Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02750/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02750-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:0552fi Freedom of Information Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RICHARD EDELMAN, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND 

EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:15-cv-02750-BEN-BGS 

ORDER: 

1) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; and 

2) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

[Docket Nos. 22-23] 

 Before this Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendant 

United States Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter “the SEC”) and the 

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Richard Edelman. (Docket Nos. 

22, 23.) The motions are fully briefed. The Court finds the motions suitable for 

determination on the papers without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. 

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on 

the issue of the adequacy of the SEC’s search for his Freedom of Information Act 

(“FOIA”) is denied without prejudice, the SEC’s motion for summary judgment that it 

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properly withheld documents pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 4 and 5 is denied without 

prejudice, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment that the SEC improperly 

withheld documents pursuant to Exemptions 4 and 5 is granted in part and denied in part 

without prejudice. Additionally, the Court partially sustains both Plaintiff’s objections to 

the evidence offered by the SEC and the SEC’s objections to portions of Plaintiff’s 

opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND1

 This action is based on Plaintiff’s claim that the SEC failed to comply with its 

obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq. to 

respond to his FOIA requests. Plaintiff’s FOIA claims are based on two written FOIA 

requests to the SEC’s Office of FOIA Services (“FOIA Office”). 

The first request was submitted on February 9, 2015, requesting: 

[A]ll documents, records, material of any nature concerning 

investigation in the matter of Empire State Realty Trust MNY08894. This would include Wells Notices and Wells 

Submissions in response. This FOIA also requests similar 

documents of any other SEC investigation concerning Empire 

State Realty Trust. 

(Docket No. 1, Compl., Ex. 1 at p. 2; Docket No. 23-4, Declaration of Richard Edelman 

(hereinafter “Edelman Decl.”) ¶ 12.)2

 On March 19, 2015, the FOIA Office advised 

Plaintiff that it had identified three boxes of documents responsive to his request, and 

asked him to confirm his willingness to pay for the estimated review and duplication 

expenses. (Compl., Ex. 3; Edelman Decl. ¶ 13.) On the same day, Plaintiff responded 

that he would pay for the estimated expenses. (Compl., Ex. 4; Edelman Decl. ¶ 13.) 

                                               

1

 The following overview of facts are drawn from the admissible evidence submitted by 

the parties in litigating the pending summary judgment motions. 2 All page number references to the parties’ moving papers in this Order refer to the page 

numbers generated by the CM/ECF system.

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 As of May 28, 2015, Plaintiff still had not received a response or any of the 

requested records from the FOIA Office. Subsequently, Plaintiff appealed the SEC’s 

failure to timely respond to his request. (Compl., Ex. 5.) On June 23, 2015, the Office of 

General Counsel (“OGC”) for the SEC remanded Plaintiff’s appeal to the SEC 

acknowledging that the FOIA Office had not met its statutory obligation to respond to 

Plaintiff’s request and “requesting that the FOIA Officer process this request as 

expeditiously as possible.” (Id., Ex. 7.) 

 On September 28, 2015, the FOIA Office informed Plaintiff that 1,442 pages of 

records had been identified as responsive to his request. The FOIA Office granted access 

to these records, “except for certain information protected from release pursuant to 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b) (4), (5), (6), and/or 7 (C), 17 CFR § 200.80(b) (4), (5), (6) and /or ii 

[sic][.]” (Id., Ex. 9.) 

 On October 23, 2015, Plaintiff appealed “all adverse decisions” related to his 

FOIA request. (Id., Ex. 10.) During the SEC’s review of Plaintiff’s appeal, Ms. Cozza, 

an OGC Senior Attorney, discovered the potential existence of approximately 44,000 

documents on two CDs that was produced by Malkin Holdings, LLC (“Malkin”) to an 

SEC attorney that were “likely responsive” to Plaintiff’s request. (Cozza Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.) 

