Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00757/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00757-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM RAY JONES, SR., 

Plaintiff,

v.

HAROLD NAZAROFF; RENEE 

GAUMINTS; M. VERDUCZO; ATTORNEY 

SUSAN K. HATMAKER; ATTORNEY 

BRETT SUTTON; ATTORNEY JARED 

HAGUE; ATTORNEY JOSEPH V. MACIAS; 

STEPHANIE DEUTSCH,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-00757-LJO-SKO

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

CHANGE OF VENUE BE DENIED

(Doc. No. 4)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

THAT PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BE 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

(Doc. No. 1)

OBJECTIONS DUE: 28 DAYS

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 18, 2015, Plaintiff William Ray Jones, Sr. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis, filed this action against current and former employees of the Eastern District of 

California federal court, Defendants Harold Nazaroff, Renee Gaumints, M. Verduczo, and 

Stephanie Deutsch (“Courthouse Defendants”), and attorneys Susan K. Hatmaker, Brett Sutton, 

Jared Hague, and Joseph V. Macias from the law firm Sutton and Hatmaker (“Attorney 

Defendants”). (Doc. 1 (“Complaint”).) On June 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Change of 

Venue, requesting that his case be transferred to the Northern District of California. (Doc. 4 

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(Motion for Change of Venue).)1 

For the reasons set forth below, and the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Change of Venue be DENIED and that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice and 

without leave to amend. 

II. SCREENING STANDARD

In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen 

each case, and must dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of 

poverty is untrue, or the Court determines that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A claim is legally frivolous when it 

lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir.1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a 

claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual 

contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a claim, 

however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, 

but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint may not simply allege a wrong has been 

committed and demand relief. The pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[;]” the complaint must contain “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). Further, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 

conclusions are not. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

 

1

 Upon further review of the pending motion for a change of venue and in light of the pending motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis, District Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill referred the motion for change of venue to the undersigned on 

June 17, 2015. (Doc. 6.) 

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Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 

(1972); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988). Unless it is clear 

that no amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma 

pauperis is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend before dismissal. See Noll v. Carlson, 

809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.1987); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1230. If the Court determines that the 

complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies 

of the complaint are capable of being cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed this action for damages and injunctive relief on behalf of himself against a 

number of individual and governmental defendants. (Compl., pp. 1-3.) So far as can be discerned 

from the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Courthouse Defendants and Attorney Defendants 

violated his civil rights and “procedural rights,” and engaged in “judicial misconduct.” (Compl, 

p. 4.) 

Plaintiff was a plaintiff in a wrongful termination lawsuit removed from state court to the 

Eastern District of California on April 20, 2012, and assigned to District Judge Anthony W. Ishii 

and referred to Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston. See William Ray Jones, Sr. v. Lehigh 

Southwest Cement Company, Inc. and Does 1-50, No. 1:12-cv-00633-AWI-JLT (“Lehigh case”). 

In the Lehigh case, summary judgment was granted in the defendant’s favor and the case was 

closed. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Relief of Judgment, in which he argued that 

Judge Ishii’s electronic signature had been repeatedly falsified and that defense counsel had 

repeatedly lied, misrepresented, and failed to disclose crucial information to the Court. The Court 

denied Plaintiff’s motion for relief, and the case remained closed. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Courthouse Defendants improperly tampered with filed pleadings 

and documents, and permitted the Attorney Defendants “to submit documents that they authored 

[and in which they had] forged federal judge Anthony W. Ishii[’s] name” and “then presented 

these documents to the court as truthful judicial orders.” (Compl., pp. 4; 21.) Plaintiff alleges that 

the Attorney Defendants “authored their own” summary judgment and “signed Judge Anthony W. 

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Ishii[’s] name,” thereby “defraud[ing] the court machinery.” (Compl., p. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that 

the Courthouse Defendants “also forged” the emails and email signatures of Chief District Judge 

Morris C. England, Jr.2 (Compl., p. 6.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that the Courthouse Defendants 

“changed information in the Pacer system to suit the Attorney[ ] [Defendants’] purposes.” 

(Compl., p. 11.) Plaintiff contends that 

[e]mployees that would forge Chief District Judge Morris C. England Jr. (sic) 

emails and write emails to the plaintiff pretending to be Judge England and Judge 

Ishii have no regard for procedural rights or civil rights of any individuals. The 

plaintiff states that the judges[’] signatures are forged and b[r]ought this issue to 

the correct authorities but they all chose to ignore the fraud and misconduct. The 

plaintiff asked the court to read and listen to the allegations brought against the 

Eastern District Court employees, but instead [they] sent U.S. Marshals3to his 

home to intimidate and threaten his family because of his complaint regarding 

their misconduct.

