Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01555/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01555-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Abraham Barrera Moreno, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-1555-PHX-PGR (LOA)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Abraham Barrera Moreno’s Motion to

Appoint Counsel, filed on October 1, 2012. (Doc. 9) In their Response, Respondents take

no position regarding Petitioner’s Motion. (Doc. 11) A reply was neither filed nor warranted.

I. Background

On July 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(Doc.1) Petitioner was convicted upon a plea of guilty to second degree murder pursuant

to a plea agreement and sentenced to 22 years in the Arizona Department of Corrections.

(Doc. 4) According to records available on-line, Petitioner’s sentence will expire in 2028.

(Id., at 1 n. 1) In his Petition, Petitioner raises two grounds for relief: 1) ineffective assistance

of trial counsel, and 2) ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel, both in violation

of his Sixth Amendment rights. Respondents were served with the Petition on September 24,

2012. (Docs. 5 and 6) The Court granted Petitioner’s Application to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis, doc. 2, on October 22, 2012. (Doc. 10) 

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On October 1, 2012, Petitioner filed the pending Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc.

9) Citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Petitioner essentially requests his pro se

Petition and other filings be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers. (Id. at 1-2) In his motion, Petitioner contends he has a “severe mental illness” and

lacks an education which prevent him from properly presenting his case in the District Court

of Arizona. (Id. at 2) Petitioner claims a denial of appointed counsel“would be prejudicial”

and “seriously put in jeopardy” his “rights to due process.” (Id.) 

On October 23, 2012, the Court ordered Respondents to file a response to Plaintiff’s

motion. (Doc. 11) Respondents filed their Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

October 31, 2012, doc. 12, and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

on November 1, 2012, doc. 13, respectively. While they take no position on Petitioner’s

request for appointment of counsel, Respondents note Petitioner has not provided the Court

any current evidence of his mental health issues in support of his request for appointed

counsel. (Doc. 13 at 2) Respondents additionally state that there is no indication in

Petitioner’s habeas petition that he is unable to understand the court proceedings or

procedures. (Id.) 

II. Right to Counsel

A. Criminal Cases

In 1963, the United States Supreme Court held that the States were required by the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all indigent

defendants charged with felonies. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Sixteen years

later, in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Supreme Court expanded the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, prohibiting the incarceration of any indigent defendant who

is not offered appointed counsel, but only in those criminal cases in which a sentence of

imprisonment is actually imposed. Id., 440 U.S. at 373 (actual imprisonment is “the line

defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel”). More recently, counsel may

be appointed to indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors pursuant to Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 44(a). See United States v. Downin, 884 F.Supp. 1474 (E.D. Cal.

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1995).

B. Civil Cases

Generally, “[t]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v.

Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted);

see also United States v. Griggs, 2008 WL 4810778, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2008)

(discussing appointment of counsel for indigent litigants in civil contempt and other

proceedings) (citations omitted). “However, a court may appoint counsel for indigent civil

litigants under exceptional circumstances.” Ming Ching Jin v. Forgia, 362 Fed.Appx. 649,

650 (9th Cir. 2010). Because there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil

case, “[t]he decision to appoint counsel is left to the sound discretion of the district court.”

Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1991); Ivey v. Board of

Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

“It is well settled that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t

of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978) (citations omitted). “[T]he Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure apply in habeas proceedings only ‘to the extent that the practice in such

proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to

the practice in civil actions.’” Id. (quoting current Rule 81(a)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P.). As with most

civil cases, “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas

corpus actions by state prisoners.” Salceda v. Salazar, 2009 WL 2514126, at *1 (S.D. Cal.

Aug. 14, 2009) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991) (citing Pennsylvania

v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“The right to appointed counsel extends to the first

appeal of right, and no further”)); Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996)

(noting that there currently exists no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in habeas

proceedings); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).

Although no constitutional right exists to do so, there is a statutory basis upon which

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1

 “In 1988, Congress enacted the legislation now known as § 3599 to govern

appointment of counsel in capital cases, thus displacing § 3006A for persons facing

execution (but retaining that section for all others).” Martel v. Clair, U.S. , 132 S.Ct.

1276, 1284-85 (March 5, 2012) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3599).

2

 Title 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) provides:

(2) Whenever the United States magistrate judge or the court determines that

the interests of justice so require, representation may be provided for any

financially eligible person who— . . . 

