Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01436/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01436-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LE VAN HUNG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LIBBY SCHAAF, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01436-CRB

ORDER GRANTING 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs are individuals who are currently experiencing homelessness and reside in 

an encampment in Union Point Park in Oakland, California (“the park”). Motion (dkt. 17) 

at 1. Defendants are the City of Oakland, the Oakland Department of Public Works, 

Oakland Major Libby Schaaf, and Oakland’s Assistant to City Administrator, Joe DeVries

(collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs oppose the City’s plan to “clean and clear” the 

park—that is, remove the homeless encampment. See Compl. (dkt. 1); accord Opp. at 1.

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, see Motion.

Defendants have filed an opposition, Opp. (dkt. 31), and Plaintiffs have, with the 

assistance of counsel, see Notices of Appearance (dkts. 29-30), filed a Reply, see Reply 

(dkt. 36).

The Court holds as follows. The parties are hereby referred to Magistrate Judge Ryu 

on the issues of (1) the City’s voicemail policies and practices regarding the phone number 

listed in the Vacate Notices and (2) the City’s policies regarding shelter “availability”. The 

Court is hopeful that the parties can reach agreement on these issues. The Court further 

orders that, after the parties have reached resolution on the two above-listed issues, the 

City may clean and clear the park, provided that it fully complies with its stated policies,

Case 3:19-cv-01436-CRB Document 46 Filed 04/23/19 Page 1 of 13
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set out in Exhibits A and B to the Dunlap Declaration (dkt. 31-2), including but not limited 

to providing a new Notice to Vacate at least 72 hours in advance, offering shelter beds 

residents to be evicted, providing notice and storage of any property collected in the clean 

and clear, and otherwise adhering to the City’s policies as well as all representations made 

in its filings and at the April 19, 2019 hearing on this Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are four individuals who have lived at an encampment in Union Point 

Park’s Eastern/Southern parking lot for varying numbers of months. Compl. at 4. Union 

Point Park is located at 2311 Embarcadero in Oakland, California. Opp. at 10. It opened in 

2005 and is operated by the City of Oakland. Id. Situated along the waterfront, the park 

features a playground, sculpture, grass lawns, two parking lots, benches, restrooms, and 

barbeque facilities. Id. A number of small businesses and a middle school are located 

nearby. Id. at 10, 12.

Around 2012, homeless encampments began to appear in Union Point Park. Id. at 

11. Neither party appears to know precisely how many individuals currently reside at 

Union Point Park. See Opp. at 14 (“Currently, the number of people at Union Point Park is 

unknown. Two small makeshift structures, debris and approximately 15 RVS remain in 

this lot.”); Reply at 9 (“According to the City’s count, well more than eight people resided 

in Union Point Park as of March 31, 2019, including residents in 15 RVs in the 

Southern/Eastern Lot.”).

After several attempts to “clean and clear” Union Point Park in 2018, Defendants 

determined that the conditions remained hazardous to both park users and encampment 

residents, and decided to notice and enforce an encampment closure. Opp. at 14; DeVries 

Dec’l ¶ 29 (dkt. 31-1); Dunlap Dec’l Exh. H. On March 15, 2019, Defendants posted a 

notice to vacate the property (“Vacate Notice”) at the Eastern/Southern parking lot where 

Plaintiffs reside. Dunlap Dec’l Exh. H. The Vacate Notice states that the site has been 

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deemed uninhabitable and directs all persons to “vacate this site and remove any personal 

belongings.” Dunlap Dec’l Exh. C. It states that on the specified time and date, Public 

Works crews will remove and store any property left at the site. Id. It emphasizes that 

“property that is unsafe or hazardous to store will be immediately discarded.” Id. It also

lists a phone number to call with questions or concerns. Id.

Oakland has in place policies governing the closure of homeless encampments. Two 

of these policies are the Encampment Management Policy, Dunlap Dec’l Exh. A, and the 

Standard Operating Procedure. Id. Exh. B. The former discusses at a high level of 

generality the City’s goals and strategies for addressing homelessness, id. Exh. A; the latter 

establishes the concrete steps the City says that it takes in “remov[ing] homeless

encampments from the public right-of-way and on City owned property.” Id. Exh. B at 1. 