(Compl., p. 6.) 

Plaintiff alleges that “the deception” the Attorney Defendants “created” during the Lehigh 

case “has prevented the plaintiff from acquiring a fair hearing.” (Compl., p. 6; see also Compl., 

p. 17.) As a result, Plaintiff was “unfairly sanctioned based on [these] lies by the defendant[s] 

 

2

 Chief Judge Morris C. England, Jr., became involved in the matter after Plaintiff and his wife filed a complaint 

regarding the alleged “misconduct” of various courthouse employees with the Judicial Council in San Francisco. 

(Compl., p. 15.) The Judicial Council referred Plaintiff to District Judge England “because he was in charge of all 

courtroom employees in the Eastern Fresno and Sacramento Districts.” (Compl., p. 15.) 

3

 Plaintiff included in his Complaint as exhibits several letters to various state and federal agencies and 

representatives, some of which referenced this alleged harassment by the U.S. Marshals. However, Plaintiff also 

attached as an exhibit a letter addressed to Senator Diane Feinstein in response to one of Plaintiff’s complaints, 

explaining that 

Mr. and Mrs. Jones had multiple civil matters pending in the Eastern District of California courts 

which were either dismissed or ruled against. The Joneses launched a telephonic harassment 

campaign against several federal judges and their staffs. When the Marshals Service contacted the 

Joneses to speak with them about calling judicial officials, Mrs. Jones became verbally aggressive 

and indicated that she and her husband would “find out where they [the federal judges] lived and

go to their house[s]” if she and her husband were unable to speak to them on the phone. 

This statement initiated a Marshals Service threat investigation in which Deputy U.S. Marshals 

interviewed the Joneses in person to ascertain their state of mind and to see if they could be 

perceived as a threat against the Judiciary. . . . in the days after the interview, the Joneses began 

calling Marshals Service employees at both the district office in Eastern California and at 

Headquarters. This escalated further when the Joneses began writing letters to various judicial and 

political figures. 

(Compl., p. 348.) 

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who are officiers (sic) of the court.” (Compl., p. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that at some point Attorney 

Defendant Haymaker was “arrested for her misconduct,” though the arrest was officially reported 

as being instead “for an overdue boat registration.” (Compl., pp. 11-12.) 

The remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint takes issue with the Court’s orders granting the 

defendant’s motions for sanctions and for summary judgment and denying Plaintiff’s motion for 

relief in the Lehigh case. (Compl., pp. 8-14; 17-21.) Plaintiff alleges, however, that 

[t]his is not a request to reopen [his] prior case but a lawsuit/summons and

complaint against parties that have devised, plotted and schemed against the 

Plaintiff to negate his civil rights and the procedural (sic) of the court. More than 

likely these defendants have compromised other cases of other unrepresented 

plaintiffs.[ ] The Plaintiff asks the court to understand that “because something 

seems unbelievable doesn’t make it not true.”

(Compl., p. 17; see also Compl., p. 43 (Plaintiff “shall request the Court[’s] indulgence to review 

the Plaintiff’s prior cause of action in the Eastern District Court Fresno, California[,] under the 

jurisdiction of Anthony W. Ishii, Senior District Judge Case No: 01-12-CV-00633-AWI”)) 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that 

. . . he cannot and will not receive fair treatment within the Eastern District Court. 

The Plaintiff is aware that the Fresno District Court has jurisdiction because of 

where the Plaintiff resides and [where the] Defendants[’] actions occurred. . . . 

However, the Plaintiff request[s] that he be allowed a change of venue to the 

Northern California District Court, Oakland/San Francisco, California. 

(Compl., p. 50; see also Mot. for Change of Venue.) On June 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for 

change of venue, formally requesting the case be transferred to the Northern District of California. 

(Mot. for Change of Venue.)

IV. VENUE IS PROPER IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT

Plaintiff requests a change of venue because he “will not be able to obtain a fair hearing 

and/or trial due to the Eastern District Courtroom Staff who are listed as Defendant[s].” (Mot. for 

Change of Venue, p. 1; see also Compl., pp. 49-50.) Because Plaintiff will be changing residence 

“this year” to Alameda, California, he requests that venue be changed to the Northern District of 

California. (Mot. for Change of Venue, p. 8.) 

