Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01380/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01380-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHANEL EPPS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 09-1380-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. Nos. 16, 22)

Plaintiff Chanel Epps (hereafter “Plaintiff”), filed a

Complaint For Judicial Review And Remedy On Administrative Decision

Under The Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. §405(g)]. Defendant

Michael J. Astrue (hereafter “Defendant”), filed an Answer to the

Complaint and the administrative record (hereafter “Tr.”), pertaining to this case. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendant has filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and the

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 1 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 2

administrative record filed by Defendant, hereby finds that

Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief requested and therefore

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED

and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. 

 I

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 15, 2006, Plaintiff filed applications for Supplemental Security Income benefits and Disability Insurance Benefits,

alleging that she was disabled since December 15, 2005. (Tr. 50-51,

122, 124-128, 129-132). The Commissioner of Social Security denied

her application initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 70-74, 77-

82). On February 18, 2009, a hearing was held at which Plaintiff

appeared with counsel and testified before an Administrative Law

Judge (hereafter “ALJ”) (Tr. 22-54). On March 17, 2009, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 9-21). The ALJ’s

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

review. (Tr. 1-3). 

 II

 SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW

Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “Act”), as

amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons

who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical

or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1)(D). Title XVI of the

Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent

persons under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. § 1382

(a). Both titles of the Act define “disability” as the “inability

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 2 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 3

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months...” Id. The Act further provides that an individual:

shall be determined to be under a disability only if

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are

of such severity that he is not only unable to do his

previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or

whether he would be hired if he applied for work. Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.” If he is, disability benefits are denied. 20

C.F. R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the decision

maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant

has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.

That determination is governed by the “severity regulation” at issue

in this case. The severity regulation provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of

impairments which significantly limits your physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will

find that you do not have a severe impairment and are,

therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your

age, education, and work experience. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c). 

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the

abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1521(b), 416.921(b). Such abilities and aptitudes include

“[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;” “[c]apacities

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 3 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 4

for seeing, hearing, and speaking;” “[u]nderstanding, carrying out,

and remembering simple instructions;” [u]se of judgment;”

“[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual

work situations;” and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work

setting.” Id. 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. 

If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the

third step, which determines whether the impairment is equivalent to

one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or equals

one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed

to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is conclusively

presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth

step, which determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant

from performing work he has performed in the past. If the claimant

is able to perform his previous work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant cannot perform his

previous work, the fifth and final step of the process determines

whether he is able to perform other work in the national economy in

view of his age, education, and work experience. The claimant is

entitled to disability benefits only if he is not able to perform

other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). 

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 4 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 5

 III

 ALJ’S FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following pertinent findings:

1. (Plaintiff) met the insured status requirements of

the Social Security Act through June 30, 2007.

2. (Plaintiff) has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since December 15, 2005, the alleged onset

date.

3. (Plaintiff) has the following severe combination of

impairments: post-traumatic stress disorder, depressive disorder, personality disorder, attention-deficit

hyperactivity disorder, learning disorder by history,

obesity associated with low back pain, bilateral

chondromalacia patella, status-post arthroscopic

chondroplasty to both knees with improvement postoperatively. She also has a history of marijuana and

alcohol abuse in remission.

The impairments considered in combination, have more

than a minimal effect on (Plaintiff’s) ability to

perform basic work activities.

Based upon his thorough review of the record, Dr.

Weilepp (a board-certified orthopedist) testified

regarding the medically determinable impairments

established in the record. Dr. Weilepp considered

(Plaintiff’s) history of right-sided knee symptoms in

July 2004, which were precipitated by dancing and

preceded the December 15, 2005 non-traumatic onset

date. He then stated she had two procedures to her

knees, one on June 15, 2006 for the left knee, and

another on November 11, 2008 for the right knee. He

specifically noted that there were no meniscus

injuries or ligament injuries. Rather, the surgeries

were for soft-tissue, synovial-type problems with

possible cystic-type problems. He explained that the

problems were not inconsistent with patellar problems

and chronic instability issues but that the problems

were not well defined by the objective evidence in the

record. He acknowledged she had used a cane and a

walker for a period of time post-operatively, but he

stressed that she had recovered normally from the

procedures without any complications, such as infections, or re-injuries. Dr. Weilepp also referred to

magnetic resonance imaging of both knees that showed

significant patellar changes, and he commented that

such changes were not unusual for people who are obese

and not particularly athletic. He also emphasized

that weight is a major issue with management of knee

problems, noting that (Plaintiff’s) body mass index of

46.26 is abnormal and severe. He further noted that

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 5 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 6

chondromalacia of both knees is not uncommon, but he

could find no specific mention of surgical correction

for tracking in her knees. In sum, Dr. Weilepp

concluded that (Plaintiff’s) knee problems had

maximally improved with the procedures, save an

improvement in her weight, and he recommended avoidance of aggravating activities such as crawling,

walking on irregular terrain, or activities involving

heights or ladders.

