Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05251/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05251-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN R. MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

M.D. LUNES, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04-5251 AWI SMS P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DENY MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT IN PART AND GRANT IN PART

(Doc. 39-1) 

 John R. Martinez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

A. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action is proceeding on the Complaint filed on February 6, 2004, against

Correctional Officers M.D. Lunes and M.G. Chamalbide for retaliation and deliberate

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

On December 1, 2006, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 39.) 

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion on January 24, 2007. 

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a Summary Judgment Motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 The following facts are undisputed for the purpose of this Motion. 

1

3

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at

trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Rule 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must

be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out

of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.

Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine

issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. UNDISPUTED FACTS1

1. Plaintiff is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) pursuant to a valid judgment in the Orange County Superior

Court for conviction of murder in the second degree and two counts of attempted

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

murder in the second degree. Plaintiff is serving a term of 26 years to life. 

2. Plaintiff was housed in the Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”) at times material to the

matters at issue in this action. 

3. Defendants Lunes and Chamalbide were Correctional Officers at CSP-Corcoran at

times material to the matters at issue in this action. 

4. On December 17, 2001, Plaintiff was validated as an associate of the Mexican Mafia

(“EME”) prison gang. 

5. Pursuant to§ 3312 of the California Code of Regulations, when a staff member

observes minor misconduct, that misconduct can be handled by verbal counseling. 

When verbal counseling achieves corrective action, a written report of the misconduct

or counseling is unnecessary. 

6. When similar minor misconduct recurs after verbal counseling or if documentation of

minor misconduct is needed, a description of the misconduct and counseling provided

shall be documented on a CDC Form 128-A, Custodial Counseling Chrono. A copy

of the completed form shall be provided to the inmate and the original placed in the

inmate’s central file. 

7. On January 12, 2003, Defendant Chamalbide authored a Counseling Chrono

(“Chrono”) documenting the incident she allegedly had observed between Plaintiff

and his cellmate, Radillo on October 15, 2002. 

8. Plaintiff was not subjected to any disciplinary action because of the placement of the

Chrono in his central file. 

D. ANALYSIS

1. Summary of Complaint

Plaintiff states that he is a jailhouse lawyer. In December 2002, Defendant Lunes

confronted inmate Vizcarra whom Plaintiff was assisting in his capacity as a jailhouse lawyer. 

Defendant Lunes asked Vizcarra whether Plaintiff was helping him with the grievance he had

filed against him. Vizcarra confirmed that Plaintiff helped him. On approximately December

22, 2002, inmate Rodriguez informed Plaintiff that Defendant Chamalbide asked him to warn

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiff to be careful because the Institutional Gang Investigator (“IGI”) was asking about him. 

On December 23, 2002, Defendant Lunes approached Plaintiff’s living quarters and took

Plaintiff to another area to give him a package. Plaintiff states that Defendant Lunes told him he

knew that Plaintiff was helping other inmates file 602s (grievances) and was assisting inmate

Vizcarra with a grievance he filed against him. Defendant Lunes then told Plaintiff in a “low

threatening voice” that there was a Chrono going around showing Plaintiff and his cellmate

(“cellie”) (inmate Radillo) in an “act.” Defendant Lunes stated that he didn’t care but it was

Plaintiff’s “homies” he had to worry about should they find out. 

On or about January 5, 2003, Defendant Chamalbide told inmate Rodriguez, another

EME gang member, that she had recently caught a pair of inmates at sex play and asked whether

that was a “bad thing.” 

On January 12, 2003, at approximately 5:00 a.m., Defendant Chamalbide approached

Plaintiff’s cell and woke him up. She informed him that she was going to have to write him up

and when Plaintiff inquired as to why, she said that the “squad (IGI) was making her” do it. 

When Plaintiff asked what she meant, she responded that the squad wanted him in trouble and

was making her write him up because it was her last day. 

Later that day, Defendant Chamalbide told inmate Rodriguez she was being pressured to

write Plaintiff up for the sexual behavior she had previously told him about. 

