Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01657/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01657-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY MARSHALL,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-1657 RRB EFB P

vs.

DEPUTY CASTRO, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His September 10, 2004, second amended complaint

alleges that defendants injured him by using excessive force while booking him into jail and then

denied him medical treatment for his injuries. The matter is currently before the court on

motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Molloy and Castro on September 28 and 29,

2006, respectively. For the reasons set forth below, both motions must be denied.

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 Although the complaint refers to Castro as a “deputy,” at the times relevant to this case

he held the rank and title of “correctional officer.” Def. Castro’s Mot. for Summ. J., Attach 11,

Decl. of Castro (“Castro Decl.”), ¶ 1.

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 Molloy was not present when plaintiff was eventually patted down, as described below,

a key event in this case. Molloy Decl., ¶ 5; Pl.’s Dep., at 75:11-17.

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I. Facts

On July 19, 2004, plaintiff was arrested and brought to the Solano County Jail. 

Plaintiff’s Verified Second Amended Complaint (“Sec. Am. Compl.”), ¶ 27. Defendant Castro,

a correctional officer,1 was on duty, and his co-defendant Molloy was the booking sergeant on

duty that day. Def. Castro’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Castro Mot.”), Attach. 11, Decl. of Castro

(“Castro Decl.”), ¶ 1; Def. Molloy’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Molloy Mot.”), Attach. 12, Decl. of

Molloy (“Molloy Decl.”), ¶ 2. Defendant Castro served under the Solano County Sheriff. Id.

He conducted the pre-booking intake process on plaintiff. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27; Castro Decl.,

¶ 1; Molloy Decl., ¶ 3. Molloy also served under the Solano County Sheriff and held the rank of

Sergeant. Molloy Decl., ¶ 1. He had no policymaking authority in his position. Id.

During the jail intake processing of plaintiff, defendant Molloy was sitting at his desk in

the receiving area. He heard loud voices coming from the direction of Castro and plaintiff and

he went over to see what was happening. Molloy Decl., ¶ 3. Molloy states that he did not know

what plaintiff was upset about and attempted to calm him. Molloy Decl., ¶ 4; Castro Decl., ¶ 2. 

Molloy then began walking back to his desk. Molloy Decl., ¶ 4.2

Castro then took plaintiff into the nurse’s office to complete a medical screening portion

of the intake process. During the process, defendants perceived plaintiff to be uncooperative and

continuing to loudly complain. They reported that he was repeatedly protesting in an excited and

agitated manner. Castro Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3; Molloy Decl., ¶ 4.

It is apparent that plaintiff’s medical condition renders his behavior difficult to manage. 

His medical records from the jail for the period immediately following his arrest and for the five

months thereafter show a history of mental illness, including bipolar disorder. Castro Mot. &

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Molloy Mot., Attachs. 14, Decl. of Norris, Ex. A, at 24-25. Notes made by medical staff indicate

that plaintiff was manic and logorrheic, claimed to possess supernatural powers and could

predict events and look into others’ minds. Id.

While waiting to be seen by the intake nurse, Castro continued with the screening process

of plaintiff, which apparently involves asking a series of questions. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27. 

Plaintiff states that Castro became frustrated during this process and chose to stop the

questioning and begin the custodial part of the job. Id. Plaintiff claims that he delayed in

answering one of Castro’s questions and for that reason Castro considered him to be

“combative.” Castro Mot. & Molloy Mot., Attachs. 8, Decl. of Stringer, Ex. A, Deposition of

plaintiff (“Pl.’s Dep.”), at 41:6-42:9, 45:7-20. Castro discontinued the medical screening, Sec.

Am. Compl., ¶ 27; Castro Decl., ¶ 3; Pl.’s Dep., at 41:12-42:9, and commenced the custodial

portion of the intake process. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27; Castro Decl., ¶ 4. He had plaintiff stand

with his face to the wall in the hallway, with the intention of patting him down prior to removing

his belt and checking his pockets. Castro Decl., ¶ 4; Pl.’s Dep., at 53:10–54:14.

