Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00144/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00144-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD DEMERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-00144-LJO-SMS PC

ORDER THAT ACTION PROCEED ON THE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT ON

EXCESSIVE FORCE AND DENIAL OF

MEDICAL CARE CLAIMS, DISMISSING ALL

OTHER CLAIMS AND CERTAIN

DEFENDANTS

(Doc. 39)

ORDER STRIKING NOTICES AND/OR

STATUS REPORTS FILED BY PLAINTIFF

(Docs. 41, 44-48, and 50-57.)

I. Procedural Status

Plaintiff Edward Demerson, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 29, 2008. 

The Court dismissed Plaintiff ’s complaint, with leave to amend, on September 22, 2008. 

(Doc. 26.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 27, 2008. (Doc. 27.) On February

26, 2009, the Court ordered Plaintiff to effect service of the amended complaint within onehundred twenty days. (Doc. 33.) On June 24, 2009, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 39.) On July 6, 2009, Plaintiff filed a partial amendment to his Second

/ / /

/ / /

/ /

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Amended Complaint. (Doc. 40.) On December 15, 2009, an order issued striking the partial 1

amendment from the record and requiring Plaintiff to file a third amended complaint, if any,

within thirty days or the second amended complaint would be deemed the operative pleading. 

(Doc. 49.) Over the last eleven months, Plaintiff has filed multiple notices indicating that a third

amended complaint is en route, pending, or completed, and would be mailed/filed shortly. 

(Docs. 41, 44-48, and 50-55.) However, to date, Plaintiff has not filed a third amended

complaint. Thus, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed on June 24, 2009, is now deemed

the operative pleading in this case. Plaintiff’s multiple notices indicating that a third amended

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complaint is en route, pending, or completed and would be mailed/filed shortly are appropriately

stricken from the record. (Docs. 41, 44-48, and 50-57.)

A. Screening Requirement 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[P]laintiffs [now] face a higher

burden of pleadings facts . . ,” Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), and while

a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted

inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation

Plaintiff erroneously titled his second amended complaint a third amended complaint. Plaintiff’s 1

description of the pleading as a third amended complaint is disregarded.

Plaintiff has exercised his right to amend once as a matter of course and may not amend again without

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leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 

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marks and citation omitted).

II. Summary of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff is currently housed at Salinas Valley State Prison. The claims at issue in this

action allegedly occurred at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison

(“SATF”) in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff names Director Jeanne S. Woodford; Inmate

Appeals Branch Chief N. Grannis; Warden Darrell G. Adams; Associate Wardens Ken Clark, L.

Polk, and J. Ahlin; Captain D. A. Cueval; Lieutenants L. Cartagena, V. Black, and Alva; 3

Sergeants Munoz and Hillard; Correctional Officers B. Phillips, E. Campos, M. H. Clausing,

Bardonnex, and Amaro; and Medical Technical Assistant Gregory as defendants. 

Plaintiff’s claims against the defendants arise from events that began on January 25,

2006, summarized briefly as follows. Plaintiff, who is a mobility impaired inmate, was in the

caged section of the walk-alone yard when he requested nail clippers. Plaintiff was told by

Defendant Phillips that he would get the nail clippers with the hair clippers. Plaintiff informed

Phillips that was not how things were done, that it wastes time because not everyone wants the

nail clippers, and Correctional Officer Molina, not Phillips, had been on this yard for the past

year. Phillips advised Plaintiff to wait until they went inside, that he had something for Plaintiff.

After yard time was over, Plaintiff was the last inmate brought in. After being searched

and shackled, Phillips rammed Plaintiff into the wall and told him that was for the “shit” he had

been talking. (Doc. 39, 2 Amend. Comp., pp. 9-10.) Phillips and Campos proceeded to hit, nd

slam, kick, and stomp Plaintiff. Defendants Amaro, Clausing, Bardonnex, Sgt. Munoz, and Lt.

Cartagina ran toward Plaintiff and began twisting the upper and lower ends of Plaintiff’s body in

different directions. (Id.) Plaintiff was then handcuffed, shackled, masked, hog-tied and carried

by the chains to the holding cage – where he was left in extreme pain. (Id.) Sgt. Munoz came

over and kicked Plaintiff in the head where his head was leaning against the cage. (Id.) Plaintiff

was feeling chest pains and Sgt. Munoz brought Psyche Tech G. Hillard to assess Plaintiff, but

Hillard was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s request to see a doctor and refused to write it on

Also spelled Cartigina.

