Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-99-04029/USCOURTS-ca8-99-04029-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-4021

___________

Republican Party of Minnesota, an *

association; Indian Asian American *

Republicans of Minnesota, an *

association; Republican Seniors, an *

association; Young Republican League *

of Minnesota, a Minnesota nonprofit *

corporation; Minnesota College *

Republicans, an association, *

*

Plaintiffs - Appellants, *

* Appeals from the United States

Gregory F. Wersal, individually, * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Plaintiff, *

*

Cheryl L. Wersal, individually; Mark E. *

Wersal, individually; Corwin C. Hulbert,*

individually, *

*

Plaintiffs - Appellants, *

*

Campaign for Justice, an association, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

Minnesota African American Republic *

Council, an association, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

Muslim Republicans, an association; *

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-2-

Michael Maxim, individually; Kevin J. *

Kolosky, individually, *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

v. *

*

Suzanne White, in her capacity as *

Chairperson of the Minnesota Board of *

Judicial Standards, or her successor; *

Edward J. Cleary, in his capacity as *

Director of the Minnesota Office of *

Lawyers Professional Responsibility, or *

his successor; Charles E. Lundberg, *

in his capacity as Chair of the *

Minnesota Lawyers Professional *

Responsibility Board, or his *

successor, *

*

Defendants - Appellees, *

*

Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of Appellant, *

*

The Minnesota State Bar Association, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of Appellee. *

*

___________

No. 99-4025

___________

Republican Party of Minnesota, an *

association; Indian Asian American *

Republicans of Minnesota, an *

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-3-

association; Republican Seniors, an *

association; Young Republican League *

of Minnesota, a Minnesota nonprofit *

corporation; Minnesota College *

Republicans, an association; Minnesota *

African American Republic Council, an *

association; Cheryl L. Wersal, *

individually; Mark E. Wersal, *

individually; Corwin C. Hulbert, *

individually; Gregory F. Wersal, *

individually; Campaign for Justice, an *

association; Muslim Republicans, an *

association, *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

Michael Maxim, individually, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

Kevin J. Kolosky, individually, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. *

*

Suzanne White, in her capacity as *

Chairperson of the Minnesota Board of *

Judicial Standards, or her successor; *

Edward J. Cleary, in his capacity as *

Director of the Minnesota Office of *

Lawyers Professional Responsibility, or *

his successor; Charles E. Lundberg, in *

his capacity as Chair of the Minnesota *

Lawyers Professional Responsibility *

Board, or his successor, *

*

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-4-

Defendants - Appellees, *

*

The Minnesota State Bar Association, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of Appellee. *

___________

No. 99-4029

___________

Republican Party of Minnesota, an *

association; Indian Asian American *

Republicans of Minnesota, an *

association; Republican Seniors, an *

association; Young Republican League *

of Minnesota, a Minnesota nonprofit *

corporation; Minnesota College *

Republicans, an association, *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

Gregory F. Wersal, individually, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

Cheryl L. Wersal, individually; Mark E. *

Wersal, individually; Corwin C. Hulbert,*

individually; *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

Campaign for Justice, an association; *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

Minnesota African American Republic *

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Council, an association; Muslim *

Republicans, an association; Michael *

Maxim, individually; *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

Kevin J. Kolosky, individually, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Suzanne White, in her capacity as *

Chairperson of the Minnesota Board of *

Judicial Standards, or her successor; *

Edward J. Cleary, in his capacity as *

director of the Minnesota Office of *

Lawyers Professional Responsibility, or *

his successor; Charles E. Lundberg, in *

his capacity as Chair of the Minnesota *

Lawyers Professional Responsibility *

Board, or his successor, *

*

Defendants - Appellees, *

*

The Minnesota State Bar Association, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: December 10, 2002

Filed: March 16, 2004

___________

Before McMILLIAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

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___________

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), the Supreme

Court reversed the grant of summary judgment against Gregory Wersal and the other

plaintiffs in this suit on their claim that the "announce" clause of Canon 5 of the

Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct violated their First Amendment rights. The

Supreme Court remanded to us for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Id. at 788. We conclude that the Supreme Court's opinion requires us to remand to

the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Wersal and the other plaintiffs on

their "announce" clause claim. We remand to the district court for consideration of

whether its disposition of the plaintiffs' claims based on restriction of partisan

activities is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. Finally, we remand to the

district court for entry of judgment in favor of Suzanne White and the other

defendants on plaintiffs' personal solicitation clause claim. 

We stated the facts of this case in our earlier opinion, Republican Party of

Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), and need not belabor them here,

except to say that Wersal was a candidate for election to the Minnesota Supreme

Court, who challenged several provisions of Canon 5. Canon 5 prohibits candidates

for judicial office from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues,

from engaging in specific partisan political activities, and from personally soliciting

campaign contributions. Wersal, together with other plaintiffs associated with his

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Other plaintiffs associated with Wersal were his campaign committee and

Republican Party members Cheryl Wersal, Mark Wersal, and Corwin Hulbert. Later,

Michael Maxim, who was also a member of the Minnesota Republican Party, and

Kevin Kolosky, who was another candidate for judicial office, joined as plaintiffs. 

2

The affiliated organizations were the Indian Asian American Republicans, the

Republican Seniors, the Young Republicans League of Minnesota, and the Minnesota

College Republicans. The Minnesota African American Republican Council and the

Muslim Republicans were later added as plaintiffs. 

3

Named as defendants were the Director of the Minnesota Office of Lawyers

Professional Responsibility and the Chair of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional

Responsibility Board. The Professional Responsibility Board supervises the Office

of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, which investigates and prosecutes ethical

violations by lawyer candidates for judicial office. 

4

The actual defendant named was the Chairperson of the Minnesota Board of

Judicial Standards. The Board of Judicial Standards enforces the Minnesota Code of

Judicial Conduct against judges. 

-7-

campaign1

 and the state Republican party and affiliated organizations,2 filed this suit

against the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board3

 and the Minnesota

Board of Judicial Standards4

 to enjoin enforcement of Canon 5. The district court

granted summary judgment to the Lawyers Board and the Judicial Board, holding that

each challenged provision of Canon 5 survived First Amendment scrutiny.

Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp.2d 967 (D. Minn. 1999). Wersal and

the other plaintiffs appealed. 

