Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02805/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02805-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JIURU HU; PANAYIOTIS 

FRANTZIS;

NO. CIV. S-06-2805 WBS EFB

Plaintiffs,

v.

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, in his 

official capacity as Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland 

Security; ROBERT MUELLER, in 

his official capacity as 

Director of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation; EMILIO T. 

GONZALEZ, in his official 

capacity as Director of the 

United States Citizenship & 

Immigration Services; and

CHRISTINA POULOS, in her

official capacity as Acting 

Director of the California 

Service Center of the United 

States Citizenship & Immigration

Services; 

Defendants.

 ----oo0oo----

In this mandamus action, plaintiffs Jiuru Hu and

Panayiotis Frantzis seek to compel defendants, senior officials

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in the United States government, to immediately adjudicate their

Form I-485 applications to adjust their status to that of lawful

permanent resident (“LPR”). The matter comes before the court on

defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Jiuru Hu is a citizen of China. (Compl. ¶ 1.) She is

the beneficiary of an approved employment based third party

preference visa petition (Form I-140), classifying her as a

professional pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(c). (Id. ¶ 9.) 

Panayiotis Frantzis is Hu’s husband. (Id. ¶ 1.) 

Defendants are senior officials either in the United

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or have

responsibilities relating to that agency. Michael Chertoff,

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), oversees

USCIS and is charged by law with the obligation of adjudicating

applications for permanent residence. (Id. ¶ 4.) Robert

Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

is responsible for investigating aliens applying for immigration

benefits. (Id. ¶ 5.) Emilio T. Gonzalez, Director of USCIS, is

charged with adjudicating applications for permanent residence. 

(Id. ¶ 3.) Christina Poulos, Acting Director of the California

Service Center of USCIS, is also charged with adjudicating

applications for permanent residence. (Id. ¶ 2.) 

On August 5, 2004, plaintiffs filed applications for

LPR status with USCIS pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). (Id. ¶

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10.) USCIS took plaintiffs’ fingerprints on September 10, 2004,

and again on October 19, 2005, and March 9, 2007. (Id. ¶ 16; Ex.

E.) 

Plaintiffs have inquired into the status of their

applications on numerous occasions. (Id. ¶ 8.) On each

occasion, they were told that the FBI namecheck, a required part

of the LPR application, remained pending. (Id. Ex. E.) On

October 17, 2006, plaintiffs sent a demand letter to the United

States Attorney for the Eastern District of California requesting

expedited action and threatening a mandamus action. (Id. Ex. A.) 

On December 5, 2006, plaintiffs filed this action seeking to

compel defendants adjudicate their LPR applications.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

1. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction only

authorized to adjudicate those cases which the Constitution and

the laws of Congress permit. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “A federal court is

presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the

contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated

Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.

1989) (citing Cal. ex rel. Younger v. Andrus, 608 F.2d 1247, 1249

(9th Cir. 1979)). 

When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, the district court may properly

review evidence outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes

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concerning the existence of jurisdiction. Land v. Dollar, 330

U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947) (“[W]hen a question of the District

Court’s jurisdiction is raised, either by a party or by the court

on its own motion . . . the court may inquire, by affidavits or

otherwise, into the facts as they exist.”); see also Biotics

Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1983)

(consideration of material outside of the pleadings does not

convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion into a summary judgment motion). 

However, when the district court does not hold an evidentiary

hearing, the factual allegations in the complaint should be

accepted as true. McLachlan v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908, 909 (9th Cir.

2001).

2. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true

and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405

U.S. 319 (1972). The court may not dismiss for failure to state

a claim unless “it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th

Cir. 2002). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the pleader

fails to state a claim supportable by a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)

(complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”). 

///

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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs predicate federal question jurisdiction upon

28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and the

Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b) and

706(1). Defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to grant mandamus because the plaintiffs are not

owed a clear duty and defendants’ actions are discretionary. 

Defendants further argue that the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.,

specifically precludes judicial review of matters committed to

agency discretion.

1. Mandamus Jurisdiction

The Mandamus Act provides that “[t]he district courts

shall have original jurisdiction in any action in the nature of

mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or

any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28

U.S.C. § 1361. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is

available to compel a federal official to perform a duty only if: 

(1) the individual’s claim is clear and certain; (2) the

official’s duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly

prescribed as to be free from doubt, and (3) no other adequate

remedy is available.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir.

1998)); see also Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 121

(1988) (“The extraordinary remedy of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. §

1361 will issue only to compel the performance of a clear

nondiscretionary duty.”) (further citations omitted). Mandamus

cannot be used to review the discretionary acts of government

officials. Nova Stylings, Inc. v. Ladd, 695 F.2d 1179, 1180 (9th

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Title 8, Section 1255, as enacted, refers to the 1

Attorney General as the deciding official. However, the authority

to adjudicate adjustment of status applications has been

transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security and his

designate in USCIS. See 6 U.S.C. § 271(b)(5); 6 U.S.C. § 557. 

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Cir. 1983). 

