Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05544/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05544-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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Case No. 15-CV-05544-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RAQUEL BLAKENEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ASCENSION SERVICES, L.P.,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-CV-05544-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION OF THE 

COURT’S ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT CREDIT RECOVERY 

ASSOCIATES, INC.’S AND REGIONAL 

FINANCE CORPORATION’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 103

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration of 

the Court’s Order Granting Defendant Credit Recovery Associates, Inc.’s and Regional Finance 

Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 103 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff brings this motion pursuant to 

Civil Local Rule 7-9. As discussed further below, Plaintiff’s motion is improperly brought 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9 because Plaintiff effectively seeks to alter the judgment entered 

in favor of Credit Recovery Associates, Inc. (“Credit Recovery”) and Regional Finance 

Corporation (“Regional Finance”) on August 15, 2016. ECF No. 99. Thus, the Court construes 

Plaintiff’s motion as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e). Having considered the parties’ briefing, the relevant law, and the record in this 

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Case No. 15-CV-05544-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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case, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration under 

Civil Local Rule 7-9, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 

59(e).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On November 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. ECF No. 82 (“FAC”) 

¶ 5. “Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code affords individuals receiving regular income an 

opportunity to obtain some relief from their debts while retaining their property. To proceed under 

Chapter 13, a debtor must propose a plan to use future income to repay a portion (or in the rare 

case all) of his debts over the next three to five years.” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 

1686, 1690 (2015). “If the bankruptcy court confirms the plan and the debtor successfully carries 

it out, he receives a discharge of his debts according to the plan.” Id. at 1690. 

In the instant case, Plaintiff’s bankruptcy plan was confirmed on May 30, 2015. FAC ¶ 5. 

Plaintiff alleges that approximately 43% of Plaintiff’s debt to Credit Recovery was to be paid 

under the terms of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy plan. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff does not allege whether any of 

Plaintiff’s debt to Regional Finance was to be paid under the terms of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy plan, 

though Plaintiff does allege that Regional Finance was bound by the terms of Plaintiff’s 

bankruptcy plan. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff does not allege that Plaintiff has successfully paid her debt 

according to the plan, or that Plaintiff’s debt has been discharged.

On September 3, 2015, Plaintiff ordered a three-bureau credit report from Equifax, Inc. 

(“Equifax”). Id. ¶ 6. In the report, Plaintiff allegedly “noticed several tradelines on the September 

3, 2015 credit report all reporting misleading and inaccurate information.” Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff 

alleges that Credit Recovery was reporting Plaintiff’s account “as owing both a balance of $649, 

monthly payments due in the amount of $60, [and] a past due balance of $909.” Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff 

alleges that Regional Finance was reporting that Plaintiff’s account was “in collections and 

charged off” without referencing Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing. Id. ¶ 10.

In response to the report, on October 18, 2015, Plaintiff disputed the allegedly inaccurate 

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Case No. 15-CV-05544-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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tradelines with the three credit reporting bureaus: Equifax, Experian Information Solutions, Inc. 

(“Experian”), and TransUnion, LLC (“TransUnion”). Id. ¶ 11. According to Plaintiff, each credit 

reporting bureau sent Credit Recovery and Regional Finance a notification that Plaintiff was 

disputing the accuracy of the credit report. Id. ¶ 12. 

On November 24, 2015, Plaintiff ordered a three-bureau credit report from Equifax. Id.

¶ 13. Plaintiff allegedly learned that the credit report still reported “the same inaccuracies” as the 

previous report. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that Credit Recovery and Regional Finance failed to 

conduct a reasonable investigation into Plaintiff’s dispute because they failed to review the terms 

of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy plan or investigate the impact of the bankruptcy plan. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff 

additionally alleges that Credit Recovery “supplied inaccurate and misleading information to the 

Credit Reporting Agencies by reporting, after Plaintiff’s [C]hapter 13 filing and confirmation of 

the repayment plan, that the account was in collections, charged off, and that both a balance and 

past due balance were owed to Defendant Credit Recovery, despite the treatment of its claims 

under the terms of Plaintiff’s confirmed [C]hapter 13 repayment plan.” Id. ¶ 23. As to Regional 

Finance, Plaintiff alleges that Regional Finance “supplied inaccurate and misleading information 

to the Credit Reporting Agencies by reporting, after Plaintiff’s [C]hapter 13 filing and 

confirmation of the repayment plan, that the account was in collections and charged off with no 

mention of Plaintiff’s [C]hapter 13 filing, despite the treatment of the claim under the terms of 

Plaintiff’s confirmed [C]hapter 13 repayment plan.” Id. ¶ 24.

