Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00693/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00693-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

JOE RANGER PICKETT, 128 361, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-693-WKW 

 ) [WO] 

ROBERT BENTLEY, GOVERNOR, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Plaintiff, an 

indigent state inmate incarcerated at the J.O. Davis Correctional Facility in Atmore, 

Alabama. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or proceed on 

appeal in forma pauperis if he “has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or 

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that 

was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury.”1

 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

                                                            

1 In Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (1998), the Court determined that the “three strikes” provision of 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which requires frequent filer prisoner indigents to prepay the entire filing fee before 

federal courts may consider their cases and appeals, “does not violate the First Amendment right to access 

the courts; the separation of judicial and legislative powers; the Fifth Amendment right to due process of 

law; or the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, as incorporated through the Fifth 

Amendment.” In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007), the Supreme Court abrogated Rivera but only 

to the extent it compelled an inmate to plead exhaustion of remedies in his complaint as “failure to 

exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA . . . and inmates are not required to specifically plead or 

demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” 

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I. DISCUSSION 

 Court records establish that Plaintiff, while incarcerated or detained, has on at least 

three occasions had civil actions and/or appeals dismissed as frivolous, as malicious, for 

failure to state a claim and/or for asserting claims against defendants immune from suit 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The cases on which this court relies in finding a § 1915(g) 

violation are: (1) Pickett v. Gaither, et al., Case No. 2:98-CV-1343-ID (M.D. Ala. 1999) 

(appeal frivolous); (2) Pickett v. McAliley, et al., Case No. 2:98-CV-1330-WHA (M.D. 

Ala. 1999) (appeal frivolous); (3) Pickett v. Thompson, et al., Case No. 2:93-CV-642-ID 

(M. D. Ala. 1993); (4) Pickett v. Esdale, et al., Case No. 2:93-CV-294-ID (M. D. Ala. 

1993); and (5) Pickett v. Phelps, et al., Case No. 2:92-CV-1289-TMH (M.D. Ala. 1992). 

This court, therefore, concludes that the summary dismissals place Plaintiff in violation 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

In the instant civil action, Plaintiff complains that Defendants conspired to house 

him in an overcrowded and hazardous environment causing him to contract latent 

tuberculosis. Neither the challenge to actions of state officials nor the general and 

conclusory allegations regarding his exposure to the tuberculosis virus in the prison 

setting adequately demonstrates Plaintiff was “under imminent danger of serious physical 

injury” when he filed this cause of action as required to meet the exception preventing 

application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 1999). 

 “General allegations that are not grounded in specific facts which indicate that 

serious physical injury is imminent are not sufficient to invoke the exception to § 

1915(g).” Niebla v. Walton Corr. Inst., 2006 WL 2051307, *2 (N.D. Fla. July 20, 2006) 

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(citing Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). “The plaintiff must allege 

and provide specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or a pattern of 

misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury, and vague 

allegations of harm and unspecific references to injury are insufficient.” Id. (citing 

Martin, supra, and White v. State of Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998) 

(internal quotations omitted). The “imminent danger” exception is available “for genuine 

emergencies,” “where time is pressing” and “a threat . . . is real and proximate.” Lewis v. 

Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002). 

 The court has carefully reviewed the claims in the instant action. Even construing 

all allegations in favor of Plaintiff, his claims do not entitle him to avoid the bar of § 

1915(g) because they do not allege nor indicate that he was “under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury” when he filed this cause of action as required to meet the 

imminent danger exception to the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Medberry, 185 

F.3d 1189. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (“By using 

the term ‘imminent,’ Congress indicated that it wanted to include a safety valve for the 

‘three strikes’ rule to prevent impending harms, not those harms that had already 

occurred.”). 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes this case is due to be summarily 

dismissed without prejudice as Plaintiff failed to pay the requisite filing and 

administrative fees upon his initiation of this case. Dupree, 284 F.3d at 1236 (emphasis 

in original) (“[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint 

without prejudice when [an inmate is not entitled] to proceed in forma pauperis [due] to 

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[violation of] the provisions of § 1915(g)” because the prisoner “must pay the filing fee at 

the time he initiates the suit.”); Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 

2001) (same). 

II. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) be 

DENIED; and 

2. This case be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the 

filing and administrative fees upon his initiation of this case. 

 It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before October 8, 2015. A party must specifically identify the 

factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is 

made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file 

written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance 

with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the 

Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district 

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by 

the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. 

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning 

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 

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F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The parties are advised that this Recommendation 

is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Done this 24th day of September, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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