Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05202/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05202-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 2014 Decided July 29, 2014

No. 13-5202

MATT SISSEL,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVICES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-01263)

Timothy M. Sandefur argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Paul J. Beard II and Daniel A.

Himebaugh. Theodore Hadzi-Antich entered an appearance.

John C. Eastman and Anthony T. Caso were on the brief for

amicus curiae Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in support

of appellant.

Lawrence J. Joseph was on the brief for amicus curiae

Association of American Physicians and Surgeons in support of

appellant.

Joseph E. Schmitz and Paul D. Kamenar were on the brief

USCA Case #13-5202 Document #1504947 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 1 of 17
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for amici curiae U.S. Representatives Trent Franks, et al. in

support of appellant.

Alisa B. Klein, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were

Stuart F. Delery, Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Ronald C. Machen

Jr., U.S. Attorney, Beth S. Brinkmann, Deputy Assistant

Attorney General, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney.

Before: ROGERS, PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A,

mandates that as of January 2014, non-exempt individuals

maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited

exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and

small-business owner who serves from time to time on active

duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his

complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce

Clause, U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause,

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention

that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved

health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the

Supreme Court’s interpretation of the mandate in National

Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,

2598 (2012) (“NFIB”), and his contention that the mandate’s

shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the

Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent

interpreting that Clause. 

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I.

A.

Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act imposes a

“[r]equirement to maintain minimum essential [health

insurance] coverage.” 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. Subsection (a)

provides that “[a]n applicable individual” — that is, an

individual subject to the requirement — “shall for each month

beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any

dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is

covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.” Id.

§ 5000A(a). Subsection (b) provides that if an applicable

individual “fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a),”

there shall be “imposed on the taxpayer a penalty,” id.

§ 5000A(b)(1), denominated the “[s]hared responsibility

payment,” id., which “shall be included with a taxpayer’s

[federal income tax] return,” id. § 5000A(b)(2). These

requirements are subject to several exceptions.

Subsection (d) limits who is an “applicable individual”

subject to the coverage requirement. See id. § 5000A(d)(2)–(4). 

The “[r]eligious conscience exemption,” id. § 5000A(d)(2)(A),

exempts from the minimum coverage requirement a “member of

a recognized religious sect”whose beliefs oppose the acceptance

of insurance benefits and an “adherent of established tenets or

teachings of such sect.” See also id. § 1402(g)(1) (criteria for

religious exemption). Also exempt is a “member of a

[qualifying] health care sharing ministry” whose members

“share a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share

medical expenses among members in accordance with those

beliefs.” Id. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(i) & (ii)(II). “Individuals not

lawfully present” in the United States, id. § 5000A(d)(3), and

“[i]ncarcerated individuals,” id. § 5000A(d)(4), are likewise

exempt from the insurance purchase requirement.

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Subsection (e) enumerates when “[n]o penalty shall be

imposed” for failure to obtain required health coverage. Id.

§ 5000A(e). Exempt are “[i]ndividuals who cannot afford

coverage,” that is, individuals whose “required contribution

(determined on an annual basis) for coverage for the month

exceeds 8 percent of such individual’s household income for the

taxable year.” Id. § 5000A(e)(1) (emphasis added). The

“required contribution” is the cost of obtaining minimum

essential coverage, either through an employer-sponsored

insurance plan or by purchasing in an insurance exchange “the

lowest cost bronze plan available in the individual market . . .

in which the individual resides.” Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(B). Also

exempt are “[t]axpayers with income below [the] filing

threshold [for federal income taxes],” id. § 5000A(e)(2),

“[m]embers of Indian tribes,” id. § 5000A(e)(3), and individuals

experiencing a “short . . . gap[]” in coverage of less than three

months, id. § 5000A(e)(4). Individuals who “have suffered a

hardship with respect to the capability to obtain coverage under

a qualified health plan,” as determined by the Secretary of

Health and Human Services, are also exempt. Id.

