Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03580/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03580-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 

2 Ciolino owns a HP PSC 2510 Photosmart printer. Feder did not identify the

printer model he owns. 

Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

In re: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION Case Number C 05-3580 JF

ORDER1 GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO STRIKE

[Docket No. 34]

I. BACKGROUND

Hewlett-Packard Co. (“HP”) manufactures printing supplies and inkjet printers. Nicklos

Ciolino (“Ciolino”) and Daniel Feder (“Feder”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) both own HP printers

purchased from CompUSA and Best Buy that use “smart chip” technology.2 “Smart chip”

technology is designed to inform the consumer of the remaining ink level in an HP ink cartridge

and when to reorder ink for an HP printer. For instance, once the “smart chip” reads that the

cartridge’s ink level is low, the “smart chip” sends a warning message to the consumer’s printer

**E-filed 3/7/06**

Case 5:05-cv-03580-JF Document 34 Filed 03/07/06 Page 1 of 13
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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

that the ink level is low and new ink needs to be ordered. 

Plaintiffs allege that HP engaged in unfair and deceptive conduct in connection with the

“smart chip” technology in its ink cartridges. Plaintiffs contend that the “smart chips” are

“programmed to prematurely register ink replacement long before depletion of the ink supply. 

Frequently, these cartridges can register as empty when they in fact have substantial ink

remaining.” Consolidated and Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”), ¶ 23. Plaintiffs

also contend that HP’s “smart chip” — without regard to the actual supply of remaining ink —

“is capable of rendering a cartridge unusable through the use of a built-in expiration date that is

concealed from consumers. An external date stamp instead only discloses the end of warranty

date, but not the date in which the cartridge is rendered unuseable.” Id., ¶ 24. 

In addition, HP allegedly “fails to explain the expiration feature at the point of purchase

and omits such information in their marketing materials.” Id., ¶ 25. Specifically, HP’s

“SureSupply” campaign and website omit such information. First, HP’s “SureSupply” campaign

promotes the “smart chip” technology as “a free user-friendly tool enabled through Smart

printing technology that provides . . . an easy way to manage and purchase HP genuine printing

supplies[.]” Id., ¶ 27. Second, HP’s website claims that “SureSupply automatically tracks and

manages customers’ toner or ink level usage, and provides alerts via email or cell phone when

toner or ink is low. With a couple of clicks of a button, customers can access cartridge

information, pricing and purchasing options that best meet their needs from the reseller of their

choice.” Id. Plaintiffs contend that HP’s “SureSupply” campaign is false because the actual

design of the “smart chip” limits consumers’ use of ink cartridges and makes consumers believe

that their cartridges are empty or expired and must be replaced. In sum, Plaintiffs assert that “HP

has deliberately withheld from its consumers information about the true functioning of the smart

chip . . . .” Id., ¶ 28. 

On October 31, 2005, Plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint (“amended

complaint”) against HP. Plaintiffs assert claims for: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of

implied warranty; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) violations of the California Consumers Legal

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

Remedies Act (“CLRA”), California Civil Code § 1750 et seq.; (5) violations of the California

False Advertising Act (“FAA”), California Business & Professions Code § 17500 et seq.; and (6)

violations of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business & Professions

Code § 17200 et seq. 

On January 6, 2006, HP filed a motion to dismiss and in the alternative a motion to strike. 

HP claims that Plaintiffs have not alleged an actual injury in connection with their six causes of

action. Additionally, HP asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims under the UCL, FAA, and CLRA fail

because the claims do not identify with the requisite particularity any statement, representation,

or conduct of HP that could support a claim under these statutes. HP also contends that the

breach of express warranty claim fails for lack of notice and insufficient facts and that the breach

of implied warranty claim fails because Plaintiffs were not in privity with HP. Finally, HP

asserts that the unjust enrichment claim is precluded because the written warranty agreements

govern the relationship between HP and Plaintiffs. 

