Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00017/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00017-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SAM ABBOUD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

MACHINES CORPORATION, 

Defendant. /

NO. C 04-00017 JW 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Sam Abboud (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against International Business Machines

Corporation (“IBM” or “Defendant”) alleging retaliation in violation of the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12940 et seq., retaliation in violation

of public policy, injunctive relief, and defamation. The action was originally filed in the Superior

Court of Santa Clara County. Defendant removed the action to the Northern District of California

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment. The Court deemed it appropriate to

take the matter under submission without oral arguments. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Based upon all the

papers filed to date, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

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II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in Aman, Jordan. (Mot. for Summ. J., “Mot.,” at 2:20; Decl. of Scott G.

Lawson in Support of Mot., “Lawson Decl.,” Ex. A 9:14-17.) He is a citizen of the State of

California and at all relevant times, has resided in the Northern District of California. Defendant is a

New York corporation with its principle place of business in the state of New York. (Def.’s Notice

of Removal Action, “Notice,” ¶ 7.) Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of

California because it owns and operates a research facility called the “Santa Theresa Facility”

located in San Jose.

Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant as a part-time, paid student intern in the fall

of 1981. Defendant hired Plaintiff on a full-time basis as a Junior Engineer in June 1982. Plaintiff

was then promoted several times, eventually becoming a Senior Engineer in 1995. He worked in the

Thin-Film Recording Head Department, in the technological area of thin-film recording head design

and characterization engineering, within Defendant’s Storage Technology Division. This was a

salaried position that fell on Band level 9 of Defendant's salary scale. Plaintiff received praises and

commendations for his work in thin-film recording heads technology. (Mot. at 2:27-3:7; Lawson

Decl., Ex. A 20:25-21:12, 25:8-16, 26:15-29:15, 41:13-23, 41:24-42:1.)

In the summer of 1998, Plaintiff filed a complaint with Defendant’s Human Resources

Division alleging discrimination based on his race by Joseph Smyth, Plaintiff's “first-line manager,”

or immediate supervisor. Raul Gonzalez was assigned to investigate the complaint. (Mot. at 3:8-16,

Lawson Decl., Ex. A 96:4-100:16.) Gonzalez determined there was no evidence of discrimination. 

However, he did find evidence of “inattention to key personnel management responsibilities and

inappropriate [use of] language” by Smyth. As a result of the investigation, Smyth was “counseled.” 

(Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J., “Opp’n,” at 6:24-26; Decl. of Denis Renaud in Support of Mot.,

“Renaud Decl.,” Ex. K Section III.) Plaintiff was also offered a position in another department but

declined, believing he had previously been promised a different position in the “modeling”

department. He continued to work in the Thin-Film Recording Head Department. (Opp’n at 6:27-

7:9; Renaud Decl., Ex. K Section III.) 

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1

 Defendant's motion states that Nix and Ciaran Fox were the first-line managers who gave

Plaintiff his low work performance evaluation. However, the record shows that Nix and Li were

Plaintiff’s first-line managers at the time. 

3

In January of 2000, Plaintiff received a low work performance evaluation rating for the 1999

work year from Jinshan Li and Lamar Nix, his first-line managers at the time.1

 (Mot. at 3:27-3:3;

Renaud Decl., Ex. K. Sections II and III.) In February of 2000, Plaintiff filed another complaint

with Defendant’s Human Resources Division alleging that his performance rating was incorrect or

unjustified, that he was being retaliated against by Smyth, his second-level manager at the time, for

his previous complaint to Human Resources. He also claimed that he had been unjustly denied a

previously promised position. Eric Stouffer was assigned to investigate, and determined that there

was no evidence supporting any of Plaintiff’s allegations. (Opp’n at 7:22-24; Renaud Decl., Ex. K

Section IV.)

On March 19, 2001, in response to his low performance rating, Plaintiff was placed on a 60-

day plan to improve his performance. He completed the plan to the satisfaction of his managers. On

August 6, 2001, however, Plaintiff was placed on a 30-day performance improvement plan because

his managers were once again dissatisfied with his work. Plaintiff was terminated on September 14,

2001 for failure to meet the objectives of the 30-day plan. (Mot. at 4:4-13; Lawson Decl., Ex. A

376:23-377:16, 127:20-128:12, 377:17-378:6, 132:6-13.) Plaintiff attributes the termination to “a

series of adverse actions” subsequent to his discrimination complaint to Human Resources. (Notice,

Ex. A ¶ 9.) 

