Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02163/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HASSAN RASHIDIAN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 03cv2163-LAB (CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION, AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.

MR. WAYNE K. WILLIS, DHS District

Director, Southern District, California; MR.

CARYL THOMPSON, OIC, BICE Detention

Center, El Centro, California; CAPTAIN M.

MOE; DR. BROWN; Medical Director,

CAPTAIN RECLOSADO, Project Director,

AKAL Security, El Centro Detention Facility,

Defendants.

Plaintiff in pro per, Hassan Rashidian, formerly an immigration detainee held at the

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service Processing Center in El Centro, California, filed a

civil rights violation complaint under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for

violations of his civil rights. He alleges he was twice attacked by other detainees and suffered physical

injuries in each instance. He alleges he reported the first attack but that no action was taken to protect

him either before or after the second attack. Plaintiff also alleges the detention center personnel failed

to provide him with the appropriate medical care. 

Defendant Reclosado moved for summary judgment, which Plaintiff opposed. This motion

was referred to Magistrate Judge Cathy Bencivengo for a report and recommendation in accordance

Case 3:03-cv-02163-LAB-CAB Document 85 Filed 03/01/07 Page 1 of 12
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with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 72.3. Judge Bencivengo issued her report and

recommendation (the “R&R”) on January 4, 2007, recommending that summary judgment be granted.

Plaintiff filed his objections on January 26, 2007. Although Plaintiff’s objections were filed one day

later than the R&R permitted, the Court will nevertheless consider them in the interests of deciding

the issues on the merits. Defendant Reclosado filed a reply to the objections, as permitted by the R&R.

The Court has previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s

medical needs, and all Defendants other than Captain Reclosado. The only remaining claim, therefore,

is Plaintiff’s due process claim against Defendant Reclosado for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s

personal safety, which was the subject of Defendant Reclosado’s motion for summary judgment.

I. Legal Standards

The district court has jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation

concerning a dispositive pretrial motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). “The district judge to whom the case

is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any

portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to which specific written objection has been made in

accordance with this rule.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A judge of the court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Thus, the district court judge reviews those parts of the report and

recommendation to which a party has filed a written objection. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 238

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

Allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held “to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). Thus, where a plaintiff appears in pro per in a civil rights case, the court must construe the

pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Although the Court must construe the pleadings

liberally, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King

v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, the Court will not assume that Plaintiff can

prove facts he has not alleged, or that Defendant has violated his rights in ways that have not been 

/ / /

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1

 Plaintiff has objected to the application of this standard and urged the Court to apply a

different standard of review but, as discussed below, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection and will

apply this well-established standard.

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alleged. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.

519, 526 (1983). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the court to enter summary judgment on

factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary

judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Arpin

v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001). In ruling on the motion, the

Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations, but instead

determines whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union,

439 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

256 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive

law. Id. at 248. After the moving party has met his or her burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id.

at 256.

“A scintilla of evidence, or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative, is

not sufficient to present a genuine issue as to a material fact.” United Steelworkers of America v.

Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The evidence is “viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fairbank v.

Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000).

Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The failure of prison

officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation when: (1) the deprivation alleged is “objectively, sufficiently serious” and (2)

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 As discussed below, Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R show he believes a different standard

should apply. However, for reasons discussed below, it is clear this is the correct standard.

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the prison officials had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” acting with deliberate indifference. Id.

at 834. “[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence ... [but] is satisfied

by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that

harm will result.”2Id. at 835.

II. Plaintiff’s Objections

Plaintiff has raised three broad factual objections, two legal objections, and an evidentiary

objection. To the extent Plaintiff may have intended to raise other objections, the Court holds,

even after affording the objections a liberal construction, such objections were not specific. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (requiring the Court to review de novo “any portion of the magistrate judge’s

disposition to which specific written objection has been made . . . .”)

A. Factual Objections

Plaintiff gives his own factual summary but does not otherwise object to the R&R’s factual

findings. This factual summary essentially repeats from Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for

summary judgment all his factual contentions related to the remaining claim. The Court therefore

construes Plaintiff’s statement of facts to constitute his objections to the R&R’s factual findings. The

Court understands Plaintiff to be objecting only to those portions of the R&R’s findings that Plaintiff’s

statement of facts conflicts with.

