Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02167/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02167-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

STUART MARTIN,

NO. CIV. S-05-2167 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF SOUTH LAKE TAHOE, a

chartered city, SOUTH LAKE

TAHOE POLICE DEPARTMENT, a

police agency, SCOTT HENG,

JOSH ADLER, B. AUXIER, B.

McGUCKIN, SHANNAN NORRGARD,

DONNA KINGMAN, JEFF REAGAN,

BRAD WILLIAMS all individually

and as an officer of SOUTH

LAKE TAHOE POLICE DEPARTMENT;

and DOES ONE through THIRTY

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants’ motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are

undisputed. (See Pls.’ Am. Separate Stmt. of Undisp. and Disp.

Material Facts in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. (“UF”), filed June 22,

2007). Where the facts are in dispute, the court recounts

plaintiff’s version of the facts. (See Pls.’ Separate Stmt. of

Disp. Facts in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. (“DF”), filed June 22, 2007).

Defendants object to various pieces of evidence that

plaintiff presents in support of his motion. Much of the

evidence that defendants object to is immaterial to the court’s

analysis of the summary judgment motion. To the extent that the

evidence is relevant, defendants’ objections are OVERRULED.

2

set forth below,1 defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND2

This case arises out of defendants’ execution of a search

warrant, during which plaintiff Stuart Martin (“Martin”) was

shot. On November 2, 2004, a search warrant for stolen weapons

was executed at the residence located at 820 Tahoe Keyes

Boulevard, South Lake Tahoe, California. (UF ¶ 1). The search

warrant was written by defendant Shannon Norrgard (“Norrgard”). 

(UF ¶ 2). Both South Lake Tahoe Police and officers of the

organization known as SLEDNET were executing the search warrant. 

(UF ¶ 4). SLEDNET is an inter-agency task force team that

focuses on drug and narcotics crimes. (UF ¶ 5).

On the morning of November 2, 2004, there was a briefing

prior to the execution of the search warrant. (UF ¶ 8). During

the briefing, numerous items were discussed, including the

location of the residence, the items to be searched, and the

assignments of officers upon approach of the house. (UF ¶ 9). 

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3

It was decided that a “flash bang” diversionary device would be

deployed in the execution of the search. (UF ¶ 14).

Plaintiff asserts that South Lake Tahoe Police Department

(“SLTPD”) personnel were not trained to execute a search warrant

with the use of a diversionary device and that SLEDNET did not

instruct SLTPD officers on how the device was going to be

deployed. (DF ¶ 1). Plaintiff also contends that surveillance

of a house should be done prior to executing a search warrant,

but neither SLTPD nor SLEDNET conducted surveillance prior to the

execution of the warrant on November 2, 2004. (DF ¶¶ 2-6). 

Officers arrived at 820 Tahoe Keys Boulevard during the

morning hours. (UF ¶ 16). Defendant Jeff Reagan (“Reagan”) was

assigned to cover the front carport area of the residence with

defendants Brad Williams (“Williams”) and Donna Kingman

(“Kingman”). (UF ¶ 18). The car port had a lot of “junk” in it. 

(UF ¶ 17). Williams was assigned to cover the front carport area

of the residence and the door that led into the home. (UF ¶ 19). 

He was positioned approximately 25 feet from the door, and could

watch the interior through the open door. (UF ¶¶ 21-22). 

Williams used a pine tree and a group of trashcans for cover in

case shots were exchanged. (UF ¶¶ 22-23; DF ¶ 10). Williams

held his firearm in a “low ready position.” (UF ¶ 25). Reagan

covered the left side of the carport area, taking cover behind an

overturned fiberglass shower stall. (UF ¶ 27). Defendants

assert that the shower stall did not offer much cover if shots

were to be exchanged. (UF ¶ 28). Plaintiff contends that while

Reagan’s upper body was exposed above the shower stall, he could

have crouched down behind it. (UF ¶ 28). Reagan was in the most

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3 Plaintiff contends that SLEDNET was in the middle of

the knock/notice when the gunshot was heard. (UF ¶ 35). 

However, the testimony cited by plaintiff provides that the gun

shot was heard “after at least one time knock and notice was

given.” (Dep. of Chris Elliott (“Elliott Dep.”) at 37:11-12).

4

“forward” position of the three officers and was concerned about

the possibility of being shot. (UF ¶¶ 29-30).

Task Force Commander Chris Elliott of SLEDNET deployed the

“flash bang” diversionary device. (UF ¶ 14). There was a “knock

and announcement” after the device was deployed, but before the

gunshot. (UF ¶ 35).3

 Plaintiff ran toward the doorway leading

to the carport. (UF ¶ 37). In his hand, he was carrying a dark

blue bandana with some white print on it. (UF ¶ 39; Dep. of

Stuart Martin (“Martin Dep.”) at 30:24-31:2).

 Williams heard the “flash bang” device go off as a loud

boom, but did not jump or react in any way. (UF ¶¶ 33-34). 

