Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02950/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02950-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2950

No. 07-3079

___________

Thornton Drilling Company, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. *

* Appeals from the United States

National Union Fire Insurance * District Court for the

Company of Pittsburgh, PA, * Western District of Arkansas.

*

Defendant - Appellant, *

*

Stephens Production Company, *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

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Submitted: April 18, 2008

Filed: August 12, 2008

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Eric Stricklin, an employee of Thornton Drilling Company (“Thornton”), was

killed by an explosion or blowout while working in Franklin County, Arkansas, on an

oil drilling rig leased to Thornton by the producer, Stephens Production Company

(“Stephens”). Stricklin’s wife and representative of his estate filed a wrongful death

Appellate Case: 07-2950 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/12/2008 Entry ID: 3460316
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The HONORABLE JIMM LARRY HENDREN, Chief Judge of the United

States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. 

2

At oral argument, we questioned our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

because the order being appealed did not resolve a counterclaim Stephens asserted

against Thornton. Thereafter, the district court entered an amended and substituted

judgment, nunc pro tunc, dismissing Stephens’ counterclaim with prejudice. As there

is now a final judgment, we have jurisdiction to decide the appeal on the merits.

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action against Thornton and Stephens. The exclusive workers’ compensation remedy

barred Stricklin’s claim against Thornton, but Stephens asserted that Thornton is

contractually obligated to indemnify Stephens for its liability to Stricklin. Stephens

settled Stricklin’s wrongful death claim for $1,705,000. Thornton’s commercial

liability insurer paid $1,000,000, its policy limit. Stephens’ insurer paid $205,000.

Stephens paid its deductible, the remaining $500,000, and demanded indemnity from

Thornton, which tendered the demand to its umbrella liability insurer, National Union

Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”). 

When National Union denied coverage, Thornton commenced this diversity

action, seeking a declaratory judgment it has no duty to indemnify Stephens or,

alternatively, that its indemnity obligation is covered by National Union’s policy.

Ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, the district court1

 held that Thornton

must indemnify Stephens and that this obligation is covered by National Union’s

policy. Thornton and National Union separately appeal.2

 As National Union now

concedes coverage, the only issue we must decide is whether Thornton must

indemnify Stephens. The parties agree that Arkansas law governs the construction of

the relevant contracts. Reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment and

its interpretation of state contract law de novo, we affirm. See Fairbrook Leasing, Inc.

v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 519 F.3d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review).

Under Arkansas law, an agreement to indemnify is enforceable in accordance

with normal contract law principles, except that a promise to indemnify another party

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for its own negligence must be clear and unequivocal. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.

Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co., 151 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Ark. 2004); Nabholz Constr.

Corp. v. Graham, 892 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Ark. 1995). The clarity of the promise is not

an issue in this case. Rather, the issue is how to interpret inconsistent indemnity

provisions in three separate and distinct agreements between Thornton and Stephens.

First, in June 2000 -- well before Stricklin’s death in January 2005 -- Thornton

and Stephens entered into a Contractor’s Master Agreement (“CMA”). The preamble

recited that Thornton as contractor “may perform work . . . for [Stephens] from time

to time.” Specific jobs “will be requested and confirmed by written contract . . . . Any

and all work agreed on shall be performed in accordance with and subject to the terms

and provisions of this Master Agreement.” Paragraph 4(d) included the indemnity

provision on which Thornton and National Union rely:

[Stephens] shall . . . indemnify and hold harmless [Thornton] . . . from

and against any claims . . . for . . . personal injury, death or property

damage . . . from . . . explosion . . . and/or a well blowout . . . even if

contributed to or caused by the . . . negligence . . . of [Thornton]. 

The parties agree that, if this provision applies, Thornton has no duty to indemnify

Stephens, and the district court’s decision to the contrary must be reversed. In arguing

that this provision applies, Thornton and Stephens emphasize paragraph 15 of the

CMA, which provided:

In the event there should be any conflict between the provisions

of this Agreement and any Company work order . . . or Contractor’s

work ticket . . . or any other type of written memoranda, pertaining to the

subject matter hereof, the provisions of this Agreement shall control

unless expressly agreed otherwise in writing by the parties hereto.

Second, in May 2004, Thornton leased from Stephens the drilling rig on which

Stricklin was working when the accident occurred. The lease was reflected in a Lease

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Agreement with Option To Sell (the “Lease Agreement”), which contained the

following indemnity provision:

[THORNTON] ASSUMES ANY AND ALL LIABILITY AND

AGREES TO . . . INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS . . .

[STEPHENS] . . . FROM AND AGAINST ANY . . . LIABILITY . . .

