Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05801/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05801-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS CEBALLOS,

Plaintiff,

v.

FOUCH, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 5801 OWW SMS P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (Doc. 29) 

 Jesus Ceballos (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 9, 2003. On June 30, 2003, the Court issued an

Order dismissing the Complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff was given the option of either

filing an Amended Complaint or proceeding with the cognizable Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendants Fouch and Flippin only. 

On July 28, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Notice of his intent to proceed on the Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendants Fouch and Flippin. The Court issued Findings and

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Recommendations to dismiss the remaining claims and defendants on September 24, 2003, and

the parties were granted thirty days to file any objections. (Doc. 13.) 

On January 12, 2004, Defendants Flippin and Fouch waived service of the Complaint and

filed a formal Answer on January 20, 2004. (Docs. 19, 21, 22.) The Court issued a

Discovery/Scheduling Order on February 20, 2004, and on January 14, 2005, the Defendants

filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 23, 29.) Plaintiff did not Oppose the

Motion for Summary Judgment. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

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In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at

trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the Summary Judgment Motion, the Court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Rule 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must

be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out

of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.

Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine

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Plaintiff neither admitted or denied the facts set forth by Defendants as undisputed nor filed a separate

Statement of Disputed facts. Local Rule 56-260(b). Therefore, the Court compiled the instant Statement of

Undisputed Facts from Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts and Plaintiff’s verified Complaint and

Opposition. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998) (verified Complaints and Oppositions

constitute opposing affidavits for purposes of the summary judgment rule if they are based on facts within the

pleader’s personal knowledge). Because Plaintiff neither submitted his own Statement of Disputed facts nor

addressed Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, the Court accepts Defendants’ version of the facts where

Plaintiff’s verified Complaint and Opposition are not contradictory. 

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issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. UNDISPUTED FACTS1

A. Plaintiff was a California prisoner at the California Substance Abuse Treatment

Facility (CSATF), at all times relevant to the claims at issue in this action. 

B. Defendant Fouch was a Correctional Officer at CSATF at all times relevant to the

matters at issue in this action. 

C. Defendant Flippin was a Correctional Officer at CSATF at all times relevant to the

matters at issue in this action. 

D. On March 5, 2002, at approximately 6:45 p.m., Defendant Fouch escorted Plaintiff to

Housing Unit C-2 to inform the “Bulldog” inmate population of a change in the

visiting procedures during lockdowns. 

E. Plaintiff, who is also a Bulldog, was escorted to Housing Unit C-2 for the purpose of

discussing the possibility of resuming the visiting program with the other “Bulldogs.” 

F. Plaintiff’s wrists were handcuffed in front of him for the escort.

G. Upon arrival into the housing unit rotunda, Plaintiff began complaining about wearing

the handcuffs and requested that they be removed. 

H. Defendant Flippin, who was the Housing Unit C-2 floor officer, explained to Plaintiff

that the “Bulldogs” were currently on lockdown status and handcuffs were required. 

I. At some point in the conversation, Plaintiff refused to go anywhere until he spoke

with the Sergeant. 

J. A personal alarm was activated. Responding staff took custody of Plaintiff and

immediately escorted him to the Facility C clinic for medical examination without

further incident. 

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K. At approximately 6:50 p.m., Medical Technical Assistant (MTA) Stroud, responded

to the alarm in Housing Unit C-2 and saw that Plaintiff was being escorted out of the

building. Plaintiff was escorted out of the medical clinic where MTA Stroud

performed a physical examination of Plaintiff and completed a CDC 7219, Report of

Unusual Occurrence. 

L. According to the CDC 7219 and Body Sheet, Plaintiff sustained the following

injuries: a contusion at the back of the head and a small laceration with a contusion at

the right eyebrow. The examination and reports were completed at 7:00 p.m. 

M. On the CDC 7219, under the section entitled “BRIEF RESUME IN PATIENTS

WORDS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INJURY OR UNUSUAL

OCCURRENCE,” MTA Stroud wrote in quotations “I have a bump on my head [and]

above my eye.” 

N. Plaintiff refused treatment for the small cut above his eye and was returned to

custody. 

O. The next day, at about 1:40 p.m., Plaintiff was seen by Registered Nurse Ruff. On the

CDC 7219 under the Section entitled “BRIEF RESUME IN PATIENT’S WORDS

OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INJURY OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE,”

Nurse Ruff wrote in quotations “I want you to see my eye and head.” 

P. Nurse Ruff noted that Plaintiff was alert and with no complaints of pain or discomfort

and conducted an assessment and unclothed body check of Plaintiff. Nurse Ruff

noted Plaintiff’s injuries which consisted of: (1) discolored upper [right] eyelid, no

swelling or redness noted to the site of right eye no drainage; (2) superficial abrasion

corner of upper [right] eyelid; (3) reddened “abrased” area to [right] side of back of

neck; and (4) quarter size contusion to top of heard [right] side. Plaintiff was returned

to custody. 

