Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02874/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02874-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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*

The appellees were not served with process in the district court and are not

participating in this appeal.  After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have

concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.  Accordingly, the appeal is submitted on the

appellant’s brief and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 14, 2010*

  Decided April 16, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2874

JOHN J. DAVIT,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM J. STOGSDILL, JR., et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 08 C 3725

Ruben Castillo,

Judge.

O R D E R

An acrimonious divorce in 1998 has spawned this and seven prior lawsuits by John

Davit against parties he sees as connected to his ex‐wife and the divorce proceedings.  See,

e.g., Davit v. Davit, 173 Fed. Appx. 515 (7th Cir. 2006) (unpublished).  This time Davit claims

that his former spouse, her lawyer, a police officer, and the State’s Attorney in DuPage

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-2874 Document: 17 Filed: 04/16/2010 Pages: 2
No. 09‐2874 Page 2

County, Illinois, conspired to get him convicted on trumped‐up criminal charges.  Davit had

been arrested after scuffling with police on his ex‐wife’s driveway; the officers were

enforcing an order of protection that prohibited Davit from being at the residence.  A state

jury found him guilty of violating an order of protection, 720 ILCS 5/12‐30, and resisting a

peace officer, 720 ILCS 5/31‐1, but the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the first of these

convictions.  Over a dissent the court reasoned that the order of protection was

unenforceable because, read literally, it forbade Davit from entering the “household of

premises” instead of the “household or premises.”  This windfall from a typo has Davit

claiming that his arrest and prosecution for being on the driveway were part of a malicious

plot to punish him for opposing his ex‐wife in the divorce proceedings, for being a

Democrat (Davit professes certainty that the defendants are all Republicans), and for

exposing “corruption” with his slew of unsuccessful lawsuits.

The district court screened Davit’s complaint prior to service, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999), and concluded that it fails to

state a claim.  We agree.  Davit’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, racketeering laws, see 18

U.S.C. § 1962, and Illinois common law have no plausible basis in fact.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); Cooney v.

Rossiter, 583 F. 3d 967, 970‐71 (7th Cir. 2009).  The complaint, like this appeal, is frivolous,

and we now warn Davit that his pursuit of additional frivolous appeals will lead to

sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 09-2874 Document: 17 Filed: 04/16/2010 Pages: 2