Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00306/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00306-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

David De La Rosa, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Hanger Prosthetics & Orthodics, Inc., et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-11-00306-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants Hanger Prosthetics & Orthodics, Inc., and Hanger Prosthetics & 

Orthodics West, Inc. (collectively “Hanger”), filed a motion for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff David De La Rosa’s workplace discrimination and retaliation complaint. 

Doc. 61. The motion has been fully briefed. Docs. 69, 70. For the reasons that follow, 

the Court will grant Defendants’ motion.1

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff is approximately 40 years old, of Mexican and Jewish ancestry, and 

Jewish in religion. Doc. 68, ¶¶ 39-41; see Doc. 68-1 at 35, Dep. of David De La Rosa, at 

129:19-130:9. Plaintiff began working full time as a soft goods fitter in the Phoenix 

office of Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics in August 2004. Doc. 62, ¶ 1. In 2007, Plaintiff 

began attending Arizona State University, and his then-supervisor, Brandon Dale, agreed 

to reduce his work hours to twenty-one hours per week and to accommodate his school 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court=s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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schedule. Id., ¶ 3. Plaintiff continued to attend school and to receive accommodated 

work schedules until his employment was terminated on May 15, 2010. Id., ¶¶ 4, 25. 

 In October of 2009, Plaintiff called Hanger’s 1-800 compliance hotline and 

reported incidents that he believed created a racist work environment. Id., ¶ 5. Plaintiff 

reported that he had seen a mannequin with a Hitler-style mustache taped to it and posed 

in a Nazi salute in an area where Plaintiff normally did not work, that Brett Bostock, the 

supervisor who replaced Brandon Dale, referred to cleaning crews as “those Mexicans,” 

and that Hangar had hired Mike Gardner, a person with racist tendencies. Doc. 68, ¶ 54. 

Frank Bostock, the manager of Hangar’s operations in Arizona and the father of 

Brett Bostock, met with Plaintiff about his complaints and offered several options, 

including transferring Plaintiff to Hanger’s Glendale office managed by David 

McCalmont. Id., ¶ 6. Plaintiff agreed to the transfer and, after taking some paid time off, 

began working at the Glendale location in mid-November 2009. Id., ¶ 9. 

 While working at Hangar’s Phoenix Office, Plaintiff had been one of only a few 

employees listed to provide “on-call” services to Phoenix Children’s Hospital (“PCH”). 

Id., ¶ 10. Plaintiff lost this extra source of work and income when he transferred to the 

Glendale office. Id., ¶ 11. Plaintiff spoke to Mr. McCalmont about this, and Mr. 

McCalmont offered to add him to the Glendale on-call list. Id., ¶ 13; see De La Rosa 

Depo. at 196:20-198:25 (Doc. 68-1 at 52). Plaintiff also e-mailed Mr. Bostock, saying he 

appreciated what Mr. Bostock had done for him and asking for additional on-call 

opportunities because he was not satisfied with the frequency of rotations available on the 

Glendale list. Doc. 62, ¶ 14. Mr. Bostock replied that the PCH on-call list was 

sufficiently covered, but suggested that Plaintiff ask Mr. McCalmont about providing 

back up coverage for other providers on the Glendale list. Id., ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff claims 

that he would not have accepted transfer to the Glendale office had he known he was to 

be taken off the PCH on-call list, a change that resulted in a $250 loss of income per pay 

period. Doc. 68, ¶ 11. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on 

January 12, 2010, alleging retaliation and discrimination based on national origin and 

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religion. Id., ¶ 7; see Doc. 68-2 at 42. 

 During a six week period in March and April of 2010, while Plaintiff was working 

at the Glendale office, Hangar received four separate complaints about Plaintiff’s work 

from co-workers and patients. Id., ¶ 16. Mr. McCalmont set up a meeting to discuss 

these incidents on May 10, 2010, at which time he presented Plaintiff with a copy of the 

complaints. Id., ¶¶ 17-18 (denied as to motivation for the meeting in Doc. 68, ¶ 17, as to 

the accuracy of the complaints in id., ¶¶ 16, 18). Cecilia Gonzales, an Employee Services 

Field Representative, attended the meeting with Mr. McCalmont and Plaintiff. Doc. 62, 

¶ 19. Mr. McCalmont scheduled a follow-up meeting attended by the same parties on 

May 14, 2010. Id., ¶ 20. At both meetings, Plaintiff denied the validity of the complaints 

against him. Id., ¶ 22. Mr. McCalmont claimed that Plaintiff was belligerent, 

disrespectful, and uncooperative, and terminated Plaintiff’s employment after the meeting 

on May 14, 2010. Id., ¶¶ 21-25. 

