Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-05-99009/USCOURTS-ca9-05-99009-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THEODORE WASHINGTON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-99009

D.C. No.

CV-95-02460-JAT

THEODORE WASHINGTON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-15536

D.C. No.

CV-95-02460-JAT

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc March 22, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed August 15, 2016

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2 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and William A.

Fletcher, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton, Jay S.

Bybee, Consuelo M. Callahan, Carlos T. Bea, Milan D.

Smith, Jr., Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen and Paul J.

Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Christen;

Dissent by Judge Bybee;

Dissent by Judge Watford

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 3

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) / 

Fed. R. Civ P. 60(b)

In appeal No. 07-15536, the en banc court reversed the

district court’s order denying Arizona death row inmate

Theodore Washington’s motion under Fed. Civ. P. 60(b) to

vacate and renter its judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254

habeas corpus petition so that his appeal could be timely, and

remanded for the district court to vacate and reenter its

judgment nunc pro tunc as of June 9, 2005, in a case in which

Washington filed a notice of appeal one day beyond the 30-

day window set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) and did not

request an extension until well after the grace period expired.

The en banc court rejected the State of Arizona’s

argument that the district court lacked authority to vacate its

judgment and that this court is without jurisdiction to hear the

appeal. Having considered the interests of finality, the danger

of prejudice to the State, that Washington missed the filing

deadline by just one day, and the absence of any indication of

bad faith by his lawyers, the en banc court concluded that

relief was required under Rule 60(b)(1) or, alternatively, Rule

60(b)(6).

The en banc court wrote that after the district court

reenters its judgment, Washington’s appeal from the denial of

his § 2254 petition may proceed in appeal No. 05-99009.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

Judge Bybee, joined by Judges Callahan, Bea, Ikuta, and

Watford, dissented. He wrote that the majority ignores the

holding in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), that the

FRAP timely filing requirements are mandatory and

jurisdictional, by shoehorning an essentially equitable

exception to the jurisdictional requirements of Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a) into Rule 60(b).

Judge Watford also dissented because Bowles held that

the filing deadline for civil appeals is jurisdictional and thus

not subject to equitable exceptions. He offered thoughts as to

why the Bowles holding is worth revisiting, should the

Supreme Court decide to take up the issue. 

COUNSEL

Gilbert H. Levy (argued), Law Offices of Gilbert H. Levy,

Seattle, Washington, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Laura Chiasson (argued), Assistant Attorney General; Terry

Goddard, Attorney General; Office of the Arizona Attorney

General, Tucson, Arizona; for Respondent-Appellee.

Nathaniel C. Love (argued), Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago,

Illinois; Mark E. Haddad, Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles,

California; David M. Porter, Co-Chair, NACDL Amicus

Committee; for Amicus Curiae National Association of

Criminal Defense Lawyers.

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 5

OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

Theodore Washington, an Arizona death row inmate, filed

a notice of appeal (“NOA”) thirty-one days after the district

court denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) limited the window for

filing this notice to just thirty days, but the rules also

provided a grace period for requesting an extension of time. 

Due to a combination of circumstances—including an error

by the court—Washington did not request an extension

because he did not learn that his NOA was one business day

late until well after the grace period expired. Washington

filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

asking the district court to vacate and reenter its judgment so

that his appeal could be deemed timely. The district court

denied his request, and he appeals.

The State argues that the district court lacked the

authority to vacate and reenter its judgment, and that our

court is without jurisdiction to consider Washington’s appeal. 

We disagree.

The filing deadline in Rule 4(a)(1) is mandatory and

jurisdictional, but from their inception, the rules have also

given district courts authority to grant relief from judgment. 

This is a death penalty case and we are mindful that both of

Washington’s co-defendants received relief from their death

sentences. Dismissal of Washington’s appeal would prevent

any appellate review of the denial of his potentially

meritorious habeas petition, yet it was a court error that

prevented Washington from seeking an extension of time

expressly allowed by the Rules. Therefore, having

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6 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

considered the interests of finality, the danger of prejudice to

the State, that Washington missed the filing deadline by just

one day, and the absence of any indication of bad faith by his

lawyers, we conclude that relief was required under Rule

60(b)(1) or, alternatively, 60(b)(6). We reverse the district

court’s order and remand for the district court to vacate and

reenter its judgment nunc pro tunc as of June 9, 2005. Once

judgment is reentered, Washington’s appeal from the denial

of his petition for writ of habeas corpus will be timely and

may be considered on its merits.

BACKGROUND

Washington is one of three co-defendants who were

convicted in 1987 of first degree murder and other offenses

after two of them entered a home and robbed and shot its

occupants. State v. Robinson, 796 P.2d 853, 856–58 (Ariz.

1990). All three defendants were sentenced to death. One of

them, James Mathers, prevailed on direct appeal when the

Arizona Supreme Court ruled that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction. See State v. Mathers,

796 P.2d 866, 873 (Ariz. 1990) (In Banc). The second codefendant, Fred Robinson, argued in his federal habeas

petition that the state trial court’s application of a “cruel,

heinous, and depraved” sentencing enhancement was

arbitrary and capricious, and that counsel was ineffective at

the penalty phase of the defendants’ joint trial. See Robinson

v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1110–12 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Robinson was granted relief on habeas review, see id. at

1113, and on remand the state trial court resentenced him to

sixty-seven years to life, see Judgment and Sentence, Case

No. S1400CR87-14064 (Yuma Cty., Ariz., Oct. 25, 2011).

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 7

Washington’s case initially took the same procedural path

as Robinson’s. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed

Washington’s conviction on direct appeal. State v. Robinson,

796 P.2d at 856. Washington filed a petition for postconviction relief in the state trial court, which remarked that

it had “a great deal of difficulty finding a basis to hold this

defendant culpable which does not apply, at least equally or

in a greater manner, to James Mathers [the co-defendant

whose conviction the Arizona Supreme Court overturned for

insufficient evidence]. If Mathers, who was present at all

times before the entry into the . . . [victim’s] residence, was

not guilty of conspiring to rob and kill, no greater evidence

seems to place this defendant at the scene.” Nevertheless, the

court denied Washington’s petition, and the Arizona Supreme

Court summarily denied his petition for review. Washington

then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the District of

Arizona. Like Robinson, Washington argued that the state

trial court erred by imposing a “cruel, heinous, and depraved”

sentencing enhancement, and that he received constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of

his trial. Despite these similarities, the course of these cases

sharply diverged on federal habeas review.

The district court’s denial of Washington’s federal habeas

petition became final on June 8, 2005, but the court did not

indicate whether it would grant a certificate of appealability

(“COA”). Washington had thirty days to file a NOA, see

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), and the thirtieth day after the district

court entered its judgment was Friday, July 8, 2005. Due to

a calendaring error by Washington’s lawyers, his NOA and

motion for a COA were filed on Monday, July 11, 2005, one

business day after Rule 4(a)(1)’s filing deadline. The Federal

Rules anticipate late filings: Rule 4(a)(5) provides a thirtyday grace period within which parties may request more time

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8 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

to file a NOA upon a showing of good cause or excusable

neglect. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Washington had plenty

of time to file a motion seeking additional time under Rule

4(a)(5), but due to a court error, he did not receive notice that

his NOA was late, so he did not know that he needed an

extension of time.

Two circumstances aligned to prevent Washington from

learning that his NOA was late within the thirty-day period

allowed to seek an extension. First, there were no filings in

the district court case, and no entries on the district court

docket, for over two and a half months after the NOA was

filed. Nothing happened that would have prompted

Washington’s lawyers to recalculate the Rule 4(a)(1)

deadline, so nothing short of spontaneously recalculating its

due date would have put Washington’s lawyers on notice of

their calendaring error. Second, the district court clerk’s

office did not promptly send Washington’s late-filed NOA to

the appellate clerk, despite an express directive that it do so. 

In 2005, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(d) required

the district clerk to “promptly send a copy of the notice of

appeal” to the appellate clerk. Fed. R. App. P. 3(d). For

reasons not apparent from the record, the district clerk did not

comply with this rule. Rather, the clerk waited for the district

court to rule on Washington’s motion for a COA before

sending the NOA to the appellate court. The district court

ruled on the motion for a COA on September 30, over two

and a half months after it was filed; the clerk then sent the

NOA on to the appellate court; and a week after receiving it,

the appellate clerk issued an order to show cause why

Washington’s appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. 

By then it was too late to seek an extension of time under

Rule 4(a)(5), but within six days Washington filed a motion

under Rule 60(b) asking the district court to vacate and

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 9

reenter its judgment so that his appeal could be decided on

the merits.

Washington’s motion was premised on Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) or, alternatively, Rule 60(b)(6). He

asked the district court to vacate and reenter its judgment

denying his habeas petition either: (1) as of June 9, 2005,

thereby rendering his original appeal timely; or

(2) immediately, thereby triggering a new thirty-day filing

window pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1). The district court

concluded that it did not have authority to grant the requested

relief, and it denied the motion. The court also reasoned that

Washington’s case did not qualify for relief under Rule

60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6).

Washington separately appealed the district court’s order

denying his Rule 60(b) motion. A three-judge panel of our

court considered Washington’s appeal from the denial of his

habeas petition (appeal No. 05-99009) and his appeal from

the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion (appeal No. 07-15536). 

The panel concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider

Washington’s appeal from the denial of his habeas petition

because his NOA was filed one day late. Washington v.

Ryan, 789 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2015). The panel also

affirmed the district court’s denial of Washington’s Rule

60(b) motion. Id. at 1046.

Our court granted rehearing en banc. Washington v.

Ryan, 811 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 2015) (mem.). We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and

we reverse the district court’s denial of Washington’s Rule

60(b) motion.

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10 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s

ruling on a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule

60(b). Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th

Cir. 2004). We review de novo any question of law

underlying the district court’s ruling. Lal v. California,

610 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

Washington argues that there are three ways this court can

reach the merits of his habeas appeal: (1) decide that the

district court abused its discretion by denying relief from

judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6); (2) construe his

motion for a COA as a Rule 4(a)(5) motion for an extension

of time to file a NOA; or (3) deem his NOA premature, not

untimely, because he filed it before the district court issued a

COA. The State argues that Rule 4(a)’s time limits, which

have a statutory basis in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, are mandatory and

jurisdictional, and that Washington’s failure to comply with

those limits precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction

over his habeas appeal.

Rule 60(b) permits the district court to vacate and reenter

judgment to restore the right to appeal in limited

circumstances. This conclusion is consistent with 28 U.S.C.

§ 2107, Rule 4(a), and case law from the Supreme Court, our

own circuit, and the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. The district

court misperceived the extent of its authority to grant

Washington’s Rule 60(b) motion. Washington’s case is in the

narrow band of cases for which relief from judgment is

appropriate. We therefore reverse the district court’s order

denying relief. Because we conclude that well-established

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 11

authority entitles Washington to relief under Rule 60(b), we

do not reach his arguments that we should construe his

motion for a COA as a Rule 4(a)(5) motion, or that his NOA

was premature.

I. Washington is Entitled to Relief Under Rule 60(b).

The district court premised its denial of Washington’s

Rule 60(b) motion on two separate grounds. First, it

concluded that Washington sought to use Rule 60(b) to

“circumvent the ‘mandatory and jurisdictional’ provisions of

[the 30-day deadline for filing an appeal provided in Rule

4(a)(1)].” Second, the court concluded that, even if Rule

60(b) gave the court authority to reenter judgment for

purposes of rendering Washington’s appeal timely,

Washington would not be entitled to relief under Rule

60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6). We respectfully disagree with both

conclusions. Several circuit courts, including our own, have

recognized that the ability to vacate and reenter judgment

pursuant to Rule 60(b) is consistent with the jurisdictional

nature of Rule 4(a)’s deadlines, and the circumstances of

Washington’s case compel relief under Rule 60(b)(1) or,

alternatively, Rule 60(b)(6).1

1 The dissent mischaracterizes this decision, and its implications. Our

opinion does not rely on the district court’s equitable authority or purport

to extend the Rule 4(a)(5) deadline to conclude Washington is entitled to

relief. It relies on the court’s express authority under Rule 60(b). 

