Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00644/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00644-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brian Thues,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-0644-PHX-NVW (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on 

April 1, 2013 (Doc. 1). On September 3, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 

10). Petitioner has not filed a reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the evidence at trial as follows:

On November 8, 2007, several officers and detectives of the 

Phoenix Police Department conducted surveillance on defendant. 

During this coordinated surveillance, Detective Geis saw defendant 

follow an 84-year-old woman, R.B., out of a Walmart parking lot. 

After R.B. entered her vehicle, Detective B.G. obtained her address 

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from the police dispatcher and drove to her home before defendant 

arrived. The detective parked his car across the street from R.B.’s 

home and found a place to hide so that he would be close by if he 

needed to intervene to protect R.B. The detective waited for the 

victim to arrive home and observed defendant drive past the 

victim’s house twice. As R.B. was removing groceries from her car, 

defendant parked his car about three houses down and “ran” to 

R.B.’s home. Detective Geis attempted to “jump” a fence to 

prevent defendant from entering R.B.’s home, but was unable to and 

defendant “went right into the house.”

Immediately after defendant entered R.B.'s home, Detective 

Geis heard a woman scream. The detective ran to the front door as 

defendant, carrying a “black purse,” was “running out the door and 

[they] collided right at the door’s entry.” Detective Geis identified 

himself by yelling “Phoenix Police.” Defendant’s momentum 

carried Detective Geis into the front yard where defendant then 

began punching him in the face. Although the detective identified 

himself numerous times, defendant continued punching and kicking 

him. Once other officers arrived, however, they were able to place 

defendant in handcuffs and under arrest.

At trial, R.B. testified that, on November 8, 20007, after she 

returned home from shopping, she grabbed a few bags of groceries 

and her purse and went into her house. She set her grocery bags on 

the table and turned to go back outside and saw a man she did not 

recognize “standing [ ] in the middle of [her] living room.” R.B. 

“shook [her] hand at him and [ ] said get out of here; you don’t live 

here.” The man grabbed R.B., pushed her to the floor, and punched 

her. After R.B. fell to the floor, the man “pulled [her] blouse 

up...over [her] head.” R.B. believed the man was going to rape her, 

but he immediately left. At trial, R.B. identified defendant as the 

man who accosted her in her home.

(Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 3-4.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 10, are referenced herein 

as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted on one count of burglary, one count of robbery, three 

counts of aggravated assault (two with regard to the civilian victim and one with regard 

to the detective), and one count of resisting arrest. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

Petitioner changed counsel during the course of the prosecution, filed a motion 

requesting to represent himself, and on the eve of trial expressed dissatisfaction with trial 

counsel arising out of a disagreement over counsel’s reticence to call a particular 

witness, but Petitioner ultimately withdrew his request. (See Exhibit FF, R.T. 7/9/09 at 

5-6; Exhibit GG, R.T. 7/13/09 at 3-12.)

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Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial with counsel, and was found guilty as charged, 

and the jury found four of five alleged aggravating factors to have been proven. (Exhibit 

C, M.E. 7/16/09.)

Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 20 years on the burglary, 12 

years on the robbery, and 4.5 years on each of the two assaults on the civilian victim, and 

consecutive to those sentences, concurrent terms of 6 years on the assault on the 

detective and resisting arrest, for an effective combined sentence of 26 years in prison. 

(Exhibit E, Sentence 1/20/10.) 

Some two and a half years later, following direct appeal, and during the pendency 

of Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding, a restitution hearing was held, and various 

restitution orders made. (Exhibit S, M.E. 8/17/12; Exhibit MM, R.T. 8/17/12.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (Exhibit F). Counsel was appointed, and filed 

a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and related state 

authorities, evidencing an inability to find an issue for appeal. Counsel did assert that 

Petitioner wished to raise claims that perjured testimony was presented to the grand jury, 

and that there was insufficient evidence to support the victim’s identification of 

Petitioner. (Exhibit F. at 18.) 

Petitioner was granted leave to file a supplemental brief, but did not do so. 

(Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. 4/12/11 at 2.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals then reviewed the record for what it alternatively 

described as “fundamental error” (id. at 2) and “reversible error” (id. at 7), found none, 

and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences (id. at 8). In so doing, the court 

rejected potential claims based upon purported false testimony at the grand jury, and 

insufficient evidence based upon a conflicting identification of Petitioner by the victim 

as Hispanic, while Petitioner is African-American. (Id. at 5-7.)

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3; Exhibit CC, 

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Appellate Docket.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Roughly one month later, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit I). Counsel was appointed (Exhibit J, M.E. 5/19/11), who filed a Notice of 

Completion of Review (Exhibit K) evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. 

Petitioner was granted leave to file a pro per petition, and counsel was directed to remain 

in an advisory capacity. (Exhibit L, M.E. 9/23/11.)

Petitioner filed an extensive Petition (Doc. M), but it was stricken for failure to

include the required certification of inclusion of all known grounds for relief, and 

supporting evidence. (Exhibit N, M.E. 2/14/12.) Petitioner was provided leave to file a 

revised petition, and was provided a form of petition. (Id.)

Petitioner then filed his Amended Petition (Exhibit O)1, incorporating the form 

petition, including checked-off claims for relief based on: (1) an identification in 

violation of constitutional rights; (2) denial of competent counsel; (3) unconstitutional 

use by the state of perjured testimony. 

The PCR court concluded that Petitioner raised five claims:

The Petition raises five separate claims: (1) the testimony presented 

to the grand jury was "not limited to factual information" and 

therefore did not permit the grand jury to resolve the issue of 

probable cause solely on the facts; (2) the victim's description of her 

assailant did not support the charges; (3) evidence of "exculpatory" 

nature was not properly presented at trial; (4) Defendant's 

"noncriminal movements and travels" were improperly admitted at 

trial; and (5) Defendant's counsel's representation was ineffective 

because due to "incompetency," "non-diligence" and/or "mere 

oversight."

(Exhibit R, M.E. 8/1/12 at 1.) The PCR court found: (1) the first two claims “precluded 

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(2) because they were raised on appeal 

and rejected by the Court of Appeals” (id.); (2) the portion of claim 2 which asserted a 

tainted in-court identification, and claims 3 and 4 were precluded under Rule 32.2 

 

1

Petitioner identifies this as his “Second Petition.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 4.) 

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because Petitioner failed to raise them on direct appeal (id. at 1-2). With regard to the 

allegation of ineffective assistance, the PCR court found that the claims of ineffective 

assistance were not colorable claims. (Id. at 2.) Accordingly, the petition was 

summarily dismissed. (Id.)

On September 10, 2012, forty days after the dismissal, Petitioner filed a Motion 

for Clarification (Exhibit T), seeking leave to file a delayed petition for review. While 

Respondents note the motion (Answer, Doc. 10 at 7), they do not report any ruling on the 

motion. This is concerning, in light of Petitioner’s subsequent “Notice of Appeal” 

(Exhibit W) which the Arizona Court of Appeals apparently construed as related to 

Petitioner’s then pending second PCR proceeding and summarily dismissed as 

premature. (Exhibit X, Order 11/30/12.)

