Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01456/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01456-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR CHARLES FOURSTAR, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

PAUL COPENHAVER,WARDEN,

Respondent.

No. 1:14-cv-01456-SKO HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(Doc. 34)

Petitioner, a federal prisoner, moves to amend a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,1 to include the following two claims:

Ground One: A 2010 statutory amendment to FBOP disciplinary 

sanctions that did away with Petitioner’s ability to continue earning 

“good-time credits” against his 2003 sentence is in violation of 

Petitioner’s rights under the ex post facto clause of the United 

States Constitution Art. I, cl. 3.

Ground Two: Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment deprivations and 

circumstances constitute the kind of “extraordinary circumstances” 

that will justify an exemption to the procedural default rule in 

habeas corpus that could conceivably justify re-opening a case 

through Fed.R.Civ.P.Rule 60(b)(6).

Doc. 34 at 3.

Despite its reference to the procedural default rule, Petitioner’s argument supporting the 

second ground appears to set forth an argument that Petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of 

which he was convicted.

 

1

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), both parties consented, in writing, to the jurisdiction of a United States 

Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment.

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Respondent urges the Court to deny the motion to amend as futile. Respondent argues 

that if it were granted, the proposed amended would result in a second or successive petition. The 

Court agrees that the motion to amend the petition must be dismissed as futile. 

I. Standards for Amendment

Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 15(a), a party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course 

within 21 days after service of the pleading, a required responsive pleading, or a motion under 

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier; in all other cases, a party may amend its 

pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the Court's leave. 28 U.S.C. § 2242; 

Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts. In ruling on a 

motion to amend a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a court must consider bad faith, undue 

delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether or not the party has 

previously amended his pleadings. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). A court 

may disallow a proposed amendment that would be futile, such as one in which the amended 

matter (1) is duplicative or patently frivolous, (2) presents no new facts but only new theories, or 

(3) provides no satisfactory explanation for failure to develop the original contentions fully. Id.

II. Ex Post Facto Claim

In proposed ground one, Petitioner claims that changes in disciplinary regulations 

administered by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) violated the ex post facto clause of the 

U.S. Constitution. His argument relies on the amendment of California Penal Code § 2933.6, 

which eliminated good-time credit for California inmates held in that state’s security housing 

units (SHU), and Hinojosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 2015).2 The proposed claim is futile 

for multiple reasons.

First, California Penal Code § 2933.6 is not a FBOP statute and has no application to 

Petitioner, who was convicted in a federal court in Montana. 

 

2 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision in Kernan v. Hinojosa, 136 S.Ct. 1603 (2016).

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Further, unlike inmate Hinojosa, Petitioner does not seek redress for a statutory change 

that amended the system of good-time credits upon which his initial sentence had been calculated. 

Instead, Petitioner contends that he was denied due process in disciplinary actions that resulted in 

Petitioner’s loss of good-time credits to which he would have been entitled but for his disciplinary 

violations. 

Because the first proposed ground is both futile and lacks merit, the Court will not grant 

Petitioner’s motion to amend the petition to include it.

III. Actual Innocence

Claim two attempts again to challenge Petitioner’s 2003 conviction in the U.S. District 

Court of Montana for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (aggravated sexual abuse by force or 

threat) and 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (offenses committed within Indian country). See Doc. 1 at 2. 

Because Petitioner has previously sought habeas relief for this conviction multiple times in 

multiple jurisdictions, this claim is barred as a successive claim. Petitioner also sought relief for 

this conviction in multiple previous cases; thus, the claim is clearly successive.

 The circuit court of appeals, not the district court, must decide whether a second or 

successive petition satisfies the statutory requirements to proceed. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A) 

("Before a second or successive petition permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the 

applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court 

to consider the application"). This means that a petitioner may not file a second or successive 

petition in district court until he has obtained leave from the court of appeals. Felker v. Turpin, 

518 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1996). In the absence of an order from the appropriate circuit court, a 

district court lacks jurisdiction over the petition and must dismiss the second or successive 

petition. Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997). Until Petitioner has 

secured leave from the court of appeals to bring this successive claim, the proposed amendment is 

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futile.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Petitioner’s motion to amend his petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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