Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02286/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02286-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gregory K. Adamson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael Hayes; Chad Watts; Dennis

Dollarhide; Johnny John; Michael

Dobson; Christopher Eastman; Charles

Bridges, Jr.; Robert Papke; Elliot

Campbell; Paul Gruetzmacher; Felipe

Amezquita; Anthony Miller; Paul Viso;

City of Tempe; Joe Arpaio; Maricopa

County, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-2286-PHX-JWS (LOA)

ORDER

I. Background

A. The allegations

On July 30, 2003, the Tempe Police Department received a 911 emergency call

from an employee of Eckerd’s Drug Store, located at the corner of McClintock and

Broadway Road in Tempe, Arizona. (Doc. 56 at 1-2) The 911 caller reported that Plaintiff

Gregory K. Adamson (“Plaintiff “) was allegedly holding a woman at gunpoint in the

Eckerd’s parking lot. When the police officers arrived on scene, Plaintiff failed to follow

their commands to surrender. Plaintiff eventually left the scene in his vehicle and several

police officers followed him. (Id. at 2) The police officers surrounded Plaintiff at the

Champions’ restaurant parking lot in Tempe and again requested that he surrender. (Id.; Doc.

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 See, doc. 4 at 7.

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4 at 4) Plaintiff failed to surrender and Officer Mike Hayes used less-than-lethal force to

subdue him. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Officer Hayes shot the “unarmed Plaintiff in the

back 4 times with [rubber bullets] as Plaintiff was surrendering peacefully.” (Id.) Plaintiff,

who claims to be a minister, asserts that he was attempting to offer assistance (“first aid

prayer”1

) to the woman in the Eckerd’s parking lot, that he did not have a weapon on him

at the time of the incident, and that the Defendant officers had no cause to aim their weapons

at him or to use any force on him. (Id. at 7)

After being arrested and refusing medical treatment, doc. 56 at 14, Plaintiff

was booked into one of the Maricopa County jails. While in jail, Plaintiff was allegedly

denied timely access to his public defender, prevented from using the law library, denied

medical care and wrongly placed in solitary confinement. (Doc. 56 at 2)

The August 29, 2005 pro se Amended Complaint seems to allege three general

claims: (1) use of excessive force and arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, and other violations under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution, all purportedly actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2)

Defendants’ failure to train, supervise, and monitor their employees; and (3) violation of

Plaintiff’s right to Due Process by Defendant Arpaio. (Doc. 4 at 4)

This case languished in the District Court for an extended period of time while

Plaintiff either represented himself or was represented by different lawyers until October 19,

2010 when the case was reassigned to the Honorable John W. Sedwick, United States

District Judge. (Doc. 128) On November 1, 2010, Judge Sedwick denied without prejudice

the then-pending motions for summary judgment, docs. 98, 104, filed by Defendants on June

23, 2009 and August 12, 2009, because “the existing motion papers have grown stale[,]” and

directed the Clerk of Court to appoint a magistrate judge to the case. (Doc. 129 at 2) 

By random lot assignment, this § 1983 action was referred to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge to whom Judge Sedwick “delegate[d] responsibility for conducting [a]

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competency hearing and determining [Plaintiff’s] competency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A). If [Plaintiff] is found incompetent, the magistrate judge is further directed to

appoint a guardian ad litem pursuant to Rule 17(c).” (Id.) Judge Sedwick further directed

that “[i]f a guardian ad litem is appointed, the guardian should have an opportunity to oppose

the defendants’ [anticipated] motions for summary judgment.” (Id.) After Plaintiff’s

competency is determined and a guardian ad litem appointed, if appropriate, a new Rule 16

scheduling order regarding a dispositive motions filing deadline will be entered in order to

manage this case without further delay.