Plaintiff disputes that he was belligerent, and claims that the meetings and 

complaints against him were a pretext used by Hangar to retaliate against him for his 

workplace discrimination and retaliation complaints. Doc. 68, ¶¶ 17-23. Plaintiff filed a 

new retaliation charge with the EEOC on May 23, 2010. Doc. 16-1 at 4. 

Plaintiff received a dismissal and right to sue letter from the EEOC on 

November 18, 2010, for his first discrimination and retaliation claims, and a second right 

to sue letter on April 8, 2011, for his second retaliation claim. Id. at 9, 11. Plaintiff 

timely filed suit on the first charges on February 15, 2011. Doc. 1. Plaintiff filed an 

unopposed motion to amend the complaint to include the second retaliation claim on 

July 7, 2011, and the amendment was allowed. Docs. 13, 15. 

II. Summary Judgment Standard. 

 A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 

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evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is also appropriate against a 

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 

trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of 

the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be 

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

III. Discussion. 

 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“complaint”) alleges “racial discrimination, 

national origin discrimination, religious discrimination, and retaliation” by Hangar in 

violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended, and Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, as amended. Doc. 16, ¶ 1. The Court 

will address Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims in turn. 

A. Discrimination. 

 Title VII provides that an employer may not “discriminate against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 

because of such individual’s race, . . . religion, . . . or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). “Similarly, § 1981 prohibits [race] discrimination in the ‘benefits, 

privileges, terms and conditions’ of employment.” Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 

F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)). A plaintiff may establish 

a violation of Title VII or § 1981 by proving that discrimination created a hostile work 

environment. See e.g. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (Title 

VII); Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 840, 797, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (§ 1981). 

 To prevail on his hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show (1) that he 

was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of his national origin, race, or 

religion; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently 

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severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an 

abusive work environment. Kang v. U. Lim America, Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 

2002) (internal quotations omitted); Gregory v. Widnall, 153 F. 3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

 To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate 

Title VII, courts look at all the circumstances, “including ‘the frequency of the 

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or 

a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee=s 

work performance.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) 

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)); see Oncale v. Sundowner 

Offshore Serv’s, 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 

(9th Cir. 2004), 349 F.3d at 642. The same analysis applies to race-based claims under 

42 U.S.C. § 1981. Manatt, 339 F.3d 840 at 797. “The required level of severity or 

seriousness ‘varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.’” 

Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir 2001) (quoting Ellison v. 

Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991)). Simple teasing, offhand comments, and 

isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in 

the terms and conditions of employment. Id.

 The Court’s analysis in this case is made unnecessarily burdensome by the fact 

that Plaintiff has alleged three forms of discrimination – race, national origin, and 

religion – but fails anywhere in his complaint and responsive pleadings to provide an 

articulated basis for any one of these claims. The Court is simply left to guess at which 

factual allegations go with which claims. This process is made even more difficult by the 

fact that the number of distinct claims is potentially unwieldy: racial discrimination 

(Mexican), racial discrimination (Jewish), national origin discrimination (Mexican), 

national origin discrimination (Jewish), and religious discrimination (Jewish). In 

addition, Plaintiff makes allegations in his complaint and numerous assertions in his 

statement of facts and deposition that relate to discriminatory conduct towards 

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individuals of other races, including racial discrimination toward African Americans 

based on the fact that Plaintiff has an adopted daughter who is partially African 

American.2

 The Court will organize its discussion of Plaintiff’s claims into those based 

on racial discrimination (Mexican) and racial and religious discrimination (Jewish).3

 

1. Racial Discrimination (Mexican). 

The complaint alleges that one of Hanger’s employees “made a series of highly 

offensive comments in the workplace regarding Mexicans and Mexican Americans.” 

Id.,¶ 14. In support, Plaintiff cites to his own deposition testimony that he heard Brett 

Bostock once or twice derogatorily refer to cleaning crews as “those Mexicans.” 

Doc. 68, ¶ 55, Doc. 68-1 at 56, Dep. of David De La Rosa, at 216:5-17, 18-23. 

