Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00406/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00406-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 751
Nature of Suit: Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act
Cause of Action: 29:2601 FMLA: Family and Medical Leave Act (Findings and Purposes)

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FSLS:D 

JUL C 1 2019 

iCLERK, U.S DISTRICT COURT i -

:~UTH,ERN Dl~TRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

.___.,._ ______ .to:-:, DEPUTY . ··· 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN MARTIN GARON, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FAIR ISAAC CORPORATION, dba 

FICO, an unknown entity, and DOES 1 

through 25, Inclusive, 

Defendants. 

Case No.: 3:19-cv-0406-BEN-BLM 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO REMAND 

[Doc. 11] 

Plaintiff John Martin Garon moves this Court to remand this matter back to the 

19 California Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for fees and costs 

20 incurred due to removal. The motion is GRANTED as to remand and DENIED as to 

21 Plaintiffs request for fees and costs. 

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I. DISCUSSION 

On September 21, 2018, Plaintiff John Martin Garon filed his Complaint in 

24 California Superior Court for eight California state law claims arising out of his 

25 employment with Defendant Fair Isaac Corporation, dba FICO. Among those claims, 

26 Plaintiff brings suit for: (1) retaliation pursuant to California Government Code§ 12940(h); 

27 (2) retaliation based on use of medical leave pursuant to California Government Code § 

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1 12945.2(1 ); and (3) disability-based associational discrimination pursuant to California 

2 Government Code § 12926( o ). 

3 On February 28, 2019, Defendant removed this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

4 federal question jurisdiction, contending that Plaintiff's discovery responses served on 

5 January 29, 2019 provided Defendant with notice, for the first time, that Plaintiff was 

6 asserting claims arising under the laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

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Specifically, Defendant points to three interrogatories it served on Plaintiff: 

Special Interrogatory No. 4: Do you contend in the first alleged cause of 

action in your Complaint, for retaliation, that Defendant violated the Family 

and Medical Leave Act ('FMLA')? 

Special Interrogatory No. 6: Do you contend in the second alleged cause of 

action in your Complaint, for retaliation, that Defendant violated the FMLA? 

Special Interrogatory No. 7: Do you contend in the third alleged cause of 

action in your Complaint, for associational discrimination that Defendant 

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act? 

In response to each interrogatory, Plaintiff offered objections and answered "Yes." 

16 Plaintiff now moves to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for the fees and 

17 costs incurred as a result of Defendant's removal. 

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A. Removal 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), an action may be removed to the federal district court 

20 when "the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." "Generally 

21 speaking, a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded 

22 complaint raises issues of federal law." Marin General Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire 

23 Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2009). Courts strictly construe the removal statute 

24 against removal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, 

25 Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). Further, "[a] defendant seeking removal has the 

26 burden to establish that removal is proper," Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 

27 LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008), and "[a]ny doubt about the right of removal 

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1 requires resolution in favor of remand." Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 

2 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). 

3 Normally, a defendant must seek removal within thirty days of the initial pleading. 

4 Here, Defendant did not do so. Defendant contends removal is still timely, however, under 

5 § 1446(b )(3 ), which provides that, where the initial pleading does not indicate the case is 

6 removable, "a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the 

7 defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order 

8 or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has 

9 become removable." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (emphasis added). 

10 As the parties appear to agree, Plaintiffs' initial pleading filed in state court did not, 

11 on its face, allege any claims arising under federal law. 1 Indeed, each of the eight claims' 

12 titles and headings identify violations of a specific California law. Thus, the usual 30-day 

13 deadline from the time Plaintiff served Defendant with his Complaint does not apply. 

14 Rather, the Court's jurisdiction turns on whether Plaintiffs interrogatory answers 

15 constitute "other paper from which it [ could be] first ascertained that the case is one which 

16 is or has become removable." Id. at § 1446(b )(3 ). Thus, the Court must determine whether 

1 7 Plaintiffs case became removable at the moment he responded "yes" to three 

18 interrogatories, which asked if Plaintiff contended that Defendant's conduct violated two 

19 federal statutes, the ADA and FMLA. The Court finds it did not. 

