Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00590/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00590-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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Gretchen Stites-Cunningham previously brought claims in her 1

individual capacity as well, but these claims have been abandoned.

(Dkt. No. 29.) 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRETCHEN STITES-CUNNINGHAM,

individually and as Guardian

ad Litem for ASHLEY STITES,

a minor,

NO. CIV. S-09-590 LKK/DAD

Plaintiffs,

v.

AQUA LEISURE INDUSTRIES, INC., O R D E R

WAL-MART STORES, INC., THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

and DOES 1-50,

Defendants.

 /

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS

 /

Plaintiff Gretchen Stites-Cunningham, as guardian ad litem for

minor Ashley Stites, brings claims regarding a snow tubing accident

that left Ashley a paraplegic. Plaintiff initially named as 1

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The opposition is styled as being on behalf of both Aqua 2

Leisure and Wal-Mart. Insofar as Wal-Mart has dismissed its claim

for contribution or indemnification, it appears that Wal-Mart has

little ground for opposing the motion for a good faith settlement

determination. Whether or not Wal-Mart opposes the motion does not

change the good faith analysis in this particular case. For

convenience, the court refers to the opposition as being filed

solely on behalf of Aqua Leisure.

2

defendants Aqua Leisure Industries, Inc., the manufacturer of the

tube used during the accident, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the

vendor who sold the tube. Aqua Leisure and Wal-Mart then filed a

third party complaint seeking indemnity and contribution from the

United States, the owner of the land where the accident occurred.

Plaintiff have since amended the complaint to allege that the

United States was directly liable, and Wal-Mart has dismissed its

claim against the United States. Thus, what remains are

plaintiff’s claims against all three defendants, and Aqua Leisure’s

claim against the United States.

Plaintiff and the United States have entered a proposed

settlement agreement. In connection with this agreement, the

United States has filed a motion for a good faith settlement

determination, which if granted would bar Aqua Leisure’s claim

against the United States. Aqua Leisure opposes this motion.2

Plaintiff has also filed separate motions for approval of a minor’s

compromise and to remand the remaining issues to state court.

These latter motions are unopposed. The court resolves all three

motions on the papers and after oral argument. For the reasons

stated below, the motions are granted.

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 These facts are taken from the United States’ motion for a 3

good faith settlement determination and from Aqua Leisure’s

opposition thereto. The court discusses these facts for purposes

of these motions only, and does not make any determinations of

facts for purposes of future proceedings.

 The United States refers to Rich’s daughter as Ashley 4

Stites’s aunt. This term is correct, but it may suggest that

Ashley was supervised by two adults. Although the degree of adult

supervision is not pertinent to the resolution of the pending

motions, the court notes that Ashley Stites is older than her aunt.

3

I. Background3

A. The Subject Accident

The accident underlying this suit occurred on January 6, 2007.

Ashley Stites (“Stites”), who was thirteen years old at the time,

had received a snow tube from her grandmother Roberta Rich as a

Christmas present. This tube was manufactured by Aqua Leisure and

purchased from Wal-Mart. Warning labels were printed on the snow

tube and box, which specified that the tube did not have any

steering or braking mechanisms. On January 6, 2007, Roberta Rich

took Stites (Rich’s granddaughter) and twelve-year-old P. Rich

(Stites’s aunt and Rich’s daughter) to go snow tubing. Stites had 4

never used a snow tube before.

The group went to Eskimo Hill, a no-fee snow play area within

Lassen National Forest. Eskimo Hill features a sloped sledding

hill that is between 150 and 200 yards long, with slopes ranging

from 23 degrees at the top to 10 degrees at the bottom. At the

bottom of this hill is a man-made depression referred to as the

“bowl.” On the side of the bowl opposite the hill is a man-made

earthen berm with a lip which extends 8 to 10 feet above the bottom

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 In opposing this motion, Aqua Leisure states that plaintiff 5

has incurred $300,000 in present medical expenses and anticipates

$3,000,000 in future medical expenses. Because the disparity

between these figures and the Rule 26 disclosures does not impact

4

of the bowl. Beyond this lip is a flat spectators’ area which

extends for approximately ten yards until the treeline. Beyond the

treeline was the boulder Stites ultimately struck.

