Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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1 Hynix was formerly known as Hyundai Electronics Industries, Ltd. References to

Hynix in this order refers also to Hyundai Electronics Industries, Ltd.

ORDER GRANTING RAMBUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY AND

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47(b) PRIVILEGE

C-00-20905 RMW

SPT

 

E-Filed on: 7/7/06

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR U.K. LTD., and

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

DEUTSCHLAND GmbH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RAMBUS INC.,

Defendant.

No. CV-00-20905 RMW

ORDER GRANTING RAMBUS'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF

NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY AND

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47(b)

PRIVILEGE

[Re Docket Nos. 1728, 1801, 1855]

Defendant Rambus Inc. ("Rambus") moves for summary adjudication that its actions of filing

lawsuits to enforce its patents and prosecuting its infringement claims cannot support imposition of

liability under the antitrust laws or California Business & Professions Code section 17200. 

Plaintiffs Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Hynix Semiconductor America Inc., Hynix Semiconductor

U.K. Ltd., and Hynix Semiconductor Deutschland GmbH ("Hynix")1

 oppose the motion. The court

has reviewed the papers and considered the arguments of counsel and hereby summarily adjudicates

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 2191 Filed 07/07/06 Page 1 of 6
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28 ORDER GRANTING RAMBUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY AND

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47(b) PRIVILEGE

C-00-20905 RMW

SPT

2

that Rambus's instigation and prosecution of its infringement claims are protected petitioning

activity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and, as to state claims, are absolutely privileged under

California Civil Code section 47(b). This order does not resolve evidentiary issues that concern

whether the filing of the lawsuits and communications associated therewith are admissible as

evidence supporting an overall scheme to monopolize.

I. ANALYSIS

A. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

Hynix concedes that Rambus's assertion of patent infringement claims does not, by itself,

constitute unlawful conduct. Nevertheless, Hynix opposes the motion and argues that the NoerrPennington doctrine is not applicable. It appears to the court that the parties do not really disagree

on the law applicable to the narrow motion made by Rambus. 

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is rooted in the First Amendment. E. R.R. Presidents

Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961). The doctrine provides that

"those who petition government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability." Prof'l

Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993). The Court

explained the underlying principle: "the Sherman Act does not prohibit persons from associating

together in an attempt . . . to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a

restraint or a monopoly." Id. An exception to the doctrine's application is justified "when

petitioning activity, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to

cover an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor." Id. (citations

omitted). However, "[a]n objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham regardless of

subjective intent." Id. 

Hynix seeks to distinguish the instant case and avoid application of the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine. Hynix argues that the line of cases applying the doctrine focus on situations where single

or multiple lawsuits constituted the entirety of the antitrust claim rather than serving as only one

integral part of a larger, external plan to threaten competition. Hynix cites Clipper Express v. Rocky

Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982) in support of its argument. In

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28 ORDER GRANTING RAMBUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY AND

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47(b) PRIVILEGE

C-00-20905 RMW

SPT

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Clipper, the Ninth Circuit held that an antitrust action against some trucking companies and a rate

bureau for action they took before the ICC was not barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Id. at

1264-65. However, in Clipper the filings before the ICC were a sham, whereas in the instant case

the lawsuits were neither baseless nor in bad faith. Therefore, the holding of Clipper does not

directly support Hynix. Nevertheless, dicta in Clipper does: "If Clipper can prove that the

defendants engaged in activities which violated the antitrust laws, those violations do not become

immune simply because the defendants used legal means—protests before the ICC—as a means to

enforce the violations." Clipper, 690 F.2d at 1265. 

The Tenth Circuit decision in Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co. explained:

We have no doubt that [if] there was nothing more than the bringing of the infringement

action, resulting damages could not be recovered, but that is not the case. The facts as

hereinbefore detailed are sufficient to support a finding that although Kobe believed

some of its patents were infringed, the real purpose of the infringement action and the

incidental activities of Kobe's representatives was to further the existing monopoly and

to eliminate Dempsey as a competitor. The infringement action and the related activities,

of course, in themselves were not unlawful, and standing alone would not be sufficient

to sustain a claim for damages which they may have caused, but when considered with

the entire monopolistic scheme which preceded them we think, as the trial court did, that

they may be considered as having been done to give effect to the unlawful scheme.

