Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04385/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04385-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1145 E.R.I.S.A.

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Although the Court’s order of October 24, 2006 afforded Molloy the opportunity to

file supplemental opposition, he did not.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD T. BERGO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SHAMROCK CONCRETE

CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-05-4385 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT JOSEPH

PATRICK MOLLOY’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court is the motion, filed August 4, 2006 by plaintiffs Edward Bergo, Karl

Bik, Cement Masons Vacation/Holiday Trust Fund for Northern California, Cement Masons

Pension Trust Fund for Northern California, and Cement Masons Apprenticeship and

Training Trust Fund for Northern California, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants Joseph Patrick Molloy (“Molloy”) and

Shamrock Concrete Construction, Inc. (“Shamrock, Inc.”) filed separate oppositions, to

which plaintiffs jointly replied. Thereafter, in accordance with the Court’s order of October

24, 2006, defendant Shamrock, Inc. filed supplemental opposition and plaintiffs filed a

supplemental reply.1

Also before the Court is Molloy’s cross-motion for summary judgment, filed October

Case 3:05-cv-04385-MMC Document 58 Filed 12/08/06 Page 1 of 7
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By order filed October 24, 2006, the Court vacated the hearing scheduled for

October 27, 2006.

3

The following facts are undisputed.

4

Molloy is President, Chief Executive Officer, and Responsible Managing Officer for

Shamrock, Inc. (See Molloy Decl. ¶ 4.)

2

6, 2006, pursuant to Rule 56. Plaintiffs have filed opposition thereto, to which Molloy has

replied. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions,

the Court rules as follows.2

BACKGROUND3

Molloy, pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement signed February 13, 2002, agreed

to be bound by the “Cement Masons Master Agreement for Northern California dated June

15, 1999 through June 15, 2005,” as well as by “any future modifications, changes,

amendments, supplements, extensions or renewals of or to said Master Agreement,” (see

Hagan Decl. Ex. A; Molloy Decl. ¶ 3); the Master Agreement was subsequently renewed

through 2009, (see Hagan Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. C). The Master Agreement requires an employer

to pay hourly contributions to certain trust funds for each hour paid for or worked by cement

masons employed by such employer. (See Hagan Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. B at 15-17, Ex. C at 39-

43.)

When Molloy signed the Memorandum of Agreement in 2002, he was a sole

proprietor, doing business as Shamrock Concrete Construction. (See Molloy Decl. ¶ 3.) 

On January 14, 2003, Molloy incorporated under the name Shamrock Concrete

Construction, Inc. (“Shamrock, Inc.”). (See Bevington Decl. Ex. B; Molloy Decl. ¶ 4.) “By

January 1, 2004, [Molloy] had stopped doing business as [a] sole proprietor,” and, “[a]fter

January 2004, “did not employ any workers.” (See Molloy Decl. ¶ 5.) “Commencing

January 1, 2004,” Shamrock, Inc. employed construction workers and made trust fund

contribution payments to plaintiffs. (See id.)4

In their complaint filed October 27, 2005, plaintiffs allege defendants failed to make

required contributions.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment as

to “all or any part” of a claim “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), (c). Material facts are those that

may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. The Court may not

weigh the evidence. See id. at 255. Rather, the nonmoving party’s evidence must be

believed and “all justifiable inferences must be drawn in [the nonmovant’s] favor.” See

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989)

(en banc) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

interrogatory answers, admissions and affidavits, if any, that it contends demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986). Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving

party’s burden is discharged when it shows the court there is an absence of evidence to

support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. at 325.

 A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of [that] party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see

also Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. The opposing party need not show the issue will be

resolved conclusively in its favor. See id. at 248-49. All that is necessary is submission of

sufficient evidence to create a material factual dispute, thereby requiring a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions at trial. See id.

//

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Molloy argues that plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment as to interest and liquidated

damages corresponding to contributions due in 2003 and paid on an untimely basis,

because plaintiffs’ moving papers refer in one passage to “the period January 2004 through

May 2005,” (see Pls.’ Mot. at 2:21-24), and in another passage to “the period July 2003

through April 2005,” (see id. at 4:24-26). Molloy does not articulate, however, much less

demonstrate, any prejudice as a result of the above-referenced discrepancy. Molloy does

not dispute that the contributions due for the period July 2003 through December 2003

were paid on an untimely basis, and the evidence offered by plaintiffs unambiguously refers

to plaintiffs’ receiving contributions due for the period July 2003 through December 2003 on

an untimely basis. (See Hagan Decl. Ex. E.)

4

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid contributions, as well as corresponding interest and

liquidated damages, and also interest and liquidated damages corresponding to

contributions alleged to have been made on an untimely basis. Plaintiffs seek to hold both

Molloy and Shamrock, Inc. jointly liable for the entire amount assertedly owed.

A. Molloy

1. 2003 Contributions

Molloy does not dispute that under the terms of the Master Agreement, he was

responsible for making contributions to plaintiffs corresponding to covered work performed

by employees hired by Molloy in his capacity as a sole proprietor, and does not dispute that

he employed workers in his capacity as a sole proprietor in 2003.

Plaintiffs offer evidence that contributions due in July 2003 through December 2003

were paid on an untimely basis, (see Hagan Decl. ¶ 12), that the interest owing on such

unpaid contributions is $543.20, (see id. ¶¶ 9, 12; Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. E), and that the

amount of liquidated damages owing on such unpaid contributions is $750.00, (see Hagan

Decl. ¶ 9; Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. E). Molloy offers no evidence to the contrary, nor has

he challenged the mathematical calculations made by plaintiffs.5

Accordingly, it is undisputed that Molloy is liable to plaintiffs in the amount of

$1293.20

2. 2004 - 2006 Contributions

Plaintiffs offer evidence, discussed infra, that contributions, interest, and liquidated

damages are owed to plaintiffs corresponding to work performed in 2004, 2005, and 2006

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by employees of Shamrock, Inc. In arguing Molloy is liable for such sums, plaintiffs rely on

¶ 30 of the Master Agreement, which provides that such “Agreement is binding upon each

Individual Employer regardless of whether he/she or it changes the name or style or

address of his/her or their business.” (See Hagan Decl. Ex. C ¶ 30).

