Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02765/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02765-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties have expressly

consented that this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated by the undersigned.

*E-filed on 12/4/07*

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

YING HE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALBERTO GONZALES, United States

Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice;

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security; EMILIO T.

GONZALEZ, Director of United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services;

CHRISTINA POULOS, Director of the

California Service Center, United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services;

DAVID STILL, San Francisco District Director,

United States Citizenship and Immigration

Services; ROBERT S. MUELLER III, Director

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Defendants. /

No. C07-02765 HRL

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND (2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Docket Nos. 12, 13

This matter is before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment,

deemed submitted without oral argument.1

 Upon consideration of the moving and responding

papers, the court grants in part and denies in part both motions.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not materially disputed:

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Plaintiff Ying He, a Chinese citizen, sues to compel the processing of her employmentbased I-485 application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. 

On May 9, 2005, plaintiff filed her I-485 application at the California Service Center of

the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The name check request was

submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on May 18, 2005. (Heinauer Decl., ¶

18). The FBI received those requests on or about May 26, 2005. (Cannon Decl., ¶ 41). On

March 14, 2007, the application was transferred to the Nebraska Service Center, where it

remains pending. (Heinauer Decl., ¶ 3). Plaintiff's application for adjustment of status is ready

to be adjudicated except for her pending background and security check. (Heinauer Decl., ¶ 9). 

A name check is one of several forms of security and background checks that must be

completed when an alien applies for adjustment of status. (See Heinauer Decl., ¶ 11). 

According to Michael Cannon, Section Chief of the National Name Check Program Section at

the FBI’s headquarters, a name check proceeds in four stages: batch processing, name

searching, file review and dissemination. (Cannon Decl., ¶¶ 11-17). Historically, during the

initial stage (an electronic database search), 68 percent of the name checks submitted by USCIS

are returned within 48-72 hours with “No Record.” (Id., ¶ 13). This means “that the FBI’s

Universal Index database contains no identifiable information regarding a particular

individual.” (Id.). The remaining name checks proceed to the second processing stage; and,

typically, 22 percent of the USCIS requests are returned after this manual name search within

30-60 days as having “No Record.” (Id., ¶¶ 14-15). Thus, by the end of the second stage, 90

percent of name checks are returned with no identifiable information for a particular individual. 

(Id.). For the remaining 10 percent, FBI records must be manually retrieved and reviewed,

unless the relevant records have been electronically uploaded into the FBI’s electronic recordkeeping system. (Id.). In the end, “[l]ess than one percent of USCIS’s requests are identified

with a file containing possible derogatory information.” (Id., ¶ 17). Name check requests are

generally handled on a “first-in, first-out" basis unless the USCIS directs the FBI to expedite a

name check. (Id., ¶¶ 18-20). 

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Plaintiff claims that defendants have unreasonably delayed the adjudication of her

application, which has been now been pending for over two and a half years. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P.

56(c)); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A genuine issue of fact is

one that could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it

could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the

motion, and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

admissions, or affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to meet its burden, “the moving

party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 210 F.3d at 1102. The non-moving party may not rest upon mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead must produce admissible

evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See id.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et

seq. and the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1362. She requests that defendants be compelled to

expeditiously complete adjudication of her I-485 application, specifically asking for

adjudication within sixty days of the court's order. Defendants contend that this court lacks

jurisdiction to compel the FBI to complete plaintiff's name checks more expeditiously. 

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Alternatively, defendants argue that any delay in the processing of plaintiff's application has not

been unreasonable. Finally, defendants contend that this court does not have jurisdiction over

some of the named defendants. 

A. Mandamus and the APA

1. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Claims

Under the APA, “[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the

reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . .

..” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Additionally, “[w]ith due regard for the convenience and necessity of the

parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to

conclude a matter presented to it.” Id., § 555(b). To invoke jurisdiction under the APA,

plaintiff must show that defendants (1) had a nondiscretionary duty to act and (2) unreasonably

delayed in acting on that duty. See Gelfer v. Chertoff, C06-06724, 2007 WL 902382, *1 (N.D.

Cal., Mar. 22, 2007) (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63-65 (2004)).

Under the mandamus statute, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any

action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any

agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. This relief is

“available to compel a federal official to perform a duty if: (1) the individual’s claim is clear

and certain; (2) the official’s duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as

to be free from doubt, and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d

929, 931 (9th Cir. 1998).

Although the mandatory injunction under the APA is technically distinct from a writ of

mandamus, the relief plaintiff seeks is identical under either statute. See Independence Mining

Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, whether the court proceeds under one

or the other in the instant case is not of practical significance. See Gelfer, No. C06-06724, 2007

WL 902382 at *3. For purposes of this case, the court will proceed under the APA framework. 

