Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02108/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02108-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMON CONTRERAS, CDCR #V-99014,

Plaintiff,

v.

RALPH DIAZ; PATRICK COVELLO; 

K. COTTRELL; C. ROCHA; V. 

CORTES; J. JUAREZ,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-02108-BAS-WVG

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 4.) 

For the reasons explained below, the Court DISMISSES the FAC with leave to amend.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 1, 2019, Ramon Contreras (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at 

Ironwood State Prison (“ISP”) located in Blythe, California, and proceeding pro se, filed 

a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Compl.”) against officials at the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), along with prison 

officials at the Richard J. Donovan (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. (Compl., ECF No. 

1.) Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he 

filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Mot. to Proceed IFP, ECF No. 2).

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On January 13, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and 

dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

and § 1915A(b). (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading in 

order to correct the deficiencies identified in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 12–13.) Plaintiff 

was cautioned that Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his amended 

complaint will be considered waived. (Id.) See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 

amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not realleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”).

On January 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed the FAC. (ECF No. 4.) In his FAC, Plaintiff 

no longer names Cruz, Seaman, and Plascencia as Defendants. (See id.) Accordingly, the 

claims against these parties are deemed waived and they are DISMISSED from this 

action. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928. 

II. SCREENING

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is 

proceeding IFP, his FAC also requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 

claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The 

purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need 

not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citation omitted).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

On June 13, 2018, while Plaintiff was housed at RJD, “a full search of the housing 

unit Plaintiff was housed in was conducted.” (FAC at 5.) During the search of Plaintiff’s 

cell, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rocha “falsely claimed” that Plaintiff had a “controlled 

substance” and filed a “false incident and rules violation report (‘RVR’).” (Id.) Due to 

this purportedly “false claim,” Plaintiff “spent . . . approximately 5 months in an 

administrative segregation unit (‘ASU’).” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was “ultimately exonerated” on January 10, 2019 and the “RVR was 

dismissed when he went for a rehearing on the RVR charge.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that 

“due process rights that should be provided to inmates during disciplinary proceedings 

were not provided to the Plaintiff.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rocha “claimed that he was the first and only officer to 

search Plaintiff’s cell” but this claim “was proven to be false.” (Id. at 6.) Defendant 

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Cottrell “was the superior officer overseeing the search” and “informed Plaintiff why he 

was going to be placed in ASU.” (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendant Cottrell that “he did not 

have a controlled substance in his property and that he had no knowledge of any 

controlled substance being inside the cell he occupied.” (Id.) Plaintiff also asked why he 

was being sent to ASU when he was “not the only inmate occupying the cell.” (Id.) 

Defendant Cottrell “responded by saying that the controlled substance was discovered in 

Plaintiff’s property.” (Id.)

However, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cottrell was “not acting as an impartial 

officer in her decision to only charge and place Plaintiff in ASU.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims 

this is a violation of CDCR policy that “mandates that when contraband is discovered in a 

cell occupied by two inmates and none of the inmates takes responsibility for the 

contraband both inmates are to be charged and placed in ASU.” (Id.) This purported 

policy violation was “noted” by the “officer who ultimately exonerated” Plaintiff. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Rocha did not place Plaintiff’s cellmate in ASU 

because he did “not want to deal” with Plaintiff’s cellmate because he is “hearing 

impaired.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rocha did not want to “deal with 

all the extra work so he lied.” (Id.) 

While Plaintiff was housed in ASU, he “maintained his innocence.” (Id.) 

However, during the committee hearing held on September 6, 2018, Plaintiff “agreed to 

sign a 128B NIK chrono accepting the results of the field test that was conducted on the 

contraband in order to proceed with the truth finding process.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims the 

only reason he agreed to sign this chrono was because “Defendant Covello and other 

committee members informed/guaranteed Plaintiff that it could not be used as evidence to 

find him guilty at his RVR hearing.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff had another committee meeting on September 20, 2018 and alleges 

Defendant Covello “reassured him that the 128B NIK chrono he signed could not be used 

against him.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Covello “further claimed that he 

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would follow Plaintiff’s case in order to make sure proper procedure would be followed.” 

(Id.) 

On October 11, 2018, Plaintiff “went before Defendant Cortes for his RVR 

hearing.” (Id.) Although Plaintiff “presented his case establishing his innocence, 

Defendant Cortes found him guilty on the ground that he accepted ‘ownership’ of the 

controlled substance when he signed the 128B NIK chrono.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff 

informed Defendant Cortes that Defendant Covello “and other committee members had 

guaranteed that the 128B NIK Chrono could not be used to find him guilty.” (Id.) 