Williams first saw plaintiff as he was in the process of exiting

the door. (UF ¶ 44; Dep. of Phillip Bradley Williams (“Williams

Dep.”) at 57:15-16). Plaintiff was running fairly straight, at a

slight angle, toward Williams or the street. (UF ¶ 45; Williams

Dep. at 57:21-22). Williams believed he saw a fire-arm that

looked like a semi-automatic in plaintiff’s hand. (UF ¶ 49;

Williams Dep. at 52:14-18). Williams testified that he saw

plaintiff turn, look at Reagan, and raise his right arm up to

shoulder height. (Williams Dep. at 59:4-24). Williams believed

that the officers were in danger and that plaintiff was going to

kill Reagan. (UF ¶ 55). Williams fired a round at plaintiff,

(Williams Dep. at 51:22-23), and plaintiff fell down immediately

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4 Plaintiff “disputes” this fact, but the evidence cited

to does not contradict defendants’ evidence. Where there are

other such “disputed” facts without citation to evidence that

raises a triable issue, the court will treat such facts as

undisputed. 

5

upon being shot. (UF ¶ 51). Defendants contend that a bandana

and pipe were found on the ground near plaintiff. (UF ¶ 40). 

After the “flash bang” device was detonated, Reagan heard

someone running through the house and saw plaintiff run through

the door. (UF ¶¶ 59-60; Reagan Dep. at 37:11-38:13). Reagan saw

plaintiff holding something dark colored that was protruding from

his hand as he was running out of the residence. (UF ¶ 42; Dep.

of Jeffrey Reagan (“Reagan Dep.” at 50:8-18).4 Reagan believed

that plaintiff was holding the item in a threatening manner and

thought it was a gun. (UF ¶ 43; Reagan Dep. at 50:14-51:6). 

Reagan prepared to engage him. (UF ¶ 63). One shot was fired,

and plaintiff was shot. (UF ¶¶ 66-67). Reagan heard the gunshot

after plaintiff had already crossed his vision. (UF ¶ 61). 

Plaintiff asserts that he did not have a gun in his hands. 

(DF ¶ 19). Plaintiff contends that he had both hands together in

front of him when he came running out of the house, and that he

did not make eye contact with Williams or look at Reagan. (UF ¶

53; DF ¶¶ 17-18). Plaintiff also asserts that he made it to the

side doorway, and the next thing he knew, he was on the ground,

“twisted.” (UF ¶ 52). 

Plaintiff contends that after he was shot and after the

house was secured, defendant Scott Heng (“Heng”) went around to

the carport. (UF ¶ 88; DF ¶ 34). Heng saw plaintiff lying on

the carport, and plaintiff told Heng “you f***ing shot me.” (UF

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¶ 88). Heng told plaintiff that he didn’t shoot him and to shut

up. (UF ¶ 88). Heng also said “Hi Stuie” to plaintiff;

plaintiff knew Heng from being a high school cop. (UF ¶¶ 88;

91). Heng commanded plaintiff to open his hand, but plaintiff

was unable to do so. (DF ¶ 35). Subsequently, Reagan pulled the

bandana out of plaintiff’s hand. (DF ¶ 36). 

Plaintiff was arrested for violation of Penal Code §§ 69 and

148(A)(1). (UF ¶ 72). He received medical treatment in the

carport area after being handcuffed following the incident. (UF

¶ 73). After approximately thirty minutes, plaintiff was

transported by ambulance to the Emergency Room at Barton Memorial

Hospital. (UF ¶ 74). Subsequently, he went to the El Dorado

County Jail, where he was released after approximately ten hours. 

(UF ¶¶ 77-78).

Defendant Josh Adler (“Adler”) was a part of the “stack”

making entry after deployment of the “flash bang” device. (UF ¶

81). Defendant Heng was also part of the “stack” making entry

after deployment of the “flash bang” device. (Dep. of Scott Heng

(“Heng Dep.”) at 24:18-20). Defendant Brandon Auxier (“Auxier”)

was assigned to cover the rear of the residence. (UF ¶ 82). 

Defendant Kingman was stationed in the front of the residence

near the carport area, and was to cover the window for safety. 

(UF ¶¶ 84-85). Kingman did not see plaintiff come out of the

house and get shot. (DF ¶ 30). Defendant Norrgard was assigned

to behind the perimeter fence in the back of the residence. (UF

¶ 90).

On October 27, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging

violations of his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Sixth,

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5 On June 15, 2007, defendants filed objections to

plaintiff’s filings in opposition to their motion for summary

judgment on the basis that they were out of compliance with the

Local Rules for various reasons. By minute order, the court

sustained the objections and plaintiff’s filings were stricken. 

Plaintiff was allowed to re-file his submissions by June 22, 2007

at 4:00 p.m. On June 29, 2007, defendants again objected to

plaintiff’s filings. Specifically, defendants point to

plaintiff’s failure to electronically file copies of his

exhibits. However, plaintiff filed courtesy copies of these

exhibits with the court and has subsequently filed them

electronically. Defendants also assert that plaintiff’s filings

were untimely because they were filed up to forty-eight minutes

late. The court finds no prejudice from this delay. Defendants’

objections are OVERRULED, and their motion to strike plaintiff’s

filings is DENIED. 

