Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17634/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17634-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RANDOLPH WOLFSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COLLEEN CONCANNON, in her

official capacity as member of the

Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; LOUIS FRANK DOMINGUEZ,

in his official capacity as member of

the Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; PETER J. ECKERSTROM, in

his official capacity as member of

the Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; GEORGE H. FOSTER, in his

official capacity as member of the

Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; SHERRY L. GEISLER, in her

official capacity as member of the

Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; MICHAEL O. MILLER, in

his official capacity as member of

the Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; ANGELA H. SIFUENTES, in

her official capacity as secretary of

the Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; CATHERINE M. STEWART,

in her official capacity as member of

the Arizona Commission on Judicial

No. 11-17634

D.C. No.

3:08-cv-08064-

FJM

OPINION

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2 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

Conduct; J. TYRELL TABER, in his

official capacity as member of the

Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; LAWRENCE F. WINTHROP,

in his official capacity as member of

the Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; MARET VESSELLA, Chief

Bar Counsel of the State Bar of

Arizona,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 11, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed May 9, 2014

Before: Richard A. Paez, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez;

Concurrence by Judge Berzon;

Dissent by Judge Tallman

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 3

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Arizona state officials and remanded an

action brought by an unsuccessful candidate for judicial

office in Mohave County, Arizona, who alleged that several

provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct,

restricting judicial candidate speech, violated the First

Amendment.

The panel emphasized that its analysis of the challenged

provisions was based on plaintiff’s status as a non-judge

candidate. Applying strict scrutiny, the panel held that

the Code’s solicitation clause, Rule 4.1(A)(6), was

unconstitutional as applied to non-judge judicial candidates

because it restricted speech that presented little to no risk of

corruption or bias towards future litigants and was not

narrowly tailored to serve those state interests. The panel

held that the political activities clauses of the Code, Rules

4.1(A)(2)–(5), were not sufficientlynarrowlytailored to serve

the state’s interest in an impartial judiciary, and were thus

unconstitutional restrictions on the political speech of nonjudge candidates.

Concurring, Judge Berzon stated that the panel’s opinion

addressed the constitutionality of certain provisions of the

Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct only as they apply to

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

judicial candidates who, like plaintiff, had not yet ascended

to the bench. 

Dissenting in part, Judge Tallman stated that Rules

4.1(a)(2) (giving speeches on behalf of others), (3) (endorsing

others), and (4) (soliciting money for others), were

constitutional because they were narrowly tailored to serve

the state’s compelling interest in maintaining judicial

impartiality and its appearance.

COUNSEL

Anita Y. Woudenberg (argued), The Bopp Law Firm, Terre

Haute, Indiana, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Charles A. Grube (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, Arizona, for

Defendants-Appellees Colleen Concannon, Louis Frank

Dominguez, Peter J. Eckerstrom, George H. Foster, SherryL.

Geisler, Michael O. Miller, Angela H. Sifuentes, Catherine

M. Stewart, Tyrell Taber, and Lawrence F. Winthrop in their

official capacities as members of the Arizona Commission on

Judicial Conduct; Kimberly A. Demarchi (argued), Lewis

Roca Rothgerber LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for DefendantAppellee Maret Vessella, Chief Bar Counsel of the State Bar

of Arizona.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 5

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

A state sets itself on a collision course with the First

Amendment when it chooses to popularly elect its judges but

restricts a candidate’s campaign speech. The conflict arises

from the fundamental tension between the ideal of apolitical

judicial independence and the critical nature of unfettered

speech in the electoral political process. Here we must decide

whether several provisions in the Arizona Code of Judicial

Conduct restricting judicial candidate speech run afoul of

First Amendment protections. Because we are concerned

with content-based restrictions on electioneering-related

speech, those protections are at their apex. Arizona, like

every other state, has a compelling interest in the reality and

appearance of an impartial judiciary, but speech restrictions

must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. We hold that

several provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct

unconstitutionally restrict the speech of non-judge candidates

because the restrictions are not sufficiently narrowly tailored

to survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly, we reverse the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

I.

Arizona counties with fewer than 250,000 people

popularly elect local judicial officers. See Ariz. Const. art.

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6 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

VI, §§ 12, 40.1 The Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct2(the

“Code”) regulates the conduct of judges campaigning for

retention and judicial candidates campaigning for office. The

Code provides for discipline if a candidate is elected as a

judge, but lawyers who are unsuccessful in their candidacy

may also be subject to discipline under the Arizona Rules of

Professional Conduct.3

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17A, Sup.

Ct. Rules, Rule 42, Rules of Prof. Conduct, ER 8.2 (2003).

Plaintiff Randolph Wolfson was an unsuccessful

candidate for judicial office in Mohave County, Arizona in

2006 and 2008. Wolfson I, 616 F.3d at 1052–53. He intends

to run in a future election. Id. at 1054–55. As a candidate,

Wolfson wished to conduct a number of activities he believed

to be prohibited by the Code, but refrained from doing so,

fearing professional discipline.4 He brought this action

1 Arizona Supreme Court and appellate court judges and judicial officers

in counties with a population greater than 250,000 (and smaller counties

that vote to do so) use a system of merit selection with retention elections.

Ariz. Const. art. VI, §§ 37, 38, 40.

2 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17A, Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 81, Code of Jud.

Conduct (2009). After Wolfson filed his complaint, the Code was revised,

effective September 1, 2009. The revision to the Code recodified and

renumbered the Rules, but did not alter the substance of the challenged

Rules at issue in this appeal. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045,

1053 (9th Cir. 2010) (Wolfson I).

 

3

 “An unsuccessful judicial candidate who is a lawyer and violates this

code may be subject to discipline under applicable court rules governing

lawyers.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17A, Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 81, Code of

Jud. Conduct, Canon 4, cmt. 2 (2009).

4 Wolfson alleges that he wanted personally to solicit campaign

contributions at live appearances and speaking engagements, and by

making phone calls and signing his name to letters seeking donations.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 7

challenging the facial and as-applied constitutionality of

certain provisions of the Code, seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief. Defending this appeal are the members of

the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct (the

“Commission”) and Arizona Chief Bar Counsel (“State Bar

Counsel”), collectively the “Arizona defendants.”5

Wolfson challenges five clauses of Rule 4.1 of the Code

(the “Rules”):

(A) A judge or judicial candidate shall not do

any of the following:

. . . .

(2) make speeches on behalf of a political

organization or another candidate for public

office;

(3) publicly endorse or oppose another

candidate for any public office;

(4) solicit funds for or pay an assessment

to a political organization or candidate, make

contributions to any candidate or political

organization in excess of the amounts

permitted by law, or make total contributions

Wolfson I, 616 F.3d at 1052. He also alleges that he wanted to endorse

other candidates for office and support their election campaigns. Id.

5 Wolfson voluntarily dismissed all claims against a third defendant, the

Arizona Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission. Wolfson v. Brammer,

822 F. Supp. 2d 925, 926–27 (D. Ariz. 2011) (Wolfson II).

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8 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

in excess of fifty percent of the cumulative

total permitted by law . . . .

(5) actively take part in any political

campaign other than his or her own campaign

for election, reelection or retention in office;

(6) personally solicit or accept campaign

contributions other than through a campaign

committee authorized by Rule 4.4 . . . .6

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17A, Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 81, Code of

Jud. Conduct (2009).

This is the second time that this case is before us. We

previously held in Wolfson I that Wolfson’s challenges to

these clauses (hereinafter the “solicitation” clause (6) and

“political activities” clauses, (2)–(5)) were justiciable and

remanded them to the district court to consider them on the

merits. Wolfson I, 616 F.3d at 1054–62, 1066–67. With

respect to his challenge to a now-defunct “pledges and

promises” clause, we held that Wolfson lacked standing to

challenge it insofar as it applied to the speech of judges. Id.

at 1064. “Wolfson cannot assert the constitutional rights of

judges when he is not, and may never be, a member of that

group.” Id.

