Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01207/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01207-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

GALE A. NORTON, in her official

capacity as Secretary of the

Interior, et al., 

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-01207 OWW TAG

ORDER RE: KERN COUNTY WATER

AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO

INTERVENE (DOC 173)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, a coalition of environmental groups, challenge

the legal validity of a Biological Opinion issued by the United

States Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) concerning the

coordinated operation of the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and

State Water Project (“SWP”). Before the court for decision is a

motion to intervene filed by the Kern County Water Authority

(“KCWA”). (Doc. 173, filed Mar. 3, 2006.) Plaintiffs oppose. 

(Doc. 209, filed May 10, 2006.) Existing intervenor defendants

have filed statements of non-opposition to KCWA’s intervention. 

(Docs. 198 (Farm Bureau), 201 (DWR), 203 (Glenn-Colusa).) The

Federal Defendants have filed a statement indicating that they

take no position on KCWA’s intervention. (Doc. 200.)

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 6, 2005, this case was transferred to this

court from the Northern District of California. (Doc. 122.) 

Prior to the transfer, United States District Judge Claudia

Wilken decided three motions to intervene, filed by: the San Luis

& Delta-Mendota Water Authority and Westlands Water District

(collectively the “Authority”)(Doc. 5, filed March 14, 2005); the

California Farm Bureau Federation (“Farm Bureau”) (Doc. 19, filed

March 30, 2005); and the State Water Contractors (“SWC”) (Doc.

27, filed Apr. 8, 2005). Judge Wilken granted the Authority and

Farm Bureau’s motions, but denied SWC’s on the ground that SWC’s

interest “will be adequately represented by the Authority and the

Farm Bureau.” (Doc. 45 at 11, filed June 13, 2005.) SWC filed

an interlocutory appeal from that order. (Doc. 113.) 

On October 12, 2005, while the interlocutory appeal was

pending, the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) moved

to intervene. (Doc. 137.) Plaintiffs opposed, relying in part

on the reasoning set forth in Judge Wilken’s order denying

intervention to SWC. (Doc. 142) The district court granted

DWR’s motion, subject to certain conditions, reasoning that DWR

had unique interests in the litigation that could not and would

not be protected by the existing parties. (Doc. 164, Jan. 5,

2006.)

Also while SWC’s interlocutory appeal was still pending,

KCWA moved to intervene, advancing three supporting arguments. 

First, KCWA argues that the interests of entities receiving water

from the State Water Project would not be protected by the

existing parties. Second, that it supplies water for both

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farming and municipal users and that this dual role puts it in a

“far different position” from any existing intervenor-defendants. 

Finally, KCWA argues that it intends to advance a defense based

upon the Commerce Clause that no other party is willing to

pursue. (Doc. 173.) 

On April 19, 2006, prior to oral argument on KCWA’s motion

to intervene, the Ninth Circuit issued a memorandum opinion

concerning SWC’s interlocutory appeal, reversing Judge Wilken’s

denial of intervention. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that:

[G]iven the Contractors’ members’ exclusive interest in

a majority of the water contracts issued from the State

Water Project and Contractors’ unique interest in

defending the South Delta Improvement Program, there is

no assurance that all of the Contractors’ arguments

will be addressed if they are not included as parties

to this action. Moreover, as a result of its exclusive

interest in the State Water Project and the South Delta

Improvement Program, there are serious doubts that the

existing parties would protect those interests to the

same extent, particularly if the parties were to enter

into settlement discussions. Thus, because the “burden

in showing inadequate representation is minimal,” we

conclude that the Contractors should be allowed to

intervene. 

(Natural Resources Defense Council v. Norton, No. 05-16581,

Memorandum dated April 19, 2006, at 3-4.)

KCWA will stipulate to that its participation will be

limited to advancing only its Commerce Clause defense. 

Plaintiffs still oppose intervention. 

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A typical Delta smelt will live for only one year and 1

spend its entire lifespan in the Delta. 

4

III. BACKGROUND

A. The Central Valley Project, the State Water Project,

and the California Bay Delta.

This case concerns the coordinated operation of the

federally-managed Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and the State of

California’s State Water Project (“SWP”). The CVP alone is one

of the largest water projects in the world, managing annually

approximately nine million acre-feet of water. (Compl. at ¶25.)

