Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00208/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00208-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert M. Lepson,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Corizon Health, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 20-00208 PHX SPL (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN:

I. Background

Plaintiff filed a prisoner civil rights complaint and motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis on January 29, 2020. In an Order entered February 27, 2020, the Court granted 

Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismissed Defendants Todd, Stewart, 

Johnson, Weekly, Barrett, and Smith, and Count Four of the Complaint, without 

prejudice. (ECF No. 6). The Court ordered Defendants Corizon, Centurion, Sewell, and 

Burns to answer the other three counts of the Complaint. (Id.). The Court concluded:

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a claim in Count One against 

Defendant Corizon regarding its policy, custom, or practice of providing 

the cheapest possible medical care to save costs, regardless of medical 

needs; an Eighth Amendment medical care claim in Count Two against 

Defendants Sewell and Burns for failure to treat Plaintiff’s injuries; an 

Eighth Amendment threat-to-safety or failure-to-protect claim in Count 

Three against Defendants Sewell and Burns for returning Plaintiff to the 

general population after he was assaulted; an Eighth Amendment claim 

threat-to-safety or failure-to-protect claim in Count Three against 

Defendant Burns for placing Plaintiff in administrative segregation rather

than the medical unit after the second assault; and an Eighth Amendment 

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medical care claim in Count Three against Defendant Burns for 

discontinuing Plaintiff’s medication. 

(ECF No. 6 at 10).

The Court ordered Defendants Sewell and Burns to answer the relevant portions of 

Counts Two and Three, and Corizon to answer Count One. (Id.). Additionally, because 

Corizon was no longer the Arizona Department of Corrections contracted healthcare 

provider, it ordered Defendant Centurion to answer only Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive 

relief. (Id.). Plaintiff returned service packets for Defendants Corizon, Centurion, 

Sewell, and Burns to the Court. Defendants Centurion, Burns, and Corizon waived 

service on April 3, 2020 and Defendant Centurion docketed an answer on May 29, 2020.

Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint on April 3, 2020, filing a 

proposed amended complaint. (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff restates claims for relief against

Todd, Stewart, Johnson, Weekly, Barrett, and Smith, and also seeks to add an additional 

25 defendants and a fifth claim for relief. (ECF No. 17 at 10-15).

II. Governing law

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff should 

be given leave to amend his complaint when justice so requires. Granting or denying 

leave to amend is a matter committed to the Court’s discretion. Hartmann v. California 

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). The Prison Litigation 

Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), requires the screening of prisoner complaints and 

the dismissal of allegations that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

prior to ordering service of a complaint on the defendants. See, e.g., O’Neal v. Price, 531 

F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Futility of amendment is sufficient to justify denial of a 

motion for leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 

2010). A proposed amended complaint is futile if, accepting all of the facts alleged as 

true, it would be immediately “subject to dismissal” for failure to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998); Riverview 

Health Inst. LLC v. Medical Mutual of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), and the Court is 

obliged to liberally construe an incarcerated pro se plaintiff’s complaint. See, e.g., Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, although Rule 8 does not demand 

detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[A]

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id., quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). A claim is plausible only “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Therefore, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, the reviewing 

court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s 

conduct. Id. at 681.

To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) an act by the named 

defendant; (2) taken under color of state law; (3) which deprived the plaintiff of a federal 

right; and (4) caused him damage. E.g., Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158,

1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, a plaintiff must allege he suffered a specific injury 

as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and he must allege an affirmative link 

between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-

72, 377 (1976).

Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to add claims that the named defendants 

denied him adequate and timely medical care, and to add claims that individual 

defendants violated his constitutional rights by denying his grievances. 

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Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must 

show (1) a “serious medical need,” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;

and (2) the defendant’s response to knowledge of the serious medical need was 

deliberately indifferent. E.g., Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a state actor must both know of 

and disregard an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health; “the official must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 

(1994).

Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a

prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment, or by the

way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 104-05 (1976); Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference is a higher standard 

than negligence or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” 

Clement v. California Dep’t of Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see 

also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of 

“indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not support a claim under 

§ 1983). Furthermore, a mere difference of opinion as to a course of treatment does not 

satisfy the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard: “to prevail on a claim 

involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must show that the 

chosen course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the circumstances,’ and 

was chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an excessive risk’ to the prisoner’s health.” 

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Toguchi, 391 F.3d at (alteration omitted), quoting Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 

(9th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the indifference must be substantial. The purported 

defendant’s action or inaction must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

Additionally, in the absence of a supervisor’s “overt personal participation in the 

act” which violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, they may be liable only if they 

personally implemented a policy “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Hansen v. 

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). See also Lolli v. 

County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, a supervisor is only 

liable under § 1983 if the plaintiff establishes the supervisor’s “personal involvement in 

the constitutional deprivation,” or a “sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 

1228, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added and internal quotations omitted). “At the 

most basic level of formulation, our law requires an ‘affirmative link’ between the 

constitutional violation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of 

control or direction, or his failure to supervise.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 

1211 (10th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases and analyzing various bases for supervisory 

liability), cited in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Prison administrators and supervisors are not per se liable for an alleged violation 

of a plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights if they fail to grant “grievances or grievance 

appeals.” Davis v. Penzone, 2017 WL 8792541, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2017). Where a 

defendant’s only involvement in allegedly unconstitutional conduct is the denial of 

administrative grievances, the failure to intervene on a plaintiff’s behalf to remedy the 

alleged unconstitutional behavior does not amount to active unconstitutional behavior for 

purposes of § 1983. See Moreno v. Ryan, 2017 WL 2214703, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 19, 

2017); Garcia v. Drake, 2012 WL 3776869, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2012), both citing 

Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).

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III. Analysis of Plaintiff’s proposed amendments

A. Count One of proposed amended complaint

In the screening order the Court described Count One as follows:

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Corizon and Centurion have a 

“long established” practice and custom of providing “the cheapest 

healthcare possible, “no matter how severe” a prisoner’s medical or 

psychological condition or injury may be. Plaintiff claims the “cheapest 

healthcare possible” is “generally recognized as having the force of law.” 

He asserts that if Corizon and Centurion employees, including contracted 

outside medical professionals, do not follow this custom or practice, “they 

as well as their contracts will be terminated” and they will therefore “lose 

any compensation they stood to gain from their employment.” Plaintiff 

alleges that Corizon and Centurion promulgated, endorsed, and enforced 

this custom in their provision of healthcare to him, through their 

employees, including the individual Defendants, from December 20, 2017 

to the date of filing of the Complaint. Plaintiff claims that Defendants 

Sewell, Burns, Stewart, Johnson, Weekly, Barrett, Todd, and Smith all 

failed to provide Plaintiff adequate treatment “because of said custom.”

(ECF No. 6 at 3). The Court concluded: “Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a claim 

in Count One against Defendant Corizon regarding its policy, custom, or practice of 

providing the cheapest possible medical care to save costs, regardless of medical

needs . . .” (ECF No. 6 at 10). 

In his proposed amended complaint Plaintiff restates the allegations made in 

Count One of his Complaint, seeking to add as defendants Dr. Baird (the “Dental 

Director”), Dr. Smith (a dentist), Dr. Arbuckle (a dentist), C. Demery (a facility health 

administrator), Connie Hawley (a grievance coordinator), Matilde Smith (a facility health 

administrator), Edward Christenson (an “outside” oral surgeon), Ms. Choi (a registered 

nurse), Mr. Tiernay (a registered nurse), Dr. M. Bartels (a physician on the “Utilization 

Management Team”), Dr. Babbitich (a physician on the “Utilization Management 

Team”), Dr. Julia Barnett (a physician on the “Utilization Management Team”), and John 

Doe defendants. (ECF No. 17 at 16). Plaintiff does not provide adequate facts in Count 

One of his proposed amended complaint to support a finding that these individuals

violated his federal constitutional rights. 

