Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-02731/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-02731-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KENYUANA MICHELLE EDWARDS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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CASE NO. 2:12-CV-2731-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Kenyuana Michelle Edwards brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying her application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits [“DIB”].

(Doc. 6.) Upon review of the record and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that the 1

Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Edwards initially filed an application for DIB on June 20, 2007, (doc. 5-4 at 2;

r. 86), alleging a disability onset date of May 25, 2006 due to Pericardial Effusion and Major

Depression, (doc. 5-6 at 17; r. 165). After the Social SecurityAdministration [“SSA”] denied

her application, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge [“ALJ”], which

Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each 1

document as it is filed in the court’s record. When the document cited is duplicated in the

bound physical copy ofthe transcript of the entire record of the proceedings, the page number

of that transcript is also included, [“Doc. ___; r ___.”].

FILED

 2014 Mar-10 PM 02:42

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:12-cv-02731-SLB Document 8 Filed 03/10/14 Page 1 of 16
was held on May 24, 2010. (Doc. 5-3 at 23; r. 22.) After the hearing, the ALJ found that

plaintiff did not have an impairment or a combination or impairments listed in, or medically

equivalent to one listed in, the Listings of Impairments. (Doc. 5-3 at 36; r. 35); see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(d). The ALJ also found that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to

perform work-related activities at the sedentary level of physical exertion, (doc. 5-3 at 38;

r. 37), and that there are jobs in the national economy that would accommodate plaintiff’s

limitations, (doc. 5-3 at 40; r. 39). In light of these findings, the ALJ denied Ms. Edwards’s

request for a period of disability and DIB on July 12, 2010. (Doc. 5-3 at 41-42; r. 40-41.)

Plaintiff then requested the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 5-3

at 2; r. 1.) The Appeals Council found no reason under its rules to review the ALJ’s

decision, and it denied her request for review. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision is the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Id.)

Following denial of review by the Appeals Council, Ms. Edwards filed an appeal in

this court. (Doc. 1.) She requests that this court reverse the Commissioner’s decision or, in

the alternative, remand the case for further consideration. (Doc. 6 at 14-15.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, this court “is limited to an

inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the

Commissioner, and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Barnhart,

284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir.

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1988). The court gives deference to factual findings and reviews questions of law de novo. 

Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). The court “may not decide the

facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that ofthe [Commissioner],

rather [it] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529

(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))

(internal quotations and other citation omitted). “The Commissioner’s factual findings are

conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (citing Martin,

894 F.2d at 1529; Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)). “Substantial

evidence” is “more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person

would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631

F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The court reviews the Commissioner’s conclusions of law de novo. Cornelius, 936

F.2d at 1145. “No . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] conclusions

of law.” Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION

The regulations require the Commissioner to follow a five-step sequential evaluation

to determine whether a claimant is eligible for a period of disability and/or DIB. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1)-(2); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1)-(2); Bowen v. City of New York, 476

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U.S. 467, 470 (1986). “[A]n individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of

[determining eligibility for DIB] if [she] is unable to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i); see also § 416(i)(1);

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The specific steps in the evaluation process are as follows:

1. Substantial Gainful Employment

First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in

“substantial gainful activity.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). If the claimant 2

is working and that work is substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner will find that the

claimant is not disabled, regardless of the claimant’s medical condition or her age, education,

and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); § 416.920(b). “Under the first step, the

claimant has the burden to show that she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 and § 416.972 define “substantial gainful activity”: 2

(a) Substantial work activity. Substantial work activity is work activity that

involves doing significant physical or mental activities. Your work may be

substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis or if you do less, get paid less,

or have less responsibility than when you worked before.

(b) Gainful work activity. Gainful work activity is work activity that you do

for pay or profit. Work activity is gainful if it is the kind of work usually done

for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.

(c) Some other activities. Generally, we do not consider activities like taking

care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school attendance, club

activities, or social programs to be substantial gainful activity.

