Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00626/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00626-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Abraan Rene Ortiz, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-11-626-TUC-FRZ-DTF

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Abraan Rene Ortiz has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Before this Court are

the Petition (Doc. 1), Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 10) and Petitioner’s Reply and Notice of

Errata (Docs. 11, 12). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its

independent review of the record, dismiss the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia and possessing narcotic

drugs for sale. He was sentenced to concurrent, enhanced presumptive terms of 3.75 and

15.75 years, as a repeat offender with two or more prior felonies. The Arizona Court of

Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. (Doc. 10, Ex. A at 2.) The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Id., Ex. B.)

Counsel for Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief (PCR). (Doc. 10, Ex.

D.) Petitioner also was granted leave to file a pro se PCR petition, which he did. (Doc. 10,

Ex. E.) The PCR court vacated the Criminal Restitution Order (although it affirmed the fine)

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and denied the remainder of the claims. (Doc. 10, Ex. F.) Petitioner and counsel filed

petitions for review. (Doc. 10, Exs. G, H.) The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but

denied relief. (Doc. 10, Ex. I.)

Petitioner then filed a “Motion for Praecipe and to Reinstate Rule (32) Proceedings,”

which the Court treated as a PCR petition and denied. (Doc. 10, Exs. L, M.) Petitioner then

filed an amended PCR petition, which the court denied. (Doc. 10, Exs. N, O.) Petitioner filed

a Petition for Special Action to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which the court treated as a

petition for review and, after granting review, denied. (Doc. 10, Exs. P, Q.)

DISCUSSION

Respondents concede that the petition is timely, however, they contend that some part

of, or the entirety of, each claim was not properly exhausted. Below, the Court evaluates each

of Petitioner’s eight claims, many of which are multi-part, for exhaustion. The Court then

evaluates the properly exhausted claims on the merits.

PRINCIPLES OF EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state’s highest

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78

(1971). Exhaustion requires that a petitioner clearly alert the state court that he is alleging a

specific federal constitutional violation. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir.

2004); see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) (general appeal to due process

not sufficient to present substance of federal claim); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-

70 (2000), as amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (general reference to insufficiency

of evidence, right to be tried by impartial jury, and ineffective assistance of counsel lacked

specificity and explicitness required); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)

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(“The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish

exhaustion.”).

In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to

exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a petitioner

is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in a prior PCR

petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) may be avoided

only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1) and

the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a prior petition or not presented in

a timely manner. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b), 32.4(a).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways.

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state

court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present

it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims

in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998)

(stating that the district court must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any

presently available state remedy). If no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32,

the claim is “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732,

735 n.1; see also Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62.

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross,

468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure to properly

exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or

shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on

the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

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 1 Respondents also identify within Claim 1 an allegation that trial counsel’s drug abuse

prevented him from performing effectively. Claim 1 mentions that counsel’s drug use

prevented him from preserving matters for review or functioning rationally. However, the

only prejudice Petitioner alleges relate to the plea offer and the suppression motion, which

are covered by subparts (a) and (b) of Claim 1. The critical issue is what counsel did or failed

to do and how that impacted Petitioner, regardless of whether his decisions were driven by

his level of legal skill, experience or drug use. Therefore, the Court does not treat counsel’s

alleged drug use as a separate claim.

 2 Petitioner raised this claim again in his second PCR petition (Motion for Praecipe);

however, the state courts did not consider it on the merits nor eradicate the default. (Doc. 10,

Ex. M at 3 n.3; Ex. Q at 3.)

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PROCEDURAL DEFAULT ANALYSIS

Claim 1

Petitioner alleges his counsel was ineffective at every critical stage, including (a) trial

counsel erroneously led him to believe the suppression motion would be successful and he

should not accept the plea offer; and (b) trial and appellate counsel failed to challenge the

search on the proper grounds.1

Petitioner raised Claim 1(a) in his pro se supplemental PCR petition. (Doc. 10, Ex. E.)

