Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00156/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00156-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD BUCKNER, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

E.I. DuPONT de NEMOURS and )

Company, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

______________________________)

 AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS.) 

 

1:05-CV-00156-AWI-SMS

ORDER DENYING MOTION OF DEFENDANT

VF IMAGEWAEAR, INC. FOR LEAVE TO

FILE A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

(DOC. 74)

Plaintiff is proceeding with counsel with a civil action.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304.

The motion of Defendant VF Imagewear, Inc. (VF), named in

the complaint as Bulwark Protective Apparel, for leave to file a

third-party complaint against E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company

(DuPont) came on regularly for hearing on April 27, 2006, at 9:30 

a.m. in Courtroom 7 before the Honorable Sandra M. Snyder, United

States Magistrate Judge. All appearances were telephonic. Michael

Hernandez appeared on behalf of Plaintiff; Leslie Burnet and

Stephen Acker appeared on behalf of the moving Defendant VF

Imagewear, Inc.; James Savage appeared on behalf of Defendant

Case 1:05-cv-00156-AWI -SMS Document 102 Filed 04/28/06 Page 1 of 9
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Ameripride Uniform Service; and George Muhar appeared for

Defendant Springfield LLC. The Court had reviewed all the papers

submitted in connection with the motion, the opposition, and the

reply. After argument, the matter was submitted to the Court.

I. Background

On March 9, 2006, Defendant VF Imagewear, Inc. (named in the

complaint as Bulwark Protective Apparel) (VF) filed a notice of

motion and motion of to file a third-party complaint against E.I.

Dupont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), a memorandum of points

and authorities, and a declaration of Leslie Anne Burnet. A proof

of service indicates that it was served on all parties. Defendant

Washing Systems filed a statement of non-opposition to the motion

on April 10, 2006. Plaintiff Donald Buckner filed opposition on

April 12, 2006, with a memorandum and exhibits. On April 20,

2006, Defendant VF filed a reply (entitled opposition to

Plaintiff’s opposition) with a declaration of Leslie Burnet with

exhibits.

This diversity case was removed in February 2005; it was

originally filed in state court in December 2004. The notice of

removal indicates that the initial complaint was by Buckner, who

was burned in a suit manufactured by VF and made of thread

manufactured by DuPont, against VF and DuPont for negligence,

negligent misrepresentation, strict liability, and breach of

warranties. It was alleged in the original complaint that

Defendants, including DuPont, knew or should have known that the

garment was dangerous and abnormally hazardous for one who worked

with hazardous and flammable substances, and Defendants

negligently misrepresented the inflammability of the garment and

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failed to warn or take precautions necessary to safeguard users. 

(Cmplt. at 6-7.) In the strict liability claim, it was alleged

that Defendants designed, manufactured, distributed, and warned

with respect to the garment; although the garment was distributed

as a flame-resistant garment, Defendants “failed to mention in

the labeling of the said product what its useful life is, its

shelf life, if any, and the effect of repeated machine washing

and/or dry cleaning with chemicals attendant thereto.” (Id. at

8.) Plaintiff further alleged that in addition to marketing a

defective product, Defendants marketed a product that was

“further defective in that it failed to warn the user, or those

who would maintain it or clean it, of either its useable shelf

life, use life, or condition which could degrade or limit its

performance in terms of its flame resistance.” (Emphasis added.)

(Id. at 8-9.) The complaint further alleged that Defendants knew

that by failing to inform individuals such as Plaintiff of the

limitations or cleaning safeguards or chemicals which should not

be employed that it was inherently dangerous. (Id. at 9, ¶ 29.)

Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants, including DuPont,

represented that the coat would have an indefinite useful life or

shelf life and could be readily cleaned or dry cleaned without

any aspect of its protective capabilities being degraded thereby.

(Id. at 9-10.)

All parties stipulated to the dismissal of DuPont on August

11, 2005.

