Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00933/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00933-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY JOAQUIN SILVEIRA III,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-933-KJN

ORDER ON PARTIES’ CROSS MOTIONS 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(ECF Nos. 18, 23)

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security 

denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security 

Act.

1

 In his summary judgment motion, plaintiff contends the Administrative Law Judge erred in

assigning a “light” RFC with a “sit/stand at will” option, because that is essentially sedentary 

work. Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred in rejecting his subjective-symptom testimony, and in

ignoring the rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs. The Commissioner opposed, 

and filed a cross–motion for summary judgment.

The court GRANTS IN PART plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, DENIES the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion, and REMANDS for an award of benefits.

1 This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule

302(c)(15). Both parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge, and the 

case was reassigned to the undersigned for all purposes. (ECF Nos. 8, 11, 25.) 

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I. BACKGROUND AND ALJ’S FIVE–STEP ANALYSIS2

On October 30, 2017, plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging an onset 

date of October 17, 2016. (Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 15, 143-44.) Plaintiff stated he was 

disabled due to information on his Veterans Affairs report and because of a bi-ventricular 

defibrillator. (AT 80.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and again upon 

reconsideration. (AT 58-67; 69-78.) Plaintiff, aided by an attorney, sought review of these 

denials with an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AT 91.) The ALJ held a hearing on

September 12, 2018, where plaintiff testified about his conditions. (AT 28-57.)

On November 20, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision determining that plaintiff was not 

disabled from his onset date onward. (AT 15-23.) As an initial matter, the ALJ determined that 

plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December of 2022. (AT 17.) At step one, 

the ALJ concluded plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset 

date of October 17, 2016. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ determined plaintiff had the following

severe impairments: non-iscemic cardiomyopathy heart failure, left pes planus, diabetes, and 

hypertension. (Id.) The ALJ found plaintiff’s COPD and small hiatal hernia to be non-severe. 

(AT 18.) At step three, the ALJ determined plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically 

2 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social 

Security program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs 

eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571—76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140—42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the 

claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step 

three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet 

or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the 

claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing past relevant work? If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any 

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). The claimant bears the burden of proof in 

the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The 

Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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equal the severity of an impairment listed in Appendix 1. (Id.) (citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1). 

The ALJ then found plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light 

work, except he could “[o]ccasionally climb[] ramps/stairs and ladders/ropes/scaffolds . . ., 

frequently balance and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, [and] crawl . . ., should avoid even 

moderate exposure to wet or humid environment[s]” and “would require a sit/stand option 

permitting sit/stand at will.” (AT 18.) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ stated he considered

those of plaintiff’s symptoms that were consistent with the medical evidence and opinions of 

plaintiff’s doctors. (AT 18-21.) The ALJ then considered the interrogatories of a vocational 

expert, who considered the ability of a person with plaintiff’s limitations to perform various 

occupations. (AT 21-22.) The ALJ concluded at step four that plaintiff was able to perform past 

relevant work as a floor attendant and office machine servicer. (Id.) Alternatively, the ALJ found 

other jobs in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. (AT 22-23.) Thus, the 

Commissioner determined plaintiff was not disabled. (AT 23.)

Plaintiff then filed this action requesting judicial review of the Commissioner’s final 

decision; the parties filed cross–motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 1, 18, 23, 24.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the agency’s decision de novo, and should reverse “only if the ALJ's 

decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied 

the wrong legal standard.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; i.e. “such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Edlund v. Massanari, 

253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, 

resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Id. The court will uphold 

the ALJ’s conclusion where “the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.”

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, the court may not reverse 

the ALJ’s decision on account of harmless error. Buck, 869 F.3d at 1048.

///

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III. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff primarily argues the ALJ erred in avoiding the assignment of a “sedentary” RFC 

by assigning plaintiff to “light” work with a “sit/stand at will” option. He also contends the ALJ 

failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting plaintiff’s symptom testimony, 

failed to consider plaintiff’s 60% disability finding from Veterans Affairs (“VA”). (ECF No. 18

at 5-10.) Plaintiff seeks a remand for benefits. (Id. at 18.)

The Commissioner disagrees, arguing that plaintiff mischaracterizes the RFC as sedentary 

by ignoring the VE’s testimony. The Commissioner also argues the ALJ provided valid reasons 

to discount plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, including the objective medical evidence, 

his conservative treatment, and conflicts between his testimony and the medical opinion evidence, 

and was not required to discuss the VA’s disability determination under current regulations. 

