Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35938/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35938-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARVIN ROBERTS; EUGENE 

VENT; KEVIN PEASE; GEORGE 

FRESE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF FAIRBANKS; JAMES 

GEIER; CLIFFORD AARON RING;

CHRIS NOLAN; DAVE 

KENDRICK,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-35938

D.C. Nos.

4:17-cv-00034-HRH

4:17-cv-00035-HRH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

H. Russel Holland, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 9, 2019 

Fairbanks, Alaska

Filed January 22, 2020

Before: Richard C. Tallman, Sandra S. Ikuta,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman;

Dissent by Judge Ikuta

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2 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing 

claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 on the 

ground that the claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477 (1994), and remanded.

Plaintiffs were convicted of murder but sought postconviction relief after an individual confessed to his 

involvement in the murder and named other men as actual 

perpetrators of the crime. Pursuant to plaintiffs’ subsequent 

settlement agreement with prosecutors, the Alaska Superior 

Court vacated plaintiffs’ convictions, prosecutors dismissed 

all indictments, and three of the plaintiffs were released from 

prison. Despite a global release of all claims by plaintiffs 

contained in the settlement agreement, plaintiffs brought this 

lawsuit against the City of Fairbanks and its officers 

alleging, among other things, malicious prosecution and 

Brady violations. The district court dismissed the action 

without leave to amend, explaining that although the 

Superior Court vacated plaintiffs’ convictions pursuant to 

the settlement agreement and stipulation, the Superior Court 

did not declare the convictions invalid.

The panel held that where all convictions underlying 

§ 1983 claims are vacated and no outstanding criminal 

judgments remain, Heck does not bar plaintiffs from seeking 

relief under § 1983. The panel held that because all 

convictions in this case were vacated and the underlying 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 3

indictments ordered dismissed, there remained no 

outstanding criminal judgment nor any charges pending 

against plaintiffs. The absence of a criminal judgment here 

rendered the Heck bar inapplicable; the plain language of the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Heck required the existence of 

a conviction in order for a § 1983 suit to be barred. The 

panel further held that the district court’s ruling to the 

contrary and the dissent’s proposed disposition conflicted 

with this Circuit’s decisions in Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 

753 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2014), and Taylor v. County of Pima, 

913 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2019).

The panel rejected defendants’ argument that joinder 

requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 

barred plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims because the State of Alaska 

was an indispensable party to this litigation. The panel held 

that the State of Alaska was not a necessary party here 

because it had not claimed any interest relating to the subject 

of this action, as confirmed by defendants. The panel stated 

that plaintiffs could obtain complete relief through their 

§ 1983 claims against the City of Fairbanks and its 

officers—the alleged perpetrators of the § 1983 violations—

if their action was successful.

The panel considered defendants’ arguments that 

plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims may be dismissed based on the 

equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel, and that plaintiffs 

failed to state claims for malicious prosecution, even if not 

barred by Heck, because they did not allege a favorable 

termination. The panel held that because these arguments 

turned in part on the enforceability of the settlement 

agreement—an issue not passed upon below— the district 

court should be allowed to address these issues in the first 

instance.

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4 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

Dissenting, Judge Ikuta stated that plaintiffs did not have 

their prior convictions “declared invalid by a state tribunal 

authorized to make such determination,” Heck, 512 U.S. 

at 487, but instead reached an agreement with the state to 

vacate their convictions. Regardless of the plaintiffs’ 

reasons for doing so, they could not now claim that the prior 

convictions were terminated in a manner that provides a 

basis for bringing § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. In 

holding otherwise, the majority cast aside the favorabletermination rule articulated by Heck v. Humphrey and thus 

was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 5

COUNSEL

Anna Benvenutti Hoffmann (argued), Nick Brustin, Richard 

Sawyer, and Mary McCarthy, Neufeld Scheck & Brustin 

LLP, New York, New York; Mike Kramer and Reilly 

Cosgrove, Kramer and Associates, Fairbanks, Alaska; for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants Marvin Roberts and Eugene Vent.

David Whedbee, Jeffrey Taren, Tiffany Cartwright, and Sam 

Kramer, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, Seattle, 

Washington; Thomas R. Wickware, Fairbanks, Alaska; for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants Kevin Pease and George Frese.

Matthew Singer (argued) and Peter A. Scully, Holland & 

Knight LLP, Anchorage, Alaska, for Defendant-Appellee 

City of Fairbanks.

Joseph W. Evans (argued), Law Offices of Joseph W. Evans,

Bremerton, Washington, for Defendants-Appellees James 

Geier, Clifford Aaron Ring, Chris Nolan, and Dave 

Kendrick.

Samuel Harbourt, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, San 

Francisco, California; Kelsi Brown Corkran, Orrick 

Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Amici 

Curiae Scholars.

Steven S. Hansen, CSG Inc., Fairbanks, Alaska, for Amicus 

Curiae Tanana Chiefs Conference.

David B. Owens, Lillian Hahn, Benjamin Harris, and Emily 

Sullivan, The Exoneration Project, Chicago, Illinois, for 

Amici Curiae The Innocence Network, American Civil 

Liberties Union, and ACLU of Alaska Foundation.

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6 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from an order dismissing claims 

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 on the ground 

that the claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477 (1994). The primary question before us is whether 

§ 1983 plaintiffs may recover damages if the convictions 

underlying their claims were vacated pursuant to a 

settlement agreement. The answer depends on whether such 

a vacatur serves to invalidate the convictions and thus 

renders the related § 1983 claims actionable notwithstanding 

Heck. We conclude that where all convictions underlying 

§ 1983 claims are vacated and no outstanding criminal 

judgments remain, Heck does not bar plaintiffs from seeking 

relief under § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I

The following facts are alleged in the operative pleading 

or are subject to judicial notice:

On October 11, 1997, several men beat and kicked to 

death 15-year-old John Hartman on the streets of Fairbanks, 

Alaska. Plaintiffs Marvin Roberts, George Frese, Kevin 

Pease, and Eugene Vent (collectively “Plaintiffs”) were 

arrested by the Fairbanks Police Department, tried, and 

convicted of the murder and received prison sentences 

ranging from 30 to 77 years. The men—three Alaska 

Natives and one Native American—were between the ages 

of 17 and 20.

Several years after the convictions, an individual named 

William Holmes confessed to his involvement in the murder 

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 7

and named Jason Wallace and three other men as the actual 

perpetrators of the crime. Partly based on this confession, 

Plaintiffs filed post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petitions in 

Alaska Superior Court in September 2013. The court ruled 

that the petitions stated a prima facie case of actual 

innocence, allowing Plaintiffs to proceed with discovery, 

which lasted two years.

On May 4, 2015, Jason Gazewood, counsel for Jason 

Wallace, wrote a letter to the post-conviction prosecutors,1

expressing his concerns with the likely outcome of a PCR 

hearing. Gazewood, a former Fairbanks prosecutor, wrote 

that their convictions were likely to be vacated and that a 

retrial would be “virtually unwinnable.” He noted that the 

lead investigator of the murder, Detective Clifford Aaron 

Ring, had “edit[ed] his recordings in such a way as to not 

record exculpatory information while using coercive 

techniques to obtain confessions,” and that the Fairbanks 

Police Department (“FPD”) was well aware of Detective 

Ring’s “use of deceptive interviewing techniques.” For 

these reasons, among others, Gazewood warned the 

prosecutors that Plaintiffs were likely to seek—and win—

tens of millions of dollars in a civil-rights suit against those 

involved in procuring their wrongful convictions.

1 Gazewood’s letter was addressed to Assistant Attorney General 

Adrienne Bachmann who had allegedly suppressed a memorandum 

documenting Holmes’ 2011 confession to the Hartman murder from 

Plaintiffs and their counsel. Because we review de novo the district 

court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “accepting all 

factual allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 

881 F.3d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 2018), we do not address whether Plaintiffs’ 

allegations can be proven.

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8 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

After discovery, the state court held a five-week 

evidentiary hearing from October through November of 

2015. The following testimony was adduced:

• William Holmes testified that he, Jason Wallace, and 

three other men had murdered Hartman;

• Eleven witnesses corroborated Holmes’ account;

• Four witnesses testified that Wallace had confessed 

to killing Hartman and provided consistent, 

interlocking accounts corroborating that fact;

• Arlo Olson, the sole witness who had identified 

Plaintiffs as assailants in an unrelated attack on Frank 

Dayton the night of the Hartman murder, testified 

that FPD officers coerced him into giving a false 

statement;

• Frank Dayton, the individual who had also been 

assaulted on the night of the murder, testified that his 

assailants had not been in Roberts’ car, as had been 

asserted by the prosecution;

• An Alaska State Trooper testified that an 

investigation corroborated key elements of Holmes’ 

confession and failed to find any evidence of 

Plaintiffs’ guilt;

• Alibi witnesses provided accounts of the activities 

and whereabouts of Plaintiffs on the night of the 

murder, establishing that Plaintiffs were never 

together that night and could not have murdered 

Hartman or assaulted Dayton; and

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 9

• Forensic experts testified that the prosecution 

improperly advanced “evidence” that Frese’s boot 

print matched the injuries on Hartman’s face, stating 

that there was no scientifically reliable way to make 

this determination.

