Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00135/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00135-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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 On March 14, 2005, having received the consent of Petitioner, the Court signed an

order construing Petitioner’s Application for Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as a

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

05cv0135; 00cr1198

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISMAEL HERNANDEZ-MURILLO,

Petitioner, 

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

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Civil No. 05-CV-0135-L

Criminal No. 00-CR-1198-L

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255

TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR

CORRECT SENTENCE 

Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Application for Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 which has been construed as a motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.1

 Petitioner has submitted supplemental

authorities in support of his Petition and has filed a reply to the Government’s response to his

motion. Having reviewed all of these submissions as well as the record of proceedings before

this Court, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his sentence was

imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Accordingly, the Court

must deny Petitioner’s motion.

Case 3:05-cv-00135-L-BLM Document 9 Filed 01/17/07 Page 1 of 6
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BACKGROUND

On July 24, 2000, Petitioner Ismael Hernandez-Murillo pled guilty to one count of

importation of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. Petitioner was subsequently

sentenced to a 30-month term of imprisonment and supervised release for a term of 3 years.

Petitioner served his term of imprisonment and commenced his term of supervised release

on June 12, 2002. On April 29, 2004, the United States Department of Probation petitioned this

Court for issuance of a bench warrant based upon the allegations that Petitioner had violated the

terms of his supervised release by committing the crime of encouraging and inducing an illegal

alien to enter the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and failing to report

to the probation officer as required. 

The Court issued a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest and, on June 28, 2004, Petitioner was

brought before this Court to show cause why his supervised release should not be revoked for

the violations alleged in the petition. After requesting a continuance, Petitioner admitted the first

allegation of the petition on August 10, 2004. The Court found Petitioner in violation of

supervised release, revoked supervised release, and sentenced Petitioner to the custody of the

Bureau of Prisons for a term of 21 months.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that the sentence imposed as a result of his violation of supervised

release must be vacated on the following grounds: 1) the Court impermissibly relied upon

information provided by the Probation Department and referred to the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (“USSG”) in determining Petitioner’s sentence; 2) Petitioner’s counsel was

ineffective for failing to challenge Petitioner’s criminal history category; 3) the conduct upon

which the supervised release revocation was based was not prosecuted; 4) the sentence imposed

was unreasonable due to the Court’s failure to consider certain factors under 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a); and 5) Petitioner received a lesser sentence for a previous conviction which involved

conduct similar to the conduct forming the basis of the supervised release revocation. The Court

finds no merit in any of these contentions.

First, the Court’s reference to information provided by the Probation Department and the

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2

 All combined, the convictions set forth in the PSR total 21 criminal history points, far

exceeding the 13-point threshold required for a criminal history category of VI. 

3 05cv0135; 00cr1198

applicable sentencing guidelines was entirely appropriate. Petitioner contends he was entitled to

a jury determination of all facts legally essential to his sentence, however there is no right to a

jury trial in supervised release revocation proceedings. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S.

694, 700 (2000) (“Although [supervised release] violations often lead to reimprisonment, the

violative conduct need not be criminal and need only be found by a judge under a preponderance

of the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Furthermore, Petitioner

admitted violating his supervised release. Thus, the Court’s order revoking supervised release

was based upon Petitioner’s own admission, no factual determination was made.

Petitioner argues that the Court erred by relying on the criminal history category set forth

in the Presentence Report (“PSR”) in arriving at his sentence. However, the Court was required

to use the criminal history category applicable at the time the defendant originally was sentenced

to supervised release. USSG § 7B1.4(a). A term of supervised release is part of the punishment

for the original crime and part of the sentence authorized by conviction. United States v.

Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, it is entirely appropriate that

the criminal history applicable at the time of conviction was utilized in determining the

appropriate sentence upon Petitioner’s violation of supervised release. Furthermore, Petitioner

waived any error with respect to the convictions set forth in the PSR by failing to object at the

time sentence was originally imposed. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any

infirmity regarding any of the convictions set forth in the PSR, nor has he demonstrated any

prejudice arising as a result of their inclusion in the PSR.2

 Therefore, there was no error in the

Court’s determination at the supervised release revocation hearing that Petitioner’s criminal

history category was a level VI as set forth in the PSR. Because there was no error, the Court

must also reject Petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of effective assistance counsel by his

attorney’s failure to object to the Court’s use of the criminal history category set forth in the

PSR.

