Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01055/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01055-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GINA MESA, CASE NO. CV F 06-1055 LJO TAG

Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION

DECISION

vs. (Doc. 15.)

MODERN WOODMEN

OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Modern Woodmen of America (“Modern Woodmen”) seeks summary

judgment/adjudication on plaintiff Gina Mesa’s (“Ms. Mesa’s”) quid pro quo sexual harassment and

hostile work environment claims. Modern Woodmen contends that Ms. Mesa lacks evidence that a term

of her employment was conditioned on acceptance of her supervisor’s sexual advances for her quid pro

quo sexual harassment claim. Modern Woodman argues that Ms. Mesa lacks evidence of sufficiently

severe or pervasive harassment for her hostile work environment claim. Ms. Mesa responds that she has

raised sufficient factual issues to defeat summary judgment/adjudication. This Court considered Modern

Woodmen’s summary judgment/adjudication motion on the record and VACATES the October 31, 2007

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This Court carefully reviewed and considered all arguments, points and authorities, declarations,

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depositions, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, objections and other papers filed by the parties.

Omission of reference to an argument, document, paper or objection is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did

not consider the argument, document, paper or objection. This Court thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it

deemed admissible, material and appropriate for summary judgment/adjudication.

The parties generally agree on the pertinent facts. In fact, Ms. Mesa adopts Modern Woodmen’s statement 2

of undisputed facts.

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hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES 1

Modern Woodman summary judgment/adjudication. 

BACKGROUND2

Ms. Mesa’s Employment With Modern Woodmen

On November 1, 2004, Modern Woodmen, a financial services firm, hired Ms. Mesa as an

administrative assistant at its Bakersfield office at the recommendation of Virgilio “Billy” Raviz (“Mr.

Raviz”), manager of Modern Woodmen’s Bakersfield office. Ms. Mesa was placed on a 90-day

probationary period and was supervised by Mr. Raviz until her termination on January 20, 2005, when

she left the office unattended during business hours to go home for a personal errand. According to

Modern Woodmen, additional problems contributed to Ms. Mesa’s termination and included tardiness,

lack of knowledge regarding Modern Woodmen policies, poor performance and time management, and

improper use of make-up time. 

Mr. Raviz’ Alleged Harassment

During three to five weeks of her employment prior to January 1, 2005, Ms. Mesa claims that

Mr. Raviz harassed her in that he stared at her, stood closely behind her, implied that he should be her

boyfriend, asked to accompany him on a day long business trip out of town, kissed her cheek, and told

her that she is beautiful.

Comments And Staring

Ms. Mesa attributes Mr. Raviz to comment that she was beautiful no less than twice a day during

a three-to-five week period. Ms. Mesa responded with “thank you,” walking away or ignoring Mr.

Raviz. According to Ms. Mesa, Mr. Raviz stared at her with eye-to-eye contact when sitting across a

conference room table or looking her up and down “as if he was disrobing me in his mind.” In her

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declaration, Ms. Mesa states: “His constant staring at me made me feel I was in the presence of someone

who was desiring me sexually.” Although the comments and staring bothered Ms. Mesa, she did not

inform Mr. Raviz that she did not care for the comments or staring. 

Ms. Mesa attributes Mr. Raviz to call her “his little Alicia” several times (weekly) during

December 2004. Alicia is the name of Mr. Raviz’ wife, who also worked at Modern Woodmen’s

Bakersfield office. Mr. Raviz immediately apologized when Ms. Mesa noted that she was not his wife.

Mr. Raviz never called Ms. Mesa “his little Alicia” in the presence of others. The “little Alicia”

comments added to Ms. Mesa’s impression that Mr. Raviz “wanted me to become involved with him

romantically.”

Ms. Mesa attributes Mr. Raviz to call her a flirt. Ms. Mesa responded that she was a talkative

person, not a flirt. Ms. Mesa claims Mr. Raviz objected and again referred to her as a flirt.