When the group arrived at Eskimo Hill, they walked past

several warning signs. Roberta Rich read one of these signs and

told plaintiff to be careful. Stites watched several people sled

down the hill and stop in the bowl. Without doing any trial runs

or other testing of the tube, she and her aunt climbed to the

highest point on the hill and got on the tube together. The two

went down the hill without taking any action to steer or slow the

tube. The tube did not stop in the bowl. Instead, it went over

the berm and lip, through the spectators’ area, and past the

treeline. The tube stopped when it hit a boulder within the

forested area. Stites also hit the boulder and sustained the

serious injuries noted above. Although the complaint alleges that

this boulder was placed by the Forest Service, the parties now

agree that this allegation is incorrect, and that the boulder was

naturally occurring.

As a result of the accident, significant medical expenses

accrued. According to her Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 disclosures, Stites

has incurred current medical expenses of $484,957.34, estimated

future medical expenses of $2,490,502, future lost wages of

$815,360.00, and general damages of $10,000,000.5

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the court’s analysis, the court does not inquire as to the

disparity’s source.

 For the remainder of this order, the court uses the format 6

“U.S. XXXX” to refer to exhibits identified by Bates stamp numbers.

5

B. History of Management of The Eskimo Hill Area

Eskimo Hill has been used as a snow play area for more than 80

years, beginning in the 1930s when the Civilian Conservation Corps

cleared the northeast slope of Eskimo Hill for its own winter

recreation use. 

In July of 1970, the United States Forest Service considered

a proposal for commercial development of Eskimo Hill. The Forest

Service noted that one proposal for commercial development, which

involved lengthening and effectively steepening the sledding run,

would risk “excessive velocities and injuries.” Letter of July 13,

1970, document Bates stamped U.S. 1096. For reasons not discussed 6

by the parties in this suit, commercial development and

accompanying slope modifications were rejected. In an August 1980

publication, the Forest Service stated that high use of the area

had lead to “an increasing number of accidents.” U.S. 1109. This

publication noted that in response to this issue, “[t]he slope was

shortened to reduce the speed of descent, groomed to remove risky

jumps, modified to provide a children’s area and so constructed to

keep vehicles out of the toe of the slope.” U.S. 1110. Neither

the 1970 nor the 1980 document refer to any incidents of

“overshooting” the stopping area at Eskimo Hill, or to any risk

thereof under the facility’s configuration at that time.

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In 1994, the Forest Service considered another a proposal to

expand the Eskimo Hill area. The Forest Service conducted an

Environmental Assessment of the proposal pursuant to the National

Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. After this

assessment, the Forest Service selected the option of

“rehabilitation and expansion of facilities at Eskimo Hill,”

including increasing parking capacity and improving access to the

hill from the parking area, design improvements for restroom

facilities, and hill expansion. Decision Notice and Finding of No

Significant Impact, U.S. 0029. However, there was insufficient

funding to implement this decision. Id. Thus, the Forest Service

did not expand the sledding hill itself, although it did lengthen

the run-out area so that the hill was less steep, create a larger

area for sledders to stop, and deepen and further define the bowl,

berm, and lip. 

In connection with the environmental assessment, the

consultant hired by the Forest Service discussed the possibility of

adding a “manzanita crash cushion to prevent sliders from entering

congregating areas or the trees.” Decl. of Eunice C. Majam ISO

Aqua Leisure’s Opp’n, ¶ 5 and Ex. D, p. 2, ¶ 4. The manzanita

cushion was not discussed in the environmental assessment itself.

This manzanita cushion was never constructed. The United States

maintains that this manzanita planting was merely a component of

the proposal to widen the sledding area, and therefore superfluous

absent such widening. Reply at 2. The documents cited by the

United States, however, do not explicitly discuss the manzanita,

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 Because the United States is now named as a defendant in 7

plaintiff’s complaint, Aqua Leisure’s third party complaint might

now be more properly called a cross complaint.

7

and they do not explicitly connect the berm with the proposed hill

expansion. 

Aqua Leisure contends that Eskimo Hill has a history of ice

forming on the bowl area. The evidence indicates that in one

spring after the accident occurred, the Forest Service was

concerned about melting snow creating a frozen pond in the bowl

area. No evidence indicates that this problem has ever occurred

during the sledding season, that it occurred the year of the

accident, or that it has recurred. 

