Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04081/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04081-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1

By order filed January 26, 2016, all claims against Defendants Julian Venci and

Judy Husary were dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).

2

By order filed March 1, 2016, the Court found the matter appropriate for decision on

the parties’ respective written submissions, vacated the hearing scheduled for March 4,

2016, and took the matter under submission.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF YANIRA SERRANO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

MENH TRIEU, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C-14-4081 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ON FEDERAL CLAIMS; DISMISSING

WITHOUT PREJUDICE STATE LAW

CLAIMS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3)

Before the Court is the “Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Remaining

Federal Claims,” filed January 29, 2016, by defendants Menh Trieu and the County of San

Mateo, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1

 Plaintiffs Carmen

Garcia, Ignacio Serrano, and Lorenzo Serrano have filed opposition, to which defendants

have replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition

to the motion, the Court rules as follows.2

Case 3:14-cv-04081-MMC Document 53 Filed 03/21/16 Page 1 of 18
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3

The facts set forth below are either undisputed or read in the light most favorable to

plaintiffs. 

4

See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150(a) (providing “[w]hen a person, as a result of a

mental health disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a

peace officer . . . may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into

custody for a period of up to 72 hours for assessment, evaluation, and crisis intervention”).

5

The Moonridge Community Housing Development contains approximately 150

duplex- and fourplex-style residences. (See Trieu Decl. at 2:4-5.) 

2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiffs Carmen Garcia, Ignacio Serrano, and Lorenzo Serrano are, respectively,

the mother, father, and brother of Yanira Serrano (hereinafter, “Ms. Serrano”), a mentally ill

individual who, on the night of June 3, 2014, was fatally shot by defendant Menh Trieu, a

Deputy in the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office. 

At 9:23 p.m. on the evening in question, in response to a report of a “violent 5150,”4

San Mateo County Public Safety Communications dispatched police, fire, and medical

services to the Serrano residence, located at 1 Maidenhair Walk Lane, within the

Moonridge Community Housing Development, which is located just outside the city of Half

Moon Bay.5 (See Trieu Decl. at 2:2-11; 2:20-22.) In issuing said communication, the

dispatcher stated that the subject of the “5150” was an eighteen-year-old schizophrenic

woman named Yanira Serrano, that she had not taken her medication and was “being

violent,” and, consequently, that the fire and medical response teams would “stage away

from the scene until it was secure[d]” by police. (See id. at 3:4-8.)

Having heard the dispatch, Deputy Menh Trieu (“Deputy Trieu”), who at the time was

on patrol in the city of Half Moon Bay proceeded, in his marked patrol car, toward the

housing development. (See Trieu Decl. at 2:12-14; 3:11.) His partner, Deputy Richard

Chaput, was driving a separate patrol car that evening and also responded. (See id. at

2:16-18; 3:13-14.) Upon arriving at the housing development, the deputies took different

routes to look for 1 Maidenhair Walk Lane, as neither knew its precise location. (See id. at

3:18-21.) 

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6

The parties dispute the manner in which Deputy Trieu approached the Serrano

residence. Plaintiffs contend he was “run[ning],” “charging,” and “lunging” (see Casillas

Decl. Ex. 3 at 49:1-4; Ex. 2 at 52:16-17), while defendants contend he was walking (see

Trieu Decl. at 4:23). Resolving the dispute in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court will

assume Deputy Trieu ran toward the residence.

3

While the deputies searched for the correct residence, the dispatcher provided

periodic updates on the developing situation at 1 Maidenhair Walk Lane. The dispatcher

first advised that Ms. Serrano had left the residence and entered a brown Land Rover in

front of the home. (See Trieu Decl. at 3:24-26.) Thereafter, the dispatcher reported that

Ms. Serrano had taken her medication, was calmer, had not been violent previously but

instead had only been yelling at her mother, and was returning to the residence. (See id. at

4:4-5.) Later, however, the dispatcher cautioned that Ms. Serrano had obtained a knife and

had exited the home with it, and that the 9-1-1 caller was asking her to relinquish it. (See

id. at 4:6-13; Ely Decl. Ex. A (Deposition of Lorenzo Serrano) at 17:7-23.)