7

and Fourteenth Amendments based upon the use of excessive force

and unreasonable search and seizure. Plaintiff brings these

constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff

also brings state law claims under the Bane Civil Rights Act and

for assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. On

May 15, 2007, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, or

in the alternative, summary adjudication.5 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

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a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

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6 In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants

violated his rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Compl. ¶ 39). 

However, plaintiff fails to address the merits of this claim in

his opposition or make any argument that he was discriminated

against on the basis of race. Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1981

claim is DISMISSED. 

10

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

ANALYSIS

I. 42 U.S.C. § 19836

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very

person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” Section 1983

confers no substantive rights itself, but rather, “provides

remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” City

of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985).

A. Fourth Amendment 

Plaintiff Martin brings claims against the individual

defendant officers, the SLTPD, and the City of South Lake Tahoe

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from excessive force and unreasonable

search and seizure. Defendants move for summary judgment on the

ground that the claims fail as a matter of law and that the

officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

1. Excessive Force against the Individual Defendants

Plaintiff Martin contends that the individual officers

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. 

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Plaintiff’s claim arises out of defendant Williams’ conduct in

shooting plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to identify or present

evidence regarding the use of any force upon him by any other

named individual defendant. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930,

939 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We reject the idea that mere presence at a

search of membership in a group, without personal involvement in

and a causal connection to the unlawful act, can create liability

under section 1983.”). As such, defendants Heng, Adler, Auxier,

McGuckin, Norrgard, Kingman, and Reagan’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiff’s claims for excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment is GRANTED.

Defendant Williams argues that plaintiff’s claims for

excessive force against him should be dismissed because his

complaint alleges that “Detective Brian Willson” and/or

“Detective Brian Williams” shot plaintiff and violated his

rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 28, 32). Defendant argues that plaintiff’s

failure to amend the complaint to correct his alleged error is

prejudicial because it negates his Answer to the complaint. 

Plaintiff asserts that he mistakenly referred to defendant

Williams as “Brian Willson” and “Brian William” in the

allegations of the complaint. Plaintiff requests that the court

permit him to amend the complaint to strike those names and

correctly replace it with the name of the defendant, Brad

Williams. 

Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to cure his

mistake regarding defendant’s name is governed by Rules 15 and 16

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 16 provides that a

party seeking amendment to a pretrial scheduling order

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demonstrate good cause. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16 (West 2007). Rule

15 provides that “leave [to amend] is to be freely given when

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15 (West 2007). 

“[L]eave to amend should be granted unless amendment would cause

prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad faith, is

futile, or creates undue delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125

F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1997).

There is no evidence before the court that the requested

modification of the complaint would prejudice defendant Williams

in this litigation. The modification does not change the parties

to this action. Since the inception of this litigation,

defendant Williams has been a named defendant; there has never

been a served defendant named Brian Willson or Brian Williams. 

Further, there appears to have been no confusion during the

course of discovery that defendant Brad Williams shot plaintiff;

defendants admitted as such in their Response to Plaintiff’s

Request for Admissions. (Ex. 19 to Decl. of Christopher W.

Goodroe in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Goodroe Decl.”),

filed June 22, 2007, at 3). Defendants merely contend that they

“would have had the opportunity to file an Answer to the Amended

Complaint setting forth the proper admissions, denials, and

affirmative defenses.” (Defs.’ Further Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n,

filed June 29, 2–7, at 5). However, defendants fail to identify,

in any meaningful way, how this amended Answer would have changed

the scope of the litigation. Rather, the court finds that

plaintiff’s proposed modification does not substantively change

the nature of this litigation. As such, the court finds good

cause to amend the pretrial scheduling order to allow plaintiff

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to amend the complaint solely to correct the asserted mistake

regarding defendant Williams’ name in the allegations of the

complaint. See also 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 409 (“Under modern

practice, if the right party is before the court, although under

a wrong name, an amendment to cure a misnomer of parties will be

allowed. . . . Corrections of misnomers are permitted under Fed.

R. Civ. Proc. 15(c).). Therefore, defendant Williams’ argument

that summary judgment should be granted based upon plaintiff’s

allegation that he was shot by Brian Willson and/or Brian

Williams fails. 

Plaintiff Martin argues that defendant Williams violated his

constitutional rights by using excessive force against him during

the execution of the search warrant. Whether a law enforcement

official used excessive force is properly analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 

Determining whether the force used to effect a

particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth

Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature

and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests’ against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.

Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 

The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be evaluated

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Id. 

A proper application of the reasonableness inquiry

requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by flight. 

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Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotations omitted); see also McKenzie v. Lamb, 738

F.2d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 1984) (the determination requires the

analysis of factors such as “the requirements for the officers’

safety, the motivation for the arrest, and the extent of the

injury inflicted”).

Defendant Williams argues that the level of force used while

executing the warrant was reasonable under the circumstances. 

Defendant Williams also argues that even if the force was in some

way excessive, he is protected from liability under the doctrine

of qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity

protects from suit government officers who do not knowingly

violate the law. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th

Cir. 1994). Qualified immunity is a generous standard designed

to protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495

(1991) (citation omitted). A law officer can establish qualified

immunity by demonstrating (1) that the law governing the

officer’s conduct was not clearly established at the time of the

challenged actions, or (2) that under the clearly established

law, an officer could reasonably have believed that the alleged

conduct was lawful. See Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 967

(9th Cir. 1999); Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir.

