Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01611/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01611-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO ALBERTO VALENZUELA,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFF MACOMBER, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01611 DAD MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is represented by Barbara Michel, Esq. 

Respondent is represented by Laura Simpton of the office of the California Attorney 

General. Respondent declined magistrate judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 11.)

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his 

conviction by jury trial on May 27, 2011, for battery on a prison guard. (Clerk's Tr. at 350-

51.) On September 27, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 

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twenty-seven (27) years to life in state prison based on California’s Three Strikes Law. 

(Id.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District on April 12, 2012. (Lodged Doc. 1.) On March 25, 2013, the appellate court 

affirmed the conviction. (Lodged Doc. 4.) Petitioner sought review by the California 

Supreme Court on May 8, 2013. (Lodged Doc. 5.) The petition for review was summarily 

denied on June 12, 2013. (Lodged Doc. 6.)

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on September 9, 2014. (Pet., ECF No.

1.) Petitioner raised the following four claims for relief: 

1) That there was insufficient evidence to show that Petitioner injured the victim or 

acted intentionally to injure the victim;

2) That the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding whether the 

injury was a result of an accident on behalf of the correctional officer;

3) That the trial court erred by failing to instruct on defenses of unconsciousness 

and involuntary intoxication; and 

4) That the conviction was a result of juror misconduct based on the failure of a 

juror to disclose her prior criminal conviction and that the jury foreman having engaged in 

coercive behavior.

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on January 15, 2015. (Answer, ECF 

No. 17.) Petitioner filed a traverse to the answer on May 24, 2015. (Traverse, ECF No. 

27.)

II. Statement of Facts1

PROCEDURAL FACTS

On March 16, 2011, an information was filed charging appellant 

with battery on a correctional officer; it was specially alleged that appellant 

personally inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of this crime. 

(§§ 4501.5, 12022.7, subd. (a).) Nine prior felony convictions and seven 

 

1 The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its March 25, 2013 opinion is presumed 

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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prior prison terms were separately alleged. (§§ 667, subds. (a), (e)-(j), 

1170.12, subds. (a)-(e), 667.5, subd. (b).)

Appellant pled not guilty and denied the special allegations. A 

bifurcated jury trial commenced on May 18, 2011.

During the morning of May 26, 2011, the trial court made the 

following announcement:

"Mr. Valenzuela is not here. He is being detained in a 

holding cell in the hallway as a result of him bolting from the 

courtroom, into the hallway, and proceeding down the 

hallway a couple of departments, before he, essentially, 

went to his knees and surrendered. [¶] The jurors were 

outside in the hallway, obviously; so they saw this. And we 

are going to bring the jurors in, simply to advise them it will 

be a few minutes before we get started."

The trial court instructed the jurors to disregard the incident. It 

individually questioned the jurors about their ability to follow this instruction 

and to remain fair and impartial. Appellant moved for a mistrial based on 

his misconduct. The court denied the mistrial motion, finding there was not 

"any reason to believe that this jury would not be able to render a fair 

verdict in this particular case." Appellant asked the court to discharge 

Juror Nos. 2193178, 2233142 and 2216314. It discharged Juror No. 

2193178, but declined to discharge the other two jurors.

On May 27, 2011, the jury found appellant guilty of battery on a 

correctional officer. It found the great bodily injury allegation not true. The 

trial court sustained six prior strike allegations (allegation Nos. 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 

10) and three prior prison term allegations (allegation Nos. 20, 21, 23). It 

found the rest of the special allegations not true.

On August 2, 2011, appellant filed a motion for new trial based on 

jury misconduct.

On August 15, 2011, appellant filed a motion to dismiss his prior 

strikes in the interest of justice pursuant to People v. Superior Court 

(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

On September 27, 2011, the new trial motion and Romero motion 

were heard and denied. Immediately thereafter, appellant was sentenced 

to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life imprisonment plus two[fn2]

years. This sentence was ordered to run consecutive to the sentence he 

was already serving in Riverside County Superior Court case No. 054754.

FN2: Special allegations Nos. 20 and 21 arose from two prison terms that 

were served concurrently.

On September 28, 2011, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE

On the morning of November 24, 2010, appellant was an inmate at 

the California Correctional Facility in Tehachapi. He was the sole occupant 

of cell No. 204 in housing unit five. Correctional Officer Michael Cich was 

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retrieving food trays from prisoners through the food port in each cell. 

Appellant refused to return his food tray. Cich[fn3] collected the food tray 

from the adjacent cell and then returned to appellant's cell. Appellant had 

covered the window on the cell door with paper. Cich asked appellant to 

return the food tray. Appellant replied, "I'm not giving you my tray. Come in 

and get it."

FN3: Solely to enhance readability correctional officers will be referenced 

to by their last names only. No disrespect is intended or implied by the 

omission of the officers' titles.

Correctional Sergeant Julio Hurtado was summoned to appellant's 

cell. Appellant would not speak to him. Hurtado opened the cell door a few 

inches and told appellant to step forward. Appellant did not respond to the 

directive. Hurtado closed the cell door. Hurtado told his supervisor, "[W]e 

needed to do a medical extraction, because there was no communication 

whatsoever with [appellant], and I couldn't determine his health or wellbeing at that moment."

A six-member extraction team assembled outside the cell. Hurtado 

unlocked the food port. He attempted to communicate with appellant but 

did not receive any response. Hurtado tossed a T-16 OC grenade through 

the food port into the cell. It made a loud bang and dispensed pepper 

spray. Appellant did not respond; there was no movement or sound inside 

the cell. Hurtado sprayed a MK-9 OC fogger, which dispensed pepper 

spray, through the food port into the cell.[fn4] Appellant did not cough or 

make any noise or movement. Hurtado closed the food port and 

announced on the radio that "we have a medical emergency in Housing 

Unit 5."

FN4: The T-16 OC grenade and the MK-9 OC fogger have similar effects. 

The user holds a MK-9 OC fogger and sprays it towards the intended 

recipient. The user tosses a T-16 OC grenade.

Correctional Officer Donald Smith was the "shieldman" and led five 

members of the extraction team into the cell; Hurtado remained outside 

the cell in the doorway.[fn5] Team members discovered that, in addition to 

covering the window on the cell door, appellant had covered the window 

on the cell's back wall and the ceiling light. Appellant had draped a blanket 

across the width of the cell. Blankets and sheets had been tied to the 

frame of the bunk bed, enclosing the lower bunk into a tent-like structure. 

The cell was dark; the only light came from the open cell door. Appellant 

was not visible.

FN5: The extraction team members were equipped with helmets with face 

shields, latex gloves and gas masks.