After obtaining additional information about the location of the residence via radio

from another responding officer, Deputy Trieu parked around the corner from where he

believed the residence to be and turned on his parking lights. (See Trieu Decl. at 4:7-9;

4:18-23.) Wearing a “utility belt” containing his firearm, a Taser gun, pepper spray, a

baton, and handcuffs, he exited his patrol car (see id. at 2:15-16; 4:20-21) and ran toward

the residence (see Casillas Decl. Ex. 2 (Deposition of Lorenzo Serrano) at 52:16-17).6 

As he approached, Deputy Trieu heard agitated yelling and saw three individuals

whom he later identified as Ms. Serrano’s parents, Carmen Garcia and Ignacio Serrano,

and brother, Lorenzo Serrano, “in the vicinity” of where he thought the residence was

located. (See Trieu Decl. at 4:25-28.) At the time of his arrival, Ms. Serrano was on the

front porch of the residence. (See Casillas Decl. Ex. 3 (Deposition of Carmen Garcia) at

49:10-11.)

When Ms. Serrano saw Deputy Trieu, she first “took two steps backwards,” i.e.,

away from the road (see Casillas Decl. Ex. 2 at 48:1-5), but then, screaming and wielding

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7

The parties dispute the pace at which Ms. Serrano first moved toward Deputy Trieu. 

(See Casillas Decl. Ex. 3 at 49:25-50:1 (“Yanira started walking slowly and she started to

follow the police officer.”); Trieu Decl. at 5:6 (“I saw that Ms. Serrano was screaming and

running towards me.”).) Construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the

Court assumes Ms. Serrano initially walked toward Deputy Trieu. 

8

Neither party points to direct evidence on the issue of how close Deputy Trieu was

to Ms. Serrano at the moment she began to advance toward him while holding the knife. 

Although Lorenzo Serrano testified that Deputy Trieu was “charging” toward Ms. Serrano

(see Casillas Decl. Ex. 2 at 52:16), given plaintiffs’ evidence that Ms. Serrano began to

walk in Deputy Trieu’s direction without immediately reaching him and that Lorenzo

Serrano had to warn Deputy Trieu that Ms. Serrano was armed with a knife (see Casillas

Decl. Ex. 2 at 44:21-23), the Court does not understand Lorenzo Serrano’s testimony to

suggest that Deputy Trieu was in close proximity to Ms. Serrano when she began to

advance on him, but, rather, that Deputy Trieu was, at that time, proceeding toward the

Serrano residence at a quick pace.

9

Ms. Serrano was 5' 2" tall and weighed 207 pounds. (See Casillas Decl. Ex. 8

(Autopsy Report) at 1:22.)

4

the knife (see Trieu Decl. at 5:6-7), began to walk7

 toward Deputy Trieu’s location (see

Casillas Decl. Ex. 3 at 49:25-50:1). Upon realizing that Ms. Serrano was advancing toward

Deputy Trieu, Lorenzo Serrano turned toward Deputy Trieu and warned “Watch out! Watch

out!” (See Trieu Decl. at 5:5-6; Ely Decl. Ex. A at 44:4-13.)8

 Ms. Serrano was overweight9

and moved toward Deputy Trieu with a “limping” gait due to a “vague deformity” in her left

foot. (See Casillas Decl. Ex. 2 at 56:2-15; Casillas Decl. Ex. 5 (Deposition of Dyanna RuizHuerta) at 12:18-20; Casillas Decl. Ex. 8 (Autopsy Report) at 5:26.) The knife she held was

a steak knife, eleven inches in length, with a six-inch blade, pointed tip, and wooden

handle. (See Ho Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. A (photographs of knife).)

Reacting to Ms. Serrano’s approach, Deputy Trieu stepped into the street,

positioned himself between two parked vehicles, and repeatedly yelled “Hey!” at Ms.

Serrano. (See Trieu Decl. at 5:11-14.) As she continued to move toward him, Deputy

Trieu “backpedaled” down the block away from her and in the direction of his parked patrol

car. (See id. at 5:17-19.) Ms. Serrano followed, holding the knife upraised above her

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10Although the interview of Endelisa Huerta and Dyanna Ruiz-Huerta is not under

oath, the Court has considered Dyanna Ruiz-Huerta’s statements therein, as neither party

has objected to and, indeed, both parties’ briefs cite to, said statements.

