Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01693/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01693-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Property Damage

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO, HETCH HETCHY WATER

AND POWER,

Defendant.

CIV-S-05-1693 DFL GGH

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Defendant City and County of San Francisco, Hetch Hetchy

Water and Power (“San Francisco”) moves to dismiss the first

amended complaint (“FAC”) of plaintiff the United States (“United

States”). For the reasons stated below, the court: (1) GRANTS

San Francisco’s motion to dismiss the United States’ fourth

claim; (2) GRANTS San Francisco’s motion to dismiss the United

States’ fifth and seventh claims; (3) GRANTS San Francisco’s

motion to dismiss the United States’ eighth claim; and (4) DENIES

San Francisco’s motion to dismiss the United States’ first,

second, third, and sixth claims.

I. 

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The United States alleges the following facts in the

complaint: 

On August 23, 1999, a fire, which came to be known as the

“Pilot Fire,” started on private land and spread to the

Stanislaus National Forest (FAC ¶ 6.) The fire started when a

tree hit a power line owned and operated by San Francisco. (Id.

¶ 6. The Pilot Fire eventually burned 4,028 acres of National

Forest land. (Id. ¶ 9.)) According to the complaint, San

Francisco was negligent in not maintaining the area around its

power lines. (Id. ¶ 7.) On February 18, 2000, the United

States submitted a claim to San Francisco for the cost of

fighting the fire and damages. (Id. ¶ 10.) San Francisco has

not paid any part of the claim. (Id.)

On August 22, 2005, the United States brought this suit. On

October 18, 2005, it filed an amended complaint. The United

States raises eight claims against San Francisco: (1) a state law

claim for negligence; (2) violation of California Civil Code §

1714(a); (3) damages under California Health and Safety Code §§

13007, 13009 and 13009.1; (4) violation of the Raker Act of 1913,

Pub. L. No. 63-14, 38 Stat. 242 § 4; (5) violation of 43 U.S.C.

§§ 1733(g) and 1765; (6) violation of 16 U.S.C. § 551, 36 Code of

Fed. Regs. § 261.1(b), and 18 U.S.C. § 1856; (7) violation of 43

U.S.C. §§ 1733(g) and 1765; and (8) breach of obligations under

federal common law.

II.

A. Claim Four (Raker Act)

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San Francisco argues that the United States’ fourth claim

based upon the Raker Act should be dismissed because the Pilot

Fire was an accidental fire that originated on private land

whereas the Raker Act only covers conduct by San Francisco on the

Stanislaus National Forest (“Forest”) and Yosemite National Park

(“Park”). (Reply at 5-6.) The United States takes the position

that by its terms the Raker Act covers any activity by San

Francisco -- wheresoever that activity occurs -- that results in

damage to timber in the Forest or Park. (Sur-Reply at 6-7.)

However, this argument is not convincing in light of the actual

text of the Raker Act. 

The introduction to section four of the statute is directed

to conduct on public lands: “the said grantee shall conform to

all regulations adopted and prescribed by the Secretary . . .

governing the Yosemite National Park . . . [and] the Stanislaus

National Forest.” Pub. L. No. 63-14, 38 Stat. 242 § 4. The

statute then establishes when San Francisco is liable for

activities in the Forest or Park: “[San Francisco] shall not

take, cut, or destroy any timber within the Yosemite National

Park or the Stanislaus National Forest, except such as may be

actually necessary in order to construct, repair, and operate its

said reservoirs . . . .” Id. Again the language addresses

activities on public lands. 

The last part of section four is also directed to conduct

occurring in the Forest and Park: “[San Francisco] shall pay to

the United States the full value of all timber and wood cut,

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injured, or destroyed on or adjacent to any of the rights of way

and lands, as required by the Secretary of the Interior or the

Secretary of Agriculture.” Id. The term “rights of way” refers

to those granted by the Act. The term “lands” refers to lands

outside of the rights of way designated by the Secretaries. The

Act does not refer to rights of way or lands that are off the

Forest or Park. In addition, the United States does not point to

any regulation by either Secretary that purports to regulate San

Francisco’s activities on any lands, public or private, other

than the Stanislaus National Forest and Yosemite National Park.

The Raker Act is much like a contract. It carefully

specifies the obligations of the grantee and the grantor. All of

these mutual obligations occur within identified public lands on

the Stanislaus National Forest and Yosemite National Park. There

is no hint or suggestion that conduct by San Francisco occurring

off of the identified public property is somehow regulated if it

has an adverse affect on timber in the Forest or Park. Under the

United States’ expansive reading, were San Francisco to fail to

eradicate a tree disease in Golden Gate Park that was eventually

transmitted to trees in the Stanislaus Forest, the Raker Act

would provide a remedy. This is not a fair reading of the

statutory language. 

