Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00202/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00202-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Landmark Equity Fund II, LLC seek to strike the affirmative defenses asserted by 

defendant Julio Arias, also known as Julio Arias Balderas. (Doc. 13). On June 2, 2015, Defendant 

filed his opposition to the motion (Doc. 15), to which Plaintiff filed a reply on July 3, 2015 (Doc. 25). 

For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART.

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action for the foreclosure of real property and enforcement of a debt for 

which the property is secured as collateral. (Docs. 1, 8). Plaintiff alleges the real property in issue is 

located at 1524 Lincoln Street, Bakersfield, California 93305, and title for the property was vested in 

Raul Aguilar. (Doc. 8 at 2, ¶ 9.) According to Plaintiff, Mr. Aguilar “transferred the Property to 

Defendant Arias, per a warranty deed recorded 6/15/01, Kern County Document No. 201082359.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that around 2004 or 2005, Cecelio Rosales and Virginia Rosales “began 

occupying the Property while Arias occupied a nearby house and agreed to act as a straw man borrower 

LANDMARK EQUITY FUND, II, LLC,

 Plaintiff,

v.

JULIO ARIAS, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-00202 - JLT

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE OF PORTIONS THE 

ANSWER FILED BY JULIO ARIAS

(Doc. 13)

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on their behalf as to the Property.” (Doc. 8 at 3, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges Arias “transferred title to the 

Property to himself, in his current name, per a warranty deed recorded 5/1/06, Kern County Document 

No. 206107275.” (Id., ¶ 11.) Further, Plaintiff alleges Arias “executed a promissory note for 

$168,000.00 to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, [MERS] nominee for WMC Mortgage Corp, 

for which the Property was secured as collateral, per a Deed of Trust, dated 11/2/06, recorded 11/28/06, 

Kern County Document No. 0206291233.” (Id., ¶ 12.) 

According to Plaintiff, the Arias is identified as the Borrower in the Deed of Trust, which 

contains the following provisions:

Borrower shall occupy, establish and use the Property as Borrower’s principal 

residence within 60 days after execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue 

to occupy the Property as Borrower’s principal address for at least one year after the 

date of occupancy, unless Lender otherwise agrees in writing, which consent shall not 

be unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are beyond 

Borrower’s control. [Deed of Trust ¶ 6]

...

Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application process, Borrower 

or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or with Borrower’s 

knowledge and consent gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or 

statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender with material information) in 

connection with the Loan. Material representations include, but are not limited to, 

representations concerning Borrower’s occupancy of the Property as Borrower’s 

principal residence. [Deed of Trust ¶8]

(Doc. 8 at 13, ¶¶ 13-15.) Plaintiff asserts Arias did not disclose “his role as a straw man borrower for 

the Rosales Defendants and non-occupancy of the Property, contrary to the Note and Deed of Trust.” 

(Id. at 4, ¶ 17.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that “Arias breached his obligations under the Note and Deed 

of Trust” through failing to disclose this role, and by “failing to make timely payments.” (Id., ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff alleges MERS “assigned the Notice and Deed of Trust to Liquidation Properties, Inc.

n/k/a Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp” on October 30, 2008, and the assignment was recorded 

on December 18, 2008. (Doc. 8 at 4, ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiff asserts, “Arias executed a loan modification of the Note and Deed of Trust, with SN 

Servicing, servicer for Citigroup” on February 18, 2010, with a retroactive effective date of January 12, 

2010. (Doc. 8 at 4, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that Arias represented himself as the borrower in the loan 

modification, and “certified, represented and agreed with SN that he lived in the Property as his 

principal address.” (Id., ¶¶ 20-21.) According to Plaintiff, Arias also breached the loan modification 

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through “failing to make timely payments, failed to disclose his straw-man execution of the Instruments 

for the Rosales Defendants and his non-occupancy of the Property.” (Id., ¶ 22.)

Plaintiff alleges Citigroup sold the loan in June 2011 to Residential Fund 76, LLC, and 

“formally assigned the Notice, Deed of Trust and 2010 Modification” on October 11, 201. (Doc. 8 at 

5, ¶¶ 24-25.) Plaintiff asserts that Residual Fund 76, LLC then assigned the Note, Deed of Trust, and 

Modification to Landmark Financial Solutions (“LFS”) on October 28, 2011. (Id., ¶ 26.) 

