Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00605/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00605-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:18-CV-605 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM BRADLEY,

CDCR #E-48180,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KATCHKA, R.N.; 

M. CASTILLO, Correctional Officer; 

ALVAREZ, Sergeant; 

D. PARAMO, Warden,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-CV-605 JLS (JLB)

ORDER (1) OVERRULING 

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS, 

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, AND

(3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

ECF Nos. 16, 23, 24

Presently before the Court is Defendants M. Castillo and J. Alvarez’s Motion to 

Dismiss Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 16). Also before the Court is 

Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R,” ECF No. 23)

advising the Court to grant Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff William Bradley’s Objections to 

the R&R (“Objs.,” ECF No. 24), and Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Objections (“Reply,” 

ECF No. 25). Having considered the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court 

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 24), ADOPTS the R&R (ECF No. 23) in 

its entirety, and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 16).

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 26 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 8
2

3:18-CV-605 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

BACKGROUND

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s R&R contains a thorough and accurate recitation of 

the factual and procedural history underlying the instant Motion. See R&R 2–3. This 

Order incorporates by reference the background as set forth therein.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Review of the Report and Recommendation

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The 

district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,” and “may 

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 

673–76 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). In the absence 

of timely objection, however, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error 

on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 

advisory committee’s note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th 

Cir. 1974)).

II. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 

states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 26 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 8
3

3:18-CV-605 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (alteration in original). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ 

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 

when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to 

say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[F]acts that are 

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to 

relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true 

“legal conclusions” contained in the complaint. Id. at 678–79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555). This review requires “context-specific” analysis involving the Court’s “judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit 

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—

but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)).

When a plaintiff appears pro se, the Court construes the pleadings liberally and 

affords the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 

890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Oretz v. Wash. Cnty., Or., 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 

1996)). When giving liberal construction to a pro se complaint, however, the Court is not 

permitted to “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Easter v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of 

Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 26 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 8
4

3:18-CV-605 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268) (citing Jones v. Cmty. Redev. 

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984)). The Court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave 

to amend “unless the pleading ‘could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other 

facts.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendants Katchka, Castillo, Alvarez, and 

Paramo: (1) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, 

(2) violation of Plaintiff’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 

(3) assault and battery prohibited by California law. See generally ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). 

Defendants Katchka and Paramo were sua sponte dismissed from this case on May 25,

2018. See generally ECF No. 12. The remaining Defendants, Castillo and Alvarez, have 

moved to dismiss only Plaintiff’s due process and assault and battery claims. See generally 

ECF No. 16.

I. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff’s due process claim is based on Defendants’ allegedly unjustified and 

penologically unnecessary “beating and kicking” of him. See Compl. at 12. Magistrate 

Judge Burkhardt concludes that Plaintiff’s due process claim, to the extent it is predicated 

on a substantive due process violation, must fail because it is duplicative of his claim under 

the Eighth Amendment. See R&R at 6–7. Further, “[t]o the extent that Plaintiff also alleges 

a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Complaint sets forth 

no facts supporting the existence of such a claim” because “Plaintiff has not alleged a lack 

of process, i.e., that he was denied a hearing, failed to receive notice of the charges, or that 

he did not have an opportunity to present his views regarding the alleged beating.” Id. at 

7. Magistrate Judge Burkhardt therefore recommends that Plaintiff’s due process claim be 

dismissed with prejudice to the extent Plaintiff asserts a substantive due process claim and 

without prejudice to the extent Plaintiff asserts a procedural due process claim. Id. at 8, 

11.

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 26 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 8
5

3:18-CV-605 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff does not appear object to this portion of Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s 

R&R,1 see generally Objs.; see also Reply at 2, and the Court finds no clear error in the 

recommendation. The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Burkhardt that Plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due process rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment and that the substantive due process claim is redundant of 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. The Court therefore ADOPTS Magistrate Judge 

Burkhardt’s R&R and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s due process claim.

