Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-00525/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-00525-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christine Baker, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV-03-0525-PCT-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc.,)

et al., ) 

)

Defendants. ) )

Introduction

Currently pending before the court are motions by defendants

Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian") (doc. 308) and

ConsumerInfo.com, Inc. ("CIC") (doc. 312) for summary judgment

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Alternatively, Experian is moving

for partial summary judgment on "Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the

Fair Credit Report Act ("FCRA"), the Arizona Fair Credit Reporting

Act [("AzFCRA")], and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages." 

Doc. 308 at 1. CIC also moves in the alternative, seeking partial

summary judgment on plaintiff's FCRA and punitive damage claims. 

See Doc. 312 at 1. 

Case 3:03-cv-00525-RCB Document 329 Filed 02/27/07 Page 1 of 10
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Despite being court ordered to do so, plaintiff pro se

Christine Baker did not file any opposition to these defense

motions. Instead, she filed a motion for reconsideration and

clarification (doc. 328) of this court's October 18, 2006 order. 

As part of that motion plaintiff also is seeking yet another

extension of time in which to respond to the defense summary

judgment motions. Additionally, she is seeking sanctions pursuant

to LRCiv 83.1(f) based upon her belief that defense attorney Marc

Carlson has violated the Local Rules, as well as court orders. 

Lastly, plaintiff is seeking clarification of the court's

procedures regarding the filing of sealed documents. 

Background

This is plaintiff's third attempt to have "all personal

identifying information and open account numbers" removed from the

exhibits which defendants filed as part of their summary judgment

motions. Assuming familiarity with its prior decisions in this

regard, suffice it to say that plaintiff has had limited success in

these attempts. Her success has been limited because, for the most

part, the defendants have complied with this District's Electronic

Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual ("the

Manual") in terms of redacting "personal identifiers" from those

exhibits. 

Substantively, plaintiff's motion gains nothing by repetition. 

Moreover, as explained below, this motion to reconsider suffers

from the additional infirmity that it is untimely.

. . .

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Discussion

A. Reconsideration

1. Timeliness

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(g), "[a]bsent good cause shown, any

motion for reconsideration shall be filed no later than ten (10)

days after the filing of the Order that is the subject of the

motion." LRCiv 7.2(g) (emphasis added). Computing time in 

accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), means that plaintiff Baker

had until November 1, 2006, to timely file this reconsideration

motion. However, plaintiff filed this motion on November 6, 2006,

more than ten days after the October 18, 2006, Order which she is

seeking to have this court reconsider. Plaintiff Baker does not

include a statement of good cause for the delay in filing her

motion for reconsideration. Thus, the court finds that this motion

is not timely.

To be sure, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) allows a longer time frame

for reconsideration motions than does LRCiv 7.2. Under the former

Rule, reconsideration motions "shall be made within a reasonable

time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year

after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Plaintiff Baker did not specify the basis

for her reconsideration motion. She cannot avail herself of the

longer time frame in which to file such a motion under Fed R. Civ.

P. 60(b), however, because the order which she is seeking to have

this court reconsider is interlocutory in that no final judgment

has yet been entered in this case. See United States v. Little,

No. CV-F-02-5141 REC/DLB, 2006 WL 2432270, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 21,

2006) (Rule 60(b) does not "apply to defendants'[reconsideration]

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motion because no judgment has been entered in favor of the

[plaintiff]."); see also Connors v. Iquique U.S.L.L.C., No. C05-

334JLR, 2005 WL 3007127, at *7 (W.D.Wash. Nov. 9, 2005) (citing

Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2001)) ("Rule

60(b) does not apply to non-final orders.") Stated somewhat

differently, this court's October 18, 2006, order did not "end[]

the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to

do but execute the judgment." See Catlin v. United States, 324

U.S. 229, 233 (1945). Quite the contrary, as is evidenced by the

pending defense summary judgment motions, there are a host of

issues which the court must resolve before entering a final

judgment in this action. Therefore plaintiff cannot avail herself

of the longer time frame for seeking reconsideration under Rule

60(b). 

2. "Inherent Discretion"

Notwithstanding Rule 60(b) and the Local Rules, the court is

fully aware of its "inherent discretion to reconsider interlocutory

orders" such as this court's October 18, 2006 Order. See Hansen v.

