Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03083/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03083-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY DUNSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CORDIS CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-03076-EMC 

AND RELATED CASES

Case No. 16-cv-03080-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-03082-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-03083-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-03085-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-03086-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-03087-EMC

Case No. 16-cv-03088-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-04012-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-04409-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-04608-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-04819-EMC 

Case No. 16-cv-05055-EMC

Case No. 16-cv-05199-EMC 

ORDER REMANDING CASES TO 

STATE COURT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs in each of these fourteen (14) related cases brought actions in state court seeking 

damages for injuries they allege were caused by defective inferior vena cava (IVC) filters1

produced by Defendant Cordis Corporation. Counsel for the plaintiffs in Quinn v. Cordis Corp., 

C-16-3080 EMC, filed a motion in state court seeking to consolidate all of the cases “for purposes 

of pretrial discovery and proceedings” and also seeking “formation of a bellwether trial process.” 

 

1 An IVC filter is a medical device implanted in the inferior vena cava and designed to prevent 

pulmonary embolism by catching blood clots and preventing them from travelling to the heart or 

lungs.

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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Consolidation of Cases 

(“Consolidation Mem.”), Docket No. 1 Ex. A at 1.2 On the basis of that motion and prior to any 

ruling on it, Cordis removed eight of the cases then pending to federal court, asserting that 

jurisdiction was proper under the “mass action” provision of the Class Action Fairness Act 

(“CAFA”) of 2005. See 28. U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). Cordis subsequently removed six

additional later-filed cases on the same ground. The Court concludes that it lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over these cases, and accordingly remands them to state court.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant Cordis Corporation is a medical device company. Plaintiffs are over 150 

individuals who claim that they or their decedents were injured by one of two Cordis IVC filters 

alleged to be defective. Plaintiffs filed fourteen separate actions – all with fewer than 100 

individuals – in California state court. 

On May 27, 2016, the plaintiffs in the Quinn action filed a Notice of Motion and Motion 

for Consolidation of Cases (“Consolidation Motion”), Docket No. 1 Ex. A, seeking to consolidate 

for pretrial purposes each of the cases related to the Cordis IVC filters under California Code of 

Civil Procedure § 1048(a), which provides that “[w]hen actions involving a common question of 

law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the 

matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such 

orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” In 

particular, the plaintiffs sought consolidation “for all pretrial purposes, including discovery and 

other proceedings, and the institution of a bellwether-trial process.” The motion noted that each of 

the actions “contain common issues such that the oral and written discovery sought from 

Defendants in each Related Action will be the same[ and] the majority of the expert discovery in 

each Related Action will also be the same” and argued that consolidation would “avoid 

unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures, avoid the risk of inconsistent adjudications, 

and avoid many of the same witnesses testifying on common issues in all actions, as well as 

 

2

Except where otherwise noted, all Docket citations refer to the docket in Dunson v. Cordis 

Corp., C-16-3076 EMC. 

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promote judicial economy and convenience.” Consolidation Motion at 7. 

In their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the motion, the Quinn

plaintiffs stated that “[t]o be clear, Moving Plaintiffs are not requesting a consolidation of Related 

Actions for purposes of a single trial to determine the outcome for all plaintiffs, but rather a single 

judge to oversee and coordinate common discovery and pretrial proceedings.” Consolidation 

Mem. at 7 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs then explained in greater detail what discovery would 

be common to all of the actions, and noted that “[w]ithout the efforts of a centralized court with 

authority to monitor and guide the discovery process for an already high number of Related 

Actions, the aggregate discovery efforts that would have to be undertaken by both Plaintiffs and 

Defendants in each individual action would be massive.” Id. at 8. Finally, plaintiffs noted that 

consolidation “may create the opportunity for settlement of cases,” as “[b]ellwether trials would 

likely prove to be an effective tool to resolution [sic] of the Cordis IVC filter cases.” Id.

On June 6, 2016, Cordis removed eight of the related cases to federal court; it removed the 

remaining cases in the following weeks. See Notice of Removal, Lesch v. Cordis, C-16-4608-

EMC Docket No. 1 at 5-6. The sole claimed basis for removal was the Consolidation Motion, 

which, Cordis claimed, “„proposes‟ a „joint trial‟” within the meaning of CAFA, thus triggering 

CAFA‟s mass action removal provision. Id. at 9-10.

