Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-00389/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-00389-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Tafoya, ) Case No. CV 06-389-PCT-FJM (JM)

)

Petitioner, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

v. )

)

Mary Hennesy, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

_________________________________)

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

[Docket No. 5] filed under 28 U.S.C. §2254. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the

United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter

was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below,

the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the

record, deny and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 6, 2001, Petitioner was charged in case number CR 2001-0185 with one

felony count of sale of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine) in Navajo County, Arizona.

(Ex. A.) A jury found Petitioner guilty of the charge on November 6, 2002. (Ex. B.) On

December 3, 2002, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Petitioner on

intensive probation for a term of 5 years. (Ex. C, Ex. D.) 

On December 13, 2002, Petitioner was charged by Information in case number CR

2002-0721 with 6 counts of use of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine). (Ex. E.) By

Case 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1The Petition is actually dated January 13, 2002, but refers to Petitioner’s December 2002

conviction. As such, the date reflected on the petition clearly should have been 2003. (Ex.

F.)

- 2 -

Petition dated January 13, 2003,1

 the State sought to revoke probation in CR 2001-0185.

(Ex. F.) 

On May 27, 2003, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement that provided he would

plead guilty to one of the new charges in CR 2002-0721 and admit that he violated probation

in CR 2001-0185. (Ex. H.) In exchange, the State: (1) would dismiss all remaining charges

in CR 2002-0721; (2) would not file substantive charges stemming from the January 13,

2003, petition to revoke; and (3) would not allege that Petitioner committed his new offense

while on probation and felony release. (Id.) At his change of plea hearing on May 27, 2003,

Petitioner waived his constitutional rights and pled guilty to the new charge and admitted to

the probation violation. (Ex. I, at 1-14; Ex. J.) However, the sentencing agreement was

rejected because the trial court believed that Petitioner had not been given adequate time to

obtain drug treatment after he was placed on probation, a fact the court saw as “something

unfair.” (Ex. I, at pp. 14-16.) The prosecutor explained that Petitioner had been placed on

probation prior to his 2001 case and failed to go to treatment as directed. (Id. at 16-17.) The

court declined to accept the plea, suggesting that the prosecutor “try it out on another Judge.”

(Id. at 17.) 

On July 16, 2003, a different judge of the superior court accepted the agreement and

set the matter for sentencing. (Ex. K, Ex. L.) On July 30, 2003, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to an aggravated 7 year term of imprisonment for the probation violation, and to

a concurrent 3 year term of imprisonment for the new drug charge. (Ex. P., Ex. Q, Ex. R.)

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition on April

9, 2004, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. (Ex. U.) The trial court

denied the petition on June 15, 2004. (Ex. W.) On July 15, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition

for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals based solely on the then-recent case, Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Ex. X.) On June 17, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals

Case 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

issued an order stating that the petition for review did not address any of the issues raised in

the PCR petition and the “those claims have been waived for further review.” (Ex. Y.)

Nevertheless, the Appeals Court stayed the petition for review and revested jurisdiction in

the trial court to permit the Petitioner to present his Blakely claim to the trial court. (Id.) 

On July 5, 2005, Petitioner filed a PCR petition limited to a Blakely issue. (Ex. Z.)

On August 16, 2005, the trial court denied the petition without a written analysis of the

Blakely claim. (Ex. BB.) On September 12, 2005, Petitioner’s counsel moved to withdraw

from representation, stating “counsel finds no ground on which to base a Petition for

Review.” (Ex. CC.) Counsel requested that Petitioner be given an extension of time to file

a pro per Petition for Review. (Id.) The trial court allowed counsel to withdraw and gave

Petitioner until October 21, 2005, to file a petition for review. (Ex. DD.) 

On October 26, 2005, Petitioner filed a “motion for special action review,” which was

dated October 17, 2005, and which raised his Blakely claim. (Ex. EE.) The Arizona Court

of Appeals treated the motion “as a timely supplemental petition for review.” (Ex. FF.) The

court denied the petition without analysis on November 10, 2005. (Ex. GG.) 

