Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00103/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00103-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MEKI WALKER GAONO,

Petitioner,

v.

M. LONG, Warden, 

Respondent.

 

I. INTRODUCTION

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Civil No.13-0103 LAB(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Meki Walker Gaono (hereafter “Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 (hereafter “Petition”). On April 20, 2009,

Petitioner was convicted by jury in San Diego Superior

Court case SCN222540 on two counts. (Lodgment 1 at 1103-

11.) Petitioner was convicted on Count One of first-degree

murder while lying in wait (Cal. Penal Code § 187) with

special circumstances. (Lodgment 1 at 1103-07.) The jury

also found Petitioner guilty on Count Two of assault with

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a firearm on a peace officer engaged in the performance of

his or her duties (Cal. Penal Code § 245(d)(1)) with

special circumstances. (Lodgment 1 at 1108-10.)

Petitioner contends he is entitled federal Habeas

Corpus relief on the following four grounds: (1) his

statements were involuntary, coerced and obtained in

violation of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct.

2601 (2004), when Detective Brown deliberately used a twostep procedure calculated to circumvent Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), (2) Detective

Brown’s testimony at the pretrial hearing and at trial

materially differed regarding the facts, revealing a

Seibert violation, (3)Petitioner was denied his right to

present a complete defense as a result of the trial

court’s exclusion of an expert witness, and (4) since

there were cumulative and collective errors, Petitioner’s

trial was prejudiced and reversal is mandated. (Pet. at 6-

9.)

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent M.

Long’s (hereafter “Respondent”) Answer, and all the

supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon

the documents and evidence presented in this case, and for

the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the

Petition be DENIED. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement is taken from the California

Court of Appeal opinion, People v. Meki Gaono, No. D0552-

90, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2011). (Lodgment No.

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12.) This Court gives deference to state court findings of

fact and presumes them to be correct. Tilcock v. Budge,

538 F. 3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner may rebut

the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and

convincing evidence. Id.; See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The facts as found by the state appellate court are as

follows:

1. Historical Background

The neighborhood where the shooting occurred is

a high gang crime area. In particular, a gang

known as the Westside Deep Valley Bloods

(“WDVB”) is active in the neighborhood. At the

time of the events in this case, a number of

WDVB gang members lived on the 500 and 600

blocks of Arthur Avenue, and on nearby streets. 

In 2006, Oceanside Police Officer Dan Bessant, a

member of the Oceanside Police Department’s

Neighborhood Policing Team, was assigned to an

area that included the neighborhood near the

intersection of Arthur Avenue and Gold Street.

Bessant, accompanied by code inspection officers, had visited the homes of known WDVB gang

members, including the residences of the Toluao

family and the Seau family. Members of both of

these families were known as ‘shot-callers’ of

the gang, which meant that they were considered

to be leaders of the gang. 

2. The Shooting

On December 20, 2006, Oceanside Police Officer

Karina Pina was on patrol with a civilian ridealong, Jacqueline Castaneda. Officer Pina was in

uniform and was driving a marked police vehicle.

At approximately 6:15 p.m., Officer Pina initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle that had expired registration tags. The driver of the

vehicle pulled over at the intersection of

Arthur Avenue and Gold Drive. Pina approached

the vehicle, obtained the driver’s information,

and returned to her police vehicle. Castaneda

got out of the police car and stood next to it.

A few minutes after the traffic stop, Officer

Bessant, who was also in uniform, arrived at the

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location and parked his marked police vehicle

behind Pina’s. 

The location where the three cars were parked

was dark. There was only one functioning streetlight nearby. The headlights and overhead lights

on Officer Pina’s car provided some additional

lighting. Officer Bessant had turned on the

amber lights on top of his vehicle, but not the

overhead lights. Officer Bessant stood nearby

while Officer Pina wrote out a citation for the

driver of the car. 

At approximately 6:30 pm., Officer Pina heard a

number of ‘whizzy sounds go by.’ She saw Officer

Bessant grab himself under his left arm and turn

away from the 600 block of Arthur Avenue. Castaneda heard four to six shots in rapid succession. After the first shot, Castaneda heard

Officer Bessant say, ‘Oh no, Oh no.’ After a

very brief pause between the first three or four

shots, Castaneda heard one or two louder shots,

which she believed had come from a higher caliber weapon.1/

After the shots were fired, Officer Bessant drew

his firearm and immediately moved toward the

right front side of Officer Pina’s police vehicle. According to Castaneda, Bessant appeared to

be injured as he moved toward Pina’s car. Leaning against the right front fender of Pina’s

vehicle, Bessant slid to the ground and dropped

his gun. 

After hearing the shots, Officer Pina looked

toward the 600 block of Arthur Avenue, but was

unable to see anything because it was so dark in

that area. She could not see anyone and could

not pinpoint where the shots had come from. Pina

fired one shot in the direction of the 600 block

of Arthur Avenue.

Officer Pina became aware that Officer Bessant

was critically injured. She called in over her

police radio that an officer was down and needed

immediate assistance. Sergeant Jeffery Brandt

responded to the scene of the shooting within a

few minutes of Pina’s call. Brandt approached

Officer Bessant, who was slumped on the ground,

leaning against Pina’s vehicle. Sergeant Brandt

tried to get Bessant to tell him where he was

injured since Brandt could not see Bessant’s

injury, but Bessant only blinked in response.

1/

Castaneda had prior law enforcement training.

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After approximately 10 or 15 seconds, Bessant’s

‘pupils basically fix[ed]’ and there was ‘no

life left in him.’

On December 21, 2006, deputy medical examiner

Jonathan Lucas performed an autopsy on Officer

Bessant. Lucas determined that a .22 caliber

bullet had entered Bessant’s chest cavity from

his left side, punctured his heart and passed

through his liver, and finally came to rest in

the right corner of Bessant’s chest cavity.

3. Other Witnesses

A number of neighbors who were in the area that

night around the time of the shooting saw a

group of between three and six males standing

near the mailbox in front of the residence at

622 Arthur Avenue.2/ Other witnesses reported

that they saw a big, stocky man with bushy hair

among the group.

A neighbor who lived across the street from 622

Arthur Avenue also reported that one of the men

had big, bushy hair. She heard the men arguing,

and later heard three to eight gunshots. When

she looked across the street again, the men were

gone. 

Another neighbor who lived across the street had

walked next door to drop something off. On her

way back to her house, she saw a big man walking

north. She heard the man say, ‘Come on, let’s go

get it. Let’s go get it. It’s in the house.’ By

that time, the men had begun to disperse, and

all of them appeared to be walking north. After

the witness entered her house, she heard noises,

like rapid firecrackers, which sounded like they

were coming from just outside her door. 

Jade Morales had been working on her car when

she heard three or four loud firecracker noises.

She then saw two men quickly walking north. One

of the men was skinny and was wearing a red tshirt.3/ The other man was stocky and had ‘poofy’

hair. This man was wearing a white t-shirt and

might have been carrying a rifle. Morales’

brother had also noticed two or three men,

including Jose Compre and possibly Penifoti

2/

622 Arthur Avenue was Jose Compre’s residence. 

3/

A gang expert testified that members of the WDVB used the

color red to represent their gang affiliation. 

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Taeotui, standing near the mailbox at 622 Arthur

Avenue shortly before the shooting. 

A neighbor who lived three houses north of 622

Arthur Avenue heard the sound of two sets of

gunshots coming from a location south of her

house, and saw two men running north. One of the

men was carrying a long silver object against

his chest. 

Another neighbor, Julio Mata, who lived across

the street and north of 622 Arthur Avenue, had

left his house to move a trailer around the

corner. While he was parking the trailer, he

heard gunshots. Mata walked back to his house

and saw Petitioner run into the side entrance of

680 Arthur Street holding a black three-and-ahalf-foot long object under his arm. Mata then

saw four other people run into the residence at

661 Arthur Avenue. Mata’s mother, who had been

waiting for him in front of their house, heard

gunshots and saw a young man running in her

direction. He was carrying something under his

arm, and he ran between the residence at 680

Arthur Avenue and the house next door. This

witness also saw several other men run into the

house at 661 Arthur Avenue, which was the Seau

family residence. 

Mata and his mother started to drive to the

store, but when they were halfway there, they

turned around. When they returned to their

residence, they saw Petitioner come out of his

house wearing shorts and no shirt. Petitioner

was looking south, in the direction of the

police officers. Mata approached a police

officer and told him that he had seen a person

run into Petitioner’s house carrying a long

object.

