Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01050/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FIL~D United States Co~~ Ap~ Tent.~ C:.-"C111t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 17 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

JOSETTE WEIMER, Individually and as 

Administratrix of the Estate of 

THOMAS i.. WEIMER, SR., Deceased; 

THOMAS L. WEIMER, JR.; JASON WEIMER; 

ANDREW WEIMER; all Minors by and 

through their Mother and Next Friend, 

JOSETTE WEIMER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

Clerk 

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No. 91-1050 

CHRISTINE SCHRAEDER; ROBERT LIEBNER; 

DAVID BREDAHL; CITY OF GREENWOOD 

VILLAGE, COLORADO, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

ABDURAHMAN SAID; GHEBRO GETAUN 1 

Defendants. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 89-B-724) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Nicholas F. Maniscalco, Chicago, Illinois, 

Appellants. 

for PlaintiffsThomas J. Helms, Montgomery Little Young Campbell & McGrew, P.C., 

Englewood, Colorado, and Louis Bruno, Bruno, Bruno & Colin, P.C., 

Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-appellees David J. Bredahl and 

Robert E. Liebner. 

Alan Epstein and Daniel R. Satriana, Jr., Hall & Evans, Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-appellee City of Greenwood Village. 

Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 1 
Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

The Plaintiffs ~n this action, the wife and children of the 

decedent Thomas L. Weimer, Sr., filed suit in federal district 

court against Defendants Robert E. Liebner and David J. Bredahl, 

Greenwood Village police officers, and the City of Greenwood 

Village, Colorado, under 42 u.s.c. § 1983. 1 Plaintiffs claim 

various constitutional violations under the Fourth, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments in relation to the circumstances surrounding 

the death of the decedent. 2 The defendant police officers, 

Liebner and Bredahl, raised the affirmative defense of qualified 

immunity. All Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 

1 Christine Schraeder was also named 

district court action, but has been 

pursuant to the motion of Appellants and 

court filed on June 13, 1991. 

as a defendant in the 

dismissed from the appeal 

subsequent Order of this 

2 Plaintiffs also claim negligence of Defendants, but because a 

claim for negligence is unavailable under § 1983, we review 

Plaintiffs' claims only for a determination of whether decedent's 

constitutional rights were violated. See Archuleta v. McShan, 897 

F.2d 495, 497 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 2 
which the district court granted as to all cla~s. Plaintiffs 

appeal. 

Decedent was a passenger in a taxi which was involved in an 

accident on an off-ramp of I-25 in Denver. The defendant police 

officers were involved in the investigation of the accident. At 

the t~e the police officers arrived at the scene, they were 

informed by another officer, already present, that decedent was 

acting "nervous" and "suspicious" and appeared to be intoxicated. 3 

Decedent had apparently tried several t~es to leave the scene of 

the accident and walk on the off-ramp to a nearby Holiday Inn. 

The police officers requested that he remain at the scene for his 

own safety as well as because his presence was necessary as a 

witness to the accident. 

When the officers requested identification from decedent, the 

only identification he could produce was a crumpled social 

security card. The officers then ran a check on h~ through the 

Colorado Cr~e Information Center, and learned he was wanted on an 

outstanding shoplifting warrant in Arapahoe County. The officers 

proceeded to arrest decedent pursuant to the warrant. They 

conducted a pat-down search, handcuffed h~ and placed h~, along 

with his suitcase, in the back seat of the squad car. The 

officers then returned to their responsibilities regarding the 

accident. The record indicates that during the period of less 

than thirty minutes that decedent waited in the squad car, Officer 

3 The autopsy report indicates that decedent had 

alcohol level of 0.16% at the time of death. App. at 72. 

3 

a blood 

Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 3 
Liebner returned to the car several times to radio messages to the 

station. 

After the officers began to transport decedent to the 

station, he announced that he was ill and was going to "throw up." 

The officers requested that he "hang on" as they were almost at 

the station. Decedent subsequently began to vomit. The officers 

radioed the station informing them of decedent's condition and 

requesting assistance upon arrival./ 1 Upon reaching the station, it 

became apparent that decedent's illness was more than a reaction 

to too much alcohol. The officers then called the paramedics from 

the Castlewood Fire Rescue Department who arrived within minutes. 