B. Procedural History

On December 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Credit Recovery and Regional 

Finance as well as against Defendants Experian; Equifax; TransUnion; Ascension Services, L.P. 

(“Ascension Services”); and Capital One, National Association (“Capital One”). ECF No. 1. The 

Complaint alleged that Defendants had violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), the California’s Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), 

Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a), and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. Id.

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On December 29, 2015, Equifax and Experian answered Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF Nos. 

15, 18. TransUnion answered Plaintiff’s complaint on December 30, 2015. ECF No. 22. Capital 

One answered Plaintiff’s complaint on February 23, 2016. ECF No. 45. 

The Court granted a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to TransUnion on February 

11, 2016. ECF No. 36. The Court granted a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to Equifax 

on April 1, 2016. ECF No. 60. The Court granted a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to 

Capital One on April 28, 2016. ECF No. 80. The Court granted a stipulation of dismissal with 

prejudice as to Experian on May 31, 2016. ECF No. 86. Thus, there were three remaining 

Defendants: Credit Recovery, Regional Finance, and Ascension Services.

Credit Recovery filed a motion to dismiss on February 24, 2016. ECF No. 47. Plaintiff 

opposed the motion on March 9, 2016. ECF No. 55. Credit Recovery replied on March 16, 2016. 

ECF No. 58. The Court granted Credit Recovery’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend on 

April 15, 2016. ECF No. 68. The Court held that Defendants’ alleged failure to report Plaintiff’s 

bankruptcy to credit reporting agencies after Chapter 13 plan confirmation, but before discharge, 

was not misleading pursuant to the FCRA or CCRAA and thus did not violate those statutes. Id.

at 9–11. Additionally, the Court held that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim

under the FCRA for Defendants’ failure to perform a reasonable investigation into Plaintiff’s 

dispute of her credit information. Id. at 6–9. Because the Court found no violation of the FCRA 

or CCRAA, the Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s UCL claim which was based on Credit 

Recovery’s alleged violations of the FCRA and CCRAA. Id. at 12. The Court cautioned Plaintiff 

that “failure to cure the deficiencies identified in [the Court’s order on Credit Recovery’s motion 

to dismiss] will result in a dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s claims.” Id.

Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint on May 9, 2016. FAC, ECF No. 82. In the 

First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that Credit Recovery, Regional Finance, and 

Ascension Services violated the FCRA and CCRAA. Id. 

Credit Recovery and Regional Finance filed a motion to dismiss on May 26, 2016. ECF 

No. 88. Plaintiff filed a response on June 9, 2016. ECF No. 87. Credit Recovery and Regional 

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Finance filed a reply on June 16, 2016. ECF No. 88.

On August 15, 2016, the Court granted Credit Recovery and Regional Finance’s motion to 

dismiss with prejudice. ECF No. 98 (“Aug. 15, 2016 Order”). The Court granted the motion to 

dismiss with prejudice because Plaintiff failed to cure the previously identified deficiencies. 

Specifically, the Court held, once again, that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the FCRA and 

CCRAA by alleging that Defendants’ failure to report Plaintiff’s bankruptcy after Chapter 13 

confirmation, but before discharge, was misleading. Id. at 8–11. Additionally, the Court held, 

also for the second time, that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under the 

FCRA for Defendants’ alleged failure to perform a reasonable investigation into Plaintiff’s dispute

of her credit information. Id. at 6–9. The same day, the Court entered final judgment in favor of 

Credit Recovery and Regional Finance. ECF No. 99.

On September 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking leave under Civil Local 

Rule 7-9 to file a motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 103 (“Mot.”). On September 20, 2016, 

Defendants Credit Recovery and Regional Finance filed an opposition to the instant motion. ECF 

No. 104 (“Opp’n”).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks leave under Civil Local Rule 7-9 to file a motion to alter or amend the 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The Court first discusses whether the 

instant motion can be brought under Civil Local Rule 7-9. The Court then addresses whether the 

motion can be construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e) and whether the motion should be granted. 

