Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_15-cv-00394/USCOURTS-ared-4_15-cv-00394-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

TINA EARNEST PLAINTIFF

v. No. 4:15–CV–394‐BRW‐BD

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner,

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

Recommended Disposition

Instructions

The following recommended disposition was prepared for Judge Billy Roy

Wilson.  Either party to this dispute may file written objections to this recommendation.

Objections must be specific and state the factual and/or legal basis for the objection.  An

objection to a factual finding must identify the finding and the evidence supporting the

objection.  Objections must be filed with the clerk of the court no later than 14 days from

the date of this recommendation.1

  The objecting party must serve the opposing party

with a copy of an objection.  Failing to object within 14 days waives the right to appeal

questions of fact.2  If no objections are filed, Judge Wilson may adopt the recommended

disposition without independently reviewing all of the record evidence.

1

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

2

Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure to file objections

waives right to de novo review and to appeal magistrate judge’s findings of fact).

Case 4:15-cv-00394-BRW Document 11 Filed 01/19/16 Page 1 of 8
Reasoning for Recommended Disposition

Tina Earnest seeks judicial review of the denial of her application for disability

insurance benefits.3  In the past, Ms. Earnest worked as a certified nursing assistant

(CNA) for a hospital.4

  She stopped working after she was diagnosed with breast cancer.

She claims she has been disabled since the diagnosis.  She based disability on breast

cancer, high blood pressure, back pain, knee pain, respiratory issues, and fatigue.5

The Commissioner’s decision.  After considering the application, the

Commissioner’s ALJ identified severe impairments: history of stage II breast cancer

(without recurrence), morbid obesity, mild to moderate osteoarthritis in the left knee,

and mild to moderate generalized joint pain.6

  The ALJ determined Ms. Earnest could

do some light work.7  Because a vocational expert identified available light work, the

ALJ determined Ms. Earnest was not disabled and denied the application.8

3

SSA record at p. 146 (applying on Apr. 2, 2014 and alleging disability beginning

Apr. 5, 2013).

4

Id. at pp. 180 & 229.

5

Id. at p. 188.

6

Id. at p. 21.  The decision reflects a typographical error — Stage III rather than

Stage II.

7

Id. at p. 22.

8

Id. at pp. 30‐31.

2

Case 4:15-cv-00394-BRW Document 11 Filed 01/19/16 Page 2 of 8
After the Commissioner’s Appeals Council denied a request for review,9 the

decision became a final decision for judicial review.10  Ms. Earnest filed this case to

challenge the decision.11  In reviewing the decision, the court must determine whether

substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the ALJ made a legal error.12

This recommendation explains why the court should affirm the decision.

Ms. Earnest’s allegations.  Ms. Earnest contends that the ALJ should have

credited a primary‐care‐provider (PCP) medical statement.  She argues that the Appeals

Council did not properly consider new evidence.  For these reasons, she maintains,

substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision.

Applicable legal principles.  For substantial evidence to support the decision, a

reasonable mind must accept the evidence as adequate to show Ms. Earnest could do

9

Id. at p. 1.

10See Anderson v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating, “the Social

Security Act precludes general federal subject matter jurisdiction until administrative

remedies have been exhausted” and explaining that the Commissioner’s appeal

procedure permits claimants to appeal only final decisions).

11Docket entry # 1.

12See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring the district court to determine whether the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the

Commissioner conformed with applicable regulations); Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187

(8th Cir. 1997) (“We will uphold the Commissioner’s decision to deny an applicant

disability benefits if the decision is not based on legal error and if there is substantial

evidence in the record as a whole to support the conclusion that the claimant was not

disabled.”).

3

Case 4:15-cv-00394-BRW Document 11 Filed 01/19/16 Page 3 of 8
some light work.  “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.”13  The ALJ limited

stooping and bending, and excluded crouching.  For the following reasons, a reasonable

mind would accept the evidence as adequate to show Ms. Earnest could work with

these limitations:

1.  Medical evidence establishes no disabling symptoms.  A claimant

must prove disability with medical evidence; her allegations are not

enough to prove she is disabled.14  The medical evidence shows that

Ms. Earnest was diagnosed with Stage II breast cancer.15  A few weeks

1320 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

1442 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(5)(A) (“An individual’s statement as to pain or other

symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability...; there must be medical

signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic

techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment...which could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and

which...would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under a disability”); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1508 (“A physical or mental impairment must be established by medical evidence

consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by your statement of

symptoms.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (“[S]tatements about your pain or other symptoms

will not alone establish that you are disabled; there must be medical signs and

laboratory findings which show that you have a medical impairment(s) which could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which,

when considered with all of the other evidence (including statements about the

intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be

accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings), would lead to a

conclusion that you are disabled.”).

15SSA record at pp. 247‐70 (diagnostic testing showing cancer in right breast).  In

stage II, “The cancer is no larger than 2 cm but has spread to the lymph nodes or is

larger than 2 cm but has not spread to the lymph nodes.” Richard A. McCartney & Tish

Davidson, Breast Cancer, 1 The Gale Encyclopedia of Med. 742, 747 (4th ed.).

