Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-01581/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-01581-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Auto Negligence

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brandee Rosales,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Sarah Rollag,

Defendant.

No. CV-22-01581-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

Before the Court are fifteen Motions in Limine: six motions filed by Defendant

Sarah Rollag (“Defendant”) (Docs. 47–52) and nine motions filed by Plaintiffs Brandee 

Rosales (Plaintiff Rosales”) and Plaintiff Rosales’ minor daughter, A.T. (“Plaintiff A.T.”) 

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”). (Docs. 57–64; 65). Each party has filed Responses in 

Opposition to the other party’s Motions, which the Court has reviewed. (Docs. 67–81). 

The Court will address each Motion in turn.

I. Background

This case arises from a rear-end collision which Plaintiff Rosales alleges caused her 

injuries and the premature birth of Plaintiff A.T. and injuries. (Doc. 5-1 at ¶¶ 13–16). 

Plaintiffs allege on September 29, 2020, Plaintiff Rosales was rear ended by Defendant, 

who failed to control her speed. (Id.) Defendant states that she saw Plaintiffs’ car in the 

left lane but could not tell that it was stopped, as she saw no brake lights or turn signals. 

(Doc. 44 at 2 (the Court’s Summary Judgment Order)). Plaintiff Rosales was twenty 

weeks pregnant at the time of the collision, so as a precaution, she sought medical care the 

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next day. (Doc. 43 at 1–2 (the Court’s Daubert Order)). She was diagnosed with headache, 

neck and lumbar sprain; but was not shown to have any placental abnormalities. (Id. at 2). 

On October 6, 2020, Plaintiff Rosales again sought care as she experienced a large leakage 

of fluids which soaked the seat of her vehicle. (Id.) She was diagnosed with “suspect 

preterm premature rupture of membranes” and discharged with instructions to rest. (Id.) 

On December 14, 2020, Plaintiff Rosales was admitted to Chandler Regional with 

various conditions related to her pregnancy. (Doc. 44 at 3). While still admitted, due to 

fetus complications, her treating doctor at Chandler Regional, Dr. Paula McEachen

performed a c-section and A.T. was born on December 18, 2020. (Id.) A.T. was born eight 

weeks premature and required a four-week long stay in the neonatal intensive care unit

(“NICU”). (Id.) 

On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff Rosales returned to the ER at Chandler Regional due 

to shortness of breath and chest discomfort over the past day. (Doc. 44 at 3). She was 

diagnosed with a pulmonary embolism, Covid-19, and pneumonia. (Id.) On March 9, 

2021, Plaintiff Rosales went to Innovative Pain & Wellness reporting cervical, lumbar, and 

left hip pain, along with headaches. (Id.) Plaintiff was prescribed a physical therapy 

treatment regimen to treat her pain. (Id.)

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging Arizona State Law Negligence and Negligence 

Per Se claims against Defendant. (Doc. 5-1). Plaintiffs allege their injuries can be linked 

to the crash. (Doc. 5-1 at ¶ 24). Plaintiffs argue that, because of each of their injuries, 

Plaintiff Rosales incurred $157,142.27 in medical expenses and Plaintiff A.T. incurred 

$172,896.00 in medical expenses. (Doc. 43 at 2). Plaintiffs’ Complaint seeks special 

damages, general and compensatory damages, as well as property damages, lost wages and 

earnings. (Doc. 5-1; ¶¶ A-E).

Defendant raises the affirmative defense of comparative fault under A.R.S. § 12-

2506, asserting that Plaintiff Rosales was in the left lane, not the center turning lane, and 

she had no brake or turn signals on. Defendant also alleges that Plaintiff Rosales had a 

duty to mitigate her damages. (Doc. 6 at 4). 

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II. Legal Standards Governing Plaintiff’s Claims

In Arizona, to establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: 

“(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach 

by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct 

and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Diaz v. Phoenix Lubrication Serv., Inc., 

230 P.3d 718, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 230 

(Ariz. 2007)). Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim is alleged under A.R.S. § 28-730(A) and 

28-701(A) which prohibit a driver from following more closely than is reasonable and 

prudent, and controlling one’s speed, respectively. 

Under Arizona’s comparative fault system, a defendant is liable “only for the 

amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s 

percentage of fault.” A.R.S. § 12-2506(A). Because an allegation of comparative fault is 

an affirmative defense, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff or a non-party are 

“actually at fault.” See Ryan v. San Francisco Peaks Trucking Co., 262 P.3d 863, 869 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). To do this, a defendant asserting a comparative 

fault affirmative defense must prove the four negligence elements: (1) a duty; (2) a breach

of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the actors conduct and the resulting injury; 

and (4) actual damages. See Diaz, 230 P.3d at 721. 

III. Motions in Lime – Legal Standards

“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine 

rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to 

manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.4 (1984). Motions 

in limine “allow parties to resolve evidentiary disputes ahead of trial, without first having 

to present potentially prejudicial evidence in front of a jury.” Brodit v. Cabra, 350 F.3d 

985, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Generally, motions in limine that seek 

exclusion of broad and unspecific categories of evidence are disfavored. See Sperberg v. 

Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975). Motions in limine are 

“entirely within the discretion of the Court.” Jaynes Corp. v. American Safety Indem. Co., 

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2014 WL 1154180, at *1 (D. Nev. March 20, 2014) (citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41–42). 

Moreover, “[a] motion in limine is not the proper vehicle for seeking a dispositive ruling 

on a claim, particularly after the deadline for filing such motions has pass.” Hana Fin., 

Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 907, 190 L. Ed. 

2d 800 (2015) (citing Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Motions in limine are “provisional.” Goodman v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 

963 F.Supp.2d 1036 (D. Nev. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and dismissed in part on 

other grounds, 613 F. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court issues its rulings on motions 

in limine based on the record currently before it. Therefore, rulings on such motions “are 

not binding on the trial judge [who] may always change his [or her] mind during the course 

of a trial.” Id. (quoting Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 (2000) (citing Luce, 

469 U.S. at 41 (noting that in limine rulings are always subject to change, especially if the 

evidence unfolds in an unanticipated manner))). “Denial of a motion in limine does not 

necessarily mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted to trial. 

Denial merely means that without the context of trial, the court is unable to determine 

whether the evidence in question should be excluded.” Id. (quoting Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. 

Elec. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004)).

A. Burden of Proof 

Motions to exclude evidence require the party seeking exclusion to inform the Court 

of the evidence’s substance with specificity. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2); United States v. 

Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 2018)(finding a motion in limine did not satisfy 

Rule 103(a)’s specificity requirement by failing to identify the specific evidence or explain 

its admissibility). The party offering the evidence and testimony at trial bears the burden 

of proof that it is relevant under Rule 401 and not prejudicial under Rule 403.

Federal Rule of Evidence 4011 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if it has any 

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and 

the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Under Rule 402, 

1 Except where otherwise noted, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Evidence.

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relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided. Fed. R. Evid. 402. However, 

all relevant evidence is subject to the balancing test set forth by Rule 403. That is, a court 

“may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 

danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 

the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

B. The Court’s Orders & Procedures

The Court’s Rule 16 Scheduling Order was issued on October 31, 2022 (Doc. 14). 

In the Order, the Court states “Disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(A) must include the 

identities of treating physicians and other witnesses who have not been specially employed 

to provide expert testimony but who will provide testimony under Federal Rules of

Evidence 702, 703, or 705. A Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report is required for any opinion of such 

witnesses that was not developed in the course of their treatment or other factual 

involvement in this case.” (Doc. 14 at 3) (emphasis added). The Order set September 15, 

2023 as the fact discovery deadline. On agreement by the parties, the Court extended the 

fact discovery deadline to November 15, 2023.

Relative to some of the parties motions, the Rule 16 Scheduling Order also states 

“Since this Court effectively requires all Rule 26(a)(3) Pretrial Disclosures to be contained 

in the joint Proposed Final Pretrial Order, this Order contemplates that all exhibits and 

witnesses that may be offered at trial will have been disclosed before the close of discovery 

as established by this Order. This Order therefore supersedes the “thirty-day before trial” 

disclosure deadline contained in that Rule. Therefore (1) failure to have timely 

supplemented a Rule 26(a) disclosure, (2) failure to have timely supplemented responses 

to discovery requests, or (3) attempting to include any witnesses or exhibits in the joint 

Proposed Final Pretrial Order that were not previously disclosed prior to the discovery 

deadline set forth in this Order, may result in the exclusion of such evidence at trial or the 

imposition of other sanctions.” (Id. at 4). Thus, the parties were made fully aware of their 

disclosure obligations and the consequences of not meeting the requirements of disclosure.

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IV. Discussion2

Defendant has filed six motions in limine seeking to exclude: (1) any claim by 

Plaintiff Rosales for property damage; (2) hearsay statements from an unidentified and 

undisclosed AutoZone employee at the accident scene; (3) evidence, testimony, or 

argument regarding Plaintiffs’ financial condition or financial hardship experienced due to 

the subject accident; (4) vehicle repair estimates and any other evidence, testimony, or 

argument regarding the vehicle repair amounts or that the vehicle was “totaled;” (5) any 

evidence, testimony, or argument that the accident caused “fetal injury;” and (6) Dr. 

O’Connor, Dr. Arce-Lara, and Dr. Ellsworth from testifying at trial as well as any causation 

opinions from these three treating providers. (Docs. 47–52). 

Plaintiffs have filed nine motions in limine seeking to exclude: (1) references to and 

evidence of “litigious society, money as a motivating factor for lawsuits, and when 

Plaintiffs hired counsel;” (2) evidence or testimony of biomechanics and whether there 

were sufficient forces in the collision to cause Plaintiffs’ injuries; (3) evidence or reference 

to Plaintiff Rosales’ criminal convictions; (4) reference to or evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ 

attendance and participation in Plaintiff A.T.’s NICU stay; (5) any reference to or evidence 

of Plaintiff Rosales’ drug use; (6) reference to or evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ prior 

physical assaults; (7) reference to or evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ prior motor vehicle 

accidents; (8) reference to or evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ sexually transmitted diseases

(“STDs”); and (9) evidence or testimony of any potential collateral sources or insurance or 

the full sums of the amounts billed by Plaintiffs’ medical providers. (Docs. 57–64, 66). 

The Court will address each Motion in turn.

A. Defendant’s Motions in Limine

1. Defendants First and Fourth Motions in Limine (Docs. 47 & 50) –

Vehicle Repair Estimates 

2 A common theme arises in the parties MILs: alleging the party failed to identify and 

disclose witnesses and evidence. Moreover, often, the parties do not precisely respond to 

the other parties motion. This calls into question whether the parties made a bona fide 

effort to meet and confer before filing their motions. 

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Defendant first seeks an Order excluding any claim by Plaintiffs for property 

damages. Defendant states that she “failed to disclose that she was even making a property 

damage claim, let alone the computation of such damages and the documents on which the 

computation is based . . . [and] . . . [t]he only exhibits Plaintiff Rosales produced which

related to the property damage were photos of her vehicle and a repair estimate.” 

(Doc. 47 at 2). Plaintiffs assert that Defendant “cannot argue surprise or prejudice 

regarding property damage” because they disclosed a repair estimate, Defendant was aware 

that the vehicle was not repaired and [they] included a property damage claim in her 

complaint.” (Doc. 75 at 1-2). Plaintiffs aver that “the inadvertent lack of property damage 

in her disclosure statement does not constitute unfair surprise or prejudice.” (Id.) Not so.

Although, as here, a party may refer to incurring property damage in a complaint, 

the federal rules of civil procedure require more. (See Doc. 1-3 t 3; ln. 19). Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26 (a)(A)(iii) provides that a party, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the 

other parties “a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party 

˗ who must also make available for inspection . . . the documents or other evidentiary 

material . . . on which each computation is based[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) provides that 

“[i]f a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) . . . the party is not 

allowed to use that information . . . to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a 

trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” So, unless Plaintiffs can 

show that the failure to provide a computation of each category of damages, beyond 

Rosales’ deposition testimony, or vehicle repair estimate, she may not place it into evidence 

at the trial. See Hill v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 570 Fed. Appx. 667, 670 (9th Cir. 

2014) (the court properly excluded evidence where disclosures did not include proper 

computation of damages so it was unclear exactly what damages Plaintiff sought).

Relatedly, in her Fifth Motion in Limine, Defendant seeks an order excluding 

vehicle repair estimates and “any other evidence, testimony, or argument regarding the 

vehicle repair amounts or that the vehicle was ‘totaled.” (Doc. 50 at 1). Defendant states 

that Plaintiffs have not disclosed a property damage claim and even if she did, the “repair 

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estimates themselves do not show the actual amount incurred.” (Id.) Defendant states that 

Plaintiffs have “not retained biomechanical or accident reconstruction experts who may 

rely on repair estimates to calculate forces and determine impact severity.” (Id. at 2). 

