Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06584/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06584-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

CAMERON HOOKER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

D. ADAMS, et al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 04- 6584 REC DLB P 

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS IN PART AND GRANTING

PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Cameron Hooker (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding against

defendants Adams and Woodford (“defendants”) on plaintiff’s claim that they violated his

constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and that defendant

Adams discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 

Plaintiff is seeking both injunctive relief and money damages, and appears to be suing defendants in

both their official and personal capacities. 

On April 22, 2005, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

defendants filed the present motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim

Case 1:04-cv-06584-LJO -DLB Document 23 Filed 11/22/05 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court will address plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend by separate order. 1

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 20, 2005 and also filed a

morion for leave to file an amended complaint. Defendants filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion

for leave to amend the complaint on November 17, 2005.1

B. Legal Standard

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider v. California

Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The federal system is

one of notice pleading. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). “Rule

8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions,” none of

which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002);

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a

statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any

set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. Discovery and summary

judgment motions - not motions to dismiss - “define disputed facts” and “dispose of unmeritorious

claims.” Id. at 512. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the

pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353

F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

Case 1:04-cv-06584-LJO -DLB Document 23 Filed 11/22/05 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 3

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th

Cir. 1981). 

C. Discussion

1. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff alleges that he is dyslexic, reads very slowly and has a 4 grade spelling level. He th

states that on July 6, 1993, he purchased a typewriter with spelling and grammar check at Folsom

State Prison. He also states that between the year 2000 and 2001, he bought a color television. 

Plaintiff was transferred to Corcoran State Prison on November 19, 2003. He states that both the

typewriter and the television were confiscated and held, pursuant to established policy, pending

arrival of his trust account money from Folsom State Prison to pay for the shipping of the property

home. Plaintiff states that he filed inmate grievances challenging the disposition of his property. He

alleges that on December 24, 2003, the property was mailed out of the institution at plaintiff’s

expense in violation of his due process rights. Plaintiff states the property is now at the home of his

father.

Defendants argue that these allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

because he was not deprived of his property.

An authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process

Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush

Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985). An authorized

deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or statutes. 

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 436; Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). Authorized

deprivations of property are permissible if carried out pursuant to a regulation that is reasonably

Case 1:04-cv-06584-LJO -DLB Document 23 Filed 11/22/05 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

“‘Ordinarily, due process of law requires [notice and] an opportunity for some kind of

hearing prior to the deprivation of a . . . property interest.’” Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d

1257, (9 Cir. 1995)(internal quotations and citations omitted). “However, when the action th

complained of is legislative in nature, due process is satisfied when the legislative body performs its

responsibilities in the normal manner prescribed by law.” Id. “[G]overnmental decisions which

affect large areas and are not directed at one or a few individuals do not give rise to the constitutional

due process requirements of individual notice and hearing; general notice as provided is sufficient.” 

Id.

As pointed out by defendants, where the inmate still retains ownership of the property, some

court shave found the requirements of due process satisfied as long as the prison authorities provide

the inmate with the opportunity to dictate where to send the property. See Searcy v. Simmons, 299

F.3d 1220, 1229 (10 Cir. 2002); Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10 Cir. 1991). Defendants th th

argue that because plaintiff does not allege that defendants failed to provide adequate notice or that

he was not allowed to dictate where his property was sent, he fails to state a cognizable claim and

this claim must be dismissed.

The Court agrees that plaintiff has failed to allege whether he received adequate notice of the

restriction or whether he was given the opportunity to decide where the property would be sent. 

However, these are not deficiencies that cannot be cured by amendment. Accordingly, the Court

recommends that defendants motion to dismiss this claim be granted but that plaintiff be granted

leave to amend the complaint to cure these deficiencies.

2. ADA Claim

Defendants contend that to the extent plaintiff is claiming an action under the ADA against

defendant Adams, his claim fails because the ADA does not provide for individual liability.

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides that:

No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected

Case 1:04-cv-06584-LJO -DLB Document 23 Filed 11/22/05 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 5

to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132. Because Title II of the ADA was modeled after § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, “[t]here is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” Zukle v. Regents of the University of California, 166 F.3d 1041,

1045, n. 11 (9 Cir. 1999). To establish a claim under the ADA and RA, plaintiff must demonstrate th

that (1) he is a person with a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified; and that the defendants’

actions either (3) excluded his participation or denied him the benefits of a service, program, or

activity; or (4) otherwise subjected him to discrimination on the basis of his physical handicap. See

Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 477, 455 (9 Cir. 1996). th

The term “public entity” is defined under Title II as any state or local government or any

department, agency, or other instrumentality of state or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A),

(B). Individuals are not proper defendants under Title II of the ADA. Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d

344, 346 (7 Cir. 2000); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8 Cir. 1999); th th

Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240-41 (D. Colo. 1999) (finding that individual liability

does not exist under the ADA); see also Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10 Cir. th

1999); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11 Cir. 1996); Gallo v. Bd. of Regents of the th

University of California, 916 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (S.D. Cal. 1995). In the instant case, plaintiff sues

the individual defendants in their official and individual capacities. Because plaintiff cannot

maintain an action against individuals under Title II of the ADA, the ADA claims against defendants

in their individual capacities must be dismissed. 

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss is GRANTED in PART as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s due process claim be GRANTED and

plaintiff be granted 20 days from the District Court’s adoption of this

recommendation to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in

this order;

Case 1:04-cv-06584-LJO -DLB Document 23 Filed 11/22/05 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 6

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ADA claim against defendants in their

individual capacities be GRANTED without leave to amend; and

3. Should plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint within 20 days of the District

Court’s adoption of this recommendation, this case proceed on plaintiff’s ADA claim

against defendants in their official capacities only.

The Court HEREBY ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to

the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy of these

Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)©. The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 21, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06584-LJO -DLB Document 23 Filed 11/22/05 Page 6 of 6