Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01737/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01737-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN WESLEY WILLIAMS, No. CIV S-08-1737-WBS-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A.J. MALFI, et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is the motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) brought by

defendants Kelly, Grannis, and Carroll. Also pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for

injunctive relief (Doc. 22). 

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The law firm defendant was formerly the firm of Franscell, Strickland, Roberts, 1

Lawrence, and Hsu.

CSP-Sac. was originally called “New Folsom” and is located next to Folsom State 2

Prison. Both are located in Represa. CSP-Sac.’s address is P.O. Box 290002. Folsom State

Prison’s address is P.O. Box 71.

Plaintiff does not state what the outcome of this case was, or attach a copy of the 3

court’s order to the instant complaint. 

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

This action proceeds on plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 18). Plaintiff names

the following as defendants: Malfi, Kelly, Young, Grannis, Lippsmeyer, Hsu, Carroll, and the

law firm of Lawrence, Beach, Allen, and Choi. Plaintiff states that, upon arriving at California 1

State Prison – Sacramento (“CSP-Sac.”) in December 2004, he “began having extreme 2

difficulties with filing administrative inmate appeals. . . .” Specifically, plaintiff asserts that

defendant Malfi, the prison warden, permitted subordinates to “deliberately frustrate plaintiff’s

appeal efforts in order to cover up misconduct by prison . . . officials.” Plaintiff states that, in

early 2005, he filed a habeas corpus petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court regarding

this claim. 

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According to plaintiff, the state court granted his motion for appointment of

counsel in December 2005 and defendant Lippsmeyer was appointed. Plaintiff contends,

however, that defendant Lippsmeyer did nothing to litigate his case and only learned from

counsel in February 2006 that prison officials had erroneously told Lippsmeyer when he

attempted to visit plaintiff that plaintiff had been moved to a different prison. Plaintiff claims

that defendants Malfi and Young are liable for “deliberately permitting subordinates to falsely

convey to Defendant Lippsmeyer that Plaintiff was ‘not at the prison’ for attorney visit.” 

According to plaintiff, defendant Young is responsible for attorney visits and, for this reason,

“knew before hand that Defendant Lippsmeyer was planning to visit Plaintiff in regards to the

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petition filed against [CSP-Sac.] officials, and deliberately denied Plaintiff’s right to counsel with

malicious intent.” 

Plaintiff states that, in February 2006, he filed an inmate grievance regarding his

inability to see Lippsmeyer. He states that, in response, defendant Young generated a

memorandum “through subordinates purporting that Defendant Lippsmeyer was contacted and

denied ever making an attempt to visit with Plaintiff . . . or scheduling such.” Plaintiff attaches a

February 6, 2006, letter from defendant Lippsmeyer regarding his efforts to see plaintiff, which

plaintiff states proves defendant Young’s “utter fabrication.” Plaintiff adds that defendants Malfi

and Grannis, who is the Chief of Inmate Appeals in Sacramento, “then failed to perform duties

legally required by failing to correct Defendant Young’s unconstitutional impositions, and by

permitting Defendant Young to use dishonesty and fabrications during administrative

investigations to cover up the deliberate denial of Plaintiff’s right to counsel.” 

Plaintiff continues by alleging that he filed a complaint with the State Bar of

California “after finding out that Defendant Lippsmeyer acted in concert with Defendants Malfi

and Young. . . .” Plaintiff attaches to his complaint a June 22, 2006, letter from the state bar

closing plaintiff’s complaint. That letter states:

We have received your complaint, on 5/15/06, against Jon Paul

Lippsmeyer. Your allegations may be grounds for a criminal appeal or a

civil claim for damages but they do not form the basis for discipline. . . . 

Plaintiff then alleges that defendant Hsu, an attorney, served a civil subpoena on

officials at CSP-Sac. requesting “any and all non-privileged and non-confidential parole and/or

incarceration records” relating to plaintiff. It appears that defendant Hsu represented the County

of Los Angeles in a civil rights case pending in the Central District of California. Plaintiff

alleges that, in response to this subpoena, defendants Kelly and Carroll produced records relating

to plaintiff’s disciplinary history as well as plaintiff’s confidential medical file. Plaintiff states

that he filed a grievance concerning this situation on July 27, 2006, but that “each level of review

and investigation were obstructed, ignored, and denied by conduct known as the code of silence,