On remand, ruling on cross-motions for summary

judgment, the district court applied a balancing test

articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Siefert v. Alexander,

608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010), and Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d

6 Arizona’s Code closely tracks the American Bar Association’s Model

Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.1 (2011).

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 9

704 (7th Cir. 2010), and upheld the constitutionality of the

five challenged Code provisions. Wolfson II, 822 F. Supp. 2d

at 929–30. The balancing test from Siefert/Bauer “derives

from the line of Supreme Court cases upholding the limited

power of governments to restrict their employees’ political

speech in order to promote the efficiency and integrity of

government services.” Id. at 929. The district court held that

this standard “strikes an appropriate balance between the

weaker First Amendment rights at stake and the stronger

State interests in regulating the way it chooses its judges,”

apparently because the speech at issue was not “core speech”

deserving of strict scrutiny but “behavior short of true

speech.” Id. at 929–30.

The district court proceeded to balance the interests of the

state against the interests of a judicial candidate. With

respect to the political activities restrictions (the campaigning

and endorsement clauses), the district court held that

“[e]ndorsements, making speeches, and soliciting funds on

behalf of other candidates is not . . . core political speech.”

Id. at 931. The district court distinguished between

announcing one’s own political views or qualifications—

speech protected by Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536

U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (White I )—and the type of speech

prohibited by the Rules, which only “advance[s] other

candidates’ political aspirations, or . . . garner[s] votes byway

of political coattails.” Wolfson II, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 931–32. 

Moreover, although the district court recognized that its

review was “limited to the constitutionality of the Rules as

applied to judicial candidates who are not also sitting judges,”

id. at 928, it nonetheless

reject[ed] the suggestion that judicial

candidates ought to enjoy greater freedom to

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10 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

engage in partisan politics than sitting judges.

An asymmetrical electoral process for judges

is unworkable. Fundamental fairness requires

a level playing field among judicial

contenders. Candidates for judicial office

must abide by the same rules imposed on the

judges they hope to become.

Id. at 932. The district court assumed the constitutional

validity of the Rules restricting political activities as applied

to sitting judges, holding that “the Pickering line of cases

[upholding the government’s power to restrict employees’

political speech to promote efficiency and integrity of

government services] remains relevant to restrictions on the

speech of sitting judges.” Id. The court concluded that Rules

4.1(A)(2)–(5) appropriately balanced the state’s interest in

“protecting the due process rights of litigants and ensuring the

real and perceived impartiality of the judiciary” against a

candidate’s interest in “participating in the political

campaigns of other candidates” and upheld the political

activities clauses as constitutional. Id.

As for the solicitation clause (Rule 4.1(A)(6)) prohibiting

a judicial candidate from “personally solicit[ing] or

accept[ing] campaign contributions other than through a

campaign committee,” the district court held that it was

constitutional as applied to non-judge candidates because it

struck “a constitutional balance” between the state’s interest

in the appearance and actuality of an impartial judiciary and

a candidate’s need for funds. Id. at 931. The district court

found that all forms of personal solicitation, whether inperson or via signed mass mailings, created “the same risk of

coercion and bias.” Id. Wolfson timely appealed.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 11

II.

A.

We review de novo an order granting summary judgment

on the constitutionality of a statute. See Nunez by Nunez v.

City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1997).

B.

Wolfson seeks to invalidate the challenged Rules on their

face, including as to sitting judges campaigning for retention

or reelection. In Wolfson I, however, we held that “Wolfson

cannot assert the constitutional rights of judges when he is

not, and may never be, a member of that group.” 616 F.3d at

1064. Nonetheless, although we reject the Arizona

defendants’ argument, which the district court adopted, that

the balancing test applicable to government employee speech

cases also applies to sitting judges and thus fairly extends to

non-judge candidates campaigning for office, we must

establish the scope of our review of the challenged Rules.

We decline to adopt the district court’s approach because

such reasoning requires a series of unnecessary constitutional

decisions.

7 Rather, our analysis of the challenged Rules is

7 We find no Supreme Court authority extending the limited First

Amendment protection for public employee speech to judicial candidate

speech, and we decline to answer the hypothetical question of whether

sitting judges are sufficiently similar to rank-and-file government

employees to warrant such application. See, e.g., White I, 536 U.S at 796

(Kennedy, J., concurring). We also find no Supreme Court authority

extending the limited First Amendment protection for employee speech to

a private citizen who is not currently a government employee but merely

seeks to become one. Id. (“Petitioner Gregory Wersal was not a sitting

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12 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

based on Wolfson’s status as a non-judge candidate. While

the Rules apply to judges whether or not a judge is actively

campaigning for retention or reelection, they only apply to

non-judge candidates during an election campaign for judicial

office.8 There is a meaningful distinction in how the Rules

actuallyapply to judges versus non-judge candidates that may

warrant distinct levels of scrutiny. Regulated non-judge

speech only takes place during a campaign. As noted above,

political speech is subject to the highest degree of First

Amendment protection. Because Wolfson’s desired speech

would only take place in the context of a political campaign

for judicial office, we do not decide whether the restrictions

as applied to judges—whether campaigning or not—fit into

the “narrow class of speech restrictions” that may be

constitutionally permissible if “based on an interest in

allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.” 

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341

(2010).

We are not persuaded that “fundamental fairness,” see

Wolfson II, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 929, warrants making an

advisory decision about the constitutional speech rights of

judges who are not presently before us and whose rights

judge but a challenger; he had not voluntarily entered into an employment

relationship with the State or surrendered any First Amendmentrights. His

speech may not be controlled or abridged in this manner.”). Nor do we

take a position on a question explicitly unresolved by the Supreme Court

in White I: whether the First Amendment “requires campaignsfor judicial

office to sound the same as those for legislative office.” Id. at 783

(majority opinion).

8

“When a person becomes a judicial candidate, this canon becomes

applicable to his or her conduct.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17A, Sup. Ct.

Rules, Rule 81, Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 4, cmt. 2 (2009).

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 13

Wolfson cannot assert, Wolfson I, 616 F.3d at 1064. Under

strict scrutiny, see Part III.A, the proponents of a speech

regulation must establish a compelling state interest served by

the regulation. Neither the Commission nor the State Bar

Counsel has argued that Arizona has a compelling state

interest in applying the same election regulations to

incumbent sitting judges as to candidates who are not sitting

judges—only that such an equal application is principled,

logical, and fair.

Our decision to limit our review to non-judge candidates

is ultimately based on judicial restraint. We need not decide

today what restrictions on judges’ speech are constitutionally

justified by the interest in allowing the judiciary to function

optimally, nor are we squarely presented with that question. 

We neither “‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in

advance of the necessity of deciding it’ nor ‘formulate a rule

of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise

facts to which it is to be applied.’” Wash. State Grange v.

Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)

(quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)

(Brandeis, J., concurring)). The only constitutional question

we address is whether the challenged Rules violate the First

Amendment rights of non-judge candidates.

III.

A.

Strict scrutiny applies to this First Amendment challenge. 

The regulations in question are content- and speaker-based

restrictions on political speech, which receives the most

stringent First Amendment protection. Republican Party of

Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 748–49 (8th Cir. 2005) (White

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14 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

II); see also Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent.

Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (“[T]he First Amendment

has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered

during a campaign for political office.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). We recently applied strict scrutiny to

another state statute regulating judicial elections because it

was, “on its face, a content-based restriction on political

speech and association [which] thereby threaten[ed] to

abridge a fundamental right.” Sanders Cnty. Republican

Cent. Comm. v. Bullock, 698 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2012)

(holding unconstitutional a ban on political party

endorsement of judicial candidates).

