Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05136/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05136-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 2014 Decided January 20, 2015

No. 13-5136

CAROL GRUNEWALD, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

JONATHAN B. JARVIS AND SALLY JEWELL,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-01738)

Katherine Anne Meyer argued the cause for appellants. 

With her on the briefs was William S. Eubanks II.

Lane N. McFadden, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was

Robert G. Dreher, Acting Assistant Attorney General. 

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, PILLARD, Circuit Judge,

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: The National Park Service

of the Department of Interior adopted a plan for the management

of deer in Rock Creek National Park in Washington, D.C. The

plan involved the killing of white-tailed deer. The consideration

and adoption of the plan included the issuance of an

environmental impact statement. Appellants, five individuals

and an organization called “In Defense of Animals,” brought the

present action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that

the Park Service’s plan violated statutes governing the

management of the Park and was not adopted in compliance

with the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint further

alleged that the environmental impact statement did not meet the

requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants. Plaintiffs brought the present appeal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Rock Creek Park in Washington, D.C., was created by Act

of Congress in 1890 as a “public park or pleasure ground for the

benefit and enjoyment of the people of the United States.” Rock

Creek Park Enabling Act (“Enabling Act”), Ch. 1001, § 1, 26

Stat. 492. Originally, the Park was under the joint control of the

Commissioners of the District of Columbia and the Chief

Engineers of the United States Army. Id. § 7. In 1916,

Congress established the National Park Service under the

National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, and the Rock

Creek Park came under the authority of the Park Service. Both

Acts authorize the management of natural phenomena such as

wildlife within the park. The present controversy arises over the

management of the deer population.

According to the Park Service, few if any white-tailed deer

inhabited Rock Creek Park at the turn of the twentieth century. 

See National Park Service, Final White-Tailed Deer

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Management Plan/EIS (“Final EIS”) at ii (2011). Over the

years, however, conditions changed. Areas surrounding Rock

Creek Park became urbanized or suburbanized. Predators, such

as cougars and wolves, no longer populated the mid-Atlantic

region. Deer became increasingly common in Rock Creek Park. 

Occasional deer sightings emerged in the 1960s and continued

sporadically throughout the 1970s. By the early 1990s, deer

sightings were so common that the Park Service no longer

recorded individual sightings. In 1989, the Park Service

recorded the first incident of a deer struck and killed by a

vehicle. See id. at 14. From 2003 to 2007, the Park Service

recorded an average of 42 deer-vehicle collisions per year. See

id. at 148.

Deer are herbivores and generally browse vegetation from

ground level to approximately six feet in height. A large deer

population can result in a visible “browse line,” a line at

approximately six feet above ground level, “below which most

or all vegetation has been uniformly browsed.” Id. at 535. Deer

browsing can adversely impact native vegetation by overconsuming existing shrubs and herbaceous species. Excessive

browsing of tree seedlings interferes with the forest’s ability to

naturally regenerate itself. See id. at 1. 

By the mid-1990’s, the Park Service began formally

monitoring deer population levels. Based on intensive scientific

evaluation, the Service estimated that, by 2009, Rock Creek

Park would have a deer density of 67 per square mile, or

approximately 315 total deer in the Park. See id. at 56. Given

the increase in deer population and the increase in attendant

problems, the Park Service convened a science team, comprised

of experts from various state and federal agencies, to provide

technical background information and research to support the

preparation of a deer management plan. Science Team Final

Report: Rock Creek Park Deer Management Plan/Environmental

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Impact Statement (“Science Team Final Report”) (2007). In

September 2006, the Park Service published a notice in the

Federal Register that it intended to prepare a white-tailed deer

management plan and an accompanying environmental impact

statement for Rock Creek Park, and invited comments from the

public. 71 Fed. Reg. 55012, 55012–13 (Sept. 20, 2006). During

the so-called “public scoping,” the Park Service held two public

meetings and received 140 written comments. See National

Park Service, Record of Decision: Rock Creek Park WhiteTailed Deer Management Plan and Final Environmental Impact

Statement (“Record of Decision”) at 11 (2012). In July 2007,

the science team published its summary and recommendations,

suggesting that an initial goal of 15 to 20 deer per square mile in

2009 “would be appropriate for Rock Creek Park.” Science

Team Final Report at 5.

