Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01870/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01870-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD ANTHONY THROOP, Civil No. 12-cv-1870-LAB(NLS)

Petitioner, REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE

DENIAL OF HABEAS

PETITION

vs.

RALPH M. DIAZ, Secretary, et al.1

 

Respondent.

Edward Anthony Throop ("Throop"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, seeks 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas relief from his June 30, 2006

convictions of two counts of battery in connection with a prison riot in Imperial County

Superior Court Case No. JCF15251. He received concurrent sentences of 25 years to

life for those convictions after bifurcated proceedings resulted in findings that Throop

had two prior serious or violent felony convictions. The California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment, and his petition for review was summarily denied by the

1

 Respondent's request that the Attorney General, Kamala D. Harris, whom Throop named as an

additional defendant, be dismissed as an improper respondent should be granted. (See Ans. 12-13, ECF No.

21-1.) The Attorney General has no custodial control over Throop and is therefore an improper respondent

in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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California Supreme Court. His several attempts to obtain collateral relief in the state

courts were unsuccessful. Troop filed his federal petition on July 27, 2012 and a First

Amended Petition on December 17, 2012 ("FAP") (ECF Nos. 1, 10.) Respondent filed

an Answer opposing any relief. (ECF No. 21.) After three extensions of time for good

cause shown (ECF Nos. 18, 27, 33), Throop filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 39.) In

consideration of the pertinent portions of the record and controlling legal authority, it

is recommended that the Petition be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In its unpublished decision affirming the judgment, the California Court of

Appeal summarized the circumstances giving rise to the charges. (Lodg. No. 10 (Cal.

Ct. App. Case No. D053340, Mar. 23, 2010).) On federal habeas review, a rebuttable

presumption of correctness attaches to state appellate courts' factual statements. 

28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746, n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). Throop

does not dispute the accuracy of the court's summary of the trial evidence, although he

disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and purports to

identify extrinsic evidence of alleged misconduct in the preparation and presentation of

the case to the jury that he argues undermines the reliability of the verdicts.

In November 2003 a fight broke out between two inmates in an

exercise yard at Calipatria State Prison, a maximum-security facility (Calipatria). Calipatria has two exercise yards, "yard 1" and "yard 2," separated by a chain-link fence. Correctional officers used pepper spray to stop the fight, ordered the two inmates to lie down in a prone position and searched them for injuries and weapons. When officers discovered that one of the inmates had sustained a puncture wound, officers expanded their search to other inmates in yard 2. When officers next found a

weapon in yard 2, they began to search the inmates in yard 1.

While searching the inmates in yard 1, about 20 or 30 inmates began attacking Officers Murriente and Andalon in the weight training area in

yard 1. Each yard has a weight training area (also known as the "weight pile"), and the only way to access the weight pile is through one of two gates at either end of the area.

At or near the time of the incident in the weight pile in yard 1, about 30 to 40 inmates in the main area of yard 1 stood, despite being ordered to "stay down," and began attacking Officers Burkhammer and Silva. 

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Inmates in yard 2 also ignored the order to stay down, and about 20 to 30

of them rushed, and began to climb over, the chain-link fence separating yards 1 and 2. Additional officers responded to the uprising and entered the weight pile in yard 1 through the "eastern" gate, while other officers ran through the "western" gate into the main area of yard 1 to help the officers under siege.

Lieutenant Lindsay Hunt testified he saw two inmates standing outside the western gate spraying officers with pepper spray from canisters that officers had lost during the melee. Hunt testified he "actually saw" Throop, along with "Inmate Garcia," spraying officers from an MK9

canister of oleoresin capsicum, a type of pepper spray used by officers at Calipatria, as officers were running through the gate to help Burkhammer and Silva. Hunt testified the MK9 canister is barrel-shaped and about nine inches long, and is similar in appearance to a mini fire extinguisher.

Hunt testified he had "absolutely no doubt" that Throop sprayed Sergeants Morales and Johnson, and Officers Drennon, Alvarez and

Leamons. Hunt also testified he saw Throop throw the MK9 canister on the ground after it stopped spraying, and run towards the center of the yard where inmates were attacking the officers.

Officer Douglas Drennon testified he was in the yard 1 weight pile helping to secure that area when he saw about 30 inmates attacking two officers in the middle of yard 1. Both officers were on the ground. 

Drennon testified that as he and other officers made their way through the gate between the weight pile and the main yard to help their fellow officers, they were hit with pepper spray. Drennon said he turned to the right and was able to avoid most of the spray, although he was hit on the left side of his face and in his eye.

Drennon testified there was "no doubt" that Throop sprayed him as he ran through the gate. Drennon also saw Throop throw the canister of

pepper spray to the ground. Drennon testified he saw Throop spray Sergeant Morales, although he could not identify the other officer sprayed by Throop. Drennon said he realized after the riot that at some unknown

point during the uprising he had lost his can of MK9 pepper spray.

Officer Randy Leamons also testified at Throop's trial. Leamons estimated that 40 inmates jumped the two officers in the middle of yard 1. As Leamons ran through the gate between the weight pile and the main yard, he saw Throop spray Morales and Drennon. Leamons was also

sprayed by Throop. Leamons testified he did not try to apprehend Throop at that time because his main concern was helping the officers under attack in yard 1.

Sergeant Martin Morales testified that as he was running through the gate to help the officers in yard 1 Throop approached him and sprayed him in the face. After being hit by the pepper spray, Morales could only see out of his right eye, until he eventually lost sight in that eye as well. Nonetheless, before he was sprayed, Morales saw Throop with the canister of pepper spray, then a "split second" later Morales testified he was hit by the spray and saw Throop run away. Morales did not run after Throop because he was more concerned about the officers under attack and

considered their lives to be in immediate danger.

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Lieutenant (then-Sergeant) Russell Johnson testified he was in the

weight pile area in yard 1 when he saw about 20 or more inmates attack

Officers Burkhammer and Silva in the middle of yard 1. As Johnson was running through the gate to assist the two officers, he testified he "clearly" saw Throop spray him with pepper spray, which struck him on the right side of the face. Johnson testified his face began to burn, but that he did not stop and apprehend Throop because Johnson was concerned about the

wellbeing of the two officers in what he described as the worst prison riot he had ever witnessed.

Officer David Acosta testified he was in the weight pile area of yard 2 when he heard officers yelling, "Get down, get down," and saw a large group of inmates fighting with officers. Acosta ran to the weight pile in yard 1 and pepper sprayed inmates that were not complying with the order to get down.

As that was occurring, Acosta saw two officers being attacked by a large group of inmates in the middle of yard 1. Acosta also saw inmates on yard 2 running toward, and jumping over, the center fence, and other

inmates in yard 1 running toward the officers in the weight pile area. Acosta saw an MK9 canister of pepper spray outside the gate in the weight pile area. Acosta's first reaction was to secure the pepper spray. Before he could do so, however, Acosta saw Throop pick up the canister and spray Drennon. Acosta attempted to subdue Throop by spraying him with pepper spray from Acosta's MK46 canister, but was too far away and ran out of spray.

Because Acosta heard Hunt yell to an officer in the observation

booth to start shooting, Acosta did not attempt to apprehend Throop. After about three shots were fired, Acosta testified the inmates began to lie on the ground in a prone position.

Officer Robin Alvarez was a security investigations officer at Calipatria on the date of the prison riot. She was in the process of

investigating the stabbing in the yard 2 weight pile when she heard commotion in the weight pile of yard 1 and saw about 40 or 50 inmates

attacking officers in the middle of yard 1. As Alvarez ran through the gate

in the weight pile in yard 1, she was hit with pepper spray on the left side of her face. Although Alvarez did not see who sprayed her, Hunt positively identified Throop as that individual.

Officer Nell Senkel testified that she was ordered to yard 1 to search for weapons after the fight between inmates in the weight pile of yard 2. Senkel testified officers searched yard 1 because inmates sometimes passed weapons to each other through the chain-link fence separating the yards.

While searching inmates, Senkel observed officers and inmates

fighting in the weight pile of yard 1. Senkel helped subdue the uprising. During the confusion, Senkel saw Throop through the chain-link fence spraying officers with pepper spray near the gate area of the weight pile in yard 1. Senkel said she had "no doubt" that Throop was the inmate using the spray, and saw the mist from the canister actually hit an officer.

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(Lodg. No. 10, slip op. at 2-7.)

The defense theory was mistaken identity, supported primarily by expert

testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification as well as the absence of

evidence to identify whose particular pepper spray canister was lost that Throop could

have picked up and used to attack the correctional officers. (See Lodg. 3, RT vol. 15

at 1306-1324.) Throop did not testify in his own behalf at trial, but defense counsel

called multiple inmate and correctional officer witnesses to impugn the credibility of

the prosecution witnesses. 

B. Procedural Background

Several prosecutions arose from the November 21, 2003 prison riot. Throop was

jointly indicted on February 3, 2005 in one of those proceedings with a co-defendant,

George Garcia. (Lodg. No. 1, CT vol. 1 at 0002-0009.) Throop was charged with five

counts of battery on a non-confined person in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 4501.5

while confined in a state prison within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 1170.1(c)

(Counts 7 through 11). Co-defendant Garcia was similarly charged in six counts

(Counts 1 through 6). Multiple continuances and intervening judicial proceedings

ensued. (See Lodg. No. 3, Reporter's Transcript ("RT") vols. 1- 7.) Just before jury

selection began on Wednesday, May 17, 2006, the prosecutor informed the court:

. . . I did relay an offer to both defendants. And that offer is that each

defendant plead to one count of 4501.5; serve the midterm of three years; admit one strike, which will be a total of six years. And I believe they'd serve 80 percent of that time. 

(Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 8 at 284-285.)

 The next day, defense counsel informed the court: "Mr. Throop has received the

[plea] offer and has declined to accept." (Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 8 at 285.) The

prosecutor then revoked the offer as to Throop. Voir dire consumed the rest of that

week. Before resuming on Tuesday, May 23, 2006, Garcia sought to enter a change of

plea. After admonitions and colloquy, the court accepted his no contest plea to the

Count 1 battery charge with a recommended sentence to the upper term of four years

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and dismissal of all remaining allegations and enhancements, including a strike

allegation. (Id. at 292-297.) Voir dire to finalize selection of Throop's jury continued

through that day and the next. (Id. vol. 9, vol. 10 at 327.) The presentation of evidence

began May 25, 2006 and concluded on June 29, 2006. (Id. vols. 10-15.) The jury

reached its verdicts on June 30, 2006, finding Throop guilty of the Count 1 and Count

2 battery charges involving correctional officers Johnson and Morales, but not guilty

of the remaining three battery counts. (Id. vol. 15 at 1356-1364.)

In bifurcated proceedings held July 11, 2006, the jury found true the allegations

that Throop had two prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of

Cal. Penal Code §667(b) through (i). (Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 15 at 1368-1378.) Throop

unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on grounds that the jury must have disregarded the

inconsistent testimony from Johnson and Morales that each claimed to be the first

officer through the gate at the time of the incident, a purported impossibility suggesting

the jury reached a "compromised verdict" warranting that the verdicts be set aside. (Id.

RT vol. 18; see also id. RT vol. 19 at 2002-2005.) On November 16, 2006 at the time

scheduled for sentencing, the court again denied Throop a new trial, but continued the

sentencing hearing. (Id. RT vol. 19 at 2002-2005.) On December 14, 2006, the court

addressed Throop's motion pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970) alleging

inadequacies associated with his attorney's motion for new trial. (Lodg. No. 3, RT vol.

20.) The court granted the motion, relieved his trial counsel, and appointed new counsel

to review the new trial motion issues. (Id. vols. 20, 21.) 

With Throop waiving time for sentencing each time, the court granted new

counsel additional time to obtain and review transcripts at status hearings in January,

March, and May 2007. (Lodg. No. 3, RT vols. 22-24.) At a status hearing on June 14,

2007, the court set the hearing of the renewed new trial motion for September 13, 2007,

at which time the People asked for a continuance. The court granted additional motion

hearing and sentencing continuances in October and December 2007. (Id. vols. 25, 26.) 

At the motion hearing on February 7, 2008, the court heard argument, discussed on the

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record each ground presented in support of the motion, then denied Throop a new trial. 

(Id. vol. 27.) The court granted defense counsel's request to continue sentencing, and

did so again in April and June 2008. (Id. vols. 27, 28.)

On July 24, 2008, the court denied Throop's motion to dismiss the prior strike

allegation and found he was subject to three strikes sentencing based upon his prior

convictions for attempted murder and murder. (Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 29 at 3330-3339.) 

For detailed reasons recited on the record, after hearing argument from counsel and

allocution from Throop himself, the court imposed the mandatory term of 25 years to

life on one of the counts and a concurrent term of 25 years to life on the second count,

to run consecutively to the life without the possibility of parole sentence Throop was

already serving. (Id. at 3337-3352.)

Throop appealed, alleging three grounds for relief: denial of a fair trial and due

process for defense counsel's failure to challenge Juror No. 2 for cause; trial court error

for failure to remove Juror No. 2 for actual bias; and the purported failure of the trial

court to independently evaluate the evidence in denying two of his new trial motions

and for refusing to allow oral argument at the second of those hearings. (Lodg. No. 5.) 

The court of appeal affirmed the convictions in an unpublished, reasoned decision. 

(Lodg. No. 10 (Cal. Ct. App. Case No. D053340, Mar. 23, 2010), slip op.) The

California Supreme Court summarily denied his Petition For Review raising the same

claims. (Lodg. No. 11; Lodg. No. 12 (Cal. Supreme Ct. Case No. S182292, Jul. 14,

2010).)

From the record lodged here,2

 it appears that Throop next filed a habeas petition

2

 Respondent represents it has lodged selective documents from several of Throop's subsequent efforts

at collateral relief in the state courts as the judicial proceedings pertinent to the resolution of his federal claims: 

"Pertinent here are the [habeas petition] he filed in the Imperial County Superior Court[,] ECH02864, which

was denied (Lod. Nos. 13, 14); those filed in the court of appeal[,] D060266 (filed August 8, 2011 – denied

September 9, 2011 (Lod. Nos. 15, 16), and D062335 (filed July 20, 2012 – denied August 22, 2012) (Lod. Nos.

17, 18); and those filed in the California Supreme Court[,] S197702 (filed November 2, 2011 – denied May 9,

2012) (Lod. Nos. 19, 20)[,] S205181 (filed September 4, 2012 – denied November 20, 2012) (Lod. Nos. 21,

22)." (Answer 9-10, ECF No. 21-1 (footnotes omitted).) Throop contends the record does not contain

transcripts from certain pre-trial proceedings from 2005 that he argues are needed in order to resolve his claims. 

That issue is addressed below in connection with his Ground Five IAC claims.

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in the California Court of Appeal, raising fifteen grounds for relief, most of which

reappear within at least one of the six discrete grounds alleged in his FAP.3

 (Lodg. No.

15; see Lodg. No. 16 (Ct. of Appeal Case No. D060266, Sept. 9, 2011), slip op. at 1-2.) 

In its reasoned decision denying him relief, applying state procedural and substantive

law, the court expressly took "judicial notice of the direct appeal No. D053340 and prior

petition No. D045743,"4

 and confirmed it had "read and considered" the "petition and

supplemental petition" comprising the filings under review. (Lodg. No. 16, slip op. at

2.) That court concluded: "Throop's conviction was thoroughly reviewed on appeal,

and he has not demonstrated a constitutional error that was so fundamentally unfair that

absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted him. (In re Clark

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 797-798.)" (Id.)

Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal judgment, the petitioner bears a

heavy burden to plead and prove sufficient grounds for relief. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) Some of Throop's issues were raised and rejected on appeal (e.g. ground Nos. 5 and 6.) A petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the same grounds as those on appeal or a

previously denied petition will be denied as repetitive when there has been

no change in the facts or law substantially affecting the rights of the petitioner. (In re Martinez (2009) 46 Cal.4th 945, 950, fn.1.) Certain of Throop's issues could have been raised on appeal and are thus successive. (Id. at p. 956.) Some issues are not cognizable on habeas corpus, e.g., the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Lindley (1947) 29 Cal.2d 709, 723.) Throop should have exhausted his administrative remedies as to the

handling of the mail by prison staff (ground No. 2.) As to the ineffective

3

 The court of appeal enumerated those grounds: "1. He was denied effective assistance of counsel

on appeal because counsel did not ensure the transcript was accurate and did not raise all viable issues; 2. He

was denied due process because he received an incomplete record after the appeal was final because prison

official [sic] mishandled the packages; 3. He was convicted as the result of false evidence and certain witnesses

were transferred, paroled or unavailable for trial; 4. His trial attorney had a conflict of interest because he

represented other inmates in other proceedings; 5. He was denied a fair trial because Juror No. 2 slept during

the trial; 6. Insufficient evidence supported the guilty findings; 7. His conviction was the result of outrageous

government misconduct by delaying the indictment, suppressing of [sic] withholding discovery, showing him

shackled to the jury; 8. Duplicative argument raised in ground No. 3; 9. He was denied due process because

the prosecution offered inconsistent theories and facts about the same events at separate trials against other

defendants; 10. His defense was impaired because he was housed under the direct supervision of 'agents for

the prosecution' that interfered with his access to counsel; 11. His trial was unreasonably delayed; 12. The

prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence; 13. He was denied a fair trial because he was subjected to

daily 'perp walks' in view of the jurors; 14. His conviction was unreliable because it resulted from

impermissible suggestive identification procedures employed by the prosecution; and 15. The Legislature did

not create remedies for state prisoners to have a fair trial." (Lodg. No. 16, slip op. at 1-2.)

4

 No "prior petition" bearing a case number "D045743" is identified in the Notice of Lodgments.

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assistance of counsel claims, Throop has not demonstrated both deficient

performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness

and prejudice under a similarly objective standard of reasonable

probability of an adverse effect on the outcome. (Strickland v.

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 718.)

(Lodg. No. 16, slip op. at 2.) 

On November 2, 2011, Throop reasserted all those claims in a habeas petition

to the California Supreme Court. (Lodg. No. 19.) That court denied the petition in a

May 9, 2012 summary docket entry in its Case No. S187702. (Lodg. No. 20.) Before

that disposition, Throop had returned to the Imperial County Superior Court with

another habeas petition, filed April 11, 2012. (Lodg. No. 13.) In a May 16, 2012

unpublished, reasoned decision, the superior court rejected his claim that there was no

substantial evidence to support his convictions on grounds his "challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence was previously brought by habeas petition and rejected by

this court in case number EHC01476 in 2011." ( (Lodg. No. 14 (Imperial County

Superior Court Case No. ECH01631), slip op. at 2.) The court also rejected, as

"speculative and conclusory," his allegations that he was "deprived of the testimony of

co-defendant/inmate George Garcia due to a Department of Corrections and Imperial

County District Attorney Office conspiracy to deprive petitioner of the alleged[ly]

exonerating testimony of Garcia," finding that Throop failed to "make out a prima facie

case of any such conspiracy" and failed to "demonstrate that the testimony of Garcia

would have any effect on a jury given that some seven CO's testified as eyewitnesses

to the batteries according to the court of appeal summary." Id. The court added: "To

the extent that he alleges ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial attorney for failing

to subpoena Garcia, that ground was also previously rejected by this court in the earlier

petition." (Id.) 

On July 20, 2012, Throop filed another habeas petition in the California Court

of Appeal. (Lodg. No. 17.) There he claimed that he was denied a fair trial and due

process on grounds that the government interfered with his right to present witnesses,

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his codefendant would have exonerated him but for the government's interference, the

prosecutor committed misconduct, and his codefendant entered into an improper plea

bargain. (Id.) In an unpublished, reasoned decision, the court of appeal took "judicial

notice of the direct appeal, People v. Throop (Mar. 23, 2010,. D053340) [nonpub. opn.]

and petitioner's previous petitions for writ of habeas corpus." (Lodg. No. 18 (Ct. of

Appeal Case No. D062335 (Aug. 22, 2012), slip op. at 1.) The court applied the state

law rules from In re Bower, 38 Cal.3d 865, 872 (1985) and from People v. Duvall, 9

Cal.4th 464, 475 (1995) that reviewing courts "presume the regularity of the

proceedings that resulted in a final judgment" and that "if a petitioner has not stated a

prima facie case for relief, the court will summarily deny the petition." The court

denied as meritless Throop's claim of governmental interference, denied as speculative

his argument that his codefendant's testimony would have exonerated him, and denied

as without foundation his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct or an improper plea

bargain. (Id. at 2.) The court also rejected his additional argument that his convictions

were not supported by substantial evidence as a claim "considered and rejected in his

previous petition," and further found "he had not shown prejudice" in those regards. 

(Id.)

Finally, on September 4, 2012, Throop filed another habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court, raising the same claims as the court of appeal had rejected

in denying his July 2012 petition. (Lodg. No. 21.) The state high court summarily

denied that petition in a docket entry dated November 20, 2012, citing: "In re Clark

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-769; People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474; In re Swain

(1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304." (Lodg. No. 22 (Cal. Supreme Court Case No. S205181,

Nov. 20, 2012).) 

In the meantime, on July 27, 2012, Throop had filed his federal habeas petition. 

(ECF No. 1.) On October 15, 2012, Throop filed a motion to stay. (ECF No. 8.) In a

December 13, 2012 Report and Recommendation, this Court recommended the motion

for stay and abeyance be denied. (ECF No. 9.) Four days later, Throop filed his FAP. 

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(ECF No. 10.) By Order entered February 1, 2013, the District Judge assigned to this

case denied the motion to stay as moot. (ECF No. 12.) Respondent filed an Answer

(ECF No. 13), and Throop filed a Traverse (ECF No. 39.) 

Throop's FAP enumerates six grounds for relief, some with divisible sub-claims. 

Ground One alleges he was denied a fair trial and due process of law because the

government "interfe[r]red with compulsory process rights to present witnesses freely." 

(FAP 7, ECF No. 10).5

 Ground Two alleges he was "deprived of due process, a fair

jury, and a fair trial because the cum[]ulative effect of Juror No. 2's misconduct

impaired the jury selection process." (Id. at 8.) Ground Three alleges his "conviction

resulted from state court failures to create remedies for abuses of discretionary power

and conflicting interest in his prosecution which taken together denied him a fair trial

and trial detainee rights generally applicable to criminal defendants." (Id. at 10.) 

Ground Four alleges the "totality of the circumstances demonstrate that petitioner's trial

was infected by a pattern of outrageous government misconduct prohibited by the U.

S. Constitution." (Id. at 12.) Ground Five alleges ineffective assistance of his trial and

appellate attorneys. (Id. at 24.) Ground Six alleges insufficiency of the evidence to

support his conviction. (Id. at 30.) 

 Respondent concedes the Petition is timely and the claims are exhausted, but

contends Throop is entitled to no federal habeas relief. (Ans. 2, ECF No. 21.)

Respondent further asserts that Ground One, although exhausted, is procedurally barred. 

(Id.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Federal Habeas Relief

"[H]abeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal

justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." 

5

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those

imprinted by the Court's electronic case filing system.

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Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011), quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). A federal court "shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). Federal habeas courts may not "reexamine state-court determinations on statelaw questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); see Bradshaw v. Richey,

546 U.S. 74, 76, (2006) ("[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting

in habeas corpus"). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") governs review

of Throop's claims because he filed his federal petition after that statute's 1996 effective

date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). AEDPA imposes a " 'highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' " requiring "that state-court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

(2002), quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7. "AEDPA prevents defendants -- and

federal courts -- from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess

the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). "As

a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show

that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking

in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. 

"By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits'

in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Richter, 131

S.Ct. at 784. Federal habeas relief is available under the first exception if the state court

result "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-76 (2003); see also Williams v.

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Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (distinguishing the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

"contrary to" test from its "unreasonable application" test). To be found an

"unreasonable application" of the precedent, the state court result must have been

"more than incorrect or erroneous;" it "must have been 'objectively unreasonable.' " 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citations omitted); Renico, 559 U.S.

at 779; see also Nevada v. Jackson, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1990 (2013). 

In applying the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), "only Supreme Court

precedential holdings clearly establish a right, [although] our circuit precedent may

provide persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a state court decision

is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent." Mendez v. Knowles, 556

F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2009). A lack of holdings from the Supreme Court on the issue

presented precludes relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S.

70, 77 (2006); see Moses, 555 F.3d at 754 ("[W]hen a Supreme Court decision does not

'squarely address[]' the issue in the case it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is

'clearly established' Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue," and a federal

habeas court "must defer to the state court's decision"), citing, inter alia, Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 123 (2008). 

Under the second AEDPA exception, relief is available only if the state court

based its result "on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)

("Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the

merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on

factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the

state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2)"). The question "is not whether a federal court

believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination

was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.

465, 473 (2007); see Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 ("A state court's determination that a

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claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fair minded jurists could

disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision"), quoting Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). 

"A spare order denying a petition without explanation or citation ordinarily ranks

as a disposition on the merits," in which case the federal habeas court "looks through"

to the last reasoned state court decision rejecting the federal claim, and applies the

deferential AEDPA standards to that "last reasoned decision." Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803 (1991) ("Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a

federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same

claim [are presumed to] rest upon the same ground"). Although an "independent review

of the record is required to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of controlling federal law," Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000), "[i]ndependent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional

issue," Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, it is "the only

method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively

unreasonable." Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; see also Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939

(9th Cir. 2013). De novo review applies only to federal claims not adjudicated on the

merits in state court, where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief. Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct 1388, 1400-01 (2011). After Cullen, the Ninth Circuit

has held that, subject to the limitations of § 2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may

consider new evidence only on de novo review. See Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 808

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (Only

"properly presented" federal claims not adjudicated on the merits by the state courts are

reviewed de novo). 

Federal habeas courts reviewing prisoners' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 "must

assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under

the 'substantial and injurious effect' standard set forth in" Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619 (1993). Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121 (2007); see Baines v. Cambra, 204

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F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000) (the Ninth Circuit applies the Brecht harmless error

standard "uniformly in all federal habeas cases under § 2254"). Thus, even if

constitutional error occurred, the petitioner must still demonstrate that the error "had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict" before

relief is warranted. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38 (internal punctuation and citation

omitted). 

2. Procedural Default

The procedural default doctrine applies to individual federal claims a petitioner

raised in state court but which were rejected there under state law barring their

consideration. A claim was not "properly filed" for purposes of subsequent federal

habeas review if the state court determined some procedural or other state law obstacle

foreclosed reaching the merits of the claim, such as untimely filing. See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). "As a rule, a state prisoner's habeas claims

may not be entertained by a federal court when (1) a state court [has] declined to

address [those] claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural

requirement, and (2) the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state

procedural grounds." Maples v. Thomas, -- U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 912, 922 (2012) (internal

punctuation and citations omitted). The state law ground may be a substantive rule

dispositive of the case, or a procedural barrier to adjudication on the merits. Walker v.

Martin, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011); see Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55,

60-61 (2009). To qualify as a procedural bar, the state law ground must be

"independent" of the federal question and "adequate to support the judgment." 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-32.

A state procedural rule constitutes an "adequate" bar to federal court review if it was "firmly established and regularly followed" at the time it was applied by the state court. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-424

(1991); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999). A state procedural rule constitutes an "independent" bar if it is not interwoven with federal law or dependent upon a federal constitutional ruling. Ake v.

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,

1040-1041 (1983); Lacrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 201).

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Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 924 (9th Cir. 2007) (parallel citations omitted).

 Although the State retains the burden to prove the adequacy of the bar, once the

State raises procedural default as an affirmative defense, "the burden to place that

defense in issue shifts to the petitioner." Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. "The petitioner may

satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate the

inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating

inconsistent application of the rule." Id.

If the procedural default bar applies to the federal claim, the "Petitioner must

establish cause and actual prejudice to avoid imposition of the bar." Cooper, 510 F.3d

at 924; F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999); see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750

(1991) (To overcome a procedural default, the petitioner must "demonstrate cause for

the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage

of justice"). The "cause" element requires a showing that "some objective factor

external to the defense" and out of the prisoner's control prevented the petitioner from

complying with state procedural rules relating to the presentation of the defaulted

claims. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753; Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1127. To establish "prejudice,"

the petitioner must show "that the errors . . . worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire [proceeding] with errors of constitutional dimension." 

Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The alternative

"fundamental miscarriage of justice" normally requires a showing of actual innocence. 

See Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2008); see Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298 (1995).)

"[A] state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for

denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the

merits despite the default," and exercised its discretion "to by-pass a timeliness issue

and, instead, summarily reject the petition for want of merit." Walker, 131 S.Ct. at

1125-26, citing, inter alia, Beard, 558 U.S. 53; see also Bennett, 322 F.3d at 580 ("A

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state court's application of a procedural rule is not undermined where, as here, the state

court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim"). 

B. Ground One Is Both Procedurally Defaulted And Without Merit

Throop alleges in Ground One that the government interfered with his

compulsory process rights, in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

to a fair trial and due process of law, based on his unsupported representations about the

content of Garcia's proposed testimony and his speculation that the government

intentionally structured a plea deal with Garcia that caused him not to testify at Throop's

trial.6

 More than the mere absence of testimony is necessary to establish a violation of

the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. See United States v. ValenzulaBernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982); see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967)

(holding that the petitioner "was denied his right to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put

on the stand" a percipient witness "whose testimony would have been relevant and

material to the defense," due to a state rule categorically disqualifying accomplice

testimony). Moreover, the appropriate standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct,

such as Throop alleges, is "the narrow one of due process," that is, whether the alleged

misconduct rendered the trial "fundamentally unfair." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.

168, 181 (1986); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974).

The state courts both reached the merits of this claim and identified state law

procedural obstacles to its consideration. From the record provided, Throop appears to

have first presented this claim in his April 11, 2012 habeas petition to the Imperial

6

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a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses does

not necessarily include the right to compel a witness to waive the Fifth amendment privilege of selfincrimination. See, e.g., Kastiger v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); Washington, 388 U.S. at 23

n. 21 ("Nothing in this opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege

against self-incrimination . . . which are based on entirely different considerations . . . ."). 

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County Superior Court. (Lodg. No. 13.)7 He argued there that he was deprived of

Garcia's purportedly exonerating trial testimony due to a California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") and county D.A.'s office conspiracy. That

court disposed of the claim in a reasoned decision, finding: 

Petitioner does not make out a prima facie case of any such conspiracy. His allegations are speculative and conclusory. Nor does he demonstrate that the testimony of Garcia would have any effect on a jury given that some seven CO's testified as eyewitnesses to the batteries according to the court of appeal summary [on direct review].

(Lodg. No. 14, slip op. at 2.) 

 Throop also presented this claim in his second habeas petition to the court of

appeal, Case No. D062335, on July 20, 2012. (Lodg. No. 17.) That court took "judicial

notice of the direct appeal . . . and petitioner's previous petitions for writ of habeas

corpus" before rejecting this claim on the merits in a reasoned decision. (Lodg. No. 18,

slip op. at 1.) The court found his arguments to be "speculative" and lacking "evidence

of prosecutorial misconduct or an improper plea bargain," adding: "Further, he had not

shown prejudice." (Id., slip op. at 2.) In summarily denying Throop's second habeas

petition to the California Supreme Court, which also contained this claim, the court

cited In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-69 (1993), Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474, and In re

Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949). (Lodg. No. 22.) Respondent argues those case

citations indicate that Throop has procedurally defaulted his Ground One claims. 

