Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00408/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00408-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kent Dyer, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Jason Napier, et al., 

Defendants. _________________________________

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No. CIV 04-0408-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Plaintiff Kent Dyer (“Dyer” and, collectively with his wife, “Plaintiffs”) is a wildlife

photographer who took, and later copyrighted, a photograph titled, “Mother Mountain Lion with

Baby in Mouth.” Defendant Jason Napier (“Napier” and, collectively with his wife and gallery,

“Defendants”) is an artist specializing in bronze sculptures who has created and sold several

monument and maquette versions of a sculpture titled, “Precious Cargo,” which shows a mother

mountain lion holding a baby mountain lion with her mouth.

In a complaint filed on February 26, 2004, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants engaged

in copyright infringement of the “Mother Mountain Lion with Baby in Mouth” photo, and

requested statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, actual damages, and profits. (Dkt. 1.) Defendants

sold both monument and maquette versions of the Precious Cargo sculpture from 2001 until

April 16, 2004, when they agreed to stop casting, creating, and/or selling the sculptures. (Dkt.

57, ¶14.) The Court entered a preliminary injunction in accordance with this stipulation on

April 19, 2004. (Dkt. 12.)

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1

 The parties have had the opportunity to submit evidence and briefing, and the Court would

not find oral argument helpful in resolving this matter. Accordingly, the Court finds the pending

motion for summary judgment suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 56.2; Local

Rules of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”) of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona

7.2(f); Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 728-29

(9th Cir. 1991) (“When a party has an adequate opportunity to provide the trial court with evidence and

a memorandum of law, there is no prejudice” when oral arguments are not held on motions for

summary judgment.).

2

 This section sets forth material facts as distilled from the parties’ separate Statements of Facts

and Statement of Controverted Facts, see dkts. 57, 63, 69, following the resolution of Plaintiffs’ motion

to strike (dkt. 73). The Court has resolved all disputed facts and drawn all inferences the evidence

reasonably can support in favor of Plaintiffs, as the nonmoving party. 

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On March 16, 2006, this Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment, holding that Plaintiffs are barred from recovering statutory damages and attorneys’

fees as a matter of law. (Dkt. 84.)

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the issues of liability and the scope of

actual damages. (Dkt. 56.) Also pending are two motions by Plaintiffs to strike certain parts

of Defendants’ evidence and expert testimony. (Dkts. 72-73.) Because the similarity between

the two works at issue here include only non-protectable elements of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted

photograph, the Court will grant summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on the issue of

liability. Thus, the actual damages issue and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike evidence relevant to

the damages issue alone (dkts. 72) are moot.1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Defendant Jason Napier is an artist who creates bronze sculptures of wildlife and other

objects and has done so for more than the past ten years. (Dkt. 57, ¶5.) Napier submits that

his wildlife sculptures have their own distinct and recognizable style with sleek, smooth,

rounded lines and surfaces that are used to express the natural anatomy of wildlife animals.

(Id.) Although it is not material to the issue of liability, Plaintiffs dispute this characterization

of Napier’s sculptures. (Dkt. 53, ¶1.)

Plaintiff Kent Dyer is a wildlife photographer who created and published wildlife photos

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3

 According to Dyer, the mother mountain lion’s protective instinct causes it to retrieve a baby

mountain lion who is near a drop-off. (Id. at pp. 4-5.) Troy Hyde explained that when kittens are very

young, such as the kittens used here, the mother mountain lion’s natural instinct is to keep the kittens

grouped together. (Id. at pp. 10-11.) 

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from 1989 to 2000. (Dkt. 57, ¶1.) In June 1995, Dyer hired Animals of Montana and its owner,

Troy Hyde, to assist him in a photo shoot involving various wildlife animals, including a mother

mountain lion with a baby mountain lion in her mouth. (Id., ¶2.) The day before the photo

shoot, Dyer scouted the area and planned how, when, and where he would shoot the photograph

of the mother mountain lion and her kitten. (Id., ¶3.) Dyer eventually found what he

considered the perfect spot for his mother mountain lion photo: a large boulder flanked by

another boulder and an evergreen tree with a snow-covered mountain, blue sky, and forest of

green trees in the background (id. at p.2). See Dkt. 1, Ex.B. After he found the location, Dyer

“composed” the photograph by (i) watching the sun move to determine the level of brightness

and shadows at different times of the day; and (ii) selecting the cameras, lenses, angle, and film

to use. (Dkt. 57 at p.3.) Based on the amount of light Dyer wanted in order to highlight the

background and subjects, he decided to shoot the photo in the morning. (Id. at p.4.) 