The CVP is managed by the United States Department of the

Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) under licenses from

the California State Water Board. The SWP, the largest statebuilt water project in the country, is managed by the California

Department of Water Resources (“DWR”). Both projects divert

large volumes of water from the California Bay Delta (“Delta”)

and use the Delta to store water. The CVP, for example, operates

the Tracy Pumping Plant, which draws billions of gallons of water

per year out of the Delta and into the Delta-Mendota Canal. 

(Compl. at ¶25.) The SWP operates diversion facilities in both

the southern and northern Delta, which divert water into the

California Aqueduct (for distribution to the San Joaquin Valley

and points south) and the North Bay Aqueduct (for distribution to

Napa and Solano counties). 

The Delta, from which these CVP and SWP facilities draw

water, is home to a number of endangered and threatened species,

including the endangered delta smelt (Hypomesus transpacificus),

a small, slender-bodied fish endemic to the Delta.1

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Historically, the Delta smelt could be found throughout the

Delta, but the population has declined significantly in recent

years. (Compl. at ¶20.)

B. Coordinated Operations and The Endangered Species Act.

The state and federal agencies charged with management of

the CVP and SWP share certain facilities and coordinate

operations with one another pursuant to a Coordinated Operating

Agreement (“COA”). The COA, which originated in 1986, has

evolved over time to reflect, among other things, changing

facilities, delivery requirements, and regulatory restrictions. 

The most recent document concerning coordinated management is the

Operating Criteria and Plan (OCAP). The OCAP proposes a number

of changes to the coordinated operation of the CVP and SWP.

 Because the Delta smelt and a number of other endangered

and/or threatened species reside in the area affected by the CVP

and SWP, any coordinated management plan, including the OCAP, 

must comply with various provisions of the Endangered Species Act

(“ESA”). Specifically, prior to authorizing, funding, or

carrying out any action, a federal agency must first consult with

USFWS and/or the National Marine Fisheries’ Service (“NMFS”) to

“insure that [the] action...is not likely to jeopardize the

continued existence of any endangered species or threatened

species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of

habitat of such species which is determined...to be critical....”

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) [ESA § 7(a)(2)]. (This form of

consultation is called “formal consultation.” 50 C.F.R. 

§ 402.02.) In addition, an independent consultation obligation

arises under § 1536(a)(3) where the federal agency “has reason to

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believe that an endangered species or a threatened species may be

present in the area affected by this project and that

implementation of such action will likely affect such species.” 

(This form of consultation is called “early consultation.” 50

C.F.R. § 402.02.) 

In this case, the Bureau entered into formal and early

consultation with the USFWS concerning the OCAP. The

consultation process resulted in the issuance by the USFWS of a

Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) on June 30, 2004 (the “2004 OCAP

BiOp”).

On August 4, 2005, the Ninth Circuit decided Gifford Pinchot

Task Force v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,

1069 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that the USFWS’s definition of

“adverse modification” to critical habitat is an impermissible

interpretation of the ESA because it focuses on whether critical

habitat modifications would impact the survival of a species,

effectively ignoring the statutorily-mandated goal of “recovery.”

In November 4, 2004, presumably in response to this ruling, the

Bureau requested reinitiation of formal consultation to address

critical habitat issues.

Plaintiffs, a coalition of non-profit conservation

organizations, filed suit on February 15, 2005, alleging that the

2004 OCAP BiOp is legally inadequate in light of Gifford Pinchot

and should be invalidated. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs named as

defendants the Department of the Interior and the USFWS. (Id.) 

On February 16, 2005, USFWS issued an amended BiOp (the

“OCAP BiOp”), which superceded the 2004 OCAP BiOp. In this

document, the USFWS asserts that it relied on statutory

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provisions of the ESA, not on the regulatory definition of

adverse modification invalidated in Gifford Pinchot. 

C. Issues Addressed by the OCAP BiOp.

The OCAP BiOp addresses current-day operations of the CVP

and SWP as well as several future actions: (1) increasing flows

in the Trinity River; (2) “8500 Banks”; (3) operating permanent

barriers in the South Delta; (4) operating an intertie between

the California Aqueduct and the Delta-Mendota Canal; (5) a longterm Environmental Water Account (“EWA”); (6) delivery of CVP

water to the Freeport Regional Water Project (“FRWP”); and (7)

various other operational changes, including changes to a

monitoring program at the North Bay Aqueduct. (OCAP BiOp at 10;

76-77.) The OCAP BiOp concludes that the coordinated operation

of the SWP and CVP, including the proposed future actions, will

not jeopardize the Delta smelt’s continued existence. (OCAP BiOp

at 223.) 

