Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06329/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06329-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD WALKER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

FRESNO POLICE DEPARTMENT, )

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-04-6329 REC SMS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS,

AND DIRECTING THE CLERK OF

THE COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT

FOR DEFENDANTS. 

(Docs. 31 & 35) 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner confined in Centinela State

Prison who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an

action concerning alleged civil right violations pursuant to 42

U.S.C. section 1983. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment or, in the Alternative, Adjudication of Issues. Upon

due consideration of the arguments of the parties and the record

herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion.

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I. Factual Background

A. July 8, 2004

On July 8, 2004 (“July 8”), Defendant Officer Conrado Martin

was on uniformed patrol with Officer Preis, who is not a

defendant in this action. At around midnight, in response to a

dispatch regarding a domestic disturbance, they proceeded to 335

W. Hawes Avenue (the “Residence”) in Fresno. When they arrived,

the officers heard yelling inside. A male voice inside asked

“who called the fucking police?” Martin Decl. ¶ 5.

Officer Martin drew his weapon and walked to the front of

the house, while Officer Preis went to the east side of the

house. Officer Martin opened the front door, shined his

flashlight into the house, and observed Ms. Canada and Plaintiff

sitting next to each other. Plaintiff appeared to Officer Martin

to have a dazed look on his face and to be very angry. Martin

Decl. ¶ 5. Officer Martin “could tell an argument or some type

of disagreement was going on.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 1 at 125:9-11. 

Ms. Canada’s two children were present. Id. at 125:2-5.

Officer Martin entered the house and pointed his gun at

Plaintiff. At this time, Officer Martin could not see

Plaintiff’s right hand. Pl.’s Opp’n 3. Officer Martin told

Plaintiff at least two times to come toward him with his hands

showing. Martin Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff did not comply with

Officer Martin’s order. Instead, Plaintiff “began backing away.” 

Pl.’s Opp’n 3. Officer Martin followed Plaintiff as he backed

away toward the back bedroom of the house, continuing to demand

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that Plaintiff stop walking away. Martin Decl. ¶ 7.

At this point, Plaintiff turned his back to Officer Martin. 

Plaintiff claims that he was simply turning around, with his

hands out, to show Officer Martin that had no weapons. Pl.’s

Opp’n 3. Plaintiff does not claim, however, that Officer Martin

asked him to turn around. Officer Martin claims that Plaintiff

turned and ran away from him. Martin Decl. ¶ 7. 

After Plaintiff turned, Officer Martin drew his “M26

department issued less lethal taser” and discharged it in

Plaintiff’s direction. Id. at ¶ 8. Officer Martin thought that

the taser darts hit Plaintiff, who then pulled one out of his

back. Id. Plaintiff denies that the taser struck him. After

Officer Martin discharged the taser, Plaintiff fled to the den

area of the residence and slammed the door. Id. at ¶ 9. Officer

Martin exited the residence through the front door and called for

assistance.

B. July 9, 2004

On July 9, 2004 (“July 9”), at approximately 8:12 a.m.,

Defendant Officer Ron Dupras was dispatched to a domestic

disturbance at the Residence. When Officer Dupras arrived, he

entered the house. Defendant Officer Luis Galindo, who was also

dispatched to the address, arrived a couple minutes later and

entered the house.

Officer Dupras ordered Plaintiff to stand with his legs

spread apart and hands on the back of his head. Plaintiff

alleges that he complied with this instruction. Pl.’s Opp’n 4. 

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Officer Dupras then searched Plaintiff for weapons. Plaintiff

alleges that Officer Dupras then twisted Plaintiff’s right arm,

causing pain, which Plaintiff reported to the officer. Id. 

Officer Dupras then allegedly grabbed the back of Plaintiff’s

shirt and kicked Plaintiff’s knee, which caused pain and made

Plaintiff fall to the ground face-first. Id. Once Plaintiff was

on the ground, one of the officers placed his knee forcefully

into Plaintiff’s neck. Id. The other officer placed his knee

forcefully into Plaintiff’s back, causing injuries. Id. Later,

Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed in a police car. Id. 

