Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02595/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02595-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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09cv2595 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES MCKILLIP,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

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Civil No. 09-2595-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. Nos. 14, 15)

On November 18, 2009, Plaintiff James McKillip (hereafter

“Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint For Judicial Review And Remedy On

Administrative Decision Under The Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.

§405(g)]. On January 19, 2010, Defendant Michael J. Astrue

(hereafter “Defendant”), filed an Answer to the Complaint and the

administrative record (hereafter “Record” or “Tr.”), pertaining to

this case. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendant has filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff has

filed a Reply to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

Case 3:09-cv-02595-WQH-WVG Document 17 Filed 12/13/10 Page 1 of 19
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09cv2595 2

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s

Reply to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and the

Record filed by Defendant, hereby finds that Plaintiff is not

entitled to the relief requested and therefore RECOMMENDS that

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED. 

I

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff was born on March 27, 1962. (Tr. 29). He attended

college for two years and studied electronics assembly. (TR. 29-30).

In 1982, Plaintiff suffered a head injury in a motor vehicle

accident and was in a coma for 28 days. (Tr. 358). Thereafter, he

worked as an auto service technician, as an electrician apprentice,

as a home health worker and as a janitor at an elementary school.

(Tr. 33-40). Plaintiff claims that he became unable to work on May

7, 2007. (Tr. 25).

A. Dr. Usha R. Ramineni

On February 23, 2007, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Usha Ramineni

(hereafter “Dr. Ramineni”), at Psycare Associates, for an initial

psychiatric consultation. Plaintiff told Dr. Ramineni that he sought

counseling because he had received a poor performance review at

work. At the time, Plaintiff was working as a janitor at an

elementary school. He said that his poor performance review stemmed

from not securing certain areas of the school and being too close

and friendly with teachers at the school. He complained of poor

concentration, distractability and memory loss. Plaintiff stated

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1/ The GAF scale is a tool for “reporting the clinician's judgment of

the individual's overall level of functioning.” American Psychiatric

Ass'n., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32

(4th ed. 2000). The clinician uses a scale of zero to 100 to

consider “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a

hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness,” not including

impairments in functioning due to physical or environmental

limitations. Id. at 34. A Global Assessment of Functioning score

between 51 and 60 indicates “Moderate symptoms or moderate

difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning. Browne v.

Astrue, 2010 WL 3732122 (D. Or., September 21, 2010).

A

09cv2595 3

that he suffered a head injury in 1982 and had used marijuana and

methamphetamine in the past. Dr. Ramineni examined Plaintiff and

found him to have a cooperative attitude, organized thought

processes and intact judgment and insight. However, Dr. Ramineni

also found Plaintiff to be depressed with impaired memory. Dr.

Ramineni gave Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Function score

(hereafter “GAF”) of 60.1/

 (Tr. 354-358, 391-396).

In March 2007, Plaintiff saw Dr. Ramineni. Plaintiff reported

that he continued to have a poor attention span and poor memory.

(Tr. 353, 397).

In April 2007, Plaintiff again saw Dr. Ramineni. Dr. Ramineni

reported that Plaintiff seemed confused, had low energy and memory

loss. (Tr. 352, 398).

In May 2007, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Ramineni that he was

tired and felt anxious. (Tr. 351, 398)

On July 23, 2007, Plaintiff received notice that his

applications for Disability Insurance Income and Supplemental Social

Security Income were denied. He reported to Dr. Ramineni that he had

lost his job, and that he was contemplating suicide. Dr. Ramineni

advised Plaintiff to go to the emergency room. Plaintiff agreed to

go to the emergency room. (Tr. 350).

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09cv2595 4

B. Dr. C. Valette

On June 26, 2007, C. Valette, Ph.D. (hereafter “Dr.

Valette”), a Clinical Psychologist, examined Plaintiff in connection

with his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Social Security Income. Plaintiff reported to Dr.

Valette that he attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings every day, was

able to take care of his personal hygiene, was able to perform yard

work, laundry tasks, cook, and take care of his own finances. He

also commented to Dr. Valette that his hobbies included “getting

naked, show off to girlfriends my collection of thong underwear.”

