Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_15-cv-00147/USCOURTS-alsd-2_15-cv-00147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

FRANKIE RICHARDSON, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00147-N

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Frankie Richardson brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) 

seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social 

Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her application for supplemental security 

income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. 

With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this 

civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 19, 20).

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 15, 16, 17), those portions of 

the administrative record (Doc. 14) (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s) in 

lower-right corner of transcript])”) relevant to the issues raised, and the oral 

argument of the parties made May 25, 2016, the Court finds that the 

Commissioner’s decision is due to be AFFIRMED.

I. Background

On September 22, 2011, Richardson filed an application for SSI with the 

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 1 of 21
Social Security Administration (“SSA”),1 alleging disability beginning August 25, 

2011.2 After her application was initially denied, Richardson requested a hearing 

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for the SSA, which was held on April 

11, 2013. On June 15, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on 

Richardson’s application, finding her “not disabled” under the Social Security Act

and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 172 – 187). 

Richardson requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the SSA’s Appeals 

Council. The Commissioner’s decision on Richardson’s application became final 

when the Appeals Council denied the request for review on January 22, 2015. (R. 1 

– 6). On March 20, 2015, Richardson filed this action under § 1383(c)(3) for judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1). See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) 

(“The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for 

SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this 

title to the same extent as the Commissioner’s final determinations under section 

405 of this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, 

irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a 

 1 SSI is a general public assistance measure providing an additional resource to the 

aged, blind, and disabled to assure that their income does not fall below the poverty 

line. Eligibility for SSI is based upon proof of indigence and disability. See 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1382(a), 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(C).

2 “For SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month where she is both 

disabled and has an SSI application on file. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202–03 (2005).” Moore 

v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 2 of 21
civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such 

decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may 

allow.”); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 

2007) (“The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence 

four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.”).

II. Standards of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the 

Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper 

legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’ 

” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 

(internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th 

Cir. 1997))). However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the 

evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” Winschel, 

631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 

2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 

(11th Cir. 1983))). “ ‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the 

[Commissioner]’s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is 

supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. 

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

 “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as 

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 3 of 21
automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the 

decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. 

Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are neither to 

conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that 

come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a 

reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light 

of all the relevant facts.”). “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a 

court] must...tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the 

[Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the “substantial evidence” “standard of review applies only to 

findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the 

[Commissioner]’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper 

standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 

1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 

F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Our standard of review for appeals from the 

administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that ‘(t)he findings of the 

Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....’

42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). As is plain from the 

statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings 

of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption 

of validity attaches to the Secretary’s conclusions of law, including determination of 

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 4 of 21
the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” (footnote and some 

citations and quotation marks omitted)). This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting 

examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) 

(per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). 

“‘The [Commissioner]’s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing 

court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has 

been conducted mandates reversal.’” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius 

v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of 

Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference 

and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 

245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 

1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo

the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. 

Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting 

decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. 

Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”).

Eligibility for ... SSI requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. 

§ ... 1382(a)(1)-(2). ... A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to engage 

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § ... 1382c(a)(3)(A) ...

Thornton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App’x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per 

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 5 of 21
curiam) (unpublished).3

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or 

equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of 

Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past 

relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are 

significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant 

can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work 

experience.

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-

(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).4

“These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate 

both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 

405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

“In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the 

examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; 

(2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the 

claimant’s age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 

(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th 

Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in 

 3 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they 

may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. See also Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases printed in the Federal 

Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”).

4 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual 

steps of this five-step sequential evaluation.

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 6 of 21
combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves 

that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant 

work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the 

claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging 

in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national 

economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 

764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the “claimant bears the 

burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, 

the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair 

record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. 

Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established 

that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the 

claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is 

responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” (citations omitted)). 

“This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe 

into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a 

claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole.” Henry v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and 

quotation omitted).

Where, as here, the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council denied 

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review of that decision, the Court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the 

Commissioner’s final decision.” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. “[W]hen the [Appeals 

Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually 

presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence.” Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). If the 

applicant attacks only the ALJ’s decision, the Court may not consider evidence that 

was presented to the Appeals Council but not to the ALJ. See id. at 1324.

III. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Richardson had “not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since September 22, 2011, the application date ...” (R. 

177). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Richardson had the following severe 

combination of impairments: coronary artery disease; coronary atherosclerosis; 

hypertension; lengthy history of tobacco abuse; and depression due to medical 

condition. (R. 177). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Richardson did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of one 

of the specified impairments in the relevant Listing of Impairments. (R. 178). 

At Step Four,

the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant 

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the 

regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do 

despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about 

[the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant 

medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 

Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine 

whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under 

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the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth 

step...20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will 

conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past 

relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five.

In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant 

work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant 

medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That 

is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular 

work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her 

prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Richardson had the RFC “to perform sedentary 

work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a)[,]” with the following limitations:

The claimant is able to lift/carry and push/pull 10 pounds occasionally, 

less than 10 pounds frequently; stand/walk for a total of 2 hours in an 

8-hour workday; and sit for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. 

However, she must avoid: climbing of ladders, scaffolds, ramps, or 

stairs; kneeling or crawling; exposure to unprotected heights and 

moving mechanical parts; exposure to extreme cold and extreme heat; 

and is limited to simple tasks; limited to routine and repetitive tasks; 

and limited to simple work-related decisions.

(R. 179).

Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Richardson was unable to 

perform any past relevant work. (R. 185). At Step Five, the ALJ, after taking 

testimony from a vocational expert, found that there exist significant numbers of 

jobs in the national economy that Richardson can perform given her RFC, age,

education, and work experience. (R. 185). Thus, the ALJ found that Richardson

was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 186 – 187).

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 9 of 21
Richardson raises three claims of error in her brief. The Court will address 

each in turn. 5

A. Claim 1 (Anxiety)

Richardson first complains that the “ALJ’s decision is silent regarding her 

consideration of anxiety as an impairment, severe or non-severe[,]” despite her 

subjective testimony and record medical evidence indicating the presence of such an 

impairment. (Doc. 16 at 4). With regard to the ALJ’s failure to mention anxiety at 

Step Two, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that this is, at most, harmless 

error. “At step two the ALJ must determine if the claimant has any severe 

impairment. This step acts as a filter; if no severe impairment is shown the claim is 

denied, but the finding of any severe impairment, whether or not it qualifies as a 

disability and whether or not it results from a single severe impairment or a 

combination of impairments that together qualify as severe, is enough to satisfy the 

requirement of step two.” Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987). 

See also Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App'x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 

2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[W]e have recognized that step two requires only 

a finding of ‘at least one’ severe impairment to continue on to the later steps. See 

Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588. Further, the regulations state that the only consequence 

of the analysis at step two is that, if the ALJ finds no severe impairment or 

 5 Generally, claims of error not raised in the district court are deemed waived. Cf. Stewart 

v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115 (11th Cir. 1994) (“As a general 

principle, [the court of appeals] will not address an argument that has not been raised in 

the district court.”); Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-11567, 2016 WL 3159217, at *4 

(11th Cir. June 7, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (applying Stewart holding in Social 

Security appeal).

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 10 of 21
impairments, he should reach a conclusion of no disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Here, the ALJ found multiple severe impairments and 

accordingly proceeded to step three of the evaluation. Based on our precedent and 

the regulations, therefore, it is apparent that there is no need for an ALJ to identify 

every severe impairment at step two. Accordingly, even assuming that Tuggerson–

Brown is correct that her additional impairments were ‘severe,’ the ALJ's 

recognition of that as a fact would not, in any way, have changed the step-two 

analysis, and she cannot demonstrate error below.”)

Moreover, the ALJ’s decision adequately demonstrates that she considered 

anxiety at both Step Three (see R. 178 (stating that the ALJ considered 

Richardson’s “impairments individually and in combination” and noting that 

Richardson reported she “did not handle stress or changes in routine well”)) and 

Step Four (see R. 180 (noting that Richardson had listed “anxiety/depression” as a 

condition that limited her ability to work), 182 (discussing the medical evidence of 

anxiety)).6 See Freeman v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 593 F. App'x 911, 914–15 

(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Although the ALJ found that Mr. 

