Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00595/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00595-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN FELIPE MIRAMONTES,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID LONG, Warden,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 12cv595 LAB (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. No. 1]

Martin Felipe Miramontes, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition). Miramontes is serving an indeterminate sentence of

146 years to life for sexually abusing children. He contests his confinement, alleging that his due

process rights and right to a fair trial were violated when the trial court admitted evidence of similar and 

prior uncharged conduct. Respondent filed an answer and an amended memorandum of points and

authorities, as the court ordered. Miramontes filed a traverse on January 15, 2013 and then again on

February 7, 2013.

This court has reviewed the Petition, amended answer, both traverses and the complete record in

this case. After a thorough review, the court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED and that it

be dismissed with prejudice. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. The Conviction.

A jury convicted Miramontes of sodomy and oral copulation/sexual penetration with a child ten

years old or younger, committing lewd sex acts on a child, using harmful matter to seduce a child, and

possession of child pornography. The jury found there were multiple victims and that Miramontes

engaged in substantial sexual conduct with a child under age 14. The court sentenced Miramontes to a

prison term of 146 years to life, with 25 years to life imposed for the sodomy count, and 15 years to life

terms for eight of the other counts, and a one-year term for one conviction of a lewd act upon a child. 

Concurrent terms were imposed for five other counts. People v. Miramontes, 189 Cal.App.4th 1085,

1089 (2010); Lodgment 2 at 948.

2. The Appeal.

Miramontes filed a direct appeal alleging these claims: (1) the admission of the prior sexual

offense evidence that occurred in Tijuana violated the California Evidence Code sections 352 and 1108

and his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial; (2) the improper admission of prior “bad

acts” evidence violated federal rights to due process and a fair trial; and (3) the trial court erroneously

instructed the jury in violation of Miramontes’s due process rights. Lodgment 3.

In a published decision the court of appeal affirmed the conviction on November 4, 2010. See

Miramontes, 189 Cal.App.4th 1085; Lodgment 6.

Miramontes filed a petition for review, alleging the first and third claims that he alleged in his

direct appeal. Lodgment 7. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on February

16, 2011. Lodgment 8.

3. Habeas Petition.

Miramontes came directly to federal court to file this Petition on March 8, 2012. In the form

Petition, Miramontes refers to pages 3 to 6 of the attachment as stating the bases for his claims. On page

3 of the attachment, Miramontes asserts these grounds for relief: 

5.1 The admission of the prior sexual offense evidence that occurred in

Tijuana violated Evidence Code Section 352 and the plain language of

Evidence Code Section 1108, as well Petitioner’s Constitutional rights to

due process and a fair trial.

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5.2 Petitioner’s judgment of conviction must be reversed in its entirety

because the trial court erroneously instructed the jurors pursuant to

CALCRIM No. 1191 in violation of Petitioner’s constitutional right to due

process. 

Dkt. No. 1, ECF p.22. These claims were presented to the California Supreme Court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A. Background

Miramontes does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his various

convictions, and we may therefore set out the facts regarding those offenses in a summary fashion, for

the purpose of evaluating his evidentiary error claims about similar uncharged conduct. In doing so, we

refer to the young victims of the 2007 sexual misconduct as L. (Eduardo L.), D. (Eduardo D.) and M.

(Javier M.). Likewise, as to the 2003 uncharged molestation incidents in Mexico, we refer to the young

victims as B. (B.B.) and A. (Alex L.).

B. The Prosecution Case: Three Victims

Basically, the evidence showed that in 2007, Defendant was in his 40's, and was living in San

Diego in an apartment complex near the residences of the three young male victims, L. (age 7), D. (age

12), and M. (age 11). In 2003, Miramontes was living in Mexico in a neighborhood near B. (then age 7)

and her male cousin A. (also age 7). He “befriended” all of these youngsters and inappropriately touched

and communicated with them in various ways, as will next be described.

