Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01277/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01277-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANELLE URATA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv1277 WQH(WMC)

ORDER

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

ALAMO FINANCING, LP, a Delaware

limited partnership; DOES 1-50,

Inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss Removal and Substitution filed

by Plaintiff Janelle Urata (ECF No. 4) and the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed

by the United States of America (ECF No. 9).

BACKGROUND

On July 11, 2011, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint against Ileana

Munoz (“Munoz”) and Alamo Financing, LP in the Superior Court of California for the

County of San Diego. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff asserted claims of motor vehicle and general

negligence; Plaintiff alleged that on June 24, 2009, Munoz was driving a vehicle rented from

Alamo when she “violated California Vehicle Code section 21658(a) for making an unsafe

movement (lane change) colliding with the Plaintiff’s vehicle causing it to veer off of the

roadway and strike an ‘Exit’ sign post causing major property damage and severe personal

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injuries to Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 6). 

On March 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the United States Navy

(“Navy”), which stated:

Janelle Urata was driving a vehicle on Interstate I-5 South and was struck on the

left rear side by a vehicle driven by Ileana Munoz travelling [sic] at

approximately 40 mph who swerved into Ms. Urata’s vehicle without signalling

[sic]. The collision pushed Ms. Urata’s vehicle off the road into a freeway sign

and down an embankment. Ms. Munoz admitted fault for the collision. Ms.

Munoz was in civilian clothing and driving an Alamo rental car. More than two

years after the collision, Ms. Urata learned that Ms. Munoz had visited San

Diego to perform training with the U.S. Navy and was on active duty at the time

of the subject incident.

(ECF No. 9-2 at 16-17).

On May 25, 2012, the United States removed the matter to this Court and filed a

Certification of Scope of Employment for Defendant Munoz. (ECF No. 1-3). In the

Certification, the United States Attorney, Laura E. Duffy, stated: 

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2679 and pursuant to the

authority vested in the United States Attorney to make

scope-of-employment certifications under 28 C.F.R. § 15.3, as

expressly redelegated to me by the United States Attorney, I hereby

certify that I have read the complaint in the above-entitled action, as

well as other documentation provided by the Department of the Navy. 

On the basis of the information now available, I hereby find and certify

that Ileana Munoz, an individually named Defendant, was acting within

the scope of her employment as a member of the armed forces of the

United States with respect to the incidents alleged in Plaintiff’s

complaint. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), the tort

claims alleged in the complaint against Ileana Munoz are deemed to

have been brought against the United States under the provisions of the

Federal Tort Claims Act.

Id. at 1. 

On June 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss Removal and Substitution. 

Plaintiff requested an opportunity to depose Munoz and/or her commanding officer regarding

the issue of whether Munoz was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the

incident. (ECF No. 4).

On June 26, 2012, the United States filed a Reply to the Motion to Dismiss Removal

and Substitution filed by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 5). The United States submitted a copy of

Munoz’s travel orders, dated June 18, 2009, which stated that her period of duty would be: “22

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JUN 2009 TO 26 JUN 2009 FOR 5 DAYS.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 2). Munoz’s travel orders

stated:

REPORT FOR ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING AOT SPECIAL TO THE

COMMANDING OFFICER, NOMI DET NSTI ASTC MIRAMAR, PO BOX

452059, SAN DIEGO, CA 921452059 NO LATER THAN 0700 ON 22 JUN

2009 FOR DUTY WITH SWIM/PHYS REFRESHER COURSE, UIC: 39683.

IF THESE ORDERS START IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN INACTIVE DUTY

ORDER (IDTT), YOU ARE ADVISED THAT THESE ORDERS MUST

START FROM YOUR HOME ADDRESS (PMA) . FAILURE TO START

FROM HOME MAY RESULT IN PAY AND/OR ENTITLEMENT ISSUES

WHEN LIQUIDATING YOUR ORDERS....

