Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02259/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02259-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY CRUMP,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-02259-JCS 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND MODIFYING 

FILING DEADLINES IN SECTION V 

OF PRETRIAL ORDER (DOCKET NO. 

41)

Re: Dkt. No. 50

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Anthony Crump asserts civil rights claims against the Bay Area Rapid Transit 

District (“BART”) and BART police officers Hashmat Bahaduri and Jason House1based on an 

incident that occurred at the Concord BART station on October 23, 2016. Presently before the 

Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). A hearing on the Motion was 

held on October 5, 2018. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part.

2

 The Court also modifies certain deadlines for filing pretrial materials, as set 

forth in the Conclusion section of this Order.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Mr. Crump’s description of his encounter with Officer’s Bahaduri and House is as follows:

 

1 Officer Tanya Salas is also named in the body of the First Amended Complaint, though Officer 

Salas was not listed in the caption of that complaint. Officer Salas is the Internal Affairs officer 

who took Mr. Crump’s post-incident statement. Mr. Crump has stipulated, however, that he is not 

asserting any claims against Officer Salas.

2 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). 

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1) I am the plaintiff herein.

2) This incident happened on October 23, 2016, at the Concord BART 

Station.

3) Earlier that day, I rode BART into Concord so that I could volunteer with 

these people who grow roses for special occasions like Mother's Day. The 

people were friends of my deceased godmother and I had been working 

with them since about 2008.

4) In 2016, I had been volunteering one day a week every week or two.

5) The people pick me up when I arrive, and they drop me back off at the 

Concord BART Station in the evening after I finish working in their 

garden.

6) On October 23, 2016, I arrived at the Concord BART Station at about 

11:30 P.M. for the Return trip.

7) I am careful so as [not] to miss the last train because if I miss the last train, 

BART stops running and they shut down the Station and the police make 

everyone leave the area.

8) Once it closes for the evening the BART Station does not reopen until the 

next morning so if I miss the last train I could be stuck in Concord in the 

cold until morning.

9) That has happened to me once before and I was careful to try not to let that

happen again.

10) I walked to the bicycle rack and unlocked and removed my bicycle and 

walked it about 30 feet to the bench so I could pack my bicycle for the 

journey back into Berkeley, California where I was living at the time.

11) I placed my hedge trimmers on the bench next to my tool bag and was in 

the process of re-attaching my seat. I remove my seat to prevent people 

from stealing it.

12) I was not engaged in any behavior that one might suspect to be criminal 

and I was taking my time packing my bicycle.

13) I had been doing this exact ritual for many years and the police had never

before detained me.

14) The first BART officer to approach me was Officer Hashmat Bahaduri.

15) He approached me and shined his light on my garden sheers and me.

16) I asked him if I he wanted to see me unlock my locks.

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17) He said he did. So I unlocked and relocked locks.

18) I have two locks, one for the front wheel and the other for the back wheel.

19) Then Officer Bahaduri asked me if those were bolt cutters on the bench.

20) Bolt cutters and hedge trimmers look nothing alike and he had his 

flashlight beaming on the hedge trimmers.

21) As a trained professional he should have known the difference between 

hedge trimmers and bolt cutters.

22) Then I heard Officer Bahaduri radio in and it sounded to me like he said 

that he was detaining a suspected bike thief.

23) I told Officer Bahaduri that the bicycle belonged to me.

24) I told him that I had not done anything wrong and that I would sue him.3

25) I also told him that I was in a hurry to catch the last BART train and that I 

did not want to miss the last train out of Concord.

 

3 Defendants ask the Court to strike paragraph 24 on the basis that it is contradicted by the video 

evidence and thus a sham affidavit with respect to this paragraph. Reply at 3. They also point out 

that a party cannot create a material dispute of fact to defeat summary judgment by making 

statements that contradict the party’s own past testimony. Id. According to Defendants, in 

paragraph 24 of his declaration, “Plaintiff claims he told Bahaduri ‘I had not done anything wrong 

and that I would sue him’ in response to Bahaduri’s radio transmission about detaining a possible 

bike thief” but that “this is incorrect” because “Plaintiff never made that statement.” Id. Further, 

Defendants assert, Mr. Crump testified at his deposition that he told Bahaduri “Don’t try nothing 

funny” and said “I’m going to go in my pocket and get this key lock out, and I’m going to unlock 

to show you it’s my bike.” Id. (quoting Downs Decl., Ex. A (Crump Dep.) at 48). The Court 

DENIES Defendants’ request to strike this paragraph. Defendants’ reading of this paragraph is 

overly narrow. Mr. Crump does not place the words in paragraph 24 in quotation marks, 

indicating that the statement was not intended to be an exact quote of what he said. Nor does he 

state that he said these things immediately upon hearing Officer Bahaduri call for back-up and 

refer to a possible bike theft. Rather, paragraph 24 is not limited to that particular point in the 

encounter. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Mr. Crump’s favor, his statement in paragraph 24 

is consistent with the video footage, discussed below, which shows Mr. Crump telling the officers 

he planned to sue them and also telling them repeatedly (using a variety of phrases) that the bike

was his and he wasn’t stealing anything. The Court notes that Defendants object to a number of 

other paragraphs in Mr. Crump’s statement on the basis that they are irrelevant, speculative or 

factually incorrect. See id. at 3-4. The Court addresses these objections only to the extent the 

statements in these paragraphs are relevant to its analysis.

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26) Then Officer Bahaduri commanded me to unlock and relock both of my 

locks again because he claimed he did not see me when I did that for him 

the first time.

27) Ultimately, I unlocked and relocked both locks four times.

28) Officer John House arrived about two minutes later.

29) When Officer House arrived, I picked up the hedge trimmers and 

demonstrated for both officers that the hedge trimmers were not bolt 

cutters.

30) I was loudly explaining that to the officers while I was motioning with the

hedge trimmers to show them that they were not bolt cutters.

31) I was not threatening them at all; however, as soon as I picked up the hedge

trimmers and began my demonstration both officers drew their weapons 

on me.

32) Officer House says that he drew his taser and pointed it at the ground in 

front of me.

33) Officer Bahaduri says that he drew his firearm and pointed at the ground 

in front of me.

34) To me it appeared that they reached for their waist area and drew firearms 

and point them at my face.

35) Regardless, I know guns are dangerous and I was frightened because I 

know that bullets may ricochet.

36) It happened really quickly, and I remembered that it was a BART officer 

who claimed he was grabbing for his taser when he shot the young man, 

Oscar Grant.

37) Both officers told me to put down the hedge trimmers or they would shoot 

me.

38) I carefully set them down on the ground and backed away from the hedge

39) Then I moved towards the bench behind me.

