Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05262/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05262-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 2004 Decided December 3, 2004

No. 03-5262

ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

GALE A. NORTON,

AS THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND

AURENE M. MARTIN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF THE INTERIOR FOR INDIAN AFFAIRS,

APPELLANTS

Consolidated with

No. 04-5084

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv01285)

Mark B. Stern, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kopp, Thomas M. Bondy,

Charles W. Scarborough, Alisa B. Klein, Lewis S. Yelin, and

Tara L. Grove, Attorneys.

G. William Austin, III argued the cause for appellees

Elouise Pepion Cobell, et al. With him on the brief were

Elliott H. Levitas, Mark I. Levy, Dennis M. Gingold, and

Keith M. Harper. Jamin B. Raskin and Mark K. Brown

entered appearances.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and RANDOLPH and ROGERS,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Secretary of the Interior and

others (‘‘the Secretary’’) appeal the preliminary injunction of

March 15, 2004, which superseded and replaced an injunction

of July 28, 2003, and required disconnection of substantially

all of the Department of the Interior’s computer systems

from the Internet. Cobell v. Norton, 310 F. Supp. 2d 77

(D.D.C. 2004) (‘‘Cobell XI’’). The injunction also requires the

Secretary to submit a plan for secure reconnection of Interior’s computer systems. In Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (‘‘Cobell VI’’), the court affirmed the district

court’s finding of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Secretary

of the Interior and the other defendants, as trustees of funds

held in trust for individual Native Americans (hereafter,

‘‘Indians’’), in failing to provide an accurate accounting. On

remand, the district court entered several injunctive orders

mandating Interior to disconnect its computers from the

Internet in light of concerns about the security of individual

Indian trust data (‘‘IITD’’), which are the basis for accounting

for Indian funds and are housed on an unknown number of

Interior’s computer systems. On appeal from the latest

injunction entered March 15, 2004, the Secretary contends

that the district court exceeded its lawful authority and,

alternatively, lacked a factual predicate for the injunction.

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We hold, contrary to the Secretary’s contention, that issuance of the March 15, 2004 injunction is not precluded by

Pub. L. 108-108, 117 Stat. 1241, 1263 (2003), which applies

only to ‘‘historical accounting activities.’’ As the district court

noted, ‘‘Interior’s present obligation to administer the trust

presents sufficient grounds for finding that Plaintiffs will be

irreparably injured.’’ Cobell XI, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 96 n.27.

We further hold that the district court’s jurisdiction properly

extends to security of Interior’s information technology systems (‘‘IT’’) housing or accessing IITD, because the Secretary, as a fiduciary, is required to maintain and preserve

IITD. We nevertheless vacate the injunction because the

district court erred by placing the burden of persuasion upon

the Secretary, disregarding Interior’s certifications on the

state of IT security, and failing to hold an evidentiary hearing

prior to entering the injunction.

I.

The underlying litigation concerns individual Indian money

accounts (‘‘IIM’’), which collectively form a trust established

by the General Allotment Act in 1887 for the benefit of

American Indians.1

 The trust corpus consists of the revenues

derived from land that was carved out of preexisting Indian

reservations under the 1887 Act. See generally Cobell VI,

240 F.3d at 1086-88. In 1994, after decades of mismanagement of the trust by the Interior and Treasury Departments,

the Secretaries of which serve as trustees for the trust,

Congress enacted the Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act (‘‘1994 Act’’), Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239

(1994), which requires the Interior Secretary, among other

things, to ‘‘provid[e] adequate systems for accounting for and

reporting trust fund balances.’’ Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1089-

1 Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (‘‘Cobell V’’);

Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (‘‘Cobell VI’’);

Cobell v. Norton, 274 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2003) (‘‘Cobell IX’’);

Cobell v. Norton, 310 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2004) (‘‘Cobell XI’’);

Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003); In re Brooks, 383

F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

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90; 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(1). In 1999, the district court found

a breach of fiduciary duty by the Secretary, and ruled that,

pursuant to the 1994 Act, the Secretary must provide ‘‘an

accurate accounting of all money in the IIM trust,’’ and

establish written policies for the ‘‘computer and business

systems architecture necessary’’ for an accurate accounting.

Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 58 (D.D.C. 1999) (‘‘Cobell

V’’).

