Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05254/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05254-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 18, 2002 Decided June 17, 2003

No. 02-5254

& No. 02–5300

CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS/CROSS–APPELLEES

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

APPELLEES/CROSS–APPELLANTS

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02500)

Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

argued the cause for appellants/cross-appellees. With him on

the briefs were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Mark

B. Stern, Robert M. Loeb, and Eric D. Miller, Attorneys, U.S.

Department of Justice.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5254 Document #754770 Filed: 06/17/2003 Page 1 of 56
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Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar were on the brief

for amici curiae Washington Legal Foundation and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs in support of

appellant urging partial reversal.

Kate A. Martin argued the cause for appellees/crossappellants. With her on the briefs were David L. Sobel,

Elliot M. Mincberg, Arthur B. Spitzer, Steven R. Shapiro,

and Lucas Guttentag.

Laura R. Handman, Eric N. Lieberman, Henry S. Hoberman, Nathan E. Siegel, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., Slade R.

Metcalf, David E. McCraw, Rene Milam, Bruce W. Sanford

and Robert D. Lystad were on the brief for amici curiae The

Washington Post Company, et al., in support of appellees/cross-appellants.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Various ‘‘public interest’’ groups

(plaintiffs) brought this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

action against the Department of Justice (DOJ or government) seeking release of information concerning persons detained in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks,

including: their names, their attorneys, dates of arrest and

release, locations of arrest and detention, and reasons for

detention. The government objected to release, and asserted

numerous exceptions to FOIA requirements in order to justify withholding the information. The parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court ordered

release of the names of the detainees and their attorneys, but

held that the government could withhold all other detention

information pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(A), which exempts ‘‘records or information compiled for law enforcement

purposes TTT to the extent that the production’’ of them

‘‘could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement

proceedings.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000). Attorneys

filed cross-appeals. Upon de novo review, we agree with the

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district court that the detention information is properly covered by Exemption 7(A); but we further hold that Exemption

7(A) justifies withholding the names of the detainees and

their attorneys. We also reject plaintiffs’ alternate theories

that the First Amendment and the common law mandate

disclosure of the contested information. We therefore affirm

in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the district

court for the entry of a judgment of dismissal.

I. Background

A. The Investigation

Consistent with the mutual decision of the parties to seek

resolution to this controversy on summary judgment, the

facts are not in serious dispute. In response to the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush

ordered a worldwide investigation into those attacks and into

‘‘threats, conspiracies, and attempts to perpetrate terrorist

acts against United States citizens and interests.’’ The Department of Justice, defendant in this action, has been conducting the investigation in conjunction with other federal,

state and local agencies. The investigation continues today.

In the course of the post-September 11 investigation, the

government interviewed over one thousand individuals about

whom concern had arisen. The concerns related to some of

these individuals were resolved by the interviews, and no

further action was taken with respect to them. Other interviews resulted in the interviewees being detained. As relevant here, these detainees fall into three general categories.

The first category of detainees consists of individuals who

were questioned in the course of the investigation and detained by the INS for violation of the immigration laws (INS

detainees). INS detainees were initially questioned because

there were ‘‘indications that they might have connections

with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist activity

against the United States including particularly the September 11 attacks and/or the individuals or organizations who

perpetrated them.’’ Based on the initial questioning, each

INS detainee was determined to have violated immigration

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law; some of the INS detainees were also determined to

‘‘have links to other facets of the investigation.’’ Over 700

individuals were detained on INS charges. As of June 13,

2002, only seventy-four remained in custody. Many have

been deported. INS detainees have had access to counsel,

and the INS has provided detainees with lists of attorneys

willing to represent them, as required by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229(b)(2) (2000). INS detainees have had access to the

courts to file habeas corpus petitions. They have also been

free to disclose their names to the public.

The second category of detainees consists of individuals

held on federal criminal charges (criminal detainees). The

government asserts that none of these detainees can be

eliminated as a source of probative information until after the

investigation is completed. According to the most recent

information released by the Department of Justice, 134 individuals have been detained on federal criminal charges in the

post-September 11 investigation; 99 of these have been found

guilty either through pleas or trials. While many of the

crimes bear no direct connection to terrorism, several criminal detainees have been charged with terrorism-related

crimes, and many others have been charged with visa or

passport forgery, perjury, identification fraud, and illegal

possession of weapons. Zacarias Moussaoui, presently on

trial for participating in the September 11 attacks, is among

those who were detained on criminal charges.

The third category consists of persons detained after a

judge issued a material witness warrant to secure their

testimony before a grand jury, pursuant to the material

witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) (material witness

detainees). Each material witness detainee was believed to

have information material to the events of September 11.

The district courts before which these material witnesses

have appeared have issued sealing orders that prohibit the

government from releasing any information about the proceedings. The government has not revealed how many individuals were detained on material witness warrants. At least

two individuals initially held as material witnesses are now

being held for alleged terrorist activity.

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The criminal detainees and material witness detainees are

free to retain counsel and have been provided court-appointed

counsel if they cannot afford representation, as required by

the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. In sum, each of

the detainees has had access to counsel, access to the courts,

and freedom to contact the press or the public at large.

B. The Litigation

On October 29, 2001, plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request

to the Department of Justice seeking the following information about each detainee: 1) name and citizenship status; 2)

location of arrest and place of detention; 3) date of detention/arrest, date any charges were filed, and the date of

release; 4) nature of charges or basis for detention, and the

disposition of such charges or basis; 5) names and addresses

of lawyers representing any detainees; 6) identities of any

courts which have been requested to enter orders sealing any

proceedings in connection with any detainees, copies of any

such orders, and the legal authorities relied upon by the

government in seeking the sealing orders; 7) all policy directives or guidance issued to officials about making public

statements or disclosures about these individuals or about the

sealing of judicial or immigration proceedings. To support its

FOIA request, plaintiffs cited press reports about mistreatment of the detainees, which plaintiffs claimed raised serious

questions about ‘‘deprivations of fundamental due process,

including imprisonment without probable cause, interference

with the right to counsel, and threats of serious bodily

injury.’’

In response to plaintiffs’ FOIA request, the government

released some information, but withheld much of the information requested. As to INS detainees, the government withheld the detainees’ names, locations of arrest and detention,

the dates of release, and the names of lawyers. As to

criminal detainees, the government withheld the dates and

locations of arrest and detention, the dates of release, and the

citizenship status of each detainee. The government withheld

all requested information with respect to material witnesses.

Although the government has refused to disclose a compreUSCA Case #02-5254 Document #754770 Filed: 06/17/2003 Page 5 of 56
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hensive list of detainees’ names and other detention information sought by plaintiffs, the government has from time to

time publicly revealed names and information of the type

sought by plaintiffs regarding a few individual detainees,

particularly those found to have some connection to terrorism.

On December 5, 2001, plaintiffs filed this action in district

court seeking to compel release of the withheld information

pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.

Plaintiffs also argued that the First Amendment, as interpreted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555

(1980) and its progeny, and the common law doctrine of

access to public records require the government to disclose

the names and detention information of the detainees.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In

its motion, the government contended that FOIA Exemptions

7(A), 7(C), and 7(F), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (C) & (F), allow

the government to withhold the requested documents as to all

three categories of detainees. These exemptions permit withholding information ‘‘compiled for law enforcement purposes’’

whenever disclosure:

(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, TTT (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy, TTT or (F) could reasonably be expected to

endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (C), (F). As to the material witness

detainees, the government also invoked Exemption 3, 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), which exempts from FOIA requirements

matters that are ‘‘specifically exempted from disclosure by

[other statutes] TTT,’’ contending that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which limits the disclosure of grand jury

matters, bars the release of information concerning material

witnesses.

In support of its motion, the government submitted affidavits from James Reynolds, Director of the Terrorism and

Violent Crime Section of the Department of Justice, and Dale

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Watson, FBI Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism—officials with central responsibility for the ongoing terrorist investigation. See Reynolds Decl., Reynolds Supp.

Decl., Reynolds Second Supp. Decl., and Watson Decl.

As to Exemption 7(A), the declarations state that release of

the requested information could hamper the ongoing investigation by leading to the identification of detainees by terrorist groups, resulting in terrorists either intimidating or cutting off communication with the detainees; by revealing the

progress and direction of the ongoing investigation, thus

allowing terrorists to impede or evade the investigation; and

by enabling terrorists to create false or misleading evidence.

As to Exemption 7(C), the declarations assert that the detainees have a substantial privacy interest in their names and

detention information because release of this information

would associate detainees with the September 11 attacks,

thus injuring detainees’ reputations and possibly endangering

detainees’ personal safety. Finally, as to Exemption 7(F), the

government’s declarations contend that release of the information could endanger the public safety by making terrorist

attacks more likely and could endanger the safety of individual detainees by making them more vulnerable to attack from

terrorist organizations. For these same reasons, the counterterrorism officials state that the names of the detainees’

lawyers should also be withheld.

C. The Judgment

On August 2, 2002, the district court rendered its decision,

ruling in part for the plaintiffs and in part for the government. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep’t of

Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002) (CNSS). Briefly

put, the court ordered the government to disclose the names

of the detainees and detainees’ lawyers, but held that the

government was entitled to withhold all other detention information under Exemptions 7(A) and 7(F). Id. at 113.

Addressing the names of the detainees, the court held that

disclosure could not reasonably be expected to interfere with

ongoing enforcement proceedings, and thus the names were

not exempt under 7(A). The court rejected the government’s

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argument that disclosure of detainees’ names would deter

them from cooperating with the government because terrorist

groups likely already know which of their cell members have

been detained. Id. at 101. Moreover, the court reasoned

that the government’s voluntary disclosure of the names of

several detainees undermined the force of its argument about

the harms resulting from disclosure. Id. at 101–02. The

court further held that ‘‘the government has not met its

burden of establishing a ‘rational link’ between the harms

alleged and disclosure’’ because its declarations provided no

evidence that the detainees actually have any connection to,

or knowledge of, terrorist activity. Id. at 102 (quoting Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 789 F.2d 64,

67 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).

The court next rejected the government’s 7(A) argument

that disclosure of names would allow terrorist groups to map

the course of, and thus impede, its investigation. Id. at 103.

The government had advanced a ‘‘mosaic’’ argument, contending that the court should consider the aggregate release of

the names under 7(A) rather than the release of each in

isolation, on the reasoning that the release of the names in

toto could assist terrorists in piecing together the course,

direction and focus of the investigation. Id. at 103. The

district court rejected this argument, holding, inter alia, as a

matter of law that FOIA Exemption 7(A) requires an individualized assessment of disclosure, and that the government’s

mosaic theory could not justify a blanket exclusion of information under Exemption 7(A). Id. at 103–04. In the district

court’s view, the mosaic theory is only cognizable under

Exemption 1, which protects information authorized by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national

defense or foreign policy. Id. The court further rejected the

government’s final 7(A) argument, concluding that there was

insufficient evidence that disclosure would enable terrorist

groups to create false and misleading evidence. Id. at 104–

05.

Turning to Exemptions 7(C) and 7(F), the court rejected

the government’s claims, holding that the admittedly substantial privacy and safety interests of the detainees do not

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outweigh the vital public interest in ensuring that the government is not abusing its power. Id. at 105–06. The court

noted that plaintiffs have raised ‘‘grave concerns’’ about the

mistreatment of detainees and have provided evidence of

alleged mistreatment in the form of media reports, and firsthand accounts given to Congress and human rights groups.

