Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01801/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01801-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Perkins, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn w. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-12-01801-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Previously this Court remanded this case to the agency to further develop the 

record. Specifically, this Court stated: 

 At step five of the disability evaluation process, the burden shifted to 

the Commissioner to show that Plaintiff could engage in gainful 

employment in the national economy. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The 

Commissioner can make this showing in one of two ways. First, a 

vocational expert can be called to evaluate a factual scenario and testify 

about “what kinds of jobs the claimant still can perform and whether there 

is a sufficient number of those jobs available in the claimant’s region or in 

several other regions of the economy to support a finding of not disabled.” 

Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 

1988) (internal citation omitted). Second, the grids can be used to 

determine if a particular claimant is capable of performing certain kinds of 

work in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

The grids are an administrative tool the Secretary may rely on 

when considering claimants with substantially uniform levels 

of impairment. They may be used, however, only when the 

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grids accurately and completely describe the claimant’s 

abilities and limitations. When a claimant’s non-exertional 

limitations are “sufficiently severe” so as to significantly limit 

the range of work permitted by the claimant’s exertional 

limitations, the grids are inapplicable. In such instances, the 

Secretary must take the testimony of a vocational expert, and 

identify specific jobs within the claimant’s capabilities. 

Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). Non-exertional limitations that are not 

covered by the Grids are those that limit an individual’s ability to work 

“without directly affecting his or her strength. . . . Examples of nonexertional limitations are mental, sensory, postural, manipulative, or 

environmental (e.g. [,] inability to tolerate dust or fumes) limitations.” 

Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 579. However, “[i]t is not necessary to permit a 

claimant to circumvent the guidelines simply by alleging the existence of a 

non-exertional impairment, such as pain, validated by a doctor’s opinion 

that such impairment exists. To do so frustrates the purpose of the 

guidelines.” Id. at 577. 

 Here, Plaintiff argues that he suffers from non-exertional limitations 

related to his cognitive impairments. Plaintiff points to the opinion of Dr. 

Oizumi, a consultative licensed clinical psychologist, who stated that 

Plaintiff would likely have trouble adhering to a consistent schedule and 

has difficult adapting to changes in his environment. (TR 503). Plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ also improperly omitted consideration of Mr. Perkins’ 

fatigue, memory and concentration limitations, which are non-exertional 

limitations requiring that the ALJ consult a vocational expert. The 

Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s limitations are consistent with the 

basic mental demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work. While 

this may be true, Plaintiff did have non-exertional limitations that were not 

considered by the ALJ. As such, the ALJ was required to take the 

testimony of a vocational expert. 

Doc. 19 at 13-15. In this same Order, this Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision with respect 

to several other claims of error on appeal. See id. at 5-13. 

 Plaintiff now moves for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 

(“EAJA”). Plaintiff argues that this Court found that the ALJ made an error of law, 

therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to fees. Doc. 25 at 2. 

 In Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit Court of 

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Appeals stated as follows: 

 EAJA provides that ‘a court shall award to a prevailing party other 

than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in 

any civil action ... unless the court finds that the position of the United 

States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an 

award unjust.’ ” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d)(1)(A)). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was 

substantially justified.” Id. (citing Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 

1258 (9th Cir.2001)). “Substantial justification means ‘justified in 

substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a 

reasonable person.’ ” Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 

(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Put differently, the 

government’s position must have a ‘reasonable basis both in law and fact.’ 

” Id. (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565). “The ‘position of the United States’ 

includes both the government’s litigation position and the underlying 

agency action giving rise to the civil action.” Id. Thus, if “the government’s 

underlying position was not substantially justified, we [must award fees 

and] need not address whether the government’s litigation position was 

justified.” Id. at 872. 

Tobeler, 749 F.3d at 832. 

 Here, Plaintiff makes a similar argument to the plaintiff in Tobeler. Specifically, 

Plaintiff argues that the government’s underlying position (i.e. the ALJ’s decision) was 

not substantially justified. Doc. 22 at 6. Plaintiff then argues that the government’s 

position defending the ALJ’s decision before this Court also was not substantially 

justified because the ALJ’s decision was wrong. Id. 

Conversely, the government argues that reasonable minds could reach different 

conclusions regarding whether “claimant’s moderate [non-exertional] limitations” were 

of a sufficient level of severity as to make the Medical Vocational Guidelines 

inapplicable and require the ALJ to seek the assistance of a vocational expert. Doc. 24 at 

4, 6. The government concludes that because claimant’s symptoms were not particularly 

severe, the government’s position, both legally and factually, including the ALJ’s 

decision and the litigation position on appeal, were substantially justified. Plaintiff 

responds are argues that because this Court concluded that the ALJ made an error “of 

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Case 2:12-cv-01801-JAT Document 26 Filed 08/13/14 Page 4 of 4