Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04425/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04425-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUBERT STIMSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-04425-JCS 

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos., 17, 21

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Hubert Stimson seeks review of the final decision of Defendant Carolyn W. 

Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (the ―Commissioner‖), denying his applications

for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the

Social Security Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Stimson‘s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, DENIES the Commissioner‘s Motion for Summary Judgment, and 

REMANDS Stimson‘s claim to the Commissioner for a calculation and award of benefits 

consistent with this Order.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On March 31, 2011, Stimson applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

security income, alleging that he had been disabled since January 1, 2009 due to lower back and 

knee problems as well as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (―COPD‖) and emphysema. 

Administrative Record (―AR‖) 190, 223. The Social Security Administration denied Stimson‘s 

claim on July 14, 2011. Id. at 65–66. On reconsideration, Stimson further alleged high levels of 

 

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The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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stress and anxiety. Id. at 253–54. The Social Security Administration affirmed the denial on 

February 2, 2012. Id. at 67–68. On March 29, 2012, Stimson requested a hearing before an 

administrative law judge. Id. at 109–11. Administrative Law Judge Timothy Terrill held a brief 

hearing on November 27, 2012, at which Stimson did not have proper identification. Id. at 12,

56–59. The case was reassigned to Administrative Law Judge Amita Tracy (the ―ALJ‖), who held 

a hearing on May 7, 2013. Id. at 31. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on May 24, 2013, 

finding Stimson not disabled. Id. at 9–23. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council 

denied Stimson‘s request for review on July 29, 2014, finding no reason to review the ALJ‘s 

decision. Id. at 1-3. 

Stimson filed this action on October 2, 2014 under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), 

which give the Court jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Commissioner. Compl. (dkt. 

1). The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Pl.‘s Mot. (dkt. 17); Comm‘r‘s Mot. 

(dkt. 21). 

B. Stimson’s Background

1. Personal and Employment History

Stimson was 53 years old as of January 1, 2009, the alleged onset date of his disability. 

AR 69. Stimson graduated from high school in 1973 and served in the U.S. Coast Guard from 

1976 to 1980. Id. at 224, 240. According to his Work History Report, Stimson worked as a 

shipping coordinator for Autodesk, Inc. from 1993 to 1996, as an export administrator at 

Advanced Fiber/Telelabs Communication from 1996 to 2005, as a manager at a Christmas store 

from 2006 to 2007, and on and off as a part-time handyman from 2008 to February 2011. Id. at 

34, 45, 237–40.

2. Medical History

The Administrative Record contains no medical evidence prior to February 2011 or after 

September 2012. Stimson did not see a doctor until February 9, 2011, when he began treatment at 

the San Francisco Veteran Medical Center. AR 53–54, 306.

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a. Chronic Pain from Lower Back and Knee

In March 2011, medical tests diagnosed Stimson‘s lower back with moderate multilevel 

degenerative disc disease with disc space narrowing and osteophytosis, moderate facet sclerosis, 

and arthritis without obvious significant nerve compression. AR 320, 381. Further, a 

neurosurgeon indicated in November 2011 that Stimson most likely also suffers from lumbar 

radiculopathy and potentially an L4 nerve root impingement. Id. at 270. 

Bilateral knee imaging from March and November 2011 revealed only minimal problems 

with Stimson‘s right knee, although medical notes from November 2011 indicate increasingly 

frequent swelling and buckling as well as sharp localized pain in the medial and lateral joints. Id.

at 344, 707. Stimson underwent physical therapy for his right knee from October to November

2011. Id. at 508. A knee MRI from December 2011 revealed no evidence of knee problems. Id.

at 677. 

Dr. Frank Chen examined Stimson in June 2011. Id. at 350–51. Dr. Chen‘s report 

indicates negative examinations for chronic low back pain, chronic pain of both knees, and 

shortness of breath on exertion. Id. at 351. He also determined that Stimson had ―no functional 

limitations on a medical basis.‖ Id. 

In July 2011, a state agency medical consultant reviewed Stimson‘s medical record and 

provided a physical residual capacity assessment. Id. 60–64. The consultant reported that 

Stimson could lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, sit for six hours 

and stand or walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday, and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, 

crouch, crawl, and climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Id. at 61, 352–53. The 

consultant opined that Stimson seemed capable of medium work. Id. at 353. In January 2012, 

another state agency medical consultant reported essentially identical findings, but differed in 

finding that Stimson could frequently—as opposed to merely occasionally—balance, stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl. Id. at 87, 91–92, 548–49. The second consultant expressly indicated that great 

weight was assigned to Dr. Chen‘s June 2011 opinion. Id. at 90.

In April 2012, Stimson‘s treating physician Dr. Sabina Hoque from the Veteran Medical 

Center provided a detailed assessment of Stimson‘s functional limitations, in the form of a 

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questionnaire. Id. at 562–65. Dr. Hoque indicated that Stimson could sit for only 20 minutes at 

one time and only two hours total in an eight-hour work day or stand for more than two hours at 

one time but only four hours total in an eight-hour work day, that Stimson would need to walk for 

ten minutes every ninety minutes during a workday, that Stimson will need to take unscheduled 

breaks during a workday approximately every one to two hours for fifteen minutes, that Stimson 

could lift and carry twenty pounds rarely and ten pounds occasionally, that Stimson would likely 

be absent from work about two days per month due to impairments or treatment, and that Stimson 

could never stoop or crouch, can rarely climb ladders or stairs, and can occasionally twist his 

body. Id. Although Dr. Hoque did not provide specific evidence in support of each assessment, 

she indicated that Stimson was diagnosed with lumbar radiculopathy and knee arthralgis, with

clinical findings and objective signs of positive straight leg raise test and tenderness along medial 

joint line with positive patellar grind. Id. at 562. She also reported that Stimson‘s treatment 

included injections and physical therapy. Id. Dr. Hoque further indicated that Stimson‘s 

impairments were reasonably consistent with his symptoms and functional limitations, id. at 563, 

and noted that the earliest date that her opinion applied to was September 23, 2011, id. at 565. 