The policies provide that when the City decides to clear a homeless encampment, it first 

posts a Vacate Notice at least 72 hours in advance of that action. Dunlap Dec’l ¶¶ 10-12; 

id. Exh. B at 3. The Standard Operating Procedure then sets out the following procedures:

5. The [Public Works Agency] PWA shall return to the 

site on the specified date to remove any belongings left at the 

encampment site, and request the assistance of the Oakland 

Police Department (OPD) if necessary.

6. City personnel shall not prevent occupants from 

retrieving their belongings before vacating the encampment site.

7. City personnel shall not confiscate or remove 

belongings from site when the occupant is present, absent 

reasonable belief that the belongings are an immediate threat to 

public health and safety or are evidence of crime or contraband.

8. PWA staff shall take photographs of the encampment 

site prior to the cleanup. 

9. PWA staff shall immediately dispose of belongings 

that are considered to be clearly trash or are unsafe for storage, 

such as food or food wrappers, soiled items, or used personal 

hygiene items . . . .

10.PWA staff will collect, bag, and label personal 

belongings left at the site. “Notice of Collected Property” will 

be posted where the original “Notice to Vacate” was previously 

posted, and will contain the PWA Call Center telephone number

. . . .

11. PWA shall itemize the belongings collected and 

include the location, date, and time of collection on the 

itemization form.

12. The collected belongings will be stored at PWA 

facility for at least ninety (90) days.

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Dunlap Dec’l Exh. B at 2-3. The City also states that it offers shelter beds and resources to 

individuals in encampments prior to the closure. DeVries Dec’l ¶ 29.

Plaintiffs contend that the City does not comply with these policies. Reply at 7-10. 

They state that the voicemail belonging to the number provided on the Property Notice is 

“frequently full,” and thus they are unable to leave a message to ask about the City’s plans. 

Reply at 9. Plaintiffs also state that they were never contacted by City outreach workers or 

offered shelter beds. Reply at 7; Veta Dec’l ¶ 9 (dkt. 39); Burns Dec’l ¶ 5 (dkt. 43); 

Huffman Dec’l ¶ 6 (dkt. 41). 

Plaintiffs also claim that, despite the City’s policies to the contrary, the City has a 

“pattern and practice” of “on-site property destruction.” Reply at 8; Miralle Dec’l ¶ 14

(dkt. 40); Johns Dec’l Exh. C (dkt. 37) (Ewing Dec’l). In declarations, Plaintiffs and other 

homeless Oakland residents report that “Oakland police and Department of Public Works 

often dispose[] of all property present, using machinery and a trash compactor.” Reply at 

10; Veta Dec’l ¶ 5; Burns Dec’l ¶ 3; Miralle Dec’l ¶ 14. They thus contend that, based on 

the City’s past practices, the City will fail to follow its policies and destroy their property 

in the clean and clear the park at issue here. Plaintiffs also contend that the City does not 

follow its practices after clearing an encampment, because the City “does not post the 

Notice of Collected Property at the site of the cleared encampment.” Reply at 9; Veta 

Dec’l ¶ 6. 

On March 15, 2019, the City of Oakland’s Public Works Department informed 

Plaintiffs, through a posted notice, that on March 20, 2019, it would close the encampment

and remove and store property left at the site at the time of cleanup. Dunlap Dec’l. Exh. J.

B. Procedural Background

On March 19, 2019—one day before the City’s proposed closure of the park, 

Plaintiffs filed the instant case and both a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and 

the instant Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Compl. at 3. Plaintiffs claim that the 

contemplated closure would violate their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See

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Reply at 2. On March 19, 2019, the Court granted a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) 

enjoining Defendants from carrying out the closure until April 2, 2019. TRO Order (dkt. 

18).

Defendants initially began the planned clean and clear on March 19. Opp. at 14. 

They allege that the crews were unaware of the TRO. Id. When Defendants learned of the 

Court’s order, they ceased all work on the closure. Id. at 14-15. No individuals were 

arrested or cited and no property was taken for storage or discarded during the aborted 

operation. Id. at 15.

The Court held a hearing on the instant Motion on April 19, 2019. At that hearing, 

the parties informed the Court that, although the TRO had expired on April 9, 2019—ten 

days prior to the hearing—Defendants had agreed to follow the terms of the TRO until this 

Court had issued its decision on the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. See Minute Entry 

(dkt. 44).