 The complaint also alleges that Hanger “sometimes reprimanded their Hispanic 

employees for speaking Spanish at work” even though speaking Spanish had no negative 

impact on Hanger’s legitimate business interests. Doc. 16, ¶ 11. Plaintiff cites to his 

own deposition in which he testified that two sisters who worked in the hospital 

department “were told they could not speak Spanish anymore.” Doc. 68, ¶ 57. Doc. 68-1 

at 56, Dep. of David De La Rosa, at 216:18-23. Plaintiff did not know who told them this 

or when the alleged incident took place. Doc. 68-1 at 56-57, Dep. of David De La Rosa, 

at 216:18-23; 217:23-25. 

 

2

 Plaintiff cites to a portion of his deposition in which he claims to have taken 

offence upon overhearing Hanger supervisor Brett Bostock comment on an African 

American co-worker’s hair, “What’s up with the greasy black girl look?” Doc. 68, ¶ 59; 

see Doc. 68-1 at 42-43, David De La Rosa Dep. 138-139. 

3

 The Court finds that race is a more appropriate basis for Plaintiff’s claims than national origin because Plaintiff asserts that he is of Mexican and Jewish ancestry (Doc. 16, ¶ 5; see Doc. 68-1 at 35, Dep. of David De La Rosa, 129:19-130:9) and this is a 

racial designation. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. Al-Kharzraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 

(1987) (equating ancestry and ethnic characteristics with race for purposes of § 1981); 

Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642, n. 20 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that a plaintiff’s Title VII national origin discrimination claim based on being Hispanic “is actually a race based claim.”). The fact that Plaintiff designated his claims as national origin rather than race in his charge sheet filed with the EEOC is of little consequence because the allegations supporting Plaintiff’s claims are the same and the Court may consider “any charges of discrimination that are like or reasonably related to the allegations made in the EEOC charge.” Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

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 Plaintiff also points to his deposition testimony regarding the manager at a 

doctor’s office where he made calls for Hanger who “made a bunch of racist comments” 

and had a “racist lingo.” Doc. 68-1 at 42-43, Dep. of David De La Rosa, at 159:2-163:5. 

Plaintiff testified that he complained about the office manager’s conduct to Brett 

Bostock, but he could not remember any exact statements he reported. Id. at 161:16-17. 

He recounts generally reporting that “she used the N word” and “she had no problem 

saying kike.” Id. at 161:22-24. 

 Plaintiff complains that Hanger hired an individual, Mike Gardner, despite the fact 

that two Hanger employees had heard him make racist remarks about African-Americans, 

and, once hired, Mr. Gardner made racist remarks about African-Americans, Hispanics, 

and Jews. Doc. 69 at 12; see Doc. 68, ¶¶ 54, 101, 102, 109. Plaintiff points to the 

deposition testimony of one witness who heard Mr. Gardner make negative remarks 

about blacks, including that black people should not be president, and remarks about 

Hispanics being lazy and on the welfare system. Doc. 68-2, Dep. of William Yule, 16: 4-

16; 19:14-23. Plaintiff cites another witness who testified that Mr. Gardner pointed to her 

Jewish necklace and said “We don’t like your kind.” Doc. 68-2, Dep. of Gretchen 

Wellman, 17:21-25. 

 Taking into account the totality of this evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 

failed to establish that Hanger subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his 

Mexican race. Most of Plaintiff’s factual assertions fail to establish the first element of a 

hostile workplace claim – that Plaintiff was subjected to discriminatory conduct. 

 Plaintiff’s assertion of Spanish language restrictions is based entirely on Plaintiff’s 

account of third-party statements. It fails to provide evidence of what was said and by 

whom, from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Hanger subjected employees to 

language restrictions or did so apart from any legitimate business interest.4

 More 

 

4

 The EEOC’s compliance manual states that “Title VII permits employers to adopt English-only rules under certain circumstances.” EEOC Compliance Manual Sec. 

13-V, EEOCCM § 13-V, 2006 WL 4673359, § 13-V(1). 

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fundamentally, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence that he was adversely affected by 

this alleged incident or that he was subjected to language restrictions. 

 Similarly, evidence that Brett Bostock referred to cleaning crews as “those 

Mexicans,” coupled with Plaintiff’s vague assertions about a non-Hanger office 

manager’s “racist lingo,” and the testimony of other employees about Mike Gardner’s 

racist comments made outside of Plaintiff’s presence, do not provide evidence of any 

verbal conduct directed at Plaintiff. 