Content-based restrictions on speech receive strict

scrutiny. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.,

529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). Here, the Rules at issue

censor speech based on content in the most

basic of ways: They prevent candidates from

speaking about some subjects [who they

endorse or on whose behalf they can speak if

that person is running for office or if the entity

is a political party] . . . ; and they prevent

candidates from asking for support in some

ways (campaign funds) but not in others (a

vote, yard signs).

Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 198–99 (6th Cir. 2010). 

The canons do not address any of the “categorical carve-outs”

of proscribable speech. See id. at 199. Nor are they the types

of regulations to which the Supreme Court has applied a less

rigorous standard of review, such as time, place and manner

restrictions, commercial speech, or expressive conduct. Id.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 15

Everysister circuit except the Seventh that has considered

similar regulations since White I has applied strict scrutiny as

the standard of review. See Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010,

1019 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 209

(2012); Carey, 614 F.3d at 198–99; White II, 416 F.3d at 749,

764–65; Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.

2002). We are not persuaded by the Seventh Circuit’s

approach, which the Arizona defendants urge us to adopt by

asking us to affirm the district court.

The Seventh Circuit treated the solicitation ban in Siefert

as a “campaign finance regulation” and applied the “closely

drawn scrutiny” framework of Buckley v. Valeo, 608 F.3d at

988 (citing 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)). The court

treated the solicitation ban like a restriction on a campaign

contribution—though by default, because the solicitation ban

was not an expenditure restriction. Id. Contrary to the

Arizona defendants’ argument, the solicitation clause at issue

here is not a restriction on a campaign contribution within the

meaning of Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27. Arizona’s

solicitation ban does nothing at all to limit contributions to a

judicial candidate’s campaign—either in amount or from

certain persons or groups. Contribution restrictions, like

those at issue in Buckley, restrict the speech of potential

contributors. 424 U.S. at 21–22. The Rule at issue here

restricts only the solicitation for the contributions—the

speech of the candidate.9

Indeed, Buckley says nothing at all

9

See also Carey, 614 F.3d at 200 (“[T]his argument [that the solicitation

clause is akin to a restriction on political donation subject to less rigorous

scrutiny] gives analogy a bad name. The solicitation clause does not set

a contribution limit, as in McConnell and similar cases. It flatly prohibits

speech, not donations, based on the topic (solicitation of a contribution)

and speaker (a judge or judicial candidate)—precisely the kind of content-

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16 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

about solicitation, other than to note that candidates will ask

for contributions. Buckley’s framework is inapposite here.10

Considering a rule prohibiting a judge or judicial

candidate from making endorsements or speaking on behalf

of a partisan candidate or platform, the Seventh Circuit

applied “a balancing approach” derived from a line of cases

determining the speech rights of government employees. 

Siefert, 608 F.3d at 983–87. As noted in Part II.B, here we

consider only the speech rights of Wolfson as a private citizen

and judicial candidate—not yet, and perhaps never, a

government employee. “[Wolfson] [i]s not a sitting judge but

a challenger; he ha[s] not voluntarily entered into an

employment relationship with the State or surrendered any

First Amendment rights. His speech may not be controlled or

abridged in this manner.” See White I, 536 U.S at 796

(Kennedy, J., concurring). For the reasons discussed above,

we decline to extend the rationale from the employee-speech

based regulations that traditionally warrant strict scrutiny.” (internal

citation omitted) (emphasis in original)).

 

10 Nor are we persuaded by the Commission defendants’ argument that

the rules prohibiting solicitation “do not involve core political speech,”

and that “[w]hen a candidate says ‘give me money,’ he adds nothing to the

full and fair expression of ideas that the First Amendment protects.” This

is a content-based distinction of pure speech that is not excepted from full

First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Int'l Soc. for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677 (1992) (“It is uncontested

that the solicitation at issue in this case is a form ofspeech protected under

the First Amendment.”); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't,

444 U.S. 620, 629 (1980) (“[S]oliciting funds involves interests protected

by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.”); Bates v.

State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977) (observing that the First

Amendment protects speech “in the form of a solicitation to pay or

contribute money”). This argument is wholly without merit.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 17

cases to apply a lower level of scrutiny to the restrictions on

Wolfson’s First Amendment rights during a judicial

campaign.

The Seventh Circuit also reasoned that a balancing

approach was appropriate because endorsements are “a

different form of speech” outside of “core” political speech

thus having “limited communicative value,” and when judges

make endorsements they are “speaking as judges, and trading

on the prestige of their office to advance other political ends.” 

Siefert, 608 F.3d at 983, 984, 986.11 We do not hold the same

view of endorsements by non-judge candidates. In Sanders

County, we held that endorsements of judicial candidates are

no different from other types of political speech: “Thus,

politicalspeech—including the endorsement of candidates for

office—is at the core of speech protected by the First

Amendment.” 698 F.3d at 745. Similarly, endorsements by

candidates for office is also political speech protected by the

First Amendment. Moreover, endorsements made by a nonjudge candidate cannot trade on the prestige of an office that

candidate does not yet hold.

We share the Seventh Circuit’s concerns about protecting

litigants’ due process rights, which we recognize as a

compelling state interest. That court reasoned that because

“restrictions on judicial speech may, in some circumstances,

be required by the Due Process Clause,” states could regulate

even political speech by judges if the regulations served the

state’s interest in protecting litigants’ constitutional right to

due process. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984. We agree that due

11 In this vein, the Commission defendants argue that endorsements have

“limited communicative value” other than the desire to be a political

powerbroker.

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18 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

process concerns are paramount, but this concern does not

justify a categorically lower level of constitutional scrutiny

for political speech by judicial candidates. Applying strict

scrutiny, we can adequately assess whether regulations on a

judicial candidate’s political speech are narrowly tailored to

serve the state’s compelling interest in protecting litigants’

due process rights. Narrow tailoring is most appropriate. 

Although we could scarcely imagine a more compelling state

interest, we also recognize that “due process” concerns arise

not in the ether, but “only . . . in the context of judicial

proceedings.” See Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or

Suppression: Due Process and the Response to Judicial

Campaign Speech, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 563, 613 (2004).12

We are mindful of the fact that we should endeavor to protect

litigants from even the “potential for due process violations”

or the “probability of unfairness.” See White I, 536 U.S. at

815–16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The potential for and probability

of a problem that in actuality arises only in real cases does

not, however, translate into a generalized concern about the

appearance or reality of an impartial judiciary warranting a

lower level of scrutiny. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit identified

the flaw in this argument.

It is the general practice of electing judges,

not the specific practice of judicial

campaigning, that gives rise to impartiality

concerns because the practice of electing

judges creates motivations for sitting judges

12

“Even if a judicial candidate campaigned solely on the basis of his

hatred and vindictiveness toward Joe Smith and the candidate were

elected, no due process problem would be presented if Joe Smith were

never involved in litigation or other proceedings before that judge.” Id.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 19

and prospective judges in election years and

non-election years to say and do things that

will enhance their chances of being elected.

Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1320; accord White I, 536 U.S. at 792

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“If the State has a problem with

judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon

itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing

judges.”).13 Moreover, there is an equally compelling state

interest in the free flow of information during a political

campaign. “Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is the

right of the voters, not the State.” White I, 536 U.S. at 794

(Kennedy, J., concurring). Whether and to what extent a

judicial candidate chooses to engage in activities such as

endorsing and making speeches on behalf of other candidates,

fundraising for or taking part in other political campaigns, or

asking for contributions is information that the electorate can

use to decide whether he or she is qualified to hold judicial

office. “The vast majority of states have judicial elections

because of a belief that judges as government officials should

be accountable to their constituents. By making this choice,

the states, by definition, are turning judges into politicians.” 

Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial

Candidates Are Unconstitutional, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 735, 736

13 See also Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 294 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)

(Reinhardt, J., concurring), vacated on other grounds, 501 U.S. 312

(1991) (“The State of California cannot have it both ways. If it wants to

elect its judges, it cannot deprive its citizens of a full and robust election

debate. . . . Whether a judicial candidate wishes to make his views known

on those issues during the electoral process is another matter. So is the

question whether it is proper for him to do so. But those are all problems

inherent in California’s decision to conduct judicial elections. If

California wishes to elect its judges, it must allow free speech to prevail

in the election process.”).

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20 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

(2002). Along with knowing a candidate’s views on legal or

political issues, voters have a right to know how political their

potential judge might be.14 To the extent states wish to avoid

a politicized judiciary, they can choose to do so by not

electing judges.

B.

Under strict scrutiny, the Arizona defendants have the

burden to prove that the challenged Rules further a

compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve that

interest. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. First we consider

Arizona’s state interests. Then, we analyze whether the

solicitation clause (Rule 4.1(A)(6)) and the political activities

clauses (Rules 4.1(A)(2)–(5)) are narrowly tailored to serve

those interests.

1.

Every court to consider the issue has affirmed that states

have a compelling interest in the appearance and actuality of

an impartial judiciary. See, e.g., White I, 536 U.S. at 775–76. 

The meaning of “impartiality” is lack of bias for or against

either party to a case. Id. at 775. This definition accords with

the idea that due process violations arise only in case-specific

14

See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention To That Man Behind

The Robe: Elections, The First Amendment, and Judges As Politicians,

21 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 301, 356 (2003) (“[S]tates that have rejected the

federal model of judicial independence have necessarily accepted (if not

celebrated) that some level of electoral accountability will play a part in

their judges’ decisions. Accordingly, because there is nothing ‘corrupt’

about the functioning of democracy, limiting speech so as to conceal the

part that electoral politics does play in judicial decisions cannot be

constitutionally justified.”).

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 21

contexts. The Supreme Court has also recognized that states

have a compelling interest in preventing corruption or the

appearance of corruption through campaign finance

regulations. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27; see also Citizens

United, 558 U.S. at 357. Thus, we recognize that Arizona has

a compelling interest in an uncorrupt judiciary that appears to

be and is impartial to the parties who appear before its judges.

The Arizona defendants also argue for two other

compelling interests that we do not find persuasive. First, the

Commission defendants argue that “the State has a

compelling interest in preventing candidates (who will after

all be the next judges if and when elected) from trampling on

the interests of impartiality and public confidence.” This

argument is, essentially, that states have a compelling interest

in regulating candidates’ speech; we do not find an interest in

regulating speech per se to be compelling. We do agree,

however, that states have a compelling interest in maintaining

public confidence in the judiciary. In a similar vein, State

Bar Counsel argues that Arizona has a compelling interest in

avoiding “judicial campaign abuses that threaten to imperil

public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s

elected judges.” But, as explained above, any imperilment of

public confidence has its roots in the very nature of judicial

elections, and not in the speech of candidates who must

participate in those elections to become judges. See White I,

536 U.S. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring).15

If a judicial

candidate wishes to engage in politicking to achieve a seat on

15 The reality is that the Rules do not “change the circumstances or

pressures that cause the candidates to want to make [prohibited]

statements,” and that “[j]udicial campaign speech codes are therefore

much more about maintaining appearances by hiding reality than about

changing reality.” Friedland, 104 Colum. L. Rev. at 612.

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22 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

the bench, keeping the public ignorant of that fact may

conceal valuable information about how well that candidate

may uphold the office of an ideally impartial, apolitical

adjudicator.

Second, the Commission defendants argue that Arizona

has a compelling interest in “preventing judges and judicial

candidates from using the prestige of their office or potential

office for purposes not related to their judicial duties.” We

are not persuaded by this argument as applied to non-judge

candidates, who cannot abuse the prestige of an office they do

not yet and may never hold.

2.

The solicitation clause prohibits a judicial candidate from

“personallysolicit[ing] or accept[ing] campaign contributions

other than through a campaign committee authorized byRule

4.4.” Rule 4.1(A)(6).16 The Code defines “personally solicit”

as “a direct request made by a judge or a judicial candidate

for financial support or in-kind services, whether made by

letter, telephone, or any other means of communication.” 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17A, Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 81, Code of

Jud. Conduct, “Terminology” (2009). We hold that Rule

16 Wolfson argues that Rule 4.1(A)(4) is also a restriction on solicitation,

because he wishes to solicit contributions to his own campaign committee,

which he considers to be a “political organization.” But the Code

explicitly carves out a judicial candidate’s campaign committee from the

definition of “political organization.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17A,

Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 81, Code of Jud. Conduct, “Terminology” (2009). 

Therefore, we analyze Rule 4.1(A)(4) alongside (A)(2)–(3) and (5),

because it prohibits a judicial candidate from soliciting funds on behalf of

or donating to a specific political organization or candidate—classic

political campaigning activities.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 23

4.1(A)(6) is unconstitutional as applied to non-judge judicial

candidates because it restricts speech that presents little to no

risk of corruption or bias towards future litigants and is not

narrowly tailored to serve those state interests.

Arizona’s sweeping definition of “personally solicit”

encompasses methods not likely to impinge on even the

appearance of impartiality. The Sixth Circuit recently

invalidated a similar clause in Kentucky that also extended

beyond one-on-one, in-person solicitations to group

solicitations, telephone calls, and letters. Carey, 614 F.3d at

204. We agree with our sister court’s cogent analysis of this

issue. “[I]ndirect methods of solicitation [such as speeches to

large groups and signed mass mailings] present little or no

risk of undue pressure or the appearance of a quid pro quo.” 

Id. at 205. The clauses are also underinclusive: a personal

solicitation by a campaign committee member who may be

the candidate’s best friend or close professional associate

(such as a law practice partner) is likely to have a greater risk

for “coercion and undue appearance” than a signed mass

mailing or request during a speech to a large group. Id. 

Moreover, the Code does not prohibit a candidate’s campaign

committee from disclosing to the candidate the names of

contributors and solicited non-contributors.

That omission suggests that the only interest

at play is the impolitic interpersonal dynamics

of the candidate’s request for money, not the

more corrosive reality of who gives and how

much. If the purported risk addressed by the

clause is that the judge or candidate will treat

donors and non-donors differently, it is

knowingwho contributed and who balked that

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24 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

makes the difference, not who asked for the

contribution.

Id.17 The lack of narrow tailoring is obvious here: if

impartiality or absence of corruption is the concern, what is

the point of prohibiting judges from personally asking for

solicitations or signing letters, if they are free to know who

contributes and who balks at their committee’s request?

Wersal teaches that the in-person “‘ask’ is precisely the

speech [a state] must regulate to maintain its interest in

impartiality and the appearance of impartiality” because of

the greater risk of a quid pro quo. 674 F.3d at 1029–31. 

Indeed, we agree with State Bar Counsel’s argument that “the

very act of asking for money, personally, creates the

impression that judge (and justice) may be for sale.” But the

clause here sweeps more broadly. It is not necessary “to

decide today whether a State could enact a narrowly tailored

solicitation clause—say, one focused on one-on-one

solicitations or solicitations from individuals with cases

pending before the court—only that this clause does not do so

narrowly.” Carey, 614 F.3d at 206 (emphasis in original).18

17 The lack of a non-disclosure-to-the-candidate requirement in

Arizona’s Code presents the opposite situation of that in White II, where

appellants challenged the fact that they could not solicit from large groups

or via signed appeal letters. The Eighth Circuit found that the prohibition

on disclosing to a candidate who contributed and who rebuffed meant the

clause was “barely tailored at all to serve [the end of impartiality as to

parties in a particular case]” or an interest in “open-mindedness.” 

