Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00577/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00577-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

Upon screening, the Court dismissed Todd, Sanchez, Hernandez, Rodarte, Benavidez,

Rollins, Hamilton, Carlson, James, Carrillo, and Does I and II as Defendants (Doc. #4).

2

DI-67 refers to Director’s Instruction 67—the process to determine whether an inmate

should be placed in protective segregation. See http://www.azcorrections.gov/adc/policy_

inclusion.asp?menuName=/all_includes/custommenus/di.htm&fileName=Policies/DI/DI0

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alvalee Sears, III, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Lieutenant Todd, el at.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-0577-PHX-MHM (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Alvalee Sears, III, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against various Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) employees: Sergeant Marrow,

Sergeant Schwartz, Correctional Officer (CO) II Springstein, and CO II Chavez (Doc. #1).1

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Doc.

#15). Plaintiff failed to respond. 

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion.

I. Background

In his Complaint, Plaintiff set forth the following facts:

In February 2007, during his confinement in the Rynning Unit, Plaintiff was assaulted

by other inmates, which led to a DI-67 investigation (Doc. #1 at 3).2

 Despite advice that

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67.htm.

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doing so would put him on the Aryan Brotherhood (AB) hit list, Plaintiff reported the names

of those inmates who had assaulted him. Plaintiff was ultimately denied placement in

protective segregation, and he was placed back on the yard at the Rynning Unit (id. at 3A).

He appealed this denial; the appeal was denied on the basis that Plaintiff’s issues appeared

to be isolated to the Rynning Unit; Plaintiff was assigned to alternate placement (id.).

Plaintiff was sent to Special Management Unit I, where he collected information on

AB members and a planned hit (id.). Plaintiff provided this information to a Sergeant and,

although he was supposed to be “pulled out” of the unit, a few days later he was transferred

back to Rynning Unit. Plaintiff was placed in detention, and he made a request to Marrow

for a DI-67 investigation. In response to this request, Marrow yelled at him and told him

that he would not get a DI-67 until he went on the yard. Plaintiff refused to go on the yard,

despite pressure from ADC officials. Plaintiff states that he was sent to the hole for 30 days

for his refusal to go to the yard (id. at 3B). 

In May 2008, Plaintiff was transferred to the Morey Unit, where inmates who had

previously assaulted Plaintiff at the Rynning Unit were now housed (id. ). Plaintiff requested

another DI-67, which Schwartz initially granted. But nine days later, Springstein told

Plaintiff to go to the yard. Plaintiff refused, and Springstein explained that Plaintiff had to

leave his cell until he was reclassified for refusing to return to the yard. Springstein shackled

Plaintiff and placed him in a holding cell (id.). Springstein told Plaintiff that he was going

to be transferred to another detention unit, but Plaintiff did not see a transport van so he told

Springstein and Chavez he would not leave the holding cell (id. at 3C). Springstein, Chavez,

and two other officers carried Plaintiff onto the yard. Within 24 hours, Plaintiff was

assaulted by AB members; he received black eyes and lacerations to his face (id.).

Plaintiff attempted to get a another DI-67 investigation and sought assistance from

Schwartz, without success. Plaintiff was forced to pay the AB to let him stay on the yard,

and he endured repeated assaults and threats for five months until a DI-67 process was finally

initiated and approved (id.).

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Notice required under Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions put his life in danger and constituted a threat

to safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment (id. at 3, 3C). He asserted that if Defendants

had done a thorough DI-67 investigation and taken action, he would not have suffered (id.).

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as

required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Doc. #15). In

support, they submit the affidavit of Cheryl Dossett, an ADC hearing officer (id., Ex. A,

Dossett ¶ 1). Dossett explains that the ADC grievance system is governed by Department

Order (DO) 802, “Inmate Grievance System,” and that a copy of this policy is available to

inmates at each unit’s resource library (id. ¶ 4). Dossett states that under DO 802, inmates

may grieve issues related to, among other things, staff, visitation, mail, institutional

procedures, Department Written Instructions, medical care, and conditions of confinement

(id.). 

According to Dossett, the initial step in the grievance process requires an inmate to

submit an inmate letter to his assigned CO III to attempt to informally resolve the complaint

(id. ¶ 6). She states that the next step is a formal grievance, which is forwarded to the deputy

warden or a designee, and the final step is an appeal to the Central Office (id. ¶¶ 6, 10). A

copy of DO 802 is attached to Dossett’s affidavit (id., Attach. 1).

Dossett attests that the grievance coordinator receives and logs all properly-submitted

grievances and appeals and returns “unprocessed” grievances that do not comply with the

policy (id. ¶ 8). Dossett further attests that she found no entries in the ADC Central Office

Grievance Appeal Log showing that Plaintiff filed any final grievance appeals on any of his

claims (id. ¶ 13). Defendants therefore argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available

remedies for his claims and the Complaint must be dismissed (Doc. #15 at 10).

