Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00319/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00319-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH NORDBY and DONNA NORDBY, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 2:10-cv-00319

 )

v. ) ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING

) PLAINTIFFS’ STATE CLAIMS

WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE dba )

PREMIERE ASSET SERVICES, BANK OF )

AMERICA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as )

Trustee for Morgan Stanley Loan )

Trust 2006-3 AR, NDEX WEST, LLC, ) 

PINNACLE REAL ESTATE GROUP OF LAKE ) 

TAHOE, INC., a California )

corporation, RONALD WALKER, an ) 

individual, DOES 1 through 50, ) 

inclusive, and all other persons )

unknown claiming any right, title, ) 

estate, lien or interest in the ) 

real property described herein, )

 )

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiffs move to remand this case to the El Dorado County

Superior Court in California, arguing removal was improper, inter

alia, because it was based on non-existent federal question

jurisdiction. (Mot. 2:22.) The removant Defendant Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) argues in its Notice of Removal that removal was

based on “the Third Cause of Action” in Plaintiffs’ “Complaint

 . . . [which is] based upon alleged violations of 15 U.S.C.

§1641(f)(2) and 15 U.S.C. § 1640[,] commonly [known as] the Truth in

Case 2:10-cv-00319-GEB-DAD Document 19 Filed 04/16/10 Page 1 of 5
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Lending Act (“TILA”).” (Not. of Removal at 2.) Plaintiffs allege in

this claim: “No named Defendant has ever voluntarily produced the

information required by 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2),” and therefore

Defendants are liable under TILA for “statutory damages in the amount

of $4,000, attorney fees and costs of suit.” (Compl. ¶¶ 24-

29)(emphasis added.) 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2) prescribes in pertinent

part: A servicer of a consumer [,]. . . [u]pon written request by the

obligor, . . . shall provide the obligor, to the best knowledge of the

servicer, with the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of

the obligation or the master servicer of the obligation.” (emphasis

added.) It is unclear whether Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo is a

“servicer” under § 1641(f)(2). However, even if Wells Fargo is a

“servicer” under § 1641(f)(2), this statutory provision does not

prescribe that Wells Fargo was obligated to voluntarily provide the

referenced information to Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs allege; Wells Fargo

was only required to provide the information upon Plaintiffs’ written

request. Since Plaintiffs do not allege they made a written request

for the information, Plaintiffs have failed to provide “[f]actual

allegations . . . enough to raise [their] right to relief [under this

TILA provision] above the speculative level . . .” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Therefore, Plaintiffs’

third cause of action is dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim for which relief may

be granted. See Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991

(9th Cir.1987)(“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) . . . . Such dismissal may be made without

notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.”). 

Plaintiffs have ten days from the date on which this 

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order is filed to file an amended complaint, solely for purposes of

amending their TILA claim; the state claims will be remanded, as

explained below. If Plaintiffs fail to file an amended compliant

within this ten day period, that failure could be construed as

Plaintiffs’ abandonment of their pled TILA claim, and this claim could

then be dismissed with prejudice and this action closed. 

The issue of whether supplemental jurisdiction should

continue being exercised over Plaintiffs' pendent state claims is

examined sua sponte. “[P]endent [or supplemental] jurisdiction is a

doctrine of discretion, not of [a party’s] right.” United Mine

Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). District courts

have discretion to sua sponte “decid[e] whether to decline, or to

retain, supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when any

factor in [28 U.S.C.§ 1367(c)] is implicated . . . ” Acri v. Varian

Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). “While

discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state

law claims is triggered by the presence of one of the conditions in §

1367(c), it is informed by the Gibbs values “of economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity.” Id. 

A district court can decline exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over a pendent state claim if “the claim substantially

predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court

has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Although a

“federal court[] [has] wide latitude to decide ancillary questions of

state law[,] [this] does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant's

effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a state law case. 

Once it appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a

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case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim

may fairly be dismissed.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727.

Plaintiffs allege the following state claims: trespass,

conversion, set aside trustee’s sale, cancel trustee’s deed, and quiet

title. Plaintiffs allege in their state claims that Defendants

illegally broke into their home, had the door locks changed, converted

Plaintiffs’ home and furnishings, and unlawfully sold Plaintiffs’ home

at a trustee’s sale. Plaintiffs seek to cancel the trustee’s deed and

to quiet title against all Defendants. Further, Plaintiffs seek

unspecified compensatory and punitive damages and a declaration that

defendants have no rights, title nor interest in Plaintiffs’ real

property. Plaintiffs claim entitlement to punitive damages in their

trespass and conversion claims based on, inter alia, “Defendants’

unlawful entry onto plaintiffs’ property and interference with

plaintiffs’ rights of ownership and possession [, and] unlawful[]

conver[sion] [of] plaintiffs’ property . . . to defendants’ own use by

asserting dominion and control over property to which they do not hold

ownership or possessory rights.” (Compl.¶ 19.) In contrast,

Plaintiffs’ TILA claim simply concerns the allegation that Defendants

failed to produce the following information required by 15 U.S.C.

§1641(f)(2): “the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of

the obligation or the master servicer of the obligation.” Plaintiffs

also request in this TILA claim $4,000 in statutory damages, attorney

fees and costs of suit. 

 Plaintiffs’ state claims substantially predominate over

Plaintiffs’ TILA claim. It is evident that the state issues are more

complex and will take more time to resolve. Where “the state issues

substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of

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the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought,

the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for

resolution to state tribunals.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. 

 The principle of comity weighs in favor of remanding

Plaintiffs’ state claims. A federal court should avoid making

“needless decisions of state law,” and comity is promoted by

recognition that state courts have the primary responsibility for

developing and applying state law. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. 

Further, judicial economy will be promoted by remanding Plaintiffs’

state claims. This case was just removed on February 5, 2010, and the

remand order would issue about two months after removal. 

Since Plaintiffs’ state claims substantially predominate

over their sole federal TILA claim and principles of comity and

judicial economy weigh in favor of remanding Plaintiffs’ state claims

to the state court from which they were removed, Plaintiffs’ state

claims are remanded to the El Dorado County Superior Court in

California.

Dated: April 16, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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