Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01864/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01864-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEBORAH DOERFLER-CASNER,

NO. CIV. S-03-1864 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS/MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

PLACER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC WORKS,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Deborah Doerfler-Casner has brought suit

against defendant Placer County Department of Public Works,

alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (“Title VII”), California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, and

42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law torts. Defendant now

moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(c) and, alternatively, for summary judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

///

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A “striper” is a machine used to paint lines on 1

roadways.

The actual duration of plaintiff’s training is unclear, 2

largely as a result of her own inconsistent testimony and claims. 

She alleged that the training took place for just 15 minutes,

(Rathe Decl. Ex. A (Doerfler-Casner County Compl.)), and later

testified that it lasted “a couple of hours” (Doerfler-Casner

Apr. 27, 2006 Dep. 115:12-14).

2

I. Factual and Procedural Background

From June 6, 1990 until February 3, 2003, plaintiff

worked as the only woman on the traffic sign maintenance crew

managed by defendant’s organization. (Compl. ¶ 9; Def.’s

Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) No. 6.) During this

period, plaintiff applied for, and was denied, promotions to more

senior positions on two occasions: in July, 1999, an available

Senior Traffic Sign Supervisor position went to Greg Jacinto and

in November, Dave Taylor was promoted to Senior Traffic Sign

Maintenance Worker. (SUF Nos. 69-70.) 

Following Jacinto’s promotion, plaintiff learned that

one of the reasons she was not selected was because she needed

more experience on the striper. (Id. No. 10.) Plaintiff’s 1

repeated requests for striper training were, however, summarily

denied. (Rathe Decl. Ex. B (Perrigo Report) (documenting

plaintiff’s requests).) Meanwhile, Taylor received the necessary

training. (SUF No. 15.) Eventually Jacinto, plaintiff’s new

supervisor, relented and gave her the opportunity to operate the

striper, although this “opportunity” consisted of a “brief”

training before being sent out on the roads.2

Plaintiff further claims that her work hours were

changed and that she alone was assigned to jobs that were

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allegedly dangerous for a person to do individually. (DoerflerCasner Apr. 27, 2006 Dep. 138:1-18 (describing a co-worker’s

concern for her safety, given her assigned work).) She also

claims that she was threatened prior to applying for more senior

positions and that after she applied, her male co-workers started

giving her the cold shoulder. (See, e.g., Huskey Decl. Ex. A

(Doerfler-Casner Nov. 23, 2004 Dep. 90:4-10, 103:2-23, 138:22-

25).)

Plaintiff further complains of physical abuse in the

workplace. She describes two incidents, one where she was hit by

a wheeled chair that Stan Kirkman sent sailing across the room

during a heated argument and another where she was kicked in the

buttocks by Lynn Steevers. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) As a result of

the kicking incident, plaintiff missed several weeks of work. 

(SUF No. 16.) Moreover, she was particularly upset by the

official report of the incident, which stated: “Lynn and Debbie

were having fun bantering back and forth when Lynn playfully side

kicked Debbie in the buttocks.” (Rathe Decl. Ex. A (DoerflerCasner County Compl.).) According to plaintiff, this

characterization was inaccurate. Rather, Steevers kicked her

because he was irritated with her. (SUF No. 16.) Steevers

received a simple verbal reprimand for his conduct. (Huskey

Decl. Ex. H (Steevers Dep. 21:18-25, 22:1-16).)

Finally, plaintiff also describes various comments that

offended her. For example, she testified that her co-worker Mike

Eastman would say things like “This is a man’s job; let a man do

it.” (Id. Ex. A (Doerfler-Casner Nov. 23, 2004 Dep. 104:21-22).) 

Additionally, various male co-workers made comments about

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Plaintiff has not included a third claim--the complaint 3

jumps from claim two to claim four.

4

plaintiff’s weight and her assumed menopause-related moodiness.

(Id. at 154:16-25, 158:16-20.)

Plaintiff kept notes on these incidents in her work

diary, which her employer required her to maintain and her coworkers resented. (SUF Nos. 34-36, 42; Doerfler-Casner Apr. 27,

2006 Dep. 135:5-9, 17-18 (threat by Kirkman).) In particular,

Eastman commented that he was “scared” that the events documented

in plaintiff’s diary would “come back and haunt them.” 