Smith knocked down the blanket that was draped across the cell 

and "immediately braced for attack." He slowly walked towards the back of 

the cell. Smith tried to remove the sheets and blankets from the bed frame 

but could not get them untied. Smith testified that he told the other officers 

that he "couldn't get the blankets down. And right about that time the 

blankets dropped from the left of me. And that's when the inmate attacked 

me from the [lower] bunk." Appellant had wrapped both of his hands with 

torn white cloth that "looked like wrapping that a boxer would have." He 

also had pieces of white cloth that may have been shirts tied "around his

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whole face, and he had just like his eyes showing."

Smith testified that appellant rushed from the lower bunk "and 

headed straight towards" him. Smith moved forward. They collided. 

Appellant hit Smith's shield with his upper torso. Smith testified that 

"[w]hen we first collided, the shield came back and hit my face, pushed up 

against my body. And I had to use a lot of force to push him back." 

Appellant continued to push against Smith. Smith had to use a great deal 

of force to push appellant towards the back of the cell. Appellant continued 

to push against Smith "in the opposite direction. And also — I don't recall if 

it was him flailing his arms, but I was being twisted around a lot. I was 

struggling to [keep] the shield on him." Smith testified that appellant was 

"pushing against me and using his body, twisting. Just fighting against me, 

basically, is what he was doing." Smith drove appellant back towards the 

bunk area. Smith's shield got caught on the top bunk and caused Smith to 

twist towards the left. Appellant "came out from the bottom of the shield."

Smith dropped the shield and faced appellant. Smith testified that 

appellant "threw ... a right backhand towards me. And I don't recall if it 

struck my face or not." Smith "threw two punches" at appellant, grabbed 

his head and "pulled him down in between my legs" to control him. 

Appellant "was flailing his arms." Smith pushed appellant towards the 

window area. The other members of the extraction team "came and 

grabbed him and put him on the ground." Smith "got next to [appellant's] 

shoulder area. And he was kind of twisting around, still kind of struggling. 

And I just held his head down with my right hand." Cich laid on top of 

appellant so other officers could place handcuffs on him. Leg restraints 

were placed on appellant and he was removed from the cell.

A nurse conducted a medical evaluation of appellant. She did not 

observe any injuries to appellant's eyes. The skin around appellant's eyes 

was not orange, unlike his front abdominal area which was orange from 

pepper spray exposure. Appellant had abrasions to his right forehead, 

above his right eyebrow and on his right palm. There was redness on the 

back of his neck. Appellant did not report any eye injuries or vision 

impairment.

Smith suffered a spiral fracture on his left hand during the cell 

extraction. Surgery was performed; a metal plate and some screws were 

placed in the hand. Smith was unable to work for four months.

Appellant did not testify or present any evidence in his defense.

People v. Valenzuela, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2145, 2-9 (Mar. 25, 2013).

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

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suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the 

conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located 

within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, the Court 

has jurisdiction over the action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of 

the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions. 

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 

7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in 

state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different 

result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 

"AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical 

factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that 

even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. 

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Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011), (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009), quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

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"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

‘adjudicated on the merits.'").

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id. To put 

it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

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verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 

Strickland prejudice standard is applied and courts do not engage in a separate analysis 

applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n. 7 (2002). Musalin 

v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d at 834.

III. Review of Petition

A. Claim One: Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence that Petitioner caused the 

injury to the victim’s hand or that he acted willfully to cause the injury. (Pet. at 6-8.)

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in a subsequent petition for review by the 

California Supreme Court. Because the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary 

in nature, this Court “looks through” that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning 

of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion.

See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n.3 (1991) (establishing, on habeas 

review, “look through” presumption that higher court agrees with lower court’s reasoning 

where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 

663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court 

opinion in determining whether state court’s rejection of petitioner’s claims was contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

In denying Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal explained:

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I. The Battery Conviction Is Supported By Substantial Evidence.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

battery conviction. He argues there is inadequate proof "that appellant was 

the actual cause of the injury to Officer Smith's hand" and "that appellant 

acted willfully in causing the injury." We are not persuaded. Appellant's 

evidentiary challenge is premised on the position that the People were 

required to prove that appellant willfully injured Smith's hand. This premise 

is unsound. The crime of battery on a correctional officer does not require 

proof of physical harm or intent to inflict injury.

The crime of battery is defined as "any willful and unlawful use of 

force or violence upon the person of another." (§ 242.) Section 4501.5 

provides: "Every person confined in a state prison of this state who 

commits a battery upon the person of any individual who is not himself a 

person confined therein shall be guilty of a felony ...." "Section 4501.5 

criminalizes a battery committed by a prisoner on a nonprisoner. The 

elements of a violation of this section are: (1) The defendant was confined 

in a state prison; (2) while confined, the defendant willfully touched the 

victim in a harmful or offensive manner; and (3) the victim was not 

confined in a state prison." (People v. Flores (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 924, 

930-931, fn. omitted.)

"[A]n offensive touching, although it inflicts no bodily harm, may 

nonetheless constitute a battery ...." (People v. Myers (1998) 61 

Cal.App.4th 328, 335; see, e.g., People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 

934 [battery conviction upheld where defendant spat on a deputy]; People 

v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 961 [battery conviction upheld where 

the defendant prisoner threw a cup of urine in the victim's face].) The term 

"injury," as used within the context of the crime of battery, is not 

synonymous with physical harm. Our Supreme Court explained this 

principle in People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893:

"A battery must be contemplated, but only an 'injury' as that 

term is used with respect to a battery need be intended. 'It 

has long been established, both in tort and criminal law, that 

"the least touching" may constitute battery. In other words, 

force against the person is enough, it need not be violent or 

severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it 

need not leave any mark.' [Citation.] [¶] 'The "violent injury" 

here mentioned is not synonymous with "bodily harm," but 

includes any wrongful act committed by means of physical 

force against the person of another, even although only the 

feelings of such person are injured by the act.' [Citation.]" 

(People v. Rocha, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 899-900, fn. 12; see 

also People v. Myers, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.)

Also, the crime of battery does not require proof that the defendant 

intended to injure the victim. Battery is a general intent crime. (People v. 

Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 (Lara).) "As with all general intent 

crimes, 'the required mental state entails only an intent to do the act that 

causes the harm ....' [Citation.] Thus, the crime of battery requires that the 

defendant actually intend to commit a 'willful and unlawful use of force or 

violence upon the person of another.' [Citations.] In this context, the term 

'willful' means 'simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act ....' 

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[Citation.]." (Id. at p. 107.)

We have examined the record and conclude there is ample 

evidence proving that appellant committed a battery on a correctional 

officer. Appellant was confined as an inmate in the California Correctional 

Facility at Tehachapi. The victim, Smith, was a correctional officer. 

Appellant instigated a cell extraction by refusing to comply with officers' 

directives. Appellant prepared for a confrontation by covering the light 

sources, stringing a blanket across the cell, creating a tent-like enclosure 

around the lower bunk and wrapping his face and hands in cloth. 