THAT IS ASSERTED BY OR ARISES ON ACCOUNT OF BODILY

INJURY [OR] DEATH . . . ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED

IN CONNECTION WITH . . . THE PERFORMANCE . . . OF THIS

LEASE AGREEMENT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT

SUCH CLAIMS OR ACTIONS ARE FOUNDED . . . UPON THE

ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE . . . OF [STEPHENS] . . . .

Third, the drilling work that led to Stricklin’s death was governed by a separate

Drilling Bid Proposal and Daywork Drilling Contract between Thornton and Stephens

(the “Drilling Contract”). A warning at the top of the first page of this International

Association of Drilling Contractors form contract stated, “THIS AGREEMENT

CONTAINS PROVISIONS RELATING TO INDEMNITY . . . AND

ALLOCATION OF RISK.” A subsection entitled “Contractor’s Indemnification of

Operator” then provided: 

[Thornton] shall . . . indemnify [Stephens] . . . from and against all

claims . . . of every kind and character, without limit and without regard

to the cause or causes thereof or the negligence of any party or parties,

arising in connection herewith in favor of [Thornton’s] employees . . . on

account of bodily injury, death or damage to property.

The parties agree that, if the indemnity provision in either the Drilling Contract or the

Lease Agreement applies, Thornton must indemnify Stephens, and the district court’s

decision should be affirmed. Neither the Drilling Contract nor the Lease Agreement

specifically referred to the CMA. 

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As an alternative position, Stephens argued in the district court that par. 15 of

the CMA contains an ambiguity -- whether the reference to “any other type of written

memoranda” includes the “written contracts” referred to in the CMA preamble, such

as the Drilling Contract and the Lease Agreement. Like the district court, we need not

consider this question, but the omission of “written contract” from par. 15 tends to cut

against Thornton’s contention that the CMA overrides these later contracts.

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The dispute turns on a question of contract law: when a “master agreement”

states that it prevails over conflicting terms in future contracts “unless expressly

agreed otherwise in writing,” does the master agreement override conflicting terms in

subsequent written contracts that do not refer specifically to the master agreement, as

Thornton and National Union contend?3

 The district court rejected this interpretation

of the CMA because it would render the conflicting indemnity provisions in the

Drilling Contract and the Lease Agreement “a nullity.” Though Thornton and

National Union urge a contrary interpretation of the CMA on appeal, they do not

challenge the district court’s conclusion that the relevant contract provisions are

unambiguous and are therefore appropriate for disposition on cross motions for

summary judgment. See generally Cranfill v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 158 S.W.3d

703, 711-16 (Ark. App. 2004). 

 On appeal, Thornton and National Union argue that the plain meaning of the

term “expressly agreed otherwise” in paragraph 15 of the CMA is that subsequent

written contracts such as the Drilling Contract and the Lease Agreement cannot be

construed as modifying the indemnity provisions in the CMA unless they explicitly

refer to the CMA and identify the term being modified. As no prior Arkansas case

supports this proposition, National Union relies on cases from other jurisdictions that

enforced explicit subsequent contract modifications, such as Goshey v. ITT Life

Insurance Corp., 590 F.2d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1979). Thornton relies on Sempra

Energy Trading Corp. v. Algoma Steel, Inc., No. 00-9227, 2001 WL 282684, at *5-6

(S.D.N.Y) (unpublished), aff’d, 300 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2002), a case that supports the

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Thornton emphasizes that the dictionary defines “express” as meaning

“explicit,” “plain,” and “precise.” But the question of course is whether the CMA

required that anything other than the conflicting term be explicit. We think not. The

Drilling Contract and the Lease Agreement left no doubt that Thornton was explicitly

agreeing to indemnify Stephens for an accident like the one that killed Stricklin. 

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district court’s decision because it recognized a distinction between modifying a prior

contract and entering into subsequent agreements that are separate and distinct. 

In our view, Thornton and National Union wrongly frame the issue as being

whether the Drilling Contract and the Lease Agreement effectively modified the

CMA. Those later agreements were separate, complete written contracts governing

discrete aspects of the parties’ overall relationship. They included unambiguous

indemnity provisions conflicting with paragraph 4(d) of the CMA. Like the district

court, we conclude that those conflicting provisions fully satisfied the “expressly

agreed otherwise” provision in paragraph 15 of the CMA.4

 This interpretation does

not render the indemnity provisions in the CMA a nullity, as they would still govern

less formal drilling work done by Thornton for Stephens that is not covered by a

separate and complete written agreement. Therefore, as is usually the case when

courts construe a sequence of written agreements, a subsequent contract that applies

more specifically to the drilling work in question is controlling. See Coop. Refinery

Ass’n v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 190 F.2d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1951) (“A

subsequent contract completely covering the same subject-matter . . . but containing

terms inconsistent with the former contract, so that the two cannot stand together . . .

becomes the only agreement of the parties on the subject.”) (quotation omitted). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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