Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_09-cv-00430/USCOURTS-alsd-1_09-cv-00430-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHANESTA TAITE LEWIS, : 

Petitioner, : 

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-00430-WS-N 

WARDEN CYNTHIA WHEELER-WHITE, : 

Respondent. : 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action was referred for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '

636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Petitioner, Shanesta Taite Lewis, a state prisoner currently in the custody of Respondent, has 

petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to ' 2254, challenging the validity 

of her 2004 conviction in the Circuit Court of Clarke County, Alabama, for first degree robbery, 

for which she was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. (Doc. 6 at 2). 

Having carefully considered Petitioner=s petition, Respondent=s answer, and the exhibits 

filed herein, the undersigned is satisfied that Petitioner=s petition is untimely. Therefore, it is 

recommended that Petitioner=s habeas petition be dismissed as time barred and that judgment be 

entered in favor of Respondent, Cynthia Wheeler-White, and against Petitioner, Shanesta Taite 

Lewis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d). 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 1 of 14
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND PROCEEDINGS

 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found the facts of this case to be as follows:1

 

 The evidence adduced at trial indicated that James Lamar Baker, II, was 

living with two friends, Terry and Carolyn Beck, in Thomasville in December 

2001. On December 6, 2001, Baker said, he returned home from school for 

lunch, and when he went upstairs to his bedroom to change clothes, he found “two 

ladies standing in [his] room.” (R. 77.) Baker positively identified the two 

women in court as the appellant Lewis and codefendant Shantel Leshay Williams. 

Baker testified that Williams was holding a 12-gauge shotgun and that Lewis was 

holding a knife. [Footnote omitted]. The women escorted Baker downstairs, put 

him in a bathroom, and pushed a freezer in front of the bathroom door, after 

which they left. When Carolyn Beck returned home a short time later, she found 

Baker in the bathroom, and the police were contacted. The next day, Beck 

noticed that a pair of earrings she had left on the kitchen counter the day before 

were missing. In January 2002, Baker saw Lewis at the Huddle House restaurant 

in Thomasville, recognized her as one of the women who had robbed him, and 

notified the police. A day or two later, Baker was presented with a stack of some 

40 photographs; he identified both Lewis and Williams as the perpetrators of the 

crime. Both Lewis and Williams testified in their own defense and denied 

participating in the robbery. 

(Doc. 12, att. 1 at 1-2). 

 On April 13, 2004, Petitioner was tried in the Circuit Court of Clarke County, Alabama, 

and convicted of first degree robbery. (Doc. 6 at 2). The court sentenced Petitioner to twentyfive years in prison. (Id.). 

Petitioner appealed her conviction to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, and the 

court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on February 18, 2005. (Doc. 12, att. 1). Petitioner did not 

file an application for rehearing or a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme 

 1

AEDPA directs that a presumption of correctness be afforded factual findings of state 

courts, Awhich may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.@ Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 

1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(e)(1)). AThis presumption of correctness 

applies equally to factual determinations made by state trial and appellate courts.@ Id. (citing 

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981)). 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 2 of 14
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Court. On March 9, 2005, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a Certificate of 

Judgment. (Doc. 12, att. 2). 

On April 7, 2005, Petitioner inquired into the status of her appeal and was informed by 

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that her conviction had been affirmed on February 18, 

2005. (Doc. 6 at 12). Petitioner subsequently requested copies of her trial transcript from her 

trial and appellate attorneys, the trial judge, and the Alabama Bar Association, all to no avail. 

(Doc. 14 at 1). 

On February 17, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to reinstate her appeal with the 

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which the court granted on February 24, 2006. (Doc. 12, 

att. 3; Doc. 12, att. 5). However, on March 9, 2006, the court set aside its order reinstating the 

appeal as having been granted in error. (Doc. 12, att. 5). The court ordered that the certificate of 

judgment remain in effect as of the date it was originally entered. (Id.). 

Five months later, in August, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion for a copy of her trial 

transcript with the presiding judge of the Clarke County Circuit Court, which the court granted. 

(Doc. 6 at 12; Doc. 14 at 1). Petitioner received the transcript in August or September, 2006. 

(Id.). 

Approximately two years and nine months later, on June 8, 2009, Petitioner filed a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Middle District 

of Alabama. (Doc. 4). On July 8, 2009, the court transferred Petitioner’s habeas petition to this 

Court. (Id.). 

On July 20, 2009, the Court ordered Petitioner to re-file her petition on the appropriate 

form, which she did on August 24, 2009. (Docs. 5, 6). In her Answer, Respondent argues that 

Petitioner’s habeas petition should be dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and as 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 3 of 14
4 

procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 12 at 3). On November 23, 2009, the Court ordered Petitioner to 

show cause why her petition should not be dismissed on the grounds of untimeliness and 

procedural default. (Doc. 13). Petitioner filed a response on December 23, 2009, 

acknowledging the untimeliness of her petition and requesting that her untimely filing be 

excused given the difficulty that she experienced obtaining a copy of her trial transcript. (Doc. 

