Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01668/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01668-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Peter Sotelo, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Terry Stewart; Donna Clement; Charles

Ryan; Meg Savage; Dora Shriro, et. al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 03-1668-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the court are Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 47),

Defendants' Statement Of Facts In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 48)

("DSOF"), Plaintiff's Answer To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 51)

("Response"), Plaintiff Statement Of Facts (doc. # 52) ("PSOF"), and defendants' Reply To

Plaintiff's Response To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 54).

Peter Sotelo sued defendants alleging Eighth Amendment, due process and equal

protection violations for defendants' roles in denying him certain protective housing during

his incarceration with the Arizona Department of Corrections. Sotelo, a homosexual with

very feminine characteristics, claims to have suffered sexual assaults, discrimination and

death threats at the hands of other prisoners. He alleges that prison officials have repeatedly

denied effeminate inmates like himself protective custody, and that prison officials have

failed to take notice of and prosecute the perpetrators of offenses against such inmates.

Case 2:03-cv-01668-NVW Document 57 Filed 10/12/05 Page 1 of 5
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Given that Sotelo has been released from prison and does not now argue the issue, his claim

for injunctive relief is moot; the court therefore addresses only his claims for declaratory

relief, compensatory and punitive damages. 

Sotelo's procedural due process claim was dismissed by the court on 04/09/2004

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915(b)(1). (doc. # 14.) The defendants

captioned above now move for summary judgment against Sotelo on both the Eighth

Amendment and equal protection claims. For the reasons explained below, the court grants

their motion.

I. Eighth Amendment Claim

A. Sotelo submits insufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. A plaintiff

must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts in support of his claim in order to

survive summary judgment. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). At

the summary judgment stage, mere speculation or allegations without supporting evidence

do not create a factual issue necessitating a trial. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 266 (9th

Cir. 1995). The only evidence Sotelo has placed before the court are 1) his own psychiatric

medical records, 2) a letter he wrote appealing a denial of his request to move to a different

yard of protective segregation, and 3) a letter from the Deputy Director rejecting his appeal.

This evidence at most supports a finding that Sotelo was denied his preferred housing and

suffered from psychiatric problems. Regardless of the truth or untruth of the allegations in

Sotelo's Complaint, "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 

B. Sotelo fails to provide any evidence linking his injury to the conduct of

particular defendants. Section 1983 will not produce vicarious liability. Monell v. Dep't of

Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976);

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (1998) ("Liability under § 1983 must be based

on the personal involvement of the defendant"). For example, Sotelo stated in his deposition

that the only reason he named Terry Stewart as a defendant was that Stewart ran the prison.

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Sotelo Deposition at 26-27. Donna Clement was named simply because she was an official

in the central office of the prison. Id. at 32-33. Only by referring to Sotelo's Complaint can

the court determine who is alleged to have done what, Complaint (doc. # 4) at 4e-4i, given

that Sotelo's statement of facts only refers broadly to general violations of his rights. No

evidence is cited to support those allegations against particular defendants.

 C. Sotelo provides no evidence suggesting he experienced an excessive risk to his

health or safety. An official must "know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference."

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Sotelo puts forth no evidence— not even a

personal affidavit— suggesting that the housing solution decided upon following his letter

of April 16, 2003 put him at "excessive risk," let alone that individual officals were aware

of that risk. On the contrary, the letter from Deputy Director Meg Savage, introduced into

evidence by Sotelo, indicates that Meg Savage and the approving authorities had considered

his concerns and concluded that alternative placement on another yard would adequately

buffer Sotelo from the dangers motivating his appeal. PSOF Ex. B at 00055.

D. To the extent Sotelo relies on the argument that certain officials "should have

known" about the offenses incurred against him, the Supreme Court has clearly held that

Eighth Amendment violations require a higher degree of culpability by prison officials.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (adopting subjective test for deliberate indifference, which requires

that the prison official actually knew of the excessive risk of harm). 

E. Sotelo has not introduced evidence to rebut defendants' evidence that

defendants acted reasonably under the circumstances. "[P]rison officials who actually knew

of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they

responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer, 511

U.S. at 844. The evidence introduced by defendants convincingly shows that almost all of

Sotelo's requests were followed by full-scale "blue book" investigations by the Criminal

Investigation Unit, that each time he reported a threat he was immediately placed in

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protective detention, and that prison officials continuously updated his Do Not House With

list and made Sotelo's housing decisions with that list in mind. Indeed, the unrebutted

evidence would even suggest that often times prison officials had Sotelo's "reasonable safety"

more on their minds than he did. See id. ("A prison official's duty under the Eighth

Amendment is to ensure 'reasonable safety'"); DSOF at ¶ 23. 

II. Equal Protection Claim

A. Plaintiff is not a member of a protected class. "To state a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194.

Homosexuals are not a protected class in the Ninth Circuit. High Tech Gays v. Defense

Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990). Although Sotelo

mentions that he was a different race than most of the other prisoners, Sotelo nowhere

suggests that he was treated differently by any defendant due to his race.

As regards Sotelo's gender discrimination claim, the Equal Protection Clause does

protect males as well as females against sex discrimination by state officials. See Miss. Univ.

for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (holding that policy of excluding males from public

school of nursing violated the Equal Protection Clause). Sotelo has not presented the court

with any evidence of his disparate treatment from other males, however, and mentioned

gender discrimination only in passing without introducing supporting evidence or argument.

Response at 1. 

B. Sotelo provides no evidence linking his injury to the conduct of particular

defendants. "Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvment of the

defendant." Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194; see also Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 691-92 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976).

C. Sotelo submits no specific evidence of a constitutional violation. A plaintiff

must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts in support of his claim in order to

survive summary judgment. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The

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evidence put forth by Sotelo— his own psychiatric medical records, a letter he wrote

appealing a denial of his request to move to a different yard of protective segregation, and

a letter from the Deputy Director rejecting his appeal— is insufficient for any reasonable

person to conclude that any particular defendant in this case acted with an intent or purpose

to discriminate against Sotelo. 

III. Immunity From Both Eighth Amendment And Equal Protection Claims

A. The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state officials in their official

capacity for damages. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

B. To the extent that Sotelo sues defendants in their personal capacities,

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. "[G]overnment officials performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). No

evidence suggests defendants here have violated any clearly established statutory or

constitutional law. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants Terry Stewart, Donna Clement,

Charles Ryan, Meg Savage, and Dora Shriro's Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 47)

is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there is no just reason for delay, and this judgment

is certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., as of the date entered

below.

DATED this 11th day of October, 2005.

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