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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY JAMES MAYO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PCC STRUCTURALS, INC., an Oregon

corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-35643

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-00145-

KI

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Garr M. King, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 8, 2015—Portland, Oregon

Filed July 28, 2015

Before: N. Randy Smith and John B. Owens, Circuit

Judges, and William Q. Hayes,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Owens

* The Honorable William Q. Hayes, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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2 MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS

SUMMARY**

Employment Discrimination

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment on a

claim of employment discrimination in violation of Oregon

disability law, and agreeing with other circuits, the panel held

that because the plaintiff had threatened to kill certain

co-workers, he was not a “qualified individual” under the

Oregon statute.

COUNSEL

Mary Ellen Page Farr (argued), Portland, Oregon; David D.

Park, Elliott & Park, P.C., Portland, Oregon, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Brenda K. Baumgart (argued) and Karen L. O’Connor, Stoel

Rives LLP, Portland, Oregon, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Timothy Mayo appeals from the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of his former employer, PCC

Structurals, Inc., on his claim of discrimination in violation of

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS 3

Oregon disability law. The district court concluded that

because Mayo had threatened to kill certain co-workers, he

was not a “qualified individual” under the Oregon statute. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mayo’s career at PCC Structurals (a leader in superalloy,

aluminum and titanium casting) began in 1987. Although he

was diagnosed in 1999 with major depressive disorder,

medication and treatment enabled him to work without

significant incident for manyyears. However, things changed

in 2010. Mayo (who welded aircraft parts) and some coworkers began to have issues with a supervisor who they

claimed was bullying them and making work life miserable. 

In January 2011, a co-worker complained on a company

hotline, which led to a meeting among Mayo, the co-worker,

and PCC’s Human Resources Director for Oregon about the

supervisor’s behavior.

Shortly after the meeting, Mayo made threatening

comments to at least three co-workers. He told one that he

“fe[lt] like coming down [to PCC] with a shotgun an[d]

blowing off” the heads of the supervisor and another

manager. The co-worker need not worry, Mayo explained,

because she would not be working the shift when the killing

would occur. Mayo told another co-worker on several

occasions that he planned to “com[e] down [to PCC] on day

[shift] . . . to take out management.” He told a third coworker that he “want[ed] to bring a gun down [to PCC] and

start shooting people.” He explained that “all that [he] would

have to do to shoot [the supervisor] is show up [at PCC] at

1:30 in the afternoon” because “that’s when all the

supervisors would have their walk-through.”

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4 MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS

Mayo’s co-workers eventually reported these threats to

management via written statements. PCC’s Senior Human

Resources Manager received these statements on February

15, 2011, and called Mayo that same day to discuss them. 

When asked if he planned to carry out his threats, Mayo said

that “he couldn’t guarantee he wouldn’t do that.” The Senior

Manager immediately suspended Mayo’s employment and

barred him from company property. PCC also notified the

police.

That evening, a police officer visited Mayo at his home to

discuss the threats. Mayo admitted making the threats and

that he had two or three people in mind, including the

supervisor. He also admitted to owning several guns, though

he had not decided which gun to use. When asked if he

planned to go to PCC and start shooting people, Mayo

responded: “Not tonight.”

With Mayo’s consent, the officer took Mayo to the

hospital, where he was placed into custody because of the

danger he posed to himself and others. See Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 426.228(1). Mayo remained in custody for six days, and

then took leave under the Oregon Family Leave Act

(“OFLA”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)

for two months. Toward the end of this leave period, a

treating psychologist cleared Mayo to return to work, as he

was not a “violent person,” but recommended a new

supervisor assignment. A treating nurse practitioner sent a

similar letter. Mayo also indicated that he wanted to return to

PCC, though the parties disagree as to whether Mayo

promised that he would not repeat his threatening behavior. 

On May 20, 2011, PCC terminated Mayo. The parties

dispute whether PCC decided to terminate Mayo before or

after he began his period of medical leave.