Ms. Mesa attributes Mr. Raviz to tell her occasionally that she needed five boyfriends. Ms. Mesa

interpreted the five boyfriends comment to mean that Mr. Raviz wanted to be her boyfriend. Ms. Mesa

advised Mr. Raviz that she had a boyfriend, “Bob.” Ms. Mesa acknowledges that Mr. Raviz never stated

that he wanted to be her boyfriend.

Ms. Mesa attributes Mr. Raviz in December 2004 to tell her that she might want to come to his

home when she asked for his address to pass on to an invited guest to Mr. Raviz’ Christmas party.

Business Trip

In late December 2004, Mr. Raviz asked Ms. Mesa to accompany him on a January 3, 2005 daylong business trip to Salinas to take notes as his assistant. Ms. Mesa attributes Mr. Raviz to have asked

whether her boyfriend would be upset that she had to go on a day-long business trip. Ms. Mesa

responded that her boyfriend should not be upset because the trip was part of her job. Ms. Mesa claims

that Mr. Raviz said: “Okay. Well, it’s going to be just you and I. . . . Well, you know, sometimes, you

know, us men, you know, get excited so. . . . Oh, excuse me, never mind.” Mr. Raviz covered his mouth

when he made the comment. Ms. Mesa did not inform Mr. Raviz that his comments made her

uncomfortable although she thought that Mr. Raviz indicated that he was excited they would be alone.

Ms. Mesa claims that she did not want to go on the trip but did not tell Mr. Raviz that she could not or

would not go.

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Peck On The Cheek

Ms. Mesa claims that near the end of December 2004, Mr. Raviz gave her a peck on the cheek

and brushed his hand against hers at the same time. 

Standing Behind Ms. Mesa

Ms. Mesa claims that Mr. Raviz stood behind her chair daily to periodically check her work.

Occasionally, Mr. Raviz told Ms. Mesa that she needed to do something differently or correct a mistake.

Although she felt uncomfortable, Ms. Mesa concedes that such conduct of Mr. Raviz was appropriate.

Ms. Mesa’s Arrest

Ms. Mesa was arrested at approximately12 a.m. on January2, 2005 for being under the influence

of PCP. Ms. Mesa missed work and the Salinas business trip with Mr. Raviz on January 3, 2005. 

End Of Alleged Harassment

Ms. Mesa acknowledges that she was not harassed from the end of December 2005 to her

January 20, 2005 termination. In her declaration, Ms. Mesa notes that Mr. Raviz’ attitude changed after

she did not attend the Salinas trip:

The impression I received . . . was that Mr. Raviz was personally upset about me not

going to Salinas. After that trip, his attitude changed towards me. First and foremost,

his harassment of me stopped. He no longer stared, called me beautiful, attempted to

kiss me, call me his Little Alicia, or claim I needed more boyfriends. 

Ms. Mesa further notes that prior to January 2005, Mr. Raviz daily praised her for a “great job” and that

she received a raise on January 1, 2005. Ms. Mesa attributes Mr. Raviz to tell her that she would receive

summer 2005 training at Modern Woodmen’s out-of-state headquarters. Ms. Mesa declares:

After the Salinas incident he no longer told me I was doing a good job and he no longer

told me that I would be receiving training. His attitude toward me clearly changed after

the Salinas trip incident. Mr. Raviz had always been complimentary and warm to me

before, but he became cold and icy to me afterwards.

Reprimand And Termination

Mr. Raviz provided Ms. Mesa a January 16, 2005 written reprimand to criticize her working less

than time reported, tardiness, dress attire, use of telephone for personal matters, failure to monitor

answering machine, and failure to adhere to Modern Woodmen procedures. On January 20, 2005, Ms.

Mesa was terminated and given a copy of her January 19, 2005 performance review that she needed

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improvement in all but the performance category. Mr. Raviz prepared the review.

Prior to her termination, Ms. Mesa never indicated to Mr. Raviz or anyone else at Modern

Woodman that Mr. Raviz’ alleged sexual advances were offensive or unwanted.

