Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03051/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03051-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

JOHN E. ADAMS PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 04-3051

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff John E. Adams appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

November 29, 2005, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $2,469.77 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 17.25 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $140.00, and $54.77 in expenses. (Doc. # 14-15). Defendant has filed a response,

expressing no objection to this award of benefits. (Doc.# 16).

§ 406 Fees:

Statutory provision for the award of attorney's fees is found in 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1).

We find this request is premature, in that there has been no submission of evidence indicating

plaintiff has been successful upon remand and has been awarded benefits from which an

appropriate fee may be paid. The fee awarded an attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 406 is paid out of

any past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), (b); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1720(b)(4). 

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EAJA Fees:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After

reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

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In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

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The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

Plaintiff’s counsel requests attorney's fees under EAJA at a rate of $140.00 an hour based

on an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour- the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index

as an exhibit to his Memorandum of Law (Doc. # 15) and has presented evidence of an increase

in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned believes his argument for enhanced fees based

on a cost of living increase has merit. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to

an award at the rate of $140.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 6.50 hours on June 24, 2004, July 13, 2004, July 15,

2004, December 6, 2004, December 6, 2004, December 21, 2004, December 30, 2004, January

4, 2005, February 18, 2005, and December 14, 2005, for work performed at the administrative

level and for reading medical evidence. None of the time submitted above appears to have been

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for work before this court. Work performed at the administrative is not compensable under the

EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984) (time spent at the

administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA). With regard to the medical evidence

reviewed we note plaintiff’s counsel did not file a motion to submit new evidence with the court

nor did he file a brief on behalf of plaintiff with the court. Accordingly, we deduct 6.50 hours

from the total number of compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.75 hour on August 23, 2004, (letters to U.S. Attorney,

Attorney General, and Commissioner enclosing Complaint and Summons. Review of file). This

time cannot be compensated under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813

F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is not

compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, we deduct 0.75 hour from the total number of

compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.50 hour on July 20, 2004, (received and reviewed order to

proceed in forma pauperis. Review of file), from which we deduct 0.40 hour; and 1.00 hour on

November 30, 2005, (received and reviewed order of remand and judgment. preparation of

affidavit of plaintiff and sent copy of judgment to the claimant. Review of file), from which we

deduct 0.90 hour. This court concludes that the time submitted on the above referenced dates,

should not have taken an attorney experienced in handling social security cases more than five

or six minutes to review these documents. Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898

(E.D.Ark. 1989). With regard to sending plaintiff the documents on November 30, 2005, this

task could have been performed by support staff. Accordingly, 1.30 hours must be deducted

from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

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Plaintiff’s counsel also submitted 1.00 hour on July 7, 2004, July 20, 2004, January 13,

2005, March 3, 2005, and August 22, 2005, for “client conferences.” The notation of a “client

conference” is vague and these boilerplate entries lack the requisite specificity for recovery.

See Role Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 971 (D.C. Cir.2004) (finding that

the generic entries of “research and writing” are inadequate to meet the fee applicant’s

obligation to present well-documented claims). Such entries are inadequate because counsel

does not state the purpose or subject matter of these repeated conferences. Id. The

undersigned also notes that these entries are excessive and redundant. As has been noted,

counsel for the plaintiff did not file an appeal brief in the instant case, and, in fact, filed no

pleadings before this court after filing the Complaint, until the instant application for attorney

fees. Counsel did not conduct any work on this case at this time; rather, the parties were

simply waiting for the court to issue a judgment. Furthermore, counsel claimed he had six one

hour conferences with plaintiff and reviewed the file thirty-seven times at the administrative

level. See Pl. App. at Ex. “A.” After the excessive amount of time spent conferring with the

plaintiff and reviewing the file at the administrative level, counsel does not need an additional

5.00 hours to review the same exact information. See Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744

F.Supp 898, 900 (E.D.Ark 1989) (finding that periodic review of files is entirely appropriate,

but one seems excessive, particularly since counsel did not report any work on the matter for

another week). Accordingly, the court reduces the time sought by 2.50 hours. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $54.77 in expenses incurred with regard to

copies and postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $54.77 to be

a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

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Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 6.20 (17.25-11.05) attorney hours, at the rate of $140.00 per hour, and for $54.77 in

expenses, for a total attorney's fee award of $922.77. This amount should be paid in addition to,

and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties

have ten days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written

objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may

result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that

objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 19 day of April 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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