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40) Both officers rushed me and grabbed my thumbs.

41) One officer grabbed my right thumb and the other officer grabbed my left.

42) They twisted my thumbs and wrenched my wrists above my shoulders and 

I could hear a popping sound. They tore both of my rotator cuffs and I later 

had repair surgery.

43) Then they placed me in handcuffs and sat me back down on the bench.

44) For the next 15-20 minutes while I was in handcuffs they attempted to 

downplay their actions in wrongfully detaining me and to justify why they 

used force on me.

45) I had not done anything to justify being detained, or handcuffed.

46) I learned later that the officers had used so much force that they tore my 

rotator cuffs, and I had to have surgery to repair both sides.

47) I also suffer from schizophrenia and the officers were placing 

extraordinary stress on me by pointing their weapons at me and by 

wrenching my arms out of place.

48) Even though I was cursing at the officers for violating my Constitutional 

rights I fully cooperated with them and followed all of their commands.

Crump Decl., ¶¶ 1-48. 

Officers Bahaduri and House both had their body cameras on during the encounter with 

Mr. Crump. See Amended Declaration by Philip. J. Downs in Support of Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment, or Adjudication (“Downs Decl.”), Exs. B & C. The body camera footage of 

the officers is consistent with many aspects of Mr. Crump’s account, though it does not show 

either officer drawing a firearm, as discussed further below. Officer Bahaduri’s body camera 

footage starts with Officer Bahaduri shining a flashlight on Mr. Crump, apparently from inside the 

BART station through a window. Downs Decl., Ex. B (Bahaduri body camera footage). Officer 

Bahaduri then walks outside the station and approaches Mr. Crump, shining his flashlight on Mr. 

Crump again, who is standing next to a bicycle, and the bench opposite the bicycle. A tool bag4

 

4 Officer Bahaduri testified at his deposition that he believed from the outset that the bag was a 

tool bag because it had “obvious tool bag logos or brands on it.” Downs Decl., Ex. E (Bahaduri 

Dep.) at 23. He further testified that he didn’t know if there were any tools in the tool bag until 

later in the encounter, when he “actually looked.” Id.

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and gardening shears can be seen on the bench. As he approaches, Mr. Crump asks, “didn’t you 

just see me unlock this bike?” Officer Bahaduri responds, “no I didn’t” and then Officer 

Bahaduri can be heard calling for backup regarding an individual “possibly stealing a bike.” Id. 

In the meantime, Mr. Crump is unlocking one of the u-locks on his bike and holding it up to 

Officer Bahaduri, saying “you see that? It’s mine.” Officer Bahaduri then shines his flashlight on 

the bench again, which is a few feet away from Mr. Crump; Officer Bahaduri says, “what is that, a 

bolt cutter?” 5 Mr. Crump responds, “it’s a hedge trimmer man, what the f*** you talking about? 

Where you from, Tucson?” Officer Bahaduri asks Mr. Crump why he is “yelling” and Mr. Crump 

tells him he is “trying to make the last train” and that Officer Bahaduri is wasting his time, 

continuing, “I just unlocked it.” Id. Officer Bahaduri asks Mr. Crump if he can “see [him] do that 

one more time” because he was “focused on the tools.” Id. Mr. Crump complies and opens a 

second u-lock as well, holding the lock up to the Officer and saying, “that should tell your ass it’s 

mine” and asking if he can catch his train. Officer Bahaduri instead asks Mr. Crump to unlock the

second lock again. Mr. Crump objects, saying, “I already unlocked that thing, I ain’t gonna 

unlock that mother-f***** no more.” Officer Bahaduri says, “okay, then you’ll be detained.” Mr. 

Crump says, “detained? I just unlocked the mother-f*****” and proceeds to unlock the second 

lock again. As he is doing so, he says, “you better call for back-up, bitch, cause you gonna need 

it.” Officer Bahaduri responds, “I already did” and continued, “it’s gonna be bad for you, the way 

you acting.”6 Mr. Crump answers, “hey f*** that man, you detaining me, I just unlocked both my 

damn locks and I’m telling you it’s my goddam bike.” At this point Mr. Crump holds up the lock

again and Officer Bahaduri says, “alright, you have a good night.” Officer Bahaduri then turns

away from Mr. Crump, who can no longer be seen, and Mr. Crump can be heard responding, “you 

have a f***** up night.”

Within seconds of this exchange Mr. Crump reappears in the footage and can be seen 

 

5 Defendants stipulated at oral argument that no bolt cutter was found in the area at any time 

during or after the encounter and that what Officer Bahaduri thought may have been a bolt cutter 

was, in fact, a pair of gardening shears. 

6

In his deposition, Officer Bahaduri testified that he was “scared” by Mr. Crump’s “threats” at 

this point. Downs Decl., Ex. E (Bahaduri Dep.) at 37.

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picking up the gardening shears, turning towards Officer Bahaduri and taking two or three steps 

forward while opening and shutting them, saying “they’re not no bolt cutters, they’re hedge 

trimmers.” At this point, Officer Bahaduri raises his voice, saying “don’t bring that around me” 

and “you’re gonna get shot.” Officer House’s voice can also be heard at this point, saying “put 

them down.” Neither officer can be seen in the footage and, as Defendants’ expert has opined, the 

video footage is “inconclusive as to whether either officer actually withdrew his sidearm from the 

holster at any time.” Downs Decl., Ex. H (Schott Report). Mr. Crump does not approach the 

officers after these commands and drops the gardening shears. He says, “I don’t believe this shit” 

and Officer Bahaduri then says, “you know what, have a seat.”7 At this point, the officers place 

handcuffs on Mr. Crump, who does not resist, though he continues to protest the officers’ actions, 

saying he unlocked his locks “four times just to show [them]” that the bicycle belonged to him.8

While Mr. Crump sits on a bench, handcuffed, Officer Bahaduri asks for identification. 

Mr. Crump tells him his id. is in his wallet in his pocket but says, “you can’t go in there in my 

pocket and get my wallet.” He tells Officer Bahaduri his name and also says he is going to sue the 

officers for harassment because he already showed them that the bicycle was his. Officer Bahaduri 

asks Mr. Crump for his birth date, which Mr. Crump provides. 

The exchange between Mr. Crump and Officer Bahaduri about the reason for Mr. Crump’s 

detention continues, with Officer Bahaduri saying “you pulled out the hedge trimmers,” and Mr. 

Crump responding that they were already out and that he “gotta put it on my bike to leave.” 

