Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01328/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01328-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff was released from prison on October 13, 2012 (Doc. 40 at 7; Doc. 42).

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adrian Crihalmean, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan,

Defendant. 

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No. CV 11-1328-PHX-JAT (JFM)

ORDER

Plaintiff Adrian Crihalmean brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Director Charles L. Ryan (Doc. 15).

Defendant moves to dismiss the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Doc.

32). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. 40).

The Court will grant the motion and dismiss the action without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit when he was a prisoner confined at the Arizona State

Prison Complex-Florence South Unit (Doc. 1 at 1).1

 In his First Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff challenged Arizona Revised Statute § 31-230, which allows ADC to collect a fee

on all deposits into an inmate’s “Spendable Account” ostensibly for the cost of maintaining

inmate trust accounts, with the fees to be placed in a “Building Renewal Fund” (Doc. 15 at

3). Plaintiff stated that on June 6, 2010, a notice was posted informing inmates that as of July

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20, 2010, a 1% fee would be applied to all deposits (id.). Plaintiff asserted that he is entitled

to challenge the statute because he has a constitutionally protected property interest in monies

deposited into his inmate account. He alleged that the 1% fee is a taking in violation of the

Fifth Amendment and violates due process (id. at 3A). 

Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that Plaintiff failed

to exhaust administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Doc. 32). 

II. Exhaustion Legal Standard

Under the PLRA, a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before

bringing a federal action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119

(9th Cir. 2009). This exhaustion requirement applies only to those individuals who are

prisoners at the time they file their lawsuit. Talamantes v. Leyva, 575 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th

Cir. 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (a prisoner is “any person incarcerated or detained in any

facility who is accused of, convicted of, [or] sentenced for . . . violations of criminal law”).

Although Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, because his was a prisoner when he filed this

action, his claim is subject to the exhaustion requirement. 

Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,

523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). A prisoner must complete the administrative review

process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92

(2006). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Thus,

the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). There can be no absence of exhaustion unless

a defendant demonstrates that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process.

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). Because exhaustion is a matter of

abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to

decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. And when considering disputed

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issues of fact, a court has broad discretion as to the method used in resolving the dispute

because “there is no right of jury trial” as to an issue arising in a pre-answer motion. Ritza

v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)

(quotation omitted). 

III. Parties’ Contentions

A. Defendant’s Motion

In support of his motion, Defendant submits evidence that ADC provides a multi-step

administrative grievance system including (1) an informal Inmate Letter, (2) a Formal

Grievance, (3) an Inmate Grievance Appeal, and (4) a final appeal to the Director (Doc. 32

at 4-7, citing Department Order (DO) 802 at www.azcorrections.gov). 

Defendant proffers copies of Plaintiff’s grievance documents showing that he filed

an Inmate Letter related to his claim on June 20, 2011 (id. at 10, Ex. A). The June 22, 2011

response to the Inmate Letter informed Plaintiff that his complaint was premature since the

1% fee did not go into effect until July 20, 2011, and Plaintiff had not yet been adversely

affected (id.). The evidence also includes Plaintiff’s June 27, 2011 Inmate Grievance

appealing this response; Plaintiff filed this as an emergency grievance and argued that his

rights are going to be violated (id.). On June 29, 2011, Plaintiff’s Inmate Grievance was

returned “unprocessed” because the 1% fee was not in yet in effect and therefore had not

affected Plaintiff (id.). 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s grievance was properly unprocessed because the

1% fee was not yet in effect; thus, his complaint was not ripe (id. at 10-11). Defendant

further contends that there is no evidence that Plaintiff initiated another grievance related to

his claim (id. at 11). 

Defendant also asserts that any argument that Plaintiff’s claim was not grievable under

the ADC grievance procedures because it allegedly concerned an action of the state

legislature fails because Plaintiff was not prevented from exhausting on the basis that his

complaint concerned a legislative matter (id.).

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The Court issued the Notice required under Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n. 14, which

informed Plaintiff of his obligation to respond and the evidence necessary to successfully

rebut Defendants’ contentions (Doc. 33). 

