Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03548/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03548-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVAREE Q. BULLOCK,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JAMES YATES, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 06-3548 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of the State of

California in and for the County of Alameda of second degree robbery and

possession of a firearm by a felon. The court found that he had suffered one prior

serious felony “strike” conviction. On August 24, 2004, petitioner was sentenced

to a 21-year state prison term. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction on

January 19, 2006, and, on March 29, 2006, the Supreme Court of California

denied review. Petitioner then filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the prosecutor’s use of peremptory

challenges against African-American jurors based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 79 (1986). Per order filed on June 2, 2006, the court found that the petition,

when liberally construed, stated cognizable claims under § 2254 and ordered

respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause and petitioner has

filed a traverse. 

Case 3:06-cv-03548-CRB Document 17 Filed 07/31/07 Page 1 of 21
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“Mr. F[.], I expected he was not going to end up on this jury, and

I wouldn’t have blamed any of the three of you for excusing him, given

his attitude about attorneys, as well as his–even though [he] denied it, I

got this feeling he had some serious misgivings about the judicial system

as a whole, and it may have been all caught up in the fact that attorneys

are involved, whether it’s a criminal cases or civil cases [ sic ], but I also

felt that getting information out of him was like pulling teeth as to some

information, and I felt that he wasn’t being entirely forthright in his

feelings, his attitudes, and any potential biases, but–and I took particular

note of his attitude about attorneys.

 “As to Ms. [S.G.], . . . I saw something that doesn’t show up in a

record. It wouldn't show up in a transcript, particularly when Ms.

Ynostroza was talking to her. There was an attitude. It’s interesting.

She’s an employee of the court working down at the Wiley W. Emanuel

Courthouse, but she was dripping with attitude, as far as I’m concerned.

Particularly when Ms. Ynostroza was questioning her. Not only when

Ms. Ynostroza was questioning her, but that I was particularly struck

2

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as

follows:

Bullock’s counsel, Michael Dinning, raised four Wheeler

objections, which case law treats as preserving Batson objections as

well (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118). Each was

overruled. We review the pertinent voir dire proceedings.

First motion. The first objection came after prosecutor Maya

Ynostroza’s third peremptory challenge, the last two being against

Black jurors K.F. and S.G. Dinning (joined by codefendant's

counsel) asked that the panel be stricken, saying: “I don’t think there

was anything wrong with either of those persons sitting as jurors in

this case, and I think that the prosecution has a burden now of

explaining why Ms. [S.G.] and why Mr. F[.] were not acceptable.”

The court confirmed the jurors’ ethnicity and said: “A ruling on a

Wheeler motion is not simply a matter of counting, however, and

while I recognize what the numbers are, I do not consider that there

is a prima facie showing of systematic exclusion of Blacks, and I’ll

tell you why I'm making that determination. I’m not blind, and I’m

not–and I don’t make a determination by turning a blind eye toward

what I’ve seen and heard.”

The court then recited its own observations about reasons for

striking the jurors1

 and ruled: “[S]o I do not find, at this point, based

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with that, and for that reason, again, I had a strong feeling that she was

going to be-that there was going to be a peremptory challenge directed at

her, which I understand, and I take that into account.”

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upon this showing, that there is a prima facie showing of systematic

exclusion, and I, therefore, do not feel it necessary to call upon the

People to justify that which I don’t think is illegal, at this point. I

will–Ms. Ynostroza, if you’d like an opportunity to be heard on your

reasons, I’ll be happy to give you that opportunity, but I’m not going

to require it.” Ynostroza responded, “I think, essentially, the court

articulated what I was prepared to articulate had the court found a

prima facie case, so I'm satisfied with the court’s record.”

Second motion. Dinning moved again to discharge the panel

after Ynostroza had exercised her twelfth challenge in all, including

two more against Black jurors–Ms. L.G. and Mr. J.G. The court said

it was “extremely puzzled” by the challenge to Mr. J.G. It felt that a

prima facie case was shown and asked Ynostroza to explain “all

four.”

Ynostroza reinforced the court’s earlier observations as to the

first two (fn.1, ante ), and no appeal argument attacks those

particular justifications. Mr. K.F., she said, had expressed “strong

feelings about” and “didn't like” attorneys, was not “forthcoming”

with information, and had a brother-in-law who had served time in

Tennessee for a drug offense because, K.F. felt, “he didn’t turn

someone else in” and was “ ‘at the wrong place, at the wrong time.’ “

Ms. S.G. was familiar to Ynostroza from S.G.’s job at “the criminal

counter” at the Wiley W. Manuel Courthouse. Ynostroza did not

think S.G. recognized her but “felt hostility from her” and that she

“wasn’t looking at me in a pleasant way.” Ynostroza felt this “some”

in S.G.’s interactions with other counsel, too, and felt that she was

not “taking well to being here in the first place”; it felt “personal,”

and Ynostroza was uncomfortable with S.G.’s ability “to be

objective and listen to evidence” in a case where Ynostroza had the

burden of proof.

