Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00325/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00325-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ANTONIA MUNIZ, individually

and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

NO. CIV. S-07-0325 FCD EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PILOT TRAVEL CENTERS LLC,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion to

remand the instant action to the Yolo County Superior Court on

the ground defendant has not established that the putative class

members’ claims exceed the requisite jurisdictional amount in

controversy of $5,000,000.00 pursuant to the Class Action

Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).1

 Defendant

opposes the motion, arguing it has proffered sufficient evidence

to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the amount in

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2 Defendant filed its “Notice to Federal Court of Removal

of Civil Action from State Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections

1332(d), 1441 and 1446,” on February 16, 2007 (hereinafter

referred to as the “Notice of Removal”).

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controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.

After review of the evidence submitted by defendant in

support of the Notice of Removal2 as well as the supplemental

evidence proffered in support of defendant’s opposition to the

motion, the court finds that defendant has met its burden of

proof to demonstrate that the amount in controversy requirement

is satisfied, and therefore plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On January 17, 2007, plaintiff filed a class action

complaint in the Yolo County Superior Court in the State of

California: Antonia Muniz, individually and on behalf of all

others similarly situated v. Pilot Travel Centers LLC, and Does

1-15, inclusive, Case No. CV07-89 (hereinafter "the Complaint"). 

Plaintiff and the members of the putative class allegedly 

"performed services with primary duties of a non-exempt nature"

for defendant in the State of California and were not paid

overtime compensation and/or were not provided lawful meal and/or

rest periods.

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts six causes of action: 

(1) wages due; (2) failure to provide meal and rest periods; 

(3) conversion; (4) failure to comply with itemized employee wage

statement provisions under Cal. Labor Code § 226; (5) for

penalties pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 203; and (6) unfair

competition pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action for failure to provide meal

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3

and rest periods pleads five counts: (1) failure to pay wages and

overtime owed for time worked in lieu of taking meal periods; 

(2) "failure to pay compensation, restitution or other relief for

each day a lawful meal period was not provided" pursuant to

Section 11(D) of Wage Order 7-2001; (3) "failure to pay

compensation, restitution or other relief for each day a lawful

meal period was not provided" pursuant to Cal. Labor Code 

§ 226.7; (4) failure to pay "compensation, restitution or other

relief for each day a lawful rest period was not provided" under

Section 12(B) of Wage Order 7-2001; (5) failure to pay

"compensation, restitution or other relief for each day a lawful

rest period was not provided" pursuant to Cal. Labor Code 

§ 226.7; and (6) failure to provide meal periods in violation of

Cal. Labor Code § 512.

Defendant filed its answer to the Complaint on February 15,

2007. Thereafter, on February 16, 2007, defendant removed the

action to this court on the basis of the CAFA. The CAFA grants

district courts original jurisdiction over civil class actions

filed under federal or state law in which any member of a class

of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any

defendant and the amount in controversy for the putative class

members in the aggregate exceeds the sum or value of

$5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(d)(2). The Act authorizes removal of such actions

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446.

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3 Plaintiff does not dispute that the removal was timely

filed nor that the minimal diversity of citizenship requirement

is met, and court finds that these other requirements of removal

are satisfied.

4 Plaintiff’s various objections to these declarations

are unavailing. Both declarations concern matters that are

within the personal knowledge of the affiants or knowledge based

on corporate records. Both declarations are signed under penalty

of perjury under federal law. Specifically as to Cheatham’s

declaration, plaintiff complains that Cheatham makes no mention

“of what [the] records actually consist of, or more significantly

if they have any relationship whatsoever to putative class

members that are all situated well over two-thousand miles away,

and in a different state [from Cheatham]." (Pl.'s Mem. P. & A.'s

3:23-25.) To the contrary, Cheatham identifies herself in her

declaration as "an authorized custodian of records for records

pertaining to human resources matters" and states that she has

"personal knowledge of the foregoing, or knowledge based upon

corporate records which are within my custody and control,

4

Plaintiff challenges the propriety of the removal solely on

the ground of the requisite amount in controversy.3 Plaintiff’s

Complaint does allege a specific amount of damages. Therefore,

in removing the action, defendant supported its Notice of Removal

with declarations setting forth the underlying facts needed to

calculate the amount in controversy based on the allegations in

the Complaint as well as the estimated calculations themselves. 

Specifically, defendant submitted the declaration of Laura J.

Cheatham (“Cheatham”), Manager of Employee Relations for

defendant and the authorized custodian of records pertaining to

human resource matters, who set forth the underlying facts needed

to calculate the amount in controversy, and the declaration of

defendant’s counsel Lena K. Sims (“Sims”), who based on the facts

supplied by Cheatham, calculated the amount in controversy in

light of the applicable laws governing penalties to which

plaintiff claims she and the putative class members are entitled. 

