Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01676/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01676-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMON BIRL, )

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Petitioner, )

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v. )

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CALIFORNIA BOARD OF PAROLE )

HEARINGS, )

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Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-01676 LJO NEW (DLB) HC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATION

[Doc. #13]

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #10]

ORDER REFERRING MATTER BACK TO

MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is represented in this action by the Federal Defender.

On June 13, 2007, the Magistrate Judge issued Findings and Recommendation that

recommended Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED and that portion of the petition

challenging the 2003 parole hearing be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to comply with the

statute of limitations. The Findings and Recommendation was served on all parties and contained

notice that any objections were to be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of service of the order.

On July 11, 2007, Petitioner filed objections to the Findings and Recommendation. 

Petitioner raises several arguments which are without merit and were properly rejected by the

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Magistrate Judge. First, he claims he should be entitled to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2) from the time his administrative appeal was denied until the time his habeas petition

was denied on February 22, 2006. This argument is completely meritless in light of Redd v.

McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077 (9 Cir.2003). In Redd, the Ninth Circuit addressed this very same th

argument and held that the limitations period commences the day after the administrative appeal

becomes final, and not after the petitioner has completed his state collateral relief proceedings. Id. at

1084 (“[T]he date of the “factual predicate” for Redd's claim under § 2244(d)(1)(D) is not

determined by asking when Redd satisfied AEDPA's exhaustion requirement; rather, it is determined

independently of the exhaustion requirement by inquiring when Redd could have learned of the

factual basis for his claim through the exercise of due diligence. This occurred when the Board

denied Redd's administrative appeal on December 7, 1998. Consequently, the limitations period

began to run on the following day.”). Thus, Petitioner’s argument was properly rejected. 

Petitioner also claims the Magistrate Judge wrongly found Petitioner was not entitled to

equitable tolling. Again, Petitioner’s argument is without merit. Petitioner did not experience any

extraordinary circumstances which made it impossible for him to file his federal petition on time that

would merit equitable tolling, such as the wrongful conduct of government officials. See Stillman v.

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9 Cir.2003). As found by the Magistrate Judge, Petitioner did not th

diligently pursue his rights with respect to the 2003 parole hearing.

Finally, Petitioner argues he should be entitled to equitable tolling in light of the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Burnett v. New York Central Railroad, 380 U.S. 424 (1965). In Burnett, the

Supreme Court held that an employee’s state court action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act

(“FELA”) tolled the federal limitations period for filing a FELA action in federal court. Id. at 434-

35. This argument is also without merit. This is not a situation where the same claims are being

pursued in concurrent jurisdictions as in FELA cases. As discussed by the Magistrate Judge, despite

the fact that the ultimate relief sought by Petitioner in his 2003, 2004, and 2005 parole hearings was

the granting of a parole date, each hearing was a separate proceeding with its own administrative and

state court remedies. Thus, Petitioner’s exhaustion of his remedies with respect to the 2004 and 2005

hearings were not a continuation of his remedies regarding the 2003 decision of the parole board. As

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stated by the Ninth Circuit, “the statute is clear that the limitations period starts from the latest of

four specific dates,” and in the context of a parole decision, the limitations period begins to run the

day after the Board denies the administrative appeal. Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084, 1085. And, the period

is tolled while Petitioner is exhausting his state remedies as to the pertinent judgment or claim. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, exhaustion concluded when the California Supreme Court denied his

habeas petition challenging the 2003 decision on February 22, 2006. 

Petitioner argues this resolution creates a situation where inmates will be forced to litigate

their claims in federal court even though it is possible the parole board may later decide the issue

favorably to the inmate, thereby mooting the case. While this may be true, the policy behind the

limitations period is to encourage prompt presentation of claims to the federal courts. Indeed, the

Ninth Circuit has stated that “AEDPA nonetheless contemplates that for habeas claims falling under

§ 2244(d)(1)(D), the statute of limitations will begin to run before exhaustion of state remedies and

thus before the federal petition can be filed.” Redd, 343 F.3d at 1083. “‘[A]s a federal statute that

interacts with state procedural rules, § 2244(d) will sometimes force a state prisoner to act

expeditiously to preserve his federal claims despite the procedural lenience of state law. . . .” Id. at

1084, quoting Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10 Cir.2003). As stated by the Magistrate th

Judge, granting petitioners tolling for the time they seek administrative and state court review for

every successive parole board decision would allow petitioners to interminably delay review of their

parole decisions in contravention of the policy behind § 2244(d). 

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a de

novo review of the case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file and having considered the

objections, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation is

supported by the record and proper analysis, and there is no need to modify the Findings and

Recommendations based on the points raised in the objections. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendation issued June 13, 2007, is ADOPTED IN FULL; 

2. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

3. The portion of the petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the 2003 parole hearing is

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DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and

4. The matter is REFERRED back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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