Appellant was hiding within the enclosure when the extraction team 

members entered the cell. Smith testified that appellant rushed forward 

and attacked him. Appellant collided with the shield Smith was holding. 

Smith testified that appellant was "pushing against me and using his body, 

twisting. Just fighting against me, basically, is what he was doing." 

Appellant flailed his arms and tried to punch Smith in the face. Appellant's 

violent attack on Smith constitutes an offensive touching. His conduct in 

preparing for the cell extraction, rushing towards and fighting with Smith 

proves that the touching was willful.

For the foregoing reasons, we reject appellant's challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence and uphold the guilty verdict on count 1.

People v. Valenzuela, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2145 at 9-13.

2. Legal Standard

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantees that a criminal 

defendant may be convicted only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 

necessary to constitute the charged crime. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 

S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Under the Jackson standard, "the relevant 

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original).

In applying the Jackson standard, the federal court must refer to the substantive 

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. 

A federal court sitting in habeas review is "bound to accept a state court's interpretation 

of state law, except in the highly unusual case in which the interpretation is clearly 

untenable and amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional 

violation." Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 642 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

3. Analysis

Petitioner asserts that there is insufficient evidence linking Petitioner’s conduct to 

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the injury to the victim’s finger. Petitioner’s argument is misplaced. Under California law, 

there is no injury requirement to prove the crime of battery – there only needs to be an 

unlawful touching. 

Even accepting Petitioner’s argument as true that Correctional Officer Smith’s 

finger was broken during the cell extraction, but not directly relating to Petitioner’s 

touching of Smith, his claim would still fail. During trial, Smith testified that Petitioner 

rushed off the bunk and attacked him. Smith described Petitioner clashing into his shield, 

and after the shield was twisted to the side, Smith observed Petitioner attempting to 

punch him. (Rep. Tr. 530-34.) Based on Smith’s testimony there was ample evidence 

that Petitioner touched smith in a harmful manner by running into his shield and 

attempting to punch him. Moreover, Smith’s evidence indicates that the touching was 

willing, as Petitioner at multiple points during the cell extraction could have complied with 

orders, but instead forced the guards to conduct a cell extraction and physically fought 

the guards when they entered his cell. 

Petitioner has not shown that the state court's determination that there was 

sufficient evidence to support the conviction was unreasonable. The state court found 

that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was 

sufficient evidence that Petitioner willfully caused a battery upon the correctional officer. 

The finding was reasonable despite not knowing whether the injury to Smith’s finger was 

directly attributable to Petitioner.

Under Jackson and AEDPA, the state decision is entitled to double deference on 

habeas review. Based on review of the trial record, there was sufficient evidence based 

on the testimony of Smith to convict Petitioner of battery upon a correctional officer. 

There was no constitutional error, and Petitioner is not entitled to relief with regard to this 

claim.

B. Claim Two – Failure to Provide Accident Instruction

Petitioner contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to 

instruct the jury regarding the defense that he acted accidentally, and did not intend to 

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batter the correctional officer. 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 1-4.) Because the California Supreme Court's 

opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it 

adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have 

issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804-05.

In denying Petitioner's claim, the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained:

A. The trial court properly declined to instruct on accident.

1. Facts.

Appellant asked the court to instruct on the defense of accident with 

CALCRIM No. 3404. This instruction provides, in pertinent part:

"[The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime[s]> if 

(he/she) acted [or failed to act] without the intent required for 

that crime, but acted instead accidentally. You may not find 

the defendant guilty of <insert crime[s]> unless 

you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) 

acted with the required intent.]"

The court refused to instruct on accident because there was no 

evidence to support this defense. It reasoned:

"But in reviewing the evidence, it's a situation where, 

although the light was blocked in the cell and there were 

chemicals agencies thrown into the cell, that certainly could 

have affected — along with the lights and chemical agents, it 

could have affected certain individuals, Mr. Valenzuela. 

There is no evidence that it did. In fact, the evidence was to 

the contrary.

"Once they got in, there was light coming from the outside. 

People could see each other in the cell. There was nothing 

that would indicate he had anything in his eyes that would 

somehow hinder him from being able to see the direction in 

which he was moving, or anything of that sort, in the course 

of what took place in the cell, along with the other evidence, 

is what led up to the physical contact; so I'm going to decline 

your request. I'm going to reject this special instruction."

2. Refusing to instruct on accident was not erroneous because the record 

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does not contain substantial evidence supporting this defense.

Appellant argues that instruction on accident was required because 

there was substantial evidence supporting this defense. He points to 

testimony that the correctional officers wore gas masks and that Hurtado 

tossed a T-16 OC grenade into the cell and then sprayed a MK-9 OC 

fogger pepper spray. Appellant also points out that Smith did not know 

how his hand became injured. This argument is unconvincing. As will be 

explained, the trial court properly declined to instruct on accident because 

there was no proof that the chemical agents introduced into the cell 

adversely affected appellant or any evidence indicating that appellant's 

contact with Smith was accidental.

The trial court must instruct on an affirmative defense, either upon 

request or sua sponte, whenever the record contains substantial evidence 

in support of the defense unless the defense is inconsistent with the 

defendant's theory of the case. (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 

982.) In this context, substantial evidence has been defined as "evidence 

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in favor of the defendant ...." (Ibid.) If 

the evidence on a defense is "minimal and insubstantial," instruction need 

not be given. (People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684.) The trial 

court's ruling is independently reviewed. (People v. Sisuphan (2010) 181 

Cal.App.4th 800, 806.)

The defense of accident or misfortune is based on section 26, 

which provides, in relevant part: 

"All persons are capable of committing crimes except those 

belonging to the following classes: [¶]...[¶] ... Persons who 

committed the act or made the omission charged through 

misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no 

evil design, intention, or culpable negligence." (§ 26.) "The 

accident defense is a claim that the defendant acted without 

forming the mental state necessary to make his actions a 

crime." (People v. Gonzales (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 390 

(Gonzales).)

Deciding if the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on accident 

turns on whether appellant offered evidence sufficient for a reasonable 

jury to find that his contact with Smith was accidental. We agree with 

respondent that the record does not contain evidence supporting this 

defense. There was no evidence showing that appellant was adversely 

affected by the chemical agents that were introduced into the cell. 

Appellant did not cough or otherwise indicate distress. He did not 

complain of burning eyes or of any other injury. The nurse who examined 

appellant did not observe any physical symptoms typically associated with 

exposure to pepper spray. Appellant's eyes were not swollen, red or tear 

stained. Appellant was not coughing or having difficulty breathing. He was 

not dizzy or disoriented. Appellant's barricade and wrappings succeeded 

in protecting him from the chemical agents introduced into the cell.

