Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00776/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00776-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICHOLAS DELREAL, III,

Petitioner,

v.

RON DAVIS,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:14-CV-00776-L-RBB

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Nicholas DelReal (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus under 22 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction and sentence of 11 

years for transportation of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance for 

sale, possession of 28.5 grams or more of methamphetamine for sale, possession of a 

short-barreled shotgun, felony possession of a firearm, and possession of oxycodone. On 

June 4, 2015, Magistrate Judge Ruben B. Brooks issued a Report and Recommendation 

recommending dismissal of Petitioner’s 22 U.S.C. § 2254 claims. (See R&R [Doc. 10].) 

Petitioner objects1to the Report and Recommendation. (See Objections [Doc. 19].) In 

 

1 Petitioner initially failed to timely object to the Report and Recommendation. However, the present 

objection is timely in light of the Court’s Sept. 3, 2015 Order [Doc. 18] granting Petitioner’s motion to 

set aside judgment. 

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reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court “shall make 

a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” 

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the reasons stated below, the 

Court overrules Petitioner’s objections and adopts the Report and Recommendation. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

After reviewing the Report and Recommendation, the Court finds its factual 

background section to be a comprehensive and accurate reflection of the underlying 

record. Accordingly, the Court adopts it as its own. (See R&R 2–9.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim 

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court 

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7–8 (2002). In deciding a 

state prisoner's habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it 

agrees with the state court's determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily 

deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court's decision was objectively 

unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 

F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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III. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Petitioner objects that the Report and Recommendation is erroneous inasmuch as it

found the state court did not commit constitutional error in denying his motion to 

suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle. More specifically, 

Petitioner contends that the state court record shows the inventory search exception to the 

warrant requirement cannot justify the search because Petitioner’s vehicle was not 

actually impounded. 

Petitioner’s argument is inappropriate for consideration on federal habeas review. 

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that “where the 

State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment 

claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas 

corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure 

was introduced at his trial.” Id. 

Petitioner argues Stone is not fatal to his claim because the state court allegedly 

relied on incorrect facts in denying his motion to suppress. The problem with this 

argument is that it focuses on the outcome of Petitioner’s Motion to Suppress rather than 

on whether he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it. Put differently, if the state 

court gave Petitioner a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, this Court cannot 

disturb the state court’s ruling, even if that ruling was erroneous. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. 

Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had 

the opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the 

claim was correctly decided.”). The Report and Recommendation was correct to 

conclude Petitioner, aided by counsel, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his 

motion to suppress where (1) the Superior Court considered it at a preliminary hearing; 

(2) the Superior Court held a hearing on a renewed motion, accompanied by extensive 

oral argument; and (3) the Court of Appeals affirmed and devoted five pages of its 

opinion to consideration of the reasonableness of the search. Because the state court thus 

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provided a full and fair opportunity for Petitioner to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, 

this Court cannot disturb its ruling. 

IV. SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s finding that the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to substitute counsel did not offend his Sixth Amendment right to

retain the counsel of his choice. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is not 

an unqualified right. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151–52 (2006). 

Rather, “a trial court [has] wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice 

against the needs of fairness and against the demands of its calendar.” Id. (internal 

citations omitted). Thus, a judge may properly deny a motion to substitute a retained 

attorney where doing so serves “purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and orderly 

administration of justice.” United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007).

Applying this standard, the Report and Recommendation concluded that the state 

court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to substitute was not objectively unreasonable 

because (1) Petitioner waited until the day of trial to bring the motion; (2) Petitioner had 

been arraigned two years earlier; (3) trial had already been continued several times; (4) 

the trial court judge concluded, based on representations from the retained attorney 

Petitioner sought to replace, that it might take as long as six months for the new attorney 

to adequately prepare for trial; and (5) Petitioner failed to provide a non-conclusory 

explanation as to how his relationship with his retained attorney had become “untenable.” 

(R&R 17–20.) Petitioner advances two objections to this conclusion. 

First, Petitioner disputes Judge Danielson’s finding that it might take up to six 

months for attorney Pasto to prepare for trial. The gist of Petitioner’s argument is that 

Judge Danielson’s time estimate must have been erroneous because (1) the previously

retained attorney (“Rodriguez”) never gave a specific time estimate as to how long it 

would take the newly retained attorney (“Pasto”) to prepare, and (2) Rodriquez offered to 

help Pasto get up to speed as soon as possible. 

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The Court does not find this argument persuasive. At a hearing on the motion, 

Pasto represented that he was not ready for trial and Rodriguez stated that representing 

DelReal would require Pasto to familiarize himself with a lot of pretrial motion work and 

involve presenting a significant amount of evidence on Petitioner’s behalf as opposed to 

simply responding to the D.A.’s evidence. (Lod. 1 Vol. 2.) Rodriguez further stated that 

“in my view of the case and what I know about it, I don’t feel it’s something you can pick 

up and try as if it was a DUI or something of that nature.” (Id. 43:26–29.) Given this 

testimony, the Court finds that Judge Danielsen’s conclusion that it could take up to six 

months for Pasto to adequately prepare was not objectively unreasonable. 

Next, Petitioner argues that Judge Danielsen’s stated concern regarding undue 

delay is belied by the fact that Judge Hernandez subsequently granted Petitioner a six day 

continuance so that Rodriguez could prepare for trial. This argument is a non sequitur. 

From the fact that the Judge Hernandez felt a six day continuance would not cause undue 

delay, it simply does not follow that Judge Danielson did not believe a continuance of up 

to six months would cause undue delay. 

 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections, adopts 

Magistrate Judge Brooks’ Report and Recommendation, and DENIES the Petition with 

prejudice. Certificate of appealability is denied. 

Dated: October 26, 2016

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