4

Case 4:15-cv-00394-BRW Document 11 Filed 01/19/16 Page 4 of 8
later, she underwent a double mastectomy.  The left breast was benign.16

After surgery, Ms. Earnest began chemotherapy.  Six months later, she

was cancer free,17 but complained about chemotherapy side effects and

menopause symptoms.  After chemotherapy, Ms. Earnest’s surgeon

removed a mass that formed in the right chest wall.18  Ms. Earnest

remained cancer free.19

Ms. Earnest complained about joint pain — especially, the left knee.20  A

rheumatologist ruled out connective tissue disease and attributed

symptoms to chemotherapy.21  Ms. Earnest’s PCP encouraged diet

management and exercise.22  Medical experts who reviewed the medical

evidence limited Ms. Earnest to light work.23  A reasonable mind would

accept the evidence as adequate to support the decision because the ALJ

required light work limited to functions that would not aggravate joint

pain.

2.  The ALJ properly discounted the PCP medical statement.  Ms. Earnest

contends that the ALJ should have credited her PCP’s report of disabling

symptoms,24 but the ALJ properly observed that the statement is internally

inconsistent and inconsistent with medical evidence as a whole.  “An ALJ

may discount or even disregard the opinion of a treating physician where

other medical assessments are supported by better or more thorough

16SSA record at p. 359.

17Id. at p. 361 (per oncologist, no evidence of reoccurrence).

18Id. at p. 393.

19Id. at p. 462 (no evidence of malignancy in mass removed from right chest wall).

20Id. at p. 491.

21Id. at p. 516.

22Id. at pp. 493, 499 & 527.

23Id. at pp. 73 & 84.

24Id. at pp. 509‐12.

5

Case 4:15-cv-00394-BRW Document 11 Filed 01/19/16 Page 5 of 8
medical evidence, or where a treating physician renders inconsistent

opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions.”25

The reported limitations are inconsistent with PCP treatment notes.  The

contemporaneous treatment note documents no negative medical findings

and encourages physical exercise.26  An earlier treatment note documents

tenderness in the spine, left shoulder, and knees, but nothing supporting

reported limitations.27  Repeated recommendations for physical exercise

contradict reported limitations.28

3.  The Appeals Council properly considered new evidence.  Ms. Earnest

complains about the consideration of new evidence, but the Appeals

Council properly determined that most of it falls outside the time period

for which benefits were denied.  “[T]o support a remand, new evidence

must be ‘relevant, and probative of the claimantʹs condition for the time

period for which benefits were denied.’”29 Only one piece of new evidence

falls within the time period for which benefits were denied — a PCP

treatment note.30  The note documents a complaint of a rash and a referral

to a dermatologist.

The remainder — attached to Ms. Earnest’s brief — was generated after

the ALJ’s decision.  The remainder shows that Ms. Earnest underwent

breast reconstruction surgery, experienced complication in the form of an

infection, had breast implants removed, was diagnosed with degenerative

changes in the knees, and received knee injections for pain control.  That

25Perkins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892, 897‐98 (8th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

26SSA record at pp. 491‐95.

27Id. at p. 498.

28Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[A] physicianʹs unrestricted

recommendations to increase physical exercise are inconsistent with a claim of physical

limitations.”).

29Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

30SSA record at p. 525.

6

Case 4:15-cv-00394-BRW Document 11 Filed 01/19/16 Page 6 of 8
evidence is not relevant to the claim because it documents a subsequent

deterioration of a previously non‐disabling condition and a later‐acquired

problem.31

4.  Vocational evidence supports the decision.  After determining that

Ms. Earnest could do some light work, the ALJ consulted a vocational

expert.  When asked about past work, the vocational expert stated that

Ms. Earnest could no longer work as a CNA, because that job is medium

work.32  Upon further questioning, the vocational expert identified

transferrable skills and representative available work: light jobs such as a

membership solicitor and sedentary jobs such as an information clerk.

The availability of these jobs shows that work exists that Ms. Earnest

could do, regardless of whether such work exists where she lives, whether

a job vacancy exists, or whether she would be hired if she applied for

work.33

Conclusion and Recommended Disposition

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision because a reasonable mind

would accept the evidence as adequate to support the decision.  To the extent Ms.

Earnest relies on her work record, work history is but one factor in evaluating a

credibility.  The ALJ properly considered all factors and all evidence.  The ALJ made no

legal error.  For these reasons, the undersigned magistrate judge recommends

DENYING Ms. Earnest’s request for relief (docket entry # 1) and AFFIRMING the

31Jones v. Callahan,  122 F.3d 1148, 1154 (8th Cir. 1997) (“An implicit requirement is

that the new evidence pertain to the time period for which benefits are sought, and that it

not concern later‐acquired disabilities or subsequent deterioration of a previously

non‐disabling condition.”).

32SSA record at pp. 59‐61.

3342 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

7

Case 4:15-cv-00394-BRW Document 11 Filed 01/19/16 Page 7 of 8
Commissioner’s decision.

Dated this 19th day of January, 2016.

____________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8

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