Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-01969/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-01969-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

E-filed on 9-7-06

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

BYRON LEVINGSTON,

 Petitioner,

v.

C.A. TERHUNE, Director of the Department of

Corrections, 

Respondent.

No. C-02-01969 RMW

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Re Docket Nos. 1, 10, 15]

Byron Levingston petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After

reviewing the papers, the court finds petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. For the

reasons stated below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The California Court of Appeal found the relevant facts as follows: Petitioner shot and killed

Dr. Louis Barbe, Jr. ("Dr. Barbe") and his son Louis Barbe, III ("Louis"), and shot but did not kill

Dr. Barbe's tenant, Michael Bennett. People v. Levingston, No. A085232, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Jan

23, 2001) ("App. Op.") at 2. Petitioner admits that he shot all three men, but claims that he did so in

self-defense or imperfect self-defense. Id. 

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 1 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

2

Dr. Barbe lived with his 31-year-old son Louis in Oakland, California. Id. Dr. Barbe was a

psychologist and Louis, due to brain damage suffered many years before, had a slightly reduced

mental capacity. Id. Dr. Barbe was financially well-off and had two tenants at his house, Jeffrey

Cunius and Bennett. Id. Bennett was in California evading drug charges in Nevada and met

petitioner when the two were working as roofers on the same project. Id. 

According to Bennett, he intended to obtain his own roofing projects and offered petitioner

employment. Id. Petitioner states that Bennett wanted to buy three pounds of marijuana from him. 

Id. at 4. On June 27, 1993, petitioner and his girlfriend, Liz Bairos, went to Dr. Barbe's house to talk

about jobs with Bennett. Id. at 2-3. Dr. Barbe mentioned that he was selling his house and

petitioner asked for a tour. Id. at 4. Petitioner claims this meeting at Barbe's house occurred so that

Bennett could sample petitioner's marijuana. Id. at 5. Bairos stated that she saw Dr. Barbe hand a

gun to Bennett during this encounter. Id.

The next day, petitioner made a second visit to Dr. Barbe's house at about 8:00 p.m. Id. at 3. 

The prosecution claimed that Bennett told Dr. Barbe the visit was to allow petitioner to tour Barbe's

house again. Id. Petitioner claims that the second visit was to deliver marijuana to Bennett. Id. at 5. 

Petitioner arrived at Dr. Barbe's house carrying a black gym bag containing marijuana. Id. at 3. 

According to the prosecution, petitioner, Dr. Barbe, Louis, and Bennett were all in the kitchen when

the phone rang. Id. at 4. Dr. Barbe answered the phone in another room and the prosecution

claimed that petitioner then pointed a gun at Bennett's head. Id. According to the prosecution,

petitioner asked Bennett "Do you know what this is?" and ordered Bennett to summon Dr. Barbe

into the kitchen. Id. Dr. Barbe entered the room and pleaded with petitioner not to use the firearm. 

Id. At that point, Bennett took a step away and petitioner fired a bullet that hit Bennett in the back

of the head. Id. Bennett then heard a second shot and saw Dr. Barbe fall next to him. Id. Bennett

heard two or three more shots before he called the police. Id.

According to petitioner, he arrived at Dr. Barbe's house to deliver the marijuana, which was

in the black gym bag. Id. at 5. Bennett answered the door, smelling of alcohol. Id. Petitioner

alleges that while Dr. Barbe was in another room, Bennett tried to take the marijuana without first

giving petitioner the money. Id. The two became embroiled in an argument, and petitioner claims

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 2 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Petitioner presents an incident from his imprisonment at the Santa Rita jail as an example of his

hypervigilance. RT at 1598-1655. A deputy inadvertently pressed a button opening petitioner's cell

door. Id. When the door opened, petitioner "popped into the corridor, looking startled, and

assuming a boxing stance as though ready to fight." Id. Petitioner apologized when confronted by

the deputy and returned to his cell. Id.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

3

that Bennett said that he was "fixing" to get his "shit," which petitioner believed was a reference to

the gun Bairos had seen Bennett with. Id. at 5-6. Bennett began to move away and petitioner

believed he was going to get a gun, so petitioner shot Bennett. Id. at 6. At that point, Dr. Barbe

retreated as if he was going to get a gun, so petitioner then shot Dr. Barbe. Id. Petitioner then

swung around to see Louis, who petitioner claimed to not know. Id. at 5-6. He saw Louis with a

Walkman and, mistaking it for a gun, shot Louis in the head. Id. at 6.