11Deputy Trieu heard Ms. Serrano yelling, but could not understand what she was

saying. (See Trieu Decl. at 6:2-3.)

12While plaintiffs are correct that Mr. Fries’s estimate of the distance and speed at

which Deputy Trieu and Ms. Serrano traveled is based on Deputy Trieu’s testimony about

where the chase began and ended, plaintiffs point to no evidence that contradicts such

testimony, nor do they offer any other reason why Mr. Fries’s calculations are unreliable. 

13The parties dispute whether Ms. Serrano was within eight feet or fifteen to twenty

feet of Deputy Trieu when he shot her. Resolving the dispute in favor of plaintiffs, the Court

assumes that they were fifteen to twenty feet apart. While defendants argue the estimate

5

shoulder. (See id. at 6:2; Ely Decl. Ex. E (Recorded Interview of Endelisa Huerta and

Dyanna Ruiz-Huerta)10 at 37:23-38:5.) 

Sensing that Ms. Serrano was closing the gap between them, Deputy Trieu turned

around and began to run down the street in a forward-facing direction. (See Trieu Decl. at

5:26-27.) Over his shoulder and as he was running away from her, he commanded her to

“stop.” (See id. at 5:28; Ely Decl. Ex. D (Deposition of Dyanna Ruiz-Huerta) at 22:10-17.) 

Ms. Serrano did not comply with that order, nor did she lower the knife. (See Trieu Decl. at

6:1.) Instead, she continued to pursue him, looking “angry and threatening” (see id. at 6:7;

Ely Decl. Ex. D at 21:4-7) and shouting in Spanish “Puta!,” “Leave!,” and “You are not going

to take me, you are not going to take me.”11 (See Ely Decl. Ex. D at 21:11-20; Ely Decl. Ex.

F (Deposition of Isabel Morelos) at 14:1-9.) 

When Deputy Trieu reached the corner of the block on which his patrol car was

parked, he veered toward the car and Ms. Serrano followed. After running past his patrol

car (see Trieu Decl. at 6:8), and having retreated for a total of approximately 160 feet (see

Ely Decl. Ex. C (Report of Craig Fries)12 at 18), Deputy Trieu turned back toward Ms.

Serrano, drew his firearm, pointed it at her, and again ordered her to “stop.” (See Trieu

Decl. at 6:10-11.) She did not slow her pace. (See id. at 6:11.) When she was fifteen to

twenty feet from where Deputy Trieu stood (see Casillas Decl. Ex. 6 (Recorded Interview of

Endelisa Huerta and Dyanna Ruiz-Huerta) at 37:1-11),13 he fired a single shot, which struck

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of fifteen to twenty feet has no support in the record, the Court disagrees. In responding to

the question of “how far away was [Ms. Serrano] when she was . . . running after the police

officer and yelling,” Dyanna Ruiz-Huerta, the only eyewitness to the shooting other than

Deputy Trieu and Ms. Serrano, stated that Ms. Serrano was “a couple of feet away . . .

probably like . . . 15, 20 feet away.” (See Ely Decl. Ex. E, at 37:1-6.) When asked to clarify

whether “it was . . . the length of a car or less than the length of a car,” Ms. Ruiz-Huerta

said “a little more.” (See id. at 37:8-11.) Later in the interview, Ms. Ruiz-Huerta stated that

Ms. Serrano was a “little more” than a car length away from Deputy Trieu when he shot

her. (See id. at 40:1-11.) Given that Ms. Ruiz-Huerta equated “a little more” than a car

length with “15, 20 feet,” and subsequently used “a little more” than a car length to describe

the distance between Deputy Trieu and Ms. Serrano at the time of the shooting, Ms. RuizHuerta can be understood to have stated that Ms. Serrano was fifteen to twenty feet from

Deputy Trieu at the time of the shooting.

14Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court, by order filed January 26, 2016,

dismissed as against defendant County of San Mateo their Second Claim for Relief, a 

§ 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment for municipal liability premised on allegations of

unconstitutional customs and practices. 

6

her in the torso and caused her to fall to the ground. (See Trieu Decl. at 6:11-12.) Ms.