The Court informed Plaintiff of his obligation to respond and the evidence necessary

to successfully rebut Defendants’ contentions (Doc. #17).3

 Plaintiff did not file a response.

The time for responding has expired, and the motion is ready for ruling.

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III. Exhaustion

A. Legal Standard

Under the PLRA, a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before

bringing a federal action concerning prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Griffin

v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). Exhaustion is required for all suits about

prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered

through the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And a

prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable

rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Thus,

the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt, 315

F.3d at 1119. Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b)

motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-

20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the method to be used in resolving the factual

dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th

Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted).

B. Analysis

As stated, Defendants bear the burden of proving lack of exhaustion and therefore

must demonstrate that there were remedies available to Plaintiff. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119; see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants submit

evidence that a grievance system was available at the prison (Doc. #15, Ex. A, Dossett Aff.

¶ 4, Attach. 1). 

In his verified Complaint, Plaintiff indicated that administrative remedies were

available for his claim, and he checked boxes indicating that he submitted a request for

administrative relief and appealed that request for relief to the highest level (Doc. #1 at 3).

But he also answered the question, “[i]f you did not submit or appeal a request for

administrative relief . . . explain why you did not,” by stating that DI-67 has its own appeal

system, which is not grievable (id.). Defendants’ motion does not respond to this averment

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in Plaintiff’s Complaint; however, Dossett’s affidavit confirms that inmates may not use the

grievance system for “classification, discipline issues, or any other system which has its own

unique appeal process” (id. ¶ 11).

From Plaintiff’s allegations, it appears that DI-67 does, in fact, have its own appeal

process that allows a prisoner to appeal to the Director after a request for protective

segregation has been denied (Doc. #1 at 3A). However, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s

Complaint is that Defendants’ actions following the Director’s DI-67 denial in February

2008, constituted a threat to his safety (id. at 3A-3C). Specifically, Plaintiff complains about

Marrow’s conduct when Plaintiff asked her to initiate a DI-67, and he alleges that she refused

to do so (id. at 3A-3B). There is no allegation or evidence that Plaintiff grieved or attempted

to grieve this refusal by Marrow through either the DO 802 process or as an appeal through

the DI-67 process. Plaintiff claims that Springstein and Chavez forced him onto the yard

despite the risk to his safety (id. at 3C); their actions were not pursuant to the DI-67 process,

and, again, there is no indication that Plaintiff attempted to grieve their actions through any

process provided by the prison. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Schwartz refused to “help”

Plaintiff or, apparently, to initiate a DI-67 investigation. Like the claim against Marrow,

there is no indication that Plaintiff grieved or attempted to grieve this refusal by Schwartz.

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants set forth a failure to protect/threat to safety

claim under the Eighth Amendment, and therefore concern Plaintiff’s conditions of

confinement. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (Eighth Amendment

imposes duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, which

includes guaranteeing the safety of inmates and protecting them from violence at the hand

of other inmates). Indeed, Plaintiff specifically alleged a violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights related to conditions of confinement (Doc. #1 at 3 ¶ 1). The evidence reflects that

DO 802 provides a grievance process for issues related to conditions of confinement and that

Plaintiff failed to use that process (Doc. #15, Ex. A, Dossett Aff. ¶¶ 4).

Moreover, in failing to respond to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff did not refute

Defendants’ evidence that he failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. On this

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record, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden to demonstrate nonexhaustion,

and Defendants’ motion will be granted.

IV. Lack of a Response

Alternately, the Court has the discretion under Rule 7.2(i) of the Local Rules of Civil

Procedure to deem Plaintiff’s lack of response as consent to Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff was warned of this possibility (Doc. # 17). The Ninth Circuit has upheld a dismissal

based on a failure to comply with a similar local rule in the District of Nevada. See Ghazali

v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995). Before dismissal on this basis, the court must

weigh “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. at

53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). If the court does

not consider these factors, the record may be reviewed independently on appeal for abuse of

discretion. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. 

The first three factors do not favor Plaintiff, particularly in light of the fact that

Plaintiff has ostensibly lost interest in prosecuting his action. There is no risk of prejudice

to Defendants to resolve the motion in their favor, and judicial efficiency also favors

resolution of this action. The fourth factor of favoring disposition of cases on their merits

weighs in Plaintiff’s favor, and for the fifth factor, dismissal without prejudice is the least

drastic sanction. In light of the overall five-factor analysis weighing in Defendants’ favor,

the Court will deem Plaintiff’s lack of a response as a consent to the granting of the motion

and dismiss the action without prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. #15).

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #15) is granted; Plaintiff’s action is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust or, alternately, for failure to respond.

/ / / 

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(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment of dismissal accordingly.

DATED this 21st day of February, 2010.

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