Id. at 105 & n.17. While rejecting the government’s attempt

to withhold detainees’ names, the court ruled that it would

permit detainees to opt out of disclosure by submitting a

signed declaration within fifteen days. Id. at 106. The court

did not address the government’s argument that disclosure

could harm public safety.

Having rejected the government’s Exemption 7 claims, the

court further held that Exemption 3 does not bar the release

of the names of material witnesses. Id. at 106–07. Specifically, the court held that Exemption 3 does not apply, reasoning Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) does not bar the

disclosure of the identities of persons detained as material

witnesses, but only bars ‘‘disclosure of a matter occurring

before a grand jury.’’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(6). The government’s evidence did not establish that any of the detainees

were actual grand jury witnesses or were scheduled to testify

before a grand jury. Further, the government’s disclosure of

the identities of twenty-six material witness detainees undercut its argument that disclosure is barred by statute. 215 F.

Supp. 2d at 106–07. As to the government’s contention that

court sealing orders prevent the government from releasing

the names of material witnesses, the court ordered the government to submit such orders for in camera review or to

submit a ‘‘supplemental affidavit explaining the nature and

legal basis for these sealing orders.’’ Id. at 108.

For reasons not unlike its rejection of the government’s

attempt to withhold the names of detainees, the court also

held that the government must reveal the names of the

detainees’ lawyers.1

 The court determined that the names of

1 The government has withheld the names of the attorneys for

both INS detainees and material witness detainees; it has revealed

the names of the attorneys for the criminally charged detainees.

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the attorneys were not covered by Exemptions 7(A), 7(C), or

7(F) for the same reason it had rejected the government’s

attempt to withhold the names of detainees; because attorneys have no expectation of anonymity; and because any

concerns about physical danger were purely speculative. Id.

at 109.

Turning to the other information sought by plaintiffs—the

dates and locations of arrest, detention, and release—the

court granted summary judgment for the government on its

claim that such detention information was covered under 7(A)

and 7(F). Id. at 108. The court credited the counterterrorism officials’ judgment that the detention information ‘‘would

be particularly valuable to anyone attempting to discern

patterns in the Government’s investigation and strategy,’’ and

that disclosure would make detention facilities ‘‘vulnerable to

retaliatory attacks.’’ Id. Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the First Amendment and common law entitle

them to the dates and locations of arrest, detention, and

release. Id. at 111–12.

The court ordered the government to release the names of

detainees and their lawyers in fifteen days, subject to the

right of detainees to opt out of disclosure. Id. at 113–14. On

August 15, 2002, the district court stayed its order pending

appeal. The government timely appealed. Plaintiffs crossappealed the district court’s ruling that the detention information was properly withheld and the district court’s ruling

that detainees could opt out of disclosure. The appeals were

consolidated.

II. The FOIA Claims

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment, Johnson v. Executive Office for United States

Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and therefore

consider anew each of the claims and defenses advanced

before the district court. We turn first to the government’s

claims of exemption from disclosure under FOIA of the

names of the detainees and their lawyers.

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A. Names of Detainees

‘‘Public access to government documents’’ is the ‘‘fundamental principle’’ that animates FOIA. John Doe Agency v.

John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1989). ‘‘Congress recognized, however, that public disclosure is not always in the

public interest.’’ CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985).

Accordingly, FOIA represents a balance struck by Congress

between the public’s right to know and the government’s

legitimate interest in keeping certain information confidential.

John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152. To that end, FOIA

mandates disclosure of government records unless the requested information falls within one of nine enumerated

exemptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). While these exemptions

are to be ‘‘narrowly construed,’’ FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S.

615, 630 (1982), courts must not fail to give them ‘‘a meaningful reach and application,’’ John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152.

The government bears the burden of proving that the withheld information falls within the exemptions it invokes. 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(b).

The government invokes four exemptions—7(A), 7(C), 7(F),

and 3—to shield the names of detainees from disclosure.

Upon review, we hold that Exemption 7(A) was properly

invoked to withhold the names of the detainees and their

lawyers. Finding the names protected under 7(A), we need

not address the other exemptions invoked by the government

and reserve judgment on whether they too would support

withholding the names.

Exemption 7(A) allows an agency to withhold ‘‘records or

information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only

to the extent that the production of such law enforcement

records or information TTT could reasonably be expected to

interfere with enforcement proceedings.’’ 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7)(A). In enacting this exemption, ‘‘Congress recognized that law enforcement agencies had legitimate needs to

keep certain records confidential, lest the agencies be hindered in their investigations.’’ NRLB v. Robbins Tire &

Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 232 (1978). Exemption 7(A) does

not require a presently pending ‘‘enforcement proceeding.’’

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Rather, as the district court correctly noted, it is sufficient

that the government’s ongoing September 11 terrorism investigation is likely to lead to such proceedings. See CNSS, 215

F. Supp. 2d at 101 n.9 (citing Bevis v. Dep’t of State, 801 F.2d

1386 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).

The threshold question here is whether the names of

detainees were ‘‘compiled for law enforcement purposes.’’ 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). Because the DOJ is an agency ‘‘specializ[ing] in law enforcement,’’ its claim of a law enforcement

purpose is entitled to deference. Campbell v. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Quinon v. FBI, 86 F.3d

1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408,

419 (D.C. Cir. 1982). To establish a law enforcement purpose, DOJ’s declarations must establish (1) ‘‘a rational nexus

between the investigation and one of the agency’s law enforcement duties;’’ and (2) ‘‘a connection between an individual or incident and a possible security risk or violation of

federal law.’’ Campbell, 164 F.3d at 32 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Quinon, 86 F.3d at 1228. The

government’s proffer easily meets this standard. The terrorism investigation is one of DOJ’s chief ‘‘law enforcement

duties’’ at this time, see Reynolds Decl. ¶ 2, and the investigation concerns a heinous violation of federal law as well as a

breach of this nation’s security. Moreover, the names of the

detainees and their connection to the investigation came to

the government’s attention as a result of that law enforcement investigation. Reynolds Decl. ¶ ¶ 2–5.

Nonetheless, plaintiffs contend that detainees’ names fall

outside Exemption 7 because the names are contained in

arrest warrants, INS charging documents, and jail records.

Since these documents have traditionally been public, plaintiffs contend, Exemption 7 should not be construed to allow

withholding of the names. We disagree. Plaintiffs are seeking a comprehensive listing of individuals detained during

the post-September 11 investigation. The names have been

compiled for the ‘‘law enforcement purpose’’ of successfully

prosecuting the terrorism investigation. As compiled, they

constitute a comprehensive diagram of the law enforcement

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investigation after September 11. Clearly this is information

compiled for law enforcement purposes.

Next, plaintiffs urge that Exemption 7(A) does not apply

because disclosure is not ‘‘reasonably likely to interfere with

enforcement proceedings.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). We disagree. Under Exemption 7(A), the government has the

burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of interference with the terrorism investigation. The government’s

declarations, viewed in light of the appropriate deference to

the executive on issues of national security, satisfy this burden.

It is well-established that a court may rely on government

affidavits to support the withholding of documents under

FOIA exemptions, King v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 830

F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and that we review the

government’s justifications therein de novo, 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(B); Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077,

1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998). It is equally well-established that the

judiciary owes some measure of deference to the executive in

cases implicating national security, a uniquely executive purview. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001)

(noting that ‘‘terrorism or other special circumstances’’ might

warrant ‘‘heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches’’); Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530

(1988) (‘‘courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude

upon the authority of the executive in military and national

security affairs’’). Indeed, both the Supreme Court and this

Court have expressly recognized the propriety of deference to

the executive in the context of FOIA claims which implicate

national security.

In CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), the Supreme Court

examined the CIA’s claims that the names and institutional

affiliations of certain researchers in a government-sponsored

behavior modification program were exempt from disclosure

under FOIA Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Id. at 163–

64. The agency claimed that the information was protected

from disclosure by a statute charging the CIA to prevent

unauthorized disclosure of ‘‘intelligence sources and methUSCA Case #02-5254 Document #754770 Filed: 06/17/2003 Page 13 of 56
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ods,’’ 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3). In accepting the CIA Director’s

judgment that disclosure would reveal intelligence sources

and methods, the Court explained that ‘‘[t]he decisions of the

Director, who must of course be familiar with ‘the whole

picture,’ as judges are not, are worthy of great deference

given the magnitude of the national security interests and

potential risks at stake.’’ Sims, 471 U.S. at 179. The Court

further held that ‘‘it is the responsibility of the Director of

Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the

variety of subtle and complex factors in determining whether

disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of

compromising the Agency’s intelligence-gathering process.’’

Id. at 180.

The same is true of the Justice Department officials in

charge of the present investigation. We have consistently

reiterated the principle of deference to the executive in the

FOIA context when national security concerns are implicated.

In McGehee v. Casey, we examined the standard of review for

FOIA requests of classified documents. 718 F.2d 1137, 1148

(D.C. Cir. 1983). We observed:

[C]ourts are to ‘‘accord substantial weight to an agency’s

affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of

the disputed record’’ because ‘‘the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy

matters have unique insights into what adverse affects

[sic] might occur as a result of a particular classified

record.’’

Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12,

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1974, p. 6267 (1974) (Conference Report on the

FOIA Amendments)). Moreover, in the FOIA context, we

have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting

harm to the national security, and have found it unwise to

undertake searching judicial review. See, e.g., King, 830 F.2d

at 217 (‘‘the court owes substantial weight to detailed agency

explanations in the national security context’’); Gardels v.

CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (‘‘Once satisfied

that proper procedures have been followed and that the

information logically falls into the exemption claimed, the

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courts need not go further to test the expertise of the agency,

or to question its veracity when nothing appears to raise the

issue of good faith.’’); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148

(D.C. Cir. 1980); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697–98

(D.C. Cir. 1977).

Given this weight of authority counseling deference in

national security matters, we owe deference to the government’s judgments contained in its affidavits. Just as we have

deferred to the executive when it invokes FOIA Exemptions 1

and 3, we owe the same deference under Exemption 7(A) in

appropriate cases, such as this one. Id. Plaintiffs provide no

valid reason why the general principle of deference to the

executive on national security issues should apply under

FOIA Exemption 3, as in Sims and Halperin, and Exemption

1, as in our earlier cases, but not under Exemption 7(A). Nor

can we can conceive of any reason to limit deference to the

executive in its area of expertise to certain FOIA exemptions

so long as the government’s declarations raise legitimate

concerns that disclosure would impair national security.

The need for deference in this case is just as strong as in

earlier cases. America faces an enemy just as real as its

former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity

of the judiciary to explore. Exemption 7(A) explicitly requires a predictive judgment of the harm that will result from

disclosure of information, permitting withholding when it

‘‘could reasonably be expected’’ that the harm will result. 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). It is abundantly clear that the government’s top counterterrorism officials are well-suited to make

this predictive judgment. Conversely, the judiciary is in an

extremely poor position to second-guess the executive’s judgment in this area of national security. Cf. Krikorian v. Dep’t

of State, 984 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Halperin,

629 F.2d at 148) (‘‘Judges TTT lack the expertise necessary to

second-guess such agency opinions in the typical national

security FOIA case.’’). We therefore reject any attempt to

artificially limit the long-recognized deference to the executive on national security issues. Judicial deference depends

on the substance of the danger posed by disclosure—that is,

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harm to the national security—not the FOIA exemption

invoked.