On December 2, 2015, Associate General Counsel Richard M. Humes remanded 

Plaintiff’s request “to the FOIA Officer for further consideration of whether to assert 

Exemptions 4, 5, 6, and 7(C).” (Compl., Ex. 13.) Pursuant to the remand, the SEC 

subsequently obtained the two CDs placed it in a queue for complex requests because of 

the time needed to process the volume of documents. (Cozza Decl. ¶ 16.) The SEC 

subsequently “located an ‘index’ which itemizes the[] 44,000 pages of additional 

records.” (Id.) However, Malkin had also requested confidential treatment of the index 

(hereinafter “Malkin Index”), which the OGC ultimately decided to withhold under 

Exemption 4. (Id.) 

The second FOIA request was sent on March 11, 2015, and requested the “SEC 

Division of Enforcement Case Closing Report in the matter of Empire State Realty Trust 

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Inc.” (Compl., Ex. 14.) On April 1, 2015, the FOIA Office denied Plaintiff’s request 

because “a Case Closing Report was not produced.” (Id., Ex. 16.) The FOIA Office 

further advised that it possessed a “Case Closing Recommendation” that was exempt 

from production pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (5) [sic].” (Id.) On October 7, 2015, 

Plaintiff appealed the FOIA Office’s decision as to his second FOIA request. (Id., Ex. 

17.) On November 12, 2015, Mr. Humes denied Plaintiff’s appeal. (Id., Ex. 18.) 

On December 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit asserting two claims for 

relief based on his allegations that the SEC violated FOIA by failing to fully comply with 

his February 9 and March 3, 2015 FOIA requests. (Docket No. 1.) After negotiations 

between the parties over production of the Malkin Index failed, the SEC filed the instant 

motion for partial summary judgment and Plaintiff filed the instant cross-motion for 

summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 22-23.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a).3

 A material fact is one that 

“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A party seeking summary judgment always 

bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion” 

and identifying the portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

323 (1986). To satisfy this burden, the movant must demonstrate that no genuine issue of 

material fact exists for trial. Id. at 322. 

/// 

                                               

3 Unless stated otherwise, all references to Rules in this Order are to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

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“FOIA cases are typically decided on motions for summary judgment.” Our 

Children’s Earth Found. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 85 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1081 

(N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Yonemoto v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 686 F.3d 681, 688 (9th 

Cir. 2011) as amended (Jan. 18, 2012), overruled on other grounds in Animal Legal Def. 

Fund v. FDA (ALDF), 836 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2016)). A district court analyzes the 

adequacy of an agency’s search and justification for withholding documents de novo. 5 

U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B). FOIA authorizes a district court to enjoin a defendant agency 

from withholding agency records, and to order a defendant agency to produce any 

improperly withheld records. Id. 

It is the agency’s burden to show that it has complied with its obligations under 

FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). More specifically, an agency bears the burden of 

proving the adequacy of its search and that it may withhold documents under one of the 

exemptions. Id.; U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). An agency may 

satisfy its burden by submitting agency affidavits or declarations, provided “they contain 

reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements.” Judicial 

Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Consumer 

Fed’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Agric., 455 F.3d 283, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). A district court must accord “substantial weight” to an agency’s 

affidavits, “provided the justifications for nondisclosure ‘are not controverted by contrary 

evidence in the record or by evidence of [the agency’s] bad faith.’” Minier v. CIA, 88 

F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 

1992)). 

DISCUSSION 

Congress enacted FOIA to facilitate public access to Government documents. 

Lahr, supra, 569 F.3d at 973 (citing Ray, 502 U.S. at 173). FOIA’s goal is to “ensure an 

informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check 

against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” Lahr, 569 

F.3d at 973 (quoting John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989)) 

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(internal quotation marks omitted in original). “At the same time, FOIA contemplates 

that some information may legitimately be kept from the public. The statute contains 

nine enumerated exemptions allowing the government to withhold documents or portions 

of documents.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9)). However, FOIA 

carries a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure,” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973, which means 

the nine FOIA exemptions are “explicitly made exclusive and must be narrowly 

construed,” Milner, 562 U.S. at 564. Moreover, even if the documents may be withheld, 

the agency must disclose any “reasonably segregable” portions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 

 Here, the SEC seeks partial summary judgment that it was justified to withhold 

some documents or portions of documents responsive to Plaintiff’s requests under several 

FOIA exemptions. Plaintiff opposes the SEC’s motion, and also cross-moves for 

summary judgment that the SEC did not conduct an adequate search, and that the 

exemptions invoked by the SEC do not apply to the withheld records. The Court will 

first address the issue of whether the SEC’s search was adequate before determining 

whether the claimed exemptions apply. 