Dr. Mindy Rosenberg, a psychologist, and Dr. George Woods, a forensic psychiatrist,

examined petitioner and determined that he was susceptible to overreaction because of his childhood

experiences with an extraordinarily violent and abusive stepfather. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal

("RT") at 1885-2410. Petitioner's stepfather allegedly singled out petitioner and his stepbrother for

the most severe treatment, and beat them regularly with whatever objects he could find. Id. Dr.

Rosenberg testified that petitioner's condition is called "hypervigilance," which causes a "paranoid

perception of details without an accurate assessment of the overall context." Id.

Petitioner states that the circumstances in which he and Bennett allegedly fought over the bag

of marijuana, combined with the alcohol on Bennett's breath and petitioner's belief that Bennett and

Dr. Barbe had a gun in the house, could lead to a hypervigilant interpretation of the situation. Id. at

1598-1655. Hypervigilance would allegedly decrease the clarity of petitioner's perception of the

situation.1

 Id. 

B. Procedural History

On December 27, 1996, the Alameda County District Attorney's Office charged petitioner

with two counts of murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of possession of a

concealable firearm by a felon. Clerk's Transcript of Petitioner's Appeal ("CT") at 1828. The

prosecutor made additional allegations of firearm use in connection with the first three counts, and

infliction of great bodily injury in connection with the attempted murder count. The prosecution

also alleged three special circumstances: murder in the course of a robbery, murder while lying in

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 3 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

4

wait, and multiple murder. Id. A jury trial began on March 2, 1998, and on May 13, 1998 the jury

returned a verdict of guilt for first-degree murder on one of the murder counts, attempted murder,

and felon in possession of a concealable firearm. Id. at 2665-2671. The jury returned a verdict of

guilt for murder in the second degree on the other murder count the next day. Id. at 2672-73. Both

the gun-use allegation and the special circumstance allegation for multiple murder were found true;

the special circumstance of murder in the course of a robbery was found untrue. App. Op. at 4. The

jury could not reach a verdict on the murder-while-lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation. 

Id. at 2684-85. On November 19, 1998, petitioner was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole. Id. at 2753-54. 

Petitioner appealed from the trial court judgment, contending that his conviction must be

reversed because (1) there was prejudicial jury misconduct, (2) the court coerced the jury into

rendering a verdict, (3) the court instructed the jury incorrectly, (4) the prosecutor committed

misconduct when arguing the case to the jury, (5) the prosecutor committed misconduct when

questioning a witness at trial, (6) the court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to

introduce certain impeachment evidence at trial, and (7) the court erred when it allowed certain

hearsay evidence to be admitted at trial. App. Op. at 1. In an unpublished decision filed on January

23, 2001, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id. Petitioner then

filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which was denied on April 26, 2001. 

Resp.'s Exs. D, E. 

Petitioner filed the present habeas petition on April 23, 2002. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

This court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "[o]n behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 4 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

5

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the 'reasonable application clause,'

a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner's case." Id. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable." Id. at 411. 

A federal court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state

court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 410. 

The "objectively unreasonable" standard does not equate to "clear error" because "[t]hese two

standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts

by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness." Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166,

1175 (2003). 

A federal court may also grant the writ if it concludes that the state court's adjudication of the

claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must

presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner

rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). 

B. Exhaustion

The issues raised in the this petition have been raised in petitioner's direct appeal to the

California Court of Appeal and in his petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 5 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 There is also no evidence that Levingston filed a habeas petition in any California state court. 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

6

Respondent's Ex. D. However, in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court, petitioner

did not raise any federal constitutional claims.2

 It is not sufficient to raise only the facts supporting

the claim in the state supreme court; rather, "the constitutional claim . . . inherent in those facts"

must be brought to the attention of the state court. See Picard, 404 U.S. 202, 277 (1971). State

courts must be alerted to the fact that prisoners are asserting claims under the United States

Constitution in order to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of federal rights. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). 

Nevertheless, this court may consider this petition on the merits, even if it is

unexhausted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), which states: "An application for a writ of

habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State."

