Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-mc-80156/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-mc-80156-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE EX PARTE APPLICATION OF DR. 

YUICHIRO YASUDA AND YU MENTAL 

CLINIC,

Applicants.

Case No. 19-mc-80156-TSH 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION AND DENYING 

MOTION TO QUASH

Re: Dkt. Nos. 10, 26

I. INTRODUCTION

Applicants Dr. Yuichiro Yasuda and Yu Mental Clinic (“Applicants”) move for 

reconsideration of the Court’s order quashing their subpoena issued to Twitter, Inc. under 28 

U.S.C. § 1782. ECF No. 26. Twitter filed an Opposition (ECF No. 31) and Applicants filed a 

Reply (ECF No. 32). The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument 

and VACATES the February 20, 2020 hearing. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the 

parties’ positions and relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS Applicants’ motion and 

DENIES Twitter’s motion to quash for the following reasons.

II. BACKGROUND

Yasuda is a psychologist and the owner of Yu Mental Clinic in Maebaru Chuo, ItoshimaShi, Japan. Kanda Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 2. On January 26, 2019, an unknown individual operating 

under the Twitter name @gefalleneren posted a private photograph of Yasuda and a woman and 

tweeted derogatory statements and hashtags about him and Yu Mental Clinic. Id. ¶ 5. The twitter 

post states (in Japanese) under the picture of Yasuda: 

Yuuki Yu (Yuicchiro Yasuda) was sued by a woman who was a 

former associate. It does not been clearly said that Yuuki Yu is 

sexually exploiting and the sexual toys of the charismatic psychiatrist 

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are mass produced. #Defamation #managed prostitution #sex crime 

#extortion #engagement scam #incapacitated rape. 

Id. & Ex. A; Mu Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. A-1, ECF No. 3. 

On April 10, 2019, the Twitter user tweeted again: 

The issue in which article links of Yuuki Yu’s women issues and 

sexual relationships are being regulated. #Yuuku Yu #Yuichiro 

Yasuda #Yu Mental Clinic #Defamation #managed prostitution #sex 

crime #Engagement scam #incapacitated rape #sexual scandals 

#Exchange of Prosecutors and judges #defamation #managed 

prostitution #sex crime #intimidation #extortion #engagement scam 

#incapacitated rape.

Kanda Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. B; Mu Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. B-1.

Applicants retained Ogasawara, Konno & Rokugawa Law Firm to initiate a civil lawsuit in 

Japan against the anonymous defendant for defamation and unlawful business interference under 

Japanese law. Kanda Decl. ¶ 1. Applicants also applied in this District for an order permitting 

discovery from Twitter into the identity of the @gefalleneren account user pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1782. ECF No. 1. Applicants submitted supplemental declarations from their Japanese counsel 

and translator. ECF Nos. 2-3. In his declaration, Japanese counsel states that he believes the 

Twitter posts defamed Applicants and unlawfully interfered with their business under Japanese 

law. Kanda Decl. ¶ 7. The Court granted Applicants’ request on June 17, 2019. ECF No. 5. 

Twitter received the subpoena on August 15, 2019. Bleicher Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ECF No. 

10. The subpoena requested the following categories of information associated with the 

@gefalleneren account:

1. All Documents showing the gefalleneren account’s login histories, 

including dates, times, IP addresses, and access type, for each login;

2. All Documents showing the gefalleneren account’s latest access 

log, including dates, times, IP addresses, and access type;

3. All Documents showing the gefalleneren account’s access log 

when that account posted each review, comment, photograph, video, 

and/or rating on the Twitter page, including dates, times, IP addresses, 

and access type; and

4. All Documents identifying the gefalleneren account’s users from 

the date that the account was created to present, including all names, 

addresses, email addresses (including email addresses corresponding 

with a Twitter account), telephone numbers, names of the computers 

used by gefalleneren account’s user(s), and information regarding any 

credit cards registered to the gefalleneren account (except for the 

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number of the credit card).

Id., Ex. 1. 

