Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-05512/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-05512-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05512-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SIDNEY T. SCARLETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

RESOL GROUP LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:14-cv-05512-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 25, 49

Plaintiff Sidney T. Scarlett (“Scarlett”) brings the instant action after he was unsuccessful 

as a defendant and appellant in three state court cases involving real property. He now sues the 

other individuals involved in those cases, including Resol Group, LLC (“Resol”), which was the 

plaintiff in the state court cases, its attorney Kirkman J. Hoffman, as well as all of the judges who 

presided over the cases at the trial and appellate division levels. 

Presently before the court is a Motion to Dismiss filed the state court judges (the “Judicial 

Defendants”).

1

 See Docket Item No. 25. Scarlett opposes the motion. See Docket Item No. 49.2 

Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 since Scarlett raises federal civil 

rights claims in the Complaint. The court has carefully reviewed the parties’ pleadings and finds 

this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). 

 

1 Resol and Hoffman have also moved to dismiss the Complaint, which is addressed in a separate 

order also filed on this date. 

2

In that filing, Scarlett also moves to strike the Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss “as 

hearsay testimony of an attorney as 3rd party without first hand knowledge.” Because a motion 

and supporting declaration are neither hearsay nor improper attorney testimony, the Motion to 

Strike is DENIED. 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05512-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE

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Accordingly, the hearing scheduled for March 12, 2015, will be vacated and this motion will be 

granted for the reasons explained below.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Since Scarlett is proceeding without legal representation, the court has liberally construed 

the “Action in Equity Complaint” filed on December 17, 2014, in order to understand the relevant 

factual background. See Docket Item No. 1. In addition, the court has reviewed the entire docket 

and includes any additional pertinent facts below. 

In general, Scarlett alleges that the six judges of the Santa Clara County Superior Court

who presided over Case Nos. 114CV265498, 114CV267656 and 114AP001736 made certain legal 

errors in violation of his constitutional rights. As this court is now aware, Case No. 114CV265498

is a sole-count unlawful detainer action filed by Resol against Scarlett, and the allegations suggest 

that Case No. 114AP001736 is Scarlett’s appeal of the unlawful detainer judgment filed in the 

appellate division of the Superior Court. Case No. 114cv267656 involves Resol’s claims against 

Scarlett for quiet title, cancellation of recorded instrument, declaratory relief, slander of title, and 

civil conspiracy.

Turning to the acts of the individual judges, Scarlett alleges in the Complaint that Judge 

Socrates Peter Manoukian “conclusively violated the law and Scarlett’s procedural due process” 

rights by issuing a writ of possession at a time when the state court had lost jurisdiction due to a 

removal to federal court. Scarlett also asserts that Judge Manoukian was “without jurisdiction” to 

issue the writ because he was recused from presiding over the case. 

Scarlett alleges that Judge Derek Woodhouse stated “unambiguously” during the unlawful 

detainer trial that he would not consider Plaintiff’s evidence or argument challenging Resol’s 

standing to sue, even though Judge Woodhouse recognized problems with Resol’s claim of title. 

With regard to Judges Griffin M.J. Bonini, Helen E. Williams, and Mary E. Arand, Scarlett 

alleges they issued void orders which denied Scarlett’s petition for writ of mandate and lifted a 

temporary stay of eviction without jurisdiction. He also asserts that a motion filed in December, 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05512-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE

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2014, has gone unanswered, which he contends should be considered “a refusal and contempt.” 

After initiating this case, Scarlett purported to remove into this action Case Nos.

114CV265498 and 114CV267656, as well as another case he had initiated, Case No. 

114cv274707. See Docket Item Nos. 16-18. This court remanded all three cases to Santa Clara 

Superior Court on February 11, 2015, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Docket 

Item No. 65. 

Scarlett also moved to recuse the undersigned and for a temporary restraining order. See

Docket Item Nos. 27, 33. Those motions were denied. See Docket Item Nos. 36, 37. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges subject matter jurisdiction and may be either facial or 

factual. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial 12(b)(1) motion 

involves an inquiry confined to the allegations in the complaint, whereas a factual 12(b)(1) motion 

permits the court to look beyond the complaint to extrinsic evidence. Id. When, as here, a 

defendant makes a facial challenge, all material allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and 

the court must determine whether lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the 

complaint itself. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. Elec., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 

“A party invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction has the burden of proving the actual existence of 

subject matter jurisdiction.” Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). A 

complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 

appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE

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a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 

Cir. 2008). Moreover, the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57.