Plaintiff appealed the termination through Defendant’s internal appeal process. In January of

2002, a panel of five IBM employees voted unanimously to overturn the decision to terminate

Plaintiff. (Mot. at 4:15-17; Renaud Decl., Ex. N; Lawson Decl., Ex. 141:4-8, 145:21-25, 146:22-

147:7, 149:14-150:11, 152:8-11.) Plaintiff was reinstated and placed in the Tribology Department in

Defendant’s Storage Technology Division on February 16, 2002. (Mot. at 5:15-16; Lawson Decl.,

Ex. C 75:18-76:6.) In January of 2003, Hitachi Global Storage Technologies acquired Defendant's

Storage Technology Division. As a result, Plaintiff became a Hitachi employee. He was employed

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2

 It is not clear whether and on what date Plaintiff received his right-to sue-notice from the

DFEH before initiating this lawsuit. However, since Defendant has not raised this issue, the Court

will assume, for the purposes of this motion, that Plaintiff has exhausted the administrative remedies

as required by law. 

3

 The parties are not in agreement with respect to the procedural timeline of this case. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in state court on November 10, 2003, and that

Plaintiff did not file a discrimination complaint with the DFEH until October 17, 2005. However,

Defendant's removal notice attaches Plaintiff's Complaint, entitled "First Amended Complaint,"

dated November 10, 2003. 

4

with Hitachi until February 12, 2005, when he was terminated as part of a reduction in force. (Mot.

at 7:9-16; Lawson Decl., Ex. A 54:7-17, 54:25-55:2, Ex. G, 183:8-184:19.) 

On October 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination based on race against

Defendant with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”).2 Plaintiff then filed

the instant suit on October 1, 2003, in the Superior Court of Santa Clara.3

 Plaintiff amended his

complaint on November 10, 2003, adding defamation as his fourth claim. On January 5, 2004,

Defendant removed the case to the Northern District of California on the basis of diversity

jurisdiction. (Mot. at 7:17-20; Opp’n 1:2-9.) 

III. STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). The purpose of summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims

or defenses.” Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. If this burden is met, the

moving party is then entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to

make a sufficient showing on an essential element with respect to which the non-moving party bears

the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23.

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The non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party cannot defeat the moving party’s properly

supported motion for summary judgment simply by alleging some factual dispute between the

parties. To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party must bring forth

material facts, i.e., “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . 

Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, including

questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence. Masson v. New

Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Matsushita,

475 U.S. at 588; T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). It is

the court's responsibility “to determine whether the 'specific facts' set forth by the nonmoving party,

coupled with undisputed background or contextual facts, are such that a rational or reasonable jury

might return a verdict in its favor based on that evidence.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. 

“[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248. However, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of

fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

587.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff’s first claim is for retaliation in violation of FEHA. (Notice, Ex. A ¶¶ 12-16.) To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a

protected activity, (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action, and (3) there is

a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Once a plaintiff

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establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff

to show that the employer’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for retaliation. McAlindin v.

County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999); Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal.

App. 4th 467, 476 (1992). 

1. Prima Facie Case

a. Protected Activity

Defendant contends Plaintiff has not engaged in any protected activity. Specifically,

Defendant contends that, in the summer of 1998, when Plaintiff filed a complaint with Defendant's

Human Resources Division against Smyth, Plaintiff's first-line manager, Plaintiff did not allege that

Smyth had discriminated against him on the basis of his race or national origin. Defendant contends

Plaintiff alleged only that Smyth had a “personal issue” with him. Defendant thus contends that

complaining about a manager who an employee believes has a personal issue with the employee

does not qualify as a protected activity. (Mot. at 9:3-10:2.) Plaintiff contends his complaint alleged

discrimination by Smyth on the basis of race. (Notice, Ex. A ¶¶ 6, 13.)

