Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00410/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00410-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., etc., :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 15-0410-KD-C

SHELIA CAMPBELL and RAYFORD :

CAMPBELL,

:

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and 

recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), on the notice of removal (Doc. 1; see 

also Docs. 4 & 5 (evidence filed in support of removal)),1 plaintiff’s motion to remand 

(Doc. 9), and the response in opposition (Doc. 12) penned and signed by Shelia 

Campbell (id. at 29). Upon consideration of the foregoing pleadings, the Magistrate 

Judge recommends that the Court GRANT plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 9).

 1 Only Shelia Campbell filed the notice of removal on August 12, 2015. (See Doc. 1.) 

However, two days later, on August 14, 2015, Campbell and her husband, Rayford Campbell, 

filed identical pleadings in this Court and thereto attached certain evidence in support of the 

removal petition. (See Docs. 4 & 5.) In addition, Rayford Campbell actively participated in the 

telephone conference conducted in this cause on August 25, 2015. (Compare Doc. 10 with Doc. 6.) 

Accordingly, the undersigned regarded Rayford Campbell’s actions and participation as 

signaling that he was specifically consenting to the removal of this action from the Circuit Court 

of Mobile County, Alabama. However, Shelia Campbell’s recent action of filing a response in 

opposition to the motion to remand solely on her own behalf causes the undersigned to 

question whether, in fact, Rayford Campbell has expressly and properly consented to the 

removal of this action. As discussed parenthetically, infra, Rayford Campbell’s failure expressly 

to consent to the removal of this action constitutes but another procedural barrier to the 

removal of this action. 

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FINDINGS OF FACT

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., etc., filed a statutory ejectment action against defendant 

Shelia Campbell in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama on October 20, 2014, 

seeking possession of the real property described in the complaint (that is, Campbell’s 

house) “together with money damages for the wrongful retention of said real property 

and an order that the Defendant has forfeited the right to redemption for failing to 

vacate the property, plus such other, further and different relief to which Plaintiff is 

entitled under these premises, and costs of court.” (Doc. 1, COMPLAINT.) Shelia 

Campbell was served with a copy of the summons and complaint, via her husband, 

Rayford Campbell, on November 11, 2014. (Doc. 9, Exhibit 1, at 2.)2 Approximately one 

month after suing just Shelia Campbell, that is, on November 19, 2014, plaintiff 

amended its complaint to add as a party defendant Rayford Campbell. (See Doc. 1, 

AMENDED COMPLAINT.) Rayford Campbell was served with a copy of the summons 

and complaint on December 29, 2014. (Doc. 9, Exhibit 1, at 1.)

On June 19, 2015, Shelia Campbell filed in Mobile County Circuit Court a 652-

page pleading entitled “’Counter Lawsuit and Complaint Motion Adjoining Plaintiff’s 

Complaint Against Their Actions To (Vacate Property And Ejectment).’” (See, e.g., Doc. 

4, MOTION TO STRIKE COUNTERCLAIMS OR “COUNTER LAWSUITS,” at ¶ 1.) 

 2 It is apparent to the undersigned that both Shelia and Rayford Campbell actually 

answered the initial complaint sometime in December of 2014, and in each of their answers

included a counterclaim for $2,000,000.00, inasmuch as the Clerk of Court of Mobile County

advised them that they each needed to remit $297.00 or their “$2,000,000.00” counterclaims 

would be stricken. (See Doc. 4, December 23, 2014 Letter from JoJo Schwarzauer, Circuit Clerk to 

Shelia and Rayford Campbell.) On December 29, 2014, the Campbells remitted to Circuit Clerk 

JoJo Schwarzauer a cashier’s check totaling $594.00. (See id., BBVA Compass CASHIER’S 

CHECK.)

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Wells Fargo filed its motion to strike counterclaims or counter lawsuits on July 23, 2015 

(see id.); Mobile County Circuit Judge Rick Stout granted the plaintiff’s motion on July 

27, 2015 (see Doc. 4, July 27, 2015 ORDER).

