Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01099/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01099-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DEBORAH HENSON, 

Plaintiff,

NO. CIV. 05-CV-1099-FCD-KJM

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASSEN COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

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This matter comes before the court on defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff Deborah Henson’s fourteenth claim for relief

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the

reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion to dismiss is

DENIED.1

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2 The facts of this case are set out in full in the

court’s prior Memorandum and Order adjudicating defendants’

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s third amended complaint, and thus,

are not repeated herein. (See Memorandum and Order, filed July

20, 2006, Docket #76.) The facts set forth blow are only those

relevant to defendants’ present motion to dismiss.

2

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff commenced employment with Lassen County Child

Protective Services (“CPS”) in May 2003. (Fourth Am. Compl.

[“FAC”], filed July 28, 2006, ¶¶ 34, 25-28, 30.) After a myriad

of alleged discriminatory and harassing incidents, plaintiff

took a medical leave of absence in June 2004. (See id. ¶ 88.) 

In November 2004, plaintiff received a letter from defendants

notifying her that her health care premiums were overdue and her

benefits would be discontinued effective September 2004. (Id. ¶¶

98-99) One year later, in November 2005, plaintiff received a

final termination letter from defendants. (FAC ¶ 110.) 

Plaintiff requested benefits upon receipt of this letter, but

defendants did not grant the request. (Id. ¶¶ 111-12.)

On July 28, 2006, plaintiff filed her Fourth Amended

Complaint seeking, inter alia, damages arising from the

deprivation of health care benefits under the Consolidated

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”). On August 9, 2006,

defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for

violation of COBRA. Plaintiff opposes the motion. 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

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allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See Id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

1986). Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.

California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

Defendants assert that plaintiff’s fourteenth claim for

relief for violation of COBRA benefits fails because plaintiff’s

election to continue these benefits expired. (Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss Pl.’s Fourteenth Claim for Relief of Pl.’s Fourth Am.

Compl., filed Aug. 9, 2006 [“Mot.”] at 1:21-26 & 2:4-6.) 

COBRA gives workers and their families who lose their health

care benefits the right to choose to continue group health

benefits provided by their health group provider for a limited

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period of time. Under COBRA, an employer is required to notify

an employee of the availability of COBRA benefits, and provide

these benefits to the employee upon the occurrence of a

“qualifying event.” 29 U.S.C. § 1166. Qualifying events include

the death of a covered employee, divorce or legal separation of

the covered employee from the employee’s spouse, and termination

of the covered employee’s employment. 29 U.S.C. § 1163. 

The critical inquiry for the purposes of this motion is

whether and when a “qualifying event” occurred such that

defendants were obligated to notify plaintiff of her COBRA

benefits. Plaintiff alleges that, by a letter dated November 18,

2005, her employment with Lassen County CPS was terminated

effective November 28, 2005. (Fourth Am. Compl. [“FAC”], filed

July 28, 2006, ¶ 110.) Plaintiff alleges that she never received

notice of the availability of COBRA benefits after this date. 

However, defendants contend that plaintiff was terminated in or

about November 2004, when defendants informed plaintiff of the

cancellation of her health care benefits and her opportunity to

continue these benefits. (Mot. at 2; See FAC ¶ 99.) Defendants

argue that plaintiff was not entitled to COBRA benefits in 2005

after she received the termination letter because she was

notified in November 2004 of the termination of her benefits and

she had an opportunity to continue the benefits at that time. 

Defendants contend that plaintiff elected not to continue her

benefits and as a result, she denied COBRA health care benefits.

The parties dispute plaintiff’s actual termination date. 

However, at this stage in the litigation, the court cannot

adjudicate the merits of this dispute. On a motion to dismiss,

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the court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff

alleges that her employment was terminated in November 2005, not

November 2004. As such, the “qualifying event” for purposes of

COBRA did not occur until November 2005. Therefore, plaintiff

was entitled to notice of the availability of COBRA benefits

after receipt of this termination letter. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s fourteenth claim for relief is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 29, 2006.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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