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MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS 5

In August 2011, Mayo sued PCC in state court, alleging

that his termination violated section 659A.112 of the Oregon

RevisedStatutes, Oregon’s counterpart to the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”).1 He argued that his “disturbing

statements and comments . . . were the symptoms of and

caused by his disability,” thus making his termination

discriminatory. PCC removed the case to federal court in

January 2012.

In July 2013, the district court granted PCC’s motion for

summary judgment. Following the decisions of numerous

other circuits, it reasoned that Mayo was no longer a

“qualified individual” once he made his “violent threats.” 

And “[b]ecause Mayo [wa]s not a qualified individual,” he

was not “entitled to protection under the ADA and Oregon’s

disability discrimination statute.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The district court’s grant of a motion for summary

judgment is reviewed de novo. The reviewing court applies

the same standard used by the district court under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Therefore, this court must

determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, whether any genuine issues of

1

“The Oregon disability discrimination statute is modeled after the

ADA. Accordingly, we interpret [the statute] consistently with the ADA.” 

Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 891 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citation omitted); see Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.139(1) (“659A.103 to

659A.144 shall be construed to the extent possible in a manner that is

consistent with any similar provisions of the [ADA].”).

Mayo also alleged violations of the OFLA and the FMLA. He later

withdrew those claims, so they are not before us.

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6 MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS

material fact exist and whether the district court correctly

applied the relevant substantive law.” Hutton, 273 F.3d at

891 (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

We applythe familiar burden-shifting framework outlined

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04

(1973), to claims under Oregon disability law. See Snead v.

Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1092–93 (9th

Cir. 2001). “Under that framework, an employee challenging

an adverse employment action has the initial burden of

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination (or

retaliation). The burden then shifts to the employer to

provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory (or nonretaliatory)

reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer

does so, then the burden shifts back to the employee to prove

that the reason given by the employer was pretextual.” 

Curley v. City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th

Cir. 2014).

Our analysis begins and ends with Mayo’s prima facie

case, as he fails to make one. “To prevail on an ADA claim

of unlawful discharge, the plaintiff must establish a prima

facie case by showing that: (1) he is a disabled person within

the meaning of the statute; (2) he is a qualified individual

with a disability; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment

action because of his disability.” Hutton, 273 F.3d at 891. 

Under Oregon disability law, like the ADA, “an individual is

qualified for a position if the individual, with or without

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the position.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.115; see

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (ADA analogue).

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MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS 7

Even if Mayo were disabled (which we assume for this

appeal), he cannot show that he was qualified at the time of

his discharge. An essential function of almost everyjob is the

ability to appropriately handle stress and interact with others. 

See Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th

Cir. 2002). And while an employee can be qualified despite

adverse reactions to stress, he is not qualified when that stress

leads him to threaten to kill his co-workers in chilling detail

and on multiple occasions (here, at least five times). This

vastly disproportionate reaction demonstrated that Mayo

could not perform an “essential function” of his job, and was

not a “qualified individual.” This is true regardless of

whether Mayo’s threats stemmed from his major depressive

disorder. Cf. Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 906 (9th Cir.

1996) (“Attempting to fire a weapon at individuals is the kind

of egregious and criminal conduct which employees are

responsible for regardless of any disability.”).

A contrary rule would place employers in an impossible

position. See Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d 1106,

1114 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a holding that would force

employers to choose between ADA liability and “a hostile

workplace environment”). As the Seventh Circuit explained

in a similar case of employee threats caused by major

depression:

The Act does not require an employer to

retain a potentially violent employee. Such a

requirement would place the employer on a

razor’s edge—in jeopardy of violating the Act

if it fired such an employee, yet in jeopardy of

being deemed negligent if it retained him and

he hurt someone. The Act protects only

“qualified” employees, that is, employees

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8 MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS

qualified to do the job for which they were

hired; and threatening other employees

disqualifies one.

Palmer v. Circuit Court, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997). 

Or as the First Circuit has explained: “Put simply, the ADA

does not require that an employee whose unacceptable

behavior threatens the safety of others be retained, even if the

behavior stems from a mental disability. Such an employee

is not qualified.” Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 87 (1st

Cir. 2003).