Dr. Valette observed that Plaintiff had a tendency to exaggerate his

difficulties and “did not put forth his best effort into this

evaluation. His poor scores are inconsistent with his adequate

presentation, and reported functional abilities.” Dr. Valette

concluded that Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning was in the

average range and that he had no mental restrictions. (Tr. 322-323).

C. Dr. G.M. Rivera-Miya

On July 11, 2007, Dr. G.M. Rivera-Miya, M.D. (hereafter “Dr.

Rivera-Miya”), a state agency psychiatrist, reviewed Plaintiff’s

records and opined that Plaintiff had a non-severe mental impairment. (Tr. 326). Dr. Rivera-Miya also opined that Plaintiff had mild

restriction of activities of daily living, mild difficulties in

maintaining social functioning, mild difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence or pace. (Tr. 334).

D. Dr. Nicodemus J. Garcia

On July 23, 2007, after Plaintiff reported to Dr. Ramineni

that he was contemplating suicide, he was seen by Dr. Nicodemus J.

Garcia, M.D. (hereafter “Dr. Garcia”), a staff psychiatrist at the

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2/ See footnote 1. A GAF score of 61-70 indicates “(s)ome mild symptoms

or some difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning...

but generally functioning pretty well...” American Psychiatric

Assn., Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32, (4th

ed. 2000). Bartell v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2161783 (W.D. Wa., April 30,

2010).

3/ See footnote 1.

09cv2595 5

County of San Diego Health & Human Services Agency, San Diego County

Psychiatric Hospital. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Garcia that he was

contemplating suicide. However, Dr. Garcia later noted that

Plaintiff was not feeling suicidal. Dr. Garcia noted that Plaintiff

was cooperative and pleasant during his examination, Plaintiff’s

thought contents were organized and coherent and his thought

processes were well-directed. Dr. Garcia determined that Plaintiff

had a GAF score of 65-702/ and concluded that Plaintiff’s potential

for harm was minimal. Dr. Garcia advised Plaintiff to continue to

take his medications and discharged him from the hospital. (Tr. 382-

383).

E. Dr. H. Susan Kower

In April 2008, Plaintiff began psychiatric treatment with Dr.

H. Susan Kower, M.D. (hereafter “Dr. Kower”). On April 7, 2008, Dr.

Kower noted that Plaintiff was alert and oriented, had coherent

thoughts, was cooperative, depressed and anxious, and had difficulty

concentrating. (Tr. 409, 423). She also noted that Plaintiff had

impaired coping skills. (Tr. 410, 424). Dr. Kower gave Plaintiff a

GAF score of 53.3/

On May 5, 2008, Dr. Kower opined that Plaintiff was “unable

to be gainfully employed due to his Major Depression, Recurrent, and

his acquired head injury.” (Tr. 372).

On September 4, 2008, Dr. Kower stated that Plaintiff was

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09cv2595 6

“unable to work due to Major Depression.” (Tr. 375).

On October 6, 2008, Dr. Kower opined that Plaintiff was

“unable to work” due to “major depression, Recurrent/Anxiety

Disorder/acquired brain injury.” (Tr. 373).

On December 27, 2008, Dr. Kower filled out a checklist of

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. The checklist noted that

Plaintiff had “markedly limited ability” to: (1) remember locations

and work-like procedures; (2) understand and remember very short

simple and detailed instructions; (3) maintain attention and

concentration for extended periods; (4) perform activities within a

schedule, maintain regular attendance and be punctual; (5) sustain

an ordinary routine without special supervision; (6) work in

coordination with or in proximity to others without being distracted

by them; (7) make simple work-related decisions; (8) complete a

normal work day and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and perform at a consistent pace without an

unreasonable number and length of rest periods; (9) interact

appropriately with the general public; (10) ask simple questions or

request assistance; (11) accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; (12) get along with coworkers

or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes;

(13) respond appropriately to changes in the work setting; (14)

travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation; and (15)

set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. (Tr. 376-

377).

At the end of the checklist, Dr. Kower noted that Plaintiff:

had a compromised short term memory and concentration,

(Plaintiff) suffers from major depression and borderline personality disorder, (Plaintiff) becomes easily

overwhelmed by minimal stress, can become irritable

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09cv2595 7

and depressed then unable to follow through. He has

interpersonal problems especially with authority

figures, can misinterpret interpersonal interactions

with co-workers - these are chronic conditions and

interfere with his ability to hold a job. His

prognosis is guarded.