We affirmed the district court with regard to each of the challenged provisions

of Canon 5. 247 F.3d at 885. We subjected the provisions of Canon 5 to strict

scrutiny, asking whether the restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling

state interest. Id. at 864. We held that the state had compelling interests in protecting

the independence and quality of its judiciary, and in preserving public confidence in

the judiciary's independence. Id. at 864-68. We held that the state had shown the

required quantum of evidence that each of those interests was threatened by the

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practices that Canon 5 regulated. Id. at 868-72 (partisan activity restrictions); 876-81

(announce clause); 883-84 (solicitation restrictions). We then held that each of the

challenged restrictions was narrowly tailored to serve the interests of judicial

independence and quality. Id. at 872-76 (partisan activity restrictions); 881-83

(announce clause); 884-85 (solicitation restrictions).

Wersal and the other plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari presenting three

questions:

1. Whether the provision of the Minnesota Code of Judicial

Conduct that prohibits a candidate for elective judicial office from

"announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political issues"

unconstitutionally impinges on the freedom of speech as guaranteed by

the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

2. Whether the severe burdens imposed by various provisions of

the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct unconstitutionally impinge on

the right of political parties to endorse candidates for elective judicial

office in violation of the freedom of speech, freedom of association, and

equal protection of law as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

3. Whether the provision of the Minnesota Code of Judicial

Conduct that forbids a candidate for elective judicial office from

attending or speaking at any political party gathering–while permitting

such a candidate to attend or speak at gatherings of all other

organizations–unconstitutionally impinges on the freedom of speech,

freedom of association, and equal protection of the law as guaranteed by

the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The petition did not include a question relating to the solicitation restrictions. The

Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the first question presented, the challenge

to the announce clause. 

Justice Scalia's opinion for the Supreme Court asked first whether the Boards

had identified a compelling state interest to be served by the announce clause. 536

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U.S. at 775-84. Justice Scalia considered the terms "judicial independence" and

"impartiality" to be insufficiently refined, and he divined three distinct meanings for

"impartiality." First, the "root meaning" of impartiality "is the lack of bias for or

against either party to the proceeding." Id. at 775 (emphasis in original). Although

Justice Scalia implicitly approved this meaning of impartiality as a compelling state

interest, he concluded that the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve that

interest and in fact was "barely tailored to serve that interest at all, inasmuch as it

does not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather speech for or

against particular issues." Id. at 776 (emphasis in original) 

The second possible meaning of impartiality was "lack of preconception in

favor of or against a particular legal view." Id. at 777 (emphasis in original). Justice

Scalia not only rejected this concept as a compelling state interest, but he considered

this sort of impartiality undesirable in a judge. Id. ("avoiding judicial preconceptions

on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable"). As defined by Justice Scalia, this

second meaning of impartiality refers not to a candidate's public actions, but to his or

her thoughts. An important point that is not explicit in the Supreme Court opinion

is that a restriction on a judicial candidate's speech would be patently ineffective in

regulating the candidate's thoughts, even if the state wanted to do so.

The third possible meaning of impartiality was "open-mindedness" or

willingness to consider all arguments. "This sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee

each litigant, not an equal chance to win the legal points in the case, but at least some

chance of doing so." Id. (emphasis in original). This "open-mindedness" meaning

of impartiality appears to be intimately related to the second meaning, lack of

preconceptions; whereas the second meaning refers to the judge's view of the

substantive issue, the third meaning refers to the judge's attitude toward reconsidering

his or her view of the substantive issue. Justice Scalia reserved judgment on whether

this third sort of impartiality in a judicial candidate was desirable (not to mention

compelling) because he considered the announce clause to be so ineffective a way to

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achieve "open-mindedness" that this could not have been the state's purpose in

adopting the clause. Id. at 780 ("As a means of pursuing the objective of openmindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully

underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous."). 

Having rejected the state interests offered by the Boards to justify Canon 5, the

Court held: "The Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibiting

candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal and

political issues violates the First Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of

summary judgment to respondents and remand the case for proceedings consistent

with this opinion." Id. at 788.

The first issue we must decide is what instructions to issue with regard to the

announce clause. Then, we must decide whether to instruct the district court to

reconsider its grant of summary judgment with regard to the partisan activity and

solicitation clauses.

I.

The Supreme Court's reversal of the grant of summary judgment for the

defendants on the announce clause issue technically leaves open the question of what

to do with the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs ask us

to remand with instructions to enter judgment for them, and the Boards do not dispute

the propriety of this request. Therefore, the district court should enter judgment for

the plaintiffs on Count II of their Second Amended Complaint. 

II.

Wersal and the other plaintiffs also ask us to reverse the entry of judgment for

the Boards and to order entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the other four

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The dissent argues that we err in taking into consideration the law of the case

doctrine in determining the disposition of issues as to which the Supreme Court did

not grant certiorari and which are not discussed in the Supreme Court's opinion in

White. In our opinion, we conclude that we must reconsider those issues to determine

if the reasoning of our earlier disposition survives the new Supreme Court decision.

The dissent takes exception to the words "clearly demonstrates the law of the case is

wrong," (quoted in Madison, 330 F.3d at 1059). This phrase does not insulate a

purely legal question from de novo review. The word "clearly" in this context does

not refer to "clear error" review, which applies to questions of fact, Anderson v. City

of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985), but to whether the new decision actually

has a bearing on other issues in this case that were not directly addressed by the

superior tribunal. We do not "defer" to our earlier opinion, as the dissent contends.

Where the Supreme Court's reasoning casts doubt on our earlier conclusions, we

revisit them, see section IV, infra; where the earlier reasoning is not inconsistent with

White, there is no reason to alter it, see section V, infra.

-11-

counts of their complaint, none of which were before the Supreme Court. The Boards

argue that we do not have jurisdiction over the issues as to which the plaintiffs did not

seek certiorari (solicitation clause) or as to which the Supreme Court denied certiorari

(partisan activity clauses). 

When the Supreme Court remands a case to us, we must determine whether the

law of the case doctrine applies to issues the Supreme Court did not decide. See

Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051, 1059 (8th Cir. 2003). The law of the case

doctrine dictates that "when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should

continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." Kinman

v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks

omitted). The doctrine does not apply "when an intervening decision from a superior

tribunal clearly demonstrates the law of the case is wrong." Id. (quotation marks

omitted); Madison, 330 F.3d at 1059; Morris v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 988 F.2d

50, 52 (8th Cir. 1993). Where the Supreme Court's reasoning in disposing of one

issue in a case affects the validity of our earlier disposition of other issues in the same

case, we will reconsider those issues on remand.5

 See Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v.

