Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00138/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00138-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Fraud

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOHN F. SPOLLEN, et al., )

) CV 11-138-TUC-DCB [CRP]

Plaintiffs, ) 

)

vs. ) 

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC., et al, )

)

Defendants. ) 

 )

Four motions are pending before the Court. Defendants, Chase Home Finance LLC

and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., filed a Motion to Dismiss Case or in the

Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement. (Doc. 6). Defendants, Tiffany & Bosco

PA, filed a Motion to Dismiss Case Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc.

7). Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand to State Court and a Motion for Leave to File

Amended Complaint. (Docs. 17, 24). 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case derives from the attempted foreclosure sale of Plaintiffs’ property at 1519

W. Fairway Wood Court, Tucson, Arizona 85737 (“Property”). (Doc. 1-3, at 68). On April

27, 2007, Plaintiffs signed the Promissory Note (“Note”) for the Property in exchange for a

loan in the amount of $260,000.00 from the original Lender, Barkley Mortgage, L.L.C.

(Doc. 8). Defendant, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (“MERS”) was the

original beneficiary under the Deed of Trust (“DOT”), which Plaintiffs signed on April 27,

2007. The DOT was recorded on April 30, 2007. (Doc. 9). 

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Plaintiffs paid their scheduled monthly mortgage payments until October 2008 when,

due to medical complications and employment set-backs, Plaintiffs claim they were unable

to continue making payments. (Doc. 25, at 34). After an alleged failed attempt to sell the

Property in 2009, Plaintiffs declared bankruptcy in April 2010. (Doc. 25, at 35). 

In the Fall of 2010, Defendants initiated the loan collection process. MERS assigned

the DOT to Defendant, Chase Home Finance L.L.C. (“CHF”), on October 19, 2010. (Doc.

20, at 20). On October 25, 2010, Defendant Tiffany & Bosco, P.A. (“T&B”) sent Plaintiffs

a letter providing them with information regarding loan modification and home retention

programs. (Doc. 20, at 41-42). On October 26, 2010, CHF accelerated the Note declaring

the entire unpaid principal balance due on Plaintiff’s loan. (Doc. 20, at 39). Mark S. Bosco,

acting as agent for CHF, subsequently prepared, executed, and recorded a Substitution of

Trustee on October 27, 2010, naming Michael A. Bosco Jr. as Successor Trustee under the

DOT. (Doc. 11). On that same day Michael A. Bosco Jr., acting as trustee, prepared,

executed, and recorded the Notice of Trustee’s Sale. (Doc. 10). At the end of October, T&B

informed Plaintiffs in writing that CHF retained T&B to enforce the terms of the loan by

non-judicial foreclosure. (Doc. 20, at 44). 

In December 2010, Plaintiffs allege they started the process of applying to CHF for

a loan modification and that on January 6, 2011, CHF informed Plaintiffs they had been

approved for a trial modification. (Doc. 25, at 41). Plaintiffs’ trial modification consisted

of three consecutive monthly payments of $1,787.75, which Plaintiffs claim they could not

afford to pay. (Doc. 25, at 41-42). Plaintiffs allege that through February 2011, they

repeatedly requested CHF to approve a lower payment but to no avail. (Doc. 25, at 42-43).

During oral arguments on July 6, 2011, counsel for CHF informed the Court that she assisted

Plaintiffs in filing a second loan modification application. According to counsel, Plaintiffs’

application should be processed and resolved within a few weeks. 

With the foreclosure in process, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court of

Pima County on February 11, 2011. (Doc. 1-3, at 66). Plaintiffs alleged numerous claims

against one or more of the Defendants in regard to their mortgage loan under the following

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theories: usury, security violation, common-law fraud, Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)

violations, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) violations, RICO/Conspiracy,

and a claim for “Statements.” (Doc. 1-3, at 72-87). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, CHF and

MERS removed the case to this Court on March 7, 2011. Defendants noted several of the

aforementioned claims raised federal law questions and complete diversity between the

parties existed permitting this Court’s diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1, at 2). 

