Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03698/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03698-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAGHBIR SINGH,

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 06-3698 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging the California Board of Parole Hearings' ("BPH") August 31,

2005 decision to deny him parole. 

Per order filed on November 7, 2006, the court found that petitioner's

claim that the BPH's decision finding him not suitable for parole does not

comport with due process appears colorable under § 2254, when liberally

construed, and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause

and petitioner has filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND

On March 6, 1987, petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder in

Fresno County superior court and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15

years to life in state prison with the possibility of parole. 

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Petitioner was denied parole until August 5, 2004, at which time the BPH

found him suitable for parole and granted him a parole date. Shortly thereafter,

the governor reversed the BPH's decision, however.

Petitioner received another parole suitability hearing on August 31, 2005;

but unfortunately for him, the BPH found him not suitable for parole and denied

him a subsequent hearing for one year.

Petitioner challenged the BPH's August 31, 2005 decision in the state

superior, appellate and supreme courts. After the Supreme Court of California

denied his petition for review on May 10, 2006, the instant federal petition for a

writ of habeas corpus followed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas

petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even

when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction.” 

White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this

court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a California state

inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any

claim on the merits: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential

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standard, federal habeas relief will not be granted “simply because [this] court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining

whether the state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPH's August 31,

2005 decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent

hearing for one year, on the ground that the decision does not comport with due

process. Petitioner claims that the BPH’s decision is not supported by some

evidence in the record having an indicia of reliability. Petitioner also claims that

the Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),

and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), preclude the BPH from using

factors not specifically found by a jury to determine parole suitability; that the

state's parole regulations are unconstitutionally vague; and that the "someevidence" standard is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses,

or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

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incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In making this determination, the

board must consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past

criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including behavior

before, during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

California's parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due

process protections. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128

(9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). It

matters not that, as is the case here, a parole release date has not been set for the

inmate because “[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole

date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s due process rights require that "some evidence" support the

parole board's decision finding him unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125

(holding that the “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole decisions

in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d

at 904 (same). This "some evidence" standard is minimally stringent and ensures

that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining

whether this requirement is satisfied “does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence.” Id. at 455-56 (quoted in Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128). 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board's

decision have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion,

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306 F.3d at 904. Relevant in this inquiry “is whether the prisoner was afforded

an opportunity to appear before, and present evidence to, the board.” Morales v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on

other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). In sum, if the parole board's determination

of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence,

with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428

F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record shows that the BPH panel afforded petitioner and his counsel

an opportunity to speak and present their case at the hearing, gave them time to

review petitioner’s central file, allowed them to present relevant documents and

provided them with a reasoned decision in denying parole. 

The panel concluded that petitioner "is not suitable for parole and would

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or threat to public safety if he was

released from prison." Aug. 31, 2005 Hr’g Tr. at 46 (Resp’t Ex. 5). The panel

explained that it found that the offense was carried out in an especially cruel and

callous manner, demonstrating an "exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering" because petitioner argued with his wife over her infidelity and a

broken lunch engagement and, in front of their four-year-old son, called her a

"hooker," grabbed her by the hair, pulled her down to the floor and slit her throat. 

Id. at 46-47. He then stabbed her 19 times, including a deep stab wound to the

heart. The panel found that the motive for the crime was inexplicable or very

trivial in relation to the offense – petitioner was angry at his wife for her

infidelity and threat to leave him. Id. at 48. Petitioner had no previous history of

violence, which the panel found "makes this crime particularly horrific." Id.

The panel noted that petitioner's correctional counselor opined that he

would pose a moderate degree of threat to the public if released from prison and

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would benefit from maintaining a disciplinary-free record and participating in

self-therapy. See id. at 22-23; May 2005 Life Prisoner Evaluation Report at 4

(Resp't Ex. 3); June 2004 Life Prisoner Evaluation Report at 5-6 (Resp't Ex. 3). 

It also noted that the psychologist evaluator opined that petitioner's potential for

violence was no more than that of the average citizen in the community;

however, the evaluator expressed concern that petitioner minimized his

responsibility for the murder by blaming his wife. See Aug. 31, 2005 Hr'g Tr. at

25, 26, 49; Dec. 2002 Psychological Evaluation at 7-8 (Resp't Ex. 4). The panel

took particular issue with this observation.

After questioning petitioner extensively about his understanding of the

nature and magnitude of the offense, the panel noted:

. . . Mr. Singh you minimized your role and responsibility in the

commitment offense by blaming your wife for infidelity and

substance abuse. You criticize the accuracy of the details in the

court transcript. In the fairness of the proceedings. You claim you

blacked out before the victim was stabbed and only regained

consciousness after the incident. You wrote a bold statement to the

former chairwoman of the Board of Prison Terms, quote of you lie

everybody believe it, if you tell the truth nobody believe it. 

