Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-03535/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-03535-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 15:1126 Patent Infringement

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28 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 07-03535 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS ETC.

(JFLC3)

**E-Filed 02/07/08**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

O’KEEFFE’S, INC.,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

TECHNICAL GLASS PRODUCTS,

ANEMOSTAT AND PILKINGTON, PLC.

 Defendant.

Case Number C 07-03535 JF

ORDER GRANTING THIRD-PARTY 1

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

[re: docket nos. 64, 78]

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS

Defendant Underwriters Laboratories (“UL”) moves to dismiss the third-party complaint

of Plaintiff O’Keefe’s, Inc. (“OKI”). OKI seeks a preliminary injunction enjoining UL from

removing the UL mark and listing from OKI’s products. For the reasons discussed below, the

motion to dismiss will be granted. The motion for preliminary injunction will denied for lack of

jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

The approval and installation of architectural glazing in locations that are either fire or

safety rated is highly regulated by code and by local building officials. Where there is a risk of

human impact (for example, when dealing with doors and immediately adjacent areas) glazing

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 The instant action is stayed in part with respect to all of the claims and counterclaims 2

related to the ’906 patent pending the reexamination proceedings before the United States Patent

and Trademark Office or until further order of the Court. 

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(JFLC3)

generally must meet impact standards, such as the ability to withstand up to 400 foot-pounds of

force. Similarly, when fire resistance is important (for example, when dealing with a fire

corridor) glazing generally must meet standards that reflect an ability to resist or protect against

fire for periods such as twenty, forty-five, sixty, or ninety minutes. Local building officials

generally do not perform tests for impact-safety or fire protection/resistance on a construction

site. Rather, building codes call for a “listed” or “rated” product, upon which the logo of an

accredited listing or rating agency is permanently affixed. There are two such major recognized

listing and rating organizations in the United States. UL is the largest and most widely

recognized of these organizations. 

OKI is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,090,906 (“the ’906 patent”) entitled, “FireResistant Safety Glass,” which is directed at a filmed wire glass product that is sufficiently

impact safe and fire resistant to meet various government safety and fire code requirements. 

Complaint ¶ 9. OKI markets this product as SuperLite I-W. Id. Defendants Technical Glass

Products (“TGP”) and Anemostat and Pilkington, PLC are competitors in the wired glass

manufacturing industry. Id. at ¶ 10. TGP fabricates, markets and sells a product known as

PyroShield NT. Id. at ¶ 13. 

On July 6, 2007, OKI sued Defendants in this Court for infringement of the ’906 patent.2

TGP filed an answer and counterclaims, including counterclaims alleging trademark

infringement and unfair competition based on OKI’s SuperLite I-XL product. In response to

these counterclaims, OKI filed its own counterclaims, including claims for unfair business

practices against TGP and UL related to OKI’s Super-Lite I-XL glazing product and for common

law unfair competition. OKI asserts that UL is unfairly competing with OKI, alleging that: (1)

TGP derived some of its information regarding the products’ performance from information

provided to the public by UL; (2) UL uses an obsolete hose-stream test on the products and

because SuperLite fails the hose-stream test, UL lists SuperLite only for twenty minute

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28 Warnock-Hersey is an independent safety and testing organization. 3

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS ETC.

(JFLC3)

applications; (3) UL rates and lists FireLite and SuperLite products improperly; (4) UL has

appeared in TGP promotional marketing videos discussing the products and the tests used to

assess their performance; and (5) UL does not recognize listings from Warnock-Hersey in UL’s 3

own listings. On November 28, 2007, UL cancelled OKI’s listing. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, and the

Court must Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Leave to amend must be granted unless it is

clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Department of

Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). When amendment would be futile, dismissal may

be ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996). 

On a motion to dismiss, the Court’s review is limited to the face of the complaint and

matters judicially noticeable. North Star International v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 720

F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983); MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir.

