Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02444/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02444-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

, a minor,

and, her natural

guardian,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CALIFORNIA REGENTS SAN

DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

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Case No. 3:12-cv-2444-GPC-MDD

REDACTED ORDER:

(1) GRANTING RENEWED

MOTION TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS; 

(2) DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH

PREJUDICE;

(3) DENYING REMAINING

PENDING MOTIONS AS MOOT

On February 12, 2013, plaintiff (“Ms.”) filed a first

amended complaint (“FAC”) on behalf of herself and her minor daughter,

(together, “Plaintiffs”). (ECF Nos. 10, 15.)

Ms. filed the FAC after this Court instructed her to file amended

versions of her initial complaint, motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and

request for appointment of counsel. (See ECF Nos. 5, 6.)

Upon review of the Amended Motion to Proceed IFP, (ECF Nos. 12, 17), the

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Court determined the Motion was moot because Plaintiff had paid the required filing

fee and did not request service of process by the U.S. Marshal. (See ECF Nos. 31, 32.) 

The Court thus denied the Amended Motion to Proceed IFP. (Id.) 

Upon review of the Amended Motion for Appointment of Counsel, (ECF Nos.

13, 16), the Court determined appointment of counsel was not appropriate because the

Amended Motion to Proceed IFP had been denied and because the Court determined

Plaintiffs had little to no likelihood of success on the merits given the fantastical

nature of Plaintiffs’ allegations. (ECF Nos. 31, 32.) The Court thus denied the

Amended Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (Id.)

The Court further noted that “a parent or guardian cannot bring an action on

behalf of a minor child without retaining a lawyer.” (Id. (citing Johns v. Cnty of San

Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1997).) The Court thus gave Ms.

until June 7, 2013, to retain counsel or face dismissal of the claims brought on behalf

of Daughter. (ECF Nos. 31, 32 at 4.)

On May 6, 2013, defendant County of San Diego (“County”) filed a motion to

dismiss the FAC. (ECF Nos. 19, 29.) The Court set the County’s Motion to Dismiss

for a hearing on September 6, 2013. On May 28, 2013, defendants La Mesa-Spring

Valley School District and John Parsons also filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, which

the Court set for a hearing on September 20, 2013. (ECF Nos. 34, 35.) On July 25,

2013, defendant Wendy Belger (erroneously sued as “Wendy TBD”) joined the

County’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 54.) Thereafter, on August 6, 2013,

defendants David Morse & Associates, Bill McDaniel, and Julie McDaniel filed a

motion to dismiss the FAC, which the Court also set for a hearing on September 20,

2013. (ECF No. 56.)

On June 11, 2013, Plaintiffs filed several motions, including: (1) a renewed

motion to proceed IFP to obtain U.S. Marshal service; (2) an alternative request for an

extension of time to serve the FAC; (3) a request for an extension of time to retain

counsel for Ms.’s daughter; (4) a motion for leave to file a second amended

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complaint; (5) a motion to disqualify judge; (6) a renewed motion for appointment of

counsel; (7) and a motion for extension of time to respond to the County’s Motion to

Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49.)

On July 18, 2013, the Count filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for an

Extension of Time to Respond to the County’s Motion to Dismiss, noting Plaintiffs had

not explained why they were unable to timely respond to the County’s Motion or

require a continuance of the September 6, 2013 hearing that, at the time, was seven

weeks away. (ECF Nos. 52, 53.) On August 20, 2013, Plaintiffs filed another motion

for extension of time to respond to the County’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 57,

59.)

1. Motion to Disqualify Judge

Plaintiffs move to disqualify the undersigned judge because, in denying

Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Appointment of Counsel, the Court relied on language

from Plaintiffs’ FAC that the County also relied on in its Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiffs note that both this Court’s order and the County’s Motion to Dismiss

quote Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding “multidimensional sexual experience[s]”; the

Church of Scientology’s practice of “mind f**king”; “cycle[s] of energy vampirism”

in which defendants engage in a “predator[y] or parasitic lifestyle or demonic

possession,” dependent upon locating “human hosts for their survival.”

Plaintiffs argues “the defense has taken selected words or phrases from various

areas of the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, out of context and strung them together

in a couple ofsentences and misconstrued the plaintiff’s intended meaning.” Plaintiffs

then provide an explanation of the “selected words or phrases,” relying on a book

called, Psychic Vampires: Protection From Energy Predators & Parasites, written by

Joe H. Slate, Ph.D., along with another book entitled, Sacred Hunger: The Vampire in

Myth and Reality, written by Michelle Belanger. 

