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Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1870 

MICHELLE JESKE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 1:18-cv-00371 — William C. Griesbach, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 10, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 2, 2020 

____________________ 

Before KANNE, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. On Halloween 2012, Michelle Jeske 

was working at a cemetery as a pallbearer and burial needs 

salesperson. She was carrying a heavy casket when she stumbled, injuring her back. About four years later, she applied for 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income based on disability; she claimed that back and spine 

problems, anxiety, depression, and suicidal tendencies made 

her unable to work. 

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The Commissioner of Social Security denied Jeske’s requests, and, after a hearing, an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”) found Jeske not disabled under the Social Security 

Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(3). Seeking judicial review, 

Jeske asked a federal district court to set aside the administrative decision. The court upheld the decision instead, and Jeske 

appealed. She argues that, for a handful of reasons, we should 

vacate and remand with instructions to return the case to the 

agency. 

Because the ALJ’s decision applies the proper standards, 

is supported by substantial evidence, and is sufficiently explained—and because Jeske waived one of her arguments—

we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

At the hearing before the ALJ, Jeske confirmed that she 

was 44 years old and lived with her husband and three of her 

four sons, ages 11, 14, and 22. She also changed the date on 

which she allegedly became disabled—changing it from the 

date of her back injury (October 31, 2012) to more than a year 

later (January 1, 2014), because substantial gainful activity in 

2013 showed that Jeske was not disabled that year. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

Jeske explained to the ALJ that she experiences constant 

back pain because of the casket-carrying incident. She elaborated that, after her injury, she received treatment through a 

workers’ compensation program for a while. And during that 

time, Jeske’s employer at the cemetery allowed her to work 

from home many days. But once the workers’ compensation 

doctor released her from treatment, Jeske’s boss no longer 

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No. 19-1870 3 

permitted her to work from home. About a month later, Jeske 

believed she “couldn’t do it anymore” and quit.

Since then, Jeske continued, she had worked part time as 

a security guard—a position that allowed her to walk, sit, 

stand, and lie down as she pleased, so long as she didn’t fall 

asleep. 

Jeske alleged that she cannot sit or stand for more than 

about 10 minutes at a time (or 20 minutes if driving) before 

back pain impels her to change positions. She described the 

pain as shooting “tweaks” that radiate through her back and 

sides, sometimes with back spasms and numbness in her legs 

and feet. She told the ALJ that “Workmen’s Comp refused to 

do anything else and so now, even still to this day, it’s just 

progressively getting worse and worse.” Because of the back 

pain and psychological stress, she said, sleep comes to her in 

two-hour increments. She tries to alleviate the pain by shifting 

positions, walking around, and taking Ibuprofen, but even 

simple tasks seem difficult or impossible. She no longer participates in her sons’ school activities, apart from picking 

them up from practice, and her husband and children help 

tremendously with the household chores, her personal hygiene, and shopping. 

Along with Jeske’s statements, the ALJ considered records 

of diagnostic imaging of her back, treatment providers’ notes, 

and consulting doctors’ evaluation reports, all following 

Jeske’s injury in 2012. 

The diagnostic images came from magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) in 2012, a nuclear scan in 2013, and an x-ray in 

2016. Doctors described the images as “negative,” and “unremarkable,” and interpreted them as indicating no more than 

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minimal or mild conditions, with no abnormal signals in the 

spinal cord detected. 

The treatment notes came from Jeske’s initial hospital visit 

the day of her injury, Jeske’s sessions with the workers’ compensation doctor and physical therapist who treated her, and 

an unrelated hospital visit in 2017. 

The first hospital record noted that Jeske had driven herself to the hospital, described the level of pain in her back as 

a 6 out of 10, and denied experiencing any numbness or tingling. The attending doctor identified the problem as acute 

thoracolumbar strain and advised light duty for a week. 

Dr. Sturm, who saw Jeske through her workers’ compensation treatment, observed Jeske’s condition improve over the 

six months following her injury. He also anticipated further 

improvement when he determined, in April 2013, that Jeske 

could work up to eight hours each work day, with no other 

restrictions. The physical therapist similarly observed that 

Jeske was improving, could benefit from continued physical 

therapy to progress further, was working full time, and rated 

her pain level as a 2 or 3 out of 10 on her last visit in March 

2013. 

After Jeske’s release from workers’ compensation, there is 

no record of treatment for her back. But the record from 

Jeske’s unrelated hospital visit in 2017 indicated no motor deficits in all four extremities, normal sensory function, and a 

normal gait. And in 2016, doctors serving as consultants for 

the Social Security Administration evaluated Jeske and her 

medical records. 

The doctor who conducted a physical exam in 2016 observed that Jeske appeared to struggle with some tasks, such 

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as tandem walking,1 bending forward, squatting, and extending her legs. During the evaluation, Jeske also reported some 

loss of sensation and she demonstrated “give way” weakness 

on motor-strength testing of her legs. At the same time, she 

had a normal gait, symmetrical reflexes, and—apart from 

bending forward only 45 degrees instead of 90—normal range 

of motion in her spine. 

