Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_24-cv-08146/USCOURTS-azd-3_24-cv-08146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Navajo County Sheriff's Posse Incorporated,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff's Posse 

Search & Rescue, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-24-08146-PCT-DJH

ORDER 

On July 19, 2024, Plaintiff Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) brought 

suit against Defendants Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff’s Posse Search & Rescue, 

Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff’s Posse Pony Express Ride, John and Sheryl Turley, 

Robert and Lynn Black, Gregory and Jackie Long, John and Deborah Wehrman, and Scott 

and Elizabeth Self (“Defendants”), alleging federal and state trademark infringement 

violations. (Doc. 1). Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction (Doc. 28). Therein, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from using “Hashknife”

trademarks and the trade names “Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff’s Posse Search and 

Rescue”, “Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff’s Posse Pony Express Ride”, and “Hashknife 

Pony Express.” (Doc. 28 at 17). 

The Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion on December 12, 2024 (Doc. 33). 

At the hearing, Defendants agreed they would not use any “Hashknife” mark, term, or logo. 

(Doc. 36 at 46:20–47:15). Defendants maintained their objection to any injunction 

preventing them from using the phrase “Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse Search and 

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Rescue” and/or its subsets. (Id. at 47:6–21). This Order thus solely addresses whether an 

injunction should issue against Defendants for the alleged trade name “Navajo County 

Sheriff’s Posse Search and Rescue” or any of its subset iterations, e.g., “Navajo County 

Sheriff’s Posse,” “Search and Rescue.” 

For the reasons set out below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request.

I. Background 

Plaintiff is a non-profit organization that was incorporated in Arizona on February 3, 

1984. (Doc. 1 at 6). The predecessor organization to Plaintiff was called the Hashknife 

Sherriff’s Posse and it was formed in 1955 to be a search and rescue mission associated 

with the Navajo County Sherriff’s Department. (Id. at 2). In addition to running search 

and rescue missions, this original Posse planned the annual “Hashknife Pony Express” 

event for educational and cultural purposes. (Id.) The Hashknife Pony Express is a race 

that requires “Hashknife cowboys” to pass mailbags to each other along a 200-mile route 

from Holbrook to Scottsdale, Arizona. (Id.) Plaintiff says the original Sherriff’s Posse 

used the Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse name, and that as its successor, it now owns the 

rights to the Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse name. (Id. at 14). Originally, Plaintiff brought 

claims against the Defendants for the following terms and marks: “Hashknife Pony 

Express,” “Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse,” the “Quarter Circle T-Brand” logo, and the 

term “Hashknife.” Again, because Defendants stipulated to no longer using the term 

“Hashknife” during oral argument and also agreed to no longer using the “Quarter Circle 

T-Brand” logo, all that remains in dispute is the name “Navajo County Sheriff’s Search 

and Rescue” and/or its subsets. (Doc. 36 at 46:20–47:15). 

Defendant Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse Search & Rescue is a non-profit 

organization that has been in existence under Arizona law since May 30, 2024. (Doc. 1 at 

6). Defendants allege that they are the only group authorized by the Navajo County 

Sheriff’s Department to conduct search and rescue missions. (Doc. 30 at 7). In fact, they 

argue they were created with the express purpose of conducting these missions and being 

the only group affiliated with the Navajo County Sheriff’s Department after the 

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Department cut ties with the Plaintiff. (Doc. 30 at 2). 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has no ownership interest in the name Navajo 

County Sheriff’s Posse. They point out that Plaintiff is no longer affiliated with the Navajo 

County Sherriff’s Office (“NCSO”)1and no longer conducts search and rescue missions 

for NCSO, which was the main reason for Plaintiff’s inception and creation. (Doc. 30 at 

2). Additionally, Defendants allege that Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse Search & Rescue

came into existence when the NCSO sought to create a new posse to conduct search and 

rescue missions for the NCSO. (Id.) They say the NCSO has issued cease and desist letters 

against Plaintiff and Plaintiff has been contacted by the Navajo County City’s Attorney’s 

Office to stop affiliating itself with the NCSO by using the same or similar name. (See 

Doc. 30–5). Defendants also state that they are the only search and rescue mission 

authorized by the NCSO to operate with and affiliate themselves with the NCSO. (Doc. 30 

at 11). In sum, Defendants dispute that Plaintiff can stop them from using the term “Navajo 

County Sheriff” because they allege that Plaintiff is no longer associated with the Navajo 

County Sheriff’s Department—the sole owner of this name. (Doc. 30 at 10). 

