Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-01306/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-01306-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1132 E.R.I.S.A.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 JEFFREY LYNN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Defendant. /

No. 10-01306 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING

IN PART

DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket No. 10)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jeffrey Lynn alleges that Defendant Pacific Gas and

Electric Company (PG&E) has denied him long-term disability

benefits in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act (ERISA). PG&E moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for

failure to state a claim. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The

motion was taken under submission on the papers. Having considered

the papers submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS PG&E’s motion

in part and DENIES it in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the complaint and documents

upon which the complaint relies, as described below. 

Plaintiff began employment with PG&E on May 22, 1984. On May

22, 1994, while in the course of his employment, Plaintiff was in

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an auto collision that left him disabled. Plaintiff returned to

work for a brief period later in 1994, but he has not worked since

that time. Plaintiff alleges that, although he has been unable to

work, he has remained an employee of PG&E, and collected workers’

compensation benefits until 2009. 

On October 27, 2009, Plaintiff applied for benefits under

PG&E’s long-term disability benefit plan. On December 23, 2009,

the plan administrator, identified only as “Hewitt,” denied

Plaintiff’s claim for benefits. Hewitt explained that Plaintiff’s

ten years and five days of credited service at the time of the

accident qualified him for ten years and five days of long-term

disability benefits. Under this calculation, Plaintiff’s

eligibility for long-term disability benefits ended in 2005. 

Further, Hewitt noted that workers’ compensation benefits and longterm disability benefits run concurrently and, because Plaintiff’s

workers’ compensation benefits exceeded his long-term disability

benefits, he was not entitled to benefits for the period prior to

2005. On March 3, 2010, Hewitt’s decision was affirmed by its

Employee Benefits Appeals Committee. 

On March 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that

his benefits were denied in violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-

1469. The complaint prays for relief in the form of compensatory

damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and “statutory damages pursuant

to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(c)(1)(b) and/or (c)(3) for failure to provide

requested long-term disability documents within 30 days.” (Comp.

5). On April 27, 2010, PG&E filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the

defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds

on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to

state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

However, this principle is inapplicable to legal conclusions;

“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not taken as true. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, the court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

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complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97.

DISCUSSION

I. Supplemental Documents Attached to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss

Supplemental documents appended to a motion to dismiss may be

considered if the authenticity of the documents is uncontested and

the complaint necessarily relies on them, even if the plaintiff

does not explicitly allege the contents of the documents. Knieval

v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted);

see Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting

that such a rule prevents “plaintiffs from surviving a Rule

12(b)(6) motion by deliberately omitting references to documents

upon which their claims are based.”).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint pleads the existence of a PG&E

long-term disability plan, Plaintiff’s application for long-term

disability benefits, the denial of the application directly and on

appeal and an explanatory brochure allegedly not given to Plaintiff

when requested. Because the complaint necessarily relies on the

contents of these documents, and because Plaintiff does not contest

their authenticity, the Court considers them in resolving the

motion.

II. Plaintiff’s Long-term Disability Benefits Claim

Defendant argues that the motion to dismiss should be granted

because, under the plain language of the plan which describes its

long-term disability benefits, Plaintiff’s eligibility for benefits

ended in 2005.

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Defendant has submitted two long-term disability plans with

its motion to dismiss, one dating from 1991, and one from 2008. 

The two plans are substantially similar in the portions to which

the parties refer, with the only difference being that the 1991

plan refers to “Service” while the 2008 plan refers to “Credited

Service.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, Ex. D., § 19.E. at 11; Def.’s

Reply, Ex. A, § IV.E at 44. Because there appears to be no dispute

over the word “Credited,” the Court refers only to the 2008 plan. 

The relevant portion of the 2008 plan provides:

SECTION IV. DURATION OF LONG-TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS

While a Participant follows treatment recommended by

his physician, LTD benefits will be available until the

earliest of the following:

. . .

D. If the Participant becomes eligible for LTD

benefits, at age 61 or older, or if the Participant has

less than five years of Credited Service with one or

more Employers (as each term is defined in the

Retirement plan) at the date of disability: Five years.

E. If the Participant has five, but less than 15 years

of Credited Service with one or more Employers at the

date of disability: a period equal to the Participant’s

length of service with an employer.

F. If the Participant has 15 or more years of Credited

Service with one or more Employers at the date of

disability: the date of the Participant’s retirement

under the provisions of the Retirement Plan or an Early

Retirement Date selected by the Participant under the

provisions of the Retirement Plan. 

Here, the parties agree that Plaintiff had ten years and five days

of Credited Service at the time he became disabled. This means

that Section IV.E. of the plan applies, and he is entitled to “a

period equal to the Participant’s length of Credited Service with

an employer.” The parties dispute, however, the interpretation of

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1

 Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply because

Plaintiff did not obtain leave to file it, as required by Civil

Local Rule 7-3(d). However, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s

sur-reply because it addresses the interpretation of documents

first introduced with Defendant’s reply. 

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that phrase.

Defendant argues that, as plan administrator Hewitt noted in

its denial of Plaintiff’s application, Plaintiff’s “length of

Credited Service with an employer” is the number of years Plaintiff

worked for PG&E before he became disabled, ten years and five days. 

This would mean that Plaintiff’s eligibility ended in 2005. In his

sur-reply,1 Plaintiff disputes this interpretation, arguing instead

that because he remains employed by PG&E and continues to accrue

Credited Service, he is entitled to long-term disability benefits

based on his continuing Credited Service, now more than twenty-five

years.

Section IV.E. does not explicitly state whether "a period

equal to the Participant's length of Credited Service" is to be

measured from the date of disability or the date the participant

ceases to be employed with PG&E. Plaintiff alleges that he has

remained employed with PG&E and continued to accrue credited

service after the date of his disability. Comp. 3. Neither party

explains why Plaintiff has remained an employee of PG&E and

continued to accrue credited service despite the fact that he has

not worked for the last sixteen years. Defendant's references to

Section II.C. and to its explanatory booklet do not appear to

demonstrate conclusively that Plaintiff's interpretation is

untenable. Defendant has not carried its burden to show that

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Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's motion to

dismiss on this ground. 

III. Failure to Provide Long-Term Disability Benefits Plan Upon

Request

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim regarding Defendant’s

failure to provide a copy of the relevant long-term disability

benefits plan is improperly plead.

The complaint refers only in its request for damages to

Defendant’s failure to provide Plaintiff with the relevant plan. 

(Comp. 5). No facts are alleged in the body of the complaint to

justify this request for damages. Plaintiff has therefore failed

to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that a plaintiff must show “more

than labels and conclusions” and that “a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.”).

Because Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts to support his

allegation that Defendant failed to provide him with a copy of the

relevant plan upon request, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, with leave to amend if Plaintiff can truthfully plead

facts that would entitle him to relief on this claim.

III. Proper Party to the Action

ERISA authorizes claims against the relevant plan and plan

administrator. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (c); Ford v. MCI

Commc’ns Corp. Health & Welfare Plan, 399 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir.

2005). Because the complaint fails to allege that PG&E is the plan

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or plan administrator, it fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion

to dismiss on this ground, with leave to amend to name the proper

defendant or plead that PG&E is a proper defendant.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES

in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff may file an

amended complaint, addressing the deficiencies described above,

within seven days of the date of this Order. If Plaintiff does so,

PG&E may file a motion to dismiss within seven days thereafter,

with Plaintiff’s opposition due seven days following and PG&E’s

reply due four days after that. The motion will be taken under

submission on the papers. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended

complaint the case will be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 

The case management conference on July 13, 2010 is vacated and

rescheduled to July 27, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 06/21/10 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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