Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00202/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00202-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

FRED SPAINHOUR, as Special 

Administrator of the Estate of Brian 

Allen Spainhour, deceased, and on behalf 

of the wrongful death beneficiaries of 

Brian Allen Spainhour PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:19-cv-00202 KGB

SHANE JONES, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by separate defendants Shane Jones,

Boone Sumners, and Rowdy Sweet, in their individual and official capacities, and Pope County, 

Arkansas (Dkt. No. 2). Plaintiff Fred Spainhour, special administrator of the estate of Brian 

Spainhour, deceased, and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Brian Spainhour, 

opposes this motion (Dkt. No. 4). Also pending before the Court is separate defendant Andrew 

W. Ballinger’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 26).1 For the following reasons, the Court grants both

motions to dismiss Fred Spainhour’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging an Eighth Amendment 

violation and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Fred Spainhour’s remaining state 

law tort claims.

I. Background

On March 25, 2019, Fred Spainhour filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 

Arkansas Survival of Actions Statute, Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-62-101 (“ASAS”), and the 

Arkansas Wrongful Death Act, Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-62-102 (“AWDA”) (Dkt. No. 1). 

 1

 Mr. Ballinger’s motion to dismiss adopts and incorporates the motion to dismiss and 

brief in support filed by separate defendants Mr. Jones, Mr. Sumners, Mr. Sweet, and Pope County 

as his motion to dismiss Fred Spainhour’s complaint (Dkt. Nos. 2; 3; 26).

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 1 of 13
2

Fred Spainhour is the father of Brian Allen Spainhour (Id., at 1). Fred Spainhour states that Brian 

Spainhour was booked into the Pope County Detention Center (“the detention center”) by Deputy 

Sheriff Boone Sumners on or about March 15, 2016 (Id., ¶ 18). At the time of his arrest, Brian 

Spainhour informed Deputy Sumners that he was prescribed various life sustaining medications 

for high blood pressure, Hepatitis C, heart valve infection, and other medical issues (Id., ¶ 20). 

Brian Spainhour was held at this facility until he was released due to a medical emergency “on his 

own recognizance” on March 18, 2016 (Id., ¶ 19). Fred Spainhour claims that Sheriff Shane Jones 

and the Pope County Sheriff’s Office failed to verify Brian Spainhour’s medications after he 

disclosed them during his screening (Id., ¶ 21). On or about March 16, 2016, Angela Porrelo 

attempted to provide the detention center with the medication that Brian Spainhour required, but 

she was turned away; the detention center did not accept the medication (Id., ¶¶ 22-23). 

Fred Spainhour claims that on March 16, 2016, Brian Spainhour informed the detention 

center that he believed he had suffered a stroke (Id., ¶ 24). In a letter possibly to Ms. Porrelo, 

Brian Spainhour wrote that he was sick, it was hard to move, he had blood clots in his fingers, and 

he was seeing a doctor or nurse (Id., at 17). Brian Spainhour wrote that he was “gonna end up 

with another stroke and maybe die,” and that he was “worried [he was] gonna have another stroke” 

(Id.). Fred Spainhour claims that, despite numerous requests for medical assistance, the detention 

center made no attempt to examine Brian Spainhour after he complained of a possible stroke (Id., 

¶ 25). Fred Spainhour states that, on March 18, 2016, Brian Spainhour suffered a stroke and fell 

into a coma while being detained at the detention center (Id., ¶ 26). Deputy Sheriff Rowdy Sweet 

was the jail administrator on March 18, 2016, and Fred Spainhour alleges that Deputy Sweet and 

Deputy Sheriff Andrew Ballinger did not call an emergency response team to examine Brian 

Spainhour or release him from custody until he was found unconscious in his cell (Id., ¶¶ 27-28). 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 2 of 13
3

Fred Spainhour claims that Brian Spainhour suffered a brain aneurism as a result of not receiving 

proper medication while detained at the detention center and passed away on March 25, 2016 (Id., 

¶ 29).

Fred Spainhour alleges that the Pope County Sheriff’s Office has a custom, policy, or 

practice where failure to supervise, train, evaluate, and discipline its officers concerning policies 

and procedures as they pertain to the laws on providing adequate medical care, which has resulted 

in an environment that condones the unreasonable withholding of medical care on citizens being 

detained at the detention center (Id., ¶ 30). Fred Spainhour further alleges that all individual 

defendants were, at all relevant times, acting under color of state law (Id., ¶ 31).