Q. On March 12, 2002, Plaintiff was issued a Rules Violation Report for Battery on a

Peace Officer. 

R. On June 27, 2002, Plaintiff was found guilty of the lesser offense of Willfully

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Resisting a Peace Officer in the Performance of Duty.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Summary of Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on March 5, 2002, while the institution was on lockdown status, he

was ordered out of his cell by Correctional Officer Fouch for the purpose of escorting him to 

another building to discuss “visiting status.” Plaintiff was handcuffed with his hands in front of

his body versus behind his back. At some point, Plaintiff indicated that he did not want to be

handcuffed but was informed that the handcuffs would remain on. Plaintiff then became hostile

about the handcuffs and when staff tried to escort him back to his building, a scuffle ensued. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Flippin struck him twice to the side of his head with his left

elbow. At some point, Plaintiff refused to go anywhere until he first spoke with the Sergeant.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Fouch, with both hands, slammed him into a concrete wall,

grabbed his face and banged his head into the wall three or four times. Plaintiff claims that

Defendant Fouch then slammed him to the floor and with one knee on Plaintiff’s back, proceeded

to bang his face into the floor approximately three or four times, until Plaintiff’s eye was busted

open. 

B. Claims for Relief

Plaintiff alleges that the forced used by Defendants Fouch and Flippin was excessive and

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

The use of excessive force by a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment. Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). When a prison security measure is undertaken

in response to a incident as in this case, the question of whether the measures taken inflicted

unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering depends on "whether force was applied in a good

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of

causing harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 5-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992). 

Factors relevant to the analysis are the need for the application of force, the relationship

between the need and the amount of force that was used and the extent of the injury inflicted.

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986). Other factors to be considered are the

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extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials on the basis of the facts known to them, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a

forceful response. Id. at 321. The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure

"does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect

that the degree of force authorized or applied was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary." Whitley

v. Albers, supra at 319; see also, Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). Prison

administrators "should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of

policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline

and to maintain institutional security." Id. at 321-322 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

547, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1970). 

In this case, the evidence provided by Defendants show that on March 5, 2002, while

handcuffed (with arms in front) and being escorted to another location, Plaintiff requested that

Defendant Flippin remove his handcuffs. When Defendant Flippin refused, Plaintiff became

belligerent about having to wear handcuffs. Defendant Flippin then placed his hand on

Plaintiff’s elbow in an attempt to escort him back to his building when Plaintiff pulled away, said

refused to go until he spoke with the Sergeant. Defendant Flippin repeated the gesture and

Plaintiff again pulled away from him. When Defendant Fouch approached and ordered Plaintiff

back to the building, Plaintiff lunged forward at Fouch putting his chest to Fouch’s. Fouch

responded by pushing Plaintiff back away from him and towards the wall. Fouch then grabbed

Plaintiff by his forearm, ordered him to the “get down,” and forced Plaintiff to the ground in a

prone position. A personal alarm sounded and staff came to Defendant’s Fouch and Flippin’s aid

and escorted Plaintiff to the medical clinic. Plaintiff was later issued and found guilty of a Rules

Violation Report for Willfully Resisting a Peace Officer in the Performance of Duty. 

Defendants also provide evidence that Plaintiff suffered only minor injuries from ths

incident. MTA Stroud reported that Plaintiff suffered a small contusion to the back of his head

and a small laceration or abrasion to the right eyebrow. Plaintiff indicated to MTA Stroud that

he had only a “bump on my head [and] above my eye” and refused treatment. The next day,

Nurse Ruff examined Plaintiff and noted some discoloration to the right eye but no swelling,

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redness or drainage. Nurse Ruff further noted a superficial abrasion to the right eyebrow and a

small contusion on Plaintiff’s head. 

Based on the above, the Court finds Defendants have met their initial burden of informing

the Court of the basis of the motion and identifying those portions of the record believed to

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the burden shifts to

Plaintiff to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See, Matsushita Elec. 

Indus.Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

Plaintiff did not oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment. However, a verified

complaint in a pro se civil rights action may constitute an opposing affidavit for purposes of the

summary judgment rule, where the complaint is based on an inmate’s personal knowledge of

admissible evidence, and not merely on the inmate’s belief. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curium); Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985);

F.R.C.P. 56(e). 

In the Complaint, Plaintiff concedes that the institution was on lockdown when he was

handcuffed and that he was handcuffed with his hands in front of him. (Complaint at 2.) 

Plaintiff further concedes that he requested to be uncuffed. Id. at 3. However, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants Fouch and Flippin began hitting him for no apparent reason. Although it is

undisputed that some physical altercation occurred and that Plaintiff suffered injury, the need for

the application of force and the relationship between the need and the amount of force used are

facts that are clearly in dispute. Accordingly, the Court finds that there exists a genuine issue of

material fact warranting trial in this case. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants

Fouch and Flippin be DENIED and the matter be referred back to the undersigned for further

proceedings. 

The Court further ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to

the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States

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District Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with

a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served

and filed within TEN (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 13, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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