In light of the deference mandated by the separation of

powers and Supreme Court precedent, we hold that the

government’s expectation that disclosure of the detainees’

names would enable al Qaeda or other terrorist groups to

map the course of the investigation and thus develop the

means to impede it is reasonable. A complete list of names

informing terrorists of every suspect detained by the government at any point during the September 11 investigation

would give terrorist organizations a composite picture of the

government investigation, and since these organizations

would generally know the activities and locations of its members on or about September 11, disclosure would inform

terrorists of both the substantive and geographic focus of the

investigation. Moreover, disclosure would inform terrorists

which of their members were compromised by the investigation, and which were not. This information could allow

terrorists to better evade the ongoing investigation and more

easily formulate or revise counter-efforts. In short, the

‘‘records could reveal much about the focus and scope of the

[agency’s] investigation, and are thus precisely the sort of

information exemption 7(A) allows an agency to keep secret.’’

Swan v. SEC, 96 F.3d 498, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

As the district court noted, courts have relied on similar

mosaic arguments in the context of national security. CNSS,

215 F. Supp. 2d at 103 & n.13. In Sims, for example, the

Supreme Court cautioned that ‘‘bits and pieces’’ of data

‘‘ ‘may aid in piecing together bits of other information even

when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in

itself.’ ’’ 471 U.S. at 178 (quoting Halperin, 629 F.2d at 150).

Thus, ‘‘[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the

scene and may put the questioned item of information in its

proper context.’’ Id. (quotations omitted). Such a danger is

present here. While the name of any individual detainee may

appear innocuous or trivial, it could be of great use to al

Qaeda in plotting future terrorist attacks or intimidating

witnesses in the present investigation. Cf. United States v.

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Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (‘‘[t]hings that did

not make sense to the District Judge would make all too

much sense to a foreign counter-intelligence specialist who

could learn much about this nation’s intelligence-gathering

capabilities from what these documents revealed about

sources and methods.’’). Importantly, plaintiffs here do not

request ‘‘bits and pieces’’ of information, but rather seek the

names of every single individual detained in the course of the

government’s terrorism investigation. It is more than reasonable to expect that disclosing the name of every individual

detained in the post-September 11 terrorism investigation

would interfere with that investigation.

Similarly, the government’s judgment that disclosure would

deter or hinder cooperation by detainees is reasonable. The

government reasonably predicts that if terrorists learn one of

their members has been detained, they would attempt to

deter any further cooperation by that member through intimidation, physical coercion, or by cutting off all contact with the

detainee. A terrorist organization may even seek to hunt

down detainees (or their families) who are not members of

the organization, but who the terrorists know may have

valuable information about the organization.

On numerous occasions, both the Supreme Court and this

Court have found government declarations expressing the

likelihood of witness intimidation and evidence tampering

sufficient to justify withholding of witnesses’ names under

Exemption 7(A). See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,

437 U.S. 214, 239–42 (1978) (allowing withholding pursuant to

Exemption 7(A) based on the risk of witness intimidation that

would attend releasing witness statements prior to NLRB

proceedings); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d

309, 312–13 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding 7(A) claim based on

government declaration that disclosure would enable corporation under investigation to intimidate or coerce informing

employees); accord Mapother v. Dep’t of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533,

1542–43 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (recognizing that government affidavits predicting witness intimidation and evidence fabrication

‘‘have achieved recognition in Exemption 7 caselaw’’); Manna

v. Dep’t of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1165 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing

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withholding of names of all ‘‘interviewees, informants, [and]

witnesses’’ in criminal investigation based on fears of retaliation from organized crime). Most recently, we addressed in

Swan a FOIA request that would have resulted in the disclosure of, inter alia, the identities of witnesses in an SEC

investigation. 96 F.3d at 499. The SEC’s declaration alleged

that disclosure would risk allowing the subjects of the investigation to ‘‘intimidate witnesses, manufacture favorable evidence, and conceal damaging evidence.’’ Id. We accepted

the SEC’s declaration and allowed the documents to be

withheld. Id. at 499, 500. The risks of witness intimidation

and evidence tampering alleged here are at least as great as

those in Swan and our other precedents. We see no reason

to assume that terrorists are less likely to intimidate the

detainees here than were the subjects of the SEC investigation in Swan. Consequently, we hold that disclosure of

detainees’ names could ‘‘reasonably be expected to interfere’’

with the ongoing terrorism investigation.

For several reasons, plaintiffs contend that we should

reject the government’s predictive judgments of the harms

that would result from disclosure. First, they argue that

terrorist organizations likely already know which of their

members have been detained. We have no way of assessing

that likelihood. Moreover, even if terrorist organizations

know about some of their members who were detained, a

complete list of detainees could still have great value in

confirming the status of their members. Cf. Gardels, 689

F.2d at 1105 (rejecting a similar argument in the FOIA

national security context and stating that ‘‘[o]fficial acknowledgment ends all doubt and gives the foreign organization a

firmer basis for its own strategic or tactical response.’’). For

example, an organization may be unaware of a member who

was detained briefly and then released, but remains subject

to continuing government surveillance. Reynolds Supp. Decl.

¶ ¶ 3, 5. After disclosure, this detainee could be irreparably

compromised as a source of information.

More importantly, some detainees may not be members of

terrorist organizations, but may nonetheless have been detained on INS or material witness warrants as having inforUSCA Case #02-5254 Document #754770 Filed: 06/17/2003 Page 18 of 56
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mation about terrorists. Terrorist organizations are less

likely to be aware of such individuals’ status as detainees.

Such detainees could be acquaintances of the September 11

terrorists, or members of the same community groups or

mosques. See Rachel L. Swarns, Oregon Muslims Protest

Monthlong Detention Without a Charge, N.Y. TIMES, April 20,

2003, at A16 (describing material witness detainee who attended same mosque as indicted terrorism suspects). These

detainees, fearing retribution or stigma, would be less likely

to cooperate with the investigation if their names are disclosed. Moreover, tracking down the background and location of these detainees could give terrorists insights into the

investigation they would otherwise be unlikely to have. After

disclosure, terrorist organizations could attempt to intimidate

these detainees or their families, or feed the detainees false

or misleading information. It is important to remember that

many of these detainees have been released at this time and

are thus especially vulnerable to intimidation or coercion.

While the detainees have been free to disclose their names to

the press or public, it is telling that so few have come

forward, perhaps for fear of this very intimidation.

We further note the impact disclosure could have on the

government’s investigation going forward. A potential witness or informant may be much less likely to come forward

and cooperate with the investigation if he believes his name

will be made public. Cf. Sims, 471 U.S. at 172 (noting

Congress’s concern that intelligence sources will ‘‘close up

like a clam’’ unless the government maintains complete confidentiality); Manna, 51 F.3d at 1165 (‘‘disclosure TTT could

result in a chilling effect upon potential cooperators and

witnesses’’).

Plaintiffs next argue that the government’s predictive judgment is undermined by the government’s disclosure of some

of the detainees’ names. The Supreme Court confronted a

similar argument in Sims, in which respondents contended

that ‘‘because the Agency has already revealed the names of

many of the institutions at which [behavior modification]

research was performed, the Agency is somehow estopped

from withholding the names of others.’’ 471 U.S. at 180. In

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rejecting the argument, the Court stated that ‘‘[t]his suggestion overlooks the political realities of intelligence operations

in which, among other things, our Government may choose to

release information deliberately to ‘send a message’ to allies

or adversaries.’’ Id. We likewise reject the plaintiffs’ version of this discredited argument. The disclosure of a few

pieces of information in no way lessens the government’s

argument that complete disclosure would provide a composite

picture of its investigation and have negative effects on the

investigation. Furthermore, as the Sims Court recognized,

strategic disclosures can be important weapons in the government’s arsenal during a law enforcement investigation. Id.

(‘‘The national interest sometimes makes it advisable, or even

imperative, to disclose information that may lead to the

identity of intelligence sources.’’). The court should not

second-guess the executive’s judgment in this area. ‘‘[I]t is

the responsibility of the [executive] not that of the judiciary’’

to determine when to disclose information that may compromise intelligence sources and methods. Id.

Contrary to plaintiffs’ claims, the government’s submissions

easily establish an adequate connection between both the

material witness and the INS detainees and terrorism to

warrant full application of the deference principle. First, all

material witness detainees have been held on warrants issued

by a federal judge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144. Reynolds

Decl. ¶ 4. Under this statute, a federal judge may issue a

material witness warrant based on an affidavit stating that

the witness has information relevant to an ongoing criminal

investigation. Consequently, material witness detainees have

been found by a federal judge to have relevant knowledge

about the terrorism investigation. It is therefore reasonable

to assume that disclosure of their names could impede the

government’s use of these potentially valuable witnesses.

As to the INS detainees, the government states that they

were

originally questioned because there were indications that

they might have connections with, or possess information

pertaining to, terrorist activity against the United States

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including particularly the September 11 attacks and/or

the individuals and organizations who perpetrated them.

For example, they may have been questioned because

they were identified as having interacted with the hijackers, or were believed to have information relating to

other aspects of the investigation.

Reynolds Decl. ¶ 10. ‘‘Other INS detainees may have been

questioned because of their association with an organization

believed to be involved in providing material support to

terrorist organizations.’’ Watson Decl. ¶ 8. Moreover, ‘‘[i]n

the course of questioning them, law enforcement agents determined, often from the subjects themselves, that they were

in violation of federal immigration laws, and, in some instances also determined that they had links to other facets of the

investigation.’’ Reynolds Decl. ¶ 10; Watson Decl. ¶ 8. Furthermore, the Watson Declaration speaks of the INS detainees being subject to ‘‘public hearings involving evidence about

terrorist links,’’ ¶ 16, and states that ‘‘concerns remain’’ about

links to terrorism, ¶ 19. The clear import of the declarations

is that many of the detainees have links to terrorism. This

comes as no surprise given that the detainees were apprehended during the course of a terrorism investigation, and

given that several detainees have been charged with federal

terrorism crimes or held as enemy combatants. Accordingly,

we conclude that the evidence presented in the declarations is

sufficient to show a rational link between disclosure and the

harms alleged.

In support of this conclusion, we note that the Third Circuit

confronted a similar issue involving the INS detainees when it

considered the constitutionality of closed deportation hearings

in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198

(3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, No. 02–1289 (May 27, 2003). The

court was faced with the same Watson Declaration in evidence here and the same government prediction that harm

would result from the disclosure of information about the INS

detainees. See id. at 218. That court acknowledged that the

‘‘representations of the Watson Declaration are to some degree speculative.’’ Id. at 219. But the court did not search

for specific evidence that each of the INS detainees was

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involved in terrorism, nor did it embark on a probing analysis

of whether the government’s concerns were well-founded.