1. Counts 1–9, L.

In the fall of 2007, Miramontes was living in San Diego with his parents and a disabled sister. L.

was seven years old and lived in the same apartment complex. L. testified at trial that Miramontes often

invited him to his bedroom and showed him pornographic movies with boys and adults, told him that

was good behavior, and then had him take off his clothes and touched him all over his body. Sometimes

D. or M. was also there and participated in such conduct. Miramontes kissed L.’s neck, penis and anus,

1

This court quotes verbatim the factual background from the California Court of Appeal's

opinion. Lodgment 3. See 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(e)(1) ("a determination of a factual issue made by a state

court shall be presumed to be correct"); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-547 (1981) (deference is

owed to factual findings of state trial and appellate courts); Garvin v. Farmon, 258 F.3d 951, 952 (9th

Cir. 2001) (paraphrasing facts from the state court opinion). Petitioner may rebut the presumption only

by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(e)(1); Slovik v. Yates, 545 F.3d 1181, 1183 n.1 (9th

Cir. 2008).

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and asked L. to suck or kiss his penis. Miramontes kept a plastic penis in the closet that he asked L. to

kiss. Miramontes put the plastic penis into his own anus, and also into L.’s anus and M.’s anus.

Miramontes gave L. a dollar and promised him a CD and a Playstation if L. would suck his

penis, but he gave L. only the CD. Miramontes showed L. how he would shower his own disabled sister

and put his finger into her anus. The last day they were together, Miramontes placed his finger and penis

into L.'s anus. That night, L.’s mother was giving him a bath and noticed a bruise on his thigh and

bleeding

from his anus. She discovered he was in pain and could not walk, and reported the incidents to police

the next day, November 5, 2007.

At first, L. told police and the interviewing social worker from the Health and Human Services

Agency (the Agency) that he knew what bad touching was and no one had done anything like that to

him. A forensic medical examination November 9, 2007 disclosed that L. had a deep tear in his anus that

had healed over time, consistent with an injury, rather than any natural causes. L.’s mother reported L.

had recently been having heart palpitations, bedwetting and severe bowel control problems.

2. Counts 10–12, D.

D. was 12 years old in the fall of 2007, and lived in the same apartment complex as did

Miramontes and L. When they were together, Miramontes talked to L. and D. about sex and how it was

good for boys to have sex together, and he showed them pornographic movies. Miramontes squeezed the

penis of D., and another time, put his hands down his own pants and then wiped a wet, sticky substance

on D.'s cheek. Miramontes told the two boys that he would kill their mothers if they told anyone. D. and

his mother also went to the police station to report Miramontes’s activities.

3. Counts 13–14, M., and 16, all three youths

M. was 11 years old in 2007 and lived near the apartments where Miramontes lived. When M.

was playing with L. and D., Miramontes sometimes approached them and showed them child

pornography involving boys. Miramontes offered the boys money to engage in sex acts with each other

or with him, while he watched, and he told M. that he liked to rape little kids.

One time, M. saw Miramontes touching another boy’s penis and buttocks, and then Miramontes

grabbed M.'s penis and touched his stomach area. Miramontes told the boys that if they told anyone

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about these activities, Miramontes would kill their mothers. Sometime later, M. learned that L. and his

mother had told the police about Miramontes’s activities.

Investigators obtained a search warrant for Miramontes’s room and found some of the items that

had been described by the three victims, including toys, the plastic penis, thong underwear, computer

photographs and videos of boys involved in sexual acts, a camera and cell phone, and photographic

prints of boys involved in sexual acts. Investigators reviewed Miramontes’s computer chat logs and

found sexual materials and sexual references to Miramontes’s sister.

L., D. and M. each testified at trial, explaining they knew the difference between truth and a lie,

and describing the above incidents that involved them.

C. In Limine Proceedings on Admissibility of Prior Uncharged Sexual Misconduct 

Incidents

Before the jury was selected, both parties brought motions in limine regarding the intent of the

prosecutor to introduce testimony about prior uncharged sexual offenses against children, specifically

two children, B. and A., who previously lived near Miramontes in Mexico. (Evid. Code, §§ 1101, 1108.)

Miramontes opposed the prosecutor's motion to introduce such testimony, arguing it was too prejudicial,

inflammatory, or confusing, and would be cumulative and unnecessary, since the current three victims

were going to testify. Also, Miramontes claimed in his own motion that federal due process violations

were inherent in the use of criminal propensity evidence.

