Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-01285/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-01285-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Oliver Lee Hurley, 

Petitioner,

vs.

William Gaspar, et. al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 03-1285-PCT-SRB (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Nancy Fiora. On July 9, 2005, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge in light of Magistrate Judge Fiora's retirement. 

For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

deny the Petition.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner's Conviction and Summary of the Case

Petitioner, Oliver Lee Hurley, was convicted by jury in Coconino County Superior

Court, Arizona, of Manslaughter. (Petition, p.1; Answer, p.2) The Court sentenced Petitioner

to seventeen years of imprisonment. (Petition, p.1) 

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The transcript of the trial refers to the witness as "Lorena Frank" and "Lorraine

Crank." (Answer, Ex. D, p. 36; Answer, Ex. C, p.65) A minute entry refers to her as

"Lorraine Crane." (Answer, Ex. E, May 15, 1998 minute entry, p.2) 

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On the evening of January 21, 1998, Petitioner and his girlfriend, Lorena Frank1

 went

to the Windy Mesa Bar in Page, Arizona, where they ordered a pitcher of beer and played

pool. (Answer, Ex. C, pp. 12-15, 36-37) Later that evening, while Petitioner and his

girlfriend were at the Windy Mesa Bar, the victim Kenneth Robbins arrived accompanied by

two other men. (Answer, Ex. A, p.57-59)

That evening, Petitioner approached Mr. Robbins, who was sitting with some other

people, tapped him on the shoulder from behind and began talking to him. (Id. at p. 61, 181)

Eventually, both men walked out of the bar together. (Id. at p. 62) Witnesses saw

Petitioner repeatedly hit Mr. Robbins. He continued to do so after Mr. Robbins had fallen

to the ground. (Id. at p.146; Answer, Ex. D, pp. 56-59) One witness also heard Petitioner

kick Mr. Robbins. (Answer, Ex. A, pp. 142-144, 146) 

Petitioner left Mr. Robbins, beaten beyond recognition, alone on the ground.

(Answer, Ex. D, p. 60; Answer, Ex. A, pp. 64-65) Petitioner told his girlfriend that Mr.

Robbins had sexually assaulted him in the past. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 71) Petitioner testified

at trial that Mr. Robbins had sodomized him in April of 1995. (Answer, Ex. K, p. 3) On

January 21, 1998, just before the fight that resulted in Petitioner's conviction, Mr. Robbins

had winked twice at Petitioner and smiled strangely at him while the men were still in the

Windy Mesa Bar. (Answer, Ex. C, pp. 3-18) 

Mr. Robbins died on January 27, 1998. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 171)

Petitioner was charged with one count of aggravated assault and one count of second

degree murder. (Answer, Ex. G, p.4) Petitioner also had three prior felony convictions. (Id.

at p. 8) Prior to trial, the trial court granted Petitioner's unopposed motion to dismiss the

aggravated assault charge. (Answer, p. 13 & Ex. H, pp. 56-57) The jury found Petitioner

guilty of the lesser-included offense of reckless manslaughter. (Answer, p.13 & Ex. I, p.4)

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The appellate court opinion attached to Respondents' Answer as Exhibit L only

contains the odd-numbered pages. The entire opinion retrieved from the appellate court's

website is filed together with the instant Report and Recommendation. 

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The jury also found that Petitioner had a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault. 

(Answer, p.13 & Ex. I, p. 30) Consequently, the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence

of seventeen years in prison. (Answer, p. 13 & Ex. J, p.18) 

B. Direct Appeal and Post-Conviction Proceedings

Petitioner, through counsel, appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arizona Court

of Appeals and raised two issues: 

1. the trail court erred by giving a lesser-included offense instruction for reckless

manslaughter; and

2. the trial court was biased against Petitioner, as shown by the court's pre-trial

discussion concerning the number of jurors required to be empaneled and by

its finding of cruelty as an aggravating factor. 

(Answer, Ex. K)

On February 24, 2000, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction

and sentence. (Answer, Ex. L2

; Arizona Appellate Court decision)

Thereafter, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona

Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. M) Petitioner raised one issue: "Is Reckless Manslaughter a

lessor-included offense of Knowing Second Degree Murder." (Id.) On October 31, 2000,

the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, without comment. (Answer, Ex. N)

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief in which he

raised two issues: 

1. the trial record is inadequate and incomplete in that it did not properly record

attorney objections to juror questions; and

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2. ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to create a record of objections

to juror questions; in failing to reasonably assess the likelihood of a guilty

verdict; and in failing to properly advise Petitioner to take a proffered plea.

(Answer, Ex. O) Petitioner also filed a Pro Per Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief in which he argued that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to obtain all

relevant documents, specifically the grand jury transcript. (Answer, Ex. P)

The trial court denied relief in separate minute entries dated May 22, 2001 and August

6, 2002. (Answer, Ex. Q, R) Petitioner concedes that he did not file a petition for review

with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Petition, p.2)

C. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On July 7, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner raises the following claims:

1. "Conviction obtained by action of a petit jury which was unconstitutionally

selected or impaneled (by [sic] the trial court acted as an advocate at trial and

at sentencing)" (Petition, p.5);

2. "Conviction obtained by a violation of the protection against double jeopardy

(by the trial court erred [sic] in instructing the jury on reckless manslaughter

on the facts presents [sic] here)" (Id. at p.6);

3. Ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, "throughout the procedure

of my case was ineffective representation" (Id. at p.7); and

4. Violation of the privilege against self incrimination, "...by telling the detaining

officer 'why' I was in handcuffs." (Id. at p.8)

On January 27, 2004, Respondents filed an Answer limited solely to a statute of

limitations defense. On November 19, 2004, the Court ordered supplemental briefing in light

of Isley v. Arizona Dep't. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2004) (decided after

Respondents filed their January 2004 Answer and holding that tolling of the statute of

limitations begins with the filing of the notice of post-conviction relief). Respondents then

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filed on December 22, 2004 the instant Answer. Respondents argue that Petitioner's claims

1, 2 and 4, and part of claim 3 are procedurally defaulted; the remaining portion of claim 3

fails to state a cognizable claim; and, alternatively, all claims lack merit.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard: Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state court remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion inquiry

focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion

generally requires that a prisoner give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims

before he presents those claims to a federal court. Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim

for relief so long as the petitioner has a right under state law to raise the claim by available

procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

A habeas petitioner may exhaust his claims in one of two ways. First, a claim is

exhausted when no remedy remains available to the petitioner in state court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). Second, a claim is exhausted if there is an absence of available state

corrective process or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the

rights of the petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). 

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have "fairly present[ed] his

claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the factual or legal bases

for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that the...[petitioner is] asserting

claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. See also

Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Mere similarity between a

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Respondents argue that Baldwin "necessarily implicitly overrules" Swoopes and,

thus, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement Petitioner herein must present his claim to the

Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer, p. 24 n. 7) The Court need not address this issue

because, as discussed infra at section C, Petitioner failed to fairly present his claims to the

Arizona Court of Appeals in the first instance. 

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claim raised in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-366. 

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts one

full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Once a federal

claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.

See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas petitions, other than those

concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted

if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on appeal of

conviction or through a collateral proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure.3

 Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

529 U.S. 1124 (2200). 

In some instances a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court did

not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." A claim is procedurally defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on

the merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002).

Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state court and it is clear

the state would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for procedural reasons. Id. The

procedural bar provides an independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction and

sentence and, thus, prevents federal habeas corpus review unless the petitioner can

demonstrate cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claim in the state proceedings. Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-

495 (1986); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine

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Although the Ninth Circuit recently suggested that under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there

are exceptions to the rule that a district court can decide whether state remedies remain

available for claims that require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver see Cassett v.

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 1336 (2006), this

Court need not address such waiver because it has not been affirmatively raised by Petitioner.

See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053

(2003).

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Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his sentence

has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered material facts probably exist

and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there

has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's conviction

if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)

(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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prevents state prisoners from obtaining federal review by allowing the time to run on

available state remedies and then rushing to federal court seeking review. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-732 (1991).

If a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available.4

 See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263

n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination often involves

consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governing postconviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies when a petitioner

may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal constitutional challenges to

convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on any claim which could have

been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain

claims5

 which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2.

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be required

to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that when a petitioner

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fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present his claims there. Id.

In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and a petitioner cannot show

cause and prejudice for the default...the district court dismisses the petition because the

petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id. at 1231.

B. Standard: Review of Merits

Pursuant to the provisions of the AEDPA, the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus

only if the state court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied __

U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 484 (2005). Therefore, the question whether a state court erred in

applying the law is a different question from whether it erred in determining the facts. Rice

v. Collins, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 969 (2006).

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the "contrary to" test and the

"unreasonable application" test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under the first test, the state court's "decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-414 (2000)). Additionally, a state court's

decision is "'contrary to' Supreme Court case law if the state court 'applies a rule that

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"[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999), only the

Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied." Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original).

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contradicts the governing law set forth in' Supreme Court cases."6 Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347

F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003) cert. denied 541 U.S. 1037 (2004) (quoting Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). "Whether a state court's interpretation of federal law is contrary to

Supreme Court authority...is a question of federal law as to which [the federal courts]...owe

no deference to the state courts." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis in original)

(distinguishing deference owed under the "contrary to" test of section (d)(1) with that owed

under the "unreasonable application" test).

Under the second test, " '[a] state court's decision involves an unreasonable application

of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle...but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'" Van Lynn, 347 F.3d

at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067) Under the "'unreasonable application clause...a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly...[r]ather that application must be objectively

unreasonable.'" Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)).

When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable application of

federal law, "[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court interpretations of

federal law." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929. 

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, "the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

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Under section 2254(e) "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct." "The AEDPA spells out what this presumption means: Statecourt fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence presented for the first time in

federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof that the statecourt finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption of correctness and the clear-andconvincing standard of proof only come into play once" it is found that the state court

reasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state proceeding. 

Taylor, 966 F.3d at 1000.

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record." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied 534 U.S. 1038 (2004) ("a federal court may not second-guess a state court's factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.") Section (d)(2) "applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court's findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective,...or that no

finding was made by the state court at all." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citations omitted). In

examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court "must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues... [M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court's

findings of fact is insufficient; 'we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court's fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court's fact-finding process was adequate.'" Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000) (emphasis in original). Once the federal court is satisfied

that the state court's fact-finding process was reasonable, or where the petitioner does not

challenge such findings, "the state court's findings are dressed in a presumption of

correctness, which then helps steel them against any challenge based on extrinsic evidence,

i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal court."7

 Taylor, 366 F.2d at 1000. See

also 28 U.S.C. section 2254(e). 

