Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02211/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeffery Bruce Teller,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents

CV-09-2211-PHX-JWS (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Florence,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October

21, 2009 (Doc. 1). On March 25, 2010, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 11). 

Petitioner filed a Reply on April 16, 2010 (Doc. 12 ).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On March 16, 2005, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on

six counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, based upon his downloading images of child

pornography. (Exhibit A, Indictment; Exhibit D Presentence Investigation.) (Exhibits to the

Answer (Doc. 11) are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) Petitioner eventually entered into

a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit B) wherein he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of

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1

 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01 was renumbered in 2009 to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-70.

Ariz. Sess. Laws 2008, Ch. 301 §§ 17,29, eff. Jan. 1, 2009. For consistency, the undersigned

will reference the statute as § 13-604.01.

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attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, in exchange for dismissal of other charges, and a

stipulation to a presumptive sentence of 10 years on the first count, and lifetime probation

on the second. The plea specified that the offenses were both “committed on or about

December 1, 2004.” (Exhibit B, Plea Agreement at 1.) 

The plea was accepted (Exhibit C, M.E. 8/4/06), and on September 15, 2006,

Petitioner was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. (Exhibit E, Sentence

9/15/06.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On December 15, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit

F). Appointed counsel eventually filed a Notice (Exhibit G) of inability to find an issue for

review. Counsel was ordered to stay on as advisory counsel and Petitioner was granted leave

to file a pro per PCR petition. (Exhibit H, M.E. 10/17/07.) 

On December 21, 2007, Petitioner filed his Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief (Exhibit I), arguing that the Arizona statute on dangerous crimes against children,

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01,1

 failed to specify a sentence for an attempted offense of sexual

exploitation. He also filed a form Petition (Exhibit I), with a laundry list of claims checked

off, including ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawfully induced plea, double jeopardy,

other constitutional violations, newly discovery evidence, lack of jurisdiction, illegal

sentence, and “failure to notify Petitioner of the right to know the accusation.” In his Reply

(Exhibit K), Petitioner complained that he had been sentenced: (1) for committing a

“dangerous crime against children” when his offense was designated “non-dangerous,” and

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(2) under the statute referring to “preparatory” offenses when he pled to an “attempt.”

Petitioner argues that these distinctions denied him fair notice of the proscribed conduct. The

PCR Court summarily dismissed the Petition, finding that Petitioner’s sentences were

justified by his guilty pleas, and legal under the applicable statutes. (Exhibit L, J.E. 4/15/08.)

Petitioner eventually filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit P), arguing that his

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights were violated because the statute referred only

to preparatory offenses and he pled to an attempt. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily

denied review. (Exhibit R, Order 8/14/09.)

Petitioner sought (Exhibit S, Motion) and obtained an extension until October 19,

2009 to file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. (Exhibit T, Order

9/10/09.) None was filed. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5; Answer, Doc. 11 at 4; Exhibit U, Docket.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 21, 2009 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s

Petition asserts a single ground for relief, “that his due process rights were violated because

he [was] sentenced under an unconstitutionally vague statute.” (Order 11/10/09, Doc. 5 at

1.) Petitioner argues that while Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01 provided sentences for

preparatory offenses and completed offenses, it did not provide a sentence for attempted

offenses for sexual exploitation of a minor.

Response - On March 25, 2010 Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) (Doc.

11 ). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim is without merit because under Arizona law

an “attempt” is encompassed within the term “preparatory offense.” 

Reply - On April 16, 2010 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 12). Petitioner argues that

the judicial glosses on the phrase “preparatory” do not constitute fair notice of what is

included in that term.

/ /

/ /

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

Fair Notice Requirement - In Rose v. Locke, the Supreme Court gave a succinct

summary of the fair notice requirement of the Due Process Clause.

It is settled that the fair-warning requirement embodied in the Due

Process Clause prohibits the States from holding an individual

“criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably

understand to be proscribed....All the Due Process Clause requires is

that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves

so as to avoid that which is forbidden.

423 U.S. 48, 49-50 (1975) (finding prohibition of “crimes against nature” was not too vague).

Application to Sentencing - Here, Petitioner does not contend that he did not have

fair notice that his conduct was prohibited. Rather, he simply complains that he did not have

fair notice of the penalty to be exacted upon violation. 

The undersigned cannot find, and Petitioner does not cite, any Supreme Court cases

applying the vagueness doctrine under the Due Process Clause to sentencing statutes.

