Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05007/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05007-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE

OF THE WAL-MART STORES, INC.

ASSOCIATES’ HEALTH AND 

WELFARE PLAN PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 05-5007

NANCY LYNN GAMBOA,

BAUDELIO JOSE GAMBOA

WENDY AURORA GAMBOA, AND

LUCAS TIZOE GAMBOA DEFENDANTS

O R D E R

There comes on for consideration Plaintiff’s Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). (Doc. 38.) On

February 7, 2006, the Court issued its decision for Defendants which

held Plaintiff’s “treatment of the SPD as part of the Plan was

unreasonable” and the “decision that reimbursement is required under

the Plan was an abuse of discretion.” As the prevailing party in

the ERISA case, Defendants contend they are entitled to an award of

attorneys’ fees and costs against Plaintiff. Plaintiff objects to

the award of attorneys’ fees on the basis that attorneys’ fees are

not warranted after the factors set out by the Eighth Circuit Court

of Appeals are applied to the facts of the case. (Doc. 41.) 

A district court has discretion to award attorneys’ fees to

either party under ERISA. Martin v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue

Shield, 299 F.3d 966, 969 (8 Cir. 2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § th

1132(g)). “When considering whether to award such fees, the Eighth

Circuit has set forth general guidelines for district courts to

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follow, including the five factors set forth in Westerhaus.”

Sheehan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 962, 968 (8th Cir. 2004)

(citing Martin, 299 F.3d at 972)); Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749 F.2d

494, 494 (8th Cir. 1984)). These factors are:

(1) the degree of culpability or bad faith of the opposing

party;

(2) the ability of the opposing party to pay attorney

fees;

(3) whether an award of attorney fees against the opposing

party might have a future deterrent effect under similar

circumstances;

(4) whether the parties requesting attorney fees sought to

benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA

plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding

ERISA itself; and

(5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.

Westerhaus, 749 F.2d at 495-96; Sheehan, 372 F.3d at 968.

Defendants request attorneys’ fees because they are the

prevailing participants/beneficiaries, but provided no additional

support for the award. See Doc. 38. However, the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals has rejected any presumption in favor of awarding

attorneys’ fees to prevailing ERISA parties. Martin, 299 F.3d at

972. 

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied the five

factors and found that the prevailing party was not entitled to

attorney fees. See Seitz v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,

433 F.3d 647, 652 (8 Cir. 2006). In Seitz, the Eighth Circuit th

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Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for the insurance company. The Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals found that Seitz was totally disabled despite the fact he

was able to do his job for two hours a day and continued to work

after being told he could no longer work for more than two hours a

day. The Court stated that “[a]lthough we disagree with MetLife’s

interpretation of the Plan’s language, we do not find their

interpretation to be without merit or a demonstration of bad faith.

We also do not believe the other factors to be of great weight in

this case. Accordingly, we deny Seitz’s request for attorneys’

fees.” Id. 

As in Seitz, we also disagree with Plaintiff’s interpretation

of the Plan’s language, but do not find the interpretation to be

without merit or to be founded on bad faith. While the second

factor is met, as Plaintiff has the ability to pay attorney fees,

this alone cannot serve as the basis for an award of attorneys’

fees. See Seitz, 433 F.3d at 652 (the court found that the factors

did not weigh in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees, although it is

clear that MetLife, as a large insurance company, had the ability to

pay any awarded attorneys’ fees); see also Schadler v. Anthem Life

Insurance Company, No. 3;95-CV-1044-D, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1623

(N.D. Tex. Feb 3, 2000) (the court found that the award of

attorneys’ fees was not justified, even after finding the defendants

had the ability to pay, the defendant had not contested this

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 We determine that because there was no finding of bad faith or 1

culpability, there is no behavior in which to deter. See Martin v. Metro.

Life Ins. Co., No. 3:98-CV-0848-D, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6198 (N.D. Tex.

2000).

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factor). We likewise find that the other three factors weigh in

favor of awarding attorneys’ fees. This is not a case in which a

future deterrent effect is at issue , nor one where Defendants sought 1

to benefit all participants/beneficiaries or to resolve a

significant legal question regarding ERISA itself. Furthermore,

both parties positions had merit. We find no additional factors

that would justify the award of attorneys’ fees. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Attorney Fees is hereby

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 13 day of April, 2006. th

/S/ Robert T. Dawson 

Honorable Robert T. Dawson 

United States District Judge

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