Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02987/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02987-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IN RE: LITHIUM ION BATTERIES 

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

This Document Relates To: 

Case No. 4:15-CV-02987-YGR 

DELL INC., ET AL., 

Plaintiffs, 

V. 

LG CHEM LTD., ET AL., 

Defendants. 

Master Case No. 4:13-MD-02420 

MDL No. 2420 

Individual Case No. 15-CV-02987-YGR 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT TOSHIBA 

CORPORATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 1310, 1431 

Plaintiffs Dell Inc. and Dell Products L.P. (“Dell Entities”) bring this action for alleged 

antitrust violations relating to the sales of lithium ion batteries, cells, and packs spanning a period 

of eleven years against defendants LG Chem, Ltd. and LG Chem America, Inc. (collectively, “LG 

Chem”), Samsung SDI Co., Ltd. and Samsung SDI America, Inc. (collectively, “Samsung”), and 

Toshiba Corporation.1 More specifically, plaintiffs allege claims for: (i) violation of the Sherman 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 against Samsung and Toshiba; (ii) violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 

against LG Chem but limited to January 2000 through September 30, 2009; and (iii) breach of 

contract against Samsung. 

Now before the Court is defendant Toshiba’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 1310.) Specifically, Toshiba 

argues that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficiently their claims based on assignments of antitrust 

claims plaintiffs received from third-party subsidiaries and affiliates. Alternatively, Toshiba 

moves the Court to order plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement of their claims pursuant to 

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 Plaintiffs have dismissed claims against eight of the thirteen defendants in this case 

namely, Panasonic Corporation and Panasonic Corporation of North America (collectively, 

“Panasonic”), Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd. and Sanyo North America Corporation (collectively, 

“Sanyo”), Sony Corporation, Sony Energy Devices Corporation, and Sony Electronics, Inc. 

(collectively, “Sony”), and GS Yuasa Corporation. 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Having carefully considered the pleadings, the papers 

submitted on this motion, and oral arguments at the hearing on September 27, 2016, and for the 

reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES Toshiba’s motion to dismiss and motion for a more 

definite statement.2 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this action against defendants for an alleged global anti-trust conspiracy to 

“fix, raise, stabilize, and maintain the prices” of lithium ion batteries (“LIBs”) from at least 

January 1, 2000 through at least May 31, 2011. According to the complaint, defendants engaged 

in continuous communications with each other “to set prices collusively” and “devis[e] 

mechanisms to nullify competition in procurements by their customers.” (Compl. ¶ 7.) 

Throughout this period, plaintiffs allege that they directly purchased more than $3.1 billion 

worth of LIBs collectively from defendants and their co-conspirators. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 25.) Relevant 

to this motion, plaintiffs allege that they “received assignments of claims with its relevant 

subsidiaries and affiliates, whereby any of the antitrust claims described in [the complaint] against 

the [d]efendants and their co-conspirators that are held by [plaintiffs’] subsidiaries and affiliates 

have or will be assigned to Dell Inc.” (Id. at ¶ 30.) 

Subsequent to Toshiba’s filing of its motion to dismiss, plaintiffs produced to Toshiba the 

agreements they entered into with their subsidiaries and affiliates under which such entities 

assigned their claims to plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 1431-5, Exhibits A–G.)3 Plaintiffs requested that 

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 In connection with its reply brief, Toshiba submitted an administrative motion to seal 

certain exhibits marked by plaintiffs as “Highly Confidential.” (Dkt. No. 1431.) Plaintiffs, as the 

Designating Parties, are required under the Local Rules to file declarations establishing that all of 

the designated materials are sealable. Civil L.R. 79-5(e)(1). Plaintiffs have not done so here. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Toshiba’s motion to seal. 

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 Plaintiffs produced to Toshiba assignments from the following entities: (i) Dell 

Computadores Do Brasil LTDA.; (ii) Dell Global BV-Singapore Branch; (iii) Dell India Private 

Limited; (iv) Dell Products (Europe) BV; (v) Dell (China) Company Ltd.; (vi) Dell (Xiamen) 

Company Ltd.; and (vii) Dell Asian Pacific SDN. BHD. In each, the relevant entity assigned “all 

rights, title, and interest in any and all causes of action . . . related to price fixing of Batteries under 

all applicable United States antitrust laws, United States state unfair competition laws, United 

States consumer protection laws, or any other United States federal or state law arising from the 

purchase of Batteries or products containing Batteries.” (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1431-5, Exhibit A.) 

