Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-00441/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-00441-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

EMMA SUE PATE,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

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Case No. 1:14-cv-00441-TMP

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, Emma Sue Pate, appeals from the decision of the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying 

her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Pate timely pursued and exhausted her 

administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

Ms. Pate was nineteen years old at the time of the alleged onset of disability, 

she has a limited education, and is able to communicate in English. (Tr. at 30). Her 

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FILED

 2015 Jun-29 PM 04:28

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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past work experiences include employment as a fast food worker (light and 

unskilled) and a cashier/checker (light and semi-skilled). Id. Ms. Pate claims that 

she became disabled on June 1, 2008, due to a gunshot wound to the leg, high blood 

pressure, bipolar disorder, and slow learning. (Tr. at 30, 130).

When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the 

regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 

2001). The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing 

substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he 

or she is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is 

not, the Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental 

impairments combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These 

impairments must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a 

claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical 

evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the 

claimant’s impairments are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to step 

three, which is a determination of whether the claimant’s impairments meet or 

equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

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Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s 

impairments fall within this category, he or she will be found disabled without 

further consideration. Id. If he or she does not, a determination of the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity will be made and the analysis proceeds to the fourth 

step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) is an assessment, based on all relevant evidence, of a claimant’s 

remaining ability to do work despite his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.945(a)(1).

The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s 

impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past 

relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the 

claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. 

Id. Step five requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the 

claimant’s age, education, and past work experience, in order to determine if he or 

she can do other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the 

claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden is on the 

Commissioner to demonstrate that other jobs exist which the claimant can 

perform; and, once that burden is met, the claimant must prove his or her inability 

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to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 

1228 (11th Cir. 1999).

Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Pate 

meets the insured status requirements for a period of disability and DIB through 

September 30, 2010. (Tr. at 19). He further determined that Ms. Pate has not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 21, 2010. Id. According to the 

ALJ, Plaintiff’s gunshot wound to the right buttock, obesity, borderline intellectual 

functioning, depression and anxiety are considered “severe” based on the 

requirements set forth in the regulations. (Tr. at 20). He also found that Ms. Pate 

has the following non-severe impairments: hypertension, history of pelvic 

inflammatory disease, history of rectal abscess and hemorrhoids, peripheral edema, 

history of ovarian cyst, constipation, restless leg syndrome, fibromyalgia, scoliosis, 

pinched nerve in the back and irritable bowel syndrome. Id. However, he found 

that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. The ALJ 

determined that she “has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work 

as defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except that she cannot climb 

ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She is limited to the performance of simple, routine, 

repetitive tasks in an environment where changes are infrequent and are gradually 

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introduced. The claimant should not interact with the general public. She can 

work in close proximity to co-workers, but would do best working on tasks alone.” 

(Tr. at 21-22).

According to the ALJ, Ms. Pate is unable to perform any of her past relevant 

work1

, she is a “younger individual,” and she has a “limited education,” as those 

terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 30). He determined that

“[t]ransferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability 

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that 

the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job 

skills.” Id. Even though Plaintiff cannot perform the full range of medium work, 

the ALJ used the testimony of the vocational expert as a guideline for finding that 

there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that she is capable of 

performing, such as hand packager, kitchen helper, and day worker, all of which are 

classified as medium, unskilled work. (Tr. at 31). The ALJ concluded his findings 

by stating that the Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, from June 1, 2008, through the date of this decision.” Id.

1

 The ALJ noted that the plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a fast food 

worker, which was graded by the vocational expert as light and unskilled, and a cashier/checker, 

which was graded by the vocational expert as light and semi-skilled. (Tr. at 30). Although this 

work is light, and the ALJ determined that the plaintiff was physically able to perform medium 

work, the vocational expert testified that the plaintiff cannot perform the past work “within the 

residual functional capacity” which notes that the plaintiff “should not interact with the general 

public” and “would do best working on tasks alone.” Id. 

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II. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act 

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there 

is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the 

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 

1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the 

Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. 

See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide 

facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id.

“The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act 

with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent 

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding 

from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 

1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Mar. 

Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the 

evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must

affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. 

No decision is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential standard [for 

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review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in its entirety 

to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 

F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal 

standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 

1984).

