Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01583/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01583-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Dwayne Johnson,

Petitioner

-vsMary Hennessy, et al.,

Respondents

CV-06-1583-PHX-MHM (JI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Winslow,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 21,

2006 (#1). Respondents filed have an Answer (#19) and a Supplemental Answer (#25) and

Petitioner has filed a Reply (#21) and Supplemental Reply (#26).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 24, 2001, Petitioner was pulled over for driving on a suspended license.

A search incident to arrest revealed that Petitioner had in his pocket a vial with thirty-four

rocks of crack cocaine. Evidence was disputed whether one of the officers also located a

clear plastic tube in the trunk of Petitioner’s car. Several weeks later, on April 6, 2001,

Petitioner was observed conducting an apparent drug sale. On arrival of the officers,

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Petitioner threw down a vial with crack cocaine, and was found to possess $524 in currency

separated by denominations in various pockets. (Exhibit O, Mem. Dec. at 5-7.) (Exhibits

to the Answer (#19) (Exhibits A to AA) and the Supplemental Answer (#25) (Exhibits BB

to NN) are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___”.)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Based on the two incidents Petitioner was indicted on July 10, 2001 on two counts

each of possession of narcotics for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia, i.e. the plastic

vials. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) The state filed an Allegation of Historical Priors (Exhibit

BB), asserting that Petitioner has been convicted in seven prior prosecutions. The state also

filed an Allegation of Amount of Drugs (Exhibit CC), asserting that the quantity of drugs

possessed by Petitioner exceeded the statutory threshold amount for heightened sentencing

under Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-3408(D) and 13-3419.

Counsel - Counsel Joanne Cuccia was appointed, but at the initial pretrial conference

on September 17, 2001, Petitioner filed a Motion for Pro Per Status and Appointment of

Advisory Counsel, and waived his right to counsel. (Exhibit B, Motion; and Exhibit C,

Waiver.) The motion to proceed pro per was granted, and attorney Cuccia was ordered to

serve as advisory counsel. Trial was set for six weeks later, on October 30, 2001. (Exhibit

D, M.E. 9/11/01.)

Approximately two weeks later, Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of new

advisory counsel, appointment of an investigator, and for an order directing advisory counsel

to turn over the discovery in her possession. Petitioner complained of limited contact with

counsel, that resulted in arguments. (Exhibit E.) Oral argument was held October 24, 2001,

the motion was granted, and attorney Corwin Townsend was appointed as advisory counsel,

and an investigator was authorized. (Exhibit F, M.E. 10/24/01.) 

Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel, which in part complained that he had not been

contacted by attorney Townsend. In a Minute Entry issued December 4, 2001, advisory

counsel was directed to contact Petitioner within three days of receipt of the minute entry.

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(Reply, #21, Exhibit D, M.E. 12/4/01.)

On December 13, 2001, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Counsel and

Appointment of New Counsel. Petitioner argued that appointed counsel had been

unavailable, and had failed to arranged for the investigator to visit Petitioner. (Exhibit G.)

Petitioner concluded that “at this time he cannot defend his [sic] self in this matter so

defendant ask this court to appoint new counsel to take over in this matter.” (Id. at 2.) The

motion was heard January 4, 2002 at a status conference, the motion was granted, and

advisory counsel Townsend was appointed to represent Petitioner. A new firm trial date of

January 15, 2002 was set. (Exhibit H, M.E. 1/4/02.)

Plea Offer - On January 9, 2002, Petitioner entered into a written plea agreement with

the prosecution, providing for Petitioner to plead guilty to an amended count 1, for attempted

possession for sale with one prior felony, and a presumptive sentence of 6.5 years. The

prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, and the allegation that the amount

possessed was over statutory thresholds for enhanced sentencing and to not allege any other

priors. Petitioner agreed that he would be sentenced to prison. (Exhibit EE; Reply, #21 at

Exhibit G.) On January 11, 2002, Petitioner entered his plea of guilty. (Exhibit FF, M.E.

1/11/02.)

On February 7, 2002, Petitioner withdrew his plea and the plea agreement was not

consummated. (Exhibit GG, M.E. 2/7/02. See Exhibit N, Supplemental Petition at 3.)

Motion Regarding Counsel - According to jail visitation records supplied by

Petitioner, counsel met with Petitioner at the jail for one hour, 37 minutes on January 9,

2002, and for and hour and 21 minutes on March 6, 2002. (Reply, #21, Exhibit C.)

Nonetheless, Petitioner proceeded to file various motions on his own, including a

motion to dismiss. The trial court addressed the motions, but admonished Petitioner that it

would not continue to address motions not filed by counsel, and inquired whether Petitioner

wished to again waive counsel. (Supp. Reply, #26, Exhibit CC, R.T. 3/7/02 at 10-11.)

Petitioner requested to waive counsel and again represent himself. (Id. at 14.) Trial counsel

alerted the trial court to disputes with Petitioner over the viability of a motion to suppress,

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and the advisability of the plea agreement Petitioner had rejected. (Id. at 12-14.) The Court

set the waiver of counsel for hearing on March 11, 2002, and requested trial counsel to

consult with Petitioner. (Id. at 14, 16.) At that hearing, Petitioner withdrew his request to

waive counsel and proceed pro per. (Repy, #21 at 9-10.)

At a status conference on April 2, 2002, Petitioner requested appointment of new

counsel, and argued it to the court:

THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, Your Honor. I have a

motion here, that I want to turn it in, for appointment of new counsel.

MR. TOWNSEND: No.

THE DEFENDANT: I can’t turn it in.

MR. TOWNSEND: I told him he has a lawyer, so I am

not going to file it.

THE DEFENDANT: I would like to turn it in for the

record.

THE COURT: You may file it. You are asking for a new

lawyer?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: Why.

THE DEFENDANT: Because we are supposed to be

going to trial today, and I haven’t talked to my lawyer since the last

court date. I don’t even have witnesses.

MR. TOWNSEND: Judge, I am not going to go into the

facts of the case, Judge. Again, I discussed these things with Mr.

Johnson over and over again.

THE DEFENDANT: This is the first time we talk about

the case when we come to trial. When we come to court, this is the

only time we talk.

THE COURT: All right.

THE DEFENDANT: He don’t come see me. I don’t

know what our defense is. We don’t discuss the case nowhere.

THE COURT: Motion for new counsel is denied.

(Reply, #21, Exhibit I, R.T. 4/2/02 at 3-4.)

Trial - Trial ultimately commenced two days later, on April 4, 2002. Petitioner filed

a series of motions in limine, only one of which was successful. (Exhibit I, M.E. 4/4/02.)

Petitioner admitted to a sentencing enhancement based upon possession of a statutory

threshold amount of drugs, and the reference to the amount was stricken from the indictment.

(Id.; Exhibit O, Mem. Dec. at 4.) A suppression hearing was held on April 6, 2002, and the

Court concluded to allow Petitioner to be impeached with three of his prior convictions.

(Supp. Reply, #26, Exhibit FF, R.T. 4/6/02 at 10.) Petitioner testified in his own behalf,

arguing that all drugs were possessed for his own personal use, and not for sale and that the

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cash in his possession had come from relatives. (Exhibit O, Mem. Dec. at 6-7.) Petitioner

was convicted on all counts. (Exhibit K, M.E. 4/9/02.)

Petitioner filed a pro per motion for new trial, asserting ineffective assistance of

counsel. The trial court rejected the claim as properly raised only in a post-conviction

proceeding. (Exhibit O, Mem. Dec. at 7-8.)

Sentencing - Petitioner appeared for sentencing on May 30, 2002. Pursuant to Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 13-604, the trial court found that Petitioner had been convicted of two historical

prior felony offenses, and sentenced Petitioner to presumptive terms on each count, including

15.75 years on each of the two possession-for-sale counts, and 3.75 years on each of the

paraphernalia counts, with each sentence to run concurrently. (Exhibit L, Sentence of

Imprisonment.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal through counsel, Spencer Heffel. Petitioner wrote the

Public Defender’s office, asking for counsel to seek a delay in the appeal process, to allow

him to first pursue a petition for post-conviction relief asserting ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. (Supp. Reply, #26, Exhibit AA.) 

Instead, counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967) and related state authorities, asserting he had been unable to find an issue for appeal,

but noting that Petitioner had requested that he raise a claim that the reasonable doubt

instruction was erroneous. (Exhibit M, Opening Brief.) Petitioner was granted leave to file

a supplemental brief, which he did. (Exhibit O, Mem. Dec. at 2.) 

Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief, dated February 10, 2003, asserted the following ten

claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) denial of appellate counsel; (3) denial of

right to counsel; (4) ineffective assistance resulting in a denial of compulsory process; (5)

denial of fair trial; (6) improper use of stale conviction for impeachment; (7) failure to

sanitize priors; (8) failure to hold hearing on motion to dismiss; (9) prosecutor’s misstatement

of facts in closing; and (10) prosecutor’s vouching. (Exhibit N at Issues Presented.) 

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In a Memorandum Decision issued June 5, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals

declined to consider Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims, finding they should be raised

in a post-conviction relief proceeding, and denied the remainder of the grounds for appeal.

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. (Exhibit O, Mem. Dec.)

Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Petition, #1 at 2.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Trial Court - On July 10, 2003, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

(Exhibit P). Petitioner was appointed counsel, Thomas Gorman, who filed a notice of

inability to find issues for review. (Petition #1 at 11.) The Court granted Petitioner leave to

file a pro per petition for post-conviction relief, and directed counsel to remain in an advisory

capacity. (Exhibit LL, M.E. 12/17/03.)

On December 31, 2003, Petitioner filed a Motion (Exhibit HH) seeking transcripts of

various hearings, and an extension of time to file his petition. 

On February 5, 2004, he filed a second motion to extend (Exhibit II), arguing that

PCR counsel had failed to forward trial counsel’s files to Petitioner. At the same time, he

filed a motion (Exhibit JJ) asking the PCR court to compel PCR counsel to forward trial

counsel’s file, and for appointment of an investigator. He also filed a separate motion to

extend (Exhibit KK), arguing that he had been transferred to a new prison.

One day later, on February 6, 2004, Petitioner filed his pro per Petition for PostConviction Relief (Exhibit Q), asserting the following ten claims: 

(1) ineffective assistance through failure to investigate defenses (id. Part 1 at 3); 

(2) ineffective assistance in presenting defense (id. at 16); 

(3) denial of right to compulsory process (id. Part 2 at 1); 

(4) denial of right to counsel (id. at 4); 

(5) insufficient evidence of priors used for sentence enhancement (id. at 13); 

(6) perjury by Petitioner and officers (id. at 15); 

(7) denial of right to self-representation (id. at 19); 

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(8) counsel’s failure to inform of plea offer (id. Part 3 at 1); 

(9) ineffective assistance from failure to sever and object (id. at 2);

(10) insufficient evidence of possession for sale (id. at 3).

(See Supp. Reply, #26, Exhibit GG, Docket (reflecting filing date).)

The state responded on March 16, 2004, arguing the merits of Petitioner’s claims, and

arguing that Petitioner was precluded under Ariz. R. Crim. P. Rule 32.2 from asserting his

claims based upon insufficient evidence and failure to prove prior convictions. The state

submitted an Affidavit of trial counsel in support of its claims. (Exhibit DD, Response.)

On March 31, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion requested that his pending motions be

heard, and a new motion for expansion of the record. (See Supp. Reply, #26, Exhibit GG,

Docket.)

The trial court did not rule on the various motions. (See Supp. Reply, #26, Exhibit

GG, Docket.) Instead, on May 25, 2004, the trial court summarily dismissed the Petition,

finding that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims had failed to establish deficient

performance. (Exhibit R, M.E. 5/25/4.) 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing (Exhibit W), which was summarily denied.

(Exhibit X, M.E. 10/28/04.) Petitioner sought and obtained leave to file a delayed petition

for review. (Exhibit Y, M.E. 1/17/05.)

Court of Appeals - Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

(Exhibit S, Petition.) Petitioner asserted six grounds for relief: (1) the trial court erred when

it denied his PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing; (2) ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, including trial counsel’s failure to communicate, to investigate, to consult with

Petitioner, to interview witnesses and defenses, to pursue suppression, present evidence of

addiction and possession for use, and to fully inform Petitioner on the plea; (3) Petitioner’s

plea was not knowing and voluntary; (4) the trial court failed to inquire into reasons for the

motion for new counsel; (5) insufficient evidence of prior conviction; and (6) denial of

effective PCR and appellate counsel as a result of their failure to assert the substantive claims

raised.

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The state responded, arguing that: (1) trial counsel was not effective; (2) Petitioner’s

claims of ineffectiveness of appellate and PCR counsel were not raised in the PCR petition,

and thus could not be raised on review, and were without merit; (3) the denial of the motion

for new counsel was precluded and without merit; (4) claims of insufficient evidence and

perjury were precluded and without merit; and (5) the claim of insufficient evidence of prior

convictions was precluded and without merit. (Exhibit NN.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. (Exhibit T, Order 10/17/05.)

Supreme Court - Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Exhibit U, Petition.) The state responded summarily on the basis of the arguments asserted

below. (Exhibit MM, Notice of Acknowledgment.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily

denied review. (Exhibit V, Order 4/14/06.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#1) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 21, 2006, asserting the following twelve claims: (1) ineffective

assistance of advisory counsel; (2) improper denial of motion for new counsel; (3) ineffective

assistance of trial counsel re communication; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel re

investigation; (5) violation of right to compulsory process; (6) ineffective assistance of

appellate and PCR counsel; (7) insufficient evidence of prior convictions; (8) violation of

right to due process and fair trial; (9) violation of due process during PCR proceeding; (10)

denial of right to self-representation; (11) denial of equal protection; and (12) denial of fair

trial.

Answer - On March 5, 2007 Respondents filed their Answer (#19), asserting defenses

of procedural default, and challenging the merits of Petitioner’s claims. Respondents concede

that Petitioner has properly exhausted his state remedies on his Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, but

such grounds are without merit. Respondents argue that Petitioner has not properly exhausted

state remedies and has now procedurally defaulted on his Grounds 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

Reply - Petitioner filed a Reply on April 9, 2007 (#21), arguing that in the Arizona

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State Prison he is denied access to legal research materials or other legal assistance.

Petitioner re-urges the merits of the claims which Respondents addressed on the merits.

Order to Supplement - On November 6, 2007, the undersigned noted several issues

not addressed by the parties, including: (1) the absence from the record of the responses to

the PCR petition; (2) the assertion in Ground 3 of an involuntary withdrawal of his guilty

plea, and lack of a response and records thereon; (3) the lack of response on Petitioner’s

claim of cause resulting from an apparently exhausted claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel; (4) the apparent exhaustion of Ground 9 and lack of response on the

merits, and records related thereto.

Supplemental Answer - On November 26, 2007, Respondents filed their

Supplemental Answer (#26) arguing that: (1) Ground 3 is without merit because the trial

court properly rejected Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance in the course of his guilty

plea withdrawal; (2) any ineffectiveness of counsel did not preclude Petitioner from filing

his claims in his pro se briefs, thus eliminating any cause from such ineffectiveness; (3) there

was sufficient evidence of Petitioner’s prior convictions; (4) Petitioner’s failure to demand

a ruling on his procedural motions to the PCR court resulted in a preclusion of those claims.

Supplemental Reply - On December 21, 2007, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Reply

(#26), arguing: (1) cause and prejudice as a result of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, and a denial of access to the courts; (2) Respondents failed to provide transcripts as

ordered by this Court; (3) Respondents failed to provide records of a February 7, 2002

minute entry reflecting the trial court’s order to counsel to consult with Petitioner on the

withdrawal (as opposed to the entry) of his plea, and that counsel failed to consult as ordered;

(4) that Petitioner’s admission of his prior conviction did not relieve the state of its obligation

to provide the prior; (5) Petitioner filed a motion requesting a ruling on his motions to the

PCR Court, and again requested a ruling in his PCR reply; (6) the merits of his claims. 

/ / 

/ / 

/ / 

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

1. Exhaustion

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a federal constitutional claim

presented by a state prisoner only if available state remedies have been exhausted.

Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 2254. To result in

exhaustion, claims must be "fairly presented." That is, the habeas petitioner must provide

the state courts with a "fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts

bearing upon his constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

276-277 (1971). A claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court if petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“[T]o exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only

one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal

court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still

available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v.

Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

“In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state

prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals

has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2005)(quoting

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)). 

Respondents concede that Petitioner has properly exhausted his state remedies on his

Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, but argue he has procedurally defaulted on his Grounds 5, 6, 7, 9,

10, 11, and 12.

a. Exhaustion of Ground 5 (Compulsory Process) - Petitioner asserts in his Ground

5 that his right “to compulsory process to call witnesses and to put forth evidence for my

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defense” was violated when advisory and trial counsel failed to cooperate in calling

witnesses listed in Petitioner’s Notice of Witness List. Petitioner asserts that this claim was

presented to the appeals court and in his Rule 32 PCR petition. (Petition, #1 at 10.)

Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner presented this claim in his PCR Petition, citing the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Response, #19 at 9 (citing Exhibit Q at 19).)

Respondents argue, however, that the claim was not presented in Petitioner’s petitions for

review to the Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.) Petitioner does

not challenge that assertion.

On direct appeal, Petitioner lists as an issue for review that he was “denied right to

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in defendant’s favor.” (Exhibit N, Suppl.

Opening Brief at Issues.) However, the substance of his arguments focused on the failings

of trial counsel. He argued “counsel does not possess carte blanche under any and all

condition to not call any witnesses in defendant[‘s] behalf[;] a defendant may not be deprived

of his right to have compulsory process.” (Id. at 8.) He further argued that “because Judge

Martin refused to dismiss [trial counsel] when motion by e defendant, and his failure to

inquire into the reason why defendant sought new counsel violated defendant’s right to

counsel, thereby depriving defendant of the right to compulsory process.” (Id. at 12.) Thus,

the Arizona Court of Appeals found that, like Petitioner’s other claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, this claim was not properly raised on direct appeal. (Exhibit O, Mem.

Dec. at 22.) Accordingly, this Court cannot find that this claim was properly exhausted by

presentation on direct appeal.

