Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02626/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02626-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARL L. HELTSLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

SERGEANT STEVEN HARRIS, OFFICER C.

DECIOUS, OFFICER A. MANDELL, OFFICER

G. LEWIS, and DOES ONE through TEN,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-2626 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case brought by Earl Heltsley

against four City of Richmond Police Officers. Defendants Steven

Harris, C. Decious, A. Mandell and G. Lewis move for summary

judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's claims of excessive force are

barred by his no contest plea to charges of resisting arrest. 

Heltsley opposes the motion. The matter was heard on May 24, 2007. 

At the hearing the parties were ordered to submit additional

materials documenting the factual basis for Heltsley's underlying

conviction. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the evidence cited therein and oral argument on the

motions, the Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

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BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Heltsley's September 22, 2003 arrest. 

On that day, Defendant Steven Harris received an unsolicited phone

call from Heltsley's half brother Mike Rogers and Rogers' stepdaughter Katheryn Snyder. Rogers owns Andy's Donut Shop, where

Heltsley worked part-time. Heltsley lived in a room behind the

shop. Harris states that Rogers told him that Heltsley had been

using crack cocaine and methamphetamine and was acting paranoid and

irrational. Rogers also reported that Heltsley had prior felony

convictions and always carried two or three guns. Specifically,

Rogers stated that Heltsley carried one gun at the small of his

back, one in a fanny pack and one on his ankle. 

Snyder told Harris that Heltsley was always armed and that he

had told her that he was manufacturing sawed-off shotguns and

machine guns in his apartment. Snyder reported that Heltsley had

been firing his guns in his room behind the donut shop. Snyder

stated that she stopped working at the donut shop because she was

afraid of Heltsley.

After talking with Rogers and Snyder, Harris conducted a

criminal history check and confirmed that Heltsley had a prior

felony conviction for possession of dangerous weapons. Harris and

another sergeant who is not a Defendant went to the donut shop to

interview Snyder's mother, to contact Heltsley and to preserve

evidence until a search warrant could be obtained. 

Harris interviewed Snyder's mother, Marylin. She informed him

that Heltsley carried a revolver and that she had heard him fire a

gun in his room behind the donut shop. She also reported that,

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while holding a gun, Heltsley had threatened to shoot her and her

children. Marylin stated that she was afraid of Heltsley. 

Close to midnight, after two other officers, Defendants

Mandell and Lewis, arrived, Heltsley drove up in his car and parked

in the lot next to the donut shop. The parties' accounts of what

happened next differ greatly. Defendants allege that when Heltsley

stepped out of his car, Mandell ordered him to step away from the

vehicle. Defendants allege that instead of doing so, Heltsley

threw a ceramic coffee cup at Mandell and began to walk away from

his car. Mandell alleges that he saw Heltsley reaching into the

fanny pack he was wearing around his waist. Mandell instructed

Heltsley to make his hands visible, to "get on the ground" and to

"stop moving." Mandell Declaration ¶ 8. Defendants allege that

Heltsley dropped to a crawling position and began crawling toward

the corner of the donut shop. Mandell continued to instruct

Heltsley to stop and lie on his stomach. 

Harris declares that by the time he arrived at the lot,

Defendants Decious and Mandell where there, instructing Heltsley to

get on the ground and to stop moving. Heltsley continued to crawl

toward his room at the back of the donut shop. Harris, Decious,

and Mandell then attempted physically to restrain Heltsley. Harris

and Mandell declare that "Heltsley significantly resisted the

officers attempt to arrest and control him" and "Heltsley fought

violently against the officers' efforts to control and arrest him." 

Harris Declaration ¶ 23, 24; Mandell Declaration ¶ 11, 12. 

According to Defendants, it then took more than four officers

several minutes to control and handcuff Heltsley. Harris and

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Mandell maintain that Heltsley continued to struggle and that he

managed to rise to his feet several times despite the officers'

efforts. At some point paramedics arrived on the scene to assist

with what Defendants describe as Heltsley's "medical emergency." 

The paramedics requested that the officers remove Heltsley's

handcuffs so they could treat him. When the handcuffs were

removed, Heltsley continued to struggle and scared away the

paramedics. The officers then handcuffed Heltsley again and

strapped him to the gurney so he could be taken to the hospital in

the ambulance.