C. Substantive Analysis of Legal Claims

Petitioner raises four claims under § 2254: (1) deprivation of his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to an impartial jury trial because the jury foreperson explained to other jurors the

nature of the weapon used; (2) denial of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and his

Fourteenth Amendment right to conviction only upon competent evidence because jurors considered

his non-testimonial demeanor in court as evidence; (3) violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to an uncoerced decision from each jury member because the trial court asked the

jury to continue deliberation; and (4) denial of his Fourteenth Amendment right to proof beyond a

reasonable doubt on every essential element of the crime with which he is charged because the trial

court gave erroneous jury instructions. As explained below, the California Court of Appeal's

decision affirming petitioner's conviction is neither contrary to nor an objectively unreasonable

application of established federal law. 

1. Foreperson's Explanation of "Single Action"

Petitioner alleges that he was deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an

impartial jury trial because the jury foreperson explained to other jurors what a single-action

revolver was. Pet. at 10. Petitioner discarded the gun after committing the crime. App. Op. at 7. 

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 6 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

7

During trial, the owner of the gun, Alfred Bairos, identified the weapon from a catalogue photo. RT

at 802-806. The catalogue listed the gun as an F.I.E. "Texas Ranger" and was introduced into

evidence without objection. Id.; CT at 2745. During deliberations, the jury foreperson told other

jurors that he was familiar with that model of handgun, and explained that the gun was single-action

(meaning it had to be cocked by hand between firings). CT at 2708-18, 2737-38, 2741. The

foreperson further told other jurors how this was relevant to the issue of premeditation. Id. 

Petitioner claims that because of this information, the jury convicted him of premeditated

first-degree murder of Louis. Pet. at 10. According to petitioner, the foreperson presented external

information in the form of his own claim to expertise or specialized knowledge, which was

improperly considered during deliberation. Id. 

Petitioner's argument is not persuasive because the foreperson's explanation is not expert

opinion and therefore not extrinsic evidence barred from consideration by jurors. The Sixth

Amendment guarantees the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. See Irvin v.

Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). "Even if only one juror is unduly biased or prejudiced, the

defendant is denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury." United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d

513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Sixth Amendment requires the jury

verdict to be based on the evidence presented at trial. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73

(1965); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). However, the Constitution

"does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising

situation." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). 

Evidence not presented at trial is deemed "extrinsic." See Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499,

504 (9th Cir. 1987). Jury exposure to extrinsic evidence deprives a defendant of the rights to

confrontation, cross-examination, and assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment. See

Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1995). The issue here is whether the foreperson's

explanation of the meaning of "single-action" constituted expert opinion that should have been

excluded as extrinsic evidence. 

The Ninth Circuit has expressly stated that "[i]t is expected that jurors will bring their life

experiences to bear on the facts of a case." Hard v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 870 F.2d 1454, 1462

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 7 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

8

(9th Cir. 1989) (denying new trial where one juror used personal knowledge of x-ray interpretation

to sway others, reasoning that jurors will bring life experience into the jury room). A juror's past

personal experiences is an appropriate part of the deliberation, because "one great advantage of

jurors over judges is their diversity of experiences." Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393 F.3d 871, 879 (9th

Cir. 2004) (holding that foreperson's comments based on her experience as medical doctor that

defendant's mental disorders caused him to commit crime and that he would receive treatment as part

of sentence did not introduce extrinsic evidence). Juries have long been instructed, in state and

federal courts, to do precisely what the foreperson did in the present case. Often the jury instruction

contains an admonition something like: 

You are to base your verdict only on the evidence received in the

case. In your consideration of the evidence received, however, you are not

limited to the bald statements of the witnesses or to the bald assertions in

the exhibits. In other words, you are permitted to draw from the facts

which you find have been proved such reasonable inferences as you feel

are justified in the light of your experience and common sense.

KEVIN F. O'MALLEY et. al, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 12.03 para. 7 (5th ed.

2000). To the extent the foreperson based his explanation on his life experience, his explanation did

not constitute misconduct that would violate petitioner's fair trial rights. 

Petitioner argues that the term "single-action" is a term requiring explanation by an expert. 

Petitioner's Traverse ("Trav.") at 4, 5. This argument is misplaced. "Single-action" is a common

term used to describe guns. See CT at 2747; MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, available at

http://www.webster.com ("adjective of a revolver : that can be cocked only by manually retracting

the hammer"). The meaning of this term would be commonly known to people familiar with

firearms; petitioner acknowledges that the term is known to many laymen. Trav. at 5. The

foreperson simply explained what "single-action" means, which can be done by any layperson and

does not require teaching by a ballistics or firearm expert. 