The PCR court denied the claim on the merits. (Doc. 10, Ex. F at 10-12.) Petitioner filed a

petition for review, stating summarily that he was raising the same claims as those raised in

his PCR petition. (Doc. 10, Ex. G.) The court of appeals denied his petition for review

because it violated Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9, which provides that a petition

for review is designed to review actions of the trial court not to give a first consideration to

the same issues raised before the trial court. (Doc. 10, Ex. I at 4.) Because this claim was

found defaulted in state court on state court grounds it is procedurally defaulted and

precluded from federal review.2

Claim 1(b), as to trial counsel, was raised in the first PCR petition filed by counsel.

(Doc. 10, Ex. D at 3-16.) The PCR court denied the claim on the merits. (Doc. 10, Ex. F at

2-4.) It was raised in a petition for review and denied on the merits by the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Doc. 10, Ex. H at 4-14, Ex. I at 4-7.) Because this claim was fairly presented and

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properly exhausted it will be addressed on the merits.

Claim 1(b), as to appellate counsel, was arguably raised in the PCR petition filed by

counsel. After arguing that appellate counsel could not bring a claim that trial counsel failed

to raise, Petitioner argued, “to the extent appellate counsel could have, but did not, litigate

the issue . . . she was ineffective.” (Doc. 10, Ex. D at 15.) The PCR court did not address

Petitioner’s contentions regarding appellate counsel, although it did generally find no

material issue of fact or law had been raised and dismissed the petition. (Doc. 10, Ex. F.)

Petitioner raised the claim in his petition for review. (Doc. 10, Ex. H at 14-16.) The appellate

court acknowledged the claim and inferred that the PCR court considered and denied the

claim and/or would have denied it. (Doc. 10, Ex. I at 7.) The appellate court did not issue a

ruling specific to this claim, however, it denied relief in entirety. (Doc. 10, Ex. I.) Thus, it

appears the claim was exhausted.

Claim 2

Claim 2 alleges that Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a search

and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly challenge this on appeal. To the

extent Petitioner is raising a claim about appellate counsel’s performance, the Court

addresses it on the merits as part of Claim 1(b). The remainder of the claim is addressed

below.

Unlawful search and seizure claims are generally not subject to review by this Court.

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), the Supreme Court held that “where the State

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state

prisoner may not be granted federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an

unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at trial.” Pursuant to Stone, a prerequisite

for consideration of Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is the denial of the chance to fully

and fairly litigate the claim in state court. 

Although Petitioner argues that his counsel did not properly challenge the search, he

does not allege that the state court impeded him from developing the claim. The trial court

held a hearing on Petitioner’s motion to suppress and provided a reasoned decision on the

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record (Doc. 10, Ex. U at 6-57), and the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed that decision

(id., Ex. A). Therefore, Petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief on his Fourth Amendment

claim.

Claim 3

Claim 3 alleges a violation of Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights; however, the

factual basis of the claim is unclear. Respondents articulate the claim as alleging that

Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the admission of his statement, that he

was on probation, made at the time of arrest. Although the claim would likely fail due to its

vagueness, it is expeditiously resolved on a procedural ground. Petitioner did not fairly

present a Fifth Amendment claim on direct appeal or in any of the documents treated as

petitions to the PCR court. (Doc. 10, Exs. D, E, L, N, V.)

If Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate this claim, it would be found

waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, this claim is technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted.

Claim 4

Claim 4 alleges a violation of due process, however, it appears to entail three

unrelated grounds. 

First, Petitioner alleges in subpart (a) that during his PCR proceeding the court erred

in finding that he had not submitted any affidavits to support his claims. Alleged errors in the

PCR process are not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding because they do not

attack the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention. See Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26

(9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (finding allegations of error in state post-conviction review

process non-cognizable); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997). Further,

Petitioner never fairly presented this claim in state court.

Second, Petitioner contends in subpart (b) that there was an objection during the

suppression hearing to the officer’s testimony on which no court has ruled. One officer

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remained in the courtroom while the other one testified, which he argues violated Arizona

Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.3. Violations of state court rules do not state a cognizable

ground for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Further,

Plaintiff never fairly presented this as a federal due process claim in state court.

