Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00613/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00613-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WAYNE RUSSELL,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

ARAMARK REFRESHMENT SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant. 

Case No. 16-cv-00613-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 14 

Plaintiff Wayne Russell filed the instant action in the Superior Court for the State of 

California, County of Alameda, on behalf of himself and in a representative capacity on behalf of 

similarly situated employees. Plaintiff brings claims for penalties under California’s Labor Code 

and Private Attorney Generals Act (“PAGA”) based on: failure to furnish accurate wage 

statements and failure to state availability of paid sick leave. On February 5, 2016, Defendant 

Aramark Refreshment Services, LLC removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction, 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). (Dkt. No. 1, Notice of Removal, “NOR.”) 

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand the case, arguing that 

Defendant has not established the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Dkt. No. 14, “Mtn.”) 

Having read and carefully considered the papers submitted, the admissible evidence, and the 

pleadings in this action, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion.1

 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (federal courts “possess only that power authorized by 

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 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 

finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. 

Case 4:16-cv-00613-YGR Document 21 Filed 03/11/16 Page 1 of 4
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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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Constitution and statute”). A defendant may remove a civil action from state court if the action 

could have originally been filed in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. A plaintiff may seek to have a 

case remanded to the state court from which it was removed if the district court lacks jurisdiction 

or if there is a defect in the removal procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The removal statutes are 

strictly construed, so as to limit removal jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 

U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941). 

A district court must remand a case if it appears before final judgment that the court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). There is typically a strong presumption against 

finding removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The burden 

of establishing federal jurisdiction for purposes of removal is on the party seeking removal. See 

Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking removal “has 

the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that removal is proper.” Geographic 

Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010). “Federal jurisdiction 

must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 

F.2d at 566; accord Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 

2003). The court “resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip 

Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). 

II. DISCUSSION

The parties agree that, absent attorney fees, the amount in controversy for Plaintiff’s 

individual PAGA claims is only $4,950. (NOR ¶¶ 22-26; Mtn. at 2:10.) Accordingly, all that 

must be determined is whether Defendant met its burden to establish that attorney’s fees of at least 

$70,050.01 can also be considered in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (“the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...”) (emphasis supplied). 

“The amount in controversy includes... attorney’s fees, if authorized by statute or 

contract.” Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s prayer for 

relief specifically seeks attorney’s fees. (NOR, Exh. A at 8.) Irrespective of whether Plaintiff 

specifically requests attorney’s fees, PAGA authorizes such an award. “Any employee who 

prevails in any [PAGA] action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and 

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costs.” Cal. Labor Code § 2699(g)(1); see also Patel v. Nike Retail Services, Inc., 58 F.Supp.3d 

1032, 1048 (N.D.Cal. 2014) (prevailing plaintiff in PAGA action may recover attorney fees). 

Defendant offers a single estimate of $90,000 in attorney’s fees for the Court’s 

consideration. Defendant calculates this estimate based on 200 hours of attorney time at a 

“relatively conservative rate” of $450 per hour. (NOR ¶ 31.) Defendant primarily relies on 

Lippold v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. – a PAGA class action – to generate its estimate of attorney’s 

fees in this case. 2010 WL 1526441 at *1 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 15, 2010). In Lippold, the court stated 

that “attorneys handling wage-and-hour cases typically spend far more than 100 hours on the 

case.” Id. at 4. However, as this Court recently held in a similar PAGA representative action: 

[S]ince Lippold, several district courts have recognized that the 

Ninth Circuit’s holding in Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of California, Inc., 

726 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2013), has undermined Lippold’s reasoning 

and have declined to extend Lippold to PAGA class actions in light 

of Urbino. In Urbino, the Ninth Circuit held that civil penalties 

under PAGA cannot be aggregated among class members to 

determine to meet the amount in controversy requirement for federal 

diversity jurisdiction. 726 F.3d at 1122. Following Urbino, the 

growing consensus among district courts in California is that 

attorney’s fees similarly cannot be aggregated, but rather they must 

be pro-rated among putative class members when determining the 

amount in controversy. Patel, 58 F.Supp.3d at 1049 (“When the rule 

is that claims are not aggregated...(as it is now for PAGA actions 

under Urbino), it would seriously undermine the anti-aggregation 

rule to allow attorney’s fees to be allocated solely to a named 

plaintiff in determining the amount in controversy”) (internal 

alterations omitted); Mitchell v. Grubhub Inc., 2015 WL 5096420 at 

*7 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 28, 2015) (noting that, following Urbino, “several 

district courts in this Circuit have determined that the amount in 

controversy in PAGA actions should only include a plaintiff’s prorated attorneys’ fees”); Perez v. WinnCompanies, Inc., 2014 WL 

5823064 at *10-11 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (“in a putative class 

action, attributing attorneys’ fees solely to a named plaintiff for 

purposes of determining the amount in controversy would be 

improper, because the plaintiff would not ultimately be entitled to 

the entirety of that award upon a favorable disposition of the case”). 

The Court finds the reasoning in these cases persuasive, and 

concludes that post-Urbino, “only the portion of attorney’s fees 

attributable to [Plaintiff’s] claims count towards the amount in 

controversy.” Patel, 58 F.Supp.3d at 1049. 

Taylor v. Interstate Group, LLC, 2016 WL 861020, at *6 (N.D.Cal. March 7, 2016). 

Case 4:16-cv-00613-YGR Document 21 Filed 03/11/16 Page 3 of 4
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United States District Court 

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Thus, even if the Court were to accept Defendant’s estimate of $90,000 as appropriate, that 

entire amount cannot be attributed to Plaintiff. Instead, the “amount must be distributed pro rata” 

to all similarly situated employees whom Plaintiff seeks to represent. Id. Even assuming that only 

one other such employee exists in the state of California, pro-rating Defendant’s estimate of 

attorney’s fees only amounts to $45,000 per person. See Patel, 58 F.Supp.3d at 1048-49 (in light 

of defendant’s failure to establish the number of employees in California for whom the plaintiff 

could bring a representative PAGA claim, the court calculated fees based on assumption of “five 

such employees”). This is far below the $70,050.01 required to clear the jurisdictional hurdle. 

Defendant contends that its $90,000 estimate need not be pro-rated because it only 

accounts for attorney’s fees Plaintiff will incur with respect to his individual claims. The Court 

disagrees. Under these circumstances, Defendant’s estimate appears to be vastly overstated. 

Defendant offers no case in which an individual Plaintiff seeking approximately $5,000 in PAGA 

penalties recovered attorney’s fees in the range of $90,000. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to 

meet its burden to establish jurisdiction. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of 

establishing that the amount in controversy in this litigation exceeds the jurisdictional threshold 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Therefore, the motion for remand is GRANTED. The clerk is directed to 

REMAND this action to the Superior Court for the State of California, County of Alameda. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2016 

______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 4:16-cv-00613-YGR Document 21 Filed 03/11/16 Page 4 of 4