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Adams, 204 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 2000). The law of the case doctrine is

discretionary, not jurisdictional. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)

("Law of the case directs a court's discretion, it does not limit the tribunal's power.");

Conrod v. Davis, 120 F.3d 92, 95 (8th Cir. 1997). 

The cases the Boards cite to show we lack power to reconsider the partisan

activity and solicitation clauses are inapposite. In Patterson v. City of Newport News,

364 F.2d 816, 817-18 (4th Cir. 1966), plaintiffs sought to relitigate in federal court

a condemnation that had been litigated to final judgment in state court. This was

barred as a matter of issue preclusion, not law of the case. In Fleming v. Lake Delton

Dev. Co., 267 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1959), the court did not decide whether res

judicata or law of the case applied, but declined to reconsider the same arguments and

the same issues the appellant had already fully litigated. There was no suggestion

that the law had changed between the first disposition and the later appeal, as the

plaintiffs argue happened in this case. 

The Boards also argue that the Supreme Court's remand limited our

jurisdiction, citing Hermann v. Brownell, 274 F.2d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1960).

Hermann "stands only for the proposition that upon remand the jurisdiction of an

appellate court is limited to those particularized points which were assigned for

consideration, if the mandate was in that form." Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554

F.2d 790, 793-94 (7th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). When a remand does not contain

such a limitation, "[o]ther issues not within the compass of the mandate are thereby

not precluded from consideration." Id. at 794. The remand in this case stated:

The Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibiting

candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed

legal and political issues violates the First Amendment. Accordingly,

we reverse the grant of summary judgment to respondents and remand

the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

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536 U.S. at 788. This is the language of a general remand, Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d

35, 42 (1st Cir. 1998), and it does not contain an express or implicit limitation on our

jurisdiction of issues that were before us prior to the grant of certiorari, id.

The question before us, then, is whether the Supreme Court's decision

demonstrates that the law applied by this court or by the district court in deciding the

partisan activity or solicitation clause issues was wrong.

III.

In our examination of the partisan activity restrictions, we did not suppose that

the restrictions were meant to avoid judicial bias for or against particular parties to

the suit, as for instance, if the Republican Party were an actual party to litigation

before a judge who was endorsed by the Party or who had announced membership in

the Party during his election campaign. Recusal of the judge in such a situation is an

obvious less restrictive alternative. Therefore, it does not appear that the partisan

activity restrictions would be narrowly tailored to avoid impartiality in Justice Scalia's

first sense of the word. 

Nor did we, in our earlier opinion, consider whether the partisan activity

restrictions tended to avoid election of judges who harbored preconceptions about

legal issues and to encourage election of judges whose brains were a tabula rasa

devoid of experience or opinion. Therefore, we did not base our decision upon

vindication of the state's interest in impartiality in Justice Scalia's second sense of the

word. 

Instead, we focused on what we can now recognize as impartiality in Justice

Scalia's third sense of the word: open-mindedness. Moreover, we focused not on lack

of open-mindedness in the sense of obstinacy or dogmatism, which are subjective

states of mind, but rather on the objectively ascertainable threat to open-mindedness

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Our focus on the effect of a candidate's obligation to and dependence on a

political party explains why we arrive at a different result than the Northern District

of New York, which recently invalidated a portion of the New York Code of Judicial

Conduct that prohibited judicial candidates from participating in partisan political

activity except for their own campaigns. Spargo v. New York State Comm'n on

Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp.2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated for abstention, 351

F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003). That court opined: "The only conceivable connection

[between the prohibition and judicial independence] would be that engaging in

political activity, whether partisan or nonpartisan, would influence a judge's decision

toward or against the view espoused, whether it be on an issue of law or as to a party

to a proceeding." Id. at 88. Although Spargo's reasoning is quite brief, it appears to

conclude that the only possible interests served by the code sections are either lack

of preconceptions as to issues of law, which the Supreme Court disapproved in

White, or lack of bias as to a party, which could be better addressed by recusal. Id.

at 88-89. This reasoning ignores the threat to the interest in open-mindedness

resulting from the reality or the appearance of obligation to and dependence on

political parties. Spargo may have omitted discussion of this interest because New

York, unlike Minnesota, has partisan judicial elections, N.Y. Election Law § 6-106

(McKinney 2003), and one could argue that it makes little sense to prohibit partisan

political activity by judicial candidates where the State has chosen to tolerate partisan

judicial elections. Minnesota, in contrast, has chosen to make its judicial elections

nonpartisan, thus demonstrating its concern with the effect of political parties on

judicial impartiality. See Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Minn. 1992).

The New York Court of Appeals disagreed with Spargo and upheld the New

York restrictions on political activity by judicial candidates as narrowly tailored to

serve compelling state interests. In the Matter of Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292-93

(N.Y. 2003).

-14-

that results from having incurred obligations to entities who, while not actually

parties to a case, have made known their desire to see certain cases decided in certain

ways. Throughout our discussion of the restrictions on partisan activities, we stressed

the possibility that candidates who became indebted to political parties could be or

seem to be bound to rule in accord with those parties' platforms, rather than in accord

with the record and the law.6

 See, e.g., 247 F.3d at 870 (citing concurrence in Moon

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v. Halverson, 288 N.W. 579, 581 (Minn. 1939), deploring "accusations of party

treason which have been heaped upon some judges in the recent past because of

decisions thought to be contrary to the interests of an indorsing party"); 247 F.3d at

872 ("The Minnesota Supreme Court has attempted to prevent judicial candidates

from incurring, or seeming to incur, debts to political parties that could compromise

their independence. . . ."); id. at 876 ("If the judiciary is then expected to review . . .

legislation neutrally, a State may conclude that it is crucial that the judges not be

beholden to a party responsible for enactment of the legislation, or to one that

opposed it."); id. (Political parties "are simply in a better position than other

organizations to hold a candidate in thrall."). In its most extreme form, this kind of

threat to open-mindedness goes by the name "bribery," which, of course, is forbidden

by laws other than Canon 5, and is unquestionably within the state's power to

proscribe. We do not mean to suggest that political endorsements are comparable to

the payment of money or could be regulated in the same way. However, the

underlying problem of candidates for public office incurring obligations which

interfere with their performance in office has been recognized as an urgent threat that

governments can remedy, even when the problem takes more subtle forms than

bribery. See McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 660-61 (2003) (corruption and

appearance of corruption extend beyond bribery to other arrangements which create

"sense of obligation" in officeholders); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528

U.S. 377, 389 (2000) ("In speaking of 'improper influence' and 'opportunities for

abuse' in addition to 'quid pro quo arrangements,' we recognized a concern not

confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from

politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors. These were the

obvious points behind our recognition that the Congress could constitutionally

address the power of money to 'influence governmental action' in ways less 'blatant

and specific' than bribery."); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National

Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973) (upholding restraints on executive

branch employees' political activities because such activities posed "hazards to fair

and effective government."). The partisan activity restrictions of Canon 5 are aimed

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at forms of obligation which are more subtle than outright corruption, but which the

state still has a compelling interest in avoiding in its judiciary. 