At the end of the evidentiary hearing, the judge told the 

parties that he would not render a decision for another six to 

eight months. Plaintiffs allege that prosecutors publicly 

stated that they would appeal any decision favorable to 

Plaintiffs all the way to the Alaska Supreme Court, thereby 

extending the men’s already lengthy incarceration for an 

indefinite period.

Several weeks after the hearing and just before 

Christmas 2015, the prosecutors offered Plaintiffs a deal: the 

prosecution would consent to vacating the convictions and 

dismissing the charges, but only if all four plaintiffs agreed 

to release the State of Alaska and the City of Fairbanks (and 

their employees) from any liability related to the 

convictions.2 Plaintiffs agreed and entered into a settlement 

agreement with the State of Alaska and the City of Fairbanks 

(the “Settlement Agreement”). The Settlement Agreement 

was filed with the Alaska Superior Court, and the parties 

jointly stipulated that the court would be asked to vacate 

Plaintiffs’ convictions. The Settlement Agreement also 

provided that “[t]he parties have not reached agreement as to 

[Plaintiffs’] actual guilt or innocence.”

2 Roberts had already been released from prison and was on 

supervised parole, but the prosecution refused to release any of the other 

three plaintiffs from prison unless Roberts agreed to the same 

arrangement.

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10 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs all signed the Settlement 

Agreement, which included the following key stipulations:

• The petitioners stipulate and agree that the original 

jury verdicts and judgments of conviction were 

properly and validly entered based on proof beyond 

a reasonable doubt.

• The parties stipulate and agree that there is sufficient 

new evidence of material facts that a new trial could 

be ordered under AS 12.72.010(4).3

• The parties stipulate and agree that this Court may 

immediately enter Orders vacating the Judgments of 

Conviction . . . and awarding each Petitioner the 

relief of a new trial for each of the charges for which 

Petitioners were convicted.

On December 17, 2015, after a judicially supervised 

mediation, the Alaska Superior Court convened a settlement 

hearing with all parties present and heard from 

representatives of the victims and counsel for all parties. 

The court explained that its role was to “ministerially sign 

the orders necessary to [e]ffect the decision of the attorney 

general,” and that, having determined that the settlement was 

procedurally proper, it “had no authority to . . . review or to 

criticize” the attorney general’s decision. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the court vacated Plaintiffs’ convictions, the 

prosecutors dismissed all indictments, and Vent, Frese, and 

Pease were released from prison. The parties inform us that 

3 Under Alaska Statute § 12.72.010(4), a person convicted of a crime 

may institute a PCR proceeding if the person claims “that there exists 

evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard by the 

court, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest 

of justice.”

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no further prosecution of these men has ensued and no new 

trial was ever ordered following the 2015 hearing.

Despite a global release of all claims by Plaintiffs 

contained in the Settlement Agreement, this civil-rights 

lawsuit was later commenced. On May 14, 2018, Plaintiffs 

filed a Second Amended and Consolidated Complaint and 

Jury Demand seeking relief under § 1983 against the City of 

Fairbanks and the four named FPD officers: James Geier, 

Clifford Aaron Ring, Chris Nolan, and Dave Kendrick 

(collectively “Defendants”). Vent and Frese alleged Fifth 

Amendment violations, and all four plaintiffs asserted the 

following causes of action:

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 deprivation of liberty;

2. § 1983 malicious prosecution;

3. § 1983 Brady violations;

4. § 1983 supervisor liability;

5. § 1983 civil rights conspiracy;

6. § 1985(3) conspiracy;

7. § 1983 Monell claims against the City of Fairbanks;

8. § 1983 First Amendment right of access;

9. Spoliation of evidence;

10. Negligence; and

11. Intentional or reckless infliction of emotional 

distress.

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12 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the 

Settlement Agreement is unenforceable, an award of 

compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.

On June 4, 2018, Defendants moved to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), or alternatively, for failure to join the State of 

Alaska as an indispensable party under Rule 12(b)(7).

The district court entered a final judgment and order 

dismissing Plaintiffs’ negligence and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress4 claims with prejudice,5 and dismissing 

the other ten claims without prejudice, under Rule 12(b)(6).6 

Roberts v. City of Fairbanks, No. 4:17-CV-0034-HRH, 2018 

WL 5259453, at *10 (D. Alaska Oct. 22, 2018). But the 

court denied leave to amend “as amendment would be futile 

at th[at] time.” Id. The district court dismissed the claims 

as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, holding that vacatur of 

convictions pursuant to a settlement agreement was 

insufficient to render the convictions invalid in specific 

reliance on the parties’ stipulation that “the original jury 

verdicts and judgments of conviction were properly and 

validly entered based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the court 

4 The court likely intended to refer to the intentional or reckless 

infliction of emotional distress claim, as Plaintiffs had not asserted a 

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The district court can 

clarify this matter on remand.

5 The court noted that Plaintiffs did not oppose dismissal of these 

two claims.

6 The court did not consider Defendants’ alternative Rule 12(b)(7) 

argument. Defendants press that issue on appeal before us.

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 13

explained, “[a]ll the Superior Court did was vacate 

plaintiffs’ convictions pursuant to the settlement agreements 

and the stipulation. The Superior Court did not declare their 

convictions invalid.” Id. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II

As previously noted, see supra n.1, we accept Plaintiffs’ 

factual allegations as true and review de novo the Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal.

III

A

We agree with the district court that our analysis is 

guided by Heck v. Humphrey, the seminal case discussing 

whether a plaintiff may challenge the constitutionality of a 

conviction through a § 1983 suit for damages. 512 U.S. 

at 478. Petitioner Roy Heck was serving a 15-year sentence 

for voluntary manslaughter in the killing of his wife. Id. 

While his appeal from the conviction was pending in state 

court, Heck filed § 1983 claims in federal district court 

alleging that defendants, including county prosecutors and a 

state police investigator, had engaged in “unlawful, 

unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation,” “knowingly 

destroyed” exculpatory evidence, and caused an “unlawful 

voice identification procedure” to be used at his trial, while 

acting under color of state law. Id. at 479. Heck sought 

compensatory and punitive damages but did not seek 

injunctive relief or release from custody. Id.

The district court dismissed Heck’s suit because it 

implicated the legality of his conviction. Id. Heck appealed 

this ruling to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. 

While the federal appeal was pending, the state supreme 

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14 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. The Seventh 

Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of the claims, 

holding that

[i]f regardless of the relief sought, the 

plaintiff [in a federal civil-rights action] is 

challenging the legality of his conviction, so 

that if he won his case the state would be 

obliged to release him even if he hadn’t 

sought that relief, the suit is classified as an 

application for habeas corpus and the 

plaintiff must exhaust his state remedies, on 

pain of dismissal if he fails to do so.

Id. at 479–80 (footnote and citations omitted).

Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the 

circuit court’s conclusion regarding exhaustion and stated 

that “§ 1983 contains no exhaustion requirement beyond 

what Congress has provided.” Id. at 483. Instead, the Court 

stated, the question before it was “whether the claim is 

cognizable under § 1983 at all.” Id. Recognizing that 

§ 1983 “creates a species of tort liability,” id. (quoting 

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 

(1986)), the Court began its analysis by looking at the 

common law of torts, specifically, the cause of action for 

malicious prosecution, which it described as the most 

analogous to Heck’s claims, id. at 483–84. The Court 

emphasized that the favorable-termination7 element of 

malicious prosecution

7 We have said that the favorable-termination rule in the context of 

malicious prosecution refers to the termination of proceedings “in such 

a manner as to indicate . . . innocence.” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 15

avoids parallel litigation over the issues of 

probable cause and guilt . . . and it precludes 

the possibility of the claimant [sic] 

succeeding in the tort action after having 

been convicted in the underlying criminal 

prosecution, in contravention of a strong 

judicial policy against the creation of two 

conflicting resolutions arising out of the same 

or identical transaction.

Id. at 484 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 S. Speiser, C. 

Krause & A. Gans, American Law of Torts § 28:5, at 24 

(1991)).

The Heck Court noted its similar longstanding concern 

“for finality and consistency” and general disinclination to 

“expand opportunities for collateral attack.” Id. at 485–86. 

Based on this laudatory concern and “the hoary principle that 

civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging 

the validity of outstanding criminal judgments,” id. at 486, 

the Court adopted a version of the common law’s favorabletermination rule for § 1983 damages claims that “call into 

question the lawfulness of conviction or confinement,” id.

at 483. The Court articulated four ways in which a § 1983 

plaintiff could satisfy this requirement:

[T]o recover damages for allegedly 

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, 

or for other harm caused by actions whose 

unlawfulness would render a conviction or 

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must 

368 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004). As discussed below, we leave to 

the district court the question whether Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient 

facts to state a claim for malicious prosecution.

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16 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

prove that the conviction or sentence has 

been [1] reversed on direct appeal, 

[2] expunged by executive order, 

[3] declared invalid by a state tribunal 

authorized to make such determination, or 

[4] called into question by a federal court’s 

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Id. at 486–87 (footnote omitted).8 Here, we need only 

consider whether Plaintiffs’ convictions were “declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination,” id. at 487, when the Alaska Superior Court 

vacated their convictions based on the Settlement 

Agreement.

The Heck Court was explicit: “If the district court 

determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will 

not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal 

judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed 

to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Id. 

