Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01646/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01646-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TRANSWEB, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES COMPANY, 

3M COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2014-1646

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey in No. 2:10-CV-04413, Judge Faith 

S. Hochberg.

______________________ 

Decided: February 10, 2016

______________________ 

 MICHAEL ERNEST WILLIAMS, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, argued for 

plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by VALERIE RODDY,

HAROLD BARZA; SANFORD IAN WEISBURST, New York, NY; 

PHILIP CHARLES STERNHELL, Washington, DC.

 SETH P. WAXMAN, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and 

Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendantsappellants. Also represented by THOMAS SAUNDERS,

KENNETH HUGH MERBER; MARK CHRISTOPHER FLEMING,

SARAH B. PETTY, Boston, MA. 

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2 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

______________________ 

Before WALLACH, BRYSON, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge. 

3M sued TransWeb for infringement of several patents. TransWeb sued for declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement of the patents. A jury found 

the patents to be invalid based on TransWeb’s prior public

use of the patented method. In accordance with an advisory verdict from the jury, the district court found the 

patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. The 

jury also found 3M to be liable for a Walker Process antitrust violation and that attorney fees were an appropriate 

antitrust remedy. The district court awarded approximately $26 million to TransWeb, including trebled attorney fees as antitrust damages. The primary issues are 

whether sufficient corroborating evidence exists to support the finding of prior public use by TransWeb, and 

whether the attorney fees are an appropriate basis for 

damages under the antitrust laws in this context. We 

hold in the affirmative on both issues. For the latter 

issue, we find that TransWeb’s attorney fees appropriately flow from the unlawful aspect of 3M’s antitrust violation and thus are an antitrust injury that can properly 

serve as the basis for antitrust damages. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

I 

TransWeb and 3M are both manufacturers of filters

for respirators, such as might be worn by workers in a 

dirty or otherwise contaminated worksite. The filter 

media at issue in this case consist of “nonwoven fibrous

webs,” which rely on a “web” of fibers rather than traditional woven material. Both TransWeb and 3M use a 

process of melting pellets of a filter material, such as 

polypropylene, blowing the melted material into a thin 

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TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 3

film, and then allowing the material to cool and solidify

into the nonwoven fibrous web.

It had been known in the art for some time that a filter medium could be improved by imparting upon it an 

electrical charge. In this way, the filter medium can repel 

or capture particulates both by mechanical and electromagnetic means. A filter medium on which a semipermanent electrical charge has been imparted is referred 

to as an “electret.”

TransWeb and 3M independently developed a technique for imparting this electret characteristic by using 

plasma fluorination. Fluorination involves introducing 

fluorine atoms into the chemical structure of the filter 

web. Previously known techniques involved mixing

fluorine compounds into the melted filter material, but 

this proved disadvantageous. Instead, TransWeb and 3M 

both discovered that it would be advantageous to first 

form the fibrous web and then introduce the fluorine 

atoms into the chemical structure. This technique involves exposing a gaseous fluorine compound to the 

surface of the filter web in the presence of plasma. The 

intense heat and electromagnetic energy introduced by 

the plasma cause some of the chemical bonds on the 

surface of the filter web to break, and the fluorine atoms 

fill in those bonds to form fluorine compounds on the

surface of the filter web.

Plasma-fluorinated filter media are particularly effective in oily environments, where other types of filter 

media might perform poorly or quickly degrade. The 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH) provides a rating and approval service for oily 

environment respirators, categorizing them as: not

resistant to oil; resistant to oil; or oil proof. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) provides 

regulations governing what NIOSH rating of respirators 

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4 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

must be used in certain types of worksites within the 

United States.

The present appeal focuses largely on the events surrounding a filtration industry exposition that occurred in 

late April and early May of 1997. It is uncontested that 

TransWeb’s founder, Kumar Ogale, attended the expo and 

handed out samples of filter material. The filter material 

included samples of TransWeb’s “T-Melt” products, an 

identifier for the general class of melt-blown, i.e., nonwoven fibrous web, media. The primary dispute is whether 

Mr. Ogale handed out, more specifically, samples of the 

“T-Melt P” products, which is the specific class of plasmafluorinated T-Melt products. Mr. Ogale testified at trial 

that he did in fact hand out T-Melt P samples at the expo, 

though no independent documents or testimony evidence 

this fact. The parties do not contest that if Mr. Ogale

handed out T-Melt P samples at the expo, then they 

would serve as prior art to the plasma fluorination technique of the claimed methods. The expo occurred more 

than one year prior to the priority date of the patents 

asserted in this case, so any public disclosure of plasma 

fluorination at the expo would be a statutory bar to patentability, at least based on that feature.

In July of 1998, 3M filed U.S. Patent Application 

09/109,497, to which both of U.S. Patents 6,397,458 and 

6,808,551 claim earliest priority. 3M asserted both the 

’458 and ’551 patents against TransWeb. In addition to 

the plasma fluorination of nonwoven fibrous webs described above, the patent family discloses use of “hydrocharging,” which is a technique that uses water to impart 

the electrical charge on the filter medium.

3M initially filed suit in Minnesota against TransWeb 

for patent infringement. After 3M voluntarily dismissed 

that suit due to an apparent personal jurisdiction issue, 

TransWeb filed suit in New Jersey for declaratory judgment.