On February 3, 2006, Plaintiffs filed opposition and HP filed a reply on February 10,

2006. Having considered the briefs, relevant evidence, and the oral arguments at the hearing on

February 24, 2006, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss and deny

the motion to strike.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for one of two

reasons: (1) Lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal

theory. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, all allegations

of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995);

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994).

“A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt the plaintiff can

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Clegg, 18 F.3d at

754. The court, however, “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Id. at

754-55. A court’s review is limited to the face of the complaint, documents the complaint

referenced, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Anderson v. Clow (In re Stac

Elecs. Sec. Litig.), 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950

F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991).

Motions to dismiss generally are viewed with disfavor under this liberal standard and are

granted rarely. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). Leave to

amend must be granted unless it is clear that amendments cannot cure the complaint’s

deficiencies. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, when

amendment would be futile dismissal may be ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d

386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996); Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1988); Beezley v.

Fremont Indem. Co., 804 F.2d 530, 531 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 

B. Standing

 “To establish the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,’ the plaintiff must

demonstrate that there was an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and

that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision by the Court.” Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit

Union, 366 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560-61 (1992)). HP argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege actual injury in each of their six claims

for relief.

Plaintiffs allege general injuries resulting from HP’s use of the “smart chip.” Paragraph

65 of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, for example, states that “[c]onsumers are . . . injured when

their printers begin to malfunction as a result of premature warnings of ink depletion and

cartridge expiration and when they are caused to purchase new cartridges before the old ones

have really run out of ink.” Amended Complaint, ¶ 65. However, Plaintiffs do not specify

whether their own printers began to malfunction or any other specific injuries. As HP makes

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

clear, “[n]either plaintiff ever alleges that he purchased an HP cartridge that was ‘partially

usable,’ or for that matter ever alleges anything at all about the performance of his HP printer or

print cartridges. And neither plaintiff alleges that he purchased a new printer cartridge that was

somehow ‘unnecessary’ as a result of HP’s conduct.” Reply at 4; see Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“[N]amed plaintiffs who represent a class must allege

and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other,

unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”

(citation and internal quotation omitted)). The other paragraphs Plaintiffs cite in their opposition

to show injury similarly fail. See Opposition at 3-4. Because Plaintiffs do not allege injury-infact, they also fail to allege the requisite casual connection between the alleged injuries and HP’s

conduct. Nor do Plaintiffs explain how their specific injuries will be redressed by the relief

sought. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (finding that the “litigant must

clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy these Art. III standing requirements”). 

Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend their complaint to address these deficiencies. 

C. Unfair Competition Law

The UCL defines “unfair competition” to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent

business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 17200. By proscribing any “unlawful” business

practice, the UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the

unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los

Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (1999). The UCL has been interpreted broadly to

prohibit unfair competition. See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 17 Cal.4th

553 (1998) (selling of cigarettes to minors in violation of state penal code constitutes unfair

competition under the statute). 

To state a claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., a plaintiff must show only

that “members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289

(9th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotation omitted). However, allegations “must state with

reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements” of the alleged violation. 

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Crystal Dynamics, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 1303, 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1997)

(quoting Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619 (1993)). Moreover, a claim

under the UCL need not be based upon violation of another law as “a practice may be deemed

unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law.” Cel-Tech Communications, Inc.,

20 Cal.4th at 180. In the instant case, Plaintiffs have identified with the required particularity the

statements and representations by HP that allegedly violates the UCL, FAA, and CLRA. 

Specifically, paragraphs 27 and 28 of the amended complaint describe how HP deceives

consumers through its “SureSupply” campaign and points to a particular HP statement and

representation on HP’s website:

27. As part of its “SureSupply” campaign, HP promotes

the “smart chip” technology as “a free user-friendly tool enabled

through Smart printing technology that provides you with an easy

way to manage and purchase HP genuine printing supplies . . .”

HP’s website claims that “SureSupply automatically tracks and

manages customers’ toner or ink level usage, and provides alerts

via email or cell phone when toner or ink is low. With a couple of

clicks of a button, customers can access cartridge information,

pricing and purchasing options that best meet their needs from the

reseller of their choice.”

