Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-00437/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-00437-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORINE HAYES,

Plaintiff

v

JOHN POTTER, Postmaster General,

Defendant. /

 No C-02-0437 VRW

 ORDER

Plaintiff Lorine Hayes (“Hayes”) has filed suit in pro

per against postmaster John Potter (“Potter”) alleging disability

discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29

USC § 701 et seq (“the RA”), and age discrimination in violation of

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 USC § 621 et

seq (“the ADEA”). Compl (Doc #1). Potter moves for summary

judgment in his favor on both claims. MSJ (Doc #21). Hayes

opposes. Opp (Doc #26). Based upon the parties’ arguments and the

applicable federal law, the court GRANTS IN PART Potter’s motion.

//

Case 3:02-cv-00437-VRW Document 28 Filed 08/03/05 Page 1 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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I

Hayes was born in 1938. In October 1968, the United

States Postal Service (“USPS”) hired Hayes, and in November 1976,

Hayes began working as a data collection technician (“DCT”) at the

Oakland post office. The DCT position consists of office work at

the post office and “field tests” away from the post office. EEO

Investigation (Doc #4), Ex I at 10. Field tests -- an assortment

of tests reviewing undelivered parcels -- are physically demanding

and require some driving and heavy lifting. Id. 

Hayes claims that she was one of three DCTs who

unofficially performed only office work because of their seniority. 

Opp at 2:19-3:6. SSA, however, asserts that all DCTs had to do

both office work and field tests. MSJ at 16:15-22. According to

Kathryn MacRae (“MacRae”), Hayes’ supervisor since 1992, Hayes

complained relentlessly whenever she had to conduct a field test. 

MacRae Letter (Doc #25, Ex L) at 1. 

In 1994, Hayes began to experience back and neck pain. 

Depo (Doc #25, Ex A) at 11:14-15. Hayes contends that an on-thejob accident in 1986 was the source of the pain. Id. On May 3,

1994, Hayes consulted her physician, Dr Geoffrey Watson, MD

(“Watson”), and he restricted Hayes to lifting 10 pounds or less.

USPS has a two-tract system for addressing the needs of

employees with impairments. EEO Investigation, Ex D at 7. 

Employees disabled by an on-the-job accident are given “limited

duty”; other impaired employees are given “light duty.” Id. 

Limited duty employees are guaranteed full time employment, while

light duty employees work at the discretion of their supervisors. 

Opp at 7:14-19. The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ultimately decides whether an employee was disabled by an on-thejob accident.

On June 7, 1994, Hayes requested light duty (Doc #23, Ex

K) and MacRae apparently approved the request. From June 1994 to

January 1995, Hayes worked full time without conducting field

tests. Opp at 3. In January 1995, however, MacRae began asking

Hayes to conduct field tests again. Hayes reminded MacRae of her

doctor-imposed limitations (Hayes Reminder (Doc #25, Ex F)), but 

MacRae requested proof that Hayes still required light duty. On

February 15, 1995, Watson mailed a letter to MacRae attributing

Hayes’ back and neck pain to her workstation and requested that

MacRae place Hayes’ computer at eye level and give Hayes an

ergonomic chair. Watson also reiterated Hayes’ lifting

restriction, although he increased the restriction from ten pounds

to fifteen pounds. Watson Note 7 (Doc #25, Ex I).

Beginning March 20, 1995, Hayes’ light duty work was

largely absorbed after MacRae hired another DCT “in order to

complete as many [field] tests as possible.” EEO Investigation, Ex

I at 10. The new DCT and several others were able to complete all

of Hayes’ light duty work “within their 8 hour shift, [even] after

conducting [field] tests.” Id (emphasis added). Hence, by March

29, 1995, the availability of DCT work within Hayes’ limitations

had declined greatly. MacRae sent notice to the other supervisors

within the Oakland post office inquiring whether they had light

duty work Hayes could perform, but none of the other supervisors

had work that fit within Hayes’ limitations. Doc #22, Ex B.

