Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02235/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02235-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Request for Certificate of Appealability

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSELL GENE RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

 v.

JEANNE WOODFORD,

Respondent. 

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No. C 07-02235 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING

REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer and a supporting

memorandum of points and authorities addressing the merits of the petition, and

Petitioner filed a traverse. Having reviewed the papers and the underlying record, the

Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief and will deny the

petition.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 3, 2005, Petitioner pleaded guilty in the Santa Clara Superior Court to one

count of petty theft with a prior conviction and one count of receiving stolen property. 

Petitioner also admitted four “strike” prior convictions and two prior prison terms. On

September 15, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years to life in

prison. 

Petitioner appealed the judgment. On November 20, 2006, the California Court of

Appeal affirmed. On February 7, 2007, the California Supreme Court denied review. 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed unsuccessful state habeas petitions in the Santa Clara Superior

Court, California Court of Appeal, and California Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed the instant federal action on April 24, 2007.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, which are taken from the probation

officer’s pre-sentence report. (Resp. Ex. A, p. 117-119.) On the morning of August 3,

2004, Grant Morrow (“Morrow”) hired several plumbers, one of whom was the

Petitioner, to perform some plumbing work at this house. (Id. at 117.) After showing

them around the house, Morrow left. (Id. at 118.) That night, when Morrow returned to

the house, he received a phone call from First U.S. Bank regarding several suspicious

transactions on his cards. (Id.) Morrow reported that he did not make the transactions

nor did he give anyone permission to do so. (Id.) Morrow then looked for and

discovered that his First U.S. Bank credit card was missing. (Id.) 

One of the unauthorized purchases was from Journey’s Shoe. (Id.) The police

contacted the owner of the plumbing company who provided Petitioner’s personal

information. (Id.) The police also communicated with an employee of Journey’s Shoe

who reported that two suspects entered the store, one of whom fit the description of

Petitioner. (Id.)

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The following day, police showed up at Petitioner’s residence and were told that

Petitioner was upstairs taking a shower. (Id.) While waiting for Petitioner, police found

the shoes that were purchased at Journey’s Shoe with Morrow’s credit card. (Id.) Then,

the officers learned that Petitioner had crawled through a second story window and fled

the residence. (Id.) 

LEGAL CLAIMS

Petitioner asserts the following claims for relief: (1) counsel was ineffective in

giving Petitioner incorrect information regarding a guilty plea, which coerced Petitioner

to plead guilty; (2) counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the case or present oral

argument at the hearing on his suppression motion; and (3) Petitioner’s sentence is cruel

and unusual.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court will entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated

on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set

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of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413

(2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at

413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should

ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was

‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 409. In examining whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable, the inquiry may require analysis of the state court’s method

as well as its result. Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). The

standard for “objectively unreasonable” is not “clear error” because “[t]hese two

standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of error fails to give proper deference to state

courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “results in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination

of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Where the highest state court to consider Petitioner’s claims issued a summary

opinion which does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal review under section

2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

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501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir.

2000). 

B. Analysis of Legal Claims

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Coerced Guilty Plea

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel

“coerced” him into pleading guilty by advising him that he would not receive a life

sentence and by failing to explain the conditions of the plea. (Am. Pet. at 7.) Respondent

contends that this claim is not only unexhausted but also meritless. Even assuming that

claim is unexhausted, this Court may deny it on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

A defendant seeking to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the ground of

ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part standard of Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) by showing “that (1) his counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable

probability that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial.” Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir.

2007) (internal quotation omitted). 

In order to establish ineffective assistance from counsel’s inaccurate prediction

regarding the likely sentence following a guilty plea, a petitioner must establish a “‘gross

mischaracterization of the likely outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined with . . . erroneous

advice on the probable effects of going to trial.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d

859, 868 (9th Cir. 2004). An attorney’s incorrect prediction as to the likely sentence

following a guilty plea does not amount to erroneous advice, or satisfy the deficiency

prong of Strickland, simply because the trial court ultimately imposed a longer sentence. 

Womack, 497 F.3d at 1002-1003. Where a defendant was informed prior to entering his

guilty plea of the potential sentence he could receive, he cannot establish prejudice from

counsel’s incorrect prediction as to his sentence. Id. at 1003-04. 

Here, Petitioner does not identify the specific conditions of the plea agreement

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about which counsel failed to advise him. Further, the transcript of the plea hearing

belies Petitioner’s assertions that he believed he would receive a maximum sentence of

thirty-two months. (Trav. at 6.) During the plea colloquy, the trial court recited the

parties’ understanding of the plea agreement, stating, “[Petitioner] would plead guilty or

no contest as to Counts 1 and 3 and receive no promises from the Court, no offers from

the District Attorney’s office and the maximum term in this case is twenty-seven years to

life in prison.” (Resp. Ex. B, p. 119.) Petitioner affirmed that the trial court’s recitation

was his understanding of the agreement and there had been no further promises made to

him. (Id.) Petitioner acknowledged in open court that he had not been threatened or

coerced to plead guilty, that he had discussed the matter with counsel, that the maximum

sentence he could receive was twenty-seven years to life, and that he was pleading

knowingly and voluntarily. (Id. at 120-21.) The trial court read the rights that Petitioner

was waiving by pleading guilty, and Petitioner affirmed that he understood those rights. 

(Id. at 121-23.) 