Telephone Call

Ms. Mesa declares that on May 3, 2006, Mr. Raviz telephoned her on her cell phone: “I heard

Mr. Raviz’s voice then say ‘it’s me.’ I froze and then hung up the phone.”

Ms. Mesa’s Claims

Ms. Mesa pursues California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), §§ 12900, et seq.,

causes of action for (first) quid pro quo sexual harassment and (second) hostile work environment. In

her complaint, Ms. Mesa alleges that soon after she started her employment, Mr. Raviz made sexual

advances toward Ms. Mesa in that he: (1) told her how beautiful she is; (2) advised her that she needed

a new boyfriend to imply he could be her boyfriend; (3) indicated she excited him; (4) called her a pet

name; (5) kissed her; (6) stared at her; (7) stood close to her; and (8) requested her to travel a long

distance with him in his vehicle. Ms. Mesa alleges that shortly after she rebuffed Mr. Raviz’ advances,

she was reprimanded and terminated. Ms. Mesa’s (first) quid pro quo sexual harassment claim alleges

her termination was motivated by her rebuffs of Mr. Raviz’ advances. Ms. Mesa’s (second) hostile work

environment cause of action is premised on Mr. Raviz’ alleged advances. 

Modern Woodmen contends that Ms. Mesa’s (first) quid pro quo sexual harassment cause of

action fails in that Ms. Mesa’s employment was not conditioned on acceptance of Mr. Raviz’ sexual

advances. Modern Woodmen further contends that Ms. Mesa was subjected to no more that sporadic

and trivial incidents which are insufficient to constitute sexual harassment.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment/Adjudication Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 56(b) permits a party against whom a claim is asserted to seek “summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Summary judgment/adjudication is appropriate when

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment/adjudication as a matter of law. F.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec.

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Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9 Cir. 1987). The purpose of summary judgment/adjudication th

is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”

Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348; International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin

Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9 Cir. 1985). th

On summary judgment/adjudication, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to

any material fact,” not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of contested matters. F.R.Civ.P. 56(c);

Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9 Cir. 1997); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress th

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464,

467, 82 S.Ct. 486 (1962); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9

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Cir. 1984). The evidence of the party opposing summary judgment/adjudication is to be believed and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts before the court must be drawn in favor of

the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as

a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

To carry its burden of production on summary judgment/adjudication, a moving party “must

either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or

show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210

F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000); see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d th

563, 574 (9 Cir. 1990). “[T]o carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party

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must persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102;

see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 

“If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no

obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-1103; see Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598.

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“If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce

evidence to support its claim or defense.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

at 574. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make

the showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”) “But if the nonmoving party produces enough

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Nissan

Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The amount of evidence

necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.’” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (quoting

First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592 (1968)). “The mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Under F.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a summary judgment/adjudication motion, interlocutory in character,

may be rendered on the issue of liability alone. “In cases that involve . . . multiple causes of action,

summary judgment may be proper as to some causes of action but not as to others, or as to some issues

but not as to others, or as to some parties, but not as to others.” Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123

(5 Cir. 1981); see also Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9 Cir. 1990); Cheng v. th th

Commissioner Internal Revenue Service, 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9 Cir. 1989). A court “may grant th

summary adjudication as to specific issues if it will narrow the issues for trial.” First Nat’l Ins. Co. v.

F.D.I.C., 977 F.Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1977).

As discussed below, Ms. Mesa has raised factual issues to avoid summary judgment/adjudication

of her quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment causes of action.

Public Policy

Ms. Mesa proceeds under FEHA which declares “as the public policy of this state that it is

necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold

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employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of . . . sex . . .” Cal. Gov. Code, § 12920.

California Government Code section 12940(a) renders unlawful an employer because of sex “to

discriminate against the person in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment.” California Government Code section 12940(j)(1) renders unlawful an employer “to

harass an employee” because of sex. Under the FEHA scheme, “‘harassment’ because of sex” includes

sexual harassment and gender harassment. Cal. Gov. Code, § 12940(j)(4)(C).

