Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00260/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00260-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE WATKINS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 14cv0260-LAB(BGS)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

STU SHERMAN, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Terrence Watkins (“Watkins”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging

his conviction in the San Diego County Superior Court case number SCD236887. 

(Doc. No. 1.)1

 Watkins raises six claims: (1) wrongful sentence enhancement; (2)

forced entry of plea agreement; (3) failure to elicit a factual basis for his plea; (4)

unconstitutional infringement upon his right to free speech and assembly; (5) failure

to label inchoate crimes as an attempt; and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Respondent argues that Watkins’s claims fail because the California Court of

Appeal’s denial of his state habeas petition on the basis that Watkins failed to state a

prima facie case for relief was neither contrary to federal law, nor an unreasonable

application of the facts in this case. For the reasons discussed below, the Court

1

The court refers throughout this Report and Recommendation to the page numbers assigned

by CM/ECF.

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recommends that the Petition in the instant case be DENIED and that this action be

DISMISSED with prejudice.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

“Between August 2011 and October 2011, Watkins and his five co-defendants

conspired to commit the crime of home invasion robbery in concert and the

crime of transportation and distribution of 15 kilos of cocaine. The

conspiracy consisted of overt act No.1, in which co-defendants Deandre

Towers and Bobby Ford met with an undercover agent and discussed the

robbery and theft of 15 kilos of cocaine; overt act No. 2, in which Watkins

and his co-defendants met with an undercover agent at a Best Buy in National

City to stage the robbery; overt act No. 3, in which Watkins and his codefendants went to a warehouse in National City to stage the robbery; and

overt act No. 4, in which Watkins and his co-defendants acquired guns to be

used in the robbery.”

See Lodgment No. 4, Opinion of California Court of Appeal, case number D061551.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On or about November 29, 2011, Watkins pleaded guilty to one count of

conspiracy to commit a home invasion robbery. (Cal. Penal Code § 182(a), 211,

212.5(a), 213(a)(1)(A)(B). Watkins also pleaded guilty to a gang enhancement and

a personal use of a firearm enhancement. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 186.22(b)(1),

12021.5(a)). (Lodgment 1 at 16-18, 90; 2 at 34-35.) He also admitted a serious

prior felony and prior strike allegations. (Lodgment 1 at 16-18, 90; 2 at 30, 36.) 

The court denied Watkins’s motion to strike his prior strike conviction. See People

v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497 (1996).

The court sentenced Watkins to a total of 13 years in prison for conspiracy to

commit home invasion robbery in concert, comprised of the lower term of three

years, doubled to six years due to the strike prior, plus five years for the serious

felony prior, and the middle term of two years for the firearm allegations. The court

2

 State court factual findings are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of

rebutting these findings by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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struck the gang allegations and prison priors. (Lodgment 1 at 92; 2 at 76-79.)

On July 19, 2012, Watkins appealed the final judgment and sentence in the

Fourth District California Court of Appeal, Division One, contending the trial court

erred by: (1) considering his “strike prior” for purposes of sentencing, 

(2) imposing a consecutive sentence for his firearm enhancement after striking

punishment for the gang enhancement, and (3) imposing a sentence longer than the

one the People offered as a stipulated sentence. (Lodgment 3.) Although Watkins’

appellate counsel drew the court’s attention to the sentencing issues listed above, she

did not allege error and requested the court to independently review the record 

pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979). Id. On October 15, 2012, the

state appellate court determined there were no arguable issues and affirmed the

judgment. (Lodgment 4.) Watkins did not file a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court.

On May 13, 2013, Watkins filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment 5.) He asserted that his constitutional rights

were violated when the trial court: (1) violated the plea agreement by imposing an

enhancement for a prior conviction that he contends was supposed to have been

dismissed; (2) coerced him into pleading guilty; (3) failed to elicit a factual basis for

his plea; (4) infringed upon his right to free speech and assembly; and (5) failed to

preface inchoate crimes as attempted crimes. (Ibid.) He also claimed (6) ineffective

assistance of counsel. (Ibid.) On July 16, 2013, the superior court denied the

petition for failing to state a prima facie case for relief. (Lodgment 6.)

On September 9, 2013, Watkins filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 7.) On September 26, 2013, the state

appellate court denied the petition, determining that Watkins did not present

evidence to support any of his contentions. (Lodgment 8.)

On October 24, 2013, Watkins filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 9.) (Ibid.) On December 11, 2013,

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the Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review. (Lodgment 10.)

On February 3, 2014, Watkins filed the instant federal Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, which raises the same six claims made in his state habeas petitions. 

(Doc. No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer on April 15, 2014. (Doc. No. 6.)