In his PCR Petition, Petitioner plainly asserted a federal compulsory process claim,

asserting “he was denied the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his

behalf...guaranteed by...the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment[s] of the United States

Const[itution].” (Exhibit Q, Part 2 at 1.) However, to exhaust his remedies, Petitioner was

required to also present the claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at

1010. In his petitions for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme

Court, Petitioner argued only claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and insufficient

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evidence of priors. (See Exhibit S, Pet. to Ct. Appls at “(0(3)”; Exhibit U, Pet. To Az. Sup.

Ct. at III.) Those petitions made no mention of a violation of Petitioner’s rights under the

Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground 5 (Compulsory Process) was not properly

exhausted.

b. Exhaustion of Ground 6 (Ineffectiveness of Appellate and PCR Counsel - For

his Ground 6, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of appellate and PCR

counsel. (Petition, #1 at 11-12.) Petitioner argues that appellate counsel should have

asserted the lack of evidence on his prior convictions, and the failure of the court to inquire

into the basis for his motion for new counsel, and the court’s choice of Petitioner’s

ineffective advisory counsel to serve as his trial counsel. (Id. at 11.) Petitioner argues that

PCR counsel was similarly ineffective for failing to assert those claims, and for failing to

adequately investigate Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at

11-12.)

Respondents acknowledge that these claims were raised in Petitioner’s petitions for

review in his Rule 32 PCR proceedings, but argue that Petitioner’s failure to raise them in

the trial court, which when coupled with the appellate courts’ failure to address the merits,

precludes a finding of exhaustion. (Response, #19 at 19 (citing Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d

896, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2004).) Petitioner does not counter this argument.

Respondents do not support their conclusion. As discussed hereinafter, failure to

present to the trial court does not prevent exhaustion; all that is required is presentation "at

all appellate stages." Casey, 386 F.3d at 916 (emphasis added) The failure to present to the

trial court may prevent habeas review if it results in the appellate court applying a procedural

bar which qualifies as an "independent and adequate state ground". But Respondents fail to

meet their burden of pleading such a ground, and none appears from the summary denial of

Petitioner's claims.

Not Presented to Trial Court - These claims were not asserted on direct appeal. (See

Exhibit N, Suppl. Opening Brief.) Thus any exhaustion must have occurred in Petitioner’s

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1

 As discussed below with regard to Ground 7, Petitioner’s state arguments on the

insufficiency of evidence of priors were not presented as federal law claims. Thus, his

ineffectiveness claim would have been based upon arguing that appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to argue a state law claim, which although related is not the same as

his current unexhausted federal law claim. As noted above, when the question is whether a

federal insufficient evidence claim was fairly presented, the answer is “no” and the shift in

authorities makes all the difference. However, when considered as a basis for an assertion

of ineffective assistance, it is not a shift in the legal nature of Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance claim, but in the facts underlying that claim. Instead of arguing that counsel was

ineffective for failing to assert authority X in support of his argument, Petitioner now argues

that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert authority Y in support of the same argument.

Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate somewhat the claims made in

state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd in part on other

grounds by Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal claim must

have been "fairly presented" in state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per

curiam); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Tamapua, 796 F.2d at 262. Thus, a

petitioner may not broaden the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by

asserting additional operative facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts.

While new factual allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may

not "fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v.

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). "[N]ew factual allegations do not render a claim

unexhausted unless they 'fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state

courts.' " Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S.

at 260). 

Were the shift in allegations simply one from citing one case to another, then no

fundamental alteration would have occurred between the two ineffective assistance claims.

However, asking the state court to consider a failure to present a state claim of insufficient

evidence is an entirely different creature from asking them to consider counsel’s failure to

present a federal claim of insufficient evidence. Arizona permits a prior conviction to be

established upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. 

[W]e hold that because neither the statute nor Apprendi requires a jury

trial on the allegation of prior convictions, the heightened burden of

proof does not apply but rather prior convictions for sentence

enhancement purposes must be established by clear and convincing

evidence.

* * * 

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PCR Proceeding.

They were not presented in Petitioner’s PCR Petition. (See Exhibit Q, PCR Petition.)

However, Petitioner did argue in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals that

he was “denied counsel on Rule 32 and appeal (ineffective assistance of counsel) because of

their failure to file [the issues raised in the petition].”1

 (Exhibht S, Pet.to Ct. Appls. at Issues

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In order to prove a prior conviction, the state must submit positive

identification establishing that the accused is the same person who

previously was convicted, as well as evidence of the conviction itself.

The proper procedure for establishing a prior conviction is for the state

to submit a certified copy of the conviction and establish that the

defendant is the person to whom the document refers.

State v. Cons, 208 Ariz. 409, 415, 94 P.3d 609, 615 (Ariz. App. 2004). In contrast, the Ninth

Circuit has held that evidence on a prior used to enhance a sentence “is sufficient if, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the fact of the prior conviction beyond a reasonable.” U.S. v. Okafor, 285 F.3d

842, 848 (9th Cir. 2002).

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for Review.) Similarly, Petitioner argued to the Arizona Supreme Court that he was denied

effective assistance “in his Rule 32 petition and petition for review appeal.” (Exhibit U, Pet.

To Az. Sup. Ct. At 9.)

Thus, Petitioner failed to present these claims to the PCR court, but did raise them in

both levels of appeal from the denial of his PCR petition. Respondents argue that this is not

sufficient. 

Presentation at Appellate Stages Required - Clearly, if Petitioner had presented his

claims for the first time to the Arizona Supreme Court, that would not be sufficient to

establish exhaustion. “Whether a claim is exhausted through a direct appellate procedure,

a post-conviction procedure, or both, the claim should be raised at all appellate stages

afforded under state law as of right by that procedure.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure,

§ 23.3b (4th ed. 1998) ). Thus, “where the claim has been presented for the first and only

time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered unless ‘there are

special and important reasons therefor’...[r]aising the claim in such a fashion does not, for

the relevant purpose, constitute ‘fair presentation.’” Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351

(1989). Therefore, where a petitioner “raised his federal constitutional claims for the first

and only time to the state's highest court on discretionary review, he did not fairly present

them.” Casey, 386 F.3d at 918.

Presentation at Trial Court Not Required - There is, however, no comparable federal

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2

 Arguably, the appropriate mode of presenting a claim of ineffectiveness of PCR

counsel would be a subsequent PCR proceeding. See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 131, 912

P.2d 1357, 1360 (Ariz.App.1995) (when asserting a “claim regarding the effectiveness of the

attorney representing him on the first petition for post-conviction relief ...the obvious method

is by means of a second petition for post-conviction relief”).

3

 

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requirement that the claims be raised at the trial court to be properly exhausted. While

presentation “at all appellate stages,” Casey, 386 F.3d at 916 (emphasis added), is clearly

required, ordinarily presentation to the trial court is not necessary to exhaustion. “If the

petitioner fails to raise a federal claim at trial (or if the claim was not cognizable at all or did

not arise until after trial), the petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by raising the

claim on appeal, on a motion for rehearing of the appeal, or even in a delayed appeal.”

Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (5th ed. 2001).

Independent and Adequate State Ground Not Asserted - That does not meant that

failure to raise a claim in the trial court cannot resulted in a bar of federal habeas review.

“Although the principal [that presentation to the trial court is not required] will overcome any

exhaustion problems, a petitioner nonetheless is well-advised to raise available claims at trial

if state law so requires, so as to avoid any risk of a ‘procedural default’ barring federal

habeas corpus relief under the independent and adequate state procedural grounds doctrine.”

Id. at § 23.3b n. 19. 

Thus, Petitioner’s failure to raise the claim in the trial court could have resulted in the

Arizona appellate courts applying a procedural bar, which would constitute an independent

and adequate state ground barring federal habeas review. Arguably it would have been

impossible for Petitioner to assert the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel to the trial court in his

PCR proceeding, inasmuch as that representation was not then complete.2

 However, he could

have asserted the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in his PCR petition. If it is assumed

that his failure to do so did not work a failure to exhaust, the question still remains whether

the claim can be found to have been properly exhausted. Arguably, some procedural bar

would have presented Petitioner from raising his claims initially to the appellate courts.3

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However, Respondents have the initial burden to “adequately ple[ad] the existence of

an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense.” Bennett v.

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). Respondents have not argued that Petitioner was

procedurally barred under an independent and adequate state ground from asserting his

claims initially to the appellate courts, but have simply argued that doing so failed to properly

exhaust his claims under Casey. (See Response, #19 at 9.) 

Not Clear State Ground Was Basis for Denial - Even if Respondents asserted the

application of a procedural bar by the state courts, “unless the state court makes clear that it

is resting its decision denying relief on an independent and adequate state ground, it is

presumed that the state denial was based at least in part upon federal grounds, and the

petitioner may seek relief in federal court.” Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.

2004). Here, there was no explicit application of a procedural bar by either appellate court,

each having issued a summary denial of the petitions for review. (Exhibits T & V.)

Ordinarily, this Court would look to the last reasoned decision of the state courts, and

presume that all subsequent decisions were on the same basis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797 (1991). However, there was never any reasoned decision on Petitioner’s claims. 

