Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02675/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02675-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUGENE DAVIDOVICH, an individual;

DAVINA LYNCH, an individual; and

JOHN KENNEY, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 11cv2675 WQH-NLS

ORDER

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining

Order filed by Plaintiffs Eugene Davidovich, Davina Lynch, and John Kenney. (ECF No. 29).

I. Background 

On November 16, 2011, Plaintiffs Eugene Davidovich, Davina Lynch, and John Kenney

initiated this action by filing a “Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary

Injunction, Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Relief” against the City of San Diego. (ECF

No. 1). The Complaint asserts two claims titled: “Injunctive Relief” and “Declaratory Relief”

and alleges that San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 titled “Unauthorized

Encroachments Prohibited” which provides: “It is unlawful for any person to erect, place,

allow to remain, construct, establish, plant, or maintain any vegetation or object on any public

street, alley, sidewalk, highway, or other public property or public right-of-way....” is

unconstitutional. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiffs seek “a declaration that [San Diego Municipal Code]

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section 54.0110 is void for vagueness and overbreadth” and an injunction “prohibiting

Defendant and its agents or employees from enforcing [San Diego Municipal Code] section

54.0110.” Id. at 3-4. The declarations attached to the Complaint state that Plaintiffs are

members of the Occupy San Diego movement, which is “a protest in solidarity with the

Occupy Wall Street movement for economic and social justice” being held at the Civic Center

Plaza in downtown San Diego. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2; 1-5 at 1; 1-6 at 1). Plaintiffs allege that

the “police sometimes choose to enforce section 54.0110 very strictly, requiring that no one

entering Civic Center Plaza place any object on the ground, particularly when members of the

protest group ‘Occupy San Diego’ enter the Plaza. On other occasions or with respect to other

individuals, the police allow objects to be placed on the ground.” (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiffs

allege that the “ordinance has a chilling effect on free expression ....” Id. 

On November 17, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Application for Temporary

Restraining Order asserting a facial challenge to San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110. 

(ECF No. 7). On November 21, 2011, the Court heard oral argument on the Ex Parte

Application for Temporary Restraining Order. On December 1, 2011, the Court denied the 

Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 25). The Court stated:

In this case, the prohibition against unauthorized encroachments in San

Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 is content neutral because it does

not single out any type of speech or provide differential treatment based

on the idea expressed. San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110

serves significant government interests in protecting the public’s health,

safety, and welfare; maintaining public property; and ensuring that the

public space is free of obstructions and is available for the use and

enjoyment of members of the public. San Diego Municipal Code

section 54.0110 is narrowly tailored because it is limited to proscribing

intrusion upon the maintenance, use, and enjoyment of public space. 

San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 allows ample alternative

channels for communication and does not preclude Plaintiffs from

communicating their message. 

Based on the record, the Court concludes that San Diego

Municipal Code section 54.0110 is a content neutral, reasonable time,

place, and manner restriction which is narrowly tailored to serve a

significant governmental interest and leaves open ample alternative

channels for communication. 

...

San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 has the plainly legitimate

sweep of protecting the public’s health, safety and welfare; maintaining

public property; and ensuring that the public space is free of obstructions

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and available for the use and enjoyment of members of the public. The

conduct targeted by the ordinance relates to the maintenance, use, and

enjoyment of public space and is not constitutionally protected. To the

extent that the ordinance may restrict expressive conduct, Plaintiffs have

failed to show that there are a substantial number of instances in which

the [ordinance] cannot be applied constitutionally in relation to its

plainly legitimate sweep.

...

The need for definiteness is present in this case because the Court has

presumed that the ordinance implicates constitutionally protected

conduct. When considering the ordinary meaning of the terms encroach,

erect, place, remain, construct, establish, plant, and maintain, as well as

their use in conjunction with each other, the ordinance plainly prohibits

individuals from using vegetation or objects to interfere with the

maintenance, use, and enjoyment of public property. The ordinance

makes it unlawful for a person to “erect, place, allow to remain,

construct, establish, plant, or maintain any vegetation or object” upon

public property in order to advance substantial government interests in

protecting the public’s health, safety and welfare; maintaining public

property; and ensuring that the public space is free of obstructions and

is available for the use and enjoyment of members of the public. S.D.

Mun. Code § 54.0110. The ordinance proscribes easily identifiable

conduct which directly advances the public interest. The Court

concludes that the ordinance provides adequate guidelines to govern law

enforcement and to avoid the potential for arbitrarily suppressing First

Amendment liberties.

Id. at 5-6, 8, 10-11 (quotations and citations omitted). 

On January 18, 2012, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining

Order asserting an as-applied challenge to San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110. (ECF

No. 29). Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order enjoining the City of San Diego “from

engaging in, committing, or performing, directly or indirectly, any and all of the following

acts: arresting or threatening the arrest of [Plaintiffs] or any Occupy San Diego demonstrator

under San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 for temporary placement of personal

belongings, signs, folding tables, chairs, or other personal possessions not constituting

permanent encroachment on city property.” (Proposed Order at 2). 