Defendant asserts that the estimates themselves are “not easy to read and understand 

without a foundational witness” which Plaintiffs have not offered. (Id.)

Plaintiffs retort that the repair estimate is probative of the issues in the case and 

“omitting such evidence may be prejudicial to Plaintiff[s] and confuse or mislead the jury” 

because the estimate “provides evidence as to the extent of damage to [her] vehicle as it 

helps establish the potential cost of repair her vehicle would require.” (Doc. 78 at 1).

Plaintiffs also assert that the repair estimate is admissible as a “business record” exception 

to the hearsay rule. Plaintiffs proffer that a records custodian will lay the foundation for 

this exception. Plaintiffs do not say, however, who will testify about the repairs required 

by the car, or the opinion leading to the estimates.

As previously noted, claims of property damage must be accompanied by a 

computation of expenses incurred. An estimate, without explanation, is insufficient under 

both Rule 26(a) and 37(c). Whereas here, Plaintiffs have not proffered a witness to testify 

about the severity of damage caused by the crash impact, the estimate is unreliable. 

Moreover, introducing the estimate as a business record under Rule 803(6) requires that 

the witness have a first-hand knowledge of the business, its record keeping procedure and 

that it was prepared in the usual course of business. Once authenticated, the estimate 

requires further explanation, so as not to confuse the jury. Apparently, no such witness was 

disclosed by Plaintiff, nor is one listed in the parties Joint Pretrial Order, (Doc. 54), so the 

Defendant has not had an opportunity to depose the witness who prepared the estimate. To 

permit this evidence at trial, through someone other than the mechanic who assessed the 

cars damage and prepared the estimate would constitute inadmissible hearsay. To do so 

would result in jury confusion and prejudice to the Defendant. The Plaintiff’s vehicle 

repair estimate is therefore excludable under Rules 401, 403 and 803. 

However, at the Final Pretrial Conference, Plaintiffs may inform the Court how their 

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failure to disclose the necessary computation of damages was substantially justified or 

harmless. As the car repair estimate falls within this category of damages, the Court will 

reserve ruling on Defendant’s Motions until that time. 

Accordingly, the Court will withhold its rulings on Defendant’s First and Fifth

Motions in Limine (Docs. 47 & 50) until the Final Pretrial Conference. 

2. Defendant’s Second MIL (Doc. 48) – Hearsay Statements3

Defendant seeks an Order excluding hearsay statements from an unidentified and 

undisclosed AutoZone employee at the accident scene. (Id. at 1). Defendant states that 

“[t]he Arizona Crash Report identified a witness named Andres Alberto Lara, but the report 

narrative does not indicate what Lara told officers.” (Id. at 2). Responding, Plaintiffs

clarify that Mr. Lara is the AutoZone employee she referred to in her deposition. 

(Doc. 76 at 1). The Court notes he is not listed as a witness in the Joint Proposed Final 

Pretrial Order. (Doc. 55). The Defendant presumes that either Officer Murillo or Ms. 

Rosales intends to introduce Mr. Lara’s statement into evidence. Defendant asserts that 

this statement is hearsay and not permitted under any exception. (Doc. 55 at 2).

Plaintiffs respond that Mr. Lara’s statements to Plaintiff Rosales fall under the 

excited utterance and present sense impression exceptions to the hearsay rule. (Id. at 2). 

So, the Court presumes Ms. Rosales intends to testify that “[He] came out of the store and 

told her he saw the whole accident.” (Id.) This indicates that she will then repeat what he 

said he saw. She states that she can testify about “the timeline of how soon after the crash” 

Mr. Lara made the statement so as to meet one of the exceptions. (Id.) 

“Hearsay” is a statement that “(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at 

the current trial . . . and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted 

in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is not permitted unless it meets an 

exception to Rule 802. Given that Mr. Lara’s statement to the Defendant meets the 

3 Plaintiffs, in this and other responses, urge the Court to deny Defendant’s Motion because 

she did not adhere to the Court’s page limit. The Court will not do so. Notably, Plaintiffs 

themselves have not adhered to the Courts procedures resulting in numerous filing errors

and they, too filed lengthy motions and responses. 

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definition of hearsay, it is impermissible unless it meets an exception to the hearsay 

prohibition.

Among the hearsay exceptions are when “[a] statement describing or explaining an 

event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). Under the Presence Sense Impression exception, the statement “must 

be made while the declarant is perceiving the facts in question or immediately thereafter.” 

Commentary note to Rule 803(1) (explaining that “it must be established that the statement 

was made contemporaneously with the event or immediately after the event.”). An 

additional exception, excited utterance, is when a statement relates to “a startling event or 

condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). The statement must be “made in response to a startling event during 

the trauma or stress of the event . . . [and] the event must be an extremely startling or 

shocking event.” See commentary note to 803(2).

Defendant states that immediately after the accident, Plaintiff Rosales pulled her car 

into a driveway past the AutoZone entrance and spoke to Defendant and her passenger. 

(Doc. 48 at 2). Plaintiff Rosales testified at her deposition that an AutoZone employee 

approached her and informed her that he witnessed the accident from inside the store and 

that he saw Plaintiff’s vehicle was fully within the turn lane. (Id.) Defendant states she 

never saw an AutoZone employee at the scene, however. (Id.) Defendant also states that 

no police officer immediately responded and that the Arizona Crash Report notes an officer 

arrived at 8:30 p.m. almost three hours after the 5:44 p.m. accident. (Id.) That Report does 

not indicate what, if anything, Mr. Lara said to the officer about what he saw. (See Doc. 

48-3). So, it is unclear when, in relation to the accident, Mr. Lara approached the Plaintiff. 

Undoubtedly, based upon the pleadings, his statement is inadmissible as an excited 

utterance as the Defendant did not see him, including after she spoke to Plaintiff. It is also 

doubtful that the statement is admissible as a present sense impression as Plaintiff Rosales 

indicates that Mr. Lara saw the accident through the store window, yet she did not speak 

with him until after she moved her car, and after she spoke with the Defendant and her 

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passenger. 

