Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-08-06329/USCOURTS-ca6-08-06329-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0025p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

MILTON HARRIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE

AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE,

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

SCOTT BRUNETTE, ELIZABETH KEEL, FRANK

CIRRINCIONE, MICHAEL TRIBUE,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Nos. 08-6329/6330

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 04-00762—John T. Nixon, District Judge.

Argued: December 1, 2009

Decided and Filed: February 5, 2010 

Before: GUY, RYAN, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Allison L. Bussell, METROPOLITAN DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Nashville,

Tennessee, for Appellant. Douglas B. Janney III, LAW OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, Mac

E. Robinson, Jr., ROBINSON & ROBINSON, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Francis H. Young, METROPOLITAN DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Nashville,

Tennessee, for Appellant. Douglas B. Janney III, LAW OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, Mac

E. Robinson, Jr., ROBINSON & ROBINSON, Nashville, Tennessee, Joseph Howell

Johnston, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. 

1

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Nos. 08-6329/6330 Harris v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville

and Davidson County, Tenn.

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Plaintiff also received a six percent (6%) supplement for serving as assistant track coach, which

is not at issue in this appeal.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendant Metropolitan Government of

Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, appeals from the entry of judgment in the

amount of $9,258.82 in favor of plaintiff Milton Harris on his claim that the reduction to his

coaching supplement as head boys’ varsity basketball coach upon his return from leave

violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). Finding that the

district court erred in failing to consider the proffered defense, and concluding that plaintiff

was not prejudiced by the adjustment to the basketball coaching supplement, we reverse and

enter judgment in favor of defendant on the plaintiff’s FMLA claim.

The FMLA claim was only one of many, and plaintiff cross-appeals from the district

court’s earlier decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Metropolitan Government

and the four individual defendants with respect to his claims of age discrimination and

retaliation. Agreeing with the district court, we find that no reasonable juror could conclude

that defendants’ proffered reasons were pretext either for age discrimination or for

retaliation. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants

on those claims.

I.

Milton Harris was a veteran teacher and coach in the Metropolitan Nashville School

System. From 1993 to 2003, Harris taught health and served as the head boys’ varsity

basketball coach at McGavock High School. Each year that plaintiff coached, he received

a “coaching supplement” that was calculated based on his gross annual teaching salary.

Yearly coaching assignments were made by the principal and coaching supplements were

paid over the whole school year, beginning with the first pay period in the fall, regardless

of when the season began. In 2003, the boys’ basketball head coach supplement was twelve

percent (12%).1

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The basketball team did not have a winning season under plaintiff’s leadership

until the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 seasons, although plaintiff received the “Coach of

the Year Award” from the Nashville Black Coaches Association for 2002-2003.

Plaintiff’s performance evaluation from May 2003 reflected several areas in need of

improvement, consistent with concerns expressed by McGavock’s Executive Principal

Michael Tribue and incorporated into the evaluation by McGavock’s Athletic Director

Dr. Frank Cirrincione. Cirrincione commented on the evaluation, however, that “Coach

Harris is striving to improve the image of the team and coaching staff” and “is working

toward changing the negative perceptions in his program.” Despite his concerns, Tribue

assigned plaintiff to be the head boys’ varsity basketball coach for the following year

because he said plaintiff was the best person for the job at the time.

Plaintiff reported for school in August 2003 and worked several days before

taking leave to undergo prostate cancer surgery. He returned to work in mid-October

and held a few meetings regarding the upcoming basketball season. Plaintiff worked

only five days, however, before he suffered a heart attack that kept him from returning

to work until January 12, 2004. In plaintiff’s absence, the basketball team was coached

by Marlon Simms, the assistant coach who received a six percent (6%) coaching

supplement, and Terry Watson, a volunteer coach who died suddenly during the season

and was replaced by Arcentae Broome.

Simms visited plaintiff while he was recuperating and consulted with him about

coaching matters. During tryouts in November 2003, Simms approached Tribue for

advice because plaintiff had asked that Simms cut an athlete from the team. Tribue

testified that he believed plaintiff’s reasons had to do with a conflict with the parents and

advised Simms to do what he thought best. The athlete made the team and became one

of its top three players.