(Tr. 378).

On April 20, 2009, Dr. Kower opined that Plaintiff was alert,

oriented and cooperative, exhibited normal speech and judgment, had

normal intellect, but was depressed and anxious, had poor recent

memory and the inability to concentrate. (Tr. 406, 420).

 II

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 1, 2007, Plaintiff filed applications for Disability

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Social Security Income. (Tr.

133-144). Plaintiff alleged that he became unable to work because of

an acquired brain injury, depression, anxiety, diabetes and high

blood pressure. (Tr. 232). The Commissioner of Social Security

denied his application initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 53-

56). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (hereafter “ALJ”). On June 25, 2009, Plaintiff

appeared and testified before Jerry F. Muskrat. (Tr. 18-52). On

September 18, 2009, ALJ Muskrat found that Plaintiff was not

disabled. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review

of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 1-3).

On November 18, 2009, Plaintiff filed this action. On January

19, 2010, Defendant filed an Answer and the administrative record

pertaining to this case. On July 26, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment. On August 23, 2010, Defendant filed an

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and a CrossMotion for Summary Judgment. On September 7, 2010, Plaintiff filed

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09cv2595 8

a Reply to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

 III

 SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW

Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “Act”), as

amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons

who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical

or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1)(D). Title XVI of the

Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent

persons under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. § 1382

(a). Both titles of the Act define “disability” as the “inability

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months...” Id. The Act further provides that an individual:

shall be determined to be under a disability only if

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are

of such severity that he is not only unable to do his

previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or

whether he would be hired if he applied for work. Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.” If he is, disability benefits are denied. 20

C.F. R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the decision

maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant

has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.

That determination is governed by the “severity regulation” at issue

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09cv2595 9

in this case. The severity regulation provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of

impairments which significantly limits your physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will

find that you do not have a severe impairment and are,

therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your

age, education, and work experience. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c). 

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the

abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1521(b), 416.921(b). Such abilities and aptitudes include

“[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling”; “[c]apacities

for seeing, hearing, and speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying out,

and remembering simple instructions”; [u]se of judgment”;

“[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual

work situations”; and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work

setting.” Id. 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. 

If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the

third step, which determines whether the impairment is equivalent to

one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or equals

one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed

to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is conclusively

presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth

step, which determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant

from performing work he has performed in the past. If the claimant

is able to perform his previous work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.

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09cv2595 10

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant cannot perform his

previous work, the fifth and final step of the process determines

whether he is able to perform other work in the national economy in

view of his age, education, and work experience. The claimant is

entitled to disability benefits only if he is not able to perform

other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). 

 IV

 ALJ’S FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following pertinent findings:

1. (Plaintiff) meets the insured status requirements

of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2012.

2. (Plaintiff) has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since May 7, 2007, the amended alleged onset

date.

3. (Plaintiff) has the following severe impairment: a

major depressive disorder.

4. (Plaintiff) does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one

of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1.

No physician has opined that (Plaintiff’s) condition

meets or equals any listing, and the state agency

physicians have opined that it does not.

In activities of daily living, (Plaintiff) has mild

restriction.

In social functioning, (Plaintiff) has moderate

difficulties.

With regard to concentration, persistence and pace,

(Plaintiff) has moderate difficulties.

(Plaintiff) has experienced no episodes of

decompensation which have been of extended duration.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record,

the undersigned finds that (Plaintiff) has the

residual functional capacity to perform a full range

of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: (Plaintiff) is further

limited to non-public simple repetitive tasks with

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4/ Dr. Kower’s records reflect that her name is “H. Susan Kower, M.D.”

09cv2595 11

minimal contact with peers and supervisors.

In making this finding, the undersigned has considered

all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms

can reasonably be expected as consistent with the

objective medical evidence and other evidence. The

undersigned has also considered opinion evidence.

(Plaintiff) has a history of a major depressive

disorder recurrent. On May 16, 2007, Usha R. Ramineni,

M.D., completed a mental health evaluation of (Plaintiff) and reported (Plaintiff) said he was sleeping

well and eating well with mild effect. (Plaintiff) was

taking his medication for his psychiatric symptoms

with no side effects. (Plaintiff) was given a global

assessment of functioning score of 60, which are mild

symptoms.

