Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00100/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00100-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS OUIA HAITHCOCK,

 

 Petitioner,

Case No. 06cv0100-J (JMA)

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY v.

M VEAL, Warden, 

 Respondent.

On November 7, 2006, this Court issued an Order adopting Magistrate Judge Jan M.

Adler’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) denying Petitioner Thomas Ouia Haithcock’s

(“Petitioner”) Motion for Stay and Abeyance of his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Mot. Stay”). [Doc. Nos. 1, 38.] Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion for a

Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). [Doc. No. 39.] For the reasons set forth below, the

Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for a COA. 

//

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Case 3:06-cv-00100-MMA-JMA Document 42 Filed 03/19/07 Page 1 of 6
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1

In contrast, if a habeas petition has been denied on the merits, the Supreme Court has stated,

“[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment

of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

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Legal Standard

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,

110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), a COA from a circuit justice or district court judge is

necessary in order to appeal the “final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State Court.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)

(2006) (emphasis added); United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997)

(holding that district courts retain authority to issue a COA under the AEDPA). In deciding

whether to grant a COA, a court must either indicate the specific issues supporting a certificate

or state reasons why a certificate is not warranted. See Asrar, 116 F.3d at 1270. 

A court may issue a COA only if the applicant has made a “substantial showing” of the

denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). If the habeas petition has

been denied on procedural grounds, the Supreme Court has determined the petitioner must

overcome two hurdles to obtain a COA.1

 See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85. The

petitioner must first show “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right,” and second, “that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. at

484. Furthermore, in determining whether a COA should be granted when the underlying

petition was procedurally barred, the Court in its discretion may dispose of the application

promptly and fairly by addressing the issue more apparent from the record and arguments. See

id. at 484-85. 

Discussion

Here, the Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance of his exhausted

claims. (See Order Denying Pet’r’s Mot. For Stay and Abeyance at 4-5.) Petitioner now seeks

a COA from this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 in order to pursue an appeal of the Order

Denying Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance. [Doc. No. 28.]

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I. Collateral Order Doctrine

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a COA may only be issued after the final order in a habeas

proceeding is rendered. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Denial of a stay is generally viewed as an order

regarding the internal progress of litigation and therefore is not considered an appealable final

order. 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 3914.13 (3d ed. 1998). Further, the Supreme Court has held that orders denying

stays of litigation are not appealable as interlocutory orders denying injunctions under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271,

275-78 (1988); see also Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. L.R. Ranch Co., 926 F.2d 859, 862 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

However, the Supreme Court has held that a “small class” of collateral orders are final

and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 even though they do not terminate the underlying

litigation. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1994). To qualify

for appeal, a collateral order “must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an

important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesage, 437 U.S.

463, 468 (1978); Praxis Properties v. Colonial Savings Bank SLA, 947 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir.

1991). A district court’s order granting a motion to stay a petition for writ of habeas corpus

has been held by the Ninth Circuit to be an appealable collateral order. See Marchetti v.

Bitterolf, 968 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Carmichael v. White, 163 F.3d 1044,

1045 (8th Cir. 1998). 

 In the case at bar, the Order denying Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance is an

appealable collateral order. The Court’s Order conclusively resolved the disputed question,

whether Petitioner has met the standard for a stay and abeyance in order to exhaust his

unexhausted claims. Additionally, the Court resolved an important issue completely separate

from the merits of the action because the issue of whether to grant a stay and abeyance is

entirely separate from the due process issues raised in the underlying habeas petition. Finally,

the issue is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment with respect to the

habeas petition. As a result of the denial of Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance,

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Petitioner is foreclosed from bringing his unexhausted claims in the current petition.

Presumably, he will attempt to pursue his unexhausted claims in state court and bring a second

petition for writ of habeas corpus once has exhausted those claims. Should he do this, the

propriety of the Court’s order denying his original Motion for Stay and Abeyance will become

moot, and will thus be unreviewable upon final judgment. 

