Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01063/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01063-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT WOMACK, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF AMADOR, ESTATE OF 

RUSSELL MOORE, deceased in his 

individual capacity, DAVID J. 

IREY, in his individual 

capacity, TODD D. RIEBE, in his 

individual capacity, RON HALL, 

in his individual and official 

capacities, RICH DUNLOP, in his 

individual capacity, JIM 

WALSHAW, in his individual and 

official capacities, ROBERT 

WERTMAN, in his individual 

capacity, JAMES GARCIA, in his 

individual capacity, and DOES 1 

through 10, 

 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/

No. Civ. S-02-1063 RRB DAD 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Robert Womack (“Womack”) brought a civil rights action 

against the County of Amador (“County”), California Highway 

Patrol Officer Russell Moore (“Moore”), San Joaquin County 

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Deputy District Attorney David J. Irey (“Irey”), Amador County 

District Attorney Todd Riebe (“Riebe”), Amador County District 

Attorney Investigator Ron Hall (“Hall”) and others,1 alleging 

Fourth Amendment claims arising out of two searches allegedly 

executed under warrants obtained with knowingly false affidavits 

during a criminal investigation into the removal and disposal of 

an underground gasoline storage tank.2 The County now moves for 

summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.3 

For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In April 1998, KRL Partnership (“KRL”)4

 purchased a defunct 

gasoline station in Jackson, California, in order to convert the 

 

1

 The other named defendants are: Rich Dunlop and Robert 

Wertman, California Highway Patrol Officers, Jim Walshaw, an 

Amador County District Attorney Investigator, and James Garcia, 

an investigator for the California Department of Insurance. 

Compl. ¶¶ 10-13. 

2

 Womack also alleges a Fourteenth Amendment malicious 

prosecution claim. 

3

 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

4

 KRL is a California general partnership by and between 

certain children of Womack created for the ownership of land 

investments. Pl.’s Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) ¶ 1.

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real property into a parking lot. Pl.’s AMF ¶ 4; Def.’s 

Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) ¶¶ 1-2. On May 2, 1998, 

Plaintiff Womack oversaw the removal of an underground gasoline 

storage tank. Pl.’s AMF ¶ 7; Def.’s UMF ¶ 3. Upon learning of 

the removal of the storage tank, Amador County officials 

expressed concern about environmental contamination and referred 

the matter to the Amador County District Attorney’s office (the 

“D.A.’s office”), which instituted a criminal investigation. 

Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 2, 5, 14-16, 18. 

In June 1998, District Attorney Stephen Cilenti (“Cilenti”) 

assigned the case to Hall, an investigator employed by the 

D.A.’s office. Pl.’s AMF ¶ 14; Def.’s UMF ¶ 18. Hall was 

assigned the task of determining whether Womack had committed 

environmental crimes in connection with the removal and disposal 

of the underground gasoline storage tank. Pl.’s AMF ¶ 14. Due 

to Hall’s inexperience with environmental cases, Irey, a San 

Joaquin County Deputy District Attorney, was specially appointed 

to conduct the investigation in Amador County, assisted by 

Moore, a California Highway Patrol Officer. Id. ¶¶ 17, 21, 33; 

Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 19, 24. Hall and Irey located the removed storage 

tank and obtained a copy of a check, drawn from a KRL bank 

account, used to pay for the disposal of the storage tank. 

Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 20-22. The address on the check was 15864 Ridge 

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Road, Sutter Creek, California, a KRL property and Womack's home 

address (the “Ridge Road Property”). Id. ¶¶ 23, 26. 

In October 1998, Moore drafted an affidavit, with the 

assistance of Irey and Hall, in support of a search warrant (the 

“first search warrant”) authorizing the seizure of KRL records 

from Womack’s residence on the Ridge Road property. Pl.’s AMF 

¶¶ 44-45; Def.’s UMF ¶ 26. On October 30, 1998, Moore and 

investigators from the D.A.’s office, including Hall, executed a 

search of the Ridge Road Property. Pl.’s AMF ¶ 50; Def.’s UMF ¶ 

29. During the search, investigators, including Hall and Moore, 

seized a broad range of documents. Pl.’s AMF ¶ 51. On December 

1, 1998, a grand jury indicted Womack and others on twenty-one 

counts, most of which concerned the removal of the underground 

storage tank and actions related to its disposal. Id. ¶ 60; 

Def.’s UMF ¶ 30. 