Ms. L.G., Ynostroza felt, seemed “honest and up-front” at

first, despite having a cousin convicted for auto theft, but “her body

language changed” after the court denied her a hardship excuse

sought for employment due to a husband’s disability. Her “[a]rms

crossed to the side of her,” and Ynostroza did not feel she would

listen to the evidence, work with other jurors, or give the case the

attention both sides needed.

Mr. J.G. had “been sitting in the box for quite a while. . . . He

looked at me a number of times, and made me uncomfortable. Not

only did I watch, specifically, when certain jurors, who were being

honest about their difficulty in being fair and impartial, particularly

Ms. F[.], who’s seated number one, when she was talking about the

stop light–the red light/green light hypothetical with a police officer

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and civilian witness–he looked over and appeared to be very

annoyed and frustrated with the responses that she was giving. I felt

she was being honest, and she was informing us all of her position

and her feelings, based on her life experiences, having grown up in

Ohio, and her belief that law enforcement is a good thing. Then,

also, when Ms. S[.] was speaking–with both prospective jurors–Mr.

[J.G.] leaned forward and had a very–I thought–disdainful reaction

on his face, when they were providing the court and the attorneys

with, just their personal beliefs and opinions, based on the questions

that were being asked of them. And someone who responds in that

way makes me think that this is a situation where, possibly, he could

be someone who would dig his heels in, and would not at least listen

to other people’s opinions, were it to come to the deliberation

process. And it did not make me feel comfortable that this was going

to be someone who would be able to work with other people, based

on his reaction to responses which I felt were genuine responses. I

didn’t feel that either of those two women were particularly trying to

get out of serving as jurors, but they were providing their responses.”

The court then invited comment from Dinning, who said he

wanted to “lightly touch on” Mr. K.F. and Ms. S.G., as to whom the

court had “already made certain factual findings” (on the prior

motion). “To the utmost extent,” Dinning said, he did “not share” the

court’s concerns about “attitude dripping from” Ms. S.G. or any

concerns about Mr. K.F. What the court construed as “difficulty” in

eliciting information, Dinning felt, was just a serious attempt to

respond honestly and fairly to each question. Turning to the newly

struck jurors, Dinning said he was “just overwhelmed” with Mr. J.G.

and began to state the juror’s experiences. “Forgive me for

interrupting,” the court interjected: “I know everything he said, and

the record will reflect that, but [Ynostroza's] comments about Mr.

[J.G.] had nothing to do with the answers that he gave. Her

reasons–it was more her observations of his demeanor and reaction

to certain other prospective jurors after we talked to them. So I don’t

think we need to focus on that so much. I agree with you that there’s

nothing in what he said which I could point to as a reason for

excluding him from this jury, but what I would like you to do is

direct your comments to her justification, because she’s not claiming

there’s anything in what he said, either.”

So focused, Dinning went on to say he did not think that the

juror’s demeanor was inappropriate and saw nothing unusual in the

juror’s reaction to the way in which another juror had behaved in

“obviously and transparently” trying to “get herself off the jury .” He

could not “feel more confident” in Mr. [J.G.’s] ability to be fair and

felt that striking him was for improper purposes. Invited by the court

to add comments, codefendant’s counsel Stephen Naratil said that he

heard “sighs in the back” upon the striking and had himself “raised

[his] eyebrows.” As for the juror who was challenged after her

hardship excuse was denied, Naratil felt she “was probably

disappointed,” and he had not noticed anything out of the ordinary.

Conceding that he did not look at the jurors “all the time,” Naratil

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The court having stated its ruling twice, with detailed reasons,

codefendant's counsel Mr. Naratil, who had joined in the objection,

pressed, “Does the court find it odd, out of the six-“ but was cut short by

the court saying: “I just made a ruling, and after I make the ruling, I don’t

need-I don’t particularly want to get into a dialogue or debate about

whether it was a correct ruling. It’s kind of the one you’re stuck with, but

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“certainly didn’t see any type of strange looks that the court saw, or

any type of looks dripping with [attitude].” Mr. K.F., he thought, had

been “thoughtful in his responses, not trying to evade responses.”