Petitioner also suggests it was error for the Court to rely on the Sentencing Guidelines at

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all. Petitioner does not elaborate on the basis for this objection, however, the Court notes that

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), has no effect on the revocation of supervised

release. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d at 1224. Therefore, if Petitioner’s objection is based upon

some formulation of Booker and the mandatory versus advisory nature of the Sentencing

Guidelines, it is unavailing.

Petitioner contends that the conduct admitted by him was incorrectly determined by the

Court to constitute a Grade B supervised release violation. Petitioner entered an admission to

Allegation Number 1 of the Probation Department petition which charged Petitioner with

violating the condition that he not commit another federal, state, or local crime by the following

means:

On April 27, 2004, Mr. Hernandez-Murillo encouraged and induced an illegal

alien to enter into the United States from Mexico in violation of 8 U.S.C. §

1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), as evidenced by the arrest report furnished by the United States

Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision, Doc. No. 26, at 2. 

A violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is punishable by a term of imprisonment

exceeding one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii) (authorizing a maximum penalty of 5 years

imprisonment for a violation of subparagraph (A)(iv)). Grade B violations are defined as

“conduct constituting any ... federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment

exceeding one year [other than those listed as Grade A violations].” USSG § 7B1.1(a)(2). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s violation was accurately categorized as a Grade B violation.

A Grade B violation with a criminal history category VI carries a range of imprisonment

between 21 to 27 months. USSG § 7B1.4(a). In Petitioner’s case, this range was capped at 24

months because his underlying offense is a Class D felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(4) (defining

“Class D” felony); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(4) (imposing qualifying penalty); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

(setting forth maximum term of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s sentencing range was 21 to 24 months; his 21-month sentence fell within

the appropriate range. 

Petitioner also claims he is entitled to relief because the conduct underlying the

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revocation of his supervised release was never prosecuted. A violation of supervised release is

determined on the basis of the defendant’s conduct, it may be found regardless of whether the

defendant was ever indicted or convicted of any particular offense. United States v. Jolibois,

294 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, Petitioner’s admission to conduct constituting an

offense was a proper basis for revocation of his supervised release.

Petitioner further argues he is entitled to Section 2255 relief because his sentence was

unreasonable. Petitioner contends that the Court failed to consider certain factors applicable

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as his mother’s recent passing and the fact that he committed

the offense constituting the supervised release violation while on medication. The Court notes

that both of these factors were brought to the Court’s attention at the time of sentencing. (Gov.’s

Resp., Ex. 17 at 5-6.) Thus, there is every indication that these factors were in fact considered

by the Court. In any event, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his sentence, which was the

minimum term authorized under the Sentencing Guidelines, was unreasonable. 

Finally, Petitioner contends that his sentence must be vacated because he received a lesser

sentence for a previous conviction which involved conduct similar to the conduct forming the

basis of the supervised release revocation. Petitioner provides no legal basis to support this

contention, nor could he, as there is no legal requirement that a person receive the same sentence

each time he or she commits a particular offense. To the contrary, a person’s willingness to

commit a repeat offense has traditionally been considered an indication that a more severe

sentence is warranted. See e.g., Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895) (“[O]ne who

proves, by a second or third conviction, that the former punishment has been inefficacious in

doing the work of reform for which it was designed ... has evinced a depravity, which merits a

greater punishment, and needs to be restrained by severer penalties than if it were his first

offence.”) (citations omitted)). Accordingly, the Court finds no merit in Petitioner’s final

contention.

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds Petitioner’s sentence upon his violation

of supervised release was properly calculated, based upon appropriate considerations, and

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reasonable under the circumstances. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any violation of the

Constitution or the laws of the United States. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 17, 2007

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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