Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05231/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05231-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO ROSAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

TOWN OF WINDSOR, et al.

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-05231 SI

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OnOctober 18, 2005, the Court heard argument on defendants’ motion forsummaryjudgment.Having

carefully considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, and for the reasons set forth below,

the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s FEHA termination

claim, plaintiff’s FEHA and Title VII harassment claims, and plaintiff’s claim of failure to prevent harassment.

The Court DENIES defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII termination claim.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Antonio Rosas brings this employment action alleging that defendants terminated his

employment as Maintenance Supervisor for the Town of Windsor because of his race. Mr. Rosas was hired

by the Town as a maintenance worker in 1990 and in 1997 he was promoted to Maintenance Supervisor.

Rosas Decl. ¶ 4. He held this position until his termination on May 29, 2003. Berlant Decl. ¶ 9. 

In April 2003, the Town received a complaint froma member ofplaintiff’s crew that another employee

had repeatedly made comments of a sexual nature at work in the presence of plaintiff, and that plaintiff failed

to take adequate action to stop the offensive comments. Berlant Decl. ¶ 4. The crewmember’s complaint also

charged that plaintiff himself had made sexually offensive comments in the workplace. Andres Decl., Exh. B
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atWIN-001487. The Town hired an independent investigatorto investigate the charges. Berlant Decl. ¶ 5. The

investigator found that the other employee violated the Town of Windsor’s General Rules of Conduct and

Harassment Policy. Berlant Decl., Exh. C at WIN-001912. The investigation also found that plaintiff made

inappropriate statements of a sexual nature while at work. Id. at WIN-001913. 

On May 21, 2003, Don Monk, the Town of Windsor’s Public Works Director, issued to the plaintiff

a Notice ofIntent to Render Disciplinary Action for violation of Town policies. Berlant Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff did

not pursue pre-disciplinary hearings available to him. Berlant Decl. ¶ 9. On May 29, 2003, Paul Berlant, then

Town Manager, terminated plaintiff based on the following five violations of the Town’s General Rules of

Conduct(Article 26.3.2):(1) violation of the Town’s Nondiscrimination Policy; (2) offensive treatment of the

public or other employees; (3) furnishing knowingly false informationin the course ofthe employee’s duties and

responsibilities; (4) inefficiency, incompetence, carelessness or negligence inthe performance ofduties; and (5)

inattention to duty. Rosas Decl., Exh. A.

Plaintiff appealed the terminationpursuant to Town disciplinary policy. Berlant Decl. ¶ 10. The appeal

hearing was conducted by independent Hearing Officer Karen Andres. Andres Decl. ¶ 2. On February 11,

2004, Ms. Andres issued a written decisionfindingthatplaintiff’sfailureto discipline the offensive crew member

violated the Town’s NondiscriminationPolicy. Id. at WIN-001483. Ms. Andres also found that plaintiff made

inappropriate sex-oriented comments in a work context and that such behavior violated Town rules. Id. at

WIN-001486. However, Ms. Andres concluded that defendants did notsustain the remaining charges against

plaintiff (dishonesty during an investigation; inattention to duty; and inefficiency in the performance of duties).

Id. at WIN-001494. Ms. Andres recommended demoting plaintiff to the level of non-supervisory employee.

Id. at WIN-001495. 

Under the Town’s policy, the ultimate determination of employment remained with the Town Manager.

Berlant Decl.,Exh. A at WIN-001164. In a March 1, 2004, letter titled “FinalDecisionRegarding Termination

of Employment,” Mr. Berlant adopted Ms. Andres’ findings of fact and her conclusions that plaintiff had

violatedthe Town’s NondiscriminationPolicy by failing to report and effectively stop the inappropriate conduct

of another employee, and by making inappropriate comments of a sexualnature at work. Mr. Berlant declined

to adopt Ms. Andres’ recommendation regarding demotion, and instead, Mr. Berlant terminated plaintiff.
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 Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds that plaintiff failed to allege age discrimination in his Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission charge. Plaintiff conceded. The Court dismissed plaintiff’s ADEA amd

FEHA claims of harassment and discrimination due to age.