Petitioner further argues that the foreperson presented himself as an expert in explaining the

term. Id. at 5-6. The foreperson's explanation was based on actual life experience because he had

owned or operated a similar pistol and was familiar with it. CT at 2708-18. Petitioner admits that

the foreperson never used the word "expert" to describe his knowledge. Trav. at 5-6. Nevertheless,

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 8 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

9

petitioner claims that to qualify as an expert, one "need[s] only to claim knowledge and experience,

and this knowledge and experience is invoked in support of an implied claim of credibility for the

information." Id. This argument leads to an absurd conclusion because, following standard jury

instructions, every juror's opinion would become an expert opinion if she draws inferences from

evidence using her own knowledge and experience. 

Therefore, the California Court of Appeal's decision is not contrary to or an objectively

unreasonable application of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 

2. Petitioner's Nontestimonial Demeanor 

Petitioner claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and his

Fourteenth Amendment right to conviction only upon competent evidence because the prosecutor

discussed and the jury considered petitioner's non-testimonial demeanor as evidence. Pet. at 11. 

During petitioner's trial, a fire alarm went off. App. Op. at 14. One juror noted that petitioner

appeared calm during the fire alarm, and pointed out this was not consistent with his claim of

hypervigilance. CT at 2714. The jurors discussed this information before and during deliberations. 

Id. Additionally, the prosecutor, in rebutting petitioner's claim of hypervigilance, said to the jury

during closing arguments, "You had evidence right here in front of you when the fire alarm went

off." App. Op. at 15. Defense counsel objected and sought an admonition. Id. During sidebar, the

court said it was inclined to sustain the objection, but it declined to make a definitive ruling so

parties could research the issue and discuss it later. Id. The court did not address the issue again,

and the prosecutor did not further discuss the fire alarm during his closing. Id. Petitioner argues

that this evidence was improperly introduced because he did not have a chance to confront it. Id.

i. Jury Misconduct

Petitioner claims that his nontestimonial demeanor in court cannot be considered by the jury,

and that the proper way for the jury to consider such demeanor is to have a percipient witness who

can be cross-examined and confronted. In support of this argument, petitioner cites Coy v. Iowa,

487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (holding that defendant is entitled to face-to-face confrontation with testifying

witness). Petitioner's argument is inconsistent with federal case law. 

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 9 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

10

It is well-settled that a defendant's courtroom demeanor is evidence. In Russell v. United

States, 288 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1961), the Ninth Circuit observed that a trial court is in a much better

position than an appellate court to determine whether the evidence in a particular case warrants a

new trial. The court noted that "the trial judge can see in the conduct and demeanor of one who

testifies (or even in the conduct and demeanor of defendants who never take the witness stand, as the

defendants did not here) a thousand and one matters impossible for a reviewing court to glean from a

printed page." Id. at 522. Likewise, in Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301 (1895), the Supreme

Court quoted with approval instructions that specifically advised a jury to consider the defendant's

"demeanor and conduct upon the witness stand and during the trial." Id. at 308 (emphasis added).

Petitioner testified as to his alleged hypervigilance, and his demeanor during trial therefore

became relevant evidence pertaining to his credibility. It is proper for the triers of fact to consider

his demeanor in court when considering his credibility. The Supreme Court in Coy held that a

defendant has a right of confrontation when there is a testifying witness, which is not the case here. 

487 U.S. at 1016-19. There is no witness to confront in the present case. It would be absurd to

require the prosecutor to produce a percipient witness to testify on petitioner's demeanor, when the

jurors could observe it directly themselves. 

Regarding the jurors' comments, the state court noted that the jurors committed misconduct

by discussing the petitioner's demeanor before deliberations began. App. Op. at 13-15. Premature

deliberations, however, are not as serious as other jury misconduct such as private communication,

outside contact, or tampering. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 653 (9th Cir. 2004). "What is

crucial is not that jurors keep silent with each other about the case but that each juror keep an open

mind until the case has been submitted to the jury." Id. at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see id. at 651-53 (no error where juror submitted note to judge before deliberations saying "we"

wanted to know whether defendant would remain in prison if jury returned noncapital sentence). 

The state court's rejection of petitioner's jury misconduct claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal Sixth Amendment law.

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 10 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

11

ii. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus case. The appropriate

standard of review, though, is a narrow check for due process violations, not a broad exercise of

supervisory power. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). A defendant's due

process rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial "fundamentally unfair." 

