Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02114/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02114-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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U N ITED STATES DISTRICT COU RT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HORACE BELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

G. FLIPPO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-02114-LJO-SMS PC

Kern County Superior Court 

Case No. S-1500-CL-237799

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO REMAND

(Doc. 6)

ORDER DISMISSING FEDERAL CLAIMS

AGAINST DEFENDANTS FLIPPO AND

SMITH FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM,

AND REMANDING ACTION TO KERN

COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

(Doc. 1)

Order on Motion to Remand and Screening Order

I. Background

This civil rights action was filed in Kern County Superior Court by Plaintiff Horace Bell, a

state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the United States

Constitution and California Constitution by Defendants C. Smith, T. Kurtz, N. Grannis, G. Flippo,

A. Hedgepeth, N. Dill, and C. Smith, all of whom are or were employed by the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Defendants Flippo and Smith removed the action to

this court on December 2, 2009. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the removal on December 14, 2009,

which shall be treated by the Court as a motion to remand.

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II. Motion to Remand

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove from state court any action “of which

the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” Federal courts “shall have original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the wellpleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question

is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams,

482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The rule makes the plaintiff

the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law,”

id., and existence of federal jurisdiction is determined by the complaint at the time of removal,

Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979).

In this instance, Plaintiff specifically alleges claims for relief arising from the violation of

the United States Constitution. Because Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth federal claims, Defendants

were entitled to remove the action to this court and Plaintiff’s opposition to the removal is without

legal merit. Also without merit is Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants are already in federal court

on this case. A plaintiff may not remove a case, and to the extent that Plaintiff filed a complaint in

federal court which is duplicative of the complaint he filed earlier in state court, which appears to

be the case, Plaintiff’s decision to file duplicative actions does not deprive Defendants of their right

to remove the earlier-filed state court case for consideration.1

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is denied.

III. Screening of Complaint

A. Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

The Court takes judicial notice of case number 1:09-cv-01855-OWW-GSA Bell v. Flippo, et al., filed

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September 22, 2009, in the Northern District of California and transferred to this court on October 21, 2009. The

determination of how to handle Plaintiff’s apparently duplicative complaint filed in case number 1:09-cv-01855-

OWW-GSA will be subject to the discretion of the judges assigned to that case.

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

Under federal notice pleading, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual

allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts “are

not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Factual allegations are accepted as

true but legal conclusion are not, and Plaintiff is required to present factual allegations sufficient to

state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

(9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Iqbal at 1949-50; Moss at 969. 

B. Discussion

1. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison in Delano, California, alleges that

he was harassed and discriminated against based on race by Defendant Kurtz, who singled him out

and targeted him for illegal placement in administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleges that he filed

a staff complaint but supervisors all the way up to the Director’s Level of appeal review endorsed

Kurtz’s conduct and behavior. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth and FourteenthAmendments

of the United States Constitution.

2. Claims Against Defendants Flippo and Smith

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted under

color of state law and (2) each defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or

federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff must

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v.

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, there is no respondeat superior liability

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under section 1983, and therefore, each defendant s only liable for his own misconduct. Iqbal at

1948-49. 

Harassment is not a constitutional violation, Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th

Cir. 1987); Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987), and Plaintiff’s complaint does not set

forth any facts in support of his conclusory claim that Defendant Kurtz discriminated against him

based on his race, Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 565 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Assuming Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against Defendant Kurtz is capable of being cured

through amendment, supervisory personnel involved in reviewing and resolving Plaintiff’s inmate

appeal of Kurtz’s behavior cannot be held liable for Kurtz’s allegedly purposeful discriminatory

conduct. Iqbal at 1948-49. Therefore, notwithstanding the deficiency in his equal protection claim

against Defendant Kurtz as presently pled, Kurtz’s actions in having Plaintiff wrongfully placed in

administrative segregation provide no basis for the imposition of liability on either Flippo or Smith

under the Equal Protection Clause.

With respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, the complaint is devoid of any facts

supporting a claim that Plaintiff was subjected to conditions of confinement that rose to the level of

a constitutional violation. “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” does not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006). The Eighth

Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane

conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Extreme

deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and onlythose deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992)

(citations and quotations omitted). Transfer from general population to administrative segregation

simply does not support a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

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IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claims under section 1983 against Defendants Flippo

and Smith. Given the nature of Plaintiff’s allegations and the bases for the claims against

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Defendants Flippo and Smith, justice does not require that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend and

the claims shall be dismissed. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court does

not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants Flippo and Smith, or the

claims against the other named defendants, who did not join in the notice of removal and who

apparently have not been served. Plaintiff’s complaint contains no viable federal claims against

Flippo and Smith, and this action shall therefore be remanded back to Kern County Superior Court

for further proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254

F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff ’s motion for remand, filed December 14, 2009, is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants Flippo and Smith as discussed herein

are DISMISSED, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 1983; 

3. This action as it relates to Flippo and Smith is REMANDED to the Kern County

Superior Court to deal with the state claims; and

4. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this order on the Kern County Superior

Court and shall serve the parties in the customary manner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 6, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In his complaint, Plaintiff states, “Judicial notice of attached staff complaint, parties involved and

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chronology of events.” (Doc. 1-3, court record p. 12.) This statement evidences Plaintiff’s intent to have the Court

wade through his seventy-nine pages of exhibits and craft his claims for him. It is Plaintiff’s duty to set forth the

allegations in support of his claims. While exhibits may be used to support claims, they must be properly and

specifically incorporated by reference, and Plaintiff may not submit voluminous exhibits in substitution for factual

allegations and anticipate that the Court will piece his claims together for him. The Court’s review is limited to the

factual allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint.

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