Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02250/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 152
Nature of Suit: Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Default of Student Loan

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 10cv2250

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10-CV-2250 JLS (CAB)

ORDER: GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(ECF No. 23)

vs.

MICHAEL A. TAIBI,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff United States of America’s motion for summary

judgment. (ECF No. 23.) Also before the Court are Defendant Michael A. Taibi’s opposition (ECF

No. 25) and Plaintiff’s reply (ECF No. 27). The motion hearing set for February 23, 2012 is HEREBY

VACATED, and the matter is taken under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local

Rule 7.1(d)(1). Having considered the parties’ arguments and the law, Plaintiff’s motion is

GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on November 1, 2010 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 for recovery of

a defaulted student loan on behalf of the Department of Education. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff

alleges Defendant obtained a student loan in the amount of $36,235.03, which was insured by the

Case 3:10-cv-02250-JLS-MDD Document 29 Filed 02/21/12 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 10cv2250

Department of Education pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1071. Defendant eventually defaulted on the loan,

and the Department of Education later assumed all rights to the claim, which had accrued capitalized

interest of $9,606.08, increasing the principal due to $45,841.11. (Id. at 2.) Defendant apparently never

made any payments on the loan. Plaintiff now seeks judgment against Defendant in the amount of

$45,841.11 plus interest at 9 percent from March 28, 1998 to the date of judgment, as well as other

costs and penalties. (Id.) As of December 19, 2011, the date of Plaintiff’s filing the instant motion for

summary judgment, this amount totals $102,448.72. (MSJ 2, ECF No. 23.) 

In support of its contentions, Plaintiff attached to the complaint a certificate of indebtedness

executed in September, 2010 and apparently mailed to Defendant at an address in La Jolla, California.

(Certificate, Compl. 3) The letter describes the history of the debt, beginning when Defendant secured

a “Federal Family Education Loan Program Consolidation” loan for $36,235.03 from CitiBank in

Rochester, New York on April 21, 1993. The loan obligation was guaranteed by United Student Aid

Funds, and then reinsured by the Department of Education under loan guaranty programs authorized

by federal statute. Defendant apparently defaulted on the obligation on March 26, 1998, at which point

the holder filed a claim on the loan guarantee. After the guarantor was unsuccessful in collecting any

amount due, on November 8, 2006, it assigned the loan to the Department of Education. The letter

concludes by informing Defendant he owes $97,070.41 as of August 27, 2010, with interest accruing

on the principal at a rate of $11.28 per day. 

With its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff additionally produces a copy of a “Loan

Consolidation Application and Promissory Note,” signed by Michael A. Taibi on April 21, 1993. (MSJ

Ex. B.) Plaintiff also provides documentation of what appears to be the record of United Student Aid

Funds of Defendant’s default (MSJ Ex. C), letters indicating several attempts to collect on the loan

by a debt collection company, National Payment Center, on behalf of the Department of Education

(MSJ Ex. D), as well as the Declaration of Michael Illes, a loan analyst for the Department of

Education (Illes Decl. ISO MSJ, ECF No. 23-3). 

On January 5, 2011, Defendant filed an answer in which he denies that he obtained a student

loan in the amount of $36,235.03 and denies defaulting on any loan. (Answer 1-2, ECF No. 3.)

Defendant claims a lack of sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the

Case 3:10-cv-02250-JLS-MDD Document 29 Filed 02/21/12 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 10cv2250

remaining allegations in the complaint and asserts fourteen affirmative defenses, each stated generally

and without any factual support in what can only be described as boilerplate fashion. (Answer 2-5.)

In opposition to the instant motion for summary judgment, Defendant provides only his own

Declaration (Taibi Decl. ISO Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1) and the Declaration of Samuel A. Sue, his attorney

(Sue Decl. ISO Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 2).

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a court to grant summary judgment where (1) the

moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and (2) entitlement to

judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d

265 (1986). “Material,” for purposes of Rule 56, means that the fact, under governing substantive law,

could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct.

2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1997). For a dispute to

be “genuine,” a reasonable jury must be able to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248.

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls on the

moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can carry his burden in two ways: (1) by

presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by

demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element

of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. Id. at 322. “Disputes over irrelevant or

unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987).

Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the burden

shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing that a genuine issue of disputed fact remains.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary

judgment motion by “rest[ing] upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 256. When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view all inferences drawn from

the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Case 3:10-cv-02250-JLS-MDD Document 29 Filed 02/21/12 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Defendant also protests on general grounds without stating how these arguments rebut or

negate an element of Plaintiff’s case. Specifically, Defendant states he commenced law school in

August, 1989, “at which time Defendant recalls entering into a promissory note for the original student

loans.” (Def.’s Opp’n 2.) Defendant further alleges that, despite having requested numerous times

“from USA Funds, since June 2000, a bill of particulars with respect to the underlying loans and the

promissory note of Citibank,” he has not received any “payment history for Defendant’s account.”

(Def.’s Opp’n 3.) The Court interprets these statements as further arguments based on the

insufficiency of Plaintiff’s evidence, and rejects them for the same reasons discussed below. 

- 4 - 10cv2250

ANALYSIS

To prevail on its claim to enforce a promissory note in a student loan case, the government

must establish: (1) the existence of the note, signed by the defendant; (2) that the government is the

current owner or holder of the note; and (3) the defendant’s default on the amount due. See United

States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Freeman, 2002 WL 467688

(N.D.Cal. Mar. 25, 2002). To prove its claim, “the government may introduce evidence of the note

and a sworn transcript of the account or certificate of indebtedness.” United States v. Petroff-Kline,

557 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 2009). Once a prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to the

defendant to establish the nonexistence, extinguishment, variance in payment of the obligation, or

some other affirmative defense. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff has presented a copy of the original Promissory Note, signed by “Michael A.

Taibi,” a Certificate of Indebtedness attesting to the government’s current ownership of the note,

Defendant’s default and the amount due, and a declaration of a Department of Education loan officer

attesting to all of the above. The Court finds this evidence is sufficient to establish Plaintiff’s prima

facie case. See United States v. Irby, 517 F.2d 1042, 1043 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding the government’s

prima facie case of loan default was clearly established by introduction of the promissory note, the

guaranty agreement, and a sworn transcript of the account by an appropriate government officer,

finding erroneous the district court’s determination that the government had not met its burden, based

solely on the defendants’ denials and demands for more specific proof). 

Defendant contests the entry of judgment against him for two primary reasons. First, he argues

that Plaintiff has not provided the contract between Defendant and Citibank, or the Disclosure

Statement. Second, he asserts that the Promissory Note is missing several material terms.1

 (Def.’s

Opp’n 4-5.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant’s arguments boil down to a single

Case 3:10-cv-02250-JLS-MDD Document 29 Filed 02/21/12 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Although perhaps not ultimately relevant to the Court’s present inquiry, Defendant

conspicuously fails to mention that, in King, the court ultimately found the contract at issue did not

fail for lack of adequate statement of terms and conditions, stating that “[e]quity does not require that

all the terms and conditions of the proposed agreement be set forth in the contract,” and that the

essential terms “were determinable” in the contract at issue. King, 197 P.2d at 324.

- 5 - 10cv2250

assertion that there is no contract obligating him to repay his student loan. (See Reply ISO MSJ 2.,

ECF No. 27.) As in Irby, Defendant’s argument rests entirely upon denials and demands for more

specific proof. For the following reasons, the Court finds Defendant has failed to establish a genuine

issue of material fact, and accordingly that summary judgment of Plaintiff’s claim is proper. 

First, Defendant argues Plaintiff has not met its burden due to a lack of evidence. Primarily,

Plaintiff does not recall ever receiving a Disclosure Statement “with information concerning the actual

terms of the notes which are the subject of Plaintiff’s case,” even though the promissory note states

Defendant was to receive such a document. (Def.’s Opp’n 2.) Plaintiff’s failure to produce this

Disclosure Statement and, perhaps, the original contract with Citibank, apparently establishes a

question as to the occurrence of a condition precedent to the contract, rendering the contract

unenforceable. (Def.’s Opp’n 2, 5.) 

Similarly, Defendant argues that missing terms in Section V of the Promissory Note establish

a question as to the validity of the contract’s formation. (Id. at 2-3.) Defendant points to captions for

Anticipated Distribution Date, First Payment Due Date, New Loan Balance, Terms, and Rate, “to be

completed by Citibank,” which are blank on the Promissory Note provided by Plaintiff. (Id.) The

Note further fails to state the interest rate or the total amount of the loan. (Id.) Defendant argues the

Note is thus invalid under a general concept of California contract law requiring certain material

terms. (Id.) (referring to King v. Stanley, 197 P.3d 321, 324 (Cal. 1948) for the proposition that “the

seller, the buyer, the price to be paid, the time and manner of payment, and the property to be

transferred” are “material factors to be ascertained from the written contract.”)2

Defendant’s attempts to cast doubt on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s evidence fail. As Plaintiff

points out, Defendant never requested any of the evidence he now asserts is crucially missing, or in

fact requested production of any document during the discovery period in this case. (Reply 5.)