According to Dr. Weilepp, the reported back problem

appeared to be related to a mechanical problem, as it

was not complemented by any x-rays, had been treated

conservatively, and was a known common problem in

individuals with obesity.

As for the severity of (Plaintiff’s) impairments, Dr.

Weilepp opined that (Plaintiff’s) conditions do not

meet or equal the severity of a listing. He stressed

that (Plaintiff’s) knee problems had improved with

surgical care without complications and there had been

a return to activity. In Dr. Weilepp’s opinion,

(Plaintiff) is capable of lifting twenty pounds

frequently and forty pounds occasionally and has no

impairment cumulatively in her capacity for standing,

walking or sitting. However, he concluded (Plaintiff)

should not work at heights, on ladders, or around

dangerous equipment, and he recommended she avoid

walking on irregular terrain or going up and over low

blocks or curbs. He further opined she should not

engage in frequent kneeling, crawling or squatting.

Nor can she engage in heavy industrial driving.

The undersigned finds Dr. Weilepp’s testimony persuasive and supported by evidence of record when considered as a whole.

In particular, orthopedist Dr. David Flood’s treatment

records do establish that he diagnosed and treated

(Plaintiff) for bilateral knee problems.

Likewise, the handwritten progress noted of her

primary care physician Dr. Bryan Abramowitz, reflect

that he rendered conservative treatment and followed

her for diagnoses of back pain presumed secondary to

obesity, knee pain related to chondromalacia, headaches, and grief reaction/depression/insomnia. It is

significant to note the migraines were responsive to

medication. He also advised to lose weight to address

the knee pain.

Despite her severe knee problems, it is significant to

note that on physical examination in December 2006,

when she began treating for emotional problems, she

had normal muscle strength and normal gait and

station. Likewise, in April 2007, when she was being

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 6 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 7

evaluated for her emotional problems, her gait and

posture were observed as normal.

In addition to the treatment records, the record

contains two consultive examination reports prepared

at the request of the State Agency. In August 2006,

Sandra Eriks, M.D., a board-certified internist,

examined (Plaintiff), but her findings were essentially normal. Despite (Plaintiff’s) history of knee

and back pain, Dr. Eriks concluded (Plaintiff) had no

physical limitations.

Similarly, after performing a second consultative

examination in April 2007, Dr. Eriks again concluded

(Plaintiff) has no physical limitations.

In addition, the non-examining medical consultants for

the State Agency, S.C. Swan, M.D., a general practitioner, and Diane Rose, M.D., an internist, agreed

with Dr. Eriks that (Plaintiff) had no severe physical

limitations.

It is significant to note that there is no treating

physician opinion to the contrary.

From a mental standpoint, (Plaintiff) has a history of

attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder diagnosed in

November 2003 by Amy Ellis, Psy. D. However, it is

significant to note (Plaintiff) graduated high school

with a “C” average despite her attention problems and

was only diagnosed after she referred herself for

evaluation.

The records reflect that her primary care physician

began prescribing psychiatric medications in mid-2006

for treatment of grief reaction/depression/insomnia,

but did not receive care from a mental health care

professional at that time.

(Plaintiff’s) depression worsened in December 2006,

apparently exacerbated by the death of her best friend

in December 2006 due to gunshot wound, which followed

shortly after the death of her sister in June 2006 due

to illness. (Ex. 19F/4) She was seen in the emergency

room on December 10, 2006 for a mixed-drug overdose,

primary drug Benadryl, depression with suicidal

ideation, and acute situational disturbance. However,

she denied previous psychiatric history or treatment

except for Effexor, Ativan and Ambien prescribed by

her primary care physician. She was diagnosed with

major depressive disorder, single episode, and anxiety

disorder NOS. She was transferred to Mercy Behavioral

Health in stable condition with plans for a 72-hour

hold. However, after evaluation by the staff at

Mercy, the hold was discontinued. On mental status

examination on December 11, 2006, (Plaintiff) was in

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 7 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 8

no acute distress. Her mood was moderately depressed,

and her affect was blunted. Speech was spontaneous

and coherent, thoughts were organized, and associations were tight. (Plaintiff’s) attention, concentration and memory were intact. (Plaintiff) was discharged home in stable condition with an increased

dose of Effexor to 300 milligrams.

