Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02535/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02535-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Ireland does not specify the kind of mechanical restraints, but the Court 1

construes this term liberally, as it must, to refer to more than just handcuffs. Fred

Cohen, Isolation in Penal Settings: The Isolation-Restraint Paradigm, 22 Wash. U.

J.L. & Pol’y 295, 306 (2006) (“Mechanical restraints include any means of

restricting an inmate’s or detainee’s ability to react physically. They usually

involve the use of such devices as leather straps, cuffs, braces, and, most recently,

a specially designed chair to which the person is strapped.”).

 Ireland does not state the charges for which he is being detained. 2

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Rod Ireland v. County of Solano, et al., CV 08-2535 CTB

Order re 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint

Plaintiff Rod Ireland (“Ireland”), a California prisoner proceeding pro se,

alleges Eighth Amendment excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Solano County and its officials—Deputy Grapentine, Deputy Barrilleaux, Sheriff

Stanton, Commander Marsh, and Sergeant Cullison—for their use of “mechanical

restraints” on him. Ireland also alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim 1

against Deputy Grapentine. Because res judicata bars Ireland from reasserting

excessive force claims against Grapentine and Barrilleaux, and because Ireland

fails to state excessive force claims against Stanton, Marsh, Cullison, and Solano

County, the Court DISMISSES those claims with prejudice. However, under the

less stringent standard for pro se complaints, Ireland does state a retaliation claim

against Grapentine. The Court thus GRANTS Ireland’s in forma pauperis motion,

and ORDERS the amended complaint, and the summons thereon, served on

Grapentine.

I. Background

Ireland filed his original complaint on October 24, 2008, and his amended

complaint on June 25, 2009. Ireland alleges that, while he was a pretrial detainee

in the Solano County Jail, he suffered two instances of excessive force in violation 2

of the Eighth Amendment, and one instance of retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10–11, 15, 19.)

On September 8, 2008, Ireland had filed an earlier action in this Court based

on the same two allegations of excessive force. Ireland v. Solano County Sheriff,

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 1 of 11
 The following is based on the factual allegations in Ireland’s amended 3

complaint, which are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to

Ireland for purposes of the Court’s initial review. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc., v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

 “Meralgia paresthetica” is numbness or pain in the outer thigh not caused 4

by injury to the thigh, but by injury to a nerve that extends from the thigh to the

spinal column. J.M. Pearce, Meralgia paraesthetica (Bernhardt-Roth syndrome),

77 J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatr. 84 (2006).

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No. 2:08-CV-2102-RCF, 2009 WL 3055217 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2009). A year

later, on September 16, 2009, Judge Raymond C. Fisher held, inter alia, that the

facts alleged did not state an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force because

“the facts currently alleged do not form an adequate basis for the Court to impute

knowledge or malicious intent to the defendants.” Id. at *1 (emphasis omitted). 

Judge Fisher therefore dismissed Ireland’s complaint with thirty days’ leave to file

a third amended complaint. Id. at *2. Ireland did not timely file any amended

complaint. On October 26, 2006, Judge Fisher entered an order that dismissed

Ireland’s complaint, with prejudice. Ireland, No. 2:08-CV-2102-RCF (Docket No.

34). Ireland now reasserts his excessive force allegations, along with an alleged

retaliation claim, in a new action—this one.

Ireland’s amended complaint alleges as follows. On August 14, 2008, 3

Deputy Grapentine applied mechanical restraints to Ireland to secure him during

transport to a court appearance. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Although Ireland complained

the restraints were too tight, Grapentine did not loosen the restraints. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

On September 8, 2008, Ireland again traveled to a court appearance and was again

placed in mechanical restraints. (Id. ¶ 15.) Although Ireland complained to

Deputy Barrilleaux that the restraints were too tight, Barrilleaux did not loosen

them. (Id. ¶ 16.) Ireland alleges the first incident resulted in meralgia

paresthetica, requiring medical care (id. ¶¶ 13, 34), and that the second incident 4

resulted in unspecified injuries, also requiring medical care. (Id. ¶ 17.) Then, on

October 15, 2008, Grapentine applied mechanical restraints to Ireland to inflict

pain in retaliation for inmate grievances Ireland filed against Grapentine. (Id. ¶

19.) This incident required further unspecified medical attention. (Id.)

