Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02075/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bianca Jimenez-Bencebi, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

State of Arizona, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-23-02075-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

INTRODUCTION

Bianca Jimenez-Bencebi (“Jimenez-Bencebi”) is the mother of L.J., K.J., K.A.J, and 

J.A.J., as well as non-party J.M.J., and Jiaro Abrego Zavaleta (“Zavaleta”) is the father of 

K.A.J. and J.A.J. 

At some point in September 2018, the Arizona Department of Child Services 

(“DCS”) filed a dependency petition to remove K.J. and J.M.J. from Jimenez-Bencebi’s

care. The petition was prompted by DCS’s receipt of a hotline call accusing JimenezBencebi of being temporarily homeless, aggressive, and neglectful toward her children. 

On September 14, 2018, DCS removed K.J. and J.M.J from Jimenez-Bencebi’s care. A 

few months later, DCS filed a petition to sever Jimenez-Bencebi’s parental rights to K.J. 

and J.M.J. As the severance proceedings were unfolding, Jimenez-Bencebi gave birth to 

K.A.J. DCS, in turn, removed K.A.J. from Jimenez-Bencebi’s care and amended the 

severance petition to include K.A.J. As the amended severance proceedings were 

unfolding, Jimenez-Bencebi gave birth to J.A.J. DCS, in turn, removed J.A.J. from 

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Jimenez-Bencebi’s care and amended the severance petition to include J.A.J. Finally, in 

May 2022, the juvenile court ruled in large part against DCS in the severance proceedings, 

ordering reunification as to K.J., K.A.J, and J.A.J. However, “DCS took no affirmative 

steps toward implementing the reunification case plan until five months later.” (Doc. 1-3 

at 140 ¶ 40.)

These developments provide the backdrop for this case, in which Jimenez-Bencebi, 

Zavaleta, L.J, K.J., K.A.J, and J.A.J. (together, “Plaintiffs”) have asserted a sprawling array 

of federal and state-law claims against the State of Arizona (the “State”) and various state 

employees (together, “Defendants”). Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss. (Doc. 6.) For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied 

in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts, presumed true, are derived from Plaintiffs’ operative pleading, 

the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 1-3 at 132-75.)

I. The Parties And Other Relevant Entities

Jimenez-Bencebi is the mother of L.J., K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. (Id. at 134 

¶ 6; id. at 137 ¶ 21.) However, J.M.J. “is not a party to this lawsuit and no claims are being 

brought on J.M.J.’s behalf.” (Doc. 11 at 3 n.1.)

Zavaleta is Jimenez-Bencebi’s husband and the biological father of K.A.J. and J.A.J. 

(Doc. 1-3 at 134 ¶ 7; id. at 137 ¶ 22.)

Between 2018 and 2020, K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J., as well as non-party J.M.J., were 

removed from Jimenez-Bencebi’s care. (Id. at 139 ¶¶ 38(d), (h); id. at 141 ¶ 48.)

The State of Arizona “is a government entity, operating through several agencies, 

including [DCS].” (Id. at 134 ¶ 12.)

Carin Patchin was “an employee of the [State] through DCS.” (Id. at 134-35 ¶ 13.) 

She worked as Jimenez-Bencebi’s caseworker “between October 2018 to March 2021.” 

(Id. at 140 ¶ 42.) She “is named herein in her individual capacity.” (Id. at 135 ¶ 13.)

Tracy Del Fiacco is “an employee of the [State] through the DCS.” (Id. at 135 ¶ 14.) 

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She replaced Patchin as the caseworker assigned to Jimenez-Bencebi after March or April 

2021. (Id. at 140 ¶ 43; id. at 147 ¶ 91. See also id. at 185 n.1 [correcting the misspelling 

of Del Fiacco’s first name in the FAC].) She “is named herein in her individual capacity.” 

(Id. at 135 ¶ 14.)

Amanda Davisson is “an employee of the [State] through the DCS.” (Id. at 135 

¶ 15.) She supervised Patchin and Del Fiacco. (Id. at 140 ¶ 44.) She “is named herein in 

her individual capacity.” (Id. at 135 ¶ 15.)1

Gregory McKay served as “Director of the DCS.” (Id. at 135 ¶ 17.) As Director, 

“McKay was the official policymaker . . . for DCS.” (Id.) “He is named herein in his 

individual and official capacity.” (Id.) 

Michael Faust served as “Director of the DCS” after McKay. (Id. at 135 ¶ 16.) As 

Director, “Faust was the official policymaker for the DCS.” (Id.) “He is named herein in 

his individual and official capacity.” (Id.)

II. Relevant Factual Background

In 2016, Jimenez-Bencebi lived in Missouri with her children, L.J. and K.J. (Id. at 

137 ¶ 24.)

On November 30, 2016, Jimenez-Bencebi was raped and, as a result, conceived 

J.M.J. (Id.) 

On July 17, 2017, “L.J. was acting out and [Jimenez-Bencebi] allegedly hit and bit 

him. L.J. called the police, and [Jimenez-Bencebi] was arrested.” (Id. at 137 ¶ 26.) 

Jimenez-Bencebi “pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of physically abusing L.J.” and 

“served a 120-day jail sentence.” (Id. at 137 ¶ 27.) While Jimenez-Bencebi was 

incarcerated, L.J. moved to Puerto Rico to live with his father and K.J. was placed in foster

1 The case caption lists Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson “individually and as an 

employee with the State of Arizona Department of Child Safety.” (Id. at 132-33). Because 

Plaintiffs later specify in the body of the FAC that Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson are 

named in their individual capacities, the Court does not interpret the case caption as naming 

Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson as parties in their official capacities. 5A Charles Alan 

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1321 (4th ed. 2023) (“[T]he

caption is not determinative as to the identity of the parties to the action . . . .”).

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care. (Id. at 138 ¶ 29.)

On August 25, 2017, while incarcerated, Jimenez-Bencebi gave birth to J.M.J. (Id.) 

J.M.J. was placed in foster care. (Id.)

In December 2017, “[t]he State of Missouri returned K.J. and J.M.J. to [JimenezBencebi] . . . a few weeks after she was released from jail.” (Id. at 138 ¶ 31.) L.J. continued 

to reside in Puerto Rico with his father. (Id. at 138 ¶ 30.) “[T]he Missouri social workers 

wrote many positive things about [Jimenez-Bencebi’s] parenting, including the fact that 

L.J. was polite and well-educated and that K.J. was well-cared for and had a strong bond 

with her mother.” (Id. at 138 ¶ 32.)

In January 2018, Jimenez-Bencebi moved to Arizona with K.J. and J.M.J. and began 

living with Zavaleta and his sister. (Id. at 138 ¶ 33.)

In late August 2018, Zavaleta’s “sister threw [Jimenez-Bencebi] out of the house 

. . . . [Jimenez-Bencebi] was pregnant with K.A.J. at the time.” (Id. at 138 ¶ 35.) JimenezBencebi then “suffered a temporary period of housing instability which lasted only a few 

weeks” and “spent a few days in a homeless shelter, Gift of Mary Shelter,” with K.J. and 

J.M.J. (Id. at 138 ¶ 36.) 

While at the shelter, someone stole money from Jimenez-Bencebi’s purse. (Id. at 

141 ¶ 48(a).)2 “When she complained about the theft, [she] was asked to leave.” (Id. at 

141 ¶ 48(b).) “Later, a hotline call was made to DCS.” (Id. at 141 ¶ 48(c).) With the 

information obtained from this call, “Patchin reported to the juvenile court that [JimenezBencebi] threatened a person with a knife at the Gift of Mary Shelter, left J.M.J. in his car 

seat for extended times, prevented others from feeding J.M.J., and only paid attention to 

K.J.” (Id. at 141 ¶ 48(e).) 

On September 6, 2018, Jimenez-Bencebi “brought J.M.J. to a medical appointment 

to keep his vaccinations up to date. This medical professional and mandatory reporter 

noted nothing unusual about J.M.J. and did not report [Jimenez-Bencebi].” (Id. at 138 

2 The FAC does not provide a specific date for this event. In Plaintiffs’ response 

brief, Plaintiffs state these events occurred “[i]n September 2018.” (Doc. 11 at 3.)

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¶ 37.)

At some point in September 2018, “[t]he first dependency petition was filed . . . as 

to K.J. and J.M.J.” (Id. at 139 ¶ 38(b).)3

On September 14, 2018, DCS removed K.J. and J.M.J. from Jimenez-Bencebi’s 

care. (Id. at 141 ¶ 48.) Upon removal, K.J. and J.M.J. were taken to Phoenix Children’s 

Hospital (“PCH”) for a physical examination. (Id. at 141 ¶ 52.) The examination found 

“no issues . . . with K.J.” (Id. at 142 ¶ 53.) “J.M.J. was admitted to PCH and found to have 

mild to moderate malnutrition.” (Id. at 142 ¶ 54.) J.M.J.’s medical records from September 

14, 2018 provided that:

J.M.J. could sit on his own, pull to stand, and was active, crawling, playful 

and happy, and that he had a total of one small fine scratch (~3/4 inch), one 

small bruise (~1/4 inch) on his cheek, and three small bruises (~1/4 to 3/8 

inch) on his right thigh. Mongolian spots were found on his back and 

buttocks, as well as some areas of hyperpigmentation. He had no bruising at 

all on his back; and the shape of J.M.J.’s head was normal, and not noted as 

flat.

(Id. at 142 ¶¶ 56-57, emphasis omitted.) J.M.J. weighed “17.3 pounds when he was 

admitted to PCH.” (Id. at 142 ¶ 59.) 

On September 20, 2018, J.M.J. was released from PCH “to his ‘adoptive’ mothers.” 

(Id. at 142 ¶¶ 55, 58.)

As of September 26, 2018, J.M.J. weighed 17.1 pounds. (Id. at 142 ¶ 59.) 

On January 24, 2019, “DCS filed a petition to terminate [Jimenez-Bencebi’s] 

parental rights to K.J. and J.M.J.” (“First Severance Petition”). (Id. at 139 ¶ 38(c).) In the 

First Severance Petition, reports to the juvenile court, and testimony in the juvenile court 

proceedings, Patchin stated:

[A.] [Jimenez-Bencebi] was homeless for several months in 2018; b. J.M.J. 

was so severely malnourished he was feeble and could barely sit up; c. J.M.J. 

had a flat head, distended stomach and non-accidental bruising all over his 

back; d. [Jimenez-Bencebi] did not like J.M.J. because [he] was a baby 

3 The FAC does not provide a specific date for the filing of the dependency petition.

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conceived by rape; e. K.J. had scratches on her face evidencing abuse; 

f. [Jimenez-Bencebi] was aggressive, as reported by a nameless witness at a 

homeless shelter; and g. [Jimenez-Bencebi] had been convicted of felonious 

child abuse in Missouri in 2017.

(Id. at 142-43 ¶ 63.) Patchin also stated “that [Jimenez-Bencebi] is an aggressive ex-felon

who hates boys and is a danger to her children.” (Id. at 143 ¶ 66.) Davisson, Patchin’s 

supervisor at DCS, signed the report containing these statements. (Id. at 140 ¶ 46.) The 

First Severance Petition was filed after Jimenez-Bencebi “successfully completed parent 

aid services.” (Id. at 144 ¶ 68.)

On March 5, 2019, Jimenez-Bencebi gave birth to K.A.J., and K.A.J. was later 

removed from Jimenez-Bencebi’s care. (Id. at 139 ¶ 38(d).)

On August 28, 2019, Jimenez-Bencebi’s therapist, Dr. Rossana Hanley, issued a 

report stating that “there is a good chance that [Jimenez-Bencebi] has completed what she 

needs to do for DCS.” (Id. at 145 ¶ 73.) Dr. Hanley diagnosed Jimenez-Bencebi with 

“adjustment disorder with depressed mood.” (Id. at 146 ¶ 85.)

In January 2020, the juvenile court granted the First Severance Petition and severed

Jimenez-Bencebi’s parental rights to K.J. and J.M.J. (Id. at 139 ¶ 38(f).) However, 

Jimenez-Bencebi “appealed the severance on procedural grounds. The severance was 

reversed, and [she] requested to have visits reinstated with her children.” (Id. at 147 ¶ 90.) 

On February 12, 2020, Jimenez-Bencebi gave birth to J.A.J., and J.A.J. was later 

removed from Jimenez-Bencebi’s care. (Id. at 139 ¶ 38(h).) In “support [of] removing 

K.A.J. and J.A.J. and to keep all the children in State’s care,” Patchin made the following 

statements to the juvenile court: 

[A.] on one occasion in July 2019 [Jimenez-Bencebi] allegedly shouted at 

her therapist, Dr. Hanley; b. on one occasion, while in labor in the hospital, 

[Jimenez-Bencebi] allegedly stated she would name J.A.J. “Motherfucker;”

c. [Jimenez-Bencebi] allegedly has gender dysmorphic disorder; and 

d. [Jimenez-Bencebi] allegedly willfully neglected J.M.J. because she hates 

boys.

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(Id. at 144-45 ¶ 71.)4 Davisson signed Patchin’s report containing these statements. (Id.

at 140 ¶ 46.) 

On December 14, 2020, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parent-child 

relationship as to K.J., J.M.J., and K.A.J. (“Second Severance Petition”). (Id. at 139 

¶ 38(g).) Although Jimenez-Bencebi requested that her visits with K.J. and J.M.J. be 

reinstated following the reversal of the order granting the First Severance Petition, “DCS 

and its agents refused to re-intestate [sic] these visits, pending the final ruling on their 

[S]econd [S]everance [P]etition.” (Id. at 147 ¶ 90.) 

In March or April 2021, “Del Fiacco took over the role of the State’s DCS 

[c]aseworker.” (Id. at 147 ¶ 91.) 

On May 20, 2021, “DCS amended the December 2020 severance petition to include 

J.A.J,” such that the new petition (“Third Severance Petition”) “was now for the 

termination of the parent-child relationship as to all four children (K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., and 

J.A.J.).” (Id. at 139 ¶ 38(i).) Davisson signed Del Fiacco’s reports submitted to the 

juvenile court. (Id. at 140 ¶ 46.)

On January 10, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing on the Third Severance 

Petition. (Id. at 147 ¶ 94.) At the hearing, “Del Fiacco testified that she had met with 

[Jimenez-Bencebi] only twice in the 10 to 11 months she had been on the case, and that 

she had never observed the parents during a visit with their children. Still, Del Fiacco . . .

alleged that [Jimenez-Bencebi] focused on the ‘wrong things’ during the visits.” (Id.) “The 

parent supervisor at Cradles to Crayons, Christina Martinez, testified at trial that [JimenezBencebi’s] concerns about her daughter were accurate and reasonable.” (Id. at 147 ¶ 97.) 

“When [Martinez] supported [Jimenez-Bencebi’s] motion for increase[d] visits with her 

children at trial, the State” responded that:

While the current service provider with Cradles to Crayons stated during trial 

proceedings that they do not see an issue with increasing visitations, their 

4 The FAC does not identify the date these statements were made or specify whether 

they appeared in Patchin’s report, a severance or dependency petition, and/or in Patchin’s 

testimony.

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report dated 05 November 2021 suggests otherwise. [Martinez] and her 

[s]upervisor who both signed off on the report, stated, “[Jimenez-Bencebi] is 

not self-aware of how her lack of impulse control is affecting her relationship 

with her children.” This statement does not suggest [Jimenez-Bencebi] has 

addressed the behavioral concerns that brought the children into 

departmental care. 

(Id. at 148 ¶ 98, emphasis in original.) “Both [Martinez] and her supervisor later stated 

that the italicized statement above . . . was provided by the State through DCS at intake 

and was not reflective of their assessment of [Jimenez-Bencebi] on 05 November 2021.” 

(Id. at 148 ¶ 99.)

On February 4, 2022, “Carlos J. Vega, PSY.D. issued his report regarding [JimenezBencebi’s] psychological evaluation. Dr. Vega found that the State and DCS were essential 

[sic] mistreating [Jimenez-Bencebi] rather than assisting her, re-victimizing her, [that she] 

struggl[ed] with depression due to the removal of her children, there was insufficient reason 

for the State and DCS to suspect any risk on the part of [Jimenez-Bencebi] and no basis 

that she would be unsafe with her children.” (Id. at 148 ¶ 102.)

On May 11, 2022, “the juvenile court ruled from the bench to sever[] [JimenezBencebi’s] rights as to J.M.J, based on neglect under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). At the same 

time, the juvenile court changed the case plan from severance to reunification for K.J[.], 

K.A.J., and J.A.J. The court ordered DCS to have a meeting with [the] parents within 30 

days of [the] 11 May 2022 ruling to start the reunification process.” (Id. at 140 ¶ 38(k).)

For six weeks following the juvenile court’s May 2022 decision, “DCS cancelled 

all of [Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta’s] supervised visits with their children.” (Id. at 140 

¶ 39.) “Since September 2018 until six weeks after the May 2022 order changing the case 

plan to reunification, [Jimenez-Bencebi] has had only limited and, at times, no access to 

K.J. and J.M.J.” (Id. at 149 ¶ 105.) “DCS took no affirmative steps toward implementing 

the reunification case plan until more than five months later.” (Id. at 140 ¶ 40.) 

On May 25, 2023, “the juvenile court dismissed the dependency action and ended 

the State, DCS and its agents’ involvement.” (Id. at 140 ¶ 41.) K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. 

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were returned to Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta. (Id.)

III. Procedural History

On May 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the State of 

Arizona. (Id. at 5-48.)

On September 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the FAC. (Id. at 132-75.) In the FAC, 

Plaintiffs assert 13 claims.