(Doerfler-Casner Apr. 27, 2006 Dep. 123:14-20.) Subsequently,

plaintiff did file her complaint in this action, alleging eleven

causes of action including: sexual harassment, actionable under

Title VII (claim one); sexual harassment and failure to prevent

sexual harassment, actionable under FEHA (claims two and four);

violation of her First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (claims five through

nine); and state law claims of negligence, battery, and assault

(claims ten, eleven, and twelve). Defendant now moves for 3

judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively for summary judgment,

on all of plaintiff’s claims.

II. Discussion

Although defendant fails to specify which arguments

pertain to its motion for judgment on the pleadings and which

pertain to its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff provides a

logical grouping that the court will adopt for purposes of this

motion. It appears that defendant’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings addresses only claims five, six, seven, and nine--the §

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This matter was originally scheduled to be heard on 4

April 17, 2006. However, on April 10, 2006, defendant filed

thirty-six objections to statements in plaintiff’s declaration

(submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion) and moved to

strike the portions of this declaration to which it objected. In

an effort to ensure that the outcome here is determined by the

merits of the case, rather than on a mere misstep by counsel in

preparing plaintiff’s declaration, the court used the scheduled

oral argument to address defendant’s evidentiary objections. At

that proceeding, defendant agreed to withdraw its objections,

provided that plaintiff agreed to allow defendant’s counsel to

depose her once more. Plaintiff consented, and the requested

supplemental deposition was conducted on April 27, 2006. 

Consequently, according to the deal struck by the parties, any

evidentiary objections in this matter have been resolved. The

court can now address the merits of the pending motion.

The motions differ in only two respects: 5

(1) the timing (a motion for judgment on the pleadings

is usually brought after an answer has been filed,

whereas a motion to dismiss is typically brought before

an answer is filed) . . . and (2) the party bringing

the motion (a motion to dismiss may be brought only by

the party against whom the claim for relief is made,

usually the defendant, whereas a motion for judgment on

5

1983 claims not based on the Monell theory of liability. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

Defendant’s arguments for summary judgment attack plaintiff’s

remaining claims.4

A. Judgment on the Pleadings

Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate after the

pleadings have closed when, on the face of those pleadings,

accepting the allegations of the non-moving party as true, no

material issue of fact remains to be resolved. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(c); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc.,

896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). Under such circumstances,

the moving party can obtain judgment as a matter of law. Hal

Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1550. However, a Rule 12(c) motion is

essentially equivalent to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and 5

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the pleadings may be brought by any party). 

Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, 311 F. Supp.

2d 898, 902-03 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (citations omitted).

Confusingly, these causes of action refer to the 6

actions of “defendants” when only one defendant has been named.

6

consequently, a district court may “dispos[e] of the motion by

dismissal rather than judgment.” Sprint Telephony, 311 F. Supp.

2d at 903. “[D]ismissal can be based on either the lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Id.; see also 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988).

Dismissal of claims five through seven and claim nine

is appropriate because defendant, a municipal entity, is the only

named defendant and cannot be the target of a § 1983 claim absent

allegations that an “official municipal policy of some nature

caused a constitutional tort.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“[A]

municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor--or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”). Claims

five through seven and claim nine lack such allegations.6

However, this dismissal is largely a formality because plaintiff

states a proper Monell claim against defendant in claim eight,

where she alleges that the aforementioned acts, including the

violations of her First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights described in claims five through seven, “were the direct

and proximate result of customs, practices, and/or policies of

Defendant . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 39.) Consequently, although the

court grants defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion as to claims five,

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six, seven, and nine, this order will have little, if any, impact

on the substantive issues in this case. 

B. Summary Judgment

Defendant’s remaining arguments appear to be for

summary judgment since they rely on evidence that goes beyond the

pleadings. Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon . . . mere

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allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading . . . .” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135,

1137 (9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Additionally, the

court must not engage in credibility determinations or weigh the

evidence, for these are jury functions. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255.