In December 2003, after the basketball season was underway, Cirrincione talked

to Tribue about the fact that Broome was not being paid anything to coach. Principal

Tribue spoke to Scott Brunette, the Athletic Director for the Metropolitan Nashville

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Plaintiff incorrectly describes this letter as stating that he could not get the supplement because

he had not coached 2/3 of the games. The letter did not say this. Further, the witnesses testified that this

2/3 rule, although new to the 2003-2004 Agreement on Coaching Responsibilities, had nothing to do with

the number of contests that a coach must attend but, rather, with the number of contests that must be

scheduled for the team in order for a coach to receive a coaching supplement.

Schools, who, in turn, spoke to Dr. June Keel, the Assistant Superintendent for Human

Resources for the Metropolitan Nashville Schools. Keel advised them both that two

people could not receive the head coaching supplement, and that an employee was not

entitled to receive a coaching supplement while on leave. Although Keel denied it,

Brunette testified that she also opined that the FMLA did not apply to coaching

supplements. On December 17, 2003, Cirrincione made a written request that plaintiff

be “dropped” as head coach; that Simms be made head coach and receive a 12%

coaching supplement; and that Broome be made assistant coach and receive a 7%

supplement effective August 11, 2003. Brunette “okayed” the request by making a

notation on that memorandum, but plaintiff was not notified. In fact, as the district court

noted, payroll did not make this change and plaintiff’s supplement was calculated at 12%

for several more pay periods, with a deduction made against it to recoup the coaching

supplement that should not have been paid.

Roughly half of the basketball season was over when plaintiff returned from

leave on January 12, 2004. According to Simms, plaintiff told him that there were “three

head coaches” and that there was “no reason for things to change.” When plaintiff’s

next paycheck was smaller than usual, he contacted payroll and was told that he was not

receiving the 12% supplement because he was no longer the head basketball coach.

Plaintiff was very upset and immediately talked to Tribue, who assured him that it was

a mistake and reinstated plaintiff as head coach effective as of his return on January 12,

2004. Plaintiff followed up with a letter to Tribue stating that he trusted the matter was

an error and “not an attempt to circumvent the applicable federal and state laws

governing employees on authorized sick leave.” Tribue responded in a letter dated

January 22, 2004, confirming the plaintiff’s reinstatement but advising him that,

according to human resources, the coaching supplement could not be paid for the period

that plaintiff was not coaching.2

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The district court found that these perceived slights would not state a claim, and plaintiff does

not challenge that finding on appeal.

Tribue also sent Brunette a memorandum requesting that plaintiff be reinstated,

on which Brunette made a hand-written notation of “ok” and “1⁄2 of 12%.” There was

evidence that this proration was defendant’s policy, although plaintiff disputed whether

it had been followed in every case. The “Agreement on Coaching Responsibilities for

2003-2004,” which plaintiff did not sign until he returned from leave, reiterated that

coaching assignments were made on a yearly basis and provided, among other things,

that the coach agreed that he would have to “[c]omplete the season to receive the full

supplement . . . [and would] be required to pay back any supplement not earned.”

In this case, plaintiff’s payroll history reflected an adjustment in January 2004

to a 6% basketball coaching supplement from which deductions were made to “recoup”

overpayments made while plaintiff was on leave. The parties stipulated with respect to

damages, (1) that the full 12% coaching supplement would have been a total of

$6,812.93 for the year, and (2) that plaintiff actually received a total of $3,728.16 for the

year—or a little more than half of the full supplement amount.

