Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04648/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04648-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1

 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX1)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RUBYE BARKHOUSEN,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 05-04648 JF

ORDER1 DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[re: docket nos. 13, 15]

Plaintiff Rubye Barkhousen (“Barkhousen”) seeks reversal of a decision by Defendant

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her disability insurance benefits. 

The challenged decision was rendered by Administrative Law Judge Adolfo J. Vila (the “ALJ”)

on April 22, 2005. The ALJ’s decision became final on November 2, 2005, when the Appeals

Council of the Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s

decision. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on July 25, 2006. Defendant filed a

cross-motion for summary judgment on September 5, 2006. Plaintiff filed a reply on September

Case 5:05-cv-04648-JF Document 19 Filed 12/05/06 Page 1 of 12
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2

 Barkhousen applied previously for such benefits in 2001, but was denied in a separate

ALJ decision that is not at issue in the instant action.

Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2

(JFEX1)

12, 2006. The matter was submitted without oral argument. 

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the ALJ’s decision dated April 22, 2005, and the

accompanying administrative record. Barkhousen is sixty-four years old with a high school

education; she worked in the past as a data entry clerk. Admin. R. at 14. Barkhousen alleges that

she became disabled on February 16, 2001, as a result of problems with back pain, poor eye

sight, hearing loss and loss of concentration. Id. On September 10, 2002, she applied for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income payments.2 Id. at 13. Her

application was initially denied on April 30, 2003, and denied again after reconsideration on

September 24, 2003. Id. at 22-23. Pursuant to Barkhousen’s request, the ALJ held a de novo

administrative hearing on January 19, 2005. Cross-mot. Summ. J. at 2. Barkhousen, who was

represented by counsel, testified at the hearing, as did vocational expert Susan Brooks

(“Brooks”). Admin. R. at 344-372. The hearing occurred in Dallas, Texas, where Barkhousen

resided at the time. Id. at 13. 

The ALJ found that Barkhousen is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security

Act and therefore is not entitled to the benefits for which she applied. Id. at 21. After

consideration of the entire record, including medical opinions described below, the ALJ found

the following. Barkhousen has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset

of the disability. Id. at 20. Her osteoporosis and affective mood disorder are considered “severe”

based on the requirements in the Regulations 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). 

However, these medically determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of the

listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. Id. Barkhousen’s allegations

regarding her limitations are not totally credible. Id. She has the residual functional capacity to

lift fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently, to stand or walk six hours total

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Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 3

(JFEX1)

in an eight-hour workday, and to sit six hours total in an eight hour workday. Id. From a mental

standpoint, Barkhousen is moderately limited in her ability to understand and remember detailed

instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; complete a normal

workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to

perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; and get

along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. Id. 

Barkhousen retains the ability to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions;

perform activities within a schedule; maintain attendance and be punctual within customary

tolerances; sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; and make simple workrelated decisions. Id. Finally, Barkhousen’s social skills and adaptive functions are adequate. 

Id. Accordingly, Barkhousen retains the residual functional capacity to perform and sustain

semi-skilled medium work. Id. 

The ALJ found further that Barkhousen suffers a disturbance of mood with depressive

symptoms and anxiety that do not precisely satisfy the diagnostic criteria of the psychiatric

review technique form. Id. Her symptoms result in a “moderate” restriction of activities of daily

living, “moderate” difficulties in maintaining social functioning, “moderate” difficulties in

maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and “no” episodes of decompensation. Id.

Consistent with the credible testimony of the vocational expert, Barkhousen’s past relevant work

as data entry clerk did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by her

residual functional capacity pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565 and 416.965. Id. at 21. 

Ultimately, Barkhousen’s medically determinable osteoporosis and affective mood disorder do

not prevent her from performing her past relevant work, therefore she is not under a “disability”

as defined in the Social Security Act. Id. 

