Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01838/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01838-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Glenn Dennis Gunder,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-12-1838-PHX-NVW (BSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on its own review. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court recommends that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with

Court orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

I. Background

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, commenced this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on

August 29, 2012. (Doc. 1.) On October 4, 2012, the Court granted Petitioner in forma pauperis

status. (Doc. 5.) The Court also directed Petitioner to notify the Court of any change in his

address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure and warned him

that failure to do so could result in dismissal of this action. (Id. at 2.) Local Rule of Civil

Procedure 83.3(d) provides that an unrepresented party who is incarcerated must notify the

Court in writing of any change in address “within seven (7) days after the effective date of the

change.” Id. On October 10 and November 9, 2012, the Court received returned mail addressed

to Petitioner marked “undeliverable” noting that Plaintiff is not in custody. (Docs. 6 and 10.)

Petitioner has not notified the Court of his current address.

Case 2:12-cv-01838-NVW Document 11 Filed 11/14/12 Page 1 of 4
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II. Discussion

In view of Petitioner’s failure to provide notice of his current address, the Court will

consider whether to recommend dismissal of this case. Petitioner has the general duty to

prosecute this case. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Pioche Mines Consolidated, Inc., 587

F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1978). In this regard, a petitioner who has filed a pro se action must keep

the Court apprised of his current address and comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion.

This Court does not have an affirmative obligation to locate Petitioner. “A party, not the district

court, bears the burden of keeping the court apprised of any changes in his mailing address.”

Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). Petitioner’s failure to inform the Court of

his current address constitutes failure to prosecute and to comply with the Court’s order.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails

to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss

the action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370

U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962), the Supreme Court recognized that a federal district court has the

inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute, even though the language

of Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appears to require a motion from a party.

Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, the Court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute

even without notice or hearing. Id. at 633.

In determining whether Petitioner’s failure to prosecute warrants dismissal of the case,

the Court must weigh the following five factors: “‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the

defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the

availability of less drastic sanctions.’” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan,

779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). “The first two of these factors favor the imposition of

sanctions in most cases, while the fourth factor cuts against a default or dismissal sanction.

Thus the key factors are prejudice and availability of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnston,

910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Here, the first, second, and third factors favor dismissal of this case. Petitioner’s failure

to keep the Court informed of his address prevents the case from proceeding in the foreseeable

future. The fourth factor, as always, weighs against dismissal. The fifth factor requires the

Court to consider whether a less drastic alternative is available. Without Petitioner’s current

address, however, certain alternatives are futile. Here, as in Carey, “[a]n order to show cause

why dismissal is not warranted or an order imposing sanctions would only find itself taking a

round trip tour through the United States mail.” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1441. 

The Court finds that one less drastic sanction is available. Rule 41(b) provides that a

dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as an adjudication upon the merits “[u]nless the

dismissal order states otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). In the instant case, the Court finds that

a dismissal with prejudice would be unnecessarily harsh. The Petition and this action will

therefore should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Isley v. Schriro, 2007 WL 3287587 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2007) (dismissing

§ 2254 petition without prejudice based on petitioner’s failure to notify court of his current

address). 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, this action be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties have

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72.

Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections.

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Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may

result in the District Court’s acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file

timely objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment

entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 13th day of November, 2012.

 

Case 2:12-cv-01838-NVW Document 11 Filed 11/14/12 Page 4 of 4