Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_20-cv-00405/USCOURTS-alnd-2_20-cv-00405-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

SHAWALTO WATTS, )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION: 2:19-00907-KD-B

 )

SMP AUTOMOTIVE, )

Defendant. )

______________________________________________________________________________

SHAWALTO WATTS, )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION: 2:19-00908-TFM-B

 )

NORTH AMERICA ONSITE, )

Defendant. )

______________________________________________________________________________

SHAWALTO WATTS, )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION: 2:19-00909-TFM-B

 )

TEAM SOLUTIONS, )

Defendant. )

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

This action is before the Court on Defendants' joint motion to transfer venue to the Northern 

District of Alabama (Doc. 10) and Plaintiff's Notice of No Objection (Doc. 18).

On March 6, 2020, the above-referenced cases were consolidated, and the Court ordered 

Plaintiff to show cause as to why the case should not be transferred to the Northern District of 

Alabama. (Doc. 16). Specifically, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5 et seq., Watts filed a race and color discrimination case against Defendants related to

his employment at SMP Automotive Systems, Alabama, Inc.'s Cottondale, AL (Tuscaloosa 

Case 2:20-cv-00405-RDP Document 19 Filed 03/24/20 Page 1 of 5
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County, AL) facility. Per Defendants: "Plaintiff’s claims ... arise out of his assignment to work at 

SMP Automotive Systems Alabama, Inc.’s facility, which is located within the jurisdiction of the 

District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in Cottondale, Alabama." (Doc. 10 at 5). 

Defendants assert the complaint: "offer[s] no facts demonstrating that venue is proper in the 

District Court for the Southern District of Alabama[;]" "[t]here is no allegation or assertion that 

Plaintiff's employment records are or were maintained in counties in the....Southern District of 

Alabama[;]" and "[t]here is no allegation that Plaintiff worked or performed services for

Defendants anywhere other than SMP Automotive Systems Alabama, Inc.’s Cottondale, Alabama 

facility." (Id.) Defendants seek to transfer venue to the Northern District of Alabama based on 

Section 2000e–5(f)(3), Section 1404(a), and Section 1406(a), claiming it is in the interest of justice 

and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. (Id.) Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants' 

venue transfer request.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division 

where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented." 

Section 1406(a) provides: "[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in 

the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case 

to any district in which it could have been brought[]")). Title VII's venue provision provides:

Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the 

unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial 

district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained 

and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would 

have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the 

respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought 

within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). 

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Pritchett v. Paschall Truck Lines, Inc., 714 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1173 (M.D. Ala. 2010). The decision 

to transfer venue is a matter of broad discretion for the Court. See, e.g., Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose 

Corp., 980 F.2d 648, 654 (11th Cir. 1993) (same); Hajhossein v. City of Statesboro, Ga., 2009 WL 

10712951, *2 (M.D. Ga. Jul. 6, 2009) (same); Lewis v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Ed., 678 F.Supp.1550, 

1551-1552 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (granting transfer after the court's consideration of the Section 

2000e–5(f)(3) and Section 1404(a) factors).

Defendants rely upon Section 2000e–5(f)(3), Section 1404(a), and Section 1406(a) as 

grounds for the motion to transfer venue. As recently expressed in Thomas v. Road & Rail Servs., 

2019 WL 2179564, *1 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 9, 2019):

It is well-settled law in this Circuit that this provision, rather than the general venue 

statute 28 U.S.C. § 1391, governs venue in Title VII actions. See Pinson v. 