D. The Claims in this Case.

Plaintiffs filed a First Supplemental Complaint on May 20,

2005, which modified the central claims in the case in light of

the 2005 OCAP BiOp. The charging allegations are summarized in

Paragraphs 30 through 34:

30. The Biological Opinion states baldly that [USFWS]

relied on the statutory provisions of the ESA and not

the regulatory definition of adverse modification when

reaching its conclusions. However, this statement is

not supported by any new analysis or by the few changes

made to the original biological opinion, and no new

definition of adverse modification is provided or

applied.

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31. In reaching a “no jeopardy” conclusion, the

Biological Opinion relies heavily on certain existing

or potential future protective measures, the adequacy

of which has not been demonstrated, and several of

which may not be implemented in the form assumed by the

Biological Opinion or at all. The Bureau has a long

history of disregarding or violating such protective

measures. For example, the Bureau failed to

consistently meet the conservation obligations agreed

upon in the biological opinions for the Friant Unit

long- and short-term renewal contracts. In addition, in

multiple years since the endangered Sacramento River

winter-run Chinook salmon and the threatened delta

smelt were listed under the ESA, the Bureau and the

California Department of Water Resources have operated

the CVP and SWP in such a way that the ESA-mandated

incidental take limits for both species have been

exceeded.

32. Among other defects, the Biological Opinion assumes

benefits to the delta smelt from future, long-term

implementation of an Environmental Water Account (EWA).

The Environmental Water Account as it presently exists

is a water redistribution program that maintains

exports to entities with contracts for water from the

Delta when protections for delta smelt or certain other

species are put into effect. At the time the original

biological opinion was signed, however, the thenexisting EWA was scheduled to expire by September 2004.

Although both the original and the revised Biological

Opinion assume a future EWA, the Biological Opinion

also states that “inclusion of the EWA in this

description does not constitute a decision on future

implementation of the EWA.” See Biological Opinion at

84. Any benefits to delta smelt from any long-term EWA

are, at best, speculative. Moreover, the Biological

Opinion’s characterization of the EWA does not agree

with the description provided by the Bureau in the June

30, 2004 OCAP when consultation with the Service was

requested.

33. Recognizing that assumed protective measures may be

inadequate and, indeed, may not even be fully carried

out, the Biological Opinion provides for an “adaptive

management” process under which the Bureau and certain

fisheries management agencies would discuss and

potentially agree to further changes in the CVP

operations that affect delta smelt through an “adaptive

management” process. However, the Biological Opinion

does not provide any assurance of any particular level

of protection for the delta smelt as a result of this

promise of future “adaptive management.”

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34. The Biological Opinion’s adaptive management

process involves the use of a so-called “Delta Smelt

Risk Assessment Matrix” as a decision-making tool

intended to be used by a Working Group to monitor the

effects of the CVP and SWP on the delta smelt. The

Matrix is a tool to identify when delta smelt may be

negatively affected by a project and to suggest

possible management strategies. The Biological Opinion

generally requires that the Working Group be informed

should the triggering conditions be met. However, the

Biological Opinion does not require that the Working

Group, or the Bureau, take any particular action if a

triggering condition occurs. No particular level of

protection for delta smelt or its critical habitat is

ensured.

(Compl. ¶¶ 30-34 (emphasis added).) 

E. The Moving Party.

KCWA is a special district formed by the California

Legislature in 1961, primarily for the purpose of acquiring water

supplies for its “member units.” KCWA is party to a contract

with the State of California to receive a supply of water from

the State Water Project. In turn, KCWA has contracted with its

member units, also public agencies, pursuant to which each member

unit receives a portion of KCWA’s SWP supply. The member units

deliver the water to farmers and municipalities. (KCWA delivers

water directly for use by the City of Bakersfield.) In total,

KCWA possesses contract rights to receive over one million acre

feet of water annually from the SWP (twenty-five percent of all

SWP water). 

