Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00957/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00957-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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28 On November 30, 2006, the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, ordered the case reassigned to 1

the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA TAYLOR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-00957-SMS

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL SECURITY

COMPLAINT (DOC. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THE ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT MICHAEL J.

ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY, AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF

LINDA TAYLOR

Plaintiff is represented by counsel and is proceeding in

forma pauperis with an action seeking judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner)

denying Plaintiff’s application for disabled widows insurance

benefits and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under

Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the

jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings

in this matter, including ordering the entry of final judgment.1

The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs,

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28 Plaintiff had previously filed an application which was denied in May 2002; the ALJ concluded that no 2

presumption of continuing disability applied because Plaintiff had presented a new mental impairment. (A.R. 15.) 

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which have been submitted without oral argument to the Honorable

Sandra M. Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for benefits in June 2003,

with a protective filing date of January 24, 2003, alleging that

she was unable to work as of January 1999 due to fibromyalgia,

chronic Hepatitis C, anxiety, and “TIA’s.” (A.R. 81-83, 446-49.)2

After initial denial and denial after reconsideration, a hearing

was held on July 18, 2005, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

James P. Berry at which Plaintiff, represented by counsel,

testified. (A.R. 14, 60-64, 66-71, 452-53.) The ALJ issued a

decision on August 15, 2005, concluding that Plaintiff was not

disabled. After the Appeals Council’s denial of Plaintiff’s

request for reconsideration on May 26, 2006, Plaintiff filed the

instant action for review on July 21, 2006. (A.R. 6-9.) After

briefs were filed by both parties, briefing concluded with the

filing of Plaintiff’s reply brief on March 27, 2007.

II. Standard and Scope of Review

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of

the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits under the Act. In

reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner

is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla,"

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a

preponderance, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10

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(9th Cir. 1975). It is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The Court must consider the record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion; it may

not simply isolate a portion of evidence that supports the

decision. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9 Cir. th

2006); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). It

is immaterial that the evidence would support a finding contrary

to that reached by the Commissioner; the determination of the

Commissioner as to a factual matter will stand if supported by

substantial evidence because it is the Commissioner’s job, and

not the Court’s, to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Sorenson

v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 (9 Cir. 1975). th

In weighing the evidence and making findings, the

Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. Burkhart v.

Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must

review the whole record and uphold the Commissioner's

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, and if the

Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence.

See, Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 812 F.2d

509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d at 995. If

the Court concludes that the ALJ did not use the proper legal

standard, the matter will be remanded to permit application of

the appropriate standard. Cooper v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 557, 561 (9th

Cir. 1987).

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III. Disability

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish

that she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due

to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A

claimant must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment of such

severity that the claimant is not only unable to do the

claimant’s previous work, but cannot, considering age, education,

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.

1382c(a)(3)(B); Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th

Cir. 1989). The burden of establishing a disability is initially

on the claimant, who must prove that the claimant is unable to

return to his or her former type of work; the burden then shifts

to the Commissioner to identify other jobs that the claimant is

capable of performing considering the claimant's residual

functional capacity, as well as her age, education and last

fifteen years of work experience. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d

1273, 1275 (9 Cir. 1990). th

The regulations provide that the ALJ must make specific

sequential determinations in the process of evaluating a

disability: 1) whether the applicant engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the alleged date of the onset of the

impairment, 2) whether solely on the basis of the medical

evidence the claimed impairment is severe, that is, of a

magnitude sufficient to limit significantly the individual’s

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities; 3)

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 “Disability” for widows and widowers is generally defined the same as for other disability insurance

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claimants. Soc. Sec. Ruling 91-3p at 2. 

 All references to the Code of Federal Regulations is to the 2005 version unless otherwise stated. 4

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whether solely on the basis of medical evidence the impairment

equals or exceeds in severity certain impairments described in

Appendix I of the regulations; 4) whether the applicant has

sufficient residual functional capacity, defined as what an

individual can still do despite limitations, to perform the

applicant’s past work; and 5) whether on the basis of the

applicant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, the applicant can perform any other gainful

and substantial work within the economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 3

416.920.4

IV. Rejection of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff not

credible because Drs. Shaw, Lessenger and Young rendered opinions

that indicated that Plaintiff had significant limitations;

Plaintiff’s mother’s testimony supported restrictions; and even

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties with

social functioning, concentration, persistence, or pace, and one

or two episodes of decompensation of extended duration. Further,

Plaintiff had sought treatment for her condition, which enhanced

her credibility.

The court in Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9 Cir. th

2007), summarized the pertinent standards for evaluating the

sufficiency of an ALJ’s reasoning in rejecting a claimant’s

subjective complaints:

An ALJ is not “required to believe every

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allegation of disabling pain” or other non-exertional

impairment. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th

Cir.1989). However, to discredit a claimant's testimony

when a medical impairment has been established, the ALJ

must provide “ ‘specific, cogent reasons for the

disbelief.’ “ Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599 (quoting Lester,

81 F.3d at 834). The ALJ must “cit[e] the reasons why

the [claimant's] testimony is unpersuasive.” Id. Where,

as here, the ALJ did not find “affirmative evidence”

that the claimant was a malingerer, those “reasons for

rejecting the claimant's testimony must be clear and

convincing.” Id.

Social Security Administration rulings specify the

proper bases for rejection of a claimant's testimony.

See S.S.R. 02-1p (Cum. Ed.2002), available at Policy

Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of

Obesity, 67 Fed.Reg. 57,859-02 (Sept. 12, 2002); S.S.R.

96-7p (Cum. Ed.1996), available at 61 Fed.Reg.