At the hearing on the motions, the court agreed with the prosecutor that under Evidence Code

section 1108, the prior acts could legitimately be used for propensity evidence, as guided by the

instructions. The court explained its ruling as follows: Under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision

(b), the evidence would be appropriate for the jury to consider as to intent or common plan. Evidence

Code section 1108 further provided for the admission of propensity evidence, if it were not unduly

inflammatory or remote in time. The court found that adding those two witnesses would not create an

unduly lengthy proceeding, and under California Supreme Court cases, Evidence Code section 1108 did

not violate federal due process guarantees. The defense objections under Evidence Code section 352 (on

both state and federal due process grounds) were overruled.

At the time of trial B. was 13 years old. In her testimony, she explained that when she was four

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to six years of age, she regularly went to the Tijuana house of Miramontes’s mother, her babysitter,

when Miramontes also lived there. Miramontes alone babysat her for about a week at one point.

Beginning when she was about four years old, Miramontes sometimes took her into his bedroom and

asked her to suck on his penis, and he would kiss and touch her breasts, buttocks, and vagina. At times,

he would also bring her cousin A. into the bedroom, make them both undress, and have B. perform

sexual acts on A. and on Miramontes, sometimes videotaping them.

Miramontes sometimes masturbated in front of B., and he sometimes required her to perform sex

acts on one of Miramontes’s visiting teenage male acquaintances, who had also appeared in

Miramontes's pornographic movies shown to her. Miramontes told her that if she told anyone about

these activities, something bad would happen to her mother. These acts stopped in 2003, when she was

six or seven years old, when her cousin, A., told B.’s mother about what was happening at Miramontes's

house, and B. then disclosed those facts to her. Tijuana police were called and investigated, and medical

examinations were conducted of the children, but apparently no charges were filed. About that time in

2003, Miramontes and family moved to San Diego.

After B.’s testimony, the court gave a limiting instruction under CALCRIM No. 1191 regarding

the uncharged crime of Miramontes committing a lewd act upon a child. The court explained to the jury

at that time that the evidence of uncharged offenses was admitted for a limited purpose, to decide

whether or not Miramontes was the person who committed the offenses in this case, with the required

intent or plan. The court repeated the same instruction when A. began his testimony, and again after the

parties rested. FN2

FN2. CALCRIM No. 1191 provides: “The People presented evidence that

the defendant committed the crimes of a lewd act upon a child that were

not charged in this case. These crimes are defined for you these

instructions. [¶] You may consider this evidence only if the People have

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, in fact,

committed the uncharged offenses. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] If you decide that the

defendant committed the uncharged offenses, you may, but are not

required, to conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed

or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also

conclude that the defendant was likely to commit sodomy [and oral

copulation and sexual penetration] of a child under 10, and lewd acts upon

a child as charged here. If you conclude that the defendant committed the

uncharged offenses, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along

with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the

defendant is guilty of [the same above offenses and] lewd acts upon a

child. The People must still prove each element of the charge and

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allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.” Additionally, the court gave

CALCRIM No. 375, regarding evidence of uncharged offenses to prove

identity, intent, common plan, etc., which included the following

language: “Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose.”

A. testified that when he and B. were both around seven, he would sometimes go into

Miramontes’s bedroom when B. was also there. Miramontes touched both B. and A. all over their bodies

while they were unclothed, and he videotaped his and their sexual acts. Miramontes kissed A.’s penis

and placed his own penis into A.’s rectum until white stuff came out. In return, Miramontes gave A. 20

pesos. 

Dr. Davis, who had examined L., also examined records of forensic medical examinations of B.

and A., conducted after their 2003 reporting of those incidents. B.’s examination was normal, and A.’s

examination showed mainly normal results, but also some evidence of abrasions on his right leg and a

laceration near his anus, which was characterized as “paragenital violence.”

D. The Defense Case

Miramontes did not testify in his defense at trial. He called as witnesses the police officer who

had initially interviewed L. At that time, L. denied to police that any bad touching had occurred.

Similarly, the Agency's social worker was originally told by L. that there had not been any bad touching

in his life. 

Likewise, when M. was initially interviewed, he denied that Miramontes had ever touched him.

Miramontes’s counsel argued that one or more of the mothers of the boys must have made up these

stories, or that L.’s anal injuries must have been caused by passing hard stools, which explanation had

not been ruled out by the medical examination.