The morning of the shoot, Hyde and other animal trainers from Animals of Montana

transported a mother mountain lion and her babies to the site chosen by Dyer and assisted in

manipulating the animals to present themselves in the scene. (Id.) This was accomplished by

using a technique that had proven to be successful in prior photo shoots: Hyde placed a baby

mountain lion on the end of a boulder near a drop-off. When the mother mountain lion was

released, she instinctively3

 walked over to the boulder and used her mouth to pick up the kitten.

(Id. at 5.) This procedure was repeated more than a dozen times until Dyer captured the

photograph that he later published and sold under the title, “Mother Mountain Lion with Baby

in Mouth” (the “Mother Mountain Lion Photo”). (Id., ¶4.)

On June 3, 2002, Dyer obtained a federal copyright registration for the Mother Mountain

Lion Photo, which listed the date of first publication as June 4, 1997. (Id.)

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Defendant Napier first met Dyer at an art show in Carefree, Arizona, although they

disagree on whether this was in 1998 or 2001. (Id., ¶6; dkt. 63, ¶2.) Napier and Dyer agree that

Napier obtained a “mini” photograph of Dyer’s Mother Mountain Lion Photo at a Carefree art

show in 2001, but they disagree on the facts and circumstances relating to how Napier obtained

the photograph. (Dkt. 57, ¶7; Dkt. 63 , ¶3.) Also in dispute is whether Dyer authorized Napier

to use the mini photograph as an art reference to create a bronze sculpture. Napier has presented

evidence that he used a number of art references to create the large and small versions of

Precious Cargo. Dyer disputes the credibility of this statement. (Dkt. 57, ¶7 and Ex. 7; Dkt.

63, ¶3.) None of these disputed facts are material, however, because Napier’s access to the mini

photograph of Dyer’s Mother Mountain Lion Photo is undisputed. (Dkt. 57, ¶8.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate in copyright infringement cases if, after viewing the

evidence and drawing every inference in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the

court concludes that no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity of both ideas and

expression between the works at issue. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (9th

Cir. 1984); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Summary judgment is proper

if reasonable minds could not differ as to the presence or absence of substantial similarity of

expression”). 

A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the works at issue are substantially similar

in a copyright infringement case. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation, 35 F.3d

1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir.

2000). Therefore, summary judgment for defendant is appropriate when plaintiff fails to make

a sufficient showing that the ideas and expressive elements of the works are substantially

similar after defendant has properly identified in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff

has failed to do so. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) (Moving party

need only inform the court of the basis of its motion and is then “‘entitled to judgment as a

matter of law’ [if] the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential

element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof”); Barnes v. Arden

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Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1985) (“‘[I]f there is no genuine issue of material

fact, and if the resisting party does not present a record sufficient to support a reasonable

finding in his favor, a district court has a duty to grant the motion for summary judgment.’”)

(citation omitted). A plaintiff avoids summary judgment in a copyright case by satisfying the

extrinsic test, which makes the similarity of the works a triable issue of fact. Kouf v. Walt

Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Court recognizes that, generally, “summary judgment is not highly favored on the

substantial similarity issue in copyright cases.” Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th

Cir. 1985); Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1355 (“Substantial similarity is usually an extremely close

issue of fact and summary judgment has been disfavored in cases involving intellectual

property”) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the question whether there is substantial similarity

of ideas and expression between two works may often be decided as a matter of law, Berkic,

761 F.2d at 1292, and there is no special standard for determining “‘whether summary judgment

is appropriate on the issue of substantial similarity of expression.’” Id. (quoting Durang, 711

F.2d at 142). Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has “frequently affirmed summary

judgments in favor of copyright defendants on the substantial similarity issue.” Berkic, 761

F.2d at 1292 (citing Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1358).