On the morning of August 12, 2015, Judge Stout heard oral argument on a 

motion for summary judgment that previously had been filed by Wells Fargo. (Doc. 9, 

at ¶ 7.) At 9:14 a.m. on August 12, 2015, Shelia Campbell filed a notice of removal in the 

Mobile County Circuit Court (see Doc. 1, at 1) and filed the same notice of removal in 

this Court at 10:57 a.m. on August 12, 2015 (see Doc. 1, Display Receipt). In the notice of 

removal, the removing defendant or defendants appear to seek removal of this case on 

the following grounds: (1) counterclaim in 337 proceedings; (2) fraud upon the Court; 

(3) fraud under Rules 59(b) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (4) 

FDCPA; (5) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, and 1985; and (6) the Deed of Trust Act and the 

Consumer Protection Act. (See Doc. 1, at 2; compare id. with Doc. 12, at 11-15 & 18-19.) 

Before addressing whether these grounds provide a basis for removal, the undersigned 

first outlines relevant case law with respect to jurisdiction in general and then touches 

upon diversity jurisdiction given that specific reference is made to diversity jurisdiction 

(compare Doc. 1, at 5-6 & 13-14 with Doc. 12, at 17, 19 & 22), with the contention being 

made that the counterclaim seeks damages in excess of $75,000 (compare Doc. 1, at 2 with 

Doc. 12, at 23 & 24). 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Jurisdiction in General.

In general, removal of a case from state court to federal court is proper if the case 

originally could have been brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, 

“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The removing 

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defendants must bear “the burden of demonstrating federal jurisdiction.” Triggs v. John 

Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also 

Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005) (“As this Court 

noted in Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2001), ‘[i]n removal 

cases, the burden is on the party who sought removal to demonstrate that federal 

jurisdiction exists.’”); McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 

party invoking the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, facts supporting the existence of federal jurisdiction.”). Moreover, 

“[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and there is a presumption against 

the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction 

are to be resolved in favor of remand.” Russell Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 264 

F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Allen v. Christenberry, 327 F.3d 

1290, 1293 (11th Cir.) (“[R]emoval statutes should be construed narrowly, with doubts 

resolved against removal.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 877, 124 S.Ct. 277, 157 L.Ed.2d 140 

(2003); University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 

1999) (“Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal 

courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly. . . . Indeed, all doubts about 

jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”); see Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 

(1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial 

decree[.]” (internal citations omitted)). Stated differently, because federal courts are 

courts of limited jurisdiction “[i]t is . . . presumed that a cause lies outside this limited 

jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction[.]” Kokkonen, supra, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. at 1675 (internal citations 

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omitted). Indeed, “[b]ecause removal infringes upon state sovereignty and implicates 

central concepts of federalism, removal statutes must be construed narrowly, with all 

jurisdictional doubts being resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Brown v. Endo 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 38 F.Supp.3d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (citation omitted). 

Before turning to whether the defendants have satisfied their burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction—whether diversity or federal question jurisdiction, 

compare Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (“An action filed 

in state court may be removed to federal court based upon diversity or federal 

questions jurisdiction.”) with CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Dhinoja, 705 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1381 

(N.D. Ga. 2010) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over 

a case if it presents a question of federal law. . . . Another basis of removal jurisdiction is 

diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”)—the undersigned first considers Wells 

Fargo’s procedural argument that the defendants failed to timely file notice of removal. 

(See Doc. 9, at 5-7.) 

As a procedural matter, the removal must be timely. See, e.g., Clingan v. Celtic Life 

Ins. Co., 244 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (“The time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 

1446(b) is ‘mandatory and must be strictly applied.’”); cf. Moore v. North America Sports, 

Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he timeliness of removal is a procedural 

defect-not a jurisdictional one.”).

The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 

30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of 

a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which 

such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of 

summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has been filed in 

court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period 

is shorter.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Here, of course, it is clear to the undersigned that the defendants’ 

removal of this action is improper. The defendants purport to remove this Alabama 

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ejectment action filed in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama on October 20, 

2014—originally served on Shelia Campbell by her husband’s acceptance of service on 

November 11, 2014, with the amended complaint adding Shelia’s husband, Rayford 

Campbell, as a party defendant, being served on Rayford Campbell on December 29, 

2014—to this Court on August 12, 2015, after the ejectment action was litigated in state 

court for over eight (8) months. The removal is, therefore, untimely, see HSBC Bank USA 

Nat’l Ass’n v. Bobrowski, 2015 WL 4506824, *2 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 23, 2015) (“Defendants 

purport to remove a foreclosure complaint filed on July 26, 2012. Defendants’ notice of 

removal filed on July 20, 2015, is therefore untimely.”), and the Court should find the 

defendants’ removal untimely under § 1446(b)(1).