When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court generally “may not consider 

any material beyond the pleadings.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 

1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the court may consider material submitted as part of 

the complaint or relied upon in the complaint, and may also consider material subject to judicial 

notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-69 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, the court must generally accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). 

However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Under Rule 12(b)(1), the Judicial Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 

Younger abstention, and Eleventh Amendment immunity preclude federal subject matter 

jurisdiction over Scarlett’s claims. Under Rule 12(b)(6), they argue that Scarlett has not stated 

sufficient facts to state a claim, and cannot do so in any event because the judicial defendants are 

absolutely immune. Since the applications of Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention and judicial 

immunity prove dispositive, only those arguments are addressed below. 

A. Rooker-Feldman

Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, “a federal district court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 

F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). “A party disappointed by a decision of a state court may seek 

reversal of that decision by appealing to a higher state court” but may not “appeal to a federal 

district court, even if a federal question is present or if there is diversity of citizenship between the 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05512-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE

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parties.” Id. at 1155. 

In addition to direct appeals, Rooker-Feldman also prohibits district courts from hearing de 

facto appeals of state-court decisions. A case can be classified as a de facto appeal “when a losing 

plaintiff in state court brings a suit in federal district court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly 

erroneous legal rulings of the state court and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that 

court.” Id. at 1156. Nor can the district court entertain issues which are “inextricably intertwined” 

with a de facto appeal. Id. at 1158. 

Here, portions of Scarlett’s Complaint make plain that this action is barred by RookerFeldman. Indeed, Scarlett seeks relief which matches exactly the description of a prohibited de 

facto appeal. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To determine whether 

an action functions as a de facto appeal, we ‘pay close attention to the relief sought by the federalcourt plaintiff.’” (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003)). Scarlett 

requests in the Complaint “that the judgments be annulled and voided as obtained upon false 

testimony and forged documents, fraud upon the court, and in violation of [Scarlett’s] 

constitutional rights.” However, this court cannot consider Scarlett’s challenge to state-court 

orders based on fraud, the admission of fraudulent evidence, or lack of jurisdiction because these 

arguments should have been raised through a post-judgment proceeding in the state trial court 

(which appears to have occurred in some form) or a direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeals. 

Furthermore, Scarlett’s constitutional and civil rights claims are not properly before the 

district court because they are “inextricably intertwined” with the prohibited de facto appeal. See

Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158 (“Only when there is already a forbidden de facto appeal in federal court 

does the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test come into play . . . .”). A claim is “inextricably 

intertwined” with a state court judgment if “the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the 

state court wrongly decided the issues before it, or if the relief requested in the federal action 

would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.” Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05512-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE

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City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Since Scarlett’s constitutional and civil rights claims are based on the state court’s alleged denial 

of due process, equal protection, and a “full and fair trial,” “federal relief can only be predicated 

upon a conviction that the state court was wrong.” Penzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 

(1987). 

Scarlett’s arguments on this topic are unpersuasive. Citing Lynk v. La Porte Superior 

Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554 (1986), he attempts to recast this case as one asserting that an 

unidentified California statute, “as interpreted,” prevented him from attacking the validity of 

Resol’s title claim. Aside from the fact that this new theory is nowhere elucidated in the

Complaint, Lynk is factually distinguishable and, when read in its entirety, actually supports the 

conclusion that Scarlett’s action is a prohibited de facto appeal. 

In Lynk, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with a rather unique situation. 

There, the plaintiff filed a federal action for violations of his equal protection rights after the 

Indiana state courts prevented him from getting a divorce because he could not attend a mandatory 

hearing (he was in prison, and the state court would not compel his attendance). The district court 

dismissed the case based on Younger abstention, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, primarily 

because the plaintiff had not previously raised his federal argument in state court. Since it was 

unclear whether that court would allow him to raise federal issues in the divorce case, the Seventh 

Circuit instructed the district court to maintain his federal action on the docket until that question 

was answered. 

Although not directly at issue, the Seventh Circuit discussed Rooker-Feldman during its 

analysis of all possible arguments supporting dismissal, and ultimately determined it did not apply

to the plaintiff’s federal action, at least at that time, since the equal protection violation “was 

neither raised nor decided” in the state court case. 789 F.2d at 564. In essence, the court held that

Rooker-Feldman did not bar the plaintiff’s federal action because his divorce case was never taken 

to judgment; in fact, it appeared that the state court’s interpretation of the statute would prevent 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

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him from ever doing so. Id. at 564. 