To be sure, given that Mr. Lara’s statement is not included in a report or deposition, 

his statement to Plaintiff is wholly unreliable. Cf. Fed R. Evid. 807 (“a hearsay statement 

is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not admissible under a 

hearsay exception” if “the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees of 

trustworthiness”). His statement, as described by Plaintiffs, is plainly inadmissible hearsay 

for which there is no exception for its admission. Moreover, Defendants assert Plaintiff 

did not disclose him as a witness, so, she has not had an opportunity to depose him. 

Consequently, admission of this hearsay testimony would result in jury confusion and 

unfair prejudice to the Defendant under Rule 403. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 48) is granted. 

Plaintiffs may not introduce the statement of Mr. Lara, the AutoZone employee.

3. Defendant’s Third Motion in Limine (Doc. 49) – Plaintiff’s 

Financial Condition

Defendant seeks an Order “excluding evidence, testimony or argument regarding 

Plaintiff’s financial condition or financial hardship experienced due to the subject 

accident.” (Id. at 1). Defendant asserts that evidence of Plaintiffs’ financial difficulties 

would “excite the sympathies of the jury and improperly influence their finding on the 

question of damages.” (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiffs counter that they are “entitled to damages for 

her pain and suffering, and reasonable value of necessary household help.” (Doc. 77 at 1). 

Plaintiff asserts that she would be prejudiced if not permitted to “[introduce] evidence of 

[her] financial strain, increased dependency on childcare, and financial assistance during 

this time.” (Id. at 2). 

Defendant’s argument relies on a case which discusses testimony or evidence as it 

relates to the “wealth or poverty of the plaintiff.” (Doc. 49 citing Tom Reed Gold Mines 

Co. v. Berd, 32 Ariz. 479, 484 (1927)). Plaintiff Rosales describes more specific evidence 

of financial damage, not her “wealth or poverty” status. Obviously, there is a 

misunderstanding of what evidence the Defendant intends to introduce which was not 

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resolved in the mandatory conferral process. 

If Plaintiff Rosales has properly provided discovery through the Rule 26(a) 

discovery process of her financial damages caused by the accident, it may be introduced. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 401. For example, Defendant states, and alleges in her Complaint, that 

at the time of the accident, she was employed by Bakyard Boyz Landscaping, from which 

she had to resign due to the injuries from the accident. (See Doc. 81-1 at 9-10). She also 

listed claimed damages of lost wages. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine 3 (Doc. 49) is denied. To 

the extent the Plaintiffs can show that testimony about her resulting financial situation is 

supported by previously disclosed evidence, it may be admitted at trial.

4. Defendants Fifth Motion in Limine (Doc. 51) – Fetal Injury

Defendant seeks an Order excluding any evidence, testimony, or argument that the 

accident caused fetal injury. She states that Defendant will not agree to “exclude any claim 

for fetal injury, despite their being zero support for such claim.” (Id. at 2). Defendant 

again asserts that Plaintiffs “did not disclose any opinions or claims for fetal injury, they 

cannot elicit such opinions or present such evidence or argument at trial.” (Id.) The only 

claim Plaintiffs make, according to Defendant, is “that A.T. has scars from the way she 

positioned herself in the womb” as a result of the accident and/or her premature birth. (Id.) 

Defendant asserts that this would force the jury to speculate because this is the only 

evidence of Plaintiffs’ fetal injury. 

Plaintiffs respond that Dr. Hirsh testified that the car accident “contributed to the 

early rupture of membranes . . . which set up milieu of changes that caused the premature 

birth of the baby.” (Doc. 80 at 2). Yet, Plaintiffs do not connect the premature birth, or 

describe the milieu of changes that result in A.T.’s scars, which is the evidence Defendant 

seeks to exclude. So, unless Plaintiffs can provide the Court with evidence or expert 

testimony that the apparent scarring on A.T. is causally connected to the accident, 

Plaintiff’s testimony will be excluded. 

/ / / /

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Fifth Motion in Limine (Doc. 51) is granted. 

However, Plaintiffs may move for reconsideration of the ruling upon a proper showing.

5. Defendant’s Sixth Motion in Limine (Doc. 52) – Testimony and 

Causation Opinions from Undisclosed Treating Physicians

Defendant seeks an Order excluding Defendant’s witnesses Dr. O’Connor, Dr. 

Arce-Lara, and Dr. Ellsworth from testifying at trial, and any causation opinions from them 

because she did not disclose them in the Rule 26(a) process. (Doc. 52 at 1). Rather, 

Defendant merely named the healthcare facilities in which the these treating physicians 

work. Plaintiffs assert that “treating medical providers can give opinion testimony that 

embraces their expertise, so long as the basis for their testimony is personal knowledge, 

observation and perception.” (Doc. 81 at 1). Plaintiffs then go on to describe the types of 

testimony permissible by a treating physician. Plaintiffs wholly ignore the gravamen of 

Defendant’s Motion which is that she “failed to disclose the providers and did not comply 

with disclosure requirements for causation opinions.” (Doc. 52 at 1). Rather, Plaintiffs

claim that Defendant was aware of the facilities where she received treatment, so she 

should have known that a physician from each facility would testify as to her treatment. 

(Doc. 81 at 4). Not so.

The Courts Rule 16 Order states “Disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(A) must include 

the identities of treating physicians and other witnesses who have not been specially 

employed to provide expert testimony but who will provide testimony under Federal 

Rules of Evidence, 702, 703, or 705. (Doc. 14 at 3) (emphasis added). Rule 26(a)(3)(i) 

provides that “a party must provide to the other party and promptly file the following 

information about the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for 

impeachment: the name . . . of each witness ‒ separately identifying those the party expects 

to present and those it may call if the need arises [and] (iii) an identification of each 

document or other exhibit, including summaries of other evidence ‒ separately identifying 

those items the party expects to offer and those it may offer if the need arises.” Even if the 

three treatment providers were not hired or designated experts, Plaintiffs had a duty to 

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disclose them because they intend to rely upon their testimony to prove elements of their

claim. 

The Joint Final Pretrial Order lists the following witnesses: Doctors Daniel 

O’Connor, Carlos Arce-Lara, and Marc Ellsworth. (Doc. 54 at 5-6). The Court notes 

Defendant’s objection as to each because “the witness was not disclosed by Rule 26(a)(1) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is thus properly excluded from trial pursuant 

to Rule 37(c)(1)[.]” (Id.). Essentially, Defendant argues that none of the proffered treating 

physicians provided causation opinions during their treatment of Plaintiff Rosales and 

permitting them to testify as to their treatment of her during random patient visits would 

confuse the issues and the jury. The Court agrees. 

