Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00194/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00194-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1, 2005

and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal Code 

§ 5075(a).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL ALBERT GUARDADO,

Petitioner,

 v.

MARGARITA PEREZ, et al.,

Respondents. ________________________________/

No. C 05-0194 CW 

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

On January 12, 2005, Petitioner Paul Albert Guardado, a state

prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility at

Soledad, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition is directed to a denial of parole

by the Board of Prison Terms1 (Board). The Court ordered

Respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. On

July 17, 2007, Respondent filed an answer and lodged a copy of the

records of the state proceedings. Petitioner timely filed a

traverse. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is granted

and the matter is remanded to the Board to reevaluate Petitioner’s

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 1 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

suitability for parole.

BACKGROUND

I. Facts

The California Court of Appeal, in affirming Petitioner’s

conviction of second degree murder, described the following facts:

On the night of February 24, 1979, a group

of youths, including Guardado, Ramirez, Vincent

Orozco, Kim Arganda, Manuel Ybarra, Corina

Ribota and Ralph Ponce, gathered in

Westminster’s Sigler Park. At about 10 p.m.,

Ybarra drove Guardado, Orozco and Arganda to a

nearby liquor store. On the way back, rear

passengers Guardado and Orozco asked for their

handguns. Arganda and Ybarra retrieved the

guns from under the front seat and passed them

back. Guardado suggested they stop and assault

people they passed, saying, “I don’t like the

way that person looks . . . let’s get him.” 

Rather than stopping, Ybarra returned to the

park.

At 11:30 p.m., Steven Buus walked through

the park wearing a black hat. Ribota pointed

him out to the others, saying, “I want that

hat.” Some of the youths, including Guardado,

Orozco and Ramirez, ran to Buus and began

beating and kicking him. Then, Guardado,

Orozco and others encircled Buus while Ramirez

kicked him some more. As Buus lay on the

ground, Ribota took his hat, tried it on and

then tossed it away.

After turning away from the scene, Ribota

heard a gunshot. She looked back and saw

Guardado, Ramirez and Orozco standing over

Buus. Guardado was holding a gun and Buus was

begging for his life. Ramirez then drew a

sawed-off shotgun from beneath his coat and

shot Buus in the heart. 

Buus’ autopsy revealed he was shot three

times. One small-caliber bullet was fired into

his back from close range. The bullet was too

fragmented to be identified. A .22-caliber

bullet was fired into Buus’ chest on the left

side, causing injuries which would have been

fatal without medical treatment. It could not

be determined whether these two shots were

fired from the same gun. The shotgun blast

destroyed Buus’ heart. He also had head

injuries from the beating, which would have

killed him if left untreated.

No one came forward with any information

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 2 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

about the shooting until 1984, when Ribota,

hoping to collect a reward, gave a detailed

interview to authorities. The police arrested

Guardado in 1988, when he was 26 years old.

At trial, Guardado claimed Ponce was the

one who shot Buus before Ramirez finished him

off with the shotgun. Guardado admitted having

a gun during the trip to the liquor store but

said he left it in Ybarra’s car when they

returned to the park. Orozco testified he took

his gun (a .22) from the car but eventually

gave it to Ponce, who shot Buus.

People v. Guardado, No. G-017962, slip op. at 2-3 (Cal. App. 4th

1997).

At his 2006 parole hearing, the Board described Petitioner’s

recent prison record: 

You remained assigned to the vocational print

shop. You received a laudatory chrono dated

June 18, ‘04 noting the exceptional talent and

valuable skills as a graphic artist. It says

you designed IST bulletin covers, institution

posters and you were considered a valuable

asset and a peer trainer. There was no

academics during this period. It says that you

participated in AA based on various chronos. 

You also participated in the Children’s

Festival, Christmas Festival and it says

apparently you designed many of the

decorations. These are listed on the chrono. 

And in February 6, ‘04 you completed a three

week Anger Management program Cage Your Rage. 

