Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-04038/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-04038-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JAMES LOREN FOSTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner, United States Social

Security Administration,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 12-CV-4038-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Kenneth D. Hampton, attorney for Plaintiff James Loren Foster, has moved for an

award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $8,500.47. He has

reached this figure by subtracting $6,000, the amount that the Commissioner granted for

administrative fees, from $14,500.47, which was 25% of the claimant’s past benefits.

The Commissioner does not oppose the motion. The court has undertaken its duty to

independently consider whether the proposed fee award is reasonable and concludes that

it is. The motion is due to be GRANTED.

Subparagraph 406(b)(1)(A) provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment

favorable to a [represented] claimant . . .the court may determine and allow . . . a

1

FILED

 2016 May-31 PM 02:47

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:12-cv-04038-VEH Document 15 Filed 05/31/16 Page 1 of 6
reasonable [attorney’s fee], not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due

benefits.” Where the claimant and his attorney have executed a contingent-fee agreement,

the Supreme Court has interpreted subsection 406(b) as requiring district courts to

conduct a two-step analysis. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002). First

comes the simple step of calculating whether the requested award falls “within the 25

percent limit.” Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010).

If so, the agreement is presumptively reasonable. In step two, the court is required to

consider whether “the fee sought is [actually] reasonable for the services rendered,”

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807, and, if not, the presumption is overcome. Where the

presumption is overcome, the court may award a fee that is reasonable in its judgment.

See id.

This standard is skeletal, see id. at 809 (Scalia, J., dissenting), but the courts of

appeals have put some meat on Gisbrecht’s bones.

1 The lodestar figure, while not

dispositive, may be compared against the contingent fee award. Id. at 808. “[C]ourts may

reduce the requested fee if the representation has been substandard, if the attorney has

been responsible for delay, or if the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of

1 Given the year in which Gisbrecht was decided (2002), it may be more temporally

accurate to say that the Supreme Court stripped the flesh from the standards set forth by the courts

of appeals. Either way, Gisbrecht only really purported to resolve a circuit split over whether

contingency agreements or the lodestar were the appropriate means of determining attorney’s fees

under the Social Security Act.

2

Case 5:12-cv-04038-VEH Document 15 Filed 05/31/16 Page 2 of 6
time the attorney spent on the case.” Jackson, 601 F.3d at 1271 (citation omitted).

Substandard representation, among other things, includes a complaint “submitted on

boilerplate pleadings,” where “no issues of material fact are present,” and where “no legal

research is apparent.” Rodriquez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 747 (6th Cir. 1989).

The reasonable fee reflects an enhancement, compared to the market rate for

similar work, based on the risk of non-payment, because “payment for an attorney in a

social security case is inevitably uncertain.” Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 370–71

(2d Cir. 1990). On the other hand, the quality of counsel and hours expended are weak

factors for assessing an award’s reasonableness; they “bear little if any relationship to the

results [i.e., award amount] achieved.” Rodriquez, 865 F.2d at 747. But the award must

not be so disproportionate to the work performed that it gives the perception that counsel

has won the Social Security lottery. McGuire v. Sullivan, 873 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.

1989) (prohibiting a “windfall”); cf. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542

(2010) (fee shifting statutes do not exist to enrich counsel); BMW of North America,

Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 631 (Ala. 1994) (Houston, J., concurring specially), rev’d

on other grounds, 517 U.S. 559 (warning of the perception of the right to trial by jury

as “Alabama’s lottery”).

Certain policy considerations should also inform the court’s judgment. Section

406 was enacted “to encourage effective legal representation of claimants by insuring

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Case 5:12-cv-04038-VEH Document 15 Filed 05/31/16 Page 3 of 6
lawyers that they will receive reasonable fees.” Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1195

(5th Cir. 1970).