 In Manatt, the Ninth Circuit discounted a Chinese plaintiff’s accounts of 

frequently overheard jokes about Chinese people and her co-workers’ mocking references 

to “China man” and “communists from Beijing” as “simple teasing” and “offhand 

comments.” 339 F.3d at 798. The Court of Appeals focused its analysis on the few 

incidents in which employees “direct[ed] their racially insensitive ‘humor’ at Manatt.” 

Id. Plaintiff has provided even less evidence. In Manatt, the plaintiff frequently 

overheard jokes that were derogatory toward her race. Id. at 795. The only statements 

Plaintiff personally overheard were “once or twice” when Brett Bostock referred to 

cleaning crews as “those Mexicans.” Doc. 68-1 at 56, Dep. of David De La Rosa, at 

216:5-17. 

 This evidence falls far short of proving Plaintiff’s allegation that one of Hanger’s 

employees “made a series of highly offensive comments in the workplace regarding 

Mexicans and Mexican Americans.” Doc. 16,¶ 14. Even if these overheard comments 

provide some evidence of conduct offensive toward Plaintiff as an individual, they are 

like the isolated, off-hand comments discussed in Manatt and are not “sufficiently severe 

or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive 

work environment.” Kang v. U. Lim America, Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2002) 

 2. Racial and Religious Discrimination (Jewish). 

 Plaintiff presents testimony in his deposition that he saw a mannequin with a 

Hitler-style mustache taped to it and its arm raised in a Nazi-style salute in the hospital 

department where he occasionally had reason to go. Doc. 68-1 at 39-41, Dep. of David 

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De La Rosa, at 146:1-154:4. Plaintiff testified that he took strong offense because his 

mother is from Germany and his Jewish family was very affected by Hitler and the 

Holocaust. Id. at 146:23-147:6. Plaintiff testified that he saw the mannequin so posed a 

couple of times, all in the same day. Id. at 147:18-22; 153:17-154:4. Plaintiff’s 

testimony is corroborated by Gretchen Wellman, another Jewish employee, who saw the 

mannequin and saw Brett Bostock laugh at it and raise the arm into a Nazi salute. 

Doc. 68-2 at 24-25, Dep. of Gretchen Wellman, 10:23-15:16. Plaintiff presents 

additional testimony that on one occasion, when the Star of David necklace he usually 

wore became visible outside of his shirt, Brett Bostock “looked at it distinctfully” and 

“screwed up his face” and said, “Oh, that’s gaudy.” Doc. 68-1 at 36, Dep. of David De 

La Rosa, at 134:11-135:10. 

 The mannequin incident, even if not specifically directed at Plaintiff, presents 

evidence that Plaintiff was subjected to conduct particularly offensive to someone of 

Jewish ancestry. Plaintiff also presents facts showing that the conduct was unwelcome. 

Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he put the arm down on the mannequin and 

“didn’t want to see it anymore” because “something like that destroyed my family. 

Something like that did terrible things.” Doc. 68-1 at 40, Dep. of David De La Rosa, at 

150:3-4. The remaining question is whether this conduct was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. 

 The offensive display of the mannequin during one day was a singular rather than 

repeated occurrence. In Manatt, the Ninth Circuit was “certainly troubled” by two 

instances of racially-offensive conduct, including offensive gestures and verbal ridicule 

directed at Manatt, and recognized that “these events caused Manatt to suffer pain.” 339 

F.3d at 799. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that “[i]f these actions had occurred 

repeatedly, Manatt may very well have had an actionable hostile environment claim.” Id. 

But the court concluded that “two regrettable incidents occurring over a span of two-anda-half years, coupled with the other offhand remarks made by Manatt’s co-workers and 

supervisor, did not alter the conditions of Manatt’s employment.” Id. 

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 The conduct complained of in this case is less direct and personalized than the 

incidents the Ninth Circuit found insufficient in Manatt. The two incidents in Manatt

were directed at the plaintiff and distinctly mocked her Chinese race and characteristics. 

First, when co-workers saw that Manatt had overheard them laughing and saying “China 

man,” they began pulling back the corners of their eyes to mock the appearance of 

Asians. Id. at 795. Second, co-workers mocked Manatt’s pronunciation of the word 

“Lima;” then, one of them placed a call to an employee in Peru and yelled “China 

woman, China woman, China woman, get your butt over here,” and had her pronounce 

the word over the phone. Id. The co-workers continued to mock Manatt’s pronunciation 

and to say it was “because she’s a China woman.” Id. at 795-96. 