Following his arrest, Plaintiff was immediately taken to

University Medical Center where Nurse Practitioner Elaine Thweatt

treated him. Plaintiff did not mention any pain when he was

booked, but complained of back pain three months after the

arrest.

On August 13, 2004, Plaintiff filed a personnel complaint

with the Fresno Police Department against Officers Dupras,

Galindo, and Martin. Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 11. He received no response

to the complaint. 

II. Procedural History

A. Criminal Case

On October 20, 2004, after a jury trial in Fresno County

Superior Court, Plaintiff was convicted of eight of the nine

counts against him, including several felony counts, for his

conduct on July 8 and July 9. Ratliff Decl. Ex. 2 at 1014:5-

1016:8; see People v. Harold Walker, Fresno County Superior Court

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California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) provides, in relevant 1

part, as follows:

Every person who willfully resists, delays, or

obstructs any public officer . . . in the

discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of

his or her office or employment, when no other

punishment is prescribed, shall be punished by

a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars

($ 1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail

not to exceed one year, or by both that fine

and imprisonment.

5

No. F04904506-3. Plaintiff was found guilty of, among other

things, violating California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) on 1

both July 8 and July 9. Ratliff Decl. Ex. 2 at 1014:23-1015:3,

1016:2-8. Plaintiff was acquitted only of Count Seven, criminal

threats in violation of California Penal Code section 422. Id.

at 1015:16-21. Plaintiff has sought habeas corpus relief under

28 U.S.C. section 2254, but none of the convictions have been

reversed, expunged, or declared invalid. See Walker v. Fresno

County Jail, 1:04-cv-006452-AWI-TAG. 

B. This Case

On September 29, 2004, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this

Court seeking damages for constitutional violations under 42

U.S.C. section 1983 (“Section 1983”). On December 27, 2005,

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with a

statement of undisputed facts and exhibits. On January 12, 2006,

Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion, a

response to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts, a

supporting declaration, and exhibits. On January 13, 2006,

Defendant filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the

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Alternative, Adjudication of Issues. Defendant submitted a

statement of undisputed facts, declarations, and exhibits in

support of its motion. On February 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed a

document entitled Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. It appears that this

document is both an Opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment

motion and a Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s

motion.

On March 2, 2006, the Court directed the parties to submit

supplemental briefing regarding Heck v. Humphrey (Heck), 512 U.S.

477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994).

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac.

Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)). 

Materiality is determined by the substantive law governing a

claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all inferences drawn

from it must be construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id. 

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The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is on

the moving party. The moving party satisfies this initial burden

by identifying the parts of the materials on file it believes

demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106

S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to

the nonmoving party to defeat summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809

F.2d at 630. Where a court decides cross motions for summary

judgment, neither party is entitled to summary judgment if a

genuine issue exists as to any material fact. United States v.

Fred A. Arnold, Inc., 573 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

The nonmoving party “may not rely on the mere allegations in

the pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment,” but must

set forth by affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party may not simply state

that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence at trial; it

must produce at least some “significant probative evidence

tending to support the complaint.” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank

v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S. Ct. 1575, 20 L. Ed.

2d 569 (1968)).

IV. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Malicious Prosecution

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegation that

Defendants prepared false police reports in connection with the

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July 8 and July 9 incidents should be evaluated as a claim for

malicious prosecution under Section 1983. Plaintiff does not

object to this characterization. “In order to prevail on a

§ 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must show

that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without

probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying

[him] equal protection or another specific constitutional

right.’” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th

Cir. 2004) (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180,

1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). A necessary element of malicious

prosecution is termination in favor of the accused. Heck, 512

U.S. at 484. The accused cannot prevail on a malicious

prosecution claim, even where the prosecution is unsuccessful, if

he does not meet his burden to show the absence of probable

cause. Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1189 (merely pointing out that

criminal charges were dismissed could not support a claim for

malicious prosecution without evidence that probable cause was

lacking).

