Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01949/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01949-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OMAR ERNEST EPPS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv1949-BEN (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION THAT

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION BE DENIED

[ECF No. 20]

vs.

N. GRANNIS, et al.,

Defendant.

On February 22, 2011, Plaintiff, a prisoner incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison and

proceeding pro se, filed a Motion For a Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary

Injunction. (Doc. No. 20). In his Motion, Plaintiff states that injunctive relief is necessary to prevent

ongoing violations of his First Amendment Freedom to Free Exercise of Religion. Id. On June 10,

2011, Defendants filed a Motion in Opposition (Doc. No. 54). On June 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed a

Reply to Defendants’ Opposition. (Doc. No. 56). 

In his Motion, Plaintiff claims that an injunction is necessary because he has been “denied

his right to free exercise and expression of religion.” (Doc. No. 20). Plaintiff argues that if his

Motion is not granted, these violations will continue. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that: (1)

he should be allowed into the Kosher diet program as his “heart risk and bad cholesterol are

rising”; (2) he should be able to receive “special religious packages” and “religious artifacts”; (3)

that he and other Muslims be allowed to attend worship services; and (4) that his Ramadan and

- 1 - 10cv1949-BEN (MDD)

Case 3:10-cv-01949-BEN-KSC Document 59 Filed 08/01/11 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

‘Eidul Fitr prayers have been severely hindered and/or refused.” Id. 

Injunctive relief is appropriate only when “irreparable injury” is threatened, City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983), and any injunctive relief awarded must avoid

unnecessary disruption to the state agency’s “normal course of proceeding.” O’Shea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488, 501 (1974) (“proper balance in the concurrent operation of federal and state courts

counsels restraint against the issuance of injunctions against state officers”). 

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy.” Winter v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 (2008) (internal citation omitted). The court must balance

“the competing claims of injury, ... the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the

requested relief, ... the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction,”

and plaintiff's likelihood of success. Id. at 374, 376-77 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480

U.S. 531, 542 (1987)); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). In order to

obtain a preliminary injunction the plaintiff must establish that “he is likely to succeed on the

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555

U.S. at 137.

An even more stringent standard is applied where mandatory, as opposed to prohibitory,

preliminary relief is sought. “[W]here a party seeks mandatory preliminary relief that goes well

beyond maintaining the status quo pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious about issuing

a preliminary injunction.” Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th

Cir.1984). Thus, an award of mandatory preliminary relief is not to be granted unless both the

facts and the law clearly favor the moving party and extreme or very serious damage will result.

See Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir.1979). “[I]n doubtful cases” a

mandatory injunction will not issue. Id. 

A. Irreparable Injury

First, in order to succeed on his Motion, Plaintiff must show that he will suffer irreparable

injury. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he

has been denied his rights to Free Exercise and Expression of Religion. (Doc. No. 20). Plaintiff

- 2 - 10cv1949-BEN (MDD)

Case 3:10-cv-01949-BEN-KSC Document 59 Filed 08/01/11 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

asserts that, as a matter of law, an ongoing deprivation of constitutional rights constitutes

irreparable injury. Id. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to show he will suffer

irreparable injury, because he has not established how he will suffer a constitutional deprivation. 

(Doc. No. 50). Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not shown how the Kosher diet

interferes with his religious exercise, what “religious packages” and “artifacts” he is being barred

from receiving, or how he is being prevented from worshiping. Id.

Plaintiff cites Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1987) for the proposition that the

deprivation of constitutional rights, as a matter of law, constitutes irreparable injury. Defendants

counter that Elrod was a Freedom of Association case, not a Free Exercise case. (Doc. No. 50). 

Defendant’s argument is unavailing. The “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal

periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 347. 

Furthermore, the “loss of an ability to practice a central tenet of one’s religion for any extended

amount of time is clearly an irreparable injury.” Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 483 (D.

Ariz., 1995). 

