Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01217/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01217-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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D£1'Ui Y 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOEL RICHARD HERNANDEZ, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

DANIEL PARAMO, et aI., 

Respondents. 

CASE NO. 13-CV-1217 BEN (BLM) 

ORDER: 

(1) READOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; 

(2) DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

(2) OVERRULING OBJECTIONS; 

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY. 

[Docket Nos. 12, 21] 

Petitioner Joel Richard Hernandez, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docket No.1). 

Respondent filed a Response on September 4, 2013, and Petitioner filed a Traverse on 

October 29, 2013. (Docket Nos. 6, 11). On February 12, 2014, Magistrate Judge 

Barbara Lynn Major issued a thoughtful and thorough Report and Recommendation 

recommending that the Petition be denied. (Docket No. 12). Any objections to the 

Report and Recommendation were due March 7, 2014. (ld.) Neither party filed any 

timely objections, and the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation on March 

21,2014. (Docket No. 13). 

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This Court granted two requests by Petitioner for extensions of time to file 

objections. (Docket Nos. 17, 20). Petitioner filed Objections to the Report and 

Recommendation which were dated June 26, 2014. (Docket No. 21). Respondent 

replied to the Objections on July 23, 2014. (Docket No. 23). This Court has carefully 

considered Petitioner's Objections. For the reasons stated below, this Court 

OVERRULES the Objections and READOPTS the Report and Recommendation. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A district judge "may accept, rej ect, or modify the recommended disposition" of 

a magistrate judge on a dispositive matter. FED. R. ClV. P. 72(b )(3); see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)( 1). "The district judge must determine de novo any part of the [report and 

recommendation] that has been properly objected to." FED. R. ClV. P. 72(b)(3). 

However, "[t]he statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate 

judge's findings and recommendations de novo ij objection is made, but not 

otherwise." United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 

banc) (emphasis in original); see also Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th 

Cir.2005). "Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, 

de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct." 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 112l. 

The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's discussion ofthe scope ofreview for 

federal habeas claims, to which no party has objected. (R&R at 4-6). In part: 

An application for a writ ofhabeas cOl1?US on behalf ofa p'erson in custody 

pursuant to the judgment ofa State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 

adjudication of the claim­

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable ~plication 0T~ ~learlY established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court ofthe UnIted States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

ofthe facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A federal court may not issue a writ ofhabeas corpus "simply because that court 

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concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Renieo v. Lett, 559 U.S. 

766,773 (2010) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,411 (2000)). The state 

court's application must be "objectively unreasonable." Id. (quoting Williams, 529 

U.S. at 409). The standard is thus "highly deferential" and "demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit ofthe doubt." Id. (citations omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

Petitioner asserts three grounds for habeas relief. First he claims that he was 

denied his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and the 

presumption of innocence from an unbiased jury when he was shackled in the 

courtroom in full view of the jury. (Pet. at 7; Obj. at 1). Second, he claims that his 

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the prosecution's 

failure to disclose the identity of a witness who may have provided exonerating 

evidence and impeachment evidence. (Pet. at 9; Obj. at 2). Third, he claims that his 

right to due process was violated because there was legally insufficient evidence to 

support a jury finding that he committed the crime for the benefit of a street gang, and 

that the court improperly used the gang finding in sentencing. (Pet. at 10; Obj. at 2). 

I. Courtroom Shackling/Chains 

Petitioner contended that his constitutional rights were violated because the jury 

saw him in court in shackles, and one juror saw him in shackles as he was being 

transported. (Pet. at 7-8). The Magistrate Judge examined the decision by the 

California Court ofAppeal, and determined that the state court's denial ofPetitioner's 

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law. (R&R at 11-15). In part, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the record does not 

support Petitioner's argument that the jury observed him wearing shackles or that he 

was prejudiced by the brief observation. (R&R at 14). 

Petitioner states that he will "submit on the arguments and authorities previously 

submitted." (Obj. at 3). Petitioner does not point to any flaws in the Magistrate 

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Judge's discussion of facts or legal analysis. 

Petitioner states that he seeks to add that he believes an evidentiary hearing is 

warranted in this matter. (Id.) Specifically, he cites to Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 

633 (9th Cir. 1999), which also involved claims that a defendant was seen in shackles 

and that this prejudiced the jury. (Obj. at 3). Petitioner points out that an evidentiary 

hearing in Rhoden revealed that the jury had discussed the defendant's shackling, and 

that the record had previously been silent about whether the jury had discussed or 

considered the shackling. (Id. at 3-4). Petitioner contends that this Court should 

appoint counsel and conduct an evidentiary hearing for the same reason. (Id. at 4). 