Mental Health records from South Bay Guidance Center

reflect (Plaintiff) initially presented for treatment

in mid 2007 and had a positive response to prescribed

treatment, including psychiatric medications and

counseling. On psychiatric evaluation in July 2007,

mental status examination was remarkable only for

anxious mood. (Plaintiff) had normal orientation,

clear and goal directed speech, normal primary mental

abilities, good attention, linear thought process and

good insight. (Ex. 19F/2). (Plaintiff) admitted to a

history of marijuana abuse and alcohol abuse. (Ex.

19F/2). She was diagnosed with a major depressive

disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, personality

disorder, and alcohol and marijuana dependence in

full, sustained remission. (Ex. 19F).

Although (Plaintiff) had occasional positive findings

on mental status examination, her reported symptoms

were usually related to noncompliance with prescribed

treatment. For example, on follow-up in October 2007,

(Plaintiff’s) mood was only so-so and her affect was

constricted, but she had been only partially compliant

with prescribed medication. (Ex. 19F/25). Similarly,

on follow-up (i)n May 2008, her mood was awful and her

affect restricted, but she had stopped taking her

prescribed antidepressant Effexor. (Ex. 19F/18). By

contrast, when she was compliant with prescribed

medication, she had essentially normal mental status

examinations on follow-up in August 2007, January

2008, March 2008, April 2008, June 2008, and August

2008. (Exs. 19F/16, 17, 20, 21, 24). She failed to

show for her regularly scheduled monthly appointments

from September 2008 (through) November 2008. (Exs.

19F/11, 12, 13, 15, 16), but her symptoms appear to

have remained under control, as there is no evidence

to the contrary.

The record also contains two reports from two examining psychological consultants for the State Agency.

On psychological evaluation in August 2006 with C.

Valette, Ph.D., (Plaintiff) had no history of psychiatric hospitalization. Her medications included

Effexor and Ambien and her mental status examination

was essentially within normal limits. Dr. Valette

opined that the psychiatric medications appeared to

be working well. Based on the results of test

scores, interaction with (Plaintiff), and background

information, Dr. Valette diagnosed a history of

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 8 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 9

learning disorder with estimated intellectual functioning in the average range. However, Dr. Valette

found no signs or symptoms of depression. Nor did

(Plaintiff) relay any symptoms upon which Dr. Valette

could diagnose post-traumatic stress disorder.

Overall, Dr. Valette found (Plaintiff) under no

mental restrictions.

At a second consultive examination in April 2007,

Mounir Soliman, M.D., a psychiatrist, diagnosed major

depression, mild to moderate, and an attentiondeficit hyperactivity disorder. Mental status

examination findings were significant for depressed

mood, congruent affect, and decreased energy, but

(Plaintiff) denied suicidal or homicidal ideation.

Intellectual functioning and sensorium were grossly

intact with no demonstrated deficits in concentration

or memory demonstrated on formal testing. Overall,

Dr. Soliman concluded (Plaintiff) could understand,

remember, and carry out simple and complex instruction, interact with coworkers, supervisors, and the

public, and withstand the stress and pressures

associated with day-to-day work activities.

In addition, the non-examining medical consultants

for the State Agency, E. P. O’Malley, Ph.D., and K.

Loomis, M.D., concluded (Plaintiff) had no severe

mental impairment.

4. (Plaintiff) does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals

one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1.

(Plaintiff) had the following degree of limitation in

the broad areas of functioning set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders

and in the mental disorders listings in 20 CFR Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1: no restriction in activities of daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning, moderate difficulties in

maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and

no episodes of decompensation.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record,

the undersigned finds that (Plaintiff) has the

residual functional capacity to perform light work,

as (that) term is defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and

416.967(b), except that (Plaintiff) may not work on

uneven terrain, at unprotected heights, or near

dangerous moving machinery; may not drive industrial

machinery; has occasional postural limitations; is

precluded from frequent squatting or crawling; and is

limited to unskilled, low stress work involving

limited public contact.

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 9 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 10

(Plaintiff) alleged a disability commencing December

15, 2005, due to post-traumatic stress disorder,

depression, problems with both knees, and a back

problem. She alleged that she stopped working

because it involved too much standing. She later

added that she was disabled due to depression, back

pain, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, and

migraines.

After careful consideration of the evidence, the

undersigned finds that (Plaintiff’s) medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected

to cause the alleged symptoms; however, (Plaintiff’s)

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible

to the extent they are inconsistent with the above

residual functional capacity assessment.

While the undersigned is sympathetic with the difficulties that (Plaintiff) is experiencing, they do not

support a conclusion of “disability” under the Act.

The undersigned has considered (Plaintiff’s) allegations of pain, excess pain, and limitations pursuant

to the law of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,

Social Security Ruling 96-7p and the pertinent

regulations. However, (Plaintiff’s) allegations of

disability are not credible to the extent alleged.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned

rejects (Plaintiff’s) allegations of disability to

the extent alleged. First, no objective findings

support (Plaintiff’s) allegations of limitations to

the extent alleged. There is no radiographic evidence

of lumbar spine impairment, despite complaints of low

back pain. Second, (Plaintiff) does not require any

assistive devices when walking, despite her claims of

disabling back and knee pain. Third, though (Plaintiff) alleged memory and concentration difficulties,

she demonstrated no memory or concentration deficits

upon repeated mental status examinations. (Exs...

19F). Fourth, even though (Plaintiff) alleges disabling back and knee pain, she does not exhibit any

atrophy. In fact, she reported to Dr. Eriks that

medication relieved her pain. Fifth, with the exception of left knee arthroscopic surgery in June 2006

and right knee arthroscopic surgery in November 2008

with apparent satisfactory recoveries, (Plaintiff’s)

course of treatment has reflected a conservative

approach. Sixth, the record does not indicate that

(Plaintiff) suffers from debilitating side effects of

her medications. Though she occasionally complained

of side effects from her psychiatric medications,

adjustments were made to her medication regimen to

address those complaints. (Ex. 19F). Seventh, although (Plaintiff) alleges disabling psychiatric

symptoms, her symptoms appear to be adequately

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 10 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 11

controlled with prescribed treatment. (Ex. 19F).

Eighth, the severely restricted activities (Plaintiff) testified to at the hearing appear to be selflimited and not commensurate with the severity of her

medically determinable impairments. She indicated

she could prepare simple meals and do laundry. She

testified that she had been taking a full course load

at a community college but had dropped out of several

classes and was taking only two courses on Tuesdays

and Thursdays. She was also receiving counseling at

South Bay Guidance Center. By contrast, in August

2006, (Plaintiff) described relatively full activities of daily living, including being a full-time

student, living in her parents’ home, and doing much

of the cooking, cleaning and shopping. Likewise, in

April 2007, she related that she was able to cook,

clean, shop, run errands, take care of personal

hygiene, and care for financial responsibilities. She

also reported getting along well with family, friends

and neighbors. She stated that she got around by

walking or taking the bus and did not require as

assistive device for ambulation. Ninth, Dr. Weilepp,

a board-certified orthopedist, imposed physical

limitations consistent with the performance of

sustained light work activity, and no treating source

has imposed specific functional limitations inconsistent (with) these limitations. Tenth, despite her

history of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder,

she graduated high school with a “C” average. Eleventh, despite a history of asthma, there were no

abnormalities on x-ray and no hospitalizations for

exacerbations of the disease. Twelfth, her headaches

are adequately controlled with prescribed medication.

Consequently, (Plaintiff’s) allegations are not

considered credible to the extent alleged.

As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned has

afforded the greatest weight to the opinion of Dr.

George Weilepp, as he is an orthopedic specialist,

and his functional assessment is uncontroverted by

any medical source. Dr. Weilepp has considered

(Plaintiff’s) severe orthopedic problems as well as

her severe obesity in arriving at his functional

assessment. (Plaintiff’s) obesity, though severe,

allows for the performance of sustained work activity

within the above-adopted residual functional capacity. It is significant to note that the remaining

assessments from the examining and non-examining

medical consultants are even less restrictive and

allow for the performance of sustained light work

activity.

From a mental perspective, the assessments of the

examining and non-examining medical consultants allow

for the performance of at least unskilled work.

