Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05192/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05192-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY BUFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

WASCO STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:01-CV-05192-AWI-SMS-P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING MONETARY

SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $250.00

BE IMPOSED ON PLAINTIFF FOR ACTING

IN BAD FAITH BY FILING MOTION TO

AMEND

(Doc. 147)

I. Findings and Recommendations Recommending Plaintiff be Sanctioned

Plaintiff Timothy Buford (“plaintiff”) is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Americans with Disabilities Act). This

action is proceeding on plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed January 8, 2004, against

defendants Carbajal, Bindel, Huertas, Dobbs, Cheatham, Leong, and Songer (“defendants”) on

plaintiff’s ADA claim. (Doc. 55.) On November 14, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave

to amend to add the State of California as a defendant and a claim of “deliberate indifference.” (Doc.

135.) Defendants did not file a response. 

On April 20, 2006, the court issued an order denying plaintiff’s motion to amend and

ordering plaintiff to show cause why monetary sanctions payable to the court for the waste of its

resources should not be imposed against him for acting in bad faith in filing the motion. (Doc. 147.)

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Plaintiff filed a response on June 19, 2006. (Doc. 159.) Defendants were provided with the

opportunity to file a response but did not do so.

A. Order Requiring Plaintiff to Show Cause

In denying plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to amend and requiring plaintiff to show cause

why sanctions should not be imposed, the court stated as follows:

A. Addition of Deliberate Indifference Claim

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to add a deliberate indifference claim. Deliberate

indifference is not a legal claim or cause of action. Rather, it is the legal standard for

claims brought for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court has reviewed

plaintiff’s second amended complaint and proposed third amended complaint, and

the events giving rise to plaintiff’s claims are the same in both complaints. Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claims as set forth in the second amended complaint were

dismissed from this action on November 8, 2004, with prejudice. (Docs. 50, 55.) On

February 5, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion seeking entry of final judgment pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) with respect to dismissal of claims and

defendants by the court on November 8, 2004. (Doc. 72.) Plaintiff’s motion was

denied on February 23, 2005. (Doc. 75.) On October 3, 2005, plaintiff sought

clarification of the status of his dismissed claims, and attempted to persuade the court

that the claims should have been dismissed without prejudice and his ability to fully

and fairly litigate his claims was being hampered. (Doc. 124.) On November 2,

2005, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for clarification, but rejected plaintiff’s

position that the court erred in dismissing his claims with prejudice. (Doc. 133.) The

court also ordered that no further motions would be granted prior to the conclusion

of this action with respect to the dismissed claims, including but not limited to

motions for clarification or reconsideration. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed the instant

motion seeking leave to amend, dated by plaintiff on November 9, 2005.

The court has inherent power to sanction parties or their attorneys for improper

conduct. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991); Roadway Express,

Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir.

2001). The imposition of sanctions under the court’s inherent authority is

discretionary. Air Separation, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 45 F.3d

288, 291 (9th Cir. 1995). The court’s “inherent power ‘extends to a full range of

litigation abuses.’” Fink, 239 F.3d at 992 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46-47).

However, in order to sanction a litigant under the court’s inherent powers, the court

must make a specific finding of “bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith.” Fink,

239 F.3d at 994. Although mere recklessness is insufficient to support sanctions

under the court’s inherent powers, “recklessness when combined with an additional

factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose” is sufficient. Id.

at 993-94. A litigant may be sanctioned for acting for an improper purpose, even if

the act was “a truthful statement or non-frivolous argument or objection.” Id. at 992.

“[I]nherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers, 501

U.S. at 44. 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims were dismissed from this action with prejudice.

The record in this action amply demonstrates that not only is plaintiff aware of that

fact but that plaintiff attempted more than once to seek one form of relief or another

from the court with respect to the dismissal of the claims. One week after plaintiff’s

latest attempt was rebuffed by the court, plaintiff served a motion seeking leave to

Case 1:01-cv-05192-SMS Document 161 Filed 09/14/06 Page 2 of 7
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28 The court takes judicial notice of the order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, filed on 1

April 19, 2006, in Buford v. Vang. (Doc. 198.)