In 2005, Congress amended the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory

or nonstatutory), including . . . section[] 1361 of []

title [28] . . . and regardless of whether the

judgment, decision, or action is made in removal

proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review

-- 

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under

section . . . 1255 [adjustment of immigration status] .

. . or

(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney

General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the

authority for which is specified . . . to be in the

discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of

Homeland Security . . . .1

Courts have consistently recognized that the meaning of this

statute is free from ambiguity and “its terms are pellucidly

clear.” Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696, 698 (E.D. Va.

2006). The statute “means that courts are precluded from

reviewing any discretionary decision or action of USCIS.” Id.

(emphasis in the original); see also El-Khader v. Perryman, 264

F. Supp. 2d 645, 649 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“The meaning of the

statute is clear and unambiguous--it precludes the courts from

reviewing any discretionary decision of the [USCIS].”), aff’d sub

nom. El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Section 1255(a) specifically provides that “[t]he

status of an alien . . . may be adjusted by the [designated USCIS

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official], in his discretion and under such regulations as he may

prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent

residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Pursuant to this statutory

authority, USCIS has promulgated regulations governing the

adjudication process. See 8 C.F.R. pt. 25. USCIS normally uses

the following three background checking mechanisms that must be

completed before an application may be adjudicated: (1)

Interagency Border Inspection System name check, (2) FBI

fingerprint check, and (3) FBI name checks. (Exh. to Mot. to

Dismiss) Notably, none of the regulations provide a time

limitation within which USCIS must render a decision on the

application or even the amount of time within which the FBI must

complete its name check or any other background check component.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that defendants have broad

discretion in how to ultimately decide their applications, but

argue that defendants have a non-discretionary duty to render a

decision within a reasonable time.

District courts have split on whether the pace that

USCIS adjudicates LPR applications is discretionary. Some courts

have held that the statutory framework precludes judicial review

of the pace at which USCIS adjudicates LPR applications. See

e.g., Grinberg v. Swacina, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___ , 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 19684, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2007) (“Sections 242 and

245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. §§ 1252 and

1255] . . . preclude judicial review of any discretionary

‘decision or action’ of the Attorney General in immigration

matters includ[ing] the pace at which immigration decisions are

made.”); Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 698-700 (Section 1255(a)

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vests USCIS with discretion over the entire process of adjustment

application adjudication, and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes

judicial review of any action, which includes the pace at which

that action proceeds); Zheng v. Reno, 166 F. Supp. 2d 875, 880-81

(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Matters within the [USCIS]’s discretion are not

reviewable under the mandamus statute. Thus, courts in this

district have repeatedly held that mandamus relief is unavailable

for delays in the adjustment process.”). 

Other district courts have concluded that because USCIS

has a nondiscretionary duty to render a decision, courts must

have jurisdiction in a mandamus suit alleging that USCIS failed

to adjudicate an application within a reasonable period of time,

or else USCIS could indefinitely delay rendering a decision. 

See, e.g., Razaq v. Poulos, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 770, at *4

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2007) (“Congress had to have intended the

executive branch to complete these adjudications within a

reasonable time--because imposing no time constraint at all on

the executive branch would be tantamount to giving the government

the power to decide whether it would decide . . . . A ‘duty to

decide’ becomes no duty at all if it is accompanied by unchecked

power to decide when to decide.”); Paunescu v. I.N.S., 76 F.

Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“Defendants nevertheless had

a non-discretionary duty to issue a decision on plaintiffs’

applications within a reasonable time.”); Yu v. Brown, 36 F.

Supp. 2d 922, 932 (D.N.M. 1999) (“[A]djudication must occur

within a reasonable time. A contrary position would permit the

[USCIS] to delay indefinitely. Congress could not have intended

to authorize potentially interminable delays.”). 

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At least one court has declined to strictly follow

either approach, finding that defendants successfully challenged

subject matter because the agency was making reasonable efforts

to complete the adjudication in that particular case. Li v.

Chertoff, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29776, at *14-*15 (S.D. Cal.

April 2, 2007) (“The Court concludes that as long as USCIS is

making reasonable efforts to complete the adjudication, the pace

required to complete that process is committed to USCIS’s

discretion.”) 

This court concludes that the pace at which USCIS

adjudicates plaintiffs’ applications is discretionary. This is

not a situation where USCIS refuses to take any action to process

a LPR application or the where delay equates to a refusal to

process a LPR application altogether either by intention or

accident. Should USCIS refuse to take any steps whatsoever to

resolve a LPR application or employ procedures such that no

decision will issue, it might legitimately be said that the

agency’s inaction was not the result of an exercise of discretion

at all. The agency would then not be operating within its

statutory discretion but rather abdicating its statutory duty to

adjudicate applications, and under those circumstances this court

could have jurisdiction to review the agency’s actions. Cf.

Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)

(where agency has “consciously and expressly adopted a general

policy which is in effect an abdication of its statutory duty,”

court had authority to direct agency to take certain actions to

comply with statutory duties, but not to resolve the ultimate

agency determination). 