What happened next is disputed. Plaintiff claims that Castro grabbed him by one of his

arms and “pointed” his body up against a cement wall. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27. He says that

Castro then removed plaintiff’s belt and searched his front pockets as he stood facing the wall

with his hands cuffed behind his back. Id. According to plaintiff, Castro then searched his rear

pockets, and without any warning, justification, or provocation, slammed his head into the

cement wall, causing dizziness, severe pain, and swelling to the left side of his face. Id.

Castro disputes this. He states that he did not push or in any way “slam” plaintiff’s head

against the wall. Castro Decl., ¶ 4. He states that if plaintiff’s head made contact with the wall

during this pat-down, Castro did not see or notice it. Id. According to Castro, plaintiff

continued to loudly protest and Castro grew concerned that plaintiff might become violent. For

that reason, Castro decided to move plaintiff to a holding cell to complete the custodial intake

process. Castro Decl., ¶ 5. Castro then walked plaintiff to the holding cell, accompanied by his

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partner and by Molloy. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27; Castro Decl., ¶ 5; Molloy Decl., ¶ 6.

Molloy testified that after he returned to his desk following the initial loud voices from

the receiving area, he next noticed Castro escorting plaintiff to the holding cell. Molloy Decl., 

¶ 6. Because he was the supervisor on duty and plaintiff had previously been “agitated,” Molloy

followed them to the cell. Molloy Decl., ¶ 6; Castro Decl., ¶ 5. He said plaintiff was escorted to

the “cold cell” where Molloy stood less than three feet behind plaintiff. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27. 

Once in the holding cell, Castro and his partner placed plaintiff with his face towards the wall in

an attempt to complete the intake search process. Molloy Decl., ¶ 7; Castro Decl., ¶ 6. Plaintiff

was again ordered to face a cement wall with his hands still cuffed behind his back. Sec. Am.

Compl., ¶ 27. Plaintiff claims that at this point he was so close to the wall that his nose was

nearly touching it. Pl.’s Dep., at 60:2-13. He said that Castro asked for assistance from the

others in removing plaintiff’s shoes and socks. Id.

There is no dispute that the officers then lifted plaintiff’s leg and removed one of his

shoes. Molloy Decl., ¶ 7; Castro Decl., ¶ 6; Pl.’s Dep., at 61:1– 62:1. However, contrary to

plaintiff’s allegation, defendants claim that while the officers were attempting to remove

plaintiff’s other shoe, he began to fall towards the floor. Molloy Decl., ¶ 7; Castro Decl., ¶ 6;

Pl.’s Dep., at 61:1– 62:1. Neither Castro nor Molloy saw plaintiff’s head contact the wall as

plaintiff began to fall. Castro Decl., ¶ 6; Molloy Decl., ¶ 7. Castro states that he did not push or

in any fashion “slam” plaintiff’s head against the wall during this procedure. Castro Decl., ¶ 6;

Molloy Decl., ¶ 7. Castro claims that he and his partner grabbed plaintiff’s shoulder as he was

falling, and they “guided” him to the floor. Molloy Decl., ¶ 7; Castro Decl., ¶6; Pl.’s Dep., at

61:10-23.

Plaintiff states, however, that after his shoes and socks were removed, Castro slammed

plaintiff’s face into the wall again. Pl.’s Dep., at 60:2-13. This time, according to plaintiff, his

vision went black and there was a ringing in his ears. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27. Castro then, says

plaintiff, pulled plaintiff away from the wall, and while other officers pulled plaintiff’s legs out

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from under him, Castro placed his hand on plaintiff’s back and slammed him to the cement

ground face first, causing him to temporarily lose consciousness. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27; Pl.’s

Dep., at 60:5-62:13. Defendants claim that Castro and his partner placed plaintiff in a prone

position on the floor to finish removing his shoes and socks. Molloy Decl., ¶ 7; Castro Decl., 

¶ 6; Pl.’s Dep., at 61:24-62:13. Plaintiff states that at that time, Castro placed his boot on

plaintiff’s neck and grinded it against his neck, breaking the skin and causing bruising and

swelling. Id. He also claims that Castro then “pounced down” on plaintiff’s right shoulder with

all his weight, causing plaintiff to bleed through his shirt. Id. He said that he asked defendant

Molloy to stop Castro and asked him why he was just standing there doing nothing and that

Molloy simply laughed. Id.