At this point decedent appeared to be unconscious and was having 

respiratory problems. 

The officers claim, and Plaintiffs do not refute, that only 

eleven minutes elapsed between the time they began to transport 

decedent from the accident scene to the station (10:17 p.m.) and 

the time the paramedics arrived to attend to decedent's needs 

(10:28 p.m.). The paramedics transported decedent to Swedish 

Hospital where he died several hours later. 

When the officers commenced to clean up the back seat of 

their squad car, they discovered a bag shoved under the seat which 

contained traces of cocaine. The officers contend that this was 

their first indication that decedent possibly had 

cocaine, which had caused his severe physical symptoms. 4 

ingested 

4 The autopsy report indicates that decedent had a 

concentration of thirteen micrograms of cocaine per milliliter of 

blood, a toxicity level which would be considered lethal. App. at 

77. 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 4 
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, 

~ applying the same legal standards used by the district court 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. 

v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth Cir. 

1990) (citing Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 552 (lOth 

Cir.), cert.denied, 484 u.s. 896 (1987)). We resolve all factual 

disputes and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 

979 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990). "Summary 

judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute over a 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law." Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 

(lOth Cir. 1991). 

The standard for evaluating qualified immunity claims was 

articulated by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 

800, 818 (1982). Recently the Supreme Court reiterated and 

clarified its holding in Harlow by stating: 11 [W]hether an 

official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally 

liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns 

on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action assessed in 

light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the 

time (the action] was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 u.s. 

635, 639 (1987)(quoting Harlow, 483 U.S. at 818-19); see also 

Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1459-60 (lOth Cir. 1991). The 

burden rests on Plaintiffs to prove that there was a clearly 

established law. Hilliard v. City & County of Denver, 930 F.2d 

1516, 1518 (lOth Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 10, 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 5 
( 

'-' 

1991); see also Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 131 

(lOth Cir. 1990)(plaintiff must demonstrate that the laws 

allegedly violated by the police officers were clearly 

established) • 

In their brief, Plaintiffs aver that "[t]he standard of 

conduct of the law enforcement officials should be analyzed, not 

only under the Fourth Amendment, but also under the substantive 

due process standard as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments." Appellant's Brief at 8. This is where Plaintiffs' 

argument ends. Although the Supreme Court recognized that 

constitutional rights are clearly established, the test of 

qualified immunity cannot be applied at "this level of 

generality ... Anderson, 483 u.s. at 639. The right must be 

established in a more particularized and relevant sense. Id. at 

640. "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates that right." Id.; see also Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1518 

("[T]he plaintiff cannot simply identify a clearly established 

right in the abstract and allege that the defendant has violated 

it. It). 11 [B]road, nonspecific allegations are insufficient to 

defeat the (defendant police officers'] claim to qualified 

immunity." Id. at 1521. 

In Graham v. Connor, 490 u.s. 386, 395 (1989), the Supreme 

Court held that .. all claims that law enforcement officers have 

used excessive force--deadly or not--in the course of an arrest, 

investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be 

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 6 
standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach." 

See also Culver v. Town of Torrington, 930 F.2d 1456, 1460 (lOth 

Cir. 1991). 5 There appears to be no resolution of the question of 

whether the Fourth Amendment continues its protection past the 

arrest point. Graham, 490 u.s. at 395 n.lO. It appears clear, 

however, that following arrest the due process protections of the 

Fourteenth Amendment are triggered to protect a pretrial detainee 

from excessive force approaching punishment. Id. A negligent act 

evincing only a lack of due care by a government official, 

however, does not warrant Fourteenth Amendment protections. See 

Daniels v. Williams, 474 u.s. 327, 330-31 (1986). 

Although Plaintiffs do not claim that the police officers 

engaged in excessive force, they do claim that the officers 

effected an illegal seizure by preventing decedent from leaving 

the scene of the accident. The police officers admit that they 

requested that decedent remain at the scene for decedent's own 

protection as he appeared to be intoxicated, and because they 

feared for his safety if he was allowed to walk on a highway 

off-ramp. They also contend that his presence as an accident 

witness was necessary in order to complete their investigation and 

report of the accident. 6 

5 The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual 

punishment is only applicable following a "'determination of guilt 

after a trial or plea ... ' 11 Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 

1489, 1493 (lOth Cir. 1990)(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 

536 n.l7 (1979)). 