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TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 5

The district court in New Jersey ultimately presented 

the following issues to a jury: infringement of claims 31 

and 57 of the ’458 patent; invalidity for obviousness of 

claims 31 and 57; unenforceability of the ’458 and ’551 

patents due to inequitable conduct; Walker Process antitrust violation based on fraudulent procurement and 

subsequent assertion of the ’458 and ’551 patents; sham 

litigation antitrust violation based on assertion of the ’458 

and ’551 patents; entitlement to lost profits damages for 

antitrust violations; and entitlement to attorney fees as 

damages for antitrust violations. The jury delivered the 

following verdicts: claims 31 and 57 are not infringed; 

claims 31 and 57 are invalid; both patents are unenforceable; 3M committed a Walker Process violation but not a 

sham litigation violation; and TransWeb is entitled to lost 

profits and attorney fees as antitrust damages.

The district court entered judgment in accordance 

with the jury verdicts. 3M moved for judgment as a 

matter of law, which the district court denied. 3M appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II

This court reviews denial of a JMOL motion de novo, 

applying the law of the regional circuit. Am. Calcar, Inc. 

v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 

2011). In the Third Circuit, courts assess “whether there 

is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could properly 

have found its verdict.” Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., 

71 F.3d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995). JMOL “should be 

granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of 

every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient 

evidence from which a jury reasonably could find” for the 

nonmovant. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 

1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). Underlying questions of law 

are reviewed without deference. ZF Meritor, LLC v. 

Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012).

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6 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

On appeal, 3M challenges the district court’s judgment on validity, inequitable conduct, and antitrust 

liability. We address each argument in turn.

III 

The jury found both claims of the ’458 patent invalid, 

and the district court denied 3M’s motion for JMOL of 

non-invalidity. 3M contests this judgment based on a 

purported lack of corroboration of Mr. Ogale’s public use 

testimony and based on alleged non-obviousness of the 

claims even if there were public use of the plasmafluorinated material. 

A 

Oral testimony by an interested party on its own will 

generally not suffice as “clear and convincing” evidence of

invalidity. See Lazare Kaplan Int’l v. Photoscribe Techs., 

628 F.3d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Price v. Symsek, 988 

F.2d 1187, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Rather, such oral testimony must be corroborated by some other evidence. See 

Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 

1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The corroborating evidence can 

include documents and testimonial evidence. See Lazare 

Kaplan, 628 F.3d at 1374–75, Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, 

Inc., 501 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Sandt Tech. v. 

Resco Metal & Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 1344, 1350–51 

(Fed. Cir. 2001). Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient. See Sandt, 264 F.3d at 1351; Knorr v. Pearson, 671 

F.2d 1368, 1373 (C.C.P.A. 1982). This corroboration

requirement for testimony by an interested party is based 

on the sometimes unreliable nature of oral testimony, due 

to the “forgetfulness of witnesses, their liability to mistakes, their proneness to recollect things as the party 

calling them would have them recollect, aside from the 

temptation to actual perjury.” Lazare Kaplan, 628 F.3d at 

1374 (quoting Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co. v. Beat ‘Em All 

Barbed-Wire Co., 143 U.S. 275, 284 (1892)).

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TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 7

A “rule of reason” analysis is used to determine the 

sufficiency of corroboration, under which “all pertinent 

evidence is examined in order to determine whether the 

inventor’s story is credible.” Sandt, 264 F.3d at 1350 

(quoting Price, 988 F.2d at 1195) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Importantly, this analysis “does not 

require that every detail of the testimony be independently and conclusively supported” by the corroborating evidence. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, 735 F.3d 

1333, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Such a requirement would 

indeed be “the antithesis of the rule of reason.” Cooper v. 

Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1998). We have 

generally been most skeptical of oral testimony that is 

supported only by testimonial evidence of other interested 

persons. Compare Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 

952, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and Lacks Indus. v. McKechnie 

Vehicle Components USA, 322 F.3d 1335, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 

2003), with Adenta, 501 F.3d at 1371–73, and Sandt, 264 

F.3d at 1351–52. We have repeatedly noted that contemporaneous documentary evidence provides greater corroborative value. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 

F.3d 1157, 1169–70 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sandt, 264 F.3d at

1350–51; Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 

1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Woodland Tr., 148 F.3d at 

1373; Price, 988 F.2d at 1196. But there are no hard and 

fast rules as to what constitutes sufficient corroboration, 

and each case must be decided on its own facts. See 

Sandt, 264 F.3d at 1350.

We treat the ultimate determination of whether such 

oral testimony is sufficiently corroborated as a question of 

fact, which we review for clear error. See Fleming v. 

Escort, Inc., 774 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

3M’s arguments against sufficiency of corroboration 

can be summed up as follows: as a legal matter, 

TransWeb must independently evidence all “material 

facts” of the purported invalidating public use; and as a 

factual matter, TransWeb provided no corroborating 

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8 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

evidence for one of the material facts, viz., that it was the 

plasma-fluorinated material that was distributed at the 

expo. 