The doctor who conducted a psychological exam in 2016 

reported that Jeske appeared unkempt and seemed to struggle with depression and underlying trauma. Documenting a 

colloquy about how Jeske spends her days, the doctor wrote 

that, “[w]hen asked what she does on a typical day, she takes 

care of the kids and will try to relax and take care of herself to 

manage her pain. She does the cooking, cleaning, grocery 

shopping, and handles the money.”

After considering the evidence, the ALJ found that Jeske 

could perform light work with specific limitations: she 

needed to be able to alternate between sitting and standing at 

will; she could not perform more than occasional stooping, 

crouching, kneeling, crawling, and climbing of ramps and 

stairs; she could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding; and 

she was limited to unskilled work and jobs involving no more 

than occasional decision making, changes in the work setting, 

and interaction with others. The ALJ determined that, although Jeske could not perform her past work at the cemetery, 

she could adjust to other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. So, the ALJ concluded, Jeske 

1 Tandem walking is walking in a straight line, placing the front foot so 

that its heel touches the toes of the standing foot. See Murphy v. Colvin, 759 

F.3d 811, 818 (7th Cir. 2014). 

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was not disabled from January 1, 2014 through September 20, 

2017. 

Jeske contends the ALJ’s assessment was improper in five 

ways, each requiring remand. 

II. ANALYSIS

The ALJ’s conclusion that Jeske was not disabled closed 

the door on both Jeske’s request for disability insurance and 

her request for supplemental security income. That’s because 

the substantive standards governing whether a person is disabled are materially the same for both types of benefits. See 42 

U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); 

Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 2002).

We review the ALJ’s “not disabled” decision directly, 

without deferring to the district court’s assessment.2 Roddy v. 

Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013). We will uphold the 

ALJ’s decision if it uses the correct legal standards, id., is supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and 

“build[s] an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to 

[the ALJ’s] conclusion,” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 

1176 (7th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). 

We review the entire record, but we do not replace the 

ALJ’s judgment with our own by reconsidering facts, reweighing or resolving conflicts in the evidence, or deciding 

questions of credibility. Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 638 (7th 

2 The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, making it the 

Commissioner’s final decision, 20 C.F.R. § 404.981, reviewable by a district 

court, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). 

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Cir. 1998). Our review is limited also to the ALJ’s rationales; 

we do not uphold an ALJ’s decision by giving it different 

ground to stand upon. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 

93–95 (1943). 

The ALJ here conducted the standard five-step evaluation 

process prescribed by the Social Security Administration for 

determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). At steps one and two, the ALJ 

found that (1) Jeske had not been doing substantial gainful 

activity since January 1, 2014, see id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), and (2) 

Jeske had three severe, medically determinable physical or 

mental impairments lasting at least twelve months: facet arthropathy of the lumbar spine;3 depression; and post-traumatic stress disorder, see id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1509. 

Jeske’s five claims of error begin at step three. She contends that (1) the ALJ’s conclusion that Jeske was not presumptively disabled was both inadequately explained and incorrect; (2) the ALJ misrepresented and improperly relied 

upon Jeske’s activities of daily living when deciding that she 

was not disabled; (3) the ALJ failed to discuss Dr. Sturm’s 

opinion about Jeske’s work hours; (4) the ALJ omitted a function-by-function assessment of Jeske’s capacity to perform exertional tasks; and (5) the ALJ inadequately accounted for 

Jeske’s limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. We 

will take each argument in turn. 

3 In less-technical terms, arthritis in joints at the surfaces of bones in the 

lumbar spine. See Facet, Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 668 (32d ed. 

2012) [hereinafter Dorland’s]; Arthropathy, id. at 158. 

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A. Step-Three Listing Determination 

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s impairments are “severe enough” to be presumptively 

disabling—that is, so severe that they prevent a person from 

doing any gainful activity and make further inquiry into 

whether the person can work unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1525(a); see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532–33 (1990). 

An impairment is presumptively disabling if it is listed in the 

relevant regulations’ appendix, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a), or 

if it is “medically equivalent” to a listing, id. § 404.1526(a). A 

medically-equivalent impairment has characteristics “at least 

of equal medical significance” to all the specified criteria in a 

listing. Id. § 404.1526(b); cf. Zebley, 493 U.S. at 530. When evaluating whether an impairment is presumptively disabling under a listing, the ALJ “must discuss the listing by name and 

offer more than a perfunctory analysis of the listing.” Barnett

v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004). 

The listing at issue here is 1.04. It identifies as presumptively disabling “[d]isorders of the spine ..., resulting in compromise of a nerve root ... or the spinal cord.”4 20 C.F.R. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.04. 