II. Certificate of Appealability

Although this Court’s Order denying Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance is

appealable under the collateral order doctrine, Petitioner, nevertheless, fails to satisfy the two

hurdles necessary to obtain a COA for a petition denied on procedural grounds. See Slack, 529

U.S. at 484-85. Because the denial of Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance is the most

significant issue from the record, the Court will address the second prong of the “substantial

showing” test, which requires Petitioner to show that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the Court was correct in its procedural ruling. Petitioner argues that a COA should

be issued because an appeal of the Order denying Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance

would raise a substantial question as to the denial of a constitutional right. (Pet’r’s Mot. COA

at 1-2.) Petitioner then raises two issues which he intends to bring on appeal: (1) ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and (2) violation of his federal rights under the

Confrontation Clause. (See id. at 2-7.) Petitioner fails, however, to demonstrate that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the Court was correct in its procedural ruling. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for a COA. 

Federal district courts have limited discretion to hold mixed petitions in abeyance in

order to permit a habeas corpus petitioner to return to state court to complete exhaustion of all

his claims. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. A district court has discretion to grant a stay and

abeyance if it has determined that: (1) “the petitioner had good cause for his failure to

exhaust”; (2) “his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious”; and (3) “there is no

indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 278.

If there was good cause for a petitioner’s failure to exhaust, it may be an abuse of discretion

to deny the motion for stay and abeyance where there is no indication of dilatory litigation

tactics. See id. at 278.

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Although the Court in Rhines did not define what constitutes “good cause” sufficient

to permit application of the stay and abeyance procedure, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit has held that good cause does not require a petitioner to show “extraordinary

circumstances” for the failure to exhaust state remedies. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654,

661-62 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court in Riner v. Crawford stated that the standard of good

cause requires the petitioner to show that he was prevented from raising a claim by his own

ignorance or by circumstances beyond his control, such as the actions of counsel either in

contravention of petitioner’s expressed desire or when petitioner had no knowledge of the

claim’s existence. See Riner v. Crawford, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 (D. Nev. 2006). In

Hernandez v. Sullivan, the district court held that good cause requires a petitioner to show that

the failure to exhaust state remedies was the result of “an objective factor external to the

petitioner which cannot fairly be attributed to him or her.” See Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F.

Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (holding that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel did not constitute

good cause because petitioner was free to seek state habeas relief on exhausted claims).

In his Motion for COA, Petitioner fails to show that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the Court was correct in its procedural ruling denying Petitioner’s Motion

for Stay and Abeyance. This Court was correct in its procedural ruling and did not abuse its

discretion because Petitioner failed to show good cause for failing to exhaust state remedies

prior to filing the instant Petition. First, Petitioner cannot meet the Riner standard for good

cause because he does not allege that appellate counsel contravened his desire to raise either

of the additional claims on appeal. Additionally, Petitioner was aware of the facts giving rise

to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, as he was present when trial counsel

failed to object to the officer’s statements and urged his attorney to call witnesses to counter

the officer’s testimony. (See Pet’r’s Second Mot. Stay, Ex. B at 2.) Further, although

Petitioner was dissatisfied with defense counsel and filed two motions to substitute counsel

prior to trial, he offers no explanation as to why he failed to raise his ineffective counsel issue

on appeal. (See Resp’t’s Lodgm’t No. 6.) In addition, Petitioner has not met the requirements

of good cause under the Hernandez standard, because he has not demonstrated that “an

objective factor external to the petitioner which cannot fairly be attributed to him” prevented

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him from raising the unexhausted claims in state court. Even if Petitioner were not aware of

these additional issues on appeal, nothing prevented Petitioner from seeking state habeas relief

on this basis. 

Therefore, the Court FINDS that Petitioner has failed to make a sufficient showing that

reasonable jurors would find it debatable whether the Court correctly denied Petitioner’s

Motion for Stay and Abeyance. 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for a Certificate of

Appealibility.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 16, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler

 All Parties 

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