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Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-12325

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket Nos. 3:15-cv-00075-DHB-BKE; 3:09-bkc-30446-SDB

MORITIZ D. HOLLOWAY,

 Debtor.

__________________________________________________________________

TODD BOUDREAUX, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

D. DUSTON TAPLEY, JR., 

JAY TAPLEY,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

MORITZ D. HOLLOWAY,

TIDAL WATERS PROPERTIES, INC., 

INVERTED INC., 

DEVONE HOLLOWAY, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

________________________

(February 24, 2017)

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Before MARCUS, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

D. Duston Tapley, Jr. (“D. Tapley”) and Jay Tapley (“J. Tapley”), both 

proceeding pro se, appeal the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s 

grant of a motion for a directed verdict filed by chapter 7 trustee Todd Boudreaux 

(“the trustee”). The case involves the estate of Charlie Sharpe Sr., who died in 

1955, but whose will was never probated and whose estate was not administered 

until 2009. Soon after Sharpe’s death, certain of his property was conveyed to his

son, Arthur Sharpe, and much later, in 2009, pursuant to orders from the superior 

court of Montgomery County, Georgia, Arthur Sharpe’s 76.06 acres of land was 

ultimately conveyed to Moritz D. Holloway, the chapter 7 debtor, and his assigns. 

Holloway, for his part, had transferred portions of his interest in the property to D. 

Tapley and Inverted, Inc. (“Inverted”), with corrected deeds filed in January 2007. 

On July 23, 2009, the administrators of Charlie Sharpe, Sr.’s estate signed a deed 

of assent, conveying to Tidal Water Properties, Inc. (“Tidal Water”) Arthur 

Sharpe’s 76.06 acres of land, presumably as Holloway’s assign. Holloway filed a 

chapter 13 (later converted to chapter 7) bankruptcy petition on August 3, 2009. 

Thereafter, the trustee filed a complaint against Holloway, D. Tapley, J. Tapley, 

Tidal Water, Inverted, and others, alleging, inter alia, fraudulent transfers of 

property, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548.

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On appeal, D. Tapley argues that: (1) Georgia’s pre-1998 probate code 

controlled the vesting of title, so the transfer at issue fell outside of § 548’s twoyear reach-back limit; (2) the bankruptcy court erred by finding a fiduciary duty 

between himself and the debtor, and by finding he breached his fiduciary duty; (3) 

the damages award was too high because only one transfer fell within the two-year 

reach-back period -- a conveyance of one-half of the debtor’s remaining one-third 

interest; (4) the debtor should have been jointly included in the damages; (5) the 

transfer also fell outside of Georgia’s Fraudulent Transfer Act’s (“GFTA”) fouryear statute of limitations; and (6) the bankruptcy court failed to establish a 

sufficient basis for the valuation of damages, and erroneously calculated damages 

based on the value of the property when he sold it rather than when he purchased 

it. J. Tapley repeats most of D. Tapley’s arguments, but also argues that the 

bankruptcy court erred by concluding that he was a joint venturer with the debtor, 

had a fiduciary duty, and breached that duty. After careful review, we affirm.

As the second court of review in bankruptcy cases, we examine the decision 

of the bankruptcy court independently of the district court. In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 

F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2012). We review the bankruptcy court’s findings of 

fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Id. In addition, to obtain a 

reversal, “an appellant must convince us that every stated ground for the judgment 

against him is incorrect.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 

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680 (11th Cir. 2014). If the appellant does not address one of the grounds, he “is 

deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the 

judgment is due to be affirmed.” Id. As a general rule, we will not consider a legal 

issue or theory raised for the first time on appeal. Formby v. Farmers & Merchants 

Bank, 904 F.2d 627, 634 (11th Cir. 1990).

Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), a “trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an 

interest of the debtor in property or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that 

was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the 

petition[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). For the purposes of § 548(a)(1), a “transfer” is 

“made when such transfer is so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the 

debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot 

acquire an interest in the property transferred that is superior to the interest in such 

property of the transferee[.]” Id. § 548(d)(1). We look to state law for the 

purposes of determining when a transfer is perfected. See Palmer v. Radio Corp. 

of Am., 453 F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir. 1971).1

Under Georgia law, when the owner of realty dies testate, the devisees in the 

will have an inchoate title in the realty which is perfected when the executor 

assents to the devise. Oliver v. Irvin, 135 S.E.2d 376, 377 (Ga. 1964). Even if the 

will is unprobated, a devisee with an interest in real property stemming from the

 1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as 

binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981.