On January 4, 1999, Todd Riebe (“Riebe”) was sworn in as 

Amador County District Attorney. Def.’s UMF ¶ 31. On 

January 11, 1999, Moore, assisted by Irey, submitted an 

affidavit in support of a search warrant (the “second search 

warrant”) to search the Ridge Road Property. Id. ¶ 32; Pl.’s 

AMF ¶ 65. The affidavit submitted in support of the second 

search warrant indicated that it had two goals: (1) it sought 

evidence to prosecute the pending indictment against Womack; and 

(2) it sought to investigate and uncover new crimes. Exh. 50, 

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attached to Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mtn., for Summary 

Judgment/Adjudication (“MSJ/MSA”). Specifically, the affidavit 

characterized the aims of the search as follows: “to gather 

evidence as to the crimes[] which Robert WOMACK was indicted on 

and to help determine the entire scope of these business 

activities that are permeated with fraud we need to determine 

several additional things.” Id.5 Before Moore submitted the 

affidavit, it was reviewed by Irey and approved by Riebe. Pl.’s 

AMF ¶¶ 69-73. 

On January 11, 1999, the second search warrant was approved 

authorizing the seizure of a broad range of documents created 

since January 1, 1995 (Pl.’s AMF ¶¶ 79, 85), and was executed by 

Hall, Moore, and others. Def.’s UMF ¶ 34. After discovering 

evidence outside the scope of the warrant, Moore interrupted the 

search and returned to court with Irey to obtain an extended 

warrant authorizing seizure of documents dating back to 1990. 

Id. ¶ 35; Pl.’s AMF ¶¶ 86-87. Following approval of the 

extended warrant, Moore allegedly seized documents relating to 

all aspects of the KRL partnership going back to 1977 and 

earlier. Pl.’s AMF ¶¶ 89-90. 

 

5

 The affidavit further stated that “we have now 

additionally embarked on the early stages of tracking unreported 

income and the monies of the WOMACK’S [sic] via their various 

questionable transfers of personal and real property and the tax 

implications of those activities.” Exh. 50, attached to Pl.’s 

Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

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On August 18, 1999, the Amador County Superior Court found 

the warrant authorizing the October 30, 1998 search to be 

facially overbroad and beyond the scope of the probable cause 

underlying the search. Pl.’s AMF ¶ 54; Exh. 25, attached to 

Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. The court ordered that all KRL 

business records seized during the search to be suppressed on 

the basis that the affidavit in support of the warrant did not 

establish probable cause for the seizure of such records. Id. 

On July 3, 2001, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the 

trial court’s order in part and reversed it in part. Exh. 26, 

attached to Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. Specifically, the 

Third District concluded that the trial court erred by 

suppressing all KRL business records because the affidavit in 

support of the warrant established probable cause for the 

seizure of some of KRL’s business records (e.g., the records 

relating to the alleged removal and disposal of the underground 

storage tank). Id. The Third District vacated the trial 

court’s order with directions to enter a new order suppressing 

only KRL business records unrelated to the alleged removal and 

disposal of the underground storage tank. Id. 

In September 2000, the D.A.’s office transferred Womack’s 

criminal prosecution to the California Attorney General’s 

Office. Def.’s UMF ¶ 41. In August 2001, the Attorney 

General’s Office dismissed the criminal charges against Womack 

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and instituted a civil action against Womack and others. Id. ¶¶ 

42-43. No criminal charges were ever subsequently filed against 

Womack, KRL or any of its partners. Pl.’s AMF ¶ 10. 

On May 15, 2002, Womack filed a civil rights action under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the following claims: (1) Fourth 

Amendment violations (unreasonable search and seizure); (2) 

Fourteenth Amendment violation (malicious prosecution); and (3) 

Monell liability. Compl. ¶¶ 1-84. On August 10, 2007, the 

County filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the 

alternative, summary adjudication. Docket at 72. The County 

seeks summary judgment/adjudication on the following grounds: 

(1) the Fourth Amendment claims are time-barred; (2) the Monell

claim fails because the county officials connected with this 

action are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment, 

and/or because Womack failed to proffer evidence demonstrating 

that the implementation of a county policy, custom or practice 

caused the alleged constitutional deprivations; and (3) the 

malicious prosecution claim fails because Womack failed to 

proffer evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether the prior criminal prosecution was pursued to a 

favorable termination. These arguments are discussed 

individually below. 

// 

// 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard

 Rule 56(b) permits a party whom a claim has been asserted 

to “move at any time, with or without supporting affidavits, for 

summary judgment/adjudication on all or part of the claim.” 