The court must keep in mind that opinions such as whether a claimant is 

disabled, the nature and extent of a claimant’s residual functional capacity, and the 

application of vocational factors “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, 

opinions on issues reserved to the commissioner because they are administrative 

findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or 

decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). Whether the 

plaintiff meets the listing and is qualified for Social Security disability benefits is a 

question reserved for the ALJ, and the court “may not decide facts anew, reweigh 

the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Dyer v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, even if the court were to 

disagree with the ALJ about the significance of certain facts, the court has no power 

to reverse that finding as long as there is substantial evidence in the record 

supporting it. 

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III. Discussion

Ms. Pate alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded 

because, she asserts, the record establishes her disability under listing 12.05(C) of 

the “Listing of Impairments.” The plaintiff argues that the ALJ misapplied listing 

12.05(C), and that further proceedings are necessary to properly evaluate whether 

she meets the listing. She does not challenge any of the ALJ’s findings regarding 

her physical impairments. 

Listing 12.05 states, in relevant part: 

Mental retardation: Mental retardation refers to significantly 

subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive 

functioning initially manifested during the developmental period, i.e., 

the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before 

age 22. 

The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the 

requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied.

* * *

C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a 

physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and 

significant work-related limitation of function. 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, app. 1, § 12.05. The introductory material to the 

mental disorders listing clarifies that to meet the listing, an impairment must satisfy 

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“the diagnostic description in the introductory paragraph and any one of the four 

sets of criteria” listed in subsections A through D. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

app. 1, § 12.00A (emphasis added). 

There are records of two IQ tests administered to the plaintiff. The first was 

the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – III, administered when the plaintiff 

was fifteen years old. At that time, the plaintiff scored a verbal IQ score of 76, a 

performance IQ score of 74 and a full scale IQ of 73. Each of the scores is greater 

than the score of 60 to 70, which satisfies listing 12.05(C). During the process of 

seeking Social Security benefits, however, the Social Security Administration 

requested that the plaintiff undergo a second IQ test. The Wechsler Adult 

Intelligence Scale – IV was administrated by Dr. Dana K. Davis, Ph.D., a licensed 

psychologist. The plaintiff scored a verbal comprehension index score of 70, a 

perceptual reasoning index score of 69, a working memory index score of 69, a 

processing speed index score of 76, and a full scale IQ of 65.

Regarding the plaintiff’s IQ score, the ALJ stated that the requirements for 

listing 12.05 were not met because “the IQ scores of Dr. Davis . . . are not 

considered valid in view of higher IQ scores from school . . . as well as the 

claimant’s activities of daily living and work history.” (Tr. at 21). The ALJ relied 

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heavily on the other aspects of Dr. Davis’s evaluation of the plaintiff in his finding 

that the plaintiff has only moderate mental limitations. He states, 

I have assigned great weight to the findings and opinion of the 

consultative examiner, Dr. Davis who stated it was likely the claimant 

would be able to work as she had previously had a number of jobs. Dr. 

Davis stated that the claimant’s mental impairment was somewhere 

between the mild mental retardation and borderline range. On the 

WAIS, the claimant obtained a full-scale IQ score 65; however, Dr. 

Davis noted the claimant was able to read simple words, communicate 

without difficulty and was fairly independent in daily activities. Dr. 

Davis stated during the interview, the claimant did not described [sic] 

any symptoms indicating depression, bi-polar disorder or anxiety. In 

fact, she stated the claimant was quite cheerful and calm.

The undersigned finds that the claimant’s abilities are more consistent 

with borderline intellectual functioning versus mental retardation. As

discussed earlier, the diagnostic description of mental retardation 

reads, ‘mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general 

intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially 

manifested during the developmental period, i.e., the evidence 

demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22’. 