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B. Count Two of Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint

In Count Two of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged:

[On] December 20, 2017, Plaintiff was assaulted by “numerous 

inmates” at ASPC Florence. Plaintiff was sent to the emergency room, 

where a PET scan of Plaintiff’s jaw was taken. The PET scan revealed that 

Plaintiff’s jaw had been broken in several places and that he had suffered a 

concussion. Plaintiff was sent back to ASPC-Florence with 

recommendations for his care. Plaintiff saw Defendants Sewell and Burns 

the following day after being returned to ASPC-Florence.

Plaintiff notified Defendant Sewell that his jaw was broken in 

several places, he had a concussion, and he was in severe pain due to the 

assault the day before. Defendants Sewell and Burns both knew Plaintiff 

had been assaulted the day before and his resulting injuries, but they 

provided no treatment, and instead sent him back into the general 

population instead of medical watch. According to Plaintiff, Sewell and 

Burns knew “there was a strong possibility that” he would be assaulted 

again and the injuries he already had would not heal properly, or at all. 

About an hour after returning to general population, Plaintiff was assaulted 

again, exacerbating the injuries he already had, and causing additional 

injuries.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Sewell and Burns “willfully with a 

knowledge of and utter disregard to the harm” that Plaintiff had already 

suffered and would suffer, “intentionally acted in accordance” with 

Corizon’s custom of providing the cheapest possible medical care by failing 

to provide him any treatment at all. 

(ECF No. 7 at 3-4). The Court concluded Plaintiff had adequately stated an Eighth 

Amendment medical care claim in Count Two against Defendants Sewell and Burns for 

failure to treat Plaintiff’s injuries.

In his proposed amended complaint Plaintiff seeks to add clarifying facts with 

regard to Count Two, with regard to where he was treated, the injuries he sustained with 

regard to his broken jaw, and the inadequacy of Defendants Sewell and Burns’ treatment 

of Plaintiff’s injuries. (ECF No. 17 at 18). Plaintiff also seeks to add allegations regarding 

“the second assault on December 21, 2017,” with regard to Defendant Corizon’s custom 

of failing to provide adequate medical care to inmates, and claims that Burns failed to 

give him prescribed medication. (ECF No. 17 at 20-21). Plaintiff asserts Stewart, Burns’ 

“direct supervisor,” also examined Plaintiff and “refused care.” (ECF No. 17 at 22). 

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Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint states additional factual claims with 

regard to Defendants Sewell and Burns in support of his claims against these two 

Defendants. However, Plaintiff’s claims again Defendant Stewart is entirely conclusory 

and without any factual support. 

C. Count Three of Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint

In Count Three of his Complaint Plaintiff asserted:

After Plaintiff was assaulted on December 20 and 21, 2017, 

Defendant Burns continued to follow Corizon’s custom of providing the 

cheapest possible treatment—which, in his case, was no treatment at all—

by deciding where to house Plaintiff after the second assault. Rather than 

house Plaintiff in the medical unit, which had the proper facilities to treat 

his injuries, Burns “allowed him” to be housed in administrative 

segregation, or “the hole.” The severity of Plaintiff’s injuries required 24-

hour attention from medical staff, but administrative segregation did not 

have the proper facilities or medical staff to treat his injuries.

On December 27, 2017, Plaintiff saw non-party Deborah McGarry, 

who ordered pain medication for Plaintiff until January 25, 2018 and 

ordered surgery for his jaw. Within 10 days, Defendant Burns took Plaintiff 

off all medication prescribed by McGarry “for no reason other than to act in 

accordance with” Corizon’s custom, because the medication McGarry had 

prescribed “cost too much.”

Plaintiff received outpatient surgery on his jaw on January 18, 2018. 