Miramontes called several family members as witnesses (his mother and two aunts), who each

testified about never seeing him act inappropriately around children. His mother testified that she, not

Miramontes, was the care provider for his disabled sister (and earlier for B.), and that Miramontes was

always too busy at work to have engaged in the activities of which he was accused. She said she did not

allow A., who she said was dirty and a “street kid,” into her house in Mexico.

According to the testimony of Miramontes’s father, the family moved to San Diego in 2003

because of his own health. In 2007, he was at the apartment building one day and saw that a young boy

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(either L. or D.) was orally copulating another boy, so he reported this to their mothers.

Miramontes called two character witnesses, a work acquaintance and a social acquaintance, who

also testified they had never seen him act inappropriately around children.

E. Verdict; Judgment

During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the evidence about the uncharged

previous sexual offenses with B. and A. could be used to show Miramontes’s propensity and specific

intent to commit the current alleged crimes, including lewd conduct upon a child under the age of 10.

(CALCRIM No. 1191.) In the same way, she also referred to the previous use of harmful material

(pornography) with A. and B., as showing a propensity to commit such acts on the current victims.

In defense counsel’s closing, she pointed out that even if Miramontes had downloaded and

viewed child pornography on his computer, that did not mean that he had actually engaged in similar

acts against the children who testified in court. She then argued that their stories had evolved over time,

and pointed out they delayed in their initial reporting of the offenses.

With respect to the testimony of the two children from Mexico, defense counsel suggested that

their stories were implausible, such as where B. said that Miramontes had babysat her for a week in

2003 while his parents were on vacation, and some sex acts happened at that time. Also, the apartment

in Tijuana had a layout that would not have allowed much secrecy in comings and goings. The physical

examinations of the Mexican children had not shown clear signs of physical or sexual abuse. In rebuttal,

the prosecutor mentioned the testimony of the two Mexican children, and argued their stories were not

merely coincidental. The case was submitted.

In jury instructions, the court read, among others, CALCRIM No. 1191, regarding the evidence

of Miramontes allegedly engaging in sexual conduct with the two Mexican children, although that was

not charged in this case.

During deliberations, the jury sent out a number of questions to the judge, including one about

the further allegations for count 1 and which multiple victims were being referenced, i.e., whether that

paragraph only referred to the current victims, “or does this include A./B. (uncharged?) Or anyone we

don't know about?” The court answered that the multiple victim language referred only to the charged

victims, L., D., and M.

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As summarized above, the jury returned verdicts finding Miramontes guilty, specifically as to L.:

One count of sodomy; four counts of oral copulation/sexual penetration; two counts of lewd acts

(hand/penis contacts); and two counts of using harmful material to seduce a minor.

As to D. in particular, the jury verdicts found Miramontes guilty of two counts of lewd acts on a

child (hand/crotch contact; finger/cheek contact), and one count of using harmful material to seduce a

minor.

As to M., the jury verdict found Miramontes guilty of one count of attempted lewd acts (display

of penis) and one count of using harmful material to seduce a minor. FN3

FN3. The jury hung on one count of lewd act upon a child (M., count 15),

and it was subsequently dismissed at the request of the prosecution. Also,

certain further allegations regarding the attempted lewd acts on M. (count

13), were dismissed after the verdict, although the others remained in

effect.

Additionally, the jury convicted Miramontes of possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd.

(a)), and found true the further allegations of multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (b); § 1203.066, subd.

(a)(7)); substantial sexual conduct with a child (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)); and use of harmful sexual

matter (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(9)). Miramontes timely appealed.

Lodgment 6; Miramontes, 189 Cal.App.4th at 1090-1096.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. AEDPA Governs this Petition.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs this Petition. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal court will not grant habeas

relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the decision was (1)

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). “Clearly established federal law,” for purposes of § 2254(d), means

“the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders

its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). 

A federal habeas petition must allege a deprivation of one or more federal rights; the federal

court will not “reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502

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U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

B. Decisions that Contradict or Unreasonably Apply Federal Law. 

A federal habeas court may grant relief where the state court (1) decides a case “contrary to”

federal law by applying a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases; or (2)

decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535

U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal court may also grant habeas relief where a state court decision is an

“unreasonable application” of federal law, such as where the state court correctly identifies the

governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applies those decisions to the

facts at issue. Id.

