Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00963/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00963-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD EUGENE MITCHELL, Civil No. 10-CV-963-JAH (POR)

Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 

[ECF No. 23]

v.

MATTHEW MARTEL, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 3, 2010, Petitioner Donald Eugene Mitchell (“Petitioner”), a prisoner proceeding

pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) denial of a mental competency hearing. (ECF No. 1.) 

On August 3, 2011, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition asserting it is time

barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (ECF No. 23.) Although Respondent concedes Petitioner

has suffered from severe mental illness, Respondent contends Petitioner’s condition was stable for a

majority of the pertinent time period so that equitable tolling is not warranted. (ECF No. 23-1.) In

addition to being untimely, Respondent also contends Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. 

Id. at 5.

In his First Amended Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner contends

equitable tolling is warranted and his claims are not procedurally defaulted because Martin v.

Walker, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011) is not controlling. (ECF No. 40.)

///

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After thorough review of the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner’s

Opposition, and all supporting documents, and in accordance with Local Rule 72.1(d), this Court

RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 18, 1997, a jury convicted Petitioner of false imprisonment by violence. 

(Lodgment 1 at 63.) Thereafter, the trial court determined Petitioner had previously been convicted

of three crimes that qualified him for sentencing under the Three Strikes law and had served a prison

term. The court imposed a sentence of imprisonment for twenty-five years to life. Id. at 112.

On December 23, 1997, Petitioner appealed, contending (1) the trial court abused its

discretion in precluding defense impeachment of the victim with evidence of a prior misdemeanor

conviction for prostitution, and (2) the sentence under the Three Strike law was cruel and unusual. 

(Lodgment 3.) On July 24, 1998, the California Court of Appeal denied the appeal. (Lodgment 6.) 

On August 7, 1998, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court

challenging his sentence. (Lodgment 7.) On September 30, 1998, the California Supreme Court

denied review. (Lodgment 8.) Petitioner did not seek certiorari from the United States Supreme

Court.

On October 16, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment 9) In this petition, Petitioner claimed his defense counsel was

ineffective in failing to investigate the victim’s record of prostitution or to investigate Petitioner’s

mental competence. Id. at 3. On April 14, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied the petition

without comment, but with citations indicating it determined Mitchell’s claims to be untimely. 

(Lodgment 10 (citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780, 959 P.2d 311, 77 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1998)).

On May 3, 2010, Petitioner filed the Petition now before this Court. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner

alleges: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) denial of a mental competency hearing. Id. at

5.

On August 17, 2010, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending the Petition was

untimely and Petitioner did not qualify for equitable tolling. (ECF No. 9.) 

This Court issued a Report and Recommendation, making the following findings: (1)

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1

 Because the Court has thoroughly addressed the fundamental issues regarding the applicability of the statute of

limitations, the date of finality of the state conviction, and the lack of applicability of statutory tolling in its previous Report

and Recommendation (ECF No. 13), the current Report and Recommendation will only address the remaining issue of

equitable tolling.

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Petitioner’s conviction became final on December 29, 1998; (2) that no later start date applied, so

Petitioner had one year from that date to file a timely federal petition, unless the date was extended

by tolling; and (3) there was no basis for statutory tolling. (ECF No. 13.) However, the Court

concluded the record was not developed sufficiently to reject the application of equitable tolling. Id.

Accordingly, the Court recommended Respondent expand the record by lodging documents

regarding Petitioner’s mental condition. Id. On February 16, 2011, District Judge John A. Houston

adopted the Report and Recommendation in full. (ECF No. 14.) 

On August 2, 2011, after lodging several medical and psychiatric records with the Court,

Respondent renewed its Motion to Dismiss, claiming Petitioner does not qualify for a sufficient

amount of equitable tolling and that his claims are procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 23.)

On September 15, 2011, given the evidence of Petitioner’s mental impairment, the Court

appointed CJA panel attorney Kurt David Hermansen to represent Petitioner. (ECF No. 35.) 

On September 16, 2011, Petitioner’s jailhouse “lawyer” filed a response in opposition to

Respondent’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 36.) On November 7, 2011, Petitioner’s counsel filed a

First Amended Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss asserting Petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling and his Petition is not procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 40.)

On November 21, 2011, Respondent filed a Reply. (ECF No. 42.)

On November 26, 2011, Petitioner filed a Response to the Reply. (ECF No. 43.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Equitable Tolling1

Respondent contends the Petition is untimely because Petitioner’s mental impairment did not

prevent him from timely filing a petition. (ECF No. 23-1 at 8-14.) Specifically, Respondent

contends the records show long periods of time during which Petitioner’s cognitive functioning was

such that equitable tolling does not apply. Id. at 8.

In his First Amended Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner contends

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equitable tolling is warranted because (1) the medical records indicate Petitioner’s mental illness

rendered him unable to personally prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing, and (2)

Petitioner was as diligent as possible given his medical impairment. (ECF No. 40.) Specifically,

Petitioner contends the records show Petitioner consistently suffered from psychotropic medication

side effects, severe paranoia, auditory and visual hallucinations, anti-social behavior due to mistrust

of others, and moderate to severe impairment in social, occupational, and school functioning from

1999 through 2011. Id. Further, a certified psychologist who has reviewed the pertinent medical

records lodged with the Court believes, in his expert opinion, that Mr. Mitchell suffers from low

intellectual functioning which affects his abilities to function independently or process legal matters. 

