Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01005/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01005-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK CONRAD FAUROT, II, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

TODD H. BARTON, Executive )

Officer, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-01005-AWI-SMS 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS (DOCS. 5, 6)

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT NO LATER THAN

THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER (DOC. 1)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an

action for relief concerning alleged civil rights violations. The

matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304. Plaintiff

filed the complaint in this action on August 2, 2006. 

I. Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

On August 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed two motions to proceed

in forma pauperis. 

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing

required by § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in

forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

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 The filing fee for civil actions is $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1

1914, as amended effective April 8, 2006. Pub. L. 109-171, 120

Stat. 4, February 8, 2006.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), Plaintiff is required to

pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. No 1

initial partial filing will be assessed by this order. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the Court will direct the

appropriate agency to collect monthly payments of twenty percent

of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s prison

trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the

appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount

in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is

paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. Screening the Complaint

A. Legal Standards

The Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if the Court determines that an allegation of poverty is

untrue or that the action is 1) frivolous or malicious, 2) fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 3) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

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(9 Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, th

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). A th

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). A

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a

fanciful factual allegation. Id. A federal court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or if the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Id. 

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

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(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11 Cir. th

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costfree filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as

damages from the Superior Court of King County; Todd H. Barton,

the executive officer of the court; and two deputy clerks of the

court referred to as clerks 1031 and 1049. Plaintiff’s complaint

stems from his attempts on February 27, 2006 and March 8 and 14,

2006, to file a habeas corpus petition with the court. He alleges

that his complaint was on a 1999 form and was rejected by Barton

and the clerks, who failed to give it a case number because it

was not on the up-to-date 2005 version of the form which,

Plaintiff alleges, “matches the 2005 version’s material topics

for the superior court, merely changing the copies to be filed in

California’s Supreme Court.” (Cmplt. p. 8.) Plaintiff asserts

that it was “materially identical.” (Id. p. 9.) It also

apparently was considered incomplete when first submitted because

two pages were improperly combined. When resubmitted, the clerks

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 Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees “[t]o the extent that this court appoints counsel pursuant to inherent 2

authority,” (Cmplt. p. 20), but Plaintiff does not formally move for the appointment of counsel. The Court thus does

not understand Plaintiff to be moving at this early stage of the case for counsel.

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required the original petition and an original signature.

Plaintiff retained the original. He alleges that it was possible

for the clerks to have simply returned the signature page for

signature instead of sending a blank 2005 version of the habeas

corpus form.

Plaintiff seeks an injunction against the failure to assign

a case number and forward the petition to a judge; he also seeks

$212.00 per day while the status quo continues. (Cmplt. p. 18.)2

Plaintiff attaches to his complaint a copy of the habeas

corpus petition as well as correspondence concerning Plaintiff’s

attempts to file it.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff names as a defendant the Kings County Superior

Court for the state of California. (Cmplt. p. 1.)

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages

or injunctive relief against a state, an “arm of the state,” its

instrumentalities, or its agencies. Durning v. Citibank, N.A.,

950 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (9th Cir.1991). A suit against a

California superior court is a suit against the state and is

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Greater Los Angeles Council on

Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9 Cir. 1987). th

Accordingly, suit against the Superior Court is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment.

D. Quasi-judicial Immunity

Judicial or quasi-judicial immunity has been extended not

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only to those who actually adjudicate disputes in an adversarial

setting, but also in appropriate cases to non-jurists who perform

functions closely associated with the judicial process. In re

Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9 Cir. 2002). The doctrine is th

appropriately applied to persons other than judges who exercise

judgments functionally comparable to those of judges, i.e., those

who exercise a discretionary judgment as part of their function.