Additionally, Fred Spainhour alleges the involvement of three John Doe defendants (Id., 

¶¶ 32-35). Fred Spainhour alleges that the first John Doe is an individual who oversaw the medical 

care provided to the detention center from March 15, 2016, to March 18, 2016, and caused damages 

to plaintiff (Id., ¶ 32). Fred Spainhour alleges that the second John Doe is any company that 

assisted in medical care for the inmates at the detention center from March 15, 2016, to March 18, 

2016, and caused damages to plaintiff (Id., ¶ 33). Fred Spainhour alleges that the third John Doe 

is any officer who refused to provide medical treatment to Brian Spainhour and caused damages 

to plaintiff (Id., ¶ 34).

Fred Spainhour alleges four counts against all defendants in their individual and official 

capacities: (1) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) Arkansas 

civil rights violations; (3) tort of outrage; and (4) failure to supervise (Id., ¶¶ 36-68). Fred 

Spainhour demands a jury trial and seeks attorney’s fees (Id., ¶7 69-80). As relief, Fred Spainhour

requests damages in an amount adequate to compensate him for the wrongful death of Brian 

Spainhour, all general and special damages caused by the alleged conduct of defendants, punitive 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 3 of 13
4

damages to punish defendants for their egregious and malicious misconduct in reckless disregard 

and conscious indifference to the consequences to Brian Spainhour, and all other relief to which 

he is entitled (Id., at 14).

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on June 12, 2019 (Dkt. No. 2). Defendants assert that Fred 

Spainhour’s complaint is time-barred and should be dismissed with prejudice (Id., ¶ 2). 

Defendants assert that Fred Spainhour concedes that Brian Spainhour was transferred from the 

detention center to the local hospital on March 18, 2016, three years and one week prior to Fred 

Spainhour filing his complaint (Dkt. No. 3, at 2). Defendants state that the complaint does not 

allege any actions, wrongful or otherwise, against any of the defendants after March 18, 2016 (Id.). 

Defendants claim that Fred Spainhour’s cause of action accrued, therefore, on March 18, 2016, 

since that is the latest date at which any wrongful act or omission committed by defendants could 

have occurred (Id., at 2-3). Defendants note that § 1983 claims are governed by the personal injury 

statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose, and defendants claim that under Arkansas 

law that means either a three-year statute of limitations or a two-year statute of limitations, 

depending on the circumstances (Id., at 2). Under either scenario, defendants claim that Fred 

Spainhour is time-barred from bringing this action since the alleged wrongful acts occurred on 

March 18, 2016, over three years before he filed suit (Id., at 3).

Fred Spainhour filed a response in opposition and supporting brief (Dkt. Nos. 4, 5). In 

response, Fred Spainhour asserts that he filed this action within the applicable statutory period 

(Dkt. No. 5, at 2). Fred Spainhour first contends that the three-year statute of limitations period is 

appropriate in wrongful death actions such as this one (Id., at 3). Fred Spainhour also contends 

that the statute of limitations begins to run when the wrongful acts or omissions result in damages, 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 4 of 13
5

not necessarily when they first occur (Id., at 4). Fred Spainhour states that the determination of 

when the injury has occurred is normally a question of fact to be answered by the jury (Id.). In 

wrongful death actions brought under § 1983, Fred Spainhour asserts that the statute of limitations 

begins to run on the date of plaintiff’s death which resulted from defendant’s acts or omissions 

(Id., at 5). Accordingly, Fred Spainhour claims that the statute of limitations began to run on 

March 25, 2016, the date of Brian Spainhour’s death, rendering this action timely filed within the 

three-year limitation period on March 25, 2019 (Id.).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Braden v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 588 F.3d at 678. In making this determination, the court must draw all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the nonmoving party. Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 2009). “When 

ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court must accept the allegations contained in the 

complaint as true and all reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Hafley 

v. Lohman, 90 F.2d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996)).

When the running of the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, the defendant has the 

burden of affirmatively pleading and proving this defense, while “‘[t]he party who is claiming the 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 5 of 13
6

benefit of an exception to the operation of a statute of limitations bears the burden of showing that 

he is entitled to it.’” Motley v. United States, 295 F.3d 820, 824 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wollman 

v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 1980)). 

III. Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court reiterates that Fred Spainhour’s complaint contains four 

causes of action: (1) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment rights 

of Brian Spainhour; (2) Arkansas civil rights violations resulting in damages suffered by Brian 

Spainhour; (3) tort of outrage resulting in severe emotional distress to Brian Spainhour; and (4) a 

policy, practice, or custom of failure to supervise as the moving force behind the violation of Brian 

Spainhour’s constitutional rights (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 36-68). The Court notes that the first cause of 

action represents a federal cause of action and the remaining three causes of action represent state 

law claims. Therefore, the Court will decide whether Fred Spainhour’s federal claim under § 1983 

alleging violations of Brian Spainhour’s Eighth Amendment rights survives defendants’ motion to 

dismiss before moving on to the state claims over which it has supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1367. 

The sole dispute regarding defendants’ motion to dismiss concerns the statute of limitations 

governing Fred Spainhour’s § 1983 claim. This dispute contains two dimensions: (1) which 

statute of limitations applies to the § 1983 claim and (2) when did Fred Spainhour’s cause of action 

for the § 1983 claim accrue. Since the parties agree on the dates upon which the relevant events

in this case transpired, the Court discusses these two issues of law in turn.

A. Applicable Statute Of Limitations

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are governed by the personal injury statute of limitations of the 

state where the claims arose. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985); Wycoff v. Menke, 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 6 of 13
7

773 F.2d 983, 984 (8th Cir. 1985). Under Arkansas law, personal injury actions have a three-year 

statute of limitations. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3). The Eighth Circuit has held that this 

three-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims in Arkansas. See Miller v. Norris, 247 

F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 2001) (“We note that Arkansas’s three-year personal injury statute of 

limitations . . . applies to this § 1983 action filed in Arkansas.); Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 

974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (“In Arkansas, the general personal-injury statute of limitations is 

three years, and this period therefore governs § 1983 actions brought in that state.”); Morton v. 

City of Little Rock, 934 F.2d 180, 183 (8th Cir. 1991) (“[I]n Arkansas the applicable period for a 

§ 1983 action is three years.” (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105; Lyons v. Goodson, 787 F.2d 

411, 412 (8th Cir. 1986))).

Arkansas law also provides that “[a]ll actions against sheriffs . . . upon any liability incurred 

by them by doing any act in their official capacity or by the omission of any official duty” have a 

two-year statute of limitations period. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-109(a). This statute applies 

to deputy sheriffs and jailers as well as sheriffs, see Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp 987, 995 

(E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd in relevant part, rev'd in part, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973), and it has been 

applied to § 1983 claims against sheriffs in their official capacity by courts in this circuit, see 

Crowley v. Benton Cty., No. 05-5098, 2006 WL 3053005, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 26, 2006); Tolliver 

v. Baxter Cty., No. 05-3036, 2006 WL 2032647, at *4 (W.D. Ark. July 18, 2006). If this two-year 

statute of limitations applied to Fred Spainhour’s claims against defendants in their official 

capacities, the Court would dismiss those claims as untimely.

However, at least one court within this district, relying on Wilson v. Garcia, has held that 

the three-year personal injury statute of limitations applies even to claims brought against officers 

in their official capacity pursuant to § 1983. See Allen v. Hall, No. 3:05-CV-00282 GTE, 2007 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 7 of 13
8

WL 5393666, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2007); see also Wilcox v. Robinson, No. 06-CV-1100, 

2008 WL 4446959, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 2008) (holding that the three-year personal injury 

statute of limitations is “the limitation period for all § 1983 cases in Arkansas” despite defendants’ 

contention that Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-56-109 governed the underlying claims). 

Moreover, in a similar situation regarding Missouri’s statutory scheme, the Eighth Circuit 

overruled itself and applied Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions 

to a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against police officers in their individual and official capacities rather 

than the three-year statute of limitations Missouri had for actions against police officers. See Sulik 

v. Taney Cty. (“Sulik II”), 393 F.3d 765, 766-67 (8th Cir. 2005), overruling Sulik v. Taney Cty.

(“Sulik I”), 316 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2003). Relying on Wilson, the Eighth Circuit called the 

application of the three-year statute of limitations “a clear error of law” and confirmed that postWilson a state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs § 1983 claims. Id. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that Arkansas’ three-year statute of limitations for personal 

injury actions applies to this § 1983 action despite the existence of Arkansas Code Annotated § 

16-56-109. Accordingly, the face of Fred Spainhour’s complaint does not establish that a twoyear statute of limitations should apply to bar some or all of his claims.