A. Plaintiff May Not Seek Reconsideration Under Civil Local Rule 7-9

Plaintiff purports to move for leave to file a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 7-9. See Mot. at 1. Rule 7-9 states:

Before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all of the claims and the rights and 

liabilities of all the parties in a case, any party may make a motion before a Judge 

requesting that the Judge grant the party leave to file a motion for reconsideration 

of any interlocutory order on any ground set forth in Civil L.R. 7-9 (b). No party 

may notice a motion for reconsideration without first obtaining leave of Court to 

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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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file the motion. 

Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). Plaintiff argues that leave to file a motion for reconsideration is warranted under 

Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(2), which provides for reconsideration if “new material facts or a change 

of law” has occurred. Mot. at 5–6. However, “[a]s the Rule’s plain text makes clear, Rule 7-9 

only applies to motions seeking reconsideration of interlocutory orders. The Rule does not apply 

after the Court has entered final judgment.” Johnson v. CFS II, Inc., 2013 WL 6700394, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013). 

Here, after the Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by Credit Recovery and Regional 

Finance, the Court entered final judgment in favor of Credit Recovery and Regional Finance. ECF 

No. 99. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration of the 

Court’s Order Granting Defendant Credit Recovery Associates, Inc.’s and Regional Finance 

Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss is not properly brought under Local Rule 7-9 and is DENIED.

B. Plaintiff Has Not Met the Standard Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

59(e)

As described above, Plaintiff may not bring her motion under Civil Local Rule 7-9. 

However, Plaintiff specified in the instant motion that she is seeking leave to file a motion under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Mot at 4–6. Therefore, the Court construes her request for 

reconsideration under Rule 7-9 as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). See 

Yanting Zhang v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2013 WL 6058307, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) 

(denying untimely motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration under Civil L.R. 7-9 and 

construing it as a motion under Rules 59 and 60); Lam v. City & Cty. of S.F., 2016 WL 1382905, 

at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2016) (“Because the court has already entered judgment in this case, it 

construes plaintiffs’ motion [under Civil L.R. 7-9] as being brought under Rules 59 and 60.”). 

Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the “proper vehicle” for filing a 

motion for reconsideration of a motion to dismiss without leave to amend. See Mir v. Fosburg, 

646 F.2d 342, 344 (9th Cir. 1980). However a Rule 59(e) motion “should not be granted . . . 

absent highly unusual circumstances.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 

1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (en banc). “In general, there are four basic 

grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to 

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correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is 

necessary to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is 

necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an intervening 

change in controlling law.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). In 

general, Rule 59(e) “‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present 

evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” Exxon Shipping Co. v. 

Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff argues that the Court should alter or amend its judgment under Rule 59(e) to allow 

Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. Mot. at 5–6. Plaintiff raises two arguments in support of 

her contention. First, Plaintiff argues that she has discovered “new facts and law” that potentially 

could provide relief if the complaint were amended. Mot. at 5. Specifically, she argues that a new 

complaint could allege that Credit Recovery and Regional Finance violated the FCRA and 

CCRAA because they did not follow the “Metro 2 Reporting Standards,” an allegedly industryaccepted format for reporting credit scores. Id. Second, Plaintiff argues that the “unintended legal 

consequences” of this Court’s order granting Credit Recovery and Regional Finance’s motion to 

dismiss warrants an alteration of the judgment. Mot. at 6. The Court addresses each argument in 

turn.

