Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01330/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01330-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANKLIN ANDRADE, JR., Booking

#1276875,

Civil

No. 14cv1330 GPC (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

[ECF No. 24. ]

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.

Defendants.

On September 11, 2015, Plaintiff Franklin Andrade, Jr., a prisoner proceeding pro

se and In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action, filed a motion to appoint

counsel. (ECF No. 24.) He requests appointment of counsel because he has no legal

experience and the lawyers he has contacted have not responded to his inquiries. Id. at

pp. 2-3. In the alternative, Andrade requests that the Court stay his action until he is

released and can receive legal help from an outside source. Id. at 3.

“There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.” Rand v.

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d

1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32

F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil

proceedings.”) (citation omitted). Federal courts do not have the authority “to make

coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S.

296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564,

569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to

“request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of

“exceptional circumstances.” See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d

1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. “A finding of the exceptional

circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance requires at least an evaluation of the

likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s

ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’”

Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th

Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is denied based on the Court’s recent

evaluation of the merits of Andrade’s case in its August 18, 2015, Report and

Recommendation, which recommended granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Andrade’s Second Amended Complaint. [ECF No. 22.] The August 18, 2015 Report

and Recommendation is currently pending before the Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel. In

the report, the Court recommended: 

1.) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim against Mike

Barletta be GRANTED because the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) did not

provide any facts showing Defendant Barletta was aware of the unidentified

physician or medical staff’s failure to give informed consent before switching

Andrade’s medicine; the unnamed nurses’ decision to stop Andrade’s usage of

Roxycodone without weaning or transfer; or the erroneous administering of

Hibicleanse to Andrade by unidentified medical staff. Further, the SAC did not

allege any facts demonstrating Barletta in some way directed or sanctioned the

staff actions, which Andrade claimed were deliberately indifferent to his medical

needs. Id. at 8:13-11:20.

2.) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim of municipal liability

with respect to the informed consent policy be GRANTED because there were no

facts alleged in the SAC that would allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference

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that implementation of the County’s informed consent policy was responsible for

the injuries alleged. Id. at 11:22-14:6.

3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim of municipal liability

as to the “detoxification” policy be GRANTED because the SAC contained no

allegations that jail medical staff were acting in accordance with County policy. 

Id. at 11:22-14:24; and 

4. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under California

Government Code § 845.6 be GRANTED because no facts were alleged in the

SAC demonstrating failure to take reasonable action to summon immediate

medical care. Id. at 15:1-16:9.

In light of the Court’s recent assessment of the merits of Plaintiff’s case, neither

the interests of justice, nor exceptional circumstances, support the appointment of counsel

in this civil proceeding. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell,

935 F.2d at 1017. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 16, 2015

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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