Defendant Cortes told Plaintiff that “if the Warden was conducting the hearing, he would 

probably find Plaintiff not guilty” but since Defendant Cortes was the hearing officer who 

was conducting the hearing, Defendant Cortes was “finding Plaintiff guilty.” (Id. at 7–8.) 

Plaintiff claims Defendant Cortes was “not an impartial fact finder,” “denied his 

requests to have Defendant Rocha available/present so he could question him,” refused to 

“accept/incorporate into the record a written document Plaintiff prepared,” and his 

decision to “find Plaintiff guilty was arbitrary.” (Id. at 8.) 

After the guilty finding, Plaintiff “sent Defendant Covello and Juarez” grievance 

forms “explaining what happened at the RVR hearing and requesting for them to step in 

and correct the arbitrary guilty finding.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff alleges neither 

responded. (See id.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Juarez “was not an impartial fact-finder 

because he affirmed Defendant Cortes’ arbitrary guilty finding on October 28, 2018.” 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff’s father wrote to the “Office of Internal Affairs” and the “Office of the 

Ombudsman.” (Id.) At Plaintiff’s December 6, 2018 committee hearing, “two 

representatives [from the Office of the Ombudsman] showed up.” (Id.) Plaintiff again 

informed the committee that he had only been found guilty “due to the 128B NIK chrono 

he signed which he was told by Defendant Covello and other committee members that it 

could not be used as evidence to find him guilty.” (Id.) Defendant Juarez was one of the 

committee members and “acknowledged that he made an error by affirming Defendant 

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Cortes’ decision to find Plaintiff guilty, so he released [Plaintiff] from ASU and ordered 

the RVR re-issued and reheard on the ground that a due process violation occurred.” (Id. 

at 9.) 

Plaintiff alleges he suffered a “dramatic change” to his “living conditions” while he 

was housed in the ASU. (Id.) He was not permitted to have his “personal property and 

appliances,” given only a “pair of boxers, a pair of socks,” and a “jumpsuit (if there are 

any available), two sheets, one blanket, and one towel.” (Id.) Plaintiff was placed in 

handcuffs every time he left his cell and “ASU inmates are only allowed behind the glass 

visits.” (Id.) Plaintiff was not permitted to “use the phone or purchase packages.” (Id.) 

In addition, Plaintiff was only allowed “10 hours of outside recreation per week.” (Id.) 

On January 10, 2019, Plaintiff “had his hearing for the re-issued RVR and he was 

found not guilty.” (Id. at 11.) According to the “disciplinary hearing results,” Plaintiff 

was found not guilty “because Defendant Rocha provided inconsistent reports and 

statements.” (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff’s cellmate “submitted a declaration and reported 

to an investigative employee that the controlled substance belonged to him.” (Id.)

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, along with compensatory and punitive damages. 

(Id. at 15.) 

C. Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment

To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his due process rights by issuing 

a false RVR that resulted in being housed in the ASU and subjected to disciplinary 

hearings, he fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person 

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). “To state a procedural due process claim, [a 

plaintiff] must allege ‘(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a 

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deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.’” Wright v. 

Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 

995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)).

A prisoner is entitled to certain due process protections when he is charged with a 

disciplinary violation. Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564–571 (1974)). “Such protections include the rights 

to call witnesses, to present documentary evidence and to have a written statement by the 

fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action 

taken.” Id. These procedural protections, however, “adhere only when the disciplinary 

action implicates a protected liberty interest in some ‘unexpected matter’ or imposes an 

‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life.’” Id. (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)); Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003).

Although the level of the hardship must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and 

“[i]n Sandin’s wake the Courts of Appeals have not reached consistent conclusions for 

identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical and significant in any 

particular prison system,” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005), courts in the 

Ninth Circuit look to:

1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; 2) the duration of the 

condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state’s action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87); see also Chappell v. 

Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2013). Only if the prisoner alleges facts 

sufficient to show a protected liberty interest must courts next consider “whether the 

procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860.

The Court does find that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show that the 

deprivations he suffered as a result of his first disciplinary conviction imposed the type of 

“atypical and significant hardship” required by Sandin to invoke a liberty interest entitled 

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to Wolff’s procedural safeguards. (See FAC at 9.)

