Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05354/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05354-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 3, 1997 Decided December 5, 1997 

No. 96-5354

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

BRUCE BABBITT, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND 

MOLLIE BEATTIE, DIRECTOR,

UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv01973)

Thomas C. Jackson argued the cause for appellants, with 

whom Patrick J. Hurd, Arthur S. Garrett III, Martha E. 

Marrapese, Glen F. Koontz and Alec I. Ugol were on the 

briefs. Alan K. Marks entered an appearance.

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David C. Shilton, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees, with whom Lois J. 

Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and J. Carol Williams,

Attorney, were on the brief. John A. Bryson, Attorney, 

entered an appearance.

William R. Irvin, Kathleen Rogers, Josh Eagle and Michael J. Bean were on the brief for amici curiae Center for 

Marine Conservation, et al.

Robin L. Rivett and Anne M. Hawkins were on the brief 

for amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.

Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar were on the brief 

for amicus curiae Washington Legal Foundation.

Paul M. Terrill, III was on the brief for amicus curiae

American Land Foundation.

Before: WALD, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

WALD, Circuit Judge: The National Association of Home 

Builders of the United States, the Building Industry Legal 

Defense Fund, the County of San Bernardino, and the City of 

Colton, California brought this action in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge an 

application of section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act 

("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for 

any person to "take"i.e., "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 

shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to 

engage in any such conduct," 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)any 

endangered species. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that 

the application of section 9 of the ESA to the Delhi Sands 

Flower-Loving Fly ("the Fly"), which is located only in 

California, exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause power and 

an injunction against application of the section to the plaintiff's construction activities in areas containing Fly habitat.

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This dispute arose when the Fish and Wildlife Service 

("FWS") placed the Fly, an insect that is native to the San 

Bernardino area of California, on the endangered species list. 

The listing of the Fly, the habitat of which is located entirely 

within an eight mile radius in southwestern San Bernardino 

County and northwestern Riverside County, California, 

forced San Bernardino County to alter plans to construct a 

new hospital on a recently purchased site that the FWS had 

determined contained Fly habitat. The FWS and San Bernardino County agreed on a plan that would allow the County 

to build the hospital and a power plant in the area designated 

as Fly habitat in return for modification of the construction 

plans and purchase and set aside of nearby land as Fly 

habitat. In November 1995, FWS issued a permit to allow 

construction of the power plant. During the same month, 

however, the County notified the FWS that it planned to 

redesign a nearby intersection to improve emergency vehicle 

access to the hospital. The FWS informed the County that 

expansion of the intersection as planned would likely lead to a 

"taking" of the Fly in violation of ESA section 9(a). After 

brief unsuccessful negotiations between the County and FWS, 

the County filed suit in district court challenging the application of section 9(a)(1) to the Fly.

The district court held that application of section 9(a)(1) of 

the Endangered Species Act to the Fly is a valid exercise of 

Congress' power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment on behalf of the 

government. See National Association of Home Builders v. 

Babbit, 949 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996). Because we also find 

that the application of section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered 

Species Act to the Fly does not exceed Congress' Commerce 

Clause power, we affirm the district court's decision to grant 

the government's motion for summary judgment.1

__________

1 Summary judgment is appropriate when all of the submissions 

"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, which lives only in 

the "Delhi series" soils found in southwestern San Bernardino 

County and northwestern Riverside County, California, is the 

only remaining subspecies of its species. The other subspecies, the El Segundo Flower-Loving Fly, is believed to be 

extinct due to destruction of its habitat through urban development. See Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Marine 

Conservation, Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense 

Fund, National Audubon Society, and World Wildlife Fund 

("Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellees") at 4. The Fly is also 

one of only a few North American species in the "mydas flies" 

family and one of only a few species in that family that visit 

flowers in search of nectar, thereby pollinating native plant 

species. See id. at 1.

Over 97 percent of the historic habitat of the Fly has been 

eliminated, and, prior to its listing as endangered, its remaining habitat was threatened by urban development, unauthorized trash dumping, and off-road vehicle use. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of 

Endangered Status for the Delhi Sands Flower-loving Fly, 58 

Fed. Reg. 49,881, 49,885 (1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 

There are currently 11 known populations of the Fly, all of 

which occur within an eight mile radius of one another. See

Declaration of Christopher D. Nagano (Apr. 30, 1996) at ¶ 14 

("Nagano Declaration"). The size of the entire population of 

Flies was recently estimated in the low hundreds. See U.S. 

Fish and Wildlife Service, Technical/Agency Draft Recovery 

Plan for the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly 12 (1996).

In 1990, after receiving two petitions asking that the Fly be 

placed on the endangered species list, the FWS began an 

investigation into whether listing of the Fly as endangered 

was warranted. Soon thereafter, the FWS found that substantial information had been presented to indicate that the 

Fly was an endangered species. Two years later, the FWS 

published its final determination that the Fly is "in imminent 

danger of extinction due to extensive habitat loss and degradation that has reduced its range by 97 percent." 58 Fed. 

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Reg. at 49,881. The listing of the Fly as endangered triggered the automatic statutory prohibitions of section 9(a)(1) of 

the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). As a result, commercial 

trade in the species could no longer occur lawfully and no 

person could "take" individuals of the species without a 

permit or an exemption.

For several years prior to the listing of the Fly as endangered, the County of San Bernardino had been planning to 

build a $470 million earthquake-proof "state of the art" 

hospital to serve as the central emergency medical center for 

the San Bernardino County area in the event of an earthquake and to serve as a primary burn care center and 

teaching facility. In July 1992, two years after the FWS had 

published its notice that sufficient information had been presented to justify listing the Fly as endangered but before the 

Fly was actually so listed, the Board of the new San Bernardino County hospital acquired the final site parcels for the 

hospital. The 76-acre site that the board acquired contained 

habitat of the Fly.

In November 1992, the FWS notified the County that the 

Fly was likely to be listed as endangered, and in May 1993

after the Fly was listedthe FWS advised the County that 

the hospital site was occupied by the Fly and that construction of the facility as then proposed would likely "take" 

members of the species in violation of the ESA. The County 

decided to modify the layout and design of the hospital to 

eliminate direct and indirect impacts to the Fly and to 

eliminate the need for a section 10 "incidental take permit." 2

__________

2 Under section 10 of the ESA, the Secretary of the FWS may 

permit a taking of an endangered species otherwise prohibited by 

section 9(a)(1) if the taking is incidental to carrying out an otherwise lawful activity. No permit may be issued until after the 

applicant submits a conservation plan, the Secretary offers opportunity for public comment on the plan, and the Secretary finds, among 

other things, that the taking will be incidental, the impacts of the 

taking will be minimized to the extent practicable, adequate funding 

for the plan is available, and the taking will not appreciably reduce 

the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species. See 16 

U.S.C. § 1539(a).

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One of the modifications to the original design for the hospital 

included in the plan was to move the hospital 250 feet north 

to "avoid[ ] direct impact to the entire area identified as 

occupied or suitable Delhi Fly habitat." Habitat Preservation, Habitat Enchangement [sic] and Impact Avoidance Plan 

for the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly at the San Bernardino County Hospital Replacement Site 8 (Dec. 1, 1993). This 

resulted in an 8.35 acre Delhi Fly habitat preserve. Id. The 

plan also created a 100-foot wide corridor to link two Fly 

habitat areas and permit interbreeding between Fly colonies.

In October 1994, the County approached FWS with a 

proposal to construct a substation to power the hospital on 

"the best remaining habitat" for the Fly. See Declaration of 

Jeffery M. Newman 8 (Apr. 29, 1996) ("Newman Declaration"). The County submitted an application for incidental 

"take" of the Fly, which would permit it to build on about 4 

acres of Fly habitat. To offset this reduction in Fly habitat, 

the County proposed to acquire and manage a nearby 7.5 acre 

site as Fly habitat. In November 1995, the FWS issued the 

section 10 permit for the substation and construction began 

shortly thereafter. See id. at 9.

In November 1995, the County informed FWS of its plans 

to redesign an intersection near the hospital that the County 

argues is critical to emergency vehicle access to the new 

hospital. The FWS determined that the plan, which called 

for a reduction of the 100 foot wide corridor to an 18 foot wide 

corridor, a reduction of 70 to 80 percent, would "greatly 

reduce, if not effectively eliminate, the entire corridor area 

set aside as a critical part of the County's efforts to avoid a 

take" of the Fly. Newman Declaration at 7. The FWS 

advised the County that the redesign of the intersection 

would probably cause a "take" of the Fly in violation of 

section 9 of the ESA.

On October 20, 1995, the National Association of Home 

Builders of the United States, the Building Industry Legal 

Defense Fund, the County of San Bernardino, and the City of 

Colton, California filed a complaint seeking a declaration that 

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tional as applied to "takes" of the Fly and asking for an 

injunction barring application of the provision. An amended 

complaint later added the California Building Industry Association and the City of Fontana as plaintiffs. On December 6, 

1996, the district court granted the government's motion for 

summary judgment. See National Association of Home 

Builders, 949 F. Supp. 1. This appeal ensued.

II. ISCUSSION

Appellants challenge the application of section 9(a)(1) of the 

ESA, which makes it unlawful for any person to "take any 

[endangered or threatened] species within the United States 

or the territorial sea of the United States," 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1538(a)(1), to the Delhi Sands Flower- Loving Fly. See also 

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater 

Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding agency's interpretation of the term "take" to include significant habitat degradation). Appellants argue that the federal government does not 

have the authority to regulate the use of non-federal lands in 

order to protect the Fly, which is found only within a single 

state. Indeed, they claim that "the Constitution of the United States does not grant the federal government the authority to regulate wildlife, nor does it authorize federal regulation 

of nonfederal lands." Brief for Appellants at 17.

The district court held that the application of section 9(a)(1) 

of the ESA to the Fly is constitutional. It concluded that the 

federal government's "limited and enumerated" powers include the power to regulate wildlife and non-federal lands 

that serve as the habitat for endangered species. The court 

also concluded that the ESA provides for a regulatory scheme 

that is within the bounds of Congress' power under the 

Commerce Clause. The district court thus granted the government's motion for summary judgment. We affirm the 

district court's decision.

Appellants' Commerce Clause challenge to the application 

of section 9(a)(1) of the ESA to the Fly rests on the Supreme 

Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 

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(1995). In Lopez, the Court held that the Gun-Free School 

Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), which made possession 

of a gun within a school zone a federal offense, exceeded 

Congress' Commerce Clause authority. Drawing on its earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see especially Perez v. 