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Berlant Decl., Exh. E. According to the Town’s policy, “[t]he Town Manager’s decision is reviewable by

administrative writ of mandamus.” Berlant Decl., Exh. A at WIN-001164. Plaintiff did not seek review ofhis

termination through administrative writ of mandamus. Berlant Decl. at ¶ 16. 

On December 8, 2004, plaintiff filed this action alleging race and age discrimination. In an order filed

on May 20, 2005, the Court dismissed four ofplaintiff’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, leaving

only the claims forrace discriminationand harassment before the Court.1 Now before the Court is defendants’

motion forsummary judgment, or in the alternative, partialsummary judgment onthe following causes of action:

(1) plaintiff’s FEHA discrimination claim; (2) plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim; (3) plaintiff’s claim of

harassment under FEHA and Title VII; and (4) plaintiff’s claim offailure to prevent harassment under FEHA

and Title VII.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary judgment

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw.”Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In a motion for summary judgment, “[if] the moving party forsummary judgment meets itsinitialburden

of identifying for the court those portions ofthe materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any

genuine issue ofmaterialfact,” the burden ofproductionthen shiftsso that “the non-moving party mustsetforth,

by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing there is a genuine issue fortrial.’”T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

In judging evidence at the summaryjudgmentstage, the Court does notmake credibility determinations

or weigh conflicting evidence, and draws all inferences in the lightmost favorable to the nonmoving party. See

T.W. Electric, 809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
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U.S. 574 (1986)). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact

and defeat summary judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49 (2d

Cir. 1985); Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Hearsay

statements found in affidavits are inadmissible. See, e.g., Fong v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759, 762-63

(9th Cir. 1980).

B. Racial discrimination in employment

The analysis for claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (“Title

VII”) and the State ofCalifornia’s Fair Employment and Housing Act(“FEHA”), Government Code § 12900,

et seq., is the same. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1994). The burdenshifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973),

governs plaintiff’s claims of discrimination under Title VII and FEHA. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie

case of discrimination, the employer must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

employment decision. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000);

Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1995); Smith v.Barton, 914 F.2d 1330,

1340 (9th Cir. 1990). If the employer meets this burden the plaintiff may produce either direct evidence of

discriminatory motive, which need not be substantial, or circumstantial evidence that is “specific, substantial

evidence of pretext.” See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, 150 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DISCUSSION

I. Claims concerning discriminatory termination

A. Plaintiff has established a prima facie case

To demonstrate a prima facie case of employment discrimination, plaintiff must show that (1) he was

a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently

in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial
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2 The fourth factor of the McDonnell Douglas test is flexible: “The facts necessarily will vary in Title

VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily

applicable in every respect to differingfactualsituations.”McDonnellDouglasCorp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802 n.13 (1973). 

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of anavailable job, and (4)some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.2 See Guz v. Bechtel Nat.

Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (2000) (citing, e.g., Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). 

The Court concludes that, although it is a close question, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of

discrimination. Plaintiff is a member of a protected class because he is Hispanic and his parents were born in

Mexico. Until his termination, plaintiffreceived positive job reviews. Rosas Decl. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff’s termination

was an adverse employment action. Plaintiff’s supervisor, Mike Carson, who is not in plaintiff’s protected

class, also failed to inform the Administrative Services Director of the complaint, thus violating the Town’s

NondiscriminationPolicy, but he received only a letter ofreprimand. Terrerri Decl., Exh. E. Plaintiff also states

that another employee, who is Caucasian, regularly engaged in the use of foul and vulgar language in the

workplace, and that this employee was not disciplined or terminated. Rosas Decl. at ¶ 8. Based on this

evidence, the Court concludes that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination.

B. Plaintiff’s FEHA claim for discriminatory termination 

Once a plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to show a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, 150 F.3d

1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendants contend that plaintiff’s violation of the Town’s Nondiscrimination

Policy, as established during the administrative hearing, is the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

terminating plaintiff’s employment. 