Ordinarily, that would mean that this Court would simply have to divine whether that

doctrine had been extended by the Ninth Circuit, or otherwise whether it should be. This

case, however, is subject to the limitations of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act (AEDPA), including the limitations on habeas relief in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Rather,

under that statute, this Court may grant habeas relief to Petitioner only if it can conclude that

the state court’s denial of relief “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), clearly established law

as determined by [the Supreme] Court ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the

Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’ ” Yarborough

v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-661 (2004) (citations omitted).

Death Penalty Cases - Constitutional concerns with vagueness have been applied by

the Supreme Court to criminal sentencing statutes, at least insofar as they concern standards

for imposing the death penalty. See eg. Broadway v. Cate, 588 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2009);

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990). However, in that context, the concern is not simply

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with fair notice, but is “rooted in the principle that ‘ ‘[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that

permit this unique penalty to be ... wantonly and ... freakishly imposed.’ ’ ” Lewis, 497 U.S.

at 774. 

In Maynard v. Cartwright, the Court considered the distinction between Eighth

Amendment vagueness claims and Due Process vagueness claims, and observed:

The difficulty with the State's argument is that it presents a Due Process

Clause approach to vagueness and fails to recognize the rationale of our

cases construing and applying the Eighth Amendment. Objections to

vagueness under the Due Process Clause rest on the lack of notice, and

hence may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons

would know that their conduct is at risk. Vagueness challenges to

statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light

of the facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied

basis. Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances

defined in capital punishment statutes are analyzed under the Eighth

Amendment and characteristically assert that the challenged provision

fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the

death penalty and as a result leaves them and appellate courts with the

kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman v.

Georgia, [408 U.S. 238 (1972)].

486 U.S. 356, 361-362 (1988). Because Petitioner’s claim is presented under the Due

Process Clause, and not the Eighth Amendment, these death penalty cases do not apply.

Supreme Court Dicta - The Supreme Court has not been wholly silent on due process

limitations on sentencing provisions. In U.S. v. Batchelder, the Court observed that: “So too,

vague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with

sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute.” U. S. v. Batchelder,

442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). However, the cases cited by Batchelder in support of this

observation were either statutory construction (and not due process) cases, see United States

v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948); and United States v. Brown, 333 .S. 18 (1948), or dealt with

a standards-less authorization to impose costs on an acquitted defendant, Giaccio v. State of

Pa., 382 U.S. 399 (1966). 

Moreover, because the Court concluded that the subject statutes “unambiguously

specify the activity proscribed and the penalties available upon conviction,” it was not

required to determine whether a constitutional question was posed. 442 U.S. at 123. But see

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U.S. v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1025 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Batchelder for the

proposition that “[s]entencing provisions may violate due process if they do not afford fair

notice of the penalty that applies to the forbidden conduct,” but finding the sentencing statute

under consideration clear); U.S. v. Gallagher, 99 F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1996) (same).

Thus, the undersigned must conclude that Batchelder’s language extending the fair

notice requirement of due process to sentencing statutes was dicta. 

Ninth Circuit Recognition of Lack of Supreme Court Authority - In U.S. v. Johnson,

the Ninth Circuit quoted Batchelder but observed that “[u]nconstitutional vagueness

challenges to the Sentencing Guidelines have been questioned as theoretically unsound.”

130 F.3d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 159-60 (8th Cir.

1990) (vagueness doctrine does not mandate sentencing guidelines). The court also observed

that the Ninth Circuit has “countenanced such challenges in deference to the Supreme

Court’s declaration” in Batchelder, but ultimately concluded that the provision under

consideration was not vague. 130 F.3d at 1354.

As recently as 2006, the Ninth Circuit was required to simply assume “that a

vagueness argument focused exclusively on sentencing, rather than on criminal conduct

giving rise to the sentence, is cognizable.” U.S. v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2006).

In 2008, the Ninth Circuit observed “[n]either this court nor the Supreme Court has identified

the level of specificity required for a parole release statute to avoid impermissible

vagueness.” Hess v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 914 (9th

Cir. 2008). The Hess court went on to assume arguendo that “parole release statutes must

meet vagueness standards similar to those applicable to death penalty statutes,” and found

that the statute in question met the standard. Id. Similarly, in Bradway v. Cate, 588 F.3d 990

(9th Cir. 2009), the Court noted the inapplicability of the Eighth Amendment vagueness

jurisprudence to a life sentence, and concluded that no Supreme Court cases had addressed

due process vagueness claims based upon a failure to narrow offenses subject to more severe

penalties less than the death penalty. Id. at 992-993. 