In 2009, the Park Service published its Draft White-Tailed

Deer Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement

(“Draft EIS”). The Draft EIS stated a need to address the

“potential of deer becoming the dominant force in the park’s

ecosystem, and adversely impacting native vegetation and other

wildlife,” a “decline in tree seedlings caused by excessive deer

browsing and the ability of the forest to regenerate,” and

“[e]xcessive deer browsing impacts on the existing shrubs and

herbaceous species” as well as on the “character of the [park’s]

cultural landscapes.” Draft EIS at 1–2 (2009). The Plan’s

objectives included protecting “the natural abundance,

distribution, and diversity of native plant species . . . by reducing

excessive deer browsing, trampling, and nonnative seed

dispersal,” and protecting the habitat of birds and “rare plant and

animal species from adverse effects of deer.” Id. at 2. The Draft

EIS identified four alternatives, including a “no-action”

alternative (Alternative A). Under Alternative B, the Park

Service would utilize non-lethal actions for deer control,

including large-scale exclosures and reproductive controls. 

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Alternative C would include lethal actions, reducing the size of

the deer herd through sharpshooting or capture and euthanasia. 

Alternative D would include both lethal and non-lethal actions,

using lethal actions to quickly reduce the deer herd, with the

possible use of reproductive controls to maintain herd size. Id.

at 41–42. The Park Service identified Alternative D as its

preferred alternative, and as the environmentally preferred

alternative. Id. at 92.

After releasing the Draft EIS, the National Park Service

announced an extended public comment period and held a

public meeting on its Draft EIS. See Record of Decision at 11. 

Over 125 people attended the meeting, and the Park Service

received 414 pieces of correspondence during the comment

period. See id. at 11–12. The Park Service ultimately chose

Alternative D in its Final EIS, finding that a combination of

lethal and non-lethal controls would promote enhanced forest

regeneration, improve the quality of Rock Creek’s scenery and

ecological diversity, and provide flexibility for the potential use

of non-lethal means to control deer herd size. See id. at 8–10. 

The Park Service rejected the no-action alternative, Alternative

A, as it would allow deer over-browsing and trampling to

continue to adversely impact native vegetation. Alternative B,

using only non-lethal reproductive controls, would not reduce

the deer population quickly enough, given the long life cycle of

white-tailed deer. Alternative C, using only lethal controls,

would accomplish many of the Park Service’s objectives, but

would not allow future use of non-lethal methods, should the

Park Service later find reproductive controls feasible and

effective in maintaining acceptable deer densities. See id. at

9–10.

The Park Service published its Final Deer Management Plan

and EIS for public review on January 13, 2012, and issued its

Final Record of Decision on May 1, 2012. Plaintiff–appellants

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filed their complaint in federal district court on October 25,

2012. The parties jointly agreed that the Park Service would

stay implementation of the deer management plan until March

15, 2013, to give the district court time to rule on the merits. On

March 14, 2013, the district court granted summary judgment

for the defendants. Grunewald v. Jarvis, 930 F. Supp. 2d 73

(D.D.C. 2013). Plaintiffs appeal, assigning several grounds of

alleged error. Upon review, we conclude that the National Park

Service acted reasonably and within the scope of its authority,

and therefore affirm.

ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to the National Park Service de novo, applying the

Administrative Procedure Act standard that “requires us to set

aside agency action that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Jicarilla

Apache Nation v. Dep’t of Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1118 (D.C.

Cir. 2010) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Applying that

standard, we consider each of appellants’ allegations of error.

A. Whether the Deer Management Plan Violates the Rock

Creek Park Enabling Act

Appellants argue that “the district court erred in deferring

to the agency’s post hoc construction of the Rock Creek Park

enabling statute.” Grunewald Br. 28. This is not precisely the

question before us, as we review the agency’s decision de novo. 

The question, then, is not whether the district court erred in its

consideration of the agency’s construction of the statute, but

whether upon review of the administrative record we determine

that the agency’s construction of the Enabling Act is sustainable.

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The relevant portion of the Enabling Act reads as follows:

[T]he public park authorized and established by this act

shall be under the joint control of the Commissioners of the

District of Columbia and the Chief of Engineers of the

United States Army, whose duty it shall be, as soon as

practicable, to lay out and prepare roadways and bridle

paths, to be used for driving and for horseback riding,

respectively, and footways for pedestrians; and whose duty

it shall also be to make and publish such regulations as they

deem necessary or proper for the care and management of

the same. Such regulations shall provide for the

preservation from injury or spoliation of all timber, animals,

or curiosities within said park, and their retention in their

natural condition, as nearly as possible.

