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Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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1 KATZMANN, Chief Judge, dissenting:

2 Article 46 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL

3 Players Association (the “Association”) and the NFL Management Council

4 requires the Commissioner to provide a player with notice of the basis for any

5 disciplinary action and an opportunity to challenge the discipline in an appeal

6 hearing.  When the Commissioner, acting in his capacity as an arbitrator, changes

7 the factual basis for the disciplinary action after the appeal hearing concludes, he

8 undermines the fair notice for which the Association bargained, deprives the

9 player of an opportunity to confront the case against him, and, it follows, exceeds

10 his limited authority under the CBA to decide “appeals” of disciplinary

11 decisions.   

12 In its thorough and thoughtful opinion, the majority does not contest this

13 understanding of the CBA.    Instead, it asserts that the Commissioner did not

14 change the factual basis for the discipline and, in effect, that any change was

15 harmless.  I cannot agree.   

16 Additionally, on a more fundamental level, I am troubled by the

17 Commissioner’s decision to uphold the unprecedented four‐game suspension.  

18 The Commissioner failed to even consider a highly relevant alternative penalty

19 and relied, instead, on an inapt analogy to the League’s steroid policy.    This

20 deficiency, especially when viewed in combination with the shifting rationale for

21 Brady’s discipline, leaves me to conclude that the Commissioner’s decision

22 reflected “his own brand of industrial justice.”  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter.

23 Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).

24 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

25 I.

26 Judicial review of an arbitration award can be boiled down to a two‐step

27 process.   Both inquiries follow from the fundamental premise that “arbitration is

28 a matter of contract.”  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363

29 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).  In the first step, the reviewing court asks whether the

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1 arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority under the relevant collective

2 bargaining agreement.  See Local 1199, Drug, Hosp. & Health Care Emp. Union,

3 RWDSU, AFL‐CIO v. Brooks Drug Co., 956 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1992).  This ensures

4 that a party is not forced “to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not

5 agreed so to submit.”  Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at 582.  If the arbitrator

6 acted within the scope of his authority, then his decision is entitled to substantial

7 deference.  The award will be upheld so long as the reviewing court finds, at the

8 second step, that the arbitral award “draws its essence from the agreement” and

9 does not reflect “merely an example of the arbitrator’s own brand of justice.”  

10 Brooks Drug Co., 956 F.2d at 25.  This guarantees that the parties get what they

11 bargained for, namely, the arbitrator’s construction of the CBA.  Enter. Wheel &

12 Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599.  In my opinion, the Commissioner’s decision fails as to

13 both steps.

14 II.

15 With regard to the first step, Article 46 of the CBA vests the Commissioner

16 with exceptional discretion to impose discipline for “conduct detrimental,” but it

17 checks that power by allowing the player to challenge that discipline through an

18 “appeal.”  Joint App. at 345‐46.  In deciding the appeal, the arbitrator may decide

19 whether the misconduct charged actually occurred, whether it was actually

20 “detrimental” to the League, and whether the penalty imposed is permissible

21 under the CBA.    But the arbitrator has no authority to base his decision on

22 misconduct different from that originally charged.    When he does so, the

23 arbitrator goes beyond his limited authority, and the award should be vacated.

24 I would find that the Commissioner breached that limitation here.    I

25 believe there are significant differences between the limited findings in the Wells

26 Report and the additional findings the Commissioner made for the first time in

27 his final written decision.    The letter announcing Brady’s discipline explained

28 that his “actions as set forth in the [Wells Report] clearly constitute[d] conduct

29 detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the game of professional

30 football” and warranted a four‐game suspension.    Joint App. at 329‐30.    The

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1 Wells Report, in turn, concluded that it was “more probable than not that Tom

2 Brady . . . was at least generally aware of the inappropriate activities of [Jim]

3 McNally and [John] Jastremski involving the release of air from Patriots game

4 balls,” Joint App. at 97, and that it was “unlikely” that McNally and Jastremski

5 deflated the balls without Brady’s “knowledge,” “approval,” “awareness,” and

6 “consent,” Joint App. at 114.    The Commissioner’s final written decision,

7 however, went further.    It found that Brady “knew about, approved of,

8 consented to, and provided inducements and rewards in support of a scheme by

9 which, with Mr. Jastremski’s support, Mr. McNally tampered with the game

10 balls.”  Special App. at 51 (emphasis added).   

11 Regardless of whether the difference between the Wells Report and the

12 Commissioner’s decision constitutes a “quantum leap,” Maj. Op. at 21, I am

13 convinced that the change was material.    The misconduct found in the Wells

14 Report is indisputably less culpable than inducing and rewarding cheating

15 through the payment of memorabilia, as was found in the Commissioner’s final

16 decision.