The state court decision must be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief the

state court’s application of “clearly established federal law” must be “objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. “Objectively unreasonable” differs from “clear error” in that a federal court

cannot grant habeas relief only because it believes the state court erroneously or incorrectly applied

“clearly established federal law;” the application must be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 75-76

(internal citation omitted). That standard under AEDPA is difficult to meet and “demands that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011) (internal quotations omitted). A state court’s determination that lacks merit still “precludes

habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the ruling. Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 

C. Decisions Based on an Unreasonable Determination of Facts.

Section 2254(e)(1) provides: “[a] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. 

D. Review of State Court Decision.

If the State Supreme Court silently denies a Petitioner’s appeal with a summary dismissal, the

reviewing federal habeas court must look through to the last reasoned state court opinion in making a

decision. See Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the decision from the

California Court of Appeal is the last reasoned state court decision addressing the two claims. 

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Lodgment 6.

DISCUSSION

1. Claim 1: Evidence Code Violations and Rights to Due Process and Fair Trial.

Petitioner claims that the admission of the prior sexual offense evidence that occurred in Tijuana

violated Evidence Code Section 352 and the plain language of Evidence Code Section 1108, in violation

of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. He first breaks down the claim by arguing that

the Tijuana offenses do not qualify as prior bad acts under California law. Then he addresses, in

general, the due process and fair trial claim. Respondent argues that the “qualification” of the Tijuana

offenses is procedurally barred and alternatively, fails on the merits. Respondent also argues that there

is no merit to Petitioner’s due process and fair trial claim.

A. Procedural Default for Part of the Claim.

As part of his claim that the Tijuana sexual offenses were improperly admitted, Petitioner argues

those acts do not qualify as prior acts under California law because the alleged acts occurred in a foreign

jurisdiction. Respondent contends that this aspect of the claim is procedurally defaulted because the

appellate court denied it for failure to raise it to the trial court. Respondent also argues, in the

alternative, that even if Petitioner overcomes the procedural default, that aspect of the claim lacks merit.

Petitioner did not raise the foreign jurisdiction claim to the trial court, he only raised it on direct

appeal. The appellate court denied the claim on procedural grounds because “it was not raised before

the trial court, and should therefore be considered to be forfeited.” Miramontes, 189 Cal.App.4th at

1098. Notwithstanding that ruling, the court went on to deny the claim on the merits:

Next, even if this argument is considered, it makes no sense, because the intended scope

of Evidence Code section 1108 is broad enough to encompass admissibility of the

testimony of B. and A., which clearly describes conduct that is prohibited by California

law, even though it did not take place in California. Nowhere in Evidence Code section

1108 is it required that the referenced other sexual offenses have taken place in the

United States, and instead, the definitions in its subdivision (d) include descriptions of

the substance of unlawful conduct involved in a prior offense, wherever it may have

occurred. The principal consideration in this inquiry is whether the comparable prior,

essentially similar, conduct occurred, not where it occurred, for purposes of determining

if California consequences will ensue, such as its admissibility under Evidence Code

section 1108.

Miramontes, 189 Cal.App.4th at 1099.

The court further concluded that in any event, these uncharged prior acts were properly admitted

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so long as they satisfied California Evidence Code § 352:

If Evidence Code section 352 requirements are satisfied, evidence of an uncharged sexual

offense or incident of misconduct that substantially consisted of the conduct defined in

Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (d)(1)(A) through (F), but that was committed

elsewhere, may properly be considered by the jury under Evidence Code section 1108,

subdivision (a).

Miramontes, 189 Cal.App.4th at 1101.

A liberal reading of the Petition suggests that Petitioner argues this aspect of his due process and

fair trial claim should not be procedurally barred. “Procedural bar issues are not infrequently more

complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in some instances to

proceed to the merits if the result will be the same.” Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir.

2002) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (“It is wasteful of both our resources and

that of the litigants [to address procedural default] if the ultimate dismissal of the petition is a foregone

conclusion.”) 

