Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02661/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02661-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

Uoitcd States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cir~it 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

JUL 0 2 1989 

ROBERT .. !;! HOECKER· 

Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT 

GWENDOLYN c. HENRY and HILERY 

HENRY, JR., husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

MERCK AND COMPANY, INC., a New 

Jersey corporation and its 

wholly owned subdivision, KELCO, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Nos. 86-2659 

86-2661 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 85-268-C) 

Edwin w. Ash of Ash, Crew & Reid, Okmulgee, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Harry M. Crowe, Jr. of Crawford, Crowe & Bainbridge, P.A., Tulsa 

Oklahoma (C.T. Harrington, Merck & Company, Inc., San Diego, 

California, with him on the brief) for Defendants-Appellants. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 1 
Gwendolyn and Hilery Henry brought this diversity action in 

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Oklahoma against Merck & Company, Inc. and its wholly owned 

subsidiary Kelco (jointly referred to as "Kelco"). The complaint 

alleged that Kelco negligently stored sulfuric acid, and, as a 

result, Valerie Jones, one of Kelco's employees, stole the acid, 

removed it from Kelco's premises, and deliberately threw it in the 

face of Ms. Henry, causing serious injury. After a jury trial, 

the district court entered a judgment against Kelco of $450,000 

for Ms. Henry for her injuries and $35,000 for Mr. Henry for loss 

of consortium. we reverse. 

Kelco raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether Kelco had a 

duty to take action to prevent Ms. Jones' criminal acts; 

(2) whether the criminal acts of Ms. Jones were a supervening 

cause of Ms. Henry's injuries, relieving Kelco of liability; and . (3) whether the owner of a dangerous instrumentality is liable for 

injuries caused thereby after it passes from his control. Because 

of our disposition of this case on the issues of duty and 

causation, we need not address the third issue. 1 

Our review of the record convinces us that Kelco owed no duty 

to Gwendolyn and Hilery Henry to store its acid such that Ms. 

Jones could not have stolen it and used it in the subsequent 

assault. We also find that Ms. Jones' acts of stealing the acid 

and using it to injure Ms. Henry constituted a supervening cause 

1 The Henrys' counsel made it clear during oral argument that they 

seek recovery only on a negligence theory. Thus, however 

denominated, duty and causation are essential elements of the 

Henrys' case. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 2 
of Ms. Henry's injuries, and Kelco's storage of the acid was, at 

most, a condition to the injury rather than a proximate cause. 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court should have granted 

Kelco's motion for directed verdict. 

I. FACTS 

Kelco operates a chemical manufacturing plant at Okmulgee, 

Oklahoma, where it makes a product known as xanthan gum. Xanthan 

gum, a.thickener used in food products and oil well drilling 

fluids, is manufactured by a fermentation process that is 

constantly monitored by laboratory technicians. The technicians 

test and monitor the fermentation materials in a laboratory 

consisting of several rooms that occupy the entire third floor of 

one of the buildings at Kelco's plant site. All laboratory 

personnel have access to the entire laboratory. 

At the time of the incident at issue here, Kelco kept 

chemicals used in the laboratory under a ''fume hood," a storage 

facility fitted with ventilation and drainage equipment. The fume 

hood was not locked and was accessible to all laboratory 

personnel. 

Among the chemicals kept under the fume hood was a gallon 

bottle of 98% chromic sulfuric acid used for cleaning glassware in 

the laboratory. Sulfuric acid is produced in large quantities in 

the United States for use in fertilizer production, petroleum 

refining, metals processing, leather processing, and as 'battery 

acid. One of sulfuric acid's characteristics is its affinity to 

water, which allows it to be used as a dehydrating agent. That 

-3-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 3 
property makes sulfuric acid useful for commercial purposes, but 

also makes it hazardous to human flesh. Thus, although sulfuric 

acid is a stable product when used properly, its dehydrating 

effect can cause serious burn-like injuries to flesh. 

