Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02763/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02763-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stephen Frank Karban, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 14-02763 PHX SRB (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

 Stephen Frank Karban (“Karban” or “Petitioner”) filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) in December, 2014, challenging 

his convictions in the Maricopa County Superior Court on eleven counts of sexual 

offenses against three victims, each of whom was his adopted daughter. (Doc. 33 at 2) 

The convictions resulted from a 30-day jury trial in which Petitioner represented himself 

with advisory counsel. Petitioner raises 29 grounds for relief in the Petition. Respondents 

filed a 183-page Answer, exclusive of exhibits (Doc. 33), and Petitioner filed a Reply 

(Doc. 36). On September 8, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion to supplement the record. 

(Doc. 44) As explained below, the Court recommends that the motion to supplement be 

denied and the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND1

 Between 1998 and 2002, Petitioner and his wife2

 adopted nine children, six girls 

 

1

 “DR” refers to the “digital record,” which is contained on a CD within Doc. 33-1, 

Ex.A. The digital record applies to the superior court record, including both Petitioner’s trial and his post-conviction relief proceedings. (Doc. 33 at 3) 

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and three boys. (DR 423 at 32-35, 41-47; DR 433 at 111-112, 115, 122, 125) Prior to 

coming to the Petitioners’ home, many of the children had been subjected to physical 

and/or sexual abuse. (DR 423 at 41-43; DR 431 at 119-120; DR 432 at 37-40; DR 433 at 

117-118, 122, 130-134) The Karbans resided in Michigan and Wisconsin, but Petitioner’s 

actions leading to his convictions at issue here occurred while they were visiting family 

in Phoenix, Arizona at the end of 2002. (DR 432 at 97-98; DR 418 at 122) During that 

visit, Petitioner was accused of sexually molesting three of his adopted daughters in a 

camper in which part of the family was sleeping. (Doc. 33 at 9-11) The daughters 

involved in the Arizona molestation charges were “Brenda”3

 (then age 10), “Helen” (then 

age 11), and “Ellen” (then age 16). (Doc. 33-2 at 105) 

 In July 2005, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court on 

one count of molestation of a child under 15 (Count 1), five counts of sexual conduct 

with a minor under 15 (Counts 2-6), four counts of sexual conduct with a minor 15 years 

of age or older (Counts 7-10), and one count of sexual abuse (Count 11). (DR 1 at 1) 

Petitioner represented himself (with advisory counsel) at his 30-day trial, which occurred 

between April 16 and June 11, 2008. (DR 405, 437) The jury convicted Petitioner on all 

counts (DR 403 at 10-12), and he was sentenced to 138.5 years of imprisonment. (DR 

402 at 27-31) 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner was represented by counsel and asserted the following 

claims: 

(1) The trial court abused its discretion when it allowed evidence of other 

acts, specifically pornographic computer images, to be introduced when the 

acts were not admitted for a proper purpose but rather to show appellant’s 

deviant sexual proclivities; the admission violated Appellant’s rights to due 

process under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and Article 2, sections 4 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution. 

 

2

 Petitioner and his wife were divorced at some point after the events at issue here. 

3

 The names used for the victims in Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 33) are pseudonyms instead of the victim’s actual first names. (Doc. 33 at 2 fn. 1). However, 

Petitioner refers to the victims by their actual names. In this Report and Recommendation, the Court uses the pseudonyms. By separate sealed Order, the Court correlates the 

pseudonyms to the real names used by Petitioner. 

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(2) Preclusion of 404(b) evidence – Jasmine’s viewing of pornographic 

material – constituted an abuse of discretion and deprived Appellant’s 

rights to due process under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United 

States Constitution and Article 2, sections 4 and 24 of the Arizona 

Constitution. 

(3) Appellant was entitled to present evidence of “good character” to rebut 

the State’s allegations against him and establish evidence of “sexual 

normalcy”; [not allowing such] constituted fundamental error. 

(4) The trial court abused its discretion when it disallowed evidence of 

Appellant’s prior Michigan acquittal in violation of Appellant’s right to due 

process under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and Article 2, sections 4 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution. 

(Doc. 33-2 at 115, 119, 121, 125) 

 After his appellate brief was filed by his counsel, Petitioner submitted a pro se 

motion to supplement the brief (Doc. 33-2 at 132-134), which the court of appeals 

denied. (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 33-2 at 132-243, 136) In July 2010, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 33-3 at 84-87) Petitioner 

filed a pro se petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court (Id. at 89-101), which 

was denied (Id. at 117). 

 Petitioner then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) raising 

twelve grounds for relief. (DR 508) These grounds, along with sub-issues addressed 

under some of those grounds, correspond with Grounds 4 through 29 of the Petition in 

this habeas case. The trial court denied the PCR petition on all grounds. (DR 525) The 

trial court found all issues but those corresponding to Petition Grounds 4 through 6 and 

14 to be precluded under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The 

trial court addressed the issues corresponding to Petition Grounds 4 through 6 and 14 on 

the merits and denied relief. (Id.) The court also considered Petitioner’s claims 

corresponding to Petition Grounds 7 through 29 on the basis of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel, stating that, “It is clear from Petitioner’s Exhibit 8 that counsel could 

not raise the claims requested for lack of merit, either legal merit or that Defendant had 

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not properly preserved the issue during trial.” (Id.) The trial court concluded that 

“Defendant fails to establish a colorable claim for relief that is cognizable under Rule 

32.1 and not precluded under Rule 32.2.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner appealed the denial of his PCR petition. (Doc. 33-6 at 11-35) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief. (Id. at 87-88) The court of appeals denied 

Petition Ground 4 as meritless. (Doc. 33-6 at 87) The court considered the merits of 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims corresponding with Petition Grounds 

6 through 29 and ruled that “[Petitioner] has failed to present a colorable claim that his 

appellate counsel was ineffective when she considered and declined to raise issues 

[Petitioner] sought to raise on appeal and she instead chose to raise issues she believed 

had more merit.” (Id. at 88) The court of appeals found Petition Ground 27 precluded 

because it could have been raised on direct appeal. (Id.) Because Petitioner had attempted 

to assert other issues and arguments by mere reference to his PCR petition, the court of 

appeals found those issues precluded from review: 

A petition for review may not incorporate by reference any issue or 

argument. State v. Bortz, 169 Ariz. 575, 577, 821 P.2d 236, 238 (app. 

1991; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.5, 32.9(c)...A petitioner must “strictly comply” 

with Rule 32 in order to be entitled to relief. 

(Id. at 87) These precluded issues correspond with Petition Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29. 

II. PETITIONER’S HABEAS CLAIMS 

A. The Petition 

The Petition before this Court was timely filed, raising the following grounds: 

 (1) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated 

when the trial court admitted prejudicial, pornographic images into evidence. 

 (2) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process and 

confrontation clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from 

introducing evidence of one victim’s sexual behavior and alcohol use. 

 (3) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process and 

confrontation clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited Petitioner from 

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introducing evidence that Petitioner was acquitted in a Michigan case involving the same 

victims. 

 (4) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process, compulsory 

process and fair trial rights were violated when government witness [Petitioner’s wife] 

threatened defense witness Frank Karban not to appear at trial to offer testimony on 

behalf of Petitioner. 

 (5) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process and 

compulsory process rights were violated when the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary 

hearing to determine if the newly discovered evidence disclosed by Frank Karban would 

have required a new trial. 

 (6) Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, 

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 

 (7) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated 

when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose an audio recording 

essential for him to undermine the theory of flight being alleged by the state. 

 (8) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated 

when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose the existence of video 

recorded colposcopy examinations of the victims. 

 (9) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated 

when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose a surprise trial exhibit 

used during re-direct examination of victim Ellen. 

 (10) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were 

violated when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose a rebuttal 

witness in a timely manner, where the prosecutor had known in advance that the prior 

disclosed rebuttal witness was unavailable for trial. 

 (11) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were 

violated when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting prejudicial testimony 

from defense witness, Sue Asplund, regarding Petitioner’s criminal history. 

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 (12) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were 

violated when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by referencing the victims’ religious 

beliefs to bolster their credibility and attack Petitioner’s credibility. 

 (13) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were 

violated when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making improper and prejudicial 

comments in her closing statement. 

 (14) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process 

and self-representation were violated when the trial court precluded Petitioner, who was 

proceeding pro se, from attending an off-record hearing held in chambers. 

 (15) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, 

equal protection, and self-representation were violated when he was forced to remain 

behind his table while the prosecutor was free to approach witnesses. 

 (16) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process, equal 

protection, and self-representation rights were violated when he was required to wear a 

leg brace and a stun belt while presenting his case to the jury. 

 (17) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process and 

confrontation clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from 

eliciting testimony that the police failed to conduct a proper investigation. 

 (18) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process and 

confrontation clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from 

eliciting evidence regarding the victim’s criminal history. 

 (19) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process and 

confrontation clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from 

conducting a re-cross examination of victim Ellen during the trial. 

 (20) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process and 

confrontation clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from 

impeaching government witness Horner with a prior inconsistent statement. 

 (21) The trial court prohibited Petitioner from impeaching the victims with their 

prior inconsistent statements. 

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 (22) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were 

violated when he was convicted of crimes unsubstantiated by any testimony or other 

evidence. 

(23) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were 

violated when the trial court allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence of his flight in 

an unrelated case. 

 (24) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were 

violated when the trial court prohibited him from introducing evidence to refute evidence 

introduced by the state to support their allegation of “flight.” 

(25) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were 

violated when the trial court gave a jury instruction on “flight” without sufficient 

evidence of his flight. 

 (26) Petitioner’s trial was held before an unfair and biased judge in violation of his 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 

 (27) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process and double 

jeopardy rights were violated because his indictment was insufficient. 

 (28) Petitioner’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process and speedy trial rights 

were violated when his trial was delayed for 2.5 years due to delays initiated by the 

prosecution. 

 (29) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to 

fundamental fairness were violated based on cumulative error. 

B. Summary of Standards and Analysis 

 Grounds 1 and 2 were raised on direct appeal but were not federalized. To 

overcome this procedural default, Petitioner must show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence, which he has not done. Petitioner has not shown that his appellate counsel was 

ineffective under Strickland for not federalizing these claims. Further, Petitioner’s 

assertion that he directed his appellate counsel to federalize these claims is belied by his 

motion to supplement brief, which contained no reference at all to supplementing by 

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federalizing claims. Petitioner’s assertion is further belied by his pro se petition for 

review to the Arizona Supreme Court, in which he failed to federalize these claims. 

Ground 3 was raised on direct appeal and arguably was not federalized, but fails in 

any event because Petitioner has not demonstrated that the trial court’s preclusion of 

Petitioner’s previous acquittal in Michigan was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law. 

Ground 4 was not raised on appeal, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the 

trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief stating: 

Karban argues a subpoenaed defense witness failed to appear at trial 

because one of the State’s witnesses intimidated the defense witness. 

Karban contends the State’s witness became an agent of the State when she 

cooperated with and testified for the State. We deny relief. A witness does 

not become an agent of the state simply because the victim cooperates with 

the State. Karban offers no evidence any agent of the State was involved in 

any alleged intimidation of the defense witness. 

(Doc. 33-6 at 87) (citations omitted) Petitioner has not shown that the adjudication of this 

claim was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established U.S. 

Supreme Court law. 

Ground 5 is procedurally barred because it was not fairly presented to the state 

court as a federal claim, and Petitioner has not argued cause and actual prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome that procedural bar. Nor does the Court find such grounds in the 

record. 

Ground 6 argues appellate ineffective assistance of counsel, which was raised in 

Petitioner’s PCR action. The Court finds this claim meritless. 

Grounds 7 through 26, 28, and 29 are presented in the Petition as grounds for 

relief independent of any ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to 

assert the claims on direct appeal. These grounds were not raised on direct appeal of 

Petitioner’s conviction. In his appeal of the trial court’s denial of the PCR petition, 

Petitioner raised these claims only as basis for appellate ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Due to Petitioner’s failure to exhaust claims in Grounds 7 through 26, 28, and 29 as 

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independent claims (as opposed to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims), 

these grounds as well as Ground 6 must be evaluated and decided under the Strickland v. 

Washington ineffective assistance of appellate counsel standard. The court of appeals 

discussed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims as a group and 

found they lacked merit under the Strickland standard. (Id. at 87-88) Petitioner has failed 

to show that the Arizona Court of Appeals decision is contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Respondents are correct that claims 7 through 26, 28, and 29 as independent 

claims for relief (as opposed to being a basis for ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel) are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted without excuse. (Doc. 33 at 2, 25 

n.13, 32, 63, 71, 76, 80-81, 84, 87, 90, 96, 104, 115, 118, 123, 126, 131, 136, 138, 146, 

151, 157, 168, 177) Thus, absent showing actual innocence, which Petitioner has failed to 

do (see Section II.A supra), ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising 

these issues is Petitioner’s only avenue for relief on these claims. To assess the 

reasonableness of appellate counsel’s decision to forego raising each of these issues on 

appeal, the merits of these issues were carefully considered by this Court in light of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ opinion denying relief. As explained generally with respect to 

Ground 6 and specifically with respect to the Court’s analysis of Grounds 7 through 26, 

28, and 29, Petitioner fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, 

and thus also fails to overcome his procedural default of these claims. 

As to Ground 27, Petitioner did not raise his claim of violation of his due process 

and double jeopardy rights on direct appeal, but did raise it as an independent ground for 

post-conviction relief. (DR 508 at 33-36) He also raised an associated ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel claim in his petition for review to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals in his PCR action. The court of appeals found relief was precluded on his due 

process and double jeopardy claim: 

[Petitioner] could have raised this claim on direct appeal. Any claim a 

defendant could have raised on direct appeal is precluded, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a). None of the exceptions under Rule 32.2(b) apply. 

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(Id. at 88) Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice for failure to raise this claim on 

appeal. As noted, the court of appeals ruled on all of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims together, correctly finding that none had raised a colorable claim. (Doc. 

33-6 at 88) This claim is procedurally defaulted without excuse. 

 Moreover, regarding all of the Petitioner’s twenty nine grounds, he has not 

specifically argued or presented actual innocence. See discussion in Section II(C)(1), 

infra. The Court has reviewed the lengthy record and filings in this case. Petitioner has 

not met the burden required for excusing a procedural default by demonstrating actual 

innocence. Petitioner does not overcome any procedural bar by actual innocence. 

C. Legal Framework 

1. Exhaustion of Remedies & Procedural Default 

 A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court remedies before this Court 

may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan 

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Arizona’s “established appellate 

review processes” consists of a direct appeal and a PCR proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

31, et. seq. and Rule 32, et. seq.; see also Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 

1994) (“To exhaust one’s state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the 

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.”). 