It also says here that you also received

recognition for Legal Services For Prisoners

With Children Seminar based on a chrono from

June ‘05. There was no psychiatric treatment,

no discipline. And the counselor writes here

that: “Guardado has programmed very well and

continues to do well with both staff and

peers.” . . . I got an Anger Management

program, a 12-week program through the

Protestant Chapel in December ‘05. . . . And

you also took the Anger Management video series

Healing For the Angry Heart, February 6. 

Resp’t Ex. 7 at 39-41. 

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 3 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The Board continued:

What I noted is that you completed the

vocational graphic arts program in ‘03. And

you also completed the Paralegal Institute

Associate Degree Program for paralegal studies

in ‘98. That was in the vocational areas. In

terms of skills that you could carry outside, I

noted that some of the other jobs you’ve held,

and I’m not going to go over all of them, point

out that you have stayed busy and you’ve had

good reports in textiles. You’ve held various

clerical positions. You’ve been a porter. Got

your GED through the Jobs Corps in 1980. . . . 

You’ve done the various HIV, TB, AIDS, STD’s

etcetera in 2000. You did the 30-hour

Parenting program through Friends Outside in

2000. And the Path to Peace, ‘02. That was a

12-week program. Addiction Recovery program, I

think that was the one of the Islam programs.

. . . Disciplinaries, you’ve had one 115. 

That was for mutual combat. That was October

21, ‘98. One 128, April 14, ‘93 for not having

clean living quarters and clothing. . . . It

is commendable. There hasn’t been any violence

since ‘98. And I want to point that out.

Resp’t Ex. 7 at 43-45.

II. Procedural History

In 1988, Petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder

with use of a firearm and was sentenced to seventeen years to life

(fifteen years for second-degree murder and two years for the

firearm). Petitioner was received in prison on November 16, 1989,

and his life term began on July 4, 1990. In 1994, the Ninth

Circuit granted Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, reversed the

trial court’s judgment, and remanded his case for re-trial. 

Guardado v. Stainer, No. 92-56190, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Upon retrial, Petitioner was again convicted of second-degree

murder with use of a firearm. He received a seventeen years to

life sentence (fifteen years for second-degree murder and two years

for the firearm). The state court of appeal affirmed the

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 4 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

conviction. People v. Guardado, No. G-017962, slip op. at 1 (Cal.

App. 4th 1997). 

Since 2002, Petitioner has been denied parole four times. In

2002, 2003 and 2004, the Board found that Petitioner was unsuitable

for parole based on the commitment offense, which was carried out

in a cruel and callous manner and demonstrated callous disregard

for human suffering. Resp’t Ex. 4 at 80; Resp’t Ex. 5 at 67;

Resp’t Ex. 6 at 81. Each time, the Board also found that the

victim was abused during the murder and that the motive for the

crime was inexplicable. Id. The Board found that Petitioner

needed to learn how to deal with stress in a non-destructive

manner. Resp’t Ex. 4 at 82; Resp’t Ex. 5 at 71; Resp’t Ex. 6 at

85. In 2002 and 2003, the Board noted that Petitioner had a stable

social history. Resp’t Ex. 4 at 81, Resp’t Ex. 5 at 69. In 2004,

however, the Board described Petitioner’s social history as

unstable based on the same information it had before it in 2002 and

2003. Resp’t Ex. 6 at 83. In 2003, the Board found for the first

time that Petitioner's criminal record showed an escalating pattern

of violence. Resp’t Ex. 5 at 68. Petitioner was convicted of

malicious mischief to a vehicle in violation of Cal. Vehicle Code 

§ 10853 in 1979 and of driving under the influence of alcohol in

1982, both after he had committed the commitment offense, but

before he was apprehended for it. Resp’t Ex. 4 at 81. In 2004,

based on the same record, the Board found instead that Petitioner

had an escalating pattern of “contact with law enforcement

agencies.” Resp’t Ex. 6 at 83.

