Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04040/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04040-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAVIS JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

 v.

A. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-04040 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On November 9, 2004, Petitioner pleaded guilty in San Mateo County Superior Court

to possession of cocaine base for sale (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11351.5) and admitted a

prior strike conviction (Cal. Penal Code § 1170.12(c)(1)) from July 8, 1997. Respondent’s

Exhibit (“Exh.”) B at 4, 7. On November 30, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced to six years in

state prison pursuant to a plea agreement. Id. at 7; Exh. C. 

Petitioner did not appeal his conviction; instead he filed a series of petitions for writ of

habeas corpus, which were all denied. Petitioner first filed a habeas petition in the San

Mateo County Superior Court, which was denied on March 8, 2006. Exhibits (“Exhs.”) D &

E. He subsequently filed a second habeas petition in San Mateo County Superior Court,

which was denied on April 26, 2006. Exhs. F & G. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in

the California Court of Appeal, which was similarly denied. See Exh. H. Finally, Petitioner

filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court challenging the appellate court’s

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decision. Id. The state supreme court denied review of the petition on June 14, 2007. Exh.

I. 

After exhausting his state judicial remedies, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition

for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court on June 29, 2006. See Petition. Per order filed on

December 4, 2006, the court found that Petitioner’s claims – that his plea was not knowing

and voluntary, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel – appeared cognizable

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), when liberally construed, and ordered respondent to show cause

as to why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to

the order to show cause and Petitioner has filed a traverse. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On the evening of April 8, 2004, a Menlo Park police officer driving an unmarked car

spotted a white vehicle parked in a gas station parking lot known for illegal drug activity. 

Exh. A at 6. Immediately before the officer pulled into the parking lot, a car driven by

Petitioner drove onto the lot and parked beside the white vehicle. Id. at 7. The officer then

observed the driver of the white vehicle approach Petitioner’s car and make hand-to-hand

contact. Id. at 9. When the officer approached the two vehicles, he saw Petitioner throw

something inside his car. Id. at 11. When the officer subsequently searched Petitioner’s

pockets, he found $320. Id. at 14. When he searched Petitioner’s car, the officer found two

pieces of “off white colored rock shaped material” that were later determined to be base

cocaine. Id. at 15. A later search of the female passenger in Petitioner’s car also yielded

base cocaine. Id. at 15. In later interviews with police officers, both the driver of the white

vehicle and the female passenger in Petitioner’s car stated that Petitioner was in the gas

station parking lot with the intention of selling base cocaine. Id. at 18-22. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

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established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.2d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a state

court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme

Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Claims

Petitioner claims that his guilty plea and six-year sentence are invalid because: (1) his

plea was not “knowing or voluntary” because he was not informed of the maximum

punishment that would result from his plea, that he had to serve 80 percent of his sentence or

that he did not face life in prison if he proceeded to trial; and (2) he received ineffective

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The terms “intelligent” and “knowing” are sometimes used interchangeably. Compare

Parke, 506 U.S. at 28 (knowing and voluntary) with Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (voluntary and

intelligent). 

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assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to inform him that he had to serve 80 percent

of his sentence, and because counsel incorrectly informed him that he faced life in prison if

he proceeded to trial. Petitioner argues that had he known that he did not face the possibility

of life in prison, he would not have pleaded guilty, and instead, would have proceeded to

trial. Pet. at 6. The claims are without merit.

1. Knowing and voluntary guilty plea

Due process requires that a guilty plea be both knowing and voluntary because

it constitutes the waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to

confront one’s accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination. See Boykin v.

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). The long-standing test for determining the validity

of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the

alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992)

(quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). A plea is “involuntary” if it is

the product of threats, improper promises, or other forms of improper coercion, Brady v.

United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1970), and is “unknowing” or “unintelligent” if the

defendant is without the information necessary to assess intelligently “the advantages and

disadvantages of a trial as compared with those attending a plea of guilty.” Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).1

A plea is not voluntary unless it is “entered by one fully aware of the direct

consequences” of the plea. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. A defendant must be advised of the

maximum allowable punishment that will result from his plea. See Torrey v. Estelle, 842

F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1988). Failure to inform a defendant of the direct consequences of a

guilty plea therefore may render a plea involuntary. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 5

F.3d 365, 368-70 (9th Cir. 1993) (sentence vacated and case remanded for resentencing

where court failed to inform defendant of supervised release affecting maximum possible

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punishment). 

