Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01009/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01009-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 15:1126 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIGHTEDGE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

SEARCHMETRICS, GMBH., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01009-WHO (MEJ)

ORDER RE: MOTION TO MODIFY 

THE STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 

ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 112

INTRODUCTION

In this patent infringement case, the parties previously entered into a stipulated protective 

order regarding the disclosure and use of discovery materials (the “Protective Order”). Dkt. No. 

58. Plaintiff BrightEdge Technologies, Inc. (“BrightEdge”) now seeks to modify the Protective 

Order to allow use of confidential documents in collateral litigation. Dkt. No. 112. Defendants 

Searchmetrics GmbH and Searchmetrics, Inc. (“Searchmetrics”) have filed an Opposition (Dkt. 

No. 115) and BrightEdge filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 116). The Court finds this matter suitable for 

disposition without oral argument and VACATES the January 22, 2015 hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 78(b); Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, and 

the record in this case, the Court issues the following order.

BACKGROUND

BrightEdge provides customers with search engine optimization (“SEO”) and analytical 

tools. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 19. It accuses Searchmetrics, a competitor in the field of 

SEO technology, of directly infringing certain BrightEdge patents related to SEO technology. Id.

¶¶ 5-43. On September 3, 2014, the Court issued the Protective Order, which states, “A Receiving

Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or produced by another Party or by a Non-Party 

in connection with this case only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle this litigation.” 

Case 4:14-cv-01009-HSG Document 118 Filed 01/13/15 Page 1 of 9
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Protective Order at 9. 

On November 21, 2014, the presiding judge in this matter, the Honorable William H. 

Orrick, stayed the case until June 1, 2015. Order Staying Case Pursuant to the Parties’ Partial 

Agreement (“Stay Order”), Dkt. No. 109. As part of the Stay Order, the Court provided a 

procedure by which the parties may seek to use documents produced in this action in any other 

proceeding. Id. at 3-4. The Stay Order provides as follows:

If a receiving party seeks to use information or documents produced 

in this action as Protected Material under the Stipulated Protective 

Order in any other proceeding, including any Trial proceeding 

brought by Searchmetrics before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

or in any state court action, the receiving party must first disclose in 

writing to the producing party the specific information or documents 

sought to be used and the purpose of the use of the information or 

documents. The parties will meet and confer within 14 days of 

receipt of the receiving party’s written request. The producing party 

may either (1) agree to use of the information or documents in the 

other proceeding or (2) refuse use of the information or documents 

in the other proceeding. If the producing party refuses use, the 

receiving party must then file a motion before Magistrate Judge 

James to seek permission to modify the Stipulated Protective Order 

to allow the use of the specifically identified information or 

documents in the other proceeding. This procedure must be followed 

each time a party seeks to use information or documents, which 

were produced in this action by another party as Protected Material 

under the Stipulated Protective Order, in any other proceeding.

Id.

Pursuant to the procedure in the Stay Order, on November 27, 2014, counsel for 

BrightEdge sent counsel for Searchmetrics a list of 46 documents that it sought to use in 

BrightEdge Techs., Inc. v. Gabriel Martinez, 113-CV-256794 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Santa Clara) (the 

“Martinez case”). Swenson Decl., Ex. C at 5-8, Dkt. No. 112-1. Gabriel Martinez is a former 

BrightEdge employee who now works at Searchmetrics. Mot. at 6. In the Martinez case, filed 

November 26, 2013, BrightEdge alleges misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract. 

Opp’n at 1. BrightEdge has not yet brought any claims against Searchmetrics in that case. Id. 

For each document in its request, BrightEdge stated its “Purpose of Use in Other 

Proceeding” as follows: “Evidence that Searchmetrics and its employees misappropriated and used 

BrightEdge’s confidential and/or trade secret information and committed other related state law 

violations.” Swenson Decl., Ex. C at 6-8. The parties met and conferred on December 11, 2014, 

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but were unable to reach an agreement. Id. ¶ 5.

In the present Motion, BrightEdge seeks permission to use 37 documents in the Martinez

case that were already produced by Searchmetrics in this case. The documents consist of emails to 

and/or from: (1) Gabriel Martinez, (2) Searchmetrics employees BrightEdge anticipates naming in 

the Martinez case, and (3) Searchmetrics’ founder and CEO. Mot. at 6-8. BrightEdge argues the 

documents are highly relevant to the trade secret misappropriation claim against Martinez, as well 

as collateral proceedings arising from an amended complaint that it intends to file adding 

Searchmetrics and its employees as defendants to the Martinez case. Id. at 5. 