Having considered (Plaintiff’s) diagnosed personality

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 11 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 12

disorder, the undersigned added a limitation to nonpublic work, despite her admission that she gets

along well with family, friends, and neighbors.

Similarly, (Plaintiff’s) history of attention-deficit

hyperactivity disorder has been accounted for in the

limitation to unskilled work, despite (Plaintiff’s)

admission that she graduated high school and is now

attending community college. It is also important to

note that no treating source has imposed any specific

mental functioning limitation to the contrary.

6. (Plaintiff) is unable to perform any past relevant

work.

The vocational expert classified past relevant work

as follows: a bagger, an unskilled medium occupation;

a children’s attendant, an unskilled, light occupation; a fast foods worker, an unskilled light occupation; a sales attendant, an unskilled, light occupation and a cashier II, an unskilled, light occupation. When asked to consider a hypothetical individual with the above-adopted residual functional

capacity, the vocational expert opined that such an

individual would be unable to perform (Plaintiff’s)

past relevant work, all of which require public

contact. Accordingly, having considered the demands

of (Plaintiff’s) past relevant work in light of the

above-adopted residual functional capacity, the

undersigned adopts the vocational expert’s persuasive

analysis and so finds.

7. (Plaintiff) was born on December 25, 1983 and was

21 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date.

8. (Plaintiff) has at least a high school education

and is able to communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to

the determination of disability because using the

Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a

finding that (Plaintiff) is “not disabled,” whether

or not (she) has transferable job skills.

10. Considering (Plaintiff’s) age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there

are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy that (Plaintiff) can perform.

If (Plaintiff) has the residual functioning capacity

to perform the full range of light work, a finding of

“not disabled” would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.21. However, (Plaintiff’s) ability

to perform all or substantially all of the requirements of this level of work has been impeded by

additional limitations. To determine the extent to

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 12 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 13

which these limitations erode the unskilled light

occupational base, the ALJ asked the vocational

expert whether jobs exist in the national economy for

an individual with (Plaintiff’s) age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity. The

vocational expert testified that given all of these

factors the individual would be able to perform the

requirements of representative occupations such as

the following light, unskilled occupations: a small

products assembler (DOT 706.684-022); a garment

bagger (DOT 920.687-018); and a laundry folder (DOT

369.687-018).

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the vocational expert’s

testimony is consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

11. (Plaintiff) has not been under a disability, as

defined in the Social Security Act, from December 15,

2005 through the date of this decision.

(Tr. 12-21) (emphasis in original)(citations to

exhibits omitted except where noted).

 

 IV

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may only disturb the Commissioner's final

decision "if it is based on legal error or if the fact findings are

not supported by substantial evidence." Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d

1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987); see Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 796

(9th Cir. 1986). The court cannot affirm the Commissioner's final

decision simply by isolating a certain amount of supporting evidence.

Rather, the court must examine the administrative record as a whole.

Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990). Yet, the

Commissioner's findings are not subject to reversal because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion.

See, e.g., Mullen v. Brown, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986).

"Substantial evidence, considering the entire record, is relevant

evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion." Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679 (9th

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 13 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1/ Plaintiff and Defendant refer to “Dr. Sciolia.” However, the record

reflects that the correct spelling of the doctor’s last name is

“Sciolla.”

09cv1380 14

Cir. 1993); see Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir.

1982). The Commissioner's decision must be set aside, even if

supported by substantial evidence, if improper legal standards were

applied in reaching that decision. See, e.g., Benitez v. Califano,

573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978).

 V

 THE ALJ DID NOT IGNORE THE OPINION OF DR. SCIOLLA1/

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in ignoring Plaintiff’s

treating psychiatrist, Dr. Sciolla’s opinion. Defendant contends that

the ALJ did not ignore Dr. Sciolla’s opinion.

The Court’s review of the administrative record indicates

that Plaintiff has misconstrued the record. While the ALJ did not

mention Dr. Sciolla by name, the ALJ referenced and thoroughly

discussed Dr. Sciolla’s records. Dr. Sciolla’s records are identified

in the record as Exhibit 19F. (Tr. 467-494). The ALJ’s decision

noted that Dr. Sciolla’s records provided the following information:

1. Plaintiff graduated high school with a “C” average,

despite her attention problems. (Tr. 15).

2. Plaintiff’s depression worsened in December 2006,

apparently exacerbated by the death of her best friend in December

2006 due to a gun shot wound, which followed shortly after the death

of her sister in June 2006 due to illness.

