Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02254/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02254-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMAL EVANS,

CDCR #P-51115,

Plaintiff,

vs.

HERNANDEZ; R. MADDEN; 

RODRIGUEZ; T. BLACHSTOCK,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-02254-GPC-WVG

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Jamal Evans (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at Centinela State 

Prison (“CEN”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights 

complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has not 

prepaid the civil filing fee; instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). 

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I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite the plaintiff’s failure to prepay the 

entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a 

prisoner and is granted leave to proceed IFP, he nevertheless remains obligated to pay the 

entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of 

the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the 

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the 

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until 

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted the certified copy of his trust 

account statement required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statements,

which show that he has had no monthly deposits, has carried an average balance of zero

in his account during the 6-month period preceding the filing of this action, and had no 

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available funds to his credit at the time of filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing 

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding 

that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s 

IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him 

when payment is ordered.”).

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 

balance of the filing fees due for this case must be collected by the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the 

PLRA also obliges the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP 

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as 

soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who 

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 

1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

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All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

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substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both 

(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 

(2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao 

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Grievance Procedures

Plaintiff has failed to allege a viable claim against any of the individually named 

Defendants. While not entirely clear, Plaintiff’s complaint appears to allege that 

Defendants have violated his constitutional rights due to the manner in which they 

responded to his administrative grievances. (See Compl. at 3.) However, a prison 

official’s alleged improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without 

more, cannot serve as a basis for section 1983 liability. See generally Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional 

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure”); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 

640 (9th Cir. 1988) (due process not violated simply because defendant fails properly to 

process grievances submitted for consideration); see also Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 

Fed. Appx. 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2014) (district court properly dismissed section 1983 

claims against defendants who “were only involved in the appeals process” (citing 

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860)). 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants are insufficient 

to state a plausible due process claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-84 (citations omitted).

D. Transfer

Plaintiff also appears to claim that his constitutional rights have been violated 

because prison officials refuse to transfer him to a facility that is closer to his family. 

(See Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to be housed in the 

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institution of his choice. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); McKune v. 

Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“It is well settled that the decision where to house inmates 

is at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”)

Because he is proceeding pro se, however, the Court having now provided him 

with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also grant Plaintiff an opportunity 

to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2);

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly 

payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding them to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 

his account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1);

5. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to file an Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies of pleading described 

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above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to 

his original complaint. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

Should Plaintiff elect not to proceed by filing an Amended Complaint within 30

days, the Court will enter a final Order of dismissal of this civil action for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and for failure to 

prosecute in compliance with a Court Order requiring amendment. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d 

at 1260-61 (dismissal for failure to prosecute permitted if plaintiff fails to respond to a 

court’s order requiring amendment of complaint); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his 

complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of 

the entire action.”).

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a civil rights form complaint 

for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2017

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