A. Adequacy of Searches 

FOIA requires a responding agency to “demonstrate that it has conducted a search 

reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 986 (quoting 

Zemansky v. EPA, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotations omitted). A 

district court evaluating the adequacy of a FOIA search does not determine “whether 

there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather 

whether the search for those documents was adequate.” Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 797 F.3d 759, 770-71 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lahr, 569 F.3d at 987) (emphasis 

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a district court assesses the 

adequacy of an agency’s search against a standard of reasonableness, construing all facts 

in the light most favorable to the FOIA requestor. Citizens Comm’n on Human Rights v. 

FDA, 45 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995). “An agency can demonstrate the adequacy of 

its search through reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith.” 

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Id., 797 F.3d at 770; see also Citizens Comm’n, 45 F.3d at 1328. “Affidavits submitted 

by an agency to demonstrate the adequacy of its response are presumed to be in good 

faith.” Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 770 (citing Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 

770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Here, the SEC has not met its evidentiary burden. 

First, the SEC relies solely upon the declarations of OGC Senior Attorney Carin 

Cozza for Plaintiff’s FOIA requests. However, as will be discussed in further detail 

below, the Court sustains Plaintiff’s objections to the portions of Ms. Cozza’s declaration 

that pertain to the SEC’s search for records responsive to his FOIA requests because she 

did not have personal knowledge of or supervise the searches. See infra, Objections. As 

a result, the SEC lacks any admissible evidence that it conducted an adequate search. 

Second, even if the Court considers these portions of Ms. Cozza’s declarations, 

they nevertheless lack the requisite minimum detail to demonstrate the adequacy of the 

SEC’s search. While the SEC is not required to search every one of its record systems, 

“[a] reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search 

performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such 

records exist) were searched, is necessary to afford a FOIA requester an opportunity to 

challenge the adequacy of the search and to allow the district court to determine if the 

search was adequate[.]” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 

(emphasis added); see also Citizens Comm’n, 45 F.3d at 1328 (“[A]ffidavits describing 

agency search procedures are sufficient for purposes of summary judgment only if they 

are relatively detailed in their description of the files searched and the search procedures, 

and if they are nonconclusory and not impugned by evidence of bad faith.”) (quoting 

Zemansky, 767 F.2d at 571) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Nowhere in Ms. Cozza’s declarations does she describe in any meaningful detail 

the process or procedures by which the SEC undertook the searches for records 

responsive to Plaintiff’s requests. She does not describe any databases or files that were 

searched, the search terms used to define the search, or discuss how all files likely to 

contain responsive materials were searched. Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. Instead, Ms. 

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Cozza’s declarations contain vague or conclusory statements about another SEC 

employee’s efforts to search for responsive records. As a result, the Court is unable to 

ascertain whether the SEC conducted an adequate search. 

However, although the SEC has not met its burden to demonstrate that it conducted 

adequate searches for Plaintiff’s FOIA requests, Plaintiff also has not met his burden to 

show an absence of genuine material fact that the SEC conducted an inadequate search. 

Surprisingly, Plaintiff relies on the same portions of Ms. Cozza’s declarations that the 

Court sustains his objections to as “pro[of] the SEC failed to conduct an adequate 

search.” (Pl.’s Cross-Mot. at 8.) Having sustained Plaintiff’s objections, the Court will 

not consider this evidence as part of its analysis of Plaintiff’s cross-motion. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c)(4). 

Plaintiff also argues that the SEC’s failure to produce and identify certain 

documents referenced in other documents he received, or an SEC generated index of the 

44,000 Malkin documents establishes that the SEC did not conduct an adequate search. 