28. The “SureSupply” campaign is false because, in

fact, the design of the “smart chip” deliberately limits a consumer’s

ability to use an ink cartridge to its full potential. “Smart chips”

and the “SureSupply” campaign deceive customers into falsely

believing that their cartridges are empty and can cause damage to

the printer, or that their cartridge [sic] are expired and must be

replaced. Absent from HP’s marketing material is any mention of

the “smart chip’s” predetermined shelf-life or premature signals of

ink depletion. The use of cartridges embedded with “smart chip”

technology increases the consumers’ cost to use HP printers. HP

has deliberately withheld from its consumers information about the

true functioning of the smart chip in a effort to prevent damage to

their bottom line. 

Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 27-28. After reviewing paragraphs 27 and 28, the Court concludes that

it is possible that the website statements could deceive a reasonable consumer. Reasonable

consumers very well could believe that their cartridges are empty or almost empty and must be

replaced, and by not immediately ordering new cartridges from HP they run the risk of not

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3 Similarly, Plaintiffs properly allege a violation of the FAA and CLRA. Reading

paragraphs 22-25 — how HP uses the “smart chip” in its deceptive scheme — and paragraphs

27-28 — the HP “SureSupply” website — together with the allegations contained in the amended

complaint’s CLRA count and FAA count, it is clear that Plaintiffs have alleged a violation of

these statutes. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 49-55, 59-60.

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

having a properly running printer.3 Accordingly, the state unfair competition causes of action

will not be dismissed.

D. Breach of Express Warranty

HP next contends that Plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claim should be dismissed

because there are not sufficient facts to justify such a claim. “In order to plead a cause of action

for breach of express warranty, one must allege the exact terms of the warranty, plaintiff’s

reasonable reliance thereon, and a breach of that warranty which proximately causes plaintiff

injury.” Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 142 (1986). The Court

agrees that Plaintiffs’ amended complaint does not comply with the requirements of Williams. 

While Plaintiffs state that HP breached warranty obligations with the use of an expiration date as

to the “smart chip” cartridges, it is unclear what precise terms of the warranty were supposedly

breached. Nor do Plaintiffs identify any specific warranty provision upon which they allegedly

relied. For example, paragraph 26 of the amended complaint provides: “According to the

Limited Warranty for HP Inkjet Print Cartridge Printerheads and Ink Supplies, HP will void the

warranty on any printer or cartridge if a cartridge was refilled using a third party device.” 

Amended Complaint, ¶ 26. 

HP further contends that Plaintiffs cannot recover for breach of express warranty because

timely notice of such breach was not given. The California Commercial Code § 2607(3)(A)

provides that a “buyer must, within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have

discovered any breach, notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy.” Cal. Com.

Code § 2607(3)(A). “The requirement of notice of breach is . . . designed to allow the defendant

opportunity for repairing the defective item, reducing damages, avoiding defective products in

the future, and negotiating settlements.” Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal.3d 374, 380

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4 HP’s reliance on Fieldstone Co. v. Briggs Plumbing Prods., Inc., 54 Cal.App.4th

357, 369-70 (1997), is unfounded. The Fieldstone plaintiff, as opposed to the Greenman

plaintiff, was sophisticated. Id. at 369. After explaining the difference between the

unsophisticated plaintiff in Greenman and the sophisticated plaintiff in Fieldstone, the court

states, “[t]hat is hardly the situation where, as here, plaintiff is a sophisticated development

company which has built many thousands of homes over the last two decades.” Fieldstone, 54

Cal.App.4th at 369. 

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

(1974). 