Elizabeth Musser is a neighbor of Karalena

Gaono, who is Petitioner’s cousin. At around

7:00 p.m. that night, Musser heard a helicopter

and went outside to see what was going on.

Musser saw Karalena at home. A few minutes

later, Musser saw a stocky man with ‘puffy’ hair

and a white t-shirt run into Karalena’s house.4/

Karalena Gaono admitted that Petitioner had

called her on the night of the shooting. She

testified that he called her only to ask her how

4/

According to Karalena and another neighbor, Penifoti Taeotui

was stocky, over six feet tall, weighed 280 pounds, and had “puffy”

hair.

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she was doing and whether she had heard all of

the sirens. Karalena admitted that after she

received the call from Petitioner, Taeotui

arrived at her house and asked to use her telephone. After using Karalena’s telephone, Taeotui

left. 

4. The Investigation

Officers recovered seven .22-caliber shell

casings and a single nine-millimeter shell

casing from the street in front of 622 Arthur

Avenue. Samples taken from the brick mailbox at

that residence tested positive for gunshot

residue. 

Officers found a black guitar case in a locked

shed in Petitioner’s backyard. Inside the guitar

case was a .22 caliber rifle with a scope. In

addition, officers found a .22 caliber revolver,

wrapped in a towel, in a drawer in Petitioner’s

kitchen. The revolver’s cylinder contained nine

expended .22 caliber cartridges in it, which

meant that there had been nine bullets in the

revolver, and that all nine had been fired.

Petitioner’s DNA and fingerprints were found on

the rifle. The scope of the rifle contained a

mixture of DNA from four people, including

Petitioner, Taeotui, and Compre and a fourth,

unidentified person. The wooden portion of the

rifle contained a mixture of DNA from Petitioner, Taeotui, Compre, Randy Seau, and Sala

Toluao. Petitioner’s left thumb print was found

on the scope of the rifle. Police identified

other figerprints on the rifle as Petitioner’s,

as well.

Taeotui’s DNA was found on the handle of the .22

caliber revolver. Officers found a sock that

contained 146 .22 caliber bullets in a closet in

Taeotui’s living room. 

Officers found a nine-millimeter cartridge in

the pocket of a pair of Compre’s shorts. They

also found a box of nine-millimeter ammunition

wrapped in a black bandana behind a dryer in

Compre’s garage. Compre’s fingerprints were on

the box. 

In March 2008, a resident of the house behind

Compre’s residence found a nine-millimeter

handgun wrapped in a blue shirt near the fence

that divided his yard from Compre’s yard. The

gun was covered in cobwebs and dirt, and appeared to have been there for a while. Investig13cv0103 7

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ators found no fingerprints or any testable DNA

samples on the handgun. However, testing revealed that the nine-millimeter shell casing

found in front of Compre’s house after the

shooting had been ejected from the handgun that

was found behind Compre’s house. 

Samples of DNA taken from cigarette butts that

were found in front of 622 Arthur Avenue matched

DNA from Petitioner, Taeotui, and Randy Seau. 

A criminalist determined that the bullet that

killed Officer Bessant was fired from the .22

caliber scoped rifle. The seven casings recovered from the area had been expended from that

rifle.

On the basis of tests that were conducted to

determine the ‘drop distance’ of a bullet fired

from the rifle at a target 386 feet away, the

examiner concluded that the rifle had been aimed

at Bessant’s head.5/ The criminalist also explained that a nine-millimeter firearm makes a much

louder sound than a .22 caliber firearm. In

addition, although there is a subtle difference

between the sounds made by a .22 caliber revolver and the sounds made by a .22 caliber

rifle, any difference would be ‘masked’ if they

were fired simultaneously.

5. Gang Evidence

Oceanside Police Detective Gordon Govier testified that the WDVB gang is a criminal street gang

that has nearly 100 documented members and/or

associates. Govier testified that the gang’s

primary activities include murder, attempted

murder, assault with deadly weapon, robbery,

carjacking, burglary, illegal possession of

firearms, drug sales, and vandalism. 

Petitioner associated with members of the WDVB

criminal street gang and appeared to be a member

of the gang. Police had identified Petitioner as

a WDVB gang member in December 2006.

Govier testified that in his opinion, the shooting was committed for the benefit of the WDVB

gang. According to Govier, younger members of

the gang, such as Taeotui, Petitioner and

Compre, would increase their status in the gang

5/

The distance between the mailbox in front of 622 Arthur Avenue

and Officer Bessant’s location at the time he was hit was

approximately 386 feet. 

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by shooting at a police officer. Such younger

members tended to look for opportunities to earn

higher status in the gang or to prove themselves.

6. Petitioner’s Statements to Police

Petitioner spoke with police detectives at the

police station for many hours overnight on the

night of the shooting. In addition, Petitioner

led detectives on a walkthrough of his residence

in the early morning hours the day after the

shooting. Detectives also visited Petitioner

while he was in juvenile hall on December 22 and

23. Detectives did not question Petitioner on

December 22 because he asked to have his mother

present before answering any questions. A

detective returned the following day with Petitioner’s [mother], and then talked with Petitioner about the shooting of Officer Bessant.

Prior to trial, pursuant to a pretrial motion to

suppress, the trial court excluded some of the

statements that Petitioner made to detectives

during certain portions of the interviews.

However, the court permitted the prosecution to

introduce the tape recordings and transcripts of

other portions of Petitioner’s interviews. Among

the statements that the court allowed in evidence were statements that Petitioner made at

approximately 3:30 a.m. on December 21, to the

effect that he had been drinking beer that day

in the park, and that he had picked up the

guitar case that contained the rifle for protection while he walked around to sober up. Petitioner stated that when he saw the police officers near Arthur Avenue, he was scared that they

would arrest him for being intoxicated, so he

pulled out the rifle and a .22 caliber handgun

and fired at both of the officers

simultaneously. After firing at the officers,

Petitioner ran home.

On December 23, at juvenile hall, Petitioner

told a detective that he fired the rifle at

Officer Bessant while standing near the mailbox

at 622 Arthur Avenue, that Jose Compre had fired

the nine-millimeter handgun, and that another

individual whom Petitioner did not name had

fired the .22 caliber handgun.

a. The Relevant Interviews

At approximately 8:30 p.m. on the night of the

shooting, police officers who were outside of

Petitioner’s house investigating the shooting

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noticed activity in the home, and also noticed

the front door was open. Officers ordered

Petitioner’s aunt and uncle, Lola and Tele, as

well as Petitioner, out of the house. Once all

three were outside, the officers handcuffed them

for the purpose of securing the officer’s

safety. Petitioner was wearing shorts, but was

otherwise unclothed and was not wearing shoes. A

police officer offered Petitioner a blanket, and

also repositioned Petitioner’s handcuffs to

allow his arms to be in front of him, so that he

would be more comfortable. Petitioner was told

that he could sit in a heated patrol car. Petitioner initially refused this offer, but later

accepted. At around 10:30 p.m., Petitioner

agreed to go to police headquarters to be interviewed. Officers were not sure at that point

whether Petitioner was a witness or a suspect.

i. The Midnight Interview

Petitioner, Lola, and Tele were transported to

the police department, where they waited in the

lobby with other people who were also waiting to

be interviewed. Detective Brown had told Petitioner that he was not under arrest and had

taken off Petitioner’s handcuffs, explaining to

him that the handcuffs had been used only as a

precaution, to ensure officer safety.

At around 12:00 a.m., Detective Brown and Detective Jeff Novak placed Petitioner in an interview room. The room contained a table with one

chair on one side, and two chairs on the opposite side. The room was equipped with a video

camera that recorded the interview.

Detectives Brown and Novak began the interview

by asking Petitioner about his residence and who

else lived there, and then asking him what he

had been doing, and where he had been earlier in

the day and into the evening. Petitioner told

detectives that after he left school at about

1:30 p.m., he had gone to a nearby park, and

that he had returned home at around 5:30 p.m.

Petitioner claimed that he had not been aware of

the shooting that took place on his street until

he went outside to get firewood. At that time,

Petitioner said, he noticed a police helicopter

circling above the neighborhood. Petitioner told

the detectives that he did not see anyone out

and about, and that he had not seen anything

going on. 

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ii. The Two-Hour Break

After approximately 45 minutes, Detective Brown

and Novak left the interview to attend a briefing on the case. While Brown and Novak were

attending the briefing, Detective Karen Priem

stayed with Petitioner in the interview room.

