Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00126/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 891
Nature of Suit: Agricultural Acts
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEROY DEL DON, JR., )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. )

 )

TOM VILSACK in his official capacity as )

United States Secretary of Agriculture, )

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )

AGRICULTURE, UNITED STATES )

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE )

FOREST SERVICE, KAREN JO ) 

CALDWELL, SUSAN SKALSKI, )

KATHY HARDY, CHRISTINA WELCH, )

and DOES 1 through 100 inclusive, )

 )

Defendants. )

____________________________________ )

 1:10-CV-126 AWI DLB

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S EX

PARTE APPLICATION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER AND MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

[Document # 12]

This is an action for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and damages by Plaintiff Leroy

Del Don, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) against the United States Department of Agriculture and individuals

employed by the Department of Agriculture (collectively, “Defendants”). This action arises out

of a dispute between the parties as to a paved driveway on a recreational residence owned by

Plaintiff that is located in Stanislaus National Forest. The complaint in this action was filed on

January 25, 2010, and primarily seeks injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from requiring the

removal of asphalt paving covering the driveway, and declaratory relief declaring that the paved

driveway as currently constructed conforms with all applicable regulations. In the instant

motion, Plaintiff requests the court grant a temporary restraining order to prohibit certain actions

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by Defendants pending the opportunity for notice and hearing on a motion for preliminary

injunction to similarly restrain Defendants’ actions pending the resolution of this action on the

merits.

Plaintiff’s application chronicles the negotiations that have been on-going between

himself and Defendants. Plaintiff’s application alleges, inter alia that:

Despite the ongoing negotiations between [Plaintiff and [Defendants] regarding

this matter and despite the representations made by [Defendants] that they would

not force [Plaintiff] off his property, on January 22, 2010, [defendant Caldwell]

issued a “NOTICE OF TRESPASS AND OPPORTUNITY TO SELL” to

[Plaintiff]. The notice advised that [Plaintiff] has no authorization to continued

to use and occupy Pinecrest Tract Lot 150 and that [Plaintiff’s] recreational

residence and all related improvements and/or structures and persona property

located on Lot 150 are in trespass. The notice further states that [Plaintiff] must

cease and desist all use and occupancy and vacate the premises immediately. The

notice further states that because [Plaintiff] has failed to implement the corrective

actions necessary to comply with the terms and conditions of his previous term

permit, a new term permit will not be authorized.

Doc. # 13 at 6:20 - 7:1. 

Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary

injunctions. See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d

1111, 1126 (E.D.Cal.2001) (“The standard for issuing a preliminary injunction is the same as the

standard for issuing a temporary restraining order.”). The Ninth Circuit in the past set forth two

separate sets of criteria for determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief:

Under the traditional test, a plaintiff must show: (1) a strong likelihood of success

on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary

relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4)

advancement of the public interest (in certain cases). The alternative test requires

that a plaintiff demonstrate either a combination of probable success on the merits

and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.

Taylor v. Westly, 488 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.2007). “These two formulations represent two

points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the

probability of success decreases.” Id. The Supreme Court recently reiterated, however, that a

plaintiff seeking an injunction must demonstrate that irreparable harm is “ likely,” not just

possible. Winter v. NRDC, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374-76 (2008) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's alternative

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“sliding scale” test). The Ninth Circuit has explicitly recognized that its alternative test was

overruled by Winter, and that “[t]he proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief

requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’ “ Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109,

1127 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374).

Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “a court may issue a

temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only

if:”

specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate

and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse

party can be heard in opposition; and 

the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the

reasons why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(b)(1)(A)&(B).

As Plaintiff points out, temporary restraining orders are issued by courts “to preserve the

status quo for a short time until the court can consider a pending motion for preliminary

injunction.” Doc. # 7:27 - 8:1 (citing Yukon Flats School Dist. V. Native Village of Venetie, 856

F.2d 1384, 1387 - 1388 (9 Cir. 1988). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b), plaintiffs must make a showing

that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to plaintiff if the order is not

issued to support their motion for a temporary restraining order. The standard for obtaining ex

parte relief under Rule 65 is very stringent. Reno Air Racing Ass'n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126,

1130 (9th Cir.2006). The temporary restraining order “should be restricted to serving [its]

underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is

necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Teamsters &

Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).

The letter of January 22, 2010, from defendant Caldwell on behalf of the Forest Service

entitled “NOTICE OF TRESPASS AND OPPORTUNITY TO SELL” (hereinafter the “January

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22 Letter”) informs Plaintiff that he is to “cease and desist all use and occupancy, and vacate the

premises immediately.” Exh. # 7 to Del Don Declaration, Doc. # 18. Further, the January 22

Letter informs Plaintiff that if he does not agree by February 26, 2010, to sell the recreational

property to a qualified buyer, he will be subject to the removal of improvement provisions of his

previous term permit as authorized under 36 CFR 251.60(h)(2)(i). Plaintiff contends that the

January 22 Letter evinces the likelihood of irreparable harm based on Plaintiff’s loss of use of the

property.

For purposes of a temporary restraining order, the court finds that Plaintiff has not

sufficiently alleged a likelihood of irreparable harm. There is no threat of imminent destruction

of the recreational facilities on the property, nor has there been any indication that the Forest

Service intends to take unilateral action to remove the contested portion of driveway. At most,

Plaintiff will be denied the use of the property until such time as Defendants have the opportunity

to oppose Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief and the matter can be heard by the court. The

court finds that such a temporary restriction does not rise to the level of constitutional

infringement or other form of irreparable harm.

In terms of likelihood on the merits, there is an insufficient basis at this point in the

proceedings to find that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. While Plaintiff alleges a

number of facts in support of his claim, the allegations are incomplete without a showing that

those facts will be sufficient to sustain the burden placed on Plaintiff by the applicable standard

of review. If, as would normally be the case in an agency decision, the court’s review is limited

to review for abuse of discretion, Plaintiff will be burdened to overcome a presumption of

validity of agency action. At this point the court finds the facts alleged by Plaintiff are not

sufficient to establish the likelihood of success against the substantial burden imposed by the

abuse of discretion standard. The court is therefore unwilling to conclude that Plaintiff is likely

to succeed on the merits.

Because the court finds that Plaintiff has not carried his burden to show irreparable harm

and a likelihood of success on the merits at this point, the court will deny Plaintiffs request for

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temporary restraining order and will instead order Defendants to submit their opposition and will

hear the parties at the earliest possible date.

THEREFORE, for the reasons previously stated, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.

2. Defendants shall file and serve an opposition, if any, to Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary

injunction not later than Tuesday, February 16, 2010, at 4:00 p.m.

3. The parties shall appear for oral argument on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction

on Tuesday, February 23, 2010, at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 2.

4. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief is continued until February 23, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 3, 2010 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

ciem0h CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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