Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02468/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02468-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN L. BOYD, JR.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CV-2468 JLS (RBB)

ORDER: (1) ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION, AND

(2) GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Doc. Nos. 9, 13)

vs.

DOMINGO URIBE, JR., WARDEN,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Respondent Domingo Uribe, Jr.’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss Petitioner Glenn L. Boyd, Jr.’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

(Doc. No. 9.) Also before this Court is Magistrate Judge Ruben B. Brooks’ report and

recommendation (“R&R”) advising this Court to grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss, (Doc. No. 13)

and Petitioner’s objections and request for leave to amend. (Doc. No. 14.) For the following reasons,

the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, ADOPTS the report and recommendation, and

GRANTS Petitioner’s request for leave to amend.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Magistrate Judge Brooks’ R&R contains a thorough and accurate recitation of the facts

underlying Petitioner’s conviction and state court trial. (R&R at 1–6.) This Order incorporates by

reference the facts as set forth in the R&R.

//

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on February 26, 2010, claiming that (1) the

petition does not challenge the legality or duration of Petitioner’s confinement, (Memo. ISO Motion

at 3–4) (2) Petitioner has no liberty interest in his classification score, (Id. at 4–5) (3) Petitioner fails

to allege sufficient facts to state a prima facie case for relief, (Id. at 5–6) and (4) Petitioner’s

contention that his commitment offense was improperly characterized is improper under habeas corpus

review (Id. at 7). Petitioner responded May 3, 2010. (Doc. No. 12.) Magistrate Judge Brooks issued

his R&R recommending that the Court deny the petition on June 8, 2010. (Doc. No. 13.) Petitioner

lodged his objections on July 1, 2009. (Doc. No. 14.) 

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. REVIEW OF THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth the

duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. “The

district court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(c); see also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614,

617 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980).

II. REVIEW OF HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Magistrate Judge Brooks correctly stated the governing legal standard in his R&R. (R&R at

6–8.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), this Court may only review claims within an application for

a writ of habeas corpus based “on the ground that [the Petitioner] is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

“Habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the ‘legality

or duration’ of confinement. A civil rights action, in contrast, is the proper method of challenging

‘conditions of . . . confinement.’” Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 498–99 (1973)). The Supreme Court has yet to address the propriety

of using habeas corpus to challenge the conditions of confinement. Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024,

1028 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n.6 (1979)). However, the Ninth

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Circuit has held that “habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action proper, where a

successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner's sentence.”

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003)

III. REVIEW OF A MOTION TO DISMISS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that

the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” generally referred to as a

motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and

sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — US — , 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Further, the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions”

contained in the complaint. Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court’s

“judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950 (citation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded

facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id.

ANALYSIS

Magistrate Judge Brooks found that none of Petitioner’s claims sufficiently stated a claim for

habeas relief because all allegations challenge the conditions of Petitioner’s confinement rather than

the legality or duration of his state court conviction as required for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

(R&R at 8–10.) 

Petitioner objects to the R&R, essentially re-arguing the case that he made in his petition. The

Court has reviewed the R&R and the supporting materials de novo and finds the R&R is correct and

the petition must be dismissed. Magistrate Judge Brooks’ R&R correctly identifies the facts and legal

standards governing this case and comes to the proper conclusion. Therefore, the Court

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OVERRULES Petitioners objections and ADOPTS IN FULL the R&R.

Petitioner’s Objections, like his Petition, are centered on the November 22, 2006 Institutional

Classification Committee hearing that re-characterized his commitment offence as an execution-type

murder resulting in Petitioner’s ineligibility to be housed at a level II institution and consequent

transfer to a level III facility. (R&R at 3; Objections at 3–8.) None of Petitioner’s objections address

the fact that the petition does not challenge the legality or duration of his confinement.

Petitioner argues that reclassification is “applied in an abusive, arbitrary and capricious

manner.” (Objections at 4.) Petitioner contends that the committee characterizations of executiontype murders “apply[] [the] unusual violence definition arbitrarily,” have “no clear definition of

unusual violence,” and use “execution type murder in an ambiguous manner.” (Id. at 7.) He argues

that this “cursory approach, on the fly, can now fit any up close murder” and that “the actions of these

committee members where there is (sic) no guild (sic) lines to define how these policies should apply,

inmates are being arbitrarily and capriciously place (sic) back in a level III prison.” (Id.) “[T]he

Warden can not (sic) simply delegate this authority [to reclassify] to his subordinates by rubber

stamping the action of his staff.” (Id. at 6.) 

Even if accurate, Petitioner’s argument against the policies and procedures of recharacterization of commitment offences fails to address the R&R. These assertions cannot change

the basic holding that a habeas corpus claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may only challenge the legality

or duration of confinement.

Petitioner also asserts that unguided application of reclassification procedures discriminates

against well-behaved Level II inmates. (See id. at 5 (“[reclassification procedures are] dubious and

specious to say the least, in that there appears to be an under tone (sic) discrimination against (sic)

certain class (sic) of inmates whom (sic) have stayed out of trouble.”).) He believes that the

discretionary application of reclassification and inadequate training of staff are the cause of the alleged

discrimination. (See id. at 6 (“Because the new application of 3375 UCC, ICC and CSR are unable

to create a classification on the ‘fly.’ (sic) Thus, this classification policy is discriminatory. This can

be traced to staff inadequate training (sic).”).) But these arguments also have nothing to do with the

legality or duration of Petitioner’s confinement. 

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Petitioner continues his criticism of reclassification procedures claiming that “[t]his phantom

classification is also inviolation (sic) of Office of Administrative Law (OAL) and the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA).” (Id. at 6.) This argument is directed at the validity of reclassification

procedures which do not implicate the legality or duration of Petitioner’s confinement.

Finally, Petitioner asserts that reclassification is a violation of due process. The Court agrees

with the R&R’s response to Petitioner’s original due process argument: “Even so, this claim, and

Boyd’s remaining claims, all affect the conditions of his confinement and are not cognizable under

federal habeas review.” (R&R at 10.)

To repeat, as found by Magistrate Judge Brooks, the petition fails because it does not challenge

the legality or duration of his confinement. Petitioner’s objections do not even address this question.

Thus, the R&R must be ADOPTED and the motion to dismiss GRANTED.

These complaints are instead properly brought as a civil rights complaint. SeeBadea, 931 F.2d

at 574. Petitioner seemingly agrees and requests either that the Court grant leave to amend to bring

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or that the Court construe his petition “as a Writ of Mandate,

Alternative Writ.” (Objections at 9.) In the interest of judicial economy, the Court will allow

Petitioner to amend in order to assert his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS IN FULL Magistrate Judge Brooks’ report

and recommendations. The petition is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and

Petitioner’s request for leave to amend is GRANTED. Petitioner MAY FILE his amended complaint

BY Friday, October 1, 2010. The Clerk of Court is directed to send Petitioner a blank 42 U.S.C. §

1983 civil rights complaint form, along with a copy of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 11, 2010

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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