Petitioner asked Priem whether he could leave

the police station, and she responded that

because he was 17 years old, she could not let

him leave alone. Petitioner asked whether his

mother6/ was still at the station, and indicated

that he wanted to leave. Detective Priem responded that she did not ‘know what the status

is,’ and asked him to ‘hang in there for [her].’

She encouraged him to rest while they waited.7/

iii. The 2:40 a.m. Statements

Detective Brown returned to the interview room

just before 2:40 a.m. At the briefing, Brown

learned that a witness had informed police that

he believed he had seen a person running into

Petitioner’s house carrying a long object. The

witness said that the person whom the witness

saw running into the house was ‘the kid that

lives there.’

Detective Brown reinitiated his interview of

Petitioner, and asked Petitioner to go over

again what Petitioner had been doing earlier in

the day on December 20. After Petitioner related

a number of details about what he had done that

day, Detective Brown asked Petitioner if he knew

why they would be asking him questions that they

already know the answers to. Petitioner responded, ‘[t]o see if I was telling the truth.’

Detective Brown indicated that there was some

things that Petitioner was telling the detectives that did not make sense, and asked Petitioner to clear those things up. Detective Brown

told Petitioner that other people had seen what

had happened and had picked Petitioner out of a

photographic lineup. The following exchange then

took place:

6/

Although Petitioner appears to have been discussing his aunt,

Lola, he often referred to her as his “mom” or “mother.”

7/

Around this time, Detective Priem asked another detective to

sit with Petitioner while she checked to see if his mother was still

at the police station. (Lodgment 6 at 3494.) A short while later,

Detective Priem returned and reassured Petitioner that his mother

was still there and would wait for him. (Id. at 3495.) 

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‘Det. Brown: You’ve told us a lot of things that

aren’t true. Now’s your chance to tell us what

is true. Tell us why this all went down, why

this happened, rather than let us go with what

it looks like.’

‘Petitioner: I just want to go home, man.’

‘Det. Brown: I understand. But you made a mistake. And you’re not telling us the truth. You -

you saw all the people that are out there;

right? Okay? We’re at your house right now. We

found some things. Okay? And we’ve taken statements from witnesses that saw it go down.’

. . . 

‘Do you want to tell us what really happened

instead of lies? Tell us what happened.’

‘Petitioner: I was just standing down the

street. I was drunk. (Inaudible.) I don’t even

know what I was thinking. I was just running

back home. (Inaudible.)’

Petitioner proceeded to tell the detectives that

he had run down the street carrying two guns, a

.22 caliber rifle and a .22 caliber revolver,

and that he had put at least one of the guns in

the shed in his yard. Petitioner said that he

[had] been carrying the guns in a guitar case

because he was scared of Crips and of other

people who had been messing with him at school.

Petitioner initially said that when he saw the

police cars, he aimed and shot in the air, but

later admitted that he had aimed ‘at the officer,’ whom Petitioner thought was ‘pulling [him]

over.’ The detectives continued to talk with

Petitioner and ask him more questions about his

story and the events of that night. At some

point Detective Novak left the room. When he

returned, he asked for Detective Brown’s help

outside the room. 

iv. The Post-Miranda 3:30 a.m. Statements

At approximately 3:30 a.m., Detectives Novak and

Brown returned to the interview room. At that

point, Detective Brown read Petitioner his

Miranda rights. Petitioner agreed to continue

talking with the detectives. Petitioner asked

whether the officer who had been shot was

‘okay.’ Detective Brown told Petitioner that he

did not know the status of the officer. Petitioner also said that he wanted Detective Brown

to ‘know that [he was] really sorry.’

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Detective Brown then asked Petitioner to tell

them what had happened, from the beginning.

Petitioner reiterated that he had been drunk,

that he saw the police car, and that he saw a

police officer walking back and forth between

two cars. Petitioner fired the rifle first, in

the direction of the officer. He fired a total

of four to six shots, using both the rifle and a

gun that he had in his pocket. Afterward, he

started running home.

v. Videotaped Walkthrough of 

 Petitioner’s Residence

At 5:06 a.m., Detective Brown took Petitioner to

Petitioner’s residence and videotaped Petitioner

while he guided police on a walkthrough of the

house and a shed in the backyard. Petitioner

pointed out where he had put the rifle and the

.22-caliber revolver, and also pointed out the

location of the clothes that he had been wearing

at the time Officer Bessant was shot. [During

the walkthrough, Petitioner asked Brown, ‘[d]o I

still have the right to remain silent?’ Detective Brown told Petitioner that he did retain

that right. After receiving this response to his

question, Petitioner continued to conduct the

walkthrough.]

The officers and Petitioner returned to the

police station at approximately 6:20 a.m., after

which Petitioner was arrested and taken to

juvenile hall.

vi. The December 22 Interview

On December 22, Detectives Brown and Sylvia

O’Brien went to juvenile hall to conduct a

follow-up interview with Petitioner. Petitioner

was aware by this time that Jose Compre had been

arrested and that Compre was also in custody at

juvenile hall.

Brown told Petitioner that other people had told

the police things that made Petitioner ‘look

really bad.’ Brown said that he wanted to talk

to Petitioner about ‘all the things that came

up.’ Brown then read Petitioner his Miranda

rights.

Despite Brown’s efforts to encourage Petitioner

to talk with the detectives, Petitioner told

them that he was not willing to speak with them

until his ‘mom or father get here.’ A little

bit later, Petitioner said that he could not

‘talk about anything until my parents get here

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or until I have both of my parents present or my

lawyer.’ Detective O’Brien asked Petitioner

whether he would be willing to speak with the

detectives if they came back with Pua, Petitioner’s stepgrandmother8/. Petitioner indicated

that he would speak to the detectives if Pua

came with them when they returned. At this

point, Brown ended the interview.

vii. The December 23 Interview

At just after 8:00 a.m. on December 23, Detectives Brown and O’Brien returned to juvenile

hall. O’Brien had picked up Pua Gaono, and she

accompanied the detectives to the interview

room. After Petitioner was brought into the

room, he and Pua spoke briefly in both Samoan

and English. At one point, Pua said, ‘Are you

sure? That’s your choice.’ She also said to

him, ‘Make sure you’re making the right choice,

Meki. Make sure you’re making the right choice.

I’m here for you, and your dad, he is here for

you. You know, okay–so tell them.’

Detective Brown started to tell both Petitioner

and Pua what he wanted to talk with Petitioner

about, and said that he wanted to clear up some

information. He then said, ‘And just so your

mom hears it, I don’t want her to think and I

don’t want you to think that I’m pulling anything over your eyes. You already know this is

no big deal. Let her know.’ At this point,

Detective Brown again read Petitioner his Miranda rights.

Petitioner told Brown that he and a few other

guys had been drinking in front of Compre’s

house near the mailbox when the group saw a

police car pull over a vehicle. Petitioner said

that he ‘had the rifle’ and began shooting

toward the police cars. Petitioner fired approximately five or six times. He heard other

gunshots, as well. After shooting the rifle,

Petitioner put it back into a bag and ran home.

When he arrived at his residence, he put the

rifle in a shed in the backyard.

Petitioner admitted knowing that someone else

had a .22 caliber revolver at the time the

officer was shot, but he would not say who that

8/

It appears that Petitioner referred to both his Aunt Lola, and

his stepgrandmother, Pua, as his “mother.”

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person was. He implicated Compre as the person

who had shot the nine-millimeter handgun.9/

b. The Suppression Hearings

The trial court heard argument from the parties

during two hearings, the preliminary hearing and

a subsequent hearing, regarding Petitioner’s

motion to suppress the statements that he made

to police officers. Petitioner challenged the

admissibility of the statements that he made

during four interviews: (1) the late December

20/early December 21 interview at the police

station; (2) the videotaped walkthrough of

Petitioner’s residence, narrated by Petitioner;

(3) the attempted postarrest interview at juvenile hall on December 22; and (4) the interview

at juvenile hall on December 23. Petitioner

contended that the interviews violated his Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights, on the grounds

that his statements were coerced and that officers had violated his rights under Miranda and

Seibert [citations omitted]. Petitioner’s

argument that his statements were coerced was

based on a number of his personal characteristics, including the fact that he was young,

unsophisticated, mostly undressed, cold, and

sleep-deprived, and also the context in which

the interviews took place, including that he had

been subjected to lengthy interrogations during

which the detectives employed a number of coercive interrogation techniques.