3. Plaintiff presented for treatment in mid 2007 and had a

positive response to prescribed treatment, including psychiatric

medications and counseling. In July 2007, Plaintiff had an anxious

mood, but normal orientation, clear and directed speech, normal

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 14 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 15

mental abilities, good attention, linear thought process and good

insight. (Tr. 15).

4. Plaintiff admitted to a history of marijuana and alcohol

abuse. (Tr. 15).

5. Plaintiff was diagnosed with major depressive disorder,

post-traumatic stress disorder, personality disorder, and alcohol and

marijuana dependence in full, sustained remission. (Tr. 15).

6. Plaintiff’s reported mental status symptoms were usually

related to non-compliance with prescribed treatment. For example,

in October 2007, her mood was only so-so and her affect was constricted, but she had been only partially compliant with her

prescribed medication. In May 2008, Plaintiff’s mood was awful and

her affect was restricted, but she stopped taking her prescribed

anti-depressant Effexor. By contrast, when Plaintiff was compliant

with her prescribed medication, she had normal mental status

examinations in August 2007, January, March, April, June, and August

2008. (Tr. 15-16).

7. Plaintiff’s psychological symptoms appear to be adequately

controlled with prescribed treatment. (Tr. 19).

8. During Dr. Sciolla’s examinations, Plaintiff did not

display memory loss or concentration deficits. (Tr. 18).

Further, Dr. Sciolla did not offer an opinion that was

inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding of non-disability. (Tr. 17, 467-

494). In fact, the ALJ noted that neither Dr. Sciolla, nor any

treating physician, imposed any specific mental functioning limitations that were contrary to his finding of Plaintiff’s residual

functioning capacity. (Tr. 19).

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 15 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 16

It is clear from review of the administrative record that the

ALJ did not ignore Dr. Sciolla’s records or opinion. In fact, the

contrary is true. As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard be DENIED and that

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard be GRANTED.

 V

 THE ALJ ERRED IN RELYING ON THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT’S TESTIMONY

 BUT THE ERRORS WERE HARMLESS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to pose a hypothetical

question to the vocational expert that contained all of Plaintiff’s

limitations. Defendant contends that the hypothetical question posed

by the ALJ was proper. 

If a claimant shows that she can not return to her previous

job, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that the

claimant can do other kinds of work. If there is no reliable evidence

of a claimant’s ability to perform specific jobs, Defendant and/or

the ALJ must use a vocational expert to provide the evidence.

Hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert must set out

all the limitations and restrictions of the claimant. Embrey v.

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ’s depiction of the

claimant’s disability must be accurate, detailed and supported by the

medical record. The vocational expert then responds to hypothetical

factual scenarios and opines, by testifying on the record, to what

jobs the claimant can still perform and whether there is a sufficient

number of those jobs available in the claimant’s region or in other

regions of the economy to support a finding of “not disabled.”

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999).

Harmless error applies in the Social Security context. If

the ALJ commits an error that is inconsequential to the ultimate

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 16 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 17

determination of non-disability, the error is harmless. The error

is harmless if the court can confidently conclude that no reasonable

ALJ could have reached a different disability determination. Stout

v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-1056 (9th Cir. 2006).

1. Vocational Expert Testimony

The ALJ and Plaintiff’s attorney asked the vocational expert

hypothetical questions regarding what jobs a person with Plaintiff’s

limitations could perform. (Tr. 61-65). 

Social Security Ruling 00-4p (hereafter “SSR 00-4p”) states

in pertinent part that “(w)hen a (vocational expert)... provides

evidence about the requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible

conflict between that (vocational expert)... evidence and information

provided in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (hereafter

‘DOT’).”(emphasis added)

SSR 00-4p further provides that the adjudicator “will ask”

the vocational expert “if the evidence he or she has provided is

consistent with the (DOT) and obtain a reasonable explanation for any

apparent conflict.” SSR 00-4p at *4 (emphasis added); Massachi v.

Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2007).

An ALJ may rely on expert testimony which contradicts the

DOT, but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to

support the deviation. Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435.