Plaintiff asserts that this asserted reason is pretext. As to the FEHA termination claim, however,

defendants assert plaintiffis precluded fromchallenging the legitimacyofthe groundsforhisterminationbecause

he did not exhaust his judicial remedies by seeking review of the Town’s decision through administrative

mandamus. Defendants contend that as a result of plaintiff’s failure to seek administrative mandamus review,

the Town’s final decision as set forth in Mr. Berlant’s March 1, 2004 letter is binding in this action. 
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The California Supreme Court held in Johnson v. City of Lama Linda that unless a party to a quasijudicial administrative agency proceeding challenges the adverse findings made in that proceeding by means

of a mandate action in Superior Court, those findings are binding in a later civil action under FEHA. Johnson

v. City of Lama Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 69 (2000) (citing Westlake Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17

Cal.3d 465 (1976); see also Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 1094.5(b)). Consequently, when “a public employee

pursues administrative civilservice remedies, receives an adverse finding, and fails to have the finding set aside

through judicial review procedures, the adverse finding is binding on discrimination claims under the FEHA.”

Johnson, 24 Cal. 4th at 76.

PlaintiffcontendsthatJohnsondoes not apply because the administrative hearing was not a proceeding

by a quasi-judicialagency and there were no proceduralprotections in place for plaintiff. Plaintiff notes that this

was the Town’s first hearing, and the hearing officer commented that it would be conducted in an informal

manner. Terrerri Decl., Exh. F. Plaintiff further states thatthe hearing officer’s opinionwas merely advisory to

Town Manager Paul Berlant, who was involved in the originaldecision to terminate plaintiff, and thus could not

have been impartial in his ultimate decision to terminate plaintiff.

The Court notes as an initialmatterthatCalifornia CivilProcedureCode § 1094.5 specifically provides

that a party challenging an administrative agency’s decision may challenge such a decision on procedural due

process grounds. Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 1094.5(b) (“The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions

whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess ofjurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and

whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.”). In any event, the Court concludes that the

administrative hearingsatisfiedthe requirements ofproceduraldue process. The administrative hearingoccurred

before an impartial decision maker, Karen Andres; plaintiff was represented by his current counsel at the

proceedings; the testimony ofwitnesses was submitted under oath; the hearings occurred over five dates from

August through November; and there was a court reporter and a record. TerrerriDecl. Exh. F. Karen Andres

provided a written report of her findings and PaulBerlant also provided a written statement of the reasons for

the determination made. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (describing

minimum requisite protections of procedural due process: written notice of grounds for the disciplinary

measures; disclosures of the evidence supporting the disciplinary grounds; the right to present witnesses and
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to confront adverse witnesses; the right to be represented by counsel; a fair and impartial decision maker; and

a written statement from the fact finder listing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the determination

made).

The Court concludes that plaintiff failed to exhaust his judicial remedies by not petitioning for writ of

administrative mandamus, thus giving binding effect to the finding that he was terminated for his violationofthe

Town’s NondiscriminationPolicy. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on plaintiff’s FEHA discrimination claim. See Johnson, 24 Cal. 4th 61 (2000).

C. Plaintiff’s Title VII claim for discriminatory termination

1. Collateral estoppel

Relying onCastillo v. City of Los Angeles, 92 Cal. App. 4th 477, 482 (2001), defendants argue that

under the doctrine of collateralestoppel, plaintiffis also precluded fromrelitigating the issue ofthe wrongfulness

ofhis terminationunder Title VII because the Town’s unreviewed administrative findings conclusively establish

it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff.

Plaintiff responds that this California authority addressed only a FEHA claim, not a Title VII claim.

Plaintiff points instead to McInnes v. State of California, 943 F.2d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1991), which held

that in a Title VII action a prior state decision enjoys issue preclusive effect only if rendered or reviewed by a

court. Here, the findings of the administrative hearing officer were never reviewed by a court, thus the Court

finds plaintiff is not precluded from challenging the reason for his termination. 