DISCUSSION

A. The Expert Testimony of Ms. Kinne is Admissible

Both parties have submitted expert testimony in support of their positions on the liability

issue before the Court. See Dkt. 57, ¶¶16-18, Ex. 10; Dkt. 63, Ex. 4. Plaintiffs have filed a

Motion to Strike the testimony of Defendants’ expert, Ms. Jane S. Kinne, from paragraphs 16-

18 of Defendants’ Separate Statement of Facts on the grounds that “she is not a lawyer, she is

not a photographer, and she is not a sculptor.” Dkt. 73 at 3, emphasis in original. Plaintiffs

contend, under Fed.R.Evid. 702 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993), “Ms. Kinne does not have the scientific,

technical or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the

evidence.” Id. The Court has reviewed the complete deposition testimony and expert witness

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4

 Ms. Kinne was retained by Defendants to (i) evaluate and identify any copyrightable elements

in the present case, (ii) comment on exhibits, including the Mother Mountain Lion Photo, and

Plaintiffs’ expert’s report, and (iii) provide an opinion as to whether there were more similarities than

differences between the Mother Mountain Lion Photograph and the Precious Cargo sculpture. See Dkt.

79, Ex. A at 9-10.

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disclosure statement of Ms. Kinne and denies Plaintiffs’ request to strike her testimony. See

Dkt. 79, Exs. A, B.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert opinion testimony.

The rule consists of three distinct but related requirements: (1) the subject matter at issue must

be beyond the common knowledge of the average layman; (2) the witness must have sufficient

expertise; and (3) the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge permits the assertion of

a reasonable opinion. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Because Plaintiffs only challenge Ms. Kinne’s

expertise to provide knowledge concerning wildlife photographs and sculptures, rather than the

substantive reliability of her testimony, the Court need not analyze the Daubert factors. See

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (holding that trial judges are charged with the responsibility of acting

as gate-keepers to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only

relevant, but reliable”).

Ms. Kinne’s deposition and expert report demonstrate that she has sufficient expertise

to provide specialized knowledge concerning the issue of copyright infringement as it relates

to the wildlife photograph and sculpture at issue here.4

 Although she is not a professional

photographer or sculptor, Ms. Kinne has close to sixty years of experience in the business of

licensing photography rights, which is inextricably intertwined with issues of copyright law.

See Dkt. 79, Ex. A at 12:20-13:10, 19:12-17, 20:6-8. Ms. Kinne has participated in numerous

professional organizations relating to these issues, including the North American Nature

Photography Association, she has served on the legal committee for the Picture Agency Council

of America for more than fifty years, and she has presented at seminars concerning copyright

protection for photographs. Id. at 35:6-36:19, 37:6-38:1, 39:16-40:14, 41:4-21, 42:6-43:10,

44:6-15, 45:14-47:2, 55:13-56:9. Throughout her professional career, Ms. Kinne has

“represented every major wildlife photographer and many of the lesser known” at least once,

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and has been retained as an expert witness and consultant in more than 500 cases, many of

which dealt specifically with copyright issues. One particular case concerned copyright

infringement of a photograph by a sculpture. Id. at 55:19-56:9, 56:10-57:10, 80:5-84:9. On the

basis of this evidence, the Court specifically finds that Ms. Kinne’s background and training

credentials are sufficient, that expert testimony provided by her may prove helpful, and that she

may reliably determine the issues on which she was retained to opine. Because the record does

not support Plaintiffs’ assertions that Ms. Kinne “does not have the formal education or training

to opine on legal issues, the art of photography or the art of sculpting” (dkt. 73 at 6), the Court

denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Ms. Kinne’s testimony.

B. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate Substantial Similarity

1. Elements of a Copyright Infringement Claim

In order to prevail on a copyright infringement claim in the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff must

show that (1) he owns a valid copyright and (2) defendant copied protected elements of the

copyrighted work. Apple Computer, Inc., 35 F.3d at 1442. Because direct evidence of copying

is not available in most cases, plaintiff may establish “copying” by showing that defendant had

access to plaintiff’s work and the two works are “substantially similar” in idea and in expression

of the idea. Id. 

In the present case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs own a valid copyright in the Mother

Mountain Lion Photo. (Dkt. 57, ¶4.) On the second prong, however, Plaintiffs’ evidence fails

to demonstrate direct copying of the Mother Mountain Lion Photo. See Narell v. Freeman, 872

F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A finding that a defendant copied a plaintiff’s work, without

application of a substantial similarity analysis, has been made only when the defendant has

engaged in virtual duplication of a plaintiff’s entire work.”). Therefore, Plaintiffs must use the

“copying test” to show infringement. The copying test requires Plaintiffs to produce evidence

demonstrating: (i) that Defendant Napier had “access” to the Mother Mountain Lion Photo and

(ii) the Mother Mountain Lion Photo and the Precious Cargo sculpture are “substantially

similar” in idea and expression of the idea. See Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 481

(citing Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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As previously stated, Defendants do not dispute the first element of the copying test, that

Defendant Napier had access to the Mother Mountain Lion Photo (Dkt. 57, ¶8). Although no

amount of proof of access will suffice to show copying if there are no similarities, Shaw v.

Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990), the import of a defendant’s access to the work

at issue is governed by an inverse-ratio rule that permits “a lesser showing of substantial

similarity if there is a strong showing of access.” Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 486.

Therefore, bearing in mind this lesser standard, the critical issue here is whether the Mother

Mountain Lion Photo and the Precious Cargo sculpture are “substantially similar” in both idea

and expression of the idea. Cf. Smith, 84 F.3d at 1220 (“establishing access eliminates the need

for a plaintiff to establish a ‘striking similarity’”). 

2. The Ninth Circuit’s “Substantial Similarity” Test

a. “Substantial Similarity” Does Not Extend to Ideas

“To show that two works are substantially similar, plaintiff must demonstrate that

the works are substantially similar in both ideas and expression.” Frybarger v. Int’l Business

Machines Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original). Although plaintiff

must first show that the ideas are substantially similar, the ideas themselves are not protected

by copyright and, therefore, cannot be infringed. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18

(1954) (copyright law protects only an artist’s expression of an idea, not the idea itself); 17

U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship

extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or

discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied

in such work.”). There are strong public policy reasons for freely permitting the use of ideas

contained in a copyrightable work so long as the protected expression itself is not appropriated.

See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1984).

Thus, to the extent that similarities between a plaintiff’s and a defendant’s works are confined

to ideas and general concepts, such similarities are non-infringing. Id.

b. The Objective Extrinsic Test

In determining whether two works are substantially similar, the Ninth Circuit

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employs a two-part analysis: an objective extrinsic test and a subjective intrinsic test. The

“intrinsic test” is a subjective comparison that focuses on whether the reasonable audience

would find the works substantially similar in the “the total concept and feel of the works.”

Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). If a plaintiff satisfies the

extrinsic test, the ultimate factfinder must apply the intrinsic test. Three Boys Music Corp., 212

F.3d at 485. Therefore, “[f]or the purposes of summary judgment, only the extrinsic test is

important.” Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004); Rice v. Fox Broadcasting

Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218. If a plaintiff cannot present

evidence that would permit a trier of fact to find that he has satisfied the extrinsic test, he

necessarily loses on summary judgment because a “jury may not find substantial similarity

without evidence on both the extrinsic and intrinsic tests.” Rice, 330 F.3d at 1174 (quoting

Kouf, 16 F.3d at 1045).

The extrinsic test considers whether two works share a similarity of ideas and expression

as measured by external, objective criteria. See Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218. In applying the

extrinsic test, the Court must distinguish between protectable and unprotectable elements of the

copyrighted work at issue because a party claiming infringement may place “no reliance upon

any similarity in expression resulting from unprotectable elements.” Apple Computer, Inc. ,

35 F.3d at 1446 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831

F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (similarities between competing stuffed dinosaur toys on account

of posture and body design, and being cuddly, stem from the physiognomy of dinosaurs or from

the nature of stuffed animals and are thus unprotectable). Therefore, in comparing the works,

the Court must filter out any “unprotectable elements.” Apple Computer, Inc. , 35 F.3d at

1443. “Among the ‘unprotectable elements’ which the court must ‘filter’ out of its comparison

of a copyrighted work and an allegedly infringing work are: ‘ideas,’ as distinguished from the

‘expression’ of those ideas; . . . or other information over which no individual is entitled to

claim a monopoly. . . . ” Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1176-77 (C.D. Cal.

2001) (internal citations omitted), affirmed, 90 Fed.Appx. 496 (9th Cir. 2004). In addition to

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5

 “‘Analytic dissection’ focuses on isolated elements of each work to the exclusion of the other

elements, combination of elements, and expressions therein.” Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin

Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997).

