Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02414/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02414-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSEPH HARDESTY and YVETTE 

HARDESTY, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

SACRAMENTO METROPOLITAN AIR 

QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 

et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:10-cv-2414-KJM-KJN 

JAY SCHNEIDER, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-2457-KJM-KJN 

ORDER 

 

Case 2:10-cv-02414-KJM-KJN Document 283 Filed 06/09/16 Page 1 of 70
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Table of Contents 

I. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 4

II. Evidentiary Objections ........................................................................................................... 4

III. General Factual Background................................................................................................. 5

A. The Mine, Hardesty Sand and Gravel, and the Cosumnes River ............................................. 5

B. The California Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 ................................................. 6

C. A Review of the Relevant California Regulatory Bodies ......................................................... 7

D. The “AB 3098 List” .................................................................................................................. 8

E. A General Timeline of Events .................................................................................................. 8

1. Early History through the 2000s ....................................................................................... 8

2. Mid-2008: Legislative Interest and Competitor Requests ............................................... 13

3. July through December 2008: Inspections of the Mine................................................... 14

4. Early 2009: Reinstatement and Removal from the AB 3098 List ................................... 16

5. March 2009 through June 2011: Further Inspections ...................................................... 18

6. April–September 2010: Notice of Zoning Violation and Hearings ................................. 20

7. Developments in 2010–2012 ........................................................................................... 20

IV. Procedural Matters ............................................................................................................... 22

V. Legal Standard ...................................................................................................................... 24

VI. Monell Claims ........................................................................................................................ 25

VII.Search and Seizure: Defendant Gregory ............................................................................ 26

A. Undisputed Facts .................................................................................................................... 26

B. Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 29

VIII. Equal Protection ............................................................................................................ 33

A. Class-of-One Claim ................................................................................................................ 33

B. The Hardestys’ Second Claim Against O’Bryant, Norris, and Testa ..................................... 37

1. Denial of Appeal and Selective Provision of Guidance .................................................. 37

2. Norris and the Truck ........................................................................................................ 37

3. Removal from the AB 3098 List Without Notice ........................................................... 38

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4. Summary ......................................................................................................................... 47

C. The Hardestys’ Sixth Claim against Sacramento County and Sherry .................................... 48

D. The Hardestys’ Seventh Claim Against Sacramento County, Storelli, and Moffitt ............... 49

E. The Schneiders’ Fifth Claim ................................................................................................... 50

IX. Procedural Due Process ....................................................................................................... 50

A. The Hardestys’ Fifth Claim Against Curt Taras ..................................................................... 51

B. The Hardestys’ Sixth Claim against the County and Sherry .................................................. 53

C. The Schneiders’ Claims .......................................................................................................... 55

1. Undisputed Facts ............................................................................................................. 55

2. Claim and Issue Preclusion ............................................................................................. 56

3. Whether Schneider Possessed a Vested Right to Mine ................................................... 59

4. Whether the County Deprived the Schneiders of a Property Interest ............................. 61

X. Substantive Due Process....................................................................................................... 63

A. The Hardestys’ Claims against Taras ..................................................................................... 63

B. The Hardestys’ Claims against Gregory ................................................................................. 63

C. The Schneiders’ Claims against Bieber .................................................................................. 64

D. Sacramento County Defendants ............................................................................................. 65

E. The Hardestys’ Claims against O’Bryant ............................................................................... 66

XI. First Amendment Retaliation .............................................................................................. 67

A. Bieber ...................................................................................................................................... 67

B. County Defendants ................................................................................................................. 68

XII.Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 69

 

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I. INTRODUCTION 

Between 2008 and 2012, California and Sacramento County regulators 

investigated reports that the Hardesty and Schneider families were operating a sand and gravel 

mine illegally on the Schneiders’ ranch. As a result, the mining operation was eventually closed. 

The investigation followed a long period of regulatory disinterest. The Hardestys 

and Schneiders allege the State and County were spurred into action not by their discovery of any 

actual legal violations, but by their desire to appease competitors and legislators motivated by 

campaign contributions. The Hardestys and Schneiders each filed a lawsuit in federal court, 

claiming the County and State deprived them of constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments. The cases were partially consolidated, and are now before the court on 

the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. The motions are granted and denied in part. 

II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

In this order the court does not individually address the hundreds of evidentiary 

objections listed by the parties in their separate statements of disputed and undisputed facts and 

elsewhere. Many objections relate to evidence that is not material; these objections are overruled 

as moot. Other objections are moot because the court does not consider the parties’ 

characterizations of the record, but the record itself. See, e.g., Hardesty Resp. State Defs.’ Stmt. 

Undisp. Mat. Facts (Hardesty UMF) no. 22, ECF No. 233 (objecting to counsel’s characterization 

of evidence as a legal conclusion or argument). Many other objections are unsupported by 

explanation or argument; the court overrules these objections summarily. See, e.g., id. at 68; 

Hardesty Resp. County Defs.’ Stmt. Disp. Facts no. 1, ECF No. 231. 

To the extent the discussion below relies on evidence the parties object to as 

hearsay, the court has in most instances interpreted the evidence for its value beyond the truth of 

the statements in question, for example, as reporting a person’s or agency’s conclusions rather 

than the truth of those conclusions. See, e.g., Wesling Decl. ¶¶ 8–9, ECF No. 222-5; id. Ex. A, 

ECF No. 222-6. And in many instances, when the party who objects on the basis of hearsay is the 

one who moves for summary judgment, the purported hearsay evidence could be presented in 

admissible form at trial; these objections are overruled. See, e.g., Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 

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1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003) (considering hearsay evidence offered by the non-moving party on 

review of summary judgment when the underlying facts could be presented in admissible form at 

trial). 

Finally, many of the defendants’ objections concern evidence the Hardestys and 

Schneiders offer to show regulators were motivated by politics, not violations of the law. See, 

e.g., Gregory Objections, ECF No. 254; State Defs.’ Objections, ECF No. 256-3. The court 

reviews this evidence separately in detail below. 

III. GENERAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. The Mine, Hardesty Sand and Gravel, and the Cosumnes River1

Jay Schneider and his family own the Schneider Historic Mine, “the Mine” for 

purposes of this order. Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (JSUF) no. 22, ECF No. 216.2 The 

Mine consists of 3,691 acres in eastern Sacramento County on a ranch that has been in the 

Schneider family since 1906. JSUF no. 23; Schneider Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 219-2. It includes land 

adjacent to the south bank of the Cosumnes River. JSUF no. 25. 

The Cosumnes River is a tributary of the Sacramento River that runs from the east 

in El Dorado County to the Sacramento and San Joaquin River Delta in the west. See Taras Decl. 

¶ 17, ECF No. 222-11. The River is one of the few undammed, free-flowing rivers on the 

western slope of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. In the 1980s and 1990s, it flooded up into part of 

the Schneider’s ranch. See Schneider Dep. 225–27. 

Until the fall of 2010, Joseph and Yvette Hardesty operated a surface mine on the 

Schneiders’ ranch, Hardesty Sand & Gravel (HSG), under an oral agreement between 

Mr. Hardesty and the Schneiders. JSUF no. 69; Hardesty Decl. ¶¶ 4–7, ECF No. 247; Hardesty 

UMF no. 17. Under this agreement, the Hardestys have exclusive control over the Mine and 

related processing areas. Hardesty Decl. ¶ 6. They lease the Mine from the Schneiders. Id. ¶ 5. 

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 In several record documents, “Cosumnes” is spelled using an epenthetic [n], reflective of 

the common local pronunciation, i.e., “Consumnes.” See, e.g., Balestreri Decl. Ex. U, at 

OMR000280, ECF No. 222-17. The court has not noted or changed this alternative spelling when 

quoting from the record. 

2

 Unless otherwise noted, electronic case file number citations are to the docket in the 

Hardesty action, No. 10-2414. 

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The Hardestys do not own any of the real property at the Mine, and they do not have any home on 

the Mine property. JSUF no. 69. Although mining operations have ceased, the Hardestys’ lease 

remains in place to date, and if the Hardestys could overcome the regulatory problems that are the 

subject of this lawsuit, HSG could resume operations. Hardesty Decl. ¶ 12. 

B. The California Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 

One statutory regime sits at the center of this case: the California Surface Mining 

and Reclamation Act of 1975 (SMARA), Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2710 et seq.3 In general, 

SMARA is meant to prevent or minimize the adverse environmental impacts associated with 

surface mining, to allow mined spaces to be used again safely for other purposes after mining 

operations cease, and to balance mining production with competing recreational, ecological, and 

aesthetic concerns. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2712; Calvert v. Cty. of Yuba, 145 Cal. App. 4th 

613, 617 (2006). Under SMARA, a surface mine operator must do three things: (1) obtain a 

permit, (2) operate under a reclamation plan, and (3) pledge sufficient financial assurances to 

follow through on the reclamation plan. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2770(a); People ex rel. Dep’t 

of Conservation v. El Dorado Cty., 36 Cal. 4th 971, 984 (2005). A local agency or “lead agency,” 

usually a city or county, is responsible for issuing the permit and approving the reclamation plan 

and financial assurances. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 2770(a), (d); Calvert, 145 Cal. App. 4th 

at 618. The County itself is the lead agency in Sacramento County. Gamel Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 

No. 218-8. 

A reclamation plan must show how the mined area will be reclaimed, i.e., restored 

and repurposed, after its operations have ceased. See Dep’t of Conservation, 36 Cal. 4th at 981 

(citing Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2770(a)). The reclamation plan must clarify how the mined land 

will be treated to minimize environmental impacts. Id. (citing Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 27734

). 

 3

 After the events of this case, California passed Assembly Bill 1142, which amended 

several of SMARA’s provisions. See 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 7 (West) (approved by the 

Governor and chaptered by the Secretary of State on April 18, 2016). The parties have not 

suggested this amendment has retroactive effect, and the court assumes in this order that it does 

not. “Generally, statutes operate prospectively only.” McClung v. Empt. Dev. Dep’t, 34 Cal. 4th 

467, 475 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

4

 “The reclamation plan shall be applicable to a specific piece of property or properties, 

shall be based upon the character of the surrounding area and such characteristics of the property 

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Financial assurances are pledges of funds sufficient to pay for the reclamation 

plan. Id. (citing Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2773.1(a)(1)). Financial assurance cost estimates, or 

“FACEs,” are reports of a mine’s operations that estimate the costs of remediation. They may be 

prepared by a third-party engineer engaged by the mine operator. See Sacramento County Code 

§ 20.04.080(D); Storelli Dep. 70–71. Financial assurance mechanisms, or “FAMs,” are the 

financial instruments themselves. 

SMARA’s permitting rule is subject to an exception. If a person has obtained a 

“vested right to conduct surface mining operations prior to January 1, 1976,” SMARA does not 

require that person to obtain a permit. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2776(a). A person has a “vested 

right” if, “prior to January 1, 1976, the person has, in good faith and in reliance upon a permit or 

other authorization, if the permit or other authorization was required, diligently commenced 

surface mining operations and incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials necessary for 

the surface mining operations. . . .” Id. This exception applies only “as long as no substantial 

changes are made in the operation except in accordance with [SMARA].” Id. The vested rights 

exception applies only to the permitting requirement. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2776(a); 

Calvert, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 617. That is, a surface mining operation with vested rights is not 

relieved of its obligation to obtain approval of its reclamation plan and to provide approved 

financial assurances. Calvert, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 617. 

C. A Review of the Relevant California Regulatory Bodies 

A gaggle of state regulatory bodies enforce SMARA.5 First, the State Mining and 

Geology Board (the Mining Board) establishes policies and regulations to implement SMARA, 

among other duties. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2755. Second, the Mining Board is part of the 

Department of Conservation (DOC), which is led by the Director of Conservation, an officer 

appointed by the Governor. Id. § 601. Third, the Office of Mine Reclamation (OMR) is a 

 

as type of overburden, soil stability, topography, geology, climate, stream characteristics, and 

principal mineral commodities, and shall establish site-specific criteria for evaluating compliance 

with the approved reclamation plan, including topography, revegetation and sediment, and 

erosion control.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2773(a). 

5

 The California Supreme Court’s decision in People ex rel. Department of Conservation

provides a summary of the relevant regulatory environment. See 36 Cal. 4th at 983–86. 

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department within the DOC. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 607(d). Fourth, the DOC is in the Natural 

Resources Agency, along with about twenty other entities. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12805(a). The 

head of the Natural Resources Agency is its Secretary. Id. §§ 12800(b), 12801. 

Another entity within the Natural Resources Agency is the Central Valley Flood 

Protection Board (the Flood Board). Cal. Gov’t Code § 12805(a). It has several responsibilities 

related to flood control in California’s Central Valley. See Cal. Water Code § 8520 et seq. The 

Flood Board has no direct connection to SMARA, but as the circumstances of this case 

demonstrate, it may become involved with the regulation of surface mining. 

Finally, the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (formerly the Department 

of Fish and Game, or “DFG”) is another member of the Natural Resources Agency. See Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12805(a). Like the Flood Board, DFG has no direct responsibility over surface 

mining, but its authority to enforce the California Fish and Game Code may bring it into contact 

with surface mining operations, as was the case here. 

D. The “AB 3098 List” 

The California Public Resources Code charges the DOC with maintaining a list of 

surface mining operations that comply with SMARA. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2717(b). This 

list is commonly referred to as the “AB 3098 list” after California Assembly Bill 3098, its 

enacting legislation. See 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 1077 (West). The California Public Contract 

Code prohibits state agencies from purchasing materials produced by any operation that is not 

included on the AB 3098 list. See Cal. Pub. Cont. Code §§ 10295.5(a), 20676. OMR is 

responsible for maintaining, publishing, and otherwise administering the AB 3098 list. JSUF 

no. 54. 

E. A General Timeline of Events 

1. Early History through the 2000s 

As noted above, the Mine has been in the Schneider family for a century. 

Schneider Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 219-2. The Mine’s early history is the subject of a number of 

disagreements among the parties to this case. It is enough to say that Jay Schneider and his father 

actively participated in mining operations on the Ranch throughout the 1970s and into the early 

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1980s, id., and that at some time in the 1980s, HSG began its lease and surface mining operations 

on the Mine under an oral contract, JSUF no. 69; Hardesty Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; Hardesty UMF no. 17. 

In 1990, the Sacramento County Zoning Enforcement Office received a complaint 

that illegal surface mining was taking place on the Schneider’s ranch. See Balestreri Decl. ¶ 7, 

ECF No. 222-14; id. Ex. A, ECF No. 222-15; Schneider Decl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 219-5. An 

inspector visited the Mine and “verified” the complaint. Schneider Decl. Ex. 3. After the 

inspection, the County determined that no use permit or reclamation plan had been approved for 

the Mine, so it ordered the Schneiders to stop mining activity immediately. Id. Schneider 

responded that the Mine was exempt from regulation because it was subject to a vested right. See

Schneider Decl. ¶¶ 6–9. 

Approximately two years later, the County asked Schneider to support his claim of 

a vested right by submitting documentation that surface mining operations had been ongoing 

since before 1976. See id. ¶¶ 11–12; id. Ex. 8, at 2, ECF No. 219-10; id. Ex. 9, at 1, ECF 

No. 219-11. The record suggests Schneider first provided the requested documentation in 1994. 

See Schneider Decl. ¶¶ 13–14; id. Exs. 10, 11, ECF Nos. 219-12, 219-13. Schneider cited several 

documents, including soil maps, topographical maps, aerial photos, and assessors’ records. See 

id. Ex. 11, at 1–2. He also sent declarations from two neighbors who reported their personal 

knowledge that surface mining had been ongoing on the ranch since the 1940s. See Schneider 

Decl. ¶ 14; id. Ex. 11, at 7–8, ECF No. 219-13. 

In August 1994, a Sacramento County Senior Planner informed Schneider the 

County had received his information and had accepted it as evidence of a vested right. Schneider 

Decl. ¶ 17; id. Ex. 13, ECF No. 219-15; see also Balestreri Decl. ¶ 8; id. Ex. B, ECF No. 222-15. 

The County specifically referred to a “Gravel Mining Operation” at “Parcel Nos. 128-0090-

035/037; Zone: AG-80.” Schneider Decl. Ex. 13. These parcels were later divided and 

renumbered as 128-0090-039 to 042. Gamel Decl. ¶ 8. The County did not require Schneider to 

obtain a use permit, but it did require a reclamation plan and financial assurances for all mining 

activities since January 1, 1976. Schneider Decl. Ex. 13. Schneider was allowed thirty days to 

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submit a reclamation plan and financial assurances, and the County warned that his failure to 

comply may result in legal action. Id.

Despite the County’s warning, it appears Schneider did not develop a reclamation 

plan or obtain financial assurances, and no evidence suggests he requested more time. Also, no 

inspections or other enforcement actions occurred for several years. 

In July 1999, OMR, the state agency, inspected the Mine and reported mining 

operations were “very active.” Balestreri Decl. ¶ 9; id. Ex. C, ECF No. 222-15; see also JSUF 

no. 31. HSG was reportedly removing material from old dredge tailings without “rhyme or 

reason,” and “holes” and “pits” were found throughout a “large area.” Balestreri Decl. Ex. C. 

According to the OMR report, the Mine had no reclamation plan or financial assurances, and the 

Hardestys had told the inspector the Mine was “vested.” Id. 