Plaintiffs argue the County failed to diligently investigate Plaintiffs’ allegations

before asserting Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous. Plaintiffs thus argue the undersigned

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should recuse himself because “plaintiffs have used this expert supported phrase to

describe harmful experience and because the Court[’]s reliance on this phrase as

depicted by the defendant indicates a bias against the plaintiffs.”

Plaintiffs claim “the Court has accepted obvious defense strategies from the

[County],” including a defamatory attack on Ms.’s credibility. Plaintiffs

claim the Court disregarded the Plaintiffs’ “references to expert support for her

allegations, [and] appears to have been intimidated by mere defensive tactics.” 

Plaintiffs further claim that the County’s assertion that “it appears evident that the

plaintiff who signed and presumably prepared the Complaint, suffers from an

undiagnosed mental disorder” is a defensive tactic “meant to shed doubt on the

plaintiff’s credibility, [and] [i]mproperly influence the Court to hasten dismissal before

any discovery can be conducted.” Plaintiffs imply that the Court has shown bias

against Plaintiffs by allowing the County to file a motion that containssuch statements.

Plaintiffs further claim the Court’s warning of dismissal if counsel was not

obtained for Ms.’s daughter showed bias because it came soon after the

County’s assertion that it appeared the author of Plaintiffs’ FAC suffered from an

undiagnosed mental disorder. 

In sum, Plaintiffs claim the Court has shown bias against them “by allowing the

defendants[’] defense strategies to influence [the Court] into taking action to ma[k]e

the determination that the plaintiffs claim is frivolous.”

Recusal of a federal judge is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 145. A judge

must “proceed no further” in a case if he “has a personal bias or prejudice” against or

in favor of any party. 28 U.S.C. § 144. A judge “shall disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” and “[w]here he

has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). 

“Under both statutes, recusal is appropriate where a reasonable person with

knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9thCir.1993)

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(quotation omitted). A “reasonable person” is defined as a “well-informed, thoughtful

observer,” as opposed to a “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.” Clemens v.

United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.2005)

(quotation & citation omitted). Further, under § 455(b)(1), a judge must recuse himself

when he harbors actual bias. United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 915 (9th Cir.

2008). 

Ordinarily, the party must allege “facts thatfairly support the contention that the

judge exhibits bias or prejudice directed toward a party thatstems froman extrajudicial

source.” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir.1980) (emphasis added). 

This “generally requires asthe basis for recusal something other than rulings, opinions

formed[,] orstatements made by the judge during the course of the trial.” Holland, 519

F.3d at 913-14. “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias

or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).

“[I]n the absence of a legitimate reason to recuse himself, a judge should

participate in cases assigned.” Holland, 519 F.3d at 912 (quotation & citation omitted).

First, the undersigned harbors no actual bias for or against any party to this

action. Second, the Court finds no reasonable person, as defined in Clemens, would

conclude the Court’s prior order demonstrates a bias against Plaintiffs. It is of no

moment that the Court relied on the same allegations that the County relied on in

determining whether Plaintiffs’ allegations bore any likelihood of success on the

merits, as it is common for courts and parties to rely on key allegations throughout the

course of a given case—especially, as here, where the key allegations form the crux of

a complaint. Finally, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of bias “thatstems from an

extrajudicial source.” That is, Plaintiffs have provided no information derived from a

source outside of these proceedings to demonstrate the undersigned is biased against

Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court must deny Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Disqualify Judge.”

2. Renewed Motion to Proceed IFP

On October 9, 2012, Plaintiffs paid the required $350.00 filing fee. (See ECF

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No. 1.) On that basis, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Proceed IFP as

moot. (ECF Nos. 31, 32.) Plaintiffs now renew their request to proceed IFP in order

to obtain marshal service on the as of yet unserved defendants. (ECF Nos. 40, 43.)

a. IFP

All partiesinstituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$350.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure

to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

Ms. declares she is currently unemployed, and that she was last

employed in April 2008. (ECF Nos. 12, 17.) Ms. states that, in November

2012, she received a lump sum of approximately $11,000 when she cashed out her

pension. (Id.) She statesthatshe receives auxiliary socialsecurity disability payments

for the care of her daughter. (Id.) Ms. states she has several checking and

savings accounts that, at the time of her declaration, had balances totaling

approximately $7,700. (Id.) She further states that she has an educational IRA in her

minor daughter’s name with a balance of about $11,500. (Id.)