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs

review of Watkins’s Petition because Watkins filed his federal habeas Petition after

the Act’s 1996 effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997); see

also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785-86 (2011) (applying 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1) to federal habeas review of state court’s determination of an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim). The AEDPA imposes a “highly deferential standard

for evaluating state-court rulings,” requiring that “state-court decisions be given the

benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (quoting Lindh,

521 U.S. at 333 n.7). Under the AEDPA’s highly deferential standard of review, a

federal court may not grant habeas relief on a claim adjudicated on its merits in state

court unless the adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the

merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. Under the first AEDPA exception, “clearly

established Federal law” refers to the Supreme Court “holdings, as opposed to the

dicta,” as of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 365 (2000). Although only Supreme Court holdings are binding, “circuit

court precedent may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly established

and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633

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F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011).

In determining whether a state court’s decision was “contrary to” clearly

established Federal law, a reviewing court must evaluate whether the decision “

‘applies a rule that contradicts [such] law’ and how the decision ‘confronts [the] set

of facts’ that were before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1399 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). A state court is not required to

cite or even be aware of Supreme Court cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor

the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)); see also

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 733 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463

U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)) (finding that when the “state court’s decision fairly

appears to rest primarily on federal law” and “when the adequacy and independence

of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, [a federal

court] will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the

case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so”).

If a state court decision “identifies the correct governing legal principle in

existence at the time,” a reviewing court must assess whether the decision

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Cullen, 131

S.Ct. at 1399 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). An “unreasonable application” of

law is “different from an incorrect application” of that law. Harrington, 131 S. Ct.

at 785 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). Similarly, a state court’s decision based

upon a factual determination may not be overturned on habeas review unless the

factual determination is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented

in the state-court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Under the second AEDPA exception, “factual determinations by state courts

are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, 

§ 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a

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factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, 

§ 2254(d)(2).” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Under the AEDPA,

the question “is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination

was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable–a substantially

higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).

The AEDPA standard requires a high level of deference to state court

decisions, such that it “preserves authority to issue habeas writ in cases where there

is no possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision

conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedents.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 

Accordingly, to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state

court’s decision on a federal claim was “so lacking in justification that there was an

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786–87; see also Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15

(2013) (“The prisoner bears the burden of rebutting the state court’s factual findings

‘by clear and convincing evidence.”) Moreover, even if this Court finds such a state

court error of clear constitutional magnitude, habeas relief is not available unless the

error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.” Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 

Where more than one state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims, a

federal habeas court analyzes the last reasoned decision as the basis for the state

court’s justification. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004); see

also Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In determining whether a state court

decision is contrary to federal law, we look to the state’s last reasoned decision.”) In

the instant matter, the California Supreme Court summarily denied review of

Watkins’s habeas petition. (Lodgment 10.) In this case, the California Court of

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Appeal’s decision on September 26, 2013, stands as the last reasoned decision

pertaining to Watkins’s claims. (Lodgment 8.) 

Accordingly, the Court must look to the California Court of Appeal’s decision

on Watkins’s state habeas petition to determine whether that decision was contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law or an

objectively unreasonable determination of the facts. See Medley v. Runnels, 506

F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007) (“On habeas review, a federal court looks through

unexplained state court decisions leaving, in effect, the denial of post-conviction

relief to the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim at issue.”)

V. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 1: Petitioner Knowingly Agreed to a Plea That Allowed Sentence

Enhancements for Prior Convictions

1. Petitioner’s Claims

Watkins contends that the plea agreement was changed without his consent

and that he was not given an opportunity to withdraw his plea. (Doc. No. 1 at 6-9.) 

Specifically, he argues that he understood the plea to call for dismissal of prior

convictions as well as other charges and allegations against him, however on the day

of sentencing, the Judge used his power to enhance his sentence based on priors he

thought would be stricken. (Ibid.; see Traverse, ECF No. 13 at 11.)

2. Respondent’s Argument

Respondent argues Watkins is not entitled to habeas relief because the plea

agreement only called for the dismissal of other charges and allegations rather than

prior convictions. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 5.) At the time of his plea agreement,

Respondent states Watkins admitted having previously served two prior prison terms

and having been convicted of both a serious felony and a strike. (Ibid.) Respondent

notes Watkins also acknowledged that he faced a maximum punishment of 34 years

in prison. (Ibid.) Respondent contends the Judge, at the time of sentencing, gave

Watkins the benefit of the plea bargain by sentencing him to only 13 years in state

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prison. (Ibid.)

3. Standard of Review 

“The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether

the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses

of action open to the defendant.’ ” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); see also

Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a plea is

voluntary if the record affirmatively proves so under the totality of the

circumstances). 

A plea is involuntary if it is the product of threats, improper promises, or other

forms of wrongful coercion. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). A

plea is unintelligent if the defendant is without the information necessary to assess

the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared to entering a guilty plea.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56. While due process requires a guilty plea to be both

knowing and voluntary, it does not require a state court to enumerate all rights a

defendant waives when he enters a guilty plea. Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d

1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1986).

a.) The Plea Agreement

Watkins’s written plea agreement is in the record and it indicates Watkins

pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit a home invasion robbery; a

gang enhancement and a personal use of a firearm enhancement. (Lodgment 1 at 16-

18, 90; 2 at 34-35.) He also admitted a serious prior felony, prison priors and a prior

strike allegation. (Lodgment 1 at 16-18, 90; 2 at 30, 36.) The document also

explicitly provides: the “D.A. will move to dismiss remaining counts and

allegation[s].” (Lodgment 1 at 16.) The plea agreement does not state that prior

felonies, prison priors or prior strikes would not be considered by the Judge at

sentencing. (Ibid.)