The Supreme Court left open the possibility that open-mindedness in judicial

candidates might be a compelling state interest, so a decision premised upon such an

interest has not been shown to be wrong, see Kinman, 171 F.3d at 610. After the

decision in White, the New York Court of Appeals entertained a First Amendment

challenge to a section of its Rules Governing Judicial Conduct that prohibited judicial

candidates from making certain pledges and promises about their future conduct in

office. The New York court applied strict scrutiny and upheld the section based, in

part, on New York's compelling interest in open-mindedness. In re Watson, 794

N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) ("[O]penmindedness is central to the judicial

function for it ensures that each litigant appearing in court has a genuine–as opposed

to illusory–opportunity to be heard.") 

Although an analysis based on the compelling interest in judicial openmindedness is not contrary to White, another aspect of our analysis of the partisan

activity clauses must be reexamined carefully. The Supreme Court held that the

announce clause would have been a "woefully underinclusive" method of achieving

the goal of electing open-minded judges, and so the announce clause could not be

said to be narrowly tailored to serve this goal. 536 U.S. at 780. It therefore behooves

us to look closely at whether the partisan activity clauses are similarly underinclusive.

Our earlier opinion's discussion of the partisan activity clauses, unlike our

discussion of the announce clause, specifically addressed the issue of

underinclusiveness in a dialogue with the dissent. Compare 247 F.3d at 871-72 with

247 F.3d at 899-902. The dissent contended that, because Canon 5 prohibited a

candidate from participating in the three specified activities with political parties, but

not with other organizations that took an interest in how a candidate would decide

certain cases if elected, Canon 5 was fatally underinclusive. 247 F.3d at 900-01. We

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responded that underinclusiveness is not a ground in its own right for invalidating a

law, but that it frequently points to two other defects that are fatal:

underinclusiveness may show that the government's interest is not truly compelling,

since the government has chosen to leave unchecked a threat to that interest; or else

it may show that the government is discriminating on the basis of content,

suppressing disfavored speech, while allowing other, favored speech even though it

ought to be subject to the same objection as the prohibited speech. 247 F.3d at 871

(citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51-53 (1994)). To disprove the existence

of this first defect, the government defending a law must "establish the empirical

reality of the problems it purports to be addressing." 247 F.3d at 871 (quoting

Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 493 (1997) (Souter, J.,

dissenting)); see generally Interactive Digital Software v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d

954, 959 (8th Cir. 2003) (For measure to pass strict scrutiny, government defending

measure must present substantial supporting evidence of harm.). 

To disprove the possibility of content discrimination, the government must

show that the speech it has burdened poses a different, more serious threat to its

asserted interest than the speech it chose not to regulate. See Erznoznik v. City of

Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975) ("[E]ven a traffic regulation cannot

discriminate on the basis of content unless there are clear reasons for the

distinctions."). For instance, in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494

U.S. 652 (1990), Michigan restricted the political expenditures of corporations in

support of or opposition to candidates for state office. The compelling interest for

such regulation was the concern that entities that amassed wealth in the economic

marketplace would parlay that wealth into "unfair advantage in the political

marketplace," 494 U.S. at 670 (Brennan, J., concurring) because their ability to spend

corporate money bore no relation to political support for the ideas the corporations

spent their money to promote, id. at 659-60, 670, 672. The Chamber of Commerce

attacked the Michigan law as underinclusive because it did not regulate expenditures

by unincorporated labor unions, which also amassed political war chests. Id. at 665.

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7

The Court had discussed in earlier cases a long history of Congressional

attempts to address the "war chest" problem posed by corporations and labor unions.

See FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1982) (Federal laws

accounting for "particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor

organizations" reflect "a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by those

entities to the electoral process."); accord FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2206

(2003) (including labor unions in discussion of policies behind regulating corporate

campaign contributions); McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 644-45 (2003) (same).

-18-

The Court noted that federal law restricted expenditures by unions, as well as by

corporations, id. at 665 n.4.7

 

Austin rejected the underinclusiveness challenge, reasoning that the

corporations enjoyed greater government-conferred legal advantages enhancing their

ability to accumulate wealth. 494 U.S. at 665. These legal advantages of corporate

form made a crucial distinction between corporations and unions. Additionally, case

law permitted union members to opt out of contributing to the union's political

activities, which meant that "the funds available for a union's political activities more

accurately reflects members' support for the organization's political views than does

a corporation's general treasury." Id. at 666. The Michigan law therefore passed

strict scrutiny. Cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992) (also upholding law

on strict scrutiny review against underinclusiveness challenge that law failed to

regulate all speech posing same threat; Court reasoned that only the type of speech

subject to regulation had been shown to pose threat to compelling interest: "The First

Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems that do not exist.");

Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in

judgment) (underinclusiveness fatal where unregulated speech would cause victim

discomfort "at least as great" as that caused by speech that was banned).

Our analysis of the problem of underinclusiveness in applying strict scrutiny

finds strong support in the Supreme Court's most recent campaign finance case,

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-19-

McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 694-98 (2003). In McConnell, the Court

considered a challenge to section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of

2002, which in turn amended section 316(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act

of 1971, to prohibit use of corporations' and unions' treasury funds to pay for election

advertising. 124 S. Ct. at 695 & n.87. Because the provision restricted campaign

expenditures, it had to be tested by strict scrutiny. Id. at 695 (asking whether

"compelling governmental interest justifies" measure); id. at 766 (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting) ("All parties agree strict scrutiny applies [to section 203]."). The plaintiffs

contended that the section was underinclusive because it did not apply to election

advertising in the print media or on the Internet. Id. at 697. The Court held that the

evidence in the case supported the conclusion that television advertising posed the

greater threat, and therefore the "record amply justifie[d] Congress' line drawing."

