Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05335/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05335-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Tort Action

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and F.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties consented to proceed before a United States

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Magistrate Judge, and by a September 8, 2004 order, this action was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence

J. O’Neill for all further proceedings.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHYLLIS NEWSOME, CASE NO. CV-F-04-5335 LJO

Plaintiff, DECISION ON DEFENDANT’S

ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND

vs. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 23.)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

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Defendant United States of America (“Government”) seeks to dismiss plaintiff Phyllis

Newsome’s (“Ms. Newsome’s”) intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on grounds that his

Court lacks jurisdiction in that the claim is preempted by the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act

(“FECA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101, et seq. Alternatively, the Government seeks summary judgment on

grounds that a settlement agreement bars Ms. Newsome’s intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim and that evidence negates or fails to establish elements of her claim.

Ms. Newsome filed no timely opposition papers, and this Court deemed the Government’s

alternative motions to dismiss and for summary judgment submitted on the pending record and vacated

Case 1:04-cv-05335-NEW Document 27 Filed 04/28/06 Page 1 of 13
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In the absence of Ms. Newsome’s opposition, this Court carefully reviewed and considered the entire record 2

to determine whether the Government’s alternative motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were well supported.

Omission of reference to an argument, document, or paper is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did not consider

the argument, document or paper.

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the May 5, 2006 hearing. For the reasons discussed below, this Court:

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1. GRANTS the Government’s F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motion that this Court lacks jurisdiction

over Ms. Newsome’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim;

2. In the alternative, GRANTS the Government summary judgment on Ms. Newsome’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; and

3. VACATES all pending dates before this Court.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Newsome’s Air Force Employment And Termination

On October 9, 2001, the United States Air Force (“Air Force”) hired Ms. Newsome for a oneyear probationary period to work as a secretary for Lieutenant Colonel Karen Mathews, M.D. (“Dr.

Mathews”), a medical doctor at Edwards Air Force Base. On September 16, 2002, Ms. Newsome was

notified that she would be terminated from her employment, effective September 27, 2002, due to

inability to effectively perform her duties.

On September 23, 2002, Ms. Newsome entered into a settlement agreement with the Air Force

by which she agreed “not to institute a lawsuit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, as amended,

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, under the United States Constitution, under any other state or federal

law, or further pursue this complaint in any forum.” (Bold added.) Under the settlement agreement,

the Air Force permitted Ms. Newsome to continue employment for three months “with no reduction in

grade or salary.” The settlement agreement further provided for Ms. Newsome’s voluntary resignation

and removal of all termination references from her personnel records. The settlement agreement noted

that it “constitutesthe complete understanding between” Ms. Newsome and the Air Force and that “[n]o

other promises or agreements will be binding unless signed by BOTH parties.” (Emphasis in original.)

The settlement agreement stated that it “sets forth the entire agreement between the parties.” The

settlement agreement concluded:

The undersigned acknowledge that each has read the Settlement Agreement in this

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matter. Ms. Newsome specifically states that she has carefully reviewed this Agreement,

understands fully all provisions contained therein, and agrees with and accepts fully and

unconditionally all terms of this Agreement.

Ms. Newsome continued her employment with the Air Force to December 28, 2002.

Ms. Newsome’s Claims

On February 27, 2004, Ms. Newsome filed her complaint in this action to allege a single cause

of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. The complaint is a bit confusing in claiming “[t]his is an action . .

. for negligence and recovery of damages under the jurisdiction” of FTCA. In response to a request for

admission propounded by the Government, Ms. Newsome admitted that her complaint alleges a single

cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under FTCA. The complaint alleges that

during 2002, Dr. Mathews “mentally abused the Plaintiff in her work environment performing duties”

for Dr. Mathews to cause Ms. Newsome to suffer “severe and extreme emotional distress.”

