Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04691/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04691-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EVLEEN SALEM, an individual,

Plaintiff,

 v.

HERITAGE SQUARE INC., doing business as

HERITAGE HOUSE GALLERIES, a

California corporation; PATRICK TUNNEY,

an individual; JOE CAPUTO, an individual; 

Defendants. /

No. C 06-04691 WHA

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

INTRODUCTION

In this action for sexual harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of

public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendants move for summary

judgment on all claims. In the alternative, defendants move for partial summary judgment or an

order specifying facts without significant controversy. Defendants have failed to eliminate all

triable issues of fact in plaintiff’s hostile work-environment claim. Similarly, there remains a

factual dispute as to when plaintiff’s employment ended and whether she was terminated. Also,

defendants have failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact in plaintiff’s claims for wrongful

termination in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

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STATEMENT

Defendant Heritage Square, Inc., doing business as Heritage House Galleries, is a

California corporation in the business of selling retail home furniture and furnishings. Its

headquarters and retail operations are located in Concord, California. Plaintiff Evleen Salem

began work at Heritage House as a designer, or furniture salesperson, in April 2004 (Sturmer

Decl. Exh. 1, 11:24–12:1). Defendant Patrick Tunney also worked as a designer at Heritage

House Galleries. 

Heritage Square compensated its designers on a straight commission basis with a

guaranteed minimum salary for the first few months of work (Miller Decl. Exh. A, 40:17–41:2). 

The commission system necessitated an orderly procedure for serving new customers coming

into the store. At Heritage Square, these procedures were referred to as the “floor rules,” and

they were described in the employee handbook (id. at 32:15–35:14, Salem Dep. Exhs 6–8). The

floor rules were referred to as an “up” system. In the morning, designers would sign in based

on the order in which they arrived. For customers who walked into the store without having

made an appointment to see a particular designer, designers would help those customers in the

order of the designers’ arrival (id. at Exh. E, 38:12–39:12). Taking a walk-in customer was

called having an “up” according to the floor rules. After a designer had an up, he or she could

not serve an arriving customer until the other designers with later ups had served arriving

customer or were not available to do so (ibid.). The floor rules forbade designers from

interfering or interrupting another designer while they were serving a customer. The written

floor rules also controlled how Heritage Square employees greeted new, incoming customers. 

In addition, designers saw customers by appointment to forge relationships with repeat

customers. Also, a designer who was originally serving a certain customer could drop that

customer if the designer deemed them unlikely to make a purchase. Another designer could

then pick up that customer, and if the customer made a purchase, the second designer would get

the commission (id. at Exh. A, 171:21–174:1). Because of the commission system at Heritage

Square, sales work was highly competitive and the floor rules were necessary to the orderly

service of customers. Disputes between employees over the adherence to and the operation of

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the floor rules were fairly common. Management would sometimes have to intervene to

interpret the floor rules or settle disputes (id. at Exh. E, 73:19–75:3). 

***

Evleen Salem was born and raised in Jordan and educated in Egypt. Salem emigrated to

the United States and became a naturalized citizen in 1983 or 1984. Arabic was her first

language. (id. at Exh. A, 20:3–21). Her religion was Orthodox Catholic, and Heritage Square

allowed her to come in to work slightly later on Sundays so she could attend mass (id. at

10:24–11:9; 57:2–23). Salem began working at Heritage House Galleries in April 2004. At the

time she began work, she was given a copy of relevant employee policies, including the floor

rules and policies on absences (id. at Exh. A, 32:13–33:10). She acknowledged that she had

read and understood Heritage Square’s policies and agreed to abide by them (id. at 32:19–33:9). 

Plaintiff worked closely with defendant Patrick Tunney. Though he was one of the

more experienced designers at Heritage Square, he was not a manager or a supervisor and had

no authority to discipline or supervise other employees (id. at Exh. E, 14:12–14:25, John

Caputo Decl. ¶ 3). Salem alleged in her complaint that Tunney was a “de facto” supervisor

(Compl. ¶ 3). She has not, however, presented any facts that would show this to be the case. 

Tunney and Salem had a number of disputes on the sales floor regarding the floor rules. Some

of these disputes involved finger-pointing and raised voices in front of customers. Plaintiff

testified that on more than one occasion, the disputes resulted in her telling Tunney to “go to

hell” (Miller Decl. Exh. A, 67:17–25; 68:22–69:14). 