20 "In the Ninth Circuit, discovery responses ... can [ constitute 'other paper' that] 

21 trigger[ s] the thirty day removal period in certain actions, mainly diversity cases and 

22 federally preempted claims." Williams v. Hilarides, 2012 WL 2339335, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

23 June 19, 2012) (citing cases). For example, "[w]here it is not clear on the face of a state 

24 complaint that diversity jurisdiction exists, subsequent discovery responses can 

25 affirmatively reveal the existence of such jurisdiction by ... disclosing that the amount in 

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1 Notably, this action does not implicate diversity jurisdiction because both parties 

are domiciled in California. 

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1 controversy is sufficient." Id.; see also, e.g., Carvalho v. Equifax Information Svcs., LLC, 

2 629 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2010) (deposition testimony can constitute "other papers" when 

3 defendant is able to reasonably determine for first time that the amount in controversy was 

4 sufficient for diversity jurisdiction). In much the same way, discovery responses may make 

5 clear to the defendant that a state claim is preempted by federal law, necessitating removal. 

6 Id.;seealso, e.g., RegentsofUniv. ofCaliforniav. Aisen, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1056(S.D. 

7 Cal. 2015) (denying motion to remand because plaintiffs alleged state law claims 

8 necessarily raised federal issues under the federal Copyright Act and the Act's work-for9 hire doctrine over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction). 

10 "In both diversity and preemption situations [triggered by "other paper,"] the 

11 defendant is aware of the claims asserted against it, and the information learned through 

12 'other papers' simply clarifies whether the claims already asserted can be heard in a federal 

13 forum." Williams, 2012 WL 2339335, at *2 (emphasis in original). In contrast, in the case 

14 here of an alleged federal question claim, "a discovery response does not unequivocally 

15 convey to a defendant that a claim, not pled in the operative complaint, is now asserted 

16 against it." Id. As already noted, the parties appear to agree that the original Complaint 

1 7 was not removable because it contained only state law claims. Although Plaintiffs 

18 discovery responses reflect his belief that Defendant's conduct also violated the FMLA 

19 and ADA, the claims Plaintiff asserted in his Complaint have not changed.2 See id. In 

20 other words, "[b ]ased on longstanding fundamental legal principles, such an assertion made 

21 only in discovery does not automatically translate into a claim for relief." Id. Similarly, 

22 Plaintiffs reference to taking a "Family Medical Leave" to show violation of California 

23 law does not convert his claims into federal ones. See Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 

24 F.3d 661,675 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[M]ere use of a federal statute as a predicate for a state law 

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2 As Plaintiff emphasizes, the interrogatory asks whether Plaintiff contends the 

federal statutes were violated, not whether he alleges such violations in her Complaint as 

causes of action. [Doc. 11-1 at p. 3.] 

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1 cause of action does not necessarily transform that cause of action into a federal claim."). 

2 Finally, the fact that Plaintiff could bring ADA and FMLA claims does not mean he must 

3 bring those claims. Strategic reasons exist for a plaintiff to choose not to bring a particular 

4 claim, including a plaintiffs desire to avoid removal. 

5 As discussed above, jurisprudence from within the Ninth Circuit makes clear that 

6 interrogatory responses can be "other paper" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). See Williams, 

7 supra. It is also clear that interrogatory responses can provide a reasonable basis for 

8 removal where the responses clarify ( 1) that the amount in controversy is satisfied for 

9 diversity purposes or (2) that a claim is federally preempted, thereby invoking federal 

10 question jurisdiction. What is not clear, however, is whether interrogatory responses can 

11 be used to show that a Complaint's state law claims are, in fact, federal law claims in 

12 sheep's clothing to establish "beyond a doubt" that federal question jurisdiction exists. 

