Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01813/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01813-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 385
Nature of Suit: Property Damage - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pd Diversity-Property Damage

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS W. PIGEON, an individual, 

TWP CONSULTING, INC., a California 

Corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WESTERN SKYWAYS, INC., a 

Colorado Corporation and DOES 1 to 100,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14-cv-1813 JLS (KSC)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTIONS IN LIMINE

(ECF No. 85)

Presently before the Court are Defendant’s Motions in Limine (“MIL”), (ECF No. 

85), and Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions in Limine (“Opp’n”), 

(ECF No. 86). The Court held a hearing on these Motions on April 27, 2017, and took the 

Motions under submission at the conclusion of the hearing. (ECF No. 87.) Having 

considered the Parties’ arguments and the law, the Court rules as follows.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine

rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to 

manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). “A motion 

in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or evidence in a 

particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). “In the case 

of a jury trial, a court’s ruling . . . gives counsel advance notice of the scope of certain 

evidence so that admissibility is settled before attempted use of the evidence before the 

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jury.” Id. at 1111–12. However, any ruling on a motion in limine is necessarily tentative in 

nature; a “district court may change its ruling at trial because testimony may bring facts to 

the district court’s attention that it did not anticipate at the time of its initial ruling.” United 

States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999).

ANALYSIS

Defendant’s first Motion in Limine seeks to exclude “[a]ny reference or mention of 

the FAA’s temporary revocation of Defendant’s Repair Station Certification that was in 

effect from approximately June 3, 2013 to August 21, 2013.” (MIL 2.) In particular, 

Defendant argues that Defendant’s temporary sanction is wholly separate from Plaintiffs’ 

allegations regarding the two “Subject Engines” because Plaintiffs purchased the Subject 

Engines two months after the temporary sanction was removed. (Id.)

Plaintiffs respond that they seek to offer evidence of the revocation solely in support 

of their cause of action for “Misrepresentation.” (Opp’n 4.) Specifically, pursuant to the 

Code of Federal Regulations, a repair station without a certificate generally may not rebuild 

or repair an aircraft engine, and Plaintiffs allege that Defendant concealed the revocation—

which was in effect during the Parties’ initial negotiations regarding the purchase of the 

engine—all the way “until almost six months after the purchase was consummated.” (Id. 

at 4–5.) Plaintiffs further allege that the revocation was “for cause,” and note that they 

intend to introduce evidence that during the revocation period Plaintiffs had a twenty-one–

minute telephone conversation with one of Defendant’s representatives during which they 

negotiated the terms of purchase of the two Subject Engines, but during which Defendant 

did not mention the emergency revocation. (Id. at 6–7.)

Given the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s first motion. Specifically, 

although Plaintiffs’ cause of action is entitled “misrepresentation,” Plaintiffs seemingly 

intend to attempt to prove the elements of fraud, which the Colorado courts have at times 

defined to include “misrepresentation.” And a cause of action for fraud under Colorado 

law requires a showing of the concealment of a material fact which “in equity and good 

conscience should have been disclosed.” (E.g., Black v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of 

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Fargo, N.D., F.A., 830 P.2d 1103, 1113 (Colo. App. 1992).) Finally, the Emergency 

Revocation explains that the “[e]mergency action in this case is a safety measure that 

provides immediate protection to the public.” (Pl.’s Request for to File First Am. Compl. 

Ex. A, ECF No. 32, at 16.)

Taking the foregoing in concert, it appears that the revocation could be more relevant 

than prejudicial, at least as the evidence would apply to certain elements of a cause of 

action for fraud. 

Defendant’s second Motion in Limine seeks to exclude “[a]ny reference or mention 

of evidence of any aspect of the Subject Engines’ performance or failure from any witness 

not providing sworn testimony at trial or by deposition.” (MIL 2–3.) The Court GRANTS

Defendant’s second Motion, but only insofar as it does not ask the Court to preclude 

evidence from unavailable witnesses that fall within a relevant hearsay exception. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs note two witnesses—John McCullough and Igor Artemeyov—who 

are unavailable but whose testimony allegedly qualify, respectively, as “recorded 

recollection” and “present sense impression” exceptions to the general hearsay prohibition.

