Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00407/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00407-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:402 Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA ESTHER RUIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:19-CV-00407

ORDER ON SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL

Claimant Maria Esther Ruiz seeks judicial review of a denial by the Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”) of her application for disability insurance benefits.

1

 ECF No. 14. She 

alleges that the SSA Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred (1) in her initial, threshold 

assessment of the severity of claimant’s left knee impairment, (2) in considering the opinion of 

treating doctor Emmanuel Fabella, (3) in evaluating claimant’s own testimony about her knee and 

back impairments, and (4) in finding that claimant could perform work existing in significant 

numbers in the national economy. We heard argument from the parties on February 18, 2020. 

Claimant was represented by counsel at the hearing. Having reviewed the record, administrative 

transcript, briefs of the parties, and applicable law, and having considered arguments raised at the 

hearing, we will remand this matter for further consideration by the ALJ.

Claimant first argues that the ALJ erred in setting aside her left knee impairment at what 

 

1 The parties have consented to entry of final judgment by a U.S. Magistrate Judge under the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), with any appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit. 

Case 1:19-cv-00407-JDP Document 18 Filed 02/19/20 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

is known as “Step 2” of the five-step disability-determining process—a threshold step at which 

the ALJ determines whether an impairment is “severe.” Step 2 “is a de minimis screening device 

[used] to dispose of groundless claims.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal quotation omitted). “An impairment or combination of impairments may be found not 

severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect 

on an individual’s ability to work.” Id. at 686 (internal quotation omitted). This is a low 

threshold. 

The ALJ explained that she found claimant’s left knee impairment not to be severe 

because there was “no swelling noted in the records” of one examination, and “functional status 

has not changed” as of August 2017.2 At Step 2, however, these reasons do not justify setting 

aside the documentation of claimant’s knee impairments. See AR 577-588 (documenting knee 

evaluation by Dr. Fabella and referencing decreased range of motion); AR 607 (documenting 

knee X-ray); AR 444 (documenting knee pain). The ALJ did not explain why, in light of this 

documentation, the impairment could be viewed as nothing more than a slight abnormality with 

no more than a minimal effect on claimant’s ability to work. 

Error at Step 2 does not always require remand. Where an ALJ finds an impairment nonsevere but considers that impairment throughout the remaining steps, including in determining 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the error may be harmless. See Lewis v. Astrue, 

498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding Step 2 error to find claimant’s bursitis condition to be 

severe harmless where “[t]he ALJ extensively discussed Lewis’s bursitis at Step 4 of the 

analysis”). Here, however, the ALJ did not consider the impact of claimant’s left knee 

impairment after Step 2. 

Defendant maintained at oral argument that the ALJ must have considered claimant’s left 

knee impairment later in the analysis, since the ALJ considered Dr. Fabella’s opinion and Dr. 

Fabella’s opinion included discussion of claimant’s knee impairment. We find this argument 

 

2 The ALJ also noted that claimant’s “gait and station were normal [as of] March 2017,” however 

this date precedes the documented dates of knee impairment (approximately June 2017) and so 

has no bearing thereon. 

Case 1:19-cv-00407-JDP Document 18 Filed 02/19/20 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

unconvincing. Although the ALJ considered Dr. Fabella’s opinion about claimant’s back, we see 

no evidence that she also considered his opinion about claimant’s left knee. Thus, the ALJ’s 

subsequent analysis did not render harmless the Step 2 error. 

Defendant points to a temporal gap in documented left knee treatment, arguing that the 

break in treatment justifies the ALJ’s setting aside claimant’s left knee impairment at Step 2. The 

interruption in treatment, however, was not identified by the ALJ as a reason for finding 

claimant’s left knee impairment non-severe. Given our mandate to conduct judicial review on the 

record, we cannot affirm the decision of an ALJ based on reasoning that the ALJ did not provide.3 

See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 

We thus determine that the ALJ’s opinion was legally flawed or unsupported by 

substantial evidence in that it erroneously found claimant’s left knee impairment non-severe at 

Step 2. We need not reach the other issues raised by claimant. For the reasons stated in this 

opinion, we remand this case for further consideration by SSA. The clerk of court is directed 

(1) to enter judgment in favor of claimant Maria Esther Ruiz and against defendant Commissioner 

of Social Security and (2) to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

No. 200.

 

3 Separately, it is far from apparent that a gap in treatment would establish non-severity. 

Case 1:19-cv-00407-JDP Document 18 Filed 02/19/20 Page 3 of 3