To be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and 

the specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The mere similarity between a claim of state and 

federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.”). Articulating the specific federal 

theory is often referred to as federalizing a claim. To federalize a claim, it is not enough 

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to simply cite the general federal constitutional provision and/or buzzwords 

unaccompanied by federal constitutional analysis. See Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 

1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Exhaustion demands more than a citation to a general 

constitutional provision, detached from any articulation of the underlying federal legal 

theory”); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 2005) (habeas petitioner 

did not give the state appellate court a fair opportunity to rule on a federal due process 

claim by concluding brief with “driveby” citation of federal constitutional provisions, 

“detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory”); Hiivala, 195 F.3d 

at 1106 (“[G]eneral appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal 

protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion.”); Galvan 

v. Alaska Dep’t Corr., 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To exhaust a federal 

constitutional claim in state court, a petitioner has to have, at the least, explicitly alerted 

the court that she was making a federal constitutional claim.”) (emphasis added). 

 A claim can also be subject to an express or implied procedural bar. Robinson v. 

Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express procedural bar exists if the state 

court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural bar “that is both ‘independent’ of 

the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s 

“Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of federal law because they do not 

depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 

U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist when a state strictly or regularly follows 

its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 

595 F.3d at 1100. 

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

 The miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default “is limited to those 

extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his [actual] innocence and establishes 

that the court cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.” Johnson v. 

Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). To pass through the 

actual innocence/Schlup gateway, a petitioner must establish his or her factual innocence 

of the crime and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 

(1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner “must 

show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in 

the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 327)). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir.2011); McQuiggin, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1927 (2013) (explaining the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in 

presenting new evidence”). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every 

case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. 

Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 

(1998). 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 Under clearly established federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Petitioner needs to show that his appellate counsel’s performance was both (a) 

objectively deficient and (b) caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984). This results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel’s performance. 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011). The Court has discretion to determine 

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which Strickland prong to apply first. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 

1998). A habeas court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must 

determine “whether there is a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s 

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th

Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, this Court’s 

“pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was 

unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 

 Petitioner received objectively deficient representation if his counsel “‘fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness’ such that it was outside ‘the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 

725 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To demonstrate prejudice, 

Petitioner “must show that there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

 The U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that none of its decisions suggest “that the 

indigent defendant has a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, 

decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). The 

Court further explained, “[e]xperienced advocates . . . have emphasized the importance of 

winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, 

or at most on a few key issues.” Id. at 751-52. See also Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 

1434 (9th Cir. 1989). 

3. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition – Legal Standard of Review 

 On habeas review, this Court can only grant relief if Petitioner demonstrates 

prejudice because the adjudication of a claim on the merits by a state court either “(1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

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clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

This is a “’highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings which demands 

that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 

U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 

(1997)).

 D. Analysis of Petitioner’s Habeas Claims 

Ground 1: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated by introduction of pornographic images 

 Petitioner raised Ground 1 on direct appeal (as issue 1), which the Arizona Court 

of Appeals denied on the merits. (Doc. 33-3 at 84-87) Because his appellate counsel 

argued the issue solely under state law, the claim was not exhausted. Petitioner has failed 

to overcome this procedural default by demonstrating cause and prejudice or by showing 

actual innocence. 

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his due process rights to a fair trial 

protected by the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution when it “admitted 

prejudicial, pornographic images of unknown adult females urinating.” (Doc. 1 at 12) 

Petitioner, acting pro se, had filed a motion in limine to preclude admission of the images, 

which were recovered from his personal laptop computer. (Id. at 13) 

The record includes testimony from victims Brenda and Ellen that Petitioner had them 

position themselves over him and urinate on his penis. (DR 423 at 93-95, DR 418 at 73-

75) One of the prosecution’s witnesses was a Wisconsin police detective, who testified he 

located images on Petitioner’s computer involving urination. (DR 416 at 101, 123-124) 

These images included various naked adult women urinating in a toilet or bowls and an 

adult man urinating on an adult woman. (DR 441 at 45-48; DR 438 at 14, 17-19, 22) 

Petitioner filed a motion in limine to preclude these images, and the trial court permitted 

extensive oral argument. (DR 441 at 42-54; DR 438 at 17-26) The court denied 

Petitioner’s motion, finding the images admissible pursuant to Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c). (DR 

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437 at 3-4) The court made specific findings as required by Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c). (Id.) 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel raised this issue, although arguing only a state law 

basis. (Doc. 33-2 at 115-120) The court of appeals conducted an assessment of this issue 

and concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion. (Doc. 33-3 at 84-85) 

Petitioner asserts he directed appellate counsel to provide a federal basis for this 

claim in his direct appeal and she failed to do so. (Doc. 1 at 15) After his appellate brief 

was filed, Petitioner submitted a pro se motion to supplement the brief, which the 

Arizona Court of Appeals denied. (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 33-2 at 132-134, 136) In Petitioner’s 

pro se motion to file a supplemental brief with the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner 

did not state any desire to federalize any claims. (Doc. 33-2 at 132-134) His request to 

supplement the brief was to add issues his appellate counsel had not included in the 

opening brief, but which he argued he had instructed her to raise. (Id. at 133) Nowhere in 

that motion or request did Petitioner advise the court he wished to provide a federal law 

basis for the claims his appellate counsel had already briefed to the court. Similarly, he 

did not advise the appellate court of the substance of the additional issues he desired to 

place before that court. (Id. at 133) Importantly, when Petitioner subsequently filed a pro 

se petition for review of the court of appeals’ decision on direct appeal with the Arizona 

Supreme Court, he did not attempt to establish an adequate federal basis for his Ground 1 

claim. (Doc. 33 at 42-45) Petitioner’s pro se filings in the court of appeals and state 

supreme court belie his claim that he instructed appellate counsel to federalize the claim 

in Ground 1.

 Ground 1 is subject to procedural default because it was not fairly presented as a 

federal claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

731 (1991). Petitioner may overcome this implied procedural bar by showing cause and 

prejudice, or actual innocence. Where there is a constitutional right to counsel, attorney 

error rising to the level of Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause, 

because “if the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the 

State.” Id. at 753–54 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). 

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 The basis for Petitioner’s claim was an issue arising out of a dispute over a state 

evidentiary ruling, and “[o]nly if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw 

from the evidence can its admission violate due process.” Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 

F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). “The habeas petitioner must show 

‘not merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions.’” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 

456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)) (emphasis in original). Petitioner failed to make such a 

showing. Thus, even if the claim had not been procedurally defaulted, it is not 

meritorious. After reviewing the record, this Court finds that the trial court’s ruling on the 

admission of the images under the Arizona Rules of Evidence was reasonable as was the 

appellate court’s affirmation of such. Even if the ruling was an error, it could not have 

infected Petitioner’s trial “with error of constitutional dimensions,” denying Petitioner’s 

right to due process. 

 Petition Ground 1 is unexhausted and procedurally barred. This bar is not excused 

by his appellate counsel’s failure to federalize his claim. Petitioner has not established 

that his appellate counsel’s failure to adequately provide a federal basis for the claim both 

fell below objectively reasonable standards and also prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687. Neither has he demonstrated that, but for his appellate counsel’s failure to 

federalize this claim, the result of his appeal would have been different. Moreover, the 

record does not support a finding that the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in his PCR action 

represented an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not due relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Ground 2: Petitioner argues that his federal due process and 

confrontation clause rights were violated when he was prohibited from introducing 

evidence of victim’s sexual behavior and alcohol use. 

 Petitioner raised Ground 2 on direct appeal (as issue 2), which the Arizona Court 

of Appeals denied on the merits. (Doc. 33-3 at 84-87) Because his appellate counsel 

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argued the issue solely under state law, the claim was not exhausted. Petitioner has failed 

to overcome this procedural default by demonstrating cause and prejudice or by showing 

actual innocence. 

 In Ground 2, Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s granting of the state’s motion 

in limine to preclude evidence of Ellen’s/Jasmine’s sexual activity4 and use of alcohol 

violated his rights to due process and confrontation clause rights under the Fifth, Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. 1 at 16-19) 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner asserted the evidence was admissible to support an 

argument that Ellen had both the “ability and motive to fabricate the charges and to 

explain why or how she might have described urination as a deviant sexual proclivity, 

and that she had sources of information other than [Petitioner].” (Doc. 33-2 at 119) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals stated that it need not decide whether the trial court abused its 

discretion, because it found that Petitioner had not been prejudiced since evidence in each 

of the categories identified by Petitioner had in fact been introduced at trial despite the 

trial court’s ruling. (Doc. 33-3 at 85) The court of appeals noted evidence admitted at 

trial, including: (1) that Jasmine was sexually permissive and had been sexually active in 

the past (DR 423 at 42-46, DR 433 at 122); (2) that she had internet access on a computer 

(DR 422 at 107); (3) that she logged onto the internet with or without Petitioner’s 

password (DR 422 at 109); (4) that she had viewed internet pornography (DR 423 at 100-

101); (5) that she had viewed pornographic movies with a friend (DR 422 at 93); (6) that 

she had used sex gels, sometimes with a friend (DR 422 at 93); and (7) that she had email 

access and some of her emails contained pornographic material (DR 422 at 107-108). 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that preclusion of some evidence pursuant to a 

state rule of evidence would rise to the level of a violation of his right to due process 

under the federal Constitution, especially when much of the evidence he sought to admit 

had been admitted despite the granting of the prosecution’s motion in limine. (See Doc. 

 

4

 The Arizona Court of Appeals listed evidence the motion intended to preclude as encompassing evidence of: Ellen’s viewing of internet pornography and adult movies; her password allowing access to the internet; her experimentation with “adult” lotions; and her having written sexually explicit emails. (Doc. 33-3 at 85) 

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33 at 50) Accordingly his claim fails on the merits even if it were not procedurally 

barred. 

 As with Ground 1, Petitioner asserts that his appellate counsel did not provide a 

federal basis for this claim in his direct appeal even though he had directed her to do so. 

(Doc. 1 at 19) Just as for Ground 1, neither Petitioner’s pro se motion to supplement the 

brief nor his pro se petition for review argued or even mentioned a federal basis for his 

state claims. (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 33-2 at 132-134, 136) Like Ground 1, this ground is 

subject to procedural default because it was not fairly presented as a federal claim in state 

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

 Petition Ground 2 is unexhausted and procedurally barred. This bar is not excused 

by his appellate counsel’s failure to federalize his claim. Petitioner has not established 

that his appellate counsel’s failure to adequately provide a federal basis for the claim both 

fell below objectively reasonable standards and also prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687. Neither has he demonstrated that, but for his appellate counsel’s failure to 

federalize this claim, the result of his appeal would have been different. Moreover, the 

record does not support a finding that the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in his PCR action 

represented an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not due relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Ground 3: Petitioner argues his federal due process and confrontation 

clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from introducing 

evidence that he was acquitted in a Michigan case involving the same victims. 

 

 Ground 3 was raised on direct appeal (issue 3) and denied on the merits. (Doc. 33-

3 at 84-87) Because Petitioner’s appellate counsel argued the issue solely under state law, 

the claim was not exhausted. Petitioner has failed to overcome this procedural default by 

demonstrating either cause and prejudice, or actual innocence. 

 Petitioner argues the trial court violated his federal rights to due process and 

confrontation when it precluded evidence of Petitioner’s acquittal at trial in Michigan on 

charges of sexual abuse against the same victims in his Arizona case. (Doc. 1 at 20) As 

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with Grounds 1 and 2, Petitioner blames his appellate counsel for failing to adequately 

federalize his claims on direct appeal. (Id.) 

 The trial court permitted admission of evidence that supported the Michigan 

charges against Petitioner for molestation of the victims, but precluded evidence that 

Petitioner had been acquitted. (Doc. 33 at 52-55) On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals noted that the trial court allowed Petitioner to use transcripts from the Michigan 

trial to impeach witnesses at trial. (Id.) The court of appeals also noted that Petitioner had 

introduced some of the evidence of other acts. (Id.) The court of appeals observed a 

conflict in the case law about whether a defendant is permitted to offer evidence of an 

acquittal to counter evidence of a prior bad act. (Id.) However, the court concluded there 

was no need to reconcile conflicting authority because the trial record did not identify the 

specific acts of which Petitioner had been acquitted in Michigan. (Id.) The appellate court 

reasoned that “[a]bsent information to connect the other-act evidence introduced at trial 

in this case with the conduct of which Petitioner was acquitted in Michigan, we cannot 

conclude the court erred by precluding evidence of the acquittals.” (Id.) 

 Respondents assert that Petitioner fails to avoid a procedural bar on this ground 

because his appellate counsel did not provide a basis in federal law on the claim in state 

court. (Doc. 33 at 56-57) They note, however, that Petitioner’s direct appeal brief cited a 

Maryland state case and a Colorado state case that considered a similar argument to be a 

matter of “due process”. (Id. at 57) Given lack of clarity within the Ninth Circuit on 

whether citation to a state case that analyzes a federal constitutional issue serves the same 

purpose as citation to a federal case analyzing the same issue, Respondents argued the 

merits of Ground 3. (Id.) This Court will also address the merits. 

 “A federal habeas court cannot review questions of state evidence law. It is well 

settled that a state court’s evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal 

habeas relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate 

due process. Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 

Federal circuit courts of appeals have consistently held that evidence of an acquittal in a 

prior proceeding is generally inadmissible. United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 168,172 (1st

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Cir. 2005); United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 537 (2nd Cir. 1979); United States v. 

Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 353 (3rd Cir. 2002); United States v. De La Rosa, 171 F.3d 215, 

219-20 (5th Cir. 1999); Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118, 122 (8th Cir. 1992) and United 

States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

The reasoning employed by these courts included that the fact of an acquittal does 

not support a finding of innocence of a charge, but rather a finding that the prosecution 

did not establish the essential elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. See De 

La Rosa, 171 F.3d at 219. The Bisanti court also noted that a defendant’s prior acquittal 

in one crime is not probative of the same defendant’s culpability in a later crime, and in 

fact such evidence tends to confuse the jury. Bisanti, 414 F.3d at 172-73. Additionally, 

federal courts have held that judgments of acquittal are properly excluded as hearsay. De 

La Rosa, 171 F.3d at 219 (further explaining that “there are seven sister circuits that have, 

in varying contexts endorsed” the view that evidence of prior acquittals are generally 

inadmissible and that the court was “aware of no contrary authority.”) It does not appear 

that the Ninth Circuit has weighed in on this issue. 

 Under this federal case law authority, it cannot reasonably be concluded that the 

state courts’ rulings on this claim violated Petitioner’s rights under the Constitution to 

fundamental fairness at trial. Moreover, because the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on 

this issue, Petitioner is unable to establish that the state courts’ adjudication of this claim 

was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

No habeas relief is warranted on Ground 3. The Court finds that even if this claim were 

not procedurally defaulted without excuse, this ground fails on the merits. 

 Ground 4: Petitioner argues his federal due process, compulsory 

process and fair trial rights were violated when a government witness threatened a 

defense witness to prevent the witness from testifying at trial. 

 Petitioner did not raise this issue on direct appeal. He asserts that the basis for 

Ground 4 for relief came to light after trial; for that reason, Petitioner raised the issue 

initially in his PCR action (Issue I.1) (DR 508 at 4-5). Both the trial court and the 

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Arizona Court of Appeals denied the claim on the merits. This Court also considers the 

merits and denies Petitioner relief. 