Apparently motivated to convince the board of the accuracy of your

self-serving version of the commitment offense. However your AA

participation while insisting you are not an alcoholic tarnishes your

credibility. You seem completely unwilling to come to grips with

the commitment offense . . . . This lack of insight combined with

questionable credibility prevents me from concluding that your

release would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.

Id. at 50-51. 

The panel commended petitioner for remaining disciplinary-free and

receiving exceptional work reports from the clothing room where he works in

prison; however, the panel concluded that "these positive aspects of your

behavior doesn't [sic] outweigh the factors of unsuitability in this particular crime

which was horrendous, callous." Id. at 50. "We feel Mr. Singh lacks insight into

the crime . . . ." Id.

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The state superior court upheld the decision of the BPH and the state

appellate and supreme courts summarily affirmed. The superior court reviewed

the record presented by petitioner and concluded that it "does not establish any

error warranting the requested relief." In re Dushun White, No. 06-BH002801,

slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2004) (Resp't Ex. 6). By citing In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (2002); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir.

2003); and Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2005), the court indicated

that the BHP's decision was supported by some evidence in the record.

The state court's rejection of petitioner's due process claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Hill standard, or was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPH’s

August 31, 2005 decision to deny petitioner parole is supported by some

evidence in the record and that evidence bears some indicia of reliability. See,

e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial of parole based on gravity of

offense and psychiatric reports); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of

parole based solely on gravity of offense and conduct prior to imprisonment);

Morales, 16 F.3d at 1005 (upholding denial of parole based on criminal history,

cruel nature of offense, and need for further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry

under Hill is simply "whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the [BPT]." Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56

(emphasis added). There is – petitioner murdered his wife in an especially

heinous, atrocious and cruel manner, slitting her throat in front of their four-yearold son and stabbing her 19 times thereafter; the counselor's report was not

completely positive, opining that petitioner posed a moderate risk of threat to the

public if released; the psychologist's report raised concerns about petitioner's

blaming his wife for her murder; and petitioner exhibited a lack of insight into the

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crime during questioning by the panel. Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c) &

(d) (listing circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole and

circumstances tending to show suitability). It is not up to this court to “reweigh

the evidence." Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994). The panel's

legitimate concern with petitioner's lack of insight into the horrific murder of his

wife constitutes some evidence under Hill. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (inquiry

under Hill is simply whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the BPH); see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

2402(d) (3) (understanding of the nature and magnitude of the offense is a factor

tending to show suitability).

Petitioner also claims that the Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004), preclude the BPH from using factors not specifically found by a jury to

determine parole suitability; that the state's parole regulations are

unconstitutionally vague; and that the "some-evidence" standard is contrary to

clearly established Supreme Court precedent. None of the claims have merit.

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. The Court later clarified in Blakely that the “statutory

maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge could

impose based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the

defendant; that is, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the sentence the judge

could impose after finding additional facts, but rather is the maximum he or she

could impose without any additional findings. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04. The

Apprendi rule does not apply here because the decision to deny parole neither

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increases the maximum penalty for second degree murder (15 years to life) nor

increases petitioner's sentence (15 years to life). Regardless, federal habeas relief

is unavailable because Apprendi and its progeny are not clearly established

Supreme Court precedent in the parole suitability context. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

Petitioned argues that the phrase "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"

in California Code of Regulations title 15 section 2404(c)(1) is unconstitutionally

vague. But he fails to acknowledge that the language following this phrase

provides a list of five factors to consider when determining whether a crime is

especially "heinous, atrocious or cruel," including the presence of multiple

victims, the abuse or mutilation of the victim and a trivial motive for the crime. 

See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E). The term "especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel," as further limited by five detailed factors/sub-definitions, is

not constitutionally vague. Cf. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 470-78 (1993)

(finding Idaho death penalty statute citing as an aggravating factor crimes carried

out in an "utter disregard for human life" not constitutionally vague because

limiting construction had been adopted which defined factor as those crimes

demonstrating "the utmost disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless

slayer"). The state courts' rejection of petitioner's claim was not an objectively

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner argues that the application of the "some evidence" standard to

parole suitability decisions is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

Supreme Court precedent. Not so. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the

"some evidence" standard identified by the Supreme Court in Hill is clearly

established federal law in the parole context. See Irons v. Carey, No. 05-15275,

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2007 WL 2027359, at *3 (9th Cir. July 13, 2007); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29. No

Ninth Circuit precedent, much less Supreme Court precedent, even suggests a

more stringent standard in the parole suitability context. Accord Nikooseresht v.

Curry, No. C 06-4357 MHP (PR), 2007 WL 2088558, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 18,

2007) (rejecting petitioner's claim that the state must prove his unsuitability for

parole by a preponderance of the evidence).

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 5, 2007 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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