3M’s legal argument attempts to lead us to a legal 

conclusion that this court has repeatedly rejected. 3M 

asks us to focus on one particular detail of the oral testimony and determine whether that detail is independently 

evidenced. But we have repeatedly rejected an elementwise attack on corroboration of oral testimony. See Fleming, 774 F.3d at 1377; Ohio Willow Wood, 735 F.3d at 

1348 (characterizing as “misplaced” an argument that a 

particular claim feature in oral testimony was not separately evidenced, and finding the argument incompatible 

with the rule of reason); Lazare Kaplan, 628 F.3d at

1373–75; Adenta, 501 F.3d at 1371–73. We stated this in 

clear terms most recently in Fleming: 

Fleming is correct that none of the corroborating 

evidence constitutes definitive proof of Orr’s account or discloses each claim limitation as written. But the corroboration requirement has never 

been so demanding. It is a flexible, rule-of-reason 

demand for independent evidence that, as a 

whole, makes credible the testimony of the purported prior inventor with regard to conception 

and reduction to practice of the invention as 

claimed.

Fleming, 774 F.3d at 1377 (citations omitted). As applied 

to this case, our rule of reason analysis requires that 

independent evidence, taken as a whole, makes credible 

Mr. Ogale’s testimony that he distributed the plasmafluorinated material at the expo.

In any event, 3M’s factual argument that TransWeb 

provided no corroborating evidence that it was the plasma-fluorinated material that Mr. Ogale distributed at the 

expo is incorrect. The correspondence with Fourth State 

demonstrates that TransWeb had produced the plasmaCase: 14-1646 Document: 54-2 Page: 8 Filed: 02/10/2016
TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 9

fluorinated material at least three months prior to the 

expo. TransWeb’s own patent application, filed at the 

same time as the expo, demonstrates that Mr. Ogale had 

invented and was seeking patent protection for the plasma-fluorinated material at least by the time of the expo. 

The correspondence with Filtration Group demonstrates

that Mr. Ogale was sending out samples of the plasmafluorinated T-Melt product shortly after the expo. The 

numerous correspondences contemporaneous with the 

Filtration Group correspondence, each accompanying 

samples of filter material not specifically identified as TMelt, show that Mr. Ogale was sending out other samples 

of filter material that may have been plasma-fluorinated. 

The correspondence with Gerson demonstrates that 

TransWeb was offering for sale large quantities of the 

plasma-fluorinated product within two months of the 

expo. Considered in its totality, this body of evidence 

provides abundant support for the credibility of 

Mr. Ogale’s claim that he distributed the plasmafluorinated material at the expo. As such, we find no 

clear error in the district court’s determination that

Mr. Ogale’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated. 

B 

3M argues that, even if TransWeb publicly used 

plasma-fluorinated material at the expo, the claims are 

still non-obvious. 3M’s argument rests on two contentions: for claim 31, it was not obvious to use hydrocharging on a plasma-fluorinated material; and for both claims 

31 and 57, objective indicia demonstrate the nonobviousness of the claims.

3M admits that hydrocharging was well-known in the 

art, at least based on U.S. Patent 5,496,507 to Angadjivand. But 3M notes that the Angadjivand patent 

counsels against “any unnecessary treatment which might 

increase [the filter material’s] electrical connectivity” 

including “ultraviolet irradiation.” Angadjivand patent 

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10 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

col. 3 ll. 26–30. Based on the testimony of both 

TransWeb’s and 3M’s expert witnesses, the filter material 

is exposed to some ultraviolet radiation during plasma 

fluorination. But TransWeb’s expert witness also testified 

that the amount of ultraviolet radiation emitted during 

plasma fluorination was minimal, refuting the notion that 

the above-quoted passage of the Angadjivand patent 

would have significantly discouraged a person having 

ordinary skill in the art from using hydrocharging on 

plasma-fluorinated material. The jury was free to credit 

this testimony and conclude based on the evidence presented that claim 31 was obvious. We see no error in this 

determination. 

3M further contends that unexpected results and 

commercial success demonstrate the non-obviousness of 

the claims. For commercial success, 3M relies on a single, 

confused exchange between its attorney and TransWeb’s

expert witness at trial, wherein the witness says that he 

does not know about the commercial success of 3M’s 

products, though maybe he said he did in the past. J.A. 

2105–06. Similarly with unexpected results, 3M relies on 

a single, self-serving annotation in the ’458 patent inventor’s notebook and a corresponding statement at trial. 

The jury heard and rejected this evidence in concluding 

that the claims were obvious. None of these arguments 

as to objective indicia demonstrate that the jury was 

unreasonable in finding the claims obvious, so we will not 

disturb that verdict.

IV 

The jury reached an advisory verdict that both the 

’458 and ’551 patents were unenforceable for inequitable 

conduct. The district court reached the same conclusion. 

3M contests this judgment on all of the required elements 

of inequitable conduct. 

A judgment of inequitable conduct requires clear and 

convincing evidence of materiality, knowledge of materialCase: 14-1646 Document: 54-2 Page: 10 Filed: 02/10/2016
TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 11

ity, and a deliberate decision to deceive. Therasense, Inc. 

v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (en banc). Except in cases of egregious misconduct, 

the materiality must reach the level of but-for materiality, 

meaning that “the PTO would not have allowed a claim 

had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art.” Id. at 

1291–92. Intent to deceive may be found only if specific 

intent to deceive is “the single most reasonable inference 

able to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 1290. If more 

than one reasonable inference is possible, “intent to 

deceive cannot be found.” Id. at 1290–91. A court “may 

infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence” 

because “direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare.” Id.

at 1290.

