Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02365/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02365-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM O. BROWN, II,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-2365 GEB GGH P

vs.

MULE CREEK STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss filed January 18,

2005. Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and 12(b)(6) for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to state a claim. After carefully reviewing the

record, the court recommends that the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies be denied. The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted.

Plaintiff’s Claims

This action is proceeding on the amended complaint filed March 24, 2004. The

defendants are M. Booth, V. Nichols, R.J. Subia, A. Burruel, M. Knowles and N. Grannis. 

Plaintiff alleges that on July 23, 2002, he mailed a package from Mule Creek State Prison

(MCSP). Plaintiff’s family initiated a UPS search when the package did not timely reach its

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destination. Plaintiff’s family discovered that the package was returned to MCSP after it was

determined that it had an improper address. Defendant Booth received and signed for the

package on August 7, 2002. At that time, plaintiff had been transferred to a different prison. 

On October 8, 2002, defendant Booth issued a memorandum to plaintiff directing

him to send funds to MCSP for re-mailing and to provide a new address for the package by

October 31, 2002. Defendant Booth also informed plaintiff that the package would be destroyed

if he failed to send the funds and the new address.

Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal regarding the handling of his package,

appeal no. 02-2267. On October 21, 2002, defendants Nichols, Subia and Burruel provided a

First Level Appeal response. See Exhibit C attached to amended complaint. Defendants stated

that upon receipt of the appeal response, plaintiff would have fifteen days to provide funds in

order to have his property mailed to an appropriate address. Id. The response stated that if the

proper funds were not received, the property would be donated or destroyed. Id.

Plaintiff appealed defendants’ response to the Second Level. On January 31,

2003, defendant Knowles responded. Id. The response states that plaintiff claims that he did not

receive the October 21, 2002, appeal response until November 4, 2002. Id. Plaintiff submitted

the trust account withdrawal order on December 3, 2002. Id. However, plaintiff’s balance at that

time was $0. Id. 

On April 18, 2003, defendant Grannis responded to plaintiff’s Third Level

Appeal. Id. In her response, defendant Grannis stated that plaintiff claimed that the package was

now missing and sought reimbursement. Id. Defendant Grannis responded that the package was

disposed of after plaintiff was provided with proper notification and time to dispose of it himself. 

Id.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his right to due process by failing to give

him adequate time to re-submit his trust account withdrawal order. Plaintiff also claims that

defendants did not follow the regulations set forth in Title 15 regarding the processing of

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returned mail in violation of his right to due process. Plaintiff argues that the regulations

provided that returned mail was to be returned to the inmate. Plaintiff also alleges that

defendants’ conduct violated the Eighth Amendment.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available

are exhausted.” In order for California prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies, they must

proceed through several levels of appeal: 1) informal resolution, 2) formal written appeal on a

CDC 602 inmate appeal form, 3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and 

4) third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections. Barry v.

Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A

final decision from the Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement. Id. at

1237-38.

In Booth v. Churner, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001) the Supreme Court held that inmates

must exhaust administrative remedies, regardless of the relief offered through administrative

procedures. 121 S. Ct. at 1825. Therefore, inmates seeking money damages must completely

exhaust their administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that no action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies because 

appeal no. 02-2267 did not name any of the defendants. 

The purpose of administrative exhaustion is to give prison officials time and

opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case. 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-525, 122 S.Ct. 983, 988 (2002). Appeal no. 02-2267 put

defendants on notice that plaintiff was complaining about the processing of his package. 

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Plaintiff’s failure to specifically identify any defendant by name did not deprive defendants of an

opportunity to address his claim. Identification of defendants in administrative appeals may be

required as to certain claims, such as excessive force, where prison officials cannot address the

claim without knowing the identify of those involved. However, identification of defendants in

the instant case was not crucial.

More importantly, plaintiff’s claims against all defendants but for defendant

Booth are based on their denials of his appeals. Under these circumstances, plaintiff could not

have named defendants Grannis and Knowles in his First or Second Level Appeals. Defendants

are implicitly suggesting that plaintiff was required to file yet another round of administrative

appeals regarding defendants’ denial of appeal no. 02-2267. Because defendants have already

had an opportunity to consider plaintiff’s claim, additional exhaustion is not required.

Because the court finds that plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies as

to all defendants, the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be

denied.

Failure to State a Claim

Legal Standard 

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts consistent with his allegations which

would entitle him to relief. NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803 

(1994); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984), citing Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 101 (1957), Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d

1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1993). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, “can be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990);

see also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

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In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 35 (1969). The court will “‘presume

that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”

NOW, 510 U.S. at 256, 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596

(1972).

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also

consider facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d

1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other

papers filed with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.

1986). The court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

Analysis

Defendants first argue that plaintiff’s claim alleging deprivation of his property

fails to state a due process claim. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that "an unauthorized intentional

deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural

requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful

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postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

Thus, where the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, only authorized, intentional

deprivations constitute actionable violations of the Due Process Clause. An authorized

deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or statutes. 

Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Knudson v. City of

Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). The California Legislature has provided a

remedy for tort claims against public officials in the California Government Code, §§ 900, et seq. 

Because California provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, plaintiff may

only bring a due process claim based on an authorized and intentional deprivation of property. 

Plaintiff claims that defendants did not follow regulations regarding the

processing of returned mail. Plaintiff claims that defendants violated Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3149(a)(8) which provides that mail received for an inmate who has been transferred from the

facility where the mail was received will be immediately forwarded to the facility to whom the

inmate’s custody has been relinquished. Plaintiff also claims that defendants failed to comply

with § 3147(a)(4) which provides that all undelivered packages returned to a facility shall be

inspected before being returned to the inmate. Plaintiff’s claim that defendants did not give him

adequate time to re-submit his trust account order is apparently also based on a failure of

defendants to follow regulations. 

Because plaintiff claims that defendants failed to follow regulations regarding the

processing of returned mail, the alleged deprivation was not authorized. Therefore, plaintiff has

not stated a colorable due process claim against defendants. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to

dismiss this claim should be granted.

Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s allegations fail to state an Eighth

Amendment claim. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual

punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Plaintiff’s claims regarding the mishandling of his

property do not implicate the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed. 

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Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s claim against defendant Grannis regarding

her involvement in the appeals process should be dismissed. The court does not construe the

amended complaint to state a claim based on defendant Grannis’ involvement in the appeals

process. Rather, plaintiff’s claim against defendant Grannis is for deprivation of property. 

Defendants also argue that they entitled to qualified immunity. Because the court

finds that the amended complaint does not state a colorable claim for relief, the court need not

reach the issue of qualified immunity.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ January 18,

2005, motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be denied; defendants’

January 18, 2005, motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 4/20/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

br2365.mtd

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