Ms. asserts she owns four vehicles: an inoperable 1974 BMW, a

financed 1978 Mercedes with $800 owed, a financed 2007 Sebring with about $3,100

owed, and a financed 2004 GMC with about $6,200 owed. She statesthat her wedding

ring set is worth about $5,000. She states that she owns a single family home with

monthly mortgage payments of $1,207.88, and that she pays an HOA fee of $174 per

month.

Ms. states her daughter and her husband are her dependents and that

she contributes about $180 a month to each of them. She states she owes

approximately $121,700 in student loans. She states that her day-to-day expenses are

provided by her husband’s retirement and disability benefits. In total, the Court finds

Ms.’s debts and expenses far exceed her assets and income and that she has

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therefore demonstrated the inability to pay the required filing fee. Accordingly, the

Court will grant Plaintiffs’ renewed motion to proceed IFP.

b. Sua Sponte Dismissal

Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP is subject to sua sponte

dismissal by the Court to the extent it contains claims which are “frivolous, malicious,

fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a

defendant immune fromsuch relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);Calhoun v. Stahl, 254

F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (“the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th

Cir.2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court

to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”).1

A complaint will be considered frivolous, and therefore subject to dismissal

under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez,

504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). The determination of whether a complaint isfrivolous must

be weighted in favor of the plaintiff. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Indeed, a court cannot

properly dismiss an action commenced by an in-forma-pauperis applicant if the facts

alleged in the complaint are merely “unlikely.” Id. at 33. A court, however, may

properly dismiss a complaint if the court finds the allegations to be “fanciful,”

“fantastic,” or “delusional,” or if the allegations “rise to the level of the irrational or the

wholly incredible.” Id. (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328). This standard applies

whether or not judicially noticeable facts exist to contradict the frivolous allegations. 

Id. If a claim is classified as frivolous, no reason exists to grant leave to amend

because the underlying action of a frivolous claim, by definition, has no merit. Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1127 n.8.

See also Velarde v. Heartland Christian Homeschool Ctr., Inc., 2013 WL 244555 (S.D. Cal. 1

Jan. 22, 2013) (undertaking § 1915(e)(2)(B) analysis where plaintiff paid the filing fee but requested

to proceed IFP in order to obtain marshal service); Powell v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2012

WL 2261189 (D. Ariz. June 15, 2012) (same).

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Here, Plaintiffs allege defendants violated their First, Thirteenth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting them to gender, religious, and racial

discrimination.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the deprivation of a

right secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) that the deprivation

was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Anderson v. Warner, 451

F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

Ms. alleges she attended San Diego State University from August

1981 through August 1986 and that, during that time, defendant Gene Lamke

(“Lamke”) discriminated against her via a “multidimensional sexual experience,” in

which he told “everyone in the class have a nice weekend but not [Ms.].” 

(ECF Nos. 10, 14 at 2.) Ms. alleges she therefore “experienced a mental

breakdown while sitting in class.” (Id.)

Ms. alleges that, in the spring of 2003, “Lamke was present the

morning after the plaintiff awoke from a Sea World sleep over . . . and indicated to

[other children there] that there was something wrong with [Plaintiffs],” thus causing

Ms. to become fearful for her daughter’s safety. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs allege

this “discrimination [was] related to gender, religion, and race,” and that Plaintiffs’

“First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth Amendments have been violated.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege

Lamke “misused research, scientific methods or religious practices to cause harm to

[Plaintiffs],” and that “Plaintiffs have suffered a series [of] repetitive multidimensional

sexual experiences causing an interference with their natural development and violation

to their civil rights.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs assert that “sheriff personnel are participating in the discrimination

scheme,” claiming that because “they are the law enforcement and the State’s muscle,

it follows that they will take up interests identified to them by State Actors, like

Lamke.” (Id.) Plaintiffs claim “the State has secured [sheriff personnel’s] cooperation

by use of their position and by the misuse of religious practices, science or research

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methods.” (Id.)