In his deposition, Heltsley testified that he drove into the

parking lot behind the donut shop, exited his vehicle, locked it

and began walking toward the shop before being approached by a

police officer he recognized as Officer Rood. Heltsley noted that

Rood had his gun drawn, so he put his hands in the air and stopped

moving. Heltsley states that immediately after he put his hands in

the air, somebody came from behind him, grabbed his left hand and

handcuffed him. Heltsley states that he asked "what was this

about" as the person was handcuffing him and said that the

handcuffs were too tight. Heltsley did not see any officer other

than Rood and does not know who handcuffed him. Heltsley states

that he was not resisting, but that the person who handcuffed him

kicked his left leg out from beneath him and pushed him to the

ground. Heltsley fell first to his knees and then lay face-down on

the ground with his chin resting on the ground. People then began

to strike him with blunt objects for a minute or two before

somebody held him down, pulled his legs up behind his body and sat

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on him. He believes that there were four people sitting on him. 

He states that he was lying still so that they would stop hitting

him. Heltsley was hit in the arm and called out, "You broke my

arm." Heltsley tried to tell the people sitting on him that he

could not breathe because of their weight. Heltsley felt somebody

twist his head to the side and step on it with a boot. He also

felt something hard against his neck, choking him. Heltsley

testified that he blacked out and does not remember anything else

before waking up in the hospital. According to his testimony,

Heltsley was conscious for between five and fifteen minutes of the

beating.

Heltsley also attaches the deposition testimony of a bystander

named Lamont Robinson. Robinson testified that he was on his way

home and decided to stop at the donut shop. When he pulled up in

front of the shop, he noticed three police cars. Robinson saw two

officers walking toward the parking lot at the rear of the shop and

another walking along the side of the shop. Robinson states that

he saw Heltsley get out of his car and saw the officers approach

Heltsley and tell him that they wanted to talk to him. Robinson

saw Heltsley turn around and stop. According to Robinson, the

officers then walked up to Heltsley and told him to put his hands

up. Heltsley complied, and the officers pat-searched him and handcuffed him. Robinson heard Heltsley tell the officers, while he

was still standing up, that the handcuffs hurt him. Robinson

states that Heltsley complained about the handcuffs for some time,

and the officers pushed Heltsley to the ground by his shoulders. 

Robinson saw Heltsley fall to his side and then begin to move to

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get on his stomach. Robinson heard Heltsley continue to say that

the handcuffs hurt him. The officers then began hitting Heltsley

with their batons and flashlights. At some point, Robinson heard a

hit and a crack and heard Heltsley tell the officers, "You broke my

arm." Robinson states that there were initially three officers,

but that another police car with two additional officers pulled up

and those officers also hit Heltsley with their batons and

flashlights. Robinson states that he went into the donut shop,

bought donuts and left. 

Heltsley was charged in a twelve count information with

various charges related to possession of assault weapons, explosive

devices and the ingredients to create explosive devices, possession

of methamphetamine and related paraphernalia, and resisting an

executive officer.

Following the preliminary hearing, Heltsley plead no contest

to one count of unlawful assault weapon activity, one count of

possession of a controlled substance with a firearm, one count of

possession of a destructive device near a public place and one

count of resisting an executive officer with force or threat

pursuant to California Penal Code § 69. Heltsley's counsel

stipulated to the factual basis for the offenses based on the

"preliminary hearing transcript and the police reports." Blechman

Supplemental Declaration, Exhibit J at 3. 

Heltsley now seeks damages for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

claims that Defendants used excessive force in arresting him. 

Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that pursuant to Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Heltsley's claims are barred by

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his § 69 conviction. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

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2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

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This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a

42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

a determination, or called into question by a federal court's

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. 

Under California law, a § 69 conviction "requires that the

officer be engaged in the lawful performance of his official

duties" when an arrest is made. Green v. Dunburgh, 2002 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 9473 at *8 (N.D. Cal.) (citing People v. Simons, 42 Cal. App.

4th 1100, 1108 (1996)). However, a claim based on excessive force

during an arrest "necessarily implies that the arrest was

'unlawful' because 'it is a public offense for a peace officer to

use unreasonable and excessive force in effecting an arrest.'" 

Green, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9473 at *9 (quoting People v. Olguin,

119 Cal. App. 3d (1981)). A § 1983 claim requires a finding that

the officers were using unreasonable force. Therefore courts have

found in some situations that such claims are barred under Heck,

because they "would impermissibly imply that the element of being

engaged in the lawful performance of [the officer's] duty is not

satisfied and that the conviction under section 69 is invalid." 

Id. 

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1Section 148(a)(1) is a misdemeanor offense which penalizes

any person who "willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public

officer, peace officer, or an emergency medical technician . . . in

the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office

or employment." Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1). Section 69, under

which Heltsley was convicted, is a felony offense which penalizes

any person who "who attempts, by means of any threat or violence,

to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty

imposed upon such officer by law, or who knowingly resists, by the

use of force or violence, such officer, in the performance of his

duty." Cal. Penal Code § 69. This difference does not impact the

Court's analysis.

