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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 6 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

GILBERT WALKER; MARY NETTA 

WALKER; FOUR WALKERS INC.; 

TRAVIS WALKER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

V. 

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF 

MEDICINE LODGE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 03-6314 

(D.C. No. 02-CV-1082-HE) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA, Chief Judge, HENRY, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(£); 10th Cir. R. 34.l(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

• This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court 

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order 

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 03-6314 Document: 010110533908 Date Filed: 04/06/2005 Page: 1
Plaintiffs Gilbert Walker, Mary Netta Walker, Travis Walker, and Four 

Walkers, Inc., all residents of Oklahoma (collectively, the "Borrowers"), appeal 

the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant First 

National Bank of Medicine Lodge, Inc., a Kansas corporation, (the "Bank") on 

their complaint alleging breach of contract, misrepresentation, breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, lender liability, promissory 

estoppel, and fraud arising out of their indebtedness to the Bank. The district 

court, applying Oklahoma law under its diversity jurisdiction, 1 ruled that the 

Borrowers' contract-related claims were barred by Oklahoma's statute of frauds, 

and that they had not presented sufficient evidence to support a claim for fraud or 

misrepresentation. "We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court." Sandoval v. 

City of Boulder, 388 F.3d 1312, 1320 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). We 

affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In December 1999, Four Walkers, Inc., executed four promissory notes to 

the Bank, each with different loan amounts and maturity dates, for a total 

The promissory notes specify that they are to be governed and construed in 

accordance with Kansas law, but, as the district court noted, both parties have 

stated throughout this litigation that Oklahoma law governs the loan agreements. 

The district court therefore applied Oklahoma law, and neither party appeals that 

decision. 

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principal loan amount of $975,000. Included was an operating loan for $275,000 

with a maturity date of December 20, 2000 ("Note 108"). Gilbert and Mary 

Walker, who own all of the interest in Four Walkers, Inc, and their son, Travis 

Walker, each guaranteed all the four loans, and Gilbert and Mary Walker signed a 

mortgage and security agreement and an agricultural security agreement to secure 

the loans. Additionally, Gilbert and Mary Walker signed a quitclaim deed 

transferring certain real estate to Four Walkers, Inc. 

Four Walkers, Inc. did not make payment on Note 108 by its December 

2000 due date. In the spring of 2001, the Bank informed the Borrowers that it 

was discontinuing agricultural loan operations. It agreed to extend Note 1 OS's 

maturity date to June 2001, to give the Borrowers time to move their loans to 

another financial institution. The Borrowers signed a Change in Terms 

Agreement in April 2001, extending the final maturity date of Note 108 to June 

30, 2001. Four Walkers, Inc. failed to pay the principal and interest due on Note 

108 by the new due date, however. Because default on Note 108 constituted a 

cross-default under all of the remaining notes, the Bank demanded immediate 

payment on all loans, which, to date, the Borrowers have not made. 

The Borrowers then filed the instant complaint against the Bank, alleging 

that they were induced into borrowing from the Bank based on oral 

representations by Bank agents stating that the Bank would remain in the local 

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area making agricultural loans for a substantial period of time, and that Note 108 

would be renewed so long as the Borrowers met certain financial conditions. The 

Borrowers further allege that the Bank fraudulently added the quitclaim deed to 

the loan documents without their knowledge, and that they signed it without 

knowing that it conveyed real property to Four Walkers, Inc. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Statute of Frauds 

Under Oklahoma law, a borrower may not "maintain an action to enforce or 

seek damages for the breach of any term or condition of a credit agreement having 

a principal amount greater than Fifteen Thousand Dollars ... , unless such term or 

condition has been agreed to in writing and signed by the party against whom it is 

sought to be enforced or against whom damages are sought." 15 Okla. Stat. 

§ 140(B). It is undisputed that the loan agreements between the Borrowers and 

the Bank are credit agreements within the meaning of section 140, and that none 

of the alleged oral representations described by the Borrowers is included or 

otherwise reflected in any of the loan documents. The district court ruled that, 

because the Borrowers' breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and lender 

liability claims are predicated on alleged oral representations that were not 

included in any loan documents or agreements, or otherwise reduced to writing, 

these claims are clearly barred by section 140(B)'s statute of frauds provision. 

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Aplt. App. Vol. III, at 394 ( court order at 6, citing Big John's Lumber Co. of 

Muskogee, Inc. v. City Bank, 901 P .2d 832, 833-34 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995)). 

On appeal, the Borrowers first contend that section 140's statute of frauds 

provision is not applicable where there is an allegation of fraud. As noted above, 

they have asserted misrepresentation and fraud claims, alleging that the Bank 

induced them to enter into the loan agreements and tricked them into signing the 

quitclaim deed. They contend that in Brown v. Founders Bank and Trust Co., 

890 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1994), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an allegation 

of fraud avoids application of the statute of frauds, even to contract-related 

claims. We disagree. 