C. Procedural History

Ashley Stites’s mother, Gretchen Stites-Cunningham, filed suit

in state court on June 26, 2007, in her individual capacity and as

guardian ad litem for Ashley Stites. The initial state court

complaint named Aqua Leisure and Wal-Mart as defendants, under

theories of negligence, products liability, strict liability,

breach of warranty, negligent design and inadequate warnings. On

September 22, 2008, Aqua Leisure and Wal-Mart filed a motion

seeking permission to file a third party complaint against the

United States, seeking indemnity and contribution. This motion was

granted, and on March 2, 2009, the United States removed the matter

to federal court. Aqua Leisure and Wal-Mart then filed an amended

third party complaint, and plaintiff subsequently filed an amended

complaint, naming the United States as a defendant. Wal-Mart has 7

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since dismissed its claims against the United States, and Gretchen

Stites-Cunningham has dismissed all claims brought by her in an

individual capacity.

II. Good Faith Settlement

The United States has proposed to settle plaintiff’s claims

against it for $25,000. The parties agree that if this settlement

is in good faith, settlement will bar Aqua Leisure’s claims for

contribution and indemnity.

A. Good Faith Settlement under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 877 & 877.6

Section 877 of the California Code of Civil Procedure

provides, in pertinent part:

Where a release, dismissal with or without

prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to

enforce judgment is given in good faith before

verdict or judgment to one or more of a number

of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the

same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors

mutually subject to contribution rights, it

shall have the following effect:

(a) It shall not discharge any other such

party from liability unless its terms so

provide, but it shall reduce the claims

against the others in the amount stipulated by

the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or

in the amount of the consideration paid for it

whichever is the greater.

(b) It shall discharge the party to whom it is

given from all liability for any contribution

to any other parties.

Section 877.6 provides a procedure for the application of this

rule, subsection (c) of which provides that settlement discharges

liability for indemnity as well as contribution:

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A determination by the court that the

settlement was made in good faith shall bar

any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from

any further claims against the settling

tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable

comparative contribution, or partial or

comparative indemnity, based on comparative

negligence or comparative fault.

Both Section 877 and the indemnity provision of Section 877.6(c)

are substantive rules applicable to state law claims brought in

federal court. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Butler, 904

F.2d 505, 511, 511 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). To the extent that the

remaining provisions of Section 877.6(c) are procedural and not

binding in federal courts, district courts are free to determine

good faith through an analogous procedure. Id. at 511; see also

Slottow v. American Casualty Co., 10 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.

1993).

These provisions apply to the plaintiff’s claims here.

Plaintiff’s claim against the United States arises under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2674. FTCA actions

are governed by the substantive law of the state in which the “act

or omission occurred.” Delta Sav. Bank v. United States, 265 F. 3d

1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001). In accordance with this rule, the

Ninth Circuit has applied Section 877 to settlement of claims

arising under the FTCA. Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461, 1462

(9th Cir. 1983). Aqua Leisure does not dispute that Section 877

applies here.

The “good faith” determination under Section 877 is based on

the factors identified in the California Supreme Court’s decision

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in Tech-Bilt, Inc v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates, 38 Cal.3d 488,

499-500 (1985). These factors include: (i) a rough approximation

of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settler’s proportionate

liability; (ii) the amount paid in settlement; (iii) a recognition

that a settler should pay less in settlement than if found liable

after trial; (iv) the allocation of the settlement proceeds; (v)

the settling party’s financial condition and the availability of

insurance; and (vi) evidence of any collusion, fraud, or tortious

conduct between the settler and the plaintiff aimed at requiring

the non-settling parties pay more than their fair share. In this

analysis, “practical considerations obviously require[] that the

evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the

time of the settlement. A defendant’s settlement figure must not

be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the

time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s

liability to be.” Id.