34,483-01 (July 2, 1996). An ALJ's decision to reject a

claimant's testimony cannot be supported by reasons

that do not comport with the agency's rules. See 67

Fed.Reg. at 57860 (“Although Social Security Rulings do

not have the same force and effect as the statute or

regulations, they are binding on all components of the

Social Security Administration, ... and are to be

relied upon as precedents in adjudicating cases.”); see

Daniels v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 1129, 1131 (10th Cir.1998)

(concluding that ALJ's decision at step three of the

disability determination was contrary to agency

regulations and rulings and therefore warranted

remand). Factors that an ALJ may consider in weighing a

claimant's credibility include reputation for

truthfulness, inconsistencies in testimony or between

testimony and conduct, daily activities, and

“unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to

seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of

treatment.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603; see also Thomas, 278

F.3d at 958-59.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of

degenerative disc disease, depressive disorder, and Hepatitis C.

(A.R. 15.) There were no findings that Plaintiff was a

malingerer. The ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s testimony and written

statements, and he detailed Plaintiff’s complaints, which

included being unable to work because of inability to handle

stress and physical pain; having pain in the neck, left shoulder,

upper back, knee, elbow, and muscles; having episodes of fatigue

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that might last for two weeks and sometimes caused extreme

tiredness that caused her to stay in bed; being functionally

limited to lifting five pounds, standing for thirty minutes,

sitting for an hour, and walking one block with a need to take

rest breaks at least fifty per cent of the time; being without

energy, motivation, or interest in things; having suicidal

thoughts, difficulty concentrating, and increased fatigue since a

prior hearing in May 2002; and experiencing side-effects of

medication, impatience, dislike of being around people, and a

tendency towards isolation. (A.R. 17-18, 469-76.) 

The ALJ stated several reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s

credibility that were clear and convincing and were supported by

substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ expressly stated that

Plaintiff’s claims were not credible to the extent that she was

totally precluded from all sustained work activity. The ALJ

stated that Plaintiff had received primarily conservative

outpatient care with generally good results, was not being

considered as a surgical candidate, had not been hospitalized as

an inpatient for any impairment, and had not received treatment

consistent with a chronic pain disorder such as the use of a TENS

unit or attendance at a pain clinic. (A.R. 19.) Plaintiff does

not challenge the substantiality of the evidence to support these

findings. It is established that an ALJ may rely on the

conservative nature of treatment or a lack of treatment in

rejecting a claimant’s subjective complaint of pain. Johnson v.

Shalala 60 F.3d 1428, 1433-34 (9 Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s reasons th

were clear and convincing.

The ALJ also stated that the objective evidence and other

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doctors’ comments were not consistent with total disability.

(A.R. 18.) 

Plaintiff argues that the opinions of Drs. Young, Shaw, and

Lessinger supported Plaintiff’s credibility.

Dr. Richard Shaw performed a consultative internal medicine

and rheumatologic examination and evaluation of Plaintiff on

November 12, 2001, apparently at the request of Plaintiff’s

attorney in connection with a Worker’s Compensation claim. (A.R.

242, 242-71.) Dr. Shaw’s findings were largely normal or mild,

including normal chest x-ray, mild degenerative disc disease in

the cervical spine, normal dorsal spine x-rays, possible

impingement in the left shoulder, normal hand and wrist x-rays,

normal lumbar spine except for mild facet joint degenerative

changes, normal knee x-rays except for possible patellar tracking

problem on the left, and normal hip x-rays except for slight

joint space narrowing in the left. (A.R. 251.) Studies showed an

elevated liver function and borderline rheumatoid factor reading

consistent with a possible chronic disease state of the liver; he

characterized them as only mild liver function abnormalities.

(A.R. 252-53.) Dr. Shaw found that Plaintiff had generalized pain

and aching, fatigue, and very minimal sleep disturbance and mood

swings; he found a total of twelve positive tender spots above

and below the waist in three quadrants. All of this was

consistent with fibromyalgia. (A.R. 249, 259.) He concluded that

Plaintiff had developed industrially related generalized

fibromyalgia associated with left sided shoulder impingement

associated with a job injury in 1998. (A.R. 253.) He stated that

she was totally and temporarily disabled but was not permanent

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and stationary; her treatment would be a multi-disciplinary

approach including physical and occupational therapy, medication

and injections, exercise, biofeedback, and psychological care and

support. (A.R. 260.) Dr. Shaw also concluded that it was very

probable that she would not be able to return to her prior

occupational activities as described; chronic lifting and

carrying of accessories, walking, and stair climbing would be

outside the confines of any permanent restrictions. (A.R. 261.)

Most of the objective findings of Dr. Shaw were mild. The

fact that Plaintiff may have been diagnosed with fibromyalgia did

not necessarily undercut the ALJ’s reasoning with reference to

the extent of Plaintiff’s dysfunction or limitation. Further, the

limitations alluded to by Dr. Shaw related only to chronic

lifting, carrying, walking, and stair climbing as present in

Plaintiff’s previous employment; they were not such as to

preclude any gainful employment.

Dr. Frederick Young, who performed a consultative orthopedic

evaluation in September 2003, opined that Plaintiff was “felt to

have possibility of fibromyalgia” with intervening arthritic

changes. (A.R. 331, 330-31.) However, as the ALJ noted (A.R. 17),

Dr. Young expressly stated that the findings were “really mild,”

and it was felt that Plaintiff should be able to perform desk

duty type of activities with limitation of lifting, sitting no

more than six hours a day, and no prolonged standing or walking.

(A.R. 331.) The doctor’s uncertain diagnosis, acknowledgment of

the mildness of Plaintiff’s symptoms, and ambiguous functional

limitations do not undercut the ALJ’s characterization of the

objective medical evidence.

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Dr. Leslie H. Lessenger, Ph.D., performed a psychological

exam of Plaintiff on August 19, 2003, to determine eligibility

for services of the Department of Social Services. (A.R. 321-25.) 

