Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01000/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01000-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RENE PASCUAL MUNOZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOE McGRATH, Warden,

Defendant.

____________________________

_

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 04-1000 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS AND TO STRIKE;

DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO FILE

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR, ALTERNATIVELY,

NOTICE THAT SUCH MOTION IS

NOT WARRANTED

(Docket Nos. 7 & 9)

Plaintiff, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison

(“PBSP”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Joe McGrath, the PBSP

Warden, placed him and the other Southern Hispanic inmates at PBSP on “lock-down” status,

based on their ethnicity. The Court, having found these allegations, liberally construed, state a

cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause, ordered the complaint served on

defendant, and ordered defendant to file a dispositive motion or, alternatively, to indicate that

such motion was not warranted in this case. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, along with a request for judicial

notice. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, to which defendant has filed a reply. Additionally,

plaintiff has filed a motion to “strike” defendant’s motion.

Case 3:04-cv-01000-MMC Document 13 Filed 09/08/05 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a claim “if as a matter of law it is clear that

no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In considering a motion to

dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and

accept all factual allegations as true. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38

(9th Cir. 1996). Federal courts are particularly liberal in construing allegations made in pro se

civil rights complaints. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). In ruling

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may not consider any material outside the complaint but

may consider exhibits attached thereto. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency

261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (treating exhibits attached to

complaint as part of complaint for purposes of ruling on 12(b)(6) motion). 

B. Factual Background

In connection with this motion, the Court limits itself to consideration of the following

facts, which are alleged in the complaint and the attachments thereto. On February 23, 2000,

defendant placed plaintiff and all other Southern Hispanic inmates at PBSP on “lock-down,”

where plaintiff remained as of the date he prepared the complaint (March 11, 2004). As a

consequence of being on lock-down, plaintiff was deprived of exercise, visitation, the

opportunity to earn behavioral credits, and other programs to which he would otherwise be

entitled. Plaintiff was among other Southern Hispanic inmates who filed petitions for a writ of

habeas corpus in the Del Norte County Superior Court, challenging the constitutionality of the

lock-down order. The petitions were consolidated, and the state Superior Court ruled in favor

of the inmates in 2002. In February 2004, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment of the Superior Court, finding that the lock-down of Southern Hispanic inmates based

on their ethnicity was an instance of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. In the state habeas petition, plaintiff sought injunctive relief. Here, plaintiff seeks

money damages for the time he was on lock-down.

Case 3:04-cv-01000-MMC Document 13 Filed 09/08/05 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1Although this Court views the alleged discrimination against Southern Hispanic

inmates to be based on their ethnicity, as opposed to their “race,” in Johnson, the United States

Supreme Court treated such discrimination as equivalent to “racial” discrimination for

purposes of equal protection analysis. 125 S.Ct. at 1145-48 (discussing whether segregated

housing of Southern Hispanic inmates, as well as inmates of other racial and ethnic groups,

violates the Equal Protection Clause).

3

C. Legal Analysis

Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on the basis of qualified immunity. 

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known." See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982). A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must first determine

whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, and then

determine whether that right was “clearly established.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603 (1999);

Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). The initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light

most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the state official’s

conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “If no

constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id. On the other hand, if a

violation could be made out on the allegations, the next sequential step is to ask whether the

right was clearly established. Id.

Under the foregoing framework, the Court must first resolve whether, under the facts

alleged by plaintiff, locking down plaintiff based on his Southern Hispanic ethnicity was

unconstitutional. Invidious racial discrimination such as racial segregation, which is

unconstitutional outside prisons, also is unconstitutional within prisons. Johnson v. California

125 S. Ct. 1141, 1146-47 (2005).1 A prison classification based on race is immediately

suspect and is subject to the same strict scrutiny as a racial classification outside prison. See

id. at 1148-49. Prison officials thus must demonstrate that the race-based policy or action is

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 1149. Here, plaintiff alleges no

facts that demonstrate the race-based lock-down of only Southern Hispanic inmates was

Case 3:04-cv-01000-MMC Document 13 Filed 09/08/05 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Indeed, defendant does not assert in his

motion that the lock-down, as alleged by plaintiff, was constitutional. Rather, defendant bases

his qualified immunity argument entirely on the second part of the Saucier analysis, arguing

that the constitutional right was not “clearly established.” 

“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established

for purposes of qualified immunity is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. If the

law did not put the official on notice “that his conduct would be clearly unlawful,” the official

is entitled to qualified immunity. See id. In the instant case, defendant argues that, in the

period from February 2000 to March 2004, it would not have been clear to a reasonable prison

official that the lock-down of plaintiff based on his Southern Hispanic ethnicity was

unconstitutional. At that time, race-based classifications of inmates were subject to a more

lenient standard than the strict scrutiny standard announced in Johnson in 2005. Prior to

Johnson, a prison regulation segregating inmates on the basis of their race or ethnicity only had

to be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.