 “Absent a presumption, ‘federal habeas courts must ascertain for themselves if the

petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment that rests on independent and

adequate state grounds.’” Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347 (9th cir. 1992) (quoting

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 736 (1991)). Here, there is little in the record to

indicate that the Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court relied on a procedural

bar to reject Petitioner’s claims. The conclusory “Denied” provides no clue, and the State

argued both the merits and a procedural bar when addressing the claim of ineffectiveness of

PCR and appellate counsel in responding to the Petition for Review. (See Exhibit NN,

Response at 14-15.) See Hunter, 982 F.2d at 347 (looking to the nature of the post-card

denial, and the defenses asserted in response to the federal claims). 

Conclusion - Thus, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s failure to present the claims

in his Ground 6 to the PCR court did not result in a failure to exhaust, and that his

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4

 It appears that page 15 of Exhibit S was interposed between pages 14 and 16,

although the proper order is not entirely clear.

5

 Petitioner listed the claim in his “Issues Presented to the Supreme Court for

Review” (Exhibit U at III), but did not argue the claim in the body of the petition to the

Arizona Supreme Court. However, presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals is sufficient

for exhaustion purposes. See Swoopes, supra.

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presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals was sufficient to exhaust those claims. 

c. Exhaustion of Ground 7 (Insufficient Evidence of Priors) - For his Ground 7

for relief, Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence of the prior convictions relied

on to enhance Petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner asserts that he presented this claim to the

Arizona Supreme Court on PCR review. (Petition, #1 at 13.) Respondents argue that while

Petitioner raised a similar claim throughout his PCR proceeding, he failed to cite any federal

law in support of the claim. (Response, #19 at 9-10.) 

In his Supplemental PCR Petition, Petitioner argued the facts of this claim, but

referenced no federal law or constitutional principle. (Exhibit Q, Part 2 at 13-15.) Similarly

in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit S at 14, 16 4

), and his

Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit U at III 5

), Petitioner failed to

raise the claim as a federal one. In Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir.1999), the Court

held that presentation of an “insufficient evidence” claim based on state law was insufficient

to raise a federal Due Process claim of insufficient evidence.

Accordingly, Ground 7 was not fairly presented, and is not properly exhausted. 

d. Exhaustion of Ground 9 (Due Process re PCR Procedures) - For his Ground

9, Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated during his PCR proceeding

when the court denied his various motions to extend, to appoint investigator, to compel

discovery, etc. and then summarily ruled on his PCR petition without holding an evidentiary

hearing. (Petition #1 at 15-16.) Respondents argue, as with Ground 6, that this claim was

raised on appeal from Petitioner’s PCR proceeding, but because it was not asserted in his

PCR petition, it was not properly exhausted. However, as discussed above in connection

with Ground 6, presentation to the trial court is not required, although its absence may result

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in a procedural bar as a result of the application of an independent and adequate state

procedural bar. 

However, this claim was not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals as a

federal due process claim. Rather, Petitioner simply identified as an issue that the “trial court

was in error for summarily dismissing the petition for relief without giving defendant an

evidentiary hearing on his allegation.” (Exhibit S, Pet. Rev. at “(0(3)”.) In the body of his

petition, he simply argued that “the superior court’s ruling summarily dismissing

defendant[’s] petition for relief without having a[n] evidentiary hearing was in error.” (Id.

at 1.)

Before the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner again identified the issue as “whether

trial court was in error for dismissing defendant’s petition for relief without evidentiary

hearing.” (Exhibit U, Pet Rev. at iii.) Citing state authority, he argued that his allegations

of ineffective assistance required a hearing to determine if they were “colorable.” (Id. at 9.)

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that this claim was not fairly presented as a federal

due process claim, and thus was not properly exhausted. 

e. Exhaustion of Ground 10 (Right of Self-Representation) - For his Ground 10,

Petitioner argues that he was denied his right to self-representation. (Petition #1 at 17.)

Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner asserted this argument in his PCR Petition (see

Exhibit Q at 19), but properly argue that because it was not raised in either of his petitions

for review (see Exhibits S and U), it is not exhausted. (Response, #19 at 11.) Indeed,

Petitioner never asserted a right to self-representation to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and

merely recited the facts of his advice to the trial court that “he no longer wants to employ

counsel.” (Exhibit S at 15.) Indeed, even Petitioner’s Petition fails to allege that this claim

was presented to the state courts. (Petition #1 at 17.)

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust this

claim.

f. Exhaustion of Ground 11 (Equal Protection) - For his Ground 11, Petitioner

argues that he was denied equal protection as a result of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

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(Petition #1 at 18.) Respondents argue that this claim is conclusory and was not fairly

presented to the state courts. (Response, #19 at 11.) Petitioner alleges in his Petition that the

claim was raised in his PCR proceeding (#1 at 18). 

Petitioner did include in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals a

paragraph captioned “Defendant was Denied Counsel and Equal Protection of the Law.”

(Exhibit S at 10.) However, Petitioner never identified this claim as being based on federal

law, instead simply arguing that he was “denied equal protection of the law.” The Arizona

Constitution has its own guarantee of “equal protection.” See Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 13 Equal

Privileges and Immunities.

While a petitioner need not recite "book and verse on the federal constitution," Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758

(9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were

before the state courts or that a "somewhat similar state law claim was made." Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). But see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004),

Stevens J. dissenting, for discussions on the effect of consideration of similar and/or identical

state law claims. Although the equal protection jurisprudence of the Arizona and Federal

governments are “essentially the same,” American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146

F.Supp.2d 1012, 1079 (D.Ariz.,2001), vac’d on other grounds 305 F.3d 1015 (2002), they

are not identical, and have different focuses and different historical purposes. Martin v.

Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 313 at n. 18, 987 P.2d 779, 799 (Ariz. App. 1999).

 The undersigned finds that Petitioner failed to fairly present a federal equal protection

claim, and thus concludes that Ground 11 was not properly exhausted.

g. Exhaustion of Ground 12 (Fair Trial) - For his Ground 12, Petitioner alleges that

the various inadequacies of trial counsel amounted to a denial of his right to a fair trial.

(Petition, #1 at 19.) Respondents again argue that this claim is conclusory and was not fairly

presented to the state courts. (Response, #19 at 12.) ) Although Petitioner alleges in his

Petition that the claim was raised in his PCR proceeding (#1 at 19), he points to no portion

of his petitions which actually raised a claim that he was denied a fair trial. The undersigned

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finds none, and thus concludes that this claim was not properly exhausted.

h. Summary re Exhaustion - Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that

Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his grounds 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12, but finds contrary to

Respondents’ arguments that Ground 6 (Ineffectiveness of PCR and Appellate Counsel) was

properly exhausted.

2. Procedural Default

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest state court, a petitioner can

satisfy the exhaustion requirement by demonstrating that no state remedies remained

available at the time the federal habeas petition was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B); Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

If, however, the procedural bar is of the petitioner’s own making, then he may be precluded

from seeking habeas relief. 

If state remedies are not available because the petitioner failed to

comply with state procedures and thereby prevented the highest state

court from reaching the merits of his claim, then a federal court may

refuse to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). This failure to comply with reasonable

state procedures is usually characterized as “procedural default.” When a petitioner has

“procedurally defaulted,” his claim is barred absent a showing of “cause and prejudice”

sufficient to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Petitioner does not argue (assuming these claims are unexhausted) that the claims are

not now procedurally defaulted. 

Claims Preclusion - Indeed, Rule 32.2(a)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

precludes relief “based upon any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in

any previous collateral proceeding.” In Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 46 P.3d 1067

(2002), the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that except for claims of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude”, the State may establish preclusion under Rule 32.2 by simply

showing “that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous

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collateral proceeding.” Id. at 449, 46 P.3d at 1070. 

Petitioner does not assert that his unexhausted claims would be of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude” so as to require something more than a mere failure to raise the

claim for it to be precluded. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims would be precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3). 

Appeals Time Bar - Moreover, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims. 

PCR Time Bar - Likewise, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent

PCR Petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions for post-conviction relief (other

than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and

sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal,

whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995)

(applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant

deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

While Rule 32.4(a) does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of

claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any

of these exceptions are applicable to his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions

in Rule 32.1 would apply to them. The rule defines the excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

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f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of her conviction or sentence. Petitioner asserts

no "newly discovered evidence" and thus paragraph (e) has no application. Paragraph (f) has

no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, and the notice of postconviction relief of-right applies only to first petitions filed within 90 days following a

judgment based on a guilty or nolo contendre plea. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 (defining when

petition of-right). Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a

change in the law occurring since his last state PCR petition. Finally, paragraph (h) has no

application to Petitioner’s various procedural claims.

Therefore, Petitioner’s unexhausted claims must be found to be procedurally

defaulted. 

3. Avoiding Procedural Default

a. Cause and Prejudice - If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a

claim, he may not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and

prejudice” sufficient to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Although

both “cause” and “prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, a court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991).

Petitioner’s original Reply did not explicitly assert cause or prejudice to excuse his

default. However, in asking for a liberal construction of his pleadings in this Court,

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Petitioner does recount the limited legal resources available to him within the Arizona

Department of Corrections. (Reply, #21 at 2-3.) In his Supplemental Reply, Petitioner

argues that the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and limited legal resources in the

prison caused his procedural default. (Supp. Reply, #26 at 2.) 

b. Limited Legal Resources - A pro se petitioner may be able to establish “cause”

if he can establish a lack of access to the law, as opposed to a lack of knowledge of the law.