At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor asked

Detective Brown what he knew about 680 Arthur

Avenue when, on the night Officer Bessant was

shot, he received an assignment to meet with

Escondido officers who were with the residents

of 680 Arthur Avenue. Detective Brown said that

he ‘knew a witness had possibly seen somebody

run from the area where they believed the shooting was committed from, possibly into that

residence carrying a long object,’ but that he

had no other information. When Brown met with

the witnesses, he noticed that they were all

handcuffed, so he called the station to determine whether the individuals were witnesses or

suspects. Detective Brown was told that all

9/

In March 2008, a resident of the house behind Compre’s

residence found this handgun wrapped in a blue shirt near the fence

that divided his yard from Compre’s yard. (Lodgment 12 at 9.)

Testing later revealed that the nine-millimeter shell casing found

in front of Compre’s house after the shooting had been ejected from

this handgun. (Id.) 

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three were witnesses, and the he should treat

them as witnesses.

Detective Brown, who was going to transport

Petitioner to the police station, took off

Petitioner’s handcuffs and ‘asked him if he

understood why the handcuffs had been put on

him, that they were for safety purposes only.’

Petitioner indicated that he understood. Brown

then informed Petitioner that he was not under

arrest, but that the police wanted to speak with

him at the station, if he would agree to go.

Petitioner said that he understood that he was

not under arrest, and agreed to go to the station to be interviewed.

Detective Brown testified about the logistics

and circumstances of his interview of Petitioner

on the night that Officer Bessant was shot and

into the next morning, including what transpired

when he left the interview room after approximately 40 minutes to attend a briefing. When

asked whether he knew ‘Petitioner had been

identified as the person a witness had seen

going into 680 Arthur after the shooting,’ Brown

said, ‘I don’t know that [that] was where he was

identified. I know that people had mentioned he

lived there, and I knew that it was a possibility that he could have been the person that ran

in there.’ After a few follow-up questions to

which objections were sustained, the prosecutor

asked Brown, ‘At the time you were coming back

into the interview room after you had the briefing conference–you’re returning from the break

in other words–had anybody identified or told

you that Petitioner had been identified as the

person who was seen running into 680? Had that

information been given?’ Detective Brown responded, ‘Not identified. Just that he met the

description of the person seen running in there-

.’

The prosecutor then asked Detective Brown about

Petitioner’s statement, ‘I just want to go home,

man.’ Specifically, the prosecutor asked Detective Brown if he remembered an earlier conversation with the prosecutor during which the prosecutor inquired as to why Brown had continued to

question Petitioner after Petitioner told Brown

that he wanted to go home, and what his reaction

had been to the prosecutor’s inquiry. Detective

Brown said, ‘Yeah. I remember I was really

upset. I was actually upset at you for saying

that. I thought you were dead wrong, and I was

100 percent convinced that that never happened.’

According to Detective Brown, in response to

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being shown a transcript of the interview, he

had been ‘very surprised’ because he ‘didn’t

think there was any way in heck that could have

happened.’ When asked what he believed had

occurred, why he was shocked, and how he could

have continued asking Petitioner questions after

Petitioner said that he wanted to go home,

Detective Brown answered, ‘After having read the

transcript and actually view[ing] the video of

that occurring, I knew exactly what happened. It

was obvious to me from watching what was going

on and hearing what was being said, it was

obvious my ears heard something being said, but

I was in the middle–I distinctly remember being

in the middle of a thought and it didn’t register what the words were said [sic]. It’s kind of

like when you’re doing something, watching TV or

something and your family, you know, interrupts

and asks you a question and you answer that and

later they bring that up and you have no idea

that it occurred because you really weren’t

paying attention to what they said.’

The prosecutor also asked Detective Brown about

the timing of his advising Petitioner of his

Miranda rights. After asking Detective Brown

questions about his and Detective Novak’s leaving the interview room and later returning, the

prosecutor asked, ‘Now, why did you admonish

Petitioner at that time?’ Brown responded,

‘Because I recognized based on his admissions

and what we knew at that point that he was going

to be arrested. There was no if’s, ands, or

buts, and that would require me to Mirandize him

in order to continue talking to him.’

Defense counsel also questioned Detective Brown

about Petitioner’s statement, ‘I just want to go

home,’ on cross examination. During that examination, the following colloquy occurred:

‘Q. It [i.e. Petitioner’s statement about going

home] was of sufficient significance that it

made you upset that you missed it, correct?

‘A. I believe it could be of possible significance, and I would have addressed things a little

bit differently had I been aware of that.

‘Q. Because you know that when you’re telling

somebody that they’re free to leave and they’re

not in custody and you’re taking statements from

them, you know that when they say things like ‘I

want an attorney’ or ‘I want to leave’ or ‘I

want to end this interview,’ you have to abide

by those things, correct?

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‘A. That’s correct.

‘Q. And you’re trained in that. You know this

stuff, right?

‘A. Yes, sir.

‘[¶] ... [¶]

‘Q. Well, we gave the court a copy of the

transcript and the tapes. But your response is

similar to ‘I just want to go home, man.’ You

say, “I understand’; is that correct?

‘A. That’s what I said, yes.

‘Q. So your mind was somewhere else, but you

said you understood.

‘A. I said that. Having viewed it, I believe I

was in the middle of a thought, and it was,

‘Hang on. Let me complete what I’m thinking

here.’

Defense counsel asked Detective Brown some other

questions about the interview, and pointed out

some of the incriminating statements that Petitioner had made. Counsel then asked, ‘[W]ell,

let me ask you. Just at that point [after

Petitioner had said he ‘was just aiming and

shooting’]–wow, did it occur to you at that

point that maybe I need to read him his rights

because–did it occur to you?’ Brown answered,

‘Not at that point because I don’t make arrests

until I corroborate a confession.’

Upon further inquiry by defense counsel, Detective Brown acknowledged that one of the reasons

that he and Detective O’Brien wanted to interview Petitioner on December 22 at juvenile hall

was because ‘there may have been a problem with

the [original] interview.’

A few days later, the trial court heard argument

from the attorneys concerning whether some or

all of the statements that Petitioner made to

police should be suppressed. Defense counsel

argued that the statements that Petitioner made

in the early morning hours of December 21 were

coerced and involuntary, and that the detectives

had engaged in a deliberate two-step interrogation process that violated Seibert when they

first obtained incriminating statements from

Petitioner, read him his Miranda rights only

after obtaining the statements, and then proceeded to obtain additional incriminating statements after having advised Petitioner of his

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rights. Defense counsel argued that the incriminating statements that Petitioner made on

December 23 were also obtained in violation of

Seibert, and further argued that Petitioner had

invoked his rights to silence and to an attorney

on the day before this interview took place,

when he ask for his parents or a lawyer.

During the discussion among the court and the

attorneys, it became clear that the prosecution

was not seeking to introduce Petitioner’s 2:40

a.m. statements, from the time that Petitioner

said, ‘I just want to go home, man,’ until

Detective Brown advised Petitioner of his rights

under Miranda. With respect to Petitioner’s

other statements, the prosecutor argued that

there was no evidence that Petitioner had been

coerced into making the statements. The prosecutor cited the fact that Petitioner was not

handcuffed when he made the statements, that he

was offered blankets, food, and drinks, and that

he was allowed to use the restroom and to sleep.

In addition, the prosecutor noted that Petitioner had not complained of discomfort during

the interviews. At one point during the interviews, just before Detectives Novak and Brown

took a break, Petitioner even asked whether he

could continue talking with them when they

returned.

The trial court delivered its initial ruling on

the suppression motion at the preliminary hearing. The trial court noted that it had reviewed

the transcripts and both video and audio recordings, in addition to having read the parties’

motion papers. The court concluded that none of

the statements that Petitioner made to police at

the police station on December 21 were coerced

or involuntary. The trial court determined that

Petitioner was not in custody until he asked

Detective Priem whether he could go home. The

court ruled that all of the statements that

Petitioner made during the 2:40 a.m. interview,

up to the time that Detective Brown advised

Petitioner or his Miranda rights, were obtained

in violation of Miranda, and had to be excluded.

The court also excluded the videotape of Petitioner’s walkthrough of his house and the statements that he made during the walkthrough, as

well as any statements that he made after the

walkthrough.

Finally, with respect to Petitioner’s December

21 statements, the court found that Detective

Brown had acted in good faith and that he had

not intentionally violated Miranda, nor deliber13cv0103 19

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ately conducted a two-step interrogation in

order to avoid Miranda, when he obtained incriminating statements from Petitioner before advising him of his rights. For example, the court

said, ‘[W]hen Detective Brown makes the statement, ‘I understand,’ I think he made that

statement. There’s no doubt that he made it.