 From late March to early April 1995, MacRae reduced

Hayes’ daily hours from eight to four, and then from four to two,

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United States District Court

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each time asserting that there was only enough light duty work for

those number of hours. EEO Investigation, Affidavit B at 7-8. On

April 6, 1995, MacRae sent Hayes home for the day, stating that

there was no light duty work available. Hayes Letter (Doc #25, Ex

K) at 2. Although MacRae told Hayes that some light duty hours

would be available throughout the week, Hayes refused to work the

few hours specified by MacRae. Id.

Beginning March 29, 1995, DCTs in the Oakland post office

had to bid for positions in a new schedule set to begin April 29,

1995. Doc #25, Ex J. Hayes bid for a position, but USPS removed

her bid pending determination that she could complete the essential

functions of a DCT. EEO Investigation, Ex D at 3, 7. USPS then

sought a letter from Watson detailing the extent of Hayes’

impairments. On May 24, 1995, Watson notified USPS that Hayes was

restricted to: (1) “light lifting of weight under 15 pounds”; (2)

“light carrying under 15 pounds”; (3) “reach[ing] above the

shoulder for a short period of time”; (4) “us[ing] both fingers for

2 to 4 hours a day”; (5) “us[ing] both hands for approximately 4

hours a day” and (6) “walk[ing] for no more than an hour a day.” 

EEO Investigation, Ex D at 9.

On September 30, 1995, USPS discharged Hayes after

determining that she could not perform the essential functions of a

DCT. EEO Investigation, Ex D at 6. It is undisputed that Hayes

has exhausted her administrative remedies regarding the alleged

discrimination. 

Hayes filed the current suit on January 24, 2002,

alleging MacRae reduced her hours and ultimately discharged Hayes

because of her disability and age. Compl at 2-3 (stating that

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United States District Court

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 Hayes’ pro se complaint erroneously asserts that her disability

discrimination claim is premised on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e-5. Compl at 1. Title VII is not, however,

applicable to disability discrimination claims. See 42 USC §

2000e-2(a)(1). Instead, disability discrimination claims against the

federal government can only be brought pursuant to the RA. See 29 USC

§§ 791, 794. Because pro se complaints are held to a less strict

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v Kerner, 404 US 519, 520 (1972), the court construes Hayes’ claims as being

brought pursuant to the RA. 

 

5

Hayes was subject to “disparate treatment” based on “physical

handicap” and “age”). Although Hayes characterizes both claims as

“disparate treatment” claims, the accusations contained in the

complaint and in Hayes’ opposition make clear that her disability

discrimination claim under the RA1

 is based on USPS’s alleged

failure to accommodate Hayes’ disability. Opp at 6 (stating that

the USPS “failed to provide [Hayes] with reasonable accommodation

when it did not provide [her] with eight hours of work.”).

II

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must

determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving

any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. “[S]ummary

judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v

Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. The

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US

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United States District Court

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317, 322-23 (1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence, by

affidavit or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting the claim

that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv v

Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). 

Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers

is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary

judgment. Thornhill Publishing Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730,

738 (9th Cir 1979). The evidence presented by the nonmoving party

“is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn

in his favor.” Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function

is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Id at 249.

III

A

The court first addresses Hayes’ disability

discrimination claim under the RA. As mentioned above, Hayes

labels this claim as one for disparate treatment. Potter’s motion

for summary judgment thus argues that Hayes has failed to make out

a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the RA. MSJ at 6

(stating that Hayes has failed to “make a prima facie showing on

her disparate treatment disability discrimination claim under the

[RA].”).

// 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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7

A review of the factual allegations contained in the

complaint, however, demonstrates that Hayes is pursuing a failure

to accommodate claim, not a disparate treatment claim. Failure to

accommodate is a cognizable claim under the RA. Section 501, 29

USC § 791, “provides for two types of claims: (1) ‘non-affirmative

action’ employment discrimination claims based upon 29 USC § 791(g)

and (2) [‘affirmative action’] claims based upon a government

employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate an employee, as

required under 29 USC § 791(b).” Stewart v United States, 2000 US

Dist LEXIS 17151, *15 (ND Cal 2000) (Spero, MJ) (internal citations

omitted).