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which operates to conceal wrongdoings.” Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant Carroll

admitted in the first level appeal response that he provided defendant Hsu with plaintiff’s

confidential records but that, defendant Young’s second level appeal response stated that there

was no record of prison officials ever receiving a subpoena and that defendant Hsu’s law office

confirmed that no subpoena was ever sent. Plaintiff asserts defendant Malfi and Grannis

“permitted Defendant Young to act with dishonesty and deliberately fabricate Defendants Young,

Kelly, and Carroll did not release Plaintiff’s confidential medical and mental health records to

Defendant Hsu, while Defendant Hsu acted in concert by participating in Defendants’ affirmative

act. . . .” Based on plaintiff’s factual assertions and the documents attached to the complaint,

plaintiff is complaining about two discreet events: (1) the alleged frustration of a visit from his

attorney; and (2) the alleged production of confidential information from his prison files. 

B. Procedural History

The court previously concluded that plaintiff’s complaint does not state a

cognizable claim with respect to attorney visits. As to this claim, the court stated:

Plaintiff claims that various defendant prison officials

frustrated an attempt by his attorney, defendant Lippsmeyer, to visit him. 

He also claims that defendant Lippsmeyer is liable because he “acted in

concert” with defendant prison officials by telling them that he never

attempted to visit plaintiff. In support of his claim, plaintiff references a

February 6, 2006, letter from defendant Lippsmeyer in which he states that

he attempted to visit plaintiff at CSP-Sac., but was told by prison officials

that he was not at that institution. Defendant Lippsmeyer’s letter goes on

to state that, according to the inmate locator service, plaintiff was in fact at

CSP-Sac. at the time of the attempted visit. Plaintiff claims that defendant

Young is responsible for attorney visits, that defendant Malfi – the prison

warden – is responsible for allowing defendant Young to violate his rights,

and that defendant Grannis – the Chief of Inmate Appeals – is responsible

for allowing defendant Young to cover up his violation. 

While prisoners generally have no right to contact

visitation, see Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 1994), they

do have a right to contact visitation with their attorneys encompassed by

their right of access to the courts, see id. at 816; see also Casey v. Lewis, 4

F.3d 1516, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993). As a jurisdictional requirement flowing

from the standing doctrine, the prisoner must allege an actual injury to

successfully plead a claim based on denial of access to the courts. See

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). “Actual injury” is prejudice

with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to

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meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim. See id.; see also

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Delays in providing

legal materials or assistance which result in prejudice are “not of

constitutional significance” if the delay is reasonably related to legitimate

penological purposes. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362. 

In this case, defendant Lippsmeyer was appointed to

represent petitioner in the context of a state habeas corpus case. 

Therefore, plaintiff suffered no actual injury with respect to bringing

contemplated litigation. In his February 2006 letter, defendant Lippsmeyer

discusses the merits of plaintiff’s state habeas case as follows:

While there may be some question in my mind

about the constitutionality of the statutes involved, it seems

to me that to get anything you want in regard to the various

appeals would be to resubmit them along with this AG’s

response which indicates that your remedy is to resubmit

new appeals. The basic claim that [the AG] seems to be

making is that “He did not avail himself of his

administrative remedies” dodge [sic] which is their best

defense to everything in the world of bureaucracy. 

Unfortunately, it works in the world of habeas corpus as

well, because the writ procedure is extraordinary relief. In

other words, the court will not do anything for you unless

the harm is clear-cut and you followed their “due process,”

such as it is. 

From this it is clear that, to the extent plaintiff did not prevail in his state

habeas case, it was because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies

and not because of any frustration of his ability to visit with his attorney. 

Plaintiff cannot state a claim based on frustration of a visit

with his attorney because he cannot establish any actual injury as a result

of the alleged frustration. 

The claim related to attorney visits was dismissed, as was Lippsmeyer as a defendant to this

action. 

As to the remaining claim related to disclosure of confidential records, the court

concluded that the complaint may state a cognizable claim against defendants Malfi, Grannis,

Young, Kelly, Carroll, Hsu, and the law firm of Lawrence, Beach, Allen, and Choi. 

Subsequently plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendants Hsu and the law firm of Lawrence,

Beach, Allen, and Choi with prejudice. Of the defendants remaining in the action – Malfi,

Grannis, Young, Kelly, and Carroll – summons was returned unexecuted as to defendant Malfi,

defendant Young has filed an answer, and defendants Grannis, Kelly, and Carroll bring the

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With respect to unserved defendant Malfi, the court issued an order to show cause

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on October 2, 2009, why Malfi should not be dismissed for failure to effect service as required by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Plaintiff filed a response on October 22, 2009, alleging

that his efforts to locate Malfi have been “stonewalled by CDCR officials.” 