Dr. Lessenger diagnosed a major depressive disorder, personality

disorder not otherwise specified, and borderline traits, with a

global assessment of functioning of 45. Plaintiff functioned in

the low average range of intellectual ability and memory except

for poor immediate memory; she complained of chronic pain and

fatigue and gave a history of disturbed interpersonal

relationships and abuse. Her affect was extremely labile, and she

was angry and irritable until the evaluation was over. Dr.

Lessenger concluded that much of her irritability appeared to be

due to feelings of failure in the evaluation process; her focus

on her own emotional distress and physical condition was such

that her concentration was negatively affected; she was unlikely

to function in a work situation where demands were made upon her,

and she would not do well interacting with others, given her

irritability and negative attitude toward others; and she would

have limited ability to deal with changes in a routine work

setting due to her emotional instability. Her ability to

understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions was

limited only by her attitude. (A.R. 324-25.)

Again, although Dr. Lessenger confirmed Plaintiff’s report

of essentially subjective symptoms of pain and fatigue, the

doctor did not make any findings that precluded all work.

According to Dr. Lessenger, Plaintiff retained the ability to

concentrate but for her own focus on her emotional distress and

physical condition; she retained the ability to do simple,

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repetitive tasks limited only by her attitude; and the extent of

job demands, changes, and the need to interact with others were

factors that could militate against successful employment. 

Further, to the extent that Dr. Lessenger’s opinion was

inconsistent with full employment, it was a departure from the

most of the remainder of the medical evidence, which the ALJ

correctly characterized as inconsistent with total disability. 

As the ALJ noted, examinations and studies in 1998 and 1999

revealed neck, arm, back, left leg, and shoulder pain thought to

be secondary to disc disease, although there were minimal

objective findings, including mild spurring at C5-6 with mild to

moderate encroachment upon the right neural foramen but with no

significant spinal stenosis, mild disc protrusion at C6-7 and

mild narrowing and spurring at C4-5-6, and mild disc herniation

at L3-4 and L5-S1; an EMG was normal, and there was no evidence

of compression neuropathy, myelopathy, or radiculopathy. (A.R.

148-62, 194, 429-30.) After treatment in 1999 with medication,

selective nerve blocks at C5-6 and C6-7, and a trigger point

injection in January 2000, she received physical therapy in 2001

and was eligible for vocational rehabilitation. (A.R. 186, 187,

193, 197, 200, 205-06.)

A summary from February 2000 of the recommendations of Dr.

Mike Mabry, a neurologist and internist who reviewed Plaintiff’s

file, revealed the opinion that Plaintiff was not totally

temporarily disabled because of a history of normal neurologic

exam, normal NCV/EMG, unremarkable imaging, light duty, and

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28 This evidence was not mentioned by the ALJ in his decision. 5

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evidence of psycho-social overlay. (A.R. 163-64.)5

Dr. Geoffrey Miller, orthopedic surgeon, performed a

qualified medical examination of Plaintiff on June 4, 2001. (A.R.

305-19.) Plaintiff reported little in the way of symptomatology;

her symptoms came and went, and there was no numbness or

weakness. Dr. Miller opined that virtually no physical findings

were identified. Dr. Miller found that Plaintiff had full motion

of the cervical spine, full range of motion of the shoulders

without impingement, no sensory or motor deficits in the hands or

upper extremities, negative Phalen’s, Tinel’s and thumb grind

test in the hands, full range of motion of the elbows, hands, and

fingers, no joint swelling, full range of motion and no symptoms

in the thoracic and lumbar spine, and symmetrical reflexes of the

upper and lower extremities. The doctor concluded that Plaintiff

did not have any demonstrable orthopedic impairment or disability

at the time. (A.R. 319.)

Dr. Miller performed a comprehensive re-evaluation for

orthopedic surgery of Plaintiff on March 11, 2003, and found that

her condition was not materially or substantially different from

his last examination. (A.R. 300, 295-301.) At the time, Plaintiff

wanted job training. (A.R. 296.) Plaintiff reported more

extensive pain than before, including the lumbar spine and left

leg, but the pain was seldom experienced. (A.R. 297.) The neck

pain and left arm numbness and tingling were just “off and on.”

(Id.) Dr. Miller’s diagnosis was history of nonspecific symptom

onset, suggestive of transient ischemic attack, and possibly

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fibromyalgia of nonindustrial origin. (A.R. 298.)

On September 26, 2003, state medical consultant Dr. Murray

Mitts opined that due to hepatitis, multiple arthralgias, and

possible fibromyalgia, Plaintiff retained the medical RFC to lift

twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and sit,

stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour

work day, with no other limitations. Because Plaintiff’s exams

had been within normal limits, he adopted a light RFC and not

sedentary. (A.R. 373-82.) This assessment was confirmed by state

medical consultant Dr. Ernest Wong on February 5, 2004. 

In 2003 and 2004, Plaintiff obtained treatment at Clinica

Sierra Vista for back pain, joint pain in both hands and elbows,

and Hepatitis C. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s mental impairment, in February

2001, Dr. Eric S. Morgenthaler, Ph.D., interpreted psychological

testing of Plaintiff to provide a personality description to Dr.

Richard Land. (A.R. 212-16.) The findings were that Plaintiff had

average range intellectual capabilities and was functioning

without cognitive impairment; she was somatically preoccupied and

had many vague and diffuse somatic difficulties but no

psychological test signs of acute depression, anxiety, or

psychological distress. Plaintiff’s personality was characterized

by histrionic dynamics that could predispose her to repression,

emotional lability, somatic expression of emotional distress,

interpersonal sensitivity, and impressionistic reasoning. The

doctor cautioned that the results were interpreted without the

benefit of a complete history or diagnostic interview and should

be considered in conjunction with a comprehensive psychiatric

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28 Again, this evidence is not referred to by the ALJ in the decision under review. 6

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evaluation. (A.R. 215.)6

In February 2001, Dr. Richard E. Land, psychiatrist,

performed a qualified or agreed medical evaluation of Plaintiff

with respect to her worker’s compensation claim. (A.R. 272-94.)