This case was assigned to a magistrate judge and then a district court judge

before being reassigned on December 23, 2008 to Judge Carlos T. Bea of the Ninth

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 2 of 11
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Circuit, who sits by designation. (Docket No. 9.)

II. Legal Standard

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss the

prisoner’s complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1124, 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). But pro se pleadings must be liberally

construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. Discussion

A. Res Judicata

At the outset, this Court rules that, under the doctrine of res judicata, Ireland

cannot reassert the excessive force claims made in the earlier action, Ireland, No.

2:08-CV-2102-RCF, against Grapentine and Barrilleaux.

The doctrine of res judicata serves to bar a claim where there is an identity

of claims, a final judgment on the merits, and an identity of parties. Mpoyo v.

Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, Ireland has

already brought Eighth Amendment claims against Grapentine and Barrilleaux on

the same two allegations of excessive force. Ireland, No. 2:08-CV-2102-RCF

(Docket No. 17) (referring to the use of mechanical restraints on August 14 and

September 8, 2008, and naming both Grapentine and Barrilleaux as defendants). 

The Court dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim of excessive force

under the Eighth Amendment, and entered a judgment dismissing Ireland’s

complaint after Ireland failed to file a timely amended complaint. Id. (Docket Nos.

32, 34). This dismissal for failure to state a claim was a “judgment on the merits”

to which res judicata applies. See Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th

Cir. 2002). This is true even if Judge Fisher erroneously dismissed Ireland’s

excessive force claims under the higher Eighth Amendment standard for convicted

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 3 of 11
 “To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, a prison official 5

must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court must focus on “the amount

of force used, not the nature or severity of the injury inflicted.” Oliver v. Keller,

289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002). Under this standard, Judge Fisher found that

the ordinary use of handcuffs and other restraints, while uncomfortable, relates to

the “routine discomfort that is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for

their offenses against society.” Ireland, 2009 WL 3055217, at *1 (internal brackets

and quotation marks omitted) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)).

 In the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”), a prisoner has the 6

right to appeal administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or

policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” 

Cal. Admin. Code tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). To exhaust these administrative remedies, a

prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution;

(2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form; (3) second-level

appeal to the institution head or designee; and (4) third-level appeal to the Director

of the CDC. Id. § 3084.5; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2009). 

A final decision from the Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion

requirement. Aidnik v. Cal. Med. Facility, No. 2:08-cv-02583-HDM-RAM, 2009

WL 3789223, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (unpublished disposition).

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inmates, rather than the lower Fourteenth Amendment standard for pretrial 5

detainees, like Ireland.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Ireland’s excessive force

claims against Grapentine and Barrilleaux.

B. Exhaustion

Next, the Court notes Ireland may not have satisfied the exhaustion

requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”). Ireland

alleges he exhausted administrative remedies (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 35), but alleges 6

his grievances were denied at only second-level—not third-level—review. (Id. ¶

37.) However, because PLRA exhaustion is an affirmative defense, see Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the Sixth Circuit rule

requiring district courts to sua sponte dismiss complaints that fail to allege

exhaustion with specificity), the Court does not now dismiss this action on

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 4 of 11
 The Court nonetheless may dismiss this action if defendants later raise the 7

exhaustion defense and prove failure to exhaust, even if by that time Ireland has

exhausted his claims. See, e.g., Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding the language of § 1997e(a) mandates that actions be

dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies

before he filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending).

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exhaustion grounds.7

C. In Forma Pauperis

On October 24, 2008, Ireland requested in forma pauperis status. Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), Ireland filed an adequate affidavit in support of his in

forma pauperis motion, along with a certified copy of his prison trust account

statement. (Docket No. 2.) Accordingly, the Court allows Ireland to proceed in

forma pauperis.

D. Failure to State a Claim

The Court next considers whether Ireland states excessive force claims

against the defendants, as well as a retaliation claim against Deputy Grapentine.

1. Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must allege facts

which, accepted as true, “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has “facial plausibility” if the

plaintiff states facts that “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. Even after

Twombly, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(per curiam) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If the complaint fails

to state a claim, the Court has discretion to dismiss the complaint with or without

leave to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1124, 1130.

To state a claim under § 1983, Ireland must allege (1) a right secured by the

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 5 of 11
 For reasons set out above, res judicata also bars Ireland from reasserting 8

excessive force claims against Sheriff Stanton, who was named in the original and

first amended complaints before Judge Fisher, albeit not in the second amended

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Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged violation

was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

2. Excessive Force

Ireland, as a pretrial detainee, is not properly subject to punishment until he

is convicted of a crime. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979) (stating

Eighth Amendment has no application to pretrial detainees); Ingraham v. Wright,

430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the

State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with

criminal prosecutions.”). Accordingly, Ireland’s excessive force claims against the

remaining defendants—Sheriff Stanton, Commander Marsh, Sergeant Cullison,

and Solano County—should be analyzed not under the Eighth Amendment, but, if

at all, under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a pretrial

detainee, such as Ireland, from the use of excessive force that amounts to

punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell, 441

U.S. at 535–39 (1979)). “A challenged action which is reasonably related to a

legitimate government objective will not, without more, constitute punishment. 

Conversely, a court may infer an intent to punish when there is no such reasonable

relation.” White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1504 (9th Cir. 1990). As to a pretrial

detainee who has not been tried, much less convicted, legitimate government

objectives include effective management of the jail and maintenance of internal jail

security and order, but not retribution and deterrence. Id. at 1504–05. To resolve a

pretrial detainee’s excessive force claims under the Due Process Clause, the Court

must balance a number of factors: “(1) the need for application of force; (2) the

relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (3) the extent of the

injury inflicted; and (4) whether force was applied in a good faith effort to

maintain and restore discipline.” Id. at 1507.

With this background, the Court finds Ireland does not state a claim against

Sheriff Stanton, Commander Marsh, or Sergeant Cullison. Ireland does not allege 8

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 6 of 11
complaint. Ireland, No. 2:08-CV-2102-RCF (Docket Nos. 1, 4, 17).

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these defendants were directly involved in the excessive force incidents above. 

Instead, Ireland alleges Sheriff Stanton and Commander Marsh were responsible

for “supervising, disciplining, and providing necessary training for all deputies.” 

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–6.) Ireland alleges he informed these defendants, including

Sergeant Cullison, of Grapentine’s and Barrilleaux’s excessive force, but that the

three defendants nonetheless failed to “investigate, report and take proper actions

to discipline those involved.” (Id. ¶ 36.) It appears Ireland intends to hold Sheriff

Stanton, Commander Marsh, and Sergeant Cullison liable for the conduct of their

subordinates, Grapentine and Barrilleaux. But liability under § 1983 cannot be

based on respondeat superior. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

A supervisor generally “is only liable for constitutional violations of his

subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. A supervisor may also be held

liable if he or she implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional

violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991)

(en banc). Ireland does not allege Sheriff Stanton, Commander Marsh, and

Sergeant Cullison knew of the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations in time to

prevent them. Nor does Ireland allege these defendants implemented a policy that

was the cause of the alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, Ireland cannot

state a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against Sheriff Stanton,

Commander Marsh, or Sergeant Cullison.

Ireland also does not state a claim based on the use of excessive force

against Solano County. As a general matter, a county may be held liable for a

violation of federal law under § 1983 only if the county has adopted an illegal or

unconstitutional practice or policy. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

690 (1978). The Monell rule thus operates to defeat Ireland’s excessive force

claims against Solano County because he does not allege an illegal or

unconstitutional practice or policy.

E. Retaliation

However, Ireland does state a retaliation claim against Deputy Grapentine.

