Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07182/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07182-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

-

Decided May 30, 1997

No. 96-7182

RONNIE HOLMES,

APPELLANT

v.

AMEREX RENT-A-CAR ET AL.,

APPELLEE

-

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 92cv0160)

-

Before: SILBERMAN, GINSBURG, and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION OF LAW

by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

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GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:

After review of the briefs submitted by the parties in the 

above-referenced case, the Court determined that a question 

of District of Columbia law will be determinative of the 

pending appeal. There is no controlling precedent to be 

found in the decisions of the District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals. We therefore certify the following questions of law 

to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals pursuant to D.C. 

Code § 11-723:

Under District of Columbia law, may a plaintiff recover 

against a defendant who has negligently or recklessly 

destroyed or allowed to be destroyed evidence that would 

have assisted the plaintiff in pursuing a claim against a 

third party?

If a plaintiff may proceed under such a theory, what 

standard of proximate cause must he meet?

On November 4, 1988 Ronnie Holmes was driving a Chrysler Dodge 600 rented to him by Amerex Rent-A-Car when he 

was involved in an accident. Holmes alleges that the engine 

of the car intruded into the passenger compartment upon 

impact. He was severely injured. After the accident Amerex took possession of the wrecked car. Holmes' attorney 

asked agents of Amerex to hold the car so that he could have 

an expert inspect the car. On March 30, 1989 Amerex 

assured Holmes' attorney that it would hold the rental car for 

60 days. Amerex later extended the deadline for inspection 

of the car to June 15. On June 14, 1989 an Amerex claims 

representative agreed to sell the car to Holmes for $200 plus 

fees. 

Unbeknownst to the claims representative, another agent 

of Amerex had already sold the car to an auto salvage 

company. A body shop engineer severed the front of the car 

and removed the engine. According to an expert in accident 

reconstructions, this action made it " impossible to determine 

within a reasonable degree of certainty whether or not the 

vehicle had design, manufacturing and/or maintenance defects 

which proximately caused Mr. Holmes' injuries."

On November 2, 1991 Holmes filed suit against Chrysler 

and Amerex in District of Columbia Superior Court alleging 

that Chrysler had negligently designed the engine of the car. 

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The complaint also alleged that Amerex had negligently 

maintained the car. Chrysler removed the case to federal 

district court. On May 26, 1992 Holmes voluntarily dismissed 

Chrysler from the lawsuit and filed an amended complaint 

naming Amerex as the sole defendant. The amended complaint dropped the count for negligent maintenance and replaced it with counts of, inter alia, negligent spoliation of 

evidence and tortious interference with the plaintiff's prospective civil action (i.e., against Chrysler) by spoliation of evidence. Holmes submitted evidence, in the form of an affidavit from an expert in biomechanics, crashworthiness, and 

accident reconstruction, that "if the vehicle were available in 

the same condition that it was immediately following the 

accident, [Holmes] would have a substantial possibility of 

proving that the Dodge 600 vehicle at issue was defectively 

designed and/or manufactured and/or maintained."

The district court entered summary judgment for Amerex 

on the claims of negligent spoliation and tortious interference 

with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence. The 

court held that if the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 

were to recognize a cause of action based upon the spoliation 

of evidence, it would follow an approach that would not enable 

Holmes to recover based upon the facts presented.

Not all jurisdictions have recognized the spoliation tort. 

See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 921 F.2d 765, 767-68 (8th Cir. 

1990) (cause of action not cognizable under Arkansas law). A 

number of jurisdictions have, however, recognized such a 

cause of action upon the ground that "a prospective civil 

action ... is a valuable probable expectancy that the court 

must protect from ... interference." Smith v. Superior 

Court, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829, 837 (1984). Those jurisdictions that 

have recognized the tort agree that the plaintiff must show 

that the defendant had a duty or made a promise to preserve 

the evidence for the plaintiff's inspection, that the defendant 

breached this duty or promise, that the plaintiff's injuries 

proximately resulted from the defendant's breach, and that 

the plaintiff suffered damages from the breach.

Three approaches to determining proximate cause have 

emerged. The Ohio approach requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the underlying cause of action was rendered 

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impossible by the destruction of the evidence and that the 

evidence "was of such a nature that it would have enabled the 

plaintiff successfully to pursue the separate civil action 

against the alleged original tortfeasor." Tomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 944, 948 (1992). The Florida 

approach requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the destruction of evidence caused a "significant impairment in the 

[plaintiff's] ability to prove the [underlying] lawsuit." Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So.2d 313, 315 (1990). The 

Florida courts recognize that this allows a plaintiff to recover 

even when the damages are uncertain. Miller v. All-State 

Ins. Co., 573 So.2d 24, 27 (1990). The California approach 

requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that he would have successfully litigated the underlying 

case if the evidence had been available. Smith, 198 Cal.Rptr. 

at 836.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Holmes, 

see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970), 

but for Amerex's negligence in allowing the automobile to be 

destroyed there was a "substantial possibility of proving" that 

the car was defectively designed or manufactured. Such 

evidence is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment under 

the Ohio approach, which requires a plaintiff to show "the 

evidence which was destroyed was of such a nature that it 

would have enabled the plaintiff successfully to pursue the 

separate civil action against the alleged tortfeasor." Tomas,

607 N.E.2d at 948. Holmes might, however, be able to 

recover under the Florida approach, which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate only that the destruction of evidence 

caused a "significant impairment in the [plaintiff's] ability to 

prove the [underlying] lawsuit." Herman, 576 So.2d at 315. 

This approach does not focus on the strength of the underlying claim. Certainly, being unable to inspect the engine of 

the car significantly impaired Holmes' case against Chrysler 

for negligent design and manufacturing. Although Holmes 

might have a difficult time proving just what damages ought 

to be attributed to Amerex's negligent destruction of the 

evidence, that difficulty would not be fatal to his claim if the 

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Court of Appeals chose to follow the Florida approach. 

Holmes might also be able to recover under the California 

approach.

We cannot determine whether the district court's entry of 

summary judgment on this claim was proper without knowing 

whether the District of Columbia would recognize such a 

claim and, if so, the standard of proximate cause that it would 

apply. The Court of Appeals has faced a related issue when 

a trial court is asked to give an adverse inference instruction 

because the defendant has lost or destroyed evidence. See 

Battocchi v. Washington Hospital Center, 581 A.2d 759, 767 

(1990) (trial court must give adverse inference instruction 

"upon a finding of gross indifference to or reckless disregard 

for the relevance of the evidence to a possible claim"); 

Williams v. Washington Hospital Center, 601 A.2d 28, 32 

(1991) (trial court erred in failing to give adverse inference 

instruction when defendant hospital acted with "willful and 

reckless disregard toward the preservation of relevant evidence within its exclusive control"). Although these cases 

might indicate that the Court of Appeals would require a 

plaintiff to show that the defendant acted intentionally or 

recklessly, the cases do not indicate the standard of proximate cause that the Court would apply. The Court may 

determine that an inter-se situation such as that involved in 

Battocchi and Williams differs significantly from the thirdparty situation involved in the present case. For that reason, 

we are impelled to certify the question to the District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals.

Appended to this certification are the briefs and portions of 

the district court record provided by the parties to this 

appeal. In addition, we shall provide the Court of Appeals 

with any other portion of the record that the Court would like 

to have in order to answer the certified questions.

So Ordered.

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