Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05543/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05543-87/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY NICHOLAS STESHENKO,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMAS MCKAY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 09-cv-05543-RS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

TRANSCRIPT AT PUBLIC EXPENSE

Plaintiff moves to have a trial transcript prepared at public expense, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 753(f). That section provides, in relevant part, that “[f]ees for transcripts furnished in other

proceedings to persons permitted to appeal in forma pauperis shall also be paid by the United

States if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but presents a

substantial question).” As noted in a prior order, however, where a party is seeking public 

funding for trial transcripts, “courts must be rigorous in their examination of applications . . . to 

ensure that the treasury is not unduly imposed upon.” Walker v. People Exp. Airlines, Inc., 886 

F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989). In light of that duty to examine the application rigorously, two prior 

orders have issued calling on plaintiff to address certain issues involving his original IFP 

application in this matter.1

 

1

 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the issue of his entitlement to maintain his IFP status on appeal 

was raised sua sponte. Rather, because plaintiff is only potentially entitled to a transcript at public 

expense if he is first entitled to IFP status on appeal, the issue arose as a direct result of his 

motion.

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CASE NO. 09-cv-05543-RS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Marital status

Item 3 of the IFP form asked “Are you married?” Plaintiff checked the box for “No.” 

That response was not legally accurate, as plaintiff remained legally married at the time. A more 

candid and appropriate response would have been for plaintiff to mark the “Yes” box, and then to 

insert as much additional information as he believed appropriate regarding the written legal 

separation agreement he has now submitted to show that his financial affairs are unconnected to 

those of his spouse. Over the course of this litigation, plaintiff has repeatedly demonstrated an 

ability to parse phrasing of questions and answers to identify statements that contain even minor 

inconsistencies, technical inaccuracies, and/or the potential to mislead, regardless of materiality. 

Had he applied the same standard to his own response to the IFP form, he would not have checked 

the “No” box on item 3 without further disclosure.

That said, plaintiff is correct that the design of the form does not facilitate disclosure of a 

separated marital status. There is at least an argument that he selected the box most nearly 

corresponding to his de facto circumstances, and to the relevance of his spouse’s financial 

circumstances. Accordingly, while plaintiff’s response was less than candid, standing alone it 

would not warrant imposition of any kind of sanctions.

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Home ownership2

Item 5 of the IFP form asked “Do you own or are you buying a home?” Plaintiff checked 

the box for “No,” and left blank the entries for estimated value and any mortgage balance. 

Plaintiff argues this response was accurate because three days prior to submitting his IFP 

application, he had executed a “transfer grant deed,” which he contends conveyed ownership of 

his house to his mother. As set out in the prior orders entered on April 14th and 15th, 2015 (Dkt. 

Nos. 1018 and 1021) the most reasonable inference supported by the record is that the parties 

intended a security transaction, not an outright transfer of ownership. Plaintiff’s arguments to the 

contrary are not persuasive.3 Moreover, even if plaintiff can construct an argument that his 

representation on the IFP application was not false in some narrow, technical, literal sense, it 

plainly was misleading, and the circumstances support a conclusion that plaintiff would have 

known that to be so at the time. Plaintiff thus knowingly omitted information from his IFP 

application that would have been necessary to render his representations completely truthful.

 

2

 Plaintiff states he is puzzled by the relationship between orders issued in this action and those 

entered in Steshenko v. Gayard, C 13-3400 LHK, and Steshenko v. Albee, C 13-4948 LHK. 

Factual findings have been made in Gayard and Albee that plaintiff’s IFP applications in those two 

actions, and well as those in this action and in a related collateral proceeding in the Eastern 

District, all contained knowingly false representations that he did not own a home. Plaintiff has 

moved to set aside those findings, and has stated his intent to appeal, should it be necessary. At 

this juncture, however, the findings stand. Furthermore, the accuracy of plaintiff’s representations 

to the federal courts on this subject was material to the issue being decided in Gayard and Albee, 

which gave the court jurisdiction to make the findings. 

 Because plaintiff was a party to Gayard and Albee, the factual findings there may be binding on 

him in other actions, including this one, under principles of issue preclusion, also known as 

collateral estoppel. Whether issue preclusion necessarily would apply in this case, however, will 

not be decided. For purposes of the present motion, it has been presumed that the findings in 

Gayard and Albee are not binding here.

3

 If the parties in fact intended a transfer, then the claim on the face of the deed that the 

transaction was exempt from documentary transfer tax was improper. Plaintiff’s argument that a 

transaction can be both a transfer of ownership and security for a debt is untenable. Because the 

tax would only have been due upon recordation of the deed, however, plaintiff did not 

consummate a wrongful claim of tax exemption.

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United States District Court

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Consequences

As noted in the April 14th order, this Court has not reached the issue of whether plaintiff’s 

misrepresentations rendered his allegation of poverty untrue, such that under 28 U.S.C §1915 

(e)(2)(a) dismissal of his substantive claims might be warranted. Because judgment has been 

entered, those claims are no longer pending here, and any dismissal on such grounds will be for 

the consideration of the appellate court.

The remaining question is whether the misrepresentations warrant revocation of plaintiff’s 

IFP status on appeal. Although plaintiff’s conduct at the time he submitted the IFP applications 

cannot be excused, there is ample evidence in the record that his present financial resources are 

very limited, such that an accurate IFP application would likely be granted. Additionally, unlike 

Gayard and Albee where the claims were still pending in the trial court, there is no express 

statutory provision calling for revocation of IFP status under circumstances like these. 

Accordingly, notwithstanding the very troubling attitude plaintiff has demonstrated as to his own 

duty of candor, his IFP status will not be revoked by this Court. 

At a number of points in the proceedings, plaintiff has expressed an intent to pursue an 

appeal on various grounds. Without suggesting that all, or even many, of those points present 

viable appellate issues, there likely exist one or more non-frivolous grounds for appeal. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for a trial transcript to be furnished at public expense is hereby 

granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2015

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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