17 The majority takes the view that the Wells Report’s conclusions clearly

18 encompassed a finding that Brady induced and rewarded the deflation of

19 footballs.    To the contrary, although the Wells Report described evidence that

20 Brady provided both McNally and Jastremski with gifts and that McNally joked

21 about demanding cash and other memorabilia, it never concluded that it was

22 “more probable than not” that the gifts Brady provided were intended as

23 rewards or advance payment for deflating footballs in violation of League rules.  

24 That stands in stark contrast to the Wells Report’s clear conclusions, by a

25 preponderance of the evidence, regarding Brady’s “knowledge,” “approval,”

26 “awareness,” and “consent.”  Fairly read, the Wells Report did not put Brady on

notice that he was found to have engaged in a quid pro quo.

1 27

                                                            

1 The majority also suggests that the Association never raised this issue.    Although not every detail I

mention is found in the Association’s brief, the concern is not of my own making.  See Br. for Appellees

Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n and Tom Brady at 49 (“Hoping to compensate for the Wells Report’s

limited findings concerning Brady’s state of mind, Goodell pulled his ‘participat[ion]’ and ‘inducement[]’

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1 I would also find that Brady was prejudiced by the change in the

2 Commissioner’s rationale and the resulting lack of notice.   The Association, in

3 light of the lack of any clear finding in the Wells Report as to the purpose of the

4 gifts, paid almost no attention to Brady’s gift‐giving during the appeal hearing.  

5 To support Brady’s argument that he had no relationship with McNally, counsel

6 for the Association asked Brady on direct examination whether he ever provided

7 gifts to people he did not know, and Brady’s affirmative response was then used

8 in his post‐hearing brief only to establish that single point.  See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No.

9 28‐231 at 15 (Post‐Hearing Br. of the NFLPA and Tom Brady) (“The only thing

10 ‘linking’ [Brady and McNally] is that Brady purportedly signed memorabilia for

11 McNally, but Brady testified that he naturally does not know the name of

12 everyone for whom he signs memorabilia, and even Wells found that Brady

13 never provided McNally any year‐end gifts or bonuses that would suggest they

14 had any relationship.”).  Beyond that, the gifts played no role in the Association’s

15 challenge to Brady’s discipline:    the League did not ask Brady about gifts to

16 McNally on cross‐examination, and neither side asked Brady about any gifts he

17 provided to Jastremski.

18 The Association’s silence on this issue, however, seems to me to reflect

19 only the lack of notice, not the lack of an available argument or a tactical decision

20 to focus on other issues.    The Wells Report found that McNally referred to

21 himself as “the deflator” and threatened (perhaps jokingly) to go to ESPN as far

22 back as May 2014, but it also credited McNally’s statement that Brady never

23 provided him with the same gifts doled out to other employees in the locker

room.2 24     The suggestion that McNally did not receive gifts from Brady even

                                                                                                                                                                                               

language from thin air.”).    Indeed, the majority addresses the Association’s challenge to the

Commissioner’s shift to a finding of “participation,” and in my view, the Commissioner’s decision uses

“participation” to refer to not only Brady’s knowledge and approval of the scheme, but also his use of

inducements and rewards.    The Association’s failure to fully flesh out this argument is, I suspect, a

consequence of the district court never having reached the issue, see Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v.

Natʹl Football League Players Assn, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), and the majority’s decision

(with which I do not quarrel) to reject the Association’s request to remand on this issue.

2 For example, the Wells Report stated the following regarding texts from McNally demanding tickets to a

game between the Boston Celtics and Los Angeles Lakers and new Uggs shoes:

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1 during the period in which McNally sent suspicious text messages is further

2 corroborated by an October 2014 text message in which Jastremski told McNally

3 that Brady “gives u nothing.”  Joint App. at 101.  Finally, it appears undisputed

4 in the Wells Report that Brady provided gifts to other locker room attendants

5 who have not been implicated in the deflation (or any other) scheme.   Brady’s

6 gift‐giving, in other words, was not necessarily indicative of illicit behavior.

7 None of this is to say that the inferences that the Commissioner drew from

8 the evidence presented in the Wells Report constituted reversible error on their

9 own.  But the foregoing demonstrates that the Association would have been able

10 to offer a meaningful challenge to the Commissioner’s conclusion (possibly

11 supported by additional new evidence regarding Brady’s practice of providing

12 gifts) had it been announced prior to the Article 46 appeal hearing.  Taking the

13 Commissioner at his word that he “entered into the appeal process open to

14 reevaluating [his] assessment of Mr. Brady’s conduct and the associated

15 discipline,” Special App. at 60, I believe that, had Brady been provided an

16 opportunity to challenge the Commissioner’s conclusion on this score, the

17 outcome may have been different.    The majority’s observation that the

18 Commissioner did not increase Brady’s punishment is beside the point.  Had the

19 Commissioner confined himself to the misconduct originally charged, he may

20 have been persuaded to decrease the punishment initially handed down.     