1994); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)

(observing that police officers “are shielded from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known”).

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The question of immunity generally is not one for the jury.

Qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228

(1991) (citation omitted). Therefore, immunity ordinarily should

be decided by the court before trial.” Id. However, if a

genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the circumstances

under which the officer acted, then the court should make the

determination after the facts have been developed at trial. Act

Up!\Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993). The

initial inquiry that the court must make to determine whether an

official is entitled to qualified immunity is whether, “[t]aken

in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do

the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)

(citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). The next

inquiry is whether the constitutional right was clearly

established. Id. The contours of the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right. Id. The salient question is whether

the law at the time of the disputed conduct gave defendants “fair

warning that their alleged treatment of plaintiffs was

unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).

Some of the facts leading to the shooting of plaintiff

Martin are undisputed by the parties. Neither plaintiff nor

defendant dispute that the SLTPD and SLEDNET were executing a

warrant for stolen weapons. (UF ¶ 3). Further, defendant

Williams did not tell plaintiff to freeze or stop nor did he

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identify himself as a police officer when plaintiff appeared in

the doorway. (DF ¶ 16). 

However, other facts surrounding the circumstances leading

to defendant Williams’ shooting of plaintiff are in dispute. 

Defendant Williams contends that he saw a gun in plaintiff

Martin’s right hand as he was running from the house. Williams

testified that when plaintiff had run about three to four feet

out of the house, defendant saw him turn and look at defendant

Reagan and raise his right arm about shoulder height. (Williams

Dep. at 59:4-24). Williams also testified that plaintiff’s hand

was in a fist, wrapped around the butt of a gun, which resembled

a Ruger. (Id.) In contrast, plaintiff contends that when he

heard the diversionary device go off, he believed it was a gas

line explosion. (Martin Dep. at 22:14-25). Plaintiff testified

that he had a blue bandanna in his hand. (Id. at 30:21-23). 

Plaintiff also testified that after hearing the loud noise from

the diversionary device, he ran, made it to the side doorway, and

then was immediately “twisted” on the ground from the gunshot. 

(See id. at 23:5-16).

“Where such disputes [of fact] exist, summary judgment is

appropriate only if defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

on the facts alleged by the non-moving party.” Blankenhorn v.

City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Barlow

v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1991)). Therefore, the

court must view the disputed facts in favor of plaintiff Martin. 

The law is well-established that a police officer may use

“deadly force to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, if under

the circumstance, he reasonably believed such force was necessary

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7 Plaintiff was subsequently arrested pursuant to

California Penal Code §§ 148(a) and § 69 for obstructing and

resisting the police officers. However, there is no evidence

that defendants had reason to believe that plaintiff was

committing a crime prior to the incident at issue in this

(continued...)

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to protect himself or others from death or serious physical harm. 

Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991)

(citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). However, a

desire to resolve quickly a potentially dangerous situation does

not, standing alone, justify the use of force that could cause

serious injury. Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.2d 1272, 1281 (9th

Cir. 2001). “There must be other significant circumstances that

warrant the use of such a degree of force at the time it is

used.” Id. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that an

officer’s use of deadly force is not lawful where the suspect did

not point the gun at the officers and was not facing them when

the first shot was fired by the officers. Curnow, 952 F.2d at

325 (denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and

finding that the defendants were not entitled to qualified

immunity). 

Under plaintiff’s version of the facts, he was shot while he

ran out of a house because of what he thought was a gas leak

explosion. Plaintiff was unarmed and was not advised to freeze

or stop by defendant Williams. Plaintiff’s version of the facts

implicitly asserts that plaintiff did not see the officers and

that he did not look at defendant Reagan or raise his arm in a

threatening manner. At that time, defendant Williams did not

have knowledge that plaintiff had committed or was committing a

crime.7

 Cf. Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110, 1119

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litigation.

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(holding that the defendant officers were entitled to qualified

immunity for shooting and severely injuring the plaintiff where

the plaintiff, whom defendants knew had committed a crime, was

armed with a dangerous weapon, was told to stop and drop it, was

warned that he would be shot if he didn’t comply, refused to let

go of the sword, and raised the sword and grunted). Thus, under

plaintiff Martin’s version of the shooting, defendant Williams

would not have reasonably believed the use of deadly force was

lawful because, even if defendant Williams believed plaintiff had

a gun, there did not exist other significant circumstances that

warranted the use of deadly force. See Curnow, 952 F.2d at 325. 

Therefore, defendant William’s motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for excessive force in

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is DENIED.

2. Unreasonable Search and Seizure against the

Individual Defendants

Plaintiff Martin contends that the individual officers

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by their unreasonable search

and seizure of him. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that

defendants arrested him without probable cause.