§ 5000A(e)(5).

B.

According to the complaint filed October 11, 2012, Matt

Sissel is an “artist who works out of his studio” in Iowa and

“also works part-time . . . for the National Guard.” First Am.

Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶ 5. “He is financially stable, has an annual

income that requires him to file federal tax returns, and could

afford health insurance if he wanted to obtain such coverage.” 

Id. He “does not have, need, or want health insurance.” Id.

Further, “he is able to and does pay for any and all of his

medical expenses out of pocket.” Id. Because “he cannot claim

any of the exemptions,” id. ¶ 15, the Affordable Care “Act

obligates [him] to purchase, at his own expense and against his

will, federally approved health insurance, or pay the ‘shared

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responsibility payment,’” id. Sissel seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief against the mandate and the Affordable Care

Act in toto.

First, Sissel alleges that the Affordable Care Act’s

“purchase requirement,” commonly known as the individual

mandate, “is not a regulation of commerce, but purports to

compel affected Americans, like [himself], to engage in

commerce.” Id. ¶ 34. Citing NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600, where

Chief Justice Roberts stated that “the Commerce Clause does

not authorize such a command,” he alleges that Section 5000A

violates the Commerce Clause. See id. Second, he alleges that

Section 5000A’s “‘shared responsibility payment’ is a tax that

raises revenue to support Government generally,” id. ¶ 39, and

violates the Origination Clause because it “originated in the

Senate, not the House,” id. ¶ 40. 

The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ruling that Sissel’s

Commerce Clause claim was premised on a misreading of the

NFIB decision, the Origination Clause did not apply because

Section 5000A was not a bill for raising revenue, and, in any

event, it satisfied the Origination Clause because there was a

valid Senate amendment to a bill that originated in the House of

Representatives. See Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human

Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159, 166–74 (D.D.C. 2013). Sissel

appeals, and our review of the dismissal of the complaint is de

novo. See English v. Dist. of Columbia, 717 F.3d 968, 971 (D.C.

Cir. 2013). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court assumes the truth of all

well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construes

reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s

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favor, see, e.g., Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 391 (D.C. Cir.

2012), but is not required to accept the plaintiff’s legal

conclusions as correct, see id.

II.

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether or not

Sissel has standing under Article III of the Constitution in order

to assure ourselves that this court has jurisdiction over his

appeal. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

559–60 (1992); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 295 F.3d 1326,

1330 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Standing must be shown at each stage of

the judicial proceedings. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.

2652, 2661 (2013). The district court concluded Sissel had

standing because he claimed to have had to sell property and

curtail his professional activities in order to raise funds to pay

for the required health insurance coverage. See Sissel, 951 F.

Supp. 2d at 164 n.7. Sissel’s complaint, however, does not

demonstrate that as of the time of his appeal, he would be

subject to the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate and

shared responsibility payment. Although he alleged that in

January 2008 he left the National Guard where he did have

health insurance during his active service, see Compl. ¶ 24, his

counsel advised during oral argument before this court that

Sissel was currently on active duty with the National Guard. See

Oral Arg. Tr. 5:14–17 (May 8, 2014). It also was unclear from

the complaint whether the circumstances relating to Sissel’s

annual income and relied on by the district court had changed. 

See id. at 7:8–20.

Upon review of the requested supplementation, see Order

(May 22, 2014), we hold that Sissel has Article IIIstanding. By

signed affidavit, Sissel attests that he does not fall within any of

the exemptions under the Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.

§ 5000A(d)(2)–(4), (e)(3). For example, he avers that he has no

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religious objection to purchasing health insurance, he is not a

member of an Indian tribe, he is not incarcerated, and he has not

been determined ineligible for Medicaid or had an individual

insurance plan cancelled. See Sissel Aff. ¶¶ 3–13 (June 2,

2014); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2) & (4), (e)(3) & (5). 