 Ground 4 is based on Petitioner’s efforts to compel his son Frank’s testimony at 

trial. (Doc. 1 at 24) Petitioner argues that because the victims testified that Frank was 

present in a pop-up camper while some of the allegations of sexual abuse were occurring, 

his testimony was crucial to Petitioner’s defense. (Id.) During trial preparation, Frank was 

communicating with Petitioner’s advisory counsel and was under a subpoena to appear at 

trial. (Id.) At some point during trial, Petitioner alleges, Frank suddenly ceased all 

communication, did not appear at trial, and was not apprehended pursuant to a bench 

warrant until the trial was over. (Id.) Frank disclosed in a subsequent affidavit that he had 

been threatened by his adoptive mother, Petitioner’s wife, if he were to appear and testify 

at trial. (Id. at 24-25) 

 Petitioner argues that because his requests for an evidentiary hearing on Frank’s 

claims were denied, there was no forum for him to try and ascertain whether his wife 

acted alone or whether she “acted at the suggestion or prompting of a state actor in the 

case.” (Id. at 25) Also, because Frank requested the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office 

to pursue charges against his mother, and no action was taken, Petitioner concludes that a 

state actor was “involved in the compulsory process violation portion” of his claim. (Id.) 

 In the PCR action, the court found no factual basis for Petitioner’s argument. (DR 

525 at 2) The trial court further found no showing of state action, concluding that “there 

is no violation of compulsory process rights when the unavailability of the witness is not 

the result of state action.” (Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that 

Petitioner provided no evidentiary support that a State agent was involved in the alleged 

intimidation of Frank. (Doc. 33-6 at 87) 

 Frank’s affidavit does not provide any basis for this Court to conclude that 

Petitioner’s wife was acting as an agent of the State when she allegedly threatened Frank 

to keep him from testifying. (DR 508 at Exh. 1, pp. 52-56) Petitioner has not shown that 

the Arizona courts’ adjudication of this claim was either contrary to or involved an 

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unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, this claim fails 

on the merits. 

 Ground 5: Petitioner argues his federal due process and compulsory 

process rights were violated when the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing 

on Frank’s allegations of intimidation. 

 This claim was not presented on direct appeal. As with the closely related claim 

presented in Ground 4, Petitioner raised this issue for the first time on state PCR review 

(Issue I.2) (DR 508 at 5-6). The trial court denied this PCR claim as frivolous. (DR 525) 

The Court of Appeals denied review pursuant to failure to comply with Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32. This Court finds that Ground 5 is procedurally barred.

 Ground 5 asserts that the trial court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing in the 

PCR action on the “newly discovered evidence” regarding Frank Karban discussed in 

Ground Four, supra, violated Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights. (Doc. 1 at 27-30) 

Frank’s affidavits included allegations of Petitioner’s wife’s physical abuse of her 

adopted daughters (the victims in Petitioner’s trial), and allegations that Ellen had made 

false allegations of sexual misconduct against others. (Id. at 28-29) Petitioner contends 

that had this evidence been available at trial, the jury would not have convicted him. (Id.

at 29) 

 Respondents argue this claim is procedurally defaulted because it was not fairly 

presented to the state court as a federal claim, and alternatively, because the claim is 

based on alleged procedural errors in the state court PCR action. (Doc. 33 at 62-63) 

 This claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did not present it in his 

PCR petition as a federal claim. Petitioner does not argue cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome that bar, and the Court finds those grounds do not exist in the 

record. Petitioner cannot show that the Arizona courts’ adjudication of this claim was 

either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law. Thus, relief is not appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). 

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 Ground 6: Petitioner argues he was denied effective assistance of 

appellate counsel (“IAAC”) in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments.

 Petitioner raised this issue in his state PCR proceedings (Issue II) (DR 508 at 6-8). 

The state courts denied this claim for Petitioner’s failure to show that his appellate 

counsel was ineffective pursuant to the Strickland standard. Likewise, Ground 6 fails. 

 Petitioner argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his appellate 

counsel ignored the eighteen “dead bang” winning issues he had outlined for her and 

asked her to pursue instead of the non-frivolous (and unsuccessful) four issues she 

briefed to the court of appeals. (Doc. 1 at 33-35) 

 In the PCR proceedings, the trial court discussed the issues Petitioner alleged his 

counsel should have raised on appeal. (DR 525 at 2) The trial court found that 

Petitioner’s counsel could not have raised the issues because Petitioner had failed to 

preserve the issues at trial or because the issues lacked legal merit. (Id.) Regarding 

Petitioner’s claim about being excluded from a non-substantive bench conference 

(Petition Ground 14), the court held that the evidence did not support a finding of 

prejudice or that Petitioner was entitled to relief. (Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals 

denied relief. The appellate court found that Petitioner had not made a showing on any of 

his IAAC claims that appellate counsel’s decision not to raise any claim fell below 

prevailing professional norms and that Petitioner had not shown that any claim would 

have changed the outcome of his appeal. (Doc. 33-6 at 88) 

The U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance to courts assessing claims such as 

Petitioner’s: 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is 

all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after 

conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining 

counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 

particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . [A] court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” 

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (citations omitted). “[T]here is a 

strong presumption that [counsel took certain actions] for tactical reasons rather than 

through sheer neglect.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 191 (2011) (citations 

omitted). 

 In Smith v. Robbins, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the application of 

Strickland to the circumstance in which a defendant asserts IAAC because counsel failed 

to raise a particular claim: 

In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), we held that appellate counsel 

who files a merits brief need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous 

claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the 

likelihood of success on appeal. Notwithstanding Barnes, it is still possible 

to bring a Strickland claim based on counsel's failure to raise a particular 

claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent. See, 

e.g., Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (C.A.7 1986) (“Generally, only 

when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the 

presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome”). 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000). 

 Petitioner repeatedly argues that the grounds his appellate counsel declined to 

raise on direct appeal were stronger than claim two raised by his counsel on appeal, 

“Whether Appellant’s failure to properly preserve his request to present evidence of 

“good character’ of “sexual normalcy” constituted fundamental error?” (Doc. 33-2 at 

101) As Respondents argue, the “sexual normalcy” argument asserted on direct appeal 

appears to have been specifically tailored to rely on a then recent Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision which had affirmed a trial court’s granting of a new trial in a case of a 

defendant convicted of sexual conduct with a minor. See State v. Rhodes, 219 Ariz. 476, 

200 P.3d 973 (Ariz. App. 2008). The determinative issue was the trial court’s post-trial 

finding that “the pre-trial ruling excluding Defendant's character evidence should have 

been reconsidered during trial based on the developing evidence.” Rhodes, 219 Ariz. at 

478, 200 P.3d at 975. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to raise this claim on 

appeal was objectively reasonable despite that the claim did not succeed. That the 

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decision was objectively reasonable is underscored by the factual similarities of the 

charges against Petitioner and the Rhodes defendant. 

 As to this Court’s standard of review regarding the state court’s application of the 

Strickland standard to appellate counsel’s performance, the Ninth Circuit has explained 

that: 

In cases where a petitioner identifies clearly established federal law and 

challenges the state court's application of that law, our task under AEDPA 

is not to decide whether a state court decision applied the law correctly. See 

id. Rather, we must decide whether the state court decision applied the law 

reasonably. See id. (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law.” (quoting Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000))). If the state court applied the law 

reasonably, we must deny relief. See id. Thus, relief is proper only “in cases 

where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state 

court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme Court's] precedents.” Id. at 

102, 131 S.Ct. 770. 

Hedlund v. Ryan, 815 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2016). 

 This Court has assessed the grounds raised in the Petition that were not raised by 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel in his state direct appeal. With respect to these grounds, 

Petitioner has not overcome the procedural bar. For the reasons given, infra, regarding 

Grounds 7 through 29, this Court determines that Petitioner has not established cause and 

prejudice because he failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s decision to argue the claims 

she presented on direct appeal was objectively unreasonable. He also failed to 

demonstrate that had his appellate counsel asserted each additional claim to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, the result of Petitioner’s appeal would have been different. Moreover, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the court of appeals’ 

ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claims in his PCR action does not represent an 

unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

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Ground 7: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were violated by 

prosecutorial misconduct for failure to disclose an audio recording involving the 

State’s theory of flight. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 7 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 5

 Ground 7 regards an audiotape of a recorded conversation Petitioner had with his 

wife at the time he was arrested. (DR 429 at 76-78, DR 432 at 141-143) The prosecution 

revealed to Petitioner the existence of the tape near the end of trial. (DR 407 at 4-6) The 

prosecution had possession of the tape a month or less prior to revealing its existence to 

Petitioner, during which time it said it was attempting to obtain enhancement of the 

extremely poor quality of the tape through an Arizona Department of Public Safety 

(“DPS”) lab. (Id. at 5-8) The prosecution provided Petitioner with copies of both the 

original tape and the “cleaned up” version on DVD provided by the DPS lab. (Id. at 9) 

The trial court found the State did not act in bad faith in disclosing the existence of the 

tape because the state had only recently received the tape and had been attempting to 

obtain a usable transcription. (Id.) The court ordered that the tape could be played by 

Petitioner, and that he could recall his wife to the stand if he wished to question her about 

it. (Id. at 10) 

 Petitioner introduced the recording at trial and played it for the jury until the jury 

asked for the recording to be stopped, saying they could not “make out anything that’s 

 

5

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going on.” (Id. at 152-153) The trial court characterized the tape as “inaudible” and 

“indecipherable” and found the tape had absolutely no value. (Id. at 153) Petitioner 

argues that the tape included evidence he could have used to bolster his argument that, 

when arrested, he was not in flight because he had proposed meeting with his wife to 

discuss the allegations against him. (Doc. 1 at 40) 

Petitioner asserts that, had he been given time to have the tape independently 

analyzed and/or enhanced, he may have been able to effectively cross examine his wife 

about the contents of the tape or refute witnesses who testified that Petitioner was fleeing. 

(DR 508 at 11) Yet, there is no reason to think that, if Petitioner had been given a chance 

to have the tape examined, the quality would have been any better than the DPS lab 

version. Given the tenuous utility of the evidence that Petitioner states was included 

within the audiotape, and the uncertainty that the trier of fact could ever have been able to 

make out what the tape contained, this Court concludes that Petitioner was not denied 

fundamental fairness at trial by the disclosure of the audiotape near the end of his trial. 

The decision of Petitioner’s counsel on direct appeal not to raise this ground was 

objectively reasonable. Further, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any his 

convictions would have been reversed if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on 

direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 8: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose the existence 

of video recorded colposcopy examinations of the victims. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 8 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

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88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default.6

At trial, the prosecution questioned the Wisconsin pediatrician who examined the 

victims in January 2003, shortly after the allegations of sexual abuse were first raised. 

(DR 417 at 119-175) The prosecution asked whether the examinations were recorded, to 

which the doctor responded that the exams of the victims’ genital and anal areas 

conducted using a colposcope were recorded. (Id. at 123-124) When asked whether there 

was anything abnormal on the victims’ exams, the doctor replied that the girls had 

“normal examinations.” (Id. at 134) The doctor also explained that a study had shown 

that only fourteen percent of children who had been subjected to “legally confirmed” 

sexual abuse showed definitively abnormal findings. (Id. at 135) 

Testimony prompted the court to question the prosecution about why the 

colposcope video had not been disclosed. (Id. at 118-119) The prosecutor stated that, as a 

medical record of a child, specific procedures would need to be followed for the 

prosecution to obtain such videos from the hospital. (Id. at 119-120) The prosecution 

further explained that because the State did not intend to use the video at trial, under Rule 

15.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the State did not need to disclose the 

video’s existence unless the defendant specifically asked for it, in which case a “very 

particularly worded order from the court” would be required. (Id. at 119) 

 The trial record reveals that Petitioner used the evidence that the victims’ 

anal/genital examinations had been normal to support his closing argument that he was 

innocent. (DR 405 at 24, 45-46, 75) There is no reason to believe the colposcope video 

would have been useful to the jury. Further, the video could not have been better 

evidence for Petitioner than the doctor’s testimony that the exams were normal. 

 Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted 

ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was 

 

6

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III.A.2) (DR 508 at 11-12), but did not raise such properly on PCR appeal. 

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objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would 

have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on 

direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

Ground 9: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were violated by 

prosecutorial misconduct involving the failure to disclose a trial exhibit used during redirect examination of victim Ellen. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 9 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default.7

 The trial exhibit at issue in Ground 9 depicted a circumcised and an uncircumcised 

penis. On direct examination, victim Ellen testified about characteristics of Petitioner’s 

genital area. (DR 422 at 5, 54-55). On cross-examination, Petitioner asked Ellen whether 

his penis was circumcised and she answered that he was circumcised because his penis 

was “open on the top” (Id. at 54-55). Petitioner’s later questioning of Ellen was intended 

to demonstrate that she had never seen his penis, because she had testified he was 

circumcised when he was not. (DR 421 at 47) 

 Q: You have seen me naked a lot, correct? 

 A: Yes. 

 Q: Before and after sex, correct? 

 

7

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III.A.3) (DR 508 at 12-13), but did not raise such properly on PCR appeal. 

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 A: Yes. 

 . . . 

 Q: And that’s how you know I’m circumcised? 

 A: Because that it’s cut off down there, yes. That your skin is cut off. 

 Q: And no one told you to testify to that fact, did they? 

 A: No. 

 Q: You have never seen my penis, have you, Jasmine? 

 A: You’re sick. 

 Q: Jasmine – Unresponsive, Your Honor. Please direct the witness to answer the 

 question. 

 THE COURT: Can we please move this questioning along with some sense 

 of alacrity, Mr. Karban. 

 Q: Jasmine, you have gambled that I was circumcised and you have lost? 

 A: I misunderstood what that meant. 

 Q: Your Honor, no further questions at this time. 

(Id. at 47-48) 

 On redirect immediately following this questioning, the State asked Ellen if she 

understood the difference between a circumcised and uncircumcised penis. (Id. at 48) She 

said she didn’t know. (Id.) The prosecution then asked if she “knew it” when Petitioner 

asked her if he was circumcised and she said he was. (Id.) Ellen answered, “No because I 

got mixed up. I was trying to think it out, okay, what each one meant, no.” (Id. at 49) 

Later, the prosecution asked to approach her with an exhibit depicting circumcised and 

uncircumcised penises. (Id. at 57) Petitioner objected, saying he had just seen the exhibit 

for the first time. (Id. at 59) The court overruled Petitioner’s objection and allowed the 

State to use the exhibit. (Id.) 

 On questioning by the prosecutor, Ellen testified that she had seen the diagram the 

day prior, when the prosecutor had shown it to her. (Id. at 58) When asked why she was 

shown the diagram, Ellen answered that it was because she did not “understand the 

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difference between circumcised and uncircumcised.” (Id.) After asking Ellen to indicate 

on the exhibit which diagram best represented how Petitioner’s penis appeared when it 

was “hard” and how it appeared when it was “soft,” she apparently selected the 

depictions of uncircumcised penises. (DR 421 at 58-60) Following redirect, the court 

denied Petitioner request for permission to “re-cross” Ellen about the diagram. (Id. at 71) 

 Even on the stale record, it is clear that Petitioner was able to very effectively raise 

and drive home to the jury the possibility that Ellen’s/Jasmine’s confusion about whether 

his penis was circumcised arose because she had never seen his penis. Petitioner has 

failed to overcome the procedural bar to this ground. Petitioner’s appellate counsel did 

not act in an objectively deficient manner by choosing not to raise this claim on direct 

appeal. Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice because he failed to show that even if 

his appellate counsel had asserted this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, the result 

of Petitioner’s proceeding would have been different. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled 

to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of 

Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an unreasonable application 

of the Strickland standard.

