Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05171/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05171-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2005 Decided July 15, 2005

No. 04-5171

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY,

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

No. 04-5172

CECIL BREWINGTON ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY,

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01978)

(No. 98cv01693)

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 1 of 33
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Alexander J. Pires, Jr. argued the cause for the appellants.

Howard S. Scher, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Peter D. Keisler,

Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of

Justice, Kenneth L. Wainstein, United States Attorney, and

Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, United States Department of Justice,

were on brief.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part

filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: This appeal

arises from a longstanding discrimination action by black

farmers against the United States Department of Agriculture

(Department) alleging racial discrimination in the administration

of federally-funded credit and benefit programs. The appellants

are farmers whose discrimination claims were denied in

adjudications conducted pursuant to a Consent Decree and

whose petitions for review of the adverse adjudications were

rejected as untimely because they were filed after the stipulated

deadlines that the parties negotiated and the court approved in

a Stipulation and Order (S&O). The appellants challenge the

district court’s denial of their motions for relief from the

stipulated deadlines under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and the

court’s inherent equitable authority. Because the court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motions, we affirm its

judgment. 

I.

In 1997 a class of black farmers filed this action in the

district court alleging racial discrimination in violation of the

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1The complaint also alleged violation of the Fifth Amendment to

the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., but, according to the district court, “both

sides agree that this case essentially is brought under the Equal Credit

Opportunity Act.” Pigf ord v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86 (D.D.C.

1999), affirmed, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq.

1 On

April 14, 1999 the district court entered the Consent Decree

which established a two-track system for resolving the

individual class members’ claims. Pigford v. Glickman, 185

F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), affirmed, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir.

2001). Under Track A, a class member with little or no

documentary evidence could submit his claim to an adjudicator

and obtain payment of $50,000 and forgiveness of debt owed the

Department if he proved discrimination by substantial evidence.

Such a claimant “has a fairly low burden of proof but his

recovery is limited.” Id. at 96. Track B, by contrast, set no

dollar cap on a claimant’s recovery but the claimant must prove

discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, “a higher

burden of proof.” Id. A claimant in either track could file a

petition for review of an adverse decision by the adjudicator

with an independent monitor who “shall direct the adjudicator

to reexamine the claim if he determines that ‘a clear and

manifest error has occurred’ that is ‘likely to result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice.’ ” Id. at 97 (quoting

Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii), at 21.

Because the Consent Decree provided no timetable for

seeking review by the monitor, the parties negotiated filing

deadlines which are set out in the S&O entered by the district

court on July 14, 2000. Under the S&O any claimant who had

received an adverse adjudicator decision as of the date of the

S&O had 120 days from that date (i.e., by November 13, 2000)

to file a petition with the monitor. Any claimant who received

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an adverse decision after the S&O’s date had 120 days from the

date of the adjudication to file a petition. The S&O expressly

recites: “No extensions of these deadlines will be granted for

any reason.” Id. 

On October 31, 2000 the claimants’ class counsel filed a

motion seeking to “redesign” the “unworkable” petition filing

process, noting that as of that date counsel had filed petitions on

behalf of only 297 of the 3,873 claimants requesting filing

assistance. Pls.’ Mot. for Expedited Hearing at 7, 3-4 (filed Oct.

31, 2000). Following a conference with the parties the district

court issued an order on November 8, 2000 directing that, in lieu

of a completed petition for each of the claimants, counsel could

satisfy the November 13, 2000 deadline by submitting a

“Register of Petitions” (Register) which simply listed the name

and claim number of each claimant who had sought counsel’s

assistance in filing a petition for review of an adverse decision

issued as of the S&O date. Pigford v. Glickman, C.A. Nos. 97-

1978, 98-1693 (D.D.C. filedNov. 8, 2000), 2000 WL34292618.

The court explained that, while “counsel should be held to the

commitments to which they agreed,” nonetheless “counsel’s

failings should not be visited on their clients.” Id. at 3, 4, 2000

WL 34292618, at *1. The court further directed that class

counsel file 400 of the Register’s petitions by December 15,

2000 and another 400 by the 15th of each month thereafter up to

a final filing date of May 15, 2001. The order recited: “Under

no circumstances shall the Monitor accept supporting materials

or withdrawals after May 15, 2001.” Id. at 5, 2000 WL

34292618, at *3. In effect, the court doubled the stipulated time

to file a petition for review of an adjudication decided as of the

date of the S&O. 

On March 15, 2001 the appellants filed a motion for an order

suspending the May 15, 2001 deadline. The district court held

a status conference and on April 27, 2001 issued an order

directing “that all deadlines set forth in the Court’s Order of

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November 8, 2000, are suspended until further order of the

Court” pending a scheduled meeting on May 1, 2001 between

class counsel and outside lawyers “who might be able to

assemble a team of pro bono lawyers to assist class counsel on

an emergency basis.” Pigford v. Veneman, 144 F. Supp. 2d 16,

20 (D.D.C. 2001). In addition, the court ordered that if, after the

May 1 meeting, class counsel decided additional time was

necessary they should file a motion for extension no later than

May 4, 2001 setting out a “realistic” filing schedule. 

After the pro bono meeting the appellants proposed

extending the filing deadline to September 15, 2001 and the

district court so ordered on May 15, 2001, finding the new

deadline “both realistic and reasonable” in light of the

“impressive commitment made by pro bono counsel to assist

Class Counsel.” Pigford v. Veneman, 143 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30

(D.D.C. 2001). The May 15, 2001 order warned that “[u]nder

no circumstances . . . shall the Monitor accept supporting

materials or withdrawals that are filed after September 15,

2001.” Id. at 31. Class counsel, with pro bono assistance,

succeeded in filling all of the remaining petitions by the new

deadline. 

On July 19, 2002 class counsel filed a motion seeking relief

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) or the court’s inherent equitable

authority on behalf of 387 claimants whose review petitions had

been rejected as untimely. On June 2, 2003 the district court

denied the motion, concluding there were no changed

circumstances that justified modifying the S&O deadlines (as

amended). Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C.