1. Claims One, Two, and Four--Sexual Harassment

Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s

gender based discrimination claims, arguing that the alleged

sexual harassment was not severe or pervasive. These claims are

founded on alleged violations of federal and state employment

discrimination laws (Title VII and FEHA), which are largely

analyzed according to the same standards. Fisher v. San Pedro

Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 608 (1989) (adopting

federal case law for hostile environment sexual harassment claims

under California law). 

“An employer is liable under Title VII for conduct

giving rise to a hostile environment where the employee proves

(1) that [s]he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a

harassing nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3)

that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment.” Pavon v. Swift Trans. Co., Inc., 192 F.3d

902, 908 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). Courts identify abusive working

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environments “by ‘looking at all the circumstances,’ including

the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with

an employee’s work performance.’” Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). In general, “the required showing of

severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely

with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” Ellison v.

Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). 

As previously noted by this court, “[t]he first element

of the hostile environment claim requires that the harasser’s

conduct be . . . either sexual in nature or perpetrated because

of the recipient’s gender.” Davis v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections,

No. S-93-1307, 1996 WL 271001, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1996)

(citing Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.

1486, 1522-23 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (listing cases holding that

harassment was based on sex where conduct lacked sexually

explicit conduct but was motivated by animus against women)); see

also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80

(1998) (“[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual

desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of

sex.”). Plaintiff has testified to and/or declared the following

facts in support of her harassment claims:

• In 1999, a male co-worker threatened to kill her if she was

promoted to the senior position, although plaintiff did not

expect him to act on this comment. (SUF No. 14.)

• Also in 1999 and in 2000, plaintiff repeatedly requested

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training on the striper. She was initially told she was too

short and a male co-worker was trained instead. Sometime in

2000, plaintiff received a brief (30-45 minute) training and

was immediately sent out on a job, where Eastman proceeded

to honk at her from another vehicle for the purpose of “fing with her.” (SUF No. 25.)

• On October 30, 2000 and September 9, 2002, plaintiff was

battered by male co-workers. (SUF Nos. 49.)

• Co-worker Eastman “exhibited anger” toward plaintiff on at

least 10 occasions. (SUF No. 27.)

• On up to 10 occasions, Eastman made the comment: “This is a

man’s job, let a man handle it.” (SUF No. 28.) Plaintiff

informed her supervisor of these comments. (Pl.’s Add’l SUF

No. 33.)

• One morning, plaintiff’s husband observed Eastman going

through her truck, which was parked outside her home. This

was against company policy. (SUF Nos. 29-30.)

• One day, while working together on a road crew assignment,

Eastman ignored plaintiff’s attempts to get his attention. 

(SUF No. 33.)

• On one occasion, plaintiff’s supervisor, Jacinto commented

on plaintiff’s recent moodiness and asked if she was going

through menopause. (SUF No. 40.)

• On June 14, 2000, Jacinto broadcast some of the contents

from plaintiff’s work diary over the radio. (Pl.’s Add’l SUF

No. 10.)

• On February 27, 2001, Jacinto told plaintiff to “watch it”

with respect to her diary entries. (Pl.’s Add’l SUF No.

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18.)

• On August 9, 2001, Kirkman made a derogatory remark about

plaintiff’s weight. He also threatened her at some point,

telling her to “watch out”. (SUF Nos. 42-43; (Pl.’s Add’l

SUF No. 20.)

• On August 23, 2001, Jacinto allowed a male co-worker to

apply his overtime hours to the next pay period, but denied

plaintiff’s request to do the same. (Pl.’s Add’l SUF No.

24.)

• Starting in 2001, plaintiff’s time records were scrutinized

by her supervisor while those of male counterparts,

allegedly, were not. (Pl.’s Add’l SUF No. 28.)

• Starting on September 10, 2001, plaintiff no longer received

standby assignments (additional wage-earning opportunities)

that went instead to male co-workers. (Doerfler-Casner

Decl. ¶ 25.)

• On September 12, 2002, Jacinto assigned plaintiff to work

alone on a job that plaintiff felt required two people. 