(Cross-Mot. at 9, 13-14.) But “[t]he fact that a document once existed does not mean that 

it now exists; nor does the fact that an agency once created a document necessarily imply 

that the agency has retained it.” Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of San Francisco Bay 

Area v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130-31 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 

“The agency’s failure to turn up a particular document, or mere speculation that as yet 

uncovered documents might exist, does not undermine the determination that the agency 

conducted an adequate search for the requested records.” Id. (citing O’Reilly, Federal 

Information Disclosure, § 9:8 (2007 Suppl.)). Plaintiff does not offer any other evidence; 

he only provides his own conclusions that the SEC did not conduct an adequate search, 

which is insufficient in a motion for summary judgment. 

In sum, after reviewing the parties’ briefings, the record, and admissible evidence 

submitted, the Court is unable to conclude, as a matter of law, whether or not the SEC 

failed to conduct a “reasonably calculated” search to uncover all relevant documents. 

Lahr, 569 F.3d at 986. As a result, based on this undeveloped record, summary judgment 

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is not warranted. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). Therefore, Plaintiff’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment as to this issue is DENIED without prejudice. 

B. Exemptions 

 “FOIA’s strong presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the 

government to show that an exemption properly applies to the records it seeks to 

withhold.” Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 772 (citing Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973). To prevail in a 

motion for summary judgment, a defendant agency “must show that . . . any claimed 

exemptions actually apply, and that any reasonably segregable, non-exempt parts of 

records have been disclosed after redaction of exempt information.” Light v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 968 F. Supp. 2d 11, 23 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Sanders v. Obama, 729 F. Supp. 2d 

148, 154 (D.D.C. 2010). 

To meet its burden, an agency typically submits an index and detailed affidavits 

which, collectively, “identify the documents withheld, the FOIA exemptions claimed, and 

a particularized explanation of why each document falls within the claimed exemption.” 

Lahr, 569 F.3d at 989 (quoting Lion Raisins v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 

1082). Also known as a Vaughn index, it must be “detailed enough for the district court 

to make a de novo assessment of the government’s claim of exemption.” Id.; see also 5 

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (authorizing district court to review a requestor’s complaint under 

FOIA de novo). “[C]onsiderable deference” is given to an agency’s affidavits that are 

made in apparent good faith, and “where the affidavits reasonably describe the 

justifications for nondisclosure and show that the content withheld falls within one of 

FOIA’s exemptions.” Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 772 (citing Hunt, 981 F.2d at 1119). 

Nevertheless, because of FOIA’s overarching goal of public disclosure, its exemptions 

are narrowly interpreted. Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 

1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973). 

 1. Exemption 4 

The SEC has withheld Vaughn index item numbers 1-23 and 51 under Exemption 

4. (Docket No. 22-2, Vaughn Index at 1-6, 13.) It moves for summary judgment that it 

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properly withheld production of these documents under Exemption 4. Plaintiff crossmoves for summary judgment that Exemption 4 does not apply to the withheld 

documents and for an order requiring the SEC to produce them. 

FOIA’s Exemption 4 exempts from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or 

financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 

552(b)(4). In the Ninth Circuit, a government agency invoking Exemption 4 must 

demonstrate that the information it seeks to protect is “(1) commercial [or] financial 

information, (2) obtained from a person or by the government, (3) that is privileged or 

confidential.” GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 

1994), overruled on other grounds in ALDF, supra, 836 F.3d at 990. A district court 

construes the terms “commercial or financial” under their ordinary meanings. Watkins, 

643 F.3d at 1194 (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 

1290 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The SEC does not claim a privilege applies to any of the 

documents it withheld under Exemption 4. Thus, the Court’s inquiry is limited to a 

determination of whether any of the documents are confidential.