In Count One, Plaintiffs assert a § 1983 claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, and 

Davisson “for violating Plaintiffs’ Right to Freedom of Association under the First

Amendment and Due Process under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. 

Constitution for unlawfully seizing and detaining K.J., J.M.J., J.A.J. and K.A.J.” (Id. at 

151.)

In Count Two, Plaintiffs assert a § 1983 claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, and 

Davisson “for violating Plaintiffs’ right to Due Process under the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments for making misrepresentations and/or omissions to the court which were 

deliberate falsehoods and/or which demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth.” (Id.

at 153-54.)

In Count Three, Plaintiffs assert a § 1983 claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, and 

Davisson “for violating Plaintiffs[’] right to Due Process under the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments for failing to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family relationship.” 

(Id. at 156.)

In Count Four, Plaintiffs assert a § 1983 claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, 

Davisson, Faust, and McKay “for violating Plaintiffs[’] right to Due Process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to make medical decisions for E.F.” (Id.

at 158.)

In Count Five, Plaintiffs assert a § 1983 claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, 

Davisson, Faust, and McKay “for violating Plaintiffs[’] right to Due Process Right under 

the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to be with E.F. during medical 

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treatment.” (Id. at 159.)5

In Count Six, Plaintiffs assert a state-law negligence per se claim against Patchin, 

Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay. (Id. at 160.)

In Count Seven, Plaintiffs assert a state-law claim for abuse of process against 

Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson. (Id. at 162, 164.)6

In Count Eight, Plaintiffs assert a state-law claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, 

Davisson, Faust, and McKay “for exercising gross negligence in carrying out their duty to 

protect the legal rights of children and families.” (Id. at 164, capitalization omitted.)

In Count Nine, Plaintiffs assert a state-law claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, 

Davisson, Faust, and McKay “for exercising gross negligence in carrying out their duty to 

make reasonable and/or diligent efforts to preserve the family relationship.” (Id. at 165, 

capitalization omitted.)

In Count Ten, Plaintiffs assert a state-law claim against Faust and McKay “for the 

gross negligence exercised by Defendant employees of DCS in carrying out their duties.” 

(Id. at 167, capitalization omitted.)

In Count Eleven, Plaintiffs assert a § 1983 claim against the State and DCS “for the 

unconstitutional acts of its employees which were committed pursuant to a policy and/or 

practice of DCS.” (Id. at 168.)

In Count Twelve, Plaintiffs assert a state-law claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, 

5 Neither the FAC nor Plaintiffs’ response identifies the “E.F.” referenced in Counts 

Four and Five. It appears this may be an unintentional carryover from a pleading filed by 

Plaintiffs’ counsel in a different lawsuit. That lawsuit, like this one, involved a sprawling 

array of claims arising from DCS’s temporary removal of a child. Fidler v. Arizona, 2024 

WL 1553703, *1 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Plaintiff-Appellant Jessica Fidler, on behalf of herself 

and her son, E.F., appeals the district court’s order dismissing her third amended complaint 

against various defendants allegedly involved in the temporary removal of E.F. from her 

custody.”). At any rate, Defendants acknowledge that “[t]his is a presumed typographical 

error. It is being interpreted as referencing the children in this action.” (Doc. 16 at 6 n.4.) 

The Court will thus construe the reference to E.F. as meaning L.J., K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., and

J.A.J.

6 Although there are references to the State and DCS within the body of Count Seven, 

the caption of Count Seven makes clear that it is only being asserted against Patchin, Del 

Fiacco, and Davisson. (Doc. 1-3 at 162.) So does the final paragraph within this count. 

(Id. at 164 ¶ 213 [“Plaintiffs were directly and proximately irreparably harmed by Patchin, 

Del Fiacco, Davisson’s abuse of process. Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson are liable for this 

harm.”].)

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Davisson, Faust, and McKay “for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Id. at 171.)

In Count Thirteen, Plaintiffs assert a state-law claim against the State, DCS, 

Davisson, Faust, and McKay for “negligent supervision, negligent training and negligent 

retention.” (Id. at 172, capitalization omitted.)

On October 3, 2023, Defendants removed this action to federal court. (Doc. 1.)

On October 12, 2023, Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. 6.)

On November 9, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a response. (Doc. 11.)

On November 20, 2023, Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 16.) Nobody requested 

oral argument.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) for the following 

reasons: “First, L.J. should be dismissed as a party because he has no standing to sue for 

interference with familial association as a sibling. Second, DCS requires dismissal as it is 

a non-jural entity and cannot be sued; and the State requires dismissal from the federal 

claim[s]. Third, all claims are barred by the statute of limitations, so all counts should be 

dismissed with no leave to amend. Fourth, all state claims are barred by an untimely notice 

of claim, so counts 5-10, 12, and 13 should be dismissed with no leave to amend. Fifth, all 

§ 1983 claims should be dismissed against Davisson, Faust, and McKay since they are 

based solely on respondeat superior theory. Sixth, qualified immunity attaches to all 

federal claims. Finally, issue and claim preclusion prevent this lawsuit from proceeding.” 

(Doc. 6 at 21.)

Each argument is discussed in further detail below, with the arguments reordered 

for purposes of analytical clarity.

I. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), “to survive a motion to dismiss, a party must allege ‘sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” In 

re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

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to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A]ll well-pleaded allegations 

of material fact in the complaint are accepted as true and are construed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. at 1144-45 (citation omitted). However, the court 

need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679-

80. Moreover, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. The court also may dismiss due 

to “a lack of a cognizable legal theory.” Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

II. L.J.’s “Standing”

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that “L.J. has no standing as a sibling and requires dismissal” 

because “[a]lthough the FAC is vague on the specific constitutional violations that L.J. 

asserts, it appears grounded in his relationship to his siblings, which does not constitute a 

viable cause of action.” (Doc. 6 at 5, capitalization omitted.)

In response, Plaintiffs clarify that “L.J.’s familial association claim is for the loss of 

his mother.” (Doc. 11 at 6.) 

In reply, Defendants argue that even if “L.J.’s claims are based on DCS’s 

interference in his relationship with [Jimenez-Bencebi],” L.J. still lacks “a viable cause of

action,” in part because “the FAC is devoid of facts supporting steps taken by [Defendants]

to interfere in this familial relationship.” (Doc. 16 at 3, capitalization omitted.) Defendants 

argue that “[t]he only plausible interpretation of these facts is that [Defendants] did not 

interfere with this relationship, only that [Jimenez-Bencebi] and L.J. ‘feared’ that they 

might. [Defendants] cannot logically be found liable for actions not taken.” (Id. at 4.)

B. Analysis

The parties’ briefing sequence has complicated the task of analyzing Defendants’ 

challenge to L.J.’s “standing.” The first problem is deciphering the nature of the challenge 

that Defendants seek to raise. A challenge to a plaintiff’s Article III standing is typically 

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raised via Rule 12(b)(1), because a lack of Article III standing implicates the Court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining 

that the constitutional “standing inquiry focuses upon whether a party has a sufficient stake 

in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy”) 

(cleaned up). However, Defendants move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and never 

mention Article III when challenging L.J.’s “standing” to pursue a familial association 

claim—to the contrary, Defendants simply assert that any claim “grounded in [L.J.’s] 

relationship to his siblings . . . does not constitute a viable cause of action.” (Doc. 6 at 5.) 

In their reply, Defendants again clarify that they seek dismissal because “L.J. does not have 

a viable cause of action.” (Doc. 16 at 3, capitalization omitted.) The Court thus construes 

Defendants’ motion as bringing a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to L.J.’s claims on the ground 

that he lacks statutory standing. Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 

2011) (distinguishing between a “lack of statutory standing [that] requires dismissal for 

failure to state a claim” and a “lack of Article III standing [that] requires dismissal for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)”). See 

generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“It is 

firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause 

of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or 

constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”); Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park 

District, 971 F.3d 722, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is not unusual for the distinction 

between standing and the merits to cause conceptual trouble when a plaintiff alleges the 

deprivation of a dubious property or liberty interest. Yet as we have explained before, to 

say that a claim is not worth anything is a determination that concerns the merits rather 

than jurisdiction. Otherwise every losing suit would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”) 

(cleaned up).

7

7 Of course, because “[s]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III . . . both the Supreme Court and [the Ninth Circuit]

have held that whether or not the parties raise the issue, federal courts are required sua 

sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing.” D’Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge 

& Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). The Court is satisfied that L.J. 

possesses Article III standing here. “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 

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This clarification dovetails with the second problem posed by the parties’ briefing 

sequence—the FAC fails to clearly indicate which of the 13 counts are being asserted by 

L.J.8and Defendants do not specify which counts they seek to dismiss. Although it perhaps 

might be possible for the Court to independently identify the elements of all 13 counts and 

then independently analyze whether each is “viable” as applied to L.J., the Court declines 

to do so. It was Defendants’ burden, as the movants, to explain why L.J.’s claims are 

subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and Defendants have failed to meet that burden. 

Cf. Shay v. Apple Inc., 512 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1071 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (“The Court agrees 

that Defendants have failed to address the allegations and theories of liability relied upon 

by Plaintiff. On a motion to dismiss, it is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that 

plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Here, the first four arguments presented in Defendants’ 

motion are arguments untethered to Plaintiff’s specific theories of liability. Defendants 

provide summary arguments and analyses seeking dismissal of all causes of action without 

addressing how they apply to each cause of action. As such, these four arguments fail to 

meet Defendants’ burden under Rule 12(b)(6) to prove that no claim has been presented 

for violations of the CLRA, UCL, negligent misrepresentation and breach of the implied 

contains three elements”: (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact; (2) a causal 

connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the 

injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560-61 (1992). Here, L.J.’s asserted injury is a lack of familial association with his 

mother. Sidestepping, for a moment, whether L.J. has a viable cause of action to seek 

redress for that sort of injury, the injury itself is particularized and concrete. As for 

causation, the FAC alleges that “[b]ecause of the State and DCS’s wrongful seizure and 

detention of K.J., J.M.J., J.A.J. and K.A.J., L.J. and [Jimenez-Bencebi] were reasonably 

afraid to have him return to live with his mother.” (Doc. 1-3 at 153 ¶ 137.) This is 

sufficient to satisfy the “Article III causation threshold,” which is “less rigorous” than 

proximate causation. Canyon Cty. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 974 n.7 (9th Cir. 

2008). See also Maya, 658 F.3d at 1070 (“To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of 

constitutional standing, plaintiffs must establish a line of causation between defendants’

action and their alleged harm that is more than attenuated. A causation chain does not fail 

simply because it has several links, provided those links are not hypothetical or tenuous 

and remain plausible.”) (cleaned up); Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 2013) 

(“[T]he test for whether a complaint shows the ‘fairly traceable’ element of Article III 

standing imposes a standard lower than proximate cause.”). Finally, the FAC sufficiently 

establishes redressability, as L.J. seeks damages to compensate for the loss of familial 

association. (Doc. 1-3 at 174.) 

8

It appears that L.J. is specifically identified as an aggrieved party only in Count One 

(Doc. 1-3 at 153 ¶ 138) and Count Six (id. at 161 ¶ 184), although many of the Counts 

seem to indicate they are being asserted by “Plaintiffs.”

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warranty of merchantability.”) (citations and footnote omitted). 

III. The State, DCS, And Faust And McKay In Their Official Capacities

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that because “[n]either DCS nor the [State] are ‘persons’ under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983,” they cannot be sued under § 1983 and “it is appropriate to dismiss count 

11 in its entirety.” (Doc. 6 at 5-6.) Defendants also argue that “DCS is a non-jural entity 

and cannot be sued at all, either under § 1983 or under state law.” (Id. at 6.)

In response, Plaintiffs concede that “DCS is not a named Defendant in this 

matter. . . . DCS is merely identified as an ‘agency’ through which the [State], who is a 

party, is alleged to have acted.” (Doc. 11 at 7.) However, Plaintiffs argue that their § 1983 

claims against the State are viable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 

436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiffs add that they “have sufficiently alleged facts 

which would support a finding of liability against the [State]—by and through DCS 

employees. Additionally, Plaintiffs can bring a state law claim against the [State] as § 1983 

and it [sic] case law does not apply to state law claims.” (Id. at 9.)

In reply, Defendants argue, for the first time, that the Eleventh Amendment bars 

Count Thirteen against the State and that Faust and McKay cannot be sued in their official 

capacities. (Doc. 16 at 5.) Defendants also distinguish Plaintiffs’ cited cases on the ground 

that they “involve lawsuits against municipalities and local governments, not against a 

State.” (Id.)

B. Analysis

1. DCS

The parties agree that DCS is not a party to this action and that “[i]t is appropriate 

to dismiss DCS as a party.” (Doc. 16 at 4, capitalization omitted; Doc. 11 at 7.) 

Additionally, DCS is a non-jural entity that cannot be sued. Neeley v. Arizona, 2022 WL 

44676, *7 (D. Ariz. 2022); Nelson v. Ariz. Dep’t of Economic Security, 2021 WL 3472742, 

*1 (D. Ariz. 2021). DCS is therefore dismissed without leave to amend. 

AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) (although 

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leave to amend should be freely granted, “a district court need not grant leave to amend 

where the amendment . . . is futile”).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against The State And Faust And McKay 

In Their Official Capacities

Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

Id. “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under 

§ 1983,” although “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive 

relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective 

relief are not treated as actions against the State.’” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 

491 U.S. 58, 71 & n.10 (1989) (citation omitted). See also Marcotte v. Monroe Corrections 

Complex, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1294 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (“‘Persons’ liable for damages 

under Section 1983 include state employees sued in their individual capacities. States and 

their agencies and state employees sued in their official capacities are not proper defendants 

under Section 1983 and therefore cannot be sued under the statute.”) (citation omitted). 

Counts Four and Five assert § 1983 claims against Faust and McKay, among other 

Defendants, and seek “general and special damages.” (Doc. 1-3 at 159 ¶ 172 [Count Four]; 

id. at 160 ¶ 177 [Count Five].) Faust and McKay are sued in their official and individual 

capacities. (Id. at 135 ¶¶ 16, 17.)9 Count Eleven asserts a § 1983 claim against the State 

and seeks “general and specific damages.” (Id. at 171 ¶ 248.) 

9 The Court acknowledges that Counts Four and Five refer to the Defendants named 

therein as “acting individually” (id. at 159-60 ¶¶ 171, 176), but does not interpret that 

language to override the earlier statement in the FAC that Faust and McKay are sued in 

both their official and individual capacities (id. at 135 ¶¶ 16, 17). The Court construes the 

complaint “liberally” and “afford[s] [Plaintiffs] the benefit of any doubt” at the motion to 

dismiss stage. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Because Faust and McKay in their official capacities are not “persons” under 

§ 1983, the official-capacity claims against those Defendants in Counts Four and Five are 

dismissed without leave to amend.

10

 Will, 491 U.S. at 71 & n.10. For the same reason, the 

claim against the State in Count Eleven is dismissed without leave to amend. Id. And 

because the only other defendant named in Count Eleven, DCS, has already been dismissed 

for other reasons, Count Eleven is dismissed in its entirety. Plaintiffs’ cited cases do not 

alter these conclusions because they concern municipalities or individuals employed by 

municipalities. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 

U.S. 163, 164-65 (1993) (§ 1983 suit against “local law enforcement officers”); City of 

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (“[A] city can be liable under § 1983 for 

inadequate training of its employees . . . .”) (emphasis added); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 

(“Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the 

conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be 

included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.”) (emphasis added); Clouthier v. 

Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Castro v. Cnty. 

of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (§ 1983 suit against a county and county 

employees); Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); 

Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); Mabe v. San Bernardino 

Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Trevino v. 

Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1996), holding modified by Navarro v. Block, 250 

F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001) (§ 1983 suit against city and city employees); Davis v. City of 

Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1989) (§ 1983 suit against a “municipal 

defendant”). 

10 Although Defendants did not raise, until their reply, the argument that Faust and 

McKay cannot be sued in their official capacities under § 1983, the Court declines to find 

that argument forfeited because it presents a purely legal question whose resolution is 

compelled by settled law. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1007 

(9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[w]e have discretion . . . to overlook any waiver” and 

exercising that discretion in part “because the issue . . . is a purely legal question”). Indeed, 

the Supreme Court has suggested that a court may dismiss a § 1983 claim on the ground 

that the defendant is not a “person” even if the defendant did not raise that specific 

argument. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002).

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3. Count Thirteen

Defendants’ final argument, raised for the first time in their reply, pertains to Count 

Thirteen, which is a state-law claim against the State, Davisson, Faust, and McKay.

11

 (Doc. 

1-3 at 172.) Defendants contend the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs from asserting 

this claim against the State. (Doc. 16 at 5.)

On the one hand, under the Eleventh Amendment, states and state officials sued in 

their official capacities are immune from state-law claims brought in federal court. 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984). On the other hand, 

“the Eleventh Amendment is not a true limitation upon the court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction, but rather a personal privilege that a state may waive.” Hill v. Blind Indus. & 

Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 201

F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1999). 

One way a state can waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity is by voluntarily 

removing an action from state court. Walden v. Nevada, 945 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 

2019). However, “this general ‘voluntary invocation’ principle does not apply in all 

circumstances. Many states statutorily waive their immunity from suit on state-law claims 

in state court. The Supreme Court has held that, when a State that has enacted one of these 

statutes voluntarily removes a suit on state-law claims from state court to federal court, that 

State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.” Id. (citations omitted). In 

contrast, “courts are divided on whether . . . a State defendant’s removal to federal court 

waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity if the State has not waived its immunity to suit 

in state court.” Bodi v. Shingle Springs Bank of Miwok Indians, 832 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th 

Cir. 2016). See also id. at 1019 n. 11 (“Although, in Embury [v. King, 361 F.3d 562, 566 

(9th Cir. 2004)], we characterized Lapides broadly as setting forth a straightforward, easyto-administer rule that removal waives Eleventh Amendment immunity, we did not 

explicitly consider whether it applied when a State defendant retained its immunity from 

11 Count Thirteen is also asserted against DCS, but all claims against DCS have now 

been dismissed.