Id. Rather, it was ‘‘quite hesitant to conduct a judicial

inquiry into the credibility of these security concerns, as

national security is an area where courts have traditionally

extended great deference to Executive expertise.’’ Id. The

court concluded: ‘‘To the extent that the Attorney General’s

national security concerns seem credible, we will not lightly

second-guess them.’’ Id. We think the Third Circuit’s approach was correct and we follow it here. Inasmuch as the

concerns expressed in the government’s declarations seem

credible—and inasmuch as the declarations were made by

counterterrorism experts with far greater knowledge than

this Court—we hold that the disclosure of the names of the

detainees could reasonably be expected to interfere with the

ongoing investigation.

In upholding the government’s invocation of Exemption

7(A), we observe that we are in accord with several federal

courts that have wisely respected the executive’s judgment in

prosecuting the national response to terrorism. See Hamdi

v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (dismissing the

habeas corpus petition of a United States citizen captured in

Afghanistan challenging his military detention and designation as an enemy combatant); Global Relief Found. v.

O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding against

constitutional challenge a portion of the USA PATRIOT Act,

50 U.S.C. § 1702(c), which authorizes the ex parte use of

classified evidence in proceedings to freeze the assets of

terrorist organizations); North Jersey Media Group, 308

F.3d 198 (holding that closure of ‘‘special interest’’ deportation hearings involving INS detainees with alleged connections to terrorism does not violate the First Amendment);

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (reversing

district court’s order that allowed alleged enemy combatant

unmonitored access to counsel). We realize that not all

courts are in agreement. In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,

303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit acknowledged

the necessity of deferring to the executive on terrorism issues

but held that the First Amendment prohibits a blanket closure of ‘‘special interest deportation hearings.’’ We do not

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find the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning compelling, but join the

Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that the courts

must defer to the executive on decisions of national security.

In so deferring, we do not abdicate the role of the judiciary.

Rather, in undertaking a deferential review we simply recognize the different roles underlying the constitutional separation of powers. It is within the role of the executive to

acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national

security. It is not within the role of the courts to secondguess executive judgments made in furtherance of that

branch’s proper role. The judgment of the district court

ordering the government to disclose the names of the detainees is reversed.

B. Identity of Counsel

We next address whether the government properly withheld the names of the attorneys for INS and material witness

detainees under Exemptions 7(A), 7(C), and 7(F). As with

the identities of the detainees, we hold that their attorneys’

names are also protected from disclosure by Exemption 7(A).

The government contends that a list of attorneys for the

detainees would facilitate the easy compilation of a list of all

detainees, and all of the dangers flowing therefrom. It is

more than reasonable to assume that plaintiffs and amici

press organizations would attempt to contact detainees’ attorneys and compile a list of all detainees. As discussed above,

if such a list fell into the hands of al Qaeda, the consequences

could be disastrous. Having accepted the government’s predictive judgments about the dangers of disclosing a comprehensive list of detainees, we also defer to its prediction that

disclosure of attorneys’ names involves the same danger. Cf.

Sims, 471 U.S. at 179–80 (upholding under FOIA Exemption

3 the government’s withholding of the institutional affiliations

of researchers in a secret government program; deferring to

government’s judgment that disclosure would lead to identification of the researchers themselves and the consequent loss

of confidential intelligence sources).

C. Other Detention Information

Having held that the government properly withheld the

names of the detainees pursuant to Exemption 7(A), we easily

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24

affirm the portion of the district court’s ruling that allowed

withholding, under Exemption 7(A), of the more comprehensive detention information sought by plaintiffs.

As outlined above, supra at 5, plaintiffs sought the dates

and locations of arrest, detention, and release for each of the

detainees. Even more than disclosure of the identities of

detainees, the information requested here would provide a

complete roadmap of the government’s investigation. Knowing when and where each individual was arrested would

provide a chronological and geographical picture of the government investigation. Terrorists could learn from this information not only where the government focused its investigation but how that investigation progressed step by step.

Armed with that knowledge, they could then reach such

conclusions as, for example, which cells had been compromised, and which individuals had been cooperative with the

United States. They might well be able to derive conclusions

as to how more adequately secure their clandestine operations in future terrorist undertakings. Similarly, knowing

where each individual is presently held could facilitate communication between terrorist organizations and detainees and

the attendant intimidation of witnesses and fabrication of

evidence. As explained in detail above, these impediments to

an ongoing law enforcement investigation are precisely what

Exemption 7(A) was enacted to preclude. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court and hold that the government properly withheld information about the dates and locations of

arrest, detention, and release for each detainee.

III. Alternative Grounds

We turn now to plaintiffs’ alternative grounds for seeking

disclosure of the detainees’ names and detention information.

Although FOIA does not mandate disclosure, plaintiffs contend that disclosure is independently required by both the

First Amendment and the common law right of access to

government information. We address these contentions in

turn, and conclude that neither is meritorious.

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A. The First Amendment

As outlined above, the government voluntarily released the

names of all criminally charged detainees. Therefore, as in

its FOIA request, plaintiffs seek the names of INS and

material witness detainees, and the dates and location of

arrest, detention, and release for all detainees. Plaintiffs

characterize the information they seek as ‘‘arrest records,’’

and contend that the public has a right of access to arrest

records under the First Amendment, as interpreted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). We

disagree. Plaintiffs seek not individual arrest records, but a

comprehensive listing of the individuals detained in connection with a specified law enforcement investigation as well as

investigatory information about where and when each individual was arrested, held, and released. The narrow First

Amendment right of access to information recognized in

Richmond Newspapers does not extend to non-judicial documents that are not part of a criminal trial, such as the

investigatory documents at issue here.

The First Amendment states that ‘‘Congress shall make no

law TTT abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’’

U.S. CONST. amend. I. In accord with its plain language, the

First Amendment broadly protects the freedom of individuals

and the press to speak or publish. It does not expressly

address the right of the public to receive information. Indeed, in contrast to FOIA’s statutory presumption of disclosure, the First Amendment does not ‘‘mandate[ ] a right of

access to government information or sources of information

within the government’s control.’’ Houchins v. KQED, 438

U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion); id. at 16 (Stewart, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (the First Amendment ‘‘do[es]

not guarantee the public a right of access to information

generated or controlled by the government’’). Thus, as the

Court explained in Houchins: ‘‘[t]he public’s interest in

knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee

of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an

Official Secrets Act.’’ Id. at 14 (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of

the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975)). Rather, discloUSCA Case #02-5254 Document #754770 Filed: 06/17/2003 Page 25 of 56
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sure of government information generally is left to the ‘‘political forces’’ that govern a democratic republic. Id. at 14–15.

Two years after Houchins, the Court recognized a limited

First Amendment right of access to a criminal trial. See

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555. In Richmond Newspapers, the Court explained that the First Amendment ‘‘was

enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials

being historically open’’ and thus incorporated the notion of

public access to criminal trials. Id. at 576–77. The Court

expanded this limited right somewhat in the years after

Richmond Newspapers. See Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press–Enterprise I) (holding

that the public has a First Amendment right to attend voir

dire examinations during criminal trial); Press–Enterprise

Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press–Enterprise II)

(holding that the public has a First Amendment right to

access transcripts of adversarial preliminary hearings that

occur prior to a criminal trial). In Press–Enterprise II, the

Supreme Court first articulated what has come to be known

as the Richmond Newspapers ‘‘experience and logic’’ test, by

which the Court determines whether the public has a right of

access to ‘‘criminal proceedings’’:

First, because a tradition of accessibility implies the

favorable judgment of experience, we have considered

whether the place and process have historically been

open to the press and general publicTTTT Second, in this

setting the Court has traditionally considered whether

public access plays a significant positive role in the

functioning of the particular process in question.

Id. at 8 (citations omitted).

Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has applied the

Richmond Newspapers test outside the context of criminal

judicial proceedings or the transcripts of such proceedings.

When the ‘‘experience and logic’’ test has been applied beyond the trial itself, as in Press–Enterprise II, it has been

limited to judicial proceedings that are part of the criminal

trial process. See also Washington Post v. Robinson, 935

F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that First Amendment

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protects public access to plea agreement on which judgment

has been entered); but see United States v. El–Sayegh, 131

F.3d 158, 160–61 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (applying ‘‘experience and

logic test’’ but finding no First Amendment right of access to

withdrawn plea agreement). Moreover, neither this Court

nor the Supreme Court has ever indicated that it would apply

the Richmond Newspapers test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings. Indeed, there are no federal court

precedents requiring, under the First Amendment, disclosure

of information compiled during an Executive Branch investigation, such as the information sought in this case.

Indeed, to the extent the Supreme Court has addressed the

constitutional right of access to information outside the criminal trial context, the Court has applied the general rule of

Houchins, not Richmond Newspapers. See LAPD v. United

Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999) (holding that

there is no First Amendment right to receive addresses of

arrestees); Houchins, 438 U.S. at 13–15 (holding that press

has no First Amendment right of access to prisons). In

Houchins, the Court observed that the press had ample

means for obtaining information about prison conditions, ‘‘albeit not as conveniently as they prefer.’’ Id. at 15. For

example, the Court noted that members of the press could

receive letters from inmates and interview inmates’ attorneys,

prison visitors, or former inmates. Id. The same is true

here. According to the government’s declarations, detainees

are free to contact family members as well as members of the

press. Detainees’ attorneys are presumably free to do the

same. In LAPD, the Court rejected a facial challenge to a

state law restricting access to the addresses of arrestees.

528 U.S. at 40. The Court explained that ‘‘this is not a case

in which the government is prohibiting a speaker from conveying information that the speaker already possesses.’’ Id.

Rather, ‘‘what we have before us is nothing more than a

governmental denial of access to information in its possession.

California could decide not to give out arrestee information at

all without violating the First Amendment.’’ Id. (citing

Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14). Similarly here, the First Amendment is not implicated by the executive’s refusal to disclose

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the identities of the detainees and information concerning

their detention.

We will not convert the First Amendment right of access to

criminal judicial proceedings into a requirement that the

government disclose information compiled during the exercise

of a quintessential executive power—the investigation and

prevention of terrorism. The dangers which we have catalogued above of making such release in this case provide

ample evidence of the need to follow this course. Cf. Global

Relief Found., 315 F.3d at 754 (‘‘The Constitution would

indeed be a suicide pact TTT if the only way to curtail

enemies’ access to assets were to reveal information that

might cost lives.’’) (citation omitted). To be sure, the Sixth

Circuit recently held that the public has a constitutional right

of access to INS deportation hearings involving the same INS

detainees at issue in this case. See Detroit Free Press, 303

F.3d 681; but see North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198

(finding no right of access). However, the Sixth Circuit

applied Richmond Newspapers only after extensively examining the similarity between deportation proceedings and criminal trials, Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696–99, and noting

the crucial distinction between ‘‘investigatory information’’

and ‘‘access to information relating to a governmental adjudicative process,’’ id. at 699. Inasmuch as plaintiffs here

request investigatory—not adjudicative—information, we find

Detroit Free Press distinguishable. We therefore will not

expand the First Amendment right of public access to require

disclosure of information compiled during the government’s

investigation of terrorist acts.

Accordingly, we conclude that the information sought by

plaintiffs falls within the general principle announced in

Houchins and affirmed in LAPD, rather than the Richmond

Newspapers exception to that rule. Plaintiffs have no First

Amendment right to receive the identities of INS and material witness detainees, nor are they entitled to receive information about the dates and locations of arrest, detention, and

release for each detainee.

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B. The Common Law

We also reject plaintiffs’ final claim that disclosure is

required by the common law right of access to public records.