(Rathe Decl. Ex. D (Stannard Report at 3).) 

• “[V]erbal abuse and harassment by Mike Eastman” led

plaintiff to take stress leave from September 12, 2002 until

February 3, 2003. (Pl.’s Add’l SUF No. 42.) When plaintiff

returned, she was assigned to a job in another building.

Most, if not all, of the incidents described are not

sexual in nature and consequently, the court assumes that

plaintiff’s claims are based on the theory that harassment was

perpetrated because of the recipient’s gender. Defendant argues

that the majority of these incidents, including both physical

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assaults, “have no gender based element whatsoever” and could

have happened to anyone. (Def.’s Mot. for J. 12.) Defendant

further argues that the remaining incidents, such as the

menopause and “man’s job” comments, which are admittedly gender

specific, do not meet the severe or pervasive requirement. (Id.

at 14.)

However, the fact that a man could have been put in the

same position as plaintiff, and subject to the same physical and

verbal abuse, does not prove that a man ever was. Defendant has

not produced any evidence demonstrating that men were subject to

the same treatment as plaintiff. “Fat jokes [may] apply to both

sexes,” but defendant has not shown, or even suggested, that they

were applied to both sexes in this case. (Id. at 13.) Moreover,

defendant has not produced evidence that men were ever battered

by their co-workers. Cf. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (“The critical

issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to

disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which

members of the other sex are not exposed.” (quoting Harris, 510

U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring))).

At most, the court has before it conflicting testimony

regarding whether some incidents involving plaintiff were

actually abnormal or took place as described by plaintiff. For

example, although plaintiff complains that she was given solo

assignments that really required two people, several deposed coworkers testified that jobs similar to the one described by

plaintiff were routinely assigned to a single person who could

“ask for help” if needed. (Rathe Decl. Ex. D (Stannard Report at

3).) To resolve these conflicting accounts, the court would need

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Defendant concedes as much in its pretrial statement 7

filed on April 18, 2004, wherein it notes that disputed issues of

fact remaining for trial include “[t]he credibility of the

plaintiff’s reports of alleged misconduct by her co-workers” and

“[t]he occurrence of plaintiff’s specific claims of misconduct by

employees of the County of Placer” (at least those instances that

defendant has not conceded did occur). (Def.’s Pretrial Stmt.

13-14.)

13

to make a credibility determination, which would invade the

province of the jury. Additionally, it is not clear that 7

plaintiff was denied training, given that according to her own

records, she turned down opportunities because she was “bleeding

bad” and/or injured. (Id. Ex. B at 000301-02.) Again, sorting

out what really happened based on conflicting accounts is the

jury’s job.

Viewing the facts presented thus far in a light most

favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable juror could find that

plaintiff was the target of harassing conduct because of her

gender. But this possibility alone is not sufficient to survive

summary judgment, for as outlined above, the conduct must also be

severe or pervasive, based on an objective and subjective

standard, to constitute harassment because of sex. Harris, 510

U.S. at 21.

Based on plaintiff’s pursuit of internal and external

complaints regarding her alleged harassment, she obviously

subjectively believes she was the victim of a hostile

environment. (See also Rathe Decl. Ex. D (Stannard Report at 5

(observing that plaintiff “truly believes she has been

discriminated against”).) Moreover, her repeated stress-related

medical leaves further support an inference that she subjectively

found her workplace severely or pervasively hostile. (See, e.g.,

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Defendants offer a competing theory for plaintiff’s 8

treatment: her co-workers were simply motivated by personal

dislike/distrust of plaintiff, rather than gender based animus. 

Although a jury could find that the conduct alleged resulted from

co-workers’ frustration with plaintiff’s habit of documenting the

misconduct of others in her work diary, see Barnett v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1998)

(“[P]ersonal conflict does not equate with discriminatory

animus.”), this possibility does not foreclose a conclusion that

defendant’s employees singled plaintiff out for unfavorable

treatment because she was a woman. See Mosakowski v. PSS World

Med., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1122 (D. Ariz. 2003)

(“Harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to

support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. The

motivation can be a general hostility to the presence of women in

the workplace.”).