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suit in state court, as it appears the State defendants there had not done. We have since 

observed that the question whether Lapides’s rule applies when a State defendant has not 

consented to suit in its own courts remains unresolved in this circuit.”) (cleaned up).

Unfortunately, due to the untimely manner in which Defendants raised their 

Eleventh Amendment challenge, neither side has briefed whether the State waived its 

immunity from suit on Count Thirteen in state court. Nor have the parties briefed how the 

Court should proceed in the absence of such a state-court waiver—as noted, Ninth Circuit 

law appears to be unsettled on this issue. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes 

that the State forfeited its Rule 12(b)(6) Eleventh Amendment challenge to Count Thirteen 

by raising that challenge for the first time in a reply brief. Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 

997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first 

time in a reply brief.”). This ruling is without prejudice to the State raising this issue again 

at a future stage of this case, at which time it can be properly briefed.

IV. Issue And Claim Preclusion

A. Issue Preclusion

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that the doctrine of issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) “bar[s] 

this lawsuit” because (1) “Plaintiffs and Defendants are the same parties in the underlying 

state court dependency proceedings”; (2) the “[i]ssues were litigated and decided in state 

court/Plaintiffs had full and fair opportunity”; (3) the “[i]ssues [were] necessary to decide 

the merits”; and (4) “[t]he issues at stake in the two cases are identical: whether removal 

and retention of custody was appropriate. There is no doubt the state court decided this 

issue on its merits.” (Doc. 6 at 17-20, capitalization omitted.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants cannot satisfy the elements for issue 

preclusion. . . . [T]he issues at stake are not the same in this matter as those in the 

dependency proceeding. . . . The issues at stake in this case . . . were not litigated and 

determined by the juvenile court dependency action. Plaintiffs did not have a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate these issues and did not do so.” (Doc. 11 at 20-21.)

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In reply, Defendants argue “that the [juvenile court] heard testimony and received 

exhibits on” the issues relevant to Counts One and Two. (Doc. 16 at 15-16.) Defendants 

further argue that the juvenile court addressed the issues relevant to Counts Three, Four, 

and Five because “Title 8 mandates the [juvenile court] review services, including contact 

with child, and make findings regarding reasonable efforts.” (Id. at 16.) Defendants also 

argue that the juvenile court addressed issues relevant to Counts Six through Thirteen 

because “the parties were able to question witnesses regarding education, training, 

experience, and DCS policies and procedures and bring those alleged deficiencies to the 

[juvenile court’s] attention in the dependency proceedings.” (Id.) Further, Defendants 

argue that Count Seven “is continually reviewed by the [juvenile court] as that [c]ourt has 

authority to issue orders and made decisions relating to the litigation.” (Id.) 

2. Analysis

“In determining the preclusive effect of a state-court judgment, this court must ‘refer 

to the preclusion law of the State in which judgment was rendered.’” Diruzza v. Cnty. of 

Tehama, 323 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). In Arizona, “[c]ollateral 

estoppel, or issue preclusion, binds a party to a decision on an issue litigated in a previous 

lawsuit if the following factors are satisfied: (1) the issue was actually litigated in the 

previous proceeding, (2) the parties had a full and fair opportunity and motive to litigate 

the issue, (3) a valid and final decision on the merits was entered, (4) resolution of the issue 

was essential to the decision, and (5) there is common identity of the parties.” Campbell 

v. SZL Properties, Ltd., 62 P.3d 966, 968 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “The fifth element is not 

required when a defendant asserts collateral estoppel.” Smith v. Barrow Neurological Inst. 

of St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2012 WL 3108811, *4 (D. Ariz. 2012), aff’d sub nom. 

Smith v. Banner Health Sys., 621 F. App’x 876 (9th Cir. 2015); accord Campbell, 62 P.3d 

at 968.

Issue preclusion does not apply here. In large part, this is because the first element

of issue preclusion (i.e., whether the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding) is 

not satisfied. Defendants’ argument to the contrary—that “[t]he issues at stake in the two 

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cases are identical: whether removal and retention of custody was appropriate”—is 

unavailing because, apart perhaps from Count One, it rests on an overly generalized 

description of the issues raised in this case and those raised in the dependency proceedings. 

Beginning with Plaintiffs’ federal claims (other than Count One), Plaintiffs assert 

§ 1983 claims for judicial deception (Count Two), failure to take reasonable efforts to 

preserve the family relationship (Count Three), and denial of Jimenez-Bencebi’s and 

Zavaleta’s ability to make medical decisions for their children or to be present during 

medical treatments (Counts Four and Five). (Doc. 1-3 at 153-60.)12 The FAC does not 

indicate that Plaintiffs raised any of these issues in the juvenile court proceedings, let alone 

that the court decided those issues. The allegations in Counts Two and Three focus on the 

allegedly false statements Patchin and Del Fiacco made to the juvenile court to support the 

removal of K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. The FAC does not allege that Plaintiffs raised 

the issues of Patchin’s and Del Fiacco’s alleged false statements during the juvenile court 

proceedings or that the falsity issue was actually litigated. Compare Dodson v. Cnty. of 

Los Angeles, 2022 WL 3681307, *2 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[U]nder this prong, we do not 

consider, for example, whether the veracity of the witnesses was at issue, but whether the 

core alleged misrepresentations were actually litigated. They were not. The dependency 

court did not determine whether the deputies falsified certain statements in the incident 

report, even though it found that G. was injured during the altercation.”) with Grimes v. 

Ayerdis, 2018 WL 3730314, *6 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“It is evident that Grimes already 

challenged the removal of his three children from parental custody and the allegedly 

fabricated evidence by defendants Ayerdis and Mendoza. The factual allegations on record 

forming the basis of Grimes’ claims, which he continued to dispute at the hearing, are also 

identical to those made in the juvenile dependency proceedings.”) and Kasdan v. Cnty. of 

Los Angeles, 2014 WL 6669354, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“As previously explained, during 

the juvenile dependency court’s determination regarding the children’s well-being, it was 

12 Count Eleven is another § 1983 claim, but it has now been dismissed for the reasons 

stated earlier in this order.

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necessary to assess credibility and resolve disputes over who was telling the truth. 

Additionally, as this Court’s previous order identified, these issues of ‘false and defamatory 

statements’ were presented to that court.”) (cleaned up). Regarding Counts Four and Five, 

the FAC does not allege that Plaintiffs raised the issue of not being able to make medical 

decisions for their children or be present for their children’s medical appointments, let 

alone that the juvenile court decided those issues.

Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are for negligence in failing to preserve the familial 

relationship and rights of children and parents (Counts Six, Eight, and Nine), abuse of 

process (Count Seven), negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention (Counts Ten 

and Thirteen), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Twelve). (Doc. 1-3 

at 160-68, 171-74.) Again, the FAC does not allege that Plaintiffs raised these issues, or 

that the juvenile court decided them, during the dependency and severance proceedings. 

Those proceedings concerned Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta’s fitness to retain custodial

and parental rights over their children, whereas this case concerns the actions taken by DCS 

caseworkers and the State. Although these issues may overlap in some ways, they are not 

the same. Compare Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Fisher, 104 F.3d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1997) (“It 

is obvious that the PACA issue was not litigated in the state action; there was no decision 

on the merits of the trust cause of action; the PACA claim was not essential to the 

determination of the contract claim; and there was no full and fair opportunity to litigate 

the PACA claim.”) with Crosby-Garbotz v. Fell in & for Cnty. of Pima, 434 P.3d 143, 149 

(Ariz. 2019) (“The precise issue here is whether Crosby abused C.C. on July 5, 2016, by 

shaking her, causing bleeding in C.C.’s brain and eyes. This factual issue was adjudicated 

in the dependency proceeding against the State. The same factual issue is the basis for the 

criminal charge.”).

Because the first element of issue preclusion is not satisfied with respect to all of 

these claims, the Court need not address the remaining elements.

This leaves Count One, which is a § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure and detention. 

(Doc. 1-3 at 151.) There is a stronger argument that an identity of issues exists as to this 

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claim because it, like the underlying juvenile court proceeding, ultimately turns on the 

propriety of the removal decision. As Defendants note, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the 

application of issue preclusion to similar claims. Smith, 621 F. App’x at 880-81 (“The 

district court granted summary judgment after concluding, based on the juvenile court’s 

findings as to Smith’s treatment of CR, that the state had a compelling interest in CR’s 

welfare that permitted it to lawfully interfere with Smith’s custody of CR. Consequently, 

the district court concluded that Smith had failed to establish that her constitutional right 

to custody of CR was violated by Banner.”). However, this case is distinguishable from 

Smith because the FAC alleges that “[t]he juvenile court finally recognized at the end of 

the second severance trial in May 2022, that the State, DCS and their agents’ picture of 

[Jimenez-Bencebi] as an abuser and [Zavaleta] as a passive inept father was inaccurate”

and thus “chang[ed] the case plan to reunification.” (Doc. 1-3 at 148-49 ¶¶ 103, 105.) This 

allegation suggests the juvenile court ultimately did not resolve the disputed issue in 

Defendants’ favor. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to the dismissal of Count One 

at this stage of the case based on issue preclusion.

B. Claim Preclusion

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that the doctrine of claim preclusion (or res judicata) “bar[s] this 

lawsuit” because (1) “a final judgment did issue in the state court proceeding on May 11, 

2022”; (2) “the parties are identical in both proceedings”; (3) “both actions concern the 

behavior and acts of DCS and its employees”; and (4) there is a “common identify [sic] of 

the cause of action.” (Doc. 6 at 17, 20-21, capitalization omitted.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that “[c]laim preclusion is not applicable. The claims 

in the juvenile dependency proceeding were different than the claims in this case, meaning 

there is no ‘identity of claims,’ as required for claim preclusion.” (Doc. 11 at 21.) 

Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he juvenile court’s only involvement was to determine 

if [Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta] were fit to parent their children. There were no legal 

issues before the juvenile court regarding the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights 

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under §1983.” (Id.)

In reply, Defendants argue that claim preclusion applies because “final appealable 

judgments were entered by a court of competent jurisdiction in January, 2020 and again on 

May 11, 2022.” (Doc. 16 at 17.) Further, Defendants argue that “in order to prove this 

civil rights case, Plaintiffs will utilize the exact same evidence as presented to the [state 

court]. . . . [J]ust because this is a constitutional violations case not a dependency 

proceeding does not alter the analysis.” (Id.)

2. Analysis

“[C]laim preclusion . . . bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were 

raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 

F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997). As with issue preclusion, the Court looks to Arizona law 

to determine the preclusive effect of the state-court judgment. Diruzza, 323 F.3d at 1152. 

For claim preclusion to apply, there must be “(1) an identity of claims in the suit in which 

a judgment was entered and the current litigation, (2) a final judgment on the merits in the 

previous litigation, and (3) identity or privity between parties in the two suits.” Lawrence 

T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 438 P.3d 259, 262 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (citation omitted).

“Arizona courts apply the ‘same evidence’ test” to evaluate the first element of the 

claim preclusion test. Id. at 264. See also Huffman v. Magic Ranch Ests. Homeowners 

Ass’n, 2023 WL 3000820, *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023) (unpub.) (acknowledging that the

Arizona Supreme Court continues to use the same-evidence test rather than the 

transactional approach). Under this approach, “[f]or an action to be barred, it must be based 

on the same cause of action asserted in the prior proceeding. Arizona has applied a rather 

restrictive test to resolve this question: If no additional evidence is needed to prevail in the 

second action than that needed in the first, then the second action is barred.” Phoenix 

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., State of Ariz., 934 P.2d 801, 804 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)

(citation omitted). “Two causes of action which arise out of the same transaction or 

occurrence are not the same for purposes of res judicata if proof of different or additional 

facts will be required to establish them.” E.C. Garcia and Co., Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

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Revenue, 875 P.2d 169, 179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). “The ‘same evidence’ test is quite 

liberal, and permits a plaintiff to avoid preclusion ‘merely by posturing the same claim as 

a new legal theory,’ even if both theories rely on the same underlying occurrence.” Power 

Rd.-Williams Field LLC v. Gilbert, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1309 (D. Ariz. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

At this stage in the case, where the Court must limit its analysis to the face of the 

FAC, Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006), Defendants have not 

demonstrated that dismissal is warranted based on the doctrine of claim preclusion. 

Although the actions underlying the issues in the juvenile court proceedings and this 

case are the same—the removal of K.J., J.M.J., J.A.J., and K.A.J. from Jimenez-Bencebi 

and Zavaleta—the claims asserted in each case are different. The juvenile court’s 

resolution of the dependency and severance actions did not resolve the constitutional and 

state-law claims at issue in this case. The juvenile court proceedings concerned JimenezBencebi’s and Zavaleta’s fitness to retain custodial and parental rights over their children. 

According to the FAC, Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta provided the following evidence in 

support of their fitness to parent: testimony from Martinez “that [Jimenez-Bencebi’s] 

concerns about her daughter were accurate and reasonable”; statements by Martinez and 

her supervisor that the State mischaracterized their assessment of Jimenez Bencebi; and a 

report by Dr. Vega that the State and DCS mistreated Jimenez-Bencebi and that she was 

not a danger to her children. (Doc. 1-3 at 147-48 ¶¶ 97-99, 102.) Plaintiffs must provide 

additional evidence regarding actions taken by the State, Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, 

Faust, and McKay to establish the distinct elements of the claims here. Best v. Driggs Title 

Agency, Inc., 2019 WL 7182582, *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (unpub.) (“In determining 

whether claims are precluded, courts consider whether the new cause of action requires the 

plaintiff to establish a distinct element through different or additional facts.”) (emphasis in 

original). Cf. Huffman, 2023 WL 3000820 at *4 (“But nuisance is a ‘separate or distinct 

cause of action’ from intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud and

misrepresentation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and a ‘derivative 

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action.’ The dismissal of those claims did not necessarily adjudicate the private nuisance 

action because none of those claims put at issue the question of interference with property. 

Evidence of interference with Huffman’s property is needed to sustain the private nuisance 

claim, and, although alleged in the 2016 complaint, it was not necessary to support the 

claims in that complaint.”) (cleaned up).

Because the first element of res judicata is not satisfied, the Court need not address 

the remaining elements.

V. Additional Arguments Regarding § 1983 Claims

Defendants raise four arguments specific to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims: (1) all of those 

claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Counts One through Five must be 

dismissed against Davisson, Faust, and McKay for failure to state a claim, because those 

defendants are being sued under an impermissible respondeat superior theory of liability; 

(3) Counts Three through Five should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, because the 

FAC fails to establish the essential element of a lack of due process; and (4) Defendants 

are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 6 at 6-11, 13-17.)

A. Statute Of Limitations

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that the § 1983 claims in Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Five 

accrued more than two years before Plaintiffs filed the complaint on May 8, 2023, and 

therefore the “statute of limitations is expired.” (Id. at 7, capitalization omitted.)13 

Regarding Count One, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs have not articulated any arguments 

demonstrating why they were not on notice of the injury at the time each child was 

removed, added to the dependency petition, and became a party to the underlying state 

court proceeding.” (Id. at 9.) Regarding Count Two, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs had 

notice of this alleged ‘false narrative’ no later than February 2020 because the claim is 

Patchin fabricated [certain] allegations to support removing K.A.J. and J.A.J. and to keep 

13 Defendants do not offer a specific argument regarding Count Eleven, which has, at 

any rate, been dismissed for other reasons.

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all the children in State’s care.” (Id., cleaned up.) Regarding Counts Three, Four, and 

Five, Defendants contend they “accrued on the date each individual child was removed” 

and “all ‘discrete unlawful acts’ occurring post-removal still accrue at removal.” (Id. at 

10-11.) Defendants also argue that “[a]ny proposed arguments supporting application of 

the continual tort doctrine must be disregarded because this claim is controlled by federal 

law, not state law.” (Id. at 9.) 

In response, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants are mistaken that the date of each 

removal is the accrual date for Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.” (Doc. 11 at 11.) Relying on 

McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109 (2019), Plaintiffs argue that “where . . . a particular 

claim may not realistically be brought while a violation is ongoing, such claims may accrue 

later. . . . The same reasoning and result apply here because of the [Defendants’] inordinate 

position of power over families caught within the dependency machinery.” (Id. at 12-13, 

cleaned up.) Plaintiffs argue that “the correct accrual date for [Jimenez-Bencebi’s and 

Zavaleta’s] claims is when the dependency proceedings terminated regaining full care and 

custody of their children on May 23, 2023.” (Id. at 13.)14 Plaintiffs also argue that “[t]he 

doctrine of continuing torts applies here as it would have been impractical for [JimenezBencebi and Zavaleta] to file a lawsuit every time they were injured by [Defendants’]

unlawful interference with their family with each removal of one of their children.” (Id.) 

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants have conceded that . . . the claims of minor 

Plaintiffs K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J[.] are not time barred due to their status as minors. L.J. is 

also a minor and his claims are not time barred pursuant [to] A.R.S. § 12-821.01(D).” (Id.

at 11 n.2.)

