Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-19-03124/USCOURTS-ca3-19-03124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

________________ 

No. 19-3124 

________________ 

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF 

SUBPOENA 2018R00776 

ABC Corporation, 

 Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

Argued on December 10, 2019 

Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed January 10, 2020) 

________________ 

OPINION 

________________ 

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ROTH, Circuit Judge

This case requires us to determine whether the First 

Amendment permits a court, acting pursuant to the Stored 

Communications Act (SCA),1 to restrain a grand jury witness 

from disclosing its receipt of service to a third party. A grand 

jury issued a subpoena to ABC Corp.,

2 an electronic service 

provider, for the data of one of its customer’s employees who 

was under criminal investigation. A search warrant later 

demanded additional data regarding the same subscriber. 

These requests were accompanied by nondisclosure orders 

(NDOs) prohibiting ABC Corp. from notifying anyone of the 

existence of the data requests. ABC Corp. complied with both 

requests but challenges the constitutionality of the NDOs, 

arguing that they infringe upon its freedom of speech. ABC 

Corp. asks to amend the NDOs to permit disclosure to an 

individual who, it argues, poses no risk to the grand jury 

investigation. We must determine whether the First 

Amendment tolerates such a restraint on speech. 

Our conclusion, which we explain below, is that the 

governmental interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy is 

sufficiently strong for the NDOs to withstand strict scrutiny. 

Disclosure to anyone outside of the grand jury process would 

undermine the proper functioning of our criminal justice 

system. We will affirm the District Court’s denial of ABC 

Corp.’s motion to amend the NDOs. 

 1 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq.

2 To maintain the secrecy of the investigation, we will refer to 

the facts in general terms and will use for the corporation the 

fictitious name of “ABC Corp.”

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I. Background

A. Statutory Background

The Stored Communications Act of 1986 (SCA) is 

“designed to protect legitimate law enforcement needs while 

minimizing intrusions on the privacy of system users as well 

as the business needs of electronic communications system 

providers.”3

 The SCA authorizes the government to compel

an electronic service provider to produce a subscriber’s

information stored on remote servers, often referred to as “the 

cloud.”4

 The advent of cloud computing has altered how the 

government obtains information during criminal 

investigations.5

 Where information was previously sought by 

directly approaching the target of the investigation or his

employer, the SCA permits prosecutors to obtain the data from 

electronic service providers.6

 

Section 2703 of the SCA allows the government to

obtain search warrants, court orders, or subpoenas for a 

subscriber’s data. These requests may be for non-contentspecific data,7 such as name, address, and product-usage 

information, or content-specific data,

8 including the contents 

of all communications, search histories, and saved files. A 

 3 132 Cong. Rec. 27633 (1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 4 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Seeking Enterprise Customer Data 

Held by Cloud Service Providers, at 1 (Dec. 2017).

5 Id. 6 Id. 7 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).

8 Id. § 2703(a), (b).

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service provider who turns over this information in response to 

a grand jury subpoena, as is the case here, is a grand jury 

witness and is not subject to the general secrecy obligation 

imposed by the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2).9

 

However, the SCA authorizes courts to prohibit a service 

provider from notifying anyone of its receipt of legal process

in appropriate circumstances.

10 

We have not had the opportunity to analyze the SCA’s 

nondisclosure provision.11 Section 2705(b) governs those 

occasions when the government may request that a court issue 

an NDO to service providers. That provision, in relevant part, 

states:

Preclusion of notice to subject of 

governmental access. A 

governmental entity acting under 

section 2703, when it is not 

required to notify the subscriber or 

customer under section 

2703(b)(1), or to the extent that it 

may delay such notice pursuant to 

subsection (a) of this section, may 

 9 Notes of Advisory Committee, Note to Subdivision (e)(2); 

see also United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 

(1983) (“[Grand jury w]itnesses are not under the prohibition 

unless they also happen to fit into one of the enumerated 

classes [listed in the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

6(e)(2)].”).

10 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).

11 We thank the parties for their additional late-hour briefing 

on this issue.

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apply to a court for an order 

commanding a provider of 

electronic communications service 

or remote computing service to 

whom a warrant, subpoena, or 

court order is directed, for such 

period as the court deems 

appropriate, not to notify any other 

person of the existence of the 

warrant, subpoena, or court 

order.12

The SCA thus permits the government to apply for an NDO 

when it seeks content or non-content data pursuant to § 2703 

unless the government itself is required to notify the subscriber

of the request.