Plaintiff complained that despite his reinstatement there were several instances—

before and after he filed his EEOC charge in February 2004—in which Simms was

treated or referred to as the head coach. Plaintiff also felt he was mistreated with respect

to classroom assignment, class composition, and the cancellation of the summer

basketball league without consulting with him. While plaintiff claimed that Tribue

ignored him, Tribue testified that it was plaintiff who avoided him and refused to

acknowledge him during a track meet.3

Tribue did not make the coaching assignments for boys’ basketball at the same

time as he made the other coaching assignments for the 2004-2005 school year. Tribue

met with Brunette and Keel to discuss naming a different head basketball coach, and

they cautioned him that plaintiff might claim retaliation. Plaintiff received an EEOC

right-to-sue letter, and filed this action on August 26, 2004. In a letter dated October 14,

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2004, Tribue notified plaintiff that he would not be reassigned as the head basketball

coach and identified several reasons for that decision. Tribue solicited applicants,

interviewed two candidates, and selected Simms to be the head boys’ varsity basketball

coach for the 2004-2005 season. Plaintiff amended his complaint to allege that he was

denied reassignment as the boys’ basketball coach because of his race, his age, and in

retaliation for engaging in protected activity. Plaintiff continued to teach until he retired

at the end of the 2005-2006 school year.

After being filed in August 2004, this case progressed through resolution of

various dispositive motions, amendments to the complaint, and the taking of discovery.

For the reasons set forth in its opinion and order entered on April 5, 2006, the district

court granted summary judgment to defendants on all of the plaintiff’s claims, except for

the FMLA and breach of contract claims asserted against the Metropolitan Government.

Plaintiff made a motion for reconsideration with respect to the retaliation and age

discrimination claims, only, which was denied on May 26, 2006. Just prior to the entry

of that order, the case was reassigned to another district court judge for all further

proceedings.

Trial, scheduled to begin in late June 2006, was continued without objection from

the defendant, but, instead of a new trial date, a status conference was scheduled and

mediation was attempted without success. In January 2007, a trial date was set for

September 18, 2007, and then, on September 5, 2007, trial was continued until July 15,

2008, and again until August 12, 2008. On July 31, 2008, the day before the final

pretrial conference, plaintiff sought leave to file a motion for summary judgment.

Although that motion was denied, new counsel for plaintiff convinced the district court

at the final pretrial conference to allow plaintiff to file a motion for judgment as a matter

of law. Plaintiff’s motion was filed on August 5, defendant responded on August 6, and

the motion was granted from the bench on August 7, 2008.

The district court’s order, entered on August 21, 2008, found that defendant’s

failure to fully restore plaintiff’s compensation upon reinstatement—namely, the 12%

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The Tennessee statute provides that upon return from leave within 12 months, an interim teacher

shall relinquish the position and the teacher shall return to the position. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-705.

Tennessee statutes also address sick leave accumulation and use, including the advancement of unearned

sick leave and the use of leave donated to a sick leave bank.

coaching supplement—violated the FMLA’s proscription that “any eligible employee

who takes leave under section 2612 . . . shall be entitled, on return from such leave . . .

to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and

other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(B). The district

court also concluded that defendant breached the 2003-2004 Education Agreement’s

provision that: “Upon returning from leave the employee shall be restored to the same

position of employment or an equivalent position with no loss of benefits, pay or other

terms of employment and consistent with TCA 49-5-705.” That is, the court found that

the contract incorporated the FMLA’s restoration rights.4

After a hearing, damages were awarded under the FMLA, only. Specifically, the

district court awarded plaintiff $3,084.77 (the stipulated portion of the full 12% coaching

supplement that plaintiff did not receive for the 2003-2004 season), plus 10%

prejudgment interest under Tennessee law from May 2004 through entry of judgment

in August 2008. In addition, the district court also awarded liquidated damages under

the FMLA based on a finding that defendant had neither acted in good faith, nor had

reasonable grounds for believing its actions were not in violation of the FMLA.

29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii). This appeal followed.

II.

A. Metropolitan Government’s Appeal

The Metropolitan Government argues that the decision granting the motion that

plaintiff styled as a motion for judgment as a matter of law was procedurally flawed and

failed to consider the substance of its defense to the FMLA claim. While a motion for

judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 is not a proper pretrial motion, it

is clear to us that the district court considered matters outside the pleadings and

determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact for trial with respect to

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liability. Although the order did not specify the nature of the motion, we read the

decision to be one granting summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary

judgment is proper when, viewing the facts and drawing all inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A district court’s order granting

summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 863 (6th Cir.

1997); see also Med. Mut. of Ohio v. k. Amalia Enters. Inc., 548 F.3d 383, 389-90 (6th

Cir. 2008).

“This court recognizes two distinct theories for recovery under the FMLA:

(1) the ‘entitlement’ or ‘interference’ theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); and

(2) the ‘retaliation’ or ‘discrimination’ theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).”

Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 384 F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir. 2004). For a claim of

interference, which is the theory asserted here, the plaintiff must establish that (1) he was

an eligible employee, (2) defendant was a covered employer, (3) he was entitled to leave

under the FMLA, (4) he gave defendant notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) the

defendant denied him FMLA benefits or interfered with FMLA rights to which he was

entitled. Id. Only the last of these was disputed by defendant in this case.

The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take not more than 12 weeks of

unpaid leave, or substituted paid leave, for reasons that include a serious health condition

that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his position. 29 U.S.C.

§ 2612(a) and (d). Also, the FMLA provides an employee who returns to work within

that 12-week period with a concomitant right “to be restored by the employer to the

position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced;” or “to be

restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other

terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A) and (B). While the

FMLA provides that the taking of leave may not result in the loss of any previously

accrued “employment benefit,” the FMLA does not entitle a restored employee to

“(A) the accrual of any seniority or employment benefits during any period of leave;”

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or “(B) any right, benefit, or position of employment other than [that] to which the

employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 2614(a)(3).

In granting judgment on the eve of trial, the district court in this case looked no

further than its determination that the coaching supplement was part of plaintiff’s “pay”

and that plaintiff was not restored to the full 12% coaching stipend when he returned to

work.

The payroll records reflect a reduction in plaintiff’s basketball coaching

supplement to 6% when he was reinstated in January 2004. To find an FMLA violation

from this alone, however, elevates form over substance and ignores the defense proffered

by the Metropolitan Government that the coaching supplement was not an employment

benefit protected under the FMLA, was not included in the paid leave provided by

defendant, and was properly adjusted such that plaintiff received the compensation

required by the coaching contract consistent with Tennessee law and the FMLA.

The district court understood defendant to rely on the unpublished decision in

Groce for the proposition that coaching supplements are not “pay” for purposes of the

FMLA. See Groce v. Metro. Gov’t, No. 3:01-1436 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 2002). The

Groce case involved another coach also employed by the Metropolitan Government who

claimed that the loss of his coaching supplement during his leave violated the FMLA’s

proscription that the taking of leave not result in the loss of any “employment benefit

accrued prior to the date on which the leave commenced.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(2).

Concluding that coaching supplements did not fit the FMLA’s definition of

“employment benefits,” the court held that removal of the supplement from the

plaintiff’s sick leave pay did not violate the FMLA. The significance of the Groce

decision to defendant’s position in this case is its holding that removal of the coaching

supplement from plaintiff’s pay while on leave would not violate the FMLA.

Although defendant argues that the coaching supplement was not part of

plaintiff’s “pay,” it clearly was part of his compensation. More precisely, however,

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plaintiff does not dispute that the coaching supplement was not part of plaintiff’s teacher

salary or the pay he was entitled to receive while on leave. Tennessee law recognizes

that a teacher, who also is employed as an athletic coach, “has two sets of rights, e.g.,

(1) his position as a teacher is protected by tenure, assuming that he has acquired tenure

status, and, (2) his position as a coach is protected by whatever contract he has with the

board to perform coaching duties, but not by tenure.” White v. Banks, 614 S.W.2d 331,

334 (Tenn. 1981). Further, relieving a teacher only of his coaching duties is not a

dismissal or a suspension but, rather, is the equivalent of a transfer within the system.

Id.; see also Warren v. Polk County Bd. of Educ., 613 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Tenn. 1981).