On January 25, 2012, Defendant filed an Opposition. (ECF No. 34). On January 30,

2012, Plaintiff filed a Reply. (ECF No. 35). On February 9, 2012, the Court heard oral

argument. 

II. Discussion

When the nonmovant has received notice, as here, the standard for issuing a temporary

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restraining order is the same as that for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l

Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the

movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520

U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotation omitted). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a movant

must show “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm

in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008); see also Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“[S]erious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards

the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction....”). 

A. Success on the Merits

Plaintiffs contend that “since the December 1 Order, ... various San Diego Police

officers have told demonstrators they may not set any objects down [in the Civic Center

Plaza].” (ECF No. 29-1 at 2). Plaintiffs contend that “[t]here have also been arrests under

SDMC section 54.0110 for sitting in a folding chair and lying on a tarp....” Id. Plaintiffs

contend that they are “arbitrarily being told they cannot set down objects or they will be

arrested.” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs contend: “Because of the potential for construing section 54.0110

in an overbroad manner, Plaintiffs seek an order to prevent the arbitrary suppression of free

speech and personal liberties that occurs when an individual police officer does construe the

ordinance in an overly broad and impermissible manner.” Id. 

Plaintiffs have submitted the Declaration of John Kenney who states that on December

9, 2011, at 11:30 p.m. “several [San Diego Police Officers] came over and asked [Kenney] if

[he] was the owner of a tarp on the ground.” (ECF No. 29-2 at 1). Keney states that he

“replied that [he] was not the owner ....” Id. Kenney states that a Sergeant “asked [Kenney]

to get off of the tarp [that was on the ground in the Civic Center Plaza], as he felt it was

‘encroaching.’ [Kenney] began to move over. But then [the Sergeant] said, no, moving off of

the tarp was not enough, [Kenney] also had to move entirely out of the area.” Id. Kenney

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states that he “said [he] was just trying to sleep, but that [he] would move over. [The Sergeant]

told [Kenney] again to entirely leave the area.” Id. at 2. Kenney states that “[a]gain, [he said

that he] was just trying to sleep, but that [he] would move over.” Id. Kenney states that he

was arrested and charged with violation of San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110. 

Kenney states that on January 6, 2012, “Occupy member Mike Garcia was arrested and

charged with violating section 54.0110 for sitting in the same folding chair he had been sitting

in daily for weeks at Civic Center Plaza.”1

 Id. Kenney states that the San Diego Police have

also confiscated a “Christmas tree, a folding chair, a table for registering voters, and an

American flag ...” from the Civic Center Plaza. Id. Plaintiffs have submitted additional

declarations asserting that members of the Occupy San Diego protest have been threatened

with arrest pursuant to San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 for placing cardboard signs

on the ground and for setting a wooden soapbox inscribed with the words ‘Free Speech’

unattended in certain areas. 

Defendant contends that San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 has been found

to be a constitutional, content neutral, reasonable time, place, and manner restriction which

is narrowly tailored serve a significant government interest and leaves open ample

alternative channels for communication. Defendant contends that San Diego Municipal

Code section 54.0110 has been in effect since 1993 and Plaintiffs have failed to show a

pattern of impermissible enforcement. Defendant contends that San Diego Municipal Code

section 54.0110 “is being enforced to prevent any individuals including Plaintiffs, other

members of Occupy San Diego, and anyone else in the Plaza area and elsewhere who may

or may not have any affiliation with Occupy San Diego, from setting up camp, leaving their

personal property around in Civic Center Plaza and other public areas, and otherwise

obstructing the free use and enjoyment of the Plaza, and the City’s other public properties

and right-of-ways, by all.” (ECF No. 34 at 8). Defendant contends that the enforcement of

San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 has “nothing to do with their message(s) or the

1

 Plaintiff Kenney describes what happened to Mike Garcia in Plaintiff Kenney’s

Declaration. Mike Garcia has not submitted a declaration in this case. 

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fact that they are demonstrating .... [enforcement] has been to prevent the Occupy San

Diego group members from re-establishing the unsafe and unsanitary ‘camp’ they have set

up at least three times since October 2011....” Id. at 9. 

Defendant has submitted the Declaration of Captain Mark Jones who states that

“[The San Diego Police Department] has enforced [section 54.0110] for years, well before

the Occupy movement, and enforces the ordinance elsewhere within the City with respect

to individuals having no relationship to Occupy [San Diego].” (ECF No. 34-1 at 3). 

Captain Jones states that since October 2011, members of Occupy San Diego have

“repeatedly cluttered Civic Center Plaza with items that indicated an intent to remain,

including camping equipment, tents, canopies, tarps, sleeping bags, tables, chairs, food and

beverage stations, cooking equipment (such as propane-fired grills), refrigeration units,

exercise equipment, luggage, and a garden.” Id. Captain Jones states that the

encampments have been unsanitary and the “[San Diego Police Department has] received

... reports of petty theft, vandalism, drug-use, public intoxication, lewd and disorderly

conduct, physical and sexual assault, and threatening behavior towards vendors ....” Decl.

