Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01082/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01082-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 

IJniCed States Court or App~ls 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 2 8 1996 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff- Appellant, 

v. 

COLORADO SUPREME COURT, 

GRIEVANCECO~TTEEOFTHE 

SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO, 

COLORADO SUPREME COURT 

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEYS, 

Amicus Curiae. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-1082 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D. Ct. No. 93-Z-2672) 

Thomas M. Bondy, Attorney (Henry L. Solano, U.S. Attorney, Kathleen L. Torres, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Barbara L. Herwig, Attorney, with him on the briefs), Civil 

Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General (Gale A. Norton, Attorney General and Laurie 

Rottersman, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief) for Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 95-1082 Document: 01019279484 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 1 
Robert L. Begleiter, Constantine & Partners, New York, NY, for amicus curiae. 

Before TACHA, HOLLOWAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

The issue in this case is whether the United States has standing to challenge the 

application of two Colorado professional ethics rules to federal prosecutors. The district 

court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the 

United States did not have standing because it did not allege that federal prosecutors had 

suffered any actual or imminent injury from application of the rules. We exercise 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse. 

BACKGROUND 

The Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct ("Colorado Rules") govern the 

conduct of all attorneys licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court, whether they practice in 

the state of Colorado or elsewhere. Colo. R. Civ. P. 241.1(b); People v. Schindelar, 845 

P.2d 1146, 1147 (Colo. 1993). Local Rule 83.6 of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado incorporates the Colorado Rules and applies them to all federal 

prosecutions conducted in the District of Colorado. Through Local Rule 83 .6, the 

Colorado Rules also govern the activities of federal prosecutors who are not licensed in 

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Colorado but conduct prosecutions in the District of Colorado. A violation of the 

Colorado Rules constitutes professional misconduct, Colo. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(a), and 

grounds for discipline, Colo. R. Civ. P. 241.6(1). Discipline may include disbarment, 

suspension, censure, or admonition. Colo. R. Civ. P. 241.7. 

The Colorado Rules became effective in January 1993. Rule 3.3(d) states, "In an ex 

parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer 

which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are 

adverse." The comments to Rule 3.8 specify that the "ex parte proceeding" mentioned in 

Rule 3.3(d) includes grand jury proceedings. Rule 3.8(f) provides that "a prosecutor in a 

criminal case shall ... not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding 

to present evidence about a past or present client unless" certain requirements are met, 

including that "the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing 

investigation or prosecution" and "there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the 

information." In addition, Rule 3.8(f) forbids a prosecutor from subpoenaing an attorney to 

present evidence about a client before a grand jury unless she "obtains prior judicial approval 

after the opportunity for an adversarial proceeding." 

In December 1992, the United States Attorney for the District of Colorado wrote to 

the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado and requested 

that the court amend Local Rule 83.6 to exclude application of Colorado Rules 3.3(d) and 

3.8(f) to criminal prosecutions in the District of Colorado. In January 1993, the U.S. 

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Attorney wrote to the Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court and requested that the 

court amend Colorado Rules 3.3(d) and 3.8(f) to prevent their application to federal 

prosecutions. After a year passed without a response from either court, the United States 

filed this suit on behalf of the United States Attorney General, the Department of Justice, and 

the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Colorado, seeking declaratory and 

injunctive relief. The complaint alleges that Colorado Rules 3.3(d) and 3.8(f) violate the 

Supremacy Clause because they alter the nature of the federal grand jury, conflict with 

federal law, and interfere with federal prosecutors in their conduct of criminal investigations 

and prosecutions. 

The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b )( 1 ). 1 United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 

871 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (D. Colo. 1994). The court held that the United States lacked 

standing because federal prosecutors had suffered no injury as a result of application of the 

rules. The court noted that since the rules became effective in January 1993, no disciplinary 

or grievance proceedings had been brought against any federal prosecutor for violating the 

rules. ld.. at 1329. Furthermore, the court determined that federal prosecutors were not 

injured by changing their behavior to conform with the rules because such changes did not 

1 The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to join an 

indispensable party, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, on the ground 

that the two rules would apply to federal prosecutors licensed in Colorado regardless of 

whether the district court in Colorado had adopted them by local rule. Colorado Supreme 

Cm!r.t, 871 F. Supp. 1328, 1328-29 (D. Colo. 1994). 