(ECF No. 23.) Thus, the Commissioner contends the decision as a whole is supported by 

substantial evidence, which should result in affirmance. (Id.) Alternatively, the Commissioner 

argues that any finding for plaintiff should result in remand for further proceedings. (Id.)

IV. DISCUSSION

A. A “light” work RFC is inconsistent with plaintiff’s “sit/stand at will” limitation.

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s formulation of an RFC permitting light work with, among 

other limitations, a “a sit/stand option permitting sit/stand at will.” (AT 18.) The ALJ based this 

portion of the RFC on the findings of the two state-agency physicians who reviewed plaintiff’s 

case at the initial and reconsideration stages (AT 58-67; 69-78), as well as on a report by 

plaintiff’s podiatrist, Dr. Kazak (AT 1026-27). The two state-agency doctors assigned an RFC of 

“light” work, which the physicians opined allowed plaintiff to stand and walk for “about 6 hours 

in an 8-hour workday.” (AT 64, 75.) The ALJ found these two opinions persuasive, and adopted 

both the “light” designation and many of the proposed limitations. (AT 21.) However, the ALJ 

also noted Dr. Kazak’s more-recent finding (filed after the state-agency physicians reviewed 

plaintiff’s case) of plaintiff’s “left pes planus/flat foot with fat pad atrophy and pain.” (Id., citing 

AT 1026-27.) Dr. Kazak stated this condition would get “worse with increased standing and 

walking.” (Id.) Dr. Kazak’s notes stated:

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Explained [to plaintiff] that in light of neuropathy, history of ulcer 

formation and prolonged healing, he is at risk for developing lower 

extremity neuropathic ulcerations. Explained that he should avoid 

prolonged standing and walking as these can lead to skin breakdown 

without him noticing it. The skin break down/ulceration may lead to 

amputation and limb loss. Explained that this condition is unlikely to 

improve. Encouraged to continue with daily foot checks.

In light of Dr. Kazak’s opinion, the ALJ “added a sit/stand option” to plaintiff’s RFC. (AT 21.)

Plaintiff’s claim is, essentially, that a “sit/stand at will” restriction is incompatible with a 

light RFC. Plaintiff argues that, because his podiatrist recommended avoiding “prolonged 

standing and walking”—a recommendation the ALJ accepted—an RFC with a “sit/stand at will” 

restriction necessarily makes him only eligible for sedentary work. Plaintiff argues that this 

matters because if he is classified under a sedentary RFC, the regulations dictate he must be found 

disabled due to his advanced age, education and unskilled work experience. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 

404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 201.00(g) (“Individuals approaching advanced age (age 50–54) may be 

significantly limited in vocational adaptability if they are restricted to sedentary work. When 

such individuals . . . can no longer perform vocationally relevant past work and have no 

transferable skills, a finding of disabled ordinarily obtains.”). Thus, plaintiff contends that the 

ALJ’s assigning a “light” RFC with this significant exertional restriction deprived him of a 

disability finding at sedentary. Based on the applicable federal regulations and social security 

rulings (“SSR”),

3

the undersigned agrees.

The relevant portion of the code of federal regulations describes light work as requiring “a 

good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing 

and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. By contrast, the same C.F.R. describes 

sedentary work as primarily involving sitting, and notes that “[j]obs are sedentary if walking and 

standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.” Further, SSR 83-10 

describes in greater detail the amount of sitting, standing, and walking required for sedentary and 

light work, as codified in Section 404.1567. For sedentary exertional levels, 83-10 states:

3

“Social Security Rulings do not carry the ‘force of law,’ but they are binding on ALJs 

nonetheless. They reflect the official interpretation of the Social Security Administration and are 

entitled to some deference as long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act and 

regulations.” Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 2017)

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Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally 

and other sedentary criteria are met. “Occasionally” means 

occurring from very little up to one-third of the time. Since being 

on one's feet is required “occasionally” at the sedentary level of 

exertion, periods of standing or walking should generally total no 

more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday, and sitting should 

generally total approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.

SSR 83-10: “Titles II & Xvi: Determining Capability to Do Other Work-the Med.-Vocational 

Rules of Appendix 2,” (S.S.A. 1983). Conversely, this Ruling describes light exertional levels as:

[A] job is in [the light] category when it requires a good deal of 

walking or standing--the primary difference between sedentary and 

most light jobs. 

***

[T]he full range of light work requires standing or walking, off and 

on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. 

Sitting may occur intermittently during the remaining time.