B. Reasonable Approximation of Liability

Tech-Bilt requires that the court consider a “rough

approximation” of “the settling defendant’s liability.” 38 Cal.3d

at 499-500. Aqua Leisure argues that this requires, at the least,

a discussion of the amount of claimed damages. The United States

contends that where a defense precludes a judgment in plaintiffs’

favor, the amount of damages claimed is irrelevant. Thus, the

United States implicitly invokes a simplistic ‘amount of damages

times likelihood of recovery’ method for valuing claims, together

////

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 Aside from asserting affirmative defenses, the United States 8

also argues that the evidence does not support some of the

allegations underlying plaintiffs’ claims. Notably, plaintiff

alleged that the United States placed the boulder in question on

site, but the evidence has revealed that the boulder’s placement

was natural.

11

with the principle that the product of any amount and zero is

zero. According to the United States, it has no potential 8

liability to plaintiff, and the $25,000 offered in settlement

merely represents the amount the United States saves by avoiding

the burden of proving its defenses.

Insofar as Aqua Leisure argues that the United States has not

met its burden of production, the court declines to deny the motion

merely on the ground that the United States’ opening memorandum did

not explicitly discuss plaintiff’s claimed damages. Plaintiff’s

precise demands were known to all parties, so this omission did not

prejudice Aqua Leisure. Additionally, the United States described

the extent of Stites’s injuries, making it clear to the court that

damages at issue would be high.

Moving beyond the question of the burden of production, Aqua

Leisure’s primary argument is that the $25,000 settlement is

unreasonable. Where the claimed damages are high, even a small

chance of success on the merits is non-negligible. Here, as noted

above, plaintiffs’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) disclosure claims

current medical expenses of $484,957.34, estimated future medical

expenses of $2,490,502, future lost wages of $815,360.00, and

general damages of $10,000,000. At the time of the initial

disclosures, plaintiffs therefore sought $13,790,819.34. Under the

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simplistic valuation method given above, if plaintiffs have, for

example, even a one or two percent chance of succeeding in proving

entitlement to these damages from the United States, the expected

value of their claim is roughly $140,000 or $280,000, less

litigation expenses.

This leaves both Aqua Leisure and the United States in curious

positions. Aqua Leisure ultimately contends that plaintiff’s

claims against all parties are barred by the assumption of risk

doctrine. Aqua Leisure and the United States further agree that

they are similarly situated with respect to this defense. This

leaves Aqua Leisure with a difficult decision. To show that the

settlement is unreasonable, Aqua Leisure must contend that the

settlement underestimates plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery. Aqua

Leisure’s objections therefore implicitly commit it to the position

that the assumption of risk defense has an appreciable likelihood

of failing. If Aqua Leisure were to identify any frailties with

the assumption of risk defense, however, Aqua Leisure might

jeopardize its own ability to invoke the defense in subsequent

proceedings. Presumably concluding that the latter is the greater

evil, Aqua Leisure has chosen not to address the United States’

argument that the assumption of risk defense is independently

sufficient to eliminate the United States’ potential liability.

The court notes that plaintiff has not conceded that the assumption

of risk doctrine bars the claims.

The United States’ position is also curious. Because the

United States has not challenged plaintiff’s damages calculation,

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 The FTCA’s discretionary judgment rule is a sovereign 9

immunity defense, and therefore jurisdictional. A federal court

must confirm that it has subject matter jurisdiction before

addressing non-jurisdictional issues. Immunity defenses, however,

must be affirmatively invoked; thus, a court has subject matter

jurisdiction until a defendant invokes its immunity. Insofar as

the United States merely argues that a discretionary judgment

defense would likely succeed without actually moving for dismissal

on this ground, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over

claims against the United States. The court may therefore consider

California’s Recreational Use Act without addressing the

discretionary judgment rule.

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the United States essentially asks the court to determine that a

reasonable person would conclude that the United States’ defenses

have in aggregate much less than a one percent chance of failing.

The United States has not, however, actually asked the court to

rule on the applicability of its defenses. Nonetheless, the United

States has submitted a statement of disputed facts and supporting

exhibits and affidavits in connection with the instant motion which

satisfy the local rules and the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e). 

Despite the oddity of both Aqua Leisure’s and the United

States’ positions, the substantive legal question involved is not

difficult. As explained below, the United States has made a

sufficient showing that claims against it are barred by

California’s Recreational Use Act. Because the court concludes

that the showing as to this defense is sufficient to render the

settlement a reasonable approximation of the United States’

liability (at most), the court need not examine the United States’

other defenses, i.e., the assumption of risk doctrine and the

discretionary judgment rule.9

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 Thus, the United States and Aqua Leisure agree that 10

plaintiff was engaged in recreational activity within the meaning

of this provision, and that the other two exceptions to the

immunity provision do not apply here.