Although not preclusive, this Court does find that the administrative determination that plaintiff violated

the Town’s Nondiscrimination Policy would constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s

discharge. Under the burden-shifting pattern of McDonnell Douglas, this returns the evidentiary burden to

plaintiff to raise a genuine factual question whether the proffered reasons are pretextual. See Raad v. N. Star

Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2003). 

2. Pretext

Plaintiff asserts that the comment of Assistant Town Manager Matt Mullan that plaintiff “looked like
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a crooked Tijuana cop” is direct evidence of discriminatory intent. When the plaintiff offers direct evidence of

discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the actualmotivationofthe employer is created even if the evidence

is not substantial. Little direct evidence is needed to establish a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the

employer. See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 ( 9th Cir. 1998), Lindahl v. Air France,

930 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1991) (direct evidence of sexual stereotyping where employer believed that

the female candidates get “nervous” and “easily upset”), Cordova v. State Farms, 124 F.3d, 1145, 1150

(direct evidence of race discrimination where employer referred to Mexican-American employee as a “dumb

Mexican.”).

The Court findsthat plaintiff has provided enough direct evidence of discriminatory animus to support

his claim that the provided reason for his termination is pretextual. Plaintiff has submitted evidence that Matt

Mullan was involved in the original decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment, and this has raised a triable

issue of fact as to defendants’ motivation in terminating plaintiff. Terrerri Decl., Exh. B at 644-45. Therefore,

the Court DENIES defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII termination claim.

II. Hostile work environment

Plaintiff alleges he suffered racial harassment under both FEHA, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(j)(1), and

under Title VII. Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim due to plaintiff’s failure

to demonstrate the objective hostility of his work environment.

Plaintiff’s FEHA claim will be evaluated under federal law because FEHA and Title VII operate under

the same guiding principles. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). To survive

summary judgment, plaintiff must show the existence of a genuine factual dispute as to whether a reasonable

Hispanic man would find the workplace so objectively and subjectively racially hostile as to create an abusive

working environment. See McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004). 

To evaluate the hostility of a work environment, the totality ofthe following factors are considered: the

frequency ofdiscriminatory conduct; itsseverity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating; and whether

it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 788 (1998), McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1113 (9th Cir. 2004). The harassment must be sufficiently
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severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment. See McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1113 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57

(1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue ofa hostile

work environment because in his deposition plaintiff agreed that none of the comments or incidents he now

complains about interfered with his ability to do his job. Moran Decl. Exh. B at 250-251:18-2; 252:4-6;

253:11-16;259:10-15.

The Court concludes that plaintiff’s evidence of a hostile work environment is not sufficient to survive

summary judgment. The standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure thatTitle VII does

not become a “general civility code.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Conduct must be sufficiently extreme to

amount to a change in terms and conditions of the employment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Plaintiff relies on

the following incidentsto establish his hostile work environment claim:(1) in 1990, a coworker told plaintiffthat

he was the “token Mexican”; (2) in 1992, the Mayor did notshake plaintiff’s hand when plaintiff delivered his

furniture; (3) in 1993, a coworker told plaintiff to “go speak her lingo” to a Mexican woman because the

coworker did notspeak “thatSpanish bullshit”; (4) in 1998 or 1999, plaintiff was instructed not to wear dark

glasses inside the building because he looked like a “corrupt Tijuana cop”; and (5) in 1998, plaintiff overheard

Matt Mullan refer to Hispanics by saying: “You know how those people are.” 

Teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to

discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions ofemployment.See Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). Plaintiff here points to

five offensive comments and incidents over a thirteen year period. While not admirable, given their nature and

frequency the described incidents do not satisfy the standards established for objective hostility of a work

environment. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim

of racial harassment.

III. Failure to prevent harassment under FEHA and Title VII

Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action is for defendants’ failure to take appropriate corrective action to

stop the harassment against plaintiffin violationofCal. Gov. Code § 12940(k) (formerly 12940(i)). However,
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in order to prevail on this claim the “necessary foundational requirements of harassment” must be established.

Trujillo v. NorthCo. Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 284 (1998). Thus, because plaintifffailed to prove

the “essential foundational predicate of harassment,” plaintiff cannot support a finding of violation of §

12940(k).