14

Pl.’s SUF No. 60 (describing leave of absence from September,

2002 until February, 2003); Id. No. 64 (plaintiff went on leave

again in May, 2005).) The more difficult question is whether her

workplace was objectively hostile or abusive. To determine this,

the court looks at the situation from the perspective of the

reasonable female victim. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Ellison, 924

F.2d at 879.

Here, plaintiff has been the subject of physical abuse

and jokes, she has been threatened, and she may have been denied

employment on equal terms with male co-workers. Defendant does

not dispute that these incidents first started occurring shortly

after plaintiff applied for, and was denied, her first promotion

to a supervisory position. A jury could very well find that a

reasonable woman in an all-male department could perceive these

actions as designed to “keep [her] from advancing in [her]

career[].” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Moreover, while incidents 8

may not have occurred on a daily basis, they did occur with some

regularity. In some instances, the conduct alleged actually

involved physical attacks on plaintiff’s person. Consequently,

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drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiff, the court cannot

say with certainty that the conduct alleged was not severe or

pervasive. Cf. Pappas v. J.S.B. Holdings, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d

1095, 1103-05 (D. Ariz. 2005) (holding that pranks (e.g.,

“messing with” plaintiff’s workstation, stapling all of her

business cards together), smirks, and ostracism, combined with a

few instances of gender-based epithets are sufficient, “albeit

minimally so,” to permit a reasonable juror to conclude that an

acrimonious work situation existed because of plaintiff’s

gender); Vandermeer v. Douglas County, 15 F. Supp. 2d 970, 980

(D. Nev. 1998) (“It is, of course, impossible to formulate a

bright line rule for when a hostile environment exists. But it

doesn’t take much to survive summary judgment in an employment

discrimination case, since the standard that the defendants must

meet to prevail at this stage is quite high.” (citing Schnidrig

v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996))). 

The court’s inquiry is still not complete, however,

until it determines that the employer can be held liable for

“failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work

environment of which management-level employees knew, or in the

exercise of reasonable care should have known.” Ellison, 924

F.2d at 881. In the Ninth Circuit, the sufficiency of an

employer’s response to allegations of sexual harassment is judged

by (1) whether the harassment stopped following the employer’s

remedial actions and (2) whether the response was calculated to

dissuade other potential harassers from pursuing unlawful

conduct. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir.

1995) (citing Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882).

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The parties do not dispute that management was well

aware of plaintiff’s complaints. Both formally, and perhaps

informally, plaintiff communicated her grievances to her direct

supervisors, their supervisors, and her supervisors’ supervisors. 

In response, defendant conducted two investigations and in many

instances found no evidence to support plaintiff’s allegations of

harassment, retaliation, and failure to promote. (Rathe Decl.

Ex. B (Perrigo Report), Ex. D (Stannard Report).) Defendant also

took disciplinary action against the two perpetrators of physical

abuse against plaintiff and additionally held a mandatory

training for employees “aimed at preventing sexual harassment,

violence and retaliation in the workplace” on January 11, 2001

(following the incident where plaintiff was kicked by Steevers). 

(Rathe Decl. Ex. B (Perrigo Report at 10); SUF Nos. 65, 88.)

However, despite these efforts, plaintiff continued to

document instances where she felt harassed. If a jury finds that

the conduct complained of constituted sexual harassment, then it

will follow that defendant can be held liable for failing to

actually put a stop to it. Consequently, summary judgment on

plaintiff’s first, second, and fourth causes of action is not

warranted. 

2. Claim Eight--Municipal Liability Under § 1983

Defendant also moves for summary judgment on claim

eight, plaintiff’s Monell claim, contending that the alleged

misconduct of plaintiff’s co-workers and direct supervisors was

“immediately addressed” and therefore any constitutional

violation was not caused by defendant’s official policies. 

(Def.’s Mot. for J. 6.) However, as previously discussed, it is

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not clear from the facts presented thus far that plaintiff’s

allegations of harassment were adequately addressed immediately,

if ever. Because triable issues of fact remain as to whether

defendant had a policy or practice that violated plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, the court must deny summary judgment on

this cause of action.