It’s on the tape and I heard it. I also believe

him when he says it [i.e. Petitioner’s request

to go home] simply did not register with him,

and that sort of makes sense when I know how

long he’s been up and your client has also been

up the same amount of time. I have to put that

into context when he maybe gets confused and

says things. But I believe Detective Brown, and

it did not register with him, even though he

responded to it. My experience in life is you

say things all the time like that. Someone says

something that’s very important, and we say,

‘Yea, fine.’ The next thing, you promised to

buy your wife something, and you didn’t listen

to her when she was asking about it. It’s one

of those things that happens. That’s what

brings me to the good faith or objective test

with Seibert.’ The trial court later reiterated

this conclusion, stating:

‘Well, I still see it the way I saw it before...

[W]hat does this word ‘deliberate’ as used in

these cases mean? And I think it means more than

they just did something intentional. Deliberate

means they want to avoid Miranda. And I do

believe Detective Brown when he says it came as

a complete surprise to him when he was told

that, about page 100, Petitioner had said: ‘I

just want to go home, man,’ and he responded: ‘I

understand.’ I am very cognizant of the fact

that both Petitioner and the officers have been

up a long time. Frankly, I have seen it in the

courtroom towards the end of every long session.

The attorneys start to misspeak, and they get

tired, and even you admit you are tired. And so

the fact he heard the words and said ‘I understand,’ but they didn’t register does not frankly

shock me at all. [¶] ... I will not change my

ruling from the tentative ruling.’

With respect to the interviews on December 22

and 23, the court found that there was no Seibert problem, in view of the significant lapse in

time between the interviews, and because these

interviews took place at a location different

from the location where the initial interview

was conducted. The court also determined that

on December 22, Petitioner had not asked for a

lawyer, but indicated only that he wanted to

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remain silent at that time. Further, as to the

December 22 interview, the court found that

there was nothing improper about Detective

O’Brien’s attempt to ‘clea[r] up an ambiguous

statement’ by asking Petitioner whether he was

requesting that his mother be present when he

seemed to be asking for his stepgrandmother or

his parents. In addition, the court determined

that as to both of the interviews that took

place at juvenile hall, the detectives’ Miranda

warnings were legally sufficient. 

(Lodgment 12 at 3-28.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2009, the San Diego District Attorney

filed a second amended information charging Petitioner

with three counts. (Lodgment 1 at 8-14.) Count One was

first-degree murder of Officer Bessant, a police officer

(Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)), committed while lying in wait

(Cal. Penal Code § 189). (Lodgment 1 at 9-12.) The

information also alleged special circumstances, including

that Petitioner intentionally and knowingly killed a peace

officer engaged in the performance of his duties (Cal.

Penal Code § 190.2(a)(7); knowingly murdered a peace

officer while the officer was engaged in the performance

of his duties (Cal. Penal Code § 190(b)); intentionally

killed a police officer (Cal. Penal Code § 190(c)(1));

personally used a firearm during the commission of the

murder of a peace officer engaged in the performance of

his duties (Cal. Penal Code § 190(c)(4)); committed the

crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in

association with a criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code

§ 186.22(b)(1)); intentionally and personally discharged

a firearm, causing death (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d));

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and personally used a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §

12022.5(a)). (Lodgment 1 at 9-12.) 

The information also charged Petitioner on Count Two

with assault with a firearm on a peace officer engaged in

the performance of her duties with respect to Officer

Pina. (Cal. Penal Code § 245(d)(1)). (Lodgment 1 at 12.)

The information alleged special circumstances during the

commission of Count Two, that Petitioner intentionally and

personally discharged a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §

12022.53(a)), and that Petitioner committed the offense

for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code §

186.22(b)(1)). (Lodgment 1 at 12.)

Finally, the information charged Petitioner on Count

Three with assault with a semiautomatic firearm as to

Castaneda (Cal. Penal Code § 245(b)), and alleged special

circumstances that Petitioner personally used a firearm in

the commission of this offense (Cal. Penal Code

§12022.5(a)) and committed the offense for the benefit of,

at the direction of, and in association with a criminal

street gang (Cal. Penal Code 186.22(b)(1). (Lodgment 1 at

13.) 

On April 20, 2009, a jury found Petitioner guilty on

Count One of first-degree murder while lying in wait and

also found true the corresponding special circumstance

allegations. (Lodgment 1 at 1103-07.) The jury also found

Petitioner guilty on Count Two of assault with a firearm

on a peace officer engaged in the performance of her

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duties and found true the corresponding enhancement

allegations. (Lodgment 1 at 1108-11.) The jury acquitted

Petitioner on Count Three of assault with a semiautomatic

firearm. (Lodgment 1 at 1112.)

On June 4, 2009, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a life sentence plus 61 years without the

possibility of parole. (Lodgment 1 at 1309-12.) On June

23, 2009, Petitioner filed an amended notice of appeal in

the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 1 at 1313.) On

September 29, 2011, in an unpublished opinion, the

California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions,

reversed in part the sentence and remanded for modification of sentence. (Lodgment 12.) The California Court of

Appeal stayed the 10-year gang enhancement charge.

(Lodgment 12 at 76.) On November 3, 2011, Petitioner filed

a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court.

(Lodgment 14.) On January 11, 2012, the Petition was

denied without opinion. (Lodgment 14.)

On January 14, 2013, Petitioner, proceeding pro se,

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court.

(Pet. at 1.) On June 13, 2013, Respondent filed an Answer

to the Petition. (“Answer.”) 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).

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Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with

respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the

state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In

deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal

court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with

the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies

an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only

whether the state court’s decision was objectively

unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4

(2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir.

2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the

“contrary to” clause if the state court applied a rule

different from the governing law set forth in Supreme

Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the

Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The

court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the

governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but

unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a

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particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable

application” clause requires that the state court decision

be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas

relief, the state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” 

See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s

highest court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying

appellate court decision and presumes it provides the

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims.

See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a

basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538

U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848,

853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus

claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither

the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state

court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law,

for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle

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or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S.

at 72.

Where the state court did not reach the merits of a

claim because of the imposition of a state procedural bar,

“there is no state court decision . . . . to which to

accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Thus, this

Court must review those claims de novo. Id. However,

AEDPA “does not require a state court to give reasons

before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __,

131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). “Rather, as [the Supreme

Court] has explained, ‘[w]hen a federal claim has been

presented to a state court and the state court has denied

relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any

indication or state-law procedural principles to the

contrary.’” Johnson v. Williams, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct.

1088, 1094 (2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785).

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to Federal

Habeas Corpus relief under United States Code Title 28

Section 2254. (Pet. at 11.) In support of this claim,

Petitioner alleges the following: (1) the trial court

prejudicially erred when it admitted Petitioner’s statements because the detective deliberately used a two-step

procedure calculated to circumvent Miranda, (2) the trial

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court erred when it denied Petitioner’s motion for

mistrial because Detective Brown’s testimony at trial

differed from the facts given in his preliminary hearing

proving Detective Brown used a deliberate two-step

procedure, (3) Petitioner was denied his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to present a complete defense

when the testimony of an expert witness was excluded, and

(4) there were cumulative and collective errors creating

prejudice, thus reversal is mandated. (Pet. at 6-9.)

A. Petitioner’s Statements 

Petitioner challenges the admissibility of the

statements that he made during four interviews: (1) the

midnight interview conducted at the police station after

the murder, (2) the 3:30 a.m. interview conducted at the

police station after the murder, (3) the December 22,

2009, attempted post-arrest interview at juvenile hall,

and (4) the December 23, 2009, interview at juvenile hall.

Petitioner contends that the interviews violated his Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights, on the grounds that his

statements were coerced and that officers had violated his

rights under Miranda and Seibert. Petitioner bases his

argument on being subjected to a deliberate two-step

interrogation and the facts that he was young, unsophisticated, mostly undressed, cold, and sleep-deprived.

1. The Midnight Interview

Petitioner claims his statements to the police

during the midnight interview were obtained in violation

of Miranda. Miranda bars the prosecution from using

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statements stemming from “custodial interrogation” unless

the defendant was first warned of his constitutional

rights. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114

S. Ct. 1526 (1994) (per curiam); See Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 

Two requirements must be met in order for the

Miranda safeguards to apply: (1) the suspect must be in

“custody,” and (2) the questioning must meet the legal

definition of “interrogation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468

U.S. 420, 428, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984). Custody for

purposes of Miranda is when a person is deprived of his or

her freedom in any significant way or is led to believe,

as a reasonable person, that he or she is so deprived.

