Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01621/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01621-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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 This order does not address the Motion to Dismiss 

from Defendants Cate and Shaw (“OIG Defendants”)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAM BESS, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

 

MATTHEW CATE et al. 

 

 Defendants. 

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CV 07-1989 LEW-JFM 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART CDCR

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

ORDER GRANTING REQUESTS

FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Currently before this Court are: (1) Defendants

Tilton, Hickman, Woodford, Dovey, Kernan and Hoshino

(hereafter “CDCR Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss1, (2)

CDCR Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, and (3)

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice. The Court

took this matter under submission on February 28, 2008.

Having considered all papers submitted pertaining to

the above Motions, THE COURT NOW FINDS AND RULES AS

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FOLLOWS: 

A. Requests for Judicial Notice

The Court GRANTS CDCR Defendants’ Request for

Judicial Notice. Under Fed. R. Evid. 201, Judicial

Notice may be taken of facts “capable of accurate and

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Here, Defendants

have provided supporting documents which will satisfy

this evidentiary standard. 

Similarly the Court GRANT Plaintiff’s Request for

Judicial Notice. Of note, although the Court will take

judicial notice of the representations made by

Plaintiff in his complaint to the California Victim

Compensation and Government Claims Board, it will not

and cannot take notice of the “veracity of the

arguments or disputed facts contained therein.” United

States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 974.

(E.D. Cal. 2004). 

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

1. Standard for Motion to Dismiss 

In a FRCP 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, “all

allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to

the Plaintiff.” McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d

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1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 2004). A dismissal is only

appropriate “if it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim which would entitle him to relief.” Stoner v.

Santa Clara County Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1120

(9th Cir. 2007). However, “a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do...

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). 

2. Statute of Limitations

Under Cal. Gov’t Code 810 et seq., the limitations

period applicable to § 1983 claims is equitably tolled

when three elements are satisfied: (1) timely notice to

the defendants in filing the first claim; (2) lack of

prejudice to the defendants in gathering evidence for

the second claim; (3) good faith and reasonable conduct

in filing the second claim. Cervantes v. City of San

Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Because Plaintiff filed his claim to the

Compensation Board on May 24, 2006, and subsequently

filed a late-claim application, Plaintiff satisfied the

timely notice element from Cervantes. Meanwhile, the

factual similarity between the Compensation Board claim

and the present action provided Defendants with the

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 The Compensation Board claim was filed on May 24, 

2006, and was completed on March 31, 2007, for a

period of 302 days. Adding 302 days to the twoyear limitations period from the date of filing

pushes the bar date back to November 24, 2004. 

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opportunity to identify the sources of evidence needed

to defend the present action. Moreover, there are no

facts to indicate Plaintiff acted in bad faith in

waiting to file the present action until after the

Compensation Board claim was denied. Altogether, the

three elements from Cervantes are met, and the

equitable tolling doctrine applies. As a result,

Plaintiff may base his complaint on any act occurring

after November 24, 2004.2

2. Free Speech Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the CDCR Defendants

conspired to deprive him of his right to free speech. 

In the 9th Circuit, “[P]laintiffs alleging a conspiracy

to deprive them of their constitutional rights must

include in their complaint nonconclusory allegations

containing evidence of unlawful intent.” Harris v.

Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 

However, “[t]hese allegations may be supported by

either direct or circumstantial evidence. This standard

is not intended to be difficult to meet.” Id.

With respect to Defendant Tilton, Plaintiff has

alleged no facts on which the Court could reasonably

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infer his involvement in the conspiracy. Indeed,

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to

state any claim against Tilton. Therefore, Tilton’s

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and all claims against him

are dismissed. 

As to the other CDCR Defendants, Plaintiff has pled

sufficient facts to allow the Court to reasonably infer

the existence of a conspiracy. Therefore, the Motion

to Dismiss is DENIED as to the other CDCR Defendants. 

3. Deprivation of Property Rights

Permanent state employees hold a property interest

in their job which is protected by Due Process. 

Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 548 (9th Cir. 2006). 

This interest contains the right to continued

employment free from disciplinary measures without

cause. Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194,

207-08 (1975). One type of disciplinary measure is a

constructive discharge. A constructive discharge

occurs when, under the totality of the circumstances,

“a reasonable person in [the employee’s] position would

have felt he was forced to quit because of intolerable

and discriminatory working conditions.” Sanchez v.

City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424, 431 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Here, Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts that

would entitle him to relief on a constructive discharge

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theory as he claims that he was constructively

discharged as a result of CDCR Defendants’ actions.