Officer Bahaduri counters, “you grabbed them and pointed them at me” and Mr. Crump says, “oh 

 

7

In his deposition, Mr. Crump recalled saying, “Man, don’t shoot me in my face over my own 

bicycle.” Downs Decl., Ex. A (Crump Dep.) at 53. Similarly, in his statement to the BART public 

affairs officer made soon after the incident Mr. Crump said that he had said, “Don’t shoot me over 

my own bike.” Downs Decl., Ex. F at 2. However, no such statements can be heard on the body 

camera footage of Officers Bahaduri or House.

8 At his deposition, Mr. Crump also testified that he “yelled in pain” and complained loudly to the 

officers when they placed the handcuffs on him, telling them they were hurting him. Downs 

Decl., Ex. A (Crump Dep.) at 83-84. He conceded that the body camera footage does not show 

him yelling or making any complaints about the handcuffs hurting him and asserted that the video 

footage must have been tampered with. Id. The Court rejected Mr. Crump’s allegation that the 

video footage was tampered with when it denied Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify Defendants’ 

counsel, finding no evidence to support that allegation. See Docket No. 44. At oral argument, 

Plaintiff stipulated that he has no evidence that the body camera footage offered by Defendants in 

support of their summary judgment motion has been tampered with.

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man, I was showing you they’re hedge trimmers, you jackass, not no bolt cutters.” Officer 

Bahaduri says, “see, it’s your attitude.” Later in the conversation, Mr. Crump can be seen telling 

Officer House that his “shit gets stolen all the time” and Officer House responds, “that’s why 

we’re detaining you, because stuff gets stolen out here.” Officer House says, “if you’d just 

cooperate the investigation would go so much faster.” Mr. Crump says, “I did cooperate” and

points out that he had unlocked his locks as he had been asked to. 

After several more minutes of back and forth between Mr. Crump and the officers, Officer 

Bahaduri tells Mr. Crump that he has to “make sure that [Mr. Crump] is not a danger to society 

because of the way [he was] acting.” Mr. Crump laughs and says, “I might be a menace to society 

because I’m black, huh?” Officer Bahaduri says he used the word “danger” and Mr. Crump says, 

“you said menace” to which Officer Bahaduri says, “you’re instigating right now, sir.” Officer 

Bahaduri then asks, “if I released you, do you want to hurt anybody?” Mr. Crump says, “I didn’t 

want to hurt nobody from the start, I was minding my own business.” Officer Bahaduri asks, “do 

you want to hurt me?” and Mr. Crump says, “I didn’t even know who the f  you were, I hadn’t 

even met you.” Officer Bahaduri asks, “are you diagnosed with any mental conditions” and Mr. 

Crump says, “no man, what is this?”9 Officer Bahaduri goes on to ask Mr. Crump a series of 

questions about his work and why he needs hedge trimmers, telling Mr. Crump that he is trying to 

determine whether the tools he has with him are burglary tools. Officer House joins in the 

conversation, telling Mr. Crump that Officer Bahaduri is trying to determine if he has the tools for 

a “legitimate reason, such as a job” or if he was using them to “steal bike parts.” Mr. Crump 

reiterates that his bag contains tools for his job and then one of the officers’ hands can be seen 

opening Mr. Crumps bag and taking things out. In response to Mr. Crump’s continued 

complaints, Officer Bahaduri tells him that he doesn’t know if Mr. Crump “threw a cable lock in a 

garbage can” or “hid it back there” and that he doesn’t know if “that’s your bike.” 

Then followed a lengthy discussion between the officers and Mr. Crump about whether or 

 

9 While Mr. Crump told the officers he was not diagnosed with any mental conditions, he testified 

at his deposition that he had been diagnosed with “paranoia” in 2003. Downs Decl., Ex. A 

(Crump Dep.) at 26. In his declaration in support of his opposition brief, Mr. Crump also states 

that he suffers from schizophrenia, as noted above. Crump Decl. ¶47.

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not the officers’ detention of Mr. Crump was justified. At one point, Mr. Crump says that the 

officers detained him because he was black and Officer House says, “okay, here we go, I just 

explained the whole process to you.” Mr. Crump says of Officer Bahaduri, “he probably wanted 

to shoot the f** ** out of me. That’s what you wanted to do, wasn’t it? You wanted me to make a 

wrong move so that you could have a reason to blast my black ass.” Officer Bahaduri responds, 

“you pointed hedge trimmers at me. I could have shot you.” Eventually Officer Bahaduri 

removes the handcuffs and after a few more minutes of conversation Mr. Crump leaves.

The body camera footage of Officer House begins at the point when Mr. Crump is holding 

the gardening shears and Officer Bahaduri is telling him to put them down. See Downs Ex. C 

(House body camera footage). Both Officer Bahaduri and Mr. Crump can be seen in Officer 

House’s video footage and the distance between them appears to be roughly 6 to 8 feet. Like the 

body camera footage from Officer Bahaduri, Officer’s House’s body camera footage does not 

capture whether either officer reached for a firearm or a taser; neither officer can be seen pointing 

a gun or a taser at Mr. Crump.

In his deposition, Officer House testified that he had a specific recollection of drawing his 

taser from its holster. See Johnson Decl., Ex. A (House Dep.) at 24. Further, Defendants 

stipulated at oral argument that they do not dispute that Officer House drew a taser. There is 

conflicting evidence, however, as to whether Officer Bahaduri drew a gun. In a statement made to 

a BART internal affairs officer soon after the incident, Mr. Crump said Officer Bahaduri had had a 

gun “to [his] head.” Downs Decl., Ex. F at 2. However, in the declaration submitted in opposition 

to summary judgment, Mr. Crump states that he saw Officer Bahaduri draw his gun and point it at 

the ground in front of Mr. Crump; likewise, in his deposition Mr. Crump testified that he saw 

Officer Bahaduri draw his gun but could not remember whether the gun was pointed at him or at 

the ground. Downs Decl., Ex. A (Crump Dep.) at 52-53. Officer Bahaduri testified at his 

deposition that he believed that he drew his firearm during his encounter with Mr. Crump and held 

in the “low ready” position, and that he had written as much in his incident report. Declaration of 

Wayne Johnson in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Johnson Decl.”), 

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Ex. B (Bahaduri Dep.) at 46-47.10 He further testified, however, that his attorney had told him 

prior to the deposition that in fact, he had not drawn his firearm. Id. When asked why he thought 

Mr. Crump had “grabbed” the gardening shears, Officer Bahaduri testified that he “believe[d] [Mr. 

Crump] was trying to show it to [him] . . . maybe to [make] clear that it wasn’t bolt cutters.” Id. 

at 33. 

Defendants also submit an expert opinion by Michael Schott, a forensic image analyst. 

Downs Decl., Ex. H. Mr. Schott opines based on his review of the body camera footage that while 

the footage is “inconclusive” as to whether either officer drew his sidearm from its holster at any 

time during the encounter, it does not support the conclusion that a gun was ever pointed at Mr. 