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activity.” Reynolds-Buckley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir.

2012).3

The ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the

alleged onset date. (Doc. 5-3 at 40; r. 39.)

2. Severe Impairments

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must

next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of

impairments that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic

work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). “[A] ‘physical

or mental impairment’ is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratorydiagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3); § 1382c(a)(3)(D). The regulations

provide: “[I]f you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which

significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find

that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not

consider your age, education, and work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); § 416.920(c). 

“An impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has

Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be 3

unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are

not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.

R. 36-2 (emphasis added).

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such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the

individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.” Brady v.

Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a); § 416.921(a). 

A claimant may be found disabled based on a combination of impairments even though none

of the individual impairments alone are disabling. Walker v. Brown, 826 F.2d 996, 1001

(11th Cir. 1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; § 416.923. A claimant has the burden to

show that she has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Reynolds-Buckley,

457 F. App’x at 863.

The ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “status post

injuries from a motorcycle accident in 2006, headaches, depression, low back pain with

radiculopathy, and status post surgical treatment of the left knee.” (Doc. 5-3 at 40; r. 39.) The

ALJ also found that her alleged impairments of pericardial effusion and obesity were not

severe. (Doc. 5-3 at 36; r. 35.)

3. The Listings

If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must then determine

whether the claimant’s impairment meets the duration requirement and whether it is

equivalent to any one of the listed impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e);

§ 404.1525; § 404.1526. Listed impairments are so severe that they prevent an individual

from performing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); see 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 [The Listings]. If the claimant’s impairment meets or

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equals a Listing, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled, regardless of the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); § 416.920(d). 

The claimant has the burden of proving that her impairment meets or equals the criteria

contained in one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at 863.

The ALJ found that Ms. Edwards did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or medically equaled a Listing. (Doc. 5-3 at 40; r. 39.)

4. Residual Functional Capacity and Past Relevant Work 

If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria of a Listing, the claimant must

prove that her impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f); § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (f). At step four, the Commissioner

“will first compare [the Commission’s] assessment of [the claimant’s] residual functional

capacity [“RFC”] with the physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant

work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b); § 416.960(b). “Past relevant work is work that [the

claimant has] done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that

lasted long enough for [her] to learn to do it.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1); § 416.960(b)(1).

If the claimant is capable of performing his past relevant work, the Commissioner will find

he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(3); § 416.920(f). The claimant bears the burden

of establishing that the impairment prevents her from performing past work. 

Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at 863.

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The ALJ found that plaintiff could not perform any of her past relevant work. (Doc.

5-3 at 41 ¶ 7; r. 40.)

5. Other Work in the National Economy

If the claimant establishes that she is unable to perform her past relevant work, the

Commissioner must show that the claimant—in light of her RFC, age, education, and work

experience—is capable of performing other work that exists in substantial numbers in the

national economy. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at 863; see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(c)(1); § 416.920(g). The regulations provide:

If we find that your residual functional capacity does not enable you to do any

of your past relevant work . . . we will use the same residual functional

capacity assessment when we decide if you can adjust to any other work. We

will look at your ability to adjust to other work by considering your residual

functional capacity and the vocational factors of age, education, and work

experience . . . . Any other work (jobs) that you can adjust to must exist in

significant numbers in the national economy (either in the region where you

live or in several regions in the country). 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1); § 416.960(c)(1). If the claimant is not capable of performing

such other work, the Commissioner must find the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(g); § 416.920(g). 

The ALJ found that plaintiff is a younger individual (32 years old) with high school

and two years of college education and transferrable skills fromher past relevant work. (Doc.

5-3 at 41; r. 40.) The ALJ found that plaintiff could “perform sedentary work which allows

for a sit/stand option and use of a cane for balance,” although “[s]he would be restricted to

performing simple, repetitive, noncomplex work tasks” and “occasional bending and

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stooping.” She could not reach “unrestricted heights” or perform“push/pull movements with

[her] lower extremities” or operate hazardous machinery. Lastly: “no driving.” (Id.) 