See e.g. Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1992) (remanding for a determination of

cause where a pro se petitioner’s incarceration in Nevada precluded access to Utah legal

materials required to challenge a Utah conviction). Cf. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding lack of library materials may establish an “impediment” which

would toll the statute of limitations applicable to habeas petitions). The petitioner must

establish, however, that the lack of access resulted in an inability to assert his claims. See

e.g. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no “cause” where despite lack

of resources generally, pro se prisoner had not shown personal deprivation, and had managed

to file other adequate petitions.) 

Represented at Most Relevant Times - For most of Petitioner’s claims, lack of legal

resources in the prison would not constitute cause, because Petitioner was represented by

appellate counsel at all relevant times necessary to the exhaustion of those claims. All but

one of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims, including Grounds 5 (Compulsory Process), Ground

7 (Insufficient Evidence of Priors), Ground 10 (Right to Self-representation), Ground 11

(Equal Protection), and Ground 12 (Fair Trial), could and should have been presented on

direct appeal, when Petitioner had the benefit of counsel, and thus was not dependent upon

the prison’s legal library, paralegals, or other prison resources. See Tacho v. Martinez, 862

F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (lack of legal assistance not cause where petitioner

represented at critical stages). 

 Absent a showing of constitutionally ineffective assistance of that counsel, Petitioner

is left to bear the results of his counsel’s efforts, however flawed.

The existence of cause for a procedural default “must ordinarily

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turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor

external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the

State's procedural rule.” Ineffective assistance of counsel is cause for

procedural default, but “[a]ttorney error short of ineffective assistance

of counsel does not constitute cause.”

* * * 

Attorney inadvertence or ignorance of the law does not establish

cause for a procedural default.

Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 492).

Thus, Petitioner cannot rely upon the limits of the prison law library as “cause” for his failure

to exhaust when he was represented.

The only unexhausted claim for which Petitioner was unrepresented was his Ground

9 (Due Process re PCR Procedures). His opportunity to challenge an alleged denial of due

process in his PCR proceedings would have occurred during his PCR petitions for review.

At the time of those proceedings, he was unrepresented and thus dependent upon the prison

legal resources. However, Petitioner fails to offer any showing that any inadequacies in

those resources made it impossible for him to present his claims in Ground 9. 

The record reflects that Petitioner had resources sufficient to raise the facts of Ground

9 as an issue for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals challenging the summary

procedures employed by the PCR court. Although, as discussed herein above, he limited that

claim to allegations of state law error, Petitioner offers nothing to show that a deficiency in

resources precluded him from identifying a federal due process claim from the same facts.

Moreover, Petitioner had sufficient resources to include in his Petition for Review

federal claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and to cite a variety of state and federal

legal authorities. (See Exhibit S, Pet. Rev. at “(0(1).”) His ability to do so suggests that he

was not wholly deprived of access to legal materials. See Thomas, 945 F.2d 1119 (finding

no “cause” where despite lack of resources generally, pro se prisoner had not shown personal

deprivation, and had managed to file other adequate petitions.) 

c. Ineffective Assistance - Petitioner argues that he in fact received not just

defective, but constitutionally ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, thus establishing

cause for his failure to exhaust. The ineffectiveness of constitutionally required counsel can

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establish “cause.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). 

This argument is foreclosed with respect to the performance of PCR counsel.

“Because there is no right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, there cannot

be constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings." Patrick Poland

v. Stewart, 169 F. 3d 573, 588 (9th Cir. 1999), (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752). “The fact

that counsel is appointed by the state court does not change the result, because counsel is not

constitutionally required.” Smith v. Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 357 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly,

any effectiveness of Petitioner’s PCR counsel cannot constitute “cause.” Thus, Petitioner

must rely upon a showing of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel to establish “cause.”

However, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel showing "cause" is itself

subject to the exhaustion requirements. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 492; Edwards v.

Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). Accordingly, "[t]o the extent that petitioner is alleging

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause for the default, the exhaustion doctrine

requires him to first raise this ineffectiveness claim as a separate claim in state court."

Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381. 

Ground 7 Only Possible Claim For Which Ineffectiveness was Exhausted - So, the

first question is whether Petitioner ever presented and exhausted claims based upon counsel’s

failure to pursue his unexhausted federal claims. In the state courts, Petitioner’s attack on

the performance of appellate counsel was limited to his failure to assert the substantive

claims raised in Petitioner’s petitions for review from his PCR petition. (See Exhibit S,

Pet.to Ct. Appls. at Issues for Review.) That PCR petition was limited to arguing (1) the

denial of his PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing; (2) ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, (3) Petitioner’s plea was not knowing and voluntary; (4) trial court failed to inquire

into reasons for motion for new counsel; (5) insufficient evidence of prior conviction. Thus,

the unexhausted claims in Ground 5 (Compulsory Process), Ground 10 (Right to Selfrepresentation), Ground 11 (Equal Protection), and Ground 12 (Fair Trial) were not a basis

for Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims, and thus were not exhausted. That leaves

Petitioner’s Ground 7 (insufficient evidence of priors) as his only unexhausted claim that

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could have been asserted to the state courts as a basis for ineffective assistance. 

Ground 7 Not Presented as Federal Claim - However, although Petitioner argued to

the state courts that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the facts of Ground 7,

Petitioner did not assert the substance of Ground 7 to the state courts as a federal claim. As

noted above, the facts underlying Ground 7 were presented in the PCR proceedings only as

a state law claim. Accordingly, Petitioner never argued to the state courts that counsel was

ineffective for failing to assert the similar federal claim. 

Thus, his “cause” is based upon arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to argue a state law claim, which although related is not the same as his current

unexhausted federal law claim. As noted above, when the question is whether the underlying

federal insufficient evidence claim was fairly presented, the answer is “no” and the shift in

authorities makes all the difference. However, when considered as a basis for an assertion

of ineffective assistance, it is not a shift in the legal nature of Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance claim, but in the facts underlying that claim. Instead of arguing that counsel was

ineffective for failing to assert authority X in support of his argument, Petitioner now argues

that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert authority Y in support of the same argument.

Difference Between State and Federal Claims Makes Alteration Fundamental -

Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate somewhat the claims made in state

court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd in part on other

grounds by Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal claim must

have been "fairly presented" in state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per

curiam); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Tamapua, 796 F.2d at 262. Thus, a

petitioner may not broaden the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by

asserting additional operative facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts.

While new factual allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may

not "fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v.

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). "[N]ew factual allegations do not render a claim

unexhausted unless they 'fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state

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courts.' " Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S.

at 260). Thus the question is whether Petitioners current claim of ineffectiveness of counsel

in failing to raise a federal insufficient evidence claim is fundamentally different from his

claim to the state courts that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the related state law

claim.

Were the shift in allegations simply one from citing one authority to another, then no

fundamental alteration would have occurred between the two ineffective assistance claims.

However, asking the state court to consider a failure to present a state claim of insufficient

evidence is an entirely different creature from asking them to consider counsel’s failure to

present a federal claim of insufficient evidence. Arizona permits a prior conviction to be

established upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. State v. Cons, 208 Ariz. 409,

415, 94 P.3d 609, 615 (Ariz. App. 2004). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that

evidence on a prior used to enhance a sentence “is sufficient if, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the fact

of the prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” U.S. v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842, 848 (9th

Cir. 2002). Thus, the standards deviate greatly between the federal and state claims of

insufficient evidence of priors, making a claim of ineffectiveness with regard to one very

different from an ineffectiveness claim related to the other. 

Conclusion re Presentation - Therefore, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s

presentation of an ineffectiveness claim based on failure to assert the state law claim of

insufficient evidence did not exhaust the ineffectiveness claim relevant to Petitioners’

unexhausted federal claim of insufficient evidence, and thus cannot excuse the failure to

exhaust that underlying federal claim.

Claim of Ineffectiveness Would Be Without Merit - Moreover, even if the

undersigned could conclude that the ineffectiveness claim were exhausted, the undersigned

could not find that it constituted “cause,” because the ineffectiveness claim is without merit.

As discussed hereinafter with respect to the merits of Petitioner’s Ground 6 (ineffective

assistance), Petitioner admitted the priors necessary to the enhancement of his sentence. Not

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only was that admission sufficient for state law purposes (as discussed therein), but were

sufficient under federal law as well. See e.g. United States v. Harris, 592 F.2d 1058,

1059-60 (9th Cir.1979) (admission by defendant or counsel sufficient evidence of prior

conviction). Thus, attempting to argue insufficient evidence under federal law would have

been futile, and thus failing to do so would not have constituted ineffective assistance.

Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, such failure

would not provide “cause” to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to establish “cause” to

excuse his procedural default of his unexhausted grounds.

d. Actual Innocence - The standard of “cause and prejudice” can apply where “ a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). However, a petitioner asserting

his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence" presented in his

habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A showing that a reasonable

doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must

show that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. Petitioner

has not attempted to make such a showing.