1986); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F.Supp. 1393, 1395 (C.D. Cal. 1995). However, under the

“incorporation by reference” doctrine, the Court also may consider documents that are referenced

extensively in the complaint and accepted by all parties as authentic, even if they are not

physically attached to the complaint. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d

970 (9th Cir. 1999). “Under the ‘incorporation by reference’ rule of this Circuit, a court may

look beyond the pleadings without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary

judgment.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).

The primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a

trial on the merits. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 634

F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show either (1) a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the

existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips in its favor. 

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 OKI states that even if the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 4

these claims, diversity jurisdiction exists. Although not pled in the existing counterclaims, OKI

states that there is complete diversity among the parties and requests leave to amend the

counterclaims accordingly. In light of the Court’s determination as to venue, discussed below,

the request will be denied without prejudice.

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Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’d, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489

(1999). These formulations represent “two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree

of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.” United States v. Odessa

Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1987). When the Court is considering the

enforcement of a statute or ordinance it should also consider the public interest and the hardship

the public may face if the injunction is granted or denied. Id. at 175; Sierra Club v. Hathaway,

579 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1978).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

OKI asserts two claims against UL and TGP. The first is brought under California’s

unfair competition law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (“Section 17200"), and the

second is for unfair competition under California common law. UL argues that these claims

should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

1. Subject matter jurisdiction

 OKI asserts that the Court has jurisdiction over the claims based on principles of

supplemental and ancillary jurisdiction. UL argues that OKI’s third-party complaint fails to 4

show the existence of federal question jurisdiction and should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). A district court has supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if that

claim is “so related” to claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction that it forms

“part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even if a district court does have

supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, it may decline to exercise such jurisdiction if: 

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) the claim substantially

predominates the claims over which the court has original jurisdiction; (3) the court has

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dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances,

other compelling reasons exist for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). A decision to

decline jurisdiction pursuant to one of these factors should take into consideration judicial

efficiency, convenience of the parties, fairness, and comity. ACRI v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114

F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997).

UL argues that OKI has not alleged that its claims against UL are so related to its

underlying federal patent and trademark claims against the other defendants that they form part of

the same case or controversy. To support supplemental jurisdiction, the operative facts of the

supplemental claims must be so related to the original claims that they form one constitutional

case. Here, OKI’s claims against UL form no part of the case or controversy in OKI’s original

complaint against TGP and Anemostat, which alleges patent infringement. OKI’s dispute with

UL is over UL’s testing procedures, methods, and refusal to list OKI’s products more favorably. 

At best, these claims are related to TGP’s pendant state law claims, not TGP’s federal claim of

trademark infringement.

Moreover, a decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the sound

discretion of the district court. As discussed above, a district court may choose to decline

jurisdiction over supplemental claims that raise “a novel or complex issue of State law[.]” 

OKI’s claim against UL relates to Section 17200. The Ninth Circuit recently has described

California law with respect to Section 17200 as being in “flux.” Lozano v. AT&T Wireless

Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 735 (9th Cir. 2007). In particular, California appellate courts have yet

to resolve whether Section 17200 claims must be tethered to some legislatively declared policy,

or whether the balancing test for these claims remains in effect. Accordingly, the Court will

decline to exercise jurisdiction for this reason as well. 

2. Venue

UL argues additionally that OKI’s third-party complaint should be dismissed pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(3) because venue in this Court is improper. Specifically, UL asserts that

OKI’s claims arise under a contract with UL in which OKI agreed that any disputes with UL

must be litigated in Cook County, Illinois. OKI argues that the forum selection clause should not

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be enforced because it is permissive and because the disputed matter is outside the scope of the

agreement. 

“A motion to dismiss based on enforcement of a forum selection clause is treated as a

motion for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3).” Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d

320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Hsu, et al. v. OZ Optics Limited, 211 F.R.D. 615, 618 (N.D.

