Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00203/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00203-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS ALLEN PORTER,

Petitioner,

v.

D.G. ADAMS, Warden, et.al.,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-00203 SMS HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR), serving a sentence of 15 years to life following his conviction in Los

Angeles County on June 13, 1983, for second degree murder, and multiple counts of assault with

great bodily injury. (Exhibit 1, attached to Answer.)

In the instant petition, Petitioner does not challenge the validity of his conviction; rather,

he challenges a disciplinary action taken against him at Avenal State Prison in 2003. 

On May 28, 2003, Petitioner was issued a Rules Violation Report (RVR) for disruptive

behavior toward Correctional Officer C. Ramey. (Exhibit 2, attached to Answer.) 

Petitioner pled not guilty and a hearing was conducted on June 19, 2003. The hearing

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was postponed until June 22, 2003, because Sergeant Campbell was off work until that day. (Id.) 

On June 22, 2003, the hearing was again postponed so that the Senior Hearing Officer (SHO)

could clarify the RVR. (Id.) The RVR was adjudicated on June 23, 2003. 

On January 20, 2003, a correctional officer interviewed Petitioner concerning a staff

complaint made by another inmate. The complaint accused correctional officer Ramey of

sleeping on the job. (See Petition, Exhibit 6.) Petitioner alleges that the information provided at

this interview caused Ramey to retaliate against him by issuing the RVR. 

On May 25, 2003, three days before the RVR was issued, Petitioner prepared an

administrative appeal and staff complaint claiming that correctional staff in his housing unit were

not properly processing his legal mail. (Exhibit 3.) Specifically, Petitioner alleged that staff had

lost or refused to mail seven of his confidential letters, and he requested an investigation into the

missing mail as well as a determination as to the responsible individual. (Id.) A specific officer

was not named in the appeal. (Id.) Petitioner alleges that this appeal caused Ramey to retaliate

against him by issuing the RVR. 

On June 11, 2003, over a week after the incident, Petitioner submitted another

administrative appeal and staff complaint. (Exhibit 4.) Petitioner, along with several other

inmates, filed this appeal alleging staff misconduct, including retaliatory housing unit transfers

against members of the Men’s Advisory Committee (MAC) and improper handling of

confidential inmate mail. (Id.) Correctional Officer Ramey and several other officers were

named in this appeal. Petitioner again alleges that Ramey issued the RVR in retaliation for filing

this appeal. 

On July 8, 2003, Petitioner filed an administrative appeal challenging the disciplinary

hearing. (Exhibit 5.) Petitioner alleged that Lieutenant Calvert was biased, he did not receive all

of the procedural protections, and that Ramey issued the RVR in retaliation for several

complaints Petitioner made against him. (Id.) The appeal was denied at the second level of

review as it was determined that the charge was substantiated by a preponderance of the

evidence, and all the procedural safeguards were met. (Id.) The appeal was subsequently denied

at the director’s level on March 9, 2004. (Id.)

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Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Superior Court

County of Kings challenging the RVR on the following grounds: (1) all of the documentary

evidence was not part of the record; (2) some of the documentation was issued beyond the

statutory time limits and the SHO was biased; (3) the SHO denied him the opportunity to present

a defense; (4) the RVR was not accurate; and (5) the RVR was retaliatory. (Exhibit 6.) The

petition was denied as the Court found the SHO’s decision to be supported by some evidence and

Petitioner’s allegations were conclusory. (Id.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition in the California Court of Appeals. Petitioner raised the

same claims he raised in the superior court petition, but also claimed that the superior court failed

to consider all of his claims. (Exhibit 7.) The petition was summarily denied on September 17,

2004. (Id.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition with the California Supreme Court raising the same claims

raised in the prior two petitions, but also claimed that the court of appeals improperly denied his

petition without an opinion. (Exhibit 8.) The petition was summarily denied on August 17,

2005. (Id.) 

On January 25, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. (Court

Doc. 1.) By order of February 23, 2006, the action was transferred to the Fresno Division. 

(Court Doc. 4.) 