This court reviews the district court’s ultimate determination of inequitable conduct for abuse of discretion 

and underlying factual determinations for clear error. 

Star Scientific v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 537 F.3d 1357, 

1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

A 

The expo samples present a definitional case of butfor materiality. During prosecution of the ’497 application, the examiner initially allowed all claims. When 3M 

notified the examiner of one of the TransWeb samples 

that it had on hand, the examiner rejected all claims as 

obvious over that disclosure and the Angadjivand patent. 

Only when 3M clarified its dubious assertion that the 

TransWeb samples were only received after signing of a 

confidentiality agreement and thus were not prior art did 

the examiner allow the claims. Because the examiner 

would not have allowed the claims had the TransWeb 

samples been properly disclosed as prior art, the 

TransWeb samples are but-for material.

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12 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

B 

The district court concluded based on a detailed review of the record that Marvin Jones, an inventor for the

asserted patents, and Karl Hanson, an in-house attorney 

at 3M, both acted with specific intent to deceive the 

patent office as to the TransWeb materials. The jury 

unanimously reached the same conclusion. While it is not 

necessary for us to recount the entire treatment of the 

factual record performed so thoroughly by the district 

court, see TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Properties Co., 

16 F. Supp. 3d 385, 398–407 (D.N.J. 2014), we note a few 

particular details that demonstrate that the district court 

did not clearly err in finding a specific intent to deceive on 

the part of Mr. Jones and Mr. Hanson. 

The record makes abundantly clear that 3M generally 

and Mr. Jones particularly were very much aware of the 

samples TransWeb was distributing at the expo. A week 

prior to the expo, a group of six 3M employees was party 

to a lengthy email coordinating 3M’s efforts to gather 

information from TransWeb at the expo. The email 

identified two employees as the “point people” in gathering information from TransWeb. J.A. 6860. The other 

parties to the email and their subordinates were to channel any questions through the point people. One of the 

point people had already met with TransWeb and received “quite a bit of information and non-production 

samples.” Id. The email also included an article from 

Nonwovens Industry briefly mentioning TransWeb’s TMelt products. One of the parties to the email was 

Mr. Jones’s supervisor, and she forwarded the email to 

Mr. Jones on the day that the expo began. Mr. Jones 

attended the expo. While he professed at trial to have no 

recollection of visiting the TransWeb booth, the district 

court found his testimony “simply not credible” and noted 

that “his demeanor was one of a witness trying to distance 

himself from any knowledge of TransWeb’s presence and 

activities at the Expo.” TransWeb, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 399. 

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TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 13

Mr. Jones’s supervisor again sent him an email within a 

month after the expo detailing the information and samples received from TransWeb by the point people. This 

email noted that TransWeb’s production operations were 

up and running, that it was sending samples to potential 

clients, that 3M already had a small sample, and that 3M 

was expecting a larger sample soon thereafter.

Further evidence shows that Mr. Jones knew not only 

that TransWeb distributed material at the expo, but that 

it was plasma-fluorinated material. Within a year of the 

expo, Mr. Jones was told directly by an employee of 

Racal—an independent filtration company at the time of 

the expo that was acquired by 3M in the following year—

that TransWeb had been producing plasma-fluorinated 

material and that TransWeb had provided samples of 

such to Racal. The district court noted that the 3M employees seemed to proceed with a newfound earnest in 

preparing their own patent application and supporting

lab notebooks around this same time. The Racal employee eventually sent the samples received from TransWeb to 

Mr. Jones, identifying them as being plasma-fluorinated. 

Around the same time, another 3M employee forwarded 

the original expo planning email to Mr. Jones and 

Mr. Hanson, noting that it did not explicitly indicate 

plasma fluorination. The district court found that this 

email indicated a follow-up to some sort of oral conversation between Mr. Jones, Mr. Hanson, and the other 3M 

employee regarding what TransWeb was distributing at 

the time of the expo. Another 3M employee later requested samples of the plasma-fluorinated material from 

TransWeb on behalf of Mr. Jones and Mr. Hanson, noting 

that some of the products had been mentioned in the preexpo Nonwovens Industry publication. 

The district court found that Mr. Hanson undertook 

an intentional scheme to paper over the potentially prior 

art nature of the Racal-received samples. The Racal 

employees received the plasma-fluorinated samples from 

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14 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

TransWeb at latest one month after the expo. Therefore, 

these samples were highly relevant to what TransWeb 

distributed at the expo. The record casts great doubt on 

whether Racal had received the samples before or after 

execution of a confidentiality agreement, thereby potentially rendering them public disclosures and prior art to 

the ’497 application. At around the same time that 3M 

was requesting further samples from TransWeb and 

learning of the potential prior art nature of the Racal 

samples, Mr. Hanson sent a confusing letter to Mr. Ogale

purporting to clarify some issues as to the confidentially 

agreements between TransWeb and 3M and between 

TransWeb and Racal. Mr. Hanson had never had any 

communication with TransWeb, and the district court 

concluded that the only possible purpose for the letter was 

to get an admission from Mr. Ogale that the Racalreceived samples were covered by a confidentiality 

agreement, even though this point was itself dubious. 

Mr. Hanson subsequently did submit this letter to the 

patent office as definitive proof that the TransWeb samples were not prior art to the ’497 application.