Plaintiff was alert and oriented and had some impairment of

recent memory, but pursuant to Dr. Morgenthaler’s conclusions on

scoring the psychological testing performed by Dr. Land, Dr. Land

concluded that Plaintiff had average intellectual capacity and

was functioning without cognitive impairment; she was somatically

preoccupied, but there was no psychological test sign of acute

depression, anxiety, or psychological distress; she had

histrionic dynamics in her personality that predisposed her to

repression, emotional lability, and somatic expression of

emotional distress, interpersonal sensitivity, and

impressionistic reasoning. (A.R. 287-88.) Dr. Land concluded that

she had a personality disorder not otherwise specified, with only

slight impairment of ability to maintain a work pace appropriate

to a given work load, perform complex or varied tasks, and accept

and carry out responsibility for direction, control, and

planning. (A.R. 290-91.) He concluded that psychiatric medical

treatment was not applicable or indicated, and Plaintiff was not

amenable to such treatment. (A.R. 291-92.) 

On September 30, 2003, state medical consultant Evangeline

Murillo completed a psychiatric review technique in which she

concluded that Plaintiff had a major depressive disorder,

anxiety, personality disorder not otherwise specified, and

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borderline traits; Plaintiff was mildly limited in activities of

daily living, maintaining social functioning, and maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace. (A.R. 355-68.) With respect

to Plaintiff’s mental RFC, she concluded that Plaintiff was

moderately limited in understanding, remembering, and carrying

out detailed instructions, and the ability to interact

appropriately with the general public; she was capable of simple,

routine tasks on a sustained basis, relating to peers and

supervisors, adapting to work-like settings and routine changes

in the work place, and maintaining attention, concentration,

persistence, and pace to complete an eight-hour work day and a

forty-hour work week; however, she should avoid the general

public. (A.R. 369-72.)

Dr. Murillo’s assessment of September 2003 was affirmed by

Dr. Glenn Ikawa on February 9, 2004. (A.R. 355.)

The record contains progress notes from Tulare County Mental

Health from February 2004 through June 2005. (A.R. 390-413, 434-

445.) Plaintiff refused to participate in a program for substance

abuse (A.R. 407) or to withdraw from Ativan, Lorazepam, or

Klonipin, as recommended by some therapists (A.R. 406, 403);

after September 2004, she attended group counseling (A.R. 397-

402) as well as individual counseling to deal with anger over a

rape she suffered while pregnant in the 1970's that resulted in

the death of the child (A.R. 390-96).

The record contains notes from Family Health Care from May

through September 2004, reflecting treatment for pain,

depression, and Hepatitis C with medication (Zoloft, Ativan,

Lorazepam, Effexor, and Vicodin). (A.R. 414-28.) Plaintiff’s

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Hepatitis C quantitative titer had improved in June 2004. (A.R.

422.)

The record also contains progress notes of Plaintiff’s

treatment at Sequoia Family Medical Center from 1998 through May

2002, reflecting primarily treatment for pain with medication

(A.R. 217-41); and notes of Plaintiff’s treatment at 34 Street th

Community Health Center from 2003 through 2004, reflecting

treatment primarily in the form of medication for Hepatitis C,

depression, and pain (A.R. 333-54).

The ALJ explained his assessment of the evidence, concluding

that the physical findings were mild. (A.R. 18-19.) He expressly

addressed Plaintiff’s mental impairment, concluding that she was

never hospitalized for mental reasons, was receiving individual

counseling, and was being treated with psychotropic medication.

(Id. p. 19.) He expressly concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to

understand, remember, and carry out one-step or two-step

instructions had not been eroded, and that although Plaintiff

would be limited to work requiring only occasional contact with

the general public, she had only mild restriction of daily living

activities, moderate difficulties in maintaining social

functioning and maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace,

and one or two episodes of decompensation, each of extended

duration. Thus, her mental condition was not shown by credible

medical evidence to be a medical condition so severe as to be

productive of symptoms that would preclude simple, repetitive

light work activity.

As previously detailed, substantial evidence supported this

conclusion. To the extent that Dr. Lessenger noted some

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limitations, the limitations were not so specific as to preclude

employment entirely, and it was for the ALJ to interpret any

ambiguity or uncertainty. To the extent that evidence is

inconsistent, conflicting, or ambiguous, it is the responsibility

of the ALJ to resolve any conflicts and ambiguity. Morgan v.

Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 603 (9 Cir. 1999). Because the ALJ th

has authority to interpret ambiguous medical opinions, Matthews

v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993), the Court must

defer to the ALJ’s decision. Further, an ALJ is entitled to draw

inferences logically flowing from the evidence. Sample v.

Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The Court thus concludes that the ALJ correctly

characterized the objective medical evidence of record and

concluded that it was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claim of

total disability. Although the inconsistency of objective

findings with subjective claims may not be the sole reason for

rejecting subjective complaints of pain, Light v. Chater, 119

F.3d 789, 792 (9 Cir. 1997), it is one factor which may be th

considered with others, Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th

Cir. 2004); Morgan v. Commissioner 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9 Cir. th

1999). Here, the ALJ’s reasoning was supported by substantial

evidence and was clear and convincing.

 The ALJ also stated that Plaintiff’s history of drug and

alcohol abuse had a negative impact on her credibility. (A.R.