(Docket #s 3, 4.)4 Said evidence showed that the 

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among others." (Cheatham Decl., filed Feb. 16, 2007, ¶ 1.) She

makes her statements in her declaration based on her review of

"Pilot's corporate human resource records during the putative

class period." (Id. at ¶ 5.) The statements concern "Antonia

Muniz [who] has filed her Complaint on behalf of herself and a

class of all current and/or former nonexempt employees of

Defendant Pilot in the State of California who worked during the

four year period preceding the date on which she filed her

Complaint." (Id. at ¶ 4.) She provides the information from her

review of records "for purposes of assessing the amount of

monetary relief sought by the claims as alleged in Plaintiff’s

Complaint." (Id. at ¶ 5.)

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amount in controversy is at least $6,380,625.10, notwithstanding

attorneys' fees or punitive damages which are plead and which, as

set forth below, are also properly considered in ascertaining the

amount in controversy. Defendants now provide additional

evidence that the amount in controversy is much greater than that

originally estimated, and that the amount in controversy is in

fact estimated to be $12,932,861.00. (Cheatham and Sims Decls.,

filed April 13, 2007 [“Supp. Decls.”].) The numbers originally

provided by Cheatham were minimum amounts because at the time of

the removal she was only able to consult one of the several

timekeeping systems used by defendant’s California stores during

the alleged class period. (Cheatham Supp. Decl., ¶s 3, 4.) 

However, Cheatham has now been able to consult most of the data

in each of the timekeeping systems used in defendant’s California

stores, and thus, she was able to provide more accurate and

thorough information from which defendant could calculate the

relevant amounts.

STANDARD

Where a complaint does not allege a specific amount in

damages, the removing defendant bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy

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5 The CAFA did not shift the burden of proof normally

applied to removal of a state action to federal court; under the

CAFA, the removing defendant continues to bear the burden of

proof, not the class action plaintiff. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow

Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 2006).

6 The contrary is true under the “legal certainty” test,

at times improperly cited by plaintiff, which requires such proof

by the removing defendant. The legal certainty test is used

where the complaint alleges a dollar amount in controversy that

is below the federal court’s jurisdictional minimum. Lowdermilk

v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007)

(holding that “where the plaintiff has pled an amount in

controversy less than $5,000,000.00, the party seeking removal

must prove with legal certainty that CAFA’s jurisdictional amount

is met”).

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exceeds the statutory minimum (in this case, $5,000,000.00 per

the CAFA). Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 116 F.3d

373, 376 (9th Cir. 1996).5 The preponderance of the evidence

standard means the “defendant must provide evidence establishing

that it is ‘more likely than not’ that the amount in controversy

exceeds that amount.” Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102

F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (citation

omitted). Said burden is not “daunting,” as courts recognize

that under this standard, a removing defendant is not obligated

to “research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims for

damages.” McCraw v. Lyons, 863 F. Supp. 430, 434 (W.D. Ky.

1994).6

Nevertheless, a court “cannot base [its] jurisdiction on a

[d]efendant’s speculation and conjecture.” Lowdermilk v. United

States Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007).

Rather, a defendant must set forth the underlying facts

supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds

the statutory minimum. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567

(9th Cir. 1992). In addition to the contents of the removal

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petition, the court considers “summary-judgment-type evidence

relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal,”

such as affidavits or declarations. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations

omitted); Singer, 116 F.3d at 374 (“defense counsel submitted

declarations to show that the amount in controversy exceeded

$50,000"). A court may also consider supplemental evidence later

proffered by the removing defendant, which was not originally

included in the removal notice. Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d

837, 840 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002).

In measuring the amount in controversy, a court must assume

that the allegations of the complaint are true and that a jury

will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the

complaint. Kenneth Rothschild Trust v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The ultimate

inquiry is what amount is put “in controversy” by the plaintiff’s

complaint, not what a defendant will actually owe. Rippee v.

Boston Market Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (S.D. Cal. 2005);

see also Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the

United States, 347 F.3d 394, 399 (2nd Cir. 2003) (recognizing

that the ultimate or provable amount of damages is not what is

considered when determining the amount in controversy; rather, it

is the amount put in controversy by the plaintiff’s complaint).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff essentially makes two arguments in support of

remand, both of which must be rejected. First, plaintiff’s

counsel attests in his declaration that the actual recovery in

this case will be much less than asserted by defendant based on

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his general experience in other similar cases. (Carver Decl.,

filed March 15, 2007.) However, for purposes of remand, the

court must accept as true plaintiff’s allegations as plead in the

Complaint and assume that plaintiff will prove liability and

recover the damages alleged. Kenneth Rothschild Trust, 199 F.

Supp. 2d at 1001; Rippee, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 986. As such,

counsel’s declaration, setting forth his opinions as to the

“typical” violation rates of employers for meal and rest periods

and overtime hours in similar cases, is irrelevant to the instant

motion.

Looking at plaintiff’s Complaint, plaintiff alleges her

claims in terms as general and expansive as possible, presumably

for the purpose of alleging as large a class of individuals as

possible to obtain the largest possible judgment. Plaintiff’s

complaint alleges she was a nonexempt employee at a Pilot Travel

Centers store in California beginning in 2001. (Compl., ¶ 6.)