Petitioner alleges he sought review in both the Arizona Court of Appeals and the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.) He references the Arizona Court of 

Appeals case number assigned to his Notice of Appeal (Exhibit W), “1 CA-CR 12-

0734.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5; Exhibit X, Order 11/30/12.) He also references Arizona 

Supreme Court case number “CR 12-0523.” (Petition Doc. 1 at 5.) Respondents have 

not supplied any records from the latter proceeding.

E. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On September 17, 2012, Petitioner filed his second Notice of Post-Conviction 

Relief (Exhibit U).2 Counsel was appointed. (Exhibit V, M.E. 10/31/12.) The PCR 

court noted the prior PCR proceeding and directed that the second proceeding would be 

allowed “only as to the restitution order issued August 17, 2012.” (Id. at 1.) 

Counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Review (Exhibit Y), reporting an 

inability to find an issue for review on the restitution proceedings. Petitioner was 

granted leave to file a pro per petition for post-conviction relief, and counsel was 

directed to remain in an advisory capacity. (Exhibit Z, M.E. 12/21/12.)

 

2

Petitioner does not report this proceeding in his Petition. (See Petition, Doc. 1 at 4-5.)

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Petitioner failed to file a pro per petition, and on April 3, 2013 (during the 

pendency of this habeas proceeding), the PCR court summarily dismissed the 

proceeding. (Exhibit AA, M.E. 4/3/13.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review.3 

F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 1, 2013 (Doc. 1). In the service 

Order, the Court determined that Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four grounds 

for relief:4

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment 

due process rights were violated by the lack of a preliminary hearing 

and unfair grand jury proceedings. In Ground Two, Petitioner 

alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. In Ground Three, he 

alleges a Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy violation. In Ground 

Four, he alleges structural error based on the jury instructions used.

(Order 6/12/13, Doc. 4 at 2.) 

Response - On September 3, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 10). Respondents argue that Ground One (Preliminary Hearing) asserts a state law 

claim and is not cognizable on habeas review, and is procedurally defaulted. (Id. at 8, et 

seq., 13-14) Respondents argue that Ground Two (Ineffective Assistance) contains 

insufficient allegations to adequately state a claim, is without merit, and is procedurally 

defaulted. (Id. at 9-10, 14-16.) They argue that Ground Three contains insufficient 

allegations to adequately state a claim, and is procedurally defaulted. (Id. at 9-10, 16.) 

Finally, they argue that Ground Four is without merit and is procedurally defaulted. (Id.

at 16-20.)

 

3

The trial court’s docket reflects transmittals and an order from the Arizona Court of 

Appeals on April 5, 2013. (Exhibit BB at 1.) However, these were filed only a day after 

the dismissal of the PCR proceeding, creating the inference that they related to earlier 

proceedings, not any attempt to seek review on Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding.

4 As discussed hereinafter, the undersigned has concluded that Ground Three also asserts 

a related claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

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Reply – In an Order filed by Judge Logan on October 8, 2013, Petitioner was 

given until November 6, 2013 to reply in support of his petition. 

No reply has been filed. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND ONE: DENIAL OF PRELIMINARY HEARING

In his Ground One, Petitioner asserts a “14th Amendment violation (Due 

Process),” and makes the following allegations:

Due process is best defined in one word – fairness. Petitioner 

contends that he never waived his right to a preliminary hearing as 

required by the rules of criminal procedure. The contaminated 

evidence had an obvious affect [sic] on judgment at the trial and 

grand jury proceedings. In essence, the right of an accused in a 

criminal trial to due process is the right to a fair opportunity to 

defend against the accusations of the prosecutor and to present a 

complete defense. Petitioner contends that he was given less than 

an indigent defense.

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Respondents construe this ground as asserting a claim that Petitioner’s due 

process rights were violated because he was not provided with a preliminary hearing as 

required by state law. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 8-9.) (Respondents contend, however, that 

state law did not actually require a preliminary hearing. (Id. at 9, n.3.)

1. Cognizable Claim of Due Process Violation

Respondents properly note that review in a federal habeas proceeding is limited to 

federal violations. A state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief only if he is “in custody in 

violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083 

(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

Moreover, a petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one 

merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 

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(9

th Cir. 1996). It has long been understood that a state may violate its own law without 

violating the United States Constitution. “We cannot treat a mere error of state law, if 

one occurred, as a denial of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state 

court on state law would come here as a federal constitutional question.” Gryger v. 

Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948).

But, that is not to say that an error of state law can never result in a denial of due 

process. The standard, however, is high. To qualify for federal habeas relief, an error of 

state law must be “sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of 

due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” See Pully v. Harris, 465 

U.S. 37, 41 (1984). To sustain such a due process claim founded on state law error, 

Petitioner must show that the state court "error" was "so arbitrary and fundamentally 

unfair that it violated federal due process." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 

(9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.1986)). To 

receive review of what otherwise amounts to nothing more than an error of state law, a 

petitioner must argue “not that it is wrong, but that it is so wrong, so surprising, that the 

error violates principles of due process”; that a state court’s decision was “such a gross 

abuse of discretion” that it was unconstitutional. Brooks v. Zimmerman, 712 F.Supp. 

496, 498 (W.D.Pa.1989). 

In evaluating Petitioner’s Petition, the Court must construe the allegations 

liberally. Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003). The undersigned finds 

Respondents’ construction of Ground One to be a liberal construction, insofar as it goes. 

What Respondents do not do is grant Petitioner the liberality of reading his assertions 

that he was denied “a fair opportunity to defend against the accusations of the 

prosecution” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6) as an allegation that the error was so egregious that it 

amounted to a violation of due process. So read, Petitioner’s Ground One states a

cognizable federal claim.

That, of course, does not mean that Petitioner has established such a violation.

/ /

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2. No Preliminary Hearing Requirement

Petitioner contends that state law required a preliminary hearing. To the contrary, 

under the Arizona Constitution either indictment by a grand jury or information after a 

preliminary hearing is a proper method of bringing an accused felon to trial. State v. 

Bojorquez, 111 Ariz. 549, 553, 535 P.2d 6, 10 (1975); Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 30 (“[n]o 

person shall be prosecuted criminally in any court of record for felony or misdemeanor, 

otherwise than by information or indictment.”).

Here, Petitioner was prosecuted by a grand jury indictment (Exhibit A). Thus, no 

preliminary hearing was required under Arizona state law. Accordingly, there was no 

violation of state law as a result of the absence of a waiver by Petitioner of a preliminary 

hearing. 

Moreover, federal law does not mandate both a grand jury indictment and a 

preliminary hearing. In Howard v. Cupp, the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that a 

petitioner had been denied equal protection because he had been prosecuted in the state 

of Oregon by grand jury indictment rather than preliminary hearing. 747 F.2d 510 (9th

Cir. 1984). “It is well settled, however, that there is no fundamental right to a 

preliminary hearing.” Id. at 510. 

