Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05218/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05218-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed November 9, 2001

No. 00-5218

Murphy Exploration and Production Company,

Appellant

v.

United States Department of the Interior and

Gale A. Norton,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv00570)

---------

On Appellees' Petition for Rehearing

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Before Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Circuit Judge Rogers dissented.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: This matter is before us on

motion for rehearing of our decision in Murphy Exploration

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& Production Co. v. U.S. Department of Interior, 252 F.3d

473 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In that decision we considered the

appeal of a natural gas producer (Murphy) from a district

court judgment dismissing for lack of jurisdiction Murphy's

suit for reimbursement of mining royalty overpayments. The

facts are set forth in the earlier opinion. The district court

had held (rightly) that the suit was governed by the Federal

Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act, 30

U.S.C. s 1724(h)(l ) ("FOGRSFA"), which requires the Secretary to "issue a final decision in any administrative proceeding ... within 33 months from the date such proceeding was

commenced or 33 months from [the effective date of the Act],

whichever is later." If the Secretary fails to do so within the

allotted time, she "shall be deemed to have issued a final

decision in favor of the Secretary ... and the appellant shall

have a right to judicial review of such deemed final action...." Id. at s 1724(h)(2)(B).

While the district court correctly identified the governing

statute, we held that the court was incorrect in its application.

That is, that court ruled that it had no jurisdiction because

Murphy's February 3, 1989 refund request did not constitute

the commencement of an "administrative proceeding" within

the meaning of FOGRSFA. In doing so, the district court

followed the Secretary's interpretation of section

1724(h)(2)(B) made in the rulemaking proceeding. For the

reasons set forth in our original opinion, we disagreed with

the Secretary's interpretation. In our analysis, we concluded

that the deference afforded agency interpretation of the

statutes under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), was inapplicable

because the controverted provision of the statute conferred

jurisdiction on the federal courts so that "we must decide, as

an original matter, whether the district court had jurisdiction

to hear Murphy's lawsuit." Murphy Exploration, 252 F.3d at

480. We concluded for reasons fully set out at 252 F.3d 480-

82 that it had such jurisdiction.

In the original proceedings before us, the Department of

the Interior ("DOI") had argued "that Murphy waived its

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cause it did not advance that view during the rulemaking

process." Id. at 478. While recognizing that in Ohio v. EPA,

997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1983), we had declined to consider an

argument that the parties had failed to raise "during rulemaking proceedings before the Agency," id. at 1528, we

distinguished Ohio on the ground that the record before us in

Murphy Exploration did not reveal that Murphy had any role

in the rulemaking proceeding and therefore could not "be said

to have 'waived' its argument by failing to advance it during

those proceedings." Murphy Exploration, 252 F.3d at 478.

After we issued our opinion, the DOI came forward with

further record material which it sought to have us notice

demonstrating that while we had been literally correct in our

earlier opinion that the record before us did not reflect the

participation of Murphy in the rulemaking proceeding, Murphy had in fact participated and had not raised the argument

that the Department was incorrectly interpreting 30 U.S.C.

s 1724(h)(2)(B). We accept the material proffered and allow

the petition of the Department of the Interior only to the

extent that we order the first full paragraph in the first

column of 252 F.3d 478, being the same language as the only

full paragraph on page 6 of the slip opinion in Murphy

Exploration, stricken.1

This revision makes no difference in the result of the case.

Ohio v. EPA still does not bar our review. That decision only

restates the incontrovertible proposition that one may not

present an argument on appeal without having first raised it

below, i.e., in the proceedings from which the litigant appeals.

See Ohio, 997 F.2d at 1528-29 ("Judicial efficiency is served

because issues that are raised before the agency might be

resolved without the need for judicial intervention."). The

question in Ohio was whether the petitioners had exhausted

their administrative review, not whether they were estopped

from advancing an argument in a different proceeding.

__________

1 That paragraph is the last before Section II.B of the opinion. It

begins, "DOI further proposes that Murphy" and ends a few

sentences later with " 'waived' its argument by failing to advance it

during those proceedings." 252 F.3d at 478.

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Nothing in Ohio or any other authority prevents Murphy

from pursuing its claim in a second forum, i.e., apart from the

original rulemaking, if such a forum is otherwise available.

As we have held before, such a forum is available to a party

when a rule is "brought before this court for review of further

[agency] action applying it." Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC,

274 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1958). As we opined in Functional Music, because "administrative rules and regulations

are capable of continuing application," were we to limit review

to the adoption of the rule without further judicial relief at

the time of its application, we "would effectively deny many

parties ultimately affected by a rule an opportunity to question its validity." Id. Just so here.

For the reasons set forth in Murphy Exploration, we

reversed the judgment of the district court that it had no

jurisdiction. Nothing in the petition before us convinces us

that we erred in any fashion in that decision.

Except to the limited extent set forth above, the petition

for rehearing is denied.2

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2 Judge Rogers would grant rehearing. See Murphy Exploration

& Production Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 483 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) (Rogers, J., dissenting).

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