                                                                                                                                                                                               

McNally described these texts as jokes, which we think is likely the case. Specifically, on

December 5, 2014, the Boston Celtics were playing the Los Angeles Lakers in Boston and

McNally had been asking Jastremski to get them tickets to a Celtics‐Lakers game for

years.    McNally said the joke was that Brady should get them courtside seats for the

game.  With regard to the Uggs, McNally said that around the holidays each year Brady

gives Uggs footwear to certain Patriots staff members, but that McNally has never received

them.    He explained that his message was a humorous response to a news report on

Brady’s distribution of Uggs in 2014.

Joint App. at 183 (emphasis added).

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1 Accordingly, I would find that the Commissioner exceeded his authority,

2 to Brady’s detriment, by resting Brady’s discipline on factual findings not made

in the Wells Report.3 3

4 III.

5 I would also find that the Commissioner’s decision fails at the second step

6 of our analysis because it does not draw its essence from the CBA.  It must be

7 emphasized that the case at hand involves an unprecedented punishment.  

8 Precisely because of the severity of the penalty, one would have expected the

9 Commissioner to at least fully consider other alternative and collectively

10 bargained‐for penalties, even if he ultimately rejected them.   Indeed, the CBA

11 encourages—though, as the majority observes, does not strictly require—the

12 Commissioner to fully explain his reasoning by mandating that he issue a

13 written decision when resolving an Article 46 appeal.    That process is all the

14 more important when the disciplinary action is novel and the Commissioner’s

15 reasoning is, as here, far from obvious.  

16 Yet, the Commissioner failed to even mention, let alone explain, a highly

17 analogous penalty, an omission that underscores the peculiar nature of Brady’s

18 punishment.  The League prohibits the use of stickum, a substance that enhances

19 a player’s grip.  Under a collectively bargained‐for Schedule of Fines, a violation

20 of this prohibition warrants an $8,268 fine in the absence of aggravating

21 circumstances.  Given that both the use of stickum and the deflation of footballs

22 involve attempts at improving one’s grip and evading the referees’ enforcement

                                                            

3 The Commissioner’s rationale also shifted insofar as he relied on new evidence regarding Brady’s

destruction of his cell phone to find that Brady “willfully obstructed” Wells’s investigation.  Special App.

at 54.    The majority persuasively demonstrates, however, that Brady anticipated this change and

challenged it at the hearing and in his post‐hearing brief.  Thus, I agree that the Commissioner’s reliance

on this new evidence does not provide a ground to vacate the suspension.  Cf. Duferco Intʹl Steel Trading v.

T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 390 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We will, of course, not vacate an arbitral

award for an erroneous application of the law if a proper application of law would have yielded the same

result.”).

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of the rules,4 1 this would seem a natural starting point for assessing Brady’s

2 penalty.    Indeed, the League’s justification for prohibiting stickum—that it

3 “affects the integrity of the competition and can give a team an unfair

4 advantage,” Joint App. at 384 (League Policies for Players)—is nearly identical to

5 the Commissioner’s explanation for what he found problematic about the

6 deflation—that it “reflects an improper effort to secure a competitive advantage

in, and threatens the integrity of, the game,” Special App. at 57.5 7    

8 Notwithstanding these parallels, the Commissioner ignored the stickum

9 penalty entirely.  This oversight leaves a noticeable void in the Commissioner’s

decision,6 10 and in my opinion, the void is indicative of the award’s overall failure

11 to draw its essence from the CBA.    Even taking into account the special

12 circumstances here—that the alleged misconduct occurred during the AFC

13 Championship Game, that team employees assisted in the deflation, that a

14 deflated football arguably affects every play, and that Brady failed to cooperate

15 in the subsequent investigation—I am unable to understand why the

16 Commissioner thought the appropriate penalty was a four‐game suspension and

17 the attendant four‐game loss of pay, which, in Brady’s case, is far more than

                                                            

4 Just as the referees check the inflation level of the footballs before the start of the game, they check

players for stickum “prior to the game and prior to the beginning of the second half.”  Joint App. at 384.  