2003). The claimants moved for reconsideration, which the

district court denied on March 10, 2004. Pigford v. Veneman,

307 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2004). This appeal followed.

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2

Initially the appellants moved to modify the S&O under Rule

60(b)(5). It was not until their motion for reconsideration that they

II.

The appellants comprise two groups of late-filing claimants:

(1) those represented by class counsel, now numbering 92, and

some 208 others who either proceeded pro se or were

represented by lawyers unaffiliated with class counsel. Class

counsel argues on behalf of each group that the district court

erred in denying relief from the filing deadlines under either

Rule 60(b)(5) or its inherent equitable power. We review the

district court’s decision whether to modify a consent order,

either under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) or pursuant to its inherent

authority, for abuse of discretion. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk

County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992) (Rule 60(b)); Shepherd

v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(inherent authority). We conclude the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion for relief.

A. Class Counsel Petitions

The district court denied the appellants’ motion for relief as

to the 92 petitions filed late by class counsel because the

appellants failed to demonstrate “changed circumstances” to

warrant modifying the S&O schedule under Rule 60(b)(5),

which provides in relevant part: “On motion and upon such

terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for

the following reasons: . . . (5) . . . it is no longer equitable that

the judgment should have prospective application . . . .” The

appellants challenge the court’s Rule 60(b)(5) decision on two

grounds. We address each in turn.

First, the appellants assert the district court incorrectly

invoked Rule 60(b)(5) because the rule governs only orders that

are final.2 The appellants contend that the S&O was not a final

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first suggested the S&O was not final and therefore not subject to Rule

60(b). Hedging their bets on appeal, they invoke the court’s

jurisdiction either under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which establishes this

court’s “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district

courts of the United States,” or under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which

allows appeals of “[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the

United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or

dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions,

except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” See

Appellants’ Br. at 1. 

order and that therefore the court should have decided whether

to grant relief solely under its inherent equitable authority. See

Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1240 (D.C.

Cir. 1980) (“The power of a District Court sitting as a court of

equity to modify the terms of a settlement agreement it

previously adopted cannot be drawn into question.”). As a

practical matter, it makes little difference whether the district

court resolved the motion under Rule 60 or under its equitable

authority as the standard for each is substantially the same.

Compare Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,

393 (1992) (under Rule 60(b)(5), “a party seeking modification

of a consent decree must establish that a significant change in

facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the

proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed

circumstance”), withEnvtl. Defense Fund, Inc, 636 F.2d at 1240

(“[S]ound exercise of judicial discretion may require that terms

of a consent decree be modified when there has been a

significant change in the circumstances obtaining at the time the

consent decree was entered.”). Nonetheless, we conclude that

the court correctly invoked Rule 60(b)(5).

The appellants do not dispute that the Consent Decree itself

is final within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5). See Appellants’

Br. at 19. They contend, however, that because the S&O simply

“establish[es] procedures for enforcing or implementing the

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3Because the S&O is a final order subject to Rule 60(b), the

district court’s order denying relief is likewise final so that we have

decree,” the S&O is “not considered ‘final’ within the meaning

of Rule 60.” Id. (citing United States v. W. Elec. Co., 777 F.2d

23 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Bogard v. Right, 159 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir.

1998)). The authorities the appellants cite do not support their

position. In Western Elec. this court reviewed the district

court’s denial of a request for waiver from restrictions in a

consent decree based on the district court’s decision not to

consider the merits of such a waiver request until a later time

when “ ‘there is substantial competition in local telecommunications service.’ ” 777 F.2d at 25 (quoting United

States v. W. Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 868 (D.D.C. 1984)).

We explained that the district court’s order denying the request

was not “final” “because the district court contemplated further

proceedings before ruling on the requests.” Id. at 26. Similarly

in Bogard, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an order that

extended the term of a monitor initially appointed for a threeyear term “unless extended by order of this court” was not a

final order because it had “no termination date” and therefore

“[t]he postjudgment proceeding could drag on for many years

and involve a host of far-reaching orders the consequences of

which could not be undone when (if ever) the postjudgment

proceeding ended with a showing of compliance so complete

that the monitor’s services could be dispensed with.” 159 F.3d

at 1062-63. By contrast, the district court’s S&O fixed final

deadlines for filing petitions with the monitor. See S&O ¶ 5, at

4 (“No extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any

reason.”). As with the Consent Decree, which the S&O

supplemented, no further court action was contemplated at the

time the S&O issued. That the S&O was in fact subsequently

modified by the court in response to the appellants’ requests

does not make it any less final. Such modification of a final

order is precisely what Rule 60(b) contemplates.3 

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appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 rather than under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), see supra note 2. See Lasky v. Cont’l Prods.

Corp. 804 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1986) (“ ‘[I]t is now well established

that orders denying a motion for relief from a judgment under Civil

Rule 60 are final.’ ” (quoting 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3916, at 610-11 (1976)).

Next, the appellants contend that even if the S&O is a final

order subject to Rule 60(b), the district court abused its

discretion in failing to modify the S&O for changed

circumstances. Again we disagree. 

In the June 2, 2003 order denying the appellants’ motion for

relief, the district court rejected their contention that “the large

volume of claimants requesting assistance with petitions during

a short period of time” constituted a changed circumstance

because it “occurred before, not after, the relevant deadlines

were agreed to by the parties and endorsed by the Court.” 265

F. Supp. 2d at 46 (emphasis by court). The court explained:

“The exponential increase in claimants was fully apparent when

plaintiffs and defendant negotiated and agreed to the July 14,

2000 Stipulation and Order, including its clear provision that ‘no

extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason.’ ”

Id. at 46 (quoting (S&O ¶ 5, at 4)). The appellants do not

quibble with the court’s analysis, see Appellants’ Br. at 22, but

contend the court abused its discretion by failing to grant relief

based on four other changed circumstances: (1) the unusually

high number of claimants with meritorious grounds for review

of their claim denials (caused by an unusually high rate of errors

by the adjudicators); (2) the extreme work load borne by the two

small class counsel firms because outside “of counsels”

participated only “minimally” in the review petition filing

(particularly after the court’s March 8, 2001 ruling that

attorney’s fees for monitor review work not be available until

after readjudication of reviewed claims produced a “disincentive

to work on the monitor review process,” Appellants’ Br. at 24);

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4Contrary to the appellants’ characterization, the Register was not

an “extra step” but a substitute step, and a less onerous one, which

relieved class counsel of their commitment to file all petitions by the

November 13, 2001 deadline. The district court therefore reasonably

rejected the notion that the Register was a changed circumstance

warranting relief.