“Probable cause exists when the police know ‘reasonably

trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in

believing that the accused had committed or was committing an

offense.’” United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th

Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856

F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1988)). “In evaluating a custodial

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8 Because defendant Williams effected the stop of

plaintiff through the intrusive means of shooting him, under the

circumstances of the case, it is clear that defendant Williams

was involved in plaintiff’s arrest. See Stevens v. Rose, 298

F.3d 880, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the defendants had

arrested the plaintiff when they gave chase to the plaintiff and

tackled him). 

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arrest executed by state officials, federal courts must determine

the reasonableness of the arrest in reference to state law

governing the arrest.” Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032,

1938 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). California

law requires that the court look to the totality of the

circumstances known by the officer to decide whether the

officer’s determination of probable cause was reasonable. See

People v. Guajardo, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1738 (1994); Agar v.

Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 3d 24, 29 (1971).

While plaintiff generally asserts that the individual

defendants violated his constitutional rights by arresting him

without probable cause, aside from defendant Williams, plaintiff

fails to identify which individual officers were involved in the

arrest.8 Plaintiff does present evidence that all individual

defendants were present at the scene of the alleged violation. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that merely being present at

the scene of an alleged unlawful act is an insufficient basis for

individual liability under § 1983. Jones, 297 F.3d at 936. As

such, because plaintiff has failed to present evidence of

defendants Heng, Adler, Auxier, McGuckin, Norrgard, Kingman,

and/or Reagan’s personal involvement in the arrest, a

prerequisite to a finding of liability, defendants Heng, Adler,

Auxier, McGuckin, Norrgard, Kingman, and Reagan’s motion for

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summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for

unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights is GRANTED.

Defendant Williams argues that he had probable cause to

arrest plaintiff after he ran from the residence where the

defendant officers were executing the search warrant. Plaintiff

was placed under arrest for violation of California Penal Code §§

148(a) and § 69. These sections criminalize resisting or

obstructing officers in the discharge of their duties. See Cal.

Penal Code §§ 148(a), 69 (West 2007). Defendant Williams

contends that under his version of the facts, plaintiff’s actions

following the detonation of the diversionary device gave him

reasonable cause to believe that plaintiff was violating these

sections. However, under plaintiff’s version of the facts,

plaintiff Martin merely ran out of the door after hearing a loud

bang, which he thought was an explosion, and was immediately shot

by defendant Williams without any provocation. 

At the time of plaintiff’s arrest, the law regarding the

fundamental right to be protected from unlawful arrests was

clear. Individuals have a right to be free from unreasonable

seizures unless there is probable cause to arrest. See MacKinney

v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995) (police officer

did not have probable cause to arrest an individual pursuant to

Penal Code § 148 where officer was in unmarked car, the plaintiff

made the plausible claim that he did not know it was the police

who gave the order, and the plaintiff’s disobedience was only

momentary); see People v. Patino, 95 Cal. App. 3d 11, 27 (1979)

(“The crime of obstructing or resisting an officer in the

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performance of his duties, Cal. Pen. Code § 69, would appear to

require an act done with the specific intent to interfere with

the officer’s performance of his duties.”). Viewing the facts in

the light most favorable to plaintiff, no reasonable officer

would have thought there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff

based solely on the fact that he ran out of the house after a

“flash bang” device was detonated. As such, plaintiff has raised

a triable issue of fact regarding whether defendant Williams had

probable cause to arrest him, and thus, defendant William’s

motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

for unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights is DENIED. 

3. Monell Claims against the City and SLTPD

Plaintiff asserts that defendant City of South Lake Tahoe

and the SLTPD is liable under § 1983. Under Monell and its

progeny, a plaintiff may hold a municipality liable under section

1983 if his injury was inflicted pursuant to city policy,

regulation, custom, or usage. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 694). The

existence of a city policy may be established in one of three

ways:

First, the plaintiff may prove that a city employee

committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant

to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding

practice or custom which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of the local governmental entity. 

Second, the plaintiff may establish that the individual

who committed the constitutional tort was an official

with final policy-making authority and that the

challenged action itself thus constituted an act of

official governmental policy. Third, the plaintiff may

prove that an official with final policy-making

authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional

decision or action and the basis for it.

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9 Plaintiff’s opposition only addresses a theory of

Monell liability based upon defendants’ alleged failure to train. 

To the extent plaintiff’s complaint alleged other theories as a

basis for a Monell claim, plaintiff has failed to support such

theories with evidence or argument, and any potential claims

arising out of these theories are DISMISSED.

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Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citations and internal quotations omitted)). Assuming that a

plaintiff can establish one of these three circumstances, he must

then demonstrate that the municipal policy “caused” the

constitutional deprivation. Id. A municipal policy “causes”

injury where it is the “moving force” behind the violation. 

Chew, 27 F.3d at 1444 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 694).

Plaintiff bases his claims against the City of South Lake

Tahoe and the SLTPD on his assertion that they failed to properly

train the individual defendants and that such failure was the

moving force behind the violation of his constitutional rights.9

Specifically, plaintiff contends that defendant SLTPD failed to

provide any training to its personnel on how to execute a search

warrant when using a diversionary device, and as a result,

defendant Williams irrationally shot plaintiff without

provocation after the device went off. Defendants contend that

there no evidence suggesting that the City deliberately failed to

train or control its officers as to reactions of individuals to

the deployment of a flash-bang device.