On June 2, 2005, Barkhousen requested administrative review of the ALJ’s decision by

the Appeals Council. Id. at 297. Her request was denied and the ALJ’s decision thus became

final. Id. at 5-9. Barkhousen, who presently resides in San Jose, California, commenced this

action on November 11, 2005, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In her motion for summary

judgment, Barkhousen requests reconsideration of the ALJ’s final decision and an award against

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Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 4

(JFEX1)

“Social Security Disability” in the amount of $300,000. Mot. Summ. J. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard for Reviewing the Commissioner’s Decision

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the authority to review the

Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits. The Commissioner’s decision (here the

decision of the ALJ) will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is

based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523

(9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). In this context, the

term “substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance - it

is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the

conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When determining whether

substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s decision, the Court examines the administrative

record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at

1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to support

more than one rational interpretation, the Court must defer to the decision of the ALJ. Moncada,

60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1258.

B. Standard for Determining Disability

A person is “disabled” for purposes of receiving social security benefits if he or she is

unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment which

is expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of

at least twelve months. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th

Cir. 1984). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant currently is

engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. 

Id. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step

requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or

combination of impairments which significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work

activities; if not, a finding of “not disabled” is made and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant

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3A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what he or she can still do despite existing

exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir.

1989).

4

 There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that there is

other work in significant numbers in the national economy that claimant can do: (1) by the

testimony of a vocational expert or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999).

Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 5

(JFEX1)

has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the

Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or

equals an impairment in the Listing; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are

awarded. Id. If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or

equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine

whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functional capacity”3 to perform his or her past

work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. The plaintiff has the burden

of proving that he or she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If

the claimant meets this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. The Commissioner

then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful

work;4 the determination of this issue comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 

20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995), as

amended April 9, 1996; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

III. DISCUSSION

Barkhousen requests summary judgment against the Commissioner for “lack of case

review and communications” and requests an award of $300,000. Mot. Summ. J. In her reply

memorandum, Barkhousen asserts that: (1) the Appeals Council failed to review her notes and

requests, (2) the ALJ did not access medical reports by Dr. Mansfield and Dr. Kotamari, and did

not consider the full diagnosis of Dr. Moe, and (3) there was no evidence before the ALJ of

Barkhousen’s lifting capacity. Additionally, Barkhousen attached a current doctor’s evaluation

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Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 6

(JFEX1)

to her reply. The Commissioner asserts that Barkhousen is not entitled to damages in this case,

that the ALJ properly assessed the medical evidence, and that Barkhousen has not satisfied her

burden of demonstrating that the record should be supplemented. 

A. Appeals Council Denial of Request for Review

Barkhousen asserts that “Plaintiff made true notes and requests to which [the] Appeals

Counsel [sic] should have reviewed.” Reply Mem. at 1. An ALJ decision following a hearing

does not become the final decision of the Commissioner until the claimant requests review by the

Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council either grants or denies review. Bass v. Social Sec.

Admin., 872 F.2d 832, 833 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(a)(5)). A party may 

obtain review of that final decision by filing a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Barkhousen did

request review by the Appeals Council, and her request was denied. This Court thus has

jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision. However, this Court does not have jurisdiction to

review the Appeals Council’s denial of Barkhousen’s request for review. 

B. Consideration of Medical Reports

Barkhousen asserts that the ALJ did not consider medical reports by Dr. Mansfield and

Dr. Kotamari, and did not consider the full diagnosis of Dr. Moe. The Commissioner asserts that

the ALJ properly assessed the medical evidence in finding that Barkhousen was not disabled. 

(1) Dr. Mansfield

The ALJ decision states that Dr. Mansfield examined Barkhousen on February 19, 2003. 

The decision goes on to address Dr. Mansfield’s report as follows. 

The claimant alleged schizophrenia and poor concentration. The claimant

reported daily activities that include household tasks, watching television, reading,

crafts, and independent self care. The claimant appeared frustrated and

demonstrated poor coping skills. Her affect was flat and her mood was depressed. 

She had fair insight and slowed motor activities, but her speech was coherent,

thought content was appropriate, and she was oriented times 3. The claimant

exhibited a low average range of intellect, pain behavior, and diminished

concentration and memory. Dr. Mansfield opined that the claimant had poor

ability to deal with the public and interact with supervisors, and she was seriously

limited but not precluded in her ability to follow work rules, relate to co-workers,

use judgment, deal with work stress, function independently, and maintain

attention and concentration. 

Admin. R. at 16. 