B. November 30, 2010 scheduling hearing

On November 4, 2010, the undersigned set a Rule 16 scheduling conference

in Courtroom 302, Sandra Day O’Connor U.S. Courthouse and ordered counsel for

Defendants and Plaintiff to be physically present “to discuss, among others, the date to

conduct a competency hearing to determine Plaintiff’s competency, whether the parties

desire to conduct any discovery on the issue including the scheduling of an Independent

Mental Examination pursuant Rule 35, Fed.R.Civ.P., and a memoranda deadline prior to the

hearing for the parties to set forth the relevant law on the standard or measure to determine

a plaintiff’s competency in a District of Arizona civil case.” (Doc. 130 at 2) 

At the November 30, 2010 scheduling conference, pro se Plaintiff, a resident

of Chino Valley, Arizona; his companion and driver, Louise Nowell; and defense attorneys,

Maria Brandon and Clarence E. Matherson, Jr., were present. Confirming on the record that

they possessed copies of Plaintiff’s medical records identified in Judge Sedwick’s November

1, 2010 order, counsel for Defendants stipulated that Plaintiff was presently incompetent and

unable to represent himself and declined the Court’s invitation to conduct an Independent

Mental Examination pursuant Rule 35, Fed.R.Civ.P., even though the Court would have

authorized a defense IME despite discovery having closed on April 15, 2008. (Doc. 65 at 2)

At the hearing, Ms. Nowell proffered her lay opinion, based on her personal knowledge of

Plaintiff, that Plaintiff is not presently mentally competent and is unable to safely drive a

motor vehicle. 

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At the conference, Plaintiff provided counsel and the Court with a copy of a

Yavapai County Superior Court minute entry, dated September 22, 2010, issued in a pending

civil case entitled Adamson v. Curtis, Case No. P1300CV20050103. In this minute entry,

Superior Court Judge Ralph M. Hess indicates:

Plaintiff Gregory K. Adamson (“Adamson”) has filed several motions to stay

these proceedings seeking the appointment of an attorney and guardian ad

litem. The Court has denied Adamson’s requests for appointment of an

attorney for the reason that he does not have the right to court appointed

counsel in this civil matter. The Court has also determined that Adamson

is incompetent and in need of a guardian ad litem; however, Adamson has

been unable to nominate anyone to act as his guardian ad litem. . . .

Exhibit 1, page 1, identified at the November 30, 2010 scheduling conference (emphasis

added).

In his November 1, 2010 order, Judge Sedwick noted that Plaintiff has filed

a psychologist’s report, dated August 2, 2010, identifying Plaintiff’s “various mental issues.”

(Doc. 129 at 1) After conducting “a Neuropsychological Mental Status Exam,” Stephen C.

Gill, Ph.D., a Sedona, Arizona licensed psychologist, citing Arizona Revised Statute § 13-

4501, concluded that Plaintiff does not “show the requisite capacity to play an appropriate

role as a plaintiff in a legal proceeding” or “to participate with an attorney in providing

pertinent facts necessary in a court proceeding.” (Doc. 123-1 at 1) Upon a July 28, 2010

evaluation, Dr. Gill found Plaintiff “easily confused, scattered, and lacking sustained focus.

He was highly forgetful in the short term. It was difficult for him to find the right word,

phrase or sentence to provide an explanation in response to a number of questions or

instructions. For example, on a screening measure of cognitive assessment, [Plaintiff] scored

poorly on word recall and verbal fluency. Category cues and multiple choice cues did not

improve the quality of his verbal recall.” (Id.) Dr. Gill diagnosed Plaintiff “with Post

Traumatic Stress Disorder; Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; and Cognitive Disorder, (by

patient report) NOS.” (Id.) 

At the November 30, 2010 scheduling conference, the parties agreed that it was

unnecessary to schedule and conduct a contested competency hearing because it is

undisputed that at this time, Plaintiff lacks the mental capacity to proceed pro se in this §

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1983 action without representation by counsel. The Court agrees.