After the OMR inspection, Schneider submitted the Mine’s annual reports to OMR 

for the years 1995 through 1998. JSUF no. 32; see also Balestreri Decl. ¶ 10; id. Ex. D, ECF 

No. 222-15. Each of these documents reported that (1) HSG operates the Mine; (2) the Mine is 

active; (3) the site is vested; and (4) the County had not performed its annual inspection. JSUF 

no. 33. The OMR’s records also show Schneider’s attorney expected to submit a reclamation 

plan and financial assurances to the County by late 1999. See Balestreri Decl. ¶ 12; id. Ex. F, 

¶ 10, ECF No. 222-15. But as of June 2000, the County had received no reclamation plan or 

financial assurances. Id. ¶ 20. 

In June 2000, the County sent Schneider a “Notice and Order Imposing 

Administrative Penalty” of $10,000 for “failure to provide a lead agency approved reclamation 

plan and financial assurance[s].” Id. ¶ 12; id. Ex. F, at OMR008170. The notice and order were 

appealable to the State Mining and Geology Board. See id. Ex. F, at OMR 8170-71. Schneider 

and Hardesty did appeal, and the Mining and Geology Board affirmed the penalty after a hearing. 

See generally id. Ex. I, ECF No. 222-15. The Sacramento County Superior Court, however, 

granted Schneider’s petition to set aside the penalty in June 2002, generally because the County 

did not first give notice of the penalty or conduct a hearing. See Balestreri Decl. ¶ 16; id. Ex. J, 

ECF No. 222-15. 

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Schneider and Hardesty eventually submitted an application for a reclamation 

plan. The County requested assistance from the DOC during its review of Schneider’s 

application, Balestreri Decl. Ex. G, ECF No. 222-15, and OMR agreed to help, Hardesty Stmt. 

Ex. 28, ECF No. 248-7. Over the next few years, Schneider developed a reclamation plan. JSUF 

no. 34; Balestreri Decl. Ex. K, ECF No. 222-15. The County Board of Supervisors reviewed a 

draft plan in August 2002, see generally Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 26, ECF No. 248-6, and a final 

reclamation plan was approved in November 2002. See Balestreri Decl. ¶ 18; id. Ex. L, ECF No. 

222-16; Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 6, ECF No. 248-1; Hardesty UMF no. 38. The 2002 reclamation plan 

has never been amended. JSUF no. 67. 

The reclamation plan describes the mining operation this way: 

Material is excavated and classified, processed and stockpiled in 

anticipation of market demand and seasonal considerations. When 

the stockpiles are sufficiently diminished to justify further 

excavation or when there is an actual or anticipated market demand 

for a particular material, then such material is excavated, classified 

or processed as necessary and prudent, thus avoiding unnecessary 

excavation. 

Balestreri Decl. Ex. L, at OMR007951, ECF No. 222-16. The plan anticipated a “low annual 

average of sand and gravel mined,” so reclamation was determined to proceed in annual phases. 

Id. It also anticipated mining would proceed in three phases. Id. The first area would be mined 

between 2003 and 2023, the second between 2023 and 2063, and the third after 2063. Id. 

At the time the reclamation plan was approved, demand for HSG’s products was 

tepid. Hardesty Decl. ¶ 20. But between 2003 and 2008, demand increased. See id. ¶ 21. 

Reports submitted to the OMR and Sacramento County show production volumes increased by a 

factor of ten between 1995 and 2003, and by six between 2003 and 2008. Gamel Decl. ¶ 11. In 

2005, HSG began excavating material from large pits in an area just south of the Cosumnes 

River. Hardesty Decl. ¶ 38; see also Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 47, at 3, ECF No. 248-8. These pits are 

found in the area that, according to the reclamation plan, would be mined between 2023 and 

2063. See Balestreri Decl. Ex. L, at OMR007962; Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 25, ECF No. 248-6. The 

parties dispute whether the Mine’s reclamation plan foresaw excavation on this scale. See

Hardesty UMF nos. 43, 46, 47; Reed Decl. ¶¶ 5–6. 

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The Mine’s 2005, 2007, and 2008 FACE reports disclosed this new excavation. 

Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 47, at 3, ECF No. 248-8; id. Ex. 48, at 3, ECF No. 248-8; Balestreri Decl. 

Ex. U, at OMR000280, ECF No. 222-17. In 2008, for example, HSG reported it was excavating 

aggregate “from a terrace deposit along the Consumnes River,” creating a thirty-acre pit about 

thirty feet deep. Balestreri Decl. Ex. U, at OMR000280. Excavation was expected to continue 

eastward. Id. The southern pit walls away from the river had been mostly resloped and covered 

partially with vegetation, but other walls were steep and would need to be contoured before the 

final reclamation plan requirements were satisfied. Id. The total estimated cost of recovery in 

this report was less than $100,000. Id. at OMR000289. 

In the same time period, the County performed periodic inspections of the Mine 

and reviewed the Mine’s reports. Hardesty Decl. ¶ 28; see also Hardesty Stmt. Exs. 47, 48, ECF 

No. 248-8 (reports). OMR’s records indicate it also exchanged correspondence with Mr. 

Hardesty about the Mine’s annual reports and discussed issues with the Mine’s FACE between 

2003 and 2007. See Balestreri Decl. ¶ 20; id. Ex. N, ECF No. 222-16. For example, OMR’s 

notes show that in August 2007, an OMR representative noticed the Mine’s report did not specify 

the number of acres subject to the reclamation plan, so OMR corresponded with Schneider and 

apparently then received this information within a few days. Id. Ex. N. 

No evidence suggests, however, that the County or State had any concerns about 

the new excavations or the mushrooming demand for HSG’s products. Neither does the evidence 

suggest that regulators questioned the Mine’s compliance with its reclamation plan. See Hardesty 

Stmt. Ex. 45, at 6, ECF No. 248-8; id. Ex. 13, at 9, ECF No. 248-2. The County took no issue 

with the Mine’s 2008 FACE report, which it found “adequate.” Balestreri Decl. ¶ 27; id. Ex. U, 

at OMR000278. As late as June 2008, OMR’s staff also recommended approval of the Mine’s 

FACE reports. Hardesty UMF no. 44; Reed Decl. ¶ 6; id. Ex. A, ECF No. 222-19. An OMR 

staffer responsible for reviewing the reports explains that he “missed” the reports’ descriptions of 

large excavations because his reviews are “quick and limited.” Reed Decl. ¶¶ 5–6. 

Despite these reports and the absence of any enforcement action by the County or 

the State, OMR’s records showed the Mine was not on the AB 3098 list as of June 2008. 

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Balestreri Decl. ¶ 28; id. Ex. V, ECF No. 222-17. OMR’s files show HSG had not been on the 

list since 1999. Hardesty UMF no. 42; Balestreri Decl. ¶ 34. It is unclear why not, and it is 

unclear on this record whether the Hardestys or Schneiders asked for HSG to be placed on the list 

or even knew the Mine was not on the list. 

2. Mid-2008: Legislative Interest and Competitor Requests 

At least as early as 2007 or 2008, one or more of HSG’s local competitors began 

sending complaints to federal, state, and local regulators. See, e.g., Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 17, ECF 

No. 248-3; Dadey Dep. 23–34. The only competitor the parties refer to by name is “Teichert 

Aggregates.” See, e.g., Dadey Dep. 23–26. Only a brief summary of these complaints and their 

effects is necessary here; a more detailed description is included below. 

In 2006 or 2007, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers began receiving complaints from representatives of Teichert Aggregates. See, e.g., 

Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 17, at 1, 3–4, ECF No. 248-3. In an apparent response to these complaints, in 

June 2008, the Army Corps of Engineers sent HSG a cease-and-desist letter. Id. Ex. 51, ECF 

No. 248-10. According to this letter, HSG had “discharged dredged or fill material into creeks 

and wetlands tributary to the Consumnes River, without a . . . permit” in violation of Section 404 

of the Clean Water Act. Id. Ex. 51, ECF No. 248-10. 

In October 2008, former California State Senator David Cox sent a letter to the 

Secretary of the Resources Agency. Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 1, ECF No. 248-1. He enclosed the 

Corps’ cease-and-desist letter. Id. at 3–4. According to his understanding, HSG had “expanded 

both in size and scope in recent years and may have done so without necessary permits,” and he 

suggested HSG’s activities were “impacting local creeks and wetlands.” Id. at 1. He encouraged 

an investigation, noting that if one mine operator could avoid compliance with federal, state, and 

local regulation, others would stand at a “competitive disadvantage.” Id. Senator Cox’s letter 

specifically cited the California Public Contract Code and the AB 3098 list, and he sent a copy to 

the Director of the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Id. at 2. He suggested the 

DOC, the Mining Board, and the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) work together 

///// 

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to investigate the Mine. Id. at 1. The cease-and-desist letter Senator Cox cited was rescinded in 

2012, although it is unclear why. Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 58, ECF No. 248-10. 

Evidence also suggests that staff of former U.S. Congressman Daniel Lungren 

arranged meetings about the Mine with the Army Corps of Engineers and Teichert 

representatives. See, e.g., Dadey Dep. 23–26; Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 55, ECF No. 248-10. 

The Hardestys have filed copies of publicly available records that suggest between 

2001 and 2008, Senator Cox received campaign contributions from Taylor & Wiley, a law firm 

the Hardestys allege represented Teichert. See Hill Decl., ECF No. 230; id. Ex. 1. Similar 

records show that Congressman Lungren received campaign contributions from James Wiley, 

John Taylor, and Suzanne Taylor between 2006 and 2012, id. Exs. 3–4, 6, and that Congressman 

Lungren received campaign contributions from “Judson T. Riggs” of “Teichert” between 2004 

and 2012, id. Ex. 5. 

3. July through December 2008: Inspections of the Mine 

Zachary Simmons of the Army Corps of Engineers was assigned to investigate the 

Mine, and after reviewing the file, he found what he believed were violations of federal law. 

Simmons Dep. 13–15, 17. He inspected the Mine in July 2008. Id. at 26–27. During this 

inspection, Hardesty accused Simmons of being on a competitor’s payroll and did not allow him 

to inspect the last of three locations Simmons wanted to see. Id. at 27, 172. 

After the July inspection, Simmons and other Corps staff decided to bring the 

California DFG into the investigation. Id. at 70. The Corps and DFG commonly work together, 

and DFG wardens may be able to obtain access to private property without a warrant. Id. at 70–

71. Simmons contacted DFG Warden Liz Gregory, and the two scheduled a follow-up 

investigation of the Mine for September 2008. Gregory Dep. 39; Simmons Dep. 71; Gregory 

Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6, ECF No. 217-3. They did not obtain a warrant or schedule their inspection with 

HSG. 

Simmons and Gregory drove onto the Schneiders’ ranch in Gregory’s patrol truck, 

and began investigating possible Clean Water Act and California Fish and Game Code violations. 

Gregory Decl. ¶ 8. Mid-way through the inspection, Hardesty and an HSG employee demanded 

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they leave. Id. ¶ 15. Only then did Gregory learn Hardesty had expelled Simmons from the Mine 

in July. Id. 

After the joint inspection, neither Gregory nor the DFG issued any citations or 

orders to the Mine. Id. ¶ 30. Nevertheless, DFG sent OMR an email requesting a meeting to 

discuss operations at the Mine. See Koehler Dep. 16–18 & Ex. 218. A meeting was arranged for 

October 2008. Hardesty UMF no. 52. Before the meeting, as noted above, the Resources Agency 

also received a letter from Senator Cox, which described possible violations at the Mine. JSUF 

no. 35. The October 2008 meeting went forward as planned, Koehler Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 222-21, 

and OMR decided to conduct an inspection. 

OMR staff requested permission from HSG to visit and inspect the Mine. Id. ¶ 5; 

Koehler Dep. Exs. 219–20. Hardesty denied the request. See Koehler Dep. 31–32 & Ex. 220; 

Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 73, ECF No. 248-11. He was suspicious that some third party was behind the 

recent spate of inspections. See Koehler Dep. Ex. 220; Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 73. HSG decided it 

would not allow more inspections until the Resources Agency Secretary explained who or what 

was behind the increased regulatory interest. Koehler Dep. Ex. 220. 

OMR obtained an administrative search warrant from the Sacramento County 

Superior Court, Koehler Decl. ¶ 5, and an inspection went forward in late December 2008, id. ¶ 6. 

According to a report prepared after that inspection, OMR concluded that the Mine’s annual 

reports and its approved reclamation plan inaccurately described the excavations just south of the 

Cosumnes River. See id. ¶ 7; id. Ex. A, ¶¶ 2.2–2.3, ECF No. 222-22. OMR’s report details 

several more specific findings: Gravel pits just south of the Cosumnes River covered 180 acres, 

whereas the most recent reports had estimated the pits covered about thirty-nine acres. Id. ¶ 2.2. 

The pits were deeper than thirty feet, the maximum depth approved by the reclamation plan. Id.

¶ 2.3. The water level in the pits was four to five feet below the water level in the Cosumnes 

River, and groundwater had seeped into the pits, which increased the possibility the river might 

flow into or “capture” the pit. Id. ¶ 2.4. The slopes of the pit walls exceeded the gradients 

foreseen in the reclamation plan. Id. ¶ 2.5. Finally, OMR found the Mine’s FAM was inadequate 

///// 

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because it had been calculated based on an estimate that forty acres would be disturbed, but OMR 

staff believed 180 acres had been disturbed. Id. ¶ 3.1. 

The Hardestys and Schneiders dispute the accuracy of OMR’s conclusions, 

particularly with respect to the danger of pit capture. They cite the April 2014 report of Donald 

Olsen, an engineer, who concluded no danger of pit capture ever existed. See Olsen Report at 

OLS 02, ECF No. 202. Olsen does not address Schneider’s deposition testimony that in previous 

years, the Cosumnes River actually had flooded up into the area near where HSG had excavated 

the gravel pits. See Schneider Dep. 226–27. 

In any event, upon reviewing the results of the December 2008 inspection, Dennis 

O’Bryant, OMR’s Assistant Director, was worried about pit capture. His concern arose in part 

from an experience several years before on another California river, where a pit had been 

captured and had cost the State several million dollars for remediation. O’Bryant Decl. ¶ 18, ECF 

No. 222-25. He also recalled working for OMR’s predecessor in the 1990s, when a large pitcapture event occurred on the Russian River. Id. In this case, he worried that if the pits near the 

Cosumnes River were captured, California would not be able to contribute much funding to 

remediate damage to the River. Id. 

4. Early 2009: Reinstatement and Removal from the AB 3098 List 

As noted above, HSG was not on the AB 3098 list in December 2008. But after 

correspondence between HSG, its attorneys, and OMR, the Mine was placed on the AB 3098 list 

in early February 2009. JSUF no. 46, 50. 

At the time HSG was placed on the list, OMR had completed its December 2008 

inspection, but it had not finalized its inspection report. Koehler Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 222-21. The 

report was finalized in late February 2009, see JSUF no. 51, and in consideration of that report, 

OMR decided to remove the Mine from the AB 3098 list immediately, without prior notice. See

O’Bryant Decl. ¶ 5; id. Ex. A, ECF No. 222-26. The December 2008 inspection had led OMR to 

conclude that the Mine’s operation did not comply with its reclamation plan, that financial 

assurances on file with the OMR were inadequate, and that the Mine’s operation did not comply 

with the Public Resources Code. Id. Ex. A, at OMR007871. Before the Mine could be reinstated 

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on the AB 3098 list, OMR concluded it would be required to submit a revised FACE, approved 

by the County and DOC, post a FAM in the amount of a revised FACE, submit an amended 

reclamation plan, and comply with the standards of Public Resources Code section 2773, 

governing reclamation plans. Id. at OMR007871–72. 

On the same day OMR removed the Mine from the AB 3098 list, it filed a lawsuit 

against HSG, Hardesty, and Schneider in Sacramento County Superior Court. See Compl., 

Luther v. Hardesty Sand & Gravel, No. 34-2009-00038102 (Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct. filed 

Mar. 18, 2009).6 Two days later, OMR moved ex parte for a temporary restraining order (TRO) 

enjoining the Mine from violating SMARA, arguing “the existing pits at the mine present [a] 

hazard, warranting an injunction to compel the Defendants to reclaim the pits now to avoid risk of 

pit capture, which would cause irreparable injury to Plaintiff on behalf of the public.” Ex Parte 

App., Luther v. Hardest Sand & Gravel, No. 34-2009-00038102. The Superior Court denied the 

ex parte application the same day “on the merits of the papers presented to the Court.” Order 

Determining Disposition of Ex Parte App., Luther v. Hardesty Sand & Gravel, No. 34-2009-

00038102. After OMR’s request for a temporary restraining order was denied, little more 

happened in the lawsuit. It was settled a few months later. Alderson Decl. Ex. L, ECF No. 222-

32. The settlement agreement reports the DOC believed any risk of pit capture had dissipated 

with the conclusion of the 2008–2009 rainy season. Id.

On the same day OMR moved for a TRO in Sacramento County Superior Court, it 

sent the County a fifteen-day notice under Public Resources Code section 2774.1(f).7

 O’Bryant 

Decl. Ex. F, ECF No. 222-26. The OMR’s letter gave notice of OMR’s conclusion that the Mine 

was operating in violation of SMARA. Id. OMR expected that after receiving the notice, the 

County would issue a notice of violation that, among other things, would require the Mine to post 

 6

 The court takes judicial notice of the filings in this case, which are public records whose 

existence is subject to no reasonable dispute. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. 

7

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action against a SMARA mining operation after the Director gives notice to the lead agency, 

among other requirements. In 2009, the notice period required by section 2774.1(f) was fifteen 

days, and in 2013 the period was lengthened to thirty days. See 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 417 

(West). 