Additionally, he avers that as of June 2, 2014, he was no longer

on active duty with the National Guard, and that he has not

purchased health insurance through the National Guard, and is

not eligible for any kind of insurance coverage or continuing

care through the National Guard. See Sissel Aff. ¶¶ 14–15. 

According to Sissel, the National Guard would provide

emergency care for any injuries or illnesses he might suffer

while on active duty, but the Guard has no such “limited

medical-emergency” obligation when he is not on active duty. 

Id. ¶ 15. 

Sissel’s counsel has further attested that based on available

information from the “Washington Healthplanfinder” website,

the cost of the least expensive qualifying health plan in the

region of the country where Sissel now lives is less than 8

percent of Sissel’s projected 2014 income. See Sandefur Aff. 

¶ 2 (June 2, 2014), Ex. A; Sissel Aff. ¶ 10. In his complaint and

affidavit, Sissel states that the two sources of his annual income

are his work as an artist and his part-time service as a Public

Affairs Specialist for the National Guard. SeeCompl. ¶ 5; Sissel

Aff. ¶ 10. Consequently, Sissel maintains he does not qualify

for a low-income exemption under the Affordable Care Act, 26

U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(a). See Appellant’s Supp. Br. 3–4. 

Taking these factual representations as true, as we must for

purposes of Article III standing, see Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. at 561, and absent any basis to question Sissel’s view of the

legal obligation of the National Guard with respect to health care

coverage, it appears certain that Sissel is subject to the Section

5000A mandate requiring him to purchase minimum essential

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health insurance coverage or else to pay the shared

responsibility payment. The government does not challenge the

affiants’ representations or otherwise claim that Sissel lacks

Article III standing. See Appellees’ Supp. Br. 1. Even though

Sissel is still a member of the National Guard and from time to

time may be called to active duty, providing him temporary

health insurance coverage by the Guard, the government has not

suggested this circumstance would render exempt an individual

otherwise subject to the requirements of Section 5000A, and we

agree. Congress has included limited, specific exemptionsfrom

Section 5000A, and, absent reason to conclude otherwise,

exemptions are to be construed narrowly. See, e.g., A.H.

Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945). This court

is aware of no countervailing considerations inasmuch as the

Affordable Care Act seeks “to increase the number of

Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of

health care.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580. We therefore turn to the

merits of Sissel’s complaint.

III.

The Constitution authorizes the Congress to “regulate

Commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 3, and to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and

proper for carrying into Execution” that authority, id. art. I, § 8,

cl. 18. In NFIB, several States and private parties challenged the

Section 5000A individual mandate on the ground, among others,

that the Commerce Clause did not empower Congress to require

individuals to purchase health insurance. See State Resp’ts Br.

on Minimum Coverage Provision 15–51; Private Resp’ts Br. on

Individual Mandate 15–62, in U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human

Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, decided sub. nom. NFIB, 132 S.

Ct. 2566. Five Justices would have held that if the individual

mandate commanded individuals to purchase insurance, then its

enactment would have exceeded Congress’s authority under the

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Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see NFIB, 132

S. Ct. at 2593 (separate opinion of Roberts, C.J.), 2650 (Scalia,

Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting), but the Court

understood that Section 5000A gives individuals the choice of

purchasing insurance or paying a tax, and sustained it as a valid

exercise of Congress’s taxing power, U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl.1; see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2598.

Sissel seeks to “enjoin[] the government from enforcing the

individual mandate against him,” Reply Br. 3, because “the

Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to impose” the

mandate, Appellant’s Br. 6. He maintains that in NFIB the

Supreme Court “did not sustain the individual mandate under

the taxing power.” Id. at 7. “[I]ndeed,” he suggests, “the

Supreme Court did not sustain the individual mandate at all.” 