Crump. Id. at 3.

B. Procedural Background

In the First Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint, Mr. Crump asserts the 

following claims: 1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on violation of his First Amendment right to be free 

from retaliation based on his exercise of his right to complain about unfair treatment (Officers 

Bahaduri and House); 2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on violation of his Fourth Amendment Right to 

be Free of Unreasonable Seizure and Excessive Force (Officers Bahaduri and House); 3) Battery 

(Officers Bahaduri and House, BART on theory of vicarious liability); 4) False Imprisonment 

(Officers Bahaduri and House, BART on theory of vicarious liability); and 5) Intentional 

Infliction of Emotional Distress (Officers Bahaduri and House, BART on theory of vicarious 

liability). Mr. Crump seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages as well as an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs. He also requests injunctive relief.11

In the Motion, Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor on all of 

Plaintiffs’ claims and on his request for punitive damages and injunctive relief. They contend the 

First Amendment claim fails because the officers’ actions were not motivated by retaliatory 

 

10 Plaintiff’s counsel attached the deposition excerpts of the two officers without assigning exhibit 

numbers or using exhibit tabs to differentiate between the testimony of the officers. To avoid 

confusion, the Court refers to the excerpts of Officer House’s deposition as “Exhibit A” and the 

excerpts of Officer Bahaduri’s deposition as “Exhibit B.”

11 The request for injunctive relief appears to be boilerplate language from a different case. At oral 

argument, Plaintiff stipulated that he is not seeking injunctive relief in this action. 

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animus based on Mr. Crump’s statements but instead, were in response to Mr. Crump’s conduct. 

Motion at 7-8. In particular, they contend Mr. Crump’s initial refusal to open the second lock in 

response to Officer Bahaduri’s request and his approaching Officer Bahaduri with gardening

shears justified the detention, which was unrelated to any statements Mr. Crump made. Id. at 8.

They also argue there is no evidence that Mr. Crump’s speech was chilled or deterred in any way 

or that his speech was the but-for cause of any injury. Id. In the alternative, Defendants contend 

they are entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim because they did not violate any clearly 

established First Amendment right. Id. at 8-10.

Defendants argue that the Fourth Amendment claims fail because no suspicion is required 

to initiate contact in a public place. Id. at 10. In any event, Defendants argue, there was 

reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Crump to conduct a brief investigation as to whether he might 

be stealing bikes by looking for signs of a cut cable lock and asking Mr. Crump to demonstrate 

that the bike was his. Id. at 10-11. This portion of the detention lasted only two minutes, 

according to Defendants, and was reasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 11. Defendants also argue 

that Officer House had reasonable suspicion even though he arrived after Officer Bahaduri had 

initiated contact with Mr. Crump, under the collective knowledge doctrine. Id. They further 

assert that even if the detention was over when Officer Bahaduri said “good night,” the subsequent

seizure was justified based on Plaintiff’s picking up the gardening shears, pointing them at the 

officers and approaching them while holding the gardening shears, which could be construed as 

“brandishing” under Penal Code section 417. Id. Officer Bahaduri also reasonably believed Mr. 

Crump had an underlying mental health condition that justified the seizure, Defendants contend. 

Id. 

Defendants also argue that Mr. Crump’s excessive force claim fails as a matter of law. Id. 

at 12. They point to case authority that handcuffing a suspect is not, by itself, excessive force and 

that the cases where handcuffing has been found to constitute excessive force have involved 

situations in which the individuals complained that the officers were hurting them when they put 

them in handcuffs and the officers ignored the complaints, which did not happen here. Id. They 

also argue that the officers would have been justified in using deadly force because Mr. Crump 

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was threatening them with a weapon and therefore, handcuffing was reasonable as a matter of law. 

Id. at 13. Finally, Defendants argue that they did not use excessive force because the evidence 

does not show that the officers drew their guns and pointed them at Mr. Crump. Id. 

Defendants argue that the battery claim fails for the same reason the excessive force claim 

fails, namely, there was no unreasonable use of force. Id. They argue that they are entitled to 

summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim because Mr. Crump’s detention was 

reasonable. Id. Defendants contend the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails 

because the video footage shows that the officers’ conduct was not outrageous. Id. Defendants 

argue that all of the claims fail as to BART because the officers did nothing that violated the law. 

Id. at ii. Defendants also argue that the Court should strike Mr. Crump’s request for punitive 

damages because BART is immune from punitive damages under federal or state law. Further, as 

to the officers, Defendants argue that there is no evidence of conduct that would warrant the 

imposition of punitive damages. Id. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

1. Rule 56

Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of 

persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has 

made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to designate 

“specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. On summary judgment, the court 

draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 

369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Nonetheless, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of 

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 

should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary 

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judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (holding that lower court had erred in 

denying summary judgment on Fourth Amendment excessive force claim where video footage 

“quite clearly contradict[ed] the version of the story told by respondent and adopted by the Court 

of Appeals.”).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (citation omitted)). Thus, analysis of a civil 

rights claim brought under § 1983 begins with the identification of the “specific constitutional 

right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.” Id. at 394 (citation omitted). 

The claim is then evaluated under the constitutional standards that apply to that constitutional 

right. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–22 (1985)). 

3. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity provides 

government officials with “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) 

(emphasis deleted)). The rule attempts to balance competing interests – those of plaintiffs who 

have been wronged by government officials, and those of government officials who may be 

inhibited in performance of their duties out of fear of financial liability and time-consuming 

litigation. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). 

To determine if an official is protected by qualified immunity, a court asks (1) whether the 

plaintiff’s constitutional right has been violated; and (2) whether that right was clearly established 

at the time of the challenged conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In Saucier, the 

Supreme Court held that the qualified immunity analysis required that the district court first 

determine whether there was a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and that only if 

such a violation was found should it proceed to the question of whether the violation involved a 

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clearly established right. 533 U.S. at 201. In Pearson, however, the Court modified this rule, 

holding that the qualified immunity analysis need not be done in any particular order. 555 U.S. at 

236. The Court reasoned that while the approach required under Saucier’s mandate may have a 

beneficial effect on the development of precedent, “[t]here are cases in which it is plain that a 

constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a 

right.” Id. at 237. Therefore, the Court concluded, a more flexible approach is warranted and will 

permit the lower courts to “determine the order of decision making that will best facilitate the fair 

and efficient disposition of each case.” Id. at 242. 