Ms. Newsome claims that she suffered emotional distress because Dr. Mathews:

1. Was abusive and angry by raising her voice, using a military tone, storming out of the

room, telling Ms. Newsome that Ms. Newsome needed to shape up, and throwing up her

hands;

2. Required Ms. Newsome to write performance evaluations for military personnel as

opposed to simply editing and proofreading them;

3. Required Ms. Newsome to drive Dr. Mathews in Ms. Newsome’s vehicle around

Edwards Air Force Base;

4. Telephoned Ms. Newsome at home several times per week regarding work-related

questions; and

5. Agreed with other supervisors who criticized Ms. Newsome’s work performance.

Ms. Newsome claims the physical manifestation of her emotional distress comprises hypertension,

headaches and stomach pain requiring medication and feelings of heart attacks. Ms. Newsome claims

no further physical ailments arising from emotional distress. Ms. Newsome attributes Dr. Mathews as

the sole source of emotional distress arising from her Air Force employment.

/ / / 

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THE GOVERNMENT’S F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS

FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) Standards

The Government contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction in that FECA preempts Ms.

Newsome’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Government contends the complaint

should be dismissed under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) which allows a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. 

Fundamentally, federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 341 (1994). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular

case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F. 2d 1221,

1225 (9 Cir. 1989). Limits on federal jurisdiction must neither be disregarded nor evaded. Owen th

Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (1978). A plaintiff bears the

burden to establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396.

This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient allegations to show a proper basis

for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over an action. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance

Corp., 298 U.S 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780 (1936); F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1).

The United States Supreme Court in Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459, 46 S.Ct. 338

(1926) explained:

A plaintiff suing in a federal court must show in his pleading, affirmatively and

distinctly, the existence of whateveris essential to federal jurisdiction, and, if he does not

do so, the court, on having the defect called to its attention or on discovering the same,

must dismiss the case unless the defect be corrected by amendment.

When a defendant challenges jurisdiction “facially,” all material allegations in the complaint are

assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the

face of the pleading. Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Telephone Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9

th

Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3 Cir. 1977); Cervantez v.

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Sullivan, 719 F.Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F.2d 229 (9 Cir. 1992). th

A defendant may also attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction apart from the pleadings.

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. In such a case, a court may rely on evidence extrinsic to the pleadings and

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resolve factual disputes relating to jurisdiction. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9 Cir.), th

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 541 (1989); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9 Cir. th

1987); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir. 1983). th

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to the merits of the Government’s F.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.

FECA Applicability

The Government argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Ms. Newsome’s

claim “is colorably covered by FECA,” which compensates federal employees for injuries sustained

during performance of their duties. To support its position, the Government cites to 5 U.S.C. § 8102,

which requires compensation under requisite circumstances:

(a) The United States shall pay compensation as specified by this subchapter for the

disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the

performance of his duty, unless the injury or death is--

(1) caused by willful misconduct of the employee;

(2) caused by the employee's intention to bring about the injury or death of himself or of

another; or

(3) proximately caused by the intoxication of the injured employee.

As a federal employee, Ms. Newsome was subject to FECA. See 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1)(A) (definition of

employee). When FECA applies, a federal employee must apply to the Secretary of Labor to pursue a

claim. 5 U.S.C. § 8145.

FECA’s exclusivity provision bars FTCA recovery:

The liability of the United States . . . with respect to the injury or death of an employee

is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States . . . to the employee . .

. in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under

a workmen's compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute.

5 U.S.C. § 8116(c).

“The remedies provided under FECA are exclusive of all other remedies against the United States for

job-related injury or death.” Figueroa v. United States, 7 F.3d 1405, 1407 (9 Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

th

511 U.S. 1030, 114 S.Ct. 1537 (1994); see Moe v. United States, 326 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9 Cir. 2003) th

(“if compensation is available under FECA, all other statutory remedies for claims arising under the

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same facts are preempted.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 877, 124 S.Ct. 281(2003). “If a plaintiff has a

colorable claim under FECA, the federal courts should dismiss any action arising under the same facts

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Moe, 326 F.3d at 1068. “A plaintiff need only allege a colorable

claim under FECA for our courts to lose jurisdiction over an FTCA action.” Moe, 326 F.3d at 1068.