See id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in

cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the

prosecutor."). Under Darden, the first issue is whether the prosecutor's remarks were improper and,

if so, whether they infected the trial with unfairness. Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir.

2005). A prosecutorial misconduct claim is decided by "examining the entire proceedings to

determine whether the prosecutor's remarks so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process." Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

A prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's courtroom behavior. See United States v.

Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 1987) (references to inappropriate laughter of non-testifying

defendant error requiring reversal as violation of due process clause of Fifth Amendment; court

noted absence of curative instruction). Repeated references to trial court's pretrial rulings regarding

evidence offered at trial is also improper absent of court's curative instructions. United States v.

Younger, 398 F.3d 1179,1192 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding "swift corrective action" on part of court and

curative instruction rendered prosecutor's impropriety harmless). 

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by mentioning petitioner's

reaction to the fire alarm in closing arguments. The standard for prosecutorial misconduct requires

that the comment "infect[] the trial with unfairness" to the point that it deprived the petitioner of due

process. Johnson, 63 F.3d at 929. Here, the prosecutor mentioned petitioner's courtroom demeanor

and questioned the validity of petitioner's claim of hypervigilance. App. Op. at 13-15. Petitioner

promptly raised an objection. Id. However, petitioner never obtained a definitive ruling from the

court on the objection. Id. The California Court of Appeal found that petitioner had waived the

issue for purposes of appeal. See People v. Staver, 115 Cal. App. 2d 711, 724 (1953) ("When the

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 11 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

12

court reserves a ruling upon an objection, the defendant must later secure a ruling thereon or he will

be presumed to have waived a ruling.") 

Even if petitioner had not waived the issue, the prosecutor's statement cannot be

characterized as infecting the trial with unfairness. In Schuler, the court found misconduct in

violation of a non-testifying petitioner's due process right. 813 F.2d at 981. In contrast, here,

petitioner testified in his trial, thereby subjecting his credibility to the same scrutiny as any other

witness. Additionally, the prosecutor only mentioned the behavior once during his closing

argument. The defendant promptly raised an objection, and the prosecutor did not discuss the

subject further. Given the other evidence against petitioner, it is unlikely that the prosecutor's

statement changed the outcome of the trial. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1539 (9th

Cir. 1988) ("Where the evidence is so strong against [defendant], and the prosecutor's 'misconduct'

relatively innocuous, it cannot be said that [defendant's] rights were substantially affected."). Hence,

the prosecutor's brief mention of petitioner's demeanor did not result in a fundamentally unfair

verdict. The petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because of the prosecutor's mention of his

courtroom behavior.

3. Jury Coercion

Petitioner asserts that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an uncoerced decision

from each jury member were violated. The jury deliberations lasted fifteen days, from April 24 to

May 14, 1998. CT at 2507-2684. On the tenth day, the jurors stated they were ready to report

deadlocks on counts one, two, and three. Id. at 2660. After polling the jurors, the trial judge sent

them back for further deliberation. Id. at 2661. On the fourteenth day, the jurors returned verdict on

all counts except on the murder of Dr. Barbe and on the lying-in-wait special circumstance. Id. at

2668-73. Two jurors indicated that further instruction would help. Id. at 2665-66. On day fifteen,

after the court asked the jury to formulate a question, the jury submitted a note asking for further

instruction on the lying-in-wait special circumstance. The court then declined to give further

instruction, but rather told the jurors to refer to the original instruction. Id. at 2684. The jury

returned a verdict of second-degree murder for Dr. Barbe's killing at the end of that day. Id.

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 12 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 An Allen charge is traditionally understood as an instruction to work towards unanimity by

considering the views of others when a jury has reached an impasse in its deliberations. See United

States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704, 716 (9th Cir. 1996). 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

13

Petitioner argues that the court's refusal to accept an impasse or to give further instructions

constituted jury coercion. Pet. at 12-13. 

This argument is unpersuasive. Whether a judge has coerced a jury's verdict is a mixed

question of law and fact, and should be considered under the totality of circumstances. Jiminez v.

Myers, 40 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1993). When a jury appears to be deadlocked, the trial court has

discretion whether to send the jury back for further deliberation or to declare a mistrial, because the

trial judge is in the best position to determine the likelihood of a verdict. See United States v.

