Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00083/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TSI, Incorporated, a Minnesota 

Corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Azbil BioVigilant, Inc., a Delaware 

Corporation, 

Defendant.

No. CV12-0083-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant Azbil BioVigilant, Inc. has filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff TSI, 

Incoporated’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Doc. 22. The motion is fully briefed. Docs. 22, 23, 24. Neither party has requested oral 

argument. For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion.1

I. Background. 

On December 14, 2004, the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued 

U.S. Patent No. 6,831,279 (the “‘279 patent”), entitled “Laser Diode-Excited Biological 

Particle Detection System.” Doc. 20, ¶ 11. Plaintiff has acquired all rights, title, and 

interest in the ‘279 patent through assignment from Canada. These rights include the 

 

1

 Defendant previously filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 15), after which Plaintiff 

filed an amended complaint (Doc. 20). Defendant’s initial motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) is 

denied as moot. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (an amended 

complaint supersedes the original complaint, and after amendment, the court will treat the 

original complaint as nonexistent). 

Case 2:12-cv-00083-DGC Document 25 Filed 05/01/12 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

rights to sue for past infringement and to all damages for past infringement of the ‘279 

patent. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff makes and sells biological particle detection systems 

embodied by the ‘279 patent, and marks its products with the patent, in compliance with 

35 U.S.C. § 287(a). Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15. 

 Defendant was given actual notice of the ‘279 patent by a letter dated June 6, 

2006. Id. at ¶ 16. Defendant markets and sells biological particle detection systems. Id.

at ¶ 20. Defendant’s customers include pharmaceutical and medical device companies in 

the United States, but these customers are not publicly identified. Id. Plaintiff denied 

Defendant a license to the ‘279 patent. Id. at ¶ 19. 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant has directly infringed on the ‘279 patent, in 

violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant has 

indirectly infringed on the ‘279 patent by inducement, in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), 

and by contributory infringement, in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Id. at ¶¶ 23, 24. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to enter judgment that Defendant has willfully infringed the ‘279 

patent in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271, to enjoin Defendant from the patent infringement, 

and to award enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 6-7. 

II. Legal Standard. 

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim to relief under 

Rule 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 

(9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are 

not entitled to the assumption of truth, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), 

and therefore are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 

In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To avoid 

a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 

Case 2:12-cv-00083-DGC Document 25 Filed 05/01/12 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the 

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – 

but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

III. Discussion. 

 Defendant challenges the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims 

under §§ 271(b) and (c).2

 Doc. 22, at 4. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has 

not pled direct infringement by a third party, how the third party has directly infringed, 

and how Defendant induces or contributes to the infringement. Id. at 2. 

A. Direct Infringement by a Third Party.

 As the first step toward establishing Defendant’s vicarious liability under either an 

active inducement of infringement or contributory infringement theory, Plaintiff must 

prove direct infringement of the ‘279 patent. See Joy Tech., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 

F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 

F.3d 1263, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, 

Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 876 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Absent direct infringement of the claims of 

a patent, there can be neither contributory infringement nor inducement of 

infringement.”). Plaintiff alleges that the third parties who are directly infringing the 

‘279 patent are Defendant’s customers “that include, for example, companies in the 

pharmaceutical and medical device industries in the United States.” Doc. 20, ¶ 20. 

Defendant “does not publicly identify its customers; a reasonable opportunity for 

discovery is therefore needed in order to identify [Defendant’s] customers by name.” Id. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s customers directly infringe the ‘279 patent by using 

Defendant’s systems. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 24. 

 

2

 Defendant does not challenge the section 271(a) direct infringement claim. Doc. 24, at 3 n.1. 

Case 2:12-cv-00083-DGC Document 25 Filed 05/01/12 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff must identify at least one third party who directly 

infringes the ‘279 patent.3

 Doc. 22, at 4. Defendant cites Joy Technologies and Arris 

Group, but neither of these cases requires identification of third party infringers by name. 