II. DISCUSSION

A preliminary injunction should issue where the plaintiff establishes that “he is 

likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). The 

Ninth Circuit has adopted a “sliding scale approach” such that “serious questions going to 

the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support 

issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a 

likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance 

for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The “[l]ikelihood of 

success on the merits ‘is the most important’ Winter factor; if a movant fails to meet this 

‘threshold inquiry,’ the court need not consider the other factors.” Disney Enterprises, Inc. 

v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, “a preliminary injunction 

is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is 

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less complete than in a trial on the merits.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 

395 (1981).

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiffs rely primarily on two recent Ninth Circuit cases, Lavan v. City of Los 

Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th.Cir. 2012), and Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th 

Cir. 2018), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 2019 WL 1434046 (Apr. 1, 2019). 

In Lavan, the Ninth Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 

“protect[s] homeless persons from government seizure and summary destruction of their 

unabandoned, but momentarily unattended, personal property.” 693 F.3d at 1024. Martin

held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, 

sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain 

shelter.” 902 F.3d at 1048.

Building on these cases, Plaintiffs argue that the proposed clean and clear would: 

(1) violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the City does not provide adequate notice 

and has a practice of destroying property on site and (2) would violate the Eighth 

Amendment because it carries a risk that they will be arrested in violation of Lavan. Reply 

at 5-13. 

The Court addresses these claims individually.

1. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishments 

“circumscribes the criminal process in three ways.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 

(1977). “First, it limits the type of punishment the government may impose; second, it 

proscribes punishment “grossly disproportionate” to the severity of the crime; and third, it 

places substantive limits on what the government may criminalize.” Martin, 902 F.3d at 

1046. Applying this standard to a Boise city ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to use 

“any of the streets, sidewalks, parks, or public places as a camping place at any time,” the 

Ninth Circuit reached the “narrow” holding that “so long as there is a greater number of 

homeless individuals in [a jurisdiction] than the number of available beds [in shelters],” the 

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jurisdiction cannot prosecute homeless individuals for ‘involuntarily sitting, lying, and 

sleeping in public.’ That is, as long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the 

government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for sleeping outdoors, on public 

property, on the false premise they had a choice in the matter.” Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048 

(quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 

F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original)). However, the Ninth Circuit also 

cautioned that Martin “in no way dictate[d] to the City that it must provide sufficient 

shelter for the homeless, or allow anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the streets . . . 

at any time and at any place.” Id. (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138 (second alteration in 

original)).

Plaintiffs argue that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their Eighth 

Amendment claim under Martin because (1) Oakland has insufficient beds for its residents 

that are currently experiencing homelessness and (2) “[t]he currently contemplated closure 

threatens plaintiffs with prosecution for their involuntary act of residing in public.” Reply 

at 5-6. 

Assuming favorably for Plaintiffs that they are correct about the availability of 

Oakland’s shelter beds, they are still unlikely to succeed on the merits of this claim. And 

that is so for the simple reason that a clean and clear of the park does not require the arrest 

of Plaintiffs—or, indeed of any homeless person residing at the park. As Judge Gilliam 

explained in a case in which plaintiffs experiencing homelessness in Oakland sought to 

enjoin a clean and clear of a different homeless encampment in Oakland: 

Plaintiffs are not faced with punishment for acts inherent to their 

unhoused status that they cannot control . . . . Plaintiffs’ theory 

would therefore require the Court to extend the right described 

in Martin well beyond the parameters set by the Ninth Circuit. 

Martin does not establish a constitutional right to occupy public 

property indefinitely at Plaintiffs’ option.

Miralle v. City of Oakland, 2018 WL 6199929, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018); see also

Sullivan v. City of Berkeley, 2017 WL 4922614, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2017) (holding 

that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that being moved from 

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BART property would violate the Eighth Amendment because BART was entitled to 

enforce trespass laws on its property).

The Court is fully persuaded by the reasoning of Miralle and Sullivan: while Martin

limits localities’ ability to arrest their homeless residents for the act of living in the streets 

when there is nowhere else for them to go, it does create a right for homeless residents to 

occupy indefinitely any public space of their choosing. See Miralle, 2018 WL 6199929, at 

*2; Sullivan, 2017 WL 4922614, at *4. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have 

not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their Eighth Amendment claim. See

Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1133.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process 

Plaintiffs’ other argument arises under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Procedural 

Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit has held that a person experiencing homelessness 

does not abandon her property by leaving it on the sidewalk, and thus that property is 

protected by the Due Process Clause. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1031. So, “[b]ecause homeless 

persons’ unabandoned possessions are ‘property’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, the City must comport with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

due process clause if it wishes to take and destroy them.” Id. at 1032. Lavan held that Los 

Angeles’ policy of seizing and destroying property created a likelihood of success on the 

merits because the “City’s practice of on-the-spot destruction of seized property presents 

an enormous risk of erroneous deprivation, which could likely be mitigated by certain 

safeguards such as adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 1032-

33 (internal citation and alteration omitted).