(3) the exhaustion of class counsel’s funds and credit by March

2, 2001; and (4) the “extra step” created by the Register

provision. It is no surprise that the district court did not address

these four changed circumstances in its initial decision as the

appellants raised them for the first time in their motion for

reconsideration. Compare Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for

Relief at 32-34 (filed July 19, 2002) and Pls.’ Reply to Def.’s

Opp’n to Mot. for Relief at 4-7 (filed Nov. 6, 2002) with Pls.’

Mot. for Recons. at 9-16 (filed June 16, 2003). When the court

addressed these newly raised circumstances in the

reconsideration order, its response was admittedly brief: “The

Court is well aware of the circumstances surrounding these

petitions and further elaboration does not change this Court’s

opinion that plaintiffs have not demonstrated changed

circumstances sufficient to justify modification of the Court’s

Orders under Rule 60(b)(5).” 307 F. Supp. 2d at 48. The

court’s brevity, however, is understandable given what had

come before.

To the extent the four new circumstances adversely affected

the petition filing process, the court had already taken them into

account and provided the appellants with relief. In response to

class counsel’s October 31, 2000 plea of an unexpectedly high

volume of meritorious review petitions, the court modified the

S&O on November 8 to permit class counsel to satisfy the

November 13, 2000 filing deadline through the simple Register

listing, a remedy the appellants accepted without complaint.4

When class counsel sought relief in spring 2001 because of their

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5After the court ordered payment of an interim $7 million fee

award on August 4, 2000, class counsel did not seek additional fees

until they moved for a third interim award on January 12, 2001, when

they did not allege any existing financial hardship but only that they

then “face[d] significant hardship based on their financing of the

implementation of the Consent Decree” for which they had “incurred

substantial financial obligations in the form of bank loans.” Mem. in

Supp. of Mot. for Third Award of Atty’s Fees at 3 (filed Jan. 12, 2001)

(emphasis added). 

6The court’s abbreviated response on reconsideration may have

been influenced as well by its perception of class counsel’s

indifference toward the filing deadlines: “At the April 19 status

conference, Class Counsel made the remarkable admission that they

never had a realistic expectation of meeting the November 13, 2000,

deadline they had negotiated with the government, nor did they have

any intention of meeting the modified May 15, 2001, deadline set by

the Court.” 144 F. Supp. 2d at 18. 

depleted resources, both financial and human,5the court granted

a four-month extension until September 15, 2001, by which

deadline all of the remaining petitions were filed. Given the

district court’s repeated accommodation of class counsel’s

continuing delinquency, we cannot say the court abused its

discretion in denying the appellants’ motion for further relief.6

The dissent contends the district court erred in two respects.

First, it argues the court erred in relying on a finding of fact that

the “critical changed circumstances” occurred before the parties

agreed to the deadline in the S&O. Dissent at 5, 11. We

perceive no such error. The court was correct when it found as

a fact in its June 2, 2003 decision denying relief that “[t]he

exponential increase in claimants was fully apparent when

plaintiffs and defendant negotiated and agreed to the July 14,

2000 Stipulation and Order,” 265 F. Supp. 2d at 47, as the

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7The appellants state in their brief: “In its June 2, 2003 order, the

District Court correctly noted that, as of July 14, 2000 plaintiffs were

aware of the vastly greater number of claimants than originally had

been anticipated.” Appellants’ Br. at 22. 

8Notwithstanding the contrary suggestion in the Dissent at 11, the

only reference to “critical changed circumstances” in the

reconsideration decision came when the court repeated the statement

first made in its June 2, 2003 decision to explain (correctly) that the

new argument raised by lawyers who had been “of counsel” when the

S&O was entered—that the S&O “itself was a change in

circumstances” because non-class counsel “was not involved in the

decision to negotiate and agree to the deadlines imposed” in

it—likewise suffered from “ ‘the fundamental flaw . . . that the critical

‘changed circumstance’ on which plaintiffs rely occurred before, not

after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to by the parties and endorsed

by the Court.’ ” 307 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (quoting 265 F. Supp. 2d at 46).

appellants acknowledge.7 The district court was also correct

when it stated in the June 2, 2003 order that “the critical

‘changed circumstance’ on which plaintiffs rely occurred before,

not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to by the parties

and endorsed by the Court.” 265 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (first

emphasis added).8 The appellants had argued at that stage that

relief from the deadlines was warranted because of “[t]he

predominant change in circumstances, since the Consent Decree

was approved in 1999,” namely, that “the number of

participants, with or without counsel, has increased 400-500%,

overwhelming the system set up by the Consent Decree,” Pls.’

Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Relief at 4-5, plainly referring

to the increased number of claimants. It is not at all surprising

if, as the dissent notes, Dissent at 3, the court’s June 2, 2003

order “ignored the key distinction argued by appellants in the

motion for reconsideration” of the order, which was filed on

June 16, 2003. Further, as we noted supra, the court had already

granted relief from the increase in meritorious petitions when it

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established the simplified Register procedure for meeting the

November 13, 2000 filing deadline.