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B. Plaintiff’s Response2

Plaintiff points to the provision within DO 802 stating that “actions of the Governor

and State Legislature” are not grievable under the ADC grievance procedures (Doc. 40 at 3,

Ex. 3). Plaintiff notes that in his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that the statute

Plaintiff challenges—Arizona Revised Statute § 31-230—is a proper act of the Arizona

Legislature instituted to raise funds for the Building Renewal Fund established under Arizona

Revised Statutes § 41-797 (id. at 4, citing Doc. 32 at 2-3). Plaintiff asserts that his claim is

that, even though § 31-230 was enacted by the legislature, it is not constitutionally valid

(Doc. 40 at 4). Plaintiff maintains that it is well-settled, and Defendant confirmed in

discovery documents, that § 31-230 is an act of the legislature (id. at 5). Plaintiff argues that

under the PLRA, the prison determines what may or may not be grieved through its

administrative remedies and, here, the ADC grievance system mandates that Plaintiff’s

complaint about § 31-230 was not grievable (id. at 5, 8).

In response to Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s complaint was not ripe and he

had to wait until the policy was in effect, Plaintiff contends that regardless of when he

attempted to grieve his claim, there was no available relief through the ADC grievance

procedures (id. at 7). 

C. Defendant’s Reply

Defendant replies that Plaintiff is not challenging § 31-230; rather, he is challenging

ADC’s implementation of the statute and its application to him (Doc. 41). According to

Defendant, Plaintiff’s complaint was in response to Director’s Instruction (DI) 304, which

implemented the fee, and DO 802 specifically provides that the ADC Inmate Grievance

Procedure “is designed to address inmate complaints related to any aspect of institutional life

or condition of confinement that directly and personally affects the inmate grievant including

. . . Director’s Instructions . . . ” (id. at 2, citing DO 802.01 § 1.1). Defendant states that

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Plaintiff did not have standing to challenge DI 304 as the policy did not yet “directly and

personally” affect him (id. at 3). They add that under Plaintiff’s interpretation of the

legislative-action exception, any ADC act would be exempt from the grievance procedures

because the ADC is itself a statutory-created entity (id.).

IV. Analysis

There are two questions presented regarding exhaustion: (1) whether Plaintiff’s claim

concerned a challenge to the “actions of the Governor or State Legislature” and was therefore

exempt from the ADC Inmate Grievance Policy, and, if the claim was not exempt,

(2) whether Plaintiff’s Inmate Letter and Inmate Grievance were properly filed and the return

of his grievance as “unprocessed” rendered remedies unavailable.

A. Grievance Procedure Exception 

The Court finds that, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, Plaintiff’s argument that his

complaint concerned an action of the legislature and was therefore exempt from the ADC

grievance procedure is not absurd. Indeed, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument to be based

on a natural interpretation of that provision in the ADC grievance policy stating that

“[a]ctions of the . . . State Legislature” “are not grievable under the Inmate Grievance

Procedure” (Doc. 40, Ex. C, DO 802.01 §§ 1.2.1, 1.2.1). Presumably, this provision is not

meaningless, and Plaintiff specifically alleges that an act passed by the State Legislature is

not constitutionally valid.

Nevertheless, the exception does not apply here. Section 31-230 states that:

The director may establish by rule a fee for any deposits made to a prisoner

spendable account. The director shall deposit, pursuant to §§ 35-146 and 35-

147, any monies collected pursuant to this subsection in the department of

corrections building renewal fund established by § 41-797. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-230(D). The statute does not require the director to implement a fee

or to set the fee at 1%; rather, the language is discretionary. Pursuant to this discretionary

authority, Defendant implemented a 1% fee on all deposits to inmate accounts. Thus, the

State Legislature did not establish the 1% fee that Plaintiff challenges; it is actually

Defendant’s action in establishing the fee that Plaintiff challenges. Because the DI 304

memorandum that notified inmates of the fee stated only that it will be charged on any

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deposits “pursuant to ARS 31-230,” it was not unreasonable for Plaintiff to believe that the

fee was imposed by the legislature and not by Defendant. 