The inquiry as to whether a constitutional right is clearly established is “particularized.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. It is not enough that the general rule is established. Id. Rather, “[t]he 

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 

what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 

640 (1987)). Although the existence of a clearly established constitutional right is usually 

demonstrated on the basis of cases involving similar facts where the alleged conduct has been 

found to be unconstitutional, “[w]hen the defendant’s conduct is so patently violative of the 

constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without guidance from the courts that the 

action was unconstitutional, closely analogous pre-existing case law is not required to show that 

the law is clearly established.” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1285-1286 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(quotation and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that courts should afford 

“deference to the judgment of reasonable officers on the scene” and should not use “20/20 

hindsight vision.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. However, “[w]here the facts are disputed, their 

resolution and determinations of credibility ‘are manifestly the province of a jury.’” Wall v. Cty. of 

Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 852 (9th 

Cir. 2002)).

B. Claims

1. Fourth Amendment Claims

Mr. Crump contends his detention was unreasonable because: 1) Officer Bahaduri had no 

basis for questioning or detaining Mr. Crump when he initially encountered Mr. Crump because 

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Mr. Crump was doing nothing unlawful; 2) the officers had no basis for seizing Mr. Crump and

placing him in handcuffs after Mr. Crump picked up the gardening shears; 3) the officers should 

have taken the handcuffs off of him sooner; and 4) the manner in which the officers placed him in 

handcuffs constituted excessive force. 

a. Initial Stop and Detention

“[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching 

an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some 

questions [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen . . . .” Florida v. Royer, 

460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). However, the individual “may not be detained even momentarily 

without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so . . . .” Id. (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 

446 U.S. 544, 556 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)). Law enforcement can stop and briefly detain a 

person for investigative purposes only if they have “a reasonable suspicion supported by 

articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’” even if they lack probable cause under the 

Fourth Amendment. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 30 (1868)). Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting 

the person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citing United States v. Tiong, 224 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Here, it is undisputed that Officer Bahaduri saw Mr. Crump with a bicycle, late at night, in 

an area where there had been numerous bicycle thefts. It is also apparent from Officer Bahaduri’s 

body camera footage that as he approached Mr. Crump, and before he spoke to Mr. Crump, the

gardening shears could be clearly seen as Officer Bahaduri shined his flashlight on the bench near 

Mr. Crump. Finally, while Mr. Crump argues strenuously that no reasonable officer could mistake 

gardening shears for a bolt cutter, Officer Bahaduri’s undisputed testimony is that gardening 

shears, like a bolt cutter, can be used to cut a cable lock. See Downs Decl., Ex. E (Bahaduri Dep.) 

at 28. On the other hand, it is also clear from the video footage that Mr. Crump used u-locks on 

his bike and not cable locks. Further, Officer Bahaduri testified at his deposition that neither 

gardening shears nor a bolt cutter can be used to cut a u-lock. Downs Decl., Ex. E (Bahaduri 

Dep.) at 28-29. He also testified that he never found any cable locks that had been cut at any time 

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during or after his encounter with Mr. Crump. Id. at 29. 

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Crump, a jury could conclude that as 

soon as Officer Bahaduri approached Mr. Crump and saw no sign of any cable lock that might 

have been cut with the gardening shears, he did not have even a reasonable suspicion that Mr. 

Crump might have stolen the bike in his possession, which had obviously been secured by u-locks 

and not a cable lock. While it is true that Officer Bahaduri was aware of the tool bag on the bench, 

he conceded at his deposition that at this point in the encounter, he had no idea if it contained any 

tools. Consequently, the fact that Mr. Crump also had a tool bag with him was not enough to 

demonstrate (at least, as a matter of law), that he had a particularized suspicion that Mr. Crump 

had been engaged in illegal activity. Therefore, the Court concludes that there is a material dispute 

of fact regarding the question of whether Officer Bahaduri violated Mr. Crump’s Fourth 

Amendment rights when he stopped him and required him to demonstrate that he could open both 

of the u-locks on the bike.

Assuming a jury were to find that this initial detention violated Mr. Crump’s Fourth 

Amendment rights, the Court next must decide whether Officer Bahaduri is entitled to qualified 

immunity because the right was not clearly established. As discussed above, courts must afford 

some deference to the judgment of officers on the scene in making this determination; moreover, a 

right should be considered clearly established only if the conduct was “patently violative” of the 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights or there is case law involving similar facts where courts have held

that the relevant conduct was unconstitutional. Neither requirement is satisfied here. While the 

general rule that reasonable suspicion is required to carry out a Terry stop is established, Mr. 

Crump has pointed to no cases involving similar facts to show that a reasonable officer would 

know that the stop carried out by Officer Bahaduri – including his request that Mr. Crump 

demonstrate that he owned the bicycle – was a violation of the individual’s Fourth Amendment 

rights. 

Nor was the conduct of Officer Bahaduri so patently violative of Mr. Crump’s rights that it 

should have been obvious to him that his conduct was unconstitutional. It is apparent from the 

video that the initial detention lasted only approximately two minutes and ended when Officer 

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Bahaduri said good night and turned away from Mr. Crump. Further, even though Mr. Crump had 

to demonstrate more than once that he could open the locks on his bike, the initial detention was 

relatively non-intrusive. This is not the sort of egregious conduct that courts have found is an 

obvious violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Deorle v. Rutherford, 

272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that where officer shot with a lead bean bag an 

emotionally disturbed man who was unarmed and posed little risk of flight or danger to the 

offices or the public, causing grave injury to the individual, the officer’s conduct was so obviously 

unconstitutional that the constitutional right was well established even though there were no cases 

involving similar facts holding as much). Therefore, the Court concludes that Officer Bahaduri did 

not violate a well-established right when he initially stopped Mr. Crump and that he is entitled to 

qualified immunity on this portion of the claim.12

b. Seizure of Mr. Crump After He Picked Up Gardening Shears

A “seizure [must] be supported by probable cause when [the] detention rises to the level of 

an arrest.” See Perce v. Multnomah Cty., Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 1996). An arrest or 

seizure “occurs when a law enforcement officer, through coercion, ‘physical force[,] or a show of 

authority, in some way restricts the liberty of a person.’” United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 

1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 

1997)). “Probable cause exists when, ‘under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting 

officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability’ that a crime was 

committed.” Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 

Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Defendants contend that when Mr. Crump picked up the gardening shears and took a few 

steps towards the officers while opening and closing them, they had probable cause to believe Mr. 

Crump had violated Penal Code section 417, which provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, except in self-defense, in the presence of any other 

person, draws or exhibits any deadly weapon whatsoever, other than 

 

12 At oral argument, Plaintiff stipulated that to the extent his Fourth Amendment claim is based on 

the initial investigative stop, which ended when Officer House said “have a good night,” he is not 

asserting that claim against Officer House, who was not present at this point.

