Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-19-06162/USCOURTS-ca6-19-06162-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 20a0220n.06

No. 19-6162

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN F. COX, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF JACKSON, TENNESSEE,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________/

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE

BEFORE: GUY, THAPAR, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs in this putative class action allege that 

they were arrested without a warrant and unlawfully detained by the City of Jackson, Tennessee, 

in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs have abandoned

any claims of false arrest—having failed to allege that a warrant was required or that the officers

lacked probable cause. This appeal concerns only the claim that plaintiffs were detained after their 

warrantless arrests without being afforded the probable cause determination required by Gerstein 

v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). The 

district court dismissed those claims, finding: (1) that two of the plaintiffs could not state a claim 

because they were released within 48 hours of arrest, and (2) that the other plaintiffs’ claims were 

barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The district court did not reach the City’s 

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 1
No. 19-6162 2

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

additional argument that the claims of all those plaintiffs whose arrests resulted in conviction are 

also barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). After de novo review, we affirm in 

part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The Amended Complaint alleged that six plaintiffs—Steven Cox, Kelly Freeman, Rufus 

Irvin, Keith Fason, David Nagi, and Ernie Kirk—were arrested and detained for varying lengths

of time before being released. Each plaintiff was allegedly detained in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment because the City had “engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to have 

[subsequently issued] arrest warrants and/or Affidavits of Complaint sworn to before a magistrate 

or a neutral and detached clerk upon a finding of probable cause that the accused had committed a 

crime.” Plaintiffs also alleged that the City failed to adequately train and supervise its officials “in 

the appropriate procedures to be utilized in obtaining arrest warrants and/or Affidavits of 

Complaint.” Essentially, plaintiffs alleged that, for some unknown period of time before and after 

their arrests, the City’s clerks issued warrants and/or Affidavits of Complaint signed by an affiant

who was not placed under oath.

Plaintiffs also averred that this deficiency was “impossible to determine from the face of 

the arrest warrant/Affidavit of Complaint” and could not have been discovered “through the 

exercise of reasonable diligence” before the public release of a letter from District Attorney 

General Jody Pickens on January 18, 2019. In that letter, which the City attached to its Answer, 

the District Attorney General said he had recently discovered that “for a long period of time and 

in a large number of cases, the Jackson City Court Clerk’s office ha[d] failed to place affiants 

under oath prior to the issuance of warrants” “as is required by [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 40-6-203 and 

Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.” This action was commenced on February 

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 2
No. 19-6162 3

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

11, 2019, and the Amended Complaint was filed on May 31, 2019.

The City sought judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(c), which plaintiffs opposed in a response and sur-reply. Granting the City’s motion, the district 

court found that plaintiffs had failed to either plausibly allege, and/or timely assert, their 

Gerstein/McLaughlin claims. This appeal followed.

II.

The decision to grant a Rule 12(c) motion is reviewed de novo, under the same standard 

that applies to a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Greer v. City of Highland Park, 884 F.3d 310, 314 

(6th Cir. 2018). That is, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, the court must determine whether the complaint 

states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citation omitted). We begin with the gravamen of plaintiffs’ Gerstein/McLaughlin claims.

“A person arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate on a showing of probable 

cause is not constitutionally entitled to a separate judicial determination that there is probable cause 

to detain him pending trial.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143 (1979). In the case of a 

warrantless arrest, “a policeman’s on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal 

justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take 

the administrative steps incident to arrest.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-14. Once that suspect is in 

custody, however, “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as 

a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Id. at 114. An adversarial hearing 

is not required, id. at 120-21, nor is there a single preferred pretrial procedure, id. at 123. Rather, 

whatever procedure a State adopts, “it must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable 

cause [to arrest] as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination 

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 3
No. 19-6162 4

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.” Id. at 125 (footnote

omitted). Addressing what “prompt” means in this context, McLaughlin clarified “that a 

jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, 

as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” 500 U.S. at 56. That 

brings us to the claims of Cox and Freeman who each alleged that they were detained for one day 

following their arrests.

A. Cox and Freeman

Cox alleged that he was arrested on March 1, 2018, and was detained until March 2, 2018

(1 day). Freeman was arrested on January 8, 2017, and detained until January 9, 2017 (1 day). 