Serrano died from the gunshot wound. (See Casillas Decl. Ex. 8.) Approximately 12.5

seconds elapsed from the time Ms. Serrano began to chase Deputy Trieu to the time she

was shot. (See Ely Decl. Ex. C at 18.)

Based on the above, plaintiffs assert (1) a cause of action against Deputy Trieu

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Deputy Trieu violated Ms. Serrano’s Fourth Amendment

rights by using excessive force against her (First Claim for Relief), and (2) a cause of action

against both defendants under § 1983, alleging a violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth

Amendment rights based on their having been deprived of a familial relationship with Ms.

Serrano (Third Claim for Relief); additionally, plaintiffs assert, as against both defendants,

state law causes of action for battery, wrongful death, and survivorship (Fourth, Fifth, and

Sixth Claims for Relief).14 By the instant motion, defendants move for summary judgment

on plaintiffs’ remaining federal causes of action.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material

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15Defendants have not moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ state law claims.

7

fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a).

The Supreme Court’s 1986 “trilogy” of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986),

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), requires that a party seeking summary

judgment show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the moving party

has done so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324 (internal quotation and citation omitted). “When the moving party has carried

its burden under Rule 56[], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “If the

[opposing party’s] evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary

judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). 

“[I]nferences to be drawn from the underlying facts,” however, “must be viewed in the light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue there is no constitutional violation, and thus they are entitled to

summary judgment on each of the remaining federal causes of action asserted against

them.15 Alternatively, Deputy Trieu asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

“All claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force–deadly or

otherwise–in the course of an arrest must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and

its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 700 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Because the inquiry as to

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8

reasonableness “is fact-sensitive,” summary judgment on excessive force claims “should

be granted sparingly.” See Maxwell v. Cty. of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir.

2012). Such claims may be decided as a matter of law, however, “if the district court

concludes, after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, that the officer’s use of

force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” See Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d

912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994).

“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the

question is whether the officer[’s] actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts

and circumstances confronting [him/her], without regard to [his/her] underlying intent or

motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Determining whether a particular use of force was

reasonable requires the Court to balance “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests

at stake.” See id. at 396 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Reasonableness “must

be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the

20/20 vision of hindsight,” and “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance

for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments–in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving–about the amount of force

that is necessary in a particular situation.” See id. at 396-97.

1. Deputy Trieu’s Use of Deadly Force

A police officer may not use deadly force unless the officer has probable cause to

believe the individual “‘poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the

officer or others’.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 704 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3

(1985)). In that regard, the Supreme Court has set out the following “non-exhaustive list of

factors for evaluating reasonability: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the

suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer[] or others, and (3) whether

the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to escape.” See Maxwell, 697 F.3d at 951

(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “Other relevant factors include the availability of less

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16Although, in setting out the facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit noted that the two

officers had deployed their Tasers, which were ineffective, before shooting the decedent,

the Court made no reference to that initial effort in its analysis of whether the officers’ use

of deadly force was reasonable.

9

intrusive alternatives to the force employed, whether proper warnings were given and

whether it should have been apparent to [the] officer[] that the person [he/she] used force

against was emotionally disturbed.” Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir.

2011). Of all the above-listed factors, the Ninth Circuit has held, “[t]he most important

factor is whether the individual posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer[] or

others.” See id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Consistent therewith, the Ninth Circuit has held that “where a suspect threatens an

officer with a weapon such as a gun or a knife, the officer is justified in using deadly force.” 

Smith, 394 F.3d at 704 (en banc) (collecting cases). In Han v. City of Folsom, for example,

two officers were summoned to the home of the twenty-three-year-old decedent by his

family, who reported that he “had been acting mentally unstable.” 551 F. App’x 923, 925

(9th Cir. 2014). Once there, the officers went to the decedent’s bedroom, where the

officers found the decedent holding a three-to-four-inch camping knife. See id. When the

decedent “told the officers to leave . . . and began approaching the officers while holding

the knife,” the officers shot and killed him. See id. Applying Smith, the Ninth Circuit found

the officers’ “actions were not objectively unreasonable.”16 See id. (internal quotation and

citation omitted) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of officers on

plaintiffs’ excessive force claim).

Relying on the principle set forth in Smith and applied in Han, defendants argue they

are entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed evidence shows that Ms.