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) and Guardians ad litem

The Ninth Circuit has established that “[i]f an infant or incompetent person is

unrepresented, the court should not enter a judgment which operates as a judgment on the

merits without complying with Rule 17(c).” Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th

Cir. 1989); Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because there was

sufficient evidence of Allen’s incompetence, the district court abused its discretion in

dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute without first holding a competency hearing

or otherwise considering his claim.”). “The absence of a guardian ad litem in this case

prejudices the ability of the court to request counsel to represent [plaintiff], puts the due

process rights of [plaintiff] in jeopardy in any trial that proceeds absent such representation,

and effectively precludes the possibility of a binding contract of settlement because of the

incompetency of one of the parties.” United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 805

(9th Cir. 1986).

“The preferred procedure when a substantial question exists regarding the

mental competence of a party proceeding pro se is for the district court to conduct a hearing

to determine whether or not the party is competent, so that a representative may be appointed

if needed.” Krain, 880 F.2d at 1121. If the incompetent litigant refuses to cooperate,

however, the district “court may dismiss the case without prejudice.” Id. (citing Bodnar v.

Bodnar, 441 F.2d 1103, 1104 (5th Cir. 1971) (affirming a dismissal without prejudice where

the plaintiff refused to submit to a mental examination to determine whether she was

competent).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 governs both the determination of a party’s

capacity to sue and be sued and his status as the real party in interest. The “real party in

interest” principle requires that an action “be brought in the name of the party who possesses

the substantive right being asserted under the applicable law.” 6A Charles A. Wright, Arthur

R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1541 at 321 (2d ed. 1990)

(“Federal Practice & Procedure” ). Capacity, by contrast, refers to “a party’s personal right

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2

 “A ‘guardian’ is defined as ‘One who has the legal authority and duty to care for

another’s person or property, esp. because of the other’s infancy, incapacity, or disability.’

Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). The person protected, the ‘ward,’ is defined as ‘A

person, usu. a minor, who is under a guardian’s charge or protection.’ Id. A ‘guardian ad

litem’ is a special type of guardian ‘usu. a lawyer, appointed by the court to appear in a

lawsuit on behalf of the incompetent or minor party.’ Id. ‘Ad litem’ is translated from the

Latin as ‘for the specific lawsuit.’” In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 408-09

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to litigate in a federal court.” Id. § 1542, at 327.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides in relevant

part:

(c) Minor or Incompetent Person.

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(2) Without a Representative. [A]n incompetent person who does not

have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a

guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem--or

issue another appropriate order--to protect . . . incompetent person

who is unrepresented in an action.

Rule 17(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. (emphasis added). “Rule 17(c) does not make the appointment of

a guardian ad litem mandatory. If the court feels that the [person’s] interests are otherwise

adequately represented and protected, a guardian ad litem need not be appointed .” McLean

v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 2010 WL 3784527, * 2 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

It is undisputed that Plaintiff lacks a “duly appointed representative” and is not

otherwise represented within the meaning of Rule 17(c). This Rule, however, provides “no

guidance regarding the circumstances that warrant a competency inquiry, or whether a pro

se plaintiff should receive special consideration under the rule.” Ferrelli v. River Manor

Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1195 (2004). In

exercising its discretion in this area, a district court should be “mindful of the need to protect

the rights of the mentally incompetent[,]” id., and is “under a legal obligation to consider

whether [such a] person is adequately protected.” 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d at 805

(citing Roberts v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958)).

The decision whether to appoint a next friend or guardian ad litem 2

 rests with

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28 (3rd Cir. 2006) (citation omitted; italics added).

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the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed unless there has been an

abuse of its discretion. M.K. through Hall v. Harter, 716 F.Supp. 1333, 1335 (E.D.Cal.

1989) (citing 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796); Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 140 (3d

Cir. 1989)). “The actual appointment process of guardians ad litem remains procedural, and

therefore, state rules do not apply to cases brought in federal courts.” Estate of Escobedo v.

City of Redwood City, 2006 WL 571354, * 7 (N.D.Cal. 2006) (citing Gibbs v. Carnival

Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 134-35 (3rd Cir. 2002)); M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174

n. 4 (8th Cir. 1977); Federal Practice and Procedure § 1571 at 511-12 (1991); see generally

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965) (federal courts apply the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure instead of state procedural practices.).

