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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED a1s 

U 'ted States Court~£ Appe o1 c· .. i enth trOll" 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ~J'R 8 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TERTII CIRCUIT 

ANTHANASIOS G. DALLIS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

TOMMY MARTIN, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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No. 90-6331 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. RO. CIV-88-1847-P) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS: 

Anthanasios G. Dallis, Big Spring Texas, Pro Se Appellant. 

Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney, and Debra A. Woods, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorneys for Appellee. 

Before ARDERSOR, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges • 

ARDERSOR, Circuit Judge. 

Petitioner, A. G. Dallis, a federal prisoner, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2241, challenging a United States Parole Commission decision. The district 

court dismissed the petition. We affir.m. 1 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-6331 Document: 01019298333 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 1 
On August 17, 1987, Dallis was sentenced to a five-year 

suspended sentence for conspiracy to bomb, and two ten-year 

consecutive terms of imprisonment for malicious destruction of a 

building and unlawfully making a firearm. The Parole Commission 

assigned an offense behavior category of seven-which resulted in a 

parole guideline range of 52 to 80 months. It also "aggregated 

[Callis's] two ten-year sentences and determined that he would not 

be eligible for parole until he had served 80 months or one-third 

of his aggregate sentence." Memorandum Qpinion at 2 (September 

27, 1990) ("Opinion"). Thereafter, Callis received a notice of 

action dated April 12, 1988, that he was continued to a presumptive parole after serving 80 months. 

Callis challenged this-agency action in district court. He 

raised two grounds in his action for habeas c·orpus relief. First, 

he argued that the Parole Commission should have calculated his 

offense behavior as category five which would have resulted in a 

guideline range of 24 to 36 months. Second, he argued that he is 

eligible for parole consideration after the service of 40 months 

because "the penalty provision for his [C]ount 3 conviction [made] 

him immediately eligible for parole consideration as to that 

[C]ount." Opinion at 2-3. The district court determined that: 

(1) under the Count 3 penalty provision, Callis must serve onethird of his sentence before parole consideration; and, (2) the 

Parole Commission properly aggregated Callis's two ten-year 

sentences. Consequently, it decided that the Parole Commission 

correctly computed Callis's parole eligibility date and it 

dismissed Callis's petition. Because a lower offense severity 

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Appellate Case: 90-6331 Document: 01019298333 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 2 
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would not change this result, the district court did not address 

the merits of Dallis's f.irst ground. On appeal, Dallis raises 

both grounds again. First, we address the question of Dallis's 

parole eligibility date. 

Appellant·- and Appellee . agree that pursuant to 18 U.S. C. 

S 4205(a) and (b) (1988), because the sentencing court "did not 

exercise its power to set a parole eligibility date, 18 u.s.c. 

S 4205(a) applies." Appellee's Brief at 4. Pursuant to 

18 u.s.c. S 4205(a) (1988), "a prisoner shall be eligible for 

release on parole after serving one-third of [his] ter.m •• • I 

except to the extent otherwise provided by law." 2 Prior to an 

amendment enacted on October 12, 1984, the penalty statute under 

which Dallis received his Count 3 sentence, 26 u.s.c. S 5871 

(1988), provided such an exception. 

The amendment to 26 u.s.c. S 5871 deleted language that 

allowed the Parole Commission to consider parole at its discretion 

so that it now reads: 

Any person who violates or fails to comply with any 

provision of this chapter shall, upon conviction, • • • 

be imprisoned not more that ten years • • • • 

26 u.s.c. S 5871 (1988). Prior to passage of that amendment, 

however, the statute continued, "and shall become eligible for 

parole as the Board of Parole shall deter.mine." Sentencing Refor.m 

Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, S 227, 98 Stat. 1937, 2030 

("Sec. 227 amendment"). 

2 18 u.s.c. SS 4201-4218 (1988), repealed by Sentencing Refor.m 

Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, S 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 1937, 2027, 

apply for five years after November 1, 1987, to individuals who 

committed offenses prior to November 1, 1987. 18 u.s.c. SS 4201-

4218 (1988). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6331 Document: 01019298333 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 3 
Dallis asserts that the amended statute became effective on 

November 1, 1987, after he was sentenced and well after he committed his offenses. Therefore, he argues the prior statute applies 

to his Count 3 sentence and the Parole Commission had the discretion to immediately consider h~ for parole as .to.that Count. The 

district court decided that the Sec. 227 amendment was effective 

on October 12, 1984, prior to when Dallis committed his offenses, 

and so applied to his Count 3 sentence. 