Each of the putative class members is "similarly situated and

employed by the Defendants during the Class Period." (Id. at 

¶ 7.) "Plaintiff and each member of the Plaintiff Class

performed services with primary duties of a non-exempt nature, as

non-exempt employees with various titles and duties, for which

they were entitled to be compensated as required by law." (Id.

at ¶ 10.) The Plaintiff class is defined as "[a]ll persons who

at any time after four (4) years prior to the filing of this

action through the date of trial were non-exempt employees of the

Defendant in California." (Id. at ¶ 13.) The subclass is "[a]ll

persons who at any time after four (4) years prior to the filing

of this action through the date of trial were non-exempt

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employees of the Defendant in California, and terminated their

employment during the Class Period." (Id. at ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff alleges no facts specific to the circumstances of

her or the class members’ allegedly missed meal and/or rest

periods; defendant’s alleged conversion of plaintiff and the

class members’ wages by its failure to timely pay said wages; or

defendant’s failure to provide itemized wage statements. 

Instead, plaintiff alleges a common course of conduct in

violation of the law resulting in injury to herself and every

other hourly employee employed by defendant in the State of

California in the four years preceding the filing of the

Complaint. (Id. at ¶s 2, 6, 13, 14, 15.) Allegedly, plaintiff

and class members "were not always paid all wages and overtime

due by the Defendant." (Id. at ¶ 18.) Allegedly, they were "not

always provided lawful meal periods." (Id. at ¶s 22, 24, 30.) 

Allegedly, they were "not always provided lawful rest periods." 

(Id. at ¶s 26, 28.) Additionally, plaintiff and the class

members were allegedly intentionally denied accurate itemized

wage statements. (Id. at ¶ 41.) Plaintiff and each putative

sub-class member are allegedly owed waiting time penalties. (Id.

at ¶ 44.)

As these allegations reveal, plaintiff includes no factspecific allegations that would result in a putative class or

violation rate that is discernibly smaller than 100%, used by

defendant in its calculations. Plaintiff is the “master of [her]

claim[s],” and if she wanted to avoid removal, she could have

alleged facts specific to her claims which would narrow the scope

of the putative class or the damages sought. Caterpillar, Inc.

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7 As set forth in defendant’s removal papers, in

California, where wage and hour class actions have settled

prior to trial for millions of dollars, it is not uncommon for an

attorneys' fee award to be in the realm of 25% to 30% of the

settlement and, thus, in excess of $1 million. (Opp’n, filed

April 13, 2007, n. 6 [providing examples of such cases].)

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v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). She did not.

Furthermore, even assuming far less than a 100% violation

rate still results in an amount in controversy that exceeds the

jurisdictional minimum because the amount in controversy is

estimated to be $12,932,861.00 based on the underlying facts

provided by Cheatham in her supplemental declaration. (See

generally Cheatham & Sims Supp. Decls.) Additionally, neither

the $6,380,625.10 nor the $12,932,861.00 figures include any

amount for the attorneys' fees or punitive damages that are plead

in the Complaint and which are properly included in determining

the amount in controversy. Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d

1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that attorneys’ fees

are included in determining the amount in controversy, regardless

of whether the fee award is mandatory or discretionary);7 Gibson

v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is well

established that punitive damages are part of the amount in

controversy in a civil action.”).

Plaintiff alternatively moves for remand, arguing 

defendant’s removal is deficient because defendant did not

produce the underlying documents which support its calculations.

(See Opp’n at 4 n. 2 [citing portions of plaintiff’s motion

wherein she repeatedly demands production of documents by

defendant].) Plaintiff contends that to justify removal

defendant was obligated to produce documents setting forth the

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precise number of employees in each putative class or subclass

alleged and the precise calculation of damages alleged. (Pl.’s

Mem. of P&A at 6:10-11, 8:10-13.)

Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. There is no obligation

by defendant to support removal with production of extensive

business records to prove or disprove liability and/or damages

with respect to plaintiff or the putative class members at this

premature (pre-certification) stage of the litigation. McCraw,

863 F. Supp. at 434 (recognizing that the preponderance of the

evidence standard does not place a “daunting” burden on the

defendant to prove the plaintiff’s claims for damages). Rather,

it is defendant's burden to produce underlying facts showing only

that it is more likely than not that the amount in controversy

exceeds $5,000,000.00, assuming the truth of the allegations

plead in the Complaint. Singer, 116 F.3d at 376; Sanchez, 102

F.3d at 404. Defendant met that burden by filing the Cheatham

and Sims declarations in support of its Notice of Removal showing

that the amount in controversy is at least $6,380,625.10,

notwithstanding attorneys' fees or punitive damages. Defendant

now, in opposition to motion, provides additional evidence that

the amount in controversy is much greater than that originally

estimated, and that the amount in controversy is in fact

estimated to be $12,932,861.00, irrespective of attorneys’ fees

or punitive damages. (Cheatham & Sims Supp. Decls.) Under

either calculation, particularly considering the additional

damages of attorneys’ fees and punitives, the instant case most

likely far exceeds the jurisdictional prerequisite, and at a

minimum, defendant has shown, by admissible evidence, that it is

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more likely than not that the jurisdictional threshold of

$5,000,000.00 is met. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to remand is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: April 30, 2007

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