In reply, Defendants attempt to distinguish McDonough: “First, McDonough is a 

criminal case, not a civil case. Second, the identified tort in McDonough was malicious 

prosecution; not illegal seizure/detention, nor interference in familial association, nor even 

judicial deception. Third it is well-settled that malicious prosecution claims require a 

judgment in defendant’s favor, which is not an element in any of the torts alleged by 

14 The FAC alleges this date as May 25, 2023. (Doc. 1-3 at 140 ¶ 41.)

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Plaintiffs.” (Doc. 16 at 8.) Defendants then elaborate on their arguments regarding the 

statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. (Id. at 8-10.) 

2. Analysis

“[A]ll § 1983 suits must be brought within a State’s statute of limitations for 

personal-injury actions.” Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 174 (2022). See also Klein v. City 

of Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 2017) (“For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”) (cleaned 

up). In Arizona, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. A.R.S. 

§ 12-542(1). Accrual of § 1983 claims is governed by federal law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has 

reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.” Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 

568, 574 (9th Cir. 2012). “Thus, an action ordinarily accrues on the date of the injury.” 

Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “The discovery rule 

requires the plaintiff to be diligent in discovering the critical facts of the case.” Klein, 865 

F.3d at 1278. 

“Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6) only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would 

not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 

987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). “When calculating whether a statute of limitations 

bars a plaintiff’s claim, federal courts apply the forum state’s tolling laws so long as they 

do not contradict federal law.” Franco v. Mesa Pub. Sch., 2020 WL 7388489, *3 (D. Ariz. 

2020), aff’d sub nom. Franco v. Mesa Police Dep’t, 2022 WL 3136949 (9th Cir. 2022).

Because Plaintiffs filed the complaint on May 8, 2023, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims 

must have—absent the application of some tolling or delayed-accrual doctrine—accrued 

on or after May 8, 2021 to be timely.

a. L.J., K.J., K.A.J., And J.A.J.

Defendants’ arguments are unavailing as to L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. because 

“[in] Arizona . . . the statute of limitations is tolled until [the plaintiff] turns eighteen.” 

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Franco, 2020 WL 7388489 at *3. See also A.R.S. § 12-502. 

b. Jimenez-Bencebi And Zavaleta: Counts One, Three, Four, 

And Five

The injuries underlying the claims in Counts One (unlawful seizure and detention), 

Three (failure to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family relationship), Four 

(violating a parent’s right to make medical decisions for their child and a child’s right to 

have their parent make those decisions), and Five (violating a parent’s right to be present 

during their child’s medical treatments and a child’s right to have a parent present) are the 

removals of K.J., J.M.J., J.A.J., and K.A.J. from Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta’s care, 

which occurred on September 14, 2018, September 14, 2018, March 5, 2019, and February 

12, 2020, respectively. (Doc. 1-3 at 139 ¶¶ 38(d), (h); id. at 141 ¶ 48.) See Moore v. Cnty. 

of Sacramento, Dep’t of Child, 2020 WL 2489736, *6-7 (E.D. Cal. 2020), report and 

recommendation adopted sub nom. Moore v. Cnty. of Sacramento, Dep’t of Child, Fam. & 

Adult Servs., 2020 WL 3542262 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (identifying the date of injury for a 

familial-association claim as the alleged date the county removed the grandchildren from 

plaintiffs’ home). Even if Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts Four and Five accrued at the later 

date that medical decisions or treatments occurred, the FAC only alleges that such 

decisions and treatment occurred between September 14, 2018 and September 20, 2018, 

when K.J. and J.M.J. were taken to PCH. (Doc. 1-3 at 141 ¶ 52; id. at 142 ¶¶ 54-55.)

Thus, absent the application of some tolling or delayed-accrual doctrine, JimenezBencebi and Zavaleta were aware of the injuries giving rise to Counts One, Three, Four, 

and Five before May 8, 2021, rendering those claims time-barred. 

c. Jimenez-Bencebi And Zavaleta: Count Two

The Ninth Circuit has held that judicial deception claims, unlike other Fourth 

Amendment claims, do not “accrue at the time of the illegal act,” and instead “[t]he 

discovery rule requires that judicial deception claims begin accruing when the underlying 

affidavit is reasonably available.” Klein, 865 F.3d at 1278-79. “Only after examining the 

underlying affidavit can the plaintiff identify the critical facts showing that” the defendants 

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made false statements. Id. at 1279. “To determine the timeliness of these claims, we must 

determine whether [plaintiffs] have alleged ‘discrete acts’ that would violate the 

Constitution that occurred within the limitations period.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of 

Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). “[I]n determining when an act occurs for 

statute of limitations purposes, we look at when the ‘operative decision’ occurred, and 

separate from the operative decisions those inevitable consequences that are not separately 

actionable.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “[T]he statute of limitations runs separately 

from each discrete act.” Id. at 1061. 

i. Patchin

The FAC alleges that Patchin made false statements about Jimenez-Bencebi and her 

children, and that Davisson signed the report including those statements, when the First 

Severance Petition was filed on January 24, 2019. (Doc. 1-3 at 154-55 ¶¶ 147(a)-(g) 

[allegations of Patchin’s alleged false statements in Count Two]; id. at 142-43 ¶¶ 62-63 

[Patchin’s statements in the First Severance Petition]; id. at 143 ¶ 62 [“None of these 

allegations were true”]; id. at 155 ¶ 150 [Davisson signed the First Severance Petition].) 

Although the FAC does not specifically allege when Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta 

became subjectively aware of those alleged false statements, the test under Klein is when 

the offending statements became “reasonably available,” and the Court has little trouble 

concluding that the pleading filed to initiated dependency proceedings against JimenezBencebi and Zavaleta was reasonably available to them on or around the date of filing. 

It is also reasonable to infer from the FAC that Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta would 

have immediately known that Patchin’s statements were false, because the FAC alleges 

that Jimenez-Bencebi did not act in the way Patchin described. Wood v. Kern Cnty. Child 

Protective Servs., 2014 WL 1664885, *6 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“On the other hand, it is not 

disputed that at the time the social worker filed the petitions and social work reports, 

Plaintiffs knew that what was being reported in these documents was false. Thus, the 

statute of limitations began running from the time Plaintiffs learned of the content of these 

documents. Notably, they don’t dispute that they were aware that the social worker alleged 

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that they caused the children harm at the time these documents were filed and they knew 

that they had not done so; to the contrary they allege they were fully aware of the claims 

being made and vehemently denied the truth of these statements. Therefore, they were 

aware of the injury and who caused it which necessitates the determination that the causes 

of action based upon this actions [sic] are barred by the statute of limitations.”) (citation 

omitted).

Separately, the FAC alleges that Patchin made additional false statements about 

Jimenez-Bencebi “to support removing K.A.J. and J.A.J. and to keep all the children in 

State’s care” and that Davisson signed the report including those statements. (Doc. 1-3 at 

155 ¶¶ 147(h)-(k) [allegations of Patchin’s false statements in Count Two]; id. at 144-45 

¶ 71 [Patchin’s statements made to the juvenile court]; id. at 155 ¶ 150 [Davisson signed 

the report containing those statements].) The FAC does not specify the exact date Patchin 

communicated these statements to the juvenile court but indicates that the statements 

formed the basis for removing K.A.J. and J.A.J., which at the latest occurred on February 

12, 2020. It is also reasonable to infer from the FAC that Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta 

knew Patchin’s statements were false, because the FAC alleges that Jimenez-Bencebi did 

not act in the way Patchin described. (Doc. 1-3 at 145 ¶ 72 [“None of these allegations 

were true”].) Stephens v. Arizona, 2023 WL 4136607, *9 (D. Ariz. 2023) (“The FAC 

makes clear that Plaintiff should have known of her injury no later than April 9, 2020, when 

Judge Mitchell signed his order authorizing DCS to remove the children from Plaintiff and 

her father’s custody based on Oglesby’s declaration, which allegedly contained omissions 

material to the findings of probable cause.”). Thus, absent the application of some tolling 

or delayed accrual doctrine, claims related to Patchin’s false statements, and Davisson 

signing the reports containing those false statements, accrued before May 8, 2021, 

rendering those claims time-barred.

ii. Del Fiacco

The FAC alleges that Del Fiacco “reiterated Patchin’s false narrative to the court in 

testimony and/or in reports to the juvenile court” and made false statements in a juvenile 

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court hearing on January 10, 2022. (Doc. 1-3 at 155 ¶¶ 148, 150; id. at 147 ¶¶ 94-95.) The 

FAC also alleges that Davisson signed Del Fiacco’s false reports submitted to the juvenile 

court. (Doc. 1-3 at 155 ¶ 150.) Del Fiacco reiterating Patchin’s statements is not a discrete 

act, but rather an inevitable consequence of replacing Patchin as the caseworker during the 

dependency and severance proceedings, so any claim based on such conduct is barred by 

the statute of limitations for the reasons explained above. Haldeman v. Golden, 2006 WL 

8436502, *3 (D. Haw. 2006) (“Plaintiffs do not allege that Duty and Cupp began 

fabricating new information that might have caused damage to them; just that they 

continued to provide the same purportedly ‘false information’ that they had been providing 

all along. Notably, that information was provided because of an obligation to provide such 

information. Consequently, even if false information were provided after December 28, 

2003 (within two years of filing the Complaint), those acts merely were consequences of 

the operative decision that is at issue and, thus, are time-barred.”). Del Fiacco’s statements

during the January 2022 hearing, however, differ from Patchin’s and were made after May 

8, 2021. (Compare Doc. 1-3 at 147 ¶ 94 [Del Fiacco’s statements] with id. at 142-45 ¶¶ 62-

63, 71 [Patchin’s statements].) Accordingly, the statute of limitations does not bar claims 

against Del Fiacco and Davisson with respect to the statements made at the January 2022 

hearing.

d. McDonough, The Continuing Torts Doctrine, And Tolling

There is no merit to Plaintiffs’ contention that the juvenile court’s dismissal of the 

dependency action on May 25, 2023 sets the accrual date for this action. First, Plaintiffs 

fail to explain how this dismissal was the development that somehow alerted them to K.J.’s,

J.M.J.’s, K.A.J.’s, and J.A.J.’s removals or to Patchin’s and Del Fiacco’s alleged false 

statements. Plaintiffs were obviously aware of those developments when they occurred. 

Moore, 2020 WL 2489736 at *8 (“Plaintiffs had ample knowledge of the alleged wrong in 

2014, when the grandchildren were removed from their home, and failed to bring their 

claims in the two years that followed.”); Wood, 2014 WL 1664885 at *5 (“Here, when the 

children were removed from the home, Plaintiffs were aware of the injury—the forced 

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entry into the home and the wrongful removal of the children—and who inflicted the 

injury—those who entered and removed the children. It is of no moment that Plaintiffs did 

not know all of the legal theories upon which they contended the entry and removal were 

wrongful; they knew they had not abused the child and knew that their other children were 

not at risk of abuse. Thus, the cause of action accrued no later than mid-July 2007 and, 

because the complaint was not filed until April 2, 2014, the statute of limitations has 

expired.”) (footnote omitted). Cf. Scoins v. Goddard, 2007 WL 2807755, *5 (D. Ariz. 

2007) (“We reject Scoins’ argument that her cause of action did not accrue until CQ was 

released from the wardship of the court on August 17, 2004. . . . Scoins realized that she

had been injured by these defendants as soon as she lost custody of her children.”). 

Second, Plaintiffs’ reliance on McDonough is misplaced. There, the Supreme Court 

held that the defendant “could not bring his fabricated-evidence claim under § 1983 prior 

to favorable termination of his prosecution.” McDonough, 588 U.S. at 117. The Court

explained that the “favorable-termination requirement is rooted in pragmatic concerns with 

avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the related 

possibility of conflicting civil and criminal judgments. The requirement likewise avoids 

allowing collateral attacks on criminal judgments through civil litigation.” Id. at 117-18

(citations omitted and emphases added). The principles animating McDonough are not 

present here, where the underlying proceeding was a civil dependency proceeding. Macias 

v. Kaplan-Siekmann, 2024 WL 83448, *5 (D. Ariz. 2024) (“Here, Plaintiffs did not have 

to wait until the dependency proceedings terminated prior to filing their claims because 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims do not involve any allegations pertaining to unlawful criminal 

proceedings. Therefore, Plaintiffs should have brought their claims forward once they 

knew that they were injured.”).

Third, the continuing torts doctrine, even assuming it applies here,15 does not delay 

15 Wostrel v. Arizona, 2023 WL 2308417, *7 (D. Ariz. 2023), on reconsideration in 

part, 2023 WL 3022471 (D. Ariz. 2023), and appeal dismissed sub nom. Wostrel v. Wright, 

2023 WL 9860830 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Plaintiffs argue that . . . the continuing tort doctrine 

get[s] around State Defendants’ statute of limitations argument . . . [b]ut this doctrine, 

which concerns accrual of a claim, is neither here nor there: federal law alone determines 

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the start of the limitations period. Under the continuing torts doctrine, “a tort claim based 

on a series of related wrongful acts is considered continuous, and accrual begins at the 

termination of the wrongdoing, rather than at the beginning.” Cruz v. City of Tucson, 401 

P.3d 1018, 1023 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). The continuing torts doctrine or “[t]he continuing 

violation theory, which applies to § 1983 claims, allows a plaintiff to seek relief for events 

outside the limitations period. In order to show a continuing violation, a plaintiff must 

state facts sufficient to support a determination that the alleged acts are related closely 

enough to constitute a continuing violation.” Reiss v. Arizona Dep’t of Child Safety, 2018 

WL 6067258, *7 (D. Ariz. 2018) (cleaned up). “However, [the Ninth Circuit] has 

repeatedly held that a ‘mere continuing impact from past violations is not actionable.’” 

Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).

As for Counts One, Three, Four, and Five, Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s loss 

of contact with their children and inability to make medical decisions for them or to 

accompany them during medical treatments were results of the continued impact of the

initial removals. Knox, 260 F.3d at 1014-15 (“Subsequent denials to requests to visit or 

correspond with inmates at CDC facilities, where the basis for the denials rests on the letter 

of permanent suspension, are nothing more than the delayed, but inevitable, consequence 

of the total and permanent suspension decision. . . . Thus, rather than being punched 

several times, Knox’s subsequent denials are more akin to developing problems as a natural 

consequence of the one and only punch, such as a bloody nose. The subsequent denials 

were nothing more than a continuing impact of the permanent suspension, not new 

violations in and of themselves.”) (footnote omitted); Andrich v. Adel, 2022 WL 574948, 

*3 (D. Ariz. 2022), aff’d, 2023 WL 6620294 (9th Cir. 2023) (“For statute-of-limitations 

purposes, accrual occurs when property is first taken, and does not continue to accrue while 

the property is still being held or until the property is eventually returned. Defendants’ 

alleged continued refusal to return Plaintiff’s property did not inflict ‘new and accumulated 

injury’ upon Plaintiff so as to invoke the continuing violation doctrine. Rather, each time 

when a § 1983 claim accrues.”).

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Defendants ignored Plaintiff’s requests, they simply reaffirmed their initial refusal to return 

the property.”) (citation omitted); Moore, 2020 WL 2489736 at *8 (“More importantly, 

plaintiffs’ argument that they (and their grandchildren) continue to suffer ill effects from 

the alleged Constitutional violations cannot save them from the statute of limitations. Even 

if some of plaintiffs’ conversations with the County supervisors occurred between 2017 

and 2019, those complaints are rooted in the events that took place in 2014.”); Reiss, 2018 

WL 6067258 at *6 (“Here, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are based on the initial deprivation of 

contact with his children stemming from the April 14, 2015 safety plan. Plaintiff’s 

continuing loss of contact with his children beyond April 21, 2015 was the result of an 

order by the family court overseeing his divorce, which Plaintiff alleges was ‘in line with, 

if not wholly based on, DCS’s safety plan.’ Accepting Plaintiff’s allegation that the family 

court based its order on DCS’s safety plan, the continuing loss of his constitutional right to 

the care and custody of his children was at most a continuing impact resulting from the 

initial deprivation of his children. Since a continuing impact does not toll the statute of 

limitations, it remains that Plaintiff’s § 1983 procedural due process claim against Santiago 

and Kash accrued on April 14, 2015, or at the latest, June 18, 2015, and is therefore timebarred.”) (citation omitted). Similarly, for Count Two, Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s 

continued loss of their children was a consequence of Patchin’s alleged false statements in 

2019 and 2020 and Del Fiacco’s alleged false statements in 2021. Haldeman, 2006 WL 

8436502 at *3.

Fourth, Plaintiffs have not identified any other basis to apply equitable or statutory 

tolling. Plaintiffs argue that “[r]equiring parents to file a lawsuit against persons holding 

inordinate power over their visitation rights and when (or if) their children would be 

returned to them within two years of removal . . . is inconsistent with the purposes of 

§ 1983 and its distinct significance in the child welfare context.” (Doc. 11 at 11-12.) But 

this sort of policy argument does not supply a basis for applying equitable or statutory 

tolling. Holland v. United States, 2022 WL 633408, *3 (D. Ariz. 2022), appeal dismissed 

sub nom. Holland on behalf of D.M.W. v. United States, 2022 WL 1801009 (9th Cir. 2022)

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(“Equitable tolling is to be used sparingly but may be applied when extraordinary 

circumstances beyond plaintiffs’ control made it impossible to file the claims on time.”) 

(cleaned up); Franco, 2020 WL 7388489 at *4 (“[Equitable tolling] is reserved for 

‘extreme cases’ and is ‘applied sparingly’”) (citations omitted); Porter v. Spader, 239 P.3d 

743, 746-47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (“Our legislature has provided for the suspension or 

tolling of a limitations period only in very limited and specified situations.”). See also

Wostrel, 2023 WL 2308417 at *7 (rejecting the argument that equitable estoppel applies in 

a § 1983 case involving child custody when the plaintiffs did not identify “specific 

promises, threats or inducements by the defendant that prevented the plaintiff from filing 

suit”).