Serrano attempted to assault Deputy Trieu with a knife. Plaintiffs argue summary

adjudication is inappropriate because triable issues exist as to whether Ms. Serrano posed

a threat to Deputy Trieu and others, and whether Deputy Trieu should have used a lesser

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17Although plaintiffs refer to Ms. Serrano as having a “club foot,” the only evidence

plaintiffs cite in support thereof is the autopsy report, which makes no mention of a club

foot. Instead, the autopsy report describes Ms. Serrano as having a “vague deformity of

the left foot,” and having on each foot scars that “measure[] about 3 inches in length” and

“appear to be iatrogenic,” i.e., the result of a surgical procedure. (See Casillas Decl. Ex. 8

(Autopsy Report) at 5:23-26.) 

18Even if plaintiffs had so argued, ample authority exists holding police officers have

no duty to retreat. See, e.g., Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 331 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding

duty to retreat would “be inconsistent with police officers’ duty to the public”), overruled on

other grounds by Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008); Tucker v. Las Vegas Metro.

Police Dept., 470 F. App’x 627, 630 (9th Cir. 2012) (Tallman, J. concurring) (citing Reed, 909 F.2d at 331) (noting “police officers have no duty to retreat when threatened with

physical assault”); see also Cal. Penal Code § 835a (“A peace officer who makes or

attempts to make an arrest need not retreat or desist from his efforts by reason of the

resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested.”).

10

degree of force, such as his Taser or pepper spray, to subdue her. The Court addresses

below the parties’ respective arguments.

a. Whether a Reasonable Jury Could Find Ms. Serrano Did Not Pose a

Threat To Deputy Trieu and Others

Plaintiffs first argue that a reasonable jury could find Ms. Serrano did not pose an

immediate threat to Deputy Trieu because she was overweight and had a foot deformity,17

and because she was fifteen to twenty feet away from Deputy Trieu when he shot her. 

There is no evidence, however, nor do plaintiffs argue that Ms. Serrano’s weight and

foot deformity rendered her physically incapable of lifting the knife and applying enough

force to stab Deputy Trieu. See George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 835, 855 (9th Cir. 2013)

(affirming district court’s denial of summary judgment where plaintiffs presented “medical

evidence . . . [that] called into question whether [the decedent] was physically capable of

wielding the gun as deputies described”). Nor have plaintiffs presented evidence showing

Ms. Serrano’s physical limitations would have rendered her incapable of getting close

enough to Deputy Trieu to harm him. As discussed above, Ms. Serrano was advancing on

Deputy Trieu and was able to get within fifteen to twenty feet of him at the time he stopped

retreating, and plaintiffs do not contend Deputy Trieu was obligated to continue to run from

her.18

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11

Similarly, there is no evidence that Ms. Serrano was incapable of rapidly closing the

gap between herself and Deputy Trieu. Indeed, the uncontradicted evidence presented by

defendants is that Ms. Serrano could have traversed the fifteen to twenty feet between

herself and Deputy Trieu in less than two seconds. (See Ely Decl. Ex. C (Fries Report) at

18 (concluding Ms. Serrano “covered approximately 160 feet from the area of her front

porch to [the] location [where] she was shot in 12.5 seconds,” which “results in an average

foot speed of approximately 13 feet per second”)); see also Estate of Larsen ex rel.

Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1261 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting officer training manual

“instructs that knife-wielding persons within 21 feet pose an ‘imminent threat’ to officers

based on the time in which the distance can be closed in an attack”); Chavez v. Las Vegas

Metro. Police Dept., 2014 WL 374444, at *8 (D. Nev. 2014) (noting officer training manual

counsels that once “individual[] with [an] edged weapon[], such as [a] knife[] . . . gets within

21 feet, the individual poses a risk of death or serious physical injury”). Under such

circumstances, to require Deputy Trieu to have waited to shoot Ms. Serrano until she was

any closer to him would be to unjustifiably put Deputy Trieu's life at risk by affording him too

narrow a window in which to react to her attack. See Estate of Larsen, 511 F.3d at