In July 2012, Stimson underwent surgery on his right knee, including arthroscopy and 

debridement partial meniscectomy procedures. Id. at 693. The post-operation notes indicate that

Stimson suffered from chondromalacia and torn meniscus in his right knee. Id. The report also 

indicates that the level of function in Stimson‘s right knee prior to surgery was ―progressive 

debility [due to right] knee pain.‖ Id. Stimson was prescribed a cane after the surgery. Id. at 686. 

A medical report from August 2012 indicates that Stimson was ―[a]lready feeling better after his 

surgery‖ though he still had ―intermittent discomfort‖ and was taking ibuprofen occasionally. Id.

at 721. Stimson deferred additional clinic appointments and discontinued post-surgery physical 

therapy in September 2012. Id. at 720.

b. Mental Health

Although the medical records from the Veteran Medical Center indicate potential anxiety 

and depression, the Veteran Medical Center does not appear to have evaluated Stimson for those 

impairments. In January 2012, psychological assistant Deborah von Bolschwing, Ph.D., of Health 

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Analysis, Inc. examined Stimson. Id. at 529–31. In her report, Dr. von Bolschwing assessed that 

Stimson had no psychological disorders. Id. at 530. Dr. von Bolschwing is a ―Registered 

Psychological Assistant‖ and her report was signed by her supervising psychologist Dr. Paul 

Martin. Id. at 531. In February 2012, a state agency psychological consultant reviewed the 

medical record and concluded that Stimson‘s mental impairments were non-severe. Id. at 88–89. 

In reviewing the record, the consultant assigned great weight to Dr. von Bolschwing‘s opinion. Id.

at 90.

c. Other

The Administrative Record indicates that Stimson‘s impairments also included COPD,

obesity, and high blood pressure. Id. at 15, 413, 479, 756. Stimson has not, however, pursued 

those afflictions as a basis for disability in his present Motion. 

C. Administrative Hearing

1. Stimson’s Testimony

The ALJ began her examination of Stimson with questions regarding his housing and 

income. AR 33–35. Stimson explained that he was divorced and had two adult children, that he 

lived in a house together with the owner, that he currently did not have a source of income, and 

that he had not received any unemployment benefits or worker‘s compensation since January 

2009. Id. When asked about his driver‘s license, Stimson explained that he sold his vehicles and 

let the license expire because ―[i]t was getting painful to drive.‖ Id. at 35. He further explained 

that he lives close to and walks to stores, and that he arranges a ride with a friend when he needs 

go somewhere further from home. Id. 

When the ALJ asked about his military service, Stimson explained that he served in the 

Coast Guard for four years, that he did deck duties during his service, and that he had not applied 

for VA disability benefits because his benefits had ―lapsed.‖ Id. at 40. 

Stimson stated that he can no longer work because of the pain in his lower back which 

―radiates down the back of [his] legs and [his] knees.‖ Id. at 39. Stimson testified that he is in 

pain ―[p]retty much all the time‖ and that lying down helps to relieve the pain. Id. He further 

stated that he takes medication for COPD and high blood pressure as well as ibuprofen for his 

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chronic pain. Id. at 39–40. Stimson testified that the medications are effective with the exception 

of ibuprofen which was ―not doing much good anymore.‖ Id. at 40. When the ALJ asked about 

stronger pain medications, Stimson explained that he missed his appointment for such medications

and had not made another appointment. Id. at 39. 

Stimson testified that he had surgery on his right knee, that the surgery did not improve his 

chronic pain, and that he was a candidate for surgery for his back and for his knees. Id. at 40–41. 

Stimson then explained that injections and physical therapy also did not help to relieve his chronic 

pain, that he wears a brace consistently on his right knee, that he had been using a prescribed cane 

for over a year. Id. at 41–42. Stimson denied any mental health issues. Id. at 42. 

In regards to his exertional limitations, Stimson testified that he could sit for about 30 

minutes at a time, stand for about one to two hours, and walk for about 30 minutes at a time. Id. at 

43, 46. When the ALJ asked about his daily routine, Stimson explained that he ―take[s] care of 

anything personal that needs to be tidied up around the house,‖ that he ―take[s] a walk if the 

weather lets [him] outside,‖ that he occasionally cooks and cleans the kitchen, that he does laundry 

once a week, and that he does grocery shopping from a store two blocks away and ―get[s] small 

amounts of things at a time.‖ Id. at 43. 

In discussing his past employment, Stimson explained that he had worked as an export 

administrator for about ten years. Id. at 37, 44. His duties included inspecting and packaging 

products as well as completing paperwork for shipping. Id. He testified that this job involved 

frequently lifting packages between 30 to 60 pounds and that the heaviest weight he had to lift was 

about 100 pounds. Id. Stimson further explained that he had worked as a manager at a Christmas 

store from 2006 to 2007. Id. at 36–37, 46–47. His duties included receiving and stocking new 

shipments, training part-time workers, and verifying time cards on a computer. Id. He testified 

that this job involved lifting weights of 20 to 30 pounds. Id. at 47. 