13 Even when the government must notify the 

subscriber, it may still obtain an NDO if it may delay 

notification pursuant to § 2705(a). A court shall issue an NDO 

if it finds reason to believe that disclosure will result in “(1) 

endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (2) 

flight from prosecution; (3) destruction of or tampering with 

evidence; (4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (5) 

otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly 

delaying a trial.”14 When these risks are present, an NDO 

prohibits an electronic service provider from disclosing the 

government’s request for data for up to one year.

15

 12 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).

13 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B). 14 Id. § 2705(b).

15 Id.; see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Policy Regarding Applications 

for Protective Orders Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), at 2 

(Oct. 19, 2017).

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B. Factual and Procedural Background

ABC Corp. is an electronic service provider that stores

its subscribers’ content and non-content data on the cloud. In 

January 2019, ABC Corp. received a grand jury subpoena 

issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(2), ordering it to produce 

the data of one of its subscribers, concerning an employee of 

the subscriber. This employee is the target of an ongoing 

criminal investigation. The subpoena sought non-contentspecific information, including, inter alia, records of names, 

physical addresses, billing information, and IP addresses 

associated with the employee’s account. The subpoena was 

accompanied by an NDO, prohibiting for one year ABC Corp. 

from notifying any person, except ABC Corp.’s own lawyers, 

of the existence of the subpoena. Two months later, a 

Magistrate Judge issued a search warrant directing ABC Corp. 

to produce content-specific data for the same account. The 

warrant sought all evidence found in the employee’s remotely 

stored data pertaining to several enumerated offenses being 

investigated by the government. The search warrant was 

accompanied by a second NDO, virtually identical to the first. 

ABC Corp. complied with both the subpoena and search 

warrant. The subscriber subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and 

a trustee has been appointed. 

ABC Corp. moved before the District Court to modify 

the NDOs to permit it to notify the bankruptcy trustee of the 

existence of the subpoena and warrant, arguing that the NDOs 

are content-based restrictions and prior restraints that infringe 

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upon its First Amendment rights.16 ABC Corp. asserted that it 

was proposing a less restrictive alternative to the content-based 

restriction. ABC Corp. argued that the trustee is a disinterested 

party, who had stepped into the shoes of the debtor and had 

been vetted and approved under Department of Justice 

guidelines. Further, ABC Corp. claimed that the trustee 

controlled the debtor’s assertion of attorney-client privilege, 

had authority to respond to the government’s demands, and had 

a duty to uncover and assert causes of action against the 

debtor’s officers and directors. ABC Corp. proposed two 

alternatives, both involving disclosure of the grand jury 

investigation to the bankruptcy trustee with varying levels of 

specificity. 

The District Court denied the motion to amend the 

NDOs. It found that § 2705(b) implicates the First 

Amendment rights of service providers and, without 

determining whether strict scrutiny applies, held that such an 

NDO passes strict scrutiny regardless. In its analysis, the court 

found that the NDOs serve the compelling governmental 

interest of “maintain[ing] the secrecy of the ongoing grand jury 

investigation and meet[ing] several of the requirements under 

 16 The Government argues that ABC Corp. never moved to 

modify the search warrant NDO. However, ABC Corp. plainly 

raised the issue in its memorandum in support of its motion to 

modify and raised it again to this Court. Moreover, the 

Government argued against modification to both NDOs before 

the District Court, and the District Court referenced ABC 

Corp.’s request for relief from the search warrant NDO in its 

memorandum opinion. We will consider ABC Corp.’s 

challenge to both NDOs.

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§ 2705(b).”17 Next, the court determined that the NDOs are 

narrowly tailored because the restriction on ABC Corp.’s 

speech is time-limited to one year. Moreover, ABC Corp. had 

failed to establish that the trustee had “any particularized need 

to the grand jury subpoena or any additional information 

regarding same.”18 Finally, the court held that the NDOs are

the least restrictive means for advancing the government’s 

interest. It rejected ABC Corp.’s proposed alternatives 

because they were impractical, less effective than the NDO, 

and risked further disclosure to third parties.