Ms. provides that she began having problems with sheriff’s

department personnel in 2003, alleging “they intentionally had multidimensional sex

with [Plaintiffs] and drained them of vital energy.” (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiffs allege that

sheriff’s department personnel’s “dependency on victims allows themto be used by the

State defendant(s) to target plaintiff with discrimination that caused serious harm

leading to imminent death.” (Id. at 4.)

Ms. elaborates that Lamke may be considered a social scientist and

that “his discriminatory scheme that provides him with sexual gratification likely

makes him a sexual psychopath.” (Id.) She asserts Lamke’s “state position allows him

to gain assistance by trust and his ability to misuse religious practices, science and

research,” including a “misuse of research regarding Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.” 

(Id.) Ms. asserts that “law enforcement would be stuck at the bottom level

of biological needs of feeding and with the full State Authority.” (Id.) Ms.

asserts “this is a condition called psychic vampirism or involves a demon spirit called

incubus,” and “could be the result of improper training and supervision.” (Id.) Ms.

claims this is supported by the fact that she “reported this theory to the

sheriffs in June 2010, July 2011, and February 2012 and about May of 2012 without

any indication that they will investigate the theory even though it has a high degree of

risk of harm,” including the “improper use of a spirit that has sex with female victims

while they sleep and drain them of vital energy.” (Id.) Ms. claims “[t]his

misuse of State Action, religious practices, science and research not only victimizes

[Plaintiffs] but also the law enforcement at the same time they are trapped in a cycle

of energy vampirism, predatorial and parasitic lifestyle or demonic possession.” (Id.

at 5.) Ms.asserts “[t]his means that they are depended upon locating human

hosts for their survival.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs claim “the defendant conspired with others to violate numerous civil

rights on a continuing basis,” using what the Church of Scientology calls a

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“communication highway,” which is a “telepathic way to communicate.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege Lamke used “Church of Scientology or other religious methods

to violate [Plaintiffs’] civil rights.” (Id.) Ms. claims she and her daughter

“were exploited with multidimensional sexual experiences,” which the Church of

Scientology calls “mind f**king.” (Id.)

Ms. claims the aforementioned “communication highway” was used

“to cause segregation to the plaintiffs” and “to cause defamation of character,

confusion, improper guidance and loss of economic rights, loss of right to associate,

to gain knowledge.” (Id. at 6.) Ms. claims “[t]he defendants have misused

research by obtaining cooperation by . . . using the power of suggestion and coupling

it with repetition.” (Id.)

Ms. claims “[t]he defendants’ discrimination is with the intent to

annihilate,” claiming “the discriminatory method is not only to purpose death upon the

plaintiffs but also to their descendants.” (Id.) Ms. asserts the “Church of

Scientology believes in accessing past and present life experiences,” and that

“[r]esearch has reveal[ed] methods for time travel.” (Id.) She asserts the “Church of

Scientology’s term ‘thetan being’ means the human spirt,” and that this “thetan being

can be accessed and their life detrimentally affected by relocation or elimination.” (Id.) 

Ms.contends Lamke practiced such a method of “relocation or elimination”

of her thetan being while she was a student in his department. (Id.) Ms.

claims “Defendant has advocated the creation of the future,” which is a process the

Church of Scientology calls “postulation.” (Id.) Ms. asserts that, through

postulation, “defendant misused religious practices, science or research,” and that the

“intentional taking of all the unborn ‘theta beings’ . . . from [Ms.] prevents

[her] from having descendants.” (Id. at 7.)

Ms.assertsshe “has been able to recall past life experiencesthat have

rights taken away including the memory of three children, the taking of all her

descendants, wealth and loss of economic rights and privileges, loss of relationships

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with family, friends and associations, lack oftravel, lack of privacy, other fulfilling and

rewarding skills like being a fast reader.” (Id.)

Ms.alleges “the discrimination isto prevent her free speech and other

First [A]mendment rights.” (Id.) She alleges two state licenses have been denied as

a result of prior restraint. (Id.) The first license was a California license to practice

law, which Plaintiff failed to receive after failing the bar exam. (Id.) Ms.

claims she failed the bar exam because, about ten days prior to the exam, her daughter

suffered a “multidimensional sexual battery which [Ms.] contends was a

state authorized gang rape by sheriff deputies.” (Id.) She claims the denial of her law

license is a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. (Id. at 16-17.)

