Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01247/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01247-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441bc Removal- Breach of Contract

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16cv1247 JM (WVG)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD M. KIPPERMAN, CHAPTER 

7 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE OF 

CHELSEA BISHAR CASE NO. 15-

08156-LTZ; CHELSEA BISHAR,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY; 

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY; 

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv1247 JM (WVG)

ORDER DENYING NONPARTY 

ATTORNEY’S MOTION FOR 

DETERMINATION OF LIEN 

ENTITLEMENT

On March 16, 2017, nonparty John T. Richards, the attorney for Plaintiffs Richard 

M. Kipperman, Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of Chelsea Bishar and Chelsea Bishar, 

moved the court for an order determining the propriety of a fee lien asserted by another 

nonparty, Plaintiffs’ former attorney Su Barry. (Doc. No. 14.) The court finds the matter 

appropriate for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and for 

the following reasons denies Richards’s motion, without prejudice, for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction.

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DISCUSSION

Richards argues that the court has supplemental jurisdiction over his claim, a 

purely state law issue, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In support, Richards cites, among other 

out-of-circuit cases, Boykin v. McCoy, 384 F. App’x 579 (9th Cir. 2010), an unpublished 

decision in which the Ninth Circuit stated that fee disputes “arising from litigation 

pending before a district court” may “fall within that court’s ancillary jurisdiction.” Id.

at 581. In that case, the fee dispute involved a party to the action, “was closely related to 

the court’s ability either to render an efficacious judgment or to control the litigation 

before it,” and was “an impediment to settlement of the individual claims.” Id. (internal 

citation omitted).

In this case, by contrast, the parties to the action have “resolved this matter in its 

entirety.” (See Doc. No. 20.) “[T]he settlement agreement between the parties has been 

executed and any terms that required action prior to dismissal have been satisfied.” (Id.) 

All that remains is “a lien asserted in the underlying bankruptcy action” between two 

nonparties. (Id.) Given this posture, nonparty Richards’s claim against nonparty Barry 

falls far short of being “so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] original 

jurisdiction that [it] form[s] part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 

United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

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 Consequently, the court does not 

have jurisdiction over the claim, and “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at 

all . . . .” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).

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1 Even if subsection (a) were satisfied, the court would decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction under subsection (c) because Richards’s claim against Barry not only 

predominates over the claims properly before the court, but is actually the only claim left 

before the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2)–(4).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Richards’s motion, without prejudice, 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 26, 2017 

JEFFREY T. MILLER

United States District Judge

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