416 F.3d at 765–66.

18 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit upheld the Minnesota solicitation clause

even under strict scrutiny precisely because the challenged clause only

prohibited direct, in-person solicitation, while the rest of Minnesota’s

Code ofJudicial Conduct permitted solicitation of groups and of a judge’s

intimates. Wersal, 674 F.3d at 1028–29. That court distinguished the

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The solicitation clause is invalid as applied to non-judge

candidates.

3.

We analyze Rules 4.1(A)(2)–(5) as the “political

activities” clauses. Judicial candidates are prohibited from

speechifying for another candidate or organization, endorsing

or opposing another candidate, fundraising for another

candidate or organization, or actively taking part in any

political campaign other than his or her own. These clauses

are also not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the state’s

interest in an impartial judiciary, and are thus unconstitutional

restrictions on political speech of non-judge candidates for

judicial office.

Rules 4.1(A)(2)–(4)—prohibiting speechifying,

endorsements, and fundraising—present the closest question. 

There is an argument that these rules are sufficiently narrowly

tailored to be constitutional because they curtail speech that

evidences bias towards a particular (potential) party within

the scope of White I: the candidate or political organization

endorsed or spoken of favorably by the judicial candidate. A

plurality of the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld a nearly

identical Minnesota prohibition on a judge or judicial

candidate endorsing “another candidate for public office”

because such an endorsement “creates a risk of partiality

outcome from that in White II, where an earlier version of the state’s Code

of Judicial Conduct prohibited group solicitation and banned judges and

candidates from signing fund appeal letters. Id. at 1029. Direct personal

solicitation “gives rise to a greater risk of quid pro quo,” id., but the scope

of Arizona’s solicitation clause is broader than Minnesota’s and we must

consider all of the affected speech.

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26 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

towards the endorsed party and his or her supporters.” 

Wersal, 674 F.3d at 1024, 1025. The plurality concluded that

the clause was narrowly tailored to serve the state’s

compelling interest in the appearance and reality of an

impartial judiciary. Id. at 1028.19

Nonetheless, we hold that these regulations are

underinclusive because they only address speech that occurs

beginning the day after a non-judge candidate has filed his

intention to run for judicial office.20 The day before a private

citizen becomes a judicial candidate, he or she could have

been a major fundraiser or campaign manager for another

19 Judge Loken, joined by Judge Wollman, concurred in the result but

agreed with the plurality’s judgment on the separate ground that the

endorsement clause served the distinct compelling state interest in

“protecting the political independence of its judiciary.” Id. at 1033 (“An

endorsement links the judicial candidate’s political fortunes to a particular

person, who may then come to hold office in a coordinate branch of

government. This is antithetical to any well considered notion of judicial

independence—that we are a ‘government of laws, not of men.’”) (Loken,

J., concurring.).

20 The Wersal plurality concluded that the Minnesota endorsement

clause was not underinclusive but only by reference to what it restricted:

“endorsements for other candidate[s] for public office.” Id. at 1027

(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). That plurality noted

that a separate clause in Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct prevented

a judge or judicial candidate from making any statement that would

“reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a

matter pending or impending in any court,” and reasoned that the two

clauses read together meant that a judicial candidate was prevented from

making any biased statement about a party or potential party, whether or

not the target of the speech had become a candidate for public office at the

time of the statement. Id. We are concerned about the temporal

dimension of a non-judge candidate’s speech, rather than the candidate

status of its target.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 27

elected official, or may have donated large sums of money to

another’s political campaign, or may have himself been an

elected politician. The Supreme Court confronted a similar

underinclusive issue in White I. There, in explaining why the

“announce clause” was underinclusive, the Court said

In Minnesota, a candidate for judicial office

may not say “I think it is constitutional for the

legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.” 

He may say the very same thing, however, up

until the very day before he declares himself

a candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until

litigation is pending) after he is elected. As a

means of pursuing the objective of

open-mindedness that respondents now

articulate, the announce clause is so woefully

underinclusive as to render belief in that

purpose a challenge to the credulous.

White I, 536 U.S. at 779–80. Here too, Rules 4.1(A)(2)–(4)

are “woefully underinclusive” because they only address

speech made after a candidate has filed his intention to enter

the race. Id. at 780. Contrary to the dissent, we fail to see

why this same concern does not apply here.

Moreover, the Arizona defendants have failed to show

why the less restrictive remedy of recusal of a successful

candidate from any case in which he or she was involved in

a party’s political campaign or gave an endorsement is an

unworkable alternative. “[B]ecause restricting speech should

be the government’s tool of last resort, the availability of

obvious less-restrictive alternatives renders a speech

restriction overinclusive.” Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting,

709 F.3d 808, 826 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, it seems that if a

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28 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

candidate indeed becomes a judge, a less restrictive means of

addressing the state’s concerns would be to require recusal in

cases where the new judge’s bias against or in favor of a party

is clear.21 Unlike the dissent and the plurality of the Eighth

Circuit in Wersal, we decline to address hypothetical

situations involving potential frequent litigants and singlejudge counties. See Dissent at 46; Wersal, 674 F.3d at

1027–28 (posing the hypothetical that “candidates and judges

would be free to endorse individuals who would become

frequent litigants in future cases, such as county sheriffs and

prosecutors”). The Arizona defendants have not offered any

evidence nor argued that these concerns exist, cf. Siefert,

608 F.3d at 987, though they bear the burden of

demonstrating that the Rules survive strict scrutiny. We

decline to speculate on whether such a problem would exist

in the Arizona judicial elections affected by these Rules.

We hold Rule 4.1(A)(5), which prohibits a judicial

candidate from “actively tak[ing] part in any political

campaign other than his or her own campaign for election,

reelection, or retention in office” to be unconstitutional

because it is overbroad. By its terms, it is not limited to

restrictions on participation in political campaigns on behalf

of persons who may become parties to a suit, but may also

include political campaigns on ballot propositions and other

issues, including political campaigns for ballot propositions

that present no risk of impartiality towards future parties. 

21 See, e.g., Friedland, 104 Colum. L. Rev. at 614 (“[T]he proper

response to judicial campaign speech that could threaten Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights may be to allow the speech and then, if a

case arises in which the judge’s former campaign speech poses a problem,

to assign that case to another judge.”).

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 29

Thus, Rule 4.1(A)(5) unconstitutionally prohibits protected

speech about legal issues. White I, 536 U.S. at 776–78.

IV.

For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the Arizona defendants. We hold that

strict scrutiny applies and that the challenged portions of the

Arizona Code of Judicial conduct unconstitutionally restrict

the speech of non-judge judicial candidates. We remand the

case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Sitting for judicial election while judging cases, Justice

Otto Kaus famously quipped, is like “brushing your teeth in

the bathroom and trying not to notice the crocodile in the

bathtub.” Joseph R. Grodin, In Pursuit of Justice: Reflections

of a State Supreme Court Justice 177 (1989) (quoting Kaus). 

Kaus would know. He sat on the California Supreme Court

from 1981 to 1985, Gerald T. McLaughlin, Memorial

Dedication to Otto Kaus, 30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 923, 923

(1997), having narrowly won a retention election in 1982 and

retiring from the court soon before the 1986 vote that would

unseat three of his former colleagues, Stephen R. Barnett,

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30 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

Otto and the Court, 30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 943, 947 & n.19

(1997).1

Kaus’ point about the psychology of judging applies

outside the context of judicial elections, for the temptation to

engage in overt political behavior affects judges generally. 

