Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02774/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02774-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12181 Americans with Disabilities Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Earl Strickland, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GE Capital Retail Bank, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-14-02774-PHX-BSB

ORDER 

 In this employment action, Plaintiff Robert Earl Strickland alleges that Defendant 

GE Capital Bank (GECRB or Defendant)1

 violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12103. (Doc. 9.) Specifically, in the Amended Complaint, 

Plaintiff alleges that GECRB violated the ADA by issuing him a corrective action notice 

on December 23, 2013 based on his alleged disability, diabetes mellitus.2

 (Doc. 9 at 4-6.) 

On March 4, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) arguing two reasons why the Court should dismiss the Amended 

Complaint. (Doc. 12.) First, Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint fails to state 

claim for which relief can be granted because Plaintiff released all claims he may have 

 

1

 Defendant clarifies that it is correctly identified as Synchrony Bank, f/k/a GE Capital Retail Bank. (Doc. 12 at 1.) 

2

 On February 3, 2015, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim based on 

Defendant’s alleged failure to hire him for a particular position in 2012. (Doc. 10 at 5-6.) Accordingly, the only remaining claim is Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant discriminated 

against him in violation of the ADA by issuing a corrective action in December 2013. 

(Id. at 5.) 

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had against Defendant when he executed a release in exchange for a layoff benefit 

payment. (Id. at 1-2.) Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim 

because his ADA claim is time barred. (Id.) Specifically, Defendant argues the Court 

should dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim because Plaintiff did not file suit within ninety days 

of receiving his right-to-sue notice. (Id.) 

 On March 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion. 

(Doc. 18.) Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed a release. (Doc. 18 at 2.) Rather, he 

argues that he was forced to sign the release to receive lay off pay. (Id.) Second, 

Plaintiff argues that this action was timely filed because he did not receive the right-tosue notice until September 30, 2014. (Id.) Defendant filed a reply in support of its 

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 21.) Plaintiff then filed a supplemental response to Defendants’ 

motion.3

 (Doc. 23.) 

 After reviewing the parties’ filings, on April 17, 2015, the Court converted the 

motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. (Doc. 22.) The 

Court gave the parties until April 24, 2015 to file supplemental materials relevant to the 

motion for summary judgment. (Id.) On April 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed a response to the 

Court’s order and asserted that he stated a claim for which relief can be granted and 

established that the Court has jurisdiction over his claims. (Doc. 24.) Defendant did not 

file any additional materials in response to the April 23, 2015 Order. As discussed 

below, the Court finds that this action is timely, but grants Defendant’s motion and 

dismisses this action with prejudice because Plaintiff released his claims.4

 

I. Summary Judgment Standard

 A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

 3

 Plaintiff did not request permission to file a supplemental response. However, Defendant did not object to that filing and the Court will consider it. 

4

 The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. 7, 16, 17.) 

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Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the 

outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed 

evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

II. Background 

 Defendant provides financing services; Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a 

collection representative. (Doc. 9 at 3; Doc. 12 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

discriminated against him by issuing him a corrective action on December 23, 2013 based 

on his disability. (Doc. 9 at 4-6.) He asserts that because of the corrective action he 

could not apply for another position with Defendant after a layoff was announced a week 

later and, therefore, he was forced into unemployment. (Id. at 4.) 

 On December 31, 2013, Defendant notified Plaintiff that the collection department 

was being relocated and that his job was being eliminated. (Doc. 9 at 4; Doc. 12 at 3, 

Exs. 1, 2.) On January 15, 2014, Defendant offered Plaintiff a “Layoff Benefit” and 

presented him with a release. (Doc. 12, Ex. 2.) On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff executed 

the release. (Id.) In exchange for executing the release, Plaintiff received the “Layoff 

Benefit,” or a severance payment, of approximately six weeks’ pay. (Doc. 12, Ex. 1, 2.) 

