Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00911/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00911-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEX TABATABAEE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BRIAN MARSHALL, et al.,

 Defendants.

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1:13-cv-00911-LJO-BAM (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE 

TO STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 16)

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

Findings and Recommendations

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Alex Tabatabaee (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action on 

June 17, 2013. On November 18, 2014, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s first amended complaint 

with leave to amend. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed on December 29, 2014, is 

currently before the Court for screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially 

plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each 

named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

(quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere 

consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison. The events alleged in the complaint 

occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Wasco State Prison. Plaintiff names the following 

defendants: (1) Brian Marshall; (2) D. Bradford; (3) M. Medina; (4) R. Ritchie; (5) Jane Does 1-

3; (6) A. Johnson; (7) V. Safari; (8) R. Baldoz; (9) Julie Santos; (10) Claudette Quiling; (11) L. 

Coleman; (12) C. Grandjean Rios; and (13) John Doe #1. 

Plaintiff was housed at Wasco State Prison from February 2 to August 9, 2012. Wasco 

State Prison has a correctional treatment center (CTC) that houses inmate-patients that are in 

need of professional supervised health care services and treatment. 

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On June 10, 2012, Plaintiff was removed from general population after a suicide attempt 

and was admitted to the CTC on suicide watch. Plaintiff remained in the CTC from June 11 to 

June 23, 2012.

On June 11, 2012, about 1:45 a.m., Plaintiff was assigned to the CTC and placed on 

suicide watch with 1-on-1 direct observation. 

On June 12, 2012, at about 3:45 p.m., Defendant A. Johnson, CNA, took Plaintiff’s vital 

signs through the food port and then documented the vitals in Plaintiff’s medical chart. 

Defendant acknowledged that Plaintiff was suffering from hypotension as his blood pressure was 

91/61. During this assessment, Defendant A. Johnson exchanged sarcastic statements with 

Plaintiff. Defendant A. Johnson stated, “You’ve got low blood pressure, but it should be of no 

concern to you especially if you die from it, it’ll work out in your favor anyway since you 

claimed to be suicidal.” Plaintiff alleges that a blood pressure measurement of 91/61 is 

considered “hypotension” and a person with this condition requires treatment. However, on June 

12, 2012, Defendant A. Johnson refused to provide Plaintiff with any medical care for his 

hypotension. She also failed to monitor Plaintiff’s blood pressure and vital signs during her 

shift. 

On June 12, 2012, at 4:15 p.m., Defendant V. Safari reviewed Plaintiff’s health chart and 

administered Plaintiff’s p.m. medication of Cymbalta. Defendant V. Safari did not check 

Plaintiff’s vital signs and did not provide any medical care for Plaintiff’s hypotension. 

Defendant V. Safari claimed she did not have time to monitor his blood pressure. Plaintiff 

alleges that Cymbalta may have unfavorable blood pressure side effects. 

On June 12, 2012, at 8:30 p.m., Defendant Safari and Defendant Baldoz administered 

Plaintiff’s nightly medication of Buspirone (Buspar) 30 mg. Defendants Safari and Baldoz did 

provide Plaintiff any medical care for his hypotension despite knowledge that the medication 

may cause further unfavorable blood pressure side effects. 

On June 13, 2012, from 12:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m., Plaintiff was having difficulty with sleep 

because of CTC’s nursing and custody staff. Plaintiff alleges that they were loud, slamming 

doors, laughing and dragging things across the floor. At about 3:00 a.m., Plaintiff complained 

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about the staff to Defendant Santos. At about 3:15 a.m., Plaintiff again complained to Defendant 

Santos and another nurse at 3:15 a.m. Defendant Santos then offered to give Plaintiff a psych 

medication to make him sleep better. Plaintiff informed Defendant Santos that he would accept 

the medication if he was not given a mood stabilizer because he does not like the side effects of 

those types of medications. 

At approximately 3:20 a.m., Defendant Santos reviewed Plaintiff’s medical chart with 

Defendant Quiling. Defendant Santos entered Plaintiff’s room with a custody officer to 

administer an injection. Plaintiff was skeptical of the injection and demanded to know what the 

medication was. Defendant Santos replied, “Don’t worry so much about it, we know what we 

are doing. We are not going to give you something that you don’t want.” Defendant Santos then 

injected the medication into Plaintiff’s left shoulder and left Plaintiff’s room with the custody 

officer. Defendants Santos and Quiling failed to monitor Plaintiff’s untreated hypotension. At 

3:40 a.m., Plaintiff was overwhelmed with drowsiness and fell asleep. The injected medication 

was later discovered to be Ziprasidone Mesylate (Geodon), which was prescribed by Dr. Hemela 

as PRN. Plaintiff alleges that Geodon is a mood stabilizer medication that can lower blood 

pressure. Plaintiff alleges that after the injection of Geodon, Defendant Santos and another nurse 

documented fraudulent notes in Plaintiff’s health records to justify the injection. 