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993)

(holding that a court reporter who was charged with having failed

to provide a transcript and who was bound by statute to provide

verbatim reports of a criminal trial was not entitled to immunity

because she was afforded no discretion in carrying out the duty

to record proceedings). After Antoine, the key question is not

simply whether common law judges performed the task in question,

but rather, whether judges themselves, in performing the function

at issue, would be entitled to absolute immunity. Antoine, 508

U.S. at 435; In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 949 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Traditionally it has been recognized that court clerks have

absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights

violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of

the judicial process, such as filing documents and giving

notices. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of

Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9 Cir. 1987). After the decision th

in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, it has been

recognized in the Ninth Circuit that court clerks who are

performing tasks related to the judicial process of resolving

disputes, and who retain some measure of discretionary judgment

in performing those tasks, continue to be immune from suit. See,

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Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (9 Cir. 1996) (holding th

that a court clerk, and a law clerk who assisted a judge by

performing functions closely associated with the judicial process

and duties most intimately connected with the judge’s own

exercise of judicial function, were entitled to absolute quasijudicial immunity), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1118 (1997); In re

Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, (9 Cir. 2002) (holding that a th

bankruptcy trustee’s clerk was entitled to complete quasijudicial immunity with respect to the clerk’s scheduling of a

hearing and failing to give notice of a hearing because both were

functionally comparable to judicial actions, and were analogous

to judicial action, in that they involved control of the docket,

a task involving the exercise of discretionary judgment related

to the resolution of disputes). 

Here, it appears that the clerks and Defendant Barton, the

executive officer, were performing functions closely associated

with the judicial process and exercise of the judicial function;

further, it appears that the three employees of the court

retained some judgment with respect to evaluating under the

applicable standards whether the petitions were formally

sufficient for filing. 

Accordingly, it appears that the court clerks and the

executive officer retained quasi-judicial immunity from suit for

rejecting Plaintiff’s petition for formal insufficiency.

Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his petition

in this regard.

E. Denial of Access to the Courts 

Plaintiff asserts that this conduct was performed under

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color of state law and constituted a prior restraint obstructing

the peaceful distribution of informational literature regarding

current events, and an infringement upon his freedom of speech in

the form of obstructing petition for redress of habeas corpus

grievances. He alleges that it violated the First Amendment and

caused an injury in the form of loss of freedom and loss of

constitutional rights. (Cmplt. 6-7, 18.) He further asserts that

the court should have given him a meaningful opportunity to be

heard, including an opportunity to obtain judicial findings

before being denied access to the court. (Id. p. 12.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ actions have deprived him

of his right of access to the courts. As the Court noted in its

order of August 30, 2006, denying Plaintiff’s motion for a

temporary restraining order, in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343

(1996), the Supreme Court defined a prisoner’s right of

access to the courts as simply the “right to bring to court a

grievance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). The right

to access the courts is limited to direct criminal appeals,

habeas corpus proceedings, and civil rights actions challenging

conditions of confinement. Id. at 354-55. A prisoner alleging a

violation of his right of access to the courts must demonstrate

that he has suffered “actual injury.” Id. 349-50. To succeed on

this action for denial of access to the courts, Plaintiff must

allege he suffered a specific, concrete, injury as a result of

Defendants’ actions. See Casey, 518 U.S. at 351; Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1998). Actual injury

means “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or

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present a claim.” Casey, 518 U.S. at 348. If the prisoner retains

the ability to present his or her arguments to the court, there

is no actual injury. Plaintiff here is not being denied the

ability to file his state habeas corpus petition. Defendants are

simply requiring Plaintiff to file his petition on a form

required by the Kings County Superior Court and provide an

original copy of the petition, including original signatures,

to the Kings County Superior Court. While Plaintiff disagrees

with these procedural rules, based on the facts as alleged by

Plaintiff, Defendants have not deprived Plaintiff of his ability

to file a state habeas corpus petition in the Kings County

Superior Court. Plaintiff must simply file his petition on the

standard form used by the Kings County Superior Court and provide

original signatures. Because it appears Plaintiff will be able to

file his petition in the Kings County Superior Court if he

complies with the court’s procedural rules, Plaintiff has not

been denied the ability to file a state habeas corpus petition in

the Kings County Superior Court. As such, Plaintiff has failed to

show an actual injury.

Accordingly, Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend

to allege an actual injury.