Watkins affirmatively consented to the terms of this agreement by signing his

initials next to the following statements:

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I am entering my plea freely and voluntarily, without fear or threat to me or

anyone closely related to me. [¶] I am sober and my judgment is not

impaired. I have not consumed any drug, alcohol or narcotic within the past 24 hours. [¶] . . . I understand that I may receive this maximum punishment as

a result of my plea: 34 years imprisonment or imprisonment plus a term of

mandatory supervision. (Lodgment 1 at 16-17.) 

Watkins’s initials indicate his awareness and acceptance of the terms of the plea. 

See Doe v. Harris, 640 F.3d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that signing

one’s initials shows acceptance of plea terms).

b.) Hearing Transcript re: Petitioner’s Oral Plea

In addition to the written plea agreement, a transcript of Mr. Watkins’ plea

before the court on November 29, 2011, is in the record. In the transcript, the court

states the following:

“The understanding is this: You’ll plead guilty to Count 1, You’ll admit the

conduct allegations that go with count 1. These are the gang allegation and

the personal use of a firearm allegation under section 12021.5(A). You’ll also

admit all the other allegations on the charging document against you that are

based on your priors. These include two prison priors, one serious felony

prior conviction and one strike prior. Is this your understanding of what’s

going to happen sir?

The Defendant (Watkins): Yes.

The Court: The understanding as well is that if you do that, everything else on

this charging document against you will be dismissed. All the other counts

and allegations will be dismissed. You face a maximum penalty just based on

these counts and allegations or this count and the allegations of 34 years in

prison, a fine of $10,000, and a period of parole that could last as long as four

years. Do you understand that?

The Defendant (Watkins): Yes.

The Court: Now, the understanding is that we’ll have a sentencing hearing. 

 The District Attorney will be free to argue what he wants. Your lawyer will

be free to argue what he wants. I’ll get a presentence report. I’ll listen to

everything, read everything and I’ll make the sentencing decision. I’m

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mindful of what the people’s original offer3 was in this case as to you, and my

sense is it’s likely to come in somewhere around that range. It could be more,

it could well be less. I’ll make that final decision at the sentencing hearing. 

Do you understand all this?

The Defendant (Watkins): Yes.

Lodgment 2, Reporter’s Transcript, pp. 29-31.

At Watkins’s sentencing hearing on January 25, 2012, the court explained the

sentence as follows:

“With respect to Count 1... conspiracy to commit residential first degree

robbery. It is a three, six , nine offense. The court chooses, considering all

the factors, the low term of three years. Pursuant to the strike prior, which I

have found in place –left in place, that term is doubled for a total term

attributable to count 1 of six years ....With respect to the gang allegation, ... I

find that was properly established by his admission... this carries a possible

five year or ten year enhancement ... I am going to strike that additional

punishment. I’m not striking the allegation, I’m striking the punishment. 

There is a serious felony prior...I have no discretion with respect to that. It

carries a mandatory five-year consecutive term. And so for the serious felony

prior ... he gets an additional five years. With respect to the prison ... priors

that were alleged and admitted, I strike those and [they are] dismissed for

sentencing purposes in this case alone. This leaves the allegation...[of]

generically carrying or possessing in the gang context of a firearm during the

commission of a gang offense ... I’m going to choose the midterm of two

years. That is a consecutive term. The total term therefore is 13 years.”

Lodgment 2, Reporter’s Transcript, pp. 77-79.

///

///

///

///

3

The original offer presented by the prosecution was “a plea to a single count of a serious

felony, admission of the strike and nickel, for a total term of 12 years ... at 80 percent.” Lodgment 2,

Reporter’s Transcript, pp. 16-17. The superior court judge sentenced Watkins to a total term of 13

years. Lodgment 2, Reporter’s Transcript, pp. 77-79.

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4. Analysis

The Fourth District California Court of Appeal, Division One denied

Watkins’s petition, determining that the record did not demonstrate, and Watkins did

not present any evidence, to show his plea was not voluntary or knowing. 

(Lodgment 8.) This Court’s review of the record confirms that conclusion. 

Specifically, the record indicates that before he entered his guilty plea, Watkins was

aware of, and consented to, the possibility of receiving an enhancement of his

sentence by the Judge. Watkins assented to this condition in order to avoid facing a

maximum 34-year sentence for the conspiracy charge alone. Given the contents of

the plea agreement and the hearing transcript, which are both in the record, it was

not unreasonable for the state appellate court to determine Watkins had not made a

prima facie showing that his plea agreement was changed without his knowledge or

consent.

