Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01257/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01257-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Docket No. 43.

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15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

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Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788-1788.32.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELD HANSSON,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Defendant. /

No. C06-01257 MJJ

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company’s (“Ford Credit” or “Defendant”)

Motion for Summary Judgment.1

 Plaintiff Keld Hansson (“Plaintiff” or “Hansson”) opposes the

motion. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arises under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act2 (“FDCPA”) and the

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act3

 (“RFDCPA”) from Defendant’s alleged wrongful

conduct in connection with the attempted repossession of Plaintiff’s automobile. 

On February 21, 2006, Plaintiff filed his original verified Complaint asserting two causes of

action against Ford Motor Company and Mitchell: (1) violation FDCPA and (2) violation of the

Case 3:06-cv-01257-MJJ Document 57 Filed 02/12/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, he removed the factual allegation that Ford Credit was doing business

as (“dba”) Jaguar Credit. (SAC ¶ 23.) Plaintiff’s current allegation is that he incurred the financial obligation to “Jaguar

Credit” only. (Id.) In support of his contention that Ford Credit and Jaguar Credit Corporation are separate entities, Plaintiff

presents Internet website printouts from the California Secretary of State indicating that Ford Credit and Jaguar Credit

Corporation are registered as separate corporations. (Swigart Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7, Exhibits (“Exs.”) 1, 2.)

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RFDCPA. On May 23, 2006, the Court held the first case management conference ordering Plaintiff

to file any motion to add a third party by June 30, 2006. On June 27, 2006, pursuant to stipulated

motion, Plaintiff filed an unverified First Amended Complaint alleging the same two causes of

action, adding Stealth as a co-Defendant, and identifying “Ford Motor Credit Company d/b/a Jaguar

Credit,” rather than Ford Motor Company, as a defendant. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶

22.)4

 

On October 16, 2006, the Court entered the Pretrial Order setting a deadline for non-expert

discovery in April 2007. Approximately 22 days later, on November 7, 2006, Ford Credit brought

the current motion for summary judgment now before the Court. Subsequently, on November 21,

2006, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add additional factual

allegations and claims against Ford Credit, Stealth, and Mitchell. 

On January 22, 2007, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. 

At the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint, the Court inquired whether

Plaintiff’s amendments would have an effect on the pending motion for summary judgment. Ford

Credit’s counsel stated that Ford Credit was willing to allow Plaintiff to amend the complaint

provided that the Court would permit Ford Credit to proceed on the pending motion for summary

judgment. The Court noted that because Ford Credit filed its motion for summary judgment only 3

weeks after the issuance of the Pretrial Order, the Court would be inclined to grant a request by

Plaintiff for more discovery under Rule 56(f). In response, Ford Credit’s counsel opined that the

issues presented in the motion for summary judgment did not raise any issues requiring additional

discovery. Plaintiff’s counsel represented that the new factual allegations regarding the relationship

between Defendants did not effect Plaintiff’s opposition to the pending motion for summary

judgment.

ANALYSIS

In this motion, Ford Credit moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s FDCPA and

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RFDCPA claims. As to the FDCPA claim, Ford Credit argues that: (1) it is not a “debt collector” for

purposes of the FDCPA; (2) Ford Credit’s co-Defendants are not “debt collectors” for purposes of

the FDCPA; and (3) since Ford Credit is a “creditor” rather than a “debt collector,” it cannot be held

vicariously liable for the alleged wrongful conduct of the co-Defendants. As to the RFDCPA claim,

Ford Credit argues that under California Business and Professions Code § 7507.13(b), Ford Credit is

not liable for any act of its co-Defendants. In opposition, Plaintiff has requested that the Court deny

Ford Credit’s motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), in order to allow Plaintiff to

conduct additional discovery. Plaintiff contends that he has not had an adequate opportunity to

obtain discovery because Ford Credit prematurely filed for summary judgment a mere 22 days after

this Court’s Pretrial Order. Plaintiff also contends that he could not have taken the depositions of

certain individuals who submitted declarations in support of Ford Credit’s summary judgment

motion. 

“Where ... a summary judgment motion is filed so early in the litigation, before a party has

had any realistic opportunity to pursue discovery relating to its theory of the case, district courts

should grant any Rule 56(f) motion fairly freely.” Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Assiniboine

and Sioux Tribes, 323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, Ford Credit does not dispute that it first disclosed its employee, Chris Hawkins

(“Hawkins”), and Stealth’s President, Jeremy Wade (“Wade”) on October 30, 2006. Hawkins and

Wade both provide material support for Ford Credit’s motion for summary judgment that was filed

one week later on November 6, 2006. Because Rule 26 is intended to provide relevant information

to the parties regarding claims and defenses, Plaintiff should have the opportunity to obtain

discovery regarding these recently disclosed material witnesses. Additionally, the Court disagrees

with Ford Credit that Plaintiff has been dilatory in seeking discovery. The record indicates that after

providing his own deposition, Plaintiff attempted to take the depositions of certain Ford Credit

employees. However, given Ford Credit’s objections, the parties had not come to an agreement on

the date for those depositions. The record also indicates that Plaintiff had served written discovery

requests on Defendants as early as June 2006. Given the timing of Ford Credit’s motion and the

relatively early stage of discovery in this case, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) request to be

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well taken. Ford Credit’s motion for summary judgment is premature. 

CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES Ford Credit’s motion for summary judgment WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. The Plaintiff shall have 60 days from the issuance of this Order to obtain necessary

discovery. Defendants may re-file motions for summary judgment, if any, after that time. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12, 2007

____________________________

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-01257-MJJ Document 57 Filed 02/12/07 Page 4 of 4