Schubert, 459 F.Supp.2d 973, 988 n.5 (E.D.Cal. 2006). Indeed, as

the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1946 amendments to Rule 60(b)

make clear, "interlocutory judgments are not brought within the

restrictions of the rule, but rather they are left subject to the

complete power of the court rendering them to afford such relief

from them as justice requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) Advisory

Committee Notes (1946 Amendments); see also American Rivers v. NOAA

Fisheries, No. CV-04-00061-RE, 2006 WL 1983178, at *2 (D.Or. July

14, 2006) (citing, inter alia, Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v.

Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005)) (A "district court

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1 As an aside, the court observes that plaintiff's reliance upon A.R.S.

§ 44-1373 is wholly misplaced. Plaintiff is relying upon two different sub-parts

of that statute. First, she is relying upon subpart (A)(1) which provides as

follows:

 Except as otherwise specifically provided 

by law, beginning on January 1, 2005, a person 

or entity shall not:

 Intentionally communicate or otherwise make 

an individual's social security number available 

to the general public.

A.R.S. § 44-1373(A)(1) (West Supp. 2006). As explained in this court's prior

orders, including its order of October 18, 2006, the challenged exhibits do not

contain plaintiff's social security number. See Doc. 318 at 4; and Doc. 327 at 5.

Thus, there has been no violation of section 44-1373(A)(1).

Plaintiff fares no better with her reliance upon sub-part (G)(1) of section

44-1373. That statute provides in relevant part:

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[has] inherent common-law authority to rescind or modify any

interlocutory order as long as the court retains jurisdiction over

the matter.") Despite the foregoing, Rule 60 provides a "helpful

guide" to this court's inherent discretion. See Hansen, 459

F.Supp.2d at 998 n.5. 

Rule 60(b) allows a court to reconsider a prior order on a

variety of grounds: "(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5)

a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) 'extraordinary

circumstances' which would justify relief." Lee v. State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insur. Co., No. CV 03-624-TUC-HCE, 2006 WL

2917348, at *1 (D.Ariz. Oct. 10, 2006) (quoting Backlund v.

Barnhart, 778 F.3d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985)). Plaintiff Baker is

not relying upon any of these bases for reconsideration. Instead,

she contends that defendants and their attorney, Marc Carlson,

violated A.R.S. § 44-1373, because supposedly the exhibits filed as

part of the defense summary judgment motions contain "personal

identifying information and open account numbers."1 As an

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Except as otherwise provided by law, 

documents or records that are recorded 

and made available on the recording entity's 

public web site after the effective date of 

this amendment to this section shall not contain 

more than five numbers that are reasonably identifiable 

as being part of an individuals' social security 

number and shall not contain an individual's:

Credit card, charge card or debit card numbers.

A.R.S. § 44-1373(G)(1) (West Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). Plaintiff completely

overlooks the fact, however, that the effective date of that statute is January 1,

2007. See id. Therefore, it does not govern the present dispute which centers

around documents filed in 2006. 

2 Clearly this is not so at least with respect to defendant CIC. That

statute states in pertinent part:

[A]ny consumer reporting agency may furnish 

a consumer report under the following circumstances 

and no other: 

In response to the order of a court having 

jurisdiction to issue such an order, or a subpoena 

issued in connection with proceedings before a 

Federal grand jury. 

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1) (West Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). The FCRA broadly

defines a consumer reporting agency as:

 any person which, for monetary fees, dues, 

 or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly 

 engages in whole or in part in the practice of 

 assembling or evaluating consumer credit information 

 or other information on consumers for the purpose 

 of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and 

 which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce 

 for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer

 reports. 

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (West 1998) (emphasis added). 

 In the present case, plaintiff does not, and indeed cannot, allege that

defendant CIC is a consumer reporting agency within the meaning of the FCRA. CIC

does not "assemble[] nor evaluate[] consumer credit information for the purposes

of furnishing consumer reports to third parties to make credit decisions." Doc.