On January 14, 2003, Plaintiff was given a CDC 128A Counseling Chrono which was

written by Defendant Chamalbide. In this Chrono, Defendant Chamalbide states that on October

15, 2002, she saw Plaintiff“‘grasping’ his cellie’s ‘erect penis” while his cellies boxer shorts

were partially removed and that she ordered him to ‘stop it’ to which he complied.” (Compl. at

5.) Defendant Chamalbide states also that reason the Chrono was being issued late was because

her first line supervisor informed her of the importance of documenting this type of information. 

Plaintiff alleges that the contents of the Chrono are false in that he never participated in such an

act. Plaintiff also states that a fact finding investigation conducted by Sgt. D.K. Beebe revealed

that it was Defendant Lunes who asked Defendant Chamalbide to write the Chrono. 

Plaintiff alleges that on February 26, 2003, while in the law library, he encountered

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Although Defendants also present argument regarding a denial of due process with respect to the issuance 2

of the chrono, this Court did not order service of the Complaint for a claim of due process. (Court Doc. 8) Thus, the

Court does not address the due process issue in these Findings and Recommendations.

6

Defendant Lunes and told him that the next time he had a Correctional Officer (“C/O”) falsify a

chrono to make sure that they didn’t inform him of it. Plaintiff states that Lunes told him “I told

you if you front me off I’m gonna do you wrong.” 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Chamalbide and Lunes retaliated against him for his

jailhouse lawyer activities by issuing a false chrono and then relaying that information to another

gang member for the purpose of putting him in danger. Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants

were deliberately indifferent to his safety when they relayed the contents of the Chrono to other

gang members. 

2. Claims for Relief2

a. Retaliation 

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support claim under Section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288

(9th Cir.2003). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The

court must " 'afford appropriate deference and flexibility' to prison officials in the evaluation of

proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory." Pratt v. Rowland,

65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482, 115 S.Ct. 2293 

(1995)). The burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate "that there were no legitimate correctional

purposes motivating the actions he complains of." Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808.

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept as

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees,

425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,

421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The federal system is one of notice pleading. Galbraith

v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard

applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions,” none of which apply to section 1983 actions. 

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to

Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. Discovery and

summary judgment motions - not motions to dismiss - “define disputed facts” and “dispose of

unmeritorious claims.” Id. at 512. “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail

but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear

on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” 

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin,

262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not

be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In this case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation

because he does not allege specific facts in the Complaint regarding his retaliation and Eighth

Amendment claims. With respect to the retaliation claim, Defendants contend that the issuance

of a “Chrono” is not an adverse action, that Plaintiff’s rights were not “chilled,” Plaintiff did not

suffer any harm and documenting Plaintiff’s misconduct advanced a reasonable correctional goal. 

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) the Court has a statutory duty to

screen complaints in cases such as this and dismiss any claims that fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Given the

requirements of the PLRA, the Court is disinclined to view with favor a subsequent motion

seeking dismissal for failure to state a claim. In this case, the screening function was performed

by the Court and an Order finding that Plaintiff stated a cognizable retaliation claim and Eighth

Amendment failure to protect claim issued on May 3, 2005. Further, the Court finds Defendants

new arguments regarding whether the Complaint states a claim for retaliation unpersuasive. 

Defendants argue that the issuance of a “Chrono” is not an adverse action because

Plaintiff was not subjected to “disciplinary action.” (Motion at 6:17-20.) Defendants later

contradict this statement by citing to the California Code of Regulations and stating that the

issuance of a Counseling Chrono is a “disciplinary method used to document minor misconduct.”

(Motion at 6:13-14.) Regardless of whether a Chrono is disciplinary in nature, Defendants cite to

no authority that an “adverse” action must be disciplinary in nature. On the contrary, Ninth

Circuit authority holds that the threat of discipline or transfer for the plaintiff's exercise of his

First Amendment rights is sufficient adverse action to state a claim. See Gomez v. Vernon, 255

F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.2001); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1141 (9th

Cir.1989). Thus, the fact that Plaintiff was not “subjected to disciplinary action” does not

support Defendant’s assertion that no “adverse action” was taken against him. 