III. Finding of Incompetency and Appointment of Guardian ad litem

Rule 17(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., mandates that “[c]apacity to sue or be sued is

determined . . . for an individual who is not acting in a representative capacity, by the law

of the individual’s domicile.” Rule 17(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. Thus, Plaintiff’s mental capacity

to sue or maintain this lawsuit is controlled by the law of Plaintiff’s domicile, here Arizona.

Estate of Garcia-Vasquez v. County of San Diego, 2008 WL 4183913, * 4-5 (S.D.Cal.

2008); Hudnall v. Sellner, 800 F.2d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 1986). “In Arizona, an ‘incompetent’

person is one who is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings or to

assist in her defense.” Maricopa County Sheriff's Office v. Greer, 2010 WL 1779349, * 3

(Az.Ct.App. 2010) (citing Kelly R. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 213 Ariz. 17, 22, 137 P.3d

973, 978 (Az.Ct.App. 2006)). “In the absence of allegations or facts which indicate that a

hearing might be in order, however, ‘the trial judge is entitled to gauge a party’s competence

by [his] personal conduct in court.’” Id. at 4 (quoting Smith v. Rabb, 95 Ariz. 49, 56-57, 386

P.2d 649, 654 (Ariz.1963)).

Based upon the recent opinions of Dr. Gill, the independent finding of Superior

Court Judge Hess, the Court’s own observations, Plaintiff’s comments at the November 30,

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3

 Precedent exists that in an unusual and exceptional case, CJA funds may properly

pay for a guardian ad litem’s fees in representing an indigent, mentally incompetent plaintiff

in a federal action. United States v. Ecker, 489 F.Supp.2d 130, 138 (D.Mass. 2007) (“The

appointment of a second attorney as a guardian ad litem located in his district is deemed to

be both beneficial to the Court and in the interest of justice. Moreover, the statute itself

authorizes compensation for ‘services necessary for adequate representation.’ 18 U.S.C. §

3006A(e). The Court concludes that the appointment of such a special representative is

necessary and advisable here.”); Scannavino, 242 F.R.D. at 667 (In a civil action brought

against the Florida Department of Corrections and others, the attorney’s “services as

guardian ad litem are compensable at the then-current rate under the Criminal Justice Act,

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (2007).”)

.

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2010 scheduling conference, and the Defendants’ stipulation during the scheduling

conference, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to substantially assist “an attorney in

providing pertinent facts necessary in a court proceeding.” (Doc. 123-1 at 1) The Court

further finds that appointment of a guardian ad litem for Plaintiff is appropriate and

necessary in this case to protect Plaintiff’s interests. As the district court stated in

Scannavino v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 242 F.R.D. 662, 667 (M.D.Fla. 2007), “failure to

appoint a guardian ad litem undermines the plaintiff’s interests and would default both the

court’s obligation under Rule 17(c) and the requirements of justice.” 

Pursuant to Rule 17(c), the Court appoints David Eisenberg, Esq., David

Eisenberg, P.L.C., 331 N First Ave, Suite 108, Phoenix, AZ 85003-4528, a well-respected

and experienced CJA panel attorney, as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff in this case. His

telephone number is (602) 452-2932. Mr. Eisenberg has no known interests adverse to

Plaintiff and must act to protect the Plaintiff’s best interests in this litigation. Mr. Eisenberg’s

services as guardian ad litem shall be compensable at the current rate under the Criminal

Justice Act (“CJA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(F), (d) (2010).3 The CJA provides for the

appointment of representation to “any financially eligible person who . . . [inter alia] is

subject to a mental condition hearing under chapter 313 [18 U.S.C. § 4241 et seq.] of this

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4

 Interestingly, in Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 455-57 (5th Cir. 2004) (en

banc), the Fifth Circuit held that district courts may tax guardian ad litem fees as court costs

against non-prevailing parties, including the government in Federal Tort Claims Act cases

pursuant to Rule 17(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., or, alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) (“Compensation

of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and

costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.”). “As an officer of

the court, the expenses of a guardian ad litem are properly taxable as costs pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d).” United States v. Ruger, Model 223 Mini Rifle, Serial No. 18492495,

2009 WL 2591145, * 3 (W.D.N.C. 2009) (citing Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658

F.2d 835, 854-55 (D.C.Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982)).

