Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00328/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00328-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Raymond Smith, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Criag Apker, 

Respondent.

No. CV 11-328-TUC-FRZ (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 (Petition), filed on June 1, 2011. (Doc. 1) Petitioner, Raymond Smith, 

claims his constitutional rights were violated when he was convicted of a disciplinary 

violation without due process. 

Before the Court is the Petition with exhibits (doc. 1), Respondent’s return with 

accompanying exhibits (doc. 10) (Answer), and Petitioner’s reply (doc. 13). 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 4) 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court enter an order denying the Petition. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Petitioner is presently incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary (USP) -

Tucson. (Petition, p.1; Answer, Ex. 1). This was also his place of incarceration at the time 

he filed his Petition. (Petition, p.1) At the time of the incidents which resulted in the 

disciplinary proceedings at issue in this Petition, however, Petitioner was housed at 

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Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) II Victorville, California. Petitioner contends that 

his constitutional rights were violated when he was convicted of a disciplinary violation 

without due process. Petitioner’s disciplinary conviction resulted in the loss of good time 

credits. Smith is currently serving a 400-month sentence of incarceration for conspiracy 

to distribute narcotics, and attempt to possess with intent to distribute narcotics, and is 

projected to complete this sentence on November 19, 2030, via Good Conduct Time 

Release. (Answer, Ex. 1, Attachment 2) 

II. DISCIPLINARY HEARING AND PROCEEDINGS

 On July 24, 2010, Smith was observed with receiving items from his girlfriend in 

the visiting room during the visit, taking the items in his mouth and swallowing the items. 

(Answer, Disciplinary Hearing Officer Report, ¶ III.C.4, Officer S. Guevera’s statment) 

Petitioner was searched and placed on Dry Cell Status in the Special Housing Unit 

(SHU), and, on July 27, 2010, provided a stool sample which, upon inspection, contained 

six balloons. (Answer, Incident Report, ¶ 11.) The balloons contained a substance which 

SIS staff tested on July 28, 2010 for narcotics. (Id.) The substance tested positive for 

THC, an active ingredient in marijuana, and SIS Technician C. Herrera reported the 

incident as a violation of Code 111, Introduction of Narcotics. (Id., ¶¶ 11-13, Ex. 2, ¶ 6) 

 On July 28, 2010, Lieutenant M. Lopez, delivered a copy of the Incident Report to 

Smith, advised him of his right to remain silent, and conducted an investigation of the 

incident. (Id., ¶¶ 14-16, 22-23) When asked if he wished to comment, Petitioner stated 

“no comment” and offered no additional information during this stage of the 

investigation. (Id., ¶¶ 24-25) Based on the information summarized above, Lieutenant 

Lopez concluded that Smith had been properly charged, recommended that Smith remain 

in the SHU, and that the incident be referred to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer for 

further processing. (Id., ¶ 27) 

Smith commented to the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC) regarding the 

incident report, that he should not be charged with introduction in violation of Code 111, 

rather he should be charged only with possession because he found the drugs on the yard. 

(Id., ¶ 17) The UDC referred the inmate to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) for 

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further action, and recommended that Smith lose phone and visiting privileges for one 

year. (Id., ¶ 20) 

 On August 18, 2010 R.A. Byrd, the DHO, conducted a disciplinary hearing. 

(Answer, Attachment 2, Discipline Hearing Officer Report) Petitioner requested a staff 

representative and Case Manager Hammoude appeared and provided a statement from 

Medical. (Id., ¶ II.B-D.) Requested witnesses, Lieutenant M. Finerfrock and Officer S. 

Guevara did not appear, but submitted statements. (Id., ¶ III.C.4) 

 The DHO found Petitioner committed the prohibited act of possession of narcotics 

paraphernalia, in violation of Code 113. (Id., ¶ V) The DHO based her findings on the 

reporting officer’s statements, the photographs of the colored balloons, and the 

statements of inmate Smith. (Id.) The DHO sanctioned Petitioner to a loss of 40 days 

good conduct time, 60 days of disciplinary segregation, 1 year loss of visits, 6 months 

immediate family only visits, and recommended a disciplinary transfer. (Id., ¶ VI) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction 

 A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. 

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). Writ of habeas corpus relief 

extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United States if the petitioner 

can show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1) & (3). A prisoner who wishes to challenge the 

manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution must bring a petition pursuant to 

§ 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez,, 204 F.3d at 864, and must file the petition in 

the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 

677 (9th Cir. 1980). 

