Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-02506/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-02506-82/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY BOWOTO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CHEVRON TEXACO CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 99-02506 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST

PLAINTIFF BASSEY JEJE

Before the Court is defendants’ motion for sanctions against plaintiff Bassey Jeje pursuant to

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The matter is scheduled for a hearing on March 21,

2008. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that this matter is appropriate for

resolution without oral argument, and VACATES the hearing. Having read and considered the

arguments presented by the parties in the papers submitted to the Court, the Court hereby DENIES

defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

The original complaint, filed on May 27, 1999, alleged that some Parabe plaintiffs were killed

or injured by gunshots and that others were detained and tortured. Plaintiff Bassey Jeje was one of the

original plaintiffs. Contrary to defendants’ contention, plaintiff was not only listed as being detained

and tortured, but also as being shot. See Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint at ¶ 77.

In January 2005, more than six years after the alleged May 28, 1998 attacks giving rise to this

suit, plaintiff at deposition volunteered that he actually had the bullet that a doctor removed from his

body. Plaintiff stated that he kept it at his house and agreed to give it to his lawyers. The day after,

defendants served a request to inspect the bullet. Plaintiff alleges that after his deposition, he left on an

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For the Northern District of California

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offshore job away from home for an approximate six-month rotation and was thus unable to produce

the bullet.

As a result, the Court ordered plaintiff to produce the bullet by June 30, 2005. On that date,

plaintiff’s counsel informed defendants that plaintiff no longer had the bullet. At the September 2005

Case Management Conference, the Court required plaintiff to provide additional information about the

loss of the bullet. In November 2005, plaintiff informed defendants that he could not locate the bullet.

He did not know how or when it disappeared. Several weeks later, in December 2005, plaintiff stated

that he kept the bullet in a container in his house, but his wife packed the container in a bag, which was

subsequently misplaced. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim about the bullet is a fabrication. In the alternative,

defendants argue that if plaintiff was indeed shot and the bullet existed, his failure to produce the bullet

was intentional. Defendants request an order dismissing plaintiff’s claims entirely or, at a minimum,

precluding plaintiff from making any claim, or presenting any evidence, that he was shot. Alternatively,

defendants request an order permitting a jury instruction that the jury may infer from plaintiff’s failure

to produce the bullet that his testimony is false or that a forensic examination of the bullet would have

been unfavorable to plaintiff’s claims. 

LEGAL STANDARD

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) reads in part: “[i]f a party . . . fails to obey an order

to provide or permit discovery . . . the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in

regard to the failure as are just, [including] . . . an order . . . dismissing the action or proceeding or any

part thereof.” However, terminating sanctions are usually imposed only as a last resort, after willful and

repeated disobedience of discovery orders. “Dismissal . . . is authorized only in extreme circumstances

and only where the violation is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the party.” Allen v. Exxon Corp.

(In re Exxon Valdez), 102 F.3d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). 

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s failure to produce the bullet is indicative of a fabricated claim.

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Setting aside the truthfulness of plaintiff’s claim, defendants argue that terminating sanctions should be

imposed upon plaintiff for failure to comply with his discovery obligations. Defendants’ arguments

are based on a presumption that plaintiff’s testimony is perjured. Defendants ask the Court to exercise

its power to make factual findings and credibility determinations when deciding motions for sanctions

under its inherent powers and Rule 37.

Plaintiff insists that factual and credibility determinations should be deferred to the jury. This

Court agrees with plaintiff’s contention that our judicial system entrusts juries to “sort the evidence and

decide the facts” so that cases are decided on their merits. See Plaintiff’s Opp. at 1. Defendants argue

that a jury can only do so if the parties produce the evidence. Defendants’ argument that forensic

ballistics evidence could have been presented to the jury is valid. However, such examination could

have produced evidence potentially useful for either party. Thus, while the bullet itself is an important

piece of evidence, it is not dispositive of plaintiff’s claims. There are other pieces of evidence available

to defendants. 

However, in fairness to defendants because they had no opportunity to examine the bullet,

plaintiff is precluded from raising on his own any argument or evidence regarding the bullet. Plaintiff’s

claims about being shot at the Parabe platform may still proceed, but he cannot rely on the bullet as

evidence unless defendants raise the issue first. If defendants wish to discuss the bullet and the

circumstances around its production, including the events leading to this motion, they are free to do so,

but plaintiff will be allowed to respond. Thus, defendants’ request to preclude plaintiff from making

any claim or presenting evidence that he was shot is DENIED. 

In addition, the Court DENIES defendants’ request to entirely dismiss plaintiff’s claim for an

intentional failure to comply with discovery obligations. While it is true that plaintiff’s response to

requests and court orders regarding the bullet was slow, plaintiff ultimately complied and provided an

explanation of the loss of the bullet. Furthermore, a terminating sanction is a last resort and requires

a showing of bad faith, willfulness or intentional disobedience. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Given the facts

and circumstances around the complicated production of the bullet allegedly located in plaintiff’s house

of Igbokada, Nigeria, the Court is unable to determine that plaintiff acted in bad faith.

Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because his conduct relating

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to the production of the bullet suggests he fabricated the claim. However, plaintiff’s claim of being shot

was raised in the original complaint. The fact that he raised the existence of the bullet more than six

years after the filing of the original complaint, as well as the subsequent loss of the bullet, is only

circumstantial evidence and can be presented to the jury.

Similarly, defendants’ request for an adverse jury instruction is DENIED. Such request, again,

is based on a presumption that plaintiff’s testimony is perjured. This is something that the Court will

not decide and defers to the jury. Defendants are granted the exclusive right to raise the issue of the

bullet and make any claims associated with it, including an indication that a forensic examination of the

bullet would have been unfavorable to plaintiff’s claims. This is an adequate sanction imposed upon

plaintiff for depriving defendants of the opportunity to examine the bullet.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion for sanctions [Docket No.

1681]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2008 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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