Freeman's back pain was not a severe impairment, the record demonstrates that 

she considered and discussed these symptoms at subsequent steps of the sequential 

analysis. Accordingly, any error in failing to find that Mr. Freeman's lower back 

pain was severe was harmless because the symptoms were nonetheless considered 

 6 Though Richardson conclusorily styles Claim 1 as challenging whether substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s mental RFC determination at Step Four, her substantive 

argument exclusively focuses on the ALJ’s purported failure to discuss Richardson’s 

anxiety, and particularly her failure to classify it as a severe or non-severe impairment at 

Step Two.

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 11 of 21
in the subsequent steps of the ALJ's analysis.”); Tuggerson-Brown, 572 F. App'x at 

951-52 (“While the ALJ did not need to determine whether every alleged 

impairment was “severe,” he was required to consider all impairments, regardless of 

severity, in conjunction with one another in performing the latter steps of the 

sequential evaluation. Despite Tuggerson–Brown's arguments to the contrary, it is 

apparent from the face of the ALJ's decision and the RFC report relied upon by the 

ALJ that the ALJ did, in fact, consider all medical evidence in combination in 

concluding that Tuggerson–Brown was not disabled. In performing his analysis, the 

ALJ stated that he evaluated whether Tuggerson–Brown had an “impairment or 

combination of impairments” that met a listing and that he considered “all 

symptoms” in determining her RFC. Under our precedent, those statements are 

enough to demonstrate that the ALJ considered all necessary evidence. See Wilson[ 

v. Barnhart], 284 F.3d [1219,] 1224–25[ (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)]. The ALJ 

went beyond those statements in his analysis, specifically discussing evidence of 

Tuggerson–Brown's depression, diabetes, leg, neck, and back pain, and mild 

degenerative disc disease. The RFC report likewise addressed many of the same 

symptoms. Accordingly, the record sufficiently demonstrates that the ALJ properly 

considered all of Tuggerson–Brown's impairments, even those not specifically found 

to be severe, in reaching a conclusion that she was not disabled. Tuggerson–Brown 

does not specifically challenge or assert that the ALJ's ultimate conclusion was not 

based on substantial evidence in some other regard, and therefore we affirm the 

denial of disability benefits.”). At oral argument, Richardson made much of the fact 

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that, immediately preceding her mental RFC, the ALJ stated that the limitations 

were “[d]ue to impairment caused by depression” only (R. 183); however, the ALJ’s

failure to specifically cite to anxiety as well immediately prior to the mental RFC 

determination is, at most, harmless, as the ALJ’s opinion otherwise adequately 

indicates that she considered anxiety at Step Four. Certainly, Richardson has not 

attempted to show how the mental RFC is inconsistent with the record evidence of 

her anxiety.

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Richardson’s assertions of reversible 

error in Claim 1.

B. Claim 2 (VE Hypothetical)

Richardson next complains that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the 

vocational expert (VE) at Step Five failed to account for her physical impairments of 

anemia and enlarged uterine fibroid.7 “ ‘In order for a vocational expert's testimony 

to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which 

 7 Though Richardson conclusorily styles Claim 2 as challenging whether substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s physical RFC determination at Step Four, her substantive 

argument exclusively focuses on the ALJ’s purported failure to include these impairments 

in her VE hypotheticals at Step Five. For her part, in her brief the Commissioner does not 

appear to have picked up on the Step Five argument, instead asserting, much like she did 

for Claim 1, that “[b]ecause the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s physical symptoms and her 

alleged limitations at subsequent steps of the decision, any failure to explicitly list certain 

impairments at step two was harmless error.” (Doc. 17 at 5 – 6).

In arguing Claim 2, Richardson purports to quote Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837 

(11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), for the proposition that an “ ‘ALJ may not arbitrarily pick and 

choose facts from the medical evidence to support his conclusion with articulating specific, 

well supported reasons for crediting some evidence while discrediting other evidence.’ ” 

(Doc. 16 at 6). As was recently pointed out to Richardson’s counsel in another Social 

Security case, Brownlow v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 15-00392-N, 2016 WL 814953, at *6 n.8

(S.D. Ala. Feb. 29, 2016), no such quote appears in Marbury.