Under the facts of plaintiff’s case, an exertional restriction of “sit/stand at will” is akin to 

“sedentary” work under this SSR—and certainly nowhere near being able to be on one’s feet for 

6 hours of a workday. The undersigned is further persuaded by dispositions equating a similar 

exertional limitation to sedentary work. See, e.g., McClure v. Comm’r, 2016 WL 4628049, at *7 

(S.D. Cal, Aug. 9, 2016) (“[where plaintiff was] limited to standing or walking for no more than 

two hours in an eight-hour day . . ., the ALJ's RFC determination is inconsistent with the 

definition of light work.”) (citing Campbell v. Astrue, 2010 WL 4689521, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 

2010) (finding the ALJ's characterization of plaintiff's exertional capabilities as “light work” to be

incongruent with the particularized finding of standing/walking limitation); see also, e.g.,

Buckner-Larkin v. Astrue, 450 Fed. Appx. 626 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Her RFC also included a sitstand option, which is most reasonably interpreted as sitting or standing ‘at-will,’ based on the 

record.”); Perez v. Astrue, 250 Fed. Appx. 774, 776 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The need to sit and stand at 

will is incompatible with the ability to either sit or stand for six hours in an eight-hour 

workday.”). 

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ appropriately resolved the conflict between an 

RFC of light work (requiring 6 hours of standing and walking in a work day) and the exertional 

“sit/stand at will” limitation by submitting the matter to the Vocational Expert (“VE”). The 

Commissioner cites to Moore v. Apfel, which does indeed reinforce the principle that “when a 

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claimant falls between [a light and sedentary] grid, consultation with a VE is appropriate.” 216 

F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Distasio v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 348 (9th Cir. 1995)

(discussing jobs that fall between two grids as “something along the lines of ‘light-minus’ or 

‘sedentary-plus.’”); SSR Ruling 83-12 (advising the assistance of a VE in cases where the 

claimant’s exertional restrictions places him “somewhere in the middle”). Thus, the 

Commissioner argues that when the ALJ believed plaintiff could not do the full range of light 

work due to the sit/stand at will limitation, consultation with the VE was required in order to 

determine whether there were jobs that plaintiff could perform. (See AT 22.) Here, the VE’s 

interrogatory stated that plaintiff would be able to perform his past relevant work as a floor 

attendant “when adjusting for the sit/stand option.” (Id.) The ALJ also noted that, in an 

alternative step-five finding, plaintiff could perform the duties of a Cashier II, with 427,000 

positions in the national economy “with 50% erosion due to sit/stand option.” (AT 23.)

The undersigned does not dispute that if this were a case of “light-minus,” the ALJ’s 

approach would be appropriate under Moore—as has been the result in so many other cases in the 

Ninth Circuit. See also SSR 83-12 (“In situations where . . . the individual's exertional limitations 

are somewhere ‘in the middle’ in terms of the regulatory criteria for exertional ranges of work, 

more difficult judgments are involved as to the sufficiency of the remaining occupational base to 

support a conclusion as to disability. Accordingly, [VE] assistance is advisable for these types of

cases.”). For example, the Commissioner cites to Watts v. Astrue, where the ALJ’s appending of 

a sit/stand option to a light-work RFC “mandated the use of a VE.” 2010 WL 1854075, at *6 

(C.D. Cal. 2010). However, the difference between plaintiff’s case and cases like Moore and 

Watts lies in the amount of time those claimants can spend on their feet. In Moore, the plaintiff’s 

exertional limitations put him somewhere between light and sedentary, and so the Ninth Circuit 

held the VE’s expertise was required, given the likely erosion in jobs for someone able to do less 

than a full complement of light work. 216 F.3d at 870-71. Similarly, in Watts, the plaintiff’s 

exertional limitation required “periodic” alternating of sitting and standing for an RFC that 

allowed for up to 6 hours of standing/walking time. 2010 WL 1854075, at *3. Thus, these cases 

illustrate how the VE can help resolve a claimant’s ability to work in those “middle” situations.

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But plaintiff’s case is not one of “light-minus.” Given the restriction to sit/stand at will, 

which is based on Dr. Kazak’s recommendation that plaintiff be off his feet as much as possible 

or risk possible amputation, it was error to deem plaintiff’s RFC as anything other than sedentary. 

See, e.g., McClure, 2016 WL 4628049 at *7 (finding the ALJ’s acceptance of the plaintiff’s 

severe mobility limitations corresponded with “occasional” standing/walking, which was 

“inconsistent with the definition of light work.”); see also, e.g., Buckner-Larkin, 450 Fed. Appx. 

at 626; Perez, 250 Fed. Appx. at 776. Thus, Moore and Watts are simply inapposite, as under a 

sedentary RFC the issue would have resolved under the “Grids,” and would not have required the 

assistance of a VE. See Rule 201.14 (Appendix 2 to Subpart P of Part 404—Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines) (requiring the entry of “disabled” for a person approaching advanced age with a high 

school education and no transferrable skills). The ALJ cannot be allowed to dodge a finding of 

disabled at sedentary by misclassifying plaintiff’s RFC as light.