6 As Defendants point out, in Colorado, it is illegal to walk 

on the portion of a highway used for traffic if you are 

intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled substance. 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-705(3). In addition, the police officers 

(continued on next page) 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 7 
.. 

In order to constitute a "seizure," the police officers must 

have restrained decedent's liberty "by means of physical force or 

show of authority." Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). 

Plaintiffs offer no facts to support a contention that the police 

officers used any physical or authoritative force in preventing 

decedent from leaving the scene prior to his arrest. The Fourth 

Amendment does not protect citizens from all seizures, only from 

those that are unreasonable. Id. at 9. Consequently, even if we 

assume that decedent may have felt he was being restrained by the 

authority of the officers, under the circumstances, we conclude 

that the actions of the police officers were reasonable, made in 

good faith, and did not violate his constitutional rights. 

It appears that decedent removed the cocaine from his 

suitcase and ingested it while waiting in the squad car. 

Plaintiffs allege that the police officers denied decedent due 

process of law by placing his suitcase in the squad car with him 

in violation of proper police procedures. Plaintiffs' only 

support for this allegation is an affidavit from a retired Chicago 

police officer stating that, in his opinion, it was inappropriate 

for the officers to do so. App. at 134. This attestation has no 

basis in law or fact and is unpersuasive. 

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the police 

officers engaged in any improper, unreasonable, or prohibited 

action, or failed to react appropriately to the circumstances. 

(continued from previous page) 

at the accident scene had a duty to prepare an 

report including interviews with available 

§ 42-4-1406(4). 

8 

accurate accident 

witnesses. Id. 

Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 8 
Consequently, it is our ultimate determination that Plaintiffs 

have failed to make a sufficient factual showing under either the 

Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendment standard. Plaintiffs have 

failed to meet their burden of showing that any of the actions of 

the officers were in cognizant violation of established law. 

Consequently, the defendant police officers, Liebner and Bredahl, 

are entitled to qualified immunity, and the grant of summary 

judgment is proper. 

Plaintiffs further argue that the City of Greenwood Village 

is liable under § 1983 for its alleged failure to adequately train 

its police officers in deliberate indifference to the 

constitutional rights of its citizens. The Supreme Court, in 

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 u.s. 658, 690-91 

(1978), held that municipalities could be held liable under§ 1983 

if 

the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 

implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, 

regulation, or decision officially adopted and 

promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover, although 

the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government 

body is an allegation that official policy is 

responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the 

Constitution, local governments, like every other § 1983 

"person, .. by the very terms of the statute, may be sued 

for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to 

governmental 11Custom" even though such a custom has not 

received formal approval through the body's official 

decisionmaking channels. 

The Supreme Court further refined its Monell decision in 

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 u.s. 469, 481 (1986), by 

holding that in order to affix liability to a municipality under 

§ 1983, the alleged unconstitutional acts must be committed by an 

official possessing final policymaking authority with respect to 

9 

Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 9 
the alleged acts. The offensive policy must emanate from an 

officially promulgated decision or from a practice which is wellsettled and permanent. Monell, 436 u.s. at 691. In addition, 

there must be a showing that the policies of the municipality were 

directly connected to the constitutional deprivation. Berry, 900 

F.2d at 1499. 

A city's liability for failure to adequately train its police 

officers is triggered only when the failure "amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come 

into contact." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 u.s. 378, 388 

(1989). Under the facts presented here, we conclude that 

Plaintiffs failed to show that the City of Greenwood Village 

violated decedent's due process rights through a policy or custom 

reflective of deliberate indifference to the rights and safety of 

its citizens. 

In conclusion, we tend to agree with Defendants that 

decedent's death, although very unfortunate, was a result of his 

own actions and cannot be adjudged the responsibility of these 

Defendants. Even accepting all of Plaintiffs' factual allegations 

as true, we are still disposed to agree with the district court's 

decision that Plaintiffs have failed to show that the actions 

engaged in by the police officers were in violation of clearly 

established law, or unreasonable under the circumstances. 

Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to 

create a genuine issue of material fact, and therefore, the 

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Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 10 
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district court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate. The 

judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1050 Document: 01019324427 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 11