At his criminal trial, Plaintiff was convicted of eight of

the nine counts against him. Ratliff Decl. Ex. 2 at 1014:5-

1016:8. Plaintiff was acquitted of Count Seven, criminal threats

in violation of California Penal Code section 422. Id. at

1015:16-21. Plaintiff has not brought forth any evidence that

meets his burden to show lack of probable cause regarding this

crime. Nor has Plaintiff pointed to any evidence that connects

statements or omissions in the police reports to the unsuccessful

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prosecution. Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendants on

this claim is GRANTED.

B. Failure to Summon Medical Care

The due process clause requires government officials to

secure medical care for persons injured in police custody. 

Maddox v. Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986)

(citing Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S. Ct.

2979, 77 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1983)). Police officers can fulfil this

constitutional requirement “by either promptly summoning the

necessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a

hospital.” Maddox, 792 F.2d at 1415 (citing Revere, 463 U.S. at

245).

On July 8, Plaintiff fled the scene after Officer Martin

discharged his taser. Because Plaintiff was not in custody on

July 8, Defendants did not have a duty to seek medical care for

him.

On July 9, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was immediately

taken to University Medical Center where Nurse Practitioner

Elaine Thweatt treated him. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4; Thweatt Decl. ¶ 2. 

Ms. Thweatt determined that he had no injuries and composed a

report showing her findings. Thweatt Decl. ¶ 3; Pl.’s Mot. Ex.

10.

Plaintiff contends that he should have been allowed to see a

doctor instead of just a nurse. He does not provide any evidence

that indicates that Ms. Thweatt’s care was inadequate or that her

diagnosis that he was uninjured was incorrect. Plaintiff submits

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documents from September and October 2005 that describe a back

injury he claims he suffered on July 9. Pl.’s Opp’n Exs. 7-10. 

The documents do not indicate that Ms. Thweatt improperly treated

Plaintiff or that a doctor could have treated Plaintiff more

effectively. In fact, one of the documents indicates that “[a]t

booking he did not mention any concerns of back pain and it was

not until 9/2/04 that he put medical request for c/o back pain,”

almost three months after his arrest. Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 7. In any

event, the Constitution only requires that an officer “tak[e] the

injured detainee to a hospital.” Maddox, 792 F.2d at 1415

(citing Revere, 463 U.S. at 245). It is undisputed that

Defendants took this step. Accordingly, summary judgment for

Defendants on this issue is GRANTED.

C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to relief on the

grounds that Defendants subjected him to “cruel and unusual

punishment.” Pl.’s Opp’n 7. Plaintiff does not specify what

conduct of Defendants gives rise to this claim.

It appears that Plaintiff is suggesting that the force the

officers used on him amounted to cruel and unusual punishment

under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment’s protections,

however, extend only to convicted prisoners. Gary H. v.

Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Johnson,

781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (pretrial detainee’s treatment

was not properly evaluated under the Eighth Amendment because he

had not been convicted). At the time of the conduct alleged in

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the Complaint, Plaintiff had not yet been convicted. Therefore,

Plaintiff does not have a claim for cruel and unusual punishment

under the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff does contend that Defendants denied him medical

care on July 9. A criminal defendant who has not been convicted

may recover for a due process violation based on principles

derived from the Eighth Amendment. Jones, 781 F.2d at 771. A

pretrial detainee may recover for inadequate medical treatment if

officials “are deliberately indifferent to [the detainee]’s

serious medical needs.” Id. All that the due process clause

requires of police officers is that they “tak[e] the injured

detainee to a hospital.” See Maddox, 792 F.2d at 1415 (citing

Revere, 463 U.S. at 245). Here, as discussed above, the officers

fulfilled this constitutional duty as a matter of law. 