B. Arkansas Survival And Wrongful Death Actions

Fred Spainhour brings suit as a result of Brian Spainhour’s death resulting from alleged 

acts of defendants. Under Arkansas law, there are two causes of action that arise when a person’s 

death is caused by the negligence of another: (1) a cause of action for the estate under the survival 

statute, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101, and (2) a cause of action for the statutory beneficiaries

under the wrongful-death statute, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102. Matthews v. Travelers Indem. 

Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 485 (Ark. 1968); Miller v. Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp., 250 S.W.3d 574 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 8 of 13
9

(Ark. Ct. App. 2007). Under Arkansas law, an action for the recovery of damages by a deceased 

person suffered prior to death is a survival action. McDonald v. Pettus, 988 S.W.2d 9 (Ark. 1999). 

A survival claim is simply a claim by the injured party that would have ended upon his 

death at common law. The legislature enacted a survival statute allowing those claims to survive

the injured party’s death. Myers v. McAdams, 236 S.W.3d 504 (Ark. 2006); Miller, 250 S.W.3d 

at 577. Under Arkansas law, personal injury actions have a three-year statute of limitations. See

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3). “The statute begins to run when the acts occur.” O’Mara v. 

Dykema, 942 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Ark. 1997). A wrongful death claim under Arkansas law must be 

filed “within three (3) years after the death of the person alleged to have been wrongfully killed,” 

except under certain circumstances not present here. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102(c)(1).

Under controlling law, surviving family members must file a § 1983 claim as a survival 

action; they may file wrongful death actions alleging violations of their own constitutional rights 

or raising applicable state law claims but may not recover wrongful death damages for a § 1983 

claim. See Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 2001). In Neer, the daughter of an 

involuntary patient at a Missouri state hospital brought a § 1983 action against hospital security 

aides alleging the use of excessive force during the takedown and restraint of the patient which 

caused his death. Id. at 1063. The daughter did not pursue her supplemental state-law wrongful 

death claim nor did she bring a separate claim for injury to her own constitutional rights. Id. at 

1064. Instead, she argued that the surviving family members should be allowed to collect damages 

on their own behalf in a § 1983 claim for the wrongful death of another. Id. at 1063. The Eighth 

Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Instead, the Neer court determined that the federal 

remedy to be applied to § 1983 death cases should be a survival action, brought by the estate of 

the deceased victim, and that damages recoverable under § 1983 should be limited only to damages 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 9 of 13
10

recoverable by the decedent. The Neer court reasoned that accepting the daughter’s argument, 

permitting recovery for damages suffered by individuals other than the decedent, and allowing the 

measure of damages under § 1983 to be defined by the language of the Missouri wrongful death 

statute would impermissibly broaden the types of injuries for which Congress intended recovery 

to be available under § 1983, which authorizes only liability “to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 

1983.

As a result, here, the Court determines that Fred Spainhour brings his § 1983 claim alleging 

violations of Brian Spainhour’s Eighth Amendment rights under the Arkansas survival statute and 

that he alleges a state law wrongful death claim over which this Court has supplemental jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Franklin v. Franklin Cty., No. 2:17-cv-2016, 2019 WL 1757533 

(W.D. Ark. Apr. 19, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-1854 (8th Cir. 2019), (determining that § 1983 

claims arising from alleged excessive force that lead to the decedent’s death were sufficiently 

alleged under the Arkansas survival statue and that the court exercised supplemental jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the Arkansas state tort claim for wrongful death). Fred Spainhour 

does not bring in his complaint a § 1983 action alleging violations of his own constitutional rights. 

Cf. Foster v. Midwest Sec. Hous., LLC, No. 05-06116-CV-SJ-GAF, 2006 WL 8438393 (W.D. Mo. 

Oct. 3, 2006) (determining that plaintiffs were not attempting to recover damages on their own 

behalf under § 1983 for the wrongful death of the decedent but instead brought § 1983 claims 

based on violations of their own liberty interests stemming from defendants’ alleged interference 

with plaintiffs’ rights of familial integrity and association).

C. Cause Of Action Accrual Date

Having established that Arkansas’ three-year statute of limitations for personal injury 

actions and Arkansas’ survival statute govern Fred Spainhour’s § 1983 claim alleging an Eighth 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 10 of 13
11

Amendment violation, the Court considers whether Fred Spainhour’s § 1983 cause of action 

accrued on March 18, 2016, or March 25, 2016. 