The record establishes that Plaintiff's complaint was indeed a “complaint of discrimination,”

and that an investigator assigned to the complaint found no evidence of discrimination. (See Renaud

Decl., Ex. K Section III.) Plaintiff has also testified in his deposition that he told the investigator he

believed Smyth was discriminating against him on the basis of race. (Lawson Decl., Ex. A 100:7-

16.) Plaintiff’s subsequent testimony as to his belief that Smyth had a personal issue with him

before he lodged the discrimination complaint is neither inconsistent with, nor contradictory to, his

earlier testimony. (Lawson Decl., Ex. G 239:17-20.) As such, Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff

filed only a personal issue complaint against Smyth is inconsistent with the evidence before the

Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination constitutes a protected activity. See

California Fair Employment & Housing Com. v. Gemini Aluminum Corp., 122 Cal. App. 4th 1004,

1018 (2004) (“[i]nformal complaints to management about discriminatory employment practices are

considered sufficient opposition to trigger the prohibition against retaliation”). 

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Defendant further contends that even assuming Plaintiff’s 1998 complaint against Smyth was

on the basis of race discrimination, it does not constitute a protected activity because Plaintiff’s

Caucasian race is not protected by California law, and Plaintiff did not complain about the

discrimination he claims he suffered from - national origin discrimination. (See Mot. at 9 n.3; Reply

in Support of Mot for Summ. J., “Reply,” 4:14-17.) Defendant’s contention is contrary to

established law for retaliatory claims. “It is well settled that a retaliation claim may be brought by

an employee who has complained of or opposed conduct that the employee reasonably believes to be

discriminatory, even when a court later determines the conduct was not actually prohibited by the

FEHA.” Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1043 (2005). 

An employee’s mistaken belief that an employer engaged in an unlawful employment

practice is reasonable if it is based on a mistake made in good faith, whether the mistake is one of

law or fact. Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994). Reasonableness is “assessed

according to an objective standard - one that makes due allowance . . . for the limited knowledge

possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of their claims.” Id. In

addition, “it has long been established that Title VII, as remedial legislation, is construed broadly.” 

Id. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's discrimination complaint constitutes protected activity so long as

Plaintiff had an objectively reasonable, good faith belief that Smyth's conduct was prohibited by law. 

Defendant contends that since Jordanese descendants are considered Caucasian, Plaintiff is

technically Caucasian, therefore, cannot assert race discrimination against Smyth who is Caucasian. 

Although Caucasian is not synonymous with “white” or “European” in traditional physical

anthropology, a reasonable jury could find that, in common usage, Caucasian usually means a white

person of European descent, excluding people of Middle Eastern origin. Therefore, the Court finds

that Plaintiff's belief that Smyth's conduct constituted unlawful racial, rather than national origin,

discrimination was objectively reasonable. 

//

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b. Adverse Employment Action

California law applies the “materiality” test for defining an adverse employment action for

purposes of FEHA retaliation lawsuits. Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1036. The test requires an adverse

employment action to “materially affect[] the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” to be

actionable. Id. at 1051. Further, the phrase terms, conditions, or privileges of employment “must be

interpreted liberally and with a reasonable appreciation of the realities of the workplace.” Id. at

1054. It protects a plaintiff against not only “ultimate employment decisions,” such as terminations

and demotions, but also “the entire spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to

materially and adversely affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity for advancement in

his or her career.” Id. 

The California Court of Appeals applied Yanowitz in Patten v. Grant Joint Union High

School Dist.,134 Cal. App. 4th 1378 (2005). In Patten, the plaintiff was a principal of a large,

underperforming middle school. Id. at 1381. After engaging in protected activity, she was

transferred to another principal position at a much smaller middle school comprised of highachieving students. Id. at 1381-82. The principal then sued her employer, the school district,

alleging retaliation. Id. at 1383. The school district claimed the “lateral” transfer did not constitute

an adverse employment action as a matter of law because the principal positions were both at middle

schools, the principal’s wages, benefits and duties remained the same, and the transfer allowed the

principal to utilize her skills in curriculum development. Id. at 1389. However, the Patten court

found that the school district’s “view of a triable issue of adverse employment action . . . was too

narrow.” Id. The court held the transfer to constitute a material adverse action because the plaintiff 

was a relatively young principal, with her entire career ahead of her; the smaller, high-achieving

school presented her with less of an opportunity to distinguish herself. Id. at 1389, 1390. The court

also examined the school district’s actions leading up to the transfer and the problems the principal

experienced as a result of the transfer. The court held that although many of the actions and

problems did not rise to material actions on their own, they presented a triable issue of material fact

regarding adverse employment action when viewed collectively. Id. at 1390. 

