Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00683/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00683-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HERBERT JOHNSON, 

CDCR #P-60805, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

M. HILL, CCI Counselor; C/O 

BOWART; C. TISCORNIA, Librarian; 

MARTY, Nurse; HOMER, CCII, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:19-cv-00683-LAB-MSB 

ORDER: 

1) DENYING PLAINTIFF LEAVE 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS AS BARRED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

(ECF No. 2) 

AND 

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 

Herbert Johnson (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil 

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Central District of California on 

March 27, 2019, together with a request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF Nos. 1, 2.) 

/// 

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On April 11, 2019, however, United States District Judge Manuel L. Real found that 

because all defendants are alleged to reside and/or be employed at RJD, and all or a 

substantial part of Johnson’s claims are alleged to have arisen at RJD, venue did not lie in 

the Central District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Therefore, Judge Real transferred the 

case here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (See ECF No. 4.) He did not address Johnson’s 

pending IFP request, and also deferred the initial screening required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) to this Court. (Id. at 3.) 

I. Request to Proceed IFP 

A. Standard of Review 

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face 

an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 

filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 

amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 

. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 

States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective 

of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation 

in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 

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1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both before and after 

the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 

styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 

prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008); 

see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that when 

court “review[s] a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 

dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 

the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’”) 

(quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) 

from pursuing any other IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he alleges he is 

facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 

493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at 

the time of filing.”). 

B. Discussion 

 As an initial matter, the Court has reviewed Johnson’s Complaint and finds it does 

not contain any “plausible allegations” which suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of 

serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, Johnson seeks to sue RJD Correctional Counselors, a nurse, 

and a librarian based on claims that on various occasions in February, March, and 

September 2018, after he arrived at RJD from either CMF in Vacaville, “SAC” or “New 

Folsom,” they “wrote him up” for refusing to take a “profiling” or “COMPAS” test, denied 

him “free copies,” separated him from his legal and personal property while he was in AdSeg, “abuse[d] [his] meds” during the “8 p.m. pill call,” and “slam[med]” him when he 

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refused to cuff up and “go to committee.” (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3- 13.) Section 

§ 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception cannot be triggered solely by complaints of past 

harm. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1053 (“The exception’s use of the present tense, 

combined with its concern only with the initial act of ‘bring[ing]’ the lawsuit, indicates to 

us that the exception applies if the danger existed at the time the prisoner filed the 

complaint.”); see also Parker v. Montgomery Cty. Corr. Facility/Bus. Office Manager, 870 

F.3d 144, 154 n.12 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Although prison can undoubtedly be a dangerous place, 

incarceration alone does not satisfy the requirement of “imminent danger of serious 

physical injury” for purposes of § 1915(g). Indeed, if it did, every prisoner would be 

entitled to IFP status and the exception would swallow the rule.”) (citation omitted). 

 And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 

some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 

satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 

1120.1

 That is the case here. 

 Based on a review of its own dockets and other court proceedings available on 

PACER, the Court finds that Plaintiff Herbert Johnson, identified as CDCR #P-60805, 

while incarcerated, has brought more than three prior civil actions and appeals which were 

dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). They are: 

1) Johnson v. Deputy Malone, et al., Civil Case No. 2:10-cv-01611-GHKRNB (C.D. Cal. April 26, 2010) (Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) to 

                                               

1 The Court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case No. 

3:05-cv-00452–MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United 

States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. 

Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘notice of proceedings in 

other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have 

a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 

2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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Dismiss First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)) (ECF No. 9); (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2010) 

(Order Adopting R&R) (ECF No. 11) (strike one); 

2) Johnson v. Walker, et al., Civil Case No. 3:12-cv-00841-LAB-RBB 

(S.D. Cal. June 26, 2012) (Order Dismissing Civil Action as Frivolous 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and Denying Motion to Proceed IFP as 

Moot) (ECF No. 11) (strike two); 

3) Johnson v. Walker, et al., Civil Case No. 3:12-cv-01837-CAB-BGS 

(S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012) (Order Dismissing Civil Action as Frivolous 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)) (ECF No. 18) (strike three); and 

4) Johnson v. Millard, et al., Civil Case No. 3:11-cv-01691-JAH-NLS 

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2012) (Orders Adopting R&Rs to Grant Defendants’ 

Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6)) (ECF Nos. 37, 38); (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2013) (Order Dismissing 

Action) (ECF No. 41)) (strike four).2

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three 

“strikes” as defined by § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not 

entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 

Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all 

prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing 

the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin 

v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is 

itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).3

                                               

2

 See Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A prisoner may not avoid 

incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage of [an] opportunity to amend.”). 

3 Johnson has also been denied leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in the 

Southern District of California on three subsequent occasions. See Johnson v. Ferrel, et 

al., Civil case No. 3:18-cv-02553-JAH-BGS (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2019 Order Denying Leave 

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II. Conclusion and Order 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

 (1) DENIES Plaintiff leave to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g); 

 (2) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to 

prepay the $400 civil and administrative filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and 

(4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 12, 2019 

 Hon. Larry Alan Burns 

Chief United States District Judge

                                               

to Proceed IFP as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Dismissing Civil Action for Failure 

to Pay Filing Fee as Required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)) (ECF No. 5); Johnson v. Paramo, 

et al., Civil Case No. 3:16-cv-00723 BEN (RBB) (S.D. Cal. July 18, 2016) (Order Denying 

Motions to Proceed IFP and to Appoint Counsel as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and 

Dismissing Civil Action for Failure to Pay Filing Fee as Required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)) 

(ECF No. 5); and Johnson v. CDC Medical, et al., Civil Case No. 3:13-cv-2498-JLS-BLM 

(S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013) (Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP as Barred by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) and Dismissing Case for Failure to Pay Filing Fee as Required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a)) (ECF No. 4). And while Plaintiff appealed Judge Sammartino’s Order in Civil 

Case No. 3:13-cv-2498-JLS-BLM, the Ninth Circuit denied Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP 

on appeal “because the USDC correctly determined that appellant has had three or more 

prior action or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” (ECF No. 9) (USCA Case No. 13-57086). 

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