Plaintiff does not provide any basis on which he can recover

for alleged cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, summary

judgement is GRANTED for Defendants on the cruel and unusual

punishment claim.

D. Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff seeks to recover under the Fourth Amendment based

on claims that officers inflicted excessive force on him, that

officers illegally entered the Residence, and that officers

arrested him without probable cause.

1. Officer Grijalva

Plaintiff has introduced no evidence that suggests that

Officer Grijalva had any role in any of the force Defendants

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allegedly directed at Plaintiff, the allegedly unlawful entries

of the Residence, or the allegedly improper arrests. 

Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Officer Grijalva on the

Fourth Amendment claims is GRANTED.

2. Chief of Police Jerry Dyer

Defendants contend that Defendant Chief of Police Jerry Dyer

(“Chief Dyer”) is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff

has presented no facts that indicate his act or omission caused a

violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Though supervisors may not be

vicariously liable for their subordinates’ constitutional

violations actions, they can be individually liable if they are

personally involved with the constitutional violation or if a

sufficient causal connection exists between their wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory liability is imposed against a

supervisory official in his individual

capacity for his “own culpable action or

inaction in the training, supervision, or

control of his subordinates”; for his

“‘acquiesce[nce] in the constitutional

deprivations of which [the] complaint is

made’”; or for conduct that showed a

“‘reckless or callous indifference to the

rights of others.’”

Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal

citations omitted). A supervisor may be liable for setting in

motion acts that cause others to inflict constitutional injury. 

Id. at 645 (citing Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th

Cir. 1978)). 

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Plaintiff has presented no evidence of any acts or omissions

of Chief Dyer that injured Plaintiff. There is no indication

that Chief Dyer was present when Plaintiff suffered any of his

injuries. Nor does Plaintiff present facts to show that Chief

Dyer failed to train officers who injured Plaintiff, that he

acquiesced in any of the injurious actions, or that he acted with

indifference to Plaintiff’s rights. 

Plaintiff does present evidence that he filed a personnel

complaint with the Fresno Police Department. Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 11. 

He claims he received no response to the complaint. In Larez,

the Ninth Circuit held that a police chief could be liable on an

acquiescence theory where he “condoned, ratified, and encouraged

the excessive use of force” by failing to discipline the officers

involved, failing to set up procedures to prevent such actions in

the future, and signing a letter refusing to sustain the victim’s

complaints. 946 F.2d at 646. Plaintiff has not presented any

such evidence of action or inaction of Chief Dyer. That

Plaintiff did not receive a response to his personnel complaint

is not sufficient to establish that Chief Dyer is responsible for

an unconstitutional omission. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims

against Chief Dyer fail as a matter of law. Summary judgement on

this claim in favor of Chief Dyer is GRANTED.

3. City of Fresno

 Municipalities may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional acts of their employees absent a “direct causal

link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged

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constitutional deprivation.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of

N.Y. (Monell), 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 611

(1978). In Monell, the Supreme Court held that, in the absence

of an official policy, a municipality could be liable under

Section 1983 where discriminatory practices are “so permanent and

well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force

of law.” 436 U.S. at 691.

Plaintiff has not brought forth any facts supporting a claim

that any action by the City of Fresno has deprived him of his

constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged, much less

provided evidence, that a custom or policy of the City of Fresno

caused or contributed to the excessive force or illegal entry or

arrest of which Plaintiff complains. Accordingly, summary

judgment is GRANTED in favor of the City of Fresno.

4. Excessive Force

The Fourth Amendment prohibition on “unreasonable . . .

seizures” protects individuals from excessive force in the

context of an arrest or seizure. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed.

2d 443 (1989). To determine whether the amount of force used in

a seizure or arrest was excessive, the Supreme Court has

prescribed the “objectively reasonable standard,” which requires

a careful balancing of “the nature and quality of the intrusion

on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396. 

The use of deadly force is reasonable only where 

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“1) it is necessary to prevent escape; 2) the officer has

probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant

threat of death or serious physical injury to him or to others;

and 3) if feasible, the officer has given some warning.” 

Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 11, 105 S. Ct. 1694,

85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985)). Where the force is not deadly, a court

evaluates the nature of the force in light of the totality of the

circumstances, “including: 1) the severity of the crime at

issue; 2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others; and 3) whether the suspect

actively resists arrest or attempts to evade arrest by flight.” 

Quintanilla, 84 F.3d at 357 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

Courts must apply the reasonableness standard objectively,

viewing the facts from the perspective of the officer at the time

of the incident. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.

a. Implications of Section 148 Conviction

In Heck, the Supreme Court placed additional requirements on

a prisoner making a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (“Section

1983”):

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,

or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

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California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) provides, in relevant 2

part, as follows:

Every person who willfully resists, delays, or

obstructs any public officer . . . in the

discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of

his or her office or employment, when no other

punishment is prescribed, shall be punished by

a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($

1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail

not to exceed one year, or by both that fine

and imprisonment.

16

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for

damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 

512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted). 

The jury in Plaintiff’s criminal trial found him guilty of

violating California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) on both July 8 2

and July 9. Ratliff Decl. Ex. 2 at 1014:23-1015:3, 1016:2-8. 

Though Plaintiff has sought habeas corpus relief, the conviction

has not been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid. 

A defendant does not violate Penal Code section 148

(“Section 148”) unless he directs his conduct at an officer who

is “in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or

her office or employment.” Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1). This

means that a defendant cannot be convicted under Section 148 “of

an offense against an officer engaged in the performance of

official duties unless the officer was acting lawfully at the

time.” People v. Simons, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1100, 1109 (1996)

(citing People v. Gonzalez 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1217 (1990)). “‘The

rule flows from the premise that because an officer has no duty

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to take illegal action, he or she is not engaged in “duties,” for

purposes of an offense defined in such terms, if the officer’s

conduct is unlawful.’” Id. (quoting Gonzalez 51 Cal. 3d at

1217). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that conviction under Section 148

can invalidate a Section 1983 claim for excessive force where

success “would necessarily imply or demonstrate that the

plaintiff’s earlier conviction was invalid.” Smith v. Hemet, 394

F.3d 689, 699 (9th Cir. 2005). The court held that an existing

conviction would bar an excessive force claim unless “the use of

excessive force occurred subsequent to the conduct on which his

conviction was based.” Id. at 698 (emphasis in original).

The Smith court was careful to distinguish a conviction by a

jury under Section 148 from a guilty plea under that section. 

Id. at 699 n. 5. Where the Section 1983 plaintiff pled guilty or

entered a nolo contendere plea to the Section 148 charge, the

factual basis for his conviction was not necessarily the entire

course of his conduct. Id. The plea could be based on certain

actions that occurred prior to the time when officers used

excessive force. Id. In such a case, the Heck rule would not

necessarily bar claims for excessive force occurring after the

conduct giving rise to the Section 148 plea. Id.

A conviction by a jury, on the other hand, necessarily

entails a broader finding regarding the officers’ conduct. Id. 

A jury that convicts a defendant of a single-act offense where

multiple acts could serve as a basis for the conviction does not

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determine which specific act or acts form the basis for the

conviction. Id. (citing People v. McIntyre, 115 Cal. App. 3d

899, 910-11 (1981)). In other words, each member of the jury

merely decides whether Plaintiff resisted arrest at some point on

a particular date. McIntyre, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 910. It

follows that “a jury’s verdict necessarily determines the

lawfulness of the officers’ actions throughout the whole course

of the defendant’s conduct, and any action alleging the use of

excessive force would ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction.’” Id. (quoting Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal.

App. 4th 1401, 1409, 1410 (2002)).

