Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Greg Moore; et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Sean Garnand; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 19-0290 TUC RM (LAB)

ORDER

Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion, filed on November 7, 2019, to

submit ex parte, in camera evidence and argument in their anticipated dispositive motions.

(Doc. 47)

As of this date, only two defendants remain in the case – Detective Sean Garand and

Sergeant Dain Salisbury. See (Doc. 1); (Doc. 38) Both men are employed by the Tucson

Police Department (TPD). (Doc. 1) The plaintiffs are in the residential real estate business.

(Doc. 1, pp. 4-5)

The plaintiffs in this action claim their constitutional rights were violated when the

defendants sought and executed search warrants in connection with an arson investigation

into the destruction of the Forgeus Apartments on June 8, 2017. (Doc. 1) They bring this

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, p. 4) Among other things, the plaintiffs claim

that the search warrant 17SW1017, executed on June 9, 2017, was procured without probable

cause. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-16) The defendants apparently believe that the plaintiffs may be

Case 4:19-cv-00290-RM-MAA Document 89 Filed 01/08/20 Page 1 of 5
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responsible for the fire that destroyed these apartments. (Doc. 1) The investigation into that

fire is ongoing. 

On December 13, 2019, this court granted the defendants’ motion to stay discovery

of the arson investigation police files pursuant to the law enforcement investigatory privilege.

(Doc. 74) Among the documents withheld from discovery is the affidavit that the defendants

used to procure the search warrant 17SW1017, executed on June 9, 2017. (Doc. 47) This

affidavit has been disclosed to the plaintiffs only in redacted form.

In the pending motion, the defendants move for permission to submit the unredacted

affidavit ex parte and in camera to this court. (Doc. 47) They then propose to file

dispositive motions challenging several of the plaintiffs’ claims arguing, among other things,

that there was probable cause to issue the warrant executed on June 9, 2017. Id. They intend

to file part of their motions in open court but will submit ex parte and in camera those

arguments that rely on the unredacted affidavit. Id. In other words, the defendants want the

court to entertain dispositive motions based, in part, on a document the plaintiffs are not

allowed to see and arguments to which the plaintiffs cannot respond.

Discussion

“[J]udges . . . are necessarily wary of one-sided process: democracy implies respect

for the elementary rights of men and must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely

be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.” Am.-Arab

Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995). “[T]he very

foundation of the adversary process assumes that use of undisclosed information will violate

due process because of the risk of error.” Id. “It is therefore the firmly held main rule that

a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera

submissions.” Id. 

In the past, courts have acknowledged exceptions to the main rule “when the

submissions involve compelling national security concerns or the statute granting the cause

of action specifically provides for in camera resolution of the dispute.” Vining v. Runyon,

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99 F.3d 1056, 1057 (11th Cir. 1996). Neither of these exceptions are present in the pending

action. Accordingly, the court finds that the “main rule” governs the pending motion. See

Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 70 F.3d at 1069. The court will not “dispose of the

merits of this case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.” Id. The pending motion

will be denied.

The parties in this case dispute whether probable cause supported the search warrant

executed on June 9, 2017. The defendants move that this court resolve the issue by

employing an ex parte, in camera procedure. They maintain this is proper because criminal

courts routinely do so when making probable cause determinations. This argument, however,

compares apples to oranges. 

When criminal courts entertain motions to suppress evidence, they sometimes make

probable cause determinations based on ex parte, in camera proceedings, but the purpose of

these proceedings is to determine what evidence will be admissible at the trial. They are not

deciding the merits of the case. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 678, 100 S. Ct.

2406, 2413 (1980) (“[T]he interests underlying a voluntariness hearing do not coincide with

the criminal law objective of determining guilt or innocence.”). Here, the defendants want

to use an ex parte, in camera proceeding to determine the existence of probable cause and,

in turn, the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. The due process concerns are different.

The defendants further argue that an ex parte, in camera proceeding “is even more

permissible in the civil context, where the parties have less stringent due process rights than

in the criminal context.” (Doc. 47, p. 12) This argument is difficult to follow. The

defendants seem to be arguing that if ex parte, in camera proceedings are permitted in the

criminal context, then they must be permissible in the civil context because due process

protections in the former context are more stringent than in the later. This argument elides

the fact that all criminal procedures are not accorded the same level of due process

protection. The procedure at a criminal suppression hearing does not require the same level

of due process that is afforded the defendant at his trial. U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679,

100 S.Ct. 2406, 2414 (1980). “At a suppression hearing, the court may rely on hearsay and

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other evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible at trial.” Id. The

identities of confidential informants may be withheld at the suppression hearing, but they

must be disclosed before trial if they are “relevant and helpful to the defense.” Id. In sum,

“the process due at a suppression hearing may be less demanding and elaborate than the

protections accorded the defendant at the trial itself.” Id. This is because a criminal

suppression hearing is focused on determining what evidence will be admissible at trial, not

on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. See Id. at 677-679.

So while the due process protections in the criminal context generally exceed the

protections afforded in the civil context, one cannot say that the due process protections

afforded at a criminal suppression hearing also exceed the level of due process required in

the civil context. And while ex parte, in camera procedures may be employed in a criminal

suppression hearing, that does not mean that the same procedure would pass constitutional

muster when resolving a civil claim. See Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045,

1069 (9th Cir. 1995).

In fact, the Ninth Circuit has already held to the contrary that ex parte, in camera

procedures are not permitted when deciding the merits of a civil claim absent special

circumstances not present in this case. Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045,

1069 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of California, 656 F.2d 1337, 1346

(9th Cir. 1981); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S.

1, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987); Vining v. Runyon, 99 F.3d 1056, 1057 (11th Cir. 1996); but see

Meridian Int'l Logistics, Inc. v. United States, 939 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1991) (District

Court could consider ex parte/in camera evidence when determining whether agent “was .

. . acting within the course and scope of his employment for the United States of America.”).

The defendants’ arguments, even if this court were to find them persuasive, are precluded by

Ninth Circuit precedent.

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IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion, filed on November 7, 2019, to submit

ex parte, in camera evidence and argument in their anticipated dispositive motions is

DENIED. (Doc. 47)

DATED this 8th day of January, 2020.

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