Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05313/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05313-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

TIMOTHY BUFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

M.T.A. HAGGIE, et al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 02-5313 OWW DLB P 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO FILE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO

ADVISE WHETHER HE WISHES TO

PROCEED WITH COGNIZABLE

CLAIMS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s second amended

complaint, lodged on November 28, 2005 pursuant to the Court’s Order of November 16, 2005. The

Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to file the lodged second amended complaint. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend

may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 

Case 1:02-cv-05313-OWW -DLB Document 97 Filed 01/09/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). th

In the second amended complaint, plaintiff brings action against the following individuals at

the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility at Corcoran: MTA Haggie, Senior MTA

Schumacher, Chief Medical Officer Posner, Correctional Officer Carline; Correctional Sergeant Hill;

and J.G. Boswell, a private party.

Plaintiff alleges that he had oral surgery on July 5, 2001, and that he had post-surgical

treatment on July 23, 2001 because he could not eat solid foods and had numbness in his tongue. 

The doctor prescribed a nutritional resource drink three times a day. Plaintiff alleges that MTA’s 

Haggie and Schumacher and Chief Medical Officer Posner reduced his nutritional resource drink to

once a day in violation of his civil rights. 

Plaintiff also alleges that on September 4, 2001, while on the recreational yard, he and other

inmates were sprayed with a chemical defoliant from a “crop-duster” airplane owned and operated

by J.G. Boswell. Plaintiff alleges that the chemical caused him nausea, respiratory problems, and

dizziness. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Carline and Hill, who were also on the yard, went inside

the program office to avoid exposure to the chemical. Plaintiff alleges that he went to the housing

unit and asked to be let inside but was refused. He alleges that defendants Hill and Caroline refused

to let him inside the housing unit for more than 40 minutes. Plaintiff alleges that on September 5,

2001, he sought treatment for ill effects from the chemical defoliant, but defendant Haggie refused

his request to be seen by a doctor. Plaintiff contends he was suffering from severe headaches, vision

problems, stomach problems and breathing difficulty as a result of his exposure. Plaintiff alleges

that he did not see a doctor for his symptoms until September 12, 2001. 

Medical Treatment Claim

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves

an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

“sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

Case 1:02-cv-05313-OWW -DLB Document 97 Filed 01/09/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 3

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very

purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a

deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner's

civil rights have been abridged, "the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." Broughton

v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A]

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does

not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs.,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to

establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not

support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving medical

treatment, the prisoner must allege that the delay led to further injury. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1060 (9 Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, th

1136 (9 Cir. 1997); Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9 Cir. th th

1985). 

In the instant case, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state cognizable claims for relief for

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against MTA’s Haggie and Schumacher and Chief

Case 1:02-cv-05313-OWW -DLB Document 97 Filed 01/09/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

Medical Officer Posner. 

B. Exposure to Chemicals

Plaintiff brings action against defendants Carline, Hill and J.G. Boswell based on his

exposure to a chemical defoliant on the outdoor recreation yard. To constitute cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve "the wanton and

unnecessary infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison

conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing,

shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,

1107 (9 Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9 Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges th th

injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if

they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152

F.3d 1124, (9 Cir. 1998) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). The deliberate th

indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation

must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know of and

disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. Thus, “a prison official may be

held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he

knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 835. Prison officials may avoid

liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence of a

reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence on the part of

the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have

been wanton. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost v. Agnose, 152 F.3d at 1128; see also

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 33 (1986). 

In the instant case, plaintiff has alleges that he informed defendants Carline and Hill about

the exposure, and they refused to allow him to go inside. These allegations are sufficient to indicate

deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety. However, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for

Case 1:02-cv-05313-OWW -DLB Document 97 Filed 01/09/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 5

violation of his constitutional rights by J.G. Boswell, a private party. The Civil Rights Act under

which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. . .

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions apply to those acting under the color of law and J.G. Boswell is not a state

actor. Private parties are generally not acting under the color of law, Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702,

707-08 (9 Cir. 1991), and plaintiff has alleged no facts that suggest that this defendant was acting th

under the color of law. To the extent plaintiff claims J.G. Boswell conspired with state officials to

expose plaintiff to harmful chemicals, his mere allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The Ninth Circuit has held that a claim under § 1985 must allege

specific facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). A mere allegation of conspiracy without

factual specificity is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id.; Sanchez v. City of

Santa Anna, 936 F.2d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has alleged no facts that support a claim

for relief under section 1985 and therefore the Court will recommend that defendant Boswell be

dismissed form this action. 

In summary, the Court finds that plaintiff states cognizable claims for relief against the

named defendants with the exception of J.G. Boswell. Accordingly, within 15 days of this Order,

plaintiff shall advise the Court whether he wishes to proceed with the cognizable claims and dismiss

defendant J.G. Boswell. Failure to advise that he wishes to proceed only with the cognizable claims

will result in a recommendation to the District Court that defendant Boswell be dismissed and this

action proceed only against the other named defendants as discussed in this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 6, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:02-cv-05313-OWW -DLB Document 97 Filed 01/09/06 Page 5 of 5