 Ground 10: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated by prosecutorial misconduct for failure to timely disclose a rebuttal witness. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 10 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 8

 

8

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Petitioner explains that before trial, Dr. Kathy Coffman was disclosed as the 

State’s rebuttal expert witness. (Doc. 1-1 at 6) When the trial continued longer than 

planned, Dr. Coffman was out of the country and the State disclosed that Coffman’s 

replacement would be Dr. L. Quinn, who worked with Dr. Coffman and was similarly 

qualified. (DR 410 at 114) Petitioner objected and moved to preclude the replacement 

rebuttal witness. (Id. at 116-117) The trial court allowed the substitution, but ruled that 

Petitioner should have the opportunity to interview Dr. Quinn. (Id. at 118, 121-122, 125, 

127) 

 Petitioner agrees with Respondents that this circumstance was “an ordinary 

procedural dispute.” (Doc. 36-2 at 25) The court made sure that Petitioner had the 

opportunity to interview Dr. Quinn prior to her testimony (DR 410 at 121-122, 125-126), 

and Petitioner does not explain how any of Dr. Quinn’s testimony in fact unfairly 

prejudiced his case. 

 Ground 10 is barred without excuse. It was objectively reasonable for appellate 

counsel not to brief this issue. There is no reason to believe that briefing the issue would 

have resulted in reversal of any of Petitioner’s convictions. Moreover, Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the 

merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 11: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated by prosecutorial misconduct involving prejudicial testimony elicited from 

defense witness, Sue Asplund, regarding Petitioner’s criminal history. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 11 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

 III.A.4) (DR 508 at 13), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 9

 Before trial, the court ruled that evidence of Petitioner’s criminal history would 

not be admitted at trial. (DR 441 at 63-64) At trial on June 4, 2008, the prosecutor 

questioned one of Petitioner’s witnesses, a foster care worker, about the reason for her 

home visit to Petitioner’s family home. (DR 409 at 149) The prosecutor asked whether 

the visit “had something to do with the fact that you had learned that [Petitioner] had 

been caught stealing gravel?” (Id.) Petitioner immediately objected and, at a bench 

conference, moved for a mistrial. (Id. at 149-150) The court denied the motion, stating 

that the question would not harm jury deliberations. (Id. at 150) The court granted 

Petitioner’s motion to strike the question and answer from the record. (Id.) 

 The record reflects that the jury’s initial and final instructions included the 

instruction that if a question is sustained on objection the jury must disregard that 

question and not guess what the answer might have been, and if an answer is ordered to 

be stricken the jury must not consider it for any purpose. (DR 406 at 81, DR 433 at 11) In 

Arizona and federal appellate courts, the presumption is that juries follow their 

instructions. State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 439, 924 P.2d 441, 433 (Ariz. 1996); Penry 

v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 (2001). Further, the improper question mentioning that 

Petitioner had been caught stealing gravel had no direct correlation to the allegation 

against him at trial. The prosecutorial conduct at issue falls far short of the sort of 

prosecutorial misconduct that would constitute a denial of due process for “’failure to 

observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.’” Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 

236 (1941)). 

 Ground 11 is procedurally barred without excuse. The decision of Petitioner’s 

appellate counsel to pass over this claim was objectively reasonable. Petitioner has not 

 

9

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III.B.1) (DR 508 at 13-14), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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demonstrated prejudice because he failed to establish that even if his appellate counsel 

had raised this claim on direct appeal, the result of Petitioner’s appeal would have been 

different. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because 

the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action 

does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

Ground 12: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated by prosecutorial misconduct involving referencing the victims’religious beliefs 

to bolster their credibility and attack Petitioner’s credibility. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 12 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default.10

 Without citing to the record, Petitioner describes numerous instances at trial where 

he says the prosecutor “injected” religion into the trial. (Doc. 1-1 at 12-14) 

Representative of these examples are: (1) Petitioner’s wife’s testimony that her 

Pentecostal religion influenced her to not wear pants, gamble, cut her hair, or view 

pornography; (2) Helen testified that her religious views encompassed prohibitions on 

wearing make-up, drinking alcohol, having affairs, and telling lies; and (3) Brenda added 

that rock and rap music were bad. (Doc. 1-1 at 12-13) Petitioner complains that his wife 

testified that Petitioner was not practicing what he was preaching, that Ellen said 

Petitioner was “into church, but not like my mom,” that Brenda said she didn’t know if 

 

10 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

III.B.2) (DR 508 at 14-15), but he failed to properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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Petitioner was active in church, and that the prosecutor repeated in her closing argument 

what Petitioner’s wife had said – that he wasn’t practicing what he was preaching. (Id.) 

Petitioner concedes that he did not object to any of this evidence at trial. (Doc. 2-1 

at 26) Because Petitioner did not object to this questioning or these statements at trial, the 

trial court did not have the occasion to delve into the basis for such statements or 

questioning. Further, Petitioner has not cited to the portions of the trial record so the 

Court can evaluate Petitioner’s assertions in context of the trial issues. 

Petitioner’s failure to object alone makes his appellate counsel’s decision not to 

brief this issue objectively reasonable. Petitioner has not shown that raising this claim on 

appeal would have changed the outcome. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s 

IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an unreasonable application of the 

Strickland standard. 

 Ground 13: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated by prosecutorial misconduct involving improper and prejudicial comments in 

the State’s closing argument. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 13 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 11

Petitioner contends the prosecutor made prejudicial comments in her closing 

argument, including: (1) that Petitioner had “got mad” at a detective on his case; (2) that 

11 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

III.B.3) (DR 508 at 15-16, DR 406 at 91-180), but he did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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Petitioner and his advisory counsel displayed improper demeanor at trial during the 

playing of a video; (3) that Petitioner’s medical expert witness was a “23,000.00 dollar 

hired gun”; (4) that the complainants were “perfect victims”; (5) repeated references to 

the positive credibility of the victims, such as “to find [Petitioner] not guilty, you have to 

find that [one of the victims] lied”; and (6) comments that “utilized religion to vouch for 

the credibility of the complainants and utilized not following the complainants’ religious 

beliefs to discredit [Petitioner].” (Doc. 1-1 at 16-17) 

 Petitioner contends that his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing 

argument should have been obvious to his appellate counsel, and that counsel was 

ineffective for not asserting this claim on appeal, thus providing “cause” for the 

procedural bar to habeas review and overcoming the presumption of effective assistance. 

(Doc. 2-1 at 33-34) 

 As an initial matter, Petitioner’s counsel was likely well aware of Arizona case 

law instructing that “prosecutors have wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments 

to the jury: ‘excessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of 

counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to 

introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed 

before the jury.’” State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 305, 4 P.3d 345, 360 (Ariz. 2000). 

Certainly, the trial court judge made this point repeatedly during closing arguments. (DR 

405 at 23, 30, 31-32, 61, 62, 64, 95) At one point, the court emphasized to the prosecutor 

and Petitioner: 

Again, I have said this now for about the sixth time, this is argument. Each 

side can argue what they think the evidence shows and what they believe 

the facts are to how they are to be interpreted by the jury. 

(DR 405 at 62) 

 This Court finds the Respondents’ arguments on this claim persuasive, for the 

reasons provided. (Doc. 33 at 96-101) Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and 

prejudice for this procedurally defaulted ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate 

counsel to pass over this claim was objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to 

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establish that any of his convictions would have been reversed or vacated even if his 

appellate counsel had raised this ground on direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the 

merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 14: Petitioner argues his “Faretta” rights to due process and 

self-representation were violated when the trial court precluded Petitioner from 

attending an off-record hearing held in chambers. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 14 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default.12 

Petitioner contends the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights when an 

in-chambers discussion was held on Petitioner’s oral motion in limine during trial. (Doc. 

1-1 at 19-22) The court ordered Petitioner’s advisory counsel to attend, but not Petitioner. 

(Id.) Petitioner argues that he objected to his exclusion from the in-chambers hearing, 

although he admits the record is “devoid” of his objection. (Doc. 36 at 27) 

The record does reveal that Petitioner has mischaracterized the nature of the inchambers discussion. The motion in limine had already been decided before the chambers 

conference. Petitioner addresses the court: 

Q: Before we bring the jury in, I would like to bring an oral motion in limine

regarding the State’s next witness. 

 

12 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

IV) (DR 508 at 16-19), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal 

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COURT: We are bringing motions in limine in the middle of the trial? 

A: It’s more or less a reminder of what the Court has already ruled on which is 

Jasmine’s prior sexual experience with people other than her biological father. 

COURT: Is not admissible. I think we had already ruled on that. 

A: Correct. However, the adoptive mother has made the comment that Jasmine 

was sexually active. Before Jasmine gets on the stand I want to make sure that 

does not come out, again, with anyone other than the biological father as the Court 

has previously ruled. 

COURT: I don’t think there’s any question. You don’t have problems with 

what Mr. Petitioner is saying her prior sexual history is beyond? 

[PROSECUTOR]: I thought-- 

COURT: Are we going to have to go in chambers and talk about this some more? 

[PROSECUTOR]: No, judge. I would only—I wasn’t intending to ask her 

anything about any of that. 

COURT: I think I made this ruling crystal clear. I don’t know why we are reexamining this. 

A: Last night I was approached by the State to allow the Kaukauna police 

department statements in as evidence and there is essentially one— 

COURT: In chambers. Mr. Romberg [advisory counsel]. 

(WHEREUPON a break in the proceedings occurs.) 

COURT: We’re back in court. The motion has already been ruled on. We don’t 

have to rediscuss it. Everybody knows what the ground rules are. I assume 

everybody is going to comply and we will be able to proceed with trial in 

somewhat expeditious manner. Now let’s get the jury in and let’s start calling 

some witnesses please. 

(DR 423, at 28-30, emphasis added.) 

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 This record reflects that Petitioner was requesting reassurance that the court’s 

previous ruling on a motion in limine would still apply to a request for evidence the State 

was considering submitting for admission. The record does not indicate that Petitioner 

objected to being excluded from the in chambers discussion, either before or after the 

discussion. In any event, upon return to the courtroom, the court affirmed that nothing 

had changed regarding the motion, and that there was no need to further discuss it. 

 Petitioner attached to his PCR petition an affidavit from his advisory counsel, 

Evan Romberg, which stated in part that the chambers conference occurred without the 

attorney of record’s (Petitioner’s) presence, that Petitioner had not authorized Romberg to 

speak for him at this unrecorded conference, and that the reason the court had expressed 

for excluding Petitioner was that the court was afraid Petitioner might see pictures of the 

court’s family. (DR 508 at 208) The affidavit reflects no substance of the actual 

discussion in chambers. (Id.) 

 The record also includes Petitioner’s affidavit dated June 23, 2011, regarding the 

in chambers conference. (Doc. 3-1 at 29) Petitioner avers that the judge pointed at him 

and said something to the effect of “[e]veryone except Mr. Karban,” and as the judge 

slammed the door, he (Petitioner) objected to the proceeding, but this objection “went 

unanswered.” (Id.) He further states, “I do not know why I was precluded from chambers. 

Previously, I had been in his chambers without incident.” (Id.) Additionally, the trial 

resumed in court “a short time later.” (Id.) 

 The Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right to self-representation in 

criminal proceedings. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The right recognized 

in Faretta, however, is not necessarily violated by the appointment of advisory counsel to 

assist the defendant. Id. at 834 n.46. The Supreme Court described an advisory counsel’s 

limitations to participate in the pro se defendant’s trial in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 

168 (1984). McKaskle instructs that “[i]n determining whether a defendant's Faretta

rights have been respected, the primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair 

chance to present his case in his own way. ... The specific rights to make [a defendant’s] 

voice heard ... form the core of a defendant's right of self-representation.” Id. at 177. 

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Moreover, “[i]f standby counsel's participation over the defendant's objection effectively 

allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions ... 

or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is 

eroded.” Id. at 178 (emphasis in the original). Here, the record reflects that the discussion 

in chambers was of no importance and left the previous ruling of the Court intact, which 

was exactly what Petitioner was requesting of the Court. 

 Petitioner cites the Ninth Circuit case Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 

2008) to support his argument on this claim. Frantz addressed a petitioner’s claim that his 

Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he was excluded from a chambers 

conference in which his advisory counsel participated and during which a discussion was 

held on how the trial court should respond to a question from the deliberating jury. Citing 

McKaskle v. Wiggins, the Ninth Circuit held that the Arizona Court of Appeals erred by 

denying Frantz’s claim on harmless error grounds, because a “McKaskle error is 

structural and therefore not subject to harmless error analysis.” Frantz, 533 F.3d at 728. 

 Respondents distinguish the facts and conclusions of Frantz, citing Lefevre v. 

Cain, 586 F.3d (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Fabricant, 506 Fed. Appx. 636 (9th Cir. 

2013), and United States v. Isaac, 655 F.3d 148 (3rd Cir. 2011), which directly address 

and distinguish Frantz. Respondents further cite United States v. Ottaviano, 738 F.3d 586 

(3rd Cir. 2013) and United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897 (2nd Cir. 1990) for support that 

Frantz is not determinative on the facts presented here. The thrust of Respondents’ 

argument is that Petitioner was present in court both before and following the brief in 

chambers meeting and did not object to either being excluded or to his advisory counsel’s 

participation, supporting a conclusion that Petitioner had acquiesced to this situation.

 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the primary focus in deciding whether a 

pro se defendant’s Faretta rights have been respected is on “whether the defendant had a 

fair chance to present his case in his own way[,]” and have his “voice heard.” McKaskle, 

465 U.S. at 177. Here, Petitioner’s non-participation in the in chambers conference did 

not in any way deprive him of his right to preserve actual control over the testimony to be 

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allowed at trial. The result of the conference on record was the court reiterating that the 

motion ruling was still in effect, just as Petitioner had requested. 

On this record, Petitioner’s Faretta’s rights were not violated, because: (1) 

Petitioner had made his intentions on the questioned evidence clear; (2) the court and 

prosecutor were in agreement with him; (3) there is no evidence that the short conference 

involved advisory counsel representing Petitioner or making any decisions, let alone 

significant tactical decisions on his behalf; and (4) no evidence was provided that 

advisory counsel spoke instead of Petitioner on any matter of importance. Petitioner has 

not demonstrated that his due process or Faretta rights were violated when he was 

excluded from the conference in chambers. 

 Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted 

ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was 

objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would 

have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on 

direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 15: Petitioner argues his federal rights to due process, equal 

protection, and self-representation were violated when he was forced to remain behind 

his table. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 15 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

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merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 13

Petitioner was in custody during the trial. He argues that he was not accorded 

equal treatment because he was required to stay behind his table while the prosecution 

was allowed to approach witnesses with both prosecution and defense exhibits. (Doc. 1-1 

at 23-25) 

Petitioner filed a motion in limine to avoid wearing a leg brace restraint during 

trial. (DR 117) This motion was argued, during which the trial court clarified its concern 

that Petitioner not be allowed to approach his victims, who would be testifying at trial. 