Hayes’ opposition goes on to allege that MacRae failed

“to make a ‘good faith effort’ in searching for a position that

[Hayes] could perform or [to which she could] be reassigned.” Id

at 7. Additionally, Hayes asserts that reassignment would not have

placed an undue hardship on USPS. Id at 8. Finally, Hayes asserts

that the USPS failed to take part in the interactive process

required under the RA. Id at 9.

To establish a failure to accommodate claim under § 501

of the RA, Hayes must prove that she (1) had a disability, (2) was

a “qualified individual with a disability” and (3) was subjected to

unlawful discrimination as the result of her disability. Mullins v

Crowell, 228 F3d 1305 (11th Cir 2000); Maes v Henderson, 33 F Supp

2d 1281, 1287 (D Nev 1999)(citing Buckingham v United States, 998

F2d 735, 739-40 (9th Cir 1993). To prove that she was a “qualified

individual with a disability,” Hayes must demonstrate that she

could perform the “essential functions” of the DCT position. 42

USC § 12111(8). 

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Potter’s motion for summary judgment makes two arguments

applicable to Hayes’ failure to accommodate claim, namely that she

is neither “disabled” nor a “qualified employee” within the meaning

of the RA. The court addresses Potter’s arguments in turn.

1

First, Potter argues that Hayes is not disabled within

the meaning of § 501 of the RA. Specifically, Potter states that

(1) it “is undisputed that on April 6, 1995, [Hayes] was not

disabled” and (2) Hayes has “identified no major life activity that

substantially limited her.” MSJ at 8:9-13. The first of these

statements is subject to dispute and the second is incorrect. 

First, Hayes claims that she is “an employee with a disability

within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.” Opp at 6:18-19. 

Hence, it is disputed whether Hayes is disabled under the RA. 

Second, Hayes states that “[a]t the time in question, [her] medical

limitations included a 15 pound lifting restriction among other

restrictions. Therefore, [she] was substantially limited in the

major life activity of lifting.” Opp at 6:19-23. 

Potter’s reply is completely silent concerning Hayes’

contentions. Specifically, Potter filed a two sentence reply

memorandum stating that he “has reviewed [Hayes’] account of the

events that led her to file a complaint and still finds no facts

that would support a claim against [USPS]. Accordingly,

[d]efendant asks the court to grant the motion for summary judgment

with prejudice.” Doc #27. Potter’s failure to address Hayes’

contentions provides sufficient grounds to deny his motion for

summary judgment; but the record discloses evidence to raise a

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genuine issue of material fact whether Hayes is disabled under the

RA. 

While Hayes does not directly reference Watson’s May 24,

1995, evaluation finding that Hayes should not lift more than 15

pounds, engage in prolonged manual tasks or walk for more than an

hour a day, Hayes cites Watson’s conclusions. Opp at 6:11-14. 

Considering Hayes’ pro se status, the court deems this reference

sufficient to satisfy FRCP 56(e)’s requirement that a nonmoving

party set forth specific facts establishing a genuine issue of

material fact. See United States v Ten Thousand Dollars ($

10,000.00) in US Currency, 860 F2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir 1988) (“We

have consistently held in this circuit that courts should liberally

construe the pleadings and efforts of pro se litigants,

particularly ‘where highly technical requirements are involved.’”)

(quoting Garaux v Pulley, 739 F2d 437, 439 (9th Cir 1984)). 

Specifically, that Watson prohibited Hayes from walking no more

than one hour per day raises a genuine issue about her disability

status under the RA. See, e g, Daoud v Avamere Staffing & Home

Care, 336 F Supp 2d 1129, 1134-1136 (D Or 2004) (finding that

walking limitations other than complete immobility could

“substantially limit” the “major life activity” of walking). 

Potter’s reply, however, fails utterly to address Watson’s report

or Hayes’ reference to it.

Accordingly, Potter has not met his initial burden of

showing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact whether

Hayes’ is a disabled individual under the RA. Celotex, 477 US at

322-23.

//

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2

Next, Potter asserts that Hayes was not a “qualified

individual with a disability” since “she was not able to lift mail

over 15 pounds nor was she able to drive to field locations to

perform mail samplings.” MSJ at 8:17-18. While this assertion may

suffice to prove that Hayes could not perform the essential

functions of her job without an accommodation, it is insufficient

to show that Hayes could perform the essential functions of the DCT

position with a reasonable accommodation. 

