Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00520/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00520-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MURRAY ALLEN WOODWORTH, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

WARDEN APKER, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 10-520-TUC-CKJ (BPV) 

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Amended Petition”). (Doc. 4) Petitioner, Murray Allen

Woodworth, alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) does not have the

authority to “extort money from [Petitoner’s’ accou[n]t without the amount and timing

being set by [t]he District Court of conviction.” Petitioner has also filed a

“Supplemental Brief” (Doc. 8) and Traverse (Doc. 15). On May 13, 2011, Petitioner

filed a “Request of the Court to Comply with 28 U.S.C. 2243" (Doc. 20), which the

Magistrate Judge construes as a request for ruling. 

Respondent filed a Return and Answer to Order to Show Cause why Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus Should Not be Granted (“Answer”) (Doc. 9) with Attachment

A and Exhibits 1 through 6 (Exhibit 4 has been ordered sealed) attached. (Doc. 9-1)

Respondent contests the Amended Petition, arguing Petitioner has failed to exhaust

administrative remedies. Moreover, the claim is without merit as Petitioner’s sentence

precedes the effective date of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996

(“MVRA”), and thus Petitioner’s reliance on post-MVRA authority is misplaced.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 5) 

Case 4:10-cv-00520-CKJ Document 21 Filed 06/17/11 Page 1 of 7
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 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order dismissing the Amended Petition for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order denying the Amended Petition on the merits.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is federal prisoner currently incarcerated at the United States

Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona. (Amended Petition, at 1; Answer, Attachment A, Ex.

1) Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District

of Indiana of one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robberies and possession

of firearms in commission of robberies, four counts of armed bank robbery, and four

counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence. (Answer, Ex. 3;

3:95CR00006) Petitioner was sentenced on February 29, 1996, and judgment was

entered on March 11, 1996. In addition to imposition of a sentence of imprisonment of

901 months, the judgment provided for payment of restitution in the amount of

$169,854.00 and a special assessment in the amount of $450.00. (Id.) The judgment

further provided that “[p]ayment of the total fine and other criminal monetary penalties

shall be due as follows: ...in full immediately.” (Id.) “Special instructions regarding

the payment of criminal monetary penalties” included that they be “paid through the

Bureau of Prison’s Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.” (Id.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

A prisoner who wishes to challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a

sentence's execution must bring a petition pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court.

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir.2000). This Court has jurisdiction

over Petitioner’s challenge to the District Court’s delegation of restitution to the BOP

and the BOP’s enrollment of Petitioner in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program

(“IFRP”). See 28 U.S.C. §2241; see also United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042 (9th

Cir. 2008).

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The Amended Petition is also properly brought in this district. See Brown v.

United States, 610 F.2d 672,677 (9th Cir. 1980) (A petitioner filing a petition for writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of

the petitioner's custodian).

B. Exhaustion

There is no statutory requirement, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, that federal

prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition

in court, thus it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535

(9th Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55

(1995). Nevertheless, federal courts “require as a prudential matter, that habeas

petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief

under § 2241.” Castro–Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir.2001), abrogated

on other grounds Fernandez–Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 36 (2006). Thus, while

“courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when prudentially required,

this discretion is not unfettered.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir.2004).

A court may waive the exhaustion requirement where administrative remedies are

inadequate, futile, or pursuit of them would cause irreparable harm. Id. at 1000-01;see

also Fraley v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir.1993) (per

curiam) (waiving exhaustion where the initial request for an administrative remedy was

denied based on official BOP policy and further appeal would almost certainly have

been denied based upon the same policy.)

The BOP has established an administrative remedy process permitting an inmate

to seek review of an issue relating to “any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28

C.F.R. § 542.10(a). Under that process, an inmate must proceed through four levels: (1)

an attempt at informal resolution; (2) a formal written request to the warden for an

administrative remedy; (3) an appeal to the regional director of the region where the

inmate is confined; and (4) an appeal to the general counsel. 28 C.F.R. §§

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542.13-542.15. The appeal to the general counsel completes the administrative remedy

process. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a).

 Petitioner alleges that he has presented the issue to “Unit Mangers and case

workers.” (Amended Petition, at 4) Respondent challenges Petitioner’s allegations of

exhaustion, presenting evidence that Petitioner did not exhaust the claim. (Answer, at

4; Ex. 5, Administrative Remedy Index.) Petitioner argues that there is no

administrative remedy available in the BOP. (Supplemental Brief, at 1; Traverse, at 15,

at 2) Petitioner explains that he “went that way once,” filed a grievance, and was put

into the yard gang at $5.25 for almost two years. (Traverse, at 15.) 

The Magistrate Judge finds no support for either of Petitioner’s arguments.

Petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated that (1) he attempted to exhaust the issue,

or (2) that exhaustion would be futile. Respondent’s exhibits demonstrate that Petitioner

is aware of the Administrative Remedy process and has used it for at least eight other

matters, however, Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding the

instant matter. (See Answer, Ex. 5, Administrative Remedy Index.) Neither has

Petitioner, aside from his own self-serving allegation, demonstrated that he previously

attempted to exhaust an IFRP claim, and that such attempts were futile due to the

application of an unchanging, official BOP policy. Additionally, the Court notes that

Petitioner submitted no evidence of the grievance he refers to that was rejected by the

BOP for this Court’s consideration in determining whether exhaustion in this case

would be futile. Finally, there is no record of any attempt to exhaust this IFRP claim in

the Administrative Remedy Index. (See Id.) 