The state appellate court’s determination is also in conformance with clearlyestablished federal law. Under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the

state of California is free to seek a judicial sentence enhancement as long as the

defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial fact finding at

the time of his guilty plea. Id. at 310. In the present case, Watkins pleaded guilty to

one count of conspiracy to commit a home invasion robbery; a gang enhancement

and a personal use of a firearm enhancement. (Lodgment 1 at 16-18, 90; 2 at 34-35.)

 Based on Watkins’s admission to the gang allegation, the judge had the authority,

to increase the sentence. There is no violation under Blakely and Watkins’s sentence

enhancement was in conformance with clearly-established federal law. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Watkins’s first claim, which

alleges his plea was changed without his knowledge, should be DENIED as the state

appellate court’s denial of this claim was neither an unreasonable determination of

the facts of this case, nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

///

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B. Claim 2: Petitioner’s History of Depression Did Not Prevent Him From

Voluntarily Entering A Guilty Plea 

1. Petitioner’s Claims

Watkins states that he suffers from bi-polar disorder, ongoing post-traumatic

stress disorder (“PTSD”), and clinical depression. (Id. at 13.) Due to his preexisting

mental illnesses, Watkins argues the trial court should have held a competency

hearing and that its failure to do so precludes a finding that he a voluntarily and

intelligently entered a guilty plea. (Id. at 12.; see also Traverse, ECF No. 13 at 13.) 

He also alleges he was forced into entering a guilty plea and that the superior court

judge began colluding against him in an unreported conference with all counsel

before the case was called. (Id. at 14.)

2. Respondent’s Argument

Respondent argues the record does not support a finding that Watkins’s past

mental illnesses prevented him from knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty in

2012. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 5.) A probation officer’s report and a sentencing hearing

from a prior case in 2002 disclosed Watkins’s previous diagnosis of depression, with

which he has suffered his whole life. (Ibid.) The report states that Watkins was also

diagnosed with bi-polar disorder in 2001. (Ibid.) However, as of 2011, Respondent

notes that Watkins told the court at the time he entered his plea that he was not

pressured or threatened. (Ibid.) Respondent also points out that at the time of

Watkins’s probation report, dated January 20, 2012, he reported that he was not

taking any medications and was in good physical health. (Id. at 5.)

3. Analysis

“Due process requires a trial court to hold a hearing, sua sponte, on a

defendant's competence to plead guilty whenever the trial judge entertains or

reasonably should entertain a good faith doubt as to the defendant's ability to

understand the nature and consequences of the plea, or to participate intelligently in

the proceedings and to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented.” 

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Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 515 (9th Cir. 1981).

In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), the Supreme

Court held that the standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant

has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding” and has “a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.” Id. at 402. In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993),

the Supreme Court extended this standard for defendants who plead guilty. Id. at

399 (rejecting the notion that competence to plead guilty must be measured by a

standard that is higher than the Dusky standard). “In addition to determining that a

defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a trial court must

satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.” 

Id. at 400.

The Court of Appeal denied Watkins’s claim, determining that he was able to

make a knowing and voluntary plea. Specifically, the Court stated: “[Watkins] does

not demonstrate . . . any evidence of an actual mental illness that would prevent him

from entering a guilty plea.” (Lodgment 8.) The record confirms this determination. 

There are no facts in the record, or facts presented by Watkins, that would indicate

the superior court judge should have entertained doubts as to Petitioner’s

competence. See Chavez, 656 F.2d at 515. 

For example, at the November 29, 2011 hearing, after listening to the judge

explain the terms of the plea deal, Watkins told the court he understood the offer and

wanted to enter a guilty plea. The following exchange took place:

“The Court: Do you understand all this?

[Watkins]: Yes

The Court: Now, is this how it’s been explained to you?

[Watkins]: Yes

The Court: Did anyone make you any other promises?

[Watkins]: No.

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Do you feel like you’ve been pressured or threatened to enter this plea other than being worried about what you might face if you got convicted?

[Watkins]: No.

The Court: Have you had any drugs or alcohol or medicine that might make it

difficult for you to understand what’s happening?

[Watkins]: No.

The Court: Do you think you understand what’s happening?

[Watkins]: Yes

The Court: This is your change of plea form, sir. Did you read and go over

this form with your lawyer?

[Watkins]: Yes.

The Court: Did you put your initials in the boxes as you covered each

paragraph?

[Watkins]: Yes.

The Court: Did you understand everything your lawyer explained to you from

the form?

[Watkins]: Yes.

The Court: Did you sign the form?

[Watkins]: Yes.

. . .

The Court: The change of plea form, sir, tells you about your constitutional

rights. Those are important rights. They mean you’re not required to plead

guilty to anything. If you wish, you can have a trial and all the rights that go

with a trial. Do you understand that?

[Watkins]: Yes.

(Lodgment 2 at 31-34.) 

As demonstrated by the record, Watkins had several opportunities on the day

he entered his plea to tell the judge that he was unable to comprehend the

proceedings because of his mental state. However, he did not voice any concerns, or

otherwise alert the judge that he felt his assent to the plea deal was compromised by

the onset of depression, PTSD or other illness. 