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an interim FAM of $733,784, “the amount deemed adequate by the Department to reclaim the 

estimated 180 acres disturbed based upon the site inspection of December 23, 2008, and pursuant 

to the reclamation plan.” Id. at OMR007389; see also Reed Decl. ¶¶ 7–8. 

In response to OMR’s letter, the County required the Mine to amend its 

reclamation plan and post an interim FAM of $733,784. O’Bryant Decl. Ex. G, at OMR000429. 

In addition to referencing the violations noted in OMR’s letter, the County listed several other 

concerns, including that the Mine did not appear to have a current business license, that it had not 

submitted certain maps, that it appeared to be operating outside its reclamation plan, and that the 

County had no record of building permits for structures found at the Mine. See id. at 

OMR000430. The County required the Mine to file an application to amend its reclamation plan 

within thirty days and warned that the Mine’s failure to respond as requested could lead to an 

enforcement action and administrative penalties. Id. at OMR000431. 

The County also sent Schneider, Hardesty, and their attorneys a letter informing 

them it had received complaints that suggested the Mine’s operations had expanded beyond its 

vested right. O’Dea Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 218-5. Specifically, the County found that mining 

operations in 1994 were “relatively small in scale” and “primarily confined to dredger tailings,” 

whereas more recently “the mining appears to be focused on riverbed aggregates adjacent to the 

Cosumnes River.” Id. at 1. In light of this evidence, the County believed operations at the Mine 

had expanded beyond their scope at the time land use restrictions were first enacted in 1956. Id. 

at 1–2. The Mine’s only recourse, according to the County, was therefore “to file for and receive 

approval of a conditional use permit and rezone.” Id. at 2. 

5. March 2009 through June 2011: Further Inspections 

OMR geologists inspected the Mine again in March 2009, November 2009, June 

2010, and November 2010. Wesling Decl. ¶¶ 12–13, ECF No. 222-5; Koehler Decl. ¶¶ 9–10, 

ECF No. 222-21. 

The OMR’s inspection in November 2009 concerned only excavations near the 

Cosumnes River. See Wesling Decl. Ex. D, at OMR004196, ECF No. 222-7. According to an 

internal OMR memo, OMR staff determined five violations remained unresolved: (1) the pits’ 

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depth exceeded the maximum allowable depth under the reclamation plan; (2) the pits had 

illegally impacted the “shallow groundwater aquifer,” but the reclamation plan does not address 

groundwater; (3) the pits were located within the 100-year floodplain without proper notification; 

(4) the Mine’s infrastructure (a processing plant, water ponds, settling basins, and stockpiles) 

were not at the locations noted by the reclamation plan; and (5) the Mine had not observed best 

practices for erosion and sediment control near the pits. Id. at OMR004197–99. OMR also 

believed the risk of pit capture remained high. Id. at OMR004199. A formal report was 

completed in June 2010. Wesling Decl. Ex. E, ECF Nos. 222-8 to -10. 

OMR also prepared an inspection report for its June 2010 inspection, which was 

completed in June 2011. See Koehler Decl. ¶ 9; id. Ex. B, ECF No. 222-23. Unlike the March 

2009 and November 2009 inspections, the June 2010 inspection had a broader scope. See id. at 

OMR004165. OMR believed nine violations had occurred: (1) the possibility of pit capture 

endangered the public health and safety and the environment; (2) the pits had impacted 

groundwater in the area, but the reclamation plan did not address groundwater; (3) mining had 

exceeded allowable depths in the pits; (4) the pits’ slopes were unstable; (5) the Mine’s erosion 

controls were inadequate with respect to the pits; (6) mining waste had been deposited on top of 

wetlands; (7) the actual areas disturbed by mining operations were approximately 239 acres, but 

the County’s reports had indicated about 112 acres were disturbed; (8) HSG’s processing plant, 

processing ponds, settling basins, and stockpiles were not in the locations noted in the 

reclamation plan; and (9) mining adjacent to the banks of the Cosumnes River was occurring 

much earlier than allowed under the reclamation plan. Id. at OMR004170–74. 

The Flood Board also conducted its inspections and negotiated remedial actions 

with the Mine and HSG between 2009 and 2011, both in conjunction with other regulators and 

independently. See generally Taras Decl., ECF No. 222-11. 

Over the same period, the County’s FACEs began to diverge from FACEs 

prepared for the Mine by its consultant. In December 2009, a County contractor estimated the 

total costs of reclamation for the Mine would be $194,745. See Olsen Rep. at OLS 03. In the 

same time period, the Mine’s consultant calculated FACEs of between $100,000 and $140,000. 

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See id.; Balestreri Decl. Ex. EE, at OMR007788, ECF No. 222-17; id. Ex. FF, at OMR 008921. 

Estimates for early 2010 differed somewhat, but were within the same order of magnitude. See

Olsen Rep. at OLS 03. But starting in mid-2010, the regulators’ estimates were much higher. For 

example, in June and December 2010, OMR estimated a $984,000 FAM was necessary. Koehler 

Decl. Ex. B, at OMR004175, ECF No. 222-23. Similarly, in December 2010, the County’s 

consultant estimated total costs of reclamation for the Mine would be $835,303. See Olsen Rep. 

at OLS 03. And in November 2012, the County’s consultant estimated total costs of reclamation 

for the Mine would be either $901,336 or $8,817,074, depending on whether material would be 

imported to refill the gravel pits beside the river. Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 40, at OMR000851, ECF 

No. 248-8. Over the same period, FACEs prepared by the Mine’s consultant never exceeded 

$200,000. See Olsen Rep. at OLS 03. 

6. April–September 2010: Notice of Zoning Violation and Hearings 

In April 2010, the County sent a notice of violation to Schneider, charging the 

Mine with zoning violations. O’Dea Decl. Ex. B, ECF No. 218-5; Schneider Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 

No. 220-2. Schneider appealed the notice of violation to the County Board of Supervisors and 

hearings were held between May and September of 2010. Gamel Decl. ¶ 19; Schneider Decl. ¶ 4; 

Sacramento Bd. of Supervisors Meeting Trs. (May 26, July 13, Sept. 14, & Sept. 28, 2010), ECF 

Nos. 220-3, 220-4, 220-6, 220-7. Jay Schneider and Richard Ross, the Schneiders’ attorney in 

this case, were both present at each hearing. See generally Sacramento Bd. of Supervisors 

Meeting Trs. (May 26, July 13, Sept. 14, & Sept. 28, 2010). 

On September 28, 2010, the Board of Supervisors upheld the notice of violations. 

See Gamel Decl. ¶ 19; Sacramento Bd. of Supervisors Meeting Tr. 30 (Sept. 28, 2010), ECF 

No. 220-7. Schneider initially pursued but then abandoned a petition for a writ of mandate in 

California superior court. See Schneider v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 34-2011-80000857 

(Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct. filed May 12, 2011). 

7. Developments in 2010–2012 

The Hardestys filed their complaint in this action in September 2010, midway 

through the hearings on Schneider’s appeal before the Board of Supervisors. See Hardesty 

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Compl., ECF No. 1. They asserted several constitutional claims against both federal and state 

defendants for alleged violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 

generally id.

In October 2010, after Schneider’s appeal concluded, the County ordered 

Schneider either to cease operations and begin reclamation or to apply for a conditional use 

permit and rezoning. Gamel Decl. ¶ 20. The Schneiders and Hardestys have not applied for a 

conditional use permit. Id. Mining ceased in Fall 2010. See Hardesty Decl. ¶ 10. 

In January 2011, the County issued a citation to Schneider for selling existing 

mining stockpiles without a permit. Schneider Decl. ¶ 100; Derby Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 218-5. 

He appealed the citation. Schneider Decl. ¶ 101; Derby Decl. ¶ 11. The Board of Supervisors 

denied the appeal and upheld the citation on May 4, 2011. Schneider Decl. ¶ 108. He filed a 

petition for a writ of mandate with the Sacramento County Superior Court. Id. ¶ 109. As noted 

above, he did not pursue the case to its conclusion. See Order Vacating Hr’g, Schneider v. Bd. of 

Supervisors, No. 34-2011-80000857 (Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 11, 2013). In a 

separate action, in March 2012, the Superior Court enjoined HSG from mining or removing 

stockpiled materials from the Mine. Order, Schneider v. Hardesty, No. 34-2012-00119889 

(Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 5, 2012), Dkt. No. 17. 

The County conducted another inspection in May 2011. Derby Decl. ¶ 18. It 

found violations of SMARA and the reclamation plan and notified Hardesty and Schneider of 

these findings in a June 2011 letter. Id. In December 2011, the Board of Zoning Appeals adopted 

portions of the June 2011 Notice and Order. See Hardesty Resp. County Defs.’ Stmt. Undisp. 

Mat. Facts no. 30, ECF No. 231; Schneider Resp. County Defs.’ Stmt. Undisp. Mat. Facts no. 30, 

ECF No. 240. 

In the late summer of 2012, Schneider believed he would be unable to obtain 

effective relief in California courts. Schneider Decl. ¶ 117, ECF No. 220-2. He filed an action in 

this court in September 2012 to avoid the running of the statute of limitations. Id. ¶ 119. His 

original complaint alleged several claims along the same lines as the Hardestys’ complaint. See 

generally Compl., Case No. 12-2457, ECF No. 1. 

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IV. PROCEDURAL MATTERS 

As noted above, the Hardestys’ original complaint was filed in September 2010. 

Three rounds of motion practice have narrowed the case to the following claims, all under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983: 

 An equal protection claim against Dennis O’Bryant, Gay Norris (a geologist at 

OMR), and Stephen Testa (the Mining Board’s Executive Officer) related to 

their allegedly selective enforcement of the AB 3098 list, Second Am. Compl. 

(Hardesty Compl.) ¶¶ 116–28; 

 A Fourth Amendment claim against Liz Gregory for conducting a warrantless 

search of the Mine, id. ¶¶ 139–45; 

 Substantive and procedural due process claims against Curt Taras (formerly of 

the Flood Board) based on a cease-and-desist letter he sent to the Mine in 

2009, id. ¶¶ 146–53; 

 Due process and equal protection claims against Sacramento County and 

Robert Sherry (the former Planning Director for the County) stemming from 

the alleged revocation of the Hardestys’ SMARA vested right, id. ¶¶ 154–62; 

 An equal protection claim against Sacramento County, Cindy Storelli (a 

principal planner for the County), and Leighann Moffitt (another principal 

planner and later Planning Director) based on their alleged differential 

treatment of the Mine’s FACEs and FAMs when compared to other similarly 

situated mining operations, id. ¶¶ 163–77; and 

 A substantive due process claim against all the defendants based on their 

alleged campaign to drive the Hardestys out of business, id. ¶¶ 192–204. 

The Schneiders’ pleadings also were the subject of motions to dismiss and 

amendments, eventually arriving at a Third Amended Complaint, which includes the following 

claims, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: 

 A procedural due process claim against Sacramento County, Sherry, Storelli, 

Moffitt, Roger Dickinson (a former member of the Sacramento County Board 

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of Supervisors), Jeff Gamel (former Sacramento County Senior Planner and 

Aggregate Resources Manager), Tammy Derby (former Chief of the Code 

Enforcement Division of Sacramento County), and Carl Simpson (another 

former Code Enforcement Chief) related to the alleged revocation of land use 

entitlements, Third Am. Compl. (Schneider Compl.), ¶¶ 241–50, Case No. 12-

2457, ECF No. 70; 

 A substantive due process claim against Sacramento County, Sherry, Storelli, 

Moffitt, Dickinson, Gamel, Derby, and Simpson related to the revocation of 

the SMARA vested right, id. ¶¶ 251–62; 

 A substantive due process claim against David Bieber (an engineer and 

consultant), arising from the alleged inflation of FACEs he calculated for the 

County, id. ¶¶ 263–80; 

 First Amendment claims against all the defendants based on the allegedly 

retaliatory increase in FACEs, id. ¶¶ 281–90; and 

 An equal protection claim against Sacramento County, Sherry, Storelli, 

Moffitt, Dickinson, Gamel, Derby, and Simpson based on their alleged 

selective treatment of the Mine, id. ¶¶ 291–305. 

The Hardesty and Schneider cases were related in May 2013, Related Case Order, 

ECF No. 156, and in August 2014, the two actions were mostly consolidated with only the claims 

against David Bieber remaining in the unconsolidated Schneider case, see Order Aug. 15, 2014, 

ECF No. 186. 

In October 2015, the parties filed several motions for summary judgment. As 

confirmed at hearing, these motions place the entirety of the Hardesty and Schneider cases before 

the court. The defendants move for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them in the 

two cases.8

 The Hardestys and Schneiders oppose these motions in total.9 The defendants also 

 8 See State Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 222; Gregory Mot., ECF No. 217; County Mot. Pt. 1, 

ECF No. 218-1; County Mot. Pt. 2, ECF No. 218-2; County Mot. Pt. 3, ECF No. 218-3; Bieber 

Mot., Case No. 12-2457, ECF No. 105. 

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each replied.10 In addition, the Schneiders move for partial summary judgment on their claim to a 

SMARA vested right and for partial summary judgment that they were deprived of this right 

without due process.11 A subset of the defendants opposes these motions,12 and the Schneiders 

replied.13 The court held a consolidated hearing on January 22, 2016 and allowed the parties to 

file written closing arguments.14

V. LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion for summary judgment will be granted “if the movant shows there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A motion for summary judgment calls for a “threshold inquiry” into 

whether a trial is necessary at all, that is, whether “any genuine factual issues . . . properly can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The court does not weigh 

evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses; rather, it determines which facts the parties do not 

dispute, then draws all inferences and views all evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. See id. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587–88 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 

find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 

(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 

 9 See Opp’n State Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 243; Opp’n Gregory Mot., ECF No. 236; 

Hardesty Opp’n County Mot. Pt. A, ECF No. 234; Hardesty Opp’n County Mot. Pt. B, ECF 

No. 235; Schneider Opp’n County Mot. Pt. A, ECF No. 238; Schneider Opp’n County Mot. Pt. B, 

ECF No. 239; Opp’n Bieber Mot., Case No. 12-2457, ECF No. 108. 

10 See State Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 256; Gregory Reply, ECF No. 253; County Reply 

Pt. 1, ECF No. 255-1; County Reply Pt. 2, ECF no. 255-2; County Reply Pt. 3, ECF No. 255-3; 

Bieber Reply, Case No. 12-2457, ECF No. 112. 

11 See Schneider Mot. Vested Right, ECF No. 219; Schneider Mot. Due Process, ECF 

No. 220. 

12 County Opp’n Vested Right, ECF No. 228; County Opp’n Due Process, ECF No. 228-

1; State Defs.’ Joinder, ECF No. 237. 

13 See Reply Vested Rights, ECF No. 258; Reply Due Process, ECF No. 257. 

14 See Minutes, ECF No. 263; Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 268; State Defs.’ Br., ECF No. 272; 

Gregory Br., ECF No. 271; County Br., ECF No. 269; Schneider Br., ECF No. 270; Hardesty Br., 

ECF No. 273; Bieber Br., Case No. 12-2457, ECF No. 118; Schneider Br., Case No. 12-2457, 

ECF No. 119. 

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The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the 

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986). If the party opposing summary judgment bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving 

party need only illustrate the “absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” In re 

Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). The burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate specific facts showing that there is 

a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quotation marks omitted). The non-moving 

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of 

the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

VI. MONELL CLAIMS 

The Hardestys and Schneiders assert several claims against the County of 

Sacramento and its officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipal bodies are subject to liability 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n.54 

(1978). The “touchstone” of a claim against a municipal government under § 1983 is the 

plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant’s “official policy” deprived her of constitutional rights. 

Id. at 690–91. Thus a plaintiff may pursue relief under § 1983 against a municipal body to 

address an unconstitutional decision a municipal government’s officers officially adopted or 

promulgated. Id. at 690. 

A municipality must be the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s injury. Bd. of 

Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). “That is, a plaintiff must 

show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must 

demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal 

rights.” Id. But “[w]here a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates 

federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is 

straightforward.” Id. (emphasis in original). “[P]roof that a municipality’s legislative body or 

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authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right 

necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably.” Id. at 405. 

Here, in its briefing, the County argued this case involves no allegedly 

unconstitutional policy because the plaintiffs have produced no evidence of a longstanding 

practice. See County Mot. Pt. 2 at 8–9. At hearing, however, counsel withdrew from this 

position. As noted in the previous paragraph, the County may have adopted a “policy” despite 

the absence of any longstanding practice or custom. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 

U.S. 469, 480 (1986); see also Hammond v. Cty. of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(county board of supervisors subject to suit for both ratifying an official’s misconduct and 

“actively participat[ing] in the deprivation of [plaintiffs’] property rights”), abrogated on other 

grounds as noted in L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1996); Evers v. Custer Cty., 745 

F.2d 1196, 1198–1203 (9th Cir. 1984) (an official declaration that deprived a person of a real 

property right, though a single act, could support a local government’s liability under § 1983). 

Indeed the parties generally refer not to the individual defendants’ actions, but to the County’s 

actions. The claims against the County may proceed if not otherwise adjudicated in this order. 

VII. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: DEFENDANT GREGORY 

The Hardestys claim DFG Warden Liz Gregory conducted an unconstitutional 

search when she and Zachary Simmons of the Army Corps of Engineers inspected the Mine in 

September 2008. 