United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971), the Lopez Court 

explained that Congress could regulate three broad categories of activity: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate 

commerce," (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 

or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the 

threat may come only from intrastate activities," and (3) 

"those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 

commerce ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect 

interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations 

omitted). Possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school, 

the Court explained, clearly did not fit the first two categories. In addition, it could not be regulated under the third 

category as an activity that "substantially affects" interstate 

commerce because it was not commercial in nature and was 

not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic 

activity. Moreover, the Court explained, Congress had made 

no findings about the effect of gun possession in school zones 

on interstate commerce. Thus, concluding that Congress had 

no rational basis for finding that gun possession within school 

zones had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the 

Court declared the statute unconstitutional. See id. at 567-

68.

It is clear that, in this instance, section 9(a)(1) of the ESA 

is not a regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate 

commerce or of persons or things in interstate commerce. As 

a result, only the first and the third categories of activity 

discussed in Lopez will be examined. In evaluating whether 

ESA section 9(a)(1) is a regulation of the use of the channels 

of interstate commerce or of activity that substantially affects 

interstate commerce, we may look not only to the effect of the 

extinction of the individual endangered species at issue in this 

case, but also to the aggregate effect of the extinction of all 

similarly situated endangered species. As the Lopez Court 

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stantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of 

individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.' " Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Maryland v. 

Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968), overruled on other 

grounds, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 

(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 

Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (first emphasis added)). If a 

statute regulates "a class of activities ... within reach of the 

federal power," Perez, 402 U.S. at 154, the courts have "no 

power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class," 

id. Because section 9(a)(1) of the ESA regulates a class of 

activitiestakings of endangered speciesthat is within Congress' Commerce Clause power under both the first and third 

Lopez categories, application of section 9(a)(1) to the Fly is 

constitutional.3

A. Channels of Interstate Commerce

Application of section 9(a)(1) of the ESA to the Fly can be 

viewed as a proper exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause 

power over the first category of activity that the Lopez Court 

identified: the use of the "channels of interstate commerce." 

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. Although this category is commonly 

used to uphold regulations of interstate transport of persons 

or goods, it need not be so limited. Indeed, the power of 

Congress to regulate the channels of interstate commerce 

provides a justification for section 9(a)(1) of the ESA for two 

reasons. First, the prohibition against takings of an endan-

__________

3

Judge Henderson's concurring opinion expresses the view that 

the first Lopez category does not apply; as to the third Lopez

category, however, I find our reasoning to be substantially similar. 

We agree that "the loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect 

on our ecosystem and likewise on interstate commerce," Concurring 

opinion ("Conc. op.") at 2 (footnote omitted); cf. infra subsection 

II.B.1, and that "at the time it passed ESA the Congress contemplated protecting endangered species through regulation of land 

and its development, which is precisely what the Department has 

attempted to do here. Such regulation, apart from the characteristics or range of the specific endangered species involved, has a plain 

and substantial effect on interstate commerce," Conc. op. at 4; cf. 

infra subsection II.B.2.

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gered species is necessary to enable the government to 

control the transport of the endangered species in interstate 

commerce. Second, the prohibition on takings of endangered 

animals falls under Congress' authority " 'to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious 

uses.' " Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United 

States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)).4

The ESA's prohibition on takings of endangered species 

can be justified as a necessary aid to the prohibitions in the 

ESA on transporting and selling endangered species in interstate commerce. In this sense, the prohibition against takings of endangered species is analogous to the prohibition 

against transfer and possession of machine guns (including 

purely intrastate possession) of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which has 

been upheld by the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 

__________

4

Judge Sentelle unsuccessfully attempts to draw a parallel between the statute at issue in Lopez, which the Supreme Court 

determined was not a regulation of the use of the channels of 

interstate commerce, and the statute at issue in this case. In fact, 

the two statutes are different in material respects. First, § 922(q)'s 

prohibition against possession of a firearm in a school zone clearly 

was not necessary to enable the government to control the transportation of firearms in interstate commerce. Yet, as noted above 

and discussed in greater depth below, the ESA's prohibition against 

taking endangered species is necessary to enable the government to 

control the transport of endangered species in interstate commerce. 

Thus, in this respect, ESA section 9(a)(1) is much more similar to 

the prohibition against transfer and possession of machine guns of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which has been repeatedly found constitutional, 

than it is to § 922(q). See infra text accompanying notes 5 & 6. 

Second, § 922(q)'s prohibition against possession of a firearm in a 

school zone clearly did not fall under Congress' authority " 'to keep 

the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses,' " Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 256, because it regulated 

possession of firearms within only a very limited area. However, as 

is again discussed in greater depth below, the ESA's prohibition on 

taking endangered animals clearly does fall under Congress' authority to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral 

and injurious uses in cases where the pressures of interstate 

commerce place the existence of species in peril.

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as a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. In 

United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996), for instance, the Ninth Circuit 

upheld section 922(o) against a Lopez-inspired Commerce 

Clause challenge. The court held that the statute was a 

" 'regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce' " because "[b]y regulating the market in machineguns, 

including regulating intrastate machinegun possession, Congress has effectively regulated the interstate trafficking in 

machineguns." Id. at 952 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559).5

Thus, section 922(o) is properly classified as a first category 

regulation because " 'federal regulation of intrastate incidents 

of transfer and possession is essential to effective control of 

__________

5 The other circuits that held that section 922(o) is a proper 

exercise of Congress' power to regulate the "channels of interstate 

commerce" employed similar reasoning. See United States v. 

Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding section 

922(o) on the ground that Congress had a rational basis to determine that a total ban on possession of machineguns would have a 

substantial effect on interstate commerce because "the connection 

between the elimination of the lawful demand for machineguns and 

the manufacture, importation, and interstate transfer of these products is obvious and direct"); United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 

781, 784 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding 19 U.S.C. § 922(o) as a first 

category regulation because "§ 922(o) regulates the 'extensive, intricate, and definitely national market for machineguns' by prohibiting the transfer and possession of machineguns acquired after May 

19, 1986") (citations omitted); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 

796-97 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997) (holding that "section 922(o) is a 

regulation which attempts 'to prohibit the interstate transportation 

of a commodity through the channels of commerce," because the 

ban on possession of machineguns controls "the interstate market 

for machineguns by creating criminal liability for those who would 

constitute the demand side of the market") (citations omitted). The 

en banc court in United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, was equally 

divided, with eight judges voting to affirm and eight judges voting 

to reverse the district court judgment. In addition, there were two 

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the interstate incidents of such traffic.' " Id. (quoting United 

States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 105 F.3d 

997 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 

(1997). In other words, it is necessary to regulate possession 

of machineguns in order to effectively regulate the interstate 

traffic in machineguns because it is impossible to sell machineguns in interstate commerce without first possessing 

them. Similarly, the prohibition on "taking" endangered 

species is properly classified as a first category regulation 

because one of the most effective ways to prevent traffic in 

endangered species is to secure the habitat of the species 

from predatory invasion and destruction. Therefore, like 

section 922(o), section 9(a)(1) of the ESA can be properly 

upheld as a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate 

commerce.6

The prohibition on takings of endangered animals also falls 

under Congress' authority to prevent the channels of interstate commerce from being used for immoral or injurious 

purposes. This authority was perhaps best described by the 

Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. 241, which the 

Lopez Court cited and quoted in its reference to Congress' 

power to regulate the use of the "channels of interstate 

commerce." In Heart of Atlanta, the Supreme Court upheld 

a prohibition on racial discrimination in places of public 

accommodation serving interstate travelers against a Commerce Clause challenge. The Court explained that " 'the 

authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate 

__________

separate opinions affirming the judgment of the district court. 

Neither of the affirming opinions directly addresses the issue of 

whether section 922(o) is a regulation of the "channels of interstate 

commerce." Therefore, I cite the Fifth Circuit's panel decision not 

for its precedential value but because I find its reasoning instructive.

6 The District Court of Massachusetts used similar reasoning in 

upholding against a Commerce Clause challenge the conviction of a 

defendant who purchased a guide and hunted Alaskan wildlife with 

a false residential hunting license in violation of the Lacey Act. See 

United States v. Romano, 929 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996). The 

court explained that "Congress may employ reasonable means to 

rid the channels of interstate commerce of illegally taken wildlife." 

See id. at 509 (citations omitted).

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commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been 

frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.' " Id.

at 256 (citation omitted) (quoted in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558). 

It does not matter if the activities that are regulated are of a 

"purely local character," the Court elaborated, " '[i]f it is 

interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter 

how local the operation which applies the squeeze.' " Id. at 

258 (citation omitted). Thus, the power of Congress over 

interstate commerce "also includes the power to regulate the 

local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the 

States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce." Id. This same 

principle was elaborated in the seminal case of United States 

v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940), which was the only other case 

cited by the Lopez Court in its description of the first 

category of activity that Congress can regulate under its 

commerce power. In Darby, the Court upheld federal wage 

and hour regulations against a Commerce Clause challenge, 

noting that such regulations were necessary to prevent states 

with higher regulatory standards from being disadvantaged 

vis-à-vis states with lower regulatory standards. In upholding the regulation, the Court explained that "Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the 

restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate 

commerce," is free to exclude from commerce goods that will 

have injurious effects in the state in which they are produced 

or to which they are destined. Id. at 114. This is true even 

though the activity prohibited by the regulation at issue in 

Darbyfailure to meet minimum wage and maximum hour 

requirementsmight have had little or no direct effect outside the state in which the goods were produced.

This same reasoning that the Supreme Court applied in 

Darby and Heart of Atlanta is applicable to the case at hand. 

In those cases as well as here, Congress used its authority to 

rid the channels of interstate commerce of injurious uses to 

regulate the conditions under which goods are produced for 

interstate commerce. In Darby, Congress used this authority to prevent labor exploitation of employees producing lumber for interstate commerce. In Heart of Atlanta, Congress 

used this authority to prevent racial discrimination by a hotel 

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serving an interstate clientele. Similarly, in this case, Congress used this authority to prevent the eradication of an 

endangered species by a hospital that is presumably being 

constructed using materials and people from outside the state 

and which will attract employees, patients, and students from 

both inside and outside the state. Thus, like regulations 

preventing racial discrimination or labor exploitation, regulations preventing the taking of endangered species prohibit 

interstate actors from using the channels of interstate commerce to "promot[e] or spread[ ] evil, whether of a physical, 

moral or economic nature." North American Co. v. S.E.C.,

327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946). Congress is therefore empowered 

by its authority to regulate the channels of interstate commerce to prevent the taking of endangered species in cases 

like this where the pressures of interstate commerce place 

the existence of species in peril.