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Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 7

(JFEX1)

The ALJ’s discussion accurately reflects the contents of Dr. Mansfield’s report found in

the medical record. Id. at 197-200. The record thus shows that the ALJ did not fail to consider

Dr. Mansfield’s evaluation and opinion. 

(2) Dr. Kotamari

While the ALJ’s decision does not specifically mention Dr. Kotamari’s name, the medical

record reveals that Dr. Kotamari is affiliated with Parkland Memorial Hospital, and the ALJ

decision does address Parkland medical reports. Admin R. at 241-43; Id. at 16-17. The medical

record includes the following notes and reports by Dr. Kotamari: progress notes taken on

February 2, 2004, reports regarding a CT scan and bone density testing done on February 24,

2004, and a report regarding an MRI done on April 20, 2004. Id. at 251, 253, 257. The ALJ

decision accurately summarizes the contents of these notes and reports. Id. at 17. Again, the

record shows that the ALJ did not fail to consider Dr. Kotamari’s notes and reports. 

(3) Dr. Moe

The ALJ decision states that the “medical record revealed that the claimant was treated by

Carlos Moe, D.O. On October 9, 2002, Dr. Moe opined that the claimant was incapacitated and

could not perform substantial gainful employment.” Admin. R. at 16. The decision specifically

addresses the reported x-rays, scans and treatment that Barkhousen received from Dr. Moe. In

concluding that Barkhousen’s impairments are severe within the meaning of the Regulations but

not severe enough to meet or medically equal one of the impairments in the Listing, the ALJ

states that he “has given careful consideration to the opinions expressed by the medical source of

record.” Id. at 19. The ALJ then states the following.

Dr. Moe opined that the claimant was incapacitated and could not perform

substantial gainful employment. . . The opinion of a treating physician is entitled

to great weight when supported by objective medical evidence and consistent with

other substantial evidence of record. On the other hand, a statement that claimant

can or cannot perform a past job, or other jobs, are not medical opinions but

administrative findings dispositive of a case, requiring familiarity with the

Regulations and legal standards set forth therein. Such issues are reserved to the

Commissioner, who cannot abdicate the statutory responsibility to determine the

ultimate issue of disability. Opinions on issue[s] reserved to the Commissioner,

such as Dr. Moe’s, can never be given controlling weight as it is not supported by

the objective evidence as a whole.

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5

 In Randolph, the court noted nonetheless that the ALJ sitting in the Fifth Circuit had not

violated the Eighth Circuit’s precedential legal requirements. Randolph, 386 F.3rd at 842 n.10. 

However, the court did not indicate that the outcome would be different if Fifth Circuit authority

was in conflict with Eight Circuit authority. Id. 

Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 8

(JFEX1)

Id. 

Under Ninth Circuit authority, physicians in disability cases may render medical and

clinical opinions, or they may render opinions on the ultimate issue of disability - the claimant’s

ability to perform work. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). The ALJ is not

bound by the uncontroverted opinions of the claimant’s physicians on the ultimate issue of

disability, but he cannot reject them without presenting clear and convincing reasons for doing

so. Id. (citing Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678. 680 (9th Cir.1993)). A treating physician’s

opinion on disability, even if controverted, can be rejected only with specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830). 

However, the ALJ in this case sits in Texas, within the Fifth Circuit. Accordingly, the

ALJ properly could apply the Fifth Circuit’s legal standards rather than those of the Ninth

Circuit. See Randolph v. Barnhart, 386 F.3d 835, 841 -842 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that where

the ALJ is based in the Fifth Circuit and the reviewing court is based in the Eighth Circuit, the

ALJ is not bound by Eighth Circuit case law).5 Under Fifth Circuit authority, the opinions,

diagnoses, and medical evidence of a treating physician who is familiar with the claimant’s

injuries, treatments, and responses should be accorded considerable weight in determining

disability. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Scott v. Heckler, 770

F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir.1985)). The treating physician’s opinions, however, are far from

conclusive as “the ALJ has the sole responsibility for determining the claimant’s disability

status.” Id. (citing Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, when

good cause is shown, less weight, little weight, or even no weight may be given to the

physician’s testimony. Id. Recognized good cause exceptions include disregarding statements

that are brief and conclusory or otherwise unsupported by the evidence. Id. (citing Scott, 770

F.2d at 485). 

