Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01593/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01593-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID PINO,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LADD, et al., 

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:13cv01593 DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff David Pino (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action. Plaintiff filed his complaint on October 3, 2013. Plaintiff 

names Correctional Lieutenant Ladd, Correctional Sergeant Musselman and Correctional 

Officers Moor, Hernandez, Watson and Lee as Defendants.

1

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

 

1 On November 12, 2013, Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge.

Case 1:13-cv-01593-LJO-DLB Document 7 Filed 03/14/14 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the 

actions or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat 

superior liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 

(9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

Case 1:13-cv-01593-LJO-DLB Document 7 Filed 03/14/14 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Valley State Prison (“VSP”), in Chowchilla, 

California, where the events at issue occurred.

Plaintiff is a Native American inmate at VSP. He alleges that on June 9, 2013, Defendant 

Ladd directed and supervised a search of the Native American sweat lodge. The search was 

conducted by Defendants Musselman, Hernandez, Moor, Lee and Watson. Plaintiff alleges that 

during the search, Defendants, “with malice aforethought and willful intent, deliberately 

destroyed sacred religious artifacts.” Compl. 5. The destroyed artifacts included the fire pit, 

sacred mound, prayer ties and “nests of baby migratory birds.” Compl. 5. Plaintiff alleges that 

the birds were killed.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions caused him to suffer physical and emotional 

anguish, shame and humiliation. He alleges that Defendants’ actions deprived him of his right to 

practice his sacred religious rituals “in full.” Compl. 6. He further alleges that the destruction of 

the sacred Indian religious area “in the manner aforementioned deprives [him] religious practices 

under sacred Indian religious beliefs.” Compl. 6.

Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendment. 

C. ANALYSIS

1. First Amendment

“Inmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive 

that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 

342, 348 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The protections of the Free Exercise 

Clause are triggered when prison officials substantially burden the practice of an inmate’s 

religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent 

with his faith. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 

Case 1:13-cv-01593-LJO-DLB Document 7 Filed 03/14/14 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. A prisoner’s 

right to freely exercise his religion, however, is limited by institutional objectives and by the loss 

of freedom concomitant with incarceration. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deliberately destroyed sacred religious artifacts, 

including the fire pit, sacred mound, prayer ties and a nest of baby migratory birds. He contends 

that this has deprived him of his right to practice “his sacred religious rituals in full at VSP.” 

Compl. 6. However, the First Amendment does not permit Plaintiff to practice his religion “in 

full.” Rather, the First Amendment prevents prison officials from substantially burdening 

Plaintiff’s religious practices.

Plaintiff also states that the destruction of the sacred Indian religious area deprives him of 

practicing his religious beliefs, but this, too, does not suggest that his practice has been 

substantially burdened.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the First Amendment.

2. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 

101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and 

often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of 

pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving 

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth 

Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 

536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

Case 1:13-cv-01593-LJO-DLB Document 7 Filed 03/14/14 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains 

while in prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks 

omitted). To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials 

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 

554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

Although Plaintiff states that Defendants’ actions were cruel and unusual, only extreme 

deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to 

form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). The alleged destruction of Plaintiff’s religious 

property, without more, is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment.

3. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty without the 

procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 

221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake. 

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or 

from state law. Id. The Due Process Clause does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in 

avoiding more adverse conditions of confinement, and under state law, the existence of a liberty 

interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the condition of 

confinement at issue. Id. at 221-23 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84, 115 S.Ct. 

2293 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are 

generally limited to freedom from restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship on 

Case 1:13-cv-01593-LJO-DLB Document 7 Filed 03/14/14 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id. at 221(citing Sandin, 515 U.S. 

at 484) (quotation marks omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff believes that Defendants’ actions imposed an atypical and significant hardship 

on Plaintiff in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. However, insofar as Plaintiff 

points to his alleged inability to practice his religion, his religion claim is properly analyzed 

under the First Amendment. “[W]here a particular amendment provides an explicit textual 

source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that 

Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for 

analyzing a plaintiff's claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.1996) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted). Thus, there is no Fourteenth Amendment due process claim 

regarding his religious practice.

Insofar as Plaintiff claims that the alleged deprivation of his violates the Due Process 

Clause, it is unclear whether Plaintiff contends that the deprivation was authorized or 

unauthorized under prison policies. If he claims the latter, Plaintiff is informed that the Due 

Process Clause is not violated by the random, unauthorized deprivation of property so long as the 

state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 

S.Ct. 3194 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has an 

adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law and therefore, he may not pursue a due 

process claim arising out of the unlawful confiscation of his personal property. Barnett, 31 F.3d 

at 816-17 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§810-895).

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 

1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint. 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

Case 1:13-cv-01593-LJO-DLB Document 7 Filed 03/14/14 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not 

change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 676-77. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim 

under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 1983.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2014 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

3b142a

Case 1:13-cv-01593-LJO-DLB Document 7 Filed 03/14/14 Page 7 of 7