Salem testified that the first time she encountered Tunney, he complimented her on her

appearance and “gave [her] a look up and down, that I felt he undressed me with his eyes”

(Sturmer Decl. Exh. 1, 196:14–22). He also complimented her on her appearance on other

occasions and asked about her body language, occasionally telling her that she looked tense (id.

at 198:10–199:25). Salem testified that she was offended when Tunney complimented her but

not when similar comments came from other employees (id. at 202:5–203:11). She also

testified that he repeatedly brought up topics of a sexual nature when she was nearby. For

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instance, when discussing a television show, she testified that he interjected personal anecdotes

related to his own sexual experiences (id. at 219:24–220:13). On other occasions, he made

sexual comments to other employees or groups of employees that plaintiff considered to be

vulgar (id. at Exh. 2, 278:1–24; 302:1–23). For instance, Salem testified that in June or July of

2005, Debbie Henriquez, another designer, and Tunney were sitting around the up desk when a

female customer entered the store wearing sweatpants with “Juicy” written on the seat. She

testified that Tunney commented to Henriquez that he could not believe that a woman would

wear such clothing. Henriquez and Tunney had a conversation about people at Henriquez’s

school wearing them. Tunney then said that “[i]f it was any juicier than that, I can put it in a

cup and spoon it.” Salem testified that she said that his remark was disgusting, and walked

away (id. at 277:8–279:3). 

Plaintiff testified that Tunney was giving her pointers on salesmanship and said that she

should touch the furniture in front of customers. She testified that he commented “I sell to

women a lot, and women love to be fondled” (id. at Exh. 1, 205:13–206:25). Tunney agreed in

his own deposition that he suggested touching the furniture in front of customers, but denied

that he used the word “fondle” and denied making the further comment about women (Miller

Decl. Exh. E, 89:22–91:8). (This order, of course, must credit plaintiff’s version for the

purposes of summary judgment.) Plaintiff also testified that Tunney commented that a faucet in

a catalog resembled male genitalia, but admitted that the conversation was actually with another

salesperson, not her, and that no one ever actually showed the catalog to Salem (Sturmer Decl.

Exh. 1, 225:18–226:25). Plaintiff also testified that Tunney commented on her physical

appearance and that of a another salesperson, saying that their respective appearances could

help them make sales (id. at Exh. 2, 286:23–290:20). 

Both sides agree that at no time did Tunney ever make overt sexual advances toward

her, touch her in an unwelcome manner, or suggest that she should sleep with him (id. at

203:19–204:6). Salem testified at her deposition, however, that the problem between herself

and Tunney was as follows (id. at 233:3–234:11):

I think he was attracted to me and I think he would have loved to

have had a relationship with me . . . . I turned him down very

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gently in so many different ways. I was not interested in gaining

his design clients, as he many times offered, as he offered me his

cell phone to come to the showroom earlier. I declined all of this

because I did not feel comfortable.

He stated to me many times over how much he admires me, how

much he respects me. But yet within the same token there was

that hostile of you just don’t understand, you don’t have the

capability to understand. You are just not a good salesperson.

So it was all mixed feelings that he did not get what I believe he

wanted from me, therefore he turned this into being hostile. 

***

Plaintiff also alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her ethnicity and

her purported religion, i.e., that some of her colleagues, specifically Tunney, believed her to be

a Muslim. Plaintiff and defendants agree that Tunney asked her for assistance in pronouncing

the names of Middle Eastern customers (Sturmer Decl. Exh. 1, 106:6–108:11). Salem testified

that such requests from Tunney made her feel as if she did not belong in this country (id. at

112:10–113:21). Once, during an argument, Salem testified that Tunney told her to “read the

floor rules, if you know how to read” (id. at 156:7–157:19). She also stated that he made

comments during arguments on her inability to assimilate and asked whether she was a citizen

and about her ability to speak English (id. at 99:8–101:23). On another occasion, Salem was on

the sales floor, and began discussing Middle Eastern politics with one of her customers. 