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3231. Although both parties argue in favor of our 

exercising jurisdiction, we have “an independent duty to satisfy 

ourselves of our appellate jurisdiction regardless of the parties’ 

positions.”19 Our jurisdiction flows from the collateral order 

exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.20 Under the collateral order 

doctrine, an otherwise non-final order is appealable if it “[1] 

finally and conclusively determines the disputed question, [2] 

resolves an important issue separate from the underlying 

merits, and [3] is effectively unreviewable after final 

judgment.”21 Here, the District Court’s order finally and 

 17 JA9. 18 JA6.

19 Bedrosian v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, IRS, 912 F.3d 144, 149 

(3d Cir. 2018).

20 United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 87-88 (3d Cir. 2001).

21 Id. at 87.

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conclusively rejected ABC Corp.’s First Amendment 

challenge to the NDO. Second, the order resolved an important 

issue: balancing a burden on speech against a court’s power to 

manage grand jury proceedings. The order is also entirely 

divorced from the merits of the grand jury proceeding and 

concerns ABC Corp.’s rights, not the rights of the grand jury 

target.22 Third, the NDOs will be effectively unreviewable if 

or when the target is prosecuted. Because all three criteria of 

the collateral order doctrine are met, we have appellate 

jurisdiction.

We exercise plenary review over questions of law.23 

Although normal deference to a district court’s factual findings 

would necessitate clear error review, “in the First Amendment 

context we have an ‘obligation independently to examine the 

whole record to ensure that the judgment does not constitute a 

forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’”24

 22 See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 398 (3d Cir. 

2011).

23 United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 

2010).

24 Id. (quoting Scarfo, 263 F.3d at 91).

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B. Content-Based Restrictions and Prior Restraint

Nondisclosure orders implicate First Amendment rights 

because they restrict a service provider’s speech.25 Courts 

apply varying levels of scrutiny to incursions on speech 

depending on whether the restriction is content based or 

content neutral.26 Content-based laws are presumptively 

unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny.27 In contrast, 

intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral restrictions.28 

Government regulation of speech is content based if it “applies 

to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea 

or message expressed.”29 The NDOs in this case are content

based because they prohibit ABC Corp. from conveying 

information about a grand jury investigation, thus “draw[ing] 

distinctions based on the message.”30 

The government’s use of NDOs also constitutes prior 

restraint, a characterization typically used to describe “judicial 

orders forbidding certain communications when issued in 

advance of the time that such communications are to occur.”31 

Indeed, the NDOs forbid ABC Corp. from speaking about its 

participation as a grand jury witness. “[P]rior restraints on 

speech . . . are the most serious and the least tolerable 

 25 See Scarfo, 263 F.3d at 92. 26 Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 941 F.3d 73, 84 (3d Cir. 2019).

27 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).

28 Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 363-64 (3d Cir. 

2016).

29 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.

30 Id. 31 See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993)

(emphasis omitted).

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infringement on First Amendment rights.”32 While prior 

restraints “are not unconstitutional per se,”33 they are 

presumptively unconstitutional34 and subject to strict 

scrutiny.35 

The government asks us to apply intermediate scrutiny, 

essentially carving out a new area for prior restraints involving 

speech about non-public proceedings. Relying on Seattle 

Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 36 the government argues that the 

restraint on ABC Corp.’s speech is not the kind of classic prior 

restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny. In 

Seattle Times, the Supreme Court declined to apply heightened 

scrutiny to a protective order limiting a civil litigant’s ability 

to disseminate for its own benefit embarrassing information 

discovered in advance of trial.37 But ABC Corp. is in quite a 

different position as a grand jury witness, and it harbors no 

abusive motives. ABC Corp. insists that it only wishes to 

disclose its receipt of service to alert an individual who can 

assert its subscriber’s rights. Moreover, the Seattle Times

language on which the government relies is derived from

Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. 

 32 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).

33 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975).

34 First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd.,

784 F.2d 467, 477 (3d Cir. 1986). 35 Stilp v. Contino, 613 F.3d 405, 415 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(“[P]rohibit[ing] public disclosure of the fact that an Ethics Act 

complaint was filed, does not survive strict scrutiny and cannot 

be enforced.”).

36 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984).

37 Id. at 34.

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DePasquale, a right of access case.38 The right of access does 

not enjoy the broad protections offered to the right of free 

speech.39 In fact, Justice Powell’s concurrence contrasted the 

right of access with a gag order, describing the latter as “a 

classic prior restraint” and “one of the most extraordinary 

remedies known to our jurisprudence.”40 We do not find 

Seattle Times instructive under these circumstances.