This court affirmed, although holding in Cobell VI that ‘‘the

actual legal breach [by the Secretary] is the failure to provide

an accounting, not failure to take the discrete individual steps

that would facilitate an accounting.’’ 240 F.3d at 1106. Noting Interior’s stipulation that it was unable to meet the

requirements of ‘‘numerous provisions’’ of the 1994 Act, the

court observed that ‘‘the federal government will be unable to

provide an adequate accounting without computer systems,

staffing, and document retention policies that are adequate

for the task.’’ Id. The court also stated there was ‘‘no need

to alter the district court’s order [in Cobell V]’’ because while:

[t]he level of oversight proposed by the district court

may well be in excess of that countenanced in the typical

delay case TTT so too is the magnitude of government

malfeasance and potential prejudice to the plaintiffs’

classTTTT

TTT [Accordingly,] the [district] court should not abdicate

its responsibility to ensure that its instructions are followed. This would seem particularly appropriate where,

as here, there is a record of agency recalcitrance and

resistance to the fulfillment of its legal duties.

Id. at 1109 (citing In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d

1346, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The court added: ‘‘[n]onetheless, we expect the district court to be mindful of the limits of

its jurisdiction.’’ Id. at 1110.

On remand, as relevant here, the district court, in light of

the Special Master’s recommendation regarding inadequate

IT security of IITD, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a

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temporary restraining order on December 5, 2001, requiring

Interior ‘‘immediately [to] disconnect from the Internet’’ its

IT systems housing or accessing IITD. See Cobell v. Norton,

274 F. Supp. 2d 111, 113 (D.D.C. 2003) (‘‘Cobell IX’’). The

plaintiff also moved for a preliminary injunction and an order

to show cause why the Secretary and counsel for the Secretary should not be held in contempt. With the consent of

Interior, the district court on December 17, 2001, entered a

Consent Order providing that ‘‘Interior shall not reconnect

any information technology system to the Internet without

the concurrence of the Special Master,’’ and ‘‘the Special

Master shall verify compliance with this Consent OrderTTTT’’

Id. at 114. The relationship between the Special Master and

Interior in carrying out the Consent Order apparently operated effectively, with almost 95 percent of Interior IT systems

being reconnected within one year, Cobell XI, 310 F. Supp. 2d

at 82, until April 2003, when the Special Master and his

contractor attempted to recheck whether computers recently

found vulnerable were secure against unauthorized Internet

access, id. The Special Master suspected that an Interior

employee had frustrated the ‘‘penetration’’ of the vulnerable

computers by providing advance warning to the computer

administrator. Cobell IX, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 114-24. This

dispute escalated and resulted in the breakdown of the relationship between the Special Master and Interior and its

attorneys from the Justice Department. See generally id.

On June 26, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to mandate the Secretary to disconnect from the Internet all Interior computers and IT systems that house or access IITD until

the Special Master certified that all the data was properly

secured. Id. at 119. Following a hearing, the district court

entered a temporary restraining order, modifying the order

in light of Interior’s suggestions. Interior, while protesting

entry of any order, stated that it was willing to work things

out with the Special Master. Id. at 120. Soon thereafter,

however, Interior requested that ‘‘ ‘Special Master Balaran

TTT be disqualified from acting in any capacity in this case.’ ’’

Id. at 124. Following a hearing on July 28, 2003, the district

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court entered a preliminary injunction, and stayed the Consent Order. Id. at 133. The July 28, 2003 injunction called

for disconnection of all Interior computers from the Internet,

except: (1) ‘‘those essential for protection against fires or

other threats to life or property;’’ and (2) those that [Interior] certified ‘‘in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure,’’ were secure from unauthorized Internet

access or did not house or access IITD. Id. at 135-36. In

light of Interior’s objection to any further involvement by the

Special Master in determining the security of Interior’s IT

systems, the district court decided to make the determinations itself. Id. at 133. The Secretary appealed.

In the interim, on August 11, 2003, the Secretary filed

certifications on the state of IT security in response to the

July 28, 2003 injunction. On March 15, 2004, the district

court entered a preliminary injunction that ‘‘supersede[d] and

replace[d]’’ the July 28, 2003 injunction. Cobell v. Norton,

310 F. Supp. 2d 98, 99 (D.D.C. 2004) (‘‘Cobell XI (Order)’’).

The March 15, 2004 injunction called for disconnection from

the Internet of all Interior computers, with exceptions for (1)

systems essential to protect against fire or other threats to

life or property, and (2) IT systems of the National Park

Service, the Office of Policy Management and Budget, and

the United States Geological Survey. Id. at 100-01. The

injunction further provides for reconnection if the Secretary

submits and the court approves a suitable proposal. Id. at

101. In issuing the injunction, the district court rejected the

Secretary’s certifications as ‘‘procedurally and substantively

defective,’’ finding they ‘‘were not properly subscribed as true

as required by local rule and statute and the very Interior

officials who drafted the reports simultaneously gave conflicting information to other government agencies such as the