A. Undisputed Facts 

A more detailed review of the facts specific to this claim is first necessary to 

explain the court’s reasoning. In July 2008, Zachary Simmons of the Army Corps of Engineers 

was assigned to the investigation of HSG and the Mine. Simmons Dep. 13–15. After reviewing 

aerial and satellite photography and looking through the Corps’ files, it appeared to him that HSG 

possibly violated federal law or regulations. See id. at 15, 17. Simmons scheduled a visit for July 

2008. Id. at 18–20, 25. 

The inspection lasted several hours. Id. at 170. Hardesty seemed frustrated and an 

HSG employee suggested Simmons was on the payroll of an unnamed competitor. Id. at 171–74. 

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Hardesty refused to allow Simmons to inspect one of three locations of interest and asked him to 

leave. See Simmons Interview 145 (Apr. 18, 2013)15; Simmons Dep. 68. 

In a meeting after the investigation, Simmons and other Corps staff considered 

how they could complete an inspection of the entire Mine. Simmons Dep. 70. Someone 

suggested planning a joint inspection with the DFG. Id. This was unsurprising to Simmons, as 

the DFG and the Corps typically work together on investigations and because DFG wardens may 

be able to obtain access to private property. Id. The next step in Simmons’ and the Corps’ 

investigation was therefore to contact their counterparts at the DFG. Id. at 71. 

When Simmons contacted DFG, he was routed to Liz Gregory. Simmons Dep. 71; 

JSUF no. 70. This was the first Gregory had heard about the Mine. Gregory Dep. 61. Simmons 

gave Gregory information about potential violations of the California Fish and Game Code at the 

Mine. Id.; Simmons Dep. 72–73; Doody Decl. Ex. 80, ECF No. 217-8. At that time, Gregory 

had some experience investigating streambed alteration issues under California Fish and Game 

Code section 1600. Gregory Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 217-3. But none of her previous inspections 

under those sections involved surface mining. Id. Simmons told Gregory he had been to the 

Mine before, but he did not say with whom or how many times he had gone. Gregory Dep. 61–

62. She knew he had visited two locations and knew that he had information about a third 

location, but she did not know Simmons had been prevented from inspecting the third site. Id. at 

70–72. 

Simmons sent Gregory some pictures of the Mine, and Gregory passed these on to 

a more experienced Fish and Game Warden, who agreed the Mine might have violated the Fish 

and Game Code. Doody Decl. ¶¶ 1–5, ECF No. 217-8. Simmons and Gregory planned an 

unannounced inspection of the Mine. See id. Ex. 78, No. 217-8; id. Ex. 80, ECF No. 217-8. 

Gregory and Simmons met at the Mine as planned. Gregory Decl. ¶ 6. Before 

they entered the Mine, Simmons told Gregory he had received a message from a congressman’s 

 15 To the extent the court relies on this testimony here, Gregory’s implied objection is 

overruled. See Gregory Reply at 2 n.3. The court’s limited consideration of that testimony here 

subjects Gregory to no prejudice. 

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office that morning. Id. This was the first either of them knew that any legislator had an interest 

in the investigation. Id.; Gregory Dep. 65; Simmons Dep. 76–77. Gregory called her captain, 

Mark Lucero, who told her to go ahead with the investigation. Gregory Decl. ¶ 6. 

Gregory and Simmons drove in Gregory’s patrol truck onto the Mine through an 

open gate on an access road. Gregory Decl. ¶ 8. Gregory did not have a warrant and did not 

believe she needed one. Id. ¶ 17. The ranch is fenced by barbed wire in some places, including 

on its border along Meiss Road near where Gregory and Simmons entered. Id. ¶ 10; see also id.

Ex. VV-1, ECF No. 217-4 (photograph of the fence from Meiss Road). Gregory parked her truck 

on the access road and began inspecting a pond area in the middle of a wide-open, grassy field. 

Id. ¶ 11; see also id. Exs. UU-1, WW-1, ECF No. 217-4 (photographs of the pond area and the 

field). The two then went back to the truck and continued north. Gregory Decl. ¶ 12. They 

stopped briefly near a weigh station, then continued again. Id. Near a processing facility Gregory 

turned east and drove past a settling pond, then parked on the shoulder of the road. Id. She and 

Simmons left the truck and began walking south. Id. The area where they stood was a wide-open 

field. Id. ¶ 13; see also id. Ex. FF, at OMR003196–97 (overhead aerial photographs of the area); 

id. Ex. SS-1, at LG00793, Photo 9 (ground-level photograph of the field). 

While Simmons and Gregory were standing in the field, a Mine employee asked 

them to go to the Mine’s weigh station. Id. ¶ 14. They did, and met Hardesty. Id. ¶ 15. Hardesty 

told them they had no right to be on the property, and Gregory disagreed, explaining she had 

authority and had brought Simmons to show her where he believed there may have been damage 

to waterways or wildlife. Id. Hardesty told her he had ordered Simmons off the property during 

his July 2008 inspection, and Hardesty said something about suing Teichert. Id.; Gregory 

Dep. 72. That was the first time Gregory had heard anything about Teichert. Gregory Decl. ¶ 15. 

Gregory left the property after she spoke to Lucero again on the phone, who told her to leave. Id. 

Gregory was upset that she had brought Simmons along and had not known he had been 

forbidden from the property before. Gregory Dep. 73. 

///// 

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Over the course of their joint inspection, Gregory and Simmons entered no 

buildings. Gregory Decl. ¶ 17. They encountered no locked or closed gates and no other physical 

barriers. Id. They went nowhere that appeared to be private. Id. 

After the inspection, Gregory received emails and participated in meetings about 

the Mine, but she played no further role in any investigation or enforcement actions. See Gregory 

Decl. ¶¶ 18–27. She never heard any state or county personnel say or imply they intended to put 

the Mine out of business or harm HSG’s business. Id. ¶ 28. In a declaration, she avers likewise 

her goal was always to “identify and resolve violations of the California Fish and Game Code and 

any related threats to the public or to fish and wildlife resources.” Id. ¶ 29. Neither Gregory nor 

the DFG issued any citations or orders to the Mine. Id. ¶ 30. 

B. Discussion 

“The Fourth Amendment safeguards ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Atwater v. 

City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). It applies against 

states and state agencies. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223–24 (1960). The Supreme 

Court recently clarified its two-part interpretation of the words “searches and seizures.” See 

generally United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). First, by mentioning 

“persons, houses, papers, and effects,” the Amendment prohibits certain intrusions on a person’s 

property. See id. at 949. Second, because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” it 

prohibits searches and seizures that violate a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” id.

at 950 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). These two conceptions operate 

independently. A search or seizure may be unreasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment if it 

concerns the type of property listed in the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the person’s 

expectation of privacy. See id. at 949–53 (monitoring a person’s location with a GPS tracker 

attached to his car was a “search” because the car was an “effect”). Likewise a search may 

violate the Fourth Amendment regardless of any trespassory intrusion if the search violates the 

person’s objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. See generally, e.g., Kyllo v. United 

/////

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States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (the government conducted a “search” of a person’s home when it 

used a thermal imaging camera from across the street). 

Under these rules, the Fourth Amendment does not offer protection against 

searches and seizures in “the open fields.” See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 

A field is not a person, house, paper, or effect, and an assertion of privacy in open fields “is not 

an expectation that society recognizes as reasonable.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 

(1984) (citations and quotation marks omitted). This is true even if the field is secluded, 

demarcated by “No Trespassing” signs, and surrounded by a barbed wire fence. See id. at 181–

83. For example, in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the 

police did not conduct a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when they shone a 

flashlight into a barn on a private ranch in the middle of an open field, even though to reach the 

barn they had first crossed several fences. See id. at 297–98, 303–05. 

Here, although it is undisputed Simmons and Gregory had no warrant, the property 

they searched was an “open field”: grass and rolling hills, under wide blue skies. See Gregory 

Decl. Exs. UU-1, VV-1, WW-1, ECF No. 217-4. No evidence suggests Gregory and Simmons 

entered any private area, structure, or home. The Hardestys have no home on the Schneider 

ranch. They can maintain no Fourth Amendment claim against Gregory because no “search” 

occurred. 

The ulterior motive the Hardestys ascribe to Gregory’s inspection—providing a 

back door for Simmons to snoop around the Mine without the Hardestys’ or Schneiders’ 

permission—would not transform that inspection into a Fourth Amendment search. Opp’n 

Gregory Mot. 6–11, ECF 236. Neither does the fact that the Mine was a private industrial 

property. The Hardestys’ arguments to the contrary rest on incorrect interpretations of several 

decisions. 

First, they cite the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th 

Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 526 U.S. 808 (1999) (per curiam).16 In that case, federal 

 16 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Berger in light of its intervening decision in 

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). The Wilson court held that police officers violated the 

Fourth Amendment by inviting media to record the execution of an arrest warrant inside a private 

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agents had obtained a warrant to search the plaintiff’s Montana ranch for evidence he had 

poisoned and shot endangered eagles. 129 F.3d at 508–09. The Ninth Circuit concluded the 

agents had run afoul of the Fourth Amendment by allowing news media to secretly record video 

and audio during the search. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected the agents’ citation to the open-fields 

doctrine because that doctrine “is not a license for the police to bring trespassers on to private 

property.” Id. at 512. Had the plaintiffs sued the agents for conducting a warrantless search of 

the field, the doctrine would have removed the case from the Fourth Amendment’s reach, but it 

could not “immunize the officers from liability for conduct that has no law enforcement purpose.” 

Id. Here, unlike in Berger, the Hardestys sue Gregory for conducting a warrantless search, and 

although the parties dispute whether her inspection was a pretext for Simmons’ continued 

investigation, it is undisputed that both Simmons and Gregory meant to search the Mine for 

violations of federal and state laws. That is, the parties agree Simmons and Gregory had a “law 

enforcement purpose,” and the Berger court’s reasoning does not apply. Berger also is 

distinguishable from this case in light of the Berger court’s passing discussion of evidence, noting 

“that the shed and other outbuildings that were a focus of the cameras were places in which the 

[plaintiffs] did have a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 512–13. No similar evidence has 

been presented here. 

Second, the Hardestys cite Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 

29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994). In that case, officers stormed a man’s home, intending to arrest 

him, without first obtaining a warrant for his arrest. See id. at 1357–59. Rather, the officers had 

obtained a warrant to investigate suspected health and safety violations on his property. Id. The 

Ninth Circuit applied the longstanding rule that prevents police from using administrative search 

warrants for criminal-law purposes. See id. at 1360–61; see also Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 

731, 736–37 (2011) (reviewing rule that “Fourth Amendment reasonableness is predominantly an 

objective inquiry” except when it comes to “administrative-search cases,” where the officers’ 

 home. Because the Supreme Court vacated the Circuit’s order, that order is non-precedential in 

total. See Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991). It remains at most 

persuasive. See DHX, Inc. v. Allianz AGF MAT, Ltd., 425 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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purpose “is not to attend to . . . the investigation for which the administrative inspection is 

justified” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Here, by contrast, the purported search was 

not of a home, but of an open field. “The Government’s physical intrusion on such an area . . . is 

of no Fourth Amendment significance.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. Moreover, Simmons and 

Gregory did not use an administrative-law search for criminal-law purposes. 

Third, the Hardestys cite United States v. Dunn, supra, 480 U.S. 294, for the 

Supreme Court’s discussion of a home’s curtilage, “the area immediately surrounding a dwelling 

house,” which the Fourth Amendment protects from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.

at 300. The Hardestys maintained no home on the Schneiders’ ranch, and the Supreme Court has 

not decided whether and how its decisions addressing the curtilage of a home may be applied to a 

business. See, e.g., United States v. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. 227, 239 n.7 (1986). But the Court 

has confirmed that “[p]lainly a business establishment or commercial or industrial facility enjoys 

certain protections under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 235; see also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 

436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (“[I]t is untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not intended 

to shield places of business as well as of residence.”); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 

(1967) (“The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about 

his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.”). And 

a number of district and appellate decisions have found the areas immediately surrounding a 

commercial or industrial facility receive some Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., United 

States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638, 654 (6th Cir. 2002) (“There may be circumstances in which the 

area adjoining a business structure is sufficiently private to enjoy a protection analogous to a 

home’s curtilage.”); United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1982) (adopting the 

possibility a search took place “within the curtilage of the [defendant’s] business buildings”); 

Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm, Inc. v. Nelson, 723 F. Supp. 432, 440 (N.D. Cal. 1989) 

(“[U]nder existing law, commercial curtilage is subject to the Fourth Amendment.”). 

If the traditional rules of curtilage could be extended to commercial and industrial 

buildings, this is not the case for extension. Four factors define the extent of a home’s curtilage: 

“the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within 

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an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps 

taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” Dunn, 476 U.S. 

at 301. Here, the evidence does not suggest Simmons and Gregory inspected any area near a 

building. They did not enter any buildings or any enclosure surrounding a building. They 

encountered no locked gates, and nothing suggested to them that the fields and gullies on the 

Mine were private. There is no evidence HSG used security cameras, guards, check stations, or 

similar countermeasures to ward off intruders. Cf. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 241 (describing 

Dow’s “elaborate” security measures). Simmons and Gregory drove onto the Mine on an open 

road. Considering that a person’s “expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different 

from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home,” New York v. Burger, 

482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987), this evidence cannot support a finding that the inspection encroached 

on any “industrial curtilage.” 

Gregory’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to the Hardestys’ Fourth 

Amendment claim. 

VIII. EQUAL PROTECTION 

The Hardestys and Schneiders allege the defendants deprived them of their right to 

equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. They contend the defendants singled them 

out arbitrarily for more vigorous enforcement in an effort to drive the Mine out of business. They 

assert multiple claims analyzed below, following an introductory discussion of the nature of claim 

asserted. 

A. Class-of-One Claim 

The Equal Protection Clause can support the type of claim plaintiffs bring, 

commonly referred to as a “class-of-one” claim. See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 

591, 601–02 (2008). A plaintiff can succeed in a class-of-one claim if she shows the defendants 

intentionally and arbitrarily treated her differently than they treated others who were in the same 

situation. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). In other 

words, a class-of-one claim has three elements: the defendant acted intentionally, treated the 

plaintiff differently than other similarly situated persons, and did so without a rational basis. 

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Gerhart v. Lake Cty., Mont., 637 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, the first element, an 

intentional act, is not in dispute. The parties agree the defendants acted intentionally. This leaves 

the second and third elements. 

As for the second element, the plaintiffs must show the defendants treated them 

differently than other similarly situated persons. Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. In this context, 

“similarly situated” means that in all relevant respects, the comparators are “alike,” Nordlinger v. 

Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992), “arguably indistinguishable,” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 

(1974), or “identical,” Chico Scrap Metal, Inc. v. Raphael, 830 F. Supp. 2d 966, 975 (E.D. Cal. 

2011), aff’d and remanded on unrelated question sub nom. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc. v. Robinson, 

560 F. App’x 650 (9th Cir. 2014). In the land-use context, the First Circuit has found this to be a 

“very significant burden,” one to be enforced “with particular rigor.” Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 

F.3d 245, 251 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 319 

F.3d 277, 283 (7th Cir. 2003)). Likewise the Second Circuit has described the plaintiffs’ 

“stringent” burden to “show an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the 

persons to whom they compare themselves.” Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d 

Cir. 2006). 

As for the third element, if the plaintiffs show the defendants treated them 

differently than others in the same situation, they must prove the defendants had no legitimate 

reason to make this distinction. Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564; Gerhart, 637 F.3d at 1023. The 

question is not whether the defendants’ actions were themselves rational, but whether the 

defendants had a valid reason to single the plaintiffs out. Gerhard, 637 F.3d at 1023. A 

distinction is permissible if it “bears a rational relation to a legitimate state interest.” Squaw 

Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted), overruled in part on other grounds, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 

(2005). The government does not necessarily act irrationally if it selectively enforces valid laws. 

Id. Some other evidence of the defendants’ malice, arbitrariness, or irrationality is essential. See, 

e.g., Valley Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Riverside, 446 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2006); Squaw Valley, 

375 F.3d at 944. 

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If a defendant offers a rational explanation for the distinctions, the case may 

nevertheless go to trial to resolve factual disputes about whether that explanation is objectively 

false or pretext for an underlying impermissible motive. See, e.g., Valley Outdoor, 446 F.3d at 

955; Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 945–46. For example, in Valley Outdoor, the plaintiffs offered 

evidence that could have shown the government denied a permit application out of spite. See

446 F.3d at 955. And in Squaw Valley, the plaintiff cited evidence suggesting the defendants’ 

enforcement actions were motivated by personal animosity. See 375 F.3d at 946–47. 

The Hardestys argue incorrectly that a plaintiff is excused of her burden to show 

the defendants treated her differently if she produces evidence of their false or pretextual 

explanations. See, e.g., Hardesty Opp’n County Mot. Pt. A at 11. The kernel of equal protection 

is a comparative test: did the government discriminate? See, e.g., Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564 

(“[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every 

person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination . . . .” 

(citation, alterations, and quotation marks omitted)). Or in other words, “‘[d]ue process’ 

emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how 

other individuals in the same situation may be treated, [whereas] ‘[e]qual protection,’ . . . 

emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are 

arguably indistinguishable.” Ross, 417 U.S. at 609. 

Without exception, the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court have required class-ofone plaintiffs to show they were treated differently than others who were similarly situated. See, 

e.g., Engquist, 553 U.S. at 601 (the Equal Protection clause “ensure[s] that all persons subject to 

legislation or regulation are indeed being ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and 

conditions.’”); Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564 (a class-of-one claim must rest on the plaintiff’s 

allegation “that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and 

that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment”); Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, __ 

F. 3d __, 2016 WL 2849245, at *4 (9th Cir. May 16, 2016) (same); Gerhart, 637 F.3d at 1022 

(same); N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Valley 

Outdoor, 446 F.3d at 955 (referring to “differential treatment”); Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 944 

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(“[A]ll persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” (citation and quotation marks 

omitted)). 