LEGAL STANDARD

District courts have broad discretion to decide when a protective order is appropriate and 

the degree of protection required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). A district court also has inherent 

authority to grant a motion to modify a protective order where good cause is shown. Phillips ex 

rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002). The party 

asserting good cause bears the burden of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if the 

motion is not granted. Id. at 1210-11. 

The Ninth Circuit “strongly favors access to discovery materials to meet the needs of 

parties engaged in collateral litigation.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 

1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Beckman Indus. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

While a motion to modify a protective order should not be granted automatically, “where 

reasonable restrictions on collateral disclosure will continue to protect an affected party’s 

legitimate interests in privacy, a collateral litigant’s request to the issuing court to modify an 

otherwise proper protective order so that collateral litigants are not precluded from obtaining 

relevant material should generally be granted.” Id.

In determining whether to grant a motion to modify a protective order, the court must first 

consider whether the moving party has demonstrated “the relevance of the protected discovery to 

the collateral proceedings and its general discoverability therein.” Id. This inquiry turns on “the 

degree of overlap in facts, parties, and issues between the suit covered by the protective order and 

the collateral proceedings.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The court next weighs the 

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“countervailing reliance interest of the party opposing modification against the policy of avoiding 

duplicative discovery.” Id. at 1133. “Reliance will be less with a blanket [protective] order” 

because such an order does not require the “good cause” showing required by Rule 26(c) with 

respect to any particular document. Id. (quoting Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476). Where a blanket 

protective order is at issue, “any legitimate interest . . . in continued secrecy as against the public 

at large can be accommodated by placing [the collateral litigants] under the same restrictions on 

use and disclosure contained in the original protective order.” Id. (quoting United Nuclear Corp. 

v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1990)).

DISCUSSION

A. Relevance

In its Motion, BrightEdge argues that each of the 37 documents are relevant in the 

Martinez case because they suggest that Searchmetrics and its employees used improper means to 

acquire knowledge of BrightEdge’s trade secret information. Mot. at 6. BrightEdge maintains 

that 23 of the documents are directly relevant to the trade secret claim against Martinez, five

documents are relevant to the trade secret misappropriation claims that it intends to bring against 

Cullen McAlpine (another former BrightEdge employee who is now employed at Searchmetrics), 

six documents are relevant to the trade secret misappropriation claims that it intends to bring 

against Shaun Silver (Director of Sales at Searchmetrics), and all 37 documents are relevant to the 

trade secret misappropriation claims that it intends to bring against Searchmetrics. Id. at 6-8. 

In response, Searchmetrics maintains that it is unclear where and how BrightEdge intends 

to use the 37 protected documents, as the proposed modification to the Protective Order would 

allow it to use the 37 documents in “any actual or potential collateral litigation.” Opp’n at 4-5 

(quoting Proposed Amended Protective Order, Dkt. No. 112-3). Searchmetrics notes that this 

proposed revision is in direct conflict with the relief requested by BrightEdge’s Motion, which 

seeks only to use the documents in the Martinez case. As BrightEdge provides no information 

regarding other collateral proceedings in which it contemplates using the documents, 

Searchmetrics contends it is “difficult or impossible to evaluate the relevance of the documents to 

the ambiguous collateral proceedings.” Id. at 5.

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To the extent that BrightEdge seeks to use the 37 protected documents only in the Martinez

case, Searchmetrics argues that BrightEdge’s own descriptions of certain of these documents show 

that they have no relevance to Mr. Martinez. Id. (citing Smith Decl., Ex. 2, Dkt. No. 111 (Index to 

Exhibits), stating that Exs. 4-6, 8-10, 29, and 36-39 are relevant to a “future trade secret case”)). 

To the extent that BrightEdge intends to use certain documents in potential claims to be filed

against Searchmetrics and/or other Searchmetrics employees, there is no current collateral 

proceeding against Searchmetrics or those other Searchmetrics employees, and thus it is premature 

to consider use of these documents in a case not yet filed. Id. Searchmetrics also notes that some 

of the documents are dated well before Mr. Martinez joined Searchmetrics, and BrightEdge has 

therefore failed to show how these documents could be relevant to the Martinez case. Id. (citing 

Smith Decl., Exs. 9-10, 23-24, 37-38). 

Upon review of the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that BritghtEdge has adequately 

established the relevance of the protected discovery to the Martinez case. Of approximately 

150,000 documents produced by Searchmetrics in this litigation, BrightEdge seeks to use 37 

emails to and/or from Searchmetrics employees. BrightEdge intends to use these documents to aid 

in amending its complaint in the Martinez case, in which it intends to bring trade secret and other 

state law claims against Searchmetrics and two additional employees. BrightEdge has provided 

specificity regarding the relevance of each of the 37 documents, which relate to Searchmetrics’ 

alleged direct use of BrightEdge’s trade secret information.