3. Claims Ten through Twelve--State Law Torts

Defendant further contends that the exclusivity

provisions in California’s worker’s compensation law, Cal. Lab.

Code §§ 3200-6002, “bar[] Plaintiff’s pendant state common law

torts claims for negligence, assault, and battery.” (Def.’s Mot.

for J. 7.) Indeed, the worker’s compensation statute does

provide the sole and exclusive remedy for injuries, both physical

and mental, that arise from conduct “within the compensation

bargain” (or within the scope of employment) and that result in

an occupational disability or the need for medical treatment. 

Cal. Lab. Code §§ 3600(a), 3602(a); Charles J. Vacanti, M.D.,

Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 24 Cal. 4th 800, 814 (2001)

(noting that when these two conditions are met, “the workers’

compensation system subsumes all statutory and tort remedies

otherwise available for such injuries”); Livitsanos v. Superior

Court, 2 Cal. 4th 744, 752 (1992). However, “a cause of action

predicated on an injury where ‘the basic conditions of

compensation’ are absent is not preempted.” Charles J. Vacanti,

24 Cal. 4th at 814. Additionally, “[a]n employee . . . may bring

an action at law for damages against the employer, as if this

division did not apply, . . . [if] the employee’s injury or death

is proximately caused by a willful physical assault by the

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employer.” Cal. Lab. Code § 3602(b)(1).

California’s workers’ compensation law, and its

exclusivity provisions, apply to injuries incurred when “the

employee is performing service growing out of and incidental to

his or her employment and is acting within the course of his or

her employment.” Cal. Lab. Code § 3600(a)(2). For the act to be

within the scope of employment, the person responsible for the

injury does not necessarily need to be acting in the interest of

his employer. See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43

Cal. 3d 148, 161 (1987) (holding that “[s]ome harassment by

superiors when there is a clash of personality or values is not

uncommon” and is furthermore to be expected in the workplace);

Fretland v. County of Humboldt, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1488 n.7

(1999) (opining that decisions holding that sexual harassment

falls outside the scope of employment, such as Farmers Insurance

Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992 (1995), have no

bearing on the applicability of the workers’ compensation law to

assault and battery claims). Significantly, battery and assault

resulting from “horseplay” is viewed by California courts as

being within the scope of employment and actionable under the

workers’ compensation act, even though this conduct goes beyond

the purposes of employment. Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Serv.,

Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 995, 1106-07 (2001).

The incidents alleged by plaintiff--a kick to the

buttocks and battery with a chair--involve conduct that one might

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See Torres, 26 Cal. 4th at 1007 (“Given the ‘the 9

propensities and tendencies of mankind and the ordinary habits of

life, it must be admitted that wherever human beings congregate,

either at work or at play, there is some frolicking and

horseplay.’” (quoting Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident

Comm’n, 26 Cal. 2d 286, 294 (1945))).

Significantly, the workers’ compensation law does not 10

bar FEHA claims based on these same acts or allegations of a

negligent response to sexual harassment because these claims are

based on accusations of discrimination, which “is not a normal

risk of the compensation bargain.” Fretland, 69 Cal. App. 4th at

1492 (emphasis added). Therefore, plaintiff’s tenth cause of

action, for negligence, is still at issue in this case,

regardless of the applicability of any exceptions to the workers’

compensation exclusivity provisions. See id. (holding that the

workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions do not bar emotional

distress claims founded on discrimination).

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expect in the workplace and these claims must be brought under 9

California’s workers’ compensation law unless an exception to the

exclusivity provisions applies. See Torres, 26 Cal. 4th at 10

1002-03 (holding that an intentional tort committed by aggressive

physical conduct is actionable only under workers’ compensation

law unless tortfeasor intended to injure). Citing California

Labor Code § 3602(b)(1), plaintiff argues that such an exception

applies here. Section 3602(b)(1) renders the exclusivity

provisions inapplicable when “the employee’s injury . . . is

proximately caused by a willful physical assault by the

employer.” Cal. Lab. Code § 3602(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

Liability under this section must, however, “be based on positive

misconduct by the employer and not on a theory of vicarious

liability such as that which forms the basis of the doctrine of

respondeat superior.” Fretland, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 1487. In

other words, the employer must ratify, or “adopt in some manner

as [its] own[,] an act which was purportedly done on [its] behalf

by another person . . . .” Id. at 1490-91. 

