Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02251/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02251-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Petitioner filed a notice of stay of proceedings, citing ongoing proceedings before the U.S.

Tax Court. Nothing in the tax court statutes or rules, however, require a stay of federal court

proceedings pending the resolution of matters pending in that court. 

10cv2251

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAMAR ELLIS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 10cv2251-IEG(BGS)

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss Petition

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE; JONATHAN ANDREWS,

Respondent.

Petitioner Lamar Ellis seeks to quash an IRS summons issued to the Custodian of Records

of GODADDY.COM, Inc. The government has filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner did not file an opposition to the motion.1 The Court

previously found the motion appropriate for submission on the papers and without oral argument.

The government’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Discussion

The government moves to dismiss the petition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of

jurisdiction. 

1. Revenue Agent Jonathan Andrews

The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars actions against federal officers in their official

Case 3:10-cv-02251-IEG-BGS Document 14 Filed 03/22/11 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2251

capacity. In such cases, the proper defendant, if any, is the United States. Gilbert v. DaGrossa,

756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) (a suit against IRS employees in their official capacity is

essentially a suit aginst the United States). The only relief sought by Petitioner is to quash the

summons issued by Revenue Agent Andrews in accordance with 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602 and 7603.

Such claim against Revenue Agent Andrews is barred by sovereign immunity. Gilbert, 756 F.2d

at 1459.

2. Suit Against the United States

 The United States is immune from suit unless there is a valid waiver of sovereign

immunity. Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1995). The only statute providing

the court with jurisdiction to quash an IRS summons is 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b). Section 7609(b),

therefore, is the exclusive method by which a taxpayer can challenge a summons issued by the

IRS. Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985). The procedures for filing a

petition to quash are set forth in § 7609(b) as follows:

(A) In general. – Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who is entitled

to notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to begin a proceeding to

quash such summons not later than the 20th day after the day such notice is given in the

manner provided in subsection (a)(2). In any such proceeding, the Secretary may seek to

compel compliance with the summons.

Pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A), the petition to quash must be filed within 20 days after

notice of the summons is given to the taxpayer. This 20-day period is jurisdictional, and the court

must dismiss a petition not filed within that time period. Ponsford, 771 F.2d at 1309; Clay v.

United States, 199 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999); Faber v. United States, 921 F.2d 1118, 1119 (10th

Cir. 1990). The 20-day time period under § 7609(b)(2)(A) begins to run on the date that notice of

the summons is mailed to the taxpayer, not the date on which it is received. Berman v. United

States, 264 F.3d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2001); Clay, 199 F.3d at 878; Stringer v. United States, 776

F.2d 274, 275-76 (11th Cir. 1985); 26 C.F.R. § 301.7609-4(b)(2) (requiring that proceeding to

quash a summons be instituted “not later than the 20th day following the day the notice of the

summons was served on or mailed to such person”). Section 7609(a)(2) provides that notice given

to a taxpayer is “sufficient” if it “is mailed by certified or registered mail to the last known address

of such person, or, in the absence of a last known address, is left with the person summoned.” This

Case 3:10-cv-02251-IEG-BGS Document 14 Filed 03/22/11 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The government asserts the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because (1) under 26

U.S.C. § 7609(h), the petition to quash must be filed in the district where the summoned party

“resides or is found,” and (2) the petition to quash was not filed until after the response date for the

summons. In addition, the government argues the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the

United States because the petitioner did not properly serve the petition. Because the Court

concludes the petition was filed beyond the jurisdictional time period set forth in § 7609(b)(2)(A),

it need not address these additional arguments.

10cv2251

language evidences an intent to relieve the government of the obligation to provide actual notice to

the taxpayer. Berman, 264 F.3d at 19.

Here, Petitioner filed his petition to quash on October 29, 2010, 29 days after the

government sent notice of the summons to him by certified mail on September 30, 2010. Thus, the

petition is untimely and the Court lacks jurisdiction.2

Conclusion

For the reasons explained herein, the government’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The

petition to quash is dismissed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 22, 2011

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:10-cv-02251-IEG-BGS Document 14 Filed 03/22/11 Page 3 of 3