Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00397/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00397-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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 1 Plaintiffs amended the complaint to add Diane Marie Heath as a defendant. (Doc. 8.)

Counsel Peter Kelly (who represents FSPR) acted as her representative for the sole purpose

of accepting service on her behalf on July 21, 2011. (Doc. 16.) She has not made an

appearance in this Court.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Desiree Dold-Apger and Thomas Apger,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Friends of the San Pedro River, Inc., 

et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-397-TUC-DCB-DTF

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand (Doc. 17) and the

Government’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 24). Defendants filed oppositions to both motions

and three supplemental briefs. (Docs. 19, 28, 32, 34, 38.) Plaintiffs filed a reply and a

supplemental reply. (Docs. 22, 33.) The Government filed a supplemental response. (Doc.

35.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice in this Court, the matter was assigned to Magistrate

Judge Ferraro for a report and recommendation. The Magistrate recommends the District

Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order granting the remand motions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 17, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Pima County Superior Court alleging

negligence by Defendants Friends of the San Pedro River, Inc. (FSPR), and Nancy and

Charles Doolittle.1

 (Doc. 1-3.) On July 1, 2011, Defendants removed the case to federal

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 2 Defendants served the Petition for Certification on the United States (Doc. 18, 21),

as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3). The Government then filed a motion to remand. In

issuing this Recommendation, the Court does not reach whether the government has standing

on the question of remand.

 3 The cited documents are attached to Defendants’ supplemental brief. Although a

petition for removal should include all the necessary factual allegations, the Supreme Court

has indicated it is proper to consider the removal petition as amended to include later-filed

evidence. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 & n.3 (1969). Plaintiffs have not

questioned reliance on this evidence and the Court considers it.

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court. (Doc. 1.) Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed a petition for certification, asking the

Court to find that Defendants were operating as federal employees at the relevant time and

are protected by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).2

On October 22, 2008, the FSPR entered into a Group Volunteer Services Agreement

with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to provide the following services:

The Friends of the San Pedro River (FSPR) operate two gift shops/bookstores

(San Pedro House and Fairbank Schoolhouse), lead guided walks/hikes and

trail rides along the river and throughout the adjacent area, present educational

programs to schools and community groups, participate in trail and

maintenance projects, and assist BLM in a variety of other programs. FSPR is

a volunteer, non-profit, non-political organization proving [sic] support to the

BLM in their stewardship of the San Pedro Riparian National Conservation

Area.

(Doc. 32, Ex. 1 at 1.)3

 The Agreement provides that volunteers are not deemed federal

employees, except that while volunteers are acting within the scope of the Agreement, “they

will be deemed as if they were Federal employees for purposes of the: (1) Federal Tort

Claims Act, which protects Federal employees from liability for injury or damage to others

while the employees are acting within the scope of their duties” (id.). See also 43 U.S.C.

§ 1737(f)(1) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to recruit volunteers to aid in the

activities of the BLM and providing that one exception to volunteers not being treated as

employees is the FTCA).

The president of the FSPR during 2009, Christopher Long, submitted an affidavit

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 4 Defendants also rely on the BLM Volunteering Guide. However, the Court relies on

the actual description of BLM involvement with FSPR, rather than a general description of

expected oversight of BLM volunteers.

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about the FSPR and its relationship with the BLM.4

 Long averred that a representative of

BLM attends the entirety of all FSPR board meetings, reviews the FSPR calendar of events

and all published materials, and receives copies of the meeting minutes and monthly event

flyers. (Doc. 32, Ex. 2 at 13, 14.) FSPR does not engage in any activity of which BLM does

not approve. (Id. at 14.) When BLM withheld approval, the equestrian program was

cancelled in 2010. (Id.)

The negligence claim in the Amended Complaint arises from a trail ride that Plaintiff

Desiree Dold-Apger attended on August 8, 2009, which was organized by Defendants FSPR

and Nancy Doolittle. Defendant Doolittle is alleged to have been responsible for organizing

and supervising the ride. As pled by Plaintiffs, no rules for the ride were provided nor were

riding abilities evaluated. Shortly after the ride began, Defendant Diane Heath allegedly

loped her horse alongside Plaintiff to pass on the congested trail. Plaintiff alleges that Heath

came too close to Dold-Apger, causing her horse to buck and throw her off. Plaintiff suffered

bilateral wrist fractures, and a medial meniscal tear in her right knee.

DISCUSSION

At the time of removal, Defendants cited the FTCA as the basis for removal, arguing

that Defendants were federal employees at the time in question. (Doc. 1 at 2-3.) After the

United States Attorney notified Defendants that it believed removal was improper under the

FTCA (Doc. 14, Ex. A), Defendants abandoned that ground for removal (Doc. 19 at 2).

In response to the motions to remand, Defendants clarified that their removal is based

solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1442:

A civil action brought in state court may be removed if it was brought against

an officer, or a person acting under an officer, of the United States or an

agency thereof sued in an individual or official capacity for any act under color

of such office.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). 