Valerie Jones, the sister-in-law of plaintiff Gwendolyn 

Henry, had worked for Kelco as a technician in its laboratory for 

approximately four and one-half years at the time of the 

occurrence that gave rise to this action. Ms. Jones was a good 

worker, scored highly on her employee evaluations, and got along 

well with h~r coworkers. There was no indication that she was 

anything other than a responsible adult. 

Although Ms. Jones did not use the sulfuric acid in the 

performance of her duties, she did have access to the fume hood 

because other chemicals she used on a daily basis were stored 

there. She was not required to travel away from the plant or to 

remove chemicals therefrom in the performance of her duties. 

On September 3, 1984, Ms. Jones stole a cupful of the 

concentrated sulfuric acid from the gallon bottle under the fume 

hood in Kelco's laboratory. 2 After work, she took the acid from 

Kelco's premises, drove to the Henrys' home and, after a brief 

verbal altercation, threw sulfuric acid in Ms. Henry's face.3 Ms. 

Henry suffered severe and permanent injuries from the sulfuric 

2 Whether the sulfuric acid was stolen from Kelco's laboratory.was 

a fact disputed at trial. For purposes of this opinion, we will 

assume that the acid was stolen from Kelco's laboratory. 

3 The altercation arose after Ms. Jones learned that Ms. Henry, 

who had been baby-sitting Ms. Jones' two year old son, trimmed his 

hair. Ms. Jones was convicted of the crime of maiming and was 

sentenced to serve seven years in the custody of the Department of 

Corrections of the State of Oklahoma. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 4 
acid. Ms. Henry has never been employed by Kelco, and Kelco had 

no prior relationship with her. 

The Henrys brought suit against Kelco under theories of 

strict liability and negligence. The district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Kelco on the strict liability claim, 

but allowed the negligence claim to go to the jury. After the 

Henrys' presentation of evidence, Kelco moved for a directed 

verdict on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to 

support their negligence claim. The district court denied Kelco's 

motion, finding that there was sufficient evidence to make it 

possible for reasonable minds to differ as to the conclusions to 

be drawn from the evidence. Kelco renewed its motion for a 

directed verdict on the same ground at the end of its case. The 

district court again overruled the motion and allowed the jury to 

render a verdict. The jury returned a verdict of $450,000 for Ms. 

Henry for her injuries, and $35,000 for Mr. Henry for loss of 

consortium. Kelco appeals from both judgments. 4 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Our standard of review in assessing whether the district 

court should have granted a directed verdict "is the same standard 

applied by the trial court in passing on a motion for directed 

verdict." Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enterprises, 774 F.2d 

380, 385 (10th Cir. 1985)·. "A directed verdict is justified only 

if the proof is all one way or so overwhelmingly preponderant in 

4 The Henry's have not appealed the summary judgment in favor of 

Kelco on the strict liability claim. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 5 
favor of the movant as to permit no other rational conclusion." 

McKinney v. Gannett Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 659, 663 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(citations omitted). 

III. NEGLIGENCE IN OKLAHOMA 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that three elements are 

essential to a prima facie case of negligence: 

(1) a duty owed by the defendant to protect the 

plaintiff from injury, (2) a failure to properly 

exercise or perform that duty and (3) the plaintiff's 

injuries are proximately caused by the defendant's 

failure to exercise his duty of care. 

McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 470 (Okla. 

1987) (citing Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 457 (Okla. 1986), and 

Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 263 (Okla. 

1982)). In this appeal, were are concerned with the first and 

third elements, duty and causation. 

A. DUTY 

The first issue is whether Kelco, under Oklahoma law, owes a 

duty to an unrelated injured party to store its sulfuric acid in a 

careful way so as to deter the theft and subsequent use of the 

acid in a criminal manner to injure the third party. 