The listing captures spinal disorders that accompany 

“[e]vidence of nerve root compression characterized by” specific symptoms: “neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by 

sensory or reflex loss and, if there is involvement of the lower 

4 Nerve roots are the lowermost parts of the nerves exiting the spinal cord. 

See Root, Dorland’s, supra note 3, at 1653. 

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back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine).” Id.

§ 1.04A. 

The listing also captures spinal arachnoiditis,5 and lumbar 

spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication,6 so long as 

the condition meets certain qualifications. See id. § 1.04B, C. 

Spinal arachnoiditis must be “confirmed by an operative 

note or pathology report of tissue biopsy, or by appropriate 

medically acceptable imaging, manifested by severe burning 

or painful dysesthesia,7 resulting in the need for changes in 

position or posture more than once every 2 hours.” Id. § 1.04B. 

Lumbar stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication must be 

“established by findings on appropriate medically acceptable 

imaging, manifested by chronic nonradicular pain8 and weakness, and resulting in inability to ambulate effectively, as defined in [another part of the appendix].” Id. § 1.04C. 

5 Spinal arachnoiditis is inflammation of the membrane that covers the 

spinal cord. See Arachnoiditis, Dorland’s, supra note 3, at 123; Arachnoid, id.

at 123; Arachnoidea Mater, id. at 123; see also 20 C.F.R. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1, 

§ 1.00K.2. 

6 Lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication is the narrowing 

of the vertebral canal, nerve root canals, or space between vertebrae in the 

lumbar spine, caused by encroachment of bone upon the space, and resulting in limping or lameness accompanied by pain and abnormal sensations in the back, buttocks, and lower limbs. See Claudication, Dorland’s, 

supra note 3, at 369; Pseudoclaudication, id. at 1541; Stenosis, Spinal S., id. at 

1770; see also 20 C.F.R. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.00K.3. 

7 Dysesthesia is distortion of any sense, especially touch. Dysesthesia, Dorland’s, supra note 3, at 577. 

8 Nonradicular pain is pain not caused by disease of a sensory nerve root 

or roots. See Pain, Radicular P., Root P., Dorland’s, supra note 3, at 1363. 

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Evaluating Jeske’s spinal impairment under Listing 1.04, 

the ALJ determined that the impairment was not presumptively disabling. Jeske argues the ALJ’s corresponding discussion was insufficient and incorrect. 

The ALJ’s initial discussion was certainly brief: 

The undersigned evaluated the claimant’s spinal impairment under pertinent listing 1.04, but there is no evidence 

of nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic 

distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor 

loss accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and positive 

straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine); spinal arachnoiditis; or lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication.

But the discussion picked up in the next part of the ALJ’s decision. There, the ALJ addressed specific evidence of Jeske’s 

symptoms and explained why he found Jeske’s statements 

about her symptoms were not fully substantiated by the other 

evidence, which showed her symptoms were less severe. 

For example, the ALJ reasoned that Jeske’s injury had not 

prevented her from working full time, including 55-hour 

weeks, after it happened. The ALJ added that doctors interpreting Jeske’s diagnostic images determined that the MRI in 

2012 showed her facet arthropathy was “mild,” and the nuclear scan in 2013 and the x-ray in 2016 returned images of 

Jeske’s spine that were “unremarkable.” Consistent with 

these interpretations, the ALJ observed, treatment providers 

determined that Jeske’s spinal condition was not a surgical 

candidate and that Jeske consistently appeared functional 

with a normal gait and intact deep tendon reflexes. Also, 

Jeske’s straight-leg raising tests were sometimes negative. 

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Continuing on, the ALJ recognized that the agency consultant who evaluated Jeske in 2016 observed a normal gait 

(albeit with some pain); full extension, full side lateral flexion, 

and full rotation range of motion; and symmetrical reflexes. 

Similarly, the ALJ reasoned, the medical record from June 

2017 documented Jeske as having a normal gait, normal sensation, and normal motor functioning. 

Jeske protests that this discussion of the evidence appears 

too late in the decision. Instead of appearing under the subheading for step three, it appears between steps three and 

four, with discussion of Jeske’s residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”). Jeske acknowledges that we’ve found step-three discussion in a comparable place before. See, e.g., Curvin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 645, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2015). But she insists that 

this practice necessarily violates the command of SEC v. 

Chenery Corp., that our judgment of the agency’s decision 

must rest only on the grounds upon which the agency’s decision was based. 318 U.S. at 87–88. Jeske also reasons that the 

ALJ’s more thorough discussion of the evidence contradicts 

his earlier statement that “there is no evidence of nerve root 

compression,” so the more thorough discussion couldn’t have 

been part of the ALJ’s step-three determination. Finally, she 

contends that the evidence compelled a finding that Jeske was 

presumptively disabled under Listing 1.04A—the subpart addressing nerve root compression. 