The record notes that school records dated in 2004 when the claimant 

was in the ninth grade found a full-scale IQ of 7[3]. It is noted that the 

claimant’s full scale IQ of 65 would satisfy the first element in the 

introductory paragraph (Exhibit B-14F). However, element two then 

requires deficits in adaptive functioning which is met as long as there 

are significant limitations in at least two of the following areas: 

communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use 

of community services, self-direction, functional academic skills, 

work, leisure, health and safety (DSM-IV-TR, p. 41). Here the 

evidence as discussed above supports significant limitation in only 

functional academics (Exhibit B-2F). Relevant to the other areas of 

adaptive functioning, the evidence reflects that the claimant has 

successfully worked as a fast food worker and a cashier/checker. It is 

noted that the vocational expert graded the work of cashier/checker as 

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semi-skilled. Further, Ms. Pate testified that she left this work 

because of her inability to stand and not because of her mental 

limitations. She testified she is able to attend church, shop and 

prepare simple meals. She reported caring for her personal needs 

independently. These activities fail to demonstrate the deficits in 

adaptive functioning as required by the core elements of mental 

retardation and therefore, this impairment is more equivalent to 

borderline intellectual functioning. The above evidence does not 

substantiate the level of limitation as alleged by the claimant but the 

reasonably [sic] limitations as supported are reflected within the 

residual functional capacity.

I agree with the assessment of the State Agency Mental Health 

consultant, Dr. Dennis. He opined the claimant was functioning in 

the borderline intellectual range. He stated she was able to fill out the 

social security forms that he noted was not consistent with a diagnosis 

of mental retardation. I find that his assessment further confirms the 

opinion. 

(Tr. at 29).

Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404 states that “In cases where more than 

one IQ is customarily derived from the test administered, e.g., where verbal, 

performance, and full scale IQs are provided in the Wechsler series, we use the 

lowest of these in conjunction with 12.05.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, Appendix 1 ¶ 

12.00(B)(6)(c). Despite the plaintiff’s statement that “the lowest of the IQ scores 

is to be used in determining the presumption of ¶12.05(C),” the guidelines do not 

require the use of the lowest IQ score ever obtained. The guidelines simply clarify

that, when comparing the verbal comprehension index score, perceptual reasoning 

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index score, working memory index score, processing speed index score, and full 

scale IQ score, the ALJ is to use the lowest of the scores. The ALJ in the instant 

case did just that. The ALJ noted that on the WISC-III, the lowest score was the 

full scale score of 73. Likewise, on the WAIS administered by Dr. Davis, the lowest 

score was the full scale score of 65. The ALJ properly applied § 404.1520, 

Appendix 1 ¶ 12.00(B)(6)(c) for each of the two IQ tests before him. He simply 

rejected the validity of the second test as an accurate indicator of plaintiff’s true 

intelligence.

Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged that “a valid I.Q. score need 

not be conclusive of mental retardation where the I.Q. score is inconsistent with the 

other evidence in the record on the claimant’s daily activities and behavior.” 

Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992), citing Popp v. Heckler, 779 

F.2d 1497, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a claim of section 12.05(C) mental 

retardation where the claimant’s IQ score of 69 was inconsistent with evidence that 

he had a two-year college associate’s degree, was enrolled in a third year of college 

as a history major, and had worked in various technical jobs such as an 

administrative clerk, statistical clerk, and an algebra teacher). Accordingly, even 

presuming the ALJ had only the IQ score of 65 to consider, he still was entitled to 

discredit the score if it was incompatible with the record as a whole. The ALJ fully 

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explained why he determined that the IQ score of 65 was not representative of the 

plaintiff’s actual mental ability. These reasons included the fact that plaintiff had 

tested higher while in school; that Dr. Davis had expressed the idea that the IQ of 

65 probably underestimated plaintiff’s true IQ and that she may have been in the 

low borderline range; that plaintiff had worked for several years without difficulty 

caused by her mental status; that Dr. Dennis noted that the plaintiff filled out her 

own activities-of-daily-living form, which would be inconsistent with mental 

retardation; and that Dr. Dennis opined that plaintiff was functioning in the 

borderline range, not the mentally retarded range of intelligence. The ALJ 

explained:

At the hearing, the representative, Mr. Booker, argued that the 

claimant’s impairments meet the criteria for 12.05C. Mr. Booker 

argued that the claimant completed ninth grade in special education 

partially and no GED was obtained. She has not had any vocational 

training. He stated she is able to do simple reading and needs help 

preparing forms. Mr. Booker noted the claimant has never had a 

driver’s license but took the test six times. She never had the oral test. 

Ms. Pate does not have a checkbook or credit card and has never 

bought insurance. He reported job applications were filled out with 

the help of the manager. He noted the claimant has never lived 

independently and has not worked since June 2008.

