Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01484/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01484-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1484

___________

Christopher Lee Prosser, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Victor Bruhn; Kimberly Swindler, *

 C.O.I., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendants, *

*

Meredith Allen, *

*

Defendant - Appellant, *

*

Steve Ragan; Eddie Williams; Captain *

Galloway; Dave Dormire; John Doe; *

Jane Doe; Correctional Medical *

Systems; Chris McBee; Woody; Carr; *

Mike Kemna, *

*

Defendants. *

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Submitted: November 15, 2007

 Filed: February 4, 2008

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Before MELLOY, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellate Case: 07-1484 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/04/2008 Entry ID: 3398439
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The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Chief United States District Judge for

the Western District of Missouri.

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Christopher Prosser, an inmate in the custody of the Missouri Department of

Corrections, suffered several injuries when he was stabbed by two other prisoners.

Prosser then filed suit, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against prison employees Victor

Bruhn, Kimberly Swindler-Thorne, and Meredith Allen-Wells alleging the stabbing

resulted from their deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court1

initially granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, however, this

court reversed and concluded that summary judgment was improper because there

were genuine issues of material fact as to whether: (1) Bruhn was aware of a

substantial risk of harm to Prosser; and (2) whether Allen-Wells and Swindler-Thorne

acted with deliberate indifference to his safety. See Prosser v. Williams, 84 F. App’x

737 (8th Cir. 2004) (unpublished). On remand, a jury found Bruhn and SwindlerThorne not liable for Prosser’s injuries but returned a verdict in favor of Prosser

against Allen-Wells in the sum of $5,000.00 in compensatory damages and

$20,000.00 in punitive damages. Thereafter, the district court denied Allen-Wells’s

post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative a new trial.

Additionally, the district court awarded Prosser attorney’s fees and costs against

defendant in the net sum of $23,401.05. The district court entered judgment against

Allen-Wells for these amounts. Allen-Wells brings this appeal asserting that there

was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm.

We first consider the district court’s decision to deny Allen-Wells judgment as

a matter of law. “We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter

of law, applying the same standard as the district court.” Canny v. Dr. Pepper/SevenUp Bottling Group, Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). We

must determine whether, as a matter of law, there was sufficient evidence to sustain

the jury’s verdict. See, e.g., First Dakota Nat’l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.

Appellate Case: 07-1484 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/04/2008 Entry ID: 3398439
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Co., 2 F.3d 801, 808 (8th Cir. 1993). In doing so, “we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the jury’s verdict and must not engage in weighing evidence or

considering questions of credibility.” Scott Fetzer Co. v. Williamson, 101 F.3d 549,

553 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate

only when all of the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable

inference sustaining the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, “where

conflicting inferences reasonably can be drawn from evidence, it is the function of the

jury to determine what inference shall be drawn.” Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832,

845 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). We are “reluctant to set

aside a jury’s verdict and will not do so lightly.” Kelly v. Armstrong, 206 F.3d 794,

797 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Allen-Wells argues that Prosser failed to present any evidence showing she was

either aware that Prosser faced substantial risk of attack or that she acted with

deliberate indifference to that risk. She contends that at most she was negligent by

allowing Prosser’s assailants entry into a housing unit where they did not reside in

violation of prison policy. After reviewing the record, we disagree. At bottom, this

case turned on a credibility determination - whether the jury believed Allen-Wells’s

testimony which was inconsistent (if not outright contradicted) by her earlier affidavit.

The jury was free to disbelieve Allen-Wells and believe Prosser’s testimony that

Allen-Wells told him shortly after the attack that she ‘basically knew what was going

on.’ And it was certainly within the jury’s province to infer that Allen-Wells’s

statement was in reference to Prosser being stabbed. We are therefore satisfied that

there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Allen-Wells violated

Prosser’s Eighth Amendment rights because she was deliberately indifferent to his

safety. 

Because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the district

court did not err in denying Allen-Wells’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment in all respects.

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