The court denied the motion, explaining as to Ms. S.G. that

the prosecutor’s term “ ‘hostility’ “ better described her than the

court’s term “ ‘attitude.’ “ Next, the court related the same concern

about a change of attitude, or “indifference,” in Ms. L.G. once that

juror’s belated request for hardship excuse had been denied, adding:

“And I didn’t make any comment about it at the time the motion was

made here, because I wasn’t going to feed that to the district

attorney. I wanted to see what she had to say, but it’s interesting she

made the same observation that I did. And I think that that is a

legitimate concern on the part of the district attorney, who has to

convince all twelve people.”

Finally, the court reiterated as to Mr. J.G. that the prosecutor’s

concern had not been with anything J.G. answered, but with J.G.’s

“reactions, as perceived by her, to other prospective jurors. I didn’t

make those observations,” the court stressed, “but I wasn’t paying

attention to [J.G.]. I was focused on the people that were being

questioned at the time, so I’m just not in a position to be able to

make any comment on that, firsthand. I think that those are–if

[Ynostroza] made those observations, that's a legitimate basis for

having a concern. I accept Ms. Ynostroza’s good faith representation

that those are the observations she made. I can’t observe everything

that goes on in that jury box, and so I think I have to, as long as I feel

that the–that that was an honest, good faith description of what she

saw, I do accept that.”

The court closed: “And I’d also note that the issue here is

whether there's been a systematic exclusion on the basis of race, and

with regard to the first three . . . my own observations tell me that

there are legitimate reasons, as articulated by Ms. Ynostroza, for

excusing them, which leaves Mr. [J.G.] as the only person regarding

whom I made no personal observations. But I would not–I don’t

think it’s necessarily appropriate to find systematic exclusion based

on excusing one person, whereas there are three other people that I

can see very legitimate reasons for. I’m saying this, in addition to

accepting Ms. Ynostroza’s remarks in [ sic ] being made honestly

and in good faith, so for the reasons articulated, the motion is

denied.”2

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if I did wrong, you’ve got a record.”

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The court both times deemed unchallenged Blacks “irrelevant,”

saying the first time this was “[b]ecause we’re not done with jury

selection,” and the second time, that “it sound[ed] like tokenism.”

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Third motion. Dinning objected again when Ynostroza

peremptorily challenged a fifth Black juror, Mr. A.F., and the matter

was taken up the next morning, codefendant again joining the

motion. The court asked for an explanation, and Ynostroza, noting as

she had the last time that there were two Black jurors remaining in

the box,3

 cited first the fact that when the court remarked that it had a

college roommate with the juror’s unusual first name and thus knew

how to pronounce it, the juror gave a “humorless,” “deadpan”

response of, “I go by Quen,” which did not at all resemble the given

name. Ynostroza added that, when seated in the box, A.F. was

unusually nervous and uncomfortable. He was either nervous “or

totally indifferent,” she thought, had an extremely low, quiet voice

that was hard to hear, gave responses that were “minimal, at best,”

and lacked any sort of “human expression.” Ynostroza's initial

impression of him as a loner grew stronger with the questioning, and

she had “a real concern,” based on his demeanor, that he would have

trouble interacting with others. She feared that he could not make his

opinions known or relate to others, and she had earlier excused a

White male juror for similar reasons.

The court responded, first, by finding the humorless response

to the name remark not “that bizarre” in that “Quen” was the start of

the man’s middle name, which he would understandably use given

his unusual first name. The court did, however, agree with the

observations of demeanor: “My read on him was he stutters. And

people who will stutter oftentimes tend to withdraw. They’re

embarrassed. And so the way he conducted himself, in my mind, was

consistent with that”–stuttering that left him “a bit of a loner. . . . So

in certain respects, I agree with you. In other respects, I don’t

necessarily agree with you. But if your major concern was for

whatever reason he appears to be a loner, who may not relate well to

other people, I consider that . . . a reason for excusing him to which

this court should properly defer, because it’s not an invalid reason.

It’s not necessarily an unreasonable reason, and I do recognize your

need to convince twelve people unanimously. So it seems to me, the

ability to relate to the other jurors would be a legitimate concern,

and, actually, the record should reflect that he does stutter or

stammer.” Ynostroza said she had noticed the stuttering but not

mentioned it, unsure whether it was a medical condition or just

brought on by nerves. The court said: “Well, that was my read,

but–and I think that has to do with the way he conducted himself,

and I don’t think your description of how he conducted himself is

really inaccurate. It’s consistent with what I saw and just can see

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“Mr. Dinning: Your Honor, do I have any chance at all to respond

to the characterizations?