On May 23, 2007, C. Valette Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, completed a mental status evaluation and

reported (Plaintiff) was seeing a psychiatrist since

April 2007 for his psychiatric symptoms. On examination, Dr. Valette said (Plaintiff’s) mood and memory

was normal. (Plaintiff’s) judgment and concentration

was also normal. Dr. Valette said (Plaintiff) had a

tendency to exaggerate his difficulties and he did not

put forward his best efforts into the evaluation. Dr.

Valette said (Plaintiff’s) poor scores were inconsistent with his adequate presentation. Dr. Valette gave

(Plaintiff) no mental restrictions.

From August 2, 2007 through April 20, 2009, the County

of San Diego Mental Health Service completed a mental

health assessment and reported although (Plaintiff)

appeared to be depressed with problems concentrating

and remembering some events that took place in his

life, (Plaintiff) was alert, clean and cooperative.

(Plaintiff’s) intellect and judgment (were) normal.

(Plaintiff) was given a global assessment of functioning score of 53, which are moderate symptoms.

On May 5, 2008, Susan H. Kower, M.D.,4/

 reported

(Plaintiff) was unable to be gainfully employed due to

his major depression recurring and his acquired brain

injury.

The undersigned has considered the treating physician’s opinion that (Plaintiff) is unable to be

gainfully employed due to his major depression,

recurrence. However, treatment records reflect

conservative care with no significant abnormality. The

undersigned finds Dr. Kower’s opinion not credible.

The undersigned finds that (Plaintiff) is not disCase 3:09-cv-02595-WQH-WVG Document 17 Filed 12/13/10 Page 11 of 19
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09cv2595 12

abled.

After careful consideration of the evidence, the

undersigned finds that (Plaintiff’s) medically

determinable impairment could reasonably be expected

to cause the alleged symptoms; however, (Plaintiff’s)

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to

the extent they are inconsistent with the above

residual functional capacity assessment.

However, to the extent that it is alleged that

(Plaintiff) cannot perform work at all exertional

levels, the undersigned finds those allegations are

not totally credible for the following clear and

convincing reasons. First, (Plaintiff) is able to

perform activities of daily living such as taking care

of his personal hygiene, housekeeping and cooking.

Second, on May 16, 2007, Dr. Ramineni reported

(Plaintiff) was sleeping well and eating well with

mild effect. (Plaintiff) was taking his psychiatric

medication with no side effects. (Plaintiff) was given

a global assessment of functioning score of 60, which

are mild symptoms.

Third, on May 23, 2007, Dr. Valette reported (Plaintiff’s) mood, judgment and concentration and memory

(were) normal. Dr. Valette said (Plaintiff) exaggerated during the interview and did not put forward his

best efforts into the evaluation. Dr. Valette said

(Plaintiff’s) poor scores were inconsistent with his

adequate presentation. Dr. Valette gave (Plaintiff) no

mental restrictions.

Fourth, from August 2, 2007 through April 20, 2009,

the County of San Diego Mental Health Service reported

(Plaintiff) was alert, clean and cooperative. (Plaintiff’s) insight was adequate and his behavior was

cooperative. (Plaintiff’s) intellect and judgment was

normal. (Plaintiff) was given a global assessment of

functioning score of 53, which are moderate symptoms.

Consequently, (Plaintiff’s) allegations are not

credible to establish a more restrictive residual

functional capacity than that found above.

Findings of fact made by State Agency medical and

psychological consultants regarding the nature and

severity of a claimant’s impairments must be treated

as expert opinion evidence of a nonexamining source at

the Administrative Law Judge level of adjudication

(SSR 96-6p). The State Agency consultants decided at

the initial and reconsideration determination levels

that (Plaintiff’s) condition was not of sufficient

severity to prevent him from working. The State Agency

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09cv2595 13

opined that (Plaintiff’s) physical and mental impairments were non-severe. The State Agency concluded that

(Plaintiff’s) condition was not severe enough to keep

him from working.