In his dissent, Judge Sentelle claims that this analysis of 

Darby and Heart of Atlanta is "far off the mark." Dissenting 

opinion ("Diss. op.") at 7. It is his analysis, however, that is 

inconsistent with the reasoning and results in these cases. In 

Judge Sentelle's view, the only regulations that would qualify 

as a proper regulation of the channels of interstate commerce 

are direct regulations of persons or things that move across 

state lines. This view is simply not consistent with the 

Court's decisions in Darby and Heart of Atlanta, which I 

again note are the only two cases the Lopez Court cited to 

illustrate its first category of authorized regulation. Neither 

Darby nor Heart of Atlanta involved a direct regulation of 

persons or things that moved across state lines. The statute 

challenged in Darby set wage and hour requirements for 

lumber factory employees, while the statute in Heart of 

Atlanta prohibited racial discrimination against hotel customers. Judge Sentelle's argument thus proves too much: If 

only direct regulation of goods that travel in interstate commerce can be upheld as valid under the channels of interstate 

commerce prong of Lopez, both of these statutes must fail as 

well, a result patently inconsistent with the Court's express 

affirmance of them in Lopez. Therefore, contrary to Judge 

Sentelle's assertion, see Diss. op. at 7-8, the argument that 

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lated in order to prevent injurious local practices that in turn 

have a substantial harmful effect on interstate commerce 

either by discouraging such commerce or by inciting a race to 

the bottom is neither novel nor unduly extensive; indeed, it is 

the core reasoning of Darby and Heart of Atlanta.

B. Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce

The takings clause in the ESA can also be viewed as a 

regulation of the third category of activity that Congress may 

regulate under its commerce power. According to Lopez, the 

test of whether section 9(a)(1) of the ESA is within this 

category of activity "requires an analysis of whether the 

regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." 

514 U.S. at 559. A class of activities can substantially affect 

interstate commerce regardless of whether the activity at 

issuein this case the taking of endangered speciesis commercial or noncommercial. As the Lopez Court, quoting 

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), noted:

"[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may 

not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its 

nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 

economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some 

earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.' "

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125).7

This interpretation of the Lopez decision is consistent with 

this court's recent decision in Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 

(D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2431 (1997). In 

Terry, we upheld the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances 

Act against a Commerce Clause challenge, concluding that 

the Lopez decision did not restrict Congress' Commerce 

Clause power to activity that is "commercial." We rejected 

__________

7

Indeed, the case at hand is in many ways directly analogous to 

Wickard. In both cases, the appellee's activity, growing wheat for 

personal consumption and taking endangered species, is local and is 

not "regarded as commerce." Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. However, 

in both cases, the activity exerts a substantial economic effect on 

interstate commerceby affecting the quantity of wheat in one 

case, and by affecting the quantity of species in the other.

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the argument that Congress could not regulate protest in 

front of abortion clinics because protest is an intrastate, 

noncommercial activity, explaining that "Congress has authority to regulate 'activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.' " Id. at 1417 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 

559 (emphasis added)). We further explained that in order to 

be subject to Congress' Commerce Clause power, "[t]he 

regulated activityin this case, interfering with abortion 

clinicsneed not be commercial, so long as its effect on 

interstate commerce is substantial." Id.8

Other circuits have also held that a statute need not 

regulate economic activity directly in order to fall under 

Congress' Commerce Clause power. For instance, the Fifth 

Circuit upheld the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 

against a challenge alleging that the Act constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power 

because it proscribes intrastate, noncommercial activity. 

United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1997). 

Acknowledging that the statute regulates intrastate, noncommercial protest activity, the court held that the statute was a 

proper exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power because it had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The 

court explained, "[a]fter Wickardand its reaffirmance in 

Lopezthere can be no question that Congress is able to 

regulate noncommercial, intrastate activity that substantially 

affects interstate commerce...." Id. at 676. Similarly, the 

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8

Interestingly, Judge Sentelle, who concurred in the Court's 

opinion in Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, fails to cite the case in his 

dissenting opinion. Indeed, he appears to assert propositions that 

are directly at odds with the Court's reasoning in that case. For 

instance, he claims that ESA section 9(a)(1)(B) is not a permissible 

exercise of Congress' commerce power because "like the statute 

challenged in Lopez, [it] does not regulate commerce." Diss. op. at 

4. Yet in Terry v. Reno, this Court clearly indicated that Congress' 

Commerce Clause power is not limited to regulating commercial 

activity. Rather, it is limited to regulating activity that has a 

substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Terry, 101 F.3d at 

1417. Were we to apply Judge Sentelle's reasoning in his dissenting opinion here to Terry, it would dictate a result contrary to the 

Court's holding in that case.

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Eleventh Circuit recently upheld the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 

("CERCLA") against a Commerce Clause challenge by the 

operator of a chemical manufacturing facility that was required to pay for the cleanup of entirely localized environmental contamination caused by the facility. See U.S.A. v. 

Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997). The court 

explained that a statute need not "regulate economic activity 

directly to satisfy the Commerce Clause" because "Lopez

reiterates that a statute will pass constitutional muster if it 

regulates an activity, whatever its nature, 'that arise[s] out of 

or [is] connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed 

in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.' " 

Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).

A recent Supreme Court decision confirms our holding in 

Terry, 101 F.3d 1412, that activity need not be commercial in 

character in order to be regulated by Congress under the 

Commerce Clause. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. 

Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1602 (1997), which 

involved a Commerce Clause challenge to an otherwise generally applicable state property tax exemption for charitable 

institutions that excluded organizations operated principally 

for the benefit of nonresidents, the Supreme Court held that 

the Commerce Clause applies to activity regardless of whether it was undertaken with the intention of earning a profit. 

Citing its earlier opinion in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 

160 (1941), in which the Court had held that interstate 

transportation of indigent persons was "commerce" regardless of whether it was "commercial in character," id. at 172 

n. 1, the Court explained that it had "already held that the 

dormant Commerce Clause is applicable to activities undertaken without the intention of earning a profit." 117 S. Ct. at 

1602. This decision confirms that the proper test of whether 

an activity can be regulated under the Commerce Clause is 

not whether the activity is itself commercial or economic but 

rather whether the activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

In evaluating the effect of the regulated activity on interstate commerce, I begin, as we did in Terry, 101 F.3d 1412, 

with the legislative history of the Act under challenge. As we 

explained in Terry, "we consider 'even congressional commitUSCA Case #96-5354 Document #313743 Filed: 12/05/1997 Page 17 of 53
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tee findings' regarding the effect on interstate commerce of 

the regulated activity." 101 F.3d at 1415 (quoting Lopez, 514 

U.S. at 562).

The Committee Reports on the ESA reveal that one of the 

primary reasons that Congress sought to protect endangered 

species from "takings" was the importance of the continuing 

availability of a wide variety of species to interstate commerce. As the House Report explained:

... As we homogenize the habitats in which these 

plants and animals evolved, and as we increase the 

pressure for products that they are in a position to 

supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten theirand our 

owngenetic heritage.

The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, 

incalculable....

...

From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in 

the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses of 

genetic variations. The reason is simple: they are potential resources. They are keys to puzzles which we 

cannot solve, and may provide answers to questions 

which we have not yet learned to ask.

...

Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer 

or other scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in 

the structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, 

much less analyzed? More to the point, who is prepared 

to risk being [sic] those potential cures by eliminating 

those plants for all time? Sheer self interest impels us 

to be cautious.

H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973). Similarly, the Senate 

Report on the precursor to the ESA, noted:

... From a pragmatic point of view, the protection of 

an endangered species of wildlife with some commercial 

value may permit the regeneration of that species to a 

level where controlled exploitation of that species can be 

resumed. In such a case businessmen may profit from 

the trading and marketing of that species for an indefinite number of years, where otherwise it would have 

been completely eliminated from commercial channels in 

a very brief span of time. Potentially more important, 

however, is the fact that with each species we eliminate, 

we reduce the [genetic] pool ... available for use by man 

in future years. Since each living species and subspecies 

has developed in a unique way to adapt itself to the 

difficulty of living in the world's environment, as a species is lost, its distinctive gene material, which may 

subsequently prove invaluable to mankind in improving 

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domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease or 

environmental contaminant, is also irretrievably lost.

S. REP. NO. 91-526, at 3 (1969).

This legislative history distinguishes the ESA from the 

statute at issue in Lopez. In Lopez, the Court noted that "as 

part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under 

the Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings regarding effect on interstate commerce." 514 U.S. at 562 

(citations omitted). The Lopez Court found, however, that 

there were no "congressional findings [that] would enable [it] 

to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce." Id. at 563. 

In this case, in contrast, the committee reports on the ESA 

discuss the value of preserving genetic diversity and the 

potential for future commerce related to that diversity. See 

also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79 

(1978) (recognizing that one of the primary concerns underlying the Endangered Species Act was concern "about the 

unknown uses that endangered species might have and about 

the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in the chain 

of life on this planet").9

__________

9 Despite the Supreme Court's directive in Lopez that a court 

reviewing the constitutionality of a statute consider congressional 

findings, see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 562, and the extensive case law 

indicating that the role of a reviewing court is to determine whether 

there is "any rational basis" for a congressional finding that a 

regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, see, 

e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,

452 U.S. 276 (1981); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1269 

(11th Cir. 1997), Judge Sentelle totally ignores the extensive legislative history of the ESA.

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These congressional findings, while highly informative, are 

of course not sufficient by themselves to make the statute 

constitutional. The courts evaluating Commerce Clause challenges to federal statutes must determine that there was a 

rational basis for Congress' conclusion that a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. As the Eleventh Circuit recently explained, "Lopez did not alter our 

approach to determining whether a particular statute falls 

within the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority.... When ruling on a Commerce Clause challenge, we 

must determine, as always, 'whether a rational basis existed 

for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected 

interstate commerce.' " United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 

1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557); 

see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 

Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) ("The task of a court that 

is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is 

relatively narrow. The court must defer to a congressional 

finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, 

if there is any rational basis for such a finding.") (citations 

omitted) (quoted in Terry, 101 F.3d at 1416).

