Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_18-cv-00762/USCOURTS-alnd-2_18-cv-00762-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CYNTHIA STANSELL, ]

]

Plaintiff, ]

]

v. ] 2:18-cv-00762-ACA

]

SHEFFIELD GROUP, INC., ]

]

Defendant. ]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant Sheffield Group, Inc.’s (“Sheffield”) motion for 

summary judgment. (Doc. 28).

Plaintiff Cynthia Stansell worked as an audit assistant at Sheffield for ten 

years. In 2016, she unexpectedly had to take eight work days of medical leave. An 

hour and a half after she returned to work, Sheffield terminated her employment. 

Ms. Stansell alleges that the termination was motivated by her disability and by her 

request for medical leave, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“Count One”), and 

the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (“Count Two”). Sheffield responds 

that it fired her because, on the first day of her leave, her manager discovered what 

he believed to be gross neglect of her work. 

FILED

 2020 Feb-05 AM 08:52

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:18-cv-00762-ACA Document 37 Filed 02/05/20 Page 1 of 17
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Although there are disputes of fact about whether Ms. Stansell was actually 

behind in her work, she has not presented any evidence creating a genuine dispute 

of fact about whether Sheffield believed that she had neglected her work, nor has 

she presented any evidence that Sheffield denied her any of the leave that she 

requested. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Sheffield’s motion for summary 

judgment and WILL ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT in favor of Sheffield and 

against Ms. Stansell on all of her claims.

I. BACKGROUND

On a motion for summary judgment, the court “draw[s] all inferences and 

review[s] all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(quotation marks omitted). 

Sheffield provides workers’ compensation insurance to employers, who 

become “members” of the Sheffield Fund. (Doc. 29-1 at 18; Doc. 29-29 at 2 ¶ 2). 

As of 2016, the Sheffield Fund had 9,000 members. (Doc. 29-1 at 18). Every year, 

Sheffield conducts an audit of all of its members to determine what premium it 

should charge each member in the coming year. (Id.; Doc. 29-15 at 7). The audit 

requires the members to submit information and documentation about the number of 

employees and their wages. (Doc. 29-1 at 18). 

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Sheffield is required to complete the audit by June 30. (Doc. 29-1 at 19; Doc. 

29-29 at 2 ¶ 3). To accomplish that goal, in early January the audit department sends 

out an “audit request letter” to each member of the Fund, asking for the information 

and documentation that Sheffield needs. (Doc. 29-1 at 18, 22–23; Doc. 29-15 at 18). 

Members must respond by April 15. (Doc. 29-1 at 19; Doc. 29-15 at 18). If a 

member does not respond by April 15, the audit department sends a second audit 

request, with a new deadline in the first week of May. (Doc. 29-15 at 18).

In 2016, the audit department employed one audit assistant—Ms. Stansell. 

(Doc. 29-1 at 19). Ms. Stansell’s job as audit assistant was to review each audit as 

it came in. (Id.). If the audit contained all the information Sheffield needed, 

Ms. Stansell would place the complete audit on the “audit shelf,” so that the auditors 

knew to pick up the file and begin working on it.1

 (Id. at 20–21, 27). 

If an audit was incomplete, Ms. Sheffield would send the member, either by 

letter or by email, what is known as a “tax doc letter,” informing them of the 

1 In her brief, Ms. Stansell disputes the fact that completed audits were stored on the audit 

shelf. (See Doc. 35 at 5 ¶ 18). Even assuming this is a material fact, Ms. Stansell herself testified 

that she put complete audits on the shelf. (Doc. 29-1 at 20). Ms. Stansell later executed an affidavit 

in which she attested that large audits “had to be stacked on [her] desk until the member complied 

to the request letters or the audit was ready to give to Chris Monroe for review.” (Doc. 34-9 at 4 

¶ 17). That statement clearly relates to incomplete audits awaiting further information or 

documentation from the member, not complete audits that are ready for an auditor’s review. 

Similarly, Ms. Stansell attests that Mr. Monroe told her “not to put audits on the shelf until 

all documents were received and included from the members.” (Doc. 34-9 at 4 ¶ 19). That 

testimony indicates only that Mr. Monroe told Ms. Stansell not to put incomplete audits on the 

audit shelf, which was reserved for complete audits. Accordingly, the fact that Ms. Sheffield was 

required to place complete audits on the “audit shelf” is not disputed.