Plaintiff continued to yell throughout the procedure. Molloy Decl., ¶ 7. Castro testified

that during the entire intake process he never understood why plaintiff was protesting and

refusing to cooperate. Castro Decl., ¶2. Castro indicated that he did not know whether

plaintiff’s protests would escalate to violence. Castro Decl., ¶¶ 2 & 5. Molloy testified that

throughout the process he observed the events from the doorway, approximately fifteen to

twenty feet away. Molloy Decl., ¶ 6. He observed that plaintiff was yelling and uncooperative

throughout the procedure. He did not see plaintiff’s head make contact with the wall. Once

plaintiff’s shoes and socks were removed, Molloy left the room, believing the officers had

matters under control. The entire exchange from the moment plaintiff was placed against the

wall in the holding cell, until the moment his shoes and socks were removed, took no more than

two to three minutes. Molloy Decl., ¶ 8.

Plaintiff does not allege that Molloy inflicted any physical harm on him. Sec. Am.

Compl., ¶ 27; Pl.’s Dep., at 72:21–73:7, 81:17– 25. Rather, his sole complaint against Molloy

was that Molloy was a supervisor who was present and observed the events in the holding cell,

but failed to intervene. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27; Pl.’s Dep., at 72:21–73:22, 81:17-25.

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Plaintiff alleges that he asked for medical assistance, which was denied. Sec. Am.

Compl., ¶ 27. He claims that he sustained injuries to his right knee, back, and neck, id., and that

the right side of his face was “swollen unusually” and he had cuts and scratches on his neck. 

Pl.’s Dep., at 44:9-24. He expressed some confusion as to whether he was facing to the right or

left and whether he sustained injury to his right or left side of his face. Id., at 75:21-76:6. He

alleges that he requested to see medical staff for “facial swelling,” and to have his neck and back

examined. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27.

In contrast, defendants claim that plaintiff had no visible injuries and neither Molloy nor

Castro perceived that plaintiff had any urgent need for medical attention at that time. Castro

Decl., ¶ 9. They note that after the intake process was complete plaintiff was taken to have his

booking photo taken, and assert that the photo shows no facial injuries.

Plaintiff filled out two Correctional Health Care Services Request forms within two to

three days of July 19, 2004. One of these forms is dated July 21, 2004, and the other July 22,

2004. Neither form mentions an assault by jail staff. Castro Mot. & Molloy Mot., Attachs. 14,

Norris Decl., Ex. A. However, the one dated July 22 references “neck and back pain,” and the

other, dated July 23, specifically notes “swollen neck.” Id. Medical staff notes also indicate that

plaintiff complained of being “pushed up against a cement wall” and that he had a bruise on his

neck. Id. at 22, 27. On physical examination on July 26, 2004, plaintiff complained of right

shoulder and neck pain, but there were no physical signs or symptoms supporting these

complaints. Id. An x-ray of plaintiff’s right knee was normal. Id. 

Plaintiff filed a tort claim with Solano County on or about September 3, 2004. Defs.’

Req. for Jud. Ntc., Ex. A, Plaintiff’s Solano County Claim for Damages (“Tort Claim”). In that

tort claim, when asked to “[s]pecify the particular act or omission and circumstances [he]

believe[d] caused injury, damage or loss,” plaintiff described physical harm stemming from his

face allegedly being “slammed” against a cement wall in the holding cell, and resulting from the

search and restraint that took place on the holding cell floor. Tort Claim. The tort claim

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contains no mention of any “head-slamming” in the hallway, nor does it mention any requests

for medical attention. Id. It also did not identify any act or omission on the part of Molloy or

any request for medical attention. Id.

II. Standards

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) avoids unnecessary trials in cases

with no disputed material facts. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of

Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52

(1986). 

