Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02774/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02774-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENYA GAYLES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-2774 GEB EFB P

vs.

D.K. SISTO, Warden, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel on a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent moves to dismiss on the ground that this

action is moot. For the reasons explained, the petition is moot and the motion must be granted.

I. Background

Prison authorities found petitioner guilty of excessive consensual contact with a female

visitor on April 8, 2006. Pet’n, Ex. 5 at 3-4. Petitioner was counseled, reprimanded, and advised

of future behavior expectations, but suffered no credit loss or other discipline. Id., Ex. 5 at 4. 

By the instant habeas corpus petition, he seeks to have the disciplinary finding (known as a

“CDC-115,” or simply “115,” after the form on which it is memorialized) expunged from his

file. Id. at 18.

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II. Mootness

Under Article III, § 2 of the federal Constitution, a federal court’s jurisdiction is limited

to those cases which present “cases-or-controversies.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). 

In habeas actions, the case-or-controversy requirement mandates that a petitioner must have

suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the respondent and redressable by

issuance of the writ. See id. In general, a habeas petition challenging a prison disciplinary

action no longer presents such a case or controversy, and therefore becomes moot, when the

punishment for the action has been withdrawn or completed at the time of the petition. Wilson v.

Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 2003). Where the petitioner can show that so-called

“collateral consequences” flow from the disciplinary action (beyond the punishment imposed),

however, the case remains justiciable. Id. at 479-80; see Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-16. This Court

must therefore determine whether petitioner has shown collateral consequences of the

disciplinary action that cause his case to remain live.

Petitioner argues that the 115 carries collateral consequences because authorities have

used and will continue to use it as a basis to deny him parole. He has attached the Governor’s

decision to reverse the Board of Parole Hearing’s decision to grant him parole, in which the

Governor stated:

While incarcerated. Mr. Gayles was disciplined for lewd conduct in 2006. 

According to the Rules Violation Report, during a visit with a female, Mr. Gayles

massaged his genitals to achieve an erection. He then attempted to force his

visitor’s hand toward his genitals. She pulled her hand away from his grip and

they both walked away. When they returned to the table, Mr. Gayles reached

under her skirt. This rules violation was under appeal at the time of Mr. Gayles’

2008 parole suitability hearing. But in discussing this incident, his 2007 mentalhealth evaluator noted that Mr. Gayles’ “inability to fully explain his side of the

events leaves questions about whether or not there remains some degree of

‘blaming others’ for his own poor impulse control decisions.”

Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp.’s Mot. to Dism., Ex. A at 3 (page marked “Page 9 of 11”). The Governor

went on to cite the following factors in support of his decision: (1) petitioner’s “life crime” (a

reference to the crime for which the petitioner was given a life sentence); (2) petitioner’s lack of

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insight into his life crime and lack of self-help regarding gangs and gang violence; and (3)

petitioner’s recent psychological evaluation, which rated him a moderate risk for future violence,

placed him in the “medium category” for general recidivism, diagnosed him with Antisocial

Personality Disorder, and expressed concerns about his parole plans. Id. at 3-4 (pages marked

“Page 9 of 11” and “Page 10 of 11”). Thus, the Governor mentioned the CDC-115 at issue in

this petition, but did not expressly count it as a factor weighing against parole.

In Spencer v. Kemna, the Supreme Court considered whether an order revoking parole

carried collateral consequences. 523 U.S. at 14-16. The petitioner in Spencer argued that the

order could be used against him in a future parole proceeding. Id. at 14. The Court found this

possibility insufficient to be considered a collateral consequence, however, because, under state

law, the order would be only one factor among many to be considered by the parole authority in

a future parole proceeding, and the parole authority had almost unlimited discretion to determine

suitability. Id. 

In Wilson v. Terhune, the petitioner argued that a CDC-115 (based on an escape attempt)

would adversely affect his future parole prospects. 319 F.3d at 482. The Ninth Circuit similarly

concluded that such a possibility did not constitute a collateral consequence, because “the

decision to grant parole is discretionary” and the 115 would be only one factor among many

considered by the Board of Parole Hearings. Id.; see also Carranza v. Gomez, 221 Fed. Appx.

582, 583 (9th Cir. 2007) (characterizing Wilson as holding that “impaired parole prospects do not

constitute collateral consequences.”). The court also noted that the Board would likely consider

the underlying conduct, which the petitioner did not deny, rather than the 115 itself, so

expunging the 115 would not improve his parole prospects. Wilson, 319 F.3d at 482.

Here, unlike Wilson, petitioner denies the charges underlying the 115. It is therefore

possible that expungement of the 115 from his record would improve his parole prospects to the

extent that the 115, and the conduct underlying it, would no longer be considered by the Board

or by petitioner’s evaluating psychologists. However, the 115 remains but one consideration

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among many reviewed by the Board and the Governor in deciding petitioner’s parole suitability. 

While the Governor discussed petitioner’s statements about the 115 to the evaluating

psychologist in his decision reversing the Board’s grant of parole, he did not expressly include

the 115 among the factors indicating petitioner’s unsuitability for parole, and petitioner has thus

not shown that the 115 impacted the Governor’s decision. Accordingly, under Spencer and

Wilson, the potential use of the 115 in future parole proceedings is too speculative to be

considered a collateral consequence, and the action is moot.

IV. Conclusion

The Court finds that petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus is moot. The

discipline petitioner challenges in the instant petition has been discharged, and petitioner has not

shown that the discipline carries collateral consequences which keep his case justiciable. 

Therefore, respondent’s motion must be granted.

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus be dismissed and the Clerk be directed to close the case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In

his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the

event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing

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Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant).

Dated: January 12, 2010.

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