“[C]ommercial or financial matter is ‘confidential’ for purposes of [Exemption 4] 

if disclosure of the information is likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to 

impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to 

cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the 

information was obtained.” Id. (citing Nat’l Parks and Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 

498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).4

 Based on a review of the Exemption 4 redaction 

descriptions in its Vaughn index, it appears that the SEC only relies on the second 

                                               

4

 As Plaintiff correctly notes, in its opening brief, the SEC agreed that district courts in 

the Ninth Circuit apply the National Parks test for confidentiality. (See Mot. at 8) 

(“[D]istrict courts in this circuit have adhered to the National Parks test.”) However, in 

its reply, the SEC invites the Court apply the test set forth by the D.C. Circuit in Critical 

Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992), 

which held that “financial or commercial information provided to the Government on a 

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interest. Specifically, the SEC argues that disclosure of the withheld documents would 

“likely cause [Malkin] competitive harm” by: 1) causing Malkin to suffer “reputational 

harm with the third parties who submitted the records to Malkin”; 2) “reveal to Malkin’s 

competitors the types of records Malkin maintains regarding its real estate portfolio”; and 

3) revealing listings of the tenants at Malkin’s various properties, which would “enable 

Malkin’s competitors to identify and contact these tenants regarding leases at competing 

properties.” (Mot. at 8-9.) 

Competitive harm analysis is “limited to harm flowing from the affirmative use of 

proprietary information by competitors. Competitive harm should not be taken to mean 

simply any injury to competitive position.” Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195 (citing Pub. 

Citizen Health Research Group, 704 F.2d at 1291-92 & n. 30 (emphasis original)). 

Additionally, “the test for confidentiality is an objective one.” National Parks, 498 F.2d 

at 766–67 (internal citations omitted). The National Parks court emphasized that 

“[w]hether particular information would customarily be disclosed to the public by the 

person from whom it was obtained is not the only relevant inquiry in determining 

whether that information is ‘confidential’ for purposes of [Exemption 4]. A court must 

also be satisfied that non-disclosure is justified by the legislative purpose which underlies 

the exemption.” Id. at 767. 

 Here, although the SEC has identified the type of injury Malkin might suffer, the 

SEC has not put forward a detailed explanation of how the injury would result from 

disclosure of the documents. First, the SEC relies solely on the Cozza and Keltner 

declarations to support its decision to withhold the disputed documents, which the Court 

sustains Plaintiff’s objections to in pertinent part. See infra, Objections. However, even 

                                               

voluntary basis” is also confidential under Exemption 4. (Def.’s Reply at 6, citing 

Critical Mass at 879.) As the SEC acknowledges, the Ninth Circuit “has never addressed 

or adopted the Critical Mass test” despite multiple opportunities to do so. (Mot. at 8; see 

also Def.’s Reply at 6.) 

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if the Court had considered the declarations, they nevertheless contain only speculative 

and conclusory statements that Malkin would suffer reputational harm or harm to its 

competitive position. 

Second, even if the Court were to rely solely on the justifications stated in the 

Vaughn index, the SEC made no effort to tailor its explanation for withholding the 

documents. Instead, the Vaughn index recites the same nonspecific and conclusory 

explanation as to why the documents were withheld for each item number: “Redacted in 

full to protect [Malkin’s] commercial and financial information that it submitted 

voluntarily and would not customarily release to the public.” (Vaughn Index at 1-7, 13.) 

“Boilerplate” explanations for non-disclosure that fail to “tailor the explanation to the 

specific document withheld” are insufficient. See Lane v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 

1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

The SEC has clearly not met its burden in this regard. 

In particular, the Court is not convinced that the Malkin Index (item number 51), 

which the SEC indicates is a “spreadsheet” that describes an “index of documents 

[Malkin] produced in class action litigation” could ever be considered confidential under 

Exemption 4. It may be that the documents described by the Malkin Index fall within a 

FOIA exemption, but the Court finds that an index or spreadsheet describing the 

existence of potentially exempt documents is not protected by Exemption 4. Therefore, 

the Court DENIES the SEC’S summary judgment motion as to item number 51, and 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion as to the same. 

