Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_93-cv-00306/USCOURTS-caed-2_93-cv-00306-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY JUNIOR WEBSTER,

No. CIV.S-93-0306 LKK DAD DP

Petitioner,

v. ORDER

S.W. ORNOSKI, Acting Warden

of the California State 

Prison at San Quentin,

DEATH PENALTY CASE

Respondent.

 /

This capital habeas action came before the court on June

12, 2006, for hearing on petitioner’s motion for an order authorizing

depositions to preserve testimony and petitioner’s motion for an

evidentiary hearing. James S. Thomson and Timothy J. Foley appeared

on behalf of petitioner. Stanley A. Cross and Patrick J. Whalen

appeared on behalf of respondent. Having considered all written

materials submitted in connection with the motions, and after hearing

oral argument, for the reasons set forth below, petitioner’s motions

will be granted.

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I. Petitioner’s Motion for Order Authorizing Depositions

The parties in a habeas proceeding are not entitled to

discovery as a matter of course. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904

(1997); Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 1013 (2003). Rather, "[a] party shall be entitled

to invoke the processes of discovery available under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge in the

exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to

do so, but not otherwise." Rule 6(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 

See also Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904. Good cause is shown "where specific

allegations before the court show reason to believe that the

petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to

demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief." Bracy, 520 U.S. at

908-09 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). Accord

Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 2004). In order to

obtain discovery a petitioner need not demonstrate that he will

prevail on the claim underlying the discovery request. See Bracy,

520 U.S. at 909 (“It may well be, as the Court of Appeals predicted,

that petitioner will be unable to obtain evidence sufficient to

support a finding of actual judicial bias in the trial of his case,

but we hold that he has made a sufficient showing . . . to establish

‘good cause’ for discovery.”); Pham, 400 F.3d at 743. Thus, it has

been “held that a district court abused its discretion in not

ordering Rule 6(a) discovery when the discovery was ‘essential’ for

the habeas petitioner to ‘develop fully’ his underlying claim. Pham,

400 F.3d at 743 (quoting Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir.

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1997)). See also McDaniel v U.S. District Court (Jones), 127 F.3d

886, 888 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the district court “acted well

within its discretion in ordering discovery” where the petitioner’s

claims did “not appear purely speculative or without any basis in the

record.”). 

Federal courts have “the power to ‘fashion appropriate

modes of procedure,’ including discovery, to dispose of habeas

petitions ‘as law and justice require[.]’” Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904

(citations omitted) (quoting Harris, 394 U.S. at 299-300). See also

Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 728. This includes the authority to approve of

the taking of evidentiary depositions. See Wilson v. Weigel, 387

F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1967).

Here, petitioner seeks an order authorizing the depositions

of seven witnesses: Maggie Crutchfield; Albert Williams; Vinita

Webster; Lenora Mitchell; Marvin Jones; Pauline Jones; and Linda

Webster. Petitioner seeks to depose each of these witnesses to

preserve their testimony with respect to penalty phase mitigation

testimony that was available to, but not presented by, petitioner’s

trial counsel. See Pet’r’s Prelim. Proffer in Supp. of Mot. for

Evid. Hr’g, Exs. 1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 24 & 25. Petitioner has

demonstrated that each of the witnesses has important personal

knowledge relating to petitioner’s claims and is either over 80 years

of age or has a serious health condition. See Tennison v. Henry, 203

F.R.D. 435, 439-41 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding good cause and granting

motion to depose witnesses in order to preserve their testimony in a

federal habeas action). Therefore, petitioner has shown good cause

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for taking the desired depositions to preserve the witnesses’

testimony. Moreover, respondent does not object to the taking of the

requested depositions, provided they are videotaped. The undersigned

agrees that it is appropriate to videotape the depositions of the

seven witnesses.

Accordingly, the court will grant petitioner’s motion for

order allowing depositions to preserve the testimony in question. 

The parties will be directed to meet and confer to schedule mutually

convenient dates and locations for the depositions, which shall be

videotaped absent further order of the court. The depositions shall

be taken as soon as practicable.

II. Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner having filed his habeas petition prior to the

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA"), the preAEDPA standard for the granting of evidentiary hearings applies in

this case. See Jones, 114 F.3d at 1013. "A habeas petitioner is

entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim if (1) the petitioner's

allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief, and (2) the

state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing,

reliably found the relevant facts." Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d

1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). Accord

Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963)(“Therefore, where an

applicant for a writ of habeas corpus alleges facts which, if proved,

would entitle him to relief, the federal court to which the

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 Even when an evidentiary hearing is not mandated, the district 1

court retains the discretion to hold one. Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d

750, 753-55 (9th Cir. 1998).