Fed. R. Civ.P. 56(b). Summary judgment/adjudication is 

appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue 

of fact is “genuine” if it constitutes evidence with which “a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). That 

genuine issue of fact is “material” if it “might effect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” See id. (“As to 

materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are 

material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 

preclude the entry of summary judgment.”).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the nonmoving 

party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the 

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movant’s burden may be discharged by pointing out to the 

district court that there is an absence of evidence to support 

the nonmoving party’s case. See id. at 325; Miller v. Glenn 

Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The moving party need not disprove the other party’s case. 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 987. “Thus, [s]ummary judgment for a 

defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to make a 

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to [his] case, and on which [he] will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If 

the moving party sustains its burden, the burden then shifts to 

the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his or her 

own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); Miller, 454 F.3d at 987. This 

burden requires more than a simple showing that there is some 

“metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 

(1986). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is 

likewise insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “If the nonmoving party fails to 

produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material 

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fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 

1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). “But if the nonmoving party 

produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material 

fact, the nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Id.

On a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable doubt as 

to the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved 

against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 

(9th Cir. 1976). The inferences drawn from the underlying facts 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 

the motion. Valadingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Where different ultimate inferences may be drawn, 

summary judgment is inappropriate. Sankovich v. Insurance Co. 

of North America, 638 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir. 1981). The 

purpose of summary judgment/adjudication is to “pierce the 

pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is 

a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id.

B. Statute of Limitations 

 The County argues that Womack’s Fourth Amendment claims are 

time-barred because more than one-year passed from the date the 

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claims accrued, October 1998 and January 1999, respectively, and 

the date the instant action was commenced, May 15, 2002. 

In § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the forum state’s 

statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with 

the forum state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable 

tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent 

with federal law. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 

2004). Prior to January 1, 2003, California’s one-year statute 

of limitations for personal injury actions applied to § 1983 

suits in federal court. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 

(9th Cir. 2004). Effective January 1, 2003, the new California 

statute of limitations for assault, battery, and other personal 

injury actions is two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. 

Because the extension is not retroactive, it does not 

resuscitate claims that would have already been barred by the 

prior statute of limitations. Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954-55. 

Here, because the instant action was commenced on May 15, 2002, 

any claims accruing before May 15, 2001 are time-barred. 

Federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues. 

Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955. “‘Under federal law, a claim 

accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the 

injury which is the basis of the action.’” Id. Under federal 

law, § 1983 claims relating to pending charges do not accrue 

until the charges are dismissed if a judgment in favor of the 

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plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of any sentence 

that might result from prosecution of pending charges. See

Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1014-16 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“hold[ing] that a § 1983 action alleging illegal search and 

seizure of evidence upon which criminal charges are based does 

not accrue until the criminal charges have been dismissed or the 

conviction has been overturned.”); accord Whitaker v. Garcetti, 

486 F.3d 572, 583 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, because 

Womack’s § 1983 action challenges the searches and seizure of 

evidence upon which the criminal charges were based, his Fourth 

Amendment claims did not accrue until the criminal charges were 

dismissed on August 6, 2001. As such, Womack’s Fourth Amendment 

claims are timely because the instant action was commenced on 

May 15, 2002, less than one-year after the criminal charges were 

dismissed.6

 

6

 Alternatively, Womack’s Fourth Amendment claims are timely 

because, under California law, these claims were tolled during 

the period in which criminal charges were pending as this action 

is based, in part, on the conduct of a county peace officer. 

See Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3 (“No person charged by indictment 

. . . or other accusatory pleading charging a criminal offense 

may bring a civil action for money or damages against a peace 

officer or the public entity employing a peace officer based 

upon conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for 

which the accused is charged, including an act or omission in 

investigating or reporting the offense or arresting or detaining 

the accused, while the charges against the accused are pending 

before a superior court.”). The definition of “peace officer” 

includes an investigator employed by the D.A.’s Office (e.g., 

Hall). See Cal. Penal Code § 830.1 (defining peace officer as 

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C. State Agent Immunity Under § 1983 

The County argues that summary adjudication is appropriate 

with respect to Womack’s Fourth Amendment claims because the 

County officials connected with this action are immune from 

liability by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine 

of sovereign immunity. 

Section 1983 provides for a damages action against “[e]very 

person” who, while acting under color of law, subjects another 

to “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws.” The federal 

Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment grants sovereign immunity from 

such suits not only to each of the fifty states but also to 

state officers. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 

U.S. 58, 71 (1989). This is because a suit against a state 

officer “is no different from a suit against the State itself.” 

Id.; see Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 

(9th Cir. 1997) (a federal action for monetary damages against 

an individual State official acting in his official capacity is 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the same way that an action 

against the State is barred). The United States Supreme Court 

has held that cities, counties, and local officers sued in their 

 

“[a]ny sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff, employed in 

that capacity, of a county, . . . or any inspector or 

investigator employed in that capacity in the office of a 

district attorney, is a peace officer.”). 