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Similarly, in this case, Defendant contends that placing Plaintiff in the Tribology Department

was not an adverse employment action because his position was merely lateral to his position in the

Thin-Film Recording Head Department. (See Mot. at 10:3-13:12.) Specifically, Defendant

contends that in both positions, Plaintiff worked in the Storage Technology Division, held the tile of

Senior Engineer, received a salary that fell on Band level 9 of Defendant’s salary scale, and had

materially similar Senior Engineer-level responsibilities and similar opportunities for advancement. 

(Id. at 12:1-11.) It is undisputed that both positions were under the same division and that Plaintiff's

salary and title remained the same. (See Opp’n at 19:9-10.) However, with respect to Plaintiff’s

responsibilities, Plaintiff declares that the duties he were assigned during his tenure in the Tribology

Department were “substantially different” from those in the Thin-Film Recording Heads Department

and that none of the duties were Senior Engineer-level work. (Decl. of Sam Abboud, “Abboud

Decl.”, ¶ 19.) For example, Plaintiff claims that he worked alongside a summer intern and was told

to continue the intern's assignments when the internship came to an end. Plaintiff has also attested

that he did not have any training, education, or experience in the science of tribology. (Id.) On the

other hand, Bruno Marchon, the manager of the Tribology Department, has testified in his

deposition that Plaintiff worked exclusively on a Senior Engineer-level project involving

characterization engineering which employed thin-film recording head technology. (Reply at 6:14-

7:3; Reply Decl. of Scott G. Lawson, “Lawson Reply Decl.,” Ex. C 21:9-23, 58:22-59:9.) Marchon

has also testified that Plaintiff worked alongside another Band level 9 Senior Engineer and never

worked with, or was assigned the same duties as, the summer intern. (Reply at 6:20-7:2, 7 n. 8;

Lawson Reply Decl., Ex. C 53:6-15, 40;10-42:19.)

On a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the non-moving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular

evidence. Masson., 501 U.S. at 520 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588;

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of

Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented evidence which, if believed by a reasonable

jury, would establish that during his tenure with Defendant in the Tribology Department, his

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4

 Plaintiff’s complaint and opposition do not list the actions making up the series of adverse

employment actions to which Plaintiff was allegedly subjected to. However, it is evident from the

pleadings that the denial of the modeling position, unwarranted negative performance evaluations,

his termination, and his placement in the Tribology Department are the actions to which Plaintiff is

referring. 

10

responsibilities were materially different from, and at a level not comparable to, those of his former

position in the Thin-Film Recording Head Department. 

Further, similar to the school principal in Patten, Plaintiff contends he was “subject to a

series of adverse employment actions” as retaliation for his discrimination complaint, culminating in

his placement in the Tribology Department. (Notice, Ex. A ¶ 13.) These alleged actions include the

denial of a modeling position he had been promised prior to the complaint, unwarranted negative

performance evaluations, and his termination .4

 (See id. ¶ 9; Opp’n at 2:25-27; Renaud Decl., Ex. K

Section I.) Plaintiff has presented evidence that, on August 11, 1998, Smyth corresponded with

Plaintiff, stating that a plan to place Plaintiff in a modeling position had not changed. (Decl. of

Robert David Baker in Support of Opp’n, “Baker Decl.,” Ex. W.) Plaintiff has also presented

evidence that prior to discrimination complaint, he was a highly rated and highly honored employee

of Defendant. He was promoted at least six times from when he began working for Defendant as a

student intern in 1981 until becoming a Senior Engineer in 1995. He had received a rating of “1” or

“2,” with “1” being the best and “4” being the worst, for the majority of the time prior to his

discrimination complaint. (Baker Decl., Ex. A 142:6-17.) Plaintiff also received three patents in the

area of thin-film recording head technology and fourteen monetary and recognition awards. 

(Abboud Decl. ¶ 7; Baker Decl., Ex. A 142: 6-17.) 

Each of Defendant’s alleged acts of retaliation, aside from its placement of Plaintiff in the

Tribology Department, may not rise to a materially adverse employment action in and of itself. 