1260-61 (finding “no genuine issue of material fact” where parties disputed whether

decedent, who was armed with knife and advancing on officer, was seven or twenty feet

away when officer shot him; holding a “reasonable officer need not await the ‘glint of steel’

before taking self-protective action” because “by then, it is often too late to take safety

precautions”) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Given the threat posed to Deputy Trieu, the Court finds unpersuasive plaintiffs’

argument that summary judgment should be denied because Ms. Serrano posed no threat

to the public, or at least none of which Deputy Trieu was aware. (See Casillas Decl. Ex. 1

(Deposition of Menh Trieu) at 268:5-8 (stating, at time of shooting, he did not see any of

“the family members in [his] immediate vicinity”). Rather, the threat to Deputy Trieu alone

was enough to justify his use of deadly force. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546,

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19Moreover, plaintiffs understate the danger posed to bystanders. Ms. Serrano “was

not in a confined area and there were other people in the vicinity,” see Reynolds v. Cty. of

San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1996), namely, three of Ms. Serrano’s family

members, who had summoned the police because Ms. Serrano was “being violent” toward

them (see Trieu Decl. at 3:5.), as well as at least two of the Serranos’ neighbors, who were

in close enough proximity to witness parts of the incident. (See Casillas Decl. Ex. 5 at 37;

Ely Decl. Ex. F at 13:16-14:11.)

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551 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding threat to safety of officers justified their use of deadly force

even though decedent did not “pose[] a risk to the public at large”).19 

b. Whether a Reasonable Jury Could Find a Clear Alternative Method of

Subduing Ms. Serrano Was Available

Plaintiffs next argue summary judgment is inappropriate because a reasonable jury

could find Deputy Trieu could have used less intrusive means, namely his Taser or pepper

spray, to subdue Ms. Serrano. The Court again disagrees. “Officers need not avail

themselves of the least intrusive means of responding to an exigent situation; they need

only act within that range of conduct [the courts have identified] as reasonable.” Glenn,

673 F.3d at 876 (internal quotation and citation omitted). In that regard, an officer must

“consider what other tactics if any were available,” and only “if there were clear, reasonable

and less intrusive alternatives to the force employed” does this factor weigh “against finding

the use of force reasonable.” See id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here,

defendants have presented undisputed evidence that Deputy Trieu considered using his

Taser and pepper spray and, given a number of concerns, reasonably concluded that

neither presented a viable alternative under the circumstances. 

Specifically, as to the Taser, Deputy Trieu avers that he feared he would not have

“sufficient time to use [his] Taser . . . [because the] Taser had a snap and buckle making it

slower to draw than [his] gun,” and he also was concerned that “the Taser prongs would not

make contact with Ms. Serrano’s body as she was advancing towards [him] due the wind,

the distance, her movement, and the apparent thickness of the sweater/hoodie that she

was wearing.” (See Trieu Decl. at 6:25-7:1.) Further, in Deputy Trieu’s experience, a

Taser was not always reliable (see id. at 7:1-4 (noting that on a previous occasion, he “had

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attempted to use [his] Taser on a suspect who had attacked [him]” but “only one prong

connected with the suspect leading to his escape”)), and, consistent therewith, he was

trained “that in a situation involving a lethal threat . . . a Taser should only be used when a

partner is present to provide lethal cover.” (See id. at 7:5-7); see also Han, 551 F. App’x at

925 (noting two officers fired their Tasers and “both were ineffective”). 

As to pepper spray, Deputy Trieu avers that such substance “needs to be deployed

precisely in the eyes,” that “it was unlikely [he] could [have] deploy[ed] the pepper spray

with that degree of accuracy given the moving target and dynamic outdoor conditions that

include[d] wind,” and “even if it is precisely deployed, pepper spray is not always reliable in

immediately stopping an assaultive or combative subject.” (See Trieu Decl. at 7:9-14.) 

Given such circumstances, Deputy Trieu felt he might not have enough time to “draw,

manipulate, and accurately direct” his pepper spray before Ms. Serrano reached where he

stood. (See id. at 7:15-18.). Moreover, as with the use of a Taser, Deputy Trieu was

trained to only use pepper spray “when a partner is present to provide lethal cover.” (See

id. at 7:14-15.)