Second, the dissent asserts the district court erred as a matter

of law by failing to consider whether class counsel’s failures to

meet the deadlines amounted to an “unforeseen obstacle

warranting relief.” Dissent at 11. The dissent relies on the

court’s decision in Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (Pigford I), for the proposition that “where class members

lack competent counsel, counsel’s failure to meet deadlines

itself may amount to an ‘unforeseen obstacle’ that makes the

decree ‘unworkable.’ ” Dissent at 6 (quoting Pigford I, 292 F.3d

at 925). Pigford I, however, presented a different situation in

two respects. First, contrary to the dissent’s characterization,

Pigford I did not present “the same issue of modification of

deadlines” as here, Dissent at 9 (emphasis by dissent), so as to

implicate law of the case. In Pigford I the court modified the

consent order to permit arbitrators to extend the deadlines for

filing evidentiary materials in Track B litigation, set out in

paragraph 10 of the Consent Decree, based on class counsel’s

“malpractice” in the Track B litigation, namely, “its inability to

represent all Track B claimants adequately,’ ” Pigford I, 292

F.3d at 925 (quoting 182 F. Supp. 2d at 52), as exemplified by

one lawyer’s failure to timely file a claimant’s direct testimony

with the arbitrator. Here, the appellants seek to modify the

S&O’s Track A deadlines for filing review petitions under

paragraph 12(b)(iii), relying on their repeated failures to meet

the filing deadlines. Second, Pigford I came before us in a

different posture. In that decision, we rejected the district

court’s determination that the consent decree could be

interpreted to permit extending deadlines but affirmed the

decision to extend deadlines based on the alternative ground, not

addressed by the district court, that the decree could be so

modified under Rule 60(b)(5) because counsel’s failures

amounted to changed circumstances warranting relief under

Rule 60(b)(5). Because we affirmed the district court’s

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9We note that the appellants did not establish below that all of the

208 claimants in fact lacked notice and there is reason to believe that

at least some of them did not. See Surreply to Pls.’Reply to Def.’s

decision, we were free to do so, as we did, on a ground not

reached by the district court and without reviewing the district

court’s rationale. EEOC v. Aramark Corp, 208 F.3d 266, 268

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Although the district court never addressed

the safe harbor provision, the issue is fully briefed, and because

we review the district court’s judgment, not its reasoning, we

may affirm on any ground properly raised.”) (citing Doe v.

Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). In this case,

however, we review the district court’s decision not to grant

relief and “may overturn such an order only for abuse of

discretion.” Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 1192

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (citingComputer Prof’ls for Soc. Responsibility

v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Twelve

John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C.

Cir. 1988)). Although the district court might have been

warranted in modifying the deadlines based on class counsel’s

failure to meet deadlines, as we explained supra, the court did

not abuse its discretion in declining to do so. For us to decide

the question sua sponte or require the district court to do so as

a matter of law, as the dissent suggests, would infringe on the

district court’s discretion and run counter to “the presumption of

client accountability for attorney conduct” which, as we

confirmed in Pigford I, applies in class actions. See Pigford I,

292 F.3d at 927.

B. Pro Se and Unaffiliated Counsel Petitions

Next, the appellants contend the district court abused its

discretion in denying relief under its inherent equitable authority

to the late filing claimants who were not represented by class

counsel and did not, class counsel contends, receive actual

notice of the S&O deadlines.9 In their motion for relief the

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Resp. to Mot. for Recons. at 6 (filed Aug. 15, 2003). 

10The S&O expressly required only that a copy of its text be

posted in every Department Farm Services Agency county office and

mailed to everyone who “requested a Claim Sheet and Election Form”

but “did not submit a [timely] completed Claim Form.” S&O ¶ 7, at

5. The actual notification procedures, however, were far more

extensive as the monitor mailed notices to all claimants who filed a

completed claim form by August 17, 2000 (approximately 20,652 in

all) and all decision letters sent after November 15, 2001 explained the

filing deadline. Monitor’s Report to Court Regarding Class Notice at

3-5.

appellants cited lack of notice as a “changed circumstance”

supporting modification of the S&O under either Rule 60(b)(5)

or the court’s inherent authority because “Track A decision

letters issued after July 14, 2000 mistakenly omitted language

informing claimants that they had 120 days from the date of the

decision to petition the Monitor for review.” Pls.’ Mem. in

Supp. of Mot. for Relief at 13-14. The district court rejected this

argument because the S&O did not require the letters to include

such notice and therefore its absence was not a changed

circumstance.10 On reconsideration, the appellants took a

different tack, arguing that when class members “do not receive

actual notice of a deadline by which they must take some action

to preserve their claims, and therefore miss the deadline, the

District Court may ‘exercise its equitable authority to excuse the

late filings.’ ” Pls.’Reply to Def.’s Resp. to Mot. for Recons. at

11-12 (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liability

Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration original)).

The appellants further urged the court to apply the “excusable

neglect” standard in exercising its inherent authority as well as

the four factors the Third Circuit adopted under the standard in

Orthopedic, namely: 

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1) the danger of prejudice to the nonmovant; 2) the length of

the delay and its potential effect on judicial proceedings; 3)

the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the

reasonable control of the movant; and 4) whether the movant

acted in good faith.

246 F.3d at 322-23 (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick

Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). The district

court applied the Third Circuit’s formulation and under the first

and third factors found no excusable neglect warranting

equitable relief because of the potential prejudice to the

Department and the appellants’ role in drafting the S&O. The

court concluded (1) that the government “ ‘will “be prejudiced

to the tune of almost one million dollars” if the Court permits

consideration of the late petitions and if even five percent of

them are successful,’ ” 307 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (quoting Pigford

v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 50), and (2) “because the

deadlines were negotiated and agreed to by plaintiffs, it logically

follows that the resulting failure to meet those deadlines had

been within the reasonable control of plaintiffs,” id. at 50-51. In

so concluding the court did not abuse its discretion. As the

district court pointed out in the May 27, 2001 order suspending

the deadlines: “As part of the bargain struck between the parties

and approved by the Court in the Order of July 14, 2000, class

counsel agreed to meet the 120 day deadline in return for the

government’s agreement to admit more than 1,100 Track A

claimants into the class who otherwise would have been

excluded.” 144 F. Supp. 2d at 19 n.2. If the district court had

granted the requested relief from the deadlines, the government

would have lost the benefit of its bargain—certainty and finality

as to its maximum liability as of the agreed upon date—while

the claimant class would have recovered the bargained-away

right to compensation for claimants filing review petitions

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 16 of 33
17

11The dissent inexplicably faults our reference to the district

court’s May 27, 2001 finding that the government bargained for the

November 13, 2000 filing deadline in explaining the district court’s

finding of prejudice to the government made in its June 2, 2003 order

denying the appellants’ motion for Rule 60(b) relief. See Dissent at

13. We doubt that in the interim the district court either forgot or

changed its mind about the quid pro quo nature of the order setting the

deadlines, the modification of which, the court found, would prejudice

the government in an amount upwards of $1 million. Nor do we agree

with the dissent’s characterization of the district court’s findings

regarding the government’s negotiation of the July 14, 2000 S&O

deadline and potential prejudice from its extension as “ironic ” or in

any way inconsistent with its earlier finding on the fairness of the

Consent Decree (which notably lacked a filing deadline) in its April

14, 1999 order. See Dissent at 13.