The Supreme Court has stated “that there are limited

circumstances in which an allegation of a ‘failure to train’ can

be the basis of liability under § 1983.” City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). “[T]he inadequacy of police

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10 Neither SLEDNET, nor McGuckin, nor Elliot are named

defendants in this action.

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training may serve as a basis for § 1983 liability only where the

failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights

of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. at 388. 

It is insufficient “to prove that an injury or accident could

have been avoided if an officer had better or more training.” 

Id. at 390. Rather, liability attaches where 

in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or

employees the need for more or different training is so

obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in a

violation of constitutional rights, that the

policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have

been deliberately indifferent to the need. 

Id. at 390-91. Moreover, plaintiff must present evidence that

“the identified deficiency in a city’s training program must be

closely related to the ultimate injury.” Id. at 391.

Plaintiff’s sole proffered evidence in support of his

failure to train claim is the deposition testimony of two SLEDNET

officers, Brian McGuckin and Chris Elliott,10 and defendant

Norrgard, who stated that they had not been trained to execute a

search warrant with the use of a diversionary device. However,

plaintiff fails to point to evidence of a program-wide deficiency

in training. See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 484-85 (“absent

evidence of a ‘program-wide inadequacy in training,’ any

shortfall in a single officer’s training ‘can only be classified

as negligence on the part of the municipal defendant – a much

lower standard of fault than deliberate indifference.’”) (quoting

Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367

(9th Cir. 1994)). Moreover, plaintiff has failed to present

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11 Plaintiff has failed to produce any expert testimony

regarding the training policies of defendant City of South Lake

Tahoe or defendant SLTPD.

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evidence that the execution of a search warrant using a

diversionary device was a recurring situation that carried with

it highly predictable consequences of constitutional violations. 

See Bd. of County Com’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 410 (1997) (holding that the generalized showing of risk

arising out of one instance of inadequate screening of an

officer’s background did not demonstrate conscious disregard of

an obvious risk). Finally, plaintiff has failed to proffer any

evidence that more or better training would have prevented the

alleged constitutional violation in this case. Cf. Johnson v.

Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 686 (upholding the plaintiff’s municipal

liability claim where the plaintiff submitted the declaration of

a law enforcement expert who opined that the Police Department’s

self-training program amounted to a failure to train police

officers about enforcement of the Privacy Act, which was a

recurring issue).11 Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiff’s Monell claims arising out of an

alleged failure to train is GRANTED.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated

his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff fails to

argue the merits of this allegation in his opposition. The

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides

that no state shall “deprive any person of . . . property,

without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment confers

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12 The Due Process Clause confers both procedural and

substantive rights. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318

(9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). However, procedural due

process implicates the principle that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment

places procedural constraints on the actions of government that

work a deprivation of interests enjoying the status of ‘property’

within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.” Memphis Light,

Gas, and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). Plaintiff

has failed to address any “property” he was deprived of due to

defendants’ conduct. As such, the court does not address this

claim. 

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substantive due process rights.12 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504

U.S. 71, 80 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746

(1987); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 

However, the use of substantive due process to extend

constitutional protection to economic and property

rights has been largely discredited. See generally

Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law at 432-65. Rather,

recent jurisprudence restricts the reach of the

protections of substantive due process primarily to the

liberties “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and

tradition.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503

(1977). 

Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1318-19. Further, “[w]here a particular

Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection’ against a particular source of government behavior,

‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive

due process’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” 

Albright v. Oliver, 520 U.S. 266, 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). The Supreme Court has specifically

held that where the Fourth Amendment is the source of limitations

on the type of conduct challenged by a plaintiff’s claims, that

Amendment, rather than the more general substantive due process

protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, must govern

the plaintiff’s claim. Albright, 520 U.S. at 273; Graham, 490

U.S. at 395; see Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1321. As such, because

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the conduct plaintiff alleges occurred is the type of government

action that the Fourth Amendment regulates, his substantive due

process claim is precluded. Therefore, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s substantive due process

claim is GRANTED.

C. Sixth Amendment

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants’ conduct

violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also fails to

argue the merits of this claim in his opposition. The Sixth

Amendment provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury . . . .” The Sixth Amendment also provides the

right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,

to confront adverse witnesses, to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses, and to have the assistance of counsel. 

Plaintiff has failed to identify with any specificity how

defendants allegedly violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Nor

has plaintiff proffered any evidence in support of this claim. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment claim is GRANTED.

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13 Plaintiff also alleged a claim for negligence in his

complaint. Defendants moved for summary judgment on this claim,

and plaintiff’s opposition fails entirely to discuss this claim. 

The court construes plaintiff’s silence on this claim as a nonopposition to defendant’s motion. Therefore, defendants’ motion

for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s negligence claim is

GRANTED.