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official capacity are themselves “persons” for purposes of § 

1983 and, although they cannot be held vicariously liable under 

§ 1983 for their subordinate officers’ unlawful acts, they can 

be held directly liable for constitutional violations carried 

out under their own regulations, policies, customs, or usages by 

persons having “final policymaking authority” over the actions 

at issue. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784-85 

(1997).7 However, states and state officers sued in their 

official capacity are not considered persons under § 1983 and 

are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the 

 

7

 A plaintiff may establish municipal liability by showing: 

(1) a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the 

standard operating procedure of the local government entity; or 

(2) that the decision-making official was, as a matter of state 

law, a final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may 

fairly be said to represent official policy in the area of 

decision; or (3) that an official with final policymaking 

authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the 

decision of, a subordinate. Ulrich v. City and County of San 

Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002); Menotti v. City 

of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005). A municipal 

policy may be inferred from widespread practices or evidence of 

repeated constitutional violations for which the errant 

municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded. Menotti, 

409 F.3d at 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

municipality can also be liable for an isolated constitutional 

violation when the person causing the violation has “final 

policymaking authority.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 

(9th Cir. 1999). Whether an official has final policymaking 

authority is a question for the court to decide based on state 

law. Id. Here, Womack does not point to a municipal policy to 

support his Monell claim; rather, he bases this claim on the 

ground that the alleged constitutional deprivations were caused 

by the decisions of County officials with final policymaking 

authority. 

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Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 

Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990). Whether this 

immunity applies to a particular governmental official is a 

question of federal law, but the “inquiry is dependent on an 

analysis of state law.” McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786. 

The framework for determining whether an official qualifies 

for Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 claims was established 

by the United States Supreme Court in McMillian, 520 U.S. 781. 

First, a court should “ask whether governmental officials are 

final policymakers for the local government in a particular 

area, or on a particular issue.” Id. at 785. Second, the 

actual function of a governmental official, in a particular 

area, depends “on the definition of the official’s functions 

under relevant state law.” Id. at 786. While state law serves 

as valuable evidence for this determination, federal courts need 

not blindly accept the California Supreme Court’s “balancing of 

the different provisions of state law in determining liability 

under § 1983.” Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1029 

(9th Cir. 2000). The federal analysis of state law to determine 

§ 1983 liability includes an inquiry into the “state’s 

constitution, statutes, and case law.” Brewster v. Shasta 

County, 275 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, while “[t]he 

California Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of 

California state law[,]” Weiner, 210 F.3d at 1028-29, when 

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determining a county’s liability under McMillian, federal courts 

engage in an “independent analysis of California’s constitution, 

statutes and case law.” See Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 

236 F.3d 552, 561 (9th Cir. 2001). Because § 1983 liability 

implicates federal, not state law, California case law is not 

controlling. Id. at 564; see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 

U.S. 622, 647 n.30 (1980) (“Municipal defenses-including an 

assertion of sovereign immunity-to a federal right of action 

are, of course, controlled by federal law.”). The determination 

of whether a county official acts for the state or for the 

county is a question of law. See Jett v. Dallas Independent 

School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). 

 In the present case, the County argues that it is immune 

from liability under the Eleventh Amendment on the basis that in 

California, a district attorney and his investigators act on 

behalf of the state rather than the county when engaged in 

investigating crime. Womack, for his part, maintains that the 

County is not immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment 

because, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a district attorney (as 

a policymaker for the County with respect to obtaining and 

executing warrants) and/or his deputies and investigators 

(policymakers through delegation) act on behalf of the county 

rather than the state when investigating crime. Because the 

County does not dispute that the District Attorney has final 

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policymaking authority over obtaining and executing warrants,8

the County’s § 1983 liability, turns, in part, on whether 

district attorneys and their investigators, when investigating 

crime, act on behalf of the state (which would immunize the 

County from § 1983 liability), or on behalf of the county (which 

would subject the County to § 1983 liability). 

Presently, as noted by the parties, there is a split in 

authority between the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme 

Court with respect to whether a district attorney acts on behalf 

of the state or the county when investigating crime. Compare

Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340, 362 (1998) (reviewing 

California’s constitution, statutes and case law, and concluding 

that a district attorney represents the state rather than the 

county when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting crimes, 

and when establishing policy and training in such areas); with

Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291 F.3d 549, 562-565 

(9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing California’s constitution, statutes 

and case law, and concluding that a district attorney represents 

the county rather than the state when engaging in investigatory 

conduct (e.g., obtaining and executing search warrants) as 

opposed to prosecutorial conduct) vacated and remanded on other 

 

8

 See Bach v. County of Butte, 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 570 

(1983) (concluding that the District Attorney is someone whose 

acts represent official policy). 