Defendants challenge this court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate claims concerning the pace

at which I-485 applications are processed. However, courts in this district have repeatedly

concluded that the USCIS has a mandatory duty to process applications within a reasonable

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time and, further, that jurisdiction lies to hear an allegation that the determination of an

application has been unlawfully withheld. See, e.g., Gelfer, No. C06-06724, 2007 WL 902382

at *2; Razaq v. Poulos, No. C06-02461, 2007 WL 61884, *3 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 8, 2007); Singh v.

Still, 470 F. Supp.2d 1064, 1066-67 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Aboushan v. Mueller, No. C06-01280,

2006 WL 3041086, *2 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 24, 2006). Those rulings are now affirmed. 

Accordingly, the crux of the present dispute is whether any delay in the government’s

processing of plaintiff's application has been unreasonable.

2. Reasonableness of the Delay: The “TRAC” Factors

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a six-factor test – the so-called “TRAC” factors – to

determine when agency delay is unreasonable:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a ‘rule of reason’;

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with

which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory

scheme may supply content for this rule of reason;

(3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less

tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake;

(4) the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or

competing priority;

(5) the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and

(6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order

to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001); Telecomms. Research & Action Center

("TRAC") v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C.Cir. 1984).

a. First and Second Factors

The first factor requires an agency to use a “rule of reason” in its decision-making. The

second factor provides that where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the

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speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme

may supply content for this rule of reason.

Plaintiff suggests that the fact that her application has been pending for over two and a

half years is patently unreasonable. She argues that Congress intended applications to be

adjudicated within 180 days. See 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (“It is the sense of Congress that the

processing of an immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days

after the initial filing of the application . . ..”). That 180-day timetable may provide some

guidance here, although defendants correctly note that the “sense of Congress” expressed in the

INA does not necessarily carry the force of law. See Yang v. California Dep’t of Social Servs.,

183 F.3d 953, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendants argue that there is no statutory deadline by

which applications must be adjudicated and that, in any event, the “first-in, first-served”

protocol must be given deference. 

It is true that Congress has not established a mandatory timeframe for the USCIS to

adjudicate applications. Moreover, “[t]he passage of time alone is rarely enough to justify a

court’s intervention in the administrative process, especially since administrative efficiency is

not a subject particularly suited to judicial evaluation.” Singh v. Ilchert , 784 F. Supp. 759, 764-

65 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citations omitted). However, the court also recognizes that there is no

precise formula for determining whether there has been an unreasonable delay. Instead, "[w]hat

constitutes an unreasonable delay in the context of immigration applications depends to a great

extent on the facts of the particular case." Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp.2d 922, 934 (D.N.M. 1999).

Absent special circumstances, it seems that the vast majority of applications are

processed within six months. (See Cannon Decl., ¶¶ 13-17; Heinauer Decl., attached fact sheet

at p. 2). While defendants have submitted some evidence generally indicating that plaintiff's

application is being processed in accordance with the government's "standard procedures" and

"normal protocol," (see Cannon Decl., ¶ 41, Heinauer Decl. ¶ 27), the record before the court

indicates that plaintiff has waited her turn for two and a half years while untold numbers of

later-filed applications have been processed. According to the USCIS website, as of April 2007

(a month before the instant lawsuit was filed), the government was processing I-485

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applications received as of October 14, 2006 – i.e., those filed nearly a year and a half after

plaintiff's application. (See Complaint, Ex. 11). In the meantime, plaintiff was first

fingerprinted in October 6, 2005– and then apparently had to be re-printed in March 20, 2007

because “[t]he fingerprint check must be less than fifteen months old at the time any application

or petition is adjudicated.” (Heinauer Decl., ¶ 15).

The record before the court suggests that processing times for applications will vary

because some applications may require greater scrutiny than others. (See, e.g., Cannon Decl.,

¶¶ 14-17). Here, however, there is no evidence explaining why the FBI needed several years to

process He's name check in particular. Furthermore, in this case, the U.S. Department of Labor

has certified that there are not sufficient U.S. workers available to fill the position on which

plaintiff's application is based. (Heinauer Decl., ¶ 4). 

b. Third and Fifth Factors

The third TRAC factor provides that delays affecting human health and welfare are less

tolerable than those concerning only economic interests. The fifth factor requires the court to

consider the nature and extent of any interests prejudiced by the delay.

Here, the nature of the interests at stake are more than merely economic. There appears

to be no material dispute that plaintiff cannot work or travel without restriction. Plaintiff also

alleges that the delay in the processing of her I-485 application has been a setback to her

ultimate goal of becoming a United States citizen. (Plaintiff's Mot. at 8). However, this court

cannot assume that the government’s decision on the pending application will be favorable to

plaintiff. If the application is denied, the interest that will have been affected is plaintiff's

interest in knowing sooner rather than later whether she may stay in this country. See Razaq,

No. 06-02461, 2007 WL 61884 at *7.

As for the extent of the prejudice suffered, plaintiff asserts that she “suffer[s] from the

day-to-day stress of not knowing whether she will be able to settle permanently in the United

States or if she will be forced to return to China.” (Plaintiff's Mot. at 8). However, plaintiff

offers no evidence, by way of declaration or otherwise, substantiating these prejudice claims. 