Once in federal court, CHF and MERS responded to Plaintiffs’ Complaint by

collectively filing a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite

Statement on March 14, 2011. (Doc. 6). In this motion, CHF and MERS allege Plaintiffs’

Complaint violates Rules 8(a)(2), 8(d), 12(f), 10(b), and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. (Doc. 6, at 6). Additionally, CHF and MERS reject each particular claim

alleged by Plaintiffs for various reasons including lack of evidence, conclusory allegations,

and statutory limitations for the filing of specific claims. (Doc. 6, at 6-12). 

T&B also filed a Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

on March 14, 2011. (Doc. 7). Claiming the causes of action against T&B are derived solely

from Michael A. Bosco Jr.’s role as Successor Trustee, T&B argues A.R.S. §33-807(E), a

statute protecting trustees from liability, necessarily bars Plaintiffs’ Complaint against T&B.

(Doc. 7, at 7-9). Further, T&B contends Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the pleading requirements

under Rule 8 and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 7, at 7-13).

At oral argument, Defendants acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ subsequently filed

Amended Complaint likely mooted their Motions to Dismiss.

Prior to responding to Defendants’ dismissal motions, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to

Remand on April 6, 2011. (Doc. 17). Plaintiffs supported this motion with three theories:

(1) a forthcoming Amended Complaint would eliminate all federal law claims; thus this

Court would lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331; (2) the requirements for diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) would not be satisfied in the Amended Complaint as

Plaintiffs intended to add two non-diverse defendants and; (3) even if diversity jurisdiction

persisted, this Court should remand the case to state court because “novel state law issues”

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should be determined by the state court. (Doc. 17, at 2-6). 

CHF and MERS filed a Response in Opposition to Motion to Remand on April 26,

2011 in which T&B joined on April 27, 2011. (Docs. 18, 19). Collectively, Defendants

contend Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is premature and that each of Plaintiffs’ arguments for

remand is “fatally flawed.” (Doc. 18, at 2). Because Plaintiffs were seeking remand based

on a “theoretical” amended complaint, Defendants argue that no legitimate basis exists for

this Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction and remand would be improper. (Doc. 18, at 1-

3). Defendants also contest Plaintiffs’ argument contending novel or complex issues of state

law support a remand motion. (Doc. 18, at 5). In their Reply in Support of Motion to

Remand, Plaintiffs reasserted their arguments made in the motion to remand. (Doc. 26, at

1-5). Plaintiffs filed this reply on May 6, 2011 – the same day they filed the Amended

Complaint.

On April 29, 2011, Plaintiffs responded to T&B’s Motion to Dismiss and CHF and

MERS collective Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. 6,7). In these responses, Plaintiffs again discuss

claims they intend to allege in a future amended complaint. In both responses, Plaintiffs

agree to dismissal of their usury, securities laws, fraud, TILA, RESPA, RICO/Conspiracy

and “Statements” claims; in essence, they agree to dismiss all their federal claims. (Docs.

20, 21). 

 On May 6, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and

lodged their proposed Amended Complaint (Docs. 24, 25). In the Motion for Leave,

Plaintiffs withdraw their original Complaint. In the lodged proposed Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs assert all new claims. (Doc. 24, at 1-3). Included in the new claims are claims

against T&B that Plaintiffs allege are not barred by A.R.S. §33-807(E). (Doc. 20, at 3-4).

The new claims are based on the same set of facts presented in the original Complaint. In

addition to the new claims, Plaintiffs request to add Michael A. Bosco Jr., Mark S. Bosco,

and Fannie Mae as defendants. (Doc. 24, at 2-3). 

In total, Plaintiffs assert nine causes of action against one or more of the Defendants.

(Doc. 24, at 2-3). None of these claims arise under federal law. Plaintiffs also assert the lack

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of complete diversity of citizenship among the parties as T&B is an Arizona firm and

Michael A. Bosco Jr. and Mark S. Bosco are both Arizona residents. (Doc. 17, at 3). 

Plaintiffs also maintain that this Court, if deciding the requirements for diversity jurisdiction

are satisfied, should abstain from exercising jurisdiction based on “judicial economy,

fairness, comity, the existence of novel issues under Arizona law, and the necessity for the

Court to interpret Arizona state statutes.” (Doc. 17, at 3-4).