The district court noted other circumstantial evidence 

suggesting a specific intent by 3M employees to hide the 

prior art nature of the TransWeb products. The district 

court noted that only after Mr. Hanson met with the 

Racal employee did that employee type meeting notes 

from his original meeting with Mr. Ogale after the expo. 

Those typed notes contained additional information

regarding patents that had not been in the original handwritten notes. The district court noted that Mr. Hanson

waited several years between learning of the potential 

TransWeb prior art and informing the patent office. In 

fact, Mr. Hanson did not disclose the TransWeb material 

to the patent office until after negotiations for 3M to 

purchase TransWeb had broken down. Further, 

Mr. Hanson waited until the last possible moment, when 

a notice of allowance had already been mailed, to submit 

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TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 15

the TransWeb material in a request for continued prosecution. The district court found Mr. Hanson’s testimony 

at trial attempting to explain this delay wholly incredible.

Based on these factual findings, the district court concluded that the only reasonable inference that explains 

the actions of Mr. Hanson and Mr. Jones is that they 

strategically delayed in disclosing the TransWeb prior art 

and then intentionally made an inaccurate disclosure of 

that material. We can find no clear error in this conclusion, particularly as the district court’s findings are based 

in large degree on its determinations that Mr. Jones and 

Mr. Hanson were not credible during relevant parts of 

their testimony. See In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent 

Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 521 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“‘This court may 

not reassess, and indeed is incapable of reassessing, 

witness credibility and motive issues on review.’” (quoting 

LNP Eng’g Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 274 

F.3d 1347, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).

Finding no clear error in the district court’s determinations on both materiality and specific intent, and 

finding no other improprieties in the district court’s 

analysis, we see no abuse of discretion in the district 

court’s ultimate conclusion of unenforceability for inequitable conduct.

V 

The jury found that 3M committed a Walker Process

antitrust violation, and awarded TransWeb damages of 

lost profits and attorney fees. The district court denied 

3M’s motion for JMOL. 3M contests this judgment based 

on several purported flaws in market definitions for the 

antitrust claim and based on the theory that TransWeb’s 

attorney fees are not appropriate antitrust damages for

the Walker Process violation. 

In Walker Process, the Supreme Court held that a 

plaintiff could bring an action under § 2 of the Sherman 

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16 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

Act based on the alleged maintenance and enforcement of 

a fraudulently-obtained patent. See Walker Process

Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 173–

74 (1965). In order to prevail on a Walker Process claim, 

the antitrust-plaintiff must show two things: first, that 

the antitrust-defendant obtained the patent by knowing 

and willful fraud on the patent office and maintained and 

enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent 

procurement; and second, all the other elements necessary to establish a Sherman Act monopolization claim. 

See Ritz Camera & Image v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 

506 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

TransWeb’s monopolization claim arises under § 2 of 

the Sherman Act as an “attempt to monopolize.” 15 

U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The “other elements” necessary to 

establish an attempted monopolization claim are: “(1) 

that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize 

and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 

power.” Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 

447, 456 (1993). In determining the dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power for element (3), the 

courts look at “the relevant market and the defendant’s 

ability to lessen or destroy competition in that market.” 

Id.

In this case, 3M does not contest that TransWeb’s inequitable conduct showing, if affirmed, along with 3M’s 

bringing of the infringement suit proves the first Walker 

Process requirement, as well as elements (1) and (2) of the 

second Walker Process requirement. We have previously 

explained that Walker Process liability requires a higher, 

more specific showing of “knowing and willful fraud” than 

the more inclusive inequitable conduct doctrine. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059, 

1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 

476 F.3d 1337, 1346–48 (Fed. Cir. 2007). After Therasense, the showing required for proving inequitable 

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TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 17

conduct and the showing required for proving the fraud 

component of Walker Process liability may be nearly 

identical. See, e.g., Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, 

Inequitable Conduct and Walker Process Claims After 

Therasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. PA. J. BUS.

L. 361, 402 n.258 (2014). Regardless, because 3M does 

not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the jury’s Walker Process fraud finding beyond challenging the inequitable conduct finding, we will accept as 

admitted that TransWeb sufficiently demonstrated the 

Walker Process fraud component. 

Instead, 3M challenges whether the district court 

properly defined the relevant market for determining 

dangerous probability of monopoly power in element (3), 

and whether the award of TransWeb’s attorney fees is 

appropriate even if the Walker Process case were proven.

A 

The relevant market is defined by both a product 

market and a geographic market. See Brown Shoe Co. v. 

United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962). This court applies the law of the regional circuit as to market definition. See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068. Under Third 

Circuit law, the definition of both the product and geographic boundaries of the relevant market is a question of 

fact. See Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 212 

(3d Cir. 2005); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 825 (3d 

Cir. 1984). 

TransWeb defined two distinct markets: an “upstream” market for “fluorinated polymeric material” and a 

“downstream” market for NIOSH-certified respirators in 

the United States. 3M challenges the scope of the relevant products for the former and the geographic scope for 

the latter.

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18 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

i 

The relevant product market consists of all products 

that are “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for 

the same purposes.” United States v. E. I. du Pont de 

Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956); see also Queen 

City Pizza v. Domino’s Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir. 