Because the Raker Act does not cover activities by San

Francisco occurring outside of the Stanislaus National Forest and

Yosemite National Park, the United States cannot recover for

damage to public land allegedly caused by San Francisco’s

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 The United States’ fifth and seventh claims contain almost 1

identical allegations. The only difference is that the seventh

claim includes a paragraph requesting an injunction under 43

U.S.C. § 1733(b). (FAC ¶ 31.) 

 These statutes are provisions of the Federal Land Policy 2

Management Act (“FLPMA”).

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negligence on private property. Therefore, the court GRANTS San

Francisco’s motion to dismiss the United States’ fourth cause of

action.

B. Claims Five and Seven (Federal Land Policy Management Act)1

San Francisco argues that the United States’ fifth and

seventh claims also should be dismissed because the Pilot Fire

originated on private land. (Reply at 6.) San Francisco

correctly contends that 43 U.S.C. §§ 1733(b), 1733(g), and 1765

authorize claims for activities on public lands, not private

land. (Reply at 6.) 2

Under 43 U.S.C. section 1733(g), “[t]he use, occupancy, or

development of any portion of the public lands contrary to any

regulation of the Secretary or other responsible authority, or

contrary to any order issued pursuant to any such regulation, is

unlawful and prohibited.” Section 1733(b) authorizes the

Attorney General to institute a civil action for an injunction

“to prevent any person from utilizing public lands in violation

of regulations issued by the Secretary under this Act.” Section

1765 requires that certain conditions be met before the United

States will issue a permit for a right of way across public

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 Section 1765 states: 3

Each right-of-way shall contain--

(a) terms and conditions which will (i) carry out the

purposes of this Act and rules and regulations issued

thereunder; (ii) minimize damage to scenic and esthetic

values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise

protect the environment; (iii) require compliance with

applicable air and water quality standards established

by or pursuant to applicable Federal or State law; and

(iv) require compliance with State standards for public

health and safety, environmental protection, and

siting, construction, operation, and maintenance of or

for rights-of-way for similar purposes if those

standards are more stringent than applicable Federal

standards; and

(b) such terms and conditions as the Secretary

concerned deems necessary to (i) protect Federal

property and economic interests; (ii) manage

efficiently the lands which are subject to the

right-of-way or adjacent thereto and protect the other

lawful users of the lands adjacent to or traversed by

such right-of-way; (iii) protect lives and property;

(iv) protect the interests of individuals living in the

general area traversed by the right-of-way who rely on

the fish, wildlife, and other biotic resources of the

area for subsistence purposes; (v) require location of

the right-of-way along a route that will cause least

damage to the environment, taking into consideration

feasibility and other relevant factors; and (vi)

otherwise protect the public interest in the lands

traversed by the right-of-way or adjacent thereto.

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land.3

Similar to the Raker Act, these statutory provisions

regulate activity on public land, not private land. Therefore,

these provisions provide no authority to the United States to

recover damages for injury to public land allegedly caused by San

Francisco’s negligence on private property or to seek an

injunction ordering San Francisco to comply with federal

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regulations on private land. Accordingly, the court GRANTS San

Francisco’s motion to dismiss the United States’ fifth and

seventh causes of action.

C. Claim Eight (federal common law)

San Francisco also moves to dismiss the United States’

eighth claim on the ground that federal common law should not be

created when state law already provides an adequate remedy. 

(Mot. at 3-5.) The United States acknowledges that its eighth

claim is a federal common law claim that is not based on any

federal statute, although it looks to various federal statutes

for guidance. (Sur-Reply at 8; Opp’n at 9-16.) Because this

claim is based on federal substantive law, and jurisdiction rests

on 28 U.S.C. § 1345, the Erie doctrine does not apply. Erie

Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). See

United States v. California, 655 F.2d 914, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1980)

(“California”) (“application of state substantive law is not

mandated”). However, where federal common law provides the rule

of decision but there is “no clear federal law to apply, federal

courts have referred to state law to provide the appropriate

rule.” Id. (quoting United States v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,

499 F.2d 1335, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1974).

Here, there is no clear federal law to apply whereas there

is clear state law expressly directed to damages and costs caused

when a fire escapes from private lands. Cal. Health & Safety

Code sections 13007 (allowing for recovery of damages to property

caused by the fire), 13009 (allowing for recovery of fire

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 Had the court reached a different conclusion on the 4

viability of the state statutory claim, as discussed in the next

section, then the federal common law claim might have been

permitted. 