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pending motion to dismiss. 

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II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of

material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The

court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All

ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen,

395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual

factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50

(2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The complaint must contain

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability,

it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally may not consider materials

outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998);

Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The court may, however, consider: (1)

documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question,

and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials

of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir.

1994).

Finally, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no

amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

B. Motion for Injunctive Relief

The legal principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, are well established. To prevail, the

moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying

controversy and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v.

Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762

F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale

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with the focal point being the degree of irreparable injury shown. See Oakland Tribune, 762

F.2d at 1376. Under any formulation of the test, however, the moving party must demonstrate

that there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury. See id. In the absence of a significant

showing of possible irreparable harm, the court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success

on the merits. See id. The loss of money, or an injury whose measure of damages can be

calculated in terms of money, will not be considered irreparable. See id. at 1334-35. Finally, the

court is unable to issue an order against individuals who are not parties to a suit pending before

it. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

Moving defendants Carroll, Grannis, and Kelly argue that plaintiff’s factual

allegations do not reflect that they violated any constitutional right. According to defendants:

Williams’ complaint contains one sentence that claims Carroll and

Kelly disclosed his medical records and another that asserts Grannis failed

to prevent the disclosure. (CR 18 pp. 4:12-14, 6:12-23). However,

Williams’ entire complaint, including the exhibits and remaining

allegations, fail to clarify these two vague and conclusory sentences. 

When read together, Williams’ entire complaint establishes that: (1)

Williams’ allegation against Carroll and Grannis concerns only their

review of Williams’ grievances; and (2) neither Kelly nor Grannis

participated in the conduct alleged by Williams. 

* * *

Williams does not claim that Carroll played any role in the case

until after Williams’ records were disclosed to [the law firm] on October

11, 2005. Williams filed a grievance on June 23, 2006, and Carroll

assessed Williams’ allegations at the first level of review on September

11, 2006. (CR 18 p. 25). Even reading all of the facts in a light most

favorable to Williams, that is the full extent of his allegations against

Carroll. Therefore, at most, Williams claims that he is dissatisfied with

Carroll’s response to his grievance. But even assuming that Carroll failed

to adequately respond to the grievance, Williams has failed to state a claim

because he does not have any right to a grievance process. Accordingly,

Williams’ complaint fails to state a claim against Carroll. 

/ / /

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Similarly, Williams’ allegations against Grannis concern only the

grievance that Williams filed eight months after CSP-Sacramento sent his

records to [the law firm]. Williams’ records were located at CSPSacramento in Represa, California. (CR 18 p. 2). Grannis worked in

Sacramento, California, as the Chief of [the Inmate Appeals Branch of

CDCR]. (CR 18 pp. 2, 22). Williams does not allege that Grannis

participated in the disclosure of his records. (CR 18). Instead, Williams

has attached a copy of Grannis’ job duties and argues that Grannis could

have prevented the disclosure because her job requires a working

knowledge of prison operations. (CR 18 p. 6). However, Grannis’ duty

statement establishes that Grannis supervises the processing of inmate

grievances . . . and she does not have any duties at CSP-Sacramento. (CR

18 p. 83). Because there is no dispute that Williams’ allegations against

Grannis concern only the processing of a grievance, Williams has failed to

state a claim against Grannis. (CR 18 p. 22). 

Moreover, Williams’ exhibits indicate that R. Manuel, not Grannis,

conducted the Director’s level review of Williams’ grievance. (CR 18 p.

22). Accordingly, Williams’ complaint also establishes that Grannis did

not participate in the conduct alleged, the Director’s level review of

Williams’ grievance. For this additional reason, the Court should grant

Grannis’ motion to dismiss. 

Similarly, an exhibit to Williams’ complaint indicates that Karen

Kelly played no role in the subject incident. Williams’ claims that staff at

CSP-Sacramento gathered his records and sent them to [the law firm] on

October 11, 2005. An exhibit to Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that Kyle

Kypke gathered his records on October 11, 2005. 