312 at 3-4. Rather, CIC "purchases credit data and products from credit bureaus,

reformats it, and resells its credit products to the consumers who are the subject

of those reports." Doc. 314 (Decl'n of David Williams (Aug. 30, 2006)) at 2, ¶ 3

(emphasis added). Thus, because CIC does not fall within the definition of a

credit reporting agency for purposes of FCRA liability, it is not subject to

section 1681b(a)(1) of that statute. Accordingly, even if plaintiff's motion was

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additional basis for reconsideration, plaintiff contends that the

filing of those exhibits violates section 1681b of the FCRA.2 Even

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timely, her argument that she is entitled to reconsideration because CIC violated

section 1681b(a)(1) of the FCRA is unavailing.

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if timely, the court would decline to exercise its "inherent

discretion" to reconsider its October 18, 2006 interlocutory order

because plaintiff is not asserting any of the potential grounds for

relief enumerated in Rule 60(b). See Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950

F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991) (district court "properly denied"

reconsideration motion where none of the Rule 60(b) factors were

present); Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985)

(same). A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for raising

arguments which could have been raised before, yet that is exactly

what plaintiff Baker is seeking to do here. Grant v. I.R.S., No.

MC06-0079-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 158729, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 16, 2007)

(citing, inter alia, Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip.,

Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also MartinezVazquez v. I.N.S., 346 F.3d 903, 905 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.

denied, 543 U.S. 1095 (2005) (citation omitted) ("district court

had discretion not to consider the [defendant's] new argument,

advanced for the first time in its motion for reconsideration[]"). 

Nothing prevented plaintiff Baker, when she moved for a protective

order on September 28, 2006, from arguing that the filing of the

defense summary judgment exhibits violated either A.R.S. § 44-1373

or section 1681b of the FCRA. Thus, for all of these reasons the

court denies plaintiff Baker's motion for reconsideration of its

October 18, 2006 interlocutory order.

B. Extension of Time

As she did in her September 28, 2006, motion for a protective

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order, etc., plaintiff is seeking a thirty day extension of time in

which to respond to defendants' summary judgment motions. Also, as

she did in her prior motion, plaintiff requests that that thirty

days commence running "AFTER all [her] credit reports with account

numbers and personal data [a]re removed from PACER[.]" Doc. 328 at

12 (emphasis in original). 

Although the court declines to grant plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration, it will grant her an extension of time in which to

respond to the pending summary judgment motions by Experian and

CIC. The primary reason for granting this extension is that the

court believes that the interests of justice will best be served by

proceeding with a fully developed record on these motions. Thus,

plaintiff shall file and serve a response to defendants' summary

judgment motions (doc. 308 and 312) on or before 5:00 p.m., March

19, 2007. Plaintiff is forewarned that if she fails to timely

respond, and/or instead makes the strategic decision which she did

in this instance, i.e. to file a motion seeking another form of

relief, she runs the risk of the court granting defendants' motions

for summary judgment in their entirety. 

In light of the foregoing, the defendants' shall have until on

or before 5:00 p.m., March 28, 2007, by which to file a reply to

plaintiff's response to their summary judgment motions. To the

extent defendants are seeking summary judgment dismissing this

action in its entirety, defendants' replies should address not only

plaintiff's response arguments but they should also insure that

they have thoroughly briefed each and every cause of action in

plaintiff's FAC. 

. . .

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C. Clarification of Sealing Procedures

In this motion plaintiff is also "request[ing] clarification

regarding the procedures to seal documents[.]" Doc. 328 at 16. 

Among other inquiries, plaintiff is asking whether "the Court

[would] order the removal of documents from PACER if the filer

requested so[.]" Id. The court will not entertain such

hypothetical inquiries. What is more, in this court's opinion,

there is no need for clarification of the procedures for sealing

documents in this district. Therefore, the court denies this

request. 

D. Sanctions

As she has previously, plaintiff is seeking sanctions against

attorney Carlson. Despite plaintiff's assertions to the contrary,

defendant Carlson has not engaged in any sanctionable conduct. 

Therefore, the court denies this aspect of plaintiff's motion as

well.

Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Christine Baker's "Motion for

Reconsideration and Clarification" (Doc. 328) is DENIED in its

entirety.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Baker's response to the

summary judgment motions previously filed by defendants Experian

and CIC shall be filed on or before 5:00 p.m., March 19, 2007.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Experian and CIC shall

. . . 

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file a reply to plaintiff's response on or before 5:00 p.m., March

28, 2007. 

DATED this 27th day of February, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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