Petitioner’s claim that his plea is invalid because he was not advised that he faced a

maximum sentence of ten years in prison, or that he had to serve 80 percent of his sentence,

is without merit. The record shows that Petitioner signed a change of plea form on

November 9, 2004 that informed him that he had to serve 80 percent of his sentence and that

he faced up to ten years in prison if he pleaded guilty. The change of plea form states in

pertinent part: “My attorney has explained to me that the maximum penalty, including

penalty assessments, which could be imposed as a result of my plea(s) of guilty or nolo

contendere is: 10 years CDC, up to 4 years parole, $20,000 restitution fine, $200 minimum,

$20,000 fine, registration as narcotics offender, serve sentence at 80%.” Exh. J. It also states

that Petitioner had not “been induced to plead guilty by any promise or representation of a

lesser sentence, probation, regard, immunity, or anything else except: 6 yrs CDC.” Id.

The change of plea form makes clear that Petitioner was informed of the direct

consequences of his guilty plea. His conclusory assertions to the contrary are unavailing. 

Cf. Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986) (declarations in open court and on

the waiver of rights form carry a strong presumption of verity). Petitioner’s claim that his

plea is invalid because the court failed to inform him that he did not face life in prison if he

proceeded to trial is also without merit. The record shows that only one strike was charged

in the Information. Under California law, this subjected Petitioner to a doubling of the term

for the possession offense, i.e., ten years; only if two strikes had been alleged, would

Petitioner have been subjected to life in prison. See Cal. Penal Code § 1170.12(c). The San

Mateo County Superior Court reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claim on the ground that the

trial court “was not required to advise petitioner that he had not already suffered two strikes.” 

Exh. G at 2. Petitioner was entitled to be informed of the direct consequences of his plea,

and the record shows that he was. See Torrey, 842 F.2d at 235.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims that his plea was not

knowing and voluntary. The state courts’ rejection of the claims was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or

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was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel

A defendant seeking to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the ground

of ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part standard of Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), by showing “that (1) his ‘counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability

that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted

on going to trial.’” Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hill,

474 U.S. at 57-59). 

The transcript of the plea hearing plays a significant role in an inquiry into the validity

of a plea: 

For the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the

prosecutor at such a hearing, as well as any findings made by

the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in

any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations

in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The

subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations

unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as

are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly

incredible. 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (citations omitted).

Petitioner claims that his counsel failed to inform him that he had to serve 80 percent

of his sentence. The claim is contradicted by the change of plea form and by Petitioner’s

“solemn declarations in open court” that “carry a strong presumption of verity.” Id. On

November 9, 2005, the court asked Petitioner whether he had “gone over [the change of plea

form] in its entirety” and whether the signature on the form was indeed his. Exh. B at 2. 

Petitioner responded affirmatively to both questions. Id. Petitioner’s mere assertions that

counsel did not inform him that he had to serve 80 percent of his sentence are unavailing. 

See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-74 

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Petitioner claims that his counsel incorrectly told him that he faced the possibility of

life in prison if he proceeded to trial. Petitioner asserts that had he correctly known that he

was not facing a life sentence, he would not have pleaded guilty and, instead, would have

risked proceeding to trial. Petitioner’s claim is without merit. Nothing in the record supports

Petitioner’s assertion that his counsel incorrectly informed him that he faced the possibility

of life in prison if he proceeded to trial. Rather, the record makes clear, as the change of plea

form illustrates, that Petitioner was informed that he faced a maximum sentence of ten years,

but would be sentenced to no more than six years if he pleaded guilty. Cf. United States v.

Barrios-Gutierrez, 255 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2001) (while defendant must be advised

of the range of allowable punishment that will result from his plea, the trial court need not

determine the actual punishment the prosecutor will seek or has the right to seek, so long as

the defendant was informed of the maximum possible sentence he faces).

Petitioner has not shown that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See

Womack, 497 F.3d at 1002. After all, Petitioner received a significant benefit from his plea

agreement – six years, instead of ten, for a pretty “slam-dunk” of a possession charge. See

United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 845-47 (9th Cir. 1996) (counsel may commit

serious errors, but as long as counsel succeeds in substantially reducing the sentence

defendant would have likely received had he gone to trial, there is no prejudice). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel. The state courts’ rejection of the claims was not contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

//

//

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G:\CRBALL\2007\4040\Order denying habeas petition.wpd 8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 18, 2007

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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