Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00119/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00119-47/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

DROPBOX INC.

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-00119-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

MODIFY THE SCHEDULING ORDER 

AND FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST 

AMENDED ANSWER

Re: Dkt. No. 254

On March 27, 2015, Plaintiff Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. (“Synchronoss”) filed its

complaint against Defendant Dropbox, Inc. (“Dropbox”). Dkt. No. 1. Dropbox submitted an 

answer to the complaint on January 10, 2017. Dkt. No. 119. On January 10, 2018, the Court 

issued a scheduling order, which included a January 19, 2018 “deadline to amend the pleadings 

without filing a motion seeking leave to amend the pleadings.” Dkt. No. 173. On August 6, 2018, 

Dropbox filed a motion seeking modification of the scheduling order and leave to file an amended 

answer, to include an unclean hands affirmative defense. Dkt. No. 198. Synchronoss filed its 

opposition on August 20, 2018, see Dkt. No. 205 (“Mot. to Modify Opp.”), Dropbox filed its reply 

on August 27, 2018, see Dkt. No. 213, and the Court held a hearing on November 1, 2018, see 

Dkt. No. 238.

The parties filed administrative motions to file under seal portions of the motion, 

opposition, and reply. See Dkt. Nos. 197, 204, 212. After the Court denied in part the sealing 

requests related to Dropbox’s motion and reply, see Dkt. No. 242, and denied Dropbox’s renewed 

sealing requests, see Dkt. No. 252, Dropbox timely filed versions of its motion and reply that only 

redacted portions previously authorized by the Court, as required under Local Rule 79-5, see Dkt. 

Nos. 254 (“Mot. to Modify”), 255 (“Mot. to Modify Reply”); see also Civ. L.R. 79-5(f)(3) ("If the 

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Administrative Motion to File Under Seal is denied or granted in part, the document sought to be 

sealed will not be considered by the Court unless the Submitting Party files a revised redacted 

version of the document which comports with the Court's order within 7 days after the motion is 

denied."). The Court now considers the revised redacted version of Dropbox's motion to modify 

the scheduling order and for leave to file a first amended answer.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party seeking to amend a pleading after expiration of the deadline set in a scheduling 

order “must satisfy the ‘good cause’ standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), which 

provides that ‘[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent,’ 

rather than the liberal standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).”1 In re W. States 

Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Oneok, Inc. 

v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015). The Ninth Circuit has provided that:

Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily considers the diligence 

of the party seeking the amendment. . . . Although the existence or 

degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might 

supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is 

upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that 

party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see 

also 6A Wright & Miller, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1522.2 (3d ed. 2018) (“What constitutes 

good cause sufficient to justify the modification of a scheduling order necessarily varies with the 

circumstances of each case.”). Although “many more motions seeking modification of scheduling 

orders are denied than are granted,” see Wright & Miller § 1522.2, courts are more willing to 

modify scheduling orders and allow parties to amend their pleadings based on newly discovered 

information that parties could not have discovered before with reasonable diligence, see, e.g., 

M.H. v. Cty. of Alameda, No. 11-cv-2862-CW, 2012 WL 5835732, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 

2012).

Once a court finds good cause to merit modification of the scheduling order under Rule 

 

1 All references to “Rule” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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16(b), the court must then consider whether to permit leave to amend the pleadings under Rule 

15(a). Under Rule 15(a)(2), “leave to amend shall be freely granted ‘when justice so requires.’” 

Townsend v. Univ. of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). 

“This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 

F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The five factors relevant to 

determining proper amendment are (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing 

party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) previous amendments. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 

182 (1962); see also Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Grange, 676 F.3d 784, 797 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (same factors). The Court weighs prejudice to the opposing party most heavily. See 

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of 

any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of 

granting leave to amend.” Id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Modification of the Scheduling Order is Warranted Under Rule 16.

Dropbox claims it seeks modification of the scheduling order in good faith, because it only 

learned of facts to support its unclean hands defense—which predicates Dropbox’s request for 

leave to amend its answer—in July 2018. See Mot. to Modify, at 5. Specifically, Dropbox claims 

that Synchronoss disclosed information in a 10-K filing that demonstrated an “orchestrated effort 

to artificially inflate the value of the Patents-in-Suit,” which Dropbox believes can serve as the 

basis for an unclean hands defense. Id. 

Synchronoss did not dispute that good cause exists to justify modification of the 

scheduling order under Rule 16(b), as it did not address Rule 16 in its opposition. Nor could it, in 

the Court’s view, as nothing suggests Dropbox could have discovered the pertinent facts, and thus 

have been able to seek modification of the scheduling order and leave to amend its answer, before 

the July 2018 disclosure.

B. Leave to Amend is Warranted Under Rule 15.

Dropbox has also shown that leave to amend its answer should be granted under this 

circuit’s liberal standard under Rule 15. To start, there have been no previous amendments and 

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Dropbox did not delay in seeking leave to amend after learning of the relevant facts to support its

proposed unclean hands defense. In addition, amendment would not be futile. “[A] proposed 

amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings 

that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Miller v. Rykoff–Sexton, Inc., 845 

F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, Dropbox’s proposed amended answer provides that 

“Synchronoss orchestrated an effort to artificially inflate the value of the asserted patents by 

entering into illusory licensing agreements,” and then “attempted to rely on those licenses to 

extract money from Dropbox in this litigation.” See Dkt. No. 198-6, at 6–7. The Court finds that 

there is a “set of facts” that could be proved that would constitute a valid defense under the 

amendment, and thus finds that amendment would not be futile. See Miller, 845 F.2d at 214.2

The Court further finds that leave to amend is not sought in bad faith. Synchronoss argues 

that Dropbox acted in bad faith, but only claims bad faith exists because Dropbox’s requested 

amendment is futile. See Mot. to Modify Opp., at 11 (“Given Dropbox has not and cannot plead 

any facts to support an unclean hands defense . . . Dropbox’s attempt to add [the defense] 

recklessly raises frivolous arguments and is factually baseless.”) In other words, Synchronoss’s 

bad-faith contention is entirely derivative of its futility claims. Because the Court finds that 

amendment would not be futile, as noted above, it therefore rejects Synchronoss’s claim that 

Dropbox proposes the amendment in bad faith. 

Finally, the Court finds that leave to amend would not prejudice Synchronoss. 

Synchronoss argues that because fact discovery is closed, an “amendment would effectively bar 

Synchronoss from obtaining discovery to refute the alleged unclean hands defense proposed by 

Dropbox.” Id. It is currently unclear what additional discovery Synchronoss might need, 

however, given that any evidence to refute the alleged unclean hands defense is presumably within 

Synchronoss’s control. And even if some limited discovery were necessary, the mere need for 

additional discovery, by itself, does not constitute sufficient prejudice under Rule 15 to withhold 

 

2 At the hearing on this motion, Dropbox’s counsel added that the unclean hands defense affords 

broader remedies than would otherwise be available to Dropbox from merely introducing this 

evidence as part of a general defense on the value of the patents.

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leave to amend. See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Enter. Co., No. 16-cv-1393-JST, 

2017 WL 3149297, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017); Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F.

Supp. 2d 1128, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

Having found no evidence of futility, prejudice, bad faith, or undue delay, the Court finds 

that it should grant Dropbox’s requested leave to amend.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Dropbox’s refiled motion to modify the scheduling order and for 

leave to file an amended answer.3 Dropbox shall file its amended answer within three days of the 

date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 

3 Dropbox’s initial motion to modify the scheduling order and for leave to file an amended answer 

is moot. See Dkt. No. 198.

1/3/2019

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