 Plaintiff presents no evidence that the offensively posed mannequin was directed 

at him, and his encounter with the mannequin does not match the frequency or severity of 

the two personalized attacks found insufficient to support a hostile work environment 

claim in Manatt. Other cases in this circuit are in accord. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 643-

44 (finding no hostile work environment where a supervisor made direct, raciallyoffensive statements to a plaintiff on two occasions six months apart); c.f. Draper v. 

Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 f.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding hostile work 

environment where plaintiff’s supervisor made frequent sexual remarks toward plaintiff 

over a two year period); Kang, 296 F.3d at 814, 817 (9th Cir. 2002); (finding sufficient 

evidence of hostile work environment where plaintiff experienced daily verbal abuse and 

multiple incidents of physical abuse.). 

The incident involving Plaintiff’s Star of David necklace adds little weight to 

Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the statement “Oh, that’s 

gaudy” was directed at anything other than the physical appearance of the necklace. 

Gretchen Wellman’s testimony that Mr. Gardner pointed to a Jewish necklace she wore 

and said “We don’t like your kind” also does not alter the Court’s conclusion because 

Plaintiff presents no evidence that he heard or was even aware of this statement. 

 Plaintiff argues that the Court should take into account the cumulative effect of all 

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of his discrimination claims and not segregate its analysis by type of claim. Doc. 69 at 

11.5

 The Court has already aggregated Plaintiff’s claims based on Jewish ancestry and 

Jewish religion because they are factually indistinguishable. Even if the Court were to 

consider all the instances of harassment based on Plaintiff’s Mexican ancestry, this would 

not add significantly to the total effect of the discriminatory conduct directed at Plaintiff. 

As the Court’s analysis of those instances above makes clear, such an approach would, at 

most, result in the addition of only a few isolated incidents of offhand comments not 

directed toward Plaintiff. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to create an issue of material fact 

that he was subjected to discriminatory conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 

the conditions of his employment and create an abusive work environment. The Court 

accordingly will grant summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s discrimination 

claims. 

B. Retaliation. 

 A plaintiff makes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation by producing evidence 

that he engaged in activity protected by Title VII, that the employer subjected him to a 

materially adverse action, and that there was a causal link between the protected activity 

and the adverse action. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 

(2006); Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2004); Lyons v. England, 

307 F.3d 1092, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 

2000). The Ninth Circuit “has explained that . . . ‘the requisite degree of proof necessary 

to establish a prima facie case for Title VII on summary judgment is minimal and does 

 

5

 Plaintiff bases this argument on the Ninth Circuit’s finding in Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F. 3d 1551, 1552 (9th Cir. 1994), that it was error for the district court to 

bisect its analysis according to a plaintiff’s sex and race. Doc. 69 at 11. But as Hanger points out, Lam was a disparate impact case that looked at whether an adverse hiring decision involving an Asian female was the product of discrimination, not at whether a 

plaintiff had proven separate theories of a hostile workplace claim. See Doc. 70 at 3. 

Plaintiff also relies on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F. 3d 506, 

515 (6th Cir. 1999), which noted that it was difficult to segregate a plaintiff’s discrimination claims on the basis of his being a black Muslim because some instances of 

discrimination linked these two traits. Id. Plaintiff has not presented evidence of 

incidents directed at both his Mexican and Jewish ancestry. 

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not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.’” Villiarimo v. 

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wallis v. J.R. 

Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 

(9th Cir. 1987) (same). 

 If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the 

defendant to present a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment 

action. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928. If the defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff 

“must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason advanced by 

the [defendant] was a pretext.” Id. The plaintiff may do so by presenting either direct 

evidence or specific and substantial circumstantial evidence that the defendant=s reason 

was a pretext for retaliation. See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062; Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, 

Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 The complaint alleges that after Plaintiff complained about the discriminatory 

work environment at Hanger, Hanger took a number of actions that constituted a “pattern 

of retaliation” against him. Doc. 16, ¶¶ 16-17. These include that Hanger supervisors 

told Plaintiff if he did not like the work environment he could either quit or be 

transferred; after Plaintiff was transferred, some of his work duties and compensation 

were taken away; hair was placed in Plaintiff’s lunch at work; Plaintiff was subjected to 

increased surveillance and unfair performance reviews; and Hangar terminated Plaintiff’s 

employment based on false accusations of misconduct. Id., ¶¶ 19-21; 23-24. 

