Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01808/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01808-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Felix Dean, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 05-1808-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Defendants State of Arizona, Marcella Kay, Patrick

Harrington and David Berns’ (“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.#25).

After reviewing Defendants' unopposed Motion and the record, the Court issues the

following Order. 

I. Procedural History

On June 15, 2005, Plaintiff Felix Dean (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant Complaint.

Plaintiff asserts multiple claims including race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (“Title VII”) and the Arizona

Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 41-1401 et seq., (“ACRA”) as well as disability discrimination

under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.,) and ACRA. After

granting two extensions of time for Plaintiff to effectuate service of process, the Defendants

filed their Answer on January 20, 2006. (Dkt.#7). On March 23, 2006, the Court conducted

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a Rule 16 Scheduling Conference to institute the relevant dates by which the case would be

governed. Notably, the Court set the discovery deadline for October 23, 2006, and the

dispositive motion deadline for November 20, 2006. (Dkt.#12). On November 17, 2006,

the Defendants filed the instant Motion for summary judgment challenging Plaintiff's claims

on multiple grounds. However, to date, Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion. 

II. Factual Background

On January 11, 1999, Plaintiff, an African American male, was hired by the Arizona

Department of Economic Security (“DES”) as a Rehabilitation Services Specialist.

(Defendants Statement of Facts, “DSOF” ¶ 1). On October 7, 2002, Plaintiff applied for and

received educational assistance funds from DES to take two internet courses offered by

Walden University to obtain credit towards a masters' degree. (DSOF ¶ 2). Plaintiff agreed

to reimburse DES if he did not meet certain grade requirements in the courses, i.e., a “B” or

better. (DSOF ¶¶ 2,18). DES issued a check to Plaintiff in the amount of $1,048.00 which

Plaintiff cashed on January 16, 2003. (DSOF ¶ 3). Plaintiff received an “F” in one of the

courses and did not take the other. (DSOF ¶ 4). However, Plaintiff did not reimburse any

portion of the DES payment to him. (DSOF ¶8). 

On August 21, 2003, Plaintiff applied for additional educational assistance from DES

to attend classes at Northcentral University. Plaintiff received a check in the amount of

$1,265.43, which he cashed on September 8, 2003. (DSOF ¶6). Despite the payment,

Plaintiff never enrolled in or paid for any courses at Northcentral University. (DSOF ¶7).

Moreover, Plaintiff did not refund any portion of the amount given to him by DES. (DSOF

¶8). 

On May 21, 2004, Plaintiff was issued a Notice of Charges of Misconduct for

dishonesty based upon obtaining and attempting to obtain education funds through false

pretenses and failing to repay the educational benefit. (DSOF ¶ 12). On May 26, 2004,

Plaintiff filed an employee grievance alleging the notice of charges to be discriminatory.

(DSOF ¶ 13). On June 11, 2004, Plaintiff's employment was terminated. (DSOF ¶ 14). 

III. Standard

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A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if the evidence shows “that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56©). To defeat the motion, the non-moving

party must show that there are genuine factual issues “that properly can be resolved only by

a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate against

a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

Although a court may not grant a motion for summary judgment simply because the

non-moving party does not file opposing material, a court may grant summary judgment

when the unopposed moving papers are sufficient on their face and show no issues of

material fact exist. Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993).

Moreover, a court is under no duty to advise a pro se non-prisoner plaintiff to respond to such

a motion or what is required to meet his evidentiary burden. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d

1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating “district court did not have to inform [pro se nonprisoner plaintiff] of the need to file affidavits or other responsive matter before granting

summary judgment against him”). 

IV. Analysis

A. Res Judicata

Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims are all barred by the doctrine of res judicata

or claim preclusion based upon a prior Superior Court dismissal of Plaintiff's claims. State

law governs the application of res judicata to a state court judgment. Ayers v. City of

Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990). In Arizona, res judicata will preclude a

claim “when a former judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent

jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties was, or might have been,

determined in the former action.” Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54, 57, 977 P.2d 776, 779 (Ariz.

1999) (citation omitted). A valid final judgment is conclusive as to every issue decided and

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It appears that in both the state and federal proceedings, Plaintiff expressly named

as defendants, the State of Arizona and the Arizona Department of Economic Security and

served such parties in addition to serving the individual Defendants not named in either suit.

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every issue raised by record that could have been decided. See Heinig v. Hudman, 177 Ariz.

66, 71, 865 P.2d 110, 115 (Ariz.App. 1994). In the instant case, it is clear that Plaintiff's

claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. A review of Plaintiff's prior state court

litigation in Maricopa County Superior Court exemplifies this conclusion. 

On October 13, 2004, prior to the instant lawsuit being filed, Plaintiff filed a

complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court asserting the same allegations and claims

against the State of Arizona, the Arizona Department of Economic Security and various John

Does. (DSOF ¶15).1

 In fact, a comparison of the Superior Court complaint with the instant

complaint, filed on June 15, 2005, reveals that the two complaints are a virtual mirror image

of each other. Additionally, on February 10, 2006, during the pendency of the instant action,

the Superior Court issued an order dismissing Plaintiff's lawsuit for failure to prosecute due

to Plaintiff's failure to make disclosures pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Arizona Rules of Civil

Procedure, failure to respond to requests for admissions, failure to appear for the Rule 16

pretrial conference and failure to appear for the final pretrial management conference. (DSOF

¶17). These circumstances demonstrate that Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants in the

instant Court have already been addressed to finality in prior state court proceedings.

Importantly, as expressly stated in Rule 41(b), a dismissal for failure to prosecute operates

as an adjudication upon the merits. See Phillips v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 596,

598, 601 P.2d 596, 598 (Ariz. 1979) (finding dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) operates as

final judgment for res judicata purposes). In addition, there can be no doubt that the

judgment is final as Plaintiff has not appealed the Superior Court's ruling. See Better Homes

Constr., Inc. v. Goldwater, 203 Ariz. 295, 298, 53 P.3d 1139 (Ariz.App. 2002) (“[i]n order

for res judicata or collateral estoppel to apply, there must be a final decision.) (citations

omitted) (emphasis original). 

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V. Summary

Plaintiff's action is barred by principles of res judicata. The previous state court

litigation raised identical claims to those presented here and was litigated to final judgment

upon the merits. Because Plaintiff's action is clearly barred, thus the Court will not visit the

other grounds for dismissal raised by Defendants. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Dkt.25).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment

accordingly. 

DATED this 5th day of July, 2007.

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