“The Court: Well, you know, I got to say, I thought about that,

and–and I’m basing this upon what she said and my observations, and I

don't think it's necessary for you to respond.

“The question for me is, do I believe that that’s a good–that she’s

representing a good faith or actual reasons and are they supported–well,

they don’t have to necessarily be, but are they supported by either

responses to questions or my own observations? And you can make all the

arguments that you want, but I believe that they are, and I’m not–my job is

not to decide whether this is a person that she should excuse. My job is

simply to decide whether her motivation for excusing this man, or any of

the African-Americans, and I heard her justification for the others, so I

didn’t need to inquire again: Was it racially motivated? And I believe I

accept her race-neutral explanation, and I don’t think comments by

defense counsel are going to add or take away from that, because they

don’t change what I heard, what I saw, and they don’t change what's going

through the district attorney's mind.

“Mr. Dinning: Well, I would like the record to reflect, Your Honor,

that I view this third occasion, upon which we’ve been compelled to bring

a Wheeler motion in this action, based upon now a fifth strike of an

African-American juror, to be a constitutional dimension, and I feel,

moreover-

“The Court: Counsel, wait, wait. I don't need that, because I know

that. To make the motion is a shorthand way for articulating all of that. It’s

all based on notions of due process and a fair trial. I thought that what you

wanted to respond to were what her actual comments were, and what

you're arguing I don’t need. I know all that. I know that’s why you’re

making the motion, and your outrage is not going to change my ruling.

That’s my ruling.”

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possible a reason for it, but I think that I accept your explanation. I

don’t find it to be unreasonable, based upon my observations of Mr.

[A.F.], and, for that reason, the so-called Wheeler motion will be

denied.”

Each defense counsel then offered views which the court

indicated, in essence, were unhelpful or had already been assumed

and considered.4

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Fourth motion. The final motion, again joined by

codefendant, came when Ynostroza exercised a sixth peremptory

challenge against a Black juror, this time Ms. E.L., one she had first

tried unsuccessfully to challenge for cause.

The court this time did not require Ynostroza to justify the

action because it did “not find that there’s a prima facie showing of

systematic exclusion” and felt it was “pretty obvious why any district

attorney would excuse Ms. [E.L.]. Not only does she characterize her

son as being constantly harassed by the police because he’s an

African-American male.” E.L. had also “expressed a rather

strong–although not absolute unwillingness to accept as true what

police officers say, and . . . any district attorney would be reasonably

justified in not wishing to take a chance on leaving a juror of that

frame of mind on the jury, particularly where she goes so far as to

point out that at least one of the defendants, as she puts it, ‘favors her

son.’ In other words, [he] makes her think of her son, visually, which

gives rise to also a concern about potential sympathy. For those

reasons, I’m not going to ask–I don’t think it's necessary to ask the

district attorney to justify excusing that juror, and the record reflects

all the things that I’ve just articulated [as] contained in her answers.

So the so-called Wheeler motion is denied.” Neither defense counsel

offered or asked to speak.

People v. Bullock, No. A107667, slip op. at 1-9 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006)

(footnotes in original) (Pet. Ex. D).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

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In California, a party who believes his opponent is using his peremptory

challenges to strike jurors on grounds of group bias alone may raise the point by way of

a timely motion. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280 (1978). After Batson,

these motions have been commonly referred to in the California courts as

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[the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court's application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id. 

B. Claims

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying his four

“Batson/Wheeler motions.”5

 He specifically claims that the court: (1) used the

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“Batson/Wheeler motions.” 

6

Petitioner also claims that the AEDPA “unconstitutionally infringes upon the

role of federal courts.” This claim has been soundly rejected by the Ninth Circuit. See

Crater v. Galaza, No. 05-17027, slip op. 8135, 8140-55 (9th Cir. July 9, 2007).

7

During step two, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. 

Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason

offered will be deemed race-neutral. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360

(1991).

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wrong standard in ruling on his motions; (2) did not permit defense counsel to

present argument after the prosecutor provided reasons for excusing two of the

jurors; and (3) failed to make a sincere and reasoned evaluation of the

prosecutor’s stated reasons, and thereby deprived him of his right to equal

protection under Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).6

The Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of jurors by peremptory

challenge solely on account of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Batson permits

prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges under a three-step

process. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the

prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Id. at 96-97. 

That is, the defendant must demonstrate that the facts and the circumstances of

the case “raise an inference” that the prosecution has excluded venire members

from the petit jury on account of their race. Id. at 96. If the defendant makes this

showing, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral

explanation for striking the jurors in question. Id. at 97.7

 Finally, the court must

determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful

discrimination. Id. at 98. To fulfill its duty, the court must evaluate the

prosecutor’s proffered reasons and determine whether there was intentional

discrimination. Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F3d 824, 831 (9th Cir 2003).

