Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00117/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brad Farabough, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Arizona Department of Corrections, et

al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 05-117-PHX-JAT (MS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner, while confined at the Arizona State Prison in Florence, Arizona,

filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By A Person in State Custody Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254" ("Petition") on March 8, 2005. [Doc. # 4]. The Petition contains

four grounds for relief:

Ground One: Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when Petitioner's trial counsel failed to adequately

investigate witnesses that were made available by Petitioner. Petitioner's trial counsel also failed to consult with Petitioner during critical phases of pre-trial proceedings.

Ground Two: Petitioner is actually innocent of the crime for which he was

convicted and Petitioner's innocence would have been demonstrated had

certain witnesses been called to testify and as shown by certain psychological examinations performed in 2000 and 2001. 

Ground Three: Petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to do process were violated when Petitioner was denied an evidentiary hearing on his newly discovered evidence during his first post-conviction proceeding. 

Case 2:05-cv-00117-JAT Document 19 Filed 03/17/06 Page 1 of 10
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 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

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Ground Four: Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was violated when trial counsel refused to provide witness testimony that was

central to Petitioner's claim of actual innocence. 

In their Answer, Respondents contend that the Petition was not filed within the

one-year time limit imposed by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 ("AEDPA").1 [Doc. # 13]. Specifically, Respondents conclude that the

Petition was untimely because Petitioner filed his first petition for post-conviction

relief after AEDPA's statute of limitations for seeking federal review had already

expired. Respondents further argue that even if Petitioner's federal habeas petition

is deemed timely, his claims are procedurally defaulted. 

The Court provided time for a Reply, which Petitioner filed. [Doc. # 18]. In his

Reply, Petitioner argues that because his first petition for post-conviction relief was

deemed timely filed, he is entitled to statutory tolling pursuant to § 2254(d)(2). 

Petitioner further argues that, even if he is not entitled to statutory tolling, he is

entitled to equitable tolling because he was "in transition" in the Department of

Corrections until December 14, 2004, and therefore had limited access to the mail

and legal supplies. 

Upon consideration of the Petition, Answer, Reply, and record in this case, the

Court reports and recommends as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 2, 1993, Petitioner was indicted in state court on one count

of child molestation. [Doc.13, Exh A., 000002]. On April 28, 1994, he was charged

with an additional three counts of child molestation. [Doc. 13, Exh. C, 000003]. 

The charges were consolidated for trial. [Doc. 13, Exh. B, 000064, Exh. D, 000013].

The jury found him guilty on one count, but were unable to reach a verdict on the

remaining counts. [Doc. 13, Exh. B, 000073, Exh. D, Item 000013]. The court

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2 The first plea agreement was entered in state case number CR 1993-

92403.

3 The second plea agreement was entered in state case number CR

1994-91247. 

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declared a mistrial with respect to the counts on which the jurors could not agree.

[Id.].

Petitioner entered into two plea agreements on September 22, 1994.

Pursuant to the first plea agreement,2

 Petitioner pled no contest to one count of

attempted child molestation, a class 3 felony. [Doc. 13, Exh. A, 000082, Exh. B,

000083]. On October 5, 1994, Petitioner received a suspended sentence and

lifetime probation. [Doc. 13, Exh. B, 000088]. As a condition of probation, Petitioner

was ordered incarcerated for a term of one year. [Id.].

Pursuant to the second plea agreement,3 Petitioner pled no contest to one

count of public sexual indecency, a class 5 felony. [Doc. 13, Exh. C, 000025; Exh.

D, 000026]. Petitioner received a suspended sentence and a three year term of

probation with respect to this plea. [Doc. 13, Exh. D, 000028]. On April 19, 1996,

Petitioner's probation was revoked due to a probation violation. [Doc. 13, Exh. D,

000035]. He was then sentenced to a term of two years imprisonment, with credit

for 166 days of pre-sentence incarceration. [Id.].

Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 27, 2001, and a

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on June 13, 2001. [Doc. 13, Exh. E, F]. The

Petition was summarily dismissed as untimely by the state trial court on August 3,

2001. [Doc. 13, Exh. G]. 

Petitioner filed a motion for re-hearing in August of 2001, alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. [Doc. 13, Exh. H].

Petitioner's motion for rehearing was granted on October 3, 2001. [Doc. 13, Exh I].

Nonetheless, Petitioner's petition was dismissed by the trial court on January 18,

2002. [Doc. 13, Exh. K].