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned must conclude that no “holdings, as

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2

 In contrast, ex post facto clarifications of the statue will not avoid vagueness

concerns. “There can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result

not only from vague statutory language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive

judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language.” Bouie v. City of Columbia 378

U.S. 347, 352 (1964).

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opposed to the dicta” of Supreme Court decisions extend the vagueness doctrine to

sentencing statutes, and consequently even if this Court could find a due process violation,

Petitioner would not be entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Statute Not Vague - Even without the limitations of 2254(d)(1), this Court could not

grant Petitioner relief, because the statute was not vague.

 Petitioner complains that the sentence applied to him could only apply if his offense

qualified as a “preparatory offense”, the Arizona statute does not define a “preparatory

offense,” and his plea was simply to an “attempted” offense. Petitioner claims a “non-legal

person of reasonable intelligence” could not discern the connection between an “attempt” and

a “preparatory offense” within this statute. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 2.) However, the vagueness

of a statute is not judged in a vacuum of a person with only the bare language of a statute to

consult. Rather, it is judged with the judicial gloss that existed at the time of Petitioner’s

crimes.2

But this prohibition against excessive vagueness does not invalidate

every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted

with greater precision. Many statutes will have some inherent

vagueness, for "(i)n most English words and phrases there lurk

uncertainties." Even trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult

legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say

with any certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid. 

Rose, 423 U.S. at 49-50.

The relevant provision, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01(L)(1) provided:

A dangerous crime against children is in the first degree if it is a

completed offense and is in the second degree if it is a preparatory

offense, except attempted first degree murder is a dangerous crime

against children in the first degree.

No explicit definition is given in § 13-604.01 for the term “preparatory offense.”

However, at least as early as 2000, the Arizona Courts had recognized “attempt” as a

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3

 The PCR court identified the sentence as being under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

604.01(J), not subsection (I). (Exhibit M, M.E. 4/15/08 at 1.) Subsection (J) of the pre-2007

statute referenced prior convictions. Subsection (I) had been renumbered to subsection (J)

by Ariz. Sess. Laws 2007, Ch 248, eff. June 13, 2007. Thus, it appears that the PCR court

simply erred by referencing the subsection as it had been re-labeled by the time of that

court’s decision in 2007. 

4

 Respondents do not argue and the undersigned does not address whether this

explicit plea to the very thing Petitioner now challenges resulted in a waiver of Petitioner’s

present claim.

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preparatory offense for purposes of § 13-604.01(L)(1). 

The legislature specifically classified preparatory offenses such as

attempt, other than attempted first degree murder, as dangerous crimes

against children in the second degree provided the completed offense

would have been a dangerous crime against children in the first degree.

State v. Carlisle, 198 Ariz. 203, 207, 8 P.3d 391, 395-396 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2000). 

Moreover, Chapter 10 of the Arizona Criminal Code (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1001 et

seq.) was entitled “Preparatory offenses”, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1001 (2004) in particular

defined the crime of “attempt.” 

Further, Petitioner was sentenced for committing “attempted sexual exploitation of

a minor and a dangerous crime against children in the second degree”, a “Class 3 Felony”

(Exhibit E, Sentence at 2.) Sexual exploitation is covered under subsection D of that statute,

and subsection (I) governs “a dangerous crime against children in the second degree pursuant

to subsection C or D.” Subsection (I) begins with the reference “Notwithstanding chapter

10 of this title”, referencing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1001 et seq., which as noted above

references attempt as a preparatory offense.3

Also, Petitioner’s plea agreement specifically referenced that he was pleading guilty

to “a Dangerous Crime Against Children in the 2nd Degree in violation of A.R.S. ...13-

1001...13-604.01.”4

 (Exhibit B, Plea Agreement at 1.) The reference to “in the 2nd Degree”

plainly hinged upon the application of § 13-604.01(L)(1) to “preparatory” offenses.

Petitioner proffers nothing peculiar about his offense that would, in light of these

statutory provisions and the pre-existing judicial gloss on them, leave any ambiguity about

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whether his attempted sexual exploitation qualified as a preparatory, second degree offense

under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01(I).

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth

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herein, the constitutional claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed October 21, 2009 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this Report

& Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3), unless otherwise

permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation shall not exceed ten

(10) pages. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or recommendations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc),

and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins

v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

DATED: March 23, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\09-2211-001r RR 11 02 04 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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