Enabling Act, § 7. Although the National Park Service, rather

than the Commissioners and Engineers named in the Enabling

Act, is now responsible for its administration, no one contends

that the Enabling Act no longer applies. As we note further

below, the Organic Act of the National Park Service, 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1, 3, is also relevant, but we nonetheless agree that the

provisions of the Enabling Act are still effective.

In beginning our review of appellants’ objection to the

agency’s adherence to the Enabling Act, we note that we afford

the Park Service the deference mandated in Chevron, U.S.A.,

Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Appellants urge that the

agency is not due such deference, as the Park Service’s position

that the statutes permit the killing of deer is “post hoc,” and first

appeared as the litigation position of the agency in the district

court. Appellants are mistaken. The agency has consistently

treated the Enabling Act as setting forth “the most fundamental

criteria against which the appropriateness of all plan

recommendations” are to be tested. National Park Service, Rock

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Creek Park Final General Management Plan/EIS at 11–12

(2005). The agency has recognized among those criteria the

mandate to “preserve and perpetuate” the park, its “ecological

. . . resources,” and its “scenic beauty,” in “as natural a condition

as possible.” Id.; Final EIS at 11. The first sentence of the

executive summary of the deer management final environmental

impact statement applies that interpretation of the Enabling Act. 

Specifically, the EIS states:

PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR ACTION

The purpose of this action is to develop a white-tailed deer

(Odocoileus virginarius) management strategy that supports

long-term protection, preservation, and restoration of native

vegetation and other natural and cultural resources in Rock

Creek Park. White-tailed deer herds have increased

substantially within and around Rock Creek Park. In 2007,

sampling indicated 82 deer per square mile in the park, and

deer densities continued at high levels in 2008 (66 deer per

square mile) and 2009 (67 deer per square mile). Results of

vegetation monitoring in recent years have documented the

adverse effects of the large herd size on forest regeneration.

Final EIS at i. The Record of Decision is to the same effect. 

See Record of Decision at 1. In short, the agency has

consistently interpreted the Act permitting it to conduct the

proposed killing of deer, and there is nothing post hoc about that

position. Before this court, however, the Park Service raises a

harder line position that the Enabling Act does not apply to the

present deer management plan at all.

The agency’s hard-line position begins with a meticulous

review of the precise language of the Act. The agency points to

the Act’s last sentence, requiring that “[s]uch regulations shall

provide for the preservation from injury or spoliation of all

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timber, animals, or curiosities within said park, and their

retention in their natural condition, as nearly as possible.” 

Enabling Act, § 7. The term “such regulations,” it argues, must

relate back to the last preceding reference to what might be

described as “such regulations.” As the agency argues, that last

reference comes in the next preceding sentence, where the

predecessor agencies of the Park Service are given the duty “to

make and publish such regulations as they deem necessary or

proper for the care and management of the same.” Id. (emphasis

added). The argument of the agency proceeds that this next

raises the question of what referent is intended by the term “the

same.” This time, the Park Service looks back to the earlier

parts of that same sentence which refer to the “duty” of the

agency to “lay out and prepare roadways and bridle paths, to be

used for driving and for horseback riding, respectively, and

footways for pedestrians.” Id. Thus, the Park Service argues,

§ 7 of the Enabling Act refers only to regulations governing

roadways, bridle paths, and footways, and has no applicability

to regulations governing other parts of the park, such as the one

before the court.

While the agency’s hard-line interpretation has some logic,

we do not find it necessary to uphold that construction of the

statute, as the statute, taken as applying to the regulation of the

whole park, nonetheless is consistent with the Park Service’s

decision in this case. The agency’s fallback position, actually

more consistent with its position in the Record of Decision and

the Environmental Impact Statement, is that even under the

Enabling Act, properly construed, the Park Service has the

authority to implement the plan as presented.

Taken at its simplest, appellants’ position is that because the

Enabling Act requires that regulations “provide for the

preservation from injury or spoliation . . . animals . . . within

said park . . . as nearly as possible,” a plan which involves

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killing some animals is not consistent with the authority and

duty granted to the governing agency. However, despite the

simplicity of that interpretation, we agree with the agency that

the meaning of “possible” can no more be taken to the

metaphysical limit of “possibility” than the term “necessary” in

the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. U.S.

