Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00889/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00889-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID FELIX,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHAMBERS, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-0889-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate 

Judge jurisdiction. No other parties have appeared in the action. 

Plaintiff‟s complaint is before the Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff complains of acts that occurred during his incarceration at Kern Valley 

State Prison (“KVSP”). Plaintiff names the following individuals, in their individual and 

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

official capacities, as Defendants: (1) Correctional Officer Chambers, (2) Correctional 

Sergeant A. Day, (3) Lieutenant W. Hammer, (4) Chief Deputy Warden D. Davey, (5) 

Appeals Coordinator C. Cramer, (6) Associate Warden S. Rimbach, (7) Appeals 

Examiner R. Pimentel, and (8) Office of Appeals Chief J.D. Lozano. 

Plaintiff‟s allegations can be summarized essentially as follows:

On January 29, 2013, Plaintiff was housed in cell 118 in the KVSP medical unit. 

(ECF No. 1 at 3.) Upon Plaintiff‟s arrival in the cell, he and a correctional officer noted 

that the bed in the cell was on its side and had been vandalized. (Id.)

On March 5, 2013, an outside contractor informed Defendant Chambers that the

electrical belt on the bed had been torn. California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) rules require that any property damage in excess of $400 

caused by an inmate be reported and written up in a Rules Violation Report (RVR). 

Defendant Chambers did not write up the damage to the bed. (Id.) However, Chambers 

initiated a $465 charge to Plaintiff‟s trust account.

Plaintiff is a type 1 diabetic. Because of the charge to his trust account, he was 

unable to purchase snacks from the canteen to stabilize his blood sugar. As a result, 

Plaintiff had seizures, hit his head on cement, and bit his tongue. (Id. at 4.) Prison staff 

did not assist Plaintiff during his seizures and has been slow in treating the injuries 

Plaintiff received as a result of seizures. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff filed a Form 602 appeal regarding the charge to his trust account, but 

Defendant Cramer screened out the appeal because there was no copy of a related 

RVR attached. (Id. at 4.) No RVR was available because Defendant Chambers did not 

write one.

Defendant Day denied Plaintiff‟s appeal at the first level. Defendant Rimbach 

approved the denial. Defendant Hammer denied Plaintiff‟s second level appeal. 

Defendant Davey approved the denial. Defendant Pimentel denied Plaintiff‟s third level 

appeal. Defendant Lozano approved the denial. These decisions were made with 

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights to due process and to be free 

from cruel and unusual punishment because Defendants knew that an RVR was needed 

to justify the charge to Plaintiff‟s trust account. 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, damages for mental and 

emotional distress, and a prohibition against any retaliatory transfer from KVSP.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights as follows: 

Defendant Chambers failed to file an RVR before charging Plaintiff‟s prison trust 

account; Defendant Cramer screened out Plaintiff‟s appeal; and Defendants Day, 

Rimbach, Hammer, Davey, Pimentel, and Lozano denied his appeal. 

The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from the deprivation of property 

without due process of law. An inmate has a protected property interest in his prison 

trust account funds. Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985). While an 

authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process 

Clause, neither negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a state 

employee “constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss 

is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 & n.13 (1984) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim against Defendant Chambers.

According to Plaintiff, the deprivation of his property was not authorized by prison 

regulations. Such an unauthorized, intentional deprivation of property requires that 

Plaintiff be provided a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Such a remedy was 

available to Plaintiff. Plaintiff could, and did, file a grievance with prison officials. 

California law also provides a post-deprivation remedy for Plaintiff‟s property deprivation. 

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiff also fails to state a due process violation against Defendant Cramer for 

screening out his inmate appeals. Prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights 

related to the administrative grievance process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 

(9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Failing to properly 

process a grievance does not constitute a due process violation. Moreover, Plaintiff‟s 

allegations and the documents attached to his complaint reflect that Plaintiff eventually 

was able to pursue his appeal.

Finally, Plaintiff has not stated a due process claim against Defendants Day, 

Rimbach, Hammer, Davey, Pimentel, and Lozano for denying his appeal. Plaintiff argues 

that these defendants knew that the charge to his account was improper because no 

RVR was written, but nonetheless ruled against him. However, prison officials are not 

required under federal law to respond favorably to inmate grievances and this alleged 

error does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. Because there is no right to any 

particular grievance process, see Mann, 855 F.2d at 640, plaintiff cannot state a 

cognizable civil rights claim for a violation of his due process rights based on allegations 

that Defendants ruled erroneously on his grievances. See, e.g., Wright v. Shannon, No. 

1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff's 

allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a 

cognizable claim under the First Amendment); Williams v. Cate, No. 1;09-cv-00468-

OWW-YNP PC, 2009 WL 3789597, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no 

protected liberty interest in the vindication of his administrative claims.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment Due 

Process claim against any of the named Defendants. Plaintiff will be given leave to 

amend his complaint. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must allege facts to show that 

Defendants‟ actions denied him a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the deduction 

of funds from his trust account.