Plaintiff states that it has used the phrase “Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse” for over 

70 years and has been the only one to conduct, market, and promote the Pony Express Ride 

event. (Doc. 31 at 6). Plaintiff also states that the Sheriff’s Department does not actually 

own any part of its name as a tradename under federal copyright law. (Id.) It points out 

that on May 25, 2021, the Arizona Secretary of State granted Plaintiff a Trade Name 

Certification for “Navajo County Sherriff’s Posse, Inc.” (Doc. 1 at 18; Doc. 1-2 at 10–12). 

II. Legal Standard 

Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). In seeking a preliminary 

injunction, a plaintiff must show that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, likely 

to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities 

tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 

1 The Navajo County Sheriff’s Office is not a named party. 

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Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). In the alternative, a preliminary injunction can also be 

issued where plaintiff raised “serious questions going to the merits” of the claim and “the 

balance of hardships tips strongly in the plaintiff’s favor. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 

Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). This is true so long as plaintiff also 

demonstrates irreparable harm and shows that the injunction is in the public interest. Id. 

A sliding scale approach is used when assessing whether to grant a plaintiff a preliminary 

injunction under these standards. Id. The elements of the test are balanced. “[A] stronger 

showing on one element can offset a weaker showing on another.” Id. 

III. Discussion 

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

To prevail on a claim of trademark or trade name infringement under the Lanham 

Act or common law, a plaintiff must show that the plaintiff has (1) a protectible interest in 

the mark; and (2) that the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumer 

confusion. Network Automation, Inc., v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 

(9th Cir. 2011). With both tradenames and trademarks, common law rights are acquired 

by adopting and using the mark in commerce. Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac, Inc., 242 F.3d 

1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). With respect to common law use, a protectible interest in the 

mark or tradename, and therefore, standing to sue, can be shown by the plaintiff in one of 

three ways. Halicki Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales & Marketing, 547 F.3d 1213, 1225 

(9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff can show that he or she is the (1) owner of a federal mark 

registration; (2) the owner of an unregistered mark; or (3) a nonowner with a cognizable 

interest in the allegedly infringed trademark. Id.

i. Protectible ownership interest 

Both registered and unregistered trade names and trademarks are protected under 

the Lanham Act. Halicki Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales & Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1225–

26 (9th Cir. 2008). While federal registration of the mark or tradename is prima facie

evidence of the validity of the mark and the registrant’s right to use the mark in commerce, 

the true test of ownership is actual use and priority of use. Sengoku Works v. RMC Int’l, 

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96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996); Quiksilver, Inc., v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 755 

(9th Cir. 2006). By showing that he used the mark in commerce first, a non-registrant can 

rebut the presumption that a registered trademark provides. Sengoku Works, 96 F.3d at 

1220. 

Here, neither party owns a federally registered trademark to “Navajo County 

Sheriff’s Posse.”).2 Because Plaintiff cannot rely on the federal registration presumption, 

it argues that it and its predecessors were using the name for over 70 years prior to 

Defendants’ use of it. (Doc. 28 at 7). Plaintiff argues its prior use supersedes Defendants’

right to call themselves the Navajo County Sherriff’s Posse Search & Rescue. (Id.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot have a common law right to use the Navajo 

County Sheriff’s Posse because if anyone has that right, it is the Navajo County Sherriff’s 

Department. (Doc. 30 at 2). They assert that the Navajo County Sherriff’s Department, a 

non-party to this case, is the rightful owner of the tradename and can establish a superior 

claim of prior use. (Id.) Defendants note that the Navajo County Sheriff’s Office is 

authorized by statute to maintain a volunteer posse to conduct a search and rescue 

operation. See A.R.S. § 11-441(C). They also provided evidence showing that the Navajo 

