Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00469/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00469-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RONALD DEAN YANDELL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DONALD WASHINGTON, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:21-cv-0469 DAD AC P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is both a state prisoner and a federal pretrial detainee, who brought this pro se 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the conditions of his pretrial detention at the 

Sacramento County Jail. Before the court are two motions: (1) defendant Jones’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief, ECF No. 33; and (2) plaintiff’s “motion for nonmutual issue preclusion to reinstate claims,” ECF No. 49. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in this case while he was housed at the Sacramento 

County Jail in relation to his prosecution in Case No. 2:19-cr-00107 KJM, charging plaintiff and 

others with offenses including racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit murder, and 

multiple drug offenses. On screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the initial complaint was 

found not to state a claim for relief. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction 

was denied. ECF Nos. 10, 12. 

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Plaintiff was given the opportunity to file an amended complaint, which he did. ECF No. 

11. The first amended complaint was screened and found not to state a claim for relief, and 

plaintiff was granted leave to file a second amended complaint. ECF No. 13. On screening of the 

second amended complaint, ECF No. 14, the undersigned found that plaintiff had stated a claim 

for violation of his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion, based on the allegations 

that plaintiff had been denied access to vegetarian meals that he had requested to accommodate 

his Buddhist faith. ECF No. 15. It was recommended that the case proceed on that claim only, 

against defendant Chaplain Toliver for damages and against Sheriff Jones for purposes of 

injunctive relief only. Id. The district judge formerly assigned to the case adopted the Findings 

and Recommendations, and all other claims and defendants were dismissed. ECF No. 17. 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 33) 

Defendant Jones moves to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief on grounds that plaintiff 

has been transferred to California State Prison – Sacramento, and the claim is therefore moot. 

ECF No. 33-1 (points and authorities in support of motion). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the 

motion, ECF No. 38, and defendant replied, ECF No. 39. 

Defendant Jones was the proper defendant for purposes of injunctive relief—and was 

served in his official capacity for this purpose only—because, had plaintiff prevailed on his free 

exercise claim while housed at the Sacramento Main Jail, the Sheriff would have been the official 

with authority to ensure compliance with an injunction requiring vegetarian meals. See Will v. 

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989); Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & 

Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff, however, is no longer housed at the 

Sacramento Main Jail. See ECF No. 29 (notice of change of address to CSP-SAC). Neither 

Sheriff Jones nor his successor, nor any Sacramento County official, has the ability to provide 

vegetarian meals now that plaintiff is no longer housed in a facility run by the County. 

When an inmate challenges prison conditions at a particular correctional facility, and then 

is transferred from the facility with no reasonable expectation of returning, any claim for 

injunctive relief becomes moot. See Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th 

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Cir. 1991). To the extent that plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief in the form of religious 

meals, he can no longer obtain that relief from defendant Jones or any appropriately substituted 

official. Because the claim for injunctive relief is moot, Jones should be dismissed from this 

action. 

Granting Jones’ motion will have no effect on plaintiff’s First Amendment claim for 

damages against Chaplain Toliver, the individual who is alleged to have personally violated 

plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion reflects the erroneous belief that the motion 

seeks dismissal of the free exercise claim in its entirety against both defendants. ECF No. 38. 

Only Jones has moved for dismissal, and the claim is moot only insofar as it is stated against him 

for purposes of injunctive relief. If the district judge adopts the recommendation to grant Jones’s 

motion, plaintiff will still be able to proceed on his claim that Toliver violated his First 

Amendment rights. 

III. MOTION TO REINSTATE CLAIMS (ECF No. 49) 

Plaintiff seeks “non-mutual issue preclusion to reinstate claims.” ECF No. 49. In 

opposition, defendants argue that the motion is procedurally improper because plaintiff identifies 

no procedural vehicle or legal basis for the relief he seeks. See ECF No. 50. It is indeed the case 

that plaintiff’s motion is based on no identifiable rule of civil procedure. The issue that plaintiff 

seeks to present is clear, however, in light of the procedural history of this case. 

Some of the claims that were dismissed from plaintiff’s case on screening were 

substantially similar to those presented by the case of a co-defendant, Pat Brady,1 and in Brady’s 

case the Ninth Circuit ruled on appeal from dismissal that some of those claims had been 

screened out in error. See Brady v. Jones, Case No. 2:21-cv-0489 TLN AC, ECF No. 32 

(reversing dismissal of claims related to placement in the Total Separation Unit and interference 

with confidential legal visits). Plaintiff wants these claims to be restored to his complaint as they 

1

 Both plaintiff and Brady are defendants in an ongoing Aryan brotherhood conspiracy 

prosecution, Case No. 2:19-cr-00107 KJM. While housed at the Sacramento Main Jail, they and 

other codefendants were subject to heightened security provisions and experienced chronic 

problems meeting confidentially with their lawyers. Common issues regarding their conditions of 

confinement and access to counsel were raised both in the criminal case and via separate civil 

rights lawsuits. 

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have been restored in Brady’s case, which was reopened on remand. Plaintiff brought this motion 

promptly following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brady. 

This court has dismissed plaintiff’s claims alleging that his due process rights were 

violated by placement in the Total Separation Unit (Claim One) and that his right to confidential 

legal visits was violated (Claim Two). ECF Nos. 15, 17. The law of the case doctrine provides 

that “a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by 

the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 

876 (9th Cir. 1997). A motion for reconsideration generally should not be granted unless the 

district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, has committed clear error, or there has 

been an intervening change in the controlling law. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma 

GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). A party seeking reconsideration must do more 

than disagree with the court’s decision or recapitulate that which the court has previously 

considered. United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). 

Nor can a reconsideration motion “be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first 

time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Marlyn 

Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 880. “To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly 

convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.” Westlands Water Dist., 134 

F.Supp.2d at 1131 (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff asserts “issue preclusion” as a basis for reinstatement of his dismissed claims. 

Issue preclusion, like claim preclusion, is a form of res judicata. Only final judgments can have 

preclusive effect. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008); Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 

204 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2000). There has been no final judgment in the Brady case. 

However, it is possible that the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum opinion in that case demonstrates 

the existence of clear error in the screening of plaintiff’s second amended complaint. That 

question, which goes to application of the law of the case doctrine, has not been properly 

presented to this court and the undersigned expresses no opinion on the merits of the matter. 

The motion at ECF No. 49 will therefore be denied as procedurally improper, without 

prejudice to a motion for reconsideration and to amend the complaint. Plaintiff is informed that if 

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he brings a motion to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) , he must provide as an 

attachment to the motion a proposed third amended complaint that includes the claims he wishes 

to “reinstate” as well as reproducing the free exercise claim that has already been found suitable 

to proceed.2 Such a motion should explain why an exception to the law of the case doctrine is 

appropriate. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion at ECF No. 

49 is DENIED as procedurally improper, without prejudice to a motion for leave to amend which 

is supported by a proposed amended pleading. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendant Jones’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 33, be GRANTED; 

2. Defendant Jones be terminated from this action; and 

3. Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claim be dismissed as moot only insofar as it 

seeks injunctive relief. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: November 14, 2023 

2

 As plaintiff has been previously advised, the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make an amended pleading complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes its predecessor. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967) (citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th 

Cir. 2012). 

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