However, insofar as Plaintiff claims Rocha filed a “false incident and [RVR]” that 

led to Plaintiff being sent to the ASU (see FAC at 5), his allegations fail to state a 

plausible due process claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First, “[t]he issuance of a false 

RVR, alone, does not state a claim under section 1983.” Murschel v. Paramo, 2018 WL 

539159, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Dawson v. Beard, 2016 WL 1137029, at *5–6 

(E.D. Cal. 2016)). Instead, claims of arbitrary action by prison officials must grounded in 

“‘the procedural due process requirements as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell.’” Id. at *5 

(citing Ellis v. Foulk, 2014 WL 4676530, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Hanrahan v. 

Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984))). “[T]here is no due process right to be free 

from false disciplinary charges,” Solomon v. Meyer, 2014 WL 294576, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

2014), because “[t]he Constitution demands due process, not error-free decision-making.” 

Chavira v. Rankin, 2012 WL 5914913, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Johnson v. 

Felker, 2013 WL 6243280, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“Prisoners have no constitutionally 

guaranteed right to be free from false accusations of misconduct, so the mere falsification 

of a [rules violation] report does not give rise to a claim under section 1983.”) (citing 

Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) and Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 

949, 951–53 (2d Cir. 1986)).

To the extent Plaintiff claims he was denied procedural safeguards at his two 

disciplinary proceedings, his allegations are also insufficient. Disciplinary hearings must 

comport with the minimum requirements of due process and the decisions of a prison 

disciplinary must be supported by “some evidence.” See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558-60; 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1985). Under Wolff’s procedural 

safeguards, due process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) written notice of the charges 

against the prisoner; (2) a brief period of time to prepare for the hearing; (3) a written 

statement by the fact finder regarding the facts relied upon and the reasons for the 

disciplinary action; (4) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary 

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evidence; and (5) an opportunity to seek the aid of a fellow inmate or prison staff for 

complex matters. 418 U.S. at 563–70.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied the right to call witnesses at his first 

hearing and Defendant Cortes refused to “accept/incorporate into the record a written 

document Plaintiff prepared.” (FAC at 8.) Plaintiff does not allege that any Wolff

standards were not met at his second disciplinary hearing and therefore, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff has failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim as to his 

second disciplinary hearing.

However, even if not all of Wolff’s procedural safeguards were met at Plaintiff’s 

first disciplinary hearing, he has alleged the presence of “some evidence” that was relied 

on by Defendant Cortes in finding Plaintiff guilty at his first disciplinary hearing. 

Superintendent, 472 U.S. at 454–55. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cortes 

relied on the chrono Plaintiff had signed, along with the purportedly “false” report 

prepared by Defendant Rocha. (See FAC at 5, 8.) “Ascertaining whether [the some 

evidence] standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, 

independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” 

Superintendent, 472 U.S. at 454–55. Rather, “the relevant question is whether there is 

any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached” by the disciplinary 

hearing officer. Id. Plaintiff’s own allegations support a finding that there was “some 

evidence” in the record to support the finding and thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 

failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against any named Defendant.

D. Respondeat Superior

Finally, Plaintiff names Ralph Diaz, Secretary for the CDCR, as a Defendant. (See 

FAC at 1, 4.) Plaintiff offers no specific factual allegations regarding this Defendant 

other than alleging that Diaz is “legally responsible for the overall operation” of the 

CDCR and “each institution under its jurisdiction.” (Id. at 4.) However, Plaintiff fails to 

state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 because he fails to include “further factual 

enhancement” which describes how or when this Defendant was actually aware of any of 

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the alleged due process violations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). 

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. 

Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437–38 (9th Cir. 1993). “Because vicarious liability is 

inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, [Plaintiff] must plead that each government-official 

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” 

Iqbal, 556 at 676; see also Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los 

Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at 

least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in” in order to 

state a claim). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s FAC offers no factual detail from which the Court 

might reasonably infer a plausible claim for relief based on a violation of any 

constitutional right on the part of the Secretary of the CDCR. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “demands 

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and in order 

“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 662 U.S. 

at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). And a supervisory official may only be 

held liable under § 1983 if Plaintiff alleges his “personal involvement in the constitutional 

deprivation, or . . . a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242-–43 (9th 

Cir. 2018); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff makes no such allegations in his FAC. Therefore, the Court sua sponte

dismisses Defendant Diaz based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a plausible individual 

liability claim against him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1); Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1126–27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

E. Leave to Amend

In light of his pro se status, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an Amended 

Complaint in order to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order, if he can. 

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See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not 

dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Defendants Cruz, Seaman, and Plascencia as Defendants. See 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928. 

2. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and 

GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an 

Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc, 896 F.2d at 1546; 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928.

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, the Court will enter 

a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on his failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), 

and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See

Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take 

advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved civil rights 

complaint form for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 8, 2020

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