The ALJ consulted a Vocational Expert [VE] to determine whether any jobs exist in

the national economy that plaintiff, considering her RFC and her vocational factors, could

perform. The VE testified that an individual with Ms. Edwards’s limitations and vocational

factors could perform the jobs of dowel inspector, cuff folder, and nut sorter type jobs. (Doc.

5-3 at 40; r. 39.) These jobs exist in significant numbers in Alabama and in the national

economy. (Id.) The ALJ found that if she complied with her RFC, “her pain and depression

are expected to reasonably impose no greater than mild to moderate functional limitations

upon her ability to perform basic work activities.” (Doc. 5-3 at 39; r. 38.) Therefore, the ALJ

found that plaintiff was not disabled.

B. MS. EDWARDS’S CLAIM

Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from depression and has migraines/headaches, back

pain, coccyx pain, and left shoulder pain associated with the motorcycle accident. (Doc. 6 at

4-5 (citing doc. 5-10 at 105-09; r. 545-549).) She also has pain in her left knee. (Doc. 6 at 6

(citing doc. 5-13 at 44-45; r. 734-35).) Plaintiff’s first argument is that the ALJ did not give

proper weight to the opinion of one of her treating physicians, Dr. Hakim. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c)(2) provides: “If we find that a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the

nature and severity of your impairments is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical

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and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial

evidence in your case record, we will give it controlling weight.” 

Here, however, the ALJ did not find Dr. Hakim’s opinion so supported or consistent,

and therefore decided not to give his opinion controlling weight. (Doc. 5-3 at 37; r. 36.) The 4

ALJ determined that reports from plaintiff’s other treating and consulting physicians

indicated that plaintiff’s condition was more mild than she and Dr. Hakim considered it to

be. The ALJ described in detail the medical source statement from Dr. Romeo’s evaluation

of plaintiff, which concluded that plaintiff “was able to sit, stand and walk for 8 hours each

total in an 8-hour work day” and could perform a variety of motor skill-based activities.

(Doc. 5-3 at 34; r. 33.) The ALJ also found Dr. Hakim’s conclusion (that plaintiff’s condition

was moderately severe) inconsistent with his conclusion that she could “lift and/or carry 20

pounds occasionally; sit 3 hours, stand and walk (combined) 2 hours total, and that her

prescribed medications would not create serious problems in most instances.” (Doc. 5-3 at

37; r. 36.) Plaintiff’s daily activities also undermined her assertion of the severity of her

condition. (Id.) Perhaps the ALJ’s biggest concern, however, was that Dr. Hakim’s

conclusions were “primarily based on [plaintiff’s] less than fully credible, subjective

The regulations provide that even when a treating physician’s medical opinion is not 4

entitled to controlling weight, it is still entitled to significant weight. See 20 C.F.R.

404.1527(c)(2)(i). However, the distinction becomes murky, since the more the ALJ finds

that the opinion is inconsistent and unsupported (and thus not controlling), the less

convincing the opinion will be to begin with. In cases where the medicallyacceptable clinical

and laboratory diagnostic techniques yield little objective medical evidence of impairment,

the weighing scheme tends to merge with the multi-factor inquiry evaluating pain. 

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assertions.” (Doc. 5-3 at 37-38; r. 36-37.) This raises plaintiff’s second argument, that the

ALJ improperly discredited plaintiff’s subjective testimony based on her daily activities.

(Doc. 6 at 11.)

As symptoms, rather than “medically determinable physical or mental impairments,”

pain and fatigue are by definition “an individual’s own description of his or her physical or

mental impairment.” SSR 96-7p. “[S]ymptoms, such as pain, are subjective and difficult to

quantify . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3). A doctor’s note saying that a patient is

experiencing pain does not transform that pain into a tumor or a virus. Pain doesn’t show up

in an x-ray or a blood sample—that is partly why the field of medicine reveres the

relationship between a doctor and a patient. But that is also why the SSA issued SSR 96-7p.