On June 13, 2012, at 6:40 a.m., Defendant Klingenberg falsely documented in Plaintiff’s 

chart that no physical distress was noted despite being informed by Plaintiff that he was feeling 

slightly light headed with stiffness of his muscles. 

On June 13, 2012, at 7:00 a.m., C.N.A. Mason took Plaintiff’s vital signs through the 

food port and documented them in Plaintiff’s medical chart. Plaintiff’s blood pressure was 

90/62. At 8:10 a.m., CTC’s nursing staff informed the clinical custody officer, Defendant John 

Doe #1, that Plaintiff was suffering from low blood pressure and they needed his assistance 

while they checked Plaintiff’s blood pressure through the food port. Defendant John Doe #1 

approached Plaintiff’s door and demanded that Plaintiff get up from his mattress on the floor and 

come to the door to have his blood pressure taken by the C.N.A. Plaintiff informed Defendant 

John Doe #1 and C.N.A. Coleman that he was feeling dizzy, lightheaded, and too weak to stand 

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and that if he got up from his mattress, he may fall. Defendant John Doe #1 then stated, “Cut 

your bullshit acting! If you don’t come to this room’s door, I am going to fucking pepper spray 

you then make you fucking get up.” Plaintiff slowly got off his mattress and walked to the door. 

As Plaintiff was having his blood pressure taken by C.N.A. Coleman through the food port, 

Plaintiff lost consciousness and fell to the floor. As a result of the fall, Plaintiff injured his right 

knee and the back of his head. Plaintiff was transported to the TTA to receive urgent care. 

Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Soleimani and received a few sutures on the back of his head to close 

his wound. 

On June 13, 2012, Dr. Soleimani generated a medical assessment report. According to 

the findings, Plaintiff was suffering from hypotension with blood pressure of 84/50 and 

bradycardia with a low pulse rate of 48. It was deemed that Plaintiff’s fall was most likely due to 

a drop in blood pressure as a result of Plaintiff’s hypotension. Plaintiff was to be administered

saline IV fluids and his pysch meds were suspended until his vital signs and blood pressure were 

stabilized. Per the physician’s order, Plaintiff’s sutures were to be removed in no more than 10 

days.

On June 13, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff returned to his CTC room for suicide watch. 

At this time, Defendant Acala administered an IV tube to Plaintiff’s left arm through the food 

port. Plaintiff was administered IV fluids for 1 hour while lying on the floor inside his cell. 

Plaintiff alleges that this caused him great discomfort and pain to his left arm and head.

Within 5 days of Plaintiff’s placement at CTC, he was infected with Scabies because of 

poor room sanitation and linen conditions. 

On June 23, 2012, at 9:30 a.m., Plaintiff’s mental health treatment team ordered Plaintiff 

to be discharged from CTC and informed Defendant Rios of Plaintiff’s discharge order. 

Defendant Rios was the discharge nurse responsible for fulfilling physicians’ orders, preparing 

prescribed medications before return to general population and arranging follow-up care. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rios discharged Plaintiff without any of his medications or 

removal of his sutures. As a result, Plaintiff was left for two weeks without any of his needed 

medications for his medical conditions (Barrett’s Esophagus with G.E.R.D. and gastritis). 

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During this time, Plaintiff suffered from nausea, stomach bloating, cramps and increased

G.E.R.D. symptoms. Plaintiff’s sutures were removed from the back of his head about two 

weeks past the 10-day removal order. This caused gross scarring at the site of his injury. 

Due to Plaintiff’s right knee injury, he was diagnosed with an internal radial tear of the 

medial meniscus with joint effusion, which required surgery. This affected Plaintiff’s daily 

physical activities and impaired his mobility. He was subjected to daily pain and lost sensation 

to the left inner side of his right knee. Plaintiff underwent knee surgery about nine months after 

June 13, 2012. Plaintiff still experiences right knee pain. 

On December 6, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a claim to the California Government Claims 

Board. On January 17, 2013, the Board rejected Plaintiff’s claim. 

Plaintiff brings the following claims: (1) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants A. Johnson, V. Safari, R. Baldoz, J. 

Santos, and C. Quiling for treatment related to Plaintiff’s hypotension condition; (2) deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendant John 

Doe #1; (3) failure to properly train and supervise staff in violation of the Eighth Amendment 

against B. Marshall, D. Bradford, Jane Does 1-3, and R. Richey; (4) deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment against C. Grandjean Rios related 

to Plaintiff’s discharge care; (5) deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs 

against Defendant L. Coleman; and (6) state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress and medical malpractice. 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 

III. Discussion

A. First Claim for Relief: Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants A. Johnson, V. Safari, R. 

Baldoz, J. Santos, and C. Quiling were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s hypotension 

condition in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 

inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

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1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 

L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). The two part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show 

(1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ “and (2) 

“the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012).

Deliberate indifference is shown where the official is aware of a serious medical need and 

fails to adequately respond. Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 

2010). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Id. at 1019; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in 

diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment 

under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation 

merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County 

of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir.1995). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir.1990). 