Id. The Court said that "reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the

phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." Id. (quoting

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 105 (1976)). McConnell thus confirms our earlier

reasoning that the sort of underinclusiveness that is fatal in strict scrutiny is irrational

underinclusiveness, not underinclusiveness that results from attempting to focus the

restriction on only the severest form of the threat to a compelling governmental

interest. 

Although our method of analysing the underinclusiveness issue remains valid,

we must examine whether the actual application was affected by anything in the

White decision. The Supreme Court's discussion of the announce clause affected

both the necessity and narrow tailoring aspects of our determination that the partisan

activity clauses passed strict scrutiny. First, our determination that the Boards had

shown the necessity of the restrictions depended partly on our view of the history of

Minnesota's effort to extricate its judiciary from partisan pressures, initially by

designating judicial elections as non-partisan, and later by adopting Codes of Judicial

Conduct restricting partisan activities. 247 F.3d at 869-70. We concluded that "'a

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-20-

long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense' combine to show

that regulation is necessary to protect the institution of the judiciary from the dangers

of partisanship and corruption." Id. at 870-71 (quoting Burson, 504 U.S. at 211).

However, the Supreme Court rejected our reliance on similar considerations

supporting the announce clause. 536 U.S. at 785 ("The practice of prohibiting speech

by judicial candidates on disputed issues, however, is neither long nor universal.").

Moreover, the Court's discussion included language that has obvious relevance to the

history of the partisan activity clauses. Id. at 786 ("Thus, not only were judicial

candidates (including judges) discussing disputed legal and political issues on the

campaign trail [throughout the 19th and first quarter of the 20th centuries], but they

were touting party affiliations and angling for party nominations all the while.").

Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider whether the partisan activities clauses are

supported by sufficient evidence of necessity, without the reliance we placed on the

history of Minnesota's efforts to protect its judiciary from partisan pressures.

Second, our conclusion that the Minnesota Supreme Court was justified in

regulating candidate speech concerning political parties, while leaving unregulated

comparable speech concerning single issue groups depended in part on the existence

of the announce clause. 247 F.3d at 876 ("At the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1997

hearing on amending Canon 5, DePaul Willette, Executive Secretary of the Judicial

Board, testified that the danger of judicial candidates affiliating with single-issue

interest groups was adequately addressed by the provision of Canon 5 prohibiting

announcement of the candidate's views on disputed legal or political issues.").

Therefore, the evidence supporting Minnesota's distinction between political and

other organizations must be reevaluated in light of the demise of the announce clause.

Third, our original underinclusiveness analysis discussed only whether the

partisan activity restrictions were underinclusive because they reached speech

pertaining to political parties, but not other organizations. We concluded the

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-21-

distinction between burdened speech and non-burdened speech was justified because

political parties posed a more pervasive threat to judicial independence than did other

types of organizations. 247 F.3d at 872, 875-76. Cf. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 686

("Congress is fully entitled to consider the real-world differences between political

parties and interest groups when crafting a system of campaign finance regulation.

Interest groups do not select slates of candidates for elections. Interest groups do not

determine who will serve on legislative committees, elect congressional leadership,

or organize legislative caucuses. Political parties have influence and power in the

legislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group.") (citation omitted). 

The Supreme Court's opinion raised an entirely different underinclusiveness

objection:

The short of the matter is this: In Minnesota, a candidate for

judicial office may not say "I think it is constitutional for the legislature

to prohibit same-sex marriages." He may say the very same thing,

however, up until the very day before he declares himself a candidate,

and may say it repeatedly (until litigation is pending) after he is elected.

As a means of pursuing the objective of open-mindedness that

respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully

underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the

credulous.

536 U.S. at 779. This type of underinclusiveness analysis looks at whether banning

certain communications within one time-frame but not another is arbitrary. The same

analysis could be applied to other clauses of Canon 5, such as the party identification

and attendance at party gatherings clauses. (The endorsement clause only makes

sense during the time-frame of an election.) This particular underinclusiveness

question was not briefed either before the district court or before us when we decided

this case the first time. The plaintiffs ought not to be barred from making a new

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-22-

argument based on the intervening Supreme Court decision, see Morris v. Am. Nat'l

Can Corp., 988 F.2d at 52 (litigant who did not raise argument on first appeal "got

lucky" when Supreme Court case changed law before its case became final), but

neither should the Boards be prevented from marshaling whatever evidence they

choose to present on this issue, as they asked to do at oral argument on remand from

the Supreme Court. We therefore remand to the district court to receive new evidence

and to determine whether the partisan activity clauses can survive strict scrutiny in

light of the Supreme Court's opinion.

IV.

The plaintiffs contended that the solicitation clause of Canon 5 was not

narrowly tailored in that it unnecessarily prohibited candidates from soliciting

contributions from large groups and sending out fund-raising letters over their own

signatures. 247 F.3d at 883-84. We held that personal solicitation by candidates

could create the impression that justice is for sale and Canon 5 left a candidate

sufficient means by which to raise funds. Id. at 884-85. Plaintiffs did not seek

certiorari on this issue. We conclude, however, that failure to seek certiorari on the

issue does not now preclude the plaintiffs from asking for reconsideration of the issue

in light of the Supreme Court's opinion. See Morris v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 988

F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1993).

As with the partisan activities clauses, our consideration of Canon 5's

restriction on personal solicitation was also premised on the state's interest in a kind

of open-mindedness-- keeping candidates free from obligations that would hamper

their ability to decide the law according to their own judgment, rather than in

accordance with implicit obligations to their financial benefactors. We said: "When

judges obtain funds from a group that has an interest in the outcome of litigation,

such as the plaintiffs' or defendants' bar, judges can appear beholden to that group for

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8

The dissent argues that because Canon 5B(2) prohibits the campaign

committee from disclosing to the candidate the names of contributors and decliners,

there is no compelling interest in prohibiting the candidate from signing his own

solicitation letters. If the request comes from the candidate himself rather than the

committee, it is natural to expect contributors to respond to the candidate rather than

the committee, which would undermine the Canon's design of interposing the

-23-

their accession to office, creating the expectation that the judges will favor their

benefactors accordingly." 247 F.3d at 883. We cannot, then, say that our opinion

was wrong in discerning a compelling state interest served by the personal solicitation

restriction.

We considered whether the personal solicitation restriction was narrowly

tailored in our original opinion. Id. at 884-85. Nothing in the Supreme Court's

opinion discredits our analysis of this issue. Cf. In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 350-

51 (Me. 2003) (upholding restriction on judges' solicitation of support for political

candidates after White as narrowly tailored), pet'n for cert. filed (Jan. 20, 2004) (No.

