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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARY JANE HAFFNER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant and 

Cross-Appellee, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY 3 0 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. Nos. 89-1244 & 89-1251 

(D. Colorado) 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

Defendant-Appellee and 

Cross-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

(No. 88-M-703) 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mary Jane Haffner (Haffner) appeals the judgment entered in 

favor of the United States Postal Service (the Postal Service) on 

her claim that she had been denied employment because of a 

physical handicap in violation of 29 u.s.c. § 791 (the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The Postal Service cross appeals the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1244 Document: 010110036125 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 1 
trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies and denial of costs. We affirm. 

From 1975 until 1985 Haffner worked for the University of 

Colorado as a word processor. 

involved in three car accidents, 

Between 1981 and 1984, she was 

each of which, she claims, 

i njured her neck. In November, 1984, however, she applied for a 

job with the Postal Service and completed a medical form on which 

she denied having: (1) "any medical disorder or physical 

impairment which would interfere in any way with the full 

performance of the duties of the position for which [she was] 

applying''; (2) ''consulted or been treated by clinics, physicians, 

healers, or other practitioners within the last five years"; (3) 

"stiffness of neck"; (4) "painful elbow''; or (5) "back injury or 

chronic back pain." She also denied having a handicap, and 

explained at trial that "I did not consider myself as impaired in 

November of 1984.'' As a result of her application, she was given 

a temporary appointment as a mail handler at the Denver Bulk Mail 

Center. She continued to work in this capacity for three threemonth tours. During this temporary employment, Haffner continued 

to work part-time as a word processor until April 1985 when the 

university terminated her employment because she was unable to 

perform her duties. 

While working for the university, Haffner sought permanent 

employment with the Postal Service. After scoring too low on a 

written examination to qualify for a competitive position, she 

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Appellate Case: 89-1244 Document: 010110036125 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 2 
applied for a noncompetitive appointment under the Postal Service 

program for hiring the severely handicapped. She obtained state 

certification that she was "severely handicapped 111 , and competed 

with three other certified applicants for three positions open to 

the four "severely handicapped" applicants. Haffner did not 

receive one of the appointments. She continued to apply for 

temporary positions with the Postal Service but denied that she 

was handicapped, and denied that she had ever been a federal 

employee. 

After mistakenly contacting the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission, Haffner ultimately filed suit alleging the Postal 

Service "blocked and discouraged [her] application for employment 

on the ground of her physical handicap" in violation of 29 u.s.c. 

§ 791 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Believing the 

testimony of Haffner that she had been misadvised by the EEOC, the 

trial court found that the doctrine of equitable tolling properly 

excused her failure to exhaust full administrative remedies. 

Further, the trial court found Haffner was "not eligible for the 

special protection under the handicapped act" and entered judgment 

for the Postal Service. 

On appeal Haffner argues the trial court erroneously found 

the facts and misapplied the law. The Postal Service argues the 

trial court erred in invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling 

1 The trial judge found the counselor who certified Haffner did 

so because it "would help meet her quota." 

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Appellate Case: 89-1244 Document: 010110036125 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 3 
and in denying its request for costs. We review the trial court's 

findings of fact to determine if clear error exists. We review 

the trial court's determinations of law de novo. Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557, 108 s.ct. 2541, 2546 (1988). The 

trial court did not err either in finding facts or in applying the 

law. 

Haffner 

handicapped 

first 

based 

argues she "established that she was 

on a physical impairment which substantially 

limits a major life activity." She contends the trial court erred 

in refusing to find her handicapped because her impairment 

prevented her from continuing employment in word processing. Her 

argument is without merit. 

The trial court concluded that "major life activity" means 

"functioning as a person, not in a particular job." In Jasany v. 

United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (6th Cir. 