Upon removal, the first nine cases were initially assigned to nine different judges in this 

district, and various motions were filed in the various actions, including a number of motions to 

remand. Despite Cordis‟s opposition, the cases were subsequently deemed related and assigned to 

Judge Illston, who stayed all of the pending motions and case management conferences in the nine 

cases and ordered that the parties submit supplemental briefing regarding the propriety of CAFA 

jurisdiction. Docket No. 33. After the cases were reassigned to the undersigned, the Court held a 

hearing on the jurisdictional issue on September 8, 2016.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework

CAFA provides for federal removal jurisdiction over “mass action[s]” in which the amount 

in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and the parties are minimally diverse, such that “any member 

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of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.”3 See 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(d)(2). The statute defines “mass action” as “any civil action (except [a Rule 23 class action]) 

in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the 

ground that the plaintiffs‟ claims involve common questions of law or fact.” 28. U.S.C. § 

1332(d)(11)(B)(i). The statute also specifically excludes certain actions, including, as relevant 

here, “any civil action in which . . . the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for 

pretrial proceedings.” 28. U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV).

The Ninth Circuit has explained that CAFA‟s mass action provision is “fairly narrow.” 

Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009). Notably, in accord with the “wellestablished rule that plaintiffs, as masters of their complaint, may choose their forum by selecting 

state over federal court and with the equally well-established presumption against federal removal 

jurisdiction,” plaintiffs may defeat CAFA jurisdiction by structuring their complaints to avoid it, 

such as by filing multiple complaints each with fewer than 100 plaintiffs. See id. 

At the same time, however, when plaintiffs request coordination of multiple cases, they 

need not “expressly request a „joint trial‟” for a court to determine that they have implicitly

proposed to try their cases jointly. Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1225 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (en banc). In determining whether a request for coordination in fact constitutes a 

request for a joint trial, the focus is on “the real substance of Plaintiffs‟ petitions.” Id. Thus 

“while plaintiffs are the masters of their complaints, they are also the masters of their petitions for 

coordination,” and in “assess[ing] whether there has been a proposal for joint trial,” courts should 

“hold plaintiffs responsible for what they have said and done.” Id.

In Corber, the plaintiffs filed a petition for consolidation under California Code of Civil 

Procedure 404.1, which provides for coordination of multiple actions “if one judge hearing all of 

the actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will promote the ends of justice.” Plaintiffs‟ 

petitions echoed this language, reiterating that they sought coordination before one judge “hearing 

 

3

The parties do not dispute that the amount in controversy and minimal diversity requirements are 

satisfied in the present cases. No party has argued that this Court has jurisdiction on any basis 

other than CAFA‟s mass action removal provision.

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all of the actions for all purposes.” Corber, 771 F.3d at 1221. They further maintained that 

coordination was appropriate in part because of the risk that without it, “there could be potential 

„duplicate and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments,‟ and that . . . „two or more separate 

courts . . . may render different rulings on liability and other issues.‟” Id. The court focused on 

“the plain language of Plaintiffs‟ petitions and memoranda” and concluded that a request for 

coordination “for all purposes” was just that, and necessarily contemplated a joint trial. Id. at 

1224. The court noted, however, that not “all petitions for coordination under section 404 are per 

se proposals to try cases jointly.” Id. To the contrary, “if Plaintiffs had qualified their 

coordination request by saying that it was intended to be solely for pre-trial purposes, then it 

would be difficult to suggest that Plaintiffs had proposed a joint trial.” Id. at 1224-25.

Accordingly, when the Ninth Circuit next considered CAFA‟s “mass action” removal 

provision, it held that plaintiffs had not requested a joint trial where they had “qualified their 

petition in just this manner.” Briggs v. Merck Sharp & Dohme, 796 F.3d 1038, 1050 (9th Cir. 