1997). “Reasonable interchangeability” may be determined by looking at price, use, and qualities of the products. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 404; Tunis 

Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 

1991).

3M argues that the district court erred in limiting the

upstream market to fluorinated products. In particular, 

3M argues that non-fluorinated filter media, such as 

fiberglass and pleated material, are interchangeable with 

fluorinated media, and that TransWeb’s expert admitted 

as much.

While 3M points to evidence supporting a conclusion 

that fluorinated material does not form a distinct market, 

this does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jury’s conclusion to the contrary. Evidence 

demonstrated that: fluorinated material has a lower

pressure drop while maintaining high filtration, as compared to other filter media; fluorinated material has a 

longer service life than other filter media; and customers 

would pay more for respirators with the fluorinated 

media. Taken together, this evidence provides a sufficient 

basis on which a reasonable jury could conclude that the 

price, use, and qualities of fluorinated material render it a 

distinct market from other filter media.

ii

“The relevant geographic market is the area in which 

a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or 

services he or she seeks.” Tunis Bros., 952 F.2d at 726 

(quoting Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Med. Serv. Ass’n of Pa., 745 

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TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 19

F.2d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984)). “Consequently, the geographic market is not comprised of the region in which 

the seller attempts to sell its product, but rather is comprised of the area where his customers would look to buy 

such a product.” Id. at 726.

3M argues that the district court erred in limiting the 

downstream market for NIOSH-certified respirators to 

the United States. In particular, 3M argues that buyers

look to overseas companies to purchase NIOSH-certified 

respirators, and that TransWeb’s expert testimony on the 

relevant geographic market was without basis.

3M’s argument is based primarily on an artificial distinction. By repeatedly pointing to the potential for 

buyers to purchase NIOSH-certified respirators from 

foreign manufacturers, 3M implies that the “United 

States” market only includes respirators manufactured in 

the United States. But TransWeb’s expert clarified that 

sales of NIOSH-certified respirators in the United States 

by foreign manufacturers were already included in his 

calculations for the “United States” geographic market. 

See J.A. 2299. As such, the flaw proffered by 3M in the 

definition of the geographic market is not present.

Beyond this artificial distinction, there is also no lack 

of evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The district 

court noted that the NIOSH certifications are relevant to 

companies operating in the United States, as the United 

States OSHA promulgates regulations regarding the use 

of NIOSH-certified respirators by employees. As such, the 

jury could have reasonably concluded that NIOSH certification is most relevant to buyers in the United States, 

given that OSHA’s regulations are limited to the United 

States. Evidence also demonstrated that 3M itself reviewed sales in the United States market distinct from 

other markets. Finally, while 3M notes that TransWeb’s 

expert did not perform any “calculations” to determine 

that the United States is the relevant geographic market, 

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20 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

his testimony was still based on expert opinion on which 

the jury was entitled to rely. Therefore, there was a 

sufficient basis on which a reasonable jury could conclude 

that the United States was the relevant geographic market for the NIOSH-certified respirators.

B 

3M’s final challenge is to the district court’s award of 

attorney fees as antitrust damages.

Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that “any person 

who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 

of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall 

recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the 

cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 

U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). The jury concluded that TransWeb 

was entitled to its lost profits and attorney fees in recompense for 3M’s antitrust violation. The jury found 3M 

liable for approximately $34,000 in lost profits, which the 

district court awarded to TransWeb as the trebled amount 

of approximately $103,000. After review by a special 

master, the district court concluded that TransWeb incurred approximately $3.2 million in attorney fees prosecuting the antitrust claim and approximately $7.7 million 

defending the infringement suit. The district court 

awarded the $3.2 million on a one-for-one basis as “cost of 

suit” fees. The district court awarded the $7.7 million 

trebled to approximately $23 million as damages. 3M 

does not appeal the lost profits or cost of suit fees.

3M argues that the district court erred in awarding 

the $23 million of attorney-fees damages, because 

TransWeb failed to show any link between those attorney 

fees and an impact on competition. 3M argues that those 

attorney fees had no effect on competition because they 

did not force TransWeb out of the market or otherwise 

affect prices in the market. On this basis, 3M argues that 

those attorney fees are not an antitrust injury and thus 

cannot be a proper basis for antitrust damages.

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TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 21

Section 4 of the Clayton Act does not provide recompense for any injury causally linked to a violation of the 

antitrust laws, but rather only for antitrust injury. See 

Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 

(1990); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 

U.S. 477, 489 (1977). TransWeb’s injury-in-fact of $7.7 

million must be “attributable to an anti-competitive 

aspect of the practice under scrutiny” in order to qualify 

as an antitrust injury. Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 334. 

Stated another way, TransWeb’s injury-in-fact must 

“stem[] from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the 

defendant’s behavior,” not from competition-increasing or 

competition-neutral aspects. Id. at 344.

3M’s argument focuses on the fact that the harmful 

effect on competition proven by TransWeb at trial never 

actually came about. TransWeb proved at trial that 

increased prices for fluorinated filter media and respirators would have resulted had 3M succeeded in its suit. 

However, because TransWeb prevailed, these effects 

never materialized.