In Miralle, the plaintiffs argued that Oakland had a “‘pattern and practice of 

unlawfully seizing and destroying property during the process of clearing homeless 

encampments.” 2018 WL 6199929, at *3. Judge Gilliam was unpersuaded, because 

Oakland’s “Standard Operating Procedure provides adequate notice and opportunity for 

Plaintiffs to be heard before property is seized.” Id. While Judge Gilliam recognized that 

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the some plaintiffs reported that the City had destroyed their property in violation of that 

policy, he concluded that “given the City’s representation that it will follow its stated 

procedures, and the notice already provided by the City,” as well as the City’s 

representation to the court “that it will follow its stated procedures,” plaintiffs were not 

likely to succeed on the merits of their Due Process claim. Id. However, he noted that the 

practices that the plaintiffs alleged, “if carried out at [the encampment at issue], would 

raise serious questions with respect to Plaintiffs’ still-pending Fourteenth Amendment 

claims.” Id. He thus ordered that “[s]hould the City choose to renew its efforts to remove 

Plaintiffs from the [] site, it must provide a new notice to vacate and otherwise comply 

with all of its Policies and Procedures, including by providing the new notice at least 72 

hours in advance, offering shelter beds to each of the 13 [site’s] residents evicted, 

providing notice and storage of collected property, and otherwise adhering to all 

representations made in its filings and at the [preliminary injunction] hearing.” Miralle, 

2018 WL 6199929, at *4.

Plaintiffs now contend that the City did, in fact, seize and destroy property at that 

encampment in violation of both the City’s Standard Operating Procedure and the 

representations that the City made before Judge Gilliam. Reply at 8-10. They thus urge that 

the same result is likely here. Id.

Plaintiffs also argue that the notice the City has provided was inadequate. Reply at 

8-9. The City posted only one Vacate Notice, on March 15, 2019. Dunlap Dec’l Exh. C. 

The notice lists a phone number for anyone who has “any questions and/or concerns.” Id.

Plaintiffs argue that the phone number listed on the Notice to Vacate “leads to a voicemail 

that is frequently full,” and the Notice provides no other method to access information 

about how to retrieve collected property. Reply at 8-9. They also allege that the City does 

not follow its policy of putting up a Notice of Collected Property after cleaning and 

clearing an encampment to alert former residents how to retrieve their belongings. Reply at 

9; Veta Dec’l ¶ 6. Instead, they argue, the City’s practice is to “dispose[] of all property 

present, using machinery and a trash compactor.” Reply at 10; Veta Dec’l ¶ 5; Burns Dec’l 

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¶ 3; Miralle Dec’l ¶ 14.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that, as Judge Gilliam put it, if the City does 

behave as Plaintiffs allege, rather than complying with its policies, that behavior “would 

raise serious questions with respect to Plaintiffs’ still-pending Fourteenth Amendment 

claims.” Miralle, 2018 WL 6199929, at *3. The Court thus concludes that Plaintiffs have 

shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their due process claim if the City cleans

and clears the encampment at the park without complying with its existing policies. See

Dunlap Dec’l Exh. A, B; see also Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1032 (“Because homeless persons’

unabandoned possessions are ‘property’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, the City must comport with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's 

due process clause if it wishes to take and destroy them.”).

1

Plaintiffs also urge, however, that the policies, even if complied with, are not 

constitutionally adequate because the only notice posted is the one-page Vacate Notice, 

which does not provide a meaningful notice opportunity because the voicemail the phone 

number leads to is frequently full. Reply at 9. The City’s stated policy does not explain 

whether or how often the voicemail is checked or emptied, or whether the phone line the 

Vacate Notice connects to is operated by a City employee, or during what hours it is 

operated. See Dunlap Dec’l Exh. A, B. The parties dispute what the phone line policy is 

and whether it is adequate. See Reply at 9; Opp at 21-22.

