Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01328/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01328-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

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and Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARMON WARREN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

D. L. RUNNELS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-01328 OWW NEW (DLB) HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. #13]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections at High

Desert State Prison in Susanville, California. Petitioner challenges a prison disciplinary hearing held

on August 21, 2002, wherein Petitioner was found guilty of engaging in sexual behavior. Petitioner

administratively appealed the decision; the final administrative appeal was denied on December 16,

2002. 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed three post-conviction collateral challenges in the state courts. On

April 2, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kings County Superior

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Although the petition was filed in the Kings County Superior Court on April 7, 2005, the petition was dated April 2, 2

2005. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is deemed filed on the date of its

submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487

U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess the timeliness of federal habeas

filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9 Cir. 2001), citing Houston v. Lack, th

487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Therefore under the mailbox rule, the Court deems the petition filed on

April 2, 2005, the date Petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison authorities for mailing.

Although the petition was filed on June 24, 2005, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the petition filed 3

on June 21, 2005, the date Petitioner signed the proof of service and presumably handed the petition to prison authorities for

mailing.

Although the petition was filed on May 10, 2006, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the petition filed 4

on April 7, 2006, the date Petitioner signed the proof of service. 

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

Court. See Exhibit A, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Motion”). The superior court

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denied the petition on May 23, 2005, as untimely. See Exhibit B, Motion. Specifically, the superior

court cited to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993) and stated, “No adequate justification for the delay in

bringing this petition is put forth here.” Id. 

On June 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court

of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District. See Exhibit C, Motion. The petition was summarily denied on 3

June 30, 2005. See Exhibit D, Motion.

On April 7, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. See Exhibit E, Answer. On June 14, 2006, the petition was denied as untimely with 4

citation to In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921 (1979), In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998), In re

Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949), and People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). See Exhibit F,

Motion.

On August 29, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on January 16, 2007, for violating the

statute of limitations, failure to exhaust state remedies, procedural default and lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner filed an opposition on April 19, 2007.

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." See

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.1990). 

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

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4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period, for failure to exhaust, for lack of jurisdiction and for procedural default.

Accordingly, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under

Rule 4. 

II. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on August 29, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

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U.S. District Court

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the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In a situation such as this where the petitioner is challenging a prison

disciplinary action, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded and the statute of

limitations commences when the final administrative appeal is denied. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

1077, 1079 (9 Cir.2003) (holding that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of an inmate’s

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administrative appeal was the “factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggered the

commencement of the limitations period). Therefore, the limitations period commenced on

December 17, 2002, the day after Petitioner was informed that his administrative appeal had been

denied. See Exhibit B, Motion. Under Section 2244(d)(1)(D), Petitioner had one year until

December 16, 2003, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Petitioner did not file his federal petition until August 29, 2006, over two and one-half years

after the limitations period had expired.

A. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

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(9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9 th th

Cir.2001) (“tolled period includes intervals between the disposition of a state court petition and the

filing of a subsequent petition at the next state appellate level”); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1247 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that the "AEDPA's one-year grace period is tolled during the pendency

of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at issue."); cf. Dils v. Small, 260

F.3d 984, 986 (9 Cir.2001) (Court found no tolling between consecutive filings at the same level);

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Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal.2001) (holding that the interval between a

motion for sentence modification in the state superior court and a habeas petition in the superior

court was not tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on December 17, 2002. Although

Petitioner filed three post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim in the state courts, those petitions did not operate to toll the statute of limitations. The first

collateral challenge was filed on April 2, 2005, over a year after the limitations period had expired. 

Because the limitations period had already expired, the collateral challenges had no tolling

consequence. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to th

tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256

(11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). In addition, the state court

petitions were denied for untimeliness. For this reason as well, the state court petitions could not toll

the limitations period. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408

(2005).

In his opposition, Petitioner argues he should be given tolling for the time a federal civil

rights complaint was pending in federal court. See Warren v. Shawnego, Case No. CV F 03 6336

AWI WMW P. Petitioner’s argument is without merit, since a federal action does not qualify to toll

the statute of limitations. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001). 

For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is untimely.

B. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

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way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), th

citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. th

814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 th

(9th Cir.1993). 

In this case, the Court finds no reason to equitably toll the limitations period. Petitioner

argues his federal civil rights complaint, while defective, should toll the limitations period because it

demonstrates he was pursuing his rights diligently. However, supposing the Court assumed the

complaint demonstrates diligence, Petitioner has not demonstrated that some extraordinary

circumstance prevented him from timely filing the instant petition. Therefore, he is not entitled to

equitable tolling. Moreover, the petition would still be untimely even if the Court were to grant

equitable tolling for this time period.

III. Exhaustion

Respondent argues the petition is also unexhausted because it was denied as procedurally

defective. Respondent’s argument is not persuasive. A petitioner can exhaust his state remedies if he

has properly presented his claim to the California Supreme Court but the court declined to address

the merits of the claim due to a procedural default. See Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th

Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner has exhausted his claims in state court.

IV. Procedural Default

A federal court will not review claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the state court

has denied relief on those claims on a state law ground that is independent of federal law and

adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). This doctrine

of procedural default is based on the concerns of comity and federalism. Id., at 730-32.

There are limitations as to when a federal court should invoke procedural default and refuse

to evaluate the merits of a claim because the petitioner violated a state’s procedural rules. 

Procedural default can only block a claim in federal court if the state court “clearly and expressly

states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). 

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If the court finds an independent and adequate state procedural ground, “federal habeas

review is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual

prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-805 (9 Cir. 1993); Coleman, 501 U.S. th

at 750; Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In this case, the state courts denied Petitioner’s habeas petitions for failure to timely file his

claims. Respondent claims the state procedural ground is independent of any federal question and

adequate to support the judgment. Petitioner does not argue the state ground was not independent or

adequate. In addition, Petitioner has not shown cause for the default or actual prejudice, or

demonstrated that failure to consider the claims will result in miscarriage of justice. Therefore,

Respondent’s argument that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims should be accepted.

V. Lack of Jurisdiction

Respondent claims the Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition because the legality or

duration of Petitioner’s confinement is not at issue. Respondent’s argument is persuasive. A habeas

corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the “legality or duration” of his

confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Although Petitioner challenges the outcome of a disciplinary hearing and an

assessment of lost good-time credits, a review of his petition and the attached Rules Violation Report

reveals Petitioner was assessed no credit forfeiture due to time constraint violations. See Exhibit A,

Motion. Therefore, Respondent is correct in that Petitioner’s complaints do not challenge the legality

or duration of his confinement, and the Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for violating the

limitations period, for procedural default, and for lack of jurisdiction.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

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California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation,

any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” 

Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if

served by mail) after service of the Objections. The Finding and Recommendation will then be

submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. th

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 8, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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