Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-01376/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-01376-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUCCESSFACTORS, INC., a Delaware

corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOFTSCAPE, INC., a Delaware

corporation; and DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 08-1376 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION AND

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR EXPEDITED

DISCOVERY

Plaintiff SuccessFactors, Inc. moves for a preliminary

injunction enjoining Defendant from (1) disseminating, publishing,

causing to be made available to the public, affirming the purported

truth or accuracy of, or directing any person to disseminate,

publish, cause to be made available to the public or affirm the

purported truth or accuracy of a certain presentation; 

(2) disseminating, publishing, causing to be made available to the

public, affirming, or directing any person to disseminate, publish,

cause to be made available to the public or affirm the allegedly

false or misleading statements set forth within that presentation;

(3) representing or implying that a person or entity other than

Defendant authored any statement in the presentation regarding

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Plaintiff when such person or entity did not explicitly so author;

(4) disseminating or making public use of Plaintiff's trade name,

trademark or logo beyond that amount reasonably necessary to

identify Plaintiff or its products and services; (5) accessing or

obtaining data from any computer system or computer owned, operated

or licensed by Plaintiff and subject to restrictions on access

without Plaintiff's express written authorization; or 

(6) disclosing, publishing, reproducing or communicating any

information or data received from such a restricted computer or

computer system. Plaintiff also seeks an order allowing certain

expedited discovery. 

The Court issued a temporary restraining order on March 13,

2008 and set a briefing schedule. Defendant has opposed both

motions. The motions were heard on March 27, 2008. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties and oral argument

on the motion, the Court grants in part Plaintiff's motion for a

preliminary injunction and denies it in part and grants in part

Plaintiff's motion for expedited discovery.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a publicly traded company that provides internetbased human resources management software. Defendant is one of

Plaintiff's competitors. On or about March 24, 2008, hundreds of

Plaintiff's actual or prospective customers received an email from

"John Anonymous" with the email address hcmknowledg2008a@gmail.com. 

The subject line of the message is "SuccessFactors Failures and

Problems" and the body reads, "If you are thinking about purchasing

from SuccessFactors, please read the following document; it

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provides information about Successfactors [sic] which they do not

want you to know." Bernshteyn Decl., Ex. 1. Attached to the

message was a forty-three page PowerPoint presentation titled "The

Naked Truth." The presentation appears on a SuccessFactors

template and includes SuccessFactor's trademarked logo at the top

of each page. The presentation purports to be "a compilation of

the facts from Successfactors [sic] customers" and states that the

facts contained in the presentation "represent the measure of

Successfactors' [sic] lack of corporate integrity and why many of

us have left them." Id. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the

presentation includes screenshots from three areas of its website:

(1) a publicly-available list of customers taken both before and

after February 28, 2008, when the list was updated, (2) screens

from several publicly available "webinars" and (3) screens from

Plaintiff's ACE environment, a password-protected area which is

accessible only to Plaintiff's employees, authorized customers,

authorized prospective customers and partners. 

After learning about the presentation and its contents,

Plaintiff analyzed its computer logs to determine which IP

addresses had accessed each of these three areas of its website

between February 11, 2008 and March 4, 2008. Plaintiff states that

only one IP address that is not associated with one of its own

offices or employees accessed all three areas of the website. That

IP address, 68.236.68.19 belongs to Defendant's Wayland,

Massachusetts office. Plaintiff also determined that this IP

address had accessed a specific ACE account, the ACE275 demo

account, on February 19 and 21, 2008. One of the screenshots in

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the presentation is taken from a customized goal included in the

ACE275 demonstration. 

Plaintiff also discovered that the ACE275 account was accessed

without authorization from three additional IP addresses, two

residential IP addresses located near Wayland, Massachusetts and

one business address assigned to Defendant's London, England

office. The ACE275 account was created for a purported prospective

customer named Ely Valles on behalf of a company called New

Millenium [sic] Shoe. At the hearing, Defendant disclosed that its

CEO David Watkins is also the CEO of New Millenium [sic] Shoe. 

Plaintiff also searched its Customer Relationship Management

(CRM) database for any information associated with the IP addresses

it identified. The CRM database is a repository of registration

information from individuals who seek access to the publiclyavailable webinars, white papers and data sheets on Plaintiff's

website. Plaintiff discovered nine entries in the CRM database,

dating back to January, 2006, for the 68.236.68.19 IP address. The

name and registration information provided by the person accessing

Plaintiff's website from that IP address varied and Plaintiff

suspects that many of the names were false. However, Plaintiff

found information linking to Defendant two of the names provided.