See Joy Tech., 6 F.3d 770; Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telcomm. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011). “A defendant’s liability for indirect infringement must relate to the identified 

instances of direct infringement.” Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1274. “Plaintiffs who identify 

individual acts of direct infringement must restrict their theories of vicarious liability – 

and tie their claims for damages or injunctive relief – to the identified act.” Id. (emphasis 

in original). “Plaintiffs who identify an entire category of infringers (e.g., the defendant’s 

customers) may cast their theories of vicarious liability more broadly, and may 

consequently seek damages or injunctions across the entire category.” Id. Here, Plaintiff 

permissibly identified a category of infringers: Defendant’s customers, including 

companies in the pharmaceutical and medical device industries in the United States. 

 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff must set forth facts indicating how 

Defendant’s customers directly infringed, and that mere “use” of Defendant’s systems is 

insufficient to establish direct infringement. Doc. 22, at 2, 4. Defendant relies primarily 

on DR Systems, in which the plaintiff accused the defendant of “knowingly and 

intentionally induced infringement” through “the sale, offer for sale, and importation” of 

the accused medical imaging systems, with the direct infringers including “the physicians 

who use [the defendant’s] infringing medical imaging systems.” DR Systems, Inc. v. 

Avreo, Inc., No. 11-cv-0932 BEN (WVG), 2011 WL 4850171, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 

2011). The court concluded that the plaintiff had not alleged any facts “concerning how 

[the defendant] induced the physicians’ direct infringement of the medical imaging 

systems.” Id. The court took no issue, however, with the physicians’ use of the accused 

 

3

 Defendant later appears dismissive of this argument. See Doc. 24, at 8 

(“[Plaintiff] spends most of its brief debating whether it needs to specifically identify [Defendant’s] customers by name. . . . The issue is not whether [Plaintiff] must identify a third party infringer by name, but rather whether [Plaintiff’s] indirect infringement claims are ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Case 2:12-cv-00083-DGC Document 25 Filed 05/01/12 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

systems as being insufficient to constitute direct infringement. Furthermore, 

section 271(a) provides that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or 

sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. 

§ 271(a). Because the definition of direct infringement includes the use of an accused 

system, and because Plaintiff has not provided any authority to the contrary, the Court 

concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled direct infringement by a third party. 

B. Inducement of Infringement.

 Section 271(b) provides that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent 

shall be liable as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). “[I]nducement requires that the 

alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to 

encourage another’s infringement.” Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks 

Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. 

JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Plaintiff alleges that, “by 

marketing and selling its biological particle detection systems, [Defendant] has 

encouraged and is encouraging its customers to use its biological particle detection 

systems and, thus, to directly infringe the ‘279 patent. This is also shown from 

[Defendant’s] website, which, for example, advertises [Defendant’s] systems as rapid 

biological detection systems that allow the user to detect the intrinsic fluorescence of 

airborne particles.” Doc. 20, ¶ 23. 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not demonstrated how it induced infringement 

merely by alleging that Defendant markets and sells the systems at issue. Doc. 22, at 5. 

Defendant again relies on DR Systems, but Plaintiff alleges more than the “sale” or “offer 

for sale” of the accused systems. Cf. DR Systems, 2011 WL 4850171, at *3. Plaintiff 

claims that Defendant has advertised the accused systems on its website as “rapid 

biological detection systems.” Doc. 20, ¶ 23. “[L]iability for active inducement may be 

found ‘where evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it 

may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting 

infringement.’” Ricoh Co., Ltd. V. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1341 (Fed. 

Case 2:12-cv-00083-DGC Document 25 Filed 05/01/12 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 

935 n.10 (2005) (stating that this reasoning applies to § 271(b)). As the Supreme Court 

explained in Grokster in the context of infringement under copyright laws, “[e]vidence of 

active steps . . . taken to encourage direct infringement, such as advertising an infringing 

use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the 

product be used to infringe.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936. Defendant’s advertisement of 

the accused systems on its website directly promotes use of Defendant’s product in an 

infringing manner. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., 145 

F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming holding that advertisements of infringing 

device induced others to infringe). 

