Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01893/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01893-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Contract Dispute

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

E-Filed 9/22/15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST FINANCIAL SECURITY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

FREEDOM EQUITY GROUP, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01893-HRL 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 10

First Financial Security, Inc. (“FFS”) sues Freedom Equity Group, LLC (“FEG”) for

intentional interference with contract as well as related violations of California’s Unfair 

Competition Law (“UCL”). FFS bases its claims on allegations that FEG induced approximately 

1,400 sales contractors to leave FFS and join FEG en masse. FEG moves under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 10. FFS 

opposes the motion. The parties have expressly consented to magistrate jurisdiction. The court 

has considered the arguments in the parties’ briefs and the arguments heard on September 1, 2015. 

The court denies the motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the 

complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is appropriate where 

there is no cognizable legal theory or there are insufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable 

legal theory. Id. (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

The court assumes the truth of factual allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to 

the claimant. Id. But the court may disregard conclusions not supported by underlying factual 

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allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663-64 (2009). The court then draws upon its 

“experience and common sense” to answer a “context-specific” question: do the alleged facts 

support a plausible claim? Id. 

Alleged facts do not support a plausible claim when the defendant offers a plausible 

alternative explanation that is consistent with the alleged facts. Eclectic Properties East, LLC v. 

Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases and discussing 

pleading standards). The alleged facts must provide the opposing party fair notice and an 

opportunity to defend itself effectively, and those facts must suggest it would be fair to subject the 

opposing party to the expense of defending against the claim. Id.

An interference with contract claim has five elements: (1) a valid contract between the 

plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the contract; (3) the defendant’s 

intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption; (4) actual breach or disruption of the 

contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damages. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & 

Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126 (1990). The third element does not require specific intent; instead, the 

plaintiff must show intentional acts that were “certain or substantially certain” to induce a breach 

or disruption. Davis v. Nadrich, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1, 10 (2009) (as modified May 21, 2009). Acts 

that “induce a . . . disruption” of contract include acts that do not actually cause breach, but still 

impede contract performance. Shamblin v. Berge, 166 Cal. App. 3d 118, 122 (1985).

The UCL applies when the claimant is harmed by business practices that are also illegal 

acts. See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 

180 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

FEG concedes in its reply that FFS plausibly alleges most of the elements in the claim for 

intentional contract interference. Dkt. No. 17 at 1-2. FEG maintains only that FFS failed to 

plausibly allege the third element: intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption. Id.

FFS argues, however, that the complaint contains several specific accusations of intentional 

conduct by FEG that was substantially certain to induce breaches and disruptions in the contracts 

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between FFS and its sales contractors. Dkt. No. 14 at 5-6. 

Indeed, several specific factual allegations support FFS’s argument. The contracts 

between FFS and its contractors contained non-compete clauses. Dkt. No. 1, Exh. A at 4. FFS

alleges: (1) an FEG principal met with Moua and Lee in January 2014; (2) the purpose of the 

meeting was to encourage a mass-defection of the sales contractors who worked under Moua and 

Lee; (3) Moua and Lee began to agitate against FFS for higher compensation in March and April 

of 2014; (4) FEG provided both legal and non-legal advice about how the contractors should 

resign from FFS; (5) many members of Moua and Lee’s team sent their resignations to FFS on 

May 10, 2014, while they met in Moua and Lee’s home; (6) FEG drafted the language the 

defectors used to resign; (7) FEG waived its customary $250 enrollment fee for defectors from 

FFS; and (8) the defectors assumed the same management hierarchy at FEG that they had used at 

FFS. Dkt. No. 1 at 10-13. These alleged facts plausibly show that FEG’s intentional acts were 

substantially certain to induce breaches and interferences in contracts between FFS and its 

contractors.

Since FEG conceded that the other four elements of intentional contract interference have 

been plausibly pled, FFS has plausibly alleged each element of intentional interference with 

contract. 

FEG provides an alternative explanation of what happened: Moua and Lee “decided on 

their own” to bring their team to a different brokerage firm. Dkt. No. 17 at 3. This explanation 

cannot defeat plausible allegations of contract interference because it is not consistent with them. 

See Eclectic, supra.

The UCL claim is plausible because an illegal business practice—intentional interference 

with contract—has been plausibly alleged as a sufficient predicate. The alleged facts provide FEG 

with fair notice and an opportunity to defend itself effectively against FFS’s claims. The alleged 

facts also show it would be fair to subject FEG to the expense of defending against these plausible 

claims.

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CONCLUSION

The motion to dismiss is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/22/15

________________________

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

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