Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00505/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00505-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDY COSBY,

NO. CIV. S-08-505 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

AUTOZONE, INC., JIM KULBACKI

and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff Randy Cosby brought this diversity action against

Defendant Autozone, Inc. under California's Fair Employment and

Housing Act. The jury found AutoZone liable to Mr. Cosby for

failure to provide reasonable accommodation and failure to engage

in the interactive process. Based on that liability, the jury

awarded Mr. Cosby $174,000 for lost wages and benefits; $1,326,000

for past mental suffering; and denied punitive damages. After

trial, AutoZone filed a motion for a new trial or remittitur, which

this court denied. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed this

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court's decision and remanded the case for this court to order

remittitur with the option of a new trial on damages. 

Now before the court are Plaintiff's and Defendant's briefs

regarding remittitur or a new trial on damages. See Pl's Br., ECF

No. 168; Def's Br., ECF No. 169. 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit directed this court as

follows:

We remand the issue of both economic and noneconomic damages to the district court for

remittitur with the option of a new trial on

damages. The district court should set the

amount of remittitur. The amount for remittitur

on economic damages is not to exceed $4,917.60,

the amount specifically requested by Mr. Cosby at

trial. In setting the amount of remittitur for

non-economic damages, the district court must

outline specifically, with reference to the

evidence presented at trial, the reasons for the

amount. 

Cosby v. AutoZone, Inc., 2011 WL 3267704, *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 1,

2011).

A. Economic Damages

As the Ninth Circuit noted, "AutoZone's failure to accommodate

and to engage in the interactive process resulted in Mr. Cosby's

being forced to take unpaid medical leave. Mr. Cosby's damages

expert testified that the economic loss from the forced medical

leave was $4,917.60, and Mr. Cosby's counsel, in closing arguments,

asked specifically for this amount." Id. at *1. 

Thus, in accordance with the Ninth Circuit's order, the

testimony from Mr. Cosby's damages expert, and Mr. Cosby's

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counsel's request at closing arguments, the court sets the amount

of remittitur on economic damages at $4,917.60. 

B. Non-Economic Damages

Under California law, "to recover damages for emotional

distress[,] the injury suffered must be severe, i.e., substantial

or enduring as distinguished from trivial or transitory." Young

v. Bank of America, 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126

(1983). Examples of emotional distress include "highly unpleasant

mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame,

humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry

and nausea." Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

In determining that the jury's non-economic damage award of

$1,326,000 was not supported by the evidence in this case, the

Ninth Circuit held that:

Even by Mr. Cosby's own description, he testified

that, after his medical leave, he came back to

AutoZone without any restrictions and that his

supervisor, Jim Kulbacki, made supportive comments. 

Mr. Cosby described himself as being only slightly

upset at being forced to take medical leave. It is

also not clear how the sexual harassment

investigation was caused by, or how the course of

its proceedings was affected by, AutoZone's failure

to accommodate or to engage in the interactive

process. Indeed, Mr. Cosby's name was cleared in

the investigation. Even if the jury found that

AutoZone's failure reasonably to accommodate

contributed to his later termination, the evidence

is insufficient to support the non-economic award. 

Mr. Cosby testified extensively regarding mental

suffering on the day of his termination. After his

termination, however, Mr. Cosby eventually found

satisfactory employment, and there is no evidence

of any enduring mental suffering.

Cosby v. AutoZone, Inc., 2011 WL 3267704, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug.

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1, 2011). 

Whether the Ninth Circuit’s findings are fully supported by

the record in this case is beside the point. It is a holding by

which this court is bound. 

The court, nonetheless, draws attention to Mr. Cosby’s

testimony regarding his emotional reactions upon notifying his

supervisor that he would be unable to drive because of his sleep

apnea; specifically, Mr. Cosby’s supervisor “pretty much shut [Mr.

Cosby] down,” “wasn’t very cooperative,” and “[d]idn’t want to come

up with any kind of accommodation,” which caused Mr. Cosby to “just

g[i]ve up.” Tr., ECF No. 98, at 42. 

The court also draws particular attention to Mr. Cosby’s

testimony regarding the non-economic injuries he suffered resulting

from his eventual termination, following his years of service to

AutoZone. Mr. Cosby testified that he felt “shell-shocked”; that

he “[d]idn’t know what to say”; and that it was the “worst day of

[his] life.” Id. at 113. Because the supervisor did not allow Mr.

Cosby to drive the company car home (even though other terminated

district managers had been allowed to do so), Mr. Cosby was

required to travel home via cab, in response to which, Mr. Cosby

testified that he “ha[d] to sit there . . . and tell [a] complete

stranger [that he] just got fired[, which] was very degrading . .