1985), the Sixth Circuit stated that an impairment "that 

interferes with an individual's ability to do a particular job, 

but did not significantly decrease that individual's ability to 

obtain satisfactory employment otherwise was not substantially 

limiting" within the meaning of the statute. The evidence 

established that on employment applications Haffner repeatedly 

denied that she was handicapped; a rehabilitation counselor 

testified that she had doubts that Haffner was handicapped; 

Haffner's doctor testified in his deposition that Haffner was not 

handicapped under either the medical or legal definitions of that 

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Appellate Case: 89-1244 Document: 010110036125 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 4 
term; and he testified at trial that Haffner was able to perform 

the duties as a word processor. The court did not err in refusing 

to determine that Haffner was handicapped based on a physical 

impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. 

Haffner next contends she established that she was 

handicapped based on a record of a physical impairment which 

limits a major life activity. Credible evidence exists to the 

contrary, however, and we are not persuaded the trial court's 

findings were clearly erroneous. 

Haffner argues the court clearly erred in rendering findings 

contrary to Haffner's position. 2 The court, however, rendered 

findings on evidence in the record that the court found credible. 

The trial court then applied a correct legal standard. We are not 

persuaded that the court erred. 

Citing Jurgella v. Danielson, 158 Ariz. 542, 764 P.2d 27, 29 

(1988), Haffner next argues the trial court erred in refusing to 

determine she was handicapped based on the perception that she had 

a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life 

activity. The record reveals that Haffner applied for positions 

that were filled with people who were legally handicapped, which 

she was not, and also for positions that were filled 

2 More precisely, Haffner argues the court's finding that she 

was not handicapped pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(a)(2} and 

(d), is clearly erroneous. Although the argument confuses factual 

findings and legal determinations, we are not persuaded the trial 

court erred in either process. 

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competitively, which she did not earn. (Facts above). 

Consequently, we are .not persuaded that the trial court erred in 

rejecting Haffner's argument. 

Cross Appeal 

The Postal Service first argues the trial court erred in 

invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling. We review this issue 

de novo, and affirm the trial court. 

The thirty-day time limitation for bringing an employment 

discrimination action against a federal agency is not 

jurisdictional and may be subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases. Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1109 (10th 

Cir. 1984). For example, "where a plaintiff has been 'lulled into 

inaction by [a] past employer, state or federal agencies, or the 

courts,"' Id. at 1110 (quoting Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. 

RE 3-J, 652 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 1981)), or where "a plaintiff 

"is 'actively misled,' or 'has in some extraordinary way been 

prevented from asserting his or her rights,' we will permit 

tolling of the limitations period." 738 F.2d at 1110 (quoting 

Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 348 (10th 

Cir. 1982)). According to Haffner's brief, she stated by 

affidavit that she told EEOC official August Roybal that she had 

been a casual employee and believed that the Postal Service had 

wrongfully determined she was not qualified for permanent 

employment. Roybal asked Haffner whether she had received a 

written rejection for permanent employment. Haffner said the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1244 Document: 010110036125 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 6 
Postal Service had simply refused to act on her application and 

.had not rejected her application in .writing. Roybal then told 

Haffner she would have to obtain a letter of rejection prior to 

filing a charge of discrimination. He also did not refer Haffner 

to the EEO process of the Postal Service. At trial, the Postal 

Service called Roybal to contradict Haffner's testimony regarding 

the agency "lulling her into inaction 

her." The trial court found that 

and actively misleading 

Roybal did not contradict 

Haffner's testimony and accepted 

reviewed the record and hold 

Haffner's testimony. We have 

the 

refusing to dismiss Haffner's complaint 

administrative remedies. 

trial 

for 

court did not err in 

failure to exhaust 

Next the Postal Service argues the trial court erred in 

Although under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(d) 

as of course to the prevailing party 

refusing to award costs. 

"costs shall be allowed 

unless the court otherwise directs," the "award of costs is within 

the discretion of the trial court." Montgomery v. Yellow Freight 

System, Inc., 671 F.2d 412, 413 (10th Cir. 1982). Under this 

standard, we uphold the trial court's decision unless we have "a 

definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear 

error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in 

the circumstances." United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 

n.2 (10th Cir. 1986). The Postal Service cites no authority and 

we are not persuaded that the trial court's decision to deny costs 

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was an abuse of discretion. 

AFFIRMED. -The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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