Stimson testified that he stopped working in 2007 because he left to go to Indiana when his 

brother passed away. Id. at 36, 44. He explained that when he returned to California in 2008, his 

physical condition ―had some weight‖ in his decision to not return to his former employers or 

occupation. Id. at 44–45. Stimson also testified that on and off from early 2008 to February 2011, 

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he worked part-time as a handyman for a friend, removing carpet pads and cleaning floors for new 

floor installations. Id. at 34, 45. He stated that he worked about 12 to 20 hours per week, making 

less than $200 per week. Id. Stimson also stated that since January 2009, he had ―never really 

applied for‖ work other than part-time and that he had not done any volunteer work. Id. at 36. 

2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

The ALJ called a vocational expert, Kathleen McApline (the ―VE‖), to testify at the 

hearing. AR 47–53. The VE summarized Stimson‘s past work as ―construction worker II, very 

heavy, unskilled,‖ ―inventory, medium, unskilled,‖ ―materials handler, heavy, semi-skilled,‖ and 

―shipping, medium, skilled‖ under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Id. at 48. 

In the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to consider an individual of Stimson‘s age, 

education and work experience who is ―limited to medium‖ with occasional climbing of ramps, 

stairs, stooping, balancing, kneeling, crouching and crawling, needs a cane to walk and for uneven 

terrain, cannot use ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and should have no exposure to atmospheric 

conditions or extreme temperatures. Id. at 48–49. The VE testified that such an individual could 

not perform Stimson‘s past work and could not perform any job ―at medium.‖ Id. at 49. On the 

other hand, the VE testified that the hypothetical individual could work as a ―security guard, light, 

semi-skilled.‖ Id. 

In the second hypothetical, the ALJ kept the same limitations as the first hypothetical 

individual, but limited to light instead of medium work. Id. The VE testified that the second 

hypothetical individual cannot perform Stimson‘s past work. Id. She further testified that the only 

jobs such an individual could perform were security guard and ―dispatcher, sedentary, semiskilled,‖ which the individual could do with ―little, if any, vocational adjustment.‖ Id. at 49–51. 

When the ALJ added a further limitation that the individual ―would be off-task 20 percent of the 

time due to the need for additional breaks in addition to the normal breaks in an eight-hour 

workday,‖ the VE answered that there would be no full-time jobs available. Id. at 50.

In the third hypothetical, Stimson‘s attorney kept the same limitations as in the second, 

with an additional limitation that the individual could only stand and walk for about four hours in 

an eight hour work day. Id. at 52. The VE testified that such limitations would ―reduce [work] to 

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half.‖ Id. 

D. The ALJ’s Analysis and Findings of Fact

1. Legal Standard for Determination of Disability

Disability insurance benefits are available under the Social Security Act when an eligible 

claimant is unable ―to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 423(a)(1), 1382c(a)(3). A claimant is only found disabled if his physical or mental 

impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but also 

―cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); see 

also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3). The claimant bears the burden of proof in establishing a disability. 

Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 881 (1996). 

The Commissioner has established a sequential five-part evaluation process to determine 

whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 

416.920(a). At Step One, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is engaged in 

―substantial gainful activity.‖ 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he is, the 

Commissioner finds that the claimant is not disabled, and the evaluation stops. If the claimant is 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner proceeds to Step Two and considers 

whether the claimant has ―a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment,‖ or 

combination of such impairments, which meets the duration requirement in 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1509, 416.909. An impairment is severe if it ―significantly limits [the claimant‘s] physical 

or mental ability to do basic work activities.‖ 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the 

claimant does not have a severe impairment, disability benefits are denied at this step. If it is 

determined that one or more impairments are severe, the Commissioner will next perform Step 

Three of the analysis, comparing the medical severity of the claimant‘s impairments to a compiled 

listing of impairments that the Commissioner has found to be disabling. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If one or a combination of the claimant‘s impairments meet 

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or equal a listed impairment, the claimant is found to be disabled. Otherwise, the Commissioner 

proceeds to Step Four and considers the claimant‘s residual functional capacity (―RFC‖) in light of 

his impairments and whether he can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

416.920(a)(4)(iv); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b), 416.960(b) (defining past relevant work as ―work 

. . . done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough 

for you to learn to do it‖). If the claimant can still perform past relevant work, he is found not to 

be disabled. If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the Commissioner proceeds to the 

fifth and final step of the analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). At Step 

Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant, in light of his impairments, 

age, education, and work experience, can perform other jobs in the national economy. Johnson v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 180 (9th Cir. 1997). A claimant who is able to perform other jobs that are 

available in significant numbers in the national economy is not considered disabled, and will not 

receive disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c)(1), 416.920(g), 416.960(c)(1). 

Conversely, where there are no jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy that 

the claimant can perform, the claimant is found to be disabled. Id.

2. The ALJ’s Five-Step Analysis

a. Step 1: Substantial Gainful Activity

The ALJ began her analysis by noting that Stimson had no reported annual earnings since 

2007. AR 14. The ALJ also noted that Stimson had worked part-time after the alleged onset date, 

but found that there was no evidence that ―this work activity rose to the level of substantial gainful 

activity,‖ and moved on to the second step. Id. at 14–15. 

b. Step 2: Severe Impairments

The ALJ determined that Stimson had ―the following severe impairments: degenerative 

disk disease of the lumbar spine with radiculopathy, status-post right knee surgery, obesity, and 

chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder.‖ AR 15. 