beyond the stipulated deadlines (as extended by the court).11 The

prejudice to the government distinguishes this case from In re

Orthopedic in which the court found the defendant would suffer

no prejudice because the addition of claimants would have “no

effect on the amount [the defendant] would pay to those

aggrieved by its products” as its liability had been capped by a

settlement agreement. 246 F.3d at 323. Here, because there is

no cap, the expansion of the number of successful claimants

(which would result from extending the deadline) will

substantially expand the Department’s monetary liability. See

id. (noting consideration of prejudice there was “a unique

inquiry” and expansion of plaintiff class “in the ordinary class

action will be to the detriment of the defendant”); cf. Grace v.

Detroit, 145 F.R.D. 413, 417 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (“Unlike the

cases cited by Plaintiff, . . . in this case there is no fixed

settlement fund. Every tardy claim accepted would be an

expansion of Defendant City’s liability for a reason not

originally ordered. The total sum of Defendant’s liability is yet

to be determined, and increases with each successive

claimant.”).

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18

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s orders denying

the appellants’ motions are affirmed.

So ordered.

 

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 18 of 33
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part: The history of this litigation bears witness to the many

obstacles to relief for the class of African American farmers

covered by a consent decree based on their allegations of

unlawful racial discrimination by the United States Department

of Agriculture in administering its farm loan programs. The task

has not been easy for a number of reasons, including the

complications necessarily associated with ensuring relief to

eligible class members and the deficiencies of class counsel, as

determined by the district court. While the district court’s

efforts so far have ensured that only a small portion of the class

will not have their claims for Monitor review considered, as a

result of the court’s decision today, the claims of 305 class

members are unduly extinguished: 97 farmers will lose the

opportunity to have independent administrative review of their

claims by a Monitor in accordance with the claims procedure in

the consent decree, and 208 farmers (170 without counsel), who

may not have received notice of the filing deadlines, will lose

their opportunity to pursue their claims at all.

In denying appellants’ motion of July 19, 2002 for relief for

these 305 class members, and the motions for reconsideration of

June 13 & 16, 2003, the district court clearly erred in relying on

a finding of fact regarding the increased claims workload, and

erred, alternatively, as a matter of law by failing to consider, in

accordance with Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (“Pigford I”), whether class counsel’s untimely filings

was a changed circumstance within the meaning of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). It also erred by failing to inquire

whether 208 claimants’ late filings were due to the inadequacy

of the notice procedures before determining whether to deny any

relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). Accordingly,

while I concur in the holding that the July 14, 2000 Order

establishing the original filing deadlines was a final appealable

order, see Op. at 8, I would reverse and remand the case to the

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 19 of 33
2

district court to determine whether the filing deadlines were

“unworkable,” and thus warranting relief for 97 class members

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), and to determine whether 208 class

members failed to receive notice of the filing deadlines as a

result of inadequate notice procedures and were entitled to relief

under Rule 6(b).

I.

The question on appeal is whether the district court abused

its discretion in denying appellants’ motions for an extension of

the filing deadlines, and for reconsideration under Rule 60(b). 

Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 2000);Peters

v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483, 1485 (D.C. Cir.

1992). While our review is deferential, an abuse of discretion

occurs when the district court relies on clearly erroneous

findings of fact, fails to consider a relevant factor, or applies the

wrong legal standard. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Class

Actions, 327 F.3d 1207, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Evans, 206 F.3d

at 1298; Marina Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v. Vessel My Girls, 202 F.3d

315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Kickapoo Tribe of Indians

v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Rule 60(b)(5) provides, in relevant part, that “the court may

relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order or proceeding

[if] . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have

prospective application.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). A movant

under Rule 60(b)(5) must demonstrate “changed circumstances”

since the entry of the judgment from which relief is sought.

Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383,

385 (1992). Such change need not be “unforeseeable, but only

unforeseen.” Id. at 385. The Supreme Court in Rufo explained,

Ordinarily . . . modification should not be granted

where a party relies upon events that actually were

anticipated at the time it entered into a decree.

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 20 of 33
3

[citations omitted] If it is clear that a party anticipated

changing conditions that would make performance of

the decree more onerous but nevertheless agreed to the

decree, that party would have to satisfy a heavy burden

to convince a court that it agreed to the decree in good

faith, made a reasonable effort to comply with the

decree, and should be relieved of the undertaking under

Rule 60(b).

Id. In Pigford I, the court held that changed circumstances may

include “unforeseen obstacles” that make an order

“unworkable.” Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 925; see Rufo, 502 U.S. at

384. 

The district court found that the large increase in the

number of claimants occurred before the deadlines in the July

14th Order were agreed to, and therefore did not amount to

unanticipated “changed circumstances” rendering the deadlines

“unworkable” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5). See Pigford

v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp.2d 41, 47 (D.D.C. 2003),

reconsideration denied, Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F. Supp.2d 43

(D.D.C. 2004). In so finding the district court, as does the court

today, Op. at 12-13, ignored the key distinction argued by

appellants in their motion for reconsideration and supported by

evidence in the record. Appellants pointed out that the critical

“changed circumstance” was not the vastly greater number of

total claimants, but the unanticipated large number of claimants

seeking Monitor review because their claims likely had been

denied erroneously in the first instance by the adjudicator, and

had potentially meritorious grounds for seeking Monitor review.

