Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00575/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00575-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR OCHOA,

Petitioner,

v.

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00575-DAD-SAB-HC

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER LEAVE 

TO FILE A MOTION TO AMEND THE 

PETITION AND NAME A PROPER 

RESPONDENT

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petitioner is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254.

I.

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires preliminary review of a 

habeas petition and allows a district court to dismiss a petition before the respondent is ordered 

to file a response, if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”

A. Leave to Amend Petition to Name a Proper Respondent

In this case, Petitioner names “Federal District Courts” as the Respondent. It is 

insufficient to name “Federal District Courts” as the Respondent. A petitioner seeking habeas 

corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must name the state officer having custody of him as the 

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respondent to the petition. Rule 2(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; Ortiz-Sandoval v. 

Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996); Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 

(9th Cir. 1994). Normally, the person having custody of an incarcerated petitioner is the warden 

of the prison in which the petitioner is incarcerated. Smith v. Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 355 (9th Cir. 

2004); Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360. However, the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions is 

also appropriate. Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 894; Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360.

Petitioner‟s failure to name a proper respondent requires dismissal of his habeas petition 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360. However, the Court will give Petitioner 

the opportunity to cure this defect by amending the petition to name a proper respondent, such as 

the warden of his facility or the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions. See Dubrin v. 

California, 720 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2013) (petitioner should be granted leave to amend 

petition to name proper respondent). In the interests of judicial economy, Petitioner need not file 

an amended petition. Instead, Petitioner may file a motion entitled “Motion to Amend the 

Petition to Name a Proper Respondent” wherein Petitioner may name the proper respondent in 

this action.

B. Exhaustion

Also, it appears that Petitioner may have failed to exhaust his claims in the instant 

petition. A petitioner in state custody who is proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based 

on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state‟s 

alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. 

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by 

providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before 

presenting it to the federal court. O‟Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). 

Here, it is unclear whether Petitioner raised his claims before the California Supreme 

Court. If Petitioner has not sought relief in the California Supreme Court, the Court cannot 

proceed to the merits of those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). It is possible, however, that 

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Petitioner has presented all of his claims to the California Supreme Court and failed to indicate 

this to the Court. Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court whether each of his claims has been 

presented to the California Supreme Court, and if possible, provide the Court with a copy of the 

petition filed in the California Supreme Court that includes the claims now presented and a file 

stamp showing that the petition was indeed filed in the California Supreme Court.

C. Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of 

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). As the instant petition was filed 

on April 25, 2016, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a 

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner‟s direct 

review became final. In this case, it is unclear when direct review became final. The petition only 

states that Petitioner was convicted on January 29, 2009, and appealed to the California Court of 

Appeals, Fifth Appellate District. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 3).1Petitioner had one year from the 

conclusion of direct review, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ 

of habeas corpus. Despite the lack of pertinent information, it appears that Petitioner may have 

filed the instant petition beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations since Petitioner 

explains that his “delay in claimed grounds for relief” was due to not having “new evidence.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 3). Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court of the following: (1) when the 

California Court of Appeals issued its decision on his direct appeal; (2) whether Petitioner sought 

relief in the California Supreme Court; and (3) if so, when the California Supreme Court issued 

its decision. 

1. Statutory Tolling Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Section 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application for 

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year limitation period. Petitioner states that he 

currently has a state habeas corpus petition “in process seeking relief through SB 261 bill.” (ECF 

No. 1 at 4). If the limitations period had already expired at the time the state collateral challenge 

was filed, the collateral challenge has no tolling consequences. See Green v. White, 223 F.3d 

1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000). Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court of when he filed this state 

habeas corpus petition. Petitioner also must inform the Court if he filed any other state habeas 

corpus petitions, when they were filed, and the date of the state court‟s decisions on those 

petitions.

2. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period also is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates 

“„(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way‟ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

 

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Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Petitioner bears the burden 

of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Id.; Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner argues that

his delay in filing the instant federal petition was due to not having new evidence. However, 

Petitioner does not explain how not having new evidence prevented him from timely filing. 

Petitioner also does not demonstrate that he has been pursuing his rights diligently.

II.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner is GRANTED THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this order in 

which to file a motion to amend the petition to name a proper respondent;

2. Petitioner is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within THIRTY (30) days from the date 

of service of this order why the petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust 

state remedies; and

3. Petitioner is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within THIRTY (30) days from the date 

of service of this order why the petition should not be dismissed for violating the 

limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order will result in dismissal of the 

petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (a petitioner‟s failure to prosecute or 

to comply with a court order may result in a dismissal of the action). Failure to amend the 

petition and state a proper respondent will result in the petition being dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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