The federal venue statute requires that a civil action, other than one based on diversity 

jurisdiction, be brought only in “(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all 

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defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events 

or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the 

subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if 

there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). “For the 

convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any 

civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1404(a).

The incidents alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint indisputably occurred within this judicial 

district, and all Defendants appear to be residents in this judicial district. Accordingly, venue lies 

in the Eastern District of California and this action could not have been brought in any other 

district. While Plaintiff argues that the Lehigh case “was delayed and purposely sabotaged” by the 

combined efforts of the Attorney Defendants and the Eastern District employee Courthouse 

Defendants, Plaintiff’s concerns have been remedied by the assignment of District Judge 

Lawrence J. O’Neill and referral to Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto, both of whom were 

uninvolved in any part of the Lehigh case proceedings. Further, while Plaintiff’s change of 

residence to Alameda, California, may indeed someday impose on Plaintiff a physical and 

financial burden to proceed in the Eastern District, such burden at this stage is purely speculative; 

if any appearance is necessary other than for a settlement conference or trial of this action, 

telephonic appearances would likely be approved. 

Since all the incidents alleged in the Complaint occurred in this judicial district and all 

Defendants reside here, the Court does not find that it would be in the interest of justice to transfer 

this action. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for a change of venue 

be DENIED.

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint comprises 400 total pages – 55 pages are facts and arguments and an 

additional 345 pages are exhibits of varying relevance. (See Compl.) The Complaint sets forth a 

“Summary” section reciting the history of the alleged “misconduct” on the part of various 

attorneys and courthouse employees (Compl, pp. 1-21), followed by a second “Summary 

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Continued” section largely repeating the allegations of the Summary section with quoted statutory 

texts inserted in bold type (Compl., pp. 21-25.) The Complaint then sets forth a third section 

entitled “Statement of Facts” repeating many of the contentions of the first two sections, and 

adding additional allegations of impropriety on the part of Magistrate Judge Jennifer Thurston and 

various members of the U.S. Marshals Service, who are not named as defendants. (Compl., pp. 

26-39.) 

The Complaint then moves to a section listing Plaintiff’s five causes of action, with large,

bold block quotes of the statutes under which he seeks to sue. (See Compl, pp. 40-42.) Finally, 

the “Conclusion” section of the Complaint recapitulates the full extent of Plaintiff’s allegations of 

misconduct and fraud against the various attorneys and courthouse employees he believes 

wronged him, and concludes with a request for transfer of venue to the North District of California 

because he contends he cannot receive a fair adjudication in the Eastern District, given his history 

with the Court and courthouse employees. (Compl., pp. 42-50.) 

Finally, Plaintiff seeks a comprehensive list of demands for relief. (Compl., pp. 44-45.) 

Plaintiff 1) “prays for justice and fairness along with damages that are payable and due to the 

Plaintiff” in the amount of $500,000, as well as punitive damages and “back-pay and future 

earnings” for lost employment; 2) asks that the Court and the American Bar Association launch an 

investigation into Attorney Defendant Susan Hatmaker and her alleged “habit of persecuting Black 

Male Plaintiffs,” 3) asks that the Court “prosecute” the Courthouse Defendants “to the fullest 

extent of the law for allowing [the Attorney Defendants] to act as presiding judges”; 4) seeks to 

reopen the Lehigh case and render a new verdict of “default against the defendants” and for the 

Plaintiff in “the amount he demand[ed] in the prior lawsuit”; and 5) seeks reimbursement of his 

“cost[s] for copies, printing and travel time for having to drive over two hundred miles to file 

documents[.]” (Compl., pp. 44-45.)

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to Allege a Plain and Concise Statement of the Elements of 

His Claim

Over the course of 55 pages of repetitive and confusing details, Plaintiff essentially alleges 

that the Attorney and Courthouse Defendants “devised, plotted and schemed against the Plaintiff 

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to negate his civil rights and the procedural (sic) of the Court.” (Compl., p. 17.) Plaintiff further 

alleges, among other things, that the Courthouse Defendants improperly tampered with filed 

pleadings and documents, permitted the Attorney Defendants “to submit documents that they 

authored [and in which they had] forged federal judge Anthony W. Ishii[’s] name,” “presented

these documents to the court as truthful judicial orders,” forged the emails and email signatures of 

Chief District Judge England, and “defraud[ed] the court machinery.” (Compl., pp. 4; 5; 6; 21.) 