On December 30, 2005, Petitioner filed a “petition for special action by prisoner” in

the trial court, again raising a Blakely claim. (Ex. HH.) On January 6, 2006, the trial court

ruled that Petitioner’s new action was not a special action under the Arizona Rules of

Procedure for Special Actions, but rather an attempt to seek a rehearing or review of the PCR

petition denied on August 26, 2005. (Ex. II.) The court denied the motion for rehearing as

untimely. (Id.)

The instant petition was filed on February 3, 2006, and amended on April 5, 2006.

Docket Nos. 1 & . In addition to his Blakely claim, Petitioner has raised a number of claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

With the exception of the Blakely claim, Respondents contend that Petitioner failed

to exhaust any of his claims in state court. A state prisoner must exhaust the available state

Case 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 2Respondents also contend that Swoopes is no longer good law and that under Baldwin

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004), Petitioner was also required to petition the Arizona

- 4 -

remedies before a federal court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion

occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing that a claim has been procedurally

defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his claims to the

state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these claims. See

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been “fairly presented” if the

petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories on which the claim is based.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.

1995). The operative facts must be presented in the appropriate context to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation requirement is not satisfied, for example,

when a claim is presented in state court in a procedural context in which its merits will not

be considered in the absence of special circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S.Ct.

at 1060. An exact correlation of the claims in both state and federal court is not required.

Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. The substance of the federal claim must have been fairly presented

to the state courts. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court found his

claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims in any forum, that

no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.

1982). "To exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999).2

 

Case 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Supreme Court to review his claims. This argument has been addressed and rejected a

number of times in this district and Respondents note that the argument is made primarily to

preserve the issue for further appellate review. In any case, the Ninth Circuit has recognized

that Swoopes survived the Baldwin decision. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998

(9th Cir. 2005).

- 5 -

Additionally, fair presentation requires that a petitioner describe both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory underlying his claims. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28. General

appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right

to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim,

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d

904 (9th Cir. 2001), and a mere reference to the “Constitution of the United States” does not

preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). As the Ninth

Circuit has explained, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for

purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper

forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis

for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations

omitted). 

As Respondents note, after Petitioner’s first PCR petition was denied, counsel filed

a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals that raised solely a Sixth Amendment

jury trial claim pursuant to Blakely. (Ex. X.) The court of appeals remanded, directing

Petitioner to present the Blakely claim to the trial court in the first instance. (Ex. Y.)

Additionally, the court specifically found that any other claims “have been waived for further

review.” (Id.) After the trial court denied Petitioner’s new PCR petition raising a Blakely

claim, Petitioner filed a motion for special action review, “ which the Arizona Court of

Appeals treated as a petition for review. (Ex. EE, Ex. FF.) Petitioner limited his

motion/petition to his Blakely claim. (Ex. EE.) After the court of appeal denied the

motion/petition, Petitioner tried to re-urge the Blakely issue in the trial court via a “special

action.” (Ex. GG, Ex. HH.) The trial court treated the “special action” as a motion for

Case 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

rehearing and denied it as time-barred. (Ex. II.) 

Petitioner has not disputed this rendition of events and has not argued that he has not

defaulted on these claims or that any of the claims would support the filing of a successive

PCR petition under Rule 32.2(b), Ariz.R.Crim.P. Likewise, the Court cannot find mention

of these claims in the state courts of appeal pleadings or an explanation in the state court of

any reason why he would be excused from the timeliness requirement of Rule 32.2(b).

Because Petitioner did not present any claims other than his Blakely claim to the Arizona

courts, those claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). As

such, the merits of the claims need not be addressed unless Petitioner establishes cause and

prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred. Petitioner has not

attempted to do so, and the Court recommends that each of Petitioner’s non-exhausted claims

be denied. 

C. Merits

Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state decision

was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision

can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority,

or (2) if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts "materially

indistinguishable" from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result.

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state

court decision is contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision

of a state court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092,

1101 (9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a new set

Case 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails to extend a

clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).

