Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00771/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00771-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Victor Lamar McKaney, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00771-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Victor Lamar McKaney has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a supporting brief. (Doc. 1; Doc. 1-1 at 4-21.) 

Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides the statute of 

limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 11 at 

17-23.) Alternatively, Respondents argue that federal habeas corpus review of 

Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred. (Id. at 23-47.) Petitioner has filed a reply in 

support of his Petition. (Doc. 12.) For the reasons below, the Court finds the Petition 

untimely, recommends that it be dismissed, and does not consider Respondents’ 

alternative argument. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 On July 20, 1995, Petitioner was charged in the Pinal County Superior Court with 

one count of first-degree murder. (Doc. 11, Ex. D.) On July 27, 1995, a supervening 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 1 of 12
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

indictment charged Petitioner with this same count. (Doc. 11, Ex. E.) On March 7, 1997, 

a jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. (Doc. 11, Ex. F.) On May 28, 1997, the trial 

court sentenced Petitioner to a term of natural life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole. (Doc. 11, Exs. G, H at 15-17.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 On June 12, 1997, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 11, Ex. M.) In his opening brief, Petitioner raised the following claims: 

(1) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial based on the midtrial disclosure of laboratory reports; (2) the trial court erred by giving a flight instruction 

over Petitioner’s objection; (3) “[t]he prosecutor committed misconduct warranting a new 

trial by arguing inflammatory theories unsupported by the evidence”; (4) the evidence 

was insufficient to support a conviction for first-degree murder; and (5) the trial court 

relied on improper factors when sentencing Petitioner. (Doc. 11, Ex. N at i.) On 

November 13, 1997, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. R.) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.) 

C. Post-Conviction Review 

 1. First Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On November 5, 1997, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial 

court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 11, Ex. Q.) 

On May 19, 1998, Petitioner, through counsel Harriette Levitt, filed a petition for postconviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) Counsel advised the court that Petitioner claimed that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his statements to police, and 

for failing to have Petitioner evaluated by a psychologist to determine whether he was 

competent. (Id.) Counsel stated that she had reviewed Petitioner’s videotaped confession 

and his medical records and discussed the matter with a psychologist. (Id.) She was 

unable to find evidence to support Petitioner’s claims and, therefore, could not “in good 

faith, argue Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id.) Counsel 

requested an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se brief. (Id. at 9-10.) The 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 2 of 12
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

court granted Petitioner until August 26, 1998 to file a pro se brief. (Doc. 11, Ex. V.) 

However, before that deadline has passed, on July 27, 1998, the trial court denied postconviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. U.) The court stated that it had reviewed the file and the 

petition, and found no claims entitling Petitioner to relief. (Id.) On August 5, 1998, postconviction counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and requested an extension of 

time for Petitioner to file a petition for review. (Doc. 11, Ex. V.) 

 Over a year later, on August 13, 1999, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for an 

extension of time to file a petition for review from the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. W.) Petitioner stated that he was waiting to receive trial 

documents from trial counsel. (Id.) On September 1, 1999, the court treated Petitioner’s 

motion as a request for an extension of time to file a petition for post-conviction relief, 

and granted him an additional sixty days to file a petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. X.) The court 

also directed trial counsel to provide Petitioner with records that pertained to his case. 

(Id.) 

 On September 10, 1999, trial counsel advised the court that, before Petitioner’s 

direct appeal was filed, he provided Petitioner with a copy of his file and transcripts. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. Y.) On October 7, 1999, Petitioner notified the court that trial counsel had 

not provided him with “sufficient documents.” (Doc. 11, Ex. Z.) On November 9, 1999, 

Petitioner filed another motion for an extension of time to file a “petition for review,” 

stating that he still did not have his court records. (Doc. 11, Ex. AA.) On December 17, 

1999, the court dismissed the post-conviction proceeding because Petitioner had not filed 

a petition for post-conviction relief by the deadline. (Doc. 11, Ex. BB.) Petitioner did 

not seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 7.) 

 2. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 Over twelve years later, on March 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief in the trial court. (Doc. 11, Ex. CC.) Petitioner raised the following 

issues: (1) post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise substantial claims 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) post-conviction counsel also served as 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 3 of 12
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

appellate counsel in violation of “State v. Bennett”; (3) post-conviction counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on 

trial counsel’s failure to argue that Petitioner’s confession was elicited while he was 

experiencing a grand mal seizure; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

secure a plea offer and then subjecting Petitioner to a trial resulting in a natural life 

sentence, despite evidence that Petitioner was incompetent. (Doc. 11, Ex. CC at 1-2.) 

After filing his petition, on April 4, 2013, Petitioner filed a related notice of postconviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. DD.) 