I. 

Ordinarily, "'judicial review' of [a] Parole Commission 

action is • • • whether the decision of the Commission is 

arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Resnick v. 

United States Parole Comm'n·, 835 F.2d 1297, 1301 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

In this case, however, Dallis's parole eligibility date depends on 

a question of law: What was the effective date of the particular 

Sentencing Reform Act section that amended the Count 3 penalty 

statute? We review this question de novo. 

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA") was passed as 

Chapter II of the Comprehensive Cr~e Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 

No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 ("CCCA"). In Romano v. Luther, 816 F.2d 

832, 834 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit explained that the 

CCCA "is an amalgamation of various bills originally drafted in 

the expectation of being enacted independently of other bills 

• • [which] contains 23 chapters, each making changes in a 

different area of federal criminal law." The Sentencing Reform 

Act "creates the new system of determinate sentences to be ~posed 

under sentencing guidelines ••• and abolishes parole." Id. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6331 Document: 01019298333 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 4 
Sentencing Reform Act, Sec. 235 "establishes a uniform effective date for most provisions of . the [SRA,] provides for 

certain exceptions to the uniform effective date, and contains 

special provisions related to the transition from the current 

system of sentencing-to the new system. Id. at 835. 3 Subsection 

235(a)(l) provided that the Sentencing Reform Act, with some 

exceptions, "shall take effect on the first day of the first 

calendar month beginning twenty-four months after the date of enactment." Subsequently, Congress changed this period to thirtysix months. Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 

99-217, S 4, 99 Stat. 1728, 1728. Therefore, most of the Sentencing Reform Act took effect on November 1, 1987. To effect a 

smooth transition between the parole system and the new determinate sentencing system, however, certain parts of the Sentencing 

Reform Act necessarily became effective upon enactment of the CCCA 

4 on October 12, 1984. 

3 As a whole, the CCCA had no effective date prov~s~on and so 

it became effective upon enactment, "except to the extent that 

specific provisions of the CCCA otherwise provide." Romano v. 

Luther, 816 F.2d at 837. 

4 See, ~' Norwood v. Brennan, 891 F.2d 179, 181-82 (7th Cir. 

1989) ("SRA transition provisions [including] S 235 were effective ~ediately"); Romano v. Luther, 816 F.2d at 839 (CCCA Ch. II, 

S 235(b)(3), the "winding up" provision, takes effect on October 

12, 1984). 

Other parts of the CCCA such as the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 

Pub. L. No. 98-473, SS 202, 203, 98 Stat. 1976, 1976 (codified as 

amended at 18 u.s.c. SS 3141- 3150 (1988)), also became effective 

on October 12, 1984. United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 948 

(lOth Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 

686-87 (9th Cir. 1986) (CCCA amendments to 18 u.s.c. S 3731 (1988) 

became effective October 12, 1984). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6331 Document: 01019298333 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 5 
When the CCCA was enacted on October 12, 1984, 

Sec. 235(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV) stated: "the provisions of sectio[n] 

227 ••• [which amended 26 u.s.c. S 5871 by deleting the 

discretionary provision,] shall take effect on the date of enactment." Even though in 1986 this section was amended to replace 

part IV with language specifying when the SRA Sec. 212(a)(2) 5 

would take effect, we agree with the district court that the later 

amendment to Sec. 235 which deleted reference to Sec. 227 did not 

repeal Sec. 227. The district court explained: 

[T]he legislative history of the amendments to Public 

Law 98-473 does not indicate any express intention to 

repeal S 227, [and] ••• this Court will not interpret 

S 227 to be repealed by implication. Further, the 

amendment to 26 u.s.c. S 5871 had already been in effect 

for two years prior to the 1986 amendment, and therefore, there was no reason to mention S 227 in the 

subsequent amendments, unless Congress intended to 

change it. 