198 F.2d 416, 425 (10th Cir. 1952); see Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 

1004 (9th Cir. 1975); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979); but see Abbott 

Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 2006 WL 1460077, *16 (D. Del. 2006).

However, Rambus has expressly stated that it is not seeking by its motion a determination of

whether its filing and prosecution of lawsuits may be offered in evidence by Hynix in support of its

claim of an unlawful antitrust course of conduct by Rambus. Rambus only seeks a summary

adjudication that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes it from federal antitrust and state

Business & Professions code section 17200 liability if and to the extent any such liability is sought

based solely on Rambus's litigation related activities. Therefore, the determination of any

evidentiary question related to Rambus's litigation related activities and damages to Hynix flowing

therefrom is premature. This order is limited to an adjudication that Rambus's use of litigation, or

threats of litigation, to enforce its patents is protected petitioning activity.

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2 California Civil Code section 47(b) provides in relevant part: "A privileged

publication or broadcast is one made [i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3)

in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other

proceeding authorized by law." (2005).

ORDER GRANTING RAMBUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY AND

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47(b) PRIVILEGE

C-00-20905 RMW

SPT

4

B. California Privilege

California Civil Code section 47(b) provides that the filing of a lawsuit is privileged activity

and serves to protect free access to the courts.2 See Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 213 (1990). 

The privilege applies "without regard to malice or evil motives." Brown v. Kennard, 94 Cal. App.

4th 40, 45 (2001). Hynix contends that California Civil Code section 47(b) does not apply because

Rambus's suits were part of a course of conduct that enabled Rambus to enforce its patents, thereby

causing Hynix's alleged injuries. Thus, Hynix argues the "the gravamen of the complaint was not a

communication but a course of conduct" and therefore section 47(b) does not apply. See Pac. Gas &

Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1132 n.12 (1990). As noted above, Hynix

acknowledges that neither Rambus's filing nor prosecution of infringement claims was in bad faith

or unlawful. To the extent that Hynix is contending that Rambus's lawsuits and communications

related thereto are violations of state unfair competition law, California Civil Code section 47(b)

bars such claims. However, this does not mean that evidence of such activity cannot be introduced

as evidence of an overall course of anti-competitive conduct.

II. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court summarily adjudicates that Rambus's instigation and

prosecution of its infringement claims constitute protected petitioning activities under the NoerrPennington doctrine and, as to state claims, are absolutely privileged under California Civil Code

section 47(b). This order does not resolve evidentiary issues that concern whether the filing of the

lawsuits and communications associated therewith are admissible as evidence supporting an overall

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28 ORDER GRANTING RAMBUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY AND

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47(b) PRIVILEGE

C-00-20905 RMW

SPT

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scheme to monopolize. The court also makes no ruling at this time as to whether any damages can

be recovered for litigation related activities if Hynix were to show some anti-competitive course of

conduct by Rambus.

DATED: 7/7/2006

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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28 ORDER GRANTING RAMBUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY AND

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47(b) PRIVILEGE

C-00-20905 RMW

SPT

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THIS SHALL CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS ORDER WAS PROVIDED TO:

Counsel for plaintiff:

Daniel J. Furniss

Theodore G. Brown, III

Jordan Trent Jones

Townsend & Townsend & Crew LLP

379 Lytton Ave

Palo Alto, CA 94301

Patrick Lynch

Kenneth R. O'Rourke

O'Melveny & Myers

400 So Hope St Ste 1060

Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899

Kenneth L. Nissly

Susan van Keulen

Geoffrey H. Yost

Thelen Reid & Priest LLP

225 West Santa Clara Street, 12th Floor

San Jose, CA 95113-1723

Counsel for defendant:

Gregory Stone

Kelly M. Klaus

Catherine Augustson

Munger Tolles & Olson

355 So Grand Ave Ste 3500

Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560

Peter A. Detre

Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke

Munger Tolles & Olson

560 Mission Street, 27th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105-2907

Peter I Ostroff

Rollin A. Ransom 

Michelle B. Goodman

V. Bryan Medlock, Jr.

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood

555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000

Los Angeles, CA 90013-1010

Jeannine Yoo Sano

Pierre J. Hubert

Dewey Ballantine

1950 University Avenue, Suite 500

East Palo Alto, CA 94303

Date: 7/7/2006 SPT 

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 2191 Filed 07/07/06 Page 6 of 6