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC), filed on

September 14, 2005, stated the same claims, alleging that

Defendant Springfield was a manufacturer of the fabric, Defendant

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VF was designer and manufacturer who introduced the coat into the

market without inspection for defect; Defendant Ameripride

ordered and purchased the coat from VH, and also cleaned,

laundered, repaired and maintained the coat; and Defendant

Washing Systems was a subcontractor of Ameripride with respect to

those services (at 6). Plaintiff alleged that Defendants WSI and

Ameripride knew that the methods and substances that they

recommended and used were not effective in cleaning the Nomex

garment and that the garment was rendered less effective and less

flame resistant (at 4); further, Defendant Springfield, a

manufacturer of the fabric and component parts, knew or should

have known that any user of the coat be advised of the absolute

need when cleaning and maintaining the garment fully and

completely to remove any potentially flammable residue form the

garment during the cleaning process (at 4). It was alleged that

each defendant was negligent in failing to warn of the hazards.

(Id. at 8.) In the strict liability action, it was expressly

stated that Defendants failed to mention in the labeling of the

product the useful life, shelf life, and the effect of repeated

washing and/or dry cleaning; it was alleged that the product was

defective in that it “failed to warn the user, or those who would

maintain it or clean it, of either its useable shelf life, use

life, or condition which could degrade or limit its performance

in terms of its flame resistance” (Id. at 10); and it was alleged

that defendants knew that by failing to inform plaintiff of the

limitations of the lab coat or “the safeguards to be employed

when cleaned, or dry cleaned, or chemicals which should not be

employed in regard thereto...that it was inherently

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dangerous....” (Id. at 10.)

II. Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in pertinent part:

(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At

any time after commencement of the action a defending

party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons

and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to

the action who is or may be liable to the third-party

plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim

against the third-party plaintiff. The third-party

plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if

the third-party plaintiff files the third-party

complaint not later than 10 days after serving the

original answer. Otherwise the third-party plaintiff

must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties

to the action. . . .

The decision to allow impleader under Rule 14 is entrusted

to the court’s sound discretion. Southwest Administrators, Inc.

v. Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1986). The

purpose of the rule is to promote judicial efficiency by

eliminating the necessity for the defendant to bring a separate

action against a third party who may be secondarily or

derivatively liable to the defendant for all or part of the

plaintiff’s original claim. Id. The Court must balance the desire

to avoid circuity of actions and to obtain consistent results

against any prejudice that the plaintiff might suffer from

complications of the case. Irwin v. Mascott, 94 F.Supp.2d 1052,

1056 (N.D.Cal. 2000).

Among the factors district courts have considered in

determining motions for impleader are 1) prejudice to the

original plaintiff; 2) complication of issues at trial; 3)

likelihood of trial delay; 4) timeliness of the motion to

implead; and 5) the merits of the third-party complaint.

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Remington Arms v. Liberty Mutl. Ins., 748 F.Supp. 1057, 1068

(D.Del. 1990). The Court should also consider the possibility of

delay and prejudice to other parties. Ahern v. Gaussoin, 104

F.R.D. 37, 39-40 (D.C.Or. 1984). The third-party plaintiff’s

claim must be dependent upon the outcome of the main claim.

Stewart v. American Int’l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 199-200

(9th Cir. 1988). This requires that the defendant must be

attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability

asserted against him by the original plaintiff. However, it is

not necessary that the third-party defendant be liable to the

original plaintiff. Irwin v. Mascott, 94 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1056

(N.D.Cal. 2000). 

B. Analysis

Defendant VF seeks to implead Dupont as a tortfeasor from

whom VF would be entitled to indemnity because DuPont invented

and manufactured Nomex thread and sold it to Defendant

Springfield, which used it to make fabric that it sold to

Defendant VF, which designed and manufactured the lab coat.