On November 18, 2019, Twitter moved to quash or modify the subpoena to require 

production only if Applicants’ satisfied the First Amendment’s requirements for unmasking the 

identity of an anonymous speaker. ECF No. 10. On December 20, 2019, the Court granted 

Twitter’s motion. ECF No. 17; In re Yasuda, 2019 WL 7020211 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2019). The 

Court found Applicants could not survive a motion to dismiss because they failed to show the 

tweets were defamatory and, even if they could, they had not shown a real evidentiary basis for 

believing that the anonymous speaker has engaged in wrongful conduct that caused them real 

harm. In re Yasuda, 2019 WL 7020211, at *4-5. The Court also found the potential chilling 

effect of disclosure outweighed Applicants’ interests in asserting claims against the anonymous 

speaker. Id. at *5-6. 

Applicants now move for reconsideration based on evidence they did not present in their 

opposition to the motion to quash. Specifically, on November 12, 2019, the Tokyo District Court 

issued a decision in which it determined the tweets by @gefalleneren were defamatory. Mot. at 4; 

Kanda Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 27. Applicants state they did not present this information to the Court 

previously because their Japanese counsel did not realize it would be pertinent until after he read 

this Court’s December 20 ruling. Mot. at 5; Kanda Decl. ¶¶ 7-8. They also state Kanda was not in 

possession of the Tokyo Court’s ruling until two days prior to Applicants filing their opposition to 

the motion to quash. Mot. at 5. Applicants move for reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9 

and for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

III. RECONSIDERATION

A. Civil Local Rule 7-9

Under Civil Local Rule 7-9(a), a motion for reconsideration may be granted before entry of 

judgment adjudicating all of the claims and rights and liabilities of all the parties in a case.1 Civ. 

1 Orders made pursuant to § 1782 are normally considered final and appealable. In re Premises 

Located at 840 140th Ave. NE, Bellevue, Wash., 634 F.3d 557, 566 (9th Cir. 2011). However, 

under Northern District of California General Order No. 44, miscellaneous matters are randomly 

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L.R. 7-9(a). A motion for reconsideration may be made on three grounds: (1) a material 

difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the court, which, in the exercise 

of reasonable diligence, the moving party did not know at the time of the order for which 

reconsideration is sought; (2) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law; or (3) a 

manifest failure by the court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments. Civ. L.R. 7-

9(b). Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and “should not be granted, absent highly 

unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, 

committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” McDowell v. 

Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1254 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). Furthermore, “[a] motion for reconsideration ‘may not be used to raise arguments or 

present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the 

litigation.’” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Further, the moving party may not reargue any written or oral argument previously asserted to the 

court. Civ. L.R. 7-9(c). 

B. Rule 60(b)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that 

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal 

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 

following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence ...;

(3) fraud ..., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged ...; or

(6) any other reason justifying relief.

Rule 60(b) is “remedial in nature and . . . must be liberally applied.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. 

Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001).

assigned to a magistrate judge and any objection to a magistrate judge’s order is to be resolved by 

a district judge. General Order No. 44 ¶ E.3. As no appeal has been brought before a district 

judge, the Court finds Applicants’ motion under Civil Local Rule 7-9 is appropriate here. 

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C. Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds Applicants have failed to show reconsideration is 

appropriate under Local Rule 7-9. Applicants rely on the Tokyo District Court’s order, but they 

admit their Japanese counsel had possession of that order at least two days before they filed their 

opposition to Twitter’s motion to quash. There has been no material difference in fact or law since 

this Court issued its December 20 ruling and the Court did not fail to consider the Tokyo District 

Court’s order as Applicants did not present it. Accordingly, there are no grounds for 

reconsideration under Local Rule 7-9. 

Instead, Applicants focus on the excusable neglect prong of Rule 60(b), arguing their 

Japanese counsel did not realize the Tokyo District Court’s decision was relevant until after 

reading this Court’s December 20 ruling. Mot. at 5. In evaluating whether neglect is excusable, a 

district court must consider “(1) the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party, (2) the length of 

delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including 

whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the moving party’s 

conduct was in good faith.” Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Pioneer 

Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). In addition, when the 

circumstances of the case so warrant, courts should consider, and give proper weight to, any 

prejudice to the movant if she were denied relief. Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1195, 

1198 (9th Cir. 2009).

