Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02075/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02075-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DAVID JAMES HOLSINGER,

Plaintiff,

v.

WOLPOFF & ABRAMSON, LLP, et al., 

Defendants.

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Case No.: C 05-2075 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE

ORDER 

On March 13, 2006, this court issued an interim order regarding the proposed form of

protective order submitted by the parties. In its interim order, the court directed the parties to revise

one paragraph of the proposed form of order. On March 14, 2006, Defendants submitted the form of

order revised as directed by the court, but also informed the court that Plaintiff had declined to

stipulate to submission of the revised form of protective order. Based on Defendants’ submission,

this court issued an Order to Plaintiff to Show Cause Why Revised Form of Protective Order Should

Not Be Issued by Court. On March 20, 2006, Plaintiff responded to the Order to Show Cause. 

Based on the file herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the court will issue a Protective Order in the revised form

submitted by Defendants pursuant to this court’s interim order. 

Courts possess inherent authority to sua sponte issue protective orders where good cause for

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ORDER, page 2

such an order is contained in the record. See, e.g., Smith v. Equifax Information Services, 2005 WL

2660381 (D.Conn. 2005). While Plaintiff is unwilling to stipulate to the terms of the revised

protective order required by this court, counsel for Plaintiff did sign a stipulated form of protective

order, filed herein at docket number 26, that contains the following factual recital:

“Disclosure and discovery activity in this action are likely to involve

production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for

which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any

purpose other than prosecuting this litigation would be warranted.” 

Thus, a showing of good cause for entry of a “blanket” protective order is contained in the record,

and sua sponte entry of such an order would be warranted. Nonetheless, the court essentially treated

Defendants’ request for entry of the revised form of protective order as if it were a motion for entry

of a blanket protective order, and afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to oppose that “motion.” 

Nowhere in Plaintiff’s opposition does Plaintiff retract his prior representation to the court that entry

of a blanket protective order is warranted in this case. On the contrary, Plaintiff reiterated his

stipulation to the original form of protective order, and thus to the factual recital therein.

Plaintiff cites no legal authority which requires the initial burden of filing a motion to be

placed on the designating party when a dispute arises over the propriety of a designation pursuant to

a blanket protective order. On the contrary, placing the burden of filing a motion on the challenging

party is entirely appropriate. See, e.g., Gillard v. Boulder Valley School Dist., 196 F.R.D. 382, 386

(D.Colo. 2000) (“the burden of proving confidentiality never shifts from the party asserting that

claim–only the burden of raising that issue”). Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that the rules “shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action.” In this court’s experience, putting the initial burden of

filing a motion to de-designate on the challenging party, while continuing to place the burden of

persuasion on the designating party, best serves judicial economy and the mandates of Rule 1. The

wisdom of this approach is reflected by the fact this district chose to formulate its model form of

protective order to place the burden of filing a motion on the challenging party.

Plaintiff is on record as objecting to the protective order being a “stipulated” order. The

court notes that the revised form of order submitted by Defendants removed the references to it being

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ORDER, page 3

a stipulation.

Plaintiff also complains that the court is disturbing the “bargain” struck by the parties. A

protective order is a court order, not a contract. While parties may suggest terms for a protective

order, the ultimate decision as to the appropriate terms for such an order resides within the discretion

of the court. See, e.g., Ares-Serono, Inc., v. Organon Int'l B.V., 153 F.R.D. 4, 6 (D.Mass. 1993)

(“Th[e] court enjoys ample discretion in fashioning the terms of a protective order to accommodate

the needs and interests of the parties.”). In any event, Plaintiff has not directed the court’s attention

to any provision of the form of protective order, other than the one revised by the court, to which

Plaintiff objects. 

Dated: 3/21/06

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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