Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00965/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00965-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY MABRY, Civil No. 08cv965 BEN (LSP)

Petitioner, ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION DISMISSING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

v.

L.E. SCRIBNER, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner Tony Mabry has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 (“Petition”). Magistrate Judge Leo S. Papas issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”),

recommending the Petition be dismissed. For the reasons that follow, the Report and

Recommendation is ADOPTED, and the Petition is DISMISSED. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) provides: “A judge of the [district] court shall make a de

novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Thus, the governing statute “makes it

clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original) (“Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a

district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept

as correct.”); Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) ( “Of course, de novo

review of a [Report] is only required when an objection is made to the [Report].” ). Mabry has filed

Objections.

Case 3:08-cv-00965-BEN-LSP Document 25 Filed 11/21/08 Page 1 of 3
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Because Mabry filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), its provisions apply. Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d

1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 207 (2003)). AEDPA

imposes a one-year statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)), an exhaustion requirement (28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)), and a bar for successive petitions (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)). Each of these

requirements presents an obstacle to Mabry’s request for habeas relief.

Mabry was convicted of first degree murder in 1993 and sentenced to an indeterminate term

of 25 years to life in prison, plus 17 years. The gist of his claim is that the California Department of

Corrections is not correctly computing the date for his parole and that it has illegally amended the

abstract of judgment for his conviction – most recently on December 15, 1999. 

If Mabry is challenging his 1993 sentence, then the Recommendation is correct that the

Petition is barred by the statute of limitations. Mabry states in his Objections, however, that he is

not challenging his conviction and original sentence. Instead he is challenging the computation and

amendment of the documents reflecting his sentence. Even so, with the last amendment of his

sentencing documents having occurred in 1999, the current Petition, having been filed nine years

later, is barred by the statute of limitations.

Moreover, the Recommendation is correct that Mabry has not yet presented his claim for

relief to California’s highest court. As a result he has not yet exhausted his state remedies and is not

entitled to federal habeas relief. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 426 U.S. 838, 844 (1999).

Finally, the current Petition is the second petition for relief Mabry has filed this year. 

Previously, Petitioner raised similar claims in this Court in Mabry v. Scribner, Case No. 08cv467 JM

(AJB). That Petition was dismissed on April 28, 2008 for failure to exhaust state remedies. He may

not present a second or successive petition on similar claims without first obtaining permission from

the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). In this case, Mabry has not obtained

authorization for the filing of this successive Petition and therefore it must be dismissed according to

§ 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under §2254

that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”). Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524,

530 (2005) (Section 2244 imposes requirements on second or successive habeas petitions).

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Accordingly, in view of the statute of limitations, the exhaustion requirement, and the

successive petition bar, the Objections are overruled and the Report and Recommendation

recommending that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be dismissed is ADOPTED. The

Petition is DISMISSED. All other pending motions are denied as moot. The Clerk shall close the

file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 21, 2008 ______________________________

ROGER T. BENITEZ

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00965-BEN-LSP Document 25 Filed 11/21/08 Page 3 of 3