Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00475/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00475-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Byron L. Hagans, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections, et al., 

Respondents. 

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CV 19-0475-TUC-JAS (LAB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus constructively filed on

September 27, 2019, by Byron L. Hagans, an inmate currently held in the Arizona State Prison

Complex in Florence, Arizona. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-11) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court, the matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Bowman for report and recommendation. LRCiv 72.2(a)(2).

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order dismissing the petition because it is time-barred. In the alternative,

the petition should be denied because the trial court’s decision to hold Hagans’s trial in absentia

did not violate “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Summary of the Case

In October of 1992, Hagans was tried in absentia and found guilty after a jury trial of “six

counts of sexual conduct with a person under the age of fourteen, three counts of sexual abuse

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 His petition was placed in the prison mailing system on this date.

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of a person under fourteen, and one count of attempted sexual conduct with a person under

fourteen.” (Doc. 7-1, p. 9); (Doc. 7-1, p. 159) On the first day of trial, Hagans’s newly

appointed counsel moved to vacate the trial in absentia because she had never met the defendant

and the last documented contact with the defendant was in March of 1992. (Doc. 7-1, p. 159)

The court denied the motion noting that “there is a Conditions of Release with the defendant’s

apparent signature on it wherein he acknowledges that he must be present for trial or a Bench

Warrant will issue and trial proceed in his absence. . . .” (Doc. 7-1, p. 159)

On May 9, 1996, the trial court sentenced Hagans to “consecutive terms of life

imprisonment on seven of the convictions and to lesser prison terms on the remainder.” (Doc.

7-1, p. 9); (Doc. 7-1, p. 32) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on October

28, 1997. (Doc. 7-1, p. 8)

On August 5, 2011, the trial court granted Hagans’s petition for post-conviction relief

and remanded for resentencing because “convictions consolidated for trial” were improperly

used “as predicate prior offenses for sentencing purposes.” (Doc. 7-1, pp. 32-33); (Doc. 7-1,

p. 88) The resentencing court sentenced Hagans to “consecutive, presumptive prison terms

totaling 147 years.” (Doc. 7-1, p. 87) On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the

sentences. (Doc. 7-1, p. 91) On February 15, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court denied

Hagans’s petition for review. (Doc. 7-1, p. 107)

More than five years later, on March 7, 2018, Hagans filed his second notice of postconviction relief arguing that his trial in absentia violated his Constitutional rights. (Doc. 7-1,

p. 120) The trial court dismissed the notice as untimely. (Doc. 7-1, p. 213) The Arizona Court

of Appeals granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 7-1, p. 213) On April 1, 2019, the Arizona

Supreme Court denied review. (Doc. 7-1, p. 220)

On September 27, 2019, Hagans constructively1

 filed in this court the pending petition

for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-11) He argues his Constitutional rights were violated

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because his trial was held in absentia and he was not present at the impaneling of the jury citing,

among other things, Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993).

On November 12, 2019, the respondents filed an answer arguing, among other things,

that Hagans’s claim is time-barred and procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 7) Hagans filed a reply

on December 9, 2019. (Doc. 8) The court finds that Hagans’s claim is time-barred and, in the

alternative, not cognizable. The court does not reach the respondents’ alternate arguments. 

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition,

however, must be filed within the applicable limitation period or it will be dismissed. The

statute reads in pertinent part as follows:

 (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

The limitation period for Hagans’s claim was triggered on “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

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seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). This date occurred when Hagans’s

resentencing became final. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156, 127 S. Ct. 793, 798

(2007) (For the purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), “[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means

sentence. The sentence is the judgment.”); Gooden v. Ryan, 2010 WL 4868184, at *2 (D. Ariz.

2010) (Judgment became final 20 days after resentencing.), report and recommendation

adopted, 2010 WL 4855624 (D. Ariz. 2010).

Hagans appealed his resentencing, but the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed “the

sentences imposed on resentencing” on September 14, 2012. (Doc. 7-1, pp. 87-91) The

Arizona Supreme Court denied Hagans’s petition for review on February 15, 2013. (Doc. 7-1,

p. 107) Hagans then had 90 days to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for review. Sup. Ct. R.

13. When he did not do so, his judgment became final on May 16, 2013. See Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159 (9th Cir. 1999). The limitation period was triggered on that date and

expired one year later on May 16, 2014. Hagans’s petition was constructively filed on

September 27, 2019. (Doc. 1) It is time-barred.

Hagans argues that § 2244(d)(1) does not bar his petition because he “did not have a

claim to bring to this court until he was informed by another inmate that pursuant to Crosby and

Rule 43 the trial court did not have the authority (jurisdiction) to have his trial in absentia.”

