Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02521/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02521-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOE,

NO. CIV. S-06-2521 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, O R D E R

Governor of California,

in his official capacity,

et al

Defendants.

 /

On November 7, 2006, California voters enacted Proposition 83,

the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law

(“SPPCA”), which amends portions of the California Penal Code.

Plaintiff John Doe seeks a temporary restraining order to enjoin

defendants from enforcing three provisions of the SPPCA. First,

section 21 prohibits any person required to register as a sex

offender from residing within 2,000 feet of any public or private

school, or park where children regularly gather. Cal. Penal Code

§ 3003.5. Second, section 22 requires any person convicted of a

registerable sex offense to be monitored by a global positioning

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system (“GPS”) for life. Cal. Penal Code § 3004. Third, section

18 requires any person convicted of a registerable sex offense to

be monitored by GPS for the term of his or her parole. Cal. Penal

Code § 3000.07. 

Plaintiff pled no contest over twenty years ago to several

felonies requiring him to register as a sex offender under Cal.

Penal Code § 290. Pursuant to the plea agreement, plaintiff was

sentenced to a term in state prison and was required to register

as a sex offender for his lifetime. Thereafter, he served his

sentence and completed his parole. Subsequently, in 2005,

plaintiff was convicted of failing to maintain registration

requirements. Pursuant to a plea agreement, plaintiff served a

prison sentence for this matter. 

Upon completion of his sentence in November 2005, plaintiff

agreed to certain parole conditions. Among these conditions was

plaintiff’s agreement “not to reside near any parks, schools, or

other areas where children congregate.” Decl. of John Doe, ¶ 7

(“Doe Decl.”). His current address has been approved by the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, but is

likely within 2,000 feet of a park where children gather. Doe

Decl. ¶ 12. 

In March 2006, his parole conditions were amended by agreement

to include GPS monitoring for the remainder of his parole. The GPS

monitoring was conducted pursuant to (then) Cal. Penal Code § 3004.

This section provides that parole authorities may require

electronic monitoring under certain circumstances but generally

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prohibits the use of electronic monitoring devices for the purpose

of eavesdropping.

II. Standard

The standard for a temporary restraining order and for a

preliminary injunction are substantially the same. Stuhlbarg Int’l

Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7

(9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit’s standard for a preliminary

injunction requires that the moving party show either (1) a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility

of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised and

the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the moving party.

Southwest Voters Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d

914, 917 (9th Cir. 2003); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA,

Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1397 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). These standards

“are not separate tests but the outer reaches of a single

continuum.” Int’l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d 819,

822 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 

 The court in any situation must find that there is at least

a fair chance of success on the merits, Johnnson v. California

State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995), and

that there is some significant threat of irreparable injury, Big

County Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Anchorage Sch. Dist., 868

F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989).

III. Analysis

First, plaintiff contends that the residency restriction

violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. He has demonstrated a

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substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim.

Specifically, it is likely that the residency restriction is

punitive in effect. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2002)

(setting forth the relevant factors in ascertaining whether a law

is punitive in effect). Moreover, if forced to comply with the

residency restriction during the pendency of this litigation,

plaintiff would be forced to move from his home and therefore

suffer irreparable harm. Accordingly, a temporary restraining

order with respect to the residency restriction is GRANTED.

Second, plaintiff claims that the lifetime GPS monitoring

requirement violates his due process rights by breaching the terms

of his plea agreement. Plaintiff is already subject to GPS

monitoring pursuant to the terms of his parole. The state has not

yet imposed any additional burden to which plaintiff did not

previously consent. Rather, the state will only be in breach of

the plea agreement, if at all, when plaintiff’s parole term expires

and the state continues to subject him to GPS monitoring. He has

not demonstrated that this will occur pending a full trial on the

merits. Accordingly, there is no immediate threat of injury, and

the motion for a temporary restraining order with respect to the

lifetime GPS monitoring requirement is DENIED.

Finally, plaintiff maintains that, even though he is currently

subject to GPS monitoring, the SPPCA removes certain protections

that were previously in place regarding the use of GPS devices

during parole, such as a prohibition on eavesdropping. Even

assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute

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as removing these protections is correct, plaintiff has not

demonstrated any immediate threat to his Fourth Amendment rights.

Accordingly, the motion for a temporary restraining order with

respect to the parole GPS requirement is DENIED.

IV. Conclusion

The court orders as follows:

1. A temporary restraining order with respect to Cal. Penal

Code § 3003.5(b) and (c) is hereby GRANTED. Defendants are

temporarily restrained from enforcing Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5(b)

and (c) against plaintiff without first notifying the court

fourteen (14) days in advance.

2. The motion for a temporary restraining order with respect

to Cal. Penal Code § 3000.07 is hereby DENIED.

3. The motion for a temporary restraining order with respect

to Cal. Penal Code § 3004 is hereby DENIED.

4. A hearing on plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary

injunction is hereby SET for December 18, 2006, at 10:00 a.m.

Defendants shall file an opposition or statement of non-opposition

to plaintiff’s motion by December 4, 2006. Plaintiff may file a

response to defendant’s opposition by December 11, 2006.

5. Plaintiff is ordered to SERVE a copy of this order on all

defendants who do not have counsel who have appeared in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 17, 2006.

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