Sommerstedt, 752 F.2d 1494, 1497-98 (9th Cir. 1985), amended by 760 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Federal courts deciding whether the jury was improperly coerced must consider the trial court's

instruction "in its context and under all circumstances," Lowenfield v. Phelps, 48 U.S. 231, 237

(1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Jiminez, 40 F.3d at 980; Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d

403, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1983). Whether the comments and conduct of a trial judge surrounding an 

Allen charge3

 violated a criminal defendant's due process rights ultimately turns on whether "the trial

judge's inquiry would be likely to coerce certain jurors into relinquishing their views in favor of

reaching a unanimous decision." Jiminez, 40 F.3d at 979. In assessing the coerciveness of a

supplemental instruction, a court must look to "(1) the form of the instruction; (2) the period of

deliberation following the Allen charge; (3) the total time of jury deliberations; and (4) the indicia of

coerciveness or pressure upon the jury." United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The facts of the present case closely resemble those in Rodriguez v. Marshall, 125 F.3d 739

(9th Cir. 1997), where the Ninth Circuit found no jury coercion. In Rodriguez, the jury met for a

total of fifteen court days, during which the jury sent five separate notes on four different days

indicating a deadlock. Id. at 742. The presiding judge refused five defense motions for a mistrial,

commented on the evidence which the jury had requested while giving a supplemental instruction,

and after the jury repeatedly declared a deadlock, learned that the jury's split had remained at 11-1

for each of the five ballots taken. Id. 

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 13 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

14

In the present case, the jury also met for fifteen court days. The jury only reported deadlocks

twice (each time with a 11-1 split). App. Op. at 16-17. The presiding judge conducted a poll after

each reported deadlock, and on both occasions at least two jurors indicated that further deliberation

would be helpful. Id. The trial judge never explicitly demanded a verdict from the jury, and the

court's Allen charges were at least partially in response to some jurors' desire for further deliberation. 

These circumstances, when considered in their entirety, do not amount to coercion. 

Petitioner argues that by first eliciting a question from the jury and then refusing to provide

further instructions, the court effectively communicated to the jury that an impasse was not

acceptable and that the jurors would have to return a verdict. Pet. at 13. It is well-settled that the

trial judge has substantial latitude in tailoring jury instructions. United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez,

558 F.2d 956, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1977). The trial judge's refusal to give further instructions, either

upon motions by parties or requests by the jury, is rarely a sufficient basis for finding jury coercion. 

See United States v. Cuozzo, 962 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding trial judge's refusal to give

further instructions on government's burden of proof with Allen charge not coercive). Here, the trial

judge's elicitation of a question was in response to two juror's indications that further instructions

might be helpful. App. Op. at 17. However, a question from the jury does not obligate the judge to

give further instructions, so long as the instructions as a whole fairly apprised the jury of the

requisite elements of each crime. See Garcia-Rodriguez, 558 F.2d at 965-66 (instructions must

"fairly and adequately" explain charges). The petitioner never challenged the sufficiency of the

instructions as originally given, therefore, petitioner cannot now complain that the judge was

obligated to answer the jury's question and give further instruction. 

Petitioner argues that the court's refusal to give further instructions "effectively

communicated to the jurors that an impasse would not be accepted and that the jurors would have to

return a verdict." Pet. at 13. This argument is unpersuasive. The judge overseeing deliberations

actually apologized for not being able to give further instructions and explained that this decision

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 14 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Judge Carl W. Morris presided at the trial. Judge Vernon Nakahara, substituting for Judge Morris,

oversaw the jury deliberation on May 11, 1998. CT at 2663. Judge Joseph Jay, substituting for

Judge Morris, oversaw the jury deliberation from May 13, 1998 to May 14, 1998. Id. at 2665, 2684.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

15

was based on a discussion with the presiding trial judge.4 App. Op. at 17. Moreover, the trial judge

explicitly instructed the jury to "return to the original instructions and then inform the court if you

are or are not able to arrive at a verdict." App. Op. at 17 (emphasis added). There is nothing in the

trial judge's language indicating that an impasse was unacceptable and the jury had to return a

verdict. 

Petitioner also argues that the present case is distinguishable from Rodriguez in that after the

final instruction, the jurors did not ask for re-reading of testimony or further instructions on the law,

 and the amount of time they took to deliberate was "negligible." Trav. at 11-12. This argument is

inconsistent with existing case law. If the jury had immediately returned a verdict after the Allen

charge, a suspicion of coercion might be raised. United States v. Bohnham, 772 F.2d 1449, 1451

(9th Cir. 1985). The jury here, however, deliberated for a day before returning a verdict. Pet. at 13. 