Merely listing the treating facility where Plaintiffs received care is wholly 

insufficient. Plaintiffs explain that “Defendant[] had sufficient notice of all treating 

physicians’ expected testimony in this case [as] [a]ll of Plaintiff’s treating medical 

facilities were disclosed.” (Doc. 81 at 4) (emphasis added). Furthermore, Plaintiffs state 

that their amended discovery responses outlined the treatment Plaintiff Rosales underwent 

at each facility and listed the dates of treatment. (Id.). Then, Plaintiffs outline that “Each

may testify regarding the Plaintiffs’ injuries/medical condition to the incident.” (Id.). 

Then, Plaintiffs state that “Defendants listed each provider within their own disclosure 

statements” indicating that they were on notice of each of Plaintiff Rosales’ providers. (Id.) 

Though this may diminish the prejudicial effect of non-specific disclosure of these treating 

physicians, it does not end the inquiry.

Though not proffered as experts, treating physicians must provide the reports upon 

which their conclusions are based, in particular where, as here, they intend to opine on 

injuries caused by the accident. In Goodman v. Staples the Officer Superstore, LLC, 644 

F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit addressed, when a treating physician is required 

to prepare an expert report compliant with Rule 26(a)(2)(B). There, the plaintiff tripped 

and fell in an office supply store and filed a complaint in state court alleging the store 

negligently allowed an unreasonably dangerous condition to exist which resulted in her fall 

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and serious injuries. Id. at 821. Under Arizona law, causation is an essential element of a 

negligence claim. Id. at 824 (citation omitted). The district judge prohibited the 

plaintiff’s medical experts from testifying about causation in plaintiff's case-in-chief 

because she did not comply with her Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report disclosure obligations. Id. 

On appeal, as a matter of first impression, the Ninth Circuit held that “when a treating 

physician morphs into a witness hired to render expert opinions that go beyond the scope 

of a treating doctor’s testimony, the proponent of the testimony must comply with Rule 

26(a)(2).” Id. at 819–20. 

Consequently, if Plaintiffs’ treating physicians each intend to testify as to the 

injuries Plaintiff sustained, then opine on the cause attributing those injuries to the accident 

at issue, the physician morphs into a “causation” expert. See Goodman, 644 F.3d at 819–

20. And, for each treating physician who intends to so testify, Plaintiffs must provide a 

report as to how he/she arrived at that opinion as to causation. Contrarily, should the 

treatment provider simply testify about his/her observation of an injury which he or she 

treated, without attributing a cause to that injury, the testimony may be admissible. Yet, 

Plaintiff bears the burden to show that she properly disclosed her intent to rely on the 

treatment provider’s testimony. If Plaintiff cannot do so, any undisclosed witness 

intending to testify will be precluded as prejudicial to the Defendant, because she will have 

been deprived of an opportunity to depose them, review the treatment record upon which 

they will rely, and will be prejudiced in presenting her defense. Plainly, Defendant is 

entitled to know who the treatment provider is and understand what the treating physician’s 

testimony is based upon. 

Accordingly, at the Final Pretrial Conference, Plaintiffs must explain when they

disclosed the identities (not the facilities in which they work) of each of her proffered 

treating physicians and the reports upon which their testimonies are based. Until then, the 

Court will grant Defendants Motion to preclude their testimony.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Sixth Motion in Limine (Doc. 52) is granted. 

Treating physician witnesses not disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and 26(a)(3)(i) and (iii), 

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and the Court’s Rule 16 Scheduling Order, are precluded from testifying. However, 

Plaintiffs may seek reconsideration of the Court’s ruling upon a proper showing that she 

complied with the requisite discovery rules.

B. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine

1. Plaintiffs’ First Motion in Limine4(Doc. 57) – Arguments of 

“Litigious Society” & When Counsel was Hired

Plaintiffs request an Order prohibiting Defendant “from any comments, arguments, 

or allusions to living in a ‘litigious society’ ” and “from bringing up when [she] hired an 

attorney.” (Doc. 57 at 2). Plaintiffs’ first request appears unnecessary as Defendant avows 

having “no intention of arguing that it is improper for money to act as a remedy, that we 

live in a litigious society, or that insurance rates will increase.” (Doc. 69 at 1). So, the 

Court will hold Defendant to that and grant the Plaintiffs Motion as to that issue. 

Defendant does not respond to the precise issue raised by Plaintiff Rosales that she 

“not bring up when [Plaintiff] hired an attorney.” Though, Defendant states that fact is not 

privileged, the Court nonetheless finds the timing of hiring a lawyer in this case is irrelevant 

to Plaintiffs’ claims. Fed. R. Evid. 401. 

However, Defendant’s Response expands upon the relevance of the date she hired 

counsel. That is, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff Rosales did not experience pain symptoms 

until after her consultation with counsel on October 5, 2020. (Doc. 69 at 2 (“It was not 

until October 6, 2020, that Plaintiff Rosales presented for pregnancy complications and 

attributed them to the subject accident”)). Defendant states her belief that Plaintiff’s 

treatment provider, Innovative Pain and Wellness, was on referral from her counsel. (Id.) 

So, Defendant posits she is entitled to elicit testimony of when Plaintiff hired counsel in 

relation to her pain symptoms. Yet, delayed pain or a delay in reporting pain is not unusual. 

So, without more, the Defendant has not fully rebutted Plaintiffs’ relevance argument and 

reference to the date Plaintiffs hired their counsel will not be admitted.

Next, Defendant adds on that she is entitled to probe secondary gain on cross4 Plaintiff titles two of her Motions in Limine as number “1” (see Doc. 66). The Court will 

address each MIL in the Order appropriately filed. 

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examination of Plaintiff Rosales in her motive and intent in filing this claim, and of the 

treatment provider(s) motive, intent and bias evident by their relationship with referring 

counsel. (Id. at 2). Defendant’s cited cases, including an out of district case, to support 

her argument are not instructive. As it is Defendant’s burden to show how this evidence is 

relevant and admissible, she fails to make that showing here.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s First Motion in Limine (Doc. 57) is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s Second Motion in Limine (Doc. 58) – Biomechanic 

Opinions and/or Arguments of Insufficient Force

Plaintiffs seek an Order precluding evidence, opinion or argument or mention5“of 

biomechanics and whether there were sufficient forces in the collision to cause injuries.” 