On June 30, 2006, Respondent filed an answer to the petition, and Petitioner filed a

traverse on December 1, 2006. (Court Docs. 13, 20.)

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to a judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as

guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner’s claims for relief arise out of a disciplinary

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hearing at Avenal State Prison, California, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(d). If a constitutional violation has resulted in the loss of time

credits, such violation affects the duration of a sentence, and the violation may be remedied by

way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876-78 (9 Cir. th

1990). 

II. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner’s claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for writ of habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003), disapproving the

Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000); Williams, 529 th

U.S. 362. “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175 (citations omitted). “Rather, that

application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

The state court’s factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court

must accept all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v.

Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110

F.3d 1380, 1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

In this case, the Kings County Superior Court denied the petition in a reasoned decision

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finding that there was “some evidence” to support the guilty findings and that Petitioner’s other

claims were conclusory and unsupported. (Exhibit 6, attached to Answer.) The summary denials

by the state appellate court and the California Supreme Court must be interpreted as denials on

this same basis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-805 (1991); see also Forrest v.

Vasquez, 75 F.3d 562, 564 (9 Cir. 1996) (federal court “looks through” summary denial to last th

explained state court judgment). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

Prisoners cannot be entirely deprived of their constitutional rights, but their rights may be

diminished by the needs and objectives of the institutional environment. Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,

so a prisoner is not afforded the full panoply of rights in such proceedings. Id. at 556. Thus, a

prisoner’s due process rights are moderated by the “legitimate institutional needs” of a prison. 

Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Superintendent, etc. v. Hill, 472

U.S. 445, 454-455 (1984).

However, when a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good time

credits, due process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) “Written notice of the charges must be

given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him

to marshal the facts and prepare a defense”; (2) “at least a brief period of time after the notice, no

less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the

disciplinary committee”; (3) “there must be a written statement by the factfinders as to the

evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action”; (4) “the inmate facing disciplinary

proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense

when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional

goals”; and (5) “where an illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity of the issues

makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an

adequate comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . .

to have adequate substitute aid . . . from the staff or from a[n] . . . inmate designated by the staff.” 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 566, 570. 

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A. Disciplinary Proceeding Complied With Due Process

Petitioner contends that the SHO did not allow him to present evidence and witness

testimony on his behalf. Initially, Petitioner contends that the SHO excluded documentary

evidence from the record, including a copy of the assignment ducat, his MAC activity card, and

the MAC bylaws. However, as Respondent argues, there is no evidence that Petitioner requested

that these documents be introduced into evidence. (Exhibit 2, to Answer.) Nonetheless, even if

Petitioner had made such a request, the documents are irrelevant. The documentation addresses

only whether Petitioner was authorized to be showering at the time of the incident, not the

disruptive behavior charge, which was the basis for the RVR. 

Petitioner additionally claims that he was not allowed to present a statement in his own

defense. This claim is unfounded as the rules violation report contains an extensive statement by

Petitioner presenting his version of the incident and his claim that he felt the rules violation was

issued in retaliation. (Exhibit 2, to Answer.) 

Lastly, Petitioner contends that the SHO did not document or allow the testimony of his

witness, Molero. As stated on the rules violation report, “Subject did not request any witnesses

to be present at his disciplinary hearing.” (Exhibit 2, to Answer, at p.4.) Accordingly, this

witness was never called, nor is there evidence Petitioner ever requested that he testify. (Id.)

B. Rules Violation Report Was Supported by Some Evidence

“In Superintendent, Mass. Correc. Inst. v. Hill, the Supreme Court further held that

‘revocation of good time does not comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due

process,’ unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in

the record.’ 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).”

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. In determining whether the “some evidence” standard is met, the Court

need not examine the entire record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh

the evidence. Id. Rather, the Court must determine whether there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion of the disciplinary board. Id., citing Superintendent v. Hill, at

455-56. 

Petitioner contends that the SHO was not impartial because he had previously ordered a

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correctional officer who witnessed the incident to write a supplemental report. Contrary to

Petitioner’s contention, this assertion does not support a finding that the SHO was biased. As

Respondent submits, the SHO ordered the report before he was even assigned to adjudicate the

case and, if anything, it merely shows that he desired all of the facts to be properly documented. 