03-1132). Our holding on the issue is therefore not wrong. The plaintiffs cite the

Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th Cir.

2002), invalidating Georgia Canon of Judicial Conduct 7(B)(2), which prohibited

judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions. The Canon did

allow the candidate's election committee to solicit funds. Id. at 1322. The Eleventh

Circuit's holding on this issue was based on the fact that the Canon would not prevent

the candidate from learning who had contributed to his campaign and consequently

from feeling beholden to those contributors. Accordingly, it was ineffective in

protecting the state's asserted compelling interest. Minnesota's Canon 5B(2), on the

other hand, prohibits a candidate's campaign committee from disclosing to the

candidate either the identity of campaign contributors or the identity of those who

were solicited for contributions but declined to contribute. The Weaver rationale is

therefore inapplicable to the Minnesota Canon.8

 We need not comment on the

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committee as the intermediary between candidate and contributors. 

-24-

conclusion expressed in Weaver that the distinction between judicial elections and

other types of elections "if there truly is one," 309 F.3d at 1321, does not justify

"greater restrictions on speech during judicial campaigns than during other types of

campaigns." Id. Cf. White, 536 U.S. at 783 ("[W]e neither assert nor imply that the

First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those

for legislative office.") We have no need to revisit our consideration of the personal

solicitation clause. 

***

We remand with instructions to the district court to enter judgment for the

plaintiffs on Count II of the Second Amended Complaint (announce clause), to enter

judgment for the defendants on Counts V (solicitation clause), and to reconsider its

ruling on Counts I, III and IV (partisan activities clauses) in light of the Supreme

Court's decision in this case and such further evidence as the parties may offer.

BEAM, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.

I concur in the court's conclusion that the district court must enter judgment for

Gregory Wersal and the other plaintiffs (collectively plaintiffs) on their "announce

clause" claim. I believe that the plaintiffs are also entitled to judgment on their

"partisan activities" and "personal solicitation" claims. Accordingly, I dissent from

the court's holdings on these issues. 

I begin by again noting that Minnesota's decision to popularly elect judges

invokes the need to fully and strictly apply the requirements of the First Amendment,

including the Amendment's speech and associational mandates. If Minnesota wants

judicial elections, it must provide the constitutional trappings required for such

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9

Footnote 5 of the court's opinion further muddies the water. First, the court

writes that we apply the law of the case unless intervening authority clearly

demonstrates that the law of the case was wrong. Next, the court cites Shrink, a case

that never mentioned the doctrine. Then, the court ultimately concludes that the

"clearly demonstrates" language is merely a redundant statement of the Shrink rule,

which allows for a de novo review of legal questions. To the extent that footnote 5

suggests that the court is conducting a de novo review of the panel's previous opinion

in light of the Supreme Court's teachings, I agree with that footnote. But I am not

-25-

procedures. As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence above, Minnesota cannot

ignore the "'crocodile [it has chosen to place] in [its] bathtub.'" Republican Party v.

White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (quoting former California Supreme Court Justice

Otto Kaus). Yet today, the court permits the State to do just that.

I adhere to the views expressed in my previous dissent, see, 247 F.3d at 885-

903, and fully incorporate my remarks by reference. But this case's present posture

requires a further and different inquiry: What must we do on remand? In considering

this question, the court misdefines our task and renders a decision that violates both

the Supreme Court's mandate and the First Amendment. 

I. Our Task on Remand

The court (sometimes referred to as the panel majority or majority) gives great

weight to its previous decision. This is error. The last time this case was before us,

the panel majority, over my dissent, upheld the solicitation clause, the partisanactivities clause, and the announce clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to

consider the announce clause. It reversed, explained why it reversed, and remanded

the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. White, 536 U.S. at 788. On

remand, instead of simply asking what the Court's order and opinion command, the

majority clouds our task by misapplying the law-of-the-case doctrine.9

 

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convinced that the opinion's text says or means what the footnote suggests, and in any

event, the footnote does not accurately describe the way the court actually applies the

doctrine. 

-26-

We owe no deference to the court's earlier decision. The Supreme Court

ordered us to proceed consistently with its opinion. Our only task on remand should

be to ensure that we render, remand, or vacate consistently with the Supreme Court's

mandate: 

A corollary to the principle that a mandate is completely controlling as

to all matters within its compass is the rule that, upon a reversal and

remand for further consistent proceedings, the case goes back . . . for a

new determination of the issues presented as though they had not been

determined before, pursuant to the legal principles enunciated in the . . .

opinion. 

Poletti v. C.I.R., 351 F.2d 345, 347 (8th Cir. 1965) (emphasis added). This de novo

review is absolute because, when the mandate tells a lower court to proceed

consistently with an opinion, the opinion and its teachings become part of the

mandate. Bailey v. Henslee, 309 F.2d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 1962); see Bankers Trust

Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1985). 

Although the court cites a case that proceeded properly on remand, Shrink

Missouri Government PAC v. Adams, 204 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 2000), Shrink does

not support the court's actions. The court cites Shrink for the proposition that

"[w]here the Supreme Court's reasoning in disposing of one issue in a case affects the

validity of our earlier disposition of other issues in the same case, we will reconsider

those issues on remand." Ante at 11. Then, the court defines our task as determining

whether "the law applied by this court or by the district court in deciding the partisan

activity or solicitation clause issues was wrong." Ante at 13. But the court ultimately

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-27-

departs from any permissible interpretation of the law-of-the-case doctrine (or any

other standard of review I can find). Two problems evidence this departure. First,

the court defers to a ruling that no court has ever made. And second, the court

adheres to rulings it made before, even though the Supreme Court's new teachings

require precisely the opposite rulings. I address each in turn.

II. The Court Defers to a Ruling it Never Made

Although it is undisputed that both the partisan-activities and solicitation

clauses must be justified by a compelling state interest, and although these clauses

restrict core, political, election speech, the last time this case was before the court, the

panel majority upheld the restrictions based on an interest it forgot to define.

The Court of Appeals concluded that [Minnesota] had

established two interests as sufficiently compelling . . .

preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and

preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the state

judiciary. . . . [A]lthough the term is used throughout the

Eighth Circuit's opinion, the briefs, the Minnesota Code of

Judicial Conduct, and the ABA Codes of Judicial Conduct,

none of these sources bothers to define it.