Contraryto plaintiff’s argument, which apparentlyrequires the ALJ to take “the doctor’s own

professional assessment” at face value, (doc. 6 at 10), the ALJ correctly relied on SSR 96-7p

to evaluate the functional effect of plaintiff’s pain. 

SSR 96-7p explains the two step process set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and

§ 416.929: “First, the adjudicator must consider whether there is an underlying medically

determinable physical or mental impairment—i.e., an impairment(s) that can be shown by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques—that could reasonably

be expected to produce the individual’s pain or other symptoms.” This determination does

not consider the “intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of the individual’s

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symptoms.” The ALJ found that plaintiff “experiences underlying impairments capable of

producing some pain and limitations . . . .” (Doc. 5-3 at 36; r. 35.) 

The question remains: how much is “some?” If the ALJ finds that the claimant meets

the first step, then 

the adjudicator must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of

the individual’s symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit

the individual’s ability to do basic work activities. For this purpose, whenever

the individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally

limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by objective

medical evidence, the adjudicator must make a finding on the credibility of the

individual’s statements based on a consideration of the entire case record.

 SSR 96-7p. 

Defining “objective medical evidence” is helpful because the evidence is powerful.

This is the sort of evidence that can make a treating physician’s opinion controlling. It can

make a finding on credibility unnecessary. It is “obtained from the application of medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, such as evidence of reduced joint

motion, muscle spasm, sensorydeficit ormotor disruption.” § 416.929(c)(2); 404.1529(c)(2).

“Objective medical evidence” comes in two forms: medical signs and laboratory findings.

6 SOCIAL SECURITY LAW AND PRACTICE § 36.18. “Medical signs are anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be observed apartfromsymptoms.”

Id. (emphasis added). “Laboratory findings are anatomical, physiological, or psychological

phenomena” which appear in things like “chemical tests” or “x-rays.” Id. 

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The ALJ found that objective medical evidence did not substantiate plaintiff’s

“alleged inability to perform all substantial gainful activities” because of her pain. (Doc. 5-3

at 36-37; r. 35-36.) The ALJ relied in part on the lack of medical signs in Dr. Romeo’s report.

Dr. Romeo found that plaintiff’s ranges of motion and gait were normal and that she had no

deformities or abnormalities. (Doc. 5-3 at 33; r. 32.) The ALJ also found that the laboratory

findings were negative: CT scans, electrodiagnostic imaging, MRI of the brain, neck, lumbar

region, cervical spine, x-rays, and EMGs were all normal. (Doc. 5-3 at 37; r. 36.)

That leaves the plaintiff’s proof of the functional effects of her pain dependent on

“other evidence.” This is the catchall provision under which the SSA will “take[] into

account” almost any piece of evidence, but will not award any one piece controlling weight.

The evidence comes from the claimant, his or her treating or nontreating sources, and other

reports. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3). But “whenever the individual’s statements about the

intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not

substantiated byobjective medical evidence, the [ALJ] must make a finding on the credibility

of the individual’s statements . . . .” SSR 96-7p. In assessing the credibility of the claimant’s

statements about her symptoms and their effects, the ALJ considers: 

1. The individual's daily activities; 

2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the individual's pain or

other symptoms; 

3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 

4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the

individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; 

5. Treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or has received for

relief of pain or other symptoms; 

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6. Anymeasures other than treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve

pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to

20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and 

7. Any other factors concerning the individual's functional limitations and

restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

SSR 96-7p; see also 20 C.F.R. 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vii); 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii).

