Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01850/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01850-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRO 49 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a 

California limited liability 

company,

Plaintiff,

v.

NESS EXPRESS 1, LLC, a 

Delaware limited liability 

company; ADAM DECKER, an 

individual; JOSEPH DECKER, an 

individual; TOMMY’S EXPRESS 

LLC, a Michigan limited 

liability company; RYAN 

ESSENBURG, an individual; and 

DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01850-JAM-JDP

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO REMAND

Before the Court is Pro 49 Development’s (“Plaintiff”) 

motion to remand. See Mot., ECF No. 8. Ness Express 1 (“Ness”), 

Adam Decker (“A. Decker”), and Joseph Decker (“J. Decker”) 

oppose. See Opp’n, ECF No. 18. Plaintiff replied, though it 

failed to comply with the Court’s order regarding filing 

requirements. See Reply, ECF No. 20; Order re Filing 

Requirements, ECF No. 6-2. For the following reasons, 

Case 2:24-cv-01850-JAM-JDP Document 25 Filed 10/22/24 Page 1 of 11
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Plaintiff’s motion is denied.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This controversy arises out of a lease between Plaintiff and 

Ness for the establishment of a car wash under the franchise of 

Defendant Tommy’s Express (“Tommy’s”). See Comp. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. 

Plaintiff alleges that named defendants A. Decker, J. Decker, and 

Ryan Essenburg (“Essenburg”) interfered with the lease. See id. 

Plaintiff brings thirteen causes of action, including breach of 

contract. See id. at 1. 

Plaintiff originally filed suit in the Superior Court of 

California, County of Placer. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.

Ness then timely removed the case to federal court under 

diversity jurisdiction. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 

Plaintiff now moves to remand this action to Placer County 

Superior Court. See Mot. at i. Plaintiff argues that there is 

not complete diversity and that Ness’s notice of removal was 

procedurally defective. See id. at 4-7. Defendants counter that 

there is complete diversity and, to the extent that the notice of 

removal was procedurally defective, it can be amended. See Opp’n 

at 4-5. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove a civil 

action from state to federal court if there exists original 

jurisdiction. See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 

1This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for October 8, 2024.

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522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997). “The district courts shall have 

original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. Courts strictly construe the removal statute 

against removal and federal jurisdiction must be rejected if 

there is any doubt as to the right of removal. Gaus v. Miles, 

Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The party removing a 

case to federal court “has the burden to prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that removal is proper.” 

Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 

599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010).

“Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon 

terms, in the trial or appellate courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1653. The 

Ninth Circuit held that a “a district court may consider laterprovided evidence as amending a defendant’s notice of removal.”

Gen. Dentistry For Kids, LLC v. Kool Smiles, P.C., 379 F. App’x 

634, 636 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 

F.3d 837, 840 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The district court did not 

err in construing [defendant’s] opposition as an amendment to its 

notice of removal.”) (citing Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 

407 n.3 (1969)). Relying on this precedent, district courts have 

routinely considered filings other than the notice of removal 

when determining whether it has jurisdiction. See e.g., 

Altamirano v. Shaw Indus., Inc., No. C-13-0939 EMC, 2013 WL 

2950600, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2013) (“A court may properly 

consider evidence the removing party submits in its opposition to 

remand, even if this evidence was not submitted with the original 

removal petition.”); McGregor v. Lincoln Nat’l Corp., No. 

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06CV0288 IEG (RBB), 2006 WL 8455559, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 

2006) (“The Court may consider the defendant’s notice of removal 

and further pleadings to determine whether the defendant has 

properly substantiated the amount in controversy thereby 

permitting removal.”); Babcock v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 

No. 12-CV-5093-TOR, 2012 WL 3862031, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 

2012) (“[T]he court may consider this evidence even if it was not 

produced with the original notice of removal.”); and Alameda 

Healthcare & Wellness Ctr., LLC v. All Am. Healthcare Servs., 

Inc., No. CV 23-859-GW-AFMX, 2023 WL 11892166, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 

Apr. 19, 2023) (“In keeping with this authority, the Court would 

treat the supporting documentation submitted along with 

Defendant’s Opposition as an amendment to the Notice of 

Removal.”). 

B. Request for Judicial Notice

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a district court may 

take judicial notice of a fact that is “not subject to 

reasonable dispute because it can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). A court may therefore 

take judicial notice of matters of public record. Reyn’s Pasta 

Bella LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of a 

grant deed recorded in the official records of the County of 

Ventura. See Request for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 8-4. The 

deed shows that A. Decker recorded title for a house in 

California on November 19, 2020. See id. Because Plaintiff 

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seeks judicial notice of a document that is a matter of public 

record and the request is unopposed, the Court grants this 

request. 