The ALJ explained that obesity was a severe impairment combined with Stimson‘s severe 

musculoskeletal impairments. Id. The ALJ further explained that Stimson‘s hypertension,

hyperlipidemia and psychiatric impairments were not severe impairments, because there was 

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insufficient evidence that those conditions more than minimally affected Stimson‘s ability to 

perform basic work functions. Id. The ALJ also noted that Stimson‘s hypertension was well 

controlled, that hyperlipidemia was managed with diet, and that Stimson denied that depression 

affected his ability to work. Id. 

The ALJ concluded by noting that with respect to Stimson‘s alleged psychiatric 

impairment, Stimson had ―no restriction in activities of daily living, no difficulties maintaining 

social functioning, no difficulties in maintain concentration, persistence or pace, and no episodes 

of decompensation of extended duration.‖ Id. (citing AR 244, 246, 261–62, 264, 266, 273, 275, 

350, 472, 527–30).

c. Step 3: Medical Severity

The ALJ found that Stimson ―does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that meets or medical equals the severity of one of the listed impairments.‖ AR 16. 

In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ considered listings 1.02 (major dysfunction of a 

joint), 1.03 (reconstructive surgery or surgical arthrodesis of a major weight-bearing joint), 1.04 

(disorders of the spine), 3.02 (COPD), and 14.09 (inflammatory arthritis). Id. The ALJ found that 

because Stimson was able to ambulate effectively, Stimson‘s impairments did not meet or equal 

listing 1.03 which requires inability to ambulate effectively. Id. With respect to listings 1.02, 

1.04, 3.02, and 14.09, the ALJ simply described the requirements of the listings and conclusively 

stated that there was no evidence in the medical record to establish that Stimson‘s impairments 

met such requirements. Id. at 16–17. The ALJ cited to the COPD test results in her discussion of 

listing 3.02, but otherwise did not cite to the medical record. Id. at 17. 

d. Step 4: Residual Functional Capacity

The ALJ determined that Stimson had 

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 

20 C.F.R §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b), except he can occasionally 

climb ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, and 

scaffolding. He can occasionally stoop, balance, kneel, crouch, and 

crawl. The claimant requires the use of a cane for ambulation and 

for uneven terrain. He should not be exposed to atmospheric 

conditions or to extreme temperatures.

AR 17. Of the three sources of medical opinion in the record regarding Stimson‘s physical 

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impairments, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of examining physician Dr. Chen as well as 

to the opinion of the treating physician Dr. Hoque, and partial weight to the state agency medical 

consultants. Id. at 19–20. 

The ALJ first considered the June 2011 assessment of examining physician Dr. Chen, in 

which Dr. Chen concluded that Stimson had no functional limitations on a medical basis. Id. at 

19. Although the ALJ found that Dr. Chen‘s opinion was supported by his examination and the 

objective record, she assigned little weight to Dr. Chen‘s assessment because ―he did not give 

reasonable consideration to the claimant‘s self-reported limitations and subjective pain.‖ Id. 

The ALJ also looked to the two reports by state agency medical consultants from July 2011 

and December 2011. Id. After briefly noting the findings from those reports, the ALJ assigned 

partial weight to the consultants‘ assessments without additional explanation. Id. at 19–20. She

noted that her determination of Stimson‘s residual functional capacity was ―essentially . . . adopted 

from the consultants‘ opinion but reduced from exertionally medium to light.‖ Id. at 20. 

The ALJ also considered the April 2012 opinion of treating physician Dr. Hoque. Id. She 

construed the opinion as stating that Stimson ―was capable of less than sedentary activity.‖ Id. 

The ALJ gave little weight to this opinion, explaining that Dr. Hoque‘s opinion was inconsistent 

with and not well supported by the Veteran Medical Center records or by the overall record and 

that the opinion was ―quite conclusory, providing very little explanation of the evidence relied on 

in forming that opinion.‖ Id. In rejecting this opinion, the ALJ cited to the medical record only 

once, referring generally to an eighty-eight page exhibit. Id. 

In regards to Stimson‘s mental health, the ALJ considered the January 2012 consultative 

examination by Dr. von Bolschwing, in which Dr. von Bolschwing found no severe psychological 

limitations. Id. She also considered the February 2012 report of a state agency psychological 

consultant which concluded that Stimson‘s psychological disorders were not severe. Id. The ALJ

assigned great weight to both opinions, noting that they were consistent with and supported by the 

overall record. Id. The ALJ also noted that Stimson denied mental health issues as a basis for his 

claims. Id. at 18.

Finally, the ALJ noted that the VE testified at the hearing that an individual with Stimson‘s 

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residual functional capacity cannot perform Stimson‘s past relevant work, and accordingly, found 

that Stimson was unable to perform past relevant work. Id. at 21. 

e. Step 5: Ability to Perform Other Jobs in the National Economy

The ALJ noted that the vocational expert testified that ―an individual with the same age, 

education, past relevant work experience, and residual functional capacity as the claimant‖ could 

perform, without acquiring additional skills, ―a light occupation such as a gate guard‖ and ―a 

sedentary occupation such as a dispatcher.‖ Id. at 22. After also noting that these jobs exist in 

significant numbers in the national and state economies, the ALJ found that Stimson had the 

ability to perform other jobs in the national economy and that Stimson was not disabled. Id. 

E. Motions for Summary Judgment 

1. Stimson’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Stimson filed a complaint seeking review of the ALJ‘s decision by this Court, and moved 

for summary judgment on the grounds that, first, the ALJ erred in determining that Stimson could 

ambulate effectively; second, the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the opinion of Stimson‘s 

treating physician; and third, the ALJ erred in giving great weight to the opinion of a 

psychological assistant. See generally Pl.‘s Mot. 

