Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00675/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00675-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT FUENTES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-0675 FCD GGH P

vs.

MIKE KNOWLES, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma

pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $150.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). An initial partial filing fee of $9.98 will be assessed by this

order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to

collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the

Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the

Case 2:05-cv-00675-FCD-GGH Document 5 Filed 04/22/05 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be

forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s

account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing

a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00675-FCD-GGH Document 5 Filed 04/22/05 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Named as defendants are Mike Knowles, J. Flint, B. Joseph, G. Colemen, C.

Campbell, C. Mitchell, J. Turella, T. Zink and J. Arong. Plaintiff first alleges that on February 3,

2004, he was assaulted by two other inmates in the “tank” at the Sacramento County Jail. 

Plaintiff alleges that he should not have been placed in the tank with these inmates because of

their classification. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Joseph, the transportation sergeant, should

have made sure that plaintiff was not placed in the same tank with these inmates. The court finds

that the complaint states a colorable claim against defendant Joseph.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Knowles is liable for this incident because, as the

Warden, he was responsible for plaintiff’s safety. The Civil Rights Act under which this action

was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

Case 2:05-cv-00675-FCD-GGH Document 5 Filed 04/22/05 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff is basing defendant Knowles’ liability on the theory of respondeat

superior. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant Knowles had any personal involvement in the

incident. Accordingly, this claim against defendant Knowles is dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Flint is liable for the incident because, as

defendant Joseph’s supervisor, he did not ensure that defendant Joseph segregated plaintiff from

the other inmates. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant Flint was present at the time that

defendant Joseph failed to segregate plaintiff. Without additional information regarding

defendant Flint’s personal involvement in the incident, the court cannot determine whether

plaintiff has stated a colorable claim against him.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Flint failed to train defendant Joseph. To state

a “failure to train” claim, plaintiff must plead facts showing that, “in light of the duties assigned

to specific officers or employees, the need for more or different training is obvious, and the

inadequacy so likely to result in violations of constitutional rights, that the policy-makers...can

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to that need.” City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989). Plaintiff had plead no facts suggesting that defendant

Flint acted with deliberate indifference in failing to train defendant Joseph. Accordingly, this

claim is dismissed.

Plaintiff next alleges that defendants Joseph and Colemen used excessive force. 

These allegations state a colorable claim for relief against these defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that following the assault by the two inmates, he was denied

adequate medical care. Plaintiff alleges that immediately following the incident defendant

Joseph summoned defendant Arong, a Medical Technical Assistant (MTA), who refused

plaintiff’s request to be seen by a doctor. Plaintiff then submitted numerous administrative

appeals requesting to be seen by a doctor. On June 16, 2004, defendant Zink, a nurse, performed

Case 2:05-cv-00675-FCD-GGH Document 5 Filed 04/22/05 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

a “medical triage” of plaintiff. She denied his request to be seen by a doctor. 

On July 2, 2004, defendant Turella, a doctor, examined plaintiff. During the

exam, plaintiff was handcuffed with his hands behind his back. Plaintiff requested that he be

placed in a holding cage for the exam so that the handcuffs, which were causing him pain, could

be removed. Defendant Turella denied this request and claimed to know nothing about the attack

by the other inmates. At the conclusion of the exam, defendant Turella prescribed muscle

relaxers and ordered x-rays. On July 7, 2004, plaintiff’s head, neck, back and shoulders were xrayed. He does not know the results.

On July 24, 2004, plaintiff filed an appeal requesting an exam by a doctor other

than defendant Turella. On July 28, 2004, defendant Mitchell interviewed plaintiff regarding this

appeal. Defendant Mitchell told plaintiff that he would be examined by Dr. Borges within the

next week. Dr. Borges did not examine plaintiff during the next week. On August 26, 2004,

defendant Mitchell told plaintiff that Dr. Borges would examine him the following week. 

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of defendants’ actions, he has suffered from

physical pain caused by the injuries he sustained following the attack by the two inmates in the

tank. Plaintiff alleges that he still suffers from pain to his back, shoulders, ankles, knees, wrists

and head. He alleges that he suffers from headaches, dizziness and has difficult walking or

moving about.

Plaintiff has stated colorable claims for inadequate medical care in violation of the

Eighth Amendment against defendants Joseph, Arong, Zink, Turella and Mitchell. Plaintiff also

alleges that defendants Knowles and Flint were responsible for the inadequate medical care

because they supervised the other defendants and were responsible for plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff

is basing their liability on the theory of respondeat superior. Accordingly, the inadequate medical

care claims against these defendants are dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Campbell is liable for plaintiff’s inadequate

medical care because he is defendant Arong’s supervisor. The inadequate medical care claim

Case 2:05-cv-00675-FCD-GGH Document 5 Filed 04/22/05 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

against defendant Campbell is dismissed because it is based on the theory of respondeat superior.

In conclusion, the complaint states a colorable Eighth Amendment claim against

defendant Joseph based on his failure to protect plaintiff from the two inmates who attacked him. 

The complaint states a colorable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendants

Joseph and Coleman. The complaint states a colorable Eighth Amendment inadequate medical

care claim against defendants Joseph, Arong, Zink, Turella and Mitchell. All other claims are

dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent

prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In

certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court

does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of

counsel will therefore be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted;

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $9.98. All fees shall be collected and paid in

Case 2:05-cv-00675-FCD-GGH Document 5 Filed 04/22/05 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections

filed concurrently herewith.

3. All claims but for the claims against discussed above against defendants

Joseph, Coleman, Joseph, Arong, Zink, Turella and Mitchell are dismissed for the reasons

discussed above, with leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days from the date of

service of this Order. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in a recommendation that

these defendants be dismissed from this action.

4. Upon filing an amended complaint or expiration of the time allowed therefor,

the court will make further orders for service of process upon some or all of the defendants.

5. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.

DATED: 4/22/05 

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

fue675.b1

Case 2:05-cv-00675-FCD-GGH Document 5 Filed 04/22/05 Page 7 of 7