Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01555/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01555-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Medical Malpractice

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JEAN MARC VAN DEN HEUVEL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-1555-TLN-EFB PS 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 This matter was before the court for hearing on December 3, 2014, on defendant’s motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.1 Assistant United States Attorney Gregory Broderick appeared on behalf of 

defendant; plaintiff appeared in pro se. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that 

the government’s motion be granted. 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff initiated this action against Shingle Springs Tribal Wellness (“SSTW”) in the El 

Dorado Superior Court, Small Claims Division, alleging a claim for dental malpractice. ECF No. 

1-1. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he suffered an injury due to negligent dental care during a 

root canal performed on August 29, 2013. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. 

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 This case, in which plaintiff is proceeding pro se, is before the undersigned pursuant to 

Eastern District of California Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

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 The United States removed this action on behalf of SSTW, on the grounds that that SSTW 

is deemed to be part of the United States Department of Health and Human Service’s Public 

Health Service under section 224 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(g), 25 U.S.C. 

§ 450f(d). Thereafter, the United States filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). ECF No. 10. 

II. Removal and Substitution of Defendant 

 Although plaintiff initially filed suit against SSTW, the United States substituted itself as 

defendant in this matter and removed the action to this court. That substitution was proper. 28 

U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) provides that: 

Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant 

employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment 

at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil 

action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State court 

shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the 

Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the 

district and division embracing the place in which the action or 

proceeding is pending. Such action or proceeding shall be deemed 

to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States 

under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the 

United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. 

“Certification by the Attorney General is prima facie evidence that a federal employee was acting 

in the scope of [his] employment at the time of the incident and is conclusive unless challenged.” 

Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698 

(9th Cir. 1993)). 

 The notice of removal explains that SSTW is funded and operates under a compact and 

funding agreement between Tribal Health and the Indian Health Service, pursuant to the Indian 

Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (2000). 25 

U.S.C. § 405f(d) provides that with respect to any claim for personal injury resulting from the 

performance of “medical, surgical, dental, or related functions, including the conduct of clinical 

studies or investigations,” an Indian tribe carrying out a self-determination agreement “is deemed 

to be part of the Public Health Service in the Department of Health and Human Services while 

carrying out any such contract or agreement and its employees . . . are deemed employees of the 

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Service while acting within the scope of their employment in carrying out the contract or 

agreement.” 

 Along with the notice of removal, the United States filed a Certification of Scope of 

Federal Employment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), in which Kelli Taylor, Chief of the Civil 

Affirmative Division, certifies that SSTW was acting within the scope of its employment at the 

time of the alleged incident giving rise to the complaint. ECF No. 1-3. Accordingly, pursuant to 

25 U.S.C. § 405f(d), SSTW is deemed to be part of the Public Health Service in the U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore, the United States was properly substituted 

as the defendant and the action appropriately removed to this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). 

III. Motion to Dismiss 

 The United States argues that plaintiff’s tort claim is jurisdictionally barred because he 

failed to exhaust the administrative claim requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). 

ECF No. 10-1 at 2-3. 

 As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit except according to its consent to 

be sued. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981). It necessarily follows where Congress 

waives the immunity of the United States any terms and conditions that it places on the waiver are 

jurisdictional and must be strictly construed. See Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. 

and School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983); Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 521 (9th 

Cir.1992). Congress has waived the immunity of the United States for certain tort claims as 

provided in the FTCA,2 but only according to the terms and conditions set out in that statute. As 

relevant here, those conditions include the administrative tort claim requirements. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2675(a). Thus, “[t]he requirement of an administrative claim is jurisdictional.” Brady v. 

United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 Significantly here, Congress has also provided that for purpose of malpractice claims 

against health care entities funded and operated under a compact and agreement with the Indian 

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 The FTCA waives immunity to make the United States “liable to the same extent as a 

private party for certain torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” 

United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976). 

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Health Service, pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. 

No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (2000), those entities shall be “deemed to be part of the Public Health 

Service in the Department of Health and Human Services while carrying out any such contract or 

agreement and its employees . . . are deemed employees of the Service while acting within the 

scope of their employment in carrying out the contract or agreement.” 25 U.S.C. § 405f(d). The 

effect of this provision is that the tort claim is deemed to be a claim against the United States. 

This includes any claim for personal injury resulting from the performance of “medical, surgical, 

dental, or related functions, including the conduct of clinical studies or investigations.” Id. 

Congress further provided that the exclusive remedy for claims of malpractice arising out of 

medical services provided by such entities and their employees shall be a claim against the United 

States pursuant to the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 233(a), (g). Accordingly, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 

§ 405f(d) SSTW is deemed to be part of the Public Health Service in the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services and the United States was substituted as the defendant. Thus, to 

proceed on his claim plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the FTCA.3

 As 

discussed below, he has not done so. 

 Although Congress has consented to suits against the United States under the FTCA, prior 

to litigating a tort claim against the United States, a plaintiff must first file an administrative claim 

with the appropriate federal agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Presentation of an FTCA claim must 

be made within two years of the accrual of the claimant’s cause of action. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 

A claim is deemed “presented” to the federal agency upon its receipt. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a); 

Vacek v. U.S. Postal Service, 447 F.3d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 2006) (mailbox rule does not apply to 

FTCA cases). A civil action may not be instituted until an administrative claim has “been finally 

denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 

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 The FTCA provides the exclusive remedy for “injury or loss of property, or personal 

injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act of omission of any 

employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,” 28 

U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), and the United States is the only proper defendant in a suit brought pursuant 

to the FTCA. FDIC v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998) 

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As noted, the administrative claim requirement under the FTCA is jurisdictional and cannot be 

waived. Cadwalder v. United States, 45 F.3d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1995). In addition, courts are 

required to strictly construe the exhaustion requirement. Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1250 (where 

exhaustion conditions not satisfied, action may not proceed “merely because dismissal would visit 

a harsh result upon the plaintiff.”). 

 Submitted with the government’s motion to dismiss is the declaration of Meredith TorresBruckheim. ECF No. 10-2. Ms. Torres-Bruckheim declares that she is a Senior Attorney in the 

General Law Division, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Health and Human 

Services. Id. ¶ 2. She states that the department maintains in a computerized database a record of 

administrative tort claims filed with the department, including those filed with respect to federally 

supported health centers that have been deemed to be eligible for Federal Tort Claims Act 

malpractice coverage. Id. ¶ 3. She further states that if a tort claim had been filed with the 

department with respect to SSTW, its approved delivery sites, or its employees or qualified 

contractors, a record of that filing would be maintained in the Claims Branch’s database. Id. ¶ 4. 

Ms. Torres-Bruckheim states that she conducted a search of the Claims Branch’s database and 

found no record of any administrative tort claim filed by the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 5. 

 In his opposition, plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to file an administrative claim. 

Instead, he claims that SSTW has inadequate posting regarding the care they provide and further 

discusses the facts surrounding his claim for dental malpractice. ECF No. 18 at 2. Further, at the 

December 3 hearing, plaintiff conceded that he did not file an administrative claim. As plaintiff 

has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 

plaintiff’s claim and the complaint must therefore be dismissed. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction, ECF No. 10, be granted and the Clerk be directed to close the case. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 10, 2015. 

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