Ms.elaboratesthat “Defendant arranged for three specifically placed

multidimensional sexual experiences for [her daughter] with the intent to alter her

natural development for the purpose of her sexual exploitation.” (Id. at 8.) Ms.

asserts the first incident occurred in April or May 2000 and involved only

Lamke, the second “was about June to August 2003” and involved “Defendant Dixon

and numerous of his associates,” and the third was on July 16, 2011 and involved

severalsheriff deputies. (Id.) Ms.further claims there were “repetitious and

on-going batteries . . . against [Plaintiffs’] will and during unconscious sleep.” (Id.) 

Ms.thus asserts her daughter’s Thirteenth Amendment rights were violated

because “these batteries caused a loss of vital energy to the Daughter and provided for

sexual gratification to the defendants, they should be considered involuntary sexual

servitude.” (Id.) Ms. further contends that, “as a State Authorized rape of

the daughter,” such action constitutes a violation of the daughter’s Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.) Ms. asserts her

daughter “cannot escape the confinesthe Defendant has placed in her dreams,” and that

“the deprivation of sleep and loss of vital energy is torture.” (Id.)

Ms. then goes on to describe how each of the remaining defendants

were involved in the alleged scheme to discriminate against Ms. and her

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daughter. 

Ms.asserts defendantJesse Dixon (“Dixon”) is, like Lamke, a faculty

member at San Diego State University, and that Dixon discriminated against Ms.

by changing the answers on her examto prevent her fromobtaining a license

to be a recreational therapist. (Id. at 11-12.) Ms. asserts Dixon spoke of

Church of Scientology theories in class and discussed “States [sic] requested research

of answering the question of what does it take to make one commit suicide,” and Ms.

believes she is the subject of such research. (Id. at 12.) Ms.

asserts Dixon led the “multidimensional battery that took [her] line of descendants,”

and that he also led the “multidimensional sexual assault on [her daughter] in 2003,”

which involved “him training her a[] little at a time to perform sexually and each time

she conformed, he rewarded her with a sucker.” (Id.) Ms. asserts “this was

a state authorized gang rape involving numerous of his associates,” and that her

daughter’s thetan being “did not survive the attack as part of the annihilation.” (Id.)

Ms. asserts her daughter experienced the second “multidimensional

sexual battery” from early July 2003 to mid-August 2003, which “started with

significant trust building and training and extended over numerous nights,” ending

“with the exploitation of [Ms.’s] daughter by numerous associates of the

defendant.” (Id. at 13.) Ms. asserts she also “suffered from

multidimensional batteries causing her to suffer a serious depletion of vital energy and

experience a paralysis and watched helplessly and was unable to protect” her daughter. 

(Id.)

Ms. alleges defendant Sonya Wright (“Wright”) was also employed

at San Diego State University and that she “improperly hired, provided inadequate

supervision and inadequate training to the defendants,” and that she failed to take

action “to prevent the violations suffered by the plaintiffs.” (Id. at 14.)

Ms. asserts defendant William Gore (“Gore”) is the Sheriff of San

Diego County and that he “knew or should have known of the condition of the sheriff

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department including improper hiring, inadequate supervision and inadequate training

leading to the violation of the plaintiffs’ civil rights.” (Id. at 15.) Ms.

asserts that “sheriff personnel claim state authority for conduct and refuse to

investigate” Ms.’s theory that “sheriff personnel are involved in the

multidimensional sexual assault” on Plaintiffs, despite the fact that Ms.has

provided the sheriff’s department with Slate’s book on psychic vampires. (Id. at 16.) 

Ms. asserts that the defendant professors, Lamke and Dixon, are directing

sheriff’s personnel in the alleged annihilation scheme. (Id.)

Ms. asserts defendant Diane Jacobs “is employed as Board of

Directors,” and that she “knew or should have known of the condition of the sheriff

department,” and failed to take corrective action. (Id. at 17.)

Ms. claims defendant Al Guerrin (“Guerrin”) “is employed as

Assistant Sheriff,” and that “[h]e was the Captain of the Lemon Grove Sheriff

Department in 2004 when [Ms.] visited him . . . at the same time as the

severe 2003multidimensionalsexual experiencesto [Ms.’s daughter].” (Id.

at 18.) Ms. claims that, prior to this visit, she “experienced

multidimensional batteries of which some were sexual and others were severe

beatings.” (Id.) She claims Guerrin “attempted to use the multidimensional sexual

batteries against [her] twice in his presence.” (Id.) Ms. further claims

Guerrin also “improperly supervised, inadequately hired and inadequately trained the

sheriff personnel under his authority,” and failed to take corrective action. (Id.) 