 Hanger does not dispute that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when he 

complained about discriminatory conduct by calling Hanger’s compliance hotline, 

speaking to Frank Bostock, and filing charges with the EEOC. Hangar’s arguments 

center instead on Plaintiff’s failure to show adverse employment actions that are causally 

linked to Plaintiff’s complaints. Doc. 61 at 14. 

 As with his discrimination claims, Plaintiff fails to provide an articulated basis for 

each of the retaliation claims alleged in the complaint. His response to the summary 

judgment motion directly addresses only two bases for retaliation – Plaintiff’s loss of onCase 2:11-cv-00306-DGC Document 72 Filed 09/04/12 Page 12 of 17
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call pay and his termination. Doc. 69 at 14. Of these, Plaintiff attempts to show a causal 

link only to his termination. Id. at 14-17. The Court is not required to construct 

arguments or locate evidence for Plaintiff. Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 

1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001); see also Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996) 

(the district court has no responsibility on summary judgment to “scour the record in 

search of a genuine issue of triable fact”). As a result, the Court will address the causal 

nexus only for his termination. 

 Plaintiff’s theory of retaliatory discharge is based on the fact that his protected 

communications included complaints about Mr. Bostock’s son, and an assertion that Mr. 

McCalmont – the sole decision-maker in Plaintiff’s termination – conspired with Mr. 

Bostock to terminate Plaintiff in retaliation. Doc. 68, ¶¶ 62, 85. This theory is based 

entirely on speculation. The fact that Mr. McCalmont was a friend of a superior who 

may have had a reason to retaliate against Plaintiff for his complaints is not sufficient to 

show a causal link between those complaints and Mr. McCalmont’s actions. Plaintiff has 

had the opportunity for full discovery, and beyond his own deposition testimony asserting 

that it is was “common knowledge” that Mr. Bostock and Mr. McCalmont were “great 

friends” and part of an “old regime” (see Doc. 68-1 at 70, Dep. of David De La Rosa, at 

272:15-25), he has produced no evidence from which a jury could infer that Mr. Bostock 

influenced or was in any way involved in Mr. McCalmont’s decision to terminate 

Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff attempts to show that Mr. McCalmont was aware of the substance of his 

discrimination complaints through Mr. Bostock. He points to evidence that Mr. Bostock 

remained in contact with Mr. McCalmont about Plaintiff’s progress after his transfer to 

the Glendale office. Doc. 69, ¶ 7. This evidence includes an email from Mr. Bostock to 

Plaintiff following his transfer stating: “I have stayed in contact with David McCalmont 

and he has indicated that you seem to be happy working with him and his staff” (Doc. 68-

2 at 36), and Plaintiff’s testimony that Mr. McCalmont told him he was communicating 

regularly with Mr. Bostock regarding Plaintiff and his job performance (Doc. 68-1 at 71, 

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Dep. of David De La Rosa, at 273:7-11). But this evidence does not show that Mr. 

Bostock held a grudge against Plaintiff for complaining about his son or that he ever 

communicated anything to Mr. McCalmont about Plaintiff’s complaints. 

Plaintiff also cites to his deposition testimony in which he claims to have told Mr. 

McCalmont about his discrimination complaints (Doc. 68, ¶ 7), but the testimony 

Plaintiff cites does not support this assertion. Plaintiff testified that he “believe[d]” he 

spoke to Mr. McCalmont about the mannequin incident, but he does not remember when 

and does not “have a lot of recollection” about the conversation. Doc. 68-1 at 54-55, 

Dep. of David De La Rosa, at 208:5-209:16. 

Plaintiff argues that Mr. McCalmont admitted in his warning letter before the 

termination that he knew Plaintiff had made a discrimination complaint against Hanger. 

Doc. 68, ¶ 7. But the letter indicates only that Plaintiff accused Mr. McCalmont of 

retaliation during the first meeting Mr. McCalmont held to discuss the four complaints 

about Plaintiff’s work performance. In relevant part, the letter states, 

Rather than participate in a solution-focused discussion of 

what you can do to address and correct how you interact with others, you became belligerent and rejected my legitimate 

comments, labeling my efforts as some kind of reaction to a 

discrimination complaint that you have against Hanger. I am not involved in that matter. 