Here, given the remedial nature of Rule 60(b) and the liberal standard under which it is 

applied, the Court finds Applicants have shown circumstances warrant relief. First, although

Applicants’ Japanese counsel had the Tokyo District Court’s decision before local counsel filed 

their opposition to Twitter’s motion, the Supreme Court in Pioneer applied a broad standard that 

permits a finding of excusable neglect even where the filer was in control of the situation. 507 

U.S. at 391 (“‘[E]xcusable neglect’ . . . is not limited to situations where the failure to timely file 

is due to circumstances beyond the control of the filer.”); Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 765 

(9th Cir. 2009) (“We thus reject the Warden’s contention that Mendez’s neglect cannot be excused 

because it was caused by circumstances within Mendez’s control.”). Further, briefing is complete 

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and Twitter does not argue that it faces any prejudice as a result of counsel’s neglect. The Court 

also notes that Applicants sought reconsideration 14 days after the Court granted Twitter’s motion 

to quash and no judicial proceedings have taken place in the meantime. Finally, Applicants have 

shown they would be prejudiced as without the name of the anonymous account holder, they are 

unable to proceed with their defamation lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court finds reconsideration 

appropriate.

IV. MOTION TO QUASH

A. Legal Standard

Section 1782 provides, in pertinent part:

The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found 

may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a 

document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or 

international tribunal . . . . The order may be made . . . upon the 

application of any interested person[.]

28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). A litigant in a foreign action qualifies as an “interested person” under § 

1782. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256 (2004). Section 1782

permits district courts to authorize discovery where three general requirements are satisfied: “(1) 

the person from whom the discovery is sought ‘resides or is found’ in the district of the district 

court where the application is made; (2) the discovery is ‘for use in a proceeding in a foreign or 

international tribunal’; and (3) the application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or ‘any 

interested person.’” Khrapunov v. Prosyankin, 931 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations 

omitted).

A district court has wide discretion to grant discovery under § 1782. Intel, 542 U.S. at 

260-61. In exercising its discretion, a district court should consider the following factors: (1) 

whether the “person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding,” (2) 

“the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the 

receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal court judicial 

assistance,” (3) whether the request “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering 

restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States,” and (4) whether the request 

is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.” Id. at 264-65.

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A district court’s discretion is to be exercised in view of the twin aims of § 1782: 

“providing efficient assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging foreign 

countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts.” Id. at 252. There is no 

requirement that the party seeking discovery establish that the information sought would be 

discoverable under the governing law in the foreign proceeding or that United States law would 

allow discovery in an analogous domestic proceeding. Id. at 247, 261-63. “Section 1782 is a 

provision for assistance to tribunals abroad. It does not direct United States courts to engage in 

comparative analysis to determine whether analogous proceedings exist here.” Id. at 263.

B. Discussion

1. Statutory Requirements

As the Court found in its previous order, Applicants’ request satisfies the minimum 

requirements of § 1782. First, Twitter’s principal place of business is in San Francisco, California, 

within this District. Second, to apply for discovery pursuant to § 1782, a formal proceeding in the 

foreign jurisdiction need not be currently pending, or even imminent. Intel, 542 U.S. at 258-59. 

Instead, all that is necessary is that a “dispositive ruling” by the foreign adjudicative body is 

“within reasonable contemplation.” Id. at 259 (holding that discovery was proper under § 1782 

even though the applicant’s complaint was still only in the investigative stage). Applicants have

shown a “reasonable contemplation” of litigation. Third, § 1782 plainly states that discovery 

orders may issue upon the request of either a foreign tribunal or an interested party. 28 U.S.C. § 

1782(a). Applicants—as the prospective litigants—have a “reasonable interest” in obtaining 

judicial assistance and, therefore, may apply for judicial assistance pursuant to § 1782. See Akebia 

Therapeutics, Inc. v. Fibrogren, Inc., 793 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015). Lastly, Applicants’ 

request is an acceptable method of discovery under § 1782. See In re Letters Rogatory from 

Tokyo Dist., Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976).