Plaintiff alleges in the three days after the anonymous email

was sent, it received numerous inquiries from concerned current and

prospective customers. On March 7, 2008, JMP Securities, an

investment bank that provides market analysis of securities,

described the presentation as "highly critical of SuccessFactors." 

Bernshteyn Decl., Ex. 3. The JMP report contained this heading:

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"We maintain our Market Outperform rating on SuccessFactors, but

reduce our price target from $15 to $12 in light of the compression

in the on demand comparables." Id. Under this heading, and

referring to the presentation, the JMP report stated, "While some

of the critical claims certainly seem to be exaggerated or

unfounded, the descriptions of specific customer problems are

harder to dismiss without independent analysis." Id. Therefore,

the report stated, "[W]e reserve final judgment until we have had a

chance to conduct some independent due diligence." Id. On March

10, JMP issued another report subtitled "Johnny Anonymous Loses

Round One" and describing the "case studies regarding alleged

problems with customer implementations" as "unfounded." Id. at Ex.

4. Plaintiff also provides evidence that concerns about the

presentation have been discussed on an internet message board

related to SuccessFactors' stock. Id. at Ex. 5. 

On March 11, 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging

claims of false and misleading statements under the Lanham Act and

California Business and Professions Code § 17500; trademark

infringement under the Lanham Act; damages under the Computer Fraud

and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030; unauthorized access to

computers, computer system and computer data under California Penal

Code § 502; defamation; trade libel; intentional interference with

prospective economic relations; and unfair competition. On that

date, Plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining

order and application for expedited discovery, with notice to

Defendant. Defendant opposed the motions, and, on March 13, 2008,

the Court granted in part Plaintiff's motion for a temporary

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restraining order and granted in part Plaintiff's motion for

expedited discovery. 

Defendant concedes that it created the presentation but argues

that it was intended only for internal use by Defendant's sales

force. Defendant states that it does not and will not use the

presentation in any external sales or marketing efforts. It

considers the presentation to be "its confidential strategic

business information" and states that it does not know who

distributed it outside the company. Response to Order to Show

Cause (Response) at 2. Defendant asserts that, since the

presentation's creation, it has instructed its employees that the

document is strictly for internal use. 

However, the only evidence Defendant presents in support of

this assertion is two email messages from its CEO to its employees,

each sent after the complaint was filed. Both of the email

messages state that the presentation is only for internal use while

maintaining that the presentation is based on "publicly available

sources." Watkins Decl., Exs. A & B. One of the messages

instructs that "[i]nformation contained in the document should be

used judiciously in competitive situation [sic] as required." 

Watkins Decl., Ex. A. In addition to its internal reassurance that

the information contained in the presentation was substantiated,

Defendant issued a press release publicly affirming the veracity of

the presentation. The press release states that the presentation

"was based on substantiated facts." Id. at Ex. 3. Plaintiff

provides evidence that Defendant has emailed a link to this press

release to its potential customers who are also Plaintiff's

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potential customers. Bernshteyn Reply Decl., Ex. 4. 

LEGAL STANDARD

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must

establish either: (1) a combination of probable success on the

merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that serious

questions regarding the merits exist and the balance of hardships

tips sharply in the moving party's favor. Rodeo Collection, Ltd.

v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The test is a "continuum in which the required showing of harm

varies inversely with the required showing of meritoriousness." 

Id. (quoting San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v.

Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 1471,

1473 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986)). The moving party ordinarily must show

"a significant threat of irreparable injury," although there is "a

sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm

increases as the probability of success decreases," United States

v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 174, 175 (9th Cir.

1987), and vice versa. To overcome a weak showing of merit, a

plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a very strong

showing that the balance of hardships is in its favor. Rodeo

Collection, 812 F.2d at 1217. 

DISCUSSION

I. Probability of Success on the Merits

Plaintiff argues that there is a sufficient likelihood that it

will succeed on the merits of three of its claims to support the

grant of a preliminary injunction. 

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1

A civil action may also be maintained based on other types of

damages not relevant to this case. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1020(a)(5)(B)(ii)-(v).

8

A. CFAA

Plaintiff first argues that it is likely to succeed on the

merits of its claim under the CFAA, which creates liability for

anybody who "intentionally accesses a computer without

authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains

. . . information from any protected computer if the conduct

involved an interstate or foreign communication." 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1030(a)(2)(C). The CFAA further provides, "Any person who

suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may

maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory

damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief." Id.

§ 1030(g). For purposes of a civil action, the loss, including

"any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of

responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and

restoring the data, program, system, or information to its

condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost

incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of

interruption of service," must total at least $5,000 in value.1

Id. §§ 1030(a)(5)(B)(I); 1030(e)(11); 1030(g).