Congress could rationally conclude that the intrastate activity regulated by section 9 of the ESA substantially affects 

interstate commerce for two primary reasons. First, the 

provision prevents the destruction of biodiversity and thereby 

protects the current and future interstate commerce that 

relies upon it. Second, the provision controls adverse effects 

of interstate competition.10

__________

10 Judge Sentelle asserts that these rationales have "no stopping 

point." See Diss. op. at 11, 13. In fact, however, they have very 

clear and obvious limits. In the case of the first rationale, the 

argument stops at endangered species. Activities that threaten a 

species' existence threaten to reduce biodiversity and thereby have 

a substantial negative effect on interstate commerce. Thus, the 

biodiversity rationale offered here provides support for the Endangered Species Act only insofar as the Act prevents activities that 

are likely to cause the elimination of species. In the case of the 

second rationale, the argument stops at activities are the product of 

destructive interstate competition. Under this rationale, interstate 

competition that is likely to produce destructive results, such as 

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1. Biodiversity

Approximately 521 of the 1082 species in the United States 

currently designated as threatened or endangered are found 

in only one state. See Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellees at 

20-21. The elimination of all or even some of these endangered species would have a staggering effect on biodiversitydefined as the presence of a large number of species of 

animals and plantsin the United States and, thereby, on the 

current and future interstate commerce that relies on the 

availability of a diverse array of species.

The variety of plants and animals in this country are, in a 

sense, a natural resource that commercial actors can use to 

produce marketable products. In the most narrow view of 

economic value, endangered plants and animals are valuable 

as sources of medicine and genes.11 Fifty percent of the most 

__________

elimination of endangered species' habitat, environmental degradation, or exploitation of labor, can be regulated by Congress. Thus, 

the destructive interstate competition rationale provides support for 

the Endangered Species Act only insofar as the Act prevents a 

bidding down of regulatory standards that is likely to result in the 

elimination of endangered species' habitat.

11 This is a necessarily constrained view of the "value" of biodiversity. Endangered species of course have value beyond the profit 

they can produce as sources of medicine and genes. For example, 

tourists travel to see them, scientists study and learn from them, 

and people get aesthetic pleasure from them. In addition, every 

species offers some clues to the path of the evolutionary chain that 

produced it and to the role of certain genes also found in humans. 

For instance, researchers have recently concluded that basic research into the genes of the common fruit fly " 'can yield crucial 

clues to human development.' " Jennifer Ackerman, Journey to the 

Center of the Egg, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, § 6, at 45 (quoting 

biologist Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard). Moreover, every species 

has a place in the ecosystem. Extinction of a species can therefore 

have an important effect on the larger system of which it is a part. 

As biologist Edward O. Wilson explained:

... The traditional econometric approach, weighing market 

price and tourist dollars, will always underestimate the true 

value of wild species. None has been totally assayed for all of 

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frequently prescribed medicines are derived from wild plant 

and animal species.12 Such medicines were estimated in 1983 

to be worth over $15 billion a year. See id. at 11. In 

addition, the genetic material of wild species of plants and 

animals is inbred into domestic crops and animals to improve 

their commercial value and productivity. As Amici Curiae

explained: "Fortifying the genetic diversity of U.S. crops 

played a large part in the explosive growth in farm production since the 1930s, accounting for at least one-half of the 

doubling in yields of rice, soybeans, wheat, and sugarcane, 

and a three-fold increase in corn and potatoes. Genetic 

diversity provided by wild plants also protects domestic crops 

from disease and pest damage." Id. at 12. Similar genetic 

engineering can be used with animals. For instance, it is not 

beyond the realm of possibility that the genes of a wild 

pollinator species like the Fly might be inbred with the 

__________

the commercial profit, scientific knowledge, and aesthetic pleasure it can yield. Furthermore, none exists in the wild all by 

itself. Every species is part of an ecosystem, an expert 

specialist of its kind, tested relentlessly as it spreads its 

influence through the food web. To remove it is to entrain 

changes in other species, raising the populations of some, 

reducing or even extinguishing others, risking a downward 

spiral of the larger assemblage.

EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 308 (1992).

12 For example, the venom of a species of South American pit 

viper led to the discovery of the angiotensin system that regulates 

blood pressure in human beings. This helped scientists devise a 

molecule that alters blood pressure and is the preferred prescription drug for hypertension, bringing the pharmaceutical company 

that manufactures it $1.3 billion a year in sales. BIODIVERISTY II:

UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECTING OUR BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 9 (Marjoie L. Reaka-Kudla et al. eds. 1997). Similarly, the saliva of the 

leech led to the development of the anticoagulant hirudin, which is 

used to treat hemorrhoids, rheumatism, thrombosis, and contusions 

and to dissolve blood clots that threaten skin transplants, and the 

saliva of the vampire bat of Central and South America is used to 

open clogged arteries and thereby prevent heart attacks. See

WILSON, supra note 11, at 285-86.

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honeybee, which currently pollinates most major U.S. crops, 

to produce a pollinator that is more disease resistant.

Each time a species becomes extinct, the pool of wild 

species diminishes. This, in turn, has a substantial effect on 

interstate commerce by diminishing a natural resource that 

could otherwise be used for present and future commercial 

purposes. Unlike most other natural resources, however, the 

full value of the variety of plant and animal life that currently 

exists is uncertain. Plants and animals that are lost through 

extinction undoubtedly have economic uses that are, in some 

cases, as yet unknown but which could prove vitally important 

in the future.13 A species whose worth is still unmeasured 

has what economists call an "option value"the value of the 

possibility that a future discovery will make useful a species 

that is currently thought of as useless. See Bryan Nolan, 

Commodity, Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of Quantification in Valuing Biodiveristy, in BIODIVERSITY 200, 202 

(Edward O. Wilson ed., 1988). To allow even a single species 

whose value is not currently apparent to become extinct 

therefore deprives the economy of the option value of that 

species. Because our current knowledge of each species and 

its possible uses is limited, it is impossible to calculate the 

exact impact that the loss of the option value of a single 

species might have on interstate commerce.14 See Alan 

__________

13 Some of the most important medical products derive from 

organisms that were once considered worthless or nearly so. For 

example, Penicillium mold, which "sparked the concept of antibiotics," was at one time valued only for the flavor it added to blue 

cheeses. See BIODIVERSITY II, supra note 12, at 9.

14 Both Judge Sentelle and Judge Henderson appear to misunderstand this argument. See Conc. op. at 2; Diss. op. at 9. Although 

both quote the statement it is "impossible to calculate the exact 

impact" of the extinction of a single species, both ignore the second 

half of the argument: that in the aggregate we can be certain that a 

decline in biodiversity will have a "real and predictable " effect on 

interstate commerce. As a result of this omission, both misportray 

the argument as claiming that the extinction of a single endangered 

species, by itself, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 

Indeed, Judge Sentelle goes so far as to describe the argument as 

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Randall, What Mainstream Economists Have to Say about 

the Value of Biodiversity, in BIODIVERSITY, supra, at 217. In 

the aggregate, however, we can be certain that the extinction 

of species and the attendant decline in biodiversity will have a 

real and predictable effect on interstate commerce.

The few federal courts that have considered post-Lopez

Commerce Clause challenges to federal wildlife protection 

have found that the extinction of animals substantially affects 

interstate commerce.15 In United States v. Bramble, 103 

__________

follows: "because of some undetermined and indeed undeterminable 

possibility that the fly might produce something at some undefined 

and undetermined future time which might have some undefined 

and undeterminable medical value, which in turn might affect 

interstate commerce at that imagined future point, Congress can 

today regulate anything which might advance the pace at which the 

endangered species becomes extinct." Diss. op. at 9. This is 

inaccurate. To the contrary, the argument is that because biodiversity has a real, substantial, and predictable effect on both the 

current and future interstate commerce, "the de minimis character 

of individual instances arising under [the ESA] is of no consequence." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. In other words, because we know 

that in the aggregate the extinction of endangered species will have 

a substantial effect on interstate commerce, it does not matter that 

it is "impossible to calculate the exact impact" of the extinction of a 

single species such as the Fly.

15 Prior to Lopez, the federal courts repeatedly concluded that 

congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. See Andrus v. 

Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n.19 (1979) (discussing Migratory Bird 

Treaty Act and noting that the "assumption that the national 

commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly 

flawed"); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th 

Cir. 1990) ("Leslie I"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991) ("The 

commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] 

jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory 

birds and endangered species."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991); 

id. at 361 n.1 (Rymer, J., concurring) ("Congress does have power 

under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered 

species."); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th 

Cir.) (declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 407 

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F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit held that the 

Eagle Protection Act was a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power because "[e]xtinction of the eagle would 

substantially affect interstate commerce by foreclosing any 

possibility of several types of commercial activity." Id. at 

1481; see also United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 

1245 (D. Or. 1996) (holding that "the possession of eagle parts 

is an activity which affects a broad regulatory scheme relating to commercial transactions and which, when viewed in the 

aggregate with similar activities nationwide, substantially affects interstate commerce") (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 

Similarly, in United States v. Romano, 929 F. Supp. 502, 507-

09 (D. Mass. 1996), the District Court of Massachusetts 

upheld the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78, which prohibits 

any person from importing, exporting, transporting, selling, 

receiving, acquiring, or purchasing in interstate or foreign 

commerce any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, 

or sold in violation of state or foreign law. Citing Congress' 

findings that the protection of endangered species protects 

future commercial activity, the court held that the Act was 

within Congress' Commerce Clause power. See Romano, 929 

F. Supp. at 508.16

__________

(1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36 (1979) 

(holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within 

dormant Commerce Clause).

16 The District Court of Hawaii relied on a similar reasoning in an 

earlier case involving a Commerce Clause challenge to the ESA,

Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 471 

F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). In 

that case, the court pointed to the interstate commerce effects of 

protecting endangered species to support its decision to uphold the 

Endangered Species Act. The court explained: "In this context, a 

national program to protect and improve the natural habitats of 

endangered species preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in these species and of interstate movement of persons, such 

as amateur students of nature or professional scientists who come 

to a state to observe and study these species, that would otherwise 

be lost by state inaction." Id. at 995. The court thus concluded 

that the state's program of preserving herds of "wild" sheep and 

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I join these courts in concluding that the extinction of 

animals substantially affects interstate commerce. More specifically, I find that the scientific evidence that is currently 

available provides sufficient support for Congress' conclusion 

that regulation of the "taking" of endangered animals is 

within its Commerce Clause power because such takings, if 

permitted, would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce by depriving commercial actors of access to an important natural resourcebiodiversity.

2. Destructive Interstate Competition

The taking of the Fly and other endangered animals can 

also be regulated by Congress as an activity that substantially 

affects interstate commerce because it is the product of 

destructive interstate competition. It is a principle deeply 

rooted in Commerce Clause jurisprudence that Congress is 

empowered to act to prevent destructive interstate competition. As the Supreme Court explained in Hodel v. Virginia 

Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) 

("Hodel v. Virginia"), a case that the Lopez Court cited 

repeatedly, "prevention of ... destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the 

Commerce Clause." Id. at 282.