Lastly, the Court notes that, for item numbers 10 and 15, the SEC also asserts 

FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which essentially permits withholding of information that 

would constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” See Bowen v. FDA, 925 

F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff states he has 

advised the SEC that he does not seek investors’ names and contact information, and asks 

the Court to “limit the scope of the information the SEC may withhold under Exemptions 

6 and 7(C) to investors’ names and contact information.” (Cross-Mot. at 16-17.) 

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Plaintiff correctly argues that the SEC has a duty to segregate non-exempt material 

from exempted material. See Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 778-89 (“FOIA provides that any 

‘reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting 

such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.’) 

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)). Plaintiff also accurately asserts that the SEC did not put 

forth any evidence, admissible or otherwise, suggesting it had attempted to segregate 

non-exempt portions of the documents. However, Plaintiff also has not met his burden to 

demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Plaintiff again relies on 

the same declarations he successfully objected to, and the remaining evidence he 

provided serves to rebut the facts asserted in those declarations. 

Thus, based on the record before it, the Court is unable to resolve, as a matter of 

law, whether the SEC’s application of Exemption 4 was justified. Therefore, the Court 

DENIES without prejudice both the SEC’s and Plaintiff’s motion and cross-motion for 

summary judgment as to item numbers 1-23. 

 2. Exemption 5 

The parties have also moved for summary judgment as to the SEC’s withholding of 

Vaughn index item numbers 24-50 and 52 under FOIA Exemption 5. As it did with 

Vaughn index item numbers 10 and 15, the SEC also asserts FOIA Exemptions 6 & 7(C) 

for item number 28. Plaintiff did not directly address item number 28 in his briefings, but 

generally agreed that the SEC may properly withhold “investors’ names and contact 

information” under these exemptions. (Cross-Mot. at 17.) Therefore, the Court shall 

only address Plaintiff’s challenges to the SEC’s application of Exemption 5. 

Under Exemption 5, an agency may withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency 

memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an 

agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). Exemption 5 shields from 

production “documents . . . normally privileged in the civil discovery context.” Carter v. 

United States DOC, 307 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck 

& Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975)). As a result, Exemption 5 “includes a ‘deliberative 

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process’ privilege.” Carter, 307 F.3d at 1088-89 (citing Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath 

Water Users Protective Assoc., 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001)). Pursuant to the deliberative 

process privilege, an agency may withhold “documents reflecting advisory opinions, 

recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental 

decisions and policies are formulated.” Carter, 307 F.3d at 1089. 

A document falls within the deliberative process privilege, if it is both 

“predecisional” and “deliberative.” Carter, 307 F.3d at 1089 (citing Assembly of 

California v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992)). The Ninth 

Circuit has described predecisional documents as follows: 

A predecisional document is one prepared in order to assist an 

agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision, and may 

include recommendations, draft documents, proposals, 

suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect the 

personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the 

agency. A predecisional document is a part of the deliberative

process, if the disclosure of [the] materials would expose an 

agency's decisionmaking process in such a way as to discourage 

candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the 

agency's ability to perform its functions. 

Carter, 307 F.3d at 1089 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

 For the same reasons the Court is unable to conclude whether the SEC properly 

applied Exemption 4, it finds it is unable to conclude whether the SEC properly applied 

Exemption 5, namely that the record and admissible evidence before it is insufficient to 

make such a determination. The SEC and Plaintiff again rely on Ms. Cozza’s 

declarations, and the SEC puts forward essentially the same boilerplate statement that the 

documents were withheld as “attorney work product, deliberative process.” (Vaughn 

Index at 7-13.) Additionally, the SEC again failed to show that it had even attempted to 

meet its duty to segregate non-exempt material. 

 In sum, neither party has demonstrated they are entitled to summary judgment as a 

matter of law. Accordingly, the Court DENIES without prejudice both the SEC’s and 

Plaintiff’s motion and cross-motion for summary judgment. 