When he returned the same day, he was in severe pain. Plaintiff told 

Defendant Todd, the nursing director, what Defendant Burns “had done” 

before the surgery, that he was in severe pain, and that his injuries required 

that he be housed in the medical unit at ASPC-Florence, which had the 

proper facilities to treat his injuries. Defendant Todd “allowed” Plaintiff to 

be housed in suicide watch, which did not have the proper facilities or 

medical staff to treat his injuries or prevent any other injuries.

(ECF No. 6 at 4-5).

In the screening order the Court noted:

Plaintiff alleges that when he returned to the prison after his jaw 

surgery, he told Defendant Todd what Defendant Burns “had done” before 

the surgery, that he was in severe pain, and that his injuries required that he 

be housed in the medical unit at ASPC-Florence, which had the proper 

facilities to treat his injuries, but Defendant Todd “allowed” Plaintiff to be 

housed in suicide watch. Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and 

conclusory to support a conclusion that Todd was aware of and disregarded 

a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not allege that Todd, as 

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Director of Nursing, had any authority to determine where to house 

Plaintiff or to override or disregard Plaintiff’s placement in suicide watch. 

Absent additional information, Plaintiff has failed to state a deliberate 

indifference claim against Defendant Todd. The Court will therefore 

dismiss Defendant Todd and Count Three.

(ECF No. 6 at 7-8). The Court noted:

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Weekly and Barrett ignored the surgeon’s

recommendation and Thomas’s direct referral for treatment, in accordance 

with Corizon’s custom and practice. First, Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory 

allegations against Weekly and Barrett refer to these Defendants 

collectively, without any factual specificity as to what any particular 

Defendant did or failed to do It is unclear whether Weekly and Barrett are 

Corizon providers or non-medical Corizon employees, such as 

administrators. It is also unclear how Siji Thomas “referred” Plaintiff’s 

treatment to Weekly and Barrett. Thus, the Court cannot determine from

Plaintiff’s allegations whether Weekly or Barrett had any authority to treat 

Plaintiff, order treatment, or disregard any decision concerning Plaintiff’s 

treatment.

(ECF No. 6 at 8-9). The Court concluded Plaintiff had adequately stated an Eighth 

Amendment threat-to-safety or failure-to-protect claim against Defendants Sewell and 

Burns for returning Plaintiff to the general population after he was assaulted, and a threatto-safety or failure-to-protect claim against Defendant Burns for placing Plaintiff in 

administrative segregation rather than the medical unit after the second assault, and a

medical care claim against Defendant Burns for discontinuing Plaintiff’s medication.

In Count Three of the proposed First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts 

Stewart, Christenson, Baird, Choi, Tiernay, Dustro, Montalvo, and Ryan failed to provide 

adequate medical care as part of Corizon’s “custom” to “provide the cheapest health care 

possible,” “no matter how severe” the prisoner’s medical or psychological injury. (ECF 

No. 17 at 23). Plaintiff deletes some allegations previously stated in Count Three, 

replacing them with allegations regarding the care provided by Christenson, an “outside” 

provider, who declined to provide Plaintiff with prescription painkillers. (ECF No. 17 at 

24-25). Plaintiff also asserts Choi was notified that he was in severe pain and that he 

wanted to be housed in the prison’s medical unit; that Choi contacted Burns, and that 

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Plaintiff was not placed in the prison’s medical unit but was returned to administrative 

segregation. (ECF No. 17 at 26-27). Plaintiff asserts he was given a choice to be housed 

in a different unit’s medical watch cell rather than in medical housing until he “either 

signed a waiver of ADOC liability or the wires [placed in his jaw] came off.” (ECF No. 

17 at 27). He asserts Stewart, Dutro, and Montalvo “allowed or forced” him to be housed 

in an observation cell, i.e., “suicide watch” which threatened his health. (ECF No. 17 

at 27-28). Plaintiff alleges Tiernay treated Plaintiff’s severe pain with Tylenol, which he 

could not consume because his jaw had been wired shut. (ECF No. 17 at 28). Plaintiff 

asserts Todd did not address his complaints, but answered his inmate letters with the 

statement: “You do not require medical supervision constantly, per your offsite provider, 

it is very rare that wires need to be cut, if you begin to vomit you have been instructed to 

lean forward, as this will lessen the chances of aspiration.” (ECF No. 17 at 29). Plaintiff 

further alleges that he received inadequate relief from Byrnes and Montalvo with regard

to his grievances (ECF No. 17 at 29-31).