In light of the record presented, the Court finds plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable

issue as to the reasonableness of Deputy Trieu’s decision not to use a lesser means of

force.

c. Whether a Reasonable Jury Could Find Deputy Trieu Issued an

Inadequate Warning

“[W]arnings should be given, when feasible, if the use of force may result in serious

injury.” Glenn, 673 F.3d at 876. Here, Deputy Trieu twice warned Ms. Serrano to “stop,”

and the consequences of failing to comply were apparent, in that Deputy Trieu had his

firearm trained on Ms. Serrano when he instructed her to “stop” the second time. See Hill

v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District, 2013 WL 5272957, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting where

officer “had his gun pointed at [decedent]” at time officer ordered decedent to drop his

knife, “the consequences of a failure to comply with the command should have been

clear”). Plaintiffs do not argue, nor could a jury reasonably find, it was feasible for Deputy

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Trieu to issue more fully stated warnings, as the encounter lasted only 12.5 seconds,

during the entirety of which time Ms. Serrano was chasing Deputy Trieu. See Deorle v.

Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering whether there was time to

give specific order or warning).

d. Whether a Reasonable Jury Could Find Deputy Trieu’s Use of Force

Was Unreasonable Because Ms. Serrano Was Mentally Disturbed

Although the Ninth Circuit has “refused to create two tracks of excessive force

analysis, one for the mentally ill and one for serious criminals,” it has observed that “in the

usual case” involving a mentally ill individual, i.e., one in which the person is “neither a

threat to himself nor to anyone else,” the use of force to detain such person may be

unreasonable even though such individual was “acting out and inviting officers to use

deadly force to subdue him.” See Bryan, 630 F.3d at 829 (internal quotation and citation

omitted). As set forth above, however, the instant encounter was not “the usual case.” 

Rather, Ms. Serrano posed a significant threat to the life of Deputy Trieu, and a danger not

only to her family members, but to other residents of the housing development who were

present at the scene. See Blanford v. Sacramento Cty., 406 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir.

2005) (concluding that, even though plaintiff “appeared emotionally disturbed,” it was “not

objectively unreasonable” for officers “to consider that securing [plaintiff’s] sword was a

priority” and to use deadly force to that end).

e. Conclusion: Reasonableness of Deputy Trieu’s Use of Deadly Force

Considering the above factors both independently and cumulatively, and viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Court finds plaintiffs have failed to raise

a triable issue as to their claim that Deputy Trieu’s use of deadly force was unreasonable. 

The Court next turns to the question of whether Deputy Trieu nonetheless violated Ms.

Serrano’s Fourth Amendment rights by provoking the confrontation that resulted in her

death.

//

//

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20In their opposition, plaintiffs argue that Deputy Trieu “charge[d] into the scene with

his gun drawn.” (See Pl.’s Opp. at 13:11.) As defendants point out, however, plaintiffs fail

to cite any evidence in support of plaintiffs’ assertion that Deputy Trieu had his gun drawn

as he approached the Serrano residence. 

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2. Provocation

Even if an eventual use of force is reasonable, “where an officer intentionally or

recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth

Amendment violation, [the officer] may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of

deadly force.” See Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1117, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002). “[I]f an officer's

pre-shooting conduct negligently provokes a suspect to violence,” however, “‘that negligent

conduct will not transform an otherwise reasonable subsequent use of force into a Fourth

Amendment violation.’” See Han, 551 F. App’x at 925 (quoting Billington, 292 F.3d at

1190) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs contend Deputy Trieu provoked the confrontation with Ms. Serrano by

running toward the Serrano residence where Ms. Serrano was standing on the porch,20 as

well as by failing to wait for his partner and failing to develop a tactical plan before

approaching the residence. None of those facts, however, will support a finding that

Deputy Trieu violated the Fourth Amendment. First, plaintiffs cite to no authority in support

of the proposition that the speed at which an officer moves could constitute an illegal

search or seizure, and therefore “an independent Fourth Amendment violation.” See

Billington, 292 F.3d at 1189. Moreover, police officers may “move quickly if delay would

gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.” See City and Cty. of San Francisco v.

Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, as

noted, Deputy Trieu was responding to a call concerning an armed, mentally disturbed

individual, who was acting in a violent manner in a residential area.