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not “chilled.” 

However, again, the proper inquiry is not whether an actual chilling took place, but whether an

official's acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment

activities. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir.2005) (finding speech can be chilled

even when not completely silenced). 

Defendants next assert that Plaintiff suffered no harm. The Ninth Circuit has held that an

inmate who has been labeled a “snitch” is subject to serious harm. Valandingham v. Bojorquez,

866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9 Cir. 1989). Similarly, the documentation of an incident Plaintiff th

alleges did not occur and the relaying of that information to Plaintiff’s fellow gang members is

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

sufficient harm to state a cognizable claim for retaliation. 

Finally, Defendants argue that documenting Plaintiff’s misconduct advanced a reasonable

correctional goal because the safety and security of the institution requires monitoring and

documenting the conduct of gang members and their associates. (Motion at 7:1:-6.) In screening

the Complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations must be viewed in the context of Plaintiff’s claims of

retaliation. Actions which may not be actionable in themselves may support a claim of

retaliation where the defendant was retaliating against the prisoner for exercising a constitutional

right and retaliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the defendant’s acts or conduct. 

See, Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84, 97 S.Ct. 568 (1977)

(Retaliation by state actor for exercise of constitutional right actionable under § 1983 even if the

acts, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper or at least not unconstitutional.) 

Thus, while documenting gang activity and the resulting issuance of a Chrono in and of itself

may be proper, an allegation that it was done solely to retaliate against an inmate for exercise of

his First Amendment right is sufficient to satisfy notice-pleading. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46 (1957) (Rule 8(a) expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader need

only give the opposing party fair notice of a claim.) 

Here, Plaintiff clearly alleges in the Complaint that Defendant Lunes inquired into

Plaintiff’s activities in assisting another inmate file a grievance against him in December of 2002. 

Defendant Lunes stated at that time that there was a Chrono going around regarding Plaintiff’s

prohibited sexual activity and that Plaintiff needed to worry about his “homies” finding out.

(Compl. at 3.) Defendant Chamalbide later informed Plaintiff that her “squad” IGI, was making

her write him up and that the squad “wants you in trouble.” (Compl. at 4.) After the Chrono

issued on January 12, 2003, for events that allegedly occurred the prior October, Defendant

Lunes stated to Plaintiff “I told you if you front me off I’m gonna do you wrong.” (Compl. at 6.) 

The allegations in the complaint sufficiently state a claim for retaliation as it does not appear

beyond a doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would

entitled him to relief. Accordingly, the Court will RECOMMEND that the Motion for dismissal

for failure to state a claim be DENIED.

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Mr. Radillo states that on the evening of January 12, 2003, Defendant Chamalbide entered the cell he 3

occupied with Plaintiff and told Plaintiff that she was writing him up. Id. According to Radillo, Defendant

Chamalbide stated that the “squad” was making her write Plaintiff up against her will. When Plaintiff inquired

further, Radillo states that Defendant Chamalbide said she thought that the squad wanted him in trouble. Id. 

According to Radillo, Chamalbide also stated that she really didn’t want to do it but that her job depended on it, that

it was her last day and that she was sorry. Id.

10

To the extent Defendants are seeking summary judgment on the retaliation claims, the

Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing that there exists no

disputed issue of fact warranting trial. Although Defendants attempt to establish that there is no

dispute as to the legitimacy of documenting the alleged sexual misconduct, Plaintiff provides

evidence to dispute such legitimacy and also that the misconduct occurred. 

The California Code of Regulations, on which both parties rely, provides that inmate

misconduct shall be handled by verbal counseling and when verbal counseling achieves the

corrective action, a written report of the misconduct is unnecessary. (15 Cal.Code Regs.