White, 536 U.S. at 775. So the Supreme Court defined impartiality for us, and left

open the possibility that judicial "openmindedness" is or might become a compelling

state interest. 

Even though the panel majority did not define "impartiality" or

"openmindedness" in the previous appeal, it does not return to this compelling-stateinterest question. Instead, the majority claims to have exercised remarkable foresight

and near-psychic precision when it states today that it earlier "focused on what we can

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10A computer scan of the majority's previous opinion fails to disclose its use of

the words "openminded" or "openmindedness" in any definitional discussion of the

words impartiality or judicial impartiality.

-28-

now recognize as impartiality in Justice Scalia's third sense of the word: openmindedness."10 Ante at 13.

This stunning metamorphosis to the determinations the panel now says it made

in its previous opinion presents, to borrow Justice Scalia's words, "a challenge to the

credulous." White, 536 U.S. at 780. And the majority further states that because the

Supreme Court left open the possibility that openmindedness might be a compelling

state interest, its supposed reliance upon such an interest was not shown to be wrong.

Ante at 16. This self-serving analysis is fatally incorrect for obvious reasons. The

analysis focuses on the recognition of a newly minted compelling state interest that

the Supreme Court scolded the majority for not finding or defining. 

When the government suppresses election speech, the Constitution demands

strict scrutiny; that is, a narrowly tailored restriction designed to serve a compelling

state interest. White, 536 U.S. at 774-75. Yet the panel majority, in neither its

previous effort nor in today's opinion, has discussed how or why "openmindedness"

is a compelling state interest that can be used to suppress election speech and

associational activities. Neither did Justice Scalia. 

As already noted, in its earlier opinion, the panel majority simply asserted that

judicial impartiality (a term it forgot to define) was a compelling state interest. Only

later did the Supreme Court define impartiality for us. And while the Supreme Court

acknowledged openmindedness as a possible use as a subset of the word impartiality,

and acknowledged the possibility that that possible subset was a compelling state

interest, the panel today claims earlier reliance on this later-defined interest and,

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11This is especially true with the solicitation clause, as shown by the panel

majority's rejection of Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (striking

down solicitation clause). The majority opinion states that because the solicitation

clause considered by the Eleventh Circuit did not prohibit the candidate from

knowing of solicitation responses or declinations, as does the Minnesota rule, the

Minnesota version passes muster. If this is correct, the disconnect between the rule

and judicial openmindedness is all the more obvious.

12The New York Court of Appeals's Watson decision–which of course does not

bind us–adds nothing to this case. See ante at 16 (citing In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1,

-29-

without further discussion, declares that it previously found this undefined interest

compelling. If the panel's present statements accurately describe its earlier holdings,

then one of the following statements must be true: either the Supreme Court missed

the panel's previous message, or the previous panel was able to examine an undefined

term so closely as to label it compelling. But neither is true. Our role as an inferior

court requires that we reject the first option. And we must reject the second because

the very ideas of fundamental rights and strict scrutiny require that before we deem

an interest compelling, we must know what that interest is. Because neither statement

is true, the court's opinion misstates what occurred.

The Supreme Court refused to pursue this crucial question because it did not

believe that the Minnesota Supreme Court had adopted the "announce" clause for the

purpose of protecting the openmindedness of judges. There is even less chance

(hardly any chance at all) that the Minnesota court adopted the partisan-activities and

solicitation restrictions to protect judicial "openmindedness." Indeed, there is almost

no readily discernible connection between the words contained in these restrictions

and "how a [judicial] candidate would decide certain cases if elected." Ante at 16.11

So, as a fundamental first step, we should ask whether "openmindedness" is a

compelling state interest at all.12 After all, the Supreme Court left open only the

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7 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam)). In Watson, the defendant defined impartiality, and the

plaintiff did not dispute that interest's compelling status. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d

at 6. The fact that the Watson court reached this uncontested conclusion does not

magically insert an analysis into the void left by the panel majority's previous

decision.

-30-

possibility that openmindedness, as a desirable judicial trait, rises to the level of a

"compelling state interest." The Supreme Court did not find it to be so and, upon

proper consideration, it may be found to fall well short of the fundamental interest

necessary to fit into this constitutional category.

Then, because we have never scrutinized the restrictions under the only interest

that can possibly support them (openmindedness), we should do so now. We should

ask, for example, whether preventing a judge from sending his or her own fundsolicitation letter is necessary to preserve the judges "willing[ness] to consider views

that oppose [existing] preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues

arise in a pending case," the hallmarks of "openmindedness" according to Justice

Scalia. White, 536 U.S. at 778. This is especially true when Minnesota forbids the

judge from learning of a solictee's response or lack thereof. But, beyond this

question, it is my view that the solicitation clause is unconstitutional for a more

specific reason. The only way the solicitation clause survives strict scrutiny is if it

is necessary and narrowly tailored to further the compelling state interest of judicial

openmindedness. The Minnesota canon does not allow a judge to even sign a

solicitation request. This is one aspect of a more complicated rule purportedly

designed to protect the state's interest. But this part of the restriction renders the law

not narrowly tailored. Stated another way, in a state where a judge cannot learn of

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13Footnote 8 shows just how forgiving the court views the strict-scrutiny

standard; indeed, the court's language appears better suited for rational-basis review.

The court asserts that the ban on personal solicitation is justified because "it is natural

to expect contributors to respond to the candidate rather than the committee" if the

candidate signs the letter. This footnote is wrong because it assumes that either

candidates will violate the law or that their contributors will not follow the

candidate's direction to reply in the way the law allows. Why is it not "natural to

expect" that candidates will obey the law and direct replies to the committee, as the

rules require? And why would we expect the contributors to do anything but obey

the candidate's direction? The record does not even approach answering (or even

asking) these questions. The court fails to realize the significance of strict

scrutiny–and its burden-of-proof allocation–when it chooses, by default, the speechsuppressing answer based on its own unsupported hypothesis.

14Perhaps the court does not feel this language is binding. In White, Justice

Scalia wrote for the Court and cited that language from one of his concurring

opinions. The fact that the language used to be non-binding does not change the fact

-31-

his donors, to keep the judge's mind "open," must the state prohibit the judge from

even signing solicitation letters? Of course not.13

III. Underinclusiveness and the Partisan-Activities Clause

Nor do I understand, even under its misguided application of the law-of-thecase doctrine, how the panel can adhere to its view that underinclusiveness is not an

independent ground to challenge a restriction on election speech (and now, by

analogy, partisan activities). I simply questioned this premise in my earlier dissent,

but Justice Scalia defenestrated it in White: "A law cannot be regarded as protecting

an interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful

speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest

unprohibited." 536 U.S. at 780 (internal marks and citations omitted). But the panel

now agrees with neither Justice Scalia nor with me.14

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that it is now the law.