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grounds by Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop 

Community of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003).9 Following 

Bishop, the California Supreme Court clarified its holding in 

Pitts by explaining that a district attorney represents the 

state, and is not considered a policymaker for the county, when 

prosecuting crimes and when preparing to prosecute crimes, 

including investigating crimes in advance of prosecution. See

Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 832-33 

(2004). In Venegas, the California Supreme Court stated that 

the “precise holding [in Pitts] was that a district attorney ‘is 

a state official when preparing to prosecute and when 

prosecuting criminal violations of state law[,]’ ” which is 

“clearly confined . . . to situations in which district 

attorneys . . . are actually engaged in performing law 

enforcement duties, such as investigating and prosecuting crime, 

or training staff and developing policy involving such matters.” 

Venegas, 32 Cal.4th at 838-39 (emphasis in original).10 In 

 

9

 See also Weiner, 210 F.3d at 1030 (applying the McMillian

analytic framework and concluding that, as a matter of law, 

based upon California’s constitution, statutes and case law, a 

county district attorney acts as a state official when engaging 

in prosecutorial conduct (e.g., a district attorney represents 

the state when deciding whether to prosecute an individual)). 

10 In clarifying Pitts, the California Supreme Court 

expressly criticized the distinction drawn by Bishop between a 

district attorney prosecuting crime on the one hand and 

investigating crime on the other; observing that a district 

attorney acts on behalf of the state when investigating crimes 

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Pitts, Bishop and Venegas, both the Ninth Circuit and the 

California Supreme Court applied the analytical framework set 

forth in McMillian, but nonetheless reached conflicting 

conclusions. Thus, the question becomes which analysis the 

court should follow. 

 In the present case, the court finds the Ninth Circuit’s 

reasoning in Bishop to be persuasive.11 Although the Ninth 

Circuit’s McMillian analysis in Bishop pre-dated the California 

Supreme Court’s analysis in Venegas, and therefore lacked the 

benefit of the analysis by the state’s highest court, ultimately 

the holding in Venegas is only binding on state courts because 

the ultimate issue-whether or not California district attorney’s 

are subject to liability under § 1983 when investigating crime-

 

in advance of prosecution because: “ ‘[n]o meaningful analytical 

distinction can be made between . . . prosecuting crime on the 

one hand, and training/policymaking regarding criminal 

investigation and prosecution on the other[.] Indeed, a 

contrary rule would require impossibly precise distinctions.’” 

See Venegas, 32 Cal.4th at 833, 837-39. 

11 While the court recognizes that the Bishop decision has 

no precedential authority because it has been vacated, Durning 

v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424, n.2 (9th Cir. 1991), it 

nonetheless finds the case to have persuasive value. DHX, Inc. 

v. Allianz AGF MAT, Ltd., 425 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(observing that “at minimum, a vacated opinion still carries 

informational and perhaps even persuasive or precedential 

value”); see also County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 

646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that the 

opinion of the court of appeals, though vacated, “will continue 

to have precedential weight and, until contrary authority is 

decided, [is] likely to be viewed as persuasive authority if not 

the governing law of the [ ] Circuit”).

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is a question of federal law even though it requires the 

application of some principles of state law to resolve it. 

Streit, 236 F.3d at 560 (“The question of municipal liability 

under section 1983 is one of federal law.”). Thus, while 

Venegas and Pitts are relevant in this court’s “analysis of 

state law” as required by McMillian, these cases do not overturn 

the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Bishop on the ultimate question 

under the federal statute. Accordingly, until Bishop is 

overturned by a panel of the Ninth Circuit or the United States 

Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Bishop is 

persuasive authority for this court. Therefore, because the 

Ninth Circuit in Bishop squarely addressed the issue of whether 

a district attorney acts on behalf of the state rather than the 

county when investigating crimes, and concluded, after applying 

the McMillian analytical framework, that a district attorney 

acts for the county when engaging in investigatory acts, Bishop, 

291 F.3d at 562-65, the court concludes that the district 

attorneys and the district attorney investigator in this action 

are not immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment and 

the doctrine of sovereign immunity for their acts in connection 

with obtaining and executing the search warrants at issue.12 As 

such, the County is not immune from § 1983 liability. 