TRAVEL VIA COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION UTILIZING

CENTRALLY BILLED ACCOUNTS (CBA) IS DIRECTED. THE

COMMERCIAL TRAVEL OFFICE (CTO) WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH

ACTUAL TICKETS OR COORDINATE ELECTRONIC TICKETING AS

REQUIRED. IF YOU DO NOT EXECUTE THESE ORDERS, RETURN THE

ORDERS AND TICKET TO THE ISSUING COMMAND IN PERSON OR BY

CERTIFIED MAIL. REIMBURSEMENT FOR YOU PURCHASING YOUR

OWN TICKET(S) IS NOT AUTHORIZED. (JFTR U3002, U3125 AND

U3140).

RENTAL VEHICLE IS AUTHORIZED (JFTR U3415) AT SAN DIEGO, CA

(22 JUN 2009 THRU 26 JUN 2009) COMPACT VEHICLE CLASS. 

QUARTERS ARE AVAILABLE AT SAN DIEGO, CA (22 JUN 2009 THRU

26 JUN 2009). IF QUARTERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE CONTACT THE

APPROPRIATE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE FOR A WRITTEN

STATEMENT....

Id. at 2-3. The United States submitted a copy of Munoz’s rental vehicle agreement with

Alamo, which stated that the vehicle was rented by Munoz on June 24, 2009 at 12:02 A.M. at

the San Diego Airport; the agreement lists June 26, 2009 at 2:30 P.M. as the scheduled return

date. Id. at 6. The United States submitted a training qualification letter sent to Munoz by the

Department of the Navy which stated: “In accordance with reference (a), PO2 ILEANA

MUNOZ has received AIRCREW REFRESHER NASTP TRAINING FOR CLASS 4

AIRCRAFT on 25 Jun 2009 at Aviation Survival Training Center MIRAMAR.... PO2

ILEANA MUNOZ received a grade of Q. All required modules were completed.” Id. at 11. 

The United States submitted a “traffic collision report,” which states that the collision between

Munoz and Plaintiff occurred on June 24, 2009 at 12:30 A.M. on “I-5 S/B ... .1 MILE(S)

NORTH OF SR-163” in San Diego. Id. at 5-1 at 9.

On July 12, 2012, the Court issued an Order which stated: “Plaintiff may depose Munoz

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and/or her commanding officer regarding the issue of whether Munoz was acting within the

scope of her employment at the time of the incident. The parties are referred to the Magistrate

Judge for any discovery disputes.” (ECF No. 7 at 3). The Court permitted supplemental

briefing regarding the Certification of Scope of Employment for Defendant Munoz, stating:

“Plaintiff may file a supplemental brief no later than 60 days from the date of this order.

Defendants may file a supplemental reply no later than 75 days from the date of this order.” 

Id. 

On July 17, 2012, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. 

(ECF No. 9). On August 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Response. (ECF No. 11). On August 13,

2012, the United States filed a Reply. (ECF No. 12).

On September 10, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a Supplemental Response to the Reply to

the Motion to Dismiss Removal and Substitution filed by the United States. (ECF No. 13). 

Plaintiff submitted the written deposition of Munoz, containing questions and written

responses, which stated in part:

...

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 2

Were YOU paid for YOUR travel time from Hawaii to San Diego to participate

in the COURSE?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 2

Yes, I was paid continuously from the time I boarded my flight from Hawaii

until the time I landed back in Hawaii and was deactivated. I also received base

pay and per diem for this time.

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 3

Where did the COURSE take place?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 3

MCAS Miramar, San Diego, California

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 4

Were YOU given any free time while in San Diego before or after the

COURSE? If yes, what did YOU do on YOUR free time?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 4

I had no free time before the course. I had no free time after the course....

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 7

Who booked YOUR plane flight and travel plans from Hawaii to San Diego for

the COURSE?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 7

The command Order Writer for VF-15 booked my flight, vehicle, and lodging. 

When the Order Writer handed me my itinerary, I requested an earlier departing

flight, and was told there were no earlier flights I could be booked on.

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WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 8

What instructions were given to you by any military personnel regarding the trip

to and from the COURSE?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 8

The Order Writer handed me a set of orders instructing me to report to the

course at MCAS Miramar and an itinerary with air, vehicle, and lodging

reservations. I had no choice in flights or vehicle rental....