Application of FECA raises issues whether: (1) the injury is within FECA’s scope; and (2) the

plaintiff is entitled to compensation “under the facts of her case.” Moe, 326 F.3d at 1068. Federal courts

must determine as a question of jurisdiction whether an injury is within FECA’s scope, that is, if an

injury is the “type” covered by FECA. Moe, 326 F.3d at 1068. FECA covers “emotional distress when

it results from physical injuries that FECA covers” as well as “psychological injuries when accompanied

by physical injuries, regardless of the order in which they occur.” Moe, 326 F.3d at 1069; see Figueroa,

7 F.3d at 1408 (emotional distress may be a disability when it arises from an employee’s emotional

reaction to an employment imposed requirement).

As noted by the Government, Ms. Newsome contends that her workplace emotional distress

manifested in hypertension, headaches and stomach pains requiring medication and feelings of heart

attacks. See Moe, 326 F.3d at 1069 (FECA preempted FTCA action where post-traumatic stress disorder

aggravated federal employee’s colitis). The record establishes that Ms. Newsome’s alleged

psychological injuries were accompanied by physical symptoms to fall within FECA’s scope.

The second issue whetherMs. Newsome is entitled to compensation “under the facts of her case”

requires determination whether injury occurred when “the employee was on the job.” Figueroa, 7 F.3d

at 1407. Such question “involves a question of ‘coverage in and of itself,’ and must be presented to the

Secretary [of Labor] for initial determination.” Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1174 (9 Cir. th

1990).

The Government points out Ms. Newsome’s alleged injury arose from her Air Force

employment. See Figueroa, 7 F.3d at 1408 (district court properly dismissed FTCA claim for stress

from exposure to possible cancer causing chemicals). The Government concludes that Ms. Newsome

has a colorable FECA claim which should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The

Government is correct. Ms. Newsome’s alleged injuries arose from and are directly tied to her Air Force

employment to render her claim colorably covered by FECA and to defeat this Court’s subject matter

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jurisdiction.

Although FECA precludes this Court’s jurisdiction, this Court will address the Government’s

alternative summary judgment motion.

THE GOVERNMENT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

As an alternative to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the Government seeks summary judgment

on grounds that the settlement agreement bars Ms. Newsome’s claim and that the evidence negates or

fails to establish elements of her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

Summary Judgment Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 56(b) permits a party against whom a claim is asserted to seek “summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists

no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

F.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348,

1356 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9 Cir. 1987). th

The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348;

International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9 Cir. 1985). th

On summary judgment, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material

fact,” not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of contested matters. F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Covey v.

Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9 Cir. 1997); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 th

U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct.

486 (1962); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9 Cir. 1984). th

To carry its burden of production on summary judgment, a moving party “must either produce evidence

negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion

at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000); th

see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9 Cir. 1990). “[T]o th

carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that

there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

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at 574. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry

of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 

“If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no

obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-1103; See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598.

“If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce

evidence to support its claim or defense.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

at 574. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make the showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no ‘genuine

issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”) 

F.R.Civ.P. 56(e) requires a party opposing summary judgment to “set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” “In the absence of specific facts, as opposed to

allegations, showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial, a properly supported summary judgment

motion will be granted.” Nilsson, Robbins, et al. v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9 Cir. th

1988). When a summary judgment motion is unopposed, a court must “determine whether summary

judgment is appropriate – that is, whether the moving party has shown itself to be entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Anchorage Associates v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3 Cir. 1990). rd

A court “cannot base the entry ofsummary judgment on the mere fact that the motion is unopposed, but,

rather must consider the merits of the motion.” United States v. One Piece of Real Property, etc., 363

F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). A court “need not sua sponte review all of the evidentiary materials th

on file at the time the motion is granted, but must ensure that the motion itself is supported by

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evidentiary materials.” One Piece of Real Property, 363 F.3d at 1101.