 After each denial, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the Orange County Superior Court. The court

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 5 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

denied his petitions and found that the facts of the murder

provided some evidence to support the Board’s decision. In re

Guardado, No. M-9845, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2003); In re

Guardado, No. M-10347, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2005); In re

Guardado, No. M-10506, slip op. at 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2005). Upon

each denial, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

with the California appellate court and California Supreme Court;

both summarily denied his petitions. In re Guardado, No. G-032023,

slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2002); In re Guardado, No. S120982, slip op. at 1 (Cal. 2004); In re Guardado, No. H-028442,

slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th 2005); In re Guardado, No. S131931, slip op. at 1 (Cal. 2005); In re Guardado, G-035509, slip

op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2005); In re Guardado, S-135618, slip

op. at 1 (Cal. 2005).

In 2006, the Board found that Petitioner was unsuitable for

parole based on the commitment offense and his lack of insight and

understanding of his part in the murder. Resp’t Ex. 7 at 98. 

Referring to Petitioner’s account of the crime, the Board stated,

“We just simply don’t find you believable.” Id. at 99. The Board

continued by asking Petitioner, “[I]f you have no insight into your

behavior, how can you correct it?” Id. The Board concluded that

nothing indicated that Petitioner had come to terms with the fact

that he was a participant in the crime, id. at 101, and that he

“absolutely didn’t demonstrate any remorse whatsoever,” id. at 104. 

The Board commended Petitioner on his progress in programs and the

“tremendous amount of work” he did while in the institution. Id.

at 100, 105. In closing, the Board stated it was “very, very

concerned for public safety” and considered Petitioner “one of the

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 6 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

most dangerous people the State could have.” Id. at 104.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Orange County Superior Court challenging the Board’s 2006 decision. 

In re Guardado, No. M-11035, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2006). 

The court denied his petition and found that the Board’s decision

was supported by some evidence. Id. The court found that the

Board pointed to the facts of the commitment offense, which

exceeded the minimum elements necessary for the crime. Id. The

court never reached Petitioner’s claim that the Board’s continuous

use of the commitment offense to deny parole violated due process. 

Id. at 4. Petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the California appellate court and the California Supreme

Court; both summarily denied his petitions. In re Guardado, No. G037843, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2007); In re Guardado, No.

S-149934, slip op. at 1 (Cal. 2007). 

Petitioner filed three separate federal habeas corpus

petitions challenging the Board’s 2002, 2003, 2004 decisions. On

March 8, 2006, the three petitions were consolidated into this

case. On September 20, 2006, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion

for appointment of counsel. On May 15, 2007, the Court

consolidated into this case Petitioner’s fourth habeas corpus

petition challenging the Board’s 2006 decision. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The petition in this case was filed after the effective date

of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), so the provisions of that act apply. Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 327 (1997); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 7 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Cir. 2002). 

Under the AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief

unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412 (2000). The first prong applies both to questions of law

and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-

09, while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court

authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1),

only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state

court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1),

if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal

court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 8 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. 

See id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct

absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El,

537 U.S. at 340. A petitioner must present clear and convincing

evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness;

conclusory assertions will not do. Id. Although only Supreme

Court law is binding on the States, Ninth Circuit precedent remains

relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court

to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last

reasoned opinion to analyze whether the state judgment was

erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072,

1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

II. Analysis

The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole

board's decision deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to

his constitutionally protected liberty interest in a parole release

date if the board's decision is not supported by “some evidence in

the record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” Sass v. California Bd.

of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)). When assessing

whether a state parole board's suitability determination was

supported by “some evidence,” the court's analysis is framed by the

statutes and regulations governing parole suitability

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 9 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

determinations in the relevant State. Id. Accordingly, in

California, the court must look to California law to determine the

findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for

parole, and then must review the record to determine whether the

state court decision constituted an unreasonable application of the

“some evidence” principle. Id.

California law provides that a parole date is to be granted

unless it is determined “that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past

convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration 

. . .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

 The California Code of Regulations sets out the factors

showing suitability or unsuitability for parole that the Board is

required to consider. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). These

include “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available,” such as,

the circumstances of the prisoner's social

history; past and present mental state; past

criminal history, including involvement in

other criminal misconduct which is reliably

documented; the base and other commitment

offenses, including behavior before, during

and after the crime; past and present attitude

toward the crime; any conditions of treatment

or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely

be released to the community; and any other

information which bears on the prisoner's

suitability for release. Circumstances which

taken alone may not firmly establish

unsuitability for parole may contribute to a

pattern which results in finding of

unsuitability. 