California law recognizes two theories of sexual harassment:

1. Quid pro quo harassment – a term of employment is conditioned on submission to

unwelcome sexual advances; and

2. Hostile work environment – harassment is sufficiently pervasive to alter conditions of

employment and to create an abusive work environment.

Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1414, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 118 (1993); Fisher v. San

Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 607, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842 (1989).

Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment

In Mogilefsky, 20 Cal.App.4th at 1414, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d at 118, the California Court of Appeal

explained quid pro quo sexual harassment:

A cause of action for quid pro quo harassment involves the behavior most

commonly regarded as sexual harassment, including, e.g., sexual propositions,

unwarranted graphic discussion ofsexual acts, and commentary on the employee's body

and the sexual uses to which it could be put. (Donald Schriver, Inc. v. Fair Employment

& Housing Com. (1986) 220 Cal.App.3d 396, 405, 230 Cal.Rptr. 620.) To state a cause

of action on this theory, is it sufficient to allege that a term of employment was expressly

or impliedly conditioned upon acceptance of a supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances.

(See Bihun v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1283A, 13

Cal.App.4th 976, 1005, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 787.)

In cases of implied sexual coercion, courts require more than conclusory allegations that the

supervisor proposed a sexual liaison and that the employee responded to overtures to protect her

employment interests. See Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology, 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 (9 Cir. th

2003).

Modern Woodmen argues that Ms. Mesa fails to establish quid pro quo harassment in that her

employment’s terms and conditions were neither expressly nor impliedly conditioned on acceptance of

Mr. Raviz’ alleged sexual advances. Modern Woodmen argues that Ms. Mesa’s failure to attend the

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Salinas business trip with Mr. Raviz does not establish an explicit quid pro quo claim. Modern

Woodmen claims that there is no implicit quid pro quo claim in the absence of evidence to connect Ms.

Mesa’s job or related matters to Mr. Raviz’ requests to engage in sexual conduct. Modern Woodsmen

notes that Mr. Raviz’ “beautiful” comments do not equate to quid pro quo harassment. Modern

Woodmen concludes that the “mere fact that [a supervisor] was interested in sex generally and desired

to have sex with [subordinate plaintiff] is simply not enough.” See Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1176.

Ms. Mesa concedes that Mr. Raviz “did not come out and tell [her] her job was on the line if she

did not succumb to his advances.” Ms. Mesa argues that Mr. Raviz’ advances were “coy” given that Mr.

Raviz’ wife worked with Mr. Raviz and Ms. Mesa and Mr. Raviz “knew he had to be careful about how

he approached” a relationship with Ms. Mesa. Ms. Mesa offers that Mr. Raviz’ staring and comments

(her beauty, “little Alicia,” needing boyfriends, men “getting excited,” and being alone together)

demonstrate that Mr. Raviz sought a sexual relationship with Ms. Mesa. Ms. Mesa surmises that after

she failed to make the Salinas trip, Mr. Raviz realized she would not engage in a sexual relationship,

ceased his advances and terminated her employment. Ms. Mesa equates Mr. Raviz’ change in attitude

as “evidence of an improper retaliatory motive,” especially since prior to the trip, Mr. Mesa praised her

daily and she received a raise. Ms. Mesa contends that the timing of her January 16, 2005 reprimand

and termination four days later raise factual issues to avoid summary judgment.

The parties agree that Mr. Raviz did not directly or explicitly make sexual propositions, discuss

sex acts, or comment on Ms. Mesa’s body for sex. Nonetheless, the inferences from the evidence are

that Mr. Raviz courted a sexual relationship to be explored on the Salinas business trip. The evidence

further suggests that Mr. Raviz felt rejected after Ms. Mesa missed the Salinas trip and in turn ceased

his advances. Thirteen days after the trip, Ms. Mesa was reprimanded and terminated four days later,

despite her claims that Mr.Raviz had praised her. The evidence minimally raises a factual issue that Ms.