3 Nevertheless, even if the removal is 

 3 In the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]he unanimity requirement mandates that in cases 

involving multiple defendants, all defendants must consent to removal.” Russell Corp., supra, 

264 F.3d at 1044 (citations omitted). The removing defendant must “receive the consent of all 

then-served defendants at the time [s]he files h[er] notice of removal.” Bailey v. Janssen 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2008). Indeed, as one district court in the 

Eleventh Circuit has often recognized, “a defendant ‘must take an affirmative step to manifest 

binding consent to the Court.’” Lennar Homes, LLC v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 2011 WL 

2295276, *2 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 8, 2011), quoting Mitsui Lines Ltd. V. CSX Intermodal Inc., 564 

F.Supp.2d 1357, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 

The undersigned is a bit confused and troubled by the actions of Shelia and Rayford 

Campbell in this case. There is no question but that Shelia Campbell filed the notice of removal 

on August 12, 2015 and there is also no question but that Rayford Campbell did not file that 

same date a consent to removal. However, because Rayford Campbell did file two days later, on 

August 14, 2015, certain evidence in support of removal (see Doc. 5), all but identical to the 

pleading filed by his wife (compare id. with Doc. 4), and later participated in the August 25, 2015 

telephone conference with the Court (see Doc. 10), the undersigned believed that Rayford 

Campbell had taken enough steps to indicate his consent to removal. The most recent pleading 

filed by Shelia Campbell though, that is, her answer to the motion to remand—same indicating 

she is the sole defendant and the sole removing party (see Doc. 12, at 2)—causes the 

undersigned some “pause” regarding whether the actions of Rayford Campbell in this case are 

indicative of “’an affirmative step to manifest binding consent to the Court.’” Lennar Homes, 

LLC, supra. Because Rayford Campbell has never filed a document in this Court consenting to 

the removal petition filed by his wife (see Docket Sheet), and Shelia Campbell is now indicating 

she is the sole removing defendant (Doc. 12), the undersigned recommends that the Court find 

that Shelia Campbell’s removal of this action without her husband’s express consent was 

procedurally improper and thereby warrants a remand to the Mobile County Circuit Court. See, 

e.g., Sinclair v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 22 F.Supp.3d 1257, 1263 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (citation omitted). 

(Continued)

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regarded as timely, the defendants have simply failed to establish subject matter 

jurisdiction, whether diversity jurisdiction (§ 1332) or federal question jurisdiction (§ 

1331). 

B. Diversity Jurisdiction. 

Where removal jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1332,4 the removing parties bear the burden of establishing complete 

diversity of citizenship, that is, that the plaintiff is diverse from all the defendants, 

Triggs, supra, 154 F.3d at 1287 (citation omitted), and, in addition, must establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not 

exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement, Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 

1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e hold where a plaintiff has made an unspecified 

demand for damages in state court, a removing defendant must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not 

exceeds the $[75,000] jurisdictional requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. 

Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Roe v. Michelin North America, 

Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010) (“If a plaintiff makes ‘an unspecified demand 

for damages in state court, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the . . . 

jurisdictional requirement.’”); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 

 

Even though the foregoing represents the “parenthetical” recommendation of the 

undersigned, the remainder of this report and recommendation will make reference to both 

Shelia and Rayford Campbell inasmuch as there can be little question that both Shelia and 

Rayford Campbell are defendants in this action.

4 Federal courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction over all civil actions where the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the action is 

between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

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805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here jurisdiction is based on a claim for indeterminate 

damages, . . . the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim on which it is basing 

jurisdiction meets the jurisdictional minimum.”). In this case, the defendants’ removal 

petition is deficient in both aspects.

Initially, the undersigned recommends that the Court find that the Campbells 

have not met their burden to establish diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 because they 

do not allege in their notice of removal that the parties are of diverse citizenship (see 

Doc. 1). Compare Bobrowski, supra, at *2 (“[I]t is unclear from Defendants’ notice of 

removal whether the requirements of diversity jurisdiction have been met. They do not 

allege that the parties are diverse or that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 

Thus, they have not met their burden to establish diversity jurisdiction under § 1332.”)

with CitiMortgage, Inc., supra, 705 F.Supp.2d at 1381 & 1381-1382 (“Dhinoja’s notice of 

removal does not contain any allegations regarding the citizenship of either party or the 

amount in controversy. . . . Thus, Dhinoja has failed to demonstrate that the parties are 

fully diverse as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”). Even if the parties are of diverse 

citizenship, it is clear that “[t]he removal statute does not provide an in-state party the 

same flexibility in removing cases,” AMD Property Management v. Lawrence, 2014 WL 

1870776, *4 (N.D. Ga. May 9, 2014), as plaintiffs have with respect to bringing a diversity 

action, compare id. with Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 & 89-90, 126 S.Ct. 