 Whether the California statute applies to FTCA claims is 11

plainly a question of federal law. The subsequent question of

interpretation of the California statute appears to be a question

of state, rather than federal, law. Both Aqua Leisure and the

United States nonetheless solely rely on federal cases interpreting

the California statute, the most recent of which is Tremini,

decided in 1992. 

14

California Civil Code section 846 provides landowners with

immunity from actions arising from recreational use of their

property. The United States may invoke this state law defense in

FTCA actions. Termini v. United States, 963 F.2d 1264, 1266 (9th

Cir. 1992) (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980)). The

United States and Aqua Leisure agree that in this case, this

statute immunizes the United States unless the United States was

“willful or malicious [in failing] to guard or warn against a

dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.” Cal. Civ. Code

§ 846(a). In this context, misconduct is willful only where 10

defendant had “(1) actual or constructive knowledge of the peril to

be apprehended, (2) actual or constructive knowledge that injury is

a probable, as opposed to a possible, result of the danger, and (3)

[a] conscious failure to act to avoid the peril.” Termini, 963

F.2d at 1267, Spires v. United States, 805 F.2d 832, 834 (9th Cir.

1986).11

Aqua Leisure argues that this case is factually analogous to

Termini, where the Recreational Use statute did not immunize the

United States from liability where a Forest Service road ended in

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an abrupt cliff, which a driver accidentally drove over. 963 F.2d

at 1261. In discussing the first willfulness element, the Termini

court held that “Common sense dictates that a precipice at the end

of a road constitutes a peril to be apprehended. It is equally

clear that the United States possessed actual knowledge of this

peril. It does not deny that the USFS built and maintained the

spur that ends literally at the cliff’s edge.” Id. at 1267. Here,

nothing indicates that the United States had actual or constructive

knowledge of the danger posed by the boulder in question, or by

other boulders present, if any. If the inquiry is broadened to

consider the danger of overshooting the sledding area, the United

States knew of this danger in the abstract, although nothing

indicates that the United States knew that Eskimo Hill, as

configured at the time of the accident, presented this danger.

Thus, the court doubts that the United States had knowledge of the

peril within the meaning of California’s Recreational Use Act.

Nonetheless, because the other elements of willfulness are

unsatisfied, further discussion of this issue is unnecessary, and

the court assumes that the United States knew that overshooting was

a danger.

As to the second willfulness element, in Termini, “the United

States should . . . have known that sooner or later an accident

would occur if it did not warn or guard against the cliff’s

presence.” Id. at 1268. This was because “The spur as designed

and maintained simply [did] not account for the possibility of

error, be it induced by human, mechanical or natural factors.” Id.

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This conclusion was further supported by the fact that the Forest

Service’s own safety regulations, as understood by the Ninth

Circuit, required placement of a sign warning of the danger. By

adopting regulations requiring a warning, the Forest Service

demonstrated knowledge of the fact that the condition was

dangerous. Id. The mere fact that no prior accidents had occurred

did not demonstrate that such an accident was unlikely. Id. at

1269. However, neither Termini nor the California authorities

cited therein concluded that the absence of prior accidents was

irrelevant. Id. (“‘the matter of probability is not to be assessed

solely by the number of prior accidents, which adventitiously may

have been few, but by all the circumstances.’”) (quoting Lostritto

v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140

Cal. Rptr. 905, 909 (1977)) (emphasis added). 

In this case, even assuming that the United States had actual

or constructive knowledge that overshooting was a danger, there is

little, if any, evidence indicating that the United States had

actual or constructive knowledge that it was probable that both

overshooting would occur and that injury would result. First,

while Aqua Leisure argues that the United States had actual

knowledge of this probability, the evidence relied upon by Aqua

Leisure does not indicate that the United States ever concluded

that overshooting was likely at Eskimo Hill under an existing

configuration. Second, subsequent to the 1970 and 1994

assessments, each of which discussed the possibility of

overshooting in the abstract, the Forest Service took steps to make

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 The United States further argues that willful misconduct, 12

for purposes of California’s Recreational Use Act, requires a

hidden peril. While both Tremino and Spires involved hidden

perils, it appears that neither case explicitly relied on the fact

that these dangers were hidden from recreational users, and the

United States has not provided any additional authority indicating

that willful misconduct requires a hidden peril. 