We do not read the antitrust injury requirement from 

Atlantic Richfield, Brunswick, and similar cases to so 

narrowly define the scope of antitrust injury. Those cases 

dealt with situations where the antitrust-defendants’

actions, though unlawful, would not have actually reduced competition. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 

337–38 (rejecting attempt to recover profits lost due to an 

increase in competition and reduction in prices caused by 

vertical, maximum-price-fixing arrangement); Cargill, 

Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 114–17 (1986) 

(rejecting attempt to block merger on the theory that the 

merged companies would increase competition and lower 

prices); Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487–88 (rejecting attempt 

to recover lost marginal profits that were not achieved 

because an acquiring company purchased a failing company, thus maintaining competition with the antitrustplaintiff).

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22 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

In this case, however, 3M’s unlawful act was in fact 

aimed at reducing competition and would have done so 

had the suit been successful. 3M’s unlawful act was the 

bringing of suit based on a patent known to be fraudulently obtained. What made this act unlawful under the 

antitrust laws was its attempt to gain a monopoly based 

on this fraudulently-obtained patent. TransWeb’s attorney fees flow directly from this unlawful aspect of 3M’s 

act. That is, TransWeb’s attorney fees “flow[] from that 

which makes [3M’s] acts unlawful,” Brunswick, 429 U.S. 

at 489, and are “attributable to [this] anti-competitive 

aspect of the practice under scrutiny,” Atl. Richfield, 495 

U.S. at 334. The “competition-reducing aspect,” id. at 

344, of 3M’s behavior was its attempt at achieving a 

monopoly by bringing the subject lawsuit. 3M’s failure to 

prevail in that lawsuit does not make the resultant attorney fees any less attributable to that behavior, and the 

attorney fees are precisely “the type of loss that the 

claimed violations would be likely to cause,” Brunswick, 

429 U.S. at 489 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 

Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)) (internal ellipses 

omitted). Therefore, TransWeb’s attorney fees are both 

injury-in-fact and antitrust injury.

3M relies on Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 

1426 (2013), as foreclosing TransWeb’s recovery of attorney fees as antitrust damages. But 3M relies on Comcast

primarily to refute TransWeb’s notion that it can separate 

the antitrust injury in § 4 from the injury-in-fact used for 

the basis of damages in § 4. On this point we agree with 

3M. Section 4 only contemplates a single injury, i.e., it 

does not allow one antitrust injury and a separate injuryin-fact that is used for the basis of damages. But this flaw 

in TransWeb’s position does not undo the damages award. 

TransWeb’s attorney fees are themselves both injury-infact and sufficiently stemming from the competitionreducing aspect of 3M’s behavior to qualify as antitrust 

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ance with this proper interpretation of the law, and 

TransWeb presented sufficient evidence for the jury to 

conclude that these requirements of § 4 were met.

This conclusion is supported by the only persuasive 

authority that addresses the award of attorney fees as 

damages for a Walker Process violation: Kearney & 

Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 

(6th Cir. 1977). In Kearney, the district court found the 

patentee liable under § 2 of the Sherman Act based on the 

Walker Process theory of liability. See id. at 372–73. The 

patentee had obtained a patent through inequitable 

conduct and later sued the defendant for infringement of 

that patent. See id. at 368–69, 371–72. The appeals court 

held that the defendant’s attorney fees could be awarded 

as § 4 damages even though “[the defendant] did not 

prove direct market place damages resulting from [the 

patentee’s] anticompetitive acts.” Id. at 374–75. The 

court relied on the reasoning from the district court that 

the patentee forced the defendant into a position of having to choose from three alternatives: cease competition, 

take a license, or defend the infringement action. See id.

at 374. The appeals court held that “one who has established or is attempting to establish an illegal monopoly by 

fraud on the Patent Office or misuse of a patent should 

not be permitted to further this goal by means of an 

infringement suit. When the antitrust violations are 

causally connected to the infringement action it is permissible to include the expenses of defending that action in 

the award of damages.” Id. 

While a causal connection is no longer a sufficient 

connection after Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489, decided that 

same year, the core logic in Kearney is still valid: the 

patentee instigated an anticompetitive suit that forced 

the defendant to choose between ceasing competition, 

taking a disadvantageous position in competition (taking 

a license), or defending the suit. Because the injury

suffered by the antitrust-plaintiff under each choice flows 

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24 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

from the anticompetitive aspect of the patent owner’s 

behavior, each can be recovered as antitrust damages.

3M had indicated that it would not license its patents 

to TransWeb. Therefore, in response to 3M’s anticompetitive infringement suit, TransWeb had only the options of 

ceasing competition altogether or defending the suit. Had 

TransWeb chosen the first option, evidence at trial 

demonstrated that TransWeb would have been forced out 

of the market and higher prices would have resulted. So,

harmful effects on competition would have resulted and

TransWeb would have undoubtedly suffered antitrust 

injury. TransWeb chose the second option. This prevented the harmful impacts to consumers of the relevant 

products but caused TransWeb to suffer a very real injury 

of its own, the cost of defending the suit. Both the lost 

profits suffered under option one and the attorney fees 

suffered under option two were attributable to what made 

3M’s behavior unlawful, i.e., bringing the lawsuit on a 

fraudulently-obtained patent in pursuit of a monopoly. 

Therefore, the injury suffered by TransWeb under either 

option qualifies as antitrust injury and thus can form the 

basis of damages under § 4.