Turning to Jeske’s first contention, we are not violating 

Chenery’s command by looking at the ALJ’s more thorough 

discussion of the evidence. Observing that an ALJ placed 

some of its step-three rationale with its discussion of a claimant’s RFC does not give the ALJ’s step-three determination 

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new ground to stand upon. It simply identifies the ALJ’s stepthree rationale for review. 

The five-step evaluation process comprises sequential determinations that can involve overlapping reasoning. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). This is certainly true of step three and 

the RFC determination that takes place between steps three 

and four: an impairment so severe that it is presumptively 

disabling will generally, if not always, leave the claimant 

without functional capacity to work—that’s why the impairment triggers a presumption of disability in the first place. See 

id. § 404.1520(d)–(e). Accordingly, when an ALJ explains how 

the evidence reveals a claimant’s functional capacity, that discussion may doubly explain how the evidence shows the 

claimant’s impairment is not presumptively disabling under 

the pertinent listing. And, as we’ve already recognized, “[t]o 

require the ALJ to repeat such a discussion throughout [the] 

decision would be redundant.” Curvin, 778 F.3d at 650. 

Here, the evidence of Jeske’s back condition and symptoms dictated whether her back impairment met the criteria 

of Listing 1.04. And the ALJ’s more thorough discussion—although located with the discussion of Jeske’s RFC—explained 

what the evidence revealed about Jeske’s condition and 

symptoms. That more thorough discussion also elaborated 

the ALJ’s initial statement. Jeske disagrees, contending that 

the ALJ’s extended discussion conflicts with his earlier statement that there was no evidence of nerve root compression. 

But we do not see the two parts of the ALJ’s discussion as incongruous. 

The regulations make clear that a disorder under Listing 

1.04 is evident only if all the listing’s criteria are met. See 20 

C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.04A, B, C. We thus read the 

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ALJ’s initial statement as saying that the evidence did not 

show that Jeske met all the required criteria—not, as Jeske 

suggests, that there was no evidence she met any of the criteria. 

Indeed, the ALJ observed evidence that Jeske exhibited 

some symptoms common to nerve root compression. For example, the ALJ recognized two positive straight-leg raising 

tests and signs that Jeske experienced reduced flexion and 

sensation alongside pain. Recall that nerve root compression 

is established by “neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by 

sensory or reflex loss and, if there is involvement of the lower 

back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine).” Id. 

§ 1.04A. 

The ALJ also recognized, however, that the evidence was 

not entirely consistent, that Jeske was not fully credible, and—

ultimately—that the requirements for an impairment under 

Listing 1.04 had not been met. So, the ALJ did not give contradictory assessments of the evidence. 

Finally, we turn to Jeske’s argument that the evidence 

compelled a step-three decision opposite the ALJ’s—because, 

she says, the evidence showed she was presumptively disabled under Listing 1.04A. Because Jeske does not contest the 

ALJ’s decision that Jeske did not qualify for a presumption 

under 1.04B (spinal arachnoiditis) or 1.04C (lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication), our analysis will focus 

on 1.04A (nerve root compression). In the end, we conclude 

that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-three determination. 

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To start, no medical records or other reports mentioned 

nerve root compression, nor did any of them indicate that all 

the indicia of nerve root compression were present. 

The diagnostic-imaging records, which the ALJ addressed, also support his determination that Jeske’s impairment was not as severe as Jeske alleged. The MRI readings 

indicated minimal-to-no significant spinal canal stenosis; 

mild-to-no foraminal stenosis;9 mild facet arthropathy; maintained vertebral heights; and no abnormal signals in the spinal cord. The nuclear scan returned “unremarkable” images 

of Jeske’s lumbar spine, no abnormal uptake in the lumbar 

spine, and “unremarkable” soft tissue uptake. And the x-ray 

report in 2016—apparently part of the consultative exam—indicated “satisfactory” vertebral height and alignment and 

“adequately maintained” disc spaces, without mention of any 

abnormalities. These records underpin the ALJ’s finding that 

Jeske’s nerve roots and spinal cord were not compromised. 

Adding to that support, the treatment notes and evaluation reports that the ALJ discussed consistently indicated that 

Jeske’s gait was normal, even if accompanied by pain, and 

that she ambulated easily. 

Next, as the ALJ noted, the evidence showed inconsistent 

straight-leg raising tests—some positive and some negative. 

And none of the records indicated whether the positive ones 

were positive in both sitting and supine positions, as Listing 

1.04A requires. 

9 Foraminal stenosis is abnormal narrowing of the natural opening in a 

vertebra. See Foramen, Dorland’s, supra note 3, at 729; Stenosis, id. at 1769. 

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The evidence the ALJ examined was also mixed on 

whether Jeske experienced limited motion of the spine and 

motor-strength loss accompanied by loss of sensation or reflexes. 