Therefore,the Court GRANTS defendants’motion forsummary judgment on plaintiff’s claim offailure

to prevent harassment.

IV. Evidentiary objections

Defendants have filed evidentiary objections to paragraphs 13 and 14 and portions of paragraphs 5,

6, 7, 9 and 12 ofthe Declaration of John Johnson. In a motion forsummary judgment only admissible evidence

may be considered by the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “When a motion for summary judgment is made and

supported, . . . the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or otherwise. . ., mustsetforth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). John Johnson was the Town ofWindsor’s Public

Works Directorfrom1992 through2001. Duringthattime,Mr. Johnson directly supervised Mike Carson, who

was Antonio Rosas’ supervisor. Johnson Decl. ¶ 2.

Paragraph 5: Defendants object to paragraph 5, lines 8 - 9, “When I spoke to Antonio Rosas

regarding Mr. Mullan’s comments, Mr. Rosas was offended and upset.” The Court DENIES the objection.

Paragraph 6: Defendants object to paragraph 6, lines 16 - 17, “Mr. Mullan seemed to have a general

distrust ofMr. Rosas whichwas not based on any facts.” The Court SUSTAINS the objection on the grounds

that the statement is conclusory and inappropriately opinion testimony.

Paragraph 7: Defendants object to paragraph 7, lines 18 - 20, “Mr. Mullan criticized each promotion

givento Mr. Rosas and felt that each promotionwas a mistake and that he did not think thatMr. Rosas should

be promoted.” The Court SUSTAINS the objection on the grounds that the statements lack foundation, is

conclusory, and inappropriately opiniontestimony. Defendants object to paragraph 7, lines 20-21, “Comments

made by Mr. Mullan caused me to believe that he felt that Mr. Rosas was a dirty Mexican and not fit to be a

supervisor on his team.” The Court SUSTAINS the objection on the grounds that the statement lacks

foundation, is conclusory, and inappropriately opinion testimony.
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Paragraph 9: Defendants object to paragraph 9, lines 7 - 9, “I believe that the discipline he received

as a result of that incident was in excess of what was appropriate givenhis level of participation in the event,”

on the grounds that the plaintiff cannot create a triable issue of fact by offering a third party witness declaration

which is contradicted by that witness’ prior testimony, and that such testimony lacks foundation. Bank of Ill.

v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys, 75 F.3d 1162, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996). The Court SUSTAINS the

objections to this statement on the grounds it is inadmissible lay opinion testimony and lacks foundation.

Paragraph 12: Defendants object to paragraph 12, lines 27 - 2, “Although Mr. Mullan did not

participate in the investigation, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the results ofthat investigation.”The Court

SUSTAINS the objection on the grounds that the statement lacks foundation.

Paragraph 13: Defendants object to paragraphs 13, lines 3 - 8, “After Antonio Rosas’ termination was

final and while I remained employed by the Town of Windsor, I met with Mr. Rosas and discussed issues

relating to his employment and shared with him my opinion that he was terminated as a result ofbeing Hispanic.

I also told Mr. Rosas that Mr. Mullan appeared to have wanted him terminated for several years prior to the

complaint by Mary Coburn in April and May of 2003 which resulted in Mr. Rosas’ termination.” The Court

DENIES the objection to paragraph 13. 

Paragraph 14: The defendants object to paragraph 14, lines 9 - 11, “I believe that the investigation

and allegations which led to Mr. Rosas’ termination, and the findings by the Town management were merely

a pretext to terminate Mr. Rosas.” The Court SUSTAINS the objection to paragraph 14 on the grounds that

the statement is improper lay opinion testimony, speculation, lack foundation and improper conclusion. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion

forsummaryjudgmenton plaintiff’s FEHA terminationclaim, plaintiff’s FEHA and Title VII harassment claims,

and plaintiff’sfailure to prevent harassment claim. The Court herebyDENIES defendants’ motion forsummary

judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII termination claim. [Docket No. 25]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 2,2005

______________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge