Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02623/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02623-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv2623

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAUNCY BOWEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

G.J. JANDA, et al.,

Defendants.

 

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 09-CV-2623-JLS (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING DEFENDANT 

G. JANDA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [Doc.

No. 18] AND DISMISSAL OF

REMAINING DEFENDANTS 

On November 18, 2009, Plaintiff Shauncy Bowen (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials violated his civil rights by assaulting him. 

(Doc. No. 1.) On April 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

naming an additional defendant. (Doc. No. 7.) On January 10, 2011, the Honorable

Janis L. Sammartino dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(m) due to Plaintiff’s failure to effectuate service in a timely manner. (Doc. No. 12.) 

On April 11, 2011, Judge Sammartino granted Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the order

dismissing the case, and directed the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s FAC

and forward to Plaintiff a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each defendant. (Doc. No.

14.) A summons was returned unexecuted as to Defendant Sanchez on May 24, 2011. 

(Doc. No. 16.) Plaintiff obtained a waiver of service executed on May 31, 2011 from

Case 3:09-cv-02623-JLS-JMA Document 19 Filed 08/26/11 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 09cv2623

Defendant G. Janda. (Doc. No. 17.) On June 27, 2011, Defendant Janda filed a motion

to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 18.) Plaintiff did not

file an opposition.

For the following reasons, the Court recommends that Defendant Janda’s motion

to dismiss be GRANTED and that the Court DISMISS the remaining unserved

defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

I. Background

The FAC alleges that on January 6, 2009, Plaintiff, while incarcerated at

Calipatria State Prison, was assaulted by Defendant Sanchez, a correctional officer,

while being escorted to the program office. (FAC at 1, 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Sanchez

struck him in the back of the head with his fist. (Id. at 3.) Two other officers, including a

Sergeant Silva, witnessed the incident and ran over. (Id.) Silva told Plaintiff to calm

down, and asked Plaintiff whether he wanted to press charges. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that

he did. (Id.) Sanchez then continued the escort to the program office, where a video

and written statement were taken. (Id.) 

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Legal Standard 

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal

theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” 

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). “While a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citations omitted). A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid

of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----,129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to

Case 3:09-cv-02623-JLS-JMA Document 19 Filed 08/26/11 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 09cv2623

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 C.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). 

Every complaint must, at a minimum, plead “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Weber v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061,

1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at

1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Facts which are alleged in the complaint are

presumed true, and the court must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences

from them in favor of the plaintiff. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988

(9th Cir. 2001). Factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Thus, where a plaintiff appears

pro se in a civil rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839

F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, and in spite of the deference the court is

bound to pay to any factual allegations made, it is not proper for the court to assume

that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated

General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459

U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

B. Discussion

Defendant Janda moves to dismiss the FAC on the basis that the FAC fails to

state a claim against him. Janda correctly asserts that the FAC contains no factual

allegations against him other than to identify him as the assistant warden and to allege

that he engaged in “cruel and unusual punishment.” Mot. to Dismiss at 1-2. A

conclusory allegation that a defendant engaged in cruel and unusual punishment

without any factual support is insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Plaintiff has plead no facts from which the Court could find

Case 3:09-cv-02623-JLS-JMA Document 19 Filed 08/26/11 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

A summons was returned unexecuted as to Defendant Sanchez on May 24, 2011. 

(Doc. No. 16.)

4 09cv2623

that he has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Janda. Furthermore, Plaintiff

cannot state a claim against Janda based on supervisory liability. Under Ninth Circuit

authority, 

Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal

participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only liable for the

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in

or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under section

1983.

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The FAC is

devoid of any factual allegations that Janda directed, participated in, or had any

knowledge of the alleged misconduct. Plaintiff’s naming of Janda as a defendant solely

on the basis that Janda is an assistant warden does not sufficiently state any claim

against him. 

 The Court accordingly recommends that Defendant Janda’s motion to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) be GRANTED without prejudice. 

III. Dismissal of Remaining Defendants Per Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)

Two defendants remain unserved in this action, Defendants Sanchez and John

Doe. As set forth above, Judge Sammartino dismissed this action without prejudice on

January 10, 2011 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) due to Plaintiff’s failure to effectuate

service in a timely manner. (Doc. No. 12.) On April 11, 2011, Judge Sammartino

granted Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the order dismissing the case, and directed the

Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s FAC and forward to Plaintiff a blank U.S.

Marshal Form 285 for each defendant. (Doc. No. 14.) 

Over four months have passed since the issuance of Judge Sammartino’s order

directing service, and proofs of service have still not been filed as to either Defendant

Sanchez or Defendant John Doe.1

 Plaintiff has failed to effectuate service on these

defendants in a timely manner and has failed to establish good cause for not having

Case 3:09-cv-02623-JLS-JMA Document 19 Filed 08/26/11 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 09cv2623

done so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (requiring that defendants be served within 120 days

of the filing of the complaint). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) requires their

dismissal. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants Sanchez and John Doe

be DISMISSED from this action. 

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned magistrate

judge recommends that Defendant Janda’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6) be GRANTED without prejudice and that the Court DISMISS Defendants

Sanchez and John Doe pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Janis L.

Sammartino, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later than September 23,

2011, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed not later than October 3, 2011. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: August 26, 2011

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:09-cv-02623-JLS-JMA Document 19 Filed 08/26/11 Page 5 of 5