However, timely notice of a breach under California law is no longer required where the

action is against a manufacturer on a warranty that arises independently of a contract of sale, such

as a manufacturer’s express warranty. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal.2d 57, 61

(1963). The Greenman court explained that “[t]he notice requirement . . . is not an appropriate

one for the court to adopt in actions by injured consumers against manufacturers with whom they

have not dealt.” Id. According to Greenman, the notice requirement “becomes a booby-trap for

the unwary. The injured consumer is seldom steeped in the business practice which justifies the

rule, and at least until he has had legal advice it will not occur to him to give notice to one whom

he has had no dealings.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). In the instant case,

Plaintiffs bought their HP printers from retail sellers. HP’s express warranties were not

contained in the contract of sale between the Plaintiffs and the retail sellers, but instead were

created independently in HP’s brochure. Thus, even if Plaintiffs did not give timely notice of

breach of express warranty to HP, the claim is not barred. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Cavanaugh, 217 Cal.App.2d 492, 514-15 (1963)

(finding that “even if the plaintiff did not give timely notice of breach of warranty to the

manufacturer the cause of action should not be held to have been barred”).4 

Regardless, “notice otherwise given within a reasonable period of time can under

California law follow commencement of suit provided it is subsequently and properly pleaded.” 

Hampton v. Gebhardt’s Chili Powder Co., 294 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1961). On November 7,

2005, Plaintiffs subsequently provided notice to HP contained in a letter from Plaintiffs’ counsel,

Bruce L. Simon. See Declaration of Bruce L. Simon (“Simon Decl.”), Ex. A. The letter

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5 HP notes that the notice letter was sent seven days after Plaintiffs’ amended

complaint was filed on October 31, 2006. This error is not fatal, however, and HP cites no

controlling authority to the contrary.

6 Plaintiffs do not specify whether they are alleging a breach of implied warranty of

fitness or implied warranty of merchantability. 

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

provided that Plaintiffs “hereby demand that within 30 days . . . HP cease to engage in and rectify

the wrongful business practices detailed above. In addition, plaintiffs demand that HP refund,

replace, and correct the defective inkjet printers and printer cartridges sold to plaintiffs . . . .” Id. 

The letter, therefore, provided HP with notice and an opportunity to cure its breaches, which HP

allegedly has failed to do.5 Accordingly, Plaintiffs will be given leave to amend their claim for

breach of express warranty to remedy the deficiencies described above. 

E. Breach of Implied Warranty

HP next argues that Plaintiffs’ breach of implied warranty claim should be dismissed both

for lack of notice and for lack of privity. As to the notice requirement, see the discussion above. 

As to the second part, HP is correct that “[v]ertical privity is a prerequisite in California for

recovery on a theory of breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability.”6 U.S.

Roofing, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 228 Cal.App.3d 1431, 1441 (1991). “The term ‘vertical

privity’ refers to links in the chain of distribution of goods. If the buyer and seller occupy

adjoining links in the chain, they are in vertical privity with each other . . . .” Osborne v. Subaru

of America, Inc., 198 Cal.App.3d 646, 656 n.6 (1988). For example, in Anunziato v. eMachines,

Inc., 402 F.Supp.2d 1133, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2005), the court found that under California law, a

laptop computer buyer who purchased a computer from a retailer lacked vertical privity with the

computer manufacturer as required to state a claim for breach of implied warranty of

merchantability. 

In line with Anunziato, the Plaintiffs in the instant case purchased HP products from

CompUSA and Best Buy, and thus lacked vertical privity with the manufacturer, HP. However,

“privity is not required where plaintiff relied on defendant’s promotional materials.” Fieldstone,

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

54 Cal.App.4th at 371. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ breach of implied warranty claim is

inadequate as presently pled because Plaintiffs have not alleged that they relied on HP’s

advertisements or promotional materials in purchasing their HP products. It is also unclear to the

Court whether Plaintiffs directly bought ink cartridges from HP’s website using the

“SureSupply.” Plaintiffs, therefore, are given leave to amend to remedy the deficiencies outlined

above. 

F. Unjust Enrichment

HP argues that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim must be dismissed because specific

contracts that exist between Plaintiffs and HP, and an action for unjust enrichment does not lie

where a contractual relationship exists between the parties. Gerlinger v. Amazon.com, Inc., 311

F.Supp.2d 838, 856 (N.D. Cal. 2004). “Under California law . . . unjust enrichment is an action

in quasi-contract, which does not lie when an enforceable, binding agreement exists defining the

rights of the parties. Paracor Fin. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir.