To support their position on the question of similarly situated persons, the 

Hardestys rely on Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg. See Hardesty Opp’n Sherry Mot. 

at 11 (citing 375 F.3d at 944). But in Squaw Valley, the defendants conceded they had “afforded 

[the plaintiff] more oversight” and imposed “more formal regulatory and enforcement action” as 

compared to similarly situated persons. 375 F.3d at 944. The passages the Hardestys cite to 

support their argument appear in the Squaw Valley court’s discussion of the defendants’ reasons 

for singling the plaintiff out, not whether similarly situated persons could be found. See id. at 

944–45 (concluding the defendants had “articulated a rational reason for their actions”). The 

Ninth Circuit discussed comparisons with other persons only to show why it believed the 

defendants’ explanation was rational: the comparators the plaintiff proposed were not similarly 

situated. See, e.g., id. at 945 (“[T]he record does support that [the defendant] imposed harsher 

penalties on [the plaintiff] . . . . However, again, [the plaintiff] has simply not provided evidence 

that these dischargers are similarly situated.”). 

The court does not read the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Erickson v. County 

of Nevada ex rel. Board of Supervisors, 607 F. App’x 711 (9th Cir. 2015), to conflict with Squaw 

Valley in this respect. The Erickson court’s brief citation of Squaw Valley is best understood as 

an analogy, as it is preceded by a “see also” signal and follows a citation to the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Engquist. See id. at 712. In any event, Erickson’s unpublished interpretation of 

Squaw Valley is not binding on this court, see Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, and neither the Erickson

nor Squaw Valley panels could have overruled the Supreme Court’s and Ninth Circuit’s many 

decisions that require a showing of similarity in any class-of-one claim. 

With these rules in mind, the court now considers the specifics of the Hardestys’ 

and Schneiders’ equal protection claims. 

///// 

///// 

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B. The Hardestys’ Second Claim Against O’Bryant, Norris, and Testa 

The Hardestys allege defendants O’Bryant, Norris, and Testa subjected the Mine 

to unusually harsh enforcement with respect to the AB 3098 list. See Hardesty Compl. 

¶¶ 120–21. 

1. Denial of Appeal and Selective Provision of Guidance 

First, the Hardestys allege they were selectively denied any appeal of OMR’s 

decision to remove HSG from the AB 3098 list. But they have produced no evidence to show any 

other mine operator was allowed an appeal. This claim therefore cannot support their case. 

Similarly, the Hardestys argue OMR denied them an explanation of how they could be reinstated 

on the AB 3098 list, whereas it gave those instructions to another mining operation. Hardesty 

Opp’n State Defs.’ Mot. at 48–49. But the Hardestys rely only on the unverified complaint to 

support this allegation. See id. at 48 (citing Hardesty Compl. ¶ 124). Allegations do not suffice 

in response to a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. 

Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). 

2. Norris and the Truck 

Second, the Hardestys allege OMR singled them out for unusually harsh 

enforcement when one of its staff, Gay Norris, followed a truck that left the Mine, then told a 

customer not to buy HSG’s products. 

Norris participated in OMR’s December 2008 inspection of the Mine. Norris 

Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 222-20. During the inspection, she saw loaded trucks leaving the Mine. Id. 

After the inspection, she checked OMR’s records and found the Mine was not on the AB 3098 

list. Id. ¶ 3. At O’Bryant’s suggestion, she decided to follow a loaded truck as it left the Mine. 

Norris Dep. 101–02 & Ex. 97; Hardesty UMF no. 68; O’Bryant Decl. ¶ 26. Following trucks to 

delivery sites was one way the DOC enforced the AB 3098 list and SMARA. O’Bryant Decl. 

¶ 26. 

The next month, Norris and another OMR staffer followed a truck as it left the 

Mine. JSUF no. 36. The truck stopped near a construction site. JSUF no. 37. Norris pulled 

alongside the truck and approached the driver. Id. She identified herself and asked the driver 

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where he was coming from and if the construction site was his delivery stop. JSUF no. 38. He 

said he was coming from the Mine and that his destination was the construction site across the 

street. JSUF no. 39. Norris went to the nearby construction office and spoke with a 

representative of the construction project. JSUF nos. 40, 41. Norris learned the project was for 

the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD), a California local government agency. JSUF 

nos. 42, 43. Norris told the representative that HSG was not on the AB 3098 list and that 

EBMUD should not buy gravel from HSG. JSUF no. 44. 

Norris’s involvement in this case ended soon after she followed the truck. JSUF 

no. 53. Although HSG was later temporarily reinstated on the AB 3098 List, Norris did not 

inform EBMUD of this fact. Norris Dep. 150–53. That was just “not something [OMR] would 

do.” Id. at 153. 

This record could not allow a jury to find OMR’s truck-following tactics were 

unusual or arbitrary. Following trucks to delivery sites was one way DOC enforced the AB 3098 

list and SMARA; it had used the same tactic in the past. O’Bryant Decl. ¶ 26. More specifically, 

aside from HSG, only two active California mining operations were not on the AB 3098 list: an 

unidentified mining operation in Riverside County, and the Pacific Rock Mine in Ventura 

County. See JSUF nos. 55, 56. Nothing suggests OMR treated these mines any differently than 

HSG. Norris also warned a state agency not to purchase materials from the unidentified 

Riverside County operation. JSUF no. 55. When Norris learned the Pacific Rock Mine was not 

on the AB 3098 list, she tried to follow its delivery trucks, but was unsuccessful. JSUF no. 56; 

Norris Dep. 136–37.17 

3. Removal from the AB 3098 List Without Notice 

Lastly, the Hardestys allege OMR selectively denied them any notice before 

removing HSG from the AB 3098 list. It is undisputed both that OMR removed HSG from the 

list without notice and that the removal was intentional. The Hardestys must therefore show they 

 17 The parties also refer to the Horseshoe Mine, but it is unclear what OMR did or did not 

do about the Horseshoe Mine and whether the Horseshoe Mine is comparable to HSG. See

Hardesty Compl. ¶ 65; State Defs.’ Mot. at 48; Norris Decl. ¶¶ 6–7. 

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were treated differently than other similarly situated persons. They propose to compare HSG to 

all California surface mining operations that were “at risk of being removed from the AB 3098 

list by OMR.” Opp’n State Defs.’ Mot. at 42. The court agrees that for all relevant purposes, 

another surface mining operation would be in an identical situation if (1) it was active, (2) in 

OMR’s view, it did not meet the listing requirements, and (3) OMR was considering whether to 

remove the mine operator from the list. The Hardestys bear the burden to point to evidence that 

would allow a trier of fact to find OMR treated a surface mining operation in this situation 

differently than it treated HSG. 

OMR ordinarily gave thirty days’ notice before removing a mining operation from 

the AB 3098 list. See, e.g., O’Bryant Decl. ¶ 14. As a matter of discretion, OMR also 

occasionally gave a mine operator more than thirty days’ notice.18 See id. ¶ 15; Koehler Decl. 

¶ 14, ECF No. 222-21; see also O’Bryant Dep. Ex. 356 (letter notifying the County of 

Sacramento several mine operators were at risk to be removed from the AB 3098 list also sent to 

those mine operators). But HSG was removed from the list without prior notice. A jury could 

credit this evidence and find HSG was treated differently than comparable mining operations. 

The focus therefore shifts to the defendants’ explanation for their decision to treat HSG 

differently. 

The defendants cite evidence showing that if OMR believed a mine operator 

would not or could not fix a problem, the operator was sometimes removed from the list without 

notice. O’Bryant Decl. ¶ 14. This appears to have been the case with the Pacific Rock and Truck 

Village Quarry mines, see id. ¶ 20; id. Ex. H, ECF No. 223-1; id. Ex. I, ECF No. 223-2, but not 

the Lehigh Southwest Cement Company, see, e.g., Pompy Decl. ¶¶ 5–9, ECF No. 222-27. As for 

HSG, defendant O’Bryant explains that he believed, after speaking to his staff, that Hardesty and 

 18 Some courts have concluded that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Engquist, any 

discretionary decision is incompatible with liability under a class-of-one theory. See, e.g., Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 542 (4th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging this 

uncertainty); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 558 F.3d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 2009) (relying 

on Engquist to conclude that a police officer’s discretionary decisions are incompatible with a 

class-of-one claim). Absent a binding decision from the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court, this 

court declines to grant summary judgment on this basis. 

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Schneider had no desire to correct problems that would require the Mine to be removed from the 

AB 3098 list. O’Bryant Decl. ¶ 16. O’Bryant also believed the Mine would need far more than 

thirty days to correct these problems. Id. ¶ 17. If, from OMR’s perspective, HSG was unlikely to 

comply and unlikely to correct problems within thirty days, removing the Mine without advance 

notice would save time and effort and might spur the Mine into action. This is a rational 

explanation for treating the Mine differently. 

The Hardestys contend this facially rational explanation hides an improper goal: 

the defendants’ desire to put HSG out of business at the behest of legislators and competitors. 

Their presentation of evidence in support of this contention is haphazard at best. The Hardestys 

have filed a separate statement of 407 allegedly disputed facts. See Hardesty Stmt., ECF No. 246. 

Many include citations to page “????” of a deposition or section “???” of the Public Resources 

Code. See id. nos. 74, 170, 177, 199, 205, 206, 213. Some documents are cited with cryptic 

abbreviations. See, e.g., id. nos. 163, 164 (citing “KH Declaration”). Others are not facts, but 

opinions or commentaries on the evidence. See, e.g., id. no. 214. Many are not cited in the 

Hardestys’ briefs. And attached to their separate statement are 129 exhibits. Most are a 

collection of letters, emails, memos, diagrams, or reports, which the Hardestys present without 

explanation, authentication, foundation, or context. 

Summary judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut,” but “an integral part 

of the Federal Rules as a whole” that allows defendants to avoid wasteful trials by proving a 

plaintiff’s claims “have no factual basis.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. For this reason, when a 

defendant moves for summary judgment and carries its initial burden to “inform the court of the 

basis for its motion,” the plaintiff must “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (quotation marks omitted). The Local Rules of this district require 

citations to “particular portions” of the record to support the non-moving party’s case. E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 260(b). Separate statements of disputed facts must be both “concise” and supported by “all 

evidentiary documents.” Id. The court has no duty to “comb the record to find some reason to 

deny a motion for summary judgment.” Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 

(9th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “If a district court must examine reams or 

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file cabinets full of paper looking for genuine issues of fact, as though the judge were the adverse 

party’s lawyer, an enormous amount of time is taken away from other litigants.” Id. Of course 

some cases, like this one, call for the evaluation of decades and reams of documentary evidence. 

But even in a complicated case, and especially in a complicated case, litigants must cite particular 

portions of the record and explain those citations. 

Moreover, evidence must be “presented in a form that would be admissible in 

evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). This Rule does not require a party who opposes summary 

judgment to present its evidence in strict adherence with the Federal Rules of Evidence. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1037. But a party presenting a document to the 

court must convey it can satisfy basic foundational precursors: Where did it come from? When 

was it created? Who created it? What does it mean?. 

By presenting the Hardestys’ evidence in the form before the court, counsel runs a 

great risk that the court will be unable to verify his clients’ interpretation of the facts. In an effort 

to resolve the pending motions on their merits rather than counsel’s organizational shortcomings, 

the court has reviewed the documents cited in the Hardestys’ briefing to determine whether the 

information in those documents could be presented in an admissible form at trial. At the same 

time, the court has taken pains to avoid doing counsel’s job for them. The documents the 

Hardestys cite are as follows: 

(a) As summarized above, see supra section III.E.2, page 13–14, on October 3, 

2008, Senator Cox sent a letter to the Secretary of the Resources Agency. Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 1, 

ECF No. 248-1. He expressed concern that HSG had secured a competitive advantage by flouting 

federal, state, and local regulations. Id. This letter could be introduced in some form at trial. 

(b) October 2008 emails between staff at the Resources Agency and DOC suggest 

Senator Cox’s letter motivated the agencies to move quickly. See Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 72, at 2, 

ECF No. 248-11 (“Given that Senator Cox is aware of, and has written to Sec. Chrisman, about 

this issue, I (and the Secretary) want it resolved one way or another as quickly as possible.”). The 

same email exchange suggests the agencies understood the investigation was more than “just a 

question about compliance with the law,” but rather “competitive advantage.” Id. It appears 

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these emails could also be presented in admissible form, for example through the testimony of the 

sender or receiver. 

(c) Diane Anderson, who previously represented the Hardestys in this action, ECF 

No. 72, submitted a declaration in support of the Hardestys’ current opposition. ECF No. 227. 

She would testify at trial that in February 2009, she exchanged emails and spoke on the phone 

with another attorney named John Williams. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Williams suggested he was working 

with one of HSG’s competitors to convince state and federal regulators to begin enforcement 

actions against the Mine. Id. ¶ 4. Anderson believes Williams contacted her under the mistaken 

impression that she was “against” Hardesty. Id. ¶ 5. Anderson attached a string of emails she 

received from Williams that explained his plan. Id. Ex. 1. “Plan A” was to convince state 

regulators to revoke a permit they had granted HSG to use portable equipment on the Mine. Id.

Ex. 1, at 3–4. “Plan B” was to convince Sacramento County to revisit its decision to recognize a 

vested right to mine. See id. Ex. 1, at 4–5. Williams also forwarded Anderson correspondence he 

had sent to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 2007, which encouraged an investigation of 

HSG and the Mine. See id. Ex. 1, at 6–7; see also Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 17, at 1, ECF No. 248-3 

(Mar. 7, 2007 letter from John Lane of Teichert Aggregates to Justin Cutler of the U.S. Fish & 

Wildlife Service); id. Ex. 17, at 2 (internal Fish & Wildlife emails about a possible investigation 

at the Mine in response to the letter); id. Ex. 17, at 3–4 (November 2007 emails between Lane and 

Michael Finan of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers encouraging an investigation of HSG and the 

Mine). Ms. Anderson’s declaration lays an adequate foundation for this evidence, at least for the 

court’s consideration at this stage. 

(d) A document titled “Strategy Matrix: Hardesty Sand and Gravel” includes a 

table with rows for several state and federal regulatory agencies, including the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife 

Service, OMR, the Flood Board, DFG, and Sacramento County. See generally Hardesty Stmt. 

Ex. 19, ECF No. 248-3. One column is titled “Teichert Strategy & Updates” and contains 

bulleted lists of past and future planned events or actions for each agency. See generally id. For 

example, in the row for the OMR, the table includes the entries “Met w/DOC Chief Deputy 

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Director 3/30,” “Met w/ Sen. Dave Cox’s office,” “Met w/Dennis O’Bryant and staff on Aug. 31, 

2010,” “OMR conducted investigation in 2009 of area near Cosumnes River,” and the table notes 

O’Bryant and Norris are named in this lawsuit. See id. at 5–6. The table is dated October 28, 

2010. See generally id. The table is marked as Exhibit 281 to the deposition of Curt Taras. See 

id. at 1. The Hardestys have not cited pages of Taras’s deposition or other evidence to explain 

who created or maintained the table or what its entries mean. The court therefore does not 

consider this document. 

(e) A memo titled “Talking Points/Script” and “Meeting with Senator Dave Cox 

May 4, 2010” including a bulleted paragraph that reads, “After significant pressure from 

Teichert/others, the following agencies are conducting their own individual investigations,” and 

lists OMR, among other federal and state agencies. Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 20, ECF no. 248-3. The 

memo suggests the Senator could help by arranging meetings, sending letters to the Attorney 

General, and calling the heads of state agencies. Id. The memo is marked as Exhibit 358 to the 

deposition of Dennis O’Bryant. See id. at 1. But the Hardestys have not cited to it or other 

evidence to explain who created the memo, when, or why, or to explain its contents. The court 

therefore does not consider it. 

(f) In an August 2010 email, Kate Wheatley of Taylor & Wiley, writing “[o]n 

behalf of Teichert Aggregates,” sent O’Bryant a request for a meeting “to discuss the County of 

Sacramento’s enforcement action for the Hardesty Sand & Gravel (Schneider Historic Mine).” 

Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 60, ECF No. 248-10. O’Bryant replied and confirmed a meeting date later 

that month in his office. Id. It appears the Hardestys could likely lay a foundation for this 

email’s admission in some form at trial, although it is unclear whether a meeting actually went 

forward as planned. See O’Bryant Dep. 195–97. 

(g) An undated memo lists names and contact information for officers in a number 

of federal and California state agencies. Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 18, ECF No. 248-3. The memo 

notes, “Highlighted names are those we’ve met with.” Id. at 1. It includes Brett Koehler and Ken 

Trott at the OMR, whose names are highlighted Id. at 2. In addition, two business cards are 

copied on the first page: Brian Lungren of Platinum Advisors, and Kate Wheatley of Taylor & 

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Wiley. Id. Mr. Hardesty understands Brian Lungren is the brother of former Congressman Dan 

Lungren and that Teichert hired Brian Lungren to advocate on its behalf. Hardesty Decl. ¶ 39, 

ECF No. 247. The memo is marked as Exhibit 77 to the Lucero deposition. See id. at 1. But the 

Hardestys have cited no part of that deposition or other evidence to explain who created the 

memo, when, or why, or to explain its contents. The court therefore does not consider this 

document. 