Mesa’s continued employment was conditioned on acceptance of Mr. Raviz’ advances based on her

reprimand and termination after she missed the Salinas business trip. 

Another consideration is the conditions under which Ms. Mesa worked. The evidence reveals

that the office was occupied by Ms. Mesa, Mr. Raviz and his wife. Such working arrangement advances

Ms. Mesa’s claim in that “the supervisory nature of the employment relationship” between Ms. Mesa

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To establish a hostile environment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must show: (1) 3

she as subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) such conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and to create an abusive working

environment. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9 Cir. 1995). th

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and Mr. Raviz “must be considered when determining whether a reasonable woman in [Ms. Mesa’s]

position would have believed that her continued employment was contingent on engaging in sexual acts

with her supervisor.” Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1176, n. 21. Mr. Raviz was not as overt as in other cases

of quid pro quo harassment, but his wife’s office presence explains histoned down approach, especially

considering his conduct regarding the Salinas trip. 

In sum, a reasonable inference from the evidence is that Mr. Raviz continued his advances until

he decided to address her employment conditions through reprimand and ultimate termination. At that

point, a factual issue arises as to conditions for her continued employment to avoid summary

judgment/adjudication on Ms. Mesa’s (first) quid pro quo cause of action. 

Hostile Work Environment Harassment

A plaintiff employee claiming sexual harassment based upon a hostile work environment “must

demonstrate the conduct complained of was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the

conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to

employees because of their sex.” Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Productions, 38 Cal.4th 264, 279, 42

Cal.Rptr.3d 2 (2006). A hostile environment claim “need not have anything to do with sexual advances. 3

. . . It shows itself in the form of intimidation and hostility for the purpose of interfering with an

individual's work performance. . . . To plead a cause of action for this type of sexual harassment, it is

'only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination and that if the plaintiff

had been a man she would not have been treated in the same manner.’” Accardi v. Superior Court, 17

Cal.App.4th 341, 348, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 (1998). A cause of action for sexual harassment on a hostile

environment theory need not allege “any sexual advances whatsoever.” Mogilefsky, 20 Cal.App.4th at

1414-1415, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d at 118-119. 

Nonetheless, “FEHA's prohibitions are not a ‘civility code’ and are not designed to rid the

workplace of vulgarity.” Sheffield v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Social Services, 109 Cal.App.4th 153,

161, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 (2003). The ordinary tribulations of the workplace, including sporadic use of

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Federal and California courts rely on federal interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., to interpret analogous FEHA provisions which prohibit unlawful discrimination and harassment.

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9 Cir. 1996); Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 65 Cal.App.4th 511, th

517, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 (1998); Clark v. Claremont Univ. Ctr. & Graduate Sch., 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 662, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 151

(1992). 

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abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing, do not constitute a hostile environment.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998) (Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 19964 does not become a “general civility code.”) “[A]nnoying or ‘merely offensive’ comments 4

in the workplace are not actionable.” Lyle, 38 Cal.4th 264, 283, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 2. 

Not all workplace conduct which may be described as harassment affects a term, condition, or

privilege of employment. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986);

Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 21 Cal.4th 121, 129-130, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 138 (1999), cert.

denied, 529 U.S. 1138, 120 S.Ct. 2029 (2000). “To be actionable, ‘a sexually objectionable environment

must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or

abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.’” Lyle, 38 Cal.4th at 283, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d

2 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275. “The plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s

conduct would have interfered with a reasonable employee’s work performance and would have

seriously affected the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee and that she was actually

offended.” Fisher, 214 Cal.App.3d at 609-610, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842. If the victim does not subjectively

perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the

victim’s employment, and there is no actionable harassment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S.

17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370-371 (1993).