In addressing the arbitration of a grievance seeking reinstatement as a coach, the

Tennessee Supreme Court has held that coaching supplements are governed by year-toyear contracts and are not entitled to the benefits of the collective bargaining process in

Tennessee. Lawrence County Educ. Ass’n v. Lawrence County Bd. of Educ., 244 S.W.3d

302, 318 (Tenn. 2007).

In this case, plaintiff was under a coaching contract for the 2003-2004 school

year, which by its terms provided that the coach would have to complete the season to

receive the full supplement and would be required to pay back any supplement not

earned. Plaintiff received paid leave as a teacher, not a coach, and was not entitled to

receive the full supplement for basketball because he missed half of the season. In fact,

plaintiff does not claim that defendant was required to pay the basketball coaching

supplement while he was on leave or for the portion of the season that he missed.

Rather, plaintiff argues that, having paid the biweekly prorated supplement during

plaintiff’s leave, defendant could not reduce the amount of the supplement paid to

plaintiff upon reinstatement without violating the FMLA. That is, plaintiff argues, the

reduction in the supplement to 6% and deductions for overpayments received in the fall,

constituted a failure to restore plaintiff to the same or equivalent pay he had when he

went on FMLA leave as a matter of law.

The district court agreed with plaintiff, emphasizing that an employer’s intent is

not relevant to an FMLA claim under the interference theory. Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc.,

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443 F.3d 501, 507 (6th Cir. 2006). However, this court has also recognized that “the

FMLA is not a strict-liability statute.” Id. (citing Throneberry v. McGehee Desha

County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2005)). “[I]nterference with an employee’s

FMLA rights does not constitute a violation if the employer has a legitimate reason

unrelated to the exercise of FMLA rights for engaging in the challenged conduct.” Id.

at 508; see also Allen v. Butler County Comm’rs, 331 F. App’x 389, 393 (6th Cir. 2009)

(holding that employee on FMLA leave could be terminated for violating more stringent

requirements of employer’s sick leave policy).

The evidence showed that, under defendant’s policies, plaintiff was not entitled

to the coaching supplement for the period when he did not coach. How that was to be

achieved, however, is less than clear. Tribue testified that he intended for plaintiff to be

reinstated to the 12% supplement. Brunette testified that he approved the request to

reinstate plaintiff as head coach, but calculated that plaintiff had missed half of the

season so could only receive the 12% supplement for the second half of the season.

Payroll records indicate that Brunette’s notation of “1⁄2 of 12%” was interpreted to mean

6% for the full year (with deductions to offset the overpayment at the 12% rate during

plaintiff’s leave).

Had payroll calculated the amount differently upon plaintiff’s reinstatement (i.e.,

paying 12% supplement per pay period with deduction of 12% per pay period for the

amounts advanced during plaintiff’s leave), there would arguably have been no reduction

at all in the plaintiff’s rate of pay. In fact, if the coaching supplement had been paid as

a lump sum after the completion of the season, payment of “1⁄2 of 12%” would not even

arguably violate the letter of the FMLA’s restoration provision because plaintiff would

have received the additional pay after his reinstatement. Defendant’s failure to suspend

the biweekly payment of the coaching supplement during plaintiff’s leave should not

make the correction of the error after plaintiff’s return from leave a violation of the

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5

Nor would it violate the collective bargaining agreement’s incorporation of FMLA rights.

FMLA.5 The district court erred by failing to consider the defendant’s legitimate reason

for adjusting plaintiff’s coaching supplement unrelated to the exercise of FMLA rights.

Moreover, even if plaintiff could prove an FMLA violation under § 2615(a)(1),

the FMLA provides no relief unless the plaintiff has been prejudiced by the violation.

Cavin v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713, 726 (6th Cir. 2003); see also 29 U.S.C.

§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) (employer liable for compensation and benefits lost “by reason of

the violation”). A plaintiff seeking relief under the interference or entitlement theory

must show that the violation caused him harm. Edgar, 443 F.3d at 508 (citing Ragsdale

v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002)). In this case, defendant has

repeatedly argued that, when all was said and done, plaintiff received more than half of

the full 12% head basketball coaching supplement for the 2003-2004 season.

