Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00723/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00723-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRADFORD O. BRYANT,

Petitioner,

 v.

ANTHONY KANE, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 05-00723 JSW

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

This matter comes before the Court on consideration of Respondent Anthony Kane’s

(“Respondent”) motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner

Bradford O. Bryant (“Petitioner”). Having considered the motion, the opposition thereto, and

relevant legal authority, the motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On February 17, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging

the decision of former Governor Gray Davis to reverse the Board of Prison Term’s (“BPT”)

decision to grant Petitioner parole in February 2003. Respondent moves to dismiss the petition

on the ground that recent California Supreme Court authority interpreting California’s parole

scheme establishes that Petitioner has no federally protected liberty interest in parole and,

therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter.

ANALYSIS

In general, “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of 

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Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). However, “a state’s statutory

scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that parole release will be

granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a

constitutional liberty interest.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12).

The California statutory provision at issue provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he panel or

the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses ... is such that consideration of the public safety requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual and that a parole date, therefore, cannot

be fixed ... .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (emphasis added). This “shall-unless” language is

similar to the statutes that were at issue in Allen and Greenholtz. See Allen, 482 U.S. at 376

(“Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall release on parole ... any person confined

in the Montana state prison or the women’s correction center ... when in its opinion there is

reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or the

community.”) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-230201 (1985) (emphasis added and in original);

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11 (“[w]henever the Board of Parole considers the release of a

committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of

the opinion that his release should be deferred because ... ”) (quoting Neb. Rev. Stats. § 83-

1,114(1) (1976)) (emphasis added).

Recognizing the similarity between California’s statutory scheme and the statutory

scheme at issue in Allen and Greenholtz, the Ninth Circuit has held that “California’s parole

scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. The scheme creates a

presumption that parole release will be granted unless the statutorily defined determinations are

made.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902 (internal quotations and citations omitted). That court

reiterated this holding in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is clear that

“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”)

(quoting McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902). 

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Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005) undermines the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Biggs and McQuillion, and

Respondent relies heavily on Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975

(E.D. Cal. 2005) in support of this argument. This Court disagrees with the Sass court’s

conclusion that the holding in Dannenberg clearly demonstrates California’s parole scheme is

not mandatory. The issue presented in Dannenberg was whether the BPT was required to set

uniform parole dates under Section 3041(a) before it determined whether a particular inmate

was suitable for parole under 3041(b). See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th

 at 1069, 1077. It

concluded the answer to that question was no. Id. at 1096. However, the Dannenberg court

used language throughout the opinion which suggests that it presumed an inmate retained a

protected liberty interest in the possibility of parole. See, e.g., id. at 1094 (noting continued

reliance on commitment offense “might thus also contravene the inmate’s constitutionally

protected expectation of parole”), 1095 n.16 (“well established principles” regarding parole

discretion with deferential judicial oversight “define and limit the expectancy in parole from a

life sentence to which due process interests attach”). Furthermore, California courts addressing

the issue post Dannenberg continue to assume a protected liberty interest exists. See In re Scott,

133 Cal. App. 4th 573 (2005); In re DeLuna, 126 Cal. App. 4th 585 (2005).

Accordingly, this Court finds itself in agreement with a majority of courts that have

considered the impact of Dannenberg on the issue presented by Respondent’s motion and

cannot find that the Dannenberg opinion represents a clear holding that California’s parole

scheme is not mandatory. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Kane, 2006 WL 515627 at *3 (N.D. Cal.

Feb. 28, 2006) (citing cases). Accordingly, under the holdings of McQuillion and Biggs,

Petitioner has a federally protected liberty interest in parole, the Court has jurisdiction over this

matter, and Respondent’s motion is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

In light of the Court’s denial of Respondent’s motion, Respondent must file and serve on

Petitioner on or before April 28, 2006, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

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issued. Respondent must file with the answer a copy of all portions of the administrative record

that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition.

If Petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he must do so by filing a traverse with the

Court and serving it on Respondent on or before May 30, 2006. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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