606, 613, 163 L.Ed.2d 415 (2005) (“While § 1332 allows plaintiffs to invoke the federal 

courts’ diversity jurisdiction, § 1441 gives defendants a corresponding opportunity. . . . 

The scales are not evenly balanced, however. An in-state plaintiff may invoke diversity 

jurisdiction, but § 1441(b) bars removal on the basis of diversity if any ‘part[y] in 

interest properly joined and served as [a] defendan[t] is a citizen of the State in which 

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[the] action is brought.’”), and since the defendants are obviously citizens of Alabama

(see Docs. 1, 3, 4, 5 & 12 (pleadings filed by Shelia Campbell or Rayford Campbell reflect 

a permanent residence of 5321 Oak Bend Court, in Mobile, Alabama)), and the action 

was brought in Alabama state court by Wells Fargo, the defendants cannot properly 

remove this action to this Court. Compare Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. LeCrone, 868 

F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir.) (“[A]ssuming the parties here to be diverse, defendant LeCrone 

could not remove the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because removal of a diversity case 

is available only if the defendant is not a citizen of the state in which the action is 

brought [here, Ohio] . . . LeCrone, as a resident of Columbus, Ohio . . ., could not 

remove the foreclosure action if its federal jurisdictional basis were diversity.”), cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 938, 110 S.Ct. 335, 107 L.Ed.2d 324 (1989); AMD Property Management, 

supra, at *4 (“§ 1441 does not permit removal to this Court on diversity grounds because 

Defendant appears to be a citizen of the State of Georgia . . ., which is the state where 

the dispossessory proceeding was brought.”); and Wells Fargo Bank v. Cyrus, 2010 WL 

3294320, *4 (N.D. Ga. Jul. 15, 2010) (“§ 1441(b) does not permit removal on diversity 

grounds to the Northern District of Georgia because Defendant is a citizen of the State 

of Georgia, which is the State where the Bank’s dispossessory proceeding was brought. 

Stated another way, Defendant, a citizen of Georgia, cannot remove the case to a federal 

court in Georgia because Plaintiff Bank brought the dispossessory action in Georgia.”), 

report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3294314 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2010), with 

Commercial Bank of Ozark v. Pearson, 2014 WL 5242941, *2 n.3 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 15, 2014) 

(“§ 1441(b) prohibits removal on diversity grounds by a defendant who is a citizen of 

the forum state.”); and Elias v. American Nat’l Red Cross, 271 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1372-1373 

(N.D. Ala. 2003) (“The notice of removal in this case makes no attempt to state a way 

around the express provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) that removals based on diversity 

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can only take place ‘if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 

defendants [i]s a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.’” (emphasis in 

original)); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 472, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 

(1996) (“When a plaintiff files in state court a civil action over which the federal district 

courts would have original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the defendant 

or defendants may remove the action to federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), provided that 

no defendant ‘is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought, § 1441(b).’”); 

Goodwin v. Reynolds, 757 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Pursuant to the so-called 

‘forum-defendant rule,’ a state–court action that is otherwise removable to federal court 

solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship is not removable if any of the ‘parties in 

interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such 

action is brought.’” (emphasis in original; citation omitted)).

The defendants have also failed to establish that the amount in controversy in 

this matter exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. It need initially be noted 

that nowhere in its ejectment complaint does Wells Fargo seek a specific amount of 

damages from the defendants (see Doc. 1, COMPLAINT & AMENDED COMPLAINT); 

therefore, the defendants must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See, e.g., Roe, 

supra, 613 F.3d at 1061. In an attempt to establish this burden, Shelia Campbell points to 

her counterclaim for $2,000,000.00 (Doc. 1, at 19) and, in addition, argues that the home 

which she and her husband are still occupying is valued at $208,000.00, well in excess of 

the jurisdictional amount of $75,000.00 (Doc. 12, at 22 & 24). Shelia Campbell’s 

arguments, however, do not establish that the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000.00. As for the counterclaim argument, this Court and other district courts in the 

Eleventh Circuit have specifically determined that a defendant’s counterclaim cannot 

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“be considered in determining the amount in controversy [in the context of removal 

jurisdiction].” Merion Realty Management, L.L.C. v. Henry, 2010 WL 5140571, *4 (S.D. Ala. 