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions "receive similarly mixed review; the state

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court's ultimate conclusion is reviewed under [section] 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded under [sections] 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1)." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978.

C. Review of Petitioner's Claims

1. Claim One: Biased trial court

Petitioner alleges that the trial court was not impartial, and thus, denied him his due

process right to an impartial judge when it "guided the prosecution so that [Petitioner] would

have an eight person jury, instead of a 12 person jury" and when the court found cruelty as

an aggravating factor at sentencing. (Petition, p. 5)

a. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Petitioner, through counsel, raised the issue of the trial court's alleged partiality in his

brief filed on direct appeal which took issue with the trial court's discussion concerning the

number of jurors and the finding of cruelty as an aggravating factor. Petitioner's brief on this

issue refers to "due process" in the following instances: 

1. in the "Issues Presented" section: "HAS APPELLANT BEEN DENIED DUE

PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE

PROSECUTION OF THE PRESENT CASE?" (Answer, Ex. K, p.6)

(emphasis in original);

2. in the caption of Petitioner's argument: "THE TRIAL COURT ACTED AS

AN ADVOCATE AT TRIAL AND AT SENTENCING. APPELLANT HAS

BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE MATTER SHOULD BE

REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL OR FOR A NEW SENTENCING

BEFORE A NEW JUDGE" (Id. at p.9) (emphasis in original); and

3. in the conclusion to that argument: "Appellant was denied due process of law

by the trial court's advocacy in the present case." (Id. at p. 10). 

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Additionally, Petitioner opened his argument with the following standard: "It is fundamental

to our system of justice that a judge be impartial. State v. Brown," 602 P.2d 478 (Ariz.

1979). (Id. at p.9) 

A petitioner fairly presents a federal claim only if he alerts the state court that his

claim rests on the federal Constitution. Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir.)

cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 738 (2005). Petitioner's mention of a denial of due

process did little to apprise the state court of the federal nature of his claim given that

"[m]ere 'general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection and the right to a fair trial,' do not establish exhaustion." Castillo v. McFadden,

399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098,1106 (9th Cir.

1999); see also Fields, 401 F.3d at 1021 (same). Moreover, while citation to state court

decisions may satisfy the exhaustion requirement, this is only so if the state case "engages

in a federal constitutional analysis." Fields, 401 F.3d at 1020-1021. If the state case cited

by the petitioner discusses both state and federal issues relevant to the petitioner's claim, the

citation to that a case "must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case involves

federal issues." Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, __ U.S.

__, 125 S.Ct. 2975 (2005). 

Herein, a fair reading of Petitioner's appellate brief reveals that he cited Brown v. State

of Arizona to support a state law claim as opposed to a federal claim concerning the trial

court's alleged partiality. The court in Brown did not engage in a federal constitutional

analysis. Instead, the state court cited to and relied on "the intent of our rules and statutes

in the administration of justice that cases be tried by judges who are not biased or

prejudiced." Brown, 602 P.2d at 480-481. The Brown court referenced a United States

Supreme Court case, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), in a string citation to support the

general proposition that "[a] judge should avoid even the appearance of partiality." Brown,

602 P.2d at 481. Petitioner's citation to the Brown decision contained "no signal in the text

of the brief that the petitioner raise[d] federal claims or relie[d] on state law cases that resolve

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Respondents also argue that the claim is not exhausted because Petitioner omitted

such claim from his Petition for Review filed with the Arizona Supreme Court. It is not clear

whether the appropriate brief to consider is Petitioner's brief filed with the appellate court or

his Petition for Review filed before the state supreme court. See Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998

n.3 ("We assume without deciding that we look to [petitioner's] Arizona Court of Appeals

brief to determine whether [petitioner] afforded Arizona a fair opportunity to address his

federal due process claim.") Given that Petitioner failed to fairly present a federal claim at

the appellate level this Court need not address the effect, if any, of the fact that Petitioner

omitted the claim from his Petition for Review filed with the Arizona Supreme Court.

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federal issues" and, thus, such citation was insufficient to fairly alert the Arizona appellate

court to Petitioner's federal due process claim. Casey, 386 F.3d at 912 n.13.8

 Moreover,

Petitioner is now barred pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

from returning to state court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. See also Franklin, 290

F.3d at 1230-1231 (“the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim

applies...if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred.”)

Petitioner also fails to show cause or prejudice for the default. 

b. Respondents' alternative argument on the merits

Respondents argue that "[p]rocedural default aside, the claim lacks merit." (Answer,

p. 25) Pursuant to the AEDPA, the Court may deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus "on

the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in

the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

Respondents contend that the Arizona appellate decision was not an unreasonable

application of clearly-established Supreme Court precedent and that judicial bias was not

shown in either the trial court's discussion concerning the size of the jury or in its sentencing

decision.

i. The necessary number of jurors

The Arizona Constitution guarantees the right to a twelve-person jury if imprisonment

for 30 or more years is authorized by law. See State v. Pope, 961 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Ariz.

App. 1998). The trial court herein requested counsel to file supplemental memoranda

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concerning the appropriate size of the jury. (Answer, p. 25 & Ex. G, p. 55) The prosecution

argued that a twelve-person jury was required because conviction of manslaughter with two

prior felony convictions, would result in exposing Petitioner to a maximum sentence of 35

years. (Id.) 