C. Diversity Jurisdiction

A court may exercise diversity jurisdiction over a matter 

when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is 

diversity of citizenship among the parties. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a). The Court addresses these requirements below.

1. Amount in Controversy

A notice of removal must include “a plausible allegation 

that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 

threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 

81, 89 (2014). The amount in controversy is calculated based 

upon “the complaint operative at the time of removal and 

encompasses all relief a court may grant on that complaint if the 

plaintiff is victorious.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 

F.3d 413, 414-15 (9th Cir. 2018). “The amount in controversy is 

simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a 

prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. 

Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff demands millions of dollars in damages 

related to the leased property. See Compl. Prayer for Relief 1. 

Accordingly, Ness’s notice of removal included “a plausible 

allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds” $75,000. See

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. at 89; 

Notice of Removal ¶ 16. While Plaintiff is correct that Ness 

does not show how it calculated the amount in controversy that it 

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provides in the notice of removal, Plaintiff does not—and cannot—

contest that the amount in controversy far exceeds $75,000. See

Mot. at 7; Notice of Removal ¶ 14. 

2. Diversity of Citizenship

An action may be removed to federal court based on diversity 

jurisdiction only where there is complete diversity of 

citizenship between the parties. Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 

582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 

1441(b)). For diversity purposes, a person is a citizen of a 

state if he or she is: (1) a citizen of the United States and 

(2) domiciled in that state. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, 

Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). An LLC is a citizen 

of the state of which its owners or members are citizens. 

Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th 

Cir. 2006). “In determining whether a civil action is removable 

on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction], the citizenship of 

defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). 

a. Consideration of Other Filings

Plaintiff claims that “removal must be based on the removal 

notice itself,” and not later submitted declarations and filings. 

See Reply at 7. However, as explained above, courts may consider 

filings after the notice of removal when determining whether 

jurisdiction exists. See supra Part II.A. The Ninth Circuit has

held that “a defendant may amend the Notice of Removal after the 

thirty day window has closed to correct a defective allegation of 

jurisdiction” and that amendment can cure “defective allegations 

regarding citizenship.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 

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853, 858 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Plaintiff argues that Kanter is inapposite because in 

that case, unlike here, (1) the opposing party did not contest 

diversity of citizenship and (2) the defendants alleged they were 

not citizens of California. See Reply at 6. But Kanter does not 

indicate that either fact—diversity being unopposed or the 

defendants alleging they were not citizens of California—was 

necessary for its holding that defective allegations can be 

amended. Because many district courts have considered evidence 

in later submitted filings, the Court finds that it too can 

review filings submitted after the notice of removal to determine 

its jurisdiction. See supra Part II.A. Accordingly, the Court 

construes these later filings as amending the notice of removal 

and considers them in making its determinations below.

b. Citizenship of the Parties

It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a citizen of California. 

See Notice of Removal at 4; Compl. ¶ 2. Tommy’s is an LLC formed 

in Michigan. Tommy’s Express LLC’s Corporate Disclosure 

Statement, ECF No. 13 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that Tommy’s 

principal place of business is in Michigan. See Compl. ¶ 6. 

Tommy’s states that all its members are citizens of Michigan. 

See Tommy’s Express LLC’s Corporate Disclosure Statement at 2.

This is not disputed by Plaintiff.

Defendant Essenburg states that he is a citizen of Michigan. 

See Ryan Essenburg’s Rule 7.1 Disclosure Statement, ECF No. 15 at 

2 and Defendant J. Decker states that he is a citizen of Arizona. 

See Joseph Decker’s Rule 7.1 Disclosure Statement, ECF No. 17 at 

2. He declares that he has lived in Arizona since the summer of 

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2022. See Declaration of Joseph Decker, ECF No. 18-2 at 2. 

Plaintiff does not dispute the citizenship of either of these 

individuals. 

Finally, Defendant A. Decker states that he is a citizen of 

Arizona. See Adam Decker’s Rule 7.1 Disclosure Statement, ECF 

No. 16 at 2. He declares that he has lived in Arizona since 

March 2024 and intends to remain there. See Declaration of Adam 

Decker, ECF No. 18-1 at 1-2. Plaintiff provides two pieces of 

evidence to dispute A. Decker’s statements. First, on or about 

June 15, 2023, Defendant’s real estate professional sent an email 

to Plaintiff’s employee that listed a California home as A. 

Decker’s asset, as well as a personal investment account that 

listed the California address for A. Decker. See Declaration of 

Michael Alizadeh, ECF No. 8-2 at 2. But the email and provided 

statement are from 2023, which is not inconsistent with A. 

Decker’s statement that he has lived in Arizona since March 2024. 