. embarrassing.” Id. at 114. Mr. Cosby testified that his “whole

life flashed in front of [his] eyes”; he “felt that [he]’d have

been better off if they shot [him]”; and he “felt like [he] was in

a sea of hopelessness . . . it was just a continuing agony from

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that day forward.” Id. at 114-15. Mr. Cosby testified that it was

“very hard” to tell his parents and his wife that he had lost his

job. Id. at 113. Mr. Cosby further testified that when his son,

Jason, returned home from serving in the military in Iraq, because

Mr. Cosby had been terminated from AutoZone, Mr. Cosby and his wife

had to tell Jason that they “couldn’t afford to go see him.” Id.

at 116. In regards to Mr. Cosby’s conversation with his two

daughters regarding his termination, Mr. Cosby stated, “it is just

awful telling them that you no longer are employed with a company

you’ve been employed with for so many years, hoping to have a

career, a retirement with. It was just – it’s just devastating.” 

Id. at 117. 

Finally, the court notes the non-economic injuries exhibited

by Mr. Cosby’s response to the question, “When you think about the

future, what comes to mind?”. Id. at 118. Mr. Cosby replied:

I know the future will never be the same as what

it would have been. . . . You know, it is hard

to accept. You know, people always say, well,

life goes on. They’ve probably never been

terminated from a position like mine. You know,

sometimes life goes on, but it will never go on

like it could have gone on. 

Id. at 118-19. 

Defendant AutoZone argues that the Ninth Circuit concluded

that there was an insufficient causal link between AutoZone’s

failure to provide reasonable accommodation and its failure to

engage in the interactive process and the damages resulting from

Mr. Cosby’s subsequent termination and, therefore, Mr. Cosby’s

emotional distress damages should not be based upon his

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termination. See, e.g., Defs’ Br., ECF No. 169, at 9. However,

the Ninth Circuit made no such finding. To the contrary, the Ninth

Circuit provided, “Even if the jury found that AutoZone's failure

reasonably to accommodate contributed to his later termination, the

evidence is insufficient to support the non-economic award.” Cosby

v. AutoZone, Inc., 2011 WL 3267704, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2011). 

The conditional structure of this sentence necessarily considers,

as opposed to invalidates, any causal link the jury drew between

AutoZone’s failure to accommodate and Mr. Cosby’s subsequent

termination. The court therefore considers it proper to take into

account Mr. Cosby’s testimony as to his emotional state following

his termination in the remittitur on non-economic damages. 

The Ninth Circuit has noted in a footnote that no “definite

standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law by which to

fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering.” See Hilao v.

Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 793 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1996). However,

the Ninth Circuit has also provided that the proper amount of a

remittitur is the maximum amount of damages that can be sustained

by the evidence in the record. D & S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix

& Contracting Co., 692 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982). This rule

prevents the court’s substitution of its judgment for that of the

jury. Id. Thus, taking into account the evidence in the record

referred to by the Ninth Circuit, and giving particular weight to

the testimony of Mr. Cosby cited above, the court determines that

remittitur on non-economic damages is appropriately set at

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$250,000.00.1 In light of the court’s remittitur of the noneconomic damage award from $1,326,000 to $250,000, Plaintiff is

entitled to a new trial if he does not accept the damage award as

remitted. See Fenner v. Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 598, 603

(9th Cir. 1983). 

C. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff requests additur to the punitive damage award, "[t]o

the extent that this court's remittitur falls below $1,000,000. .

. so that AutoZone's total damages liability meets or exceeds []

$1,000,000." Pl's Br., ECF No. 168, at 17. Plaintiff's request

is denied.

It appears to the court, however, that based on the evidence

before the court, the jury blurred the lines between punitive and

compensatory damages in making its damage awards. If Plaintiff

rejects remittitur and instead seeks a new trial, as the Ninth

Circuit has provided, the new trial will address the issue of

damages. Cosby v. AutoZone, Inc., 2011 WL 3267704, *2 (9th Cir.

Aug. 1, 2011). That is, the new trial will address Plaintiff’s

economic, non-economic, and punitive damage awards. See Minthorne

v. Seeburg Corp., 397 F.2d 237, 244 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[O]n the

question of damages, this Circuit has held that the trial judge .

. . may ‘grant a new trial when he is of the opinion the verdict

is against the weight of evidence.’”) (internal citations omitted).

Accordingly, the court ORDERS as follows:

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 The court is in the unenviable position of second guessing

the jury.

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[1] The court REMITS the economic damage award for

Plaintiff from $174,000 to $4,917.60. 

[2] The court REMITS the non-economic damage award for

Plaintiff from $1,326,000 to $250,000.00. 

[3] Plaintiff's request for additur to the punitive damage

award is DENIED.

[4] Within twenty-one (21) days of the filing of this

order, Plaintiff SHALL inform the court in writing of

whether he (1) consents to the remitted damages award; (2)

seeks a new trial; or (3) plans to appeal the remittitur. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 10, 2012. 

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