The Court finds that because the language in the statute is discretionary and not

mandatory, Plaintiff’s claim concerning the 1% fee falls outside of “actions of the State

Legislature,” and, for this reason, his complaint was grievable under the ADC grievance

procedure. 

B. Exhaustion

A defendant must show that administrative remedies were available and unused.

Albino v. Baca, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 4215918, at *8 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2012); see Sapp

v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (“the PLRA therefore does not require

exhaustion when circumstances render administrative remedies ‘effectively unavailable’”)

(internal quotation omitted). To show that remedies were available, the defendant “must

demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available, whether at unexhausted levels of the

grievance process or through awaiting the results of the relief already granted as a result of

that process.” Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37. Relevant evidence demonstrating whether relief

remained available includes official directives explaining the review process and

“information provided to the prisoner concerning the operation of the grievance procedure

in this case, such as the response memoranda in these cases.” Id. at 937. The information

provided to the prisoner is especially pertinent “because it informs our determination of

whether relief was, as a practical matter, ‘available.’” Id.

Here, Defendant points to that section of the ADC grievance policy limiting

grievances to issues related to institutional life or conditions of confinement “that directly

and personally affect[] the inmate grievant” (Doc. 32 at 5, citing DO 802.01 § 1.1). Because

the DI 304 memorandum was already posted and announced that the 1% fee was established

and set to go into effect the following month (as opposed to a proposed fee that may or may

not be implemented in the future), it may not have been clear that Plaintiff’s complaint could

not yet be addressed by the ADC grievance process. However, the applicability of the

grievance system was clarified through the response memoranda to Plaintiff’s Inmate Letter

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and Inmate Grievance, which specifically informed him that he had to wait to grieve his

complaint until the 1%-policy was in effect and affected him (Doc. 32, Ex. A). To qualify

for an exception to the exhaustion requirement, Plaintiff must show that this response and

the return of his grievance as “unprocessed” were inconsistent with or unsupported by the

ADC grievance regulations. See Sapp, 623 F3d at 823-24. Plaintiff fails to point to any

provision within DO 802 that is inconsistent with the grievance response that he had to wait

until the policy was in effect and “personally and directly” affected him.

Even assuming that the response was not supported by the ADC grievance policy,

and that Plaintiff should have been able to grieve his complaint about the fee before it went

into effect, the mistake did not render administrative remedies effectively unavailable. Cf.

Id. at 823 (if prison officials screen out an inmate’s appeal for improper reasons, and inmate

cannot pursue the requisite sequence of appeals, administrative remedies are unavailable);

Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

excused where the warden’s mistake rendered administrative remedies effectively

unavailable). The grievance response did not in any way suggest that Plaintiff’s complaint

was not grievable or that no relief was available; it simply delayed the time he could file his

grievance by a few weeks. 

The record shows that, despite prison officials’ instructions that his grievance was

premature, Plaintiff did not submit a grievance after the July 20, 2011 effective date or after

the fee was imposed on a deposit into his account. Thus, when administrative remedies

were available, he did not attempt to use them. See Albino, 2012 WL 4215918, at*8, 12 (an

inmate must make a reasonable, good faith effort to comply with the grievance procedures).

The only explanation for not subsequently filing a grievance is Plaintiff’s assertion that it

did not matter when he attempted to grieve because there was no relief by way of the ADC

grievance process (Doc. 40 at 7). But this does not suffice; exhaustion is required even

when a prisoner seeks relief not available in the grievance proceedings. Booth, 532 U.S. at

741.

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In sum, Plaintiff was required to grieve his complaint about the 1% fee and his failure

to do so as instructed by prison officials constitutes a failure to exhaust. Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss will be granted. Dismissal for nonexhaustion is without prejudice;

therefore, Plaintiff may file a new complaint in federal court alleging the same subject

matter. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. 32).

(2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32) is granted; the First Amended

Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment of dismissal accordingly.

DATED this 24th day of October, 2012.

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