As discussed below, this court finds that federal habeas relief is not available to Petitioner

because the state court’s determination that the Tijuana offenses constituted prior acts and that the prior

acts evidence was properly admitted was objectively reasonable within the meaning of § 2254(d). Thus,

addressing the issue of procedural default for only one aspect of the claim will not change the outcome

of these proceedings. Further, the appellate court found that the sub issue of where the prior acts

occurred is irrelevant so long as Evidence Code § 352 is satisfied, an issue that this court addresses

below. Judicial economy dictates reaching the merits of Petitioner’s due process and fair trial claim

without a determination regarding the procedural bar for one aspect of this claim. 

Accordingly, the court RECOMMENDS reaching the merits of claim one without ruling on the

issue that the claim is procedurally defaulted.

B. Merits of Due Process and Fair Trial Claim.

Respondent argues that the claim presents an issue of state law only, and therefore is not

cognizable. Respondent alternatively argues that the appellate court correctly found the evidence was

properly admitted, so that no federal constitutional violation could have occurred.

Generally, the correctness of a state evidentiary ruling presents only an issue of state law and is

not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

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Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not

subject to federal habeas review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of

such magnitude that the result is a violation of due process. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th

Cir. 1995). Even if a federal constitutional error can be shown, a federal court would still have to

determine whether the error was harmless. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (habeas

relief is not available unless the error resulted in a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the

jury’s verdict); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-122 (2007) (harmless error analysis under Brecht is still

required even after showing that the state court opinion was contrary to or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-736 (9th Cir. 2008)

(en banc) (a finding that a state court decision is objectively unreasonable under § 2254(d) still requires

a federal habeas court to determine whether a constitutional violation actually occurred).

The interplay between California Evidence Code section 3522

 and section 11083 gives a state

court discretion to admit evidence of prior acts as propensity evidence: “[t]rial courts may no longer

deem ‘propensity’ evidence unduly prejudicial per se, but must engage in a careful weighing process

under § 352.” People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 916-917 (1999) (finding that “the trial court’s

discretion to exclude propensity evidence under section 352 saves section 1108 from defendant’s due

process challenge”). In deciding whether to admit prior sexual offense evidence, the trial court should

consider such factors as its nature, relevance, remoteness, likelihood of confusing the issues, prejudicial

impact, and burden on defendant in defending against the uncharged offense. Id. The trial court has

broad discretion to assess whether concerns of undue prejudice outweigh the evidence’s probative value. 

People v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 1124 (1994).

Here, the appellate court reasoned the prior acts evidence was properly admitted:

/ / /

2

 California Evidence Code § 352 states: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate

undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues,

or of misleading the jury.”

3

 California Evidence Code § 1108(a) states: “In a criminal action in which the defendant

is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or

offenses is not made inadmissible by § 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to § 352.” 

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In this case, the trial court had a substantial basis to find the evidence from B. and A. was

admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), on the issues of

Miramontes's intent and common scheme or plan. The prosecution had a legitimate need

to introduce such evidence, because Miramontes was pleading not guilty and was

claiming that the victims in the current offenses were not credible and they or their

mothers were making up the charges. It was therefore important to bolster the credibility

of the current victims by bringing in evidence from Miramontes's prior child

acquaintances, who had undergone similar treatment at his hands. In each case, he was

much older than the child victims, performed similar acts on them, showed them

pornography, had them interact sexually while he watched, offered them money, and/or

threatened their families. That evidence supports the common design or plan theory for

admissibility under Evidence Code section 1101.

Likewise, under Evidence Code section 1108, Miramontes cannot show an abuse of

discretion in admitting this evidence about his prior sexual activity with other children.

For one thing, it was not unduly remote or dissimilar (four years before). At that time,

both B. and A. were about seven years old, the same age as L. in the current set of

charges, while Miramontes was an adult in his late 30's and early 40's. The prior acts of

sexual misconduct described in the testimony of B. and A. were similar in nature to those

charged, and were described in sufficient detail to make them probative (even allowing

for the then young age of the children and the passage of time, presumably affecting their

memories). It is not dispositive that no charges were filed in Mexico, nor that the

physical exams of B. and A. were inconclusive, since the major features of the prior

sexual conduct closely resembled those in the current charges.