The existence of a duty is an essential element of a 

neglig~nce claim; without it the claim must fail. As the Oklahoma 

Supreme Court said in Nicholson v. Tacker, 512 P.2d 156, 158 

(Okla. 1973): 

It is an established rule of law that there can be 

no actionable negligence where the defendant has 

breached no duty owed to the plaintiff. Just because 

the defendant has created a risk which harmed the 

-6-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 6 
plaintiff that does not mean that, in the absence of 

some duty to the plaintiff, the defendant will be held 

liable. 

Whether a duty exists is a legal question to be determined by 

the court. Brown v. C.H. Guernsey & Co., 533 P.2d 1009, 1013 

(Okla. App. 1973). If no duty exists, there is nothing for the 

jury to decide, and a directed verdict must be granted in favor of 

the defendant. Hunter Constr. Co. v. Watson, 274 P.2d 374, 377 

(Okla. 1953). Thus, as a matter of law, even if Kelco carelessly 

stored the acid, and that carelessness facilitated Ms. Jones' 

violent act against Ms. Henry, Kelco is entitled to a directed 

verdict if it owed no duty to Ms. Henry to prevent the injury. 

The general rule is that, absent special circumstances, no 

duty is imposed on a party to anticipate and prevent the 

intentional or criminal acts of a third party. Oklahoma follows 

that rule. Joyce v. M & M Gas Co., 672 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Okla. 

1983). In Joyce, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a motorist 

who left the keys in his truck when it was parked outside his 

house did not owe a duty to an unrelated victim who was injured 

when a thief stole the truck and negligently ran into the victim. 

In so holding, the court said that the victim failed to 

demonstrate "special circumstances" that created in the motorist a 

duty to prevent the acts of the thief. Id. at 1174. 

Oklahoma recognizes only two types of special circumstances 

that create a duty to anticipate and prevent the acts of a third 

party: (1) "where the actor is under a special responsibility 

toward the one who suffers the harm"; and (2) "where the actor's 

own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a 

-7-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 7 
recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct, 

which a reasonable man would have taken into accounti" Joyce, 672 

P.2d at 1174.5 

1. DUTY ARISING FROM A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY 

A special responsibility may arise from a relationship with 

the victim coupled with a foreseeability of the specific risk to 

the victim. An example of a relationship that might give rise to 

a duty to anticipate and prevent the acts of third party is a 

landlord-tenant relationship. See Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455 

(Okla. 1986). In Lay, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a 

tenant stated a cause of action for negligence against her 

landlord when she alleged that she was raped by an intruder who 

gained access through a door that was secured by a defective lock, 

that the landlord knew that the lock was defective before the 

assault and had been requested to fix it, and that the landlord 

was aware that there had been prior rapes in the same apartment 

complex. The court held that the landlord's knowledge of the 

dangerous condition created a duty on his part to protect the 

tenant: 

5 Other states recognize a duty to protect third persons arising 

from a special relationship between the actor and the party who 

actually harms the third party. ~' Tarasoff v. Regents of 

Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 529 P.2d 553, 

559 (1974) (psychiatrist had duty to warn victim of patient's 

specific, articulated intent to kill her). But see Brady v. 

Hopper, 751 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1984) (psychiatrist had no 

duty to warn victim of presidential assassination attempt where 

psychiatrist had no knowledge of the patient's specific threat to 

a specific victim); Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950, 954 

(10th Cir. 1984) (physician had no duty to warn third parties of 

an infectious disease contracted by one of his patients). 

-8-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 8 
The act of a third person in committing an 

intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm 

to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's 

negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an 

opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or 

crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent 

conduct knew or should have realized the likelihood that 

such a situation might be created and that a third party 

might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a 

tort or crime. 

Id. at 458 (emphasis added; quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§ 448 (1965)). 

Here, Ms. Henry was not injured on Kelco's property. Nor did 

she have any relationship with Kelco prior to the injury'. Indeed, 

Kelco had no knowledge of Ms. Henry or that she might be harmed as 

a result of Kelco's storage of the acid. Therefore, we conclude 

that, under Oklahoma law, Kelco did not have a special 

relationship with Ms. Henry that gave rise to a duty to protect 

her from the criminal acts of Ms. Jones. 