Irrespective of how the payments were divided, it is undisputed that plaintiff was not

prejudiced by the reduction in the coaching supplement after he returned from leave. We

find that plaintiff cannot prevail on his FMLA claim as a matter of law and, therefore,

defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor on this claim.

B. Plaintiff’s Cross-Appeal

Plaintiff limits his cross-appeal to the district court’s entry of summary judgment

in favor of all of the defendants with respect to his claims that he was not reassigned to

be the head basketball coach either (1) because of his age in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), and the Tennessee

Human Rights Act (THRA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-401(a); or (2) in retaliation for

engaging in protected activity in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In the absence of direct

evidence of either age discrimination or retaliation, plaintiff relied on the burden-shifting

framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05

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Although the Supreme Court has not definitively decided whether the McDonnell Douglas

framework applies to disparate treatment claims under the ADEA based on circumstantial evidence, we

are without authority to overrule this court’s published decisions absent an inconsistent decision of the

Supreme Court or an en banc decision to the contrary. Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 622 (6th Cir.

2009).

7

The same analysis applies to such claims under the ADEA and the THRA. Bender v. Hecht’s

Dep’t Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 627 (6th Cir. 2006).

(1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-59

(1981).6

In this case, the district court found that plaintiff could make the prima facie

showing for age discrimination and retaliation, but found that the evidence was not

sufficient to lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the proffered reasons were a pretext

either for unlawful discrimination or for retaliation. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000). A genuine issue of fact exists only when there

is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

1. Age Discrimination

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, plaintiff

must show that (1) he was at least 40 years old at the time of the alleged discrimination,

(2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) he was otherwise qualified

for the position, and (4) he was rejected and someone outside the protected class was

selected. Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 F.3d 611, 621-22 (6th Cir. 2001). Once the plaintiff

makes this showing, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a

nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. at 622. When the defendant does so, the

burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered

reason was mere pretext for intentional age discrimination. Id.; see also Allen v.

Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 394 (6th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff retains the

ultimate burden of proving that “age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse

action.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009); Ky. Ret. Sys. v.

EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2366 (2008).7

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Plaintiff states in a footnote that he asserted a claim of retaliation under the THRA that was not

separately addressed in defendants’ motions or the district court’s order granting summary judgment.

Because retaliation claims under the THRA and § 1981 are governed by the same legal framework, the

district court’s analysis and our conclusions apply to both. Wade, 259 F.3d at 464.

2. Retaliation

To make a prima facie showing of retaliation, plaintiff must show that (1) he

engaged in protected activity, (2) the activity was known to the defendant, (3) plaintiff

was subjected to materially adverse action, and (4) there was a causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse action. Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259

F.3d 452, 463 (6th Cir. 2001). Once this showing is made, which defendants do not

contest on appeal, the defendant must articulate a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for its

action before the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was not

its true reason but merely a pretext for retaliation. Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 552

F.3d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2009). The burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff

throughout. Id.

8

3. Pretext

Defendants proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons

for not reappointing plaintiff to coach basketball for the 2004-2005 season. A plaintiff

may demonstrate that an employer’s explanation is not credible by demonstrating that

the proffered reasons (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the

employer’s action, or (3) were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action. Manzer

v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994). A defendant’s

proffered reason cannot be proved to be a pretext “unless it is shown both that the reason

was false, and that discrimination [or retaliation] was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).

Tribue’s letter notifying plaintiff of the decision in October 2004, identified

several reasons based on plaintiff’s performance during the previous season: (1) being

reported “by several parents and students for discussing other student’s team behavior

and family/home life”; (2) having instructed Simms to cut a player who “ultimately

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placed third in overall performance for the 2003-2004 season”; and (3) failing to “read

your opponents’ strategy and adjust accordingly during a game situation has led to

several losses.” In addition, Tribue relied on the performance evaluation from May 2003

indicating that improvement was needed in the areas of organization, communication

with coaches, public relations, game preparation, effectiveness in working with others,

discipline (fairness and consistency), communication with players, and conduct of the

team.