Nov. 19, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 5339425 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 9, 

2010); see also, e.g., Conference Am., Inc. v. Q.E.D. Int’l, Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1241 (M.D. 

Ala. 1999) (“[T]he court finds that a counterclaim should not be considered when 

determining whether the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332 is satisfied in 

the context of removal.”).5 The valuation argument is also unavailing inasmuch as 

plaintiff filed a statutory ejectment action under Alabama law seeking possession of the 

real property (the house) because of its purchase of the real property at foreclosure (see

Doc. 1, COMPLAINT), EB Investments, L.L.C. v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 930 So.2d 502 (Ala. 

2005) (finding claim to be one in ejectment under § 6-6-280(b), Ala. Code 1975, when the 

complaint alleged that plaintiff was entitled to possession of land because of its 

purchase of the land at a foreclosure sale and that the defendant was unlawfully 

detaining same); see also MacMillan Bloedell, Inc. v. Ezell, 475 So.2d 493, 496 (Ala. 1985) 

(recognizing that statutory ejectment under § 6-6-280(b) is possessory in nature); 

therefore, since the core issue of the instant suit is the limited right of possession, the 

removing parties cannot rely on the value of the property to satisfy the amount in 

controversy requirement, cf. AMD Property Management, supra, at *4 (“’As a 

dispossessory proceeding under Georgia law is not an ownership dispute, but rather 

only a dispute over the limited right to possession, title to property is not at issue and, 

accordingly, the removing defendant may not rely on the value of the property as a 

whole to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.’”); CitiMortgage, Inc., supra, 705 

 5 Courts have reached this conclusion given the Eleventh Circuit’s clear direction 

that district courts “must look to plaintiff’s claim to determine whether removal [is] 

appropriate.” Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis supplied).

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F.Supp.2d at 1382 (“[T]his court has held that as a matter of law, a claim seeking only 

ejectment in a dispossessory action cannot be reduced to a monetary sum for purposes 

of determining the amount in controversy.”). Because the Campbells cannot rely on the 

value of their house to establish the amount in controversy, and have not otherwise 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Bank’s efforts to eject them 

from the house and obtain from them certain money damages for their wrongful 

retention of the property establish the amount in controversy, this second requirement 

for diversity jurisdiction has not been met.

C. Federal Question Jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that federal 

courts possess “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. “[U]nless the face of a plaintiff’s complaint 

states a federal question, a defendant may not remove a case to federal court on [a 

federal question] basis, even though a possible defense might involve a federal 

question.” Ervast v. Flexible Products Co., 346 F.3d 1007, 1012 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis 

supplied), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 808, 125 S.Ct. 30, 160 L.Ed.2d 10 (2004); see also Jefferson 

County, Alabama v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 430-431, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 2075, 144 L.Ed.2d 408 

(1999) (“To remove a case as one falling within federal-question jurisdiction, the federal 

question ordinarily must appear on the face of a properly pleaded complaint; an 

anticipated or actual federal defense generally does not qualify a case for removal.”); see 

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) 

(“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘wellpleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a 

federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 

complaint.”). Nor, despite the removing defendants’ apparent position to the contrary 

(see Doc. 12, at 2 (defendants’ base assertion that the court should look to their 

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purported “complaint”)),6 “can federal jurisdiction rest upon an actual or anticipated 

counterclaim.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 1272, 173 L.Ed.2d 

206 (2009); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830, 

122 S.Ct. 1889, 1893, 153 L.Ed.2d 13 (2002) (“[T]he well-pleaded complaint rule, properly 

understood [does not] allo[w] a counterclaim to serve as the basis for a district court’s 

‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”); Bobrowski, supra, at *2 (“[T]he assertion of federal 

counterclaims is insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.”). As 

previously indicated, the removing defendants bear the burden of establishing that a 

federal question exists. See, e.g., Friedman, supra, 410 F.3d at 1353. 