Although the 2016 evaluation report documented lessthan-normal flexion in Jeske’s spine, it also documented normal extension, normal right and left lateral flexion, normal 

right and left rotation in the lumbar spine, symmetrical reflexes, and ability to walk normally. The ALJ observed this 

assortment of medical findings, as well as Dr. Sturm’s notes 

reporting similar findings about Jeske’s normal gait and station, and essentially normal range of motion. 

As for motor-strength loss accompanied by loss of sensation or reflexes, Jeske exhibited “give way” on motor-strength 

testing of her legs in the 2016 evaluation, and Jeske said she 

experienced numbness. But the ALJ also determined that 

Jeske’s portrayal of her symptoms was not entirely credible, 

and the ALJ was not required to find the “give way” demonstration was conclusive proof of weakness. Cf. Simila v. Astrue, 

573 F.3d 503, 508, 518–19 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “give 

way” results—which indicate less-than-full effort on strength 

testing—may not be reliable indications of muscle weakness 

and may be a sign of exaggerated symptoms). The ALJ also 

acknowledged Dr. Sturm’s determination that by mid-January 2013, Jeske could lift, carry, push, and pull up to 40 

pounds. And, as the ALJ noted, the doctors who saw Jeske 

consistently documented that her reflexes were intact, and the 

hospital record from 2017 indicated no motor deficits in all 

four extremities and normal sensory function. 

So, although the evidence showed Jeske suffered from limiting back pain, abundant evidence supports the ALJ’s 

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determination that her condition lacked all the requirements 

of a presumptively disabling impairment under Listing 

1.04A. We therefore reject Jeske’s first argument. 

B. Jeske’s Daily-Living Activities 

Next, Jeske argues that the ALJ both misrepresented and 

improperly relied upon Jeske’s ability to perform activities of 

daily life. 

Jeske points to two of the ALJ’s statements, in particular. 

First, at step three, the ALJ wrote that Jeske “endorsed being 

capable of caring for her kids, managing money, and finishing 

what she starts (though she testified she does not finish what 

she starts)” and that she “reported not needing any special 

reminders to take care of her personal hygiene, caring for her 

children ..., cooking cleaning, managing money, shopping, 

and driving.” Second, between steps three and four, the ALJ 

reiterated that Jeske “reported rather good activities of daily 

living,” as she “indicated not needing any special reminders 

to take care of her personal hygiene, caring for her children 

..., cooking, cleaning, managing money, shopping, and driving.” 

These are not mischaracterizations. Jeske gave varying accounts of her daily-living activities. In a functional report she 

submitted to the agency, she indicated that she takes care of 

her children, with the two adult children helping out. She also 

indicated that she does not need any special reminders to take 

care of personal needs and grooming, and she sometimes prepares her own meals. Similarly, the agency doctor who conducted a psychological evaluation in 2016 relayed: “When 

asked what she does on a typical day, she takes care of the 

kids and will try to relax and take care of herself to manage 

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her pain. She does the cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping, 

and handles the money.” 

The ALJ acknowledged that, at the hearing, Jeske indicated she was less capable, saying that her husband helps 

with her personal hygiene, at least one son always helps her 

pick up groceries, the kids do the vacuuming and dishes, and 

her husband does the laundry. But, also at the hearing, Jeske 

endorsed the ALJ’s partial recapitulation of the functional report she had submitted to the agency, indicating her earlier 

description remained accurate. 

It was the ALJ’s responsibility to decide the facts and resolve discrepancies in these accounts. See Clifford v. Apfel, 227 

F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). The ALJ’s resolution has adequate support in the psychological report, Jeske’s functional 

report, and Jeske’s hearing testimony. The ALJ did not have 

to override this evidence with Jeske’s inconsistent statements 

at the hearing. We therefore do not see the ALJ’s statements 

as misrepresenting Jeske’s daily-living activities. 

The ALJ likewise did not improperly rely upon Jeske’s 

daily-living activities when evaluating whether she was disabled. An ALJ may not equate activities of daily living with 

those of a full-time job. Alvarado v. Colvin, 836 F.3d 744, 750 

(7th Cir. 2016). But an ALJ is not forbidden from considering 

statements about a claimant’s daily life. In fact, agency regulations instruct that, in an assessment of a claimant’s symptoms, the evidence considered includes descriptions of dailyliving activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a), (c)(3). 

Here, the ALJ did not reason that Jeske’s activities of daily 

living are as demanding as those of full-time work. Rather, 

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the ALJ considered Jeske’s activities to determine whether her 

symptoms were as severe and limiting as she alleged. 

At step three, the ALJ reasoned that Jeske’s activities of 

daily living, alongside other evidence, showed that Jeske’s 

mental impairments were characterized by “no more than 

moderate limitation[s]” in her ability to understand, remember, or apply information; interact with others; concentrate, 

persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage herself. See 20 

C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 12.04, 12.15. In other words, the 

ALJ considered Jeske’s daily-living activities as one factor—

among others—indicating that Jeske’s descriptions of her 

mental-functioning limitations were not fully credible. This 

use of daily-living activities, to assess credibility and symptoms, was not improper. See Alvarado, 836 F.3d at 750. 