Appellants explained that class counsel originally had

anticipated that the vast majority of would-be seekers of

Monitor review would not meet the high standards for such

review set forth in the consent decree — “clear and manifest

error” that is “likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 21 of 33
4

justice,” Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii) — and therefore, at the

time they agreed to the July 14th Order deadlines, had estimated

that only approximately 2,500 petitions would require

processing for Monitor review. However, class counsel

subsequently discovered that a much higher number of the

claims rejected by the adjudicator were potentially meritorious

claims even under the high standard for Monitor review. In fact,

the total volume of claims actually processed for Monitor review

was much higher than 2,500: Class counsel and the of-counsel

law firm Chestnut, Sanders ended up processing 3,700 Track A

requests for Monitor review, with other firms processing other,

smaller numbers of requests. 

In support of this distinction, appellants pointed to the high

success rates of claims upon Monitor review: The facilitator’s

report cited by appellants indicated that approximately 48% of

the claimants who had filed for review with the assistance of

counsel had been approved by the Monitor for reexamination by

the adjudicator, and 100% of reexamined petitions prevailed on

the merits. This statistical evidence substantiated class

counsel’s argument that many meritorious claims had been

erroneously denied by the adjudicator, necessitating the filing of

petitions for Monitor review and creating more work for class

counsel than was anticipated when the July 14th Order deadlines

were agreed to.

The record further indicates that the number of class

members seeking Monitor review was unanticipated by either

party or by the district court when the parties agreed to those

deadlines. As noted, when the district court established the

Register of Petitions process in the November 11, 2000 Order,

class counsel was estimating a total of 2,500 petitions for

Monitor review. The district court relied on this estimate to set

the filing schedule for fully supported petitions. The November

11th Order further indicated that the higher volume of petitions

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 22 of 33
5

for Monitor review was not anticipated, for the district court

acknowledged that neither the Department nor the Monitor were

prepared to handle and process the higher volume of petitions.

The court stated:

It is obvious that if Class Counsel, Of Counsel and all

unaffiliated counsel were forced to file thousands of

fully supported Petitions by November 13, the

government would be unable to respond to them in a

meaningful way within the 60 days that it has to file a

response. [citation omitted] Furthermore, the Monitor

informed the Court at the hearing that even if the

government had the resources to complete such a task,

the Monitor initially will be unable to decide the

Petitions at a pace greater than 200 to 300 each month.

Indeed, the district court later acknowledged at the April 19,

2001 status conference that “some of the failings of the lawyers,

if we want to call them that, are simply because people were

overworked. There was much more to be done than people

thought.” (emphasis added). 

In light of the record evidence that the high number of class

members seeking Monitor review was unanticipated at the time

the July 14th Order deadlines were agreed to, the district court

clearly erred in relying on its finding in its opinion of June 2,

2003 that the “critical ‘changed circumstance’” had “occurred

before, not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to,” in

denying appellants’ motion for reconsideration in its opinion of

March 19, 2004, Pigford, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 48, without

distinguishing between the overall number of claimants and the

number of petitions for Monitor review. Instead, the district

court denied reconsideration stating that, notwithstanding

appellants’ “further elaboration,” “the [c]ourt declines to revisit

its determination that the asserted ‘changed circumstances’

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 23 of 33
6

1

 See In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396

F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)); In re

Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir.

2001); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir.

1980); Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1972); see

also In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2005);

Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280-81 (7th Cir.

2002); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th Cir. 1973). While

the district court noted that these cases involved earlier stages of class

action proceedings, it failed to articulate any reason why this principle

would not apply at the remedial stages of class action proceedings.

See Pigford, 307 F. Supp.2d 43, 50 (D.D.C. 2004).

presented by [appellants] do not justify modification of the

[c]ourt’s prior orders under Rule 60(b)(5).” Id. While the court

states that the district court established the Register procedure

to provide relief from the increased volume of meritorious

petitions, Op. at 13, that relief created filing problems of its

own and, in any event, the district court underestimated the

volume of Monitor-review petitions even then.

Moreover, in denying appellants’ motions, the district court

failed to consider the instruction of Pigford I that where class

members lack competent counsel, counsel’s failure to meet

deadlines itself may amount to an “unforeseen obstacle” that

makes the decree “unworkable” under Rule 60(b)(5). Pigford

I, 292 F.3d at 925. In Pigford I, this court embraced the concept

that the district court has a duty to protect class members where

such members did not choose their counsel and where retention

of other lawyers is unlikely, 292 F.3d at 926-27, a concept

embraced by other circuits as well.1 Noting that the consent

“decree’s express purpose is to ‘ensur[e] that in their dealings

with [the Department], all class members receive full and fair

treatment,’ Consent Decree at 2, and its ‘main accomplishment

was the establishment of a process to adjudicate individual

claims,’” this court distinguished between the failings of class

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 24 of 33
7

counsel and the opportunity of class members to avail

themselves of the remedial scheme under the consent decree:

The court opined that there was “no basis for holding [the class

members] responsible for [counsel’s] failure” to meet deadlines

which had been bargained for by the parties, Pigford I, 292 F.3d

at 927, and held that relief was appropriate under Rule 60(b)(5)

because “class counsel’s failure to meet critical Track B

deadlines amounts to an ‘unforeseen obstacle’ that makes the

decree ‘unworkable,’” id. at 927 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at

384). 

This conclusion in Pigford I is no less applicable now than

it was then, for “[t]o hold otherwise would sanction the farmers’

double betrayal: first by the Department . . . and then by their

own lawyers.” Id. In granting an extension of Track B

deadlines missed due to attorney error, the district court had

previously acknowledged that the general rule that attorney error

is not excusable should not apply here, where “[t]he history of

this case is unique . . . and requires more than hasty application

of general practice.” Pigford v.Veneman, 182 F. Supp.2d 50, 52

(D.D.C. 2002). This court observed in Pigford I that,

[T]he decree itself assumes competent representation

for the farmers. The decree’s express purpose is to

“ensur[e] that in their dealings with [the Department],

all class members receive full and fair treatment,” . . .

and its “main accomplishment was the establishment of

a process to adjudicate individual claims.” . . . Unless

the farmers have competent counsel, we cannot

imagine how they could ever obtain “full and fair

treatment” in a claims process where . . . missing a

single deadline could be fatal.