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8, a plaintiff must “plead a short and plain statement of the 

elements of his or her claim.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(d)(1). Dismissal is 

appropriate under Rule 8 where a complaint is “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy 

and largely irrelevant.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 1996). See 

also Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming 

dismissal of a “verbose, confusing and conclusory” complaint under Rule 8). “Something labeled 

a complaint but . . . prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as 

to whom plaintiff[ ] [is] suing for what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a 

complaint.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180. Further, in evaluating whether a complaint should be 

dismissed under Rule 8, dismissal does not turn upon whether “the complaint is wholly without 

merit.” Id. at 1179. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead a short and plaint statement of the elements of his claim 

under Rule 8. Plaintiff’s Complaint is argumentative, prolix, and replete with redundant, 

irrelevant details. See id. at 1178-79. Plaintiff fails to identify exactly which individual defendant 

or defendants he believes wronged him, in what manner and for what purpose they were acting in 

concert to wrong him, what wrong he is alleging occurred, and what harm he suffered as a result 

of that legal wrong. (See Compl.) It is also unclear how Plaintiff’s repeated insistence that the 

defendants somehow acted in concert to falsify District Judge Ishii’s signature on the PACER 

court document system or in the Court’s orders actually harmed him. The Court is unable to 

determine the nature or extent of Plaintiff’s damages, aside from the apparently arbitrary amount 

of $500,000 demanded in compensatory and punitive damages. (See Compl., at pp. 44-45.) 

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Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed for failure 

to comply with Rule 8 pleading standards. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177-80. 

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim Under Section 1983

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges civil rights violations under the Civil 

Rights Act for conspiracy.4 The Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 19835“is not itself a 

source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). “A person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within 

the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative 

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Where, 

however, a defendant is immune to suit under the common law, there is no cognizable section 

1983 claim. Davenport v. Winley, 314 Fed. Appx. 982 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 

4

 Plaintiff cites to several sections of the United States Code as the basis for his claims against the Attorney and 

Courthouse Defendants. (Compl.) Plaintiff alleges the Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil action for 

deprivation of rights; 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights; 18 U.S.C. § 241, Conspiracy against 

rights; 18 U.S.C. § 242, Deprivation of rights under color of law; 18 U.S.C. § 505, Seals of courts, signatures of 

judges or court officers; and, 28 U.S.C. § 951, Oath of office of clerks and deputies. (See Compl., pp. 40-42.) As 

there is no basis for Plaintiff’s claims under the other statutes, however, the Court will only address Plaintiff’s claims 

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. 

 Both 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are criminal statutes that provide the U.S. Department of Justice with authority to 

prosecute and punish private and public coconspirators who seek to violate rights secured by the U.S. Constitution. 

See U.S. v. Berke Cake Co., 50 F. Supp. 311 (E.D.N.Y. 1943), appeal dismissed 320 U.S. 807. There is no private 

right to sue within these sections, and neither section of the U.S. Code authorizes the Court to appoint the Attorney 

General to investigate or prosecute a defendant. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.

 Similarly, there is no private right to sue under either 18 U.S.C. § 505 or 28 U.S.C. § 951, and neither section of 

the U.S. Code authorizes the Court to appoint the Attorney General to investigate a defendant. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 526(a)(2) (the United States Attorney General may investigate official acts of clerks of U.S. courts “at the request 

and on behalf of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts”). 

5

 [Section 1983] creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of state law, 

deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Section 1983 does not create any 

substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by governmental 

officials. To prove a case under section 1983, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that (1) the action 

occurred “under color of state law” and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional 

right or federal statutory right. [citations omitted].

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A person acts under color of state law when the individual 

“exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the 

authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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1. The Attorney Defendants Are Not State Actors and Therefore Cannot 

Act Under the Color of Law for the Purposes of Section 1983

The Attorney Defendants were privately retained counsel for the defendant in the Lehigh 

action; the Attorney Defendants are not state actors and therefore cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1983 or 1985. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 

(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff cannot sue opposing counsel under § 1983 “because he is a 

lawyer in private practice who was not acting under color of state law,” and “[p]laintiff’s 

conclusory allegations that the lawyer was conspiring with state officers to deprive him of due 

process are insufficient”) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff’s claims for violation of civil rights 

therefore fail as to the Attorney Defendants. 

2. The Courthouse Defendants Are Immune from Suit Under Section 1983

The Courthouse Defendants in this action are immune from suit for their involvement in 

the Lehigh case. “[O]fficers of the court . . . have absolute immunity in the performance of 

duties authorized by [ ] statute.” Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 

1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d 1486, 1486 (9th Cir.1986) (clerk 

of the United States Supreme Court immune from suit); Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (“clerks, like judges, are immune from damage suits for performance of tasks that 

are an integral part of the judicial process”); Hilska v. Suter, 308 Fed. Appx. 451, 452 (D.C. Cir.