Id.

Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include

the nature of the commitment offense and whether “[t]he prisoner

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 10 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner.” Id. at (c). This includes consideration of the number of

victims, whether "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner,” whether the victim was “abused, defiled or

mutilated during or after the offense,” whether “[t]he offense was

carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering,” and whether “[t]he motive for the

crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” 

Id.

Other circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole

are a previous record of violence, an unstable social history,

previous sadistic sexual offenses, a history of severe mental

health problems related to the offense, and serious misconduct in

prison or jail. Id.

Circumstances tending to support a finding of suitability for

parole include no juvenile record, a stable social history, signs

of remorse, that the crime was committed as a result of significant

stress in the prisoner's life, a lack of criminal history, a

reduced possibility of recidivism due to the prisoner's present

age, that the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has

developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release,

and that the prisoner's institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. Id. at 

(d).

Respondents argue that California inmates do not have a

federally protected liberty interest in parole release and that the

Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary in Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128,

is not clearly established federal law for the purposes of AEDPA. 

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 11 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

However, this Court is bound by Ninth Circuit authority. 

Respondents next contend that even if California prisoners do

have a liberty interest in parole, the due process protections to

which they are entitled by clearly established Supreme Court

authority are limited to an opportunity to be heard and a statement

of reasons for denial. This position, however, has likewise been

rejected by the Ninth Circuit, which held in Irons that a

prisoner’s due process rights are violated if the Board’s decision

is not supported by "some evidence in the record," or is "otherwise

arbitrary." The “some evidence” standard identified is thus

clearly established federal law in the parole context for purposes

of § 2254(d). See Sass, 461 F.3d 1128-1129. 

The Board explained that it based its denial primarily on the

commitment offense. It is undeniable that the offense was heinous,

atrocious and cruel, demonstrating a callous disregard for human

suffering. These facts will never change. However, the Ninth

Circuit has held that continuous reliance over time on static

factors such as the commitment offense could violate due process. 

See Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 545 (9th Cir. 2008); Irons

v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2007); Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129; Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-917 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Ninth Circuit has not specified the number of denials or the

length of time served beyond the minimum sentence that would

constitute a due process violation, but Petitioner has served more

than his minimum sentence and has been denied parole by the Board

five times. The question is whether it is reasonable to find after

almost thirty years that the facts of the offense constitute some

evidence that Petitioner would be a danger to society if released. 

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 12 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

 Other evidence before the Board weighed against a finding that

Petitioner is currently dangerous. Both Petitioner’s 1999 and 2004

psychological reports conclude that Petitioner’s violence potential

if released into the community is “no more than the average citizen

in the community.” Pet’r Att’y Decl. Ex. B-1 at 5; Ex. D-1 at 3. 

The 1999 report, which was before the Board at all of his hearings,

stated that his “prognosis for successful community living is

good.” Pet’r Att’y Decl. Ex. B-1 at 3. Petitioner’s 2002 Life

Prisoner Evaluation Report stated that Petitioner would pose a

moderate degree of threat to the public if released from prison. 

Pet’r Att’y Decl. Ex. B-2 at 1. His 2003 Life Prisoner Evaluation

Report stated, “Considering the commitment offense, prior record

and prison adjustment, this writer believes that the prisoner would

probably pose a low degree of threat to the public at this time, if

released from prison . . . I feel he has the proportionate

ingredients for successful reintegration into society.” Pet’r

Att’y Decl. Ex. C-2 at 5. His 2004 Life Prisoner Evaluation Report

stated that he “has evolved into a rational, responsible and

insightful person and I believe if he was released from prison, he

would pose no more than a low degree of threat to the public.” 

Pet’r Att’y Decl. Ex. D-2 at 2. 