(DR 449 at 26-27) The court told the parties that the primary prosecutor and Petitioner 

would both be required to remain at counsel tables except to make opening statement and 

closing argument. (DR 441 at 60) He ordered that if a witness needed to examine an 

exhibit, the second chair prosecutor would be able to approach the witness on behalf of 

the primary prosecutor, and Petitioner’s advisory counsel could approach for Petitioner. 

(Id.) The court explained that his intention was for the State to not receive any latitude in 

this respect that Petitioner was not also granted. (Id. at 61) In response to a question from 

the prosecutor about a theoretical issue involving the minor witnesses, the court stated, 

“I’m not saying [anything] is cast in absolute stone, but I really want there to be an even 

playing field as it regards the two of you asking questions and your position in the 

courtroom . . ..” (Id.) 

 Petitioner asserts that this is not what happened at trial. (Doc. 1-1 at 24) The 

examples Petitioner provided to support this allegation comprise instances when the 

second chair prosecutor questioning the witness remained at the table and the primary 

prosecutor approached the witness with the exhibits (DR 419 at 17; DR 420 at 42, 47-48; 

DR 416 at 85). The Court finds that these instances were consistent with the trial court’s 

order to make the procedures equal for the two sides – the questioner remains at the table 

and an assistant brings the exhibit back and forth. In addition, in order to prevent the jury 

 

13 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

V) (DR 508 at 19-22), but he did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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from noticing the leg brace restraint and stun belt on Petitioner during trial, which were 

only seen from behind per the affidavits submitted by Petitioner (see Ground 16, infra), it 

was reasonable to require Petitioner to remain at the defense table. Thus, the examples 

cited by Petitioner do not support a colorable argument that his federal due process, equal 

protection, or Faretta rights were violated. Petitioner was not denied a fundamentally 

unfair trial resulting from the court’s order on the motion in limine. 

 Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted 

ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was 

objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would 

have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on 

direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 16: Petitioner argues his federal due process, equal protection, 

and self-representation rights were violated when he was required to wear a leg brace 

and a stun belt while presenting his case to the jury. 

Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 16 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default.14

 

14 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

V) (Doc. 508 at 19-22), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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Petitioner contends that the trial court’s restriction requiring him to conduct his 

defense at trial, in the presence of the jury, wearing both a leg brace and a stun belt was 

unjustified and therefore unconstitutional. (Doc. 1-1 at 26-29) 

 According to Petitioner the court record is “devoid of” or “missing” his objection 

to having to wear a stun belt and leg brace in view of the jury. (Doc. 36 at 27) During a 

pretrial hearing on August 27, 2007, the court discussed Petitioner’s motion regarding 

restraints during trial. (DR 449 at 24-32) Petitioner asked to preclude a leg brace, but not 

a stun belt, mentioning, “I understand the concept of courtroom security.” (Id. at 25) The 

court, who said he had not tried a pro se sex offense trial, declined to rule on the motion 

until after he had spoken with other judges who had tried such cases, and with the 

sheriff’s office about security protocol. (Id. at 30-31) The prosecution stated it would not 

oppose Petitioner using a stun belt without a leg brace. (Id. at 31) The prosecutor 

emphasized that she wanted to be sure the jury did not see “whatever it is that’s on him.” 

(Id.) The judge responded, “I totally agree.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner states that shortly after trial commenced, and during an unrecorded inchambers conference held on a separate issue, he objected orally to the stun belt and the 

leg brace he was required to wear. (Doc. 1-1 at 27) He asserts that the trial court asked 

the sheriff’s deputy who was present how security is ordinarily handled, and the deputy 

said that all trials were conducted with the defendant wearing both restraint devices. (Id.

at 28) Petitioner states that the judge decided that the trial would continue with Petitioner 

using both restraints. (Id.) The parties have not directed this Court to trial transcripts that 

document whether Petitioner wore either a stun belt or a leg brace or that establish the inchambers conference was conducted, let alone detail what was discussed. 

 In Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit denied habeas 

relief where the petitioner had been required to wear a leg brace under his pants leg 

during trial and several jurors became aware of it because it made the petitioner limp to 

and from the witness stand. 709 F.3d at 929. Despite the juror awareness of the leg brace, 

the Ninth Circuit found that the state court reasonably decided that the petitioner was not 

prejudiced. In Ghent v. Woodford, the Ninth Circuit held that to prevail on a due process 

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shackling claim, a court must find that: (1) the defendant was restrained in the jury’s 

presence; (2) the shackles were seen by the jury; and (3) the physical restraint was not 

justified by state interests. 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Petitioner does not argue that the jury actually saw either the stun belt or leg brace. 

Petitioner supported his state PCR action with his own affidavit as well as affidavits from 

his sister, niece, and his expert witness/family acquaintance, each averring to some aspect 

of Petitioner’s restraints they said they observed from being behind Petitioner in the 

spectator area during trial. Petitioner’s affidavit dated June 23, 2011, includes statements 

that he needed to walk “unnaturally” to make sure he did not lock the leg brace and that 

he had to continually be conscious of not showing his “shackles” to the jury. (Doc. 3-1 at 

28). The other affidavits indicated that a spectator sitting behind Petitioner could see the 

outline of the stun belt through Petitioner’s clothing, and that they noticed his unnatural 

gait. (Doc. 3-4 at 7, 27, 29) 

Petitioner presents no evidence presented that any juror saw either the stun belt, to 

which Petitioner had not objected, or noticed the leg brace. Although Petitioner and his 

affiants explain that a person behind him might observe the outline of his stun belt under 

his jacket, there is no evidence that the jury was ever behind Petitioner during the trial. 

Indeed, as explained in Ground 15, the court restricted Petitioner to the defense table. 

Petitioner’s hands were unfettered. There was potent evidence introduced against 

Petitioner in his lengthy trial, including extensive testimony of the three victims, who 

were his adopted daughters. There was also evidence that Petitioner had sought to flee to 

avoid prosecution (see Ground 23, infra). In this case, any theoretical jury impact from 

the State’s well hidden use of restraints on Petitioner was greatly outweighed by the 

State’s interests. 

 Ground 16 is procedurally defaulted without excuse. Petitioner has not 

demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted ground. The decision of 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was objectively reasonable. 

Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would have been reversed or 

vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on direct appeal. Moreover, 

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Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ 

ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an 

unreasonable application of the Strickland standard.

 Ground 17: Petitioner argues his federal due process and confrontation 

clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from eliciting testimony 

that the police failed to conduct a proper investigation. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 17 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 15

Petitioner argues his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court 

granted the State’s motion in limine and prevented him from eliciting testimony from the 

Phoenix Police Department regarding its failure to “conduct a proper investigation.” 

(Doc. 1-1 at 30-32) Petitioner paints a broader picture of the pretrial ruling than the 

record supports. 

 The State’s motion in limine requested the court to preclude Petitioner from 

“arguing or questioning witnesses about the failure of the Phoenix Police Department to 

question him prior to submitting charges.” (DR 508 at 228) At oral argument, the State 

expressed concern that allowing Petitioner to cross-examine the State’s witnesses (police 

detectives) about why they did not question him prior to submitting charges would 

necessarily lead to the evidence: (1) that he had been questioned before in other 

jurisdictions; (2) had been tried in those jurisdictions; and (3) had invoked his right to 

 

15 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

VI.1) (Doc. 508 at 22-23), but he did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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counsel in those jurisdictions, preventing the Phoenix police from questioning him. (DR 

441 at 20-21) Petitioner pointed out that when the Phoenix police began its investigation 

of him, he was not in custody. (Id. at 22) The court recognized that Petitioner’s invoking 

his right to counsel in other states wasn’t an invocation as to Phoenix, but, on the 

argument that the Arizona allegations involved the same victims in a “series of 

transactions,” denied Petitioner the ability to ask police witnesses why they did not 

interview him. (Id. at 21-22) Importantly, the trial court granted a narrow limitation only 

on the specific question of why the Phoenix police did not conduct an interview of 

Petitioner. (Id. at 21-22) 

 Petitioner’s argument supporting this ground focuses on the Supreme Court’s 

decision in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), which involved the “question 

whether an accused’s invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a 

judicial proceeding constitutes an invocation of his [Fifth Amendment] Miranda right to 

counsel.” Id. at 173. Petitioner argues that McNeil did not apply. The Court does not 

need to travel this side road with Petitioner. The State made it clear that the reason that 

Petitioner was not questioned was because of his invocation of right to counsel in other 

jurisdictions. Even if the Phoenix Police Investigators were wrong in their reasoning, the 

trial court’s order does not present any avenue for habeas relief. 

 In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, the Supreme Court instructed that “a criminal 

defendant states a confrontation clause violation by showing that he was prohibited from 

engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical 

form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from 

which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the 

witness.’” 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). 

This, however, was not the situation in Petitioner’s case. He was able to cross-examine 

the police regarding the thoroughness of their investigation, for example, asking whether 

it was reasonable for the police to assume the victims were credible based only on their 

police interviews, or questioning a detective about evidence the police had looked for that 

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may have helped to show that the allegations against him were false. (DR 421 at 103-

105) 

 Petitioner’s argument fails because the trial court’s order did not prohibit 

Petitioner from effectively challenging witnesses on the thoroughness of the police 

investigation, and was based on the prosecution’s stated reason - Fifth Amendment 

concerns - for not interviewing Petitioner prior to bringing charges. Due to the 

interwoven facts and victims between the Michigan and Wisconsin charges and the 

Arizona charges, the application of McNeil to Petitioner’s case was not as obvious as he 

argues. The only limitation imposed by the trial court on Petitioner’s cross examination 

about the propriety of the investigation was the narrow topic of why Petitioner was not 

questioned. Petitioner’s confrontation clause rights were not violated. 

 Ground 17 is procedurally barred without excuse. Petitioner has not demonstrated 

cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted ground. The decision of Petitioner’s 

appellate counsel to pass over this claim was objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed 

to establish that any of his convictions would have been reversed or vacated even if his 

appellate counsel had raised this ground on direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the 

merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 18: Petitioner’s federal due process and confrontation clause 

rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from eliciting evidence of 

victim Ellen’s/Jasmine’s criminal history. 

Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 18 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

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merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 16

Petitioner argues that it was fundamental error for the trial court to prohibit him 

from bringing out evidence of Ellen’s criminal history. (Doc. 1 at 33-35) The criminal 

history at issue was Ellen having stolen Ritalin, an act to which she admitted and for 

which was placed on juvenile probation. (DR 452 at 16-17, 21, 27-28) The trial court 

granted the State’s motion in limine to preclude this evidence, finding it was not relevant 

to the issue of whether Petitioner had improper criminal sexual conduct with the victims. 

(Id. at 27-28) 

The record shows that Petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to, and did, 

rigorously cross-examine Ellen about her testimony. The circumstance that the trial court 

prohibited Petitioner from questioning this witness about was well within the trial court’s 

discretion to exclude under Arizona Rules of Evidence 608(b) and/or 609(d)(4). This 

action would be fully in accord with the Supreme Court’s discussion in Van Arsdall, 475 

U.S. at 679 (“trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is 

concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns 

about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ 

safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”).

 Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted 

ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was 

objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would 

have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on 

direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 

16 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

VI.2) (Doc. 508 at 23), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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 Ground 19: Petitioner argues his federal due process and confrontation 

clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from conducting a recross examination of victim Ellen during the trial. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 19 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 17 

Ground 19 asserts a confrontation clause claim regarding the introduction of an 

exhibit depicting circumcised and uncircumcised penises during Ellen’s testimony and 

the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s request for re-cross examination regarding the 

exhibit. Petitioner separately argued a due process violation in Ground 9, supra. 

 As discussed supra, the confrontation clause allows trial judges “wide latitude” to 

impose “reasonable limits” on cross-examination of witnesses. On the facts, the trial 

judge was well within the range of reasonable limits to preclude Petitioner from 

conducting re-cross-examination based on the exhibit. Petitioner had already dramatically 

challenged Ellen on her testimony that he was circumcised, leaving her to concede that 

she misunderstood what the term meant. (DR 421 at 47-48) The confrontation clause 

requires sufficient opportunity to cross examine, which Petitioner was afforded, but it 

does not guarantee the last word as Petitioner’s argument in support of this Petition 

ground implies. 

 Similar to his due process clause argument discussed in Ground 9, supra, the 

decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was objectively 

 

17 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

VI.3) (Doc. 508 at 23-24), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal 

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reasonable. Petitioner has not demonstrated that any of his convictions would have been 

reversed or vacated if his appellate counsel had raised this ground. Moreover, Petitioner 

is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on 

the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an 

unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 20: Petitioner argues his federal due process and confrontation 

clause rights were violated when the trial court prohibited him from impeaching 

government witness Horner with a prior inconsistent statement. 

Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 20 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 18

At issue in Ground 20 is Petitioner’s cross examination of witness Horner, the 

stepfather of Petitioner’s wife. Petitioner asked Horner if Horner had ever “expressed a 

concern that . . . these allegations may be conjured up.” (DR 428 at 118) Horner replied 

“no.” (Id.) Petitioner then confirmed with Horner that he had been interviewed by the 

Phoenix Police Department and asked Horner, “It is your testimony right now that you 

never said I have thoughts that maybe some of this a conjured up by the different 

testimony that they’ve given so inconsistent?” (Id. at 118-119) Mr. Horner said he did not 

recall having made that statement. (Id. at 119) Later, Petitioner cross-examined the 

Phoenix Police detective who had interviewed Mr. Horner. (DR 421 at 98-114) Petitioner 

asked her, “When you interviewed Harold Horner, did he express any concern that he had 

 

18 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

VI.4)(Doc. 508 at 24), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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that the allegations may be made up?” (Id. at 100) The prosecutor objected to the 

question. (Id.) Petitioner explained that he was attempting to establish through the 

detective that Horner had made a prior inconsistent statement. (Id. at 101) The prosecutor 

argued that Petitioner had already impeached Horner, and although he did not get the 

response he wanted, it was improper to use the detective for the same purpose. (Id.) The 

trial court sustained the objection. (Id.) 

 As discussed above regarding confrontation clause rights, the trial court is 

afforded wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross examination based on 

concerns of relevancy.19 Here, Petitioner had the opportunity to ask Horner directly about 

his previous statement, and Petitioner’s questioning of Horner and the detective made it 

clear to the jury that Horner’s statement had been recorded on the police report as 

represented by Petitioner. (DR 421 at 101, DR 428 at 119) Further, whether Horner had 

expressed a belief that the allegations against Petitioner were made up was irrelevant and 

collateral. The question of whether the victims were telling the truth or not about the sex 

allegations was a question for the jury, not the witnesses. Under Arizona law, “[i]t is 

well settled that where a witness denies the making of a prior inconsistent statement and 

the statement relates to a matter collateral to the issues being tried, the impeaching party 

is bound by the witness’ answer and can’t produce extrinsic evidence to contradict the 

witness.” State v. Williams, 111 Ariz. 511, 514, 533 P.2d 1146, 1149 (Ariz. 1975).

 Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted 

ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was 

objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would 

have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on 

direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 

19 Arizona courts are allowed discretion to find a prior statement inconsistent if a 

witness’s inability to recall is disbelieved by the trial judge. State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 

60, 76, 280 P.3d 604, 620 (Ariz. 2012). 

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 Ground 21: Petitioner argues the trial court prohibited him from 

impeaching the victims with their prior inconsistent statements. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 21 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 20

Petitioner explains that the three victims in this case had previously been 

interviewed by police in Michigan and Wisconsin as well as by the Phoenix Police 

Department. (Doc. 1-2 at 1) In addition, the victims had given testimony in a preliminary 

hearing and two prior trials in Michigan as well as in a preliminary hearing in Wisconsin. 

(Id.) Even outside of the web of habeas procedure, Ground 21 fails because the Court’s 

review of the trial record plainly reveals that Petitioner was allowed to use the transcripts 

and previous statements to cross examine the victims. At times, Petitioner did so quite 

effectively. See, e.g., DR 422 at 29-30. Petitioner’s appellate counsel was correct not to 

raise this issue on appeal. Petitioner failed to preserve the issue at trial and the issue 

lacked legal merit. 

 Respondents focus their argument on the legal issues raised in a pretrial motion 

that Petitioner filed prior to trial. Citing Rule 19.3(c) Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, Petitioner filed a motion for permission to “read-in” testimony from his 

previous action in Michigan from witnesses who might not have been available to testify 

at Petitioner’s Arizona action. (DR 62) The Court agrees with Petitioner that this motion 

 

20 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

VI.5) (DR 508 at 22, 24-25), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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and its legal basis do not well inform on the issue of whether Petitioner should have been 

and in fact was allowed to cross examine the victims using their previous statements. 

 Petitioner cited instances in which he alleges the trial court improperly prohibited 

him from using the victims’ prior inconsistent statements in cross examination. (Doc. 36-

4 at 18) In the first example, DR 418 at 114, Petitioner appears to be referring to this 

exchange: 

Q: In that interview did you tell Detective VanGordon that it has been 

happening ever since two months after you got placed in my house? 

[Prosecutor]: Objection. Improper Impeachment. 

The Court: Sustained. 

Petitioner fails to inform that once he had laid foundation (DR 418 at 115, 116), he was 

later allowed to ask about what the victim said in the previous interview: 

Q: Do you remember telling Detective VanGordon that I began abusing 

you because it’s been happening ever since two months after we got there? 

[Prosecutor]: Objection. Hearsay. Improper impeachment. 

The Court: No. I’m going to overrule it. The witness can answer if she can. 

[Witness]: Ask the question. 

Q: Do you remember telling Detective VanGordon because it’s been 

happening ever since two months after we got there? 

A: I don’t know 

(DR 418 at 116-117) Then, Petitioner in his next question chooses to move on to a 

different line of questioning: 

Q: Let’s back up to when you first were placed in my home. We were 

living in a mobile home; correct? 

(DR 418 at 117). Petitioner can blame no one but himself for this choice. 

It appears to the Court that Petitioner was allowed many opportunities and varying 

ways in which to use the prior statements of the victims in cross examining them. For 

example, in one of the instances that Petitioner lists, DR 417 at 8 (Doc. 36-4 at 18), 

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Petitioner did not even attempt to directly use the transcripts or reports, and was still 

allowed to ask a question with the substance of a previous statement: 

Q: So your testimony today is that no one has refreshed your memory; is 

that correct? 

A: Correct. 

Q: Have you ever been asked about this in the past going to Las Vegas? 

[Prosecutor]: Objection. Hearsay. 

The Court: Sustained. Rephrase. 

Q: When you testified in the past about this were you asked if you knew 

where we went. 

A: I do not know. 

Q: Is your memory better today than it was four years ago? 

A: No. 

Q: So if four years ago you were asked about this and you didn’t 

remember then, why do you remember it today? 

A: Because I was talking about it. 

Q: But no one told you it was Las Vegas; correct? 

A: Correct. 

(Emphasis added) 

 Petitioner’s appellate counsel was correct that Petitioner failed to make a proper 

record. In instances where objections were sustained, Petitioner made no offer of proof 

which was necessary to understand the substance of the excluded evidence. See Arizona 

Rules of Evidence 103(a)(2). For example, Petitioner complains about the sustained 

objection at DR 422 at 106. Yet, Petitioner did not put into the trial court record the 

substance of the transcript section to which he was referring and one cannot tell the 

substance from the context (DR 422 at 105-107). 

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rephrase and have his question answered after properly refreshing recollection. Petitioner 

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cites DR 417 at 53-54: 

Q: This pain level – I am going back to pain that you described. Have you 

ever said that it felt like a needle. 

A: I don’t know. 

Q: You’ve testified regarding this in the past, correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Would your prior testimony be consistent with the way you felt that 

night? 

[Prosecutor]: Objection. 

The Court: Sustained. 

Q: In your prior testimony did you say it felt like a needle? 

[Prosecutor]: Objection. Improper impeachment. Hearsay. 

The Court: Sustained. 

Then, Petitioner refreshes recollection: 

Q: Would looking at your prior testimony would it help refresh your 

memory what it felt like? 

A: Yes. 

(DR 417 at 54). On the next page not cited by Petitioner, Petitioner gets his question 

answered: 

Q: Okay. How did you describe how that felt then? 

A: I said like a needle. 

(DR 417 at 55) 

 Another misleading reference by Petitioner is the citation to DR 422 at 33, when 

an objection is sustained to having a victim read a portion of a transcript of her previous 

statement. Petitioner fails to bring to the Court’s attention that after additional 

questioning, Petitioner is successful in having the victim read that statement to the jury. 

(DR 422 at 71) 

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the trial judge not only overrules the prosecutor’s objection to an attempt by Petitioner to 

use the transcript, but also states, “You can go ahead and do this, Mr. Karban. Please 

maybe we can – you can consult with [your advisory counsel]. That’s what he’s for.” 

(DR 422 at 76) Petitioner then goes on to use the transcript to refresh the victim’s 

recollection and ask his questions over yet another objection by the prosecutor. (DR 422 

at 77-79) 

 With that same victim and other victims, Petitioner became proficient at refreshing 

recollection and did so several more times effectively with previous statements. See, e.g., 

DR 422 at 129-130 (Petitioner only cites DR 422 at 128); DR 424 at 70-71 (Petitioner 

only cites DR 422 at 70); DR 417 at 59 (“Q: That’s not your previous testimony? A: It 

is...”) 

 To the extent that Petitioner’s use of the previous statements was not how he 

would have liked, this Court agrees with the trial court’s ruling on Petitioner’s petition 

for post-conviction relief: 

When a Defendant waives counsel and represents himself, he may not 

complain about the quality of his defense. Feretta v. California, 422 U.S. 

806, 834 n. 46 (1975). Further, he may not raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance of his own representation. State v Mott, [162 Ariz. 452, 460, 784 

P.2d] 278, 286 (1990). 

(DR 525 at 1). 

Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted 

ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was 

objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would 

have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on 

direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

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Ground 22: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated because he was convicted of crimes unsubstantiated by any testimony or other 

evidence. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 22 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 21

Petitioner argues that his federal rights were violated because some of the counts 

he was convicted of were not adequately substantiated by testimony or evidence.. 

 (i) Brenda’s/Amanda’s testimony

 Petitioner was found guilty of five counts involving Brenda: a count of 

molestation of a child; three counts of sexual conduct with a minor involving vaginalpenile contact; and one count of sexual conduct with a minor involving anal-penile 

contact. (DR 403 at 10-11) Respondents assert that the victim testimony reasonably 

supported the jury’s verdict of guilty on four counts of sexual conduct with a minor and 

one count of molestation of a child. 

 Brenda testified she had sex with Petitioner three times in Arizona. (Id. at 61) She 

described the first occasion as when one of her younger siblings was in the bed between 

her and Petitioner and he told that child to go sleep with Helen and another sister. (DR 

418 at 60-61) Brenda said she was not wearing clothes that night and that “he would stick 

his hot dog up my butterfly22 or my butt.” (Id. at 61) She said she thought the first 

 

21 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

VII) (Doc. 508 at 25-26), but he did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

22 Brenda referred to Petitioner’s penis as his “hot dog” and to her vagina/private 

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encounter ended when “one of the kids came into the camper.” (Id. at 64) She testified 

that Petitioner had touched her butterfly with his hot dog but did not put it in, and thought 

it was the first encounter. (Id. at 70) Respondents assert that the jury could reasonably 

conclude that Brenda’s testimony described at least two separate crimes: one involving 

Petitioner touching her butterfly with his hot dog but not putting it in, and another in 

which he stuck his hot dog up her butterfly or butt. (Doc. 33 at 139-140) 

 Brenda described her second encounter with Petitioner as “basically the same,” as 

the first, except that she thought it was just the boys in the camper with them at that point 

of the night. (Id. at 64) She said she could not remember what made the encounter stop 

that time. (Id. at 65) Respondents contend Brenda’s description of the second encounter 

constituted at least one additional crime. (Doc. 33 at 140) 

 Brenda described her third encounter with Petitioner as the time he told her he 

would give her five dollars and forgive a dollar she owed him if she slept in bed with him 

and had “fun,” meaning “sex”23. This encounter occurred at night. (Id. at 66-67) She 

thought this was the time Petitioner “stuck his hot dog in my butt, but I don’t know.” (Id.

at 67) Respondents argue that this testimony could allow a reasonable juror to conclude 

there had been a separate crime. (Doc. 33 at 140) 

Respondents further explain that Brenda’s/Amanda’s testimony provided the basis 

for at least one additional crime, when she said that she knew that Petitioner put his hot 

dog in her butt one time in the camper in Arizona. (Id. at 67) She said it was the time that 

she would scoot away toward the window. (Id. at 69) She said she did not know if it was 

boys or girls that were in the camper at that time. (Id. at 70) 

Petitioner argues that Brenda’s/Amanda’s testimony does not support all of the 

charges for which he was found guilty. In a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action, Petitioner’s 

argument prevails only if “it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial 

no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

 area as her “butterfly.” (DR 433 at 118-119; DR 418 at 60-61) 

23 She earlier testified that having “fun” with Petitioner meant having sex. (DR 418 at 60) 

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Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). Moreover, this Court is required to decide 

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319 (emphasis in original). In so holding, the Supreme Court 

recognized the jury’s obligation “fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the 

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id.

 Regarding his convictions relating to Brenda, Petitioner argues that her testimony 

really only describes two encounters, and further that the molestation charge must have 

been a lesser-included offense to a charge of sexual conduct with a minor, causing him 

prejudice because the sentence for those two counts are set to run consecutively. (Doc. 1-

2 at 7) Petitioner’s first argument fails because the testimony may reasonably be 

considered to support all five of the counts. Petitioner’s second argument fails because 

Brenda testified that he touched his penis to her vagina, but did not put it in. This could 

reasonably have been interpreted by a juror to mean a separate crime from when, during 

the same encounter, she said he penetrated her vagina or her anus with his penis. Under 

Arizona cases, “[m]ultiple sexual acts that occur during the same sexual attack may be 

treated as separate crimes.” State v. Boldrey, 176 Ariz. 378, 381, 861 P.2d 663, 666 (Ariz. 

App. 1993). 

 (ii) Helen’s testimony 

 The jury found Petitioner guilty on one count of sexual conduct with a minor 

regarding Helen. (DR 403 at 11) Helen testified that she only remembered spending one 

night in the camper. (DR 424 at 13) She said it was the night her mom came out to the 

camper and she moved from the bed Petitioner was using into another bed with two 

siblings. (Id.) After the siblings would not be quiet, she moved back into the bed 

Petitioner was sharing with Brenda and went to sleep. (Id. at 14-15) She awoke and felt 

Petitioner touching her vagina. (Id. at 15) She stated that Petitioner had placed his hand 

down her pajama pants, and was moving his finger “to rub.” (Id. at 16-18) Helen testified 

that this had happened before, but only once in Arizona. (Id. at 19) 

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 Petitioner argues that Helen’s testimony does not support the charge of sexual 

conduct of a minor because she did not testify to having sexual intercourse. (Doc. 1-2 at 

8) This argument fails because the Arizona charge of sexual conduct with a minor in 

A.R.S. § 13-1405 requires the “engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact[,]” 

and the definition of sexual intercourse in A.R.S. § 13-1401.3 captures “masturbatory 

contact with the penis or vulva[]” without the need to show penetration. Helen’s 

testimony that Petitioner was rubbing her vagina with his hand constituted masturbatory 

contact with the vulva. 

 (iii) Ellen’s testimony

 Petitioner was found guilty of five crimes involving Ellen in Arizona: two counts 

of sexual conduct with a minor, digital-vaginal contact; a count of sexual conduct with a 

minor, penile-vaginal contact; a count of sexual conduct with a minor, oral-vaginal 

contact; and a count of sexual abuse. (DR 403 at 11-12) 

 Ellen testified that Petitioner penetrated her vagina the first time while they were 

in the camper, fully clothed, and she was sitting on a bench behind him while they were 

watching television. (DR 423 at 74) She said that he penetrated her with more than one 

finger and was moving his hand “in and out” repeatedly. (Id. at 77, 80) The second 

encounter she testified to occurred in the camper during the day when they were alone 

and were going to take a nap. (DR 423 at 82-83) She said Petitioner kissed her on her 

vagina, put his private part in her vagina, and “touched her boobs.” (Id. at 82, 84, 85) She 

further explained that they both took off all of their clothes, and that he put his hand in 

her vagina. (Id. at 84-85) She also said that Petitioner put his private part in hers and had 

sex, which came to a stop when he ejaculated. (Id. at 86, DR 422 at 4) 

Petitioner argues that Ellen’s testimony did not support two charges of sexual 

conduct with a minor involving digital vaginal contact. (Doc. 1-2 at 8) This argument 

lacks merit because Ellen’s testimony expressly includes instances of Petitioner inserting 

his fingers into her vagina on two distinct occasions. (DR 423 at 73-81, 85-86) 

 Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted 

ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was 

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objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would 

have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on 

direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 23: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated when the trial court allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence of his flight 

in an unrelated case. 

Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 23 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 24

 Petitioner explains that when he was arrested in Wisconsin in January 2003 

(shortly after the allegations in Arizona occurred), a number of items were in his vehicle, 

including his sleep apnea machine, a gas can, plastic tubing, a laptop computer, a new 

cell phone agreement, a document entitled, “Creating a New Identity in North America”, 

his birth certificate, his parents’ death certificates, a road atlas, and $1,500.00 in cash. 

(Doc. 1-2 at 11; DR 408 at, 71-77, 82-85; 104-106, 139; DR 419 at 8-9, 15-21, 59; DR 

420 at 5-6, 43-50) The police also searched Petitioner’s Wisconsin apartment and found 

that it was largely emptied and that he appeared to be moving out. (DR 419 at 21, 26- 27) 

An investigation of the laptop recovered from Petitioner’s vehicle revealed a 30-day trial 

version of a software program permitting the user to remove files from a hard drive (DR 

 

24 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

VIII.1) (Doc. 508 at 27-28), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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416 at 79, 92-980), as well as images involving sexualized urination. (DR 416 at 101, 

124) These facts also underlie Petitioner’s arguments presented in Grounds 24 and 25. 