At a pretrial conference, defense counsel declined to take a position on whether a

twelve-person jury was required because he did not want his comments to be construed as

a waiver of Petitioner's right to a twelve-person jury. (Answer, p. 26 & Ex. S, pp. 5-6)

Defense pointed out that if Petitioner were convicted of an offense punishable by 30 or more

years, and a twelve-person jury was not empaneled, such conviction would be reversible

error. (Id.)

The trial court questioned whether non-dangerous prior felonies could be used to

enhance a sentence on a dangerous crime. (Id. at p. 8) The trial court then stated:

In addition to that, although I won't tell the State how to run their case, it's

certainly always easier to convince 8 (eight) people than 12 (twelve) people.

And the State can consider lowering the possible jeopardy to the defendant by

dismissing one of the allegations of prior convictions or something to bring it

under 30 years. But that's up to them; it's their choice. 

(Id. at pp. 8-9)

The prosecutor then moved to dismiss one of the prior felony allegations, thus making

a sentence for more than 30 years impossible and rendering the charges triable to an eightperson jury. (Id. at pp. 9-10) The trial court responded that it was inclined to grant the motion

unless Petitioner was able to show authority demonstrating that he could insist on a twelveperson jury in such circumstance. (Id. at pp. 10-11) The trial court said it would make a

ruling the following day. (Id. at p. 11)

The following day, Petitioner filed a request for stay of proceedings for special action

and a motion for change of judge. (Answer, Ex. G, pp. 56-57) He argued that the trial judge

was biased and had given tactical advice to the prosecution that it was easier to obtain a

conviction with an eight-person jury. (Id.)

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 14 of 30
9

The defense did not file such a memorandum. (Answer, Ex. U, p. 6)

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The matter was heard by another judge who ruled "that the statements of [the trial

judge] do not show a bias or prejudice such that Defendant cannot receive a fair trial" and

that the trial judge's comments "did not constitute an abandonment of his role as a neutral

tribunal." (Answer, Ex. E, May 12, 1998 Minute Entry at p.10) Petitioner's motion for a stay

to file a petition for a special action was denied. (Id. at p. 11) 

On the first day of trial back before the assigned trial judge, Petitioner's counsel

renewed his motion for a stay so that he could file a special action. (Answer, Ex. U, pp. 2-3)

The court denied the stay but pointed out that Petitioner could still proceed with the special

action. (Id. at p.3) The court also raised the issue of the required number of jurors stating

that "the Defense was given the opportunity to file a memorandum regarding the number of

the jurors necessary in this case.[9] And quite frankly this is important to the Court because

we don't have courtrooms here that are capable of handling this trial. And so we had made

arrangements with another judge, a federal judge, to borrow their courtroom for a 12 man

jury." (Id. at pp. 3-4) The trial court opined that dismissal of two of the allegations of prior

felony convictions would result in a maximum sentence of 23.25 years which, in turn, would

dispense with the need for a twelve-person jury. (Id. at pp. 4-8) After some discussion, the

trial court made inquiry of defense counsel as follows:

THE COURT: Now what's your position on a 12 (twelve) man jury? Do

you want 12(twelve)? Do you want 8 (eight)? If so, why? This is your

opportunity to put anything on the record that you want?

MR. GORMAN [Defense Counsel]: Well, my position is I want a 12

(twelve) person jury. I think it's easier to convict someone with an 8 (eight)

person jury than a 12 (twelve) person jury. I adopt the motion I filed this

morning in support of that position. And I think Mr. Horlings [the prosecutor]

is being assisted in creating a jury panel of 8 (eight) that will assist him in a

conviction. And for that reason I ask for a 12 (twelve) person jury. I voice no

opinion on the range of sentences that apply because it's irrelevant what my

opinion is anyway on that issue.

(Id. at pp. 8-9)

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The trial court found that Petitioner cited no legal grounds to support empaneling a

twelve-person jury; noted that it was in the prosecution's discretion to dismiss two of the

allegations of prior convictions; and stated that "[c]ommon sense tells you that 8 (eight)

jurors are easier to convince than 12 (twelve). I have to agree with you there, Mr. Gorman."

(Id. at p.9) The court then granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss the second and third

allegations of priors. (Id. at pp. 9-10) The court further stated:

All right. Judge Coker has ruled on the change of judge, and I won't get

into that. I will note, however, for the record that although Defense counsel

is claiming some type of bias because of conversations about an 8 (eight) or

12 (twelve) man jury, the Court ruled very favorable to him just moments

before that on another issue highly contested by the State. I can't please all the

people all the time. 

And also the quotes that are in the Defense's motion about what the

Court said don't necessarily match up with the transcript. So, I'll let someone

else determine that at a later time.

(Id. at pp. 10-11) The trial court ordered that the jury would consist of eight persons with two

alternates. (Id. at p.11) 

ii. Cruelty as an aggravating factor

At sentencing, the prosecution concurred with the recommendation in the presentence

report that Petitioner be sentenced to the maximum penalty of 18.5 years of imprisonment.

(Answer, p.28 & Ex. J, p.6, p.10) The prosecution conceded that the crime was not

"especially heinous" but cited Petitioner's previous criminal record which consisted of 22

prior misdemeanor convictions and three prior felony convictions, stressing that 15 of the

prior convictions were for some form of assault. (Ex. J, pp. 6, 9-10) The prosecution argued

that Petitioner's record "deserves the maximum penalty." (Id. at p. 10)

The court found two aggravating factors: (1) Petitioner's criminal record, which it

noted included numerous instances of combined alcohol and assault-related offenses and that

Petitioner failed on previously imposed probation; and (2) cruelty in committing the crime.