Plaintiff alleges Arias executed a second loan modification on September 29, 2011, 

“stipulating that LFS was the holder of the loan, representing himself as the borrower, reducing the 

principal loan balance to $80,000.00, per his fulfillment of its conditions, including applying for [the 

Hardest-Hit Fund].” (Doc. 8 at 5, ¶ 27.) However, Plaintiff asserts that Arias breached the 2011 

modification agreement. (Id., ¶ 30) According to Plaintiff, LFS assigned the Note, Deed of Trust and 

Modifications to Plaintiff on January 27, 2015. (Doc. 8 at 5, ¶ 31.)

Based upon these facts, Plaintiff seeks the foreclosure of the Property, “a post-sale 

judgment/writ of possession/ejectment” and enforcement of the Notice, Deed of Trust, and Loan 

Modification instruments “under which Arias is indebted to Plaintiff.” (See Doc. 8 at 6-7.) 

Arias filed his answer to the amended complaint on May 4, 2015. (Doc. 12.) Arias denied 

many factual allegations and stated the following affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a cause of 

action, (2) Plaintiff’s comparative negligence, (3) actions in good faith, (4) estopped/ratification, (5) 

lack of standing, (6) unclean hands, (7) statute of limitations, (8) waiver, (9) full performance by 

defendant, (10) waiver, and (11) consent. (See Doc. 12 at 6-9, ¶¶50-60.) In addition, Arias indicated 

he was reserving his right to state additional affirmative defense based upon new facts that may be 

discovered. (Id. at 9, ¶ 61.) Further, in his prayer for relief, Arias requested that he “be awarded 

attorneys fees and costs.” (Id. at 9.)

Plaintiff now requests that Court “strik[e] the affirmative defenses and prayer for attorney’s fees 

of Defendant Arias and ... deem certain averments in the First Amended Complaint admitted.” (Doc. 

13 at 1.)

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II. Legal Standards

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Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party responding to a pleading to 

“state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1). 

Further, responding parties are instructed to “state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including:

accord and satisfaction; assumption of risk; contributory negligence; duress; estoppel; failure of 

consideration; fraud; illegality; injury by fellow servant; laches; license; payment; release; res judicata; 

statute of frauds; statute of limitations; and waiver.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 

The Court may strike “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter” from a pleading, either on the Court’s own motion or by motion of a party. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(f). A defense may be “insufficient” as a matter of pleading or as a matter of law. See 

Security People, Inc. v. Classic Woodworking, LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44641, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 4, 2005) (citing Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979); Kaiser Aluminum 

& Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982)). The Ninth 

Circuit has explained a defense is insufficiently pled if it fails to give “fair notice” of the defense. 

Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827. A defense is insufficient as a matter of law when there are no questions of 

fact, questions of law are clear and not in dispute, and the defense would not succeed under any 

circumstances. SEC v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citations omitted). Further, a 

defense may be stricken as immaterial if it “has no essential or important relationship to the claim for 

relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

The purpose of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f) “is to avoid the expenditure of time and 

money that must arise from litigating spurious issues.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 

880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, motions to strike affirmative defenses “are disfavored and 

infrequently granted.” Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005). Even if 

a court strikes an affirmative defense, leave to amend should be freely given where the opposing party 

will not be prejudiced given the strong policy favoring resolution of cases “on the proofs rather than the 

pleadings.” Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir. 1957); Wyshak, 

607 F.2d at 827.

III. Discussion and Analysis

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A. Failure to State a Cause of Action: “Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff failed to 

state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the Defendant.” (Doc. 12 at 

6, ¶ 50.)

Plaintiff contends this “fails to provide notice of how the FAC is insufficiently pled.” (Doc. 13 

at 4.) In response, Arias asserts the defense was raised “as a precautionary matter due to [his] inability 

at the pleadings stage to determine the terms of the assignment upon which plaintiff claims a right to 

pursue this action. (Doc. 15 at 4.)

Significantly, proper “[a]ffirmative defenses plead matters extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima 

facie case, which deny plaintiff’s right to recover, even if the allegations of the complaint are true.” 