(ECF No. 40-1.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes the record is adequate to resolve the

pending equitable tolling issue without need for additional discovery or an evidentiary hearing and,

further, finds the Petition is timely. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss on the basis of timeliness be DENIED.

1. Law

Generally, before equitable tolling may be considered, a Petitioner must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006). The

mere existence of an “extraordinary circumstance”, however, is not enough to warrant equitable

tolling. A petitioner must also establish a causal connection between the extraordinary circumstance

and the federal petition’s untimeliness. Bryant v. Arizona Att. Gen, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.

2007). A petitioner seeking application of the doctrine bears the burden of showing that it should

apply to him. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1153.

Mental incompetence may equitably toll the statute of limitations. Laws v. Lamarque, 351

F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir 2003); Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541

(9th Cir. 1998). “Where a habeas petitioner’s mental incompetence in fact caused him to fail to meet

the AEDPA filing deadline, his delay was caused by an ‘extraordinary circumstance beyond [his]

control,’ and the deadline should be equitable tolled.” Laws, 351 F.3d at 923. 

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The Supreme Court has not examined or delineated the circumstances under which mental

illness will warrant equitable tolling. However, in Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010), the

Ninth Circuit recently established the following two-part test for determining a petitioner’s

eligibility for equitable tolling based on mental impairment: 

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an “extraordinary circumstance”

beyond his control, [] by demonstrating the impairment was so severe that either

(a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need to

timely file, or,

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable to personally prepare a habeas

petition and effectuate its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims to the extent he could

understand them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing

deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to

assistance.

Id. at 1099-1100.

The first prong of the Bills test is satisfied if a petitioner’s mental impairment was so severe

that it prevented him from understanding the need to timely file a habeas petition or take steps to

effectuate that filing, whether personally or through the assistance of others. Id. at 1100. The

second prong of the Bills test is a “totality of the circumstances” test, which “considers whether the

petitioner’s impairment was a but-for cause of any delay.” Id. Moreover, the Court must consider

“whether the circumstances demonstrated the petitioner was otherwise diligent in attempting to

comply with the filing requirements” and exploiting whatever assistance is “reasonably available.” 

Id. 

2. Petitioner’s Medical History

a. Medical Records

In Petitioner’s medical records spanning over eleven years, it is apparent Petitioner suffers

from Schizophrenia, Paranoid type, Bi-Polar Disorder, and Poly-substance Dependence. (Lodgment

12 at 98.) Since 1985, Petitioner has suffered from auditory and visual hallucinations, and

occasional involuntary muscle spasms. (Lodgment 15 at 12; Lodgment 13 at 50.) Petitioner’s

auditory hallucinations consist of voices, which are not command in nature, but tell Petitioner

nonsensical things. (Lodgment 15 at 12, 23.) Petitioner’s visual hallucinations are “little objects in

the corner of his eyes, such as bugs or people.” (Lodgment 15 at 23.) From March 1999 to February

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2011, Petitioner was treated with the following anti-psychotic, anti-depressant, and anti-seizure

medications: Haldol; Olanzapine; Thorazine; Cogentin; Artane; Benadryl; Seroquel; Zoloft; Paxil;

Risperdal; Depakote; Abilify; and Benztropine. (Lodgment 11 at 2, 5, 21,24; Lodgment 12 at 10,

91, 113, 182, 186, 196; Lodgment 13 at 207; Lodgment 14 at 322.) 

At Petitioner’s sentencing hearing in 1997, his mother testified that Petitioner suffered from a

brain embolism and had surgery thirteen years earlier for which he received medication and

qualified for Social Security assistance. (Lodgment 2 at 242, 244.) Further, she testified that

Petitioner spent nine months in Patton State Hospital, where he was diagnosed as a paranoid

schizophrenic. Id. at 242. In a sworn declaration attached to Petitioner’s First Amended Response

in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner’s mother confirms the accuracy of what

she told the state court sentencing judge in 1997. (ECF No. 40, Exhibit B.)

In the habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court, Petitioner’s jailhouse “lawyer”

asserted Petitioner “has mental health issues and still suffers from them. Petitioner suffers from

lapses of consciousness [and] memory, paranoi[d] schizophrenia and Petitioner is diagnosed with [a]

mental disorder.” (Lodgment 9 at 3.) In his pro se Opposition to the current Motion to Dismiss,

Petitioner’s jailhouse “lawyer” also represented that Petitioner is a participant in the Mental Health

Delivery System and receives mental health treatment in prison. (ECF No. 12 at 10.) 

The earliest medical record before the Court is a March 1999 report, in which a clinician

noted Petitioner needed to come off the yard because he was running around, manic, with “poor

coherence of ideas,” while screaming rapidly and being extremely uncooperative. (Lodgment 12 at

183.) In April 1999, Petitioner was transferred to another prison and was placed in Enhanced

Outpatient Program (EOP), where he took several of the psychotropic medications listed earlier. 