Plaintiff fails to adequately state a cognizable claim for relief against Stewart,

Dutro, and Montalvo, because his claims regarding these individuals is conclusory. 

Because Choi acted upon Plaintiff’s request but did not have the authority to grant the 

request, Plaintiff fails to show that Choi showed a reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s wellbeing. Plaintiff’s disagreement with Christenson, Todd, and Tiernay regarding his 

medical treatment does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim, because a 

disagreement about the level of treatment an inmate receives, without more, is 

insufficient to establish a wanton indifference to a serious medical need.1 See Goolsby v. 

1 The Ninth Circuit has held that, before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have 

been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ 

‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter 

Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, a complaint that a physician has been 

negligent in treating a medical condition does not state a valid Eighth Amendment claim. See

Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he plaintiff must prove 

more than negligence but less than subjective intent – something akin to reckless disregard.”

(internal quotations omitted)), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 794 (2019); Wood v. Housewright, 900 

F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Ridge, 2011 WL 2006303, at *15-16 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) (finding the plaintiff 

failed to state an adequate claim for relief when he was not provided opioid pain 

medication); Stroup v. Bishop, 2009 WL 50187, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2009) (same). “[A]

difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding 

treatment does not give rise to a 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 

(9th Cir. 1981). To establish that such a difference of opinion amounted to deliberate 

indifference, the prisoner “must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was 

medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and “that they chose this course in 

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). “The deliberate indifference doctrine is limited in 

scope,” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012), and neither a 

disagreement over the course of treatment nor medical malpractice will support a claim, 

Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2012). See also Hernandez v. Keane, 

341 F.3d 137, 146-48 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Issues of medical judgment cannot be the basis of 

a deliberate indifference claim where evidence of deliberate indifference is lacking.”). To 

state a valid Eighth Amendment claim. the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating

“more than negligence but less than subjective intent – something akin to reckless 

disregard.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal 

quotations omitted)), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 794 (2019).

Plaintiff’s claims against Byrnes and Montalvo fail because the denial of a 

grievance is not the basis for the violation of a federal constitutional right.

D. Count Four of Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint

In Count Four of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged:

After the surgery on his jaw in January 2018, the surgeon identified 

a cystic mass in Plaintiff’s mandible, displaced anterior cartilage, and 

separation in his temporomandibular joint. The surgeon recommended that 

Plaintiff be immediately treated for those issues to prevent further injury.

On April 18, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred to ASPC-Eyman. His 

medical record was received and reviewed by all medical, dental, and 

mental health staff, including the issues and recommendations regarding his 

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jaw. Siji Thomas immediately placed Plaintiff on pain medication and 

“referred” treatment of the cystic mass, displaced anterior cartilage, and 

separation in the temporomandibular joint (TMJ) to Defendants Weekly 

and Barrett.

Defendants Weekly and Barrett ignored the surgeon’s 

recommendation and Thomas’s direct referral for treatment. Plaintiff’s 

injuries were not treated at all, and when he grieved the issue on July 2, 

2018, he was given the “cheapest remedy possible”: an MRI. Plaintiff’s

injuries were all confirmed a second time by a July 10, 2018 MRI, but 

Defendants Weekly and Barrett “chose not to treat the issues and acted in 

accordance with” Corizon’s custom.

Between July 10, 2018 and May 21, 2019, Plaintiff “constantly” 

filed Health Needs Requests (HNRs) for treatment of his injuries and 

grieved the issue “through the proper grievance procedure.” “All the 

while,” Plaintiff’s injuries were getting worse and more painful. On May 

21, 2019, Defendants Stewart and Smith “chose to give” Plaintiff the

cheapest remedy possible for his injuries, which was removal of the cystic 

mass and “nothing” for the displaced anterior cartilage or separation of the 

TMJ, which were both more expensive to treat.