Tunney took note, walked by, and commented under his breath that the conversation was not

appropriate (id. at 120:6–122:20). Tunney also expressed his disapproval when Salem spoke in

Arabic with customers, calling such behavior unprofessional or inappropriate (id. at

117:14–118:19). 

Tunney also made a comment on some kind of headdress, which Salem identified as

Middle Eastern but stated that such clothing is worn by many cultures, worn in the store by one

of his customers (id. at 133:8–134:22). Salem testified that he asked her questions about her

religion, church attendance, and practices related to her religion (id. at 134:23–135:7). Salem

also related an incident in which Tunney and other employees made some comments related to

the 9/11 terrorist attacks in which they joked that a former coworker might have appeared in

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news of the attack. Tunney asked her whether she knew how people could engage in such

attacks, which question she believed to be racial harassment (id. at 103:9–106:5). 

At some point, Salem had a conversation with a woman who had formerly worked with

Tunney at another furniture store. She said that Tunney had previously targeted a female

employee where he worked, and suggested that Tunney would keep after his target until she

quit. Salem recalled no further contact with the woman who told her that story, and Salem

could not identify any of female employees that had been repeatedly targeted (id. at Exh. 2,

305:18–306:22). Tunney testified that at least once, defendant John Caputo asked him to ease

off of Salem. Tunney also testified that Debbie Henriquez, a co-worker, also asked him the

same thing (id. at Exh. 6, 79:23–80:14; 81:22–82:19). It is unclear from the deposition

testimony whether these requests from Caputo and Henriquez were in response to fights

between Tunney and Salem, or his purported comments based on gender, religion, or ethnicity. 

Salem and Tunney had another dispute on July 17, 2005, regarding customers and the

operation of floor rules. She testified that while she was sitting at the up desk, Tunney came

over and began to yell at her. After the altercation, she reported being distressed and emotional,

and later she reported having heart palpitations, anxiety, headaches, stomach problems, and

difficulty breathing (id. at Exh.1, 141:18–142:6; 146:7–18). Salem discussed the incident with

John Caputo. He testified that after the incident, she had told him that she was thinking of

quitting her job at Heritage Square. He told her that he would speak to Tunney regarding his

actions toward her. It is not clear that John Caputo understood that Salem believed Tunney’s

behavior to be sexual harassment or ethnic discrimination (id. at Exh. 3, 189:3–192:15). John

Caputo also testified that he hired his brother, Joe Caputo, as a supervisor, to provide a support

mechanism for the sales staff (id. at 189:21–190:5). John Caputo testified that he had little

experience in handling matters of sexual harassment (id. at 226:18–25). 

John Caputo wrote a letter to Salem after the incident on July 17, 2005 (id. at

282:10–283:2; Dep. Exh. 12). In it, he described the altercation between Salem and Tunney. 

The letter reported that Salem referred to the altercation between herself and Tunney as

“harassment.” According to the letter, Salem’s husband later came in and spoke to John Caputo

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regarding the events. The letter stated that both Salem and her husband referred to Tunney’s

actions as “harassment” and relayed that she asked Caputo to take disciplinary action against

Tunney for the incident. Caputo wrote that he told her that she could file a complaint with the

EEOC if she so desired (ibid.). 

John Caputo testified that he told Joe Caputo of the altercations between Tunney and

Salem (id. at 198:1–8). Joe Caputo testified in his deposition, however, that John Caputo only

gave him basic, general information about the sales staff at Heritage Square (id. at Exh. 5,

22:15–25; 24:13–18). He testified that he was never told of any of Salem’s allegations of

harassment by Tunney (id. at 84:21–85:14). Joe Caputo testified that he did not notice any

problems between Tunney and Salem through the month of August up until September 15 (id. at

67:16–68:2). 