Howes v. Fields, – U.S. –, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012).

Interrogation consists of express questioning or police

officer’s words or actions he or she should know are

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02, 100 S. Ct.

1682 (1980).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that

custody for purposes of Miranda is determined by an

objective inquiry. J.D.B. v. N. Carolina, – U.S. –, 131 S.

Ct. 2394, 2402-03 (2011). To ascertain whether a suspect

is in custody, the courts look to the objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation, not the subjective

views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the

person being questioned. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322. 

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 A child's age in some circumstances may have an

effect on how a reasonable person in the suspect's

position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.

Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325. “[A] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured

to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.”

J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402-03. Although, the Supreme Court

has continuously held that “teenagers nearing the age of

majority” are likely to react to an interrogation as would

a “typical 18–year–old in similar circumstances.” Id. at

2406. A state court decision that fails to mention a

17–year–old's age as part of the Miranda custody analysis

is not objectively unreasonable under the deferential

standard of review set forth by AEDPA. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct.

at 2405. 

Here, the Court of Appeal’s determination that

Petitioner was not in custody during the midnight interview was objectively reasonable. The Court of Appeal

looked to the objective circumstances surrounding the

midnight interview and found that numerous facts weighed

against a finding of custody. First, Petitioner was told

on a number of occasions that he was not under arrest.

(Lodgment 12 at 22, 31.) Second, Petitioner was told the

handcuffs were a precaution for officer safety and were

repositioned in order for Petitioner to be more comfortable. (Id. at 14, 22, 31.) Third, after an officer

offered him a blanket, Petitioner voluntarily went to the

police station. (Id.) Fourth, Petitioner was treated as

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a witness and was informed that he was free to go home at

any time. (Id. at 22, 31.) Moreover, Petitioner’s aunt

and uncle accompanied him to the police station and

remained there in a different room while he was being

interviewed. (Lodgment 6 at 3594; Lodgment 12 at 14.) The

Court of Appeal’s failure to address Petitioner’s age (17;

nearly an adult) as a factor does not change this analysis. As a result, the Court of Appeal reasonably concluded

that the facts of the midnight interview do not objectively convey “custody” for the purposes of Miranda.

The Court of Appeal’s finding that Petitioner’s

interview became custodial upon telling Detective Priem

shortly before 2:00 a.m. that he wanted to go home was

also objectively reasonable. As a result, this court

finds that Petitioner’s statements made during the 2:40

a.m. interview were properly suppressed by the trial court

and will not be discussed further herein. 

Detective Priem was asked to sit with the Petitioner

while Detective Brown attended a briefing without knowing

any information about who Petitioner was or what he was

doing at the station. (Lodgment 6 at 3488-89.) Furthermore, Detective Brown did not objectively discern Plaintiff was a minor simply by observing his outward looks or

demeanor; she only learned that he was a minor after

engaging in casual conversation with him.10/ (Id. at

3492.) When Petitioner asked Detective Priem if he could

10/

This provides further support for the fact that the Court of

Appeal’s failure to address Petitioner’s age regarding the midnight

interview, supra, was not unreasonable.

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leave, she stated that she did not know what was going on,

that he would have to leave with his mother because of his

age, and that he should put his head down and rest. (Id.

at 3493.) Detective Priem asked another detective to sit

with Petitioner while she checked to see if his mother was

still there. (Id. at 3494.) A short while later,

Detective Priem returned and reassured Petitioner that his

mother was still there and would wait for him. (Id. at

3495.) When Detective Brown returned, he and Detective

Priem did not discuss what Petitioner said to her or what

she had said to Petitioner while she was in the room. 

(Id. at 3493-94.) 

Under these circumstances, a reasonable person

nearing the age of majority could likely be lead to

believe that he was deprived of his freedom to leave the

police station since he was told he would have to wait to

leave with his mother. As such, the Court of Appeal

reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s interrogation

became custodial when he asked to leave the police station

and the request was denied. 

The facts above make it clear to this Court that the

state-court adjudication of Petitioner’s claim regarding

Miranda did not involve an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established law. Relief is available under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) only if the state court's decision is

objectively unreasonable. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410;

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. 

2. The 3:30 a.m. Interview

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Petitioner claims that Detective Brown deliberately

employed a two-step question-first technique that rendered

his Miranda waiver unknowing and unintelligent. (Pet. at

6.) Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by

admitting his post-warning statements during the 3:30 a.m.

interview because they were obtained in violation of

Seibert. (Pet. at 6.) As discussed supra, by the time of

Petitioner's 3:30 a.m. interrogation, he was in custody

for purposes of Miranda. Therefore, this Court must

determine if it was Detective Brown’s intent during the

3:30 a.m. interrogation to undermine the Miranda warnings.

This Court concludes, like the trial judge, that Detective

Brown had no such intent.

Justice Souter’s plurality opinion in Seibert11/

discussed the validity of the police technique “question

first, warn later,” and concluded that this technique

could undermine the very purpose of the Miranda warnings.

“A two-step interrogation involves eliciting an unwarned

confession, administering the Miranda warnings and

obtaining a waiver of Miranda rights, and then eliciting

11/

In Missour v. Seibert, an officer “testified that he made a

‘conscious decision’ to withhold Miranda warnings, thus resorting to

an interrogation technique he had been taught: question first, then

give the warnings, and then repeat the question ‘until I get the

answer that she’s already provided once.’” Seibert, 542 U.S. at

605-06. Employing this “question-first practice,” the interrogating

officer left the defendant alone in an interview room at the police

station for 15 to 20 minutes, then “questioned her without Miranda

warnings for 30 to 40 minutes, squeezing her arm and repeating” an

accusatory remark. Id. at 604-05, 611. After the defendant

confessed and was given a 20-minute break, the officer read her the

Miranda warnings, resumed the questioning by mentioning their

previous conversation, “and confronted her with her prewarning

statements.” Id. at 605.

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a repeated confession.” United States v. Narvaez–Gomez,

489 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Seibert, 542

U.S. at 609–10). The plurality examined whether “it would

be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the

warnings could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12. The plurality

opinion also noted that giving Miranda warnings midstream

“without expressly excepting the statement just given,

could lead to an entirely reasonable inference that what

[the accused] has just said will be used, with subsequent

silence being of no avail.” Id. at 613. The plurality

determined that the circumstances of the second confession

did not “reasonably support a conclusion that the [Miranda] warnings given could have served their purpose [to

reduce the risk of admitting coerced confessions].” Id.

at 617. 

In his concurring opinion, which is also the legal

standard,12/ Justice Kennedy held the “admissibility of

post-warning statements should continue to be governed by

the principles of Elstad13/ unless the deliberate two-step

strategy was employed.” Id. at 622. “If the deliberate

12/

Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is the legal standard

from Seibert because when applied, it produced results with which

the majority of the Court could agree. See U.S. v. Williams, 435

F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2006); See also Marks v. United States,

430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S. Ct. 990 (1977). “When a fragmented Court

decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys

the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed

as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the

judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Id.

13/

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).

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two-step strategy has been used, post-Miranda warning

statements that are related to the substance of preMiranda warning statements must be excluded unless

curative measures are taken before the post-Miranda

warning statement is made.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622.

Justice Kennedy suggested that “an additional warning that

explains the likely inadmissibility of the prewarning

custodial statement may be [a] sufficient” curative

measure. Id. Thus, where a deliberate two-step strategy

is not used, a subsequent administration of Miranda

warnings to a suspect who has given a prior voluntary but

unwarned statement should suffice to remove the conditions

that precluded admission of the earlier statement if the

suspect made a rational and intelligent choice to waive

his rights. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622; Oregon v.

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314.

In United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158

(9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit held that to determine

the interrogator’s intent to undermine the Miranda

warnings, courts should examine objective evidence and any

available subjective evidence, such as an officer's

testimony. The following factors determine the relevant

objective evidence: (1) the completeness and detail of the

questions and answers in the first round of interrogation,

(2) the overlapping content of the two statements, (3) the

timing and setting of the first and the second, (4) the

continuity of police personnel, and (5) the degree to

which the interrogator's questions treated the second

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round as continuous with the first. See Seibert, 542 U.S.

at 615; Williams, 435 F.3d at 1159.

