Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01154/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01154-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY C. RIVAS, JR.,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 04cv1154-J (JMA)

ORDER DENYING:

(1) CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY [Doc. No. 57.];

(2) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

APPEAL IN FORMA

PAUPERIS [Doc. No. 58.]; AND

(3) REQUEST FOR

TRANSCRIPTS [Doc. No. 59.]

v.

STUART J. RYAN, Warden,

Respondent.

On June 20, 2007, this Court issued an Order adopting Magistrate Judge Jan M.

Adler’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) and denying Petitioner Roy C. Rivas’

(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(“Petition.”) [Doc. No. 54.] Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Certificate of

Appealability, Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis, and Request for Transcripts. 

[Doc. Nos. 57, 58, 59.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s

Motion for COA, Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis, and Request for

Transcripts.

Legal Standard 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), a state prisoner may not appeal the denial of a

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habeas petition unless he obtains a COA from a district or circuit judge. See 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997)

(holding that district courts retain authority to issue a COA under the AEDPA). In deciding

whether to grant a COA, a court must either indicate the specific issues supporting a

certificate or state the reasons why a certificate is not warranted. See Asrar, 116 F.3d at

1270. 

A court may issue a COA only if the applicant has made a “substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If a habeas petition has been

denied on the merits, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate

that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Discussion

This Court denied each claim of the Petition on the merits. (See June 20, 2007

Order passim.) The Petition challenges Petitioner’s convictions for first degree murder,

attempted residential robbery, residential burglary, and use of a gun during the commission

of the crimes. Petitioner now seeks a COA on the following grounds: (1) the Court erred in

upholding the state court’s factual determination that jury foreman Rudy Medina did not lie

during voir dire; (2) the Court erred in determining that Petitioner was not denied his right

to an impartial jury; (3) the Court erred in determining that Petitioner was not denied his

Sixth Amendment right to confront declarant Patsy Moreno; (4) the Court erred in

determining that the admission of Gloria Rivas’ testimony was not an unreasonable

application of law. 

I. The State Court’s Factual Determination that the Jury Foreman Did Not Lie

During Voir Dire

Petitioner asserts that the Court erred in upholding the state court’s factual finding

that during voir dire, jury foreman Rudy Medina did not lie about his relationship with

Petitioner’s mother, Rita Reith. (COA at 4.) Petitioner’s claim stems from Medina’s

failure to tell the trial court during voir dire that he had a romantic relationship with

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Petitioner’s mother twenty-five years earlier. 

In addressing a habeas petition filed by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a state court, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed

to be correct.” Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). A “state court factual determination is

unreasonable only if it is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among

reasonable jurists.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

This Court properly decided that the state court’s factual determination regarding

Medina’s veracity was not clearly incorrect. Although it is apparent that Medina did not

reveal all of the facts about his relationship with Reith during voir dire, whether Medina

lied during voir dire would be debatable among reasonable jurists. Medina testified at an

evidentiary hearing that he did not reveal the romantic nature of his relationship with Reith

because he “was never asked.” (Lodgm’t No. 2(b) at 210-11.) A review of the record of

voir dire proceedings reveals that although the court and counsel asked Medina about his

work relationship with Reith, neither the court nor counsel directly asked Medina whether

he had a romantic relationship with Reith. (See Lodgm’t No. 14 (July 19, 1994 Rep.’s Tr.)

at 80-81, 146.) In light of the deferential review that this Court is required to afford state

court factual findings, this Court did not err in upholding the state court’s determination

that Medina did not lie about the nature of his relationship with Reith. 

II. Right to an Impartial Jury

Petitioner asserts that the Court erred in finding that Medina’s presence on the jury

did not deny Petitioner his right to an impartial jury. (COA at 11.) The Supreme Court has

long held that “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the

defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215

(1982). Petitioner was granted an evidentiary hearing at which he had the opportunity to

prove actual bias. (See Lodgm’t No. 2(b) at 197.) Both Medina and Reith testified

regarding their past relationship. (See id. at 108, 197.) This testimony did not support a

finding that Medina was biased against Petitioner as a result of his relationship with Reith. 