(Lodgment 11 at 1; Lodgment 12 at 10.) Petitioner remained in EOP through 2011, with very few

exceptions.

During the months following March 1999, Petitioner’s intellectual functioning was noted as

within normal limits. (Lodgment 12 at 85.) However, Petitioner’s voices and delusions persisted

and he indicated “people are trying to get me.” Id. at 172. Petitioner also had nightmares and

experienced difficulty falling asleep. Id. In a December 1999 report, it was noted that Petitioner’s

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auditory hallucinations were controlled, but that Petitioner’s cognitive skills, insight, and judgment

were “impaired,” and his general information was “poor/vague,” as opposed to within normal limits

reported earlier in the year. Id. at 158. 

In February 2000, Petitioner’s cognitive skills were noted as “some/impaired” as opposed to

within normal limits. (Lodgment 12 at 152.) Although his hallucinations were controlled by his

medication, his speech was “pressured/loud” and his insight and judgment were marked as

“impaired/poor.” Id. A clinician stated Petitioner suffers from paranoia, mistrust of others, a

disorganized thought process, paranoid delusions, and being “socially isolative.” Id. at 82. In April

2000, an EOP progress report noted Petitioner’s insight was “minimal,” his cognition “confused,”

and he was easily diverted from the group topic. Id. at 60. In November 2000, Petitioner’s auditory

hallucinations remained stable with his medication, but Petitioner continued to exhibit anti-social

behavior and suffered from paranoid thoughts, obsessive thoughts about mistrust of others, and a

“disorganized thought process.” Id. at 124. 

In January 2001, Petitioner requested to see a psychiatrist to discuss his medication because

he felt like he was “going to swallow his tongue and body is locking all over.” (Lodgment 12 at

113.) In February 2001, a clinician indicated Petitioner was really confused/frustrated regarding

steps necessary to obtain records for his appeal. Id. at 108. The clinician stated Petitioner is easily

overwhelmed and has real difficulty understanding explanations or recommendations on how to

effectively deal with and cope with things as they occur. Id. In a Suicide Risk Assessment form

dated April 6, 2001, a clinician stated Petitioner was not at risk of suicide, despite suffering

delusions, hallucinations, depression, poor impulse control, insomnia, and anxiety. Id. at 6. Later

that month, a clinician noted Petitioner was agitated and angry, and had obsessive thoughts which

interfered with his daily activities. Id. at 96. In Progress Notes dating between May 2001 and

October 2001, a clinician noted Petitioner actively participated in group therapy sessions, but

provided minimal insight. Id. at 37-50. In December 2001, Petitioner expressed he continued to feel

“paranoid’ and requested additional medication. Id. at 95.

In January 2002, after spending time in administrative segregation where he did not get his

medication for two days, a clinician reported Petitioner was anxious and mildly paranoid. 

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(Lodgment 12 at 93.) In May 2002, a clinician noted Petitioner was focused on paranoid themes,

felt “negative vibes,” thought others were taking advantage of him, and felt people were laughing at

him. Id. at 91. At that time, Petitioner accepted medication for anxiety, depression and sleep

difficulties. Id. On June 25, 2002, a clinician noted Petitioner “appears to have residual symptoms

of schizophrenia, [and] when stressed becomes paranoid.” Id. at 90. In August 2002, a clinician

noted Petitioner stated he was “hearing ‘more voices’ and they had made him quit his job [as a

janitor].” (Lodgment 13 at 207.) In September 2002, a clinician noted Petitioner had a tendency to

“become anxious, stressed, obsessive worrying when his needs, wants or concerns are not

immed[iately] resolved.” Id. at 206. Further, EOP progress notes from September indicated

Petitioner was “a bit slow,” and that he raised tangential comments without knowing he was off

topic. Id. at 276. In November 2002, an EOP progress note stated, “Petitioner continues to try and

cope with paranoia & anxiety. He has not made much more progress in the program but he appears

to be maintaining.” Id. at 37. The clinician further found Petitioner had poor insight and judgment,

but found Petitioner’s present mental status was within normal limits. Id. 

In February 2003, Petitioner’s intellectual functions were noted as within normal limits, but

Petitioner continued to cope with paranoia and anxiety. (Lodgment 11 at 56.) Although the

clinician noted no hallucinations, Petitioner’s insight and judgment were noted as “poor.” Id. A

May 2003 report revealed the same observations. Id. at 53. In June 2003, a clinician indicated

Petitioner had an impaired thought process, indicating it was “slow.” (Lodgment 13 at 166.) In

September 2003, Dr. Gary Kelley (PhD), indicated he was worried about Petitioner and referred him

for a psychiatric/medication evaluation. (Lodgment 12 at 89.) In November 2003, Petitioner’s

cognition was evaluated again as within normal limits, but his insight and judgment were poor. 

(Lodgment 11 at 47, 38.) The report also noted minimal coping skills and emotional reactions. Id. 