5 Although the Commissioner reasoned that steroid use also has the same adverse effects on the League,

the fact that numerous infractions may be said to compromise the integrity of the game and reflect an

attempt to gain a competitive advantage serves only to render more problematic the Commissioner’s

selection of what appears to be the harshest potential comparator without any meaningful explanation.  

This is especially true since, for the reasons stated by the district court, the Commissioner’s analogy to

steroid use is flawed.    See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 465.    In short, the

Commissioner’s reliance on the League’s steroid policy seems to me to be nothing more than mere

“noises of contract interpretation” to which we do not ordinarily defer.  In re Marine Pollution Serv., Inc.,

857 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 768 F.2d 180, 187 (7th Cir. 1985)).

  

6 The omission is all the more troubling since the Association raised this point during the arbitration

proceedings. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 28‐231 at 9 (Post‐Hearing Br. of the NFLPA and Tom Brady) (“The

Player Policies further illustrate the disparate nature of any player suspension for an alleged competitive

infraction, let alone for just being ‘generally aware’ of one.    They identify player punishments for

equipment violations that ‘affect[] the integrity of the competition and can give a team an unfair

advantage’—such as putting stickum on receiver gloves . . . —and subject first‐time player offenders to a

fine of $8,268 for a specified violation.”).

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1 $8,268.    The lack of any meaningful explanation in the Commissioner’s final

2 written decision convinces me that the Commissioner was doling out his own

3 brand of industrial justice.   Cf. Burns Intʹl Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Intʹl Union, United

4 Plant Guard Workers of Am. (UPGWA) & Its Local 537, 47 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995)

5 (“[I]f a ground for the arbitrator’s decision can be inferred from the facts of the

6 case, the award should be confirmed.” (quoting Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469

7 F.2d 1211, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)) (emphasis added).  In this regard, it bears noting

8 that the Schedule of Fines provides that a player caught violating the prohibition

9 on stickum a second time is to be fined $16,537.  Thus, even where aggravating

10 circumstances exist, the Schedule of Fines does not provide for the extreme

increase in penalty that the Commissioner found appropriate here.7 11

12 In sum, the Commissioner’s failure to discuss the penalty for violations of

13 the prohibition on stickum, the Commissioner’s strained reliance on the penalty

14 for violations of the League’s steroid policy, and the Commissioner’s shifting

15 rationale for Brady’s discipline, together, leave me with the firm conviction that

16 his decision in the arbitration appeal was based not on his interpretation of the

17 CBA, but on “his own brand of industrial justice.”  Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363

18 U.S. at 597.

19 IV.

20 The Commissioner’s authority is, as the majority emphasizes, broad.  But it

21 is not limitless, and its boundaries are defined by the CBA.  Here, the CBA grants

22 the Commissioner in his capacity as arbitrator only the authority to decide

                                                            

7 The majority again gives me too much credit in stating that the Association did not raise this argument.  

I read the Association’s brief to make two arguments with respect to alternative penalties.  The first is that

the Player Policies, and in particular the “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations” provision, governed

Brady’s misconduct here and necessitates that he receive no more than a fine.  I agree with the majority

that this has no merit.    The second, however, is that the Commissioner’s failure to discuss certain

probative terms—in particular, the “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations” provision and the stickum

prohibition (obviously, I find only the latter actually probative)—reflects that the Commissioner was not

actually construing the CBA, the only limitation imposed on an arbitrator acting within the scope of his

authority.  And, as the majority acknowledges, in support of that argument, the Association contends that

the Commissioner’s “CBA defiance is only underscored by his reliance on the Steroid Policy.”   Br. for

Appellees Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n and Tom Brady at 45.   

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1 “appeals,” that is, whether the initial disciplinary decision was erroneous.  The

2 Commissioner exceeded that limited authority when he decided instead that

3 Brady could be suspended for four games based on misconduct found for the

4 first time in the Commissioner’s decision.    This breach of the limits on the

5 Commissioner’s authority is exacerbated by the unprecedented and virtually

6 unexplained nature of the penalty imposed.    Confirming the arbitral award

7 under such circumstances neither enforces the intent of the parties nor furthers

8 the “federal policy that federal courts should enforce [arbitration] agreements . . .

9 and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.”  Textile Workers

10 Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).

11 I end where I began.  The Article 46 appeals process is designed to provide

12 a check against the Commissioner’s otherwise unfettered authority to impose

13 discipline for “conduct detrimental.”    But the Commissioner’s murky

14 explanation of Brady’s discipline undercuts the protections for which the NFLPA

15 bargained on Brady’s, and others’, behalf.  It is ironic that a process designed to

16 ensure fairness to all players has been used unfairly against one player.

17 I respectfully dissent.

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