The Supreme Court held in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), that ‘‘the courts of this

country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public

records and documents, including judicial documents.’’ Id. at

597. Plaintiffs, citing several state court cases finding a

common law right of access to arrest records, urge us to

recognize a federal common law right to receive the information they seek. In response, the government claims that the

common law right of access is limited to judicial records.

Even if the common law right applies to executive records,

the government contends, FOIA has displaced the common

law right. While we question the government’s first contention, we accept its second.

This Court has held that the common law right of access

extends beyond judicial records to the ‘‘public records’’ of all

three branches of government, Washington Legal Found. v.

United States Sentencing Commission, 89 F.3d 897, 903–04

(D.C. Cir. 1996), and we are bound by our precedent. We

need not decide, however, whether the information sought by

plaintiffs is a public record. Even if it is, the common law

right of access is preempted by FOIA.

In Nixon, the Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the

common law right of access covered the tapes sought by the

media. 435 U.S. at 599. Nonetheless, the Court denied

disclosure because the Presidential Recordings Act provided

a statutory scheme for seeking access to the tapes. Id. at

603–06. The Court held that the presence of this ‘‘alternative

means for public access tip[ped] the scales in favor of denying

release.’’ Id. at 606. In El–Sayegh, this Court applied

Nixon’s principle that a statutory disclosure scheme

preempts the common law right. See 131 F.3d at 163. The

Court found no common law right of access to a withdrawn

plea agreement because ‘‘[t]he appropriate device’’ for access

to the records ‘‘is a Freedom of Information Act request

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addressed to the relevant agency.’’ Id. (citing Nixon, 435

U.S. at 605–06).

The principles of Nixon and El–Sayegh apply with full

force here. FOIA provides an extensive statutory regime for

plaintiffs to request the information they seek. Not only is it

uncontested that the requested information meets the general

category of information for which FOIA mandates disclosure,

but for the reasons set forth above, we have concluded that it

falls within an express statutory exemption as well. It would

make no sense for Congress to have enacted the balanced

scheme of disclosure and exemption, and for the court to

carefully apply that statutory scheme, and then to turn and

determine that the statute had no effect on a preexisting

common law right of access. Congress has provided a carefully calibrated statutory scheme, balancing the benefits and

harms of disclosure. That scheme preempts any preexisting

common law right.

In accordance with Nixon and El–Sayegh, we cannot craft

federal common law when Congress has spoken directly to

the issue at hand. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314

(1981) (‘‘when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need

for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal court

disappears’’). Consequently, we reject plaintiffs’ claim that

the common law right of access requires disclosure of the

requested information.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the

government was entitled to withhold under FOIA Exemption

7(A) the names of INS detainees and those detained as

material witnesses in the course of the post-September 11

terrorism investigation; the dates and locations of arrest,

detention, and release of all detainees, including those

charged with federal crimes; and the names of counsel for

detainees. Finally, neither the First Amendment nor federal

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common law requires the government to disclose the information sought by plaintiffs.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Disregarding settled

principles governing the release of government records under

the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., this

court holds that the government may keep secret the names

of hundreds of persons whom it has detained in connection

with its investigation of the September 11, 2001 terrorist

attacks without distinguishing between information that can,

in FOIA’s words, ‘‘reasonably be expected to interfere’’ with

the investigation and information that cannot. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7)(A). While the government’s reasons for withholding some of the information may well be legitimate, the

court’s uncritical deference to the government’s vague, poorly

explained arguments for withholding broad categories of information about the detainees, as well as its willingness to fill

in the factual and logical gaps in the government’s case,

eviscerates both FOIA itself and the principles of openness in

government that FOIA embodies.

I.

I begin with some preliminary observations about the

principles that govern this case. First, no one can doubt that

uniquely compelling governmental interests are at stake: the

government’s need to respond to the September 11 attacks—

unquestionably the worst ever acts of terrorism on American

soil––and its ability to defend the nation against future acts of

terrorism. But although this court overlooks it, there is

another compelling interest at stake in this case: the public’s

interest in knowing whether the government, in responding to

the attacks, is violating the constitutional rights of the hundreds of persons whom it has detained in connection with its

terrorism investigation––by, as the plaintiffs allege, detaining

them mainly because of their religion or ethnicity, holding

them in custody for extended periods without charge, or

preventing them from seeking or communicating with legal

counsel. The government claims that the detainees have

access to counsel and freedom to contact whomever they

wish, see Op. at 5, but the public has a fundamental interest

in being able to examine the veracity of such claims. Just as

the government has a compelling interest in ensuring citizens’

safety, so do citizens have a compelling interest in ensuring

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that their government does not, in discharging its duties,

abuse one of its most awesome powers, the power to arrest

and jail.

Second, while the governmental interests in this case may

be uniquely compelling, the legal principles that govern its

resolution are not at all unique. The court’s opinion emphasizes the national-security implications of the September 11

investigation, but as the government conceded at oral argument, this case is not just about September 11. The law that

governs this case is the same law that applies whenever the

government’s need for confidentiality in a law enforcement

investigation runs up against the public’s right to know ‘‘what

[its] government is up to.’’ United States Dep’t of Justice v.

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773

(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). In all such situations, FOIA fully accommodates the government’s concerns

about the harms that might arise from the release of information pertaining to its investigations. To be sure, the statute

strongly favors openness, since Congress recognized that an

informed citizenry is ‘‘vital to the functioning of a democratic

society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the

governors accountable to the governed.’’ NLRB v. Robbins

Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). But Congress

also recognized that ‘‘legitimate governmental and private

interests could be harmed by release of certain types of

information.’’ John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S.

146, 152 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). It therefore ‘‘provided TTT specific exemptions under which disclosure

could be refused,’’ id., including the four exemptions relevant

to this case: Exemption 7(A), for information that ‘‘could

reasonably be expected to’’ interfere with ongoing law enforcement efforts, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A); Exemptions 7(C)

and 7(F), for information that ‘‘could reasonably be expected

to’’ unjustifiably compromise an individual’s privacy or physical safety, id. § 552(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F); and Exemption 3, for

information that other statutes exempt from disclosure, id.

§ 552(b)(3). But ‘‘ ‘these limited exemptions do not obscure

the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant

objective of the Act.’ ’’ John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152

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(quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)).

Accordingly, courts must ‘‘narrowly construe[ ]’’ the exemptions, and ‘‘the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.’’

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The

government may in some situations withhold entire categories

of records from disclosure, as it seeks to do here by withholding names and other information pertaining to all terrorisminvestigation detainees. In order to sustain its burden, however, the government must demonstrate that ‘‘the range of

circumstances included in the category ‘characteristically support[s] an inference’ that the statutory requirements for

exemption are satisfied.’’ Nation Magazine v. United States

Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing

United States v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 176–80 (1993)).

The third principle relates to the level of deference we owe

the government. Invoking the ‘‘heightened deference to the

judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of

national security,’’ Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696

(2001), the government refuses to identify the specific categories of information that would actually interfere with its

investigation, but rather asks us simply to trust its judgment.

This court obeys, declaring that ‘‘the judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess the executive’s judgment in this area of national security.’’ Op. at 15. But

requiring agencies to make the detailed showing FOIA requires is not second-guessing their judgment about matters

within their expertise. And in any event, this court is also in

an extremely poor position to second-guess the legislature’s

judgment that the judiciary must play a meaningful role in

reviewing FOIA exemption requests. Neither FOIA itself

nor this circuit’s interpretation of the statute authorizes the

court to invoke the phrase ‘‘national security’’ to relieve the

government of its burden of justifying its refusal to release

information under FOIA.

To begin with, I think it not at all obvious that we owe

heightened deference to the government in this case. Citing

the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to FOIA’s

Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), the exemption for nationUSCA Case #02-5254 Document #754770 Filed: 06/17/2003 Page 34 of 56
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al-security matters, we have held that in evaluating Exemption 1 claims, ‘‘ ‘substantial weight’ is to be accorded to

detailed agency affidavits setting forth the basis for exemption.’’ Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697 n.10 (D.C. Cir.

1977); see also S. REP. NO. 93–1200, at 12 (1974) (‘‘ ‘[T]he

conferees recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have

unique insights into what adverse effects might occur as a

result of public disclosure of a particular classified record.

Accordingly, the conferees expect that the federal courts, in

making de novo determinations in section 552 (b)(1) cases

under the Freedom of Information law, will accord substantial

weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the

classified status of the disputed record.’ ’’). We have also

extended this heightened deference to cases involving Exemption 3 as it incorporates the National Security Act of

1947, which requires the CIA Director to protect ‘‘intelligence

sources and methods’’ from unauthorized disclosure, 50 U.S.C

§ 403–3(c)(7). E.g., Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir.

1980) (National Security Act); Weissman, 565 F.2d 692 (Exemption 1 and National Security Act). The government,

however, relies on neither Exemption 1 nor the National

Security Act in this case, and contrary to the court’s suggestion, see Op. at 15, we have never held that such heightened

deference is also appropriate in Exemption 7 cases. Indeed,

in Weissman, which the court cites for the proposition that

‘‘we owe the same deference under Exemption 7(A) in appropriate cases,’’ we found Exemption 7 inapplicable in the case

of the CIA’s investigation into the FOIA requester’s background ‘‘except under special collateral circumstances,’’ for

instance, to protect the identities of FBI personnel named in

requested materials. We instead focused on the deference

owed the agency under Exemption 1, as well as Exemption 3

as it incorporates the National Security Act. 565 F.2d at

694–96, 698 & n.15.

In any event, the government’s case fails even under the

heightened deference we have applied in Exemption 1 and

National Security Act cases. No matter the level of deference, our review is not ‘‘vacuous.’’ Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d

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408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Even when reviewing Exemption

1’s applicability to materials classified in the interest of

national security, we have made clear that no amount of

deference can make up for agency allegations that display, for

example, a ‘‘lack of detail and specificity, bad faith, [or] failure

to account for contrary record evidence,’’ since ‘‘deference is

not equivalent to acquiescence.’’ Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1998). By accepting the

government’s vague, poorly explained allegations, and by

filling in the gaps in the government’s case with its own

assumptions about facts absent from the record, this court

has converted deference into acquiescence.

With these principles in mind, I examine each of the

government’s arguments for withholding the detainee information. Part II explains why Exemption 7(A), which forms

the basis of the court’s holding, cannot justify the government’s refusal to disclose the bulk of the requested information about the detainees. Part III shows why the government’s alternative arguments under Exemptions 7(C), 7(F),

and 3 as it incorporates Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

6(e) likewise fail. Finally, Part IV demonstrates why, on the

basis of the record before us, the government has no basis

under any exemption for withholding the names of the detainees’ attorneys.

II.

Although FOIA permits agencies to craft rules exempting

certain categories of records from disclosure under Exemption 7(A) instead of making a record-by-record showing, see

Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 236, an agency’s ability to rely on

categorical rules has limits. Specifically, the government

must divide information it seeks to withhold into ‘‘categories

TTT [that are] sufficiently distinct to allow a court to grasp

‘how each TTT category of documents, if disclosed, would

interfere with the investigation.’ ’’ Crooker v. Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 789 F.2d 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(quoting Campbell v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682

F.2d 256, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). An acceptable category is

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‘‘functional,’’ that is, it ‘‘allows the court to trace a rational

link between the nature of the document and the alleged

likely interference.’’ Id.; see also Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d

at 893 (‘‘There are limits TTT to when categorical rules may

be employed. Only when the range of circumstances included

in the category ‘characteristically support[s] an inference’

that the statutory requirements for exemption are satisfied is

such a rule appropriate.’’).