Similarly, between steps three and four, the ALJ mentioned Jeske’s daily-living activities when explaining his finding that Jeske “is not as limited as alleged.” This credibility 

determination, like the ALJ’s earlier assessment, invited the 

ALJ’s consideration of Jeske’s daily-living activities. 

Accordingly, Jeske’s second argument lacks merit. 

C. Consideration of Dr. Sturm’s Opinion 

Third, Jeske faults the ALJ for not discussing one of Dr. 

Sturm’s opinions on Jeske’s work hours. Dr. Sturm started 

seeing Jeske following her back injury in October 2012, and 

his last treatment visit with her was on April 16, 2013, when 

he released her from treatment and observed that—apart 

from avoiding work days exceeding eight hours—she had no 

restrictions. 

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No. 19-1870 19 

Jeske points to the doctor’s notes from that last appointment on April 16. She specifically excerpts his written statement that 

[p]erhaps in 6 or 8 months she will get back to baseline, particularly if she can cut back her long work weeks or maybe 

she needs to reduce her work commitment to say 30 hours 

a week, try going part-time to see if this helps her back. 

Maybe sometime later in life she can go back to 40 hours. I 

am not sure if these are options for her, however. 

This statement, Jeske argues, mandated specific attention 

in the ALJ’s decision because it “was patently a[n] opinion 

speaking to Jeske’s RFC; namely, whether Jeske was able to 

perform 8 hour a day, 5 day a week ‘regular employment’ on 

a ‘regular and continuing basis.’” Relying on our decision in 

Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013), Jeske reasons that

if the ALJ was not going to give this opinion significant 

weight, the ALJ needed to explain why. 

An ALJ does have to consider opinions from medical 

sources on a claimant’s RFC—that is, the most a person can 

do in a work setting despite the person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1545(a)(1), 404.1527(d)(2). Those opinions may be rejected only with “an accurate and logical bridge” between the 

evidence and the ALJ’s decision. Roddy, 705 F.3d at 636 (quoting Craft, 539 F.3d at 673). 

But an ALJ “is not required to mention every piece of evidence.” Craft, 539 F.3d at 678. In particular, when a treating 

doctor opines that a patient can work full eight-hour days 

without other restrictions and is improving; observes that the 

patient has been working overtime lately; and suggests that 

the patient cut back to at- or below-full-time hours to maximize her improvement, the ALJ does not have to explain why 

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that last statement is not an opinion about whether the claimant can work full time. That much is obvious from the statement’s content and context. 

This is the situation we have here. Viewing Dr. Sturm’s 

hour-reduction statement in context, rather than in isolation, 

it is clear that the comment was not his opinion about whether 

Jeske could work a full-time job. 

For a while after Jeske’s injury, Dr. Sturm believed Jeske’s 

condition restricted her to four-hour work days. But by January 10, 2013, he endorsed Jeske’s return to an unlimited work 

schedule. In his progress report from that date, he noted that 

Jeske’s work days were now “9 or 10 hours, sometimes more,” 

and that Jeske had disagreed with his assessment that she 

could handle unlimited work days. He decided she should 

“limit her work day to 6–8 hours at this point, since her symptoms may flare-up with long work days.” 

When Dr. Sturm saw Jeske a week later, he recognized that 

she was “currently working 6–8 hours a day and makes it 

through the day” and that her pain was “daily, not necessarily 

hourly” and gets worse if she lifts anything heavy. He also 

wrote that Jeske reported 10% overall improvement and that 

her work restrictions were “the same as [the] last visit, i.e., 

limit lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling to 40 pounds. Avoid 

most extensive stooping, bending, stretching, twisting. Limit 

work day to 6–8 hours.” 

At a visit the next month, Dr. Sturm opined that Jeske 

“seems pretty functional ... and can do most of her regular job 

including full days without any hour restrictions. She just 

tries to avoid lifting heavy caskets and things that are obviously ergonomically challenging.” And later that month, Dr. 

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No. 19-1870 21 

Sturm wrote that Jeske was “back at work including full-time 

now. She sometimes works 38 hours over 4 days. In other 

words, over 9 hours a day. She is trying to avoid heavy lifting, 

such as lifting coffins, but she can do all the other parts of her 

job.” 

Continuing to chart Jeske’s progress in March, Dr. Sturm 

noted that Jeske “reports only 20% overall improvement. 

However, as we start discussing it further, it sounds to me like 

she can do her entire regular job. She just avoids awkward 

lifting.” He observed that Jeske “seems very happy with her 

progress,” and he concluded that Jeske’s symptoms were “improving.” He added that although he believes Jeske has pain 

that has been limiting, he was “not able to demonstrate a conclusive objective pathology to explain the persistence of her 

symptoms” and “she is looking a lot better these days.” 