A detailed review of the amended complaint and exhibits attached thereto reveals the following

allegations relating to Grannis, Carroll, and Kelly, consistent with defendants’ summary:

Page 4, lines 11-14 Plaintiff’s confidential mental health and medical records

were disclosed by defendants Carroll and Kelly.

Page 5, lines 5-9 Defendant Carroll addressed plaintiff’s inmate grievance at

the first level and “admitted to being responsible for

photocopying the private, privilege, and confidential

records in dispute which were then turned over to

Defendant Young. . . .”

Page 6, lines 12-21 Defendant Grannis “omitted to perform duties legally

required causing the deprivation upon which Complaint is

made. . . .”

Exhibit D December 13, 2006, Director’s level appeal decision on

plaintiff’s grievance regarding disclosure of confidential

information. This decision was signed by “R. Manuel” for

defendant Grannis. 

/ / /

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Exhibit D September 11, 2006, first level appeal response signed by

defendant Carroll.

Exhibit H October 11, 2005, declaration of custodian of records Kyle

Kypke regarding plaintiff’s records. 

At the outset, the court agrees with defendants that plaintiff does not have any

stand-alone constitutional right related to processing of his inmate grievances. See Mann v.

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th

Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance

process). Because there is no right to any particular grievance process, it is impossible for due

process to have been violated by ignoring or failing to properly process grievances. Numerous

district courts in this circuit have reached the same conclusion. See Smith v. Calderon, 1999 WL

1051947 (N.D. Cal 1999) (finding that failure to properly process grievances did not violate any

constitutional right); Cage v. Cambra, 1996 WL 506863 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that prison

officials’ failure to properly process and address grievances does not support constitutional

claim); James v. U.S. Marshal’s Service, 1995 WL 29580 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing

complaint without leave to amend because failure to process a grievance did not implicate a

protected liberty interest); Murray v. Marshall, 1994 WL 245967 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding

that prisoner’s claim that the grievance process failed to function properly failed to state a claim

under § 1983). 

With the foregoing in mind, the court concludes that plaintiff cannot state any

claim against defendant Grannis, who held a supervisory position related to review of inmate

grievances. Specifically, as defendants note, plaintiff’s exhibits reflect that R. Manuel – not

defendant Grannis – wrote the Director’s level appeal decision. Thus, Grannis simply had no

involvement in the alleged improper disclosure of confidential records. And, even if Grannis had

authored the Director’s level decision, there is no stand-alone right related to the processing of

inmate grievances. Defendant Grannis should be dismissed. 

/ / /

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Similarly, as defendants note, plaintiff’s only allegations as against defendant

Carroll concern the September 11, 2006, first level response. Because plaintiff has no

constitutional right related to processing or handling of inmate grievances, defendant Carroll

should also be dismissed. 

As to defendant Kelly, it appears that plaintiff assigns liability based on his

apparent contention that defendant Kelly was responsible for actually gathering and providing his

confidential health information to the law firm. Any such contention, however, is belied by

plaintiff’s exhibits which reflect that Kyle Kypke – not defendant Kelly – gathered and produced

plaintiff’s documents. Thus, there are no allegations to establish the participation of defendant

Kelly in any constitutional violation. 

B. Motion for Injunctive Relief

In his motion for injunctive relief, plaintiff alleges that defendant Grannis has

engaged in acts of retaliation for plaintiff having filed this lawsuit. The court cannot recommend

granting relief for two reasons. First, plaintiff has not established the likelihood of irreparable

injury because any claim that defendant Grannis has engaged in acts of retaliation can be

redressed in a separate lawsuit alleging same. Second, for the reasons discussed above, the court

finds that defendant Grannis should not be a defendant to this action. Based on this finding, the

court is unable to grant injunctive relief against a non-party. 

C. Defendant Malfi

Finally, the court addresses non-service of defendant Malfi. Upon further

consideration, the court now concludes that plaintiff cannot state a claim against defendant Malfi,

who is sued in his supervisory capacity. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under

§ 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only

liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant

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can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct

because government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for

his or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. In this

case, plaintiff’s allegations that defendant Malfi is responsible solely because of his supervisory

role is insufficient. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) be granted; 

2. Defendants Grannis, Kelly, Carroll, and Malfi be dismissed with

prejudice; 

3. This action proceed on plaintiff’s claim relating to disclosure of

confidential information as against defendant Young only; and

4. Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 22) be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 15 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 3, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:08-cv-01737-WBS-CMK Document 50 Filed 03/04/10 Page 13 of 13