Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00029/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00029-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCHMIKA PAGGETT,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06 CV 0029 JM (CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

vs. RECOMMENDATION

JO ANNE BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed, after exhausting her administrative remedies, the present

complaint for judicial review of the denial of Social Security disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Plaintiff asks that this court reverse the decision to deny benefits, or in the alternative to

remand the matter for a new administrative determination. Plaintiff also seeks costs and fees.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which were referred to the Honorable

Cathy Ann Bencivengo, United States Magistrate Judge. Pending before the court is the Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) of Judge Bencivengo, recommending that this court deny Plaintiff’s

motion and grant Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff filed timely objections to the R&R. After reviewing

the R&R and Plaintiff’s objections, the court hereby ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety as set forth

below. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 3:06-cv-00029-JM-CAB Document 20 Filed 06/18/07 Page 1 of 4
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DISCUSSION

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth in

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636. The district court “shall make

a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made. A judge of the

court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1981). The

magistrate’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, regardless of whether any party has filed

objections thereto. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). “If neither party

contests the magistrate’s proposed findings of fact, the court may assume their correctness and decide

the motion on the applicable law.” Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1979). 

The court will now conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which Plaintiff

objects. First, Plaintiff contends the R&R incorrectly concluded that Plaintiff was sufficiently notified

of her right to hire an attorney to represent her at the hearing. This is because, according to Plaintiff,

the notice of hearing and the ALJ merely told Plaintiff she could have a “representative” present, and

that Plaintiff, as an individual who suffers from Borderline Intellectual Functioning with an IQ

between 71 and 84, could not be expected to understand that a “representative” could also mean

“attorney.” The R&R concluded that, in the context of a social security appeal, a layman would

understand the word “representative” to also mean an attorney. R&R at 7-8. The court concludes that

Plaintiff’s objection lacks merit. Even if use of the word “representative” did not sufficiently apprise

Plaintiff that she could hire an attorney, the hearing transcript shows that the hiring of an attorney was

expressly addressed. Tr. 316 (indicating Plaintiff’s father, who was representing Plaintiff at the

hearing, stated “I want to have attorney to come”, to which the ALJ responded “All right.”). The fact

that hiring an attorney was discussed at the conclusion of the hearing is immaterial. The ALJ recessed

the proceedings for two weeks so that Plaintiff could seek out the assistance of an attorney during that

time and request a new hearing if desired. Id. Therefore, Plaintiff knew she could hire an attorney

(as opposed to a “representative”) before the proceedings would be concluded. Plaintiff argues the

ALJ’s decision to stay proceedings for only two weeks was unreasonable, thereby depriving Plaintiff

Case 3:06-cv-00029-JM-CAB Document 20 Filed 06/18/07 Page 2 of 4
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of a real opportunity to retain counsel. Plaintiff, however, provides no legal or factual basis for this

argument. For example, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Plaintiff attempted to find an

attorney within two weeks but needed more time in which to do so. 

The second objection pertains to the ALJ’s duty to fully develop a factual record. Higbee v.

Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff objects, relying on Higbee, to the R&R’s

conclusion that the ALJ’s failure to consider the actual reports of Plaintiff’s hospitalization at

Villaview Hospital, as opposed to relying only on Plaintiff’s oral testimony about her hospitalization,

was immaterial. The R&R so concluded on the ground that the Villaview hospitalization “did not

appear to have such crucial significance as to necessitate obtaining the records themselves.” R&R at

9-10.

In Higgbee, the claimant was denied benefits in part because he was not a United States

resident. The claimant, who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, would not cooperate during

administrative proceedings in providing evidence of his home address. The ALJ concluded that the

claimant had failed to establish U.S. residency, and the district court granted summary judgment to

the defendant. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that there was insufficient evidence to support

whether or not the claimant was a U.S. resident. See Higgbee, 975 F.2d at 562. Reversing and

remanding for further development of the facts, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the lack of evidence,

coupled with the claimant’s mental illness, casts a cloud of doubt . . . on whether the Secretary’s

decision [to deny benefits] was correct.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

This case is distinguishable from Higgbee, in which there was no evidence of whether the

claimant resided in the U.S. By contrast, here substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion

that Plaintiff was not disabled. See R&R at 10-14 (detailing medical evidence in the record supporting

ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s condition was non-severe). Therefore, the failure to examine the actual

Villaview records was not a failure to develop the factual record pursuant to Higbee. This is so

especially since the ALJ elicited Plaintiff’s testimony as to her hospitalization at Villaview and, unlike

in Higbee, there was no indication that Plaintiff was being uncooperative thereto even in light of her

mental condition. Tr. 308-09. 

/ / / 

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CONCLUSION

The court ADOPTS in whole the conclusions, findings, and recommendations contained in

the R&R. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 18, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Bencivengo 

All Parties 

Case 3:06-cv-00029-JM-CAB Document 20 Filed 06/18/07 Page 4 of 4