Recognizing this narrow authority does not “put[] a hole right through”

the Rule 4(a) appeal deadlines, as the dissent fears. Courts have used this

authority, sparingly, for decades to restore the thirty-day window to file

an appeal; a handful of cases have been found to warrant this type of

relief. To reach its extravagant conclusions, the dissent repeats a few key

errors: it misconstrues our own circuit’s case law, see In re Stein, 197 F.3d

421 (9th Cir. 1999), misstates case law from our sister circuits, and

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A. In Exceptional Cases, Rule 60(b) Authorizes

District Courts to Vacate and Reenter Judgments

to Reset the Time to Appeal.

The Supreme Court “has long held that the taking of an

appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and

jurisdictional.’” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007)

(quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S.

56, 61 (1982) (per curiam)). But the Supreme Court has also

recognized that a district court’s authority to provide relief

from judgment includes the authority, in certain

circumstances, to vacate and reenter a judgment to restore the

opportunity to appeal. See Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520

(1944). The Federal Rules have been amended since Hill,

and some of those amendments limit the relief available to

parties who fail to timely appeal due to lack of notice that

judgment was entered. But Washington’s case is not a lackof-notice case, and Congress has neither amended the rules

nor enacted a statute to abrogate the district court’s authority

to vacate and reenter judgment where other grounds support

a Rule 60(b) motion.2

erroneously asserts that the majority relies solely on a missed filing

deadline. The dissent also relies heavily on Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S.

205 (2007), though Bowles says nothing about Rule 60(b). In fact, Bowles

relies on another Supreme Court case that strongly supports our decision.

2 The Federal Rules and its amendments were authorized by the Rules

Enabling Act, see ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at

28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012)), under which Congress delegated to the

Supreme Court its rule-making authority over the “practice and

procedure” of federal courts, United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d

947, 954 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)). The

Rules Enabling Act also established a committee to evaluate and propose

amendments to the Rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073. The Supreme Court

transmits proposed amendments to Congress no later than May 1 of the

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 13

In Hill, the Supreme Court recognized that district court

authority to vacate and reenter judgment includes the

authority to do so for the purpose of restoring the opportunity

to appeal. See id. at 523–24. Hill missed the original

deadline to file his appeal because he did not receive timely

notice of the district court’s judgment. Id. at 521. The

Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order vacating

and reentering its judgment in order to trigger a new filing

deadline. Id. at 523–24. In doing so, the Court confirmed

that the district court’s reentry of judgment was consistent

with the general authority it retained over its cases. See id.

The dissent reads Hill as a narrow decision limited to

parties who do not receive notice of judgment, and to filing

deadlines established by rule, not statute. But Hill is not so

limited. Hill did not question that the district court lacked

authority to extend the appeal deadline, id. at 523, yet it

approved the district court’s decision to reenter judgment to

restore the opportunity to appeal. The Hill dissent argued that

the majority’s decision would allow federal judges “to make

a dead letter of the statutory limit of the period for appeal.” 

Id. at 526 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). And,

contrary to the dissent’s interpretation, the Rules Committee

also read Hill as creating a broad form of relief. It warned

year in which the amendments are to take effect and the amendments are

deemed adopted on December 1 of the same year unless Congress rejects

them. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a). The dissent suggests Rule 4(a) rests on

different authority because it “codifies” and “implement[s]” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2107, but Congress has amended § 2107 to track Rule 4(a), not the other

way around. See 16A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and

Procedure § 3950.3 (4th ed. 2016) (describing history of § 2107). The

dissent offers no authority for its implied assertion that the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure have a superior statutory foundation than that of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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14 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

that the decision “g[a]ve the district court power, in its

discretion and without time limit . . . to vacate a judgment and

reenter it for the purpose of reviving the right of appeal.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 77 advisory committee’s note to 1946

amendment. In the aftermath of this decision, the Committee

responded by trimming, not eliminating, the authority Hill

recognized.

By 1991, the Committee had amended the Federal Rules

in three ways significant to Washington’s case.3 First, the

Committee added Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

4(a)(5), which provided a thirty-day grace period to allow a

litigant who missed Rule 4(a)(1)’s filing deadline an

opportunity to move for an extension of time to file an appeal. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Parties may be entitled to an

extension under Rule 4(a)(5) if they show excusable neglect

or good cause. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii).

Second, the Committee added Rule 4(a)(6), which is

specific to cases in which parties miss Rule 4(a)(1)’s deadline

due to lack of notice of the district court’s judgment. See

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This rule authorizes an “outer time

limit” of 180 days to move for an extension of time to file an

appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) advisory committee’s note to

1991 amendment. A district court may not otherwise relieve

parties from failing to file a timely appeal due solely to lack

of notice of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) (“Lack of

notice of the entry [of judgment] does not . . . authorize the

3 During the same time period, Congress enacted § 2107 and

periodically amended it to track these rule amendments. See 16A Charles

Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3950.3 (4th ed.

2016).

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 15

court to relieve . . . a party for failing to appeal within the

time allowed, except as allowed by [Rule] 4(a).”).

Third, the Committee expanded the grounds for relief

under Rule 60(b) to encompass the “various kinds of relief

from judgments which were permitted in the federal courts

prior to the adoption” of the rules. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60

advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment; see also

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 235 (1995)

(recognizing that Rule 60(b) “codified judicial practice that

pre-existed”). As Hill demonstrates, these “various kinds of

relief” included the district court’s ability to grant relief from

judgment for the purpose of restoring the right to appeal. 

Many courts recognized the validity of using Rule 60(b) for

this very purpose.4See also Klapprott v. United States,

335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949) (recognizing that Rule 60(b) “vests

power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments

whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice”).

After the addition of Rule 4(a)(6), we held that Rule 60(b)

is not available to restore appeal rights in lack-of-notice

cases. In re Stein, 197 F.3d 421, 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1999)

(explaining that our case law allowing Rule 60(b) relief to

retrigger appeal rights was rendered “obsolete and

inapplicable” to lack-of-notice cases “by the 1991 addition of

4

See, e.g., Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983); Burkett

v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1217 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other

grounds by Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016); Wallace v.

McManus, 776 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1985), superseded by rule, Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(6), as recognized in Clark v. Lavallie, 204 F.3d 1038,

1040 (10thCir. 2000); Wilson v. Atwood Grp., 725 F.2d 255, 258 (5thCir.

1984) (en banc); Hensley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 651 F.2d 226,

227 (4th Cir. 1981); Mizell v. Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 586 F.2d 942,

944 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978).

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16 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

Rule 4(a)(6)”). Our sister circuits agreed. See Zimmer St.

Louis, Inc. v. Zimmer Co., 32 F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1994)

(“[T]he plain language of both Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) and

Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) addresses specifically the problem of

lack of notice of a final judgment.”); see also Vencor Hosps.,

Inc. v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 279 F.3d 1306,

1311 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Clark v. Lavallie, 204 F.3d

1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 2000) (same).

This history shows that Congress acted in the years since

Hill to narrow the circumstances under which late-filed

appeals may be accepted, but despite several sets of

amendments, changes to § 2107 and the Federal Rules have

not abrogated district courts’ traditional authority to grant

relief from judgment in cases—like Washington’s—where “a

notice of appeal is filed late for reasons other than lack of

notice.” Tanner v. Yukins, 776 F.3d 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2015). 

Indeed, after the 1991 amendments, several courts have had

occasion to explicitly recognize that Rule 60(b) may be used,

sparingly, to restore the right to appeal in extraordinary cases

when parties rely on grounds other than lack of notice.

One such case was Mackey v. Hoffman, where our own

court followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Maples v.

Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012), and identified attorney

abandonment as an extraordinary circumstance that justified

relief under Rule 60(b).5

682 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir.

2012); see also Lal, 610 F.3d at 524 (recognizing attorney’s

5

In Maples, the Court held that petitioner’s state post-conviction

attorneys’ abandonment, which caused petitioner to miss a state filing

deadline, constituted an “extraordinary circumstance[] beyond his control”

that lifted the state procedural bar to his federal petition. Maples, 132 S.

Ct. at 924 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 659 (2010)). 

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 17

gross negligence as extraordinary circumstance justifying

relief from judgment where counsel failed to prosecute a

wrongful death action). Mackey was a federal habeas

petitioner who learned of the judgment entered against him

after Rule 4(a)(6)’s 180-day period had passed because his

attorney abandoned him and never informed him of the status

of his case. Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1249–50. Citing In re Stein,

the district court concluded that it lacked discretion to provide

relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Id. at 1250. We

reversed, and explained that the limitations on district court

authority identified in In re Stein apply only to Rule 77(d)

lack-of-notice cases. See id. at 1252. Mackey and In re Stein

are consistent with the conclusion that Rule 60(b) relief

remains available for extraordinary cases outside of the lackof-notice context.6

The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in

Ramirez v. United States, 799 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2015), where

a federal habeas petitioner missed the deadline to file a NOA

after his counsel abandoned him. Id. at 849. The Seventh

Circuit saw “no reason to distinguish between actions at the

state level that result in procedural default and the consequent

loss of a chance for federal review”—describing the posture

in Maples—“and actions at the federal level that similarly

6 The dissent accuses us of sub silentio overruling In re Stein, but this is

plainly wrong. We simply recognize, as our court previously recognized

in Mackey and as we did in In re Stein itself, that In re Stein’s holding is

limited to lack-of-notice cases. See Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1252 (“Unlike

the appellants in In re Stein, Mackey is not seeking to utilize Rule 60(b)(6)

to cure a Rule 77(d) ‘lack of notice’ problem.”); In re Stein, 197 F.3d at

426 (distinguishing prior Ninth Circuit case law that permitted Rule 60(b)

reliefto restore appeal rights as “rendered obsolete and inapplicable to this

type of [lack-of-notice] case”) (emphasis added).

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18 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

lead to a procedural default that forfeits appellate

review”—as was the posture in Mackey. Id. at 854.

Finally, notwithstandingRule 4(a)(1)’sjurisdictional time

limit, the Sixth Circuit held in Tanner that the district court

had authority to vacate and reinstate its denial of a habeas

petition pursuant to Rule 60(b). 776 F.3d at 441. This

afforded a new thirty-day window to file an appeal. Tanner

was nearly illiterate but she managed to prepare an appeal

from the denial of her habeas petition with the assistance of

a prison writ-writer. Id. at 436. She wound up filing it one

day late because her prison unit was placed on lockdown, and

prison guards threatened to put her in solitary confinement if

she left her cell to meet her filing deadline. See id. The

district clerk’s office processed the appeal, not realizing that

it was late. Id. at 436–37. By the time the circuit court

received the NOA, the thirty-day period for requesting an

extension had expired, and Tanner’s appeal was dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 437. Tanner responded by filing

a successful 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the guards who

interfered with her constitutionally guaranteed access to the

court. Id. Armed with a judgment recognizing the

unconstitutional nature of the guards’ actions, Tanner sought

relief in her habeas case under Rule 60(b)(6). Id. As the

district court did in Washington’s case, the district court in

Tanner denied relief because it concluded that Rule 4(a)(1)’s

time limit is jurisdictional and that granting relief under Rule

60(b) would impermissibly circumvent the rule’s

jurisdictional limits. See id. at 437–38.

The Sixth Circuit reversed. In doing so, the court

recognized that Rule 60(b) dates back to the earliest

promulgation of the Federal Rules, that the rule “is simply the

recitation of pre-existing judicial power,” id. at 438 (quoting

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 19

Plaut, 514 U.S. at 234–35), and that the amendments to the

Federal Rules have limited this authority only where the

reason for a late filing is lack of notice of judgment, see id. at

441–43. The Sixth Circuit remanded Tanner’s case with

instructions to vacate and reenter judgment. Id. at 444. Its

decision is consistent with the mandatory nature of the filing

deadline in Rule 4(a)(1) and the relief we grant Washington

today.

The dissent incorrectly states that only the Sixth Circuit

is in accord with our decision. This misstates the law of other

circuits. For example, the dissent relegates the Seventh

Circuit’s recent Ramirez decision to a footnote, selecting

instead the Seventh Circuit’s earlier case, Bell v. Eastman

Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2000). Bell did not

categorically hold that Rule 60(b) may not be used to restore

appeal rights in non lack-of-notice cases. It simply decided

that the basis for the Rule 60(b) motion in that case—one that

should have been argued on direct appeal because it

challenged the trial judge’s interpretation of evidence—did

not warrant Rule 60(b) relief, and that an appeal from the

denial of such a motion is functionally an appeal from the

underlying judgment itself. See id. at 800.