In the next month, April, Dr. Sturm discharged Jeske from 

treatment. While he recommended that she refrain from 

working more than eight hours a day, he concluded that she 

otherwise had no restrictions. He observed that Jeske had recently “had to work a 55 hour week, which amounted to 10 

hours a day plus a 6 hour shift on Saturdays. This just did not 

work out for her. The constant up and down motions, continuous walking, standing bothered her back.” He continued: 

I indicated that perhaps her body is just giving her the message that it is time to cut back on her hours. She has an active 

family life at home, 4 boys as I recall that can be difficult to 

keep up with. Maybe she just needs to cut back her work 

hours to something more reasonable. I will give a suggestion that it would be prudent to limit her work hours to 8 

per day to minimize her symptoms. Otherwise, she has no 

restrictions.

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22 No. 19-1870 

Finally, Dr. Sturm responded to Jeske’s question about 

further improvement. His answer is the statement that Jeske 

contends is “patently” an opinion speaking to her RFC: 

[S]he is asking if I think she will ever really improve. I think 

she will. Perhaps in 6 or 8 months she will get back to baseline, particularly if she can cut back her long work weeks or 

maybe she needs to reduce her work commitment to say 30 

hours a week, try going part-time to see if this helps her 

back. Maybe sometime later in life she can go back to 40 

hours. I am not sure if these are options for her, however.

Contrary to Jeske’s assertion, this statement about cutting 

back her hours to “get back to baseline” was not Dr. Sturm’s 

opinion about Jeske’s ability to work full time in any job. In 

the same report, Dr. Sturm opined that Jeske could indeed 

work full time: eight-hour days with no other restrictions. His 

comments about cutting back hours referred to Jeske’s overtime work schedule, the strenuous demands of her work at 

the cemetery, and Jeske’s hope to improve beyond her current 

condition, which—in Dr. Sturm’s view—allowed her to work 

eight-hour days at the job she had then. 

Dr. Sturm’s opinion and progress notes stand in stark contrast to the situation in Roddy, 705 F.3d at 636. In that case, the 

claimant’s treating doctor had opined that the claimant could 

work at most six hours a day, five days a week; could not handle a job full time; and eventually would not be able to remain 

in the workforce at all. Id. Instead of adopting this treating 

doctor’s view, the ALJ adopted the conflicting view of another 

doctor, who had seen the claimant only once and had not discussed the objective medical evidence of the claimant’s degenerative condition. Id. at 637. The ALJ did not explain why 

the treating doctor’s opinion should be set aside, leaving the 

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No. 19-1870 23 

decision without “an accurate and logical bridge” from the 

evidence to the conclusion that the claimant could work full 

time. Id. at 636–37 (quoting Craft, 539 F.3d at 673). 

Here, however, Dr. Sturm saw Jeske’s condition as improving, and he consistently opined—from January through 

April—that she could work a full-time schedule of eight-hour 

days. So, the ALJ’s conclusion that Jeske could work a fulltime job did not oppose the opinion of Jeske’s treating physician. Quite the contrary, the ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. 

Sturm’s January 2013 report that Jeske could work up to eight 

hours per day and lift, carry, push, and pull up to 40 pounds. 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not need to address Dr. Sturm’s 

comment about perhaps reducing Jeske’s hours for more improvement. 

And so, Jeske’s third argument meets the same end as her 

first two. 

D. Function-by-Function Assessment of Residual Functional 

Capacity

Fourth, Jeske argues that the ALJ failed to include a function-by-function assessment of her RFC. She relies on Social 

Security Ruling 96-8p, which binds all components of the Social Security Administration. See 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1); Nelson v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 2000). 

The Ruling emphasizes that the ALJ must identify an individual’s functional limitations before expressing the RFC in 

terms of exertional levels (i.e., sedentary, light, medium, 

heavy, and very heavy). SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34474, 34475 

(July 2, 1996). Otherwise, the Ruling explains, the adjudicator 

could “overlook[] some of an individual’s limitations or restrictions.” Id. at 34476. It goes on to say that the adjudicator’s 

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assessment must address the claimant’s exertional and nonexertional capacities, id. at 34477, and that exertional capacity 

“defines the individual’s remaining abilities to perform each 

of seven strength demands: [s]itting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling.” Id. The Ruling instructs 

that each function must be considered separately. Id. Jeske argues that this requirement imposes a rigid rule upon the ALJ 

to write about each of the seven strength-demand functions, 

which the ALJ here did not do. 