Rule 56 serves to screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of genuine

disputes over facts material to the outcome of the case; e.g., issues that can only be determined

through presentation of testimony and evidence at trial such as credibility determinations of

conflicting testimony over dispositive facts.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

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 On January 20, 2006, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Thus, to overcome summary judgement an opposing party must show a dispute that is

both genuine, and involving a fact that makes a difference in the outcome.3

 Two steps are

necessary. First, according to the substantive law, the court must determine what facts are

material. Second, in light of the appropriate standard of proof, the court must determine whether

material factual disputes require resolution at trial. Id., at 248. 

When the opposing party has the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the

moving party need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v.

National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). The moving party need only point to matters

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex v. Cattret, 477

U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish

genuine material factual issues. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. The opposing

party must demonstrate that the disputed facts are material, i.e., facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that disputes are

genuine, i.e., the parties’ differing versions of the truth require resolution at trial, see T.W. Elec.,

809 F.2d at 631. There can be no genuine issue as to any material fact where there is a complete

failure of proof as to an essential element of the nonmoving party's case because all other facts

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 A verified complaint may be used as an affidavit in opposition to the motion. 

Schroeder v McDonald, 55 F. 3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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are thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The opposing party may not rest

upon the pleadings’ mere allegations or denials, but must present evidence of specific disputed

facts. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.4

 Conclusory statements cannot defeat a properly

supported summary judgment motion. See Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir.

1983). 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 249, 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the proponent must adduce

evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American Int’l Group, Inc. v.

American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322).

If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at issue, summary judgment is

inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other

hand,“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation

omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary judgment. 

With these standards in mind, it is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial over the issue raised on this motion, i.e., whether the defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s safety. Equally critical is that “deliberate indifference”

is an essential element of plaintiff’s cause of action. Therefore, to withstand defendant’s motion,

plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. He must demonstrate a

genuine issue for trial, Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989), and he 

must do so with evidence upon which a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on the

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evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252. 

III. Analysis

A. Excessive Force 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a pretrial detainee from

the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.

10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)); see Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The Due Process clause protects pretrial

detainees from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment . . . . Graham therefore

explicates the standards applicable to a pretrial detention excessive force claim in this circuit.”)

(citations omitted). The factors a court should consider in resolving a due process claim alleging

excessive force are: (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the

need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) whether

force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline. White v. Roper, 901

F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir.1990).

To determine whether particular restrictions and conditions accompanying pretrial

detention amount to punishment, the court first looks to whether the disability imposed is for the

purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental

purpose. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538. Absent a showing of an express intent to punish, whether a

restriction amounts to punishment will generally turn on whether there is an alternative, rational

purpose for the restriction, and whether the restriction then appears excessive in relation to that

purpose. See id. If a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal, i.e., if

it is arbitrary or purposeless, the court may infer that the purpose of the action is punishment. Id.

at 539.

Defendants’ motion argues that plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact as to

whether defendants used force at all. They submit a copy of plaintiff’s booking photo together

with a declaration that the photo was taken after the use of force that plaintiff claims to have

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 The copy of the booking photo defendants submitted is overly dark and wholly

obscured by poor print quality. The quality is so poor that the court is unable to discern any of

plaintiff’s features let alone whether the photo does or does not show evidence of injury. 

Whether the original or a photographic duplicate would provide useful evidence is unknown. 

Neither was submitted in support of this motion. To urge the court to grant judgment on the faith

of such “evidence” is an affront to the court.

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taken place. Castro Mot., Attach 12, Molloy Mot., Attach. 10, Decl. of Jones, Ex. A, Booking

photo (“Photo”); Molloy Decl., ¶ 11; Castro Decl., ¶8. Defendants claim that the booking

photograph shows no facial injuries. Id. However, the quality of the copy is so poor that it is

impossible for the court to discern any evidence from the photo either in support of defendants’

claims or plaintiff’s.5 Id. Defendant Castro asserts that he “did not push or ‘slam’ his head into

the wall . . . did not ‘grind’ [his] boot onto his neck . . . [and] did not ‘pounce’ on him.” Castro

Decl., ¶ 6. Defendant Molloy claims that “at no time did I witness [Castro] exert any fore to

restrain [plaintiff].” Molloy Decl., ¶ 10. In support of their claims, defendants argue that there is

no evidence showing that they used any force or that plaintiff was injured as a result of their

actions. Plaintiff contends, under penalty of perjury in his verified complaint, that they did

use force and that there was no provocation for its use. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27. He claims that

defendant Castro slammed his head into the wall, slammed his body to the ground and his face

into the floor, ground his boot into plaintiff’s neck, and then denied medical treatment. Id.