4. Summary

Respondents concede that Petitioner has properly exhausted his state remedies on his

Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state

remedies on Ground 5 (Compulsory Process), Ground 7 (Insufficient Evidence of Priors),

Ground 9 (Due Process re PCR Procedures) Ground 10 (Right to Self-representation),

Ground 11 (Equal Protection), and Ground 12 (Fair Trial). However, the undersigned finds

that Petitioner did properly exhaust his remedies on Ground 6 (Ineffectiveness of PCR and

Appellate Counsel). 

Petitioner’s state remedies which could address his unexhausted claims are now

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procedurally barred, and thus Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on those claims.

Petitioner fails to show “cause” to excuse his procedural default, or actual innocence.

Accordingly, Grounds 5, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 must be dismissed with prejudice. Reed, 468

U.S. at 11; Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1380. 

B. GROUND 1 (Ineffective Assistance of Advisory Counsel)

In his Ground 1, Petitioner argues that advisory counsel Corwin Townsend was

ineffective for failing to contact petitioner and failing to retain an investigator despite

authorization. As result, Petitioner argues that he moved for appointment of new counsel,

and the trial court then responded improperly by appointing the same attorney, thereby

denying Petitioner his right to self-representation. (Petition, #1 at 5.)

Respondents acknowledge that this claim was raised in Petitioner’s PCR proceedings.

(Response, #19 at 7.) Respondents argue, however, that “[b]ecause a self-represented

defendant has no right to advisory counsel, a constitutional claim based on ineffective

assistance of advisory counsel is not cognizable.” (Id. at 14.) Respondents do not separately

address Petitioner’s argument concerning the denial of his right of self-representation. 

Petitioner replies that the essence of his claim is that the court erred “by appointing

an incompetent advisory counsel to be counsel of record.” (Reply, #21 at 8.)

Ineffective Advisory Counsel - Assuming that, despite Petitioner’s Reply, he does

attack the effectiveness of advisory counsel, Respondents properly conclude that such a claim

is without merit. “A defendant has the right to represent himself or herself pro se or to be

represented by an attorney. However, a ‘defendant does not have a constitutional right to

‘hybrid’ representation’ at trial.” U.S. v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1193 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted). Where a defendant has no constitutional right to counsel, he cannot be deprived

of constitutionally required effective assistance. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 588

(1982). See also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (no right to PCR counsel,

and therefore no constitutionally significant ineffectiveness). 

Appointment of Ineffective Counsel - Petitioner contends that, notwithstanding the

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lack of constitutional significance of advisory counsel’s ineffectiveness, that ineffectiveness

did make it wrong for the trial court to appoint the same counsel to represent Petitioner.

(Reply, #21 at 8.) 

Advisory counsel was appointed on October 24, 2001. (Exhibit F, M.E. 10/24/01.)

He failed to contact Petitioner, despite an express order to do so. (Reply, #21, Exhibit D,

M.E. 12/4/01.) Some 50 days after his appointment, advisory counsel had still not contacted

Petitioner, and accordingly on December 13, 2001, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss

Counsel and Appointment of New Counsel, complaining of counsel’s continued absence.

(Exhibit G.) Despite the non-communicativeness of advisory counsel, the same counsel was

appointed to represent Petitioner at trial. (Exhibit H, M.E. 1/4/02.)

The undersigned presumes, for purposes of this discussion, that advisory counsel’s

performance prior to appointment as trial counsel was sufficiently egregious to amount to

defective performance under the standards adopted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), and that it called into question his competence. However, the appointment of

such counsel does not, without more, amount to a Sixth Amendment violation. 

In U.S. v. Ross, the defendant was represented by counsel who had been suspended

from the practice of law by the state bar (ultimately being disbarred), and had never been

admitted to the federal court bar. 338 F.3d 1054 (2003). The Ninth Circuit found no Sixth

Amendment violation, noting that the “Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists ‘not for its

own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.’”

Id. at 1056 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)). Accordingly, the

existence of any constitutional violation resulting from the appointment of such presumably

unqualified counsel was “appropriately addressed under the same rubric generally applicable

to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: the test set forth in [Strickland], actual deficient

performance plus prejudice.” Id. at 1056. 

Similarly, this Court must require Petitioner to show that trial counsel was actually

ineffective after appointment as such counsel, not merely that he had demonstrated

incompetence prior to his appointment. To the extent that Petitioner attempts to do so

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 Respondents posit the limitations on habeas relief embodied in 28 U.S.C.

§2254(d)(1) (state court's decision must be "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"

before relief may be granted). Here, the trial court did not explicitly address any portion of

this claim in denying Petitioner’s PCR Petition. (Exhibit R, M.E. 5/24/4.) Nor did the

Arizona Court of Appeals or Arizona Supreme Court, both of whom issued summary denials.

(Exhibits T and V.) Where there is no reasoned rejection of the claim, the habeas Court is

left to applying its own evaluation, comparing the outcome to that of the state court, and only

then if there is a discrepancy can the habeas court begin to evaluate whether the state court

outcome was "contrary to or an unreasonable application of" Supreme Court law. See Himes

v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 and n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Independent review of the record

is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can

determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable"). Because the

undersigned concludes that this claim is without merit, the limitations on relief in

§2254(d)(1) need not be reached.

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through his other substantive claims, those matters will be addressed hereinafter. Petitioner’s

claim based solely upon the trial court’s selection of counsel is without merit, and must be

denied.6

Summary - Whether viewed as a claim of ineffective assistance of advisory counsel,

or a claim based upon the trial court’s appointment of previously incompetent counsel,

Petitioner’s Ground 1 fails to set forth a violation of a constitutional right, and is therefore

without merit, and must be denied.

C. GROUND 2 (Denial of Motion for New Counsel)

In his Ground 2, Petitioner argues that the trial court denied him due process when it

denied his April 2, 2002 motion to replace trial counsel without conducting a hearing into the

allegations in the motion. (Petition #1 at 6.) Respondents concede the exhaustion of this

claim, although noting that it was couched in terms of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel

in Petitioner’s PCR proceedings. (Response #19 at 8.) Analyzing it on that basis,

Respondents argue that Petitioner recognizes that the trial court did make inquiries into the

basis of the motion, and heard Petitioner’s response. (Id. at 16.) Petitioner replies that, given

the matters at stake, something more than a “cursory” examination of the issues was

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 Again, there is no reasoned decision by the state courts for this Court to evaluate.

(See Exhibits , T, and V.) However, because the undersigned finds the claim to be without

merit, the relief limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) are not reached.

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required.7

“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333

(1976). “What the Constitution does require is ‘an opportunity * * * granted at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner,’‘for (a) hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ The

formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance

of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings. Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-379 (1971) (citations omitted). In assessing whether a state

court's has violated a defendant’s right of due process, the habeas court must determine

whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

Here, the record relates that both Petitioner and his counsel were heard on his motion,

albeit briefly, and Petitioner was able to relate his concerns about his limited contact with

counsel, and lack of knowledge about his defense. (Reply, #21, Exhibit I, R.T. 4/2/02 at 3-

4.) What appeared from that exchange was the existence of an ongoing though strained

relationship between trial counsel and Petitioner, with counsel representing that he had

“discussed these issues with Mr. Johnson over and over again,” and Petitioner countering that

“[t]his is the first time we talk about the case when we come to trial.” (Id. at 4.) Given, as

the trial judge described it, the “tortured history” of the case particularly with respect to

Petitioner’s representation, it is understandable that the court was not inclined to dive into

a mini-trial on the communications between counsel and Petitioner. (Id. )

Petitioner does not suggest what additional information he would have provided had

a protracted hearing been held. Moreover, Petitioner’s own records reflect that he was being

less than candid with the court, having in fact met with counsel at the jail at least twice

before, for a total of almost two hours. (Reply, #21, Exhibit C.) It must be presumed that

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 To the extent that Petitioner may have intended to assert the present claim under the

Sixth Amendment, it would be without merit for the same reasons that his challenge to the

initial appointment of trial counsel, as expressed in Ground 1, is without merit. The proper

mode for attacking the sufficiency of counsel is through a Strickland analysis of counsel’s

performance.

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such facts would have been adduced had a more substantial hearing been held. This was not

a difficult case, there being virtually no dispute as to the essential facts, and only a dispute

as to Petitioner’s intent (e.g. whether his possession was for use or sale) to be inferred from

those facts. Thus, extensive contact between counsel and defendant would not necessarily

have been anticipated.

Under these circumstances, Petitioner has offered nothing to show that the trial court’s

failure to conduct a more protracted hearing was a denial of due process , nor has Petitioner

shown that the lack of such hearing prejudiced him. Accordingly, this claim is without merit

and must be denied.8

D. GROUNDS 3 and 4 (Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel)

For his Ground 3, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, because Petitioner was not fully informed of facts necessary to making a choice to

go to trial. Petitioner complains that he was not aware of the limited defense that would be

presented (e.g. limited evidence on Petitioner’s addiction). Consequently, Petitioner made

a “choice to go to trial that was not a[n] intelligent and knowingly choice.” (Petition, #1 at

8.) 

For his Ground 4, Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate

investigation, including failing:

(1) to investigate the scene to impeach witnesses’ testimony of what they observed;

(2) to investigate potential witnesses of Petitioner’s history of drug usage;

(3) to interview any witnesses;

(4) to develop other lines of defense;

(5) to develop evidence of Petitioner’s drug usage;

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(6) to fully inform Petitioner to assist in choosing to go to trial; and

(7) to investigate the basis for a suppression motion.