Plaintiff’s factual assertions, as set forth in his objections to the R&R, are as follows:

On March 10, 2003, Plaintiff was attacked by another detainee

while asleep in Alpha South Barrack . . . and was physically

injured[, resulting] in [his] seeking medical assistance. He identified the

attackers and asked for security and protection from the concerned

authorities from future incidents, [but] nothing proper was done.

Plaintiff requested to be placed in B/East Barrack where he thought

he [would have] protection but he was rather placed in another barrack with

another group of people making him even more vulnerable for future

attacks. He was again attacked by another detainee [on] 9-17-03 . . .and

again suffered physical injuries. Although he reported the second attack,

again, no safety measures were taken, and he did not receive the medical

treatment he sought. Being desperate to ensure his safety, Plaintiff also filed

[a] “Detainee Grievance Form”.

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3

 The factual assertions in the “Argument” and “Conclusion” section are virtually identical,

although the “Conclusion” section adds some conclusions of law, asserting for instance, that

Defendant “acted ‘Deliberately indifferent’ to Plaintiff’s security, safety and medical needs.’”

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(Objections to R&R, at 2:18–3:7). Plaintiff also includes several factual assertions in a short section

that follows, headed “Arguments,” and repeats these in a later section headed “Conclusion”:3

. . . Defendant [Reclosado] knew about plaintiff’s vulnerability to attacks while a

detainee; Defendant was informed after the first attack that Plaintiff would be subject

to future attacks; Defendant knew that Plaintiff was fearful of future attacks;

Defendant was given a written request endorsed by the Medical Director of the

facility to take measures to assure plaintiff[’s] safety; [and] Defendant . . .Reclosado

failed to take steps within his authority to prevent future attacks.

(Id. at 3:8–21; see also 8:15–25 (substantially identical “Conclusion” section).) Obviously, several

of these “factual” assertions are actually assertions of opinion or law (e.g., “nothing proper was done,”

and “Reclosado failed to take steps within his authority to prevent further attacks.”) Conclusory

assertions of law or unwarranted inferences are inadequate even at the pleading stage, Adams v.

Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004), and will not suffice to create a triable issue of material

fact.

1. Objection: Defendant Reclosado Was Informed Plaintiff Would Be

Subject to Future Attacks

The only significant discrepancy between the R&R’s findings and the statements of fact in

Plaintiff’s objections is Plaintiff’s contention that “Defendant was informed after the first attack that

Plaintiff would be subject to future attacks . . . .” Other than this, the R&R essentially accepts

Plaintiff’s statement of events (excluding Plaintiff’s statements of opinion and conclusions of law),

but includes greater detail. Plaintiff has not objected to any of the other details included in the R&R’s

factual findings. Therefore, the Court ADOPTS those portions of the R&R’s factual findings Plaintiff

has not objected to.

As the R&R notes, Plaintiff has presented no evidence showing Defendant Reclosado knew

of any potential danger to Plaintiff before the first attack. (R&R at 5:19–20.) Plaintiff appears to

concede this, stating “Defendant was informed after the first attack that Plaintiff would be subject to

future attacks.” (Obj. at 8:17–18.) The R&R notes Plaintiff has not argued that failure to prevent the

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 first attack amounted to deliberate indifference. (R&R at 5:20–22.) Because Plaintiff was attacked

not attacked a third time, the Court therefore focuses on the time between the first and second attacks.

Plaintiff’s objection that “Defendant was informed after the first attack that Plaintiff would be

subject to future attacks” points to a central evidentiary issue critical to Plaintiff’s case. Defendant

Reclosado submitted a declaration stating that between the first and second attacks, he “had no

information to indicate that Rashidian was at risk for a further attack” or “under threat of another

attack, or in any way at ‘risk.’” (Reclosado Decl. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., ¶¶ 9, 16–17.)

Because Defendant Reclosado is competent to testify to what information he did or did not have, this

suffices to meet his initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The burden then shifts to Plaintiff, who “may not rest upon mere

allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Id. at 256.