C. Discretionary Intel Factors

The first three discretionary Intel factors also support granting the application. As to the 

first factor, Twitter is not a participant in Applicants’ contemplated proceeding. Intel, 542 U.S. at 

264 (“[N]onparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign tribunal’s 

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jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, unavailable in the United States, may be unobtainable 

absent § 1782(a) aid.”). Second, there is no indication that a Japanese court would reject 

information obtained through § 1782 discovery. In this situation, courts “err on the side of 

permitting discovery.” See In re Varian Med. Sys. Int’l AG, 2016 WL 1161568, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 24, 2016) (collecting cases). Third, there is no evidence that the request conceals an attempt 

to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of Japan. 

Twitter’s motion focuses the fourth Intel factor, whether the request is unduly intrusive or 

burdensome. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “the ability to speak anonymously on the 

Internet promotes the robust exchange of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely 

without ‘fear of economic or official retaliation . . . [or] concern about social ostracism.’” In re 

Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing McIntyre v. Ohio 

Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995)). This protection applies in the context of § 1782 

applications when foreign civil litigants such as Applicants seek discovery in the United States 

with the assistance of the U.S. judicial system. In re Yasuda, 2019 WL 4933581, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 7, 2019). If the foreign litigant asserts that an anonymous speaker’s speech is actionable, the 

First Amendment protects the speaker from being unmasked unless the applicant:

(1) identifies the party with sufficient specificity that the court can 

determine that the party is a real person subject to suit; (2) identifies 

all previous steps taken to locate and identify the party; (3) 

demonstrates that the action can withstand a motion to dismiss; and 

(4) proves that the discovery is likely to lead to identifying 

information.

In re Ex Parte Appl. of Jommi, 2013 WL 6058201, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2013) (citing 

Columbia Ins. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999)). 

In its previous order, the Court found Applicants satisfied three of the Jommi requirements. 

First, Applicants demonstrated that the anonymous defendant is a real party subject to suit in 

Japan as it identified the URL address of the anonymous defendant’s Twitter account, the IP 

address and specific dates of the tweets. See id. (petitioner’s knowledge of the author’s “specific 

post on a specific blog” and the URL of the post was sufficiently specific to identify the defendant 

as a real party); In re Frontier Co., Ltd., 2019 WL 3345348, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2019) 

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(Frontier “demonstrated that the party is a real party subject to suit” because it “identified the 

unknown defendant through the URL of their Cloudflare account, their IP address, and the specific 

date of the post.”). 

Second, Applicants took steps to identify the author and their search revealed the server of 

the anonymous defendant is with Twitter. Kanda Decl. ¶¶ 8-10, ECF No. 12. 

Third, discovery is likely to lead to identifying information. According to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), parties “may obtain discovery that is relevant to any parties claim or 

defense.” The subpoena issued to Twitter seeks IP addresses, account information and identifying 

information of the anonymous defendant’s Twitter account to unmask their identity, which is 

relevant to Applicants’ anticipated defamation claim. Jommi, 2013 WL 6058201, at *4; Frontier, 

2019 WL 3345348, at *5; In re Letter Rogatory-Request for Int’l Judicial Assistance From the 

Harju Country Court in Estonia Petition of Lyoness Eesi OÜ, 2017 WL 1436096, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 24, 2017) (holding petitioner’s § 1782 request for specific user information to name 

defendants is necessary for resolving defamation claim in foreign court). Moreover, internet 

service providers and operators of communication systems are “generally familiar with this type of 

discovery request.” In re Roebers, 2012 WL 2862122, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012) (finding § 

1782 application to subpoena Apple, Inc. and Yahoo! Inc. for identifying documents was not 

overly burdensome). 