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additional information or documentation that Sheffield needed. (Id. at 20–21). Tax 

doc letters are not the same as audit requests; audit requests are sent in the beginning 

of January with an April deadline and, if the member misses the April deadline, in 

mid-April with an early May deadline. (Doc. 29-15 at 18–19). Tax doc letters 

should be sent as soon as a member submits an incomplete audit. (Id. at 19).

When Ms. Stansell was the audit assistant, the tax doc letter gave the member 

two or three weeks to respond. (Doc. 29-1 at 21). If the member failed to respond, 

Ms. Stansell would send a second tax doc letter. (Id.). If the member did not respond 

in full to the second tax doc letter, Ms. Stansell would send a final tax doc letter. 

(Id.). 

Ms. Sheffield testified that when she had an incomplete audit waiting for a 

response from the member, she would place the file on a “tax document letter shelf,” 

unless she had sent the tax doc letter by email. (Doc. 29-1 at 29, 32–33). If she had 

sent an email, she would print a copy of the email to keep with the incomplete audit, 

which she would store on her desk. (Id. at 33–34). Ms. Stansell submitted two 

pictures of her desk (docs. 34-10, 34-11), which she testified she had taken at some 

time in April 2016 (doc. 29-1 at 34, 36–37). The pictures show several large stacks 

of documents. (Docs. 34-10, 34-11). Ms. Stansell has labeled the pictures to show 

that several of the stacks are audits waiting to be reviewed for completeness, or 

incomplete audits awaiting a response to a tax doc letter. (Docs. 34-10, 34-11).

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Ms. Stansell was supposed to review every audit as it was received to 

determine whether Sheffield needed to send a tax doc letter. (Doc. 29-1 at 38). 

Ms. Sheffield testified that sometimes it could take “several days” to review all of 

the audits and determine whether she needed to send tax doc letters. (Id.; see also 

id. at 32). 

If the member never responded with all the required information and 

documentation, Ms. Stansell would give the incomplete file to her supervisor, Chris 

Monroe. (Doc. 29-1 at 16, 22). Mr. Monroe would have to decide whether to “close 

out” the member’s account (in other words, decline to renew the member’s policy 

with Sheffield) or estimate the premium due based on the information and 

documentation available. (Id. at 22). 

From 2006 until 2014, Ms. Stansell had employee performance evaluations in 

the “very good” or “exceeds expectations” ranges. (Doc. 29-2 at 40–84). Although 

Ms. Stansell received high marks in the “quantity of work” section of her evaluations 

from 2007 to 2014, a recurring theme was the need to continue increasing the 

quantity of completed audits. (Id. at 44–45, 49, 54, 56, 59, 63, 67, 73, 76). 

In 2015, Ms. Stansell received a “meets expectations” evaluation for her work 

in the audit department. (Id. at 82–84). Her evaluator, Mr. Monroe, noted that “[w]e 

need to make sure to stay on top of tax doc letters to make sure info is coming in 

before audit deadline”; “[a]gain, we just need to make sure we do a better job of 

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staying on members to get info in before deadline”; and “[w]e will need to improve 

the system going forward to keep track of when info is requested and when a second 

request is needed.” (Id. at 83). Mr. Monroe concluded that, “[a]s we talked about a 

few weeks ago, [w]e will need to have a plan in place to make sure we are requesting 

tax docs more regularly. This will cut down on the estimated and close outs that are 

given to me at the end of June.” (Id. at 84; see also Doc. 29-15 at 65–66). 

Ms. Stansell denies having the conversation Mr. Monroe referenced in the 

evaluation. (Doc. 34-9 at 3 ¶ 15).

On May 4, 2016—around the final deadline for members to respond to the 

“audit request” letters—Ms. Stansell called in sick because she had to go to the 

emergency room for kidney stones. (Doc. 34-9 at 3 ¶¶ 7–8). On May 10, 

Ms. Stansell had surgery relating to the kidney stones, and she returned to work on 

May 18. (Doc. 29-1 at 29). She testified that while she was on leave, no one from 

Sheffield contacted her about taking leave or discussed the FMLA with her. (Doc. 

34-9 at 3 ¶¶ 10–11).

Mr. Monroe attested that when Ms. Stansell began her medical leave, he 

checked her work station and found “multiple stacks of incomplete paperwork on 

and around [her] desk with no labels, some of which dated back to at least February 

2016.” (Doc. 29-29 at 3 ¶ 6). As a result, he called in all four of Sheffield’s auditors 

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and instructed them to stop their regular work and begin processing the audits on 

and around Ms. Stansell’s desk. (Id. at 3 ¶ 7). 