Watkins had another opportunity at his sentencing hearing, which occurred on

January 25, 2012, (more than 45 days after his plea was entered), to notify the judge

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that he was feeling the effects of mental illness. However, he did not. And, in fact,

counsel for Mr. Watkins told the judge on the record before sentencing began that: “I

talked to Mr. Watkins to make sure that he is physically, mentally prepared to

proceed this morning, and he has assured me he is. I always like to make that

inquiry of a client. You never know if something has come up of a medical nature.” 

(Lodgment 2 at 60.) The evidence in the record supports the Court of Appeal’s

determination that Watkins’s history of depression and PTSD did not prevent him

from entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s

decision finding there was no evidence of a mental illness that prevented Watkins

from entering a guilty plea was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in

this case

Watkins’s claim that the judge colluded against him also holds no merit. The

judge disclosed on the record that he met with all counsel in an unreported

conference before the case was called. (Lodgment 2 at 3.) The judge stated that at

the conference, counsel advised him of the complexities of the case. (Ibid.) The

judge then explained the very complexities he discussed with counsel to Watkins

and his co-defendants on the record at the hearing. (Id. at 3-8.) The complex issues

addressed by the judge included an explanation of the pros and cons posed by

allegations, package offers, enhancements, proceeding with a preliminary hearing

and going to trial. (Id. at 3-8.) Specifically, the judge stated: 

“I want to be sure that the record shows that each of you understands what

your offer is and what the potential downside might be if you didn’t take it. I

do that frankly for two reasons. One, I think it’s only fair. I think you should

be entitled to know what the worst -case scenario might be as best that can be

determined, before you make a decision to accept or reject an offer. And the

second one is ...I want to be sure that I did everything in my power to make

sure that each one of you gentlemen was fully informed of what the downside

might be. And then although I never get pleasure out of imposing huge

sentences, at least I can know that everybody knew what the cards were on the

table.” 

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(Id. at 6-8.) 

There is no evidence in the record, and Watkins has failed to produce any

evidence, to indicate that the superior court judge should have doubted his ability to

understand the consequences of the plea or to participate intelligently in the

proceedings on November 29, 2011 or at the sentencing hearing on January 25,

2012. After an extensive explanation of the consequences of the plea deal and in

response to the court’s many questions as to whether he understood the terms of his

plea, Watkins repeatedly answered that he understood. IT IS THEREFORE

RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Watkins’s second claim alleging he was

forced to enter a guilty plea as a result of his history of mental illness. The Court of

Appeal’s decision finding there was no evidence of a mental illness that prevented

him from entering a guilty plea was neither an unreasonable application of federal

law, nor an unreasonable determination of the facts in this case.

C. Claim 3: The Trial Court Established an Adequate Factual Basis for

Petitioner’s Guilty Plea

1. Petitioner’s Claims

Watkins claims the superior court judge failed to elicit a factual basis for his

plea. (Doc. No. 1 at 19.) He argues that neither the judge, nor the prosecutor, could

establish he was a participant in the alleged crimes. (Ibid.) Specifically, Watkins

highlights two examples from the record. (Id. at 10.) He claims that he was never in

possession of a gun. (Ibid.; see also Traverse, ECF No. 13 at 17.) He also claims

that he denied wanting any involvement with the sting operation and that his only

intent was to return a crack pipe. (Ibid.; see also Traverse, ECF No. 13 at 17.)

Watkins seeks a withdrawal of his guilty plea on the ground that there was

insufficient and conflicting evidence to support his plea. (Id. at 10-11.)

2. Respondent’s Argument

Respondent argues that United States Supreme Court precedent invalidates

Watkins’s claim. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 6.) Specifically, Respondent states in North

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Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court held that express

admission of guilt is not constitutionally required for a valid guilty plea. (Ibid.) 

Further, in Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a

petitioner who has pled guilty may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character

of the guilty plea by showing that the advice received from counsel was not within

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. (Ibid.) 

Respondent argues that Watkins had an opportunity to challenge the charges by

proceeding to trial, but chose to plead guilty instead; therefore, he is not entitled to

relief. (Id. at 7.)

3. Analysis

“An accused may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the

imposition of a prison sentence even though he is unwilling to admit participation in

the crime.” N. Carolina, 400 U.S. at 25. “Guilty pleas coupled with claims of

innocence should not be accepted unless there is factual basis for [the] plea and until

[the] judge has inquired into and sought to resolve conflict between waiver of trial

and claim of innocence.” Ibid. “When a criminal defendant, on advice of counsel,

has solemnly admitted in open court that he is guilty of a charged offense he may not

thereafter raise independent claims relating to deprivation of constitutional rights . . .

but may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by showing

that counsel's advice was not within the standards of governing Supreme Court

decision.” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 258.

The state appellate court denied Watkins’ state petition finding: “[T]he

evidence in support of the petition demonstrates... the court determined that Watkins

understood his guilty plea and found a factual basis for the plea. Watkins’s [sic]

conclusory claims to the contrary do not state a prima facie case for relief.” 