292 F.3d at 927 (quoting Consent Decree, at 2; Pigford v.

Glickman, No. 97cv01978 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2001)). Not only has

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 25 of 33
8

2

 Six months before the November filing deadline, the motion

of May 8, 2000 for an interim award of attorneys’ fees, costs and

expert fees filed by class counsel and certain of-counsel stated:

It is now nearly three years since this case began.

During this time the firms incurred crushing expense.

For example, [class counsel] Conlon, Frantz incurred

substantial obligations - borrowing $1,000,000

simply to remain solvent. Mr. Pires was not paid for

over 15 months. He obtained multiple mortgages to

pay his personal expenses. . . . [The Of-counsel law

firm of] Chestnut, Sanders was forced by the scope of

the litigation to borrow $1 million, hire new

employees and cut partner salaries by 60%.

On August 4, 2000, the district court, acknowledging “the dire

financial straits in which several firms affiliated with class counsel

currently find themselves,” ordered an immediate preliminary award

to counsel of $7 million, which covered only previously incurred costs

and amounted to less than one-half the cumulative loadstar amount of

$14,582,703. Although, in response to class counsel’s motion for an

extension of the July 14th Order deadlines, the district court set up the

Register of Petitions process in November 2000, counsel still missed

filing deadlines. When the parties’ attempt, at the district court’s

suggestion, to resolve their differences regarding counsel’s May 8th

request fees and costs proved unsuccessful, on January 12, 2001 class

counsel, of-counsel, and one counsel moved for additional interim fees

the district court found class counsel’s performance sanctionable

and imposed severe monetary fines on them, Pigford v.

Veneman, 307 F. Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2004), but at a time when

there was, as the district court stated, “much more to be done

than people thought,” and the critical filing deadlines were

drawing near, class counsel and of-counsel were in dire financial

straits as a result of the lack of payment of interim fees by the

government, as appellants reminded the district court in their

motion for reconsideration.2 The district court recognized at a

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 26 of 33
9

alleging “significant hardship” as a result of continued financing of

implementation of the Consent Decree, without the regular payment

of fees, through bank loans to cover staff salaries and expenses. A

further payment of interim fees and costs was ordered on March 8,

2001, well after the filing deadlines, and still, because of the

government’s resistence, class counsel did not receive any payment

until July 2001, of $14.9 million, see Pigford v. Veneman, 369 F.3d

545 (D.C. Cir. 2004); a further payment of $500,000 was ordered on

December 2, 2002, Pigford v. Veneman, 239 F. Supp. 2d 68, 71

(D.D.C. 2002). The delay in approving payment and the delay in

actual receipt of interim fees by class counsel are ignored by the court

in discussing the district court’s “repeated accommodation of class

counsel’s continuing delinquency.” Op. at 11.

status conference held on April 19, 2001 that the delay in

awarding interim fees 

had an impact on the number of lawyers and the

amount of time that those lawyers are spending on the

Monitor petition process. . . . if you have to succeed or

prevail to get paid, then getting new lawyers in the act

would be hard, and I understand that it is also having

an impact on the existing lawyers. [Class counsel] has

cut back on [its] staff.

(emphasis added). 

Today, by affirming the denial of appellants’ motions, the

court ignores our analysis in Pigford I and the duty of the trial

judge to protect class members who do not chose their own

counsel when unanticipated circumstances have created “a

situation where there were too many cases and too few lawyers.”

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 27 of 33
10

Br. for Appellants at 22. By declining to account for Pigford I’s

contrary holding as an infringement of the district court’s

discretion, Op. at 14, the court ignores that Pigford I involved

the same unique history, the same consent decree, the same class

counsel, and the same issue of modification of deadlines missed

by class counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5)

considered in the same court, and as such its holding is nearly

akin to the law of the case, in addition to being law of the

circuit. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393, 1395

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). That Pigford I involved claims

under Track B rather than Track A does not change the fact that

the legal issue before the court is the same: whether appellants

are entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(5) for counsel’s failures

to meet filing deadlines. See Op. at 13-14. While the court

points out that Pigford I acknowledged “the presumption of

client accountability for attorney conduct,” id., it ignores that

Pigford I also found this presumption overcome because class

counsel was not freely chosen by class members and the

circumstances of the case, together with the terms of the decree,

made retention of other lawyers “unlikely.” Pigford I, 292 F.3d

at 926. Here, the very same circumstances remain, and were

further exacerbated by additional unanticipated circumstances

which created “a situation where there were too many cases and

too few lawyers.” Br. for Appellants at 22. This court cannot

avoid, by pointing to “a different procedural posture,” Op. at 13,

that the district court is bound, under Pigford I, see LaShawn A.,

87 F.3d at 1393, 1395, to separate class counsel’s failings from

the claims of the class members, particularly in light of the

district court’s affirmative duty to “renew its stringent

examination of the adequacy of class representation throughout

the entire course of the litigation,” In re Fine Paper Antitrust

Litigation, 617 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir. 1980), and that the district

court’s failure to do so is an abuse of discretion, Evans, 206 F.3d

at 1298.

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11

Finally, while the Secretary would distinguish Pigford I as

concerned with extinguishing a class member’s claim, see

Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 922, from the denial of an opportunity to

seek Monitor review, from the perspective of the class member

whose claim has been wrongfully denied, the effect is the same:

Neither class member will have the opportunity to utilize the

remedial process established in the consent decree. Taken

together, the circumstances identified in appellants’ motions

suggest that the 97 class members should not bear the burden of

counsel’s failures to meet filing deadlines. In order to avoid a

“double betrayal” of the class members, the district court was

required to separate the failures of counsel from the claims of

the class members in order to ensure that the opportunity to

pursue the claims process established in the consent decree not

be foreclosed. Id. at 927. It did not do so, and the court today

fails to explain how the district court fulfilled its responsibilities

in accordance with the analysis in Pigford I. 