Plaintiff also received subsidized insurance benefits for a total of six months. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s signed release includes an agreement to “waive and release all waivable claims 

of any kind (whether known or unknown, to the fullest extent permitted by 

law) . . . which arise from or relate to [his] employment and/or the termination of [his] 

employment with the Company.”5

 (Doc. 12, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff also agreed that the claims 

he was releasing include “any and all claims of discrimination . . . on the basis 

of . . . disability.” Id. 

 

5

 The Notice of Layoff includes this same language. (Doc. 12, Ex. 1.) 

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 According to his Amended Complaint, on September 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed a 

charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 

alleging disability discrimination. (Doc. 9 at 2.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 

alleges that the EEOC dismissed his charge and that he received his ninety-day right-tosue notice on September 24, 2014. (Id. at 3.) However, in his response and supplemental 

response, Plaintiff alleges that he received the right-to-sue notice on September 30, 2014. 

(Docs. 18 at 2; Doc. 23 at 1.) 

III. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s ADA Claim

 Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss this action because Plaintiff’s 

ADA claim is time-barred. (Doc. 12 at 5.) Plaintiff argues that this action was timely 

filed because he received his right-to-sue notice on September 30, 2014. (Docs. 18, 23.) 

 The federal limitations period for bringing an ADA claim is ninety days from the 

receipt of a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Title VII 

limitations period is ninety days); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (ADEA limitations period is ninety 

days); 42 U.S.C. § 12217(a) (ADA limitations period is borrowed from Title VII actions, 

which is ninety days). If a litigant does not file suit within ninety days, the claim is timebarred. See Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(recognizing that the ninety-day period is a statute of limitations); Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 

963 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the requirement of filing a civil action 

within ninety days from the date the EEOC dismisses a claim constitutes a statute of 

limitations); Edwards v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). This limitations period is enforced strictly against pro 

se and represented litigants. Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P’Ship., 495 F.3d 

1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Cntr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 

147, 150 (1984) (dismissing a pro se Title VII complaint filed outside of limitations 

period). Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Defendant bears the 

burden of proving that Plaintiff filed his ADA claim beyond the limitations period. See 

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Tovar v. U.S.P.S., 3 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993) (“In every civil case, the defendant 

bears the burden of proof as to each element of an affirmative defense.”). 

 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that he received the right-to-sue notice 

on September 24, 2014. (Doc. 9 at 3.) Defendant argues that the cause of action is 

untimely because it was filed on December 29, 2014, more than ninety days after Plaintiff 

received the notice of right to sue. (Doc. 12 at 5-6.) In response to Defendant’s motion, 

Plaintiff argues that he received the right-to-sue notice on September 30, 2014, which 

would make his lawsuit timely filed on the last day of the limitations period. (Doc. 18 at 

2; Doc. 23 at 1.) Plaintiff attaches the right-to-sue notice to his response. (Doc. 18-1 at 

2-3.) The notice indicates that it was mailed on September 24, 2014. (Id.) Defendant 

argues that Plaintiff’s cause of action is untimely because Plaintiff is presumed to have 

received the right-to-sue notice within three days of mailing, or on September 27, 2014. 

(Doc. 21 at 3 (citing Payan, 495 F.3d at 1125).) 

 In the Ninth Circuit, when a claimant does not dispute receipt of a right-to-sue 

notice from the EEOC, the notice is presumed to have arrived three days after it was 

mailed. See Payan, 495 F.3d at 1125-26. However, the three-day presumption can be 

rebutted with “evidence suggesting that the receipt was delayed beyond the presumed 

period.” Id at 1126. However, “general claims that mail is sometimes delayed” and 

unsupported conjecture does are not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Id. at 1126; see 

also Gonzales v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 2013 WL 6284172, at *5 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 

2013) (general allegations about weather and mail delivery during winter months was 

insufficient to rebut the three-day presumption). Rather, to rebut that presumption, a 

plaintiff must establish that he “did not receive the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter in the 

ordinary course.” Payan, 495 F.3d at 1126. In Payan, the court found that the plaintiff 

did not rebut the three-day receipt presumption because she merely claimed that mail was 

sometimes delayed. Id. at 1127. There, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim was 

barred by the ninety-day limitations period because she filed her lawsuit three days late. 