2015). In Briggs, a group of plaintiffs proposed join an already-ongoing “Judicial Council 

Coordinated Proceeding (JCCP).” The JCCP plaintiffs had previously suggested the use of 

bellwether trials to test some of the issues in the consolidated cases. In the petition to join the 

JCCP filed by some of the Briggs plaintiffs, they stated that they “do not seek joint trials of any 

cases or plaintiffs, but rather, all claims shall be tried individually.” Id. at 1050. They stated that 

coordination was appropriate to “avoid[] inconsistent rulings and promot[e] economy and 

efficiency for all parties, witnesses and counsel.” In concluding that plaintiffs had not requested a 

joint trial for the purposes of CAFA jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit stressed plaintiffs‟ explicit 

disavowal of that intent. The court also noted that whereas the Corber plaintiffs sought 

coordination in part to avoid “inconsistent judgments,” the Briggs plaintiffs only sought to avoid 

“inconsistent rulings,” a much “broader term than „judgments,‟ including various dispositions of 

pre-trial motions.” Id. As to the proposal to institute bellwether trials, the court held that “a 

bellwether trial is not, without more, a joint trial within the meaning of CAFA.” Id. at 1051. 

Accordingly, even if the request for bellwether trials could be imputed to the Briggs plaintiffs, 

“that would not transform [their] petition into a proposal for a joint trial.” Id.

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B. The Quinn Motion

Against this legal background, the Court turns to the facts of this case. First, and most 

significantly, the Quinn motion clearly and emphatically disclaims any effort to seek a joint trial, 

stating that that “[t]o be clear, Moving Plaintiffs are not requesting a consolidation of Related 

Actions for purposes of a single trial to determine the outcome for all plaintiffs, but rather a single 

judge to oversee and coordinate common discovery and pretrial proceedings.” Consolidation 

Mem. at 7. It is evident that the plaintiffs carefully attempted, by explicitly focusing their request 

on “pretrial proceedings,” to hew to language that Corber and Briggs approved as a way to clarify 

intent. This emphasis on “pretrial proceedings” was repeated throughout the motion. In the face 

of such a clear statement, it is, as Corber noted, “difficult to suggest” that the plaintiffs here have 

proposed a joint trial. 771 F.3d at 1224. 

Cordis‟s argument that Plaintiffs, notwithstanding their strenuous insistence to the 

contrary, in fact requested a joint trial is almost entirely predicated on Plaintiffs‟ request to 

institute a “bellwether trial process.” Indeed, according to Cordis, the mere fact that “the word 

„trial‟ [is] peppered throughout [the] consolidation motion” – albeit always in the context of the 

proposed bellwether trial process – belies the Plaintiffs‟ contention that their request is limited to 

pretrial matters since “„trial is by definition a step beyond „pretrial.‟” Cordis Opp. at 5. This 

argument is meritless.

As Briggs recognized, “[a] bellwether trial is a test case that is typically used to facilitate 

settlement in similar cases by demonstrating the likely value of a claim or by aiding in predicting 

the outcome of tricky questions of causation or liability.” 796 F.3d at 1051. In other words, the 

bellwether trial typically serves a purely informational purpose. As commentators have explained, 

in common practice, “[t]he results of [bellwether] trials are not binding on the other litigants in the 

group. The outcomes can be used by the parties to assist in settlement, but the parties can also 

ignore these results and insist on an individual trial.” Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 576, 580–81 (2008); see also In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 

F.3d 986, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We recognize that the results of the Hanford bellwether trial are 

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not binding on the remaining plaintiffs.”).4 Because bellwether trials are typically nonbinding and 

serve a purely informational role, Briggs explained that the very “nature of the proceeding 

[plaintiffs] sought to join” – i.e., a coordinated pretrial process featuring the use of bellwether 

trials – “confirm[ed]” the court‟s “conclusion that [they] did not seek a joint trial.” 796 F.3d at 

1051. 

The same is true here. The term bellwether trial refers to the traditional use of such trials 

as informational, not binding. Cordis is wrong to seize on Plaintiffs‟ statement that “[b]ellwether 

trials would likely prove to be an effective tool to resolution of the Cordis IVC filter cases” as 

evidence that Plaintiffs‟ really sought a joint trial. See Cordis Resp. at 7 (quoting Consolidation 

Mem. at 8) (emphasis added by Cordis). The immediately preceding sentence in the 

Consolidation Memorandum states that “consolidation of the Related Actions may create the 

opportunity for settlement of cases.” Consolidation Mem. at 8 (emphasis added). It is perfectly 

apparent, in other words, that Plaintiffs contemplated “resolution” of the additional cases through 

settlement on the basis of information provided by the bellwether case, not a joint trial.