There also is no evidence showing that appellant slipped or 

otherwise accidentally stumbled into Smith. Smith testified that appellant's 

eyes were not covered by the white shirt that he had wrapped about his 

face.[fn6] Smith also testified that appellant lunged toward him, pushed 

against him and tried to hit him. Since the crime of battery does not 

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require proof of injury, the fact that Smith could not exactly pinpoint how 

the injury occurred does not support a reasonable inference of accident. 

Appellant's argument that Smith's injury could have arisen accidentally is 

premised on speculation, not reasonable inference derived from trial 

evidence.

FN6: Hurtado testified that appellant had covered his entire face with a 

towel. However, Hurtado did not enter the cell. Smith was close to 

appellant and was able to see that appellant's eyes were uncovered.

Appellant's reliance on Lara, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th 102 and 

Gonzales, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 382 is misplaced. Both of these cases 

are factually inapposite. In Lara, the victim testified that she grabbed the 

back of the defendant's shirt and he "turned around to free himself from 

her grasp and hit her in the nose by accident." (Lara, supra, 44 

Cal.App.4th at p. 106.) In Gonzales, the victim and two of the defendant's 

family members testified that the victim's injuries were caused when she 

was accidentally struck by a bathroom door. (Gonzales, supra, 74 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 385-386.) By contrast, in this case there was 

undisputed testimony from Smith that appellant rushed towards him and 

attacked him. Appellant collided into Smith's shield and then forcefully 

pushed against Smith. Appellant tried to punch Smith and flailed his arms 

inside the small cell. There was no testimony from appellant or anyone 

else that his contact with Smith was accidental.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly declined to 

instruct on accident because the record does not contain substantial 

evidence supporting this defense. It necessarily follows that appellant's 

federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial were not 

infringed by the instructional omission.

People v. Valenzuela, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2145 at 13-18.

2. Analysis

This Court's review of Petitioner's claim of state instructional error is "limited to 

deciding whether [his] conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991); 

28 U.S.C. § 2241. In order to grant federal habeas relief on the basis of faulty jury 

instructions, the Court must first conclude that the alleged error was of constitutional 

magnitude. See California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 117 S. Ct. 337, 136 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1996).

In order to grant federal habeas relief on the basis of faulty jury instructions, the 

Court must conclude that the alleged error "had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict." Roy, 519 U.S. at 5; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Federal habeas relief is warranted only if the Court, after reviewing the record, has 

"grave doubt" as to the error's effect. Stanton v. Benzler, 146 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 

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1998). "The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial 

that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's 

judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct 

appeal." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 52 L. Ed. 2d 203 

(1977). The trial court's error in omitting a jury instruction is less likely to be prejudicial 

than the trial court's misstatement of the law. Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155; see also

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (habeas petitioner whose claim 

involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an especially heavy burden).

To evaluate the effect of jury instructions, the Court must look at the context of the 

entire trial and overall charge to the jury. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Prantil v. California, 843 

F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988). They may not be judged in artificial isolation. Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 72. In addition, a reviewing court's principal constitutional inquiry is whether there 

is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions in a way that 

violates the Constitution. See id.

While a state is generally free to define the elements of an offense, once the state 

has defined the elements, due process requires that the jury be instructed on each 

element and instructed that they must find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1985); In re 

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); United States v. 

Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 1997); Stanton, 146 F.3d at 728.

It necessarily follows, therefore, that constitutional trial error occurs when a jury 

makes a guilty determination on a charged offense without a finding as to each element 

of the offense. According to the Supreme Court, a jury instruction that omits an element 

of the offense constitutes such an error. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S. Ct. 

1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999). However, such an error "does not necessarily render a 

criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or 

innocence." Id. at 9. Provided that such an error occurred, Petitioner's conviction can 

only be set aside if the error was not harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 

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18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); Neder, 527 U.S. at 15. Under the Chapman

harmless error test, it must be determined "beyond a reasonable doubt" whether "the 

error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

Here, Petitioner contends the trial court erred by failing to supply the jury with an 

instruction on an accident defense to explain that the battery was unintentional. In 

declining to find substantial evidence support a defense of accident and declining the 

instruction, the state court noted that the scene of the cell extraction would have been 

chaotic, with the release of pepper spray, multiple guards rushing in the cell, and 

bedsheets tied up in the cell. However, the Court noted that the testimony was that light 

was provided through the doorway of the cell, and that there was no evidence to support 

a scenario where Petitioner’s vison was affected by the chemical agents or otherwise 

obscured. (Rep. Tr. at 982.) Based on the testimony presented, the court declined to 

provide the instruction. 

Petitioner again argues that there is no clear indication of how Smith’s hand was 

broken, but that fact alone does not create substantial evidence to support a defense of 

accident. Petitioner presented no evidence that his vision was obscured or that he was 

otherwise confused by the situation presenting itself during the cell extraction. 

Finally, the failure to present the instruction was harmless. Even if properly 

instructed, Petitioner has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would 

have been different. Petitioner has done little refute the prosecution’s evidence that he 

rushed at and struggled with Smith during the cell extraction. The fact that Smith could 

not attribute his broken finger to a specific event, Petitioner has not shown that his 

actions during the confrontation could have been construed as accidental. 

Upon review, the state court's holding comports with the requirements of federal 

law. Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner has not shown that the court erred in 

failing to provide the jury instruction that the battery was the result of an accident. Even 

had an instructional error occurred, Petitioner has not shown it had substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that the trial court did not commit instructional error 

such that resulted in the violation of Petitioner's due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 

72. It is recommended that Petitioner's second claim for relief be denied.

C. Claim Three – Failure to Provide Unconsciousness and Intoxication 

Defense Instructions

Petitioner contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to 

instruct the jury regarding the defenses of unconsciousness and involuntary intoxication. 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 1-4.) Because the California Supreme Court's 

opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it 

adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have 

issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804-05.

In denying Petitioner's claim, the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained:

B. The trial court properly declined to instruct on unconsciousness and 

involuntary intoxication.

1. Facts.

Defense counsel requested instruction on involuntary intoxication 

(CALCRIM No. 3427) and unconsciousness (CALCRIM No. 3425) based 

on the discharge of chemical agents into appellant's cell.

The prosecutor argued that the evidence did not support either 

instruction. She also argued that involuntary intoxication instruction did not 

apply because it was designed to be given only when the intoxication 

occurred without any fault on the part of the intoxicated person.

The trial court refused to instruct on involuntary intoxication, 

reasoning: 

"... I don't think there is really enough evidence of this 

Court's giving involuntary intoxication instruction either. 

There is really no evidence of the actual state of intoxication, 

if any, that there was on Mr. Valenzuela. [¶] In fact, the 

evidence is essentially to the effect that he guarded from 

being intoxicated by virtue of putting the materials over his 

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mouth, towels up, things of that sort, so that the chemicals 

couldn't get to him." The court refused to instruct on 

unconsciousness because it "wouldn't apply unless I was 

considering and gave the other instruction. There was some 

evidence he reached some level of intoxication."