(h) Another of the Hardestys’ former attorneys, Scott Morris, wrote to Kenneth 

Trott in October 2009 to explain the Hardestys’ belief that OMR was participating in a politically 

motivated scheme to drive HSG out of business. Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 62, ECF No. 248-1119; see 

also Hardesty Decl. ¶ 40 (expressing the same belief). Zachary Simmons of the Army Corps of 

Engineers also appears to have believed that HSG did not present any regulatory concern, unlike 

other mining operators who had complained about HSG’s operations. See Hardesty Stmt. Ex. 52, 

ECF No. 248-10. This evidence could be introduced in some form at trial. 

(i) The Hardestys filed copies of publicly available records that suggest (i) several 

times between 2003 and 2012, former Supervisor Roger Dickinson received campaign 

contributions from Taylor & Wiley, the law firm they allege represented Teichert, see Hill Decl., 

ECF No. 230; id. Ex. 1; (ii) former Senator David Cox received campaign contributions from 

Taylor & Wiley in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007, and 2008, id.; (iii) Dickinson received campaign 

contributions from “A. Teichert & Sons, Inc.” between 2001 and 2014, id. Ex. 2; (iv) Dan 

Lungren received campaign contributions from James Wiley, John Taylor, and Suzanne Taylor 

between 2006 and 2012, id. Exs. 3–4, 6; and (v) Dan Lungren received campaign contributions 

from “Judson T. Riggs” of “Teichert” between 2004 and 2012, id. Ex. 5. This evidence is 

presented largely in compliance with Rule 56. 

In addition to this evidence of alleged pretext, as noted above, a trial may be 

necessary for a second reason: if the evidence could show the defendants’ rational explanation 

///// 

 19 The Hardestys also cite Morris’s deposition, and say he made the same observation, but 

do not refer to a specific page. See Hardesty Stmt. no. 213, ECF No. 246. 

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itself was false. Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 945–46. Aside from the evidence of pretext reviewed 

above, the Hardestys also argue the factual foundation of OMR’s decision is in dispute. 

OMR explains its decision not to give the Hardestys and Schneiders notice before 

taking HSG off the AB 3098 list by citing the report of its December 2008 inspection. See

O’Bryant Decl. ¶ 5; id. Ex. A, ECF No. 222-26. As a result of that inspection, OMR determined 

(i) the pits just south of the Cosumnes River were larger, deeper, and more steeply sloped than 

reported or permitted by the Mine’s reclamation plan; (ii) the pits’ depth had caused groundwater 

to seep into them, which in turn undermined the integrity of the pits’ walls and increased the 

possibility the river might flow into the pits; and (iii) the Mine’s FAM was inadequate because it 

was prepared without knowledge of the pits’ actual size. See Koehler Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 222-21; 

id. Ex. A, ¶¶ 2.2–2.5, 3.1, ECF No. 222-22. OMR geologists are prepared to testify about these 

conclusions and their reasoning. See generally id.; Wesling Decl., ECF No. 222-5. 

To contest these findings, the Hardestys point out that their former attorney, Scott 

Morris, concluded that OMR’s theory of pit capture was not viable. Morris is an engineer and 

formerly worked for the Army Corps of Engineers. Morris Dep. 11. As part of his 

responsibilities, he worked to repair levees in the Sacramento area after they were damaged in a 

1986 flood. Id. at 11–12. He also helped write and obtain approval of SMARA reclamation 

plans in Stanislaus, Merced, and Tuolomne Counties. Id. at 12–13. Morris believes OMR 

misclassified riverbanks as levees, falsified inspection reports, misused the SMARA process, and 

invented its theory of pit capture or flood danger. See id. at 49–52. In his opinion, the earthen 

wall between the pits at the Mine and the Cosumnes River were thicker and more stable than most 

levees in Sacramento. See id. at 98. 

The Hardestys also rely on the opinion of engineer Don Olsen. Olsen is a 

Principal at Holdrege & Kull, an engineering consulting firm that has provided services to HSG 

and the Mine. Olsen reviewed documents, reports, topographical maps, and photographs, 

interviewed engineers and others who knew about the Mine, visited the Mine, and drew on his 

personal knowledge to conclude the pits were never in danger of being captured. See Olsen Rep. 

at OLS 02, ECF No. 202. 

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In sum, before 2008, OMR and other state regulatory agencies made only sporadic 

attempts to require HSG and the Mine to comply with SMARA’s provisions. OMR was not 

particularly concerned with HSG’s operations. It seemed satisfied HSG was operating the Mine 

under a vested right and an approved reclamation plan. Then, after HSG’s operations expanded 

significantly, competitors voiced concerns to legislators and regulators, who contacted several 

federal and state agencies. OMR abruptly began a series of inspections and enforcement actions. 

It moved more quickly than it would have if no legislator or competitor were involved. OMR 

decided to remove HSG from the AB 3098 list without notice, which was out of the ordinary, on 

the basis of its belief that the Schneiders and Hardestys would not fix problems at the Mine site. 

OMR also believed that even if the Schneiders and Hardestys did move quickly to address its 

concerns, they would need more than the thirty-day notice period to do so. But two experienced 

engineers believe OMR’s conclusions were faulty. 

On this record, a jury could find that OMR’s enforcement decisions were a 

legitimate attempt to enforce the law in response to complaints. A regulator cannot always be 

said to have acted on improper motives by responding to complaints from legislators and voters. 

Cf., e.g., U.S. ex rel., Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1146 

(9th Cir. 1998) (“[C]itizens are entitled to advocate the passage or enforcement of laws and 

members of Congress may seek to influence agency action.”); accord Eastern R.R. Presidents 

Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961); Radio Ass’n on Defending 

Airwave Rights, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 47 F.3d 794, 808 (6th Cir. 1995); Sierra 

Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A jury could also find HSG was operating 

outside its reclamation plan and was unable or unwilling to fix problems within the OMR’s 

standard thirty-day notice period. But on the other hand, a jury could find that OMR’s decision to 

treat HSG differently was motivated by politics, not reason, and that OMR intended its 

investigation to harm the Hardestys’ business, not to remedy violations of SMARA. Because 

both conclusions are reasonable interpretations of this record, the motion for summary judgment 

cannot be granted on the basis of the state defendants’ explanation for their decision to remove 

HSG from the 3098 list. 

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That said, no evidence connects defendant Testa to OMR’s decision to remove 

HSG from the AB 3098 list. The same is true of defendant Norris. The Hardestys’ equal 

protection claims therefore cannot proceed against these two defendants. 

O’Bryant argues he is protected by his qualified immunity. At summary 

judgment, to resolve the question of qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-part inquiry. 

Tolan v. Cotton, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014) (per curiam). A district court may 

take either of these two parts first, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009), but typically 

the court first determines whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party 

asserting an injury, show the defendant violated one or more of the plaintiffs’ federally protected 

rights. Tolan, 134 U.S. at 1865; Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159, 1168 

(9th Cir. 2013). The discussion above answers this question in the affirmative: the Hardestys 

have presented evidence that would allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that O’Bryant 

arbitrarily removed HSG from the AB 3098 list without notice in violation of the Equal 

Protection Clause. 

The second part of the qualified-immunity inquiry tests whether the federal right 

asserted was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866. 

That determination hinges on whether the law as it was gave the defendants fair warning that their 

conduct was unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). Here, at the time OMR 

removed HSG from the 3098 list, the Supreme Court had clearly confirmed that the Equal 

Protection Clause prohibits government officers from intentionally and arbitrarily treating a 

person differently than others in the same situation. See, e.g., Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. 

Likewise, it was clearly established that an officer in O’Bryant’s situation may face liability if his 

explanation for this differential treatment is objectively false or is pretext for an impermissible 

motive, see, e.g., Valley Outdoor, 446 F.3d at 955; Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 945–46, both 

triable questions in this case. O’Bryant is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

4. Summary 

In conclusion, the state defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with 

respect to the equal protection claims against defendants Norris and Testa. The motion is also 

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granted with respect to the claims (1) that O’Bryant selectively denied the Hardestys an appeal of 

their removal, (2) that O’Bryant selectively ignored their requests for guidance on reinstatement 

on the AB 3098 list, and (3) that O’Bryant selectively instructed OMR staff to follow trucks as 

they left the Mine. The motion is denied with respect to the claim that O’Bryant selectively 

denied the Hardestys notice before removing HSG from the AB 3098 list. 

C. The Hardestys’ Sixth Claim against Sacramento County and Sherry 

The Hardestys propose three bases for this claim. First, they argue “Sherry 

allowed other mines to remain on the AB 3098 list despite outdated and completely misleading 

FACE amounts, while hounding the Hardestys and raising their FACE amounts by 500% to 

1000%.” Hardesty Opp’n County Mot. Pt. A at 11 (citing Hardesty Stmt. no. 205). This 

argument cannot apply to Sacramento County or Sherry because it is undisputed that state 

agencies control membership on the AB 3098 list, not Sacramento County or its officers. See, 

e.g., JSUF no. 54. 

Second, the Hardestys argue another mine, which they refer to as the Kennefick or 

Pilliken mine, was allowed to operate during the pendency of its application for a conditional use 

permit, but they were not allowed to continue operations without a conditional use permit. See

Hardesty Opp’n County Mot. Pt. A. at 12 (citing Hardesty Stmt. nos. 399–402). They cite only 

Mr. Hardesty’s declaration to support this assertion. See Hardesty Stmt. nos. 399–402 (citing 

Hardesty Decl. ¶¶ 80–83). Mr. Hardesty’s declaration does not establish a foundation for his 

assertions and does not clarify during what time period the Kennefick mine was allowed to 

operate. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced 

sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”). Even if 

his statements were admitted, they would not show HSG and the Kennefick mine were alike in all 

relevant respects. For example, it remains uncertain whether the two mines were a similar size, 

whether they operated over a similar time period, and whether they operated under similar 

permits. 

Third, the Hardestys argue other mining operators were allowed to move their 

processing plants without risking violation of their reclamation plans or permit status. Hardesty 

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Opp’n County Mot. Pt. A at 12. But they offer no evidence to show where these other mines 

were located, when processing plants were moved, and how these unnamed mining operations 

were otherwise similarly situated. 

The motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the equal protection 

claims against Sacramento County and Sherry. 

D. The Hardestys’ Seventh Claim Against Sacramento County, Storelli, and Moffitt 

The Hardestys rely on three allegations to support this claim. First, they allege 

that “[u]nlike the other similarly-situated mining operators in Sacramento County, the Defendants 

selected and hired an environmental inspector, Dan [sic] Bieber, to inspect the Plaintiffs’ mining 

operations and prepare a FACE.” Hardesty Compl. ¶ 168. Second, they allege the defendants 

substantially increased the amount of their required financial assurances and ordered HSG to halt 

its operations, but allowed similarly situated competitors to continue operating for decades 

without posting additional financial assurances. Id. ¶ 169. And third, they allege the defendants 

inspected the Mine far more often than other surface mining operations. Id. ¶ 172. 

The record includes no evidence of another surface mining operation. Rather, the 

Hardestys impugn the defendants’ failure to offer evidence or assert that other mines were 

subjected to the same regulatory scrutiny. See Hardesty Opp’n County Mot. Pt. B at 9. This is 

not the defendants’ burden to carry. The Hardestys, not the defendants, would be required to 

prove at trial that HSG was treated differently than other similarly situated mine operators. See, 

e.g., Gerhart, 637 F.3d at 1022. On summary judgment, the defendants “need only prove that 

there is an absence of evidence” to support the Hardestys’ case. In re Oracle, 627 F.3d at 387. 

And the Hardestys must respond by “designat[ing] specific facts demonstrating the existence of 

genuine issues for trial.” Id.

The Hardestys have not produced the evidence they would use to show a jury that 

HSG and another competitor are, in all relevant respects, “alike,” Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10, 

“arguably indistinguishable,” Ross, 417 U.S. at 609, or “identical,” Chico Scrap Metal, 830 F. 

Supp. 2d at 975, as they must in a class-of-one case. If the jury is to make something of their 

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case, it needs “grist” for the mill. See Hardesty Opp’n County Mot. Pt. B at 8 (quoting CordiAllen, 494 F.3d at 251). 

The motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the equal protection 

claims against Sacramento County, Storelli, and Moffitt. 

E. The Schneiders’ Fifth Claim 

The Schneiders’ equal protection claims are a subset of the Hardestys’ claims 

under the same Amendment. See Schneider Compl. ¶¶ 296–302 (alleging the defendants required 

higher-than-normal financial assurances and conducted an unusually large number of inspections 

in an effort to drive the Mine out of business). They offer no evidence in addition to that cited by 

the Hardestys and in fact rely on the same briefing. Compare, e.g., Schneiders’ Opp’n County 

Mot. Pt. B, with Hardesty Opp’n County Mot. Pt. B. Because only the claims against O’Bryant 

will proceed to trial, and the Schneiders assert no claims against him or other OMR staff, the 

motion for summary judgment is granted for the County defendants as to the Schneiders’ equal 

protection claim. 

IX. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 

The Schneiders and Hardestys claim the defendants deprived them of their 

property interests in the Mine without due process. The Due Process Clause prohibits the 

government from depriving a person of life, liberty, and property rights without first undertaking 

an adequate process. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). A person 

can therefore succeed in a § 1983 lawsuit against a government actor by showing (1) that she had 

a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution, (2) that the defendant deprived her of 

that interest, and (3) that the process the defendant undertook, if any, was lacking, see, e.g., 

Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). 

First, the Constitution does not create the property interests it protects. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538. Those interests “are created and their dimensions are defined by 

existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source,” for example, California 

law. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Given a particular interest, “federal 

constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of 

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entitlement’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” San Bernardino Physicians’ Servs. Med. Grp. 

v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1408–09 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas 

& Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)). 

Second, to succeed, the Hardestys and Schneiders must show not only that their 

rights or interests are protected, but also that the defendants deprived them of those interests or 

rights. Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1090. If they cannot, then their claims may not proceed. Guatay 

Christian Fellowship v. Cty. of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 984 (9th Cir. 2011). 

And third, the process itself—what “process” is “due” varies from one situation to 

the next. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). But, generally speaking, “[t]he 

fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and 

in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). In most circumstances, the Constitution requires a hearing before the 

government deprives a person of liberty or property. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127. 

A. The Hardestys’ Fifth Claim Against Curt Taras 

The Hardestys allege Curt Taras deprived them of due process “by issuing a cease 

and desist letter demanding that Hardesty stop all work regulated by the California Water Code 

and California Code of Regulations at the Mine without any notice, hearing, or opportunity for 

appeal.” Hardesty Compl. ¶ 150. They allege the cease-and-desist letter prevented Hardesty 

“from removing aggregate thereby depriving him of a legally cognizable property interest without 

due process of law.” Id. ¶ 151. But the Hardestys have not supported these allegations with 

evidence. 

Curt Taras worked at the Flood Board beginning in February 2009. JSUF no. 17. 

He participated in an inspection of the Mine in May 2009. Taras Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 222-11. He 

took measurements and pictures of the pits near the Cosumnes River. Id. After his inspection, he 

sent Hardesty and Schneider a letter summarizing his findings: (1) the pits were within a 

designated floodway; (2) the pits were fifty feet deep and deeper than the surface of the river; 

(3) water was seeping from the river into the pits; (4) the pits’ slopes were steep and had failed in 

some places; (5) a reservoir had been created illegally; and (6) stockpiles had been placed within 

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the designated floodway. Id. Exs. C, D, at CVFPB 000013, 16, ECF No. 222-13. The letter 

directed Hardesty to “cease and desist all work regulated by the California Water Code and 

California Code of regulations on your property,” including “all excavation work, levee 

alterations, reservoir filing, and dam construction.” Id. at CVFPB 000014, 17. 

Scott Morris, the Hardestys’ attorney, remembers receiving Taras’s letter and 

calling the Flood Board to say Mr. Hardesty did not believe the letter was binding. Morris 

Dep. 189. Taras’s superior told Morris the Flood Board would not enforce the letter and would 

visit the Mine. Id. Taras visited the mine again, at Hardesty’s invitation, on June 12, 2009. 

Taras Decl. ¶ 8. After the meeting, the Flood Board agreed Hardesty could continue mining, and 

Hardesty volunteered to complete repairs, restore the terrain, move his stockpiles, and excavate 

only beyond the regulatory setbacks. Id. The Mine was free to continue excavations. Morris 

Dep. 188–90. Hardesty completed all the Flood Board’s requests, even though he was under no 

obligation to do so. Id. at 100. 

Flood Board staff visited the Mine again the next year, and in an April 27, 2011 

letter, the Flood Board informed Schneider it would not pursue an enforcement action. Taras 

Decl. Ex. H, ECF No. 222-13. Taras left the Flood Board in April 2015, and to his knowledge the 

Flood Board had not received the information it requested in its previous letter but had not taken 

any enforcement actions. Taras Decl. ¶ 16. 

This evidence cannot show the Hardestys were deprived of any right. See, e.g., 

Guatay, 670 F.3d at 984 (local government did not deprive plaintiff of any protected property 

interest by sending notice of violation and cease-and-desist letter because it never brought 

enforcement action). In response to Taras’s argument that Hardesty was deprived of no right, the 

Hardestys argue only that the letter forced them “to hire attorneys and pay for additional reports” 

because “Taras used [the letter] in his appearance at the Schneider appellate hearing on the vested 

right to mine.” Opp’n State Defs.’ Mot. at 55. They do not cite authority to support this position, 

and the court has located none. 

The motion for summary judgment is granted as to this claim. 

