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Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-2676

IN RE:

WENDY A. NORA,

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:13-cv-00021-bbc — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

____________________

SHOW CAUSE HEARING OCTOBER 28, 2014 — DECIDED

FEBRUARY 11, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER, POSNER, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. On August 13, 2014, we ordered attorney Wendy Nora to show cause why she should not be 

sanctioned for pursuing a frivolous appeal, see Fed. R. App. 

P. 38, and why she should not be disciplined for conduct 

unbecoming a member of the bar, see id. 46(c). PNC Bank, 

N.A. v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650, 655 (7th Cir. 2014). For the reasons that follow, we now impose a sanction of $2,500 but 

suspend the sanction until such time, if ever, that Nora submits additional frivolous or needlessly antagonistic filings. 

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I. Background

As discussed in our earlier opinion, this case arose from a 

Wisconsin foreclosure action in which Nora, retained by 

Sheila Spencer, raised numerous objections focused on alleging that PNC Bank was fraudulently attempting to foreclose.

Nearly four years after the suit had been filed, Nora then 

removed the case to federal court on the basis that she had 

just discovered through internet research that Freddie Mac 

was the “real party in interest.” The district court remanded 

the case to state court and awarded fees and costs to PNC, 

concluding that Nora failed to explain how federal jurisdiction could exist when Freddie Mac was not a party to the 

case. Nora moved for reconsideration, and the court denied 

the motion as “frivolous,” noting that Nora “ignored the voluminous law stating that district courts lack jurisdiction to 

reconsider remand orders, made no good faith argument for 

changing existing law and offered no meritorious arguments 

for reconsidering the decision to award fees.” The court 

added that Nora had attempted “repeated procedural feints 

to delay the foreclosure that was properly before the state 

court.” 

Nora then appealed on behalf of both Spencer and herself, and we concluded that the appeal was sanctionably 

frivolous. We explained that Nora had “never presented any 

colorable basis for federal jurisdiction over this years-old 

state-court foreclosure case,” leading us to “suspect that the 

removal was part of a strategy designed to gum up the progress of the case.” Spencer, 763 F.3d at 655. We also observed 

that we lacked jurisdiction over Nora’s appeal on her own 

behalf because liability for the award of fees and costs rested 

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solely with Spencer; although Nora asserted that Judge 

Crabb had “engaged in a campaign of libel against [her],” 

this alleged criticism did not permit Nora to appeal. Id. at 

653–54. Nora suggested at oral argument that she would 

withdraw her name as co-appellant but never did so. Id. at 

654.

Further, we noted that Nora’s conduct appeared to be 

part of a pattern of troubling litigation tactics. We observed 

that Nora had been suspended indefinitely from practicing 

law in Minnesota (though later reinstated) for conduct similar to her actions in this case: making frivolous arguments, 

with no prospect of success, in an effort to delay foreclosure

of her clients’ farm land. See In re Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328, 330 

(Minn. 1990). Additionally, we observed that Nora’s responses to her opponents and the courts during this litigation were “unnecessarily accusatory and antagonistic,” noting that Nora had accused “the state court judge and court 

reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts, the district judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel against [her],’ 

and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable civil fraud 

and racketeering [that] may constitute state and federal 

criminal misconduct.’” Spencer, 763 F.3d at 655 (alterations in 

original). We gave Nora 30 days to show cause why she 

should not be sanctioned.

Two days after we issued our opinion, Nora filed a 14-

page “initial response” alleging that the opinion did not 

provide her with reasonable notice of the charges against 

her. She requested an evidentiary hearing and appointment 

of “an attorney to represent the proponent of the Order to 

Show Cause and a referee or special master to preside at the 

hearing.” We denied Nora’s request for appointment of a 

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special master and a full evidentiary hearing but agreed to 

hold a hearing on the show-cause order as allowed under 

Rule 46(c). We warned Nora that we would not accept additional filings beyond “one proper response to the showcause order” and directed her to address the following four 

issues in her response: (1) whether the removal of this case, 

motion to reconsider, and appeal of the fee order were frivolous; (2) whether her appeal on her own behalf was frivolous; (3) whether the removal and appeal were litigated for 

the improper purposes of delay or increasing litigation costs; 

and (4) whether her attacks on her opponents and the district judge were appropriate advocacy. 