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Toshiba withdraw its motion to avoid further litigation. Toshiba declined and maintains that such 

production is insufficient because the assignment agreements still fail to provide details on what 

the assignors purchased, when those purchases occurred, the identity of the seller, or where the 

transactions took place, all of which Toshiba claims should be alleged in the complaint. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 

1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1988)). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face 

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). If the facts alleged do not support a reasonable inference of liability, stronger than a mere 

possibility, the claim must be dismissed. Id. at 678–79; see also In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 

F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a court is not required to accept as true “allegations 

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences”). 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a ‘short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–55 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original). Even under the liberal pleading standard 

of Rule 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires 

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Id. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (internal brackets and 

quotation marks omitted)). The Court will not assume facts not alleged, nor will it draw 

unwarranted inferences. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a 

plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

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judicial experience and common sense.”). 

Rule 12(e) allows a party to move for a more definite statement before filing a responsive 

pleading where the original pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 

prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored and rarely 

granted.” Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing 

Cellars v. Pac. Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)). “The rule is aimed 

at unintelligibility rather than lack of detail and is only appropriate when the defendants cannot 

understand the substance of the claim asserted.” Id. (citing Beery v. Hitachi Home Elecs., Inc., 

157 F.R.D. 477, 480 (C.D. Cal. 1993)). “If the detail sought by a motion for more definite 

statement is obtainable through discovery, the motion should be denied.” Griffin v. Cedar Fair, 

L.P., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Castaneda, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1045). 

III. DISCUSSION

Toshiba moves to dismiss only claims plaintiffs allegedly hold based on assignments they 

received from certain subsidiaries and affiliates. Specifically, Toshiba argues that plaintiffs need 

to allege the identity of the assignors, what products the assignors purchased, from whom 

assignors purchased the products, when assignors purchased the products, and where assignors 

engaged in any transactions. In the context of claims held by assignments, courts have found that 

plaintiffs must “allege facts showing that the assignor would be entitled to relief.” See In re TFTLCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., Nos. 09-CV-1115, 07-MD-1827, 2009 WL 4874872, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009) (citing cases). 

The court’s decision in In re TFT-LCD is instructive. There, the defendants also argued 

that they were entitled to know the identity of the “assignor of plaintiff’s claims, the products the 

assignor purchased, and the defendants from whom it purchased those products in order to 

ascertain the nature of the claims being asserted and reasonably prepare a response.” Id. at *4. 

The court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, noting that at a minimum, plaintiff must 

identify the assignor. Id. However, the court also noted that plaintiff need not add allegations 

addressing all of defendants’ demands, explaining that defendants “may uncover the additional 

details surrounding the assignor’s purchases through discovery.” Id. The court held similarly in 

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another order in the TFT-LCD litigation with respect to the Michigan and Wisconsin state 

plaintiffs. See In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 

2011) (requiring plaintiffs to allege the identity of the assignors and noting that the “balance of the 

information sought by defendants, such as information about the contracts, is not required as a 

pleading matter and can be explored in discovery”). 

Plaintiffs do not dispute the complaint lacks the level of specificity sought but assert that 

the pleadings are sufficient, especially in light of their production of the assignment agreements to 

Toshiba, citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501–02 (1975). Warth, which concerned standing 

rather than failure to state a claim, merely stands for the basic proposition that courts may allow or 

require plaintiffs to “supply, by amendment to the complaint or by affidavits, further particularized 

allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff’s standing.” Id. Given the nature of plaintiffs’ 

overall allegations and the production of the assignment agreements themselves, the Court finds 

that Toshiba’s asserted deficiencies in the complaint have been cured. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Toshiba’s motion to dismiss the complaint. For the same reasons, the motion for a more 

definite statement under Rule 12(e) is also DENIED. Toshiba has more than sufficient information 

to file an answer. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court also finds that a more specific articulation of the 

assignments would be beneficial here, in light of the potential impact of the Foreign Trade 

Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”) on the action. Pursuant to FTAIA, the Sherman Act does 

not cover trade or commerce with foreign nations, other than import trade or commerce, unless 

such conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on American domestic, 

import, or certain export commerce, and “such effect gives rise to a claim” under the Sherman 

Act. 15 U.S.C. § 6a; see Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09-CV-6610, 2014 

WL 258154, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014); Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852–

53 (7th Cir. 2012) (indicating that FTAIA establishes an element of a Sherman Act claim). Given 

the potential for motion practice relative to the FTAIA, a precise articulation of the facts relative 

to those issues promotes efficiency. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS plaintiffs to serve a 

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statement providing the factual basis upon which the assignors’ claims meet the FTAIA 

requirements within twenty-eight (28) days of this Order. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Toshiba’s motion to dismiss the complaint 

and motion for a more definite statement as set forth above. Toshiba shall file its answer to the 

complaint within fourteen (14) days of this Order. 

This Order terminates Docket Numbers 1310 and 1431. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 4, 2016 ______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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