As discussed below, the Government’s summary judgment motion is well supported, and the

Government has met its summary judgment burden to demonstrate that the settlement agreement bars

Ms. Newsome’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and that evidence negates or fails to

prove essential elements of Ms. Newsome’s claim.

Applicability Of State Law To FTCA Liability

The Government argues that California law applies to Ms. Newsome’s intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim brought under the FTCA.

An action can be brought against the Government only to the extent that it waives its sovereign

immunity. Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1429 (9 Cir. 1996); Valdez v. United States, 56 th

F.3d 1177, 1179 (9 Cir. 1995). The FTCA waives the Government’s sovereign immunity to a suit for th

personal injuries caused by an “employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office

or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the

claimant in accordance with the law of place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. §

1346(b)(1); Washington v. United States, 868 F.2d 332, 333 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992, 110 th

S.Ct. 539 (1989); see 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 

“The FTCA specifies that the liability of the United States is to be determined ‘in accordance

with the law of the place where the [allegedly tortious] act or omission occurred.’” Rhoden v. United

States, 55 F.3d 428, 430 (9 Cir. 1995) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).); see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. th

14, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1474 (1980) (“an action under FTCA exists only if the State in which the alleged

misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct to go forward”). Under the

FTCA, state law “applies not only as to the creation of liability but also as to release from liability.” Kee

v. United States, 168 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9 Cir. 1999); Air Transp. Assoc. v. United States, 221 F.2d 467, th

471 (9 Cir. 1955). th

Release

The Government contends that with the settlement agreement, Ms. Newsome released the

Government of liability to bar her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

"It is the policy of the law to discourage litigation and to favor compromise and voluntary

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settlements of doubtful rights and controversies, made either in or out of court." Central Basin etc. Wat.

Dist. v. Fossette, 235 Cal.App.2d 689, 705, 45 Cal.Rptr. 651 (1965); see also Stroman v. West Coast

Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 460-461 (9 Cir. 1989) (public policy favors settlement of employment th

claims), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854, 111 S.Ct. 151 (1990). 

California Civil Code section 1541 provides: “An obligation is extinguished by a release

therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor, upon a new consideration, or in writing, with or without

new consideration.” Generally, “a written release extinguishes any obligation covered by the release’s

terms, provided it has not been obtained by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress or undue

influence.” Skrbina v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 (1996)

(general release of employment law claims included discrimination claims); Pampillonia v. RJR

Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2 Cir. 1998)(“Accordingly, we hold that the release is unambiguous,

nd

was knowingly and voluntarily entered into, and therefore bars the plaintiff from bringing the present

action.”); Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Cty. Soil & Water Conserv., 133 F.3d 816, 819 (11 Cir. 1998) (“an th

employee can waive his ‘cause of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement agreement’ if

‘the employee’s consent to the settlement was voluntary and knowing.’”)

The Government points out that pursuant to the settlement agreement, Ms. Newsome agreed not

to pursue litigation, and the Air Force permitted Ms. Newsome to continue her employment through

December 28, 2002 with no reduction in grade or salary, and to voluntarily resign so she could pursue

other federal employment. Ms. Newsome signed the settlement agreement to acknowledge that she

carefully reviewed, understood and accepted “all terms.” The evidence is clear that the settlement

agreement extinguished Ms. Newsome’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Nothing

suggests the settlement agreement was obtained by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress or undue

influence, especially given that Ms. Newsome was allowed to continue her employment beyond the oneyear probationary period and that her termination was treated as a voluntary resignation. The settlement

agreement bars Ms. Newsome’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 

Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress Elements

The Government further contends that the evidence fails to establish elements of Ms. Newsome’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

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The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1)

defendant’s outrageous conduct; (2) defendant’s intention to cause, or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress;

and (4) an actual and proximate causal link between the tortious (outrageous) conduct and the emotional

distress. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal.3d 278, 300, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 110

(1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1644 (1989);Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43

Cal.3d 148, 155, n. 7, 233 Cal.Rptr. 308 (1987). The “[c]onduct to be outrageous must be so extreme

as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Davidson v. City of

Westminister, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 (1982) (quoting Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24

Cal.3d 579, 593, 156 Cal.Rptr.198 (1979)). Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it is of a nature

which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress. Liability does not extend to

mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Fisher v. San Pedro

Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 617, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842, 857 (1989).