Const. art. I, § 8. Just as there is no question that Congress need

not discover the direst and most absolute necessity in order to

execute its enumerated powers, neither can it be that the Park

Service must refrain from wildlife management unless it can

determine that it is utterly impossible to avoid that form of

management. Under the Chevron analysis, we defer to an

agency’s interpretation, not only where it is the best

interpretation, but where it is merely “reasonable.” Chevron,

467 U.S. at 844. We do not suggest that the agency’s

interpretation of its authority here is not the best, but only assure

that it is at the very least reasonable.

The National Park Service interpreted the mandate to

preserve animals from harm “as nearly as possible” to permit

killing some animals to prevent serious harms to other natural

resources, even before those harms have fully materialized. 

That interpretation was reasonable. We note that the Tenth

Circuit considered a similar issue in interpreting the Secretary

of Interior’s authority under Section 3 of the Organic Act to

“provide in his discretion for the destruction of such animals . . .

as may be detrimental to the use of any of said parks,” 16 U.S.C.

§ 3. In rejecting the argument that something is only

“detrimental to the use” of a park if it causes a present harm, the

court observed: 

The obvious purpose of this language is to require the

Secretary to determine when it is necessary to destroy

animals which, for any reason, may be detrimental to the

use of the park. He need not wait until the damage through

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overbrowsing has taken its toll on the park plant life and

deer herd before taking preventive action no less than he

would be required to delay the destruction of a vicious

animal until after an attack upon a person.

New Mexico State Game Comm’n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197, 1201

(10th Cir. 1969).

In our focus on the interpretation of the Enabling Act

responsive to the appellants’ assignment of error, we do not lose

sight of the ultimate purpose of our review: We are to uphold the

agency’s action unless it is “‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Jicarilla,

613 F.3d at 1118 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Indeed, in

first setting forth the two-step process of Chevron analysis, the

Supreme Court noted that the review of an agency’s enabling

acts occurred in the context of reviewing regulations that “are

given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or

manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 

It was in that context that the Chevron Court observed that “a

court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory

provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the

administrator of an agency.” Id. There is nothing unreasonable

about an agency charged with the preservation of “all timber,

animals, or curiosities within said park,” Enabling Act, § 7

(emphasis added), determining that preventing an imbalance that

allows one species of its protectees to destroy others is within

the power granted by its enabling act.

The reasonableness of the Park Service’s interpretation of

the Enabling Act, and indeed, the propriety of its decision under

the arbitrary and capricious standard, is buttressed by the fact

that the Park Service is required to comply not only with the

Enabling Act, but also with the National Park Service Organic

Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. The Organic Act, which creates the

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Park Service as an agency of the Department of Interior,

provides the Service power to

promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as

national parks, monuments, and reservations hereinafter

specified . . . to conserve the scenery and the natural and

historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for

the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such

means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of

future generations.

16 U.S.C. § 1.

Further, the Organic Act expressly provides that the

Secretary of the Interior (of whom the Service is the delegee)

“may also provide in his discretion for the destruction of such

animals and of such plant life as may be detrimental to the use

of any said parks, monuments, or reservations.” Id. § 3. Given

the express empowerment under the Organic Act, the agency’s

interpretation is, at the very least, reasonable.

Appellants discount the effect of the Organic Act by

claiming that the Organic Act is overridden by the Enabling Act. 

In support of this proposition, they point to 16 U.S.C. § 1c(b),

which provides, “[e]ach area within the national park system

shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of any

statute made specifically applicable to that area.” Thus, the

normal canon that the later-enacted Organic Act would

supersede the earlier-enacted Enabling Act is inapplicable. That

may be. Nonetheless, our earlier observations, that the agency’s

interpretation of the two Acts as giving it the power it exercises

in the decision under review are consistent and reasonable,

remain undisturbed. In short, we reject appellants’ first

assignment of error.

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B. Whether the Deer Management Plan is Otherwise

Arbitrary and Capricious

Aside from their argument that the Deer Management Plan

violates the Park’s Enabling Act, appellants raise other issues

that we analyze under the Administrative Procedure Act. 

Appellants contend that “[e]ven accepting the agency’s position

as articulated in its brief to the district court – that ‘NPS must

reduce the deer population if necessary to prevent “injury or

spoliation” of the “timber” and other resources of the Park, “and

their retention in their natural condition as nearly as possible,”’

– the Park Service simply cannot demonstrate that such

circumstances are present here.” Grunewald Br. 31–32 (quoting

NPS Mot. Summ. J. 30, Grunewald v. Jarvis, No. 1:12-cv-1738

(D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2013), ECF No. 18) (emphasis added by

appellants). Appellants claim that the Park Service has not

demonstrated that deer are causing a problem for forest

regeneration, and has not demonstrated that deer, rather than

some other factor (such as invasive, nonnative plant species), are

to blame for any detrimental impacts on native plant species. 