Mary Jesko, Ph.D., a vocational consultant, provided

expert vocational testimony at the hearing. After a

thorough review of the record, Dr. Jesko identified

(Plaintiff’s) past relevant work, its Dictionary of

Occupational Titles’ number, its skill level, and its

exertional requirements as generally performed in the

national economy. Accordingly, (Plaintiff) has past

relevant work as: a service technician (auto) was

unskilled performed at a medium level of exertion, an

apprentice electrician was skilled performed at the

medium level of exertion, a home attendant was

semiskilled performed at a medium level of exertion

and a school janitor was semiskilled performed at a

medium level of exertion of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 

Dr. Jesko then considered a question involving a

hypothetical individual with (Plaintiff’s) testimony

and past relevant work experience. She replied that

such an individual is not able to perform his past

relevant work.

The court concurs with and adopts the analysis of the

vocational expert and so finds.

6. (Plaintiff) is unable to perform any past relevant

work.

7. (Plaintiff) was born on March 27, 1962 and was 45

years old, which is defined as a younger individual

age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date.

8. (Plaintiff) has at least a high school education

and is able to communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to

the determination of disability because applying the

Medical-Vocational Rules directly supports a finding

of ‘not disabled,’ whether or not (Plaintiff) has

transferable job skills.

10. Considering (Plaintiff’s) age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there

are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy that (Plaintiff) can perform.

(Plaintiff’s) ability to perform work at all

exertional levels has been compromised by

nonexertional limitations. To determine the extent to

which these limitations erode the occupational base of

unskilled work at all exertional levels, the underCase 3:09-cv-02595-WQH-WVG Document 17 Filed 12/13/10 Page 13 of 19
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09cv2595 14

signed asked the vocational expert whether jobs exist

in the national economy for an individual with

(Plaintiff’s) age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity. The vocational expert

testified that given all the factors the individual

would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as production inspector, DOT

No. 669.687-014, classified as unskilled, sedentary

exertional level with 720 in the local economy and

98,000 in the national economy, a glass filler, DOT

No. 692.685-114, unskilled, light exertional level

with 790 in the local economy and 110,000 in the

national economy, and a floor waxer, DOT No. 381.687-

034, classified as unskilled, medium exertional level

with 1,600 in the local economy and 1.5 in the

national economy.

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the vocational expert’s

testimony is consistent with the information contained

in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the

undersigned concludes that, considering (Plaintiff’s)

age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, (Plaintiff) is capable of making a

successful adjustment to other work that exists in

significant numbers in the national economy. A finding

of ‘not disabled’ is therefore appropriate under the

framework of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines.

11. (Plaintiff) has not been under a disability, as

defined by the Social Security Act, from May 7, 2007

through the date of this decision.

 V

 THE ALJ PROPERLY REJECTED THE CONCLUSIONS OF

 PLAINTIFF’S TREATING PSYCHIATRIST

A. The ALJ Properly Determined Plaintiff’s Residual

 Functional Capacity

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by substituting his own

opinion of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (hereafter

“RFC”) instead of adopting the opinion of Dr. Kower, one of

Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrists. Specifically, Plaintiff refers

to Dr. Kower’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental functioning and

inability to work. (See Section I.E. of this Report and Recommendation.) Nevertheless, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the (RFC) to

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the

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following non-exertional limitations: (Plaintiff) is further limited

to non-public simple repetitive tasks with minimal contact with

peers and supervisors.” (Tr. 13). Defendant argues that the ALJ

properly rejected Dr. Kower’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s RFC.

It is the responsibility of the ALJ, not a claimant’s

physician, to determine a claimant’s RFC. Vertigan v. Halter, 260

F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s determination of a

Plaintiff’s RFC must be supported by substantial evidence. Morgan v.

Comm. of Social Security, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). When the

ALJ determines a claimant’s RFC, he must take into account those

limitations for which there is support in the record that do not

depend on the claimant’s subjective complaints. If the ALJ’s

determination of a claimant’s RFC takes into account a claimant’s

limitations which have support in the record, a function-by-function

analysis for medical conditions and impairments is unnecessary.

Bayliss v. Barnhart 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, Dr. Ramineni’s notes reflect that Plaintiff had

organized thought processes, intact judgment and insight, but

impaired memory. Also, Dr. Ramineni reported that Plaintiff told

him that while he was working as a janitor at an elementary school,

he received a poor performance review due to his failure to secure

certain parts of the school and for making inappropriate comments to

teachers at the school. Further, Dr. Ramineni assigned Plaintiff a

GAF score of 51-60, which indicates moderate symptoms or moderate

difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning. (Tr. 354-

358, 391-396).

