Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08207/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08207-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 30:1276 Interior: Review of Agency Action

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Center for Biological Diversity, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Salazar, et al., 

Defendants, 

and 

Denison Mines (USA) Corp. and Denison 

Arizona Strip, LLC, 

Defendant-Intervenors. 

No. CV09-08207-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 This case arises from the renewed operation of a uranium mine near Grand 

Canyon National Park. Plaintiffs alleged five claims in their Third Amended Complaint: 

(1) the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) violated the FLPMA and 1872 

Mining Law by failing to approve a new plan of operations for uranium exploration and 

mining activities at the Arizona 1 Mine; (2) alternatively, BLM failed to prepare a 

supplement to the 1988 Environmental Analysis to consider new circumstances and 

information relevant to environmental concerns related to the Arizona 1 Mine, in 

violation of NEPA; (3) BLM failed to prevent the unnecessary and undue degradation of 

public lands; (4) BLM violated NEPA by relying on a categorical exclusion for the 2008 

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free use permit issued to Mohave County to mine and extract gravel from Robinson 

Wash; and (5) BLM violated NEPA in making its 2008 Bonding Decision for the Arizona 

1 Mine. Doc. 126. On April 8, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary 

injunction (Doc. 36), which the Court denied on June 17, 2010 (Doc. 71). On May 27, 

2011, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs 

on Claims One, Two, Three, and Five. Doc. 163. The Court remanded the categorical 

exclusion issue in Claim Four to BLM for further consideration. Id. On June 27, 2011, 

the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the May 27, 2011 summary 

judgment order. Doc. 166. Pursuant to the Court’s July 22, 2011 order (Doc. 173), the 

parties filed simultaneous memoranda addressing their respective positions on the merits 

of Claim Four. Docs. 178, 179, 180. On October 7, 2011, the Court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs with respect to Claim Four. 

Doc. 184. 

 Plaintiffs have appealed the May 27, 2011 summary judgment order (Doc. 163), 

the June 27, 2011 order denying reconsideration (Doc. 166), and the October 7, 2011 

summary judgment order (Doc. 184) to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit. Doc. 186. Plaintiffs have filed a second motion for an injunction in this Court 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 62(c), asking the Court to enjoin all mining activities associated with the 

Arizona 1 Mine pending the outcome of their appeal. Doc. 188. Defendant-Intervenors 

Denison Mines (USA) Corp. and Denison Arizona Strip, LLC, and Federal Defendants 

Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, and BLM, have filed oppositions to Plaintiff’s 

motion. Docs. 195, 196. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion. 

 Rule 62(c) provides that “[w]hile an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order 

or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may suspend, 

modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the 

opposing party’s rights[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). A party seeking relief under Rule 62(c) 

“must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 

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irreparable harm in the absence of . . . relief, that the balance of equities tip in his favor, 

and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 

636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 

555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The first two factors of the four-part test – likelihood of success 

on the merits and irreparable injury – are the most critical and must be satisfied before the 

second two factors are considered. Nken v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009). “It is 

not enough that the chance of success on the merits be ‘better than negligible.’” Id.

(quoting Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999)). By the same token, simply 

showing some possibility of irreparable injury fails to satisfy the second factor. Id. 

(citing Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375). 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that the “serious questions” sliding scale approach to 

injunctions survives Winter when applied as part of the four-element Winter test. 

Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011). “In other 

words, ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply 

toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two 

elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. at 1132. 

 The Court initially notes that Plaintiffs “maintain that they are likely to succeed on 

the merits of their claims on appeal,” (Doc. 191, at 4), but do not make any supporting 

arguments to this effect. They argue instead that their claims have raised serious 

questions warranting more deliberative consideration on appeal. Doc. 191, at 4-6. The 

Ninth Circuit has held, however, that in order to reach the sliding scale analysis, “a 

moving party must, at an ‘irreducible minimum,’ demonstrate some chance of success on 

the merits.” Global Horizons, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 510 F.3d 1054, 1058 

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Arcamuzi v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 

(9th Cir. 1987)). When a party has not shown any chance of success on the merits, no 

further determination of irreparable harm or balancing of hardships is necessary. Id. 

Even under the “serious questions” approach, Plaintiffs fail to meet the standard required 

for the Court to grant an injunction because they do not demonstrate any chance of 

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success on the merits. 

 Nor have Plaintiffs demonstrated the existence of serious questions going to the 

merits. “Serious questions are ‘substantial, difficult, and doubtful, as to make them a fair 

ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative investigation.’” Republic of the 

Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hamilton Watch Co. 

v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1952)). 

 Plaintiffs argue on Claims One and Three that the Court’s prior rulings confirm 

the existence of serious questions because the Court initially characterized BLM’s 

interpretation of its regulatory scheme as “problematic.” Doc. 191, at 5 (citing Doc. 71, 

at 5). Despite this initial concern, the Court ultimately concluded that the “obvious 

import of these provisions is that a plan of operations remains effective for periods of 

operation before and after temporary closures[.]” Doc. 163, at 7. The Court noted that 

Plaintiff’s reading of the regulations had several flaws and that the language and intent of 

the regulations plainly supported BLM’s application of the regulations. Id. at 7-9. 

 On Claim Two, Plaintiffs assert that they are unaware of other cases in which 

BLM has successfully characterized the actions it took at the Arizona 1 Mine as anything 

more than monitoring activities that require no NEPA review in an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact statement. Doc. 191, at 5-6. Plaintiff’s lack of 

awareness of BLM’s actions in other cases does not persuade the Court that serious 

questions of the nature contemplated by the Ninth Circuit exist on this claim. See 

Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1362. 

 On Claim Four, Plaintiffs argue that BLM has never before taken the position that 

it may lawfully issue a gravel mining permit without considering the use of the gravel as 

part of the required cumulative impact analysis. Doc. 191, at 6. To the contrary, 

Defendant-Intervenors explain that BLM never claimed that it could issue free use 

permits without performing a cumulative effects analysis under NEPA. Doc. 195, at 9. 

The Court agreed with BLM’s position that it complied with NEPA by conducting a 

cumulative effects analysis in this case, and found that BLM’s actions were not arbitrary 

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and capricious when it determined that further NEPA analysis was not required. 

Doc. 184, at 6. 

 On Claim Five, Plaintiffs argue that the question of whether BLM updating a 

reclamation bond that facilitates uranium ore mining on public land is subject to NEPA is 

a novel question never previously addressed by the courts. Doc. 191, at 6. However, 

BLM’s position in this case is consistent with other cases in this Circuit holding that such 

activities are not major federal actions triggering NEPA requirements. See, e.g., Sierra 

Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming that the BLM’s review of 

notice mines was not major federal action requiring environmental assessment). 

 In sum, Plaintiffs do not meet the Winter test for injunctions because they have not 

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, or the existence of serious questions 

going to the merits. The Court therefore need not address Plaintiff’s irreparable harm, 

balance of hardships, and public interest arguments. 

IT IS ORDERED: Plaintiff’s second motion for an injunction pending appeal 

(Doc. 188) is denied. 

 Dated this 11th day of January, 2012. 

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