Thus, appellants argue, the Park Service has not shown that

killing deer is necessary for the protection of the natural

ecology. See Grunewald Br. 31–39.

We first observe that appellants have misconstrued the Park

Service’s interpretation of the Enabling Act. Appellants contend

that, under the Park Service’s own interpretation of the Enabling

Act, reduction of the deer population must be necessary to

prevent injury to plant life. However, appellants make this

argument by selectively quoting the Park Service’s district court

summary judgment brief out of context. In the relevant section

of the brief, when the Park Service described the conditions

under which the Enabling Act’s text “arguably compelled” the

killing of deer, it was adverting to a potentially nondiscretionary core of its duty to act. See NPS Mot. Summ. J. 30. 

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The Park Service was not thereby delineating its own reasonable

interpretation of the outer limit of its prophylactic management

authority, consistent with the Park’s Enabling Act and agency

Organic Act, to select to kill deer as a prudent strategy to

manage competing natural resources in the Park. Contrary to

appellants’ contentions, and consistent with our analysis of the

governing statutes above, the Enabling Act does not require the

Park Service to wait until killing deer is absolutely necessary to

protect other native species. The agency’s Organic Act gives

the Park Service broad discretion to take preventive measures to

control species overpopulation. See, e.g., New Mexico State

Game Comm’n, 410 F.2d at 1201. In this case, the Park Service

did not need to wait until deer overbrowsing took an even

greater toll on native plant species, that is, until the problem met

the appellants’ definition of “necessary,” before taking action.

Appellants further claim that the Park Service lacks the

“data it said were needed before it could take any action to kill

deer in this Park.” Grunewald Br. 32 (emphasis in original). 

They contend that the Park Service’s science team established

a “threshold for taking action” based on Park staff’s monitoring

of tree seedling counts and deer browsing impacts, and that the

Park Service failed to show that conditions in Rock Creek Park

met this threshold. Id. at 32–37. We disagree. The record

shows that the Park Service met its “threshold for taking action.” 

The record documents a dramatic reduction in tree seeding

stocking rates from 1991 to 2007. See Final EIS at 176. Under

high deer densities, such as those present in Rock Creek Park,

normal forest regeneration may be expected to occur when 67%

of observed plots have at least 153 seedlings. See id. at 46. 

None of the plots observed in 2007 had 153 or more seedlings

present. Id. at 176. 

Appellants argue that the Park Service’s seedling count

analysis is flawed because it looked at unfenced plots only, and

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thus could not isolate deer as a causal factor. See Grunewald Br.

at 33–35. We are not persuaded by this argument. First, the

failure to undertake paired plot studies does not mean that the

Park Service failed to meet its self-defined “threshold for taking

action.” Monitoring unfenced plots sufficed to meet that

threshold. See Final EIS at 45–46. Second, the Park Service has

conducted a paired plot study to isolate the effects of deer, and

found that detrimental ecological “impacts can be directly

attributed to deer browsing.” Id. at 17. Thus, the Park Service

had the data necessary to meet its “threshold for taking action,”

and did not need to undertake any further studies before

deciding to take lethal action against deer.

Appellants’ contention that the Park Service had not shown

that deer, rather than some other factor such as invasive plants,

are responsible for harming native plants also fails. The district

court addressed this issue at length, see Grunewald, 930 F.

Supp. 2d at 83–84, 88–90, and we agree with the district court’s

conclusion that the record shows that “the deer are having

negative impacts on Rock Creek Park,” id. at 83. The Park

Service is not required, under the Park’s Enabling Act or

otherwise, to show that deer and only deer are threatening the

native ecology. The Final EIS repeatedly acknowledges the

concurrent threat that invasive plant species pose to the native

ecology. “Anyone reviewing the [Final EIS] does not have to

read far before the subjects of deer management and exotics are

discussed together: there are five mentions of the two subjects

in the first two pages.” Id. at 89. The Park Service has also

shown that deer independently threaten native plants. The Park

Service has compared vegetation cover between fenced and

unfenced plots to help isolate the impacts of deer browsing on

native plants. Final EIS at 17–18. The Park Service has directly

monitored the effects of deer, including observing the effects of

deer browsing. See id. at 14. The Park Service has reasonably,

and on the basis of sufficient evidence, concluded that “deer

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herbivory is having significant negative impacts on forest

vegetation in the park.” National Park Service, Impacts of Deer

Herbivory on Vegetation in Rock Creek Park, 2001-2009 at 10

(2011). Therefore, we hold that the National Park Service’s

Deer Management Plan for Rock Creek Park is not arbitrary,

capricious, or otherwise in contravention of the Administrative

Procedure Act.