Office of Management and Budget and the General Accounting Office stating that Interior’s IT systems were in fact

vulnerable.’’ Cobell XI, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 83. Further, the

district court found the Secretary’s proposal for reconnections

unsatisfactory, essentially because past experience indicated

the Secretary and Interior’s closely-aligned contractor could

not be relied upon to do an adequate job. Id. at 86-95. The

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district court, however, emphasized in its accompanying memorandum opinion that it ‘‘is not telling Interior how to run its

operations nor foisting management directives on the agency.

It is Interior that is tasked with proposing a security standardTTTT’’ Id. at 97. The Secretary appeals. This court

consolidated this appeal with the Secretary’s appeal of the

July 28, 2003 injunction and stayed the March 15, 2004

injunction pending appeal. Cobell v. Norton, 2004 WL 758956

(D.C. Cir. 2004).

II.

The Secretary challenges the March 15, 2004 injunction as

lacking any legal foundation or factual predicate. According

to the Secretary, the injunction lacks a legal basis in the 1994

Act, is contrary to the mandate in Cobell VI, and violates

settled limitations on judicial review. Not only did the district court fail to amend its 1999 order in Cobell V in

compliance with Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1106, but by ordering

sweeping equitable relief calling for wholesale improvement

of Interior’s IT systems security, the district court exceeded

its authority under the APA and violated separation of powers principles. Moreover, in the Secretary’s opinion, Pub. L.

No. 108-108 removed any legal basis for the injunctions.

The court reviews the grant of a preliminary injunction for

abuse of discretion. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,

931-32 (1975); Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313,

1318 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The district court’s legal conclusions

are subject to ‘‘essentially de novo review,’’ City of Las Vegas

v. Lujan, 974 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1989), while its findings

of fact, which include the district court’s assessment of whether the Secretary has taken sufficient actions to fulfill her

fiduciary duties and to comply with court orders, are reviewed for clear error, id. Upon de novo review of the

Secretary’s challenges to the district court’s authority, we

hold that the district court possessed authority on remand

from Cobell VI to issue a preliminary injunction regarding IT

security.

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As a threshold matter, the Secretary’s contention that Pub.

L. No. 108–108 removes any legal basis for the March 15,

2004 injunction is unpersuasive. This statute provides that

nothing in any law ‘‘shall be construed or applied to require

TTT Interior to commence or continue historical accounting

activitiesTTTT’’ 117 Stat. at 1263. As such, the plain text of

the statute addresses only the historical accounting activities

required by the district court’s September 2003 structural

injunction, Cobell X, 283 F. Supp. 2d 66, rather than the

Secretary’s current trust obligations addressed in the March

15, 2004 injunction. It is indisputable that the Secretary has

current and prospective trust management duties that necessitate maintaining secure IT systems in order to render

accurate accountings now and in the future. Cobell VI, 240

F.3d at 1103. Consequently, Pub. L. No. 108-108 does not

affect the IIM trust beneficiaries’ current and prospective

substantive rights, which hinge on accurate accountings, and

the court has no occasion to consider the plaintiffs’ challenge

to its constitutionality.

The Secretary’s other challenges to the district court’s legal

authority to enter the March 15, 2004 injunction are also

unpersuasive. In contending that the district court ignored

the narrow mandate of Cobell VI by undertaking to oversee

Interior’s computer security, the Secretary relies on this

court’s re-characterization of the legal breach of fiduciary

duty in Cobell VI as a failure to provide an accounting, not

the separate steps directed by the district court toward

facilitating an accounting, and on this court’s expectation that

the district court would ‘‘be mindful of the limits of its

jurisdiction.’’ Id. at 1106, 1110. But the Secretary ignores

relevant discussion in Cobell VI. The court made plain in

Cobell VI that it was ‘‘premature TTT to rule on the precise

scope of the district court’s planned proceedings’’ in addressing the difficult task of extracting an accounting from an

agency with an intransigent past. Id. at 1110. The court

likewise made plain that maintaining adequate computer systems, along with staff and document retention policies, is

critical to the completion of an adequate accounting. Id. at

1106. While the court also stated that Interior ‘‘should be

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afforded sufficient discretion in determining the precise route

[it] take[s], so long as this threshold [of producing an adequate accounting] is met,’’ id., the court did not limit the

district court’s authority to exercise its discretion as a court

of equity in fashioning a remedy to right a century-old wrong

or to enforce a consent decree, see Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S.