Plaintiff contends that it can prove that it suffered over

$5,000 in losses, citing the 

analysis of which restricted environments had been

accessed (to determine the extent of breach);

collection and analysis of IP addresses accessing

Plaintiff's network, to determine whether access was

internal or hostile (to determine the appropriate

response); and review of logs of documented users to

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confirm conclusions.

Reply at 13. Plaintiff claims, "These reasonable responses took

many hours of valuable time away from day-to-day responsibilities,

causing losses well in excess of $5,000." Id. 

Defendant argues only that Plaintiff's CFAA claim will fail

because Plaintiff's alleged cost of discovering the author of the

presentation does not fit the definition of "loss" under the

statute. Defendant cites Tyco International (U.S.) v. Does, 2003

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25136 (S.D.N.Y.), in support of its argument that

the "cost of investigating and trying to locate the perpetrator is

not included as a qualifying type of loss." Id. at *8-9. 

However, Tyco and the other cases upon which Defendant relies

are neither controlling nor directly on point. In Tyco, the New

York court addressed a CFAA claim against an individual who

unsuccessfully attempted to damage Tyco's computers by sending

spam. In that case, default entered against the defendant and Tyco

argued that it was entitled to recover as damages the fees paid to

its investigator to discover the identity of the unsuccessful

spammer. The court acknowledged that "the CFAA allows recovery for

losses beyond mere physical damage to property" but found that "the

additional types of damages awarded by courts under the Act have

generally been limited to those costs necessary to assess the

damages caused to plaintiff's system or to resecure the system in

the wake of a spamming attack." Id. at *10.

However, in cases like this, where the offense involves

unauthorized access and the use of protected information, the

reasonable "cost of responding to [the] offense," 18 U.S.C. 

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§ 1030(a)(5)(B)(I), will be different from such cost in a case

where the primary concern is the damage to the plaintiff's computer

system itself. While discovering who caused the damage would be

important to the plaintiff in a case such as Tyco to determine from

whom it should seek relief, it is not essential to remedying or

discovering the extent of the harm. In contrast, where the

offender has actually accessed protected information, discovering

who has that information and what information he or she has is

essential to remedying the harm. In such cases courts have

considered the cost of discovering the identity of the offender or

the method by which the offender accessed the protected information

to be part of the loss for purposes of the CFAA. See, e.g.,

Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15329, *2-3

(D. Ariz.) (finding that the cost the plaintiff incurred in

conducting a forensic analysis of the defendant's computer was a

loss where the defendant emailed the plaintiff's confidential

information to himself before resigning from his position with the 

plaintiff). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood

that it will prevail on its CFAA claim. 

B. Trademark Infringement

Plaintiff also contends that it is likely to succeed on its

trademark infringement claim, arguing that Defendant has used more

of Plaintiff's trade name than necessary to criticize legitimately

Plaintiff and its products and services. Defendant counters that,

even if it has exceeded the nominative fair use to which it is

entitled, it has only used Plaintiff's trademarks on internal

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2It is notable that the only evidence Defendant provides in

support of this contention is the declaration of its general

counsel and emails regarding the confidentiality of the

presentation sent by Defendant's CEO after this lawsuit was filed. 

11

documents. Defendant further argues that, even if one of its

employees distributed the presentation, Defendant would not be

liable because any such action would be outside the scope of the

individual's employment. 

Defendant states, "At this stage, it cannot be disputed that

the Presentation was intended for internal use at Softscape. 

Softscape did not distribute the Presentation to the public, and

the disclosure of the Presentation was not authorized, ratified or

condoned by Softscape."2

 Response at 11. However, as Plaintiff

points out, whether or not Defendant authorized or condoned the

distribution of the Presentation, it was distributed. Moreover,

there is no evidence that anybody other than Defendant and its

employees had access to the presentation. Therefore, based on the

evidence currently available, and even accepting as true

Defendant's position that it did not intend the presentation to be

disseminated outside of the company, either Defendant or one of its

employees must have distributed the presentation or provided the

presentation to the individual who did so. 

Defendant cites the Restatement of Agency § 7.03 in support of

its position that even if the document were distributed by one of

its employees, such distribution was unauthorized and therefore

outside the scope of that individual's employment. However, as

Plaintiff argues, the Restatement specifically states, "Conduct is

not outside the scope of employment merely because an employee

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disregards the employer's instructions." Rest. (3d) Agency § 7.07

cmt. c.

Even if Defendant did not intend to distribute the

presentation containing Plaintiff's registered marks, the

presentation was distributed and it is likely that Defendant can be

held liable for any causes of action based on that distribution.

Based on the evidence currently available, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has established a likelihood of succeeding on the merits

of its trademark infringement claim. 