(Doc. 1, p. 11) He maintains that the limitation period for his claim was triggered on “the date

on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); (Doc. 8, p. 2). He asserts

that this date occurred when another inmate provided him with the case law upon which he

bases his claim. (Doc. 8, p. 3) Once he obtained this case law, “he used due diligence and

brought it to the Arizona Courts’ attention.” Id. Hagans’s analysis of the limitation statute is,

however, incorrect.

The “factual predicate” trigger starts the limitation period when “the prisoner knows (or

through diligence could discover) the important facts underlying his claim, not when the

prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1155 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2001). Here, the facts underlying the claim were known when Hagans was originally

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sentenced. He knew at that time that he was convicted in absentia and he knew he was not

present when the jury was impaneled. That date came before the date on which the judgment

became final. Therefore, the “factual predicate” trigger does not apply.

Hagans argues in the alternative that the limitation period for his claim was triggered on

“the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation

of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) He asserts that the “inadequate law

libraries” in his prison created an impediment to filing. (Doc. 8, pp. 2-3) This inadequacy, he

explains, prevented him from discovering “the structural error” caused by his trial in absentia

until he received case law from another inmate. Id. Hagans is correct when he describes the

reduction of prison library resources. But he is incorrect when he implies that this reduction

was “in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).

In August of 1997, the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) “disbanded the case

law collections in ADOC facilities.” Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir.

2007). Instead, it “provided inmates with access to paralegals,” who were “permitted to direct

prospective habeas petitioners to legal materials containing AEDPA [the habeas statute], but

were not allowed to conduct legal research for inmates.” Id. ADOC was allowed to do this

because the Supreme Court held in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996) that

its plan for reducing the size of the ADOC libraries did not violate the Constitution. Id. The

Casey court specifically rejected the view that the State must provide library resources that

would “enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court.”

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2181 (1996). Accordingly, Hagans’s lack

of legal resources was not an “impediment to filing [his] application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)

(emphasis added).

Hagans cites Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.2000) in support of his

argument, but that case is inapposite. In Whalem/Hunt, the Ninth Circuit held that a law library

that failed to contain a copy of the AEDPA could be an “impediment” pursuant to §

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2244(d)(1)(B). Id. at 1148. Hagans, however, does not assert that his law library failed to

contain a copy of the AEDPA. Instead, he argues that his law library failed to contain legal

resources that would have enabled him to discover the legal theory underlying his petition. The

Supreme Court, however, has ruled that law libraries need not contain those resources, so the

deficiency identified by Hagans was not an impediment “in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354, 116 S.

Ct. 2174, 2181 (1996). Hagans suggests, in the alternative, that his counsel should have

identified this issue for him, but “appointed defense counsel is not an actor of the State.”

Crihalmean v. Ryan, 2013 WL 5524509, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2013). Assuming counsel was an

impediment, she was not an impediment “created by State action. . . .” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(B).

In the alternative, the court finds that Hagans’s claim does not qualify for habeas relief.

A State court prisoner qualifies for habeas relief only if the State court’s adjudication of the

claim violated “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. s 2254(d)(1). And the Supreme Court has never held that trial in

absentia violates the Constitution if the defendant is not present for impanelment of the jury. 

Fairey v. Tucker, 132 S.Ct. 2218, 2220 (2012); Carroll v. Outlaw, 2017 WL 9249495, *5 (N.D.

Miss. 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2025298, *4 (N.D. Miss. 2018).;

see also White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (“Clearly

established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to

the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions.”) (punctuation modified).

Hagans argues that Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993) is on point, but he is

mistaken. In Crosby, the Supreme Court held that a trial in absentia, where the defendant was

not present for impanelment of the jury, violates Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, not the

Constitution. Id. In fact, the Crosby court explicitly stated that it expressed no opinion as to

whether trial in absentia under the circumstances presented in that case was a Constitutional

violation. Id. at 261; see also Fairey v. Tucker, 132 S.Ct. 2218, 2220 (2012) (Justice

Sotomayor, dissenting from denial of certiorari, urging the Court to address this issue). The

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Crosby court did find a violation of a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, but that does not help

Hagans. Those rules apply in federal court, not state court. Fed.R.Crim.P. 1(a)(1); Collins v.

Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010). They did not apply to Hagans’s trial.

Hagans cannot show that the trial court’s decision to hold his trial in absentia, where he

was not present for the impanelment of the jury, violated “clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. s 2254(d)(1). His petition

must be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1)

Hagans’s petition is time-barred. In the alternative, his petition should be denied because his

claim is not cognizable.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The Local Rules permit a response to an objection.

They do not permit a reply to a response without permission from the District Court.

DATED this 20th day of February, 2020.

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