(footnote omitted). Because all convictions here were 

vacated and underlying indictments ordered dismissed, there 

remains no outstanding criminal judgment nor any charges 

pending against Plaintiffs. The absence of a criminal 

judgment here renders the Heck bar inapplicable; the plain 

language of the decision requires the existence of a 

conviction in order for a § 1983 suit to be barred. See id.

Defendants argue, and the dissent agrees, that even

though the convictions were vacated, they are still “valid” 

and so Plaintiffs’ civil-rights claims are not cognizable. But 

8 We have held that Heck applies equally to claims brought under 

§ 1985. See McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.4 

(9th Cir. 2004).

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the plain meaning of Heck and our precedents counsel 

otherwise. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the 

definition of “vacate” is “to nullify or cancel; make void; 

invalidate.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1782 (10th ed. 2014) 

(emphasis added). Nevertheless, Defendants maintain that 

the state court did not declare the convictions “invalid,” as 

required by Heck, despite vacatur, because Plaintiffs, 

pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, “confirm[ed] the 

validity of their original convictions and sentences.” The 

district court agreed, concluding that vacating Plaintiffs’ 

convictions and sentences “is not the same thing [as 

invalidating them] for purposes of Heck.” Roberts, 2018 

WL5259453, at *10. The dissent claims allowing a § 1983 

action based on vacated convictions is novel and contrary to 

our precedents. See post, at 41. We address each argument 

in turn.

B

The district court’s ruling and the dissent’s proposed 

disposition conflict with our decisions in Rosales-Martinez 

v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2014), and Taylor v. 

County of Pima, 913 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2019). 

Unfortunately, the district court did not have the benefit of 

Taylor, our most recent decision in this area, when it 

dismissed the case. There, we considered the vacatur of 

multiple convictions pursuant to an agreement following a 

post-conviction relief petition based on newly discovered 

evidence calling the convictions into question—mirroring 

the circumstances here. 913 F.3d at 932. The appellant in 

Taylor—convicted of felony murder in 1972—entered into 

a plea agreement with the state in 2013 whereby his original 

1972 conviction was vacated, he pleaded no contest to the 

same counts, was resentenced to time served, and was 

ultimately released from prison. Id.

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18 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

Our opinion in Taylor was firmly rooted in the reasoning 

that vacatur of a conviction by a state court constitutes 

invalidation under Heck. Specifically, we said that “under 

Heck, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action may not seek a judgment 

that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a state-court 

conviction or sentence unless, for example, the conviction 

had been vacated by the state court.” Id. at 935 (emphasis 

added). We confirmed the district court’s proper analysis of 

Heck: “Heck does not bar [Taylor] from raising claims 

premised on alleged constitutional violations that affect his 

1972 convictions [which had been vacated pursuant to the 

settlement] but do not taint his 2013 convictions [to which 

he pleaded no contest].” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We concluded that “Taylor’s 1972 jury conviction 

ha[d] been vacated by the state court, so Heck pose[d] no 

bar to a challenge to that conviction or the resulting 

sentence.” Id. (emphasis added). We ultimately held that 

Taylor was barred from seeking incarceration-related 

damages because all the time he served was “supported by 

the valid 2013 state-court judgment,” not the vacated 1972 

convictions. Id.

Our dissenting colleague contends that Taylor’s 

conclusion that § 1983 suits based on vacated convictions 

are not barred by Heck is merely an “offhand comment” that 

was made “in passing” and is therefore not binding. Post, 

at 44. We think that reading of Taylor is too narrow. We 

expressly held there that Heck did not bar Taylor from 

seeking damages related to the 1972 conviction—just that 

Taylor could not seek incarceration-related damages, 

because the valid 2013 conviction “[a]s a matter of law . . .

caused the entire period of his incarceration.” Taylor, 

913 F.3d at 935. Cf. Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 762 

(9th Cir. 2014) (allowing a § 1983 suit for nominal and 

punitive damages—but not incarceration-related damages—

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 19

where the plaintiff was convicted, his conviction was set 

aside on habeas for Miranda violations, and he was 

subsequently reconvicted without the tainted evidence). 

Taylor specifically challenged “his 1972 prosecution, 

convictions, and sentence and [did] not challenge his 2013 

‘no contest’ pleas,” recognizing that Heck would bar only 

the non-vacated judgment. Taylor, 913 F.3d at 935 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We agreed that the 2013 

judgment was valid because it had not been vacated, unlike 

the 1972 conviction. Id.

Far from an “offhand comment” made “in passing,” 

Taylor’s understanding that a vacated conviction was 

“declared invalid” under Heck was an integral element 

underpinning our holding. We held that only the 2013 

conviction—not the vacated 1972 conviction—barred his 

claim for incarceration-related damages, and we called the 

fact that the 2013 conviction supported his entire period of 

incarceration “critical[].” Id. That is no idle comment made

in passing. Unlike in Taylor, here there is no substitute 

outstanding conviction to bar Plaintiffs from their suit for 

damages as Taylor’s 2013 conviction barred his.

In Rosales-Martinez, the state court vacated the 

plaintiff’s convictions pursuant to a settlement agreement 

following his filing of a habeas corpus petition alleging 

Brady violations. See 753 F.3d at 893. In 2004, RosalesMartinez was convicted of four drug-related counts and 

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 to 25 years. Id. 

at 892. He filed a state habeas petition after learning that the 

sole witness to testify against him had a criminal history that 

was not disclosed by the state as ordered by the court. Id. 

Rosales-Martinez then entered into a stipulated agreement 

with the state in which he agreed to withdraw his habeas 

petition and to plead guilty to one of the counts for which he 

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20 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

was charged in exchange for the state’s recommending 

vacatur of his other convictions “based on the cumulative 

errors” he alleged and recommending to the court that he be 

sentenced only to time served. Id. at 893.

The state court accepted the agreement, vacated three of 

the four counts, and imposed a punishment of time served, 

whereupon Rosales-Martinez was released from prison. Id. 

at 894. He then filed a § 1983 action in federal district court 

based on the state’s alleged Brady violations. Id. at 892. The 

district court concluded that Rosales-Martinez’s § 1983 

claim was untimely because he failed to file it within the 

two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 895. The court based 

its decision on the rule that “[a] federal claim accrues when 

the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which 

is the basis of the action.”9 Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

We reversed, pointing to the Supreme Court’s holding in 

Heck that “a § 1983 action challenging a conviction or 

sentence does not ‘exist[]’ until the conviction or sentence is 

invalidated.” Id. at 896 (alteration in original) (citation 

omitted). Applying this rule, we stated, “Heck therefore 

teaches that Rosales-Martinez’s claims did not accrue until 

the Nevada court vacated those convictions on December 2, 

2008.” Id. We thus implicitly held that vacating a 

conviction pursuant to a settlement agreement serves to 

invalidate the conviction under Heck. Specifically, we stated 

that “Rosales-Martinez pleaded guilty to one of the four 

9 The court applied a statute of limitations of two years as provided 

by Nevada state law. “Nevada law provides the statute of limitations 

because, in the absence of a federal provision for § 1983 actions, the 

analogous state statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies.” 

Rosales-Martinez, 753 F.3d at 895.

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counts of his original conviction, with the other three being 

held invalid.” Id. at 899 (emphasis added).

We went on to remand the case so the district court could 

determine how Rosales-Martinez’s guilty plea to one count 

under the release-dismissal agreement should be addressed:

The fact that Rosales-Martinez was 

reconvicted following the vacation of his 

initial convictions, means that he still has an 

outstanding conviction. This outstanding 

conviction raises the question whether 

Rosales-Martinez’s § 1983 action is barred 

by Heck’s holding that “[a] claim for 

damages [based] on a conviction or sentence 

that has not been so invalidated is not 

cognizable.”

Id. at 897 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487) (alterations in 

original). Indeed, our decision reversing the lower court was 

contingent upon the finding that Heck does not bar a suit for 

damages based on convictions that were vacated pursuant to 

a settlement agreement.

The dissent’s attempt to distinguish Rosales-Martinez is 

unconvincing. The dissent argues that Rosales-Martinez

does not support our holding here because in that case we 

remanded “so the district court could address the viability of 

the plaintiff’s complaint in the first instance.” Post, at 42.

But the dissent misreads our opinion in Rosales-Martinez. 

We remanded that case not because we doubted that the state 

court’s vacatur of Rosales-Martinez’s three convictions 

invalidated them for purposes of Heck, but because his plea 

to the remaining count “suggest[ed] a continuous validity to 

a portion of his original conviction and sentence,” and, 

therefore, “a possible inconsistency between it and a § 1983 

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22 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

action.” Rosales-Martinez, 753 F.3d at 899. Indeed, on the 

same page of the opinion that the dissent cites for the 

proposition that we remanded the case “so the district court 

could address the viability of the plaintiff’s complaint in the 

first instance,” post, at 42, we instructed the district court to 

determine Rosales-Martinez’s prospects for compensatory 

damages “based on the convictions that were vacated as 

invalid,” Rosales-Martinez, 753 F.3d at 899 (emphasis 

added). Guided by these decisions and the plain language of 

Heck, we must order reversal here.10

C

Nevertheless, the district court held, and the dissent 

argues, that vacatur-by-settlement does not qualify as 

invalidation under Heck. See Roberts, 2018 WL 5259453, 

at *8 (“All the Superior Court did was vacate plaintiffs’ 

convictions pursuant to the settlement agreements and the 

stipulation. The Superior Court did not declare their 

convictions invalid.”); see post, at 41. The dissent’s view 

that a conviction vacated by settlement is not “declared 

invalid” under Heck appears to arise out of its conflation of 

the favorable-termination rule in the tort of malicious 

10 There is a fundamental difference in how we and the dissent read 

Heck. The dissent cites language defining an “outstanding criminal 

judgment” in McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019) (quoting 

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007)). See post, at 47. The dissent 

ignores the very next sentence in the Wallace opinion, which explains 

that the Heck rule for deferred accrual “delays what would otherwise be 

the accrual date of a tort action until the setting aside of an extant 

conviction.” 549 U.S. at 393. There are no extant convictions here. All 

convictions were set aside. In the absence of any remaining convictions, 

Heck does not bar § 1983 claims. Our reading of Heck comports with 

that of our circuit precedent in Taylor and Rosales-Martinez.