 

12 Although this case differs from Bishop insofar as Womack 

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 Nevertheless, the court concludes that Womack’s Monell

claim fails because there is no direct evidence before the court 

of the existence of an unconstitutional policy, nor is there any 

evidence of a pattern of municipal activity on the part of the 

County. No other incidents are described. Nor is there proof 

that the alleged constitutional deprivations were caused by an 

existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which can be 

attributed to a municipal policymaker. See City of Okl. City v. 

Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (while a municipality may be 

liable under Monell for a single incident where the person 

causing the violation has “final policymaking authority” (e.g., 

District Attorney), “[p]roof of a single incident of 

 

was indicted at the time of the second search, this search, like 

the search in Bishop, was an investigative rather than 

prosecutorial function because it went beyond gathering evidence 

for the prosecution of Womack for environmental crimes as it 

sought evidence of whether KRL was permeated with fraud. See

KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1113-114 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(concluding that the collateral investigation into whether KRL 

was permeated with fraud was an investigative rather than 

prosecutorial function because it went beyond any legitimate 

preparation to prosecute Womack for any crime in the removal of 

the storage tank or other crime charged in the indictment. 

Specifically, the court concluded that the defendants conduct in 

connection with the collateral investigation was not protected 

by absolute immunity “because defendants were ‘engage[d] in 

behavior typically associated with police work [such as] 

pursuing leads, exploratory fact gathering, and searching for 

evidence’ ”). Accordingly, because obtaining and executing the 

second search warrant was an investigative rather than a 

prosecutorial function, the district attorneys and their 

investigator acted on behalf of the county rather than the state 

with respect to such conduct, and therefore are not entitled to 

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

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unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability 

under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that 

it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, 

which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.”). 

In this case, Womack asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights 

were violated based on: (1) District Attorney Cilenti’s decision 

to assign Hall as the lead investigator despite his inexperience 

investigating environmental crimes; and (2) District Attorney 

Riebe’s decision to seek evidence of new crimes in the “second 

search warrant.”13 These alleged incidents of unconstitutional 

activity are insufficient to establish municipal liability 

because there is no evidence that the alleged deprivations were 

caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which 

can be attributed to a municipal policymaker. 

To the extent that Womack attempts to argue that municipal 

liability attaches based upon the notion that Cilenti and Riebe 

ratified the unconstitutional conduct of subordinates, the court 

rejects this argument. Womack did not proffer evidence 

demonstrating that either Cilenti or Riebe ratified a 

subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, and had knowledge 

 

13 In this regard, Womack alleges that his Fourth Amendment 

rights were violated because Riebe knew that the affidavit in 

support of the second search warrant did not establish probable 

cause for the issuance of a search warrant to search for 

evidence of new crimes. 

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of the alleged constitutional violation and actually approved 

it. See Christie, 176 F.3d 1239. (while a municipality may be 

liable under Monell for a single incident where a final 

policymaker ratifies a subordinates decision, ratification 

requires proof that an authorized policymaker has approved the 

subordinates decision and the basis for it, and has knowledge of 

the alleged constitutional violation and actually approves it). 

The mere assignment of Hall as an investigator, without more, is 

insufficient to support municipal liability predicated upon a 

ratification theory. Nor is Riebe’s decision to seek evidence 

of new crimes in the “second search warrant,” without more, 

sufficient evidence to support municipal liability predicated 

upon a ratification theory. Riebe’s refusal to overrule a 

subordinate’s completed act (i.e., the affidavit prepared by 

Irey and Moore in support of the second search warrant) does not 

constitute approval to support Monell liability.14 See Weisbuch 

v. County of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 781-82 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(“To hold cities liable under section 1983 whenever policymakers 

 

14 In KRL, 384 F.3d at 1116-117, the Ninth Circuit held that 

Riebe was entitled to qualified immunity for his approval of the 

January 11 warrant (i.e., the second search warrant) because it 

was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 

official belief in its existence unreasonable.” In doing so, 

the Ninth Circuit implicitly recognized that reasonable minds 

could disagree as to whether probable cause supported the second 

search warrant and affidavit. See KRL v. Estate of Moore, 512 

F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2008).

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fail to overrule the unconstitutional discretionary acts of 

subordinates would simply smuggle respondeat superior liability 

into section 1983.”) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Additionally, to the extent that Womack argues that 

municipal liability attaches to the County based upon the notion 

that Irey, Hall or Moore exercised policymaking authority on 

behalf of the County over obtaining and executing the search 

warrants at issue, the court finds this argument unpersuasive. 

Womack cites neither facts nor law to support the proposition 

that, as a matter of state law, a deputy district attorney, or a 

district attorney investigator, or a California Highway Patrol 

Officer are individuals whose acts represent official County 

policy, i.e., Womack failed to demonstrate that Irey, Hall or 

Moore had the authority to make final policy over obtaining and 

executing search warrants or that their edicts or acts in this 

regard may be fairly said to represent official policy of the 

municipality. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 920 (9th Cir. 