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Specifically, the testimony revealed that the relationship was casual in nature, it ended

twenty-five years prior to Petitioner’s trial, and it did not end acrimoniously. (See id.) 

Accordingly, this Court properly found that Petitioner was not denied his right to an

impartial jury. 

III. Confrontation Clause

Petitioner asserts that the Court erred in finding that the admission of a hearsay

statement by co-defendant Patsy Moreno did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to

confront and cross-examine witnesses. (COA at 8.) Over Petitioner’s objections, the state

court admitted the testimony of a police officer who stated that Moreno told him that she

had agreed to participate as the driver in the robbery attempt. (Lodgm’t No. 14 at 344.) 

Petitioner argues that the admission of this statement violated his Sixth Amendment rights

because the statement did not bear adequate indicia of reliability. (COA at 10.)

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) is controlling

with regard to this issue because Petitioner’s appeal was decided well before the Supreme

Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See Whorton v.

Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1184 (2007). Roberts provides that hearsay testimony is

admissible if: (1) the declarant is unavailable; and (2) the statement either falls within a

firmly rooted hearsay exception or bears adequate indicia of reliability. 448 U.S. at 66. 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that self-inculpatory statements bear strong indicia of

reliability. See Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Petitioner argues that Moreno’s statement to the police officer did not bear adequate

indicia of reliability because her statement inculpated both herself and Petitioner. (COA at

10.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that Moreno’s statement supported an inference that

Petitioner was involved in the robbery. (Id.) An examination of the record reveals that

Moreno’s statement made no reference to Petitioner. Rather, the police officer testified that

Moreno stated that she was the driver in the robbery attempt. (See Lodgm’t No. 14 at 344-

46.) There is no indication that Moreno described Petitioner’s role in the robbery or

attempted to shift the blame for the incident to Petitioner. The fact that the statement

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wholly inculpated Moreno undermines Petitioner’s contention that the statement lacked

reliability. Further, even if Moreno’s statement was improperly admitted, Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate that Moreno’s statement prejudiced his defense. Other witnesses

testified in detail as to Petitioner’s involvement in the robbery and corroborated Moreno’s

statement that she was the driver during the robbery attempt. (See Lodgm’t No. 14 at 399-

422.) Because Petitioner’s trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair by the admission of

Moreno’s statement, this Court properly found that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights

were not violated.

IV. Petitioner’s Allegation that Witness Gloria Rivas’ Testimony Was Scripted 

Petitioner argues that the plea agreement between witness Gloria Rivas and the

prosecution unconstitutionally restricted her testimony in violation of Petitioner’s due

process rights. (COA at 11.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that the terms of the plea

agreement provided that Gloria Rivas “could only offer testimony that would help the

prosecution and not benefit the defense.” (Id.)

An agreement requiring a witness to testify truthfully in exchange for a plea is

permissible as long as “the jury is informed of the exact nature of the agreement, defense

counsel is permitted to cross-examine the accomplice about the agreement, and the jury is

instructed to weigh the accomplice’s testimony with care.” United States v. Yarbrough,

852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir. 1988). 

At Petitioner’s trial, the jury was informed of the nature of Gloria Rivas’ plea

agreement and was instructed to take the agreement into account when assessing her

testimony. (Lodgm’t No. 14 at 380.) The prosecutor reminded her to “tell the truth.” (Id.

at 414.) Petitioner’s counsel cross-examined Gloria Rivas regarding the agreement. (Id. at

490-91.) These facts indicate that even though Gloria Rivas testified in exchange for a

plea, her testimony was proper because she was instructed to testify truthfully, the jury was

aware of the agreement, and Petitioner’s counsel had an opportunity to question her about

the agreement. Further, Petitioner fails to offer any evidence supporting his claims that

Gloria Rivas was coerced into testifying favorably for the prosecution or that she testified

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falsely. Accordingly, this Court did not err in finding that the admission of Gloria Rivas’

testimony was a reasonable application of law. 

Conclusion

 Petitioner’s COA does not provide, nor can this Court identify, any evidence

showing that reasonable jurists would find this Court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for COA,

Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis, and Request for Transcripts because

Petitioner has failed to make a “substantial showing” of the denial of a constitutional right. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: August 13, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Adler

All Parties

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