The case at hand bears a substantial similarity to the three 

cases in which the Supreme Court best articulated the principle that Congress may act to prevent interstate competition 

that has a destructive effect: Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264, 

Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) ("Hodel v. Indiana"), 

and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In Hodel v. 

Virginia, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the 

constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. The Surface Mining Act required mine 

operators to restore the land after mining to its prior condition, including its approximate original contour, topsoil, hydrologic balance, and vegetation in order to "protect society 

and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal 

mining operations." 452 U.S. at 268. An association of coal 

__________

goats which destroyed the habitat of an endangered bird constituted 

an unlawful "taking" of the bird by the state. Id.

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producers in Virginia challenged the Act, which it claimed 

"regulat[ed] the use of private lands within the borders of the 

States," as beyond Congress' Commerce Clause power. Id.

at 275. The Court held that the Act was a valid exercise of 

Congress' power under the Commerce Clause because "Congress rationally determined that regulation of surface coal 

mining is necessary to protect interstate commerce from 

adverse effects that may result from that activity." Id. at 

281. Moreover, the Court concluded that "the power conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to permit 

congressional regulation of activities causing air or water 

pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have 

effects in more than one State." Id. at 282.

The parallels between Hodel v. Virginia and the case at 

hand are obvious. The ESA and the Surface Mining Act both 

regulate activitiesdestruction of endangered species and 

destruction of the natural landscapethat are carried out 

entirely within a State and which are not themselves commercial in character. The activities, however, may be regulated 

because they have destructive effects, on environmental quality in one case and on the availability of a variety of species in 

the other, that are likely to affect more than one State.17 In 

each case, moreover, interstate competition provides incentives to states to adopt lower standards to gain an advantage 

vis-à-vis other states: In Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264, the 

states were motivated to adopt lower environmental standards to improve the competitiveness of their coal production 

facilities, and in this case, the states are motivated to adopt 

lower standards of endangered species protection in order to 

attract development.18

__________

17 See supra subsection II.B.1 for a discussion of how biodiversity 

affects interstate commerce.

18 In his dissent, Judge Sentelle attempts to distinguish Hodel v. 

Virginia, 452 U.S. 264, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, and United 

States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, from the case at hand by asserting 

that "[i]n the present case neither Congress nor the litigants, nor 

for that matter Judge Wald, has pointed to any commercial activity 

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The Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning in Hodel v. 

Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, which was decided on the same day as 

Hodel v. Virginia, and involved a challenge to different 

provisions of the same Act. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 

involved a constitutional challenge to the "prime farmland" 

provisions of the Surface Mining Act, which established special requirements for surface coal mining operations conducted on land that qualified as prime farmland and that had 

historically been used as cropland. The Court held that the 

provisions did not violate the Commerce Clause. The Act 

was adopted, the Court explained, "to ensure that production 

of coal for interstate commerce would not be at the expense 

of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety, 

injury to any of which interests would have deleterious effects 

on interstate commerce." Id. at 329. Moreover, the Court 

noted, the Act reflected a congressional desire to "protect[ ] 

mine operators in States adhering to high ... standards from 

disadvantageous competition with operators in States with 

less rigorous regulatory programs." Id.

The parallels between Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, and 

the case at hand are again striking. In both cases, the 

statutes under challenge regulated intrastate activity that is 

not itself commercial and that can be carried out entirely 

within a State: the destruction of farmland and the destruction of endangered species. Just as the prime farmland 

provisions of the Surface Mining Act were adopted to protect 

agriculture, the environment, and health and safety, injury to 

which would have deleterious effects on interstate commerce, 

__________

lenged, or any other sort of commerce being destroyed by the 

taking of the fly." Diss. op. at 13. Again, this is inaccurate. In 

addition to arguing that a decline in biodiversity would have a 

substantial and predictable destructive effect on interstate commerce, see supra subsection II.B.1, this section of the opinion refers 

repeatedly to the fact that the ESA regulates the conditions under 

which development takes place, and thereby prevents states from 

adopting lower standards of endangered species protection in order 

to attract development (e.g., construction of a hospital, power plant, 

and intersection)activity that even Judge Sentelle presumably 

would admit is commercial in nature.

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section 9(a)(1) of the ESA was adopted to ensure that 

"growth and development," H.R. 37 ("Endangered and 

Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1973") (Findings, 

Purpose, and Policy), reprinted at 119 CONG. REC. 25,694, 

25,694 (1973), would not be at the expense of the conservation 

and protection of a variety of species, injury to which would 

have equally deleterious consequences for interstate commerce.19 Thus, in both cases, the activity at issue may be 

regulated because it is likely to have destructive effects on 

interstate commerce.

Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 

Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), also concluded that activity could 

be regulated under the Commerce Clause if it involved destructive interstate competition. In Darby, the Court upheld 

wage and hour regulations for employees engaged in the 

production of lumber for interstate commerce. Although the 

statute "undertakes to regulate wages and hours within the 

state contrary to the policy of the state which has elected to 

leave them unregulated," 312 U.S. at 114, the Court held that 

the statute was within the Commerce Clause power because it 

was necessary to control destructive interstate competition. 

The Court explained that "Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may 

be appropriately imposed on interstate commerce, is free to 

exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states 

for which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to 

the public health, morals or welfare, even though the state 

has not sought to regulate their use." Id. (citations omitted). 

The Court further explained that "interstate commerce 

should not be made the instrument of competition in the 

distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce and to 

the states from and to which the commerce flows." Id. at 

115.

Like Darby, 312 U.S. 100, the case at hand involves a 

regulation of the conditions under which commercial activity 

takes place. The statute in Darby regulated the wages and 

__________

19 See id.

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hours of workers in Georgia who were engaged in producing 

lumber for interstate commerce. Similarly, the statute in this 

case regulates the taking of endangered species in the process of constructing a hospital, power plant, and intersection 

that will likely serve an interstate population. In both cases, 

Congress passed the statute in part to prevent states from 

gaining a competitive advantage by enacting lower regulatory 

standards than other states. Congress was aware that no 

state could be expected to require significantly more rigorous 

labor standards or endangered species protection than other 

states, because for each individual state, the cost of providing 

better working conditions or preserving a species outweighs 

the benefits even though in aggregate, the benefits of better 

labor standards and biodiversity outweigh the costs.20

__________

20 Indeed, both the House and Senate recognized this as a reason 

for passing the Endangered Species Act. In its Declaration of 

Policy, the Senate stated as follows:

... The Congress finds and declares that

(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United 

States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern 

and conservation;

....

(5) encouraging the States, through Federal financial assistance and a system of incentives, to develop and maintain 

conservation, protection, restoration, and propagation programs which meet national and international standards is a key 

to meeting the Nation's international commitments and to 

better safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation's 

heritage in fish and wildlife.

S. 1983 ("Endangered Species Act of 1973") (Declaration of Policy), 

reprinted at 119 CONG. REC. 30,157, 30,157 (1973). Similarly, in its 

declaration of findings, purpose, and policy, the House stated:

... The Congress finds and declares that one of the unfortunate consequences of growth and development in the United 

States and elsewhere has been the extermination of some 

species or subspecies of fish, wildlife, and plants; that serious 

losses in species of wild animals with educational, historical, 

recreational, and scientific value have occurred and are occurring ...; that a key to more effective protection and manageAs the cases discussed above illustrate, the Court has long 

held that Congress has the power under the Commerce 

Clause to prevent destructive interstate commerce similar to 

that at issue in this case. I therefore find that Congress has 

the power to prevent interstate competition that will result in 

the destruction of endangered species just as it has the power 

to prevent interstate competition that will result in harm to 

the environment, Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264, the destruction of "prime farm land," Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 

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324, or the employment of people under substandard labor 

conditions, Darby, 312 U.S. 100.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species 

Act is within Congress' Commerce Clause power and that the 

Fish and Wildlife Service's application of the provision to the 

Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly was therefore constitutional.21 The district court's decision granting the Government's 

motion for summary judgment is therefore

__________

ment of native fish and wildlife that are endangered or threatened is to encourage and assist the States in developing 

programs for such fish and wildlife; and that the conservation, 

protection, restoration, or propagation of such species will inure 

to the benefit of all citizens.

H.R. 37 ("Endangered and Threatened Species Conservation Act of 

1973") (Findings, Purpose, and Policy), reprinted at 119 CONG. REC. 

25,694, 25,694 (1973).

21 In the conclusion to his dissent, Judge Sentelle quotes a 

portion of Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution. See

Diss. op. at 15. Justice Story was undoubtedly an eloquent and 

brilliant scholar. As Justice Thomas recently noted, however, 

Justice Story's views "represent only his own understanding" of the 

Constitution. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 

856 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Today few would agree with 

Justice Story's claim that the "power to regulate manufactures" 

falls outside Congress' Commerce Clause power. Indeed, the Lopez Court clearly established the principle that where activity, 

including manufacturing activity, "substantially affects interstate 

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Affirmed.

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commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained." 

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with Judge Wald's conclusion that the "taking" 

prohibition in section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act 

(ESA) constitutes a valid exercise of the Congress's authority 

to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce 

Clause.1I cannot, however, agree entirely with either of her 

grounds for reaching the result and instead arrive by a 

different route.

Judge Wald first asserts that section 9(a)(1) is a proper 

regulation of the "channels of commerce." In support she 

cites decisions upholding regulation of commercially marketable goods, such as machine guns and lumber,2

and public 

accommodations.3In each case, the object of regulation was 

necessarily connected to movement of persons or things 

interstate and could therefore be characterized as regulation 

of the channels of commerce. Not so with an endangered 

species, as the facts here graphically demonstrate. The Delhi 

Sands Flower-loving Flies the Department of the Interior 

seeks to protect are (along with many other species no doubt) 

entirely intrastate creatures. They do not move among 

__________

1

It is beyond question that the development San Bernardino 

County proposes is not only a "discomfit[ure]"of the Delhi Sands 

Flower-loving Fly, see Dissent at 1, but also a "taking" within the 

meaning of ESA, see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995) (upholding 

Department of Interior's interpretation in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 of 

statutory definition of "take" to include "an act which actually kills 

or injures wildlife," which "may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by 

significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including 

breeding, feeding, or sheltering"). Further, the extent of inconvenience the County experiences if the unlawful taking is prevented, 

see Dissent at 1-2, is irrelevant so long as the prevention is 

authorized under the Commerce Clause.

2 United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995); United 

States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

3 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 

(1964).