First, Stimson contends that the ALJ erred in determining that Stimson could ambulate 

effectively because he requires a cane to walk. Id. at 2, 4. Stimson asserts that if the ALJ had 

found that Stimson could not ambulate effectively, then his impairments would have satisfied the 

requirements for disability in Step Three under listing 1.03 or 1.04. Id. at 2, 8.2 

Second, Stimson argues that the ALJ erred in disregarding the opinion of Stimson‘s 

treating physician, Dr. Hoque, because the opinion is well supported by the record. Id. at 5, 7. 

According to Stimson, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Hoque‘s opinion because the ALJ 

―deemed it unsupported by the record.‖ Id. at 5. Stimson contends that the medical records of 

―orthopedic surgeries, MRIs, diagnostic testing, physical therapy, [and] chart notes‖ as well as 

diagnoses and prescriptions support Dr. Hoque‘s opinion, although Stimson provides no details as 

 

2

It is unclear from Stimson‘s Motion whether he seeks to establish disability under listing 1.03 or 

1.04, as he mentions only listing 1.04 initially but discusses only listing 1.03.

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to how those records support the opinion. Id. at 5, 7. Stimson also contends that the ALJ erred in 

giving less weight to Dr. Hoque‘s opinion than that of the state agency medical consultants 

―whose opinion is presumably based upon a review of the medical records.‖ Id. at 5. 

Third, Stimson contends that the ALJ erred in assigning great weight to the opinion of Dr. 

von Bolschwing because she is not a licensed psychologist. Id. at 6. Stimson argues that because 

Dr. von Bolschwing is only a psychological assistant and not a licensed psychologist or another 

acceptable medical source, her opinion should be assigned little or no weight. Id. (citing 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1513). Stimson asserts that it is irrelevant that Dr. von Bolschwing‘s report is signed 

by her licensed psychologist supervisor, Dr. Martin. Id. Stimson fails to explain, however, how 

assigning less weight to Dr. von Bolschwing‘s mental health evaluation would change the ALJ‘s 

conclusion, or what, if any, evidence in the record indicates that Stimson has a psychological 

impairment. 

2. Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Commissioner filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, asking the Court to 

affirm the Commissioner‘s final decision that Stimson was not disabled. See generally Comm‘r‘s 

Mot. The Commissioner responds to each of Castillo‘s arguments individually. 

First, the Commissioner argues that there is no medical evidence that Stimson cannot 

ambulate effectively. Id. at 4. The Commissioner contends that although Stimson requires a cane 

to walk, the need for a single cane does not necessitate a finding of inability to ambulate. Id.

(citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, 1.00(B)(2)(b)(2)). The Commissioner also points to the 

ALJ‘s findings that Stimson could independently complete daily activities and to Stimson‘s 

testimony that he can walk for around 30 minutes. Id. 4–5 (citing AR 15, 20). 

Second, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly weighed the conflicting medical 

opinions, because Dr. Hoque‘s opinion was conclusory and not well supported. Id. at 5–8. 

According to the Commissioner, an ALJ may reject a treating physician‘s opinion only ―by 

providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.‖ Id. at 6 

(citing Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Commissioner contends 

that the ALJ correctly rejected Dr. Hoque‘s opinion because it was ―conclusory in nature with very 

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little explanation, unsupported by treating records or the record as a whole, and neither well 

supported by medically acceptable clinical evidence nor by laboratory diagnostic techniques.‖ Id.

(citing AR 20; Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (―When confronted 

with conflicting medical opinions, an ALJ need not accept a treating physician‘s opinion that is 

conclusory and brief and unsupported by clinical findings.‖)). The Commissioner elaborates on 

the ALJ‘s reasons by explaining that the ―only‖ objective explanation provided by Dr. Hoque was 

―positive [straight leg raise test], tender[ness] along the medial joint line at knee with positive 

patellar grind, and the indication that [Stimson] received injections and physical therapy.‖ Id. at 7 

(citing AR 561).3 The Commissioner further contends that she may offer ― ̳additional support for 

the Commissioner‘s and the ALJ‘s position‘ without inventing a new reason‖ and points to 

specific portions of the medical record to support the ALJ‘s determination that Dr. Hoque‘s 

opinion was unsupported by the record. Id. at 7–8 (citing Warre v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1005 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006); AR 19–20, 566, 590, 647, 693, 719–21). 

Third, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly gave great weight to Dr. von 

Bolschwing‘s opinion because it was consistent with and well supported by the record. Id. at 8 

(citing AR 20, 527–31). The Commissioner argues that even though Dr. von Bolschwing was 

only a psychological assistant, the fact that her licensed psychologist supervisor signed the report 

validates the opinion as a proper medical opinion. Id. (citing AR 531). The Commissioner also 

contends that Dr. von Bolschwing‘s opinion is still entitled to great weight even assuming that it is 

not an acceptable medical source, because an uncontradicted ―other source‖ opinion is entitled to 

great weight. Id. (citing AR 19, 87–89, 530).

Finally, the Commissioner contends that if the Court finds that the ALJ erred, then the 

 

3

The Commissioner also explains that Dr. Hoque‘s opinion was given ―after only 6–9 months of 

contacts with [Stimson] and relied on [Stimson‘s] knee and low back pain‖ and that ―[w]hen asked 

to explain why she believed [Stimson‘s] limitations to be  ̳reasonably consistent‘ with his 

impairments, she provided no explanation.‖ Comm‘r‘s Mot. 7 (citing AR 561, 563). However, 

this explanation seems to be a misreading of Dr. Hoque‘s opinion. First, it seems that Dr. Hoque‘s 

answer of ―6–9 months‖ was referring to the frequency of her contact with Stimson, rather than 

the length of contact. AR 561. Second, Dr. Hoque did not provide an explanation because the 

form did not call for an explanation if, as was the case here, Dr. Hoque believed Stimson‘s 

impairments and limitations were reasonably consistent. AR 563. 

