Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02568/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02568-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEANETTE RAMIREZ SMITH; et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 12-cv-2568 BEN (RBB)

ORDER SUA SPONTE

DISMISSING WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND

vs.

MOSS GARDENS APARTMENTS,

L.P. dba MOSS GARDENS

APARTMENTS; et al.,

Defendants.

Federal courts have an obligation to sua sponte inquire as to their jurisdiction,

because Article III, § 2 of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to

ongoing “cases” or “controversies.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520

U.S. 43, 64 (1997); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12

(2004). To invoke federal jurisdiction, Article III demands that a plaintiff show that

he or she has “suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or

imminent.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit put it, “[i]t is an inexorable command of the

United States Constitution that the federal courts confine themselves to deciding

actual cases and controversies. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.” Gator.com

Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2005). Because Plaintiffs

have invoked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 (i.e., federal question jurisdiction)

based solely on alleged violations of the Federal Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et

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seq., the Court considers whether Plaintiffs have articulated a substantial federal

question sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction.

As alleged in the Complaint, in April 2007, Jeanette Ramirez Smith and Jorge

Fajardo Muniz moved into Moss Gardens Apartments with their minor children. 

(Complaint ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs allege that the manager for Moss Gardens Apartments,

“incessantly harassed Ms. Ramirez about allowing her children to play in the

common areas” of the property. (Id. ¶ 17.) On October 22, 2012, Plaintiffs filed

suit against Defendants Moss Gardens Apartments, L.P., Pennell Property

Management, Inc., Dennis H. Pennell, and Dennis H. Pennell, II, alleging that

Defendants discriminated on the basis of “familial status” in the operation of Moss

Gardens Apartments. 

In 1968, Congress enacted the Federal Housing Act (“FHA”) to prohibit

discrimination against buyers and renters of residential housing. In 1988, Congress

enacted the Fair Housing Amendments Act amending the FHA and prohibited

housing discrimination on the basis of “familial status,” except in housing for older

persons. In 1995, Congress enacted the Housing for Older Persons Act, making

clear that where a community houses at least one person over 55 years of age in at

least 80% of the housing units, familial status discrimination is permissible. See

Taylor v. Rancho Santa Barbara, 206 F.3d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiffs are silent as to whether the Moss Garden Apartments qualify as

housing for older persons. If so, there would be no federal case or controversy

about familial discrimination. This is the first flaw in their federal claim.

The second flaw is one of time limitations. Section 3613 of the Act limits the

private right of action to suits filed within two years of discriminatory events. This

case was filed in October 2012, making actionable acts more recent than October

2010. Yet, the Complaint speaks of many older events. For example, the

Complaint states, “[i]n April 2007. . . husband and wife moved into the apartment

complex.” (Complaint ¶ 15.) The Complaint continues, “[o]n multiple occasions

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from 2007 to present,” and “[t]he problems started as far back as 2008,” and

“[s]ince 2007, Defendants have enforced a rule.” (Id. ¶ 17.) The Complaint further

alleges, “[o]n many occasions since 2007,” and “[o]n at least three occasions in

2008,” and “[i]n July 2010 . . . .” (Id. ¶ 17.) 

There are only two events that are specifically alleged to have occurred

within the two-year period preceding the Complaint. One event occurred in April

2011. At that time the apartment manager allegedly became upset at the minor

Plaintiffs for playing in the common area. 

That a manager became upset in April 2011 is, without more, a legal trifle

that is too insubstantial to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. Skaff v.

Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2007)

(collecting cases) (“The ancient maxims of de minimis non curat lex and lex non

curat de minimis teach that the law cares not about trifles.”); see also McKee v.

Turner, 491 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1974) (“We, therefore, hold that McKee’s

case is de minimis, and does not present a justiciable controversy.”). 

The other event took place in October 2012 when a Notice of Termination of

Tenancy was served upon Plaintiffs. Terminating a lease for a discriminatory

reason would not be a trifle. However, Plaintiffs offer only the conclusory assertion

that the notice was “primarily due to the fact that Plaintiffs had refused to obey the

continued order to stop letting their children play in the common areas.” This fails

to describe discrimination based on familial status. Moreover, the Complaint is

silent as to the stated reason given for the termination notice. It is plausible that the

termination notice was for a pedestrian reason such as non-payment of rent, rather

than a reason violating the FHA. Even Plaintiffs’ assertion that the termination

notice was based upon the minor plaintiffs’ continued playing could equally

describe landlord action based on disruptive or unsafe behavior as well as

discrimination based on familial status. It is significant that the Complaint does not

allege that individuals over 18 years of age were permitted to play with balls, toys,

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or bikes in the apartment common areas, while families with minor children were

not permitted. In other words, all that Plaintiffs have alleged is that Defendants

enforced a no-playing rule that may have been applied equally to all ages of

residents. A controversy over generally-applicable rules of housing behavior

fashioned to achieve non-discriminatory ends does not create a justiciable

controversy under the Federal Housing Act. The instant Complaint fails to allege

more.

A third problem is that the Fair Housing Act, by its terms, generally extends

to those who buy or rent housing. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §3604(a) (“It shall be

unlawful . . . to refuse to sell or rent . . . .”); §3604(b) (“It shall be unlawful . . . to

discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or

rental of a dwelling . . . .”); §3604(c) (“It shall be unlawful . . . to make, print, or

publish . . . with respect to the sale or rental . . . .”); §3604(d) (“It shall be

unlawful . . . to represent to any person . . . that any dwelling is not available for

inspection, sale or rental . . . .”). The Complaint does not allege that the Plaintiffs

rented an apartment at the Moss Garden Apartments. The Complaint states that

they “moved into” the apartment complex in 2007. (Complaint ¶ 15 emphasis

added.) The Complaint further alleges that the manager harassed Ms. Ramirez,

“[d]uring the time that Ms. Ramirez and her family has lived at the Subject

Property,” rather than during the time Plaintiffs have rented at the property. 

(Complaint ¶ 17 emphasis added.) Plaintiffs do not come within the protection of

the Act if they have not bought or rented or offered to buy or rent housing from the

Defendants. 

In conclusion, because the Complaint does not describe a federal controversy

substantial enough to invoke federal jurisdiction, and because the remaining state

law claims depend upon the existence of a live federal claim for supplemental

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jurisdiction, this case is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs may file an 1

amended complaint within 30 days of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 6, 2013

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

See 28 U.S.C. §1367(c); Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. Modesto,

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583 F.3d 690, 715 & n.16 (9th Cir. 2009).

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