The Court agrees with the Commissioner that Richardson’s mention of “mental 

retardation” in one sentence of Richard’s Claim 2 argument appears to be an editing error.

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 13 of 21
comprises all of the claimant's impairments.’ ” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180 (quoting 

Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227). See also Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th 

Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“In this case, we cannot assume that the vocational expert 

would have answered in a similar manner had the ALJ instructed him to consider 

all of the appellant's severe impairments. Thus, we must conclude that the 

Secretary failed to meet its burden of showing that the appellant could perform 

other gainful employment in the economy. We hold that the Secretary's decision 

was not supported by substantial evidence.”). “However, questions that ‘implicitly 

account[ ] for the claimant's limitations’ are sufficient to meet this requirement[,]” 

Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) 

(quoting Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180–81), and an ALJ is “not required to include 

findings in the hypothetical that the ALJ had properly rejected as unsupported.” 

Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161.

Claiming that she “provided objective medical evidence” of anemia, 

Richardson cites (1) several notations in medical records indicating that she takes

iron supplements; (2) a discharge summary for an almost-two-week hospital stay in 

August 2011 after being admitted with chest pain and shortness of breath, where it 

was noted, inter alia, that she was “profoundly iron deficient,” was given iron 

transfusions during her stay, and would “continue oral iron supplementation” on 

discharge (R. 455 – 456); and (3) stray comments in her subjective testimony that 

she has to stop after 5 or 10 minutes of activity because she “get[s] tired” (R. 231 –

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 14 of 21
232) and can’t go out alone “because of unblance [sic]” / “imbalance” (R. 316, 327).8 

Richardson, however, has pointed to no record evidence actually diagnosing anemia. 

Even the cited discharge summary did not include anemia among the nine 

“discharge diagnoses” it did list. (R. 456). To the extent Richardson is asking the 

Court to infer a diagnosis of anemia from this evidence, the Court declines.9

The ALJ acknowledged at Step Four that an abdominal ultrasound 

performed during a September 2011 hospital visit revealed an “enlarged uterine 

fibroid” (R. 180 (citing Exhibit 3F, pages 9-10 [R. 436 – 437])). While it is true, as 

Richardson cites, that her uterine fibroid mass was described as causing her 

abdomen to appear “about the same size as 7 month pregnancy” (R. 445), she has 

pointed to no record evidence indicating that the mass impaired her abilities,10 and 

the ALJ found that, “despite her impairments,” Richardson’s “admitted activities of 

 8 Though Richardson claims otherwise (see Doc. 16 at 5), none of the record testimony she 

has cited reports “dizziness.”

9 At oral argument, Richardson attempted to shift the focus of this claim, asserting only 

that the ALJ’s decision generally failed to account for evidence of “fatigue.” (R. 423). 

However, the ALJ noted that Richardson denied “shortness of breath” “as of November 

2011,” and that “she experienced symptomatic improvement (with less chest pain and 

shortness of breath) following her heart surgery in 2011...” (R. 180). Moreover, as the 

Commissioner correctly notes in her brief (Doc. 17 at 5), numerous medical records list 

fatigue as “not present” (R. 414, 418), or stated that Richardson denied “shortness of 

breath” (R. 548, 565, 569) or otherwise had “no complaints” of fatigue (R. 613 – 614, 621 –

622). For those visits in which fatigue was noted, Richardson was diagnosed with 

transient illnesses: bronchiolitis and influenza (R. 423 – 425); and gastroenteritis and fever 

(R. 617 – 618).

 

10 Richardson asserts that this visit was the result of her fibroid mass “caus[ing] her to have 

vomiting and pain in her lower back, pain severe enough to force her to go to the emergency 

room.” (Doc. 16 at 5 (citing R. 431)). While the treatment notes from this single emergency 

room visit do contain some discussion of her fibroid mass, they do not state that it was the 

cause of her symptoms. Rather, Richardson reported that the pain and vomiting “started 

suddenly after eating a hamburger,” and “food poisoning” was ultimately diagnosed. (R. 