Courts “look to federal common law to determine when a cause of action under § 1983 

accrues.” Johnson v. Precythe, 901 F.3d 973, 980 (8th Cir. 2018), certiorari granted and judgment 

vacated on other grounds by Precythe v. Johnson, 139 S. Ct. 1546 (2019) (quoting Wallace v. 

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). “Under the traditional rule of accrual . . . the tort cause of action 

accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, when the wrongful act or omission results 

in damages.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391 (quoting 1 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions § 7.4.1, pp. 

526-27). “The standard rule is that accrual occurs ‘when the plaintiff has a complete and present 

cause of action, . . . that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’” Precythe, 901 F.3d 

at 980 (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388). “[A] plaintiff's cause of action accrues when he 

discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the injury that is the basis of the 

litigation.” Id. (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Beckham, 138 F.3d 325, 330 (8th Cir. 1998)).

On this issue, Fred Spainhour’s complaint appears deficient as to the § 1983 claim based 

on an alleged Eighth Amendment violation. Fred Spainhour’s complaint alleges a violation of 

Brian Spainhour’s Eighth Amendment rights, not Fred Spainhour’s own, pursuant to Arkansas’ 

survival statute (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 36-48). See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101. Specifically, Fred 

Spainhour alleges the following actions or omissions violated Brian Spainhour’s constitutional 

rights under the Eighth Amendment, including the right to adequate medical care and the right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment: Deputy Sumners unreasonably withheld necessary 

medical care from Brian Spainhour; Deputy Sweet intentionally withheld necessary medical care 

from Brian Spainhour; and Sheriff Jones intentionally refused to intervene after Deputy Sweet, 

Deputy Ballinger, and Deputy Sumners refused to provide medical care to Brian Spainhour (Dkt. 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 11 of 13
12

No. 1, ¶¶ 38-39, 41-42). Fred Spainhour’s complaint states that, as a direct and proximate result 

of these actions, Brian Spainhour suffered damages in the form of both temporary and permanent 

injuries, including loss of feeling, motor skill deficiencies, emotional distress, and death (Id., ¶ 48).

Fred Spainhour’s complaint states that these alleged actions and omissions occurred on or 

before March 18, 2016 (Id., ¶¶ 19-29). Fred Spainhour’s complaint also asserts that these alleged 

actions and omissions resulted in damages as early as March 18, 2016, when Brian Spainhour 

suffered a stroke and fell into a coma at the detention center (Id., ¶ 26). Accordingly, Brian 

Spainhour had a complete and present cause of action as early as March 18, 2016, due to the 

damages suffered on that day from the alleged wrongdoing of defendants. Further, Fred 

Spainhour’s complaint makes no allegations of wrongful actions or omissions taken by defendants 

upon Brian Spainhour’s release from the detention center on March 18, 2016 (Id., ¶ 19). Though 

Brian Spainhour continued to suffer injuries and damages from the alleged wrongdoing through 

March 25, 2016, his cause of action for his § 1983 claim alleging an Eighth Amendment violation 

accrued on March 18, 2016. 

Accordingly, this Court applies a three-year statute of limitation to Fred Spainhour’s § 

1983 claim alleging an Eighth Amendment violation which accrued March 18, 2016. Because 

Fred Spainhour filed his complaint on March 25, 2019, Fred Spainhour’s § 1983 claim alleging an 

Eighth Amendment violation is time-barred, and the Court dismisses this claim in accordance 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because Fred Spainhour’s complaint states only

one federal claim under § 1983 which the Court dismisses as time-barred, the Court declines to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims raised in the complaint, 

including the Arkansas wrongful death claim, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court 

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 12 of 13
13

dismisses those remaining claims without prejudice and tolls the period of limitations consistent 

with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismisses Fred 

Spainhour’s § 1983 claim alleging an Eighth Amendment violation (Dkt. Nos. 2, 26). Because the

Court considers Fred Spainhour’s federal claim time-barred, the Court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law claims, dismisses without prejudice those 

remaining state law claims, and tolls the limitations period for those claims consistent with 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(d). 

So ordered this 18th day of March, 2020.

 _______________________________

 Kristine G. Baker

 United States District Judge

Case 4:19-cv-00202-KGB Document 27 Filed 03/18/20 Page 13 of 13