Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02454/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02454-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODNEY L. BELLE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06CV2454 WQH (LSP)

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’

vs. MOTIONS TO DISMISS

CHASE HOME FINANCE LLC;

LOANSTAR MORTGAGE SERVICES,

LLC; MARRIOTT VACATION CLUB

INTERNATIONAL; and NOVASTAR

MORTGAGE, INC.,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

Pending before the Court are the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Marriott Vacation

Club International, Chase Home Finance, and Loanstar Mortgage Services. (Docs. # 3, 4, 35). The

Court finds these matters suitable for submission on the papers and without oral argument pursuant

to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 7, 2006, Plaintiff Rodney L. Belle filed the Complaint in this matter, asserting

various claims against Defendants Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase), Loanstar Mortgage Services,

LLC (Loanstar), Marriott Vacation Club International (Marriott), and Novastar Mortgage, Inc.

(Novastar). (Doc. # 1). On December 1, 2006, Defendant Chase moved to dismiss for failure to state

a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and in the alternative, moved for a more definite

Case 3:06-cv-02454-WQH-LSP Document 37 Filed 05/22/07 Page 1 of 8
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statement pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). (Doc. # 3). On December 5, 2006, Defendant Marriott

moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of service of process, and failure to

state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), (b)(5), and (b)(6). (Doc. # 4). In the alternative,

Defendant Marriott moved for a more definite statement pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). (Doc. #

4). On May 18, 2007, Loanstar joined Chase’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 35). In opposing the

motions to dismiss, Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. # 21). The Court denied the

motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice because Plaintiff failed to cite law or facts

which supported a preliminary injunction. (Doc. # 24). 

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Rodney Belle alleges that on or about July of 2006, he entered into an agreement with

Defendants Chase, Loanstar, Novastar, and Marriott. Complaint at 3. Though it is not entirely clear,

the agreement appears to relate to real property in San Diego, and Plaintiff alleges that he “honored/

tendered in full with good faith funds the said amount of the property ($400,000.00 to over

$600,000.000) by commercial instrument No. 4443800530 . . . .” Compl. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that

this controversy is over Four Hundred Thousand to over Six Hundred Thousand

Dollars and it also involves real properties; located at 640 Pyramid St. San Diego, CA

92114 (loan no. 20929816 of Chase Home Finance, LLC and Loanstar Mortgage

Service, LLC/ Loan No 2013993 Nova Star Mortgage Inc./ Loan No. 0014405549.

Compl. at 2.

Apparently related to the above agreement, or perhaps related to a “settlement agreement” or

other “stipulations,” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “dishonored/failed to give full disclosure

pursuant to Regulation Z of the Truth-in-Lending Act pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act .

. . .” Compl. at 4, 9. In addition, Defendants failed to disclose “that the original loan was created by

a check book entry, which may be sold in the open market (as a promissory note) for 80-90 cents on

the dollar with no consideration to the plaintiff.” Compl. at 13. Defendants also failed to disclose that

“lawful money was loaned out.” Compl. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “refused to sign . . .

under the penalty of perjury by sworn Affidavit/Jurat that . . . lawful money was loaned out . . . .”

Compl. at 5, 9. Defendants “declined in setting a public conference and invitation of the press/ media

in front of” Defendants’ places of business. Compl. at 9. 

Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants “counterfeited securities” in violation of the

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Security and Exchange Commission Act of 1933 and 1934. See Compl. at 10-11, 14. Plaintiff also

alleges that Defendants violated the International Protocol of the United Nations Convention on

International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes. Compl. at 1, 9-10. Finally,

Plaintiff briefly alleges a breach of contract (Compl. at 6), violation of the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (Compl. at 16), and violations of the Uniform Commercial Code (Compl.

at 3, 7, 14).

