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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of AppeaJs 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

AUG 3 0 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

CHARLES R. TANTILLO, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

JOSEPH L. FRIEDES; NATIONAL FUNDING ) 

CORPORATION; and JLF PROPERTIES I, LTD.,) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

GARDNER MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

No. 89-3328 

(D.C. No. 86-4019-R) 

( D. Kan.) 

Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-3328 Document: 010110041660 Date Filed: 08/30/1990 Page: 1 
Defendant Gardner Management Corporation (Gardner) appeals 

from a district court order denying its motion to vacate an 

adverse judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The judgment, 

awarding plaintiff $5,000 and $15,000 for compensatory and 

punitive damages, respectively, was entered on a jury verdict 

rendered at the conclusion of a trial in which Gardner did not 

participate. 

in the case, 

Gardner, which had not entered a formal appearance 

evidently was never notified of either the trial 

setting or the subsequent entry of judgment. The instant motion 

was filed when Gardner's counsel became aware of these facts 

through informal communication otherwise unrelated to this action. 

Gardner asserted three arguments in support of the Rule 60(b) 

relief sought below: (1) the judgment obtained by plaintiff is 

void for lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) the judgment should be 

vacated because Gardner was not given the requisite notice under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) prior to entry of default judgment; and (3) 

regardless 

Gardner's 

of the validity of 

liability, the jury's 

the judgment with respect to 

assessment of unliquidated 

compensatory and punitive damages, and any award of attorney's 

fees, cannot stand due to the lack of notice to Gardner. The 

standard for our review of the district court's denial of 

Rule 60(b) relief turns on the nature of the grounds asserted in 

support of the motion. Ordinarily, such a ruling is discretionary 

and should not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of 

discretion; however, if the underlying judgment is void for lack 

of jurisdiction or because its entry violated due process, relief 

is mandatory. See Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-3328 Document: 010110041660 Date Filed: 08/30/1990 Page: 2 
441-42 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Compare Greenwood Explorations, Ltd. v. 

Merit Gas & Oil Corp., 837 F.2d 423, 426 (10th Cir. 1988) with 

Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1983). 

In a diversity action, the existence of personal jurisdiction 

over the defendant is determined by the law of the forum state 

(here, Kansas). Rambo v. American S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 

1416 (10th Cir. 1988). In this regard, the district court held as 

a threshold matter that the pertinent provision of the Kansas 

long-arm statute, Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 60-308(b)(5), which requires a 

contract between the nonresident defendant and the resident 

plaintiff "to be performed in whole or in part by either party in 

the state," was satisfied by Gardner's contractual obligation to 

send to plaintiff (a Kansas resident) monthly reports and rental 

income arising out of its management of plaintiff's time-share 

property in Florida. This ruling comports with the existing case 

law. See, e.g., Continental Am. Corp. v. Camera Controls Corp., 

692 F.2d 1309, 1312-14 (10th Cir. 1982); Slawson v. Hair, 716 

F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (D. Kan. 1989)("As to what may constitute part 

performance of a contract within the forum, courts have been 

satisfied with merely the nonresident's payment of funds to the 

resident's offices within the forum," citing Continental 

American)); Petroleum Data Servs., Inc. v. First City 

Bancorporation of Texas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (D. Kan. 

1985). We also concur in the district court's determination that 

by virtue of Gardner's solicitation and initiation of a direct, 

continuing contractual relationship with plaintiff through 

inclusion of its management contract with the other materials sent 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-3328 Document: 010110041660 Date Filed: 08/30/1990 Page: 3 
to potential time-share purchasers 

"purposefully availed itself of 

activities within 

constitutionally, the 

the forum 

exercise 

around the country, Gardner 

the privilege of conducting 

State," thus justifying, 

of personal jurisdiction over 

Gardner in Kansas. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 

462, 472-75 (1985); Rainbow Travel Serv., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels 

Corp., 896 F.2d 1233, 1237-39 (10th Cir. 1990). 

The district court rejected the other two grounds asserted in 

Gardner's motion, regarding lack of notice of either default or 

the adjudication of damages, as inapposite because the judgment 

entered against Gardner was based not on default principles but on 

the jury's determination of the merits of plaintiff's claims 

(albeit without consideration of any defenses available to 

Gardner). The district court was correct in summarily rejecting 

Gardner's contention with respect to the notice under Rule SS(b) 

of the default judgment itself, since no such judgment was in fact 

entered. However, the failure to provide notice to Gardner of the 

trial in which both the fact and amount of its liability to 

plaintiff was determined cannot be disregarded on the same basis. 

Courts have granted relief when a party has been prejudiced either 

by inadequate notice of trial generally, see Seven Elves, Inc. v. 

Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 403 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Ellingsworth 

v. Chrysler, 665 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1981), or by the failure 

to receive notice (even post-default) of a hearing limited to the 

issue of unliquidated damages, see Hunt v. Inter-Globe Energy, 

Inc., 770 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, for the 

reason expressed immediately below, Gardner has not demonstrated 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-3328 Document: 010110041660 Date Filed: 08/30/1990 Page: 4 
an entitlement to Rule 60(b) relief under the circumstances of 

this case. 

"It is generally held that neither ignorance nor carelessness 

on the part of the attorney will provide grounds for 60(b) 

relief." Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833, 835 (8th Cir. 

1969); see Evans v. United Life & Accident Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 466, 

472 (4th Cir. 1989); Hough v. Local 134, IBEW, 867 F.2d 1018, 1022 

(7th Cir. 1989). Thus, where, as here, there was a substantial 

window of time in which counsel easily could have ascertained the 

upcoming trial date, 1 lack of direct, formal notice does not 

excuse counsel's failure to monitor the status of the case with 

due diligence, and Rule 60(b) relief is, accordingly, unwarranted. 

See, e.g., Prior Prods., Inc. v. Southwest Wheel-NCL Co., 805 F.2d 

543, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1986); Sutherland v. ITT Continental Baking 

Co., 710 F.2d 473, 475-76 and n.3 (8th Cir. 1983); In re 

Ksenzowski, 56 Bankr. 819, 828 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); see also 

Universal Film Exchs., Inc. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573, 576-77 (4th 

Cir. 1973). Cf. Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460-61 (9th Cir. 

1983)(lack of timely notice of judgment ordinarily not sufficient, 

in itself, to warrant Rule 60(b) relief; but where counsel had 

secretary repeatedly check docket, which clearly misled her as to 

status of case, relief deemed appropriate). 

1 The August 27, 1987, pretrial order indicated the case would 

be ready to be set for trial anytime after November 2, 1987, and 

trial was not actually held until February 12, 1988. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-3328 Document: 010110041660 Date Filed: 08/30/1990 Page: 5 
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-3328 Document: 010110041660 Date Filed: 08/30/1990 Page: 6