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However, courts have found, in other situations, that a

conviction for resisting arrest does not bar a claim for excessive

force. For example, in Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.

2001), the Ninth Circuit held that Heck did not bar the plaintiff's

excessive force claim in spite of her conviction for resisting

arrest in violation of California Penal Code § 148(a)(1)1. Because

Sanford alleged that the defendants punched her after she had

already been handcuffed and arrested, the court found that the

grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants was improper. The

court reasoned, "Excessive force used after an arrest is made does

not destroy the lawfulness of the arrest. Sanford's conviction

requires that Motts be acting lawfully in the performance of his

duties 'at the time the offense against him was committed.'" Id.

at 1120. 

Similarly, in Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir.

2005) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that "a § 1983 action is

not barred under Heck unless it is clear from the record that its

successful prosecution would necessarily imply or demonstrate that

the plaintiff's earlier conviction was invalid." Id. at 699

(emphasis in original). Therefore, the court found that a grant of

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summary judgment was improper where it could not "determine that

the actions that underlay Smith's conviction upon his plea of

guilty occurred at the time of or during the course of his unlawful

arrest." Id.

Heltsley argues that there were two distinct altercations

underlying his conviction and that the record does not demonstrate

upon which altercation his conviction was based. According to

Heltsley, the first altercation occurred while he was conscious and

the second occurred between the time he blacked out and the time he

was handcuffed in the ambulance. Heltsley argues that his

excessive force claim is based upon the officers' conduct during

the first altercation because he has no recollection of the second.

Therefore, Heltsley argues that his claim is not barred under Heck

because there is no evidence to refute the theory that his no

contest plea was based on his conduct during the second

altercation. 

Heltsley's counsel stipulated that the factual basis for his

no contest plea was based on the police reports and the preliminary

hearing. Defendant Harris' police report and testimony at the

preliminary hearing support Plaintiff's theory. Harris describes

the first phase of the incident, including "a significant struggle,

during which Earl sustained a compound fracture of his right arm." 

Heltsley Report at 1. According to Harris' report, "Earl was

finally handcuffed, but that did not stop his efforts to escape. 

Earl's efforts to rise to his feet were only overcome by the

application of bodily force by several additional responding

officers, as well as Officer Dicious [sic], Officer Mandell,

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Officer Lewis and I, which pinned Earl's legs to his buttocks and

his body to the ground." Id. According to Harris' testimony, once

Heltsley was restrained,

Sergeant Dixon called for an ambulance with four-point

restraints . . . so that Earl may be controlled and his

injuries attended . . . By the time [the paramedics]

arrived, we found that Earl had gone limp and stopped

breathing; his skin had grown ashen. The paramedic

immediately asked that Earl be turned over and that his

handcuffs be removed. Earl was turned over, and Officer

Lewis removed one of his handcuffs. Earl took two deep

breaths, then sat up an began to scream . . . While

other officers grabbed other parts of his body, I

reached out for Earl's right arm. After a second

struggle, I was able to gain control of his right arm

again. The handcuffs were replaced and Earl was placed

onto an ambulance gurney, in four-point restraints and

handcuffs . . . Officers Mandell and Decious accompanied

Earl to the hospital, where he again had to be

physically restrained, twice!

Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added). 

Similarly, at the preliminary hearing, Harris testified as

follows, "The first portion of the arrest, the first struggle,

lasted some where [sic] in the neighborhood of 30 seconds, maybe a

minute . . . The second one was a shorter period of time, probably

half as long." Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 92-93. Harris

was the only officer who testified about the arrest at the

preliminary hearing.

As in Smith, there is no indication of whether Heltsley's plea

was based on his conduct during the first struggle or the second; 

Heltsley plead no contest to one count of violating § 69, "but

there is no information as to which of his actions constituted the

basis for his plea." Smith, 394 F.3d at 698. Further, the

charging document simply recites the statutory description of the

offense. It is possible that the officers used excessive force to

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2Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of

various court records related to Heltsley's conviction. Plaintiff

does not oppose the request. The Court GRANTS Defendants' request

for judicial notice (Docket No. 18). Defendants' objection to

evidence submitted by Plaintiff (Docket No. 26)) is DENIED as moot. 

The Court did not consider any improper or inadmissible evidence in

deciding these motions.

13

subdue Heltsley during the first struggle and that they only acted

lawfully during the second struggle. Because the factual basis for

Heltsley's no contest plea is not clear, Heltsley's "lawsuit does

not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and is

therefore not barred by Heck." Id. (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion

for summary judgment.2 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6/4/07

Dated: ________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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