Although I have no doubt that some of the requested

information is exempt from FOIA’s mandatory disclosure

requirement, the court treats disclosure as an all-or-nothing

proposition, repeatedly emphasizing the breadth of the plaintiffs’ request—the fact that they seek the names and other

information pertaining to ‘‘every single individual detained in

the course of the government’s terrorism investigation,’’ Op.

at 17––as a justification for accepting the government’s own

very broad, categorical refusal to release the bulk of the

requested information. This all-or-nothing approach runs

directly counter to well-established principles governing

FOIA requests. Nothing in the statute requires requesters

to seek only information not exempt from disclosure. To the

contrary, the government bears the burden of reviewing the

plaintiffs’ request, identifying functional categories of information that are exempt from disclosure, and disclosing any

reasonably segregable, non-exempt portion of the requested

materials. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The government fails to satisfy that burden in this case, for the range of circumstances

included in the government’s exemption request do not ‘‘characteristically support’’ an inference that the information

would interfere with its terrorism investigation.

In support of its exemption request, the government offers

declarations from two senior officials with responsibility for

the terrorism investigation. One of those declarations, by

Dale L. Watson, a Federal Bureau of Investigation official

charged with supervising the investigation, was prepared not

for this case, but for cases involving the closure of deportation

hearings. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308

F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 2003 WL 1191395 (May

27, 2003); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th

Cir. 2002). Watson’s declaration thus speaks not to the harm

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that would flow from disclosing detainees’ names or other

information, but instead to the harm that would flow from

publicly airing evidence about particular detainees at such a

hearing––i.e., ‘‘what evidence led to the detention of each

individual,’’ ‘‘[i]nformation about how any given individual

entered the country,’’ and ‘‘what evidence the United States

has against members of a particular cell.’’ Watson Decl.

¶ ¶ 12–13. Plaintiffs in this case request no such information.

The court nevertheless relies on the Watson declaration, as

well as North Jersey Media Group, see Op. at 22–23, despite

the fact that neither has anything to do with the release of

detainee names.

The other declaration, by Department of Justice Terrorism

and Violent Crime Section chief James S. Reynolds, does in

fact outline the harms that might result from release of some

detainee names. But it does not support the government’s

request for a 7(A) exemption, since that request treats all

detainees the same, even though Reynolds tells us that the

only common thread among the detainees is that they were

‘‘originally questioned because there were indications that

they might have connections with, or possess information

pertaining to, terrorist activity against the United States.’’

Reynolds Decl. ¶ 10; see also id. ¶ ¶ 27, 36. As Reynolds

himself acknowledges, this group includes some detainees

who have turned out to be innocent of any involvement with

terrorist activity and have ‘‘no information useful to the

investigation.’’ Id. ¶ 36.

Ignoring this important concession, the court declares that

‘‘[t]he clear import of the declarations is that many of the

detainees have links to terrorism’’––which the court considers

‘‘no surprise given that the detainees were apprehended

during the course of a terrorism investigation, and given that

several detainees have been charged with federal terrorism

crimes or held as enemy combatants.’’ Op. at 21. The

court’s approach is unconvincing for two reasons.

To begin with, it rests on what seems to be a faulty

assumption about facts not in evidence. As of November 5,

2001, the last time the government released a tally, there

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were 1,182 detainees. See Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt,

Count of Released Detainees Is Hard to Pin Down, WASH.

POST, Nov. 6, 2001, at A10 (quoting Justice Department

spokeswoman Mindy Tucker). Nothing in the record tells us

how many of those 1,182 detainees have been charged with

federal terrorism crimes or held as enemy combatants. What

little information the record does contain, however, suggests

that the number may be relatively small. A list of federally

charged detainees attached to the government’s motion for

summary judgment reports that as of the time this suit was

filed, only one detainee had been criminally charged in the

September 11 attacks and only 108 detainees had been

charged with any federal crime—primarily violations of antifraud statutes. Reynolds Decl. ¶ 27; Def. Mot. for Summary

Judgment, Ex. 8.

In any event, the court concedes the point––even if ‘‘many’’

of those ‘‘apprehended during the course of a terrorism

investigation’’ have links to terrorism, not all of them do. As

the court itself notes, the declarations establish that many of

the INS detainees were held because law enforcement agents

determined in the course of questioning them that they were

in violation of federal laws; only ‘‘ ‘in some instances’ ’’ did

agents ‘‘also determine[ ] that they had links to other facets of

the investigation.’’ Op. at 21 (quoting Reynolds Decl. ¶ 10).

Furthermore, although the court assumes that all those detained on material witness warrants ‘‘have relevant knowledge about the terrorism investigation’’ because a federal

judge issues such warrants ‘‘based on an affidavit stating that

the witness has information relevant to an ongoing criminal

investigation,’’ Op. at 20, that assumption seems unwarranted

given the government’s concession that ‘‘it may turn out that

these individuals have no information useful to the investigation,’’ Reynolds Decl. ¶ 36.

The government gives us no reason to think that releasing

the names of these innocent detainees could interfere with its

investigation. Indeed, the government never really asks us

to believe that disclosure of the names of innocent persons

having no knowledge of terrorist activity would in any way

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impede its ability to gather information from those who do

have such knowledge. Instead, it asserts that ‘‘a detainee

who knows his name will be made public may be deterred

from cooperating now or in the future for fear of retaliation

by terrorist organizations against him or his family and

associates.’’ Reynolds Decl. ¶ 15. Although the court accepts

this argument, Op. at 19, it is ultimately not an argument for

withholding detainees’ names, but rather for withholding the

names of people who have information that might be helpful

to law enforcement officials. These are two different categories of people, for as Reynolds acknowledges, many detainees

have no information to provide. Reynolds Decl. ¶ 36. These

two groups thus merit different treatment. In fact, several

statutory provisions address precisely the problem the government identifies, but all of them are aimed at protecting the

identities of those people who provide information, not people

the government questions because it thinks they might have

information but who turn out not to. FOIA Exemption 7(A)

protects the identities of witnesses where disclosure might

pose a risk of interference in the form of witness intimidation

or coercion, Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 239–40; FOIA Exemption 7(D) protects the identities of sources who choose to

provide information to law enforcement agents on a confidential basis, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D); and the National Security

Act protects the identity of intelligence sources in order to

prevent those sources from ‘‘clos[ing] up like a clam,’’ CIA v.

Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 172 (1985) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The government can and should rely on these

provisions to protect the names of detainees who provide

information to law enforcement agents or whom the government believes will be able to provide such information in the

future. The government may not, however, preemptively

withhold the identities of innocent detainees who do not now,

and may never, have any information of use to the terrorism

investigation.

The only argument that could conceivably support withholding innocent detainees’ names is the assertion that disclosure of the names ‘‘may reveal details about the focus and

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scope of the investigation and thereby allow terrorists to

counteract it.’’ Reynolds Decl. ¶ 16 (emphasis added). That

Reynolds believes these harms may result from disclosure is

hardly surprising—anything is possible. But before accepting the government’s argument, this court must insist on

knowing whether these harms ‘‘could reasonably be expected

to’’ result from disclosure––the standard Congress prescribed

for exemption under 7(A). Nothing in Reynolds’s declaration

suggests that these harms are in fact reasonably likely to

occur.

To begin with, Reynolds never explains how a list of names

of persons unknown to terrorist organizations would tell the

terrorists anything at all about the investigation, much less

allow them to ‘‘map [its] progress.’’ Id. For example, if the

government tells us that it detained men named Mohammed

Mubeen, Osama Elfar, Ghassan Dahduli, Fathi Mustafa, Nacer Fathi Mustafa, and Hady Omar, Jr., none of whom has

any connection to terrorist organizations, see Amy Goldstein,

A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption: Massive, Secretive Detention Effort Aimed Mainly at Preventing More Terror,

WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A1, what could that information

possibly tell terrorists about the government’s investigation?

Though Reynolds’s declaration provides no answer, the court

speculates that the names of these innocent detainees could

be valuable to terrorist organizations because ‘‘[s]uch detainees could be acquaintances of the September 11 terrorists, or

members of the same community groups or mosques.’’ Op. at

19. That may well be true in some cases, but if it is,

Reynolds should tell us so under oath, thus providing a record

basis for the government to claim an exemption for those

detainees who pose such concerns. But the court’s speculation, supported only by a newspaper article describing a

single detainee who attended a mosque that two terrorism

suspects also attended, see id. (citing Rachel L. Swarns,

Muslims Protest Monthlong Detention Without a Charge,

N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2003, at A16), falls far short of satisfying

the government’s burden under FOIA.

The government’s failure to provide an adequate explanation is all the more glaring given that the detainees represent

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only a subset—and quite possibly a very small subset—of

persons questioned in connection with this investigation.

Reynolds Supp. Decl. ¶ 2. As a result, even if releasing

detainee names were to provide some insight into the terrorism investigation, that insight would be limited. Releasing

the names of the detainees, but not the names of those

questioned in connection with the investigation, can paint only

a partial—and possibly misleading—picture of the government’s investigative strategy. For example, if the government detains two people in Detroit but questions a thousand

in Chicago, wouldn’t release of the detainee information

wrongly lead terrorist organizations to believe that the government was focusing on Detroit, not Chicago?

The second failing in both the government’s request and

the court’s analysis is that they treat all detainee information

the same, despite the fact that each item of information that

plaintiffs seek about the detainees—names, attorneys’ names,

dates and locations of arrest, places of detention, and dates of

release—is clearly of very different value to terrorists attempting to discern the scope and direction of the government’s investigation. Although the Reynolds declaration tells

us that ‘‘releasing the names of the detainees who may be

associated with terrorism and their place and date of arrest

would reveal the direction and progress of the investigations,’’

Reynolds Decl. ¶ 16, it does not tell us, for example, whether

releasing the detainees’ names and dates of arrest, but not

their places of arrest––or even releasing the dates of arrest

alone––would involve the same danger. The Reynolds declaration, moreover, contains no justification at all for withholding dates of release. Indeed, the government has already

disclosed the release dates of detainees who had been held on

federal criminal charges. Id. ¶ 8. This information may

seem unimportant, but from the FOIA requesters’ point of

view, it could be highly relevant to the question of how the

government is treating the persons it has detained. Taken

together, arrest and release dates can tell the public how long

persons have been detained, raising concerns about possible

constitutional violations. See Appellees’ Br. at 27.

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The government’s allegations of harm are also undercut by

the fact that it has itself provided several other means by

which this information can become public. Not only do

detainees remain free to inform whomever they choose of

their detention, Reynolds Decl. ¶ 23, but on numerous occasions since September 11, the government itself has disclosed

precisely the kind of information it now refuses to provide

under FOIA. For example, on April 17, 2002, the government announced the arrest of Issaya Nombo, whom government officials said they suspected of connections to terrorism,

although he was arrested on immigration charges. Officials

revealed Nombo’s name and the date and place of his arrest.