14). The Court will now address that issue.2

 DISCUSSION 

Title 28 U.S.C. ' 2254 governs the authority of the federal courts to consider applications 

for writs of habeas corpus submitted by state prisoners. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 

889 (11th Cir. 2003). Section 2254 was amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AAEDPA@), which became effective April 24, 1996. Id. at 890. Since Petitioner 

filed her petition on June 8, 2009, this case is governed by AEDPA. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d), as amended, a state prisoner seeking a federal habeas 

corpus remedy must file his federal petition within one year of the Aconclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.@ The Act provides that: 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of-- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by 

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review; 

 2

 Having found herein that Petitioner’s habeas petition is due to be dismissed as untimely, 

the issue of whether Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted is pretermitted. 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 4 of 14
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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of 

the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right 

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the 

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the 

claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d). 

As discussed above, the record shows that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on February 18, 2005. (Doc. 12, att. 1). Petitioner did not file 

an application for rehearing or a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme 

Court, and, on March 9, 2005, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a Certificate of 

Judgment.3

 (Doc. 12, att. 2). Therefore, March 9, 2005, is “the date on which the judgment 

 3

 The filing of an application for rehearing is a prerequisite for certiorari review by the 

Alabama Supreme Court. Ala. R. App. P. 40(d)(1) (“In all criminal cases except pretrial appeals 

by the state, the filing of an application for rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

is a prerequisite to certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme Court.”). 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 5 of 14
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became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review.”4 See § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The record does show that Petitioner filed a pro se motion to reinstate her direct appeal in 

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on February 17, 2006, and the court granted the motion 

on February 24, 2006. (Doc. 12, att. 3; Doc. 12, att. 5). However, on March 9, 2006, the court 

set aside its February 24, 2006, order as having been erroneously granted and reinstated the 

original certificate of judgment as of the date it was originally issued.5 (Id.). Thus, Petitioner’s 

motion to reinstate her direct appeal did not delay the commencement of the one-year statutory 

 4

 When calculating the timeliness of a habeas petition brought under § 2254, the 

judgment ordinarily is not considered final until “90 days after entry of judgment in the state 

court of last resort,” allowing credit for the time period during which a petitioner may seek 

certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. Jackson v. Secretary for the Dep’t of 

Corrs., 292 F.3d 1347, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002). However, because Petitioner did not file an 

application for rehearing and a petition for certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme Court, she 

was not entitled to the additional ninety days for seeking certiorari review in the United States 

Supreme Court. See Jones v. Albright, 2010 WL 1929765, *7 n.8 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (“Jones did 

not file a proper certiorari petition seeking direct review of her conviction and sentence in the 

state court of last resort, that is, the Alabama Supreme Court; therefore, she was not entitled to 

seek direct review in the United States Supreme Court ... and this Court need not add to that 

final judgment date the 90 days contemplated in Supreme Court Rule 13. 1. . . .”). 

5

 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held: 

[B]ecause this court has determined that the February 24, 2006, order reinstating 

this appeal was issued in error, the Court now ORDERS that said order, along 

with the order recalling the March 9, 2005, certificate of judgment, are hereby set 

aside and held for naught. . . . [S]aid certificate of judgment remains in effect as 

of the date it was originally issued.” 

(Doc. 12, att. 5 at 1). 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 6 of 14
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period; rather, the limitations period commenced on March 9, 2005, and expired on March 9, 

2006, long before Petitioner filed her federal habeas petition on June 8, 2009. (Doc. 4). 

To save her untimely petition, Petitioner must demonstrate circumstances excusing her 

untimely filing. As discussed above, § 2244(d)(2) provides for statutory tolling of the habeas 

limitations period during the time in which a properly filed application for State post-conviction 

or other collateral review is pending. In this case, however, Petitioner did not file an application 

for post-conviction or collateral review following the conclusion of her direct appeal.6

 

Therefore, Petitioner’s untimely habeas petition is not saved by the statutory tolling provision of 

' 2244(d)(2). 