The findings of the state trial court on the issue of discriminatory intent

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In reversing Collins v. Rice, 348 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), the Supreme Court

determined that the Ninth Circuit improperly substituted its evaluation of the record for

that of the state trial court. See Rice, 126 S. Ct. at 973. “Reasonable minds reviewing

the record might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, but on habeas review that

does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s credibility determination.” Id. at 975-76

(holding the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to use a set of debatable inferences to set aside the

conclusion reached by the state court does not satisfy AEDPA’s requirements for

granting a writ of habeas corpus).

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are findings of fact entitled to the presumption of correctness in federal habeas

review. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995). So are the findings of

the state appellate court. See Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir.

2004); Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), this means

that a state court’s findings on discriminatory intent are presumed sound unless

the petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. MillerEl v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). The

petitioner must show the state court’s conclusion to be “an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). Therefore, a federal habeas

court can only grant habeas relief “if it was unreasonable to credit the

prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Batson challenge.” Rice v. Collins,

126 S. Ct. 969, 974 (2006).8

 The standard is demanding, but not insatiable. 

Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240.

1. Standard of Review

The trial court used the term “systematic exclusion” in explaining

its reasoning for its ruling on three of petitioner’s four motions. With regards to

the first motion, the court stated: “I do not consider that there is a prima facie

showing of systematic exclusion of Blacks.” As a result, the court did not require

the prosecutor to provide a race neutral explanation of its two challenges. 

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However, upon the second motion, the court did find a prima facie case of

discrimination for the first two strikes and did require the prosecutor to provide a

race neutral explanation, thus negating any error in not finding a prima facie case

earlier. In ruling on the second motion, the court accepted the prosecutor’s race

neutral explanation for striking one of the jurors, stating that it did not find

“systematic exclusion.” Finally, in ruling on the fourth motion, the court once

again found that petitioner had not made a prima facie case of discrimination

because petitioner had not shown evidence of “systematic exclusion.”

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s use of the term “systematic

exclusion” constituted reversible error. The California Court of Appeal rejected

his contention stating: 

The court repeatedly used the term “systematic exclusion”

rather than “purposeful racial discrimination,” and Bullock sees this

as prejudicial error. We do not. We agree that “systematic exclusion”

applies in the context of motions to quash a venire for selection

procedures that assertedly result in systematic exclusion of a class of

jurors in violation of the constitutional fair-cross-section requirement

( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 855-858), and is a

misnomer in the Batson/Wheeler context, where the challenge is to a

panel for asserted racial discrimination in the use of strikes (see

People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1152, fn. 1 [defining venire

and panel ] ). But the main concern is that the word “systematic”

might be misconstrued to vitiate settled law that the unconstitutional

exclusion of even one juror on improper grounds of racial or group

bias requires court action ( People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903,

927, fn. 8), and we find no support for Bullock's concern that such

misconstruction permeated the rulings here.

Our state high court has noted the stubborn persistence of the

term “systematic exclusion” in Batson/Wheeler rulings, long ago

calling it inapposite ( People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 716,

fn. 4) and recently calling it “somewhat of a misnomer,” yet not

faulting its use when “this and other courts have used and understood

that term as an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting Wheeler

error” and, in that case, declining to conclude from its use “that a

wrong standard was applied” ( People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th

at p. 927, fn. 8; but see id. at pp. 933-934 (dis. opn. by Kennard, J.)).

The record does not, as Bullock maintains, show any

misunderstanding that the prosecutor had to “systematically” exclude

Blacks–i.e., leave none in the box or have unconstitutional motives

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for every strike–to warrant Batson/Wheeler relief. Bullock relies on

the court’s remarks in the second ruling that it had not made the same

“personal observations” Ynostroza had and did not “think it’s

necessarily appropriate to find systematic exclusion based on

excusing one person, whereas there are three other people that I can

see very legitimate reasons for.” The court, however, was not

referring to a need for the prosecutor to strike every Black juror or

have improper motives for all of them. Rather, the context (set forth

earlier in this opinion) shows the court saying only that, while it had

not personally observed one juror’s demeanor (occurring while other

jurors were being questioned), it had seen such conduct in three

others and, partly for that reason, felt that the prosecutor was telling

the truth about what she saw in the fourth. The very next words out of

the court’s mouth confirm this: “I’m saying this, in addition to

accepting Ms. Ynostroza's remarks [as] being made honestly and in

good faith.” So do these preceding remarks: “I can’t observe

everything that goes on in that jury box, and so I think I have to, as

long as I feel that the–that that was an honest, good faith description

of what she saw, I do accept that.” Further confirming lack of any

misconception that all Black jurors had to be stricken are the court’s

statements, in the second and third rulings, that it deemed the

existence of Black jurors left in the box “irrelevant.” The notion that

unstricken Black jurors were entirely “irrelevant” to discerning racial

discrimination was a dubious one ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th