Of course, here Petitioner asserts not an equal protection violation, but a denial of 

due process, as a result of the resulting impact on his ability to defend himself at trial. 

The Sixth Circuit has plainly held that there is no due process right, or any other 

constitutional right, to a preliminary hearing. Dillard v. Bomar, 342 F.2d 789, 790 (6th

Cir. 196) (reviewing Supreme Court and other circuit cases). 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Howard that there was no equal 

protection right to a preliminary hearing was drawn from Austin v. U.S., 408 F.2d 808 

(9th Cir. 1969), which in turn relied upon Sciortiono v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 134 (2nd

Cir. 1967), cert denied 390 U.S. 906 (1968). In Sciortiono, the federal defendant argued 

that the preliminary hearing “provided by Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure is intended to serve as a means of discovery for the accused as well as a forum 

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for determining probable cause, so that the need for such an examination is not 

eliminated by the return of an indictment.” 385 F.2d at 133. After noting the principle 

that the finding of probable cause in an indictment “eliminates the need for a preliminary 

examination,” id., the court concluded that allowing a defendant to prepare for trial by 

using the preliminary hearing as a means of conducting discovery, was not the purpose 

of a preliminary hearing.

Thus, the only purpose to be served by a preliminary hearing is to preserve the 

protection of a finding of probable cause before the maintenance of a prosecution. 

Petitioner was afforded such protection by the grand jury indictment process.

3. Any Error Harmless

Assuming there were any defect in failing to provide Petitioner with a preliminary 

hearing, such error was rendered harmless by his conviction at trial. In U.S. v. 

Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986), the Court rejected a challenge to procedures at a 

grand jury proceeding, where the defendant had been convicted at trial. The Court 

reasoned: “the petit jury's verdict rendered harmless any conceivable error in the 

charging decision that might have flowed from the violation. In such a case, the societal 

costs of retrial after a jury verdict of guilty are far too substantial to justify setting aside 

the verdict simply because of an error in the earlier grand jury proceedings.” 475 U.S. at

73. 

Similarly here, any error in not having a preliminary hearing was rendered 

harmless when the trial jury’s verdict established that there was not only probable cause 

to believe Petitioner had committed the offenses, but proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

4. Summary

Liberally construed, Petitioner’s Ground One does assert a cognizable claim of a 

denial of due process. That claims is without merit, however, because Petitioner had no 

state or federal right to a preliminary hearing, and any error in failing to provide such a 

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hearing was harmless. Accordingly, Ground One must be denied.

B. FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY STATE A CLAIM

Respondents contend that Petitioner fails to adequately state claims in his 

Grounds Two and Three.5 (Answer, Doc. 10 at 9-11.) 

1. Applicable Standard

“Under Rule 8(a), applicable to ordinary civil proceedings, a complaint need only 

provide ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ 

Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c) is more demanding. It provides that the petition must “specify 

all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner” and ‘state the facts supporting each 

ground.’” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). Conversely, a habeas petition 

cannot rest on allegations that are “conclusory and wholly devoid of specifics,” which 

“are no substitute for proper allegations of fact.” Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 

1058 (9th Cir. 1970). “Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of 

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 

1994). 

While a pleading may be dismissed for failure to state a claim, that dismissal is 

ordinarily made without prejudice, and with leave to amend. “Dismissal with prejudice 

and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear on de novo review that 

the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). That principle flows from the mandate in 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 that leave to amend “shall be freely given when 

justice so requires.” Id. at 1051. 

The amendment of habeas petitions is governed by the “rules of procedure 

 

5

The undersigned presumes without deciding, that the Court’s recitation in the service 

Order (Doc. 4) of the claims asserted in the Petition does not equate to a finding that the 

identified claims have been adequately stated. To the extent that such Order does 

constitute such a finding, this discussion about the failure to adequately state a claim 

would be moot, the earlier ruling serving as the law of the case.

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applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. This includes Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). “In the absence of any 

apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the 

part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, 

futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely 

given.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

Thus, in deciding whether to dismiss a habeas petition with or without prejudice 

for failure to state a claim, this Court is required to “consider the relevant factors and 

articulate why dismissal should be with prejudice instead of without prejudice.” 

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. 

2. Application to Grounds Two and Three

Ground Two – In his Ground Two, Petitioner asserts a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The approved form of 

Petition then requires and instructs: “Supporting FACTS (Do not argue or cite law. Just 

state the specific facts that support your claim.)” (Petition Doc, 1 at 7.) Petitioner then 

recites the following:

Either ineffective assistance occurred or it didn’t, because all trial 

lawyers make major mistakes on every trial. Although the right to 

ineffective assistance of counsel does not require a criminal 

defendant’s attorney to leave no stone unturned or any witness 

unpursued [sic], it is axiomatic that a failure to call a particular 

witness to the stand or pursue a particular line of defense may be so 

inept that it demonstrates an unreasonable choice of how to conduct 

a proper defense. Here, Petitioner contends that ineffective 

assistance occurred from the beginning of the case during grand jury 

proceedings and was in need of a defense that would bring every 

factor into play as to avoid the ultimate punishment he has been 

presented with. Further, when an attorney fails to be an adversary to 

the State, that attorney constructively denies counsel to his or her 

client.

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) Respondents argue that this is nothing more than “general 

principles and assertions” and fails to provide “specific instances of counsel’s conduct.” 

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(Answer, Doc. 10 at 10.) 

Indeed, the bulk of this recitation is simply generic assertions of legal principles. 

The only plainly factual allegation is the assertion that “ineffective assistance occurred 

from the beginning of the case during grand jury proceedings.” Liberally construed, this 

adequately asserts a claim that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel in 

the grand jury proceedings. 

It is true, as discussed hereinafter, that there is no constitutional right to counsel in 

grand jury proceedings, and thus this claim is without merit. That the claim is without 

merit does not establish that it is not adequately stated – the issue is not a defect in 

pleading, but a defect in the legal premise. Such a defect cannot be cured by additional 

facts, but requires the assertion of a different claim. Accordingly, a denial of the 

defective claim, rather than dismissal with leave to amend the pleading, is the 

appropriate remedy.

The remainder of that sentence (“Petitioner...was in need of a defense that would 

bring every factor into play”) and the reference in the next sentence about counsel failing 

“to be an adversary to the State,” assert a claim under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 

648 (1984) that counsel failed to mount a defense. Because a claim that counsel failed to 

mount a defense is an assertion of a negative, further specifics are often unnecessary to 

adequately state the claim.

As an alternative to the claims that Ground Two fails to adequately state a claim, 

Respondents contend that the Ground at best asserts a claim comparable to that in 

Petitioner’s PCR petition that “defense counsel was incapable of exploring all facts of 

evidence and positions of defense either due to incompetency, nor diligence to the case 

or mere oversight. Regardless, it rendered defense counsel inadequate and ineffective to 

defend or even to intelligently advise the defendant.” (Answer, Doc. 10 at 14-15 

(quoting Exhibit M, PCR Petition at 2.) That sweeping allegation is the essence of a 

Cronic claim.