(Doc. 58 at 1). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert Defendant’s witness, Dr. Hugh Miller, is a 

fact witness who opined that this was “a fairly minor accident.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiffs argue 

that Dr. Miller is not an engineer or proffered as an expert and testimony about the severity 

of the crash and forces necessary to cause injury requires specialized knowledge. (Id.) So, 

Plaintiffs aver that Dr. Miller should be precluded from offering this opinion.

Defendant asserts that Dr. Miller examined Plaintiff Rosales at Chandler 

Regional/Dignity Health Clinic following the collision. (Doc. 67 at 9). After his 

examination, Dr. Miller described in his record that “it sounds as though it was a fairly 

minor accident.” (Doc. 67-1 at 2). The statement is admissible as it relates to Plaintiff

Rosales’ statement during medical treatment and diagnoses, and it is probative of her 

description of the impact of the collision. Under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), the statement of a 

party opponent is admissible, albeit hearsay, if it was made “by the party in an individual 

. . . capacity.” So, to the extent that Dr. Miller testifies about what Plaintiff said caused her 

injuries, they may be admitted. Moreover, as a treating physician, Dr. Miller’s diagnosis 

of her injuries and their cause is admissible fact testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 701 (stating 

that lay witness testimony “rationally based on the witness’s perception” is admissible). 

/ / / /

5 The Court notes that “argument and mention” are overly broad terms that may cause 

confusion. For instance, the Court will not preclude counsel from arguing or mentioning 

in closing argument that this was a “minor accident.”

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 58) is denied. 

3. Plaintiffs’ Third Motion in Limine (Doc. 59) – Criminal History 

Plaintiffs seek to exclude evidence or reference to Plaintiff Rosales’ criminal 

convictions. (Doc. 59). Plaintiffs specifically seek to exclude evidence of or reference to 

a misdemeanor DUI Plaintiff Rosales pled guilty to in 2018 as well as her failure to 

complete fingerprints and failure to make scheduled payments. (Doc. 59 at 1). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff Rosales’ conviction is relevant to show her “chronic 

marijuana abuse, as her own expert, Dr. Hirsch, acknowledged that marijuana use would 

cause negative effects on a normal pregnancy.” (Doc. 79 at 1). Defendant asserts that 

Plaintiff Rosales “[m]edical records and criminal records show that she was not an 

occasional user; rather, she abused marijuana and was ordered to take substance abuse 

courses following her DUI conviction.” (Id. at 2). She also notes that, based on Plaintiff 

Rosales’ plea agreement, Rosales was using marijuana during her first pregnancy but 

suffered a miscarriage. (Id.)

Rule 404 controls the outcome of this issue. Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence 

of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to 

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. 

R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, this evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such 

as “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. at 404(b)(2). If admissible, this evidence must meet Rule 

403’s balancing test. United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1978).

Indeed, Dr. Hirsch stated during his deposition that consistent marijuana use can 

cause a premature delivery but noted that Plaintiff Rosales was not consistently smoking 

marijuana during this pregnancy. (Doc. 33-2 at 2). Dr. Hirsch stated that marijuana use 

one to two times per week is not excessive and that this would not have adversely affected 

her pregnancy. (Id. at 3). He based this opinion on internet articles, such as those published 

by the Mayo Clinic. (Id. at 4). In an affidavit Dr. Hirsch submitted for the Daubert motions 

in this matter, Dr. Hirsch states that, in his expert opinion, Plaintiff Rosales’ prior 

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pregnancy history and marijuana use did not cause her premature delivery or rupture of 

membranes. (Doc. 33-1 at 4). Instead, he asserts that the rear-end accident she was 

involved in caused her preterm premature rupture of membranes and the subsequent need 

for a c-section. (Id.) Defendant can cross examine Dr. Hirsch, and even Plaintiff Rosales, 

using these facts without referencing her criminal convictions.

Importantly, there is no evidence proffered that Plaintiff was under the influence of 

marijuana when the collision occurred. Yet, Defendant argues that “[g]iven Plaintiff 

Rosales’s DUI conviction, prior miscarriage while using marijuana, serious auto accident 

while intoxicated by marijuana, and her noted marijuana use during her pregnancy with 

A.T., there is a strong implication that she was frequently and excessively using 

marijuana.” (Doc. 79 at 3) (emphasis added). Defendant essentially seeks to introduce 

propensity evidence, which is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Defendant’s 

argument can be distilled to a simple one: that because Plaintiff Rosales has struggled with 

her sobriety in the past, she must have struggled with it while pregnant with A.T.—which 

she seeks to bolster through the criminal conviction evidence. (See Doc. 79). Defendant 

does not seek to admit this evidence for any admissible purpose, such as “proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 

accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). So, the Court must exclude this evidence under Rule 

404(b). 

Even if this evidence were admissible, it would not meet Rule 403’s balancing test. 

Sangrey, 586 F.2d at 1314. A jury may draw many “implications” from a DUI 

conviction—but Plaintiff Rosales’ DUI is not at issue here. This evidence is minimally 

probative given the other evidence Defendant may probe into regarding Plaintiff Rosales’ 

marijuana use. Defendant can limitedly cross examine Plaintiff Rosales and Dr. Hirsch 

about her marijuana use without referencing her criminal convictions. Evidence of her 

criminal convictions would be needlessly cumulative. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court 

may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 

danger of . . . needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). There is also a strong 

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likelihood that this evidence would unfairly prejudice Plaintiff Rosales and confuse the 

present issues. See id. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Third Motion in Limine (Doc. 59) is granted. 

Defendant may not make reference to or seek to introduce evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ 

criminal convictions.

4. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Motion in Limine (Doc. 60) – NICU Stay

Plaintiffs seek an Order excluding “evidence, reference, opinion, argument or 

mention of [her] attendance and participation in A.T.’s NICU stay.” (Doc. 61 at 1). 

Plaintiffs asserts that Plaintiff Rosales’ “injury and subsequent premature birth of A.T. is 

one of the main issues in this case.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff is concerned that mention of her 

“lack of presence for the baby’s feedings, lack of presence at the baby’s bedside, lack of 

demonstration or understanding of caring for the baby and social work consults” would be 

confusing, mislead the jury and result in undue delay. (Id.) Plaintiff states that the 

probative value of any mention of her lack of presence or attendance during A.T.’s NICU 

stay is outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence. (Id.).

