Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-00453/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-00453-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK LEON WEBSTER,

Petitioner,

 v.

G. ORTIZ, Warden,

Respondent. ______________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

) 

No. C 01-0453 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY AND MOTION

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL;

DIRECTING CLERK TO FORWARD

FILE TO NINTH CIRCUIT

(Docket No. 37)

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a notice of appeal and a

request for a certificate of appealability, seeking leave to appeal the denial of petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order dismissing a claim from the above-titled

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be

denied. 

In 2001, petitioner filed the instant habeas petition, challenging the validity of a 1995

second-degree robbery conviction obtained against petitioner in the Alameda County

Superior Court. One of the claims petitioner raised in the petition was a challenge to his

sentence, which had been enhanced by a 1985 bank robbery conviction. Petitioner claimed

the 1985 conviction could not be used to enhance the 1995 sentence because the 1985

conviction had been obtained in violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to selfrepresentation. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832, 835 (1975). 

The Court dismissed the claim, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision

Case 3:01-cv-00453-MMC Document 38 Filed 03/11/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 Indeed, petitioner was appointed counsel before he elected to proceed pro se.

2

in Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). Specifically, the Court

ruled as followed:

In Lackawanna, the [Supreme] Court held that if a “conviction is later used to

enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the

enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior

conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.” [Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 404.] 

The only exception to the rule barring challenges to prior convictions used to

enhance current sentences is that a petitioner may challenge a prior conviction

on the ground that the right to the appointment of counsel for an indigent

defendant under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was denied. [Id.] 

 Petitioner’s third claim does not fall within this exception because he does not

claim that he was denied his right to the appointment of counsel.1

 Petitioner’s

claim that his decision to exercise his right to self-representation under Faretta

was not knowingly and voluntarily made is distinct from the “unique

constitutional defect” of failing to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant. 

See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994) (holding exception for

bringing claims under Gideon for the denial of the right to the appointment of

counsel does not encompass other claims under the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel, such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, involuntary guilty

plea, and failure to advise of the right to “stipulated facts”). As a result,

petitioner’s third claim does not fall under the exception to the rule in

Lackawanna that petitioner may not challenge the constitutionality of the 1985

prior conviction used to enhance his current sentence. Accordingly,

petitioner’s third claim must be dismissed.

(Order, filed July 23, 2001, at 2:10-3:1.) 

In a separate order, the Court denied on the merits petitioner’s one remaining claim

challenging his 1995 conviction, that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in

connection with a pre-trial motion to suppress. (See Order, filed Sept. 26, 2001.)

Petitioner next filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of the petition

on the merits, which motion the Court denied. (See Order, filed Jan. 25, 2002.) 

Additionally, petitioner sought a certificate of appealability, which both this Court and the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied. (See id. & Ninth Circuit Order, filed Sept. 19, 2002.) 

Thereafter, petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of the

petition on the merits, claiming false evidence of a “911” call had been introduced at his trial. 

The Court denied the motion, finding petitioner could have raised the claim in his original

petition. (See Order, filed Sept. 25, 2002.) 

More than six years later, on October 14, 2008, petitioner filed a third motion for

Case 3:01-cv-00453-MMC Document 38 Filed 03/11/10 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

reconsideration, in which he argued that the Court should reconsider its decision to dismiss

his claim collaterally challenging the validity of the 1985 conviction used to enhance the

sentence imposed for the 1995 conviction. Specifically, petitioner claimed that a petition he

had filed in the Northern District in 1987, which prior petition challenged the 1985

conviction and was denied on the merits, see Webster v. Myers, No. C 87-4949 WWS (PR),

had been altered by prison officials; additionally, petitioner argued, had this Court been

aware of such alteration, it would not have concluded petitioner’s sentence-enhancement

claim was foreclosed by Lackawanna, supra.

The Court, by order filed April 13, 2009, denied the motion for reconsideration, ruling

as follows:

Petitioner claims the Court should reconsider its dismissal of his claim that the

1985 conviction could not be used to enhance the sentence for his 1995

conviction. As noted, the Court dismissed petitioner’s attempt to collaterally

challenge the validity of the 1985 conviction under Lackawanna, for the reason

that petitioner was not claiming he had been denied the right to counsel with

respect to that conviction, the sole exception to the rule barring challenges to

prior convictions used to enhance current sentences. See Lackawanna, 532

U.S. at 404. None of the grounds asserted in the present motion for

reconsideration call the Court’s ruling into question. Specifically, petitioner

does not allege, nor is there anything in the record to suggest, that because of

the alleged alteration of his 1987 petition, the Court was precluded, at any time,

from considering a viable collateral challenge to the 1985 conviction under

Lackawanna. In particular, there is no showing that the alleged alteration of

the 1987 petition prevented petitioner from raising a collateral challenge to the

1985 conviction on grounds of the denial of the right to counsel.

(Order, filed April 13, 2009, at 5:10-22.)

In the instant request for a certificate of appealability, petitioner argues the Court erred

in denying reconsideration by not extending the Lackawanna exception to the circumstances

alleged by petitioner, specifically, the asserted alteration by prison officials of a petition

challenging a prior conviction, even where there is no showing petitioner had been prevented

from challenging the prior conviction on grounds of the denial of the right to counsel. 

A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

without first obtaining a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P.

22(b). A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where

Case 3:01-cv-00453-MMC Document 38 Filed 03/11/10 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Petitioner has not filed a request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and the

Court makes no determination as to whether such status should be granted.

4

a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to

satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The requirement that a certificate of

appealability be obtained applies to appeals of rulings on motions to reconsider. See

Langford v. Day, 134 F.3d 1381, 1382 (9th Cir. 1998). 

For the reasons discussed in the order dismissing petitioner’s sentence-enhancement

claim and in the order denying the October 14, 2008 motion to reconsider, the Court

concludes jurists of reason would not find the result debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, the request for a certificate of appealability is hereby DENIED, and

petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel is hereby DENIED, without prejudice to

petitioner’s renewing both the request and the motion in the Ninth Circuit.2

The Clerk shall forward this order, along with the case file, to the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals, see Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir.

1997), from which petitioner may seek an order for a certificate of appealability, see Fed. R.

App. P. 22(b)(1), and any other relief appropriate for its consideration 

This order terminates Docket No. 37.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 11, 2010 _________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

Case 3:01-cv-00453-MMC Document 38 Filed 03/11/10 Page 4 of 4