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The purpose of the removal statute is to protect the government’s operations from

state interference with its officers when they are acting within their authority; avoid local

prejudice against federal laws or officials; prevent the state from impeding enforcement of

federal laws; and assure a forum for federal immunity defenses. Watson v. Philip Morris Co.,

Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 150 (2007). To achieve the statutory goals a court should not narrowly

interpret § 1442, rather, it is to be interpreted generously; a defendant must allege only a

colorable claim that he comes within its parameters. Jefferson County Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S.

423, 431-32 (1999); Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (9th Cir.

2006). Although broadly construed, section 1442 requires a defendant to satisfy several

requirements for proper removal: (1) that it is a “person” under the statute; (2) “there is a

causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer’s directions, and

plaintiff’s claims”; and (3) averment of a federal defense. Durham, 445 F.3d at 1251 (citing

Acker, 527 U.S. at 431; Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 139 (1989)).

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants do not satisfy factor 2 because they were not acting

under direct control of a federal officer with respect to the action upon which they are being

sued. Defendants argue that they were acting within the scope of their agreement with BLM

and, therefore, were deemed federal employees at the relevant time. Defendants rely on the

information in the Long affidavit to establish that BLM directed and controlled FSPR

activities. Specifically, that trail rides were, at the relevant time, a BLM-sanctioned activity.

FSPR argues that the actual trail ride did not have to be under direct control of a BLM

official because they knew of the event and did not object. Further, the volunteers were

operating as employees for the event and it was up to BLM to impose the level of control it

felt appropriate.

The caselaw indicates that to satisfy § 1442 a federal official “must have ‘direct and

detailed control’ over the defendant.” Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F.Supp. 569, 572 (N.D. Cal.

1992) (citing Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 781 F.Supp. 934, 946 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (collecting

cases); Gulati v. Zuckerman, 723 F.Supp. 353, 358 (E.D. Pa. 1989)); Bahrs v. Hughes

Aircraft Co., 795 F.Supp. 965, 969 (D. Ariz. 1992) (the controlling question is “‘to what

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extent defendants acted under federal direction’ at the time they were engaged in conduct

now being sued upon.”). This Court has noted that “[t]he mere fact that the government

possessed the power to exercise control over the project does not establish that the power was

in fact ever exercised.” Bahrs, 795 F.Supp. at 970. As stated by other courts, defendant must

show that the acts forming the basis of the suit “were performed pursuant to an officer’s

direct orders or comprehensive and detailed regulations.” In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether,

488 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Ryan, 781 F.Supp. at 947); Good v. Armstrong

World Industries, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1125, 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

Defendants attempt to distinguish the cases upon which Plaintiffs rely, Fung, Ryan

and Bahrs. However, Defendants do not contest that those cases set forth the relevant

standard to be applied in determining whether Defendants were acting under a federal officer

at the time in question. Further, Defendants do not cite a single case to support their general

argument that they were operating under a federal officer.

The specific actions of FSPR, that are alleged to have led to the current suit, were the

failure to provide rules for the trail ride, the failure to assess the riders’ abilities, and the

failure to adequately supervise or organize the trail ride, including providing insufficient trail

leaders. (Doc. 8 at 3-4.) Defendants have not alleged, nor provided any evidence that a

federal official directed the organization of, or rules for, trail rides conducted by FSPR. To

the contrary, the evidence indicates that FSPR chose to conduct trail rides and BLM, at that

time, did not preclude the activity. Long stated in his affidavit that BLM has not participated

in the training of FSPR volunteers for many years. (Doc. 32, Ex. 2 at 4.) Further, there is no

suggestion that the trail rides were required by federal law or involved a federal duty. Even

under the broadest interpretation, Defendants fail to meet at least one of the requirements of

§ 1442, that their actions were taken under the direction of a federal officer.

Despite abandoning the FTCA as the basis for removal, Defendants attempt to use the

principles relevant to that statute to endorse removal under § 1442. In particular, FSPR

appears to equate status as a federal employee for purposes of the FTCA with a federal

official having direct control over the FSPR’s actions. Those two things are not factually nor

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legally equivalent. See Vandeventer v. Guimond, 494 F. Supp.2d 1255, 1265 (D. Kan. 2007)

(noting a distinction between federal employee status for the FTCA and the requirement of

“acting under” a federal officer for removal). The fact that FSPR and its members are deemed

federal employees for purposes of the FTCA does not control whether removal is appropriate

under § 1442. Further, FSPR erroneously argues that this removal is their only avenue to

protection under the FTCA. As was briefed extensively, the FTCA provides a process for the

government or a court to certify that a person was acting in the scope of federal employment,

at which time the United States is substituted as the defendant and the case is removable. See

28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).

Defendants bear the burden of establishing removability, see Wilson v. Republic Iron

& Stell Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921); California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831,

838 (9th Cir. 2004), and they have failed to do so. This result does not conflict with the

purposes of the federal officer removal statute because litigating this matter in state court

does not thwart any significant federal policy. See Watson, 551 U.S. at 150; Ryan, 781

F.Supp. at 950-51.

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, enter an order GRANTING Plaintiff’s and the Government’s Motions to Remand.

(Docs. 17, 24.)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Any 

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objections should be filed under the following case number: CV-11-397-TUC-DCB.

DATED this 14th day of October, 2011.

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