The dissent also relies on the Third Circuit’s decision in

West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1983). But West does not

stand for the broad proposition that using Rule 60(b) to

restore appeal rights is inconsistent with § 2107. Indeed,

when the Third Circuit later “reaffirm[ed] West,” it

acknowledged “exceptional circumstances that justify relief

under Rule 60(b) outside the time constraints of Rule 4(a)(5)”

for the purpose of preserving appeal rights. Burkett v.

Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1217 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated

on other grounds by Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609

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20 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

(2016). By pointing to factually distinguishable cases from

other circuits, the dissent misses the broader point that there

is a solid line of case law recognizing that district courts have

the ability to restore appeal rights, in limited circumstances,

by vacating and reentering judgment.

The only circuits we are aware of to suggest such relief is

never available are the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. See Perez

v. Stephens, 745 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 2014); Jackson v.

Crosby, 437 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2006). Perez is

nothing like Washington’s case because it addressed a

situation in which counsel affirmatively decided not to file an

appeal, rather than a situation in which external

circumstances prevented an appeal from being filed. 

745 F.3d at 176. And in Jackson, the Eleventh Circuit had

previously dismissed an appeal as untimely and viewed a

later-filed Rule 60(b) motion as a request that the district

court circumvent its earlier decision. 437 F.3d at 1296. The

result we reach today is consistent with our own case law and

case law from the Sixth and Seventh Circuits—decisions

recognizing that this use of Rule 60(b) is not new, that it has

been rarely but consistently used for decades, and that

Congress did not eliminate it when it imposed other

limitations in the years since the Supreme Court’s decision in

Hill.

The State argues that Rule 60(b) is unavailable to assist

Washington because its plain language authorizes relief from

“judgment,” there is no infirmity in the judgment entered

against Washington, and the problems in this case arose only

after the judgment was entered. But Rule 60(b) does not

require that the asserted grounds for relief exist before

judgment is entered, and Rule 60(b)’s history and use make

clear that it is not so limited. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 60

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 21

advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (noting Rule

60(b) encompasses grounds for relief that existed before the

rule’s adoption); see also Tanner, 776 F.3d at 444

(recognizingRule 60(b) relief maybe appropriate for grounds

arising after judgment was entered); Mackey, 682 F.3d at

1254 (same); Burkett, 826 F.2d at 1217 (same); Wilson,

725 F.2d at 258 (same); Rodgers, 722 F.2d at 460 (same);

Hensley, 651 F.2d at 227 (same); Mizell, 586 F.2d at 944 n.2

(same).

The State also argues that we lack jurisdiction to hear

Washington’s appeal because, in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c),

Congress specifically limited the amount of time by which

district courts can extend the period for filing NOAs. The

State and the dissent rely heavily on Bowles v. Russell,

551 U.S. 205. There, the district court granted a Rule 4(a)(6)

motion to reopen the time to file an appeal, but it inexplicably

authorized three more days than the rule allows. Id. at 207.

The Supreme Court noted the “mandatory and jurisdictional”

nature of Rule 4(a) deadlines and concluded that the court of

appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal filed before the

expiration of the court-imposed deadline, but after the

expiration of the period allowed by the rule. Id. at 209–10,

213–15. The Court reiterated that federal courts have “no

authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional

requirements.” Id. at 214.7

7 The D.C. Circuit cited Bowles when it ruled that the district court

lacked authority to provide Rule 60(b) relief “to circumvent the 180-day

deadline of Appellate Rule 4(a)(6),” even in particularly compelling

circumstances. See In re Sealed Case, 624 F.3d 482, 489 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

(affirming denial of Rule 60(b) motion in a lack-of-notice case where

appellant was not allowed to review a sealed docket despite written and

oral inquiries to the clerk of the court). In re Sealed Case was a

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We are not persuaded that Bowles dictates the outcome of

Washington’s appeal. Bowles did not address Rule 60(b) and

did not purport to announce a new principle of law. Bowles

described as “long held” the principle that appeal deadlines

are mandatory and jurisdictional, id. at 209, and it did nothing

to call into question the similarly “long held” district court

authority under Rule 60(b).8

Id. at 205. In fact, Bowles relied

on Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434 U.S.

257 (1978), a case that supports our decision. Bowles,

551 U.S. at 209–10 (citing Browder for the proposition that

Rule 4(a) is jurisdictional). Browder was a habeas case in

which the state respondent filed an untimely motion for an

evidentiary hearing after the district court granted habeas

relief. See 434 U.S. at 260–61. The Supreme Court

concluded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because

the untimely motion for an evidentiary hearing did not toll

Rule 4(a)’s limit on the time to appeal. See id. at 264–65,

271–72. Critically, the State argued that the motion it filed in

the district court was not based on Rule 60(b). Id. at 263.

particularly harsh result, but as we recognized in In re Stein, there does not

appear to be any other avenue of relief in pure lack-of-notice cases.

8 The dissent argues that by relying on Rule 60(b), the majority

impermissibly circumvents the § 2107 time limits governing appeals. But

under the dissent’s view, many other types of Rule 60(b) motions would

also “circumvent” those statutory limits. For example, a party may appeal

a district court’s judgment after the court rules on a timely post-judgment

motion, such as a Rule 60(b) motion, even if the court waits months before

ruling, and even if the court denies the motion. Such an appeal would be

filed more than “30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed

from,” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), and it would not be subject to an

extension under Rule 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6). Of course, Rule 4(a)(4) tolls the

time to appeal in such cases, but Rule 4(a)(4) has the same statutory

footing as Rule 60(b).

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 23

Justice Blackmun wrote separately to concur in the

judgment, joined by Justice Rehnquist. The concurrence

explained that if the state had not “disavowed any reliance on

Rule 60(b),” its motion likely could have been considered a

motion under Rule 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6). See id. at 274

(Blackmun, J., concurring). The concurrence observed that,

had this been the case, an order from the district court

reinstating its judgment would have started a new appeal

period and respondent’s NOA would have been timely. Id. at

272. Justice Blackmun saw “no obligation on [the] Court’s

part to attempt to rescue respondent’s case on a Rule 60(b)

basis” because the respondent insisted that it had not relied on

Rule 60(b) in the trial court. Id. at 274.

The core principle from Bowles and Browder—that

federal courts lack equitable authority to extend Rule 4(a)’s

jurisdictional deadlines—is the same principle recognized in

Hill. See Hill, 320 U.S. at 523 (“It goes without saying that

the District Court could not extend the period [to appeal]

fixed by Rule . . . .”). But Hill identified a second principle

that does no violence to the first: federal court authority to

relieve parties from judgment, now vested in Rule 60(b),

includes the authority to vacate and reenter the judgment in

extraordinary circumstances to restore the thirty-day

opportunity to appeal. See id. at 523–24.

For decades, courts have sparingly but consistently

exercised their authority under Rule 60(b) to restore appeal

rights. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has seen fit

to limit this authority except in lack-of-notice cases.

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B. Washington is entitled to relief under Rule

60(b)(1).

The district court ruled that Washington’s case did not

warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because he did “not

demonstrate[] that he acted diligently in discovering the

untimely filing” and because Washington failed to make “any

effort to confirm the timeliness of his NOA until notified by

the Ninth Circuit.”

Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief from judgment for

“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” On

appeal, Washington relies on mistake and excusable neglect. 

In Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates

Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), the Supreme Court

explained that excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) applies

when a party’s failure to file on time is within “his or her

control.” Id. at 394. Motions for relief from judgment under

Rule 60(b)(1) must be filed within one year from the entry of

judgment and they must satisfy the four-factor test the

Supreme Court established in Pioneer. The test considers:

(1) the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the

length of the filing delay and its potential impact on the

proceedings; (3) the reason for the filing delay; and

(4) whether the moving party acted in good faith. Id. at 395;

see also Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253,

1261 (9th Cir. 2010); Briones v. Riviera Hotel &Casino, 116

F.3d 379, 381–82 (9th Cir. 1997). A district court must fully

consider these factors in every case; we have explicitly

rejected per se rules for determining whether a mistake is

excusable. See Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 860 (9th

Cir. 2004) (en banc).

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 25

In cases decided before Rule 4(a)(6) was adopted, we

required parties to show diligence before invoking Rule

60(b)(1) for the purpose of restoring the opportunity to

appeal. See Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir.

1983). Rodgers was a lack-of-notice case, but we see no

reason to remove this requirement for parties like Washington

who seek relief for reasons other than lack of notice. See

Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993)

(applying Rodgers to a non lack-of-notice case). In

addition—consistent with the Supreme Court’s emphasis in

Pioneer that “all relevant circumstances surrounding” the

parties’ failure to make a timely filing must be considered,

507 U.S. at 395—we consider the stakes at issue. Here, the

stakes are extraordinarily high because Washington faces a

death sentence.

Before applying the Pioneer test, we note that while

Washington’s initial calendaring error deprived him of the

right to appeal within Rule 4(a)(1)’s time limit, it was the

separate failure to realize that his appeal was late—and that

he needed to seek a Rule 4(a)(5) extension—that ultimately

caused Washington’s appeal to be dismissed. The district

court recognized this; its order denying Washington’s motion

for Rule 60(b) relief focused on Washington’s failure to

discover his calendaring error. The court implicitly ruled that

the failure to catch the first error in time to seek a Rule

4(a)(5) extension was not excusable neglect. Under the

circumstances of this case, application of the Pioneer test

compels a different outcome.

The first Pioneer factor favors relief. The State has not

argued that it would be prejudiced if Washington’s habeas

appeal is heard on the merits. Nor could it; the State has been

on notice of Washington’s intent to appeal since one business

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day after the initial Rule 4(a)(5) deadline. Second, the length

of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings also

favors granting relief: even considering the time required to

resolve the Rule 60(b) motion, reentering judgment so that

Washington’s appeal could move forward would have added

only an insignificant amount of time in the context of this

case. Third, the reason for the initial late filing is

uncontested. Washington’s lawyers simplymiscalculated the

date the NOA was due and calendared it one day too late.9

Washington’s lawyers did not catch their initial filing error

because, after the NOA was filed, nothing prompted them to

recalculate the due date. There were no filings before the

appellate court’s order to show cause that should have

prompted Washington or his lawyers to recalculate Rule

4(a)(1)’s filing deadline, and the State does not point to any

event or other communication from the court or between the

parties that should have put Washington on notice of the

error. The final Pioneer factor is whether the moving party

acted in good faith. Here, there is no suggestion that

Washington’s lawyers missed the 4(a)(5) window in bad faith

or to gain advantage, and we have said that where other

factors counsel relief, a calendaring mistake and related

failure to catch that mistake is no bar to Rule 60(b)(1) relief. 

See Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1262.

9 We have affirmed orders granting Rule 4(a)(5) relief for negligent

calendaring errors. See, e.g., Pincay, 389 F.3d at 860 (paralegal read Rule

4(a)(1) as permitting 60 days to appeal, the time allowed when the

government is a party to the case, even though the government was not a

party); Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 1996)

(appeal deadline docketed a day late because of failure to realize August

contains thirty-one days), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v.

Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

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As for the district court’s concern that Washington’s

lawyers were not diligent in recognizing their mistake, even

daily monitoring of the docket would not have revealed that

Washington’s NOA was late. Washington filed his NOA and

request for a COA on July 11, 2005. No other entries

appeared on the district court docket until the district court’s

September 30 ruling on Washington’s motion for a COA. 

We do not require lawyers to spontaneously recalculate Rule

4(a)’s filing deadlines after they file a NOA when there is no

suggestion from the court or the docket that the NOA was

late. Rule 4 itself does not demand perfection—its drafters

created a grace period in Rule 4(a)(5) precisely because

mistakes happen. Washington’s lawyers are responsible for

the initial late filing, but we cannot say they lacked diligence

for failing to detect their late filing in time to seek an

extension. The district court abused its discretion in

concluding otherwise.

Granting Washington relief would have had only a

negligible effect on the proceedings, but denying relief

eliminated any federal appellate review of the habeas petition

in this capital case. This tremendous disparity, in

combination with consideration of the Pioneerfactors, amply

justified relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1).

C. In the Alternative, Washington is entitled to relief

under Rule 60(b)(6).

If relief from judgment is not available under Rule

60(b)(1)–(5), Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes the district court to

grant relief from judgment for “any other reason that justifies

relief.” To justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a party must

show external “‘extraordinarycircumstances’ suggesting that

the party is faultless in the delay.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 393. 