18.) The record contains substantial evidence supporting a

history of drug and alcohol abuse. (A.R. 341 [note dated July 8,

2003, from Clinica Sierra Vista noting Plaintiff’s telephone

report that she was drinking about one gallon a day]; A.R. 416-17

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[progress note from Family Health Care from the summer of 2004

noting that Plaintiff’s mental health treatment source was

requesting that Plaintiff quit taking “benzos and opiates,” and

that Plaintiff was angry about adjustment of her medications];

322 [report to Dr. Lessenger in August 2003 that Plaintiff drank

alcohol heavily in the past but no longer used drugs or alcohol];

A.R. 413 [progress note from February 2004 reflecting Plaintiff’s

report to Tulare County Mental Health that Plaintiff had a

relapse in her drinking very heavily in the 1990's]; 409

[Plaintiff reported relapsing and drinking four beers in April

2004]; A.R. 408 [Plaintiff referred to an arrest in 1970 for

drinking and driving].) However, the ALJ gave other reasons for

his credibility determination that are independent of Plaintiff’s

alcohol or drug use or abuse; further, Plaintiff does not

specifically challenge this aspect of the ALJ’s reasoning. Thus,

the Court finds further analysis of this to be unnecessary

because the ALJ’s other reasons for his credibility determination

were independent, clear and convincing, and supported by

substantial evidence.

V. Rejection of Lay Witness’s Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the

testimony of Plaintiff’s mother were inadequate and not supported

by substantial evidence.

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s mother, Juanita Baldo,

testified at the hearing that Plaintiff, who had lived on her

property in a separate trailer for one and one-half years and

visited her every day, complained of back pain quite often, could

not lift or do anything, got upset, threw things, needed to lie

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down one-third of the day, had anxiety attacks, was paranoid, had

short attention spans, could not handle even an hour of work,

slept a lot, and had problems with stress. (A.R. 18, 484-87.) She

also testified that as far as she knew, Plaintiff had taken

medication prescribed to her, Plaintiff had not drunk alcohol for

many years, and the mother did not know of any drinking by

Plaintiff in the past year. (A.R. 488.)

Lay witnesses constitute other non-medical sources under the

pertinent regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(4), 16.913(d)(4).

Information from such other sources cannot establish the

existence of a medically determinable impairment, a demonstration

requiring evidence from acceptable medical sources; however,

information from such other sources may be based on special

knowledge of the claimant and may provide insight into the

severity of impairments and how they affect the person’s ability

to function. Soc. Sec. Ruling 06-03p pp. 2-3; Dodrill v. Shalala,

12 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9 Cir. 1993). th

With respect to evaluating evidence from other non-medical

sources such as spouses, parents, friends, and neighbors who have

not seen the claimant in a professional capacity in connection

with the impairments, the weight to which such evidence is

entitled will vary according to the particular facts of the case;

it is appropriate to consider factors such as the nature and

extent of the relationship with the claimant, whether the

evidence is consistent with other evidence, and any other factors

that tend to support or refute the evidence. Soc. Sec. Ruling 06-

03p p. 6. The adjudicator should generally explain the weight

given the opinions from such other sources or otherwise ensure

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that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or

decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the

adjudicator’s reasoning when such opinions may have an effect on

the outcome of the case. Id. An ALJ cannot discount testimony

from lay witnesses without articulating specific reasons for

doing so. Id. at 919. 

Here, the ALJ expressly stated that he found that the

testimony of Plaintiff’s mother was biased and inconsistent with

the medical evidence of record; the objective evidence and other

doctor comments were not consistent with total disability. (A.R.

18.) Bias is clearly a relevant factor with respect to evaluating

a lay witness’s testimony. Further, it is appropriate for an ALJ

to rely on medical evidence in rejecting inconsistent testimony.

Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511-12 (9 Cir. 2001) (noting the th

propriety of rejecting family members’ testimony in part because

of inconsistency with medical history generally alluded to in the

decision); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9 Cir. th

2002). Here, the ALJ referred to evidence in the form of

documented medical history that was specific, legitimate, and

even clear and convincing in force. Substantial evidence

supported the ALJ’s conclusions.

VI. Consideration of Medical Sources’ Opinions

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s treatment of the opinions of

several medical sources was inadequate. 

The governing standards for evaluating and articulating

findings concerning expert opinions have recently been

summarized:

The opinions of treating doctors should be given

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more weight than the opinions of doctors who do not

treat the claimant. Lester [v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830

(9th Cir.1995) (as amended).] Where the treating

doctor's opinion is not contradicted by another doctor,

it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing”

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if

the treating doctor's opinion is contradicted by

another doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion

without providing “specific and legitimate reasons”

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at

830, quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th

Cir.1983). This can be done by setting out a detailed

and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof,

and making findings. Magallanes [v. Bowen, 881 F.2d

747, 751 (9th Cir.1989).] The ALJ must do more than

offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the

doctors', are correct. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418,

421-22 (9th Cir.1988).

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th

Cir.1998); accord Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957;

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31.

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9 Cir. 2007). Further, with th

respect to the opinions of non-treating physicians, the

regulatory standards have likewise been summarized:

By rule, the Social Security Administration favors the

opinion of a treating physician over non-treating

physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. If a treating

physician's opinion is “well-supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques and is not inconsistent with the other

substantial evidence in [the] case record, [it will be

given] controlling weight.” Id. § 404.1527(d)(2). If a

treating physician's opinion is not given “controlling

weight” because it is not “well-supported” or because

it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in

the record, the Administration considers specified

factors in determining the weight it will be given.

Those factors include the “[l]ength of the treatment

relationship and the frequency of examination” by the

treating physician; and the “nature and extent of the

treatment relationship” between the patient and the

treating physician. Id. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii).

Generally, the opinions of examining physicians are

afforded more weight than those of non-examining

physicians, and the opinions of examining non-treating

physicians are afforded less weight than those of

treating physicians. Id. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(2).

Additional factors relevant to evaluating any medical

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 A “medical opinion” is a statement from an acceptable medical source that reflects a judgment about the 7

nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments, including the severity of the impairment, its symptoms, a diagnosis

and prognosis, a statement of what the claimant can still do despite his or her impairments, and any physical or

mental restrictions. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2).