The SHO’s decision relied on the RVR and the supplemental report in making his determination

that Petitioner was guilty of engaging in disruptive behavior. This finding is supported by “some

evidence.” 

On May 28, 2003, at approximately 2245 hours, Correctional Officer C. Ramey observed

Petitioner in the “B” side showers. Petitioner was paged to the Officers Station. As officer

Ramey attempted to counsel Petitioner regarding the shower hours and procedure, Petitioner

“became enraged, stating in a loud voice and capturing the attention of housing unit population,

‘I work all day.’” (Exhibit 2, attached to Answer.) Officer Ramey told Petitioner that the roster

indicated that his work hours were from 7:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. However, Petitioner stated that

his work hours varied, which was reflected on his activity card. Petitioner then “became more

enraged and his voice even louder” when he stated, “ ‘You are just singling me out.’ ” He stated

that there was another inmate in the shower and that inmate would also need to be issued a rules

violation. Petitioner’s “actions drew even more attention from the housing unit population” and

“disrupted the orderly operation of the housing unit.” (Id.) 

In response to the charges, Petitioner stated he was not disruptive toward Officer Ramey

and did not speak in a loud voice. He had worked that entire day and he therefore missed the

regular shower schedule. His privilege card reflects that his work schedule varies. (Id. at p.2.) 

Based on a preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner was found guilty of disruptive

behavior. It was determined that when Petitioner was noticed to be showering at an unauthorized

time and while he was being counseled, he became disruptive toward Officer Ramey. Then after

being counseled, Petitioner became “enraged” drawing the attention of other inmates in the area. 

It was noted that Petitioner disrupted the “orderly operation” of the unit by raising his voice

while arguing with the reporting officer. In light of the evidence presented and considered at the

hearing, there was “some evidence” to support the decision. 

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Petitioner’s contention that the SHO was not impartial because he had previously ordered

a corrections officer who witnessed the incident to write a report does not demonstrate bias. As

Respondent submits, the SHO ordered the report before he was assigned to adjudicate the case

and, if anything, it shows that he wanted all the facts to be properly presented and documented.

C. Petitioner Has Failed to Establish That The RVR Was Issued in Retaliation

Petitioner contends that the disciplinary action taken against him should be invalidated

because Officer Ramey issued the RVR in retaliation for several inmate appeals Petitioner filed

as well as due to a staff complaint against Ramey in which Petitioner was involved. Petitioner’s

claim is not persuasive.

First, as Respondent correctly argues, because Petitioner is challenging the validity of the

disciplinary hearing and resulting loss of good time credits, the proper standard for reviewing a

challenge to the RVR is “some evidence.” In this § 2254 proceeding, the claims before this

Court are due process claims rather than First Amendment retaliation claims. For the reasons

explained above, the state court properly applied the clearly established federal law and

determined that “some evidence” supported the SHO’s decision. 

D. Untimely Issuance of Supplemental Rules Violation Report

Petitioner claims that he did not receive a supplemental report within 15 days pursuant to

the CDCR regulations. This claim is not cognizable in the instant federal habeas corpus petition. 

Habeas corpus relief is not available to correct alleged errors in the state court's application or

interpretation of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991);

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1084-85 (9th Cir.1985). CDCR regulations provide that an

inmate must normally receive a copy of the RVR within 15 days of the incident. Cal. Code.

Regs. tit. 15, § 3320(a). Federal law, however, does not specify how much advance notice an

inmate must receive. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563. In fact, Petitioner does not allege that he did not

receive advance notice of the charges, he contends only that he did not receive all the reports

within the 15 days prescribed by California law. Such a claim is not cognizable. The

Constitution only requires that prisoners be afforded those procedures mandated by Wolff at a

prison disciplinary hearing; it does not require that prison officials comply with their own more

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generous procedures or time limitations. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d at 1419-1420; Rogers

v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 8 (1 Cir. 1984). st

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; and,

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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