Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_02-cv-00644/USCOURTS-almd-2_02-cv-00644-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1973(c) Voting Rights -Qualifications &amp; Procedures

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOHNNY SWANSON III, )

et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 2:02cv644-T

NANCY WORLEY, etc., et al., ) (WO)

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

This case challenging various aspects of Alabama’s

election laws governing independent candidates has taken

on the realization of the mythical Greek Hydra: Just as

the court resolves one claim, another appears in its

place. The court has already granted summary judgment in

favor of the state defendants on the plaintiffs’

challenge to the 3 % signature requirement for

independent candidates. Swanson v. Bennett, 219

F.Supp.2d 1225, 1231-1234 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (Swanson I);

Swanson v. Bennett, 340 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1299-1301 (M.D.

Ala. 2004) (Swanson II). It is also apparent that, while

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partial preliminary-injunctive relief was appropriate on

the plaintiffs’ ‘fair notice’ challenge to the deadlineregistration change for independent candidates in 2002,

Swanson I, 219 F.Supp.2d at 1229-1230, that claim is now

moot and thus is due to be dismissed. Swanson II, 340

F.Supp.2d at 1298-1299 (“[T]he only way the same wrong

could recur for [the plaintiffs] would be if Alabama were

to change the law regarding the registration deadline

again and fail to give them notice of it again, or if

they were to move to another State where the deadline was

changed at the last minute. It appears from the current

record that these things are not reasonably likely to

occur.”).

Now that the court has addressed and resolved these

two claims, the plaintiffs assert that their claim

challenging the deadline-registration change also

includes a claim that the deadline-registration change

(from six days after the second primary election to the

day of the first primary election, 1975 Ala. Code

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1. Plaintiffs’ brief (Doc. No. 89) at 5.

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§ 17-7-1, unconstitutionally denies them the opportunity

to collect signatures on the day of the primary election.

According to the plaintiffs, “The primary polling places

are the most viable source of successful petition drives

for a variety of reasons including[:] the mindset of

electors is on election issues, petitioners are assured

that the elector is a registered voter, the electors[’]

district and polling places are readily apparent,

electors are not suspicious of the petitioners’ need for

personal information, it is the only public place where

petitioners’ activities are welcomed, and it is the least

costly means of obtaining signatures.”1

However, other factors present in the Alabama

election scheme “alleviat[e],” Swanson I, 219 F.Supp.2d

at 1230, this perceived loss. Alabama “does not restrict

voters from signing petitions based on their party

affiliation, nor does it restrict voters who have already

voted in a primary from signing the petition.

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Independent candidates can seek signatures from voters

who have already signed other petitions, and there are no

restrictions on how many signatures may come from a

specific geographical area. Alabama does not restrict

how many signatures can be submitted in an effort to meet

the 3 % requirement, and the state allows unlimited time

to conduct the petitioning effort.” Id. The defendants

also contend that Alabama needs the additional time

afforded by the earlier, primary-election deadline to

verify petition signatures and to perform other

administrative duties connected to the election cycle.

Therefore, applying the balancing test and factors

articulated in Swanson I, this court concludes that

changing the deadline for independent candidates to

collect signatures from six days after the second primary

election to the day of the first primary election is

“reasonable” and does not “put[] an unreasonable burden

on independent candidates.” Id. See Jenness v. Fortson,

403 U.S. 431, 438 (1971) (deadline of primary election

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2. The defendants add that, even with the deadline

being the primary election day, independent candidates

can still collect signatures on that day. The court,

however, appreciates that it would be quite difficult, if

not impossible in many instances, to prepare petitions

and submit them to the designated state or local official

and to have a meaningful opportunity to gather additional

signatures, all on the same day. 

for independent candidates to meet signature requirement

is not “unreasonably early”); see also Council of

Alternative Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64 (3d Cir. 1999);

Wood v. Meadows, 207 F. 3d 708 4th Cir. 2000); Rainbow

Coalition of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma State Election Board,

844 F. 2d 740 (10th Cir. 1988).2

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 30th day of May, 2006.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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