1996) (concluding that police officers are not officials with 

final policy-making authority); Bach, 147 Cal.App.3d at 570 

(concluding that while a District Attorney is someone whose acts 

represent official policy, this rule does not extend to deputy 

district attorneys (or municipal employees other than elected 

representatives or departmental supervisors) because it would 

cause municipalities to be routinely liable for the tortious 

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acts of employees who violate constitutional rights violating 

the teachings of Monell, namely that there is no respondeat 

superior liability under § 1983). Moreover, the court finds 

that Womack failed to designate specific facts raising the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

final policymaking authority was ever delegated to Irey, Hall or 

Moore. The mere assignment of Irey, Hall and Moore to 

investigate Womack by the District Attorney, without more, is 

insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether final policymaking authority was delegated to Irey, Hall 

or Moore.15 Finally, the court finds that Womack’s failure to 

train/supervise theory of municipal liability fails because he 

did not proffer evidence demonstrating that the alleged 

inadequacy of training or supervision was the result of a 

 

15 An official delegates final policymaking authority when 

it delegates final authority to establish municipal policy with 

respect to the challenged action, not when it delegates 

discretion to act on the municipalities behalf. Christie, 176 

F.3d at 1236. In making this determination, courts consider 

whether the official’s discretionary decision is constrained by 

policies not of that official’s making and whether the 

official’s decision is subject to review by the municipality’s 

authorized policymakers. Id. Because Womack failed to proffer 

evidence demonstrating that Irey, Hall or Moore had final 

authority to establish municipal policy over obtaining and 

executing search warrants, or that they were not constrained by 

policies not of their making, or that their decisions regarding 

obtaining and executing search warrants were not subject to 

review by the District Attorney, municipal liability does not 

attach to the County under § 1983 for the conduct of Irey, Hall 

and Moore for their conduct in connection with obtaining and 

executing the search warrants at issue. 

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“deliberate” or “conscious” choice. While a local government 

may be liable for constitutional violations resulting from its 

failure to supervise, monitor or train, liability only attaches 

where the inadequacy of said supervision, monitoring or training 

amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the people 

with whom the local government comes into contact. See City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388(1989); Long v. County of Los 

Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2006); see also

Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 

1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (absent evidence showing that the alleged 

inadequacy in training was the result of a “deliberate” or 

“conscious” choice, any shortfall in training can only be 

classified as negligence on the part of the municipal defendanta much lower standard of fault than the deliberate indifference 

necessary to establish a municipal policy). 

 For these reasons, summary adjudication of Womack’s Fourth 

Amendment claims is appropriate. 

D. Malicious Prosecution 

 The County argues that summary adjudication of Womack’s 

malicious prosecution claim is appropriate because Womack failed 

to proffer evidence establishing a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether the prior criminal prosecution was pursued to 

a favorable termination. 

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 The general rule is that a malicious prosecution claim is 

not cognizable under § 1983 if process is available in the state 

judicial system to provide a remedy. Usher v. City of Los 

Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, “an 

exception exists to the general rule when a malicious 

prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of 

equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject 

a person to a denial of constitutional rights.” Bretz v. 

Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Thus, a 

malicious prosecution plaintiff “must show that the defendants 

prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that 

they did so for the purpose of denying her equal protection or 

another specific constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of 

Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is based on 

state law elements. See Usher, 828 F.2d at 562. In California, 

the malicious prosecution plaintiff must plead and prove that 

the prior proceeding commenced by or at the direction of the 

malicious prosecution defendant, was: (1) pursued to a legal 

termination favorable to the plaintiff; (2) brought without 

probable cause; and (3) initiated with malice. Villa v. Cole, 4 

Cal. App. 4th 1327, 1335 (1992); Sagonowsky v. More, 64 Cal. 

App. 4th 122, 128 (1998). If a plaintiff cannot establish any 

one of these three elements, his malicious prosecution action 

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will fail. StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Services, Inc., 136 

Cal.App.4th 1392, 1398 (2006). 

With respect to the element of favorable termination, this 

element “requires a termination reflecting the merits of the 

action and plaintiff’s innocence of the misconduct.” Pattiz v. 

Minye, 61 Cal.App.4th 822, 826 (1998). A termination is “not 

necessarily favorable simply because the party prevailed in the 

prior proceeding; the termination must relate to the merits of 

the action by reflecting either on the innocence of or lack of 

responsibility for the misconduct alleged against him.” 