And so I write separately to identify, and hopefully to tame,

the “crocodile” stalking today’s majority opinion: the

prospect that the principles we apply now will be used in

future litigation to challenge the constitutionality of

restrictions on the political behavior of sitting judges. The

opinion studiously— and designedly— does not address that

issue. But it is worth explaining why, in my view, the

considerations pertinent to evaluating the complex of

constitutional issues raised by such restrictions are quite

different than those the majority opinion applies today.

I.

Today’s opinion addresses the constitutionality of certain

provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct (“Code”)

only as they apply to judicial candidates who, like Wolfson,

have not yet ascended to the bench. It does not decide those

provisions’ constitutionality as they apply to elected judges

1

Justices of the California Supreme Court and Judges of the California

Court of Appeal are nominated by the Governor, confirmed by the

Commission on Judicial Appointments, and then subject to voter approval

in a retention election at the time of the next gubernatorial election and,

thereafter, at the end of each 12-year term. See Cal. Const. art. 6, § 16(d);

Cal. Elec. Code § 9083. Judges of the California Superior Court usually

sit for general election every six years, Cal. Const. art. 6, § 16(b), unless

an incumbent is not unopposed, Cal. Elec. Code § 8203, or a county

adopts by majority popular vote the retention-election system applicable

to appellate judges, Cal. Elec. Code § 8220.

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who, like Kaus, have already taken their oaths of office. Still

less does it decide the constitutionality of restrictions on the

political activity of judges who, like us on the federal bench,

“hold their Offices during good Behaviour,” U.S. Const. art.

III, § 1, and never sit for election. In the name of prudence

and constitutional avoidance, the majority’s opinion rightly

reserves judgment on the constitutionality of restricting the

speech of sitting judges, an issue neither properly before us

nor necessary to the resolution of this case.

I emphasize the limited scope of today’s decision for fear

that future litigants might otherwise seek to obscure it,

despite the repeated admonishments in the opinion. Of the

five Code provisions we strike today, only one — the

solicitation ban — directly relates to a judicial candidate’s

own campaign for office.2 The remainder prohibit a would-be

judge’s efforts to advance the political fortunes of other

candidates or causes, through speeches, endorsements,

fundraising, financial support, or other campaign assistance.3

 

2

 The full text of the provision is as follows:

(A) A judge or judicial candidate shall not . . . .

(6) personally solicit or accept campaign contributions

other than through a campaign committee authorized by

Rule 4.4 . . . .

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17A, Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 81, Code of Jud.

Conduct (2009), Rule 4.1(A)(6).

 

3

 The full text of the provision is as follows:

(A) A judge or judicial candidate shall not do any of the

following:

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As these proscriptions bear little direct relation to judicial

candidates’ personal political fortunes, a casual reader might

be forgiven for assuming that they are just as constitutionally

offensive as applied outside the election context, to sitting

judges, whether or not they reached the bench via election.

In my view, that is not so, for at least two reasons: The

analytic framework applicable to political restrictions on

sitting judges may well differ from the one we apply today. 

And the compelling state interest that could well justify such

restrictions differs from the one emphasized in the majority

opinion. I address each difference in turn.

. . . .

(2) make speeches on behalf of a political organization

or another candidate for public office;

(3) publicly endorse or oppose another candidate for

any public office;

(4) solicit funds for or pay an assessment to a political

organization or candidate, make contributions to any

candidate or political organization in excess of the

amounts permitted by law, or make total contributions

in excess of fifty percent of the cumulative total

permitted by law . . . .

(5) actively take part in any political campaign other

than his or her own campaign for election, reelection or

retention in office . . . .

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17A, Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 81, Code of Jud.

Conduct (2009), Rule 4.1(A)(2)–(5).

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II.

In applying strict scrutiny to a judicial candidate who is

not now a judge, today’s majority opinion rightly rejects the

Seventh Circuit’s approach, which applies to political

restrictions on elected sitting judges a balancing test derived

from the Supreme Court’s cases on public employee speech. 

Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010); Siefert v.

Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010). Although such a

tempered standard has no application to a candidate who has

not yet taken his oath of judicial office, whether it would be

appropriatelyapplied to political restrictions governing sitting

judges is quite a different manner.

The Constitution permits the government to prohibit its

employees from speaking about matters of public concern

where the government’s interest “in promoting the efficiency

of the public services it performs through its employees”

outweighs the First Amendment interest in speech. Pickering

v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill.,

391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The Pickering balancing test seeks

“both to promote the individual and societal interests that are

served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public

concern and to respect the needs of government employers

attempting to perform their important public functions.” 

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006). And that test

recognizes that “there are certain governmental functions that

cannot operate without some restrictions on particular kinds

of speech.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765

(2002), did not decide whether the public employee speech

cases would justify restrictions on judges’ active support for

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34 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

political causes or the candidacies of others. Justice

Kennedy, who was a member of the five-justice majority,

wrote a separate concurrence, explaining this limitation:

“Whether the rationale of Pickering[, 391 U.S. 563], and

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), could be extended to

allow a general speech restriction on sitting judges —

regardless of whether they are campaigning — in order to

promote the efficient administration of justice, is not an issue

raised here.” White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).

In Siefert, 608 F.3d at 985, the Seventh Circuit extended

the public employee speech cases to a provision of the

Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting an elected

sitting judge from “[p]ublicly endors[ing] or speak[ing] on

behalf of [a political party’s] candidates or platforms,” id. at

978–79. It reasoned that the government’s authority as an

employer, “its duty to promote the efficiency of the public

services it performs,” and the imperative that “the work of the

judiciary conform[] with the due process requirements of the

Constitution” justified a less rigorous balancing test for

restrictions on elected sitting judges’ participation in the

political campaigns or candidacies of others. Id. at 985. In

a subsequent decision, the Seventh Circuit extended this

balancing test to provisions of the Indiana Code of Judicial

Conduct prohibiting elected judges from leading or holding

office in political organizations or making speeches on behalf

of such organizations. Bauer, 620 F.3d at 710–11.

The core rationale of the public employee speech cases,

on which Siefert and Bauer relied, does not apply to the case

presently before us. Wolfson has never been an employee of

Arizona, let alone a judge. Indeed, he may never become

one. While the public employee speech cases do not rest

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solely on the now-antiquated principle that the government

can condition employment on the waiver of First Amendment

rights, see Myers, 461 U.S. at 143–44, the nature of

government employment is a necessary component of their

reasoning. Pickering recognized as much, commenting that

“it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an

employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ

significantly from those it possesses in connection with

regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” 391 U.S.

at 568. The public employee speech cases thus recognize the

“crucial difference, with respect to constitutional analysis,

between the government exercising ‘the power to regulate or

license, as lawmaker,’ and the government acting ‘as

proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.’” Engquist v.

Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (alteration in original)

(quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.

886, 896 (1961)). Critically, the balancing test the Pickering

line of cases articulates does not apply to governmental

restrictions on the speech of those, like judicial candidates,

not employed by the government. We could not abandon that

determinative distinction without dangerously expanding the

scope of constitutionally permissible regulation of speech.

But our refusal to apply to a judicial candidate not yet a

state employee a balancing test derived from the public

employee speech cases says nothing whatever about the

applicability of such a test to individuals who have already

taken their oaths of judicial office and already receive wages

from the state. That question remains unanswered. 

Resolving the First Amendment challenge of a sitting judge

to similar restrictions on his speech will require answering it. 

