Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03334/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03334-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CARL E. BIBBS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

HAL WILLIAMS, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 19-cv-03334-PJH 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff 

has filed an amended complaint. 

DISCUSSION 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim 

is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 

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(citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed 

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] 

to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme 

Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

LEGAL CLAIMS 

Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty of several disciplinary 

violations. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 

protects individuals against governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property without 

due process of law. Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause 

may arise from two sources: the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests 

are generally ones pertaining to liberty. Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the 

sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, 

whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 

484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to mental hospital), 

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and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (involuntary administration of 

psychotropic drugs)). Deprivations that are less severe or more closely related to the 

expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a protected liberty 

interest, provided that the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See Sandin, 515 

U.S. at 477-87. An interest of “real substance” will generally be limited to freedom from 

restraint that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life” or “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence.” Id. 

at 484, 487. The placement of an inmate in a highly restrictive housing setting may 

amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest of “real substance” within the meaning of 

Sandin. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005). 

When there is a deprivation of a liberty interest of real substance, the procedural 

protections to which the prisoner is entitled depend on whether the deprivation results 

from a disciplinary decision or an administrative decision. If it is a disciplinary decision, 

the procedural protections required are: written notice, time to prepare for the hearing, a 

written statement of decision, allowance of witnesses and documentary evidence when 

not unduly hazardous, and aid to the accused where the inmate is illiterate or the issues 

are complex. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-67 (1974). The Due Process 

Clause requires only that prisoners be afforded those procedures mandated by Wolff and 

its progeny; it does not require that prisons comply with their own, more generous 

procedures. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419–20 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on 

other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472. A prisoner's right to due process is 

violated “only if he [is] not provided with process sufficient to meet the Wolff standard.” 

Id. at 1420. 

There also must be some reliable evidence to support the disciplinary decision, 

see Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 

704-05 (9th Cir. 1987). “Ascertaining whether [the some evidence] standard is satisfied 

does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the 

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is 

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whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached” by 

the disciplinary hearing officer. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. This standard 

is considerably lower than that applicable in criminal trials. See id. at 456. 

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The appropriate period is 

that of the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. 

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 377-78 (2004). In California, the 

general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the two-year period set 

forth at California Civil Procedure Code § 335.1 and is the applicable statute in § 1983 

actions. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). California Civil 

Procedure Code section 352.1 recognizes imprisonment as a disability that tolls the 

statute of limitations when a person is "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution 

under the sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for life." Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 352.1(a). The tolling is not indefinite, however; the disability of imprisonment 

delays the accrual of the cause of action for a maximum of two years. See id. 

Plaintiff states that he was found guilty of eight separate Rules Violation Reports 

(“RVR”) from 2013 to 2016. For several of the RVRs, plaintiff alleges that there was 

insufficient evidence or certain procedures were not followed. Plaintiff also states that for 

each RVR that was issued he was told by defendant, a correctional lieutenant, to see the 

clerk. Plaintiff repeatedly went to see the clerk who stated that if plaintiff obtained a $200 

cash card, the RVR would not appear on plaintiff’s record. Plaintiff states he does not 

have that kind of money and could never purchase the cash card. At one-point 

defendant stated in response to plaintiff telling him that he did not have $200, “Then I 

guess you will continue to get these write-ups.” 

Plaintiff states that as a result of these RVRs he lost visits, time in the yard and 

dayroom, and telephone calls. Plaintiff also states that he lost good time credits and his 

minimum eligible parole date has changed as a result of the RVRs. Plaintiff fails to 

specifically describe the punishment for each RVR and if each RVR resulted in the loss of 

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good time credits. For relief, plaintiff seeks for the RVRs to be expunged and to receive 

money damages. 

As currently presented, there are several problems with plaintiff’s allegations, and 

the complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information. Plaintiff 

must specifically describe the punishment for each separate RVR he wishes to challenge 

and which RVRs resulted in the loss of good time credits that affected his minimum 

eligible parole date. He may wish to include exhibits or other prison paperwork 

discussing the RVRs and punishments. 

Habeas is the “exclusive remedy” for the prisoner who seeks “‘immediate or 

speedier release’” from confinement. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533-34 (2011) 

(quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)); see Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 

740, 747 (1998); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). “Where the prisoner’s 

claim would not ‘necessarily spell speedier release,’ however, suit may be brought under 

§ 1983.’” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 533-34 (quoting Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82). But a 

challenge to a disciplinary finding that resulted in assessment of time credits must be 

brought in habeas if reinstatement of the time credits would “necessarily spell speedier 

release.” Id. at 525. 

To the extent that plaintiff challenges specific RVRs that resulted in the loss of 

time credits, he must challenge those RVRs in a habeas petition. If plaintiff is successful 

in reversing an RVR, he may then bring a civil rights action to seek money damages.1

 

Plaintiff can perhaps proceed in a civil rights action with respect to an RVR that did not 

result in the loss of time credits but where he suffered an atypical and significant 

hardship. In an amended complaint, plaintiff should specifically describe the punishment 

1 In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction 

or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question 

by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477, 486-487 (1994). 

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from each individual RVR at issue. He should also address if some of the claims are 

untimely in light of the statute of limitations and when some of the RVRs occurred. 

CONCLUSION 

1. The amended complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance

with the standards set forth above. The second amended complaint must be filed no 

later than April 6, 2020, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this 

order and the words SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an 

amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it 

all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th 

Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. 

Failure to file an amended complaint may result in dismissal of this case. 

2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed 

“Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 5, 2020 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

United States District Judge 

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

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