(Id. at pp. 12-14) With regard to the latter, the court stated:

The probation officer has indicated that I should find an aggravating factor that

your acts were heinous, cruel or depraved. And, quite frankly, I don't know

using a common sense standard, how this couldn't be considered to be at a

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 16 of 30
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minimum of cruel. Although I guess there are crimes that are so heinous, cruel

and depraved nowadays, that that standard has gotten so high that even what

you did doesn't qualify under those three words of heinous, cruel or depraved.

You certainly had this man down, punching him over and over again.

He was totally helpless. I've seen the picture of his face. It looks terrible.

How this cannot be considered to be cruel, I don't know. And I am going to

find this as an aggravating factor.

In other words, you committed this in a cruel or especially cruel

manner. Whether that holds up on appeal, I don't know. But I can't see how

this couldn't be considered to be a cruel crime.

(Id. at pp. 13-14) The court found one mitigating circumstance–that Petitioner was

significantly impaired. (Id. at p. 15) However, the court also found this circumstance should

not be accorded weight because of Petitioner's prior criminal activity while intoxicated. (Id.)

The court also stated: "Weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances then, we're

down to about one mitigating and one aggravating circumstances a piece." (Id. at p.16) The

court declined to impose the maximum sentence, and instead imposed imprisonment for 17

years. (Id. at p.18) At the close of sentencing, the court stated:

I am going to note for the record at this time that because of the amount of

emphasis I have placed on the defendant's prior record, the sentence would

have been the same as far as I'm concerned had I considered the fact that the

defendant's actions were cruel towards the victim. Even if I hadn't considered

that aggravating factor, I still would have imposed a sentence that would have

been identical to the one that I imposed today.

And the reason for that is the number of prior offenses, the number of

prior offenses that are related to alcohol, and the number of prior offenses that

are related to assaultive conduct, and the number of prior offenses that were

related to both alcohol and assaultive conduct.

(Id. at pp. 22-23)

iii. The Appellate court decision

On direct appeal, the appellate court found no bias on behalf of the trial court as

follows: 

Defendant has presented no evidence that the trial judge was biased.

As to the issue of an eight-person jury, the trial court simply recognized the

obvious fact that a twelve-person jury was required only if the prosecutor

wished to pursue all of the original allegations against defendant. The trial

judge made clear at the time of his comments that it was entirely up to the state

whether to proceed with the original charges or to dismiss any of the

allegations of prior convictions. The trial court noted that it had made

arrangements to use a different courtroom if a jury of twelve was required

because the judge's regularly assigned courtroom was inadequate for such a

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- 18 -

proceeding...Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial judge had not become

an advocate for the state.

As to the sentencing issue...the trial court made clear that it was not

using the cruelty finding as a basis for increasing defendant's sentence.

Rather, it expressly found that defendant's criminal history alone warranted the

sentence that was imposed, which although aggravated, was less than the

maximum possible. The trail court's comments at sentencing reflect a careful

consideration of the circumstances of the offense as well as other aggravating

and mitigating factors, not judicial bias.

(Arizona Appellate Court decision, pp. 11-12) The appellate court also noted that "[e]ven if

the trial court erred in finding the offense to be 'cruel,' it could still consider the brutal nature

of the offense as an aggravating circumstance." (Id. at p.12 n.3) 

iv. Discussion

"[A] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that

"the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge...is too high to be constitutionally

tolerable" in situations where "the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and

in which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him."Id.

(footnotes and citations omitted); see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905-906 (1997)

("...the floor established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a fair trial in a fair

tribunal...before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome

of his particular case.") (citations omitted).

As set forth supra at iii, the appellate court evaluated the trial court's contemporaneous

comments concerning the decision to empanel an eight-person jury and its sentencing

decision. The appellate court stressed that the trial court emphasized that the decision to

dismiss the allegations of priors was entirely up to the state and arrangements had been made

to proceed in a larger courtroom if a twelve-person jury was necessary. The trial court's

comment that it was easier to convince eight instead of twelve people in no way supports

the conclusion that the judge harbored actual bias against Petitioner or that he had an interest

in the outcome of the particular case given that under the circumstances of this case,

allowing the state to dismiss two allegations of prior felonies and proceed before an eightCase 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 18 of 30
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person jury inured to Petitioner's benefit by reducing the maximum possible sentence of

imprisonment by approximately 12 years. (See Answer, Ex. U, pp. 6-7 (noting the dismissal

of allegations of two priors would reduce the maximum possible sentence from 35 years to

23.25 years) 

Additionally, as the appellate court pointed out, the sentence actually imposed did not

support a finding of judicial bias given the trial court's stated reasons on the record

supporting such sentence and given that Petitioner was sentenced to less than the maximum

possible time. The sentence imposed was also less than that recommended in the presentence report and by the prosecutor. There being no showing on the instant record that

Petitioner was denied "a fair trial in a fair tribunal...before a judge with no actual bias against

the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case," Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904, the

state appellate court's decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Nor did the state court's proceeding result in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the evidence presented.

2. Claim Two: Instruction on reckless manslaughter

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause when it

instructed the jury that reckless manslaughter was a lesser-included offense of second-degree

murder. (Petition, p. 6)

a. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Respondents argue that the claim is procedurally defaulted because it was not fairly

presented as a federal constitutional issue before the state court. 