(Answer 13, ECF No. 21-1.) 

Throop argues that the rules cited by the California Supreme Court in connection

7

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petition to the superior court in Case No. ECH02864, and Lodgment No. 14 as that court's order denying the

petition in Case No. ECH02864. (ECF No. 22 at 2.) In a footnote to that Notice, Respondent Lodgment No.

13 had not yet been received from Imperial County. In a Supplemental Notice of Lodgment, filed May 28,

2013, Respondent purports to lodge both that petition and the superior court order denying that petition, i.e.

"lodgments 13 and 14." (ECF No. 23.) However, both the supplementally lodged petition and order bear the

case number "EHC01631," not "ECH02864." In the caption of the court of appeal's September 9, 2011 denial

of Throop's habeas petition to that court in its Case No. D060266 (Lodg. No. 16), predating the Lodgment Nos.

13 and 14 by more than six months, the court of appeal references "Imperial County Sup. Ct. No. JCF15251

& ECH02864." (Lodg. No. 16, slip op. at 1.) The Court proceeds on the assumption that the actual lodged

documents, rather than their case number descriptors in the lodgment notices are Respondent's intended

"pertinent" documents (Answer 9-10, ECF No. 21-1),and Troop is silent with respect to any discrepancies. 

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with its summary dismissal do not support a finding of procedural default. (Traverse

17-24, ECF No. 39.) First, he argues that "none of the three procedural bars that were

applicable to Ground One (Untimeliness bar (Clark), or Successive petition (Swain) bar,

or the Duval[l] bar) had been consistently applied by the California Supreme Court

during the relevant time frames when petitioner initiated his post conviction

proceedings in 2011." (Id. at 19, citing Carpenter v. Ayers, 548 F.Supp.2d 736, 756

(N.D. Cal. 2008) and Wells v. Maas, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994).) Neither of

those cases supports his assertion or satisfies his burden to avoid a procedural default,

and neither ruling is from a court providing controlling authority for this analysis. The

district court in Carpenter found that California's 1993 Clark untimeliness and

successiveness rules were not an adequate procedural bar to that capital petitioner's

pursuit in federal court of certain federal claims denied on those grounds by the state

court because the operative date for purposes of that analysis was just three years after

the Clark decision. The Maas case was decided under Oregon state law and has no

bearing on procedural default analysis under California law.

In California, habeas petitioners may have their claims denied as untimely

without a merits review if they "substantially delay" presenting them without

justification. In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 765, n.5. A citation to In re Clark signals that the

state court rejected the claim as untimely. See Walker,131 S.Ct. at 1126, 1128

(California's untimeliness rule is an independent and adequate state procedural ground

for the denial of a claim as procedurally defaulted). A citation to Swain may also

indicate that a state habeas petition is untimely under California law. La Crosse v.

Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2001). Although the Ninth Circuit has held

that "a citation to Swain by itself . . . [does not necessarily] mean that a habeas

application was untimely filed," Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2012),

in Throop's case, the California Supreme Court’s citation to Swain does not stand "by

itself." The Ninth Circuit has held that denial of a state habeas petition with citations

both to Duvall and to Swain is deemed a denial on procedural grounds. See Gaston v.

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Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005) ("In light of its citations to Swain and

Duvall, we read the California Supreme Court's denial of [petitioner's] sixth habeas

application as, in effect, the grant of a demurrer" and "was thus procedurally deficient

under California law"). The state courts accordingly may be found to have rejected

Throop's Ground One compulsory process claim as procedurally defaulted.

Throop's showings are wholly inadequate to support a finding of cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice adequate to overcome procedural

default of the claim. His asserted "good cause" for "delay of Ground 1" includes

allegations that his appellate counsel failed to cooperate to obtain complete appellate

transcripts, referring to transcripts of proceedings from 2005, a period predating his

indictment, and purported interference by correctional counselors in his attempts to

communicate with Garcia, among other things. (Traverse 19-22, ECF No. 39.) The

contributions Throop argues Garcia would have made to his defense as a trial witness

are speculative, and their value, even if Throop's unsubstantiated representations about

the content of Garcia's testimony were true, are overstated, as discussed below. 

Accordingly, he fails to satisfy the "prejudice" prong of the cause and prejudice

showing required to overcome a procedural default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753;

Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1127; see also Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. 

Even if the Court were to reach the merits of this claim, it warrants no federal

habeas relief. Throop fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor's actions associated with

Garcia's plea agreement constituted misconduct or that the absence of Garcia's

testimony at his trial rendered it so "fundamentally unfair" as to make the resulting

conviction a violation of due process. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 181. The prosecutor

had extended a plea offer to both Throop and his codefendant shortly before trial began. 

Throop rejected the offer made to him, but Garcia accepted his shortly after trial began

in what Throop characterizes as a government ploy to deprive him of his Garcia's trial

testimony by imputing unsubstantiated motivation to the prosecution. (FAP 7, ECF No.

10: "after [the] prosecution team learned about Garcia's plans to exonerate petitioner

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they took affirmative steps to place a blanket restriction on his participation by

improperly structuring a mid trial plea agreement contingent on barring his testimony

in petitioner's defense.") 

Throop represents that Garcia "planned to testify in his own defense at the

tentatively scheduled joint trial to illustrate[] how the claims of prosecution witness

Lieutenant Hunt were false (see Ground Four contention that Burkhammer was NOT

stripped of pepperspray equipment by Garcia), and further intended to clarify that

petitioner could not have been reliably observed by Hunt to be in the vicinity of the five

alleged pepper-spray victims since he never left a seated position that was several yards

to the north of Burkhammer's ordeal with Garcia." (Id.) On that basis, he argues that

his "[r]ebuttal to prosecution witnesses was unfairly undermined by the government's

interference with rights to have an alleged accomplice freely give evidence having

material and favorable value" to the defense. (Id.) He attempts more indirectly to

augment this theory with speculation that the terms of Garcia's plea bargain hampered

his choice to testify because it left him "with the impression that his previously reduced

charges, and/or dismissed strike, might become reinstated at the district attorney's

request, which prevented [Throop's defense counsel] from subpoenaing him as an addon to finalized witness lists." (FAP 7, ECF No. 10.) (Id.) The claim does not appear to

be supported by any evidence. 

The factual summary reproduced above, to which this court owes a presumption

of correctness, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), substantiates that the prosecution evidence

against Throop was strong. Looking through to the state court of appeal's merits

decision addressing this claim on habeas review, like the decision from the superior

court before it, the state courts reasonably rejected his conclusory representation that

absent the government's purported interference "it is reasonably likely he would have

been acquitted." (Lodg. No. 18, slip op. at 1-2: .) 

Petitioner's claim the government interfered with his right to a fair trial is without merit and his argument that his codefendant's testimony would have exonerated him is speculative. There is no evidence of

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prosecutorial misconduct or an improper plea bargain. To the extent

petitioner is arguing his convictions were not supported by substantial evidence, that contention was considered and rejected in his previous petition. Further, he had [sic] not shown prejudice.

(Lodg. No. 18, slip op. at 2.) 

Throop continues here to rely on the same speculative arguments in support of

Ground One, without regard to the applicable standards of review, and his arguments

should fare no better than they did in state court. For all the foregoing reasons, it is

recommended relief on Ground One be DENIED as procedurally defaulted or,

alternatively, that the state court's merits result was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the

facts from the record presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

C. Ground Two: Failure To Remove Juror No. 2 For Cause

Throop argues he was deprived of his due process, impartial jury, and fair trial

rights on grounds that Juror No. 2 failed to reveal until the trial was underway that the

Imperial County District Attorney was his cousin, and that the trial court erred in not

removing Juror No. 2 on that ground. (FAP 8-9, ECF No. 10.) He also asserts an

ineffective assistance of counsel component of this claim. (See Id. at 27-28.) 

Throop relies on Cal. Penal Code § 1089, addressing the state law rules and

standards for jury selection, qualifications, examination, challenges, seating, discharge,

substitution and the like, in support of this claim. (FAP 9, ECF No. 10.) He argues

that defense counsel should have been granted an additional peremptory challenge to

remove that juror, relying on defense counsel's observation after the trial court "failed

to remove Juror #2 for cause": "It would be a preempt if I had one" remaining. (Id.,

citing 11 RT 583.) However, "peremptory challenges are within the States' province

to grant or withhold," and even "the mistaken denial of a state-provided peremptory

challenge does not, without more, violate the Federal Constitution." Rivera v. Illinois,

556 U.S. 148, 158 (2009). Throop's attempt to inflate this incident into an instance of

unconstitutional "coneal[ment] of relevant facts" and the "giving [of] misleading

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answers during voir dire" is unpersuasive. He cites Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.

396, 408 (1894), a nineteenth century case for the general proposition that "depriving

a defendant of the exercise of peremptory challenges for cause interferes with the right

to due process and [a] fair trial" (Traverse 27, ECF No. 39), but only summarily argues:

[T]he court's failure to excuse Juror #2 for cause forced an incompetent juror on the defense. [¶] Had Juror #2 honestly and correctly responded to material questions during voir dire, these hints of bias – if not sufficient

to warrant challenge for cause – would have provided a valid basis for the

defense to exercise the preempt with full freedom. For these reasons, one

of the most important of the rights secured to the accused was lost or

impaired.

(FAP 8, ECF No. 10.)

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees state criminal defendants a federal

constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149

(1968); see also Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1238-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (the

impartial jury guarantee requires that a verdict be based solely on the evidence produced

at trial). As Respondent acknowledges, "[t]he 'opportunity to prove actual bias is a

guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury.' " (Answer 15, ECF No. 21-1,

quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 216 (1982). The Ninth Circuit recognizes three

forms of bias: 

(1) "actual bias, which stems from a pre-set disposition not to decide an issue impartially"; (2) "implied (or presumptive) bias, which may exist in

exceptional circumstances where, for example, a prospective juror has a relationship to the crime itself or to someone involved in a trial, or has

repeatedly lied about a material fact to get on the jury"; and (3) "so-called McDonough-style bias, which turns on the truthfulness of a juror's responses on voir dire" where a truthful response "would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.'"

United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1189 (9th Cir. 2013), quoting Fields v. Brown,

503 F.3d 755, 766–67 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (parallel citations omitted), citing

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554–56 (1984). 

"Actual bias is, in essence, 'bias in fact'—the existence of a state of mind that

leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality." United States

v. Mitchell, 568 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir.2009), quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 214

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F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000); see Fields, 503 F.3d at 767 ("Actual bias is typically

found when a prospective juror states that he can not be impartial, or expresses a view

adverse to one party's position and responds equivocally as to whether he could be fair

and impartial despite that view"). "A defendant who asserts that a juror was actually

biased against him bears the burden of demonstrating both the bias itself, and the court's

erroneous refusal to strike the juror on the basis of that bias." United States v.

Martinez–Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The

"determination of whether a juror is actually biased is a question of fact." Fields, 503

F.3d at 767. Reviewing courts accord particular deference to a trial court's credibility

determinations "based, as they are, on firsthand observations unavailable to us on

appeal," People v. Barnwell, 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1053 (2007), because the trial court is

in a superior position "to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who

compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications

of potential jurors." Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 2 (2007). 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized implied bias in two contexts: first, "in those

extreme situations 'where the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect

of the litigation is such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain

impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances,' " Fields, 503 F.3d at 770,

quoting Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112; and second, "where repeated lies in voir dire imply

that the juror concealed material facts in order to secure a spot on the particular jury," 

id., citing Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). To get a new

trial based on a juror's responses in voir dire, a party must demonstrate that the juror

failed to answer honestly and that a correct answer would have provided a basis for

challenge for cause. See McDonough Power Equipment, 464 U.S. at 554–56. 

 The court of appeal addressed this claim on direct review of Throop's conviction,

after supplemental briefing following an ordered augmentation of the record to include

the reporter's transcripts of the voir dire proceedings. (Lodg. Nos. 7, 8; see Lodg. No.

4, Augmented RT ("ART") vols. 1-5.) The voir dire of Juror No. 2 appears in

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Augmented RT vol. 3 at 407-417 and vol. 4 at 426-428. From the voir dire record,

Throop complains that several prospective jurors revealed they had relatives or

acquaintances working in the district attorney's office, each of whom "was specifically

questioned about those relatives and acquaintances," while Juror No. 2 "sat silently with

his eyes closed." (FAP 8, ECF No. 10, citing 3 ART at 400-406, 4 ART 476, 547-548,

556-7, 575, 638.) One prospective juror had disclosed that she was acquainted with the

Assistant District Attorney, and a second disclosed that she was related to the District

Attorney, Gilbert Otero. Both were questioned about their relationships to those

officials. "At the request of defense counsel, those who revealed emotional

involvement were excused by the Court for cause, or peremptory challenge." (Id., citing

"4 ART 556-557, 558, 565-566.") 

After trial began, Juror No. 2 approached the court and disclosed that he had

forgotten to mention the D.A. was his cousin. (Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 11 at 580-583.) 

Throop characterizes the "surprise" acknowledgment to the court and counsel "that DA

Otero was also a relative of his, and that they visited several times a year, the last of

which was one month before trial" as substantiating his claim of intentional

concealment constituting bias. (FAP 8, ECF No. 10, citing 11 RT 580-583.) Juror No.

2 described visits with his cousin as "not really" very often, about "two or three times,

maybe, a year," and stated that they did not discuss the D.A.'s work. (Lodg. No. 3, RT

vol. 11 at 580-581.) 

The court of appeal declined to disturb Throop's conviction on any ground

associated with the retention of Juror No. 2. The court extracted the facts from the voir

dire record that Juror No. 2 had identified two nephews who worked at Calipatria

prison, one as a correctional officer and one as a teacher, and that he also volunteered

an admission that he had recently noticed he was developing memory problems. (Lodg.

No. 10, slip op. at 8-9.) "After a day and [a] half of trial testimony, and outside the

presence of the jury, Juror No. 2 informed the court and counsel that during voir dire

he had forgotten to disclose that he and Riverside District Attorney Gilbert Otero were

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cousins."8 (Id. at 9.) The court reproduced in its decision the resulting colloquy among

the court, counsel, and Juror No. 2. (Id. at 9-13.) Based on that record, the court found

no "concealment" occurred.

Assuming Juror No. 2 was required to disclose during voir dire that he and the Riverside district attorney were cousins, the record supports the (implied) finding that Juror No. 2's failure to do so was unintentional and

inadvertent. (See People v. Wilson [(2008) 44 Cal.4th 758] at p. 823.) Indeed, Juror No. 2 was forthcoming in voir dire regarding information

about his two nephews who worked at Calipatria. He also volunteered he

recently had experienced problems with his short-term memory.

Moreover, the record shows that at the time Juror No. 2 made the

disclosure about his cousin, he did so of his own accord. Juror No. 2

reiterated to the court and counsel that he sometimes "forg[o]t things," as he had volunteered during voir dire, and explained the circumstances of

how he came to realize that he had forgotten to inform the court and counsel that his cousin was the Riverside district attorney. The record also shows Juror no. 2 volunteered this information outside the presence of the jury, telling the court and counsel, "I thought I better bring it up."

On this record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the finding of the trial court that Juror No. 2 did not intentionally withhold information in voir dire regarding his cousin, and that his failure to

disclose that information, to the extent he was required to disclose it, was

inadvertent and unintentional. (See People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at

p. 823.)

(Lodg. No. 10 at 15.)