In January 2004, a clinician noted Petitioner’s medication was changed because his previous

prescription made him paranoid. (Lodgment 13 at 123.) Although the clinician concluded Petitioner

was within normal limits, the clinician noted Petitioner was paranoid and that he stays away from

people. Id. February 2004 progress notes indicated Petitioner’s mood, affect and behavior were

within normal limits, but they also reported Petitioner was “dealing with voices” and experiencing

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mood swings. Id. at 112-113. Specifically, a February 4, 2004 EOP Mental Health Treatment Plan

stated: 

[Petitioner] has not shown any significant change in the last 90 days. Same issues, same

problems, some paranoia. Regardless of past experience he does not appear to learn from

those experiences nor does he progress. His ability to go to mainline and successfully

program is questionable. Coping skills are minimal and he reacts emotionally to the same

problems time and time again.

Id. at 117. During visits with clinicians in March 2004, Petitioner reported he is “doing good,” but

“paranoia hits him now and then.” Id. at 106-110. An April 2004 report indicated Petitioner’s

cognition as within normal limits, but noted insight and judgment to be poor. (Lodgment 11 at 30,

31.) In June 2004, a report noted Petitioner had low intellectual functions and cycled in and out of

moderate to high levels of paranoia while obsessing over certain issues. Id. at 39. In July 2004, a

clinician noted Petitioner’s intellectual functions and reality contact were “below average.” Id. His

insight and judgment were noted as “limited”, and the report indicated Petitioner continued to suffer

from delusions and paranoia. Id. In September 2004, Petitioner is reported stating, “I still

hallucinate, even if I don’t hear voices, I get the wrong thoughts in my head.” (Lodgment 13 at 72.) 

An October 2004 report showed most assessments as within normal limits. (Lodgment 11 at 37.) A

report from November 2004 noted most cognition categories as within normal limits, but further

noted Petitioner’s eighth grade education. Id. at 44. 

From the beginning of 2005 through November 2005, Petitioner was taken out of EOP and

placed in Clinical Case Management, a lesser level of care. (Lodgment 13 at 10.) In March 2005,

while taking medication, a report noted Petitioner’s speech was normal and well-organized, he had

no psychotic symptoms, and he exhibited no abnormal movements. Id. at 58. July progress notes,

however, indicate Petitioner felt “drowsy” as a result of his medication and his affect was noted as

“anxious.” Id. at 54-55. Also, in August 2005, Petitioner’s medication was changed because he was

experiencing involuntary movements while under his previously prescribed medication. Id. at 50. A

clinician also noted his speech was pressured, he was anxious, he experienced hallucinations and

persecutory delusions. Id. at 49-53. In November 2005, Petitioner was placed back in EOP and

continued to suffer from paranoia, anxiety, and depression. (Lodgment 11 at 31.) In December

2005, although Petitioner’s insight and judgment were noted to be within normal limits, his thought

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content was not. (Lodgment 13 at 41.) In fact, the report indicated Petitioner still suffered from

auditory and visual hallucinations such as voices and quoted Petitioner as saying, “my mind still

plays tricks on me.” Id. 

In January 2006, Petitioner’s thought content was still noted as not within normal limits, his

speech was “pressured,” and his insight and judgment were noted as “poor.” (Lodgment 14 at 349.) 

At this point, Petitioner attempted to function for several months without medication. In June 2006,

Petitioner was reported stating, “Voices tell me to get in trouble but I ignore them.” Id. at 277. The

clinician also noted Petitioner’s thought process was “non linear, rambling.” Id. In August 2006,

Petitioner expressed anger over the death of his brother, and it was reported he had “poor” judgment. 

Id. at 344. In October 2006, Petitioner continued to report hearing voices. Id. at 343. In a report

from November 2006, it was noted that Petitioner was “rambling on religious themes,” “slow,”

inappropriately laughing, and exhibited poor insight and judgment. Id. at 58. On December 5, 2006,

a psychiatrist stated Petitioner seemed to be “psychotic. [He] believes in angels, [the] devil.

[Petitioner] needs antipsychotic medication.” Id. at 340. 

In February 2007, after being prescribed Zoloft, Risperdal and Cogentin, Petitioner was

speaking incoherently, expressing bizarre thoughts, and unable to sit or pay attention. (Lodgment 14

at 6.) In April and May 2007, Petitioner refused his medications. Id. at 7-9. In July 2007, Petitioner

indicated his medications made him shake and induced paranoia. Id. at 331. Although a clinician

found Petitioner to be within normal limits in a November 2007 report, the clinician also noted

Petitioner was agitated, “slightly bizarre,” “manic,” and his insight and judgment were poor. Id. at

55. The clinician also stated Petitioner was “slow, but reads okay.” Id. at 58. Another report from

late 2007 described Petitioner as “confused.” Id. at 326-327. On December 31, 2007, during an

appointment with a clinician, Petitioner became very loud and angry and started rambling and

threatening people from his past. Id. at 326.