There is a First Amendment right to petition the government through prison

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 7 of 11
 Under the less stringent standard for pro se complaints, the Court can also 9

infer when Ireland made grievances, see Am. Compl. ¶ 24 (“On August 27, 2008

[Ireland] filed an inmate grievance # 800 2530 about not being seen concerning the

incident on August 14, 2008 with Deputy Grapentine.”), and with whom he filed

others. See id. ¶ 25 (“On 9-7-08 [Ireland] filed a claim with the Solano County

Sheriff for violations of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for

excessive force.”). Further, the Court reads Ireland’s legal conclusion—that

Grapentine applied excessive force “in retaliation” for those grievances—as a

factual allegation—that Grapentine applied force “because of” such grievances. 

The Court will not apply a heightened pleading standard simply to require Ireland

to restate what, liberally construed, may be understood as a factual allegation: “in

retaliation” can mean “because of” in the vernacular. Cf. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94

(holding the complaint could not be dismissed on the ground the prisoner’s

allegation of harm—that the prison’s termination of his medication was

“endangering [his] life”—was “too conclusory” to state “a cognizable independent

harm” for his Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs).

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grievance procedures. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). To

state a retaliation claim, Ireland must allege (1) Grapentine took some adverse

action against him (2) because of (3) Ireland’s protected conduct and that such

action (4) chilled Ireland’s First Amendment rights and (5) the action did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. See id. at 567–68.

Here, Ireland alleges “Grapentine used the mechanical restraints on . . .

[him] in such a fashion as to cause lasting pain and injury, and did so knowingly

and deliberately and in retaliation for initiating and maintaining inmate grievances

and complaints for [Grapentine’s] excessive . . . force with the mechanical

restraints[.]” (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Construing this claim liberally, as it must, the

Court can infer all of the elements of retaliation —even that excessively tight 9

restraints advance no legitimate correctional goal. Although Ireland filed

numerous grievances against Grapentine after the alleged retaliation (see id.

¶¶ 29–33), the Ninth Circuit has “explicitly held that an objective standard governs

the chilling inquiry; a plaintiff does not have to show that ‘his speech was actually

inhibited or suppressed,’ but rather that the adverse action at issue ‘would chill or

silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.’” 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rhodes, 408 F.3d

at 568–69). Indeed, the retaliatory infliction of pain—as Ireland alleges—would

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 8 of 11
9

chill or silence the speech of a reasonable person.

Therefore, Ireland states a First Amendment retaliation claim against

Grapentine.

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Ireland’s in forma pauperis motion is granted.

2. The excessive force claims against all defendants are dismissed with

prejudice.

3. The Court finds the pro se amended complaint alleges facts sufficient for

preliminary screening purposes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, on Ireland’s retaliation

claim. Service of the summons and amended complaint is proper for defendant

Grapentine on that claim.

4. The Clerk of the Court shall send Ireland one (1) return of service

(USM-285) forms, one summons, an instruction sheet, and a copy of the amended

complaint filed June 25, 2009.

5. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, Ireland shall complete

the attached Notice of Submission of Documents and submit the following

documents to the Clerk of the Court:

(a) The completed Notice of Submission of Documents;

(b) One (1) completed summons for the single defendant listed in number

3 above;

(c) One (1) completed return of service (USM-285) form for the single

defendant listed in number 3 above; and

(d) Two (2) copies of the endorsed amended complaint filed June 25, 2009.

6. Ireland need not attempt service on the defendant and need not request

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 9 of 11
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waiver of service. Upon receipt of the above-described documents, the Clerk of

the Court shall deliver those documents to the United States Marshal, who shall

serve the above-named defendant with those documents pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4 without payment of costs.

7. If Ireland fails to submit to the Clerk of the Court the Notice of

Submission of Documents and the other required documents within thirty (30) days

of the date of this Order, the Clerk of the Court must, without further notice, enter

a judgment of dismissal of this action without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Date: January 7, 2010 /s/Carlos T. Bea

 Carlos T. Bea

 United States Circuit Court Judge 

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 10 of 11
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE JORDAN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

M. VEAL, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________

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2:08-cv-02535-CTB

NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF

DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff hereby submits the following documents in compliance 

with the court’s order filed ______________:

______ completed summons form

______ completed USM-285 forms

______ copies of the _______________

Complaint/Amended Complaint

DATED:

___________________________________

Plaintiff

Case 2:08-cv-02535-CTB Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 11 of 11