431, 124 S. Ct. 899, 905 (2004). The court merely suggested

that the district court should grant the Secretary some

leeway in fashioning solutions, and the district court’s memorandum opinion accompanying the injunction reflects this

approach.

Contrary to the Secretary’s view, ‘‘[w]hile the government’s

obligations are rooted in and outlined by the relevant statutes

and treaties, they are largely defined in traditional equitable

terms,’’ Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1099, and the narrower judicial

powers appropriate under the APA do not apply. Jicarilla

Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1567

(10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), adopted as majority opinion as modified en

banc, 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986). Although the APA is the

device whereby sovereign immunity was waived in this case,

Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1094–95, and the court considered

whether final agency action was involved, id. at 1095, the

Secretary has an ‘‘ ‘overriding duty TTT to deal fairly with

Indians,’ ’’ id. at 1099 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,

236 (1974)), and the Secretary’s actions must be judged by

‘‘ ‘the most exacting fiduciary standards,’ ’’ id. (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)), in this

litigation. The Secretary cannot now try to ‘‘ ‘escape h[er]

role as trustee by donning the mantle of administrator’ to

claim that courts must defer to h[er] expertise and delegated

authority.’’ Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Jicarilla,

728 F.2d at 1567). The district court, then, retains substantial latitude, much more so than in the typical agency case, to

fashion an equitable remedy because the underlying lawsuit is

both an Indian case and a trust case in which the trustees

have egregiously breached their fiduciary duties. Id. at 1099,

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1109. The Secretary’s suggestion that the appropriate role

for the district court was confined to retaining jurisdiction

and ordering periodic progress reports, as in In re United

Mine Workers of America International Union, 190 F.3d

545, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1999), ignores these salient considerations.

It is only by mischaracterizing the March 15, 2004 injunction that the Secretary can now contend that the district

court dictated Interior’s actions for improving IT system

security, and therefore violated the separation of powers.

The plain language of the injunction as well as the district

court’s memorandum opinion requires the Secretary to develop the IT security programs. The district court did not order

the type of wholesale programmatic changes rejected in

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 891

(1990), and Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1095. Nor does the

injunction include particular tasks for Interior to perform

based on policies developed by the district court, as in Cobell

V. Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1105-06. The injunction does no

more than ensure that the Secretary is ‘‘tak[ing] reasonable

steps toward the discharge of the federal government’s fiduciary obligations to IIM trust beneficiariesTTTT’’ Id. at 1106.

The district court has limited its role to accepting or rejecting

the Secretary’s proposals, rather than dictating their substance or even the standard for measuring the security of

Interior’s IT systems. Cobell XI (Order), 310 F. Supp. 2d at

101. Given the admissions in the Consent Order of Interior’s

past gross computer security failures, and the ‘‘impasse’’

between the parties regarding the manner in which the

Consent Order should be implemented, Cobell IX, 274 F.

Supp. 2d at 126, the district court had authority to require the

Secretary to propose a workable plan in order ‘‘to ensure that

its instructions are followed.’’ Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1109.

III.

We do not reach the merits of the Secretary’s challenges to

the factual predicate for the March 15, 2004 injunction because related procedural and evidentiary issues require that

we vacate the injunction.

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A.

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that

should be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by

a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion. Mazurek

v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). To prevail, the

moving party must demonstrate (1) a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits, (2) that it would suffer irreparable

harm without injunctive relief, (3) that an injunction would

not substantially harm other interested parties, and (4) that

issuance of the injunction is in the public interest. Serono

Labs, Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d

738, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a).

The district court, in entering the July 28, 2003, preliminary injunction found, after a hearing, that:

[the] plaintiffs have not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court that the reconnected systems are not

presently secured from unauthorized access. The failure

to present such evidence certainly weighs against directing that the reconnected systems be immediately disconnected. On the other hand, the Interior defendants have

failed to demonstrate to this Court that the reconnected

systems are, in fact, secure from such unauthorized

access. Without any evidence that the systems are

secure, it would be an act of folly for this Court simply to

permit them to remain connected.