In January 2008, a Captain requested an emergency referral for Interdisciplinary Treatment

Team (IDTT) due to bizarre behavior. (Lodgment 14 at 52.) Despite the fact that Petitioner was on

his medication, Petitioner was constantly yelling disrespectful racial/gang epithets and sexual

comments, such as “f*** the Bloods [and] the Crips” and “I ain’t no rapist, I don’t pull out my

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dick..” Id. Petitioner was agitated and hyper-verbal, talking loudly and refusing to stop talking. Id.

at 53. Petitioner’s intellectual functioning was reported as within normal limits, while his

concentration and attention were “poor,” his insight was “poor,” and it was noted that Petitioner

could not follow a train of thought. Id. In March 2008, an EOP progress report noted Petitioner still

needed “continuous redirection to the task at hand.” Id. at 296. On April 10, 2008, a clinician noted

Petitioner’s speech was pressured, his affect was angry/agitated, his concentration, attention and

memory were poor, and his insight and judgment were poor. Id. at 49. In April, July, and October

2008, a clinician noted Petitioner suffers from depression and agitation. Id. at 45-48. Specifically,

in July 2008, although a clinician noted Petitioner’s appearance and hygiene were within normal

limits, he also indicated Petitioner was delusional. Id. at 261. In September 2008, Petitioner stated

that he is “always wrestling [with] something in my mind.” Id. at 236. However, on October 29,

2008, a clinician reported Petitioner’s insight and judgment were fair. Id. at 222. In a December

2008 progress note, a clinician stated, “[n]o evidence of acute psychosis at this time.” (Lodgment 14

at 220.) 

In September 2009, Petitioner’s thought process was noted as within normal limits, while his

cognition, fund of information, and intellectual functioning were not within normal limits. 

(Lodgment 11 at 27.) The report further noted Petitioner had a history of depression, had no GED

and only an eighth grade education. Id. 

In a February 2010 report, a clinician requested another emergency IDTT referral. 

(Lodgment 11 at 18.) Several reports from staff indicated Petitioner had been acting bizarre by

talking to himself and appearing disorganized and expressing thoughts unrelated to his current

situation. Id. Another clinician noted Petitioner talked very rapidly about various religious issues

and tried to take his clothes off in the medical office. (Lodgment 14 at 208.) Petitioner appeared

disoriented, tangential and made statements like, “I think like an ant; I think like a spider.” Id. His

fund of information and intellectual functioning were not within normal limits, his insight and

judgment were “poor,” and his thought process was “tangential.” (Lodgment 11 at 19.) An IDTT

clinician indicated Petitioner would benefit from a “comprehensive treatment program with an

emphasis on skill development and increased programming and structured treatment environment. 

(Lodgment 14 at 41.) Petitioner was diagnosed with psychotic disorder and bipolar disorder, and

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2

 A Global Assessment of Functioning score is the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of

functioning. It is rated with respect only to psychological, social, and occupational functioning, without regard to

impairments in functioning due to physical or environmental limitations. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL

OF MENTAL DISORDERS, at 32 (4th Ed. 2000). Scores in the range from 50 to 60 indicate “Moderate symptoms...or

moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning.” Scores from 40 to 50 indicate “Serious symptoms...or

any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.” Scores from 30 to 40 indicate “Some impairment in

reality testing or communication...or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment,

thinking, or mood.” Id.

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was ultimately recommended for a higher level of care. Id. at 208. An April 2010 EOP group

progress report indicates Petitioner had difficulty staying on the group topic and needed constant

verbal redirection to allow peers to share in discussion. Id. at 178. A May 2010 report indicated

orientation and cognition as within normal limits, but characterized Petitioner’s thought process as

“circumstantial.” (Lodgment 1 at 13.)

The medical records also report Petitioner’s Global Assessment of Functioning Score2 (GAF)

between 1999 and 2010. In March 1999, Petitioner’s GAF score fluctuated from 60 to 30 in a matter

of day. (Lodgment 12 at 4.) In April 1999, his score fluctuated between 43 and 35. Id. at 3, 9. 

Between August and November, his score ranged between 40 and 42. Id. 

From February 2000 through December 2000, Petitioner’s GAF score fell between 42 and

45. (Lodgment 12 at 82, 143.) In 2001, his score varied between 43 and 45. Id. at 115, 110, 98. In

2002, his score was 44. (Lodgment 13 at 38.) In 2003, his score varied between 45 and 47. Id. at

166. From February through June 2004, his score was 47, in July it increased to 50, and in October

it increased again to 55. (Lodgment 11 at 41, 35.) 

However, in November 2005, Petitioner’s score dropped back down to 47. (Lodgment 11 at

31.) 

A year later, in November 2006, his score increased to 60. (Lodgment 14 at 59.) 

In January 2008, Petitioner’s score plummeted down to 49. (Lodgment 14 at 5.) 

A year later, in September 2009, Petitioner’s score reached an all time high of 65. 

(Lodgment 11 at 28.) Only five months later, in February 2010, his score dropped to 49. Id. at 17. 

Three months later, after his current federal habeas petition was filed by a jailhouse “lawyer,”

Petitioner’s score dropped to 40. Id. at 14.

b. Dr. DeFrancesco’s Declaration

In support of his Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner attached a

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 In Brown, the Supreme Court noted mentally ill prisoners in California “do not receive minimal, adequate care.”

