Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00992/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00992-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONTOREY DANYELL HARPER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, ET AL.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-00992-GPC-BGS

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IFP [ECF No. 2]

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

On April 25, 2016, Plaintiff Montorey Danyell Harper (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro 

se, initiated this action against defendants United States Government, City of San Diego 

(“City”), San Diego Sheriff Department, Police Department, and Hard Rock Cafe (“HRC”)

(collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff concurrently filed a motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion and sua sponte DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a 

claim on which relief may granted.

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DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP

Any party instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay 

the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a), the Court may waive the filing fee if a party demonstrates an inability to pay by 

submitting an affidavit reporting all assets of the individual. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The 

plaintiff must submit an affidavit demonstrating an inability to pay the filing fee, and the 

affidavit must include a complete statement of the plaintiff’s assets. Id. § 1915(a)(1). When 

a plaintiff moves to proceed IFP, the court first “grants or denies IFP status based on the 

plaintiff’s financial resources alone and then independently determines whether to dismiss 

the complaint” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“§ 1915(e)(2)”). Franklin v. Murphy, 

745 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984).

In his declaration accompanying the Motion to Proceed IFP, Plaintiff states that he 

is employed and receives $4025.00 per month in wages. (ECF No. 2 at 1.) Plaintiff also 

receives an additional $2906.00 per month in veteran’s assistance (VA) and $1119.00 per 

month in social security benefits (SSA). (Id.) Plaintiff maintains a checking account with 

a current balance of $60.00. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff does not have any other significant assets 

such as real estate, stocks, bonds, or securities. (Id.) Plaintiff has regular monthly expenses 

in the amount of $4,050.00—$1900.00 on housing, $1150.00 on food, and $1000.00 on 

transportation. (Id.) Plaintiff does not have any dependents, debts owed, or financial 

obligations. (Id.)

Based on Plaintiff’s representations, he is able to pay the filing fee, and the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP.

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II. Sua Sponte Screening

A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), is

additionally subject to mandatory sua sponte screening. The Court must dismiss any 

complaint if at any time the Court determines that it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 

F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(en banc).

The requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are analogous to those under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “Rule”) 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8, a pleading 

must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual 

allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). To state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially 

plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, “the nonconclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be 

plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

In addition to the liberal pleading standards set out in Rule 8(a), a document filed 

pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When the 

plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court affords the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2001); Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d 621, 623 

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(9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights 

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal 

interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, “[v]ague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand 

a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 

Cir. 1982); see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim under § 

1983). “The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal 

quotations omitted).

Plaintiff invokes jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to Gibson v. United 

States, “[t]o make out a cause of action under section 1983, plaintiff[] must plead that (1) 

the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived the plaintiff[] of rights secured 

by the Constitution or federal statutes.” 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff

alleges that “defendant”—presumably Defendant HRC—refused Plaintiff service based on

Plaintiff’s race and sex. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff’s further alleges that Defendant City 

was “having its employees and residence [sic] discriminate” and that “the city is caught up 

in the US sex discrimination and sex schemes.” (Id.)

Plaintiff does not allege any conduct suggesting that Defendant HRC acted under 

the color of state law. Defendant HRC appears to be a private entity. Further, there are no

allegations indicating that any Defendants were acting in concert to further “established 

city policy or procedure” that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional or federal statutory rights. 

See Gibson, 781 F.2d at 1337. See also Monnell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 

658, 691 (1978) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat 

superior theory.”); Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 1981) 

(explaining that the plaintiff must allege that the municipality’s implied or tacit 

authorization, approval, or encouragement of illegal conduct resulted in the action causing

harm to plaintiff) (quoting Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 

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U.S. 1016 (1980)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s discrimination allegations

fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff’s remaining allegations are scattered and not comprehensible, unsupported 

by any factual allegations, and fail to state a claim that is plausible on its face.

1

Accordingly, as currently pled, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal and 

the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and 

sua sponte DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failing to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days 

from the date this Order is stamped “Filed” to file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

that addresses the pleading deficiencies noted above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2016

 

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint requests damages for emotional distress “in cases brought under 

Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), and the Rehabilitation 

Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 749(a)(1).” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff’s Complaint further 

requests relief for “emotional pain,” “suffering,” “inconvenience,” “mental anguish,” and 

“loss of enjoyment of life.” (Id. at 3–4.) Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint claims that Plaintiff’s 

business was harmed as a result of Defendants’ actions. (Id. at 4).

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