Because the district court, in denying the motion for

reconsideration, erroneously relied on its finding in its opinion

of June 2, 2003 that the “critical changed circumstance”

occurred before the July 14th Order deadlines were agreed to

without taking into account record evidence demonstrating that

the volume of petitions for Monitor review – the relevant change

in circumstance – was not anticipated at the time the deadlines

were agreed to, and in the alternative erred as a matter of law by

failing to consider whether class counsel’s failures to meet the

deadlines amounted to an “unforeseen obstacle” warranting

relief, I would reverse and remand the case to the district court

to address whether the deadlines were “unworkable” under Rule

60(b)(5).

II.

Additionally, the district court failed to inquire whether

adequate notice was provided to 208 class members, for whom

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 29 of 33
12

appellants proffered evidence that these class members had not

received notice of the filing deadlines for Monitor review, in

determining whether relief was warranted under the “excusable

neglect” standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). 

The July 14 Order modified the consent decree to limit the

period within which class members could seek Monitor review

of denied claims and, as the district court noted, it did not

provide for individual notice to unsuccessful Track A class

members. Instead, the July 14th Order required only that a copy

of it be (1) posted in every USDA Farm Services Agency county

office, and (2) sent by the facilitator to those persons who

requested a claim sheet and election form. According to the

Monitor’s Report, “few people eligible to file a petition with the

Monitor would have received direct notice of the 120-day

deadline from the mailing,” and many claimants would not see

a posting in a USDA Farm Services Agency county office. See

Monitor’s Report to the Court Regarding Notice to the Class of

the 120-Day Deadline to File a Petition for Monitor Review

(May 30, 2003). The Monitor attempted to remedy the situation

by mailing additional notices to farmers who had either

requested or made telephonic inquiries regarding claim forms.

Still, appellants proffered evidence that 208 class members had

received no notice of the filing deadlines. See, e.g., Joint

Appendix at 186; 218-233, 248, 254, 256, 258, 265, 268, 269,

286, 321; id. at 423.

Nonetheless, the district court denied relief under the

“excusable neglect” standard of Rule 6(b). Applying the fourfactor test of Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.

P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 398-99 (1993), the district court found

first, that the government would be “prejudiced to the tune of

almost one million dollars” by allowing consideration of late

petitions if five percent were successful, and second, that

“because the [July 14th Order] deadlines were negotiated and

USCA Case #04-5171 Document #906115 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 30 of 33
13

agreed to by the [appellants], it logically follows that the

resulting failure to meet those deadlines had been within the

reasonable control of [appellants].” Each finding is problematic

given the district court’s duty to ensure that adequate notice

procedures were, in fact, established to provide class members

with notice of filing deadlines. The district court made no

finding that appellants were not proceeding in good faith or that

there would be undue delay of the proceedings by granting

relief. 

The district court’s finding of “prejudice” to the

government is ironic. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82,

95 (D.D.C. 1999); see also Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 927. In

approving the consent decree, the district court observed that

“the settlement is a fair resolution of the claims brought in this

case and a good first step towards assuring that the kind of

discrimination that has been visited on African American

farmers since Reconstruction will not continue into the next

century.” Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 86 (emphasis added). The July

14th Order deadlines were not imposed in order to limit the

government’s liability as such, but rather, according to the

district court, to bring closure to the process through fair

procedures that would identify the number of class members

seeking Monitor review. Moreover, the dollar amount of

prejudice claimed by the Secretary represents 0.04% of the

estimated settlement, see Pigford, 206 F.3d at 1244, and 0.125%

of the amount actual paid out by the government at that time.

This court, in turn, mistakenly relies on the Secretary’s

argument that class counsel’s agreement that the July 14th Order

deadlines would not be extended was the quid pro quo for its

agreement to admit other Track A claimants into the class who

would otherwise have been excluded. See Op. at 16-17; Br. for

the Appellee at 24. This is not the analysis adopted by the

district court in denying appellants’ motions; instead, the district

court addressed that quid pro quo in imposing monetary

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14

sanctions on class counsel in a separate order, see Pigford v.

Veneman, 144 F. Supp.2d 16, 19 n.2 (D.D.C. 2001), which is not

on appeal. 

The district court’s second finding, that the failure to meet

the deadlines was within the farmers’ control because they

agreed to the July 14th Order deadlines, is clearly erroneous

because it ignored the threshold question of whether the agreedto notice provisions ensured that adequate notice would be

provided to class members, many proceeding pro se, whose

claims had been denied by the adjudicator. The fact that class

counsel agreed to the notice procedures did not discharge the

district court’s obligation to ensure notice was directed in a

reasonable manner. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B); Doe v.

Lexington-FayetteUrbanCountyGov't, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS

7771, at *11-12 (3d Cir. 2005); Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 926

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)). Once the Monitor determined

that the notice procedures were inadequate and appellants

proffered evidence that 208 class members claimed not to have

received notice, the district court had a duty to inquire whether

the notice procedures were adequate in fact. In an analogous

context, the Second Circuit pointed out that the district court has

“the inherent power and duty to protect unnamed, but interested

persons,” Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1972),

and although the notice procedures in the settlement agreement

were complied with, the Second Circuit reversed the exclusion

of claims filed late due to the lack of actual notice, id. As the

Third Circuit observed, the district court’s equitable powers

under Rule 23 “are retained by the court until the settlement

fund is actually distributed.” In re Orthopedic Bone Screw

Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2001). 

Whether the prejudice to the government outweighed other

considerations could not be determined by the district court until

it first determined – in light of the proffered evidence that the

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agreed-to notice procedures were inadequate for 208 class

members – the adequacy of the agreed-to notice procedures, and

whether the late filings were the result of inadequate notice.

Only then could the district court determine whether the 208

class members were entitled to relief under Rule 6(b).

Therefore, I would reverse and remand the case for the district

court to determine the adequacy of the notice procedures and

whether the 208 class members were entitled to relief. See

Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 925-27; In re Orthopedic Bone Screw

Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d at 321-29; Zients, 459 F.2d at 630.

 

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the

court’s opinion.

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