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Main Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Cal. 1987). In contrast, a 

denial of allegations in the complaint or “an assertion that the [plaintiff] cannot prove the elements of 

[its] claim” is not a proper affirmative defense. Solis v. Couturier, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63271 at 

*8-9 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2009). Accordingly, “[f]ailure to state a claim is an assertion of a defect in 

Plaintiff’s prima facie case, not an affirmative defense.” Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Estrada, 2011 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61010 at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2011); see also Boldstar Tech., LLC v. Home Depot, 

Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“Failure to state a claim is a defect in the plaintiff’s 

claim; it is not an additional set of facts that bars recovery notwithstanding the plaintiff’s valid prima 

facie case”). Therefore, Arias’ first affirmative defense is STRICKEN.

B. Plaintiff’s Comparative Negligence: “Defendant alleges that Plaintiff was negligent 

and careless in and about the matters set forth in the Amended Complaint, and that 

Plaintiff’s damages, if any, are, and/or shall be, the direct and proximate result of 

Plaintiff’s own negligence and that, as a result, Plaintiff’s claim, as contained in the 

Amended Complaint, is barred or proportionately reduced.” (Doc. 12 at 6-7, ¶ 51.)

Plaintiff argues this “is not a defense to this contract-based matter.” (Doc. 13 at 4, citing e.g., 

FDIC v. Varrasso, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50443 at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2012)). In response, Arias 

indicated that he “agrees to the striking or withdrawal of this affirmative defense.” (Doc. 15 at 4.) 

Accordingly, the second affirmative defense is STRICKEN.

C. Actions in Good Faith: “Defendant alleges that the answering Defendant and each of 

their agents, servants and/or employees acted reasonably, properly and in good faith in 

all transactions relevant hereto, and did not directly or indirectly perform any acts 

whatsoever which would constitute a breach of duty owed to Plaintiff.” (Doc. 12, ¶52.)

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Plaintiff argues this affirmative defense “lacks any factual details and is also irrelevant and 

immaterial in showing whether Arias breached the contractual terms of the Note, Deed of Trust or 

Modifications.” (Doc. 13 at 5, emphasis omitted.) On the other hand, Arias argues “[t]his defense is 

asserted based on [his] faithful performance under the terms of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust 

since 2006, and the failure of plaintiff and its predecessors to assert a breach of occupancy clause 

some eight (8) years later.” (Doc. 15 at 5.) 

Notably, Arias does not allege facts in his Answer to support his assertion that he acted in good 

faith. Moreover, to the extent that Arias asserts he “did not directly or indirectly perform any acts 

whatsoever which would constitute a breach of duty owed to Plaintiff,” this defense goes to the merits 

of the complaint. An allegation that “merely negates an element [the plaintiff] was required to prove 

... [is] not an affirmative defense.” Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 

(9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the third affirmative defense is STRICKEN.

D. Estoppel/ Ratification: “Defendant alleges that Plaintiff directed, ordered, approved 

and ratified Defendant’s conduct alleged herein, unreasonably delayed in bringing this 

action and are estopped and barred from alleging the matters set forth in said Amended 

Complaint.” (Doc. 12 at 7, ¶ 53.) 

Plaintiff argues this affirmative defense fails to provide fair notice because “no facts are pled in 

support of th[e] defense.” (Doc. 13 at 5.) Plaintiff notes that Arias “failed to plead that . . . Plaintiff 

used any misleading conduct to lead him to a particular result,” and did not “plead that Plaintiff 

executed any written documents as to this alleged conduct.” (Id.)

In response, Arias asserts the defense based upon his “faithful performance pursuant to the 

terms of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust since 2006.” (Doc. 15 at 5.) According to Arias, “The 

fact that ARIAS has made all payments and complied with all of the terms in the[] operative contracts 

warrants the assertion of these defenses that any breach...may estop plaintiff from pursuing this action 

or otherwise constitute a ratification by plaintiff and/or its predecessors in interest not to enforce or 

otherwise pursue the occupancy clause as a default.” (Id.) Significantly, however, these assertions are 

not made in the answer, which fails to provide Plaintiff fair notice of how the doctrine of estoppel or 

ratification may be applied. See J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Montanez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

137732 at *8-9, (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) (striking an affirmative defense based upon estoppel where 

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the plaintiff failed “to specify which theory of estoppel is being asserted and the allegation [was] 

wholly insufficient to provide . . . adequate notice of the facts supporting the defense”). Therefore, 

Defendant’s fourth affirmative defense is insufficiently pled, and is STRICKEN with leave to amend.