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application is made has the power to receive evidence and try the

facts anew.”), overruled on other grounds in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,

504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). Under this standard an evidentiary hearing is

required “where the petitioner establishes a colorable claim for

relief and has never been afforded a state or federal hearing on

th[e] claim ....” Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir.

2005). See also United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822

(9th Cir. 1991) ("Unless the court is able to determine without a

hearing that the allegations are without credibility or that the

allegations if true would not warrant a new trial, an evidentiary

hearing must be held."). A motion for evidentiary hearing in this

context is thus measured against the relatively “low bar” of alleging

a colorable claim for relief. Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638,

650 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Earp, 431 F.3d at 1170). 

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Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing on three of

the remaining ten claims in this capital habeas action. Those three

claims include the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during

the penalty phase of the trial; that California’s capital sentencing

statute fails to narrow the application of the death penalty in any

meaningful way; and that petitioner was denied his right to

meaningful appellate review by the California Supreme Court. 

Respondent opposes the motion for evidentiary hearing, primarily

arguing that much of the evidence proffered by petitioner in support

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 In neither of the two previously filed post-conviction 2

petitions in state court did petitioner receive an evidentiary

hearing. Thus, with respect to the three claims at issue in the

pending motion, the question is whether petitioner would be entitled

to relief if the facts alleged in support of those claims were proved

to be true.

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of the motion is made up of “unexhausted factual assertions” which

are inadmissible in these habeas proceedings. Below the court

addresses respondent’s primary argument and then turns to whether an

evidentiary hearing on each of the three claims is appropriate.

A. Petitioner’s Claim of Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty

Phase Trial

Because petitioner was not afforded a hearing by the state

court, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he has presented a

colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the

penalty phase.2

In arguing that petitioner’s motion for evidentiary hearing

on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based upon

unexhausted factual assertions, respondent contends that because most

of the declarations in petitioner’s preliminary proffer are of

relatively recent vintage and were not presented to the state court

they cannot be considered by this court. Respondent also asserts

that petitioner’s declarations either fundamentally alter the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim presented to the state court,

or, if they do not, are irrelevant and should not be considered.

Petitioner responds by noting that he previously filed two

post-conviction petitions in state court both of which asserted

ineffective assistance of counsel claims and requested further

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factual development and a hearing. In neither proceedings did the

state court grant the requested hearing. Petitioner argues that 

based upon the state habeas petitions and exhibits along with the

initial proffer presented to this court, it is clear that he has

demonstrated a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

at the penalty phase of his trial. In this regard, petitioner

recounts his allegations that his inexperienced trial counsel elected

to proceed without co-counsel and then was permitted to withdraw

between the guilt and penalty phases due to health concerns in light

of his representation to the court that new counsel who was familiar

with petitioner’s case was available and prepared to proceed with the

penalty phase. In fact, petitioner contends, new counsel soon

advised the trial court that nothing had been done to prepare for the

petitioner’s penalty phase trial. As a result of defense counsel’s

unpreparedness, the mitigation presentation on behalf of petitioner

was exceedingly brief, covering only twenty-two pages of transcript. 

Petitioner claims that his counsels’ failure to investigate and

present a case in mitigation constituted ineffective assistance. 

In addition, petitioner contends that the proffer made to

this court provides an overview of the quality and quantity of

mitigation evidence that was available to the defense at the time of

petitioner’s trial but was neither investigated nor presented except

in the most summary fashion. That evidence, petitioner argues, would

have demonstrated his history of instability, the brutality and

alcoholism in his family, his impoverished childhood, his helpful and

quiet nature prior to his military service, the devastating impact on

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his life caused by his combat experience in Vietnam, his inability to

adjust upon his return from the war, his predisposition to and fall

into drug dependency and his psychological problems and neurological

deficits. Petitioner argues that had this mitigation evidence been

fully presented there is a reasonable probability that the jury’s

penalty phase decision would have been different.

Petitioner’s arguments are persuasive. He has alleged a

colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the

penalty phase, a claim upon which he did not receive a hearing in

state court. He has supported the allegations in support of that

claim with a detailed preliminary proffer. He therefore is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing on that claim. See, e.g., Landrigan v.