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II. California State Law Claims13

A. The Bane Civil Rights Act against the Individual

Defendants

Plaintiff brings claims against all defendants for the

excessive and unreasonable use of force in violation of the Bane

Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 52.1. Section 52.1

provides for a private right of action “if a person . . .

interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion . . . with the

exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights

secured by the Constitution . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (West

2007). The individual defendants rely upon the same contentions,

affirmative, defenses, and points of law in moving for summary

judgment on this claim as those relied upon in moving for summary

judgment on plaintiff’s federal claims. As such, and for the

reasons set forth above, defendants Heng, Adler, Auxier,

McGuckin, Norrgard, Kingman, and Reagan’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiff’s § 52.1 claims for excessive force

and unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth

Amendment is GRANTED. Defendant William’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiff’s § 52.1 claims for excessive force

and unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights is DENIED. All individual defendants’ motion

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14 While the Edson court addressed only the state law

claim of battery, the court’s reasoning can be extended to apply

the same standard to the claim of assault. See Johnson v. County

of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 794 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s § 52.1 claims for

violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is GRANTED. 

B. Assault and Battery against the Individual Defendants

Plaintiff alleges state tort claims for assault and battery

against all defendants. California assault and battery claims

are the counterpart to plaintiff’s federal claims for excessive

force brought under § 1983. See Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63

Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1274 (1988). To sustain a claim of assault

and battery against a police officer under state law, plaintiffs

must provide evidence that the officer used unreasonable force. 

Id.14; See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 794

(9th Cir. 2003). For the reasons provided in the court’s

analysis of plaintiff’s § 1983 excessive force claim, plaintiff

has raised a triable issue of fact that defendant Williams used

excessive force. Therefore, defendant William’s motion for

summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s assault and battery claims

is DENIED. However, because plaintiff has failed to raise a

triable issue of fact regarding the liability of the other

individual defendants for excessive force, defendants Heng,

Adler, Auxier, McGuckin, Norrgard, Kingman, and Reagan’s motion

for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claims for assault and

battery is GRANTED. 

Defendant Williams argues that he is immune from plaintiff’s

state law claims of assault and battery pursuant to California

Government Code §§ 820.2 and 821.6. Section 820.2 provides

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immunity for police officers’ discretionary decisions made during

arrests. Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2 (West 2007); Blankenhorn, 485

F.3d at 487. However, it is well established that “this

provision does not apply to officers who use unreasonable force

in making an arrest.” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 487 (citing

Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256 (1967); Robinson v.

Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002)). Because

plaintiff’s claim against defendant Williams arises out of the

alleged use of force against him, defendant Williams is not

entitled to immunity pursuant to § 820.2. 

Defendant Williams also asserts that § 821.6 immunizes him

from liability for his conduct. Section 821.6 provides that

[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by

his instituting or prosecuting any judicial

administrative proceeding within the scope of his

employment, even if he acts maliciously and without

probable cause.

 “The provision’s principal function is to provide relief from

malicious prosecution.” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 487-88 (citing

Kayfetz v. California, 156 Cal. App. 3d 491 (1984)). This

immunity extends to actions taken in preparation for formal

proceedings, including actions incidental to the investigation of

crimes. Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1205,

1209-10 (1994); see also Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 488 (citing

Phillips v. City of Fairfield, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1118 (E.D.

Cal. 2005). Here, the alleged tortious conduct occurred during

an arrest, not an investigations into plaintiff’s guilt. See

Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 488. Plaintiff’s only relation to the

execution of the search warrant was to run out of the house after

a diversionary device was set off by SLTPD officers and SLEDNET

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15 Defendant Williams also argues that he is immune from

liability pursuant to California Penal Code § 835a, which allows

offices to use reasonable force to effect an arrest based upon

reasonable cause. Because plaintiff has presented evidence

demonstrating triable issues of fact regarding whether the arrest

and the force used was reasonable, this section is inapplicable.

16 Plaintiffs again argue that defendant Williams is

entitled to immunity. For the reasons set forth above, defendant

Williams is not entitled to statutory immunity. Further, § 821.6

does not provide immunity for claims of false imprisonment. 

Amylou R., 28 Cal. App. 4th at 1211 n.2 (citing Sullivan c.

County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 719-22 (1974).

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officers. This case does not present the type of factual

circumstances in which § 821.6 has been held to apply. See Karam

v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2003); Baughman v.

State of California, 38 Cal. App. 4th 182 (1995); Amylou R., 28

Cal. App. 4th 1205. As such, defendant Williams is not entitled

to immunity pursuant to § 821.6.15

C. False Arrest and Imprisonment against the Individual

Defendants

Plaintiff also alleges that the individual defendants are

liable for false arrest and imprisonment. “[T]he basis for the

tort of false imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of another’s

liberty.” Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc., 45 Cal. App.

4th 990, 1000 (1996). For the reasons provided in the court’s

analysis of plaintiff’s § 1983 unreasonable search and seizure

claim, plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact regarding

whether defendant Williams had probable cause to arrest him. 

Therefore, defendant William’s motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims is

DENIED.16 However, because plaintiff has failed to raise a

triable issue of fact regarding the liability of the other

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17 For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff has failed

to identify any extreme or outrageous conduct by defendants Heng,

Adler, Auxier, McGuckin, Norrgard, Kingman, and/or Reagan;

therefore, their motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress is GRANTED.