T&B responded to Plaintiffs’ Motion to File an Amended Complaint on May 13,

2011. (Doc. 27). T&B argues that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Local Rule 15.1, which

requires parties to submit a “redlined” version of the proposed amended pleading. (Doc. 27,

at 2). In their Motion to File Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs note they deliberately chose not

to provide a redlined version of the Original Complaint believing it would be “more

confusing than helpful” given the significant changes between the original Complaint and

the proposed Amended Complaint. (Doc. 24, at 1 n. 1). 

T&B also alleges that Plaintiffs’ proposed Amended Complaint, like the Complaint

itself, is subject to dismissal under Rule 8 because Plaintiffs failed to cure the pleading

defects present in the Complaint. (Doc. 27, at 3). Finally, T&B argues Plaintiffs failed to

follow this Court’s Order to specifically address T&B’s argument that it cannot be sued

pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-807(E). (Doc. 27, at 3). 

In their Reply to T&B’s Response, Plaintiffs argue (1) the proposed Amended

Complaint complies with Rules 8 and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with

regard to the length, clarity, and presence of factual allegations; (2) Plaintiffs' Response to

T&B’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20, at 3-4) does address T&B’s A.R.S. §33-807(E)

argument and; (3) the requirement under Local Rule 15.1 to provide a redlined version of the

Complaint to portray changes is futile considering the Amended Complaint is essentially a

new document, composed in a different format, with entirely different claims than those

alleged in the Complaint. (Doc. 28, at 2-5). 

CHF and MERS did not provide any response to Plaintiffs’ motion to file an amended

complaint.

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides leave to amend “shall be freely given

when justice so requires.” Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990).

In assessing the propriety of a motion for leave to amend, courts consider (1) bad faith; (2)

undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether

plaintiff has previously amended his complaint. Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866

F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). If the court determines that the complaint, as amended, is

subject to dismissal, then “leave to amend need not be given”. Moore v. Kayport Package

Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 

A complaint must provide enough facts that a reviewing court can surmise a plausible

link between the facts and the stated claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). While not analogous to a “probability requirement,” the “plausibility

standard” demands more than a mere possibility of a defendant’s alleged wrongdoing.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The complaint must also consist of “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” with each

allegation being “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 

The Court recommends granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to File Amended Complaint. No

evidence exists that Plaintiffs have acted in bad faith in seeking amendment of their original

complaint. Indeed, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend because of several deficiencies in the

original Complaint highlighted by Defendants. (Doc. 28, at 2-4). There is equally no

evidence to suggest that Plaintiffs unduly delayed in filing for a motion to amend. Plaintiffs

filed the Complaint on February 11, 2011. (Doc. 1-3). After removal to this Court from the

state court, all Defendants filed dismissal motions on March 14, 2011. (Docs. 6, 7).

Plaintiffs filed timely responses to these motions on April 29, 2011, and expressed their

intention to file a motion to amend their complaint in the upcoming week. (Doc. 20, at 2;

Doc. 21, at 2). Plaintiffs then filed their motion to amend on May 6, 2011. (Doc. 24).

Plaintiffs did not unduly delay in filing their proposed Amended Complaint. Further,

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Defendants will not suffer significant prejudice if Plaintiffs are allowed to amend their

complaint nor have Plaintiffs previously amended their complaint. 

T&B contends amendment is futile. (Doc. 27, at 3). The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs

allege several specific acts of wrongdoing by all Defendants and support each alleged act

with facts specific enough to plausibly state a claim for relief against Defendants. (Doc. 25).

This Court’s recommendation to grant the Motion to Amend is not altered by T&B’s

contention that A.R.S. § 33-807(E) prevents suit against T&B nor that Plaintiffs’ failure to

follow Local Civil Rule 15.1 should result in denial of the Motion. The Arizona statute bars

claims against trustees if (1) the trustee is named as a defendant in the claim; (2) the claim

relates to the trustee’s authority to act under the DOT Statutes or deed of trust; and (3) the

claim does not allege that the trustee breached his obligations under the DOT Statutes or the

deed of trust. A.R.S. § 33-807(E); (Doc. 7, at 8). In the lodged proposed Amended

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege T&B breached its obligations under the DOT Statutes and deed

of trust by aiding and abetting other Defendants in violation of A.R.S. § 33-420. (Doc. 25,

at 29-32). In the briefing thus far Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs’ claim, as

alleged, is barred by the Arizona statute. 