Id. In Sissel’s view, “[t]he NFIB opinion makes an essential

constitutional distinction between the individual mandate —

which compels people to buy health insurance — and the shared

responsibility payment — which imposes a tax on people who

choose not to purchase health insurance,” and he maintains that

only the latter was upheld by the Court. Id. at 7, 10. Unless this

court declares the individual mandate invalid, he contends the

mandate will “render[] [him] a violator of federal law if he fails

to buy the prescribed insurance.” Id. at 12. 

Sissel’s Commerce Clause claim rests on a flawed

understanding of the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB. See

Appellees’ Br. 7–8. In NFIB, the government “ask[ed] [the

Court] to read the mandate not as ordering individuals to buy

insurance, but rather as imposing a tax on those who do not buy

that product.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593 (emphasis added); see

also id. at 2584 (separate opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Although 

Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[t]he most straightforward

reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to

purchase insurance,” id., he concluded, in an opinion joined by

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four other Justices, that “it need not be read to declare that

failing to [purchase insurance] is unlawful,” id. at 2597 (opinion

of Roberts, C.J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and

Kagan, JJ.) (emphasis added). Rather, the Court held that

Section 5000A can be read to do nothing “more than impose a

tax,” and “[t]hat is sufficient to sustain it” under the

Constitution. Id. at 2598. 

Sissel’s contention that the individual mandate “compels

[him] to buy health insurance,” Appellant’s Br. 7, is thus

foreclosed under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the

mandate; in the Court’s opinion, the mandate provision “leaves

[Sissel] with a lawful choice” to purchase health insurance or

not, “so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on that choice,”

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600. Although the Chief Justice stated that

the individual mandate “would . . . be unconstitutional if read as

a command,” he concluded that it is not unconstitutional as

beyond the scope of Congressional authority because it “can

reasonably be read” as not imposing a command. Id. at 2601

(separate opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis added). The

Court’s decision to sustain the constitutionality of the whole of

Section 5000A under the taxing power necessarily disposes of 

Sissel’s Commerce Clause claim. His reliance on later opinions

in the circuits is misplaced as none denies that the Supreme

Court upheld the individual mandate as a valid exercise of the

taxing power. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 97

(4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 371 (6th

Cir. 2013); United States v. Roszkowski, 700 F.3d 50, 58 (1st

Cir. 2012).

IV.

The Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, states

that “[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House

of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with

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Amendments as on other Bills.” Sissel contends that “the shared

responsibility payment is a bill for raising revenue” and that it

“originated in the Senate, not the House” in violation of the

Origination Clause. Appellant’s Br. 20. He states in his

complaint that “[i]n September, 2009, the House [of

Representatives] passed H.R. 3590, entitled the ‘Service

Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009,’” to “‘amend[] the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify [the] first-time

homebuyers credit in the case of members of the Armed Forces

and certain other Federal employees.’” Compl. ¶ 40. He alleges

this bill “had nothing to do with health insurance reform,” and

yet “[i]n November of [2009], the Senate purported to ‘amend’

the House bill by gutting its contents, replacing them with

health-insurance reforms (including the purchase requirement

and associated payment), and renaming the bill the ‘Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act.’” Id. The “substitute

legislation,” he alleges, was “a revenue-raising tax bill,” id., and

the enactment of the Act violated the Origination Clause

“[b]ecause the tax originated in the Senate, and not in the

House,” id. ¶ 41. Because we conclude that the shared

responsibility payment in Section 5000A is not a “Bill[] for

raisingRevenue” within the Supreme Court’s accepted meaning

of that phrase, and thus was not subject to the Origination

Clause, this court has no occasion to determine whether it

originated in the House or the Senate.

In interpreting the Origination Clause, the Supreme Court

has held from the early days of this Nation that “revenue bills

are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are

not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create

revenue.” Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897)

(citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

§ 880). The Court has adhered to this “strict” interpretation. 

See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397 (1990);

Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436 (1906); United States v.

