Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_98-cv-00951/USCOURTS-cand-4_98-cv-00951-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON SPIELER, by his guardian ad

litem, ALISON J. SPIELER,

Plaintiff,

v.

MT. DIABLO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant. /

No. C 98-0951 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR A STAY PENDING

APPEAL

Defendant Mount Diablo Unified School District moves for a

stay of the Court’s remedial order pending a decision on

Defendant’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiff opposes

Defendant’s motion. The matter was taken under submission on the

papers. Having considered all of the papers submitted by the

parties, the Court denies Defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action alleging a denial of his and

other class members’ right to full and equal access to Defendant’s

facilities and programs. In 2000, the parties entered into a

consent decree that resolved the matter. The agreement provided,

in part, that:

The Parties agree that all playboxes shall be made

minimally accessible by providing new surfacing under the

“use zone” of the playboxes at a cost of approximately

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$10,000 per site as Priority 1 work. Exceptions would be

Gregory Gardens, Shadelands, and Sunrise Center for which

the entire playbox will be made accessible as Priority 1

work. The Parties further agree that the remainder of

the costs currently designated as “playbox access” shall

be included as Priority 2 work. Should new regulations

pertaining to playbox access be issued, the parties will

meet and confer regarding any changes necessary in this

agreement.

Consent Decree § III.A.3 (Docket No. 34). The agreement did not

define the term “minimally accessible.” It did, however, refer to

the “minimum accessibility features” contained in the Logan Hopper

Report, which was attached as Exhibit C to the consent decree. Id.

§ III.A.2. With respect to playboxes, the Report stated only that

an “absolute minimum degree of accessibility” required “[a]t least

one accessible play structure, representative of the types of play

structures provided at the site, for each student level at each

site, including path of travel and surfacing beneath it.” Id. Ex.

C at 7.

Defendant attempted to comply with the consent decree by

replacing the surfaces of some playboxes with a rubberized

material; it replaced the surfaces of other playboxes with

engineered wood fiber (EWF). According to Defendant, it currently

costs approximately $85,000 to install a rubberized surface in a

playbox, far more than it costs to install EWF. Defendant expects

this cost to rise to approximately $100,000 over the course of the

next five years. Plaintiff disputes this amount.

In 2005, the parties disputed whether Defendant had fulfilled

its obligations under the consent decree. After meeting with a

magistrate judge, the parties entered into an interim settlement

agreement to resolve whether the use of EWF, as maintained by

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Bonded EWF has yet to be determined to be ADA compliant, nor has

it been certified as compliant with the American Society for Testing

and Material standards for accessibility of playbox surfacing. 

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Defendant, satisfied the requirements of the consent decree. This

agreement required Defendant to pay a neutral observer to observe

the condition of the EWF in the playboxes during the 2005-2006

school year.

The agreement further provided that if the parties were unable

to resolve their disagreements after meeting and conferring about

the year-long observations, they would bring their dispute to the

Court. In the event of such a dispute, the agreement provided for

limited briefing; each party would submit a single letter brief to

the Court, no longer than five pages. There was to be no

evidentiary hearing. Under the agreement, after reviewing the

letter briefs and observations of the neutral observer, the Court

would determine whether Defendant had satisfied the requirements of

the consent decree and, if necessary, would order an appropriate

remedy. If the Court determined that Defendant must remove and

replace EWF surfacing in whole or in part, the agreement provided

that Defendant could either “(1) phase in installation of the

prescribed surfacing over a period of three years and replace at

least one playbox at each school site within the first year after

the Court’s order; or (2) install a bonded EWF product within three

years of the Court’s order and a formal Court confirmation that the

use of a bonded EWF product complies with the Consent Decree and

all applicable laws.”1

On March 2, 2007, pursuant to the interim settlement

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agreement, the parties filed letters with the Court concerning

their dispute over whether Defendant had satisfied its obligations

with regard to the maintenance of the EWF in the playboxes. 

Plaintiff argued that Defendant had not, and moved for enforcement

of the consent decree. Defendant argued that it had satisfied its

obligations and that its maintenance of the EWF was satisfactory

and sufficient. The observations did show steady improvement by

Defendant. Nonetheless, there were still instances, even at the

end of the school year, where the surfaces in the playboxes

exceeded a slope found to be accessible for children with

disabilities. This was so even though Defendant was aware that its

compliance was being monitored.

On May 1, 2007, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for

enforcement of the consent decree. The Court concluded that, with

respect to the use of EWF in the playboxes as maintained by

Defendant, Defendant had violated the terms of the consent decree. 

The parties were ordered to meet and confer to attempt to agree

upon a remedy. If the parties could not agree, they were ordered

to submit proposed remedial orders. The parties did not agree and

each side submitted its own proposed order.

In an order dated August 16, 2007, the Court adopted in part

Plaintiff’s proposed remedial order. It found that Defendant had

been given an extensive opportunity to demonstrate that it could

maintain its EWF playboxes in a way that complied with the consent 

decree, but had failed to prevent ongoing slope violations. The

Court concluded that Defendant must replace its EFW surfacing with

rubberized surfacing. The remedial order required Defendant to

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replace the surfacing in eighty percent of its playboxes over a

period of five years, with twenty percent of these playboxes

undergoing replacement each year. Defendant appealed this order to

the Ninth Circuit and now requests that it be stayed until the

appeals court issues its decision.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that “[w]hen an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final

judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court

in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an

injunction during the pendency of the appeal.” The standard for

granting a stay pending appeal is similar to that for a preliminary

injunction. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Thus, a party seeking a stay must show either (1) a likelihood of

success on the merits of its appeal and the possibility of

irreparable harm, or (2) that serious questions regarding the

merits exist and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its

favor. See Lands Council v. McNair, 494 F.3d 771, 775 (9th Cir.