Plaintiffs conscious choice not to provide a redlined version of their amended

pleadings as required by Local Rule 15.1 was reasonable. (Doc. 24, at 1 n. 1). As noted in

their Motion for Leave to Amend, Plaintiffs selected not to provide the redlined version

because the lodged proposed Amended Complaint contained significant changes. (Doc. 24).

While not strictly following Local Rule 15.1, Plaintiffs acted reasonably and explained to the

Court and Defendants the reason for their choice. 

 Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File

Amended Complaint be granted.

B. Remand 

The Court will address several issues related to whether remand is appropriate in this

case. A defendant can remove an action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction or

federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d

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1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). If the action is removed because of diversity jurisdiction, there

must be complete diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(b). Hunter, 582 F.3d

at 1043. “[I]f after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder

would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and

remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e); Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc.,

236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Newcomb v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686,

691 (9th Cir. 1998)). Thus, if diversity is the sole basis for the federal court’s jurisdiction,

joinder of non-diverse parties, including parties not considered to be indispensable, divests

the court of that jurisdiction. Id. 

If an action is removed because it involves a federal question, the removal is proper

if a federal question appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. Jefferson County, Ala.

v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). If federal question jurisdiction existed at the time of

removal but is later lost, the federal court is not compelled to remand the case. Albingia

Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker International Inc., 344 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2003). The

federal court retains the discretion to adjudicate the remaining state claims. Nishimoto v.

Federman-Bachrach & Associates, 903 F.2d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 1990). 

While federal courts retain discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state

law claims removed from state court, federal courts should avoid exercising that power in

some situations. Id. It may be an abuse of discretion for federal courts to retain such cases

where all federal claims are eliminated before trial. Carnegie-Mellon U. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 (1988). Typically, the values of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims.” Id. n. 7. This is not, however, a mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all cases.

Id. 

When a federal court decides, after balancing all the factors involved, that the most

appropriate course of action is to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims, the court can either dismiss the action or remand it to state court. Id. at 351. A

remand is “preferable” to dismissal because it avoids statute of limitation problems and costs

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involved with filing new pleadings in state court. Id. at 351-352. Prior to dismissing an

action or granting remand, the court can consider whether the plaintiff has engaged in

“manipulative tactics” in an attempt to return to state court. Id. at 357. Filing federal claims

in state court is generally viewed as a “legitimate tactical decision” by the plaintiff. Baddie

v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1995). As such, plaintiffs are entitled to

dismiss the federal claims after removal if they decide “a state court forum is more important

to them than their federal claims.” Id. at 490. 

1. Motion to Remand is Premature

In their Motion to Remand, Plaintiffs requested remand due to (1) lack of federal

question jurisdiction; (2) lack of diversity jurisdiction; and (3) the existence of novel issues

of state law. (Doc. 17, at 1-6). The Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand

be denied without prejudice as premature. 

Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Remand on April 6, 2011. (Doc. 17). This was a full

month before they filed the Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. (Doc. 24). While

Plaintiffs were “considering eliminating any claims that raise questions under federal law,”

they had not, in fact, filed any motion to amend their Complaint and dismiss their federal

claims. (Doc. 17, at 2). Thus, Plaintiffs’ federal claims were still live at the time they filed

their Motion to Remand. Because their federal claims persisted, so did the Court’s federal

question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331.

Further, diversity jurisdiction endured because Plaintiffs had not yet added defendants

who allegedly destroy diversity. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, which adds Michael A.

Bosco Jr. and Mark S. Bosco as defendants, and adds new claims against T&B, was filed a

month after the motion to remand. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand was premature.