Clearly, there is a dispute. The question is whether plaintiff has met his burden under Celotex to

establish through evidence sufficient to meet his burden of proof at trial that the dispute here is

genuine. 477 U.S. at 323. 

The statements by these two defendants and by plaintiff, each percipient witnesses to the

disputed events, conflicts. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court

finds that genuine issues of material fact remain. Plaintiff has claimed, under oath, that Castro

slammed his head into the wall and, while plaintiff was on the floor, placed his boot on

plaintiff’s neck and grinded it against his neck, and then pounced on plaintiff’s shoulder. He has

also claimed, under oath, that he pleaded with Molloy to stop Castro and asked Molloy why he

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was just standing there doing nothing and that Molloy simply laughed. Defendants, of course,

deny these allegations entirely. But if plaintiff’s testimony is believed by a jury he may be

entitled to prevail on his claim.

Defendants’ testimony may very well prove to be more credible for the reasons

defendants argue. There does not appear to be physical evidence to corroborate plaintiff’s

version of the events, but his credibility, like that of the defendants, is to be determined by the

trier of fact at trial and not on the papers in the context of this summary judgment motion. A

jury will be entitled to weigh the defendants’ credibility arguments, including the strength or

weakness of plaintiff’s testimony in light of all of the other evidence, including the evidence that

plaintiff was behaving in a loud and combative manner, and that he suffers from mental illness. 

A reasonable jury could find that plaintiff’s version of the events is not credible. Likewise, it

could also draw inferences from these facts and find that defendants used force amounting to

punishment out of frustration over plaintiff’s disruptive and combative behavior. See Bell, 441

U.S. at 538. On this motion the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable

to plaintiff and to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Plainly, there is a triable

issue of fact over what happened and defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law on the question of whether Castro used excessive force to control the plaintiff. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

B. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need 

A pre-trial detainee’s claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs derives from the

due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual

punishment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). However, the same substantive standard applies. Wolfish,

441 U.S. at 535. A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two

elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s

response to that need. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

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on other grounds sub. nom, WMX Technologies, Inc v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc).

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result

in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Examples of indications that a prisoner has a

“serious” need for medical treatment include the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor

or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical

condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities or the existence of chronic and

substantial pain. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir.

1990)).

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial

risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

he “must also draw the inference.” Id.

In order for deliberate indifference to be established, therefore, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant that results in harm. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

1985). A finding that the defendant's activities resulted in “substantial” harm to the prisoner is

not necessary, however. Nor must plaintiff demonstrate that the defendants’ actions were

egregious. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060, 1061 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7-10

(1992) (rejecting “significant injury” requirement and noting that Constitution is violated

“whether or not significant injury is evident”)). Nevertheless, the existence of serious harm

tends to support an inmate’s deliberate indifference claims. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

(9th Cir. 2006) (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060).

////

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Once the prerequisites are met, it is for the factfinder to determine whether the

defendants were deliberately indifferent. Such indifference may appear when prison officials

deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown in the way in

which prison officials provide medical care. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062 (delay of seven

months in providing medical care during which medical condition was left virtually untreated

and plaintiff was forced to endure “unnecessary pain” sufficient to present colorable § 1983

claim); Compare Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (jury could find

deliberate indifference where officials denied showers and medical attention to inmates who had

been exposed to pepper-spray); and Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc) (summary judgment should not have been granted to defendants where plaintiff presented

evidence that prison officials failed and refused to follow doctor’s orders for a liquid diet for

plaintiff whose mouth had been wired shut to treat a broken jaw); with Toguchi v. Chung, 391

F.3d 1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment in favor of defendant doctor appropriate

where evidence showed doctor did not believe that Cogentin use presented a serious risk of harm

to plaintiff; claim that doctor failed to conduct a differential diagnosis did not amount to more

than negligence and claim that doctor failed to employ emergency treatment was conclusory);

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiffs could not prove Eighth

Amendment violation in class action because they “have not demonstrated that delays occurred

to patients with [dental] problems so severe that delays would cause significant harm and that

defendants should have known this to be the case”).

