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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 10, 2024*

Decided December 13, 2024 

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge

DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge

No. 24-1710 

JALAM VANTROY SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LUTHERAN UNIVERSITY 

ASSOCIATION, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Hammond Division. 

No. 2:21-CV-178-TLS

Theresa L. Springmann, 

Judge.

O R D E R

After Jalam Smith sued the Lutheran University Association, Inc. (also known as

Valparaiso University) for racially discriminating against him while he was a student at

the university, Valparaiso moved for summary judgment. In opposing that motion, 

Smith failed to comply with the local rules, and the district judge entered summary 

judgment for Valparaiso. On appeal, Smith contests the entry of summary judgment 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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and other procedural rulings. Because Smith did not properly dispute the facts that 

mandate summary judgment, and his additional challenges lack merit, we affirm. 

We construe the record in favor of Smith, the non-moving party. See Vesey v. 

Envoy Air, Inc., 999 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2021). Smith, who is Black, attended 

Valparaiso for one semester in 2019. He enrolled in five courses. In his social-work 

course, Smith often turned in assignments late, and his work was rated subpar, leading 

his professor to talk to Smith about his poor performance and tardiness. Smith believes

that he was graded unfairly because of his race, and the professor harassed him with 

emails about his inadequate performance. Later, Smith stopped attending the course, 

Valparaiso denied Smith’s request to withdraw from it, and he ultimately failed it. 

Smith also struggled in his chemistry course. He eventually withdrew from it upon his

professor’s recommendation. In Smith’s view, he was again unfairly graded because of 

his race and harassed about his inadequate performance in that course. 

Smith complained to no avail to Valparaiso and the Office of Civil Rights of the 

United States Department of Education, precipitating this suit. In his verified complaint, 

he alleges that Valparaiso discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of 

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; violated his rights under 

the Fourteenth Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and conspired to violate those rights 

based on his race, see 42 U.S.C. § 1985. He also sued Valparaiso for violations of Indiana 

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

Valparaiso later moved for summary judgment on all claims and filed a 

Statement of Material Facts in compliance with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and local rules. See N.D. IND. L.R. 56-1(a)(3). Local rules required Smith to file 

a response to Valparaiso’s statement along with his own statement of any additional 

material facts, and to cite supporting evidence in the record. See id. 56-1(b)(2)–(3). Smith

filed a “Statement of Undisputed Genuine Issues of Material Fact,” but it did not 

respond to Valparaiso’s statement, identify facts he disputed, or properly cite the record 

for evidence supporting the arguments that he included. 

The district judge ruled that Smith had failed to dispute Valparaiso’s Statement 

of Material Facts properly, accepted the facts from Valparaiso as admitted (which we 

recounted above), and entered summary judgment for Valparaiso. The judge also

explained that Smith lacked a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VI

because he cited no evidence that he was meeting Valparaiso’s legitimate educational 

expectations or was treated worse than similar students of other races. The judge also

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ruled that Smith had abandoned his other claims by failing to address Valparaiso’s 

arguments. Smith moved to amend the judgment, but the judge denied his motion.

On appeal, Smith contests the summary judgment, a decision that we review 

de novo. Vesey, 999 F.3d at 461. According to Smith, the district judge failed to hold 

Valparaiso to its evidentiary burden of production and persuasion. He believes that 

Valparaiso was required, but failed, to rule out the prospect of a jury finding in his 

favor on each claim. 

Smith’s argument inverts the burdens at summary judgment. Contrary to 

Smith’s assertion, Valparaiso was not required to support its motion with evidence 

negating Smith’s claims because Smith, not Valparaiso, bore the burden of proof on 

each claim at trial. See Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 896 (7th Cir. 

2018) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986)). Once Valparaiso 

showed the district judge that no evidence supported Smith’s claims, Smith needed “to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of” the elements of his claims. 

See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. To do so, he had to “designate specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial” on those elements. See Johnson, 892 F.3d at 896 (citing 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). For his Title VI claim, these elements included meeting the 

course’s legitimate educational expectations and receiving worse treatment compared 

to similar students of different races. See Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 

921 (7th Cir. 2007). But Smith did not designate any facts supporting these elements, as 

the local rules required. That failure means that Valparaiso is entitled to summary 

judgment. 

We recognize that Smith submitted a verified complaint, and he correctly notes

that a verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of summary 

judgment. Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 

245, 246 (7th Cir. 1996)). But he did not cite any parts of his complaint in responding to 

Valparaiso’s statement that no evidence supported his Title VI claim. Because of that 

failure, the district judge reasonably deemed the facts in Valparaiso’s statement 

admitted and, based on those facts, properly entered summary judgment. See Friend v. 

Valley View Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 365U, 789 F.3d 707, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2015). 

As for Smith’s other claims, he argues that the district judge wrongly ruled that 

he had “abandoned” them. But even if we do not treat those claims as “abandoned,” 

summary judgment was correct because on de novo review we conclude that, as with 

his Title VI claim, Smith did not properly support them. His response to Valparaiso’s 

motion alluded to discrimination, harassment, and violations of state law. But again, he 

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did not identify in the record evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find for him 

on those claims, thereby permitting the district judge to rule against him.

Smith raises procedural challenges to the summary judgment, but they all lack 

merit. He first argues that the district judge took “judicial notice” of the factual 

allegations in his complaint under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and thus

he did not need to cite evidence at summary judgment. He points to the judge’s 

statement in its screening order assessing the legal sufficiency of his complaint, where it 

stated that it would “accept his allegations as true.” But the judge was merely 

explaining that courts assume the truth of allegations in a complaint for purposes of 

reviewing the allegations for legal sufficiency. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 669 

(2009). This is not the same thing as taking “judicial notice” of facts. See FED. R.

EVID. 201(b). In any event, this review did not relieve Smith of his duty to obey the local 

rules citing evidence in response to a motion for summary judgment. 

Smith next argues that summary judgment was improper because the district 

judge granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), see 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and 

accepted his verified complaint. But Smith provides no explanation for why his IFP

status was relevant to summary judgment. And again, he did not tell the district judge 

(nor does he tell us) which statements in his verified complaint created a genuine issue 

of material fact. He thus gives us no reason to disturb the district judge’s judgment.

Smith also argues that summary judgment was improper because several of 

Valparaiso’s employees that he mentioned in his complaint did not submit sworn 

declarations in support of the motion for summary judgment. But as we explained 

above, in moving for summary judgment a defendant need not submit any evidence, 

including sworn declarations, negating the claims on which the plaintiff bears the 

burden of proof. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24. 

Finally, Smith’s unpersuasively challenges the denial of his post-judgment 

motion, which we review for an abuse of discretion. Vesey, 999 F.3d at 463 (citing 

Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 953 (7th Cir. 2013)). A motion under 

Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must introduce new but previously 

unavailable evidence or demonstrate a manifest error of law or fact. Id. Smith argues 

that, because he attached a new statement of facts opposing summary judgment, the 

district judge unreasonably denied his motion. But Smith’s motion was simply an 

attempt to relitigate summary judgment with a new statement of facts. Because Smith 

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failed to explain why these facts were unavailable and did not offer any new evidence 

or show a manifest error of law, the judge reasonably denied the motion.

AFFIRMED

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