Three of the auditors testified that they found audits dating back to January 

and February for which it appeared Ms. Stansell had not sent tax doc letters or 

emails. (Doc. 29-26 at 15; Doc. 29-27 at 13; Doc. 29-28 at 12, 16, 19). The auditors 

and Mr. Monroe testified that they spent between five and seven working days 

catching Ms. Stansell’s work up, during which time they did not do any of their own 

work. (Doc. 29-15 at 21; Doc. 29-26 at 12, 22; Doc. 29-27 at 12–13; Doc. 29-28 at 

15, 23, 28). Several of them testified that they did not believe one person could have 

completed all of the work on Ms. Stansell’s desk by the June 30 deadline. (Doc. 29-

15 at 26; Doc. 29-26 at 18; Doc. 29-28 at 28–29). The audit department sent between 

250 and 300 tax doc letters on Ms. Stansell’s behalf during her absence. (Doc. 29-

15 at 17; Doc. 29-26 at 12). 

Ms. Stansell testified that when she left work on May 3, she had completed 

all of her work and the incomplete audits were labeled and organized in her cubicle. 

(Doc. 29-1 at 31–32; Doc. 34-9 at 4 ¶ 20). She posits that the incomplete work on 

her desk may have been audits that Sheffield received after she went on leave, 

because Sheffield routinely received a large volume of mail right around the May 

deadline to submit audits. (Doc. 35 at 24; see Doc. 34-9 at 4–5 ¶¶ 18, 24; see also 

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Doc. 29-28 at 9–11). She testified that she could have completed all of her work by 

the June 30 deadline. (Doc. 34-9 at 4 ¶ 22). 

On May 4 or 5—very shortly after Ms. Stansell went out on leave, and while 

the rest of the audit department was working on the files found on her desk—

Mr. Monroe recommended to the president of Sheffield that the company terminate 

Ms. Stansell’s employment. (Doc. 29-15 at 14; see Doc. 29-1 at 23). The president 

agreed with that recommendation. (Doc. 29-15 at 17; Doc. 34-7 at 15, 18). Before 

Ms. Stansell returned to work, Mr. Monroe wrote a note for her personnel file setting 

out the rationale behind the decision to fire her as neglect of her work. (Doc. 29-3 

at 3). 

Ms. Stansell returned to work on May 18. (Doc. 34-9 at 5 ¶ 23). After an 

hour and a half, she had a meeting with Mr. Monroe at which he told her that 

Sheffield no longer required her services and terminated her employment. (Doc. 29-

1 at 30).

II. DISCUSSION

Ms. Stansell asserts that her termination violated the ADA and that it 

constitutes FMLA interference and retaliation. (See Doc. 1 at 6–13; Doc. 35 at 22–

28). Because the analysis is the same for the ADA and the FMLA retaliation claims, 

the court will address those claims together first, and conclude by addressing the 

FMLA interference claim.

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1. The ADA and FMLA Retaliation Claims

In Count One, Ms. Stansell asserts that her termination was discrimination 

based on her disability, in violation of the ADA. (Doc. 1 at 6–9). In Count Two, 

Ms. Stansell asserts in part that her termination was retaliation for taking FMLA 

leave. (Id. at 10–13).

The ADA prohibits “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the 

basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, 

or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 

conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 

The FMLA permits eligible employees to take a certain amount of leave per 

year “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to 

perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 

It also prohibits retaliation against an employee for engaging in a practice protected 

by the FMLA. Id. § 2615(a)(1), (a)(2); see also Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer 

Bd. of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001). To establish an 

FMLA retaliation claim, an employee must show “that [her] employer’s actions were 

motivated by an impermissible retaliatory or discriminatory animus.” Strickland, 

239 F.3d at 1207.

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In the absence of direct evidence, courts analyze claims of discrimination in 

violation of the ADA and retaliation in violation of the FMLA under the burdenshifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973). See Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207 (FMLA retaliation claims); Farley v. 

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1333 (11th Cir. 1999) (ADA 

discrimination claims). Under that test, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination or retaliation, creating a rebuttable presumption that the 

employer acted unlawfully. Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207; Farley, 197 F.3d at 1336.