 No finding of unconstitutional bias is warranted from this record, including the

in chambers proceeding. The Imperial County D.A. does not appear to have had any

personal involvement in Throop's trial. Throop cites no authority for the proposition

that merely having a relative who is head of the prosecuting agency qualifies as a

circumstance rendering it "highly unlikely the average person" could deliberate

impartially as a juror. The court of appeal acknowledged the record reflected that the

Juror No. 2 hesitated or expressed uncertainty in some of his responses to a series of

questions the trial court posed to assess his impartiality. Nevertheless, the court

substantiated that the trial court obtained sufficient reassurances that the juror did not

think his cousin's occupation would make a difference in how he viewed the evidence,

8

 The court of appeal incorrectly identifies Gilbert Otero as the district attorney in Riverside County. 

An official Imperial County website identifies Gilbert Otero as that county's district attorney. Throop was tried

in Imperial County.

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and that he could wait until all the evidence was heard before taking one side or the

other, to support with "substantial evidence" the juror's qualification "to continue

serving on the jury after the disclosure." (Lodg. No. 10, slip op. at 16.) The court of

appeal additionally noted:

After discussion with Juror No. 2, defense counsel observed that

there likely was no good cause to excuse Juror No. 2, and that it appeared to defense counsel that Juror No. 2 was "uncomfortable." The prosecutor left it up to the defense whether to move to excuse Juror No. 2, although she added Juror No. 2 appeared to be "sleeping" or "resting his eyes in the trial. The court agreed with defense counsel there was no good cause to excuse Juror No. 2, noting that if Juror No. 2 "didn't remember he is

related to the D.A. until now, it just doesn't seem likely that they're that close. So we're – I guess we'll go on with him."

(Lodg. No. 10, slip op. at 16-17 (footnote omitted).)

Throop also seizes on the prosecutor's passing observation that Juror No. 2 was

seen possibly "sleeping" during voir dire to bolster this claim. (FAP 9, ECF No. 10,

citing 11 RT 583.) The prosecutor "intimated that Juror #2 may have missed the

previous voir dire discussions regarding DA employees familiar to jurors (as opposed

to merely forgetting about his family connection) because that juror had been "noticed

. . . sleeping quite frequently, but that's another issue." (Id.) The suggestion that Juror

No. 2 was inattentive during the voir dire questioning of the other prospective jurors

actually undermines Throop's theory that Juror No. 2 intentionally omitted the

information he later voluntarily imparted to the court. In addition, the court of appeal 

noted that Throop did not raise that issue in the appeal and the juror was not challenged

on that ground at trial, observing:

. . . [W] note the prosecutor's statement he was "sleeping" or "resting his eyes" at the beginning of what turned out to be a lengthy trial is insufficient to establish cause to remove Juror No. 2. (See People v. Bowers (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 722, 731 (concluding a juror cannot be discharged for sleeping unless there is convincing proof the juror actually slept.) Moreover, the record shows there were no other instances in which

Juror No. 2 slept or rested his eyes during the remainder of the lengthy trial.

(Lodg. No. 10, slip op. at 17 n.10.)

Throop relies on the wholly speculative inference that the juror's family tie to the

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District Attorney must have predisposed him in favor of the prosecution. He fails to

show that Juror No. 2 had any "preset disposition not to decide an issue impartially,"

or of any relationship "to the crime itself or to someone involved" in the trial, or of any

"repeated lying" about a material fact in order "to get on the jury" to support a finding

of implied bias. See Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2000); Dyer, 151 F.3d 970. 

Throop's trial attorney conceded the circumstances offered no ground for a valid

challenge for cause. (See Lodg. No. 10, slip op. at 16-17. As soon as Juror No. 2

informed the court of his relationship to the district attorney, the court and counsel

thoroughly assessed his fitness to serve on Throop's jury. "[T]he trial court and counsel

believed Juror No. 2 was honest in his assessment of his ability to be fair and impartial,

in light of the fact defense counsel said he did not believe good cause existed to excuse

Juror No. 2, a conclusion also reached by the trial court." (Lodg. No. 10, slip op. at 17-

18.) ; see also Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422, 1426-27 (9th cir. 1997) ("[O]n habeas

review, a trial court's findings regarding juror fitness are entitled to special deference"

and should only be disturbed if there is "manifest error"). 

It is recommended the Court find from this record that the state courts reasonably

concluded Throop establishes no basis to disturb his conviction on the basis of the

alleged misconduct of Juror No. 2. Even if constitutional error occurred in defense

counsel's or the trial court's handling of the issue, Throop has not demonstrated that the

error prejudicially affected his trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623,

637. Without a showing of prejudice, federal habeas relief is unavailable. Bains, 204

F.3d at 977. According the requisite deference to the objectively reasonable result of

the state courts on the merits of Throop's juror misconduct claim, it is recommended

that relief on Ground Two be DENIED, as he is not in custody in violation of any

federal right on this theory. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d).

D. Ground Three: Denial Of Pretrial Detainee Rights And Prejudicial Custody

Throop summarizes his Ground Three claims with broad imprecision.

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Petitioner's conviction resulted from state court failures to create remedies

for abuse of discretionary power and conflicting interest [sic] in his prosecution which taken together denied him a fair trial and trial detainee

rights generally applicable to criminal defendants under the Fifth Sixth &

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 

(FAP 10, ECF No. 10 (typography modified).)

Throop variously characterizes his prison custodians as "agents of the

prosecution" and also as "private parties" with a personal interest in the outcome of the

trial. (FAP 10, ECF No. 10.) He argues: the "allegations against petitioner transpired

on a prison recreation yard" and the "unit's staff were among the approximately 100

guards whose involvements in the incident required counsel to interview or subpoena

to trial, while those same officials also administered petitioner's court transportation,

visiting schedules for attorney (or family), handled his correspondences / legal mail,

controlled his out of cell exercise, inspection of crime scene evidence, etc." (FAP 10,

ECF No. 10.) He sweepingly elaborates:

As delineated in Ground 4, those agents of the prosecution made

petitioner's due process a mere formality because they engaged in patterns of misconduct and abuse of administrative discretion to interfere with

compulsory process rights, withheld favorable evidence, harassed

petitioner into changing his plea, committed jury embracery [sic], and

employed post-arraignment investigative tactics to elicit information about

defense strategies or incriminating statements. Moreover, multiple prosecution witnesses, which included a DA Liaison Officer, improperly capitalized upon their access to findings and conclusions of internal CDC

investigations, or other administrative reports compiled by the prosecution

team concerning the circumstances of the alleged offense, to help advance purely private litigation that was not closely related in furtherance of criminal law enforcement.

(FAP 10, ECF No. 10.) The discrete claims "delineated in Ground Four" that Throop

invokes in support of Ground Three are addressed in that section, below. 

Ground Three encompasses multiple claims Throop argues contributed to a

"pattern of misconduct [that] affected trial." (FAP 11, ECF No. 10.) Respondent states

its understanding of the claims as: "Throop thinks that the CDCR should not have been

his custodian during the pendency of his criminal prosecution in this case." (Answer

18, ECF No. 21-1.) Throop articulates numerous criticisms of California's "statutory

framework" regulating the physical custody, supervision, and housing restrictions of 

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prison inmates who are also pretrial detainees awaiting "completion of criminal

proceedings related to in-custody offenses. . . ."9

 (FAP 10, ECF No. 10.) In particular,

he argues that his constitutional rights were violated because: "ambiguities within the

statutory framework" permit the delegation of housing supervision and physical custody

to "victims and subpoenaed witnesses" in the pending proceedings when the charged

crime occurred while the named defendant was an inmate. (Id.) He contends his

prosecution was "unfair" because "the prosecution team [was not] free from influence

of private parties [having] particular reasons for wanting to see him convicted,"

apparently referring to prison staff. (Id.) He challenges the denial of defense counsel's

"peremptory petition to disqualify the CDC as the prosecution's representative and

custodian housing petitioner during trial," due to alleged "conflicts of interest

manifested among its personnel tasked with ensuring his access to court and basic

pretrial detainee rights," invoking the court's "supervisory power to protect the integrity

of the judicial process." (Id., citing "CT 131 at Exhibit 202".) 

Federal habeas courts do not exercise "supervisory powers" over state courts. A

federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Throop cites no United States Supreme Court authority for the

proposition that his status as a convicted state prisoner serving a criminal sentence who

is awaiting an indictment and trial for new criminal conduct while incarcerated in the

9

 Throop adds in his Traverse that he purportedly has "new proof" of "deliberate government intrusion"

through a purported "administrative strategy" at Calipatria that he identifies as admissions by former warden

Larry Scribner and four correctional officers in a different case from this District that he identifies as David

Cota v. Scribner, Case No. 09cv2507, purportedly presenting complaints that "they oversaw an administrative

strategy . . . which was designed to identify, investigate and subdue any Calipatria prisoners having suspected

predisposition for staff assaults with strategic threat group affiliations." (Traverse 31, ECF No. 39.) Throop 

provides as "Exhibit A" to the Traverse two expert reports submitted in connection with a prisoner civil rights

case brought by an inmate alleging racially discriminatory lockdowns and challenging efforts to classify that

plaintiff as a gang member. (Id. at 59- 84.) Evidence associated with that matter is wholly immaterial to the

issues presented in Throop's FAP and has no bearing on the permissible scope of review associated under

AEDPA standards. Moreover, this Court already declined to take judicial notice of those expert reports in

connection with this case when it denied his motion for appointment of counsel. (See ECF Nos. 29, 31, 33.) 

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institution where he is serving his original sentence, on that basis, entitles him to any

particular custody modification. Throop's imaginative complaints regarding California's

"statutory framework" governing the state's administration of its criminal justice system

fall outside the permissible scope of this Court's review. General appeals to broad

constitutional principles, such as due process and the right to a fair trial, do not suffice

to state a federal claim cognizable on habeas review, any more than such statements

suffice to exhaust federal claims in state court. See, e.g., Castillo v. McFadden, 399

F.3d 993, 1000–02 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding it is not sufficient to engage in

"scattershot citation of federal constitutional provisions" divorced from "any articulated

federal legal theory . . ."). The proper avenue for prisoners to pursue complaints about

their conditions of confinement, as opposed to claims affecting the fact or duration of

their custody, is a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Respondent correctly observes that "federal courts defer to prison officials to

determine the proper placement of inmates, as [sic] among the 'wide spectrum of

discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators

rather than of the federal courts.' " (Answer 18-19, ECF No. 21-1, citing Meachum v.

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976).) "It is well settled that the decision where to house

inmates is at the core of prison administrators' expertise." McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24,

39 (2002), citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225. 

On the issue of alleged improper influences brought to bear on the prosecution

by the "private party" CDCR officers who were injured during the prison riot, Throop

represents that the injured officers pursued worker's compensation insurance claims and

civil damages in Imperial County Small Claims Court against some of the inmates. 

From those extraneous allegations, he speculates that "prison officials overseeing the

custody of petitioner and his coindictees held personal and financial interests in the

outcome of their criminal prosecution" which all hinged upon portraying and

characterizing their supposed injuries from pepperspray exposure as attributed to the

actions of an inmate (i.e. petitioner) as opposed to a fellow employee's recklessness." 

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(FAP 10-11, ECF No. 10). Throop also imputes to "retaliatory animus" of correctional

officers acting as "agents of the prosecution" other conduct he argues contributed to

denying him a fair trial. 

The resulting pattern of misconduct affected trial by causing petitioner's conviction to rest on inappropriate considerations not validly before the jury because the retaliatory animus of agents of the prosecution orchestrated unusual shackled escorts alongside jurors, and discouraged inmate witnesses at CAL from cooperating with this defense through brutality, threats or contrived administrative discipline.

(FAP 11, ECF No. 10, citing in support two inmate declarations "at Exhibits 223-228.") 

The shackling issue is addressed below in connection with Ground Four, where

Throop raises it as a discrete claim. Concerning his allegations of obstruction of access

to inmate witnesses, Respondent substantiates that after Throop's attorney complained

to the trial court that he and his investigator were having difficulty arranging interviews

with inmates in 2005 and 2006 due to prison regulations, "the court offered to issue

appropriate orders to accommodate counsel." (Answer 19, ECF No. 21-1, citing FAP

at 10, Exhs. 202-210.) "Throop offers no evidence that indicates his complaints were

not subsequently and adequately addressed." (Id.) At trial, the defense presented forty

trial witnesses: seven inmates and thirty-one correctional officers or other individuals

associated with the CDCR. (See Lodg. No. 3, ECF No. 22-11, Master Index at 4-7;

Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 11 at 736-781, vol. 12 at 782-1023, vol. 13 at 1024-1163, and vol.

14 at 1164-1173.)

To the extent a cognizable federal claim could conceivably be extracted from

Throop's presentation of Ground Three, it is recommended the Court find he has failed

to satisfy either exception to the deference federal habeas courts owe to state court

results on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). As he has not demonstrated that he

is in custody in violation of federal law on this vague theory, relief should be DENIED.

E. Ground Four: Pattern Of Government Misconduct And Cumulative 

Error

Throop's Ground Four presents a number of disparate claims in support of a

"totality of the circumstances" argument for habeas relief, alluding broadly to the

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federal constitutional guarantees of due process and a fair trial. He alleges as instances

of "Pretrial" governmental misconduct: (a) unreasonable prosecutorial delay to gain

tactical advantage; (b) deliberate and unfair intrusion into his attorney-client

relationship with post-indictment investigations and interrogation techniques intended

to elicit privileged information; (c) failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused;

and (d) improper plea bargain conditions caused the unavailability of co-defendant

Garcia's testimony at trial. (FAP12-17, ECF No. 10.) He alleges as "Trial" defects: (e)

due process violation through the prosecution's proffered inconsistent facts and theories

regarding the same charges at the separate trials against his coinductees "concerning

elements of his involvement"; (f) his conviction was based on false testimony;

(g) unreliable conviction due to "impermissibly suggestive identification procedures";

and (h) subjection to "daily nonroutine escorts in shackles viewed by jurors to

circumvent pretrial orders to remove his handcuffs in their presence." (Id. at 18-23.) 

He summarily contends: "Ground Four shows the prosecuting agency acted with bad

faith" in a manner "intentionally designed to disrupt and interfere with petitioner's trial

defense." (Traverse 35, 36 ECF No. 39 (typography modified).)

1. Preindictment Delay

The prison riot giving rise to Throop's criminal prosecution along with those of

numerous other inmates, occurred on November 21, 2003. He alleges a felony

complaint was forwarded to the D.A. in February 2004, but he was not arraigned on

those charges until February 2005. (FAP 12, ECF No. 10.) He alleges the "prosecuting

agency" engaged in "unreasonable preaccusation delay to intentionally gain tactical

advantages," conduct he asserts rendered "his trial . . . fundamentally unfair" in

violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (FAP 12,

ECF No. 10 (typography altered).) 

 While the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial does not attach until a suspect

is formally charged or arrested, Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992),

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971), the potential prejudicial effect of

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delays in charging a suspect are subject to scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. 

United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982); see United States v. Lovasco, 431

U.S. 783, 788-90 (1977), citing Marion, 404 U.S. at 320-21. "[P]roof of actual

prejudice" is generally a necessary element to prevail on a claim alleging excessive

pre-indictment delay and "makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for

adjudication," but prejudice alone does not "make[] the claim automatically valid." 

United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 792-96 (1977) (declining to adopt a rule

requiring prosecutors to make charging decisions at any particular point during an

investigation, and holding that "to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay

does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat

prejudiced by the lapse of time"). Reliance "solely on the real possibility of prejudice

inherent in any extended delay," such as "that memories will dim, witnesses become

inaccessible, and evidence be lost," are possibilities not in themselves adequate to show

that a defendant could not receive a fair trial due to pre-indictment delay. Marion, 404

U.S. at 325-26. 