B. Davisson, Faust, And McKay

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that “[t]he FAC defectively alleges § 1983 claims against 

supervisors based on the supervisors only ‘ratifying’ their subordinates[’] conduct.” (Doc. 

6 at 7.) More specifically, Defendants argue that Counts One through Five are “devoid of 

any allegations that Davisson knew the information was ‘false’ when she signed off on a 

court report or how she specifically was involved in the seizure of any of the children.” 

(Id.) Defendants also argue that Counts Four and Five provide “[e]ven fewer factual details 

. . . regarding participation by Faust and McKay.” (Id.) Defendants add that “[t]here is no 

mention regarding any specific appointments or medical decisions that Davisson, Faust, or 

McKay made on behalf of any child; therefore these limited facts are insufficient to state 

any plausible federal claim for relief—the language is conclusory at best.” (Id.)

In response, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ argument that “Plaintiffs must 

allege a supervisor ‘set in motion a series of acts’ that would cause others to inflict 

constitutional injury and to establish intent . . . is an incorrect statement of the law, 

particularly at the pleading stage.” (Doc. 11 at 10.) Plaintiffs contend, in reliance on 

Keates v. Koile, 883 F. 3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2018), that “supervisory officials may be liable 

on the basis of their own acts or omissions,” and “Plaintiffs here do allege the wrongful 

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act(s) committed by each state Defendant and how these acts give rise to the claimed 

violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” (Id., cleaned up.) Specifically, Plaintiffs 

contend that “[t]he claims against the supervisors and former directors here are for their 

own actions, or failures to act, and not simply in the manner of respondeat superior.” (Id.

at 11.) Plaintiffs also contend that they “have reason to believe that discovery will show 

that not only did these supervisors and former directors ratify their employees’ wrongful 

conduct, but actually and actively directed the wrongful conduct.” (Id.)

In reply, Defendants reiterate that “the FAC does not contain facts pertaining to the 

individual conduct of [Davisson, Faust, and McKay].” (Doc. 16 at 6.) Defendants then 

elaborate upon some of the arguments raised in their motion regarding the FAC’s 

deficiencies. (Id. at 6-7.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish that 

Davisson, Faust, and McKay “had knowledge of the unconstitutional conduct of their 

subordinates.” (Id. at 7.) Defendants add that Plaintiffs’ reliance on Keates is “misplaced”

because “the Court specifically found that the complaint failed to allege that Director Carter 

(former DCS Director) had knowledge of the constitutional deprivations and acquiesced in 

them.” (Id. at 8, emphasis omitted.)

2. Analysis

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific 

injury as a result of a defendant’s specific conduct and show an affirmative link between 

the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 

(1976). “There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[V]icarious liability is 

inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits . . . .”). A supervisor may be liable in an individual capacity 

under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional 

deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 

2011) (citation omitted). A sufficient causal connection can be shown where a supervisor 

“set[s] in motion a series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[es] to terminate a series 

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of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause 

others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207-08 (cleaned up).

As an initial matter, there is no merit to Plaintiffs’ assertion that dismissal is 

unwarranted because discovery will show that the supervisors ratified and directed the 

wrongful conduct. Such an approach would seemingly allow plaintiffs to use the discovery 

process to determine whether they can discover enough facts to assert a plausible claim for 

relief, an approach that would undermine the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). Rutman Wine Co. 

v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Appellant argues that the 

district court should not have dismissed its claims without permitting discovery. . . . [This] 

position is unsupported and defies common sense. The purpose of [Rule] 12(b)(6) is to 

enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of complaints without subjecting 

themselves to discovery. . . . [I]f the allegations of the complaint fail to establish the 

requisite elements of the cause of action, our requiring costly and time consuming 

discovery and trial work would represent an abdication of our judicial responsibility.”) 

(cleaned up).

a. Count One: Davisson

Count One alleges that Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson, each in their individual 

capacities, violated Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by 

unlawfully seizing and detaining K.J., J.M.J., J.A.J., and K.A.J. (Doc. 1-3 at 151.) With 

respect to Davisson, Plaintiffs’ theory is that “Davisson failed to ensure Patchin’s 

investigation met the statutory requirements under A.R.S. § 8-456(C)(1)” (id. at 151

¶ 123); that “[a]s Patchin and Del Fiacco’s supervisor, Davisson substantially participated 

in the unlawful seizure of J.A.J. and K.A.J. and detention of K.J., J.M.J, J.A.J. and K.A.J. 

in State’s care by authorizing Patchin and Del Fiacco’s false filings and false [statements]” 

(id. at 152 ¶ 129); and that “[p]rior to the relevant times when K.J., J.M.J., J.A.J. and K.A.J. 

were seized and detained, the State and DCS agents, Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson did 

not first pursue reasonable avenues of investigation” (id. at 153 ¶ 134).

These unsupported and conclusory allegations are insufficient to plausibly establish 

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that Davisson personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, set in motion the acts that led to the deprivation, or was 

aware of the deprivation and failed to act. Fidler, 2024 WL 1553703 at *2 (“These claims 

fail against Quigley and Kaplan-Siekmann because there are no plausible allegations that 

those defendants did anything to violate Fidler’s or E.F.’s rights to familial association. 

The third amended complaint contains no allegations that Quigley personally participated 

in E.F.’s removal or placement with a foster family beyond supervising Burns. And the 

nonconclusory allegations demonstrate only that Kaplan-Siekmann reviewed some 

documents and submitted a report to the Arizona Department of Child Safety. This conduct 

does not constitute a plausible constitutional violation.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Davisson in Count One, and Davisson will be 

dismissed from that count. The dismissal is with leave to amend because it may be possible 

for Plaintiffs to cure the aforementioned defects.

b. Count Two: Davisson

Count Two alleges that Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson violated Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by “making misrepresentations and/or omissions 

to the court which were deliberate falsehoods and/or which demonstrated a reckless 

disregard for the truth.” (Doc. 1-3 at 153-54.) The FAC alleges that “Davisson directed 

or ratified Patchin and Del Fiacco [sic] wrongful judicial deception” (id. at 155 ¶ 149) and 

that Patchin perpetrated false narratives under Davisson’s supervision (id. at 142-45 ¶¶ 63, 

69, 71). Those allegations parrot legally conclusory language and are insufficient to state 

a claim against Davisson. Macias, 2024 WL 83448 at *4 (“Defendant Hinckley’s 

supervisory title is not enough to hold Defendant Hinckley liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries.”); 

Jones v. Town of Quartzsite, 2015 WL 12551172, *5 (D. Ariz. 2015), aff’d, 677 F. App’x 

317 (9th Cir. 2017) (“These conclusory allegations that defendants Anderson and Orgeron 

‘participated in, or directed, the filing of’ the zoning code complaint fall woefully short of 

alleging that either of them violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”). 

The remaining allegations in the FAC also fail to plausibly establish that Davisson 

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was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations or had knowledge of the 

wrongfulness of the acts that would lead to those deprivations. The FAC alleges that 

“Davisson signed Patchin and Del Fiacco’s false reports filed with the juvenile court, in 

accordance with DCS policy” (Doc. 1-3 at 155 ¶ 150), but this alone does not establish that 

Davisson had knowledge of the false statements or ordered Patchin and Del Fiacco to 

submit false statements to the juvenile court. Fidler, 2024 WL 1553703 at *2; Wostrel, 

2023 WL 2308417 at *7 (“The sole specific, factual allegations against Long are that he 

‘approved’ two progress reports that Plaintiffs allege contained false information or 

omitted material information. Neither allegation suggests that Long knew or reasonably 

should have known that the report contained the false or omitted information or that the 

report’s submission would cause a constitutional injury. As such, both allegations against 

Long arise under a respondeat superior theory and cannot ground liability under § 1983.”) 

(citation omitted). Further, the allegation that K.A.J. and J.A.J’s removal “was based on 

Patchin and Davisson’s steadfast adherence to a malicious and distorted view that 

[Jimenez-Bencebi] is an aggressive ex-felon and that [Zavaleta] is too passive to protect 

his children from this menace” (Doc. 1-3 at 139-40 ¶¶ 38(e), (j)) is conclusory and 

unsupported by factual allegations of Davisson’s knowledge of the falsity of the statements.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Davisson in Count Two, 

and Davisson will be dismissed from that count. The dismissal is with leave to amend 

because it may be possible for Plaintiffs to cure the aforementioned defects.

c. Count Three: Davisson

Count Three alleges that Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson violated Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by “failing to make reasonable efforts to preserve 

the family relationship.” (Id. at 156.) The FAC alleges Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson

“fail[ed] to complete a thorough investigation, as required by A.R.S. § 8-456(C)(1) and 

when, among other things, they (1) relied on false hearsay provided by a blame-shifting 

thief at the Gift of Mary Shelter; (2) failed to investigate the positive information from 

Missouri social workers; (3) failed to speak with L.J. who loves his mother very much; 

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(4) failed to consider that a [sic] J.M.J. was examined by a mandatory reporter only one 

week prior to the false DCS hotline call; (5) failed to review the medical records which 

showed that when J.M.J. was placed in foster care, weighed less than he did when he was 

in [Jimenez-Bencebi’s] care; and (6) falsely asserted to the trial court that [JimenezBencebi] wanted to name J.A.J. ‘Motherfucker.” (Id. at 157 ¶ 158.) The FAC also alleges 

Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson “fail[ed] to keep all the children together in one foster 

home” and “repeatedly den[ied] [Jimenez-Bencebi] visitation rights during the various 

dependency proceedings, and even after the case plan was changed to reunification in May 

2022.” (Id. at 157 ¶¶ 161-62.)

The list of allegations against Davisson in Count Three is extensive but deceiving—

there are no factual allegations in the FAC to support that Davisson personally committed 

any of those actions, set those actions in motion, or knowingly refused to stop those actions. 

Indeed, the FAC alleges Patchin reported the incident at the Gift of Mary Shelter and 

Jimenez-Bencebi’s statement about naming J.A.J. (Id. at 141 ¶ 48(e); id. at 155 ¶ 147(i).) 

As explained above with respect to Count One, the allegation that Davisson failed to 

investigate, without further factual support, is conclusory. Fidler, 2024 WL 1553703 at 

*2. 

The FAC’s allegations that “DCS never reported th[e] positive information [from 

the Missouri social workers] to the juvenile court during any of the dependency 

proceedings” (Doc. 1-3 at 138 ¶ 32); that “[t]he State and DCS failed to interview her oldest 

son, L.J.” (id. at 146 ¶ 82); that “[f]or the first six weeks after the 11 May 2022 order, DCS 

cancelled all of Plaintiffs’ supervised visits with their children” (id. at 140 ¶ 39); and that 

“DCS and its agents refused to re-instate [Jimenez-Bencebi’s] visits” with her children (id.

at 147 ¶ 90) do not compel a different conclusion. Those statements do not specify that 

Davisson personally participated in those actions or was aware of them. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Davisson in Count Three, 

and Davisson will be dismissed from that count. The dismissal is with leave to amend 

because it may be possible for Plaintiffs to cure the aforementioned defects.

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d. Counts Four And Five: Davisson, Faust, And McKay

Counts Four and Five assert violations of the Fourteenth Amendment against 

Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, and Faust and McKay in their individual capacities16 for 

preventing Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta from making medical decisions for their 

children and violating Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta’s right to be present during their 

children’s medical treatments. (Doc. 1-3 at 158-59.) In Count Four, the FAC alleges that 

“Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay interfered with [Jimenez-Bencebi’s and 

Zavaleta’s] constitutional right to make medical decisions for their seized and detained 

children disallowing them from attending medical appointments while they were in State’s 

care.” (Id. at 159 ¶ 170.) In Count Five, the FAC alleges that “Patchin, Del Fiacco, 

Davisson, Faust, and McKay interfered with [Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s] 

constitutional right to be present during their seized and detained children’s medical 

appointments.” (Id. at 160 ¶ 175.) The FAC provides no factual support for these 

statements and does not otherwise allege that Davisson, Faust, and McKay were personally 

involved in interfering with, or aware of interference with, Jimenez-Bencebi’s and 

Zavaleta’s right to make medical decisions for their children or ability to be present during 

their children’s medical appointments. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim, 

and Davisson, Faust, and McKay are dismissed from Counts Four and Five. The dismissal 

is with leave to amend because it may be possible for Plaintiffs to cure the aforementioned 

defects.

C. Due Process

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that “counts 3-5 . . . fail because it is clear from the FAC’s face 

that the state court provided Plaintiffs with due process.” (Doc. 6 at 14-15.) More 

specifically, Defendants argue that “[t]he FAC is replete with examples of testimony and 

exhibits considered by the [juvenile] court in two severance trials, and even reference 

16 Counts Four and Five are also asserted against Faust and McKay in their official 

capacities, but those claims have now been dismissed for other reasons.

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appellate review. Plaintiffs do not assert any restrictions on their ability to raise issues in 

the state court proceedings, thus due process was afforded to Plaintiffs and no 

constitutional violations occurred; therefore no valid claims exist.” (Id. at 15, citation 

omitted.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants incorrectly assert that parental rights 

are protected only by procedural due process. Parents’ rights are fundamental liberty 

interests, and the heightened protection of substantive due process applies.” (Doc. 11 at 

16.) At any rate, regarding procedural due process, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants 

violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights when they failed to reasonably investigate the 

anonymous hotline tip, and had they done so, they would have determined that the 

information was false. However, that did not absolve [Defendants] from the requirement 

of fundamentally fair procedures as their allegations within the petitions were false and 

misleading.” (Id. at 17.) Regarding substantive due process, Plaintiffs argue that 

“Defendants’ conduct shocks the conscience and was in violation of Plaintiffs’ substantive

due process rights” because “Defendants [sic] acts were arbitrary, motivated by the 

employees’ time pressures, workload, and unwillingness to fully investigate the 

allegations, rather than for the legitimate state interest of protecting children. [Defendants] 

also knew, as would any reasonable DCS employee, that there was a substantial risk of 

serious harm if K.J., K.A.J., and [J.A.J.’s] removals were unwarranted.” (Id. at 18.)

In reply, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs[] provided no convincing case law or 

additional facts to challenge the premise that they failed to receive procedural due process 

in the underlying dependency proceedings.” (Doc. 16 at 12.) Defendants add that 

“Plaintiffs may dispute the thoroughness of the investigation, but simply asserting they 

would have come to a different conclusion is not enough.” (Id.) Regarding substantive 

due process, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient facts to support 

their position that any of [the] individual [Defendants] ‘shocked the conscience’ by their 

actions in not investigating more thoroughly, relying on the source, removing the children, 

filing a dependency proceeding, and filing alleged false information with the [juvenile 

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court].” (Id. at 13.) Defendants argue that “there is no evidence [that Defendants]

deliberately fabricated the information . . . . Since it is also clear that Plaintiffs had the 

opportunity to challenge that information during the dependency proceedings, no 

constitutional violation occurred.” (Id. at 14.)

2. Analysis

This marks another instance where the briefing sequence has greatly complicated 

the task of analyzing Defendants’ dismissal arguments. Although Defendants seek 

dismissal of Counts Three, Four, and Five, the parties’ briefs broadly discuss substantive 

and procedural due process without addressing the specific contours of the claims at issue. 

Indeed, both sides offer analysis and case law regarding familial association and judicial 

deception claims, but those are the claims raised in Counts One and Two. Nevertheless, in 

the subparts that follow, the Court has endeavored to evaluate the sufficiency of Counts 

Three, Four, and Five.

a. Count Three

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured 

by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged 

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

At first blush, Count Three seems to satisfy those requirements by alleging that 

Patchin and Del Fiacco17“are liable for violating Plaintiffs right to Due Process under the 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to make reasonable efforts to preserve the 

family relationship.” (Doc. 1-3 at 156.) However, in the body of Count Three, Patchin

and Del Fiacco are only accused of violating the Arizona constitution and various Arizona 

statutes. (Id. at 156-58.) A § 1983 claim will not lie in this circumstance. Ybarra v. 

Bastian, 647 F.2d 891, 892 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Section 1983 protects against the ‘deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’ Only federal 

17 Count Three is also asserted against Davisson, but that claim has now been 

dismissed for other reasons.

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rights, privileges, or immunities are protected by the section. Violations of state law alone 

are insufficient.”); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (“Section 1983 imposes 

liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties 

of care arising out of tort law.”). Additionally, to the extent Count Three actually was—

notwithstanding the FAC’s references to violations of Arizona law—an attempt to hold

Patchin and Del Fiacco responsible for federal constitutional violations related to the 

preservation of “the family relationship,” any such claim would be duplicative of Plaintiffs’ 

§ 1983 claim against Patchin and Del Fiacco in Count One. Cf. Natividad v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 2299601, *17 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing claim that was 

“duplicative and unnecessary”). 

Accordingly, Count Three is dismissed. The dismissal is with leave to amend 

because it may be possible for Plaintiffs to cure the aforementioned defects.

b. Count Four

“The right to family association includes the right of parents to make important 

medical decisions for their children, and of children to have those decisions made by their 

parents rather than the state.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2000). 

To that end, “physical examinations of their child may not be undertaken for investigative

purposes at the behest of state officials unless a judicial officer has determined, upon notice 

to the parents, and an opportunity to be heard, that grounds for such an examination exist 

and that the administration of the procedure is reasonable under all the circumstances.” Id.

(cleaned up).

