Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01694/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01694-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD ALLEN WISLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

CITY OF FRESNO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F 06-1694 AWI SMS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Documents #7 & #8)

This civil rights lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Plaintiff Richard A. Wisler

(Plaintiff) for injuries he sustained as a result of alleged excessive force by Defendants in

connection with his arrest. This court has subject matter jurisdiction of the civil rights cause of

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of

action. Venue is proper because the alleged acts giving rise to this action occurred in this

district.

BACKGROUND

On November 21, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint. The first cause of action is brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges Defendants violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution by falsely arresting and detaining Plaintiff and

using unreasonable force on him. The second cause of action is brought under state law and

alleges assault and battery. The third cause of action is brought under state law and alleges

negligence because Defendants (a) Used their fist to subdue Plaintiff when he was already pinned

down; (b) Used a taser to shoot Plaintiff when he was already on the ground; (c) Failed to devote

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 Defendant Sergeant Steven Casto was sued under the name “Sergeant S. Castro.” 1

Because Defendant Casto’s true name appears to be Casto, rather than “Castro,” he has been

referred to as “Defendant Casto” or “Casto” in this memorandum opinion. 

2

a reasonable and sufficient amount of time and service to training and supervising the individual

defendants regarding arresting and detaining individuals; and (d) Failed to devote a reasonable

and sufficient amount of time and service to training and supervising the individual defendants

regarding the use of force.

On December 26, 2006, Defendant City of Fresno, Defendant Long, Defendant Logue,

Defendant Pak, Defendant Jones, and Defendant Casto filed a motion to dismiss. Defendants 1

contend that Defendants Pak and Casto must be dismissed because the complaint fails to allege

any improper conduct by Defendant Pak and Defendant Casto. Defendants also contend that

naming the individual Defendants in their official capacity is redundant of Plaintiff’s suit against

the City of Fresno.

On January 16, 2007, Defendant Bradford filed a motion to dismiss. Defendant

Bradford contends that he must be dismissed because the complaint fails to allege any improper

conduct by him. Defendant Bradford also contends that suing him in his official capacity is

redundant.

On February 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed an opposition. Plaintiff contends that discovery is

necessary before Plaintiff will be able to allege the specific involvement of Defendants Casto,

Pack, and Bradford. However, Plaintiff argues that these Defendants are liable because they

played an integral part in the constitutional violations. Plaintiff admits that while the suits

against the individual defendants in their official capacity is redundant, the claims against them

in their individual capacity is not redundant.

On February 16, 2007, Defendants filed a reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

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claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal can be based on the failure to allege a th

cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9 Cir.1984). In considering a th

motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in

the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's

favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is disfavored, see Hall v.

City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9 Cir.1986), and may be granted only in th

extraordinary circumstances, see Gilligan v. Jamco Develop. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9

th

Cir.1997). Essentially, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests plaintiff's compliance

with the liberal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5A Charles

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356, at 294-96; see also Kehr

Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.1991) ("[U]nder Rule 12(b)(6) the

defendant has the burden of showing no claim has been stated."). As the Supreme Court has

noted, when evaluating a complaint for failure to state a claim, the question is not whether the

facts stated in the complaint, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to any relief. Instead, the

question is whether there is any set of "facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations

of the complaint" that would entitle plaintiff to some relief. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534

U.S. 506, 514 (2002); Diaz v. Gates, 380 F.3d 480, 482 (9 Cir. 2004). th

ALLEGED FACTS

The complaint alleges that on the evening February 4, 2006, Plaintiff Richard Wisler was

traveling home in his BMW. The complaint alleges that shortly before Plaintiff arrived home,

he hit a curb due to heavy fog conditions. After the minor accident, Plaintiff drove into his

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driveway at 7202 N. Belvedere, Fresno, California. 

The complaint alleges that immediately after Plaintiff parked his car, Fresno City

Police Officers demanded that Plaintiff get out of the car. The complaint alleges that these

officers were Fresno Police Officers Long, Logue and Reserve Sergeant Jones.

The complaint alleges that Officers Long and Logue forcibly removed Plaintiff from

his car and forcibly placed him on the ground pinning his arm behind his back, placing him face

down on the ground, and restraining him. The complaint alleges that Officer Long applied three

strikes to the upper head portion of Plaintiff although he was already placed on the ground by two

officers. The complaint alleges that despite the presence of three officers, the severe nature of

the three strikes to Plaintiff’s head, the fact that he was already on the ground with his arms

pinned behind his head, another officer shot Plaintiff with a taser gun.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was arrested and charged with several misdemeanors.

Later Plaintiff was taken to University Medical Center for a blood drawn sample to use for a

possible DUI. The complaint alleges that despite the profuse blood from Plaintiff’s nose and

right eye, he was released without any significant medical treatment nor any paperwork.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was subsequently released from custody without

being booked into jail.