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In Fretland, the plaintiff was, among other things,

ordered to use unsafe equipment, verbally abused, subject to

threatening phone calls, ostracized by co-workers, and eventually

“propelled” by a co-worker/supervisor against a stair rail. Id.

at 1482. The physical abuse rendered him unable to work. Id. 

After an investigation, which produced conflicting stories, the

employer issued a simple “letter of warning.” Id. at 1491. 

Despite the fact that plaintiff alleged that his repeated reports

of harassment fell on deaf ears and his assertions that the

battery was part of a larger discriminatory harassment campaign,

the court found these facts sufficient to establish that the

employer had not ratified the co-worker/supervisor’s abuse. Id. 

Because plaintiff failed to rebut the employer’s evidence of an

investigation into and reprimand for the incident, the court

affirmed summary judgment. Id.

Similarly, defendant here investigated both incidents

where plaintiff claimed physical abuse and, after considering

conflicting stories, the investigators determined that

plaintiff’s claims were unsupported. (Rathe Decl. Ex. B (Perrigo

Report), Ex. D (Stannard Report).) Defendant did, however, give

Steevers a letter of reprimand following the October 30, 2000

incident where he kicked plaintiff. (Rathe Decl. Ex. B (Perrigo

Report at 10).) Defendant also punished Kirkman for the incident

with the chair by suspending him for one day. (SUF No. 88.)11

Plaintiff has produced no evidence, only her bald assertions, to

refute these facts, which demonstrate that defendant did not

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As the Fretland court pointed out, “testimony [that] 12

may arguably be relevant to prove the County actively

participated in discrimination . . . is not [necessarily]

relevant to prove ratification of the assault and battery.” 69

Cal. App. 4th at 1491. Whether the workers compensation laws

provide the exclusive remedy for an assault or battery claim

turns on whether the employer manifested approval of the

perpetrator’s conduct, not whether the employer sufficiently

punished him so as to deter future incidents (which, as

previously noted, is relevant in an analysis of sexual harassment

claims).

The court recognizes that in the introduction to her 13

complaint, plaintiff does lay the foundation for claims of

retaliation and failure to promote. (Compl. ¶ 3 (“Plaintiff has

been told by her supervisor that she will not be promoted further

constituting acts of discrimination and retaliation.”).) 

However, plaintiff’s complaint lacks a factual basis for such

claims because the events on which they might be based had not

yet occurred when the complaint was filed and plaintiff has not

properly noticed a motion to amend. See Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding

that once the period for amending the pleadings, as specified in

the scheduling order, has passed, plaintiff must properly notice

a motion to amend the complaint and the scheduling order).

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ratify a willful physical assault on plaintiff. Cf. Fretland, 12

69 Cal. App. 4th at 1491. Therefore, in accordance with

Fretland, the exclusivity provisions apply to plaintiff’s

eleventh and twelfth causes of action and summary judgment on

these claims is warranted.

4. Underlying Theories of Liability

Finally, defendant also moves for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s “claims” for “retaliation” and “failure to promote.”

However, as plaintiff admitted during oral argument, these are

not separate causes of action in the complaint. In the absence 13

of actual claims, the court will not grant or deny summary

judgment on these theories.

///

///

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III. Conclusion

Because plaintiff has named only the County, a local

government unit, as a defendant in this case, her § 1983 claims

can only be brought pursuant to the Monell theory of liability. 

Additionally, she cannot state claims for battery or assault in

the workplace because the exclusive remedy for the acts alleged

is a workers’ compensation claim. Questions of fact remain,

however, as to whether plaintiff was the victim of sexual

harassment and the claims based on these allegations must

therefore be decided by a jury. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as

to claims five, six, seven, and nine, and these claims are hereby

DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to claims

eleven and twelve and in all other respects DENIED. 

DATED: June 1, 2006

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