 Petitioner filed a pretrial motion to preclude evidence and testimony related to 

intent to flee. (DR 181) He stated that abuse allegations were made against him on 

December 31, 2002, and he was arrested in Wisconsin on January 5, 2003. (Id. at 1) After 

an acquittal in a jury trial in Michigan, Petitioner then was arrested for similar allegations 

involving the same victims in Wisconsin, and was released on May 31, 2005 after taking 

an Alford Plea agreement for time served. (Id. at 2-3) A Wisconsin police detective 

subsequently referred the original Arizona allegations occurring at the end of December 

2002 to the Phoenix Police Department, after which Petitioner was arrested on July 25, 

2005 for the Arizona charges. (Id. at 3) 

 Petitioner was released on bond for the Arizona arrest warrant, and remained in 

Wisconsin under certain conditions until he waived extradition to Maricopa County. (Id.) 

Petitioner emphasized that during that time, he had “ample time and resources to 

abscond, but did not.” (Id.) For this reason, Petitioner argued that the evidence of intent 

to flee in early 2003 would not be probative of truthfulness. (Id. at 4, citing Ariz. R. Evid. 

608) The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to preclude the evidence and left it to the 

jury to decide whether there was any intent to flee. (DR 441 at 27-33) 

Petitioner’s argument regarding the trial court’s ruling on the introduction of 

evidence of his flight is unavailing. Petitioner’s characterization that the issue of his flight 

was from “an unrelated case” is unfounded. Petitioner’s wife learned of the allegations in 

Arizona on December 31, 2002. (DR 432 at 118) Petitioner flew back to Wisconsin on 

January 1, 2003. (DR 407 at 32-34) He was stopped by the police in Wisconsin on 

January 5, 2003 with the items at issue in his vehicle. (DR 419 at 10-15) Despite the fact 

that Petitioner was tried on the Michigan and Wisconsin charges before he was 

eventually charged in Arizona for the allegations that occurred in late 2002, the Arizona 

allegations were those most closely tied to date of Petitioner’s 2003 arrest. The nature of 

much of the evidence (particularly the document entitled, “Creating a New Identity in 

North America,” his birth certificate, his parents’ death certificates, a new cell phone 

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agreement, and $1,500.00 in cash) was relevant to Petitioner’s state of mind shortly after 

the allegations came out. See Ground 26, infra for additional discussion of Petitioner’s 

arguments against the jury instruction on flight and concealment. 

 Ground 23 is procedurally barred without excuse. Petitioner has not demonstrated 

cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted ground. The decision of Petitioner’s 

appellate counsel to pass over this claim was objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed 

to establish that any of his convictions would have been reversed or vacated even if his 

appellate counsel had raised this ground on direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the 

merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 24: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated when the trial court prohibited him from introducing evidence to refute 

evidence introduced by the state to support their allegation of “flight.” 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 24 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 25

After the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to preclude the flight evidence 

associated with his arrest on January 5, 2003, there was argument on whether Petitioner 

should be permitted to introduce evidence that, prior to surrendering to the jurisdiction of 

the Maricopa County Court in 2005, he could have absconded and did not. (DR 441 at 

 

25 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

VIII.2) (Doc. 508 at 28), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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33-38) Petitioner asserted that it would be unfair to allow evidence of intent to flee in 

January 2003, yet preclude evidence of his opportunity to flee while on probation but out 

of custody. (Id. at 34) 

 The state asserted that the two time periods were distinguishable, based on the 

proximity in time to the allegations of abuse, which could be relevant to consciousness of 

guilt. (Id. at 35) The state argued the two sets of circumstances were further 

distinguishable because in 2003 Petitioner had not been charged, while in 2005 he was 

under Wisconsin probation supervision. (Id. at 36) The trial court ruled that the 2003 

evidence of flight would be allowed, but Petitioner would not be permitted to comment 

on “what he did or did not attempt to do in 2005.” (Id. at 38) 

Evidence of whether Petitioner chose not to abscond more than two years after his 

arrest, after having been acquitted in Michigan and having entered into a plea deal in 

Wisconsin, is too attenuated by time and by Petitioner’s changed circumstances to be 

relevant on the question of his state of mind shortly after the allegations in late 2002/early 

2003. The trial court’s preclusion of this evidence was reasonable pursuant to an 

assessment of relevancy under Rules 401 and 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. See

Ground 26, infra for additional discussion of Petitioner’s arguments against the jury 

instruction on flight and concealment. 

 Ground 24 is procedurally barred without excuse. Petitioner has not demonstrated 

cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted ground. The decision of Petitioner’s 

appellate counsel to pass over this claim was objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed 

to establish that any of his convictions would have been reversed or vacated even if his 

appellate counsel had raised this ground on direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the 

merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standard. 

Ground 25: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights were 

violated when the trial court gave a jury instruction on “flight” without sufficient 

evidence. 

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 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 25 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 26

 Petitioner argues that the standard Arizona flight or concealment instruction given 

the jury (DR 406 at 82-83) was not substantiated by testimony or evidence. (Doc. 1-2 at 

18) Petitioner states that he objected to this instruction, but does not point to any record 

in support of his objection, other than his affidavit attached to his PCR petition, in which 

he avers, “While I recall objecting to the jury instruction regarding flight, I cannot find 

the record of the proceeding.” (DR 508, Ex. 3, ¶11; Doc. 36 at 27) The trial transcript 

including the reading of the instructions to the jury does not indicate that Petitioner 

objected to the giving of the instruction at or near that time. (Dr. 406 at 83, 91) 

 In Arizona, before instructing a jury regarding evidence of flight, a defendant’s 

conduct must “manifest a consciousness of guilt.” State v. Cutright, 196 Ariz. 567, 570, 2 

P.3d 657, 660 (Ariz. App. 1999). Arizona applies a two-part test before determining that 

a flight instruction is appropriate, including that: (1) evidence is assessed for a reasonable 

inference that flight or attempted flight was “open” (i.e., the result of immediate pursuit); 

and, if not (2) the evidence must “support the inference that the accused utilized the 

element of concealment or attempted concealment.” State v. Smith, 113 Ariz. 298, 300, 

442 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Ariz. 1976). This test requires a court to “be able to reasonably 

infer from the evidence that the defendant left the scene in a manner which obviously 

 

26 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

VIII.3) (Doc. 508 at 28-30), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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invites suspicion or announces guilt.” State v. Weible, 142 Ariz. 113, 116, 688 P.2d 1005, 

1008 (Ariz. 1984). 

 Respondents concede that the situation presented here does not conform to the first 

test. (Doc. 33 at 147) They assert, however, that the evidence amply supports the second 

test allowing the inference that Petitioner was in the process of engaging in concealment 

or attempted concealment. (Id.) 

 The jury instruction read: 

Flight or concealment. In determining whether the State has proved the 

Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider any 

evidence of the Defendant’s running away, hiding, or concealing evidence, 

together with all the other evidence in the case. You may also consider the 

Defendant’s reasons for running away, hiding, or concealing evidence. 

Running away, hiding or concealing evidence after a crime has been 

committed does not by itself prove guilt. 

(DR 406 at 82-83) Respondents’ arguments supporting the trial court’s decision to give 

the instruction appear reasonable, effectively distinguishing certain facts in State v. 

Speers, 209 Ariz. 125, 98 P.3d 560 (Ariz.App. 2012). 

 Regardless of whether the trial court was correct in giving the jury instruction 

under Arizona law, that decision by Petitioner’s trial court cannot be said to rise to the 

level of a violation of Petitioner’s federal due process rights. Similar to the circumstances 

present in the habeas cases cited by Respondents, the flight instruction given at 

Petitioner’s trial included that a finding of flight was insufficient to establish guilt, and 

that all other evidence in the case should be considered, including the defendant’s reasons 

for running, hiding or concealing evidence. See Hawkins v. Hora, 572 Fed. Appx. 480, 

481 (9th Cir. 2014); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. 

Yates, 622 F.Supp.2d 854, 860 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Petitioner has not shown that the flight 

instruction “by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). 

 There was strong evidence that Petitioner was in the process of flight and intended 

to conceal his identity and the contents of his laptop. Ground 25 is procedurally barred 

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without excuse. Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally 

defaulted ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim 

was objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions 

would have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground 

on direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 26: Petitioner argues his trial was held before an unfair and 

biased judge, violating his federal due process rights. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 26 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 27

 The Petition explains that he had obtained a letter dated September 3, 2008, 

written by Petitioner’s advisory counsel stating that, during the in-chambers conference 

Petitioner was not invited to attend (see Ground 14, supra), the trial judge told advisory 

counsel he felt very uncomfortable having Petitioner in his chambers “with pictures of his 

family all around, and that he was afraid of Mr. Karban seeing these pictures.” (DR 370 

at Exh. A) Based on the judge’s purported statement, Petitioner concludes that the logical 

result is that the judge would be, and was, predisposed to making sure that Petitioner was 

convicted. (Doc. 1-2 at 23) 

 

27 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

IX) (Doc. 508 at 30-32), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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 Petitioner provided some examples he argues indicates the trial court’s 

“inconspicuous maneuvering” intended to achieve a conviction, including (1) prohibiting 

a line of cross-examination of a prosecution witness; (2) overruling Petitioner’s objection 

to the prosecution’s questioning of one of the victims about Petitioner’s mindset 

regarding committing sexual abuse in the presence of others; and (3) sustaining an 

objection (as hearsay) to a question from Petitioner to Ellen about whether she ever wrote 

letters to Petitioner’s wife describing her relationship with Petitioner. (Id. at 23-25) 

 Additionally, Petitioner complains the trial court’s animosity toward him was 

evident in the court’s facial expressions, impatience with the slowness of the defense 

case, permissiveness with the State regarding discovery violations, trial continuances and 

violations of Petitioner’s speedy trial rights. (Id. at 26-27) Petitioner contends that the 

judge’s permissive rulings did not extend to him, as evidenced, for example, in the denial 

of Petitioner’s request for time to have an audio tape enhanced and of his motion for a 

mistrial. (Id. at 27)

 To prevail, Petitioner’s claim of judicial bias “must overcome a presumption of 

honesty and integrity” in his trial judge. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). The 

U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that, in assessing a trial court’s alleged bias or 

prejudice, it is understood that: 

[t]he judge . . . may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill 

disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly 

reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or 

prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly 

and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings. 

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1994). The Court instructed that: (1) 

judicial rulings, standing alone, “almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or 

partiality motion”; and (2) “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced 

or events occurring in the course of the . . . proceedings . . ., do not constitute a basis for a 

bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that 

would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. The Court further explained that 

“judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even 

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hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality 

challenge.” Id. Providing additional dimension to actions by judges that would not 

support a finding of bias, the Supreme Court reasoned: 

Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, 

dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of 

what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as . . . 

judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom 

administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at 

courtroom administration—remain immune. 

Id. at 555-556 (emphasis in original). 

 As noted, in his Petition, Petitioner offers three examples of evidentiary rulings 

that Petitioner believes are incorrect legally. (Doc. 1-2 at 23-26) He specifically notes 

that these are only samples of evidentiary rulings that he considers to have been 

questionable. (Doc. 1-2 at 26) Petitioner supported his state PCR action with his affidavit 

and affidavits from his sister, niece and his expert witness and family acquaintance, Dr. 

LeMire, each averring that the trial court consistently urged Petitioner to move his case 

along faster, and made “unprofessional” facial expressions and gestures. (Doc. 3-4 at 7, 

27, 29) Each asserted that the trial court did not demonstrate the same level of impatience 

and lack of consideration toward the State. (Id.) Petitioner’s affidavit dated June 23, 

2011, includes his statement that his family members told him that the trial court had 

been making “facial gestures” to him. (Doc. 3-1 at 29). 

The evidence on which Petitioner relies for his argument is disposed of by the 

Supreme Court’s opinion in Liteky. This Court has reviewed the trial transcripts, which 

do not reflect the trial court displaying overt bias against Petitioner or partiality toward 

the prosecution. If the trial court exhibited impatience or annoyance with the pace of the 

trial at times, this fails to establish bias or impartiality under Liteky, because such 

expressions appear to have reflected the trial court’s efforts at courtroom administration 

rather than bias against the pro se petitioner. 510 U.S. at 555-556. See also Larsen v. 

Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner’s arguments do not establish 

that the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary objections supply a basis to conclude the court 

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was biased against Petitioner, and clearly do not reflect a “deep-seated favoritism or 

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. If accurate, the trial 

court’s alleged statement that he did not invite Petitioner back into his chambers for a 

brief discussion because he did not feel comfortable with Petitioner in his chambers was a 

reflection of “knowledge and the opinion it produced [that] were properly and necessarily 

acquired in the course of the proceedings.” Id. at 550-51. The alleged statement does not 

display a degree of antagonism that suggests it was impossible for the court to render a 

fair judgment. The record does not support a contrary conclusion. 

Much of the evidence Petitioner relies on here was not in the state appellate court 

record. Importantly, Petitioner did not move to recuse the trial judge during trial, and did 

not otherwise assert bias and/or prejudice. Accordingly, this claim would not have been 

not reviewable on direct appeal. See State v. Everhart, 169 Ariz. 404, (Ariz. App. 1991). 

Ground 26 is procedurally defaulted without excuse. Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that this claim was any stronger than the claims his appellate counsel argued 

on direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner has not established prejudice because he fails to 

show that even if his appellate counsel had asserted this claim to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, the result of Petitioner’s proceeding would have been different. Moreover, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ 

ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an 

unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 Ground 27: Petitioner’s federal due process and double jeopardy rights 

were violated because the indictment was insufficient. 

 This claim was not argued on direct appeal. Petitioner first raised this issue in his 

PCR action as Issue XI, argued on the merits and as an IAAC claim for failure to raise 

the issue on appeal. (Doc. 508 at 33-36, Ex. HH at 16-17) The trial court denied the claim 

as precluded under Rule 32.2(a). (DR 525) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the 

constitutional (due process and double jeopardy) claim as precluded for failure to raise 

the claim on direct appeal. (Doc. 33-6 at 88) Additionally, applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed for not raising colorable 

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issues. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar because he 

failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and prejudice, or 

actual innocence to excuse the default. 

 Petitioner asserts that the indictment was insufficient in its language, and that the 

convictions cannot be sufficiently associated with the indictment counts. (Doc. 1-2 at 28-

32) Among other things, Petitioner argues the indictment did not adequately describe the 

necessary physical acts, lacked sufficient detail to provide him with notice of what he had 

been charged and convicted on, and made it difficult to tie the charges to the evidence, 

including dates. (Doc. 1-2 at 30-32) 

 Petitioner failed to raise this issue when required under Arizona procedural law. 

The Supreme Court of Arizona has explained this procedural obligation and why it exists: 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5(e) provides that “[n]o issue 

concerning a defect in the charging document shall be raised other than by a 

motion filed in accordance with Rule 16.” Rule 16.1(b) requires that such 

motions be filed at least twenty days before trial; Rule 16.1(c), in turn, 

provides that any motion not timely filed is “precluded.” 