There is no clearly defined standard to judge whether conduct is outrageous for purposes of the

tort:

Manifestly, the standard for judging outrageous conduct does not provide a “bright line”

rigidly separating that which is actionable from that which is not. Indeed, it generally

hazards a case-by-case appraisal of conduct filtered through the prism of the appraiser’s

values, sensitivity threshold, and standards of civility. The process evoked by the test

appears to be more intuitive than analytical . . . 

Yurick v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1128, 257 Cal.Rptr. 665 (1989).

While the outrageousness of a defendant’s conduct normally presents an issue of fact to be

determined by the trier of fact, the court may determine in the first instance whether the defendant’s

conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Trerice v. Blue

Cross of California, 209 Cal.App.3d878, 883, 257 Cal.Rptr. 338, 340 (1989); Fowler v. Varian

Associates, Inc., 196 Cal.App.3d 34, 44, 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 (1989).

The Government contends that the conduct of which Ms. Newsome complains “was not extreme

and outrageous as a matter of law” in that Ms. Newsome simply claims Dr. Mathews:

1. Was abusive and angry by raising her voice, using a military tone, storming out of the

room, telling Ms. Newsome that Ms. Newsome needed to shape up, and throwing up her

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hands;

2. Required Ms. Newsome to write performance evaluations for military personnel as

opposed to simply editing and proofreading them;

3. Required Ms. Newsome to drive Dr. Mathews in Ms. Newsome’s vehicle around

Edwards Air Force Base;

4. Telephoned Ms. Newsome at home several times per week regarding work-related

questions; and

5. Agreed with other supervisors who criticized Ms. Newsome’s work performance.

The Government further contends that the evidence fails to establish Dr. Mathew’s intentional

or reckless conduct calculated to cause Ms. Newsome serious mental distress. “Intentional infliction of

emotional distress requires conduct which is especially calculated to cause and does cause the claimant

mental distress of a very serious nature.” Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal.App. 3d 1269, 1273, 237 Cal.Rptr.

873(1987) (“The fact that defendants' conduct had not been especially calculated to cause plaintiffs'

distress was fatal to their claim.”). 

According to the Government, Ms. Newsome fails to demonstrate that she suffered severe or

extreme emotional distress in that her distress is limited to hypertension, headaches, stomach pains and

feelings of heart attacks. “Severe emotional distress means, then, emotional distress of such substantial

quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure

it.” Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397, 89 Cal.Rptr. 78 (1970).

The record negates and fails to support elements of Ms. Newsome’s intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim. Dr. Mathews’ conduct cannot be characterized as unreasonably intolerable and

demonstrates a supervisor’s frustration with a subordinate’s job performance, not outrageousness. The

conduct of which Ms. Newsome attributes to Dr. Mathews fails to demonstrate an intent or reckless

disregard of probability to cause emotional distress or Ms. Newsome’s alleged physical symptoms.

Although plaintiff claimed to suffer hypertension, headaches, stomach pains and heart attack feelings,

such symptoms fail to substantiate severe or extreme emotional distress and suggest that they may be

associated with matters outside of Ms. Newsome’s Air Force employment. The Government has meet

its burden to demonstrate it is entitled to summary judgment.

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. GRANTS defendant United States of America’s F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motion that this

Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff Phyllis Newsome’s intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim;

2. In the alternative, GRANTS defendant United States of America summary judgment on

plaintiff Phyllis Newsome’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim;

3. DIRECTS this Court’s clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendant United States of

America and against plaintiff Phyllis Newsome and to close this action; and

4. VACATES the May 25, 2006 settlement conference, June 15, 2006 pretrial conference

and July 25, 2006 trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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