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amend to add a claim of deliberate indifference, arising out of the same fact pattern

as that of the claims dismissed with prejudice. 

The court can discern no good faith basis for the attempt to add this claim to the

action, and plaintiff has set forth none in his motion. The filing of the instant motion

to amend appears to the court to be frivolous, abusive, and in bad faith. As plaintiff

has demonstrated in this action and in case number CV-F-00-6496-REC-SMS-P

Buford v. Vang, plaintiff is disinclined to accept the rulings of this court that do not 1

go in his favor, even in the absence of a sound basis for challenging the orders.

Plaintiff repeatedly attempts to make end-runs around the orders of this court, and is

willing to make misrepresentations or omit critical information in his effort to do so.

By this order, plaintiff is placed on notice that his motion seeking leave to amend to

add a claim for deliberate indifference appears to constitute bad faith in light of the

dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claim, with prejudice. Plaintiff shall be provided

with the opportunity to be heard and show cause why the court should not assess a

monetary fine against plaintiff for acting in bad faith, payable to the court for the

waste of its resources.

B. Rehabilitation Act Claim

Plaintiff is well aware that if he wishes to amend or supplement his pleading, he must

file a motion which “state[s] with particularity the grounds therefor,” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 7(b)(1), and must submit a proposed amended or supplemental pleading with his

motion, having been placed on notice via orders of the court in this action. (Docs.

93, 112, 122, 131.) In the instant motion, plaintiff states that he is seeking to add

only the State of California as a defendant and a deliberate indifference claim.

However, review of the proposed third amended complaint reveals that in addition

to those changes, plaintiff included a new claim brought pursuant to the

Rehabilitation Act (29 U. S. C. § 794). Given plaintiff’s awareness of the

requirement that he identify in his motion seeking leave to amend the claims and

parties he proposes to add, the court can discern no justification for plaintiff’s

inclusion of a new claim not referenced in his motion. It appears to the court that this

is another act of bad faith by plaintiff. Plaintiff shall be provided with the

opportunity to be heard and show cause why the court should not assess a monetary

fine against plaintiff for acting in bad faith, payable to the court for the waste of its

resources.

(Doc. 147, Order to Show Cause, 2:8-4:16.)

B. Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause

1. Deliberate Indifference Claim

In response to the order to show cause, plaintiff argues that certain wrongs can violate more

than one constitutional right, and the deliberate indifference claim he sought to add was not one for

violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 159, 2:7-14.) Plaintiff also argues that the claim of

deliberate indifference fell within the purview of both the procedural and substantive components

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of the Due Process Clause and the proper approach would have been to review those claims. (Id.,

2:14-19.)

Although plaintiff is correct that the deliberate indifference standard is relevant to claims

other than for violation of the Eighth Amendment, see e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d

1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing standard for damages in ADA actions), the meritoriousness

of plaintiff’s position goes no further than that. Even if the court were persuaded that plaintiff was

not attempting to make an end-run around the court’s previous orders and instead believed he could

in good faith add this new claim, which the court is not, plaintiff’s allegations of deliberate

indifference clearly and unequivocally fall within the purview of the Eighth Amendment. There has

been no misinterpretation by the court of the basis for plaintiff’s proposed claim. As a convicted

prisoner, it is the Eighth Amendment which protects plaintiff from cruel and unusual punishments,

and it is the Eighth Amendment under which vindication is sought for conditions such as those

complained of by plaintiff in his proposed third amended complaint. Plaintiff may not evade the

prior orders of this court and pursue a claim previously dismissed by omitting the term “Eighth

Amendment” and casting the claim as one for “deliberate indifference.” The allegations set forth

in the proposed third amended complaint are largely the same as those set forth in the second

amended complaint and the events giving rise to the proposed deliberate indifference claim are the

same as those set forth in the second amended complaint. It is clear that the Eighth Amendment is

the correct legal claim for plaintiff’s allegations of “deliberate indifference,” despite plaintiff’s

omission of the precise terminology and despite plaintiff’s attempt to argue otherwise. 