In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and in his objections to the R&R,

Plaintiff points solely to paragraph 9 of Defendant Reclosado’s declaration, Plaintiff’s request for

transfer endorsed by the Medical Director, and a grievance form submitted five days before the second

attack. (Opp’n at 7:8–8:17; Obj. at 2:21–3:21, 6:1–7:12.) The R&R concludes, on the basis of

Plaintiff’s amended complaint, that the grievance form was forwarded to the INS and requested that

INS investigate the first attack but does not bring up any continuing safety issues. (R&R at 2:26–3:1,

7:23–8:3.) Plaintiff has not objected to this characterization of the grievance form. The grievance

form therefore does not tend to show that Defendant Reclosado knew Plaintiff was at risk of another

attack. This is particularly true given the lack of evidence that the two attacks were in any way related.

(R&R at 6:16–18.)

While Plaintiff also mentions writing two letters to Chief Officer Deleon, he never suggests

these contained any information that might tend to show Defendant Reclosado was informed Plaintiff

was in danger of future attacks. (Obj. at 7:9–11.) The R&R’s findings cite Plaintiff’s amended

complaint and conclude these letters requested medical assistance, (R&R at 2:21–23 (citing amended

complaint at 25–26)). This was relevant to other claims Plaintiff brought, but not to the claim at issue

here. Plaintiff has not objected to the R&R’s characterization of these two letters.

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Paragraph 9 of Defendant Reclosado’s declaration says:

If one of the detainees was at “risk” for an attack, there were numerous sources of

“at risk” information available, such as the detainee himself, other detainees, a

relative of the detainees, and even rumors. At no time during Mr. Rashidian’s

residence at the El Centro facility, was I aware of any such information.

This paragraph merely states that if a detainee was at risk of being attacked, there would be many

possible sources of information warning about the risk, but that Defendant Reclosado received no

information from any of these sources suggesting that Plaintiff would be attacked a second time. This

is of no help to Plaintiff, since it only tends to show Defendant Reclosado did not receive any notice

Plaintiff was at risk.

Plaintiff places most of his emphasis on the Medical Director’s endorsement of his request for

a transfer. This document contains two sets of remarks, one by Plaintiff, and one by Medical Director

Dr. Brown. Plaintiff initially requests to be transferred “only” to B/East barracks “Because I have

Protection.” [sic]. As the R&R notes, Plaintiff never explained the nature of the protection he believed

he would have had in B/East, nor provided evidence of it. (R&R at 7:18–20.) This is followed by an

endorsement by the Medical Director, stating simply, “Support measure to assure Patient’s safety and

maintain health and walking.” (Obj. at 6:1–25 (citing Opp’n, Ex. B).)

Neither Plaintiff’s request nor Dr. Brown’s recommendation warn of the danger of violence

at the barracks to which Plaintiff was eventually transferred. Because Plaintiff does not identify any

threats or possible threats, this request does not warn of danger in other barracks. At most, it can be

taken as a warning that Plaintiff lacked “protection” in all barracks except B/East, and that he felt most

secure there. Because Plaintiff provides no evidence he had known enemies in barracks where he did

not have “protection,” he fails to show that the absence of “protection” is equivalent to the presence

of danger — or, more significantly, why Defendant Reclosado would have known this. 

Plaintiff seems to believe Dr. Brown’s recommendation was intended as a warning, but there

is no evidence of this. Rather, Dr. Brown’s recommendation appears to recommend a transfer to

B/East for primarily medical reasons. As the R&R notes, this recommendation is very general and

does not call for any specific course of action. (Id. at 7:21–22.) Although the recommendation

mentions “to assure safety” as one of the reasons, there is no clear indication this refers to actual safety

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from attack, particularlyan apparentlyunrelated attack, as opposed to reassuring Plaintiff or preventing

medical complications. There is also no evidence Dr. Brown would have any reason to know where

Plaintiff was or was not likely to be attacked, or the purpose of Dr. Brown’s recommendation. In short,

there is no evidence of that Dr. Brown’s recommendation was intended as a warning of future

violence, nor is there any evidence that Dr. Brown had any basis for giving such a warning.

Furthermore, the only evidence of the conclusions Defendant Reclosado drew from this

recommendation shows that Defendant Reclosado did not interpret it as a warning. Therefore, this

evidence is not sufficiently probative to create a triable issue of material fact. See United

Steelworkers of America, 865 F.2d at 1542. 

Plaintiff has repeatedly alleged that, following the first attack, he was fearful for his life. (See,

e.g., Opp’n at 7:24–25.) Even accepting these assertions, however, this does not constitute evidence

that Plaintiff was actually in danger, much less that Defendant Reclosado knew Plaintiff was in danger.

