Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00344/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00344-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Doug Nielsen,

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Warden Conrad M. Graber, 

Respondent.

No. CV 11-344-TUC-JGZ (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 (Petition), filed on June 9, 2011. (Doc. 1) Petitioner, Doug Nielsen claims 

that he was denied his due process right to a fair disciplinary hearing. 

Before the Court is the Petition with exhibits (doc. 1), Respondent’s return with 

accompanying exhibits (doc. 12) (Answer), and Petitioner’s reply (doc. 13). 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 7) 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court enter an order denying the Petition. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Petitioner is presently incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institute (FCI) – 

Safford, Arizona. This was also his place of incarceration at the time of the incidents 

which resulted in the disciplinary proceedings at issue in this Petition, and at the time he 

filed the present Petition. Petitioner’s disciplinary conviction resulted in the loss of 27 

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good time credits. Nielsen is currently serving a 285-month sentence of incarceration for 

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and is projected to complete this 

sentence on May 24, 2012, via Good Conduct Time Release. 

II. DISCIPLINARY HEARING AND PROCEEDINGS

 Following the imposition of sanctions, including the loss of 27 days of good time 

credits, imposed for fighting with another person in violation of Bureau of Prison’s 

Disciplinary Code 201, Nielsen administratively appealed the disciplinary conviction 

claiming he was not provided with an impartial Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) during 

his disciplinary proceedings because Lieutenant Wayne Elie participated in the 

investigation of the incident and subsequently was the DHO at his hearing. (See Petition 

at 7) Following administrative denial of the claim at all levels, Nielsen filed the instant 

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

 Subsequently, after the filing of the instant Petition, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 

determined a re-hearing of this disciplinary matter would be appropriate. Accordingly, a 

re-hearing was conducted on August 17, 2011, before DHO Joseph J. DeVore. (Answer, 

Ex. II, DeVore Declaration, ¶ 4.) DHO DeVore is stationed at FCI Terminal Island, 

California. (Id., ¶ 1) DHO DeVore concluded Nielsen committed the disciplinary 

infraction and re-imposed sanctions. (Id., ¶ 7) Despite the rehearing in front DHO 

DeVore, Nielsen maintains that the due process violations inherent in his initial hearing 

still entitle him to expunge his disciplinary conviction. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

 A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. 

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). Writ of habeas corpus relief 

extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United States if the petitioner 

can show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1) & (3). A prisoner who wishes to challenge the 

manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution must bring a petition pursuant to 

§ 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864, and must file the petition in 

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the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 

677 (9th Cir. 1980). 

 In the instant case Petitioner is seeking relief with respect to disciplinary 

proceedings that, in part, resulted in the loss of good time credit while incarcerated at 

FCI-Safford. Petitioner is challenging the legality of the manner in which his sentence is 

being executed. Thus, the Petition is properly before this Court under 28 U.S.C. §2241. 

B. Exhaustion 

 Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging 

any circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. 

Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). The Government concedes that 

Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the disciplinary action. (See

Answer, Doc. 12, at 3, ¶ II.a; see also Petition, at 4, Exhibits, Administrative Remedies)

C. Merits

1. Due Process 

 Federal prisoners have a statutory right to good time credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624. 

Accordingly, they have a due process interest in the disciplinary proceedings that may 

take away those credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). "Due process 

in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives written notice of the 

charges, and a statement of the evidence relied on by the prison officials and the reasons 

for disciplinary action." Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)(citing 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66.). "The inmate has a limited right to call witnesses and to 

present documentary evidence when permitting him to do so would not unduly threaten 

institutional safety and goals." Id. (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.) Once these Wolff

procedural protections are followed, the only function of a federal court is to review the 

statement of evidence upon which the committee relied in making its findings to 

determine if the decision is supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent. Mass. Corr. 

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1984) (“The requirements of due process are satisfied if 

some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board.”) 

 In the federal prison system, the Bureau of Prisons has, by regulation, adopted 

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specific guidelines for inmate discipline procedures which are set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 

541.10 et seq.

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 These guidelines largely track the due process requirements established by 

the Supreme Court in Wolff. See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1404 (3rd Cir. 1991). 

Under these regulations, when prison staff have reason to believe that a prohibited act has 

been committed by an inmate, an incident report must be prepared and referred for 

investigation. 28 C.F.R. § 541.14. After investigation, the incident report is referred to a 

Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) for an initial hearing. 28 C.F.R. § 541.15. The UDC 

may either reach a finding regarding whether a prohibited act was committed, or refer the 

case to the Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) for further hearing. 28 C.F.R. § 541.15(f). 

The DHO then has the authority to dismiss any charge, to find a prohibited act was 

committed, and to impose any available sanction for the act. 28 C.F.R. § 541.18. The 

DHO hearing is conducted pursuant to the procedures set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 541.17. 