137, 168 [passed jurors considered]; People v. Gray (2001) 87

Cal.App.4th 781, 787 [passed group members a factor, though not

conclusive] ) but does in this instance serve to negate the possibility

of any erroneous thinking about the term “systematic exclusion.” 

People v. Bullock, slip op. at 10-11.

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s claim was not

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent, nor was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner argues that the state court of appeals improperly relied on

Reynoso because in that case the lower court only used the term “systematic

exclusion” once rather than repeatedly. See People v. Reynoso, 31 Cal. 4th 903,

927 (2003). The issue, however, is not how many times the lower court used the

wrong term, but rather whether use of that term implies that the court used the

wrong standard. 

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In this case, the lower court’s use of the term in finding no prima facie

case on the first motion clearly does not amount to an unreasonable application of

federal law because the court later did find a prima facie case and did require the

prosecutor to present a credible race-neutral reason for the strike, as required by

Batson. The California Court of Appeal’s explanation of the use of the term on

the second motion does not represent an objectively unreasonable determination

of the facts or an objectively unreasonable application of federal law. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Though the lower court used the wrong term, it did not rely on

that reasoning in denying the motion, but rather found that the prosecutor

presented a credible, race-neutral explanation. Finally, on the fourth motion the

court again used the wrong term, but also once again looked to the existence of

race-neutral reasons for excusing the juror in finding that the petitioner had not

made a prima facie case. This Court is satisfied that despite the state trial court’s

use of the term “systematic exclusion,” there is no indication that the trial court

actually applied an incorrect standard. The California Court of Appeal’s

conclusion to this effect certainly cannot be considered objectively unreasonable. 

See id. 

2. Defense argument

Petitioner claims that the state trial court erred by curtailing defense

counsel’s argument during the second and third motions. The California Court of

Appeal rejected this claim, stating: 

On the second motion, the court specifically invited defense

counsel Dinning to comment on the justifications, and he did so at

length. The court did interrupt toward the start, when Dinning

explained how he “attempted to be extremely secretive regarding the

making of these motions,” but the court correctly called that

irrelevant and asked him to respond to the justifications, “because

that's where we are at this point”–implicitly meaning step three.

Then Dinning went on for two and a half transcript pages about the

justifications, interrupted only once, when he began reciting Mr.

J.G.’s background. The court properly redirected counsel to the

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justifications, noting that the prosecutor had not relied on anything in

the juror’s responses as justification for striking him, that the record

would reflect those facts, and that the court was “just trying to cut

right to the chase, and avoid wasting time” on other matters. Dinning

finished without further interruption, and the court then invited

codefendant's counsel to comment, letting him finish before ruling.

No conceivable error appears.

On the third motion, the court did proceed to rule before

considering defense argument. However, unlike the prior motion

involving justifications for four jurors, this time the court already

had all prior input and only the justifications for one new strike to

consider. Also, again unlike the last time, the court had observed for

itself all of the observations the prosecutor cited. The court

thoroughly addressed them, agreeing in the end with the root

concerns but explaining in detail that it attributed some of the juror’s

odder reactions and demeanor to a stuttering problem. When Dinning

then asked if he would have “any chance at all to respond to the

characterizations,” the court explained at length its bases for ruling

and said it did not believe defense counsel's comments would

“change what I heard, what I saw, and . . . what’s going through the

district attorney’s mind” (set out more fully in fn. 4, ante ).

Nevertheless, the court did entertain remarks by Dinning and cut him

off only when counsel focused on the circumstances of this being a

third Wheeler motion and the fifth stricken Black juror. The court

explained: “Counsel, wait, wait. I don't need that, because I know

that. . . . I thought that what you wanted to respond to were what her

actual comments were, and what you're arguing I don’t need. I know

all that. I know that’s why you're making the motion, and your

outrage is not going to change my ruling.” (Italics added.) In spite of

that elaborate explanation, Dinning offered nothing directed to the

prosecutor's comments, and there is no reason to think that such

argument would have been rejected if offered. Erroneous limitation

of argument is not shown.

