Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01873/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01873-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 462
Nature of Suit: Naturalization, Petition For Hearing of Denial
Cause of Action: Review of denial of an application for naturalization

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HASAN SHEIKH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LORETTA LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.

Defendants. 

Case No. 15-cv-01873-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 17 

Pending before the court is the government’s motion to dismiss plaintiff Hassan Sheikh’s 

second amended complaint seeking judicial review of the United States Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (“USCIS”)’s decision to deny his application for naturalization under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The government principally argues that Sheikh failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies. (Dkt. No. 17.) Sheikh opposes, arguing further 

administrative appeal would be futile due to a purported conflict between an applicable regulation 

and its governing statute. (Dkt. No. 18.) 

Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, oral 

argument at the October 20, 2015 hearing, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby 

GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES the action WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

I. BACKGROUND

On February 17, 2015, the San Francisco branch of USCIS denied Sheikh’s application for 

naturalization. (Dkt. No. 14, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 1.)1

 Sheikh is a citizen and 

national of Pakistan lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. (Id. ¶ 2.) He 

 1

 For purposes of this motion, the allegations in the complaint are taken as true. See 

Colony Cove Props. v. City of Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011) 

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filed his Form N-400 application for naturalization on October 21, 2014. (Id. ¶ 9.) A letter from 

USCIS to Sheikh attached to Sheikh’s SAC states that his application for naturalization was 

denied because, among other reasons, he disrupted his continuity of residence during the five years 

preceding the filing date of his application with a trip to Pakistan from March 3, 2013 to 

September 3, 2013. (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 2; see also SAC ¶ 16.) Further, the letter states that the trip 

from March 3, 2013 to September 3, 2013 constituted an absence from the United States of “183 

days.” (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 2). 

Sheikh timely filed a complaint invoking the Court’s jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), 

which governs judicial review of denied naturalization applications. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A party seeking dismissal of a claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 

Rule 12(b)(1) may make a facial challenge resting on the allegations of the complaint, or may 

point to evidence beyond the pleadings. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 

This motion constitutes a facial challenge. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may 

consider “allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters 

properly subject to judicial notice.” Colony Cove Props. v. City of Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and the issue of lack of jurisdiction can be 

raised at any time by either party or the court. See Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer 

Products, Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594–95 (9th Cir. 1996). Because federal courts are presumed to lack 

subject matter jurisdiction, the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that 

subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Vacek v. United States Postal Service, 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 

(9th Cir. 2006). A motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be 

brought as a 12(b)(1) motion. See, e.g. Benson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 1207, 

1211 (9th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives the Court 

of subject matter jurisdiction when the governing statute mandates exhaustion. See Puga v. 

Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Framework 

When an initial application for naturalization has been denied, the applicant may request 

review of the decision before an immigration officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a). The applicant must 

exhaust this administrative procedure before filing suit in district court. See 8 U.S.C. 1421(c); 8 

C.F.R. § 336.9(d). Upon exhaustion, the applicant may seek de novo review before the district 

court. See 8 U.S.C. 1421(c).2

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

 The parties agree that Sheikh did not avail himself of his statutory right under 8 U.S.C. § 

1447(a) to an administrative appeal of the denial of his application for naturalization. Instead, he 

filed a complaint before this Court under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). The Court must (i) determine 

whether exhaustion is prudential or jurisdictional in the context of section 1421(c), and if it is 

prudential, (ii) decide whether Sheikh must exhaust in the instant case. 

1. Legal Framework 

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires one who challenges an 

agency decision to exhaust all of his or her administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. 

See Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2004). Exhaustion serves two main 

purposes: protecting administrative agency authority and promoting efficiency. See Woodford v. 

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). Exhaustion is the general rule: “courts should not topple over 

administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred, but has erred against 

objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.” Id. (internal citation and quotations 

omitted, emphasis in original). 

 2

 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) provides: 

A person whose application for naturalization under this subchapter 

is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer under section 

1447(a) of this Title, may seek review of such denial before the 

United States district court for the district in which such person 

resides in accordance with Chapter 7 of Title 5. Such review shall 

be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and 

conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, conduct 

a hearing de novo on the application. 

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There are two types of exhaustion: jurisdictional, where it is explicitly required by statute, 

and prudential, where it remains the general rule but a court may exercise its discretion and 

decline to require exhaustion. See Puga, 488 F.3d at 815 (“Administrative exhaustion can be 

either statutorily required or judicially imposed as a matter of prudence.”) (citing Noriega-Lopez v. 

Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). Even where a particular statute does not specifically 

require exhaustion, courts may prudentially require exhaustion of administrative remedies. See 

Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98. A determination on the nature of the exhaustion requirement in the 

context of a particular statute is significant. If a court finds exhaustion jurisdictional, and the 

plaintiff has not exhausted, that court may not retain jurisdiction over the case. See Puga, 488 

F.3d at 815. 

However, if a court determines that exhaustion is prudential, that court may elect to retain 

jurisdiction over the case if the circumstances of the case fall within an exception to the general 

rule requiring exhaustion. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992). Where 

exhaustion is prudential, courts are guided by two competing sets of concerns. See id. at 144-46. 

