Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01306/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01306-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODOLFO ARAUJO NAVARRO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

CALIFORNIA, )

)

Respondent. )

)

1:08-cv-01306 YNP (DLB) (HC)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. #14]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

On November 14, 2005, Petitioner was convicted of forcible rape and sexual battery in the

Tulare County Superior Court. (Pet. 1.) Petitioner received a sentence of 8 years. Id.

Petitioner appealed his conviction raising the following grounds: (1) the trial court erred by

refusing to grant a hearing on the admissibility of proffered evidence regarding the victims sexual

conduct and, alternatively, that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence under

section 352 of the California Evidence Code (Pet., attached Court of Appeal opinion; Doc. #1, 50);

(2) the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting Jerry Moore’s rebuttal testimony (Id. at

62); (3) the jury instruction CALJIC no. 2.62 (drawing negative inferences from a defendant’s

testimony) should not have been given and the trial court committed prejudicial error by having done

so (Id. at 63); and (4) the trial court violated appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury by

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 1

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imposing the upper term based on factors not admitted by appellant or found to be true by the jury

beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 66.) On February 23, 2007, the appellate court found error

pertaining to the fourth claim under Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). (Mot. to

Dismiss, 2; Pet., attached Court of Appeal opinion; Doc. #1, 40-68.) The court vacated Petitioner’s

sentence and remanded the case back to the trial court for modification of the sentence and resentencing. (Id.)

On March 23, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for direct review in the California Supreme

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Court in which he raised the following claim, “[a]n upper term sentence which violates the rule

established in Cunningham v. California must be reduced to the middle term to comply with

fundamental fairness and the double jeopardy clause and in the absence of existing California law for

contested sentencing procedures.” (Mot. to Dismiss, 2; Pet., attached Petition for Review; Doc. #1,

22-69.) On September 12, 2007, the State supreme court granted review and transferred the matter

back to the appellate court “with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of

People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 and People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825.” (Mot. to

Dismiss, 2; Lodged Doc. A.) After reconsideration, On November 16, 2007, the State appellate

court vacated its earlier decision and affirmed the judgment in its entirety. (Mot. to Dismiss, 2;

Lodged Doc. B, attached Court of Appeal Decision.) 

On December 19, 2007, in light of the appellate court’s November 16 decision, Petitioner

filed a second petition for review with the State supreme court raising the same single ground as his

earlier State supreme court petition. (Mot. to Dismiss, 2; Lodged Doc. B.) The petition for review

was denied on January 23, 2008. (Mot. to Dismiss, 2; Pet., attached California Supreme Court

decision; Doc. #1, 12.)

On February 13, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Tulare Count

Superior Court, which raised a single issue–juror misconduct. (Mot. to Dismiss, 3; Lodged Doc. C.)

On February 14, 2008, the petition was denied on the following grounds: (1) Petitioner failed to

provide adequate and propr notice; (2) Petitioner failed to raise the issue in a timely manner; and (3)

Respondent’s motion to dismiss states the date of the petition as March 27, 2007, but for purposes of this order,

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the Court will defer to the date on which the petition was signed. (See Pet., attached Petition for Review; Doc. #1, 37.)

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 2

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the superior court will not consider matters on habeas that have already been raised and/or rejected

on direct appeal. (Mot. to Dismiss, 3; Pet., attached Superior Court ruling; Doc. #1, 14-15.) 

Subsequently, on March 26, 2008, the superior court amended the order denying the petition in a

reasoned decision analyzing the alleged juror misconduct. (Mot. to Dismiss, 3; Pet., attached

Superior Court ruling; Doc. #1, 17-19.) On March 7, 2008, Petitioner filed another petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the Tulare County Superior Court claiming that the “verdict was obtained in

violation of appellant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury.” (Mot. to Dismiss, 3; Lodged Doc.

D.) The petition was denied on March 12, 2008, for failing to raise the issues in a timely manner and

failing to state a basis for relief. (Mot. to Dismiss, 3; Lodged Doc. E.)

On August 11, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant petition in the U.S. District Court asserting

that the “verdict was obtained in violation of appellant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury.” 

(Doc. #1, 4.) On April 3, 2009, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Petitioner failed

to exhaust his claim in State court. (Doc. #14.) Petitioner did not file a response to Respondent’s

motion. It is Respondent’s motion to dismiss that will be considered herein.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to

relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing §

2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be raised by the attorney

general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has

referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state

remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03

(9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for

dismissal pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 3

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B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir. 1988).

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 4

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Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the 

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood,

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added).

Respondent asserts that the petition should be dismissed because Petitioner never raised the

juror misconduct claim to the California Supreme Court. Petitioner filed two different petitions for

review with the State supreme court, both of which only raised the Cunningham error claim. The

claim at issue in the instant petition is whether there was juror misconduct when the juror who was to

become the foreman indicated after the trial that he knew one of the witnesses. (Pet., 4.) As stated

above, the Cunningham error issue pertains to sentencing limits which shares neither a factual nor a

legal basis with juror misconduct. Even though Petitioner presented claims of juror misconduct to the

superior and appellate courts, at no time was the State supreme court given a full and fair opportunity

to rule on the issue; therefore the claim is unexhausted.

CONCLUSION

The claim presented in the instant petition was never presented to the State supreme court;

thus, the petition is unexhausted and must be dismissed.

ORDER

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED and the petition for writ

of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 5

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