Mr. Booker’s closing statement indicated that school records showed 

IQ in the low 70s that was the Weschler IQ test for children. He 

stated the adult version of the test provided basis for 12.05C with fullscale IQ score of 65.

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. . . 

School records indicated that the claimant was administered the 

WISC-III intelligence test in May of 2004 and obtained a full scale IQ 

score of 73 with verbal IQ score of 76 and performance IQ score of 74. 

She was found eligible to continue to participate in special education 

classes because of the discrepancy between ability and achievement. 

The areas of environmental/cultural/economic concerns, mental 

retardation, emotional disturbances, visual/hearing disabilities and 

motor disabilities were all ruled out as the primary cause of her 

impairment. The interpretation of the WISC test noted that her 

general cognitive ability was in the borderline range with verbal and 

performance ability scores in the borderline range. It was noted that 

the claimant was in Algebra classes (Exhibits B-1F and B-2F).

. . . 

On April 6, 2011, the claimant underwent a consultative psychological 

evaluation conducted by Dr. Dana Davis, at the request of the Agency. 

The diagnostic impressions were mild mental retardation through 

borderline intelligence and complaints of leg pain. The claimant was 

administered the Weschler Adult Intelligence Test (WAIS) and 

obtained a full-scale IQ score of 65. Dr. Davis noted these scores were 

a little lower than the testing that was completed in the school setting 

when the claimant’s full scale IQ score was 73. She opined that best 

description, therefore, would be somewhere between the mild mental 

retardation and borderline range. She noted the claimant was able to 

read simple words, communicated without difficulty and was fairly 

independent other than no driver’s license. Dr. Davis summarized 

that the claimant presented with lower than average intelligence. The 

examiner noted that although the claimant had been diagnosed with 

major depression, bi-polar disorder and anxiety disorder, she did not 

describe any symptoms on the evaluation and really was quite cheerful 

and calm during the interview. Dr. Davis stated the claimant had a 

number of jobs in the past, she thought it was likely she would be able 

to work again (Exhibit B-14F).

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DDS mental health expert found that the claimant had mental 

retardation scores but functioning level more like borderline 

intellectual functioning. Dr. Larry Dennis stated that claimant filled 

out her own activities of daily living form that was not likely indicative 

of mental retardation. He indicated the claimant had a moderate 

restriction in the activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in 

maintaining social functioning and moderate difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence or pace with no episodes of 

decompensation (Exhibit 15-F).

Dr. Dennis indicated the claimant could understand, remember and 

carry out short and simple instructions but not detailed instructions. 

He noted she could attend to simple tasks for two hours over the 

eight-hour workday but noted she would require casual supervision 

and would work best with a well-spaced workstation. He indicated 

contact with the general public should be casual and criticism needed 

to be given in a non-confrontational manner. The claimant would 

work best with few familiar co-workers. He noted changes in the work 

setting needed to be gradual and infrequent but indicated the claimant 

could make short-range plans but would need help with long range 

planning (Exhibit B-17F).

. . . 

I find that the claimant has no more than moderate mental limitations. 

There is no record that the claimant is currently participating in any 

mental health treatment.

. . . 

I observed at the hearing that the claimant was alert and oriented. She 

was able to answer all questions logically and coherently. There was 

no indication that the claimant was not attentive and discussed her 

impairments for almost one hour without hesitation.

In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported 

by the medical evidence of record. I find that the claimant has some 

mental limitations and have allowed for these restrictions in the 

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residual functional capacity where she is limited to limited to [sic] the 

performance of simple, routine, repetitive tasks in an environment 

where changes are infrequent and gradually introduced. The claimant 

should not interact with the general public. She can work in close 

proximity to co-workers, but would do best working on tasks alone. 

(Tr. at 23-26, 29-30).

 There is no indication that the ALJ failed to properly consider all of the 

plaintiff’s IQ evidence. The ALJ’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s IQ score of 65 

was not valid due to its inconsistency with other evidence in the record and that the 

plaintiff does not meet the listing of 12.05(C) is supported by substantial evidence. 

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Pate’s 

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be 

entered affirming the Commissioner’s determination.

DATED this 29th day of June, 2015.

_______________________________

T. MICHAEL PUTNAM

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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