A plaintiff need not prove a complete failure to treat. Deliberate indifference may be

shown where access to medical staff is meaningless such as where the staff is not competent and

does not render competent care. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir.1989)

(summary judgment reversed where medical staff and doctor knew of head injury, disregarded

evidence of complications to which they had been specifically alerted and without examination

prescribed contraindicated sedatives).

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Here, the question is whether plaintiff’s sworn statements, if believed, establish

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need such that he suffered “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” See McGuckin, 974 F.2d 1050, (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). He claims

to have sustained injuries that were so severe that they caused bleeding, bruising, and swelling to

various parts of his body. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27. Those allegations are, as noted above,

disputed. But the dispute over whether the plaintiff was handled in the manner he suggests

simply underscores the dispute here. If his face was smashed into the wall, and if a boot was

ground into his neck, he may have sustained injuries warranting medical attention. The evidence

shows that the earliest he received medical care was on July 26, 2004, seven days later. Norris

Decl., Attachs. That same evidence also shows that plaintiff suffered from a variety of ailments

for which medical attention may have been warranted, including scleroderma and bipolar

disorder. Id. A jury could find that defendants purposefully acted or failed to act and resulting

harm therefrom. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley, 766 F.2d at 407. As discussed

above, a jury might find defendants’ testimony more credible, but it is for the trier of fact to

weigh credibility. There plainly is a triable issue of fact on this issue. Accordingly, defendants

are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on this question. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324. 

C. Respondeat Superior 

To state a claim against a supervisor who did not personally inflict the injury alleged,

plaintiff must allege the supervisor (1) caused others to act, or knowingly refused to stop them

from acting, knowing or having reasonable cause to know they would inflict injury; (2) approved

such conduct and injury after the fact; or (3) so failed to train or control subordinates to avoid

such injury as to demonstrate reckless or callous indifference to constitutional injury. Redman v.

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989); Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); see also, Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 937 & fn. 4

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(9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has the burden of proving these elements to his claim.

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is

based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder

v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn. 10-11 (9th Cir.1995); see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1090 n. 1 (9th Cir.1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.1998) (treating allegations in

prisoner’s amended complaint as opposing affidavit). Here, plaintiff's complaint was signed

under penalty of perjury and on summary judgment, may serve as a declaration in opposition to

the motion to the extent the passages relied on are based on personal knowledge and are

otherwise admissible testimony. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.1999)

(citing T.W. Elec. Svc., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.

1987)).

Plaintiff contends that defendant Molloy should be held liable for Castro’s alleged use of

excessive force because Molloy ratified Castro’s conduct by failing to intervene. Plaintiff asserts

that he appealed to Molloy to intervene in Castro’s alleged use of excessive force and that

Molloy merely laughed. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 27. Molloy claims that he followed Castro and

plaintiff to the holding cell, Molloy Decl., ¶ 6, but that he observed nothing amounting to a use

of force. Molloy Decl., ¶¶ 7, 10. Although “[o]rdinarily, ratification is a question for the jury,”

Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1999), to survive summary judgment, plaintiff

must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether ratification

occurred.

First, there is a genuine dispute over whether Castro used excessive force. Second, there

is a genuine factual dispute over whether Molloy ratified that excess by “knowingly refus[ing] to

stop [Castro] from acting, knowing or having reasonable cause to know [Castro] would inflict

injury” or “fail[ing] to train or control subordinates to avoid such injury as to demonstrate

reckless or callous indifference to constitutional injury.” Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446; Taylor, 880

F.2d at 1045; Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646; Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743; see also Jones, 297 F.3d at

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937 & fn. 4. Accordingly, the court finds that defendant Molloy’s respondeat superior defense

fails and he is not entitled to summary judgment. 