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states either on their own or through human agency. As a 

result, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez, the 

statutory protection of the flies "is not a regulation of the use 

of the channels of interstate commerce." 115 S. Ct. at 1630.

Judge Wald also justifies the protection of endangered 

species on the ground that the loss of biodiversity "substantially affects" interstate commerce because of the resulting 

loss of potential medical or economic benefit. Yet her opinion 

acknowledges that it is "impossible to calculate the exact 

impact" of the economic loss of an endangered species. Wald 

Op. at 23. As far as I can tell, it is equally impossible to 

ascertain that there will be any such impact at all. It may 

well be that no species endangered now or in the future will 

have any of the economic value proposed. Given that possibility, I do not see how we can say that the protection of an 

endangered species has any effect on interstate commerce 

(much less a substantial one) by virtue of an uncertain 

potential medical or economic value. Nevertheless, I believe 

that the loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on 

our ecosystem 4and likewise on interstate commerce. In 

addition, I would uphold section 9(a)(1) as applied here because the Department's protection of the flies regulates and 

substantially affects commercial development activity which is 

plainly interstate.

First, I agree with Judge Wald that biodiversity is important to our understanding of ESA and its relation to interstate commerce. As Judge Wald's opinion notes:

Every species is part of an ecosystem, an expert specialist of its kind, tested relentlessly as it spreads its influence through the food web. To remove it is to entrain 

changes in other species, raising the populations of some, 

reducing or even extinguishing others, risking a downward spiral of a larger assemblage.

__________

4 An ecosystem consists of "[t]he organisms in a community plus 

the associated abiotic factors with which they interact." Helena 

Curtis & N. Sue Barnes, Biology glossary at G-7 (5th ed. 1989).

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Wald Op. at 21 n.11 (quoting Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life 308 (1992)). The effect of a species' continued 

existence on the health of other species within the ecosystem 

seems to be generally recognized among scientists. See

Stephen M. Johnson, United States V. Lopez: A Misstep, but 

Hardly Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 

N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 33, 79 (1996) ("It is a fundamental principle of ecology that ecosystems are composed of interdependent parts that play vital roles in preserving the ecosystem. 

As an ecosystem becomes less diverse, it becomes less adaptable to stresses that are placed on it.") (footnotes omitted); 

Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a 

Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 Envtl. L. 1095, 1129 (1996) 

("[S]cientists have rediscovered that the world cannot meaningfully be broken down into isolated parts, that every part is 

connected to every other part. Perhaps the strongest statements about interconnectedness come from scientists, scholars, and regulators working in the field of conservation 

biology who are critical of the species-by-species, reaction-tocrisis approach taken by the Endangered Species Act. They 

understand that species protection issues cannot be separated 

from those of ecosystem health.") (footnotes omitted). Some 

studies show, for example, that the mere presence of diverse 

species within an ecosystem (biodiversity) by itself contributes to the ecosystem's fecundity. See Yvonne Baskin, Ecologists Dare to Ask: How Much Does Diversity Matter? 264 

Science 202 (1994). The Congress recognized the interconnection of the various species and the ecosystems when it 

declared that the "essential purpose" of ESA, which protects 

endangered species, is in fact "to protect the ecosystem upon 

which we and other species depend." H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, 

at 10 (1973); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (finding that endangered species "are of aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value") (emphasis added); cf.

16 U.S.C. § 1361(5)(b) (congressional finding in support of 

Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 that "marine mammals ... affect the balance of marine ecosystems in a manner 

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ucts which move in interstate commerce, and that the protection and conservation of marine mammals and their habitats 

is therefore necessary to insure the continuing availability of 

those products which move in interstate commerce"). Given 

the interconnectedness of species and ecosystems, it is reasonable to conclude that the extinction of one species affects 

others and their ecosystems and that the protection of a 

purely intrastate species (like the Delhi Sands Flower-loving 

Fly) will therefore substantially affect land and objects that 

are involved in interstate commerce. There is, therefore, "a 

rational basis" for concluding that the "taking" of endangered 

species "substantially affects" interstate commerce so that 

section 9(a)(1) is within the Congress's Commerce Clause 

authority. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.

The interstate effect of a taking is particularly obvious here 

given the nature of the taking the County proposes. In 

enacting ESA, the Congress expressed an intent to protect 

not only endangered species but also the habitats that they, 

and we, occupy. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 10 (1973) 

(identifying ESA's "essential purpose" as "to protect the 

ecosystem upon which we and other species depend"); S. 

Rep. No. 93-307 at 4 ("Often, protection of habitat is the only 

means of protecting endangered animals which occur on nonpublic lands."); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2416-18 (1995) 

(statutory definition of "take" as "harm" encompasses habitat 

modification). At the same time, the Congress expressly 

found that "economic growth and development untempered 

by adequate concern and conservation" was the cause for 

"various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United 

States hav[ing] been rendered extinct." 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1531(a)(1). It is plain, then, that at the time it passed ESA 

the Congress contemplated protecting endangered species 

through regulation of land and its development, which is 

precisely what the Department has attempted to do here. 

Such regulation, apart from the characteristics or range of 

the specific endangered species involved, has a plain and 

substantial effect on interstate commerce. In this case the 

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regulation relates to both the proposed redesigned traffic 

intersection and the hospital it is intended to serve, each of 

which has an obvious connection with interstate commerce. 

See Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(concluding abortion clinic activities substantially affect interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 

States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964) (concluding that "facilities and 

instrumentalities used to carry on [interstate] commerce, such 

as railroads, truck lines, ships, rivers, and even highways are

also subject to congressional regulation, so far as is necessary 

to keep interstate traffic upon fair and equal terms") (emphasis added).5

Insofar as application of section 9(a)(1) of ESA 

here acts to regulate commercial development of the land 

inhabited by the endangered species, "it may ... be reached 

by Congress" because "it asserts a substantial economic effect 

on interstate commerce." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 

125 (1942), quoted in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 

556 (1995).6

For the preceding reasons I believe that the Department of 

the Interior's regulation of the County's proposed "taking" of 

the endangered Delhi Sands Flower-loving Fly, pursuant to 

section 9(a)(1) of ESA, is a lawful exercise of governmental 

authority under the Commerce Clause.7

__________

5

In light of these authorities I cannot agree with my dissenting 

colleague that "[t]he activity regulated in the present case involves" 

only "local land use." Dissent at 10.

6 The dissent suggests this justification has no "stopping point" as 

required by Lopez. See Dissent at 10-11; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. 

In Lopez the Court was concerned that the "theories" offered by 

the government would authorize regulation of "all activities that 

might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate 

to interstate commerce" and "any activity that it found was related 

to the economic productivity of individual citizens." Id. The 

rationale on which I rely permits regulation only of activities 

(including land use) that adversely affect species that affect, or are 

involved in, interstate commerce.

7

In so concluding, I note that neither the Supreme Court nor any 

circuit court has used Lopez to strike down an attempted regulation 

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__________

outside the criminal arena. For cases rejecting post-Lopez challenges to noncriminal statutes, see Wald Op. at 16-17.

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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: This case concerns 

the efforts of San Bernardino County, California ("the County"), to construct a hospital and supporting infrastructure for 

its citizens and other humans. Unfortunately, those efforts 

discomfit an insectthe Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly. 

According to the parties in this case, there are fewer than 300 

breeding individuals of this species, all located within forty 

square miles in southern California. These flies live as larvae 

for nearly two years under Delhi Sands, a particular type of 

grit, apparently found only in those forty square miles of 

southern California, after which they emerge to feed and 

breed for two weeks before dying.

In 1982, the County began considering construction of a 

$470 million "state-of-the-art," "earthquake-proof" hospital 

complex. The day before ground breaking was scheduled to 

occur in 1993, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") 

of the Department of the Interior ("Interior") added the fly to 

the endangered species list and notified the County that 

construction of the hospital, on County land using County 

funds, would harm a colony of six to eight flies and would 

therefore violate federal law. To prevent being prosecuted 

by the Service, County officials were forced to move the 

hospital complex 250 feet northward and to set aside 8 acres 

of land for the fly, delaying construction for a year and 

costing County taxpayers around $3.5 million. The Service 

also imposed a variety of other stringent requirements, including preservation of a flight corridor for the insect which 

today prevents improvements to a traffic intersection necessary to allow emergency access and avoid "virtual gridlock" 

when the hospital opens. At one point, the Service threatened to require shutting down the eight-lane San Bernardino 

Freeway (US 10, one of the most heavily traveled in southern 

California) for two months every year (I am not making this 

up). It did later drop this demand. The Service has also 

impeded several localities from complying with Countymandated weed-control programs which are an integral part 

of preventing brush fires in the area. Construction planning 

and projects, including an electrical substation and housing 

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developments, have also been threatened, impeded, or prohibited because of the fly. Local land-use planning, including 

the authority to balance environmental concerns with development in a way to best serve citizens' interests, has been 

disrupted; the financial health of the local governments has 

been impacted; a local enterprise zone has been threatened; 

and private land development has been impeded.

STATUTORY JUSTIFICATION

What business, one might ask, does the federal government 

have disrupting these activities of the unit of local government, which range from the purely local to the generally local 

in nature? The government's answer begins with a statutory 

justification. It acts under the authority conferred upon it by 

the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), specifically, section 

9(a)(1) of that Act, which makes it unlawful, inter alia, to "(B) 

take any such species within the United States or the territorial seas of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 

Next, one might ask, what does that statute have to do with 

the regulation of the County's activities in building a hospital 

and the supporting infrastructure? It is not apparent that 

the hospital plans to "take" any insects, or any other species. 

It proposes to construct structures for human use, and the 

humans using those structures propose to drive automobiles, 

each of which might disturb the fly, but would not entail 

anything that most users of the English language would 

recognize as "taking" the fly. Unfortunately for the County 

and its citizens, however, the Secretary of the Interior has 

determined that the word "take" includes within its definition 

"harm" and, therefore, activities which alter the habitat of an 

endangered species are covered by the statute prohibiting the 

taking of that species since the habitat modification might 

harm it. Even more unfortunately for the County and the 

citizens, the Supreme Court has agreed with that expansive 

definition of "take." Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 

Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 

Therefore, we may take it as a given that the statute forbidding the taking of endangered species can be used, provided 

it passes constitutional muster, to prevent counties and their 

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citizens from building hospitals or from driving to those 

hospitals by routes in which the bugs smashed upon their 

windshields might turn out to include the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly or some other species of rare insect. That 

leaves the question for today as: by what constitutional 

justification does the federal government purport to regulate 

local activities that might disturb a local fly?

THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS

The Department of Interior asserts that section 9(a)(1)(B) 

of the ESA, and specifically its use of that section to prohibit 

activities in southern California which might disturb a fly 

existing only in southern California, are constitutional under 

the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. That 

clause empowers Congress to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 

Indian tribes." This brings the next question: Can Congress 

under the Interstate Commerce Clause regulate the killing of 

flies, which is not commerce, in southern California, which is 

not interstate? Because I think the answer is "no," I can not 

join my colleagues' decision to affirm the district court's 

conclusion that it can.

ANALYSIS

The proposition that the federal government can, under the 

Interstate Commerce Clause, regulate an activity which is 

neither interstate nor commerce, reminds me of the old 

chestnut: If we had some ham, we could fix some ham and 

eggs, if we had some eggs. With neither ham nor eggs, the 

chances of fixing a recognizable meal requiring both amount 

to nil. Similarly, the chances of validly regulating something 

which is neither commerce nor interstate under the heading 

of the interstate commerce power must likewise be an empty 

recitation. I recognize that for some decades of jurisprudential development, the Commerce Clause has been used as the 

justification for the regulation of a plethora of activities not 

apparently within its text. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 

U.S. 111 (1942) (regulating the consumption of home-grown 

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wheat). So wide-ranging has been the application of the 

Clause as to prompt one writer to "wonder why anyone would 

make the mistake of calling it the Commerce Clause instead 

of the 'hey-you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like clause.' " 

Judge Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume 19, 19 HARV. J.

L. PUB. POL. 1, 5 (1995). However, in 1995, the Supreme 

Court brought an end to the galactic growth of the Clause's 

application and reminded Congress that the words of that 

Clause, like the rest of the Constitution, have content, in 

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). While I would 

have found the present application of the ESA to be outside 

the enumerated powers of Congress under the Commerce 

Clause even in the world before Lopez, after that controlling 

decision, I think there can be no doubt.

In Lopez, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, in which 

Congress made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual 

knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 

18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988). The Court concluded that because "[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial 

activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be 

connected in any way to interstate commerce," the statute 

"exceeds the authority of Congress" to regulate commerce 

under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 514 U.S. at 551. 

For the same reasons, I would hold that the challenged 

subsection of the ESA likewise exceeds that authority.

First, ESA section 9(a)(1)(B), like the statute challenged in 

Lopez, does not regulate commerce. In Lopez, the Supreme 

Court repaired to first principles. It reminded us that the 

Commerce Clause, unsurprisingly, regulates "commerce," and 

that "commerce ... is traffic ... it is intercourse ... commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations," as 

relevant here, between states. Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons v. 

Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-190 (1824)). The Lopez Court then 

went on to analyze the developments of Commerce Clause 

jurisprudence through the next 171 years after Gibbons v. 

Ogden. Specifically, the Court noted such significant developments as the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act, 

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24 Stat. 379 (1887), and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 

209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and the era of 

federal regulation which they ushered into our jurisprudence. 

Coupling this with the development of the negative Commerce Clause, see authorities collected in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 

554, the Lopez Court traced Commerce Clause jurisprudence 

to NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), 

and the growing extension of congressional authority to the 

regulation of essentially intrastate activities that " 'have such 

a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that 

their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions' [which] are within 

Congress' power to regulate." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37). Following that 

through Wickard v. Filburn, supra, the Lopez Court finally 

analyzed the present state of our commerce jurisprudence.

The Court identified "three broad categories of activity that 

Congress may regulate under its commerce power." Id. at 

558-59. Under the Lopez analysis, these three categories 

are: (1) "Congress may regulate the use of the channels of 

interstate commerce"; (2) "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 

or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the 

threat may come only from intrastate activities"; (3) "Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate 

those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 

commerce." Id. (citations omitted). My colleagues and I 

agree that Lopez recognizes the limitation of the power of 

Congress to act under the Commerce Clause to these three 

categories. Opinion of Judge Wald ("Wald Op.") at 8; Opinion of Judge Henderson ("Henderson Op.") at 1. They 

further agree with each other that the federal government's 

actions in this case come within its Commerce Clause authority as defined in Lopez. They cannot, however, agree as to 

how it fits within the Lopez analysis.

I find this inability to agree unsurprising, as this effort to 

regulate does not fit any of those categories. First, category 

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able. Judge Wald expressly agrees that "section 9(a)(1) of 

the ESA is not a regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of persons or things in interstate commerce." Wald Op. at 8. Apparently Judge Henderson agrees 

sub silentia, as she never asserts the second category of 

Lopez analysis as a foundation for upholding this application 

of the Act. That said, we are left with potential justification 

of the Act only as regulation of the use of channels of 

interstate commerce or as an exercise of Congress' power to 

regulate those activities having a substantial relationship to 

interstate commerce. My colleagues accept differing arguments as to why one or both of those rationales underpins the 

exercise of federal authority over purely local actions disturbing a purely local fly.

Judge Wald first asserts that the action taken by the 

Service under section 9(a)(1)(B) is a constitutional regulation 

of "the use of the 'channels of interstate commerce.' " Wald 

Op. at 9 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558). The short disposition of this argument is to say it does not command a 

majority even without me. Judge Henderson rejects it out of 

hand, noting, correctly, that all authority offered by Judge 

Wald in support of the channels-of-commerce rationale upheld 

regulation "necessarily connected to movement of persons or 

things interstate...." Henderson Op. at 1 (citing United 

States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. 

Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. 

v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)). As Judge Henderson 

goes on to note, neither the whole of the endangered species, 

nor any of the individuals comprising it, travel interstate. 

The Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly is an inveterate stay-athome, a purely intrastate creature. The Gun-Free School 

Zones Act, stricken as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 

in Lopez, involved purely local possession of firearms, objects 

which do move in interstate commerce, presumably through 

its channels. The Supreme Court without difficulty determined that that section was "not a regulation of the use of the 

channels of interstate commerce." Neither is this. It does 

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not purport to be.1

Not only do I join Judge Henderson in rejecting any claim 

that section 9(a)(1)(B) is constitutional as a proper regulation 

of the channels of commerce, but I would go further than she 

and note that Judge Wald's supporting analysis of Darby and 

Heart of Atlanta is far off the mark.

As Judge Wald notes, both Darby and Heart of Atlanta

concerned congressional efforts to "rid the channels of interstate commerce of injurious uses." Wald Op. at 13. But, for 

reasons I have already described, supra n.1, preventing habitat destruction contributes nothing to the goal of eliminating 

the fly, or any other endangered species, from the channels of 

commerce. The fact that activities like the construction of a 

hospital might involve articles that have traveled across state 

lines cannot justify federal regulation of the incidental local 

effects of every local activity in which those articles are 

employed. Judge Wald seems to be trying to extend Congress' power over the channels of commerce to allow direct 

federal regulation of any local effects caused by any activity 

using those channels of commerce. She focuses not on the fly 

in the channels of commerce, but everything else moving in 

the channels of commerce that may affect the fly. But this 

improperly inverts the third prong of Lopez and extends it 

without limit. Under Judge Wald's theory, instead of being 

__________

1

Judge Wald unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish Lopez by 

claiming that a prohibition against habitat destruction is "necessary 

to enable the government to control the transport of endangered 

species in interstate commerce." Wald Op. at 10. The fly is not an 

article of interstate commerce, and does not travel the channels of 

commerce. The issue before us is not possession or sale of flies, 

but, essentially, destruction of flies. Congress may have the authority to prevent interstate transportation of flies, and that aspect 

of the ESA is not challenged here. But preventing destruction of 

local flies cannot reasonably be held to be either "necessary" or 

"proper" to keeping the channels of commerce free from their 

interstate transportation. While prohibiting the local possession 

and exchange of flies might arguably be necessary to preventing 

interstate transportation or exchange of flies, prohibiting destruction of fly habitat is not.

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limited to activities that substantially affect commerce, Congress may also regulate anything that is affected by commerce.

While Judge Henderson agrees with me that category (1) 

of Lopez regulation does not support the Department's position, she agrees with Judge Wald that the statutory protection of the flies can be justified under category (3): that is, 

that it is the regulation of "activities that substantially affect 

interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. Once 

again, however, my colleagues cannot agree as to a rationale. 

Before responding to their differing opinions on why the 

regulation of intrastate fly killing falls within Congress' "power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to 

interstate commerce," I pause to further elaborate the Supreme Court's analysis of that category of legitimate regulatory power from Lopez. Because category (3) was the only 

category which even arguably could have permitted Congress 

to regulate the purely intrastate possession of firearms considered in Lopez, the Supreme Court afforded it a more 

thorough analysis than the other two categories and, in so 

doing, established three areas of inquiry necessitated by a 

claim of interstate commerce authority under the "substantial 

effects" category. Thus, in considering whether or not to 

uphold regulation under that rationale, we must examine 

whether:

 the regulation controls a commercial activity, or an 

activity necessary to the regulation of some commercial 

activity;

 the statute includes a jurisdictional nexus requirement to ensure that each regulated instance of the 

activity affects interstate commerce; and

 the rationale offered to support the constitutionality 

of the statute (i.e., statutory findings, legislative history, 

arguments of counsel, or a reviewing court's own attribution of purposes to the statute being challenged) has a 

logical stopping point so that the rationale is not so broad 

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as to regulate on a similar basis all human endeavors, 

especially those traditionally regulated by the states.2

None of the rationales offered by my colleagues pass this 

examination. Judge Wald offers two possible explanations as 

to why the challenged regulatory activity falls within category 

(3). First, she puts forth the "biodiversity" rationale. Under 

this rationale, she argues that the extinction of a species, and 

the concomitant diminution of the pool of wild species, "has a 

substantial effect on interstate commerce by diminishing a 

natural resource that could otherwise be used for present and 

future commercial purposes." Wald Op. at 23. As I understand her argument, because of some undetermined and 

indeed undeterminable possibility that the fly might produce 

something at some undefined and undetermined future time 

which might have some undefined and undeterminable medical value, which in turn might affect interstate commerce at 

that imagined future point, Congress can today regulate 

anything which might advance the pace at which the endangered species becomes extinct. Judge Henderson rejects this 

rationale, noting cogently that our colleague admits "that it is 

'impossible to calculate the exact impact' of the economic loss 

of an endangered species," Henderson Op. at 2 (quoting Wald 

Op. at 23). Judge Henderson further notes that "it is equally 

impossible to ascertain that there will be any such impact at 

all." Id. She then reasons, and I agree, that we cannot then 

"say that the protection of an endangered species has any 

effect on interstate commerce (much less a substantial one) 

by virtue of an uncertain potential medical or economic 

value." Id. I would further note that Judge Wald's first 

rationale fails under each of the subsidiary inquiries of category (3) discussed above.