Since May 21, 2019, Plaintiff’s condition has deteriorated, and his 

displaced anterior cartilage and separation in the TMJ have not been 

treated. After filing “numerous” HNRs and grievances, Defendant Johnson 

“has refused and continues to refuse” to provide any treatment for 

Plaintiff’s injuries.

(ECF No. 6 at 5-6). The Court concluded Plaintiff’s claims were insufficient to support a 

conclusion that Stewart, Smith, or Johnson were aware of and deliberately disregarded 

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The Court noted Plaintiff’s only allegation against 

Defendant Johnson was that Johnson “refused and continue[d] to refuse” to provide any 

treatment for Plaintiff’s injuries, although Plaintiff had filed “’numerous’ HNRs and 

grievances.” (ECF No. 6 at 9-10). The Court found Plaintiff’s allegations vague and 

conclusory, inter alia because Plaintiff had not established Johnson was aware of any 

health needs request or grievance.

In Count Four of his proposed amended complaint Plaintiff deletes his prior Count 

Four2and asserts a denial of medical care claim against Hawley, Smith, Demery, and 

2 Plaintiff restates the facts delineated in Count Four of his Complaint in Count Five of 

his proposed amended complaint. (ECF No. 

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Bowden, all of whom he identifies as employees of Corizon, and Green, Neighbors, 

Young, and Telles, whom he identifies as kitchen staff and kitchen managers employed 

by “Trinity.” (ECF No. 17 at 36). Plaintiff also names Trinity Food Services as a 

defendant in Count Four. 

Plaintiff alleges his medical care provider placed him on a “full liquid diet,” but 

“Trinity Food Services failed to provide [Plaintiff’s] prescribed full liquid diet . . . to date 

this action was filed . . .” (Id.). Plaintiff contends he was provided milk, oatmeal, and 

high calorie shakes, “etc.,” but he was not given the proper proportions of these foods. 

(ECF No. 17 at 38). Plaintiff contends that he “spoke directly with Ms. Greene, Mr. 

Neighbors, kitchen security staff [and] medical staff” regarding the failure to provide him 

with a liquid diet, “to no avail.” (ECF No. 17 at 37). Plaintiff alleges Greene and 

Neighbors told him the unit kitchen did not possess a blender and, accordingly, they 

could not provide him with a liquid diet. (Id.). As a result, Plaintiff asserts he was “forced 

to consume whole foods when otherwise ordered by the medical provider, causing him 

severe pain and undue suffering . . .” (ECF No. 17 at 39).

Plaintiff alleges he was “forced” to have “degrading interactions” with Weeden, 

Carr, Roubles, “and others,” with regard to the issue of his liquid diet, and he “was 

notified that DOC staff could and would not force Trinity Staff (specifically Ms. Greene 

and Mr. Neighbors) to comply and meet prescribed needs.” (ECF No. 17 at 38). Plaintiff 

alleges he “constantly” requested relief from Amick, Chambers, Rivera, Martin, Miller, 

Walker, Vasquez and others, including Weeden, Ducharme, Silua, Johnson, Verdugo and 

Caziarc. (ECF No. 17 at 39). Plaintiff contends Demery, Britton, Hawley, and Smith 

denied his grievances. (Id.).

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege facts to support a claim that Demery, 

Bowden, Weeden, Carr, Roubles, Young, Telles, Amick, Chambers, Rivera, Martin, 

Miller, Walker, Vasquez, Weeden, Ducharme, Silua, Johnson, Verdugo, and Caziarc 

knew of and disregarded a serious risk of harm regarding Plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs. Britton, Hawley, and Smith did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by 

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denying his grievances because Plaintiff does not have a federal constitutional right to a 

particular resolution of a grievance. Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth 

Amendment claim in amended Count Four against Trinity Food Services for violation of 

his Eighth Amendment rights by the denial of an adequately-nutritious liquid diet as 

prescribed by his medical care providers. 

