Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02084/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02084-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH . Prt~o Uoued St.atqs G>urr t;>£ Appeals 

Tenth Ci:-ruit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

F£B 12 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

-------------=ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

BILL M. OVERTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

P. CREPO, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 90-2084 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C.· No. 89-0406 HB) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Bill M. Overton, pro se. 

Shirley D. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Gary R. Allen, 

David English Carmack and Curtis C. Pett, Attorneys, Tax Division, 

Department of Justice, Washington,, D. c., William L. Lutz, United 

States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Of Counsel, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

* After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determiniation of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-2084 Document: 01019726091 Date Filed: 02/12/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Bill M. Overton appeals pro se from the 

district court's dismissal of his claims against the United States 

and his claims against internal revenue officer P. Crepe, in her 

individual capacity. Plaintiff asserts that Crepe illegally and 

maliciously filed a notice of federal tax lien for the years 1977 

and 1981 on his property. He seeks damages from the United States 

and Crepe, as well as the release of the federal tax lien. The 

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction relying upon the AntiInjunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421. The court dismissed the claims 

against the revenue officer for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

In accordance with Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), we 

have construed the plaintiff's pro se pleadings liberally. we 

first consider the district court's dismissal of defendant's claim 

against the revenue officer for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

The plaintiff has the burden of proving personal jurisdiction. 

Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 

440, 443 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 1082 (1986). 

For such jurisdiction, a defendant must have "certain minimum 

contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the 

suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 

U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 

(1940)). See Benally v. Amon Carter Museum of Western Art, 858 

F.2d 618, 624-26 (lOth Cir. 1988). Plaintiff approaches the issue 

differently, contending that the court has personal jurisdiction 

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Appellate Case: 90-2084 Document: 01019726091 Date Filed: 02/12/1991 Page: 2 
by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which provides for service upon 

federal defendants by certified mail beyond the territorial limits 

of the district in which the suit was initiated. Clearly he is 

mistaken. Section 1391(e) is a venue statute, not a grant of 

"nationwide in personam jurisdiction in a personal damage action 

against a United States official in his individual 

capacity •••• " Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th 

Cir. 1985) (citing Stafford v. Briggs, 444 u.s. 527 (1980)). See 

also Borntrager v. Stevas, 772 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 474 u.s. 1008 (1985). Personal jurisdiction does not 

result from§ 1391(e), and we find nothing in the record to 

indicate that the revenue officer has ever had any contact with 

New Mexico. Plaintiff therefore has failed to meet his burden of 

proving that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 

revenue officer would not offend the due process standard of 

International Shoe. The district court correctly dismissed 

plaintiff's claims against the revenue officer in her individual 

capacity. 

Turning to the claim for damages against the government, 

"[i]t is well-settled that the United States retains its sovereign 

immunity from suit unless it has expressly waived such 

immunity .••• " National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs 886 

F.2d 1240, 1245-46 (lOth Cir. 1989) (citing Atkinson v. O'Neill, 

867 F.2d 589, 590 (lOth Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff cannot rely on the 

Federal Tort Claims Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity since 

the act excludes from coverage "[a]ny claim arising in respect of 

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Appellate Case: 90-2084 Document: 01019726091 Date Filed: 02/12/1991 Page: 3 
the assessment or collection of any tax .••• " 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2680(c). Furthermore, plaintiff cannot rely on I.R.C. § 7432. 

Section 7432 amounts to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for 

civil damages actions for failure to release a federal tax lien 

upon notice under I.R.C. § 6325; however, it is effective only for 

damages arising and notices given after December 31, 1988. 

Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, § 6240(c), Pub. 

L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3746. Plaintiff has not shown that he 

has given notice in accordance with S 6325. Section 1432's waiver 

therefore is inapplicable. Since there was no waiver of sovereign 

immunity, the district court correctly granted the government 

summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for damages. 

We now address plainti-ff's request for injunctive relief. 

The Anti-Injunction Act provides that "no suit for the purpose of 

restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be 

maintained in any court by any person .... " I.R.C. § 742l(a). 

"A judicial exception to the act permits an injunction 'if the 

taxpayer demonstrates that: 1) under no circumstances could the 

government establish its claim to the asserted tax; and 2) 

irreparable injury would otherwise occur.'" Lonsdale v. United 

States, 919 F.2d 1440, ____ (lOth Cir. 1990) (quoting Bob Jones 

University v. Simon, 416 u.s. 725, 737 (1974)). Nothing in the 

record remotely indicates that plaintiff has established either of 

the Bob Jones prerequisites for injunctive relief. 