 Defendant states that Plaintiffs are seeking special damages for Plaintiff A.T.’s 

stay in the NICU, along with general damages for Plaintiffs pain and suffering and loss of 

enjoyment of life. (Doc. 73. at 2). A.T. was delivered on December 18, 2020, and admitted 

to the NICU. (Id.). Defendant outlines the numerous times that the NICU attempted to 

contact Plaintiff Rosales because she had not been at A.T.s bedside for “a few days.” (Id.) 

Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff Rosales’ whereabouts were unknown resulting in an 

extended NICU stay from A.T.’s date of discharge. (Id. at 3). Defendant offers that 

Plaintiff Rosales also did not participate in A.T.’s care and feeding and was “not 

demonstrating understanding of the necessary cares of the child.” (Id. at 2). Defendant 

states that this evidence is probative of Plaintiff’s claim for damages, particularly because 

she is seeking $$172,896 for A.T.’s NICU stay. (Id. at 3). The Court agrees. 

As noted, Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges she and A.T. “suffered extreme physical and 

mental pain and anguish and continues to suffer extreme physical and mental pain and 

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anguish . . . and enjoyment of life[.]” (Doc. 5-1 at 4). She has also filed a claim for special 

and compensatory damages. (Id. at 5). Plaintiffs appear to be seeking damages in the full 

amount attributable to A.T.’s stay in the NICU. So, whether all or part of the amount 

incurred is attributable to Plaintiff’s absence is relevant to her damages claim and 

Plaintiff’s duty to mitigate those damages. Fed. R. Evid. 401. So, evidence of A.T.’s 

extended NICU stay caused by Plaintiff Rosales’ absence is admissible.

Moreover, Plaintiff Rosales intends to seek damages for mental pain and anguish. 

Should she testify that these claims stem from her loss of enjoyment of the birth experience 

and time spent with A.T. upon delivery, Defendant may cross-examine her related to 

evidence of her absence at the NICU, as it is probative of these claims. Beyond her 

absences at the NICU, evidence of Plaintiff Rosales not demonstrating understanding of 

the necessary cares of the child is more prejudicial than probative of any issue to be tried. 

Fed. R. Evid. 403. So, Defendant is precluded from referring to her lack of parental 

understanding.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Motion in Limine (Doc. 60) is denied.

5. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Motion in Limine (Doc. 61) – Drug Use 

Plaintiffs also seek to exclude any reference to or evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ drug 

use. (Doc. 61 at 1). They argue that evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ marijuana use is 

irrelevant unduly prejudicial, impermissible character evidence, and misleading. (Id.) 

Defendant argues that this evidence is well-documented throughout her medical records, 

which her own expert testified would adversely impact a normal pregnancy. (Doc. 72 at 1). 

She argues that the evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ marijuana use is relevant and highly 

probative to causation, therefore, it is admissible. (Id.) 

This issue has already been decided by the Court’s Daubert Order. (Doc, 43). 

There, Defendant had argued that Dr. Hirsch should be excluded because he failed to 

consider alternative explanations for Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Id. at 8). The Court found that 

Dr. Hirsch did not “ ‘utterly fail’ to offer an explanation for why alternative causes were 

ruled out” because he “relied on Plaintiff Rosales extensive post-accident medical records, 

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which include her past obstetrical history, such as a miscarriage and a second pregnancy 

that resulted in a c-section at 39 gestational weeks as well as her use of marijuana prior to 

and during her pregnancy.” (Id. at 9). The Court concluded that Dr. Hirsch would be 

allowed to testify and that “[t]o the extent Defendant argues he did not ‘adequately rule 

out’ alternative causes for Plaintiff Rosales’ injuries, this is a credibility determination that 

goes to the weight of his opinions, not their admissibility.” (Id. (citing Lopez v. Johnson 

& Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (concluding that evidence of

additional factors an expert failed to rule out should be attacked by cross examination rather 

than exclusion)). By allowing Dr. Hirsch to testify as to the cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries, 

the Court must also allow him to be cross examined on why he ruled out alternative 

explanations for the injuries. (See Doc. 43 at 9); see also Stanley v. Novartis Pharms. 

Corp., 11 F. Supp. 3d 987, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“When an expert rules out a potential 

cause in the course of a differential diagnosis, the ‘expert must provide reasons for rejecting 

alternative hypotheses using scientific methods and procedures and the elimination of those 

hypotheses must be founded on more than subjective beliefs or unsupported 

speculation.’ ”). Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Fifth Motion in Limine (Doc. 61) is denied. 

Reference to or evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ drug use before and during her pregnancy is 

fair grounds for cross examination. 

6. Plaintiffs’ Sixth Motion in Limine (Doc. 62) – Prior Physical 

Assaults 

Plaintiffs next seeks to exclude any reference to or evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ 

prior physical assaults under Rules 401, 402 and 702. (Doc. 62 at 1). Plaintiff Rosales 

states that she has been the victim to several physical assaults perpetrated by her exboyfriend. (Id. at 2). She states that she has had to seek medical attention twice related to 

these assaults, on March 2, 2017, and April 14, 2018. (Id.) Defendant argues that, given 

Plaintiff Rosales’ injury claims, evidence of her 2018 assault is relevant to causation and 

damages. (Doc. 71 at 1). 

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Defendant states that Plaintiff Rosales is seeking damages for treatment received at 

Innovative Pain and Wellness from March through July 2021. (Id. at 2). During that 

treatment, Plaintiff Rosales reported bilateral lumbar pain and underwent imaging, which 

showed disc bulging, neuroforaminal narrowing, and a disc herniation. (Doc. 71-1 at 2).

Defendant also notes that Plaintiff Rosales is seeking damages for a head injury with 

accompanying headaches and permanent left facial paralysis. (Doc. 71 at 2). Defendant 

argues that it should be able to cross-examine Plaintiff Rosales and Dr. Shayya about the 

two physical assaults Rosales was involved in. (Id. at 3). In March of 2017, Plaintiff 

Rosales went to Banner Casa Grande Medical Center with right lower quadrant abdominal 

pain, right flank pain, and right back pain after her ex-boyfriend punched her in her side. 

(Doc. 71-3 at 1). In 2018, Plaintiff Rosales was punched in the face by her ex-boyfriend

which caused left eye bruising and tenderness. (Id. at 12). Plaintiff’s assault injuries are 

to the same areas in which she alleges ongoing pain attributable to the collision. 

The accident occurred on September 29, 2020—more than a year after these 

assaults. (Doc. 44 at 2). The Court finds that this evidence, while attenuated, is relevant 

as it has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. As Defendant notes, it is “entitled to cross-examine Dr. 