Here, there is nothing to indicate that plaintiff’s complaint, as amended (Doc. 1, 

COMPLAINT & AMENDED COMPLAINT), raises anything more than a statutory 

ejectment claim under Alabama law, compare Ala.Code § 6-6-280(b) (“An action for the 

recovery of land or the possession thereof in the nature of an action in ejectment may be 

maintained without a statement of any lease or demise to the plaintiff or ouster by a 

casual or nominal ejector, and the complaint is sufficient if it alleges that the plaintiff 

was possessed of the premises or has the legal title thereto, properly designating or 

describing them, and that the defendant entered thereupon and unlawfully withholds 

and detains the same.”) with Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 159 So.3d 31, 35 & 

46 (Ala. 2013) (recognizing that successful bidder at foreclosure auction can bring a 

 6 The defendants, of course, never filed a complaint in state court; instead, they 

filed an answer to the complaint filed by Wells Fargo, the plaintiff, and therein inserted a 

counterclaim for $2,000,000.00. In addition, the defendants later filed a 652-page document 

titled “Counter Lawsuit and Complaint Motion Adjoining Plaintiff’s Complaint Against Their 

Actions To (Vacate Property And Ejectment).” Had this document not been stricken by the 

Mobile County Circuit Court, at best it constitutes the defendants’ additional counterclaims 

and/or defenses; it is not a complaint and is obviously not the plaintiff’s complaint, which is the 

only complaint considered in deciding whether federal question jurisdiction exists. See Ervast, 

supra.

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statutory ejectment action under § 6-6-280(b) against original debtor/mortgagee). No 

federal law or authority is presented on the face of the complaint, as amended (see Doc. 

1, COMPLAINT & AMENDED COMPLAINT); certainly, none of the federal laws

identified by the defendants in the removal petition (counterclaims in 337 proceedings, 

fraud upon the Court, fraud under Rules 59(b) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, FDCPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, and 1985, or the Deed of Trust Act and 

Consumer Protection Act) are apparent on the face of the complaint. Moreover, Wells 

Fargo does not request relief (see, e.g., Doc. 1, COMPLAINT, at 2 (“Plaintiff demands 

possession of the aforesaid real property, together with money damages for the 

wrongful retention of said real property . . . and costs of court.”)) beyond that 

contemplated by a statutory ejectment proceeding under Alabama law, see Ala.Code § 

6-6-280(b) (“An action for the recovery of land or the possession thereof in the nature of 

an action in ejectment may be maintained[.] . . . The plaintiff may recover in this action 

mesne profits and damages for waste or any other injury to the lands, as the plaintiff’s 

interests in the lands entitled him to recover[.]”). Because an ejectment action, like the 

one brought by Wells Fargo, is exclusively a matter of state law, and the defendants 

have not otherwise established that plaintiff’s “well-pleaded complaint presents a 

federal question, they have failed to establish federal question jurisdiction under § 

1331.” Bobrowski, supra, at *2; see also CitiMortgage, Inc., supra, 705 F.Supp.2d at 1381 

(“[E]ven though Dhinoja’s notice of removal alleges that Georgia’s dispossessory 

process violates his rights under the United States Constitution, a Court’s inquiry into 

the presence of federal question jurisdiction is limited to the allegations found in the 

plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. If a federal question is not presented on the face of 

the complaint, ‘it is no substitute that the defendant is almost certain to raise a federal 

defense.’ Thus, it is immaterial that Dhinoja alleges that his constitutional rights have 

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been violated. Consequently, the Court finds that there is no federal question presented 

such that this Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1331.” (internal citation omitted)); see Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, supra, 868 

F.2d at 194 (“FNMA’s complaint for foreclosure of LeCrone’s mortgage raises no federal 

issues and thus the suit between FNMA and LeCrone does not present a federal 

question for removal analysis, Mr. LeCrone’s reliance upon federal regulations in his

defense notwithstanding.”). Accordingly, this Court lacks federal question jurisdiction 

under § 1331.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the complaint, as amended, filed by 

Wells Fargo in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama contains no grounds upon 

which this Court might exercise subject-matter jurisdiction and, therefore, is it

RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 9) be GRANTED and that 

this cause be remanded to the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama from whence it 

came.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c)(1) & (2). The parties should note that under Eleventh 

Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was 

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informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to 

object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal 

for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing 

before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 3rd day of September, 2015. 

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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