Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00803/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00803-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 130
Nature of Suit: Miller Act
Cause of Action: 40:3131 Bonds of contractors of public buildings

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for the 

use and benefit of:

McCULLOUGH PLUMBING, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HALBERT CONSTRUCTION 

COMPANY, INC. et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-803-CAB-WVG

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND MOTION 

TO ALTER JUDGMENT

[Doc. Nos. 170, 175]

AND RELATED CROSS-CLAIMS AND 

COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD 

PARTY COMPLAINT

This matter is before the Court on a motion for attorneys’ fees, nontaxable costs, and 

prejudgment interest by McCullough Plumbing, Inc. (“McCullough”) and The Guarantee 

Company of North America USA (“Guarantee”), and a motion to alter the judgment by 

Halbert Construction Company, Inc. (“Halbert”). The motions have been fully briefed, 

and the Court deems them suitable for submission without oral argument. Both motions 

are denied.

I. Background

The parties are familiar with the facts which will not be repeated in detail here. 

Halbert was the prime contractor on a contract with the United States Army Corps of 

Engineers for work on a dining facility in Monterey, California (the “Project”). In 

connection with the Project, Halbert and Defendant Western Surety Company (“Western”)

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executed and delivered a payment bond to the United States under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 

§§ 3131 et seq. Plaintiff McCullough Plumbing, Inc. (“McCullough”) entered into a 

subcontract with Halbert to provide plumbing work for the Project (the “Subcontract”).

In its complaint, McCullough alleged that Halbert had not paid McCullough for the 

full value of the labor, services, materials, equipment, and supplies it provided to the 

Project. Based on these allegations, McCullough asserted claims against Halbert for breach 

of the Subcontract and quantum meruit, and against Halbert and Western jointly for 

recovery on the Miller Act payment bond. McCullough’s alleged damages fell into three 

categories: (1) the unpaid balance of the original Subcontract amount; (2) payment for 

change orders; and (3) damages resulting from delay in completion of the Project such as 

extended overhead and personnel costs.

Halbert filed a counterclaim against McCullough for breach of contract, breach of 

express warranty, and negligence, and a third party claim against Guarantee on a bond 

Guarantee had issued for McCullough’s performance on the Subcontract (the 

“Performance Bond”). [Doc. No. 68.] Halbert’s alleged damages fell into four categories: 

(1) cost to repair inadequate work by McCullough; (2) cost to complete work McCullough 

failed to perform under the Subcontract; (3) a contractual mark-up to the costs for 

completion work; and (4) damages for delays to Project caused by McCullough’s breach.

At the conclusion of a nine-day trial, a jury found that McCullough had proved its 

breach of contract claim and its claim that it provided additional work outside the 

Subcontract and approved Change Orders. On the verdict form, the jury found that 

McCullough had proved damages of: (1) $220,909.00 for unpaid work and materials on 

the Subcontract and any approved Change Orders; (2) 47,814.70 for delay; and (3) 

$135,947.70 for unpaid work and materials outside the Subcontract and approved Change 

Orders. The jury found that Halbert’s surety, Western Surety owes McCullough the full 

amount of these damages totaling $404,671.40. [Doc. No. 166.]

The jury also found that Halbert had proved its breach of contract claim against 

McCullough. On the verdict form, the jury found that Halbert had proved damages of 

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$345,362.00 for completion work, but no damages for repair work, mark-up, or delay. [Id.] 

The jury found that Halbert had not performed all its obligations under the performance 

bond issued by Guarantee and therefore found that Guarantee was not obligated to pay 

Halbert any damages for McCullough’s default on the Subcontract. [Id.]

Pursuant to the Court’s order after the verdict was read, the parties jointly submitted 

a proposed judgment on July 29, 2019, and the Court signed and entered that judgment on 

the same day. [Doc. No. 168.] The Judgment states that: (1) McCullough recovers 

$404,671.40 from Halbert and Western, jointly and severally, on McCullough’s complaint; 

(2) Halbert recovers $345,362.00 from McCullough on Halbert’s counterclaim; and (3) 

Halbert recovers nothing on its claim against Guarantee. McCullough and Guarantee now 

move for their attorney’s fees pursuant to the fee provision in the Subcontract. [Doc. No. 

170.] Halbert opposes that motion and separately moves to alter the judgment. [Doc. No. 

175.]

II. Halbert’s Motion to Alter the Judgment

The verdict form asked the jury to itemize Halbert’s damages into four categories: 

(1) repair work; (2) completion work; (3) mark-up; and (4) delay damages. Halbert argues 

that the judgment of $345,362.00 on Halbert’s counterclaims is incorrect because the jury 

entered $345,362.00 on the line of the verdict form for completion work, but zero on the 

line for mark-up, whereas Halbert contends a 20% markup on completion work is 

mandated by the Subcontract. This argument is disingenuous considering that Halbert did 

not present evidence at trial that it incurred $345,362.00 in costs for completion work and

in its closing argument asked the jury to enter just $287,802.00 on the line for completion 

work on the verdict form. Thus, Halbert is now arguing for a judgment that is not supported 

by the evidence presented to the jury at trial. 