2. Refusing to instruct on involuntary intoxication and unconsciousness 

was proper because the record does not contain substantial evidence 

supporting this defense.

As previously discussed, the trial court must instruct on an 

affirmative defense, either upon request or sua sponte, whenever the 

record contains substantial evidence in support of the defense unless the 

defense is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (People v. 

Salas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 982.) Appellant argues the record contained 

substantial evidence supporting the defenses of involuntary intoxication to 

unconsciousness. He relies on Hurtado's testimony that he introduced 

pepper spray into the cell "to disorient [appellant] in case he was okay in 

there, because it causes irritation to the eyes." Appellant argues it was a 

question for the jury to determine "whether and to what degree the 

chemical agents deployed into the cell" affected his mental state. We 

disagree. The trial court correctly determined that there was insufficient 

evidence to justify instruction on the defenses of involuntary intoxication or 

unconsciousness.

The record does not contain any evidence proving that the 

chemical agents introduced into appellant's cell caused intoxication or 

unconsciousness. Cich testified that the effects of MK-9 OC fogger include 

coughing, sneezing, chest tightness, sensations of irritation and burning. 

Cich did not know if the MK-9 OC fogger had an anesthetic effect. Hurtado 

testified that a T-16 OC grenade causes coughing. Hurtado testified that 

the effects of a T-16 OC grenade are "physical only" and he is not aware 

of "any effects other than physical effects."

Also, there was evidence showing that appellant avoided the 

harmful effects of the chemical agents by covering his face and 

barricading himself into his bunk behind blankets and sheets. Appellant 

did not cough or exhibit any difficulty breathing after the chemical agents 

were dispensed into his cell. A nurse examined appellant after the cell 

extraction. She did not observe any injuries on appellant other than a few 

abrasions.

In sum, there was no evidence in the record indicating that the 

chemical agents caused intoxication or unconsciousness and no evidence 

that appellant was physically or mentally impaired by the agents. The 

record does not contain substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could have concluded that appellant was either involuntarily intoxicated or 

unconscious when the assault occurred. Therefore, the trial court properly 

refused to instruct on these defenses. Appellant's federal constitutional 

rights to due process and a fair trial were not infringed by the instructional 

omission.[fn7]

FN7: This determination renders moot the Attorney General's argument 

that instruction on involuntary intoxication was properly denied because a 

fundamental criterion underlying this defense is the defendant's lack of 

fault and, in this case, appellant was blameworthy.

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People v. Valenzuela, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2145 at 18-22.

2. Analysis

The law regarding the review of jury instruction claims was set forth in claim two, 

above. See supra, Section III(B)(2). Petitioner contends the trial court erred by failing to

supply the jury with instructions for unconsciousness and involuntary intoxication based 

on the effect of the chemical agents sprayed in his cell during the cell extraction. The trial 

court listed to the evidence presented for allowing the instructions, and even noted that 

that defense counsel presented an “appropriate” and “artful” argument, but that the 

evidence presented just did not support allowing the instruction. (Rep. Tr. at 985.)

The state court, in denying Petitioner’s claim, noted that there was evidence that 

Petitioner had mitigated the effects of the chemical agents by covering his face and 

barricading himself in his bunk behind blankets and sheets. The court also noted that 

Petitioner did not present evidence that he was physically or mentally impaired by the 

chemical agents. In opposition, prosecution witness testified that the chemical agents 

only cause physical effects, and do not cause psychological effects. (Rep. Tr. at 371-

373, 485-86.) Accordingly, there was no evidence that the chemicals altered Petitioner’s 

mental facilities. Further, Petitioner’s actions, as described by the prosecution witnesses, 

do not appear to be actions of an individual who was incapacitated by the chemical 

agents used during the cell extraction. Rather, the state court was reasonable in 

determining that there were no facts to support the claims that Petitioner was 

unconscious or otherwise not in control of his actions. Based the evidence presented, 

the failure to provide the instructions was harmless. The jury was not reasonably likely to 

find Petitioner suffered from intoxication from the chemical agents so that he was not 

aware of his actions and lacked the intent to commit the battery. The evidence 

suggested that Petitioner took actions to avoid contact with the chemical agents so that 

he would be capable of assaulting the guards when they entered the cell. Even had an 

instructional error occurred, Petitioner has not shown it had substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that the trial court did not commit instructional error 

such that resulted in the violation of Petitioner's due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 

72. It is recommended that Petitioner's third claim for relief be denied.

D. Claim Four – Juror Misconduct

Petitioner contends that his rights to due process were violated by juror 

misconduct. He alleges (1) that one juror failed to disclose that she had a prior conviction 

for petty theft, (2) that the foreperson acted improperly, and (3) that the jury failed to 

deliberate with all of the members of the jury present. (Pet. at 23-29.)

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 1-4.) Because the California Supreme Court's 

opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it 

adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have 

issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804-05.

In denying Petitioner's claim, the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained:

A. Facts.

On August 2, 2011, appellant filed a motion for new trial based on 

juror misconduct. The motion was supported by declarations of Juror Nos. 

2 and 12. Both of these jurors declared that "[a]t no time during 

deliberations was I convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] 

was guilty of the charged offenses and/or enhancements." Both jurors also 

averred that they wrote questions to be given to the judge for further 

instruction on the law but the foreperson refused to forward the questions 

and said that he would not be asking any questions. Juror No. 12 averred 

that the foreperson entered the deliberation room and announced that 

appellant "is already in prison anyway, so what are the odds that he didn't 

do the battery?" They averred that when Juror No. 12 said that appellant 

was not guilty, the foreperson angrily screamed that "he would not accept 

a hung jury and we would be here all day if there was no guilty verdict 

because he would not come back for further deliberations. So find him 

guilty so we can go home." They both averred that the deliberations took 

place while not all 12 jurors were present. Juror No. 12 averred that 

appellant's status as an inmate and his act of leaving the courtroom during 

trial was discussed during deliberations. Juror No. 2 averred that the 

foreperson and another juror discussed "matters the court ordered to not 

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be discussed during deliberations." Both jurors averred that they did not 

know they could report the foreperson's conduct to the judge. Finally, 

Juror No. 2 averred that she suffered a misdemeanor petty theft conviction 

in 2003 but did not disclose this conviction during voir dire due to its age.

The prosecutor opposed the new trial motion and filed evidentiary 

objections to portions of the declarations.

Hearing on the new trial motion was held on September 27, 2011. 

The trial court denied the motion in a lengthy oral ruling. The court made 

findings on each of the averments contained in the jurors' declarations.