1996). 

Under California law, unjust enrichment is “synonymous with restitution.” McBride v.

Boughton, 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387 (2004). To prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, plaintiff

must establish that defendant received a benefit and that it would be unjust to allow defendant to

retain the benefit at the expense of plaintiff. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726

(2000). “Determining whether it is unjust for a person to retain a benefit may involve policy

considerations.” First Nationwide Sav. v. Perry, 11 Cal.App.4th 1657, 1663 (1992). 

Here, Plaintiffs assert that, “the express warranty at issue is not a binding agreement

between the parties. There has been no bargain-for-exchange between plaintiffs and HP. Rather,

the bargain for exchange occurred between the retail seller and the plaintiffs.” Opposition at 16. 

Further, “Plaintiffs received the written warranties subsequent to their purchases of HP’s

products. Thus, the warranty itself was not specifically contracted for and cannot, by any means,

limit plaintiffs’ right to recover for unjust enrichment.” Id. Moreover, although the terms of

HP’s written warranty agreements may govern the relationship between HP and Plaintiffs,

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

Plaintiffs may plead an unjust enrichment claim in the alternative. Accordingly, HP’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim will be denied. 

III. MOTION TO STRIKE

A. Legal Standard

The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike

generally will not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could not have any

possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation. LeDuc v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 814

F.Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Allegations “supplying background or historical material or

other matter of an evidentiary nature will not be stricken unless unduly prejudicial to defendant.” 

Id. Moreover, allegations that contribute to a full understanding of the complaint as a whole

need not be stricken. Id.

B. Paragraph 12(i) and Paragraph 26

1. Paragraph 12(i)

Paragraph 12(i) of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint reads: 

The common legal and factual questions which do not vary

from Class member to Class member and which may be

determined without reference to individual circumstances of any

Class member include, but are not limited to, the following: 

. . . . 

(i) Whether Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing with Plaintiff and the Class[.]” 

Amended Complaint, ¶ 12(i).

HP moves to strike paragraph 12(i) as immaterial and irrelevant because “Plaintiffs have

not asserted a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

against HP . . . .” Motion to Strike at 6. The Court disagrees. Not only does paragraph 12(i)

relate to Plaintiffs’ specific allegations of HP’s misconduct under California Business &

Professions Code § 17200, but the paragraph also is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation

because conduct constituting a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing also

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

may constitute an unfair business practice under Section 17200. See Heighley v. J.C. Penny Life

Ins. Co., 257 F.Supp.2d 1241, 1256-58 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 

2. Paragraph 26

Paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint provides: 

According to the Limited Warranty for HP Inkjet Cartridge

Printerheads and Ink Supplies, HP will void the warranty on any

printer or cartridge if a cartridge was refilled using a third party

device. Thus, HP compounds the impact of the “smart chip”

technology by directing consumers to use only their cartridges, and

designing them so that they cannot be refilled by third parties,

which is a much cheaper way to replace ink.

Amended Complaint, ¶ 26. 

Plaintiffs contend that paragraph 26 is relevant to their causes of action for breach of

warranty and for violation of the UCL. The Court agrees. Paragraph 26 supplies background

information about HP’s practices that is not unduly prejudicial to HP. See LeDuc, 814 F. Supp.

at 830. Accordingly, the motion to strike will be denied. 

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED HP’s motion to dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and HP’s motion to strike is DENIED. Plaintiffs may

file an amended complaint on or before March 31, 2006, that addresses the deficiencies identified

herein. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 7, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Court

Case 5:05-cv-03580-JF Document 34 Filed 03/07/06 Page 12 of 13
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Case No. C 05-3580 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFEX1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Bruce Lee Simon, bsimon@cpsmlaw.com 

Kelly L Bulawsky, kbulawsky@cpsmlaw.com 

Philip L. Gregory, pgregory@cpsmlaw.com 

Sally J. Berens, sberens@gibsondunn.com

Case 5:05-cv-03580-JF Document 34 Filed 03/07/06 Page 13 of 13