Cobell IX, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 132. The district court concluded injunctive relief was warranted, and adopted a ‘‘middle

ground,’’ between disconnecting all the reconnected systems

and allowing continued connection of potentially unsecured

systems, by ordering the Secretary to submit certifications

explaining why each IT system housing or accessing IITD

was secure. Id. at 132. In entering the March 15, 2004

injunction, the district court also found that the ‘‘plaintiffs

have already prevailed on the merits in both the first phase

and phase 1.5 of this litigation,’’ and thus ‘‘have demonstrated

a substantial likelihood’’ of success on the merits. Cobell XI,

310 F. Supp. 2d at 95 (citing Cobell V, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1;

Cobell VI, 240 F.3d 1081; and Cobell X, 283 F. Supp. 2d 66).

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Prevailing on the merits of the liability claim of a breach of

fiduciary duty by the Secretary in failing to account for IITD

funds did not relieve the plaintiffs of their burden as the

moving party to demonstrate the necessity of the IT disconnection injunction to safeguard against imminent and irreparable injury to their interests. The district court in Cobell V

contemplated that the post-liability phase of the underlying

litigation would, in part, ‘‘involve the government bringing

forward its proof on IIM trust balances and then plaintiffs

making exceptions to that proof.’’ 91 F. Supp. 2d at 31.

Given Interior’s superior access to information about the

state of its IT system security, this was a reasonable way to

proceed in evaluating the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive

relief to disconnect IT systems. Cf. Office of Workers’ Comp.

Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 274 (1994).

But it was error to shift the burden of persuasion to the

Secretary to show why disconnecting most of Interior’s IT

systems was unnecessary to ensure the security of IITD, and

the error was not harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; FED. R.

CRIM. P. 52(a); cf. Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1188 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (citing Williams v. U.S. Elevator Corp., 920 F.2d 1019,

1123 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).

The evidence before the district court consisted of the

Special Master’s reports documenting vulnerabilities of Interior’s IT systems through February 5, 2002, including exposure of IITD ‘‘to uninvited review and manipulation,’’ Cobell

XI, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 81, and identifying ‘‘many problems

that were not fixed.’’ Id. at 81 n.6. The Special Master also

reported results from continued penetration testing in February and March 2003. Three external reports — a House

Committee report, an Interior Report to the Office of Management and Budget, and a report by the General Accounting

Office — advised of Interior’s and other federal agencies’ IT

deficiencies. However, the Secretary points out, and the

plaintiffs do not dispute, there was no evidence that anyone

other than the Special Master’s contractor had ‘‘hacked’’ into

any Interior computer system housing or accessing IITD.

The external reports did not specifically address whether, in

March 2004, unauthorized access through the Internet presented an imminent danger to the integrity of IITD, or if

Interior’s network security compromised the security of

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IITD. Nonetheless, the district court relied upon these

reports as reason to conclude that Interior could not monitor

itself or be solely responsible for the security of IITD. Id. at

89-93. In contrast, the Secretary’s certifications of August

11, 2003 purported to demonstrate how Interior had rendered

its IT systems security adequate to protect IITD. The

district court declined to examine the sources for the Secretary’s certifications, rejecting the certifications on procedural

grounds. See infra Part III B. Had such examination

occurred, and the sources been credited, there would have

been no factual basis for disconnecting Interior’s IT computer

systems from the Internet. Hence, placing the burden of

persuasion upon the Secretary was not harmless error.

B.

The Secretary’s certifications on IT systems security consisted of twelve declarations and supporting materials. The

district court declined to consider them because the declarants stated that the information provided was ‘‘true and

correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief,’’

which the district court held contravened Local Rule 5.1(h)2

and 28 U.S.C. § 1746.3 Id. at 85. The court addressed the

2 Local Rule 5.1(h) of the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia provides in pertinent part:

Whenever any matter is required or permitted by rule to be

supported by the sworn written statement of a person TTT the

matter may TTT be supported by the unsworn declaration,

certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person

which is subscribed as true [and correct] under penalty of

perjuryTTTT

3 28 U.S.C. § 1746 provides in pertinent part:

Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any

rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law,

any matter is required or permitted to be TTT proved by the

sworn declaration, verification, certificate, TTT in writing of the

person making the same TTT such matter may TTT be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such

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substance of the submissions only by stating the information

‘‘is often confusing and contradictory,’’ id., pointing to a single

internal inconsistency, id. at 85-86. The reasons given by the

district court do not support its disregard of the certifications.