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IV. DISCUSSION

KCWA moves both to intervene of right and, in the

alternative, to permissively intervene. 

A. Intervention as of Right.

1. Legal Standard.

Intervention is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

24. To intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2), an

applicant must claim an interest, the protection of which may, as

a practical matter, be impaired or impeded if the lawsuit

proceeds without the applicant. Forest Conservation Council v.

United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The Ninth Circuit applies Rule 24(a) liberally, in favor of

intervention, and requires a district court to “take all wellpleaded, non-conclusory allegations in the motion as true absent

sham, frivolity or other objections.” Southwest Ctr. for

Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A four part test is used to evaluate a motion for intervention of

right: 

(1) the motion must be timely; 

(2) the applicant must claim a "significantly

protectable" interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the action; 

(3) the applicant must be so situated that the

disposition of the action may as a practical

matter impair or impede its ability to protect

that interest; and 

(4) the applicant's interest must be inadequately

represented by the parties to the action. 

Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1493.

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2. Timeliness; Significant Protectable Interests;

Impairment of Interests.

There is essentially no dispute that KCWA satisfies the

first three elements for intervention of right.

In assessing timeliness, courts in the Ninth Circuit must

consider: (1) the current stage of the proceedings; (2) whether

the existing parties would be prejudiced; and (3) the reason for

any delay in moving to intervene. League of United Latin Am.

Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). In this

case, the district court set March 8, 2006 as the deadline for

motions to intervene March 8, 2006. (Doc. 171 at 6, filed Feb.

14, 2006.) KCWA timely moved to intervene on March 8, 2006. 

(Doc. 173.) The district court has not yet made any

jurisdictional or merits rulings in this case. Existing parties

are not prejudiced when “the motion was filed before the district

court made any substantive rulings.” Northwest Forest Resource

Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996). The

motion to intervene is timely.

To demonstrate a “significantly protectable interest,” “a

prospective intervenor must establish that (1) the interest

asserted is protectable under some law, and (2) there is a

relationship between the legally protected interest and the

claims at issue.” Id. A prospective intervenor has a sufficient

interest “where the contractual rights of the applicant may be

affected by a proposed remedy.” Forest Conservation Council, 66

F.3d at 1495. Here, among other remedies, Plaintiffs seek to

have the OCAP BiOp declared invalid and request injunctive relief

to prevent the defendants “from taking any action in reliance on

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the invalid Biological Opinion.” Either of these remedies would

affect “significant protectable interests” held by KCWA, which is

party to a contract with the State of California annually to

receive one million acre feet of SWP water. 

Finally, KCWA has demonstrated that disposition of this

action may impair or impede its ability to protect its contract

right. This requirement demands only a showing that the

applicant “would be substantially affected in a practical sense

by the determination made in an action.” Southwest Ctr. for

Biodiversity, 268 F.3d at 822. If the OCAP is invalidated, the

amount of water available under the State Water Project may be

reduced. 

3. Adequate Representation of KCWA’s Interest by

Existing Parties.

The remaining issue in dispute is whether KCWA’s interests

are adequately protected by other defendants or defendantintervenors. In assessing the adequacy of representation, the

Ninth Circuit looks at three factors: 

(1) whether the existing parties will undoubtedly make

all of the applicant’s arguments;

(2) whether the existing parties are capable of and

willing to make the applicant’s arguments; and

(3) whether the applicant offers a necessary element

to the proceedings that otherwise would be

neglected. 

Id. at 823. “[T]he requirement of inadequacy of representation

is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of its

interests may be inadequate....[T]he burden of making this

showing is minimal.” Sagebrush Rebellion Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d

525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983). 

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The parties advance divergent interpretations of the 2

Ninth Circuit’s presumption of adequacy rule, both citing the

following passage from Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086

(9th Cir. 2003) in support of its position: 

When an applicant for intervention and an existing

party have the same ultimate objective, a presumption

of adequacy of representation arises. League of United

Latin Am. Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1305. If the

applicant's interest is identical to that of one of the

present parties, a compelling showing should be

required to demonstrate inadequate representation.