1. Metro 2 Reporting Standards

With respect to Plaintiff’s theory for relief involving the Metro 2 Reporting Standards, 

Plaintiff’s sole argument is that her theory for relief is supported by “new facts and law.” The 

Court first addresses whether “new facts” support Plaintiff’s Metro 2 Reporting Standards theory

and then discusses whether “new law” supports the theory. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s “new facts” argument, Plaintiff must show, under Allstate, that 

the Metro 2 Reporting Standards constitute “newly discovered or previously unavailable 

evidence.” Allstate, 634 F.3d at 1111. Evidence is not “newly discovered” under the Federal 

Rules if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of [the district court’s ruling] or could 

have been discovered with reasonable diligence.” Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 

U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1987); see Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 

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2011) (affirming district court’s denial of habeas petitioner’s motion for reconsideration where 

petitioner’s evidence of exhaustion was not “newly discovered” because such evidence was 

available almost one year prior to the district court’s denial of the petition). Plaintiff does not 

assert that the Metro 2 Reporting Standards were unavailable prior to the Court’s order granting 

the motion to dismiss or that Plaintiff was unable to discover the Metro 2 Reporting Standards 

after exercising reasonable diligence. Therefore, Plaintiff provides no basis for the Court to find 

that the Metro 2 Reporting Standards constitute “newly discovered or previously unavailable 

evidence.” Allstate, 634 F.3d at 1111; see Ybarra, 656 F.3d at 998 (denying Rule 59(e) motion

where facts were available prior to district court’s ruling).

Next, the Court considers whether Plaintiff’s Metro 2 Reporting Standards theory is based 

on “new law.” Under Allstate, a Rule 59(e) motion can only be granted based on new law if, after 

judgment was entered, there has been an “intervening change in controlling law.” Allstate, 634 

F.3d at 1111. Plaintiff cites two district court cases that Plaintiff asserts would support providing 

leave to amend based on Plaintiff’s Metro 2 Reporting Standards theory. See Nissou-Rabban v. 

Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 2016 WL 4508241 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2016) (finding Metro 2 

theory to be viable even though the defendant did not challenge the theory’s viability); Mestayer v. 

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 2016 WL 3383961, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2016) 

(allowing leave to amend to allege Metro 2 theory because “it is not clear at this juncture that the 

[Metro 2] theory is not viable”). However, both Nissou-Rabban and Mestayer were issued months 

before the Court’s August 15, 2016 order granting Credit Recovery and Regional Finance’s

motion to dismiss, and therefore could have been raised to the Court prior to its order. See Exxon, 

554 U.S. at 485 n.5 (“Rule 59(e) . . . ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise 

arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’”). In 

addition, Nissou-Rabban and Mestayer are non-binding district court decisions. J & J Sports 

Prods., Inc. v. Munguia, 2014 WL 1572409, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014) (“[T]his Court is not 

bound by any other district court decision . . . .”). Therefore, those decisions are not “intervening”

and do not constitute a “change in controlling law.” Allstate, 634 F.3d at 1111. Moreover, the 

Mestayer court expressed doubt about the Metro 2 theory’s viability and did not reach the issue 

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directly. See Mestayer, 2016 WL 3383961 at *3 (stating that Metro 2 theory “may” be viable, but 

that, regardless, Plaintiff failed to adequately plead the theory).

Overall, Plaintiff had multiple opportunities to raise the Metro 2 Reporting Standards 

theory it now asserts, but simply failed to do so. Plaintiff failed to allege violations of the Metro 2 

Reporting Standards in her December 3, 2015 original complaint. ECF No. 1. After the Court, on 

April 15, 2016, dismissed Plaintiff’s original complaint, the Court specified that “failure to cure 

the deficiencies identified in this Order will result in a dismissal with prejudice [of an amended 

complaint].” ECF No. 68 at 12. Even so, Plaintiff failed to allege violations of the Metro 2 

Reporting Standards in her May 9, 2016 amended complaint. ECF No. 82. In Plaintiff’s June 9, 

2016 opposition to Credit Recovery and Regional Finance’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff failed to 

raise the Metro 2 Reporting Standards as a reason to provide leave to amend, even though NissouRaban was issued on June 6, 2016, three days before the opposition brief was due. ECF No. 87. 

Finally, Plaintiff did not make any attempt to bring the Metro 2 Reporting Standards to the 

attention of the Court between the filing of its June 9, 2016 opposition and the Court’s Order on 

August 15, 2016. ECF No. 98. Plaintiff’s failure to previously raise an argument or theory of 

relief does not require the Court to grant a motion under Rule 59(e). See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 485 

n.5 (“Rule 59(e) . . . ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present 

evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’”) (citation omitted)). Thus, 

the Metro 2 Reporting Standards are not a basis for granting a motion to alter or amend the 

judgment.

