Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01584/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01584-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Janine Klein,

Plaintiff,

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant.

_______________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 13-1584-TUC-DCB

ORDER

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman on November 20, 2013,

pursuant to Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, District of Arizona (Local

Rules), Rule (Civil) 72.1(a). On October 8, 2014, Magistrate Judge Bowman issued a

Report and Recommendation (R&R). She recommends that the Court affirm the Social

Security Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits. The

Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s R&R as the findings of fact and

conclusions of law of this Court, affirms the decision, and enters Judgment for the

Defendant. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The duties of the district court in connection with a R&R by a Magistrate Judge are set

forth in Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Where the parties object to a R&R, “‘[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made.’” Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).

Case 4:13-cv-01584-DCB Document 26 Filed 02/12/15 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1This case was accepted for review by the Appeals Counsel because the ALJ incorrectly

stated the last insured date. The Appeals Counsel adopted the decision of the ALJ and extended

it to the entire period from Klein’s alleged onset date to the date of the ALJ’s decision. The

Commissioner affirmed. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge referred to the final decision of the

Commissioner as the ALJ’s decision and the Plaintiff refers to it as the Appeals Council

decision. This Court will follow the Magistrate Judge’s lead and refer to the final agency

decision as the ALJ’s decision. 

- 2 -

This Court's ruling is a de novo determination as to those portions of the R&R to which

there are objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13

(9th Cir.2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2003) (en

banc). To the extent that no objection has been made, arguments to the contrary have been

waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (objections are waived if they are not

filed within fourteen days of service of the R&R), see also McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d

1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (failure to object to Magistrate's report waives right to do so on

appeal); Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (citing Campbell v. United States

Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974) (when no timely objection is filed, the court

need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept

the recommendation)).

The parties were sent copies of the R&R and instructed that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1), they had 14 days to file written objections. See also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (party

objecting to the recommended disposition has fourteen (14) days to file specific, written

objections). In deciding the case, the Court has considered the objection filed by the

Plaintiff, and the parties’ briefs and the administrative record considered by the Magistrate

Judge.

OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff objects to the R&R. She asserts that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation is

based on a Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) assessment that was not made by the

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1

 The Magistrate Judge failed to consider Plaintiff’s need

to use a sign-language interpreter. The Magistrate Judge improperly treated the ALJ’s

Case 4:13-cv-01584-DCB Document 26 Filed 02/12/15 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

prerogative to analyze the record and assess Klein’s RFC as insulating it from substantialevidence review. The Magistrate Judge incorrectly held that Klien’s restriction to “simple

instructions” did not conflict with the vocational expert’s identification of Reasoning Level

2 Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

The Plaintiff’s objections are aimed at two conclusions made by the ALJ, which the

Magistrate Judge recommends this Court affirm, which are as follows: 1) “The Claimant has

a severe hearing loss and must have a job that requires only occasional hearing and

speaking;” and 2) “She is limited to jobs requiring understanding, remembering and carrying

out simple job instructions only.” (R&R (Doc. 23) at 8 (quoting Tr. 41)).

As to the first conclusion, Plaintiff asserts this misstates the evidence which consisted of

her testimony that she needed “to communicate face-to-face (to lip read) or use a signlanguage interpreter,” (Objection (Doc. 24) at 6 (citing P’s Opening Brief at 17-21)), and

non-examining source opinions that she “could speak without limitation and had a limited

ability to hear”; was “limited in communication in the workplace in any background noise,”

needed to wear hearing aids and avoid concentrated exposure to noise. (Objection (Doc. 24)

at 8-9); (TR 101, 115). Plaintiff challenges the Magistrate Judge’s finding that “the ALJ

could reasonably conclude that Klein’s hearing impairment would limit her ability to hear

and require her on occasion to position herself face-to-face with the speaker and on occasion

to ask the speaker to speak slowly so she could understand. Because her impairment makes

communication more difficult, the ALJ could reasonably conclude that Klein was limited to

jobs that would require only occasional hearing and speaking.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff argues the

ALJ’s decision does not include the logic well articulated by the Magistrate Judge and

“[t]here is nothing intrinsic to hearing and speaking occasionally that such take place faceto-face with slow speaking.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff believes the ALJ did not consider either

limitation and did not consider her need for a sign-language interpreter.

The Court notes that, likewise, there is nothing intrinsic about needing face to face

communications to allow Plaintiff to lip read which precludes her from communicating

Case 4:13-cv-01584-DCB Document 26 Filed 02/12/15 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

“only occasionally.” The ALJ’s decision reflected the Plaintiff was being assisted at the

hearing by a sign-language interpreter, but Plaintiff’s testimony reflected she did not

regularly use an interpreter. Her testimony was that she generally got on by reading lips and

hearing aids helped as long as there was not excessive background noise. See (TR 78); see

also 101, 115 (non-examining state agency medical opinions); R&R at 5 (daily living

activities). Plaintiff’s work history reflects she held jobs, including her current part-time

position as a water aerobics instructor, where she communicated occasionally, without a

sign-language interpreter. Based on Plaintiff’s testimony, such occasional communications

occurred face-to-face without the use of hearing aids. Plaintiff testified her hearing aids

were not working and that she could not use them in the water, anyway because the water

would damage them. (TR at 77.)

The Magistrate Judge did not err in recommending this Court find substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff had severe hearing loss and must have a job that

requires only occasional hearing and speaking.

 The Court finds the same regarding the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to find no

error between the vocational expert’s opinion Plaintiff can perform RDL 2 jobs and the

ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was a person “who can ‘understand and remember [and] carry

out simple job instructions only.’” (R&R (Doc. 23) at 8 (quoting Tr. 41(R&R at 12 (quoting

TR 87, 41)). The vocational expert’s opinion was that Plaintiff could perform jobs listed in

the DOT (Dictionary of Occupational Titles) as having a Reasoning Development Level

(RDL) of 2). (R&R at 12) “She argues that an RDL of 2 is incompatible with her limitation

to ‘understand and remember [and] carry out simple job instructions only.’” Id. 

“An RDL of 2 requires a worker to ‘[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out

detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.’” (R&R at 12-13) (citation omitted). 

“The RDL 1 description contains the word “simple” but further restricts the term in the

phrase “simple one- or two-step instructions.” Id. at 13. The ALJ’s use of the phrase

“simple job instructions” does not exclude Plaintiff from jobs meeting the RDL 2 description

Case 4:13-cv-01584-DCB Document 26 Filed 02/12/15 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

just because it does not contain the word “simple” but uses instead the phrase “detailed but

uninvolved written or oral instructions.” There is no evidence that Plaintiff is limited to

simple one- or two-step instructions. (R&R at 13). Like the Magistrate Judge, this Court

“concludes the vocational expert did not err by opining that Klein could perform the job of

office helper or assembler even though she could ‘understand and remember [and] carry out

simple job instructions only.’” Id.

CONCLUSION

After de novo review of the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Objection, this Court agrees

with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Magistrate Judge in her R&R. 

The Court adopts it, and for the reasons stated in the R&R, the Court affirms the decision of

the ALJ denying Plaintiff disability benefits and dismisses the Plaintiff’s case.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that after a full and independent review of the record, in respect to

the objections, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 23) is accepted

and adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is affirmed and the case is

dismissed. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 11th day of February, 2015.

Case 4:13-cv-01584-DCB Document 26 Filed 02/12/15 Page 5 of 5