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The district court denied Washington’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion

because it concluded that the motion was “not grounded in

external, extraordinarycircumstances not otherwise addressed

by Rule 60(b)(1)–(5).”

Our review of the record in this case persuades us that

external circumstances did prevent Washington from

discovering that his appeal was late, and from seeking an

extension of time before Rule 4(a)(5)’s grace period expired. 

The dissent does not acknowledge it, but the record is unique

in its clarity on this point.10

When Washington filed his NOA in 2005, Federal Rule

of Appellate Procedure 3(d) required the district court clerk

to “promptly send a copy of the notice of appeal” to the

appellate clerk. The district clerk’s office did not comply

with this rule. Instead, the clerk waited over two and a half

months, until the district court issued the COA, before

sending Washington’s NOA to the appellate court. The

dissent protests that Rule 3(d) “does not specify a time within

which the district court must act,” but the rule did require that

the NOA be forwarded promptly, and we cannot conceive of

a definition in which a nearly three-month delay qualifies as

“prompt.” Nor can the few courts that have considered the

question. See, e.g., Yadav v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.,

935 F.2d 540, 541 (2d Cir. 1991) (district court clerk violated

10 The State argues that the only external circumstances that are relevant

to Rule 60(b)(6) are those that prevent the initial filing of an appeal in

compliance with Rule 4(a)(1), not those that prevent a petitioner from

realizing that the appeal was untimely in time to seek a Rule 4(a)(5)

extension. We see nothing to support this distinction. The principle from

Hill that district court authority to provide relief from judgment includes

the authority to vacate and reenter judgment to restore appeal rights

applies equally to Rule 4(a)(5) and Rule 4(a)(1).

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 29

Rule 3(d) by failing to forward NOA to the court of appeals

for nearly three months). The record does not reveal why the

district court did not comply with Rule 3(d). The clerk may

have thought that it was sufficient to comply with Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(1), which at the time

required the clerk to “send the certificate [of appealability]

. . . to the court of appeals with the notice of appeal.” Fed. R.

App. P. 22(b)(1) (1999) (emphasis added). Whatever the

clerk’s reason, Rule 22(b)(1) did not render Rule 3(d) a

nullity; the clerk was required to comply with Rule 3(d) and

also with Rule 22(b)(1).

These two rules served different functions in a

coordinated scheme: Rule 22(b) facilitated the administrative

transfer of habeas cases from the district court to the appellate

court. Forwarded together, the NOA and COA gave the

appellate clerk notice of the transfer of jurisdiction and of the

issues presented for appeal. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2253;

Fed. R. App. P. 4. Rule 3(d) served an entirely different

purpose. It was intended to give the court of appeals

“increased practical control over the early steps in the

appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(d) advisory committee’s note to

1979 amendment.

The dissent questions how it could be that the rules may

have required the district clerk to forward the NOA twice in

situations like this one, where there was a delay between the

entry of judgment and a ruling on the motion for a COA. 

This requirement, the dissent claims, “makes no sense.” But

it makes perfect sense. It was the district court’s entry of

judgment, not its ruling on a COA, that started the clock on

Rule 4(a)’s deadlines. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Once

the clock began ticking, Rule 3(d)’s “prompt” requirement

ensured the appellate clerk received the NOA in time to

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30 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

identify, and permit the parties to cure, jurisdictional defects

before Rule 4(a)(5)’s grace period expired.

The Second Circuit recognized as much in Yadav, one of

the few published opinions addressing Rule 3(d). See

935 F.2d at 541. The plaintiffs in Yadav filed a premature

NOA and failed to renew their filing after the district court

ruled on their motion for reconsideration. This rendered their

appeal untimely under Griggs v. Provident Consumer

Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982), superseded in part by Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i), 1993 amendments. The Second

Circuit excused the failure to refile because the district clerk

failed to promptly forward the premature NOA to the

appellate clerk, and therefore “omitted an important step in

the appellate process.” Yadav, 935 F.2d at 541–42. There,

like here, “if . . . the notice had been promptly forwarded to

this Court, we could have promptly dismissed the appeal at a

time when the appellants would still have had 30 days” to

cure their jurisdictional defect. Id. at 542. The answer to the

dissent’s question is apparent when it is remembered that any

defects in a NOA affect the jurisdiction of the appellate court,

not the district court, hence Rule 3(d)’s sensible requirement

that the NOA be forwarded to the appellate clerk promptly. 

See id. at 541–42.

Washington’s appeal, like the Yadavs’, illustrates why

Rule 3(d) directs that NOAs must be forwarded promptly. 

One week after receiving the NOA, the appellate clerk issued

an order to show cause why Washington’s appeal should not

be dismissed as untimely. Six days after that, Washington

filed his Rule 60(b) motion. The record does not require that

we speculate about what would have happened if

Washington’s NOA had been forwarded without delay: if the

NOA had been forwarded promptly, Washington would have

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 31

received notice with two weeks remaining in Rule 4(a)(5)’s

grace period, he would have had ample time to request an

extension, and it cannot be doubted that he would have done

so. We know this because it took just six days for

Washington’s lawyers to respond once they received the

order to show cause. The district court abused its discretion

by not crediting the combination of the court’s failure to

promptly forward the NOA to the appellate clerk and the time

it took to rule on the COA as external factors that foreclosed

Washington’s opportunity to seek an extension of time.11

II. We Do Not Reach Washington’s Alternative

Arguments.

Washington’s NOA and COA were docketed just after

Rule 4(a)(5)’s thirty-day grace period began. Washington

argues on appeal that his motion for a COA may be construed

as a request for an extension of time under Rule 4(a)(5); if

granted, this request would render his appeal timely. Wellreasoned case law supports the proposition that “[a]ny

submission signed by a party that may fairly be read as a

request to the district court to . . . permit a late appeal should

11 The sequence of events that thwarted Washington’s appeal cannot be

repeated. The Committee amended Rule 22 in 2009 and the current rule

directs that NOAs be forwarded even if no COA has issued: “[w]hen an

applicant has filed a notice of appeal, the district clerk must transmit the

record to the court of appeals; if the district judge has issued a [COA], the

district clerk must include in this transmission the certificate.” Fed. R.

App. P. 22 advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendment (emphasis

added). Thus, even if court staff mistakenly consult Rule 22 in isolation,

it is plain that the NOA must be forwarded without waiting for the COA. 

Also in 2009, the Committee added a new rule that requires a district court

to “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

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32 WASHINGTON V. RYAN

suffice” as a motion for additional time under Rule 4(a)(5). 

Campos v. LeFevre, 825 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1987). This

is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent statements that

it is “a good thing . . . that courts sometimes construe one

kind of filing as another” to “identify[] a route to relief.” See

Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2156 (2015). But

Washington never raised this argument before the district

court despite his opportunity to do so.12

Washington also adopts an argument advanced byamicus,

that the order denying his § 2254 habeas petition did not

become final and appealable until the district court ruled on

his motion for a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (a COA is a

prerequisite to appeal of an order denying a § 2254 petition). 

As far as we are aware, this argument is one of first

impression. Because we conclude that the circumstances of

Washington’s case entitle him to relief under well-established

authority applying Rule 60(b)(1) or, alternatively, 60(b)(6),

we do not reach Washington’s alternative arguments.

CONCLUSION

Having traced the historyand interpretation of Rule 60(b),

we conclude that when Congress adopted the Federal Rules,

it entrusted the courts with the essential task of identifying

the rare cases that warrant reentry of judgment for purposes

of restoring the right to appeal. Subsequent amendments

12 Washington filed two Rule 60(b) motions with the district court after

he learned his NOA was late. A three-judge panel of our court vacated the

district court’s order denyingWashington’s first 60(b) motion because the

case had not been remanded and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The

panel then issued a limited remand to permit Washington to file a second

Rule 60(b) motion. Neither motion argued that his motion for a COA

should be construed as a motion for a Rule 4(a)(5) extension.

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 33

have not abrogated that authority and district courts have

discharged this obligation with care. Of the thousands of

judgments entered by district courts each year, only a handful

have been found to warrant this type of relief. We conclude

that Washington’s is one of them.

We reverse the district court’s denial of Washington’s

motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) in

appeal No. 07-15536. On limited remand, the district court

shall vacate and reenter its judgment denying Washington’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus, nunc pro tunc, June 9,

2005. After the district court reenters its judgment,

Washington’s appeal from the denial of his § 2254 petition

may proceed in appeal No. 05-99009. We do not reach the

remainder of Washington’s arguments. No new briefing is

authorized by this decision.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, with whom CALLAHAN, BEA,

IKUTA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:

I take no pleasure in writing this dissent. Washington’s

counsel filed his notice of appeal one day late. The office of

the Arizona Public Defender is well known to this court and

enjoys an outstanding reputation. Washington’s lead counsel

has earned the respect of this court; he is an experienced and

conscientious attorney, an expert in death penalty appeals and

habeas petitions. For anyone who has litigated and has

known the anxiety of counting and then recounting the days

towards deadlines, this is a nightmare.

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For at least the last fourteen years, the Supreme Court has

been telling us that we have failed to appreciate the difference

between jurisdictional rules and claim-processing rules. See,

e.g., Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428,

434–36 (2011); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.

154, 160–63 (2010); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Locomotive

Eng’rs &Trainmen Gen. Comm. ofAdjustment, Cent. Region,

558 U.S. 67, 81–82 (2009); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,

546 U.S. 500, 510–12 (2006); Eberhart v. United States,

546 U.S. 12, 15–16 (2005) (per curiam); Kontrick v. Ryan,

540 U.S. 443, 452–56 (2004); United States v. Cotton,

535 U.S. 625, 630–31 (2002). The Court has chided itself

that, “Courts—including this Court—have sometimes

mischaracterized claim-processing rules . . . as jurisdictional

limitations.” Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 161. Accordingly,

“[i]n light of the important distinctions between jurisdictional

prescriptions and claim-processing rules,” the Court has

“encouraged federal courts and litigants to ‘facilitat[e] clarity

by using the term “jurisdictional” only when it is apposite.’” 

Id. (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455). We have responded

to the Court’s prompting by carefully considering whether

cases must be dismissed for jurisdictional reasons or for

other, non-jurisdictional reasons. See, e.g., Kwai Fun Wong

v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1051 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc);

Irigoyen-Briones v. Holder, 644 F.3d 943, 947–49 (9th Cir.

2011); United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947,

951–54 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Sadler,

480 F.3d 932, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2007).

Rules that are part of the process of adjudicating claims

and rules that constrain our jurisdiction are very different

kinds of rules. From the perspective of the parties, it may not

make much difference if the result is an adverse judgment;

after all, a party doesn’t usually care if the case is dismissed

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 35

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or Rule

12(b)(6), because the effective result is the same. But the

application of jurisdictional rules versus claim-processing

rules is of great consequence to the federal courts. Claimprocessing rules go to the way in which we will conduct our

ordinary business. Congress has granted us power, through

the Rules Enabling Act, to promulgate rules of procedure in

our courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). Such rules bring order

to the process by which we resolve disputes. Such rules must

be respected and enforced, but these rules, after all, are our

rules and we feel a freer hand in the flexible application of

those rules. Such rules may be waived or forfeited. See

Union Pac. R.R. Co., 558 U.S. at 81–82; Kontrick, 540 U.S.

at 456.

Jurisdictional rules, by contrast, go to our “power to hear

a case” and “can never be forfeited or waived.” Arbaugh,

546 U.S. at 514 (quoting Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630). They are

grounded in Article III of the Constitution, the organic

provision that creates the federal courts and locates those

courts within a system of separated powers. Article III vests

the “judicial Power of the United States” in “one Supreme

Court, and such inferior courts as the Congress may from

time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 

The “judicial Power” is not a self-defining term, but

shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,

arising under this Constitution, the Laws

of the United States, and Treaties made,

or which shall be made, under

their Authority;—to all Cases affecting

Ambassadors, other public Ministers and

Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and

maritime Jurisdiction; —to Controversies to

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which the United States shall be Party; —to

Controversies between two or more States;

—between Citizens of different states,—

[and] between Citizens of the same State

claiming Land under Grants of different

States.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, as amended by amend. XI. This

section contains the outer limits of our jurisdiction. See Ex

Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 513 (1868) (“The principle that

the affirmation of appellate jurisdiction implies the negation

of all such jurisdiction not affirmed having been thus

established, it was an almost necessary consequence that acts

of Congress, providing for the exercise of jurisdiction, should

come to be spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as

acts making exceptions to the constitutional grant of it.”);

Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1810)

(“Had the judicial act created the supreme court, without

defining or limiting its jurisdiction, it must have been

considered as possessing all the jurisdiction which the

constitution assigns to it. . . . [The appellate powers of this

Court] are limited and regulated by the judicial and by such

other acts as have been passed on the subject.”). Other than

cases affecting ambassadors,ministers, and consuls, Congress

controls the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art.

III, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate

Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,

and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”). 

Because Congress has the power to create lower federal

courts under Article III, Section 1, Congress also has the

power to regulate the jurisdiction of the lower courts,

including this one. U.S. const. art. III, § 1; Sheldon v. Sill,

49 U.S. 441, 448–49 (1850). We possess only such

jurisdiction as Congress has granted by statute, and no more. 

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 37

Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 449 (“Courts created by statute can have

no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”); United

States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812) (“All other Courts

created bythe general Government possess no jurisdiction but

what is given them by the power that creates them, and can be

vested with none but what the power ceded to the general

Government will authorize them to confer.”); Veterans for

Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir.

2012). These jurisdictional limitations maynot be waived but

must be observed with exactness, lest we seize power we

have no right to exercise. Because we are a “government of

laws and not of men,” Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XXX,

sometimes, as judges in hard cases, we must decline to

exercise power even when it is contrary to our best

inclinations as people. But it is the nature of a government of

laws that we must resist our inclinations especially when it

contravenes the power entrusted to us.

This is one of those hard cases.

I

Petitioner Theodore Washington’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus was denied by the district court. He sought to

appeal, but his notice of appeal was filed one business day

late due to a paralegal’s error in calculating the filing

deadline. By the time this court issued an order to show

cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed as

untimely, Washington had missed the thirty-day grace period

provided under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP)

4(a)(5) in which to file a motion for extension of time to file

an appeal. Rule 4(a) codifies the jurisdictional time limits on

the right to appeal imposed by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 2107. 

The statute provides:

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Except as otherwise provided in this section,

no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or

decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a

civil nature before a court of appeals for

review unless notice of appeal is filed, within

thirty days after the entry of such judgment,

order or decree.

28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). In turn, the federal courts implemented

this statute in FRAP 4(a): “In a civil case, except as provided

in [this Rule], the notice of appeal required byRule 3 must be

filed with the district clerk within 30 days after entry of the

judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Congress provided an exception to § 2107(a) in

§ 2107(c): “The district court may, upon motion filed not

later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise

set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a

showing of excusable neglect or good cause.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2107(c).1 Again, the federal courts have implemented this

 

1

 Section 2107(c) also provides as follows:

In addition, if the district court finds—

(1) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a

judgment or order did not receive such notice from the

clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and

(2) that no party would be prejudiced,

the district court may, upon motion filed within 180

days after entry of the judgment or order or within 14

days after receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier,

reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 39

provision in FRAP 4(a)(5) and (6).2See Obaydullah v.

the date of entry of the order reopening the time for

appeal.

28 U.S.C. § 2107(c).

 

2

 Those rules provide, in relevant part:

(5) Motion for Extension of Time.

(A) The district court may extend the time to file a

notice of appeal if:

(i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after the time

prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires; and

(ii) regardless of whether its motion if filed before or

during the 30 days after the time prescribed by this

Rule 4(a) expires, that party shows excusable neglect or

good cause

. . . .

(C) No extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed

30 days after the prescribed time or 14 days after the

date when the order granting the motion is entered,

whichever is later.

(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal. The district

court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period

of 14 days after the date when its order to reopen is

entered, but only if all the following conditions are

satisfied:

(A) the court findsthat the moving party did not receive

notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of

the entry ofthe judgment or order sought to be appealed

within 21 days after entry;

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Obama, 688 F.3d 784, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 

The rule provides that a party must file a notice of appeal

within thirty days after the entry of judgment, with only two

narrow exceptions: (1) where a party can demonstrate

“excusable neglect,” the party may file a motion for an

extension of time up to thirty days after the date to timely

appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5); and (2) where a party fails to

receive notice of the judgment, the party may move to reopen

the time to file within 180 days after the entry of judgment,

or within fourteen days after receiving notice of the judgment,

whichever is earlier, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

Had Washington’s attorney realized his error earlier, he

could have sought an extension of time from the district court

under Rule 4(a)(5) and rectified the untimely filing. 

However, having missed the time in which to seek an

extension, Washington filed a motion in the district court

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), asking the

district court to vacate and reenter its original judgment

denying his habeas petition. The intended effect of this

procedure was to restart the thirty-day period in which to

timely file an appeal—Washington was not, in fact, seeking

to amend or suspend any substantive part of the district

court’s order denying his petition. The district court denied

the motion, finding that Rule 60(b) could not be used solely

for the purpose of restarting the time to file an appeal. I

agree, and conclude that this court therefore lacks jurisdiction

(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the

judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the

moving party receives notice under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is earlier;

. . . .

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), (6).

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 41

to entertain Washington’s untimely appeal. The U.S.

Supreme Court was clear in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205

(2007), that the FRAP timely filing requirements are

“mandatory and jurisdictional,” id. at 209 (quotations

omitted), barring courts from creating equitable exceptions

that would allow an appeal where a party fails to comply with

these requirements, however “extraordinary” the

circumstances that precipitated the missed deadline. Today,

the majority chooses to ignore that holding by shoehorning an

essentially equitable exception to the jurisdictional

requirements of Rule 4(a) into Rule 60(b). Our jurisdiction

extends no farther than Congress has granted by statute,

Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 449, which in this case means the outer

limits of § 2107. That statute does not admit the exception

created by the majority.

A

In Bowles, the Supreme Court held that the “timely filing

of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional

requirement,” because the Rule 4(a) filing requirements are

statutorily based in 28 U.S.C. § 2107. Bowles, 551 U.S. at

214. Likewise, the exceptions to the Rule 4(a) timely filing

requirements—Rules 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6)—are based in

28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). Bowles dealt specifically with Rule

4(a)(6) and an equitable exception known as the “unique

circumstances” doctrine. Id. at 213. Bowles failed to file a

timely appeal from the district court’s denial of his petition

for a writ of habeas corpus. He sought, as permitted by Rule

4(a)(6), to reopen the period for filing his appeal, which

would have given him an additional fourteen days. 

Inexplicably, the district court gave him seventeen days, and

he filed within that period, but after the fourteen-day period

had expired. Id. at 207. The Court held that Bowles’ appeal

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was late and must be dismissed because courts “[have] no

authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional

requirements” in order to excuse an untimely filing. Id. at

214.

The result in Bowles seemed particularly harsh given that

the untimely filing period was expressly authorized bydistrict

court order. The Supreme Court still denied relief, noting that

“[i]f rigorous rules like the one applied today are thought to

be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to promulgate

rules that excuse compliance with the statutory time limits.” 

Id. But in the end, the Supreme Court “lack[ed] present

authority to make the exception petitioner seeks.” Id. at 215. 

The issue was one of judicial power, not judicial will.

Unlike Bowles, the case before us today deals with the

thirty-day grace period under Rule 4(a)(5) rather than the

180-day time limit in Rule 4(a)(6). The reasoning of Bowles,

however, clearly applies, because the thirty-day grace period

provided in Rule 4(a)(5) also derives from

28 U.S.C.§ 2107(c). If equitable exceptions cannot be made

to Rule 4(a)(6) because Rule 4(a)(6) is based in statute and

therefore jurisdictional, I see no principled basis for

distinguishing Rule 4(a)(5), and the majority offers none. 

Moreover, the Court in Bowles spoke broadly about the Rule

4(a) timing requirements and exceptions—it did not base its

reasoning off any particular distinguishing feature of Rule

4(a)(6) such that the decision should not be read to apply to

Rule 4(a)(5) as well. The lesson to be drawn from Bowles is

that when Congress provides timely filing requirements,

courts are meant to stick to them, even where the resulting

consequences are harsh, as they admittedly are here.

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 43

B

The majority argues that its decision today does no

violence to the principle announced in Bowles because its

decision here rests on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),

and Rule 60(b) gives district courts the authority to relieve

parties from judgment. Here, the majority concludes that this

rule may be used not to amend or seek relief from a district

court judgment, as the rule is intended to be used, but to seek

relief only from the date of that judgment. Maj. Op. at 23. 

Allowing the district court to vacate and reenter the exact

same judgment in order to enlarge the time to file an appeal

constitutes a misuse of Rule 60(b) and violates Bowles by

circumventing the statutory time frame governing appeals.3

Unlike Rules 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6), which are based in

statute, Rule 60(b) is a court-promulgated rule that gives

district courts the authority to provide relief from a final

judgment if a motion is filed “within a reasonable time” and

“not more than a year after the entry of the judgment.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Relief may be afforded, among other

reasons, for mistake, excusable neglect, or extraordinary

3 The majority notes that Rule 4(a)(4) tolls the time to appeal where a

Rule 60(b) motion has been filed, and suggests that Rule 60(b) is an

embarrassment to my theory. Maj. Op. at 22 n.8. Where a Rule 60(b)

motion is used properly, it seeks to substantively amend the judgment,

thus rendering the original judgment un-final. In that case, there is no

longer anything to appeal from until the amended judgment is entered. 

Rule 4(a)(4) simply recognizes this, and thus presents no conflict with

Rule 4(a)(5) or § 2107. This is also why a Rule 60(b) motion may be filed

up to a year after the entry of judgment without running afoul of the time

to appeal. But as I noted above, Washington in this case was not actually

seeking to alter or amend the judgment. He just wanted more time to file

an appeal.

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circumstances that justify relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (6);

Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,

507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993) (holding that relief under Rule

60(b)(6) requires a party to show “‘extraordinary

circumstances’ suggesting that the party is faultless in the

delay”); Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168

(9th Cir. 2002). Under the majority’s reading, Rule 60(b)

subsumes Rule 4(a): if Rule 60(b) provides an avenue of

relief from an untimely appeal, then parties actually have up

to a year in which to seek an appeal, not thirty days as

provided byRule 4(a)(5). Such a reading not only contradicts

Rule 4(a), but, more importantly, 28 U.S.C. § 2107, and the

contradiction is not easily resolved: Rule 60(b) is a claimprocessing rule, while Rule 4(a) is largely jurisdictional. But

rather than interpret these rules to avoid such a conflict, i.e.,

by concluding that Rule 60(b) simply does not provide relief

from an untimely filing of a notice of appeal, the majority

seeks to avoid what it perceives as an unfair result and

ignores the fact that its holding allows Rule 60(b) to be used

to circumvent the jurisdictional time limits of Rule 4(a).4

 

4

 The majority states that I am “implied[ly] asserti[ng] that the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure have a superior statutory foundation than

that of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Maj. Op. at 12–13 n.2. No. 

What I have said, and it bears repeating, is that the time limits in FRAP

4(a)(5) have a specific statutory basis, 28 U.S.C. § 2107, while Rule 60(b)

has no such statutory corollary. The majority seems to suggest that

because both the FRAP and the Rules of Civil Procedure were

promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2072, the two

rules have the same statutory basis, and therefore Rule 60(b) can be used

to circumvent Rule 4(a). Maj. Op. at 12–13 n.2. The problem that the

majority refuses to acknowledge is that its proposed use of Rule 60(b)

circumvents not only Rule 4(a)(5), but § 2107, a separate statute. No

court has ever held that the Rules Enabling Act gives courts the power to

promulgate rules to overturn other acts of Congress and expand the

jurisdictional limits that Congress has set.

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WASHINGTON V. RYAN 45

The majority writes that, “[f]or decades, courts have

sparingly but consistently exercised their authority under

Rule 60(b) to restore appeal rights.” Maj. Op. at 23. It

appears to base its entire decision on the principle that Rule

60(b) gives district courts the general authority, based on

historical practice, to revive lost appeal rights. The

majority’s historical account of this use of Rule 60(b),

however, leaves a great deal to be desired. There was indeed

an historical practice of using Rule 60(b) to restart the time to

file an appeal in a very specific context: cases in which a

party never received notice of the district court’s final

judgment, and so missed the time to file an appeal because

the party was not aware that an appeal had become possible. 

In Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520 (1944), the Supreme Court

appeared to depart from longstanding precedent when it held

that the district court in that case had the authority to vacate

and reenter its original judgment to restart the time to file an

appeal where the clerk of the court had failed to serve notice

of the judgment on the parties as required by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 77(d). Id. at 523–24; see also id. at 525–26

(Stone, C.J., dissenting) (listing cases in which the Court had

prohibited an extension of the time to file an appeal). The

Court reasoned that, while Rule 60 did “not in terms apply to

the situation,” it was acceptable for the trial judge to provide

relief “in the view that the petitioner relied upon the

provisions of Rule 77(d) with respect to notice.” Id. at 524.

The majority interprets Hill to stand for the much broader

proposition that courts may use Rule 60(b) in any

circumstance that a court deems “extraordinary” in order to

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restart the time to file an appeal. Maj. Op. at 23.

5

I see no

such broad proposition in that case; rather, as I have said, the

Court appeared to create a specific exception to the rule

against extending the time to file an appeal where a party

failed to receive notice of the judgment. It is also worth

noting that the Hill Court dealt with a court-promulgated rule

setting the time to file an appeal, not a statute that

conditioned jurisdiction on timely filing. Hill, 320 U.S. at

521–23. See generally Wright, Miller, et al., 16A Fed. Prac.

& Proc. Juris. § 3950.3 (4th ed. 2016) (discussing the history

of FRAP Rule 4). There was, in fact, a statute setting a threemonth statutory deadline for appeals at the time that case was

5 The majority concludes that this case involves “extraordinary”

circumstances and assures us that this is one of a “narrow band of cases,”

that our power will be used “sparingly,” and that it is a “rare case[],” one

of a “handful” of the thousands of cases decided each year. Maj. Op. 10,

16, 23, 32–33. There is really nothing extraordinary about attorneys

miscalculating filing deadlines—even by one day. It happens all the time. 

See, e.g., Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Pincay v.

Andrews, 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d

238 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (death penalty case); Hallgren v. U.S. Dep’t

of Energy, 331 F.3d 588 (8thCir. 2003); Lattimore v. Dubois, 311 F.3d 46

(1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000);

Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d

552 (6th Cir. 2000). And there is no limiting principle if we allow this

exception.

If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late filings

might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of

exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the

filing deadline . . . Filing deadlines, like statutes of

limitations, necessarily operate harshly and arbitrarily

with respect to individuals who fall just on the other

side of them, but if the concept of a filing deadline is to

have any content, the deadline must be enforced.

United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 100–01 (1985).

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decided. See 43 Stat. 936, 940. But the three-month

statutory deadline was irrelevant in Hill, because the appeal,

although late under the D.C. Circuit’s twenty-day

rule—which the Court concluded the circuit had the authority

to set—had still been filed within the three-month deadline

set by Congress. Hill, 320 U.S. at 521–22 (noting that the

judgment was entered on May 7, 1940 and that the appeal

was filed on June 14, 1940). The Court therefore had no need

to address either the statute or any jurisdictional questions its

circumvention might have raised. Furthermore, in examining

the statutory deadline, the Court observed that the threemonth provision did not even apply to the D.C. Circuit,

because that court was governed by a separate statute. Hill,

320 U.S. at 522–23 (“[T]he statute conferring power on the

[D.C.] Court of Appeals to set the time for appeal was not

superseded by the legislation creating and defining the

jurisdiction of circuit courts of appeals.”).6 Either way, the

 

6 A bit of historical background is helpful in understanding the context

here. At the time Hill was decided in 1944, the Court of Appeals of the

District of Columbia—which would indeed become what we know as the

D.C. Circuit—was not yet considered one of the federal circuit courts of

appeal. In the Evarts Act of 1891, Congress separated the trial and

appellate functions for most of the federal courts in the United States,

creating our present system of federal district courts and the circuit courts

of appeal. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. It did not adopt

this change for the courts in the District of Columbia, however, until two

years later. With the Act of February 9, 1893, Congress kept the Supreme

Court of the District of Columbia as a trial court, and created a new, threemember Court ofAppeals ofthe District ofColumbia to exercise appellate

jurisdiction over the trial court. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch.74, § 7, 27 Stat.

434, 435–36. It did not become clear until 1933, however, that this trial

court and the new three-judge Court of Appeals were even Article III

courts, as opposed to Article I “legislative” courts. See O’Donoghue v.

United States, 289 U.S. 516, 549, 551 (1933). And it was not until

1948—four years after Hill—that Congress designated D.C. as one of the

eleven judicial circuits of the United States, and re-named the Court of

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problem identified in Bowles with circumventing a

congressionally mandated time frame was not an issue in

Hill.

Hill is irrelevant for another reason: A similar exception

has now been codified in § 2107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c)(1)

(providing relief for “a party entitled to notice of the entry of

a judgment or order [who] did not receive such notice”). 

Section 2107 then limits the time within which relief can be

granted to the party. If Hill once stood for anything relevant

to this case, it has been superceded by statute. Indeed, Hill

has also been superceded by rule. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 77(d)(2) provides that “[l]ack of notice of the entry

does not affect the time for appeal or relieve—or authorize

the court to relieve—a party for failing to appeal within the

time allowed, except as allowed by Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4(a).” This rule, which binds the district court,

prohibits the powers exercised by the Court in Hill. The 1946

Advisory Notes to Rule 77 state that

Rule 77(d) has been amended to avoid such

situations as the one arising in Hill v.

Hawes. . . . [T]he effect of the decision in Hill

v. Hawes is to give the district court power, in

its discretion and without time limit, . . . to

vacate a judgment and reenter it for the

Appeals for the District of Columbia the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit. Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 41,

45, 62 Stat. 869, 870–71; see also Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader

Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal Courts of the

District of Columbia, 90 Geo. L.J. 549, 559–61 (2002); see generally,

John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical

View, 92 Va. L. Rev. 375 (2006).

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purpose of reviving the right of appeal. This

seriously affects the finality of judgments.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 77 Advisory Committee Notes.

What the majority has done is take Hill’s narrow

exception and make it limitless. It takes the holding of

Hill—which Congress has superceded by statute and which

the federal courts have addressed by rule—and finds

additional authority in that decision. In the process, it ignores

§ 2107, upends Rules 4 and 77, and overrules, sub silentio,

our own prior, considered decisions. See In re Stein,

197 F.3d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Rule 4(a) and Rule 77(d)

now form a tessellated scheme; they leave no gaps for Rule

60(b) to fill.”). It is a daring and brazen move.

Nor have the lower courts, in the years since Hill was

decided, interpreted that case as broadly as the majority does

today. The majority cites few cases in support of the

proposition that Rule 60(b) may be used to circumvent

appellate filing periods that do not involve situations in which

a party failed to receive notice of judgment, save two from

the Sixth Circuit, see Tanner v. Yukins, 776 F.3d 434 (6th Cir.

2015); Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1993), and

two involving “attorney abandonment,” which is not at issue

here, see Ramirez v. United States, 799 F.3d 845 (7th Cir.

2015); Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Maj. Op. at 16–19. Indeed, I have found no other cases in

which courts have held that Rule 60(b) may be used to

circumvent the time for filing an appeal where a party missed

the filing deadline for reasons other than lack of notice of the

lower court judgment or attorney abandonment—whether

those reasons are mistake, neglect, or some other

“extraordinary circumstance.”

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Several courts, in fact, held before Bowles that Rule 60(b)

may not be used to circumvent timely filing deadlines in nonlack-of-notice cases. The Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh

Circuits have all discussed at length why relief is not

available under any provision of Rule 60(b) in order to restart

the time to file an appeal. See, e.g., Jackson v. Crosby, 437

F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 364 F.3d 106, 111–12 (3d Cir.

2004) (citing West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1983));

Dunn v. Cockrell, 302 F.3d 491, 492–94 (5th Cir. 2002) (per

curiam); Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 800–02

(7th Cir. 2000).

As the Third Circuit pointed out in West, 721 F.2d at

96–97, Rule 4(a) is a specific rule of appellate procedure, one

that is based on a statute which governs the time in which

appeals must be taken, see 28 U.S.C. § 2107. Rule 60(b), on

the other hand, is a court-promulgated general procedural rule

that applies to the district courts, providing for relief from

judgments. The Third Circuit concluded that under the

general/specific canon of construction, Rule 4(a), not Rule

60(b), controls the time to appeal, because Rule 4(a) is

specific to the timing of appeals. Id. The court concluded

that this was so despite the “inequitable results that may flow

from a strict application of the harsh time constraints in Rule

4(a).” Id. at 96. The court also pointed out that “to allow a

party to rely on Rule 60(b) as an alternative to the time

constraints of Rule 4(a) would have the substantive effect of

nullifying the provisions of Rule 4(a)(5).” Id.7

7 The majority cites the Third Circuit’s decision in Burkett v.

Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1217 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other

grounds by Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016), for the

proposition that “exceptional circumstances” may justify relief under Rule

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The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits agreed for similar

reasons. See Dunn, 302 F.3d at 492–93; Jackson, 437 F.3d at

1296.8 The Fifth Circuit additionally noted that relief is

limited under Rule 4(a)(5) to protect the finality of

judgments, and that this is particularly important where, as

here, “the movant neither complains of any denial of a full

and fair hearing before the district court nor seeks by the

ruling to have the district court alter its ruling, but rather asks

only that the order be vacated and reentered.” Dunn,

302 F.3d at 493 (quoting United States v. O’Neil, 709 F.2d

361, 373 (5th Cir. 1983)). In such a situation, where the Rule

60(b) motion “is avowedly being used only to extend the time

for appeal,” it “squarely collides with Rule 4(a)(5),” and

therefore is impermissible. Id.

60(b) despite failure to comply with the Rule 4(a) timing requirements. 

Maj. Op. at 19–20. What the majority leaves out is that the “exceptional

circumstances” to which the court referred is the fact that Burkett never

received notice of the entry of the final order he was attempting to appeal

from; the notice was sent to an incorrect address. Burkett, 826 F.2d at

1216–17. In other words, this is simply another lack-of-notice case. At

the time, the exception in Rule 4(a)(6) specifically addressing lack-ofnotice situations had not yet been added to Rule 4(a); hence, the Third

Circuit was relying on the historical lack-of-notice exception discussed

above.

8 Dunn and Jackson were both capital habeas cases. Dunn’s attorney

filed his notice of appeal four days late. Dunn, 302 F.3d at 492. Jackson’s

attorney filed an untimely Rule 59(e) motion, which meant that it was

inoperative to toll the filing period for a notice of appeal of the district

court’s denial of his habeas petition. Jackson didn’t realize this until the

Eleventh Circuit dismissed his initial appeal, at which point he sought

relief in the district court under Rule 60(b) to restart the filing period. 

Jackson, 437 F.3d at 1292. Thus, we are not the only court that has had

to address this issue in this freighted context.

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The Eleventh and Seventh Circuits likewise touched on a

similar issue, noting that the purpose of Rule 60(b) is to

challenge an error made by the district court; therefore, using

Rule 60(b) as a substitute for a timely appeal goes “outside

the scope of the rule.” Bell, 214 F.3d at 801–02; see also

Jackson, 437 F.3d at 1296 (“Petitioner was not asking for

relief from any order of the district court, but was instead

attempting to resuscitate the time to file an appeal by asking

the district court to circumvent an order from this court

dismissing the appeal as untimely.”).

Based on these cases alone, I would be reluctant to

conclude that Rule 60(b) provides an avenue for relief in the

situation we face here: not a lack-of-notice case, but a case in

which the petitioner’s attorney negligently failed to timely

file. The weight of pre-Bowles case law does not appear to

support such an extension of this practice. In fact it suggests

the opposite: that, contrary to the majority’s opinion, Rule

60(b) cannot be, and has not been, used in the manner the

majority uses it in this case.9

9 The majority argues briefly that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Browder v. Director, Dep’t ofCorrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978), on which

Bowles relied for the proposition that Rule 4(a) time limits are

jurisdictional, see Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209–10, supports its decision today. 