The government is not required "to make charging decisions immediately upon

assembling sufficient evidence to establish guilt" because, among other things, that

would "preclude the Government from giving full consideration to the desirability of

not prosecuting in particular cases." A prosecutor may have wide latitude to decide

when to seek an indictment, especially when [as here] a case involves more than one

person." United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1989), citing

Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 792-95.

Throop states that on March 10, 2006, "trial counsel moved to dismiss the

charges by demonstrating how the DA Office was in collusion with CDC/Cal

Investigative & Security Units (ISU) to deliberately delay petitioner's indictment in bad

faith, and not out of convenience nor legitimate continuing need to investigate," and that

the delay had impaired his defense. (FAP 12, ECF No. 10.) He argues that the

government engaged in only "the pretext of an investigation," and that the trial court

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applied an improper standard of review in denying the motion that purportedly absolved

the State of its burden to articulate reasonable justification for the delay. (Id.) He

further argues:

. . . [T]here were no suspects at large or other extenuating circumstances that warranted extensive investigations because the subject offense was an in-custody melee confined to a prison recreation yard [on November 21, 2003], for which all 75 inmates within its perimeter were immediately isolated regardless of race or involvement until the January 15, 2004 completion of crime/incident report #CAL-FAY-03-11-0592. Then

throughout 2004, those same finalized administrative documents held in

the possession of the [ISU] became utilized as the preponderance of

evidence by correctional officers involved in the disturbance, for

strategically harassing petitioner (and numerous inmate coindictees) with false or frivolous claims for civil damages against them in the Imperial County Small Claim[s] Court. See Petitioner's subpoenas filed in Small Claims Court on August 25, 2004 at Exhibits 168-172.

(FAP 12, ECF No. 10.) 

Throop alleges that the prosecutors "collaborated with the ISU's DA Liaison (CO

Alvarez)" as "quasi-civil advisory attorneys to coordinate" that "purely private litigation

in a ploy that compelled" the prospective inmate defendants in the prison riot criminal

case, including himself, "to submit handwritten inmate declarations" in order to

"defend[] property rights at civil hearings." (FAP 12, ECF No. 10.) Based on those

speculative motives, he urges the Court to "infer[] circumstantial evidence that

prosecutors deliberately sandbagged petitioner's Grand Jury indictment until after small

claims judgments had been taken against him in absentia . . . because Alvarez had

already filed the felony complaint against him to the DA in February 2004" but "the

prolongation of arraignment [lasted] until February 2005." (Id.) He identifies the

prejudice from that alleged conduct as including that "impeachable statements in the

private litigation were later exploited by the prosecution team during grand jury and

trial to tactically bolster their witnesses' testimony," contributing to the purported

"fundamental unfairness" of his trial, "because it further created POSTaccusation

hi[n]d[r]ances to defense efforts to locate witnesses." (Id. at 13.) 

Respondent fairly summarizes this claim as alleging "the prosecution delayed

seeking an indictment because it was in 'collusion' with the CDCR and Calipatria's

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[ISU]" and was purportedly acting with alleged "deliberate . . . bad faith delay." 

(Answer 20, ECF No. 21-1.) Respondent further observes that "the Supreme Court has

repeatedly noted that charging decisions generally rest within the prosecutor's

discretion." (Id., citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 424 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (" '[T]he

conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal

constitutional violation' " so long as " 'the selection was [not] deliberately based upon

an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification' "),

quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).)

Throop relies on Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) for the proposition

that "[t]he accused has an interest in being tried promptly, even though he was confined

in a penitentiary for an unrelated charge." (Traverse 37, ECF No. 39.) Reprising some

arguments from Ground Three, he represents that notices of charges were issued to

himself and about 75 other inmates following the prison riot, which he characterizes as

the "the moment of their 'arrest' pending investigation and collection of evidence by

members of the Calipatria prison's ISU." (Id.: "Incident Packages were issued to

petitioner and over 40 other inmates for allegations of PARTICIPATION IN A RIOT

to BATTERY" on January 15, 2004, which he characterizes as an event constituting the

conclusion of findings.) He contends he "asserted his rights to Demand Trial pursuant

to [Cal.] Penal Code 1381" on March 19, 2004 after he was notified that his case had

been filed with the District Attorney's office, "out of concern that his ability to locate

witnesses [favorable to] his defense would become impaired" due to inmate and staff

transfers out of Calipatria. (Id. at 37-38.) He argues that "delaying the indictment for

15 months -- until February 22, 2005 -- was prejudicial" and purportedly served no

"valid police purpose of criminal prosecution." (Id. at 38, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407

U.S. 514, 531 (1972).)

The analysis of prejudicial delay entails essentially the same "two prong" test

under either the Sixth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment standards. The defendant

must prove "actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay" and that "the delay, when

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balanced against the prosecution's reasons for it, offends those 'fundamental conceptions

of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.' " Sherlock, 962

F.2d at 1353-54, quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790; see Moran, 759 F.2d at 782 ("The

defendant has a heavy burden to prove that a preindictment delay caused actual

prejudice: the proof must be definite and not speculative, and the defendant must

demonstrate how the loss of a witness and/or evidence is prejudicial to his case")

(citations omitted). Only if the claimant first shows actual prejudice need the court

balance the length of delay against the government's reason for the delay. Lovasco, 431

U.S. at 790. 

 The court of appeal rejected this claim on the merits along with the 14 other

enumerated grounds for relief in its reasoned decision denying Throop collateral relief

in its September 9, 2011 decision. (Lodg. No. 16.) That court's conclusion that the

delayed indictment did not prejudice the outcome of Throop's trial is not contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of any United States Supreme Court holding, see Richter,

131 S.Ct. at 785-86, nor an unreasonable determination from the facts, and is entitled

to deference. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), (e)(1). The record of the chaotic prison riot and the

considerable investigation required before the prosecution could responsibly issue the

indictments against Throop and dozens of other participating inmates on individualized

charges amply support that result. He has not made the required showing of "actual,

nonspeculative delay" which, considered against the magnitude of the charging process

in these circumstances, suggests that he consequently received a trial that violated

"fundamental conceptions of justice." Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1353-54; Lovasco, 431

U.S. at 790. Relief on this theory is not warranted.

2. Intrusion Into Attorney/Client Relationship

Throop represents he has "circumstantial evidence," predicated on "information

and belief," that "illicit intrusions" by certain of his "housing custodians," caused

prejudicial interference in the preparation of his defense. (FAP 13, ECF No. 10.) He

identifies the alleged misconduct as "opening and reading confidential mail,

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eavesdropping on attorney visits" and "manipulating conditions" of his segregated

confinement "that permitted agents of the prosecution to freely taunt, or initiate

communications with him about circumstances of the subject offense, or to gain a

tactical advantage prior to offering their testimony at the later trial, or to otherwise

pressure petitioner and his codefendant to change their pleas or reconsider subpoenaing

guards as defense witnesses." (Id.) He further alleges that in "collaboration with the

DA, ISU conducted surreptitious post-indictment prying into defense strategies . . . that

were designed to discern impeachable or incriminating statements and tactical

information," then purportedly "after the prosecution team successfully discovered the

flaws in their own case by monitoring privileged communications, they took affirmative

steps to withhold information and evidence favorable to petitioner's defense." (Id.) He

vaguely identifies the resulting prejudice from that alleged misconduct as: "words or

actions reasonably likely to elicit derivable responses by alleged victims, and

subpoenaed witnesses, routinely subjected petitioner to an atmosphere of egregious

conduct and harassment intended to psychologically subvert the attorney-client

relationship with CDC methods of badgering, provoking and other express questioning

or its functional equivalent." (Id. at 14.) 

As a particular example in support of those representations, Throop recites that

on December 23, 2005, particular correctional officers allegedly "orchestrated a ruse to

lure petitioner into interrogation rooms under false pretenses of an attorney visit from

trial counsel," then threatened him "with physical force or adverse administrative

consequences if he refused to participate in their interview" after he "detect[ed] their

deception" and "became uncooperative." (FAP 13, ECF No. 10.) He represents that he

"was not permitted to leave and rights to counsel ignored." (Id.) As he left that area,

he alleges he discovered that prosecution witness and D.A. Liaison officer Alvarez (one

of the victims in the incident) "and other CDC or DA investigators were monitoring the

room from behind a mirrored wall." (Id. at 13-14.) He further alleges "on information

and belief" that those officers "compiled their own reports concerning the interview that

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they classified as confidential documents to ensure [defense counsel] could not access

it for inclusion within the motion to dismiss." (Id. at 14.) He also contends that photo

logs were "doctored" for the purported purpose to "conceal . . . duplicity." (Id.)

Based on those speculative inferences and innuendo, Throop contends the

"adverse effects" of that alleged conduct "were not revealed until the initiation of trial." 

(FAP 14, ECF No. 10.) He argues "[t]he Courts' failures to give consideration to the

totality of pretrial government intrusions and subterfuge acquiesced a chill on [sic]

attorney collaborations with petitioner, or his inmate witnesses, and became

substantially prejudicial for the defense." (Id.) 

Contrary to Throop's representation, the California Court of Appeal expressly

stated that it had taken judicial notice of Throop's direct appeal and a prior petition, and

that it had "read and considered" the "petition and supplemental petition" under review,

before denying him collateral relief in its September 2011 opinion. (Lodg. No. 16.) 

Applying the requisite deference to state court results on the merits of any federal

constitutional claim that might be extracted from Throop's rambling narrative, and in

the absence of a holding from the United States Supreme Court that controls the

disposition of any such claim, the Court should find he fails to satisfy AEDPA

standards on a theory of government intrusion into the attorney/client relationship. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a),(d). 

3. Failure To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Throop alleges he was denied due process for the prosecution's failure to disclose

to him favorable evidence "in possession of the investigative agency." (FAP 14, ECF

No. 10 (typography altered).) The allegedly withheld evidence is some photographs

taken during or after the prison riot and the confiscated clothes he was wearing at that

time. He also speculatively alleges that he "is informed and believes that several

inmates, including Victor Parra, provided statements to the ISU team(s) that had

exculpatory value to his defense," relying for that assertion on his own declaration

describing hearsay remarks he attributes to Parra after that inmate's trial, and that the

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prosecution failed to comply with his attorney's discovery demand for "statements of

all defendants" or "documented information from prisoners interviewed as potential

suspects in the case." (FAP 16, ECF No. 10.) Throop summarily concludes: "The

failures to disclose is prejudicial to petitioner because under the Totality of

Circumstances in this case it was reasonably probable that had those materials been

available during trial it would have been sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome of the jury's verdict at issue." (FAP 16, ECF No. 10.) Respondent argues

Throop's Brady claim should be rejected in its entirety as vague and conclusory. (Id.

at 22.)

In order to establish a constitutional violation on a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct in the withholding of evidence, a claimant must satisfy the standards from

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83v(1963). "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence

is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution," and the suppression must have prejudiced the defendant. Brady, 373

U.S. at 87. The duty to disclose favorable evidence "is applicable even though there has

been no request by the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and

. . . the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence,

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,

280 (1999) (parallel citations omitted). 

"[E]vidence is 'material' within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would

have been different." Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009); see Strickler, 527

U.S. at 280. "A 'reasonable probability' of a different result is . . . shown when the

government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the

trial." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (The touchstone of materiality "is

not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict

with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a

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trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence"); see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. "The

mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense,

or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the

constitutional sense." Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations

omitted). "[U]nless the [suppression] deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no

constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and absent a

constitutional violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor's duty to disclose." 

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108.

 Concerning the photographs, Throop represents that Victor Parra, one of the

multiple indicted inmates who was tried separately from Throop on other charges

arising from the November 2003 prison riot, was represented by Brooks Anderholdt,

a partner in the same law firm as his own defense attorney. Those attorneys employed

the same private investigator, George Wallet. Throop represents that "[d]uring Spring

2005, Mr. Anderholdt received videotapes and approximately 200+ photos as part of

Parra's requested discovery," which he describes as "completed sets of discovery films,"

and that his trial court "initially ordered these two attorneys to utilize (share) that single

set of (Parra's) discovery," as "described in Ground 5 below." (FAP 14, ECF No. 10.) 

Throop claims that investigator Wallet "arranged a viewing of Parra's films with

petitioner" in September 2005. (Id.) He represents that "in several 35mm photographs,

[he, Throop] is depicted" in a seated position "more than 100 feet away from . . . the

location of the alleged offenses occurred." (Id. at 14-15.) He also contends that one of

the ISU videos shows him "relinquishing his personal clothing" to officers and having

the items "tagged and bagged as evidence alongside other inmate's clothing." (Id. at

14.) 

Throop represents "on information and belief" that the Parra trial began in

September 2005, months before his own May 2006 trial, and that the photographs

investigator Wallet possessed were "entered into evidence at that trial." (FAP 15, ECF

No. 10.) He alleges that "an oversight prevented copies of those pictures taken by [CO]

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Alvarez being provided to" his defense counsel, who "was never able to inspect them

and had no knowledge of them until petitioner explained their relevance in May 2006." 

(Id.) His defense attorney "[a]pparently . . . requested a second set of photos from the

DA after discovering that the Parra discovery had become unavailable," but that at the

readiness conference before his trial Throop "alerted [his attorney] that this second

batch contained less than half of the earlier stack issued" for the Parra trial. (Id.) He

also asserts that he "personally complained to [his] trial [judge] about it," because that

circumstance purportedly "was evidence that ISU had doctored the photo log to delete"

images favorable to him. (Id.) 

Respondent argues that Throop fails to support his contentions of withheld

evidence with any affidavit or declaration from his trial counsel. The record reveals that

at the May 16, 2006 motions in limine hearing, Throop addressed the court regarding

his concerns that "a group of photographs" he was shown the day before "are not the

same photographs that I seen six months ago with the investigator." (Lodg. No. 3, RT

vol. 7 at 199.) In particular, Throop represented he could not now locate "three to five"

pictures of inmates he had seen before which "were close-up photographs, like a portrait

of these men in these areas," and a particular "photograph of the scene." (Id. at 200-

201.) Defense counsel acknowledged that Throop had expressed those concerns to him,

that he had compared the photographs in his file to each picture in the prosecutor's file

and all were accounted for. (Id. at 200). Counsel stated he would talk to the

investigator about the ostensibly missing photographs. (Id.) Counsel added that there

was also "a question as to the photographic logs, but that's been explained by Officer

Critenon [sic]." (Id.) Respondent observes that "there is nothing in this record to

indicate that [defense counsel] was prevented from viewing or obtaining copies, during

or after Parra's" September 2005 trial, "if counsel thought them material." (Answer 21-

22, ECF No. 21-1.) 

Throop urges this Court to engage in a frame-by-frame analysis of particular

photos he contends are "favorable to petitioner's defense" to establish the legitimacy of

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his claim.10 (Id.) Leaving aside the impropriety of such a proposed undertaking on

federal habeas review, the Court notes that even though Throop wants the Court to

impute a Brady violation to the prosecution on the ground of a purportedly incomplete

production of photographs intentionally "withheld," Throop simultaneously

acknowledges that the discrepancy appears to have been the result of an "oversight." 

(Id.) By Throop's own account, the prosecution had in fact already produced a complete

set of the relevant photographs to his attorney's law partner who was representing

inmate Parra at a separate trial. The defense investigator actually showed them to

Throop personally months before his trial.

Concerning his confiscated clothing, Throop states that he was unaware "until

ISU delivered boxes of physical evidence to court" that had been "processed from the

crime scene" that "none of his clothing had been included nor released to [his defense

counsel] either," despite "the video show[ing] ISU collecting it." (FAP 15, ECF No.