Accordingly, the trial court had an adequate basis to conclude that the prior offense

evidence was not impermissibly inflammatory in nature; “prejudicial” is not synonymous

with “damaging,” as suggested in People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 320. Nor was

the presentation of this evidence, by two witnesses, unduly burdensome in terms of trial

time.

With respect to Miramontes's contention that the prior offense testimony must have been

inordinately confusing to the jury, the record shows that the trial court took pains to

inform the jury of the limited purpose for which the testimony of B. and A. could be

considered, by giving it three sets of instructions on that issue. Further, the trial court had

an adequate basis, in the weighing process of Evidence Code section 352, to conclude

that the prior offense evidence was neither cumulative nor unnecessary, merely because

the current three victims were also available to testify. Instead, since Miramontes was

challenging the credibility of the current three victims, it was well within the discretion

of the trial court to carry out this balancing process in favor of allowing the prior offense

testimony for the purpose of showing propensity.

Miramontes, 189 Cal.App.4th at 1102-03. Finding the evidence was properly admitted, the appellate

court did not conduct a harmless error analysis. Id. at 1103.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has ruled on whether admission of propensity

evidence under section 1108 violates due process. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 863-864 (9th Cir.

2006) (recognizing the U.S. Supreme Court has reserved ruling on whether propensity evidence violates

due process); Smith v. Roe, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1085-88 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (because U.S. Supreme

Court has not ruled on whether other crimes evidence violates due process the claim cannot be

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cognizable under AEDPA). The Ninth Circuit has, however, specifically rejected a due process

challenge to Federal Rule of Evidence 4144

. See U.S. v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1024, 1027 (9th Cir.

2001). It concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 403–which is equivalent to California Evidence Code

section 352–serves to filter out prior conduct evidence that is so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant

of his due process rights. Id. at 1026. The court explained: “With the protections of the Rule 403

balancing test still in place, LeMay's due-process challenge to Rule 414 loses much of its force.” Id.

The analysis of Rules 403 and 414 in LeMay is analogous to the California Supreme Court’s

analysis of sections 352 and 1108 in Falsetta, and parallels the trial court’s balancing test here:

Further, the trial court had an adequate basis, in the weighing process of Evidence Code

section 352, to conclude that the prior offense evidence was neither cumulative nor

unnecessary, merely because the current three victims were also available to testify.

Instead, since Miramontes was challenging the credibility of the current three victims, it

was well within the discretion of the trial court to carry out this balancing process in

favor of allowing the prior offense testimony for the purpose of showing propensity.

Miramontes, 189 Cal.App.4th at 1103. 

Finally, the record does not support a finding that the jury was confused by admission of the

prior acts. The appellate court noted:

With respect to Miramontes's contention that the prior offense testimony must have been

inordinately confusing to the jury, the record shows that the trial court took pains to

inform the jury of the limited purpose for which the testimony of B. and A. could be

considered, by giving it three sets of instructions on that issue.

Id. As further discussed below with respect to claim 2, the jury was instructed several times to follow

the limiting instructions and treat the prior acts merely as one factor to consider within the context of all

the evidence presented against Petitioner. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (stating

almost invariable assumption that jurors follow their instructions). The primary evidence in this case

consisted of strong eyewitness testimony of the victims who corroborated each other with their

consistent accounts. Petitioner has identified nothing fundamentally unfair about the use of the prior

acts evidence also presented by eyewitnesses, which itself was based on conduct consistent with and

similar to the charged offenses.

4

California Evidence Code § 1108 is similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 414, which permits the

introduction of prior conduct evidence in federal child molestation cases.

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To the extent Petitioner contends that the state courts erred in ruling that the evidence of his prior

bad acts was admissible under California law, such a claim is not cognizable on federal habeas. Estelle,

502 U.S. at 67. With respect to Petitioner’s claim that introduction of the evidence was a violation of

his federal rights to due process and a fair trial because it unfairly permitted the jury to find that he had a

propensity to commit crimes similar to the ones with which he was charged, the state court’s denial of

the claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. Accordingly, the court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim that the admission of

evidence of his prior acts in Tijuana violates his rights to due process and a fair trial be DENIED.