Id. at 1086. Plaintiffs emphasize the first sentence, asserting

that, in this case, KCWA and numerous existing parties share the

same ultimate objective of shielding the OCAP-BiOp. Therefore,

according to Plaintiffs’ logic, KCWA must make a compelling

showing of inadequacy. KCWA suggests that this language actually

imposes a heightened burden upon Plaintiffs to establish that

KCWA’s interests are identical to those of the existing

intervenor-defendants. In support of this contention, KCWA

points out that Arakaki, in the paragraph before the above quoted

passage, cites Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 529

n.10 (1972), for the proposition that “[t]he requirement of [Rule

24] is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of

his interest ‘may be’ inadequate; and the burden of making that

showing should be treated as minimal.” But, KCWA’s

interpretation of Arakaki is not an entirely faithful one. The

language from Trbovich is in no way contrary to the position

advanced by Plaintiffs. Put simply, the analysis suggested by

the Ninth Circuit in Arakaki is as follows. First, a court must

examine whether “an applicant for intervention and an existing

party have the same ultimate objective.” 324 F.3d at 1086. If

this is the case “a presumption of adequacy of representation

arises.” In most cases, this presumption can be rebutted by a

minimal showing of inadequacy, as suggested by Trbovich. 

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It is “well-settled precedent in this circuit” that “[w]here

an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same

ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation

arises.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1305; 

see also Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir.

2003). This presumption is triggered here because KCWA and SWC 2

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Although Arakaki and Trbovich are arguably inconsistent with one

another, a district court is bound to follow the holdings of the

Ninth Circuit unless clearly in conflict with supervening

authority. See Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 750-51 (9th

Cir. 2005) (articulation of rule by circuit court is law of the

circuit, even if not technically necessary to disposition of

case). Arakaki controls with respect to the subset of cases in

which the applicant's interest is shown to be “identical to that

of one of the present parties.” In such cases, the applicant

must make a “compelling showing of inadequacy.” Neither Arakaki

nor Trbovich impose an additional burden of proof upon the party

opposing intervention.

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share the same ultimate objectives of upholding the validity of

the OCAP BiOP and ensuring continued delivery of water from the

SWP. However, the presumption is rebuttable upon a showing that

the applicant and the existing parties “do not have sufficiently

congruent interests.” Southwest Center for Biological Diversity,

268 F.3d at 823.

Initially, KCWA suggested that its interests diverge from

existing intervenor-defendants’ in several respects: (1) the

interests of entities receiving water from the State Water

Project would not be protected by the existing parties; (2) KCWA

supplies water for both farming and municipal users, putting it

in a “far different position” than any existing intervenordefendants; (3) KCWA intends to advance at the remedies stage a

defense based upon the Commerce Clause that no other party is

willing to pursue. (Doc. 173, filed March 8, 2006.) 

The first of these bases for a finding of divergence is no

longer valid after the Ninth Circuit’s decision granting SWC’s 

motion to intervene. SWC specifically represents the interests

of SWP contractors. 

It is not clear whether KCWA continues to rely on the second

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KCWA requests that the district court take judicial 3

notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of the “Notice of

Ruling and Request to Expedite Oral Argument” which was filed by

SWC with the Ninth Circuit on January 10, 2006. (See Doc. 175.)

As the document is a public record subject to judicial notice,

this request is granted. 

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basis for intervention. KCWA has not offered any support, legal

or logical, for its assertion that the existence of municipal

users within its jurisdiction alters the nature of its interests

in this litigation vis-a-vis any other SWP contractor, already

represented by SWC. 

KWCA’s remaining contention to justify intervention is its

intent to assert the so-called “Commerce Clause defense”. KCWA

describes this defense as follows:

[T]he Secretary of the Interior lacks authority under

the Commerce Clause to apply Section 7 of the ESA on

behalf of the delta smelt, which has no apparent role

in interstate commerce and whose habitat is located

entirely within the State of California. (See United

States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). Thus [KCWA]

will contend that the operations of the CVP and [SWP],

as they apply to the delta smelt, do not substantially

affect interstate commerce. 

(Doc. 173 at 13.) KCWA does not clearly explain how or in what

context this so-called “defense” would be raised during the

remedies phase. Apparently, SWC has informed the Ninth Circuit

that it has no intention to pursue the Commerce Clause defense

before the district court. (See Doc. 175 at 5.) KCWA agrees 3

voluntarily limit its participation in this lawsuit to only

raising this single issue of the Commerce Clause defense. 

Plaintiffs nonetheless oppose KCWA’s intervention.