1

See Smith Decl., Ex. 2 (Index 

detailing the relevance of the 37 identified documents). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor 

of modification. See CBS Interactive, 257 F.R.D. at 205 (permitting modification of protective 

order in patent case where plaintiff sought “specific modification of one clause of the protective 

order to permit it to use discovery information from this litigation for the purposes of initiating 

 

1 Because the relevant documents are under seal, the Court need not enumerate or specifically 

describe the discovery materials herein. CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 195, 205 

(N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1989) (“While this 

Court has recognized that the common law right of access creates a strong presumption in favor of 

public access to materials submitted as evidence in open court, this presumption should not apply 

to materials properly submitted to the court under seal.”); Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1213 (holding that 

the usual presumption of the public’s right of access is rebutted when a party attaches a sealed 

discovery document to a non-dispositive motion)).

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collateral litigation.”). 

B. Countervailing Interests

The court next weighs the “countervailing reliance interest of the party opposing 

modification against the policy of avoiding duplicative discovery.” Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1133. 

“Reliance will be less with a blanket [protective] order” because such an order does not require the 

“good cause” showing required by Rule 26(c) with respect to any particular document. Id.

(quoting Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476). Where a blanket protective order is at issue, “any legitimate 

interest . . . in continued secrecy as against the public at large can be accommodated by placing 

[the collateral litigants] under the same restrictions on use and disclosure contained in the original 

protective order.” Id. (quoting United Nuclear, 905 F.2d at 1428).

Here, the disclosure sought is not as broad as full public disclosure; BrightEdge seeks a 

specific modification of one clause of the Protective Order to permit it to use documents from this 

litigation in pending collateral litigation. All other clauses and provisions of the Protective Order 

will stand, including the disclosure restrictions of highly confidential materials to attorneys’ eyes 

only. 

Searchmetrics argues it is premature to modify the Protective Order, as there is no pending 

collateral litigation against it or the two additional Searchmetrics employees BrightEdge intends to 

add to the Martinez case. The absence of a pending suit against the target party is an important 

factor in cases denying a motion to modify a protective order. See, e.g., H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y.

v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 551, 555-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“One explanation for these 

decisions is that the absence of any pending litigation against the target makes it less likely that 

modification of the protective order will avoid costly and repetitive discovery.”). However, 

BrightEdge has already identified the claims it intends to bring and the relevance of the documents 

to those claims. BrightEdge first notified Searchmetrics and Judge Orrick of its intent to bring 

these claims on November 12, 2014, when it stated that it would drop them from the proposed 

amended complaint in this federal action. Swenson Decl., Ex. B (Hr’g Tr. Nov. 12, 2014), Dkt. 

No. 112-01 (“We are willing to take off all of the state law issues at this time that we’ve requested 

amendment, and we will proceed in State Court with those claims at this time.”). Because 

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BrightEdge has provided the specific claims it intends to bring in the Martinez case, and has 

identified the relevance of the 37 documents it seeks to use, the Court finds the lack of pending 

collateral litigation against Searchmetrics and its two employees holds little weight in the analysis. 

See CBS Interactive, 257 F.R.D. at 205 (granting modification of protective order where there was 

no pending collateral litigation, but plaintiff asserted it needed the discovery to pursue claims for 

trade secret misappropriation in state court).

Moreover, Searchmetrics previously argued that BrightEdge’s trade secret claims against 

Searchmetrics must not be a part of this case but rather must be filed in state court. BrightEdge 

moved to amend the complaint in this case to bring trade secret misappropriation and other state 

law claims against Searchmetrics and two of its employees. Dkt. No. 80. Searchmetrics opposed 

this motion (Dkt. No. 92), arguing that BrightEdge’s trade secret claims must be brought in the 

Martinez case: “BrightEdge’s proposed state law claims against Searchmetrics are part of the same 

case or controversy in BrightEdge’s case against Mr. Martinez,” and “[a]llowing BrightEdge’s 

state law claims against Mr. Martinez and against Searchmetrics to proceed on different tracks in 

state court and federal court is highly inefficient.” Dkt. No. 92-3 at 11 (emphasis in original). 

Searchmetrics repeated this in its reply in support of its motion to stay this case:

Such state law claims (though they are baseless) are more 

appropriately added (if at all) to the pending state trade secret 

misappropriation case against Searchmetrics’ employee Gabriel 

Martinez, as BrightEdge’s allegations against Searchmetrics arise 

from Mr. Martinez’s alleged actions and thus share a common 

nucleus of fact with BrightEdge’s claims against Mr. Martinez.