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analytical dissection of similarities,5

 a court may consult expert testimony in applying the

extrinsic test. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 485.

c. Application of the Objective Extrinsic Test

Applying the extrinsic test to the present case, Plaintiffs must first identify the sources

of the alleged similarity between the Mother Mountain Lion Photo and Defendants’ Precious

Cargo sculpture. Using “analytic dissection, and, if necessary, expert testimony,” the Court will

then determine whether any of the identified similar features are protected by copyright. The

typical objective features to be compared when dissecting photographs include “selection of

subject, posture, background, lighting, and perhaps even perspective alone.” Los Angeles News

Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d

448, 452 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also ETS-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1075-76

(9th Cir. 2000); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Elements of originality

in a photograph may include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera,

evoking the desired expression, and almost any other variant involved.”) (citations omitted).

Through the testimony and report of their expert witness, sculptor and mold-maker

Jeffrey Tritel, Plaintiffs have presented evidence of alleged “similarity” between the Mother

Mountain Lion Photo and the Precious Cargo sculpture. Mr. Tritel states that “there is virtually

no difference” between Precious Cargo and the Mother Mountain Lion Photo because “both

express a particular idea.” Dkt. 63, Exh. 4 at 51:19-22, 75:9-15 (“the basic communication, the

idea would be the same”), 77:9-10 (“there’s no original idea here”). Elaborating on his opinion,

Mr. Tritel explained,

For me art has always been about expressing an idea. And in, in the photograph

the idea expressed is the fierce protective nature of the mother cat with her kitten.

That in the sculpture even right down to the title, which is Precious Cargo,

emphasizes that same intent, which is the protective nature of the mother

mountain lion with her kitten. And whether the paws, whether one has claws and

the other one doesn’t and whether a paw is spaced three inches wider in one than

the other, does not affect that intent or the content – the communicative content

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of the sculpture I think [sic] is identical to the communicative content of the

photograph.

Id. at 51:23-52:10, emphasis added. Mr. Tritel further states that the “intent” of Plaintiff Dyer,

“that of showing a mother mountain lion with her kitten,” has not been substantially altered by

the Precious Cargo sculpture, and “therefore makes the sculpture a copy rather than an original

work of art.” Id. at 52:19-53:1, 76:6-10, 77:1-5. Finally, Mr. Tritel characterizes Precious

Cargo as a “direct rip off” of the Mother Mountain Lion Photograph because “the focal point

on the photograph is the, is the mother and her baby and obviously that is the focal point of the

sculpture, that is the essence of what this sculpture is about.” Id. at 74:23-75:3. In addition to

Mr. Tritel, Leslie Bell, a sculptor and mold-maker, similarly opined that Defendant Napier’s

Precious Cargo sculpture “copied the image from Mr. Dyer’s photograph of the mother

mountain lion with her cub in its mouth.” ( Dkt. 63, Exh. 3 at ¶2-8.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ evidence

of similarity breaks down into three categories: (i) the idea of a mother mountain lion holding

her kitten; (ii) the intent to portray the protective nature of a mother mountain lion with her

kitten; and (iii) the focal point of both works is the mother mountain lion holding a kitten in her

mouth. For three reasons, Plaintiffs’ evidence of similarity fails to satisfy the extrinsic test. 

First, the “idea” of the protective nature of a mother mountain lion with her kitten is not

protected by copyright law. As previously stated, ideas themselves are not protected by

copyright law and, therefore, cannot be infringed. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217-18 (copyright

protects only an artist’s expression of an idea, not the idea itself); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no

case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,

process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form

in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”); Dr. Seuss Enters.,

109 F.3d at 1398 (“‘Substantial similarity’ refers to similarity of expression, not merely

similarity of ideas or concepts.”); supra at 8-9. 

Second, Mr. Tritel’s opinion that Defendant Napier copied Plaintiff Dyer’s “intent” to

show the protective nature of a mother mountain lion with her kitten is not a protectable

copyright element because when a similarity in expression arises from the use of a common

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idea, no substantial similarity can be found. Aliotti, 831 F.2d at 901. Here, Plaintiffs’ Mother

Mountain Lion Photo and Defendants’ Precious Cargo sculpture each encompass the idea of

a mother mountain lion with a kitten in her mouth near the edge of a drop-off. As a result, both

works of art communicate the “intent,” or concept, of the protective nature of a mother

mountain lion. Because the concept of “protective nature” necessarily flows from the idea of

a mother mountain lion picking up a kitten near the edge of a drop-off, the concept is

inseparable from the idea presented here. See Dkt. 57, pp. 4-11 and Ex. 7. As such, the concept

of protective nature displayed by Plaintiff’s Mother Mountain Lion Photo is not protected by

copyright law. See Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 827 (the concept of a night light built into a book is

not protectable under copyright law); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th

Cir. 1988) (fifteen features in two computer games of karate result from constraints inherent in

the sport of karate, and thus are nonprotectable features that necessarily follow from the idea

of a martial arts karate combat game); Frybarger, 812 F.2d at 529 (to the extent that similarities

between works were confined to ideas and general concepts, they were noninfringing). 