However, the Supreme Court has held that when determining whether a state court's 

adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established law, a habeas court is limited to the record that was 

before the state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (citing 28 

U.S.C. §2254( d)( 1)). Accordingly, Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing must 

be denied. 

The Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge did not err in determining that the 

state court's denial of Petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. 

II. Witness 

Petitioner contended that information was given to the prosecution by an 

informant, and that the trial judge did not grant the defense's motion to release 

information about the informant. (Pet. at 9). In his Objections, Petitioner also contends 

that this witness might have been used to impeach prosecution witnesses. (Obj. at 2). 

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner had presented his arguments to 

the state courts in habeas petitions, but that the state courts did not decide the issue on 

the merits. (R&R at 15). The Magistrate Judge therefore determined what theories 

could have supported the state court's ruling, and ifthe theories are inconsistent with 

the ruling. (Id. (citation omitted». The Magistrate Judge noted that a state's 

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interpretation of its laws or rules does not provide a basis for federal habeas corpus 

relief when no federal constitutional question arises. (Id. (citation omitted)). The 

Magistrate Judge determined that he does not state a claim for relief to the extent that 

he claims the trial judges violated California state law. (R&R at 16-17). 

The Magistrate Judge also noted that to establish a constitutional violation with 

respect to an incorrect evidentiary ruling, a habeas petition must show that the ruling 

was so prejudicial as to render the trial "fundamentally unfair." (R&R at 16) (citing 

Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Magistrate Judge found 

that Petitioner had not established that the ruling was incorrect, or provided facts 

indicating that prejudice resulted, or established that it rendered the trial 

"fundamentally unfair." (R&R at 17). 

To the extent Petitioner claimed a Brady or Roviaro violation, the Magistrate 

Judge determined that Petitioner had not established a constitutional violation. 

Petitioner argued that it was likely that the informant provided information about a 

drug dealing by Delgado. (R&R at 17 (citations omitted)). He argued that producing 

the information could discredit the witness, and that because drug dealing is dangerous, 

it might exonerate Petitioner by identifying the real attacker and real reason for the 

attack. (Id. (citations omitted)). The trial court determined that Petitioner had failed 

to show a nexus between the stabbing and drug activity. (Id. (citations omitted)) 

Petitioner was able to present evidence during trial and argue that Delgado was not 

credible because he had engaged in illegal drug activity and was doing so on the 

evening ofthe stabbing. (R&R at 18 (citations omitted)). Further, Petitioner did not 

establish that the identity ofthe informant was evidence that was favorable to Petitioner 

or that suppression prejudiced him. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that 

Petitioner was merely speculating that the identity ofthe informant would be helpful 

and would add credibility to his argument that someone else committed the crimes, and 

that this speculation was insufficient. (Id. (citations omitted)). 

In his Objections, Petitioner refers to his statutory right to discovery, right to 

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Brady material, the right to call witnesses in his defense, and the prosecutor's claim of 

privilege pursuant to the Evidence Code. (Obj. at 4). He contends that the in camera 

hearing was inadequate because the trial court did not inquire about the "level of 

testimony" the witness could provide. (Id.) He states that the "use ofthis section as 

authority" was misplaced because the informant was not being called to provide 

information against the defendant, but rather to provide impeaching testimony against 

prosecution witnesses. (Id. at 4-5). He argues that cross-examination ofthe witness 

would have provided testimony that the "alleged victims had made statements to this 

'informant' after the incident occurred, whereby they made statements that they were 

all well aware that the defendant was not a real member or associate ofany gang." (Id. 

at 5). He claims that the "issue was discussed in detail" by the alleged victims in the 

presence ofthe informant. (Id.) He states that the "federal question" is not about the 

state's interpretation or violation of its own law. (Id.) Rather, he states it is about 

whether or not his constitutional rights were violated by failing to adequately provide 

"federally mandated discovery ('Bradymaterial')" and whether such failure to disclose 

and allow the witness to testify violated his right to a fair trial. (Id. at 5-6). In response 

to arguments that the witness was not material, Petitioner asks how this is known ifthe 

record is silent. (Id. at 6). He states that "ifit is true" that the testimony would reveal 

that the victims were aware that the defendant was not gang-related, the testimony 

would be material and would likely affect the jury's determination on the gang 

allegation. (Id.) He concedes that "[s]aid testimony may or may not have changed the 

defendant's level ofculpability," but that without allowing the witness to testify, even 

in camera, it "changed the course ofthis trial" and violated his constitutional rights. 