In her response to the Court’s show cause order, Petitioner appears to rely on equitable 

tolling to justify her untimeliness. (Doc. 14). With respect to equitable tolling, the United States 

Supreme Court recently held in Holland v. Florida, 2010 WL 2346549, *9, __ U.S. __, (June 

14, 2010), that the timeliness provision in the federal habeas corpus statute, § 2244(d), “is 

subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, 

however, “only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

 6

 To the extent that Petitioner would argue that the motion to reinstate her direct appeal 

tolled the statutory period under § 2244(d)(2), that argument is unavailing. Even if the Court 

construed Petitioner’s motion as a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

collateral review that tolled the statutory period during the pendency of the motion from 

February 17, 2006, to March 23, 2006 (which allows fourteen days to file an application for 

rehearing from the court’s March 9, 2006, order), Petitioner still waited more than three years to 

file her habeas petition on June 8, 2009, long after the one-year statutory period had expired. 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 7 of 14
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extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland, 2010 WL 

2346549 at *12 (citations omitted) . 

“Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy that is typically applied sparingly.@ Wade 

v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). AThe burden of establishing entitlement to this 

extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the petitioner.@ Id. (citations omitted). 

A determination as to whether rare and exceptional 

circumstances are presented requires the examination of the facts 

in each case. Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 

2002) (per curiam). The focus of the inquiry regarding 

Aextraordinary circumstances@ is Aon the circumstances 

surrounding the late filing of the habeas petition@ and not on the 

circumstances of the underlying conviction, Helton v. Secretary for 

the Dep=t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2001) (per 

curiam), and whether the conduct of others prevented the petitioner 

from timely filing, see Lawrence, 421 F.3d at 1226. [Footnote 

omitted]. 

Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006). 

In her habeas petition and in her response to the Court’s show cause order, Petitioner 

claims that she did not learn that her conviction had been affirmed by the Alabama Court of 

Criminal Appeals on February 18, 2005, until she called the court on April 7, 2005, and, 

thereafter, she attempted in vain to obtain a copy of her trial transcript so that she could “go . . . 

further in [her] case.” (Doc. 6 at 12; Doc. 14). According to Petitioner, she contacted her trial 

attorney, her appellate attorney, the trial judge, and the Alabama State Bar Association, but it 

was not until she filed a motion with the presiding judge of the Clarke County Circuit Court in 

August, 2006, that she finally received the transcript in September, 2006. (Doc. 6 at 12; Doc. 14 

at 1). The Court accepts as true Petitioner=s account of her efforts to obtain a copy of her trial 

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transcript. However, this explanation for her untimeliness in filing her habeas petition is 

unpersuasive for several reasons. 

First, it was unnecessary for Petitioner to obtain a copy of her trial transcript before filing 

her federal habeas petition. The law is well settled that a petitioner is not required to submit the 

state court record when filing a federal habeas petition. See Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 232 

(2004). 

The unavailability of documents, the contents of which a petitioner 

has at least constructive knowledge, does not affect the petitioner=s 

ability to file a federal habeas petition. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 

U.S. 467, 500, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991). 

A[T]here is no requirement that a habeas petitioner enumerate in his 

petition every fact which supports a ground for relief. Rather, Rule 

2(c) of the Rules Governing ' 2254 Cases provides that a 

petitioner need only >set forth in summary form the facts 

supporting each of the grounds= specified in the petition. See

Donovan v. Maine, 276 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2002) (habeas corpus 

petition need not be pleaded with particularity, so citation to 

transcript unnecessary); Ruark v. Gunter, 958 F.2d 318, 319 (10th 

Cir. 1992) (prisoner not entitled to transcript before filing ' 2254 

petition).@ Lloyd v. Van Natta, 296 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2002), 

cert. denied 537 U.S. 1121, 123 S. Ct. 856, 154 L. Ed. 2d 802 

(2003). 

Chambers v. Mosley, 2006 WL 1381855, *4 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (unreported) (AIt is likewise clear 

from the record that nothing prevented Chambers from filing a timely habeas petition and then 

clarifying the petition once he received the Rule 32 documents from counsel.@); Tucker v. 

Chatman, 2008 WL 822512, *3-4 (M.D. Ga. 2008) (unreported) (A>[e]quitable tolling does not 

excuse a petitioner=s late filing simply because he was unable to obtain a complete trial transcript 

before he filed his ' 2254 petition.=@) (citations omitted); see also Powe v. Culliver, 205 Fed. 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 9 of 14
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Appx. 729, 734-35 (11th Cir. 2006) (Petitioner failed to show that he could not have filed his 

Rule 32 petition without his trial transcript; thus, the federal habeas limitations period, which 

expired before Petitioner filed his Rule 32 petition, was not equitably tolled). 

 Second, even if the Court assumed that Petitioner’s inability to obtain a copy of her trial 

transcript7

 prevented her from filing a habeas petition before September, 2006, the fact remains 

that Petitioner waited almost three years after receiving the transcript to file her habeas petition 

on June 8, 2009. Thus, Petitioner’s argument provides no justification for her subsequent delay. 

