Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01186/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01186-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERTO CRESPO MAQUEDA,

Detainee No. A-201-221-552,

Civil No. 14cv1186 LAB (JLB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(ECF Doc. No. 2) 

AND 

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

vs.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY,

Defendant.

Roberto Crespo Maqueda (“Plaintiff”), currently detained at the San Diego

Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed

a civil complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents of the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 

Plaintiff has not prepaid the filing fee required to commence a civil action; instead,

he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 3). 

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I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 1

prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, “[u]nlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the full

amount offiling feesin civil actions and appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison Litigation

Reform Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). As defined by the

PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused

of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law

or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Under this definition, “an alien detained by the INS

pending deportation is not a ‘prisoner’ within the meaning of the PLRA,” because

deportation proceedings are civil, rather than criminal in nature, and an alien detained

pending deportation has not necessarily been “accused of, convicted of, sentenced or

adjudicated delinquent for, a violation of criminal law.” Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 886.

Thus, because Plaintiff claims he is an immigration detainee, and not a “prisoner” as

defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the filing fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) do not

apply to him. See Compl. at 2.

Accordingly, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets and finds it is

sufficient to show that he is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain

this action. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

(ECF Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED .

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 1

2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial

Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule) (eff. May 1, 2013). However,

the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. 

Id.

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II.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP issubject to sua sponte dismissal

by the Court to the extent it contains claims which are “frivolous, malicious, fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845,

845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”)

First, Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim pursuant to the FTCA, which waives

sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by federal employees. FDIC v. Meyer,

510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). The FTCA provides that district courts have exclusive

jurisdiction of civil actions against the United States for money damages “for injury or

loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or

omission of any employee” of the federal government while acting within the scope of

his office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475. However,

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege, among other things necessary to state a valid claim

under the FTCA, that he exhausted his administrative remedies under the FTC prior to

filing suit. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The FTCA bars

claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their

administrative remedies.”); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9thCir. 1980) (“The

timely filing of an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the bringing of

a suit under the FTCA, and, as such, should be affirmatively alleged in the complaint.”). 

Based on this fundamental jurisdictional defect, Plaintiff’s FTCA claims must be

dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Lopez, 203

F.3d at 1127.

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Second, to the extent Plaintiffseeks to hold the Department of Homeland Security

liable for alleged civil rights violations pursuant to Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388, his claims

also fail. Bivens established that “compensable injury to a constitutionally protected

interest [by federal officials alleged to have acted under color of federal law] could be

vindicated by a suit for damagesinvoking the general federal question jurisdiction of the

federal courts [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331].” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486

(1978). Bivens provides that “federal courts have the inherent authority to award

damages against federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for violations of their

constitutional rights.” Western Center for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153,

1156 (9th Cir. 2000). However, a Bivens action may only be brought against the

responsible federal official in his or her individual capacity. Daly-Murphy v. Winston,

837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1988).

Bivens does not authorize a suit against the government or its agencies for

monetary relief. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994); Thomas-Lazear v. FBI, 851

F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988); Daly- Murphy, 837 F.2d at 355. Accordingly, to the

extent that Plaintiff is seeking to sue the Department of Homeland Security for alleged

constitutional violations, he may not do so in this Bivens action.

Finally, in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have “acted

specifically with the intent to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights to be free from

unlawfully and unreasonable deportation. (Compl. at 3.) However, Bivens relief is not

available when a plaintiff is attempting to sue “federal agents for wrongful detention

pending deportation.” Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2012). 

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No.

3) is GRANTED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days

leave from the date this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures

the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in

itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not

named and any claim not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

DATED: June 27, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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