However, this does not end the inquiry.

Although Skelly clearly established a general

proposition that state employees are entitled to

continued employment without undue discipline,

Defendants may be entitled to qualified immunity on

their actions. As the Supreme Court explained in

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, “The contours

of the right must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.” Here, the unlawfulness of

Defendants’ alleged actions are not readily apparent. 

Plaintiff has claimed an infringement on his property

rights by combining the constructive discharge doctrine

of Sanchez with the general proposition from Skelly. 

While this is a valid legal argument, the law is not so

clearly established as to defeat qualified immunity. 

Therefore, because qualified immunity exists, Plaintiff

may only pursue prospective relief on his deprivation

of property rights claim, and may not pursue damages. 

Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.10 (2003). 

4. Deprivation of Liberty Rights

State laws do not create a protected liberty

interest unless the law itself places substantive

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limits on official discretion. See White v. Lambert,

370 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004); Meachum v. Fano,

427 U.S. 215, 228-229 (1976). 

Here, Plaintiff argues that under Cal. Gov’t Code §

8547.3(a), state law places substantive limits on

Defendants’ discretion. This argument is persuasive. 

The statute is quite clear that any interference with

the rights provided by the Whistleblower Protection Act

is barred. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts for

the Court to reasonably infer that Defendants

interfered with Plaintiff’s right to report

governmental corruption free from retaliation. At the

pleading stage, this is sufficient to avoid dismissal. 

Moreover, because the alleged right deprived is

contained in a statute, it is a clearly established

right, and Defendants have no immunity on this claim.

5. RICO Claim

In order to plead a violation under RICO, Plaintiff

must allege four elements: (1) existence of an

enterprise affecting or engaged in interstate commerce,

(2) defendant employed by or associated with the

enterprise, (3) defendant participated in the

enterprise’s affairs, and (4) a pattern of racketeering

activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

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 See, e.g., United States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d 

1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant threatened to

deliver embarrassing audio tapes to his victim's

employer, a corporation engaged in interstate

commerce); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495,

501 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant's extortion

threatened the depletion of resources from a

business engaged in interstate commerce').

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Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

state a RICO violation. Under 18 U.S.C. §1961(4)

enterprise is broadly defined to include any “legal

entity” or any group of individuals “associated-infact”. Plaintiff’s complaint clearly alleges that

Defendants are a legal entity, and are factually

associated to OIG Defendants. As to the Interstate

Commerce requirement, the Court in United States v.

Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1997)

stated that the requirement is satisfied by proof of a

probable or potential impact. Because the required

connection to is so slight,3 the fact that the alleged

enterprise may have some imaginable de minimus impact

on interstate commerce is sufficient. 

Plaintiff needs only allege that Defendants played

“some part in directing the enterprise’s affairs.” 

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993). If

the enterprise is CDCR, then Defendants, as high level

directors of the organization, certainly took part in

CDCR’s affairs. And, if the enterprise is the

association-in-fact between CDCR Defendants and OIG

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Defendants, CDCR Defendants would be the enterprise. 

Lastly, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

plead a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.

§1861 defines racketeering activity to include a wide

variety of acts. Here, Plaintiff has alleged two acts

of attempted bribery, under 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a). 18

U.S.C. § 1510(a) requires that Defendant endeavored to

“obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of

information” to investigators. Taking Plaintiff’s

allegations of material fact as true, it is not

illogical to infer that there may have been an attempt

by Defendants to delay the communication of information

through bribery. 

Plaintiff also alleges obstruction of justice under

18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), (d)(1) and (d)(2). These

claims are also sufficiently supported by the

Plaintiff’s allegations of fact. 

The Court also finds a sufficient causal nexus

between the alleged RICO violations and Plaintiff’s

injury. Plaintiff’s injuries would not have arisen but

for Defendants’ actions, and they are certainly

foreseeable consequences of those actions. Thus,

Plaintiff’s RICO claim against CDCR Defendants should

not be dismissed at this time. 

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C. Conclusion

CDCR Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Defendant Tilton

is GRANTED. Defendant Tilton is dismissed from the

action. Plaintiff hereby has 20 days leave to amend

the complaint to properly include Tilton. 

CDCR Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all other

Defendants is DENIED. However, Plaintiff’s claim of

deprivation of property rights under § 1983 cannot

proceed because CDCR Defendants have qualified

immunity. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW

Senior, U.S. District Judge

DATED: March 13, 2008

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