2. DUTY ARISING FROM THE DEFENDANT'S OWN ACTS 

WHICH CREATE A RECOGNIZABLE HIGH DEGREE OF RISK 

Special circumstances that create a duty to protect injured 

parties may also arise when the defendant's own acts create a 

recognizable high degree of risk to another. Joyce v. M & M Gas 

Co., 672 P.2d 1172, 1174 (Okla. 1983). In Joyce, the court 

concluded that the driver of a truck that was stolen "owed no duty 

to the general public to protect its members from the risk of 

negligent driving of the thief'' because the "the tragic events 

which followed were not a danger reasonably to be anticipated and 

guarded against." 672 P.2d 1173, 1174. See also Felty v. City of 

Lawton, 578 P.2d 757, 762 (Okla. 1977) (police officer who left 

-9-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 9 
squad car running did not owe a duty to the victim when a thief 

stole the car and ran into the victim because "no 'special 

circumstances' existed that would impose an additional duty on the 

part of the defendant to prevent the actions of third persons"). 

The court in Felty observed that although certain acts of a 

third party may be foreseeable, criminal acts generally are less 

foreseeable than negligent or intentional (but legal) acts: 

[A]n act or omission may be negligent if the actor 

realizes or should realize that it involves an 

unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct 

of the other or a third person which is intended to 

cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal .••• 

Normally the actor has much less reason to anticipate 

intentional misconduct than he has to anticipate 

negligence, particularly where the intentional conduct 

is a crime, since under ordinary circumstances it may r~asonably be assumed that no one will violate the 

criminal law. 

Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 302B comment d).6 

Here, Ms. Jones was a model employee at all times prior to 

her theft of the acid, and Kelco had no reason to know of her 

criminal propensities or her intention to harm Ms. Henry.7 

Furthermore, sulfuric acid is readily available in the 

marketplace8 and there was no testimony that sulfuric acid is 

6 The court mentioned that "[s]pecial circumstances in which the 

negligent operation of a vehicle may be foreseeable include 

leaving the vehicle in a neighborhood populated by drunks or in 

front of a school where it may be stolen by children." Joyce, 672 

P.2d at 1173 n.2 (citing Felty). 

7 Kelco's personnel manager, who was well acquainted with Ms. 

Jones, testified that "[s]he was a good worker; her absentee 

record was very good; she got along well with her coworkers as 

well as any of us." Tr. Vol. III at 342. See also Tr. Vol. III . ·at 349, 351, 352. 

8 Kelco's expert witness .gave the following testimony concerning the availability of sulfuric acid: 

[continued on next page •.. ] 

-10-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 10 
conunonly subject to theft or that it is commonly used as a 

weapon.9 Thus, even if Kelco should have been aware that someone 

might steal the acid, it was unforeseeable that the thief would 

use it as a weapon or that it would be used specifically against 

Ms. Henry. 

[ ••• coninued from previous page] 

A. The chemical known as sulfuric acid is what we 

refer [to] as the work horse chemical in th~ industry. 

In the United States there is no greater chemical 

product -- when I say greater I mean in quantity. There 

is no more abundance, no greater quantity of any other 

chemical that will match the production of sulfuric 

acid. 

. . . . Q. Sulfuric acid also used in -- does it have very 

general application by the public? 

A. Yes, it is commonly used by the public. 

Q. In what way? 

A. It is found in every automobile battery. It is 

found sometimes in small concentrations in drain 

cleaners around the house. 

. . Q. Well, Dr. Crynes, is chromic sulfuric acid a 

conunodity that is in common usage? · 

A. It is in common usage. You probably could find it 

in nearly every high school chemistry laboratory and 

every college or university laboratory. You could 

probably find it in any industrial laboratory where 

there is the necessity to clean glassware, or the 

laboratory, nonporous laboratory ware. 