C. Challenges Under the National Environmental Policy

Act

In addition to their arguments relying on the Enabling Act

and the Administrative Procedure Act, appellants contend that

the Park Service did not comply with the National

Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). In reviewing appellants’

arguments on this subject, we recall at the outset that NEPA’s

mandate “is essentially procedural.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,

558 (1978). NEPA requires agencies to take a “‘hard look’ at

environmental consequences,” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.

390, 410 n.21 (1976), and to “provide for broad dissemination

of relevant environmental information,” Robertson v. Methow

Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). It is “well

settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but

simply prescribes the necessary process.” Robertson, 490 U.S.

at 350. NEPA is “not a suitable vehicle” for airing grievances

about the substantive polices adopted by an agency, as “NEPA

was not intended to resolve fundamental policy disputes.” 

Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir.

1987).

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1. Whether the Park Service Violated NEPA in its

Failure to Consider Exotic Vegetation Abatement as a

Fifth Alternative

Appellants argue that “by failing to consider the reduction

of exotic plant species as an alternative way to protect the native

vegetation in the Park,” Grunewald Br. 39, the National Park

Service violated its NEPA obligation to consider “all

‘reasonable alternatives’ to the proposed action,” Nevada v.

Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting 40

C.F.R. § 1502.14). Appellants argue that the Park Service has

recognized that the proliferation of exotic plants seriously

threatens native vegetation. They further contend that removing

exotic plants could accomplish the stated objective of the Deer

Management Plan to protect native plants, and that the Park

Service violated NEPA when it refused to consider exotic plant

removal as an alternative to killing deer.

Again, appellants’ argument is not persuasive. In reviewing

an agency’s selection of alternatives, we owe “considerable

deference to the agency’s expertise and policy-making role.” 

City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

“[W]e review both an agency’s definition of its objectives and

its selection of alternatives under the ‘rule of reason.’” 

Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d

66, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “[A]s long as the agency ‘look[s] hard

at the factors relevant to the definition of purpose,’ we generally

defer to the agency’s reasonable definition of objectives.” Id.

(quoting Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d

190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). “If the agency’s objectives are

reasonable, we will uphold the agency’s selection of alternatives

that are reasonable in light of those objectives.” Id.

Under this deferential standard, we conclude that the Park

Service did not err when it failed to include removing exotic

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plants as a stand-alone alternative. In arguing that the Park

Service could have achieved its stated objectives without killing

deer, appellants quote selectively from the record. They

emphasize the Management Plan’s objectives to “[p]rotect the

natural abundance, distribution, and diversity of native plant

species,” and “[m]aintain, restore, and promote a mix of native

plant species and reduce the spread of nonnative plant species.” 

Final EIS at i (quoted in Grunewald Br. 40). However,

appellants omit other, more specific objectives that the Park

Service cannot accomplish through plant management alone. 

These objectives include “[p]rotect[ing] habitat of rare plant and

animal species from adverse effects of deer, such as excessive

deer browsing, trampling, and nonnative seed dispersal”; and

“[p]rotect[ing] the integrity, variety, and character of the cultural

landscapes by reducing excessive deer browsing, trampling, and

nonnative seed dispersal.” Final EIS at ii.

The Park Service reasonably determined that the

overpopulation of white-tailed deer in Rock Creek Park

detrimentally affects the Park’s ecology. Given this concern, it

was not unreasonable for the Park Service to define its

objectives in terms of abating the effects of deer browsing and

trampling. A stand-alone exotic plants management plan would

not address the deer problem. The agency did not adopt “an

‘unreasonably narrow’ definition of objectives that compels the

selection of a particular alternative.” Theodore Roosevelt, 661

F.3d at 73. Instead, it reasonably defined its objectives and

alternatives in light of its legitimate concern with deer

populations. Accordingly, the Park Service did not violate

NEPA when it did not consider a “plants-only” option as an

alternative.