However, the Court found Applicants failed to demonstrate the anonymous defendant 

committed an act that can withstand a motion to dismiss. Yasuda, 2019 WL 7020211, at *4. The 

Court noted that, although Kanda stated generally that Applicants have viable claims under 

Japanese law, he merely recited the tweets and stated they constitute defamation, without any 

support. Id. On reconsideration, Applicants now provide the Tokyo District Court’s order, in 

which the court found @gefalleneren’s tweets constitute defamation. Mu Decl., Ex. A-1, ECF No. 

28. As such, Applicants have now shown their action can withstand a motion to dismiss.

Even so, the Court must still consider the potential chilling effect of ordering disclosure of 

the anonymous defendant’s identity. Art of Living Found. v. Does 1-10, 2011 WL 5444622, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011) (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342). “[I]in conducting the First 

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Amendment balancing that must be performed before permitting discovery that has implications 

for protected speech, it is not enough to consider the adequacy of the allegations; rather, courts are 

required to go beyond the pleadings to determine if there is an evidentiary basis for concluding 

that the requested discovery is appropriate.” In re PGS Home Co. Ltd., 2019 WL 6311407, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019) (citing Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969, 975 

(N.D. Cal. 2005) (“It is not enough for a plaintiff simply to plead and pray. Allegation and 

speculation are insufficient. The standards that inform Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6) offer too little 

protection to the defendant’s competing interests.”).

In addressing the First Amendment implications of Applicants’ request, the Court looks to 

cases that have addressed similar requests in the context of civil discovery. In that context, courts 

in this District have ruled that in order to unmask an anonymous speaker, a litigant must 

“persuade[] the court that there is a real evidentiary basis for believing that the defendant has 

engaged in wrongful conduct that has caused real harm to the interests of the plaintiff.” Music 

Grp. Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. Does, 82 F. Supp. 3d 979, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing 

Highfields, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 975-76). If a plaintiff makes this showing, the court must then 

“assess and compare the magnitude of harms that would be caused” to the plaintiff’s and 

defendant’s competing interests if the court ordered disclosure of the speaker’s identity. Id.

Here, the primary evidence in the record is the tweets themselves, which fall in the 

category of commercial speech. PGS, 2019 WL 6311407, at *5. As such, the Court applies the 

Highfields test in considering the possible chilling effect that would result from granting 

Applicants’ request. Id.; Music Grp., 82 F. Supp. 3d at 983 (“The Ninth Circuit has indicated that 

the Highfields test is one of middling rigor, appropriate where, as here, the challenged speech falls 

somewhere beneath the most protected realm of ‘political, religious, or literary’ discourse; is, in 

significant part, ‘commercial speech’ that enjoy ‘lesser’ protection; but may be more safeguarded 

than pure ‘fighting words and obscenity,’ which is ‘not protected by the First Amendment at all.’”) 

(quoting Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1173, 1175-76; Art of Living, 2011 WL 

5444622, at *5). Given that the Tokyo District Court has already found that the tweets constitute 

defamation, the Court concludes that Applicants have shown that the anonymous defendant 

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engaged in wrongful conduct and a “real evidentiary basis” that the tweets caused real harm. 

Although speech on the Internet receives First Amendment protection, “freedom of speech has its 

limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation . . . .” Ashcroft v. 

Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002); In re Application of Ontario Principals’

Council, 2013 WL 6844545, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2013) (“Given the content of the online 

postings and the contemplated defamation claims to be alleged thereon, general First Amendment 

principles concerning freedom of speech would not preclude the requested discovery.”). Further, 

Applicants’ request is narrowly tailored as it seeks identifying information and not the content of 

any communication. See Yasuda, 2019 WL 4933581, at *4 (finding subpoena to Twitter under § 

1782 for potential defamation case in Japan satisfied First Amendment safeguards where applicant 

sought the IP addresses, account information and identifying information of the anonymous 

defendant’s Twitter account to unmask their identity); Frontier, 2019 WL 3345348, at *5

(granting a § 1782 request to issue a subpoena for the name, address, email address, telephone 

number and account holder settlement information, including credit card payments and credit card 

company). Accordingly, the Court finds the subpoena satisfies First Amendment safeguards.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Applicants’ motion for reconsideration

and DENIES Twitter’s motion to quash.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 14, 2020

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

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