Schiro, 441 F.3d 638, 643, 650 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (where

petitioner is denied appointment of an expert and an evidentiary

hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court

he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in his federal habeas action

if he can establish a colorable claim for relief); Earp, 431 F.3d at

1185 (vacating district court’s summary judgment on ineffective

assistance of counsel claim and remanding for evidentiary hearing);

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1316 (9th Cir. 1994)(“[T]he

district court should not have granted summary judgment to the

government on Siripongs' claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel .... Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and

the resolution of these claims by the district court on the basis of

a fully developed factual record.”); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d

1153, 1170 (9th Cir. 1990)(holding petitioner was entitled to

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evidentiary hearing solely on the question of ineffective assistance

of counsel and remanding with instructions to conduct that hearing).

B. Petitioner’s Claim that California’s

Statutory Scheme Fails to Adequately

Narrow Application of the Death Penalty

Petitioner also seeks to expand the record by presenting

empirical evidence in support of his claim that California’s death

penalty scheme fails to narrow those eligible for the death penalty

in any meaningful way. Petitioner points out that he brought this

claim to the state courts and requested, but did not receive, a

hearing. Specifically, petitioner seeks leave to present the court

with statistical evidence currently being gathered in two other cases

currently pending in this district. See Frye v. Goughnour, No. Civ.

S-99-628 LKK JFM and Riel v. Goughnour, No. Civ. S-01-507 LKK KJM. 

Respondent opposes the motion, arguing that this claim by petitioner

fails as a matter of law under the decisions in Mayfield v. Woodford,

270 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) and Karis v. Calderon,

283 F.3d 1117, 1141 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002). Respondent’s argument has

previously been rejected by the court. (See Order filed July 27,

2004 at 8-9 in Frye v. Goughnour, No. Civ. S-99-628 LKK JFM and Riel

v. Goughnour, No. Civ. S-01-507 LKK KJM.) 

Petitioner has alleged a colorable claim that the

California death penalty scheme violates the narrowing requirement of

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). He did not receive a hearing

in state court on this claim. He therefore is entitled to submit 

evidence to this court in support of that claim. Accordingly, his

motion will be granted without prejudice to a motion to exclude or

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 Counsel for both parties agreed at the hearing that in the 3

event the motion for evidentiary hearing is granted regarding this

claim, the evidence may well be capable of submission by way of

declaration and cross-examination, deposition or in some other

fashion rather than a classic evidentiary hearing conducted before

the court. The undersigned encourages counsel to meet and confer in

pursuit of such options particularly as to any evidence to be

submitted with respect to this claim. 

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limit that presentation depending on the nature of the additional

evidence developed in the two cases pending before the court noted

above. 

C. Petitioner’s Claim that He Was Denied

His Right to Meaningful Appellate

Review

Finally, petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing on his

claim of lack of meaningful appellate review of death judgments by

the California Supreme Court. Counsel for petitioner state that they

anticipate expanding the factual record regarding this claim by

submitting statistical information similar to that collected by legal

commentators as well as testimony from an expert to put those

statistics in context. Respondent opposes the motion for an

evidentiary hearing with respect to this claim, arguing that

petitioner has given no specific indication of what evidence he would

offer in support of this claim and that in the absence of evidence

there is no need for a hearing.

Although the court remains somewhat unclear regarding the

precise nature of the evidence petitioner proposes to present in

support of this claim, the court will exercise its discretion to

grant the motion for an evidentiary hearing as to this claim.3

/////

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 Parties may appear at the conference telephonically. To 4

arrange telephonic appearance, parties shall contact Pete Buzo, the

courtroom deputy of the undersigned magistrate judge, at (916) 

930-4128.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion for order allowing depositions to

preserve testimony is granted. The depositions shall occur as soon

as practicable with the dates and locations of the depositions to be

agreed upon by the parties. The depositions shall be videotaped

absent further order of the court.

2. Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary hearing is granted 

as set forth above.

3. A status conference is SET for August 15, 2006, at

10:30 a.m. Counsel are directed to meet and confer prior to that 4

time and to be prepared at the status conference to discuss the

manner in which evidence will be presented to the court, to schedule

the evidentiary hearing and to discuss the status of the parties’

preparation for that evidentiary hearing.

DATED: July 27, 2006.

ddad1\orders\webster0306.evid.hearing

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