Here, the Court of Appeal found there was enough

substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision

in not finding a deliberate two-step technique. The Court

of Appeal noted that the detectives had very little

evidence surrounding the shooting. There was no evidence

in the record concerning an official police policy of

deliberately withholding Miranda warnings until Petitioner

had confessed. Petitioner could not cite to the record or

present any evidence in support of his assertion that the

detectives in this case deliberately withheld their

Miranda advisement until Petitioner had incriminated

himself. The Court of Appeal also stated that Detective

Brown’s testimony was evidence against a deliberate twostep technique because he testified that he believed

Petitioner was a witness and not in custody. Detective

Brown testified that when he felt there was probable cause

that Petitioner was involved in the shooting, he issued

Miranda warnings to Petitioner. The Court of Appeal

examined the completeness and detail of Petitioner’s

initial statements to the Detectives, which the court

found fell far short of a complete rendition of the

circumstances surrounding the shooting, although they were

confessionary in nature. 

This Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s determination that the police did not deliberately utilize a

two-step strategy was objectively reasonable. Detective

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Brown firmly maintained in his testimony that he did not

deliberately use a two-step strategy. Detective Brown was

unaware that Petitioner asked Detective Priem during the

break if he could go home. Moreover, Detective Brown

testified that he was in the middle of a thought when

Petitioner stated he wanted to go home and it did not

register in Detective Brown’s mind that Petitioner made

that statement. He maintained that he was in disbelief

when the prosecutor later informed him that Petitioner

stated he wanted to go home during the interview. The

trial court observed Detective Brown's demeanor while he

testified, watched the video of the interviews, and found

credible Detective Brown’s testimony about how he may have

missed Petitioner’s request to go home. 

In addition, Detective Brown did not exploit the

pre-Miranda warned admission to pressure Petitioner into

waiving his right to remain silent. Detective Brown also

did not rely on Petitioner's pre-Miranda warning statement

to obtain the post-Miranda warning statement. The postMiranda warning interview did not resemble a

cross-examination where the officer confronts a petitioner

with his inadmissible pre-Miranda warning statements and

pushes him to acknowledge them. None of the objective

factors, and none of the evidence before the Court,

necessarily demonstrates that Detective Brown was untruthful or that the police used a deliberate strategy to

circumvent Miranda. 

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 Furthermore, Petitioner has not produced any “clear

and convincing evidence” sufficient to rebut the presumption of correctness applicable to the state courts'

deliberateness determination under 28 U.S.C. Section

2254(e)(1). See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d at 999–1000

(once a state court's fact finding process survives

intrinsic review under section 2254(d)(2), state court's

findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness

under section 2254(e)(1)). 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeal’s

rejection of Petitioner's claim that the trial court erred

under Seibert in admitting evidence from Petitioner's 3:30

a.m. interview was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Moreover,

it was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v.

Richter, –– U.S. ––, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785–87 (2011).

3. The December 22 and 23 Interviews

Petitioner claims that detectives violated Miranda

by reinitiating the interrogation on December 22 and 23

after Petitioner had invoked his right to silence during

the December 21 walkthrough. In Berghuis v. Thompkins,

560 U.S. 370, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010), the U.S.

Supreme Court held “there is good reason to require an

accused who wants to invoke his or her right to remain

silent to do so unambiguously. A requirement of an

unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an

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objective inquiry that ‘avoid[s] difficulties of proof and

. . . provide[s] guidance to officers’ on how to proceed

in the face of ambiguity.” The Thompkins Court went on to

state that there is no principled reason to adopt a

different standard for determining when an accused has

invoked the Miranda right to remain silent. Therefore,

the right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously. 

Petitioner claims that he invoked his right to

silence during the December 21 walkthrough. Petitioner’s

only statement on the record pertaining to an invocation

of silence is Petitioner’s question: “[d]o I still have

the right to remain silent?” Detective Brown responded,

telling Petitioner he still had the right to remain

silent. After Detective Brown’s response, Petitioner

continued answering questions and conducting the

walkthrough. Petitioner’s question did not clearly and

unequivocally demonstrate that he invoked his right to

remain silent. Thus, the officers did not violate Miranda

by reinitiating the interrogation on December 22 and 23. 

Petitioner also challenges the statements made on

December 22 and 23 at juvenile hall. However, Detectives

did not question Petitioner on December 22 after reissuing

Miranda warnings because Petitioner stated that he could

not ‘talk about anything until my parents get here or

until I have both my parents present or my lawyer.’

Detective Brown then asked if he would be willing to talk

if Petitioner’s stepgrandmother, Pua, was present and

Petitioner agreed. 

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On December 23, Detective Brown and Pua went to

juvenile hall where Detective Brown again reissued Miranda

warnings to Petitioner. After Detective Brown reissued

the Miranda warnings, Petitioner talked about shooting

Officer Bessant. There is nothing in the record that

demonstrates that Petitioner clearly and unequivocally

stated that he was invoking his right to remain silent or

invoking his right to counsel. Thus, Petitioner’s

contention that he invoked his Miranda rights is without

merit, since the record does not show that Petitioner

unequivocally invoked any of his Miranda rights. 

For the foregoing reasons, the state courts' rejection of Petitioner's claim that the trial court erred

under Miranda in admitting evidence from Petitioner's

December 22 and 23 interviews was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal

law. Further, it was not an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

4. Coerced Or Involuntary Statements

Petitioner challenges the admissibility of the

statements that he made during the interviews because they

were coerced and involuntary. The accused's statement

during a custodial interrogation are admissible at trial

if it can be established that the accused “in fact

knowingly and voluntarily waived [Miranda] rights” when

making the statement. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.

369, 373, 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979). 

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Waiver has two distinct dimensions: “waiver must be

‘voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free

and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion,

or deception,’ and ‘made with a full awareness of both the

nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences

of the decision to abandon it.’” Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at

2260. Determining whether a confession is voluntary

depends on whether the defendant’s will was overborne at

the time he confessed. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.

503, 513, 83 S. Ct. 1336 (1963). 

The court must determine under the circumstances

whether “the government obtained the statement by physical

or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so

that the suspect’s will was overborne.” Beaty v. Stewart,

303 F.3d 975, 992 (9th Cir. 2002); See also Hutto v. Ross,

429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S. Ct. 202 (1976). “The test is

whether the confession was ‘extracted by any sort of

threats or violence, (or) obtained by any direct or

implied promises, however slight, (or) by the exertion of

any improper influence.’” Hutto, 429 U.S. at 30; Bram v.

United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S. Ct. 183 (1897). 

Encouraging a suspect to tell the truth is not

coercion. Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 495 (9th

Cir. 1997). Also, “misrepresentations linking a suspect to

a crime or statements which inflate the extent of evidence

against a suspect do not necessarily render a confession

involuntary.” Id.; see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731,

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739, 89 S. Ct. 1420 (1969); United States v. Miller, 984

F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.1993).

Petitioner argues that his inculpatory statements

were coerced because he was young, unsophisticated, mostly

undressed, cold, and sleep-deprived at the time he made

the statements. In addition, Petitioner contends the

interrogating officers made coercive statements by

encouraging him to tell the truth. Also, Petitioner

claims the interrogating officers lied to him by misrepresenting that a witness had identified him in a photographic lineup. 

The conditions of Petitioner’s interrogation are

similar to Amaya-Ruiz14/. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the atmosphere of Petitioner’s

questioning was not coercive. Detectives suggested that

Petitioner should rest and offered him something to eat or

14/

In Amaya-Ruiz, Petitioner argued the atmosphere of his

questioning was coercive because, during the questioning, he was

wearing only a blanket and underwear; he had been detained since

12:15 a.m. and was not questioned until 9:30 a.m.; and he had not

slept or had anything to drink or eat during the night. In addition

Amaya-Ruiz contended the interrogating officers made coercive

statements by encouraging him to tell the truth. Also, Petitioner

claimed the interrogating officers lied to him by misrepresenting

that a witness had seen him leaving in a stolen truck and they

preyed on his lack of intelligence and education. 

The Ninth Circuit held the atmosphere surrounding the

questioning of Petitioner was not coercive. The court stated that

the cell had a bench on which Petitioner could sleep, agents offered

him something to eat or drink, and the officers' voices were calm

and not threatening. Also, the fact that he had no clothing was not

coercive because they provided him with a blanket. The court found

that the officers' statements were not "sufficiently compelling" to

overbear Petitioner's will and that the misrepresentation does not

amount to coercion. Since, Petitioner had not established that his

confession was the product of coercion, his alleged lack of

intelligence and education does not render his confession

involuntary. 