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Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875). Necessarily, this court has

followed suit. See Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083,

1090 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Under this “strict” interpretation, the

Supreme Court has upheld as not subject to the Origination

Clause a tax on circulating bank notes, see Nebeker, 167 U.S. at

202, a tax to fund railway construction in the District of

Columbia, see Millard, 202 U.S. at 436–37, and a “special

assessment” levied on federal criminal offenders for a victims’

fund, see Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 401. In each case,

consistent with its “strict” interpretation of the phrase “Bills for

raising Revenue,” the Court’s analysis focused on the purpose

of the challenged measure: Because the revenue raised was

merely incidental to the main object or aim of the challenged

measure, the requirements of the Origination Clause were held

not to apply. In Nebeker, for example, the issue was whether “a

tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking

association in circulation[] was a revenue bill within the

[Origination] [C]lause.” 167 U.S. at 202. The Court observed

that “[t]he main purpose that Congress had in view was to

provide a national currencybased upon United States bonds, and

to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question.” 

Id. at 203 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Millard, involving the

use of property taxes to fund railway construction in the District

of Columbia, the Court reasoned that “[w]hatever taxes are

imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act.”

202 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added). And in Munoz-Flores, the

Court noted that “[a]ny revenue for the general Treasury that

[the provision imposing a special assessment on defendants]

creates is . . . ‘incidental’ to that provision’s primary purpose,”

which was to provide money for a crime victims’ fund. 495

U.S. at 399 (emphasis added; alterations omitted). In each

instance, the Court underscored that unless a bill is aimed at

“levy[ing] taxes in the strict sense,” it does not fall within the

limited scope of the Origination Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495

U.S. at 397; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436; Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202. 

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The purposive approach embodied in Supreme Court

precedent necessarilyleads to the conclusion that Section 5000A

of the Affordable Care Act is not a “Bill[] for raising Revenue”

under the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court’s repeated

focus on the statutory provision’s “object,” Nebeker, 167 U.S.

at 203, and “primary purpose,” Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399,

makes clear, contrary to Sissel’s position, that the purpose of a

bill is critical to the Origination Clause inquiry. And after the

Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB, it is beyond dispute that the

paramount aim of the Affordable Care Act is “to increase the

number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease

the cost of health care,” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580, not to raise

revenue by means of the shared responsibility payment. The

Supreme Court explained: “Although the [Section 5000A]

payment will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed

to expand health insurance coverage.” Id. at 2596 (emphasis

added); see id. at 2596–97. This court noted in Seven-Sky v.

Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2012), abrogated by NFIB, 132

S. Ct. 2566 (2012), that the “congressional findings never

suggested that Congress’s purpose was to raise revenue.” See

42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (congressional findings). To the contrary,

“the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage

everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage,

not revenues from penalties.” Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. The

Supreme Court acknowledged that the Section 5000A shared

responsibility payment may ultimately generate substantial

revenues — potentially $4 billion in annual income for the

government by 2017, see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 — if people

do not “sign up” for coverage, but those revenues are a byproduct of the Affordable Care Act’s primary aim to induce

participation in health insurance plans. Successful operation of

the Act would mean lessrevenue from Section 5000A payments,

not more.

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Sissel contends, however, that the Supreme Court cases

rejecting Origination Clause challenges merely embody “two

exceptions” to the general “presumpt[ion]” that “[a]ll taxes” are

subject to the Clause. Appellant’s Br. 14; Reply Br. 6–7. He

maintains that the Affordable Care Act does not fall within

either exception because the Section 5000A payment neither

funds a particular governmental program, as was true in MunozFlores, 495 U.S. at 397–98, nor enforces compliance with a

statute passed under some other (non-taxing) constitutional

power, as in Millard, 202 U.S. at 433. Yet even assuming Sissel

is correct that the precedent can be classified in one or both of

his categories, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held

that a statute must be so classifiable to avoid the requirements of

the Origination Clause. All Sissel has demonstrated is that the

Affordable Care Act’s mandate does not fall squarely within the

fact patterns of prior unsuccessful Origination Clause

challenges, not that his challenge should succeed. 