 Here, nothing suggests that the BOP has predetermined the issue that Petitioner

raises for the first time in his current petition. Indeed, unlike the prisoner's request in

Fraley, which was denied initially pursuant to an unchanging, official BOP policy,

there is no evidence that Petitioner's issue has ever been addressed at any level of the

BOP's administrative process. Further, allowing petitioner to bypass the exhaustion

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requirement on those new issues would only encourage petitioner and other prisoners

to deliberately bypass the BOP's administrative remedy process. 

Accordingly, Petitioner's claim should be dismissed without prejudice for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies.

C. Merits

Alternatively, Petitioner’s claim has no merit. Petitioner asserts in Ground One

of his Amended Petition that the “Bureau of Prisons does not have the authority to

extort money from [Petitoner’s’ accou[n]t without the amount and timing being set by

[t]he District Court of conviction.” (Amended Petition, at 4) Respondent contests the

Amended Petition, arguing that the claim is without merit as Petitioner’s sentence

precedes the effective date of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”)

and Petitioner’s reliance on post-MVRA authority is misplaced. (Answer, at 5-9)

The District Court ordered Petitioner to pay restitution in the amount of

$169,854.00, payable in full immediately, to be paid through the Bureau of Prison’s

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. (Answer, Ex. 3) The IFRP, codified at 28

C.F.R. § 545.10 et seq., is a voluntary program in which inmates are encouraged to

meet financial obligations through the provision of incentives. The consequences of

declining to participate in the IFRP is the loss of those incentives. Petitioner asserts that

the Bureau of Prison’s scheduling and collection of restitution payments violates the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decisions in United States v. Gunning, 401 F.3d 1145

(9th Cir. 2005), and the District Court of Oregon’s decision in United States v. Soroka,

508 F.Supp.2d. 869 (D.Or. 2007).

Petitioner’s claims have no merit, and the cases he cites do not provide support

for his assertions. Both petitioners in Gunning and Soroka were convicted after the

enactment of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996. In Gunning, the Ninth

Circuit held, in reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2), that the District Court is ultimately

responsible for determining a restitution payment schedule, and does not have the

authority to delegate that to the BOP. Id., at 1150. In Soroka, the petitioner filed a

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habeas petition challenging the authority of the BOP to set a schedule of payments

while he was incarcerated, relying on the authority of Gunning, supra. Soroka, 508

F.Supp.2d at 870. The district court found Gunning controlling and ordered the BOP

to vacate its decision to place Soroka on “IFRP Refuse” status, to vacate all sanctions

imposed against Soroka, and to restore Soroka to the position he would have been in

“but for” BOP’s decision to place him in “IFRP Refuse” status. Id., at 870. Thereafter,

the district court denied the government’s motion to amend the judgment, looking to the

MVRA for guidance and finding no cause under the MVRA to amend the judgment. Id.

The holding of these cases was an interpretation of a specific controlling statute

– 18 U.S.C. § 3664. The section of the statute that the Ninth Circuit relied upon in

finding this duty non-delegable is found in 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (f)(1)(1): “In each order

of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each

victim's losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic

circumstances of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) It goes on to say: “Upon

determination of the amount of restitution owed to each victim, the court shall, pursuant

to section 3572, specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule

according to which, the restitution is to be paid....” Id. § 3664(f)(2). These provisions

of the statute, enacted as the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996, became

effective for sentencing proceedings in cases in which the defendant was convicted on

or after on April 24, 1996, and thus do not apply to Petitioner, who was convicted

before April 24, 1996. Pub.L. 104-132, Title II, § 211. Thus, Petitioner’s reliance on

these cases, and on the MVRA as it presently exists is misplaced. 

Petitioner also argues in his traverse that “even under the old § 3664" only a

district court can set the timing and amounts of restitution. There is, however, no

support in the statutory language of the prior version of the statute for Petitioner’s

argument. The version of the statute in effect prior to the enactment of the MVRA

placed no constrictions on the district court’s delegation of authority in scheduling

restitution payments. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (1995). 

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III. REQUEST OF THE COURT TO COMPLY WITH 28 U.S.C. § 2243

To the extent that the Petitioner seeks an immediate ruling on the pending

habeas, the Motion should be denied. The Magistrate Judge has issued a report and

recommendation for consideration by the District Court, and the District Court will

issue a ruling on the habeas in due course, after it has fully considered the documents

filed by the parties, and within the time available to it in light of the District Court's

other responsibilities. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court enter an order DISMISSING the Amended Petition (Doc. 4) for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter an

order DENYING the Amended Petition on the merits. (Doc. 4.) 

The Court further recommends that the District Court DENY Petitioner’s request

to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (Doc. 20). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The

parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case

number: No. CV-10-520-TUC-CKJ.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to

the Petitioner and the Respondent. 

DATED this 17th day of June, 2011.

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