Captain Mark Jones ECF No. 18-1 at 3. Captain Jones states that the City of San Diego has

incurred significant costs to clean, sterilize, and repair the Civic Center Plaza area as a

result of the Occupy movement. Decl. Captain Mark Jones ECF No. 34-1 at 3. Captain

Jones states that “[t]hroughout the Occupy [San Diego] protest ... protestors have been

permitted to , and consistently have, exercised a wide range of speech activities ... such as

marching, demonstrating, carrying signs and symbols, shouting and chanting, assembling,

and meeting, without interference from [the San Diego Police Department].” Id. 

The Court has previously found that San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 is a

content neutral, reasonable time, place, and manner restriction which is narrowly tailored to

serve a significant governmental interest and leaves open ample alternative channels for

communication. (ECF No. 25); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,

468 U.S. 288296 (1984) (finding that restricting camping and sleeping on public property

was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction and that “using these areas as living

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accommodations would be totally inimical to [the Government's substantial interest in

maintaining the parks in an attractive and intact condition, readily the public]....”);

Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 1990)

(holding that there is no “private constitutional right to erect a structure on public property. 

If there were, our traditional public forums, such as our public parks, would be cluttered

with all manner of structures.”). However, the application of an ordinance that is

constitutional on its face may nonetheless violate an individual’s First Amendment rights. 

See Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 854 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that court must

“make doctrinal space for challenges to the content-discriminatory enforcement of

content-neutral rules....”). 

A party presents an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of an ordinance

when the party “contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the litigant's

particular speech activity, even though the law may be capable of valid application to

others.” Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998). “A successful

as-applied challenge does not render the law itself invalid but only the particular

application of the law.” Foti, 146 F.3d at 635. 

There are two types of as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of an ordinance:

a challenge based on selective enforcement and a paradigmatic challenge. In a selective

enforcement challenge, an ordinance may be “neutral and constitutional ... [but it] has been

enforced selectively in a viewpoint discriminatory way.” Hoye, 653 F.3d at 854 (citation

omitted). “[P]laintiffs are generally required to show the existence of an unconstitutional

policy by extrapolating from a series of enforcement actions ... . [which] demonstrate[s]

that the municipality is enforcing against them a rule that is distinct from the

constitutionally valid enactment.” Id. at 855. In a paradigmatic challenge, the plaintiff

“argu[es] that it is unconstitutional to apply the ordinance to him because, given all the

circumstances, his ability to communicate is unduly constricted.” Id. at 857. “[W]hether

the ordinance is unconstitutionally restricting [plaintiff’s] speech is ultimately a causation

question based on the particular facts: Does the ordinance as applied to the actual

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circumstances ... foreclose ample alternative channels of communication?” Id. at 858-59. 

In this case, San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 proscribes intrusion upon

the maintenance, use, and enjoyment of public space. San Diego Municipal Code section

54.0110 allows ample alternative channels for communication because it is content-neutral

and it and does not preclude Plaintiffs from communicating their message. Plaintiffs have

submitted evidence of only two instances in which individuals were cited for violation of

San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110. Plaintiff Kenney was cited for violation of

San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 because he was sleeping on a tarp in the Civic

Center Plaza. See (ECF No. 29-2 at 1). Plaintiff Kenney reports that another individual

was cited for violation of San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 because that

individual sat “in the same folding chair he had been sitting in daily for weeks at Civic

Center Plaza.” Id. Plaintiffs have also submitted evidence that San Diego Police Officers

have warned Occupy San Diego members not to leave their personal belongings and protest

materials unattended in certain areas of the Civic Center Plaza. 

The Court finds that both of the instances in which individual were cited for

violation of San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 involved reasonable application of

the ordinance. Accordingly, the enforcement actions do not demonstrate that the Defendant

is enforcing San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 selectively in a viewpoint

discriminatory way. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed show that the City of

San Diego is enforcing San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 against Occupy San

Diego members due to viewpoint discrimination. 

The Court finds that there is no evidence that the warnings and enforcement of San

Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110 have prevented Plaintiffs from marching,

demonstrating, carrying signs and symbols, shouting and chanting, assembling, and

meeting. The Court finds that warnings and enforcement of San Diego Municipal Code

section 54.0110 protects the maintenance, use, and enjoyment of public space. 

Accordingly, the warnings and enforcement of San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110

does not unduly constrict Plaintiffs’ ability to communicate their message. The Court

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concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to show that, under all of the circumstances, Plaintiffs’

ability to communicate their message is unduly constricted. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to show that they are likely to

succeed on the merits of their challenge to San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0110. 

B. Irreparable Injury, Balancing of Hardships, Public Interest

 “When ... a party has not shown any chance of success on the merits, no further 

determination of irreparable harm or balancing of hardships is necessary.” Global

Horizons, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 510 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“[T]his rule applies with equal force to the public interest.”). A determination of

irreparable harm, balancing of the hardships, or public interest is not necessary at this stage

of the proceedings because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood

of success on the merits. 

III. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Ex Parte Application for Temporary

Restraining Order filed by Plaintiffs Eugene Davidovich, Davina Lynch, and John Kenney

(ECF No. 29) is DENIED.

DATED: February 10, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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