The district court found that—irrespective of the validity of any subsequent probable cause 

determination—Cox and Freeman failed to state a claim because their detentions “lasted less than 

48 hours.”1

It is true, as plaintiffs insist, that McLaughlin did not say that a detention of less than 48 

hours can never violate the Fourth Amendment. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56 (“This is not to say 

that the probable cause determination in a particular case passes constitutional muster simply 

because it is provided within 48 hours.”). But McLaughlin did say that a jurisdiction that provides 

a judicial probable cause determination within 48 hours complies with the promptness requirement 

of Gerstein, and “will be immune from systemic challenges.” Id. And, a particular plaintiff 

challenging the promptness of a determination made within 48 hours of arrest would have to 

“prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably.” Id. (“Examples 

of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the 

1Although not material to this appeal, the Affidavit of Complaint and warrant that the City provided 

to the district court appears to charge Cox with an offense committed on March 11, 2018, and 

purports to have been sworn to and signed on March 12, 2018.

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 4
No. 19-6162 5

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.”) 

Here, Cox and Freeman did not allege that their probable cause determinations were unreasonably 

delayed for improper purposes; rather, they claim that the purportedly valid probable cause 

determination was defective.

Nor can Cox and Freeman escape the presumption that their one-day detentions were 

constitutionally reasonable by arguing that Gerstein did not involve a detainee who never received

a proper probable cause determination. This argument fundamentally misapprehends what 

Gerstein says the Fourth Amendment requires. That is, an officer’s probable cause determination 

will justify a warrantless arrest and a brief period of detention, but that detention may not be 

extended without a prompt judicial determination that there is probable cause to arrest. Gerstein, 

420 U.S. at 113-14. If, as here, such a detention ends within a constitutionally reasonable period 

of time, it does not matter whether there was also a judicial determination of probable cause to 

arrest.

The district court did not err in finding that the one-day detentions of Cox and Freeman 

could not state a Fourth Amendment claim based on the alleged defects in the post-arrest warrants 

or Affidavits of Complaint. The district court’s dismissal of these claims is affirmed.2

B. Irvin, Fason, Nagi and Kirk

The other four plaintiffs alleged that they were detained for more than 48 hours “without 

having an arrest warrant or Affidavit of Complaint issued upon a finding of probable cause, after 

being sworn to before a magistrate or neutral and detached clerk.” Specifically, and listing the 

most recent first, Kirk was arrested on April 4, 2017, and detained until April 17, 2017 (9 days); 

2Plaintiffs also miss the mark when they argue that this result authorizes a policy of making 

warrantless arrests without probable cause as long as the detainees are released within 48 hours. 

On the contrary, such a detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim would arise from the arrest itself.

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 5
No. 19-6162 6

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

Irvin was arrested on January 11, 2017, and detained until January 23, 2017 (12 days); Nagi was 

arrested on January 11, 2017, and detained until January 17, 2017 (6 days); and Fason was arrested 

on March 8, 2016, and detained until March 24, 2016 (12 days).3 As this recitation makes clear, 

all four of these plaintiffs were arrested, detained, and released more than one year before this 

action was commenced on February 11, 2019. Plaintiffs argue that these claims were nonetheless 

timely filed because they did not accrue until the District Attorney General’s letter was released 

on January 18, 2019. We start there.

1. Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for claims brought under § 1983 is determined by the law of the 

state “where the cause of action originated.” Hall v. Spencer Cty., 583 F.3d 930, 933 (6th Cir.

2009) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). Under Tennessee law, the applicable 

limitations period is one year for civil actions brought under federal civil rights statutes. Johnson 

v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015); see also TENN.CODE ANN. 

§ 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) (2017). However, the accrual date for a § 1983 claim is governed by federal 

law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). As a result, a § 1983 claim “does not accrue 

until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, both 

his injury and the responsible party.” Hall, 583 F.3d at 933 (citation omitted); see also Johnson, 

777 F.3d at 843. This objective inquiry asks “what event should have alerted the typical lay person 

to protect his or her rights.” Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation 

omitted); see also Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000).

The City argued that these plaintiffs’ Gerstein/McLaughlin claims accrued once they had 

3Plaintiffs state that Nagi was released on February 17, 2017, after being detained for six (6) days, 

but this is likely an error because that would be a 37-day detention and the judgment in his name 

that was attached to the City’s Answer was dated January 17, 2017.

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 6
No. 19-6162 7

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

been detained for 48 hours without a probable cause hearing. See Johnson v. Cty. of Paulding, 

780 F. App’x 796, 799 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), pet. for cert. filed, No. 19-1196 (U.S. Jan. 2, 

2020); cf. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (limitations period begins when the false imprisonment ends). 