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B. The Hardestys’ Sixth Claim against the County and Sherry 

The Hardestys allege the County deprived them of due process by “initiating 

proceedings to revoke —and revoking—the vested legal non-conforming use on the Mine without 

providing any notice or a hearing to [them].” Hardesty Compl. ¶ 157. Generally speaking, in a 

case like this, the Due Process Clause requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 

opportunity to present their objections.” Gallo v. U.S. Dist. Court For Dist. of Ariz., 349 F.3d 

1169, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 

306, 314 (1950)). 

The County advances two arguments in favor of its motion. First, it argues the 

Hardestys are collaterally estopped from arguing they were denied due process because the 

Sacramento County Superior Court already determined they lack a constitutionally protected 

interest in any vested right. County Mot. Pt. 2 at 9–11; O’Dea Decl. Ex. E, ECF No. 218-5 

(transcript of proceedings on Friday, July 20, 2012 in Hardesty v. Bd. of Supervisors of 

Sacramento Cty., No. 34-2012-80001138 (Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct. 2012)). The Superior 

Court denied the Hardestys’ motion for a preliminary injunction because “there is not a vested 

property interest to Mr. Hardesty that [was] before [the court] in this lawsuit.” O’Dea Decl. Ex. 

E, at 18. 

In federal court, the preclusive effect of a previous state-court determination is 

governed by that state’s rules of preclusion. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. 

Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2014). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the 

relitigation of an issue that was argued and decided in prior proceedings. Lucido v. Superior 

Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341 & n.3 (1990) (en banc). A previous decision has preclusive effect 

only if (1) the issue was identical to that decided in the previous proceeding; (2) the issue was 

actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the previous decision was final and on 

the merits; and (5) the person against whom preclusion is sought was the same person as in the 

earlier proceeding or is in privity with that person. Id. The party asserting preclusion bears the 

burden of establishing each of these elements. Id. 

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Here, the County has not borne its burden to establish the Superior Court’s 

decision was final. The Superior Court’s order denied a motion for a preliminary injunction. “A 

preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, and the trial court possesses the inherent power to 

modify its preliminary injunction which is of a continuing or executory nature.” Huntingdon Life 

Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1248 (2005) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). A preliminary injunction is binding 

only if “it appears the court intended a final adjudication of the issue involved.” Id. (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). The County has presented no evidence to show the Superior Court 

intended its decision to finally adjudicate the case. Because the burden is the County’s to bear, 

the motion cannot be granted on the basis of issue preclusion. 

The County’s second argument concerns the actual notice the Hardestys had of the 

mid-2010 hearings before the Board of Supervisors. County Mot. Pt. 2 at 12–14. It is undisputed 

the Hardestys received the County’s April 2, 2009 letter, which reported the County’s finding that 

the Mine was operating outside the scope of its vested right, see O’Dea Decl. Ex. A, ECF 

No. 218-5. But no evidence suggests the Hardestys received the County’s April 2010 notice of 

violation. See id. Ex. B, ECF No. 218-5; Schneider Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 220-2. Neither the 

Hardestys nor their attorney attended the mid-2010 hearings before the Sacramento County Board 

of Supervisors. See Sacramento Bd. of Supervisors Meeting Tr. at 2 (May 26, 2010), ECF 

No. 220-3; Sacramento Bd. of Supervisors Meeting Tr. at 2 (July 13, 2010), ECF No. 220-4; 

Sacramento Bd. of Supervisors Meeting Tr. at 2 (Sept. 14, 2010), ECF No. 220-6; Sacramento 

Bd. of Supervisors Meeting Tr. at 2 (Sept. 28, 2010), ECF No. 220-7. 

The court disagrees that the Hardestys’ complaint in this case, filed about three 

weeks before the Board of Supervisors had made a decision on Schneider’s appeal, shows the 

Hardestys had actual notice of the proceedings before the Board of Supervisors and had an 

opportunity to voice objections in those proceedings. Although the Hardestys’ original complaint 

describes the pending appeal, see Compl. ¶¶ 52–53, the record does not allow the court to say 

conclusively that the Hardestys knew about the status of the appeal or had a meaningful 

opportunity to participate. The County’s motion cannot be granted on this basis. 

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The motion is denied as to the Hardestys’ procedural due process claim against 

Sacramento County and Sherry. 

C. The Schneiders’ Claims 

The Schneiders and the County defendants both move for summary judgment on 

the Schneiders’ claims that they owned a vested right in the Mine and that the County deprived 

them of this right without due process. Specifically, the Schneiders challenge the Board of 

Supervisors’ September 2010 decision upholding the County’s April 2010 notice of violation. 

1. Undisputed Facts 

On April 2, 2009, the County sent Jay Schneider, Joseph Hardesty, and their 

attorneys a letter informing them the County had received a complaint challenging their vested 

rights to mine. O’Dea Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 218-5. After an investigation, the County 

concluded that HSG’s operations had expanded impermissibly since the time land use restrictions 

were first enacted in 1956. Id. at 1–2. Therefore the County believed the Mine’s operations were 

not within the scope of the Mine’s vested right. Id. at 2. The Mine’s only recourse was “to file 

for and receive approval of a conditional use permit and rezone.” Id. 

In April 2010, the County sent a notice of violation to Schneider, charging the 

Mine with violations of the Sacramento Zoning Code. O’Dea Decl. Ex. B, ECF No. 218-5; 

Schneider Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 220-2. The letter warned that the County could seek to revoke any 

applicable permits, declare the Mine a public nuisance, and prosecute in civil or criminal court. 

See O’Dea Decl. Ex. B, at 1–2. The County allowed Schneider fifteen days to request an 

opportunity to appear before the County’s Board of Supervisors and appeal the County’s 

determination. O’Dea Decl. Ex. B, at 2. Schneider appealed and hearings were held on May 26, 

July 13, and September 14 and 28, 2010. Gamel Decl. ¶ 19; see also generally Schneider Decl., 

ECF No. 220-2. Schneider and his attorney were both present at the hearings, where they offered 

evidence and made arguments against the County’s decision. See generally Sacramento Bd. of 

Supervisors Meeting Tr. (May 26, July 13, Sept. 14, & Sept. 28, 2010). On September 28, 2010, 

the Board of Supervisors upheld the notice of violation and made detailed findings of fact. See

Gamel Decl. ¶ 19; Sacramento Bd. of Supervisors Meeting Tr. 30 (Sept. 28, 2010). 

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In May 2011, Schneider filed a petition for a writ of mandate under California 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. See Pet. Writ of Mandate, Schneider v. Bd. of 

Supervisors, No. 34-2011-80000857 (Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct. filed May 12, 2011).20 He 

raised several claims: (1) the Board of Supervisors had acted in excess of its jurisdiction by 

revoking their vested right; (2) they were denied a fair trial because they “were not advised of the 

legal basis or evidence forming the basis of the decision to revoke their vested rights” and the 

Board “engaged in ex parte communications with staff prosecuting the appeal as well as with 

non-parties relative to the merits of the case,” among other reasons; (3) the Board did not follow 

SMARA’s procedural requirements; (4) the Board improperly relied on evidence collected after it 

determined a violation had occurred; (5) the County had already recognized that Schneider had a 

vested right to conduct a surface mining operation; (6) the Board unconstitutionally denied them 

of substantive and procedural due process rights; (7) the Board incorrectly determined they 

possessed no vested right; (8) the Board made no effort to comply with the California 

Environmental Quality Act; (9) the Board’s decision was an unconstitutional taking; and (10) the 

Board’s decision was a breach of contract. 

In July of the same year, Schneider moved ex parte for a temporary restraining 

order, and the motion was denied. See Minute Order, Schneider v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 34-

2011-80000857 (Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct. filed July 25, 2011). After the ex parte application 

was denied, Schneider did not pursue the litigation. See Order Vacating Hr’g, Schneider v. Bd. of 

Supervisors, No. 34-2011-80000857 (Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 11, 2013) (noting 

Schneider had filed no opening brief and vacating the hearing on their petition). According to the 

state court docket, the writ petition remains open. 

2. Claim and Issue Preclusion 

The County first contends the Schneiders’ claim is precluded by the results of the 

proceedings before the Board of Supervisors and Sacramento County Superior Court. 

///// 

 20 The court takes judicial notice of this document and the other filings in the same action, 

as they are public records whose filing can be subject to no dispute. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. 

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Federal courts give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever that state’s 

courts would do the same. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). As 

summarized above, in California, the doctrine of issue preclusion bars the “relitigation of issues 

argued and decided in prior proceedings.” Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 341. In addition, the doctrine of 

“[c]laim preclusion prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the 

same parties or parties in privity with them.” DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 61 Cal. 4th 813, 

824 (2015). 

An unreviewed state administrative decision can also preclude later litigation of a 

repurposed § 1983 claim in federal court. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986). If a 

state agency, acting in a judicial capacity, resolves disputes of fact or law properly before it, and 

the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate those disputes, federal courts give the agency’s 

decision the same preclusive effect the state’s courts would recognize. Id.; see also United States 

v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966); Avila v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 758 

F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014); Wehrli v. Cty. of Orange, 175 F.3d 692, 694 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The idea is to promote comity between federal and state courts and to enforce repose, i.e., to 

prevent state administrative proceedings from becoming dress rehearsals for follow-on 

constitutional litigation in federal court. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 798; Miller v. Cty. of Santa Cruz, 

39 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Miller illustrates how these rules operate in 

practice. In that case, the plaintiff, a former Sheriff’s Deputy, had been terminated for allegedly 

failing to report an overpayment of wages, among other disciplinary violations. 39 F.3d at 1032. 

He contested the termination before the County’s Civil Services Commission, which held a public 

evidentiary hearing. Id. The deputy was represented by counsel at the hearing and was permitted 

to present evidence and arguments. Id. After the hearing, the Commission sustained his 

dismissal. Id. Although he had been notified of his right to appeal under California Code of Civil 

Procedure sections 1094.5 and 1094.6, the deputy chose to file a lawsuit in federal court instead, 

asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights to equal protection and 

substantive and procedural due process. 796 F. Supp. 1316, 1317 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 39 F.3d 

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1030 (1994). The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the 

basis of issue and claim preclusion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 39 F.3d at 1031–32. The 

Circuit directly acknowledged the absence of any review by a state court. See id. at 1033–34; see 

also Plaine v. McCabe, 797 F.2d 713, 719 n.12 (9th Cir. 1986) (“If an adequate opportunity for 

review is available, a losing party cannot obstruct the preclusive use of the state administrative 

decision simply by foregoing her right to appeal.”).21

Here, the County defendants argue that because Schneider has not pursued his 

state mandamus action to its conclusion, the Schneiders are barred from challenging the Board of 

Supervisors’s 2010 determinations here. For three reasons, the court disagrees. 

First, the action before the Superior Court has reached no conclusion, and no 

judgment has been entered. Whether as a matter of issue or claim preclusion, that case has no 

preclusive effect here. A claim is precluded only after entry of “a final judgment on the merits in 

the first suit,” and an issue is precluded only if “argued and decided” such that it is resolved 

conclusively by the “prior judgment.” DKN Holdings, 61 Cal. 4th at 824–25. 

Second, the Schneiders challenge not just the Board of Supervisors’ factual 

findings and legal conclusions, but the procedure the Board followed. The preclusion rules 

described in Miller do not apply when a plaintiff raises a constitutional challenge to the 

 21 These preclusion doctrines are distinct from two other doctrines the court finds 

irrelevant, although they are raised in the parties’ briefing: administrative exhaustion and 

ripeness. 

First, by giving preclusive effect to a state agency’s unreviewed decision, a federal court 

does not require administrative exhaustion. See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1034 n.3. Administrative 

exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982). An aggrieved person may elect to pursue a claim under § 1983 in 

federal court or obtain review in a state administrative agency proceeding, but she may not try 

again in federal court after unsuccessfully litigating an issue before an administrative body. 

See id. 

Second, because federal courts have no jurisdiction where there is no case or controversy, 

a claim must be ripe before litigation begins in federal court. See, e.g., Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. 

Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807 (2003). For this reason, when a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims 

target a state agency’s administrative actions, the agency must have reached a final decision. See, 

e.g., Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 

186 (1985). Finality is an element of both ripeness and preclusion, but for different reasons: 

when it comes to ripeness, a court assures itself of its jurisdiction by testing that the dispute is 

real, whereas preclusion requires a final decision to avoid giving final effect to temporary 

decisions. 

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administrative body’s procedure itself. See Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cty. of L.A., 648 

F.3d 986, 992 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011). Neither can the court give preclusive effect to an unreviewed 

administrative decision if the procedure the agency deployed gave the parties no adequate 

opportunity to litigate. Utah Const., 384 U.S. at 421. If, as the Schneiders argue, the proceedings 

before the Board of Supervisors were poisoned by conflicts of interest and improper ex parte

communications, and if the Board never truly informed them of the legal or evidentiary basis of 

its decision, the Board’s decision can be given no preclusive effect. 

Third, barring the Schneiders’ due process claims would be inequitable given the 

circumstances of this litigation. The County defendants have waited far too long, more than two 

years and after the close of discovery, to argue for issue or claim preclusion. See, e.g., N. 

Pacifica, LLC. v. City of Pacifica, 366 F. Supp. 2d 927, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (a defendant may 

waive Miller preclusion by raising that defense too late in the litigation, citing, inter alia, Kern 

Oil & Refining Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 735 (9th Cir. 1988)). On a similar note, 

although the County defendants argue now that Schneider should have litigated his state court 

petition to its conclusion, in a related state court case, they argued that any state proceedings 

should be stayed while this action is pending. See Opp’n Mot. Prelim. Inj. 1–2, Hardesty v. Bd. of 

Supervisors, No. 34-2012-80001138 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento filed June 28, 2012). The 

County cannot have it both ways. 

The Schneiders’ due process claim is not barred by the Board of Supervisors’ 

September 2010 decision. In this limited respect, their alternative motion for partial summary 

judgment of the County defendants’ fifth affirmative defense is granted, see Schneider Mot. Due 

Process at 1, but as explained below, their motions are otherwise denied. 

3. Whether Schneider Possessed a Vested Right to Mine 

The Schneiders request partial summary judgment that they possessed a vested 

right to conduct surface mining operations on their ranch. Specifically, they seek an order 

declaring that “[a]t all times prior to April 2, 2009, the real estate parcels associated with the 

Schneider Historic Mine were protected as a ‘vested mine’ within the meaning of the Surface 

///// 

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Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 (SMARA), Public Resources Code, Sections 2710–2796.” 

Notice of Motion at 2, ECF No. 219-1. 

California Public Resources Code section 2776(a) provides, 

No person who has obtained a vested right to conduct surface 

mining operations prior to January 1, 1976, shall be required to 

secure a permit pursuant to this chapter as long as the vested right 

continues and as long as no substantial changes are made in the 

operation except in accordance with this chapter. . . . 

The same section defines “vested right”: 

A person shall be deemed to have vested rights if, prior to January 

1, 1976, the person has, in good faith and in reliance upon a permit 

or other authorization, if the permit or other authorization was 

required, diligently commenced surface mining operations and 

incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials necessary for 

the surface mining operations. . . . 

Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2776(a). 

In Hanson Brothers Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 12 Cal. 4th 533 

(1996), the California Supreme Court held that the “diminishing asset doctrine” applied to the 

vested right to conduct mining operations as defined in Public Resources Code section 2776. 

Under that rule, “[w]hen a mining or quarrying operation is a lawful nonconforming use, 

progression of the mining or quarrying activity into other areas of the property is not necessarily a 

prohibited expansion or change of location of the nonconforming use.” Id. at 553. Rather, 

“[w]hen there is objective evidence of the owner’s intent to expand a mining operation, and that 

intent existed at the time of the zoning change, the use may expand into the contemplated area.” 

Id. Thus, for example, “where increased population creates an increased demand for the 

aggregate used in road construction, an increase in production to meet that demand would not be 

construed as an enlargement or intensification of the use.” Id. at 573. 

Here, it remains unclear whether “no substantial changes [were] made in the 

operation except in accordance with [SMARA].” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2776(a). Specifically, it 

is undisputed that mining operations on the Schneiders’ ranch expanded substantially between 

1995 and 2009. A rational trier of fact could conclude on this record that the mining operation 

that existed until 1994, which was the operation the County considered when its personnel 

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recognized the Schneiders’ vested right, was significantly smaller. A trier of fact could likewise 

find that HSG began excavating large pits south of the Cosumnes River between 2002 and 2008, 

and that this was a significant departure from the mining operations that had occurred before 

2002. If this were a jury’s conclusion, the departure would likely represent a “substantial change” 

within the meaning of Public Resources Code section 2776(a). Neither have the Schneiders cited 

evidence to show that as of 1976 or another earlier date, mining operations at the ranch were 

expected to expand into the area directly south of the Cosumnes River or that mining operations 

were to expand beyond the excavation of dredger tailings. 

The Schneiders’ motion for summary judgment on this question is denied. 

4. Whether the County Deprived the Schneiders of a Property Interest 

The Schneiders also move for summary judgment that the County deprived them 

of a vested right to mine without due process. Because the Schneiders have not shown as a 

threshold matter that they possessed a vested right to mine, this motion cannot be granted. This 

leaves the question of the County’s cross-motion on the same claim. The County argues the 

Schneiders have cited no evidence to show they have a vested right. With respect to the due 

process aspect of this claim, the County relies on the hearings it conducted in 2010. 

