Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02150/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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- 1 - 06cv2150

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv2150 JM(JMA)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION;

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S CROSS

MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION 

vs.

HOMETOWN BUFFET, INC.,

Defendant.

Defendant Hometown Buffet (“HTB”) moves for summary judgment, or partial summary

adjudication, on the issue of whether Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) satisfied its statutory obligation to conciliate prior to commencing this action.

Plaintiff EEOC opposes the motion and separately moves for a finding that the EEOC met the

condition precedent of conciliation. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the EEOC

discharged its statutory obligation to conciliate prior to filing the present action. Accordingly, the

court denies HTB’s motion for partial summary adjudication and grants EEOC’s cross motion for

partial summary adjudication. 

BACKGROUND

On September 29, 2006 the EEOC commenced this action alleging that HTB subjected

Charging Parties Yesica Owen, Eliza Navarette, and other similarly situated individuals, to sexual

harassment/hostile work environment on the basis of sex, female. (Compl. at p.1). The EEOC alleges

that HTB engaged in unlawful employment practices since October 2002, in violation of Section

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703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The sexual harassment included “unwanted physical

touching and/or sexually charged and/or suggestive speech and/or conduct.” (Compl. ¶10). The effect

of the allegedly wrongful conduct adversely affected the Charging Parties status as employees,

because of their sex. (Compl. ¶12). The EEOC also alleges that it satisfied “[a]ll conditions precedent

to the filing of this action.” (Compl. ¶9).

On January 28, 2005 the EEOC received a charge of discrimination from Yesica Owen against

HTB. Following an investigation into the Owen charge, which included requesting information from

HTB, on October 3, 2005 HTB received a determination letter from the EEOC, finding reasonable

cause to believe that Owen, and similarly situated individuals, were subject to sexual harassment and

sex-based harassment while employed at HTB. (Def. Exh. 8). On or about December 9, 2005 HTB

received a conciliation proposal from the EEOC. (Def. Exh. 9). Among other things, the proposal

sought maximum statutory penalties of $300,000 per individual impacted by HTB’s alleged

discriminatory practices, lost wages for the employees, and injunctive relief to remedy the perceived

alleged discriminatory practices. (Def. Exh. E). 

Mr. Hanneman, in-house counsel for HTB, carried out discussions with the EEOC regarding

the conciliation proposal. Mr. Hanneman explained that his investigation failed to reveal an

evidentiary basis for the award to the putative plaintiffs. (Hanneman Decl. ¶20). Mr. Hanneman

requested specific facts supporting the charge but was informed that the EEOC was not in a position

to comply with this request. Id. During a conversation between Mr. Hanneman and counsel for the

EEOC on January 17, 2006, Mr. Hanneman was again informed that the EEOC had concluded that

“egregious discrimination” had taken place at HTB but that it was unable to provide more specific

information regarding the claims. (Hanneman Decl. ¶21). At that time, Mr. Hanneman noted that

“due to the EEOC stance, it did not appear [the charges] could be resolved through conciliation.” Id.

 On June 12, 2006 HTB received another determination letter regarding Navarette and, on July

17, 2006, HTB received a conciliation proposal, similar to the proposal received with respect to Ms.

Owen. Shortly thereafter, on August 2, 2006, HTB received another letter from the EEOC indicating

that unless a counter proposal were submitted within ten business days, the EEOC would assume that

attempts at conciliation had failed. (Def. Exh. 12). 

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- 3 - 06cv2150

On August 28, 2006, HTB’s outside counsel, Mr. Hoge, contacted the EEOC and informed the

EEOC that HTB required additional information to rationally assess the discrimination charges.

(Hoge Decl. ¶3). When asked by Mr. Hoge whether a relatively small conciliation amount such as

$500 would have been sufficient to keep the case in the conciliation process, the EEOC did not

directly respond but indicated that the matter would be referred to the EEOC’s legal department. Id.

On September 29, 2006, the EEOC commenced the present action.

HTB now moves for partial summary adjudication on the issue of whether the EEOC satisfied

its duty to conciliate prior to commencing this action. The EEOC opposes the motion and separately

moves for summary adjudication in its favor.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c); British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.

981 (1979). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its

motion and identifying those portions of the file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is “no

express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or

other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). The opposing party

cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and

by [the party’s] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation

omitted). The opposing party also may not rely solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by

factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 994 (1962). Any doubt as to the

existence of any issue of material fact requires denial of the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

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1 At the time of oral argument the court questioned both parties whether further conciliation efforts

would likely prove fruitful. Given the tenor of counsel’s responses, the court concludes that further conciliation

efforts would not likely prove productive. 

- 4 - 06cv2150

The Motion

Under Title VII, the EEOC has a statutory duty to conciliate prior to instituting an action

against an employer for discriminatory practices. 

If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause

to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such

alleged unlawful employment practice by conference, conciliation, and persuasion.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Conciliation is a condition precedent that the EEOC must satisfy before filing

suit. EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982). In the event the court finds that

the EEOC failed to adequately conciliate the claims, the remedy is to stay the action in order to allow

the EEOC an opportunity to comply with its statutory conciliation duties. EEOC v. Zia Company, 582

F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978) (in the event court finds conciliation efforts inadequate, district court

should stay the proceedings pending “further conciliation efforts”); EEOC v. California Teachers

Ass’n, 534 F.Supp. 209, 213 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (“sufficiency of a conciliation effort does not

present a jurisdictional question, so long as a conciliation attempt has been made”).1

The threshold issue before the court concerns the standard of review applied to the agency’s

conciliation process. HTB generally argues that the court should apply the Fifth Circuit’s legal

standard to determine whether the EEOC was reasonable in its stance during the conciliation process.

See EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The fundamental question

is the reasonableness and responsiveness of the EEOC’s conduct under all the circumstances.”); EEOC

v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003). The other view, expressed by

the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, instructs that the district court should not consider the details of the

parties’ negotiations, but, rather should focus on whether the EEOC provided the employer an

opportunity to confront all the issues. See Zia, 582 F.2d at 533; California Teachers Ass’n, 534

F.Supp. at 212; EEOC v. KECO Ind., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984) (“The district court should

only determine whether the EEOC made an attempt at conciliation. The form and substance of those

conciliations is within the discretion of the EEOC as the agency created to administer and enforce our

employment discrimination laws and is beyond judicial review.”).

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The plain language of the statute does not identify a standard of review to be applied to the

EEOC’s administrative conduct, procedures, and determinations. In the absence of binding Ninth

Circuit authority, the court concludes that relevant legislative history intended substantial discretion

to be vested in the EEOC. The statutory scheme provides that the EEOC should continue with the

process of conciliation until such times as it is “unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation

acceptable to the Commission. . . .” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). Further, an effort by the Senate in 1972

to require judicial review of the EEOC’s determinations of “acceptable” agreements was soundly

rejected as unworkable. 118 Cong.Rec 3807 (Feb. 14, 1972); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, 504 F.Supp.

241, 262 (N.E. Ill 1980). Federal courts also generally accord deference to an agency's administrative

decisions, rule-making, and operating procedures, as well as to their interpretations of the governing

statute. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) ("[a]n

agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable

and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress"); American Trucking Assoc. v. L.C.C., 722

F.2d 1243, 1248 (5th Cir.1984) (stating that "[e]ven if an agency's interpretation would not be the one

we would adopt if looking at a statute completely afresh, we ordinarily accept that agency's

interpretation of its own statute if the interpretation 'has a reasonable basis in law' "); Chemical Mfrs.

Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (The view of the agency

charged with administering the statute is entitled to considerable deference; and to sustain it, we need

not find that it is the only permissible construction that the agency might have adopted but only that

the agency's understanding of this very "complex statute" is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a

court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency.). Finally, deference to the EEOC’s

determinations is consistent with the Administrative Procedures Act which provides that an agency’s

actions, findings, and conclusions should be set aside if found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §706).

Here, applying a deferential standard of review to the EEOC’s conciliation efforts, there is

substantial evidence to support a finding that the EEOC satisfied the statutory condition precedent

/ / / 

/ / / 

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28 2 The court notes that HTB alternatively argues that even if the deferential standard is employed by the

court, the EEOC still did not adequately conciliate.

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 ofconciliation.2 The record indicates that the EEOC invited HTB to conciliate both the Owen and

Navarette charges of discrimination over an eight month period of time, (DUF, 3, 14-18, 22, 24); HTB

received letters from the EEOC providing notice that it had found reasonable cause to believe that the

Charging Parties were subjected to sexual harassment and sex-based harassment while employed at

the El Cajon restaurant, (DUF 11, 25); HTB was provided with an opportunity to conciliate the

charges of discrimination, (DUF 13, 27); HTB was provided notice of the type of monetary and

injunctive relief sought by the EEOC, (DUF 9, 12, 13, 27); and HTB was notified, on or about August

21, 2006, that it deemed conciliation efforts futile. (DUF 30). This evidence supports the court’s

finding that the EEOC complied with its conciliation obligations by providing HTB with an

opportunity to confront the discrimination related charges. 

HTB contends that the EEOC’s position in seeking the maximum statutory limits and

nationwide injunctive relief was unreasonable because, among other things, the EEOC failed to

provide sufficient specific facts to support the discrimination determination and the information

provided to HTB failed to provide insight into the identity of the supposed similarly situated

employees. The court is sympathetic to HTB’s arguments that the EEOC could have done more to

facilitate conciliation. The court notes that the EEOC’s rigid and preemptive attitude (i.e. requesting

maximum statutory penalties of $300,000 per employee based solely upon conclusory and unidentified

evidence) did not serve as an effective conciliation technique. The court is also mindful, however,

that in the period of several months following the parties’ initial efforts at conciliation in January 2006

until the failure of the conciliation efforts in August 2006, HTB never presented a counter proposal

to resolve the EEOC’s charges. Notwithstanding, it is not the role of this court to assess the

reasonableness of the EEOC’s efforts. This court’s role is limited to reviewing whether the EEOC’s

efforts afforded the employer an opportunity to confront the issues. The form and substance of the

EEOC’s conciliation efforts “is within the discretion of the EEOC as the agency created to administer

and enforce our employment discrimination laws and is beyond judicial review.” KECO, 748 F.2d at

1102. As set forth above, the EEOC minimally complied with its conciliation obligations.

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Finally, HTB’s arguments fail to establish that the EEOC acted in bad faith or otherwise failed

to discharge its statutory duties. Furthermore, to the extent that the discrimination claims are not

sufficiently flushed out, HTB is entitled to conduct discovery to defend itself against the EEOC’s

charges. 

In sum, the court denies HTB’s motion for partial summary adjudication and grants EEOC’s

motion for partial summary adjudication on whether the EEOC satisfied the conciliation requirement

of Title VII.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 6, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

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