But because Gerstein and McLaughlin do not require a formal hearing, the City’s argument must 

be that the claims accrued once they were detained for longer than 48 hours without a judicial 

determination of probable cause. See Sanders v. Detroit Police Dep’t, 490 F. App’x 771, 774 (6th 

Cir. 2012).

We understand plaintiffs’ claim to be that if the warrants or affidavits had been as they 

appeared to be—issued on a finding of probable cause after having been sworn to before a qualified 

magistrate or clerk—their “subsequent period of detention would have been constitutional under 

Gerstein and its progeny.” (Pls’ Br., p. 15.) That will be for plaintiffs to prove, of course, but the 

City has provided what appear to be the post-arrest warrants and/or Affidavits of Complaint that 

were signed and sworn to against Irvin, Fason, Nagi, and Kirk. We may consider a document, 

such as these, that is not attached to a complaint or answer when it “is referred to in the pleadings 

and is integral to the claims.” Com. Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335-36 

(6th Cir. 2007). If, as it appears, these plaintiffs received a facially valid probable cause 

determination within 48 hours of arrest, their Gerstein/McLaughlin claims would accrue when they 

discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that the probable 

cause determination was constitutionally defective.

To that end, the Amended Complaint specifically alleged that it was “impossible to 

determine from the face of the arrest warrant/Affidavit of Complaint that the Defendant failed to 

have them sworn to before a magistrate or detached and neutral clerk and a finding of probable 

cause made as required by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” As a result, plaintiffs averred 

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 7
No. 19-6162 8

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

that they “were not aware of the constitutional deficiency, nor could they have discovered it 

through the exercise of reasonable diligence” before District Attorney General Pickens’ letter was 

released on January 18, 2019. The district court concluded that the deficiency identified in that 

letter related only to claims of false arrest and “had nothing whatever to do with the ability of the 

Plaintiffs to know that they had been held in custody without a probable cause hearing for longer 

than the time deemed presumptively reasonable under McLaughlin.” But that is not necessarily 

so.

The letter does describe an “issue regarding arrest warrants in Jackson City Court that 

[was] discovered recently.” (Emphasis added.) That discovery followed the dismissal of a felony 

case after it was determined that the clerk did not have the affiant swear to the warrant as is required 

by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-203 and Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. At 

first blush, this seems to concern only arrests; but, in fact, arrest warrants in Tennessee serve a 

dual function.

Under Rule 3, an Affidavit of Complaint alleging that a person has committed an offense 

must be “made on oath before a magistrate or a neutral and detached court clerk authorized by 

Rule 4 to make a probable cause determination.” And, Rule 4, in turn, authorizes the issuance of 

an arrest warrant if the Affidavit of Complaint establishes “that there is probable cause to believe 

that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.” As the commentary 

to Rule 4 explains, however, the form “makes no distinction between warrants issued for persons 

not yet arrested and those warrants issued for persons already arrested without a warrant.” TENN.

R. CRIM. P. 4 (Advisory Commission Comment).

The command to arrest is obviously surplusage where the warrant is directed 

against one already in custody; but a warrant in such cases still serves as the official 

charging instrument, issued after a judicial finding of probable cause, and gives 

notice of the charge which must be answered.

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 8
No. 19-6162 9

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, it is possible that the District Attorney General’s disclosure did have

something to do with the plaintiffs’ claim that they did not receive a Gerstein-compliant probable 

cause determination within 48 hours of arrest.

The City argued that, even so, these plaintiffs—or their criminal defense attorneys—should 

have discovered the alleged deficiency in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Maybe. It is true 

that the District Attorney General’s letter implies that someone’s criminal defense attorney got 

felony charges dismissed after it was “determined” that the clerk failed to “have the affiant swear 

to the warrant.” Yet, without saying how the defect came to light, the letter describes it as a

“revelation” and indicates that further investigation determined that it happened over “a long 

period of time and in a large number of cases.” It would be premature to conclude from the 

pleadings and documents before us that the plaintiffs who received a probable cause determination 

within 48 hours of arrest nonetheless should have discovered that their continued detention was 

unconstitutional more than a year before this action was commenced. See Am. Premier 

Underwriters, Inc. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 839 F.3d 458, 464 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation 

omitted) (“courts should not dismiss complaints on statute-of-limitations grounds when there are 

disputed factual questions relating to the accrual date”).