We thus reject the government’s invitation to apply a 

lesser degree of scrutiny. Because the NDOs are content-based 

restrictions and presumptively unconstitutional prior restraints, 

we apply strict scrutiny to determine whether they are

constitutionally infirm.

C. Strict Scrutiny

The government has the burden to establish that the 

NDOs survive strict scrutiny.41 Strict scrutiny requires the 

government to demonstrate that the restriction on speech “(1) 

serve[s] a compelling governmental interest; (2) [is] narrowly 

tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) [is] the least restrictive 

means of advancing that interest.”42 “The purpose of the [strict 

scrutiny] test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further 

 38 Id. at 33-34 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 

368, 399 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)).

39 First Amendment Coal., 784 F.2d at 477; Stilp, 613 F.3d at 

413.

40 Gannet Co., 443 U.S. at 399 (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n., 427 

U.S. at 562).

41 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).

42 Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 286 (quoting ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 

F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2008)).

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than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to ensure 

that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished.”43 

1. The Restriction on Speech Serves a Compelling 

Governmental Interest.

In reference to the application of strict scrutiny here, the 

government argues that it has a compelling interest in 

preserving the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. But strict 

scrutiny sets a high bar for the government to meet. 

“[Government] officials may not constitutionally punish 

publication of the information, absent a need to further a 

[governmental] interest of the highest order.”44 We are 

convinced, however, that protecting the secrecy of an 

investigation is a paramount interest of the government.45 The 

government’s interest is particularly acute where, as here, the 

investigation is ongoing.46 

Moreover, § 2705(b) sets out for us the governmental 

interests that must exist before a court issues an NDO. Here, 

the District Court and Magistrate Judge found reason to believe 

that notification would “seriously jeopardize the investigation 

 43 Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666.

44 Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990) (quoting 

Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).

45 See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 

211, 218 (1979) (“[T]he proper functioning of our grand jury 

system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”).

46 See id. at 222 (“[T]he interests in grand jury secrecy, 

although reduced, are not eliminated merely because the grand 

jury has ended its activities.”).

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. . . by giving targets an opportunity to flee or continue flight 

from prosecution, destroy or tamper with evidence, change 

patterns of behavior, or notify confederates.”47 In denying 

ABC Corp.’s motion to amend, the District Court found that 

the NDOs serve a compelling governmental interest in 

maintaining the secrecy of the ongoing grand jury investigation 

and meet several requirements under § 2705(b). We agree. 

ABC Corp. concedes that the government asserts a 

compelling interest in preventing notice to the target of the 

investigation. But ABC Corp. “misperceives the breadth of the 

compelling interest that underlies” the restriction on speech.48 

The government’s interest in grand jury secrecy is not limited 

to avoiding notification to the target. The Supreme Court has 

identified several reasons to maintain grand jury secrecy: 

(1) To prevent the escape of those 

whose indictment may be 

contemplated; (2) to insure the 

utmost freedom to the grand jury in 

its deliberations, and to prevent 

persons subject to indictment or 

their friends from importuning the 

grand jurors; (3) to prevent 

subornation of perjury or 

tampering with the witness who 

may testify before [the] grand jury 

and later appear at the trial of those 

indicted by it; (4) to encourage free 

 47 JA39, JA45 (citing § 2705(b)(2), (3), (5)).

48 See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 435

(2015).

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and untrammeled disclosures by 

persons who have information 

with respect to the commission of 

crimes; (5) to protect innocent 

accused who is exonerated from 

disclosure of the fact that he has 

been under investigation, and from 

the expense of standing trial where 

there was no probability of guilt.49 

To be sure, these reasons include avoiding consequences that 

might flow from alerting the target. But the Supreme Court’s 

reasons additionally relate to the grand jury’s ability to freely 

deliberate, the desire for unfettered testimony by witnesses, 

and the protection of the target from the assumption of guilt.50 

Consistent with these concerns, § 2705(b) prohibits disclosure 

to “any other person” and not just to the target of the 

investigation. Therefore, we must next consider whether the 

NDOs are narrowly drawn and the least restrictive means to 

preserve grand jury secrecy, not just whether the restriction 

avoids alerting the target of the investigation.

 49 Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219 n.10 (alteration in original) 

(quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 

681 n.6 (1958)).

50 Id.; see also Sells Eng’g Inc., 463 U.S. at 424 (“Grand jury 

secrecy . . . is as important for the protection of the innocent as 

for the pursuit of the guilty.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). But see Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 634 

(“[R]eputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription 

of truthful speech.”).