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Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9

(JFEX1)

The Social Security Administration has set forth regulations regarding medical source

opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner. 20 CFR §§ 404.1527(e), 404.927(e). 

Under these regulations, an opinion that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” are not

medical opinions but are instead opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they

are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case. Id. In 1996, the Social Security

Administration issued a ruling to provide additional policy interpretations and procedures for

evaluating opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner. Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-5p, 1996 WL

374183. The ruling held that opinions on these issues must not be disregarded. Id. at 5. 

However, even when offered by a treating source, they can never be entitled to controlling weight

or given special significance. Id. at 5. The adjudicator is required to evaluate all evidence in the

case record that may have a bearing on the determination or decision of disability, including

opinions from medical sources about issues reserved to the Commissioner. Id. If the case record

contains an opinion from a medical source on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, the

adjudicator must evaluate all the evidence in the case record to determine the extent to which the

opinion is supported by the record. Id.

In the instant case, the ALJ applied the correct legal standard in not giving controlling

weight to Dr. Moe’s ultimate conclusion that Barkhousen is unable to work. The ALJ addressed

Dr. Moe’s medical findings and evaluated other evidence in the case record to determine the

extent to which Dr. Moe’s opinion is supported by the record. The record reflects that the ALJ

had good cause to disregard Dr. Moe’s opinion of disability because it was not supported by the

objective evidence as a whole. 

 

C. Lifting Capacity Determination

The ALJ decision states that, “[b]ased on the evidence, in its entirety, the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to lift 50 pounds occassionally [and] 25 pounds frequently[.]” 

Admin. R. at 18. Barkhousen asserts that there was no evidence before the ALJ with respect to

her lifting capacity. However, the medical record contains an evaluation by medical consultant

Dr. Cremona. Id. at 138-39. This evaluation contains a checklist by which Dr. Cremona

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Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10

(JFEX1)

indicates that Barkhousen’s exertional limitations allow her to occasionally lift fifty pounds and

to frequently lift twenty-five pounds. The checklist instructs the evaluator to base his

conclusions on all evidence contained in the file including clinical and laboratory findings,

symptoms, observations, lay evidence, and reports of daily activities. On the checklist, the

evaluator is asked to explain how and why the evidence supports his conclusions regarding the

patient’s lifting capacity. In response to this question, Dr. Cremona notes, “61 year old . . .

Osteoporosis . . . From all joints. X-ray [] spine normal. Nuero intent . . . RFC takes into

consideration pain alleged by cl[aimant].” Id. at 139. 

Barkhousen asserts that neurology examiner Dr. Elliot did not report on her ability to lift. 

Dr. Elliot’s report in the medical record does not indicate exact pound lifting capacity

information. However, the report does indicate that “[o]verall muscle bulk and tone are normal”

and that “[o]verall power testing reveals normal 5/5 strength both distally and proximally in the

upper and lower extremities.” Id. at 168. Although Dr. Elliot’s report does not list specific

weight capacity, it is not inconsistent with Dr. Cremona’s assessment of Barkhousen’s lifting

capacity. 

D. New Evidence

Barkhousen attached a current doctor’s evaluation to her reply memorandum. The Court

may remand the case to the Commissioner and order additional evidence to be taken before the

Commissioner, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that

there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior

proceeding. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). For new evidence to warrant remand, the evidence offered

must bear directly and substantially on the matter in dispute. Burton v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 1415,

1417 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The report submitted by Barkhousen reflects a recent evaluation of her lumbar spine and

concludes “[n]o acute fracture or sublaxation. Degenerative changes as above.” This medical

report does not appear to be material to Barkhousen’s condition as of the time the ALJ rendered

his decision. 

 

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Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11

(JFEX1)

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED;

(2) Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and

(3) The Clerk of the Court shall close the file.

DATED: December 5, 2006.

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 05-04648 JF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12

(JFEX1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Sara Winslow sara.winslow@usdoj.gov, kathy.terry@usdoj.gov;

claire.muller@usdoj.gov 

Rubye Barkhousen 

3705 Seine Court 

San Jose, CA 95127 

Case 5:05-cv-04648-JF Document 19 Filed 12/05/06 Page 12 of 12