2. Heck v. Humphrey

Finally, urging the court to affirm on alternative grounds, the City contends that the claims 

of Irvin, Fason, Nagi and Kirk are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 

When a plaintiff “seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a 

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 

sentence.” Id. “[I]f it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate 

that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. We assume that these plaintiffs 

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 9
No. 19-6162 10

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

pleaded guilty to charges arising out of their warrantless arrests and that none of those convictions 

have been invalidated. The only question before us is whether plaintiffs’ success on their 

Gerstein/McLaughlin claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions. We 

conclude that it would not.

Heck offers an example of a claim that does not seek damages directly attributable to the 

conviction but for which success would necessarily imply that the conviction was wrongful. Id. 

at 486 n. 6. Namely, a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force would be barred when it 

would imply the invalidity of a related conviction for resisting arrest because, to prevail under 

§ 1983, the plaintiff “would have to negate an element of the offense of which he [had] been 

convicted.” Id.; see also Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 2014). 

In contrast, Heck also explains that a claim for damages attributable to an unreasonable search may 

not be barred “even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in [the] state 

criminal trial” because success on such a claim would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s 

conviction was unlawful. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 7; see also Harper v. Jackson, 293 F. App’x 

389, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (holding Heck bars unreasonable search claims “where 

the contested search produced the only evidence supporting the conviction and no legal doctrine 

could save the evidence from exclusion”).

Plaintiffs understandably rely on this court’s decision in Sanders v. City of Detroit, 490 F. 

App’x 771, 773-74 (6th Cir. 2012). There, we held that a Gerstein claim was “unaffected by Heck, 

as that claim is for ‘monetary damages for a constitutional violation unrelated to [the plaintiff’s] 

ultimate conviction of the substantive offense.’” Id. at 773 (quoting Alkire v. Irving, 339 F.3d 802, 

816 n. 10 (6th Cir. 2003)). Although not controlling, Sanders got it right. As discussed earlier, a

Gerstein/McLaughlin claim alleges that the plaintiff was not afforded a prompt judicial 

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 10
No. 19-6162 11

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

determination of probable cause following a warrantless arrest as required by the Fourth 

Amendment. Such a § 1983 claim seeks damages for the allegedly unlawful pretrial detention, 

but, as Gerstein itself explained, “a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant 

was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119.

Without disagreeing with Sanders, the City argued that the Gerstein claims at issue here 

are different because an arrest warrant may also serve as the charging document under Tennessee 

law. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2-104 (a prosecution is commenced by, among other things, 

“finding an indictment or presentment,” “the issuing of a warrant,” or “the filing of an 

information”); see also State v. McCloud, 310 S.W.3d 851, 859 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009). The 

City has represented that all the plaintiffs—except Cox who was subsequently indicted—were 

charged by issuance of the arrest warrants that plaintiffs claim were issued without first placing 

the affiant under oath. “Under Tennessee law, if a warrant does not meet procedural and 

constitutional requirements, it is invalid.” State v. Wilson, 6 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1998) (citing State v. Burtis, 664 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)). And, “[a] void 

warrant invalidates all subsequent proceedings emanating from the warrant.” Id. (citing State v. 

Campbell, 641 S.W.2d 890 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)). But it would not invalidate a conviction 

commenced by other means, McCloud, 310 S.W.3d at 860, or prevent the state from curing the 

defective arrest warrant by reinstituting proceedings against a defendant within the relevant statute 

of limitations, Wilson, 6 S.W.3d at 507. Nor, as is pertinent here, would a deficient warrant 

invalidate a conviction based on a guilty plea. State v. Gross, 673 S.W.2d 552, 553-54 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1984). The court in Gross explained that although a direct attack on an unsigned 

warrant would have been successful, the plea of guilty waived the defects. Id. at 553 (“a plea of 

guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects, procedural defects, and constitutional infirmities”).

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 11
No. 19-6162 12

Cox, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

Because the judgments on which the City relies reflect that plaintiffs Irvin, Fason, Nagi, 

and Kirk pleaded guilty, proof that their arrest warrants and/or Affidavits of Complaint were not 

sworn to before a magistrate or neutral and detached clerk would not necessarily imply the 

invalidity of their convictions. As in Sanders, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims seeking damages for 

their post-arrest detention without a proper determination of probable cause are not barred under 

Heck.

* * *

The district court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings is AFFIRMED with respect 

to the claims of plaintiffs Cox and Freeman, and REVERSED and REMANDED with respect to 

the claims of plaintiffs Irvin, Fason, Nagi, and Kirk.

 Case: 19-6162 Document: 30-2 Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 12