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2. The Restriction on Speech is Narrowly Tailored.

The District Court found that the NDOs are narrowly 

tailored because they are limited in time to one year. ABC 

Corp. argues that time limitations are not enough to pass 

constitutional muster and that restrictions must be also be 

tailored in scope. To this end, ABC Corp. characterizes the 

NDOs as a “total ban” on its speech. We agree that a temporal 

limitation alone may not be enough to satisfy strict scrutiny.

51 

The ban here is not, however, a total ban.

Courts consistently distinguish between disclosure of 

information that a witness has independent of his participation 

in grand jury proceedings and information the witness learns 

as a result of his participation.52 This approach strikes a 

“balance” between First Amendment rights and the 

government’s “interests in preserving the confidentiality of its 

 51 See United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 

2005) (“A prior restraint is not constitutionally inoffensive 

merely because it is temporary.”).

52 Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 632 (“[W]e deal only with 

respondent’s right to divulge information of which he was in 

possession before he testified before the grand jury, and not 

information which he may have obtained as a result of his 

participation in the proceedings of the grand jury.”); First 

Amendment Coal., 784 F.2d at 479 (holding that confidentiality 

requirement can prevent witnesses from disclosing 

proceedings, with the exception of their own testimony); see 

also Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34 (“[A] party may disseminate 

the identical information covered by the protective order as 

long as the information is gained through means independent 

of the court’s processes.”).

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grand jury proceedings.”53 Here, the NDOs prohibit ABC 

Corp. only from speaking about the existence of the 

government’s requests—information it learned of by its 

participation as a grand jury witness.54 The NDOs do not 

prohibit ABC Corp. from discussing the government’s requests 

abstractly, as service providers have done by disclosing the 

number of data requests and NDOs they receive in public 

docket civil complaints. This can hardly be described as a 

“total ban” on speech. The NDOs only proscribe speech that 

would reveal the existence of this particular grand jury 

investigation to a non-participant, a measure narrowly tailored 

to preserve the secrecy of this grand jury proceeding.

3. The Restriction on Speech is the Least Restrictive 

Means of Advancing the Governmental Interest.

ABC Corp. contends that the government can 

accomplish its compelling interest through less restrictive 

means. “[I]f the Government could achieve its interests in a 

manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less 

speech, the Government must do so.”55 “When a plausible, less 

restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech 

restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to prove that the 

 53 See Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 630-31.

54 See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] witness’[s]

disclosure of the grand jury proceedings . . . is knowledge he 

acquires not ‘on his own’ but only by virtue of being made a 

witness.”).

55 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 

(2002).

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alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.”56 ABC 

Corp. proposes two alternatives: (1) permission for it to notify 

the bankruptcy trustee of the subpoena; or (2) permission to 

notify the trustee of the subpoena without identifying the target 

email account, which according to ABC Corp., would prompt 

the trustee to seek more information from the District Court 

and enter into a protective order to restrict further 

dissemination. 

We agree with the government that these alternatives 

are untenable. They are impractical and would be ineffective 

in maintaining grand jury secrecy. Disclosure by an electronic 

service provider to a third party undermines the government’s 

interest in maintaining the confidentiality of an ongoing 

investigation.

57 We cannot and will not assess the 

trustworthiness of a would-be confidante chosen by a service 

provider. Simply put, “[w]e decline to wade into this swamp” 

of unworkable line drawing.58 Neither courts nor the 

government can be expected to vet individuals selected by 

service providers and determine their risk of subverting an 

 56 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 816

(2000). 57 Cf. First Amendment Coal., 784 F.2d at 479 (“The 

confidentiality requirement is reasonable and may be enforced 

insofar as it would prevent a person [including a witness] . . . 

from disclosing proceedings taking place before the Board. . . 

. The state interest in this respect, as in the grand jury setting, 

is sufficiently strong to support such a ban.”).

58 Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 454.

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ongoing investigation. Strict scrutiny does not demand that 

sort of prognostication.59 

In sum, the NDOs’ gag effect remains the least 

restrictive means to maintain grand jury secrecy. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order by 

the District Court denying ABC Corp.’s motion to amend the 

nondisclosure orders.

 59 See id. (“The First Amendment requires that [a speech 

restriction] be narrowly tailored, not that it be ‘perfectly 

tailored.’”) (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 

(1992)).

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