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prosecution with Heck’s four distinct means of favorable 

termination.11 See post, at 48–51.

To be sure, Heck did create a favorable-termination rule,

see Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 

2005), and the Supreme Court in Heck called malicious 

prosecution the “closest analogy” to a § 1983 suit for 

wrongful conviction, 512 U.S. at 484. But Heck’s favorabletermination requirement is distinct from the favorabletermination element of a malicious-prosecution claim. 

Compare Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1068 (malicious-prosecution 

plaintiff must “establish that the prior proceedings 

terminated in such a manner as to indicate his innocence”), 

with Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (favorable-termination rule 

satisfied when conviction or sentence is (1) reversed on 

direct appeal, (2) expunged by executive order, (3) declared 

invalid by a state court, or (4) called into question by a 

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus).

The dissent’s contention to the contrary—that the 

analogy to malicious prosecution means that a § 1983 suit is 

barred by Heck unless the plaintiff could bring a claim for 

malicious prosecution at common law, see post, at 49—is 

simply wrong. That argument contravenes the plain 

11 The dissent quotes from the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in 

McDonough to support its apparent claim that Heck establishes an exact 

replica of the favorable-termination rule from the malicious-prosecution 

context. See post, at 37. McDonough—a statute-of-limitations case—

holds no such thing. Describing when a plaintiff may bring a § 1983 suit 

alleging fabrication of evidence, the Court wrote: “Only once the 

criminal proceeding has ended in the defendant’s favor, or a resulting 

conviction has been invalidated within the meaning of Heck . . . will the 

statute of limitations begin to run.” McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2158 

(internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). By posing the favorabletermination rule and invalidation under Heck disjunctively, McDonough

firmly undermines the dissent’s insinuation that they are coterminous.

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24 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

language of Heck, because convictions’ being “called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus,” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487—the fourth listed exception 

to the Heck bar—does not necessarily indicate the innocence 

of the accused, as is required for a malicious-prosecution 

action to be maintained. The Second Restatement of Torts—

the very source upon which the dissent relies, see post, 

at 49—states that, where “new proceedings for the same 

offense have been properly instituted and have not been 

terminated in favor of the accused,” there has been no 

“sufficient termination to meet the requirements of a cause 

of action for malicious prosecution.” Restatement (Second) 

of Torts § 660; see also id. § 660 cmt. g (“When the charge 

has been properly revived under the criminal procedure of 

the particular jurisdiction, there can be no liability . . . until 

the new proceedings have terminated in favor of the 

accused.”). Prosser & Keeton on Torts is in accord: “Any 

disposition of the criminal action which does not terminate 

it but permits it to be renewed . . . cannot serve as a 

foundation for the action [of malicious prosecution].” W. 

Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 119, at 874 

(5th ed. 1984). Thus, a “favorable” final order or disposition 

must “preclude[] the bringing of further proceedings against 

the accused.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 659 cmt. g; 

see also id. § 660 cmt. a (“Proceedings are ‘terminated in 

favor of the accused,’ . . . only when their final disposition 

is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused.”). In 

short, there is no favorable termination in the maliciousprosecution context when new proceedings for the same 

offense have been instituted and are not subsequently 

terminated in favor of the accused.12

12 The common-law treatises cited by the dissent, see post, at 49 n.9,

are in harmony. See 8 Stuart M. Speiser et al., American Law of Torts

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In light of these well-established common-law 

principles, the dissent’s suggestion that vacatur-bysettlement cannot qualify as a favorable termination under 

Heck because settlement was not considered a favorable 

termination at common law must fail. Convictions “called 

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus” routinely terminate in a manner that could not 

sustain a malicious-prosecution action. Indeed, it is not 

uncommon in the context of habeas relief for an individual 

to be subsequently re-tried and re-convicted on the same 

charges. See, e.g., Jackson, 749 F.3d at 758. Our sister 

circuits are in accord. See, e.g., Pratt v. United States, 

129 F.3d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Whitley, 

734 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir. 1984); Gamble v. Estelle, 

551 F.2d 654, 654–55 (5th Cir. 1977); Mullreed v. Kropp, 

425 F.2d 1095, 1096–97 (6th Cir. 1970).

Thus, the dissent’s reading of Heck’s favorabletermination rule simply cannot be maintained. Both the 

common-law principles discussed above and our precedents 

in Rosales-Martinez and Taylor make clear that the law of 

our circuit is not that Heck bars a § 1983 suit unless the 

§ 28:5 (2019) (regurgitating the standard recited in the Second 

Restatement); 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 60 (“With respect to 

the malicious prosecution requirement that the prior proceeding must 

have terminated in plaintiff’s favor, termination of the prosecution must 

be in such a manner that it cannot be revived.” (emphasis added)); id. at 

§ 61 (“The inquiry into whether a termination of a criminal prosecution 

was favorable to the defendant focuses on whether it was dispositive as 

to the defendant’s innocence of the crime for which the defendant was 

charged.”). Cf. id. § 63 (“A criminal proceeding in which the accused 

was originally convicted, but the conviction was reversed on appeal 

following a determination that the evidence on which the conviction was 

based had been obtained pursuant to a faulty search warrant, does not 

result in a favorable termination for the accused and thus cannot provide 

a basis for a malicious prosecution claim.”).

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26 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

plaintiff could succeed in a malicious-prosecution action, as 

the dissent would apparently hold.13

D

The dissent accuses us of creating “a fifth method of 

favorable termination” in addition to Heck’s four—namely, 

vacatur-by-settlement. Post, at 47. Not so. We merely hold 

that where, as here, a § 1983 plaintiff’s conviction is vacated 

by a state court, that conviction has been “declared invalid 

by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,” 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (the third exception to Heck’s bar), 

and that Heck is therefore no bar to the suit.

The dissent also claims that our holding today would 

allow “criminal defendants who served their sentences” to 

“subsequently bring § 1983 actions to establish that they had 

been wrongfully convicted.” Post, at 46. That, too, is 

incorrect. That reasoning conflates “conviction” and 

“incarceration.” A person who is released from 

incarceration after fully executing his sentence would be 

13 The dissent cites language from Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 

137 S. Ct. 911 (2017), arguing that it appears to undermine the 

contention that “favorable termination” is not coterminous in the 

malicious-prosecution and Heck contexts. Post, at 38. Explaining its 

reliance on common-law principles “[i]n defining the contours and 

prerequisites of a § 1983 claim,” the Supreme Court in Manuel cited 

Heck in support of the assertion that “[s]ometimes, th[e] review of 

common law will lead a court to adopt wholesale the rules that would 

apply in a suit involving the most analogous tort.” 137 S. Ct. at 920–21. 

However, regardless of what the Court meant by its “adopt wholesale” 

statement, it cannot be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the plain 

language of Heck itself. As described above, interpreting this passing 

statement to mean that the favorable-termination requirement is 

coextensive in both the malicious-prosecution and Heck contexts 

contravenes a plain reading of Heck and our circuit’s case law.

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barred from bringing a § 1983 suit based on that conviction 

because the conviction remains “extant.”14 Wallace, 

549 U.S. at 393. Indeed, as noted above, our holding adheres 

to Heck’s requirement that a conviction be invalidated in 

accordance with one of the four methods set out by the 

Court.

E

The dissent’s effort to demonstrate the continuing 

validity of Plaintiffs’ vacated convictions is based on an 

incomplete analysis of the Settlement Agreement’s 

stipulations. The dissent claims that the convictions are still 

valid, even post-vacatur, based in part on the following 

stipulation agreed to by the parties: “[T]he original jury 

verdicts and judgments of conviction were properly and 

validly entered based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

That conclusion is problematic for two reasons.

First, Plaintiffs allege the stipulations were the product 

of an unenforceable agreement to waive their civil-rights 

claims. The adjudication of that claim may well result in a 

very different outcome on remand. Second, even if the 

Settlement Agreement were deemed enforceable, reading 

this stipulation to mean that Plaintiffs agree the convictions 

are currently valid ignores the very next stipulation, which 

14 The dissent accuses us of “play[ing] word games” in reaching this 

conclusion. Post, at 46 n.6. However, the dissent provides no authority 

for its assertion that, based on our reasoning, “a court could conclude 

that a defendant who has fully served a sentence has satisfied or 

discharged the convictions so that it is no longer ‘outstanding’ or 

‘extant’” for purposes of Heck. Id. Nor can it. We explicitly disclaim 

that characterization of our opinion: under our holding today, a person 

who has served his sentence but whose conviction remains unimpeached 

is barred by Heck from bringing a § 1983 suit based on that conviction.