Doc. 68-2 at 39-40. This statement, made in response to Plaintiff’s accusation, does not 

show that Mr. McCalmont had prior knowledge of Plaintiff’s discrimination complaints 

or had any reason to retaliate against Plaintiff for making them. Any knowledge Plaintiff 

may have imparted to Mr. McCalmont in the form of accusations at the first meeting 

occurred after Mr. McCalmont had received the complaints that Plaintiff claims were 

trumped up as a reason to terminate him. Plaintiff’s theory simply does not work. If Mr. 

McCalmont learned about Plaintiff’s protected conduct from Plaintiff at their first 

meeting to address the complaints, then the complaints could not have been instigated by 

McCalmont in retaliation for the protected activity as Plaintiff alleges. 

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 Plaintiff makes a final argument that his termination is per se grounds for a prima 

facie case of retaliation because it took place less than four months after Plaintiff filed his 

charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Doc. 69 at 17. Plaintiff relies on Coszalter v. 

City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2003), which states that, “[d]epending on the 

circumstances, three to eight months is easily within a time range that can support an 

inference of retaliation.” But Coszalter did not hold, as Plaintiff argues, that temporal 

proximity is a per se ground for a prima facie case of retaliation. In fact, the court 

proceeded to caution that “[a] rule that any period over a certain time is per se too long 

(or, conversely, a rule that any period under a certain time is per se short enough) would 

be unrealistically simplistic.” Id. at 977-78. 

 The Ninth Circuit has stated that “in some cases, causation can be inferred from 

timing alone” if the alleged retaliation follows “on the heels of protected activity.” 

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). But cases that 

have found a period of months between protected activity and alleged retaliation 

sufficient for a prima facie case have, at a minimum, relied on an additional showing of 

knowledge of, or some kind of involvement in, the protected activity on the part of the 

decision-maker. See, e.g., Miller v. Fairchild Indus. Inc., 797 F.2d 727, (9th Cir. 1986) 

(finding evidence that management personnel responsible for layoffs had also 

participated in EEOC negotiations and knew of the plaintiffs’ protected activity less than 

two months earlier was “sufficiently probative . . . to establish a prima facie case”); 

Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (inferring causation where 

adverse employment actions took place less than three months after Yartzoff’s complaint 

where his supervisors were aware of his Title VII charges and his participation in 

administrative investigations); Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 

869-70 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding causal link where alleged retaliation followed within 

months of protected activity where supervisor told employee he knew of her complaint 

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and that it “would not be in her best interests” for her to file a discrimination charge).6 

Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has stated that lack of knowledge of a plaintiff’s protected 

activity on the part of the decision-maker “breaks the requisite causal link.” Cohen, 686 

F.2d at 797. 

 Here, Plaintiff provides no evidence beyond speculation that Mr. McCalmont 

knew of Plaintiff’s protected activity when events allegedly were set in motion to 

terminate him. The fact that Plaintiff complained about Mr. Bostock’s son and Mr. 

Bostock communicated with Mr. McCalmont about Plaintiff’s welfare after the transfer is 

simply insufficient to show that Mr. Bostock told Mr. McCalmont of Plaintiff’s protected 

activity or conspired with McCalmont to retaliate against Plaintiff. Mr. McCalmont 

testified that he was not involved in the events leading up to Plaintiff’s transfer and was 

not provided details about the circumstances surrounding that request. Doc. 62-2 at 2, ¶ 

3. Plaintiff provides no evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff’s testimony that he “believed” 

he told Mr. McCalmont about the mannequin incident is not sufficient to create a genuine 

issue of fact for trial. And the fact that Plaintiff claimed retaliation in his first meeting 

with McCalmont to discuss complaints does not show that McCalmont had knowledge of 

Plaintiff’s protected activity when, under Plaintiff’s theory, the complaints were trumped 

up to provide a pretext for his termination. 

Plaintiff has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

conclude that McCalmont knew of his protected activity. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

Because a decision-maker’s lack of knowledge about protected activity “breaks the 

requisite causal link,” Cohen, 686 F.2d at 797, the Court will grant summary judgment to 

Defendants on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 61) is granted. 

 

6 Strother involved charges brought under California law, but the same threepronged requirement for showing a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII applied. 79 F.3d 859 at 868. 

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 2. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 4th day of September, 2012. 

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