As noted, Briggs explained that “a bellwether trial is not, without more, a joint trial within 

the meaning of CAFA.” Briggs, 796 F.3d at 1051 (emphasis added). Cordis maintains that here, 

unlike in Briggs, there is “much „more‟ than just a mention of a bellwether trial,” such that even 

under the reasoning in Briggs the plaintiffs in this case proposed a joint trial.5 Cordis Resp. at 12 

 

4

To be sure, “parties within the pool may agree to be bound by the outcome of the bellwether 

case, and courts will give effect to such agreements, though arguably on contract, not preclusion 

grounds.” Newberg on Class Actions § 11:20 (5th ed.). There is no indication whatsoever that 

any of the plaintiffs in this case have agreed to be bound by the results of any bellwether trial. 

Cordis does cite two cases from the Central District of California in which the court appeared to 

assume that a bellwether trial would have preclusive effect on other litigants, and that a proposal 

to pursue a bellwether trial was therefore a proposal for a joint trial under CAFA. See Cordis Opp. 

at 10 (citing Baker v. Fresenius USA, Inc., No. CV 14-9698-JGB AGRX, 2015 WL 846854, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2015); Allen v. Wilson, No. CV 14-9686-JGB AGRX, 2015 WL 846792, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2015)). The cited cases are easily distinguishable. First, the court in those 

cases relied in part on the fact that the plaintiffs there, unlike in the present case, had not included 

any explicit statements that they intended coordination only for pretrial purposes. Second, the 

decisions predate Briggs, which instructed that a request for a bellwether trial standing alone does 

not constitute a request for a joint trial.

5 Cordis also attempts to dismiss the Briggs statement as mere dicta. First, given that Briggs‟s 

discussion of bellwether trials directly supported its holding, it is not at all clear that those 

statements are dicta at all. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 647 

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n.4. But viewed in context, all of the statements Cordis relies upon are consistent with a request 

for coordination only for pretrial purposes. 

First, Cordis argues that Plaintiffs‟ concern with “avoid[ing] many of the same witnesses 

testifying on common issues in all actions” can only be a reference to joint trial testimony. Cordis 

Resp. at 7 (quoting Consolidation Mem. at 1). But that statement appears in a sentence describing 

the benefits of consolidation “for purposes of pretrial discovery and proceedings.” Consolidation 

Mem. at 1. Elsewhere in the Memorandum, Plaintiffs explain in more detail that their focus is on 

securing “the deposition of corporate employees” and reports from expert witnesses. Id. at 7-8. 

Next, Cordis points to the fact that Plaintiffs propose consolidation in part “to eliminate the risk of 

inconsistent adjudications” and argue that this indicates they must have contemplated a joint trial. 

Cordis Resp. at 7. But, as in Briggs, “adjudications,” like “rulings,” is a term broad enough to 

encompass “various dispositions of pre-trial motions.” Briggs, 796 F.3d at 1051. In contrast, the 

Corber petition was concerned with “the danger of inconsistent judgments and conflicting 

determinations of liability,” issues “that would be addressed only through some form of joint 

trial.” Corber, 771 F.3d at 1223-24 (emphasis added). Finally, Cordis notes that Plaintiffs at one 

point describe the “danger of inconsistent adjudications” as consisting of “different results because 

tried before different judge and jury.” Consolidation Mem. at 7. While this language does appear 

to describe a trial, the statement appears in a description of the benefits of consolidation in 

general, not the specific benefits sought in this case. Viewed in its context, therefore, the 

statement does not contravene the clear and explicit thrust of the Consolidation Motion, which is 

limited to pretrial proceedings and exemplary, not binding, bellwether trial(s).

By contrast, Briggs gave examples of cases in which a request for a bellwether trial was

part of a request for a joint trial. See Briggs, 796 F.3d at 1051. In Atwell v. Boston Scientific 

Corp., plaintiffs‟ counsel discussed bellwether case selection at a hearing in state court, but also 

 

(1995) (“If a reason that can be narrower is for that reason dicta, then anything other than the 

announcement of an outcome is dicta.”). In any case, it is not clear that this Court can or should 

ignore directly on point dicta from the Ninth Circuit. See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta 

Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 

2021, 2042 (2013) (noting that in practice, “the holding-dictum distinction seems largely 

irrelevant”).