(Lodgment 8.) 

This Court RECOMMENDS a finding that Watkins’s claim alleging the judge

failed to elicit a factual basis for his plea is without merit. At the November 29,

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2011, hearing, the judge asked Watkins the following:

“The Court: Now, the change of plea form tells me that you conspired to

commit a residential home invasion robbery in concert. You did this with

fellow Lincoln Park gang members, in concert, while armed with a gun. Are

these things true?

The Defendant (Watkins): Yes.”

(Lodgment 2, November 29, 2011 hearing at p. 34.)

The transcript of the hearing also indicates that before Watkins entered his

plea, the judge discussed the constitutional right to a jury trial to Watkins explaining:

“[Y]ou’re not required to plead guilty to anything. If you wish, you can have

a trial and all the rights that go with a trial. Do you understand that?

The Defendant (Watkins): Yes.

The Court: If you take this agreement and make this plea, then you won’t be

having a trial. If you don’t have a trial, you won’t be using all of those rights. 

Does that make sense to you?

The Defendant (Watkins): Yes.

The Court: You’ll be giving them up, in other words. Do you understand?

The Defendant (Watkins): Yes.”

 (Id. at 33-34.) 

Notwithstanding the advisement of the superior court judge, Watkins

voluntarily entered a plea of guilty. (Id. at 34-35.) Accordingly, the judge

concluded at the hearing: “I find that Mr. Watkins understands and voluntarily and

intelligently waives his constitutional rights . . . He understands the nature of the

charges and the consequences of the plea and the admissions. I find a factual basis

for each.” (Id. at 36.) IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Watkins’s

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third claim be DENIED as the Court of Appeal’s denial was a reasonable

application of federal law and a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the

record which demonstrates a factual basis was elicited by the superior court judge

and that Watkins entered his guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently.

D. Claim 4: Petitioner’s Right to Free Speech and Assembly Was Not Violated.

1. Petitioner’s Claims

Watkins claims he had a right to be in the same location as his cousin while

the sting operation took place because he was not a part of the conspiracy. (Doc.

No. 1 at 25; see also Traverse, ECF No. 13 at 20.) He argues that criminalizing

“talking and grouping” violates his right to free speech and assembly. (Ibid.)

2. Respondent’s Argument

Respondent argues conspiracy only becomes criminal after the defendant

performs an act in furtherance of committing an underlying, target crime. Therefore,

Respondent argues, Watkins was convicted for his intent to commit home invasion

robbery and his participation in several overt acts4

 in furtherance of that conspiracy,

not for the simple act of assembling or speaking. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 7.) Respondent

argues punishment of the conspiracy is permissible under federal law and does not

impinge on Watkins’ rights of assembly or free speech. Id.

3. Analysis

In De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937),

the U.S. Supreme Court explained the distinguishing characteristics of conspiracy as

compared to the exercise of free assembly-free speech as follows:

“The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to

4

 On direct appeal, the state appellate court found: “[t]he conspiracy consisted of overt act

No.1, in which co-defendants Deandre Towers and Bobby Ford met with an undercover agent and

discussed the robbery and theft of 15 kilos of cocaine; overt act No. 2, in which Watkins and his codefendants met with an undercover agent at a Besy Buy in National City to stage the robbery; overt

act No. 3, in which Watkins and his co-defendants went to a warehouse in National City to stage the

robbery; and overt act No. 4, in which Watkins and his co-defendants acquired guns to be used in the

robbery.”

See Lodg. No. 4, Opinion of California Court of Appeal, case number D061551.

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its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution

protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they

have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.”

Id. at 365.

Similarly, under California law, a “conspiracy exists when one or more

persons have the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as

the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of the

commission of an overt act by one or more of the parties to such agreement in

furtherance of the conspiracy.” People v. Herrera, 83 Cal. App. 4th 46, 64 (2000). 

These facts may be established either through the use of circumstantial evidence or

inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged

conspirators before and during the alleged conspiracy. Ibid. Discussions and

arrangements among conspirators in regard to and for the criminal act may constitute

properly chargeable overt acts in a criminal conspiracy prosecution. People v. Von

Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th 175, 245 (1992).

After reviewing the well-established federal law governing conspiracy and the

California state law Watkins challenges, it is clear that the state law setting forth the

elements of conspiracy does not conflict with federal law construing the rights of

assembly, association and speech as provided under the First Amendment. 

As for Watkins’ contention that he was not part of the conspiracy, the state

appellate court on direct appeal found otherwise. (Lodgment 4.) In its opinion, the

court of appeal found: (1) co-defendants Deandre Towers and Bobby Ford met with

an undercover agent and discussed the robbery and theft of 15 kilos of cocaine; (2)

Watkins and his co-defendants met with an undercover agent at a Best Buy in

National City to stage the robbery; (3) Watkins and his co-defendants went to a

warehouse in National City to stage the robbery; and (4) Watkins and his codefendants acquired guns to be used in the robbery.” (Lodgment 4.) As a result, the

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Court of Appeal denied Watkins’s state habeas petition finding “[he] presents no

evidence to support any of his contentions.” (Lodgment 8.) 