The government, on the other hand, has submitted evidence indicating that plaintiff currently

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holds employment authorization documents valid through June 1, 2008. (Heinauer Decl., ¶ 26). 

Defendants also submitted evidence indicating that Plaintiff has an advance parole travel

document valid through May 20, 2008. (Id.). Thus, the court finds that the interests at stake are

important, but plaintiff's showing as to the extent of prejudice is nonetheless underwhelming.

c. Fourth and Sixth Factors

The fourth TRAC factor directs the court to consider the effect of expediting delayed

action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority. However, the sixth factor

provides that no finding of impropriety is required before finding that agency action has been

unreasonably delayed. Here, defendants assert that, since September 11, 2001, the FBI’s

workload has increased and it has had to complete security checks more carefully and

thoroughly. As such, defendants contend that any delay in the adjudication of plaintiff's

application is justified in view of the government’s paramount interest in securing the nation’s

safety. Conversely, the government argues that permitting plaintiff to jump ahead in the “firstin, first-served” process will only delay other applications and intrude upon the government’s

efforts to safeguard national security.

The uncontroverted evidence submitted by the government indicates that the

administrative burden of processing name checks is considerable. The FBI is responsible for

handling name checks for a number of government agencies, including USCIS. (Cannon Decl.,

¶ 4). Before September 11, 2001, the FBI processed approximately 2.5 million name check

requests per year. (Id., ¶ 21). For the fiscal year 2006, the FBI processed over 3.4 million name

checks. (Id.). Since September 11, 2001, the FBI reportedly has received "millions" of name

check requests from USCIS. (See id., ¶ 22; Heinauer Decl., ¶ 17). This court appreciates the

administrative burden faced by defendants, but it does not find that assertions of overwork alone

are sufficient to justify substantial delays. See Yu, 36 F. Supp.2d at 934 (“[D]elays of [a

significant] magnitude, particularly when they occur over uncomplicated matters of great

importance to the individuals involved, may not be justified merely by assertions of overwork.”)

(citations omitted).

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“Undoubtedly, national security must be considered a competing priority of the highest

order. However, the mere invocation of national security is not enough to render agency delay

reasonable per se.” Singh, 470 F. Supp.2d at 1069. Here, there is no particularized showing

that plaintiff's application is especially complex or presents any national security concerns. If

there were, the fact that plaintiff lives and works in this country suggests that national security

interests require that her background check be completed sooner rather than later. See Toor v.

Still, 2007 WL 2028407, No. C07-0645, *2 (N.D. Cal., Jul. 10, 2007) (“[C]onsidering the fact

that most applicants will be physically present in the United States, [allowing inaction] seems

antithetical to the national security interests.”); see also Dong v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 2601107,

No. C07-0266, *10 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 6, 2007) (same). Additionally, if status were to be

adjusted in error, the government may rescind the status and initial removal proceedings. See 8

U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(A), 1256(a); Singh, 470 F. Supp.2d at 1070. In any event, it cannot be

said that plaintiff will gain an unfair advantage by having her application processed

expeditiously, given the reality that many applicants were actually second-in-line (compared to

plaintiff) but "first-served."

3. Conclusion

Thus, while the court is not overwhelmed by plaintiff's arguments as to the extent of

prejudice suffered, it does conclude that she has important non-economic interests at stake. Her

application has been pending for two and a half years, and nothing in the record demonstrates

that the delay has been reasonable as a matter of law.

B. Jurisdiction over the Named Defendants

Defendants contend that because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the

agency responsible for implementing the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §

1255, that Michael Chertoff (in his official capacity as Secretary of DHS) is the only relevant

defendant. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 271(b), 557; See also Konchitsky v. Chertoff, No. C-07-00294

RMW, 2007 WL 2070325 (N.D. Cal.). Therefore, they seek dismissal of all other defendants. 

Plaintiff does not object. (Opposition Brief, pg. 1). 

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Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Alberto Gonzales, Emilio

T. Gonzalez, Christina Poulos, David Still and Robert S. Mueller III is granted and plaintiff's

motion is denied. This court retains jurisdiction over Michael Chertoff to require DHS to

process plaintiff’s application within a reasonable amount of time.

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, as to all defendants except for Michael Chertoff, defendants’

motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is

denied. Defendants’ motion is otherwise denied, and plaintiff’s motion is otherwise granted. 

Defendants shall adjudicate plaintiff's I-485 application by February 4, 2008. By

that date, defendants shall file an affidavit with the court demonstrating compliance. This case

shall remain open pending receipt of defendants’ affidavit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/4/07

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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5:07-cv-2765 Notice has been electronically mailed to: 

Justin Fok jfok@jclawoffice.com 

Edward A. Olsen edward.olsen@usdoj.gov, tiffani.chiu@usdoj.gov 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

Dated: 12/4/07

 /s/ KRO 

Chambers of Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd

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