The trial court found that the averments by Juror Nos. 2 and 12 that 

they never thought appellant was guilty were inadmissible.

The trial court admitted the jurors' averments that the foreperson 

refused to forward their written questions "is something certainly I can 

consider." The trial court found there was no evidence concerning the 

information that was requested by the jurors and the jurors did not directly 

ask the court any questions despite having been provided with multiple 

opportunities to do so.

The trial court found that the foreperson violated an admonition of 

the court when he said that appellant left the courtroom because he was 

guilty. The court gave this event "very little weight" because appellant 

"should not be able to profit ... by his own wrongdoing ...."

The trial court found that averments recounting statements made 

by the foreperson concerning appellant's guilt were inadmissible because 

they reflected the foreperson's subjective reasoning process. It found that 

averments concerning the interactions between the jurors and foreperson 

were inadmissible. It found that averments concerning the foreperson's 

demeanor and his statement that he would not accept a hung jury to be 

reflections of heated juror deliberations. Also, "[t]here is no evidence, nor 

should there be, as to how it might have impacted other jurors. It's simply 

as to the bias or the prejudice of the foreperson coming into the 

deliberations in this particular case."

The trial court found the jurors' averments that deliberations took 

place when less than 12 jurors were present were admissible and 

"evidence[s] some misconduct." Yet, "[t]here is no evidence as to what 

was discussed or how it might evidence some bias by any of the jurors .... 

[T]here was nothing ... that it resulted in some bias against the defendant 

other than being a violation of the admonition ...."

The trial court determined that the jurors did not commit misconduct 

by discussing appellant's status as an inmate because this was an 

element of the charged crime. Also, "there is nothing in the declaration 

that references or demonstrates to the Court that the discussions as to his 

status as an inmate reflected some sort of bias that somehow impacted 

one or more of the jurors."

The trial court found that the jurors were polled after the verdict was 

read. They had an opportunity to report the foreperson's misconduct or 

"express any issues they had" with the verdict.

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Finally, the trial court found that Juror No. 2's failure to disclose her 

prior petty theft conviction was misconduct. Yet, there was nothing 

indicating that the failure to disclose the conviction somehow biased the 

juror in reaching a decision in the case. Therefore, "it has very little weight 

in deciding this motion."

The trial court ruled as follows:

"So ultimately, as I indicated, I think there is a great deal in 

the declarations that's not admissible.... [¶]...[¶] ... There is 

still the fact that there was misconduct, there was failure to 

follow admonitions, as I've discussed. [¶] But in this 

particular case, in evaluating all these acts, as we have 

discussed, the admissible acts, the admissible conduct that 

occurred that I can consider for this purpose, but whether it's 

singularly or all together, I do not find that there was 

prejudice in this particular case. [¶] To the extent that I could 

say that there was a likelihood of bias in this particular case, 

that it was substantial, I simply can't find that based on the 

facts of the case based on the evidence before me, which is 

the admissible portion of the declarations. [¶] I'm going to 

deny the motion for a new trial at this time based on those 

findings."

B. Denial of the new trial motion was proper.

Appellant argues that the jury misconduct was prejudicial and the 

trial court erred by denying the new trial motion. This argument is 

unconvincing.

1. Applicable legal standards.

"An accused has a constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. 

[Citations.] An impartial jury is one in which no member has been 

improperly influenced [citations] and every member is '"capable and willing 

to decide the case solely on the evidence before it"' [citations]." (In re 

Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 293-294.) Juror misconduct occurs when 

there is a direct violation of the juror's oaths, duties or instruction. (Id. at p. 

294.) Misconduct also occurs when a juror receives outside information 

concerning the case or shares improper information with other jurors. 

(Ibid.) Yet, "with narrow exceptions, evidence that the internal thought 

processes of one or more jurors were biased is not admissible to impeach 

a verdict." (Ibid.) "[W]here a verdict is attacked for juror taint, the focus is 

on whether there is any overt event or circumstance, 'open to 

[corroboration by] sight, hearing, and the other senses' [citation], which 

suggests a likelihood that one or more members of the jury were 

influenced by improper bias." (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

Section 1181 permits the trial court to grant a motion for new trial 

when the jury has "been guilty of any misconduct by which a fair and due 

consideration of the case has been prevented" (id., subd. 3) or has 

decided the verdict "by any means other than a fair expression of opinion 

on the part of all the jurors" (id., subd. 4). When ruling on a new trial 

motion that is based on juror misconduct, the trial court undertakes a 

three-step inquiry. First, it must decide if the affidavits supporting the 

motions are admissible under Evidence Code section 1150.[fn8] Second, 

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the trial court must determine whether the facts establish misconduct. 

Third, the trial court must determine if the misconduct was prejudicial. 

(People v. Bryant (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1467.) Juror misconduct 

raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. (In re Lucas (2004) 33 

Cal.4th 682, 696.) This presumption is rebutted "'if the entire record in the 

particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and 

the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable 

probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more 

jurors were actually biased against the defendant.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.; In re 

Hamilton supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296.)

FN8: Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) provides: "Upon an 

inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence 

may be received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events 

occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is 

likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible 

to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a 

juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 

concerning the mental processes by which it was determined."

The trial court's ruling on a new trial motion is reviewed under the 

abuse of discretion standard and will not be reversed unless a manifest 

and unmistakable abuse of discretion is clearly apparent. (People v. 

Bryant, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467.) When presented with the new 

trial motion based on the ground of juror misconduct, "the reviewing court 

has a constitutional obligation to determine independently whether the 

misconduct prevented the complaining party from having a fair trial." 

(People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582, fn. 5.) The appellate court 

"accept[s] the trial court's credibility determinations and findings on 

questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] 

Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct, however, is a mixed 

question of law and fact subject to an appellate court's independent 

determination. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 582.)

2. Nondisclosure of Juror No. 2's misdemeanor conviction.

The trial court found that Juror No. 2's failure to disclose her prior 

petty theft conviction was misconduct but there was no evidence 

demonstrating that the omission reflected juror bias. Therefore, the court 

gave it "very little weight in deciding this motion."

Appellant argues that Juror No. 2's omission "undermined the jury 

selection process." His contention is unavailing. When a juror has 

concealed information, prejudice is determined by examining if the 

omission was made to conceal a biased state of mind. (See In re 

Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 294-295.) Here, there is nothing 

indicating that failure to disclose the prior conviction indicated any bias 

against appellant. There is no evidence before us that Juror No. 2 

intentionally failed to disclose the 10-year-old misdemeanor conviction in 

an effort to conceal a bias or prejudice. The trial court correctly gave this 

averment little weight.

3. Deliberations with less than 12 jurors present.

The trial court found that misconduct occurred when deliberations 

took place while less than 12 jurors were present. The court then found 

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that the record did not contain any evidence concerning the substance of 

these deliberations or any evidence of bias against appellant. Therefore, 

the misconduct was not prejudicial.