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suppression costs), 13009.1 (allowing for recovery of costs for

investigating the fire). In these circumstances, state

substantive law governs and provides the content of the federal

common law claim. See California, 655 F.2d at 917-918. Given

that the United States already brings claims under Cal. Health &

Safety Code sections 13007, 13009, 13009.1, the federal common

law claim is duplicative and will be dismissed.4

D. Claims One, Two, Three, and Six (State law claims)

San Francisco argues that the United States’ first, second,

third, and sixth causes of action are barred by the state statute

of limitations. (Mot. at 5-6.) Under Cal. Gov. Code section

954.4, “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity . . . until a written claim therefor has been

presented to the public entity and has been acted upon . . . or

has been deemed to have been rejected . . . .” If the public

agency does not provide a written notice of a decision on the

claim, then the suit must be brought within two years of its

accrual. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6.

The United States alleges that it filed a claim with San

Francisco on February 18, 2000 and brought suit on August 22,

2005. (FAC ¶ 10.) Because San Francisco did not reject the

claim in writing, San Francisco argues that the United States had

two years -- until August 23, 2001 -- to bring its claim. (Mot.

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at 6.) Therefore, San Francisco asserts that claims one, two,

three, and six should be dismissed as untimely. (Id.) 

The United States responds that its suit is timely because

the six year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b)

applies. (Opp’n at 4.) Generally, the United States is not

bound by state statutes of limitations. United States v.

Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940). However, San Francisco

argues that the Summerlin rule does not apply to § 945.6 in light

of an exception to Summerlin as explained in United States v.

California, 655 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1980). (Reply at 3-4.) The

California court held that “a state statute which provides a time

limitation as an element of a cause of action or as a condition

precedent to liability applies to suits by the United States even

if there is an otherwise applicable federal statute of

limitations.” 655 F.2d at 918 (citing United States v. Hartford

Accident and Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1972)). 

However, the California opinion, if still good law, addresses

only the initial filing of a fire suppression cost claim as a

condition precedent to bringing suit. In this case, there is no

question that the United States made such an initial filing. The

California court was not presented with the issue of whether the

two year statute of limitations operated to extinguish a claim or

operated as a condition precedent. 

In Bresson v. C.I.R., 213 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000),

the Ninth Circuit emphasized the distinction between “claimextinguishment provisions on the one hand, and timing

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requirements that form conditions precedent to the accrual of a

claim on the other.” Here, under § 945.4 a claim accrues -- “no

suit . . . may be brought . . . until” -- when it is presented in

writing and deemed denied. That fully accrued claim is

extinguished by operation of § 945.6 if “suit” is not commenced

within two years. None of the statutory language suggests that

the two year requirement is a condition precedent to suit rather

than a traditional statute of limitations. Thus, under the

reasoning in Bresson, § 945.6, as a “claim-extinguishment”

provision, would not apply to a claim by the United States that

has previously accrued. Rather, the rule in Summerlin applies

such that the United States had six years to file under the

federal statute of limitations.

Moreover, the Bresson court also found in the alternative

that the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v.

California, 507 U.S. 746, 757 (1993), established a new approach

to the application of Summerlin that does not rely on whether the

state statute of limitations is viewed as a “claim-extinguishment

provision” or a “condition precedent” to the claim. According to

Bresson, under the Supreme Court opinion the critical inquiry is

two-fold: (1) whether “the right at issue was [] acquired through

the operation of any federal law, and (2) [whether] the United

States . . . [came] to possess the relevant right by acting in

its sovereign capacity.” Bresson, 213 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.

2000).

The issue here is whether the “right” to recover costs and

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 “[I]t is the policy of the United States that the public 5

lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of

scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air

and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that,

where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands

in their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat

for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide

for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.”

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damages was created “through” or “by” a federal statute. This is

a close question. On the one hand, the United States is

proceeding under provisions of state law that gives a public

agency the right to collect fire suppression costs and damages in

certain circumstances. The “right” is one created by state law. 

On the other hand, the United States is acting as the sovereign,

as the caretaker of public lands in the National Forest and Park

systems. Its invocation of the state law right is based entirely

on its position as the sovereign, with the right and duty to

manage and maintain public lands. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).5

In this sense, its underlying right to collect money from San

Francisco under California Health & Safety Code section 13009

derives from federal law. Given that the Summerlin rule is the

general rule, that the United States complied with all conditions

precedent to the accrual of its claim, and that the claim of the

United States stems ultimately from its management and ownership

of public lands, the court holds that the United States is not

subject to the two year California statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, the court DENIES San Francisco’s motion to dismiss

the United States’ first, second, third, and sixth claims.

III.

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For the reasons stated above, the court: (1) GRANTS San

Francisco’s motion to dismiss the United States’ fourth claim;

(2) GRANTS San Francisco’s motion to dismiss the United States’

fifth and seventh claims; (3) GRANTS San Francisco’s motion to

dismiss the United States’ eighth claim; and (4) DENIES San

Francisco’s motion to dismiss the United States’ first, second,

third, and sixth claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/8/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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