Sissel’s interpretation of the taxing power also fails to

adhere to Supreme Court precedent. In emphasizing that in

NFIB the Court upheld Section 5000A solely as an exercise of

Congress’s taxing power, see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600, Sissel

contends that the Section 5000A tax is presumptively subject to

the Origination Clause because it “serves no constitutional

purpose other than to raise revenue pursuant to Congress’s

taxing power.” Reply Br. 7. This implicitly assumes that all

exercises of the taxing power are necessarily aimed at raising

revenue. In fact, “the taxing power is often, very often, applied

for other purposes[] than revenue.” 2 JOSEPH STORY,

COMMENTARIESON THECONSTITUTION OFTHEUNITED STATES

§ 962, p. 434 (1833), cited in NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596. In

United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950), the Supreme

Court stated:

It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease

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to be valid [under the taxing power] merely because it

regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the

activities taxed. The principle applies even though the

revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or the

revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary. Nor

does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on

activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate.

Id. at 44 (emphasis added; citations omitted). That view was

reiterated in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953),

where the Court upheld “a tax on persons engaged in the

business of accepting wagers,” id. at 23, notwithstanding the

argument that “the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize . . .

illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax

measure,” id. at 28, abrogated on other grounds by Marchetti v.

United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Because not all of

Congress’s exercises of the taxing power are primarily aimed at

raising revenue, and a measure is a “Bill[] for raising Revenue”

only if its primary purpose is to raise general revenues, some

exercises of the taxing power are not subject to the Origination

Clause. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Nebeker and Millard

confirm this point: Not all “taxes” are “Bills for raising

Revenue.” See Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202; Millard, 202 U.S. at

436–37.

Sissel’s attempts to distinguish the Supreme Court’s “tax”

cases confirm that the Origination Clause inquiry does not hinge

on the existence (or absence) of anothersource of constitutional

authority. For instance, Sissel contends that the tax on

circulating notes in Nebeker was not a “Bill[] for raising

Revenue” because, among other things, it was enacted “in

furtherance of Congress’s Article I power to coin money.” 

Reply Br. 6; see U.S.CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 5. But many taxes are

imposed to raise revenue in furtherance of the federal

government’s enumerated powers, and some of those taxes may

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well be “Bills for raising Revenue.” The mere existence of

another source of Congressional power, then, cannot be what

insulates a measure from the Origination Clause. Conversely,

a measure that would not be a “Bill[] for raising Revenue” does

not become one simply because Congress lacks an independent

basis (apart from the taxing power) to enact it. For example,

Sissel contends that the tax to finance railroad projects in

Millard was not a “Bill[] for raising Revenue” because, among

other things, Congress possessed exclusive constitutional

jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. ReplyBr. 7; see U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Yet nothing in Millard hints that

Congress’s authority over the District of Columbia affected the

Origination Clause inquiry in that case. See Millard, 202 U.S.

at 436–37.

In sum, under Supreme Court precedent, the presence of

another constitutional power does not suggest that a provision is

not a “Bill[] for raising Revenue,” and the absence of another

constitutional power does not, in itself, suggest that it is. 

Because the existence of another power is not necessary (or

sufficient) to exempt a bill from the Origination Clause, the

mere fact that Section 5000A may have been enacted solely

pursuant to Congress’s taxing power does not compel the

conclusion that the entire Affordable Care Act is a “Bill[] for

raising Revenue” subject to the Origination Clause. Where, as

here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision’s

revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. 

The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared

responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial

revenues. In light of the Supreme Court’s historical

commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause,

this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose

primary purpose “plainly” was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596

— falls outside the scope of the Clause.

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Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for

failure to state a cause of action.

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