People v. Bullock, slip op. at 13-14. The California Court of Appeal’s rejection

of petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

In determining the credibility of the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation,

the court must evaluate the prosecutor's proffered reasons and credibility under

the totality of the relevant facts, using all the available tools including its own

observations and the assistance of counsel. Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039,

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1047 (9th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2003). In both

motions at issue here, the trial court evaluated all relevant facts and curtailed

defense counsel’s arguments only when it was satisfied that his arguments would

not have added anything new to the matter at hand. 

On the second motion, defense counsel’s arguments concerned Mr. J.G.’s

qualifications as a juror, not the credibility of prosecutor’s claim that he believed

Mr. J.G. would not work well with other jurors. At the third stage of a Batson

claim, the juror’s qualification are no longer relevant, since a prima facie case has

already been made. Likewise, on the third motion, defense counsel’s arguments

concerned the number of African-American jurors already removed, a fact

relevant for making the prima facie case but less relevant in responding to the

credibility of the prosecutor’s justification. The state appellate court reasonably

concluded that the trial court only curtailed the defense counsel’s arguments

when it was clear that defense counsel had no relevant comment to add to the

proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). After all, nothing in the record suggests

that the prosecutor’s race-neutral justification for striking the jurors would have

been rejected had defense counsel been allowed to argue further. 

3. Evaluation of prosecutor’s credibility

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim that the

court did not make a “sincere and reasoned” attempt to determine the legitimacy

of the prosecutor’s race neutral explanations and instead conflated steps two and

three of the evaluation by simply accepting any plausible explanation. The court

explained: 

We do not read the record that way. Had the court simply

accepted any plausible explanation, it would have had no need to

find, as it did, that Ynostroza gave “an honest, good faith description

of what she saw, I do accept that.” If Bullock means to split hairs,

saying that an honest, good faith observation might not necessarily

be the one Ynostroza actually relied upon, then this, too, is

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unsupported by the record. It is enough to consider these remarks

limiting defense counsel’s comments in ruling on the third motion:

“The question for me is, do I believe that that’s a good–that she’s

representing a good faith or actual reasons and are they

supported–well, they don’t have to necessarily be, but are they

supported by either responses to questions or my own observations?

And you can make all the arguments that you want, but I believe that

they are, and I’m not–my job is not to decide whether this is a person

that she should excuse. My job is simply to decide whether her

motivation for excusing this man, or any of the African-Americans, and I heard her justification for the others, so I didn't need to inquire

again: Was it racially motivated? And I believe I accept her

race-neutral explanation, and I don’t think comments by defense

counsel are going to add or take away from that, because they don’t

change what I heard, what I saw, and they don’t change what’s going

through the district attorney’s mind.” (Italics added; see fn. 4, ante.)

The record leaves no doubt that the trial judge separately

undertook Batson's third analytical step, making “ ‘ “a sincere and

reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's explanation in light of

the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial

techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the

prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has exercised

challenges for cause or peremptorily. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”

(People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 919.) This is not a case

like those Bullock cites, where a trial court stopped at declaring

explanations to be plausible (U.S. v. Alanis (9th Cir.2003) 335 F.3d

965, 968-969), asked no questions when offered reasons were

suspiciously inconsistent with the record (People v. Silva (2001) 25

Cal.4th 345, 385-386), or accepted reasons that were so vague as to

afford no meaningful basis for the ruling (People v. Allen (2004) 115

Cal.App.4th 542, 546, 551, 553).

Bullock attacks demeanor-based justifications as disputed by

defense counsel or uncorroborated, but we must give the trial court’s

findings great deference, as turning largely on evaluations of

credibility (People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 918, 924), and

we cannot second-guess them. Defense counsel disputed some of the

prosecutor's interpretations, but the court accepted them as genuine

and honest, having observed most for itself, and generally agreed

with the prosecutor. The court’s duty was to ask: “[W]as the reason

given . . . a ‘legitimate reason,’ legitimate in the sense that it would

not deny defendants equal protection of law [citation], or was it a

disingenuous reason for a peremptory challenge that was in actuality

exercised solely on grounds of group bias?” (Id. at p. 925.) The court

resolved that question by properly focusing “on the subjective

genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given . . ., not on the

objective reasonableness of those reasons,” (id. at p. 924) or whether

other attorneys may have reasonably differed over what conclusions

to draw from what was seen (ibid.).

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People v. Bullock, slip op. at 11-13 (footnote omitted). 

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s claim was not

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent, nor was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court of appeal’s assessment of the trial

court rulings was reasonable. The record shows that the trial court did not simply

accept the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reasons at face value. 