Jeske is right that the ALJ did not organize his discussion 

to include a section addressing each of the seven strength 

functions, one by one. We join our sister courts, however, in 

concluding that a decision lacking a seven-part function-byfunction written account of the claimant’s exertional capacity 

does not necessarily require remand. See, e.g., Mascio v. Colvin, 

780 F.3d 632, 635–36 (4th Cir. 2015); Hendron v. Colvin, 767 F.3d 

951, 956–57 (10th Cir. 2014); Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 

177 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 

1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 

567–68 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Our role is to determine whether the ALJ applied the right 

standards and produced a decision supported by substantial 

evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869. The 

ALJ’s explanation must enable us to meaningfully carry out 

that role. Cf. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636–37. But if we can tell that 

the ALJ considered the claimant’s ability to perform all seven 

functions, we need not remand to have the ALJ better articulate its analysis on the claimant’s exertional capacity. Of 

course, if the ALJ does not articulate findings on a function, 

the risk is greater that we will conclude the ALJ failed to consider it. Yet, the lack of an explicit finding does not necessarily 

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No. 19-1870 25 

prevent us from concluding that the ALJ appropriately considered a function. 

For example, under certain circumstances, we may determine that the ALJ implicitly found a claimant not limited in 

performing a function. Cf. Depover, 349 F.3d at 567–68. This is 

in part because an ALJ must find no limitation in a function if 

the claimant has not alleged such a limitation and the record 

lacks information indicating one exists. SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. 

Reg. at 34475. When those conditions are met, we may conclude that the ALJ found no limitation in that function, without the ALJ stating so explicitly. 

Similarly, if the claimant alleged a functional limitation, 

the ALJ validly found that allegation not credible, and the evidence does not otherwise indicate a limitation in that function, we may conclude that the ALJ considered the function 

and found no limitation in it, even if the ALJ did not revisit 

the topic to put that finding into so many words. Cf. Hendron, 

767 F.3d at 957. 

Another way we can tell the ALJ considered a function is 

by looking at how the ALJ analyzed the evidence and discussed the claimant’s limitations. If the ALJ discussed evidence on a certain function, that discussion may lead us to 

find the ALJ considered the claimant’s ability to perform it. 

Cf. Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 178. The same is true if the ALJ 

acknowledges a specific functional restriction when discussing the claimant’s exertional level. See id.

In the end, so long as the ALJ’s discussion shows that the 

ALJ considered all strength-demand functional limitations in 

arriving at a conclusion supported by substantial evidence, 

we need not remand for clearer explanation. Cf. Depover, 349 

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F.3d at 568. To be sure, remand may be appropriate when—

despite evidence of a functional limitation—the ALJ fails to 

assess a claimant’s ability to perform that function. Cf. Mascio, 

780 F.3d at 636; Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177–78. But Jeske has not 

shown that to be the case here. 

Instead, the ALJ’s discussion, viewed alongside the whole 

record, reflects that the ALJ adequately considered Jeske’s exertional capacity, including her ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, 

carry, push, and pull.10 The ALJ accepted Jeske’s reported sitting and standing limitations, and he observed multiple records documenting her normal gait and easy ambulation. The 

ALJ also acknowledged that Jeske exhibited moderate difficulty squatting and mild trouble tandem walking during the 

consultative exam, and he explicitly gave significant weight 

to Dr. Sturm’s opinion that Jeske could lift, carry, push, and 

pull up to 40 pounds but should avoid extensive stooping, 

bending, stretching or twisting. 

Because the ALJ overtly inspected this evidence on Jeske’s 

capacity to perform the seven strength functions, we are convinced that the ALJ considered those functions when determining that Jeske could perform light work with specific restrictions. The evidence also supports this conclusion, and 

Jeske has not presented an argument otherwise. So, we do not 

see a reason to remand for a clearer articulation of Jeske’s 

functional limitations. 

10 Jeske does not contend that the ALJ failed to properly assess her nonexertional physical capacities. 

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No. 19-1870 27 

E. Limitations in Concentration, Persistence, and Pace 

Jeske’s last argument is that the ALJ failed to account for 

Jeske’s limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. 

Jeske did not raise this contention before the district court, nor 

does she now argue that it went unpreserved because of inadvertence, rather than intentional relinquishment. She 

simply argues that we should conduct initial review of this 

alleged error because we review de novo the district court’s 

decision upholding the agency’s conclusion. 

De novo review does not prevent us from finding an argument waived. Cf., e.g., Hassebrock v. Bernhoft, 815 F.3d 334, 341–

42 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding argument waived when reviewing 

summary judgment de novo). And our review in cases over 

agency decisions awarding or denying social security benefits 

is just one tier in a review sequence. See Kendrick v. Shalala, 998 

F.2d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 1993). In this tiered structure, arguments not presented to the Appeals Council are not waived, 

but arguments omitted before the district court are. See 

Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Jeske asks us to depart from this structure by stepping 

ahead of the district court in evaluating her fifth claim. But 

she has not told us why we should do so, apart from suggesting that we can and so we should. That is not enough to overcome waiver here. 

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the judgment upholding the agency’s decision that Jeske was not disabled from January 1, 2014 through 

September 20, 2017. 

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