Sagonowsky, 64 Cal.App.4th at 128. “If the resolution of the 

underlying action leaves some doubt concerning plaintiff’s 

innocence or liability, it is not a favorable termination 

sufficient to allow a cause of action for malicious 

prosecution.” Pattiz, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 826. “‘It is 

hornbook law that the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution 

action must plead and prove that the prior judicial proceeding 

of which he complains terminated in his favor.’” Sagonowsky, 64 

Cal.App.4th at 128; see Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 

1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004) (an individual seeking to bring a 

malicious prosecution claim must generally establish that the 

prior proceedings terminated in such a manner as to indicate his 

innocence. A dismissal in the interests of justice satisfies 

this requirement if it reflects the opinion of the prosecuting 

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party or the court that the action lacked merit or would result 

in a decision in favor of the defendant.). “Favorable 

termination ‘is an essential element of the tort of malicious 

prosecution, and it is strictly enforced.’” StaffPro, 136 

Cal.App.4th at 1400. The element of favorable termination in a 

malicious prosecution action is a legal question for the court 

to decide. Id. at 1398. 

In the present case, the underlying action was the 

prosecution of Womack for environmental crimes allegedly 

committed during the removal and disposal of an underground 

storage tank. Following a search of Womack’s residence and 

seizure of documents, Womack was indicted by a grand jury on 

twenty-one counts, most of which concerned the removal of the 

underground storage tank and actions related to its disposal. 

The prosecution of this action was subsequently terminated on a 

motion by the Attorney General’s Office to dismiss all charges 

“in the interests of justice.” Shortly thereafter, a civil 

enforcement action was instituted by the Attorney General’s 

Office against Womack predicated upon the same facts as the 

criminal prosecution, seeking, among other things, civil 

penalties for the unlawful removal and disposal of the 

underground storage tank.16 Womack maintains that a termination 

 

16 Decl. of Laurence L. Angelo, Exh. S.

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of the criminal prosecution “in the interests of justice” is 

sufficient to satisfy the favorable termination element of his 

malicious prosecution claim. In this regard, the court finds 

that Womack has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that 

the prior criminal prosecution was pursued to a favorable 

termination. Specifically, Womack failed to proffer evidence 

demonstrating that the criminal prosecution was terminated in 

such a manner to reflect that the action lacked merit or would 

result in a decision favorable to Womack. Rather, Womack has 

baldly asserted, without citation to controlling authority, that 

a termination “in the interests of justice” is sufficient to 

satisfy the favorable termination element of his malicious 

prosecution claim at the summary judgment stage.17 The court 

disagrees.18 As the party bearing the burden of proof on this 

issue at trial, Womack was required, after the County pointed to 

 

17 In this regard, Womack relies on Awabdy. Such reliance, 

however, is misplaced because Awabdy merely sets forth the 

standard for avoiding dismissal of a malicious prosecution claim 

at the pleading stage, not the production of evidence necessary 

to avoid summary judgment. 

18 A dismissal of criminal proceedings “in the interests of 

justice,” is generally not deemed a favorable termination 

because such a dismissal reflects ambiguously on the merits of 

the action, thus leaving open the question of defendant’s guilt 

or innocence. Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal.App.3d 823, 827 n.4 

(1978); see People v. Matthews, 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1056 (1992) 

(“[D]ismissal [of a criminal indictment] in the interests of 

justice does not necessarily imply factual innocence, but rather 

may reflect the result of a negotiated or pragmatic disposition 

of the case.”). 

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the absence of evidence on this issue, to produce evidence 

indicating that the criminal prosecution terminated in such a 

manner to reflect the action lacked merit or would result in a 

decision favorable to Womack. Womack failed to do so. 

Accordingly, because the termination of the underlying 

prosecution leaves some doubt concerning Womack’s innocence or 

liability, and because Womack failed to establish a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether the underlying dismissal 

constitutes a favorable termination, the County is entitled to 

summary adjudication on Womack’s malicious prosecution claim. 

See Pattiz, 61 Cal.App.4th at 826-27 (summary adjudication is 

appropriate if a plaintiff cannot establish an element of his or 

her malicious prosecution claim).19 

For these reasons, summary adjudication of Womack’s 

malicious prosecution claim is appropriate. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

 

19 Indeed, the fact that the Attorney General’s Office 

instituted a civil enforcement action against Womack shortly 

after dismissing the criminal charges, predicated upon the same 

facts, suggests that the charges against Womack were not 

dismissed based on his innocence or lack of responsibility. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s claims against the County of Amador are hereby 

DISMISSED with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 6th day of March, 20008. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

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