(B) is seeking relief under section 2241, 2254, or 2255 of title 28.

(emphasis added). 

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counsel may be appointed in a non-capital federal habeas action.1

 District courts may appoint

counsel for financially eligible habeas petitioners when “the interests of justice so require.”

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B)2

; Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196. “Unless an evidentiary hearing is

required, the decision to appoint counsel in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding is a discretionary

matter.” Price v. Cashell, 2007 WL 837229, at *8 (D. Mont. March 14, 2007) (citing

Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir. 1988)). “Generally, counsel should only

be appointed when the circumstances of the case indicate that such appointment is necessary

to prevent a due process violation.” Id. (citation omitted). If, however, an evidentiary hearing

is ordered, appointment of counsel is mandatory. See, e.g., Johnson v. Henry, 2009 WL

3424195, at *1 (E.D. Cal. October 23, 2009). 

III. Discussion

At this early juncture in this habeas action, the Court has not determined that an

evidentiary hearing is necessary. Nevertheless, after reviewing his 14-page Petition,

Petitioner demonstrated an ability to understand the applicable law, recited his relevant

history and legal authority, checked the applicable and inapplicable boxes on the form

Petitioner used, and articulated understandably how his prior lawyers’ allegedly ineffectively

represented him.

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3

 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.3(a) authorizes a trial court to order a

pretrial mental health evaluation only “[i]f the court determines that reasonable grounds for

an examination exist. . . .” See State of Arizona v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 442-43, 94 P.3d

1119, 1137-38 (Ariz. 2004) (citations omitted).

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Petitioner’s motion is much like the issues and arguments presented in Lavery v.

Singh, 2011 WL 5975934 (S.D. Cal. November 29, 2011). In Lavery, petitioner filed a

motion, contemporaneously with his habeas petition, requesting, among other things, the

appointment of counsel. Petitioner alleged that he required the assistance of counsel because

he “suffers from various mental illnesses and deficiencies and another inmate has had to help

him prepare his habeas filings.” 2011 WL 5975934, at *1. There, the district court found that

petitioner’s medical records were, at least, seven years old and petitioner did not submit any

evidence that he was currently suffering from a mental illness that prevented him from

proceeding without counsel. Id. The court ultimately denied petitioner’s request for

appointment of counsel because petitioner did not “present any relevant or recent evidence

of current incompetence . . . .” Id. at *4. Cf. Derritt v. Galaza, 229 F.3d 1157, 2000 WL

868537, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying, inter alia, Petitioner’s request for appointment of

counsel because Petitioner’s “mere allegation that he suffers from a mental illness is

insufficient to toll the limitations period or require an evidentiary hearing. He did not allege

what mental disorder he suffered from, whether he suffered from that disorder during the

limitations period, or how the disorder would have rendered him incompetent to file a timely

habeas petition.”). 

Petitioner attached to his Petition an Arizona Rule 113

 mental health evaluation, dated

January 3, 2007, ordered by a Yuma County Superior Court judge, in which the examiner

concluded Petitioner was “not competent to stand trial [because] he is still too psychotic to

rationally and meaningfully assist his attorney in his own defense.” (Doc. 9, Exh. A at 13)

This evaluation, however, is more than six years old and, most likely, there are other mental

health reports closer in time to his guilty plea, finding Petitioner competent to proceed,

which have not been provided to the Court as this early stage of this case. Moreover,

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Petitioner has offered no evidence that he is currently suffering from a severe mental illness

that prevents him from understanding the pending court proceedings. 

IV. Conclusion

Petitioner has not established that the interests of justice at this time require the

appointment of counsel. Whether he requested it or not, his pro se Petition and future filings

will not be held to the higher standard expected of lawyers and will “be construed so as to

do justice.” See Rule 8(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. Even as lawyers must, pro se Petitioner, however,

must become familiar, and comply, with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of

Practice for the District Court for the District of Arizona (“Local Rules”). Carter v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986). There is no reason

at this time to believe Petitioner cannot do so. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner’s

motion without prejudice and will revisit the issue if the need to so arises or a hearing is

required. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint to Counsel, doc. 9, is

DENIED without prejudice. 

Dated this 31st day of January, 2013. 

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