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title.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(F). The Court finds that the appointment of a guardian ad

litem in this exceptional § 1983 action is necessary in the interest of justice, and that Plaintiff

is financially unable to obtain and compensate adequate representation and a guardian ad

litem.

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IV. Duties and responsibilities of a Guardian ad litem

Generally, the role of the guardian ad litem in a federal lawsuit “is to protect

the interests of the incompetent person.” Richards v. Duke University, 166 Fed.Appx. 595,

599 (3d Cir. 2006). “The duties of a guardian ad litem are essentially ministerial. While he

may negotiate a proposed compromise to be referred to the court, he cannot render such a

compromise effective merely by giving his consent.” Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075,

1079 (9th Cir. 1978). “It is the court’s order approving the settlement that vests the guardian

ad litem with the legal power to enforce the agreement.” Id. A guardian ad litem is not

appointed to serve as counsel but to “act for the [ward] in the cause, with authority to engage

counsel, file suit, and to prosecute, control, and direct the litigation.” Noe v. True, 507 F.2d

9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1955)).

Moreover, the appointment of a guardian ad litem “deprives the litigant of the right to

control the litigation.” Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1990). “A

guardian ad litem is authorized to act on behalf of his ward and may make all appropriate

decisions in the course of the specific litigation.” Id. As Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem, Mr.

Eisenberg may enter into “binding contracts for the retention of counsel and expert witnesses

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and may settle the claim on behalf of his ward [subject to court approval].” Id. at 1033

(quoting 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d at 805. Unfortunately, the District Court does not

have the funds to compensate an attorney on an hourly basis retained by Mr. Eisenberg to

represent Plaintiff but such attorney may be engaged on a contingency fee or pro bono basis.

Mr. Eisenberg is authorized to “repudiate a settlement agreement prior to court approval.”

Dacanay, 573 F.2d at 1079.

After appointing a guardian ad litem, a district court “maintains a continuing

obligation to supervise the guardian ad litem’s work.” Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,

199 F.3d 642, 652 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing Dacanay, 573 F.2d at 1079; Noe, 507 F.2d at 12

(“through a guardian ad litem the court itself assumes ultimate responsibility for

determinations made on behalf of the [ward]”). Of course, the district court may remove the

guardian ad litem. Dacanay, 573 F.2d at 1079; Hull by Hull v. United States, 53 F.3d 1125,

1127 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that parties seeking to challenge the decisions of a

guardian ad litem have a remedy of applying to the court to have the guardian ad litem

removed or to have another guardian ad litem appointed); Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687,

693 (10th Cir. 1989) (denying standing to legal representative after appointment of a

guardian ad litem, reasoning that proper remedy is to petition the court for removal of the

guardian ad litem).

IT IS ORDERED that David Eisenberg, Esq., is hereby appointed as guardian

ad litem for Plaintiff in this case. Mr. Eisenberg’s services as guardian ad litem shall be paid

pursuant to, and are compensable at the current rate of, the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3006A(d) (2007).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may file dispositive motions

on or after, but not before, Friday, March 4, 2011, but not after Friday, March 18, 2011

or such dispositive motions will be deemed untimely and summarily denied. Any

cross-motion for summary judgment may be filed within 30 days after the filing of an

adverse party’s dispositive motion; provided, however, such motion is related solely to the

specific issue directly raised in the initial dispositive motion. Each side is limited to only one

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 See, LRCiv 7.2(e).

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motion for summary judgment that complies with the Local Rule’s page limitations5 unless

express prior leave of the Court is granted for good cause shown.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court and Defendants shall

provide electronic notice to David Eisenberg, Esq., Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem, on this

order and all future filings herein until further order of the Court.

Dated this 6th day of December, 2010.

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