We discern no error in the trial court's reasoning or result. The 

declarations by Juror Nos. 2 and 12 did not contain any information about 

the content of deliberations that occurred when less than 12 jurors were 

present. They set forth nothing more than the bare fact that deliberations 

took place when less than 12 jurors were present. There is no evidence 

that the jurors deliberated when less than 12 jurors were present because 

they were biased against appellant. There is no proof of bias against 

appellant. We agree with the trial court that the misconduct was not 

prejudicial.

4. The jury foreperson's conduct/statements.

Appellant repeats the averments contained in the jurors' 

declarations about the foreperson and asserts that these averments 

proved prejudicial misconduct. This argument suffers from a fatal defect. 

As set forth ante in section III.A., the trial court made an evidentiary ruling 

that many of the averments concerning the foreperson were not 

admissible. Also, the trial court separately ruled on each alleged act of 

misconduct and explained why the misconduct was not prejudicial. 

Appellant's briefing failed to acknowledge that the trial court found portions 

of the declarations to be inadmissible.

Appellant did not challenge the trial court's evidentiary rulings and 

did not object to the trial court's rulings on the averments concerning the 

foreperson. Therefore, any potential appellate challenges to the trial 

court's ruling on these points "are deemed to have been waived or 

abandoned." (Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Fraternal Finance Co. (1934) 

220 Cal. 362, 363.) Appellant bears the burden of raising an issue on 

appeal and showing reversible error by legal argument on the point with 

citation of authorities. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 

701, pp. 769-770; Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 

Cal.App.4th 539, 546 ["it is not this court's function to serve as ... backup 

appellate counsel"].) We reject appellant's perfunctory and generalized 

claim that the foreperson committed prejudicial misconduct as 

insufficiently undeveloped. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 206; 

People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1116, fn. 20.)

We have independently reviewed the trial court's rulings concerning 

averments about the jury foreperson. The trial court properly determined 

that the foreperson engaged in misconduct in two respects: (1) by refusing 

to relay jury questions to the court; and (2) by saying to other jurors that 

appellant left the courtroom because he was guilty. We agree with the trial 

court that this misconduct was not prejudicial.

The record does not support a substantial likelihood of prejudice 

against appellant. The jurors did not identify the nature of the questions 

that the foreman refused to relay to the court. The trial court instructed the 

jurors that any questions could be submitted to the court in writing 

(CALCRIM No. 3550) and Juror Nos. 2 and 12 failed to take advantage of 

this opportunity. Without knowing the content of the questions, we cannot 

find that the foreperson's refusal to relay the questions to the trial court 

was the product of a bias against appellant.

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We agree with the trial court that appellant is not entitled to a new 

trial because the foreperson improperly referenced appellant's 

unauthorized flight from the courtroom as proof of guilt. The trial court 

reasoned that appellant "should not be able to profit ... by his own 

wrongdoing." In In re Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th 273, our Supreme Court 

wrote that a defendant can never overturn a verdict by instigating an 

incident that influences the jurors, as follows: "At the outset, we question 

whether a convicted person can ever overturn the verdict on grounds that 

persons acting in his behalf deliberately sought to influence the jury. 

Certainly no such claim could ever be valid where the accused himself 

had instigated the incident; a party cannot profit by his or her own 

wrongdoing." (Id. at p. 305.) Appellant cannot flee from the courtroom and 

then claim reversible error because a juror mentioned his wrongful 

conduct during deliberations.

This court has independently reviewed the record as a mixed 

question of law and fact. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it determined that the irregularity that occurred in this case 

was not prejudicial. The standard we apply "is a pragmatic one, mindful of 

the 'day-to-day realities of courtroom life' [citation] ...." (In re Hamilton, 

supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296.) In this case, the presumption of prejudice was 

sufficiently rebutted. The entire record, including the nature of the 

misconduct and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is not a 

substantial likelihood that one or more of the jurors were actually biased 

against appellant. (Ibid.) Therefore, we hold that the new trial motion was 

properly denied.

People v. Valenzuela, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2145 at 22-35.

2. Relevant Law

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution safeguards a 

criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be tried by a panel of impartial and 

indifferent jurors. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 

(1961); see also Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 507 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Irvin, 366 

U.S. at 722) ("The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 'guarantees to the criminally 

accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.'") "It is not required, 

however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved." Irvin, 366 

U.S. at 722-23 (finding that mere existence of preconceived notion of guilt or innocence 

of accused is insufficient by itself to rebut the presumption that a prospective juror is 

impartial). Rather, due process requires that a defendant be tried by "a jury capable and 

willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 

209, 217, 102 S. Ct. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982); see also Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 

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755, 766 (9th Cir 2007). Jurors are objectionable if they have formed such strong and 

deep impressions that their minds are closed against conflicting testimony. See Irvin, 

366 U.S. at 722 n.3. The presence of even one biased juror deprives a defendant of the 

right to an impartial jury. Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998).

The Sixth Amendment also requires the jury verdict be based entirely on the 

evidence produced at trial. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-473, 85 S. Ct. 546, 13 

L. Ed. 2d 424 (1965). When presented with allegations of jury misconduct or juror bias, 

the trial court is required to determine what transpired, the impact on the jurors, and 

whether or not what transpired was prejudicial. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 

229-230, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 654, 1954-1 C.B. 146 (1954); Dyer, 151 F.3d at 974 

("A court confronted with a colorable claim of juror bias must undertake an investigation 

of the relevant facts and circumstances."). As the Supreme Court noted:

[T]ampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter 

pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively 

prejudicial . . . The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests 

heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of 

the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the 

defendant.

Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229 (citing Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150, 

13 S. Ct. 50, 36 L. Ed. 917 (1892)); see also Xiong v. Felker, 681 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th 

Cir. 2012).

Further, the evaluation of claims of juror misconduct depends on whether the 

misconduct is based on extrinsic influences or intrinsic influences. When the misconduct 

stems from an extrinsic or external influence, prejudice is presumed unless the 

government shows it was harmless. See United States v. Remmer, 347 U.S. 227, 228-

29, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 654, 1954-1 C.B. 146 (1954); Xiong v. Felker, 681 F.3d 

1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 228-29) ("The presumption of 

prejudice that arises from juror misconduct, although strong, is not conclusive; 'the 

burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the 

defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.'") The 

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situation is different when the alleged misconduct is intrinsic to the jury's deliberations.

"[L]ong-recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury 

deliberations from intrusive inquiry." Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127, 107 S. 

Ct. 2739, 97 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1987). Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and California 

Evidence Code section 1150(a) prohibit the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict 

when that testimony relates to intrinsic matters, i.e., the internal, mental processes by 

which the verdict was rendered. See id. at 116-27 (discussing Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); 

People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 695-96, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351 (1991) 

(discussing Cal. Evid. Code § 1150(a)).