D. Qualified Immunity 

Defendants argue that even if there was a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the

individual defendants are protected by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields state

actors from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Qualified immunity strikes a balance between

compensating those who have been injured by official conduct and protecting government's

ability to perform its traditional functions.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992). “[T]he

qualified immunity recognized in Harlow acts to safeguard government, and thereby to protect

the public at large, not to benefit its agents.” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168. The Supreme Court does

not “draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state

officials under [42 USC] § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution [via Bivens v.

Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) ] against federal officials.” Butz v. Economou,

438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).

The analysis for qualified immunity entails three steps. First, the court must determine

whether the facts, taken in light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show a violation

of the plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If

the court finds a material factual dispute whether a constitutional violation has occurred, then the

court determines whether the right infringed was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). Finally, the court assesses whether it would be

clear to a reasonable person in the defendant’s position that its conduct was unlawful in the

situation it confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 205. See also Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d

1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006) (characterizing this final inquiry as a discrete third step in the

analysis). “This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the

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very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of

pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)

(citation omitted). For excessive force claims, courts first inquire into the objective

reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the necessity of his actions, and second, inquire into the

objective reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the legality of his actions. Wilkins v. City of

Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710, 713

(9th Cir. 2005) (stating, in the context of excessive force, that “[t]he Supreme Court did not need

to create a catalogue of all the acts by which cruel and sadistic purpose to harm another would be

manifest”). Defendants carry the burden of proving their conduct was reasonable under these

standards.

The qualified immunity analysis is thus conceptually distinct from the excessive force

constitutional analysis. See Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 691 (9th Cir.2003). That is, an

officer may violate an inmate’s constitutional right, but still be entitled to qualified immunity if

he can show that a reasonable officer in his position would have believed his response was a

good faith effort to restore discipline. See id. at 692-93 (guard who shot passive, unarmed

inmate standing near a fight between other unarmed inmates was entitled to qualified immunity

because a reasonable official standing where the guard was standing (i.e., in a tower 360 feet

away from the disturbance) could perceive that both plaintiff and another inmate were

threatening a third inmate with serious injury); Compare Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710,

712-13 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that prison guard could not reasonably believe that he could

lawfully kick the genitals of a prisoner who was on the ground and in handcuffs).

Defendants claim they are entitled to qualified immunity on all of the plaintiff’s alleged

violations. The argument discounts unduly the nature of the factual dispute here. According to

plaintiff’s sworn statement, the officers attacked without provocation or legitimate purpose. 

Under plaintiff’s version, there exists no “reasonable mistake” under which the officers could

have reasonably believed in the necessity or legality of their conduct. See Santos v. Gates, 287

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F.3d 846, 855 n12 (9th Cir. 2002) (declining to grant qualified immunity “because whether the

officers may be said to have made a ‘reasonable mistake’ of fact or law, may depend upon the

jury’s resolution of the disputed facts and the inferences it draws therefrom”). See also Hervey

v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 995) (qualified immunity inappropriate in excessive force

cases because they raise issues of fact). If plaintiff’s testimony is credited, there is no basis for

good faith immunity here.

In sum, evaluation of plaintiff’s excessive force claims depends principally on credibility

determinations and the drawing of factual inferences from circumstantial evidence, both of

which are the traditional functions of the jury; hence, a question of material fact exists with

respect to the amount of force used by the officers. Additionally, “because questions of

reasonableness are not well-suited to precise legal determination,” Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432,

1440 (9th Cir. 1994), the jury should be allowed to assess whether the force used by the officers

was excessive. Accordingly, the court recommends denial of defendants’ assertion of qualified

immunity.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Molloy’s September 28, 2006, motion for summary judgment be denied;

2. Defendant Castro’s September 29, 2006, motion for summary judgement be denied;

and

3. Plaintiff be directed to file a pretrial statement within 30 days, and defendants be

given 15 days after such service to file and serve a pretrial statement.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

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within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 6, 2008.

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