E. Count Five of Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint

Plaintiff seeks to add a fifth claim for relief in his proposed amended complaint. In 

his proposed amended complaint he seeks to add as defendants Christenson, Baird, 

Weekly, Arbuckle, Smith, Hawley, Todd, Johnson, Demery, Bartels, Babbitich, Barnett, 

and Stewart, who he asserts were employees of Corizon and/or Centurion from January 

13, 2018 to “to present . . .” (ECF No. 17 at 42-43). In his proposed Count Five Plaintiff 

asserts Corizon and Centurion have a “long established custom and/or practice” that, 

regardless of the severity of an inmate’s serious medical or psychological needs, Corizon 

and Centurion require their employees to “provide the cheapest remedy/healthcare 

possible . . .” (Id.). Plaintiff then restates the facts stated in Count Four of his Complaint, 

adding the additional allegations that he was denied pain medication by Burns, 

Christenson, Baird, and Stewart, and that his inmate letters and grievances of this issue

was denied by Todd. Plaintiff contends a recommended surgery for removal of a systic 

mass was delayed for over a year because Corizon’s Utilization Management Team, i.e., 

Bartels, Babbitich, and Barnett, “in concert with Florence Complex Medical Director Dr. 

Scott Stewart,” declined to approve the procedure. (ECF No. 17 at 47). Plaintiff alleges 

Hawley informed him he would be “returned” to Christenson for an alternative treatment, 

i.e., an “arch bar removal” to treat his “TMJ.” (ECF No. 17 at 48-49). Plaintiff alleges

Baird had “reaffirmed” Plaintiff continued presenting with a “clearly visible . . . systic 

mass” and that there was an “urgent need” for removal of the mass, a finding affirmed by 

Arbuckle. (ECF No. 17 at 50-51). Plaintiff allows that in May of 2019 the systic mass 

was removed. (ECF No. 17 at 52). Plaintiff argues Bartels, Barnet, Babbitich, and 

Stewart violated the Eighth Amendment by improperly denying him the recommended 

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systic mass removal procedure from January of 2018 through May of 2019. (ECF No. 17 

at 52-53). 

Plaintiff has failed to adequately state a claim for relief that the treating providers, 

i.e., Christenson, Baird, and Arbuckle, denied him adequate medical care, because they 

did recommend the surgery, indicating they were deliberately indifferent to or recklessly 

disregarded Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff fails to allege a sufficient factual 

basis to proceed on his claims against Weekly and Smith. Plaintiff has not adequately 

alleged a claim against Hawley, Todd, Johnson, or Demery, inter alia because the denial 

of Plaintiff’s grievances did not violate his constitutional rights. However, broadly 

construed, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint adequately states a claim for the 

denial of adequate medical care by “Dr. M. Bartels,” Julia Barnett, Dr. Babbitich, and 

Stewart,

3 because these individuals knew of Plaintiff’s serious medical need for the 

surgery; they had the authority to order the surgery, and they allegedly unreasonably 

delayed the surgery for more than a year.4

Therefore,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion at ECF No. 17 be granted only 

insofar as recommended herein.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court order Defendant Trinity Food Service s 

to answer the relevant portions of Count Four of Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint, 

and further order that Defendants M. Bartels, Julia Barnett, Babbitich, and Scott Stewart,

be ordered to answer the relevant portions of Count Five of Plaintiff’s proposed amended 

complaint. 

3 Plaintiff names these defendants in their individual capacity (ECF No. 17 at 7-80).

4 Deliberate indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay or 

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in 

which prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 

F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). “In deciding whether there has been deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs, we need not defer to the 

judgment of prison doctors or administrators.” Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 

198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989).

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014).

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72.

Dated this 1st day of June, 2020.

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