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C. Plaintiff’s Request for Discovery 

In his reply brief, Plaintiff requested the Court “set the depositions of FOIA 

Specialist Luetkenhaus and Branch Chief McInerney and direct the SEC to release all 

writings generated by the FOIA office relating to its efforts to comply with Edelman’s 

FOIA requests.” (Pl.’s Reply at 10.) The Court does not agree that discovery is 

necessary at this time. “Courts are permitted to rule on summary judgment in FOIA 

cases solely on the basis of government affidavits describing the documents sought.” 

Lion Raisins, 354 F.2d at 1082. A district court may allow the government to move for 

summary judgment prior to permitting a plaintiff to conduct discovery. Lane, 523 F.3d at 

1134. 

Thus, the Court shall allow the SEC an additional opportunity to again move for 

summary judgment and attach admissible declarations responsive to this Court’s Order. 

See, e.g. Jarvik v. CIA, 741 F. Supp. 2d 106, 122 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Even if an agency’s 

affidavits regarding its search are deficient, courts generally do not grant discovery but 

instead direct the agency to supplement its affidavits.”). Whether Plaintiff will eventually 

be entitled to discovery may depend on the SEC’s ability to submit evidence that it 

conducted an adequate search. See, e.g., id. (“Only if the agency has not undertaken an 

adequate search for responsive documents is discovery appropriate.”).5

 

OBJECTIONS

Finally, the Court shall address the objections raised by both parties. Plaintiff 

objects to the Declarations of Carin M. Cozza (Docket No. 22-2, “Cozza Decl.”; Docket 

No. 25-1, “Supp. Cozza Decl.”) and Thomas N. Keltner, Jr. (Docket No. 22-3, “Keltner 

Decl.”; Docket No. 22-4, “Supp. Keltner Decl.”). The SEC objects to portions of 

/// 

                                               

5

 Similarly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s request “for an order under 17 C.F.R. 200.83(g) to 

make ‘both request and substantiation may become part of the public court record [sic]’” 

is not necessary at this time. (Cross-Mot. at 18.) 

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Plaintiff’s opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court analyzes each 

objection in turn. 

Plaintiff contends that the Cozza Decl. and Supp. Cozza Decl. should not be 

considered in their entirety because Ms. Cozza admits to relying on written and oral 

hearsay, but does not identify which statements were based on her own personal 

knowledge and which were on hearsay. (Docket No. 23, Pl.’s Cross-Mot. at 7; Docket 

No. 27, Pl.’s Reply at 2-4.) Alternatively, Plaintiff objects to paragraphs 3-5, 7-8, 10, 14, 

16, 19, and 23 of the Cozza Decl. as inadmissible hearsay or conclusions based on 

hearsay. (Pl.’s Cross-Mot. at 7.) In a motion for summary judgment, “[a]n affidavit or 

declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set 

out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is 

competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). 

The parties agree that in the context of an action under FOIA, an agency may rely 

on “an affidavit from an agency employee responsible for supervising a FOIA search” in 

order to satisfy Rule 56’s personal knowledge requirement. Lahr v. Nat'l Transp. Safety 

Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 990 (9th Cir. 2009).6

 The parties disagree over whether Ms. Cozza is 

“an agency employee responsible for supervising a FOIA search.” Id. 

In her initial declaration, Ms. Cozza states she is “a Senior Attorney in the Office 

of General Counsel (“OGC”) for the [SEC]” and has served in this capacity for two years. 

(Cozza Decl. ¶ 1.) Her duties include “reviewing administrative appeals of decisions 

issued by the [SEC’s] Office of FOIA Services (“FOIA Office”) regarding Freedom of 

Information (“FOIA”) requests.” (Id.) Although Ms. Cozza describes how FOIA Lead 

Research Specialist Jason Luetkenhaus and the FOIA Office searched for records 

responsive to Plaintiff’s requests, nowhere in her declarations does she discuss how she 

supervised or was involved in any way in the searches. In fact, Ms. Cozza’s declarations 

                                               

6 See Def.’s Reply at 3; Pl.’s Reply at 3.

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demonstrate that she works in a separate office (the OGC) from the FOIA office, and is 

responsible for reviewing appeals to decisions by the FOIA office after a search has 

already been conducted. (Cozza Decl. ¶ 1; Supp. Cozza Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) 