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Day, Rimbach, Hammer, Davey, Pimentel, and 

Lozano subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by denying his appeal.

The Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from 

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). To determine whether the conditions of Plaintiff‟s 

confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the Court must assess whether 

Plaintiff was deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Frost v. 

Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

“[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 

humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk 

of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate 

it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). To state a claim for threats to safety, 

an inmate must allege facts to support that he was incarcerated under conditions posing 

a substantial risk of harm and that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to those 

risks. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. To adequately allege deliberate 

indifference, a plaintiff must set forth facts to support that a defendant knew of, but 

disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the 

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 837.

Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and 

unusual punishment. Defendants‟ denial of Plaintiff‟s appeal does not reflect deliberate 

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. Although Plaintiff alleges that the 

deduction of funds from his account caused him to suffer seizures as a result of being 

unable to purchase food from the canteen to stabilize his blood sugar, he does not 

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

allege facts to show that, in denying his appeal, Defendants knew of, but disregarded 

this risk. 

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If he chooses to do so, he must show that 

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to 

Plaintiff.

C. Medical Indifference

Perhaps Plaintiff intended to allege that prison staff was deliberately indifferent to 

his serious medical needs by failing to provide adequate treatment for his diabetes or 

seizures. However, Plaintiff has not linked any named defendants to any such claim.

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that a named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 

588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). Accordingly plaintiff has failed to state a claim for medical indifference. 

The Court will provide Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to 

amend, he must link a named defendant to his medical claims. The Court will provide 

below the legal standard applicable to such a claim if it is indeed what he wishes to 

allege. 

A claim of medical indifference requires (1) a serious medical need, and (2) a 

deliberately indifferent response by defendant. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

Cir. 2006). A serious medical need is alleged by showing that “failure to treat a prisoner's 

condition could result in further significant injury or the „unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.‟” Id.; McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The 

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 

worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly 

affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are 

examples of indications that a prisoner has a „serious‟ need for medical treatment.”). 

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

The deliberate indifference standard is met by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Mere indifference, negligence, or medical 

malpractice is not sufficient to support the claim. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1976)).

D. California Regulations

Plaintiff may wish to allege claims for violation of Title 15 of the California Code of 

Regulations. The existence of Title 15 regulations governing the conduct of prison 

officials does not necessarily entitle an inmate to sue civilly for their violation. The Court 

has found no authority to support a finding of an implied private right of action under Title 

15, and Plaintiff has provided none. Several district court decisions hold that there is no 

such right. See e.g., Vasquez v. Tate, No. 1:10-cv-1876-JLT (PC), 2012 WL 6738167, at 

*9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012); Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1211 (S.D. Cal. 

2012).

Plaintiff may not bring an independent claim solely for violation of prison 

regulations set out in Title 15. Leave to amend such a claim is futile and will be denied 

on that basis.

E. Injunctive relief

Plaintiff‟s complaint appears to seek an order against retaliatory transfer to a 

different institution. This request falls within the category of requests for injunctive relief.

Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is an “extraordinary remedy, 

never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 

that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public 

interest.” Am. Trucking Ass‟ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). The Court does not have jurisdiction to order 

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

injunctive relief which would require directing parties not before the Court to take action. 

Zepeda v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 

1985) (“A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the 

parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the 

rights of persons not before the court.”).

Plaintiff has failed to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits since at this 

stage of the proceedings he has failed to state a cognizable claim.

Plaintiff fails to suggest a real and immediate threat of injury. See City of Los 

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–102 (1983) (plaintiff must show “real and 

immediate” threat of injury, and “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show 

a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any 

continuing, present, adverse effects.”). There is no indication that Plaintiff has been 

threatened with retaliatory transfer. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy this element.

Plaintiff does not address the third or fourth elements, i.e., the balancing of 

equities and public interest concerns. Absent a cognizable claim, there is nothing to tip 

the balance of equities in Plaintiff‟s favor. And, while the public has an interest in 

avoiding retaliatory conduct by prison officials, the record before the Court does not 

justify the Court substituting its judgment regarding Plaintiff‟s institutional placement for 

that of prison staff.

Further, it is not clear whether Defendants have authority to order Plaintiff‟s 

transfer or retain his current placement, and it thus is unclear whether they are the 

proper subjects of an injunction against such a transfer. 

The various criteria not having been met, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff‟s Complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court will grant Plaintiff 

an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

(9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts 

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to „state a claim that is plausible on its face.‟” 

Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate 

that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form 

and (2) a copy of his Complaint, filed June 11, 2014;

2. Plaintiff‟s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

the Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure to 

comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00889-MJS Document 8 Filed 09/08/14 Page 11 of 11