The Court notes that Plaintiff alleges that denial of access

to the court is also a violation of his right to substantive due

process founded in turn on the First Amendment and Privileges and

Immunities Clause. (Cmplt. p. 7.) However, “[t]o establish a

violation of substantive due process..., a plaintiff is

ordinarily required to prove that a challenged government action

was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial

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relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general

welfare. Where a particular amendment provides an explicit

textual source of constitutional protection against a particular

sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide

for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d

868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and

brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845 (1997); County

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). Here,

Plaintiff’s right of access claim appears to subsume any more

generalized substantive due process claim.

Plaintiff also appears to assert a denial of procedural due

process. (Cmplt. pp. 15-17.) He asserts that the clerks

unreasonably declined the petition while knowing that there was

no material difference between the 1999 and 2005 forms and

without any emergency need, other necessity, or impracticality

and thus denied meaningful and possible pre-deprivation process.

(Cmplt. 10, 12.) He asserts that his only remedy is an

independent state tort action. (Id. p. 13.)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects

prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556

(1974). To establish a procedural due process claim, a prisoner

must generally show 1) a protected liberty or property interest,

and 2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. Thornton v.

City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9 Cir. 2005). th

Here, the only interest alleged by Plaintiff to have been

affected is his right of access to the courts. As the Court has

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already ruled, Plaintiff was not denied his right of access

because he did not suffer any actual injury. Plaintiff was not

barred from filing a petition; rather, he was given an up-to-date

form and was given the opportunity to fill it out, affix an

original signature, and file it. Plaintiff simply declined to use

the form. 

F. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had reckless or callous

disregard for and/or indifference to Plaintiff’s federally

protected rights; further, he alleges that their conduct was

“possibly produced by evil motive to intentionally defy U.S.

law,” and he seeks punitive damages for willfully harmful denials

of access by all three defendants. (Cmplt. p. 18.) Plaintiff

further alleges that the rejection of his habeas petition for use

of the wrong form and for no signature indicated retaliation and

was pretextual because, according to a federal case and federal

court rules, none is required. (Cmplt. p. 9.) Plaintiff does not

state the reason for the retaliation. 

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First

Amendment rights to speech or to petition the government may

support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d

1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th

Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and

that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First

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Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, it is the superior court policies

and not prison action of which Plaintiff complains. Nevertheless,

Plaintiff has not alleged that the action taken was because of

any specified conduct of Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff has not

alleged a chilling of his First Amendment rights. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff will be permitted to amend his

complaint to allege facts concerning a retaliation claim.

G. Discrimination

Plaintiff also appears to allege that he was treated in a

discriminatory manner (Cmplt. pp. 13-14), although he does not

indicate the nature of any class involved or any prohibited basis

for discrimination. He also adverts to § 1981.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination by

private actors. Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.

1989). The defendants in this case are state actors. A claim of

racial discrimination advanced by plaintiff in this action must

be brought pursuant section 1983 rather than section 1981.

Plaintiff will have an opportunity to amend his complaint to

state facts concerning discrimination.

III. Amendment of the Complaint

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the

complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable claim against the defendants and has failed to plead

facts demonstrating jurisdiction in this Court. However, it is

possible that Plaintiff can allege a set of facts, consistent

with the allegations, in support of the claim or claims that

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would entitle him to relief. Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff

an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies of

this complaint. Failure to cure the deficiencies will result in

dismissal of this action without leave to amend.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules

adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree

of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that

support Plaintiff's claim. Id. 

In addition, Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot

refer to a prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended

complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay,

375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once Plaintiff files an amended

complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must

be sufficiently alleged.

IV. Disposition

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted; and

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing

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fee of $350.00 for this action; all fees shall be collected and

paid in accordance with this Court’s order to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections filed concurrently herewith;

and

3. Plaintiff's complaint IS DISMISSED with leave to

amend; and

4. Plaintiff IS GRANTED thirty days from the date of

service of this order to file an amended complaint that complies

with the requirements of the pertinent substantive law, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of

Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number

assigned this case and must be labeled "First Amended Complaint"; 

failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this

order will be considered to be a failure to comply with an order

of the Court pursuant to Local Rule 11-110 and will result in

dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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