Philip Shenon, African Held After Name Is Left in Cave,

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at A15. At a June 10, 2002 press

conference, the Attorney General announced the arrest of one

Abdulla Al Muhajir, born Jos ́e Padilla, for suspected terrorism involvement, revealing not only Al Muhajir’s two names,

but also the date and place of his arrest, and the events

leading to his capture. Attorney General Ashcroft News

Conference, June 10, 2002, available at http:/www.usdoj.

gov/ag/speeches/2002/061002agtranscripts.htm. And on July

26, 2002, government officials announced they were holding

Mohammad Mansur Jabarah on a material witness warrant

after his arrest in connection with a terrorist plot in Singapore. William K. Rashbaum, Captured Qaeda Member

Gives Details on Group’s Operations, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,

2002, at A8.

Nothing in the record explains why the government’s concerns about interference with the investigation do not apply

with respect to detainees such as Abdulla Al Muhajir, Issaya

Nombo, and Mohammad Mansur Jabarah, but do nevertheless apply with respect to the other detainees. In its reply

brief, the government explains that it may have strategic

reasons for disclosing certain information, since its disclosures to date ‘‘have identified specific individuals in a manner

unlikely, in the view of the law enforcement experts, to

impede the progress of the investigation.’’ Appellant’s Reply

Br. at 18. While this may well be so, it is an argument of

counsel, and though the court accepts it, FOIA requires that

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the agency––not counsel––explain such judgments under oath.

The reason for this requirement is clear: We owe deference

to agency expertise, not to lawyers defending the agency in

litigation. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d

153, 165–166 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,

318 U.S. 80 (1943)). If there are legitimate investigative

reasons for releasing the names of some detainees, but not

others, then Mr. Reynolds or others responsible for the

terrorism investigation should explain those reasons under

oath––in an in camera affidavit, if necessary to protect the

information––and that explanation would probably warrant

judicial deference.

It is true, as the court points out, that the Supreme Court

in CIA v. Sims acknowledged ‘‘the political realities of intelligence operations in which, among other things, our Government may choose to release information deliberately to ‘send

a message’ to allies or adversaries’’ when it upheld the CIA’s

right to withhold intelligence information even if the CIA has

already released some part of it. 471 U.S. at 180. Unlike

this court, however, the Supreme Court did not simply assume it understood the government’s strategy; it reached its

conclusion on the basis of the CIA Director’s affidavit explaining that strategy. Id. at 180 & n.24. The record in this case

contains no similar explanation. Moreover, counsel’s argument suggests that the government itself differentiates

among detainees on a case-by-case basis for purposes of

assessing how disclosure might harm its investigation. If the

government itself makes such distinctions in deciding what

information to release, then why, particularly in light of

FOIA’s exacting standards, doesn’t it make those distinctions

in its exemption request before this court?

By asking these questions, the court would not, as it warns,

be ‘‘second-guessing’’ the government’s judgments about matters of national security. Op. at 15. It would, rather, be

doing the job Congress assigned the judiciary by insisting

that the government do the job Congress assigned to it:

provide a rational explanation of its reasons for claiming

exemption from FOIA’s disclosure requirements.

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III.

Because the court concludes that Exemption 7(A) applies to

the government’s entire request, it never addresses the government’s alternative arguments under Exemptions 7(C),

7(F), and 3. In my view, none of these provisions supports

the government’s refusal to disclose the detainee information

either.

Exemption 7(C)

Exemption 7(C) permits the government to withhold law

enforcement records where their release ‘‘could reasonably be

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Like Exemption 7(A), the

application of Exemption 7(C) is subject to a set of wellestablished standards. Because the statute refers not to

invasions of privacy generally, but to ‘‘unwarranted’’ invasions

of privacy, courts evaluating claims for 7(C) exemption must

do more than simply identify a privacy interest that will be

compromised by disclosure of information. Instead, they

must ‘‘balance the public interest in disclosure against the

interest Congress intended the Exemption to protect.’’ Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 776.

Relying on our decision in Nation Magazine, the government argues that the detainees have ‘‘ ‘an obvious privacy

interest cognizable under Exemption 7(C) in keeping secret

the fact that they were subjects of a law enforcement investigation,’ ’’ and that these privacy concerns are ‘‘particularly

acute given the nature and magnitude of the September 11

attacks.’’ Appellant’s Br. at 39–40 (quoting Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 894). This argument is unconvincing. For

one thing, if the government is so concerned with the detainees’ privacy, why has it released so much information about

them? What about Abdulla Al Muhajir’s privacy, or Issaya

Nombo’s, or Mohammad Mansur Jabarah’s? Nothing in the

Reynolds declaration explains how the government’s press

conferences releasing the names of these detainees demonstrate any respect for their privacy.

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In any event, we have never held that individuals who have

been not only investigated, but also arrested and jailed, have

a similar privacy interest in avoiding ‘‘unwarranted association with criminal activity or reputational harm.’’ Nation

Magazine, 71 F.3d at 894. Even though being arrested

subjects a person suspected of criminal activity to embarrassment and potentially more serious reputational harm, the law

is nevertheless clear that no right of privacy ‘‘is violated by

the disclosure of ‘an official act such as an arrest.’ ’’ Am.

Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Housing &

Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Paul

v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).

To be sure, detainees may have a unique interest in avoiding association with the crimes of September 11. Even so,

that interest is clearly outweighed by the public interest in

knowing whether the government, in investigating those heinous crimes, is violating the rights of persons it has detained.

And while FOIA asks only whether the public interest in

disclosure outweighs the private interest in secrecy, it bears

noting that the private interests in this case weigh on both

sides of the balance: Plaintiffs’ request for disclosure of the

detainees’ names seeks to vindicate not only the public’s right

to know what its government is up to, but also the detainees’

own rights, including the right to counsel and to speedy trial.

Nothing in SafeCard Services, Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197

(D.C. Cir. 1991), requires a different result. SafeCard establishes that names appearing in law enforcement files will

often fall within the scope of Exemption 7(C), since records

containing such information are generally far less probative of

an agency’s behavior or performance than of the behavior of

the persons whose names appear in the records. Id. at 1205;

see also Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 895 (‘‘In some, perhaps

many, instances where a third party asks if an agency has

information regarding a named individual in law enforcement

files, the cognizable public interest in that information will be

negligible; the requester will be seeking records about a

private citizen, not agency conduct.’’). The SafeCard court

therefore formulated a categorical rule exempting disclosure

of such information unless the requester can show (1) compelUSCA Case #02-5254 Document #754770 Filed: 06/17/2003 Page 46 of 56
16

ling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity,

and (2) that the information is necessary to confirm or refute

that evidence. SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1205–06. Plaintiffs’

FOIA request satisfies both elements of this rule.

To begin with, this case does not implicate SafeCard’s

concern that disclosure of names in law enforcement files will

generally shed less light on the government’s behavior than it

does on the behavior of private citizens. In SafeCard, the

FOIA requester sought information relating to organizations

and individuals whom the SEC had suspected of manipulating

the requester’s stock and who might be witnesses or litigants

in the SEC’s investigations. 926 F.2d at 1200, 1205. Similarly, in many other Exemption 7(C) cases, FOIA requesters

seek names in law enforcement files primarily in order to

attack their convictions or otherwise exculpate themselves––a

‘‘personal stake’’ in disclosure that ‘‘does not count in the

calculation of the public interest.’’ Oguaju v. United States,

288 F.3d 448, 450 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Billington v.

United States Dep’t of Justice, 233 F.3d 581, 582 (D.C. Cir.

2000). Here, in contrast, plaintiffs have little if any personal

stake in their FOIA request, which aims solely to glean

information relating to the government’s conduct of its terrorism investigation and its treatment of the detainees. Designed to ‘‘shed[ ] light on an agency’s performance of its

statutory duties,’’ this request implicates precisely the kind of

public interest lying at the heart of Exemption 7(C)’s balancing test. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 773.

Moreover, plaintiffs offer ample evidence of agency wrongdoing. The record includes hundreds of pages of newspaper

articles, human rights reports, and congressional testimony

reporting alleged governmental abuses such as holding detainees for long periods without allowing them to seek or

communicate with counsel and without charging them. See,

e.g., Alison Leigh Cowen, Detainees’ Lawyers Complain of

Unfair Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at B1; Richard

A. Serrano, Many Held in Terror Probe Report Rights Being

Abused, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at A1; Amnesty International, Amnesty International’s Concerns Regarding Post

September 11 Detentions in the USA, available at

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http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc pdf.nsf; Human Rights

Watch, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of

Post–September 11 Detainees, available at http://www.hrw.

org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802.pdf; Department of Justice

Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending

Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary

Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Gerald H. Goldstein,

Attorney, National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers),

available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?=28; id.

(statement of Michael Boyle, Attorney, American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n). To be sure, none of this evidence has

been tested and proved in a court of law. But SafeCard

requires only ‘‘compelling’’ evidence—not tested evidence, and

not even evidence that would be admissible at trial. If

hundreds of pages of first-hand reports of governmental

abuses do not qualify as ‘‘compelling’’ evidence sufficient to

justify an investigation into the government’s conduct, then I

cannot imagine what would. After all, FOIA’s purpose, as

SafeCard recognizes, is to allow the public access to records

necessary to ascertain whether the government has acted

illegally. If requesters already had tried and tested proof of

such illegal activity, then resort to FOIA would be unnecessary. History, moreover, is full of examples of situations in

which just these sorts of allegations led to the discovery of

serious government wrongdoing—from Teapot Dome in the

1920s to the FBI’s COINTELPRO counterintelligence program in the 1960s to Watergate in the 1970s.

In short, by interpreting SafeCard to require anything

more than compelling ‘‘allegations of illegal agency activity,’’

Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 896, the government would

transform the SafeCard test into a categorical ban on the

disclosure of names contained in law enforcement records.

That result finds justification in neither FOIA nor our cases

interpreting Exemption 7(C). See Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d

at 896 (holding that a blanket exemption for all names in law

enforcement records ‘‘would be contrary to FOIA’s overall

purpose of disclosure, and thus is not a permissible reading of

Exemption 7(C)’’); Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

(ordering the disclosure of the name of a high-ranking FBI

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official in internal reports concerning the agency’s investigation of a cover-up).

Finally, plaintiffs need the information they request to

confirm or refute the compelling evidence of agency wrongdoing––the SafeCard test’s second requirement. While it is

true that a list of names alone would shed no light on whether

the government has respected detainees’ constitutional rights,

plaintiffs need the names in order to gather information about

the government’s treatment of the detainees. Appellees’ Br.

at 30. In this respect, plaintiffs’ request differs from the vast

majority of FOIA requests for information concerning named

individuals in law enforcement files, where the only plausible

public interest is knowing to what extent an agency believed

the named individuals were involved in illegal activity. Cf.

Rosenfeld v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 812

(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Exemption 7(C) does not justify

withholding the identities of persons investigated for subversive activities in FBI files, where the names would make it

possible to determine whether the FBI had investigated

student activists for participating in political protests by

comparing the FBI’s investigations to a roster of a student

activist group’s leadership).