Maj. Op. at 22. It does not. Browder reached the unremarkable

conclusion that a post-judgment motion for a new evidentiary hearing in

a habeas proceeding, which the Court construed as an untimely Rule 59

motion, could not be used to toll the time to file an appeal. Id. at 264–65,

271–72. The original judgment granting habeas was issued in October,

and the district court agreed to hold the post-judgment evidentiary hearing

in a December 8 order, but ultimately denied the state relief after holding

the hearing in January, a decision from which the state then appealed. The

Court found that the appeal was untimely because the untimelymotion had

not tolled the time to appeal. The concurrence, on which the majority

relies, Maj. Op. at 23, merely pointed out that if the state’s motion for the

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But in light of Bowles, I fail to see how a claimprocessing rule like Rule 60(b) can legitimately be used to

avoid a jurisdictional, statutory filing requirement, and the

majority has offered no explanation on this point. PostBowles, two circuits have addressed the interaction between

the Supreme Court’s decision and Rule 60(b). In In re Sealed

Case (Bowles) (a different Bowles), the D.C. Circuit rejected

the argument that Rule 60(b) could be used to circumvent the

time limits of Rule 4(a)(6), which provides for a 180-day

extension of the time to file an appeal where a party never

received notice of the lower court judgment. 624 F.3d 482,

486–88 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The appellant in that case argued

that Rule 60(b) is a “court-promulgated rule” in which time

limits are not jurisdictional, and that it could be used to afford

relief from the time limit imposed by Rule 4(a). The D.C.

Circuit disagreed. It observed that “the [Supreme] Court has

never held that a party could use a court-promulgated rule to

circumvent the jurisdictional bar on limits for reopening the

time to appeal enacted by Congress,” and that allowing relief

under Rule 60(b) would do just that. Id. at 486. Because

“[t]he Court [in Bowles] spoke in unequivocal and

uncompromising terms in stating that courts lacked power to

post-judgment evidentiary hearing were construed as a Rule 60(b) motion,

the district court’s December 8 order could have been construed as

granting Rule 60(b) relief setting aside the original October judgment,

because the district court clearly intended to reopen the judgment by

holding the evidentiaryhearing. Browder, 434 U.S. at 272–73 (Blackmun,

J., concurring). Had the Court instead construed the district court’s order

in such a way, the state’s appeal would then have been timely as an appeal

from the reentry of judgment after the evidentiary hearing was held. Id.

at 273. Nothing in this case suggests that the state could have moved

under Rule 60(b) to vacate and reenter the judgment solely for the purpose

of restarting the time to file an appeal, without seeking to alter the original

judgment.

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carve out equitable exceptions to jurisdictional statutory

requirements. . . . it would be difficult to imagine that the

Court would not also view the use of Rule 60(b)” to

circumvent the Rule 4(a) filing requirements as

“illegitimate.” Id. at 486–87 (quoting Bowles, 551 U.S. at

214).

The Fifth Circuit agrees. In Perez v. Stephens, 745 F.3d

174, 178–81 (5th Cir. 2014), the court revisited its decision

in Dunn in light of Bowles, and concluded that Bowles

provided even stronger support for the conclusion that Rule

60(b) could not be used to circumvent the timely filing

requirements of Rule 4(a)(5). In Perez, the court dealt

specifically with whether relief from an untimely appeal was

available under Rule 60(b)(6), the “extraordinary

circumstances” exception. The court recognized that

§ 2107—the statute on which Rule 4(a) is based—contains no

“extraordinary circumstances” exception, or any exception

other than the two implemented in Rule 4(a)(5) and Rule

4(a)(6). Id. at 179. Hence, the court reasoned that “Congress

does not intend for any exceptions, other than the ones

already codified, to be used by parties to avoid strict

compliance with appellate deadlines.” Id. Accordingly, the

use of Rule 60(b) would contravene the clear rule in Bowles

that courts cannot create exceptions to statutorily-based

jurisdictional requirements. Id. The court cited several

unpublished dispositions from other circuits in light of

Bowles, as well as the D.C. Circuit’s published decision in the

In re Sealed case, that reached the same conclusion. Id. at

180 (citing cases).

The only circuit to agree with the majority’s position

today is the divided decision of the Sixth Circuit in Tanner v.

Yukins, 776 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2015). Tanner reaffirmed the

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Sixth Circuit’s pre-Bowles decision in Lewis v. Alexander, in

which the court held that Rule 60(b) could be used to restart

the time to file an appeal where a party’s attorney had

inadvertently untimely filed and did not realize this until after

the thirty-day grace period in Rule 4(a)(5) had expired. See

Tanner, 776 F.3d at 443–44; Lewis, 987 F.2d at 394–96. In

Tanner, prison guards prevented a habeas petitioner from

getting to the library to sign her notice of appeal during a

prison lockdown. Tanner, 776 F.3d at 436. She signed it and

sent it the next day, but the notice was already untimely. Of

course, she failed to realize this during the thirty-day grace

period provided by Rule 4(a)(5). Id. at 437. Tanner brought

a 1983 suit against the prison guards for causing the untimely

filing of her notice of appeal, and won. She then sought relief

from the untimely filing under Rule 60(b), and the Sixth

Circuit concluded that she had shown “extraordinary

circumstances” because of the guards’ conduct. But the court

distinguished Bowles along the same superficial lines that the

majority does here, noting only that Bowles dealt with the

exception under Rule 4(a)(6) and said nothing about Rule

60(b), and without discussing the nearly identical statutory

basis for Rule 4(a)(5). Id. at 438–41. Ironically, the court

might have shown its hand when it remarked that the

petitioner in Tanner was “deserving of an equitable

outcome.” Id. at 443. In short, Tanner offers no reasoned

argument that would support the majority’s position here.

The majority’s reliance on our decision in Mackey v.

Hoffman is equally unpersuasive. Mackey is, at best,

irrelevant to the circumstances of this case, and at worst, a

deeply flawed decision that conflicts with the Supreme

Court’s decision in Bowles. Mackey held that “attorney

abandonment” constitutes an extraordinary circumstance

under Rule 60(b)(6) justifying relief from judgment in order

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to extend the time to file an appeal. Mackey, 682 F.3d at

1253–54. Mackey’s attorney stopped pursuing his case

without informing him after Mackey’s parents stopped paying

his legal fees, and as a result, Mackey missed the deadline to

file a notice of appeal from the district court’s denial of his

habeas petition. Id. at 1248–50.

In finding that Rule 60(b) could be used to extend the

time to file an appeal due to the attorney’s misconduct, the

panel relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Maples v.

Thomas, which held that attorney abandonment could

constitute sufficient cause to lift a state procedural bar to

federal habeas review. 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012). State

procedural bars may be excused where a petitioner can

demonstrate cause for the procedural default that was beyond

his control, and actual prejudice from the violation of federal

law. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). 

In Maples, the petitioner’s attorneys changed jobs and

stopped pursuing the case, without ever informing the

petitioner, and as a result, the petitioner missed a state filing

deadline. 132 S. Ct. at 919–20. The Supreme Court noted

that generally, attorney negligence does not excuse a

petitioner’s default, but that the situation was different where

“an attorney abandons his client without notice, and thereby

occasions the default.” Id. at 922. Accordingly, the Court

found that the petitioner had demonstrated sufficient cause to

excuse the state procedural bar. Note, however, that Maples

dealt with an equitable exception to the judge-created, i.e.,

non-jurisdictional, procedural bar doctrine. Id. at 922. It had

nothing to do with jurisdictional time limits, Bowles, or Rule

60(b), and therefore presents a rather uncertain basis on

which to justify what the panel did in Mackey: bypass a

jurisdictional time limit using Rule 60(b).

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Mackey, unlike Maples, implicated the jurisdictional

problem addressed in Bowles, and that we face here today.

Like the Sixth Circuit and like the majority here, the Mackey

panel dealt with Bowles in the same facile manner, dismissing

Bowles because Bowles dealt with the notice of judgment

problem addressed byRule 4(a)(6), again without considering

the identical statutory basis behind Rule 4(a)(5). Mackey,

682 F.3d at 1253. I am therefore deeply skeptical that

Mackey was correctly decided in the wake of Bowles.10

Even assuming, however, that Mackey is correct, there

was no attorney abandonment in Washington’s case, making

Mackey inapplicable here. Even Washington does not argue

that his attorney “abandoned” him by miscalculating a filing

deadline and filing the notice of appeal one business day

late.11 As I noted in footnote 5, supra, this kind of mistake is

far from “extraordinary”—it is simple negligence that is,

unfortunately, all too common. There is nothing exceptional

about this case that warrants an extension of Mackey.

10 The SeventhCircuit recently followed the Mackey decision in Ramirez

v. United States, 799 F.3d 845, 854 (7th Cir. 2015), a similar attorney

abandonment case. The reasoning in Ramirezis, in some ways, even more

puzzling than that in Mackey. Ramirez likewise relies on a number of

Supreme Court cases dealing with the procedural bar doctrine, as well as

cases regarding AEDPA’s prohibition on successive habeas petitions, to

justify using Rule 60(b) to restart the time to file an appeal. Ramirez does

not even mention Bowles.

11

In fact, the panel in this case remanded the case to the district court

after Mackey was decided to determine whether Washington had suffered

attorney abandonment. The district court concluded that he had not. 

Washington has not challenged this finding in the current en banc

proceedings.

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C

The majority concludes that Bowles has no bearing on this

case because Bowles did not disturb the historical practice of

using Rule 60(b) to extend the time to file an appeal. But the

historical practice on which the majority relies is dubious at

best; there is a slew of case law that weighs against the

extension of this practice to the situation before us in this

case. However, even if the majority is correct as to how Rule

60(b) was once used, Bowles makes crystal clear that such a

practice is no longer an option. There is no difference

between creating an “equitable exception” to the time limits

in Rule 4(a) and using Rule 60(b) to “restore the opportunity

to appeal,” Maj. Op. at 12: both mechanisms extend the time

to file an appeal past the time limit that has been set by

Congress, time limits which the Supreme Court has

concluded are jurisdictional. The majority’s attempt to

suggest otherwise is utterly unconvincing. I am persuaded

that Rule 60(b) simply does not provide relief from the

untimely filing of a notice of appeal.

II

Lastly, I wish to remark on the argument made by the

majority regarding an “error” made by the district court in

this case in failing to promptly notify the circuit that

Washington had filed a notice of appeal. At the time

Washington filed his notice of appeal, Rule 3(d) of the FRAP

required the district court to “promptly send a copy of the

notice of appeal” to the circuit court. Fed. R. App. P. 3(d). 

However, Rule 3(d) did not specify a time within which the

district court must act. The rule did not even identify from

which point the district court’s “promptness” is to be

measured—whether the notice must be “promptly” forwarded

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upon the district court’s receipt of it, or “promptly” upon

occurrence of some other event. FRAP 22(b)(1), which has

since been amended, required the district court to “send the

certificate [of appealability] or statement [why a certificate

should not issue] to the court of appeals with the notice of

appeal and the file of the district court proceedings.” Fed. R.

App. P. 22(b)(1) (1998). The district court clerk in this case

waited until the district court had ruled on Washington’s

certificate of appealability—a prerequisite to our

jurisdiction—before sending the certificate of appealability,

together with the notice of appeal and the district court

record, to this court, as Rule 22(b) required.

The majority concludes that this was error, because the

district court clerk did not “promptly” send the notice of

appeal to the circuit as soon as the notice of appeal was filed,

but rather waited until the certificate of appealability had

issued. Moreover, the majority argues, this error prejudiced

Washington: if the district court clerk had sent the notice of

appeal to the circuit as soon as it was filed, our clerk’s office

would have issued an order to show cause earlier, and

Washington’s attorney might have realized the appeal was

late in time to request an extension of time to file an appeal

within the thirty-day grace period provided by Rule 4(a)(5). 

Maj. Op. at 30–31. In other words, Washington’s

negligence—or that of his attorney—was all the district

court’s fault, because the district court clerk “prevent[ed]”

Washington from being able to timely file. Maj. Op. at 5, 8,

20, 28, 28 n.10.

This is an extraordinary statement by the majority. I have

no interest in opining on a version of the FRAP that no longer

exists, but the majority’s argument on this issue is so strained

that I am compelled to briefly address it. At the time, the

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district court was not required, as it is now, to issue or deny

a certificate of appealability at the same time it issued its final

order regarding the merits of the habeas petition. See Fed. R.