2009) (per curiam) (“[C]lerks enjoy absolute immunity from damages for performance of tasks 

that are an integral part of the judicial process”). 

This absolute immunity is lost only if the Courthouse Defendants’ action were “clearly and 

completely outside the scope of their jurisdiction.” Demoran v. Dewitt, 781 F. 2d 155, 158 (9th 

Cir. 1985). The Courthouse Defendants’ alleged actions were not outside that scope: they were 

performing administrative functions at the direction of the Court, and the Complaint does not 

allege actions sufficient to overcome this immunity. The Courthouse Defendants are immune

from liability for the actions taken in furtherance of their respective duties during the Lehigh case. 

Plaintiff’s claims of violation of his civil rights therefore fail as to the Courthouse Defendants. 

//

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3. Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege Specific Facts Showing His Constitutional Rights 

Were Violated

Plaintiff further fails to allege specific facts showing how his constitutional rights were 

violated by the Courthouse Defendants. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be 

proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. See Bell, 550 U.S. at 561. To state a 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal 

Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under 

color of state law. West, 487 U.S. at 48; see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 

(6th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that his constitutional rights have 

been violated, and that a defendant acted with requisite intent or deliberate indifference. See 

Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring more than an allegation of “gross 

negligence” to trigger section 1983). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, 

not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the 

specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

Here, Plaintiff fails to set forth a single specific constitutional right the Courthouse 

Defendants allegedly infringed. Plaintiff simply alleges, without supporting facts, that the 

Courthouse Defendants conspired with the Attorney Defendants “to submit documents that they 

authored [and in which they had] forged federal judge Anthony W. Ishii[’s] name” and “then 

present[ ] these documents to the court as truthful judicial orders,” forged the emails and email 

signatures of Chief District Judge England, and “defraud[ed] the court machinery.” (Compl., pp. 

4; 5; 6; 21.) Plaintiff claims that the Courthouse Defendants violated their oaths of office and 

engaged in unspecified misconduct to both cover up and publish the Attorney Defendants’

forgeries. 

Plaintiff does not allege with any specificity precisely how the Courthouse Defendants

violated any of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, and fails to allege specific constitutional rights he 

contends the Courthouse Defendants violated. Nor does he allege the Courthouse Defendants had 

the requisite intent to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. See Ostrander, 879 F.2d at 588. 

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Therefore, Plaintiff fails to raise a constitutional claim against the Courthouse Defendants as 

required by § 1983. 

Plaintiff also fails to plead the individual elements required for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show “that the conspiring 

parties reached a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the 

minds in an unlawful arrangement” to violate his constitutional rights. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 

693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[M]ere proof of a 

conspiracy is insufficient to establish a section 1983 claim.” Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 

F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir. 1980). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts establishing that the 

various Attorney Defendants and Courthouse Defendants acted in concert with the “common 

design and understanding” to violate his constitutional rights.

Dismissal is proper when the complaint fails to allege either a cognizable legal theory or 

there is an absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Shroyer v. New 

Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). As discussed above, 

Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of his civil rights fails. Accordingly, IT IS 

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint therefore be dismissed for failure to plead a 

cognizable federal claim. 

C. Leave to Amend Should Not Be Granted

Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable federal claim, and no additional set of facts can invoke 

this Court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for damages, for a re-opening of the Lehigh case, 

or for prosecution of the Defendants’ alleged misconduct. 

Plaintiff has filed suit for damages under § 1983, against Defendants who are either not 

state actors and not subject to § 1983 or who are immune from suit, and therefore his Complaint 

must be dismissed. Davenport, 314 Fed. Appx. 982. Although the court would ordinarily grant a 

pro se plaintiff leave to amend, see Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130, it does not appear that the defects of 

the Complaint can be cured by more detailed factual allegations or revision of Plaintiff’s claims. 

Accordingly, leave to amend would be futile and the action should be dismissed with prejudice. 

See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir.1996). 

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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

As stated above, all incidents alleged in the Complaint occurred in this judicial district and 

all Defendants reside in this judicial district, and therefore venue is appropriate in this district. 

Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a cognizable claim for relief for a violation of his 

constitutional rights. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Change of Venue be DENIED and that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice and 

without leave to amend. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 304. Within twenty-eight 

(28) days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these 

findings and recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” The 

district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. See Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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