The Supreme Court has taken care to note that district courts should act “with 

caution in granting summary judgment,” and have authority to “deny summary judgment in a case 

where there is reason to believe the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 255. A trial may be necessary “if the judge has doubt as to the wisdom of terminating 

the case before trial.” Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1507 

(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1994)). This may be 

the case “even in the absence of a factual dispute.” Rheumatology Diagnostics Lab., Inc v. Aetna, 

Inc., No. 12-05847, 2015 WL 3826713, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2015) (quoting Black, 22 F.3d 

at 572); accord Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2001). Given 

the fact-bound context of a due-process claim, which concerns the plaintiff’s “opportunity to be 

heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, an uncertain 

factual record on summary judgment may simply necessitate a trial. 

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Here, two basic concerns prevent the court from granting the County defendants’ 

motion. First, it is unclear when the alleged deprivation occurred and which hearings or appeals 

were devoted to which actions or decisions. For example, in April 2009, the County wrote to 

Schneider to explain its opinion that the Mine no longer had a vested right under SMARA. See

O’Dea Decl. Ex. A, at 1–2, ECF No. 218-5. But there is no evidence the County attempted to 

prevent any continued mining operations for the next year. Moreover, during that year, the 

County appeared to have assumed the Mine needed no permit because it had a vested right. See

Schneider Decl. ¶ 28, ECF No. 219-2; id. Ex. 22, at 1 ECF No. 219-24. When the County took 

up the issue again in April 2010, its notice referred to violations of the County’s Zoning Code, not 

to SMARA. See O’Dea Decl. Ex. B, at 1–2, ECF No. 218-5. The County also took apparently 

contradictory positions during the 2010 appeal. Its attorney argued both that the County was not 

“attempting to revoke some vested right,” Sacramento Cty. Bd. Supervisors Hr’g Tr. 60 (Sept. 14, 

2010), and that Schneider had no vested right to mine, see, e.g., id. at 11 (Deputy County Counsel 

explains, “The relevant case is Hanson,” 12 Cal. 4th 533 (1996), discussed above, “So what the 

Board needs to look at is: Did the operator have an objective manifestation of an intent to mine 

the area as of 1956? . . . So we’re looking for initia [sic] that he did or did not show he intended to 

mine what is now being minded [sic]”). 

The court’s second concern surrounds the procedure itself. Schneider has filed a 

detailed declaration describing several procedures he considers questionable that the Board of 

Supervisors employed during his 2010 appeal. See generally Schneider Decl., ECF No. 220-2. 

Were his claims to go to trial, Schneider could be expected to testify, for example, that the 

County did not tell him what evidence it would rely on in his appeal and that the County 

forwarded its evidence to HSG’s competitors, but not to him. See id. ¶¶ 5–16, 23–25, 31–32. He 

would also testify that the County’s attorney received technical assistance from HSG’s 

competitors but did not inform Schneider of this assistance. Id. ¶¶ 14, 38–39. 

In these circumstances, the wiser course is to proceed to trial. The County’s crossmotion is denied. 

///// 

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X. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 

The Due Process Clause prohibits government officials from arbitrarily depriving 

a person of her constitutionally protected property or liberty interests. See, e.g., Action Apartment 

Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 2007). This 

includes the right to devote land to any legitimate use, Harris v. Cty. of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 

503 (9th Cir. 1990), and to pursue a given profession, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 

(1959). But “only ‘egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional 

sense’: it must amount to an ‘abuse of power’ lacking any ‘reasonable justification in the service 

of a legitimate governmental objective.’” Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Cty. of Sacramento 

v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)); accord N. Pacifica, 526 F.3d at 484 (“The irreducible 

minimum of a substantive due process claim challenging land use regulation is failure to advance 

any governmental purpose.”). Only conduct that “shocks the conscience” violates the Due 

Process Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). 

A. The Hardestys’ Claims against Taras 

“To state a substantive due process claim, the plaintiff must show as a threshold 

matter that a state actor deprived it of a constitutionally protected life, liberty or property 

interest.” Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1087. Because the plaintiffs have not shown that Taras’s ceaseand-desist letter deprived them of any property interest, as discussed above, in the context of the 

Hardestys’ procedural due process claim against Taras, summary judgment is granted as to this 

claim. 

B. The Hardestys’ Claims against Gregory 

The Hardestys allege Gregory “engaged in a politically-motivated scheme” with 

the other defendants to drive the Hardestys out of business. See Opp’n Gregory Mot. at 13. They 

expressly disclaim any allegations of a conspiracy, see id. at 12–13 n.3; Gregory’s liability 

therefore depends on her own actions, not the actions of others. The only evidence the Hardestys 

cite to support their claim is that before Gregory’s inspection she may or may not have known 

that Simmons visited the Mine before and was expelled, and she became aware a legislator was 

interested in the case, albeit immediately before entering onto the Mine site at which point she 

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checked with her supervisor before proceeding. These facts could not allow a jury to decide she 

was part of a politically motivated scheme or that she deprived the Hardestys of their interests in 

engaging in their chosen profession. 

Gregory’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to this claim. 

C. The Schneiders’ Claims against Bieber 

David Bieber is a registered Professional Geologist, Geophysicist, Engineering 

Geologist, and Hydro-Geologist in the State of California. Bieber Decl. ¶ 1, Case No. 12-2457, 

ECF No. 105-2. He worked as a senior geologist for Geocon Consultants between March 2001 

and June 2013. Id. ¶ 2. 

Geocon provided consulting services to the County during its investigation of the 

Mine. See, e.g., id. ¶ 5. In 2009, Bieber and Geocon were retained by the County of Sacramento 

in anticipation of litigation and hearings about the Mine. Id. ¶ 4. Geocon entered a contract with 

the County in each year between 2009 and 2012. Id. ¶ 5. Between 2009 and 2012, Bieber 

accompanied County inspectors on their annual inspection of the Mine, and after each inspection, 

he was directed to draft a report. Id. ¶ 7. His reports were to include a description of the 

conditions at the Mine and evaluate an annual adjustment to the FACE. Id. Based on his report, 

County personnel would complete a formal inspection report and determine the appropriate 

FACE. Id.; JSUF no. 58. Bieber also testified as an expert on the County’s behalf. Bieber Decl. 

¶ 10. 

As relevant here, the County asked Bieber to calculate a 2012 FACE for the Mine. 

See id. ¶ 11. The County directed him to assume the pits south of the Cosumnes River would be 

backfilled to be consistent with the surrounding topography. Id. Bieber determined a depression 

of ten or fifteen feet below the original, pre-mining ground level would be consistent with the 

surrounding topography. Id. ¶ 12. This assumption was based on his observation that ten to 

fifteen feet below ground level was above the 100-year floodwater level of the Cosumnes River. 

Id. He calculated that more than one million cubic yards of material would be required to backfill 

the pit areas to this elevation. Id. County Counsel told Bieber it was unclear whether stockpiles 

of aggregate at the Mine could be used to fill the pits. Id. ¶ 13. He therefore performed two 

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calculations: (1) the cost of reclamation if fill materials were imported; and (2) the cost of 

reclamation should on-site materials be available for the County to use. Id. He calculated a 

FACE value of $8,817,074 if soil were imported and $901,336 if on-site materials were used. Id.; 

see also id. Ex. D, Case No. 12-2457, ECF No. 105-6 (Bieber’s report); JSUF no. 65. The 

difference was attributable to his estimate that the cost of importing soil would exceed $6 million. 

See Bieber Decl. ¶¶ 13–14; see also JSUF nos. 61, 62. 

The Schneiders’ claim against Bieber is founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 

prohibits the denial of a federal right “under color of law.” See Schneider Compl. ¶¶ 263–80; 

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 946 (1982). Assuming without deciding that Bieber 

can be said to have acted “under color of law,” the evidence before the court would not allow a 

rational trier of fact to conclude his actions “shock the conscience.” The undisputed facts show 

Bieber prepared a report in line with the County’s instructions, performed inspections and 

calculations, gave testimony to explain his conclusions, and otherwise followed through on the 

assignment for which he was hired. The Schneiders’ complaint, at its core, has little to do with 

Bieber’s actions and everything to do with the County’s decisions about the Mine’s reclamation 

plan and financial assurances. 

Bieber’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to this claim, and the court 

does not reach his other arguments. 

D. Sacramento County Defendants 

The Hardestys and Schneiders claim the County defendants stripped them of their 

vested right to operate a surface mine, which deprived them of their right to pursue their chosen 

profession and to devote their land to a legitimate use. The Constitution protects both of these 

interests. See, e.g., Greene, 360 U.S. at 492; Harris, 904 F.2d at 503. Plaintiffs’ substantive due 

process claims may proceed if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to their case, 

shows the County lacked any legitimate government purpose for its actions. Shanks, 540 F.3d 

at 1088. 

The Hardestys and Schneiders argue the County defendants were motivated by 

political pressure rather than a legitimate government purpose. Several years ago, the Ninth 

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Circuit opined that a local government’s arbitrary land use decisions, if motivated by “political 

pressure from neighbors,” could support a substantive due process claim. Del Monte Dunes at 

Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1508 (9th Cir. 1990). More recently, in an 

unpublished memorandum disposition, the Ninth Circuit cited Del Monte Dunes and confirmed 

that a substantive due process claim may proceed to trial if the evidence could show the 

government’s regulatory decisions were motivated by “political or other considerations.” 

Swenson v. Siskiyou Cty., 498 F. App’x 719, 721 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The defendants do not dispute these general conclusions, but argue instead that a 

jury could not find, on this record, that they intended to drive HSG out of business and were 

motivated by political pressure. The evidence highlighted above, in the discussion of the 

Hardestys’ equal protection claim, could allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that Sacramento 

County and its officers were motivated by political pressure from HSG’s competitors rather than 

a legitimate intent to enforce SMARA and the County’s Zoning Code. 

The County defendants’ motion is denied as to this claim. 

E. The Hardestys’ Claims against O’Bryant 

The Ninth Circuit also has held that “excessive and unreasonable” enforcement 

schemes may violate the Due Process Clause. See Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 478 

(9th Cir. 1988) (allowing Due Process claim to go forward where jury could have found that 

police harassed bar’s customers and staff and conducted frequent and unjustified inspections or 

surveillance in effort to harm bar’s business). Here, a jury could conclude that O’Bryant directed 

“excessive and unreasonable” enforcement actions at the Mine at the behest of legislators and 

competitors. Whether O’Bryant intended to drive HSG out of business or merely to enforce the 

law is a question not for this court, but a jury. See, e.g., Newman v. Checkrite Cal., Inc., 912 F. 

Supp. 1354, 1380 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (citing authority for proposition that “[o]rdinarily, intent and 

motive are paradigmatic issues for resolution by the trier of fact at trial”). 

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XI. FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION 

The First Amendment prohibits government officials from retaliating against a 

person for “speaking out.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). To succeed in a First 

Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must present evidence to establish three facts. First, the 

plaintiff must have engaged in an activity the First Amendment protects. See Coszalter v. City of 

Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). Second, the defendants’ actions must be shown to have 

deterred a “person of ordinary firmness” from engaging in that activity. Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 

693 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The plaintiff is not required to show she was herself 

deterred. See id. Third, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s actions were motivated by an 

intent to deter her from asserting her First Amendment rights. Mendocino Envt’l Ctr. v. 

Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The defendant’s “retaliatory animus” must 

be the but-for cause of its actions; if, without any intent to retaliate, the defendant would have 

done the same thing, the plaintiff cannot succeed. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260. The 

defendant’s intent to deter may be demonstrated by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 

Mendocino, 192 F.3d at 1300–01. 

Here, the Schneiders allege that after they filed this lawsuit in this court in 

September 2012, Sacramento County, several of its officials, and its consultant, David Bieber, 

retaliated against them by demanding much larger financial assurances for the Mine. See

Schneider Compl. ¶¶ 284–86. They also allege the County intended to prevent them from filing 

any lawsuit at all by crippling them financially. See id. ¶ 282. 

A. Bieber 

The claims against Bieber have no evidentiary support. The Schneiders argue 

Bieber retaliated against them by calculating a higher FACE in November 2012, but Bieber was 

not served with notice of this lawsuit until April 2013. JSUF no. 66; see also Summons, Case 

No. 12-2457, ECF No. 11. Based on the record before the court, Bieber would testify at trial that 

he did not know the Schneiders had filed their complaint until after he finished his report. Bieber 

Decl. ¶ 15. He could not have retaliated against them for filing this lawsuit if he did not know the 

lawsuit had been filed. The Schneiders cannot avoid summary judgment of this claim by arguing 

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Bieber must have known, given the Hardestys’ pre-existing civil rights lawsuit filed in this court 

in 2010, that he would be named as a defendant in the Schneiders’ complaint. This theory does 

not establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the Schneiders’ complaint and Bieber’s 

decision, let alone a but-for causal relationship. 

Summary judgment is granted as to the First Amendment claims against Bieber. 

B. County Defendants 

This leaves the claims against the County defendants. Unlike Bieber, the County 

defendants do not argue they were unaware of the Schneiders’ lawsuit here when they increased 

the Schneiders’ FACE requirement. Their motion rests on two alternative arguments. First, they 

argue a person of “ordinary firmness” in the Schneiders’ position would not have been deterred 

from filing a civil rights lawsuit because, as it turns out, the Schneiders were not deterred. 

County Mot. Pt. 3 at 18–19. But the Schneiders can succeed even if they were not deterred from 

continuing in this case. Lacey, 693 F.3d at 916. “[I]t would be unjust to allow a defendant to 

escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined plaintiff 

persists in his protected activity.” Mendocino, 192 F.3d at 1300. A jury could reasonably 

conclude that a mine operator of ordinary firmness would be deterred from pursuing a civil rights 

lawsuit if a County official demanded several hundred thousand dollars more in financial 

assurances. 

The County also argues the Schneiders have not established a logical connection 

between its late-2012 FACE calculations and their civil rights action. It points out that by the 

time the Schneiders filed their complaint, the Hardestys had been pursuing very similar claims for 

about two years. County Mot. Pt. 3 at 19. This interpretation of the evidence is reasonable, and 

could support a verdict in the County’s favor. But the evidence could also support the 

Schneiders’ case. Before the Schneiders’ complaint was filed, the County had required them to 

post financial assurances of less than $200,000. A few months after they filed their complaint, 

the County demanded financial assurances of between $0.8 million and $8 million. 

Circumstantial evidence such as this is enough to survive summary judgment. See, e.g., 

Mendocino, 192 F.3d at 1300–01 (citing Hines v. Gomes, 108 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1997)). The 

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County defendants may yet prevail at trial by showing they would have done exactly the same 

thing had the Schneiders never filed a civil rights action. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260. But that 

is not the only reasonable conclusion a jury could draw from this evidence. 

That said, the Schneiders’ other theory of the County defendants’ liability, that the 

County intended to avoid a civil rights lawsuit by financially ruining the Mine, is supported by 

nothing but speculation. It is unclear what the Schneiders would present to the jury to support 

this claim. 

The County defendants’ motion is denied as to the Schneiders’ allegation that the 

Mine’s FACE was increased in retaliation for filing a civil rights lawsuit, and granted on the 

allegation that the County intended to prevent a civil rights lawsuit by financially ruining the 

Mine. 

XII. CONCLUSION 

This order resolves the pending motions for summary judgment in Case 

No. 10-2414 (the Hardesty case), ECF Nos. 217, 218, 219, 220, and 222, and in Case No. 12-

2457 (the Schneider case), ECF No. 105, as follows: 

The Defendants’ Motions in the Hardesty Case 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to the following claims: 

(1) The second claim, under the Equal Protection Clause, against defendants Norris and Testa, 

and against O’Bryant to the extent this claim is based on the allegations that O’Bryant 

selectively denied any right to appeal HSG’s removal from the AB 3098 list and selectively 

provided no guidance on reinstatement on the AB 3098 list; 

(2) The fourth claim, under the Fourth Amendment, against defendant Gregory; 

(3) The fifth claim, under the Due Process Clause, against defendant Taras; 

(4) The sixth claim, under the Equal Protection Clause, against the County and defendant Sherry; 

(5) The seventh claim, under the Equal Protection Clause, against the County and defendants 

Storelli and Moffitt; and 

(6) The ninth claim, under the Due Process Clause, against defendants Taras and Norris. 

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Summary judgment is DENIED as to the following claims: 

(1) The second claim, under the Equal Protection Clause, as to defendant O’Bryant, to the extent 

this claim is based on the allegation that O’Bryant selectively removed HSG from the AB 

3098 list without advance notice; 

(2) The sixth claim, under the Due Process Clause, against the County and defendant Sherry. 

(3) The ninth claim, under the Due Process Clause, against the County and defendants Storelli, 

Moffitt, Sherry, and O’Bryant. 

The Defendants’ Motions in the Schneider Case 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to the following claims: 

(1) The second claim, under the Due Process Clause, against defendant Bieber; 

(2) The third claim, under the Due Process Clause, against defendant Bieber; 

(3) The fourth claim, under the First Amendment, against defendant Bieber, and against the other 

defendants to the extent this claim is based on the Schneiders’ allegation that the defendants 

intended to prevent a civil rights lawsuit by financially ruining the Mine; and 

(4) The fifth claim, under the Equal Protection Clause. 

Summary judgment is DENIED as to the following claims: 

(1) The first claim, under the Due Process Clause, against all defendants except Bieber 

(2) The fourth claim, under the First Amendment, against all defendants except Bieber, to the 

extent this claim is based on the Schneiders’ allegation the defendants intended to retaliate for 

the filing of the complaint in the Schneider case. 

The Plaintiffs’ Motions in the Schneider Case 

The motions are DENIED. 

* * * 

Additionally, the unconsolidated portion of the Schneider case, against defendant Bieber, is 

CLOSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 8, 2016. 

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