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2. Whether NEPA Requires the National Park Service

to Analyze the 2004 Draft Exotic Plant Management

Plan as a “Connected” or “Similar” Action

Appellants argue the Park Service violated NEPA when the

Park Service did not analyze its 2004 Draft Exotic Plant

Management Plan in the same NEPA document as its Deer

Management Plan. Appellants contend that an agency should

consider “connected” or “similar” actions within a single NEPA

document. Connected actions are “closely related and therefore

should be discussed in the same impact statement.” 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.25(a)(1). Similar actions are those “which when viewed

with other reasonably foreseeable or proposed agency actions,

have similarities that provide a basis for evaluating their

environmental consequences together.” Id. at § 1508.25(a)(3). 

Therefore, appellants contend, the National Park Service’s 2004

Draft Exotic Plant Management Plan, which aims to combat the

proliferation of invasive plants in Rock Creek Park, is a

“connected” or “similar” action and the Park Service should

have considered it alongside the Deer Management Plan within

a single programmatic EIS. We disagree. The Park Service did

not violate the requirements of NEPA by analyzing the 2004

Draft Exotic Plant Management Plan and the Deer Management

Plan in different documents. “Even when [an EIS addresses]

one of a series of closely related proposals, the decision whether

to prepare a programmatic impact statement is committed to the

agency’s discretion.” Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh,

655 F.2d 346, 374 n.73 (D.C. Cir. 1981). “Only if the decision

is arbitrary and capricious will we overturn it.” Nevada, 457

F.3d at 92 (citations omitted). In determining whether a

programmatic EIS is necessary, we consider “the extent of the

interrelationship among proposed actions and practical

considerations of feasibility.” Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412.

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We reject appellants’ contention that the Park Service was

required to consider the Draft Exotic Plant and Deer

Management Plans together in a single EIS as similar actions. 

The regulation cited by appellants does not support appellants’

contentions. Defining “similar actions,” the regulation provides

that an agency “may wish to analyze [similar] actions in the

same impact statement,” and “should do so when [it is] the best

way to assess adequately the combined impacts of similar

actions or reasonable alternatives.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3)

(emphasis added).

The Park Service did not act arbitrarily, but rather exercised

its lawful discretion, when it declined to analyze the Exotic

Plant and Deer Management Plans together. While the Park

Service acknowledges that the subjects of deer management and

invasive species management are “in some ways related,” the

Park Service maintains that they are distinct actions “addressed

in two different planning efforts.” Final EIS at 380. Appellants

point out that the Rock Creek Park General Management Plan

lists future “invasive species control” and “deer management”

implementation plans as “[c]onnected, [c]umulative, and

[s]imilar [a]ctions.” See Grunewald Br. 42–43. However, the

fact that each plan may be related to the Park’s General

Management Plan (which is the “basic document for managing

Rock Creek Park,” Rock Creek Park Final General Management

Plan at 1) does not mean that the plans are so closely related to

each other that NEPA requires concurrent analysis of deer

management and exotic plant control. As the Supreme Court

has held, “[a]n agency enjoys broad discretion in determining

how best to handle related, yet discrete, issues in terms of

procedures and priorities.” Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing

Se. Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 230 (1991)

(citations omitted). The Park Service has not abused that broad

discretion here.

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Similarly, appellants’ contention that the Park Service

arbitrarily failed to consider the Deer Management and Draft

Exotic Plant Plans together as “connected” actions is unavailing. 

Under the regulation, actions are “connected” if they

“[a]utomatically trigger other actions which may require

environmental impact statements”; “[c]annot or will not proceed

unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously”; or

“[a]re interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the

larger action for their justification.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1). 

Again, the Park Service acted within its discretion when it

declined to analyze the Exotic Plant and Deer Management

Plans together as “connected” actions. Nothing in the record

indicates that any of the regulatory definitions of “connected”

apply. Neither Plan automatically triggers other reportable

actions. Actions pursuant to the Deer Management Plan have

already proceeded, and have not depended on the concurrent or

previous undertaking of the Draft Exotic Plant Plan or some

other action. The Plans are not interdependent parts of a larger

action. The fact that the Plans have similar goals, protecting the

native ecology, does not make the plans sufficiently intertwined

to require concurrent NEPA analysis. “[A]n agency need not

solve every problem before it in the same proceeding.” Mobil

Oil, 498 U.S. at 231. A court “cannot force an agency to

aggregate diverse actions to the point where problems must be

tackled from every angle at once. To do so risks further

paralysis of agency decisionmaking.” Nw. Res. Info. Ctr., Inc.

v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir.