Dkt. No. 91 at 12. At the November 12, 2014 hearing, Searchmetrics agreed that BrightEdge 

should have the option to pursue its trade secret misappropriation and related state law claims 

either in this action or in State Court. Swenson Decl., Ex. 1 (Tr. Hr’g Nov. 12, 2014) at 18:17-20 

(“They want to be able to have the option of moving forward here or filing elsewhere, and we 

think it should be one or the other when a stay is issued.”). Judge Orrick agreed: “I wouldn’t take 

supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims because I think they are properly – they are more 

properly in the State Court case as opposed to this one.” Id. at 24:7-10. Despite previously 

expressing that BrightEdge should pursue its trade secret claims in state court, and Judge Orrick

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supporting that position by providing a procedure for using documents produced in this case to do 

so, Searchmetrics now attempts to prohibit BrightEdge from using documents it has already 

obtained to bring the trade secret claims in state court. Searchmetrics cannot have it both ways.

Searchmetrics next argues that BrightEdge is attempting to enlist this Court’s assistance in 

circumventing a state court order denying BrightEdge’s motion to compel production from 

Searchmetrics. Opp’n at 6. Specifically, Searchmetrics notes that in the Martinez case, 

BrightEdge issued a subpoena with 57 requests for document production from Searchmetrics, but 

that request was denied. Id. at 7. However, while it appears that the state court denied 

BrightEdge’s motion to compel production from Searchmetrics as a third party, there is nothing 

preventing BrightEdge from serving discovery on Searchmetrics as a party to obtain the same 

information. “Whether a collateral litigant would ultimately obtain access to the discovery 

materials is not something this court can even determine.” CBS Interactive, 257 F.R.D. at 205-06

(citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1133; Superior Oil Co. v. Am. Petrofina Co. of Tex., 785 F.2d 130, 130 

(5th Cir. 1986) (“Questions of the discoverability in the state litigation of the materials discovered 

in the federal litigation are, of course, for the state courts”)). 

Searchmetrics also argues that German and European Union privacy laws prohibit 

disclosure of personal data, and the decision for production of such data in this patent case cannot 

justify production of and use of the information in other unrelated and unidentified litigation.2 

Opp’n at 8. Instead, Searchmetrics contends that the court presiding over the collateral litigation 

would need to perform a case-specific, multi-factor balancing test with respect to the specific 

collateral litigation to determine whether the information should be produced. Id. However, this 

Court previously held that the German and European privacy laws do not prohibit disclosure of 

Searchmetrics’ documents at issue here. Dkt. No. 56 (Aug. 13, 2014 Discovery Order). 

Searchmetrics has already produced the 37 documents, and it does not identify any personal 

information in the 37 documents that warrants protection under the privacy laws. Further, the only 

contemplated defendants are Searchmetrics and its employees. It is unclear how use of the 

 

2

Searchmetrics GmbH is a German limited liability company with its principal place of business 

in Berlin, Germany. SAC ¶ 2.

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already-disclosed documents would violate privacy laws. 

Finally, Searchmetrics notes that it produced approximately 150,000 documents in reliance 

on the Protective Order, which specifically states that the protected documents would be used in 

this case only. Opp’n at 10. As Searchmetrics and BrightEdge are competitors, Searchmetrics

maintains that its reliance interest is heightened, thus weighing in favor of the continued protection 

of Searchmetrics’ information. Id. “Ninth Circuit precedent also looks to the needs of parties 

engaged in pending litigation and, in particular, the reliance interests on the protective order of the 

party opposing its modification.” CBS Interactive, 257 F.R.D. at 206 (citing Beckman, 966 F.2d at 

475; Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1132 (“modification should generally be granted only where reasonable 

restrictions on collateral disclosure will continue to protect an affected party’s legitimate interests 

in privacy.”)). Here, the Court finds that Searchmetrics has not shown that its privacy interests 

will be affected or harmed by the disclosure of any particular documents produced in discovery in 

the Martinez case. BrightEdge has already obtained the documents and seeks to use them only 

against Searchmetrics and its employees. Further, there is no indication that Searchmetrics’

information would be exposed to any third parties; the documents would have equally restricted 

access under the protective order in the Martinez case, and the parties could modify that protective 

order if needed. “Mere reliance on a blanket protective order does not justify a refusal to modify it 

when a reasonable request for disclosure has been made.” Id. (citing Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476).

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, BrightEdge’s Motion to Modify the Stipulated Protective 

Order is GRANTED. The Protective Order entered on September 3, 2014 will be modified to 

permit use of the 37 documents solely in the Martinez case. The parties shall meet and confer and 

file a stipulation as an addendum to the Protective Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 13, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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