On the first motion, the trial court initially found that petitioner had not

made a prima facie case of discrimination in either of the prosecutor’s two strikes

that were challenged. The court explained why the prosecutor’s strikes did not

raise an inference of discrimination. According to the court, the first juror

removed, Mr. K.F., “had some serious misgivings about the judicial systems as a

whole,” and “wasn’t being entirely forthright in his feelings.” Most importantly,

the court “took particular note of his attitude about attorneys.” People v. Bullock,

slip op. at 2. The second juror, Ms. S.G., “was dripping with attitude.” Id. at 5. 

After the second motion, the court found a prima facie case as to the first motion

and required the prosecutor to explain the two strikes. The prosecutor reinforced

the court’s observations, saying that Mr. K.F. didn’t like attorneys and was not

forthcoming with information, and that Ms. S.G. appeared hostile. The court

agreed with these observations. As to the first motion, it was not objectively

unreasonable for the trial court to credit the prosecutor’s race neutral explanation

for the Batson challenge. See Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969, 974 (2006). Now

was it objectively unreasonable for the state appellate court to accept the trial

court’s findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

On the second motion, the trial court found a prima facie case of

discrimination and required the prosecutor to explain the strikes. The prosecutor

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explained that Ms. L.G. at first appeared to be a good candidate for the jury but

had a change of attitude after she was denied a hardship excuse which made him

doubt that “she would listen to the evidence, work with other jurors, or give the

case the attention both sides needed.” People v. Bullock, slip op. at 3. The court

shared this observation of Ms. L.G., and the fact that the prosecutor

independently reached the same conclusion as the court bolstered the court’s

belief in the prosecutor’s credibility. The court relied on this credibility

determination in part in accepting the prosecutor’s explanation of the strike of

Mr. J.G., which had “puzzled” the court. The prosecutor stated that though Mr.

J.G. appeared to be a qualified juror, he seemed disdainful of other jurors and

“could be someone who would dig his heels in, and would not at least listen to

other people’s opinion. . . .” Id. at 4. The court noted that it had not made the

same observations but accepted the prosecutor’s good faith representations in part

based on the fact that the court shared the prosecutor’s observations with regards

to every other juror dismissed. Although defense counsel argued that Mr. J.G.

was a qualified juror, the court found that the statements did not bear on the

credibility of the prosecutor’s rationale and so disregarded them. As to the

strikes raised on the second motion, it was not objectively unreasonable for the

trial court to credit the prosecutor’s race neutral explanation for the Batson

challenge. See Rice, 126 S. Ct. at 974. Nor was it objectively unreasonable for

the state appellate court to accept the trial court’s findings. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

On the third motion, the trial court again found a prima facie case of

discrimination and required the prosecutor to explain the strike. The prosecutor

explained that Mr. A.F. appeared to be unusually nervous and a “loner” which

likely would make it difficult for him to interact with other jurors. Importantly,

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the prosecutor noted that she had earlier excused a white male juror for similar

reasons. People v. Bullock, slip op. at 6. Although the court did not share some

of the prosecutor’s sentiments, it did agree with the general observations about

Mr. A.F.’s demeanor and thus accepted the prosecutor’s explanation. The court

disregarded defense counsel’s arguments on the matter because the arguments

would not “add or take away” from the courts acceptance of the prosecutor’s

race-neutral explanation. Id. at 7. As to the strike raised on the third motion, it

was not objectively unreasonable for the trial court to credit the prosecutor’s race

neutral explanation for the Batson challenge. See Rice, 126 S. Ct. at 974. Nor

was it objectively unreasonable for the state appellate court to accept the trial

court’s findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

On the fourth motion, the trial court found that the petitioner had not made

a prima facie case of discrimination in the challenged strike. The court stated

that it was “pretty obvious why any district would excuse Ms. E.L.” The court

went on to explain that the juror “characterize[d] her son as being constantly

harassed by the police because he’s an African-American male,” and that she

“expressed a rather strong–although not absolute unwillingness to accept as true

what police officers say.” People v. Bullock, slip op. at 8. Additionally, Ms.

E.L. had noted that one of the defendants looked like her son raising a concern of

potential sympathy. After the court denied the motion, neither defense counsel

offered or asked to speak. It was not objectively unreasonable for the trial court

to conclude that no prima facie case of discrimination had been made for the

Batson challenge. See Rice, 126 S. Ct. at 974. Nor was it objectively

unreasonable for the state appellate court to accept the trial court’s findings. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 

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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED.

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 31, 2007 

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge 

G:\CRBALL\2006\3548\Draft Order.wpd

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