Ms. asserts defendants Sergeant Bolwerk (“Bolwerk”), Sergeant

Yamamoto (“Yamamoto”), Sergeant Kirk Thomson (“Thomson”), Lieutenant Finley

(“Finley”), and Deputy Willis (“Willis”) are all employees of the sheriff’s department

and that they participated in the “multidimensional sexual batteries and beatings”

against Plaintiffs and/or failed to take corrective action. (Id. at 19-22.)

Ms. claims defendant Lieutenant Michael Hernandez (“Hernandez”)

is also employed by the sheriff’s department and that he participated in the

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discrimination against Plaintiffs by failing to take action when Ms. advised

him that Plaintiffs’ neighbor—defendant sheriff’s deputy Donna Duncan

(“Duncan”)—had taken an inappropriate interest in Ms.’s daughter and that

Ms. herself was experiencing a drain in vital energy. (Id. at 22-23.) Ms.

asserts Hernandez retaliated against her “by sending a deputy and [PERT]

nurse to [Ms.’s] home.” (Id. at 23.)

Ms.asserts defendant Sergeant Rose (“Rose”) is also employed by the

sheriff’s department and that she supervised Duncan. (Id. at 24.) Ms.

asserts that, in June 2010, she complained to Rose that Duncan had an inappropriate

interest in Ms.’s daughter and that both she and her daughter were “suffering

interference with their bodily integrity.” (Id.) Ms. explained her theory

regarding the “drain of her vital energy while she was sleeping and forwarded her a

copy of [the Slate book on psychic vampires].” (Id.) Ms. claims Rose, in

turn, retaliated against Ms. “by sending a deputy and [PERT] nurse to [Ms.

’s] home.” (Id.)

Ms. claims “Defendant Detective with the PERT nurse” is also

employed by the sheriff’s department and that he participated in the discrimination

against Plaintiffs by going to Plaintiffs’ home several days after Ms.

reported Duncan’s alleged inappropriate interest in Ms.’s daughter to

Hernandez and Rose. (Id. at 25.)

Ms. claims defendant Wendy TBD (“Wendy”) was the PERT nurse

who accompanied the aforementioned deputy. (Id. at 35.) Ms. claims

“defendant used intimidation to threaten [Ms.] with incarceration as

retaliation and to violate her civil rights.” (Id.) 

As mentioned above, Ms. alleges Duncan is also deputy for the

sheriff’s department, and also thatshe “lives a couple doors down from” Plaintiffs. (Id.

at 26.) Ms.assertsshe recognized Duncan’s voice “as being the deputy that

arranged the multidimensional gang rape” of Ms.’s daughter, and that

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Duncan “participated in repetitive assaults and beatings on [Ms.],” which

“should be considered involuntary servitude.” (Id.) Ms.asserts Duncan also

“arranged for a hearing devi[c]e to be placed inside [Plaintiffs’] home by sending . . .

a salesman for a home security system.” (Id.)

Ms. claims defendant Marilyn TBD (“Marilyn”) is also employed by

the sheriff’s department and thatshe participated in the alleged discrimination scheme. 

(Id. at 36-37.) Ms.asserts Marilyn advised Ms.that the “sheriffs

were hiring for court deputies,” and that, in January 2011, Marilyn stopped her vehicle

in front of Ms.’s home to speak with Duncan. (Id. at 37.) Ms.

asserts that, when she looked out the window, Duncan glared at her. (Id.) 

Ms. claims defendant Sergeant Wallace (“Wallace”) is also an

employee ofthe sheriff’s department and that he responded to Ms.’s 911 call

regarding the alleged July 16, 2011 multidimensional attack on Ms.’s

daughter, and that Wallace failed to fully investigate Ms.’s claims. (Id. at

33.)

Ms.alleges defendant DeputyBucher (“Bucher”)is also employed by

the sheriff’s department and that he responded to Ms.’s call in May 2012

regarding her concern that Duncan was continuing to cause multidimensional attacks

against Ms.’s daughter. (Id. at 34.) Ms. claims that Bucher said

he could handle the investigation but would not return messages. (Id.)