 In the instant case Petitioner is seeking relief with respect to disciplinary 

proceedings that, in part, resulted in the loss of good time credit while incarcerated at 

USP-Tucson. Petitioner is challenging the legality of the manner in which his sentence is 

being executed. Thus, the Petition is properly before this Court under 28 U.S.C. §2241. 

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B. Exhaustion 

 Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging 

any circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. 

Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). The Government concedes that 

Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the disciplinary action. (See

Answer, Doc. 10, at 8, ¶ 14; Ex.1, ¶ 4; see also Petition, at 2, and Exhibits) 

C. Merits 

1. Due Process 

 Federal prisoners have a statutory right to good time credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624. 

Accordingly, they have a due process interest in the disciplinary proceedings that may 

take away those credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). "Due process 

in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives written notice of the 

charges, and a statement of the evidence relied on by the prison officials and the reasons 

for disciplinary action." Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)(citing 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66.). "The inmate has a limited right to call witnesses and to 

present documentary evidence when permitting him to do so would not unduly threaten 

institutional safety and goals." Id. (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.) Once these Wolff

procedural protections are followed, the only function of a federal court is to review the 

statement of evidence upon which the committee relied in making its findings to 

determine if the decision is supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent. Mass. Corr. 

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1984) (“The requirements of due process are satisfied if 

some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board.”) 

Petitioner asserts that the he was not given a 24-hour notice prior to the hearing 

before the DHO, contrary to Program Statement (P.S.) 5270.08 and CFR 541.17.1

 

 

1

 Presumably Petitioner is referring to 28 C.F.R. § 541.17 (2010). The regulations promulgated in this section have, since the time of Petitioner’s offense been revised and 

renumbered. See 75 FR 76263-01. The regulation directing the timing of DHO hearings is now found at 28 C.F.R. 541.8, Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units, Discipline Hearing Officer hearing. This Report and Recommendation will refer to the 2010 version of the regulations in existence at the time of Petitioner’s disciplinary 

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Petitioner further asserts that the UDC staff violated the rights of Petitioner in not 

securing a confidential hearing for Petitioner, and conducted the hearing in an area in 

front of the inmate’s cell while housed within the SHU, contrary to policy regulation 

5293.052. 

1. Notice 

 In the federal prison system, the Bureau of Prisons has, by regulation, adopted 

specific guidelines for inmate discipline procedures which are set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 

541.10 et seq. These guidelines largely track the due process requirements established by 

the Supreme Court in Wolff. See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1404 (3rd Cir. 1991). 

Under these regulations, when prison staff have reason to believe that a prohibited act has 

been committed by an inmate, an incident report must be prepared and referred for 

investigation. 28 C.F.R. § 541.14. After investigation, the incident report is referred to a 

Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) for an initial hearing. 28 C.F.R. § 541.15. The inmate, 

in turn, is entitled to notice of any proposed violation. The UDC may either reach a 

finding regarding whether a prohibited act was committed, or refer the case to the 

Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) for further hearing. 28 C.F.R. § 541.15(f). The DHO 

then has the authority to dismiss any charge, to find a prohibited act was committed, and 

to impose any available sanction for the act. 28 C.F.R. § 541.18. The DHO hearing is 

conducted pursuant to the procedures set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 541.17. 

Throughout this hearing process the inmate is provided with a series of procedural 

rights. For example, the inmate is entitled to notice of the alleged infraction. Specifically, 

the Warden must give the inmate advance written notice of the charges no less than 24 

hours before the DHO hearing. 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(a). The inmate is also entitled to 

assistance at DHO hearings. In particular, the Warden must provide the inmate with a full 

time staff member to represent him at the DHO hearing. 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(b). 

As to Petitioner’s claim that the disciplinary procedures violated his due process 

rights because he was not given notice, specifically by the Warden of the facility, 24 

 proceeding. 

