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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT FILED 

United Stat.es Court ofAppeals 

Ti.nth r.ircllit, 

MARJORIE ROBERTS, THE MISSION) 

STATE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY ) 

(now Federal Deposit ) 

Insurance Corporation); and ) 

THE OVERLAND PARK STATE BANK ) 

AND TRUST COMPANY, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

vs. 

METROPOLITAN LIFE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

JAN 1 81989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-1400 

(D.C. No. 80-2315-S) 

( D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before BALDOCK, MCWILLIAMS and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

This is the second time that this matter is before us. On 

the first appeal, we remanded the case for additional factual 

findings. Roberts v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 808 F.2d 1387 

(10th Cir. 1987). 

On remand, the trial court indicated that it was adopting the 

plaintiffs' theory based upon the testimony of Mr. Hosfield. In 

the opinion resolving the first appeal, we stated that if: 

the onus was on the agent to ascertain the actual amount 

due to keep the policy in effect and ••• the insured 

paid when the information was obtained, then specific 

dates of late payment are not crucial to Roberts' 

reasonable reliance on his dealings with Hosfield to 

keep his policy in effect. This course of conduct 

Appellate Case: 87-1400 Document: 01019962048 Date Filed: 01/18/1989 Page: 1 
between the parties would justify a conclusion under 

Kansas law that Metropolitan was estopped by its agent's 

conduct, which it ratified by accepting payments outside 

the grace period, from requiring reinstatement for the 

continuation of Robert's policy. 

Id. at 1390. Thus, we recognized that if certain facts were found 

expressly by the trial court, its original legal conclusion would 

be correct. 

On remand, the trial court supplied the necessary facts. In 

its memorandum and order filed on March 5, 1987, it stated: 

In summary, the Court accepts that version of the facts 

argued by Plaintiff, i.e., that there was "an 

understanding between Roberts and Metropolitan, through 

Hosfield, that the agent would ascertain the amount 

available for a premium loan, arrange the loan, and 

allow the insured to pay the difference." Roberts, 808 

F.2d at 1390. Furthermore, "the onus was on the agent 

to ascertain the actual amount due to keep the policy in 

effect and ••• the insured paid when the information 

was obtained •••. " Id. Therefore, "specific dates 

of late payment are notcrucial to Roberts' reasonable 

reliance on his dealings with Hosfield to keep the 

policy in effect." Id. Defendant was not permitted to 

effect a forfeiture because, by its course of conduct, 

it led Roberts to honestly believe that the premiums 

could be paid and would be received in the manner and 

within the time of payment actually made in this case 

for the September 5 and December 5, 1978 premiums. 

Rec. vol. III, doc. 77 at 3. Thus, the trial court entered 

judgment based on the policy in favor of plaintiffs-appellees. 

Our review convinces us that: l} the trial court proceeded 

properly on remand, 2) its findings of fact are not clearly 

erroneous, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), and 3) its conclusion of law 

resulting in judgment for the appellees is correct given its 

factual findings. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1400 Document: 01019962048 Date Filed: 01/18/1989 Page: 2 
Appellees' motion for punitive damages and double costs, also 

having been duly considered, is denied. 

SO ORDERED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 87-1400 Document: 01019962048 Date Filed: 01/18/1989 Page: 3 
No. 87-1400, Roberts, et al. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge, concurring. 

I concur fully in the majority opinion. However, I take this 

opportunity to write separately in order to address briefly an 

argument raised by defendant-appellant. Appellant contends that 

the judgment of the district court should be reversed and the case 

remanded for a new trial because the district court allowed 

testimony during trial on the estoppel issue even though no 

discovery had been conducted on that issue and the issue was not 

listed in the pretrial order. Plaintiffs-appellees respond, and I 

agree, that appellant waived this issue because appellant could 

have raised the issue in its first appeal to this court but did 

not do so. 

The issue of improper admission of evidence regarding 

estoppel was not listed in the Notice of Appeal in the first 

appeal, it was not listed as an issue in appellant's brief in that 

appeal, and it was not mentioned as an issue in our previous 

opinion, Roberts v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 808 F.2d 

1387, 1388 (10th Cir. 1987). Therefore, I conclude that the issue 

was not raised in the first appeal. An issue that could have been 

raised in a prior appeal but was not raised generally is waived. 

Munoz v. County of Imperial, 667 F.2d 811, 817 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). This rule is "necessary to the 

orderly conduct of litigation." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 

Inc., 740 F.2d 1071, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

Appellate Case: 87-1400 Document: 01019962048 Date Filed: 01/18/1989 Page: 4 
Appellant argues that it did raise the issue in the first 

appeal, pointing to a footnote in its opening brief in that 

appeal. While it is true that the footnote mentions the lack of 

discovery on the issue of estoppel and the district court's 

admission of testimony on that issue, it does so in the context of 

an argument that the district court failed to make adequate 

findings of fact. Appellant did not argue in that footnote that 

the admission of evidence on the estoppel issue constituted 

reversible error, as it now argues in this appeal. Thus, I 

conclude that appellant did not raise the issue in the first 

appeal and, consequently, the issue is waived. 

However, even if appellant were correct that the issue had 

been raised in the first appeal, I would still conclude that 

appellant is barred from raising the issue in this appeal. If the 

issue had been raised in the first appeal, our disposition in that 

case necessarily rejected appellant's present position on this 

issue. In our previous decision we held that the appropriate 

relief was a remand for further factual findings by the district 

court. Our disposition implicitly rejected appellant's present 

argument that admission of evidence on the estoppel issue required 

a reversal and a new trial. Ordinarily, the law of the case 

doctrine precludes an appellate court from reexamining an issue 

previously decided by that court in the same case. See,~, 

United States v. Mazak, 789 F.2d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1986); Handi 

Investment Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 653 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 

1981). Although technically we may have the power to reexamine an 

issue raised in an earlier appeal, see lB J. Moore, Moore's 

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Appellate Case: 87-1400 Document: 01019962048 Date Filed: 01/18/1989 Page: 5 
Federal Practice ,r 0.404(4.-4) at 136-37, ordinarily our practice 

is not to do so except on rehearing. Therefore, even if appellant 

were correct in arguing that the issue of improper admission of 

evidence had been raised in its prior appeal to this court, 

appellant would be precluded from re-appealing that issue. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1400 Document: 01019962048 Date Filed: 01/18/1989 Page: 6