Amici Washington Legal Foundation and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs contend that release of the

information is not necessary to evaluate whether the government is operating within the bounds of the law in detaining

persons in connection with its terrorism investigation, since

the public has other means of obtaining the information:

Individual detainees can bring individual lawsuits, the Department’s Inspector General has investigated allegations of misconduct, and media reports and congressional investigations

all tell the public what its ‘‘government is up to.’’ Washington Legal Found. Br. in Support of Appellant at 17. But

Amici’s argument has no basis in FOIA. If Congress had

intended for individual lawsuits, internal investigations, or

newspaper reports to relieve the government of its obligations under FOIA, then it would have expressed that intent

in the law.

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Exemption 7(F)

The government next invokes Exemption 7(F), which permits withholding law enforcement records where their release

‘‘could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical

safety of any individual.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F). Here

again, the government’s evidence fails to establish that the

entire range of records encompassed in the plaintiffs’ FOIA

request ‘‘could reasonably be expected’’ to endanger the

detainees.

The government’s declarations tell us only that (1) ‘‘[d]etainees who are, in fact[,] affiliated with a terrorist group may

be perceived by such groups as informants for the United

States and be killed to preclude their future cooperation,’’

Reynolds Decl. ¶ 37, and (2) ‘‘[i]f prisoners learn that an

individual who was detained as a result of the investigation

emanating from the September 11 attacks is in their own

prison facility, some may try to retaliate against this individual,’’ id. ¶ 29. The government tells us nothing about what

threat, if any, disclosure would pose to detainees who are

neither affiliated with a terrorist group nor currently imprisoned. And the government’s own disclosures again undermine its assertions about detainees’ safety. Plaintiffs point

out that the Justice Department Inspector General himself

named two of the detention centers used to house the terrorism investigation detainees, a fact that the government neither denies nor explains. Appellees’ Br. at 27. Again, the

government may have had reasons for disclosing the names of

only these two detention centers, but nothing in the Reynolds

declaration tells us what those reasons might be.

Exemption 3

Finally, the government invokes Exemption 3, which exempts from disclosure matters that are ‘‘specifically exempted

from disclosure by statute TTT, provided that such statute TTT

requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such

a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue.’’ 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(3). According to the government, Exemption 3,

which encompasses Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)’s

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prohibition on the disclosure of ‘‘matters occurring before the

grand jury,’’ see Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 867–68 (D.C. Cir. 1981),

excuses it from disclosing the names of detainees held on

material witness warrants, since ‘‘each of these warrants was

issued to procure a witness’s testimony before a grand jury,’’

Reynolds Second Supp. Decl. ¶ 4. As such, the government

contends that Exemption 3 provides a ground for nondisclosure independent of Exemption 7.

Rule 6(e) forbids disclosure of ‘‘not only what has occurred

and what is occurring, but also what is likely to occur’’ before

a grand jury, including disclosure of witnesses’ identities. In

re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir.

1998). Therefore, the names of persons detained on material

witness warrants who have actually testified before grand

juries are unquestionably exempt from disclosure. The government, however, insists that Exemption 3 also covers the

names of material witness detainees who have neither testified before grand juries nor are scheduled to do so, as well as

the names of detainees who were released without ever

having testified, because all of these detainees were originally

detained in order to ‘‘procure [their] testimony before a grand

jury.’’ Reynolds Second Supp. Decl. ¶ 4.

Saying that the material witness detainees were held in

order to secure their testimony is quite different from saying

that their testimony is ‘‘likely to occur’’ before a grand jury.

Indeed, the record indicates that at least seven material

witnesses have been released without testifying before a

grand jury, so in their cases, it seems more accurate to say

that their testimony is quite unlikely to occur before a grand

jury. See Indiana Men Ordered to Testify to Return to

Evansville, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 25, 2001. Furthermore, although current detainees may be, on the whole, somewhat

more likely to testify before grand juries, their testimony is

not necessarily ‘‘likely to occur’’ for purposes of Rule 6(e).

We have said that the ‘‘likely to occur’’ language must be read

sensibly: It does not authorize the government to draw ‘‘a

veil of secrecy TTT over all matters occurring in the world

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that happen to be investigated by a grand jury.’’ In re

Sealed Case, 192 F.3d 995, 1001–02 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we have

made clear that Rule 6(e) covers ‘‘testimony about to be

presented to a grand jury’’ (emphasis added)—hence the

‘‘likely to occur’’ language—but does not cover government

investigations that merely parallel grand jury investigations.

Id. at 1002–03. Because the government fails to show that all

material witness detainees are likely to testify before grand

juries, it may not, on this record, withhold their names under

Rule 6(e). To hold otherwise would convert this circuit’s

carefully crafted standard into an absolute rule that would

permit the government to keep secret the name of any

witness whom it ever thought might testify at a grand jury

proceeding, or who might testify at some indefinite point in

the future. Neither Rule 6(e) nor the law of this circuit

justifies that result.

IV.

No part of the government’s exemption request better

illustrates its infirmities than its refusal to disclose the names

of the detainees’ attorneys. Essentially rehashing its arguments for withholding the names of the attorneys’ clients, the

government argues––and the court agrees, see Op. at 23—

that releasing attorneys’ names would interfere with the

terrorism investigation and would compromise the detainees’

privacy interests, since releasing a list of attorneys ‘‘may

facilitate the identification of the detainees themselves.’’

Reynolds Decl. ¶ 18. The government also claims to be

withholding the attorneys’ names for their own good, warning

that attorneys identified as representing individuals detained

in connection with the terrorism investigation ‘‘run the risk

that they will be subjected to harassment or retaliation in

their personal as well as professional lives.’’ Reynolds Decl.

¶ 26.

Both parts of this argument are not only profoundly wrong,

but also reflect a complete misunderstanding of the nature of

this country’s legal profession. In the first place, attorneys’

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names are quite clearly not a proxy for the names of their

clients. Indeed, recognizing that knowledge of the lawyer’s

identity does not inexorably lead to identifying the client,

ethical rules forbid lawyers from identifying their clients

without their consent, except in extraordinary circumstances.

Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides

that absent extraordinary circumstances, ‘‘[a] lawyer shall not

reveal information relating to the representation of a client

unless the client gives consent after consultation’’—a prohibition that generally includes disclosure of a client’s identity.

See CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 83 (4th ed. 1999).

Because the decision ultimately belongs to the detainees and

not their lawyers, providing a list of the lawyers’ names would

do little more to facilitate identification of the detainees than

the government’s current policy of allowing the detainees to

identify themselves to the media and to whomever else they

choose.

Even assuming that releasing attorneys’ names will somehow facilitate identification of the detainees, the court’s all-ornothing approach again impermissibly shifts the burden of

identifying exempt information from the government to plaintiffs. The government’s Exemption 7(A) argument for withholding lawyers’ names thus fails for the same reason as its

7(A) argument for withholding the names of all detainees.

How would releasing the names of attorneys representing

innocent clients with no connection to terrorist activities

interfere with the government’s terrorism investigation?

Neither the court nor the government provides an explanation.

The government’s second argument fares no better. The

notion that the government must withhold the attorneys’

names for their own good is flatly inconsistent with lawyers’

roles as advocates and officers of the court in our fundamentally open legal system. Having voluntarily assumed this

public role, lawyers have little expectation of anonymity. I,

for one, know of no lawyer who has ever asked for the kind of

protection the government now asserts on behalf of the

detainees’ lawyers. Moreover, I have no doubt that lawyers

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will represent individuals associated with the terrorism investigation even without the protection the government urges.

As Judge Kessler noted in her opinion in this case, the

history of our profession is full of examples of brave men and

women who have taken on unpopular causes in the interest of

justice. Center for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 215

F. Supp. 2d 94, 109 (D.D.C. 2002). Not only do lawyers

regularly represent persons accused of terrible and highly

publicized crimes against individuals, but many of this country’s most prominent and well-respected lawyers have defended persons accused of heinous crimes against the state, from

Aaron Burr to Nazi saboteurs to Soviet spies, as well as

persons merely suspected of a propensity to commit such

crimes, such as Japanese internees in World War II.

In addition, the government completely fails to substantiate

its concerns about releasing attorneys’ names. The government insists that ‘‘[i]n light of the brutality of the acts

committed against the United States, even the mere possibility of retaliation against these lawyers justifies withholding

their identities.’’ Reynolds Decl. ¶ 38. FOIA, of course, does

not allow the government to withhold information based on

‘‘mere possibilities.’’ And the Reynolds declaration fails to

establish that retaliation is reasonably likely. Indeed, if the

government is so worried about retaliation against lawyers,

why did it release a comprehensive list of attorneys representing federally charged detainees? See Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment, Ex. 8. Reynolds provides no answer. And

if the risk of retaliation has materialized in the case of these

attorneys, Reynolds certainly does not tell us so.

If the government has legitimate concerns about the safety

of one or more of the lawyers, FOIA requires it to describe

those concerns with reasonable specificity—again in an in

camera affidavit, if necessary—and explain why it believes

the harms it fears ‘‘could reasonably be expected’’ to occur.

Giving appropriate deference to law enforcement expertise,

the district court would then be in a position to evaluate the

government’s concerns and determine whether withholding

the attorneys’ names under Exemption 7(F)––or some other,

less extraordinary measures––are needed to protect the deUSCA Case #02-5254 Document #754770 Filed: 06/17/2003 Page 54 of 56
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tainees’ attorneys. Absent such evidence, however, the government has no basis for its flat refusal to release lawyers’

names.

V.

Although I think it unreasonable to infer that all of the

information plaintiffs seek in their FOIA request qualifies for

exemption, the government may be able to point to more

narrowly defined categories of information that might justify

the inference. For example, while nothing in the record

supports the government’s contention that releasing the

names of innocent detainees would harm the investigation,

perhaps the government could justify withholding the places

of arrest on the ground that such information might provide

terrorist organizations with some insight into the government’s investigative methods and strategy. I would therefore

remand to allow the government to describe, for each detainee or reasonably defined category of detainees, on what basis

it may withhold their names and other information.

This ‘‘more particularized approach’’ comports with both

‘‘Congress’ intent to provide workable rules of FOIA disclosure,’’ United States v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 180 (1993)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and FOIA’s

ultimate aim: to give the public ‘‘access to information about

how Government is exercising its trust,’’ at a time when

‘‘Government is becoming involved in more and more aspects

of every citizen’s personal and business life.’’ 112 Cong. Rec.

13654 (1966) (statement of Rep. Rumsfeld). It would also

ensure that this court treat FOIA as ‘‘a disclosure statute and

not as an excuse to withhold information from the public.’’

Id.

Rather than hold the government to clearly established

standards governing FOIA exemptions, the court sustains the

government’s vague, ill-explained decision to withhold information, invoking principles of deference and engaging in its

own speculation to fill in the gaps in the government’s showing. In my view, the court’s approach drastically diminishes,

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if not eliminates, the judiciary’s role in FOIA cases that

implicate national-security interests. Congress certainly

could have written FOIA that way, but chose instead to

require meaningful judicial review of all government exemption claims. If the government thinks that a new, broader

FOIA exemption is needed for terrorism cases, it should ask

Congress to create one, just as in the wake of September 11 it

asked Congress to authorize roving wiretaps of suspected

terrorists and to permit detention of non-U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism without specific charges. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). But

this court may not change the law in Congress’s stead. For

all its concern about the separation-of-powers principles at

issue in this case, the court violates those principles by

essentially abdicating its responsibility to apply the law as

Congress wrote it. I dissent.

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