Local Rule 5.1(h) and 28 U.S.C. § 1746 contemplate as

adequate certifications that are ‘‘substantially’’ in the form of

the language of their provisions. A declaration or certification that includes the disclaimer ‘‘to the best of [the declarant’s] knowledge, information or belief’’ is sufficient under the

local rule, the statute. See United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d

1147, 1154-55 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1064

(2003). Moreover, the July 28, 2003 injunction directed only

that the certifications be made in accordance with Rule 11 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Cobell IX, 274 F.

Supp. 2d at 136. Rule 11(a) provides that ‘‘[e]xcept when

otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings

need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit,’’ FED. R. CIV.

P. 11(a), and the district court cited to no other requirement

compelling verification. Further, Rule 11(b), which governs

‘‘[r]epresentations to the court,’’ explicitly contemplates certifications to ‘‘the best of the person’s knowledge, information,

and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the

circumstancesTTTT’’ FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). The district court

therefore erred in rejecting Interior’s submissions as ‘‘procedurally TTT defective.’’ Cobell XI, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 83.

Furthermore, the district court seemed to be insisting on

compliance with Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which expressly requires affidavits to be based on

personal knowledge. But that rule applies to a motion for

summary judgment. Here the district court treated the

matter as a preliminary injunction proceeding. Nothing in

the rules specifies what sort of affidavits are required at the

preliminary injunction stage. This court has never decided

that the Rule 56(e) standard should apply to such proceedings

and there is good reason to believe it should not. Summary

judgment substitutes for trial and it therefore makes sense to

person which is subscribed by him, as true [and correct] under

penalty of perjuryTTTT

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require evidentiary submissions to consist only of admissible

evidence. A preliminary injunction is just that — preliminary. It does not substitute for a trial, and its usual office is

to hold the parties in place until a trial can take place; the

proceedings are streamlined, intentionally, because the fuse is

often so short. See 12 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE’S

FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.23 (2004); 11A CHARLES ALLEN

WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2949 (2d

ed. 1995); see also Sierra Club Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC,

992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1993).

While internal inconsistencies could provide a basis for

discrediting the certifications, the district court cited only

one. Id. at 85–86. A statement accompanying the declaration of the Deputy Director for the Bureau of Land Management indicated that the Automated Fluid Mineral Support

System had been reconnected, while an attached table indicated the system had ‘‘no internet connectivity.’’ Id. at 86.

The inconsistency could affect whether the court would give

credence to that particular certification, but it did not support

disregarding the others, which were prepared and sworn by

different people with regard to different bureaus. To the

extent the district court also observed that the Secretary was

telling a different story about its computer security to other

branches of the government, see id. at 89-95, the only issue

before the district court was the security of IT systems

housing and accessing IITD, and the external reports referenced by the court did not address that precise issue. Consequently, the district court also erred by disregarding Interior’s certifications as substantively defective. Id. at 83.

C.

A preliminary injunction may be granted based on less

formal procedures and on less extensive evidence than in a

trial on the merits, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Pena, 147

F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)), but if there are genuine issues

of material fact raised in opposition to a motion for a preliminary injunction, an evidentiary hearing is required, Ty, Inc. v.

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GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997). Particularly when a court must make credibility determinations to

resolve key factual disputes in favor of the moving party, it is

an abuse of discretion for the court to settle the question on

the basis of documents alone, without an evidentiary hearing.

See Prakash v. Am. Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1181 (D.C. Cir.

1984); cf. Dopp v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 461 F.2d 873 (2d Cir.

1972). The circumstances and interests at stake will affect

whether an abbreviated or more extensive evidentiary hearing is necessary. See Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481 U.S.

250, 261 (1987); Mantek Div. of NCH Corp. v. Share Corp.,

780 F.2d 702, 705-06 (7th Cir. 1986).

The district court could not resolve the state of Interior’s

IT systems security without conducting a hearing on the

evidence in dispute. In opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion for

injunctive relief mandating disconnection of Interior’s IT

systems from the Internet, the Secretary described various

measures taken and underway by Interior to secure IT

systems, and disputed that such drastic relief was necessary.

Almost nine months had passed since the hearing for the July

28, 2003 injunction. Under the circumstances, the court

abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing

before issuing the March 15, 2004 injunction.

Accordingly, we vacate the March 15, 2004 injunction and

remand the case to the district court.

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