Plaintiff contends that the IRS has removed the assessments 

underlying the lien and that the Anti-Injunction question is 

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Appellate Case: 90-2084 Document: 01019726091 Date Filed: 02/12/1991 Page: 4 
"moot" since there is no "assessment" or "collection" at issue. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 5 at 4. Yet plaintiff apparently has failed to 

pursue the administrative remedy for such a claim. The Code 

provides that the Secretary is to issue a certificate of release 

for any notice of federal tax lien within thirty days of the day 

the Secretary determines that the liability for the underlying 

assessment has been satisfied or is legally unenforceable. I.R.C. 

§ 6325(a); Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 401.6325-1 (1983). Taxpayers can 

request such certificate of release with a written submission to 

the district director where the lien is filed. The writing must 

contain the name and address of the taxpayer, a copy of the notice 

of federal tax lien, and an explanation of the grounds for release 

of the lien. Id. 

If, as plaintiff alleges, "(t]he IRS has implicitly admitted 

[its] mistake •.• by removing the assessments," rec. vol. I, 

doc. 5 at 4, he is not without remedy. If the assessments indeed 

have been paid and the Secretary refuses to issue a certificate of 

release pursuant to his duty under S 6325(a), plaintiff may force 

the release by instituting proceedings against the Secretary in 

the nature of mandamus, 28 u.s.c. S 1361, or through a quiet title 

action, 28 U.S.C. S 2410(a). 1 Plaintiff, however, has failed to 

1 Section 2410 waives sovereign immunity only to the extent 

that the taxpayer challenges the procedural regularity of the 

lien, not the underlying tax assessment. Schmidt v. King, 913 

F.2d 837 (lOth Cir. 1990); Pollack v. United States, 819 F.2d 144, 

145 (6th Cir. 1987); Aqua Bar & Lounge v. United States, 539 F.2d 

935 (3d Cir. 1976); Falik v. United States, 343 F.2d 38, 40-43 (2d 

Cir. 1965). To the extent that taxpayer challenges the 

Secretary's failure pursuant to his duty under I.R.C. § 6325(a) to 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-2084 Document: 01019726091 Date Filed: 02/12/1991 Page: 5 
provide any evidence of a § 6325 notice or of payment of the 

assessments. 2 

The Supreme Court's interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) 

requires that summary judgment be granted against a party "who 

fails to • establish the existence of an element essential to 

that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 

proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 979 

(lOth Cir. 1990). The moving party need only "inform[] the 

district court of the basis for its motion, and identify[] those 

portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of 

a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The government has met this 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

release the lien upon notice and proof that the underlying 

assessments have been paid, he challenges the procedural 

regularity of the existence of the lien itself, and not the 

assessments. This type of suit obviously would not violate the 

principle that "a person whose sole claim is that a federal tax 

assessment was not well grounded in fact and law must 'pay first 

and litigate later.'" Falik, 343 F.2d at 42. See also Kurio v. 

United States, 281 F. Supp. 252, 264 n.l3 (S.D.Tex 1968) ("Once 

the tax or part of the assessment has been paid, the suit is no 

longer in the nature of an injunctive action."); United States v. 

Waite, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (W.D.Pa. 1979); Annotation, 

Taxpayer's Right under 28 USCS § 2410(a) to Challenge Procedures 

Followed in Imposing and Enforcing Federal Tax Lien on his 

Property, 38 A.L.R. Fed. 900 (1978). 

2 Exhibit A in plaintiff's complaint appears to be a written 

request seeking a certificate of release for the lien, rec. vol. 

I, doc. 1, A; however, the pleadings mention nothing of the 

matter, and the complaint contains nothing more than allegations 

that the assessments have been removed and are unenforceable. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2084 Document: 01019726091 Date Filed: 02/12/1991 Page: 6 
burden by pointing to the Anti-Injunction Act as a bar to 

injunctive relief. Plaintiff, on the other hand, has not provided 

evidence of compliance with the notice provisions of § 6325 or 

that the assessments have been paid or are legally unenforceable, 

nor has he established the Bob Jones prerequisites for injunctive 

relief. 416 U.S. at 737. The government is not required to come 

forth with affirmative evidence to disprove these elements. 

Plaintiff therefore fails under the Celotex guideline for 

avoidance of summary judgment. 477 U.S. at 322, 23. We conclude 

that "there is no genuine issue of material fact" and that the 

government is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

AFFIRMED. 

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