Nor does Petitioner allege that but for counsel’s alleged errors, there was a

reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial. At the outset, Petitioner was

charged with three felonies, four strike priors, and two prior prison terms. His sentencing

exposure was twenty-seven years to life to seventy-seven years to life, depending on

whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. By agreeing to plead

guilty, Petitioner limited his exposure to the low-end of his sentencing range. There is no

evidence in the record supporting Petitioner’s assertion that counsel misadvised him or

that Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s advice.

Accordingly, the state court’s determination was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

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2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Suppression Motion

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel

failed to investigate or present oral argument in support of his motion to suppress. (Am.

Pet. at 7-8; Trav. at 8-11.) Again, Respondent contends that this claim is not only

unexhausted but also meritless. Again, this Court will deny the claim on the merits. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

It is well-established that a valid plea of guilty bars habeas review of most

non-jurisdictional claims alleging antecedent violations of constitutional rights. Tollett v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). As the Supreme Court explained in Tollett, 

“[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty

of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the

guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea. .

. .” Id. at 267; see Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994) (superseded on

other grounds by AEDPA as described in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.

2000). In other words, a guilty plea forecloses consideration of pre-plea constitutional

deprivations in federal habeas corpus. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. Other than a claim that

the court lacked jurisdiction, which Petitioner has not alleged, the only claim that can be

raised in a habeas corpus petition after a guilty plea is a challenge to the constitutional

validity of the plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).

This authority does not preclude Petitioner from asserting a claim that his plea was

not voluntary and intelligent or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in

connection with his plea. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266. However, claims of ineffective

assistance that are based on acts or omissions of counsel that preceded and are not related

to the validity of the plea may not be considered on federal habeas review. Moran, 57

F.3d at 700. Petitioner’s claim with respect to counsel’s investigation and presentation of

his motion to suppress involves an alleged pre-plea constitutional violation. Accordingly,

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it is not cognizable on federal habeas review.

3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner argues that his twenty-five year to life sentence amounts to cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. A criminal sentence that is

not proportionate to the crime for which the defendant was convicted violates the Eighth

Amendment. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). But “outside the context of

capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences

will be exceedingly rare.” Id. at 289-90. For the purposes of review under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1), it is clearly established that “[a] gross proportionality principle is applicable

to sentences for terms of years.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). 

In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice

Scalia joined in a two-justice plurality to conclude that Solem should be overruled and

that no proportionality review is required under the Eighth Amendment except with

respect to death sentences. Id. at 961-985. A three-justice concurrence concluded that

Solem should not be rejected and that the Eighth Amendment contains a narrow

proportionality principle that is not confined to death penalty cases, but that forbids only

extreme sentences which are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 997-1001. 

Because no majority opinion emerged in Harmelin on the question of proportionality, the

view that the Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly

disproportionate to the crime is considered the holding of the Court. United States v.

Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In judging the appropriateness of a sentence under a recidivist statute, a court may

take into account the government’s interest not only in punishing the offense of

conviction, but also its interest “‘in dealing in a harsher manner with those who [are]

repeat[] criminal[s].’” Bland, 961 F.2d at 129 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,

276 (1980)). The Eighth Amendment does not preclude a state from making a judgment

that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been

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convicted of at least one serious or violent crime, as may occur in a sentencing scheme

that imposes longer terms on recidivists. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29-30 (2003)

(upholding twenty-five-to-life sentence for recidivist convicted of grand theft); Rummel,

445 U.S. at 284-85 (upholding life sentence with possibility of parole for recidivist

convicted of fraudulent use of credit card for $80, passing forged check for $28.36 and

obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses). Substantial deference is granted to state

legislature’s determination of the types and limits of punishments for crimes. United

States v. Gomez, 472 F.3d 671, 673-74 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In addressing this claim in Petitioner’s case, the state appellate court properly

relied upon these Supreme Court cases above and corresponding California law as

explicated in In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 410 (1972). (Resp.’s Ex. D.) The court concluded

properly that Petitioner’s current offenses were no less serious than those offenses at issue

in Rummel, Ewing, and Lockyer. (Id. at 10.) The court relied upon the fact that

Petitioner’s sentence was punishment not only for the instant offenses but also for

committing the crimes as a recidivist offender and that recidivism justifies the imposition

of longer sentences for subsequent offenses. (Id. at 10-11.) The court noted that

Petitioner repeatedly had re-offended, had a criminal history spanning more than twentyfive years, and consistently performed poorly on parole. (Id. at 11.) The court’s

conclusion that Petitioner’s sentence was not cruel and unusual thus was not contrary to

or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court authority. (Id.) 

C. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners recently have

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing §

2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). In light of the

foregoing discussion, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

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constitutional right [or] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a COA. 

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying state criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the

petition for writ of habeas corpus and COA are DENIED. 

The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment and close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

3/24/10

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSELL GENE RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

 v.

JEANNE WOODFORD,

Respondent. /

Case Number: CV07-02235 JF 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Russell Gene Rodriguez V-97356

Pleasant Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 8504

D-2-138 Low

Coalinga, CA 93210

Dated: 

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Diana Munz, Deputy Clerk

4/7/10

4/7/10 /s/

Case 5:07-cv-02235-JF Document 27 Filed 04/07/10 Page 11 of 12
Russell Gene Rodriguez V-97356

Pleasant Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 8504

D-2-138 Low

Coalinga, CA 93210

CV07-02235 JF 

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