Most of the ALJ’s analysis focuses on the absence of objective medical evidence

corroborating the alleged effects of plaintiff’s pain. If that were all the ALJ relied upon, he

would have run afoul of the SSA’s regulations and policy interpretations discussed above,

and probably Eleventh Circuit precedent as well. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208,

1211-1212 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing but distinguishing an unpublished case in which the

court reversed an ALJ decision for relying solely on a “lack of corroborative objective

findings of impairment” when the plaintiff claimed her fibromyalgia debilitated her).

However, the ALJ in this case also relied on “[a] medical source statement in July 2009 [that]

was reflective of the ability to perform medium work activity,” (doc. 5-3 at 33, 37; r. 32, 36),

the improvement that she exhibited in coping with her depression on psychotropic

medication, (doc. 5-3 at 38; r. 37), and her “self-reported activities of daily living,” (doc. 5-3

at 37; r. 36). In Moore, the court recognized two points relevant to this case: “credibility

determinations are the province of the ALJ,” and “inconsistencies between [the plaintiff’s]

descriptions of her diverse daily activities and her claims of infirmity” are proper bases for

discrediting a claimant. Moore, 405 F.3d 1212. Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s activities

of “cooking, shopping, doing housework and laundry, reading, working on crossword

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puzzles, watching television, taking care of her son, visiting with family, going to church,

and driving,” (doc. 5-3 at 37; r. 36 (citing doc. 5-7 at 17-21; r. 187-191 (Ex. “3E”))) (see also

doc. 5-7 at 34-39; r. 204-209), undermined her “assertions of disabling pain and limitations.”

While that sentence glosses over the difficulty plaintiffsometimes has doing these activities,

and certain activities are not inconsistent even with a bedridden person (watching television,

reading, working on crossword puzzles), plaintiff’s description of her daily activities is

consistent with her sedentary RFC. The ALJ also cites “medical records,” (doc. 5-3 at 37;

r. 36 (citing doc. 5-9 at 83-87; r. 421-425 (“Ex. 10F”))), in which an examining physician

“was concerned that patient’s effort . . . was poor” and noted the inconsistency between

plaintiff’s poor performance in a hip flexion exam and plaintiff’s ability “to walk down the

hall with a very mildly abnormal gait,” (doc. 5-9 at 87; r. 425). Therefore, the ALJ’s

conclusion that “plaintiff’s allegations regarding her limitations were not totally credible”

was based on substantial evidence. (Doc. 5-3 at 41; r. 40.)

Even though the ALJ found plaintiff’s and Dr. Hakim’s statements less than

persuasive in evaluating the functional effects of plaintiff’s pain, the ALJ did not, as

plaintiff’s brief puts it, “dismiss [the evidence] out of hand.” (Doc. 6 at 10.) The chief report

upon which the ALJ relied in forming his RFC was Dr. Romeo’s, which would have called

for an RFC that allowed for medium work. The ALJ’s RFC allowed for plaintiff to do

simple, sedentary work.

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have recontacted Dr. Hakimto more fullydevelop

the record, (doc. 6 at 10), but because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination

that plaintiff was not disabled, the ALJ did not err in failing to recontact Dr. Hakim. The

following passage is instructive:

First, the ALJ did not err by failing to recontact Dr. Abdulla for clarification

of his report. As discussed above, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's

determination that [plaintiff] was not disabled, and that decision was supported

by other treating physicians . . . . [T]here was no need for additional

information or clarification. In any event, [plaintiff] had the burden of

producing evidence in support of his claim and was represented by counsel,

who neither requested a clarification nor objected that the medical records

were inadequate.

Osborn v. Barnhart, 194 F. App’x 654, 668-69 (11th Cir. 2006).

Based on the record as a whole, the court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Ms.

Edwards is capable of performing a limited range of sedentary work is supported by

substantial evidence. Therefore, the decision of the ALJ, as adopted by the Commissioner,

denying Ms. Edwards’s claim for a period of disability and DIB is due to be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner is due to be

affirmed. An Order affirming the decision of the Commissioner will be entered

contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.

DONE this 10th day of March, 2014.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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