In this case, the court will assume that Ms. Stansell has established the prima facie

case.2

2 Sheffield argues that Ms. Stansell cannot establish a prima facie case of ADA 

discrimination because it has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination. 

(Doc. 30 at 16). The existence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason does not affect whether 

Ms. Stansell can establish a prima facie case of discrimination; those are two separate aspects of 

the McDonnell Douglas test.

Sheffield also argues that Ms. Stansell’s ADA discrimination claim fails as a matter of law 

because she cannot establish that she is disabled as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). (Doc. 30 

at 29–31). Ms. Stansell disputes that argument. (See Doc. 35 at 27). Even if the court accepted 

Sheffield’s argument that she is not disabled under § 12102(1), Sheffield has not addressed an 

alternative definition of disabled under the statute: a plaintiff who the employer regards as 

disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). The court declines to sua sponte address whether Ms. Stansell 

qualifies as a disabled person under every definition of “disabled” provided by the ADA, and will 

assume that she meets the requirement of establishing that she is disabled for purposes of the ADA. 

Finally, Sheffield argues that Ms. Stansell cannot establish a prima facie case of ADA 

discrimination because she never requested an accommodation on account of her alleged disability. 

(Doc. 30 at 27–29). Ms. Stansell concedes that she never requested an accommodation. (Doc. 35 

at 8 ¶ 41). However, Eleventh Circuit caselaw permits a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case 

without showing that she requested an accommodation. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 

F.3d 1247, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2007) (“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the 

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Next, the burden shifts to the employer to “articulat[e] a legitimate 

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment decision.” Farley, 197 

F.3d at 1336. If the employer can satisfy its burden, then the plaintiff must offer 

evidence that the reason proffered was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Id.. 

To establish that a reason was pretextual, the plaintiff must present evidence that 

“the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor 

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993); Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. 

Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007).

Sheffield’s articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 

Ms. Stansell’s termination is that it believed that she had grossly neglected her duties 

before she went on medical leave, although it discovered that neglect only after she 

went on leave. (Doc. 30 at 17–24, 37). Even taken in the light most favorable to 

Ms. Stansell, the evidence establishes that after she called in sick on May 4, 

Mr. Monroe went by her desk and found what he believed were multiple stacks of 

incomplete audits for which Ms. Stansell had not sent tax doc letters. (Doc. 29-29 

at 3 ¶ 6). As a result, he ordered the entire audit department to stop their work and 

focus on completing all the paperwork on Ms. Stansell’s desk, which took them at 

ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is disabled; (2) he is a qualified individual; and (3) he was 

subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his disability.”). 

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least five full working days. (Doc. 29-15 at 21; Doc. 29-26 at 12, 22; Doc. 29-27 at 

12–13; Doc. 29-28 at 15, 23, 28; Doc. 29-29 at 3 ¶ 7). 

The undisputed evidence that Sheffield believed Ms. Stansell had neglected 

her work is sufficient to satisfy the employer’s burden under the McDonnell Douglas 

test. See Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The factual issue 

to be resolved [at the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason prong of the McDonnell 

Douglas test] is not the wisdom or accuracy of [the employer]’s conclusion that [the 

plaintiff] was an unsatisfactory employee. [The court is] not interested in whether 

the conclusion is a correct one, but whether it is an honest one.”). Accordingly, the 

burden shifts back to Ms. Stansell to present evidence creating a genuine dispute of 

material fact about whether that articulated reason was pretext for discrimination or 

retaliation.

Ms. Stansell contends that she has presented evidence of pretext because: 

(1) she was not, in fact, behind on her work and would have been able to complete 

all of the audit files by Sheffield’s deadline; (2) three other employees who 

“committed performance or policy violations and did not request medical leave were 

not terminated”; (3) Sheffield attempted to deny her unemployment compensation; 

and (4) only one and a half hours elapsed between her return to work and her 

termination. (Doc. 35 at 23–24, 28).

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“[T]he fact that [Ms. Stansell] thinks more highly of her performance than her 

employer does is beside the point. The inquiry into pretext centers on the employer’s 

beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists 

outside of the decision maker’s head.” Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 

F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). As stated above, the undisputed evidence shows 

that Mr. Monroe believed Ms. Stansell had neglected her work, and based on that 

belief he recommended terminating her employment, a recommendation that the 

decisionmaker adopted. (Doc. 29-15 at 14, 17; Doc. 34-7 at 15, 18). Ms. Stansell 

has not created a genuine dispute of material fact about the truth of Mr. Monroe and 

the decisionmaker’s belief in her neglect.