Third, Mr. Tritel’s and Ms. Bell’s opinions that “the focal point on the photograph” –

the mother mountain lion holding a kitten in her mouth – is the same as the focal point of the

sculpture is not a protectable similarity because the image of a mother mountain lion holding

a kitten in her mouth is expressed by nature such that it is “the common heritage of

humankind,” which no artist may use copyright law to prevent others from depicting.” See

Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). In Satava, the Ninth Circuit wrestled with

locating “the faint line between unprotected idea and original expression in the context of

realistic animal sculpture.” Id. at 807. Satava was a glass artist who specialized in creating

“glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures” and registered several of his glass sculptures with the

Copyright Office. The defendant in that case, Lowry, saw Satava’s work and began creating

his own “glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures.” After seeing some of Lowry’s work, Satava sued

for copyright infringement.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Satava could not use copyright law to “prevent others

from copying aspects of his sculptures resulting from . . . jellyfish physiology,” because such

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 A “thin” copyright “protects against only virtually identical copying.” Id.

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elements “are part of the public domain” and “are the common property of all.” Id. at 810-11.

The Satava Court further explained, 

Satava may not prevent others from depicting jellyfish with tendril-like tentacles

or rounded bells, because many jellyfish possess those body parts. He may not

prevent others from depicting jellyfish in bright colors, because many jellyfish

are brightly colored. He may not prevent others from depicting jellyfish

swimming vertically, because jellyfish swim vertically in nature and often are

depicted swimming vertically. [FN] Satava may not prevent others from

depicting jellyfish within a clear outer layer of glass, because clear glass is the

most appropriate setting for an aquatic animal.

Id. at 811 (footnote and citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit found that Satava had made some

original, and therefore copyrightable, contributions to his sculptures, such as the curls of certain

tendrils; the arrangement of certain colors; and the unique shape of the jellyfishes’ bells. Id.

at 812. To the extent that these and other artistic choices were “not governed by jellyfish

physiology,” the Court held that Satava enjoyed a “thin” copyright, “comprising no more than

his original contribution to ideas already in the pubic domain.” Id.6

 As a result, Satava could

“prevent others from copying the original features he contributed, but he [could] not prevent

others from copying elements of expression that nature displays for all observers.” Id.

In Satava, the Ninth Circuit made clear that it was not holding “that realistic depictions

of live animals cannot be protected by copyright.” Id. For the following reasons, however, the

Court held that “that the scope of copyright protection in [realistic depictions of live animal]

works is narrow”: 

Nature gives us ideas of animals in their natural surroundings: an eagle with

talons extended to snatch a mouse; a grizzly bear clutching a salmon between its

teeth; a butterfly emerging from its cocoon; a wolf howling at the full moon; a

jellyfish swimming through tropical waters. These ideas, first expressed by

nature, are the common heritage of humankind, and no artist may use copyright

law to prevent others from depicting them.

 Id. at 813, emphasis added. The Court recognized that an artist “may, however, protect the

original expression he or she contributes to these ideas,” by varying certain elements such as

“the pose, attitude, gesture, muscle structure, facial expression, coat, or texture of the animal”

and “the background, lighting, or perspective.” Id. “Such variations, if original, may earn

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7 None of the parties dispute that mountain lions in nature commonly perch, or crouch, on rocks.

8

 By their assertion that Satava only applies “where there is little variation between the lifelike

representation of a natural creature and the protected work” (dkt. 62 at 13), Plaintiffs concede that

Satava applies here because there is no variation between an actual, alive mother mountain lion holding

her kitten and the Mother Mountain Lion Photo. See dkt. 57 at pp. 19-20.

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copyright protection.” Id. The Ninth Circuit’s overriding concern in Satava was to prevent

copyright protection from “cheat[ing] the public domain” by expanding to the point of

providing a monopoly on the “use of ideas that properly belong to us all.” Id.