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filed motions requesting the court to assign all three cases “to a single Judge for purposes of 

discovery and trial.” 740 F.3d 1160, 1163-66 (8th Cir. 2013). In In re Abbott Labs., the Seventh 

Circuit characterized plaintiffs request as including a request for a bellwether trial, but plaintiffs 

specifically moved for consolidation “through trial” and “not solely for pretrial proceedings.” 698 

F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2012). Finally, in Bullard v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., the 

Seventh Circuit explained that “a trial of 10 exemplary plaintiffs, followed by application of issue 

or claim preclusion to 134 more plaintiffs without another trial, is one in which the claims of 100 

or more persons are being tried jointly.” 535 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). In 

each of these cases, the request for coordination plainly encompassed both pretrial and trial 

proceedings. Thus, unlike the present case, there was sufficiently “more,” in addition to a 

bellwether trial request, to warrant jurisdiction under CAFA.

Lastly, at the hearing on this question, counsel for Cordis argued that Plaintiffs‟ petition 

constituted a request for a joint trial because it admittedly contemplated consolidation of some 

pretrial proceedings, such as a Frye hearing, that might involve receiving evidence in the form of 

live testimony and which could potentially bind all parties as to certain issues. Relying in part on 

a broad definition of the word “trial” to mean “a formal judicial examination of evidence and 

determination of claims in an adversary proceeding,” Black‟s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), 

Cordis argues that any evidentiary hearing with potentially preclusive effect constitutes a trial 

within the meaning of CAFA. The Court disagrees. CAFA specifically distinguishes between 

trial and pretrial proceedings, as it specifically exempts from the definition of “mass action” a 

“civil action in which . . . the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial 

proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV). Cordis‟s definition of “trial” would render this 

provision a virtual nullity, as it would sweep in quintessentially pretrial proceedings such as 

summary judgment hearings or evidentiary hearings on admissibility of expert testimony. Indeed, 

the Ninth Circuit has indicated that summary judgment does not constitute a “trial” for CAFA 

purposes, and Cordis concedes as much. See Corber, 771 F.3d at 1224 n.4. The Court cannot 

accept a definition of “trial” that not only flies in the face of common usage, but also reads a key 

exception out of CAFA‟s jurisdictional provision.

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The Court therefore concludes that it lacks jurisdiction under CAFA‟s mass action 

provision, and hereby REMANDS these cases to state court.

C. Attorneys‟ Fees

In their briefing, the Quinn plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to “an award of their 

actual expenses, including reasonable attorneys‟ fees, because of defendant‟s removal and refusal 

to agree to remand.” Quinn Docket No. 26. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears 

that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order 

remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney 

fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” A finding of bad faith on the part of the removing party 

is not required for a court to award fees under this provision. Moore v. Permanente Med. Grp., 

Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1992). “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award 

attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable 

basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be 

denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).

Whether the Court should award fees in this case, therefore, turns on whether Cordis had 

an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. While the Court rejects Cordis‟s arguments 

in favor of removal, even if “[t]here is no question that [Cordis]‟s arguments were losers, removal 

is not objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party's arguments lack merit.” 

Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). In Lussier, the Ninth 

Circuit explained that in determining whether removal was objectively unreasonable, a court 

should determine “whether the relevant case law clearly foreclosed the defendant‟s basis of 

removal” taking into account “clarity of the law at the time of removal.” Id. at 1066. 

The Court concludes that while Briggs forecloses Cordis‟s arguments, enough ambiguity 

remains, though barely so, to make Cordis‟s petition reasonable. Briggs made clear that “a 

bellwether trial is not, without more, a joint trial within the meaning of CAFA,” Briggs, 796 F.3d 

at 1051, but it does not clearly explain what “more” would suffice to convert a request for a 

bellwether trial into a request for a joint trial. While ultimately incorrect, Cordis‟s argument that 

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Briggs‟s requirement for “more” is satisfied by a pretrial evidentiary proceeding is not wholly 

unreasonable; nor is its citation to language in the Consolidation Motion that refers to the benefit 

of avoiding different results flowing from trials before different judges and juries. The Court

therefore will not award fees.

Accordingly, the Court remands these cases (listed below) to the Alameda County Superior 

Court for lack of federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs‟ request for attorneys‟ fees and costs is DENIED.

C-16-3076

C-16-3080

C-16-3082

C-16-3083

C-16-3085

C-16-3086

C-16-3087

C-16-3088

C-16-4012

C-16-4409

C-16-4608

C-16-4819

C-16-5055

C-16-5199

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 23, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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