However, even though Plaintiff is correct that the deprivation of his right to Free Exercise

of Religion is an irreparable injury, he has not shown how he suffered a constitutional deprivation. 

His Motion contains vague allegations that he has not been allowed to worship, but there is no

indication that this is actually the case. He has not stated, with specificity, how his ability to

worship was constrained. Furthermore, though Plaintiff contends that this current diet is

unhealthy, a proposition unsupported in Plaintiff’s Motion, he has not explained how the current

diet violates the tenets of his religion. (See Doc. No. 20). While he states that his chronic

constipation and flatulence causes him to “be in a continous [sic] state of ritual impurity,” it is

does not appear that he must be placed on the Kosher diet to cure this problem. Defendants state

that Plaintiff can be placed on a medical needs diet or receive other medical treatment. (Doc. No.

50 at 5). 

Thus, Plaintiff has not clearly established that he will suffer an irreparable injury if an

injunction is not granted. 

/ / /

- 3 - 10cv1949-BEN (MDD)

Case 3:10-cv-01949-BEN-KSC Document 59 Filed 08/01/11 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Even if Plaintiff has established irreparable injury, he has not established a likelihood of

success on the merits. Plaintiff states that he has shown a likelihood of success, and cites Shakur

v. Schiro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008) in support. In Shakur, a Muslim inmate argued that the

prison’s refusal to provide him with a Kosher diet unconstitutionally burdened his religious

exercise. Id. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the Shakur Court did not hold that the plaintiff was

unconstitutionally burdened . See id. The Shakur court merely noted that, at the summary

judgment phase, under the four factor Turner test to determine if the challenged prison regulation

is valid, at least two of the factors weighed in favor on the prison, and the other two were too close

to determine at the summary judgment phase. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit merely held that

unresolved factual issues, such as whether there were alternative diet programs, precluded

summary judgment. Id. Here, Defendants have already stated that Plaintiff can be placed on an

alternative medical diet. (Doc. No. 50). Thus, Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success

on the merits. 

C. Balance of Equities

Plaintiff has not shown that the balance of hardships weighs in his favor. In his Motion,

Plaintiff contends that he will face ongoing suffering if an injunction is not granted, and that

Defendants face no hardship if an injunction is granted. (Doc. No. 20). Defendants contend that

an injunction would increase costs in the prison, as the Kosher meals cost more than the religious

alternative diet, and that Defendants would have to completely restructure prison policy during

Muslim holidays, which could jeopardize prison security. While it is unclear if the argument that

the Kosher meal costs more is valid, See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891, Defendants’ other argument is

valid. Plaintiff’s vague and general request that Muslim inmates be allowed to move more freely

about the prison would require Defendants to radically alter prison policies; policies put in place to

ensure the safety and security of the facility. Because there is considerable burden to Defendants

and Plaintiff has not clearly established what burden he faces if an injunction is not granted, this

factor weighs in favor of Defendants. 

/ / /

- 4 - 10cv1949-BEN (MDD)

Case 3:10-cv-01949-BEN-KSC Document 59 Filed 08/01/11 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

D. Effect of an Injunction on the Public Interest

Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that an injunction would be in the public interest. Plaintiff

contends that an injunction will serve the public interest because it is always in the public interest

for prison officials to obey the law. (Doc. No. 20). However, Plaintiff has not shown that

Defendants are violating the law, or that he is likely to succeed on his claim that Defendants are

violating the law. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that there is a public interest in orderly

and safe prisons, as well as maintaining the cost of prisons. (Doc. No. 50). The Court agrees, and

finds that this factor weighs in favor of Defendants. 

E. Conclusion

It is recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objection to this REPORT must be filed

with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 19, 2011. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendations. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than August 26, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specific time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 1, 2011

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

- 5 - 10cv1949-BEN (MDD)

Case 3:10-cv-01949-BEN-KSC Document 59 Filed 08/01/11 Page 5 of 5