437).

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 15 of 21
daily living,” which included “taking care of her autistic young adult son” and a 

“regular exercise program includ[ing] walking 2-3 times weekly,” were 

“substantially more consistent with an individual able to sustain competitive work 

activity.” (R. 180, 184). The ALJ also found that the “objective medical evidence of 

record ... is consistent with an ability to perform sustained sedentary work, subject 

to the limitations specified in the” RFC, noting that, “since October 2011, 

[Richardson ] has not been hospitalized for extended treatment; has been evaluated 

and conservatively treated in the emergency room a few times for relatively nonurgent complaints; and had infrequently presented for outpatient evaluation and 

treatment.” (R. 184). Finally, the ALJ found Richardson’s statements concerning 

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms to be “not totally 

credible to the extent they are inconsistent with” the ALJ’s RFC determination. (R. 

184). Richardson does not challenge these determinations, which implicitly indicate 

that the ALJ did not consider her fibroid mass to have a substantial limiting effect 

on Richardson’s ability to work.

Richardson has pointed to no record evidence of an anemia diagnosis, nor has 

she cited evidence contradicting the ALJ’s implicit finding that her enlarged fibroid 

did not significantly impair her ability to work beyond the limitations in the ALJ’s 

RFC, which were included in the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE at Step Five As 

such, she has not shown that the ALJ was required to explicitly account for either 

condition in her hypotheticals. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Richardson’s 

assertions of reversible error in Claim 2. 

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 16 of 21
C. Claim 3 (Medication Side Effects)

Finally, Richardson asserts that the ALJ erred in not finding her disabled 

due to frequent urination caused by Richardson’s diuretic medications. At her 

hearing before the ALJ, Richardson testified that one of the side effects of her 

medications was “frequent urination” and that she “use[s] the bathroom all the 

time...” (R. 228). Also at the hearing, Richardson’s representative “asked the 

vocational expert whether any jobs would be available for a hypothetical individual 

who needed to take breaks every 15 minutes, or for an individual who required 

frequent restroom breaks due to the side effects (urinary frequency) of prescribed 

medication,” with the VE responding that “there would be no jobs available for such 

an individual.” (R. 186). 

The ALJ noted Richardson’s testimony regarding her frequent urination but 

determined that the “overall record otherwise indicates that actual side effects of 

the claimant’s prescribed medications would not interfere with her ability to 

perform work activities in any significant manner.” (R. 184). In particular, the ALJ

noted “the claimant’s disability status reports show that she had experienced no 

side effects from 9 of 11 prescribed medications,” with a March 2012 report stating

only “that her blood pressure medication caused dizziness and that she had 

experienced drowsiness after taking Lortab. (R. 183 (citing Exhibit 9E [R. 339 –

344])). The ALJ found Richardson’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms to be “not totally credible” (R. 184); 

as for the hypotheticals presented to the VE by Richardson’s representative, the 

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 17 of 21
ALJ found them “not supported by the evidence of record in this case.” (R. 186).

Richardson cites no record evidence corroborating her testimony of frequent 

urination, much less any that indicates it would prevent her from working. As the 

Commissioner’s brief correctly points out (Doc. 17 at 6), not only did Richardson 

consistently fail to self-report side effects of frequent urination in her disability 

reports to the SSA, she also regularly failed to report this side effect her physicians. 

(See R. 362 [no “problems urinating” or other GI/GU issues noted] 414, 418, 548 

[“When questioned about medication side effects, patient notes none.”], 569 [same 

as previous], 565 [“When questioned about medication side effects, patient notes 

none. Tolerating chlorthalidone.”], 608 [“GENITOURINARY: No complaints”], 614 

[same as previous], 622 [same as previous], 629 [no “problems urinating” or other 