The parties also dispute whether there is adequate shelter space available to park 

residents. See Reply at 5; Opp. at 19. They appear to dispute both the number of available 

 

1

 In their Reply, for the first time, Plaintiffs argue for the first time that the clean and clear

would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause, in addition to 

the Procedural Due Process Clause, because the City would be “deliberately indifferent” to 

the dangers it would create to Plaintiffs by forcing them from the relative safety of the 

encampment. Reply at 11-13; cf. Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1102 

(E.D. Cal. 2012). The Court takes no view of the merits of this argument, and need not, 

because the Court follows “‘[t]he general rule . . . that [parties] cannot raise a new issue for 

the first time in their reply briefs.” State of Nev. v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1560 (9th Cir. 

1990) (United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1986) (first and second 

alterations in original)); see also U.S. ex rel. Giles v. Sardie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1127 

(C.D. Cal. 2000) (“It is improper for a moving party to introduce new facts or different 

legal arguments in the reply brief than those presented in the moving papers.”).

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beds in the shelters and what it means for a shelter to be “available”—Plaintiffs contend 

that Oakland’s shelter policy means that the shelter space is functionally unavailable 

because it would mean Plaintiffs would have to abandon the majority of their belongings 

and even their pets to access only a short-term shelter stay. See Reply at 5 n.6.

As the Court discussed with the parties at the hearing on April 19, 2019, the Court 

directs the parties to seek the assistance of Judge Ryu as to (1) the Vacate Notice policies 

and (2) shelter availability policies. The Court is hopeful the parties can reach resolution 

on these issues.

B. Irreparable Harm

Having cleared the “most important” preliminary injunction factor, see Disney 

Enterprises, Inc., 869 F.3d at 856, Plaintiffs easily satisfy the next factor: irreparable harm. 

See Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1144. Even if the loss of a home and one’s property were not 

an irreparable harm—and the City does not appear to contest that it would be, see Opp. at 

25-26—the Ninth Circuit has held that “an alleged constitutional infringement will often 

alone constitute irreparable harm.” Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 715 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (quoting Associated General Contractors v. Coalition For Economic Equity, 950 

F.2d, 1401, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991)). If the City is allowed to clear the encampment in 

noncompliance with its policies, see Dunlap Dec’l Exhs. A, B, and destroy Plaintiffs’ 

property, as Plaintiffs allege, Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm. 

C. Balance of Equities

Plaintiffs argue that the balance of the equities tip in their favor because, while they 

recognize that the City has an interest in “preserving the park, protecting children walking 

to school, preventing crime, and catering to local businesses,” it has not “demonstrate[d] 

that the removal of this homeless encampment meets these interests,” or that “children feel 

unsafe, let alone are unsafe, walking to school.” Reply at 13-14. The Court is mindful of 

the City’s interests in ensuring that all residents have full and safe use of the park and 

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surrounding area. However, the balance of the equities tips of favor of Plaintiffs: they risk 

losing not only their homes and sources of safety, but their community and their 

possessions if the City cleans and clears the park without complying with its policies. 

D. Public Interest 

As to the final Winter factor, the City urges that it “must not be prevented from 

exercising its municipal authority to close the encampment, clean and clear the lot, abate 

hazardous conditions, and restore health and safety to the community.” Opp. at 26-27. But 

nothing about the preliminary injunction order Plaintiffs seek prevents the City from 

cleaning and clearing the area or “abat[ing] hazardous conditions,” id. The City does not 

contend that clearing the park is the only manner in which it can seek to address the health 

and safety of the community. See Opp. at 26-27. Moreover, of course, the residents of the 

park are members of the community, and their interests, too, must be included in assessing 

the public interest. Nor does the Court’s order prevent the City from cleaning the park in 

compliance with its policies, see Dunlap Dec’l Exh. A, B, once the parties have reached 

resolution on the two subsidiary issues of the City’s phone policies and shelter availability 

with Judge Ryu. The Court thus finds that the public interest weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have met their 

burden to show that a preliminary injunction should issue to enjoin the City from clearing 

the park in a manner that violates its stated policies. The Court thus orders as follows:

The parties are referred to Judge Ryu on the issues of (1) the City’s voicemail 

policies and practices regarding the phone number listed in the Vacate Notices and (2) the 

City’s policies regarding shelter “availability”. The Court is hopeful that the parties can 

reach agreement on these issues. 

The Court further orders that, after the parties have reached resolution on the two 

above-listed issues, the City may clean and clear the park, provided that it fully complies 

Case 3:19-cv-01436-CRB Document 46 Filed 04/23/19 Page 12 of 13
Case 3:19-cv-01436-CRB Document 46 Filed 04/23/19 Page 13 of 13