Thus, liberally construed, the undersigned finds that Ground Two adequately 

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states claims that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel in the grand jury 

proceedings, and that trial counsel failed to mount a defense. These claims will be 

addressed on their merits hereinafter.

Ground Three – In his Ground Three, Petitioner asserts claims of double 

jeopardy and prosecutorial misconduct as an “infraction” of the Fifth Amendment. 

(Petition Doc. 1 at 8.) 

This case was a quasi stacked case, because the State implied that 

Petitioner was under surveillance and that numerous charges were 

gonna be filed to circumvent his safeguarded rights. Before a trial 

court can admit evidence of other acts, the court must find clear and 

convincing evidence that Petitioner had committed the act. The 

mother of all evil is speculation and the double counting of all 

enumerated factors, that were elements of conviction, has double 

jeopardy at bar. A claim of prosecutorial misconduct warrants 

reversal only if #1) misconduct is indeed present and #2) a 

reasonable likelihood that the misconduct could have affected the 

jury’s verdict, thereby denying the Petitioner a fair trial. The facts in 

supporting facts shows ill will and egregious behavior that warrants 

censorship. Because the double jeopardy clauses of both 

constitutions have been held to protect against three distinct abuses: 

#1) a second prosecution for the same offense; #2) a second 

prosecution for the same offense following a conviction and 

multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of A.R.S. § 

13–116.

(Id.)

Respondents again argue that this Ground “simply asserts constitutional principles 

without explaining how those principles were violated.” (Answer, Doc. 10 at 11.) 

However, liberally construed, Petitioner asserts claims that he was subjected to 

double jeopardy because there was an implication by the prosecution that other charges 

were going to be filed against him and that he had been under surveillance, and that such 

implication amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. Again, while these claims are without 

merit, that does not establish that they are not adequately stated. Rather, they simply do 

not merit relief. Thus, it is appropriate to dispose of these claims on their merits rather 

than dismissing them with leave to amend. 

These claims will be addressed on their merits hereinafter.

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C. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents contend that Grounds Two, Three and Four are procedurally 

defaulted.

1. Discretion to Deny on Merits in the Face of Procedural Default Defense

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed 

without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, 

where a petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial 

remedies, and those remedies are now no longer available because of some procedural 

bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking 

habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is 

generally proper absent a “miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed 

v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Similarly, “absent showings of ‘cause’ and ‘prejudice,’ 

federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] declined to address 

a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural 

requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state 

procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, - - - U.S. - - -, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011). 

However, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) provides: "An application for a writ of habeas 

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to 

exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State." Accordingly, the court is free 

to side step the exhaustion issue when it is more efficient or easier to dispose of a claim 

on its merits. Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1162 (8th Cir. 1999). That exception 

only applies in limited circumstances where the petitioner has no hope of prevailing on 

the merits of his claim. "[A] federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the 

merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable 

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federal claim." Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, (9th Cir. 5/3/5). 

Although § 2254(b)(2) speaks in terms of a “failure to exhaust” and procedurally 

defaulted or procedurally barred state remedies have been technically exhausted, at least 

some courts have read 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) as authorizing the avoidance of a 

procedural default or procedural bar analysis in favor of a rejection on the merits. 

“Thus, although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), which provides that ‘[a]n application for a writ 

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the 

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State,’ is not in terms 

applicable to procedural defaults we see no reason why we should not act consistently 

with that section when there is a possible procedural default.” Hameen v. State of 

Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 251-52 (3

rd Cir. 2000). “The U.S. Supreme Court has held that 

federal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding 

against the petitioner on the merits.” Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6

th Cir. 2003)

(citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). See also Nobles v. Johnson, 

127 F.3d 409, 423-24 (5th Cir.1997) (deciding against the petitioner on the merits even 

though the claim was procedurally defaulted); Miller v. Mullin, 354 F.3d 1288, 1297 

(10th Cir.2004) (“In the interest of judicial economy, [w]e need not and do not address 

these issues, however, because the case may be more easily and succinctly affirmed on 

the merits.” (internal quotation marks omitted; modification in original)); Wilson v. 

Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847, 868 (4th Cir.2003) (declining to decide the case on the basis of a 

procedural bar never raised by the state when the merits could be easily disposed of 

against the petitioner); Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1162 (8th Cir.1999) (seeing 

no need to “belabor” the “difficult question” of a procedural bar when the claim was 

easily resolvable against the petitioner on the merits).

In Lambrix (relied upon by the Sixty Circuit in Hameen) the Supreme Court held 

that a Teague question could be addressed on its merits despite the assertion of a 

procedural default defense.

A State's procedural rules are of vital importance to the orderly 

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administration of its criminal courts; when a federal court permits 

them to be readily evaded, it undermines the criminal justice 

system. We do not mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue 

must invariably be resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be. 

Judicial economy might counsel giving the Teague question 

priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas 

petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated 

issues of state law. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (permitting a federal 

court to deny a habeas petition on the merits notwithstanding the 

applicant's failure to exhaust state remedies).

Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525. 

The Ninth Circuit similarly relied on Lambrix to find that the appellate court 

could dispose of a claim on its merits despite the applicability of a procedural bar. “We 

do agree, however, that appeals courts are empowered to, and in some cases should, 

reach the merits of habeas petitions if they are, on their face and without regard to any 

facts that could be developed below, clearly not meritorious despite an asserted 

procedural bar. Procedural bar issues are not infrequently more complex than the merits 

issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in some instances to proceed 

to the merits if the result will be the same.” Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 

(9

th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). See Flournoy v. Small, 681 

F.3d 1000, 1004, n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (relying on Franklin to address merits despite 

allegation of procedural default).

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that, if Petitioner’s claims are 

plainly without merit, if “it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a 

colorable federal claim,” then notwithstanding any allegation or appearance of 

procedural default or procedural bar, this Court may, in the interests of judicial economy, 

dispose of the claims on the merits.

2. Reasons to Exercise Discretion to Deny on Merits

Here, resolving the exhaustion, procedural default, and procedural bar issues 

raises a number of thorny problems. 

First, in addressing Petitioner’s direct appeal following an Anders brief, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals initially reported that its task was to search the record for 

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“fundamental error,” a limited type of error. (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 2.) Anders

directs a court faced with appointed counsel’s failure to make arguments for relief “to 

decide whether the case is wholly frivolous,” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, which requires an 

unrestricted review for viable claims. It is true that the Arizona court later in its decision 

identified its task as a search for any “reversible error.” However, there is nothing 

explicit in the decision to clarify which of the two standards was actually applied. This 

distinction might affect a finding of exhaustion or cause and prejudice.