The complaint alleges that the actions of Officers Long, Logue and Sergeant Jones were

taken pursuant to a policy, pattern, practice, and custom of the City of Fresno to arrest

individuals by using improper means, including the use of excessive force, even when no

reasonable basis exists for believing that use of force will be required. The complaint alleges that

despite their knowledge of this illegal policy, pattern, practice, and custom, the supervisory and

policy-making officers have taken no effective steps to terminate the policy, pattern, practice and

custom; and have not effectively disciplined or otherwise properly supervised the individual

officers who engage in the policy, pattern, practice and custom.

The complaint alleges that the City of Fresno has not effectively trained City of Fresno

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officers with regard to the proper constitutional and statutory limits of the exercise of their

authority; have assigned as training officers certain officers known to engage in the illegal policy,

pattern, practice and custom; and have sanctioned the policy, pattern, practice and custom

through their deliberate or grossly negligent indifference to the effect of this policy, pattern,

practice and custom, on the constitutional rights of residents. The complaint alleges that

supervisory and policymaking officers have taken no effective action to ensure that safeguards

are put into place to avoid the false arrest and detention of citizens and the unjustified use of

excessive fore. The complaint alleges that instead, the City of Fresno has ratified acts of

misconduct by its police officers, including acts of Defendants Long, Logue, and Jones.

The complaint alleges that as the direct and proximate results of the acts, omissions,

policies, patterns, practices and customs of Defendants alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered

severe bodily harm, substantial and emotional pain and suffering, shock and injury to the nervous

systems, humiliation, extreme and severe mental anguish, acute anxiety, emotional and physical

distress, and fear, all to their damage and detriment. In addition, the complaint alleges Plaintiff

has incurred, and will continue to incur, medical expenses. To date, Plaintiff has had two

surgeries to fix the loss of vision due to the broken right orbital bone received from the three fist

strikes, and is due for at least one more surgery. Finally, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff has

incurred, and will continue to incur, other damages, including, but not limited to, lost of wages.

The complaint alleges that Defendants, Long, Logue, Pack, Jones, Bradford, and Casto

were at all relevant times officers of the Fresno Police Department. The complaint alleges that

each Officer is sued individually and in their official capacity.

DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Link Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto to Constitutional Violations

Defendants contend that Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto must be dismissed from

this action because the complaint does not allege any involvement by these Defendants in

Plaintiff’s arrest or Defendants’ use of force. The Civil Rights Act under which this action was

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filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the

defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by

the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.

2006). 

The civil rights statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. 

See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976). “A person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if that person does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts, or omits to perform an act which that person is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9 2006) th

(quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978). “Indeed, the ‘requisite causal

connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the

deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or

reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Hydrick, 466

F.3d at 689 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743-44). Thus, in order to state a claim for relief

under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or

omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

The complaint alleges specific conduct by Defendants Long, Logue, and Jones. 

However, the complaint does not allege any specific conduct by Defendants Pack, Bradford, or

Casto other than their employment by the City of Fresno. The complaint fails to allege how

these Defendants subjected Plaintiff to an unlawful seizure and/or used excessive force. In the

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opposition, Plaintiff concedes that at this time, without discovery, Plaintiff cannot allege more

specific conduct concerning Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto. The complaint fails to state

a civil rights violation against Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto at this time.

In the opposition, Plaintiff contends that his theory of liability against Defendants Pack,

Bradford, and Casto is based on these officers’ participation, along with a group of officers, in

committing constitutional violations against Plaintiff. In the Ninth Circuit, an officer who does

not commit a constitutional violation – i.e. a bystander officer – cannot be liable under Section

1983 based on a “team effort” theory. Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9 Cir.1996). The th

problem with a “team effort” theory of liability is that it improperly removes individual liability

as the issue and allows a jury to find a defendant liable on the ground that even if the defendant

had no role in the unlawful conduct, he or she would nonetheless be guilty if the conduct was the

result of a “team effort.” Id. at 293-94. For example, in Chuman, the district court instructed

that jury that if they found a search was conducted in an unreasonable manner, all members of

the team conducting the search may be held liable no matter whose actions ultimately inflicted

the plaintiff's injury. Id. The Ninth Circuit found such a jury instruction improper because it

allowed liability to attach to “a mere bystander” who had “no role in the unlawful conduct.” Id.

at 294-95. Citing to the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177 (5 Cir. th

1989), the Ninth Circuit states that “integral participation” by each officer is a predicate to

liability. Chuman, 76 F.3d at 294.