(Id.) He contends that an evidentiary hearing is warranted since the record is silent, 

and the court would otherwise be ruling on a record that does not exist. (Id.) 

At the outset, Petitioner does not dispute, or point to any flaws in reasoning with 

respect to the Magistrate Judge's determination that any claim premised on violation 

ofCalifornia state law does not state a claim for relief. 

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Further, after careful review of the Objections, it is apparent that Petitioner's 

argument that his constitutional rights were violated is premised upon his speculation 

about what testimony the unknown informant would have given. Although he suggests 

at one point that the victims made statements to the informant regarding the defendant's 

gang associations and that it was "discussed in detail," his later statements indicate that 

these comments were speculative. (Obj. at 5-6). He later concedes that it cannot be 

known what the informant would say based on a silent record. (ld. at 6). To the extent 

Petitioner intended to suggest that he had some basis for believing that the unknown 

informant had any such information, he has not presented such facts to this Court. 

Petitioner's Objections also fail to establish a nexus between the drug activity and the 

stabbing. To the extent Petitioner suggests that the in camera review was itself 

inadequate, he provides no authority to support a claim that his constitutional rights 

were violated. He presents no authority, for example, requiring that the witness testify 

in the in camera hearing. Petitioner's Objections do not undermine the Magistrate 

Judge's conclusion that he failed to establish that the ruling was incorrect, that he has 

not provided facts indicating that prejudice resulted from the allegedly incorrect ruling, 

or that it rendered the trial "fundamentally unfair." (R&R at 17). 

Although Brady does apply to state cases, a petitioner asserting Brady claims 

must satisfy three elements: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, 

(2) the evidence must be suppressed by the State, and (3) prejudice must have ensued. 

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 690-91 (2004) (citation omitted); Amado v. Gonzalez, 

No. 11-56420,2014 WL 3377340, at *10 (9th Cir. July 11,2014). Petitioner has not 

shown that the allegedly exculpatory evidence from the informant would be favorable, 

or that he was prejudiced by its suppression. He also fails to demonstrate that he was 

prejudiced with respect to the impeachment material. 

Accordingly, this Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation that the 

state court's decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law . 

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Petitioner again seeks to remedy his inability to sufficiently allege a violation by 

asking this court to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to develop a record that might 

provide a basis for finding a constitutional violation. However, Petitioner is not 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1389. 

III. Gang Finding 

Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated because there was 

legally insufficient evidence to support a jury finding that he committed the crime for 

the benefit of a street gang, and that the court improperly used the gang finding in 

sentencing. (Pet. at 10; Obj. at 2). As laid out in the Supreme Court's opinion in 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 

Clause is violated only when "it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the 

trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt." Id. at 324. Jackson claims face a "high bar" in habeas proceedings. Coleman 

v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam). First, a court reviewing the 

matter on direct appeal can only set aside a jury verdict on the basis of insufficient 

evidence "if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury." Id. (quoting 

Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam)). On habeas review, a federal 

court may not overturn a state court decision to reject a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. Id. 

(citations omitted). Instead the state court decision must be "objectively unreasonable." 

Id. (citations omitted). 

The Magistrate Judge concluded that there was "substantial evidence" to support 

the jury determination that Petitioner was a member of a street gang, that he made the 

criminal threats during the assault for the benefit of or in association with the Logan 

Clicka street gang, and that he had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in 

any criminal conduct by gang members. (R&R at 23). The Magistrate Judge discussed 

the evidence in the trial transcript supporting these conclusions, including lay witness 

testimony, stipulations entered into at trial, and the testimony of an expert on gangs. 

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(Id. at 22-23). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the jury's 

detennination was not unreasonable, and that the state court's analysis and decision 

denying the sufficiency ofthe evidence claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, federal law. (Id. at 23). 

In his Objections, Petitioner states that he will "submit on the previous 

authorities" and points to evidence that he claims was not presented at trial to prove 

gang membership or association. (Obj. at 7). He discusses case law regarding the 

requirements for a gang finding, and argues that he does not meet the criteria. (Id. at 

7-9). He further denies that he has ever been a gang member and states that he did not 

intend to benefit a gang. (Id. at 9). However, he does not rebut the evidence outlined 

by the Magistrate Judge in support ofher conclusion. Petitioner has failed to point to 

any error offact or law in the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Accordingly, this 

Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation that the state court's decision was 

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's Objections. The 

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is READOPTED. The Petition is 

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court DENIES a certificate of appealability 

because the issues are not debatable amongjurists of reason and there are no questions 

adequate to deserve encouragement. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 

(2003). The Clerk ofCourt shall enter judgment denying the Petition. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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DATED: JUIY~14 

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