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Court should remand for further procedures and not for payment of benefits, so that ―the entity 

Congress entrusted with making disability determinations may correct any perceived errors.‖ Id. 

at 9 (citing Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)

District courts have jurisdiction to review the final decisions of the Commissioner and 

have the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner‘s decisions, with or without 

remanding for further hearings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). 

When asked to review the Commissioner‘s decision, the Court takes as conclusive any 

findings of the Commissioner which are free from legal error and supported by ―substantial 

evidence.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is ―such evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,‖ and it must be based on the record as a whole. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence means ―more than a mere 

scintilla,‖ id., but ―less than a preponderance.‖ Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 

846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Even if the Commissioner‘s findings are supported by 

substantial evidence, they should be set aside if proper legal standards were not applied when 

weighing the evidence and in reaching a decision. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 

1978). In reviewing the record, the Court must consider both the evidence that supports and 

detracts from the Commissioner‘s conclusion. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 

1996) (citing Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985)).

If the Court identifies defects in the administrative proceeding or the ALJ‘s conclusions, 

the Court may remand for further proceedings or for a calculation of benefits. See Garrison v. 

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019−21 (9th Cir. 2014).

B. Stimson’s Ability to Ambulate Effectively

The Social Security regulations provide the following definitions relevant to the issue of 

whether a claimant can ambulate effectively:

(1) Definition. Inability to ambulate effectively means an extreme 

limitation of the ability to walk; i.e., an impairment(s) that interferes 

very seriously with the individual’s ability to independently initiate, 

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sustain, or complete activities. Ineffective ambulation is defined 

generally as having insufficient lower extremity functioning (see 

1.00J) to permit independent ambulation without the use of a handheld assistive device(s) that limits the functioning of both upper 

extremities. (Listing 1.05C is an exception to this general definition 

because the individual has the use of only one upper extremity due 

to amputation of a hand.)

(2) To ambulate effectively, individuals must be capable of 

sustaining a reasonable walking pace over a sufficient distance to 

be able to carry out activities of daily living. They must have the 

ability to travel without companion assistance to and from a place of 

employment or school. Therefore, examples of ineffective 

ambulation include, but are not limited to, the inability to walk 

without the use of a walker, two crutches or two canes, the inability 

to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces, 

the inability to use standard public transportation, the inability to 

carry out routine ambulatory activities, such as shopping and 

banking, and the inability to climb a few steps at a reasonable pace 

with the use of a single hand rail. The ability to walk independently 

about one‘s home without the use of assistive devices does not, in 

and of itself, constitute effective ambulation.

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(b) (emphasis added). Administrative guidance 

issued by the Social Security Administration further provides that ―required use of one cane or 

crutch [does not] automatically exclude all gainful activity. However, if someone who uses one 

cane or crutch is otherwise unable to effectively ambulate, the impairment(s) might still meet or 

equal a listing.‖ Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal 

System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 58013 (Nov. 19, 2001). 

The fact that Stimson requires a prescribed cane to walk does not necessitate a finding of 

inability to ambulate. See id. Stimson does not argue that he is ―otherwise unable to effectively 

ambulate.‖ See id. To the contrary, the record indicates that Stimson often takes walks and is able 

to independently shop for groceries and that he is able to use public transportation. Id. at 15, 35, 

43, 244, 264, 350, 530. The Court therefore finds that Stimson is ―capable of sustaining a 

reasonable walking pace over a sufficient distance to be able to carry out activities of daily living‖ 

and that Stimson‘s impairments do not reach the level of ―extreme limitation of the ability to 

walk.‖ 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(b). The ALJ properly found that Stimson 

could ambulate effectively. 

C. Credibility of Dr. von Bolschwing

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ considers evidence from 

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―acceptable medical sources‖ such as licensed physicians or licensed certified psychologists. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1513(a). An ALJ may also consider evidence from ―other sources,‖ including 

―medical sources not listed in paragraph (a) of this section (for example, nurse-practitioners, 

physicians‘ assistants, naturopaths, chiropractors, audiologists, and therapists).‖ 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1513(d). 

Here, Dr. von Bolschwing is not a licensed psychologist, but rather a psychological 

assistant. AR 531. While Stimson argues that Dr. von Bolschwing‘s opinion should have been 

given little or no weight simply because she is not a licensed psychologist, the ALJ was entitled to 

consider and weigh Dr. von Bolschwing‘s evaluation even if it was only an ―other source‖ medical 

opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a), (d).

Dr. von Bolschwing‘s report, indicating that Stimson has no severe mental impairments, is 

not contradicted by the record. AR 530. First, a state agency psychological consultant reached the 

same conclusion as Dr. von Bolschwing. AR 88–89. Further, the VA Medical Center records

indicate that Stimson potentially suffers from anxiety and depression, but no psychological 

evaluation was conducted. Finally, Stimson himself denied any mental health issues. AR 18, 33, 

302. Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in assigning great weight to Dr. von 

Bolschwing‘s uncontradicted opinion.

D. The Opinion of Dr. Hoque

1. Legal Standard for Opinions of Treating Physicians

―Cases in this circuit distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those 

who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant 

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining 

physicians).‖ Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). ―[T]he opinion of a treating 

physician is . . . entitled to greater weight than that of an examining physician, [and] the opinion of 

an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than that of a non-examining physician.‖ 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012.