Throughout this hearing process the inmate is provided with a series of procedural 

rights. For example, the inmate is entitled to notice of the alleged infraction. 28 C.F.R. § 

541.17(a). The inmate is also entitled to assistance at DHO hearings. 28 C.F.R. § 

541.17(b). Additionally, “[i]n order to insure impartiality, the DHO may not be the 

reporting officer, investigating officer, or UDC member, or a witness to the incident or 

play any significant part in having the charge(s) referred to the DHO.” 28 C.F.R. § 

541.16(b). 

 At the time of his first DHO hearing, Nielsen was provided a Notice of Discipline 

Hearing Before the DHO, along with a statement of Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing. 

(Answer, Ex. II, Attachment 3) Nielsen waived the right to a staff representative, 

requested no witnesses and offered no documentary evidence. (Answer, Ex. I, 

Attachment 3, DHO Report, ¶¶ II. – III.) Nielsen commented at the hearing that “ I 

 

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The regulations promulgated in this section have, since the time of Petitioner’s 

offense been revised and renumbered. See 75 FR 76263-01. The regulation directing the 

conduct of DHO hearings is now found at 28 C.F.R. 541.8, Inmate Discipline and Special 

Housing Units, Discipline Hearing Officer hearing. This Report and Recommendation 

will refer to the 2010 version of the regulations in existence at the time of Petitioner’s 

disciplinary proceeding. 

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disagreed with inmate Mahler about the faster way to square and inmate Mahler started 

saying things, degrading me in front of the other students. I told inmate Mahler to stop 

and he wouldn’t so I started hitting inmate Mahler.” (Id., ¶ III.B.) After considering the 

incident report, including the contract teacher’s statements in which he observed Nielsen 

involved in a physical altercation with another inmate, the memorandum submitted by the 

contract teacher stating essentially the same thing, Inmate Mahler’s statement that 

Nielsen hit him, and Nielsen’s admission that he threw the first punch, DHO Elie found 

Nielsen committed the prohibited act of fighting with another person in prohibition of 

Code 201. (Id., ¶ V.) The DHO Report reflects that two inmate statements were obtained 

(id., ¶ III.D.), but were not considered by the DHO in reaching his conclusion that 

Nielsen committed the prohibited act (id., ¶ V.). DHO Elie imposed sanctions of loss of 

27 days Good Conduct Time, Disciplinary Segregation of 15 days, an additional 15 days 

of Disciplinary Segregation suspended pending 180 days clear conduct, 60 days loss of email privilieges, 60 days loss of telephone privileges, and 60 days loss of visiting 

privileges. (Id, Ex.1, Attachment 3, DHO Report) 

At the time of his re-hearing, Nielsen was again advised of the charges and his 

rights, and waived his rights to a staff representative and his right to have witnesses, and 

offered no documentary evidence. (Id., ¶ 4; Answer, Ex. II, Attachment 2, ¶¶ II.-III. )

Nielsen admitted being involved in a fight, and stated that he didn’t start the fight, but 

that he finished it. (Answer, Ex. II, DeVore Declaration, ¶ 5) DHO DeVore found 

Nielsen committed the disciplinary infraction of fighting, in violation of Code 201 after 

considering the content of the incident report which documented the encounter between 

the Officer writing the report and the contract employee who witnessed the fit, in addition 

to the typed and signed memo of the contract employee who witnessed the fight, as well 

as Nielsen’s admission. (Answer, Ex. II, DeVore Declaration, ¶ 6; Ex. II, Attachment 2, ¶ 

V) The statements by the two inmate witnesses previously obtained were not considered. 

The sanctions imposed by DHO DeVore were not greater than those imposed by DHO 

Elie, and sanctions that had been previously served were not re-imposed. 

Initially, it is not evident that DHO Elie’s interview of two witnesses actually 

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occurred or was in violation of Petitioner’s due process rights. Only Nielsen’s own 

affidavit, not the affidavit of the two witnesses, states that the two inmate witnesses were 

questioned by Lt. Elie as part of an investigation to the incident. (Petition, Affidavit of 

Doug Nielsen, ¶ 6) No affidavit is provided by the witnesses themselves that this is what 

in fact occurred. Though the witness statements appear on the DHO report, it is not clear 

when they were obtained. 

Additionally, even though it violates prison regulations for a DHO to conduct an 

investigation, a violation of a Bureau of Prisons’ regulation does not necessarily 

implicate due process. Indeed, due process does not impose a requirement that the DHO 

not take part in the investigation. As noted above, the Supreme Court held that the 

Constitution requires compliance with minimal federal due process standards and 

explained that these minimal requirements are: (1) written notice of the charges against 

an inmate at least 24 hours before a disciplinary hearing; (2) a written statement by the 

fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action 

taken; and (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in an 

inmate’s defense. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67. As these requirements were met in this case, 

Petitioner's dissatisfaction with the DHO’s participation in his disciplinary proceeding, 

absent any demonstration of actual bias or impartiality on the part of the DHO does not 

implicate due process concerns, and Petitioner has not in fact articulated any way in 

which he was harmed by the alleged procedures. Moreover, the relevant inquiry is not 

“whether the prison complied with its own regulations,” but whether Plaintiff was 

“provided with process sufficient to meet the Wolff standard.” Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 

1415, 1420 (9th Cir.1994), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 

472 (1995). 