Moreover, how the jury arrived at the total it entered on the line for completion work 

is readily apparent from the testimony and evidence at trial. Halbert’s expert, Michelle 

Mangan, testified that Halbert’s total actual costs for completion work were $287,802.00, 

and that Halbert was entitled to a 20% mark-up equaling $57,560.00 on that amount, for a 

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total including mark-up of $345,362.00. [Doc. No. 183-1 at 5-42.] This is the exact amount 

the jury awarded to Halbert on the verdict form line for completion work and is the amount 

awarded to Halbert on its counterclaim in the judgment. [Doc. No. 168.] Ironically, 

Halbert argues that McCullough’s opposition asks the Court to construe the verdict as 

something it does not state when it is Halbert asking the Court to enter judgment 

inconsistent with the verdict and inconsistent with the evidence Halbert put on at trial with 

respect to the amount it incurred for completion work. Because the judgment accurately 

reflects the jury’s verdict, and because the verdict based on the evidence presented at trial 

reflects that the jury included a 20% markup on the amount of completion work Halbert 

itself argued it performed as a result of McCullough’s breach, Halbert’s motion to alter the 

judgment is denied.

III. McCullough’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

The Subcontract states that:

In the event it becomes necessary for either party to enforce the provisions of 

this Subcontract or to obtain redress for the violation of any provision hereof 

the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the other party all costs, 

reasonable attorneys’ fees, and expenses associated with such action, 

including statutory interest.

[Doc. No. 170-2 at 40.] The parties do not dispute that California law applies to 

McCullough’s fee motion. Pursuant to California Civil Code section 1717, “[i]n any action 

on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which 

are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the 

prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, 

whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable 

attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a). “Although generally 

the prevailing party is the one ‘who recovered a greater relief in the action on the 

contract[,]’ the court may determine there is no prevailing party.” Deane Gardenhome 

Assn. v. Denktas, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code 

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§ 1717(b)(1)). Thus, section 1717 “vests the trial court with discretion in making the 

prevailing party determination.” Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal. 4th 863, 871 (1995).

“[I]n deciding whether there is a ‘party prevailing on the contract,’ the trial court is 

to compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties’ demands on 

those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, 

opening statements, and similar sources. The prevailing party determination is to be made 

only upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by ‘a comparison of the extent 

to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.’” Id. at 876

(quoting Bank of Idaho v. Pine Avenue Assocs., 137 Cal. App. 3d 5, 15 (1982)). “Typically, 

a determination of no prevailing party results when both parties seek relief, but neither 

prevails, or when the ostensibly prevailing party receives only a part of the relief sought. 

In other words, the judgment is considered good news and bad news as to each of the 

parties.” Deane Gardenhome Assn., 13 Cal. App. 4th at 1398 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “[I]n determining litigation success, courts should respect substance 

rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by ‘equitable considerations.’” Hsu, 

9 Cal. 4th at 877 (emphasis in original used to clarify that equitable considerations 

unrelated to litigation success, “such as the parties’ behavior during settlement negotiations 

or discovery proceedings,” are irrelevant when one party obtains a “simple, unqualified 

win” on the contract claims).

Following these guidelines, “a party who is denied direct relief on a claim may 

nonetheless be found to be a prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise 

achieved its main litigation objective.” Id. at 877. At the same time, “the court may 

conclude the person receiving the greater monetary judgment may not be the party 

recovering ‘greater relief’ on the contract action.” Sears v. Baccaglio, 60 Cal. App. 4th 

1136, 1151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Either way, however, “[i]f neither party achieves a 

complete victory on all the contract claims, it is within the discretion of the trial court to 

determine which party prevailed on the contract or whether, on balance, neither party 

prevailed sufficiently to justify an award of attorney fees.” Marina Pacifica Homeowners 

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Assn. v. S. California Fin. Corp., 20 Cal. App. 5th 191, 205–06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)

(quoting Scott Co. v. Blount, Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1103, 1109 (1999)); see also City of 

Emeryville v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1251, 1267 (9th Cir. 2010) (“‘[W]hen the ostensibly 

prevailing party receives only a part of the relief sought,’ the result is ‘mixed,’ and the trial 

court has ‘discretion to find no prevailing party.’”) (quoting Hsu, 9 Cal. 4th at 875-76); 

Warner Bros. Int’l Television Distrib. v. Golden Channels & Co., No. 

CV0209326MMMSHSX, 2013 WL 12374776, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2013) (“Where, 

as here, neither party can claim total victory, California courts vest discretion in the court 

to deny fees to both.”). 