In Susag, the plaintiff in a Section 1983 action alleging

excessive force had been convicted by a jury for a violation of

Section 148 for conduct contemporaneous with the alleged

excessive force. 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1406. Because the record

in the criminal case did not reflect what acts formed the basis

for the conviction, the court concluded that “any claim of

excessive force based on discrete acts that occurred immediately

preceding [plaintiff]’s arrest is barred by the Supreme Court's

holding in [Heck] since a finding in his favor would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his conviction under Penal Code section

148, subdivision (a).” Id. at 1410. The court held that the

only claims that would not be barred by Heck would be “claims of

excessive force that took place after he was finally subdued and

placed in the patrol car.” Id. 

Here, the jury did not specify which of Plaintiff’s acts on

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July 8 and July 9 supported conviction under Section 148. This

means that a finding that an officer used excessive force at any

time before Plaintiff was “subdued and placed in the patrol car”

would invalidate the convictions. See id.

b. Officer Martin

Plaintiff does not allege that Officer Martin behaved

culpably in connection with the July 9 incident. Therefore the

only actions of Officer Martin at issue are those on July 8.

The jury that convicted Plaintiff under Section 148 for his

actions on July 8 could have based its verdict on any of the

several actions that allegedly violated that statute. See

McIntyre, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 910. The state introduced evidence

that Plaintiff disobeyed Officer Martin by backing away from the

officer, turning his back to him, and running into the den. Any

finding that an action by Officer Martin used excessive force on

July 8 would imply that a conviction based on any of those

actions was invalid. See Susag, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1410. For

instance, a finding that discharging the taser amounted to

excessive force would imply the invalidity of a conviction based

on Plaintiff’s subsequent act of running into the den area. This

is because the jury may have based its conviction under Section

148 on the act of running into the den area. Consequently,

claims based on any allegedly excessive force inflicted prior to

Plaintiff’s flight into the den area are barred by Heck. 

Plaintiff does not allege that Officer Martin inflicted excessive

force on him after he fled into the den area. Accordingly,

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summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Officer Martin on the

excessive force claim.

c. Officers Dupras and Galindo

Plaintiff does not allege that Officer Dupras or Officer

Galindo had any role in the events of July 8.

Plaintiff contends that, on July 9, Officers Dupras and

Galindo applied excessive force while effectuating their arrest

of Plaintiff. He contends that they twisted his arm, kicked his

leg from under him to knock him to the floor, and placed a knee

into his back and his neck while he was on the ground. 

When the jury convicted Plaintiff under Section 148, it did

not specify what action by Plaintiff supported the conviction or

when such an action occurred. The jury found that at some point,

Plaintiff “resist[ed], delay[ed], or obstruct[ed]” the officers

in the course of their lawful duties. Cal. Penal Code

§ 148(a)(1). The “jury’s verdict necessarily determine[d] the

lawfulness of the officers’ actions throughout the whole course

of the [Plaintiff]’s conduct.” McIntyre, 115 Cal. App. 3d at

910. This means that a finding that Officer Dupras or Officer

Galindo inflicted excessive force upon Plaintiff at any time

prior to his being subdued and placed in the patrol car would

necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction. See

Susag, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1410. Plaintiff does not allege that

Officers Dupras or Galindo engaged in conduct that would give

rise to a claim for excessive force after he was placed in the

patrol car. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Officer

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Dupras and Officer Galindo on the excessive force claim is

GRANTED.

5. Warrantless Entry and Seizure of Plaintiff

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against police

officers who violate the Fourth Amendment by making a warrantless

entry into or arrest within a person’s home without probable

cause and in the absence of exigent circumstances. LaLonde v.

County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed.

2d 639 (1980)). 

Heck will bar Plaintiff’s claims of illegal entry and

seizure under the Fourth Amendment if his success would

necessarily imply an invalidity of his Section 148 conviction. 

The Supreme Court in Heck gave the following example of a Section

1983 action that is barred by a prior conviction:

A state defendant is convicted of and

sentenced for the crime of resisting arrest,

defined as intentionally preventing a peace

officer from effecting a lawful arrest. . . .