3. Analysis

a. Undisclosed Conviction

Petitioner first claims misconduct based on juror number 2 failing to disclose

during vior dire that she had a misdemeanor conviction. In a declaration, the juror admits 

that she was convicted of petty theft in 2003 but failed to disclose the conviction due to 

its age. (See Clerk’s Tr. at 297-98.) Respondent notes that Petitioner did not request the 

transcripts of vior dire during trial. Without records, it is not possible to determine 

whether the juror purposely failed to disclose the conviction, or if the jurors were only 

asked to disclose more recent convictions. Even assuming that the juror failed to 

disclose the conviction, Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by the juror’s 

conduct. While the failure to disclose the conviction deprived the parties the ability to 

question the juror regarding any bias that she may have harbored as a result of the 

conviction, the state court was reasonable in determining that the failure to disclose the 

conviction was not done in an effort to conceal bias or prejudice. Petitioner was not able 

to question the juror regarding the conviction, but has provided no argument as to why a 

nearly ten year old theft conviction would have biased the juror. 

The Court finds the state court's decision to be an objectively reasonable 

application of Supreme Court precedents. The trial court in this case conducted review of 

Petitioner’s claim of juror misconduct and determined that there was no evidence of 

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prejudice based on juror bias due to the undisclosed conviction. The denial of the claim 

was not an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedents.

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on the failure of the juror to 

disclose the conviction.

b. Misconduct of Juror Foreperson

Petitioner next asserts that the foreperson engaged in intimidating and coercive 

behavior that constituted misconduct. Petitioner alleges that the foreperson insinuated 

during deliberations that Petitioner may be guilty as he was already in prison, that he 

stated that he would not accept a hung jury, that he allowed deliberations without jurors 

present, refused to deliver jury questions to the court, commented that Petitioner “ran out 

of the courtroom so he must be guilty,” and was otherwise rude, loud, angry, and 

threatening. (See Pet. at 26-27.) 

First, to the extent that Petitioner’s argument is based on the discussions of the 

jurors during deliberations, federal law prohibits the admission of juror testimony to 

impeach a jury verdict. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987). To the extent 

that Petitioner’s claims are based on the comments or behavior of the jury foreman, 

those claims relate to the internal, mental processes of the jury. There is no indication 

that the foreperson introduced external information. To the extent that the foreman 

presented his arguments regarding Petitioner’s guilt based on the evidence presented 

during trial in an offensive manner, the state court was reasonable in denying the claim. 

Further the state court was reasonable in determining that the foreman did not 

commit misconduct by refusing to relay juror questions to the court or commenting on 

Petitioner’s attempt to leave the courtroom as a sign of guilt. With regard to refusing to 

relay juror questions, the state court found that there was no prejudice. At trial, the jury 

was informed that they could send a note through the bailiff, if needed. (Clerk’s Tr. at

245.) Petitioner has presented no evidence regarding what questions, if any, were not 

relayed. Further, Petitioner has not shown how the failure to relay those questions 

created bias against Petitioner. 

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Based on the evidence presented in his federal petition, the state court was 

reasonable in finding the alleged failure of the foreperson to relay questions to be 

harmless. Petitioner has not shown it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict as he has not described what questions were to be asked, 

and there are no obvious evidentiary issues from a review of the record. See Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 637. Accordingly, the denial of Petitioner's claim of misconduct based on the 

foreman’s failure to relay questions was not an objectively unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court precedents. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on 

the failure to convey juror questions.

Finally, with regard to the claim that the juror foreman commented on Petitioner’s 

guilt based on Petitioner running out of the courtroom into the hallway, the state court 

found that Petitioner should not benefit from his own wrongful conduct. Additionally, 

upon reviewing the entire record, it found that even if the comments were made, there 

was no evidence of bias, and Petitioner was not prejudiced by the comments. Even if the 

foreperson took into account Petitioner’s actions during trial, the state court was 

reasonable in finding that there was no substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict based on the incident. “The Sixth Amendment affords no 

relief when the defendant's own misconduct caused the alleged juror partiality and the 

trial judge employed reasonable means under the circumstances to preserve the trial's 

fairness.” Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 626 (9th Cir. 2002). In this case, the trial 

court held a hearing after the incident and removed several jurors, but kept several other 

jurors on the panel that the court believed could remain impartial. In addition to taking 

adequate safeguards, there was significant evidence of Petitioner’s guilt based on the 

evidence presented at trial. Petitioner has not shown that the denial of this claim was an 

objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.

c. Deliberation Without All Jurors Present

Petitioner, in his final contention of juror misconduct, alleges that the jury 

continued to deliberate without jurors present. The claim is conclusory, and does not 

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provide any specific mention of how many jurors were not present, and for what period of 

time deliberations occurred without the full jury. The declarations of the two jurors noted 

that deliberations occurred on multiple occasions without all the jurors present. (Clerks’ 

Tr. at 294-297.) However, the jury deliberated for less than two hours before reaching a 

verdict. (Id. at 249, 253.) 

Petitioner has not shown that the deliberations indicate improper bias by the jury 

or otherwise harmed his case. Even if some jurors were absent for parts of the 

deliberation, all the jurors agreed with verdict as read in open court. In this case, the jury 

found Petitioner guilty of battery but not of the enhancement of great bodily injury. 

(Clerk’s Tr. at 253-54.) A review of the record reflects that there was not significant 

evidence to support the great bodily injury enhancement, and the fact that the jury did 

not find Petitioner guilty of the enhancement is not supportive of finding that the jury was 

biased against Petitioner. Instead, even if all the jurors were not present during 

deliberation, they reached a verdict that was reasonable based on the record, and which 

all jurors admitted that they were in agreement with in open court. 

Finally, even if some of the jurors were not present, or if the result was not 

unanimous, there would still not be a violation of federal law. As a state criminal 

defendant in a noncapital case, Petitioner had no federal constitutional right to a 

unanimous jury verdict. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 635 n.5 (1991) ("a state criminal 

defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no federal right to a unanimous jury 

verdict"); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-12 (1972) (no constitutional right to 

unanimous jury verdict in non-capital criminal cases); see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 

406 U.S. 356, 359, 92 S. Ct. 1620, 32 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1972) (the Supreme Court "has 

never held jury unanimity to be a requisite of due process of law."). Accordingly, to the 

extent that some jurors were not present, or the decision was not unanimous (even 

though in this case, the jury returned a unanimous decision) there would be no violation 

of federal law. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief for his Sixth Amendment right to 

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be tried by a panel of impartial and indifferent jurors. Irvin, 366 U.S. 717, 722; Hayes, 

632 F.3d 500, 507. It is recommended that Petitioner's fourth claim for relief be denied.

IV. Recommendation 

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 23, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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