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a firearm, in a rude, angry, or threatening manner, or who in any 

manner, unlawfully uses a deadly weapon other than a firearm in any 

fight or quarrel is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by 

imprisonment in a county jail for not less than 30 days.

Cal. Pen. Code section 417(a). Based on the video footage, there is no question that Mr. Crump 

“exhibit[ed]” the gardening shears to Officers Bahaduri and House.

13

 Likewise, Mr. Crump 

concedes that he was “upset and loud and cursing,” see Opposition at 7, which can also be seen on 

the video footage, supporting probable cause for the “rude [or] angry” requirement of section 

417(a). The remaining question is whether the officers had probable cause to believe the 

gardening shears constituted a “deadly weapon.” 

Although the Court has found no case law that addresses the meaning of “deadly weapon” 

in Penal Code section 417(a), the California Supreme Court has addressed the meaning of that 

term in Penal Code section 245, which prohibits assault with a “deadly weapon,” offering the 

following guidance:

As used in section 245, subdivision (a)(1), a “deadly weapon” is “any 

object, instrument, or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be 

capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily 

injury.” (In re Jose D.R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275–276, 186 

Cal.Rptr. 898.) Some few objects, such as dirks and blackjacks, have 

been held to be deadly weapons as a matter of law; the ordinary use 

for which they are designed establishes their character as such. 

(People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 327, 78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 

P.2d 153, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Ray (1975) 14 

Cal.3d 20, 32, 120 Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017.) Other objects, while 

not deadly per se, may be used, under certain circumstances, in a 

manner likely to produce death or great bodily injury. In determining 

whether an object not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such, 

the trier of fact may consider the nature of the object, the manner in 

which it is used, and all other facts relevant to the issue. (In re Jose 

D.R., supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 276, 186 Cal.Rptr. 898; see People 

v. Nealis (1991) 283 Cal.Rptr. 376, 232 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4, fn. 2 

[citing California decisions holding various objects, not deadly per se, 

to be deadly weapons under the particular circumstances].)

People v. Aguilar, 16 Cal. 4th 1023, 1028–29 (1997). Thus, for example, in Estate of Montanez v. 

City of Indio, where the plaintiff was holding a pair of scissors, the court noted that “the 

determination of whether an object not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such is a 

 

13 As both Officers House and Bahaduri can be heard in the video footage telling Mr. Crump to 

put the shears down and can be seen placing handcuffs on Mr. Crump, the Fourth Amendment 

claim applies to both officers as to this portion of the encounter.

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question of fact to be determined by a jury or trier of fact.” No. 517CV00130ODWSHK, 2018 WL 

1989533, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018) (citing People v. Aguilar, 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–29

(1997)). 

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Court finds that there is a dispute of 

fact as to whether a reasonable person would have concluded that Mr. Crump was using the 

gardening shears as a deadly weapon. Mr. Crump testified that he was showing the officers that 

he had gardening shears and not a bolt cutter and indeed, Officer Bahaduri testified at his 

deposition that that is what he thought Mr. Crump was doing when he picked up the gardening 

shears. A jury could reasonably conclude based on the video footage and the testimony of Mr. 

Crump and Officer Bahaduri that the officers did not have probable cause to believe that Mr. 

Crump was using the gardening shears as a deadly weapon, leaving the officers without probable 

cause for the seizure of Mr. Crump and causing the subsequent detention to be unlawful. 

Assuming that the officers violated Mr. Crump’s Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him 

at this point in the encounter, however, it is also clear to the Court that those rights were not 

clearly established under the facts of this case. It is undisputed (and the video shows) that the 

gardening shears had long blades that obviously could cause serious injury or death, that Mr. 

Crump took at least a few steps towards the officers while holding them, and that he was angry 

and upset. It is also undisputed that only moments before, he had told Officer Bahaduri in a 

threatening manner that he was going to need back-up. There is no case law involving similar 

facts suggesting that the officers should have known that detaining Mr. Crump under these 

circumstances violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Nor is it reasonable to expect that officers 

encountering situations such as the one here, where a visibly-upset individual is holding a tool that 

obviously has the potential to inflict serious harm, be familiar with the case law regarding the 

types of weapons that courts have found to be deadly weapons as a matter of law and the 

circumstances under which courts have found that objects that are not inherently deadly 

nonetheless satisfy the “deadly weapon” requirement of Penal Code section 417. Therefore, the 

Court concludes that Officers Bahaduri and House are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. 

Crump’s Fourth Amendment claim to the extent it is based on the seizure of Mr. Crump after he 

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picked up the gardening shears.

c. Length of the Detention

“[A] detention may be unlawful under the Fourth Amendment ‘either because the detention 

itself is [unreasonable] or because it is carried out in an unreasonable manner.’” Meredith v. Erath, 

342 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th 

Cir.1994)). “The scope of a detention ‘must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.’” 

Ganwich v. Knapp, 319 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 

500 (1983)). 

Mr. Crump contends the officers kept him in handcuffs for a period that exceeded “the 

time permitted for any legitimate purpose” because the officers held him in handcuffs and 

“lectured to [him] after they knew he had not stolen a bicycle or committed any other criminal 

activity.” In other words, under Mr. Crump’s theory, this claim turns on whether the officers had 

probable cause to detain him in the first instance. As discussed above, there are material disputes 

of fact as to whether the officers had probable cause based on the display by Mr. Crump of the 

gardening shears, but there is no clearly established right that would have led a reasonable officer 

to know that that the conduct at issue was unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court concludes that 

the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim based on the length 

of the detention for the reasons discussed above. 

d. Excessive Force Claims

It is well-established that “‘[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem 

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,’ . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (U.S. 1989) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 

1973)). Rather, courts ask whether the officers’ actions were “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of 

the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 

motivation.” Id. “In considering an excessive force claim, [courts] balance ‘the nature and quality 

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing 

governmental interests at stake.’” Id. Determining whether the force used was reasonable 

“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the 

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severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 

flight.” Id. Of these factors, the Ninth Circuit has held that the most important is “whether the 

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 

1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Mr. Crump alleges that he was subjected to excessive force because: 1) Officer Bahaduri 

pointed a gun at him; and 2) the officers subjected him to painful handcuffing. As to the first 

theory, the evidence is mixed as to whether Officer Bahaduri drew his gun. Drawing all 

reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Crump, the Court concludes that a jury could reasonably 

conclude that Officer Bahaduri drew his gun. On the other hand, no reasonable jury could 

conclude that a gun was pointed at Mr. Crump. In addition to Officer Bahaduri’s testimony that 

he remembers holding his firearm at the “low ready,” the opinion of Mr. Schott on this question, 

and the video footage itself, even Mr. Crump conceded at his deposition that he could not 

remember whether Officer Bahaduri had pointed a gun at the ground or at him. Moreover, Mr. 