Here, both parties argued to the jury that the other breached the Subcontract, and 

both parties sought damages far in excess of what the jury found them to have suffered. 

That the jury calculated McCullough’s breach of contract damages as slightly more than 

Halbert’s damages resulting a net payment to McCullough of less than ten percent of what 

it asked the jury to award hardly qualifies as a “simple, unqualified win” for McCullough 

and a clear loss for Halbert. To the contrary, neither party achieved its main litigation 

objective and neither party prevailed sufficiently to justify an award of attorney fees. The 

outcome here is the epitome of a “mixed result.” McCullough expressly admits as much 

in its reply.1 Accordingly, the Court declines to find that McCullough was the prevailing 

party such that it is entitled to its attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs pursuant to the 

Subcontract and section 1717. Cf. Chuck Olsen Co. v. F.P.D., Inc., 698 F. App’x 409, 410 

(9th Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of request for attorney’s fees noting that the plaintiff 

“succeeded in obtaining only a portion of its claimed damages. It was well within the 

district court’s discretion to decline Olsen prevailing party status in such circumstances.”).

 

1 Doc. No. 184 at 11 (“McCullough does not dispute the mixed result in this case.”)

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IV. Guarantee Is Not Entitled to Its Attorney’s Fees

Guarantee is a party to this lawsuit solely as the defendant to one claim filed by 

Halbert for payment under the Performance Bond. The jury found in favor of Guarantee 

on that claim, so Guarantee was the prevailing party. The Performance Bond does not 

contain an attorney’s fees provision, but Guarantee nevertheless argues that it is entitled to 

its fees and costs because the Subcontract, which contains such a clause but to which 

Guarantee is not a party, was “by reference made a part [of the Performance Bond]; except 

as otherwise provided [therein].” [Doc. No. 184-1 at 4.] The attorney fee provision in the 

Subcontract, however, allows for recovery of fees “in the event it becomes necessary for 

either party to enforce the provisions of this Subcontract. . . .” [Doc. No. 170-2 at 40

(emphasis added).] In its claim against Guarantee, Halbert was not seeking to enforce the 

provisions of the Subcontract; rather, Halbert was seeking to enforce the provisions of the 

Performance Bond. Guarantee does not identify any provision in either the Subcontract or 

Performance Bond that would allow for recovery of fees in connection with an effort to 

enforce the provisions of the Performance Bond. Thus, Guarantee is not entitled to its fees 

for successfully defending Halbert’s claim under the Performance Bond.2

V. Prejudgment Interest

McCullough also argues that it is entitled to prejudgment interest on its net recovery 

of $59,309.40 at a statutory rate of 10% per annum from the date McCullough filed the 

complaint in this action. “Under California law, prejudgment interest is governed by Civil 

Code section 3287 and is recoverable in any action in which damages are certain or 

‘capable of being made certain by calculation’ and the right to recover such damages is 

vested in the plaintiff on a particular day.” Cataphora Inc. v. Parker, 848 F. Supp. 2d 

1064, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2012). “When the allocation of liability turns on factual issues, 

 

2 Notably, Guarantee made no effort to identify any fees or costs related exclusively to its defense of 

Halbert’s claims, and it is questionable whether Guarantee actually incurred any unique fees or costs that 

would not otherwise have been incurred by McCullough, which was represented by the same counsel as 

Guarantee throughout this litigation.

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damages are uncertain; however, when the allocation turns exclusively on legal issues, 

damages are certain and interest is available.” Westport Ins. Corp. v. California Cas.

Mgmt. Co., 916 F.3d 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2019). “Damages are deemed certain or capable 

of being made certain within the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 3287 where there 

is essentially no dispute between the parties concerning the basis of computation of 

damages if any are recoverable but where their dispute centers on the issue of liability 

giving rise to damage.” Diaz v. Kubler Corp., 785 F.3d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Leff v. Gunter, 33 Cal. 3d 508, 519 (1983)). “Thus, where the amount of damages cannot 

be resolved except by verdict or judgment, section 3287(a) prejudgment interest is not 

appropriate.” Cataphora, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.

In its motion, McCullough does not explain how its net recovery was capable of 

being made certain by calculation, likely because such calculation clearly was not possible

before the jury returned with its verdict. Halbert did not just contest liability on 

McCullough’s claims; it contested the amount of McCullough’s alleged damages and 

argued that McCullough owed Halbert damages in excess of any incurred by McCullough. 

Because neither McCullough’s damages related to Halbert’s breach nor the net recovery in 

this case were certain or capable of being made certain by calculation until the jury verdict, 

McCullough is not entitled to prejudgment interest.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Halbert’s motion to alter the judgment is DENIED; and,

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees, nontaxable costs, and prejudgment interest 

is DENIED.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2019

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