22

opinion, not limited to the opinion of the treating

physician, include the amount of relevant evidence that

supports the opinion and the quality of the explanation

provided; the consistency of the medical opinion with

the record as a whole; the specialty of the physician

providing the opinion; and “[o]ther factors” such as

the degree of understanding a physician has of the

Administration's “disability programs and their

evidentiary requirements” and the degree of his or her

familiarity with other information in the case record.

Id. § 404.1527(d)(3)-(6).

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9 Cir. 2007). th

With respect to proceedings under Title XVI, the Court notes

that an identical regulation has been promulgated. See, 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.927.

A. Dr. Shaw

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ obviously rejected Dr. Shaw’s

report but failed to give reasons for not adopting it.

The ALJ adverted to Dr. Shaw’s examination and conclusions,

including the finding of cumulative trauma from an industrial

perspective relating to her neck, left shoulder, low back, and

left hip and knee, and the findings that she had developed

industrial fibromyalgia syndrome as a result of her orthopedic

injuries and had Hepatitis C. (A.R. 17.) He further noted that

Dr. Shaw felt that Plaintiff was precluded from her past relevant

work as a teacher’s aide. (Id.)

Except with respect to the issue of fibromyalgia, which is

treated separately below, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s

contention because to the extent that Dr. Shaw rendered a medical

opinion , the ALJ’s treatment of it was adequate. A summary of Dr. 7

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Shaw’s findings has previously been set forth. The only

limitations expressed by Dr. Shaw were that Plaintiff was

temporarily totally disabled by industrially related fibromyalgia

such that she would require six to twelve months of treatment

before she could be permanent and stationary (and thus a

qualified injured worker, apparently with respect to California’s

worker’s compensation system) (A.R. 260, 261, 242); and, he noted

that it was “quite probable that she will not be able to return

to her prior occupational activities as described” (A.R. 261).

Her prior employment had involved chronic lifting and carrying of

accessories, and chronic walking and stair climbing. (A.R. 261,

242-245, 257.)

As Defendant notes, and as has been detailed hereinabove,

the ALJ set forth in detail his analysis of the medical evidence

and his conclusion that it was inconsistent with total

disability. The ALJ expressly stated that he adopted the opinions

of the state agency medical consultants, and he discussed the

other opinions supporting his decision. (A.R. 17-19.) The ALJ

also expressly concluded that the objective medical evidence was

not consistent with total disability. (A.R. 18-19.) Dr. Shaw’s

own findings were mild (essentially normal findings with only

positive straight leg raising on the left at sixty degrees,

tender spots, mild degenerative changes of the neck, back and hip

with slight narrowing of the AC joint on the left shoulder,

possible patellar tracking problem reflected in x-rays, and only

slightly abnormal liver function tests). (A.R. 247-51, 258.) 

The Court concludes that the ALJ stated specific, legitimate

reasons why the doctor’s opinion on the ultimate issue of

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disability was rejected. The Court notes that the ALJ was not

bound by such an opinion. A determination of whether or not a

claimant meets the statutory definition of disability is a legal

conclusion reserved to the Commissioner; the opinion of a medical

source on the ultimate issue of disability is not conclusive.

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9 Cir. 1989). th

Further, with respect to Dr. Shaw’s opinion that Plaintiff

could not perform her past relevant work as a teacher’s aide, the

ALJ also made a finding, consistent with Dr. Shaw’s conclusion,

that Plaintiff was precluded from performing her past relevant

work. (A.R. 19.)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that to the extent that Dr.

Shaw rendered an opinion as to Plaintiff’s functionality, the ALJ

adequately detailed the evidence and the ALJ’s evaluation of the

evidence such that specific, legitimate reasons were stated for

his treatment of Dr. Shaw’s opinion.

B. Dr. Lessenger

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously refused to state

reasons for the rejection of the opinion of consulting examiner

Dr. Lessenger, who concluded that Plaintiff was unlikely to

function in a work situation with demands made upon her, would

not do well interacting with others given her irritability and

negative attitude towards others, and was limited in her ability

to deal with danger in the work place due to emotional

instability. 

The ALJ expressly concluded with respect to Plaintiff’s

mental impairment that Plaintiff was never hospitalized for

mental reasons, was receiving individual counseling, and was

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being treated with psychotropic medication. (A.R. 19.)

Substantial evidence supports this characterization of the

essentially conservative treatment that Plaintiff was receiving

and the essentially mild progress of Plaintiff’s symptoms from

the mental impairment. 

The ALJ expressly addressed the findings and opinion of Dr.

Lessenger, concluding that Lessenger’s exam showed low average

intellectual ability and memory functions except for poor

immediate memory. (A.R. 17.) He recited Plaintiff’s labile

affect, anger, and irritability over the exam. (A.R. 17.) The ALJ

addressed what is reasonably interpreted as some ambiguity in the

opinion of Dr. Lessenger. The doctor had noted Plaintiff’s

selective irritation and anger (Plaintiff was angry and irritable

with the examiner, but polite and pleasant with the people whom

she called for a ride home), and the doctor had opined that much

of the irritability appeared to have been due to feelings of

failure in the evaluation. (A.R. 324.) The doctor had also noted

that Plaintiff was focused on her own emotions and physical

condition. This opinion was reasonably interpreted by the ALJ to

mean that Plaintiff had, in addition to a major depressive

disorder and personality disorder, an attitude which was to some

extent within Plaintiff’s control. Dr. Lessenger expressly stated

that Plaintiff’s ability to understand, carry out, and remember

simple instructions was limited “only by her attitude.” Again, it

was opined that Plaintiff “would not do well” with respect to

responding appropriately to others because of “her irritability

and negative attitude toward others.” 

