Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00967/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00967-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

DEBRA REEVES-HOWARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 3:07cv967-MHT

) (WO)

SOUTHERN UNION STATE ) 

COMMUNITY COLLEGE, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

In an on-the-record pretrial conference held on

January 29, 2009, plaintiff Debra Reeves-Howard’s

attorneys informed this court that Reeves-Howard was no

longer bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of her First Amendment rights or a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiracy to violate her civil

rights. Reeves-Howard’s attorneys also clarified that her

claims for race discrimination would no longer be based

on her non-promotion to the position of Acting

Coordinator with Selma CareerLink but would rely solely

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on allegations of “inadequate handling of grievances.”

Pretrial Tr. at 1. Accordingly, the court issued an order

dismissing Reeves-Howard’s First Amendment and conspiracy

claims and narrowing her race-discrimination claim. The

court also issued an order stating, among other things,

that (1) the motion to dismiss would remain pending only

as to the § 1983 claims against defendants Susan Salatto

and Claude O. McCartney in their individual capacities;

(2) the motion to dismiss would be denied in all other

respects; and (3) the trial would be continued to June

14, 2009, with discovery extended to May 1, 2009. 

Following the pretrial conference, however, ReevesHoward filed a motion for reconsideration and

clarification asking that the court allow her to

“withdraw the prior stipulated dismissal of her First

Amendment claims and her race discrimination claims as to

the terms and conditions of her work environment.” Pl.’s

M. Reconsideration at 3. Reeves-Howard argued that she

would not have asked the court to dismiss these claims if

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she had known that discovery was going to be extended and

trial would be continued. Now that the court has granted

more time to complete discovery, she explained, she might

be able to support these claims. For the reasons that

follow, the motion for reconsideration will be denied.

First, the court used the pretrial conference to

narrow the claims and advance this case, and it is

reluctant to undo this work by granting the motion for

reconsideration. According to Rule 16 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may use a pretrial

conference to consider and take action “(A) formulating

and simplifying the issues, and eliminating frivolous

claims or defenses; (B) amending the pleadings if

necessary or desirable; ... (K) disposing of pending

motions; ... [and] (P) facilitating in other ways the

just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action.”

The pretrial conference was especially necessary and

productive in this case. At the time, several of the

claims in the complaint were not clear and a motion to

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dismiss was still pending. During the conference, the

parties narrowed the complaint to focus on the claims

that Reeves-Howard could provide evidence to support; as

a result, the court was satisfied that the pending motion

to dismiss could be denied in all remaining respects

(except as to the claims against Salatto and McCartney in

their individual capacities). Granting Reeves-Howard’s

motion for reconsideration now would not only undo the

necessary work of the pretrial conference, it would

require the court to reconsider its denial of the motion

to dismiss, moving this already lengthy litigation

several steps backward.

Second, Reeves-Howard should have been aware, when

the pretrial conference began, that the defendants’

request for an extension of the discovery and dispositive

motion deadlines was an issue before the court. The

defendants had filed a motion for a scheduling conference

in October 2006, several months before the pretrial

conference, requesting more time to complete discovery

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and an extension as to the dispositive motions deadline.

In fact, Reeves-Howard’s counsel did not oppose this

motion. At the time of the pretrial conference, the court

had not yet ruled on this motion; it was still pending

before the court.

Third, the court relied on Reeve-Howard’s dismissal

of certain claims when it set a new trial date and

calculated how much additional time would be needed for

discovery and the filing of dispositive motions. Granting

the motion for reconsideration would have required the

court to reconsider these dates as well. For example,

Reeves-Howard’s First Amendment claim was particularly

undeveloped before it was dismissed. If this claim had

remained part of this litigation, the court would have

needed to grant even more time for discovery, ReevesHoward would have been required to file yet another

amended complaint, and the court would have needed to

choose an even later trial date. 

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Fourth, because these claims have been dismissed

without condition and without prejudice, denying the

motion for reconsideration will not unduly disadvantage

Reeves-Howard. The voluntary dismissal of claims at this

stage in the litigation is governed by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), which provides that an action

may be dismissed by court order, “on terms that the court

considers proper.” Pursuant to “its broad equitable

discretion under Rule 41(a)(2), the district court must

weigh the relevant equities and do justice between the

parties in each case, imposing such costs and attaching

such conditions to the dismissal as are deemed

appropriate.” Pontenberg v. Boston Scientific Corp., 252

F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001)(internal quotations and

citations omitted). Claims may be dismissed with

prejudice; however, they are usually dismissed only with

costs and fees taxed against the plaintiff. See Ortega

Trujillo v. Banco Central Del Ecuador, 379 F.3d 1298,

1302 (11th Cir. 2004)(clarifying that, “Our research

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indicates ... the usual conditions attached to a

voluntary dismissal involve prejudice only in a practical

sense (e.g., paying costs or expenses, producing

documents, producing witnesses)”); see also McGregor v.

Board of Com'rs of Palm Beach County, 956 F.2d 1017, 1021

(11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that “it is common to

condition dismissal on the payment of the defendant's

costs.”) The court chose not to impose any conditions in

this case, however, mitigating any prejudice (legal or

practical) that might otherwise result from denying

Reeves-Howard’s motion for reconsideration.

Finally, the court notes, without deciding, that if

Reeves-Howard had not dismissed these claims voluntarily,

the court probably would have done so pursuant to the

motion to dismiss. Reeves-Howard’s race discrimination

claim (based on the terms and conditions of her

employment) and her First Amendment claim were simply too

vague and conclusory. For example, the racediscrimination claim asserted merely that Reeves-Howard

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was “harassed” due to her race and “treated differently

in the terms and conditions of her employment.” Except

for the specific claim of non-promotion (which has been

abandoned as to the race-discrimination claim) no

specific facts supporting race discrimination were

asserted; and the proposed pretrial order did no better

at clarifying a basis for this claim. Reeves-Howard’s

First Amendment claim suffered from a similar deficiency.

The complaint failed to identify, specifically, what

speech was protected by the First Amendment or how it

might have implicated a matter of public concern. It

simply made the conclusory and circular assertion that

the defendants “violated plaintiff’s First Amendment

rights to legal redress and speech ... when they refused

to promote her and engaged in a pattern of harassment

against plaintiff in retaliation against plaintiff for

her exercise of her First Amendment rights.” Pl.’s Am.

Comp. at 33. 

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***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that plaintiff Debra

Reeves-Howard’s motion for reconsideration (doc. no. 49)

is denied. 

DONE, this the 20th day of May, 2009.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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