Salem’s final day of work was October 9, 2005. Tunney and Salem had a dispute over a

customer that Salem felt he had greeted out of turn (Miller Decl. Exh. A, 178:10–179:19). She

brought the dispute to the attention of Joe Caputo, the manager on duty at the time (id. at

180:6–14). Salem testified in her deposition that Joe Caputo yelled at her and told her that she

was a troublemaker and that he had had enough from her (Sturmer Decl. Exh. 1,

180:18–181:12). Joe Caputo testified, however, that he asked her to go into his office to talk

about the dispute (Miller Decl. Exh. D, 101:23–102:10). He also testified that Salem refused to

discuss the matter with him and left the store (id. at 100:11–101:22). Salem testified that he

told her that if she left the office without explanation, she should not bother coming back to

work (Sturmer Decl. Exh. 1, 181:13–18). Joe Caputo testified that he wanted to warn her that

she should not leave without explaining the situation or lodging a complaint (id. at Exh. 5,

103:1–12). He also stated that he did not have the authority to hire or terminate employees (id.

at 103:22–104:1). After the incident, Joe Caputo called John Caputo and relayed what had

occurred (id. at 101:23–102:10). 

Salem admitted in her deposition that she left work early on the day of October 9, 2005,

and that she did not have authorization to do so (Miller Decl. Exh. A, 186:7–11). She did not

report for work or call in for October 11 through October 13, the next three days that she was

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scheduled to work (id. at 191:3–22). According to the Heritage Square employee handbook, an

employee on non-authorized leave who did not report to work or call within two working days

would be considered terminated effective on the third day he or she was absent (id. at Exh. 6, p.

73). 

Salem testified that she believed that Joe Caputo had terminated her on October 9, 2005

(id. at 418:15–419:5). She called John Caputo on October 12, and he informed her that a letter

of termination was in the mail (id. at 189:2–191:2). He told her that her failure to come to work

or call in meant that she was terminated. 

Plaintiff filed this action on August 1, 2006. She alleges claims for (1) employment

discrimination under Title VII based on gender, purported religion, and ethnicity against all

defendants, (2) sexual harassment in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing

Act against all defendants, (3) retaliation against Heritage Square, (4) wrongful termination in

violation of public policy against Heritage Square, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional

distress against all defendants. This motion for summary judgment was filed on July 18, 2007. 

Trial is set to begin on October 22, 2007. 

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment should be granted where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits

show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of

production to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Playboy

Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24

(1986). “If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts’ that show a genuine

issue for trial.” Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted).

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In the Ninth Circuit, “there is a high standard for the granting of summary judgment in

employment discrimination cases.” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th

Cir. 1996). “‘[W]e require very little evidence to survive summary judgment’ in a

discrimination case, because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a

‘searching inquiry’ – one that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder, upon a full

record.’” Ibid. (quoting Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff

argues that there remain triable issues of fact as to whether she was subjected to a hostile

environment based on gender, ethnicity, and purported religion, whether the termination of her

employment was based on retaliation, and whether she was wrongfully terminated in violation

of public policy against sexual, ethnic, and religious harassment.

As an initial matter, both plaintiff and defendants have filed objections to evidence

presented in briefing this motion. To the extent those objections bear on the outcome of this

motion, they will be dealt with as they arise. 

1. TITLE VII CLAIMS.

Plaintiff’s first claim alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based

on gender, national origin, and purported religion in violation of Title VII. Her second claim

alleges that she was subjected to severe and pervasive sexual harassment in violation of

California’s Fair Housing and Employment Act. 

An employer is liable for conduct giving rise to a hostile work environment if the

employee can show: (1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature;

(2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an intimidating, hostile,

offensive, or abusive working environment. See Pavon v. Swift Transp. Co., 192 F.3d 902, 908

(9th Cir. 1999). The severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a

reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering “all the circumstances.” Oncale v.

Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). Factors that may be considered “may

include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

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threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes

with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).

A. Sexual Harassment.

Plaintiff presents evidence that she was subjected to verbal remarks and conduct based

on her gender, ethnic background, and her purported religion. As to sexual harassment, she

notes that Tunney was “constantly” giving her compliments on her appearance and asked her on

one occasion if she was happy in her marriage. She also contends that he brought sexual

connotations to normal workplace conversations with other employees that she could overhear. 

Although these were not sexual references, he would also have serious disagreements over the

operation of the floor rules with her, attempt to intimidate her, yell at her, and point his finger in

her face. He would mock her in front of colleagues. Defendants respond by pointing out that

Tunney never made any sexual advances and never touched her in an unwelcome way. Plaintiff

agrees. She argues, however, that Tunney’s conduct was sufficient to create a triable issue of

fact that the hostile environment was so severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and

conditions of employment. 