The procedural requirements of SSR 00-4p ensure that

the record is clear as to why an ALJ relied on a

vocational expert’s testimony, particularly in cases

where the expert’s testimony conflicts with the

(DOT)... (T)he Social Security Administration relies

primarily on the (DOT) for ‘information about the

requirements of work in the national economy.’ The

Social Security Administration also uses testimony

from vocational experts to obtain occupational

evidence. Although evidence provided by a vocational

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 17 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2/ The transcript contains the word “loss.” However, a fair reading of

the transcript would indicate that the word should be “low.”

3/ The Court notes that the hypothetical question did not include

Plaintiff’s ability to lift twenty pounds frequently, forty pounds

occasionally and the limitation that she should not engage in

frequent kneeling.

09cv1380 18

expert ‘generally should be consistent’ with the

(DOT), neither the (DOT) nor the (vocational expert)... evidence automatically ‘trumps when there is

a conflict.’ Thus, the ALJ must first determine

whether a conflict exists. If it does, the ALJ must

then determine whether the vocational expert’s

explanation for the conflict is reasonable and

whether a basis exists for relying on the expert

rather that the (DOT).

Massachi, 406 F.3d at 1453 (citations omitted).

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, except that she may not work

on uneven terrain, at unprotected heights or near dangerous moving

machinery, may not drive industrial machinery, is precluded from

frequent squatting or crawling and is limited to unskilled low stress

work involving limited public contact. (Tr. 17). Further, Dr.

Weilepp, who the ALJ found persuasive, opined that Plaintiff is

capable of lifting twenty pounds frequently, forty pounds occasionally and should not engage in frequent kneeling. (Tr. 13).

The ALJ asked the vocational expert the following question:

If I find... that the Claimant is limited to light

work with the qualifications are added restrictions

that she should not work on uneven terrain or drive

dangerous machinery, work near – I’d say drive

industrial machinery or work near or close to dangerous moving machinery. If I find that she would have

limited capacity for dealing with the public, her

work should be loss2/ stress, limited public contact,

and no continual occasional restrictions – I’m sorry,

occasional postural restrictions would be indicated

rather than continuous and no frequent squatting and

crawling, and no working at unprotected heights. With

those restrictions, would she be able to do any of

her past work?

(Tr. 61-62).3/

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 18 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 19

The vocational expert responded that she could not perform

her past work. (Tr. 62). Then, the ALJ asked the vocational expert

what other work a claimant with the above-noted restrictions, could

perform. The vocational expert responded that a person with the

restrictions noted in the ALJ’s hypothetical question could perform

the work of a Small Products Assembler (DOT 706.684-022); a Garment

Bagger (DOT 920.687-018); and a Laundry Folder (DOT 369.687-018).

(Tr. 62). The ALJ did not ask the vocational expert if his testimony

comported with, or conflicted with, the DOT.

The Court’s review of the DOT for the jobs noted above shows

that Plaintiff, with her limitations, can perform these jobs. None

of these jobs require working on uneven terrain or at unprotected

heights, on or near dangerous machinery, nor frequent squatting or

kneeling. Further, these jobs do not require lifting more than

twenty pounds occasionally, which is well within Plaintiff’s

capabilities, and are unskilled, low stress work involving limited

public contact.

2. Harmless Error

The Court has already noted that the ALJ’s hypothetical

question to the vocational expert failed to include several of

Plaintiff’s abilities and limitations. Since the hypothetical

question posed to the vocational expert did not set out all of

Plaintiff’s abilities and limitations, the hypothetical question

violated the dictates of Embrey, 849 F.2d at 422. Therefore, the

Court concludes that the ALJ erred in posing the hypothetical

question to the vocational expert. Further, the ALJ erred in failing

to ask the vocational expert, pursuant to SSR 00-4p, if the evidence

he provided conflicted with, or was consistent with, the DOT. 

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 19 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 20

However, the Court finds that these errors were harmless

because they were inconsequential to the ALJ’s determination of

Plaintiff’s non-disability. As indicated above, the DOT’s descriptions of a Small Products Assembler, a Garment Bagger and a Laundry

Folder are essentially consistent with the ALJ’s hypothetical

question to the vocational expert, and consistent with the added

limitations noted by Dr. Weilepp. Therefore, the Court confidently

concludes that no reasonable ALJ could have reached a different

disability determination, or could have concluded that Plaintiff

could not perform the above-noted jobs. As a result, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this

regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this

regard be GRANTED.

 VI

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 3, 2010, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 20 of 21
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

09cv1380 21

September 13, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

DATED: August 13, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01380-WQH-WVG Document 25 Filed 08/13/10 Page 21 of 21