10.) He posits, among other things, that if the clothing evidence had been made

available to counsel in advance of trial, testing could have been conducted for "residue

from chemical agents described by staff as doused onto all of the inmates in the

vicinity" of the riot "to corroborate petitioner's defense that he was never affected by

teargas because he was NOT in the area and had not handled any pepper-spray

weapons." (Id.) His speculative, self-serving representation about what his clothes

might have revealed is insufficient to satisfy any of the elements of a viable Brady

claim. 

This Court's function is confined to a determination whether the state courts

reached an objectively reasonable result from the record, irrespective of other inferences

or findings which might also be drawn. The California Court of Appeal reasonably

rejected his claim that the prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence in its

10 Throop adds, "on information and belief," that certain photographs "which were filmed at the CAL

infirmary, & Pioneers Memorial Hospital [citing exhibit numbers], are/were the same pictures distributed to

the defense attorneys representing the dozen or more inmates indicted for that incident after petitioner" but were

"NOT released" to him for his trial. (FAP 15, ECF No. 10.) He fails to establish how those could be construed

as "exculpatory" or having impeachment value with respect to the pepper spray charges against him. 

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September 9, 2011 decision denying Throop habeas relief. (Lodg. No. 16.) Throop's

ambiguous and speculative arguments fail to demonstrate that the prosecution

"withheld" any evidence material to the determination of his guilt in the form of missing

photographs, seized clothing, or any particular inmate interview, or any likelihood that

"the result of the proceeding would have been different" had that material been

produced before trial. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280; cf. Smith, 132 S.Ct. at 630 (finding,

on direct review of a first-degree murder conviction, that the prosecution withheld a

witness' "undisclosed statements" that were "plainly material" because that "was the

only evidence linking [the defendant] to the crime"). No fewer than seven correctional

officer percipient witnesses in the melee testified at his trial and identified him as an

active participant in the pepper spraying incidents for which he was convicted. "We

have observed . . . that evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the

State's other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict." Smith v.

Cain, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 627, 630 (2012), citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13 and n.

21. Throop has not shown a "reasonable probability" that the jury would have been

persuaded by the allegedly undisclosed evidence, "in the context of the entire record." 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112. After independent consideration of the

record, it is recommended the Court find no basis to disturb the state courts' rejection

of this claim. 

4. Prosecutorial Interference With Defense Witness Availability

Throop repackages here as "interference" with witness availability his contentions

regarding the circumstances of Garcia's acceptance of a plea deal and his consequent

withdrawal from his anticipated joint trial with Throop, discussed in connection with

his Ground One allegations of conspiracy and interference with compulsory process. 

He reiterates his suspicions that the plea deal was part of alleged collusive conduct

among "agents of the prosecution" engaged in surreptitious conduct and tactics to learn

his and his co-defendant's defense strategies. (FAP 17, ECF No. 10.) He characterizes

this claim as another example of a "pattern" of government misconduct in his case

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allegedly undertaken in order to gain "an unfair tactical advantage over the defense." 

(Id.) 

Throop argues in particular that "the information gleaned from the government

intrusions into their lawyer-client relationships had already alerted the prosecution that

inmate Garcia was poised to testify as a witness for petitioner's defense once he was

sentenced in accordance with the DA's offer that was accepted in the winter of 2005." 

(FAP 16, ECF No. 10.) He represents that Garcia "renegged [sic] on the plea

agreement" after he received his presentence report, "and resumed trial preparations for

a joint trial with" Throop. (Id.) Throop then describes "on information and belief" a

convoluted series of alleged promises and conduct by Garcia's public defender

purportedly to further that attorney's pursuit of a position in the District Attorney's

office, such as an agreement to propose a new plea deal to Garcia that instructed him

"to refuse to testify on behalf of petitioner's defense" and "not to share any further

information relating to this case with petitioner, nor his defense representatives." (Id.

at 16-17.) Throop speculates that the "revised [plea] agreement [offered to Garcia]

carried significant coercive force," and "intimidated" Garcia. (FAP 17, ECF No. 10.) 

Without a shred of supporting evidence, Throop concludes: "As a result, he was

instructed to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights until sentencing . . . which was held

in abeyance until after the trial to guarantee that he would not cooperate as a defense

witness under threat of revoking the deal." (Id.)

Ignoring the codified limitations of federal habeas review of state court

convictions, Throop argues this Court should grant him relief because "a preponderance

of evidence demonstrates a strong suggestion that Garcia's decision not to testify was

induced by the State's willful and deliberate misconduct," in supposed violation of

Throop's "Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments not to employ tactics that

substantially interfere with an accused's right of access to a crucial witness in his

defense." (FAP 17, ECF No. 10.) Throop's assertion that the prosecution acted to

"transform[] a willing witness into one who would refuse to testify" is predicated on his

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fanciful notion that "[i]f not for the prosecution's persistent shenanigans petitioner

would have been acquitted of the two remaining counts because the evidence was not

over-whelming, and primarily circumstantial since the bulk of prosecution testimony

pertained to spraying Alvarez, Leamons and Drennon, for which the acquittals for

Counts 3, 4 and 5 proves never happened at all!" (Id.) Even if all that Throop alleges

with regard to the circumstances surrounding Garcia's absence as a witness at his trial

were true, a proposition he fails entirely to substantiate, the record does not support the

conclusion that absent Garcia's evidence, Throop did not receive a fair trial. See

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. If Garcia had testified that Throop

had nothing to do with the batteries on correctional officers, at most a credibility

question would have been before the jury, to weigh against the multiple eyewitnesses

who identified Throop as a perpetrator. 

As reasonably found by the superior court in denying Throop habeas relief on

the ground that he was allegedly deprived of Garcia's testimony due to prosecutorial and

CDCR misconduct, "[h]is allegations are speculative and conclusory," and he fails to

"demonstrate that the testimony of Garcia would have any effect on a jury given that

some seven CO's testified as eyewitnesses to the batteries according to the court of

appeal summary." (Lodg. No. 14, slip op. at 2.) The state court of appeal subsequently

reviewed anew Throop's claim that he was purportedly deprived of his codefendant's

"exonerating testimony" and thus a fair trial, and similarly found his speculative

arguments were inadequate to state a prima facie case for relief. (Lodg. No. 18, slip

op. at 1-2: "There is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or an improper plea

bargain.") The Court should find that there is no basis for disturbing the state court

result as Throop satisfies none of the AEDPA standards for federal habeas relief on this

theory. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a),(d).

5. Inconsistent Prosecutorial Facts And Theories At Separate Trials

Throop alleges his Fifth Amendment rights were violated "because the state

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proffered inconsistent prosecutorial theories and facts regarding the same charges at

separate trials against his coindictees concerning elements of his involvement" in the

riot during the prison yard melee which resulted in grand jury indictments "against a

dozen or more state prisoners for battery." (FAP 18, ECF No. 10 (typography

modified).) The court of appeal denied him relief on that or any of the other multiple

challenges to his conviction presented in his second habeas petition to that court, on the

merits and on procedural grounds. (Lodg. Nos. 15, 16.) 

 In reliance on Ninth Circuit authority, for apparent want of controlling United

States Supreme Court authority, with Throop conceding "the Supreme Court has yet to

consider this issue" (Traverse 45, ECF No. 39), Respondent articulates the Ninth

Circuit's approach to the constitutionality of inconsistent theories taken by a prosecutor

in separate trials, which Throop adopts in his Traverse.

 The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors violate a defendant's right to due process if they knowingly use false evidence. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.

78, 84-89 (1935). It follows that a prosecutor's pursuit of fundamentally

inconsistent theories in separate trials against separate defendants charged with the same murder can violate due process if the prosecutor knowingly uses false evidence or acts in bad faith.

Nguyen v. Lindsey, 232 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).

Leaving aside the AEDPA restriction that the absence of a United States Supreme

Court holding on the issue presented precludes habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1), Carey, 549 U.S. at 77, Throop's reliance on Thompson v. Calderon, 120

F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998), in support of

this argument is misplaced. The Thompson court found that the prosecutor violated that

defendant's due process and fair trial rights by pursuing "glaring inconsistencies" in his

theories, arguments, and factual representations in separate trials of two defendants

charged with the same murder. That prosecutor made "patently untrue statements" to

the jury about the lack of motivation for the testifying jailhouse informants to lie,

temporar[ily] abandon[ed] during Thompson's trial . . . the theory he presented, and

supported with evidence, at the preliminary hearing, in the pretrial motions, and again

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at and after [his co-defendant's] trial," and "essentially ridiculed the theory he had used

to obtain a conviction and death sentence at Thompson's trial"). Id. at 1055-56, 1057-

58. In Throop's case, he identifies no particular "patently untrue" statement or

fundamentally inconsistent, mutually-negating theory advanced by the prosecution in

any particular separate trial arising from the same crimes for which he was tried. As

Respondent observes, "Throop does not assert and produces no evidence that the

prosecutor argued at a trial of a different inmate charged with the same crime, that is,

the pepper-spray assault on Morales and Johnson, that anyone other than Throop was

guilty." (Answer 23, ECF No. 21-1.) It appears that only Throop and his co-defendant

Garcia were charged with those particular batteries. Moreover, the United States

Supreme Court "has never hinted, much less held, that the Due Process Clause prevents

a State from prosecuting defendants based on inconsistent theories." Bradshaw v.

Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 190 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); see Nguyen, 232 F.3d at

1240 (recognizing that a prosecutor's presentation of even fundamentally inconsistent

theories of guilt against co-perpetrators who are tried separately is not a per se

constitutional violation). Throop satisfies none of the AEDPA standards required before

federal habeas relief is warranted on this theory. 

6. Conviction Based On False Testimony

Throop alleges that prosecution witness Lieutenant Hunt falsely testified, for the

first time at his trial, that Officers Burkhammer and Silva "had lost their pepper spray

when they fell to the ground" during the melee. (FAP 19, ECF No. 10, citing 10 RT at

421.) Throop characterizes Hunt's testimony as a purported effort "to fill the voids in

the prosecution theory that could not positively explain why no single prison guard

under his command submitted reports about losing their state issued MK-9 equipment,

nor did anyone recover or collect any MK-9s from an inmate or on the ground,"

whereas "State regulations mandate that supervisors be immediately notified of any

weapons lost by staff -- or intercepted by prisoners." (Id.) After a detailed summary

of his own interpretation of the evidence, Throop concludes: "The prosecution clearly

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acquiesced Hunt's [sic] deception of the court by failing to correct his misleading

testimony," a purported violation of the constitutional standards from Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 

"A conviction obtained through the use of false evidence, known to be such by

representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment," whether

through the prosecutor's solicitation of such evidence or through allowing it "to go

uncorrected when it appears." Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, citing, inter alia, Mooney, 294

U.S. 103. On federal habeas review of Napue errors, the harmlessness standard "is

different from the ordinary harmlessness standard, and is referred to in Napue and its

progeny as a 'materiality' standard." Dow v. Virga, 729 F.3d 1041, 1043, 1048 (9th Cir.

2013) ("a presentation to a fact-finder of false testimony knowing it to be false" requires

"reversal of a conviction if 'the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood

have affected the judgment of the jury' "), quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.

150, 153 (1972), quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271.

 The state court record amply supports the immateriality, for purposes of

undermining officer Hunt's testimony, of an absence in incident reports by correctional

officers involved in the riot of statements that they lost their MK-9 pepper spray

equipment. As reasonably found by the court of appeal on direct review, irrespective

of whose particular MK-9 pepper spray canister or canisters were used to spray the

correctional officers or how the canister he used came into Throop's possession, several

testifying witnesses, including Morales and Johnson, the two victims he was convicted

of spraying, positively identified him. No reasonable factfinder could conclude that

Hunt's purportedly "misleading" statement constituted "false evidence" "uncorrected"

by the prosecutor that probably affected the judgment of the jury.

7. Impermissibly Suggestive Identification Procedures

Throop speculates that he was identified by correctional officers as a participant

in the riot as part of their effort to "scapegoat" prisoners out of "embarrassment" for

having relinquished control over their pepper spray equipment, whereas the pepper

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spray "exposure [was] actually attribut[able] to errant friendly fire from a coworker." 

(FAP 21, ECF No. 10.) He argues the eyewitness testimony at his trial was "tainted by

unnecessary underground suggestive identification practices employed by

CDCR/CAL." (Id.) He recites as a purported example of that claim, among others of

the same ilk, that "every prosecution witness acknowledged preparing their report

drafts while collaborating with other guards . . . referring to 'laundry lists' of inmate

names." (Id.) He argues from that procedure that "circumstantial evidence of the

high[] suggestiveness of the investigative agency's out of court identification procedure

. . . was conducive to COACHING petitioner's inculpation." (Id.) 

Urging this Court to characterize the eyewitness identification testimony against

him as "incredible, or patently unbelievable," and to disregard it all on that basis, he

vaguely argues "the court should consider the entire process of the prosecuting agency's

clearly inadmissible methods of suggesting identifications along with confusing

conditions at the scene" as "[c]ircumstantial evidence of the questionable origins of

recklessly discharged pepper spray streams." (FAP 21-22, ECF No. 10.) He contends

that the three acquittals in his case, involving officers Leamons, Alvarez, and Drennon,

warrant exclusion in its entirety of their testimony, as well as the testimony of "the

relevant prosecution witnesses who corroborated those 3 guards' version" of events on

grounds those verdicts purportedly prove it did "NOT . . . happen[] at all." (Id. at 22.)

Rather characteristically of Throop's briefing, it is only in his Traverse that

Throop cites any authority in support of his "impermissibly suggestive witness

identification" due process claim. (Traverse 48-51. ECF No. 39.) None of it supports 

his position. For example, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), overruling on

other grounds recognized in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the Court

applied the exclusionary rule that a finding of a due process violation in the context of

a tainted confrontation for identification purposes depends on the totality of the

circumstances surrounding it, because the rules are aimed to avoid confrontations that

are "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification"

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as to deny the accused due process. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-302 (finding no due

process violation when the defendant was brought to the hospital room of a stabbing

victim for purposes of identification). Similarly, the Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.

188 (1972) applied the totality of the circumstances standard to hold that an arguably

suggestive station-house identification of a suspect by a rape victim was nonetheless

reliable and was properly allowed to go to the jury. In Throop's case, no reasonable

determination that a risk of "irreparable mistaken identification" due to "unnecessarily

suggestive" identification procedures is conceivable. The testifying correctional officer

witnesses were employed at Calipatria where Throop was incarcerated, and most were

personally acquainted with him before the incident through their interactions with

inmates in the course of their employment. In those circumstances, none of his

complaints about the investigational process through which he was identified by them

to be a perpetrator can reasonably be construed as entailing an "unnecessarily

suggestive" process that undermines the reliability of the identifications or,

consequently, of his convictions. 

This claim is patently meritless. Cutting through Throop's hyperbolic

speculation, rejecting his distinguishable authority, and disregarding the inapplicable

standards of review he invokes, his arguments do not undermine the objective

reasonableness of the state court's result. His contention that the "tainted" pretrial

identification procedures rendered the eyewitness evidence unreliable is particularly

unpersuasive because he admits the jury was made aware of the identification

procedures during his trial: "the totality of these facts were uncovered only by

questioning at the trial, and essentially surprised the defense." (FAP 22, ECF No. 10.) 

A federal habeas court does not reweigh the evidence nor substitute its own assessment

of the evidence for that of the fact finder. This Court should decline Throop's sweeping

invitation to "exert its power to upset flawed jury credibility determinations" and to

"reject the 'suggestive identification evidence' " he summarily purports to have "shown

to be contrary to law, or so improbable on it face that no reasonable fact-finder could

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accept it . . . because under all the circumstances [a] 'substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification' is EVIDENT." (Traverse 51, ECF No. 39, quoting

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198.) 