―To reject [the] uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, an ALJ must 

state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.‖ Ryan v. Comm’r of 

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Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has recently 

emphasized the high standard required for an ALJ to reject an opinion from a treating or 

examining doctor, even where the record includes a contradictory medical opinion:

―If a treating or examining doctor‘s opinion is contradicted by 

another doctor‘s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence.‖ Id. This is so because, even when contradicted, a treating 

or examining physician‘s opinion is still owed deference and will 

often be ―entitled to the greatest weight . . . even if it does not meet 

the test for controlling weight.‖ Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 

(9th Cir. 2007). An ALJ can satisfy the ―substantial evidence‖ 

requirement by ―setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the 

facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation 

thereof, and making findings.‖ Reddick [v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 

725 (9th Cir. 1998)]. ―The ALJ must do more than state conclusions. 

He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, 

rather than the doctors‘, are correct.‖ Id. (citation omitted).

Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set 

forth specific, legitimate reasons for crediting one medical opinion 

over another, he errs. See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 

(9th Cir. 1996). In other words, an ALJ errs when he rejects a 

medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more 

than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical 

opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate 

language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion. See 

id.

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012−13 (footnote omitted). 

If an ALJ has improperly failed to credit medical opinion evidence, a district court must 

credit that testimony as true and remand for an award of benefits provided that three conditions are 

satisfied: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Id. at 1020. Under such circumstances, a court should not remand for further administrative 

proceedings to reassess credibility. See id. at 1019−21. This ―credit-as-true‖ rule, which is 

―settled‖ in the Ninth Circuit, id. at 999, is intended to encourage careful analysis by ALJs, avoid 

duplicative hearings and burden, and reduce delay and uncertainty facing claimants, many of 

whom ―suffer from painful and debilitating conditions, as well as severe economic hardship.‖ Id.

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at 1019 (quoting Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1398−99 (9th Cir. 

1988)). A court may remand for further proceedings ―when the record as a whole creates serious 

doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 

Act.‖ Id. at 1021. A court may also remand for the limited purpose of determining when a 

claimant‘s disability began if that date is not clear from the credited-as-true opinion. See House v. 

Colvin, 583 Fed. App‘x 628, 629 (9th Cir. July 12, 2014) (citing, e.g., Luna v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 

1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010)). Outside of those circumstances, remand for further proceedings is an 

abuse of discretion if the credit-as-true rule establishes that a claimant is disabled. Garrison, 759 

F.3d at 1020.

2. The ALJ Erred in Assigning Little Weight to Dr. Hoque’s Opinion

Because Dr. Hoque is Stimson‘s treating physician, Dr. Hoque‘s opinion is entitled to 

substantial weight unless (1) the ALJ presented clear and convincing reasons to reject it, supported 

by substantial evidence, or (2) it was contradicted by other medical opinions and the ALJ provided 

specific and legitimate reasons to reject it, supported by substantial evidence. See Ryan, 528 F.3d 

at 1198. 

The ALJ rejected Dr. Hoque‘s opinion on the grounds that (1) the opinion was inconsistent 

with and not well supported by the Veteran Medical Center records or the record as a whole, and 

(2) the opinion was conclusory and provided ―very little explanation of the evidence relied on.‖ 

AR 20. The Court finds that the ALJ erred in disregarding Dr. Hoque‘s opinion because neither of 

the two reasons offered by the ALJ was ―specific and legitimate.‖ See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198. 

First, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Hoque‘s opinion was inconsistent with and not well 

supported by the record. AR 20. Although the Commissioner now expends great effort in 

elaborating on this conclusion by the ALJ, the standard that the Court must apply is whether the 

ALJ provided in her opinion ―specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence.‖ See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. Here, the ALJ failed to identify any specific 

inconsistencies between Dr. Hoque‘s opinion and the medical record, or otherwise provide any 

explanation of her assertion that the opinion was not supported by evidence. AR 20. Accordingly, 

the ALJ did not ―set forth [her] own interpretations and explain why they, rather than [Dr. 

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Hoque‘s], are correct‖ but instead merely criticized the opinion ―with boilerplate language that 

fail[ed] to offer a substantive basis for [her] conclusion.‖ See id.; see also, Embrey v. Bowen, 849 

F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988) (―To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient 

objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions mandated by the objective 

findings does not achieve the level of specificity our prior cases have required . . . .‖). 

The Court also finds that Dr. Hoque‘s opinion is not substantially inconsistent with the 

overall medical record, contrary to the ALJ‘s conclusion. Dr. Hoque‘s opinion provides a detailed 

assessment of Stimson‘s functional limitations, which, according to the ALJ, imply that Stimson is 

capable of ―less than sedentary work.‖ AR 20, 562–65. The medical notes from the Veteran 

Medical Center contain no inconsistencies with these assessments, and instead confirm Dr. 

Hoque‘s diagnoses, clinical findings, and objective signs, as indicated in the opinion. Dr. Hoque‘s 

opinion is also consistent with Dr. Chen‘s opinion which reported no functional limitations 

because Dr. Hoque‘s opinion indicates that Stimson‘s limitations described therein began only in

September 2011, while Dr. Chen‘s report is from June 2011. AR 350, 565. 

The only inconsistency with the record is the second state agency medical consultant report 

from December 2011, which indicates much less severe functional limitations than Dr. Hoque‘s 

opinion. AR 91–92. However, treating physician Dr. Hoque‘s opinion is entitled to greater

weight than the non-examining consultants‘ opinion. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. 