In both his motion for summary judgment and reply

memorandum, Potter ignores Hayes’ suggested accommodations: 

Restructuring her job or moving her to a vacant position within the

Oakland post office. Opp at 8:1-2. The RA specifically considers

job restructuring and reassignment to a vacant position to be

reasonable accommodations. 42 USC § 12111(9)(B). Although MacRae

attempted to find light duty work in other sections of the Oakland

post office (Doc #22, Ex B), this effort alone is insufficient to

satisfy the RA; USPS had to consider whether Hayes was capable of

performing the essential functions of positions vacant at the time. 

42 USC § 12111(9)(B). Potter fails to demonstrate whether he did

so. Moreover, Hayes alleges that the Human Services Director at

the Oakland post office, Virginia Glover, was responsible for

accommodating disabled employees, but that Glover never worked with

Hayes. Opp at 4. 

Potter could have replied to Hayes’ allegations by

arguing that USPS attempted to accommodate Hayes’ disability or

that Hayes’ suggested accommodations presented an “undue hardship,”

pursuant to 42 USC § 12112(b)(5)(A). Potter’s reply did neither. 

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Potter thus fails to demonstrate an absence of genuine issues of

material fact whether Hayes could perform the essential functions

of the DCT position with a reasonable accommodation. Accordingly,

summary judgment is inappropriate. Celotex, 477 US at 322-23.

To be fair, the court notes that Hayes’ pleadings and

opposition are not a model of clarity. The court is not

unsympathetic to the difficulty counsel faces when dealing with a

pro se litigant such as Hayes. But this does not excuse Potter

from the minimal effort required to produce a substantive reply

memorandum. Potter’s motion for summary judgment on Hayes’ RA

claim is DENIED.

IV

Next, the court addresses Hayes’ claim for age

discrimination in violation of the ADEA. Section 623(a)(1) of the

ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer * * * to discharge any

individual * * * because of such individual’s age * * *.” Because

Hayes’ age discrimination claim is based on circumstantial evidence

of discrimination, the court applies the burden-shifting analysis

announced by the court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US

792 (1973). See Enlow v Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co, Inc, 389 F3d

802, 812 (9th Cir 2004). 

Under McDonnell Douglas, Hayes must first demonstrate a

prima facie case of discrimination. Coleman v Quaker Oats Co, 232

F3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir 2000). If she does so, Potter then has the

burden of “articulat[ing] a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for

its employment decision,” such as decreasing light duty hours. Id

(quoting Wallis v J R Simplot Co, 26 F3d 885, 889 (9th Cir 1994). 

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In order to prevail, Hayes must then “demonstrate that [Potter’s]

alleged reason for the adverse employment decision is a pretext for

another motive which is discriminatory.” Id. “To establish a

prima facie case using circumstantial evidence, [Hayes] must

demonstrate that [she] was (1) [a] member of the protected class

(at least age 40); (2) performing her job satisfactorily; (3)

discharged and (4) replaced by substantially younger employees with

equal or inferior qualifications.” Id (citing Nidds v Schindler

Elevator Corp, 113 F3d 912, 917 (9th Cir 1997)).

Hayes cannot establish a prima facie case for age

discrimination; she was not replaced by a substantially younger and

less or equally qualified employee. Indeed, Hayes’ complaint fails

to mention a replacement, much less allege that her replacement was

substantially younger and less or equally qualified. Accordingly,

Hayes fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact whether

she was terminated in violation of the ADEA.

V

In sum, the court GRANTS Potter’s motion for summary

judgment on Hayes’ age discrimination claim and DENIES Potter’s

motion for summary judgment on Hayes’ RA claim. The parties are

ordered to appear for a further case management conference (CMC) on

October 4, 2005, at 9:00 am or on another such date that the 

//

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//

//

//

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parties may arrange with each other and the court’s deputy, Cora 

Delfin. The parties should attend the CMC prepared to set firm

dates for a pretrial conference and trial.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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