On appeal, Petitioner argued that his conviction should be reversed because reckless

manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of second degree murder under Arizona law.

(Answer, Ex. K, pp. 7-8) Petitioner did not assert any violation of the federal Double

Jeopardy Clause before the state court, nor did he cite federal cases or state cases that

engaged in a federal constitutional analysis of the issue. See Fields, 401 F.3d at 1020-1021.

Consequently, Respondents are correct that Petitioner failed to fairly present Claim Two in

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 19 of 30
10The record reflects that although Petitioner submitted a proposed jury instruction on

reckless manslaughter, it was only submitted "in the event that the Court was inclined to give

those lesser includes [sic], not that I wanted them given...I don't want them given. I don't

want lessor [sic] includeds given." (Answer, Ex. V, p.18)

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state court. Id. Further, Petitioner is now barred pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure from returning to state court and, thus, Petitioner is procedurally

barred from pursuing such claim here. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. See also

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. 

b. Respondents' alternative argument on the merits

Respondents are also correct that Petitioner's Claim Two lacks merit because it

involves an issue of state law and does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court decided to instruct the jury on

two theories of lesser-included offenses of second degree murder (1) sudden-quarrel

manslaughter and (2) reckless manslaughter.10 (Answer, p.33 & Ex. V, pp. 127-128)

In rejecting Petitioner's appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that as a matter of

Arizona law, reckless manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of knowing second degree

murder. (Answer, p. 33 & Arizona Appellate Court decision, pp. 5-7) The appellate court

further found that the reckless manslaughter instruction in Petitioner's case was supported by

the evidence. (Id.)

Respondents are correct that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to the instant

claim. The Double Jeopardy clause "forbids successive prosecution and cumulative

punishment for a greater and lesser included offense." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169

(1977) (footnote omitted). Here, where Petitioner was convicted of only the lesser offense

in one prosecution, there is no Double Jeopardy violation. See id. Petitioner's Claim Two,

therefore, is without merit.

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 20 of 30
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3. Claim 3: Ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and post-conviction counsel

a. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by counsel and his Pro Per

Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner claimed that trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to insist upon creating a record of attorney objections to juror questions;

in failing to reasonably assess the likelihood of a guilty verdict; in failing to properly advise

Petitioner to take a proffered plea; and in failing to obtain all relevant documents for trial.

(Answer, Ex. O, P) The trial court denied relief in separate minute entries. (Answer, Ex. Q,

R) Petitioner concedes that he did not seek review of these decisions with the Arizona Court

of Appeals. (Petition, p.2)

It is well-settled that a habeas petitioner "must give the state courts one full

opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's

established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Therefore, Petitioner has

failed to fairly present his claim to the state court. Moreover, because Petitioner has no

available state court remedies to exhaust his claim now, see Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, 32.4(a),

Petitioner's claim is procedurally barred. Petitioner has not established cause or prejudice for

failing to present such claims to the state court.

Petitioner argues that he submitted the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel to the Arizona Court of Appeals during the direct appeal when he filed a Motion for

Change of Appellate Counsel which that court denied. (Petitioner's Response to

Respondents' Supplemental Pleadings, p.7 & Ex. 1) Review of Petitioner's post conviction

petitions reveal that he did not raise the issue of ineffective appellate counsel therein. 

In Arizona, a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is encompassed

within a Rule 32.1 post-conviction proceeding. State of Arizona v. Herrera, 905 P.2d 1377

(Ariz. App. 1995). "Construing Rule 32.1 to include claims of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel is consistent with the stated purpose [of] the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure in consolidating state post-conviction procedures 'into a single comprehensive

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 21 of 30
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remedy.’ Rule 32.1 cmt. (1987). Thus, even if we were to identify an alternate vehicle for

advancing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in this court, recognizing an

exception to Rule 32 would frustrate a principal goal of that rule." Id. at 1381-1382.

Therefore, to the extent that Petitioner attempted to raise ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel in the course of his direct appeal, that claim was not raised in a procedurally

appropriate manner. Id. Where an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not presented

to the state court in the manner that state law requires, that claim has not been exhausted for

purposes of federal habeas review. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000). See

also Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056, (9th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed __

U.S. __, 74 U.S.L.W. 3533 (March 13, 2006), (new allegations of ineffective assistance of

counsel not previously raised before the state court cannot be addressed on habeas review);

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (same). Therefore, Petitioner

failed to fairly present the state court with his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective.

Petitioner has no available state remedies, and his claim is now procedurally barred. 

Petitioner contends that he did not present the claim to the state court, other than

superior court, because he "was lacking resources." (Petition, p.7) On the instant record,

such explanation alone does not show that external forces prevented Petitioner from

presenting the facts to the state court. See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305

(9th Cir. 1996) (cause is an external impediment such as government interference).

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show cause for the procedural default.

Respondents are also correct that there is no cognizable claim for ineffective

assistance of post-conviction counsel. (See Answer, p.36) Section 2254(i) expressly states

that "the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral postconviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section

2254." Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that "[t]here is no constitutional

right to an attorney in state-post conviction proceedings....Consequently, a petitioner cannot

claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings." Coleman, 501

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 22 of 30
- 23 -

U.S. at 752. Thus, Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the postconviction relief proceeding fails.

b. Respondents' alternative argument on the merits

In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of

trial counsel for failing to make a record of attorney objections to juror questions for the

reason that there were approximately nineteen instances in which juror questions were asked

without a recorded side-bar record. (Answer, Ex. O, p.6) The record did contain the original

written questions from the jurors and post-conviction relief counsel noted that "there are

instances where the Court took considerable time to allow counsel to record objections. If

indeed the Court had indicated to counsel that objections could be recorded and trial counsel

did not take advantage of that invitation, then, in that respect, trial counsel would have been

ineffective for failing to create an adequate record for review." (Id.) 

Petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to assess a guilty verdict

and in failing to advise Plaintiff to take a proffered plea. Petitioner's Petition for PostConviction Relief, filed through counsel, indicated that "Defendant has alleged that during

the course of the trial, the State tendered a plea offer that called for a stipulated term of

imprisonment of five years...The record is totally devoid of any information concerning

whether a plea offer was made, the terms of that offer or any discussion concerning the

offer." (Id. at p.11)

Petitioner argued in his Pro Per Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction Relief that

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to provide him with copies of documents during trial,

specifically that trial counsel did not obtain grand jury transcripts "at the outset of this case."

(Answer, Ex. P, p. 2) 

In rejecting Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial court

held:

There is an adequate record regarding jury questions during trial with both

parties being provided with the opportunity to put anything on the record and

secondly this Court will not intervene in plea negotiations between the parties.

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 23 of 30
- 24 -

***

Defendant asserts that his attorneys [sic] failure to review the Grand Jury

Transcript should be considered incompetent representation. The Defendant

cites no case law in support of his contentions. This Court has reviewed the

Grand Jury Transcript in this case and finds that it contains no exculpatory

evidence. Absent specific facts and case law to support Defendant's claim, [it

is ordered summarily denying the claim.]

(Answer, p. 37 quoting Ex. R and Q respectively) (bracketed text appears in Respondent's

Answer)

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Supreme Court established

a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To establish that his

trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland, Petitioner must show: (1) that his counsel’s

performance was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

Petitioner’s defense. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 688, 694). 

To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that “counsel made errors

so serious...that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. The relevant inquiry

is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the decisions made by

defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998).

In considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained that ‘[r]eview of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting

Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1995)). "The reasonableness of counsel’s

performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and

in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential."

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Additionally, “[a] fair assessment of

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 24 of 30
- 25 -

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Even where counsel’s performance was deficient, Petitioner must also establish

prejudice in order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To establish

prejudice, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

Under the prejudice factor, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does

not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on

the judgment.” Id. at 691. Because failure to make the required showing of either deficient

performance or prejudice defeats the claim, the court need not address both factors where one

is lacking. Id. at 697-700. 

It is well-settled that “[c]onclusory allegations [of ineffective assistance of counsel]

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James

v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (a petitioner

“making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that

are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment”); Ortiz, 149 F.3d

at 933 (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim where petitioner failed “to indicate

how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure” to conduct cross-examination on a specific

issue); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) (defendant was not denied

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call out-of-state witnesses absent indication

of what witnesses would have testified to or how their testimony would have changed

outcome of proceeding); Cranford v. Sumner, 672 F.Supp. 453, 457 (D.Nev. 1987) (“Aside

from the bald allegation that his attorney should have raised this claim but did not, the

petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his attorney’s performance fell below the reasonable

level of professional competence required by Strickland .”) 

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 25 of 30
- 26 -

Petitioner herein has not demonstrated any basis on which trial counsel should have

objected to the juror questions or should have requested the grand jury transcripts nor has

Petitioner shown any resulting prejudice. Additionally, the record is clear that during trial

outside the presence of the jury, the trial court inquired whether a manslaughter charge was

appropriate and went on to discuss the possibility of a plea offer. (Answer, Ex. B, p.5). The

trial court further stated that "[c]learly it's Mr. Horling's [the prosecutor's] call. He can make

an offer...but I assume that the negotiations have been completed." (Id.) Defense counsel

responded: "Judge, I'm open to any offers. I am in the trial because nothing was offered

except second degree murder. Mr. Hurley basically had no incentive. There was an offer

to stipulate to the presumptive, but in my opinion that was no offer, a second degree murder

charge and stip to the presumptive. I am open to hearing offers, but the ball is in Mr.

Horling's court." (Id. at pp. 5-6) Respondents aptly point out that "trial counsel's decision

to go to trial in this case was very effective assistance because Petitioner was not convicted

of second-degree murder, but rather of manslaughter, a lesser offense." (Answer, p. 38) 

Accordingly, review of the instant record supports the conclusion that the state court

decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of fact or an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Nor has Petitioner cited instances demonstrating that appellate

counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that Petitioner was

prejudiced by such conduct. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (the Strickland

standard applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). Therefore,

Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel is without merit.

4. Ground Four: violation of privilege against self-incrimination

Petitioner claims that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated when he

told officers "why" he was in handcuffs. (Petition, p.8) According to Petitioner, he did not

receive a Miranda warning before he made the statement. (Id.) 