Plaintiff’s generalized subjective fear of being attacked, without more, does not constitute evidence

he was at risk of attack, or that Defendant Reclosado knew he would be attacked. See, e.g., Jones v.

Marshall, 459 F. Supp.2d 1002, 1011 (E.D.Cal. 2006) (granting defendants’ motion for summary

judgment where plaintiff, an inmate who was attacked while in prison, had “a generalized fear for his

safety, but offer[ed] no evidence that defendants knew of the specific harm to [p]laintiff”).

Plaintiff contends the fact that he mentioned protection showed that he was in danger, and that

he specifically knew he would be in danger in the barracks to which he was transferred. (Obj. at

8:18–9:2.) As noted, however, Plaintiff’s subjective belief or feeling is not adequate to withstand a

motion for summary judgment.

Because there is no evidence to support a finding that Defendant Reclosado was warned about

a specific danger to Plaintiff, this objection is OVERRULED.

2. Objection: Defendant Reclosado Knew PlaintiffWasVulnerable to Attack

More generally, Plaintiff objects to the R&R’s factual conclusions, arguing the R&R should

have concluded Defendant Reclosado knew (or should have known) he was vulnerable to attack, but

failed to take any reasonable measures to protect Plaintiff from attack. 

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Almost immediately after the first attack, Plaintiff was transferred to a different barracks,

although not to B/East. (R&R at 7:5–6, 7:12–13.) This put him out of reach of his first attacker. (Id.

at 5:24–6:2.) Plaintiff contends that because he earlier told Defendant Reclosado that he wanted to

live only in B/East barracks, that he had “Protection” in B/East, and that he was afraid, Defendant

Reclosado knew the new barracks were unsafe. (Obj. at 6:19–7:8.) There is no evidence, however,

that Plaintiff told Defendant Reclosado they were unsafe, or provided any evidence or reasons that

would have shown they were unsafe. (R&R at 7:13–16.)

The documents discussed above are the only evidence Plaintiff has cited that might support a

finding that Defendant Reclosado was warned of dangers in the new barracks. As the R&R observes,

no documents written by Plaintiff in the period between the two attacks mention safety concerns or

requests to be transferred from the new barracks. (R&R at 9:9–11.)

As the R&R notes, without objection from Plaintiff, the two attacks occurred six months apart,

and there is no explanation or evidence the two were in any way related, whether by who the

perpetrators were, their motives, the manner in which the attacks occurred, or any other factor. (R&R

at 6:16–18.) Bearing this in mind, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence or explanation why the first

attack should have made Defendant Reclosado aware of the danger of a second attack. Unless the two

attacks were related in some way, it is not self-evident that a prisoner who is attacked once but moved

to different housing away from his attacker would likely be attacked a second time months later. The

R&R concludes the first attack “appeared to be no more than an isolated incident.” (R&R at 6:20.)

The evidence Plaintiff points to would be sufficient to support a finding that, in retrospect, his

subjective concerns regarding where he was transferred to turned out to be well-founded and that, had

he been transferred to B/East instead of to a different barracks, he might not have been attacked a

second time. However, what Plaintiff believed, or what might have happened if Defendant Reclosado

had acted differently is not at issue. What is at issue is whether Defendant Reclosado knew of and

ignored a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Because there is no evidence Defendant Reclosado

knew of such a risk, or ignored it, there is no triable issue of material fact and summary judgment for

Defendant Reclosado is appropriate. For these reasons, this objection is OVERRULED.

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3. Objection: Defendant Reclosado’s Authority to Increase the Number of

Guards Is Irrelevant

Plaintiff briefly objects to Defendant Reclosado’s argument that Defendant Reclosado “had

no authority to increase the number of guards at any post or change guards from one post to

another . . . .” (Obj. at 8:18–21.) Plaintiff calls this argument irrelevant, contending that Defendant

Reclosado should have ensured that the guards on duty provided Plaintiff protection because of his

known vulnerability. Plaintiff has not objected to the accuracy of this finding, but only to its

relevance. In essence, Plaintiff is arguing Defendant could have provided him with protection in some

other way.