Crumps testimony at his deposition and his statement to the internal affairs officer that Officer 

Bahaduri put a gun to his head and that he begged the officer not to shoot him is flatly 

contradicted by the video footage, which shows no such thing. Thus, that testimony is not 

sufficient demonstrate a material dispute of fact under Scott. 

Assuming a jury found that Officer Bahaduri used excessive force by drawing his firearm 

and pointing at the ground, the Court concludes that he did not violate a clearly established right 

and therefore, that he is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.14 As discussed above, at the 

point when Officer Bahaduri allegedly drew his gun Mr. Crump had picked up a pair of garden 

shears and had taken a few steps towards the officer; Mr. Crump was also visibly upset and had 

told Officer Bahaduri a few minutes before that he was going to need back-up. Plaintiff has 

pointed to no case law involving similar facts suggesting that Officer Bahaduri should have known 

that drawing his gun and holding it in a low ready position violated Mr. Crump’s Fourth 

 

14 To the extent Mr. Crump’s excessive force claim is based on Officer House’s drawing of his 

taser, the same reasoning applies to that claim as to Officer Bahaduri’s drawing of his firearm.

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Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Nor is this the sort of egregious violation that 

would make it obvious that this conduct constituted a violation of Mr. Crump’s constitutional 

rights.

Similarly, with respect to the allegation of painful handcuffing, the Court finds that while 

there may be material factual disputes as to whether the officers used excessive force, they are 

entitled to qualified immunity. “[H]andcuffing substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of an 

otherwise routine investigatory detention.” United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th 

Cir. 1982). Thus, in the absence of probable cause, courts look to whether officers reasonably 

believed an individual was likely to flee or presented a danger to the officers or the public in 

determining whether the use of handcuffs was reasonable. Id. On the other hand, courts typically 

find that the initial decision to place an individual in handcuffs is reasonable if there is probable 

cause to believe a crime has been committed. See, e.g., Davis v. Cty. of San Bernardino, No. 

EDCV 08-1262SVWSSX, 2009 WL 3838287, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009), aff’d, 442 F. 

App’x 300 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that initial decision to place plaintiff in handcuffs did not 

violate Fourth Amendment based, in part, on finding that there was probable cause). Nonetheless, 

“abusive application of handcuffs” may violate the Fourth Amendment even if there is probable 

cause. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Wall v. Cnty. of Orange, 

364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (“overly tight handcuffing can constitute excessive force.”). 

Mr. Crump contends “one can see from the close ups of the video that the officers placed 

Mr. Crump in a form of thumb and or wrist lock and forced his arms above his shoulders, tearing 

his rotator cuffs.” Opposition at 9; see also Crump Decl. ¶ 46 (“I learned later that the officers 

had used so much force that they tore my rotator cuffs, and I had to have surgery to repair both 

sides.”). Although Mr. Crump has not offered any medical evidence that his rotator cuffs were 

torn neither have Defendants offered conflicting evidence that they were not torn (or that it was 

not because of the handcuffing). If Mr. Crump’s statement that his rotator cuffs were torn as a 

result of the handcuffing is admissible there is a material dispute of fact as to whether the 

handcuffing constituted excessive force. The Court does not reach that question, though, because 

it finds that under the specific circumstances of this case, Mr. Crump’s right to be free from 

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excessive force was not well-established.

“The Ninth Circuit has allowed excessive force claims based on handcuffing to proceed to 

the jury where repeated requests to loosen the handcuffs were ignored and the plaintiff suffered 

some injury.” Chambers v. Steiger, No. C14-1678-JCC-MAT, 2015 WL 9872531, at *7 (W.D. 

Wash. Oct. 29, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. C14-1678-JCC, 2016 WL 235764 

(W.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 2016) (citation omitted); see also Malek v. Green, No. 17-CV-00263-BLF, 

2017 WL 4284117, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017) (holding that officers were entitled to 

qualified immunity as to claim based on painful handcuffing where there were no allegations of 

abnormal handcuffing procedure, visible manifestations of the plaintiff’s pre-existing injury that 

allegedly made handcuffing painful, or “even a request by [the plaintiff] to the Officers to loosen 

or remove the handcuffs”). In Malek, the court found that there was no clearly established right as 

to the handcuffing based on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Walls because in that case the plaintiff 

had repeatedly complained to the officers that the handcuffs were too tight and they ignored him; 

there was also evidence that he suffered nerve damage from the handcuffing and had to give up his 

profession as a dentist as a result. 2017 WL 4284117, at *18 (citing Walls, 364 F.3d at 1110-

1112)).

Here, there is some evidence of injury but there is no evidence that Mr. Crump complained 

to the officers, either while the officers placed the handcuffs on him or during the period that 

followed, when Mr. Crump continued to converse with the officers while sitting on a bench in 

handcuffs. Instead, the video footage shows that he never alerted the officers that they were 

hurting him or that the handcuffs were causing him pain. Even assuming that the officers’ manner

of placing Mr. Crump in handcuffs caused him injury, the Court has found no case law 

demonstrating that they violated well-established constitutional rights where Mr. Crump did not 

complain and there was no other circumstance that would have made it apparent to the officers 

that they were causing him pain or injury. As in Malek, this court finds that the facts here are 

distinguishable from Walls and therefore, that case is not sufficient to show that the officers 

violated a clearly established right. Accordingly, the Court concludes the officers are entitled to 

qualified immunity on Mr. Crump’s claim that he was subjected to excessive force in violation of 

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the Fourth Amendment.

For these reasons the Court GRANTS the Motion as to Mr. Crump’s Fourth Amendment 

claims.

2. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

To demonstrate retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must prove that 

the defendant “took action that ‘would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future 

First Amendment activities.’” Skoog v. Cty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

In addition, the plaintiff must show that the “desire to cause the chilling effect was a but-for cause 

of the defendant’s action.” Id. In Skoog, the Ninth Circuit found that even where the defendant’s 

conduct is supported by probable cause a plaintiff may be able to establish a violation of his or her 

First Amendment rights. Id. at 1234-1235. Thus, for example, in Ford v. City of Yakima, the 

court found that there was sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on a First 

Amendment retaliation claim where the plaintiff was arrested for violating a noise ordinance 

following a vehicle stop even though there may have been probable cause for the arrest. 706 F.3d 

1188, 1193-1195 (9th Cir. 2013). 