Nonetheless, Petitioner was granted a new hearing, with a new DHO who had not 

taken any part in the investigation, and to whom Petitioner does not raise any allegation 

of impartiality or bias. Accordingly, Petitioner was provided an impartial decision-maker 

under the definition set forth in Wolff, supra, and under 28 C.F.R. § 541.16. 

As to the rehearing being a due process violation because BOP rules do not 

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provide for such rehearing, the prisoner provides no cogent argument or legal support for 

the proposition. Similarly the court finds no basis for the contention that a rehearing 

cannot be held while a court action is pending as to the same matter. Indeed, the absurdity 

of such a position would be manifest in any matter in which the prisoner received the 

same or a more favorable disciplinary outcome on rehearing than in the prior proceeding. 

Essentially, petitioner contends that the respondent violated due process by acting to 

afford him due process, and he therefore fails to state a cognizable claim of due process 

violation. See Gaines v. Stenseng, 2006 WL 219910 (D.Kan.) (citing cases). 

 Petitioner asserts the rehearing deprived him of the opportunity to present 

documentary evidence and to call witnesses. The complete denial of the opportunity to 

present specifically identifiable witnesses who possess exculpatory evidence is a 

procedural defect which necessarily implies the invalidity of the deprivation of good time 

credits. See Edward v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997). Though Nielsen alleges his 

rehearing deprived him of the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence, Nielsen 

acknowledged that he understood his right to both a staff representative and to present 

witnesses and evidence, but waived both these rights. (Id., ¶ 4; Answer, Ex. II, 

Attachment 2, ¶¶ II.-III.), Furthermore, Nielsen does not allege what exculpatory 

evidence or witnesses he would have presented. 

 The Court also finds that Petitioner's habeas corpus petition is fatally deficient 

because there are no allegations suggesting that Petitioner was wrongly disciplined. In 

other words, Petitioner offered no reason to think that he might have been found not 

guilty of the charged Code 201 violation if he had been afforded more generous 

procedural benefits during the DHO proceedings. Thus, even if there was some 

procedural flaw in the DHO proceedings, it apparently was a harmless error. 

One Magistrate Judge recently summarized harmless error analysis as it applies in 

the prison disciplinary setting as follows: 

On a repeated and consistent basis, federal courts hold that in prison 

disciplinary cases, “[e]ven if a prison official's actions create a potential due 

process violation, a habeas petitioner needs to demonstrate that he was 

harmed by the violation in order to obtain relief.” Jordan v. Zych, No. 

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7:10–cv–491 (W.D.Va.2011) 2011 WL 2447937 at *4, citing Brown v. 

Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 508 (4th Cir. 2004). See also Powell v. Coughlin, 

953 F.2d 744, 751 (2nd Cir. 1991) (“it is entirely inappropriate to overturn 

the outcome of a prison disciplinary proceeding because of a procedural 

error without making the normal appellate assessment as to whether the 

error was harmless or prejudicial”); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th

Cir. 2003) (alleged due process violation rejected based on harmless error 

analysis, because prisoner failed to explain how excluded testimony would 

have aided his defense against disciplinary charges); Pilgrim v. Luther, 571 

F.3d 201, 206 (2nd Cir. 2009) (“a prisoner is entitled to assistance in 

‘marshaling evidence and presenting a defense,’ “ but “any violations of 

this qualified right are reviewed for ‘harmless error’ ”); Grossman v. Bruce, 

447 F.3d 801, 805 (10th Cir. 2006) (“errors made by prison officials in 

denying witness testimony at official hearings are subject to harmless error 

review”). 

Adams v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2011 WL 7293381, *3 (D.Minn., December 6, 

2011) Here, Petitioner has not shown that the outcome of the DHO disciplinary 

proceedings would have been different if he had been afforded an impartial DHO at the 

first proceeding. Petitioner admitted the violation throughout the first proceeding. At the 

second DHO hearing, Petitioner requested no witness, nor offered to present any 

documentary evidence in his defense, and again admitted the offense. Petitioner has 

consistently maintained that he “admitted to the charged incident and is not disputing the 

fact to the date of this petition.” (Reply, at 8) Thus, even if procedural errors did occur 

during the DHO disciplinary proceedings, Petitioner has offered no reason to believe that 

any such errors affected the outcome of the proceedings. For this additional reason, 

Petitioner cannot be granted a writ of habeas corpus based on his current due process 

claims. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner's claim that he was deprived of due 

process is without merit and fails to provide a basis for relief. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent 

review, enter an order DENYING the Petition. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

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within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: No. CV11-344-TUC-JGZ. 

Dated this 7th day of March, 2012. 

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