15Even though Justice Scalia wrote the applicable rule in this very case when

the Court reversed the first time, the majority today ignores that language and instead

relies upon McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 694-98 (2003). That reliance puzzles

me. First, I don't understand why the court today pieces together blurbs from that

several-hundred-page opinion, when Justice Scalia wrote a clear, one-sentence rule.

Remarkably, even though the Supreme Court decided McConnell shortly after it

decided White, and even though the McConnell opinion contained hundreds of pages

and more citations than I care to count, the McConnell opinion didn't cite White. I

am quite certain that the Supreme Court did not overlook White when it wrote

McConnell. Instead, it recognized that the two cases were so different as to not even

justify a single citation. But this distinction does not dissuade the court today. When

the puzzle pieces seem out of place, the court pounds them until they wedge together;

the problem is, the pieces are not only in the wrong place, but they are from the

wrong puzzle. 

Even this patchwork formulation doesn't support the court's holding. In

McConnell, the "Court held that the evidence in the case supported the conclusion

that television advertising posed the greater threat, and therefore the record amply

justifie[d] Congress' line drawing." Ante at 19 (citing McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 697)

-32-

The majority's view on underinclusiveness is an interesting but unsupportable

position because I am certain that Justice Scalia meant what he wrote in White. His

words bear repeating: "A law [here the partisan-activities restriction] cannot be

regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order [possibly a judge's

openmindedness] . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that . . . interest

unprohibited." Id. The panel apparently does not dispute that we must strike down

the partisan-activities clause unless we regard it as protecting an interest of the

highest order. But somehow (and I admit I do not see how) the court feels free to

finesse this Supreme Court language to allow the partisan-activities clause to purport

to protect judicial openmindedness even though the clause leaves appreciable damage

(affiliation with and the support from other special-interest groups) unprohibited.15

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(emphasis added and internal quotations omitted). Determining which threat is

"greater" requires a comparison of the two threats. In its previous opinion, the panel

majority purported to examine the threats presented by association with political

parties, concluded they were not arbitrary, cited inapplicable cases that support

treating political parties differently, and held that the State had satisfied its heavy

burden. But the panel majority never discussed (and it does not discuss today) the

threats that special-interest-group association pose, even though the record highlights

this problem. It certainly fails to discuss "ample" record evidence (past or present)

that supports the idea that political association presents a greater threat to judicial

openmindedness than special-interest association. Indeed, the record, including a

Minnesota Supreme Court hearing conducted when the court was amending the

ethical rules, shows that special-interest-group association posed at least as great a

threat. See Hearing on the Amendment to Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,

C7-81-300, Tr. at 36-37, 40 (Minn. Nov. 19, 1997) (Minnesota District Judge Gary

Meyer testifying) ( The rule "allows a candidate for the judiciary to seek and use the

endorsements of such special interest groups as the National Rifle Association, the

Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, the National Organization for Women,

Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, or any labor union. Clearly, organizations such as

these can and frequently do support and oppose candidates for political office. . . .

It appears that the proposed changes to [the rule] are an attempt to strip political

affiliation from judicial elections, but at the same time, they allow and perhaps

encourage candidates to adopt issue group affiliation. This doesn't take party politics

out of the judicial election. . . . Is it appropriate for a judicial candidate to speak and

appear at a MADD . . . function but not a political party? Why should these special

interest endorsements and activity be protected as constitutionally guaranteed free

speech and assembly but political party endorsements and activity not be so

protected.").

We should not remand to the district court to allow it to review the record for

evidence that is not there. There simply is not "ample" record evidence to show that

this line drawing is necessary to advance the state's interest in an openminded

judiciary, or in the appearance of an openminded judiciary. In a gun-control case,

how is the candidate's openmindedness more affected by his political affiliation than

his NRA affiliation? In an abortion case, would association with a political party

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influence judicial minds more than association with pro-life or pro-choice groups?

To justify the restriction, even the court's proposed rule requires a "yes" answer to

these questions. Because neither logic nor the record supports a "yes" answer, the

Constitution forbids the line drawing. 

16In this regard, I take judicial notice, for instance, of candidate filings

contained in Minnesota Board of Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Reports

for year 2000 and in Minnesota media reports that reveal that large law firms and

their members contribute substantial sums of money to judicial candidates, especially

incumbent candidates, as well as to non-judicial candidates for state and federal

office. See In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 392 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986) (permitting

consideration of matter outside the record on appeal), rev'd on other grounds sub

nom. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).

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The facts establish the probability of greater harm to judicial openmindedness from

association with these other narrowly focused, politically active groups who have

persistent interest in many of the cases an elected judge may be called upon to decide

in the Minnesota courts.16

Even so, the majority never examines whether these other political contacts

pose an "appreciable danger." If a law cannot pass strict scrutiny when it leaves an

appreciable danger unprohibited, the starting place must be to ask whether an

appreciable danger exists at all and, if so, does the law leave it unprohibited? This

is the essence of the "underinclusiveness" inquiry and it clearly is an independent

ground for challenging the restriction. And although the panel correctly notes that

the underinclusiveness challenge clearly points toward two other fatal defects in the

Minnesota law, the unprotected-appreciable-danger challenge stands on its own and

defeats the Minnesota rule. 

In short, although the panel's interpretation of Supreme Court

underinclusiveness jurisprudence is inventive, I choose Justice Scalia's binding

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interpretation of the law. The Minnesota partisan-activities clause, as presently

written, violates the Constitution.

IV. CONCLUSION

The panel majority uses the discretionary, judicial-economy-based, law-of-thecase doctrine to reach an unsupportable result. Minnesota has failed to establish a

"compelling state interest," at least one with a discernible connection to the

regulations at issue. One regulation is woefully underinclusive and the other overly

broad but with no real connection to a constitutionally protectable interest. The

majority construes its previous ruling as deciding a question that did not exist when

the decision was rendered. And, the panel defers to its own hypothetical ruling

instead of applying the mandate of the Supreme Court. For these reasons, and those

expressed in my previous dissent, I concur in the court's invalidation of the Minnesota

Supreme Court's announce clause, but dissent from the court's failure to invalidate

the partisan-activities and solicitation restrictions.

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