In the only exhausted claim contained in the petition, Petitioner asserts that the

imposition of an aggravated sentence based upon judicial factual findings was a violation of

his rights under Blakely. Respondents contend that Petitioner’s conviction was final when

Blakely was decided and that he is not entitled to retroactive application of the decision.

Additionally, Respondents assert that even if Blakely is applied to Petitioner’s sentences, he

could not prevail. As explained below, contrary to Respondents’ contention, Petitioner’s

conviction was not yet final when Blakely was decided. Nevertheless, as the State courts

determined, Blakely provides no basis for habeas relief.

To assess the timeliness of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court

must first determine the date on which Petitioner's conviction became “final by conclusion

of direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In making this determination, it is significant

that by pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law.

A.R.S. § 13-4033(B); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e). Petitioner, however, retained the right to seek

review in an “of-right” proceeding pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4.

In Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit addressed the

question of when the conviction of a pleading defendant in Arizona becomes “final by the

conclusion of direct review” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The court held that an

“‘of-right proceeding,'available under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to criminal

defendants who plead guilty, is a form of ‘direct review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1),” id. at 711, and explained that “[b]ecause a Rule 32 of-right proceeding is a form

of direct review, AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Id.

Under Summers, because Petitioner pleaded guilty, his conviction became final upon

“the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon]

Case 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Summers, 418 F.3d at

711. Here, Petitioner was sentenced on July 30, 2003. (Ex. O; Ex. P; Ex. Q; Ex. R.) Under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, Petitioner had ninety days from the entry of judgment and sentence within

which to file a notice of review under Rule 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4(a)(stating that “[i]n

a Rule 32 of-right proceeding the notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry of

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or mandate

by the appellate court in the petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief proceeding.”)

Petitioner timely filed a notice of post-conviction review on or about August 6, 2003. (Ex.

S.) After the Arizona Court of Appeals remanded Petitioner’s Blakely claim, the trial court

dismissed the PCR petition on August 26, 2005. (Ex. BB.) Petitioner then sought appellate

review and by order dated November 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s

petition for review. (Ex. FF.) Because Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona

Supreme Court of the order denying his Rule-32 petition, his judgment became final on the

date that deadline expired, December 10, 2005. Summers, 418 F.3d at 711; Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.9(c). As such, Petitioner’s conviction was not final when Blakely was decided in June

2004. 

Turning to the merits of the claim, Respondents argue that Blakely does not apply to

Petitioner’s sentences because prior convictions are exempt from the Sixth Amendment’s

jury trial requirement. Petitioner did not reply to this contention, but the Court in deciding

Blakely made it clear that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases

the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a

jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (citing Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)); United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th

Cir. 2006). Thus, by its express terms, Blakely does not apply to the fact of a prior

conviction.

Further, it is unclear how Petitioner’s sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by

the statutes pursuant to which he entered his guilty plea. Petitioner plead guilty to the use

of dangerous drugs, a class 4 felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(1), and to the sale

Case 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

of a dangerous drug, a class 2 felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(7). (Ex. H.) As

reflected in the Petitioner’s plea agreement, the presumptive sentence for a class 4 felony is

2.5 years, and the presumptive sentence for a class 2 felony is 5 years. A.R.S. § 13-701(c).

However, as reflected in the plea agreement, the maximum sentences were 3 years for a class

4 felony, and 10 years for a class 2 felony. (Ex. H.) Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

7 years for the class 2 felony and a concurrent term of 3 years for the class 4 felony. (Ex. R.)

Petitioner has not alleged specific facts that show how or why the sentences imposed

exceeded these maximums. 

III. CONCLUSION

As explained above, the Magistrate Judge finds that Petitioner’s claims, with the

exception of his Blakely claim, fail because Petitioner did not timely raise the claims before

the appropriate Arizona State courts and has not established cause or prejudice in relation to

those claims. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge cannot say that the Arizona courts decisions

denying Petitioner’s Blakely claim were contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief and his claims must be

denied.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District

Court, after its independent review, deny Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [Docket No. 5].

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 06-389-PCTCase 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

FJM. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 8th day of August, 2008.

Case 3:06-cv-00389-FJM-JR Document 15 Filed 08/08/08 Page 10 of 10