Plaintiff admits that Defendants Johnson, Safari, Baldoz, Santos, and Quiling provided 

him with medical treatment and care. In particular, Plaintiff admits that Defendant A. Johnson 

took Plaintiff’s vitals, Defendants V. Safari and Baldoz administered needed medications for 

certain of Plaintiff’s medical issues, and Defendants Santos and Quiling responded to Plaintiff’s 

request for medications to help him sleep. Plaintiff’s allegations that these defendants failed to 

treat his hypotension amount to medical malpractice or, at most, gross negligence, which is not 

sufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. 

B. Second Claim for Relief: Deliberate Indifference

In his second claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe #1 was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution. 

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The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 

1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Prison officials therefore have a “duty to ensure that prisoners are provided 

adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 

217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

In order to establish a violation of this duty, a prisoner must show that he was subjected 

to an objectively serious deprivation that amounts to a denial of “the minimal civilized measure 

of life's necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 

(1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). 

A prisoner must also show that prison officials acted with sufficiently culpable states of mind in 

failing to satisfy their duties. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Prison officials must have acted with 

deliberate indifference. Id. A prison official is liable under the Eighth Amendment only if he 

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe #1 ordered Plaintiff to get up from 

his mattress on the floor and come to the door to have his blood pressure taken by the C.N.A. 

Although Plaintiff indicated that he was not feeling well, was lightheaded and was too weak to 

get up from his mattress, Defendant John Doe #1 threatened Plaintiff with pepper spray if he 

failed to get up and come to the door. After Plaintiff came to the door, and while his vitals were 

being taken, Plaintiff lost consciousness and fell to the floor. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Defendant John Doe #1 knew of and 

disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety from losing consciousness and falling. 

Plaintiff also has failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant John Doe #1 drew 

any inference that Plaintiff was at substantial risk of harm from a fall based solely on Plaintiff’s 

complaints. Defendant John Doe #1 was reportedly acting in compliance with the nursing staff 

request that he provide assistance while a nurse checked Plaintiff’s blood pressure through the 

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food port. (ECF No. 16, p. 9.) In other words, Defendant John Doe #1 relied on the opinion or 

statements of the nursing staff. 

C. Third Claim for Relief: Failure to Train/Supervise

In his third claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant B. Marshall, D. Bradford, 

Jane Does 1-3 and R. Ritchie failed to provide adequate training and supervision of CTC nursing 

and custody staff. Plaintiff also elsewhere alleges that Defendant Medina failed to provide 

adequate training and supervision. However, Plaintiff may not bring suit against these 

defendants (or any others) based solely on their roles as supervisors. 

Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of 

subordinate employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 

734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 

F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 

2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Snow v. 

McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 989) (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 

726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability 

exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials 

implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and 

is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. 

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants B. Marshall, D. Bradford, Jane Does 1-2 and R. 

Richey were personally involved the constitutional deprivation related to Plaintiff’s hypotension

or that they instituted a deficient policy. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations regarding deficient 

policies are not sufficient as he has not identified any relevant policy. 

D. Fourth Claim for Relief: Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

In his fourth claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant C. Grandjean Rios was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s post-discharge medical needs in violation of the Eighth 

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Amendment to the United States Constitution. As discussed above, to state a claim based on 

prison medical treatment, an inmate “must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical 

needs.’” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim for relief against Defendant Rios. There is no 

indication that Defendant Rios was responsible for or had control over the actions of custody or 

medical staff following Plaintiff’s return to the general population. Stated differently, there is no 

indication that Defendant Rios controlled the administration of Plaintiff’s medication or the 

responsiveness to his health care needs (such as ensuring removal of the sutures) after Plaintiff’s 

release from the CTC. 

E. Fifth Claim for Relief: Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

In his fifth claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Coleman was deliberately 

indifferent by taking Plaintiff’s blood pressure through the food port. In order to state a claim 

based on prison medical treatment, an inmate “must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.’” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical 

needs against Defendant Coleman. At best, Plaintiff has alleged gross negligence, which is 

insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood, 900 F.2d at

1334.

F. State Law Claims

As Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable federal claims in this action, the Court finds 

it unnecessary to screen Plaintiff’s state law claims. The Court generally declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in the absence of viable federal claims and this 

case presents no exception. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 715 F.3d 

1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 

(9th Cir. 2001); see also Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (if court 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims once court dismissed federal 

claims, then the court should dismiss the state law claims without prejudice). Therefore, it shall 

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be recommended that Plaintiff’s state law claims be dismissed without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(c)(3); Parra, 715 F.3d at 1156.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable section 1983 claim upon which relief may 

be granted. Although Plaintiff was provided with the relevant legal standards applicable to his 

federal claims, he has been unable to cure the deficiencies by amendment. Therefore, further 

leave to amend is not warranted. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of 

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s state law claims be dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction; 

and 

2. This action be dismissed as to Plaintiff’s federal claims, with prejudice, for failure to 

state a cognizable claim under section 1983. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties 

may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the 

magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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