Second, Petitioner appears to have attempted to seek review in his first PCR 

proceeding, but was thwarted by the PCR court’s apparent failure to address his request 

to extend the time for a petition for review (see Exhibit T, Motion for Clarification), and 

the appellate court’s construction of his “notice of appeal” as being related to his second 

PCR proceeding and thus summarily dismissing it (Exhibit X, Order 11/30/12). These 

matters raise questions about the availability of the state remedies to Petitioner and/or 

cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default.

Third, the lack of specificity in Petitioner’s Grounds for Relief would require the 

Court to make assumptions about the claims he asserts in order to ascertain whether 

those claims had been presented at a particular stage of the state proceedings.

Fourth, although curable through further proceedings to expand the record, the 

record provided to date is incomplete. Exhibit O to the Limited Answer is Petitioner’s 

Amended Petition in his first PCR proceeding. The petition asserts that the facts in 

support of the petition “are contained in Attachment A,” (id. at ¶ V), and that a series of 

exhibits are attached (id. at ¶ VI). No attachments or exhibits are included in the copy 

filed with the Court. Exhibit P to the Limited Answer is the State’s responsive brief in 

Petitioner’s PCR proceeding. The copy filed with the Court ends abruptly at page 6. 

Petitioner alleges he sought review in both the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.) He references the Arizona Court of Appeals case 

number assigned to his Notice of Appeal (Exhibit W), “1 CA-CR 12-0734.” (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 5; Exhibit X, Order 11/30/12.) He also references Arizona Supreme Court 

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case number “CR 12-0523.” (Petition Doc. 1 at 5.) Respondents have not supplied any 

records from the latter proceeding.

Finally, although again curable through supplemental briefing, Respondents 

failure to discern the claims identified herein renders their arguments on the exhaustion 

issues incomplete. While it is true that Petitioner has failed to affirmatively assert any 

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals (on direct appeal or in a PCR proceeding), 

Respondents have not addressed whether the claims discerned herein were raised to the 

PCR court and disposed of on independent and adequate state grounds, or potentially the 

subject of Petitioner’s apparently thwarted attempts at seeking review.

As discussed hereinafter, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Grounds 

Two, Three, and Four fail to raise even a colorable federal claim. Accordingly, for the 

reasons discussed above, the undersigned will proceed to the merits of these claims 

despite the assertion or appearance of a procedural default or procedural bar defense.

D. MERITS OF GROUND TWO: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 

The undersigned has found that, liberally construed, Ground Two asserts claims 

that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel in the grand jury proceedings, 

and that trial counsel failed to mount a defense. 

1. Standards of Review

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, not every error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

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Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

No Decision on the Merits – The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a 

petitioner has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on 

its merits, then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the 

restrictive standards of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091-92 (2013). See id. (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim 

rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

merits).

2. Standards for Ineffective Assistance Claims

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

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petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687 88, 694. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

In determining whether counsel performed deficiently, the court must focus on 

whether the attorney's actions were appropriate under the circumstances existing at the 

time. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Moreover, there is a strong presumption counsel’s 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that, under 

the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. 

United States v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). The court 

should “presume that the attorneys made reasonable judgments and decline to second 

guess strategic choices.” United States v. Pregler, 233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

To establish prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

3. Ineffectiveness at Grand Jury Proceedings 

Petitioner asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel in the grand jury 

proceedings. However, “[w]here a defendant does not have a constitutional right to 

counsel, he cannot raise an ineffective assistance claim.” U.S. v. Mathisen, 103 F.3d 142 

(9th Cir. 1996). “[A] person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel 

attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated 

against him.” U.S. v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984). Thus, there is no right to 

counsel in a grand jury proceeding. U.S. v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 673-674 (9th Cir. 

2000). Consequently, Petitioner has no basis to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of 

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counsel at the grand jury, and this portion of Ground Two is plainly without merit and 

must be denied.

4. Failure to Mount a Defense

Petitioner asserts that counsel failed to mount a defense of his case. 

Such claims are a unique breed of ineffectiveness claim. On the same day that 

Strickland was handed down, the Supreme Court also established an exception to the 

deficient and prejudicial performance standard by holding that certain circumstances in a 

criminal trial are so likely to prejudice the accused that no actual showing of prejudice 

need be made; ineffective assistance is presumed. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 

(1984). In Cronic, the Court identified two circumstances as being presumably 

prejudicial: the accused being denied criminal counsel at a critical stage of his trial or 

counsel entirely failing to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial 

testing. 466 U.S. at 659. 

The only time Petitioner asserts he was denied all counsel was at the grand jury. 

But as discussed herein above, he had no right to counsel at that point in the proceeding.

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the second alternative under Cronic as applying 

only "where there has been an actual breakdown in the adversarial process at trial." 

Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 744 n. 2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 390 (1990).

The Circuit has found such a breakdown and presumed prejudice to result when: (1) 

defense counsel has conceded that there is no reasonable doubt concerning the only 

factual issues in dispute, United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.1991); 

(2) when counsel has slept through a portion of the trial, Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 

831, 834-35 (9th Cir.1984); or (3) counsel has uttered racial epithets at his client and 

threatens to be very ineffective if he insists on going to trial, Frazer v. United States, 18 

F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir.1994).

On the other hand, while complete failure to defend a criminal case is ineffective 

assistance, the constitution does not require counsel to manufacture a defense where 

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none exists. See U.S. v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1986). The sixth amendment 

does not require counsel to invent a defense.” Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757, 764 (5th 

Cir. 2001), rehr’g granted on other grounds 284 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner fails to show that trial counsel failed to mount a defense. To the 

contrary, trial counsel: negotiated limitations on evidence of Petitioner’s prior 

convictions (Exhibit FF, R.T. 7/9/09 at 5-6); negotiated for and argued for limitations on 

evidence of Petitioner being a suspect in other robberies and being under surveillance 

(id. at 14-18); conducted voir dire of the jury panel (id. at 83-89); sought the striking of 

jurors for cause (id. at 98-99); cross examined all but two of the prosecution’s witnesses

(Exhibit HH, R.T. 7/14/09 at 27, 41, 77, 107, 130, 143; Exhibit II, R.T. 7/15/09 at 22, 35, 

37); objected to proposed jury instructions (Exhibit II, R.T. at 39, et seq.); made several 

motions for a directed verdict (id. at 44, et seq.); presented closing arguments that the 

prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proof (id. at 90, et seq.); asserted objections 

to the prosecution’s rebuttal argument (id. at 108); opposed the prosecution’s objections 

to the defense’s closing argument (id. at 123); opposed the aggravating factors (Exhibit 

JJ, R.T. 7/16/09 at 3); requested polling of the jury (id. at 6); presented closing 

arguments on the aggravating factors (id. at 21); objected to evidence at the sentencing 

hearing (Exhibit KK, R.T. 12/9/09 at 8, 17); cross examined witnesses at sentencing (id.

at 15, et seq., 20 et seq.); argued against a finding of some of the prior convictions (id. at 

23, et seq.), opposed evidence at sentencing of uncharged conduct (Exhibit LL, R.T. 