As a result, the SEC has not established that Ms. Cozza is “an agency employee 

responsible for supervising” Plaintiff’s FOIA searches. Lahr, 569 F.3d at 990. However, 

certain portions of Ms. Cozza’s declarations do state facts based on her own personal 

knowledge. Therefore, the Court sustains Plaintiff’s objections to paragraphs 3-5, 7-8, 

14, 16, and 19 of the Cozza Decl. and paragraphs 3-4 and 8 of the Supp. Cozza Decl. 

inasmuch as they are not based on Ms. Cozza’s personal knowledge or supervision of the 

SEC’s searches for records responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests. Similarly, the Court 

sustains Plaintiff’s objections to paragraphs 10 and 23 of the Cozza Decl. because it is 

unclear whether Ms. Cozza’s statements are based on her own personal knowledge. 

Plaintiff’s objections to the remaining portions of the Cozza declarations are overruled. 

Plaintiff next objects that the Keltner Decl. should not be considered in its entirety 

on the grounds that it “violates the best evidence rule, lacks authentication, is hearsay is 

irrelevant and states legal conclusions.” (Pl.’s Cross-Mot. at 7.) Plaintiff further objects 

to paragraphs 2-10 of the Supp. Keltner Decl. on the grounds that the statements are 

“inadmissible conclusions and hearsay by a non-expert unsupported by evidence 

establishing the facts upon which the conclusions are based.” (Id. at 8.) The SEC did not 

respond to Plaintiff’s objections to either Keltner declaration. 

The Court agrees that the Keltner declarations lack authentication. The Keltner 

declarations indicate they were prepared to support an appeal for FOIA Confidentiality 

Treatment, not the SEC’s motion for summary judgment. (Keltner Decl. at 1, Supp. 

Keltner Decl. ¶ 1.) The SEC failed to submit any affidavit or declaration to authenticate 

the Keltner declarations. Moreover, the Court has reviewed the Keltner declarations and 

agrees that they assert unfounded factual and legal conclusions. Therefore, the Court 

sustains Plaintiff’s objections to both Keltner declarations. 

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Finally, the SEC objects as “improper” portions of Plaintiff’s opposition and crossmotion for summary judgment, which it describes as “sweeping attacks on the [SEC’s] 

motives and conduct over long periods of time, on issues unrelated to the merits of this 

case, and on issues unrelated to the [SEC’s] conduct with respect to this FOIA request.” 

Plaintiff did not respond to the SEC’s objection. The Court agrees that the disputed 

portions of Plaintiff’s briefings do not appear relevant to his present claim, or support his 

cross-motion. Therefore, the Court sustains the SEC’s objections as to the portions of 

Plaintiff’s opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment that consist of argument 

unrelated to his specific FOIA requests or the SEC’s conduct regarding his FOIA 

requests. 

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES without prejudice the SEC’s 

Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES in part, without prejudice,

Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to the adequacy of the SEC’s search 

for documents responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests and the withholding of Vaughn

index item numbers 1-50 and 52. 

The Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as 

to item number 51 (the Malkin Index), and ORDERS the SEC to produce an unredacted7

copy of the document to Plaintiff within three (3) days of the date of this Order. 

Finally, the Court hereby ORDERS the SEC to file a renewed motion for 

summary judgment, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. The SEC’s motion 

shall submit a revised Vaughn index, address both the adequacy of its search for 

Plaintiff’s FOIA requests and the justification for its claimed exemptions by submitting 

detailed, admissible affidavits in accordance with this Order. 

                                               

7

 The SEC may redact the names and contact information of individuals to protect their 

privacy pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) if such information appears in the Malkin 

Index. 

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The SEC is further ordered to comply with its duty to segregate non-exempt 

material. Plaintiff’s opposition and any renewed cross-motion for summary judgment 

shall be filed thirty (30) days after the SEC files its renewed summary judgment motion. 

Any replies shall be due within ten (10) days of the respective summary judgment 

motion or cross-motion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 27, 2017 

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