 On May 23, 2013, the trial court dismissed the petition as untimely and successive. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. EE.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals 

arguing that the trial court erred by denying the petition for post-conviction relief as 

untimely and successive. (Doc. 11, Ex. FF.) Petitioner also argued that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to explain the benefits of entering a plea agreement compared to the 

risks of going to trial. (Doc. 11, Ex. HH.) On November 7, 2013, the court of appeals 

granted review, but denied relief. (Id.) The court found that the trial court correctly 

found Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel precluded under Rule 

32.2(a)(3) because Petitioner could have raised that claim in his first post-conviction 

proceeding. (Id.) Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review with the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 11, Ex. II.) On May 8, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. JJ.) 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On April 24, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a 

supporting brief in this Court.1

 (Doc. 1; Doc. 1-1 at 4-21.) Petitioner raises the following 

claims: (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to challenge the trial court’s 

refusal to order a Rule 11 evaluation of Petitioner, (b) failing to challenge trial counsel’s 

 1

 The Court considers the Petition filed on the date Petitioner delivered it to prison officials for mailing. (Doc. 1 at 11); see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988) (a legal document is deemed filed on the date a petitioner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail). 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 4 of 12
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

failure to request a Rule 11 evaluation, and (c) failing to challenge trial counsel’s failure 

to challenge Petitioner’s confession that was given “under duress of a medical seizure” 

(Ground One); (2) post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (Ground Two); (3) post-conviction counsel, 

who also served as appellate counsel, failed to raise substantial claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial and appellate counsel (Ground Three); (4) trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to “properly secure the plea offer from the state of second-degree murder of 

not less than 15 years,” thereby subjecting Petitioner “to a trial resulting in a natural life 

sentence when there was overwhelming evidence of [first]-degree murder” and that 

Petitioner was incompetent (Ground Four); and (5) trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the State’s use of a police report at sentencing (Ground Five). (Doc. 1 

at 8-14.) 

 Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 11.) 

Alternatively, Respondents argue that federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims 

is procedurally barred. (Id.) For the reasons below, the Court finds the Petition untimely, 

recommends that it be dismissed, and does not consider Respondents’ alternative 

argument. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

 A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The 

limitations period generally commences on “the date on which the judgment became final 

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).2

 Therefore, to assess the timeliness of the Petition, the Court 

determines the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became “final by the conclusion of 

direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

 

2

 The statute of limitations commences on the latest of the dates determined by applying §§ 2244(d)(1)(A) through (D). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Petitioner 

does not make any allegations indicating that subsections (B), (C), or (D) should apply. 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 5 of 12
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 After his trial and sentencing, Petitioner pursued direct review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 11, Exs. M, N.) On November 13, 1997, the appellate court 

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 11, Ex. R.) Petitioner did not seek 

review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.) Accordingly, his conviction became final 

thirty days later, on December 15, 1997, upon the expiration of time for seeking review in 

the Arizona Supreme Court.3

 See Gonzalez v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 641, 656 

(2012) (for a state prisoner who does not seek review in the State’s highest court, the 

judgment becomes “final” on the date the time for seeking such review expires); 

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1609, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (in Arizona, a direct appeal 

is final upon the expiration of the time for seeking review of the court of appeals’ 

decision in the Arizona Supreme Court, rather than upon the issuance of the mandate); 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (an Arizona litigant must file a petition for review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court within thirty days after the court of appeals files its decision). 

Therefore, the one-year limitations period commenced on December 16, 1997 and 

expired one year later unless tolling applies. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 

1245-47 (9th Cir. 2001) (the AEDPA limitations period begins to run on the day after the 

triggering event pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). 

B. Statutory Tolling 

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in state court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

 

3

 Thirty days after November 13, 1997 was Saturday, December 13, 1997. The next business day was Monday, December 15, 1997. 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 6 of 12
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 While his direct appeal was still pending, on November 5, 1997, Petitioner filed a 

notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. Q.) Thus, the limitations period that 

would have started running on December 16, 1997, was immediately tolled by the earlierfiled application for post-conviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Isley v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (in Arizona, statutory 

tolling begins when a Rule 32 notice of post-conviction relief is properly filed). The 

statute of limitations remained tolled while Petitioner’s post-conviction proceeding was 

pending in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On December 17, 1999, the trial 

court dismissed the post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 11, Ex. BB.) Petitioner did not 

seek review in the appellate court. (Doc. 1 at 7.) Accordingly, his post-conviction 

proceeding was no longer pending and the statute of limitations began running on 

December 18, 1999, and expired one year later on December 18, 2000.4

 See Hemmerle, 

495 F.3d at 1074-75 (stating that the petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief tolled the 

AEDPA limitation period only up to the date that the trial court summarily dismissed the 

post-conviction action for petitioner’s failure to timely file a petition for review). 

 Over twelve years later, on March 5, 2013, Petitioner commenced a second postconviction proceeding in state court.5

 (Doc. 11, Ex. CC.) However, this proceeding was 

commenced after the limitations period had expired and could not toll the already expired 

limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(holding that “section 2244(d) does not permit the re-initiation of the limitations period 

that has ended before the state petition was filed.”). Therefore, the statute of limitations 

expired on December 18, 2000. Petitioner did not file his pending Petition until April 24, 

2015. (Doc. 1.) Thus, the Petition is untimely unless Petitioner establishes that equitable 

tolling or an exception to the limitations period applies. 