We are further persuaded to our conclusion by the 

multitude of regional circuit precedents finding that 

attorney fees incurred defending an anticompetitive 

lawsuit can form the basis for antitrust damages. See 

Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 

814 F.2d 358, 371–76 (7th Cir. 1987) (permitting recovery 

of attorney fees for defending anticompetitive cartel suit 

even though sham litigation was not present); Rickards v. 

Canine Eye Registration Found., 783 F.2d 1329, 1334–35

(9th Cir. 1986) (permitting recovery of attorney fees for 

defense of sham litigation); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 

F.2d 842, 857–58 (1st Cir. 1985) (permitting recovery of 

attorney fees for defending bad faith assertion of trade 

secrets); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 

1295–98 (9th Cir. 1984) (permitting recovery of attorney 

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TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES 25

fees for defending bad faith prosecution of patent infringement suit); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 

F.2d 986, 996–97 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); American InfraRed Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., 360 F.2d 977, 996–97 

(8th Cir. 1966) (permitting recovery of attorney fees when 

a patent suit is in furtherance of an illegal monopolistic 

scheme, though the suit itself may not be sham litigation); 

Dairy Foods Inc. v. Dairy Maid Prods. Coop., 297 F.2d 

805, 808–10 (7th Cir. 1961) (same); Clapper v. Original 

Tractor Cab Co., 270 F.2d 616, 623–24 (7th Cir. 1959) 

(same); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 

424–25 (10th Cir. 1952) (same).

3M criticizes TransWeb’s reliance on cases such as 

Handgards that did not deal with Walker Process violations in particular. According to 3M, because some cases 

relied on by TransWeb dealt with sham litigation, the 

holdings are inapposite here. It is true that we have held 

that sham litigation and Walker Process are distinct 

avenues by which a party can lose Noerr-Pennington

immunity. See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071–72. In 

Nobelpharma, we noted that the Supreme Court had 

declined to explain how sham litigation and Walker 

Process liability relate to one another, so we declined to 

merge the two doctrines. See id. (discussing Prof’l Real 

Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 

U.S. 49, 61 n.6 (1993) (“PRE”)). We reasoned that the 

objective baselessness and subjective bad faith requirements for sham litigation laid out in PRE are one way 

that a party can lose antitrust immunity, while the “very 

specific conduct that is clearly reprehensible” and defined 

in Walker Process is another way. Id. at 1071.

But that distinction does not make the regional circuit 

cases dealing with sham litigation or other antitrust 

violations uninformative to the present issue of damages. 

While there are distinctions between the various types of 

antitrust violations, the logic underlying the award of 

attorney fees as antitrust damages is sufficiently similar 

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26 TRANSWEB, LLC v. 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES

to make those holdings relevant in the Walker Process

context. In particular, it is the abuse of the legal process

by the antitrust-defendant that makes the attorney fees 

incurred by the antitrust-plaintiff during that legal process a relevant antitrust injury. See Premier Electric, 814 

F.2d at 375–76 (explaining that fraud in litigation seeks 

to obtain more than authorized by the political branches 

and that “litigation costs incurred to combat the consequences of acts exceeding the authorization granted by 

the political branches could be the basis of liability”); 

Handgards, 601 F.2d at 997 (“In a suit alleging antitrust 

injury based upon a bad faith prosecution theory it is 

obvious that the costs incurred in defense of the prior 

patent infringement suit are an injury which ‘flows’ from 

the antitrust wrong.”). Cf. PRE, 508 U.S. at 58 (“Indeed, 

we recognized that recourse to agencies and courts should 

not be condemned as sham until a reviewing court has 

discerned and drawn the difficult line separating objectively reasonable claims from a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims which leads the factfinder to conclude that 

the administrative and judicial processes have been 

abused.” (internal quotation marks and modifications 

omitted)). 

No assertion of a patent known to be fraudulentlyobtained can be a proper use of legal process. No successful outcome of that litigation, regardless of how much the 

patentee subjectively desires it, would save that suit from 

being improper due to its tainted origin. Therefore, we 

find the holdings of our sister circuits allowing attorney 

fees as antitrust damages in contexts such as sham litigation and lawsuits in furtherance of a broader anticompetitive scheme to be persuasive arguments in favor of 

allowing TransWeb to recover its attorney fees as § 4 

damages in this case.

To conclude otherwise would be contrary to the purpose of the antitrust laws. The antitrust laws exist to 

protect competition. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320 

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(1962). If we were to hold that TransWeb can seek antitrust damages only under option one, forfeiture of competition, but not option two, defending the anticompetitive 

suit, then we would be incentivizing the former over the 

latter. This would amount to incentivizing TransWeb to 

forfeit competition rather than continue it. This is not in 

accord with the purpose of those very same antitrust laws.

Furthermore, it furthers the purpose of the antitrust 

laws to encourage TransWeb to bring its antitrust suit 

under option two instead of waiting to be excluded from 

the market under option one. If TransWeb proceeds only 

after being excluded from the market under option one, 

then the injury-in-fact will no longer be borne by 

TransWeb alone, but rather would be shared by all consumers in the relevant markets. 

For these reasons, we find that TransWeb’s attorney 

fees incurred defending the infringement suit are antitrust injury and thus can form the basis for damages 

under § 4. 

VI 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s 

denial of JMOL on non-invalidity and on the antitrust 

counts, as well as the district court’s judgment of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct.

AFFIRMED

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