2 Contingent fees, in particular, “provide[] a critical incentive for able

attorneys to practice in the social security field.” Wells, 907 F.2d at 371. At the same

time, the court’s review is the only bulwark for impecunious and disabled claimants, see

Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006), against the

gutting of their statutory entitlement by the “specialized Social-Security bar [that]

charges uniform contingent fees (the statutory maximum of 25%), which are presumably

presented . . . on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 812 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).

Applying the foregoing principles here, the court finds a valid contingent fee

agreement set at or below the statutory maximum contingency. (See doc. 13-1 at 12).

Proceeding to step two, Hampton recorded his hours as follows:

Date Activity Time

5/20/09 Initial Interview with Client, Initial file opening letter to client 0

3

11/25/12 Received decision from the Appeals Council that affirms decision of

ALJ. Drafted Summons, Complaint, SSAN letter, and civil cover sheet.

1.3

2 This is binding authority in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala.,

661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close

of business on September 30, 1981 are binding on all federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit).

3 This was included in the administrative fee petition request

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Case 5:12-cv-04038-VEH Document 15 Filed 05/31/16 Page 4 of 6
12/6/12 Filed the Summons and Complaint with the Clerk of Court in Hunstville.

Filing fee was $350.00. Service Mailed. Letter to the Client with a copy

of the Summons, Complaint, and Civil Cover sheet and explaining the

appeal process from this point forward.

.5

3/6/13 Received the Answer, Transcript, and Briefing Letter Electronically.

Downloaded the documents and reviewed the answer and briefing letter.

.9

4/13/13 In depth review of the file 6

4/14–15/13 Partial drafting of the Plaintiff’s brief 10

4/19/13 Completed drafting the plaintiff’s Brief. Converted brief to a PDF format

and electronically filed the Brief with the Court. Letter to the client with

a copy of the Brief and explaining the remainder of the Briefing

Schedule. Converted Brief to WordPerfect format. Email to Judge

Hopkins Chambers with a copy of the WordPerfect format Brief.

4.6

6/1/13 Reviewed the Commissioner’s Brief. Drafted the Plaintiff’s Reply

Memorandum

5

6/2/13 Converted the Plaintiff’s Reply brief to both PDF and WordPerfect

Formats. Electronically filed the PDF version with the Court using the

ECF systems. E-mail to Judge Hopkins Chambers with the WordPerfect

version. Letter to the Client with a copy of the Reply Brief and explaining

that the briefing is concluded and that the case is submitted to Judge

Hopkins for decision.

1.3

9/24/13 Explained to the client that I do not know when the Judge will make a

decision, but I do not expect it at least until November, 2013.

.3

2/17/14 Client called and I explained that we do not have a decision issued as of

today, but that I expect a decision to be issued at anytime since the last

brief was filed in June, 2013.

.3

3/28/14 Received a decision from the United States District Court that reverses

the original decision and sends it back for a new hearing on the new

evidence submitted to the Appeals Council. The decision Grants an

Extension to file a Fee Petition until after the approval of any

administrative fee. Letter to the client with a copy of the Final Order and

Memorandum Opinion and requesting that he advise us of any new or

additional medical treatment.

.7

2/16/16 Received an authorization to Charge $6000.00 for the work at the

Administrative Level.

.1

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Case 5:12-cv-04038-VEH Document 15 Filed 05/31/16 Page 5 of 6
TOTAL 31.0

Thirty-one hours to complete a social security appeal is a reasonable number,

especially where, as here, the plaintiff filed a reply brief. As for the lodestar, $8500.47

divided over 31 hours comes out to about $275 per hour. Although the court is of the

opinion that $250 per hour is a more accurate reflection of the market rate in this district

for this kind of work, the required enhancement for the uncertainty of recovery makes

$275 per hour well within the realm of reasonableness. Additionally, the plaintiff’s

filings were above average quality compared to the social security filings in this district.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. It is ORDERED that attorney’s fees in

the amount of $8500.47 be awarded to Kenneth D. Hampton.

DONE this 31st day of May, 2016.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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