Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01166/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01166-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RAYMOND A. GREEN, 

CDCR #E-68189, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:18-cv-1166-MMA-BLM 

ORDER: 

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[Doc. No. 2] 

AND 

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM, 

AND FOR SEEKING DAMAGES 

FROM IMMUNE DEFENDANTS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B) AND § 1915A(b) 

Raymond A. Green, (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison 

in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking $15 million in compensatory damages and $15 million in 

punitive damages from the State of California’s Board of Parole Hearings for 

incarcerating him for a period of time “grossly disproportionate” to his criminal sentence. 

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See Doc. No. 1 at 1-3, 7. Plaintiff is “willing to negotiate to settle at 10 million dollars 

and to be released from prison.” Id. at 7. 

Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he 

filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 2). 

II. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

In order to institute a civil action, a party must pay a filing fee of $400.1 See 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite his failure to prepay the entire fee only 

if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 

(9th Cir. 1999). However, because he is a prisoner, even if he is granted leave to proceed 

IFP, Plaintiff remains obligated to pay the entire filing fee in “increments” or 

“installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “King”). 

From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% 

of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the 

average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, 

                                               

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). 

The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, 

assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account 

exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629. 

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted copies of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report for the 6-month period preceding the filing of his Complaint, as well as 

a certified prison certificate attesting to his trust account activity and balances. See Doc. 

No. 2 at 4, 6-8; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; King, 398 F.3d at 1119. 

These statements show that Plaintiff had no available balance on the books at the time of 

filing. See ECF No. 2 at 8.. Based on this accounting, no initial partial filing fee is 

assessed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be 

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment 

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial 

partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case 

based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2), 

declines to exact any initial filing fee because his prison certificate indicates he has “no 

means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, to instead 

collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and 

forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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III. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A

 A. Standard of Review 

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it 

“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 

(1989). 

 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

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“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009). 

 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015). 

C. Discussion 

 As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). 

First, to the extent Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully imprisoned based on the 

length of his criminal sentence, his suit “challeng[es] the validity of [his] continued 

incarceration [and therefore] lie[s] within ‘the heart of habeas corpus.’” Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 

489-99 (1973) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically 

designed” to provide a state prisoner with the “exclusive” means to “attack the validity of 

his confinement” in federal court)). 

Second, Plaintiff may not seek damages against the Board of Parole Hearings, an 

agency of the State of California. The State of California is not a “person” within the 

meaning of § 1983 and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. 

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. 

v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment bars federal 

jurisdiction over suits by individuals against a State and its instrumentalities, unless either 

the State consents to waive its sovereign immunity or Congress abrogates it); see also 

Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing prisoner’s § 1983 suit 

against the State of Arizona as legally frivolous), superseded by statute on other grounds 

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as stated in Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130; Brand v. Schubert, No. 2:16-CV-1811 MCE EFB P, 

2017 WL 531721, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2017) (sua sponte dismissing § 1983 claims 

against the State of California on sovereign immunity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A). 

D. Leave to Amend 

While the Court would typically grant Plaintiff leave to amend in light of his pro se 

status, it concludes that doing so under the circumstances would be futile. See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1127 n.8 (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by 

definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”); 

Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (leave to amend is not required if 

it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.”) (internal citations omitted). 

III. Conclusion and Orders 

 For the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2). 

2) ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the full $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to 

twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND 

NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION. 

 3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001. 

 4) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon

which § 1983 relief can be granted and for seeking monetary damages against defendants 

who are absolutely immune pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 5) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would also be frivolous, 

and therefore not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not 

be frivolous); and 

6) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: July 20, 2018 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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