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the medical report. (Id.) Plaintiff told Sgt. Munoz that he was having chest pain and Sgt. Munoz

brought over Nurse Gregory who told Plaintiff to stand up. (Id. at p. 11.) Plaintiff indicated that

he could not stand. (Id.) Nurse Gregory indicated that Plaintiff would not receive any medical

attention unless he stood up and thereafter refused to treat Plaintiff. (Id.) Lt. Cartagina then

video-taped Plaintiff’s injuries, but did not secure medical attention for Plaintiff even though

Plaintiff told him that Plaintiff had chest pains. (Id.) Plaintiff was not provided with any

medical care until approximately thirteen hours later, when he was taken to the prison’s hospital,

given medication, and admitted over night.

After being discharged, Plaintiff was taken back to administrative segregation and housed

on strip cell status. Plaintiff was later issued a Rules Violation Report, found guilty at a prison

disciplinary hearing, and assessed an eighteen month Security Housing Unit term

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Use of Excessive Physical

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)

(citations omitted). For claims of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Although de minimis uses of force do not violate the

Constitution, the malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates the Eighth

Amendment, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id. at 9-10; see also

Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force standard

examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). 

Plaintiff’s allegations state cognizable claims against Defendants Phillips, Campos,

Amaro, Clausing, Bardonnex, Sgt. Munoz, and Lt. Cartagina for using excessive physical force

against Plaintiff.

2. Denial of Medical Care

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an

inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d

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1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The two part

test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical need’ by

demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury

or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need

was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted)). Deliberate indifference is shown

by “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and harm

caused by the indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). Deliberate indifference

may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id.

(citing McGuckin at 1060 (internal quotations omitted)). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in

receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to

make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin at 1060 (citing

Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Plaintiff’s allegations state cognizable claims against Sgt. Munoz, Lt. Cartagina, Nurse

Gregory, and Psyche Tech G. Hillard for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

3. Due Process Claims

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Id. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from

state law. Id. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in

avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.” Id. Under state law, the existence of a

liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the

deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state

law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484; Myron v.

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Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff alleges that his placement on strip cell status and receiving a term in the SHU for

eighteen months violated his rights to due process. However, he fails to describe any difference

between his regular housing situation and strip cell status or the conditions in the SHU to show

any atypical and significant hardship. Id. at 484; Myron, 476 F.3d at 718. Because Plaintiff does

not show any atypical and significant hardship, he does not have a protected liberty interest in not

being placed on strip cell status and/or in the SHU. Thus, Plaintiff may not pursue a claim for

denial of due process resulting from the imposition of those sanctions.

Further, the existence of an administrative remedy process does not create any substantive

rights and cannot support a claim for relief for violation of a constitutional right. Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988);

Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, Plaintiff’s disagreement with

the decisions of the defendants reviewing his appeal and his dissatisfaction with the depth and/or

competency of their review of his appeal cannot support a viable due process claim. Id.

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for violation of his rights to due process. 

Because Plaintiff has previously been given the applicable standards for stating claims under the

Fourteenth Amendment, and because of the length of time that Plaintiff has taken and yet still not

filed a Third Amended Complaint, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims for violation of

his rights to due process be dismissed, with prejudice.

3. Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.

2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and

only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of

the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison

officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer

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v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Despite having previous been given the standards, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to make any

showing that he was denied the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities such that the

Court recommends Plaintiff’s claims that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement be dismissed, with prejudice.

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint states a cognizable claim for relief against

Defendants Phillips, Campos, Amaro, Clausing, Bardonnex, Sgt. Munoz, and Lt. Cartagina for

using excessive physical force against Plaintiff and against Sgt. Munoz, Lt. Cartagina, Nurse

Gregory, and Psyche Tech G. Hillard for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 

However, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not state any other claim(s) upon which

relief may be granted against any other defendant. 

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed June

24, 2009, against Defendants Phillips, Campos, Amaro, Clausing,

Bardonnex, Sgt. Munoz, and Lt. Cartagina for using excessive physical

force against Plaintiff and against Sgt. Munoz, Lt. Cartagina, Nurse

Gregory, and Psyche Tech G. Hillard for deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs; 

2. Plaintiff’s claims for violations of his rights to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment, and for the conditions of his confinement under

the Eighth Amendment be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted; 

3. Defendants Director Jeanne S. Woodford; Inmate Appeals Branch Chief

N. Grannis; Warden Darrell G. Adams; Associate Wardens Ken Clark, L.

Polk, and J. Ahlin; Captain D. A. Cueval; and Lieutenants V. Black, and

Alva be dismissed from this action based on Plaintiff’s failure to state any

claims upon which relief may be granted against them; and 

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4. Plaintiff’s multiple notices indicating that a third amended complaint is en

route, pending, or completed and would be mailed/filed shortly (Docs. 41,

44-48, and 50-57) are stricken from the record. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 21, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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