Rumsfeld, 192 F. App'x 811, 817 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Title VII claims are governed 

by § 2000e–5(f)(3), and these venue provisions set forth the exclusive venues for 

Title VII claims [...]”); Kravec v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 579 F. Supp. 619, 

622 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (The “general venue statute, 28 USC § 1391, did not provide 

an additional place of venue where the terms of § 2000e–5(f)(3) were not met,” and 

upon reviewing the “clear language of § 2000e–5(f)(3)” the court found that “the 

intent of Congress to limit venue to the judicial districts concerned with the alleged 

discrimination seems clear.’ ”) 

Moreover, as explained in Martin v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 2013 WL 5350880, *3-4 and note 1 

(S.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2013) (Order adopting R&R):

[1] While the defendant references 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) with respect to its 

alternative motion to transfer venue.... it then proceeds to argue that venue is 

improper in this district based upon Title VII's venue provisions ....... a § 1406(a)

transfer argument. ..... § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 

the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 

district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division 

to which all parties have consented.”) presupposes that venue is proper in the 

district in which the case is filed. See Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 816 

(5th Cir.1967) (“In substance, § 1404 is the statutory enactment of the doctrine of 

forum non conveniens tempered to allow transfer rather than dismissal. By contrast, 

§ 1406 operates in cases where the first forum chosen is improper in the sense that 

the litigation may not proceed there.”); Ford v. Supreme Court of Florida, 2006 

WL 1382075, *6 n. 15 (M.D.Fla. May 18, 2006) (“28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ... governs 

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actions filed in an improper venue[ ] as opposed to § 1404(a), which governs actions 

filed in [a] permissible yet inconvenient venue.”); Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales 

U.S.A., Inc., 397 F.Supp. 476, 477 (N.D.Ga.1975) (“Since venue is improper in this 

court, transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is foreclosed.... Therefore, the question 

now becomes whether the case should be dismissed or transferred under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1406(a)[.]”).

***

The general venue provisions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are inapplicable to 

Title VII employment discrimination cases ... because Title VII has its own venue 

provisions. See, e.g., Pinson v. Rumsfeld, 192 Fed.Appx. 811, 817 (11th Cir. May 

18, 2006) (“The venue provisions of § 2000e–5(f)(3) were intended to be the 

exclusive venue provisions for Title VII employment discrimination actions and [ 

] the more general provisions of § 1391 are not controlling in such cases.”), cert. 

denied, 549 U.S. 1066, 127 S.Ct. 698, 166 L.Ed.2d 539 (2006). ...

***

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). Pursuant to these provisions, therefore, an action may 

be brought “(1) in any district court in a state where the alleged Title VII violation 

occurred; (2) in the judicial district where the employment records that pertain to 

the alleged Title VII violation are maintained; (3) in the judicial district where 

plaintiff would have worked had there been no Title VII violation; and, if none of 

the previous three conditions exist, (4) in the judicial district where the defendant's 

principal office is located.” Pritchett v. Paschall Truck Lines, Inc., 714 F.Supp.2d 

1171, 1173 (M.D.Ala.2010). And where, as here, venue is questioned, the plaintiff 

has the burden of establishing that “venue in the forum is proper.” Vinson, supra,

192 Fed.Appx. at 817.....

***

....In light of the foregoing, venue is clearly improper in the Southern District of 

Alabama. Where venue is improperly laid in a district, as here, § 1406(a) directs 

the court to “dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any 

district or division in which it could have been brought.” Id. This language is 

“sufficiently broad ‘to authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff 

may have been in filing his case as to venue [,]’ ..... Pritchett, supra, 714 F .Supp.2d 

at 1175, citing and quoting Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 & 467, 82 

S.Ct. 913, 916, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962). .....

Regarding the relevant factors: 1) the alleged Title VII violation occurred in the Northern 

District of Alabama; 2) the employment records pertaining to the alleged Title VII violation are 

maintained in the Northern District of Alabama; and 3) plaintiff would have worked in the 

Northern District of Alabama had there been no Title VII violation. And, even though #1-3 are 

met, there is no allegation that Plaintiff worked anywhere other than at Defendants' office in the 

Northern District of Alabama. Moreover, Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants' motion. 

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Upon consideration, "because venue is improperly laid in the Southern District of Alabama, 

transfer of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed 

a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of 

justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought[]”).... is 

appropriate ..." Martin, supra at *3. As such, it is ORDERED that Defendants' unopposed motion 

to transfer venue (Doc. 10) is GRANTED and that this action is hereby TRANSFERRED to the 

Northern District of Alabama.

DONE and ORDERED this the 24th day of March 2020. 

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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