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drink. (Lodgment 12 at 40.) Additionally, Petitioner was

provided with a blanket in order to stay warm. (Id.)

Detective Brown did not use any threats and kept his voice

calm and respectful. (Lodgment 12 at 40, 42.) Detective

Brown’s statements were not "sufficiently compelling" to

overbear Petitioner's will and the misrepresentation does

not amount to coercion. Moreover, when the detectives

were leaving the interrogation room, Petitioner asked if

he could continue to speak with them when they returned.

(Lodgment 12 at 42.) Finally, since Petitioner had not

established that his confession was the product of

coercion, his alleged lack of intelligence and education

does not render his confession involuntary. 

For the foregoing reasons, the state courts' rejection of Petitioner's claim that the trial court erred in

admitting statements from Petitioner's interviews was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Further, it was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). In sum, this Court finds that Petitioner is not

entitled to Habeas Corpus relief on Ground One.

B. Detective Brown’s Trial Testimony

Petitioner argues that the trial court erroneously

denied his motion for a mistrial based on the fact that

Detective Brown’s trial testimony materially differed from

his preliminary hearing testimony, which illustrated a

Seibert violation. Petitioner alleges that Detective

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Brown’s testimony at trial materially differed in three

factual parts from his pretrial testimony, proving that

Petitioner was treated as a suspect rather than a witness.

Petitioner contends the following parts prove Detective

Brown’s subjective intent: (1) the information Detective

Brown received during the two hour break, (2) Detective

Brown’s testimony explaining the reason for him riding in

the back seat of the transport vehicle with Petitioner,

and (3) Detective Brown’s increasing suspicion of Petitioner’s involvement. Petitioner argues that the difference in the testimony suggests that Detective Brown

deliberately violated Miranda under the holding in

Seibert, and thus calls into question the trial court’s

findings of fact as to Detective Brown’s subjective intent

during the interviews. 

Petitioner’s challenge to the trial court’s denial

of his mistrial was reviewed under the abuse of discretion

standard by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal

specifically addressed the three areas that Petitioner

claimed were materially different in Detective Brown’s

trial testimony from his preliminary hearing. The Court

of Appeal found the record made clear that Detective

Brown’s testimony at the preliminary hearing and his

testimony at trial was substantially similar.

First, the Court of Appeal held that Detective

Brown’s testimony with respect to the information he

obtained during the two hour break was generally consistent as to the pertinent information. Detective Brown

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indicated during the preliminary hearing and during

Petitioner’s trial that he was aware that someone matching

the description of Petitioner ran into Petitioner’s house

carrying what was believed to be a rifle. The fact that

he used the word “identified” at trial versus “meeting his

general description” is not materially different. 

Second, the Court of Appeal held that Detective

Brown’s testimony at trial with respect to sitting in the

back seat of the transport vehicle as a safety precaution

did not undermine Detective Brown’s pretrial testimony

that he understood that Petitioner was to be treated as a

witness. Detective Brown’s testimony was unwavering that 

he treated Petitioner as a witness during the initial

interview. Detective Brown’s safety precaution en route

to the police station is not inconsistent with his

testimony that he considered Petitioner merely as a

witness prior to Petitioner’s admission regarding his role

in the shooting. 

Lastly, Detective Brown’s increasing suspicion of

Petitioner was not a question that he was asked at the

pretrial hearing or suppression motion hearing. Therefore, the statement at trial cannot be seen as being

materially different from his pretrial or suppression

hearing testimony. Also, there is no “requirement of

warnings to be imposed simply because... the questioned

person is one whom the police suspect.” Mathiason, 429

U.S. at 495. Detective Brown’s increasing suspicion does

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not mean he deliberately engaged in a two-step interrogation to avoid advising Petitioner of his Miranda rights. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeal’s

rejection of Petitioner's claim that the trial court erred

in denying Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial on the basis

that Detective Brown’s testimony was materially different

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established Federal law. It also was not an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to

Habeas Corpus relief on Ground Two.

C. Exclusion of Expert Witness

Ground Three of the Petition claims that the trial

court abused its discretion when it refused to let

Petitioner present expert testimony about the factors

related to the reliability and accuracy of Petitioner’s

confessions. Petitioner alleges a violation of his

federal right to procedural due process because of the

trial court's exclusion of his proffered expert testimony

on the general psychological factors and police techniques

that can lead to false or unreliable confessions.

During pretrial discussions with both counsel, the

court indicated that it reserved a ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony until after the prosecution

presented its case. (Lodgment 12 at 54.) The court

stated, “[a]ssuming that you think that Doctor Leo would

be helpful to the jury, again, I emphasize the ultimate

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issue I have to decide. I would say we should let the

jury go, have a 40215/ hearing for a whole day, and decide

what it is he’s going to testify to . . .” (Id.) The trial

court suggested briefly that the testimony of the defense

counsel’s expert witness may fall within the knowledge of

the jurors and may therefore be excluded. 

Defense counsel reiterated that he was uncertain

whether he would call Doctor Leo until after the prosecution had presented its case. Upon conclusion of the

prosecution’s case, defense counsel called one witness and

then rested without calling Doctor Leo. Defense counsel

did not seek a hearing under California Evidence Code

Section 402 regarding Doctor Leo’s potential testimony and

the trial court never made an ultimate ruling on Doctor

Leo’s testimony. 

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's

finding that the defense counsel made a tactical decision

not to present Doctor Leo because there was potential that

his testimony could open the door for the prosecution to

ask Doctor Leo about statements made by Petitioner that

had otherwise been excluded. The Court of Appeal also

noted that the trial court’s statement in the minute order

denying the defendant’s request for a California Evidence

15/

California Evidence Code § 402 states: (a) When the existence

of a preliminary fact is disputed, its existence or nonexistence

shall be determined as provided in this article. As used in this

article, “preliminary fact” means a fact upon the existence or

nonexistence of which depends the admissibility or inadmissibility

of evidence. The phrase “the admissibility or inadmissibility of

evidence” includes the qualification or disqualification of a person

to be a witness and the existence or nonexistence of a privilege.

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Code Section 402 hearing was not in the transcript record.

The Court of Appeal stated that the trial court relied

upon the reporter’s transcript rather than the minute

order. Thus, the Court of Appeal held that defense

counsel’s indication that he did not intend to elicit

Doctor Leo’s testimony together with the defense resting

its case before the parties discussed Doctor Leo’s

testimony further did not create a claim for exclusion of

an expert witness. 

This Court agrees that defense counsel made a

strategic decision not to call Doctor Leo as a defense

witness. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim of error regarding

the exclusion of an expert witness is without merit.

Moreover, the trial court would not have abused its

discretion in denying Dr. Leo’s testimony, had he been

called as a witness, because the subject matter to which

he was expected to testify did not require expert testimony. “A ... court does not abuse its discretion when it

refuses expert testimony where the subject does not need

expert ‘illumination’ and the proponent is otherwise able

to elicit testimony about the subject.” United States v.

Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1997), citing United

States v. Castaneda, 94 F.3d 592, 596 (9th Cir. 1996); see

also United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th

Cir. 2001)(noting that there are a variety of reasons to

exclude expert testimony related to the credibility of a

confession including that it encroaches on the jury’s

vital function to make credibility determinations). Since

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the Court finds that it was an objectively reasonable

application of clearly established federal law, Petitioner

is not entitled to Habeas Corpus relief on Ground Three.

D. Cumulative Errors

Finally, Petitioner asserts the cumulative and

collective errors individually and cumulatively in whole,

and in part, caused him prejudice. Petitioner alleges that

his right to fundamental fairness at trial, as guaranteed

under due process, was violated as a result of these

errors.

Reviewing courts have acknowledged the possibility

that in some cases, “[t]he cumulative effect of multiple

errors can violate due process even where no single error

rises to the level of a constitutional violation or would

independently warrant reversal.” Parle v. Runnels, 505

F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir.2007), citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973). However,

as discussed supra, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

that any errors, let alone errors of a constitutional

dimension, occurred in his case. Accordingly, “there is

nothing to accumulate to a level of a constitutional

violation.” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th

Cir. 2002).

In sum, Petitioner's claim that there were cumulative and collective errors that caused prejudice is

unfounded. The Court cannot conclude that the state

court’s rejection of his claim was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

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Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to Habeas Corpus

relief on Ground Four.

V. CONCLUSION

After a review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Should be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 7, 2013,

any party may file written objections with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all

parties no later than November 21, 2013. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 

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F.3d. 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998), Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: October 10, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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