E. Standing: “Defendant alleges that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue.” (Doc. 12 at 7, ¶ 54.) 

Plaintiff argues this is not an affirmative defense, but rather “an allegation Plaintiff has not met 

its burden of proof to pursue this case.” (Doc. 13 at 5, citing Dairy Employees Union Local No. 17 v. 

Dairy, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14805 at *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2015)). In response, Defendant asserts

that he is unable to determine whether Plaintiff has standing “[u]ntil discovery is conducted concerning 

the underlying security documents and the ...sundry assignments plaintiff claims the right to pursue.” 

(Doc. 15 at 5.)

Importantly, because “standing is an element of plaintiff’s prima facie case,” a challenge to 

standing is not a proper affirmative defense. Dodson v. Strategic Rests. Acquisition Co. II, LLC, 289 

F.R.D. 595, 604 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (striking an affirmative defense for lack of standing, because the issue 

“is properly addressed through denial or a motion to dismiss”). Therefore, Arias’ fifth affirmative 

defense is STRICKEN. 

F. Unclean Hands: “Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has continually failed to act in good 

faith when dealing with the rights of Defendant herein, and as a result, Plaintiff is 

barred from relief by the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.” (Doc. 12 at 7, ¶ 55.) 

The doctrine of unclean hands bars recovery for a plaintiff who engaged in “reprehensible 

conduct in the course of the transaction at issue.” McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 

U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (citations omitted). Here, Defendant does not identify any conduct by Plaintiff 

amounting to “unclean hands” in support of this defense in the Answer. Because the assertion lacks 

factual support, it is insufficient to give Plaintiff fair notice of the basis of this defense. See CTF 

Devel., Inc. v. Penta Hospitality, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99538, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009) 

(“simply stating that a claim fails due to plaintiff’s ‘unclean hands’ is not sufficient to notify the 

plaintiff what behavior has allegedly given them ‘unclean hands’”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, 

Defendant’s sixth affirmative defense is STRICKEN with leave to amend.

G. Statute of Limitations: “Defendant alleges that some, or all of the purported claims 

for damages are barred by the provisions of applicable statutes of limitations in the 

California Code of Civil Procedure, including but not limited to, Sections 318, 321,

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336, 337, 337.1, 337.15, 337.2, 338, 338.1, 339, 339.5, 340, 340.1, 340.2, 340.3, 340A, 

340.5, 340.6, 342, 343, 344, 345.” (Doc. 12 at 8, ¶ 56.) 

Plaintiff argues that Arias fails to identify in the Answer “which if any claims are time barred.” 

(Doc. 13 at 6, citing Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49822 at *9-10 (N.D. 

Cal. Apr. 15, 2015)). In response, Arias asserts the defense is “based on the suspected expiration of the 

statute of limitations governing plaintiff’s claim.” (Doc. 15 at 6.) Arias argues, “Plaintiff claims a 

breach of contract under the ‘occupancy clause,’ the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of which occurred 

over 7 years ago... and the fact that this claim has not been raised at any point in time prior to now 

suggests the applicable statute of limitations has expired.” (Id.)

Again, however, Arias did not state any facts in the Answer to support his seventh affirmative 

defense. As the court noted in Hernandez, a defendant must identify the claim to which he believes a 

statute of limitation applies, and allege facts to give a plaintiff fair notice of the defense. Id., 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 49822 at *10. Accordingly, the seventh affirmative defense is STRICKEN with leave to 

amend.

H. Waiver: “Defendant believes, and on such information and belief, alleges that Plaintiff 

engaged in conduct that constitutes a waiver of their rights. By reason of such waiver, 

the answering Defendant is excused from the performance of the alleged contract.” 

(Doc. 12 at 8, ¶57.) “Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has voluntarily and intentionally 

waived the right to seek relief in this action from Defendant.” (Id. at 9, ¶ 59.)

Waiver is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. 

Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, there is no indication in Defendant’s answer that 

Plaintiff engaged in activity that might constitute a waiver of known rights. Without supporting factual 

allegations, Arias’ assertion that the doctrine of waiver is applicable is insufficient to provide fair 

notice. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Nguyen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51641, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 

22, 2012) (finding an affirmative defense insufficient where the defendant “does not provide any 

supporting facts, making it impossible for Plaintiff to ascertain the basis for the affirmative defense[]”). 

Accordingly, these affirmative defenses are STRICKEN with leave to amend.