And, without prejudging whether we should adopt the Siefert

analysis for restrictions on political activity by sitting judges

on behalf of political causes or the candidacies of others, I

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36 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

suggest that the analogy to the Pickering line of cases has

much to commend it.

III.

Even if we determined that restrictions on the political

activity of sitting judges were subject to strict scrutiny, the

state interest supporting such a restriction would be far

stronger than the one we hold inadequate to justify the

restrictions on judicial candidate Wolfson’s speech today.

The Supreme Court has recognized as a “vital state

interest” the interest in maintaining those “safeguard[s]

against judicial campaign abuses that threaten to imperil

public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s

elected judges.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S.

868, 889 (2009) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Preserving public confidence includes

maintaining the perception of judicial propriety. In other

words, “‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’” In

re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v.

United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). “[T]he appearance of

evenhanded justice . . . is at the core of due process.” 

Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 469 (1971) (Harlan,

J., concurring).

The majority opinion, taking its cue from Supreme Court

cases on judicial elections, focuses its strict scrutiny analysis

on the interest in preserving the actuality and appearance of

judicial impartiality. The case law’s emphasis on impartiality

derives from the obligations imposed by the due process

clause, particularly “the proposition that an impartial judge is

essential to due process.” White, 536 U.S. at 776. This

compelling interest in preserving the appearance of

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 37

impartiality is both weighty and narrow: weighty, because it

rises to the level of a constitutional obligation, requiring a

judge to recuse himself from a particular case in the name of

due process, Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886–87; and narrow,

because it refers only to “lack of bias for or against either

party to the proceeding,” White, 536 U.S. at 775–76

(emphasis in original). Given this narrow focus on the parties

appearing before a judge in an actual proceeding, the lessrestrictive remedy of mandatory recusal is available to a state

seeking to protect, as it must, the due process rights of

litigants appearing in its courts.

But I would define the state’s interest in preserving public

confidence in its judiciary more broadly, as reaching beyond

the process due specific litigants in particular cases. 

Maintaining public trust in the judiciary as an institution

driven by legal principles rather than political concerns is a

structural imperative. The rule of law depends upon it.

The fundamental importance of this structural imperative

has been recognized from the founding of the nation. As

Alexander Hamilton emphasized in The Federalist No. 78,

the courts possess “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely

judgment . . . .” Id. at 433 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

Deprived of those alternative sources of power, the authority

of the judiciary instead “lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product

of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s

acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the . . .

law means and to declare what it demands.” Planned

Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992);

see also White, 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring)

(“The power and the prerogative of a court . . . rest, in the

end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments.”). It is the

courts’ perceived legitimacy as institutions grounded in

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38 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

established legal principles, not partisanship, “that leads

decisions to be obeyed and averts vigilantism and civil

strife.” Bauer, 620 F.3d at 712. Loss of judicial legitimacy

thus corrodes the rule of law, “sap[ping] the foundations of

public and private confidence, and . . . introduc[ing] in its

stead universal distrust and distress.” The Federalist No. 78,

at 438. In this sense, “[t]he rule of law, which is a foundation

of freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for

its independence, its professional attainments, and the

absolute probity of its judges.” NY State Bd. of Elections v.

Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 212 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).

This nation’s political history demonstrates the disastrous

effects of the perceived politicization of the courts. Charges

that King George “ha[d] obstructed the Administration of

Justice” and “ha[d] made judges dependent on his Will alone

. . . .” were among the founding generation’s justifications for

the 1776 revolution. The Declaration of Independence para.

11 (U.S. 1776). Similar concerns apply outside the context

of a monarchy: Where the judiciary is drawn into the political

intrigues of its coordinate branches, the public might well

“fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the

fountains of justice. The habit of being continuallymarshaled

on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law

and of equity.” The Federalist No. 81, at 452 (Alexander

Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).4 And where the

4 This quotation appears in an explanation of why the Supreme Court is

“composed of a distinct body of magistrates, instead of being one of the

branches of the legislature, as in the government of Great Britain . . . .” 

Id. at 451. But the dangers of perceived partisanship apply at least as

much to judges independently chosen but participating publicly in the

selection of legislative or executive policies and decisionmakers.

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politicization of the judiciary brings it into alliance with the

politicians who staff the other two branches of government,

the public may no longer consider “the courts of justice . . . as

the bulwark of a limited Constitution against legislative

encroachments,” The Federalist No. 78, at 437, or executive

excesses. In short, when sitting judges support the campaigns

of nonjudicial candidates — via endorsements, speeches,

money, or other means — the public may begin to see them

not as neutral arbiters of a limited system of governance, but

as participants in the larger game of politics.5

The defendants here express preciselythis concern — that

if sitting judges may support the campaigns of others, the

public will perceive them as masters of the political game,

powerbrokers “trading on the prestige of their office to

advance other political ends . . . .” Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984;

see also Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 4.1, cmt.4 (2011)

(justifying prohibitions on endorsements and speeches on

behalf of other candidates as “prevent[ing sitting judges]

from abusing the prestige of judicial office to advance the

interests of others”). The opposite fear is equally justified:

Today’s powerbroker is tomorrow’s pawn, as the political

winds shift and the next election cycle approaches. The

endorsing judge entwines his fate with whomever he endorses

and earns the enmity of his favored politician’s opponents. 

5

I leave aside whether sitting judges may endorse or support other

candidates for judicial office. Such support does not implicate the

powerful state interest in the appearance ofjudicial independence fromthe

political branches I discuss in the text. Moreover, a sitting judge’s

endorsement of a judicial candidate is a singularly effective mode of voter

education. Few observers are as qualified as sitting judges to evaluate the

competencies of those who would join their ranks. The concerns and

analyses in this concurring opinion are therefore limited to judicial

participation in issue, legislative, and executive elections.

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40 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

“This kind of personal affiliation between a member of the

judiciary and a member of the political branches raises the

specter — readily perceived by the general public — that the

judge’s future rulings will be influenced by this political

dependency.” Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1034 (8th

Cir. 2012) (Loken, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis

in original).

In his concurrence in Wersal, Judge Loken concluded that

there is a “compelling state interest . . . in protecting the

political independence of its judiciary.” Id. at 1033. I have

no reason at this juncture to come to rest on that question. 

Instead, I emphasize that, at the very least, there is a powerful

state interest in preventing sitting judges from playing the

part of political powerbroker and creating the publicly visible

interdependence that corrodes confidence in judicial

autonomy. Assessing whether that interest qualifies as

“compelling,” in the lexicon of First Amendment doctrine,

awaits a properly presented case — particularly as the issue

will never arise if we first determine that the Pickering

balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, applies to speech

restrictions on sitting judges.

Almost certainly, a state does not forfeit this powerful

interest in judicial autonomy by selecting its judges via

popular election. It was in the context of a state prohibition

against judicial candidates expressing their personal views on

disputed legal and political issues during their own campaigns

that the Supreme Court has explained that “‘the greater power

to dispense with elections altogether does not include the

lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of stateimposed voter ignorance. If the State chooses to tap the

energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process,

it must accord the participants in that process . . . the First

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 41

Amendment rights that attach to their roles.’” White,

536 U.S. at 788 (alteration in original) (quoting Renne v.

Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 

But that observation does not seem to extend to prohibitions

on campaigning on behalf of issue elections or for nonjudicial

candidates. The Supreme Court’s case law on the political

behavior of government employees has “carefully

distinguishe[d] between [proscribable] partisan political

activities and mere expressions of views,” which are

constitutionally protected. Biller v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,

863 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing U.S. Civil Serv.

Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S.

548, 554–56 (1973), and United Pub. Workers of Am. v.

Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 98–99 (1947)); Siefert, 608 F.3d at

984; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (citing Letter

Carriersin support of the proposition that the Supreme Court

has often “upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that

operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, . . . based on

an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their

functions”).6Indeed, prohibitions on supporting the

campaigns of others complement, rather than contradict, the

decision to select judges via popular election: By adopting

such restrictions alongside judicial elections, states harness

the “legitimizing power of the democratic process” while

avoiding worrisome interdependence between judges and

politicians from the remaining two branches.

6

It is true that an elected judge’s support of another candidate or cause

signals something about his views, which might be marginally useful to

voters assessing their options at the polls. See Siefert, 608 F.3d at 994–95

(Rovner, J., dissenting) (“We are, after all, often judged by the company

we keep.”). But so long as an elected judge may articulate his personal

views of legal and political issues in support of his own campaign,

attentive voters have a far more direct means with which to form an

opinion about competing judicial candidates.

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42 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

Nor should we forget that our own federal scheme

supplements its structural protections for judicial autonomy

with direct prohibitions on politicking. Structurally, our

Constitution endows judges with life tenure and prohibits the

diminution of their salaries. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Such

protections seek to encourage “that independent spirit in the

judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of

so arduous a duty,” The Federalist No. 78, at 437, and help

“preserve[] the independence of the Federal Judiciary,”

White, 536 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In addition

to those structural safeguards the federal judiciary has

adopted a code of ethics that regulates directly the behavior

of federal judges, including restrictions on supporting the

political causes and candidacies of others.7 Our ethical code

 

7

 The full text of the relevant canon provides:

(A) A judge should not:

(1) act as a leader or hold any office in a political

organization;

(2) make speeches for a political organization or

candidate, or publicly endorse a candidate for public

office; or

(3) solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a

contribution to a political organization or candidate, or

attend or purchase a ticket for a dinner or other event

sponsored by a political organization or candidate.

(B) A judge should resign the judicial office if a judge

becomes a candidate in a primary or general election

for any office.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 43

is independent of the structural safeguards that insulate us

from the political branches, and it performs a slightly

different function. I see no reason why a state cannot adopt

the one without the other, except with regard to a judicial

candidate’s personal campaign for judicial office in states

where judicial elections are held.

Critically, the state interest in preserving an autonomous

judiciary is powerful only insofar as it applies to sitting

judges; it has no application to judicial candidates who, like

Wolfson, have not yet reached the bench. The spectacle of

sitting judges aiding partisan allies in their political struggles

corrodes the public repute of the judiciary in a way that the

participation of a mere candidate never can. Indeed, the

interest in an independent judiciary does not come into

existence until a judge assumes office; the politicking of lay

people cannot damage the reputation of a body whose ranks

they have not yet joined. Individuals who run for judicial

office may themselves be officers of political parties or

holders of nonjudicial political office when they decide to run

for a judgeship. That politicians can become judges is no

secret. But that is different from allowing judges to remain

or become politicians while still on the bench. Moreover, as

the majority opinion explains, a layman who has not yet

assumed office has no prestige derived from the office he has

not yet attained to lend his political brethren. Essentially,

(C) A judge should not engage in any other political

activity. This provision does not prevent a judge from

engaging in activities described in Canon 4.

Administrative Office ofU.S. Courts, Code of Judicial Conduct forUnited

States Judges, Canon 5 (2011).

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44 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

ascending to the bench is like taking the veil, and that veil

does not descend until the oath of office is sworn.

Meanwhile, to the extent White sought to preserve voters’

access to “relevant information” and to prevent “stateimposed voter ignorance” about the candidates sitting for

election, 536 U.S. at 782, 788 (internal quotation marks

omitted), such concerns are weaker for already seated judges. 

Such judges already possess a record of decisions that

interested voters can analyze to inform themselves about the

desirability of competing judicial candidates; under White,

they are free to campaign for their own reelection by drawing

attention to their records on the bench. By contrast, lay

people, like Wolfson, who have not yet sat on the bench lack

any such judicial record, making their campaign speech —

including endorsements — relatively more valuable for what

it reveals about how they might perform in office.

* * *

In sum, the principles applicable to the constitutionality

of political restrictions on sitting judges diverge dramatically

from those we apply to today’s challenge to restrictions on a

judicial candidate not now a judge. The standard of review

may well differ. And the powerful interests supporting such

restrictions differ, too. I need not address, as the issue is not

before us, whether the particular restrictions we review today

would be constitutional as applied to sitting judges. But I am

quite sure that the analysis required to resolve that question

will receive scant support from our decision in this case.

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WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 45

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that strict scrutiny—not

Seifert—is the appropriate standard. I agree that we should

limit our decision to non-incumbent judicial candidates. And

I agree that Rules 4.1(a)(5) (campaigning for others) and

4.1(a)(6) (personal solicitation) are unconstitutional as

applied to those candidates. I concur in the majority opinion

only on those points. I part company with my colleagues as

to Rules 4.1(a)(2) (giving speeches on behalf of others),

(3) (endorsing others), and (4) (soliciting money for others). 

These three rules are constitutional because they are narrowly

tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest in maintaining

judicial impartiality and its appearance—the hallmark of

government’s third branch.

My colleagues acknowledge that these three rules

“present the closest question,” and that the Eighth Circuit

upheld similar ones. Wersal, 674 F.3d at 1024–25. 

Nonetheless, the majority concludes that they are not

narrowly tailored for two reasons: timing and recusal. The

timing argument is that the rules are underinclusive because

“they only address speech that occurs beginning the day after

a non-judge candidate has filed his intention to run for

judicial office.” The recusal argument is that the rules are

more restrictive than recusal, i.e., requiring judges who have

campaigned for others to recuse themselves when those

others show up as litigants. I dissent because I do not find

these reasons persuasive.

The majority’s timing argument is clever but impractical. 

Its breadth alone suggests this. The argument would cut

down any restriction (a) that is subject to strict scrutiny and

(b) that starts to apply to people only after some triggering

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46 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

event. If the restriction’s enactment counts as a triggering

event, and I don’t see why it wouldn’t, then strict scrutiny

would always be fatal. That cannot be the law.

Moreover, the argument doesn’t actually answer the

question, which is whether there are less restrictive ways to

preserve judicial impartiality and its appearance. Having no

rules is, of course, less restrictive. But it isn’t an alternative

means of furthering the interest at stake here. Any actual

alternative will suffer from the timing problem the majority

identifies. So the timing argument tells us nothing about

which alternative is the least restrictive; it only identifies a

problem that all conceivable alternatives share.

The majority’s recusal argument, like the timing

argument, is too impractical in my view. In Arizona, only

very small counties elect judges. And some small counties

may well have only one superior court judge. If that one

judge campaigns for someone who is then elected sheriff or

district attorney, an outside judge would be necessary in

every criminal case and in all civil cases involving the county

where the district attorney is its lawyer. Constant recusal is

no solution.

That’s what the Eighth Circuit held in Wersal, after it

considered this obvious problem. 674 F.3d at 1027–28. The

majority, on the other hand, recognizes the problem, but then

sidesteps it, claiming that the state failed to raise it and that

dealing with it would require us to speculate. I disagree. 

There’s no need to speculate about something so self-evident. 

And it’s hard to fault the state for failing to dwell on the

obvious.

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In sum, I don’t buy the timing or recusal arguments. And

without them, there’s nothing that prevents us from declaring

that these three rules are the least restrictive means at

Arizona’s disposal for furthering their compelling interest in

maintaining judicial impartiality and its appearance. Simply

affixing the label of strict scrutiny and then declaring that

unspecified less restrictive means are required gives no

guidance as to what rules pass constitutional muster. And it

encourages an elective free-for-all that undermines respectfor

the third branch of government. Because my colleagues

disagree, I respectfully dissent.

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