Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00100/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00100-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS OUIA HAITHCOCK,

 

 Petitioner,

Case No. 06cv0100-J (JMA)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING R&R; and

(2) DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION FOR STAY AND

ABEYANCE

v.

M VEAL, Warden, 

 Respondent.

Before the Court is Petitioner Thomas Ouia Haithcock’s (“Petitioner”) Motion for Stay

and Abeyance of his §2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 10.] Magistrate

Judge Jan M. Adler has filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that this

Court deny Petitioner’s Motion. [Doc. No. 33.] Petitioner has filed Objections to the R&R.

[Doc. Nos. 35-37.] Respondent Warden M. Veal (“Respondent”) has not filed a Reply. For

the reasons set forth below, this Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the Motion for Stay

and Abeyance. 

Background

On May 6, 2004, Petitioner was convicted in the San Diego Superior Court of selling

cocaine base (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11352(a) (West 2006); Cal. Penal Code §

1203.073(b)(7) (West 2006)) and possessing cocaine base for sale (Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 11351.5 (West 2006)). (See Resp’t’s Lodgm’t No. 2 at 342-43.) Petitioner admitted one

prior term allegation (Cal. Penal Code § 667.5 (West 2006)) and one prior strike allegation

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(Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(I), 1170.12(c)(1) (West 2006)). (See id. at 347.) On June 4,

2004, the court sentenced Petitioner to a total term of ten years in state prison consisting of the

upper term of five years on count one, doubled for the prior strike conviction. (See id. at 355.)

The Court dismissed the possession conviction as a lesser included offense and struck the

prison prior term. (See id.) 

On January 19, 2005, Petitioner filed an appeal to the California Court of Appeal.

Petitioner raised two issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment

right to effective assistance of counsel when it denied his two motions to substitute defense

counsel at trial, and (2) that the trial court denied him due process when it improperly

sentenced him based on aggravating factors that were not found by a jury or admitted by

Petitioner. (See Resp’t’s Lodgm’t No. 3 at 8, 21.) On August 10, 2005, the California Court

of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. (See Resp’t’s Lodgm’t No. 6 at 9.) Petitioner

sought review of the California Supreme Court, raising the same claims. (See Resp’t’s

Lodgm’t No. 7.) On October 19, 2005, the California Supreme Court summarily denied

review. (See Resp’t’s Lodgm’t No. 8.) 

On January 17, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

[Doc. No. 1.] Petitioner raised the same claims as his appeal in state court, arguing that (1) the

trial court denied him the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when it

denied his two motions to substitute counsel, and (2) the trial court denied him the Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process when it used aggravating factors not found by a jury in

Petitioner’s sentencing. (See Pet’r’s Pet. at 7-9.) On February 24, 2006, Petitioner filed a

Motion for a Stay and Abeyance on the basis that after filing his federal habeas petition, he

discovered new issues related to his case and would like to exhaust them in state court. [Doc.

No. 6.] On February 24, 2006, Petitioner filed a letter with the Court seeking to learn the status

of his motion for stay and abeyance. [Doc. No. 8.] 

On February 28, 2006, Petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus in San Diego County

Superior Court. (See Pet’r’s Second Mot. Stay, Ex. B at 1.) In his state court habeas petition,

Petitioner argues the same claims he presents here, as well as two additional claims: (1) his

Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his trial and

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appellate counsel were ineffective, and (2) the arresting officer’s hearsay testimony at trial

violated the federal Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

(See id. at 2-5.) 

On March 21, 2006, Petitioner filed a second Motion for Stay and Abeyance. [Doc. No.

10.] On March 9, 2006, the Court ordered Respondent to respond to Petitioner’s Motion for

Stay and Abeyance. [Doc. No. 11.] On April 14, 2006, Respondent filed its Opposition.

[Doc. No. 12.] On June 2, 2006, Petitioner filed his Reply. [Doc. No. 23.] On June 28, 2006,

Petitioner filed an additional reply, consisting of substantially similar documents. [Doc. No.

28.] On June 30, 2006, Respondent filed its Answer and on July 31, 2006, Petitioner filed his

Traverse. [Doc. Nos. 29, 31.] On August 30, 2006, Magistrate Judge Adler issued an R&R

advising this Court to deny Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance. [Doc. No. 33.]

Petitioner filed Objections to the R&R on September 29, 2006 and October 16, 2006. [Doc.

Nos. 36, 37.] 

Legal Standard

I. Standard for Reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

 The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set

forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676

(1980). When no objections are filed, the Court may assume the correctness of the magistrate

judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law. See Campbell v. United

States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974). Under such circumstances, the Ninth

Circuit has held that “a failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to

give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.”

Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), overruled on other

grounds by Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, the

Court conducts a de novo review of any findings of fact objected to by Petitioner and a de novo

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review of conclusions of law.

II. Motion for Stay and Abeyance

A federal court’s duty in examining a state prisoner’s habeas petition is governed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under

the AEDPA, a petitioner must file his federal habeas petition within one-year of the date the

state proceedings become final. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002).

Additionally, the AEDPA requires that a district court dismiss a habeas petition if the

petitioner has not already exhausted all available state court remedies as to each claim. See

U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1996); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). 

As a result of the one year statute of limitations and the state court exhaustion

requirement, petitioners filing “mixed” petitions, containing both exhausted and unexhausted

claims, “run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their

unexhausted claims.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275 (2005). This is so because if the

district court dismisses a timely filed mixed petition for failure to exhaust state remedies, then

it is unlikely that a petitioner could exhaust his claims in state court and refile his federal

petition within the statute of limitations period. See id. As a result of the mixed petition

problem, the Supreme Court has in some circumstances allowed district courts to grant a stay

and abeyance of a mixed petition. See id. A stay and abeyance holds the petition “in abeyance

while the petitioner return[s] to state court to exhaust his previously unexhausted claim.” See

id. at 276. “Once the petitioner exhausts his state remedies, the district court will lift the stay

and allow the petitioner to proceed in federal court.” Id. 