The R&R mentioned this fact in passing, as part of its analysis showing Defendant Reclosado

did not ignore known risks. (R&R at 6:25–27.) Plaintiff does not object to the R&R’s finding that

Defendant Reclosado reported the first attack to the INS, and that Defendant Reclosado received no

instructions regarding additional security measures for Plaintiff’s safety. (Id. at 6:21–25.) The Court

finds this evidence to be relevant, because it tends to show Defendant Reclosado did not ignore known

risks. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant Reclosado could have provided

him with additional protection in some other manner is unsupported by any cited evidence. More

significantly, the implication that Defendant Reclosado should have provided Plaintiff with additional

protection is unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, this objection is OVERRULED.

B. Legal Objections

1. Standard of Review at Summary Judgment Stage

Plaintiff objects to the standard of review at the summary judgment stage, contending the Court

is bound to accept his allegations as true. In support of his contention, Plaintiff has cited the standard

of review for motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), i.e., “All allegations of material

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cahill v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, both Defendant Reclosado’s

motion and the R&R made clear Defendant Reclosado was moving for summary judgment or, in the

alternative, summary adjudication pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, while Cahill, the authority Plaintiff

cites, expressly applies the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Furthermore, the caption of Plaintiff’s own

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opposition to the motion for summary judgment specifically identifies the nature of the motion he is

opposing. Because it is clear the motion under consideration is a motion for summary judgment,

the Court rejects this argument and OVERRULES this objection.

2. Official’s Liability for Civil Rights Violations

Plaintiff objects to the standard for holding an official liable for violations of civil rights.

Plaintiff cites Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) for the principle

that “if . . . officials know or should know of the particular vulnerability, then the Fourteenth

Amendment imposes on them an obligation not to act with reckless indifference to that vulnerability.”

(quotingColburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3rd Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff emphasizes

the words “should know,” and apparently concludes the standard is met if Defendant Reclosado should

have known Plaintiff was vulnerable to attack. For purposes of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Redman, the “should know” language is dicta, because in that case, the Court noted, officials did know

of plaintiffRedman’s vulnerability. The “should know” standard conflicts with the holding of Redman

that, to be liable, an official must be deliberately indifferent, and “must have more than a mere

suspicion that an attack will occur.” 942 F.2d at 1442 (quoting Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459

(9th Cir.1986)). Furthermore, the “should know” standard, later clarified in Colburn v. Upper Darby

Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1025 (1991) (“Colburn II”) as referring to "something more than a negligent

failure to appreciate the risk . . . though something less than subjective appreciation of the risk,” was

called into doubt by the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, as

noted by Owens v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F. Supp.2d 373, 379 (E.D.Pa. 1998). Cf. Litz v. City of

Allentown, 896 F. Supp. 1401, 1409 (E.D.Pa. 1995) (citing the Colburn II standard, but omitting the

alternative “or should know” language).

In any event, the “should know” standard has been expressly rejected by the Ninth Circuit after

Farmer. The deliberate indifference standard is met only if the official “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). “[I]t is not enough that the person

merely be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, he must also draw that inference.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.

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at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If a person should have been aware of

the risk, but was not, then the person has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe

the risk.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citing Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001)).

The R&R correctly states the Ninth Circuit’s standard. Plaintiff’s objection to the R&R’s

reliance on this standard is therefore OVERRULED.

C. Evidentiary Objection

Plaintiff objects to the Court’s reliance on the transcript of his deposition. He contends he had

no opportunity to review and correct it and has no knowledge of its contents. Plaintiff obviously

knows the contents of those few portions of the transcript cited in the R&R and has not objected to any

of the factual statements the R&R cites the transcript for. Furthermore, the R&R’s citations to the

transcript are few and brief, and its reliance on the transcript is minimal. Even if the Court were to

sustain Plaintiff’s objection, it would not affect the outcome of this case. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request

is DENIED AS MOOT.

III. Conclusion and Order

For these reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections. Applying the correct legal

standards as discussed above to the evidence, the Court finds the R&R was correct in recommending

Defendant Reclosado’s motion for summary judgment be granted. The Court therefore ADOPTS the

R&R and GRANTS Defendant Reclosado’s motion for summary judgment. Because all other parties

and claims were already dismissed, all pending pretrial dates are hereby VACATED, all pending

motions are hereby DENIED AS MOOT and this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 28, 2007.

___________________________________

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge 

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