Shayya and Plaintiff Rosales regarding these prior assaults, as their existence tends to 

undercut Plaintiff Rosales’s injury claims.” (Doc. 71 at 3). One of the very reasons the 

Court did not exclude Dr. Shayya in its Daubert Order (Doc. 43) was because his failure 

to rule out a 2019 accident where Plaintiff Rosales was ejected from her vehicle was “a 

credibility determination that goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of his opinions, 

which should be addressed by cross-examination during trial.” (Id. at 16 (citing Stanley 

v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 3d 987, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2014)). The same can be 

said for the 2018 assault. Dr. Shayya did not consider this assault in coming to his expert 

opinion. Why he did not consider this evidence, or whether any injury from the assault 

contributed to Plaintiff Rosales’ injuries, is ripe for cross examination. See Primiano v. 

Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Shaky but admissible evidence is to be attacked 

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by cross examination, contrary evidence, and attention to the burden of proof, not 

exclusion.”). That is, in essence, the tradeoff for Dr. Shayya being allowed to testify at all. 

As for Rule 403, the Court finds that, while this evidence is somewhat prejudicial, 

its probative value is not outweighed by whatever prejudicial effect it may have upon the 

jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn’t material.” Old 

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 193 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations 

omitted). Any prejudice this evidence and testimony may hold is outweighed by its 

probative value. Fed. R. Evid. 403.6 

The risk of any unfair prejudice can also be mitigated through a limiting instruction. 

See id. To protect Plaintiff Rosales interests, the Court can issue a limiting instruction 

directing the jury to consider the evidence only for its effect or contribution to Plaintiff 

Rosales’ injuries. If they wish for a limiting instruction to issue, Plaintiffs may submit 

proposed language for such a limiting instruction for the Court to read at the time any such 

evidence is introduced.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine. (Doc. 62) is denied. 

7. Plaintiff’s Seventh MIL (Doc. 63) – Prior Motor Vehicle 

Accidents

Plaintiffs next seek to exclude any reference to or evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’ 

prior motor vehicle accidents. (Doc. 63 at 1). Specifically, Plaintiff Rosales seeks to 

exclude evidence or reference to a 2019 accident in which she was ejected from her vehicle. 

(Id. at 2). Defendant previously asked the Court to exclude one of Plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. 

Shayya, because he did not consider or even know about this accident when he reached his 

opinions. (Doc. 28 at 10). The Court considered its Motion and concluded that “[b]ecause 

Dr. Shayya was aware of Plaintiff Rosales’s history of headaches as well as her concussion, 

the Court finds that his failure to rule out the 2019 accident is a credibility determination 

that goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of his opinions, which should be addressed 

by cross-examination during trial.” (Doc. 70 at 4 (citing Doc. 43 at 16)). This credibility 

6 As for Rule 702, the Court is not sure why Plaintiffs cited it here, but they only cited it 

once and did not develop a separate 702 argument. (See Doc. 62). 

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determination is thus relevant and probative to Defendant’s case. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 

403. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 63) is denied.

8. Plaintiffs’ Eighth Motion in Limine (Doc. 64) – STD History

Plaintiffs next seeks to exclude any reference to or evidence of Plaintiff Rosales’

STD history. (Doc. 64 at 1). Plaintiffs state that Defendant will seek to introduce evidence 

of her STD history in an attempt to show that they contributed to her premature delivery 

of A.T. (Id. at 2). They argue that this is an attempt to get the jury to focus on Plaintiff 

Rosales’ sexual history which is irrelevant and would be highly prejudicial. (Id.) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff Rosales’ STD history is admissible as it provides an 

alternate cause for her preterm premature rupture of membranes. (Doc. 68 at 1). This 

evidence is inadmissible. 

Plaintiffs’ own expert witness, Dr. Hirsch, admitted during his deposition that STDs 

“can” impact a normal pregnancy. (Doc. 68-1 at 4). However, when asked whether 

Plaintiff Rosales had any STDs during her pregnancy with A.T., Dr. Hirsch testified that

she did not have any. (Id.) He elaborated that Plaintiff Rosales had not had an STD since 

“before her first pregnancy,” which was around August or September of 2018. 

(Id; Doc. 29-7 at 5). Defendant attempts to shoehorn in this evidence with the evidence 

that Plaintiff Rosales tested positive for bacterial vaginosis one week before the subject 

accident. (Doc. 68 at 2). Plaintiffs seek to exclude references and evidence to her STD 

history, not this specific diagnosis. (See Doc. 64). Without more, the evidence of Plaintiff 

Rosales’ STD history is not relevant as she did not test positive for an STD during or in 

close proximity to her pregnancy with A.T. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. This evidence also 

appears, as Plaintiffs argue, to attempt to get the jury to focus on Plaintiff Rosales’ sexual 

history which the Court finds violates Rule 403 since this evidence has little probative 

value yet is highly prejudicial. See id. at 403. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 64) is granted. 

Defendant is precluded from eliciting references to or introducing evidence of Plaintiff 

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Rosales’ history of STDs. 

9. Plaintiff’s Ninth Motion in Limine (Doc. 66) – Collateral Source 

Payments and Medical Bills

In Arizona, an injured persons may sue in tort to recover the full amount of their 

billed medical expenses caused by the tort, even though they may not have paid that 

amount or (any amount) of medical expenses. The “collateral source rule” prohibits 

tortfeasors from avoiding liability for damages in situations in which an injured party 

has been compensated by a third party. Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198,

202, ¶ 13, 129 P.3d 487, 491 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). So, Plaintiffs may introduce 

previously disclosed medical bills in the full amount of those expenses, even though 

her insurer may have negotiated a lesser payment on her behalf. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Ninth Motion in Limine (Doc. 66) is granted. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Second (Doc. 48), Fifth (Doc. 51) and Sixth

(Doc. 52) Motion in Limine are GRANTED. Her Third Motion in Limine (Doc. 49) 

is DENIED. The Court will withhold ruling on Defendant’s First and Fourth Motions 

in Limine (Docs. 47 & 50) until the Final Pretrial Conference is held on December 16, 

2024. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ First, Third, Eighth and Ninth

Motions in Limine (Docs. 57, 59, 64 and 66) are GRANTED. Their Second, Fourth, 

Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Motions in Limine (Docs. 58, 60–63) are DENIED. 

Dated this 13th day of December, 2024.

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge

Case 2:22-cv-01581-DJH Document 83 Filed 12/13/24 Page 26 of 26