Nora did not limit herself to one proper response. On 

September 2, 2014, she submitted a petition for rehearing en 

banc on behalf of herself and Spencer, rehashing her frivolous appellate arguments. On September 19, she filed both a 

“partial response to order to show cause (all rights reserved)” and a separate motion to stay further proceedings 

pending a petition for writ of certiorari. On October 3, after 

the court denied her request for a stay of proceedings, she 

filed a citation of additional authority under Circuit Rule 

28(e) to bring to our attention a Sixth Circuit decision that 

purportedly supports her arguments on the merits. Finally, 

on October 17, eleven days before the show cause hearing, 

Nora moved to postpone the hearing because she had become “progressively mildly cognitively impaired as the result of a whiplash injury” from a car accident on September 

13. We denied the request to postpone the hearing but 

granted Nora, or an attorney on her behalf, leave to argue by 

speakerphone. On October 28, Nora appeared in person for a 

20-minute hearing.

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II. Discussion

In responding to our earlier opinion, Nora has dug in her 

heels and continues to press the same arguments that were 

thoroughly rejected in the district court and our earlier opinion. Nora spends much of her response quoting portions of 

our earlier opinion and arguing that she could prove them 

wrong if given an evidentiary hearing. She made the same 

argument at her hearing. But Nora fails to specify what evidence she would present to undermine our opinion; she 

merely declares—without citation to the record—that a dozen different statements in our opinion were “false.” These 

contentions do nothing to justify the removal, motion to reconsider, and appeal in this case. She also argues that she 

properly appealed on her own behalf because “the effect of 

the district court decision was to require her to indemnify 

Ms. Spencer.” But as we explained in our earlier opinion, the 

award was against Spencer, not Nora, and Nora has not 

shown that she agreed to indemnify Spencer. 

Nora also argues that, by depriving her of an evidentiary 

hearing, we violated her constitutional right to due process, 

citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). That argument is 

frivolous. Ruffalo holds that an attorney must receive fair notice of adverse charges and an opportunity to respond before 

being disciplined. Id. at 550; see Lightspeed Media Corp. v. 

Smith, 761 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2014). These requirements 

were satisfied here through our opinion and subsequent order describing our concerns, and our allowance of time to 

respond and a hearing.

Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a litigant or 

attorney presents appellate arguments with no reasonable 

expectation of success for the purposes of delay, harassment, 

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or sheer obstinacy. See Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Loop Corp., 726 

F.3d 899, 909–10 (7th Cir. 2013); Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 

469, 475 (7th Cir. 1990); Mays v. Chi. Sun-Times, 865 F.2d 134, 

138–39 (7th Cir. 1989). Nora’s responses provide us with no 

persuasive reason to doubt that her arguments in this appeal 

were motivated by improper purposes. We note that this is 

far from the only case—from the last two years alone—

where Nora has raised frivolous and unsupported allegations of fraudulent mortgage documents. See In re Residential 

Capital, LLC, No. 12-12020 (MG), 2013 WL 6227582, at *2 

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2013) (concluding that “[a]lmost 

everything asserted in the [Response Nora filed] is frivolous” as “most of the Response contains unsupported allegations of fraud and various constitutional violations”); Rinaldi 

v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., Nos. 13-CV-336-JPS, 13-CV-643-

JPS, 2013 WL 5876233, at *9--10 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 31, 2013) (rejecting numerous claims against a mortgage as lacking “any 

arguable basis” and noting that Nora’s briefs were “almost 

unintelligible”); In re Schmid, 494 B.R. 737, 752 (Bankr. W.D. 

Wis. 2013) (rejecting fraud allegations as based on Nora’s 

opinions drawn “without the benefit of a factual or legal basis”); see also Van Stelton v. Van Stelton, 994 F. Supp. 2d 986, 

994 (N.D. Iowa 2014) (refusing to dismiss abuse-of-process 

claim alleging that plaintiffs represented by Nora brought 

lawsuit for improper purposes).