Though it is not entirely clear what relief Plaintiff is seeking, it appears that Plaintiff would

like the Court to enforce the terms of an undisclosed “settlement agreement,” and or to order

reconveyance of a deed of trust. Compl. at 4, 17-18.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

FED. R. CIV. P. 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). “The Federal Rules adopt a

flexible pleading policy; however every complaint must, at a minimum, give fair notice and state the

elements of each claim against each defendant plainly and succinctly.” Rasidescu v. Midland Credit

Management, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098-99 (S.D. Cal. 2006). When presented with a pro se

complainant, the pleadings must be construed liberally, and the plaintiff must be given the “benefit

of any doubt.” Abassi v. I.N.S., 305 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). However,

“even pro se plaintiffs must allege, with at least some degree of particularity, overt acts taken by [the]

defendant which support his claims.” Rasidescu, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. De La

Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978). A complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). In ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the pleadings in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, and further, must accept as true all material allegations in the

complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d

1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond

the complaint. Moore v. Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1989).

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/

DISCUSSION

Defendants Chase and Marriott move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.

P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. # 4). Defendants

contend that the Complaint is undecipherable, confusing, and does not put them on notice of the

specific claims against them. Defendants further contend that the Complaint does not comply with

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), and that there are insufficient allegations to support the various claims.

Defendant Marriott moves to dismiss on the additional grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and

insufficiency of process pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5). 

A. Marriott’s Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process

Defendant Marriott, a corporation, contends that it was not properly served pursuant to FED.

R. CIV. P. 4(h). Marriott contends that Plaintiff attempted service on Marriott by placing a copy of

the Complaint in an envelope, and mailing it to Marriott’s post office box in Lakeland, Florida.

Marriott contends that this method of service is improper for corporate defendants, and moves to

dismiss for insufficiency of service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s opposition

to the motion to dismiss does not address Marriott’s argument with respect to service of process.

FED R. CIV. P. 4(h) provides in pertinent part:

(h) Service Upon Corporation and Associations

Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon a domestic or foreign

corporation or upon a partnership or other unincorporated association that is subject

to suit under a common name, and from which a waiver of service has not been

obtained and filed, shall be effected:

(1) in a judicial district of the United States in the manner prescribed for individuals

by subdivision (e)(1), or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to

an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by

appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized

by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the

defendant . . . .

When serving a corporation, Rule 4(h) requires personal service on someone at the corporation, and

service by mail to a general corporate address is not sufficient. Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d

863, 868 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Apache Tribe Federal Credit Union v. The Federal Home Loan

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Bank of San Francisco, No. C97-2160 MMC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15233, * 11 (N.D. Cal. Sept.

30, 1997); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h) advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendments. “A federal court

does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served properly under FED.

R. CIV. P. 4.” Grand Canyon Resort Corp. v. Drive-Yourself Tours, Inc., NO.: CV-05-03469-PHXSMM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42414, * 6 (D. Ariz. Jun. 22, 2006), citing Direct Mail Specialists v.

Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988). “When service of process is

challenged, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the court’s personal jurisdiction is properly

exercised.” Id., citing Hirsh v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield, 800 F.2d 1474, 1477 (9th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff attached a declaration of service to the Complaint. (Doc. # 1). Therein, Plaintiff

indicated that he served Marriott “[b]y placing a copy [of the Complaint] in a separate envelope, with

postage fully prepaid . . . and depositing each in the U.S. Mails at San Diego, Ca on 11/7/06.” (Doc.

# 1). The Court concludes that Plaintiff attempted to serve Marriott by mail, and that such service did

not comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h). In addition, because Plaintiff did not respond to Marriott’s

motion to dismiss for improper service, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met his burden of

showing that the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Marriott is properly exercised. Hirsh, 800 F.2d

at 1477.

“If service is insufficient, the Court may either dismiss the case or retain jurisdiction but quash

service.” Hickory Travel Systems, Inc. v. Tui AG, Tui, 213 F.R.D. 547, 553 (N.D. Cal. 2003). For the

reasons stated below, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted and does not comply with FED.R.CIV. P. 8(a). Accordingly, Marriott’s motion to dismiss

for insufficiency of service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. # 4) is GRANTED.

B. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim & Failure to Comply with Rule 8(a)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Complaint is confusing, undecipherable, and fails to

distinguish among the various claims being alleged. In addition, Defendants contend that the

Complaint’s factual allegations are insufficient to support the claims. Plaintiff’s opposition to the

motions to dismiss is non-responsive to Defendants’ arguments.

As noted above, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint satisfies Rule 8 if

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it gives the Defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002), citing Gibson, 355 U.S. at 47. A complaint

fails to give fair notice when it is “so verbose, confused, and redundant that its true substance, if any,

is well disguised.” Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1956).

Plaintiff’s Complaint is twenty-two pages long, and it is titled a “Complaint to Action of Quiet

title/Lis Penden.” After reviewing the Complaint, it is not clear that Plaintiff in fact seeks an action

to quiet title, as the Complaint essentially ignores references to “quiet title” outside of the case caption

and page numbering. In addition, it is not clear which factual allegations, if any, Plaintiff included

to support a quiet title action. Aside from referencing a piece of real property in San Diego, nothing

in the Complaint supports an action to quiet title, and it is not entirely clear who owns the referenced

property, or whether it is subject to adverse claims. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020. The

Complaint does not indicate whether Defendants have an interest in the referenced property. The

Court concludes that Plaintiff has neither stated a claim for, nor put Defendants on fair notice of, a

claim to quiet title. 

Aside from the confusing “quiet title” claim, it appears that Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim

for violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1601, and specifically Regulation Z. See

15 C.F.R. § 226.1. Plaintiff does not provide detail to his Regulation Z claim, however, and does not

identify which parts of Regulation Z Defendants violated. Such detail is required to put Defendants

on fair notice of Plaintiff’s claims. Regulation Z contains four sub-parts and appendices, and each

subpart relates to a different type of transaction and is governed by particular rules and requirements,

e.g. “Open-end credit,” “closed-end credit, “oral disclosures,” and “special rules for mortgage

transactions.” See 15 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(1-6). Without notice of which sections of Regulation Z they

are alleged to have violated, Defendants cannot frame responsive pleadings to the Complaint. This

is particularly true given the often incoherent allegations in the Complaint. Though the Complaint

makes numerous references to Defendants’ “failure to disclose that lawful money was loaned out,”

the Court concludes that the failure to disclose allegations do not, standing alone, properly assert a

claim for violation of Regulation Z given the breadth, scope, and detail of that statute. In addition,

while the Complaint makes reference to Yanamoto v. Bank of New York, 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir.

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2003), the Complaint does not explain how that case is relevant to the circumstances alleged here.

In fact, the only thing that the Court can conclude based on the Yanamoto reference is that Plaintiff

may have tried to rescind an agreement–though it is not clear what agreement–by noticing the

Secretary of the Treasury or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Finally, the Court concludes that

the Complaint does not allege facts which establish the applicability of Regulation Z. See 15 C.F.R.

§ 226.1(c).

The Complaint makes references to other claims, including “Invasion of International Protocol

of the United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory

Notes,” “counterfeiting securities” in violation of “Security Exchange Commission Act of 1933 and

1934,” and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). However,

after reviewing the entirety of the Complaint, the Court is unable to determine the specific nature of

the claims asserted, how they relate to the allegations in the Complaint, and which sections or

subsections of the various Acts or statutes Defendants have allegedly violated. 

The Court concludes that the Complaint does not put Defendants on “fair notice” of the claims

asserted against them. Rasidescu, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1098-99. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to

dismiss are GRANTED without prejudice. (Docs. # 3, 4). 

CONCLUSION

Defendant Marriott’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of

service of process (Doc. # 4) is GRANTED.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) and failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted are GRANTED. (Docs. # 3, 4, 35). In addition,

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, but without prejudice. 

Plaintiff has thirty days from the date this Order is stamped “filed,” to file and serve an

Amended Complaint. See Local Civil Rules 4.1; 15.1. If Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff shall also cure deficiencies with respect to service of process of Defendant

Marriott. See FED.R.CIV.P. 4(h). Failure to file an Amended Complaint within the time allowed will

result in the Court terminating this case. 

DATED: May 22, 2007

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WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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