Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-01021/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-01021-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint 1

screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires

the court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from

a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

 ____________________________

IRA C. TODD *

Plaintiff, *

v. * 3:07-CV-1021-WKW

 (WO)

SHERIFF J. JONES, et al., *

Defendants. * 

 ____________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Ira Todd [“Todd”], an inmate incarcerated at the Lee County Detention

Center, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 20, 2007. He complains

that Defendants improperly destroyed or misplaced his personal property on or about

September 15, 2007. Todd requests that his personal articles be returned to him or that he

be reimbursed for the value of the lost/destroyed property. Upon review of the complaint,

the undersigned concludes dismissal of this case prior to service of process is proper under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); see also 1

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992).

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I. DISCUSSION

Todd complain that Defendants improperly lost and/or destroyed his personal property

in violation of his due process rights. Insofar as Todd’s complaint about the allegedly

improper loss or destruction of his property is concerned, the court finds that under no set of

facts is he entitled to relief. 

"If the [property from Plaintiff's cell] was not returned because

of [Defendants’] negligence, there has been no unconstitutional

deprivation of property. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (negligent loss of property does

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.) If

[Defendants] intentionally refused to return the [property],

plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation. In Hudson v.

Palmer the Court ruled that an 'unauthorized intentional

deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute

a violation of the Due Process Clause . . . if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.' 104 S.Ct. at 3202,

82 L.Ed.2d at 407. It is essential to [the instant] complaint that

it allege that [Defendants] acted without authorization. If

[Defendants] w[ere] acting pursuant to authorization, [their]

actions would be within the outer perimeter of [their] duties and

would not have violated any clearly established constitutional

right and therefore [they] would be immune from suit. See

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1691-

92, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Flinn v. Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551, 1553

(11 Cir.1985). Only if the complaint is construed as alleging th

that [Defendants] w[ere] acting in bad faith outside the scope of

[their] duties can it evade the doctrine of official immunity. 

Rodriguez-Mora v. Baker, 792 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11 Cir. 1986). See also Holloway v. th

Walker, 790 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (5 Cir. 1986) (finding no breach of federally guaranteed th

constitutional rights, even where a high level state employee intentionally engages in tortuous

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conduct, as long as the state system as a whole provides due process of law); Myers v.

Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94-95 (5 Cir. 1996) (“the Parratt [v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 th

(1981)]/Hudson [v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)] doctrine protects the state from liability

for failing to provide a pre-deprivation process in situations where it cannot anticipate the

random and unauthorized actions of its officers.” The complainant bears the burden of

establishing that the state's post-deprivation remedy is inadequate). 

The State of Alabama, through its Board of Adjustment, provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for Todd to seek redress for the loss of his property. Ala. Code § 41-9-60

et seq. (1982). In light of this adequate state remedy, Todd’s allegation that Defendants

violated his due process rights by improperly losing or destroying his personal property,

whether such was the result of negligence or an intentional act, lacks an arguable basis in the

law and is, therefore, subject to dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff's

complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

 It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before December 10, 2007. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects.

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Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The

parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore,

it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein th

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the th

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done, this 27 day of November 2007. th

 /s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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