The only other factors the Board cited for its conclusion that

Petitioner remained dangerous were what it called his lack of

insight, Resp’t Ex. 7 at 98, and lack of remorse, id. at 104. It

appears that the Board equated Petitioner’s lack of insight with

his denial that he was the shooter. The Board explained:

I’m troubled by the way by the fact that

Justice Caudill’s letter to the Governor states

factors that involve your case that are unusual

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 13 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

and it says that “even though he was 17 years

of age when the crime was committed and he was

convicted on the theory of aiding, abetting the

individuals who actually committed the crime”

and you were convicted of second degree murder

with the use of a firearm twice, even after the

first Appellate decision upheld the hearsay

issue. That concerns me. I don’t think you

are necessarily being straightforward and

honest with anyone. . . . And we accept the

findings of the court to be true and we refer

to the Appellate decision. And therefore, we

have to make a comparison in order to establish

insight. And we don’t feel like you have any.

Id. at 102-03. However, the California Penal Code provides that

the Board “shall not require, when setting parole dates, an

admission of guilt to any crime for which an inmate was committed.”

Cal. Penal Code § 5011(b). See also 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2236

(same). Further, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction of second-degree murder on an aiding and abetting

theory. Petitioner clearly admits his guilt of second degree

murder as an aider and abettor.

 The Board’s finding that Petitioner’s description of the crime

is not believable is based on the following: 

we have looked back at some of the things you

said and that really concern us. They’re just

subtle things, subtle differences. You talk of

the fact that Ralph stepped in front of you and

fired the weapon and that you thought that

might be why the witness thought it was you

that fired the weapon. And then another time

you talked about being at least five feet away

when he fired the weapon. The way you

characterize your participation in this crime

as I said is as if you weren’t even part of the

mix. You stated that some times you

participate in chasing Mr. Buus and that you

were one of the people surrounding him. You

said that at other times that you simply

followed one of your crime partners because you

thought there was going to be a fight and you

knew that there was going to be a fight. This

was certainly for one thing no fight. This was

a horrible, violent, disgusting, brutal attack

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 14 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

on an innocent young man who was incredibly

outnumbered and who spent the last of his life

in absolutely abject terror. It was -- This

was a horrible crime. And there was nothing

that we saw today that indicated to us that you

were a participant in the crime.

Resp’t Ex. 7 at 100-101. Being five feet away from Ralph and being

behind him are not inconsistent. Similarly, Petitioner’s admission

that he participated in chasing the victim, and his statement that

he followed others to a fight with the victim are not inconsistent. 

The Board was clearly incorrect in its statement that

Petitioner “absolutely did not demonstrate any remorse whatsoever

. . .” Id. at 104. Petitioner has expressed remorse for his crime

and sorrow for the victim and his family. In a 2004 letter, he

states, “I cannot give Steven his life back or his family back the

young man which my wrongdoing helped deprive them of. The best I

can do and will do, with God’s help and yours, is give back to the

community in Steven Buus’ memory.” Pet’r Decl. Ex. D-2 at 3. The

sincerity of Petitioner’s remorse is backed up by the evaluations

of him by others, including psychologists and prison staff. His

1999 psychological report, which was before the Board at all of his

hearings, opines that he “states demonstrated understanding

regarding the circumstances leading to the commitment offense and

his empathy for the victim appeared to be genuine.” Pet’r Att’y

Decl. Ex. B-1 at 3, 4. His 2004 psychological report added that he

“accepted responsibility for leaving the scene, and for the many

years of suffering which resulted for the family of the victim.” 

Pet’r Att’y Decl. Ex. D-1. Petitioner’s 2003 Life Prisoner

Evaluation Report stated that he “makes no excuses for his past

behavior and above all he expresses a sincere heartfelt based

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 15 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

remorse for his part in the tragic occurrence that fateful day and

for the continued adverse affects it has had on the victim’s family

and his own. . . . He soulfully feels for all concerned and cannot

change what occurred. He will forever make amends in his heart.” 

Pet’r Att’y Decl. Ex. C-2 at 5.

Because the Board is precluded from relying on Petitioner’s

failure to admit a particular version of the commitment offense,

and because the Board was clearly wrong in its assessment that

Petitioner has expressed no remorse, the commitment offense is the

only evidence of present dangerousness. The question remains

whether the commitment offense constitutes some evidence of present

dangerousness.