However, as explained in Yanowitz, a court may consider a plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation

collectively. Yanowitz, 34 Cal. 4th at 1055. “There is no requirement that an employer’s retaliatory

acts constitute one swift blow, rather than a series of subtle, yet damaging, injuries.” Id. “Enforcing

a requirement that each act separately constitute an adverse employment action would subvert the

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purpose and intent of [FEHA].” Id. at 1056. Here, Plaintiff contends Defendant systematically

retaliated against him, that is, that all of Defendant’s alleged acts of retaliation were taken in

response to his filing a complaint of discrimination with Human Resources and were thus connected

to one another. (Notice, Ex. A ¶¶ 9, 13.) A reasonable jury could conclude that these acts,

considered collectively, materially and adversely affected the objective terms and conditions of

Plaintiff’s employment and Plaintiff’s opportunity for advancement in his career. Therefore, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact regarding adverse employment

action. 

c. Causal Link

A causal link may be established by an inference derived from circumstantial evidence

demonstrating “the employer’s knowledge that [the employee] engaged in protected activities and

the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment

decision.” Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of California, 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69 (2000) (quoting

Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1988)). “The issue in each case is whether retaliatory

animus was a but-for cause of the employer's action.” Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 121 Cal. App.

4th 95, 108 (2004) (citing Clark v. Claremont Univ. Ctr., 6 Cal. App. 4th 639, 665 n.6 (1992)). 

Being that “the employer ” is often a “large economic enterprise[] with [a] layered and

compartmentalized management structure[],” the employee “can establish the element of causation

by showing that any of the persons involved in bringing about the adverse action held the requisite

animus, provided that such person’s animus operated as a ‘but-for’ cause, i.e., a force without which

the adverse action would not have happened.” Id. (construing Clark, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 665-66.) 

In this case, Defendant contends Plaintiff cannot show a causal link between his

discrimination complaint and his placement in the Tribology Department because Plaintiff has no

evidence of retaliatory animus on the part of any of the persons who made the decision to place

Plaintiff in the Tribology Department. (Mot. at 13:15-18.) Defendant also contends that the period

between the summer of 1998, when Plaintiff filed his discrimination complaint against Smyth, and

February 16, 2002, when Plaintiff was placed in the Tribology Department, far surpasses the

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requisite temporal proximity. (Id. at 13:27-14:3.) However, the Court has already found that

Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's alleged retaliatory acts,

when viewed collectively, constitute an adverse employment action. As such, Plaintiff can establish

a casual link so long as he can show that any of the persons involved in those acts held retaliatory

animus sufficient to operate as a but-for cause of the acts and temporal proximity. 

Plaintiff has testified in his deposition that Gabor Paal, his third-line manager during the

summer of 1998, told him he was not going to “reward” him for complaining to Human Resources

by placing him in the modeling position he had previously been promised. (Opp’n at 7:5-8; Baker

Decl., Ex. A 106:5-107: 14.). Plaintiff has further testified that Nix, one of the two first-line

managers who evaluated Plaintiff’s work performance for 1999 work year, acknowledged that

Smyth, as Plaintiff's second-line manager at the time, was involved with Plaintiff’s employment. 

(Opp’n at 7:15-19; Baker Decl., Ex. A 245:11-248:12.) The requisite retaliatory animus on the part

of Paal is evident from his alleged statement and may be rationally inferred on the part of Smyth

since Smyth was the subject of Plaintiff’s discrimination complaint. 

The evidence which Plaintiff has presented shows that Defendant’s alleged series of

retaliatory acts commenced within a very short time after he filed his discrimination complaint. This

satisfies the temporal proximity requirement. Plaintiff was allegedly denied the modeling position at

the conclusion of the investigation into his discrimination complaint. The other actions making up

Defendant’s adverse employment action followed in a linear fashion. Accordingly, the Court finds

that Plaintiff has presented a triable issue of material fact as to a causal link between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action. Plaintiff has therefore established his prima facie case. 