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 9

Did any military personal acting on behalf of the U.S. government instruct YOU

on which route to take or give you directions to MCAS Miramar?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 9

My orders told me only that I was to report at MCAS Miramar for the course. 

For my convenience, a short set of written directions were also given to me. 

These were not instructions or orders....

(ECF No. 13-1 at 3-5). Plaintiff submitted a written deposition of Munoz’s commanding

officer, Hobie Anderson, containing questions and written responses, which stated in part:

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 1

Who booked DEFENDANT’s plane flight and travel plans to San Diego for the

COURSE prior to SUBJECT INCIDENT?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 1

I do not know. At that time, the US Navy made travel plans using DTS

(Defense Travel System). Ms. Munoz would most likely have booked her travel

by inputting her travel on the DTS website, and selecting travel at the

government rate. After she made her DTS reservations, at least two supervisors,

the command travel clerk and then the command operations officer, would have

reviewed it for final approval....

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 3

Was DEFENDANT instructed to use Alamo Rental Agency for a rental car?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 3

Not that I am aware of. Ms. Munoz was instructed to have a rental vehicle, if

she had used a taxi or shuttle service for the duration of her training it would

have cost the command significantly more, and she would not have been

reimbursed for such bills. She most likely made her rental vehicle reservation

through the DTS system, which would have required her to book a rental vehicle

at a government contract rate.

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 4

Was DEFENDANT given any free time while in San Diego before or after the

COURSE?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 4

No. Reservists were not given any free time before or after the course. If Ms.

Munoz had wanted to take leave, she would have needed to submit a request chit

through the command, and I do not believe she made any requests for personal

time. Ms. Munoz was ordered to go to MCAS Miramar, fully participate in the

course, and then report back to Hawaii. Her midnight flight does not indicate

that she had free or personal time, and the flight does not surprise me. Ms.

Munoz likely had obligations to complete before departing Hawaii, and also had

to cross several time zones in traveling from Hawaii to arrive in California.

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 5

Did DEFENDANT’s normal military duties include driving a motor vehicle?

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ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 5

Yes. Often, the enlisted servicemembers at our command, including Ms. Munoz,

had duty driver responsibilities. And on training events such as this, it was also

part of her military duties to rent a vehicle, transport herself to and from class,

and then return to the command....

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 8

What were DEFENDANT’s normal working hours while on active duty?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 8

As an active duty servicemember, Ms. Munoz’s working hours ran twenty four

hours a day. She had an obligation to comply with requests and orders to her at

any given hour. More specifically, as a Navy air crewman, she had nothing

similar to civilian ‘normal working hours.’ Air crewman work at all hours, and

are often on missions that go through the night.

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 9

Did the U.S. government and/or the military derive any benefit from

DEFENDANT while driving the vehicle on June 24, 2012 at the time of

SUBJECT INCIDENT?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 9

Yes. The Navy’s benefit was in getting a qualified air crewman. This course

was a requirement for air crewmen every four years, and could not be waived. 

 If Ms. Munoz hadn’t been able to travel to the training, complete it, and return,

then she would have been useless to the Navy. Further, the command did not

have any extra members, and would have been greatly burdened if she had

become unqualified to do her job.

WRITTEN DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 10

To what extent does the U.S. government/military routinely reimburse the costs

of travel for military personal who train outside of their stationed based?

ANSWER TO DEPOSITION QUESTION NO. 10

The military covers all permitted expenses for such travel. This includes travel,

lodging, and per diem....

(ECF No. 13-1 at 8-10). On September 25, 2012, the United States filed a Supplemental

Reply. (ECF No. 14).

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Dismiss Removal and Substitution filed by Plaintiff

A. Applicable Standard

“The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States and

provides a cause of action against the government for persons injured as a result of ‘the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within

the scope of his office or employment, under the circumstances where the United States, if a

private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where

the act or omission occurred.’” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d 1158, 1163

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(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). A district court may review the certification

of the United States that a federal employee was acting within the scope of his employment. 

Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 436-37 (1995); see also Osborn v. Haley,

549 U.S. 225, 247 (2007) (“[A] complaint’s charge of conduct outside the scope of

employment, when contested, warrants immediate judicial investigation. Were it otherwise,

a federal employee would be stripped of suit immunity not by what the court finds, but by what

the complaint alleges.”) (citation omitted). “Certification by the Attorney General is prima

facie evidence that a federal employee was acting in the scope of [his] employment at the time

of the incident and is conclusive unless challenged.” Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797,

800 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1993)). “The party seeking

review bears the burden of presenting evidence and disproving the Attorney General’s

certification by a preponderance of the evidence.” Billings, 57 F.3d at 800.

B. Contentions of the Parties

Plaintiff asserts that the United States was improperly substituted as a defendant and

that this action must be remanded to California Superior Court, County of San Diego. 

Plaintiff contends that “there is sufficient evidence that Ms. Munoz was not acting within the

scope of her employment” (ECF No. 13 at 1) because Munoz was “essentially off the clock

when the incident occurred.” (ECF No. 4 at 5). Plaintiff asserts that Munoz “was not on active

duty until she reported to the commanding officer at MCAS.” (ECF No. 13 at 3).

The United States contends that Munoz was acting within the scope of her employment,

pursuant to a travel order. (ECF No. 5 at 3). The United States asserts that Munoz was

“traveling on direct orders of [her] employer and for the sole purpose of serving [her]

employer’s business; that [she] was traveling on the most direct route between two of [her]

employer’s work locations; that [she] was using an expressly authorized means of

transportation; that [she] was driving during regular working hours; and that [she] was being

paid [her] regular salary plus per diem, plus costs of transportation.” Id. at 3-4. 

C. Discussion

“Whether a member of the armed services of the United States was acting within the

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scope of his employment at the time of an alleged negligent or wrongful act depends on

whether the individual was ‘acting in line of duty.’” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 408 F.3d at

1163 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671). In order to determine whether a servicemember was “acting

in the line of duty,” a district court reviews the scope of employment determination under the

principles of respondeat superior of the state in which the tort allegedly occurred. McLachlan

v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Lutz v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 944 F.2d

1477, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The scope of employment inquiry, including, in the military

context, whether the employee was ‘acting in line of duty,’ is defined by the applicable state

law of respondeat superior.”). 

“Under California’s law of respondeat superior, employers are liable for acts of their

employees occurring within the scope of their employment.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 408

F.3d at 1163. The California Supreme Court has held that an employee is acting within the

scope of employment:

... when in the context of the particular enterprise an employee's conduct is not

so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting

from it among other costs of the employer's business. In other words, where the

question is one of vicarious liability, the inquiry should be whether the risk was

one that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the

enterprise undertaken by the employer.

Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal.4th 992, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 478, 906 P.2d

440, 448 (1995). “A related approach is to ask whether the tort was, in a general way,

foreseeable from the employee's duties.” Jeewarat v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 177 Cal. App.

4th 427, 435 (2009) (citation omitted); see also Xue Lu v. Powell, 621 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir.

2010) (“A nexus must exist between the employment and the tort if the employer is fairly to

be held liable.”). However, an employer will not be held liable for an employee's conduct “if

the employee substantially deviates from the employment duties for personal purposes.” 

Farmers Ins. Group, 906 P.2d 440, 448. 

“An offshoot of the doctrine of respondeat superior is the so-called ‘going and coming

rule.’ Under this rule, an employee is not regarded as acting within the scope of employment

while going to or coming from the workplace.” Baptist v. Robinson, 143 Cal. App. 4th 151,

162 (2006). An exception to the “going and coming rule” is known as the “special errand” or

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“special mission” rule. ” Jeewarat, 177 Cal. App.at 427. The special errand rule “holds an

employer vicariously liable for accidents occurring while an employee is engaged in a special

errand for the employer, including the employee’s commute to or from the special errand.” 