13 Nonetheless, that is Defendant's theory. Defendant does not argue that Plaintiffs "other 

14 paper" reveals the existence of either diversity jurisdiction or a federally preempted claim. 

15 Rather, Defendant theorizes that the "other paper" reveals that Plaintiffs Complaint, which 

16 asserts state law claims on its face, surreptitiously alleges claims arising under two federal 

1 7 statutes, the FMLA and ADA. 

18 Consistent with the face of Plaintiffs Complaint, which identifies the California 

19 statute under which each of Plaintiffs claims is brought, Plaintiff contends that he brings 

20 only state law claims, not FMLA or ADA claims. Despite Defendant's unusual attempt to 

21 show federal jurisdiction in this manner, Defendant does not offer any on-point authority. 

22 Instead, Defendant's few cited authorities are distinguishable and do not support removal. 

23 For example, there is no independent diversity jurisdiction basis for Plaintiffs state law 

24 claims. Cf Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2006) 

25 (reversing district court's remand of case after plaintiffs dismissal of sole federal claim by 

26 finding that district court still had authority over state law claims under alternative diversity 

27 jurisdiction ground). Defendant does not remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, which "provides 

28 an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule" and permits removal of non-federal suits 

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1 against federal officers by finding the federal question element to be "met if the defense 

2 depends on federal law." Maguire v. A.C. & S., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 323, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 

3 2014). Cf Maguire 73 F. Supp. 3d at 327 (denying motion to remand where plaintiffs 

4 discovery answers first revealed the availability of the federal government-contractor 

5 defense); Barnes v. Foster Wheeler Corp, 2013 WL 2649793 (D.N.J. June 11, 2013) 

6 (same). Finally, Defendant does not assert that Plaintiffs claims are cognizable under the 

7 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which confers original jurisdiction to 

8 federal courts over actions to compel arbitration of labor disputes. Cf Camden Industries 

9 Co. v. Carpenters Local Union, 246 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.H. 1965) (denying motion to 

10 remand where plaintiffs interrogatory answers indicated plaintiff was in an industry 

11 affecting commerce, thereby implicating 29 U.S.C. § 185). 

12 Likewise, the Court has not located any authority supporting removal under the facts 

13 of this case. Indeed, to apply Defendant's approach "would be to invite defendants to 

14 remove at any whiff of a claim, and deprive plaintiffs of their role as masters of their 

15 complaint." Williams v. Hilarides, 2012 WL 2339335, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2012). As 

16 the Central District of California explained when faced with a similar removal theory: 

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The rule Plaintiff would have this Court adopt is contrary to the type ofbrightline rule announced by the Supreme Court in Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti 

Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999). In federal question cases, the lack 

of a clear rule as to when the time period for removal begins is necessary to 

avoid gamesmanship and inconsistencies in removed actions. For example, if 

a defendant removes based on discovery answers, a plaintiff can convincingly 

argue that removal was improper because a federal claim was not alleged in 

the operative pleading. Such an unclear rule will also force a defendant to 

guess as to whether a discovery response could lead to a federal claim. In dual 

jurisdiction cases, defendants are entitled to rely on the allegations in the 

operative complaint, and the Court's finding [denying remand] is consistent 

with this principle. 

26 Williams, 2012 WL 2339335, at *2. 

27 The Court's review of authorities outside of this Circuit reflect a similar conclusion. 

28 See, e.g., Zawatsky v. Jeddo Stars Athletic Ass 'n, 2017 WL 4778541 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 

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1 2017). "Only in rare circumstances have courts used the 'other paper' doctrine to find 

2 federal question jurisdiction." Id. at *4. Such "rare circumstances include when an 

3 ambiguous existing claim is clarified by later papers or when the 'other paper' clarifies that 

4 a plaintiffs state law claim is one that would be preempted by federal law." Id. (internal 

5 citations and quotation marks omitted). As already discussed, there is no federal 

6 preemption issue. As to those "rare circumstances" under which the "other paper" clarified 

7 that an ambiguous existing claim arose under federal law, Efford v. Milam, 368 F. Supp. 