2. Legitimate, Nonretaliatory Reason and Pretext

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer

to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its adverse employment action. McAlindin, 192

F.3d at 1238; Flait, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 476. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that

the employer’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for retaliation. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1238;

Flait, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 476. Here, Defendant contends it placed Plaintiff in the Tribology

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Department to avoid further conflict between Plaintiff and Smyth and to accommodate Plaintiff’s

stated desire not to return to work under Smyth’s supervision. (Mot. at 15:8-10, Donahoe Depo

50:7-15, Aboud Depo 258:21-259:1, 260:21-25.) These are legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons

sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that the placement may not have been motivated by retaliatory

animus. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1994)

(holding that the employer’s proffered reason for transferring the plaintiff to a different work shift -

to separate her from the supervisor against whom she complained of sexual harassment - was not

retaliatory in nature). 

However, Defendant fails to address any of the other actions making up its alleged adverse

employment action. Defendant has not offered an explanation for allegedly denying Plaintiff a

modeling position. Defendant has also not explained why Plaintiff, who was a highly rated

employee prior to his discrimination complaint, was given a lower performance rating after he filed

the complaint. Additionally, Defendant has failed to explain why Plaintiff was terminated and then

promptly reinstated by a panel of five IBM employees who voted unanimously to overturn the

decision to terminate Plaintiff. In light of this failure, the burden of showing pretext does not shift

back to Plaintiff, and the legally mandatory inference of retaliation arising from Plaintiff’s prima

facie case does not drop away. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981)). Accordingly, the

Court denies summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 

 B. Retaliation in Violation of Public Policy

Plaintiff's second claim is for retaliation in violation of public policy under Tameny v.

Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167 (1980). (Notice, Ex. A ¶¶ 17-20.) In Tameny, the California

Supreme Court held that “when an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental

principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages

traditionally available in such actions.” Id. at 170. The California Court of Appeal has subsequently

expanded the relief in Tameny to protect an employee who was demoted as a retaliatory measure,

but was not terminated. Garcia v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1556, 1162 (1986). To

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support a Tameny claim, “the public policy triggering the violation must be tethered to a

constitutional or statutory provision.” Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66, 71 (1998)

(citing Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4 1083, 1095 (1992)). 

In this case, the underlying policy alleged to be violated is FEHA. (Notice, Ex. A ¶ 18;

Opp’n at 23:4-5.) Defendant contends Plaintiff cannot make out a Tameny claim because Plaintiff

was neither terminated nor demoted, and because Plaintiff cannot show that IBM retaliated against

him in violation of FEHA. (Mot. at 17:28-18:5.) It is undisputed that IBM terminated Plaintiff’s

employment. (Mot. at 4:11-13; Opp’n at 9: 21-22.; Notice, Ex. A ¶ 9.) Though Plaintiff was later

reinstated after a review process, there is a genuine dispute as to whether the initial termination was

in retaliation for his discrimination complaint. In addition, after Plaintiff was reinstated, he was

placed in an entirely different department. Plaintiff contends that this placement was a retaliatory

demotion. (Opp’n at 19:3-5.) Because there are triable issues of fact precluding summary judgment

as to Plaintiff’s FEHA claim, summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation in violation of

public policy is improper. The Court therefore denies summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of

retaliation in violation of public policy. 

C. Injunction for Reinstatement Claim

 Plaintiff’s third claim for the injunctive relief of reinstatement is improper. “[A]n injunction

is a remedy, not a cause of action.” Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Assn., 105 Cal. App. 4th

604, 618 (2003) (citing McDowell v. Watson, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1159. As such, the Court

dismisses Plaintiff's third cause of action as improper. This dismissal does not preclude Plaintiff

from seeking injunctive relief as part of his prayer for relief, assuming Plaintiff has properly asked

for such relief in the operative Complaint. Defendant contends an injunction requiring reinstatement

is not available here because Hitachi has acquired the division that includes Plaintiff's former

position in the Thin-Film Recording Head Department. (Mot. at 7:9-12; Lawson Decl., Ex. A 54:7-

17, 54:25-55:2.) The Court need not address this issue at this time. 

//

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D. Defamation Claim

Plaintiff's fourth claim is for defamation. Plaintiff's claim fails for several reasons.

1. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff’s defamation claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 3409(c) for defamation claims. Plaintiff contends that his claim is timely because

each time his IBM employment records were reviewed by the IBM managers, with whom he

interviewed, there was a new publication of the documents. (Opp’n at 23:16-19.) Plaintiff’s

contention is without merit. In California, the accrual of claims arising out of the publication of

defamatory statements is governed by the “single-publication rule.” Under the rule, the period of

limitations commences upon the first general publication. Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal. 4 1230,

1245 (2003) (citing Belli v. Roberts Furs, 240 Cal. App. 2d 284, 289 (1966)). Accordingly, because

Plaintiff’s work performance evaluation, improvement plans, and termination were communicated to

persons in IBM’s HR Department and persons making up IBM’s internal appeal panel in 2000 and

2001, Plaintiff’s defamation claim, filed in 2003, is untimely. 

2. Failure to State Claim

Even assuming Plaintiff’s claim is timely, it nonetheless fails because Plaintiff has not stated

a claim for defamation. A claim of defamation requires a showing of “intentional publication of a

statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes

special damage.” Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 645 (1999) (citing Cal. Civ. Code §§

45, 46.). Here, Plaintiff alleges that “John Doe #1, a managerial employee of IBM published to

Wayne Imaino, an IBM manager, that Plaintiff was not competent to hold a position in Imaino’s

department.” (Notice, Ex. A ¶ 25.) Plaintiff further alleges that “John Doe #2, a managerial

employee of IBM, published to Stewart Parkin, an IBM manager that Plaintiff was not competent to

hold a position in Parkin’s department.” (Id. ¶ 26.) However, Plaintiff has not presented the Court

with any evidence to substantiate these allegations. Plaintiff does not identify what statements of

fact were made or by whom. In fact, Plaintiff contends he was not defamed by statements made by

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his former managers, Smyth and/or Ciaran Fox, or by IBM’s HR Department to Imaino and Parkin. 

(Opp’n at 23:12-14.) 

Rather, in his opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff contends “the defamation

constitutes the ‘3’ rating [he] received, the 60 and 30-day notices [he] was placed on, and finally the

termination.” (Id. at 23:14-16.) Plaintiff’s claim fails on this theory of liability as well because he

“may not raise a new theory of liability for the first time, after the close of discovery, in his

opposition to summary judgment without amending his complaint.” Matthews v. Xerox Corp., 319

F.Supp. 2d 1166, 1172 (D. Cal. 2004) (citing Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1291-92

(9th Cir. 2000)). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to identify any defamatory statement of fact made in

connection with these personnel events. In Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 958,

965 (1993), the court considered whether a poor performance evaluation by an employer supports a

cause of action for defamation by the employee. The court held that “unless an employer’s

performance evaluation falsely accuses an employee of criminal conduct, lack of integrity,

dishonesty, incompetence or reprehensible personal characteristics or behavior [citation], it cannot

support a cause of action for libel.” Id. The court continued, stating, “This is true even when the

employer’s perceptions about an employee’s efforts, attitude, performance, potential or worth to the

enterprise are objectively wrong and cannot be supported by reference to concrete, provable facts.” 

Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that a performance evaluation denotes opinion, not fact, and

therefore is not actionable defamation. Id. at 970-71. In this case, Plaintiff’s first-line managers

rated Plaintiff as “3,” indicating that he “achieved some/most of [his] commitments.” (Opp’n at

2:21-22; Renaud Decl., Ex. K Section III.) The performance evaluation also included “supporting

comments that [Plaintiff’s] team interaction could have been stronger.” (Renaud Decl., Ex. K

Section III.) The rating and supporting comments do not suggest any criminal conduct, or lack of

integrity, honesty, or competency on the part of Plaintiff, nor do they impute any reprehensible

personal characteristics or behavior. Therefore, they are not actionable defamation. 

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

defamation claim. 

V. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. The Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First and

Second Causes of Action, e.g. retaliation in violation of FEHA and retaliation in violation of public

policy. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Causes of Action, e.g., injunction for

reinstatement and defamation.

Dated April 7, 2006 JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Bradford K. Newman bradfordnewman@paulhastings.com

Dugan William Bliss duganbliss@quinnemanuel.com

Robert David Baker attyatlaw@earthlink.net

Scott G. Lawson scottlawson@quinnemanuel.com

William A. Morehead williammorehead@quinnemanuel.com

Dated: April 7, 2006 Richard w. Wieking, Clerk

By: /s/ JW Chambers Melissa Peralta

 Courtroom Deputy

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