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individual defendants for unreasonable search and seizure,

defendants Heng, Adler, Auxier, McGuckin, Norrgard, Kingman, and

Reagan’s motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claims

for false arrest and imprisonment is GRANTED.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against

the Individual Defendants17

Plaintiff also brings claims for intentional infliction of

emotional distress arising out of defendant William’s use of

force. Defendant Williams argues that he is immune from suit

pursuant to California Government Code §§ 820.2 and 821.6. For

the reasons set forth above in the court’s analysis of

plaintiff’s assault and battery claims, these statutory

provisions do not provide immunity for actions arising out of the

use of excessive force or arising out of acts that allegedly

happened during an arrest. See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 488. 

Therefore, defendant William’s motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of

emotional distress is DENIED.

E. Respondeat Superior Liability of the City and SLTPD

Plaintiff claims that the city is liable for all state law

tort claims pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. 

Plaintiff asserts that the officers committed the alleged acts

within the course and scope of their employment as police

officers for the city, and therefore, the city is vicariously

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18 Defendants also argue that a municipality cannot be

held liable under California Civil Code § 52.1. Defendants fail

to cite to any on-point authority for this contention. Contra

Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744 (2002) (upholding

judgment against municipality for liability pursuant to § 52.1). 

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liable. Defendants City of South Lake Tahoe and SLTPD move for

summary judgment on the grounds that under Cal. Gov. Code §

815.2(b), a public entity cannot be held liable for an injury

resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity where the employee is immune from liability. Defendants

assert that defendant officers are immune under §§ 820.2 and

821.6.18

Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a) provides that a city is liable for

acts and omissions of its employees under the doctrine of

respondeat superior to the same extent as a private employer. 

Unlike the rule against municipal liability under federal law set

out in Monell, California imposes liability on municipalities

under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Robinson, 278 F.3d at

1016. Under California law, a city’s immunity depends upon

whether the police officers are immune. Id. For the reasons

provided in the court’s analysis of plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

against defendant Williams, plaintiff has raised a triable issue

as to whether defendant Williams, while operating in the course

of his employment, used excessive force and unreasonably seized

plaintiff Martin. Further, as set forth above, defendant

Williams is not immune under California state law. Thus, under

Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a), liability may flow to defendants City

of South Lake Tahoe and SLTPD for defendant William’s actions

towards plaintiff. Accordingly, defendants City of South Lake

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Tahoe and SLTPD’s motion for summary judgment regarding

respondeat superior liability arising out of plaintiff’s state

law claims is DENIED.

III. Punitive Damages

Finally, defendants move for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. Defendants contend

that there are no facts upon which plaintiff can support his

claim for punitive damages. In § 1983 cases, punitive damages

may be assessed “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be

motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless

or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of

others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Under

California law, exemplary damages are allowed where it is proven

by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of

oppression, fraud, or malice. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (West 2007). 

Plaintiff wholly fails to respond to defendant’s motion and

argument with respect to punitive damages. As such, the court

construes plaintiff’s silence as a non-opposition to defendant’s

motion. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to proffer evidence

supporting his broad allegations that defendants’ actions were

willful, reckless, and malicious. As such, defendants’ motion

for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claim for punitive

damages is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

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(1) Defendants Heng, Adler, Auxier, McGuckin, Norrgard,

Kingman, and Reagan’s motion for summary judgment

regarding all of plaintiff’s claims is GRANTED.

(2) Defendant William’s motion for summary judgment:

(a) regarding plaintiff’s § 1983 claims arising out of

alleged Fourth Amendment violations is DENIED.

(b) regarding plaintiff’s § 1983 claims arising out of

alleged Sixth Amendment violations is GRANTED.

(c) regarding plaintiff’s § 1983 claims arising out of

alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations is

GRANTED.

(d) regarding plaintiff’s § 52.1 claims arising out of

alleged Fourth Amendment violations is DENIED.

(e) regarding plaintiff’s § 52.1 claims arising out of

alleged Sixth Amendment violations is GRANTED.

(f) regarding plaintiff’s § 52.1 claims arising out of

alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations is

GRANTED.

(g) regarding plaintiff’s state law claims for

assault, battery, false arrest, false

imprisonment, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress is DENIED.

(h) regarding plaintiff’s state law claim for

negligence is GRANTED.

(i) regarding plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages

is GRANTED.

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(3) Defendants City of South Lake Tahoe and SLTPD’s motions

for summary judgment:

(a) regarding plaintiff’s Monell claims for failure to

train is GRANTED.

(b) regarding plaintiff’s respondeat superior claims

for violations of § 52.1, assault, battery, false

arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress is DENIED.

(c) regarding plaintiff’s state law claim for

negligence is GRANTED.

(d) regarding plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages

is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint solely to correct

the asserted mistake regarding defendant Williams’ name in the

allegations of the complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s amended

complaint does not supercede the foregoing order’s regarding

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff is directed

to file a first amended complaint within ten (10) days of this

order. Defendants may file an amendment to their previously

filed answer, reflecting any modifications as it relates to

plaintiff’s corrections, within ten (10) days thereafter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 26, 2007 

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