Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01094/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01094-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Susan Mae Polk (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 6, 2012. Currently, there is 

no operative complaint on file. On February 20, 2015, and March 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed affidavits 

attesting to the purported bias and prejudice of the undersigned, United States Magistrate Judge 

Barbara A. McAuliffe. The Court construes the affidavits as a motion to disqualify, and the matter is 

submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

II. Motion for Disqualification

A magistrate judge must disqualify himself if “his impartiality might be reasonably 

questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or if “he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or 

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” 28 U.S.C.§ 455(b)(1). 

SUSAN MAE POLK,

 Plaintiff,

v.

GODINA, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:12-cv-01094-LJO-BAM PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO 

DISQUALIFY MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR BIAS 

AND PREJUDICE

(ECF Nos. 32, 35)

Case 1:12-cv-01094-LJO-BAM Document 39 Filed 04/15/15 Page 1 of 4
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“[J]udicial rulings or information acquired by the court in its judicial capacity will rarely support 

recusal.” United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Liteky v. United 

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994)). 

The objective test for determining whether recusal is required is whether a reasonable person 

with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned. Johnson, 610 F.3d at 1147 (quotation marks and citation omitted); Pesnell v. Arsenault, 

543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008). “Adverse findings do not equate to bias,” Johnson, 610 F.3d at 

1147, and in this instance, Plaintiff disagrees with the Court’s screening order, which does not support 

recusal.

Plaintiff also expressly seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. In relevant part, section 144 

states: 

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a 

timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending 

has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse 

party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be 

assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or 

prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of 

the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for 

failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any 

case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is 

made in good faith.

28 U.S.C. § 144. 

If the judge to whom a timely motion is directed determines that the accompanying affidavit 

specifically alleges facts stating grounds for recusal under § 144, the motion must be referred to 

another judge for a determination of the merits. United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 

1980). The judge to whom the motion is directed is to determine independently whether all the 

circumstances call for recusal, and such matter rests within the sound discretion of that judge. Sibla, 

624 F.2d at 868. Motions under §144 are directed to the judge before whom the matter is pending, 

Case 1:12-cv-01094-LJO-BAM Document 39 Filed 04/15/15 Page 2 of 4
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which in this instance would be the undersigned. The Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiff’s 

declarations were timely filed.

Having set forth the legal standard, the Court now examines Plaintiff’s affidavits. 

Plaintiff’s Affidavit

Plaintiff contends that the undersigned made numerous errors in the order dismissing 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint with leave to amend, including misquoting from the amended 

complaint, misstating material facts, creating false insinuations, omitting crucial elements of a claim, 

subjecting her to a more stringent pleading standard, misstating the law and not allowing her to join 

this action with Polk v. Pittman, 1:11-cv-00728-AWI-BAM (PC). Plaintiff also contends that the 

undersigned imposed an arbitrary 25-page limit on any amended complaint. (ECF No. 32, pp. 1-2, 4-

7; ECF No. 35, pp. 2, 4-7.) Plaintiff’s allegations are not directed at the undersigned’s purported bias, 

but rather at challenging the screening order dismissing her first amended complaint with leave to 

amend that was issued on January 7, 2015. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff has not been prejudiced by the 

Court’s dismissal order as she has been granted leave to amend her claims. 

Plaintiff further suggests that the undersigned has exhibited bias by “making intrinsically 

derogatory comments, which waft in negative innuendoes unsupported by the record as a whole and 

which aren’t in fact true” and by adopting an adversarial posture. (ECF No. 32, p. 2.) Plaintiff has not 

identified any derogatory comments. Plaintiff’s disagreement with the undersigned’s findings and 

conclusions in the screening order is not sufficient to demonstrate bias or prejudice. The Court is 

required to screen complaints brought by a prisoner seeking relief against an officer or employee of a 

governmental entity and evaluate whether the prisoner has stated a claim that is facially plausible. 28 

U.S.C. §1915A(a); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions to disqualify the 

undersigned, filed on February 20 and March 2, 2015, are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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