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That is not the case here. Although the time that has

elapsed in processing the LPR applications in this case has been

substantial, USCIS has not refused to process or take any steps

toward adjudicating these applications. Instead, plaintiffs’

applications are simply proceeding at a pace unsatisfactory to

them. However, so long as it appears that the pace at which

plaintiffs’ applications are being processed is the result of the

exercise of some agency discretion, the statutory framework

precludes judicial review of the reasonableness of that pace.

The court agrees with the Safadi court that Congress

“did not intend to preclude from judicial review all

discretionary actions involved in the processing of an adjustment

application except for the pace of such processing.” Safadi, 466

F. Supp. 2d at 699. Plaintiffs’ argument that judicial review is

appropriate to ensure processing within a reasonable time is

belied by the complete absence of any statutory time limits. Had

Congress intended to allow judicial review of the pace of

processing LPR applications, there would have been an exception

carved out from the general statutory exclusion of judicial

review in this area.

The court is particularly reluctant to reach a contrary

interpretation in the area of immigration since control of this

area is largely entrusted to the political branches of

government. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (“Since

decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with

foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must

be defined in the light of changing political and economic

circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more

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appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to

the Judiciary.”); see also Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d

961, 970 (9th Cir. 2003) (“‘[J]udicial deference to the Executive

Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context where

officials exercise especially sensitive political functions that

implicate questions of foreign relations.’” (quoting I.N.S. v.

Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999))). Moreover, delays in

conducting necessary security checks--the reason for the delay in

adjudicating plaintiffs’ applications--are “‘inevitable and

becoming more frequent in light of heightened security concerns

in the post-911 world.’” Safadi, 466 F.2d at 700 (quoting

Mustafa v. Pasquerell, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8047, at *16-*17

(W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2006)). Should delays become systemically

problematic, the political branches retain the power to allocate

sufficient additional resources to USCIS and the FBI to alleviate

that problem. Judicial inquiry into the reasons for a delay is

particularly improper in contexts where, as here, national

security may be implicated. 

Finally, jurisdiction predicated on unreasonable delay

is an uncertain standard to say the least. The Li court held

that a delay, one year longer than the delay here, was not

unreasonable and not due to agency inaction. Li, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 29776 at *14. The Yu court held that the delay in

processing an LPR application that was less than the delay here

may be unreasonable, but was not reasonable as a matter of law. 

Yu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 935 (“The reasonableness of such delays

depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case

which are currently not before the Court.”) This court does not

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suggest that it is unable to engage in a reasonableness analysis. 

The court does suggest, however, that such an analysis would be

subject to all of the vagaries, uncertainties, and potential

inequities inherent in any analysis so fact specific. In this

court’s view, that kind of approach is inappropriate in a context

where it was not contemplated by Congress and there are no

articulable factors to guide the court. 

Rather than further taxing the limited resources of the

USCIS and the courts with mandamus petitions every time an

applicant is dissatisfied with the pace at which his or her

application is being processed, the better standard is for the

courts only to review those cases in which it appears that the

USCIS’s actions or inactions are not the result of an exercise of

discretion but rather the result of an abdication of its

responsibilities to process and adjudicate LPR applications. 

For all of the reasons above, the court finds that the

pace at which plaintiffs’ applications are being adjudicated are

actions committed to defendants’ discretion. Because Title 8,

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) specifically excludes these actions

from judicial review, the court does not have jurisdiction to

entertain plaintiffs’ mandamus action. 

2. Jurisdiction Under the Administrative Procedures

Act

The APA provides that “[w]ith due regard for the

convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives

and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to

conclude a matter presented to it.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). When a

plaintiff is entitled to judicial review, the reviewing court has

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the power to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or

unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 

 However, “a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a

plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency

action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah

Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (emphasis in

original). The APA specifically exempts from judicial review

actions “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. §

701(a). As discussed above, there are no governing statutes or

regulations specifying a time limit for processing an LPR

application or completing a FBI name check. The APA’s general

command that agencies resolve matters within a reasonable time is

not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction where, as here, the

challenged action is within an agency’s discretion. See Safadi,

466 F. Supp. 2d at 700; 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). 

Moreover, even if the APA otherwise conferred

jurisdiction, Section 1252(a)(2)(B) of Title 8, which

specifically precludes judicial review notwithstanding the

mandamus statute, or any other provision of law, governs this

case. For the reasons discussed above, Section 1252(a)(2)(B)

precludes judicial review of the pace at which defendants

adjudicate plaintiffs’ LPR applications. Therefore, plaintiffs’

citation to the APA and Section 1331 does not restore subject

matter jurisdiction. See Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 700-701; Li,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29779 at *17-*18. Accordingly, the court

will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject

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Because the court grants defendants’ motion under Rule 2

12(b)(1, it need not address their motion under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Further, plaintiffs’ counter-motion for summary judgment, which

failed to adhere to the requirements of Local Rule 56-260, cannot

be considered since the court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. 

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matter jurisdiction under the APA. 

2

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED, and this action is hereby DISMISSED.

DATED: May 21, 2007

 

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