1/20/10 at 4); presented statements of Petitioner’s brother, mother (id. at 18, et seq.); 

and argued for a reduced sentence (id. at 26, et seq.).

Petitioner points to nothing further that counsel should have done. To be sure, he 

does generically reference failures by attorneys to call witness or to pursue particular 

lines of defense, or to make reasonable choices how to conduct the defense. (Petition, 

Doc, 1 at 7.) Petitioner proffers nothing, however, to show that any such witnesses, 

defenses, or choices in how to defend the case existed in this matter.

In sum, Petitioner fails to show that counsel did not mount a defense. 

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Accordingly, this portion of Ground Two is also without merit.

Accordingly, Ground Two is plainly without merit, and must be denied.

E. MERITS OF GROUND THREE: DOUBLE JEOPARDY / MISCONDUCT

Liberally construed, Petitioner’s Ground Three asserts claims that he was 

subjected to double jeopardy because there was an implication by the prosecution that 

other charges were going to be filed against him and that he had been under surveillance, 

and that such implication amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.

At a pretrial status conference, the parties discussed other charges against 

Petitioner then pending before the grand jury. (See Exhibit DD, R.T. 7/11/08 at 3, 10.) 

Those discussions were held before the jury was called, and were not instigated by the 

prosecution, but by the defense. 

At trial, the prosecutor related to the court that “at the time this incident occurred, 

this defendant was an identified suspect in several other robberies, and the police were 

actually doing surveillance on the defendant that particular day when they observed these 

actions.” (Exhibit GG R.T. 7/13/09 at 14.) It was part of a discussion with the trial court 

to obtain a ruling on the exclusion of such testimony. The trial court ultimately ruled:

THE COURT: I am going to permit the state to introduce 

testimony that they were following the defendant for another lawful 

purpose, and I am going to make a finding that the events of that 

specific day which do not include other crimes are admissible, in 

that the prejudice to the defendant does not outweigh the relevance. 

(Id. at 17-18.) This occurred prior to the jury panel entering the courtroom. (See id. at 

18.) 

In opening statements, the prosecution related, inter alia, that “officers and 

detectives with the Phoenix Police Department were doing surveillance, and they were 

doing surveillance on the defendant, Brian Thues, for another lawful purpose.” (Exhibit 

HH, R.T. 7/14/09 at 5.) 

At trial, Officer Miranda testified to the surveillance:

Q. And what was your purpose? What were you doing that 

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day?

A. We were conducting surveillance, Officer Jarvis and I, in 

particular in the southwest corner of 7th Avenue and Osborn.

Q. And were you doing surveillance on a particular person 

that day?

A. Yes, we were.

Q. And was that person an individual by the name of Brian 

Thues?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. And had you been shown a photograph of that person 

prior to doing surveillance?

A. I had been shown at least two photographs prior. 

(Exhibit HH, R.T. 7/14/09 at 18.) Miranda described following Petitioner in his vehicle 

from that location, a grocery store, to a WalMart parking lot, to a private residence, back 

to the WalMart, to a second private residence, to the WalMart a third time, and then to a 

third residence where Petitioner was being arrested by other officers. (Id. at 18-25.) 

Other officers offered similar testimony (albeit from their own viewpoints), 

including Officer Jacobs (id. at 33-39), Officer Ferencik (who added testimony 

suggesting that Petitioner appeared to be following vehicles to the other residences) (id.

at 48-58), Officer Adams (id. at 66-75), Officer Geis (id. at 84-86), and Officer Collard 

(id. at 124).

In closing arguments, the prosecution again referenced that the officers were 

“doing surveillance on that day.” (Exhibit II, R.T. 7/15/09 at 74.) The prosecution 

further argued:

There are lots of things the state does not have to prove. The 

only things that the state does have to prove are the actual elements 

of the offenses. For example, if you were wondering why were the 

police doing surveillance that day, that is not an element of the 

offense, of any of the offenses.

(Id. at 80.) The prosecutor further argued:

Another important point I want to make, I know you heard a 

lot of testimony about the officers doing surveillance starting in the 

area of 7th Avenue and Osborn and watching the defendant drive in 

those parking lots and then driving around Spectrum Mall and going 

to some different homes before he went to Mrs. Butler's. I just want 

to be clear that the state is not suggesting that the defendant was 

committing any crimes when he was driving around in that fashion.

When he followed those other drivers to Yucca and Rovey, 

the state is not suggesting that he was committing crimes, but we 

have the officers tell you about that to show you a few different 

things. One would be the defendant's intent that day when he did 

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finally arrive to Mrs. Butler's residence, his single-mindedness into 

getting into Mrs. Butler's home and put into much better perspective 

when you hear about his behavior at the two previous residences 

and what occurred. The officers' concerns based on what they had 

observed of the defendant’s actions that day. It places their actions 

into some better context for you when you know what they had 

already observed that day the defendant doing.

(Id. at 81-82.) 

In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued:

The police were following a black man around Phoenix. 

Now, is defense trying to make that sound as ugly as possible? 

That's an improper argument since we already said that you are not 

told why the police are doing surveillance and why not? Because it's

not relevant to your determination of the facts as far as these 

charges, but to suggest that perhaps they're just following him 

around because of his race or any other improper purpose certainly 

is not a proper argument to make.

(Id. at 113.)

At sentencing Officer Geis asked to address the trial court as a victim. Defense 

counsel addressed the other conduct issues:

MR. SCHWARTZSTElN: Judge, before we begin, I was 

wondering -- I want to be sure -- I know Officer Geis is well 

informed of this case and the facts as part of his investigation. I just 

want to make sure that we’re not going to be discussing any 

uncharged cases or any unsolved cases or anything of that nature. I 

don't believe it is appropriate under the circumstances.

THE COURT: I understand your concern. I can put in 

context anything Officer Geis tells me with respect to any other 

cases. I am sure he will give me input on this case. So, Officer Geis, 

come up here.

(Exhibit LL, R.T. 1/20/10 at 4.) 

Officer Geis stated:

I was asked to assist officers in conducting surveillance on 

Mr. Thues, believing he was involved in some criminal activity. As 

I followed Mr. Thues along with the other officers, we followed Mr. 

Thues and watched him follow one woman to her house, where his 

intentions -- he was unable to follow through on his intentions due 

to the fact that she was able to get in her garage and shut the garage 

door. There was a second woman that he went back to a shopping 

mall and followed from there to 19th Avenue and Bethany. He 

methodically chose his victims by driving up and down the parking 

lot of the shopping mall looking for someone who he believed could 

be a victim. As I watched Mr. Thues do this, I was sick to my 

stomach, believing it could be my mother or grandmother that he is 

basically hunting or targeting to be a victim.

I followed Mr. Thues as he followed the second woman to 

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her townhome and the only reason his intentions were thwarted on 

that occasion was that a neighbor had come out and greeted the 

elderly woman. Therefore, he was unable to follow through on those

intentions. The third woman I observed Mr. Thues target was Mrs. 

