Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00463/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00463-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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07cv17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON ARMITAGE,

Petitioner,

v.

KENNETH CLARK,

Respondent.

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Civil No. 09cv463-L(POR)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

CORPUS PETITION

Petitioner Brandon Armitage, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). Petitioner claims, among other

things, that his constitutional rights were violated because the jury was allowed to convict him

on either of two theories for burglary, where one of the theories did not meet the requisites of the

burglary statute. The Petition was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter

for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule

72.1(d). 

The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending the Petition

be granted. Respondent objected. For the reasons which follow, the Report and

Recommendation is adopted in part and rejected in part. The Petition is DENIED.

In reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court “shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,”

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

Case 3:09-cv-00463-L-POR Document 18 Filed 04/25/11 Page 1 of 8
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by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, “the district judge must

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but

not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc)

(emphasis in original); see Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225-26 & n.5 (D. Ariz.

2003) (applying Reyna-Tapia to habeas review). 

The Petition alleges two claims. The first claim is that Petitioner was denied his

constitutional rights when the state appellate court failed to address his second claim, that the

jury was allowed to convict him on two alternative theories of burglary, when only one of the

theories was legally sufficient for conviction. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the

first claim, and Petitioner did not object. When no objections are filed, the de novo review is

waived. Section 636(b)(1) does not require review by the district court under a lesser standard. 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). In the absence of objections, the portion of the

Report and Recommendation recommending denial of the first claim is adopted. Respondent

objects to the recommendation to grant the second claim. Upon performing the requisite de novo

review, Respondent’s objections are sustained.

Petitioner was tried in state court on seven charges, burglary of an inhabited dwelling in

January and September 2003, possession of a firearm by a felon on two separate occasions,

possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm, discharge of a

firearm in a grossly negligent manner, and failure to appear by a person released from custody

on bail. After a jury trial, he was convicted on five of the counts, including the September 2003

burglary, which is at issue before this court. Petitioner is currently serving a prison sentence

based on this conviction.

At trial, the prosecution argued that Petitioner should be found guilty of the September

2003 burglary because he was found in the victim’s garage, inside the victim’s car while trying

to remove the car stereo from the dash board. The prosecution maintained that Petitioner entered

the victim’s house with the intent to steal either the car or the car stereo. Petitioner’s defense

was that he did not have the requisite intent to steal because he was under the influence of

methamphetamine and did not know that he was removing the stereo from the car’s dashboard

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when he was arrested. On review in state court and in his Petition herein, Petitioner argued that

based on the instructions given to the jury with respect to the September 2003 burglary and the

answers to the jury’s questions during deliberations, the state court allowed the jury to convict

him based on two alternative theories, either the intent to steal or possession of

methamphetamine. The California Court of Appeal determined that there was sufficient

evidence presented at trial to support a burglary conviction based on intent to steal. (See Lodg.

Exh. 9 at 8-10.) Petitioner does not challenge this determination in his Petition. On the other

hand, it is undisputed that intent to possess methamphetamine is insufficient to support a

conviction. (See Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation Granting

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Objection”) at 1.)

The jury instruction for the September 2003 burglary count stated in full:

Defendant is accused in Count Six of having committed the crime of

burglary, a violation of section 459 of the Penal Code.[]

Every person who enters any building with the specific intent to steal, take

and carry away the personal property of another of any value and with the further

specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of that property or with the

specific intent to commit any felony, is guilty of the crime of burglary in violation

of Penal Code section 459. 

It does not matter whether the intent with which the entry was made was

thereafter carried out. 

In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved: 

1. A person entered a building; and 

2. At the time of the entry, that person had the specific intent to steal

and take away someone else's property, and intended to deprive the owner

permanently of that property. 

(Notice of Lodgment (“Lodg.”) Exh. 1 at 99.) As noted on review in state court, this instruction

was legally correct. (Id. Exh. 9 at 11.) This determination is not challenged in this proceeding.

After commencing deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the court:

In count 6 in the crime of burglary. Does the specific intent to commit a felony

have to be a specific intent to commit a theft, or could it be a specific intent to

commit any other felony. (For example possession of illegal substance, (meth.) [?] 

(Lodg. Exh. 9 at 10.) The court conferred with counsel and provided the jury with a written

response, “The theory advanced by the District Attorney is that the Defendant entered an

inhabited dwelling house with the specific intent to steal, not to commit another crime.” (Id.)