Plaintiffs argue that the “obvious purpose” of ¶ 30 is to “prevent the individual

employer from playing a shell game using different business names or styles to evade the

obligations of the agreement.” (See Pl.’s Opp. to Molloy’s Cross-Mot. at 4:23-25.) 

Consistent therewith, plaintiffs read ¶ 30 to provide that when an individual employer, such

as Molloy, agrees to be bound by the Master Agreement, he remains bound by that

Agreement irrespective of whether he later changes the name or form of his business. 

Such interpretation, plaintiffs argue, is further supported by the Memorandum of

Agreement, which provides that even where the newly-named or newly-formed employer

signs a new agreement with plaintiffs, the individual employer “continues to be bound” by

the agreement he previously signed. (See Hagan Decl. Ex. A.)

Molloy, although agreeing with plaintiffs that the “obvious purpose” of ¶ 30 is to

prevent an individual employer from playing “a shell game,” (see Reply in Support of

Molloy’s Cross-Mot. at 4:7-11), argues ¶ 30 should be interpreted as providing that where

an individual employer incorporates, the new corporation, but not the individual employer, is

liable under the Master Agreement. This proposed interpretation is not persuasive. First,

such interpretation runs counter to the language of both the Memorandum of Agreement

and Master Agreement, each of which provides for continuing liability of the “Individual

Employer,” i.e., the signatory thereto. Second, were the Court to adopt Molloy’s

interpretation, a party signing the contract could avoid liability thereunder simply by

engaging in the type of “shell game” both parties agree the contract sought to preclude.

Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiffs have demonstrated, as a matter of law, that

Molloy is liable for the contributions owed by reason of covered work performed by

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In light of this finding, the Court has not addressed plaintiffs’ argument that Molloy’s

cross-motion is procedurally improper.

6

employees of Shamrock, Inc., and that Molloy is not entitled to summary judgment.6

Plaintiffs offer evidence that the following contributions, interest, and liquidated

damages are owed for the period 2004 through 2006:

(1) Of “reported contributions” identified by Shamrock, Inc. on “Employer Reports”

submitted to plaintiffs, defendants failed to pay the total amount of $72,604.76. (See

Hagan Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. G.) The interest owing on such unpaid contributions is $11,592.84,

(see id. ¶¶ 9,12; Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D), and the amount of liquidated damages owing

thereon is $11,592.84, (see Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D).

(2) Plaintiffs’ audit results uncovered that defendants did not report $22,097.95 in

contributions due. (See Hagan Decl. ¶ 16). The interest owing on such unpaid

contributions is $4539.62, (see Hagan Supp. Decl. ¶ 3), and the amount of liquidated

damages owing thereon is $4539.62, (see id; Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D).

(3) The interest owing on contributions paid on an untimely basis is $6393.52, (see

Hagan ¶¶ 9, 12, Ex. G; Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D at 2), and the amount of liquidated

damages owing on untimely paid contributions is $2400, (see Hagan Decl. ¶ 9; Bevington

Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. E).

 Molloy has offered no evidence to the contrary, nor has he challenged the

mathematical calculations made by plaintiffs.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated, as a matter of law, that Molloy is liable to

plaintiffs in the further amount of $135,761.15.

B. Shamrock, Inc.

1. 2003 Contributions

Plaintiffs argue that Shamrock, Inc. is jointly liable with Molloy for the $1293.20 due

as a result of contributions owed in 2003 and paid on an untimely basis, on the ground

Shamrock, Inc. is the “successor” to Molloy’s sole proprietorship. (See Pls.’ Reply at 6:1-

5.) Setting aside the fact that plaintiffs articulate their successorship theory for the first time

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in plaintiffs’ reply to Shamrock, Inc.’s opposition, thereby precluding Shamrock, Inc. from

responding thereto, plaintiffs offer no evidence in support of a successorship theory.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to show Shamrock, Inc. is, as a matter of law,

jointly liable with Molloy for the above-referenced $1293.20.

2. 2004 - 2006 Contributions

Plaintiffs argue that Shamrock, Inc. is jointly liable with Molloy for the $135,761.15

due as a result of unpaid contributions, interest, and liquidated damages corresponding to

obligations owed for the period 2004 through 2006. Shamrock, Inc. concedes it is

“responsible for all contributions” owed to plaintiffs as of January 1, 2004, (see Shamrock,

Inc.’s Opp. at 3:1-3), and has offered no evidence to dispute plaintiffs’ evidence or

calculations as to the amounts owed corresponding to that period.

Accordingly, it is undisputed that Shamrock, Inc. is jointly liable with Molloy for the

above-referenced $135,761.15.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part, as follows:

a. To the extent plaintiffs claim plaintiffs are entitled to the total amount of

$137,054.35, of which amount $135,761.15 is jointly and severally owed by Molloy and

Shamrock, Inc., and $1293.20 is severally owed by Molloy, the motion is hereby

GRANTED.

b. To the extent plaintiffs claim Shamrock, Inc. is jointly liable with Molloy for

the sum of $1293.20, the motion is hereby DENIED.

2. Molloy’s cross-motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 8, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-04385-MMC Document 58 Filed 12/08/06 Page 7 of 7