(Id. at 9.)

Respondents argue that trial counsel pursued Petitioner’s defense of being a drug

addict possessing for his own use, and that Petitioner has failed to show that counsel’s choice

of witnesses to use was not a reasonable tactical choice. (Response, #19 at 16-17.)

Respondents further argue that Petitioner has failed to show prejudice, given the inability of

any witnesses other than Petitioner to address Petitioner’s intent. (Id. at 17-18.) 

With regard to Ground 3, Petitioner replies that (after Petitioner withdrew his guilty

plea) at a hearing on March 7, 2002, the Court directed counsel to review the plea and the

motion to waive counsel with Petitioner, but that counsel failed to do so. As a result, on

March 11, 2002, Petitioner finally determined to withdraw from the plea agreement, to

withdraw his request to waive counsel, and to proceed to trial. (Reply, #21 at 9-10.) With

regard to Ground 4, Petitioner replies that counsel should have pursued witnesses of

Petitioner’s extreme addiction, and an expert witness to testify about drug usage and

addiction. (Id. at 10-12.)

The trial court did not address the claims in Ground 3. With regard to the claims in

Ground 4, the trial court concluded:

The Defendant makes numerous claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel. None of them, however, show that counsel’s preparation or

performance were below the standard for criminal defense. Counsel

clearly made a tactical decision to not call certain witnesses. Such a

decision does not amount to ineffective assistance. Defendant testified

that he was an addict. The State did not dispute the fact. The jury

evaluated this testimony and still found that the 1.1 grams of cocaine,

possessed along with $524 in cash, was possessed for sale.

(Exhibit R, M.E. 5/24/4.)

Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims - Generally, claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance

- counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard for reasonableness; and (2)

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prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694.

Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding

either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not

prejudicial. Id. at 697.

Ground 3: Failure to Advise re Plea - Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to

provide him adequate information to choose to proceed to trial. 

In Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit recognized that

Strickland’s recognition of a right to effective assistance at all critical stages of a proceeding

extends to the consideration of a guilty plea. Consequently, the Nunes court found a viable

claim of ineffective assistance where “the factual scenario was (1) that Nunes' attorney gave

him the wrong information and advice about the state's plea offer and (2) that if Nunes had

instead been informed accurately, he would expressly have taken the bargain.” Id. at 1054.

The prejudice was the rejection of a favorable plea offer, and was factually supported

when“Nunes swore (just as he had stated in his written declaration in the state court

proceedings) that he would have accepted the plea offer if it had been accurately conveyed

to him, and explained why that was so.” Id. at 1055-1056.

Here, Petitioner argues that counsel failed to meet with him and offered no advice on

the withdrawal of plea. Petitioner argues that on February 7, 2002 counsel was ordered to

consult with Petitioner. Petitioner argues that counsel did not do so in the ensuing month,

and could not have consulted with Petitioner on the matter until March 6, 2002, as shown by

the jail visitation records. (Supp. Reply, #26 at 5 (citing Exhibit DD thereto).) However,

the record shows that Petitioner’s plea was withdrawn long before, on February 7, 2002.

Given the frequency with which criminal defense counsel confer with their clients in the

courtroom, either before or after proceedings, the lack of a jail visit is of little weight.

 Moreover, Petitioner argued in his PCR Petition, not that counsel failed to advise him

about the plea, but that counsel advised him and advised him incorrectly. (Exhibit Q, PCR

Petition at 39-40.) Thus, Petitioner has already conceded that counsel did, in fact, consult

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 Counsel avers that he had in fact “discussed Defendant’s case with him, including

trial strategy and defenses.” (Exhibit DD, Response to PCR Petition at Exhibit A, ¶ 2.)

Because it is not necessary to a determination on the claim, the undersigned does not resolve

that factual dispute.

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with him about the propriety of the plea as opposed to proceeding to trial. What he must (and

does) argue now, therefore, is that he was prejudiced because he was not counseled anew

after he voiced his intent to withdraw his plea. Nunes does not mandate serial advice.

Having once adequately counseled Petitioner, trial counsel needed, absent some unique

circumstance, to have done no more.

The only factor pointed to by Petitioner to establish a need for additional counseling

is the trial court’s instruction to trial counsel to consult with Petitioner. While trial counsel’s

failure to comply with that instruction might have violated an obligation to the court, it did

not automatically render counsel’s performance deficient. Indeed, one could surmise that

such counseling might have consisted of little more than a reference to counsel’s advice prior

to entering the plea. Failing to revisit the prior advice would be unsurprising given the

limited time between Petitioner’s entry and withdrawal of his plea.

Moreover, Petitioner presents nothing to show that counsel made any

misrepresentation to him about the terms of the plea offer or his prospects at trial. Rather,

he argues that counsel failed to inform him of the nature of the defense that would be

mounted. In particular, Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to “inform him of the

defenses, trial tactic, and strategy that no witnesses or evidence of a history of drug addiction

would be presented to the jury.”9

 (Petition, #1 at 8.) Respondents argue that this claim is

without merit because counsel did in fact pursue a defense that the possession was for

personal use. (Answer, #19 at 16-17.)

Trial tactics and strategy are matters to be resolved by counsel, are often adjusted or

supplanted as trial progresses, and are not the types of affirmative facts which counsel should

always be expected to address in discussing the propriety of a plea. See 17A A.R.S.

Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 42, Rules of Prof.Conduct, ER 1.2, Comment (“With respect to the means

by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as

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required by ER 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the

representation.”); and ER 1.4, Comment (“Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably

consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In

some situations--depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the

feasibility of consulting with the client--this duty will require consultation prior to taking

action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be

made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior

consultation.”).

Certainly, counsel’s prognosis of the outcome of a trial is a relevant consideration

when discussing a plea. However, Petitioner does not allege that counsel represented a

positive outcome was assured or even likely. To the contrary, it appears that counsel strongly

encouraged Petitioner to accept the plea. At the hearing on Petitioner’s motion for new

counsel, trial counsel commented:

MR. TOWNSEND: Just so you know, I have

communicated on several different occasions. I think Mr. Johnson

ought to resolve this case with the plea agreement we have already

signed up for. So I don’t think that it should go to trial in this case.

(Reply, #21, Exhibit I, R.T. 4/2/02 at 13-14.) 

Thus, it appears that Plaintiff is now attempting to elevate an after-the-fact dispute

about trial strategy into a failure to advise on the plea. Assuming arguendo that counsel had

made representations to Plaintiff that he intended to present a variety of additional evidence,

it is not apparent that those would amount to material misrepresentations. As the trial court

observed: 

Counsel clearly made a tactical decision to not call certain witnesses.

. . . Defendant testified that he was an addict. The State did not dispute

the fact.

(Exhibit R, M.E. 5/24/04.) Failure to present additional cumulative evidence on the point

cannot now be considered to have rendered advice on the plea offer inadequate.

The undersigned finds no basis to conclude that counsel rendered a defective

performance in the course of advising Petitioner about the proffered plea agreement.

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Moreover, in light of trial counsel’s advice to Petitioner to take the plea agreement,

and the overall conduct of Petitioner during the course of the pre-trial proceedings, the

undersigned could find little credibility in any claim by Petitioner that additional or better

advice from counsel would have resulted in Plaintiff accepting the plea offer. 

Ground 4: Failure to Investigate Scene - Petitioner argues that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate the scene of his arrest. Petitioner asserts that such

investigation would have permitted trial counsel to impeach eyewitness’ testimony based

upon their inability to observe. Petitioner fails to show how the absence of such

impeachment prejudiced him. 

To establish prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Petitioner makes no suggestion what pertinent testimony would have been discredited

by the investigation of the scene. The issues seriously in dispute at trial were whether a crack

pipe had been found in Petitioner’s car (Exhibit AA, R.T. 4/9/02 at 6, 41), the arrangement

of the cash in Petitioner’s possession (id. at 34) and whether Petitioner’s intent in possessing

the cocaine was usage or sale (id. at 53). The existence of the crack pipe and arrangement

of the cash were relevant only as being indicative of Petitioner’s intent. The basic events

(e.g. Petitioner’s possession of the drugs and the paraphernalia) have never been disputed by

Petitioner. Moreover, the existence of the crack pipe and the arrangement of the cash were

matters observed as part of the search of Petitioner and his vehicle. Thus, obscured view

would have been all but irrelevant to Petitioner’s defense. 

It is true that impeaching the eyewitnesses may have lessened their credibility, but that

would have impacted only the disputed issues upon which they had knowledge, i.e. the

existence of the crack pipe and the arrangement of cash. Moreover, the primary evidence on

the intent issue came from a Detective Scadden, who was not an eyewitness, and was not

present at either scene. (Exhibit Z, R.T. 4/8/02 at 132.) Given the lack of dispute over

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10 The trial court did not provide any reasoned rejection of this argument, focusing

solely upon Petitioner’s claims on ineffectiveness based on failure to call additional

witnesses. (See Exhibit R, M.E. 5/24/4.) Because the undersigned concludes that the claim

is without merit, the evaluation of the trial court’s unreasoned decision under § 2254(d)(1)

is not required.