I. Full Performance: “Defendant alleges that his full performance of any agreement or 

act required of him, if there be such agreements or acts, fulfills all their duties and 

obligations to Plaintiff, if any there be, contractual, fiduciary, or other, and no other 

duty or obligation to Plaintiff remains on behalf of the answering Defendant.” (Doc. 12 

at 8, ¶ 58.) 

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Defendant asserts that through this defense, he affirms that he “fully complied with the 

operative Promissory Note and Deed of Trust concerning the making of all payments called for under 

the Promissory Note.” (Doc. 15 at 6.) Significantly, the denial of allegations in the complaint is not a 

proper affirmative defense. See Solis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63271 at *8-9. Further, Arias fails to 

allege any facts to support this defense in his Answer. Therefore, Arias’ ninth affirmative defense is 

STRICKEN.

J. Consent: “Defendant alleges that Plaintiff consented, expressly and impliedly, to any 

acts or conduct complained of in the Amended Complaint and, therefore, Plaintiff is 

barred from recovery.” (Doc. 12 at 9, ¶ 60.) 

Plaintiff argues this affirmative defense “is duplicative of the above defenses of Waiver, which 

likewise fails to plead Plaintiff’s written consent to the conduct of Defendant Arias, modifying the 

Note and Deed, per the Statute of Frauds.” (Doc. 13 at 7.) In response, Arias asserts he stated the 

defense “as a precautionary measure since the operative underlying documents have not been attached 

to plaintiff’s amended complaint or otherwise been made available to [him]...” (Doc. 15 at 7.) Also, 

Arias argues the defense is not duplicative to the defense of waiver, “to the extent that there may have 

been a conscience waiving of the ‘occupancy clause.’” (Id.)

Again, however, Arias failed to plead any facts to support this affirmative defense. There are 

no facts from which it may be inferred that Plaintiff indicated its consent, expressly or impliedly to 

Arias’ conduct. Without such facts, Arias fails to give Plaintiff fair notice. See Wyshak, 607 F.2d at

827. Therefore, the eleventh affirmative defense is STRICKEN with leave to amend.

K. Reservation of Defenses: “Defendant alleges there may be new facts not alleged in 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint that may reveal new affirmative defenses which this 

answering Defendant may assert at the time of trial.” (Doc. 12 at 9.)

“An attempt to reserve affirmative defenses for a future date is not a proper affirmative 

defense in itself.” Solis v. Zenith Capital, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43350, at *19 (N.D. Cal. May 

8, 2009). (citation omitted). Rather, if a defendant seeks to add affirmative defenses at a later date, the 

defendant “must comply with Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id.; see also Wyshak, 

607 F.2d at 826-27. Thus, Defendant’s reservation clause is not a proper affirmative defense, is 

redundant, and is STRICKEN.

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L. Prayer for attorneys’ fees and costs

In his prayer for relief, Arias requested he “be awarded attorneys fees and costs.” (Doc. 12 at 

9.) Plaintiff requests that Court “strik[e] the affirmative defenses and prayer for attorney’s fees of 

Defendant Arias” because he “did not and cannot allege any contractual or statutory basis for an award 

of his attorney’s fees and costs.” (Doc. 13 at 1, 8.) Plaintiff contends: “The Deed of Trust and Note 

provide for the Lender to collect expenses, such as attorney’s fees and costs in pursuing its remedies 

under them. The Note and Deed of Trust do not provide for the Defendants to collect their fees and 

expenses under them.” (Id. at 8, emphasis omitted.) 

Significantly, however, this Court has determined that striking portions of a prayer for relief is 

not proper under Rule 12(f). Estate of Prasad v. County of Sutter, 958 F. Supp.2d 1101, 1128-29 (E.D. 

Cal. 2013) (declining to strike a prayer for relief for damages or attorney’s fees because the prayer did 

not “qualify material that may be stricken under any of ‘the five categories’ in Rule 12(f)”); see also 

McGuire v. Recontrust Co., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155864 at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“[A]n 

improper prayer is neither an ‘insufficient defense’ nor a ‘redundant, immaterial, impertinent or 

scandalous’ matter under Rule 12(f)”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to strike the 

prayer for attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED.

M. Plaintiff’s request to strike denials

Plaintiff argues that Arias should been deemed to have admitted ¶¶ 13-15, 20, and 21 of the 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) which relate to the Note, Deed of Trust, and loan modifications. 

