Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05398/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05398-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QUILLIE L. HARVEY, JR., 

Plaintiff(s),

 v.

G. JORDAN, et al.,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C 05-5398 CRB (PR)

ORDER 

(Docs # 19 & 23) 

Plaintiff, a prisoner at Salinas Valley State Prison ("SVSP"), filed a pro se

civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that, on or about July 29,

2004, prison officials used excessive force when they unnecessarily used tear gas

to extract him from his cell. He also alleges that he was denied due process at

subsequent classification and disciplinary hearings, treated more harshly than

Hispanic inmates who were also extracted from their cells and that the prison's

appeals process did not address properly any of these violations.

Per order filed on March 28, 2006, the court dismissed plaintiff's

allegations regarding shortcomings in the prison's administrative appeals process,

and prison officials' improper actions in connection therewith, under the authority

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The court explained:

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It is well-established that there is no constitutional right to a

prison administrative appeal or grievance system. See Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). And a state's creation of a prison

administrative appeal or grievance system does not implicate a

liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Antonelli

v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (prison appeal

process is procedural right that does not give rise to protected

liberty interest requiring procedural protections of Due Process

Clause); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)

(same). Plaintiff's allegations regarding shortcomings in the

prison's administrative appeals process, and prison officials'

improper actions in connection therewith, fail to state a claim under

§ 1983 and are dismissed See id.

Mar. 28, 2006 Order at 2. The court found that plaintiff's allegations of use of

excessive force, denial of procedural due process in connection with

classification and disciplinary hearings and denial of equal protection appear to

state cognizable claims under § 1983 and ordered them served on the named

defendants. See id.

Plaintiff has since inundated the court with numerous filings, including an

objection to the dismissal of some of his claims and multiple requests, letters,

motions. He also has filed an amended complaint seeking to reintroduce the

claims the court dismissed in its March 28, 2006 order.

Plaintiff's objections to the dismissal of his allegations regarding

shortcomings in the prison's administrative appeals process, and prison officials'

improper actions in connection therewith, are without merit. It matters not that

he now tries to couch them in terms of his First Amendment right to petition the

government or of access to the courts. Although plaintiff has a First Amendment

right to petition the government for redress of grievances, he has no right to a

response or any particular action. See, e.g., Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th

Cir. 1991) (prisoner's right to petition the government for redress is not

compromised by the prison's refusal to entertain the grievance). And although he

also has a right of access to the courts, the timely filing of this § 1983 action

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makes clear that the hindrances of which he complains did not cause him an

actual injury to court access. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)

(examples of impermissible hindrances resulting in an actual injury to court

access include a prisoner whose complaint was dismissed for failure to satisfy

some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal

assistance facilities, he could not have known; and a prisoner who had "suffered

arguably actionable harm" that he wished to bring to the attention of the court,

but was so stymied by the inadequacies of the library that he was unable even to

file a complaint); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (agreeing

with district court that prisoner “did not allege injury, such as inability to file a

complaint or defend against a charge, stemming from the restrictions on his

access to the law library”). Plaintiff's amended complaint is DISMISSED under

the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Plaintiff original complaint shall remain

the operative complaint in this matter and this matter shall remain limited to

plaintiff's core allegations of use of excessive force, denial of procedural due

process in connection with classification and disciplinary hearings and denial of

equal protection. Although regrettable, plaintiff's allegations regarding

shortcomings in the prison's administrative appeals process, and prison officials'

improper actions in connection therewith, are not an additional basis for relief

under § 1983. 

Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (doc # 19) is DENIED for

lack of exceptional circumstances. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328,

1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and/or

preliminary injunction (doc # 23) is DENIED without prejudice to raising in the

context of a new action. The basis for the motion are occurrences or events that

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took place well after the filing of this action. See Manning v. City of Auburn,

953 F.2d 1355, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 1992) (supplemental pleadings setting forth

occurrences or events which happened after the date of the original complaint are

optional; claims not filed in a supplemental complaint may be filed in a separate

lawsuit). Moreover, plaintiff cannot obtain a TRO or preliminary injunction

without first satisfying the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65. Prior to granting a preliminary injunction, notice to the adverse

party is required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). A motion for preliminary injunction

therefore cannot be decided until the parties to the action are served, and they

have not yet been served here. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir.

1983). A TRO may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party

or that party's attorney if: (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by

affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss

or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or the party's

attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney (plaintiff

himself in this case, as he proceeds pro se) certifies in writing the efforts, if any,

which have been made to give notice and the reasons supporting the claim that

notice should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Plaintiff has not satisfied

both requirements. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 5, 2006 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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