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28 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

acknowledges that new evidence now undermines the 

validity of the original verdicts and “requires vacation of the 

conviction or sentence in the interest of justice” pursuant to 

Alaska Statute § 12.72.010(4) (emphasis added). That 

stipulation declares that “[t]he parties stipulate and agree that 

there is sufficient new evidence of material facts that a new 

trial could be ordered under AS § 12.72.010(4).” Id. Indeed, 

these stipulations reflect the parties’ agreement that (1) the 

original verdicts were properly and validly entered in 1997, 

and (2) now, a new trial could be ordered based on new 

evidence calling into question whether Plaintiffs were 

actually the killers, thus requiring vacatur of their once-valid 

convictions.

While we do not make a finding regarding the newly 

introduced evidence, we do note that the dissent’s 

conclusion that the vacated convictions are still valid is 

undermined by its failure to look at the actual result of the 

Settlement Agreement. There are no charges pending 

against any of these men four years after the Settlement 

Agreement was entered into. Nor do they stand convicted of 

anything.

IV

Defendants argue, in the alternative, that joinder 

requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 bar 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims because the State of Alaska is an 

indispensable party to this litigation. We reject this 

argument.

In deciding whether a party is indispensable, we “must 

determine: (1) whether an absent party is necessary to the 

action; and then, (2) if the party is necessary, but cannot be 

joined, whether the party is indispensable such that in equity 

and good conscience the suit should be dismissed.” 

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 29

Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power 

Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Under Rule 19, a 

party is required to be joined, if feasible, when:

(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord 

complete relief among existing parties; or

(B) that person claims an interest relating to the 

subject of the action and is so situated that 

disposing of the action in the person’s absence 

may:

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the 

person’s ability to protect the interest; or

(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial 

risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 

inconsistent obligations because of the interest.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.

We have held that joinder is “contingent . . . upon an 

initial requirement that the absent party claim a legally 

protected interest relating to the subject matter of the action.” 

United States v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 689 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(quoting Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 

705 F.2d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983)). In Thomas, Head & 

Greisen Employees Trust v. Buster, we similarly held that an 

entity was not an indispensable party to an action because 

“[it] had not claimed an interest in [the defendant’s] limited 

partnership . . . at the time of the default judgment and the 

district court was able to craft appropriate and meaningful 

relief in the absence of [the entity] which . . . did not 

prejudice [its] property rights.” 95 F.3d 1449, 1460 n.18 (9th 

Cir. 1996).

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30 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

The State of Alaska is not a necessary party here because 

it has not claimed any interest relating to the subject of this 

action, as confirmed by Defendants. Plaintiffs may obtain 

complete relief through their § 1983 claims against the City 

of Fairbanks and its officers—the alleged perpetrators of the 

§ 1983 violations—if their action is successful. We 

therefore hold that the State is not an indispensable party 

under Rule 19 and reject Defendants’ alternate ground for 

affirmance.

V

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims may 

be dismissed based on the equitable doctrine of judicial 

estoppel, and that Plaintiffs failed to state claims for 

malicious prosecution, even if not barred by Heck, because 

they did not allege a favorable termination. Because these 

arguments turn in part on the enforceability of the Settlement 

Agreement—an issue not passed upon below—we will 

allow the district court to address these issues in the first 

instance. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 

392–93 (1987); Lynch v. City of Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122, 

1125 (9th Cir. 1989).

In Rumery, the Supreme Court considered “whether a 

court properly may enforce an agreement in which a criminal 

defendant releases his right to file an action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 in return for a prosecutor’s dismissal of pending 

criminal charges.” 480 U.S. at 389. Rumery filed § 1983 

claims against the town and its officers, alleging that they 

had “violated his constitutional rights by arresting him, 

defaming him, and imprisoning him falsely.” Id. at 391. But 

before bringing suit, Rumery had agreed to release any 

claims he might have against the town and its officials to 

obtain the dismissal of criminal charges that had been 

brought against him. Id. at 390–91. In evaluating whether 

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 31

Rumery was free to bring § 1983 claims despite the releasedismissal agreement, the Court, in a plurality decision, held 

that the enforceability of the agreement must first be 

established. Id. at 392–93. The Court adopted a case-bycase approach to determine (1) whether the agreement was 

entered into voluntarily, and (2) whether enforcement is in 

the public interest. Id. at 398 (“[W]e conclude that this 

agreement was voluntary, that there is no evidence of 

prosecutorial misconduct, and that enforcement of this 

agreement would not adversely affect the relevant public 

interests.”); see also id. at 399–401 (O’Connor, J., 

concurring). We later concluded in Lynch that “Rumery

requires the district court to hear the evidence and evaluate 

whether the public interest is served by enforcement of the 

release-dismissal agreement.” 880 F.2d at 1128.15

Here, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims at the 

pleading stage and did not hear any evidence to determine 

whether Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into the Settlement 

Agreement or whether enforcement is in the public 

interest.16 Therefore it is premature for us to address 

15 Following Rumery, we acknowledged that “the availability of 

release-dismissal agreements creates a risk that public officials will use 

the threat of criminal prosecution to suppress civil rights claims.” Lynch, 

880 F.2d at 1127 (citing Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394). Given the facts 

before us in Lynch, we found that “[t]he limited empirical evidence 

available suggests that this may be the case.” Id. We do not address that 

question here since the district court did not conduct a Rumery hearing.

16 Generally, the burden of pleading and proving the enforceability 

of a release-dismissal agreement would fall to defendants. Perry v. Merit 

Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1986 n.9 (2017) (“In civil litigation, a 

release is an affirmative defense to a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not 

something the plaintiff must anticipate and negate in her pleading.” 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) and Rumery, 480 U.S. at 391)); see also

Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1125 (“Justice O’Connor, agreeing with the 

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32 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

whether the Settlement Agreement is enforceable, and we 

leave that issue for the district court.

VI

We hold that the district court erred in applying the Heck 

rule to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. We therefore vacate the 

district court’s dismissal order and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED, VACATED, and REMANDED with 

instructions.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The Supreme Court could not have been more clear: 

“[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment,” a § 1983 plaintiff “must prove 

that the conviction or sentence has been [1] reversed on 

direct appeal, [2] expunged by executive order, [3] declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination, or [4] called into question by a federal court’s 

plurality’s result, wrote separately to emphasize that the burden of 

establishing the enforceability of such agreements is borne by the civil 

rights defendants.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1126 n.5 (“We note, 

therefore, that a majority of the Supreme Court in Rumery expressed the 

view that the burden of establishing that a release-dismissal agreement 

does not violate public policy rests with the civil-rights defendant 

seeking to invoke the agreement as a defense.”). Thus, to win on their 

judicial estoppel defense, Defendants have the burden of proving the 

enforceability of the Settlement Agreement. However, insofar as 

Plaintiffs have alleged the unenforceability of the Settlement Agreement 

to meet elements of their claims for relief, they would bear the burden of 

proof on enforceability.

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issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (emphasis added). In other 

words, to claim tort damages for a wrongful conviction, the 

plaintiff must prove that a court (or the executive) 

recognized that the conviction was invalid and wiped out the 

conviction. In holding that the plaintiffs here can bring 

§ 1983 claims without meeting this requirement, the 

majority squarely contradicts Supreme Court precedent. I 

therefore dissent.

I

A brief description of some key facts is in order. The 

plaintiffs were all tried and convicted of murder in 1997. 

Several years later, they filed petitions for post-conviction 

relief based on new evidence. The majority recounts in 

detail the striking and persuasive evidence adduced by the 

plaintiffs at a post-conviction hearing—but this evidence is 

irrelevant, as there was no judicial determination that the 

facts recited by the majority are true or the witnesses 

credible. All we know is that the plaintiffs chose not to wait 

for the state court’s ruling on their petitions, but instead 

entered into settlement agreements with the state and the 

City of Fairbanks that left the truth about their underlying 

convictions undecided. In fact, the settlement agreements 

expressly state they do not address issues related to the 

underlying convictions: the parties agreed that they had “not 

reached agreement as to . . . actual guilt or innocence.” 

Rather than resolve the merits of their prior convictions, 

plaintiffs (all of whom were represented by counsel) agreed 

to withdraw their petitions for post-conviction relief, as well 

as all claims of actual innocence and all allegations of police 

and prosecutorial misconduct. The plaintiffs also agreed to 

release the state and the City of Fairbanks (and their 

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34 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

employees) from all liability arising out of or related to their 

arrests and convictions.

As required by the settlement agreements, the parties 

filed a stipulation with the state court that went even further 

than the settlement agreements. Rather than describe the 

prior convictions as wrongful or invalid, the parties agreed 

that “the original jury verdicts and judgments of conviction 

were properly and validly entered based on proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” The parties then agreed that the state 

court could vacate the judgment of conviction and order a 

new trial. Upon the court doing so, the state would dismiss 

the indictments. The court would then be obliged to order 

the plaintiffs’ release.