See Declaration of Michael Alizadeh, Exh. 2. Second, Plaintiff 

provided the grant deed showing that A. Decker registered title 

for a California home in 2019. See Request for Judicial Notice. 

But A. Decker states that he co-owns this property and rents it 

to a third party. See Declaration of A. Decker at 2. Plaintiff 

argues that A. Decker must provide the current lease to prove 

that it is rented out. See Reply at 8. Even if A. Decker owns 

property in California that does not not conclusively demonstrate

that he is a citizen of the state for diversity purposes.

Plaintiff has not provided any other evidence disputing A. 

Decker’s statements regarding his citizenship. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that A. Decker is a citizen of Arizona. 

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The evidence before this Court at this time reveals that 

Plaintiff is a citizen of California and all Defendants are 

citizens of other states. The amount in controversy has also been 

satisfied and the Court therefore finds that it has diversity 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

D. Defects in the Notice of Removal

Plaintiff’s remaining arguments for remand are (1) all 

defendants did not initially consent to removal; (2) the notice 

of removal was unsigned; and (3) removal was untimely. See Mot.

at 6; Reply at 2, 4. The Court addresses these issues in turn. 

First, the Ninth Circuit held that when all properly served 

defendants do not join a petition for removal, “the district 

court may allow the removing defendants to cure the defect by 

obtaining joinder of all defendants prior to the entry of 

judgment.” Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 

2011)(citation omitted). Tommy’s and Essenburg consented after 

the filing of the present motion. See Notice of Consent to 

Removal, ECF No. 12. Accordingly, all properly served defendants 

have consented to removal before an entry of judgment. As such, 

the Court construes this later filing as curing the defect in the 

notice of removal. 

Second, Ness’s counsel signed the notice of removal. See

Notice of Removal at 2. While Plaintiff is correct that the 

notice is not signed on a later page, it presents no argument as 

to why the initial signing is insufficient for purposes of Rule 

11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Reply at 4; 

Notice of Removal at 5.

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Finally, Plaintiff improperly raises a new issue in its 

reply regarding the timeliness of the removal petition. Ness 

filed its notice of removal within thirty days, as it was served 

on June 4, 2024, and petitioned for removal on June 28, 2024. 

See Notice of Removal at 5. Plaintiff argues that Ness could not 

remove the action within thirty days because the complaint was

not removable on its face. See Reply at 2-4 (citing Kuxhausen v. 

BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2013). But 

Plaintiff misreads Kuxhausen. There, the Ninth Circuit

recognized that 28 U.S.C. Section 1446 “identifies two thirty-day 

periods for removing a case. The first thirty-day removal period 

is triggered if the case stated by the initial pleading is 

removable on its face. The second thirty-day removal period is 

triggered if the initial pleading does not indicate that the case 

is removable, and the defendant receives ‘a copy of an amended 

pleading, motion, order or other paper’ from which removability 

may first be ascertained.” Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1139 (cleaned 

up). This distinction is to preserve a defendant’s ability to 

remove later, not prohibit them from doing so earlier. The Ninth 

Circuit continued, “To avoid saddling defendants with the burden 

of investigating jurisdictional facts, we have held that the 

ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial 

pleading in order for the first thirty-day clock under § 1446(b) 

to begin.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Even if Plaintiff is correct that the complaint was not removable 

on its face, that would just mean the first thirty-day clock was 

not triggered, and that Ness still had an additional thirty-day

period to remove after removability was ascertained; it did not 

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prohibit Ness from petitioning for removal when it did. As such, 

Plaintiff’s claim that removal was untimely fails. 

In sum, the Court finds there are no remaining procedural 

defects in the notice of removal and Plaintiff’s motion to remand 

is therefore denied. 

E. Sanctions for Failure to Comply with the Court’s Order

Plaintiff’s Reply exceeded the Court’s page limit. See

Order re Filing Requirements at 1. Plaintiff’s Reply was nine 

pages, whereas the filing requirements limit this brief to five 

pages and call for sanctions of $50 per page exceeding the limit. 

See id. Local Rule 110 authorizes the Court to impose sanctions 

for “failure of counsel or of a party to comply with . . . any 

order of the Court.” Therefore, Plaintiff's counsel, Alexander 

Kandel, is ordered to pay $200.00 to the Clerk of the Court.

III. ORDER

Because the Court finds that Defendants have proven by a 

preponderance of evidence that removal was proper, Plaintiff’s 

motion to remand is DENIED. See Geographic Expeditions, Inc., 

599 F.3d at 1107. As such, Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’

fees and costs is also DENIED.

It is further ordered that within ten (10) days of this 

Order Alexander Kandel shall pay sanctions of $200.00 to the 

Clerk of the Court

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 21, 2024

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