Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02697/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02697-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDRA EILRICH,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:09-cv-2697 CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 

(EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1), is pending before the court. Plaintiff seeks fees in the amount of 

$22,888.82.

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 Defendant contends fees under the EAJA should not be awarded because the 

government’s position was substantially justified. In the event fees are awarded, defendant 

contends that the claimed fees should be reduced by $4,263. In addition, defendant contends any 

fee that is awarded must be made payable to the plaintiff. 

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 In the reply, plaintiff seeks an additional sum of $1,902.89 in fees for ten hours (reduced from 

14 hours) spent in reviewing the opposition and researching and drafting the reply. The amount 

requested appears to be based on the maximum rate for work performed in 2015. Since work on 

the reply was performed in 2016, any award made for the reply will be based on the 2016 rate.

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A. Substantial Justification

The EAJA provides that the prevailing party in a civil action against the United States 

may apply for an order for attorneys’ fees and expenses within thirty days of final judgment in the 

action. An applicant for Social Security benefits receiving a remand under sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party, regardless of whether the applicant later succeeds in 

obtaining the requested benefits. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993). In this case, the 

matter was remanded under sentence four for further proceedings pursuant to the order of the 

court on cross-motions for summary judgment. See ECF No. 62. Plaintiff thus is entitled to an 

award of fees under the EAJA. The court must allow the fee award unless it finds that the 

position of the United States was substantially justified. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 568-69 

(9th Cir. 1995).

The burden of establishing substantial justification is on the government. Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). In Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), the 

Supreme Court defined “substantial justification” as ‘justified in substance or in the main’ -- that 

is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person. That is no different from the 

‘reasonable basis in both law and fact’ formulation adopted by the Ninth Circuit and the vast 

majority of other Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue. Id. at 565. A position does 

not have to be correct to be substantially justified. Id. at 566 n.2; see also Russell v. Sullivan, 930 

F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991), receded from on other grounds, Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 

1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002).

In determining substantial justification, the court reviews both the underlying 

governmental action being defended in the litigation and the positions taken by the government in 

the litigation itself. Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987), disapproved on other 

grounds, In re Slimick, 928 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1990). Where the underlying government action 

was not substantially justified, it is unnecessary to determine whether the government's litigation 

position was substantially justified. Andrew v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1988).

Defendant contends the government’s position was substantially justified. In support of 

this contention, defendant argues that the complex procedural history of this case, in which the 

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District Court initially upheld the decision of the Commissioner but then remanded the matter 

pursuant to the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, along with 

the medical record containing ambiguous evidence which was, in the government’s view,

unlikely to be resolved by further development of the record, demonstrates that the government’s 

position was substantially justified. This court does not agree. As noted in the order granting 

plaintiff’s second motion for summary judgment, the ALJ specifically ignored the mandate of the 

appellate court and found the new evidence from Dr. Galanopoulus was not probative. Although 

defendant is correct that the government can lose on the merits and its position still be 

substantially justified for purposes of EAJA, defendant’s argument in this instance is unavailing. 

In reviewing the entire evidentiary record, briefing on the cross-motions for summary judgment 

and order granting remand in this case, the court has determined defendant’s position had no 

reasonable basis in either law or fact. In failing to properly consider the additional evidence, as 

directed by the appellate court, the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified. See, 

e.g., Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (position not justified where ALJ 

mischaracterized medical evidence); see also Roe v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2016 WL 

3064645 (9th Cir. May 31, 2016) (court must evaluate procedural error in determining substantial 

justification). Fees under the EAJA will therefore be awarded. 

B. Reasonable Fee

The EAJA directs the court to award a reasonable fee. In determining whether a fee is 

reasonable, the court considers the hours expended, the reasonable hourly rate, and the results 

obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

424 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant does not contest the hourly 

rate claimed but challenges several of the entries as not properly charged to defendant, or 

otherwise excessive, unreasonable or insufficiently documented. Defendant first contests $2,030 

in fees claimed for non-attorney representative Shirley Hull. Defendant contends EAJA does not 

authorize fees for non-attorney representatives. In the circumstances of this case, defendant is 

correct. The billing records, fee agreement between Ms. Hull and plaintiff, and the appointment 

of representative demonstrate that Ms. Hull was not working under the supervision of an attorney 

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while representing plaintiff at the administrative level. See ECF No. 65-1, Administrative 

Transcript (“AT 379-380). Plaintiff is accordingly not entitled to EAJA fees for Ms. Hull’s 

representation. See Ferrando v. Comm’r, 2013 WL 1087800, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 14, 2013); see 

also Cook v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 226 (1994) (in context of veteran appeal, EAJA fees not 

recoverable for non-attorney representative unsupervised by attorney). The amount of $2,030 

will therefore be deducted from the fee award.

Defendant also contests a claim of $439.04 in fees spent on addressing an order to show 

cause and an order to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff does not oppose this reduction. 

The court finds that these fees are not reasonably charged to defendant and this amount will be 

deducted as well. The court finds the remainder of defendant’s challenges to be unwarranted. 

Upon review of the entire record, the court is satisfied that plaintiff’s counsel has not engaged in 

duplicative billing, claimed excessive hours for legal research, or improperly claimed fees for 

clerical tasks. A total of $2,469.04 will therefore be deducted from the amount claimed. In 

addition, the court will award $1,917 for fees incurred in connection with the reply.2

The EAJA award must be made by this court to plaintiff, and not to counsel. See Astrue 

v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that fees pursuant to the EAJA are awarded to 

plaintiff in the amount of $22,336.78.

Dated: October 14, 2016

4 eilrich2697.eaja

 

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 The court finds the 10 hours claimed by counsel is reasonable. The statutory maximum rate 

under EAJA for work performed in the first half of 2016 is $191.70/hour. 

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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