We agree with our sister circuits.2 An employee whose

stress leads to serious and credible threats to kill his coworkers is not qualified to work for the employer, regardless

of why he makes those threats. We have not located any

2

See also Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 809, 813

(6th Cir. 1999) (following Palmer and holding plaintiff not qualified

because he told school board members “You’ll be sorry for this” and “You

will regret this”); Williams, 303 F.3d at 1290; Valentine v. Standard &

Poor’s, 50 F. Supp. 2d 262, 287–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Sotomayor, J.),

aff’d, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision); Adams

v. Alderson, 723 F. Supp. 1531, 1532 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d sub nom.

Adams v. GSA, No. 89-5265, 1990 WL 45737 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 1990)

(per curiam); Mammone v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,

847 N.E.2d 276, 286–92 (Mass. 2006); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield

of Mich., 579 N.W.2d 435, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam).

The EEOC has reached the same conclusion. See U.S. Equal Emp.

Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans

with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (Mar. 25, 1997), 1997

WL 34622315, at *16 (advising that an employee who “has a hostile

altercation with his supervisor and threatens the supervisor with physical

harm” is “no longer a qualified individual”); Ferrell v. West, EEOC

Petition No. 03960032, 1997 WL 177246, at *9 (Apr. 9, 1997) (following

Palmer).

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MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS 9

cases, regulations, or guidance that disagree with this

common sense principle.

Despite this lack of authority, Mayo argues that more is

required before an employee who makes violent threats can

be found not qualified. In particular, he asserts that an

individualized assessment under the rubric of the “direct

threat” defense is needed. See Or. Admin. R. 839-006-

0244(1) (“[A]n employer may refuse to employ an individual

with a disability posing a direct threat to the health or safety

of others.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (ADA analogue);

Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th

Cir. 2003) (describing “direct threat” defense). But as we

explained in Curley, the “direct threat” defense focuses on a

prospective threat of violence; it allows an employer to

terminate an employee who “pose[s] a danger to other

employees” or has demonstrated a “potential of future

violence.” 772 F.3d at 633 (emphases added); see also

Bodenstab v. County of Cook, 569 F.3d 651, 658–59 (7th Cir.

2009). In this case, we do not conclude that Mayo’s

termination was permissible because histhreats demonstrated

that he posed a “potential of future violence.” Instead, as

explained above, we conclude that his termination was

permissible because his stress led to death threats. Mayo was

unable to appropriately handle stress and interact with others

—an “essential function” of his job.3 Neither our precedent

3 This same reasoning answers the objection that our holding effectively

creates a new judicial exception unsupported by the text of the ADA or

Oregon disability law. We do not hold that employees who make violent

threats, like illegal drug users, are simply not entitled to the protection of

disability discrimination law as a matter of policy, regardless of whether

they can perform their jobs or not. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.124;

42 U.S.C. § 12114(a). We hold that such employees have demonstrated

they are not “qualified individual[s].” Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 659A.112, .115;

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nor ADA regulations require an individualized assessment of

future risk in this context.

We also reject Mayo’s arguments that he was still a

“qualified individual” under the terms of the rule that we join

our sister circuits in adopting. Though he argues that the

cases cited above are distinguishable because they involved

more extreme facts (which is highly debatable), Mayo’s

credible, detailed, and unwavering plan to kill his supervisors

more than adequately demonstrated that he lacked the ability

to appropriately handle stress and interact with others.4 Mayo

is also wrong to suggest that he just needed a “reasonable

accommodation,” namely different supervisors. See Or. Rev.

Stat. § 659A.115 (employee is qualified if he can perform

“essential functions” of position with “reasonable

accommodation”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (same). Even now,

he does not dispute that another disturbing incident might

have occurred if he had returned to PCC and faced similarly

stressful conditions. Giving Mayo a different supervisor,

therefore, would not have changed his inappropriate response

to stress—it would have just removed one potential stressor

42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112.