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Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals in

March of 2002. [Doc. 13, Exh. L]. The Petition was summarily denied on February

21, 2003. [Doc. 13, Exh. M]. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the

Arizona Supreme Court. [Doc. 13, Exh. N]. The Supreme Court summarily denied

review on December 5, 2003. [Doc. 13, Exh. O].

Petitioner's federal habeas Petition was filed in this Court on March 8, 2005.

[Doc. 4]. Respondents oppose the Petition on grounds that it is barred by the

statute of limitations. Alternatively, Respondents contend that Petitioner's claims

are procedurally defaulted.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Federal One-Year Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") imposes

a one-year limitation period on state prisoners filing habeas corpus petitions in

federal court. For prisoners whose convictions were final prior the effective date of

the AEDPA, the one-year time limit begins on April 25, 1996, the day after the

AEDPA was enacted. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001). For everyone else, the time begins to run on the date their

judgment of conviction becomes final. A judgment of conviction becomes final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.

28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 (1987). 

A petitioner is given 30 days from the date the Arizona Court of Appeals files

its decision on direct appeal to file a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme

Court. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.19 (a). In addition a judgment is not

“final” where a prisoner has sought direct review to the state’s highest court until the

expiration of the ninety day period in which a defendant may file a petition for writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. Wixom, 264 F.3d at 898; Bowen

v. Rowe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999).

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4 The time period for filing any notice of post-conviction relief or petition

for writ of certiorari also would have expired prior to the enactment of

the AEDPA. Likewise, Petitioner's probation in case number CR 1994-

91247 was revoked prior to the effective date of the AEDPA.

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In the instant case, Petitioner’s conviction became final before the enactment

of the AEDPA. Judgment and sentence on Petitioner's plea of guilty was entered

on October 5, 1994. Because a Petitioner who pleads guilty is not entitled to direct

review of a sentence, see Rule 17.1(e), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

Petitioner's conviction became final on that date.4 The one-year time limit to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus therefore began on April 25, 1996, the day

after the AEDPA was enacted. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246.

The AEDPA's one-year limitation period is subject to both statutory and

equitable tolling. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th

Cir. 1998). Absent such tolling, Petitioner had until April 24, 1997 to file an action

for habeas corpus relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Patterson, 251

F.3d at 1246. Petitioner's federal habeas petition was not filed until March 8, 2005,

almost eight years after time to file under the statute of limitations had run.

Therefore, this Court must determine whether he is entitled to either statutory or

equitable tolling.

B. Statutory Tolling

Section 2244(d)(2) of the AEDPA provides that “[t]he time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation.” 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). An application for collateral review

is pending during all of the time in which a state prisoner is "attempting, through

proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies. . . .” Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Petitioner filed a Post-Conviction Relief Petition in state court on April 27,

2001. [Doc. 13, Exh. E]. This Petition was filed four years after the one-year federal

statute of limitations expired on April 24, 1997. Petitioner argues that he should be

entitled to statutory tolling because his post-conviction petitions, which were based

on newly discovered evidence, were properly filed under the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. 

Petitioner's argument fails for two reasons. First, the federal statute of

limitations is not tolled during the period of time between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief. See Nino, 183 F.3d at

1006 ("AEDPA's statute of limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is

issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is filed

because there is no case 'pending' during that interval."). Therefore, even if

Petitioner's post-conviction relief petition would be timely under the Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure, the federal statute of limitations nonetheless expired before

Petitioner's state post-conviction proceedings commenced. Second, once the

federal one-year statute of limitations has run, a subsequent post-conviction relief

petition does not reset the statute of limitations. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner's postconviction Petition for Review on December 5, 2003. [Doc. 13, Exh. O]. Thus,

even assuming that Petitioner's state post-conviction filings could toll the statute of

limitations until this date, Petitioner would have had to file his habeas corpus petition

by December of 2004. His Petition, which was not filed until March of 2005, would

still be untimely under this approach. 

Petitioner additionally argues that this Court should review his federal habeas

petition despite any procedural defects because he is actually innocent. Petitioner

theorizes that the victims' mother convinced her children to falsely accuse him. In

support of his claim of actual innocence, Petitioner points to the affidavits of several

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witnesses who could attack the credibility of the victims' mother and the reports of

two psychologists who could raise doubts about his sexual propensities. 