The “integral participation” requirement was further explained in Boyd v. Benton, 374

F.3d 773 (9 Cir.2004). In Boyd, a SWAT team used a flash-bang device when etering into an th

apartment in which several people were sleeping, and several people were injured when the

device ignited. Id. at 778. Prior to the raid, the SWAT team supervisor created the raid plan,

including what devices they would deploy and how the raid would commence. Id. at 777. The

Ninth Circuit found that every “officer involved in the operation knew of the plan to use the

flash-bang, did not object to that plan, and actively participated in its operation.” Id. The Ninth

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Circuit determined that each officer was liable for the constitutional violation because each

officer involved in the search was an “integral participant.” Id. While the SWAT team was

standing behind the officer who deployed the device, they could still be liable because they were

all part of the operation, and they were all aware of the decision to use the flash-bang device. Id. 

Pursuant to Chuman and Boyd, liability under Section 1983 requires integral participation

by officers rather than simple participation in a team effort. Here, the complaint’s allegations

are insufficient to allege Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto’s liability on an “integral

participation” theory. The complaint does not allege facts indicating that the named Defendants

were all integral participants in Plaintiff’s arrest and the excessive force used on Plaintiff. In its

analysis in Boyd, the Ninth Circuit noted three factors that were met by the officers actions: (1)

each officer stood armed behind the individual that deployed the flash-bang; (2) each officer

participated in some meaningful way in the search operation which used the flash-bang; and (3)

each officer participated in the search knowing that a flash-bang would be used but failed to

object. Boyd, 374 F.3d at 780.

In this case, there are no allegations that Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto were even

present when Plaintiff was arrested and the excessive force was used. Assuming they were

present, there are no allegations that these officers were anything more than mere bystanders. 

There are no allegations that they were performing some function necessary to the completion of

a police goal nor allegations that they continued their actions despite knowledge of a

constitutional violation. Thus, based on the allegations currently in the complaint, Plaintiff

cannot maintain a civil rights cause of action against Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto on an

“integral participant” theory. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to link Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto with some

affirmative act or omission, Plaintiff’s civil rights cause of action against Defendants Pack,

Bradford, and Casto must be dismissed. When dismissing a complaint, the Ninth Circuit has

stated that “leave to amend should be granted unless the district court determines that the

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 The court does not address this argument as to Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto 2

because they are being dismissed from this action for the reasons cited above.

9

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Bly-Magee v. California,

236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9 Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d th

1293, 1296 (9 Cir. 1996). At this time it appears Plaintiff needs discovery to determine the th

exact roles of Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto. Regardless of when Plaintiff chooses to

amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the Defendants’ actions resulted in a

deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9 Cir. 1980). th

The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named Defendant is involved. There can

be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection

between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. 

B. Official and Personal Capacity

The complaint sues Defendants Long, Logue, and Jones in their official and personal

capacities. Defendants contend that the suits against these Defendants in their official 2

capacities should be dismissed because they are redundant of the action against the City of

Fresno.

In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court explained the difference between individual

and official capacity suits: Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a

government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in

contrast, “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-55; Kreines v. United States, 33 F.3d 1105,

1107 (9 Cir. 1994). An official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as

th

a suit against the entity because the entity is the real party in interest. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-

55; Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9 Cir. 1999); Lewis v. th

Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 446 (9 Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court concluded that “[a] th

victory in a personal-capacity action is a victory against the individual, rather than against the

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entity that employs him.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 167-68.

Under this precedent, Plaintiff’s civil rights claim against Defendants Long, Logue, and

Jones in their official capacities is really a claim against the municipal entity itself, which in this

case is the City of Fresno. A suit against a governmental officer in his official capacity is

equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity itself. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d

630, 646 (9 Cir. 1991). As such, Defendants Long, Logue, and Jones request that this court th

dismiss this claim as unnecessary, improper and redundant. In Luke v. Abbott, 954 F.Supp.

202(C.D. Cal.1997), the District Court held that “the proper Monell defendant in a civil rights

case is the local government entity, and not the local government officer sued in official capacity

on behalf of the local governmental entity.” Id. at 202. The District Court stated that naming a

local government officer in an official capacity claim “only leads to a duplication of documents

and pleadings, as well as wasted public resources for increased attorneys fees.” Id. at 204. This

court agrees with the reasoning of Luke and its progeny. The court finds that when officers in

their official capacity and the local government entity for whom they work are both named in a

lawsuit, the officers in their official capacity are redundant defendants and may be dismissed. 

See id at 203. Thus, the court will dismiss Defendants Long, Logue, and Jones to the extent they

are sued in their official capacities. This court will proceed against the City of Fresno and

Defendants Long, Logue, and Jones in their individual capacities.

ORDER

Based on the above memorandum opinion and order, the court ORDERS that:

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED;

2. Defendants Pack, Bradford, and Casto are DISMISSED from the civil

rights cause of action;

3. Defendants Long, Logue, and Jones in their official capacities are

DISMISSED from the civil rights cause of action; and

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4. Plaintiff may file any amended complaint within thirty days of this order’s

date of service.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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