 

4

 One year after December 17, 1999 was Saturday, December 16, 2000. The next 

business day was Monday, December 18, 2000. 

5

 Petitioner filed his second petition for post-conviction relief on March 5, 2013. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. CC.) On April 4, 2013, he filed his notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. DD.) 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 7 of 12
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

C. Equitable Tolling

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply 

the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 Petitioner does not provide any explanation for the untimely filing of his Petition. 

(Doc. 1 at 16; Doc. 12.) Rather than addressing the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, 

Petitioner argues that the procedural default of his claims should be excused under 

Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).6

 (Doc. 1 at 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 

16; Doc. 1-1 at 4-21; Doc. 12.) Even if the Court were to construe the Petition and Reply 

as asserting that the untimely filing should also be excused under Martinez, that argument 

would fail. 

In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that, under limited circumstances, the 

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could constitute cause to excuse the 

procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 

1315; see also Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293-95 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(extending the holding in Martinez to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel). The Martinez decision does not address the timeliness of a habeas petition or 

 6

 Petitioner also refers to Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013) and Trevino v. Thaler, ___U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). (Doc. 1 at 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14; 

Doc. 12 at 3.) These cases discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez in relation 

to habeas corpus petitioners whose claims were procedurally defaulted. See Detrich, 740 

F.3d at 1242-1246; Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1912-14. These cases do not discuss whether 

the Martinez decision applies to the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 8 of 12
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the tolling of the AEDPA limitations period. See Worrell v. Ryan, WL 1951657, at *1 

(D. Ariz. Apr. 28, 2015) (“[T]he Martinez decision has no application to the issue of the 

timeliness of the petitioner’s habeas petition.”); Wheelwright v. Wofford, 2014 WL 

3851155, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2014) (“Although the rule in Martinez is an equitable 

one, it applies only to procedural default issues and does not apply to equitable tolling 

principles pertinent to the AEDPA limitations issue.”); see also White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 

882, 884 (9th Cir. 2010) (the adequacy analysis used to decide procedural default issues 

is inapplicable to the determination of whether a federal habeas petition was barred by the 

AEDPA statute of limitations); Moreno v. Ryan, 2014 WL 24151, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 2, 

2014) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that Martinez delayed the start of the limitations 

period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) and finding that “Martinez has no 

applicability to this action as it does not concern the timeliness of a habeas petition.”). 

Accordingly, the Martinez decision does not provide a basis for equitably tolling the 

limitations period. 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of legal 

assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations 

period. “[I]t is well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se

petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 

1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir.1999)). 

Petitioner’s ignorance of the law and indigent status do not distinguish him from the great 

majority of inmates pursuing habeas corpus relief. Such circumstances are not 

extraordinary and do not justify tolling the limitations period. “If limited resources, lack 

of legal knowledge, and the difficulties of prison life were an excuse for not complying 

with the limitation period, the AEDPA’s limitation period would be meaningless since 

virtually all incarcerated prisoners have these same problems in common.” Bolanos v. 

Kirkland, 2008 WL 928252, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008); see also Rasberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the denial of equitable tolling because 

neither the district court’s failure to advise the petitioner of the right to amend his petition 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 9 of 12
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

to include unexhausted claims, nor petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the 

limitations period, were extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling). 

 Similarly, any delay that Petitioner experienced in receiving the record in his 

criminal case matter does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” that prevented 

Petitioner filing a timely federal petition. Petitioner admits that he was in possession of 

the record “around the second week of January, 2000[,]” more than thirteen years before 

he filed his petition with this Court. (Doc. 1-1 at 12-15.) 

D. Exception to the Statute of Limitations

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013), the Supreme 

Court recognized an exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations for a claim of actual 

innocence. The Court adopted the actual innocence gateway previously recognized in 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), for excusing the bar to federal habeas 

corpus review of procedurally defaulted claims. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 937-38.) To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must 

show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in 

the light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Schlup requires a petitioner ‘to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence — that was not presented at trial.’” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

 Petitioner has not presented new evidence and has not shown that failure to 

consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Doc. 1; Doc. 1-1 

at 4-21; Doc. 12.) Thus, this exception does not excuse his untimely filing. 

III. Conclusion 

 Petitioner did not file the pending habeas petition until years after the statute of 

limitations had expired and, therefore, the Petition is untimely. As set forth above, 

Petitioner is not entitled equitable tolling, and has not established that an exception to the 

limitations period should apply. Accordingly, the Petition should be denied as untimely 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 10 of 12
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and the Court does not consider Respondents’ alternative argument for denying habeas 

corpus relief. Because the Court does not reach the procedural default issue, Petitioner’s 

request for discovery and a hearing “to show that his default is excused,” (Doc. 1-1 at 20; 

Doc. 12), should also be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), 

including Petitioner’s request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. This recommendation is not an order that is 

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal 

pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed 

until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from 

the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written 

objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties 

have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely 

objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further 

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 11 of 12
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 20th day of October, 2015. 

Case 2:15-cv-00771-DJH Document 13 Filed 10/21/15 Page 12 of 12