Plaintiff argues that the “reports” from parents were vague and not worthy of

consideration because disgruntled parents often complain about coaches. Plaintiff

cannot complain of a lack of specificity because plaintiff’s counsel prefaced his

questions about these reports with the statement that he did not need to know the names

of the parents or students involved and then did not ask for more specificity about those

complaints. Nor has plaintiff argued that they are without basis in fact. Plaintiff also

argues that the reports did not involve more egregious conduct than other complaints that

Simms had allowed players to play with their underwear showing. It is not difficult to

understand, however, that privacy concerns make it particularly inappropriate for a

coach to talk about the behavior and home of some students with the parents of other

students.

Next, plaintiff denies that he specifically directed Simms to cut the player in

question, explaining that he merely told Simms that any player who cannot follow the

rules of the team should be cut. While Tribue was not present for their discussion,

Tribue testified that Simms sought his advice during tryouts in November 2003 because

he was under the impression that plaintiff wanted him to cut the player in question from

the team. Tribue also explained that he believed plaintiff had asked Simms to do so

because of a perceived conflict with the student’s parents. Even if Tribue’s

understanding was later shown to be “‘mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless,’” that

would not establish pretext since the evidence indicates that Tribue reasonably and

honestly believed that to be the situation. Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 401

(6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

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Plaintiff also questions whether problems with plaintiff’s performance motivated

the decision. Plaintiff offers no reason to disbelieve Tribue’s explanation that plaintiff

had demonstrated an inability to read the opponent’s strategy and adjust during the

game, which resulted in several of the team’s losses during the second half of the 2003-

2004 season. Plaintiff argues that it must not have motivated the decision because the

concerns about plaintiff’s performance identified in the May 2003 evaluation did not

prevent Tribue from assigning plaintiff to coach for the 2003-2004 season. The evidence

shows not only that the areas identified in that evaluation continued to be a problem, but

Tribue relied on specific problems with plaintiff’s performance during the 2003-2004

season. Tribue concluded that plaintiff was no longer the best person to coach the team,

and plaintiff does not come forward with evidence to show that Tribue’s reasons were

pretextual.

During his deposition, Tribue testified that he also considered plaintiff’s public

display of disrespect during a track meet in the spring of 2004. Emphasizing that this

was not specifically mentioned in Tribue’s letter, plaintiff accuses Tribue of offering

“shifting justifications” for his decision. Although not specifically referenced in

Tribue’s letter, the reasons given included plaintiff’s problems with communication and

effectiveness in working with others. We are not persuaded that this represents the sort

of “shifting justifications” that might suggest pretext. See Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto.,

Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 592 (6th Cir. 2002) (where employer provided one reason in

interrogatories, another in a deposition, and yet another in connection with summary

judgment). Moreover, Tribue’s reference to what he saw as a public snubbing by a

subordinate hardly supports plaintiff’s claim that the failure to reappointment him was

the result of age discrimination or retaliation.

Finally, plaintiff testified that he was told by a guidance counselor at McGavock

that she heard from Tribue that plaintiff would not be allowed to coach the next year

whether or not he retired. When pressed, however, plaintiff conceded that the only thing

the counselor actually said was that there was a rumor that plaintiff would not be the

basketball coach the following year. Plaintiff conceded that he had no evidence that

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and Davidson County, Tenn.

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Tribue was the source of the rumor. Plaintiff also claimed that he was told by another

coach that Tribue had said plaintiff would be retiring at the end of 2003-2004. The

coach in question, however, attested that he did not recall any conversation to that effect

with Tribue. When plaintiff was asked why he thought the decision was based on age

discrimination or retaliation, plaintiff responded that he could not think of any other

reason.

Viewing the evidence and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to come forward with

evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that the proffered reasons for not

reassigning him as head basketball coach for the 2004-2005 season were pretext for

unlawful age discrimination or retaliation.

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and

REMAND for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants.

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