Butler over at 17th Avenue and Bethany Home Road in a shopping 

mall. I watched him as he saw her, target her and began to follow 

her all the way home to her address.

(Id. at 5-6.) 

1. Double Jeopardy

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall “be 

subject to the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. 

Amend. V. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) the Supreme Court held that the 

Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is enforceable against the States 

through the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates four separate guarantees: "It protects 

against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against a second 

prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and against multiple punishments for 

the same offense." Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306- 07 

(1984) (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980)); see United States v. 

Brooklier, 637 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 450 U.S. 980 (1980). The Double 

Jeopardy Clause also incorporates the concept of criminal collateral estoppel, barring a 

subsequent prosecution dependent upon “an issue of ultimate fact [that] has once been 

determined by a valid and final judgment” in the defendants’ favor in an earlier 

prosecution. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). 

Here, Petitioner does not assert that he was tried in consecutive trials for the same 

offense, either after an acquittal or a conviction. Nor does he allege that he was punished 

twice for the same offense. Nor does he allege that some ultimate fact at issue in this 

case had been decided in his favor in an earlier proceeding, or that one decided in the 

instant proceeding was again raised in a subsequent one.

At best, Petitioner complains that information was presented in this proceeding 

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was suggestive of his commission of other crimes. Such evidence is not without its 

constitutional infirmities. See e.g. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 865 et seq. (9th

Cir. 2006) (discussing due process concerns from evidence of other crimes). But a 

violation of Double Jeopardy is not one of them.

2. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner asserts that the implication by the prosecution that other charges were 

going to be filed against him and that he had been under surveillance amounted to 

prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutorial misconduct which “rises to the level of a due 

process violation” may justify habeas relief. Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d 300, 306 (9th

Cir. 2010). To make out such a claim, a Petitioner must show that: (1) the prosecutor’s 

conduct was improper; and (2) that the impropriety substantially prejudiced the 

defendant. U.S. v. Sanchez, 659 F.3d 1252, 1256 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Cristini v. 

McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 899 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying standard to prosecutorial misconduct 

based on prior bad acts evidence). 

Here the only reference to other charges occurred outside the presence of the jury, 

and thus was harmless.

 Moreover, while the trial was replete with references to Petitioner being under 

surveillance, the prosecution and its witnesses were circumspect in adhering to the trial 

court’s ruling that no testimony be presented about the purpose for the surveillance. “A 

prosecutor may rely in good faith on evidentiary rulings made by the state trial judge and 

make arguments in reliance on those rulings.” Cristini, 526 F.3d at 900. 

It is true that testimony of Petitioner being under surveillance created an inference 

of other wrongdoing, with the risk of an implication that guilt of the charged offense 

could in turn be inferred. However, such evidence may properly be admitted if, for 

example, it is admitted for another proper purpose, e.g. to establish “motive, opportunity, 

preparation, plan,” etc. See e.g. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Moreover, such evidence may 

be admitted when it is “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense. U.S. v. 

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Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1995). Such evidence may be properly 

introduced “when it was necessary to do so in order to permit the prosecutor to offer a 

coherent and comprehensible story regarding the commission of the crime; it is 

obviously necessary in certain cases for the government to explain either the 

circumstances under which particular evidence was obtained or the events surrounding 

the commission of the crime.” Id. at 1012-1013. 

Here, the nature of Petitioner’s movements prior to his assault on the victim 

established his preparation, planning and intent to undertake the robbery. Further, the 

extremely limited testimony about the surveillance was necessary to explain to the jury 

why six officers were engaged in testifying about those movements, and why Petitioner 

was apprehended as he exited the civilian victim’s residence. Thus, the introduction of 

testimony and arguments about the surveillance was not improper, and thus does not 

support a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

Even if this Court could conclude that the prosecutor acted improperly, there is no 

likelihood that the misconduct had a prejudicial effect on the outcome. The evidence 

against Petitioner was plainly overwhelming. He was caught “redhanded and in the 

fact.” Sir Walter Scott, Ivanhoe, Chapter 25 (describing the capture of a deer poacher). 

Or, in this case, Petitioner was caught purse-handed.

Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct are without merit.

Therefore, Ground Three is plainly without merit and must be denied.

F. MERITS OF GROUND FOUR: JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Finally, in Ground Four, Petitioner alleges structural error based on the jury 

instructions used. In support of this claim, he asserts the following:

Structural error has been defined as error that affects the basic 

framework within which the trial proceeds rather than simply an 

error in the trial itself. Forcing Petitioner to proceed to a trial in 

which his interests are not vigorously advocated by an able lawyer 

and [without?] a safeguarded right such as a guaranteed preliminary 

hearing or an unbiased judge is of course structural error. Although 

structural error is impossible to quantify and [defies?] analysis by a 

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harmless error standard. The lack of correct jury instructions, such 

as the presumption of innocence lasts throughout the trial can’t be 

[treated?] as obsolete. It is self evident that jurors are highly 

unlikely to remain impartial after hearing evidence that misleads 

them to believe that releasing this prisoner would mean releasing a 

dangerous person. Guilt can not be established by a defendants 

mere presence at a crime scene and the jury was placed in a 

predicament in which they could only come to one conclusion 

(Portillo) and (Le-Blanc) are reasonable doubt instructions that 

should have been implemented. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) While Petitioner makes reference to claims raised elsewhere in 

his Petition (i.e. ineffective assistance and lack of a preliminary hearing), the Court has 

liberally construed this ground as a asserting a claim based on the jury instructions. 

(Order 6/12/13, Doc. 4 at 2.) Petitioner has not made any objection to this 

characterization. Respondents have adopted a similar limited view (Answer, Doc. 10 at 

16, et seq.), and Petitioner has not opposed that.

In particular, Petitioner argues the lack of instructions on a presumption of 

innocence and reasonable doubt, resulting in his being convicted solely on the basis of 

his presence at the scene.

Respondents argue that the jury received adequate instruction on the presumption 

of innocence and reasonable doubt, even in light of the Arizona Supreme Court’s 

decision in State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995)6. 

Respondents further argue that Petitioner was not entitled to a “reasonable efforts” 

instruction under State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 497, 924 P.2d 441 (1996), which pertained 

only to cases involving an opportunity for the jury to convict on a lesser included 

offense, and no such instructions were requested in this case. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 17-

18.)

Applicable Law - “When considering an allegedly erroneous jury instruction in a 

habeas proceeding, an appellate court first considers whether the error in the challenged 

instruction, if any, amounted to ‘constitutional error.’ ” Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 

826, 833 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 147 (1998)). 

 

6

In Portillo, the Arizona Supreme Court mandated the use of a specific form of 

instruction on reasonable doubt, disapproving the use of the then extant Recommended 

Arizona Jury Instruction 5. 182 Ariz. at 596, 898 P.2d at 974. 