2007). “These two alternatives are extremes of a single continuum

in which the greater the relative hardship to the party seeking the

[stay], the less probability of success must be shown.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). In cases such as this one, the

court should also consider the effect on the public interest of

granting the stay. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435.

When ruling on a motion for a stay of a final judgment, the

district court will already have ruled on the legal issue being

appealed. When evaluating the movant’s likelihood of success on

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the merits in this context, the court need not conclude that it is

likely to be reversed on appeal in order to grant the stay. 

Strobel v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 2007 WL 1238709, at *1 (S.D.

Cal. 2007). Rather, it may grant the stay when it has ruled on “an

admittedly difficult legal question and when the equities of the

case suggest that the status quo should be maintained.” Wash.

Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841,

844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

DISCUSSION

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Defendant has appealed the Court’s finding that its failure to

maintain the accessibility of its EWF playboxes violated the terms

of the consent decree. Specifically, Defendant argues that the

Court erred by allegedly interpreting the term “minimally

accessible” to require “absolute perfection in the maintenance of

District playbox surfaces.” Defendant also maintains that the

Court erred in finding that the playboxes were not accessible,

because no students have complained of accessibility problems. In

its reply, Defendant further states that the Court found the use of

EWF in playboxes to be non-compliant with the ADA. Defendant

argues that this represents a novel holding and will present an

important legal issue of first impression on appeal.

The Court notes that the relevant language of the consent

decree is ambiguous with respect to the measures Defendant was

ultimately expected to take to make the playboxes accessible. 

However, it is clear that the phrase “minimally accessible” was

employed only as a means of identifying work that was required to

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be designated as Priority 1. The “remainder of the costs currently

designated as ‘playbox access,’” in turn, were to be designated as

Priority 2. Despite repeated questioning by the Court at oral

argument, the parties could not assign a precise meaning to the

phrase, “costs currently designated as ‘playbox access.’” In any

event, Defendant is incorrect in its assertion that the Court found

its playboxes not to be “minimally accessible.” The Court did not

apply a “minimal accessibility” standard in its previous orders,

because such a standard was not contemplated by the consent decree. 

Nor did the Court require absolute perfection. Defendant has not

supported its argument that the consent decree required only that

the playboxes be “minimally accessible.” Therefore, Defendant’s

likelihood of success on this point is small.

As for Defendant’s argument that its playboxes cannot be found

inaccessible because no students have complained of as much,

Defendant provides no authority for the proposition that consent

decree compliance or accessibility should depend on whether

students have formally complained.

Finally, while Defendant attempts to cast the Court’s order as

holding that the use of EWF in playboxes does not comply with the

ADA, the order merely held that Defendant’s maintenance of its EWFfilled playboxes did not comply with the terms of the consent

decree in this case. Thus, the Court’s order did not establish a

broad legal principle and will not constitute a “serious issue of

first impression” on appeal, as Defendant contends.

In sum, Defendant has not presented the Court with any

argument that has a high likelihood of success or raises a

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difficult legal question such that granting a stay in this case

would be appropriate.

II. Balance of Hardships

Defendant argues that it would be irreparably harmed if the

Court were not to grant a stay of the remedial order. It is true

that Defendant may have to pay to install rubberized surfaces in

some of its playboxes while its appeal is pending. The cost of

this replacement is disputed by the parties; Defendant claims it

will cost between $85,000 to $100,000 per playbox, while Plaintiff

claims it can be done for less than $57,000 for even a large-sized

play area. Whatever the cost of replacing the playbox surfaces, it

will be spread out over a period of five years. This allows

Defendant more time to comply than Plaintiff’s recommendation,

which in turn allowed Defendant more time than it had agreed to in

the interim settlement agreement. Thus, the magnitude of the

financial burden on Defendant is reduced by the high likelihood

that the court of appeals will issue its decision before a majority

of the playbox surfaces have been replaced. Further, Defendant

will derive some benefit from providing disabled children in its

charge with accessible equipment.

In contrast, any further delay in making Defendant’s playboxes

accessible will subject Plaintiff and other class members to

segregation based on their disabilities. This harm cannot be

quantified and is, by its very nature, irreparable. See Silver

Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814,

827 (9th Cir 2001) (“We have held that where a defendant has

violated a civil rights statute, we will presume that the plaintiff

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Plaintiff’s motion to strike and Defendant’s objections to

certain portions of the declarations submitted in connection with this

motion (Docket Nos. 162, 168 and 169) are DENIED as moot. The Court

did not consider any improper or inadmissible evidence in deciding

this motion.

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has suffered irreparable injury from the fact of the defendant’s

violation.”) (citing Smallwood v. Nat’l Can Co., 583 F.2d 419, 420

(9th Cir. 1978)). In addition, the public interest favors

Defendant’s prompt provision of accessible playboxes so that all of

its students may have an equal opportunity to participate in

developmental recreational activities.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the balance of

hardships tilts in Plaintiff’s favor. Considering this with

Defendant’s low likelihood of success on the merits, the Court is

not persuaded that the equities at stake would be served by

exercising its discretion to stay the remedial order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion (Docket No. 151)

for a stay of the Court’s remedial order of August 16, 2007 pending

a decision on Defendant’s appeal is DENIED.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:11/2/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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