Unlike Lynk, Scarlett does not allege that a California law prevented him from taking a 

claim to resolution. Instead, he alleges that the Judicial Defendants rejected his legal arguments or 

abused discretion when issuing rulings. That is something entirely different, and as the Lynk court 

noted, is the sort of claim that makes a federal action subject to Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 563-64 

(explaining that Rooker-Feldman basically operates by “simply by noting that an adverse 

judgment, even one that is erroneous as a matter of state or even federal law, is not a denial of due 

process.”). Similarly, his conclusory allegations do not constitute the type of extrinsic fraud 

required to invoke the limited exception to Rooker-Feldman, at least with regard to the Judicial 

Defendants. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 

“focus” of a claim within the fraud exception is not whether a state court committed legal error, 

but rather on a wrongful act by the adverse party.) 

For these reasons, the court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all 

claims due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

B. Younger Abstention

Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1971), federal courts may not stay or enjoin 

ongoing state court proceedings except under special circumstances. Younger abstention is

generally appropriate when “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings, (2) the proceedings 

implicate important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state 

proceedings to raise federal questions.” Dubinka v. Judges of Super. Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The allegations in the Complaint meet all of the abstention requirements. It can be 

reasonably inferred that at least a portion of the state proceedings are ongoing because Scarlett 

alleges that Judge Manoukian continues to issue orders related to Resol’s unlawful detainer case. 

He also alleges that Judges Bonini, Williams and Arand have neglected to rule on a pending 

motion. In addition, Scarlett’s request for relief is particularly illustrative of this element, since he 

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requests an order restraining Judges Manoukian and Woodhouse from issuing further orders. 

The second element is satisfied because issues relating to real property, including those 

related to the unlawful detainer process, “represent a sufficient state interest to warrant Younger

abstention.” Contreras v. MTC Fin., Inc., No. C 10-5836 PSG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136908, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010). 

The third element is also satisfied because Scarlett’s unadorned argument that state court 

procedures have precluded him from raising federal claims is insufficient to overcome the 

presumption that the state court forum is an adequate one. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15. It was 

his burden to prove this element, but he failed to address it in opposition. Id. at 14. 

Since all of the elements are present, this action must also be dismissed due to Younger

abstention. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (“Younger v. Harris contemplates 

the outright dismissal of the federal suit.”). 

C. Judicial Immunity 

“A judge is generally immune from a civil action for damages,” as well as from actions for 

declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief. Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 

1996). This immunity applies no matter how erroneous or injurious the alleged act, and is not lost 

through a judge’s grave procedural errors or acts in excess of jurisdiction. Id. at 1244.

Furthermore, this immunity protects judges even when a conspiracy with one party against another

is alleged. Id. 

As has been explained, Scarlett’s allegations of error against the Judicial Defendants relate 

to actions each took in their official capacities as state court judges. Regardless of how injurious 

or incorrect he believes their decisions to be, the claims and requests for relief fall squarely within 

the scope of what is prohibited by judicial immunity. 

While the court recognizes that acts taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not 

protected, Scarlett’s allegations against Judge Manoukian on that subject are clearly contradicted 

by a document subject to judicial notice, namely the remand order issued by Judge Lucy H. Koh 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05512-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE

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on December 1, 2014.3 See Resol Group, LLC v. Scarlett, No. 14-CV-04402-LHK, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 166406, 2014 WL 6766258 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2014). Since Judge Manoukian is not

alleged to have made the orders described in the Complaint until December 12, 2014 - after the 

certified remand order was mailed to the state court - it is apparent he did so with jurisdiction and 

without the impediment of a removal to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A certified copy 

of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court 

may thereupon proceed with such case.”). In addition, Scarlett’s argument that Judge Manoukian 

lacked jurisdiction due to his recusal is barred under Rooker-Feldman because this court could not 

reach the issue without conducting a review of the recusal decision. 

Thus, the Judicial Defendants are immune from the claims asserted against them in the 

Complaint. 

D. Leave to Amend

The court finally considers whether Scarlett should be permitted leave to amend the claims 

against the Judicial Defendants. Although leave should generally be freely given, dismissal 

without leave to amend is proper if “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” 

Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 972 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Such is the case here. Since the 

Complaint makes clear the claims against the Judicial Defendants are based on conduct that could 

never support liability, allowing for further amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the claims 

against the Judicial Defendants will be dismissed without leave to amend. 

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket Item No. 25) 

is GRANTED. All claims against the Judicial Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 

TO AMEND.

 

3

The Judicial Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC 

v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the court “may take 

judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record.”)

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The hearing scheduled for March 12, 2015, is VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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