B. Plaintiff’s Other Claims

Given the finding above regarding the ALJ’s misclassification of plaintiff’s RFC, 

plaintiff’s remaining points of error are not dispositive. However, for the sake of thoroughness, 

they are briefly addressed below.

Plaintiff claims the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing reasons to reject the more 

restrictive aspects of plaintiff’s subjective-symptom testimony. Regarding plaintiff’s testimony 

of his ability to sit, stand, and walk, the undersigned finds this issue in line with the 

misclassification issue. It appears incongruous for the ALJ to accept the opinion of Dr. Kazak—

that plaintiff be off his feet or risk amputation, and disregard plaintiff’s similar testimony. Thus, 

to the extent these issues align, the undersigned finds the ALJ failed to offer clear and convincing 

reasons to discredit plaintiff’s testimony regarding his abilities to stand and walk. Trevizo v. 

Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony 

about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

doing so . . . The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 

cases.”) (citing Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2014)).

///

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It is unclear if plaintiff is challenging the remainder of the ALJ’s findings on plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony (concerning his cardiac condition, diabetes, hypertension, and other medical 

issues). To the extent there is such a challenge, the undersigned finds the ALJ met the clear and 

convincing standard by relying on the inconsistencies in the medical evidence, conservative 

treatment, and control with medication. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040 (finding examples of 

“specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting or rejecting a claimant’s subjective 

symptom testimony to include: the effectiveness of or noncompliance with a prescribed regime of 

medical treatment, inconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and their conduct, and whether 

the alleged symptoms are consistent with the medical evidence).

Finally, plaintiff initially challenged the ALJ’s failure to address the VA’s 60% disability 

rating. (ECF No. 18.) However, plaintiff conceded that under the new regulations, the ALJ is not 

bound by any other agency’s disability determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c) and 1504 (for 

claims filed after March 17, 2017, another agency’s disability determination is “neither valuable 

nor persuasive,” and the ALJ need not provide analysis of that agency’s determination). Plaintiff 

argues in his reply brief that the ALJ was still required to consider the evidence underlying the 

VA’s determination, but the undersigned finds the ALJ met this duty. (See AT 17-18, citing 

multiple records from the VA).

C. Remedy

Plaintiff requests a remand for benefits. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (noting that a court 

may remand for benefits if “(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient 

reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the 

improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the 

claimant disabled on remand.”). The Commissioner requests that, if the undersigned finds for 

plaintiff, a remand for further proceedings is appropriate. (ECF No. 23 at 23-24.) 

Here, the undersigned sees no utility to further proceedings, as under the Garrison prongs. 

First, the ALJ accepted Dr. Kazak’s report regarding plaintiff’s standing/walking limitations, and 

fashioned an RFC with that limitation in mind. The ALJ also made the requisite findings 

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regarding plaintiff’s age, education, and applicability of previous work experience. (AT 22, 

citing Rule 202.14 of the Grids in finding plaintiff approaching advanced age, with a high school 

education and no transferable skills.) Thus, there is no further evidence to adduce, and no further 

findings for the ALJ to make. Second, the ALJ’s error in misclassifying plaintiff’s RFC is purely 

legal. See Buck, 869 F.3d 1048 (the courts may reverse “if the ALJ applied the wrong legal 

standard.”) The only error that need be corrected is to apply the applicable grid, C.F.R., and SSR 

sections to the evidence adduced (as noted in Section A above). Third, the court credits as true 

both Dr. Kazak’s report (AT 1026-27) and the evidence classifying plaintiff by his age, education 

and work experience—both of which the ALJ himself credited in crafting the “sit/stand at will” 

limitation in the RFC and resolving plaintiff’s case. (See AT 22.) 

In setting plaintiff’s classification as “sedentary,” and using Rule 201.14 of the Grids, an 

entry of “disabled” is required. For these reasons, the undersigned orders a remand to the ALJ for 

the calculation and award of benefits. See, e.g., Horton v. Astrue, 252 Fed. App'x. 160, 161 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (remanding for an award of benefits where inability to stand/walk was inconsistent 

with light classification, and where no further evidence need be adduced or interpreted on this 

issue). 

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23) is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED IN PART;

3. The final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED, and judgment is entered 

for plaintiff;

4. On REMAND, the agency is instructed to calculate and award benefits; and

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

Dated: November 10, 2020

silv.933

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