Nora also fails to alleviate our concern about her engaging in “conduct unbecoming a member of the court’s bar” 

under Rule 46(c). She contends that her comments during 

this litigation have amounted to nothing more than unsanctionable rudeness, citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985). In 

Snyder, the Supreme Court concluded that a single illmannered letter did not rise to the level of “conduct inimical 

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to the administration of justice” that is sanctionable under 

Rule 46(c). Id. at 645–47; see In re Lightfoot, 217 F.3d 914, 916–

17 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing this standard and collecting 

cases applying it). But Nora’s conduct is more egregious 

than that in Synder. As noted in our earlier opinion, Nora has 

repeatedly acted with needless antagonism toward opposing 

counsel and judicial officers. In her responses to our order to 

show cause, she has refused to back down from her accusations of libel against Judge Crabb and “actionable civil fraud 

and racketeering” against opposing counsel. She denies accusing the state court judge of altering transcripts, but the 

record belies her denial: she not only made the accusations 

but moved for substitution of the judge on that basis. She 

also now derides “this panel and many of the judges in this 

circuit” as being biased “against homeowners’ rights to be 

heard and defend their homes.” This bandying about of serious accusations without basis in law or fact is unacceptable 

and warrants sanctions. See In re Hendrix, 986 F.2d 195, 201 

(7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that attorney’s filing of submissions not grounded in law or fact is sanctionable); Mays, 865 

F.2d at 140 (sanctioning attorney for falsely imputing positions on opponents and the court).

Nora suggested at her hearing that her problems represent a personal dispute with Judge Crabb, pointing out that 

the judge decided to unseal Nora’s medical records in an 

appeal Nora filed in her own bankruptcy case. But Nora has 

failed to persuade us that the judge’s actions amounted to 

anything more than adverse rulings against her. Cf. Liteky v. 

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings 

alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”). Moreover, we affirmed Judge Crabb’s dismissal of that case for failure to prosecute, agreeing that 

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Nora had unjustifiably prolonged the proceedings by claiming to be “totally disabled” even though she continued to 

actively litigate. See In re Nora, 417 F. App’x 573, 575–76 (7th 

Cir. 2011). When we questioned Nora about the lack of basis 

for her libel accusations at the hearing in this case, she proposed that she could substantiate her accusations if allowed 

to discuss them with us in chambers. There is no reason to 

believe that allowing Nora to disparage Judge Crabb in private would convince us that sanctions are inappropriate.

Furthermore, a review of Nora’s other recent litigation 

makes clear that she has a pattern of engaging in this type of 

antagonistic behavior. The chief bankruptcy judge of the 

Western District of Wisconsin criticized Nora this past 

summer for repeatedly disregarding the judge’s instructions 

about the court’s jurisdictional and constitutional limits. In re 

Bechard, Bankr. No. 14-11862-13, 2014 WL 3671419, at *6 

(Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 21, 2014). Nora then challenged that 

decision through a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing 

that the judge had issued the decision for the sole purpose of 

defaming her. Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp, 2014 WL 

4209608 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014). The district court found 

that the judge’s “stern, but restrained, criticism” of Nora had 

been “well within the bounds of propriety and civility,” 

though “Nora’s petition [was] not.” Id. at *3 n.7. Additionally, Nora was recently sanctioned $1,000 by another district 

judge in this circuit for ignoring the judge’s “extremely clear 

warning” against filing frivolous submissions. Rinaldi, Nos. 

13-CV-336-JPS, 13-CV-643-JPS, ECF Doc. 48, at 3 (E.D. Wis. 

Apr. 9, 2014). Earlier in that case, the judge observed that, as 

in this case, Nora had “at every turn filed briefs that ha[d]

done little to clarify the matters under consideration while 

further confusing matters,” noting that Nora’s filings lacked 

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coherent focus, cited controlling legal authority sparingly if 

at all, rehashed rejected arguments, and contained “irrelevant and argumentative language that has no place in a legal 

brief.” Rinaldi, Nos. 13-CV-336-JPS, 13-CV-643-JPS, ECF Doc. 

37, at 2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 13, 2013). We affirmed that sanction 

on appeal. Rinaldi v. HSBC USA, N.A., Nos. 13-3865, 14-1887 

(7th Cir. Feb. 11, 2015). There is also a pending disciplinary 

case against Nora in Wisconsin. See Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Nora, No. 2013AP000653-D (Wis. filed Mar. 20, 2013).

Because the $1,000 sanction imposed in Rinaldi does not 

appear to have deterred Nora from continuing to submit 

frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings, we now impose 

an increased sanction of $2,500. We suspend this sanction, 

however, until the time, if ever, that Nora submits further 

inappropriate filings. We also direct the clerk of this court 

to forward a copy of this order and our earlier opinion to the

Office of Lawyer Regulation of the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court.

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