As the R&R correctly stated, a district court has discretion to grant a stay and abeyance

if: (1) “the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust”; (2) “his unexhausted claims

are potentially meritorious”; and (3) “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 278. (See R&R at 3.) 

Discussion

Here, Petitioner has exhausted both claims in his current Petition because the state

appellate and supreme court rejected these claims on appeal. (See Pet’r’s Pet. at 7-9; Resp’t’s

Lodgm’t Nos. 6, 8.) However, Petitioner seeks a stay and abeyance of his exhausted claims

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so that he may exhaust two additional claims in state court: (1) ineffective assistance of trial

and appellate counsel, and (2) violation of his federal rights under the Confrontation Clause.

(See Pet’r’s Second Mot. Stay, Ex. B at 1.) Respondent concedes that all Petitioner’s current

claims are exhausted, but asserts that Petitioner has not shown good cause for a stay and

abeyance because he was aware of these additional two issues at the time of appeal. (See

Resp’t’s Opp’n at 3.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and

DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance.

I. Petitioner Has Not Shown Good Cause for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies 

Petitioner argues that he has shown good cause for failing to exhaust his current claims

in state court because he was not aware of these issues at the time of his appeal. (See Pet’r’s

Objections at 5.) Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not shown good cause because the

issues he raises are factually based and were apparent by reference to the trial record at the

time of trial and appeal. (See Resp’t’s Opp’n at 3.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court

FINDS Petitioner has not shown good cause for his failure to exhaust state remedies.

The Supreme Court has held that “[b]ecause a stay effectively excuses a petitioner’s

failure to present his claims first to state courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate when

the district court determines that there [is] good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his

claims first in state court.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. Although the Court in Rhines did not

define what constitutes “good cause” sufficient to permit application of the stay and abeyance

procedure, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that good cause does not require

a petitioner to show “extraordinary circumstances” for her failure to exhaust state remedies.

See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2005).

In Riner v. Crawford, 415 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1210 (D.Nev. 2006), the district court stated

that the standard for good cause requires the petitioner to show:

[H]e was prevented from raising the claim, either by his own ignorance or confusion about the law or the status of his case, or by circumstances over

which he had little or no control, such as the actions of counsel either in

contravention of the petitioner’s clearly expressed desire to raise the claim or

when petitioner had no knowledge of the claim’s existence. 

Riner, 415 F.Supp.2d at 1211; see also Morales v. Scribner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41773, 6-7

(N.D.Cal. 2006). Other district courts have adopted the same standard for “good cause” as the

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procedural default standard for cause. See Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1207

(C.D.Cal. 2005). In Hernandez, the court held that good cause requires a petitioner to show

that the failure to exhaust state remedies was a result of “an objective factor external to the

petitioner which cannot fairly be attributed to him or her.” Id. On this basis, the court held

that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel did not constitute good cause because Petitioner

was free to seek state habeas relief on the unexhausted claims. Id. at 1207. Similarly, the

Morales court held that the failure of appellate counsel to include a claim in a petition to the

California Supreme Court did not constitute good cause “because counsel’s oversight was not

a factor beyond the petitioner’s control.” Morales, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41773 at 2. 

Here, Petitioner has not shown good cause. First, Petitioner cannot meet the Riner

standard for good cause because he does not allege that appellate counsel contravened his

desire to raise either of the additional claims on appeal. Additionally, Petitioner was aware of

the facts giving rise to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Petitioner was

present when trial counsel failed to object to the officer’s statements and urged his attorney to

call witnesses to counter the officer’s testimony. (See Pet’r’s Second Mot. Stay, Ex. B at 2.)

Also, Petitioner was dissatisfied with defense counsel, as evidenced by Petitioner’s two

motions to substitute counsel prior to trial. (See Resp’t’s Lodgm’t No. 6 .) Yet, Petitioner

offers no explanation as for why he failed to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel issue

on appeal. 

Petitioner’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 5391

U.S. 36 (2004), is misguided as the basis for Petitioner’s failure to raise his Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause claim. As an initial matter, Crawford does not provide Petitioner with

a basis for good cause for failing to raise the claim. In Crawford, the Court held that playing

a tape-recorded statement of a witness who did not testify at the defendant’s criminal trial,

violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36, 67 (2004). Here, Petitioner disputes the arresting officer’s testimony, which was not

pre-recorded. In fact, Petitioner’s attorney cross-examined the officer in open court. (See

Resp’t’s Lodgm’t No. 1 Vol. 3 at 100.) 

Second, Petitioner has not met the requirements of good cause under the Hernandez

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standard because he has not demonstrated that “an objective factor external to the petitioner

which cannot fairly be attributed to him” prevented him from raising the unexhausted claims

in state court. Even if Petitioner were not aware of these additional issues on appeal, nothing

prevented Petitioner from seeking state habeas relief on the this basis. Thus, the Court FINDS

the R&R correctly concluded that Petitioner has not shown good cause because he was aware

of the additional unexhausted claims at the time he initiated collateral review in federal court.

(See R&R at 4.) Because the Court has determined that Petitioner has not shown good cause,

the Court need not address whether Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious

or whether Petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, this Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 7, 2006

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler

 All Parties 

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