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 26 of 30
- 27 -

a. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Petitioner concedes that he did not raise this claim on direct appeal or in his petitions

for post-conviction relief. (Petition, p.8; see also Answer, p. 39 (pointing out that Petitioner

did not raise this issue before the state court)) Therefore, Petitioner has not fairly presented

his Fifth Amendment claim to the state court. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Petitioner

asserts that the failure to raise the claim was "due to ineffectiveness of assistance counsel

[sic]...I attempt to allege the incident as to the fourth amendment claims...and be raise in my

appeal...but the attorneys just rush through the proceedings...trial and appeal." (Petition, p.8)

(ellipses in original)

An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for procedural default "is

itself an independent constitutional claim" and as such must be fairly presented to the state

court. Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451. Thus, "an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted

as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted." Id.

at 453. However, just as with other claims, the procedural default of an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim may

"be excused if the prisoner can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to that

claim." Id. (emphasis in original). As discussed above, Petitioner failed to fairly present

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the state court and Petitioner failed to establish

cause for such default. Further, the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel Petitioner

advanced in his post-conviction proceedings before the trial court never mentioned

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise the Miranda issue. Thus, Petitioner has

failed to establish cause for the procedural default herein.

b. Respondents' alternative argument on the merits

In pre-trial motions, Petitioner through defense counsel raised the issue of

voluntariness of his statements and the trial court held a hearing on the matter. At that

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 27 of 30
11Respondents spell the Corporal's name as: "Bartell." (Answer, p.40) The transcript

of the pre-trial hearing uses "Bartel." (Answer, Ex. H, p. 3) 

12According to Respondents, the trial transcript indicates that Petitioner had received

Miranda warnings prior to arriving at the station and prior to making any statements.

(Answer, p. 40 n. 11 citing Ex. A, p. 101) "However, because the trail court's ruling on

admissibility of the statements was based on what it heard at the voluntariness hearing,

Respondents, for the purposes of argument, will assume that Bartell [sic] did not give

Petitioner the Miranda warnings until they reached the police station." (Answer, p.40 n.11)

Therefore, consideration of Claim Four is based on the testimony presented at the pre-trial

voluntariness hearing. 

- 28 -

hearing, Corporal Bartel11 testified that he and Officer Johnson arrested Petitioner on the

night of the incident at Petitioner's home. (Answer, Ex. H, p.5) Petitioner "was agitated. He

was yelling profanities wanting to know what was going on when he saw me." (Id. at p.6)

Officer Bartel observed that Petitioner had been drinking alcohol. (Id. at pp. 6-7) The officer

smelled the odor of alcohol and noticed that Petitioner's eyes were watery and bloodshot. 

(Id.) Petitioner was coherent and he was able to walk and stand upright. (Id.) Given

Petitioner's state of intoxication, Officer Bartel would not have let Petitioner drive had

Petitioner not been under arrest. (Id. at pp. 19-20) On the way to the police station after the

arrest, Petitioner and Officer Bartel rode in the backseat of the patrol car. (Id. at p.8) They

were separated by a metal screen. (Id.) Officer Bartel sat in the back compartment with the

police dog "due to the fact that Mr. Hurley was agitated." (Id.) The officers had not yet

advised Petitioner of his Miranda warnings and they did not ask Petitioner any questions

while en route to the police station.12 (Id. at p.9) 

Officer Bartel testified that while in the police car, Petitioner 

said he knew why he was in handcuffs because he had beat that guy, unquote.

Hurley said, "I did it." 

He admitted it. 

"You have always been straight with me, so I won't lie to you. I did it

but I had my reasons." 

Hurley went quiet for a few seconds then asked me, "If you drank with

a guy and he took off your pants what would you do." 

I didn't say anything to Hurley. He then said something to the effect of,

"I remember that guy I got him back." 

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 28 of 30
13Respondents point out that "[t]he transcript contains an obvious clerical error, with

the trial court finding the statements were 'inadmissible.' (R.T. 5/8/98, at 25) That, of course

is contrary to its ruling that Miranda did not apply because Petitioner was not being

interrogated. And the statements were admitted at trial without further comment." (Answer,

p. 40 n.12)

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He didn't state anything else until we got to the police department.

(Id. at pp. 14-15) At the police station, Officer Bartel read Petitioner the Miranda advisory.

(Id. at pp. 9-11, 17) Thereafter, Petitioner agreed to talk with the Officer. (Id.) 

The trial court found that Petitioner's "statements in the vehicle were not the result of

any custodial interrogation, that they were made solely by the defendant as a result of any

questioning. Therefore, Miranda is not appropriate or necessary because they are not

custodial interrogation. Although he was in custody, he was not being interrogated.

Therefore, those statements are inadmissible [sic]."13 (Id. at p. 25)

It is well-settled that for Miranda to apply, the defendant must be subjected to

custodial interrogation. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 991 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

444 (1966)). The United States Supreme Court has defined interrogation under Miranda as

encompassing "not only...express questioning, but also... any words or actions on the part of

the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should

know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect...A practice

that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a

suspect thus amounts to interrogation." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).

The facts developed during the pre-trial motions hearing support the state court's finding that

Petitioner's statements did not result from interrogation but were instead spontaneous.

Officer Bartel testified that he did not question Petitioner in the squad car nor did the

Officer's conduct amount to any functional equivalent to interrogation. Therefore, the state

trial court's ruling was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. Nor did the state court's proceeding result in a decision that was based on an

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 29 of 30
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unreasonable determination of the evidence presented. Because Petitioner's claim is without

merit, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief.

III. CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny Petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) for the reasons that Petitioner's claims are

procedurally defaulted and, alternatively, Petitioner's claims lack merit.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(B), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections

are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-03-1285-PCT-SRB.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 20th day of June, 2006.

Case 3:03-cv-01285-SRB Document 21 Filed 06/20/06 Page 30 of 30