Applying Satava here, it is clear that the image of a mother mountain lion perched on a

rock with a kitten in her mouth is an idea “first expressed by nature” that is “the common

heritage of humankind, and no artist may use copyright law to prevent others from depicting

[it]” (id.). See Dkt. 57, Exh. 7. As a result, Plaintiffs cannot prevent Defendants from any

copying aspect of the mother mountain lion or kitten that naturally result from the physiology

of mountain lions. See id. at 811 (plaintiff may not prevent others from depicting the body parts

of jellyfish); Aliotti, 831 F.2d at 901 (“Appellants therefore may place no reliance upon any

similarity in expression resulting from . . . the physiognomy of dinosaurs . . . .”). Moreover,

Plaintiffs may not prevent Defendants from depicting a mother mountain lion perched on a

boulder with a kitten in her mouth, because, as Plaintiffs concede (dkt. 57 at pp. 4-11), mother

mountain lions in nature instinctively carry their kittens with their mouths.7

 See Satava, 323

F.3d at 811 (plaintiff may not prevent others from depicting jellyfish swimming vertically

because jellyfish swim vertically in nature); Aliotti, 831 F.2d at 901 n.1 (noting that a

Tyrannosaurus stuffed animal’s open mouth was not an element protected by copyright because

Tyrannosaurus “was a carnivore and is commonly pictured with its mouth open”).8

The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that work associated with getting the mountain

lions into the “ideal pose” is a protectable element (dkt. 62 at 7, 15), because they have not

demonstrated that the poses struck by both the mother mountain lion and the kitten are original

and were created by Plaintiff Dyer, rather than naturally occurring poses created and displayed

by nature. To the contrary, both Plaintiff Dyer and Troy Hyde admit that it is natural and

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instinctive for a mother mountain lion to pick up and carry kittens in her mouth. See Dkt. 57,

pp. 4-11. Moreover, it cannot reasonably be disputed that the poses at issue here – the mother

mountain lion holding a kitten in her mouth – were necessary to the expression of the

underlying idea of the protective nature of a mother mountain lion. Thus, the similarities

relating to the mountain lions’ poses are encompassed within the unprotectable subject matter

of the Mother Mountain Lion Photo. See Satava, 323 F.3d at 811-12.

While Satava’s holding dictates that the subject matter of Plaintiffs’ Mother Mountain

Lion Photo – a mother mountain lion perched on a boulder with a kitten in her mouth – is not

copyrightable, Plaintiffs’ original contributions to the Mother Mountain Lion Photo enjoy a

“thin” copyright that comprises “no more than his original contribution to ideas already in the

pubic domain.” Id. at 812. Given the evidence presented in this case, it is clear that the

protectable elements of Plaintiffs’ Mother Mountain Lion Photograph are the following: the

choice of location (i.e., the mountains of Montana), background (i.e., snow-covered mountains,

forest of trees, and blue sky), perspective, lighting/shading, timing, angle, framing, film, and

camera. See Dkt. 1, Ex. B; Dkt. 62 at 10. In this case, however, all of the similarities in

expression between the two works at issue consist of unprotectable elements or themes that flow

predictably from the underlying subject matter. See supra at 14-15; compare Dkt. 1, Ex. B with

Dkt. 1, Exs. C-I. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence (and do not contend) that

Defendants’ Precious Cargo sculpture is similar with respect to the choice of location,

background, perspective, lighting/shading, timing, angle, framing, film, or camera. Nor have

Plaintiffs shown that the attitude, gesture, muscle structure, facial expression, coat, and texture

of the mother mountain lion and her kitten are original features contributed by Plaintiff Dyer,

rather than expressions and features displayed by mountain lions in nature for all observers.

See Satava, 323 F.3d at 813 (an eagle with talons extended to catch a mouse is an idea nature

provides of animals in their natural surroundings). Because Plaintiffs have failed to produce

evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that Plaintiffs have satisfied the extrinsic

evidence test, the Court will grant summary judgment for Defendants on the issue of liability.

See Rice, 330 F.3d at 1174.