II. Assault and Battery Claim

Plaintiff also alleges that the allegedly unjustified and penologically unnecessary 

“beating and kicking” of him constituted an intentional assault and battery under California 

law, see Compl. at 13, for which he seeks compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 

3, 6. Magistrate Judge Burkhardt notes that, although “[t]he [California Government 

Claims Act (“CGCA”)] generally has ‘no applicability to [section] 1983 actions,’” 

Defendants here are moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s state-law assault and battery claim on 

the basis that Plaintiff failed to comply with the CGCA. R&R at 9–10. Magistrate Judge 

Burkhardt recommends that Plaintiff’s claim be dismissed without prejudice because 

“Plaintiff has failed to alleged compliance with the CGCA with respect to his state assault 

and battery claim against Defendants.” Id. at 10. Further, because the underlying incident 

occurred on December 21, 2016, “Plaintiff cannot obtain compliance” at this stage and “the 

only remaining question is whether Plaintiff has already complied with the claims 

presentation requirement but failed to allege such in his Complaint.” Id. at 10. Magistrate 

Judge Burkhardt therefore “recommends that Plaintiff be given leave to amend his 

Complaint to allege compliance with the CGCA, if possible.” Id.

/ / /

 

1 To the extent Plaintiff claims that Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s R&R is “‘collusory’ & ‘conspiratory,’” 

see Objs. at 2 (emphasis in original), the Court disagrees. The R&R is well-reasoned and based in federal 

precedent.

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 26 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 8
6

3:18-CV-605 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff objects to this portion of Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s R&R; consequently, 

the Court reviews her recommendation de novo. In his Objections, Plaintiff argues that the 

CGCA applies only to “litigants filing non-federal civil right suits.” Objs. at 1. “[F]urther, 

for federal civil rights-suits, there is ‘NO’ requirement, as there is with an action brought 

under the California Tort Claims Act, that a claim be filed and rejected by the Board of 

Control before a lawsuit can be filed.” Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiff stresses that he 

“has followed the language of the law to [the] letter.” Id. at 3. In their Reply, Defendants 

stress that they “seek to dismiss the state claims” pursuant to the CGCA, not Plaintiff’s 

federal claims under Section 1983. See Reply at 2.

The Court must agree with Magistrate Judge Burkhardt and Defendants. As 

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt notes, the CGCA requires a plaintiff seeking to sue a public 

entity or public employee for money damages for actions taken within the scope of the 

employee’s employment first to file a government claim. See R&R at 8 (citing Cal. Gov’t 

Code §§ 905.2, 950.2, 950.6; Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th 

Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)). “A claim relating to a cause of 

action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the 

accrual of the cause of action.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. If the claim is not timely 

presented within six months, a claimant may submit a written application for leave to 

present the claim within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year after the accrual of the 

cause of action. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4.

In his claim for assault and battery, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive 

damages against Defendants, state employees, for actions taken within the scope of their 

employment. See Compl. at 3, 6. Consequently, despite having filed claims under Section 

1983, Plaintiff must comply with the CGCA for his assault and battery claim. See KarimPanahi, 839 F.2d at 627 (requiring compliance with California Tort Claims Act for claims 

under California tort law in suit involving Section 1983 claims). Plaintiff, however, does 

not contend that he complied with the claims presentment requirement of the CGCA prior 

to asserting his assault and battery claim. See generally Compl.; see also R&R at 9. 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 26 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 8
7

3:18-CV-605 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for assault and battery is properly dismissed for failure to 

allege compliance with the CGCA.

Although Plaintiff does not appear to challenge that portion of the R&R, Judge 

Burkhardt is also correct in concluding that Plaintiff cannot obtain compliance with the 

CGCA at this time. Because the underlying assault and battery occurred on December 21, 

2016, see Compl. at 3, 8, 13, Plaintiff would have had to present his claim by June 21, 

2017, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2, or have applied to present an untimely claim by 

December 21, 2017. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4. Consequently, the only way in which 

Plaintiff can amend his California assault and battery claim is to allege that he has already 

complied with the claims presentation requirement. See R&R at 10. Accordingly, the 

Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections and ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s 

R&R as to Plaintiff’s state law assault and battery claim.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court:

1. OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 24),

2. ADOPTS in its entirety Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s R&R (ECF No. 23),

and

3. GRANTS Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 16). Specifically, the Court 

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against 

Defendants Castillo and Alvarez to the extent it is predicated on a violation of Plaintiff’s 

substantive due process rights. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

Plaintiff’s (1) Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Castillo and Alvarez to the 

extent it is predicated on a violation of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights, and 

(2) California assault and battery claim against Defendants Castillo and Alvarez to the 

extent Plaintiff can demonstrate that he has already complied with the claims presentation 

requirement of the California Government Claims Act. Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended 

complaint to cure the specific deficiencies enumerated above within forty-five (45) days of 

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 26 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 8
8

3:18-CV-605 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the date on which this Order is electronically docketed. Failure to file an amended 

complaint by this date may result in dismissal of the aforementioned claims with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2019

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 26 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 8