The Ninth Circuit has found Allen charges followed by much shorter deliberations to be noncoercive. See United States v. John, 39 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 1994) (jury deliberation of two and

one-half hours after Allen charge was sufficient); Bohnham, 772 F.2d at 1451 (jury deliberation of

one and one-half hours between Allen charge and verdict did not demonstrate coercion). The total

deliberation time of one day after the Allen charge in this case does not indicate that the jury was

coerced into returning its verdict. Therefore, the state appellate court's resolution of this issue

comports with applicable federal law.

4. Improper Jury Instruction

Petitioner claims that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to proof beyond a

reasonable doubt on every essential element of the crime because of the court's erroneous instruction

on voluntary manslaughter. Pet. at 14-15. Evidence in the case went to the issue of actual but

unreasonable self-defense, which petitioner claims caused the jury to return an improper verdict of

first-degree murder. Id. at 14. Pursuant to CALJIC No. 5.17, the trial court instructed the jury that

imperfect self-defense could not be applied nor malice aforethought negated if petitioner "by his

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 15 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

16

unlawful or wrongful conduct created the circumstances which legally justified his adversary's use

of force or attack." App. Op. at 19-20. Petitioner claims that this instruction misstates the state law

from In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768 (1994), and negates the principle of imperfect self-defense. 

Pet. at 14; Trav. at 12.

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim

cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991)

("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state

law questions."). It is undisputed that "[a] state court has the last word on the interpretation of state

law." Mendez v. Small, 298 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2002). The federal court hearing a habeas

claim is "bound by a state court's construction of its own penal statues." Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d

705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993). 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the

challenged instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

petitioner's due process rights. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.

141, 146 (1973) ("[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or

even 'universally condemned,' but that it violated some [constitutional] right."). A state violates a

criminal defendant's due process right to fundamental fairness if it arbitrarily deprives the defendant

of a state-law entitlement. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). 

In the present case, the state court did not arbitrarily deprive petitioner's due process rights in

giving the jury instruction. A closer look at California law supports the court's conclusion on the

issue of imperfect self-defense. The state appellate court ruled that the pertinent portion of CALJIC

No. 5.17 states the law correctly. App. Op. at 19-21. The Ninth Circuit noted this exception to the

self-defense doctrine in Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 2003), where the court upheld a jury

instruction that "if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the aggressor, and that

defendant's acts and conduct provoked or commenced the fight, then self-defense is not available as

a defense." Id. at 1321 n.7 (holding that defendant was first aggressor and self-defense could not be

found by jury).

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 16 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

17

Nevertheless, petitioner argues that if a defendant actually believes his opponent is the

aggressor, such belief is a mistake of fact and he is entitled to the defense of imperfect self-defense

even when the defendant objectively is the aggressor. Trav. at 13. This is an incorrect

understanding of In re Christian S. What the defendant subjectively believes has no bearing on the

exception to the imperfect self-defense doctrine: 

It is well established that the ordinary self-defense doctrine . . .

may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful

conduct . . . has created circumstances under which his adversary's attack

or pursuit is legally justified. It follows, a fortiori, that the imperfect selfdefense doctrine cannot be invoked in such circumstances.

7 Cal. 4th at 773 n.1. There is nothing in this language about a defendant's subjective belief. The

exception to the imperfect self-defense doctrine is based on an objective standard. 

In summary, both the state trial court and the appellate court correctly interpreted the law on

imperfect self-defense and did not arbitrarily deprive petitioner's due process rights. Under the

Estelle doctrine, this court must defer to the state-court decision and find that petitioner failed to

state a claim for which relief is available in this forum. 

III. ORDER

The court finds that petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal constitutional

rights in the underlying state criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is denied.

DATED: 9/7/06

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 17 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—No. C-02-01969 RMW

18

A copy of this order was mailed on to:

Counsel for Petitioner:

Mark D. Greenberg 

PBM No. 429 

484 Lake Park Avenue 

Oakland, CA 94610 

Counsel for Respondent:

Juliet B. Haley 

California Attorney General's Office 

455 Golden Gate Avenue 

Suite 11000 

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this order to co-counsel, as necessary.

Case 5:02-cv-01969-RMW Document 16 Filed 09/07/06 Page 18 of 18