There is no basis in the record from which this Court can conclude that the

state court’s decision denying Watkins’s claim for a violation of his First

Amendment rights by virtue of being charged for conspiracy constitutes an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Furthermore, Watson has not identified any

legal authority to support a finding that the state court’s decision was contrary to or

an unreasonable application of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). IT IS

THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Watkins’s fourth claim alleging a violation

of his First Amendment rights to free assembly, association and speech be DENIED.

E. Claim 5: Petitioner’s Assertion That Inchoate Crimes Are Mischaracterized

is Not Supported By Federal Law.

1. Petitioner’s Claims

Watkins claims that his plea agreement is void because inchoate crimes, such

as conspiracy, must be described as an attempted crimes. (Doc. No. 1 at 32.) 

Watkins argues that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

because the superior court judge accepted his guilty plea as to conspiracy, however,

there was no evidence of conspiracy. At most, Watkins argues that there may have

been an attempt at home invasion robbery. However, he contends the government

would have been unable to prove an attempted robbery charge because there was no

actual cocaine to rob due to the fact that he was unwittingly caught in a government

sting operation. (See Traverse, ECF No. 13 at 21.)

2. Respondent’s Argument

Respondent asserts that there is no Supreme Court authority that supports

Watkins’s contention that inchoate crimes should be described or construed as an

attempted crime. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 7.) 

///

///

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3. Analysis

The Court of Appeal denied Watkins’s petition, explaining that “conclusory

allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the allegations do not

warrant relief.” (Lodgment 8.) While the court did not specifically mention

Watkins’s argument that inchoate crimes are mischaracterized, it did state that

Watkins “presents no evidence to support any of his contentions” including his claim

that there was insufficient evidence to support his plea of guilty to conspiracy to

commit home invasion robbery. (Ibid.) 

As explained in Section D supra, well-established federal law recognizes the

crime of conspiracy as a legitimate offense. Federal law has also held that conspiracy

may be distinguished from, and is not in conflict with, the rights of assembly,

association and speech as provided under the First Amendment. With respect to

Watkins’s claim that his conspiracy charge should have been labeled as an attempt,

this court has found no law, and Watkins has presented no federal authority, requiring

inchoate crimes to be construed or described as “attempts”.

In this fifth claim, Watkins again contends that there was no evidence of

conspiracy. However, as also explained in Section D supra, the state appellate court

found Watkins participated in several overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Finally, as discussed in Section C supra, the record demonstrates Watkins

voluntarily and knowingly entered a guilty plea to the conspiracy charge. The

November 29, 2011 hearing transcript indicates the judge explained to Watkins that

he had “an absolute right to take the case clear through the legal system . . . to have

the question of whether [he] should be found guilty or not guilty decided by a jury of

12 people . . . and nobody is here trying to talk [him] out of doing that.” (Lodgment 2

at 4.) After being made aware of his rights, Watkins told the judge he understood his

plea deal and its consequences. Based on this record, the Court of Appeal denied

Watkins’s petition, determining that he entered a valid guilty plea. (Lodgment 8.) 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED Watkins’s fifth claim be DENIED

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as the state appellate court’s decision denying Watkins’s claim, which alleges 

mischaracterization of the conspiracy charge and insufficient evidence to support his

plea of guilty, was neither an reasonable determination of the facts, nor contrary to or

an unreasonable application of federal law.

F. Claim 6: Petitioner’s Counsel Met the Applicable Legal Standard.

1. Petitioner’s Claims

Watkins claims his lawyer: (1) failed to investigate the charged crimes; (2)

failed to bring forth favorable and exculpatory evidence; (3) failed to challenge the

prosecution’s burden of proof at the preliminary hearing; (4) failed to notify the court

about his mental illness and the necessity of a competency hearing; and (5) coerced

him into entering a guilty plea. (Doc. No. 1 at 38.) Specifically, as to item 2,

Watkins contends, his counsel at the superior court level, David Ira Berman, Esq., did

not follow up on information that another co-defendant, “Mr. Ford[,] was willing to

give up his deal so that Petitioner, an innocent man could be set free.” (Traverse,

ECF No. 13 at 19.) 

2. Respondent’s Argument

Respondent addresses each of Watkins’s allegations of his trial counsel’s

deficient performance. Specifically, with regard to item 1, Respondent argues

Watkins fails to proffer evidence that his counsel failed to investigate and does not

advise the court as to what evidence would have been disclosed if such investigation

took place. As to item 2, Respondent contends Watkins fails to disclose any

exculpatory evidence. With regard to item 3, Respondent argues Watkins fails to

proffer evidence which would have demonstrated that the prosecutor could not have

established probable cause at the preliminary hearing. As to item 4, Respondent

argues Watkins fails to demonstrate that his counsel did not advise the trial court

about his mental health history, that the trial court was not otherwise aware of his

mental health history, or that a competency hearing was necessary. Finally, with

regard to item 5, Respondent argues Watkins fails to provide any evidence that his

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counsel coerced him into pleading guilty and the record indicates the contrary. (Doc.