In Brown, the court held that the statute of frauds provision in section 140 

does not bar a cause of action for fraud. See id. at 862-64. It concluded that the 

purpose of the statute of frauds - to protect lenders from liability litigation and 

promote certainty in credit agreements - would not be defeated by allowing fraud 

claims because of the high standards needed to establish fraud. Id. at 863. 

Nothing in Brown or any other Oklahoma decision, however, supports the 

Borrowers' argument that a mere allegation of fraud avoids application of the 

statute of frauds to contract and other claims. Brown simply holds that a 

borrower is not precluded by section 140 from bringing a cause of action for 

fraud, assuming the borrower can establish the elements of a fraud claim. See id. 

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at 861-864. As discussed below, we agree with the district court that the 

Borrowers failed to present evidence that would support a cause of action for 

fraud against the Bank. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the breach of 

contract, promissory estoppel and lender liability claims under section 140. 

B. Trade Usage and Duty of Good Faith 

Next, the Borrowers argue that the district court erroneously rejected their 

breach of contract claim and their tortious breach of contract claim based on their 

allegation that the Bank violated the implied usage of trade and implied 

obligation of good faith provisions found in the Uniform Commercial Code 

("UCC"). See 12A Okla. Stat.§§ 1-203, 1-205. They argue that under trade 

usage and the implied duty of good faith, the Bank was obligated to renew Note 

108. Note 108 expressly provides, however, that payment was due on demand or, 

if no demand was made, on the December 20, 1999 due date, later amended to 

June 30, 2001. Further, it contains no provision obligating the Bank to renew or 

extend the loan. The district court ruled that neither an implicit trade usage nor 

an implicit obligation of good faith can override an explicit contractual term. 

The Borrowers assert, without citation to any legal authority, that the 

district court's holding is contrary to the UCC. Borrowers are incorrect. As the 

district court correctly explained, an explicit contract term, here the definitive and 

unambiguous due date, controls over trade usage. 12A Okla. Stat.§ 1-205(4). 

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Similarly, the obligation of good faith cannot be employed to override express 

contract terms or to obligate a party to accept additional terms or a material 

change in the contract's terms. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First 

Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding bank did not 

violate good faith obligation by refusing to make further advances under loan 

which did not require it, even where borrower able to repay); Roberts v. Wells 

Fargo AG Credit Corp., 990 F.2d 1169, 1174 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting similar 

argument, under Oklahoma law, that bank should have renewed note under 

implied duty of good faith, though loan did not require renewal); Badgett v. 

Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 359-60 (1991) (holding bank did not violate 

good faith obligation by not renegotiating or restructuring loan because no 

express term in the loan agreement required bank to do so). Thus, the district 

court did not err in dismissing the Borrowers' claims for breach and tortious 

breach of contract. 

C. Misrepresentation and Fraud 

Finally, the Borrowers allege that they presented sufficient evidence to 

submit their misrepresentation and fraud claims to a jury. We have reviewed the 

record and the evidence presented, and we disagree. The allegations that the 

Bank promised to renew Note 108 and promised to remain in the agricultural loan 

business in the Borrower's community are promises to act in the future. 

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Oklahoma only permits a fraud claim based on the promise of future acts if the 

plaintiff can establish that "the promise to act in the future is accompanied by an 

intention not to perform and the promise is made with the intent to deceive the 

promisee into acting where he would not otherwise have done so." Citation Co. 

Realtors v. Lyon, 610 P .2d 788, 790 (Okla. 1980) (noting general rule that 

promise to do something in the future is not fraud). We agree with the district 

court that the Borrowers presented no evidence that the Bank agents did not 

believe their alleged representations at the time they made them. "There must be 

evidence of each element of fraud presented before the issue may be properly 

submitted to a jury." Roberts, 990 F.2d at 1173 (upholding, under Oklahoma law, 

grant of summary judgment to bank where borrower failed to present evidence 

that bank's "promise to perform was accompanied by an intent not to do so"). 

We also agree with the district court that the Borrowers failed to present 

evidence that would support a claim that the Bank fraudulently hid the quitclaim 

deed from Gilbert and Mary Walker. The document is clearly entitled a quitclaim 

deed in all-capital letters, and the Walkers admit that they signed the deed. They 

contend, however, that an agent of the Bank hid the quitclaim deed under other 

papers; Mr. Walker stated in his deposition that he specifically remembered that 

this document was covered by other documents when he signed it, and that he was 

prevented from reading it because of time, though he did not explain what those 

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time constraints were. There is no evidence, however, that any agent of the Bank 

told the Walkers they had to sign the documents quickly or that they otherwise 

prevented the Walkers from reading the deed. As the district court ruled, 

precisely the same allegations as made by the Walkers have been held by the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court to be insufficient to establish an action for fraud. See 

Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 760 P.2d 174, 178-79 (Okla. 1988) (rejecting 

fraudulent concealment claim based on allegation that agent concealed lease 

agreement under other documents and that she hurriedly signed it without reading 

it, because no evidence that agent actively concealed lease from her or prevented 

her from seeing or reading it). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Chief Judge 

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