On the one hand, requiring exhaustion aims to preserve the appropriate balance between the 

judicial branch and the agencies of the executive branch, promoting judicial and administrative 

efficiency. See id. at 145-46. On the other hand, “federal courts are vested with a ‘virtually 

unflagging obligation’ to exercise the jurisdiction given them. . . . Accordingly, this Court has 

declined to require exhaustion in some circumstances even where administrative and judicial 

interests would counsel otherwise. In determining whether exhaustion is required, federal courts 

must balance the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum 

against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.” Id. at 146 (internal citations 

omitted). For instance, this exception may be appropriate where it would be futile to require 

exhaustion. See, e.g. Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2010) (waiving exhaustion 

requirement where statute and its implementing regulation were purportedly in conflict). 

2. Analysis 

i. Whether Exhaustion is Jurisdictional or Prudential 

The parties each set forth distinct Ninth Circuit cases in support of their positions on this 

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issue, with Sheikh arguing that exhaustion is prudential in the context of section 1421(c), and the 

government arguing it is jurisdictional. The Court finds that exhaustion is prudential in the 

context of 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). See Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2012); see also

Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec’y, 723 F.3d 710, 714-720 (6th Cir. 2013). The government 

argues that U.S. v. Hovsepian stands for the contrary proposition that exhaustion is jurisdictional 

here. 359 F.3d 1144, 1162 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2004). Hovsepian is not, however, directly on point. 

The cited portion of Hovsepian is dicta and clearly contradicted by the more recent decision in 

Eche. In Eche, the Ninth Circuit squarely addressed the question of whether exhaustion of 

administrative remedies is prudential or jurisdictional in the context of section 1421(c), 

determining that it was prudential. See Eche, 694 F.3d at 1028. 

ii. Prudential Exhaustion 

The Court next addresses whether exhaustion should be required here. Sheikh argues that 

the futility exception applies in this case, and thus contends he should not be required to exhaust 

his administrative remedies. Specifically, Sheikh points to a purported conflict between an 

applicable USCIS regulation and the Immigration and Nationality Act—with the former 

purportedly prohibiting absences of exactly six months or more, and the latter prohibiting 

absences of only more than six months. Sheikh argues this conflict renders an administrative 

appeal futile because USCIS is bound by its own regulation, which requires USICIS to provide 

Sheikh with the same answer he already received—namely, that his purported absence of exactly 

six months disrupted his continuity of residence. 

As a threshold matter, Sheikh’s ability to rely on the purported conflict depends on his 

2013 trip having lasted exactly six months. The question thus arises: how to calculate six months 

where, as here, the governing statute specifies the relevant time period in terms of months. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1427(b). First, years are calculated based on the calendar, and the law does not typically 

recognize fractions of a day. See Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 990-93 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“Thus, for example, the span from January 1st to December 31st constitutes one year, regardless 

of the time of day on January 1 or December 31 that the relevant events occurred.” Id. at 992. 

Further, “the first legally significant date, the terminus a quo, is included. . . . [Thus,] a year runs 

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from one date to the prior date in the next year—365 days, the equivalent of the period from 

January 1 to December 31, and not from January 1 to the next January 1, which would be 366 

days, or a year and a day.” Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Second, the Supreme Court 

determined that an eighteen month statutory period ran from November 1, 1819 to April 30, 1821. 

See Griffith v. Bogert, 59 U.S. 158, 162-65 (1855). Third, months may be defined as calendar 

months where, as here, a governing statute specifies a time period in terms of months. See, e.g.,

Williams v. Astrue, 324 Fed. Appx. 618, 619 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Using the method for counting time described above, for Sheikh’s trip to have lasted 

exactly six months, having started on March 3, 2013, it would have ended on September 2, 2013. 

Here, it ended on September 3, 2013 and thus lasted six months and a day. As such, Sheikh’s trip 

did not last the precise amount of time necessary to raise the purported conflict between 8 C.F.R. § 

316.5(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b) that may have justified an exception to the exhaustion 

requirement on the basis of futility. 

Sheikh argues that the time period in question begins on March 4, not March 3, pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a). (Dkt. No. 28.) Using March 4 as the starting date, Sheikh 

contends he was out of the country six months exactly. Sheikh’s argument does not persuade 

given the Ninth Circuit’s use of a common sense approach to calculating periods of years (or, in 

this case, months) in the immigration context, Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d at 992, precedent 

which petitioner admittedly requests that this Court ignore. The Court declines to do so. Sheikh 

must exhaust his administrative remedies at USCIS before seeking judicial review of the denial of 

his application for naturalization from this Court. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the government’s motion to dismiss for 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Dismissal without prejudice is appropriate where, as 

here, the plaintiff has not asked for a stay and has not demonstrated grounds to excuse the 

exhaustion requirement. See Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2011); see 

also Jariwala v. Napolitano, 2011 WL 1260228, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2011) (granting motion 

to dismiss without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies). As Sheikh has neither 

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requested a stay nor justified application of the futility exception, the case is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

This Order terminates Docket Number 17. 

The Clerk shall administratively close the case file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 1, 2015 

 ________________________________________

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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