8 2d 380 (E.D. Pa. 2005), offers one example. In Efford, the praecipe stated only that 

9 defendants were being sued and did not provide any factual or legal basis for the lawsuit 

10 or any basis that would support federal question jurisdiction. The defendant then removed 

11 within 30 days of receiving a letter from plaintiff, which stated plaintiffs counsel's belief 

12 that the facts supported a "civil RICO claim," including describing the facts relevant to 

13 each of the RICO elements. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania held removal was 

14 appropriate because the letter was "other paper" that first made it "unequivocally clear and 

15 certain to defendants" that a claim arose under federal law, where it was not clear before. 

16 Id. at 386. 

17 The instant case, however, does not present such "rare circumstances."3 In contrast 

18 to Efford where the defendant had no knowledge of the basis for the plaintiffs lawsuit or 

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3 Although not raised by the parties, the Court also notes that this matter does not fit 

within that "special and small category" of exceptional cases in which the resolution of a 

complaint necessarily requires application of federal law, thereby providing federal 

jurisdiction over a state law claim. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) 24 ("[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily 

raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and ( 4) capable of resolution in federal court 

without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress."). Plaintiffs state law 

26 claims do not "necessarily raise[]" a federal issue, and a federal issue is not "actually 

disputed." Cf JustMed v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the 

complaint's state law claims against an ex-employee necessarily raised a federal issue 

sufficient to provide federal question jurisdiction because the ex-employee's rights in the 

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1 what type of claims the plaintiff alleged, Plaintiffs Complaint pleads specific causes of 

2 action under specific California laws and pleads facts in support. Also unlike Efford, 

3 Plaintiffs discovery responses do not make "unequivocally clear" that Plaintiffs state law 

4 claims are, in fact, federal claims under the FMLA or ADA. Rather, Plaintiff maintains 

5 that he brings only state law claims, a position that is consistent with the face of his 

6 Complaint, which identifies the California statutes under which each of his claims is 

7 brought. 

8 To remove this case based on a federal question, Defendant must show that 

9 Plaintiffs state law claims "arise under" federal law. Defendant does not argue, per se, 

10 that Plaintiffs state law claims "arise under" the FMLA or ADA; instead, it argues without 

11 support that Plaintiff has actually alleged federal FMLA and ADA claims, not state law 

12 claims, by pointing to Plaintiffs interrogatory responses. Those discovery responses, 

13 · however, fall short of supplying the necessary "reasonable basis for removal" because they 

14 do not "unequivocally convey" that Plaintiffs Complaint actually asserts federal claims. 

15 Accordingly, Defendant has not established any reasonable basis for removal, let alone 

16 satisfied its burden of establishing a basis for removal without "any doubt." Moore17 Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). 

18 B. Costs 

19 Plaintiff also moves for attorneys' fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("An order 

20 remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including 

21 attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal."). Fees may be awarded only "where the 

22 removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal." Martin v. 

23 Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). When this requirement is met, whether 

24 to award fees is within the discretion of the court. See id. at 139. Here, whether Defendant 

25 had an objectively reasonable basis for removal of the case is a close question. 

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the federal Copyright Act's work-for-hire doctrine). 

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1 Nonetheless, the Court finds Defendant seemingly acted in good faith. Therefore, in its 

2 discretion, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs requests for fees and costs incurred as a result of 

3 the removal. 

4 II. CONCLUSION 

5 Plaintiffs motion to remand is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

6 For the previous reasons, the action is REMANDED to the California Superior Court, 

7 County of San Diego for all further proceedings. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

10 DATED: June»019 

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est for fees is DENIED. 

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