First, the regulation does not control a commercial activity, 

or an activity necessary to the regulation of some commercial 

__________

2 This specific formulation of the inquiries necessary under category (3) is drawn from United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1455-56 

(6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., dissenting in part). However, each of the 

points summarized in Judge Boggs's formulation is taken directly 

from Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-65.

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activity. Neither killing flies nor controlling weeds nor digging holes is either inherently or fundamentally commercial 

in any sense. Like the criminal statute struck down in Lopez,

the challenged section of the ESA "by its terms has nothing 

to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, 

however broadly one might define those terms." Lopez, 514 

U.S. at 561. In applying that test in Lopez, the Supreme 

Court noted that "[s]ection 922(q) is a criminal statute" and 

that "under our federal system, the States possess primary 

authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law." Id. at 

561 & n.3 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The 

activity regulated in the present case involves local land use, a 

similar traditional stronghold of state authority.

As to the second subsidiary inquiry, the Supreme Court 

noted in Lopez that the statute before it contained "no 

jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-bycase inquiry, that the firearms possession in question affects 

interstate commerce." Id. at 562. Just so with the ESA. 

Nothing in section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Act or any other governing section requires that the regulated activity affect interstate commerce or provides any jurisdictional nexus supporting such a test. Like the statute in Lopez, it falls outside the 

authority granted by the Commerce Clause.3

Third, the rationale offered by Judge Wald to support this 

intrastate application of a statute unlimited by either of the 

other two subsidiary inquiries has no logical stopping point. 

As Judge Henderson suggests, the rationale dependent upon 

the purely speculative future impact of an action with no 

__________

3

Judge Wald chides me for not discussing Terry v. Reno, 101 

F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2431 (1997). See

Wald Op. at 16 n.8. In Terry, the effect on commercial activity was 

obviouspersons blocking access to clinics directly affected the 

business of abortion doctors serving interstate customers. The 

taking of a purely local fly, a harm without even a remote effect on 

commerce, cannot be reasonably likened to local activities undertaken with the purpose and effect of directly impeding interstate 

commerce.

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demonstrable impact at all cannot be said to "ha[ve] any 

effect on interstate commerce (much less a substantial 

one)...." Henderson Op. at 2. If it could, then I do not see 

how Congress could be prohibited from regulating any action 

that might conceivably affect the number or continued existence of any item whatsoever. A creative and imaginative 

court can certainly speculate on the possibility that any object 

cited in any locality no matter how intrastate or isolated 

might some day have a medical, scientific, or economic value 

which could then propel it into interstate commerce. There is 

no stopping point. If we uphold this statute under Judge 

Wald's first rationale, we have indeed not only ignored 

Lopez but made the Commerce Clause into what Judge Kozinski suggested: the "hey-you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like 

clause." Kozinski, supra.

Though Judge Henderson rejects Judge Wald's "biodiversity" rationale, she relies on a related justification of her own, 

which is to me indistinguishable in any meaningful way from 

that of Judge Wald. As I understand her rationale, it 

depends on "the interconnectedness of species and ecosystems," which she deems sufficient for us "to conclude that the 

extinction of one species affects others and their ecosystems 

and that the protection of a purely intrastate species [concededly including the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly] will 

therefore substantially affect land and objects that are involved in interstate commerce." Henderson Op. at 4. I see 

this as no less of a stretch than Judge Wald's rationale. 

First, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress "to regulate 

commerce" not "ecosystems." The Framers of the Constitution extended that power to Congress, concededly without 

knowing the word "ecosystems," but certainly knowing as 

much about the dependence of humans on other species and 

each of them on the land as any ecologist today. An ecosystem is an ecosystem, and commerce is commerce.

Granted, years of jurisprudence have extended that regulatory authority to encompass "activities having a substantial 

effect on interstate commerce," the third category of Lopez

legitimacy, but Judge Henderson's rationale fails the analysis 

of this third category as completely as does Judge Wald's. I 

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will not rehash the first two subsidiary requirements, because 

the failure is for precisely the same reasons set forth above. 

As to the third subsidiary test, it fails for substantially the 

same reasons as Judge Wald'sit has no stopping point. 

There is no showing, but only the rankest of speculation, that 

a reduction or even complete destruction of the viability of 

the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly will in fact "affect land 

and objects that are involved in interstate commerce," 

Henderson Op. at 4, let alone do so substantially.4 Nothing 

in the statute certainly necessitates such a nexus, nor has my 

colleague supplied a reason why this basis of regulation would 

apply to the preservation of a species any more than any 

other act potentially affecting the continued and stable existence of any other item of a purely intrastate nature upon 

which one might rest a speculation that its loss or change 

could somehow affect some other object, land, or otherwise, 

that might be involved in interstate commerce.

In addition to their biodiversity/ecosystem justifications, 

each of my colleagues offers a second rationale for justifying 

Interior's actions under the third category of Lopez regulation. Judge Wald asserts that "[t]he taking of the Fly and 

other endangered animals can also be regulated by Congress 

as an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce 

because it is the product of destructive interstate competition." Wald Op. at 26. I am not at all certain what that 

means in relation to the application of the ESA to the 

building of a hospital and supporting infrastructure in a single 

intrastate location. She relies on Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 

264 (1981), Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), and United 

States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940). Although she asserts 

"striking parallels" between those cases and the present one, 

I see no parallel at all. In each of those cases, Congress 

regulated arguably intrastate commercial activities, specifically mining and lumber production for interstate commerce. 

__________

4

Indeed, there is nothing in either Judge Henderson's opinion or 

the record to support speculation that the extinction of the Delhi 

Sands Flower-Loving Fly would have any effect on any other 

species.

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In each of those cases, the Supreme Court upheld the relevant statutes, noting that the regulated actors would either 

destroy other commercial activities or be able to unfairly 

compete with interstate competitors subject to higher regulatory standards protective of other elements of commerce. In 

the present case neither Congress nor the litigants, nor for 

that matter Judge Wald, has pointed to any commercial 

activity being regulated, any commercial competition being 

unfairly challenged, or any other sort of commerce being 

destroyed by the taking of the fly. With reference to her 

other rationale, I saw no stopping point; here, I am not even 

sure what the beginning point is, let alone the terminus. I do 

not think a decision upholding the challenged section of the 

ESA on this rationale can exist in the same jurisprudence as 

Lopez.

Finally, Judge Henderson would justify the challenged 

section on the basis that "in enacting the ESA, the Congress 

expressed an intent to protect not only endangered species, 

but also the habitats that they, and we, occupy." Henderson 

Op. at 4. I see no legally significant distinction between this 

justification and her "ecosystems" justification. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate "commerce," 

not habitat. People and animals lived in habitats at the time 

of the adoption of the Constitution, and we live in habitats 

now. Because the power to regulate habitats was "not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 

by it to the states," that power is "reserved to the states 

respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. Amend. X. For 

the reasons outlined with reference to the ecosystem justification, the habitat justification fails as well.

Judge Henderson would support her view that Commerce 

Clause authority extends to the regulation of "land inhabited 

by the endangered species," with the language of Wickard v. 

Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), that a subject matter "may 

... be reached by Congress" because "it asserts a substantial 

economic effect on interstate commerce." I do not see the 

applicability of the Wickard language to our present controversy. The statute in Wickard involved the regulation of the 

interstate wheat market. The issue in Wickard involved the 

production and consumption of homegrown wheat. Where 

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Congress has acted to regulate interstate commerce in a 

commodity, the intrastate production and consumption of that 

commodity in fact has an obvious effect on the impact of the 

regulatory scheme. While the effect of one farmer's production and consumption may not by itself be substantial, "his 

contribution, taken together with that of many other similarly 

situated, is far from trivial." Wickard 317 U.S. at 127-28, 

quoted in Lopez 514 U.S. at 556. In discussing Wickard, the 

Lopez Court rejected the notion that the Wickard precedent 

establishes that "all activities affecting commerce, even in the 

minutest degree, may be regulated and controlled by Congress." Lopez 514 U.S. at 558 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). It went on to note that the Court in Maryland 

v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), had rejected that expansive 

reading of Wickard and held that "neither here nor in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general 

regulation of state or private activities." Id. at 197 n.27, 

quoted in Lopez 514 U.S. at 558. Here, there is no general 

regulatory scheme of interstate commerce in a commodity 

such that the cumulative effect of purely local state and 

private activities could substantially affect it. There is no 

commerce in the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly.

An alternate reading of Judge Henderson's second justification with its stress on the effect of the regulation upon the 

highway and hospital is that she concludes that Congress may 

regulate purely intrastate activitiese.g., the habitat modification of the flywhere the regulation will then affect items 

which are arguably in interstate commerce. Again, I do not 

see the stopping point. Congress is not empowered either by 

the words of the Commerce Clause or by its interpretation in 

Lopez to regulate any non-commercial activity where the 

regulation will substantially affect interstate commerce. The 

most expansive view of Lopez is that Congress can regulate 

"those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 

commerce." Nowhere is it suggested that Congress can 

regulate activities not having a substantial effect on commerce because the regulation itself can be crafted in such a 

fashion as to have such an effect.

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In the end, attempts to regulate the killing of a fly under 

the Commerce Clause fail because there is certainly no 

interstate commerce in the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly. 

The whole effort to employ a clause that empowers Congress 

to regulate commerce in order to serve a perhaps worthy but 

wholly non-commercial goal of preserving an endangered fly 

calls to mind the thoughts of the first great commentator on 

the Constitution, Justice Joseph Story. Story considered the 

then-current question of whether the constitutional authority 

to regulate commerce could be applied to the perhaps worthy 

"purpose of encouraging and protecting domestic manufactures." He declared,

If this were admitted, the enumeration of the powers of 

congress would be wholly unnecessary and nugatory. 

Agriculture, colonies, capital, machinery, the wages of 

labour, the profits of stock, the rents of land, the punctual performance of contracts, and the diffusion of knowledge would all be within the scope of the power; for all 

of them bear an intimate relation to commerce. The 

result would be, that the powers of congress would 

embrace the widest extent of legislative functions, to the 

utter demolition of all constitutional boundaries between 

the state and national governments.... The power to 

regulate manufactures is no more confided to congress, 

than the power to interfere with the systems of education, the poor laws, or the road laws of the states.

Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution § 1075 

(1833).

CONCLUSION

I dissent from the decision of this court to uphold that 

regulation.

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