GI/GU issues noted]). The Eleventh Circuit has consistently held that an ALJ may 

discredit a claimant’s alleged symptoms from medication side effects where the 

claimant has failed to report those side effects to her physicians and where the 

physicians have not otherwise expressed concern over those side effects. See 

Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“Ms. Swindle 

also argues that the many medications she is taking have severe side effects that 

the ALJ failed to take into consideration. However, the ALJ noted that Ms. Swindle 

did not complain of side effects, with the exception that she felt that one medication 

might be giving her headaches, and the record did not disclose any concerns about 

side effects by the several doctors who examined and treated her. The ALJ's 

determination that side effects from medication did not present a significant 

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 18 of 21
problem is therefore supported by substantial evidence.”); Gantea v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 380 F. App'x 950, 951 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“The 

administrative law judge was entitled to discredit Gantea’s complaints because 

neither of the physicians who prescribed Gantea’s medications stated that side 

effects limited Gantea’s ability to work. See Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 

(11th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (evaluating symptoms based on ‘any 

inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts 

between [the] statements [of the claimant] and the rest of the evidence’).”); Colon ex 

rel. Colon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 411 F. App'x 236, 238 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (unpublished) (“The ALJ concluded that Mr. Colon's subjective complaints 

were ‘not fully credible.’ Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to 

discredit Mr. Colon's complaints as they related to medication side effects: none of 

Mr. Colon's doctors reported any side effects from his medications, and he did not 

complain to them of any side effects. See Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 

(11th Cir.1990) (where represented claimant did not complain about medication 

side effects, other than an isolated mention that they might be responsible for 

causing her headaches, and where the record did not disclose any concerns about 

side effects from her doctors, substantial evidence supported the determination that 

the effects did not present a significant problem).”); Werner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 

421 F. App'x 935, 938 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[A] claimant’s 

failure to report side effects to his physicians is an appropriate factor for the ALJ to 

consider in evaluating whether a claimant’s alleged symptoms are consistent with 

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 19 of 21
the record.” (citing Swindle, 914 F.2d at 226)).11 Thus, the ALJ’s determination that 

the “overall record ... indicates that actual side effects of the claimant’s prescribed 

medications would not interfere with her ability to perform work activities in any 

significant manner” is supported by substantial evidence with regard to 

Richardson’s subjective complaints of frequent urination. Accordingly, the Court 

OVERRULES Richardson’s assertions of reversible error in Claim 3. There being 

no other claims of error asserted, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s final 

decision denying Richardson benefits is due to be AFFIRMED. 

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the 

Commissioner’s January 22, 2015 final decision denying Richardson’s application

 11 Richardson relies primarily on Barefoot v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-841-CSC, 2015 WL 

106383 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 7, 2015), in arguing Claim 3. In Barefoot, “[t]he Commissioner 

argue[d] that the record undermine[d] Barefoot's credibility[ because, during the relevant 

period, the medical record demonstrates that Barefoot did not frequently seek treatment for 

the side effects of her medication.” Id. at *10. The Commissioner based this argument on 

notations in the record from both treating physicians and the claimant that the claimant 

was doing “fine,” “well,” etc. See id. at *10 – 11. The district court rejected that argument. 

While noting, consistent with Swindle, that “[i]n the typical disability case, a person’s 

failure to seek treatment or complain of a symptom of a condition is a legitimate basis for 

the Commissioner to discount that person’s credibility[,]” the court nevertheless held “that 

approach is not appropriate in this particular case. Just as a person who has lost their sight 

would not complain about being blind every time that person visited her doctor, it is not 

rational to expect Barefoot to constantly complain about known, ever present side effects of 

a medicine which she must take to preserve her life.” Id. at *11.

Barefoot is distinguishable from the facts of this case. Richardson did not simply fail 

to “constantly complain” to her doctors about her frequent urination; rather, she 

consistently failed to mention it to her doctors and the SSA when specifically asked about 

any medication side effects. Richardson argues that she should not have been expected to 

report this side effect because it would be implied from the diuretic nature of her 

medication. Regardless, Richardson “bears the burden of proving that [s]he is disabled, and, 

consequently, [s]he is responsible for producing evidence in support of h[er] claim.” Ellison

v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Richardson testified only 

that she “uses the bathroom all the time” due to her medications, and she has identified no 

record evidence that supports the determination that this side effect was disabling in 

nature.

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 20 of 21
for SSI benefits is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED this the 22nd day of August 2016.

/s/Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:15-cv-00147-N Document 22 Filed 08/22/16 Page 21 of 21