Opinion at 8 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 u.s. 114, 

122 (1979)); ~also United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 933, 934 

(lOth Cir. 1988) ("Courts are reluctant to find repeal by implication even when a later statute is not entirely harmonious with an 

earlier one • unless the text of legislative history of the 

later statute shows that Congress intended to repeal the earlier 

and simply failed to do so expressly.") (citing Watts v. Alaska, 

451 u.s. 259, 266-67 (1981)). The 1986 amendment to 

Sec. 235(a)(l)(B)(ii)(IV) merely "add[ed] a fourth event that must 

5 Criminal Law and Procedures Technical Amendments Act of 1986, 

Pub. L. No. 99-646, S 35, 100 Stat. 3592, 3599. The Sentencing 

Reform Act, Sec. 212(a), repeals certain United States Code Title 

18 sections and substitutes new chapters to effect the new 

Sentencing Reform Act, codified as amended at 18 u.s.c. SS 3551-

3559 ( 1988). 

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precede the effectiveness of the sentencing guidelines -- section 

212(a)(2) of the Crime Control Act taking effect." Romano v. 

Luther, 816 F.2d at 836 n.4. It did not change the effective date 

of the Sec. 227 amendment to 26 u.s.c. S 5571 which expressly 

became effective upon enactment two years earlier. The district 

court correctly determined that the Sec. 227 amendment was effective on October 12, 1984. 

The district court also noted that although the 1985 version 

of 28 C.F.R. S 2.2(d) was in conflict with the then recently 

amended 26 u.s.c. S 5871 (1988), in 1988 the regulation was 

amended to be consistent with the statute. As amended it also 

deletes the discretionary release of inmates who commit offenses 

on or after October 12, 1984, and requires completion of one-third 

of a sentence term before the Parole Commission may consider 

parole. 6 28 C.F.R. S 2.2(d) (1990). 

Because we also agree that the Parole commission properly 

aggregated Dallis's two ten-year sentences to determine an 

80-month parole eligibility from a twenty-year base, 7 we hold that 

6 Naturally, a regulation may be out of step with a statute it 

is intended to enforce for a period after the statute is amended 

and before the corresponding regulation is likewise amended. Even 

if the regulations which were temporarily out-of-step with the 

statute applied, as Appellee notes "offenders have fair warning 

that the guidelines governing parole determinations are subject to 

change and a prisoner does not have any expectation of a particular parole system." Appellee's Brief at 9-10; see Greenholtz v. 

Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 u.s. 1, 7 

(1979); Yamamoto v. United States Parole Comm'n, 794 F.2d 1295, 

1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1986); Inglese v. United States Parole Comm'n, 

768 F.2d 932, 940 (7th Cir. 1985); Solomon v. Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 

284 (7th Cir. 1982). 

7 Goode v. Markley, 603 F.2d 973, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1979) cert. 

denied, 444 u.s. 1083 (1980); Walker v. J.C. Taylor, 338 F.2d 945, 

945-46 (lOth Cir. 1964). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6331 Document: 01019298333 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 7 
the Parole Commission correctly computed Dallis's parole 

eligibility. 

We need not address Dallis's other issue on appeal that the 

Parole Commission miscalculated his offense behavior rating. It 

is a well-settled general rule that "a federal appellate court 

does not consider an issue not passed upon below." Pell v. Azar 

Nut Co., 711 F.2d 949, 950 (lOth Cir. 1983) (quoting Singleton v. 

Wulff, 428 u.s. 106, 120 (1976)). Although a court might bend 

this rule in the interest of fairness to avoid injustice or if 

"the proper resolution is beyond any doubt," id. (quoting 

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 u.s. at 121), the Parole Commission correctly computed Dallis's parole eligibility date. Therefore, it 

is not unfair for us to refuse to review his offense severity 

rating because: 

even ~f the Commission were to rate his offense in a 

lower category, with corresponding lower guideline, he 

still would not be eligible for release until he had 

served 80-months. . •. [A]ssigning him a lower offense 

severity would not change his release date. 

Appellee's Brief at 10. 

In sum, the amended penalty statute applies to Dallis's Count 

3 sentence. Pursuant to this statute, the Parole Commission correctly computed Dallis's parole eligibility date. The district 

court, therefore, properly dismissed Dallis's petition for habeas 

corpus relief. 

We AFFIRM. 

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