131 S. Ct. At 1924. Prison overpopulation, which was at about 200% of designed capacity, has caused the demand for

mental health care in California’s prison system to overwhelm the mental health staff. Id.

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declaration of Dr. David DeFrancesco, PhD, a licensed psychologist in the State of California. (ECF

No. 40-1 at 1-8). Dr. DeFrancesco concluded that Petitioner has had a long history of mental health

problems after reviewing nearly one thousand medical records and mental health progress reports

pertaining to Petitioner. Id. at 2. Specifically, Dr. DeFrancesco stated that based on his review of

Petitioner’s infirmity from 1991 through 2011, “it is clear that [Petitioner] would not have been able

to file a petition without assistance.” Id. at 8. Also, Dr. DeFrancesco stated that Petitioner “has

struggled with serious mental health issues for over a decade, which prevented him from timely

filing his habeas petition in federal court.” Id.

3. Analysis

As discussed thoroughly in the Court’s previous Report and Recommendation, the statute of

limitation in Petitioner’s case began to run on December 29, 1998. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) Accordingly,

absent tolling, Petitioner had until December 29, 1999 to file a timely federal habeas petition. 

However, Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until April 26, 2010, nearly 11 years after the

limitations period ran. Notwithstanding this delay, the Court finds equitable tolling is warranted for

the entirety of the pertinent time period, thereby making the petition timely.

Preliminarily, the Court takes note that not every month between December 1998 and April

2010 can be accounted for in Petitioner’s medical records. However, the Court does not consider the

lack of medical records as a failure on Petitioner’s part to carry his burden in establishing that the

doctrine of equitable tolling applies to him. See Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1153. Rather, as highlighted

by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011),3

 the Court considers the lack

of medical records in Petitioner’s file as a reflection of the inadequate mental health care inmates

receive in the California prison system. Therefore, rather than presume Petitioner was mentally

competent during the months without medical records, the Court will examine the severity of

Petitioner’s mental illness based upon the totality of the records before the Court.

First, equitable tolling is warranted because a review of the medical and psychiatric records

indicates Petitioner’s mental illness rendered him unable to personally prepare a habeas petition and

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 Only reports from the following five months showed most assessments as within normal limits, without any

reports to the contrary: (1) October 2004 (Lodgment 11 at 37); (2) November 2004 (Lodgment 11 at 44); (3) March 2005

(Lodgment 13 at 58); (4) October 2008 (Lodgment 14 at 222); and (5) December 2008 (Lodgment 14 at 220).

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effectuate its filing during the pertinent time period. Specifically, close inspection of the medical

records indicates Petitioner has not been stable since 1999. Although the records indicate Petitioner

responded well to treatment at times, it is clear from the records Petitioner consistently struggled

with schizophrenia, paranoia, psychotropic medication side effects, low levels of intellectual

functioning, and auditory and visual hallucinations between 1999 and 2010. Indeed, out of the

nearly one thousand pages of medical records, spanning almost 11 years of Petitioner’s mental

health history, records from only five months definitely indicate Petitioner may have been capable of

filing a habeas petition or seeking assistance.4 Conversely, records from March 1999-September

2004, December 2004-February 2005, April 2005-August 2008, November 2008, and January 2009-

April 2010 reveal Petitioner’s consistent struggle with severe mental impairment. Therefore,

Petitioner’s medical records reveal that only five months of the statute of limitations ran between

December 1998 and April 2010.

Further, Petitioner’s GAF scores and Dr. De Francesco’s declaration support the contention

that he was not stable between 1999 and 2010. With few exceptions, Petitioner’s GAF scores from

1999 until 2010 indicate serious impairment. Between February 2000 through June 2004,

Petitioner’s GAF score fluctuated between 40 and 50, indicating serious impairment. From 2004

through 2010, Petitioner fluctuated from having moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or

school functioning to having serious impairment. These fluctuations corroborate the medical

records in demonstrating Petitioner was unstable during the pertinent time period.

Respondent contends the Court should not toll the time between the beginning of 2005

through November 2005 because Petitioner was taken out of EOP and placed in Clinical Case

Management (“CCM”), a lower level of care. (ECF 43 at 5.) However, in accordance with the

Supreme Court’s finding in Brown v. Plata that the demand for mental health care in California’s

prison system has overwhelmed mental health staff, that a mentally ill prisoner could face a “four to

five year gap” before receiving treatment, or become “trapped in lower levels of treatment,” the

Court does not presume Petitioner’s temporary placement in CCM was due to his alleged improved

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 As discussed previously, March 2005 is one of the five months that does not warrant equitable tolling.