Tr. Vol. III at 286-87, 290-91. 

9 The Henrys' expert witness testified that valuable and materials 

conunonly used as weapons are subject to theft, but there was no 

evidence that common chemicals like sulfuric acid are likely to be 

stolen, much less used as a weapon. See Tr. Vol. II at 99. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 11 
We conclude that under Oklahoma law there were no special 

circumstances arising from either a special relationship or the 

foreseeability of the harm that imposed a duty upon Kelco to 

prevent Ms. Jones from stealing the acid and throwing it on Ms. 

Henry. Therefore, the district court should have granted Kelco's 

motion for directed verdict. 

B. CAUSATION 

We also conclude that the district court should have granted 

Kelco's motion for directed verdict on the alternate ground that 

Ms. Jones' theft and criminal use of the acid constituted a 

supervening cause of Ms. Henry's injuries. Thus even if Kelco was 

careless in the storage of the acid, Kelco's actions were not the 

proximate cause of _Ms. Henry's injuries, and Kelco cannot be held 

accountable to Ms. Henry ·or her husband. 

The law in Oklahoma is clear that before a defendant will be 

liable for a plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff must prove that 

his injuries resulted directly and proximately from the 

defendant's carelessness. Woodward v. Kinchen, 446 P.2d 375, 377 

(Okla. ·1968). The law does not charge a person with all possible 

consequences of his acts. Rather, the law ignores the remote 

cause and looks for the proximate cause of the injury. 

"The proximate cause of an event must be that which in a 

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an independent cause, 

produces the event and without which the event would not have 

occurred." Gaines v. Providence Apartments, 750 P.2d 125, 126-27 

(Okla. 1987) (citing Beesley v. United States, 364 F.2d 194 (10th 

-12-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 12 
Cir. 1966) and cases cited there). "Where the negligence 

complained of only creates a condition which thereafter reacts 

with a subsequent, independent, unforeseeable, distinct agency and. 

produces an injury, the original negligence is the remote rather 

than the proximate cause thereof." Gaines, 750 P.2d at 127. 

"This is held to be true though the injury would not have occurred 

except for the original act." Beesley, 364 F.2d at 196 (citing 

Oklahoma cases). 

Generally, the question of proximate cause is one of fact for 

the jury. Bannister v. Town of Noble, Okla., 812 F.2d 1265, 1267 

(10th Cir. 1987) (citing Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 652 

P.2d 260, 263 (Okla. 1982)). However, the question becomes an 

issue of law when there is no evidence from which a jury could 

reason~bly find the required proximate, causal nexus between the 

careless act and the resulting injuries. Bannister, 812 F.2d at 

1267 (citing Smith v. Davis, 430 P.2d 799, 800 (Okla. 1967)). In 

that circumstance, it is for the court to determine as· a matter of 

law whether intervening factors broke the causal nexus between the 

original actor's careless behavior and the resulting injury. 

Thompson, 652 P.2d at 264; Merchants Delivery Service, Inc. v. Joe 

Esco Tire Co., 533 P.2d 601, 604 (Okla. 1975). 

An intervening factor sufficient to break the causal nexus is 

a supervening cause. 10 When an intervening cause is found to be 

lO Oklahoma courts refer to an intervening cause that cuts off the 

original tortfeasor's liability as ''supervening." Other 

jurisdictions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts §440 (1965) 

use the term "superseding" to refer to the same concept. Because 

our decision rests on Oklahoma law, we will use Oklahoma's 

terminology in this opinion. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 13 
supervening, "the original negligence may be said to undergo a 

legal metamorphosis into a remote cause or 'mere condition.'" 