Moving on to the remaining non-sheriff personnel defendants, Ms.

asserts that defendant Bill McDaniel is a manager that works for defendant David

Morse and Associates, is a Church of Scientology member, and “has misused religious

practices, science or research violating Plaintiffs’ civil rights.” (Id. at 27.) Ms.

asserts Bill McDaniel “was so encouraged, coerced or forced by the state

defendants that their conduct equates to state action against [Plaintiffs] by

participating” in Lamke and Dixon’s discrimination scheme. (Id.) Ms.

asserts that, “by using the ‘communication highway’ Defendant misuse[d] religious

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practices, science or research to conduct defamation of character of [Ms.]

resulting in segregation, economic hardship and deprivation of rights. (Id. at 28.)

Ms. asserts Julie McDaniel is an office manager at David Morse and

Associates and is also a Church of Scientology member. (Id.) Ms. claims

Julie McDaniel gave Ms. religious books concerning the Church of

Scientology, “showed disapproval that [Ms.] could not make a better effort

to read them,” and also participated in the alleged discrimination scheme. (Id. at 29.)

Ms. claims defendant Skip Williams (“Williams”) is an “Investment

Representative” that worked with Ms.and that he invited and took her to the

Church of Scientology. (Id. at 30.) Ms.asserts Williams violated numerous

civil rights by using the “communication highway.” (Id.)

Ms. claims defendants John Parson (“Parson”) and Mr. Strickland

(“Strickland”) were employed as principal and teacher, respectively, at the daughter’s

school. (Id. at 31-33.) Ms. claims Parson and Strickland discriminated

against Plaintiffs by failing to take appropriate action in response to Ms.’s

daughter being bullied at school. (Id.)

Plaintiffs contend “the Sexual Psychopath in Institutions of Higher Learning

statute is unconstitutional because the states valid purpose cannot be achieved,”

because “[i]t sweeps too broadly or too narrowly to be effective . . . is vague,” and “is

irrational.” (Id. at 37-38.) In short, Plaintiffs take issue with the unidentified statute

because it requires “the removal of sexual psychopath only if they are convicted.” (Id.

at 38.)

Plaintiffs conclude their FAC with a prayer for “$4,000,000 to include all

remedies available under the law.” (Id. at 40.)

Considering Plaintiffs’ entire FAC, asset forth above, the Court finds Plaintiffs’

allegations lack an arguable basis in fact. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. At the core

of Plaintiffs’ allegations is a theory that San Diego State University faculty used

psychic means to orchestrate a scheme involving sheriff’s department personnel, Ms.

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’s former colleagues, and the Church of Scientology to destroy the lives of

Ms. and her daughter. Plaintiffs’ allegations rest on “psychic vampirism”;

a telepathic “communication highway”; psychic “multidimensional” attacks; psychic

“mind f**king”; and demonic possession—all used to obliterate Plaintiffs’ “thetan

beings” or human spirits and to drain them of their “vital energy.” Notwithstanding

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Slate’s book about “psychic vampirism” and terms used by the

Church of Scientology, the Court findsthese allegations to be “fanciful,” “fantastical,”

or both. See id.

Even assuming there were a factual basis for Plaintiffs’ allegations, Plaintiffs

have not provided any legal basis on which to sue Defendants for engaging in such a

scheme. Plaintiffs assert Defendants’ actions violated their First, Thirteenth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting them to gender, religious, and racial

discrimination. Plaintiffs have provided no authority, and the Court has found no

authority, however, that would allow a plaintiff to recover under these amendmentsfor

being subjected to such a scheme. The Court thus finds Plaintiffs’ allegations lack an

arguable basis in law. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations are frivolous for purposes of §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and must therefore dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC. Further, because a

frivolous claim, by definition, has no merit, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC with

prejudice. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 n.8.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify Judge, (ECF Nos. 40, 47), is DENIED;

2. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, (ECF Nos. 40,

43), is GRANTED;

3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), Plaintiffs’ FAC is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE, and the Clerk of Court is directed to enter

JUDGMENT accordingly;

4. All remaining motions that remain pending are DENIED AS MOOT;

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5. The hearings currently set on September 6 and 20, 2013, are VACATED; 

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to TERMINATE this case; and

7. The Clerk of Court is directed to FILE UNDER SEAL this Order in

accordance with the procedures set forth in the Order at ECF Nos. 5, 6.

DATED: September 4, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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