In Count Four, the FAC alleges that Patchin and Del Fiacco18 “interfered with 

[Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s] constitutional right to make medical decisions for their 

seized and detained children disallowing them from attending medical appointments while 

they were in State’s care.” (Doc. 1-3 at 159 ¶ 170.) The only other references to medical 

decisions in the FAC are that K.J. and J.M.J. received physical examinations at PCH after 

18 Count Four is also asserted against Davisson, Faust, and McKay, but those claims 

have now been dismissed for other reasons.

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their removal on September 14, 2018, and that J.M.J. remained at PCH until September 20, 

2018. (Id. at 141 ¶ 52; id. at 142 ¶¶ 54-55.) The FAC includes no additional allegations 

about medical decisions regarding L.J., K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J.

Because the FAC does not offer any allegation that Patchin and Del Fiacco 

participated in the decision to prevent Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta from making medical 

decisions for K.J. and J.M.J., or even that any medical decisions were made on behalf of 

L.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Patchin and Del Fiacco 

in Count Four. Fidler, 2024 WL 1553703 at *3 (“Claims Six and Seven allege violations 

of Fidler’s rights to direct and participate in E.F.’s medical care. . . . The third amended 

complaint includes no factual allegations that, if taken as true, show that Burns, Quigley, 

Manjarrez, Saenz, or Edwards were responsible for (1) E.F. receiving medical 

examinations (2) without notice to Fidler and (3) without permission for her to be present. 

Fidler therefore did not state a plausible entitlement to relief in Claims Six and Seven.”); 

Keates, 883 F.3d at 1242 (“Because the complaint does not offer any plausible allegation 

that any of these CPS employees participated in the decision to interfere with Keates’s and 

A.K.’s constitutional rights, the district court did not err in dismissing the claims against 

them.”). The dismissal is with leave to amend because it may be possible for Plaintiffs to 

cure the aforementioned defects.

c. Count Five

The Court reaches the same conclusion as to Count Five. “[P]arents have a right 

arising from the liberty interest in family association to be with their children while they 

are receiving medical attention (or to be in a waiting room or other nearby area if there is 

a valid reason for excluding them while all or a part of the medical procedure is being 

conducted). Likewise, children have a corresponding right to the love, comfort, and 

reassurance of their parents while they are undergoing medical procedures, including 

examinations—particularly those, such as here, that are invasive or upsetting.” Wallis, 202 

F.3d at 1142.

...

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In Count Five, the FAC alleges in conclusory fashion that Patchin and Del Fiacco19

“interfered with [Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s] constitutional right to be present 

during their seized and detained children’s medical appointments.” (Doc. 1-3 at 160 

¶ 175.) But again, the totality of the FAC’s factual allegations on this topic are that J.M.J. 

and K.J. received physical examinations on September 14, 2018 (id. at 141 ¶ 52) and that 

J.M.J. received treatment for malnutrition (id. at 142 ¶¶ 54-57). Although it is plausible,

based on those facts, to infer that Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta were not present during 

K.J.’s and J.M.J.’s treatments, the FAC is silent on who (if anyone) prevented JimenezBencebi and Zavaleta from being present and whether L.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. underwent 

any medical treatments without their parents present. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed 

to state a claim against Patchin and Del Fiacco in Count Five. Fidler, 2024 WL 1553703 

at *3; Keates, 883 F.3d at 1242. The dismissal is with leave to amend because it may be 

possible for Plaintiffs to cure the aforementioned defects.

D. Qualified Immunity

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue they should be “afforded qualified immunity protections for the 

Section 1983 [c]laims” because Plaintiffs have not “show[n] there is clear precedent that 

would put an official on notice that what they were doing is unlawful.” (Doc. 6 at 15, 

capitalization omitted.) More specifically, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs provide no 

legal authority to support the proposition that relying on information received in a hotline 

report violates a constitutionally protected right,” that “relying on hearsay during a DCS 

investigation does not violate a clearly established constitutional right,” that “challenging 

the thoroughness of an investigation also fails to violate a clearly established right,” and 

that “[t]he same holds true for any allegations that [Defendants] failed to include 

exculpatory evidence in ‘records’ provided to the Court.” (Id. at 15-16.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants make the erroneous claim that they 

19 Count Five is also asserted against Davisson, Faust, and McKay, but those claims 

have now been dismissed for other reasons.

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are entitled to qualified immunity for § 1983 claims.” (Doc. 11 at 18.) Plaintiffs also note 

that “determining claims of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage raises 

special problems for legal decision making.” (Id. at 19, cleaned up.) Plaintiffs cite Keates

in support of their argument that the challenged conduct violated clearly established law. 

(Id.) 

In reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs “provide no additional clarity to support 

their position that [Defendants] adopted ‘knowingly false information’ and incorporated 

that information into the state court filings.” (Doc. 16 at 14.) Defendants then elaborate 

upon some of the arguments raised in the motion to dismiss: “Essentially, Plaintiffs dispute 

the authenticity of the information provided to DCS by the source, and dispute this 

information should have been provided to the juvenile court; but no legal principle supports 

this position.” (Id. at 14-15.)

2. Analysis

In light of the analysis set forth in earlier portions of this order, the only remaining 

§ 1983 claims are (1) the claims in Counts One and Two asserted by L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and 

J.A.J. against Patchin and Del Fiacco; and (2) the claim in Count Two asserted by JimenezBencebi and Zavaleta against Del Fiacco related to the January 2022 hearing. The Court 

will confine its qualified-immunity analysis to those claims.

“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless 

a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional 

right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). As for the second prong, a government 

official’s conduct violates “clearly established” law when “‘the contours of a right are 

sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is 

doing violates that right.’” Id. at 741 (cleaned up). Although there need not be a “case 

directly on point,” “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 

question beyond debate.” Id. In other words, the case law must “have been earlier 

developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all 

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reasonable government actors, in the defendant’s place, that what he is doing violates 

federal law.” Shafer v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017). See 

also Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (“This Court has repeatedly told courts—

and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of 

generality.”) (cleaned up); Sharp v. Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(“The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that we examine whether the violative 

nature of particular conduct is clearly established by controlling precedent, not whether the 

conduct violates a general principle of law. . . . Except in the rare case of an ‘obvious’ 

instance of constitutional misconduct . . . , Plaintiffs must identify a case where an officer 

acting under similar circumstances as defendants was held to have violated the Fourth 

Amendment. In other words, Plaintiffs must point to prior case law that articulates a 

constitutional rule specific enough to alert these [defendants] in this case that their 

particular conduct was unlawful.”) (cleaned up). “[T]he prior precedent must be 

‘controlling’—from the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court—or otherwise be embraced by a 

‘consensus’ of courts outside the relevant jurisdiction.” Sharp, 871 F.3d at 911 (citation 

omitted). See also Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The right 

must be settled law, meaning that it must be clearly established by controlling authority or

a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”). 

Ninth Circuit law is not a model of clarity concerning who bears the burden of proof 

when the defense of qualified immunity has been raised. Many Ninth Circuit opinions hold 

that “[o]nce the defense of qualified immunity is raised by the defendant, the plaintiff bears 

the burden of showing that the rights allegedly violated were ‘clearly established.’” LSO, 

Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Shafer, 868 F.3d at 1118 

(“Shafer argues that it is Deputy Padilla’s burden to demonstrate that he did not violate 

Shafer’s clearly established constitutional right. Again, we disagree.”); Romero v. Kitsap 

County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of proof that 

the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.”) 

(citation omitted). However, other Ninth Circuit opinions hold that “[q]ualified immunity 

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is an affirmative defense that the government has the burden of pleading and proving.” 

Frudden v. Pilling, 877 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 2017). These opinions are difficult to 

reconcile. See generally Slater v. Deasey, 943 F.3d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 2019) (Collins, J., 

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The panel committed . . . error in suggesting 

that Defendants bear the burden of proof on the disputed qualified-immunity issues 

presented in this appeal. . . . [T]he applicable—and well-settled—rule [in the Ninth 

Circuit] is that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was 

clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.”) (cleaned up). Acknowledging 

the uncertainty in this area, the Court concludes—consistent with the most recent published 

Ninth Circuit decisions on this topic—that the burden falls onto Plaintiffs to identify the 

clearly established law supporting their § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Hart v. City of Redwood 

City, 99 F.4th 543, 557 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the law 

was clearly established. None of the cases Plaintiffs have identified . . . put the 

constitutional question beyond debate that the violative nature of Gomez’s particular 

conduct was clearly established. As such, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Hart’s rights 

were clearly established.”) (cleaned up); Smith v. Agdeppa, 81 F.4th 994, 1004 n.4 (9th 

Cir. 2023) (“[T]he burden is not on the officers to prove they fit perfectly within the facts 

of a case granting qualified immunity; the burden is on the plaintiff to show a violation of 

a clearly established right in the specific circumstances at issue.”); Hughes v. Rodriguez, 

31 F.4th 1211, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of pointing to prior 

case law that articulates a constitutional rule specific enough to alert these officers in this 

case that their particular conduct was unlawful.”) (cleaned up).

“Determining claims of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage raises 

special problems for legal decision making. On the one hand, we may not dismiss a 

complaint making ‘a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ But on the other hand, 

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity so long as ‘their conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.’ The Supreme Court has emphasized that this is a low bar, explaining that 

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‘qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but 

mistaken judgments about open legal questions.’” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1234-35 (cleaned 

up).

a. Count One

In Count One, Plaintiffs allege that Patchin and Del Fiacco20 violated Plaintiffs’

rights to familial association by seizing and detaining K.J., J.M.J., J.A.J., and K.A.J. 

without conducting a reasonable investigation and through the use of false statements 

during the dependency and severance proceedings. (Doc. 1-3 at 151-52 ¶¶ 121, 126-27.) 

As noted, Plaintiffs cite Keates as supplying the clearly established law supporting this 

claim. 

In Keates, a mother (Keates) brought her 13-year-old daughter (A.K.) to a clinic to 

address A.K.’s depression and past expressions of suicidal ideation. Keates, 883 F.3d at 

1232. The clinic made a same-day referral to PCH, where a social worker and other PCH 

personnel “informed Keates that the decision had been made to prevent A.K. from going 

home with Keates, and that she was required to go to a mental hospital for inpatient 

treatment.” Id. After Keates expressed dissatisfaction with that decision, “‘someone’ from 

PCH called CPS to report that A.K. was suffering severe depression and had attempted a

suicide by strangulation on May 20, 2013,” that “inpatient care was necessary,” and that 

“Keates was not able to enact a safety plan.” Id. at 1232-33 (cleaned up). The following 

day, May 21, 2023, “Koile, a CPS case worker, interviewed A.K. without Keates present 

and without Keates’s consent. A.K. reported that her only complaint about her mother was 

that she ‘yells, screams, and cusses.’ A.K. also told Koile that she had suicidal ideation in 

the past but had not attempted suicide on May 20.” Id. at 1233. Nevertheless, later that 

day, Koile “issued a temporary custody notice (TCN) allowing him to take A.K. away from 

Keates and put her into CPS custody.” Id. That same day, as A.K. was being discharged 

from PCH and transferred to a behavioral health facility, Koile “told the intake nurse that 

20 Count One is also asserted against Davisson, but that claim has now been dismissed 

for other reasons.

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A.K. had tried to commit suicide on May 20, 2013.” Id. Despite that statement, “[t]he 

intake nurse . . . found A.K.’s suicide risk to be low.” Id. The following day, May 22, 

2023, “Koile interviewed Keates, who told him that A.K. did not attempt suicide on May 

20.” Id. Nevertheless, the following day, May 23, 2023, “Koile informed [the behavioral 

health facility] that he had concluded that Keates was unable to care for A.K. and that a 

dependency petition would be filed. The Arizona Department of Economic Security filed 

a dependency petition on behalf of CPS on May 24, 2013. The petition stated that A.K. 

attempted suicide on May 20, 2013.” Id. A few days later, A.K. was discharged from the 

behavioral health facility and then placed in a foster home. Id. at 1234. Finally, in late 

2013, A.K. returned home and the dependency petition was dismissed. Id.

In an ensuing lawsuit, Keates and A.K. asserted, among other things, a § 1983 claim 

alleging “that the defendants had violated Keates’s and A.K.’s constitutional rights to 

familial association under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the right to 

be free from deliberately falsified evidence in dependency proceedings.” Id. The district 

court dismissed the § 1983 claim at the pleading stage based on qualified immunity but the 

Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 1234, 1240. As for the familial association theory of liability, 

the Ninth Circuit began by distilling the applicable legal standard: “Our case law clearly 

establishes that the rights of parents and children to familial association under the 

Fourteenth, First, and Fourth Amendments are violated if a state official removes children 

from their parents without their consent, and without a court order, unless information at 

the time of the seizure, after reasonable investigation, establishes reasonable cause to 

believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, and the scope, degree, 

and duration of the intrusion are reasonably necessary to avert the specific injury at issue.” 

Id. at 1237-38. Next, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, for several reasons, the factual 

allegations in the complaint were sufficient to establish a violation of that standard. The 

first was that the requirement of a “reasonable investigation, giving rise to a reasonable 

cause to believe that A.K. was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury” was “not met” 

in light of Koile’s failure to “corroborate the PCH call to CPS or obtain other medical 

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opinions on whether A.K. was at risk,” the fact that “both Keates and A.K. repeatedly 

informed Koile that A.K. was not actively suicidal,” and the fact that “the intake nurse . . . 

determined that A.K. was ‘low-risk’ for suicide.” Id. at 1238. The second was that “[t]he 

complaint further alleges facts plausibly indicating that Koile had sufficient time to obtain 

a warrant,” in part because “when Koile first talked to A.K., she was in a hospital and under 

medical supervision.” Id. at 1238-39. The third was that “the complaint plausibly indicates 

that Koile exceeded the scope of any intrusion necessary to protect A.K.,” as “there was no 

basis for preventing Keates from having contact with A.K.” and “no basis for requiring 

A.K. to be strapped to a gurney when she was transported to” the behavior health facility. 

Id. at 1239. Finally, turning to the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis, the 

Ninth Circuit concluded that Koile’s arguments regarding the reasonableness of his 

conduct, including that “he acted reasonably because he was told by ‘qualified medical 

providers’ at PCH that A.K. was actively suicidal and needed inpatient treatment,” were 

“not supported by the complaint.” Id. at 1239-40. The court concluded: “[T]hus based 

solely on the facts alleged in the complaint construed in favor of Keates and A.K., a 

reasonable official in Koile’s position would know the available information did not

establish reasonable cause to believe that A.K. was in imminent danger of attempting to 

commit suicide, or that it was necessary to separate her from her mother, transfer her to 

[the behavioral health facility], and continue to detain her after medical professionals at 

[that facility] concluded she was a low suicide risk.” Id. at 1240.

At this summary makes clear, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Keates is in large part factually 

misplaced. There, the complaint alleged that the seizure of A.K. occurred on May 21, 2013 

pursuant to a temporary custody notice (“TCN”) issued by Koile, a CPS employee. Id. at 

1233. The complaint further alleged that DCS did not initiate dependency proceedings 

until May 24, 2013. Id. This timeline was critical to the court’s analysis because one of 

the elements of the underlying constitutional claim for familial association was that the 

challenged removal occurred “without a court order.” Id. at 1236-37. Indeed, “[t]he TCN 

was central to the alleged constitutional violation, as it was the basis for Koile’s seizure 

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and removal of A.K.” Id. at 1242. 

Here, in contrast, the FAC does not allege that the removal of any of the children 

occurred without a court order. Nor do the remaining allegations in the FAC raise a 

plausible inference that the removals occurred without a court order. Although the FAC is 

very precise as to when each removal occurred—it alleges that K.J. and J.M.J. were 

removed on September 14, 2018 (Doc. 1-3 at 141 ¶ 48), that K.A.J. was removed on March 

5, 2019 (id. at 139 ¶ 38(d)), and that J.A.J. was removed on February 12, 2020 (id. at 139 

¶ 38(h))—the FAC vaguely alleges that dependency proceedings were first initiated in 

“September 2018” (id. at 139 ¶ 38(b)), which is potentially before any of those removals 

occurred. The FAC also alludes to various proceedings in juvenile court in which Patchin 

and Del Fiacco provided allegedly false testimony and implies that one of those 

proceedings occurred before the September 14, 2018 removal of K.J. and J.M.J. (Id. at 141 

¶ 48(e) [identifying, as one of the “events” that “led to this removal,” the instance where 

“[b]ased only on this hearsay from a witness who had a motive to lie, Caseworker Patchin 

reported to the juvenile court that Bianca threatened a person with a knife at the Gift of 

Mary Shelter, left J.M.J. in his car seat for extended times, prevented others from feeding 

J.M.J., and only paid attention to K.J.”].) Defendants’ reply brief also seems to argue—

albeit imprecisely—that qualified immunity is required as to Count One because that claim 

is based on judicially authorized removals. (Doc. 16 at 15 [“Essentially, Plaintiffs dispute 

the authenticity of the information provided to DCS by the source, and dispute this 

information should have been provided to the juvenile court; but no legal principle supports 

this position.”].)21

In a recent decision in a similar case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 

grant of qualified immunity, at the pleading stage, to a DCS worker who was alleged to 

have violated the plaintiffs’ right to familial association, emphasizing that because “[t]he 

21 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs’ pursuit of the judicial deception claim in Count 

Two seems to imply that at least some of the removals were judicially authorized. As 

discussed in later portions of this order, one of the elements of a judicial deception claim 

is materiality, i.e., that the court would have declined to issue the order had the defendant 

been truthful.