Third, Petitioner contends in subpart (c) that he did not knowingly waive his right to

a probation revocation hearing, to which he was entitled. Based on the record the Court has

reviewed, revocation of probation is not relevant to Petitioner’s case. He did argue in his first

PCR petition that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily relinquish his right to

a jury trial on his probation status, which violated his right to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 10, Ex. D at 17-19.) However, he did not raise that claim as

a federal constitutional one in his petition for review. (Doc. 10, Ex. H at 16-19.) Thus, he

failed to fairly present this claim in state court.

If Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate these claims, they would be

found waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure because they do not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, these claims are technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted. Additionally, subparts (a) and (b) are not cognizable.

Claim 5

Petitioner alleges that the sentence imposed was primarily a punishment for

Petitioner’s past rather than the current crime which amounted to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also contends appellate counsel failed

to raise issues later identified by PCR counsel, specifically his right to a hearing on his

probation status and a violation of criminal rule 9.3.

Petitioner did not raise an Eighth Amendment claim on appeal nor in any PCR

petition. In his state court filings he made passing references to the Eighth Amendment but

he never connected it to a specific factual allegation nor did he allege that he was being

punished for prior crimes. Next, Petitioner did not allege in any PCR petition that appellate

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 3 Petitioner arguably makes the allegation in Claim 6 that he had a right to a jury

determination of his probation status. That allegation is included in Claim 7 and the Court

addresses it in that section.

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counsel failed to raise claims regarding his right to a hearing on his probation status or the

trial court violated criminal rule 9.3.

If Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate these claims, they would be

found waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure because they do not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, these claims are technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted.

Claim 6

Claim 6 alleges that “counsel’s presentation lacked verocity [sic] and failed to

interview witnesses to ensure a complete defense.” He also alleges counsel failed to object

to amended instructions.3

 Petitioner provides no additional facts to explain this claim, nor

does he assert that he suffered prejudice from any of these alleged deficiencies. These

minimal conclusory allegations are insufficient for habeas relief. See Rule 2, Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (requiring petition to state the facts in

support of each claim); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding

that vague and conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance do not warrant habeas relief);

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding insufficient conclusory allegations that

did not identify what counsel would have done if performing effectively). Thus, these claims

are subject to dismissal.

Further, Petitioner did not exhaust in state court a claim that counsel at any stage was

ineffective for failing to interview witnesses or object to instructions. If Petitioner were to

return to state court now to litigate these claims, they would be found waived and untimely

under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because they

do not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h).

Therefore, these claims are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

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 4 Petitioner labeled this claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct but does not make any

factual allegations relevant to such a claim. Further, Petitioner did not exhaust any

prosecutorial misconduct claims. The Court addresses the various legal claims tied to the

factual allegations of Claim 7.

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Claim 74

Claim 7 asserts that (a) the trial court erred by withholding the evidence regarding

probation from the jury and then using that evidence as aggravation for the sentences. He

also contends that (b) it was error for the sentencing court not to consider mitigation.

Although Petitioner does not clearly identify the constitutional violation at issue, the 

Court evaluates the claim as one of due process. Petitioner additionally alleges that

(c) counsel at all stages was ineffective for failing to raise these two issues. Finally, he states

that (d) he is raising a claim of “jeopardy” and sufficiency of the evidence.

In his first PCR petition filed by counsel, Petitioner argued subclaim (a), that the trial

court’s failure to submit the issue of Petitioner’s release status to a jury violated his right to

due process. (Doc. 10, Ex. D at 17-19.) However, this claim was not raised in the petition for

review. (Doc. 10, Ex. H.) Nor was this claim raised in any of the subsequent PCR petitions.

Therefore, Petitioner failed to fairly present Claim 7(a) in state court.

Petitioner never presented a claim in state court that the sentencing court failed to

consider mitigation. However, giving liberal interpretation to Claim 7(b) as alleged in his

federal petition, the Court evaluates a similar claim that he did raise in a PCR proceeding.

In the first PCR petition, counsel argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it

determined that it could not impose a mitigated sentence. (Doc. 10, Ex. D at 16-17.)

However, this claim was not presented as one based on federal law in the petition. Nor was

it raised and federalized in a subsequent PCR petition. Therefore, Petitioner did not fairly

present Claim 7(b) in state court.