Id.

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 In his response and supplemental response, Plaintiff asserts that the delivery of the 

right-to-sue notice was delayed because he moved to a new apartment complex in July or 

August 2014 and the post office had trouble rerouting mail to that apartment complex. 

(Doc. 18 at 2; Doc. 23 at 1.) Plaintiff explains he was one of the first tenants to move 

into the new apartment complex and that the complex mailing address was not 

recognized by the post office for at least four months.6

 (Doc. 23 at 1.) He states that the 

City of Chandler made a mistake regarding the zip code that was to be assigned to the 

complex. (Id.) To support that assertion, Plaintiff submitted an October 2014 email 

exchange between Laura Habetler, the community manager at Avilla Rental Homes at 

901 S. Alma School Road in Chandler, Arizona, and Ernest Brunetto with Meb 

management services. (Doc. 23 at 4.) The email exchange states that “due to a special 

adjustment on route C011, the entire zip code has been locked. This will prevent us from 

inputting the individual apartment addresses at 901 S. Alma School [and] 900 S. Alma 

School.” (Id.) A November 7, 2014 e-mail states that Brunetto added the units at 901 

Alma School Road to the database and that “[t]hey will be in [the] carriers’ delivery 

starting Monday.” (Doc. 23 at 5.) Plaintiff argues that, considering the problems with 

the zip code at his new apartment complex, the presumption that he received the right-tosue notice within three days of mailing date should not apply. (Doc. 23 at 1.) 

 Unlike Payan, Plaintiff’s description of the mail problems at his new apartment 

complex is not a “general claim[] that mail is sometimes delayed.” See Payan, 495 F.3d 

at 1126. Rather, it is based on specific mail-delivery issues related to the zip code for his 

new apartment complex. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented “evidence 

suggesting that the receipt was delayed beyond the presumed period,” and finds this 

action timely filed. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that this action 

should be dismissed as untimely. 

 

 

6

 The docket reflects that Plaintiff’s mailing address is 901 S. Alma School Road, Unit 13, Chandler, Arizona 85224. 

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IV. Plaintiff Released his ADA Claim

 To support its motion for summary judgment, Defendant also asserts that 

Plaintiff’s ADA claim fails because he waived and released his right to bring all 

employment claims, including an ADA claim. (Doc. 12 at 4.) Plaintiff does not dispute 

that he signed a release or that the release waived his right to bring his ADA claim. 

(Doc. 18 at 2, Doc. 23, Doc. 24.) Rather, he argues that he was forced to sign the release. 

(Doc. 18 at 2.) He also argues that the release should not apply because his suit is based 

on disability discrimination, not poor performance or “breaking contracts.” (Id.) As 

discussed below, the Court finds that the release applied to Plaintiff’s ADA claims, there 

is no genuine issue regarding whether Plaintiff was forced to sign the release, and 

Plaintiff executed the release, which released Plaintiff’s ADA claim asserted in this 

action. 

A. The Release 

 The legal authority Defendant cites supports the conclusion that Plaintiff’s release 

waived his ADA claim. “[T]here is a compelling public interest and policy in upholding 

and enforcing settlement agreements voluntarily entered into.” Bianchi v. Perry, 140 

F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. United 

States, 23 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Consistent with that policy, courts within the 

Ninth Circuit enforce agreements that waive and release ADA claims. See Pardi v. 

Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the settlement 

agreement executed by the plaintiff waived his ADA claim); Sowell v. Freescale 

Semiconductor, Inc., 2008 WL 2941269, at *6-7 (D. Ariz. Jul. 25, 2008) (holding that the 

plaintiff’s ADA and Title VII claims were barred by a release signed as part of a 

severance package, and recognizing that public policy favors voluntary settlement of 

employment discrimination claims brought under federal statutes). 

 In Pardi, the Ninth Circuit enforced a settlement agreement between an employer 

and a former employee. Pardi, 389 F.3d at 848. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, 

the former employee released all claims for actions that occurred during his employment. 

