Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08126/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08126-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eugene J. Cofsky, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-8126-PCT-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc. 1),

respondents’ response (doc. 10), petitioner’s traverse (doc. 14), the report and

recommendation of the United States magistrate judge (doc. 21), petitioner’s objections (doc.

24), and respondents’ response to the objections (doc. 25). 

Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and

conspiracy to commit escape. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with the

possibility of parole after 25 years on the conspiracy to commit murder charge, and three

years imprisonment on the conspiracy to commit escape charge. The Arizona Court of

Appeals subsequently vacated his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit escape,

concluding that he was improperly charged with multiple offenses arising from one

conspiracy in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1003(C). 

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Petitioner argues in his habeas petition that (1) his right to due process was violated

because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit

first degree murder; (2) his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process were violated

because an improper jury instruction lowered the State’s burden of proof; (3) he was denied

his right to effective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel did not cite Evanchyk

v. Stewart, 202 Ariz. 476, 47 P.3d 1114 (2002), in support of his claim that insufficient

evidence supported his conviction; (4) his constitutional right to confront witnesses was

violated by the admission of out-of-court statements by a co-conspirator; and (5) his right to

due process was violated by the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself. 

In his first ground for relief, petitioner asserts that his right to due process was

violated because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding him

guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. In particular, he contends that there was

insufficient evidence to establish that he agreed to participate in a plan that included first

degree murder. After an exhaustive review of the trial transcript, and based on evidence that

established petitioner’s extensive participation in the conspiracy, the magistrate judge

concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy

to commit first degree murder. The judge found that petitioner has failed to establish that the

state courts’ rulings rejecting his sufficiency of the evidence claim were either contrary to,

or based on an unreasonable application of, federal law, or involved an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

After a de novo review, we agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that sufficient

evidence existed to support petitioner’s conviction. He is not entitled to habeas relief on

Ground One. 

Petitioner next objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Ground Two is

procedurally defaulted, arguing that his “grounds for relief are intertwined” with his claims

under Grounds One, Three, and Six. Objection at 15. Based on our de novo review, we

agree that petitioner did not fairly present his claim to the state courts and therefore Ground

Two is procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

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In his third ground for relief, petitioner argues that, pursuant to Evanchyk, 202 Ariz.

476, 47 P.3d 1114 (2002), his conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder is

invalid, and that appellate counsel’s failure to cite Evanchyk constitutes ineffective assistance

of counsel. We agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that petitioner is not entitled

to habeas relief because he has not shown that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. Evanchyk

does not apply to petitioner’s case because the State did not assert a felony murder theory of

conspiracy. Moreover, the jury was properly instructed on the elements necessary to find

petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder based on a premeditation

theory, as opposed to a felony murder theory. Therefore, counsel’s failure to cite Evanchyk

does not constitute ineffective assistance. Ground Three does not provide a basis for habeas

relief.

Petitioner asserts in Ground Four that his constitutional right to confront witnesses

was violated by the admission of out-of-court statements by a co-conspirator. The magistrate

judge concluded that the out-of-court statements were admissible because the statements

were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Petitioner does not object to this conclusion and

accordingly we accept the magistrate judge’s recommendation that petitioner is not entitled

to habeas relief on Ground Four.

In Ground Five, petitioner asserts that the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself sua

sponte violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and due process. The

magistrate judge rejected this ground for relief, concluding that the claim was not properly

raised in state court and is therefore procedurally defaulted and barred from habeas review,

and that, even when considering the merits of the claim, Ground Five does not entitle

petitioner to habeas relief. Petitioner does not object to this conclusion. We accept the

magistrate judge’s recommendation that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Ground

Five. 

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In Ground Six, petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated by the

trial court’s so-called Pinkerton jury instruction that “a conspirator is liable for all criminal

acts committed by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” See

Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180 (1946). He claims that this

instruction improperly lowered the State’s burden of proof and allowed the jury to convict

him of conspiracy to commit first degree murder without finding that he had the requisite

intent to support a conviction for first degree murder. Under Arizona law, a conspirator is

responsible for a co-conspirator’s acts only if the conspirator is an accomplice or principal.

State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497, 501, 844 P.2d 1147, 1151 (1992). To be an

accomplice, a conspirator must aid, counsel, agree to aid, or attempt to aid in the commission

of the substantive offense–in this case first degree murder. Id.

The magistrate judge first concluded that petitioner did not exhaust the claim raised

in Ground Six and that it is therefore barred from habeas review. Petitioner did not object

to this conclusion and we accept the magistrate judge’s conclusion. Petitioner’s request for

relief pursuant to Ground Six is procedurally defaulted and is therefore denied. 

In addition, however, the magistrate judge rejected the claim asserted in Ground Six

on its merits. Although the judge found that the Pinkerton jury instruction was improperly

given, he concluded that the instruction did not “so infect the entire trial” that petitioner’s

conviction violated due process. R&R at 78 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112

S. Ct. 475, 482 (1991)). We agree. Based on the jury instructions as a whole, the trial court

properly instructed the jury that to convict petitioner of conspiracy to commit first degree

murder, it could not merely find that he acted in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit

escape. The court instructed the jury that it could only convict petitioner of conspiracy to

commit first degree murder if it found that petitioner agreed with at least one other person

that one of them or another person would commit first degree murder, and that he made the

agreement with the intent to promote or aid the commission of the crime of first degree

murder. (Doc. 10, exhibit Q at 123). The jury was further instructed that it must consider

each charge against each defendant separately. (Doc. 17, exhibit JJ at 16). The magistrate

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judge concluded that the jury instruction did not give rise to a due process violation because

there is “no ‘reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

way’ that violates the Constitution.” R&R at 86 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S. Ct.

at 482). Finally, the magistrate judge concluded that even if the instruction did result in a due

process violation, the error was harmless because petitioner was not charged with any

substantive offenses, and therefore the Pinkerton instruction did not apply to him. For all of

these reasons, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Ground Six.

Based on the foregoing, we accept the report and recommendation of the magistrate

judge pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING the petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc. 1).

DATED this 19th day of March, 2009.

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