8. Shackled Escorts Viewed By Jurors

Throop alleges: "Petitioner's right to due process and a fair trial . . . was violated

because the prosecuting agency deliberately subjected him to daily nonroutine escorts

in shackles viewed by jurors to circumvent pretrial orders to remove his handcuffs in

their presence." (FAP 22, ECF No. 10.) He challenges this purported component of his

Ground Four "CDC's pattern of misconduct" contending that as "agents of the judicial

system," they "contrived conditions for manipulating and exploiting their control over

his court appearances." (Id. (typography modified).) 

On May 17, 2006, the day before voir dire began, the court and counsel discussed

the use of physical restraints in the courtroom. Everyone agreed visible restraints

would not be permissible, but that the nature of the case and legitimate security

concerns on the part of the CDC made some form of courtroom restraint desirable. 

(Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 7 at 185-189.) The court identified as the "main problem" to be

addressed was to keep the defendants "away from weapons," not merely to "protect

from flight," and intentionally placed on the record the security challenges at the

courthouse in support of her ruling that the defendants should at least wear leg braces:

[T]his courthouse has four doors in which people enter. And there is no

security at any of those doors. There's no camera. There is no metal

detector. There are no lock boxes for weapons. There is no guard at any of these doors. They're open all day long from 8:00 in the morning until about 6:00. . . .

(Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 7 at 210-211.)

The court stated its expectation that the defendants they would not "be wearing

handcuffs or any other chains or visible shackles." (Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 7 at 208; see

Lodg. No. 1, CT vol. 2 at 0513, ordering that Throop be "unshackled but wearing a leg

brace and clothed in street clothes during the trial" at "any and all court appearances

made by the inmate after May 16, 2006. . . ."). The court had a "brown cloth put around

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the table" in the courtroom so the defendants' feet could not be seen. The next day,

before voir dire began, the custody captain from Calipatria and the prison's litigation

coordinator appeared along with the defendants and counsel to further discuss the

restraints issue. The captain explained that the prisoners would be in leg iron shackles

when they arrived for court "per our policy," with a heavy metal plate secreted

underneath the table for securing the leg iron chain. (Lodg. No. 3, RT vol. 8 at 276-

279.) He explained that defendants would come to the table in full irons on their legs

and ankles "like you see now," and acknowledged it would be "noticeable that they're

walking with something heavy attached to their feet". (Id. at 279.) Defense counsel

argued that the irons' chain and metal plate would prevent the defendants from standing

and could be heard by the jury. Counsel requested that "if my client chooses to testify,"

counsel requested that a leg brace replace the irons for that period. (Id. at 280-281.) The

captain responded that a "brace is not part of the [CDCR's] equipment that we are

authorized to utilize," and "while these gentlemen are in our charge, that's not a device

that we can use to secure them." (Id. at 281.) The court permitted the metal plate with

a hook to restrain the defendants' legs under the table, until such time as the testimony

issue might arise. (Id. at 283-284; see Lodg. No. 1, CT vol. 2 at 528.)

 Throop alleges that thereafter, his transportation teams began "deviating from"

the practice that had been customary for his pretrial hearing appearances, when he

arrived an hour early, restrained in waist and leg chains, but accessed the courthouse

through prisoners' entrances located in an alleyway at the rear of the building. He

alleges they stopped using the "less intrusive entrances designated for prisoner escort

routes" to court and began instead, "halfway through voir dire and for the duration of

the trial," to keep him in the vehicle "until the moment that his jurors began arriving and

entering through the court's East wing public entrance, at which time the backdoor

passages were bypassed so that they could parade petitioner in chains around the

building's driveway and into the same civilian path known to be favored by jurors #3,

#4, #5, and #11." (FAP 23, ECF No. 10.) He contends "this suspicious arrangement"

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led to "inappropriate encounters at the doorway staircase between jurors and petitioner

-- in full restraints with armed uniformed escorts, multiple times per week." (Id.) 

Throop attributes those procedures as intended "to coercively suggest he was a

violent person predisposed to commit crimes of the type alleged" predicated on a

"pretext of justifiable or reasonable need." (FAP 23, ECF No. 10.) He contends that

"the synchronicity of those stages 'perp-walks' " provides additional "[c]ircumstantial

evidence of the on-going tag team chicanery between ISU and prosecutors. . . ." Id.) 

He represents that the court "reproached deputies and guards to exercise caution"

following "the first instance of shackle exposure on May 18, 2006," yet another such

encounter recurred in the hallway, purportedly causing defense counsel to express

"dismay[] over the futility of redundantly addressing an obvious network of collusion

between government actors." (Id.) He argues that the "resulting prejudice from these

machinations became apparent when [J]uror #3 was later seen in the jury box physically

demonstrating for Juror #4 the methods for securing prisoners' wrists to waist-chains

that she became familiar with seeing." (Id.) He concludes from those allegations that

"it is reasonably probable that those nonroutine security measures amounted to

deliberate jury embracery that impaired the fairness of petitioner's trial . . . ." (Id.)

The Constitution forbids the use of visible restraints during a criminal trial

"unless that use is 'justified by an essential state interest' -- such as the interest in

courtroom security -- specific to the defendant on trial." Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S.

622, 624 (2005) (emphasis in original). The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments permit

a trial court to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, that restraints visible to the

jury are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial, in consideration of such

traditional factors as potential security problems and the risk of escape. Id. at 629; see

Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir.1985) ("The trial court has

discretion to use shackles or other security measures when circumstances dictate"). 

Ordinarily, only the shackling of a defendant in the courtroom during trial when the trial

court prejudicially failed to comply with established safeguards to ensure that only the

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least restrictive alternatives are used in response to a compelling need concerns federal

habeas courts. See Dyas v. Poole, 317 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)

(finding prejudice from a concededly unconstitutional shackling of the defendant during

her trial where the record was devoid of evidence that the trial court made attempts to

conceal the defendant's restraints in the courtroom during the trial); see also Spain v.

Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding a due process violation when the

trial judge failed to considered the less restrictive means of exclusion from trial before

imposing on the defendant shackling of "unparalled" extent and duration); Rhoden v.

Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir.1999) (finding a defendant was prejudiced

because the jury saw him shackled throughout the entire trial). 

The safe transport of prisoners and the manner of transport from prison to court

are the responsibility of the institutional custodian. The Ninth Circuit has consistently

held that a juror's brief or inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in physical restraints

outside of the courtroom does not raise a constitutional concern warranting habeas

relief. See, e.g., Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (Brief or

inadvertent glimpses "of a shackled defendant is not inherently or presumptively

prejudicial"); see also Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d 145, 147-48 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding

no due process violation when some members of the jury pool saw the defendant in

shackles in a court corridor, and that although the court committed constitutional error

by permitting shackling during trial without weighing that burden against less restrictive

alternative, the error was harmless). 

 In his Traverse, Throop clarifies that this complaint targets the conduct of his

custodians rather than the trial court: "[B]ecause petitioner was housed in the custody

of the same victims and crime scene investigators involved in his prosecution, they were

enabled to abuse their discretion in a concerted strategy to prejudice petitioner's jury

panel by 'staging' daily 'perp-walks' disguised as routine security practices that

'displayed to the world against his will, in handcuffs, and in a posture connoting guilt.'

" (Traverse 52, ECF No. 39, quoting Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 212 n.7 (2d Cir.

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2000), an inapposite Second Circuit civil rights case brought by an arrestee pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging such conduct under the Fourth Amendment.) Respondent

argues that Throop's complaint "that he was transported from the prison to the

courthouse in shackles and that some jurors saw him" is not contrary to any "United

States Supreme Court holding that prohibits the shackling of defendants during

transport to the courthouse," and therefore "the state court's denial of this claim cannot

have been unreasonable." (Answer 25, ECF No. 21-1, citing Moses, 555 F.3d 760.) 

 The record here demonstrates that Throop's trial judge reasonably exercised her

discretion to accommodate the competing interests of security and protection against

unnecessarily suggestive restraints. The issue was discussed among court and counsel,

and precautions were taken to conceal his restraints in the courtroom. As emphasized

in Deck, the most important indicator of prejudice in this context is the visibility of

restraints to the jury during trial. Deck, 544 U.S. at 624. Throop does not challenge the

manner, visibility, or degree of restraint used in the courtroom during the course of the

trial proceedings. 

Even if Throop could establish a violation of his due process rights in this regard,

"[s]hackling, except in extreme forms, is susceptible to harmless error analysis." 

Duckett v. Godinea, 67 F.3d 734, 749 (9th Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Larson v. Palmateer,

515 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the petitioner failed to show that

"wearing the leg brace for the first two days of a six-day trial" satisfied the Brecht

standard). Throop fails to establish prejudice from his contentions that some jurors

caught glimpses of him in transit to the courtroom wearing restraints. The jurors

obviously knew by the nature of the charged crimes that Throop was already

incarcerated at the time of the prison riot. Moreover, the trial evidence against him was

substantial. See Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 2010) ("we have held that

the unconstitutional shackling of a defendant results in prejudice only of the evidence

of guilt is not 'overwhelming' ") (citation omitted). It is recommended the Court find

the state courts reasonably denied Throop relief on this theory, as he demonstrates

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neither a constitutional violation nor prejudice associated with his shackling claim.

9. No Constitutional Errors To Cumulate

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the combined effect of discrete trial errors can

sometimes warrant federal habeas relief, even when none of them individually does. 

See Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,] at 298, 290 n. 3, 302-03 (1973); see also Alcala v.

Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the combined prejudice

of multiple errors deprived the defendant "of a fundamentally fair trail and constitute[d]

a separate and independent basis for granting his petition"). However, a cumulative

prejudice claim necessarily presupposes that the Court will find that substantial error

occurred in connection with at least two claims. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524

(9th Cir. 2011) ("Because we conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude

occurred, no cumulative prejudice is possible"). As it is recommended the Court find

"no single constitutional error" occurred under any of Throop's Ground Four claims,

"there is nothing to accumulate to a level of a constitutional violation." Mancuso v.

Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Ground Four should be DENIED in its

entirety.

F. Ground Five: Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel ("IAC")

Throop challenges the constitutional adequacy of his representation by trial and

appellate counsel in several particulars, under the heading: " 'Surrounding

Circumstances' Impaired Trial And Appellate Counsel's Abilities To Provide Effective

Representation In Accordance With The Sixth And Fourteenth Amendments To The

U.S. Constitution." (FAP 24, ECF No. 10). Concerning his trial attorney, Thomas

Storey, he alleges: (a) counsel was "actively influenced by diverse conflicts of interest

that adversely affected his performance and adequacy of representation"; (b) deliberate

state interference denied him effective assistance of counsel; (c) "the cumulative impact

of the surrounding circumstances" contributed to "deficiencies & inactions of trial

counsel during critical stages"; and (d) IAC for failure to request that Juror No. 2 be

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removed for cause "after the trial court's procedures impaired the exercise of

peremptory challenges." (Id. 24-28.) He also alludes to his Ground Four claim that the

sharing of the photographic evidence by his attorney and Victor Parra's attorney, 

partners in the same law firm, as initially instructed by the trial court, entailed IAC. The

latter claim is addressed above in connection with Ground Four. (FAP 14, ECF No.

10.) Concerning his appellate attorney, Robert E. Boyce, Throop alleges IAC for failure

to exhaust or brief viable issues and failure to ensure the transcript was accurate. (Id.

at 28-29.) 

1. Legal Standards

To prevail on an IAC claim as a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must

demonstrate that his or her attorney's unprofessional errors were so serious as to deprive

the defendant of the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and that the deficient

performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984) (The claimant must show both (1) deficient performance under an

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) prejudice). To demonstrate deficient

performance, "[t]he challenger's burden is to show 'that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.' " Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 689. To

demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that "but for counsel's unprofessional

errors," there is a reasonable probability "the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 690, 694 ("A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome"); see Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792 ("The

likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable"). "Because

failure to meet either [Strickland] prong is fatal to [an IAC] claim, there is no

requirement that we 'address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an

insufficient showing on one.' " Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 987 (9th Cir. 2011),

quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. "Without proof of both deficient performance and

prejudice to the defense . . . the sentence or conviction should stand." Bell v. Cone,

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535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) (citation omitted). 

The Strickland performance and prejudice standards govern the resolution of IAC

challenges to the representation of appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith v.

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). Reviewing courts must apply a "strong

presumption" that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "The pivotal question is whether

the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable." Richter, 131

S. Ct. at 785. A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit bars federal habeas

relief so long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the correctness of the state

court’s decision. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664. "[I]t is not enough to convince a federal

habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state court decision applied

Strickland incorrectly." Bell, 535 U.S. at 699. Federal habeas courts must ask "whether

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential

standard," not "whether counsel's actions were unreasonable." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at

785, 788. "[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary

conclusion was unreasonable." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786; see Burt v. Titlow, __ U.S.

__, 134 S.Ct. 10, 13 (2013) (discussing the "double deference" federal habeas courts

must apply to IAC claims and reversing a Sixth Circuit court for failure to apply that

standard in "refusing to credit a state courts' reasonable factual finding and by assuming

that counsel was ineffective when the record was silent"). 

Relief on IAC grounds can also be warranted when "the surrounding

circumstances made it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance

that ineffectiveness [is] properly presumed without inquiry into actual performance at

trial." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661 (1984), citing Powell v. Alabama,

287 U.S. 45 (1932). Such circumstances may be found, for example, from the denial

of the presence of counsel at critical stages of a prosecution or when an actual

breakdown in the adversarial process justifies the application of a presumption that the

defendant's conviction "was insufficiently reliable to satisfy the Constitution." Id. at

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662. 

2. Trial Counsel Challenges

Of the claims Throop raises under a theory of trial counsel IAC, only his

allegations that counsel purportedly had a conflict of interest because his law partner

represented another inmate in a separate trial arising from the prison riot, that he was

distracted by his own representation of an inmate also housed at Calipatria who was

facing capital murder charges in an unrelated matter, and that he was ineffective for

failing to have Juror No. 2 removed from the jury involve conduct attributable to his

attorney's own conduct. 

Throop's contentions that "deliberate state interference denied petitioner effective

assistance of counsel" protected by the Sixth Amendment and that "the cumulative

impact of the surrounding circumstances" contributed to "deficiencies & inactions of

trial counsel during critical stages" (FAP 25, 27, ECF No. 10 (typography altered)

comprise allegations that conduct by others impaired his defense. The particular

circumstances extraneous to counsel's own performance that Throop relies on in support

of this claim are addressed and disposed of in connection with Ground Four. Throop's

speculative allegations fall short of demonstrating "that counsel failed to function in any

meaningful sense as the Government's adversary," Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666, due to any

such extreme breakdown or third party obstructionism. New suggestions in his

Traverse elaborating other general criticisms of his attorney need not be separately

considered. 

Throop relies on Campbell v. Rice 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005), a case

presenting distinguishable facts, for the proposition that defendants are entitled to

"representation that is free from conflicts of interest." (Traverse 54, ECF No. 39.) He

faults the trial court for failure to inquire into the possibility that his defense attorney

might be unable to effectively advocate for Throop because his law partner was

defending another inmate in a separate trial on separate charges arising out of the same

prison riot. (FAP 24-25, ECF No. 10.) He speculates that another of counsel's cases,

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unrelated to his own or to the incident giving rise to the charges against him "restrained

[counsel's] assertiveness with CDCR/ISU." (Id.) "Although a petitioner who shows

that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not

demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171

(2001) (emphasis omitted), Throop demonstrates no actual conflict of interest existed

or affected the adequacy of his representation. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,

348 (1980) ("[A] defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an

actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance"). Reviewing

courts "cannot presume the possibility for conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance

of counsel." Id. As noted by Respondent, "[e]ven where the same attorney represents

two co-defendants in the same trial, 'trial courts may assume either that multiple

representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept

such risk of conflict as may exist.' " (Answer 29, ECF No. 21-1, quoting Cuyler, 446

U.S. at 347.) Throop fails to establish any factual basis to support his claim any conflict

of interest deprived him of the effective assistance of trial counsel.