App. P. 11(a). It was apparently common practice for our

district courts to issue an order addressing the petition on the

merits, and then separately address the certificate of

appealability, sometimes weeks or months later. Under the

majority’s new reading of FRAP 3, the district court clerk

was required to forward the notice of appeal to the circuit

court twice: first, when the notice of appeal was initially

filed, in order to comply with Rule 3(d), and second, after the

certificate of appealability was issued, in order to comply

with Rule 22(b)(1). This makes no sense. As the majority

acknowledges, the notice of appeal and the certificate of

appealability, when forwarded together, give the circuit court

clerk notice of the transfer of jurisdiction of the case. Maj.

Op. at 29; Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir.

1992). But without the certificate of appealability, the circuit

has no jurisdiction. What, then, would be the purpose of

forwarding the notice of appeal before the certificate of

appealability issues? To inform the circuit that jurisdiction

may transfer in the future? The majority cites no relevant

case law from any court in support of this novel reading of

the rules. The one case the majority cites in support of its

proposition is Yadav v. Charles Schwab & Co., 935 F.2d 540

(2d Cir. 1991), a non-habeas civil case, meaning that Rule

22(b) was not implicated there as it is here. Certainly I do not

disagree with the holding of Yadav that when only Rule 3 is

in play, Rule 3 requires the district court clerk to forward the

notice of appeal to the circuit court sooner rather than later. 

But the issue here is how Rule 22(b)’s requirement of a

certificate of appealability—including the certificate of

appealability’s attendant effect upon our jurisdiction—

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informs the operation of Rule 3 in the specific context of

habeas cases.

Although the rules may have been inartfully drafted, an

alternative, more logical reading of the rules—one the

majority does not even consider—is that the rules required

the district court clerk to “promptly” forward the notice of

appeal once the certificate of appealability issued, not once

the notice of appeal was filed. Such a reading harmonizes the

two seemingly contradictory directions provided in the

FRAP. Rule 22 is specific to the habeas context, while Rule

3 applies generally to notices of appeal in all cases. 

Presumably, in non-habeas cases—in cases where no

certificate of appealability is required—the district court

would “promptly” forward the notice of appeal to the circuit

court as soon as the notice was filed. But in the habeas

context, Rule 22 appears to give more specific

instructions—to forward the notice of appeal with the

certificate of appealability—thus requiring the court clerk to

wait until the certificate of appealability actually issued. 

Once the certificate of appealability issued, the clerk could

then “promptly” forward the notice of appeal together with

the certificate of appealability and the record to the circuit

court, as Rule 22(b) required. That is exactly what the district

court clerk did here, and I see no reason to accuse the district

court of error in an underdeveloped argument based on a

reading of the FRAP with no support in logic or case law.

Even assuming, however, that the district court clerk did

err in its reading of the rules, Bowles tells us that this does not

matter. In Bowles, the late filing really was the district

court’s fault, as the district court gave the petitioner an extra

three days past the permitted extension period, and the

petitioner relied on this extension. The Supreme Court held

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that this was irrelevant, given the jurisdictional nature of the

time limits at issue. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 207, 214. The

situation in this case is no different. If anything, it is less

sympathetic. In Bowles, the defendant followed what the

district court told him he should do. Here, counsel made his

own mistake and might have been alerted to his error if the

district court had forwarded the notice of appeal to this court

and if we issued a prompt order to show cause within the

thirty day grace period.12 Neither counsel’s error nor the

timing of the district court’s forwarding of the notice of

appeal can avoid the time for filing an appeal.

III

In short, the majority has offered no reasoned explanation

for its decision to ignore the Supreme Court’s dictate in

Bowles, the text of Rule 60(b) and Rule 4(a), or the reasoning

of our sister circuits. It has utterly failed to explain how a

claim-processing rule like Rule 60(b) can be used to

undermine a jurisdictional, statutory filing requirement

promulgated by Congress. And it ignores the consequences

of its decision today: that in allowing relief under Rule 60(b)

from an untimely appeal, the court puts a hole right through

the Rule 4(a) timing requirements, now giving parties up to

a yearto attempt to pursue an appeal. That cannot be correct. 

And while I am sympathetic to the petitioner’s particular

plight in this case, I note that federal courts regularly and

12 The majority, however, has identified no statute or rule requiring this

court to provide notice—in the form of an order to show cause why the

appeal should not be dismissed—that an appeal is untimely. Even if the

majority’s reading of FRAP 3 and 22 were correct, the district court’s

timing in forwarding the notice of appeal did not deprive Washington of

any notice to which he was entitled. Nothing in the district court’s actions

“prevented” Washington’s counsel from filing a timely notice of appeal.

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completely preclude review in federal habeas cases—even

capital cases—where a would-be habeas petitioner fails to

timely file within the one-year statute of limitations. See,

e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007)

(declining to apply equitable tolling to a habeas petition in a

death penalty case where the petitioner’s attorney

miscalculated the statute of limitations)13

; Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418–19 (2005) (declining to

apply equitable tolling to a petitioner sentenced to life

without parole); Damren v. Florida, 776 F.3d 816, 821–22

(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (declining to apply equitable

tolling to a habeas petition in a capital case); Rouse v. Lee,

339 F.3d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 2003). I would affirm the

judgment of the district court.14 As Isaid at the outset, I take

no pleasure in that judgment, but it is the judgment required

by law.

I respectfully dissent.

13 See Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336–37: “Lawrence argues that his

counsel’s mistake in miscalculating the limitations period entitles him to

equitable tolling. If credited, this argument would essentially equitably

toll limitations periods for every person whose attorneymissed a deadline. 

Attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable

tolling, particularly in the post-conviction context where prisoners have

no constitutional right to counsel.”

 

14 I note as well, that although the majority concludes the district court

was wrong when it found that it did not have the power to use Rule 60(b)

to reopen the time to file an appeal, rather than remanding to the district

court to reconsider whether Rule 60(b) relief is warranted in light of our

new holding, the majority just concludes that it is. Thus we engage in a

bit of self-help, expanding our own jurisdiction by concluding that the

district court simply abused its discretion by not affording relief.

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WATFORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I join Judge Bybee’s dissent, but like him I take no

pleasure in voting to dismiss Theodore Washington’s appeal. 

Dismissing the appeal because his lawyer filed the notice one

day late strikes me as a grave injustice in the circumstances

of this case. We are nonetheless compelled to take that action

because Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), held that the

filing deadline for civil appeals is jurisdictional and thus not

subject to equitable exceptions. Id. at 214. I offer a few

thoughts below as to why that holding is worth revisiting,

should the Supreme Court decide to take up the issue.

To begin with, neither of the rationales offered by the

Court to support the decision in Bowles is sound. The Court

relied in part on the fact that Congress itself set the filing

deadline for civil appeals in a statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2107,

rather than delegating authority to the courts to set the

deadline by court rule. 551 U.S. at 210–13. But that fact

proves nothing, really, about what Congress intended. Just

because Congress can limit the jurisdiction of federal courts

by statute does not mean that it intends every filing deadline

fixed by statute to be of jurisdictional stature. We know that

to be true because most of the filing deadlines set by

Congress in federal statutes of limitations (a close analog

here) have been held to be non-jurisdictional. See, e.g.,

United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632–33 (2015);

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010); Irwin v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93–96 (1990). 

Thus, as the Supreme Court has explained, we would need

some clear indication from Congress that it meant a particular

filing deadline to be treated as jurisdictional beyond the fact

that the deadline appears in a statute. Wong, 135 S. Ct. at

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1632. As I will explain shortly, no such indication appears

with respect to the time limits set by § 2107.

The other rationale for Bowles’ holding cannot support

the decision standing alone. The Court relied on its long

historical practice, reflected in cases dating back more than a

century, of treating deadlines for filing appeals from one

court to another as jurisdictional. 551 U.S. at 209–10. The

precedents the Court cited, including United States v.

Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960), do indeed refer to appellate

filing deadlines as “jurisdictional.” Id. at 224. But each of

those cases was decided before 2004, the year the Court

began to correct what had been, in past cases, its “less than

meticulous” use of the term “jurisdictional.” Kontrick v.

Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004). Beginning with Kontrick,

the Court articulated a more precise definition of the term,

one limited to requirements that describe the classes of cases

a court is competent to adjudicate. Id. at 455; Scarborough

v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413–14 (2004). Just two years

before Bowles was decided, the Court identified Robinson as

a chief source of the prior confusion and explicitly disavowed

Robinson’s flawed conception of the meaning of

“jurisdictional.” Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16

(2005) (per curiam).

While Bowles left the Court’s law “incoherent” the day it

was decided, 551 U.S. at 220 (Souter, J., dissenting), Bowles

has become even more of an outlier since then. With one

exception, the Court’s post-Bowles cases have routinely held

statutory filing deadlines to be non-jurisdictional. See, e.g.,

Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632–33; Sebelius v. Auburn Regional

Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817, 824–26 (2013); Henderson

ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011);

Holland, 560 U.S. at 645. (The one exception is John R.

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Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008),

which, much like Bowles, rested entirely on stare decisis

grounds, not on an analysis of the statute under the Court’s

current framework for determining whether a requirement is

of jurisdictional stature. See Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1636.) 

Bowles sticks out as an unprincipled exception to this trend,

and it has justifiably been the subject of academic criticism

for that reason. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, The Failure of

Bowles v. Russell, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 631, 634–43 (2008); Erin

Morrow Hawley, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution:

Redefining the Meaning of Jurisdiction, 56 Wm. & Mary L.

Rev. 2027, 2051–59 (2015); Howard M. Wasserman, The

Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 Nw. U. L.

Rev. 947, 964–66 (2011).

Bowles’ holding cannot be reconciled with the Court’s

current view of what it means for a requirement to be

jurisdictional. An appellate filing deadline does not define

the classes of cases federal courts of appeals are competent to

adjudicate; it merely sets a time limit on a procedural step

necessary to move the litigation forward. The Court has

observed on more than one occasion that “time prescriptions,

however emphatic, are not properly typed ‘jurisdictional.’” 

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

If the time limits set by § 2107 were analyzed under the

approach employed in the Court’s most recent cases, they

would undoubtedly be ranked as non-jurisdictional. 

Section 2107 contains no clear statement of Congress’

intention to make the filing deadline for civil appeals

jurisdictional; the statute’s language is no more emphatic, and

no more jurisdictional in tone, than any of the other filing

deadlines that the Court has held to be non-jurisdictional. See

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Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632–33; Auburn Regional, 133 S. Ct. at

824. The fact that Congress left undisturbed a long line of the

Court’s cases that (erroneously) ranked appellate filing

deadlines as jurisdictional cannot transform the plainly nonjurisdictional language of § 2107 into a clear statement that

the time limits specified there were intended to be

jurisdictional. I cannot think of any other area in which the

Court, having imposed a clear statement rule, has then been

willing to accept congressional silence or inaction as adequate

to satisfy the rule.

Nor does § 2107’s placement within the broader statutory

scheme reflect an intention to make the time limits

jurisdictional. Section 2107 appears in a part of Title 28

entitled “Procedure,” not in the part entitled “Jurisdiction and

Venue” that contains the provisions governing appellate

jurisdiction (such as §§ 1291 and 1292). The Court has relied

on precisely this sort of placement decision when holding

other filing deadlines to be non-jurisdictional. Wong, 135 S.

Ct. at 1633; Henderson, 562 U.S. at 439.

Legislative history, another tool that the Court has used in

this area, see Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633, also offers no clear

indication that Congress intended the time limits in § 2107 to

be treated as jurisdictional, rather than as run-of-the-mill time

prescriptions. In fact, § 2107’s legislative history reveals that

Congress fixed the section’s particular time limits based on

a pre-existing court rule, to which Congress merely sought to

conform the statutory provision. See 16A Charles Alan

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3950.1, at

186–88 (4th ed. 2008).

Finally, appellate filing deadlines fit precisely within the

definition of what the Court has called “claim-processing

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rules,” that is, “rules that seek to promote the orderly progress

of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain

procedural steps at certain specified times.” Henderson,

562 U.S. at 435. As the Court’s recent cases make clear,

claim-processing rules are “[a]mong the types of rules that

should not be described as jurisdictional.” Id.

In sum, Bowles stands on shaky ground and merits

reconsideration. Nevertheless, it controls here and, if

faithfullyapplied, requires us to dismiss Washington’s appeal

as untimely, even at the cost of ending Washington’s bid to

obtain habeas relief from his death sentence on grounds

similar to those that spared his co-defendant’s life.

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