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The Court’s conclusion regarding the lack of substantial similarity between protectable

elements of the Mother Mountain Lion Photo and the Precious Cargo sculpture is supported by

the expert opinion of Ms. Kinne. Ms. Kinne recognized that both the Mother Mountain Lion

Photo and the Precious Cargo sculpture reflect the protective nature of a mother mountain lion

with a kitten in her mouth, which is not protectable because mountain lions in this same pose

“exist in nature and they are common to all of us.” (Dkt. 57 at p.19.) Moreover, according to

Ms. Kinne, the Precious Cargo sculpture is an artist’s interpretation of mountain lions existing

in nature because the rock “is a highly polished, idealized rock,” and “some of what might

appear in a natural living mountain lion” has also been altered. (Id. at pp.19-20.) The Mother

Mountain Lion Photo, by contrast, is a realistic depiction of both mountain lions in a “total

scene,” including trees, the sky, and a snow-covered mountain. (Id. at pp.19-20.) Thus, in Ms.

Kinne’s opinion, the copyrightable elements of the Mother Mountain Lion Photo are “the

lighting, the scene, the entire scene, the angle, and because of making those choices, his choice

of film and lens,” none of which were copied by Defendant Napier in creating the Precious

Cargo sculpture. (Id. at pp. 22.) 

For two reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ reliance on Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301

(2d Cir. 1992), a case in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s

holding that a sculpture infringed a copyrighted photograph depicting a smiling husband and

wife holding a litter of puppies. First, Rogers presented “the rare scenario” where there was

direct evidence of copying by the defendant, who admittedly gave a copy of the photograph to

artisans with explicit instructions that the work be copied in every respect, including the

composition, shading, poses, and expressions. Id. at 307. Moreover, “the importance of

copying the very details of the photograph that embodied plaintiff’s original contribution” was

stressed by the defendant throughout the creation of the sculpture, including his instruction that

the creation be designed “as per photo.” Id. The Court of Appeals determined that the

undisputed direct evidence of copying sufficiently supported the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id. In the present case, by contrast, it is undisputed

that Plaintiffs have produced no direct evidence of copying by Defendant Napier. 

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9

 For this reason, the Court specifically rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that “[t]he Rogers Court

went to great lengths to address precisely why the idea of a couple sitting with eight small puppies on

a bench has copyright protection even though it is a fairly common scene.” Dkt. 62 at 12.

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Second, the Rogers Court recognized that, even if direct evidence of copying was not

available, the district court’s decision could be upheld on the basis that defendant’s “access to

the copyrighted work is conceded, and the accused work is so substantially similar to the

copyrighted work that reasonable jurors could not differ on the issue.” Id. at 307. In its

alternative holding, however, the Second Circuit recognized the principle espoused by the Ninth

Circuit in Satava: that the idea of a couple with eight small puppies seated on a bench was not

protected,9 “but rather [plaintiff’s] expression of the idea – as caught in the placement, in the

particular light, and in the expressions of the subjects – . . . g[a]ve[] the photograph its charming

and unique character, that is to say, ma[d]e[] it original and copyrightable.” Id. at 308. The

Court emphasized, however, that if defendant had “simply used the idea presented by the photo,

there would not have been infringing copying.” Id. at 308, emphasis added. The present case

is distinguishable from Rogers because Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the expression

of the Mother Mountain Lion Photo – in terms of the original and protectable elements

incorporated by Plaintiff Dyer – were copied by Defendant Napier in the Precious Cargo

sculpture. 

CONCLUSION

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, no reasonable jury

applying the objective extrinsic evidence test could find substantial similarity of ideas and

expression in the Mother Mountain Lion Photo and the Precious Cargo sculpture because,

after the nonprotectable elements of the Mother Mountain Lion Photo are filtered out, there

is not substantial similarity. Although both works of art have the same subject matter – a

mother mountain lion perched on a rock with a kitten in her mouth – it is well-settled that

when a live creature commonly appearing in nature is reproduced, the only elements

protected by copyright are those original aspects which are not required in the depiction of

the creature as expressed in nature. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence of

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substantial similarity with respect to the protectable aspects of the Mother Mountain Lion

Photo that are not required by the idea of a mother mountain lion with a kitten in her mouth.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on the issue of liability, and DENYING AS MOOT Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment on the issue of damages. (Dkt. 56.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike

Exhibits 1 Through 3 of Defendants’ Separate Statement of Facts Accompanying

Defendants’ Reply Memorandum and Motion to Strike Exhibit 13 From Defendants’

Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 72.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Testimony of

Jane Kinne from Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Disqualify Jane

Kinne as Defendants’ Expert Witness. (Dkt. 73.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 25th day of September, 2006.

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