 Defendant points to Claim 20 of the ‘279 patent, which “requires the end user 

(e.g., a customer) to analyze a particle . . . and then make a determination as to ‘whether 

that particle is biologically viable.’” Doc. 22, at 5 (citation omitted). Defendant claims 

that Plaintiff has not pled any facts that Defendant’s customers ever make this 

determination with Defendant’s systems. Id. at 6. To the contrary, Plaintiff has alleged 

that Defendant’s customers directly infringe “by using such biological particle detection 

systems, which are embodiments of the ‘279 patent,” and that Defendant markets its 

systems as “rapid biological detection systems that allow the user to detect the intrinsic 

fluorescence of airborne particles.” Doc. 20, ¶ 23. While this language may not mirror 

the language in Claim 20, Defendant’s website advertising is still relevant as evidence of 

its intent to induce infringement. See Ricoh, 550 F.3d at 1342 (“That the presentation 

may have failed to communicate any information regarding the patented methods or the 

possibility of infringement does not render it irrelevant as evidence of [Defendant’s] 

intent.”). To the extent that Defendant cites Claim 20 to show that its customers used its 

systems for a purpose other than what is protected by the ‘279 patent, the Court will 

address that argument at the summary judgment stage with the benefit of further factual 

development. 

Case 2:12-cv-00083-DGC Document 25 Filed 05/01/12 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Finally, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendant “knowingly 

induced” infringement by its customers. Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1315. Plaintiff claims 

that “[Defendant] was given actual notice of the ‘279 patent by a letter dated June 6, 

2006,” and that Defendant previously sought a license to the ‘279 patent. Doc. 20, ¶¶ 16, 

19. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that 

Plaintiff has pled enough facts to show that Defendant knew of the ‘279 patent and took 

active steps to induce infringement. The Court will deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

the section 271(b) inducement of infringement claim. 

 C. Contributory Infringement. 

 Section 271(c) provides: 

Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the 

United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 

combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing 

a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 

the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an 

infringement of such patent, and not a staple or commodity of commerce 

suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 

infringer. 

35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Under this section, a party who sells a component with knowledge 

that the component is especially designed for use in a patented invention, and is not a 

staple article of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, is liable as a 

contributory infringer. Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1316; see Ricoh, 550 F.3d at 1337. To 

establish contributory infringement, a plaintiff must show the following elements: (1) that 

there is direct infringement, (2) that the accused infringer had knowledge of the patent, 

(3) that the component has no substantial noninfringing uses, and (4) that the component 

is a material part of the invention. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1326 

(Fed. Cir. 2010). 

As discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that Defendant’s customers 

directly infringed by using Defendant’s systems and that Defendant had knowledge of the 

Case 2:12-cv-00083-DGC Document 25 Filed 05/01/12 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

patent.4 See Doc. 20, ¶¶ 16, 18, 24. Defendant does not initially challenge the third and 

fourth elements of Plaintiff’s contributory infringement claim (see Doc. 22), but waits 

until its reply to do so (see Doc. 24, at 9 (arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged that 

Defendant’s biological detection systems constitute a material part of the ‘279 patent, that 

Defendant knew its systems were especially made or adapted for use to infringe the ‘279 

patent, and that Defendants’ systems are not suitable for substantial non-infringing use, to 

make a claim for contributory infringement)). It is well established, however, that 

“courts will not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Bach v. 

Forever Living Prod. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d. 1110, 1122 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007); Lentini 

v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 843 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court 

will deny the motion to dismiss the section 271(c) contributory infringement claim. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant’s initial motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) is denied as moot. 

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint (Doc. 22) is 

denied. 

3. The Court will schedule a case management conference by separate order. 

Dated this 1st day of May, 2012. 

 

4

 Plaintiff must ultimately show that Defendant knew that its systems were “both patented and infringing.” Fujitsu, 620 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Golden Blount, Inc. v. 

Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 

Case 2:12-cv-00083-DGC Document 25 Filed 05/01/12 Page 8 of 8