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315-16 (1995), the United States Supreme

Court held that petitioners may avoid procedural bars to consideration of the merits

of their petitions if they can establish "actual innocence." A petitioner may pass

through the Schlup gateway "if all the evidence, including the new evidence, makes

it 'more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.' " See Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th

Cir. 2002) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

The Ninth Circuit has not yet definitively resolved whether Schlup's "actual

innocence gateway" is available to save a habeas corpus Petition from dismissal

pursuant to the statute of limitations. See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776-77 (9th

Cir. 2002) (suggesting actual innocence gateway may be available; remanding for

determination of whether actual innocence established before deciding whether

gateway available under AEDPA). Nonetheless, the Court need not decide the issue

in this case because Petitioner has not made the extraordinary showing required to

establish actual innocence. 

The affidavits Petitioner offers to establish that the victims' mother urged her

children to falsely accuse Petitioner of molestation do not establish that the children

were lying. The affidavits instead amount to impeachment evidence that might have

been offered to challenge the victims' motivation to testify. The Ninth Circuit has

recognized that such "speculative and collateral impeachment falls far short of

showing actual innocence." Gandarela, 286 F.3d at 1086 (finding that evidence

offered to impeach a four-year-old molestation victim's testimony was not sufficient

to establish actual innocence). 

Moreover, the two psychological evaluations Petitioner offers in support of his

claim do not establish actual innocence. These evaluations allegedly indicated that

Petitioner did not possess deviant personality traits and raised skepticism over

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5

 The Court further finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.

Petitioner has not made any showing that an evidentiary hearing would yield any

evidence other than the evidence already offered by Petitioner in support of his

claim. The newly presented evidence offered, even if accepted, does not establish

actual innocence. Under these circumstances, Petitioner is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. See Griffin, 350 F.3d at 966 (citing 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2));

Gandarela, 286 F.3d at 1087.

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whether Petitioner committed the offenses at issue. [See Doc. 4 at 6; Doc. 13, Exh.

E at 6-8]. The Ninth has explained that speculative evaluations obtained subsequent

to a conviction "merit little weight on habeas review" because "psychiatrists disagree

widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness a defendant could . . .always

provide a showing of factual innocence by hiring psychiatric experts who would

reach a favorable conclusion." Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1515 (9th Cir. 1990)). The Court has

further recognized that "it is clear that the mere presentation of new psychological

evaluations...does not constitute a colorable showing of actual innocence." Id.

(quoting Harris, 949 F.2d at 1516). Here, the psychological reports at issue might

have bolstered Petitioner's case if offered into evidence, however, the reports do not

negate the possibility that a reasonable juror could find Petitioner guilty of the crimes

charged.5

C. Equitable Tolling

The Court next considers whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. A

petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only “if extraordinary circumstances beyond

[his] control made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon, 128 F.3d at

1288-1289. See also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. ___ (2005), 2005 WL 957194,

*6 (U.S. April 27, 2005); Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir.

2003)(quoting Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)); Calderon v.

United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163

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F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Woodford

v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). Put another way, equitable tolling may be

available "[w]hen external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely claim." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999). The litigant generally bears the burden of proving both that he has been

diligently pursuing his claim and that extraordinary circumstances impeded filing. 

Pace, 544 U.S. ___ (2005), 2005 WL 957194, *6; see also Lehman v. United States,

154 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, Petitioner asserts that he was classified by the Arizona Department of

Corrections as a prisoner "in transition" during part of his incarceration. He

maintains that, despite his due diligence, he was not able to obtain the required legal

forms to file his habeas corpus petition until he obtained "permanent residence" on

December 14, 2004. He claims that thereafter, he could not file his Petition because

he was denied access to a paralegal.

The Court finds Petitioner's argument insufficient to establish a basis for

equitable tolling. Even assuming that Petitioner's transitional status impeded his

ability to file a habeas corpus petition, Petitioner concedes that the impediment was

lifted on December 14, 2004. He did not file his Petition until almost three months

later. Petitioner attempts to justify this delay in filing by asserting that he lacked

access to a paralegal. The Ninth Circuit has squarely rejected the argument for

equitable tolling that is based on a lack of access to legal materials when the

petitioner was able, as here, to file post-conviction petitions. See Gaston v. Palmer,

417 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005). 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner's federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed several years

after the statute of limitations expired, and he has not established entitlement to

either statutory or equitable tolling. Accordingly, his claims are time-barred.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's "Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus By A Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254" (Doc.

# 4) be DENIED and DISMISSED in its entirely as untimely filed.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1),

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties

shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties

have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be

considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED this 17th day of March, 2006.

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