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hours prior to the hearing, Petitioner’s argument fails as a matter of fact, and as a matter 

of law. Pursuant to both Bureau of Prison policy and federal regulations, an inmate is to 

be given written notice of a charge no less than 24 hours before the DHO’s hearing. See

P.S. 5270.08 and 28 C.F.R. § 541.17. The Incident Report was written by SIS Technician 

C. Herrera on July 28, 2010, at approximately 9:30 am. The written notice was provided 

to Petitioner on July 28, 2010, at approximately 12:40 pm by Lieutenant Lopez. This 

notice was provided to the inmate well over 24 hours before his appearance before the 

DHO. Though Petitioner states that the Warden is specifically designated with the duty of 

ensuring that the inmate receives this notice, and that in this case, this was not 

accomplished, there is no provision in the program statement or the regulations that this 

duty may not be delegated. See 28 C.F.R. 541.17 (2010). In fact, the Program Statement 

specifically contemplates that notice will be provided by “staff.” See P.S. 5270.08. 

 Additionally, even if it were a violation of prison regulations for the Warden to 

fail to individually notify Smith of the charge, a violation of a Bureau of Prisons’ 

regulation does not rise to a due process violation. Indeed, due process does not impose a 

requirement that notice be provided by the Warden. As noted above, the Supreme Court 

held that the Constitution requires compliance with minimal federal due process 

standards and explained that these minimal requirements are: (1) written notice of the 

charges against him at least 24 hours before his hearing; (2) a written statement by the 

fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action 

taken; and (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his 

defense. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67. As these requirements were met in this case, 

Petitioner's dissatisfaction with process of his notification does not implicate due process 

concerns, and Petitioner has not in fact articulated any way in which he was harmed by 

this delegation of the notification procedures. Moreover, the relevant inquiry is not 

“whether the prison complied with its own regulations,” but whether Plaintiff was 

“provided with process sufficient to meet the Wolff standard.” Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 

1415, 1420 (9th Cir.1994), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 

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472 (1995). 

2. Confidential UDC hearing 

 As to Petitioner’s claim that his UDC hearing was not conducted in a secure 

hearing location, this claim also fails to raise a due process violation. Petitioner alleges 

this violates policy regulation 5293.052. The Court was unable to find a Bureau of Prison 

Policy Statement 5293.052, but presumes that Petitioner is referring to the form “Inmate 

Rights at Discipline Hearing” which is form BP-A0293, a form that replaced BPS293(52). That form explains the rights an inmate has at a Discipline Hearing in front of 

a DHO. Petitioner has not alleged that he was not given a copy of the charges, was denied 

the right to a staff representative, the right to call witnesses, to present a statement, to be 

present throughout the hearing, to be advised of the DHO’s decision, or to appeal the 

decision of the DHO. Though Petitioner states he was unable to communicate with the 

UDC in confidence, he has not alleged that he requested to speak with the UDC in a 

confidential setting, or that he was later unable to present any confidential information in 

his defense to the DHO in a confidential setting. Petitioner does not allege any facts at 

this time that he would have presented had he had the opportunity to do so. 

3. Staff Representative and Witnesses 

Petitioner raises for the first time in his reply a claim that either the failure of the 

DHO to allow the requested staff witnesses to testify, instead of submitting written 

statements, or the failure of his requested staff representative to represent him instead of 

Case Manager Hammoude, would have cast doubt about his actual guilt in this instance, 

or would have assisted him in bringing the due process issue to the forefront in a way that 

he could not. It is well established, however, that the Court will not address an argument 

raised for the first time on reply. See United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1039 n. 7 (9th

Cir. 2010) (declining to address an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief in a § 

2255 motion); Belgrade v. Montana, 123 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997) (declining to 

consider claims not raised in the original habeas petition to the district court). 

Furthermore, the Court has reviewed the incident report and the DHO report and 

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finds that the due process requirements of a prison disciplinary hearing, as established by 

Wolff, supra, were met in this case. The Petitioner received notice well in advance of the 

hearing. The hearing was conducted by DHO R. A. Byrd, whom the Petitioner does not 

dispute was an impartial officer. Petitioner was allowed to present witnesses and 

documentary evidence. He was also afforded an opportunity to have a staff 

representative. Petitioner was given a copy of the DHO’s report which contained a 

written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the sanctions on August 

20, 2010. During the hearing, Petitioner argued that he should have been charged with 

Code 113 instead of Code 111, but presented no evidence that he was in fact innocent of 

the charges. The DHO agreed with the inmate and found him to have committed the 

prohibited act of Code 113. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner's claim that he was deprived of due 

process is without merit and fails to provide a basis for relief. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent 

review, enter an order DENYING the Petition. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: No. CV11-328-TUC-FRZ. 

Dated this 15th day of March, 2012. 

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