(Doc. 13 at 8-9.) In addition, Plaintiff argues the Court should find Arias’ denials related to the 

assignments were improper, and that ¶¶ 23-29 of the FAC should be deemed admitted. (Id.)

In these paragraphs of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he Deed of Trust defines the Borrower 

as Defendant Arias,” and includes an occupancy clause requiring the Borrower to “occupy, establish 

and use the Property as Borrower’s principal residence within 60 days after execution of this Security 

Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as Borrower’s principal address for at least one 

year after the date of occupancy...” (Doc. 8 at 3, ¶¶13-14.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges the Deed of 

trust provides the Borrower will be in default if he gives “materially false, misleading, or inaccurate 

information or statements to Lender... in connection with the Loan.” (Id., ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges Arias 

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executed loan modification agreements in 2010 and 2011. (See id., ¶¶ 20-21.) Further, Plaintiff makes 

several allegations related to the assignments of the Note, Deed of Trust, and loan modifications. (Id.

at 4-5, ¶¶ 23-29.)

Arias responded to these allegations stating that he was “without knowledge or information 

sufficient to admit or deny the facts contained in the paragraph[s].” (Doc. 12 at 3, ¶¶ 13-15, 20-21, 23-

29.) Plaintiff argues the responses were improper because Arias admits “his execution of the Warranty 

Deeds, Note and Deed of Trust and denied breaching them,” and Arias “denied breaching the 

Modifications.” (Doc. 13 at 9.) Plaintiff asserts the denials should be stricken because “Arias is clearly 

in possession of copies of these documents and/or has knowledge of them.” (Id., citing In re AST 

Research Sec. Litig., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20850 at *4 (C.D. Ca. Nov. 10, 1994)). 

In re AST Research Sec. Litig., the defendant neither admitted nor denied the allegations set 

forth but instead referred “plaintiffs to documents readily available to defendants.” Id., 1994 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 20850 at *4. Such documents included press releases issued by the defendant, quarterly reports 

also issued by the defendant, and trading records. Id. The court found the defendant failed to comply 

with the requirement of Rule 8(b) to either admit or deny the factual allegations, and deemed the 

allegations of the complaint as admitted pursuant to Rule 8(d). Id. However, the court recognized that 

“if a party is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny, they may so state and this 

has the effect of a denial.” Id. at *3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)). 

Specifically, under Rule 8(b), “A party that lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a 

belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the statement has the effect of a denial.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(b)(5). Here, Defendant asserted he lacked information sufficient to respond to the 

allegations of the complaint where Plaintiff quoted the terms of the Deed of Trust, and the parties to the 

loan modifications. (Doc. 12 at 3, ¶¶ 13-15, 20-21.) Like Plaintiff, the Court finds it somewhat 

incredible that Arias does not know whether he was obligated to reside at the home or that he was the 

“borrower” on the loan, though whether Arias knew he was obligated to live in the home for a year is 

not quite so intuitive. On the other hand, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Arias thinks he 

may have been identified by some other title in the document, such as “mortgagee” or the like or that he 

does not recall now whether there were occupancy requirements. Notably, clarifying these issue should 

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be relatively easily to handle in discovery.

As a result, the Court concludes Arias’ responses related to ¶¶ 23 -29 are marginally justified 

and sufficient to comply with Rule 8(b), under which the responses are deemed denials, not admissions. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(5). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to deem ¶¶ 13-15, 20-21, and 23-29 as 

admitted is DENIED.

IV. Conclusion

Significantly, it does not appear many of the deficiencies identified above may be cured by 

amendment. However, leave to amend the answer should be freely given where the plaintiff will not 

be prejudiced. Rennie & Laughlin, 242 F.2d at 213; Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to strike the affirmative defenses is GRANTED IN PART; 

2. Defendant’s first, second, third, fifth, and ninth affirmative defenses are STRICKEN

without leave to amend;

3. Defendant’s reservation to state other affirmative defenses is STRICKEN without 

leave to amend;

4. Plaintiff’s motion to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED; 

5. Plaintiff’s motion to deem ¶¶ 13-15, 20-21, and 23-29 of the First Amended Complaint 

as admitted is DENIED; and

6. Any amended answer SHALL be filed within twenty-one days of the date of service of 

this order. If Defendant does not amend within this time period, the Answer will stand.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 9, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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