Thompson, 652 P.2d at 264 .• 

Under Oklahoma law, for an intervening act to be deemed a 

supervening cause, it must meet a three-prong test: "it must be 

(l) independent of the original act, (2) adequate of itself to 

bring about the result and (3) one whose occurrence was not 

reasonably foreseeable." Strong v. Allen, 768 P.2d 369, 371 

(Okla. 1989) (quoting Thompson, 652 P.2d at 264); see also Minor 

v. Zidell Trust, 618 P.2d 392, 394 (Okla. 1980). 

An act is independent when it is not logically compelled by, 

and does not naturally flow from, the original carelessness. 

Independence does not necessarily imply absence of some linkage 

between the two acts; rather, it means that the intervening act is 

neither invited by nor an ordinary response to the original act. 

When the intervening act is intentionally tortious or criminal, it 

is more likely to be considered independent. Cf. Restatement 

(Second) of Torts§ 302B, comment d (1965). Here, the original 

act of carelessness was Kelco's storing the acid where it was 

accessible to all laboratory employees. While the availability of 

the acid may have made the theft easier, it did not logically 

compel the theft, nor was the theft an ordinary response to the 

storage of the acid in the fume hood. Ms. Jones' own acts were 

independent of Kelco's storage of the acid. Furthermore, Ms. 

Jones' subsequent criminal use of the acid, which was the 

immediate cause of the injury, was certainly not logically 

-14-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 14 
compelled by, nor did it naturally flow from, Kelco's careless 

storage of the acid. 

The second element of a supervening cause is that the 

intervening act must be adequate in itself to bring about the 

injury. Here, although Kelco's actions facilitated Ms. Jones' 

acquisition of a weapon, it was Ms. Jones' own actions, and not 

Kelco's, that directly caused the injury. 

The third element of a supe~vening cause is that the 

intervening act must not be reasonably foreseeable. Indeed, 

foreseeability is the standard by which proximate cause, as 

distinguished from the existence of a mere condition, is to be 

tested. Atherton v. Devine, 602 P.2d 634, 636 (Okla. 1979). We 

find no evidence in this case that could support a finding that 

Kelco could reasonably have foreseen that Ms. Jones would steal 

the acid and use it as a weapon. Ms. Jones was a model employee 

who never gave any indication of criminal propensities, and there 

was no showing that acid was the sort of material that would 

typically be subject to theft or used as a weapon. 11 

Although the precise factual circumstances in the case before 

us have not been addressed by the Oklahoma courts, we find the 

case of Joyce v. M & M Gas Co., 672 P.2d 1172 (Okla. 1983), to be 

dispositive. In Joyce, one of the defendant's employees left the 

ignition key inside a truck belonging to the defendant. A third 

party stole the truck, drove it through a red light, and collided 

with the victim. The issue addressed by Supreme Court of Oklahoma 

was whether leaving the ignition key inside the truck was an act 

ll See notes 7 and 9. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 15 
of carelessness that would constitute the proximate cause of the 

plaintiff's injuries. Citing two previous Oklahoma cases, 

Merchants Delivery Service, Inc. v. Joe Esco Tire Co., 533 P.2d 

601 (Okla. 1975), and Felty v. City of Lawton, 578 P.2d 757 (Okla. 

1977), the court found that the actions complained of merely 

created a condition permitting the subsequent injury but that it 

did not constitute a proximate cause. Joyce, 672 P.2d at 1173. 12 

Reviewing the case before us in light of the Joyce decision, 

we find that Ms. Jones' acts constituted a supervening cause of 

Ms. Henry's injures. Ms. Jones' theft of the acid was at least as 

independent as the theft of the automobile. Likewise, the act of 

throwing the acid was as adequate to create the injury as the 

running of the automobile through the red light. Moreover, 

Jones' criminal acts were no more foreseeable than the theft anq 

negligent driving of an automobile. Indeed, the acts here are 

even less foreseeable than the acts in Joyce. The thief in Joyce 

used the vehicle for driving, the purpose for which vehicles are 

intended. Ms. Jones, on the other hand, did not use acid for its 

intended purpose; she used it as a weapon. In addition, the thief 

in Joyce merely drove the car negligently, which is more 

foreseeable than an intentional misuse such as Ms. Jones' criminal 

12 See also Woodward v. Kinchen, 446 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1968), where 

the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a defendant, who had stopped 