Faced with the settlement agreements and the 

stipulation, the state court made clear that it was not opining 

on the merits of the underlying convictions or the terms of 

the settlements. At a hearing on December 17, 2015, a 

relative of the murder victim protested the settlements. In 

response, the state court explained that the attorney general 

was exercising his lawful authority to settle civil litigation, 

and the court had “no power of review or approval.” “The 

duty of this Court, once that inherent authority is exercised, 

using the structures of the law, is to ministerially sign the 

orders necessary to [e]ffect the decision of the attorney 

general.” Because the settlement agreements were 

procedurally proper, the state court explained, it was 

required to enter the “appropriate order” to vacate the 

plaintiffs’ convictions. And once the plaintiffs’ convictions 

were vacated, the state attorney general had the authority to 

dismiss the indictments. Under state law, the court had no 

power to block this exercise of authority; rather, the court 

“would violate the separation of powers in any attempt to 

stop him.” As the court summed up, “[t]hat’s a long way of 

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 35

saying that this is a lawful settlement conducted under lawful 

procedure, under the inherent authority of the attorney 

general, over which this Court has no authority to . . . review 

or to criticize.” The same day, the state court vacated the 

plaintiffs’ judgments of conviction and commitment.

About two years later, on December 7, 2017, the 

plaintiffs filed a complaint against the City of Fairbanks and 

the police officers who were involved in obtaining the 

plaintiffs’ convictions. The plaintiffs asked the court to 

order that the settlement agreements were unenforceable, 

which would relieve them from their agreements that their 

convictions were properly and validly entered as well as 

relieving them from their broad releases of liability. But the 

plaintiffs did not request vacatur of the stipulation, which 

was the basis for the dismissal of their indictments and 

vacatur of their convictions. Rather, the plaintiffs alleged 

that the dismissal of their indictments and vacatur of their 

convictions were “valid and cannot be undone even though 

the release cannot be enforced against” them. Thus, 

realizing the benefits of the stipulation while ignoring the 

obligations imposed by the settlement agreement, the 

plaintiffs alleged that the officers’ “unlawful, intentional, 

willful, deliberately indifferent, reckless, and bad-faith acts 

and omissions caused [the plaintiffs] to be falsely arrested 

and imprisoned, unfairly tried, wrongfully convicted, and 

forced to serve more than 18 years imprisoned.” The district 

court dismissed the complaint as barred by Heck, and this 

appeal followed.

II

Given that the plaintiffs did not wait for a judicial ruling 

that their prior convictions were invalid, but instead chose to 

vacate those convictions by means of settlements, the 

question arises whether the plaintiffs can nevertheless bring 

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36 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

constitutional tort claims for wrongful conviction under 

§ 1983. The answer under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 

(1994), is no.

A

Heck v. Humphrey held that § 1983 “creates a species of 

tort liability,” and that “over the centuries the common law 

of torts has developed a set of rules to implement the 

principle that a person should be compensated fairly for 

injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights.” Id.

at 483 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257–58 

(1978)). Accordingly, the Court held that the common law 

rules “defining the elements of damages and the 

prerequisites for their recovery[] provide the appropriate 

starting point for the inquiry under § 1983.” Id. (quoting 

Carey, 435 U.S. at 257–58).

In Heck, the petitioner had filed a suit in district court 

under § 1983 against two state prosecutors and a police 

investigator, alleging that they had engaged in an illegal 

investigation leading to the petitioner’s conviction. Id.

at 478–79. The petitioner’s complaint sought compensatory 

and punitive monetary damages. Id. at 479. Heck concluded 

that “[t]he common-law cause of action for malicious 

prosecution provides the closest analogy” to the petitioner’s 

claims for damages because “it permits damages for

confinement imposed pursuant to legal process.” Id. at 484.

Having identified malicious prosecution as the most 

analogous common-law cause of action for a claim of 

wrongful conviction, the Court focused on one of its key 

elements: “One element that must be alleged and proved in 

a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior 

criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.” Id. This 

element of favorable termination “avoids parallel litigation 

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over the issues of probable cause and guilt” and “precludes 

the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action 

after having been convicted in the underlying criminal 

prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy 

against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out 

of the same or identical transaction.” Id. (cleaned up). 

Accordingly, Heck concluded that “the hoary principle that 

civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging 

the validity of outstanding criminal judgments,” which has 

“always applied to actions for malicious prosecution,” is 

equally applicable to § 1983 damages actions that require 

“the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or 

confinement.” Id. at 486. In other words, if a plaintiff had 

been convicted, and that conviction had not been invalidated 

on appeal or through procedures for post-conviction relief, 

the plaintiff cannot prevail in a civil tort suit that requires the 

plaintiff to prove that the prior conviction or sentence was 

invalid. See id.1

Since Heck, the Court has reaffirmed the requirement 

that a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 malicious prosecution 

action must establish termination of the prior conviction in 

his favor. Indeed, just last year, the Court noted that “Heck

explains why favorable termination is both relevant and 

required for a claim analogous to malicious prosecution that 

would impugn a conviction, and that rationale extends to an 

ongoing prosecution as well: The alternative would 

1 Heck also stated that a § 1983 action cannot be used as a substitute 

for a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 512 U.S. at 480, although under 

Heck’s reasoning, the habeas statute and § 1983 “were never on a 

collision course in the first place because, like the common-law tort of 

malicious prosecution, § 1983 requires (and, presumably, has always 

required) plaintiffs seeking damages for unconstitutional conviction or 

confinement to show the favorable termination of the underlying 

proceeding,” id. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring).

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38 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

impermissibly risk parallel litigation and conflicting 

judgments.” McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2160 

(2019) (emphasis added); see also Manuel v. City of Joliet, 

Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 920–21 (2017) (“Sometimes, . . . review 

of common law will lead a court to adopt wholesale the rules 

that would apply in a suit involving the most analogous tort. 

See . . . Heck v. Humphrey.”); Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 

410 F.3d 1136, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing Heck’s 

“favorable termination rule”).

After adopting malicious prosecution’s favorabletermination rule, Heck articulated what satisfied the 

necessary element of “termination of the prior criminal 

proceeding in favor of the accused.” 512 U.S. at 484. 

According to Heck, “to recover damages for allegedly 

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other 

harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove

that the conviction or sentence has been [1] reversed on 

direct appeal, [2] expunged by executive order, [3] declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination, or [4] called into question by a federal court’s 

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486–87 

(emphasis added); see also id. at 489 (“Even a prisoner who 

has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of 

action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or 

sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by 

the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.”).

Eliminating any doubt that a plaintiff must show one of 

these four terminations, Heck stated that “[a] claim for 

damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence 

that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 

§ 1983.” Id. at 487 (emphasis added). If a plaintiff cannot 

make the necessary showing, the plaintiff cannot bring a 

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ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 39

§ 1983 malicious prosecution action that requires “the 

plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or 

confinement.” Id. at 486–87. Instead, the plaintiff can bring 

only those § 1983 claims that do not “demonstrate the 

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the 

plaintiff,” such as “a suit for damages attributable to an 

allegedly unreasonable search,” because “such a § 1983 

action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that 

the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.” Id. at 487 & n 7.2

B

As Heck makes plain, the plaintiffs here are precluded 

from bringing a § 1983 malicious prosecution action 

because their underlying convictions were not invalidated 

but were instead vacated pursuant to settlement agreements. 

The plaintiffs expressly agreed that they had “not reached 

agreement as to . . . actual guilt or innocence” and stipulated 

that “the original jury verdicts and judgments of conviction 

were properly and validly entered based on proof beyond a 

2 As we have explained, “under certain circumstances a plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim is not Heck-barred despite the existence of an outstanding 

criminal conviction against him.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 760 

(9th Cir. 2014). For example, “plaintiffs who had been convicted for 

driving under the influence of alcohol could challenge the way in which 

their blood had been drawn when they were arrested” because their 

convictions were based on their pleas, “not [on] verdicts obtained with 

supposedly illegal evidence.” Id. (quoting Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 

823 (9th Cir. 2001)). Similarly, “a plaintiff convicted of resisting arrest 

could bring a § 1983 action for excessive use of force if the excessive 

force was employed against him after he had engaged in the conduct that 

constituted the basis for his conviction, because in such a case success 

on his § 1983 action would not imply the invalidity of the conviction.” 

Id. (citing Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 2005) (en 

banc)).

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40 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

reasonable doubt.”3 No court has ruled on the validity of the 

plaintiffs’ prior convictions or made a finding as to the 

plaintiffs’ guilt or innocence. Indeed, the state court 

explained in great detail that it had no power to review, 

approve, or block the attorney general’s discretionary 

decision to vacate the convictions and dismiss the 

indictments. As the state court summed it up, “this is a 

lawful settlement conducted under lawful procedure, under 

the inherent authority of the attorney general, over which this 

Court has no authority to . . . review or to criticize.” Far 

from declaring the plaintiffs’ convictions invalid, the state 

court’s ruling was merely the ministerial recognition of 

agreements between the plaintiffs and the state.

3 The majority argues that it is improper to consider the parties’ 

stipulation, because the plaintiffs allege that the “stipulations were the 

product of an unenforceable agreement to waive their civil-rights 

claims.” Maj. at 27. The majority is mistaken; this allegation appears 

nowhere in the record. Rather, the record establishes that the plaintiffs 

rely on the validity of the stipulation by alleging that “[t]he dismissal of 

the indictment[s] and vacation of [their] conviction[s]” are “valid and 

cannot be undone even though the release[s]” are unenforceable. 

Because the dismissal and vacatur are based on the stipulation, the 

continued existence of the stipulation is vital to the plaintiffs’ claims.