In Ford, the plaintiff emerged from the car yelling and although he complied with the 

officer’s order to produce his license and registration he told the officer he thought the stop was 

racially motivated as he did so. Id. at 1190. The officer, in turn, made a number of statements 

indicating that his decision to take the plaintiff to jail rather than simply issuing a citation was 

based on the plaintiff’s statements. Id. Among the officer’s statements were the following: “(1) 

‘Stop running the mouth and listen’; (2) ‘If you talk over me, you are going to go to jail, sir. Do 

not talk over me’; (3) ‘If you cooperate, I may let you go with a ticket today. If you run your 

mouth, I will book you in jail for it. Yes, I will, and I will tow your car’; (4) ‘If you cooperate and 

shut your mouth, I'll give you a ticket and you can go.’” Id. at 1190-1191. Later, the officer said 

to the plaintiff:

You’re going to jail for numerous reasons. The crime you’re going to 

jail for is the city noise ordinance. A lot of times we tend to cite and 

release people for that or we give warnings. However ... you acted a 

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fool ... and we have discretion whether we can book or release you. 

You talked yourself—your mouth and your attitude talked you into 

jail. Yes, it did.

Id. at 1191. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of 

defendants on the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, finding that there was sufficient 

evidence for a jury to find that the defendants’ actions would have a chilling effect on the 

plaintiff’s speech and that the defendant’s actions were caused by retaliatory animus. Id. at 1193-

1195.

The court in Ford also found that the officer was not protected by qualified immunity 

because the First Amendment right in that case was well-established. Id. at 1195. The court 

pointed to a 1990 decision, Duran v. City of Douglas, Ariz., 904 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1990), in 

support of its conclusion. Id. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a traffic stop motivated by 

obscene gestures by occupants of the car without any legitimate reason for the stop would 

constitute a “serious First Amendment violation.” 904 F.2d at 1378. The Ford court went on to 

point to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Skoog, in which it held that there may be a violation of an 

individual’s First Amendment rights even where there was probable cause to support the officer’s 

conduct. Ford, 706 F.3d at 1196. Based on this case law, the court in Ford concluded that the 

First Amendment right in that case was clearly established. Id. (“Thus, Duran clearly established 

that police officers may not use their authority to punish an individual for exercising his First 

Amendment rights, while Skoog clearly established that a police action motivated by retaliatory 

animus was unlawful, even if probable cause existed for that action.”). Consequently, the court 

found that the officer in Ford was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. 

The evidence in this case on Mr. Crump’s First Amendment retaliation claim is sufficient 

to survive summary judgment because a jury could reasonably conclude that both the chilling 

effect and the causation requirements are satisfied. As to the first requirement, Plaintiff has 

pointed to evidence of conduct which a jury could conclude would chill his exercise of First 

Amendment rights, namely, detaining him, using excessive force in placing him in handcuffs, and 

prolonging the detention when there was no legitimate reason to do so. He has also offered 

evidence of retaliatory animus. First, the video shows that Mr. Crump cursed at Officer Bahaduri 

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numerous times after he was stopped and that he was detained and placed in handcuffs 

immediately after telling Officer Bahaduri to have a “f***** up night.” While Defendants

contend they were reacting to Mr. Crump’s conduct and not his statements, that is a question more 

appropriately decided by a jury. Second, there is some evidence that the officers’ conduct with 

respect to Mr. Crump’s detention was based on Mr. Crump’s statements and not for a legitimate 

reason. In particular, one of the officer in this case (as in Ford) told Mr. Crump as he sat in 

handcuffs, “it’s your attitude.” This statement was made after Mr. Crump complained that the 

officers’ actions were racially motivated and had called one of the officers a “jackass.” Based on 

this evidence, the Court concludes that Mr. Crump’s First Amendment retaliation claim is 

supported by sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.

The Court further concludes that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on this 

claim. As the court in Duran and Skoog found, it is well-established that retaliatory arrest and 

retaliatory search and seizure by a law enforcement officer violate an individual’s First 

Amendment rights. Thus, to the extent a jury finds that the officers in this case detained Mr. 

Crump or used excessive force against him because of Mr. Crump’s protected statements, the 

officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Therefore, the Court DENIES the 

Motion as to Mr. Crump’s First Amendment Retaliation claim.

3. State Law Claims

a. Battery

Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on the battery claim because 

there was no excessive force, as a matter of law. Because the Court finds that there are material 

disputes of fact with respect to whether the officers used excessive force Defendants’ challenge to 

the battery claim also fails. Therefore, the Motion is DENIED as to the battery claim.

b. False Imprisonment

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the false imprisonment 

claim because the underlying detention was valid. Again, the Court has found that there are 

material disputes of fact on this issue and therefore, that Defendants’ challenge to the false 

imprisonment claim also fails. Therefore, the Motion is DENIED as to the false imprisonment 

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claim. 

c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants contend there is no evidence that the officer’s conduct was “outrageous” and 

therefore, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed. If the jury 

should find that the officers used excessive force against Mr. Crump, or detained him longer than 

necessary in retaliation for Mr. Crump’s complaints (including his complaints that he was being 

wrongfully detained and that the detention was racially motivated), the Court cannot say, as a 

matter of law, that the conduct of the officers was not outrageous. Rather, that is a question that is 

more appropriately decided by a jury.

4. Punitive Damages

Defendants contend BART is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

from punitive state law under California Government Code § 818. Motion at 14 (citing City of 

Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981)). Defendants are correct. At oral 

argument, Mr. Crump’s counsel stipulated that he is seeking punitive damages only as to the 

individual defendants. 

With respect to the individual BART officers, Defendants argue that the request for 

punitive damages should be stricken because the officers did not engage in conduct that would 

warrant an award of punitive damages under Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983). In that case, the 

Court held that “a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 

when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it 

involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” 461 U.S. at 

56. Similarly, under California law, punitive damages may be appropriate “where it is proven by 

clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. The Court concludes that the question of whether this standard is met is 

more appropriately decided by a jury and therefore denies Defendants’ request to strike the prayer 

for punitive damages as to the individual officers named as defendants in this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion is GRANTED as to all of Mr. Crump’s Fourth 

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Amendment Claims, which are dismissed with prejudice. The Court DENIES the Motion in all 

other respects. In addition, the Court modifies the deadlines for filing and exchanging 

pretrial materials set forth in Section V of its pretrial order, Docket No. 41. In particular, 

the materials described in Section V that are to be filed 30 days before the January 25, 2019 

pretrial conference will instead be due 45 days before the pretrial conference, that is, on 

December 11, 2018. Materials that are to be filed 20 days before the pretrial conference 

under Section V will be due 35 days before the pretrial conference, that is, on December 21, 

2018. Finally, the parties are cautioned to adhere strictly to the specific instructions in the pretrial 

order; any pretrial materials that do not comply with the instructions in the pretrial order 

may be stricken. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 10, 2018

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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