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Id. Specifically, the former employee released “all claims arising from [his] employment 

with [employer] prior to the date of his execution of the Settlement Agreement, including 

but not limited to, individual claims under federal, state, or local laws prohibiting 

employment discrimination and any claim for attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 846. The Ninth 

Circuit rejected the former employee’s claim that the settlement agreement was invalid, 

and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims, including the former employee’s 

ADA claim, which arose before the settlement agreement was executed. Id. at 848. 

 Similar to the plaintiff in Pardi, Plaintiff signed a release that waived any and all 

claims that arose from or were related to his employment or the termination of his 

employment with GECRB. (Doc. 12, Ex. 2) The release in this case is more specific 

than the one in Pardi because it states that the release included any and all “claims of 

discrimination . . . on the basis of . . . disability.” (Id at 1.) Thus, the Court rejects 

Plaintiff’s assertion that the release does not apply to his claim of disability 

discrimination. See Dominguez v. BCW, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (D. Ariz. 2000) 

(holding that the plaintiff could not assert that her release was uninformed if the claim 

was specifically listed as a released claim). 

 Defendant also advised Plaintiff that he should consult with an attorney before 

signing the release, that he had forty-five days to decide whether to sign the release, and 

that he could revoke the release within seven days after signing it. (Doc. 12, Ex. 2 at 2.) 

Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the release and did not revoke it. In exchange for 

the release, Plaintiff received, among other benefits, a severance payment and subsidized 

insurance benefits. (Doc. 12, Ex. 2 at 1; Ex. 1.) To determine whether Plaintiff 

effectively released his ADA claim, the Court considers whether Plaintiff was forced to 

sign the release. 

B. Plaintiff was not Forced to Sign the Release 

 In his response, Plaintiff argues that he was forced to sign the release to receive 

lay off pay. (Doc. 18 at 2.) Defendant agrees that Plaintiff was required to sign the 

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release to receive lay off pay. (Doc. 21 at 2.) However, they argue that Plaintiff was not 

forced to sign the release. (Id.) 

 The record reflects that on January 15, 2014, Plaintiff was notified that his 

employment would end in sixty calendar days. (Doc. 12, Ex. 1.) At the same time, 

Defendant gave Plaintiff a copy of the release, and informed him that he would be 

required to sign and return it to receive a severance payment. (Doc. 12, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff 

was given forty-five days to consider whether to sign the release. (Doc. 12, Ex. 2 at 2-3.) 

Plaintiff waited fifty-six days before he signed the release on March 12, 2014. (See

Doc. 12, Ex. 2 at 3.) The release is just over two pages long. (Doc. 12, Ex. 2.) The first 

page of the release describes in plain language the claims it released. (Id. at 1.) 

Defendant advised Plaintiff to consult with an attorney before signing the release. (Id. at 

2.) Additionally, Plaintiff was permitted to revoke his acceptance of the release within 

seven days of signing it. (Id.) Plaintiff does not allege that he attempted to revoke his 

release. 

 After review of the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not offered evidence 

sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding his claim that he was forced or 

coerced to sign the release under duress or out of fear of not receiving layoff pay or being 

forced into retirement. (Doc. 18 at 2.); see Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 

458, 463 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding a former employee’s release of all claims and finding 

that there was no evidence whatsoever that the plaintiff was coerced into signing the 

agreement, noting that the plaintiff waited “several days” to sign the agreement and 

finding no evidence that the plaintiff was discouraged or prevented from seeking legal 

advice before signing the release). Because Plaintiff released his ADA claim, Defendant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

V. Conclusion

 Because there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff released all claims against 

Defendant that arose during his employment, including any claims for disability 

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discrimination under the ADA, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and 

the Court enters summary judgment in Defendant’s favor. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant GE Capital Retail Bank’s Motion to Dismiss 

(Doc. 12), which the Court converted to a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22), is 

GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant and 

terminate this action. 

 Dated this 1st day of May, 2015. 

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