C. Lanham Act False Advertising Claim

Plaintiff next argues that it has established a likelihood of

success on the merits of its Lanham Act false advertising claim. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the elements of such a claim are: 

(1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a

commercial advertisement about its own or another's

product; (2) the statement actually deceived or has the

tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its

audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is

likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the

defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate

commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to

be injured as a result of the false statement, either by

direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by

a lessening of the goodwill associated with its

products.

Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff argues that much of the information contained in the

presentation is false or misleading, and provides declarations to

support its arguments. The statements in the declarations

submitted by Defendant are not sufficient to rebut Plaintiff's

evidence. 

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In fact, Defendant does not argue directly that the statements

are not false or misleading. Rather, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff's false advertising claim fails because (1) Defendant did

not use the presentation in commerce; (2) the presentation was not

an advertisement; and (3) Defendant did not circulate the

presentation in interstate commerce. 

As Plaintiff notes, Defendant's argument that it did not use

the presentation in commerce fails because Defendant admittedly

continues to use information from the presentation in commerce. As

described above, Defendant's CEO sent an email to Defendant's sales

group instructing them to continue to use the information in the

presentation "in competitive situations." Watkins Decl., Ex. A. 

Moreover, a press release posted on Defendant's website affirms the

veracity of the information in the presentation. Defendant has

emailed to its prospective customers a link to this press release. 

These acts are sufficient to establish that Defendant is continuing

to represent the veracity of the contents of the presentation in

commerce. 

Defendant next argues that the presentation was not an

advertisement. The Ninth Circuit has held that representations may

be considered advertisements if they are

1) commercial speech; 2) by a defendant who is in

commercial competition with plaintiff; 3) for the

purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant's

goods or services. While the representations need

not be made in a "classic advertising campaign," but

may consist instead of more informal types of

"promotion," the representations 4) must be

disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing

public to constitute "advertising" or "promotion"

within that industry.

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Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Coastal Abstract Serv. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173

F.3d 725, 735 (9th Cir. 1999)). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's

claim fails because the "speech," which it defines as "the

circulation of the Presentation" was not conducted by Defendant. 

However, as discussed above, the evidence before the Court strongly

suggests that Defendant can be held liable for any dissemination of

the presentation. Moreover, Defendant's continuing affirmation of

the veracity of the contents of the presentation constitutes

ongoing speech. 

Defendant's final argument, that it did not cause the

presentation to enter interstate commerce, also relies on its

assertion that it cannot be held liable for the dissemination of

the presentation. Thus, this argument also fails. The Court finds

that Plaintiff has demonstrated a fair likelihood of success on the

merits of its Lanham Act false advertising claim. Because

Defendant has not provided evidence that the statements in the

presentation are true, the Court will enjoin Defendant from

affirming the veracity of such statements to the extent that they

purport to represent objective facts that can easily be proven true

or false. 

II. Likelihood of Irreparable Injury

Plaintiff argues that it has demonstrated a likelihood of

irreparable injury because it will "continue to suffer immeasurable

loss to its relationships with actual and prospective customers

caused by the distribution of the Presentation if an injunction

does not issue." Application for TRO at 8. 

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Defendant counters that Plaintiff has already suffered any

harm stemming from the one-time distribution of the presentation. 

Defendant further argues that past conduct cannot alone suffice to

establish the threat of irreparable injury. Finally, Defendant

contends that its stated intent not to distribute the presentation

in the future precludes the need for a preliminary injunction. 

However, as discussed above, Defendant has continued publicly to

attest to the veracity of the material contained in the

presentation. Moreover, there is no evidence that Defendant has

publicly acknowledged that it, not Plaintiff's dissatisfied

customers, created the presentation. 

Based on the likelihood of success on Plaintiff's trademark

infringement and false advertising claims discussed above, the

Court grants in part Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary

injunction. 

III. Expedited Discovery

Plaintiff seeks expedited discovery with respect to two

issues: how Defendant accessed the restricted portions of its

computer system and which individuals were responsible for the

creation and distribution of the presentation. As discussed at the

hearing, by March 28, 2008, the parties were to have met and

conferred along with their respective IT experts to determine a

plan for preserving electronic evidence. Formal discovery may

commence forthwith. In addition, the parties shall conduct their

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) conference on April 10, 2008

to establish a mutually agreeable discovery plan. To the extent

the parties are unable to agree, each party shall file a brief of

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five pages or less stating its position on the disagreement by

April 14, 2008. 

CONCLUSION

 The Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary

injunction. The injunction has entered as a separate order. 

Plaintiff's motion for expedited discovery is GRANTED in part. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/1/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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