(Proposed Cmplt at 1-2.) VF alleges that DuPont had active and

primary fault and negligence and thus was obligated to defend,

indemnify, and hold VF harmless. VF also alleges that should it

be liable, it would be entitled to contribution from DuPont of a

percentage of liability. Finally, VF also seeks declaratory

relief with respect to DuPont’s obligation to indemnify it.

 A claim for partial indemnity on a comparative fault basis

by a concurrent tortfeasor is available under California law.

American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, 20 Cal.3d 578, 599, 605-606 (1978). This doctrine with

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respect to indemnity also applies to successive tortfeasors,

Blecker v. Wolbart, 167 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1203 (1985), and to

defendants in strict liability actions, Daly v. General Motors

Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 742-43 (1978). Thus, the third-party

complaint appears to be potentially meritorious.

Evidence that David Loftin, the VF employee who controlled

or supervised the formulation of warning language, relied

substantially on an entity other than DuPont (Southern Mills, a

fabric supplier) in the process resulting in the warnings does

not change this analysis at this point in the case. Loftin did

testify that DuPont probably was consulted, that he read DuPont

material and edited it into the RK-63 document, and that there

was other information that was put out by VF on special care for

Nomex, including general care information in the safety apparel

update, the price list, and the catalog. Further, the declaration

of Burnet in support of the reply, Exhs. B-D points out that

DuPont literature existed which covered topics that VF included

in its warning language. At this point it is not the ultimate

probative posture of the evidence that is significant; rather, it

is merely the issue of the legal sufficiency or futility of the

statement of the claim. The fact that there is controverting

evidence regarding the extent of DuPont’s involvement does not

render legally insufficient or futile what is otherwise a legally

sufficient claim for indemnification.

The gist of the claim against DuPont by VF is the same as

the Plaintiff’s existing claim against VF, namely, inadequate

warning regarding the nature and care of the garment. Thus, it

does not appear that this issue would complicate the issues at

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trial in any substantial sense.

The allegations of the original and first amended complaints

were sufficient to put VF on notice of the presence of a

defective warning theory with respect to the use or laundering of

the garment. It appears that the dismissal of DuPont from the

action was premature. As early as November 2005, Plaintiff’s

request for production included two requests for documents

regarding washing Nomex garments with non-Nomex items, and on

January 13, 2006, Plaintiff propounded requests for admissions

containing seventeen requests regarding the washing process.

Defendant’s delay of months in bringing this motion is not

adequately explained or excused.

Plaintiff notes that the discovery cut-off in this case was

April 17, 2006; expert witness designation is due on April 21,

2006; non-dispositive motions are due by July 7, 2006, and

dispositive motions by July 14, 2006; pretrial is set for August

4, 2006. More than fifteen non-expert depositions have been taken

(in March and April 2006), and Plaintiff has expended over $6,000

in deposition transcripts; opening up the case to a new party

would require reopening and retaking depositions that have

already taken place at considerable time and expense. Further,

the lab coat was cut up in February 2006 and disseminated for

destructive testing at VF’s request, with no piece reserved for

DuPont or any other additional party. This does tend to reflect

the substantial course of discovery that has been nearly

completed in this case and some likely prejudice to DuPont.

Significant additional discovery is likely. Trial is only five

months away (September 19, 2006), and it is extremely unlikely

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that DuPont could adequately prepare for trial within the current

deadlines. 

Finally, as Plaintiff notes, because VF can file a separate

action for indemnity due to the fact that the impleader is

permissive and not mandatory, VF will suffer no ultimate

prejudice (although it would have to incur the costs and delay of

another action).

III. Disposition

Accordingly, it is appropriate for the Court to exercise its

discretion to deny VF’s motion for leave to file a third party

complaint. See, Ahern v. Gaussoin, 104 F.R.D. 37, 41-42 (D. Ore.

1984) (failure to justify ten month delay); McDougald v. O.A.R.S.

Companies, Inc., 2006 WL 997896, *3 (E.D.Cal. April 17, 2006).

The motion of Defendant VF Imagewear, Inc. for leave to file

a third-party complaint IS DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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