Furthermore, given that the medical consultants afforded great weight to Dr. Chen‘s opinion

which the ALJ herself rejected for failure to give reasonable consideration to Stimson‘s selfreported limitations and subjective pain, the Court concludes that the ALJ‘s reliance on the 

consultants—and thus, indirectly, on Dr. Chen‘s discredited opinion—is not a ―legitimate‖ reason 

to reject Dr. Hoque‘s opinion. AR 19, 90; see Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. 

The ALJ also noted that Dr. Hoque‘s opinion was merely conclusory and that Dr. Hoque 

provided ―very little‖ explanation for her assessment. AR 20. Citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, the 

Commissioner argues that the ALJ was entitled to reject a treating physician‘s opinion that was 

―conclusory and brief and unsupported by clinical findings.‖ Comm‘r‘s Mot. at 6; Tonapetyan v. 

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). In Tonapetyan, a treating physician diagnosed the 

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claimant with a variety of impairments and opined that the claimant could not perform sedentary 

work. Id. The ALJ rejected this opinion because the physician‘s reports offered no objective 

medical findings in support and the court affirmed the ALJ‘s decision after confirming that the

reports contained no objective evidence supporting the physician‘s opinion. Id. 

The Court finds, however, that this case is more similar to Sanfilippo v. Astrue. 274 Fed.

App‘x 551, 552 (9th Cir. 2008).4 In Sanfilippo, the ALJ rejected the treating‘s physician‘s opinion 

as brief, conclusory, and unsupported. Id. The court, however, noted that the record included the 

physician‘s clinical findings, extensive descriptions of the claimant‘s pain management 

consultations, and a thorough residual functional capacity questionnaire, and thus found that the 

physician‘s opinion was ―not brief, conclusory, or unsupported,‖ contrary to the ALJ‘s decision. 

Id. 

Here, as in Sanfilippo, Dr. Hoque‘s opinion was a detailed residual functional capacity 

questionnaire, accompanied by thorough medical records from the Veteran Medical Center. See

AR 562–65; Sanfilippo, 274 Fed. App‘x at 552. Further, unlike in Tonapetyan where the opinion 

offered no objective medical evidence at all, Dr. Hoque‘s opinion expressly points to clinical 

findings and objective signs which are confirmed by the medical record. See AR 562; 

Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. The ALJ failed to discuss this objective medical evidence 

provided by Dr. Hoque and instead simply labeled the opinion as ―conclusory.‖ Id. 20. The Court

therefore finds that the ALJ failed to ―set forth specific, legitimate reasons‖ for disregarding Dr. 

Hoque‘s opinion. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. 

3. Dr. Hoque’s Opinion Must be Credited as True

As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit‘s ―settled‖ credit-as-true rule dictates that where the 

record has been fully developed, the ALJ has failed to provide sufficient reason to discredit a 

medical opinion, and crediting that opinion would require a finding that the claimant is disabled, a 

district court usually must remand for an award of benefits. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 999, 1019−21. 

The first and second conditions are satisfied here. First, the Court finds that the record has been 

 

4

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fully developed. Further, as discussed above, the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reason to reject 

Dr. Hoque‘s opinion. 

The third criterion—whether crediting Dr. Hoque‘s opinion would require a finding that 

Stimson is disabled—is more complicated. Dr. Hoque‘s opinion indicates that Stimson can only 

sit, stand, or walk for a total of six hours of a work day and requires unscheduled breaks every one 

or two hours for fifteen minutes. Id. at 562–65. This corresponds to taking more than twenty 

percent of the workday off. At the hearing, the VE was asked to consider an individual of 

Stimson‘s age, education, skills, and light functional limitations with occasional climbing of 

ramps, stairs, stooping, balancing, kneeling, crouching and crawling, who needs a cane to walk 

and for uneven terrain, cannot use ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and should have no exposure to 

atmospheric conditions or extreme temperatures, who would also need to be off-task twenty 

percent of the workday. AR 49–50. The VE testified that there are no jobs available in the 

national economy for such an individual. Id. Dr. Hoque‘s opinion, credited as true, establishes 

that Stimson‘s residual functional capacity is the same as this hypothetical individual, but with 

more severe postural limitations. See id. at 562–65. Thus, the Court finds that the VE‘s testimony 

applies to Stimson at the time of Dr. Hoque‘s opinion, and that there were no jobs available in the 

national economy that he could perform at that time. 

Under the statutory framework for disability benefits, however, not every impairment that 

prevents a claimant from working necessarily meets the definition of ―disability.‖ The law 

requires that an impairment ―has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 

less than 12 months.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Here, Dr. Hoque‘s report establishes that 

Stimson was unable to work beginning September 23, 2011. See AR 565. Stimson had surgery 

on his knee in July of 2012—less than twelve months after the September onset date, and a few 

months after Dr. Hoque rendered her opinion—and medical records indicate that he showed 

improvement after the surgery. See id. at 721. Based on the record available, the Court cannot 

conclusively determine whether Stimson remained unable to work after his surgery, and thus 

whether his impairments constitute or constituted ―disability‖ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). 

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The Court therefore remands for further proceedings. In keeping with the purposes 

underlying the credit-as-true rule, the Commissioner is instructed on remand to accept Dr. 

Hoque‘s diagnosis for the period from September 23, 2011 until Stimson‘s July 2012 surgery and 

to devote further administrative proceedings to determining Stimson‘s ability to work after his 

surgery. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Stimson‘s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, the 

Commissioner‘s Motion is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings 

consistent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2016

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

Case 3:14-cv-04425-JCS Document 22 Filed 07/13/16 Page 23 of 23