1995) (citation omitted). We hold that the Park Service did not

err in concluding that the Deer Management and Exotic Plant

Plans are not “similar” or “connected” for the purposes of

NEPA.

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3. Whether the National Park Service Violated NEPA

by Failing to Consider the Deer Management Plan’s

Effects on the “Human Environment”

Appellants argue that the National Park Service “violated

NEPA by failing to consider the adverse impact its decision to

kill wildlife will have on the public’s ability to enjoy this

extremely special national park which for over 120 years has

been . . . completely free of any violence against wildlife.” 

Grunewald Br. 52. Appellants reason that NEPA requires an

agency to consider “the environmental impact of the proposed

action,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C), including the “aesthetic” aspects

of a decision, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8, and how the action will affect

“the relationship of people with [the natural and physical]

environment,” id. § 1508.14. Appellants stress the views of park

goers, expressed in several public comments, that allowing the

killing of deer will “significantly mar their ability to enjoy using

this Park” and “fundamentally transform the overall character of

the Park from a tranquil place . . . to a place where wildlife is

shot, maimed, and killed” regularly. Grunewald Br. 53. They

maintain that the district court wrongly dismissed these concerns

as mere “psychological harms,” and that the Park Service did

not adequately consider and address them. We disagree. 

The National Park Service complied with NEPA by

adequately considering the Deer Management Plan’s effects on

the human environment. The Final EIS discusses at length the

potential impacts of each alternative on visitor use, experience,

and safety. Final EIS at 240–55. The EIS discusses the costs

and benefits of archery and sharpshooting; the possibility of

adverse impacts on those who might see or hear the killing;

ways to prevent visitor encounters with dead or dying deer; and

mitigating the impact of gunshots on the “soundscape” of the

park. Id. The Plan mitigates its effects on visitor experience by

limiting culling activities to night or times when the park is

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closed; concentrating activities during winter months, when

there are fewer visitors; and separating visitors from culling

activities or uncollected deer carcasses. See Record of Decision

at 5. In short, the Park Service adequately considered the

impacts that killing deer could have on the human environment. 

It squarely addressed the potential effects on visitors of seeing

or hearing the killing of deer, and other tangible and physical

impacts of the Plan. 

The National Park Service was not required to consider the

psychological harm that some visitors may suffer from simply

knowing that the intentional killing of deer happens at Rock

Creek Park. The appellants fail in their attempt to recast their

psychic injuries as concerns relating to visitor experience and

the human environment. They claim that the killing of deer

fundamentally changes the character of the Park and destroys its

value to some visitors. However, once we set aside what the

Park Service has addressed (witnessing killings, encountering

carcasses, hearing gunshots, etc.), appellants’ claim supports at

most a psychological harm—appellants’ knowledge that deer are

killed, even if they perceive no such killings. NEPA requires

agencies to consider “the effect of their proposed actions on the

physical environment.” Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People

Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772 (1983) (emphasis

added). NEPA does not require an agency to consider the

potential that its action may remotely cause “psychological

health damage” for some members of the public. Id. at 775–76. 

The Park Service adequately and comprehensively considered

the impacts of its proposed alternatives on the “human

environment.” It was not obligated to address the potential for

some members of the public to be psychologically harmed by

simply knowing that deer are killed in Rock Creek Park; this

kind of remote impact is outside the scope of NEPA.

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CONCLUSION

While there might not have been any white-tailed deer

present in Rock Creek Park at its founding in 1890, deer

populations have risen dramatically since the first deer sightings

in the 1960s. With no natural predators, deer populations grew

unabated. While the native deer are a valued park resource, the

National Park Service became concerned with the deer’s

ecological impacts. The National Park Service, exercising its

expertise, studied the deer and their effects on Rock Creek Park. 

The Park Service concluded that the deer pose a threat to the

Park’s native ecology, and proposed taking action to reduce the

deer population to sustainable levels. The Park Service

eventually decided to take lethal action against the Park’s deer,

quickly reducing the herd to an ecologically sustainable level. 

The Park Service held open the potential future use of

contraceptives to maintain population levels. In reaching this

decision, the Park Service fully complied with the Rock Creek

Park Enabling Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the

National Environmental Policy Act. Therefore we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

So ordered.

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