Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-00797/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-00797-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

HELEN C. RUSHING Plaintiff

v. 4:04CV00797 GH/HLJ

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration, Defendant

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States

District Judge George Howard. The parties may file specific written

objections to these findings and recommendations and must provide the

factual or legal basis for each objection. An original and one copy

of the objections must be filed with the Clerk no later than eleven

(11) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. A copy

must be served on the opposing party. The District Judge, even in

the absence of objections, may reject these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Helen C. Rushing, has appealed the final decision of

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to deny her

claim for Disability Insurance benefits. Both parties have submitted

appeal briefs and the case is ready for decision.

The Court's function on review is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

record as a whole and whether it is based on legal error. Long v.

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Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater,

82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996).

 In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must

consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as

well as evidence that supports it; the Court may not, however,

reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial

evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Sultan v.

Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

"Disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or

mental impairment" is "an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Plaintiff alleged disability based on systemic lupus

erythematosus, a left ear hearing problem, arthritis, knee problems

and sleep apnea. (Tr. 79) The Commissioner found that she was not

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The only

issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner's decision that

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The Hon. Michael A. Kirkpatrick.

 2Although the record contains medical evidence from as early as

1989, the relevant period of inquiry in this case is from Plaintiff’s

alleged date of onset, July 5, 2002 (Tr. 62), through the date of the

ALJ’s decision. An applicant must be disabled during the pendency of

his or her application. Turley v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 524, 527 (8th

Cir. 1991).

3

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act is supported

by substantial record evidence.

After conducting an administrative hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge1

 (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a

disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time

through October 20, 2003, the date of his decision. 2 (Tr. 20) On

June 14, 2004, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for a

review of the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 4-6) Plaintiff then filed her

complaint initiating this appeal. (Docket #2)

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence.

Plaintiff was 52 years old at the time of the hearing. (Tr.

258) She is a high school graduate with additional vocational

training. (Tr. 85, 112, 260) She has past relevant work as a title

clerk, accounting clerk, office manager and cashier. (Tr. 19, 20,

88-95)

The ALJ considered Plaintiff's impairments by way of the

required five-step sequential evaluation process. The first step

involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in

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substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)(2004). If the

claimant is, benefits are denied, regardless of medical condition,

age, education or work experience. Id.

Step 2 involves a determination, based solely on the medical

evidence, of whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of

impairments which significantly limits claimant’s ability to perform

basic work activities, a “severe” impairment. Id., § 404.1520(c).

If not, benefits are denied. Id.

Step 3 involves a determination, again based solely on the

medical evidence, of whether the severe impairment(s) meets or equals

a listed impairment which is presumed to be disabling. Id.,

§ 404.1520(d). If so, and the duration requirement is met, benefits

are awarded. Id.

If claimant does not meet or equal a Listing, then a residual

functional capacity assessment is made based on all the relevant

medical and other evidence. Id., § 404.1520(e). This residual

functional capacity assessment is utilized at Steps 4 and 5. Id.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity, despite the impairment(s),

to perform the physical and mental demands of past relevant work.

Id., § 404.1520(f). If so, benefits are denied. Id.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able

to make an adjustment to other work, given claimant's age, education

and work experience. Id., § 404.1520(g). If so, benefits are

denied; if not, benefits are awarded. Id.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

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gainful activity since her alleged onset date, July 5, 2002. (Tr.

19) He found that she had “severe” impairments, systemic lupus

erythematosus and arthritis, but that she did not have an impairment

or combination of impairments that met or equaled a Listing. (Tr.

16, 19) He judged that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not

totally credible to the extent that she contended. (Tr. 19)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity for light work. (Tr. 20) He recognized that Plaintiff's

past relevant work as a title clerk, accounting clerk, office manager

and cashier did not require the performance of work-related

activities precluded by her limitations, and that her impairments did

not prevent her performing her past relevant work. Id.

Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly develop the

record. (Br. 18-20) For instance, she contends that she had

“obvious” mental incapacities that were never developed. (Br. 18)

However, it is significant that Plaintiff did not allege a disabling

mental impairment in her application for disability benefits, see

Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1375 (8th Cir. 1993), did not offer

it at the hearing as a basis for disability, Brockman v. Sullivan,

987 F.2d 1344, 1348 (8th Cir. 1993); see Matthews v. Bowen, 879 F.2d

422, 424 (8th Cir. 1989) (claimant did not allege disability due to

mental impairment and presented only minimal evidence of anxiety) and

had never sought or been referred for mental health treatment. See

Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d at 1375, citing Johnson v. Bowen, 866 F.2d

274, 275 (8th Cir. 1989) and Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 884 (8th

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Cir. 1987).

It is of some relevance that Plaintiff's attorney did not obtain

the evidence which Plaintiff now complains is not in the record.

Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff

has not demonstrated that she was prejudiced or treated unfairly by

the manner in which the ALJ did or did not develop the record. Id.

The ALJ is permitted to issue a decision without obtaining additional

evidence as long as the record is sufficient to make an informed

decision. E.g., Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir.

1995). In this case, the evidence was sufficient upon which to make

an informed decision.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ had a clear duty to obtain an

residual functional capacity from her treating physician, but relied

instead on a residual functional capacity determination by State

agency physicians. (Br. 19-20)

This court has considered and rejected Howard's

argument that additional medical evidence must be produced

at step 5. Anderson v. Shalala , 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th

Cir.1995). In Anderson we noted that 

[i]t was the ALJ's responsibility to determine

Anderson's RFC based on all the relevant

evidence, including medical records,

observations of treating physicians and others,

and Anderson's own description of her

limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545-46, 416.945-

46. We must determine whether the record

presents medical evidence of Anderson's RFC at

the time of the hearing. Frankl v. Shalala, 47

F.3d 935, 937-38 (8th Cir.1995). If there is no

such evidence, the ALJ's decision "cannot be

said to be supported by substantial evidence."

Id.

The need for medical evidence, however, does not

require the Secretary to produce additional

evidence not already within the record. "[A]n

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ALJ is permitted to issue a decision without

obtaining additional medical evidence so long as

other evidence in the record provides a

sufficient basis for the ALJ's decision." Naber

v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 189 (8th Cir.1994).

Id. Since there was already sufficient medical evidence in

the record to support the ALJ's decision, the Commissioner

was not required to produce additional medical evidence at

step 5.

Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 2001). 

The ALJ made it clear that he based his residual functional

capacity determination on the entire record. (Tr. 18) That is

proper. Id. He did rely, in part, on the assessment of State agency

medical consultants. (Tr. 19) State agency medical consultants are

"highly qualified physicians . . . who are also experts in Social

Security disability evaluation. Therefore, administrative law judges

must consider . . ." their opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(i)

(2003) (emphasis added). 

Next, Plaintiff faults the ALJ’s credibility determination.

(Br. 20-24) The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints in

light of Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984). (Tr. 16-

18)

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports

the degree of severity of subjective complaints alleged is

just one factor to be considered in evaluating the

credibility of the testimony and complaints. The

adjudicator must give full consideration to all of the

evidence presented relating to subjective complaints,

including the claimant's prior work record, and

observations by third parties and treating and examining

physicians relating to such matters as:

1. the claimant's daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

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4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of

medication;

5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the

claimant's subjective complaints solely on the basis of

personal observations. Subjective complaints may be

discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as

a whole. 

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

There is little objective support in the record for Plaintiff's

claim of disability. No evaluations showed medical conditions that

were disabling. Furthermore, inconsistencies between the medical

evidence and Plaintiff's subjective complaints gave reason to

discount those complaints. Richmond v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1141, 1443

(8th Cir. 1994). 

Given the inconsistencies in Plaintiff's statements, the lack of

medical evidence in support of Plaintiff's allegations, Plaintiff's

daily activities, her functional capabilities and the lack of

restriction placed on Plaintiff by her physicians, the ALJ could

rightly discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints. See Thomas v.

Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259-60 (8th Cir. 1991); Cabrnoch v. Bowen,

881 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1989).

In a Disability Supplemental Interview Outline dated August 12,

2002 (Tr. 113), Plaintiff indicated that she groomed without

assistance; did laundry and dishes, changed sheets, ironed,

vacuumed/swept, took out the trash, washed her car and raked leaves;

she shopped for groceries and clothes and completed postal and

banking errands (Tr. 109); she prepared ten meals a week, including

sandwiches, frozen dinners, meats, vegetables, desserts and dishes

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that required recipes; paid bills, used a checkbook and counted

change; drove, including unfamiliar routes, walked for exercise and

used public transportation; attended church, watched television,

listened to the radio, read and visited friends and relatives; she

played solitaire and completed puzzles (Tr. 110). In another

Disability Supplemental Interview Outline completed later in the

month, she indicated that she did not watch television, but made

ceramics and some crafts, such as embroidering. (Tr. 97) From

August of 2002 until April of 2003, she attended class for 20 hours

or more a week. (Tr. 275)

She did not quit her last job because of her impairments, but

rather was laid off. (Tr. 79) The decision to deny benefits is

bolstered by the fact that Plaintiff received unemployment

compensation during the time that she claims to have been disabled.

Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1997). 

It appears that Plaintiff told her doctor in July of 2002 that

she was in school, drawing unemployment, looking for work and walking

five miles a day. (Tr. 166) At the administrative hearing,

Plaintiff disputed that she had been walking five miles a day, but

admitted that she was walking 20 minutes on a treadmill. (Tr. 271)

Her doctor urged her to continue her activity and continue her job

search. (Tr. 166)

Plaintiff engaged in extensive daily activities, which is

inconsistent with the level of pain and limitation alleged. See

Forte v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2004)(plaintiff

attended college classes and church, shopped for groceries, ran

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errands, cooked, drove, walked for exercise and visited friends and

relatives); Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 48 (8th Cir.

2001)(plaintiff took care of personal needs, washed dishes, changed

sheets, vacuumed, washed cars, shopped, cooked, paid bills, drove,

attended church, watched television, listened to radio, read and

visited friends and relatives); Gray v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 799, 804 (8th

Cir. 1999)(plaintiff cared for himself, did household chores, drove

short distance, performed other miscellaneous activities); Haggard v.

Apfel, 175 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 1999)(plaintiff cooked some meals,

watered flowers around house, helped wife paint, watched television,

went out for dinner, occasionally drove and occasionally visited with

friends); Lawrence v. Chater, 107 F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir.

1997)(plaintiff dressed and bathed herself, did some housework,

cooking and shopping); Pena v. Chater, 76 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir.

1995)(daily caring for one child, driving when unable to find ride

and sometimes going to grocery); Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 431

(8th Cir. 1995)(visiting neighbors, cooking own meals, doing own

laundry and attending church); Novotny v. Chater, 72 F.3d 669, 671

(8th Cir. 1995)(carrying out garbage, carrying grocery bags, driving

wife to and from work inconsistent with extreme, disabling pain);

Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1995)(plaintiff cooked

breakfast, "sometimes" needed help with household cleaning and other

chores, visited friends and relatives and attended church twice a

month); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993)(plaintiff

lived alone, drove, shopped for groceries and did housework with some

help from neighbor).

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The ALJ's credibility analysis was proper. He made express

credibility findings and gave multiple valid reasons for discrediting

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. E.g., Shelton v. Chater, 87 F.3d

992, 995 (8th Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 258 (8th

Cir. 1996); Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff has advanced other arguments, which the Court has

carefully considered, and found to be without merit.

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make

an independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of

the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which contradicts his

findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence in the

record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. E.g.,

Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan,

956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992).

There is ample evidence in the record as a whole that "a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion"

of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; see

also Reutter v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The

Commissioner's decision is not based on legal error.

THEREFORE, the Court hereby affirms the final determination of

the Commissioner and dismisses Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 25th day of July, 2005.

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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