his car in the middle of ·a dirt road to carry on a conversation 

with the driver of another vehicle was not liable for the injuries 

to a passenger in his car when it was hit by another car that was 

illegally backing down the road. The court said that the 

defendant's careless (and illegal) behavior was a mere "condition" 

rather than a proximate cause of the accident. Id. at 378. But 

see Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 458 (Okla. 1986) (landlord held 

liable to a tenant who was raped when landlord knew of prior rapes 

and of tenant's defective lock, which landlord failed to repair). 

-16-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 16 
act throwing the acid on Ms. Henry. A fortiori, Kelco's careless 

storage of the acid was a mere condition rather than a proximate 

cause, and Ms. Jones' criminal acts were a supervening cause of 

Ms. Henry's injuries.13 

Moreover, we believe that Oklahoma's application of the 

supervening cause doctrine would follow the analysis of the 

Nebraska Supreme Court in Shelton v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 

Neb., 211 Neb. 82Q, 320 N.W.2d 748 (Neb. 1982). In Shelton, a 

former employee of the defendants stole poison from the 

defendants' laboratory where he worked. Although his duties did 

not include working with the poison, he had access to it in the 

laboratory. After the employee left the defendants' employment, 

he broke into two homes and poisoned the victims' beverages with 

the poison that he had previously stolen from the defendants. The 

representatives of the victims' estates brought suit against the 

defendants for negligence in failing to control access to the 

poison. In ruling for the defendants, the court held that even 

though the former employee had been in prison for attempted murder 

with a shotgun prior to the time he was hired by defendants, they 

13 The case before us is distinguishable from the dram shop cases 

which impose liability on the seller of intoxicating liquors to a 

noticeably intoxicated buyer and a third party is injured as a 

result of the intoxication of the buyer. Dram shop laws are sui 

generis creatures of statute or common law to protect a public 

interest. Moreover, from an analytical perspective, the 

intoxication of the buyer of the liquor cannot be said to be 

independent of the careless act of the seller in selling liquor to 

an obviously drunk buyer, nor can the subsequent negligence of the 

intoxicated buyer in driving while under the influence be said to 

be unforeseeable to the seller. See Brigance v. Velvet Dove 

Restaurant, 725 P.2d 300, 304 (Okla. 1986). 

-17-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 17 
neither knew nor reasonably should have known that he was likely 

to steal poison and kill people with it. Id. at 753. 

The Nebraska court adopted a common-sense approach to 

employers' liability for the theft and violent use of their 

possessions: 

Every place of employment offers an employee the 

opportunity to find some item which, if stolen and 

improperly used, can cause another harm. Shall we hold 

an off ice employer liable if a secretary steals a pair 

of shears and stabs another? Shall we hold a grocery 

employer liable if one of its stockpersons steals rat 

poison and injures another? Shall we hold an automotive 

employer liable if one of its mechanics steals a tire 

iron and causes injury to another? we do not believe 

the law goes that far. In each case the unlawful acts 

of the employee must be considered to be an efficient 

intervening cause, else every employer becomes an 

insurer to the public generally. 

Id. at 754. Our review of Oklahoma law persuades us that 

Oklahoma courts would endorse the reasoned view of the 

Nebraska Supreme Court. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Kelco had no 

duty to Ms. Henry to anticipate and prevent Ms. Jones' 

criminal acts of stealing the acid and throwing it on Ms. 

Henry, and that Ms. Jones' criminal acts of stealing the acid 

and using it as a weapon constituted a supervening cause of 

Ms. Henry's injuries. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment 

of the district court and remand with instructions to direct 

a verdict in favor of Kelco. 

-18-

Appellate Case: 86-2661 Document: 01019569325 Date Filed: 07/03/1989 Page: 18