County Sheriff’s Office has been asserting its exclusive right to the name and is preparing 

to bring litigation against Plaintiff to establish its own claim that it has prior use rights in 

the phrase Navajo County Sheriff. (Doc. 36 at 13:36:34). At the hearing, Defendants

produced a recent cease and desist letter sent to Plaintiff from the Navajo County 

Attorney’s Office, in which the Office said Plaintiff was risking legal action from the 

Navajo County Attorney’s Office with Plaintiff’s continued use of “Navajo County 

Sherriff’s Posse.” (Doc. 30-5 at 3). The Navajo County Sheriff’s Department Navajo 

County Sheriff David M. Clouse filed a Declaration in support of Defendants, clarifying 

that Plaintiff is no longer an affiliate of the Navajo County Sherriff’s Office. (Doc. 30-4 

at 2).

2 Plaintiff does have a state registration for the tradename “Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse 

Inc.” with an expiration date of April 25, 2029. (Doc. 28-1 at 13). Defendants also have 

a state registration for the tradename “Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff’s Search & 

Rescue,” with an expiration date of June 14, 2029. (Doc. 34-1 at 2). 

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To contend with this argument, Plaintiff correctly notes in its briefing and during its 

oral argument that government entities must establish trademark rights in the same manner 

as private entities. (Doc. 31 at 6; Doc. 36 at 13:13:18). See also generally, Bd. Of Regents 

of the Univ. of Houston Sys. On Behalf of the Univ. of Houston Sys. & Its Member 

Institutions v. Houston Coll. of L., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 3d 573, 581 (S.D. Tex. 2016) 

(requiring a state university to establish its trademark right under the same factors used for 

private entities under the Lanham Act). The caveat or carveout to this however, as Plaintiff 

knows, is that a right can also be established through common use. Pac. Supply Co-op. v. 

Farmers Union Cent. Exch. Inc., 318 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1963) (setting out the common 

law rights for trademark infringement under prior exclusive use). Defendants assert that

the Navajo County Sheriff’s Department is the entity with the superior and consistent use 

of the term Navajo County Sheriff. (Doc. 36 at 13:37:03). Without the use of the phrase 

Navajo County Sheriff, all Plaintiff is left with is the term “Posse.” Defendants point out 

that this is a generic term and not protected. (Doc. 30 at 14); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. 

Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1012 (9th Cir. 1979) (defining a generic term 

as one that refers to a genus or class of things and not the true source of a consumer 

product). Defendants also point out that they are now the only search and rescue operation 

directly affiliated with the Sheriff’s Department. (Doc. 30 at 11). Defendants argue that 

they derive their permission to use the name from the Navajo County Sheriff’s Department, 

the true rightful common law owner of the phrase itself. (Id.)

The Court agrees with Defendants that even under a common law trademark right, 

Plaintiff has not established it will show a superior use right to the phrase Navajo County 

Sheriff. That common law right most likely belongs to the Navajo County Sheriff’s 

Department. The Department, as of now, has not given Plaintiff the right to use that term, 

nor has Plaintiff established that its common law use supersedes the Navajo County 

Sheriff’s Department’s common law use of this phrase. Unable to show a protectible 

interest in the phrase Navajo County Sheriff, the Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of 

success on the merits of its trademark infringement claim. 

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ii. Consumer confusion test 

Finding above that the Plaintiff has not established that is has a protectible 

ownership interest in the tradenames, the Court will not address the consumer confusion 

test. 

B. Irreparable Harm 

In the Ninth Circuit, irreparable harm used to be presumed in a trademark 

infringement action when likelihood of success on the merits was properly shown. 

Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, that is no longer the case since the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay in 2006 

and Winter in 2008. Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 

1248 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 338 (2006) and 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)). For a plaintiff to prevail on 

this prong, the Plaintiff must show that irreparable injury is likely, not just a possibility if 

the injunction is not granted. Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1249. Irreparable harm will not be 

presumed simply because it is a trademark infringement action, rather it must be 

demonstrated, just like the other elements. Id. 