2. Alleged Unintended Legal Consequences

The Court next considers Plaintiff’s argument that the Court should grant Plaintiff’s

motion to alter or amend the judgment because the Court’s order granting Credit Recovery and 

Regional Finance’s motion to dismiss would have “unintended legal consequences.” Mot. at 6. In 

the order, this Court held that it is not a violation of the FCRA or CCRAA for financial institutions 

to not reference a debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding when reporting information to credit reporting 

bureaus if the bankruptcy court has not yet discharged the debtor’s debt. ECF No. 98 at 10. The 

Court held that the existence of a Chapter 13 repayment plan confirmation did not alter this 

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analysis. Id. Plaintiff argues that the Court’s holding carries unintended consequences, namely, 

that a debtor that has received a Chapter 13 repayment plan confirmation will have to wait until 

discharge before the debtor’s credit report reflects the bankruptcy proceedings. Mot. at 6.

As discussed above, there are four grounds in Allstate that would justify granting a motion 

to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). Plaintiff does not specify on which of the four 

grounds “unintended legal consequences” would justify relief. Thus, the Court addresses each in 

turn. First, the Court addresses whether Plaintiff’s argument asserts a “manifest error” of fact or 

law in the Court’s decision granting Credit Recovery and Regional Finance’s motion to dismiss. 

Allstate, 634 F.3d at 1111. In this Court’s order granting Credit Recovery and Regional Finance’s

motion to dismiss, the Court stated that courts in this district have “consistently held that it is not 

misleading or inaccurate to report delinquent debts that have not been discharged.” ECF No. 98 at 

10; see e.g., Mortimer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 3155563, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

2, 2012) (“While it might be good policy in light of the goals of bankruptcy protection to bar 

reporting of late payments while a bankruptcy petition is pending, neither the bankruptcy code nor 

the FCRA does so.”). The Court therefore concluded that “Credit Recovery[] and Regional 

Finance had no obligation to reference Plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceeding” to comply with the 

FCRA and CCRAA. ECF No. 98 at 10. 

Here, Plaintiff’s argument regarding unintended legal consequences does not challenge the 

Court’s legal analysis or the factual basis on which the Court relied when granting Credit 

Recovery and Regional Finance’s motion to dismiss. Instead, Plaintiff’s argument is one 

involving policy, which does not alter the legal requirements of the bankruptcy code, the FCRA, 

or the CCRAA. See Mortimer, 2012 WL 3155563 (holding that the potential policy consequences 

of delayed reporting do not alter the requirements of “the bankruptcy code [or] the FCRA”); see 

also United States v. Eller, 2007 WL 1544779, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2007) (holding that 

“matter[s] of policy” are “for the judgment of the legislature and not for the inference of the 

judiciary”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s policy argument does not provide a basis for finding a “manifest 

error” of fact or law. 

Second, the Court addresses whether the unintended legal consequences of the Court’s 

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order creates “manifest injustice,” which requires a showing that the court made an error that is 

“direct, obvious, and observable, such as a defendant’s guilty plea that is involuntary or that is 

based on a plea agreement that the prosecution rescinds.” In re Oak Park Calabasas Condo. 

Ass’n, 302 B.R. 682, 683 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 563 (7th ed. 

1999)). Plaintiff’s argument regarding unintended legal consequences is an argument discussing 

the negative effects of a policy created by statute, and does not involve “direct, obvious, and 

observable” error in the Court’s prior decision. Id.

Finally, Plaintiff’s unintended legal consequences argument does not involve “newly 

discovered or previously unavailable evidence” or an “intervening change in controlling law.” 

Allstate, 634 F.3d at 1111. Plaintiff provides no indication that she could not have brought this 

policy argument earlier and does not cite to any new, controlling law that upends the consistent 

decisions in this district that hold that “it is not misleading or inaccurate to report delinquent debts 

that have not been discharged.” ECF No. 98 at 10; see Exxon, 554 U.S. at 485 n.5 (“Rule 

59(e) . . . ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that 

could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’”) (citation omitted)).

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 59(e), and Plaintiff’s motion

to alter or amend the judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 17, 2016

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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