“Harassment cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial[;] rather the plaintiff must show

a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a generalized nature.” Fisher, 214

Cal.App.3d at 610, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842. A plaintiff must prove more than a few isolated incidents. See

Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8 Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972, 104 S.Ct. th

2347 (1984); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2 Cir. 1986). nd

Courts apply “a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a plaintiff’s allegations

make out a colorable claim of hostile work environment.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917,

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923 (9 Cir. 2000); Fisher, 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 609, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842. Factors considered include th

(1) the nature of the unwelcome sexual acts or works (generally, physical touching is more offensive

than unwelcome verbal abuse); (2) the frequency of the offensive encounters; (3) the total number of

days over which all of the offensive conduct occurs; and (4) the context in which the sexually harassing

conduct occurred. Fisher, 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 610, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842.

Modern Woodmen contends that Mr. Raviz’ conduct lacks necessary severity or pervasiveness

for a hostile environment claim. Modern Woodmen argues that Mr. Raviz’ single, brief kiss on Ms.

Mesa’s cheek and hand-to-hand brush does amount to an unwelcome sexual act to establish a hostile

work environment. Modern Woodmen points to Brooks, 229 F.3d at 926, where the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals held that a single incident of a co-worker forcing his hand under plaintiff’s sweater to fondle

her bare breast did not support a hostile work environment claim in that a reasonable woman in

plaintiff’s position would not consider the terms and conditions of her employment altered by the coworker’s actions. See also Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (a hand on shoulder,

brief hug or peck on the cheek are “not severe enough to be actionable in and of themselves.”)

As to frequency of offensive encounters, Modern Woodmen notes that Mr. Raviz’ alleged

misconduct occurred during three to five weeks of Ms. Mesa’s 12-week tenure and ceased no less than

three weeks prior to her termination with no expectation of future misconduct. Modern Woodmen

argues that Ms. Mesa fails to offer “specific facts” of frequency and duration of offensive acts other than

Mr. Raviz’ business trip comments and kiss on the check. Modern Woodmen notes that Ms. Mesa offers

no evidence as to how Mr. Raviz’ alleged conduct affected her work or duties. 

Ms. Mesa responds that there are sufficient factual issues of hostile work environment to be tried

by a jury and points to several decisions where courts found incidents and conduct were sufficient to

defeat summary judgment.

Having found factual issues as to quid pro quo harassment, this Court likewise finds factual

issues of hostile work environment. The conduct at issue includes Mr. Raviz’staring, looking Ms. Mesa

from head-to-toe, sexually charged and implicit comments, a kiss and hand touching. In total, such

conduct raises factual issues whether Ms. Mesa’s direct supervisor altered her employment conditions

and created a hostile and abusive environment based on Ms. Mesa’s sex. A jury rationally could find

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that Mr. Raviz’ daily staring, comments and standing behind Ms. Mesa constitute intimidation which

interfered with Ms. Mesa’s work as evidence by her performance review. Mr. Raviz’ conduct, in total,

exceeded mere trivialities and sporadic incidents of vulgarity. A reasonable person in Ms. Mesa’s

position could find Mr. Raviz’ conduct offensive and obstructive, as she did. Although Mr. Raviz’

conduct was limited to roughly a month, it occurred over a significant portion of Ms. Mesa’s brief

employment. In contrast to cases on which Modern Woodmen relies, the creator of the hostile work

environment was not a fellow co-worker; it was Ms. Mesa’s direct supervisor with power to continue

or terminate her employment. As discussed above, Mr. Raviz’ conduct was not explicitly graphic.

Nonetheless, its tone was sexual to reach objective and subjective offensive levels. Given the nature of

Ms. Mesa’s situation, the fact that she did not complain prior to her termination is unavailing to Modern

Woodmen. The evidence is not so one-sided to entitle Modern Woodmen to summary

judgment/adjudication on Ms. Mesa’s (second) hostile work environment cause of action.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court DENIES Modern Woodmen summary

judgment/adjudication on Ms. Mesa’s quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment

causes of action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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