Plaintiff told the Court during oral argument and in its briefing, that Plaintiff’s 

irreparable harm arises from the trademark infringement itself. (Doc. 36 at 13:28:55; Doc. 

28 at 14). In other words, Plaintiff contends it may suffer irreparable harm to its reputation 

and goodwill because it has no control over what Defendants may do or say about the 

similar name. But this possibility is simply not an argument that can withstand the high 

standard imposed on this Court to grant a preliminary injunction under Ninth Circuit 

standards post-Winter. Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC, 736 F.3d at 1248. Plaintiff cannot 

simply plead that infringement on its own shows irreparable harm, particularly where 

Plaintiff cannot establish he is likely to success on the merits of his common law ownership 

claim (a precursor to establishing any infringement). Id.

Having shown no actual irreparable harm, the Court finds that this prong does not 

favor Plaintiff. 

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C. Balance of Equities 

As to the third Winter factor, “district courts must give serious consideration to the 

balance of equities.” Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 475 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citation omitted). In doing so, courts must consider “all of the competing interests at 

stake.” Id. “The basic function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo 

pending a determination of the action on the merits.” Chalk v. United States Dist. Court 

Cent. Dist., 840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988). “Status quo is defined as the last, 

uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” Susanville Indian Rancheria 

v. Leavitt, 2007 WL 662197, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2007) (quoting Regents of the Univ. 

of Cal., 747 F.2d 511, 514 (9th Cir 1984) (cleaned up).

Plaintiff argues that it needs the Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse name to continue to 

operate as an organization. (Doc. 28 at 15). Plaintiff’s main contention is that the name 

belong entirely to the Plaintiff and that Defendant will continue to operate “in conjunction 

with the Navajo County Sherriff’s Department,” even without the use of the name. Id.

Defendants argue, however, that they cannot entirely promote their affiliation with the 

Navajo County Sherriff’s Department if they are not allowed to use a name that signals 

their close association with the Department. (Doc. 30 at 14). The Court agrees with 

Defendants. Though they would be authorized by the Navajo County Sheriff’s Department 

to conduct these search and rescue missions, they would not be able to fully operate as the 

organization that they are, without a name that reflects their association with the Sheriff. 

The Plaintiff, on the other hand, is already conducting search and rescue missions for other 

counties, as explained by Plaintiff during oral argument. Based on the foregoing, the 

balance of equities tips in favor of the Defendants. 

D. Public Interest 

“The public interest analysis for the issuance of a[n] injunction requires [the court] 

to consider whether there exists some critical public interest that would be injured by the 

grant of [injunctive] relief.” Pure Wafer Inc. v. City of Prescott, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 

1179 (D. Ariz. 2017) (citation omitted). Plaintiff urges its requested injunction is in the 

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public interest’s favor because “[c]ourts have held that the public interest is served by 

protecting a company’s right to proprietary information, business operations, and 

contractual rights.” Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 F.Supp.2d 973, 983 (D. Ariz. 2006).

Plaintiff argues that in the trademark infringement context, the public interest is 

synonymous with the right of the public to not be deceived. (Doc. 28 at 16). Defendants, 

on the other hand, point out that their ability to operate as the only search and rescue 

operation associated with the Navajo County Sherriff’s Department will be jeopardized if 

the injunction is granted. (Doc. 30 at 6). Defendants argue this would deprive the public 

of a vital public interest. (Id.) The Court agrees with Defendants that the Navajo County 

Sheriff’s Office/Department has a right to choose the entity that uses their name and does 

search and rescue missions on their behalf. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has not satisfied the four-part 

standard set forth in Winter for preliminary injunctive relief. The Court will not enjoin 

Defendants from using the name “Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse Search & Rescue” or any 

of its subsets. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction under 

common law trademark and tradename infringement (Doc. 28) for the Defendant’s use of 

the phrase “Navajo County Sherriff’s Posse Search & Rescue,” or its subsets is DENIED.

By stipulation of the parties, Defendants are enjoined from using the term “Hashknife” and 

the “Quarter Circle T Brand” logo. 

Dated this 13th day of January, 2025.

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge

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