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affect the attorneys' ability to prosecute cases, and did not injure the attorneys personally. 

l.d.. In sum, the court held that no case or controversy existed because the United States 

could not show actual or imminent injury in fact, and thus could not establish the injury 

element of the standing requirement. The United States appeals this decision, arguing that 

the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 

DISCUSSION 

We review the district court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss for lack of 

standing de novo. Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (lOth Cir. 1994). A motion to 

dismiss is appropriate when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of 

facts entitling it to relief." Ash Creek Minin~ v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868, 870 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

Although the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the elements of standing, Lujan v. 

Defenders ofWildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992), we must accept as true all well-pleaded 

facts, and construe all reasonable allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Hackford, 14 F.3d at 1465. 

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and 

controversies. U.S. Const. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1; Valley For~e Christian Colle~e v. Americans 

United for Separation of Church and State. Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) . The case or 

controversy limitation requires that a plaintiffhave standing. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. 

Ct. at 2136. "In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the 

court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. A 

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plaintiff has standing when (1) she has suffered an injury in fact, (2) there is a causal 

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) it is likely that the 

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. 

An "injury in fact" is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete, 

particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Id. These three 

elements of standing are "an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case," and thus the plaintiff 

must support each element "with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 

successive stages of the litigation." ld.. "At the pleading stage, general factual allegations 

of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we 

'presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support 

the claim."' Id. at 2137 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 

(1990)). 

In this case, the district court held that the United States failed to establish the first 

element of standing, injury in fact. We disagree. In order to establish injury in fact, '"the 

plaintiff must allege some concrete injury, whether actual or threatened .... '" Ash Creek 

Mining, 969 F.2d 868, 875 (quoting Glover River Org. v. United States Dep't oflnterior, 675 

F.2d 251, 253 (lOth Cir. 1982)). The complaint in this case alleges that Colorado Rules 

3.3(d) and 3.8(f) interfere with federal prosecutors in their conduct of criminal proceedings 

and change the nature of the federal grand jury in Colorado. These allegations are 

sufficiently "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent" to withstand a motion to 

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dismiss. 

Colorado Rule 3.3(d) requires the submission of exculpatory evidence to grand juries. 

The Supreme Court held in United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1745 (1992), that 

courts may not use their supervisory power to oblige federal prosecutors to present 

exculpatory evidence. Such a rule is incompatible with the federal grand jury system. 

"[T]he grand jury sits not to determine guilt or innocence, but to assess whether there is 

adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge." ld. at 1744. To make this assessment, "it has 

always been thought sufficient to hear only the prosecutor's side." Id. The Court in 

Williams noted that the grand jury is a constitutional entity, but "belongs to no branch ofthe 

institutional government." ld. at 1742. Consequently, the Court held, courts have very 

limited power to fashion rules of grand jury procedure, and certainly cannot impose rules that 

change the nature of the grand jury or the traditional relationship between the prosecutor, the 

constituting court, and the grand jury itself. Id.. at 17 44. 

By forcing federal prosecutors to submit exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, Rule 

3.3(d) effectively "alter[s] the grand jury's historical role, transforming it from an accusatory 

to an adjudicatory body." ld. We express no opinion on the merits ofthe United States's 

claim that Rule 3 .3( d) violates the Supremacy clause, because standing does not depend on 

the merits ofthe claim. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. However, the Supreme Court's holding in 

Williams supports the United States's contention that it is injured by Rule 3.3(d). By 

alleging that federal prosecutors have changed their practice in order to follow this rule, the 

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• 

United States has alleged a concrete, particularized, and actual injury in fact. 

The United States has also alleged sufficient injury in fact with regard to Rule 3.8(t). 

Rule 3.8(t) forbids prosecutors to subpoena attorneys to present evidence before grand juries 

about past or present clients unless the information sought is "essential" and there is no other 

"feasible alternative to obtain the information." In addition, Rule 3.8(f) requires that 

prosecutors obtain prior judicial approval following an adversarial proceeding in order to 

subpoena an attorney. The United States alleges that Rule 3.8(t) delays the presentation of 

evidence to grand juries, and that the requirement of an adversarial hearing threatens grand 

JUry secrecy. 

These allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. This court has 

specifically held that with regard to subpoenas of attorneys before grand juries, beyond a 

satisfactory showing of relevance, prosecutors are not "required to make any further showing 

of need or a lack of another source for the subpoenaed information." In re Grand Juzy 

Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485, 1496 (lOth Cir. 1990). By alleging that Rule 3.8(t) creates delays 

and jeopardizes secrecy, the United States has established concrete, particularized, and 

actual injury in fact. In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that "requiring the 

Government to explain in too much detail the particular reasons underlying a subpoena 

threatens to compromise" grand jury secrecy. United States v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292, 

299 ( 1991 ). Thus the United States meets the injury in fact requirement when it alleges that 

Rule 3. 8( f)'s provision regarding judicial approval of attorney subpoenas threatens grand jury 

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secrecy. 

The defendants argue that the U.S. Attorneys' Manual contains provisions that are 

substantially similar to Rule 3.8(t), and consequently that Rule 3.8(t) does not require a 

change in federal prosecutors' behavior. However, Rule 3.8(t) requires far more from federal 

prosecutors than does the U.S. Attorneys' Manual. The Manual requires that all subpoenas 

of attorneys for information relating to the representation of a client be approved by the 

Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division. The Manual directs the Assistant 

Attorney General not to approve such subpoenas unless "the information sought is 

reasonably needed for the successful completion of the investigation or prosecution" and "all 

reasonable attempts to obtain information from alternative sources shall have proved 

unsuccessful." Rule 3.8(t)'s requirements that attorney testimony be "essential" and that 

there be "no other feasible alternative to obtain the information" set a higher standard for 

obtaining attorney subpoenas than the Manual. More importantly, Rule 3.8(t) requires 

judicial approval of attorney subpoenas after an adversarial hearing. This requirement 

creates a substantial change in federal prosecutors' practice. In addition, the adversarial 

hearing required by the Rule jeopardizes grand jury secrecy; no provision in the Manual has 

a similar effect. In sum, Rule 3.8(t) ~change federal prosecutors' practice, and the 

United States's allegations as to those changes establishes injury in fact. 

Federal prosecutors have challenged rules substantially similar to Colorado's Rule 

3.8(t) in the First and Third Circuits. Whitehouse v. United States District Court for the 

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.. 

District of Rhode Island, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995); Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992). In Whitehouse, the court 

upheld a federal district court's adoption of a state ethical rule similar to Colorado's Rule 

3.8(f). 53 F.3d at 1355. The Baylson court held that adoption of such a rule falls outside the 

rule-making authority of the federal courts. 975 F.2d at 104. What is significant for this 

case, however, is that neither the Whitehouse nor the Baylson court addressed the issue of 

standing. A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a case if the plaintiff does not have 

standing, Valley For~e, 454 U.S. at 471-76, and a court must raise the standing issue sua 

sponte, if necessary, in order to determine if it has jurisdiction. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 

(1979); FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 

1996); Ban~erterv. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1497 (lOth Cir. 1995); In re Thompson, 

965 F.2d 1136, 1140 (1st Cir. 1992). Although the First and Third Circuits did not address 

standing when they decided cases very similar to this one, we must assume that those courts 

believed that the plaintiffs had standing as both courts proceeded to address their respective 

cases on the merits. 

In its opinion, the district court suggested that the United States could establish 

standing only by alleging that disciplinary actions had been taken against a federal prosecutor 

who had violated the rules. This is incorrect. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 2201, a plaintiff may seek declaratory relief before actual harm occurs if she has a 

reasonable apprehension of that harm occurring. As we observed in ANR Pipeline v. 

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Corporation Commission of Oklaboma, 

Parties need not ... await the imposition of penalties under an unconstitutional 

enactment in order to assert their constitutional claim for an injunction in 

federal court. Once the gun has been cocked and aimed and the finger is on 

the trigger, it is not necessary to wait until the bullet strikes to invoke the 

Declaratory Judgment Act. 

860 F.2d 1571, 1578 (lOth Cir. 1988). Thus federal prosecutors need not risk disbarment by 

violating the Colorado Rules in order to challenge those rules in federal court. 

The United States filed this suit nearly a year after the rules went into effect. The 

defendants suggest that this delay in filing suit undermines the United States's standing. The 

United States explains, however, that the U.S. Attorney requested exemptions from Rules 

3.3(d) and 3.8(f) from federal district court of Colorado and the Colorado Supreme Court, 

and waited for a response from those bodies before commencing this lawsuit. Such efforts 

to avoid litigation do not cast doubt on standing in this case. 

In sum, we hold that the United States's complaint sufficiently alleges the injury in 

fact required for standing. Thus the decision of the district court is REVERSED, and this 

case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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