Throop's allegation of IAC for failure to excuse Juror No. 2 for cause fails for the

same reasons as discussed in connection with the Ground Two challenge to the retention

of that juror. Concerning the IAC component of that claim, a portion of the discussion

among court and counsel at the conclusion of the colloquy with Juror No. 2 summarizes

the considered conclusions reached by the trial court and counsel on that juror's fitness

to remain on the jury:

[THE PROSECUTOR]: It's really up to the defense. If it's an issue for

anybody that he's related to the D.A., continuing would be for them. So I'll leave it up to them.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He says he can be fair. I don't think that's

cause. It would be a preempt if I had one.

THE COURT: Yeah. It didn't seem to be cause. If he doesn't -- if he

didn't remember he's related to the D.A. until now, it just doesn't seem like

they're that close. So we're -- I guess we'll go on with him.

(Lodg. No. 10, slip. op. at 13.) 

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The court of appeal on direct review reasonably rejected this ground for relief.

Based on our conclusions ante upholding the trial court's ruling that Juror No. 2 was competent to continue on the jury, that he did not engage in misconduct by his inadvertent failure to disclose that he and the

Riverside district attorney were cousins and that Throop was not prejudiced even if we assumed juror misconduct, we conclude trial

counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness. We further conclude that Throop, in any event, cannot show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's (alleged)

unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different. [¶] . . . [W]e conclude Throop was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel did not move to excuse Juror No.

2.

(Lodg. No. 10, slip op. at 20 & n. 12 (adding additional grounds for rejecting the claim

based on state law authority affecting the exercise of peremptory challenges.)

According the requisite "double deference" to state court resolutions of IAC

claims, see, e.g., Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 13, it is recommended the Court not disturb the state

court's objectively reasonable rejection of Throop's challenges to the constitutionality

of his trial counsel's representation. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785-86.

3. Appellate Counsel Challenges

Throop alleges he was "deprived of a meaningful and effective direct appeal" due

to counsel's allegedly ineffective assistance in purportedly failing to exhaust or brief

"viable issues" and for failing "to ensure that the transcript is accurate." (FAP 28, ECF

10.) In the latter regard, he identifies "2005 pretrial hearings" as not part of the

transcribed record. He summarily characterizes those hearings as "essential to

supporting the contentions that Judge Cota knowingly forced [trial counsel] to labor

under a conflict of interest that included sharing discovery with two other attorneys,

thereby causing discovery to become withheld from petitioner's trial." (Id. at 29.) 

Throop vaguely summarizes: "Thus, the surrounding circumstances of [appellate

counsel's] representation prevented him from acting as an effective advocate for direct

appeal. . . ." (Id.) The contentions he alleges could be supported by the missing hearing

transcripts, even if true, are disposed of above in connection with Grounds Three and

Four as providing no basis for federal habeas relief.

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Appellate counsel need not raise every possible issue, no matter how remote, in

order to avoid an IAC determination. See Jones v. Barnes,, 463 U.S. 745, 752 (1983);

see also Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002). A petitioner is "not

prejudiced by appellate counsel's decision not to raise issues that had no merit." 

Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1507 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, where "trial

counsel's performance, although not error-free, did not fall below the Strickland

standard," no IAC can be ascribed to appellate counsel for failure to argue the

petitioner's conviction should be overturned because of trial counsel's purportedly

ineffective assistance. Id.

Respondent contends appellate counsel was not required to raise Throop's falseevidence and inconsistent-theories claims, arguing "the claims would not have been

successful on appeal," foreclosing a finding of prejudice from counsel's purportedly

deficient performance in that regard. (Answer 33, ECF No. 21-1.) Those theories are

addressed above in connection with Ground Four, with the recommendation that they

be rejected as meritless. Throop cannot demonstrate prejudice from counsel's decision

not to raise meritless claims on appeal. Featherstone, 948 F.2d at 1507. As Respondent

further notes, "there is no authority for the proposition that [appellate counsel] had a

duty to search the record of other trials looking for issues." (Id.)

Similarly, Throop fails to demonstrate prejudice from his complaints about an

incomplete record. He represents his preparation of post-conviction claims was

"complicated" or "impeded," but he managed to file a comprehensive FAP and multiple

state petitions without a transcribed record of proceedings from 2005. Respondent

inventories minutes from the lodged Clerk's Transcript (Lodg. No. 1) for the period

between February and April 2005 that Throop complains of, then accurately observes: 

"Throop fails to assert how these un-transcribed proceedings were material to his

defense or to his appeal." (Answer 34, ECF No. 21-1.) For example, Throop's own

pleading establishes that his "shackling complaint . . . did not become an issue until a

year later, after a May 17, 2006 hearing" (id, citing FAP at 23, 29), and untranscribed

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pre-trial proceedings similarly would not "have affected his ability to raise a sentencing

issue" (id., citing FAP at 29). Throop fails to demonstrate prejudicial IAC of his

appellate counsel in any of the regards he identifies.

It is recommended the Court apply the "double deference" required by AEDPA

in its review of all Throop's IAC claims, Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 13, Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785-

86, to conclude the state court's rejection of this ground for relief comports with

controlling United States Supreme Court authority and is objectively reasonable, and

DENY relief on Ground Five.

G. Ground Six: Insufficient Evidence

Throop argues his conviction was based on less than proof beyond a reasonable

doubt of "each essential element . . . necessary to substantiate the subject offense," so

that he was "denied his right to have the sufficiency of the evidence independently

reviewed by the trial and appellate court . . . ." (FAP 30, ECF No. 10.) Relying on

materials outside the trial record and on his speculative arguments, Throop attempts to

bypass the applicable standards of review controlling a substantive sufficiency of the

evidence claim as well as the permissible scope of federal habeas review prescribed by

AEDPA. In his Traverse, he suggests this Court should "disregard evidence it finds to

[be] incredible, implausible, or contrary to law" and reach its own conclusions,

irrespective of the jury's and the state courts' findings, and he sweepingly "reiterates that

he is actually innocent," urging the Court to reexamine the entire record in consideration

of each of his arguments purportedly "demonstrating that Respondent's claim of

overwhelming evidence is without merit." (Traverse 57, ECF No. 39.) 

"As a matter of federal constitutional law, 'the Due Process Clause protects the

accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact

necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.' " Juan H. v. Allen, 408

F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

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the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). If the facts support conflicting

inferences, the reviewing federal court must presume "that the trier of fact resolved any

such conflicts in favor of the prosecution" and must "defer to that resolution." Id. at

319, 324, 326 (the fact-finder alone is charged with determining the credibility of

witnesses, resolving evidentiary conflicts, and drawing reasonable inferences from

proven facts). "A reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of

insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury." 

Coleman v. Johnson, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam), quoting

Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4,(2011) (per curiam) ("it is the

responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn

from evidence admitted at trial").

 Federal habeas courts reviewing state court convictions do not reweigh the

evidence or make credibility determinations. All conflicting factual inferences must be

resolved in favor of the prosecution. Juan H, 408 F.3d at 1266 n.1, citing Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319. After AEDPA, a constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

to support a conviction is controlled by the clearly established principles enunciated in

Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, applied "with an additional layer of deference." Id. at 1274; see

also Parker v. Matthews, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2152 (2012) (same). Before

granting federal habeas relief, "we must conclude that the state court’s determination

that a rational jury could have found that there was sufficient evidence of guilt . . . was

objectively unreasonable." Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.

denied sub nom. Boyer v. Premo, 132 S.Ct. 2723 (U.S. Jun. 4, 2012); see Renico, 559

U.S. at 773; see also McDaniel v. Brown, -- U.S. --, 130 S.Ct. 665, 673 (2010)

(reversing a habeas grant for misapplication of the Jackson standard, observing the

Court of Appeals correctly "acknowledged that it must review the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, but the court's recitation of inconsistencies in the

testimony shows it failed to do that").

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Throop relies for this claim on arguments he presented in FAP Ground Four,

expecting the Court to credit those claims as established facts and to substitute his

interpretation of the evidence for that of his jury and of the state courts. He summarily

represents that the State courts:

. . . failed to give objective consideration to the substantial and injurious influence upon those convictions attributed to the false evidence

introduced by the prosecuting agency. As previously shown, the linchpin of those counts was the credibility of eyewitness testimony (and

identification procedures) neither of which proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that prisoners could have believably acquired MK-9 weapons necessary to commit the specific offenses. By first eliminating Lt. Hunt's false testimony, rational common sense will show that it was impossible for the alleged victims to have been battered by petitioner because it hasn't

been shown that guards relinquished possession of said weapon to any prisoner.

(FAP 30, ECF No. 10.)

This Court may not disturb the state courts' rejection of this claim based on

Throop's arguments. "[T]he assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally

beyond the scope of review." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 330; see Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d

950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) ("A jury's credibility determinations are . . . entitled to

near-total deference under Jackson"). In addition, Throop exaggerates the inference to

be drawn from the fact that the jury acquitted him of three of the five battery charges

for which he was tried when he states: "The jury's . . . verdict to acquit petitioner of

[battery against Leamons, Alvarez, and Drennon] demonstrates that those 3 batteries did

NOT happen at all, and therefore these witnesses [i.e., "the bulk of prosecution

witnesses [presented] to support the allegations that Leamons, Alvarez and Drennon had

been hit with pepperspray discharged by a prisoner"] cannot have a ponderable legal

significance to substantiate the remaining 2 convictions for the identical evidence." 

(FAP 30, ECF No. 10.) Even if Throop's two convictions and three acquittals could be

characterized as "inconsistent verdicts," a dubious proposition in this case, the United

States Supreme Court has observed: " 'The most that can be said . . . is that the verdict

shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real

conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's

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guilt.' " United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984) (citation omitted). 

The court of appeal on direct review of his convictions rejected as without merit

Throop's "inconsistent verdict" argument, where he presented it in the context of his

challenge to the trial court's denial of his new trial motion. The court applied abuse of

discretion standards to that determination, but rejected the claim only after also

determining the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts. 

At the hearing on the new trial motion, the trial court stated it initially had been surprised the jury convicted Throop of only two counts and acquitted

him of the remaining three counts. However, the trial court noted that after

it reviewed the trial testimony of various witnesses, including Johnson and Morales, the trial court found the "jurors could rationally find [Throop] . . . guilty of some charges and not guilty of others." The trial court noted it

would be "unbelievable" under the circumstances if all the officers

remembered everything identically, inasmuch as there had been a stabbing and guards were being attacked by between 40 and 60 inmates. The court

also noted the eyewitness testimony of Johnson and Morales who each

"clearly" saw Throop spray them with pepper spray. Finally, the court noted the jury could have chosen to believe some of the witnesses' testimony and disregarded others, and found some of the evidence more convincing on

certain counts than on others.

(Lodg. No. 10, slip op. at 21-22, 22-23: "Because of our conclusion that the trial court

independently reviewed the evidence and properly found there was sufficient credible

evidence to support the verdict, and our own independent review of the record that

shows there is ample evidence to support the jury's verdict, we conclude reversal of his

conviction is not warranted even if the verdict was inconsistent.") 

The factual summary from the court of appeal's reasoned decision set forth above

amply satisfies the Jackson standard and forecloses federal habeas relief on this theory. 

Respondent accurately extracts from the record the facts that "no less than seven

witnesses, including the two victims whom Throop was convicted of assaulting,

testified that they saw Throop spray officers with the pepper spray." (Answer 35, ECF

No. 21-1.)

The two victims [testified they] saw Throop spray them specifically. Only Officer Robin Alvarez, who was sprayed, did not know who her assailant

was, but Hunt said it was Throop. This was overwhelming evidence of Throop's guilt with regard to the two counts for which he was convicted.

(Answer 28, ECF No. 21-1.)

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The state court result on Throop's insufficient evidence ground for relief should

not be disturbed, as it comports with controlling federal authority and is based on a

reasonable determination of the facts from the record presented. Relief on Ground Six

should be DENIED.

H. No Evidentiary Hearing Warranted

Although Throop did not specifically request an evidentiary hearing in his FAP,

Respondent argues in the Answer that he is not entitled to one. (Ans. 36-37, ECF No.

21-1.) In his Traverse, Throop "denies that he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing,"

and represents that he offers "suggestions" for such a hearing in a "contemporaneously

filed briefing" that this Court has neither identified nor would entertain. (Traverse 2-3,

ECF No. 39.) In an August 19, 2013 order denying Throop's motion for appointment

of counsel, the undersigned magistrate judge observed: "it is not evident at this time

that an evidentiary hearing is necessary." (ECF No. 33 at 2; see Traverse 3, ECF No.

39.) No discernable change in his circumstances warrants revising that opinion. 

AEDPA prescribes the manner in which federal habeas courts must approach the

factual record. In addition to the presumption of correctness attaching to a state court's

determination of a factual issue, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), section 2254(e)(2)

substantially restricts "the discretion of federal habeas courts to take new evidence in

an evidentiary hearing." Cullen, 131 S.Ct at 1400-01. "If the applicant has failed to

develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold

an evidentiary hearing on the claim" unless the applicant shows that the claim relies on

a new rule of constitutional law "made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme

Court, that was previously unavailable," or "a factual predicated that could not have

been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2)(A). In the latter circumstance, the petitioner must also demonstrate that "the

facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing

evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have found

the applicant guilty of the underlying offense." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). De novo

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review is only appropriate in federal habeas proceedings when the state courts did not

reach the merits of a federal claim properly presented to it. Cullen, 131 S.Ct at

1400-01; see Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; Pace, 544 U.S. at 417; see Stokley, 659 F.3d at

808 (only on de novo review can a federal habeas court entertain new evidence). 

Throop's claims are all subject to AEDPA's deferential standard of review.

Moreover, "a federal court may not grant an evidentiary hearing without first

determining whether the state court’s decision was an unreasonable determination of

the facts." Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005), citing Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 71; see Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. "If a claim has been adjudicated on the

merits by a state court," and "[i]f a claim subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) does not

satisfy that statutory requirement," it is "unnecessary to reach the question whether §

2254(e)(2) would permit a [federal] hearing on th[at] claim." Cullen, 131 S.Ct at 1400-

01; see Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474 ("Because the deferential standards prescribed by §

2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must take into account those

standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate"). A federal habeas

petitioner "must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before

that state court." Id. at 1400, n.7 ("[E]vidence introduced in federal court has no

bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review" and an unreasonable determination of facts under §

2254(d)(2) must be found to be unreasonable "in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding"). It is recommended that the Court find on this record that an

evidentiary hearing is neither warranted nor permissible under the AEDPA restrictions

imposed by 28 U.S.C. §2254(e). Throop's request should be DENIED.

For all the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court find that the state

court results on none of Throop's federal claims is contrary to or an unreasonable

application of controlling federal authority and that the state courts made objectively

reasonable factual determinations from the record in reaching their results. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). As neither AEDPA exception to the deference federal habeas courts

owe to state court results is satisfied here, and as Throop is not in custody in violation

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of federal law, the Petition should be DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge Larry Alan Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For all the

foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this habeas Petition be DENIED in

its entirety as the petitioner is not in custody in violation of any federal right, and that

petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED. IT IS FURTHER

RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this Report

and Recommendation and (2) directing that judgment be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than March 28, 2014, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation." IT IS

FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than April 11, 2014. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 21, 2014

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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