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Petitioner’s drug usage and addiction, the undersigned cannot say that there is a reasonable

probability the outcome would have been different with such impeachment evidence.

Accordingly, this portion of the claim is without merit.10 

Ground 4: Failure to Pursue Witnesses - Petitioner argues that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate potential witnesses of Petitioner’s history of drug usage,

and to interview witnesses. The trial court rejected this claim on the basis that the decision

to not call witnesses was a tactical one, and that Petitioner’s drug usage was undisputed.

(Exhibit R, M.E. 5/24/04.) In his Affidavit, trial counsel avers that “the witnesses Defendant

wanted me to call at trial were irrelevant or detrimental to Defendant’s case.” (Reply, #21,

Exhibit L, Aff. of Townsend at ¶ 4.)

Tactical decisions with which a defendant disagrees cannot form the basis for a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992).. "Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself

sufficient to support a charge of inadequate representation." Gustave v. United States, 627

F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, the court need not determine the actual reason for

an attorney's actions, as long as the act falls within the range of reasonable representation.

Morris, 966 F.2d at 456-457. 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to proffer the testimony expected from such witnesses. He

simply points to his lists of possible witnesses. (Reply, #21 at 12 (referencing Reply Exhibit

H (Notice of Witness List) and Exhibit Q2, PCR Petition at 20.) A petitioner may not simply

speculate about what a witness’ testimony, but must adduce evidence to show what it would

have been. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997). “[E]vidence about the

testimony of a putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony

by the witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have

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been favorable; self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” 

U.S. v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991).

Further, the omitted evidence would have simply been cumulative to Petitioner’s

undisputed testimony that he was a drug addict and user. The failure to call witnesses whose

testimony would be cumulative to other evidence creates no "prejudice" within the meaning

of Strickland. United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,

470 U.S. 1058 (1985).

Finally, Petitioner fails to support his allegation that trial counsel failed to interview

any witnesses. Trial counsel avows that he “interviewed the police officers involved.”

(Reply, #21, Exhibit L, Townsend Affid. at ¶ 6.) Petitioner fails to support his conclusory

allegations that other witnesses should have been interviewed. Petitioner offers nothing but

his unsupported contention to the contrary, and fails to offer anything to show that he had

knowledge of counsel’s activities outside the context of the courtroom or jail. And,

Petitioner fails to suggest how the outcome at trial would have been different had counsel

conducted further interviews.

The undersigned can find neither defective performance nor prejudice on this issue.

Ground 4: Failure to Develop Defenses - Petitioner argues that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to develop other lines of defense. However Petitioner fails to identify

what other defenses may have been available, beyond the possession-for-use defense which

counsel presented. Conclusory allegations that are not supported by specific facts do not

merit habeas relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, sub. nom James

v. White, 513 U.S.935 (1994).

Ground 4: Failure to Develop Evidence of Drug Usage - Petitioner argues that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to develop evidence of Petitioner’s drug usage. Petitioner

suggests that a laundry list of relatives and others would have testified to Petitioner’s

addiction to and usage of drugs. Respondents note that evidence of Petitioner’s addiction

and usage was presented, and was undisputed. The only non-cumulative evidence that

Petitioner suggests would have come from an unidentified expert, who presumably would

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testify that the amount of crack cocaine possessed by Petitioner was an amount usable by

him. (Reply, #21 at 12.) However, Petitioner fails to provide any information about the

identity of his purported expert, or to proffer testimony by such an expert. Such conclusory

allegations are insufficient to support a habeas petition. Grisby, 130 F.3d at 373.

Ground 4: Failure re Suppression Motion - Finally, Petitioner argues that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the basis for a suppression motion.

However, Petitioner does not describe the basis for such a motion. Moreover, trial counsel

states in his affidavit that he considered the potential for such a motion, but concluded it was

not appropriate because the traffic stop was lawful. (Reply, #21, Exhibit L, Townsend Affid.

at ¶ 3.) Petitioner offers nothing to show that counsel’s evaluation was flawed.

"[I]n order to show prejudice when a suppression issue provides the basis for an

ineffectiveness claim, the petitioner must show that he would have prevailed on the

suppression motion, and that there is a reasonable probability that the successful motion

would have affected the outcome." Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000)

(overr’d on other grounds, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003)) (citing Kimmelman

v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986)). See Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344 (9th Cir. 1994)

(noting role of attorney as counselor in not pursuing un-meritorious motions to suppress).

Summary re Ground 4: Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel - Plaintiff fails to make

out any claim of ineffectiveness with respect to trial counsel. Consequently, Grounds 3 and

4 must be denied.

E. GROUND 6 (Ineffective Assistance of PCR and Appellate Counsel)

 For his Ground 6, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of appellate

and PCR counsel. (Petition, #1 at 11-12.) Petitioner argues that appellate counsel should

have asserted the lack of evidence on his prior convictions, and the failure of the court to

inquire into the basis for his motion for new counsel, and the court’s choice of Petitioner’s

ineffective advisory counsel to serve as his trial counsel. (Id. at 11.) Petitioner argues that

PCR counsel was similarly ineffective for failing to assert those claims, and for failing to

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adequately investigate Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at

11-12.)

PCR Counsel - Petitioner’s PCR counsel claim is without merit. As discussed

above, the Supreme Court has consistently held that “the right to appointed counsel extends

to the first appeal of right, and no further.” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555

(1987). See also Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1993) (no right to counsel

in a state post-conviction relief proceeding, even though that was the first place the defendant

could assert ineffective assistance of counsel); and Jeffers v. Lewis, 68 F.3d 299 (9th Cir.

1995) (same). “Because there is no right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings,

there cannot be constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings."

Poland, 169 F. 3d at 588 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752). “The fact that counsel is

appointed by the state court does not change the result, because counsel is not

constitutionally required.” Smith, 392 F.3d at 357. 

Appellate Counsel - Petitioner did however, have a right to effective assistance of

counsel on direct appeal. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555.

Lack of Evidence on Priors - Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective

for failing to challenge the lack of evidence on his prior convictions. However, Petitioner

does not make any suggestion of the specific prior convictions to which he refers, the manner

in which the evidence was sufficient, nor does he suggest he had actually not incurred such

convictions. 

Petitioner’s sentence was enhanced pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604 based upon

his having two prior felony convictions. (Exhibit L, Sentence of Imprisonment.) Petitioner

admitted at trial the existence of three prior felony convictions. (Exhibit Z, R.T. 4/8/02 at

171; Exhibit AA, R.T. 4/9/02 at 11-14.) Admissions of prior convictions are sufficient for

sentence enhancements. See State v. Hunter, 137 Ariz. 234, 238, 669 P.2d 1011, 1015

(Ariz.App.,1983) (“before a sentence may be enhanced pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604 by a

prior conviction, the prior conviction must either be admitted by the defendant or found to

be true by the trier of fact”).

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Thus, any attempt by appellate counsel to challenge the lack of evidence would have

been futile. “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Motion for New Counsel - Petitioner argues appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to challenge the trial court’s failure to inquire into Petitioner’s basis for moving for

new counsel. For the reasons discussed above in disposing of Ground 2 (Denial of Motion

for New Counsel), Petitioner fails to show that such argument would have been successful.

Failure to raise the futile argument was not ineffective assistance. Baumann, supra.

Appointment of Trial Counsel - Finally, Petitioner argues that appellate counsel

should have challenged the appointment of advisory counsel as trial counsel. For the reasons

discussed above in disposing of Ground 1 (Ineffective Assistance of Advisory Counsel),

Petitioner fails to show that such a challenge would have been successful, and thus has failed

to show that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise it. Baumann, supra.

Summary - Petitioner had no constitutional right to effective assistance of PCR

Counsel, and fails to show that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the

claims asserted by Petitioner. Accordingly Petitioner’s Ground 6 is without merit, and must

be denied.

F. GROUND 8 (Due Process / Fair Trial)

For his Ground 8, Petitioner argues that he raised issues on appeal that he did not seek

review on from the Arizona Supreme Court. He asserts he did not seek such review because

he had already filed his Rule 32 PCR Petition. Petitioner seeks to have this court now

consider those issues. (Petition, #1 at 14.) Respondents concede that the claim is exhausted,

but argue that it improperly asks this Court to substitute for the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Response, #19 at 10.) 

Habeas relief is available to a petitioner “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

 Petitioner’s Ground 8 fails to make out a violation of either. Although Petitioner asserts a

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denial of due process and a fair trial, he fails to allege any misfeasance by Respondents or

in his prosecution. Rather he simply seems to regret his choice to forego some of his claims.

This claim is without merit, and must be denied. 

G. SUMMARY

The undersigned finds that Grounds 5, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 were not properly

exhausted, and are now procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has failed to show cause and

prejudice or actual innocence sufficient to excuse his procedural default or to avoid the effect

of the procedural bars. Accordingly, Grounds 5, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 must be dismissed with

prejudice.

The remaining Grounds, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8 are without merit, and must be denied.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Grounds 5, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 21, 2006 (#1) be DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of the Petitioner's Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 21, 2006 (#1) be DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

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determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: August 26, 2008 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\06-1583-001r RR 07 10 11 re HC V2.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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