No. 6-1 at 7-8.)

3. Analysis

In order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must

show (1) deficient performance by his counsel, and (2) resulting prejudice. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Supreme Court in Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), adapted the two-part Strickland test slightly in order to

specifically address challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of

counsel. The Hill court held that a defendant seeking to challenge the validity of his

guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) his

“counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and

(2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” See also Womack v.

Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-59). 

“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made

to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective

at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered

sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotations omitted). The

Court need not address the attorney performance prong if the claim can be resolved

on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

The state court of appeal denied Watkins’s habeas petition, explaining that “he

does not demonstrate how his attorney was ineffective.” (Lodgment 8.) This court

agrees. Watkins has not identified what helpful evidence defense counsel would have

discovered had he conducted an investigation or contacted additional witnesses. 

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 689. As an attachment to his Traverse, Watkins does

include a letter from his appellate counsel to him discussing a possible claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel against Mr. Berman for failure to investigate or

find exculpatory evidence. However, in the letter, appellate counsel explains to

Watkins that Mr. Berman found “no credible witness to provide a declaration that

you were not involved and that the individual you mentioned as a possible declarant

was one of the defendants who was only getting a plea bargain if you plead guilty.” 

(See Traverse, ECF No. 13 at 85.) Watkins’s letter from appellate counsel does not

overcome the presumption that Mr. Berman had a sound strategic reason for not

pursuing a declaration as to Watkins’s innocence, especially if the declaration was

going to come from one of his co-conspirators, co-defendant, Ford5

, whose credibility

would have been severely damaged due to his participation in the crime. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689. This Court finds no evidence in the record, and no evidence

submitted by Watkins to suggest that Mr. Berman’s performance was objectively

unreasonable. 

Watkins’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim also fails because Watkins 

was not prejudiced by his attorney’s recommendation that he accept a plea deal. As

reviewed in detail in Sections A through C, supra, the record indicates that before he

entered his guilty plea, Watkins was aware of, and consented to, the possibility of

receiving an enhancement of his sentence by the Judge. Watkins accepted a plea deal

to avoid facing a maximum 34-year sentence for the conspiracy charge alone. (See

Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that the

petitioner “suffered no prejudice from his attorney's prediction because, prior to

5

 Watkins’s co-defendant, Ford, was given a “package offer” at the November 29, 2011

hearing. Lodgment 2 at 6. Specifically, it was explained at the hearing that: “Offers have been

extended to all defendants. As to defendants Towers and Ford, however, they are not truly extended. 

They are extended in the events that [co-defendants] 3, 4, 5, and 6 plead guilty.” The court explained:

“There has been an offer extended to [Towers and Ford], but that offer they can only take if everybody

accepts. So as to Mr. Cruz, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Watkins, and Mr. Dodson, there have been other offers

extended, and any one of you gentlemen can accept that offer by yourself and separate yourself out

of this case. Mr. Towers and Mr. Ford, however, can only accept the offer today if everybody accepts

the offer.”

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accepting his guilty plea, the court explained that the discretion as to what the

sentence would be remained entirely with the court”). Watkins received a 13-year

sentence instead of a 34-year sentence. 

There is also no evidence to indicate that the superior court judge should have

doubted Watkins’s ability to understand the consequences of the plea or to participate

intelligently in the proceedings on November 29, 2011 or at the sentencing hearing

on January 25, 2012. After an extensive explanation of the consequences of the plea

deal, and in response to the court’s questions as to whether he understood the terms

of his plea and the constitutional rights he would be waiving, Watkins repeatedly

answered that he understood. He did not tell the judge or his attorney that his history

of depression or other illness was affecting his ability to participate in the

proceedings. Thus, Watkins has not presented any evidence showing that, but for

Mr. Berman’s failure to procure a declaration from co-defendant Ford or other

witnesses as to his innocence, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. This is especially true when

there were four other co-defendants, apart from Mr. Ford, who were involved in the

conspiracy and did not offer to provide a declaration as to Watkins’s innocence. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court find the state

appellate court’s’ rejection of Watkins’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim

was neither an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor an

unreasonable determination of the facts of this case and DENY habeas relief on claim

six.

VI. CONCLUSION

Watkins has failed to show that the Court of Appeal’s denial of his petition for

writ of habeas corpus was objectively unreasonable application of law or facts. He

has not established that the trial court violated his plea agreement by imposing a

sentence enhancement, coerced him into pleading guilty, failed to elicit a factual basis

for his plea, infringed upon his constitutional right to free speech and assembly or

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mischaracterized his conspiracy charge. Watkins also did not establish that he was

denied effective counsel. The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to

United States District Judge Larry A. Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local

Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

California. 

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED this habeas Petition

be DENIED on the grounds that Petitioner is not in custody in violation of any

federal right. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order (1)

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation and (2) directing that

judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than January 20, 2015 any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than February 3, 2015. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 29, 2014

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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