Plaintiff’s assertion that the court should have reviewed his claim as one brought for violation

of the Due Process Clause is of no service to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged due process claims in

previous complaints. (Docs. 1, 31, 46.) Court orders screening those complaints found that plaintiff

had stated neither a procedural nor a substantive due process claim, and plaintiff’s due process

claims were dismissed from this action with prejudice. (Docs. 26, 34, 50, 55.) Thus, citing to the

Due Process Clause as a basis and a justification for the new claim provides no protection because

it leaves plaintiff in the same position of attempting to add a claim or claims previously dismissed

with prejudice, in direct contravention of the court’s orders.

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Finally, plaintiff’s remaining arguments can be best described as rehashing issues which were

resolved in prior orders and which plaintiff was specifically instructed would not be considered

further until the conclusion of this action. (Doc. 159, Response, 2:19-5:1; Doc. 133, Order, 2:9-11.)

The court declines to address these arguments with any further specificity, as plaintiff may not at this

time reargue the merits of his Eighth Amendment claims or argue why the court erred in making the

conclusions it did in dismissing plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim.

Suffice it to say, these arguments do not serve to show that plaintiff acted in good faith in bringing

the motion to amend to add a claim of deliberate indifference. Rather, they again demonstrate

plaintiff’s inability or unwillingness to accept rulings of this court and plaintiff’s practice of

incessantly searching for loopholes to allow him to proceed as he sees fit.

2. RA Claim

With respect to adding a Rehabilitation Act claim to the proposed third amended complaint

but failing to acknowledge the addition of the claim in his motion to amend, plaintiff argues the

“inclusion of the State of California as a defendant was inadvertantly [sic] thought to automacitally

[sic] succeed a claim of the Rehabilitation Act claim by the Plaintiff thought to be analogous with

or inextricably linked to a state in violation of the (ADA) as in addition to the only way a state can

be sued absent immunity.” (Doc. 159, 1:24-2:5.) The Court can make little sense of this response.

Although ADA and RA claims are often brought together and share similarities, they are

separate and distinct legal claims. Plaintiff stated in his motion to amend that he was seeking leave

to add the State of California as a defendant and a claim of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff then

added in his proposed third amended complaint a Rehabilitation Act claim, in addition to the claim

of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff was on notice that he must identify in his motion to amend which

claims and/or parties he is seeking to add, and his proffered explanation for his failure to identify the

newly added Rehabilitation Act claim in his motion to amend is unpersuasive.

C. Conclusion

On April 20, 2006, plaintiff was notified the court was considering sanctions against him for

acting in bad faith, notified of the basis for the sanctions and the type of sanctions, and provided with

the opportunity to be heard. The court has considered plaintiff’s response to its order to show cause

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 The court takes judicial notice of its docket reflecting the actions filed by plaintiff in this district. 2

 The court takes judicial notice of court documents 5 and 7 in case number 1:03-CV-6138-OWW-LJO 3

(PC) Buford v. Ott.

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and finds that plaintiff has not set forth any good faith bases justifying his behavior. Accordingly,

the court shall recommend that plaintiff be sanctioned for acting in bad faith in the amount $250.00,

payable to the court for wasting its resources. The court is mindful that plaintiff is incarcerated and

proceeding in forma pauperis. Nevertheless, plaintiff may not continue to waste the resources of the

court by acting in bad faith and count on his in forma pauperis status to shield him against the

consequences of his behavior. The court notes that although incarcerated and proceeding pro se,

plaintiff is not an inexperienced litigator in this court. To date, plaintiff has filed twenty-two actions

in the Eastern District of California. Further, plaintiff’s litigiousness and pursuit of claims lacking 2

in merit has caused him to be subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which precludes him from proceeding

in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal unless he is in “imminent danger of serious physical

injury.” The sanction amount assessed by the court takes plaintiff’s status into consideration and 3

plaintiff may be assured that the amount assessed would be greater if not for the fact he is

incarcerated and proceeding in forma pauperis. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff be sanctioned in the amount of $250.00 for acting in bad faith in filing the

motion to amend on November 14, 2005;

2. The monetary sanction be payable to the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California and be remitted within thirty (30) days; and

3. This action be dismissed if plaintiff fails to comply with the order and remit the

monetary sanction.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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