Cal. 2002). In such a motion, “the pleadings are not accepted as true and facts outside the

pleadings may be considered by the district court.” Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 63 F. Supp.

2d 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1999). There are two types of forum section clauses. Northern Cal.

Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (9 Cir. th

1995). “A mandatory forum selection clause is presumed valid and is to be strictly enforced. A

permissive forum selection clause, on the other hand, simply means that the parties consent to the

jurisdiction of the designated forum.” Hsu, et al., 211 F.R.D. at 618 (internal citation omitted). 

“To be mandatory, a clause must contain languages that clearly designates a forum as the

exclusive one.” Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 69 F.3d at 1037. 

 The forum selection clause upon which UL relies provides, in its entirety, as follows:

11.0 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State

of Illinois, USA without reference to its choice of law principles. Any action

related to the Agreement shall be filed in the federal or state court having

jurisdiction in Cook County, Illinois, USA. The parties consent to the exercise of

personal jurisdiction of that court and shall bear costs, legal fees and expenses

incurred in transferring actions filed elsewhere.

This language is mandatory and indicates that the parties intended to limit venue. In

Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea Tech., Ltd., 875 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit

considered a clause that read “[v]enue of any action brought hereunder shall be deemed to be in

Gloucester County, Virginia.” The court concluded that the clause was mandatory, “because

Docksider not only consented to jurisdiction of the state courts of Virginia, but further agreed by

mandatory language that the venue for all actions arising out of the license agreement would be

Gloucester County, Virginia.” Id. at 764. By contrast, in Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme

Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1987), upon which OKI relies, the venue clause stated that

“[t]he courts of California, County of Orange, shall have jurisdiction over the parties in any

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action at law relating to the subject matter or the interpretation of this contract.” In that case, the

Ninth Circuit concluded that the clause at issue required only that the parties consent to

jurisdiction in the designated court, and did not exclusively require them to file in that

jurisdiction. Id. To illustrate its point, the Ninth Circuit gave an example of mandatory forum

selection language—“[A]ny dispute . . . shall be brought in either San Diego or Los Angeles

Count” Id.—that is nearly identical to that in the agreement between OKI and UL.

OKI nonetheless argues that its claims against UL arise not from the agreement but rather

from UL’s alleged preferential treatment of TGP. However, while OKI alleges in its third-party

complaint that “UL has not applied its testing and reporting polices fairly and even-handedly

through the glazing industry” Third-Party Complaint at ¶ 48, it also argues in its Opposition brief

that “UL’s Actions and Conduct Constitute Breach of Contract and of the Covenant of Good

Faith and Fair Dealing.” Opp. at 17. In this section of its brief, OKI claims expressly that “UL

has also breached its listing agreement with OKI by arbitrarily and capriciously purporting to

cancel it.” Id. Accordingly, UL’s motion to dismiss for improper venue will be granted.

3. Failure to State a Claim

UL also asserts that OKI’s third-party complaint should be dismissed under Fed. Rule.

Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Because it finds that the third-party complaint is

subject to dismissal under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(3), the Court does not reach this argument.

B. Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin UL’s cancellation of its listing. OKI argues that if injunctive

relief is not granted it will suffer immediate and irreparable injury. However, because the Court

does not have jurisdiction, OKI’s motion will be denied without prejudice.

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(3) is GRANTED. OKI’s motion for preliminary

injunction is denied without prejudice.

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Case No. C 07-03535 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS ETC.

(JFLC3)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 7, 2008 ________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 07-03535 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS ETC.

(JFLC3)

This Order has been served on the following persons:

Daniel T. Bernhard 

bernhard@freelandlaw.com 

Jeffrey Stewart Love

jeffrey.love@klarquist.com 

David John Massey Pitman 

dpitman@fulpat.com 

Kimball Anderson

kanderson@winston.com

Case 5:07-cv-03535-LHK Document 84 Filed 02/07/08 Page 9 of 9