Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04954/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04954-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA M. PANTOJA-ROMERO,

individually and as proposed Guardian Ad

Litem for minors MGN-P and NJN-P,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

WATERFRONT APARTMENTS; 260

CANAL STREET ASSOCIATES;

STANFORD PROPERTIES, INC.; and RON

LIEBEG,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 02-4954 JSW

ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Now before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for attorneys’ fees and Defendants’

motion for a de novo review of Chief Magistrate Judge Larson’s Report and Recommendation

as to their motion for attorneys’ fees. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for decision. The

Court finds these motions suitable for disposition without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

Accordingly, the hearing set for January 27, 2006, is VACATED. 

On March 2, 2005, this Court issued an order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims. (See Docket

No. 43.) Both parties then filed motions for attorneys’ fees and costs, contending they were the

prevailing party. On a referral from this Court, Chief Magistrate Judge Larson issued a Report

and Recommendation, recommending that this Court deny the parties’ cross-motions for

attorneys’ fees and costs. With respect to Plaintiff’s motion, Judge Larson found that Plaintiff

was not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under a “causation or catalyst” theory. (Report and 

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Recommendation at 3-7.) With respect to Defendants’ cross-motion, Judge Larson found that

Defendants could not be considered the prevailing party, and thus, were not entitled to recover

attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 7-8.) Judge Larson noted that this Court did not decide any

claims on the merits, but rather, dismissed the claims pursuant to the Plaintiff’s request. Thus,

Judge Larson reasoned that Defendants were not a prevailing party. Moreover, Judge Larson

found that even if Defendants were the prevailing party, they are not entitled to recover

attorneys’ fees. A district court may exercise its discretion to award a prevailing defendant

attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action

was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). Judge Larson rejected

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff proceeded in bad faith and that her claims were frivolous

because Plaintiff had presented substantial evidence of potentially triable habitability issues, and

these claims are still pending in state court. 

Defendants filed a motion seeking de novo review of the recommended denial of their

motion. Upon a de novo review, the Court agrees with Judge Larson’s Report and

Recommendation to deny Defendants’ attorneys’ fees and costs. Defendants disagree with

Judge Larson’s characterization of the Court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims and contend

that they were the prevailing party. Defendants argue that this Court granted Defendants’

motion summary judgment because Plaintiff’s claims were not meritorious. (Mot. for Review

of Report at 4). Defendants misinterpret the Court’s order dated March 2, 2005. In response to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff requested that all her claims be dismissed

for various reasons. The Court merely granted Plaintiff’s request to dismiss her claims. 

(See Docket No. 43.) Accordingly, Defendants are not a prevailing party. 

Moreover, even if Defendants could be considered a prevailing party, the Court finds

that it would not be appropriate to award them attorneys’ fees. District courts may award

attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendants in civil rights cases only in “exceptional” or “extreme”

cases where the action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or without foundation. Herb

Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

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Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422). Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff’s action was

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Therefore, the Court agrees with Judge Larson

that Plaintiff’s action does not qualify as such an “exceptional” or “extreme” case warranting an

award of attorneys’ fees and costs to Defendants. 

Plaintiff has not objected to Judge Larson’s recommended denial of her motion. With

respect to Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds the Judge Larson’s Report correct, well-reasoned

and thorough. 

Accordingly, the Court adopts Judge Larson’s Report and Recommendation and

DENIES both parties’ motions for attorneys’ fees and costs..

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 25, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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