He then brings a § 1983 action against the

arresting officer, seeking damages for

violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable seizures. In order to

prevail in this § 1983 action, he would have

to negate an element of the offense of which

he has been convicted. Regardless of the

state law concerning res judicata . . . the

§ 1983 action will not lie.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (internal citations omitted); see Cummings

v. Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 684 (6th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s Section

1983 excessive force claim was barred under Heck because the

officer’s excessive force would have been a defense to the charge

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of assaulting a police officer of which he was convicted, but his

claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated could

proceed because, under Ohio law, such a claim was not a defense

to the criminal charge). 

An element of Section 148 is a finding that the officer

against whom the conduct is directed “was acting lawfully at the

time.” Simons, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 1109 (citing Gonzalez 51 Cal.

3d 1179 at 1217). “This means, where the offense is committed

upon an officer effecting an arrest the arrest must have been

lawful.” People v. Wilkins, 14 Cal. App. 4th 761, 776 (1993). 

To enter a dwelling without consent and make a lawful warrantless

arrest, officers “must not only have had reasonable cause to

believe defendant had committed a felony but there must also have

been exigent circumstances justifying the officers’ immediate

entry without obtaining a warrant.” Id. at 777 (citing Welsh v.

Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732

(1984)).

a. Officer Martin

A finding that Officer Martin violated Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment rights by entering the Residence on July 8 would

necessarily imply that Plaintiff’s Section 148 conviction was

invalid. It was only after Officer Martin entered the house that

Plaintiff engaged in the conduct that supported the conviction. 

Plaintiff’s actions – backing away from the officer, turning away

from him, and running into the den – only had the potential to

“resis[t], dela[y], or obstruc[t]” Officer Martin after any

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alleged illegal entry took place. See Cal. Penal Code

§ 148(a)(1). A finding that Officer Martin’s entry violated the

Fourth Amendment would mean that he was not engaged in his duties

under the statute. This is because a law enforcement official

has no duty to take illegal action and thus “is not engaged in

‘duties,’” if his conduct is unlawful. Simons, 42 Cal. App. 4th

at 1109 (quoting Gonzalez 51 Cal. 3d at 1217). Plaintiff could

not interfere with Officer Martin’s duties, as defined in Section

148, unless the officer had acted lawfully in entering the

Residence. Plaintiff may not recover under Section 1983 for

Officer Martin’s alleged Fourth Amendment violations so long as

the Section 148 conviction stands. Therefore, summary judgment

is GRANTED in favor of Officer Martin on the Fourth Amendment

claim.

b. Officers Dupras and Galindo

Plaintiff seeks to recover on the basis that, on July 9,

“Officer Dupras conducted a warrantless and non-consensual entry

of the residence” and “did seize Plaintiff without probable

cause.” Pl.’s Opp’n 3, 7. Claims that the officers violated

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights are also barred if they

necessarily imply the conviction under Section 148 for the July 9

incident is invalid. 

Under California law, an unlawful entry renders an otherwise

lawful arrest unlawful, for purposes of Section 148. Implicit in

the jury’s finding that Plaintiff violated Section 148 is a

finding that officers “had reasonable cause to believe defendant

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had committed a felony” and that there existed “exigent

circumstances justifying the officers’ immediate entry without

obtaining a warrant.” Wilkins, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 777. 

Otherwise, the officers’ warrantless entry and arrest of

Plaintiff would have been unlawful. If that were the case,

Plaintiff could not be guilty of resisting, delaying, or

obstructing the officers in the course of their lawful duties. A

finding by this Court that Officer Dupras or Officer Galindo

illegally entered the Residence or illegally seized Plaintiff

would imply the invalidity of the Section 148 conviction. 

Accordingly, summary judgement in favor of Officers Dupras and

Galindo on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims is GRANTED.

V. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

For the reasons stated above, there is no genuine issue as

to a material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

2. Summary judgment for Defendants is GRANTED.

3. The Clerk of this Court shall enter judgment for Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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