Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01579/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01579-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VU NGUYEN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1579 FCD KJM PS

vs.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is pending before the court. Upon review of the

documents in support and opposition, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS

AS FOLLOWS:

This case arises out of plaintiff’s employment in the Department of Dermatology

at UC Davis and his termination therefrom in July 2004. Plaintiff names as defendants the

University of California, Davis (“UCD”) and three individuals. Plaintiff alleges two causes of

action. The first cause of action is under the California Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”),

California Government Code § 8547 et seq.; the second cause of action is under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for infringement of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights of free speech on matters of public

concern. The gravamen of plaintiff’s claims is that allegedly the laboratory in which plaintiff

was employed committed fraud in research on skin cells, plaintiff reported the fraud, and

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 Defendants contend in their moving papers that all of plaintiff’s section 1983 claims 1

are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff, however, did not receive notice of the

termination until receipt of a letter of dismissal dated July 15, 2004. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 21.

The statute of limitations begins to run on the date the decision is made and communicated to the

plaintiff. Delaware State College v. Ricks (1980) 449 U.S. 250, 258. Plaintiff received notice of

the decision to terminate no earlier than July 15, 2004; therefore the section 1983 claim based on

the termination is not time barred (July 15, 2006 was a Saturday). After hearing on the motion to

dismiss, defendants filed a notice conceding that claims arising out of the termination are not

barred by the statute of limitations. 

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plaintiff was terminated from his position with the University for reporting the fraud.

Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Both plaintiff and defendants request the court take judicial notice of documents submitted in

connection with the pending motion. The court takes judicial notice of those documents

submitted by both plaintiff and defendant that are part of the administrative proceedings of the

grievance plaintiff filed with the University regarding his termination.

Defendant UCD moves to dismiss on the ground the University is immune from

suit under the Eleventh Amendment. UCD is considered an instrumentality of the State for

Eleventh Amendment purposes. Thompson v. Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1442-43 (9th Cir.

1989). The action against UCD accordingly cannot be maintained in federal court and this

defendant should be dismissed.

The individual defendants contend all of the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

except for the claim related to plaintiff’s termination, are barred by the statute of limitations. 1

Actions brought under section 1983 are governed by the statute of limitations for personal injury

actions of the forum state. See, e.g., Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). 

California law provides for a two year statute of limitations for personal injury. Cal. Civ. Proc.

Code § 335.1. The pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an

employment decision, does not toll the running of the limitations periods. Delaware State

College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980). This action was filed July 17, 2006. Plaintiff

complains of a variety of actions taken by defendants, most of which occurred prior to July 17,

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2004. The claims accruing prior to July 17, 2004 accordingly are time barred. 

With respect to the state claim predicated on the WPA, defendants correctly

contend that plaintiff was obligated to seek a writ of mandamus in state court to overturn the

administrative decisions that adversely decided his grievance. Campbell v. Regents of the

University of California, 35 Cal. 4th 311, 320-24, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 (2005); see also

Ohton v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 148 Cal. App. 4th 749, 769 (2007)

(judicial exhaustion required for claims under the WPA). The whistleblower claim was decided

against plaintiff in the grievance proceedings at three levels of administrative appeal, which

included fact finding and investigation of the facts underlying plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff did not

seek a writ of administrative mandamus under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 and,

accordingly, failed to judicially exhaust this claim. As such, plaintiff cannot proceed here in

federal court on his state law claim. 

The only remaining claim that is neither time barred nor barred under the doctrine

of judicial exhaustion is the section 1983 claim predicated on the termination that plaintiff

alleges was in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. That claim also should be

dismissed. While there is no requirement of administrative exhaustion for this claim, the

decisions rendered in quasi-judicial administrative proceedings such as were conducted in this

case, and which are final and binding on plaintiff, are entitled to res judicata with respect to

claims made under section 1983 and cannot be relitigated here. University of Tennessee v.

Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986); see also Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th

Cir. 1994). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted; and 

2. This action be dismissed.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

"Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 10, 2007.

006

nguyen-ucd.57

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