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state court accepted Burns’ investigation as sufficient to issue a temporary dependency 

order . . . Burns was not on notice that her conduct was constitutionally deficient.” Fidler, 

2024 WL 1553703 at *2. For similar reasons, if Count One were based solely on Patchin’s

and Del Fiacco’s efforts to cause the children to be removed from Jimenez-Bencebi, the 

Court would conclude they are entitled to qualified immunity, at least under the second 

prong of the qualified-immunity analysis. See also Keates, 883 F.3d at 1239 n.2 (noting 

the lack of established law as to whether state officials may be held liable for detention 

authorized by a juvenile court); David v. Kaulukukui, 38 F.4th 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2022) 

(“Turning to this case, David sufficiently alleges that Kaulukukui participated in removing 

B.D. from her custody without a court order, placed B.D. in Keahiolalo’s custody, and 

prevented David from having contact with B.D. or regaining custody. These allegations, 

if true, violate a clearly established constitutional right to familial association.”) (emphasis 

added). 

But Count One is not limited in this fashion. In addition to challenging the decision 

to remove the children at various points in 2018, 2019, and 2020, Count One also 

challenges the timely failure to allow Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta to resume visitation 

after, at a minimum, the juvenile court issued its May 2022 decision authorizing 

reunification. (Doc. 1-3 at 140 ¶¶ 38(k), 39-40 [“On 11 May 2022, the juvenile court . . . 

changed the case plan from severance to reunification for K.J, K.A.J., and J.A.J. The court 

ordered DCS to have a meeting with parents within 30 days of 11 May 2022 ruling to start 

the reunification process. For the first six weeks after the 11 May 2022 order, DCS 

cancelled all of Plaintiffs’ supervised visits with their children. In direct violation of the 

11 May 2022 order, DCS took no affirmative steps toward implementing the reunification 

case plan until more than five months later.”].) 

On the one hand, there is a strong argument that it would violate clearly established 

law for a DCS employee to interfere with parental visitation under these circumstances, 

i.e., where the interference was not only unauthorized by court order, but directly contrary 

to a court order. Keates, 883 F.3d at 1239 (“[T]he complaint plausibly indicates that Koile 

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exceeded the scope of any intrusion necessary to protect A.K. Based on the allegations in 

the complaint, there was no basis for preventing Keates from having contact with A.K.”) 

(citation omitted); David, 38 F.4th at 804 (“Even if B.D.’s initial removal was supported 

by reasonable cause, David alleges facts plausibly indicating that the Defendants . . . 

exceeded the scope of any intrusion necessary to protect B.D. The FAC states that David 

was not able to speak with or see B.D. for 21 days. Nor was she informed of B.D.’s 

whereabouts. With no indication that B.D. faced any past abuse by David or that B.D. was 

at risk of future abuse, there was no basis for preventing David from having contact with 

B.D. or for separating B.D. from David for 21 days. Again, the FAC alleges that CWS 

itself had deemed David’s home to be at the lowest risk level just days before B.D. was 

removed from her mother’s care. Based on these allegations, the 21-day separation was 

significantly longer than reasonably necessary to alleviate a threat of immediate harm.”) 

(cleaned up). 

On the other hand, the FAC does not allege who was responsible for these acts of 

interference. Patchin was presumably not responsible, given that the challenged acts 

occurred after May 2022 yet Patchin ceased being assigned to Plaintiffs’ case as of March 

or April 2021. (Doc. 1-3 at 140 ¶¶ 42-43; id. at 147 ¶ 91.) Thus, Patchin is entitled to 

qualified immunity as to this aspect of Count One.

As for Del Fiacco, although he was the assigned DCS worker from March 2021 

onward, the FAC does not allege that he was responsible for the acts of interference—

instead, it generically attributes them to “DCS.” (Id. at 140 ¶¶ 39-40, emphases added 

[“For the first six weeks after the 11 May 2022 order, DCS cancelled all of Plaintiffs’

supervised visits with their children. In direct violation of the 11 May 2022 order, DCS

took no affirmative steps toward implementing the reunification case plan until more than 

five months later.”].) This is insufficient to overcome Del Fiacco’s claim of qualified 

immunity as to this aspect of Count One. 

For these reasons, the § 1983 claim in Count One against Patchin and Del Fiacco is 

dismissed. The dismissal is with leave to amend, as Plaintiffs may be able to allege new 

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facts to cure the deficiencies identified above.

b. Count Two

In Count Two, Plaintiffs assert a claim for judicial deception against Patchin and 

Del Fiacco.

22

 “[A]s part of the right to familial association, parents and children have a 

‘right to be free from judicial deception’ in child custody proceedings and removal orders.” 

David, 38 F.4th at 800 (citation omitted). See also Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health 

Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]eliberately fabricating evidence in civil 

child abuse proceedings violates the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

when a liberty or property interest is at stake . . . .”). “To state a violation of the 

constitutional right to familial association through judicial deception, a plaintiff must allege 

‘(1) a misrepresentation or omission (2) made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for 

the truth, that was (3) material to the judicial decision.’ A misrepresentation or omission 

is ‘material’ if a court ‘would have declined to issue the order had the defendant been 

truthful.’” David, 38 F.4th at 801 (cleaned up). 

i. Patchin

Under the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis, the Court must assess 

whether the factual allegations in the FAC are sufficient to support a judicial deception 

claim against Patchin. As explained below, they are.

The FAC alleges that Patchin made the following “misrepresentations and/or 

omissions to the court which were deliberate falsehoods and/or which demonstrated a 

reckless disregard for the truth”:

[A.] [Jimenez-Bencebi] was homeless for several months in 2018; b. J.M.J. 

was so severely malnourished he was feeble and could barely sit up; c. J.M.J. 

had a flat head, distended stomach and non-accidental bruising all over his 

back; d. [Jimenez-Bencebi] did not like J.M.J. because [he] was a baby 

conceived by rape; e. K.J. had scratches on her face evidencing abuse; 

f. [Jimenez-Bencebi] was aggressive; g. [Jimenez-Bencebi] had been 

convicted of felonious child abuse in Missouri in 2017; h. on one occasion 

in July 2019 [Jimenez-Bencebi] shouted at her therapist, Dr. Hanley; i. on 

22 Count Two is also asserted against Davisson, but that claim has now been dismissed 

for other reasons.

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one occasion, while in labor in the hospital, [Jimenez-Bencebi] stated she 

would name J.A.J. “Motherfucker;” j. [Jimenez-Bencebi] has gender 

dysmorphic disorder; and k. [Jimenez-Bencebi] willfully neglected J.M.J. 

because she hates boys. 

(Doc. 1-3 at 153-54; id. at 154-55 ¶ 147.) 

The FAC also provides factual allegations specifying why these statements are false. 

According to the FAC, Jimenez-Bencebi’s “home instability was brief, measured in weeks 

not months.” (Id. at 143 ¶ 67(a).) The FAC also alleges that Jimenez-Bencebi “loves” 

J.M.J. as demonstrated by her “tak[ing] J.M.J. for his one-year checkup and vaccinations.” 

(Id. at 143 ¶ 67(b).) At that appointment, the “medical professional and mandatory reporter 

noted nothing unusual about J.M.J. and did not report [Jimenez-Bencebi].” (Id. at 138 

¶ 37.) Further, contrary to Patchin’s statements regarding J.M.J.’s medical condition, 

J.M.J.’s medical records from the day he was removed state that J.M.J. “was active, 

crawling, playful and happy,” had only one small scratch, one small bruise on his cheek, 

and three small bruises on his thigh, and had a normal shaped head. (Id. at 142 ¶¶ 56-57.)

The FAC also alleges that J.M.J. lost weight after being in foster care and that his “mild or 

moderate malnutrition in September 2018 was most likely attributable to this feeding issue 

rather that any neglect on [Jimenez-Bencebi’s] part.” (Id. at 144 ¶ 67(g).) The FAC also 

alleges that Jimenez-Bencebi’s previous conviction was a misdemeanor, not a felony. (Id.

at 137 ¶ 27.) In a similar vein, the FAC alleges that Jimenez-Bencebi’s therapist “Dr. 

Hanley stated in a report dated 28 August 2019 that ‘there is a good chance that [JimenezBencebi] has completed what she needs to do for DCS’” and “never stated in her notes that 

[Jimenez-Bencebi] shouted at her or was aggressive towards her in any way.” (Id. at 145 

¶¶ 73-74.) Additionally, the FAC alleges that “[r]eports from [Zavaleta’s] service 

providers were also positive, and contrary to DCS’s ‘too-passive to protect’ narrative.” (Id.

at 145 ¶ 76.) The FAC also alleges that Jimenez-Bencebi “was never diagnosed by any 

therapist with gender dysphoria.” (Id. at 145 ¶ 81.) These facts make it plausible that 

Patchin’s statements were misrepresentations.

The FAC also provides specific factual allegations in support of the second element 

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of the judicial deception test. The FAC alleges that the “exculpatory evidence” referenced 

above regarding J.M.J.’s weight and medical status “was immediately evident to [Patchin], 

but she knowingly or recklessly ignored it.” (Id. at 142 ¶ 61.) Further, information about 

Jimenez-Bencebi’s homelessness and prior conviction was likely available to Patchin at 

the time that she made at least some of her challenged statements to the juvenile court.

23

 

These facts make it plausible that Patchin made the challenged statements with at least 

reckless disregard for the truth. Kastis v. Alvarado, 2020 WL 2468389, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2020) 

(“Plaintiff has alleged facts—not merely conclusions—to show that defendant Alvarado 

made deliberately false statements or recklessly disregarded the truth in his search warrant 

affidavit and that those misrepresentations and omissions were material to the reviewing 

state court judge’s probable cause determination. Plaintiff’s allegations specify which of 

the statements in defendant Alvarado’s affidavit were false and why plaintiff believes those 

statements to be false. Plaintiff also specifies the information that defendant Alvarado 

omitted from his affidavit and why those omissions were material to the probable cause 

determination. Assuming the truth of these factual allegations, plaintiff has plausibly 

alleged that defendant Alvarado either acted deliberately or in reckless disregard for the 

truth in presenting his affidavit to the issuing state court judge.”). Cf. Scanlon v. Cnty. of 

Los Angeles, 92 F.4th 781, 802 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he details in Olarte’s report confirm 

that the Parents had consulted with at least two doctors—one, a pediatrician who worked 

with them on K.X.’s autism, and the other, a board-certified anesthesiologist and pain 

management specialist who recommended cannabis oil to treat her autism—and were on 

an extended waiting list to see a third doctor who was known for treating autistic children 

with cannabis oil. That simply cannot be squared with Olarte’s recommendation that K.X. 

and G.X. be removed because the Parents ‘had not consulted with a medical professional 

or a professional who deals with autism.’”) (cleaned up).

23 Although Defendants correctly note that certain medical records would not have 

been available to Patchin at the time of the first removal on September 14, 2018 (Doc. 6 at 

17 n.11), the claim of judicial deception is not limited to that timeframe and also 

encompasses Patchin’s later statements.

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The factual allegations in the FAC also make it plausible that but-for Patchin’s 

statements, K.J., K.A.J, and J.A.J. would not have been removed from Jimenez-Bencebi’s

and Zavaleta’s care. The FAC alleges that “[t]he juvenile court finally recognized at the 

end of the second severance trial in May 2022, that the State, DCS and their agents’ picture 

of [Jimenez-Bencebi] as an abuser and [Zavaleta] as a passive inept father was inaccurate.” 

(Doc. 1-3 at 148 ¶ 103.) Patchin is alleged to have submitted the false statements to the

juvenile court to support removing the children and terminating Jimenez-Bencebi’s 

parental rights. (Id. at 142-43 ¶¶ 62-63; id. at 144-45 ¶ 71.) Accepting the factual 

allegations in the FAC as true, it is plausible to infer that the removals would not have 

occurred had the juvenile court been aware those statements were false. David, 38 F.4th 

at 802 (“Additionally, David alleges that ‘had the presiding judge in the Family Court been 

informed of the Custody Order, Defendant Keahiolalo’s application for a temporary 

restraining order would not have been granted as to B.D.’ In other words, she claims that 

but-for Kaulukukui’s misrepresentation or omission, David would not have been deprived 

of custody over B.D., meaning that the omission was material. Thus, we conclude that 

David has successfully stated a claim for violation of her and B.D.’s right to familial 

association based on judicial deception.”) (cleaned up). 

As for the second prong of the qualified-immunity test, although Plaintiffs’ response 

brief does not identify any clearly established law supporting their judicial deception claim, 

the FAC identifies various cases, including Hardwick v. County of Orange, 844 F. 3d 1112 

(9th Cir. 2017). (Doc. 1-3 at 154 ¶ 145.) 

Hardwick supplies the sort of clearly established law that is necessary to overcome 

Patchin’s claim of qualified immunity as to Count Two. There, the plaintiff sued the 

County of Orange and employees of its Social Services Agency under the theory “that the 

social worker employees acting under color of state law maliciously used perjured 

testimony and fabricated evidence to secure her removal from her mother, and that this 

abuse of state power violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights 

to her familial relationship with her mother.” Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1114. More 

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specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the social workers (1) made false statements in reports 

submitted during the dependency proceeding; (2) made false statements on and off the 

record “to the commissioner overseeing the dependency proceeding, triggering [the 

plaintiff’s] seizure”; (3) fabricated and suppressed evidence during the dependency 

proceeding; and (4) used false statements to keep the plaintiff separated from her mother 

“even though defendants allegedly knew they were lying to the court about the basis for 

the initial seizure and subsequent detention.” Id. at 1115. The Ninth Circuit held that the 

defendants were on notice in February 2000, when they removed the plaintiff from her 

mother, that “the specific granular right to be free from deliberately fabricated evidence in 

civil child dependency proceedings where a parent’s or child’s protected familial liberty 

interest is at stake” is clearly established. Id. at 1117. See also Scanlon, 92 F.4th at 805 

(“The right to be free from judicial deception was clearly established prior to 2016 and so 

before the events of this case.”); David, 38 F.4th at 800-01 (stating that “the right to be free 

from judicial deception in matters of child custody ‘is beyond debate’”); Kohlmann, 2023 

WL 1782023 at *8 (same).

Accordingly, Patchin is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Two at this 

stage of the proceedings. David, 38 F.4th at 802-03 (“We conclude that any reasonable 

official would understand that the latter behavior—if proven—violates the law. As such, 

it is ‘hardly conduct for which qualified immunity is either justified or appropriate.’”) 

(citation omitted).

ii. Del Fiacco

Under the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis, the Court must assess 

whether the factual allegations in the FAC are sufficient to support a judicial deception 

claim against Del Fiacco. As explained below, they are not.

The FAC provides only a few allegations to support that claim—that Del Fiacco 

“re-alleged Patchin’s false narrative and allegations” when she took over for Patchin in 

March or April 2021 and that Del Fiacco “knew Patchin’s allegations were false [and] 

recklessly disregarded the exculpatory facts that were evidenced in the record.” (Doc. 1-3 

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at 147 ¶¶ 91-93.) These statements merely parrot the language from case law that Del 

Fiacco acted with knowledge or indifference in “re-alleging” Patchin’s statements and are 

insufficient to state a claim for judicial deception. Salvi v. Cnty. of San Diego, 2019 WL 

1671001, *7 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“Plaintiffs have not alleged facts, but simply conclusory 

allegations that Defendants acted ‘deliberately or recklessly.’ Absent facts to support this 

allegation, this claim must be dismissed.”) (citation omitted); Riveira v. Dresch, 2019 WL 

3238569, *5 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“Even if Defendant’s affidavit contained inaccuracies 

regarding this policy, Plaintiffs have not raised factual allegations that plausibly establish 

that Defendant knowingly or recklessly made false statements regarding that policy.”).

The FAC also alleges that during testimony to the juvenile court on January 10, 

2022, Del Fiacco “falsely alleged that [Jimenez-Bencebi] focused on the ‘wrong things’ 

during the visits.” (Doc. 1-3 at 147 ¶ 94.) But this statement does not actually allege that 

Del Fiacco’s testimony was false. The FAC alleges that “[t]hese ‘wrong things’ were that 

[Jimenez-Bencebi] was concerned that her daughter had a very large bruise on her leg, red 

marks on her private parts, and tangled unkempt hair. Del Fiacco was the only individual 

who considered [Jimenez-Bencebi’s] concerns as ‘wrong things.’” (Id. at 147 ¶¶ 95-96.) 

Jimenez-Bencebi does not dispute that she focused on those things (id. at 147 ¶ 97 [alleging 

that Jimenez-Bencebi’s “concerns about her daughter were accurate and reasonable”]), but 

rather disputes Del Fiacco’s characterization of them as “wrong.” This is not an allegation 

of a false statement, but rather a critique of Del Fiacco’s opinion regarding the propriety of 

Jimenez-Bencebi’s concerns. Regardless, there is no support in the FAC that Del Fiacco 

knew or disregarded that these statements were false or that Del Fiacco’s testimony had an 

influence on the juvenile proceeding. As noted, all of the challenged removals had already 

occurred by the time of the January 2022 hearing, and the FAC alleges that the juvenile 

court ruled in large part against DCS in its decision issued in May 2022. Schindler v. 

Contra Costa Cnty., 2023 WL 2414864, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“Regardless, even assuming 

these statements were false, Plaintiff has not alleged that but for these statements, the 

court’s determination in the dependency proceedings would have been different.”). 

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This determination makes it unnecessary to proceed to the second prong of the 

qualified-immunity analysis as to Del Fiacco. She is dismissed from Count Two. The 

dismissal is with leave to amend because it may be possible for Plaintiffs to cure the 

aforementioned defects.