(Opp’n 9–10.) Although the Court does not currently have sufficient facts to determine if 

these hearsay exceptions are validly met, the Court nonetheless notes that both of Plaintiffs’ 

asserted exceptions seem inapplicable to the present facts. The “past recollection recorded” 

exception does not appear to be met given that the relevant witness—who is now dead—

will be unable to affirm the truth and reliability of the recorded recollection. See, e.g., J. C. 

Penney Co. v. N. L. R. B., 384 F.2d 479, 484 (10th Cir. 1967) (“To meet the accepted 

standards of admissibility, the trial court must also be satisfied the writing was made at a 

time when the events were fresh in the writer’s mind and the witness must verify the 

writing’s authenticity and truthfulness.”). And the “present sense impression” exception 

also does not appear to be met given that Plaintiffs indicate the relevant witness created his 

document only “within a day” after the engine failed, whereas the present sense impression 

exception usually requires a much tighter timeline. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 556 

F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (“ ‘The idea of immediacy lies at the heart of the exception,’

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thus, the time requirement underlying the exception ‘is strict because it is the factor that 

assures trustworthiness. ’ ” (citing 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 

Federal Evidence § 8:67, 559, 562 (3d ed. 2007))).

Defendant’s third Motion in Limine seeks to exclude “[a]ny reference or mention of 

any evidence or information regarding any other prior wrongs or alleged prior wrongful 

acts of Defendant or Defendant’s representatives that are not directly related to this lawsuit, 

specifically including, but not limited to, alleged or actual violations of FAA regulations 

or requirements.” (MIL 3.) The Court GRANTS Defendant’s third MIL. Plaintiffs argue

that character evidence is admissible when a person’s character or character trait is an 

essential element of a charge, claim, or defense. (Opp’n 11–12.) However, Plaintiffs’ only 

claims are for negligence, product liability, breach of contract, and “misrepresentation,” 

and to admit evidence of prior negligent acts to bolster the conclusion that Defendant acted 

negligently in this particular instance would likely be impermissible.

Defendant’s fourth Motion in Limine seeks to exclude “[a]ny attempt to solicit 

testimony from Plaintiffs’ representatives or other witnesses who are not designated 

experts that would seek to place an expert definition of ‘excessive’ oil consumption as it 

relates to either of the Subject Engines.” (MIL 3.) The Court DENIES Defendant’s fourth 

MIL. Plaintiffs indicate that they seek to introduce testimony from Plaintiffs’ pilot and 

mechanic witnesses regarding “written and oral assurances provided by Defendant 

regarding ‘reasonable’ oil consumption, rationally based on their perceptions of those 

assurances.” (Opp’n 13.) The testimony will also address “actions and repairs taken by 

Defendant when the ‘oil consumption as recorded’ was reported to Defendant.” (Id.) The 

testimony therefore likely will only concern issues that are not based on scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge, and non-experts may testify to such matters.

Defendant’s fifteenth Motion in Limine seeks to exclude “[a]ny mention, reference 

to, or testimony from Plaintiffs advising the jury what they think the law is, what it should 

be, or what Defendant must show to prevail in this case.” (MIL 6.) The Court GRANTS

Defendant fifteenth MIL, but not insofar as the MIL would preclude Plaintiffs from

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introducing relevant Code of Federal Regulation Sections going to alleged negligence per 

se on behalf of Defendant.

All of Defendant’s remaining Motions in Limine—five through fourteen and sixteen

through twenty-four—seek to exclude many different types of evidence and argumentation 

without providing any meaningful specificity to the facts of this case. (See MIL 3–8.)

Accordingly, the Court DENIES these Motions in Limine. The Court, of course, will at all 

times attempt to adhere to the Federal Rules of Evidence and all other binding authority.

CONCLUSION

Given the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s second, third, and fifteenth 

Motions in Limine—subject to the conditions outlined above—and DENIES all others.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 5, 2017

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