Alternatively, the majority argues that the stipulation that plaintiffs’ 

convictions were valid does not mean that plaintiffs agreed their 

convictions are currently valid, because the parties also stipulated that 

“there [was] sufficient new evidence of material facts that a new trial

could be ordered under AS 12.72.010(4).” Maj. at 27–28. This is a red 

herring. As the majority acknowledges, the only relevant issue for Heck

purposes is whether the plaintiffs’ convictions were “declared invalid by 

a state tribunal authorized to make such determination.” Maj. at 16. The 

state court did not do so here, and the parties’ agreement that the 

convictions could be vacated for a new trial is merely a vacatur by 

agreement.

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Because the plaintiffs’ convictions were not “declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination,” nor reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, or called into question by a federal court’s 

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–

87, the plaintiffs are unable to show that their criminal 

proceedings were terminated in their favor. They are 

therefore barred from using a civil action to establish they 

were wrongly convicted. Thus, the plaintiffs’ claim for 

damages stemming from their allegedly wrongful 

convictions are “not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487. 

Heck’s clear holding resolves this appeal.

C

The majority raises two arguments to support its 

assertion that a conviction that is vacated by settlement is the 

same as a conviction that is “declared invalid by a state 

tribunal,” 512 U.S. at 487, and therefore qualifies as a 

favorable termination for Heck purposes, Maj. at 16–22. 

Neither has merit.

First, the majority asserts that there is no difference 

between vacatur of a conviction by settlement and a 

declaration that a conviction is invalid because a dictionary 

defines “vacate” to mean “invalidate.” Maj. at 16–17. But 

this theory is contrary to Heck. Heck refers to convictions 

that are “declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination,” 512 U.S. at 487, and a vacatur by 

agreement of the parties does not constitute a state court’s 

declaration that the conviction is invalid. While the word 

“vacate” could mean “invalidate” in certain contexts, it does 

not carry that meaning in this context. “In law as in life . . . 

the same words, placed in different contexts, sometimes 

mean different things.” Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

1074, 1082 (2015). Accordingly, there is no fair way to read 

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42 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

Heck’s reference to a conviction or sentence that is “declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination,” 512 U.S. at 487, to mean a conviction or 

sentence that is vacated pursuant to a settlement agreement.

Second, the majority contends that two Ninth Circuit 

cases support the position that vacatur by settlement is the 

same as a declaration of invalidity. See Rosales-Martinez v. 

Palmer, 753 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2014); Taylor v. Cty. of Pima, 

913 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2019). But the majority’s reliance is 

misplaced because neither holds that a vacatur by settlement 

qualifies as a favorable termination under Heck.

Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 

2014), does not help the majority because instead of 

addressing whether a vacatur by settlement constituted a 

favorable termination, we remanded so the district court 

could address the viability of the plaintiff’s complaint in the 

first instance.

Rosales-Martinez considered a plaintiff’s § 1983 

complaint, which alleged that the state court had granted his 

state habeas petition and ordered his release from prison. Id.

at 892. On appeal, the government filed a last-minute 

motion for judicial notice of several documents showing that 

this was incorrect; in fact, the parties had agreed to vacate 

the plaintiff’s conviction on cumulative error grounds, and 

in return, the plaintiff agreed to plead guilty to one offense. 

Id. at 893. We took judicial notice of the documents 

proffered by the government, and noted the complexity they 

added to the case. See id. at 894–95. After considering the 

potential impact of these documents, we ultimately 

concluded that “[t]he viability and scope” of the plaintiff’s 

“§ 1983 claim, in relation to Heck v. Humphrey . . . should 

be evaluated by the district judge on remand.” Id. at 899. 

We explained that “[a] court of appeals should not rule on 

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the significance of [the plaintiff’s] plea in the absence of a 

complete record and the comments of both sides, plaintiff 

and defendants, and without the benefit of the district court’s 

analysis.” Id.

Contrary to the majority, our decision in RosalesMartinez to reverse the district court was not based on the 

finding that Heck permits a § 1983 action whenever a 

conviction has been vacated pursuant to a settlement 

agreement. Maj. at 20–21. Instead, Rosales-Martinez held 

only that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s 

claims as untimely, because the claims—to the extent they 

were viable at all—could not have accrued until the Nevada 

court vacated the underlying convictions. 753 F.3d at 896. 

Because we refrained from resolving the question whether 

the plaintiff’s claims were viable, the district court, on 

remand, felt obliged to refer the case to a pro-bono program 

“for the purpose of identifying counsel to assist Plaintiff with 

addressing the threshold question of whether his § 1983 

claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey.” Martinez v. 

Palmer, No. 3:10-cv-00748-MMD-VPC, 2015 WL 

5554147, at *5 (D. Nev. Sep. 21, 2015). Given our failure 

to rule on the viability of plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, the 

majority errs in relying on Rosales-Martinez for any 

authoritative ruling on this issue.

Nor does Taylor v. County of Pima, 913 F.3d 930 (9th 

Cir. 2019), support the majority’s position, because that case 

ruled on an entirely different issue. In Taylor, a plaintiff who 

had been convicted of 28 counts of felony murder for starting 

a fire at a Tucson hotel brought a state post-conviction 

petition, raising a new theory based on an affidavit from an 

expert: the hotel fire was not caused by arson. Id. at 932. 

In light of this new evidence, the government and the 

plaintiff entered an agreement to vacate the original 

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44 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

conviction and replace it with a new conviction, and the state 

court resentenced the plaintiff to time served. Id. The 

plaintiff then brought a § 1983 action against the 

government based on alleged unconstitutional practices in 

securing the original conviction. Id.

We concluded that because all of the time that plaintiff 

served in prison was supported by a valid replacement 

conviction, he could not recover incarceration-related 

damages. Id. at 935. Although Taylor stated in passing that 

a plaintiff in a § 1983 action could challenge a conviction 

that had been “vacated by [a] state court,” this statement was 

not necessary to its holding, because the resolution of the 

case was based on the determination that the plaintiff’s valid 

replacement conviction barred his § 1983 claim. Id.4 

Accordingly, Taylor offered no reasoning to support its 

offhand comment, and it is inconsistent with Heck; such 

statements “made in passing, without analysis, are not 

binding precedent.” In re Magnacom Wireless, LLC, 

503 F.3d 984, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2007).5

4 Although the majority refers to “Taylor’s understanding that a 

vacated conviction was ‘declared invalid’ under Heck,” Maj. at 19

(emphasis added), the majority cannot—and therefore does not—point 

to any statement in Taylor to that effect; indeed, the words “declared 

invalid” never even appear in the opinion.

5 The majority argues that Taylor’s comment that Heck does not 

apply when a conviction is “vacated by a state court” was not made in 

passing, because we later said that it was “[c]ritica[l]” that the time 

Taylor served in prison was supported by a new conviction. Maj. at 19. 

Far from supporting the majority’s position, this fact undermines it. It 

was “[c]ritica[l]” that a new conviction supported Taylor’s entire period 

of incarceration because, at that point, it made no difference that Taylor’s 

earlier conviction was “declared invalid”: “even if Taylor proves 

constitutional violations concerning the 1972 conviction, he cannot 

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In sum, the plaintiffs’ convictions were not “declared 

invalid by a state tribunal.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Rather, 

the convictions were vacated pursuant to settlement 

agreements, such that the “criminal judgment[s]” are still 

“outstanding,” precluding the plaintiffs’ claims for relief. Id.

at 486–87. Neither Rosales Martinez nor Taylor are to the 

contrary. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot make the 

necessary showing to bring their § 1983 malicious 

prosecution action.

D

Although the plaintiffs fail to show that their vacated 

convictions were favorably terminated in one of the four 

methods specified by Heck, the majority suggests that the 

plaintiffs can sidestep Heck to bring their § 1983 action.

First, according to the majority, Heck does not apply to 

a vacated conviction because the conviction is no longer 

“outstanding.” 512 U.S. at 486–87; Maj. at 16. To support 

this theory, the majority points to Heck’s statement that “if 

the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even 

if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any 

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the 

action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some 

other bar to the suit.” 512 U.S. at 487; Maj. at 16. According 

to the majority, this means that if a criminal judgment is no 

longer outstanding, i.e., it has been discharged or satisfied in 

some way, the criminal defendants may bring a § 1983 

establish that the 1972 conviction caused any incarceration-related 

damages.” Id. at 935. Thus, the assumption that Taylor’s earlier 

conviction was “declared invalid” was “merely a prelude to another legal 

issue [i.e., the effect of Taylor’s new conviction] that command[ed] the 

panel’s full attention.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915 (9th 

Cir. 2001).

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action without showing that the judgment was invalidated in 

one of the four ways identified in Heck. See Maj. at 16.

On its face, this conclusion is contrary to Heck. First, 

Heck precludes plaintiffs from bringing a § 1983 action 

unless they have shown that their conviction was invalidated 

by one of the four specific means. 512 U.S. at 486–87. The 

majority, by contrast, allows plaintiffs to bring a § 1983 

action if their conviction was discharged or satisfied by any 

means.6 Second, Heck explains that one purpose of the 

favorable-termination rule is to avoid the risk that a criminal 

conviction could be deemed valid in the criminal context and 

invalid in the civil context. See id. at 484–85. Under the 

majority’s rule, this exact scenario could arise. If a 

conviction merely needs to be discharged or satisfied by 

some means, then criminal defendants who served their 

sentences could subsequently bring § 1983 actions to 

establish that they had been wrongfully convicted. And here 

the plaintiffs are attempting to invalidate their criminal 

judgments in a civil proceeding on the ground that they were 

“unfairly tried” and “wrongfully convicted,” even though 

their criminal judgments were never invalidated in a criminal 

proceeding.