Next, the Court evaluates Claim 7(c), which alleges that trial and appellate counsel

were ineffective for failing to raise the issues alleged in subparts (a) and (b) of this claim,

which the Court refers to as Claims 7(c)(i) and 7(c)(ii), respectively. In the first PCR petition,

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counsel argued that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge

Petitioner’s sentence on the state law ground that the trial court erroneously believed

mitigated sentences were not available (subpart (ii)). (Doc. 10, Ex. D at 16-20.) He did not

clearly argue that trial or appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the trial

court’s failure to submit Petitioner’s probation status to a jury (subpart (i)). (Id.) However,

the PCR court arguably addressed ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) as to both

underlying claims regarding Petitioner’s sentence. (Doc. 10, Ex. F at 7-9.) On appeal,

Petitioner argued only that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court

could have imposed a mitigated sentence. (Doc. 10, Ex. H at 16, 19.) That claim was denied

on the merits. (Doc. 10, Ex. I at 10.) Therefore, Claim 7(c)(ii) – that counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise claim 7(b) – was exhausted and will be considered on the merits.

However, Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claim 7(a), Claim

7(c)(i), was not fairly presented because he failed to include the claim in his petition for

review to the court of appeals. 

If Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate Claims 7(a), 7(b) and 7(c)(i),

they would be found waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure because they do not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, Claims 7(a), (b) and (c)(i) are technically

exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

Further, even if Petitioner established a constitutional error as to Claim 7(c)(i), the

error would be harmless. See Estrella v. Ollison, 668 F.3d 593, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2011)

(Apprendi error is harmless if state presented sentencing judge with sufficient documents to

establish probation status beyond a reasonable doubt). Petitioner has never denied that he was

on probation when he committed the crimes, and the PCR court and appellate court found

that the prosecutor admitted exhibits establishing that Petitioner was in fact on probation

when he committed the offenses. (Doc. 10, Ex. F at 6, Ex. I at 9.)

Petitioner’s assertion of violations based on double jeopardy and insufficiency of the

evidence (subclaim (d)) are mere conclusory allegations, detached from any facts, and are

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insufficient to state a claim. See Rule 2, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll.

§ 2254 (requiring petition to state the facts in support of each claim); Jones v. Gomez, 66

F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995).

Claim 8

Petitioner alleges that the appellate court and superior court breached the rules of

judicial conduct when ruling on Petitioner’s newly discovered evidence and failed to hold

an evidentiary hearing. First, Petitioner does not clearly state a violation of a federal law or

the United States constitution, as required for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a). Second, alleged errors in the appellate or PCR process are not cognizable in a

federal habeas corpus proceeding because they do not attack the lawfulness of Petitioner’s

detention. See Franzen, 877 F.2d at 26; Gerlaugh, 129 F.3d at 1045. 

Finally, Petitioner has not fairly presented such a claim in state court. If Petitioner

were to return to state court now to litigate this claim, it would be found waived and untimely

under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because it

does not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h).

Therefore, Claim 8 is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

Cause and Prejudice and Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Although Petitioner discusses the law regarding cause and prejudice and miscarriage

of justice in his Reply, he does not provide any support for his argument that he can

demonstrate either one. (Doc. 11 at 4-6, 55-56, 77-78.) Petitioner argues the substance of the

claims in his Petition, rather than identifying an external cause for failing to properly raise

the claims in state court as is required. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (“cause” to excuse a default

exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that “some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.”). Further, to

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice based on factual innocence, a petitioner

must show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who

is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). To establish the requisite

probability, the petitioner must demonstrate with new reliable evidence that “it is more likely

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than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. at 324, 327. Petitioner has not presented any new evidence to support such an

allegation. Petitioner has failed to set forth any ground to overcome the procedural defaults

found above.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR RELIEF UNDER THE AEDPA

The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas relief” with the

“acknowledged purpose of ‘reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal

sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007) (quoting Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings’ . . . demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of

the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664

(9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists

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of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction

became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006).

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In

characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has

observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the

facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir.

2004). 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court’s

application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner must show that the

state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.”

Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state

court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 340

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(2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In

considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed

to be correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74; Miller-El II,

545 U.S. at 240.

MERITS ANALYSIS

Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

The governing federal standard for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), which recognizes a right to

“effective assistance of counsel” arising under the Sixth Amendment. The Strickland

standard for IAC has two components. A defendant must first demonstrate that counsel’s

performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 466 U.S. at

687. It requires the defendant to show that counsel’s conduct “fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88. Counsel’s performance is strongly presumed to

fall within the ambit of reasonable conduct unless petitioner can show otherwise. Id. at 689-

90. Second, a defendant must show that the mistakes made were “prejudicial to the defense,”

that is, the mistakes created a “reasonable probability that, but for [the] unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A court need not address

both prongs of an ineffectiveness claim, if it is easier to dispose of it solely by assessing

prejudice, the court is free to do so. Id. at 697.

Claim 1(b)

Petitioner alleges that trial and appellate counsel failed to challenge the search on the

proper grounds. The PCR court set forth the following background relevant to this claim:

On November 30th, two TPD officers approached a parked vehicle with a

temporary license plate. The officers had noticed that the lights to the vehicle

were off and that there were two passengers inside. When one of the officers

approached the vehicle, the occupants rolled down the window and the officer

encountered a strong odor of unburnt marijuana. The second officer then

approached and also detected the odor and the occupants were asked to exit the

vehicle. When the occupants had exited the vehicle Officer Currier informed

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the Defendant of his intention to search the vehicle. The officers searched the

car for marijuana including a lunch box that was in the back seat of the

vehicle. Inside the lunch box the officers found what appeared to be cocaine,

a measuring spoon, an air freshener, and a small scale.

(Doc. 10, Ex. F at 1-2.) The Court then addressed Petitioner’s claim that counsel was

ineffective for failing to challenge the search of the lunch box.

With respect to trial counsel, the PCR court found he had made the argument that

Petitioner was alleging he failed to make. After the close of testimony at the suppression

hearing, counsel argued that Officer Currier did not have permission to search the car and

“certainly didn’t have permission to search in the lunch box, which is another container, and

he specified that the odor wasn’t emanating from the container.” (Id. at 3.) The court

followed up with the prosecution, asking, “even though they are searching the vehicle, is

there – do they not need to get a search warrant just to search the lunch container. I mean,

that is going – it’s not going anywhere.” (Id.) The court further inquired, “but do you believe

that the lunch box is part of the vehicle search.” (Id.) Based on these facts, the court found

that counsel had made the argument in question and that the trial court understood that

counsel was asking for suppression specifically as to the lunch box search; therefore, it found

Petitioner had not satisfied either prong of the Strickland standard. (Id. at 3-4.) The appellate

court similarly found that the trial court considered the propriety of the search of the

lunchbox. (Doc. 10, Ex. I at 6.) The court found, therefore, that Petitioner was not prejudiced

by counsel’s actions. (Id.)

This Court must defer to facts as found by the state court, unless rebutted by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The state courts’ fact finding is dispositive of

this claim. The state courts found that the trial judge ruled on the question Petitioner argued

his counsel failed to raise. Petitioner has not argued that this finding was in error nor

presented any evidence to rebut it. The Court reviewed the transcript from the suppression

hearing, including the court’s ruling, and concludes that the state courts’ fact finding was not

unreasonable in light of the record, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Because the trial court

addressed the claim, even if not clearly raised by counsel, Petitioner was not prejudiced. The

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state courts’ denial of this claim, as to trial counsel, was not an unreasonable application of

Strickland.

With respect to appellate counsel, Petitioner alleges she should have argued that, even

if there was probable cause to search the car, there was not probable cause to search the lunch

box. Because this claim was denied by the state court on the merits but without any rationale

(Doc. 10, Ex. I), the Court independently reviews the record but defers to the state court’s

ultimate decision to deny the claim, see Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir.

2002).

In evaluating prejudice, the Court assesses whether there is a reasonable probability

that the claim would have been successful if counsel had raised it on appeal. See Moorman

v. Ryan, 628 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010). “If probable cause justifies the search of a

lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents

that may conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

Thus, the scope of an automobile search is “defined by the object of the search and the places

in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” Id. at 824. For example, if

there is probable cause to believe undocumented aliens are being transported in a van, that

will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Id.