Further, the extent of any dysfunction was not clearly

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stated. The doctor stated that Plaintiff was “unlikely to

function” in a work situation where there were demands; she

“would not do well” interacting with others given her attitude,

and her ability to deal with changes in a routine work setting

were “[l]imited” due to emotional instability. 

To the extent that evidence is inconsistent, conflicting, or

ambiguous, it is the responsibility of the ALJ to resolve any

conflicts and ambiguity. Morgan v. Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595,

603 (9 Cir. 1999). Because the ALJ has authority to interpret th

ambiguous medical opinions, Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680

(9th Cir. 1993), the Court must defer to the ALJ’s decision. The

ALJ here operated within the permissible bounds of his discretion

in interpreting Dr. Lessenger’s indefinite and uncertain

limitations. Having done so, the ALJ then proceeded to rely on

the opinion to the extent that it indicated that although

Plaintiff had some limitations, with respect to the performance

of simple, repetitive tasks, it was within Plaintiff’s ability to

do so. The ALJ limited Plaintiff’s work to simple, repetitive

tasks with only occasional contact with the general public. (A.R.

19.) 

The ALJ expressly credited the opinions of the state agency

consultants who found that Plaintiff could perform simple,

repetitive light work with limited public contact. (A.R. 18.) 

The ALJ expressly addressed the mental rating of impairment

severity (the “B” criteria) and concluded that Plaintiff had mild

restriction of daily living activities, moderate difficulties in

maintaining social functioning, maintaining concentration

persistence, or pace, and one or two episodes of decompensation,

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each of extended duration. (A.R. 19.) He expressly concluded that

Plaintiff’s testimony was not credible, and the credible medical

evidence did not show an underlying medical condition so severe

as to be productive of symptoms which would preclude simple,

repetitive light work activity. (A.R. 19.)

The Court acknowledges that Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-5p states

that when there is a medical source statement as to a claimant’s

RFC, adjudicators must weigh medical source statements under the

rules set out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927 by stating

appropriate explanations for accepting or rejecting such

opinions. Here, with respect to Dr. Lessenger’s opinion, the ALJ

reasonably interpreted the opinion and made corresponding

provisions in the RFC. It is clear from reading the totality of

the ALJ’s decision that he determined that the credible,

objective medical evidence (Drs. Murillo, Ikawa, Morganthaler,

Land) was consistent with the RFC assigned to Plaintiff, and that

he reasonably interpreted Dr. Lessenger’s opinion as not being

inconsistent with such an RFC.

Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9 Cir. 2005). Here, th

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s interpretation and

weighing of the evidence, and the reasons for the ALJ’s decision

are sufficiently clear from the decision to permit meaningful

review.

C. Dr. Young

It is unclear whether the ALJ actually rejected the opinion

of Dr. Young, who opined that Plaintiff could perform desk type

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duties with a limitation on lifting, sitting more than six hours

daily, and prolonged standing or walking. (A.R. 17, 331.) The

ALJ’s RFC was light work, with sitting, standing, or walking no

more than six hours during an eight-hour workday. (A.R. 18.)

However, in noting the limitations placed by Dr. Young, the

ALJ stated that the findings were mild. (A.R. 17.) To the extent

that the opinion of Dr. Young was ambiguous because Dr. Young did

not make his opinion regarding the precise length of standing or

walking any more specific than it was (“no prolonged standing or

any prolonged walking”) (A.R. 331), the ALJ was entitled to

interpret the evidence reasonably, and he reasonably interpreted

it as consistent with his RFC. To the extent that it was

inconsistent, the ALJ stated specific reasons (mild findings)

sufficient to reject any limitation. It is established that the

opinion of a treating physician may be rejected if it is

ambiguous and inconsistent or conclusionary in form and not

supported by clinical findings. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d

1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,

751.

VII. Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert

Plaintiff argues that the hypothetical question propounded

to the vocational expert (VE) was incomplete because it did not

include all necessary limitations, and thus it could not serve as

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff

argues that at step five, the vocational testimony was inadequate

to support the finding that given her RFC and vocational factors,

Plaintiff could perform jobs other than her past relevant work

that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. See,

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20 C.F.R. §§ 1560, 416.960; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,

1098-99 (9 Cir. 1999) (setting forth in detail the five steps of th

analysis of disability). 

The Commissioner may carry its burden of showing ability to

do other work by eliciting the testimony of a vocational expert

(VE) in response to a hypothetical that sets out all the

limitations and restrictions of the claimant that are supported

by the record. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9 Cir. th

1995). A hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert (VE)

must be based on medical assumptions supported by substantial

evidence that reflects all the claimant’s limitations. Osenbrock

v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9 Cir. 2001) (citing Roberts th

v. Shalala, 66 F.3d at 184)). An ALJ may accept or reject

restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not supported by

substantial evidence. Osenbrock, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65. Reliance

on a hypothetical that fails to include all accepted limitations

is insufficient to carry the agency’s burden of proving ability

to engage in alternative work. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1044 (9 Cir. 1995) (remanding case to the agency to determine th

vocational ability based on a hypothetical that accurately

reflected mental RFC, including moderate limitations in ability

to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions, as

well as work with others without distraction, respond

appropriately to work changes, and set goals or plans

independently of others). Although a hypothetical should include

subjective complaints, it need not include complaints which were

rejected with a statement of reasons supported in the record.

Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th

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Cir. 1997). 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff could lift and carry twenty

pounds occasionally and ten frequently; stand, walk, or sit six

hours each in an eight-hour day; maintain attention,

concentration, persistence, and pace; relate to and interact with

others; adapt to usual changes in work settings; and adhere to

safety rules; however, she was restricted to simple, repetitive

tasks and only occasional contact with the general public. (A.R.