Defendants contend that a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would not have

considered Tunney’s actions to have altered the terms of her employment. The standards for a

hostile work-environment claim are not to be interpreted as a code of workplace civility;

complaints based on “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of

abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing” are not actionable. Farragher

v. City of Boca Raton, 775, 788 (1998) (emphasis added). Defendants present evidence that

Tunney and Salem had an antagonistic working relationship which plaintiff does not deny given

that they had several arguments over customers and the operation of the floor rules. Moreover,

defendants contend that the incidents she did identify in her deposition were merely isolated

instances of conduct that did not rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment. 

This order now turns to whether the conduct was severe and pervasive enough from both

an objective and subjective standpoint to alter the terms and conditions of Salem’s employment. 

It seems clear from Salem’s testimony that from a subjective standpoint, she believed that the

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terms and conditions of her employment were altered, or so a reasonable jury could conclude. 

Turning to the objective aspect, Salem testified that she was subjected to the following conduct:

• Tunney repeatedly complimented her on her appearance and body

language; 

• Tunney continuously brought up subjects of a sexual nature in

conversations with other employees while Salem was within

earshot;

• Tunney related personal anecdotes of a sexual nature when

discussing a television show;

• Tunney told plaintiff that “women love to be fondled” when

giving her advice on selling furniture; 

• Tunney showed a faucet in a catalog to other employees and

commented that it looked like male genitalia, without showing the

picture to plaintiff;

• He made comments on the appearance of a female customer

wearing sweatpants bearing the slogan “Juicy” on the rear. 

Plaintiff also argues that Tunney’s comments and actions, including arguments they had over

customers and the operation of the floor rules, that did not directly implicate sex or her gender

were nonetheless motivated by hostility based on her gender. “[H]arassing conduct need not be

motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.” 

Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Plaintiff admits that she and Tunney had an antagonistic working

relationship, but argues that his hostility toward her was motivated her sex. Plaintiff cites Hong

v. Right Management Consultants, Inc., 2006 WL 335291, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (Hamilton, J.),

for the proposition that conduct need not be sexual in nature, but there still must be a sufficient

showing that the conduct was motivated by gender. In Hong, the plaintiff established based on

her own testimony and the testimony of others that she was treated differently and was

subjected to different working conditions because of her gender, even though much of the

conduct of which she complained did not directly implicate her gender. Here, particularly

coupled with Tunney’s comments, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that his conduct was

motivated by his hostility toward plaintiff because of her gender. 

Under the law in the Ninth Circuit, a single, fairly mild incident of sexual harassment is

not sufficient to sustain a hostile work-environment claim. See Kortan v. California Youth

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Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that summary judgment was proper for

defendants where a supervisor had referred to a former female superintendent using derogatory

names in front of plaintiff on an isolated occasion). Here, however, the number and frequency

of incidents to which plaintiff testified is sufficiently greater to require a jury trial. 

B. Ethnic and Religious Discrimination.

Plaintiff also claims that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her

ethnicity and her purported religion — although Salem was an Orthodox Catholic, she alleges

that she was discriminated against because her coworkers, including Tunney, believed her to be

a Muslim. 

Salem presents evidence that Tunney would “repeatedly” ask her how to pronounce

Middle Eastern names. When Salem and Tunney had arguments regarding the floor rules, he

would sometimes question her language skills and her ability to read. Tunney told her that

speaking Arabic and discussing Middle Eastern politics with customers was inappropriate. 

Tunney and other employees made comments and jokes about the 9/11 terror attacks and

commented on a customer’s wearing some type of headdress or head scarf which plaintiff did

not identify. 

Salem also argues that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether and when Tunney was

aware that she was a Catholic, not a Muslim. She points out that she had a conversation with

Tunney about her church attendance on Sundays some time between February and April of

2005. Thereafter, he asked her if, because of her religion, she had to fast on certain days or eat

certain things. Salem contends that this meant that he was making a comment on her purported

religion. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is still unclear that

Tunney was making a comment regarding her religion. Putting these comments together with

others, however, defendants have not eliminated all triable issues of fact as to whether she was

subjected to a hostile work environment based on her ethnicity and religion. 