4 We emphasize that we only address the extreme facts before us in this

case: an employee who makes serious and credible threats of violence

toward his co-workers. We do not suggest that off-handed expressions of

frustration or inappropriate jokes necessarily render an employee not

qualified. Nor do we imply that employees who are simply rude, gruff, or

unpleasant fall in the same category as Mayo. See U.S. Equal Emp.

Opportunity Comm’n, supra, at *15 (advising that an “anti-social”

employee with a “psychiatric disability” can be a “qualified individual,”

even if he is “abrupt and rude”).

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and possibly added another name to the hit list.5 Mayo’s

objection that compliance with conduct standards prohibiting

violent threats is “not fundamental to the work of a welder”

is similarly unavailing. The logic of our holding is that

compliance with such fundamental standards is an “essential

function” of almost every job. Although it is possible to think

of isolated jobs that involve little interaction with others,

Mayo’s position as a welder—in which he had many coworkers and was under the supervision of a number of

individuals—is not one of these rare exceptions.

This ruling is consistent with our cases holding that

“conduct resulting from a disability is considered to be part

of the disability, rather than a separate basis for termination.” 

Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1139–40

(9th Cir. 2001); see also Gambini v. Total Renal Care, Inc.,

486 F.3d 1087, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2007); Dark v. Curry

County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2006). Unlike in

Humphrey, Gambini, and Dark, we do not need to consider

whether PCC has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for terminating Mayo, as he has failed to establish a

prima facie case at step one of the McDonnell Douglas

framework. Our holding is also consistent with the facts and

arguments made in those cases.

In Humphrey, the employer hospital argued that a medical

transcriptionist was not a “qualified individual” because her

obsessive compulsive disorder prevented her from regularly

and predictably showing up for her job. 239 F.3d at 1135. 

5 This is borne out by the fact that Mayo arguably did receive this

accommodation prior to making his violent threats. Although Mayo was

not transferred to a different plant as he now proposes, PCC did honor his

request for a transfer to a different shift in late 2010.

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12 MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS

But as this court held, the employee was still a “qualified

individual” because the hospital could have allowed her to do

her job from home or take a leave of absence. See id. In

Dark, the employee, a maintenance and construction worker,

caused an accident when he ignored signs that he was likely

to have a seizure and fell unconscious while driving a pickup

truck. 451 F.3d at 1081. Nevertheless, his employer, a

county road department, never argued that his failure to be

more forthcoming rendered him unqualified—only that his

“uncontrolled epilepsy” rendered him incapable of operating

the heavy machinery that his job entailed. This court

disagreed, noting that the road department might have been

able to accommodate the employee through reassignment or

a period of leave. See id. at 1087–90. And in Gambini, the

employee, a contracts clerk, effectively had a temper tantrum

after she received a negative performance review from her

supervisors. 486 F.3d at 1091–92. Though this court held

that her “violent outburst” was protected as “part and parcel

of her disability” if it stemmed from her bipolar disorder, we

specifically noted in response to a petition for rehearing that

her employer, a dialysis provider, was free to argue that she

was not a “qualified individual.” See id. at 1094–95.

None of these cases featured an employer that

persuasively argued that the employee was not a “qualified

individual” because of his or her disability. PCC has done so

here. We thus conclude that the facts in this case compel a

different result, and we join several other courts in holding

that an employee whose stress leads to violent threats is not

a “qualified individual.”

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MAYO V. PCC STRUCTURALS 13

IV. CONCLUSION

Depression and mental illness are serious problems that

affect millions of Americans, including many lawyers and

judges. We do not minimize the struggles of those who suffer

from these ailments or suggest that all such individuals are

incapable of working. But we disagree with Mayo that

employers must simply cross their fingers and hope that

violent threats ring hollow. All too often Americans suffer

the tragic consequences of disgruntled employees targeting

and killing their co-workers. While the ADA and Oregon

disability law protect important individual rights, they do not

require employers to play dice with the lives of their

workforce. We thus conclude that PCC’s actions in this case

were lawful.

AFFIRMED.

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