Petitioner argues that the search of the lunchbox lacked probable cause because an

officer testified that the scent of marijuana was not emanating from the lunch box. Officer

Currier testified that a strong odor of unburnt marijuana was coming from the interior of the

car. (Doc. 10, Ex. U at 19.) On cross-examination, he responded with “No” to the question,

“Now, the odor was not emanating from the lunch box; correct?” (Id. at 21.) 

The lunchbox was in the passenger compartment of the car, which is where the odor

was detected by two officers. Thus, there was probable cause to search that area of the car.

Further, some quantity of marijuana could fit inside a lunchbox. Therefore, there was

probable cause to search the box. Trial counsel did not establish if Officer Currier determined

there was no scent of marijuana emanating from the lunchbox prior to opening it. His

testimony could readily be interpreted as indicating that he did not find marijuana in the

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lunchbox, thus, it was not producing the odor. Petitioner was not prejudiced because there

was not a reasonable probability that, if this claim had been raised on appeal, it would have

been successful. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Arizona Court of Appeals

denied Petitioner’s claim as to appellate counsel.

It was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law for the state court to

deny this claim.

Claim 7(c)(ii)

Petitioner alleges that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to

challenge the trial court’s belief that it could not impose a mitigated sentence.

In his PCR petition, Petitioner argued that the trial judge erred in concluding that

Petitioner had admitted he was on release when he committed the crimes. (Doc. 10, Ex. A

at 16-17.) Petitioner argued that the statutory provision, that a court may not sentence below

the presumptive term for a defendant who is on release, did not apply to him.

The PCR court found that, although he never said the words, it was the intention of

Petitioner that he admit he was on probation at the time of the offenses. (Doc. 10, Ex. F at

4.) Further, based on the documents admitted by the trial court, reasonable evidence

supported the fact that Petitioner was on probation at the time he committed the offenses. (Id.

at 6.) Thus, Petitioner could not be sentenced below the presumptive term. (Id. at 6-7.) The

PCR court found that trial counsel was not ineffective nor was Petitioner prejudiced. (Id. at

9.) The court noted that Petitioner, counsel and the Court all understood that Petitioner

intended to admit his probation status and he knew that meant he could not receive a sentence

below the presumptive term. (Id.) Further, he was not prejudiced because he was sentenced

in the range he acknowledged was available to the court. (Id.) The appellate court noted that

Petitioner’s probation status was mentioned more than once by the court at sentencing and

was acknowledged by defense counsel. (Doc. 10, Ex. I at 9-10.) The court of appeals found

that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the actions of trial or appellate counsel because he was

unequivocally on probation. (Id. at 10.)

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 5 If Petitioner chooses to file objections, he and the Court would benefit from each

claim being addressed separately under an independent heading.

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Petitioner does not dispute the state court fact finding that he was on probation at the

time he committed the offenses. That finding is presumed correct by this Court and there is

no evidence to the contrary in the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner also does not

dispute that under Arizona law, because he was on probation, he could not be sentenced

below the presumptive term of 15.75 years to which he was sentenced. Because Petitioner

was sentenced to the term to which he was subject under the facts and the law, he was not

prejudiced by trial or appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the ambiguous record.

The state court’s denial of this claim was not an objectively unreasonable application

of Strickland.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

Claims 1(a), 3, 4(c), 5, 7(a), 7(b), and 7(c)(i) are procedurally defaulted and should

be dismissed on that basis. Claims 1(b) and 7(c)(ii) do not warrant relief under the AEDPA

and should be dismissed on the merits. Habeas relief on Claim 2 is foreclosed by Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). Claims 4(a) and 4(b) are not cognizable and are

procedurally defaulted. Claim 6 is conclusory, fails to state a claim and is procedurally

defaulted. Claim 7(d) is conclusory and subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Claim

8 fails to state a federal claim, is not cognizable and is procedurally defaulted. Based on the

foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court enter an order DISMISSING

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation.5

 If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Any 

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objections filed should be captioned with the following case number: CV-11-626-TUC-FRZ.

DATED this 21st day of June, 2012.

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