Defendants contend that even considering the facts in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, there is no triable issue of fact as to whether she was subjected to discrimination based

on her ethnicity or religion. Salem did testify that the comments made her feel “less American”

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and as if she did not belong in the country. Again, defendant argues that the incidents plaintiff

identifies appear to be isolated and are not sufficient to rise to the level of severe or pervasive

harassment. Similarly, in Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2003), the

Ninth Circuit held that isolated, racially offensive comments coupled with an incident of teasing

the plaintiff for her accent and pronunciation did not constitute a objectively hostile work

environment. Here, however, plaintiff testified that Tunney demeaned her ability to read and

understand English on several occasions. Defendants have failed to show, particularly in

conjunction with other remarks Tunney allegedly made regarding plaintiff’s sex, that she was

not subjected to a hostile work environment. 

Plaintiff argues in her opposition that in determining whether she was subjected to a

hostile environment, all facts relevant to her claims of gender, ethnic, and religious

discrimination should be considered together. Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1561

(9th Cir. 1994). Defendants argue that this action is distinguishable from Lam because it dealt

with discrimination in hiring decisions, not a hostile work-environment claim. This distinction,

although valid, does not necessarily demand that Salem’s claims of gender, ethnic, and religious

discrimination should be considered separately. At any event, plaintiff has shown that there

remains a triable issue of fact regarding whether she was subjected to a hostile work

environment based on sex, religion and ethnicity. Plaintiff’s case is arguably weak — she

admits that Tunney never solicited sex from her or touched her in appropriate manner. Still,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s discrimination claims under Title

VII and FEHA must be DENIED.

2. RETALIATION CLAIMS UNDER FEHA.

“Lawsuits claiming retaliatory employment termination in violation of CFEHA are

analogous to federal Title VII claims, and are evaluated under federal law interpreting Title VII

cases.” Flait v. North American Watch Co., 3 Cal. App. 4th 767, 476 (1992). To establish a

prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, the plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she engaged

in a “protected activity;” (2) that the employer subjected the employee to an adverse

employment action; and (3) a causal link that existed between the protected activity and the

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employer’s action. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005). “Once an

employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate,

nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Ibid. If the employer does so “the

presumption of relation ‘drops out of the picture,’ and the burden shifts back to the employee to

prove intentional retaliation.” Ibid.

A. Prima Facie Case.

Plaintiff has the burden to present evidence that she engaged in a protected activity. 

Salem testified in her deposition that she complained repeatedly about Tunney’s harassment to

John and Joe Caputo, who failed to take action. She estimated that she complained to them

about Tunney’s behavior approximately 20 to 30 times, although she did not point out when any

of those complaints occurred. She also points out that in John Caputo’s letter to her following

the incident on July 17, 2005, he underlined the word “harassment” in two places. 

In response, defendants point out that on October 9, 2005, Salem’s final day of work,

she testified that she had complained to Joe Caputo because of a dispute with Tunney over

adherence to the floor rules and interrupting a salesperson while they were with a customer, not

because of harassment. Still, the fact remains that Salem testified to complaining about

harassment to management on other occasions. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, she has created a triable issue of fact that she complained about harassment and

engaged in protected activity. 

Turning to the second element, plaintiff argues that she was fired on October 9, 2005, in

retaliation for complaining about harassment. Defendants contend that Salem walked off the

job early and failed to call in for three days in violation of store policy. Heritage Square also

argues that Salem knew the consequences of leaving work early without an excuse because she

was aware of Heritage Square’s policies. Whether or not she intended to quit, according to

defendants, she was ultimately terminated for her failure to follow company policy. Viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could determine that

she had suffered an adverse employment action. 

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Finally, turning to the third element, plaintiff argues that she was terminated for

complaining about harassment to management. Plaintiff points out that Tunney was one of

Heritage Square’s highest-earning salespersons. Rather than responding to her complaints

about harassment, so the argument goes, defendants instead chose to circle the wagons around

their highest-earning salesperson. Moreover, she argues that her alleged termination was

sufficiently close in time to her complaints about harassment to show retaliation. Here, viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she has presented a prima facie case that she

was retaliated against. 

B. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason.