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unprobated will has a similar, inchoate, legally protected title in the realty. See

Allan v. Allan, 223 S.E.2d 445, 448 (Ga. 1976) (concluding that devisee of onehalf interest in realty under unprobated will had a legally protected interest in the 

real property).

A deed that fails to include a beginning point or other specifications 

enabling one to definitively locate the property to be conveyed is invalid. See Lord 

v. Holland, 655 S.E.2d 602, 604 (Ga. 2008). A party cannot convey title to 

property to which he does not hold title, whatever his intentions may be. Vance v. 

Jackson, 504 S.E.2d 529, 531 (Ga. 1998).

Here, the bankruptcy court did not err by concluding that Holloway’s 

transfer of property to Tidal Water fell within § 548’s two-year reach-back limit. 

As the record shows, Charlie Sharpe Sr. died with a will that was unprobated. But 

regardless of whether the will was probated, those with interests in the property 

stemming from the will, such as Arthur Sharpe, only retained an inchoate interest 

in the property. See Allan, 223 S.E.2d at 448. Under Georgia law, Arthur 

Sharpe’s inchoate interest in the property perfected when the executor of his 

father’s estate assented to the devise. Oliver, 135 S.E.2d at 377. That happened on 

July 23, 2009. Thus, the date the executor assented -- July 23, 2009 -- is the 

relevant date of the transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1). Because Holloway’s 

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bankruptcy case was initially filed on August 3, 2009, the deed of assent was well 

within the two-year reach-back period. 

The plaintiffs argue that because the pre-1998 probate code provided that the 

date of death dictates when title to property vests, Arthur Sharpe’s interest in the 

property vested upon his father’s death in 1955, and not 2009. Thus, the plaintiffs 

say, Holloway’s 2006-07 conveyances of interest in the property did not fall within 

the Bankruptcy Code’s two-year reach-back period. We disagree. Even before 

1998, the law provided that Arthur Sharpe’s inchoate interest in the property did 

not perfect until the executor of his father’s estate assented to the devise, which 

occurred on July 23, 2009. See Allan, 223 S.E.2d at 448; Oliver, 135 S.E.2d at 

377. Moreover, and in any event, the bankruptcy court held that the legal 

descriptions of the property in the earlier transfers were so insufficiently vague that 

they were invalid to convey title, and that title was unclear until the 2009 probate 

court orders. Because the plaintiffs do not challenge this independent holding of 

the bankruptcy court on appeal, their arguments concerning the pre-1998 probate 

code must fail. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.

As for the plaintiffs’ arguments concerning their fiduciary duties, the 

debtor’s joint liability, the GFTA, or J. Tapley’s argument that he did not act as a 

joint venturer with the debtor, we need not reach them. As the record shows, the 

bankruptcy court concluded that even though it held in favor of the trustee on 

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several grounds, the trustee could only recover the value of the property, minus any 

appropriate setoffs. Because the trustee’s damage award would have been the 

same had the bankruptcy court determined that the plaintiffs were liable only for 

the § 548 fraudulent transfer, the plaintiffs’ other challenges do not affect the 

disposition of this appeal. See Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 

1279 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Because we conclude that the jury was entitled to return a 

verdict for Goldsmith on his claim of retaliation and the jury awarded the same 

damages based upon both theories of wrongful termination, we need not address 

any issues about Goldsmith’s alternative claim that his termination was based on 

his race.”). 

Lastly, D. Tapley failed to raise his damages arguments -- that the 

bankruptcy court’s valuation lacked a sufficient basis and that Holloway should 

have been included in the damages -- before the bankruptcy court. Because we 

generally do not consider issues not raised below, we decline to address his 

damages arguments. See Formby, 904 F.2d at 634.

AFFIRMED.

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