We require pretrial objections to an indictment in order to allow correction 

of any alleged defects before trial begins. If a defendant makes a timely 

objection, the State can remedy any duplicity by filing a new indictment 

charging multiple counts, thus exposing a defendant to multiple penalties. 

See State v. Rushton, 172 Ariz. 454, 456, 837 P.2d 1189, 1191 (App.2002). 

By failing to object before trial and later seeking dismissal of allegedly 

duplicitous counts, a defendant seeks to have his cake and eat it too: he 

avoids the potential of multiple punishments by depriving the State of the 

opportunity to amend, and then attempts to avoid any punishment at all. See 

id. (“While defendant risked, in the alternative, the possibility of a nonunanimous guilty verdict on the single charge as alleged, his failure to 

object to the indictment indicates a risk he was willing to take. Defendant 

simply gambled and lost and cannot now be heard to complain.”). 

State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 335-36, 111 P.3d 369, 378 (Ariz. 2005). 

Petitioner also asserts that because his indictment was flawed, this impacted the 

state courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, which can be argued at any time. (Doc. 1-2 at 28) 

However, Petitioner did not claim in his state court actions that the trial court lacked 

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subject matter jurisdiction because of a defective indictment. Moreover, Article 6, 

Section 14(4) of the Arizona Constitution grants subject matter jurisdiction over felony 

cases, rather than Article 2, Section 30, which requires, in part, that a person will not be 

prosecuted criminally in Arizona without an information or indictment. State v. 

Maldonado, 223 Ariz. 309, 312, 223 P.2d 653, 656 (2010). 

 For each of the eleven counts included in Petitioner’s indictment, the State 

provided the elements and statutory basis for each charge, the name of the victim, and a 

date range, which for each count was “on or between the 21st day of December, 2002 and 

the 31st day of December, 2002.” (DR 1) The indictment noted that all charges occurred 

in Maricopa County, Arizona. (Id.) 

 Under federal law, “[a]n indictment is sufficient if it (1) ‘contains the elements of 

the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must 

defend’ and (2) ‘enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future 

prosecutions for the same offense.’” United States v. Lazarenko, 564 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). To allege the 

essential elements of a crime, an indictment may cite the specific statutory provision(s). 

Id. The Ninth Circuit has found no clearly established Supreme Court precedent that 

would disallow an indictment in a child sexual abuse case that provides a discrete period 

when several alleged instances of abuse occurred, without pinpointing a specific date for 

any one instance. Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 2003) 

 Although the jury in Petitioner’s trial was able to arrive at unanimous verdicts on 

each of the counts of the indictment, Petitioner argues that the evidence was insufficient 

to support all of the counts. The Court addressed this argument in finding no basis for 

relief under Ground 22, supra. Moreover, Petitioner’s concern regarding the possibility of 

double jeopardy arising out of the indictment is allayed by the trial evidence, “since the 

record as well as the indictment must be consulted should that issue arise in a future 

prosecution.” United States v. Lewis, 426 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir. 1970). 

 Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted 

ground. The decision of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was 

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objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would 

have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on 

direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR 

action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard..

Ground 28: Petitioner argues his federal due process and speedy trial 

rights were violated when his trial was delayed by the prosecution for 2.5 years. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 28 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 28

Ground 28 is about the time it took for the case to get to trial. Petitioner states that 

he pursued this claim in pre-trial motions as well as in a Special Action to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1-2 at 33) While acknowledging that some of the delay in getting 

his case to trial was attributable to the defense, Petitioner contends that it was “the State, 

with its vast resources which continuously stalled the start of trial.” (Doc. 1-2 at 33-36)

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial.” The speedy-trial right is “amorphous,” 

“slippery,” and “necessarily relative.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). In 

Barker, the Court refused to quantify the right or to predicate the right on a defendant's 

explicit request for a speedy trial. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89–90 (2009). 

Rejecting such “inflexible approaches,” Barker established a “balancing test, in which the 

 

28 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

XII) (Doc. 508 at 36-39), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” 407 U.S. at 529-30. 

 Some of the factors that should be weighed when considering such claims include 

the length of and reasons for delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and the 

prejudice to the defendant from the delay. Brillon, 556 U.S. at 89–90; Barker, 407 U.S. at 

530. To trigger a speedy trial inquiry, an accused must show that the period between 

indictment and trial passes a threshold point of “presumptively prejudicial” delay. See, 

e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Prejudice normally is presumed if the delay in bringing the 

defendant to trial has exceeded one year. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1 

(1992). If this threshold is not met, the Court need not proceed with the other Barker

factors. Id., 505 U.S. at 651–52. Deliberate delay “to hamper the defense” weighs heavily 

against the prosecution. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. “[M]ore neutral reason[s] such as 

negligence or overcrowded courts” weigh less heavily “but nevertheless should be 

considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the 

government rather than with the defendant.” Id. Because defense counsel is defendant's 

agent, delay caused by the defendant's counsel is charged against the defendant. See 

Brillon, 556 U.S. at 90–91. 

(i) Length of the delay 

 Petitioner was indicted on the Arizona charges on July 25, 2005 (DR 1) and his 

first day of trial was April 16, 2008 (DR 437). This period accounts for about 2.7 years, 

which falls within the period of lapsed time when prejudice is presumed. Accordingly, 

this Court assesses the other Barker factors. 

(ii) Reasons for the delay

 On February 7, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion to designate a complex case. (DR 

22) He based his request on: the eleven counts of his indictment, the nature of the charges 

against him; the number of State’s witnesses from Arizona, Michigan and Wisconsin; the 

need for expert witnesses; the need to obtain transcripts and to interview witnesses 

associated with his prior prosecutions in Michigan and Wisconsin; and defense counsel’s 

inability to be prepared for the then-existing trial date in March 2006. (DR 22) On August 

29, 2006, Petitioner’s new counsel requested a trial continuance from September 2006 to 

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April 2007. (DR 34) Among the reasons given the court were that Petitioner’s case had 

been assigned to another attorney who required additional trial preparation and because 

counsel would not be available until after a pending homicide trial. (Id.) Petitioner later 

moved to continue the May 17, 2007, trial date, after which trial was set for September 

18, 2007. 

 The trial was continued a number of times between September 2007 and the 

eventual start date in April 2008, largely due to issues attributable to the prosecution and 

assignment of the case to a new prosecutor, to the trial court’s calendar, and to scheduling 

conflicts with expert witnesses. (Doc. 33 at 172) 

(ii) Defendant’s assertion of the right 

 Petitioner did assert his right to a speedy trial, and filed a motion to have his case 

dismissed due to trial continuances. (DR 169) However, his assertion of this right must be 

assessed in light of his “other conduct” which contributed to the trial delay. United States 

v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986). Foremost in this assessment is the fact that 

Petitioner requested the trial continuances resulting in trial delay for most of 2006 and a 

large portion of 2007 due to his request to designate his case as complex and his new 

counsel’s case schedule. Additionally, Petitioner’s defense case was supported by a very 

large number of pre-trial motions, which are evidence of not only a vigorous defense but 

also a substantial workload for the prosecution and trial court to address. 

(iii) Prejudice to Defendant from the delay

 Petitioner asserts prejudice in the delay of his trial by explaining that his witnesses 

were frustrated at repeated trial date changes, that he was required to spend “countless 

hours” trying to keep his witnesses up to date, and that the delay caused anxiety, which 

he expressed to the trial court. (Doc. 2-3 at 33-34; Doc. 36-5 at 31) He does not assert 

that the delay resulted in lost evidence or lost memories, resulting in prejudice to his case. 

 In balancing the Barker factors, the Court finds: (1) that Petitioner has not shown 

significant prejudice from trial delay; and (2) that while he asserted his speedy trial 

rights, Petitioner was responsible for much of the delay, and the State’s reasons for 

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causing delay were not a reflection of bad faith but were rather attributable to 

overcrowded courts and change in counsel by both the prosecution and the defense. 

 Ground 28 is procedurally defaulted without excuse. Petitioner has not 

demonstrated cause and prejudice for this procedurally defaulted ground. The decision of 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel to pass over this claim was objectively reasonable. 

Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his convictions would have been reversed or 

vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised this ground on direct appeal. Moreover, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ 

ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC claim in his PCR action does not represent an 

unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

Ground 29: Petitioner argues his federal due process rights to 

fundamental fairness were violated based on cumulative error. 

 Like the remainder of Grounds 7-26, 28, and 29, Ground 29 was procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because it was not raised on direct appeal and Petitioner’s 

presentation of the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at the Arizona 

Court of Appeals during his PCR proceedings did not fairly present the underlying 

constitutional claim (see discussion in Section II(B), supra). Applying the Strickland test, 

the court of appeals correctly held that Petitioner’s IAAC claims failed. (Doc. 33-6 at 87-

88) Petitioner does not overcome the procedural bar to considering this claim on the 

merits because he failed to establish his IAAC claim resulted in cause for the default and 

prejudice, and because he failed to show actual innocence to excuse the default. 29

 Petitioner asserts that there must have been trial error because he had been tried on 

similar charges that occurred in Michigan and was acquitted. (Id. at 38) To support this 

conclusion, Petitioner argues that the Arizona charges lacked support from medical 

evidence, any eyewitnesses, or photographic images of the actual abuse. (Id.) He 

concludes that the difference in result between his Michigan and Arizona cases was “the 

accumulation of errors [in his Arizona action] depriving [him] of a fair trial.” (Id.) 

 

29 Petitioner raised this issue on the merits in his PCR action at the trial court (Issue 

X) (Doc. 508 at 32-33), but did not properly raise such on PCR appeal. 

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 Both Petitioner and the State concur that Arizona follows a general rule of not 

recognizing the cumulative error doctrine in criminal cases, unless “the court is 

evaluating a claim that prosecutorial misconduct deprived [the] defendant of a fair trial.”

Smith v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 78-79, 969 P.2d 1184, 1190-91 (Ariz. 1998). It would 

seem to be reasonable that Petitioner’s appellate counsel could not have provided 

ineffective counsel for failure to raise a claim that the Arizona appellate courts would not 

recognize. Nevertheless, Petitioner suggests that appellate counsel could have raised this 

claim in order to preserve it for federal habeas review.

Ninth Circuit caselaw holds that “[t]he combined effect of multiple errors may 

justify habeas relief “if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each error 

considered individually would not require reversal.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 928 

(9th Cir.2007). But when none of a petitioner's claims rises to the level of constitutional 

error, “there is nothing to accumulate to a level of a constitutional violation.” Mancuso v. 

Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir.2002). In review of the Petition, this Court has 

found that none of the grounds establishes a constitutional violation. Accordingly, there is 

nothing here to accumulate to a level of constitutional violation. 

 Ground 29 is procedurally barred without excuse. In light of this Court’s finding 

of no basis for success on a cumulative error, it finds that Petitioner’s counsel’s 

representation was objectively reasonable. Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his 

convictions would have been reversed or vacated even if his appellate counsel had raised 

this ground on direct appeal. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 because the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s IAAC 

claim in his PCR action does not represent an unreasonable application of the Strickland

standard. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner raised Grounds 1 and 2 on direct appeal but these claims were not 

federalized. Accordingly, the Court finds that these grounds were not exhausted and were 

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not overcome this procedural default by 

establishing cause and prejudice or actual innocence. 

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Petitioner raised Ground 3 on direct appeal and it was arguably federalized. The 

Court finds that this ground fails because Petitioner has not demonstrated that the trial 

court’s preclusion of his acquittal in Michigan was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law. 

Petitioner did not raise Ground 4 on appeal, and the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. This Court finds the 

adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law. 

Petitioner did not raise Ground 5 on direct appeal. The Court finds that this ground 

is procedurally barred because it was not fairly presented to the state court as a federal 

claim, and Petitioner has not argued cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence to 

overcome that procedural bar, which in any event the record does not support. 

Ground 6 argues appellate ineffective assistance of counsel. This ground was first 

raised in his PCR action, and the Court finds it was properly denied under the Strickland

standard. 

Grounds 7 through 26, 28, and 29 were not raised on direct appeal of Petitioner’s 

conviction and Petitioner did not raise these as independent claims in appeal his state 

court PCR petition. Instead, Petitioner raised these claims as basis for appellate 

ineffective assistance of counsel in his post-conviction proceeding. After evaluating these 

grounds under the Strickland standard, this Court finds Petitioner failed to overcome his 

procedural default of these claims. 

Ground 27 was not raised on direct appeal. Petitioner raised Ground 27 as an 

independent ground for post-conviction relief, as well as a claim of IAAC. In the PCR 

proceedings, the state trial and appellate courts found this issue was precluded. This 

Court finds that Petitioner fails to overcome the procedural bar. Further, there was not 

appellate ineffective assistance of counsel for not raising the claim on direct appeal. 

 With regard to all twenty nine grounds of the Petition, Petitioner has not argued or 

shown actual innocence and the record in this matter does not support actual innocence. 

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This Court finds that Petitioner has not overcome any procedural default on the basis of 

actual innocence. 

 Finally, this Court finds that the adjudication of all 29 grounds by the Arizona 

courts, whether on the merits of the claims or asserted as claims of ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel, does not warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because such 

adjudication: (1) was not contrary to or did not involve an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or (2) did not result in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of facts 

considering the evidence presented.

IV. PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT HIS PETITION WITH AN 

AFFIDAVIT

 On September 8, 2016, Petitioner filed a “Request to Supplement the Record of 

[Petitioner’s] Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition.” (Doc. 44) In the motion, Petitioner 

requests leave of the Court to supplement the record with an affidavit. (Id.) Petitioner 

explains his request is relevant to Ground 14, involving his claim that his Faretta rights 

were violated when the trial court held an in-chambers conference without Petitioner’s 

participation. Petitioner’s request involves an affidavit from Mr. Lee Damner, who 

Petitioner states was the court-appointed private investigator present in the courtroom 

when the trial court called the in-chambers conference. (Id.) Although Petitioner does not 

attach any affidavit, he avers that “Mr. Damner will attest to the fact that Judge Lee 

violated [Karban’s] self-representation right over [Karban’s] contemporaneous objection 

and that [Karban] never acquiesced to permit advisory counsel to act or speak on behalf 

of [Karban].” (Id. at 2) 

 Petitioner asserted this issue in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, and the Arizona Court of Appeals decided the claim on the merits (Doc. 33-6 at 

87-88). Accordingly, review of Petitioner’s claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is 

limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 

merits. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181-182 (2011). Therefore, the Court denies 

Petitioner’s motion. 

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 Moreover, even if admitted, the Court finds that the affidavit would not alter the 

Court’s analysis of Ground 14. As is noted, the primary focus in deciding whether a pro 

se defendant’s Faretta rights have been respected is on “whether the defendant had a fair 

chance to present his case in his own way[,]” and have his “voice heard.” McKaskle, 465 

U.S. at 177. Mr. Damner was not present in chambers for the conference (DR 508 at 206, 

208) and at most could add to the record only that he had observed that Petitioner had 

objected as the judge was exiting the courtroom, as Petitioner averred in his affidavit. 

(Doc. 3-1 at 29) 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Stephen Frank Karban’s Request 

to Supplement the Record of His Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition (Doc. 44) be denied.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Stephen Frank Karban’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be

denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists 

of reason would not find the ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the 

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 8th day of December, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

 

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