Plaintiff claims it did not produce the referenced documents because it properly only produced

documents it indented to “use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for

Case 3:10-cv-02250-JLS-MDD Document 29 Filed 02/21/12 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 10cv2250

impeachment,” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). (Id.) After receiving Defendant’s opposition to

the instant motion, Plaintiff searched for and found the referenced documents, producing them in its

Reply. (Reply 5; Exs. D & E.) 

Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff initially provided enough evidence to establish its prima

facie case, and because these documents respond directly to Defendant’s allegations made in his

opposition brief, the Court finds it may properly consider this rebuttal evidence even though it was

offered for the first time in Plaintiff’s reply brief. See, e.g., Saguaro Medical Associates, P.C. v.

Banner Health 2009 WL 3740700, 7 (D.Ariz. Nov. 6, 2009) (concluding that rebuttal evidence is

allowed in appropriate circumstances in a reply); see also EEOC v. Creative Networks, LLC and ResCare, Inc., 2008 WL 5225807 at *2 (D.Ariz. Dec. 15, 2008) (reviewing the rule that a party may not

provide “new” evidence with a reply and then deprive the opposing party of an opportunity to respond

to the new evidence, and denying the motion to strike because the challenged evidence was not “new”

but rather properly rebutted arguments first raised in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.)

The Court finds further that Plaintiff’s proferred evidence of the original transaction between

Defendant and Citibank and the Disclosure Statement support the facts asserted in Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment. The Court finds that this evidence cures any deficiency in Plaintiff’s evidence

indicated by Defendant, even if Defendant’s allegations were potentially meritorious, which the Court

need not determine here.

In further effort to cast doubt upon the existence of an agreement, Defendant improperly

applies California contract common law to a federal statutory claim for the collection of a defaulted

guaranteed student loan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (granting district courts original jurisdiction of

all civil actions commenced by the United States and expressly authorized by Act of Congress) and

34 C.F.R. § 682.102(e)(7) (“If a borrower defaults on a loan, the guarantor reimburses the lender for

the amount of its loss. The guarantor then collects the amount owed from the borrower.”) (See

Reply 3.) Even if the California common law cited by Defendant were applicable here, Defendant is

a far cry from meeting his burden to establish an affirmative defense to rebut Plaintiff’s prima facie

case, namely the nonexistence of a contract for lack of certain terms. See Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d at

290 (describing the burden-shifting with regard to affirmative defenses after the government

Case 3:10-cv-02250-JLS-MDD Document 29 Filed 02/21/12 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 10cv2250

establishes its prima facie case of student loan default). Even according to the very case cited by

Defendant, contract terms may be determined by custom or reasonable expectation of the parties under

California law, and the contract will not fail for lack of such terms. King, 197 P.2d at 324.

More importantly, applicable federal law specifically provides some terms, and allows for the

absence of others, with respect to student loan agreements in particular. For example, as Plaintiff

explains, the applicable interest rate on consolidations loans is set by statute at 9% for loans made

before July 1, 1994. (Reply 4); see also 34 C.F.R. § 682.202(a)(4)(i). Further, some information

cannot be known at the time credit is advanced in the student loan context, such as the repayment

amount and repayment schedule, because it cannot be determined until after the student completes his

or her education. See Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d at 295 (discussing student loan agreements in the context

of asserted TILA violations). Clearly, the federal law governing the type of student loan agreement

at issue in this case is distinct at least in some ways from state common law principles, and

establishing its own requirements for the government’s collection of amounts owed from defaulting

borrowers, which Plaintiff has satisfied here. 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has provided competent summary judgment evidence to

support a prima facie case for student loan default, and that Defendant’s arguments do not raise

genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk

of Court is directed to enter judgment against Defendant in the amount of $45,841.11 principal, plus

interest at 9% per annum from March 28, 1998 to the date of this judgment. Plaintiff is also entitled

to recover costs pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717(e)(1). This amount is subject to increase due to accrual

of post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(b). 

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 21, 2012

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-02250-JLS-MDD Document 29 Filed 02/21/12 Page 7 of 7