VI. State-Law Claims

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that, under A.R.S. § 12-821, any claim against a public entity or 

public employee must be brought within one year of accrual, meaning that “all state claims 

are expired” because “the accrual date for these torts” is either “the removal dates for the 

individual children—with the latest removal occurring on February 12, 2020” or at the 

latest the filing date of each dependency and severance petition, the last of which “was 

filed on May 20, 2021.” (Doc. 6 at 11-12.) However, Defendants “concede that the state 

claims of K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. are not time barred, due to their status as minors.” (Id. at 

11 n.7.) Defendants also argue that the notice of claim filed by Jimenez-Bencebi, Zavaleta, 

and L.J. was untimely because it “is dated November 8, 2022, so it is undisputed that no 

Defendant received the claim prior to that date.” (Id. at 13.) Finally, Defendants note that 

“[t]he other minors were not listed as claimants’ within the notice of claim.” (Id. at 13 

n.9.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue, in reliance on Rogers v. Board of Regents of University 

of Arizona, 311 P.3d 1075 (Ariz. App. 2013), “that ‘an analysis of the elements of the 

underlying claim is necessary to determine when a cause of action accrues.’” (Doc. 11 at 

14, cleaned up.) Plaintiffs argue “because [Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s] state law 

claims implicate the same concerns at issue in McDonough, the same accrual rule applies 

too . . . . Since the state court proceedings ended on May 23, 2023, with a dismissal of the 

dependency, Plaintiffs had until . . . May 23, 2024 to file a lawsuit.” (Id. at 16, internal 

citation omitted.)24 Plaintiffs argue that “[d]ependency and termination proceedings 

regularly last much longer than one hundred eighty days, or even a year. Thus, under any 

24 The FAC alleges this date as May 25, 2023. (Doc. 1-3 at 140 ¶ 41.)

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other approach, parents with potential claims against state actors would face an untenable 

choice between letting their claims expire and filing suit against the very state actors who 

are seeking to have their children declared dependent or to have their parental rights 

permanently terminated. Both options are undesirable and fraught with peril.” (Id. at 15-

16.)

In reply, Defendants accuse Plaintiffs of “seek[ing] to circumvent application of the 

codified discovery rule in A.R.S. § 12-821.01 by arguing the continuing tort doctrine 

extends the statute of limitations for the state claims; but this is erroneous.” (Doc. 16 at 

10.) Defendants also contend that “Plaintiffs[] conflate two concepts in their reliance on 

Rogers. Although Rogers does state[] that ‘an analysis of the elements of the underlying 

claim is necessary to determine when a cause of action accrues’; and, it is true that certain 

torts may have different accrual dates due to the elements, this does not undercut 

application of the discovery rule applicable via the statute for most torts.” (Id., cleaned 

up.) Defendants then elaborate on the arguments made in the motion to dismiss. (Id. at 

10-12.)

B. Analysis

1. Statute Of Limitations

Because Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay are public employees 

and the State is a public entity, any state-law claims against those defendants “shall be 

brought within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” A.R.S. § 12-

821. Arizona recognizes the discovery rule, which holds that “a cause of action accrues 

when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably 

should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition that caused or 

contributed to the damage.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B). “Thus, ‘the relevant inquiry is when 

did a plaintiff’s knowledge, understanding, and acceptance in the aggregate provide 

sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.’” Thompson v. Pima Cnty., 243 P.3d 1024, 

1028 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiffs filed the complaint on May 8, 

2023. Therefore, if any of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims accrued before May 8, 2022, and are 

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not subject to tolling, they are time-barred.

a. L.J., K.J., K.A.J., And J.A.J.

As Defendants concede, the statute of limitations does not bar the state-law claims 

asserted by L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. because “[in] Arizona . . . the statute of limitations 

is tolled until [the plaintiff] turns eighteen.” Franco, 2020 WL 7388489 at *3. See also

A.R.S. § 12-502.

b. Jimenez-Bencebi And Zavaleta: Counts Six, Nine, And 

Twelve

The FAC demonstrates that Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta were on notice to 

investigate the alleged injuries in Counts Six, Nine, and Twelve before May 8, 2022. 

Counts Six and Nine include allegations that Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and 

McKay failed to preserve Plaintiffs’ familial relationship by removing K.J., J.M.J., J.A.J., 

and K.A.J. (Doc. 1-3 at 161-62, 164-67.)25 But all of those removals occurred between 

2018 and 2020. Count Twelve alleges that Plaintiffs suffered emotional distress because 

of Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay’s “unwarranted removal of a child 

from their loving parent and then wrongfully and falsely accusing the parent of neglect and 

abuse.” (Id. at 171 ¶ 251.) But once again, the actions giving rise to that claim are the 

removals that occurred between 2018 and 2020. 

Because this time bar cannot be cured with amendment, these Counts are dismissed 

as to Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta without leave to amend.

c. Jimenez-Bencebi And Zavaleta: Counts Seven, Ten, And 

Thirteen

Count Seven alleges three sets of abuse of process: (1) Patchin filing the dependency 

25 Specifically, Count Six alleges that Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and 

McKay engaged in negligence per se by failing to protect L.J., K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., and 

J.A.J., by engaging in judicial deception to remove the children from Jimenez-Bencebi’s 

custody, and by not conducting a thorough investigation before their removals. (Doc. 1-3 

at 161-62.) Count Nine alleges that Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay 

“acted with gross negligence and breached their duty to make reasonable and/or diligent 

efforts to preserve the family relationship by failing to complete a prompt and thorough 

investigation.” (Id. at 166-67 ¶ 229.)

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and severance petitions, and Davisson approving those petitions (id. at 163 ¶¶ 204, 207); 

(2) Davisson and Del Fiacco continuing to “prosecut[e] . . . these petitions” (id. at 164 

¶ 210); and (3) “fail[ing] to initiate any meaningful steps [to reunite Plaintiffs] until five 

months after being ordered to do so” (id. at 164 ¶ 212).26 

The first two alleged abuses are time-barred for the same reasons as Counts Six, 

Nine, and Twelve. Because this time bar cannot be cured with amendment, those claims 

are dismissed without leave to amend as to Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta. 

In contrast, the final alleged abuse underlying Count Seven—failing to initiate the 

reunification process within 30 days of the juvenile court’s May 11, 2022 order—occurred 

within the limitations period. (Id. at 164 ¶ 212.) That portion of Jimenez-Bencebi’s and 

Zavaleta’s claim in Count Seven is therefore not time-barred. 

The analysis is largely the same regarding Counts Ten and Thirteen. Count Ten 

alleges that “Faust and McKay operated with gross negligence and breached the duties 

described herein by failing to ensure that all the State and DCS investigators were properly 

trained on their duty to protect the legal and due process rights of children and families 

from the time of the initial contact through case closure.” (Id. at 168 ¶ 237.) Count 

Thirteen alleges that the State, DCS, Davisson, Faust, and McKay engaged in negligent 

supervision, training, and retention that resulted in a breach of the duty to “make reasonable 

efforts to reunite parents with their children” and “allowed . . . Patchin and Del Fiacco to 

26 Although paragraph 212 attributes this abuse to “the State and DCS,” Count Seven 

is not asserted (or has been dismissed) against those entities for reasons discussed in earlier 

portions of this order. Also, although the Court harbors doubt as to whether the FAC 

contains sufficient factual allegations to show that Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson were 

personally responsible for this particular abuse—as discussed in earlier portions of this 

order, Patchin and Del Fiacco are entitled to qualified immunity as to the § 1983 claim 

premised on this abuse due to the absence of factual allegations tying them to the alleged 

interference—the analysis here is limited to the statute-of-limitations argument raised by 

Defendants. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375-76 (2020) (“In our 

adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation. . . . [A]s 

a general rule, our system is designed around the premise that parties represented by 

competent counsel know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts 

and argument entitling them to relief. In short: Courts are essentially passive instruments 

of government. They do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to 

right. They wait for cases to come to them, and when cases arise, courts normally decide 

only questions presented by the parties.”) (cleaned up).

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pursue a false narrative and allegations against [Jimenez-Bencebi] and allowed the 

unlawful seizure of her children and allowed them to continue their false narrative in Court 

filings and testimony.” (Id. at 172; id. at 173 ¶¶ 263-66.) Liberally construed, those counts 

seem to sweep in both conduct related to the removals and conduct related to the failure to 

ensure reunification in a timely manner following the May 2022 order. Accordingly, to 

the extent Counts Ten and Thirteen are based on the removals, those portions of Counts 

Ten and Thirteen are dismissed without leave to amend as to Jimenez-Bencebi and 

Zavaleta, but to the extent Counts Ten and Thirteen are based on reunification failures, 

those portions of Counts Ten and Thirteen are not time-barred as to Jimenez-Bencebi and 

Zavaleta. 

d. Jimenez-Bencebi And Zavaleta: Count Eight

Count Eight alleges that Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay are liable 

for gross negligence and violating Plaintiffs’ legal rights “when they failed to properly 

investigate whether the State and DCS should remove the children from their parent’s 

care”; “fail[ed] to complete a prompt and thorough investigation”; and “made 

representations to the court that were false and/or demonstrated a reckless disregard for the 

truth.” (Id. at 165 ¶¶ 218-19, 221.) As discussed above, all of the challenged conduct 

relating to the removals and the court statements occurred before May 2022, so any statelaw claim by Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta based on such conduct is time-barred.

However, Count Eight also alleges that Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and 

McKay “limit[ed], and at times forbid[], [Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s] visits with 

the children” (id. at 165 ¶ 220)—conduct that occurred for six weeks following the juvenile 

court’s May 2022 order. (Id. at 140 ¶ 39.) Thus, Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims

in Count Eight against Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay regarding that 

challenged conduct is not time-barred.27 

...

27 As noted in the previous footnote, the analysis here is limited to the issue of 

timeliness and does not address whether Count Eight properly attributes the visitationinterference claim to all of the named Defendants.

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e. McDonough And The Continuing Tort Doctrine

There is no merit to Plaintiffs’ contention that the juvenile court’s dismissal of the 

dependency action on May 25, 2023 sets the accrual date for their state-law claims. As 

discussed in earlier portions of this order, McDonough does not alter the limitations 

calculations because the principles animating that decision are not present here, where the 

underlying proceeding was a civil dependency proceeding. 

Nor does Arizona law suggest that the continuing tort doctrine delays the accrual of 

Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. First, Plaintiffs cite no legal authority—and the Court is aware 

of none—establishing that the continuing tort doctrine applies to the specific state-law 

claims asserted here. Lund v. Burch & Cracchiolo P.A., 2020 WL 6834539, *8 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2020) (“Further, Lund cites to no Arizona case that applies the continuing tort 

doctrine to claims for abuse of process and invasion of privacy, and given the facts of this 

case—much like the court in Cruz—we decline to do so now.”); Watkins v. Arpaio, 367 

P.3d 72, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (“The common-law ‘continuing wrong’ doctrine would 

enable such a victim to wait to sue until after the investigation is finished. But the 

limitations rules that apply to Watkins’s claim against Arpaio are creatures of statute, not 

the common law, and those statutes do not allow one in Watkins’s situation to wait to bring 

suit until more than a year after acts sufficient to state a claim occur.”). 

Second, the Court doubts that applying the continuing tort doctrine would be 

appropriate in this instance, because the events giving rise to liability were sufficient to put 

Plaintiffs on notice of their claims, without any need for aggregation. Watkins, 367 P.3d 

at 76 (“Watkins’s intentional-infliction claim is unlike those in the cases he cites; in those 

cases, liability arose from a long series of cumulative acts, any one of which likely was 

insufficient by itself to support the claim. Here, we do not have a situation in which the 

initial acts in a series of alleged wrongdoing are not sufficient by themselves to support a 

claim.”); Floyd v. Donahue, 923 P.2d 875, 879 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (“We agree that under 

certain conditions a tort is continuous, and in such cases the limitations period does not 

commence until the date of the last tortious act. However, the continuing tort rule does not 

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apply here because each claimed act is a separate assault causing separate as well as 

cumulative injury.”) (citation omitted). Here, each instance of challenged conduct is 

separately cognizable.

2. Notice Of Claims

Under Arizona law, a party seeking to bring a claim against public entities and 

employees must file a “notice of claim” within 180 days of the action accruing. A.R.S. 

§ 12-821.01(A); Walton v. Arizona, 2017 WL 5997441, *3 (D. Ariz. 2017) (“The 

requirement of filing a notice of claim is mandatory on claims against public entities and 

individual public employees.”). “If a notice of claim is not properly filed within the 

statutory time limit, a plaintiff’s claim is barred by statute.” Falcon ex rel. Sandoval v. 

Maricopa County, 144 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc). “Actual notice and 

substantial compliance do not excuse failure to comply with the statutory requirements 

. . . .” Id. However, “[n]otwithstanding subsection A, a minor or an insane or incompetent 

person may file a claim within one hundred eighty days after the disability ceases.” A.R.S. 

§ 12-821.01(D). 

Both sides agree that the notice of claim at issue here, which was filed by JimenezBencebi, Zavaleta, and L.J., is dated November 8, 2022. (Doc. 6-1; Doc. 11 at 16.) 

a. L.J.

L.J. filed his notice of claim before filing the complaint and before his period of 

disability ceased. Accordingly, the notice-of-claim requirement does not bar L.J.’s statelaw claims.

b. K.J., K.A.J., And J.A.J.

The notice of claim does not list K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. as claimants. (Doc. 6-1 at 

1.) Although Defendants seem to suggest this omission means the state-law claims of K.J., 

K.A.J., and J.A.J. must be dismissed (Doc. 6 at 13 n.9), any such argument is mistaken. 

As noted, § 12-821.01(D) provides that “a minor . . . may file a claim within one hundred 

eighty days after the disability ceases.” Id. Thus, the deadline for K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. 

to file their respective notices of claim will not arrive until 180 days after each of their 

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eighteenth birthdays. See also Estate of DeSela v. Prescott Unified Sch. Distr. No. 1, 249 

P.3d 767, 768 (Ariz. 2011) (“This statute generally requires persons having claims against 

public entities or employees to file pre-litigation notices within 180 days after the claim 

accrues, but minors may file such notices within 180 days after turning eighteen.”); Leibel 

v. City of Buckeye, 556 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1078 (D. Ariz. 2021) (agreeing that “the 180-day 

period does not begin to accrue until a minor reaches the age of eighteen”). 

c. Jimenez-Bencebi And Zavaleta: Counts Seven, Ten, And 

Thirteen

As noted, Count Seven is a claim that Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson failed to 

initiate the reunification process within 30 days of the juvenile court’s May 11, 2022 order. 

(Doc. 1-3 at 164 ¶ 212.) Counts Ten and Thirteen also contain language that, when 

liberally construed, sweeps in conduct related to the failure to ensure reunification in a 

timely manner following the May 2022 order. (Id. at 168 ¶ 237 [Count Ten]; id. at 173

¶ 263 [Count Thirteen].) Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta were therefore on notice to 

investigate the alleged injuries as of June 10, 2022. Their notice of claim filed on 

November 8, 2022—i.e., less than 180 days after June 10, 2022—was therefore timely.

d. Jimenez-Bencebi And Zavaleta: Count Eight

As noted, Count Eight is a claim that Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and 

McKay “limit[ed], and at times forbid[], [Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s] visits with 

the children” for at least five weeks following the juvenile court’s May 11, 2022 order. (Id.

at 140 ¶ 39; 165 ¶ 220.) Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta were therefore on notice to 

investigate the alleged injuries as of June 22, 2022. Their notice of claim filed on 

November 8, 2022—i.e., less than 180 days after June 22, 2022—was therefore timely.

...

...

...

...

...

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is granted in part and denied in 

part. 

2. The remaining counts are (a) Count Two, which is asserted only against 

Patchin by L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J.; (b) Count Six, which is asserted against Patchin, 

Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay by L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J.; (c) Count Seven, 

which is asserted against Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson by all Plaintiffs (although it is 

time-barred in part as to Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta); (d) Count Eight, which is asserted 

against Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay by all Plaintiffs (although it is 

time-barred in part as to Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta); (e) Count Nine, which is asserted 

against Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay by L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J.; 

(f) Count Ten, which is asserted against Faust and McKay by all Plaintiffs (although it is 

time-barred in part as to Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta); (g) Count Twelve, which is 

asserted against Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay by L.J., K.J., K.A.J., 

and J.A.J.; and (h) Count Thirteen, which is asserted against the State, Davisson, Faust, 

and McKay by all Plaintiffs (although it is time-barred in part as to Jimenez-Bencebi and 

Zavaleta).

3. Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend, with limitations as expressed in the 

body of this order.

4. If Plaintiffs choose to attempt to amend their FAC, their Second Amended 

Complaint (“SAC”) must be filed within 21 days of the entry date of this Order. Plaintiffs 

must, consistent with LRCiv 15.1(a), attach a redlined version of the pleading as an exhibit. 

Although the Court appreciates that providing a redlined version may prove technically 

challenging, Plaintiffs must comply with this requirement in light of the length of the 

current complaint and the limited nature of the leave to amend that is being granted.

5. Regardless of whether Plaintiffs file a SAC, Defendants are authorized to file 

a successive motion to dismiss within 21 days of the deadline for filing the SAC. Cf. 

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Hasbrouck v. Yavapai County, 2021 WL 321894, *12 (D. Ariz. 2021) (“[E]ven though a 

party is ordinarily barred by Rule 12(g)(2) from filing a successive motion to dismiss on 

grounds that could have been raised in an earlier dismissal motion, the Court will permit 

the County to file another dismissal motion that addresses Count One. This outcome is 

necessitated, in part, by the prolixity of Plaintiffs’ complaint, which made it difficult for 

the County to raise all potential dismissal arguments in the initial motion it filed jointly 

with the other County Defendants.”).

Dated this 10th day of June, 2024.

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