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The fact that a jury instruction is allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis 

for federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). Thus, to the 

extent that the jury instructions were merely violative of a state requirement under the 

Arizona courts’ decisions in Portillo and LeBlanc or for failure to utilize state “R.A.J.I. 

instructions”7, Plaintiff would not be entitled to habeas relief.

“Although the Constitution does not require jury instructions to contain any 

specific language, the instructions must convey both that a defendant is presumed 

innocent until proven guilty and that he may only be convicted upon a showing of proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 820 (9th Cir. 2004), 

overruled on other grounds by Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855 (9th Cir.2009). The 

standards applicable to each instruction are different, however. 

A state prisoner is denied due process if the instructions to the jury fail to require 

that the jury find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sullivan v. 

Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-278 (1993). This requirement arises out of the intersection 

between “the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the 

Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict.” Id. at 278. The failure to provide such 

instruction is structural error. Id. at 281-282. Again, however, “[t]he Constitution does 

not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the 

government's burden of proof.” U.S. v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting U.S. v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.1997).

On the other hand, a court is not always required to give an instruction on the 

presumption of innocence, although the failure to do so may result in a violation of the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it results in the denial of a fair trial. 

Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979). Thus, the absence of such an 

instruction is not deemed to be structural error, but requires a finding of harm based upon 

 

7

The Revised Arizona Jury Instructions are standard jury instructions created by the 

State Bar of Arizona. They are not approved by the Arizona Supreme Court, and their 

use is not mandatory. That court had in the past adopted “Recommended Arizona Jury 

Instructions,” but discontinued doing so in 1996. See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 566, 

20 P.3d 631, 633 (2001). 

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the totality of circumstances. Id. 

Reasonable Doubt Instruction – Here, Petitioner was afforded both a reasonable 

doubt and a presumption of innocence instruction. 

With regard to reasonable doubt, the trial court instructed:

The State has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. This means the State must prove each 

element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt is proof, by the evidence, that leaves you firmly 

convinced of the Defendant's guilt. This standard is higher than the 

standard for either proof by a preponderance of the evidence or 

proof by clear and convincing evidence.

There are very few things in this world that we know with 

absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require 

proof that overcomes every doubt. If, based on your consideration 

of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the Defendant is 

guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the 

other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, 

you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.

(Exhibit B, Final Jury Instruct. at 7.) Thus, the jury was instructed with regard to the 

reasonable doubt requirement. 

It is true that the language utilized did not track word-for-word the instruction 

mandated in Portillo. See Portillo, 182 Ariz. at 596, 898 P.2d at 974.8 However, as 

noted above, only constitutional error justifies habeas relief. Petitioner points to no 

constitutional defect in the instruction given. The Ninth Circuit has upheld similar 

 

8

Portillo adopted the Federal Judicial Center’s Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, and 

mandated the following form:

The state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil cases, it is only necessary to 

prove that a fact is more likely true than not or that its truth is highly 

probable. In criminal cases such as this, the state's proof must be 

more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you 

firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things 

in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal 

cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every doubt. If, 

based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly 

convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you 

must find him/her guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there is a 

real possibility that he/she is not guilty, you must give him/her the 

benefit of the doubt and find him/her not guilty.

182 Ariz. at 596, 898 P.2d at 974.

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language. See United States. v. Velasquez, 980 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir.1992) (“firmly 

convinced”); United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1257–59 (9th Cir.1997) (“firmly 

convinced,” not “every possible doubt,” “real possibility,” “benefit of the doubt.”). 

Presumption of Innocence Instruction - With regard to the presumption of 

innocence, the trial court instructed:

The law does not require a defendant to prove innocence. Every 

defendant is presumed by law to be innocent. You must start with 

the presumption that the defendant is innocent.

(Exhibit B, Final Jury Instruct. at 6.) This instruction tracks the Arizona Pattern Jury 

Instruction adopted by the State Bar of Arizona. RAJI (Criminal) Standard Criminal 5a 

(3rd ed. 2014).

In addition, the trial court instructed:

The State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the 

evidence. The defendant is not required to produce evidence of any

kind. The decision on whether to produce any evidence is left to the

defendant acting with the advice of an attorney. The defendant's 

decision not to produce any evidence is not evidence of guilt.

(Exhibit B, Final Jury Instruct. at 5-6.) 

Again, Petitioner points to no defect in these presumption of innocence

instruction. 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to make any showing that any defect in the instruction 

denied him a fair trial. 

In Taylor, the Supreme Court found a denial of due process from the complete 

lack of a presumption of innocence instruction, but only did so based upon the “Spartan” 

instructions giver overall, a closing argument by the prosecution based on facts not in 

evidence and a call to consider the defendant’s status as a defendant as evidence of guilt, 

and the weakness of the evidence. 436 U.S. at 486-488. Here, Petitioner argues that the 

jury was subjected to “evidence that misleads them to believe that releasing this prisoner 

would mean releasing a dangerous person,” and suggests that the jury was led to believe 

that his “mere presence at a crime scene” established his guilt. 

Petitioner points to nothing in the record to support any misleading evidence 

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about the danger posed by Petitioner. That the undisputed evidence of Petitioner’s 

conduct, namely his stalking, assault and robbery of an elderly victim, and ensuing 

assault on a police officer, might lead to the conclusion that he was dangerous, that does 

not mean the evidence was improper. While the jury was obligated to begin with the 

presumption of evidence, they were not obligated to ignore evidence which overcame it.

Similarly, Petitioner points to nothing to show that the jury was led to convict 

based solely on his presence at the scene. He was not merely some happenstance 

bystander. To the contrary, the prosecution presented credible evidence from the victim 

and/or numerous police officers that Petitioner followed the victim to her home, entered 

the home, assaulted the victim, took her purse, and was captured, the victim’s purse in 

hand, as he attempted to flee the home, while still on the property, and assaulted the 

police officer when he was apprehended.

Moreover, here (in addition to the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt 

instructions) the trial court had painstakingly instructed the jury on, inter alia, their duty 

to decide the case on the evidence (Exhibit B, Final Jury Instruct. at 4), limited solely to 

the evidence produced in court (id. at 5), that the obligation to produce evidence was 

solely the prosecution’s and that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required (id. at 5-

6), and that the officers’ testimony was not entitled to special credence (id. at 9). Further, 

the Court instructed the jury on the required proof for each of the charges. (Id. at 10, et 

seq.) 

In sum, Petitioner points to no portion of the record which would establish that he 

was denied a fair trial as a result of any defect in the presumption of innocence 

instruction. 

Petitioner’s Ground Four is plainly without merit, and must be denied.

G. SUMMARY

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes: (1) that Ground One asserts 

a federal claim, but is without merit; (2) that Grounds Two and Three adequately state 

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claims; and (3) that notwithstanding any purported procedural default, Grounds Two, 

Three and Four are plainly without merit, and thus should be denied on the merits.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set 

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forth herein, the constitutional claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed April 1, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant

/ /

/ /

/ /

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to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: June 20, 2014

13-0644r RR 14 05 21 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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