 Finally, the Court rejects Petitioner’s argument that she is entitled to equitable tolling 

because she did not have the benefit of legal counsel to advise and assist her with filing a timely 

habeas petition. (Doc. 14 at 2). It is well settled that there is no right to counsel in a habeas 

proceeding. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007) (“Attorney miscalculation 

[of habeas limitations period] is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in 

the postconviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel”) (citing 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 756 (1991) (“there is no right to counsel in state 

collateral proceedings after exhaustion of direct appellate review.”). Therefore, the “lack of an 

attorney will not excuse an untimely habeas application.” Lovato v. Suthers, 42 Fed. Appx. 400, 

 7

 The Court notes that Petitioner has not alleged conduct by her attorneys of the nature 

alleged in Holland, 2010 WL 2346549 at *9, *13, in which the Supreme Court recently 

examined whether an attorney’s misconduct was so “serious” that it warranted application of 

equitable tolling to the habeas limitations period. However, even assuming such misconduct on 

the part of Petitioner’s attorneys in failing to provide her a copy of her trial transcript, equitable 

tolling of that time period on this basis, or any other, would not save her untimely petition. 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 10 of 14
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402 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (neither ignorance of the law nor lack of an attorney warrant 

the application of equitable tolling to the untimely filing of a federal habeas application). 

AIn order to be entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling, a petitioner must act with 

diligence, and the untimeliness of the filing must be the result of circumstances beyond his 

control.@ Drew v. Department of Corrs., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2002). The facts 

presented by Petitioner do not evidence extraordinary circumstances beyond her control which 

made it impossible for her to file her petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a timely manner, nor 

do they present a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that Petitioner used due diligence in 

pursuing habeas corpus relief in a timely manner. Therefore, equitable tolling is inapplicable to 

the present case and does not save Petitioner’s untimely filing of her habeas petition. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, “[t]he district court must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases (December 1, 2009). A certificate of 

appealability may issue only where “the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a habeas petition is dismissed on 

procedural grounds, such as in the instant case, without reaching the merits of any underlying 

constitutional claim, “a COA should issue [only] when the prisoner shows . . . that jurists of 

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court 

was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 11 of 14
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In the instant case, Petitioner's claims do not warrant the issuance of a Certificate of 

Appealability. Petitioner's claims are time-barred and Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any 

basis for tolling the limitations period. Therefore, no reasonable jurist could differ on the 

appropriate disposition of the petition on the record presented. It is thus recommended that the 

Court deny any request for a Certificate of Appealability. Because Petitioner is not entitled to a 

Certificate of Appealability, any request for leave to appeal in forma pauperis is also due to be 

denied.8

 CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is the recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

that Petitioner=s petition for habeas corpus be dismissed as untimely filed and that judgment be 

entered in favor of the Respondent, Cynthia Wheeler-White, and against the Petitioner, Shanesta 

 8

 The guidelines for proceeding in forma pauperis are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. An 

appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that the appeal is 

not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A); Lee v. Clinton, 

209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that “good faith” is “an objective concept” and 

that “not taken in good faith” is “a synonym for frivolous”); DeSantis v. United Techs, Corp., 15 

F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1288-89 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (stating that good faith “must be judged by an 

objective, not a subjective, standard” and that an appellant “demonstrates good faith when he 

seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous”). An appeal filed in forma pauperis is 

frivolous if it appears that the appellant “has little or no chance of success,” meaning that the 

“factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” 

Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). For the reasons 

previously stated in addressing the Certificate of Appealability, the undersigned concludes that 

an appeal in this case would be without merit and would not be taken in objective good faith. 

Thus, Petitioner is neither entitled to a Certificate of Appealability nor to appeal in forma 

pauperis. 

Case 1:09-cv-00430-WS-N Document 15 Filed 07/01/10 Page 12 of 14
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Taite Lewis. It is further recommended that any motion for a Certificate of Appealability or for 

permission to appeal in forma pauperis be denied. 

The instructions which follow the undersigned=s signature contain important information 

regarding objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DONE this 1st day of July, 2010. 

 /s/ Katherine P. Nelson 

 KATHERINE P. NELSON 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND 

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION AND 

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within 

fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with 

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of 

anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the 

Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982) (en banc). The procedure for 

challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge is set out in more detail 

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that: 

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in a 

dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by 

filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge's Recommendation’ within 

ten days9

 after being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different 

time is established by order. The statement of objection shall specify those 

portions of the recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for the 

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of 

filing the objection, a brief setting forth the party's arguments that the magistrate 

judge's recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition 

made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the 

magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or 

referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to 

submit a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the 

objection. 

 A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals; 

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed. 

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 

and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original records in this 

case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation, 

but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination that 

transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript. 

 

9

 Effective December 1, 2009, the time for filing written objections was extended to “14 days 

after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 

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