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Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 22, 1999 Decided January 11, 2000

No. 99-7041

Amy Gleklen,

Appellant

v.

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, Inc., et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv00072)

Roy W. Krieger argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Barry J. Reingold argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief was Kara M. Sacilotto.

Before: Williams, Sentelle, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an order

of the district court, Robertson, J., granting summary judgment for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee

on three counts of unlawful discrimination alleged by Amy

Gleklen, a former employee. We affirm because Gleklen did

not rebut the Committee's reasonable, nondiscriminatory explanation for its employment decision.

I

Gleklen worked as the Deputy Director of the Harriman

Communications Center, an arm of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, shifting between full-time and

part-time status as the needs of the Democratic Committee

changed between campaign seasons. In February 1997,

shortly after Gleklen informed the Committee that she was

pregnant with her third child, the Committee decided to

embark on a more vigorous off-cycle member services program which required it to hire additional staff and increase

the work hours of the existing staff. In early March 1997,

the Democratic Committee requested Gleklen to resume fulltime employment in April. Gleklen refused. She preferred

to continue working three days a week and wanted the

Committee to reinstitute the job-sharing arrangement it had

allowed the previous year in the event that more work was

needed. When Gleklen failed to report for work on April 1,

she was fired and immediately replaced by a woman who was

not pregnant. In June 1997, Gleklen timely filed a complaint

with the EEOC alleging that the Committee had violated the

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the D.C. Human Rights Act,

and the Family and Medical Leave Act. The EEOC responded with a "no reason to believe" letter on October 14, 1997,

and Gleklen brought suit in federal district court.

Applying the burden-shifting analysis for discrimination

claims set forth in Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156

F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc), the district court

granted the Democratic Committee's motion for summary

judgment because there was "no evidence from which a jury

could reasonably find a causal link between defendants' April

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1997 request that plaintiff resume a full-time schedule and

the impending birth of her child in August 1997." Gleklen v.

Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm., 38 F. Supp. 2d

18, 21 (D.D.C. 1999).

II

Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an

employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of such individual's sex...." 42

U.S.C. s 2000e-2(a). Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as an amendment to Title VII: "[W]omen

affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related

purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in

their ability or inability to work...." 42 U.S.C. s 2000e(k).

The D.C. Human Rights Act uses the same language. See

D.C. Code Ann. s 1-2505(b) (1981). The Family and Medical

Leave Act grants eligible employees twelve weeks of leave

during any twelve-month period following the birth of a child,

and further provides: "It shall be unlawful for any employer

to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the

attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. s 2615(a)(1). Gleklen claims that the Democratic Committee violated each of these provisions.

The burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is applicable to D.C. Human

Rights Act claims. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Federal Nat'l

Mortgage Ass'n, 165 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Although

we have not considered the applicability of McDonnell Douglas to claims like Gleklen's under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Leave Act, other circuits have concluded that

McDonnell Douglas provides the proper framework for analysis of such claims. See, e.g., Graham v. State Farm Mutual

Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) (Leave Act);

Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316, 319 & n.10 (5th

Cir. 1999) (Leave Act); Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d

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759, 763 (7th Cir. 1999) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act);

Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400-01 (2d Cir. 1998)

(Pregnancy Discrimination Act). Given that the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act and D.C. Human Rights Act provisions in

question are identical, and in view of the general similarity of

the Leave Act, the McDonnell Douglas approach offers a

coherent method of evaluating the evidence for all three

alleged violations. For the most part, then, Gleklen's claims

may be analyzed simultaneously.

Under McDonnell Douglas, Gleklen had to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination, at which point the Democratic Committee had to produce evidence articulating a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, after

which Gleklen had to "produce substantial probative evidence

that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the

employment decision and that the real reason was [discriminatory animus]." Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 320; see also Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir.

1981).

A

On her Pregnancy Discrimination Act and D.C. Human

Rights Act claims, Gleklen made out the requisite prima facie

case: she was pregnant, she was qualified, she was fired, she

was replaced by a woman who was not pregnant, and her

replacement performed Gleklen's former job while devoting

at least some of her time to other responsibilities.1 See

Pendarvis v. Xerox Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 1998).2

__________

1 Gleklen set forth additional allegations, unnecessary to mention.

2 The Democratic Committee also argued that the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act does not require employers to grant maternity

leave; that maternity leave must be given only if the employer

overlooks comparable absences of non-pregnant employees; that

the Committee did not offer eight weeks of leave on either a paid or

unpaid basis to employees who were not pregnant; and that Gleklen

therefore would not have a claim under the Act even if the

Committee terminated her precisely to avoid providing her maternity leave. See Brief for Appellees at 26-30 (citing 29 C.F.R.

s 1604.10(b); Marshall v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 157 F.3d 520, 527

On her claim under the Leave Act, Gleklen had to show

that she engaged in a protected activity under this statute;

that she was adversely affected by an employment decision;

and that the protected activity and the adverse employment

action were causally connected. See Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 319.

As she describes her claim, it is essentially one of retaliation.3

Temporal proximity is often found sufficient to establish the

requisite causal connection for such claims. See, e.g., King v.

Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1999).

In this case, Gleklen's supervisor requested that she return to

work full time only a few weeks after she disclosed her

pregnancy. These two events were sufficiently close in time

to infer a causal nexus on the facts of this case. Compare

Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177-78

(3d Cir. 1997); Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39,

42-43 (5th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, Gleklen appears to have

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met her burden of alleging facts from which a reasonable jury

might infer a causal connection.

B

Although Gleklen made out a prima facie case on each of

her claims, she cannot prevail on any of them. The Democratic Committee put forward reasonable and nondiscriminatory reasons for requiring Gleklen to work full time

if she wanted to keep her job: they were planning to launch a

__________

(7th Cir. 1998); Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 296

(3d Cir. 1997); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th

Cir. 1994); Pendarvis, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 57 n.3). The Committee

also argued that Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d at

817, cited by Gleklen, does not support her position that the

Pregnancy Discrimination Act gives her rights superior to those

enjoyed by non-pregnant employees because Abraham employed

"disparate impact" analysis, whereas Gleklen claims disparate treatment. Given our disposition of the case, it is not necessary for us to

consider the questions these arguments pose.

3 "She planned to engage in statutorily protected activity (i.e.

maternity leave); her employer took adverse action (she was fired);

and there is evidence of a causal connection between these two

events." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 24.

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major new off-cycle initiative which required the full-time

efforts of existing employees as well as the hiring of new

ones. Gleklen believes this was an elaborate pretext designed to force her resignation, but she fell far short of

rebutting the Committee's more plausible explanation for its

actions. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289. She relies on four items

of "evidence," all of which lack substance or otherwise fail to

establish a "genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c).

First, in her deposition, Gleklen testified that someone had

informed her of a conversation in which Congressman Frost

said to former Congresswoman Margolies-Mezvinsky that

Gleklen was terminated because Gleklen, before her last

pregnancy, had told the Democratic Committee that she was

not going to have any more children. Gleklen's deposition is

the only evidence of this conversation in the record, and it is

not enough.

The rather awkward language of Rule 56(e) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "an adverse party may

not rest on mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's

pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as

otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." While a

nonmovant is not required to produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial, the evidence still must be

capable of being converted into admissible evidence. The

opening lines of the rule suggest as much: "Supporting and

opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,

shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,

and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to

testify to the matters stated therein." See also Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Otherwise, the objective

of summary judgment--to prevent unnecessary trials--would

be undermined. See id. at 323-24 & n.5. Verdicts cannot

rest on inadmissible evidence. Gleklen's evidence about the

conversation is sheer hearsay; she would not be permitted to

testify about the conversation at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 801-

807. It therefore counts for nothing. See 10A Charles Alan

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Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure s 2722, at

371-72 & n.11 (1998) (citing cases).

Second, in her affidavit opposing summary judgment and in

her deposition, Gleklen recounted a conversation in which

Greg Speed--who was hired full time along with Todd Glass

in March 1997 to handle the increased workload of the

Democratic Committee's new initiative--said that he did not

expect a significant increase in the Harriman Communications Center's workload until August 1997. Even if true,

Gleklen never suggested that Speed was in any manner

involved in the decision to terminate her; nor did she offer

any evidence that Speed shared his views with the supervisors who made that decision. Moreover, the record contains

several documents detailing the Democratic Committee's new

initiative. (The documents are under seal.) Even if use of

the Harriman Center's facilities did not rise appreciably

before August 1997, clearly the efforts to generate increased

work began well before Gleklen was terminated, directly

supporting the Democratic Committee's contention that it

anticipated an increased workload for the Harriman Center's

staff.

Third, Gleklen's affidavit purports to refute the Democratic

Committee's statistics demonstrating increased activity at the

Harriman Center between April and August 1997. Whether

the activity level actually increased is not the critical question. Gleklen needed to--but did not--refute the Democratic

Committee's evidence showing that those in charge of the

Harriman Center reasonably believed that its activity would

increase when they asked Gleklen to resume a full-time

schedule and later terminated her for rejecting that request.

Fourth, Gleklen is mistaken in asserting that Susan Maiers,

the woman who replaced her, only worked part time to fill the

Deputy Director's duties. The evidence shows that Maiers

was working full time for the Democratic Committee Finance

Office one month before Gleklen's termination and that Maiers was performing the duties of the Harriman Center's

business manager on a part-time basis until a replacement

could be found. When Gleklen was terminated, Maiers left the

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Democratic Committee Finance Office and took over Gleklen's post as Deputy Director full time, working nine-to-five,

five days a week. Maiers testified that she acted as the

Deputy Director on a full-time basis, and performed the

business manager functions part time--the opposite of Gleklen's assertion. This testimony further supports the Democratic Committee's contention that the Deputy Director's

position required a full-time employee. In any event, Gleklen

did not rebut the Committee's evidence that it was making a

good faith attempt at filling the business manager position

while Maiers did double duty.

The district court's summary judgment in favor of the

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee is therefore

affirmed.

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