Id.; see also LeElder v. Rice, 21 Cal.App.4th 1604, 1607 (1994) (under the “special errand”

rule, “it is necessary to determine the main purpose of injury-producing activity: If it was the

pursuit of the employee's personal ends, the employer is not liable.”); Purcell v. United States,

130 F.Supp. 882 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (finding that a servicemember was acting within the scope

of his employment when he crashed his vehicle while driving enroute to a school for temporary

training pursuant to his orders); but see also Chapin v. United States, 258 F.2d 465, 468 (1958)

(holding that a servicemember “traveling between permanent duty stations is [traveling]

‘merely during employment’ and not within the scope of employment.”).

In this case, the parties do not dispute that the Navy ordered Munoz, a Navy reservist,

to report to the Marine Corps Air Station at Miramar for a training exercise that was to take

place between June 22, 2009 and June 26, 2009. In her written deposition, Munoz stated that

she was paid continuously from the time she boarded her flight to San Diego until she returned

to Hawaii and that the Navy booked and reimbursed the costs of her rental vehicle and hotel

room in San Diego. (ECF No. 13-1 at 3-5). Munoz’s commanding officer, Hobie Anderson,

stated in a written deposition that “Ms. Munoz’s working hours ran twenty four hours a day”

and that “it was ... part of her military duties to rent a vehicle [and] transport herself to and

from class....” Id. at 8-10. Munoz’s orders stated that her “period of duty” was to be June 22,

2009 through June 26, 2009 and that “[u]pon completion of subject duty, with the exception

of back to back orders, you will return to the address indicated after your name and upon

arrival you will stand released from subject duty.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 2). 

At the time of the accident, Munoz was acting pursuant to specific Navy orders that

directed her to travel from her home to a temporary duty station; there is no evidence in the

record that Munoz substantially deviated from her Navy duties for personal purposes. Based

upon these facts, the Court finds that Munoz’s actions fall under the special errand exception

to the going and coming rule. See Felix v. Asai, 192 Cal.App.3d 926, 931 (1987) (“An

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employee ‘coming from his home or returning to it on a special errand either as part of his

regular duties or at a specific order or request of his employer ... is considered to be in the

scope of his employment from the time that he starts on the errand until he has returned or until

he deviates therefrom for personal reasons.’”). 

The Court concludes that the risk of an accident under the facts of this case was “typical

of or broadly incidental to the enterprise undertaken” by the Navy and that Munoz was acting

“in the line of duty,” i.e. within the scope of her employment, when the accident occurred. 

Farmers Ins. Group, 11 Cal.4th at 992; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 408 F.3d at 1163. Plaintiff

has failed to meet her burden “of presenting evidence and disproving the Attorney General’s

certification by a preponderance of the evidence.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 408 F.3d at 1163;

see also Jeewarat, 177 Cal. App. 4th at 434 (“Whether an employee was acting within the

course and scope of his employment is generally a question of fact, but if the facts are

undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible, the question is one of law.”). The

United States of America shall remain substituted as a defendant in place of Defendant Ileana

Munoz. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).

II. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 

A. Applicable Standard

“A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary

affirmatively appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,

873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides: “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In determining the presence or absence of

federal jurisdiction, the court applies the “‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that

federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the

plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831,

838 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). When

assessing subject matter jurisdiction, the court assumes the truth of all allegations in the

complaint. See Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 684 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008). Subject

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matter jurisdiction must exist at the time the action is commenced and must be disclosed in the

complaint. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376,

1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “If jurisdiction is lacking at the outset, the district court has ‘no power

to do anything with the case except dismiss.’” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 

B. Contentions of the Parties

The United States contends that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations

and that this Court lacks jurisdiction. The United States asserts that Plaintiff’s claim accrued

at the time of the collision on June 24, 2009, over two years before Plaintiff filed her March

7, 2012 administrative claim. Id. Plaintiff contends that the Civil Servicemembers Relief Act

(“SCRA”) “supercedes” 28 U.S.C. section 2401(b) and “exclud[es] military service from the

computation of the statute of limitations.” (ECF No. 11 at 3). Plaintiff asserts that her

administrative claim was timely if Munoz’s active service is excluded from the statute of

limitations computation. Id. at 5. The United States contends that the SCRA does not apply

on the grounds that the United States has replaced Munoz as the only Defendant in this case

and “Plaintiff has no ‘action ... against any person in military service.’” (ECF No. 12 at 8). 