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Shortly thereafter, the jury submitted another question: 

Are we limited to considering only the theory advanced by the District Attorney or

does the law allow us to take into consideration evidence given by the

defendant[']s own testimony. [¶] We are specifically confused by [page] 47 of the

jury instructions. Paragraph 2- line 5 seems inconsistent with the 4th paragraph. 

(Lodg. Exh. 9 at 10-11.) 

Page 47 is the jury instruction for the September 2003 burglary, which is quoted in its

entirety above. The question refers to the language in paragraph 2 of the instruction, which

provides that “specific intent to commit any felony” can be a basis for conviction, and paragraph

4, which is narrower, because is references only “specific intent to steal and take away someone

else's property, and inten[t] to deprive the owner permanently of that property.” 

The court’s response to the jury’s question was, “The accurate definition of burglary is set

forth on [page] 47 of your jury instructions.” (Lodg. Exh. 9 at 11.) Shortly thereafter, the jury

returned a verdict, convicting Petitioner on several counts, including September 2003 burglary. 

During sentencing, in response to the defense counsel’s concern that the jury may have

based the conviction on a legally insufficient basis, the prosecutor replied: 

For the record, I also spoke to the jurors, and while they did discuss the

methamphetamine issue, they also assured us that they would have found, and

most likely did find, depending on which juror you speak to, that he entered with

the intent to commit theft on the second burglary. 

(Lodg. Exh. 2 at 431.)

Respondent objected to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the prosecutor’s statement in

support of the recommendation to grant the Petition. (Cf. R&R at 12,18 & Objection at 11.) The

Objection is based in part on Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which, with exceptions not

pertinent here, precludes consideration of evidence of juror statements regarding the jury’s

deliberative process. This rule applies in federal habeas proceedings. See Sassounian v. Roe,

230 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the prosecutor’s statement about the

information he received from the jurors about their deliberative process cannot be used to attack

the validity of the jury verdict and should not have been considered.

It is undisputed that the jury instructions correctly stated the elements of burglary,

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although it is apparent from the record that the trial court’s answers to the jury questions were

not particularly helpful in addressing the point which confused the jurors. Nevertheless, the

California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument that in light of the instruction and the

jurors’ confusion, the jury was allowed to convict him based on a legally insufficient theory of

burglary:

Armitage also faults the trial court for what he characterizes as essentially

giving its imprimatur to convicting him on the erroneous theory that he entered the

garage with the specific intent to commit the crime of being under the influence of

methamphetamine. The criticism is unfounded.

. . . [¶] . . . There was nothing erroneous about the instruction for this

burglary count or the court's responses to the jury's questions. Both the instruction

and the court's responses to the jury's questions properly informed the jurors that in

order to convict Armitage of burglarizing the Tuiteses' garage, they had to find he

entered the garage with the specific intent to steal. We disagree with Armitage's

argument that the court implicitly told the jury it could convict him of burglary on

any theory other than theft being the target or underlying offense.

It is pure speculation on Armitage's part to suggest the jury relied on

possession of methamphetamine as the target offense for this burglary count. The

jury notes merely indicate that at two different points of time, at least one juror

was unclear as to the target offense. Beyond this, Armitage's suggestion that the

jury convicted him of burglary on the basis that he had the specific intent to be

under the influence of methamphetamine is unsupported. . . .

(Lodg. Exh. 9 at 10, 11-12.)

The question presented by the Petition is whether this state court determination “involved

an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This is a “highly deferential standard . . .

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct.1388, 1398 (2011). A petitioner “can satisfy the unreasonable

application prong of § 2254(d)(1) only by showing that there was no reasonable basis for the

[state court] decision.” Id. at 1402 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

petitioner carries the burden of proof to meet this standard. Id. at 1398. The question, therefore,

“is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether

that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan,

550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).

The pertinent clearly established federal law is summarized in Middleton v. McNeil:

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In a criminal trial, the State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury

instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement. 

Nonetheless, not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction

rises to the level of a due process violation. The question is whether the ailing

instruction so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process. A single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but

must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. If the charge as a whole is

ambiguous, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury

has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. 

541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (internal ellipsis, brackets, quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Weeks v. Angelone this law was applied to facts similar to those presented in the

Petition. See 528 U.S. 225, 232, 233 (2000). In the penalty phase of a capital case, the jury was

given instructions which were legally correct. Id. at 231. Nevertheless, the jurors were confused

whether they had to issue capital punishment when they made certain findings, or were at liberty

to decide to issue a lesser punishment. Id. at 229 & n.1. As in this case, in response to a

question from the jury indicating that the jurors were confused, the court directed the jury to the

pertinent and legally correct jury instruction. See id. at 229. According to the instruction, the

jury was at liberty to issue a lesser punishment notwithstanding its factual findings. 