As to Deputy Trieu’s failure to wait for his partner and failure to develop a tactical

plan, Ninth Circuit precedent is clear that a plaintiff cannot “establish a Fourth Amendment

violation based merely on bad tactics that result in a deadly confrontation that could have

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been avoided.” See Billington, 292 F.3d at 1190-91 (finding officer had not intentionally or

recklessly provoked confrontation with decedent where officer failed to wait for “backup [to]

arrive”); George, 736 F.3d at 839 n.14 (rejecting plaintiff’s arguments that deputies had

violated Fourth Amendment by not “gathering intelligence . . . before heading to the

backyard” where decedent was located and by “failing to set up a non-confrontational, soft

perimeter around the house”; finding “[a]t most, [such] failings amount to negligence”). 

Moreover, in this instance, had Deputy Trieu waited for his partner to arrive or until after

devising a tactical plan, the situation may well have resulted in injury to one or more of the

people who were present, at least one of whom had been endeavoring, without success, to

get Ms. Serrano to relinquish her weapon.

Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to raise a triable issue with respect to provocation, and

consequently, fail to raise a triable issue as to their claim that Deputy Trieu violated Ms.

Serrano’s Fourth Amendment rights.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs also assert, as against both defendants, a claim under § 1983 for loss of

their familial relationship with Ms. Serrano as a result of Deputy Trieu’s use of force. 

“[P]arents have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the companionship and society

of their children,” and “[o]fficial conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ in depriving parents of

that interest is cognizable as a violation of due process.” See Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554.

Here, as an initial matter, the parties disagree as to the applicable legal standard. 

“Where actual deliberation is practical, . . . an officer’s ‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice

to shock the conscience,” but “where a law enforcement officer makes a snap judgment

because of an escalating situation, his conduct may only be found to shock the conscience

if he acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” See

id. Contrary to plaintiffs’ conclusory argument that “Deputy Trieu had time to deliberate

before he shot” Ms. Serrano (see Pl.’s Opp. at 18:7), the undisputed evidence shows that

the encounter lasted only 12.5 seconds, which period did not allow enough time for Deputy

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21Given the above findings, the Court does not address herein the parties’

arguments as to qualified immunity.

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Trieu to “actual[ly] deliberat[e].” See, e.g., Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.

2008) (holding “purpose to harm” standard applied; finding officer did not have time to

actually deliberate during “five-minute altercation” between officer and decedent that was

“quickly evolving and escalating, prompting ‘repeated split-second decisions’”).

As to the merits of the claim, plaintiffs offer two undisputed facts from which a jury

could, according to plaintiffs, infer that Deputy Trieu acted with a purpose to harm Ms.

Serrano. First, Deputy Trieu put on gloves before he exited his vehicle, which, according to

plaintiffs, suggests that “Deputy Trieu intended to have meaningful physical contact with

Yanira Serrano and to inflict harm” (see Pl.’s Opp. at 18:12-13), and second, Deputy Trieu

purposefully, as opposed to accidentally, shot Ms. Serrano. Neither such fact is sufficient,

whether considered independently or cumulatively, to support a jury finding that Deputy

Trieu acted “maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” See Cty. of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1998). As to the former, Deputy Trieu’s

undisputed testimony is that he wore gloves to be “cautious” and protect against any

disease transmittable by contact with body fluids. (See Casillas Decl. Ex. 1 at 191:10-

193:15.) As to the latter, where, as here, an officer’s use of deadly force is justified, such

force cannot form the basis of a finding that an officer acted with a “purpose to harm

unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” See Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554

(finding “mere fact that [officer] shot [decedent]” was not evidence of intent to harm

“separate from a legitimate law enforcement objective”).

Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue with respect to their Due

Process claim.21

C. State Law Claims

Although it appears to the Court that the viability of plaintiffs’ state law claims is

contingent on the viability of the federal claims resolved above, see, e.g., Edson v. City of

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Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272-74 (1998) (holding, to prevail in wrongful death suit

alleging police officer committed battery, plaintiff must, as in federal action under § 1983,

prove police officer used unreasonable force), defendants, as noted, have not moved for

summary judgment on the state law claims. As plaintiffs’ state law claims are the only

claims remaining, the Court will dismiss those claims without prejudice to plaintiffs’ re-filing

them in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966) (holding “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . .

the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 40

F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (“In the usual case in which federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”) (emphasis omitted).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

plaintiffs’ federal claims is hereby GRANTED, and plaintiffs’ state law claims are hereby

DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2016 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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