Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00006/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00006-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORMAN E. YARTZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

COALINGA STATE HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00006 DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Norman E. Yartz (“Plaintiff”) is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on January 5, 

2015. He names Coalinga State Hospital, Psych. Tech. Luke Koll, and Psych. Tech. James Petterson

as Defendants. Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge on March 19, 2015.

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss the case, in whole or in part, 

if the Court determines it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) 

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(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts “are 

not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt 

resolved in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2012); Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), but Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible to survive 

screening, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each 

named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that 

a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of 

satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969.

B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently detained at Coalinga State Hospital where the events giving rise to this 

action took place. Plaintiff makes the following allegations against Defendants. 

On July 7, 2014, he was attacked and physically assaulted by Defendants Koll and Petterson, 

who acted without probable cause, and without any emergency threat or danger to Plaintiff, patients, 

staff or security of the hospital. Plaintiff claims that Defendants entered his room without 

identifying themselves and came into his private bed area. Defendant Koll opened his privacy 

curtains and then grabbed Plaintiff’s hand and forced his own body against Plaintiff’s body. 

Defendant Koll, using both of his hands, violently forced Plaintiff’s hand onto the bed. Plaintiff was 

shocked as no instructions had been given to him. Plaintiff reacted by attempting to protect himself 

as he was holding his TV remote by swinging his hand in a circular motion. Plaintiff states staff 

claimed he was trying to hit them. Defendant Petterson then grabbed Plaintiff’s feet whereupon 

Plaintiff kicked out with his leg and allegedly hit Defendant Petterson in the groin area. Plaintiff 

states he was merely trying to protect himself from the unprovoked assault. Defendant Petterson 

then placed Plaintiff in an “illegal choke hold” by wrapping his arm around Plaintiff’s neck and 

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physically placing pressure on his neck while Defendant Koll continued to twist his arm until 

Plaintiff released the remote control.

Plaintiff requests that his personal property be returned to him, including his television and 

remote control, media player and remote control, MP3 player music, movies and Nintendo D/S Lite 

games. 

C. DISCUSSION

1. Excessive Force

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 

(9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). As a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to Fourteenth 

Amendment protections. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 

(2001) (“[D]ue process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the [civil 

confinement act] bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed.”); 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir.2004) (“Civil status means civil status, with all the 

Fourteenth Amendment rights that accompany it.”). A civil detainee is entitled to “more considerate 

treatment” than his criminally detained counterparts. Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (quoting Youngberg v. 

Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982)). 

In the context of detainees, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that they not be subject to 

conditions that amount to punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 536. “At a bare minimum . . . an individual 

detained under civil process - like an individual accused but not convicted of a crime - cannot be 

subject to conditions that “amount to punishment.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 

536). Thus, “when a SVPA detainee is confined to conditions identical to, similar to, or more 

restrictive than, those in which his criminal counterparts are held, [the Court] presume[s] that the 

detainee is being subjected to punishment.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

A claim of excessive force by a detainee is analyzed under the objective reasonableness 

standard. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)) (holding use of force is 

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reasonable after careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's 

constitutional interests against the countervailing government interests at stake); see also Andrews v. 

Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 

(8th Cir.1989)) (applying objective reasonableness standard in context of civil detainees and finding 

use of force must be necessarily incident to administrative interests in safety, security, and 

efficiency).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Koll physically assaulted him by grabbing his hand and 

forcing it onto the bed, and by then placing his body against Plaintiff’s. Plaintiff states he reacted 

defensively by moving his arm in a circular motion while holding a TV remote. He states Defendant 

Petterson then grabbed at Plaintiff’s feet but Plaintiff kicked out at him and hit Petterson in the 

scrotal area. Defendant Koll then continued to twist Plaintiff’s arm while Petterson placed him in a 

chokehold applying pressure to his neck until he released the remote control. 

These allegations are insufficient to state a claim against Defendants Koll and Petterson for 

violation of due process. The Ninth Circuit has held that “egregious government conduct in the form 

of excessive and brutal use of physical force constitutes a violation of substantive due process” 

cognizable under section 1983. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987); see 

also Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 924 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (“[p]rison beatings which ‘shock 

the conscience’ are actionable under section 1983”). “[R]esolving a substantive due process claim 

requires courts to balance several factors focusing on the reasonableness of the officers' actions 

given the circumstances.” Smith, 818 F.2d at 1417. These factors are (1) the need for the application 

of force, (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, (3) the extent 

of the injury inflicted, and (4) whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and 

restore discipline. Id.; see also Gaut, 810 F.2d at 924 (listing these same factors). Here, Plaintiff 

does not state that he suffered any injury as a result of Defendants’ actions. Certainly, he has made 

no showing sufficient to establish that the use of force against him was “excessive” or “brutal.” 

White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990).

In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that analysis of whether the use of force was 

objectively reasonable requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances in each particular 

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case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to 

the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9, 105 S.Ct. 

1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (whether seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is judged by 

the “totality of the circumstances”). Here, Plaintiff admits to actively resisting Defendants by 

swinging his TV remote and by kicking Defendant Petterson in the groin. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that Defendants’ actions were objectively 

unreasonable. Defendants’ use of force does not appear to be anything more than incident to the 

search. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Koll and Petterson.

2. Coalinga State Hospital

With respect Plaintiff’s claim against Coalinga State Hospital, a local government unit may 

not be held responsible for the acts of its employees under respondeat superior. Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235; 

Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 

1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather, a local government unit may only be held liable if it inflicts the 

injury complained of. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185. 

Generally, a claim against a local government unit for municipal or county liability requires 

an allegation that “a deliberate policy, custom, or practice . . . was the ‘moving force’ behind the 

constitutional violation . . . suffered.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 

2007); City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989). Alternatively, and 

more difficult to prove, municipal liability may be imposed where the local government unit’s 

omission led to the constitutional violation by its employee. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1186. Under this 

route to municipal liability, the “plaintiff must show that the municipality’s deliberate indifference 

led to its omission and that the omission caused the employee to commit the constitutional 

violation.” Id. Deliberate indifference requires a showing “that the municipality was on actual or 

constructive notice that its omissions would likely result in a constitutional violation.” Id.

Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any specific facts linking Coalinga State Hospital to a 

violation of his due process rights. As noted above, Coalinga State Hospital may not be held liable 

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absent any showing that its actions or omissions led to the constitutional violations by its employees.

3. Unreasonable Search

The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 

520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2964 (2011); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 

1988). The reasonableness of the search is determined by the context, which requires a balancing of 

the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights the search entails. Bell, 441 

U.S. at 558-59 (quotations omitted); Byrd, 629 F.3d at 1141; Bull v. City and Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010); Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 

2010); Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332-34. Factors that must be evaluated are the scope of the 

particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the 

place in which it is conducted. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (quotations omitted); Byrd, 629 F.3d at 1141; 

Bull, 595 F.3d at 972; Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1227; Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332. 

Plaintiff takes issue with the unannounced intrusion into his room and private bed area. 

However, there are no facts supporting a claim that Plaintiff was subjected to an unreasonable search 

by Defendants. A bare assertion that Plaintiff’s room and bed area were entered does not support a 

claim, as Plaintiff is not entitled to be entirely free from institutional searches. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558; 

see also Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 535-36 (9th Cir. 2010) (civil detainee awaiting 

commitment proceedings was not a free person with full civil rights).

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 

1983. In an abundance of caution, the Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an 

amended complaint. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s federal rights and liability may 

not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of mere respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 

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(2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim 

under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 20, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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