C. Discussion

Generally, the United States and its agencies may not be sued in federal court unless

Congress has waived sovereign immunity. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990)

(“[T]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued ... and

the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the

suit” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) represents

a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States, and, as such, must be strictly

construed. U. S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979); see also Marley v. United States, 567 F.3d

1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2009). In order to bring a tort claim against the United States under the

FTCA, potential plaintiffs must file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal

agency. 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). “A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred

unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such

claim accrues....” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); see also Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 111 (explaining that the

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FTCA “bars any tort claim against the United States unless it is presented in writing to the

appropriate federal agency ‘within two years after such claim accrues.’”). 

1. Accrual of Plaintiff’s FTCA Claim

A claim accrues under 28 U.S.C. section 2401(b) when “the plaintiff knows both the

existence and the cause of his injury....” Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 111. In this case, the damage

to Plaintiff’s vehicle was immediately apparent after the accident. The United States submitted

a “traffic collision report” which states that Munoz was the driver of the vehicle that collided

with Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s claim accrued on June 24, 2009, when her alleged injury occurred. 

See Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a tort claim

accrues when plaintiff knows or had reason to know of his injury and that “ignorance of the

involvement of government employees is irrelevant to accrual of a federal tort claim.”).

2. Civil Servicemember Relief Act 

The SCRA provides:

The period of a servicemember's military service may not be included in

computing any period limited by law, regulation, or order for the bringing of any

action or proceeding in a court, or in any board, bureau, commission,

department, or other agency of a State (or political subdivision of a State) or the

United States by or against the servicemember or the servicemember's heirs,

executors, administrators, or assigns.

50 App. USCA § 526.

In this case, the United States has replaced Munoz as the sole defendant and Plaintiff’s

exclusive remedy is against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (explaining that the

remedy against the United States under the FTCA “is exclusive of any other civil action or

proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee

whose act or omission gave rise to the claim”); see also Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093,

1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.”);

Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451, 1452 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1983). The Court concludes that

the SCRA does not toll Plaintiff’s claim because neither Plaintiff nor the United States

constitute a “servicemember or ... [that] servicemember's heirs, executors, administrators, or

assigns.” 50 App. USCA § 526; see also Miller v. United States, 803 F. Supp. 1120. 1130

(E.D. Va. 1992) (“[T]he military personnel who were allegedly negligent have complete

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immunity from suit, thus there is no military official who is primarily liable for the damages

claimed by the [plaintiffs]. The only defendant the [plaintiffs] can sue for the alleged

negligence is the United States, a party to which the underlying policies of the []SCRA have

no application. The Court holds that the []SCRA's tolling provisions do not apply to the time

limitations period for [plaintiff]'s claims.”).

3. Timing of Plaintiff’s FTCA Claim

The two-year statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2401(b) expired on

June 24, 2011, over eight months before Plaintiff filed her March 7, 2012 administrative claim

with the Navy. (ECF No. 9-2 at 16-17); 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).1

 The Court concludes that

Plaintiff’s FTCA claim is barred by the statute of limitations and the United States has not

waived its sovereign immunity. See Marley, 567 F.3d at 1038. The Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction and the motion to dismiss is granted. See Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499,

502 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the requirement to file an administrative claim before filing

an FTCA suit is jurisdictional).

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Removal and Substitution filed

by Plaintiff Janelle Urata (ECF No. 4) is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction filed by the United States (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED. The Clerk shall remand this

case to Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego to permit Plaintiff to pursue

her tort claim against the remaining defendant, Alamo Financing, LP.

DATED: December 13, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

1

Under 28 U.S.C. section 2679(d)(5), “an action that is removed to federal court

generally is considered timely if the administrative claim would have been timely had the

claim been filed on the date of commencement of the state action.” Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1055 n. 2 (9th Cir.2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5)). This action cannot

be saved by 28 U.S.C. section 2679(d)(5) because Plaintiff’s state court action was filed on

July 11, 2011, outside of the statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5). 

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