The question is whether KCWA’s interests are identical to

those of the existing parties. Specifically, does KCWA’s desire

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to advance the Commerce Clause defense create sufficient

divergence? “Where parties share the same ultimate objective,

differences in litigation strategy do not normally justify

intervention.” Id. at 1086. Where the existing parties will

“make all arguments necessary to defend [the applicant]”

intervention should not be permitted. Id. In Arakaki, the

applicant argued that the existing defendants would not raise a

particular defense. Based upon the record, the Ninth Circuit

found that the existing parties “will adequately represent [the

applicant’s] interest at trial...[because they] will make all

arguments necessary to defend [the applicant].” Here, SWC has

confirmed that it will not pursue the Commerce Clause defense in

the district court. Plaintiffs nevertheless object to

intervention on the ground that the Commerce Clause defense is

not “necessary” to KCWA’s defense because the argument (1)is not

relevant and (2) has been “universally rejected by every Court of

Appeals that has confronted it, and the Supreme Court has

uniformly declined to review those appellate decisions.” 

KCWA responds that plaintiffs are “seeking court orders that

would result in SWP operations being altered until, and after, a

new BO is prepared and approved. At that point, the scope of ESA

authority to regulate operations of the State Water Project

becomes very relevant.” (Doc. 209, KCWA’s Reply, at 6.) KCWA

also adds that “this issue of how the ESA applies to the

sovereign activities of the State, in the context of the reach of

the commerce clause, has never been litigated.” (Id.)

The Commerce Clause defense rases issues which have not

previously succeeded in any circuit. However, the test for

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intervention is not whether the defense has merit in the context

of this case, where the State of California has managed the SWP

cooperatively with the federal government for many years. the

merits of the defense cannot be addressed dispositively without

notice and opportunity to be heard. 

Plaintiffs express concern that litigating this issue here

will unnecessarily complicate the litigation, and overburden

their resources, suggesting that it might be more appropriate for

KCWA to raise this issue in a separate lawsuit. Requiring KCWA

to bring a separate action would likely only delay the

proceedings and unnecessarily burden judicial and party

resources. KCWA’s Commerce Clause defense is integrally related

to the subject matter of this case and a separate lawsuit based

on the defense would likely become the subject of a transfer

and/or consolidation motion. Allowing KCWA to raise the defense

here will not “unnecessarily complicate the litigation.” If the

defense is meritless, a Rule 12 or other dispositive motion

should appropriately address its efficacy.

Plaintiffs object separately to KCWA’s suggestion that it be

permitted to raise the Commerce Clause defense during the

remedies phase of the case, arguing that interjection of the

defense at that stage may unnecessarily delay resolution and

thereby further jeopardize the Delta smelt. This is a valid

concern. KCWA has indicated that it is prepared to advance the

Commerce Clause defense according to the existing dispositive

motions schedule. This approach will permit decision on the

Commerce Clause defense in a more timely manner.

Finally, Plaintiffs express concern about the growing number

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of intervenors and the potential burden placed on Plaintiffs if

required to respond to full-length briefs from all opposing

parties. All parties agreed to address this concern at the upcoming case management conference.

B. Permissive Intervention.

Alternatively, KCWA requests permission to permissively

intervene pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2), which provides that a court

may, in its discretion, permit intervention, “when an applicant's

claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or

fact in common.” In exercising its discretion the court “shall

consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice

the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” Id.

The language of the rule makes clear that if the would

be intervenor's claim or defense contains no question

of law or fact that is raised also by the main action,

intervention under Rule 24(b)(2) must be denied. But,

if there is a common question of law or fact, the

requirement of the rule has been satisfied and it is

then discretionary with the court whether to allow

intervention.

Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1111 (9th Cir.

2002). “Where proposed intervenors would present no new

questions to the court, a motion for permissive intervention is

properly denied.” Hallco Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Quaeck, 161 F.R.D.

98, 103 (D. Or. 1995). Here, KCWA plans to present one new legal

issue, concerning its Commerce Clause defense. 

//

//

//

//

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V. CONCLUSION

KCWA’s motion to intervene as a matter of right is GRANTED,

conditioned upon strictly limiting its participation to

presenting the Commerce Clause defense. Further conditions on

briefing length may be imposed at the case management conference. 

SO ORDERED

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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