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overshooting less likely, such as deepening the bowl and

constructing a berm. Third, in this case, the lack of prior

accidents is a stronger indicator of safety than it was in Tremino.

Eskimo Hill had been used by thousands of sledders over decades

without an accident similar to plaintiff’s. In Tremino, because

the road was rarely used, the lack of accidents could more easily

be attributed to a statistical fluke.12

As to the third willfulness factor, in light of the many

proactive steps taken by the Forest Service to ensure the safety of

Eskimo Hill (moving the spectators’ area, deepening the bowl,

constructing a berm, limiting the height of the sledding hill,

removing jumps in the sledding hill, etc.), and the lack of

evidence indicating the probability of injury or the United States’

knowledge thereof, there appears to be no evidence to indicate that

the United States “consciously failed to act to avoid the peril.”

Based on the above, if the present motion were one for summary

judgment, the court would be inclined to grant summary judgment to

the United States, concluding that the United States was not liable

to plaintiff or for contribution or indemnity to Aqua Leisure.

This is not such a motion. If the court were inclined to address

the issue sua sponte, thereby definitively absolving the United

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States of all liability, then at the very least, due process would

require that plaintiff be provided notice of this inclination and

an opportunity to argue that the Recreational Use statute does not

apply. Aqua Leisure, on the other hand, has had its day in court.

Despite considering Aqua Leisure’s objections, the court is

persuaded that the proposed $25,000 settlement is not so low as to

be “out of the ballpark” of the United States’ potential liability

in this matter. City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court of San

Bernadino County, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1262 (1987). 

C. Remaining Tech-Bilt Factors

Aqua Leisure does not dispute that the remaining Tech-Bilt

factors weigh in favor of a finding of good faith. Most notably,

the record does not indicate “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct

aimed to injure the interest of non-settling defendants.” TechBilt, 698 P.2d at 166-67. Accordingly, the court concludes that

the settlement is in good faith for purposes of Cal. Code Civ. P.

section 877 and 877(c). The settlement therefore insulates the

United States from claims for contribution or indemnity to other

defendants. Because Aqua Leisure’s third party claim (now a crossparty claim) is barred, the court dismisses this claim with

prejudice.

III. Approval of Minor’s Compromise

Under E.D. Cal. Local Rule 202, settlement of a claim brought

on behalf of a minor requires court approval. Local Rule 202(c)

requires disclosure of the terms of counsel’s employment, and what

counsel will receive under the settlement. California law imposes

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similar requirements. 

Here, the terms of the settlement provide that the entire

$25,000 will go to plaintiff’s counsel, who have purportedly

already incurred costs (exclusive of fees) in excess of $30,00 in

this action.

As explained in the preceding section, the court finds that a

reasonable person would anticipate that the United States has

little, if any, liability toward plaintiff. Moreover, if the

United States were to file and prevail upon a dispositive motion,

the United States would be entitled to recover costs from

plaintiffs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). In light of these

factors, the court approves the minor’s compromise.

IV. Remand

The United States removed on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1346,

which provides for federal jurisdiction where the United States is

a party. Because plaintiff’s claims against the United States are

hereby settled, and Aqua Leisure’s claims against the United States

are therefore barred, the United States is no longer a party to

this action. Neither Aqua Leisure nor Wal-Mart dispute that remand

is appropriate if the United States is dismissed. Accordingly, the

motion for remand is granted.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the court ORDERS as follows:

1. The motion for approval of a minor’s compromise (Dkt. No.

38) is GRANTED.

2. The Unites States’ motion for good faith settlement

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determination (Dkt. No. 33) is GRANTED. 

3. Because the good faith settlement bars claims against the

United States for indemnity or contribution, Aqua

Leisure’s third party complaint/cross-complaint against

the United States (Dkt. No. 11) is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

4. All claims against the United States having been

resolved, the United States is no longer a party to this

suit. Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Dkt. No. 39) is

therefore GRANTED. The matter is remanded to state

court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 10, 2010.

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