78, 89 (1987); see also Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled by

Johnson v. California , 125. S.Ct. 1141, 1161 (2005) (finding Turner standard does not apply

to racial classifications in prison). Consequently, in the instant case, to satisfy the “clearly

established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis, defendant would have to show that a

prison official could have reasonably believed, under the circumstances pertaining at PBSP

between February 2000 and March 2004, that locking down plaintiff due to his Southern

Hispanic ethnicity was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. 

Defendant argues that at the time in question, he could have reasonably believed that

locking down Southern Hispanic inmates, including plaintiff, was reasonably related to prison

security. In support of this argument, defendant points to various factual findings made by

California trial and appellate courts. In particular, findings have been made that there are gangs

in the California prisons, and at PBSP in particular, which gangs are formed on the basis of the

race and ethnicity of the inmates; that these gangs have a history of violent clashes and riots in

Case 3:04-cv-01000-MMC Document 13 Filed 09/08/05 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2Although the state court opinions are attached to the complaint, plaintiff does not

allege that the factual findings contained in those opinions are true. 

5

the prisons; that a particular gang known as the “Mexican Mafia” or “EME,” which is made up

of Sourthern Hispanic inmates, is the most dangerous and powerful of the prison gangs at

PBSP, and is particularly effective at intimidating Southern Hispanic inmates into joining the

gang; that the lock-down of Southern Hispanic inmates in February 2000 was ordered after

Southern Hispanic gangs participated in a riot with other PBSP gangs; that in January 2001,

defendant nonetheless implemented a policy that abolished racially segregated housing at

PBSP, under which the lock-down of Southern Hispanic inmates would be lifted; and that the

policy was not implemented before March 2004 because of a lack of resources required to

evaluate the security risks of individual inmates.

These factual findings by the state courts are not facts alleged by plaintiff in the

complaint.2 Although the Court, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, may also consider facts

that are properly the subject of judicial notice under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence, see MGIC Indemnity Corp. V. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1986), such as

the existence and content of the court files in another case, the Court may not take judicial

notice of the truth of the factual findings made by such other court, because such facts do not

qualify as facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” within the meaning of Rule 201(b). See

Taylor v. Charter Medical Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1998). Consequently, this

Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the state courts made the factual findings cited by

defendant, but it cannot take judicial notice that these facts are true. Cf. Day v. Moscow, 955

F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992) (taking judicial notice of fact that prior court had made certain

findings, for purpose of analyzing defense of res judicata raised in Rule 12(b)(6) motion). 

Accordingly, to whatever extent locking down plaintiff was based on the history of racial

tensions at PBSP, the particular dangers posed by Southern Hispanic gangs, or the lack of

resources to alter the lock-down practice sooner, the Court cannot consider such facts at this

stage of the litigation.

In sum, because a review of the facts alleged in the complaint reveals no rationale for

Case 3:04-cv-01000-MMC Document 13 Filed 09/08/05 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

the lock-down, let alone any legitimate penological interest reasonably served thereby, and

because defendant could not reasonably have believed he could lawfully single out inmates

based on their Southern Hispanic ethnicity for no legitimate penological interest, the instant

complaint, when the Court considers only the facts alleged in the complaint and of which

judicial notice can be taken, is not subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

D. Motion to Strike

Plaintiff asks the Court to “strike” defendant’s motion because it was filed after the

deadline set forth in the Court’s Order of Service filed May 19, 2004. Plaintiff made the same

argument in his previously-filed motion for default judgment. In an order filed November 11,

2004, the Court denied that motion because defendant’s delay in filing a dispositive motion

was attributable to delays in service of the complaint and the Order of Service. For the same

reason, plaintiff’s motion to strike likewise is denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED and plaintiff’s motion to strike is

DENIED. 

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, defendant shall

file a motion for summary judgment or a notice that he is of the opinion that this case cannot

be so resolved. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall

conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Defendant is advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified immunity

found, if material facts are in dispute. If defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be

resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary

judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on the plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on defendant no later than thirty (30) days from the date defendant’s motion

Case 3:04-cv-01000-MMC Document 13 Filed 09/08/05 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs:

The [defendant has] made a motion for summary judgment

by which [he seeks] to have your case dismissed. A motion for

summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--

that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect

the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your

case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other

sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint

says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted in favor of defendant[ ], your case will be dismissed and

there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (holding party

opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of

material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file

an opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by

plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against plaintiff without a trial. 

See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18

F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

c. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

plaintiff's opposition is filed.

Case 3:04-cv-01000-MMC Document 13 Filed 09/08/05 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

3. Extensions of time are not favored, although reasonable extensions will be

granted. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to

be extended.

This order terminates Docket Nos. 7 and 9.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 8, 2005

_____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-01000-MMC Document 13 Filed 09/08/05 Page 8 of 8