Ms. Stansell’s argument about the three employees who were disciplined but 

never requested medical leave appears to be an argument that Ms. Stansell had 

comparators, which is usually a part of the prima facie case. See Lewis v. City of 

Union City, Ga.,, 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“[W]e hold . . . 

that a meaningful comparator analysis must be conducted at the prima facie stage of 

McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework, and should not be moved to the 

pretext stage.”) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). However, if a plaintiff can 

establish proper comparators, the court can consider that evidence at the pretext 

stage as well as the prima facie stage. See Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 

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F.3d 913, 921 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Evidence already introduced to establish the prima 

facie case may be considered [at the pretext stage].”). 

In this case, Ms. Stansell’s purported comparator evidence does not create a 

genuine dispute of fact about whether the termination was pretextual because

Ms. Stansell has not established how the three comparators she identifies in her brief 

are “similarly situated [to her] in all material respects.” See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227–

28. Even if some other Sheffield employees were disciplined for violations of 

performance standards of company policies, Sheffield’s decision not to terminate 

them does not show that its decision to terminate Ms. Stansell was pretextual.

With respect to Ms. Stansell’s argument about the denial of unemployment 

compensation, even if true, opposing the payment of unemployment compensation

would not establish that Sheffield’s reason for terminating her employment was 

disability discrimination or retaliation for using FMLA leave. That evidence does 

not even hint at a different (prohibited) motive for her termination.

And finally, the temporal proximity between Ms. Stansell’s return to work 

and her termination cannot alone serve as evidence of pretext sufficient to withstand 

a motion for summary judgment. Cf. Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 

439 F.3d 1286, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that a two week delay between the 

employee’s request for leave and his termination “is evidence of pretext, though 

probably insufficient to establish pretext by itself,” but holding that the plaintiff had 

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presented evidence of pretext when considering the close temporal proximity in 

connection with evidence of the employer’s “failure to articulate clearly and 

consistently the reason for an employee’s discharge” and a “deviation from [the 

employer’s] own standard procedures”). 

Because Ms. Stansell has not created a genuine dispute of material fact about 

whether Sheffield’s articulated reason for her termination was pretext for either 

discrimination under the ADA or retaliation under the FMLA, the court GRANTS

Sheffield’s motion for summary judgment on those claims.

2. The FMLA Interference Claim

As an initial matter, it is not clear that Ms. Stansell’s complaint actually 

asserts a claim of FMLA interference. In her FMLA claim, Ms. Stansell describes 

the same factual basis as her claim under the ADA and asserts that Sheffield fired 

her because she took leave. (See generally Doc. 1 at 10–12). An FMLA interference 

claim, however, requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the 

evidence that [she] was entitled to the benefit denied.” Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1206–

07; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The complaint does not state that Ms. Stansell 

was denied any benefit under the FMLA; only that Sheffield retaliated against her 

for taking medical leave. But even assuming that Ms. Stansell’s complaint can be 

read to assert a claim of FMLA interference, Ms. Stansell has not presented any 

evidence that Sheffield denied her request for leave. To the contrary, the undisputed 

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evidence is that Sheffield allowed Ms. Stansell to finish her medical leave before it 

terminated her employment. 

In her brief in opposition to summary judgment, Ms. Stansell argues that 

Sheffield’s failure to notify her that she qualified for FMLA was a “per se violation 

of the FMLA” (doc. 35 at 21), apparently because the lack of notification 

discouraged her from using FMLA leave on other occasions (see id. at 22). Even 

assuming that lack of notification of coverage under the FMLA constitutes a valid 

FMLA interference claim—which it does not—Ms. Stansell did not raise that claim 

in her complaint, and “[a] plaintiff may not amend her complaint through argument 

in a brief opposing summary judgment.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 

F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Chavis v. Clayton Cty. Sch. Dist., 300 

F.3d 1288, 1291 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002).

Because Ms. Stansell has not presented any evidence creating a dispute of 

material fact about whether Sheffield interfered with her rights under the FMLA, the 

court GRANTS Sheffield’s motion for summary judgment on the claim of FMLA 

interference.

III. CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS Sheffield’s motion for summary judgment and WILL 

ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT in favor of Sheffield and against Ms. Stansell 

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on all of her claims. The court will enter a separate final judgment in accordance 

with this opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this February 5, 2020.

 _________________________________

 ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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