Nevertheless, the jury later returned with the capital punishment. Id. at 230. The court held:

Given that petitioner's jury was adequately instructed, and given that the trial judge

responded to the jury's question by directing its attention to the precise paragraph

of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, the question

becomes whether the Constitution requires anything more. We hold that it does

not.

Id. at 234. The holding was based on the presumption that a “jury is presumed to follow its

instructions” and “understand the judge’s answer to its question,” and that the jury did not have

any additional questions after the judge’s answer directing it to the pertinent instruction. Id. “To

presume otherwise would require reversal every time a jury inquires about a matter of

constitutional significance, regardless of the judge’s answer.” Id. 

The court further bolstered its holding based on “several empirical factors” (each juror’s

affirmation in open court that he or she considered the constitutionally required evidence, the

length of deliberations after the judge answered the jury’s last question, the fact that the jury did

not ask any follow-up questions, and the defense counsel’s closing argument, which explained

the jury’s discretion in deciding on the punishment). Id. at 234-36. The court found that even if

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1 The Report and Recommendation relies on Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46

(1991), for the proposition that simply pointing the jurors to the jury instruction was insufficient

because “[j]urors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of

conviction submitted to them is contrary to law . . ..” (R&R at 17, quoting Griffin, 502 U.S. at

59.) Griffin held that, in a federal prosecution, a general guilty verdict need not be set aside

although the jury was instructed on two theories of conviction, only one of which was supported

by sufficient evidence, and there was doubt as to which theory the jury relied upon for the guilty

verdict. 502 U.S. at 48, 60; see also id. at 47. The passage quoted in the Report and

Recommendation was not Griffin’s holding. Griffin did not address Petitioner’s argument in this

case, that the jury was allowed to base a guilty verdict on a theory which was contrary to law. 

The phrase “clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” as stated in the habeas statute, refers to the holdings of Supreme Court cases. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Habeas relief in this case therefore cannot be based on

Griffin. Furthermore, unlike in Griffin, the jury in Petitioner’s case was not instructed on two

theories of the September 2003 burglary, but only one – intent to steal, which is undisputed to be

a legally sufficient theory. (See Lodg. Exh. 1 at 99.) 

7 07cv17

petitioner may have demonstrated a possibility that the jury applied the instruction in an

unconstitutional manner, the record fell short of reasonable likelihood required to establish a

constitutional violation. Id. at 236. 

In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge carefully distinguished the

“empirical factors” in Weeks from the record in this case. (Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) at 17-18.) Based on this analysis, she found that the state court’s determination

involved an unreasonable application of federal law and recommended granting the Petition.1

Subsequently, in Harrington v. Richter the Supreme Court amplified the deferential

nature of habeas review. “Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or

theories supported . . . the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 

Authority to issue habeas relief is limited to “cases where there is no possibility fairminded

jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents. It goes

no farther.” Id. “Indeed, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Renico v. Lett, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1855,

1862 (2010). “Even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion

was unreasonable.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

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If this court were sitting on direct review, it would have good reasons to overturn the

California Court of Appeals decision. Even Respondent concedes that the state court decision

“may be debatable.” (Objection at 1-2.) The jury questions clearly reflect the jury’s confusion,

and the trial judge’s final answer was evasive and unhelpful. Rather than directing the jury to

the entirety of the instruction, which was the source of the confusion, the judge easily could have

directed them to paragraph 4 of the instruction, which would have unambiguously answered the

question. (Cf. Lodg. Exh. 1 at 99 (instruction); Exh. 9 at 10-11 (question and answer).) 

Examining the state court record de novo, this court could easily find that it was reasonably

likely that the jury applied the challenged instruction so as to base the September 2003 burglary

conviction on possession of methamphetamine, a legally insufficient ground, rather than intent to

steal. 

This court, however, does not sit on direct review of state court decisions. Federal habeas

review is “highly deferential” and must give the state court the benefit of the doubt. Cullen, 131

S. Ct. at 1398. Given the holding of Weeks and the similarity of the record in this case to the

facts of Weeks, this court cannot conclude that there was “no reasonable basis for the [state

court] decision,” see Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1402, or that no fairminded jurist could agree with the

state court, see Harrington, 131 S. Ct. 786-77.

Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation is adopted in part and rejected in part. The

Petition is DENIED. Certificate of appealability is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2011

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. LOUISA S. PORTER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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