Petitioner demonstrates the other factors that indicate his

suitability for parole. He has no juvenile record. He has a

relatively minor record of convictions, which includes no

convictions involving violence other than the commitment offense. 

He has expressed apparently sincere remorse, as discussed above. 

Although the Board’s findings on this point have been inconsistent,

he has a stable social history, evidenced by his 1999 and 2004

psychological reports. Pet’r Att’y Decl. Ex. B-1 at 1; Ex. D-1 at

1. He married and fathered two sons, now grown, after the

commitment offense but before he was arrested for it. Petitioner’s

present age of forty-six years suggests a reduced possibility of

recidivism. He has made realistic plans for release, as evidenced

by letters from many members of his family indicating that they can

assist him with employment and housing. Resp’t Ex. 7 at 24-30. 

Petitioner’s educational achievements, including his GED, AA, and

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 16 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

Paralegal Certificate, have given him marketable skills that can be

put to use on release. His institutional activities, such as

rehabilitation programs and vocational and charitable work,

indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon

release.

The circumstances tending to indicate a petitioner’s

unsuitability for parole are not applicable to Petitioner. He has

no record of convictions for violent offenses other than the

commitment offense. He does not have an unstable social history. 

He has committed no sadistic sexual offense, he has no history of

mental health problems and he has committed no serious misconduct

in prison. His disciplinary history consists of one instance of

mutual combat in 1998 and a failure to clean his cell in 1993.

The last reasoned state court opinion is that of the Orange

County Superior Court. That court concluded that the record

contained “some evidence” to support the Board’s finding that

Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. In re Guardado, No. M-11035,

slip op. at 3. However, the state court misstated the “some

evidence” test. The state court found that the Board’s recitation

of the facts of the crime was “some evidence” to support the

Board’s conclusion that the crime was “horrible,” and therefore the

Board was “not required to engage in further analysis.” Id. at 3-

4. The Ninth Circuit has explained that the “test is not whether

some evidence supports the reasons the [Board] cites for denying

parole, but whether some evidence indicates a parolee’s release

unrealistically endangers public safety” and that “some evidence of

the existence of a particular factor does not necessarily equate to

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 17 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

some evidence the parolee’s release unreasonable endangers public

safety.” Hayward, 512 F.3d at 543 (citing In re Lee, 143 Cal. App.

4th 1400, 1408 (2006)). 

 The state court failed to note that, over time, the Board’s

continuous reliance upon an unchanging factor--Petitioner’s

commitment offense--may violate his due process right. Here,

Petitioner’s crime was committed decades ago, when he was seventeen

years old. An unusual circumstance which bears on the predictive

quality of the commitment offense is that Petitioner was not

charged with the crime until ten years later; during that period,

he was not convicted of any violent crime. While the Board may

base its denial on the gravity of the commitment offense alone,

over time, this “‘runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process

violation.’” Id. at 545 (quoting Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915). As time

passes, the commitment offense becomes such an unreliable predictor

of a petitioner’s present and future dangerousness that it does not

satisfy the “some evidence” standard. Id. at 546. The state court

did not point to any other evidence of present dangerousness.

In light of Petitioner’s entire record--including his age at

the time of the crime, his violence-free years before he was

arrested, his lengthy incarceration, his rehabilitation through

education, good conduct and charitable work--his commitment

offense, which occurred twenty-nine years ago, no longer

constitutes “some evidence” that his release will pose an imminent

danger to public safety. See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 546. The

Board’s continued reliance upon the commitment crime alone violated

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 18 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

Petitioner’s due process rights, and the state court’s contrary

finding was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is GRANTED. The Court remands to the Board to hold a

new hearing within sixty days and re-evaluate Petitioner’s

suitability for parole in accordance with this order. All pending

motions are terminated. A separate judgment shall issue, and the

Clerk is directed to close the file. Each party shall bear his or

her own costs. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4/9/08

Dated:_____________________ ____________________________

 CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-00194-CW Document 43 Filed 04/09/08 Page 19 of 19