§§ 3312.) Plaintiff provides the Court with Defendant Chamalbide’s Answers to Interrogatories

in which she states she did not issue a written Chrono of the incident immediately because the

verbal counseling achieved corrective action. (Exh. C, p. 2, Opp. Mtn for Summ. Judgment.) In

those interrogatories, Defendant Chamalbide also states that she only issued the Chrono after

Defendant Lunes asked her to but that she was reluctant to do so because too much time had

lapsed. (Id. at p. 3.) Defendants submit no evidence regarding the actions of Defendant Lunes. 

Plaintiff also provides evidence to dispute that the alleged misconduct even took place. 

In support of his Opposition is the declaration of Juan Radillo, Plaintiff’s cellmate at the time

the sexual misconduct allegedly occurred and who allegedly participated in the sexual

misconduct. (Exh. A, Opp. Mtn. Summ. Judgment.) Mr. Radillo states that the contents of the

Chrono issued by Defendant Chamalbide are false as he and Plaintiff never engaged in sexual

misconduct. Id. Plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of fact as to the 3

very conduct that forms the basis on which Defendants allegedly issued the Chrono. As such,

Plaintiff has created a disputed issue of material fact sufficient to defeat the Motion for Summary

Judgment on the retaliation claim against both Defendants Chamalbide and Lunes. 

2. Eighth Amendment

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1250-51; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To

establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were

“deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmates’s safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

at 834. The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Id. at 834 (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know of and

disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff also fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim because

claims that he might be assaulted are speculative. However, Plaintiff need not establish actual

injury to sufficiently state an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect. Farmer, 511 U.S.

825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (Plaintiff need not wait for a “tragic event” such as an actual assault

before obtaining relief). 

Defendants also argue that the allegation that the information was relayed is based on

inadmissible hearsay. However, when a plaintiff lacks personal knowledge of certain facts but,

based on hearsay, believes them to be true, those facts may be alleged in the Complaint. The

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit such pleading as long as the allegation is identified as

such and there is a likelihood the allegations will have evidentiary support after reasonable

opportunity for investigation and discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(3)(b). 

Here, the Complaint alleges that both Defendants knew that sexual misconduct between

gang members was prohibited and such information, if relayed to other gang members, could

subject Plaintiff to physical harm. (Compl. at 10.) The Complaint also alleges that Defendant

Chamalbide relayed this information to another gang member (Compl. at 10). The Complaint

does not allege, however, that Defendant Lunes also relayed that information to other inmates. 

The Complaint alleges only that Defendant Lunes stated that Plaintiff had to worry about his

“homies” finding out. (Compl. at 3.) At most, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Lunes

hinted or made threat that the information could be relayed. Threats, however, do not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987); Oltarzewski

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (verbal harassment or abuse alone is not

sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). As indicated above, to

state an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants knew of and

disregarded a risk to his safety. Although the Complaint alleges that Defendant Lunes knew that

sexual activity between EME gang members was prohibited, the Complaint does not allege facts

indicting that Defendant Lunes disregarded his safety. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Lunes and the Court will

recommend that the Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant Lunes be

dismissed.

With regard to Defendant Chamalbide, in opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment,

Plaintiff has presented evidence to dispute that the alleged sexual activity occurred and also that

the contents of the Chrono were relayed to another gang member by Defendant Chamalbide. 

(Exhs. A, F, Opp. Mtn. Summ. Judgment.) Plaintiff’s allegations and evidence are sufficient to

state a claim and create a disputed issue of fact warranting trial. Accordingly, the Court will

recommend that the Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied with respect to Defendant

Chamalbide. 

 E. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion For Summary Judgment on the retaliation

claim against Defendants Chamalbide and Lunes be DENIED; that the Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendant Chamalbide be DENIED; and that the Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendant Lunes be GRANTED and Defendant Lunes be DISMISSED from the action.

The Court further ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to

the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States

District Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with

a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

and filed within TEN (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 16, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05251-AWI -SMS Document 45 Filed 02/20/07 Page 13 of 13