2. Claim 2: Due Process Claim In Light of Alleged Erroneous Jury Instruction.

Petitioner claims, without any specific facts or argument, that his judgment of conviction must

be reversed because the trial court erroneously instructed the jurors pursuant to CALCRIM No. 11915

 in

violation of Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process. [Dkt. No. 1, ECF p. 22.] In general, when

evaluating the CALCRIM No. 1191 instruction, the court considers whether the jury’s finding the prior

acts true under a preponderance of the evidence test lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. 

An error in jury instruction can form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief if it is shown that

“‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.’” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414

U.S. 141, 146 (1973). Moreover, the allegedly erroneous jury instruction cannot be judged in isolation. 

5

The CALCRIM No. 1191 instruction given in this case went as follows:

The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the crime of lewd acts on a child

that was not charged in this case. These crimes are defined for you in these instructions. You may

consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant, in fact, committed the uncharged offenses. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a

different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of

the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.

If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must disregard this evidence entirely.

If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged offenses, you may, but are not

required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual

offenses and, based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit sodomy of a

child under 10, oral copulation of a child under 10, sexual penetration of a child under 10, and lewd acts

on a child, as charged here.

If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged offenses, that conclusion is only one

factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the

defendant is guilty of sodomy of a child under 10, oral copulation of a child under 10, sexual penetration

of a child under 10, and lewd acts on a child. The People must still prove each charge beyond a

reasonable doubt. Lodgment 1 at 143; Lodgement 2 at 843-844.

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Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Rather, it must be considered in the context of the entire trial record and the

instructions as a whole. Id.

“The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A jury instruction that relieves the prosecution of its burden of

proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt violates due process. Henderson v.

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 153 (1977). 

The appellate court summarily rejected Petitioner’s due process claim based on the No. 1191

jury instruction:

Likewise, Miramontes acknowledges that his substantive challenge to CALCRIM No.

1191, regarding propensity evidence, has been rejected by our Supreme Court in

Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012–1016, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601. (See

also People v. Cromp (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 480, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 [Cromp

clarifies that CALCRIM 1191 is the same instruction addressed in Reliford].) This

argument is raised here only to preserve it for any future review by the federal courts.

While we understand the purpose of raising these issues, we must follow the directions of

our Supreme Court and reject Miramontes’s due process contentions. (Auto Equity Sales,

Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.)

People v. Miramontes, 189 Cal. App. 4th at 1103-04.

Here, the jury was adequately instructed regarding the prosecution’s burden of proving

Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The challenged instruction says that the uncharged prior

conduct need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence in order to be used by the jury. But it

concludes with language stating that if the jury concludes that Petitioner committed the prior uncharged

acts, they are “only one factor to be considered along with all the other evidence,” that they are “not

sufficient by [themselves] to prove that the defendant is guilty of sodomy of a child under 10, oral

copulation of a child under 10, sexual penetration of a child under 10, and lewd acts on a child, and that

the prosecution “must still prove each element of every charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lodgment

1 at 143; Lodgement 2 at 843-844.

In closing arguments, the prosecutor said the evidence of the “uncharged events in this case” can

be used “to decide whether or not Mr. Miramontes is that one that committed these offenses,” and

whether those events were related to intent and common scheme and plan. Lodgment 2 at 868-869;

Lodgment 6 at 22. She then explained the difference between looking at the uncharged acts under a

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preponderance of the evidence standard, while needing proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support a

guilty verdict for the charged offenses. Lodgment 2 at 874.

Here, the jury was clearly instructed on the prosecution’s burden of proof. Even to the

extent the first part of the challenged instruction could be read as suggesting otherwise, the last part

of the instruction clarifies that a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner

committed the prior offense is not sufficient by itself to convict him of the charged offenses. See

Schultz v. Tilton, 659 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM

No. 1191 was unambiguous and clearly stated that petitioner could be convicted only if the evidence as

a whole proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime). The state court’s

determination that the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof, and that no reasonable juror

would have believed they could convict Petitioner of the charged offenses by a burden of proof less than

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is objectively reasonable. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the state court’s adjudication of Claim 2 was neither contrary

to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has failed to show the state court determinations were contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, or that they were based on an unreasonable determination

of facts. Therefore the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED in its entirety and that it be

DISMISSED with prejudice. The court submits this report and recommendation to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 26, 2013, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than May 10, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 28, 2013

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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