While the Motion to Remand was premature, the Magistrate Judge notes if the District

Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend, removal may be appropriate based on the

Amended Complaint. Defendants argue, in fact, that remand is still not appropriate even if

the Motion to Amend is granted. At oral argument, defense counsel raised several concerns

about Plaintiffs’ attempts to destroy complete diversity. Defendants contend the claims

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against T&B in the Amended Complaint may likely be dismissed in a future motion to

dismiss if the Amended Complaint is granted. Defendants further argue the two individual

Boscos named in the Amended Complaint are likely nominal defendants and thus their

citizenship is irrelevant to diversity analysis. Defendants at oral argument requested this case

not be remanded so they may have the opportunity to brief these diversity jurisdiction issues.

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court deny as premature Plaintiffs’

Motion to Remand. The Magistrate Judge further recommends this case not be remanded sua

sponte, but rather the parties be given time to file, as appropriate, a motion to remand and any

motions to dismiss based on the Amended Complaint.

2. Abstention is Not Warranted

In addition to arguing against diversity or federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiffs

contend that this Court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction due to novel issues of state

law. (Doc. 17, at 4-6). While the Magistrate Judge recommends denying the Motion to

Remand as premature, the Court will address Plaintiffs’ abstention argument as an alternate

ruling. Plaintiffs contend that a state court is better able to “establish a coherent policy” by

interpreting Arizona’s statutory scheme involving foreclosure regulation. (Doc. 17, at 7). 

Plaintiffs rely on the doctrine of Burford abstention, which protects state

administrative processes from undue federal interference into matters of local concern and

matters within the special competence of local courts. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.

Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989). Abstention is not required

“whenever there exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a ‘potential for

conflict’ with state regulatory law or policy.” Id. District courts have “an obligation and a

duty to decide cases properly before them,” and Burford represents an “extraordinary and

narrow exception to the duty of the [d]istrict [c]ourt to adjudicate a controversy.” City of

Tucson v. U.S. West Commun., Inc., 284 F.3d 1128, 1132-1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711 (1996)). As such, district courts “cannot

abstain merely because there are complex and difficult issues of state law involved in the

controversy before it.” Id. at 1133. 

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Limiting the application of Burford abstention, the Ninth Circuit requires (1) that the

state has concentrated suits involving the local issue in a particular court; (2) the federal

issues are not easily separable from complicated state law issues with which the state courts

may have special competence; and (3) that federal review might disrupt state efforts to

establish a coherent policy. Tucker v. First Maryland Savings & Loan, Inc., 942 F.2d 1401,

1405 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The requirements for abstention have not been met in this case. Plaintiffs have not

shown or referred to any pending state judicial proceedings concerning the issues involved

in Plaintiffs’ claims. Nor have Plaintiffs shown or referred to any state court judgment

entered on the issues before the Court. Plaintiffs’ claims do not implicate the Arizona system

of administrative regulation or sovereignty and Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that this

Court would be incapable of applying Arizona law to the issues. Assuming Plaintiffs’

supposition that the issues involved in their suit constitute complex issues of state law,

abstention would still be improper because the “mere difficulty of state law does not justify

a federal court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favor of state court action.” La. Power &

Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 (1959). 

The Magistrate Judge recommends Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand based on abstention

be denied.

C. Motions to Dismiss

The Court recommends that CHF and MERS’s collective Motion to Dismiss and

T&B’s Motion to Dismiss be denied as moot. (Docs. 6, 7). These motions address

Plaintiffs’ original Complaint. Plaintiffs voluntarily agreed to withdraw their original

Complaint and dismiss all the claims within it. (Doc. 24, at 2). During oral argument,

Defendants CHF and T&B conceded their Motions to Dismiss are moot if Plaintiffs’ Motion

to Amend is granted. Because the Court recommends granting Plaintiffs leave to amend,

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss should be denied as moot.

III. RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review:

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1. Grant Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend and order the Clerk of the Court to file Plaintiffs’

lodged proposed Amended Complaint. (Docs. 24, 25).

2. Deny Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand as premature or in the alternative, deny Plaintiffs’

Motion to Remand based on abstention. The Magistrate Judge further recommends the case

not be remanded sua sponte to state court as Defendants request an opportunity to file

motions to dismiss addressing diversity jurisdiction issues. (Doc. 17).

3. Deny Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss as moot. (Docs. 6, 7).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that any

objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV-11-138-DCB.

DATED this 15th day of July, 2011.

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