Of course, Heck did not hold that plaintiffs could use 

civil actions to challenge convictions that had been 

discharged by any means. Read in context, it is clear that 

6 The majority plays word games by claiming that a vacated 

conviction, but not a conviction that has been satisfied by service of the 

sentence, can be the basis for a § 1983 malicious prosecution action. 

Maj. at 27 & n.14. No binding precedent forecloses a court from 

concluding that a defendant who has fully served a sentence has satisfied 

or discharged the conviction so that it is no longer “outstanding” or 

“extant”; like a vacated conviction, a satisfied conviction is a historical 

fact but not a current condition.

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Heck’s reference to “outstanding criminal judgments” is a 

reference to judgments that have not been invalidated by one 

of the four methods of favorable termination listed in Heck. 

Id. at 487. This common-sense reading is supported by the 

Court’s subsequent use of the phrase “outstanding criminal 

judgment” as a synonym for a judgment not invalidated by 

one of these four means: “[T]he Heck rule comes into play 

only when there exists a conviction or sentence that has not 

been . . . invalidated, that is to say, an outstanding criminal 

judgment.” McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2160 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 

384, 393 (2007)).7 Because the majority’s conclusion that a 

plaintiff can bring a § 1983 malicious prosecution action so 

long as the underlying criminal judgment was discharged by 

any means is contrary to Heck, the majority’s interpretation 

must be rejected.

Second, by claiming that vacatur by settlement qualifies 

as a favorable termination, even though it is not on Heck’s 

list of four qualifying methods of termination, the majority 

implicitly holds that vacatur by settlement is a fifth method 

of favorable termination. Maj. at 22–23. In other words, the 

majority asserts that a plaintiff can bring a § 1983 malicious 

prosecution claim to “demonstrate the invalidity” of a 

criminal judgment that has been vacated by agreement of the 

parties—even if the underlying conviction has not been 

reversed, declared invalid by a state court, expunged by 

7 The majority implies that it can ignore this definition of 

“outstanding criminal judgment,” Maj. at 22 n.10, because the Supreme 

Court has stated that, in light of Heck, the statute of limitations for 

bringing a § 1983 claim does not accrue “until the setting aside of an 

extant criminal conviction,” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393. But the context 

makes clear that this statement merely echoes Heck’s rule that a plaintiff 

cannot bring a § 1983 action until a conviction has been favorably 

terminated in one of the four ways listed in Heck.

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executive action, or called into question by a grant of habeas 

corpus. 512 U.S. at 486–87. This approach also fails.

As an initial matter, Heck makes clear that plaintiffs 

“must” show that their convictions were terminated in one 

of four specific ways. 512 U.S. at 486–87. Vacatur by 

settlement is not on the list, and the list is exclusive: Heck

does not permit other, unidentified ways of satisfying the 

favorable-termination requirement. See id. Thus, any 

attempt to recognize additional means of favorable 

termination is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See id.

Moreover, recognizing vacatur by settlement as another

method of favorable termination is contrary to Heck’s 

reliance on the common-law cause of action for malicious 

prosecution, which was the Court’s “starting point” for 

determining the viability of a § 1983 claim. 512 U.S. at 483–

84 & n.4 (reiterating its “reliance on malicious prosecution’s 

favorable termination requirement as illustrative of the 

common-law principle barring tort plaintiffs from mounting 

collateral attacks on their outstanding criminal 

convictions”). The common law did not recognize vacatur 

by settlement as a method of favorable termination: For over 

a century, courts have recognized that a claim for malicious 

prosecution does not lie if the prosecution was abandoned 

based on a settlement or compromise.8 The treatises are in 

8 See, e.g., Erie R. Co. v. Reigherd, 166 F. 247, 250 (6th Cir. 1909) 

(“A termination of a prosecution by nol. pros. by consent of the 

defendant, or by a compromise, is such a termination as to leave no 

foundation for denying that there was probable cause.”); Woodson v. 

McLauglin, 239 S.W. 735, 736 (Ark. 1922) (“The testimony being 

undisputed that a compromise was effected as a result of which the 

prosecution out of which this litigation arises, was settled, a verdict was 

properly directed in defendants’ favor.”); Bell Lumber Co. v. Graham, 

219 P. 777, 778 (Colo. 1923) (“It is well settled that a compromise 

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accord.9 Thus, if a criminal proceeding “is withdrawn or the 

prosecution abandoned pursuant to an agreement of 

compromise with the accused,” the resolution “is not a 

sufficient termination to meet the requirements of a cause of 

action for malicious prosecution.” Restatement (Second) of 

Torts § 660 (1977). “Although the accused by his 

acceptance of a compromise does not admit his guilt, the fact 

of the compromise indicates that the question of his guilt or 

innocence is left open.” Id. § 660 cmt. c. As such, by 

entering into a settlement agreement and “[h]aving bought 

peace,” an accused “may not thereafter assert that the 

voluntarily made, or a settlement by the consent of the accused, defeats 

a recovery in an action for malicious prosecution based upon a criminal 

proceeding.”); Leonard v. George, 178 F.2d 312, 313 (4th Cir. 1949) 

(“Notwithstanding the protests and declarations of plaintiff made at the 

time, we think that he is unquestionably preluded by the settlement from 

suing for malicious prosecution with respect to the case thus disposed 

of.”); Ferreira v. Gray, Cary, Ware & Freidenrich, 87 Cal. App. 4th 409, 

413 (2001) (“[Plaintiff] may have received a favorable determination at 

one point in the proceeding . . . [but] the litigation terminated as a result 

of a negotiated settlement in which both sides gave up something of 

value to resolve the matter.”).

9 See, e.g., 8 Stuart M. Speiser et al., American Law of Torts § 28:5 

n.2 (2019) (“[T]ermination resulting from negotiation, compromise, 

settlement, or agreement is not considered a favorable termination.”); W. 

Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 119, at 875 (5th ed. 

1984) (“[W]here charges are withdrawn or the prosecution is terminated 

. . . by reason of a compromise into which [the accused] entered 

voluntarily, there is no sufficient termination in favor of the accused.” 

(footnotes omitted)); 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 67 (“Where both 

sides give up anything of value . . . to end litigation, a party cannot later 

claim he or she received a favorable termination . . . to establish 

malicious prosecution.”).

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50 ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS

proceedings have terminated in his favor.” Id.10 

Accordingly, vacatur by settlement is not—and never was—

recognized as a favorable termination at common law, so the 

majority’s attempt to recognize it as a fifth means of 

favorable termination under Heck squarely contradicts 

Heck’s reliance on the “common law of torts.” 512 U.S. 

at 483.11

In sum, the majority has no authority to recognize a new 

means of favorable termination; Heck’s list is exclusive. See 

id. at 486–87. And even if the majority could recognize new 

means of favorable termination, vacatur by settlement is not 

10 The majority points out that some courts construing the four 

means of favorable termination in Heck do not require a showing that the 

termination was inconsistent with guilt. Maj. at 23–26; see, e.g., Pardue 

v. City of Saraland, Ala., No. CV 99-0799-CG-M, 2004 WL 7338484, at 

*6 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 2004) (rejecting argument that Heck requires a 

“final determination in favor of the accused”). Other courts require such 

a showing. See DiBlasio v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 654, 658 (2d Cir. 

1996) (issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was not an “indication of 

innocence,” and thus did not qualify as a favorable termination under 

Heck, because plaintiff “conceded both the possession and sale of the 

cocaine”). But this subsequent elaboration of Heck has no bearing on 

the question whether Heck contemplated that vacatur by settlement—

unanimously rejected as a favorable termination at common law—

qualifies as a favorable termination for purposes of a § 1983 action.

11 The majority mischaracterizes the dissent by arguing that the 

dissent would hold that a § 1983 plaintiff must be able to satisfy the 

common law’s favorable-termination rule. Maj. at 25–26. The dissent 

would merely hold that the plaintiffs’ convictions were not “declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,” as 

required by Heck, and so the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are “not 

cognizable.” 512 U.S. at 487; see supra Part II.B. The dissent discusses 

the common law only to show that the majority has no principled basis 

for recognizing vacatur by settlement as a fifth method of favorable 

termination under Heck.

Case: 18-35938, 01/22/2020, ID: 11569393, DktEntry: 63-1, Page 50 of 51
ROBERTS V. CITY OF FAIRBANKS 51

a favorable termination at common law, so there is no basis 

for deeming it a method of favorable termination here.

***

Simply stated, the plaintiffs did not have their prior 

convictions “declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized 

to make such determination,” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, but 

instead reached an agreement with the state to vacate their 

convictions. Regardless of the plaintiffs’ reasons for doing 

so, they cannot now claim that the prior convictions were 

terminated in a manner that provides a basis for bringing 

§ 1983 malicious prosecution claims. In holding otherwise, 

the majority casts aside the favorable-termination rule 

articulated by Heck v. Humphrey and thus is inconsistent 

with Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, I dissent.

Case: 18-35938, 01/22/2020, ID: 11569393, DktEntry: 63-1, Page 51 of 51