Additionally, Dr. Garcia, who treated Plaintiff when

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Plaintiff was contemplating suicide, noted that Plaintiff’s thought

contents were organized and coherent and his thought processes were

well-directed. He assigned Plaintiff a GAF score of 65-70, which

indicates some mild symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning, but generally functioning pretty well.

(Tr. 382-383).

Further, Dr. Kower opined that Plaintiff was alert, oriented,

had coherent thoughts, was depressed and anxious, had difficulty

concentrating, and had impaired coping skills. (Tr. 410, 424)

The Court finds that the symptoms reported by Drs. Ramineni,

Garcia and Kower are consistent with an RFC limited to simple

repetitive tasks. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169-

1174-1175 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ’s finding in this regard is

supported by substantial evidence in the record as noted by Drs.

Ramineni, Garcia, and Kower. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in

assigning an RFC that limited Plaintiff’s potential work to simple

repetitive tasks.

Moreover, Plaintiff received a poor work performance review

due, in part, to his making inappropriate comments to coworkers. He

also commented to Dr. Valette that his hobbies included “getting

naked, show off to girlfriends my collection of thong underwear.”

(Tr. 322). The Court finds this comment to be an odd and peculiar

response to a question regarding one’s hobbies. In light of

Plaintiff’s inappropriate and odd comments, the Court finds that the

ALJ’s decision to limit Plaintiff’s RFC to non-public work with

minimal contact with coworkers and supervisors, was reasonable. As

a result, the ALJ’s decision did not err in assigning an RFC which

further limited Plaintiff to non-public work with minimal contact

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with peers and supervisors. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard be DENIED and

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard be GRANTED.

B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Opinions of Plaintiff’s 

 Treating Psychiatrist

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly

reject the opinions of Dr. Kower, one of Plaintiff’s treating

psychiatrists. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed

to state clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Dr. Kower’s

opinions. Defendant argues that the ALJ properly evaluated Dr.

Kower’s opinions.

An ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to the

opinion of a treating physician. Batson v. Comm. of Social Security,

359 F.3d 1190, 1194-1195 (9th Cir. 2004). “Although a treating

physician’s opinion is generally afforded the greatest weight in

disability cases, it is not binding on the ALJ with respect to the

existence of an impairment or the ultimate determination of

disability.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.

2001). “The ALJ may disregard the treating physician’s opinion

whether or not that opinion is contradicted.” Magallanes v. Bowen,

881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).

When an ALJ is presented with conflicting medical opinions of

Plaintiff’s treating physicians and the opinions of consultive

physicians, greater weight must be given to the opinion of the

treating physicians, unless the ALJ gives specific, legitimate

reasons for disregarding the opinion of the treating physician.

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195.

An ALJ may discount a treating physician’s opinion if it is

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presented in the form of a check list and does not have supportive

objective evidence and is contradicted by other statements and

assessments of a claimant’s medical condition. Id. at 1195; Crane v.

Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996).

The ALJ specifically addressed Dr. Kower’s opinions and

discounted them because there was no objective medical evidence in

Dr. Kower’s records to support her opinions, nor any cross-references or explanations as to how she arrived at her conclusions.

Consequently, the ALJ determined that Dr. Kower’s opinions were not

entitled to controlling weight and were inconsistent with other

evidence in the record. The ALJ also rejected Dr. Kower’s opinions

regarding Plaintiff’s most severe limitations, as not supported by

the record. (Tr. 14).

The ALJ specifically and legitimately discounted Dr. Kower’s

opinions because her records do not provide objective medical

evidence of Plaintiff’s limitations as asserted in her opinions.

Further, the Record was replete with evidence from Plaintiff’s other

treating psychiatrists and consultive mental health evaluators that

Plaintiff’s symptoms were not as severe as Dr. Kower opined.

Further, Dr. Kower’s opinions were properly discounted because they

were presented in the form of check lists that were unsupported by

objective evidence and were contradicted by other treating and

consultive physicians’ statements and assessments of Plaintiff’s

limitations. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195, Crane, 76 F. 3d at 253.

As a result of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Dr.

Kower’s opinions were properly evaluated. Therefore, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this

regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this

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regard be GRANTED.

 VI

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 14, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

January 28, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 13, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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