The burden now shifts to defendants to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for their actions. It is undisputed that Salem left early on her final day of work, that Joe Caputo

warned her against leaving without explaining the situation, and that she did not show up for

her next two shifts or call in to explain her absences. It is also undisputed that Heritage

Square’s attendance policy was explained in the employee manual, a copy of which Salem

received on beginning work. Accordingly, defendants have presented evidence that they had a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Salem.

C. Pretext.

“[A] plaintiff at the pretext stage must produce evidence in addition to that which was

sufficient for her prima facie case in order to rebut the defendant’s showing.” Godwin v. Hunt

Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). “When plaintiff offers direct evidence of

discriminatory motive, a triable issue of as to the actual motivation of the employer is created

even if the evidence is not substantial.” Id. at 1221. Plaintiff can also prove pretext “indirectly,

by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of credence because it is

internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable.’” Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough

School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). When at the

summary-judgment stage, “one draws all permissible inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party.” Id. at 1194. 

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Plaintiff does not present direct evidence of a discriminatory motive in terminating her

employment. She does, however, testify that to her knowledge, John Caputo had never fired

anyone for failure to call in for work, at least at that store. She also argues that the letter sent by

John Caputo on October 12, 2005, informing her of her termination is evidence of pretext. The

evidence that she presents of pretext is admittedly slim, however, a reasonable trier of fact could

still conclude that Heritage Square’s reasons for terminating her were pretextual. Accordingly,

there still remain triable issues of fact on plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and defendants’ motion

for summary judgment is DENIED. 

3. WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY.

“Apart from the terms of an express or implied employment contract, an employer has

no right to terminate employment for a reason that contravenes fundamental public policy as

expressed in a constitutional or statutory provision.” Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th

1238, 1252 (1994). An employee actually or constructively discharged in violation of a public

policy may have an action against the employer. Ibid. For a policy to support a claim for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy, it must be: (1) delineated in either

constitutional or statutory provision; (2) public in the sense that it serves the benefit of the

public, rather than only the individual; (3) well-established at the time of discharge; and (4)

substantial and fundamental. Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 880, 901 (1997). 

The public policy in opposing gender, ethnic, and religious discrimination is wellestablished in both California and federal law, and certainly benefits the public. Much as

plaintiff has demonstrated that there are triable issues of fact as to her claim for retaliation, there

are also triable issues of fact as to whether plaintiff was terminated for complaining to

management about harassment based on her gender, ethnicity, and religion. Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to this claim. 

4. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND PUNITIVE

DAMAGES.

The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme

and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or the reckless disregard

of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering or extreme

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emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the

defendant’s outrageous conduct. KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 4th 1023, 1028

(1995). The first element sets a high standard. “Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme

as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Ibid. 

Defendants first argue that plaintiff cannot maintain this claim because she has not

presented any evidence that she was harassed or retaliated against as a matter of law. As

described previously in this order, plaintiff has shown that there remain triable issues of fact on

those claims. Moreover, Tunney had several heated arguments with her over the floor rules

during which he yelled, pointed a finger at her, slammed a notebook down on her desk, and

asked if she could read. These incidents admittedly came during arguments, but viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to Salem, a reasonable jury could conclude that they exceeded

the bounds of conduct tolerated in a civilized society. A reasonable jury could also conclude

that Tunney made such statements with the intent of causing plaintiff emotional distress. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress is DENIED. 

As to plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, defendants contend that plaintiff cannot

show that she is entitled to punitive damages. A plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages if he or

she can show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants were guilty of malice, fraud

or oppression. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. Plaintiff has shown that there remain triable issues of

fact that she either was subjected to a hostile work environment or was retaliated against for

complaining of harassment. In turn, whether defendants were guilty of malice, fraud, or

oppression is likewise a question for the jury. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to Salem’s claim for punitive damages is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

DENIED. 

A final caveat must be added. After denying a defense summary judgment motion, the

Court has occasionally found that the trial record falls short of the summary judgment record

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and a Rule 50 motion is warranted. Sometimes the plaintiff refuses to go as far at trial as he or

she did in a lawyer-prepared declaration. Sometimes evidentiary objections make a difference. 

Where, as here, the overall case is borderline, the risk of such an outcome is heightened. 

Counsel should not take anything for granted and both sides should be mindful of Rule 50. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4, 2007. ______________________________________ WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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