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mental health as opposed to a variety of other factors, such as prison overcrowding. 131 S. Ct. at

1926. Rather, the Court finds that between January and November 2005, only March 20055

 does not

warrant equitable tolling because a report unequivocally states that while taking medication,

Petitioner’s speech was normal and well-organized, he had no psychotic symptoms, and he exhibited

no abnormal movements. (Lodgment 13 at 58.) On the other hand, reports from July and August

2005 (the only other months between January and November 2005 accounted for in the medical

records) indicate Petitioner experienced side effects as a result of his medication, his speech was

pressured, he was anxious, and he experienced hallucinations and persecutory delusions. (Lodgment

13 at 49-55.) By November 2005, Petitioner was placed back in EOP because he continued to suffer

from paranoia, anxiety, and depression. (Lodgment 11 at 31.) Thus, the Court finds the only month

Petitioner spent in CCM not warranting equitable tolling is March 2005. 

Respondent also contends Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling after he filed his state

petition on October 16, 2009, which would amount to nearly six months of the limitations period,

because the very act of filing that petition shows he was able to file and his impairment did not cause

delay. (ECF No. 42 at 4.) It is important to note that Petitioner’s jailhouse “lawyer,” not Petitioner

himself, filed the state habeas petition asserting that Petitioner “has mental health issues and still

suffers from them. Petitioner suffers from lapses of consciousness [and] memory, paranoi[d]

schizophrenia and Petitioner is diagnosed with [a] mental disorder.” (Lodgment 9 at 3.) In fact, in

September 2009, only one month before filing his state petition, Petitioner’s fund of information,

and intellectual functioning were reported as not within normal limits. (Lodgment 11 at 27.) And

by February 2010, only four months after filing the state petition, a clinician requested an emergency

IDTT and Petitioner’s fund of information and intellectual functioning were reported as not within

normal limits, his insight and judgment were poor, and his thought process tangential. (Lodgment

11 at 18-19.) Also, an April 2010 EOP group progress report indicates Petitioner had difficulty

staying on the group topic, and needed constant verbal redirection. (Lodgment 14 at 178.) 

Therefore, at a minimum, the Court finds equitable tolling is warranted for February and April 2010,

so that only four months of the limitations period expired after Petitioner filed his state habeas.

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However, even assuming the Court concludes the full six months of the limitations period expired

after Petitioner filed his state habeas, the petition is still timely. As discussed previously,

Petitioner’s medical records reveal that only five months of the statute of limitations ran between

December 1998 and April 2010. The expiration of six months of the limitations period after

Petitioner filed his state petition in addition to the expiration of five months discussed earlier only

amounts to eleven months between December 1998 and April 2010 that do not warrant equitable

tolling. Accordingly, based upon a thorough review of Petitioner’s medical records, the Court finds

Petitioner’s “mental state rendered him unable to personally prepare a habeas petition and effectuate

its filing,” thereby satisfying the first Bills prong. Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100.

Further, Petitioner satisfies the second Bills prong because under the totality of the

circumstances, particularly in light of his mental incompetence, Petitioner was diligent. Bills, 628

F.3d at 1100. In February 2001, Petitioner received a letter from the Social Security Administration

advising him they would send the records he requested so long as he provided them the name of a

responsible person who could review the records with him to ensure he understood them. 

(Lodgment 12 at 109.) Petitioner asked a clinician if he would write the letter for him, and the

clinician responded that he would review the materials with Petitioner but would not write the letter

for him. Id. At this point, Petitioner indicated he felt confused and frustrated because he needed to

write a letter in order to get the records he needed. Id. at 108. The clinician noted Petitioner was

confused by the request, easily overwhelmed, and had difficulty understanding explanations or

recommendations on how to effectively deal with things that occur. Id. A subsequent report noted

that after working on the letter for several weeks, Petitioner was excited and relieved that he was

finally able to mail a simple letter to the Social Security Administration. Id. at 105. In a January

2006 report, Petitioner stated he was going to the law library to work on his case, even though the

same report noted his thought content was not within normal limits, his speech was “pressured,” and

his insight and judgment were noted as poor. (Lodgment 14 at 349.)

A review of the mental records reveals Petitioner diligently pursued his claims to the extent

he could. Petitioner’s consistent struggles with schizophrenia, paranoia, psychotropic medication

side effects, low levels of intellectual functioning, and auditory and visual hallucinations between

1999 and 2010 made even the simplest of tasks, such as writing a letter, an unquestionable

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challenge. Completing the legal research necessary to prepare a habeas petition and then writing a

petition is challenging for most attorneys, so that such an endeavor for someone like Petitioner, who

only has an eighth grade education and suffers from severe mental impairment, is near impossible. 

In fact, the evidence shows Petitioner did not have the mental competence necessary to file a petition

and consequently relied on a jailhouse “lawyer” to file both his state and federal petitions. 

Therefore, within the meaning of the second Bills prong, Petitioner “show[ed] diligence in pursuing

the claims to the extent he could understand them, ” but that his mental impairment made it

impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances. Bills, 628 F.3d at

1100-01. 

Accordingly, because Petitioner satisfies both prongs of the Bills test, the Court hereby

RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis of timeliness be DENIED.

B. Procedural Default

Respondent contends Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted because the California

Supreme Court denied the petition on April 14, 2010, with citations indicating that it determined

Petitioner’s claims to be untimely. (ECF No. 23-1, referring to Lodgment 10, citing In re Robbins,

18 Cal. 4th at 780.

Petitioner asserts his claims are not procedurally defaulted because Martin v. Walker, U.S. 

, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011) is not controlling. (ECF No. 40 at 19-24.) Specifically, Petitioner asserts

extending Martin to this case would necessarily ignore Petitioner’s serious mental impairment,

thereby violating the requirement that petitions of pro se petitioners alleging incompetence be

construed liberally, as well as offend due process and notions of fundamental fairness and

substantial justice. Id. 

When a state court rejects a federal claim based upon a violation of a state procedural rule

which is adequate to support the judgment and independent of federal law, a habeas petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted his claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). A state

procedural rule is "independent" if it is not interwoven with federal law. LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244

F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001). A state procedural rule is "adequate" if it is "clear, consistently

applied, and well-established" at the time of the default. Calderon v. United States District Court,

96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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Respondent has the initial burden of pleading as an affirmative defense that Petitioner’s

failure to satisfy a state procedural bar forecloses federal habeas review. Bennett v. Mueller, 322

F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). Once Respondent has asserted the existence of an adequate and

independent state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the burden shifts to Petitioner who

must place this defense at issue by “asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate the

inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent

application of the rule.” Id. at 586. If Petitioner meets his burden to place the defense at issue, the

ultimate burden to demonstrate the adequacy of a state procedural bar is on Respondent. Id. 

Respondent has pleaded that the California Supreme Court, in the last reasoned state court

decision, clearly and expressly stated the denial of Petitioner’s claims rested on a state procedural

bar. (Lodgment 10.) Indeed, the California Supreme Court cited In re Robbins, (1998) 18 Cal. 4th

at 780, which held that an untimely petition will be considered on the merits only if a petitioner

establishes good cause for the delay. Id. Therefore, the burden has shifted to Petitioner to challenge

the independence or adequacy of the procedural bar. Bennett, 332 F.3d at 586. 

 In Walker v. Martin, the petitioner presented claims alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel to the California Supreme Court nearly five years after his conviction became final, without

providing any reason for the long delay, and, as here, the petition was denied with citations to In re

Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998). Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1124. The Walker Court recognized that

Robbins is cited by the California Supreme Court, and in particular page 780 of the Robbins opinion

(which was cited here), when that court signals "that a habeas petition is denied as untimely." Id. 

That is, the California Supreme Court signaled that the petitioner had failed to seek habeas relief

without "substantial delay" as "measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably

should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the 

claim," and had failed to carry "the burden of establishing (I) absence of delay, (ii) good cause for

the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of timeliness." Walker, 131 S.Ct.

at 1125, quoting Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780, 787. Ultimately the Court held that California's

timeliness rule is clearly established and consistently applied. Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1128-31.

Here, Petitioner cannot successfully challenge the independence of California's timeliness

bar. The Ninth Circuit has held that California's timeliness bar is independent, and this Court is

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bound by that holding. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We conclude

that because the California untimeliness rule is not interwoven with federal law, it is an independent

state procedural ground, as expressed in Clark/Robbins.") 

However, Petitioner successfully challenges the adequacy of California's timeliness rule. 

The adequacy of a state procedural rule "is not within the State's prerogative finally to decide; rather,

adequacy ‘is itself a federal question.'" Lee v. Kemma, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002), quoting Douglas

v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965). Although Walker found California's timeliness rule to be

clearly established and consistently applied, the Walker Court noted that a petitioner might be able

to show the rule to be inadequate in his or her own case by showing that "the California Supreme

Court exercised its discretion in a surprising or unfair manner." Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1130 ("A state

ground, no doubt, may be found inadequate when discretion has been exercised to impose novel and

unforeseeable requirements without fair or substantial support in prior state law.") (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kemma, 534 U.S. at 376 (recognizing exceptions where

"exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop

consideration of a federal question.")

Petitioner contends it was unfair for the California Supreme Court to impose a procedural bar

here because Petitioner’s “lengthy history of mental illness distinguishes him from Martin and

constitutes good cause for his substantial delay in filing his habeas petitions.” (ECF No. 40 at 24.) 

In fact, there is substantial evidence of mental impairment before, during, and after the statute of

limitations period in this case, as discussed at great length above. Further, the necessity of a

jailhouse “lawyer” and the near eleven year delay in filing his petitions highlights Petitioner’s total

inability to comply with California’s timeliness requirements. Therefore, the California Supreme 

Court’s imposition of a timeliness bar unfairly interferes with Petitioner’s right to have his

constitutional claims heard. See Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1130. To rule otherwise would be to deny

numerous prisoners suffering from severe mental illness a fair and full opportunity to present their

claims to federal courts. Moreover, allowing California’s timeliness rule to preclude Petitioner from

having his federal claims reviewed on the merits would not only offend notions of fundamental

fairness, it would also defeat the purpose of allowing equitable tolling based on mental

incompetence. 

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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds California’s timeliness bar, as applied to Petitioner,

is inadequate. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on the

basis of procedural default be DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this case and based on the foregoing, the Court hereby

RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on timeliness and procedural default be

DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(1994). Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before February 23, 2012. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before March 5,

2012. The parties are further advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 3, 2012

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

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