21.) The ALJ posed a hypothetical to the VE which included each

of these limitations. (A.R. 490.) The VE responded that such an

individual could not perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work but

could perform simple jobs, including hand packaging at the

simple, light level with over 30,000 positions; telephone

directory distributor with over 10,000 positions; and production

worker with over 33,000 positions. (A.R. 490-91.)

Plaintiff argues that it was improper for the ALJ to include

in the hypothetical an ability to maintain attention,

concentration, persistence and pace and ability to relate to and

interact with others. Plaintiff contends that this is so because

the ALJ also found that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in

maintaining social functioning and concentration, persistence or

pace, and further had one or two episodes of decompensation, each

of extended duration. Plaintiff asserts that the two sets of

findings are inconsistent, and thus the hypothetical was

inadequate and invalid.

The ALJ did make the findings (A.R. 19); however, he

expressly stated that they were made “[i]n terms of the mental

rating of impairment severity (“B” criteria); further, after

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making these findings, he stated:

The credible medical evidence therefore does not show an

underlying medical condition so severe as to be productive

of symptoms which would preclude simple, repetitive light

work activity, and the claimant’s testimony is not found

credible in supporting work activity limitations to the

extent contended.

(A.R. 19.)

Regulations provide that a psychiatric review technique is

used by adjudicators to assess an individual’s limitations and

restrictions from a mental impairment in categories identified in

“paragraph B” and “paragraph C” criteria of adult mental

disorders listings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a. However,

the criteria identified in “paragraph B” and “paragraph C” are

not used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential analysis relating to

RFC, but rather are used to rate the severity of mental

impairments at the earlier analytical steps 2 and 3. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520a, 416.920a; Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-8p p. 4. 

Here, the ALJ used the technique and concluded that

Plaintiff had a severe mental impairment of depressive disorder.

(A.R. 15, 19.) At the RFC steps, the ALJ considered the pertinent

opinions and assigned limitations in the RFC that corresponded to

the opinions, such as the limit to simple repetitive tasks and

only occasional contact with the public. As previously noted, the

ALJ’s decision adequately reflected the reasoning process through

which the ALJ weighed the medical opinions, and substantial

evidence supported the decision, including the opinions of the

state agency physicians Drs. Murillo and Ikawa, which in turn

were based on the opinions of the examining psychologist and

psychiatrist, Drs. Morganthaler and Land. It is established that

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the opinion of an examining physician based on adequate findings

may amount to substantial evidence. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242

F.3d 1144, 1149 (9 Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, th

830 (9 Cir. 1995). Likewise, the opinion of a nontreating, th

nonexamining physician can amount to substantial evidence as long

as it is supported by other evidence in the record, such as the

opinions of other examining and consulting physicians, which are

in turn based on independent clinical findings. Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9 Cir. 1995). Here, the findings th

were supported by substantial evidence. 

As previously analyzed, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints for clear and convincing reasons supported

by substantial evidence in the record. Thus, the question did not

have to include Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the hypothetical

question propounded to the VE was adequate, and the testimony

provided by the VE constituted substantial evidence supporting

the ALJ’s findings.

VIII. Fibromyalgia

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously failed to find

that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was a severe impairment. Defendant

counters that at a later step the ALJ considered all the opinions

concerning Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and the functional

limitations, if any, resulting therefrom; thus, even though he

did not find that fibromyalgia was a severe impairment, he

included the impairment’s effects throughout the analysis. Thus,

the failure to find severity was immaterial.

At step two, the Secretary considers if claimant has "an

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impairment or combination of impairments which significantly

limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). This is referred to as the

"severity" requirement and does not involve consideration of the

claimant's age, education, or work experience. Id. The step-two

inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless

claims. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 153-54 (1987). The Secretary

is required to "consider the combined effect of all of the

individual's impairments without regard to whether any such

impairment, if considered separately, would be of [sufficient

medical] severity." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(F).

Basic work activities include the abilities and aptitudes

necessary to do most jobs, such as physical functions of walking,

standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying,

or handling; capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;

understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;

use of judgment; responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a

routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b).

An impairment or combination thereof is not severe when

medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a

combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than

a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work. An

impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit a

claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a); Soc. Sec. Ruling 85-28;

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (9 Cir. 1996). th

Here, although the ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia

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to be a severe impairment, the ALJ considered the allegation that

Plaintiff was disabled by fibromyalgia (A.R. 15) and Plaintiff’s

claim of subjective symptoms that Plaintiff associated with

fibromyalgia (A.R. 18). Further, the ALJ considered all symptoms

and the expert opinions concerning Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia in

connection with Plaintiff’s RFC, including Dr. Young’s and Dr.

Shaw’s. (A.R. 17, 19). The ALJ noted Dr. Young’s diagnosis of

possible fibromyalgia and Dr. Shaw’s diagnosis of industrial

fibromyalgia syndrome. (A.R. 17.) The ALJ relied on the mildness

of Dr. Young’s findings, but he appeared to incorporate some of

the limitations of duty, lifting, and sitting, standing and

walking. Further, the ALJ noted Dr. Shaw’s diagnosis, and the ALJ

concluded, consistent with the recommendation of Dr. Shaw, that

Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work.

An ALJ’s failure to find an impairment severe, even if

erroneous, is harmless error where at the later RFC stage of the

analysis, the ALJ discusses the impairment, the medical findings,

the pertinent symptoms, and the applicable opinions concerning

functional limitations. Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th

Cir. 2007). In the present case, considering all the

circumstances, it is concluded that even if it was error not to

find that Plaintiff had a severe impairment of fibromyalgia, any

error was harmless.

IX. Disposition

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s

decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole and was based on proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the administrative decision

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of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security and DENIES

Plaintiff’s Social Security complaint.

The Clerk of the Court IS DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, 

and against Plaintiff Linda Tylor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 24, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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