moved to intervene either

as a matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)1

or permissively pursuant to Rule 24(b). Intervenor Applicants

have specifically limited the scope of their request to the issue

of whether any preliminary injunctive relief ordered by this

Court should be made contingent on Plaintiffs’ posting of a

substantial surety bond in accordance with Rule 65(d). Motion,

1:17-19.

Case 2:05-cv-01608-MCE-GGH Document 82 Filed 09/08/06 Page 2 of 6
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3

An applicant has the right to intervene under Rule 24(a) if

1) the intervention request is made in a timely fashion; 2) a

“significantly protectable” interest related to the subject

matter of the litigation is asserted; 3) disposition of the

matter may impair or impede the applicant’s interest in the

absence of intervention; and 4) if the applicant’s interest is

not adequately represented by existing parties. Wetlands Action

Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1113-14 (9th

Cir. 2000). Private parties may not, however, intervene as a

matter of right in an action alleging NEPA violations on grounds

that such parties do not have the requisite significantly

protectable interest in NEPA compliance actions. Kootenai Tribe

of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Because Intervenor Applicants are private parties, and given the

fact that the claims sought to be asserted in this action do

implicate NEPA, intervention here as a matter of right appears

inappropriate.

Permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), however, “plainly

dispenses with any requirement that the intervenor shall have a

direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the

litigation.” SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434,

459 (1940). Consequently permissive intervention may be allowed

here even in the face of allegations sounding under NEPA.

An applicant seeking permissive intervention must satisfy

three threshold requirements: 1) the motion must be timely; 2)

the court must have an independent basis for jurisdiction over

the applicant’s claims; and 3) the intervenor’s interests must

share a common question of law or fact with the main action. 

Case 2:05-cv-01608-MCE-GGH Document 82 Filed 09/08/06 Page 3 of 6
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4

Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998). The

district court has broad discretion to grant permissive

intervention if these factors are met. See Spangler v. Pasadena

City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977).

 The threshold requirements for permissive intervention on

Intervenor Applicants’ part appear to have been satisfied. 

Although the instant action was filed in August of 2005, the

issue on which Intervenor Applicants desire to be heard (the size

of any surety bond to be posted as a condition to preliminary

injunctive relief) became ripe only with the Ninth Circuit’s July

31, 2006 remand of this case for entry of a preliminary

injunction, and Intervenor Applicants’ Motion was filed on July

20, 2006, before that remand even occurred. Consequently

Intervenor Applicant’s limited intervention request is timely. 

Although under the terms of the Ninth Circuit’s remand a decision

as to the preliminary injunction had to be rendered within thirty

days, and while a preliminary injunction was accordingly issued

by this Court on August 31, 2006, the nominal $1,000.00 surety

bond required at that time was specifically made subject to

increase following further briefing, given the instant

intervention request.

In addition, because Intervenor Applicants assert that

halting the proposed logging through a preliminary injunction

impacts their various concerns, primarily with respect to the

economic livelihood of businesses and individuals within the

greater area where logging is to occur, the remaining

prerequisites (common issues and independent jurisdictional

grounds) are also met. 

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Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 2

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

5

In exercising its discretion to allow permissive

intervention, the Court recognizes that logging, or the cessation

thereof, can impact large and varied interests, including those

advanced by Intervenor Applicants. The Court has also considered

the fact that Intervenor Applicants’ intervention requested is

directed to one limited and discrete issue; namely, how large a

surety bond should be required in connection with the preliminary

injunction. Ensuring that all competing interests are heard will

contribute to the just and equitable resolution of this case. 

Consequently permissive intervention will be allowed, and the

motion presently before the Court is granted. Intervenor 2

Applicants are directed to file their Proposed Opposition to

Preliminary Injunction Without Surety Bond forthwith.

In permitting such intervention, however, the Court must

still consider “whether the intervention will unduly delay or

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original

parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). Plaintiffs must be given

adequate opportunity to respond to Intervenor Applicants’ request

for an additional surety bond. 

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6

A hearing on whether such a bond will be required is

therefore set for September 25, 2006. Plaintiffs’ Reply to

Intervenor Applicants’ Opposition, if any, shall be filed prior

to that hearing date in accordance with the provisions of Local

Rule 78-230(d). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 8, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-01608-MCE-GGH Document 82 Filed 09/08/06 Page 6 of 6