Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02569/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02569-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Janice Makuchan, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-04-2569-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Docs. ##10, 12. The parties have filed

responses to the motions. Docs. ##11, 15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

deny Plaintiff’s motion and grant Defendant’s cross-motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on March 7, 2002, claiming an

inability to work since January 2, 1996, due to ulcerative colitis, irritable bowel disease, and

Crohn’s disease. Doc. #6A, Tr. 77-79, 85. The applications were denied initially and on

reconsideration. Tr. 57-60, 63-66. A hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

was held on May 12, 2003. Tr. 28-54. The ALJ issued a written decision on June 23, 2003,

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act prior to

her date last insured, December 31, 1996. Tr. 20-23. This decision became Defendant’s

final decision when the Appeals Council denied review on September 24, 2004. Tr. 8-11.

Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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Doc. #1.

II. Standard of Review.

Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750

(9th Cir. 1989); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla,

but less than a preponderance. See Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).

Put another way, substantial evidence is relevant evidence that, when considered in light of

the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support the decision. See

Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). In determining

whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that

detracts from it. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720.

III. Analysis.

The ALJ found that between January 2, 1996, the alleged disability onset date, and

December 31, 1996, the date last insured, Plaintiff had the following impairments:

dyshidrosis, anemia, probable protein and vitamin deficiency, suspected food allergies,

hypersensitivity, hair loss, a high grade cervical lesion, and varicose veins. Tr. 20-21, 23 ¶ 3.

The ALJ determined that these impairments, both singly and in combination, were not severe.

Tr. 20, 23 ¶¶ 3-5. The ALJ thus concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 23 ¶ 6.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because he failed to call a medical expert at the

hearing. Doc. #10 at 1-2. Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence and that the ALJ was not required to call a medical expert. Doc. #12

at 2-5.

A. Is the ALJ’s Decision Supported by Substantial Evidence?

The ALJ set forth in his written decision a thorough summary of the relevant medical

evidence. Tr. 21-22. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments led only to a periodic

decrease in energy and did not significantly limit her ability to do basic work activities.

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One of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Venkatesh, opined in August 2002 that

Plaintiff had no restrictions in her ability to perform basic work activities. Tr. 335-36.

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Tr. at 21. With respect to Plaintiff’s allegations of ulcerative colitis, irritable bowel disease,

and Crohn’s disease, the ALJ found that there was no evidence that Plaintiff had any

significant symptoms of, or received treatment for, these conditions during 1996. Tr. 21-22.

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her impairments and alleged

conditions not entirely credible. Tr. 21-22. The ALJ concluded that there was “a lack of

objective medical evidence demonstrating significant functional limitations due to any

medical condition that would have been sufficient enough to limit [Plaintiff’s] ability to

engage in basic work-related activity during [the relevant] period of time.” Tr. 22.

“An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not

significantly limit [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). Basic work activities include such things as seeing, hearing,

speaking, sitting, standing, walking, lifting, using judgment, and understanding, carrying out,

and remembering simple instructions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(1)-(4).

In this case, there was no indication from any treating or examining physician that

Plaintiff had significant limitations in her ability to do basic work activities. See Tr. 21.1

Non-examining physicians opined that the medical evidence did not show that Plaintiff had

any functional limitations prior to her date last insured. Tr. 220-23, 333-34. These opinions

alone constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision because they are

consistent with other evidence in the record. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752 (“[T]he

reports of consultive physicians . . . may serve as substantial evidence.”); Morgan, 169 F.3d

at 600 (“Opinions of a nonexamining, testifying medical advisor may serve as substantial

evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with

it.”); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The opinions of non-treating

or non-examining physicians may . . . serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are

consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.”); see also

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f) (stating that the opinions of non-examining physicians constitute

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The Court notes that medical records dated May 14, 1996 indicate that Plaintiff had

a tiny rectal fissure, some blood in her stool after she started taking iron supplements, and

small internal hemorrhoids. Plaintiff was instructed to use Anusol for two weeks and to

include more protein and natural iron in her diet rather than taking over-the-counter iron

supplements. Tr. 263-64. To the extent these conditions are symptoms of ulcerative colitis,

irritable bowel disease, or Crohn’s disease, there is no evidence in the record showing that

the conditions significantly limited Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities during

the relevant period. 

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medical evidence). Moreover, as of December 6, 1996, Plaintiff’s energy was better, her hair

growth had returned to normal, and her nutrition had improved. Tr. 250. Having considered

the record as a whole, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination that Plaintiff’s impairments were not severe during the relevant period. See

Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Because a reasonable mind could

conclude on the basis of the evidence of record that Crane was not disabled, we find that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings.”).2

 

The ALJ’s credibility finding also is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff

reported in April 1996 that she exercised 40 minutes a day and has always been an exerciser.

Tr. 270. Plaintiff reported in May 1996 that during the day she read, watched television, and

spent much of her time taking care of the household, which she enjoyed doing. Tr. 132-33.

The ALJ acted within his discretion in concluding that these activities are not those of an

individual with severe medical impairments. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750 (“The ALJ

is responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony.”);

Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600 (affirming the ALJ’s credibility analysis where the ALJ

“determined that Morgan’s ability to fix meals [and] do laundry . . . served as evidence of

Morgan’s ability to work”); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (holding that the ALJ gave clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting the plaintiff’s testimony of severe impairments where the

plaintiff was able to perform various household chores); Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749

(9th Cir. 1995) (“The ALJ’s statement of specific reasons for discrediting Orteza’s

complaints of pain and fatigue is sufficient. An ALJ is clearly allowed to consider the ability

to perform household chores[.]”); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001)

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Although not cited by the parties, a case recently decided by the Ninth Circuit notes

that an ALJ’s determination that impairments are not medically severe must be supported by

“substantial evidence to find that the medical evidence clearly established that [Plaintiff] did

not have a medically sever impairment of combination of impairments.” Webb v. Barnhart,

433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court concludes that evidence before the ALJ in

Plaintiff’s case satisfies this standard. 

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(affirming the ALJ’s credibility analysis where the ALJ “pointed out ways in which Rollins’

claim to have totally disabling pain was undermined by her own testimony about her daily

activities, such as . . . housekeeping”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (stating that an

ALJ may consider a claimant’s daily activities in evaluating symptoms and pain).

With respect to Plaintiff’s testimony that she was housebound due to her need to use

the bathroom frequently, the ALJ stated at the hearing that he had reviewed Plaintiff’s

medical records “over and over again” and that there was “nothing in [t]here about going to

the bathroom.” Tr. 48. Plaintiff stated that she had told her doctor that she “was running to

the restroom all the time.” Tr. 49. The relevant medical records, however, do not document

any such problem. Rather, the records show that Plaintiff chiefly complained about rashes,

anemia, hair loss, and cervical problems. Tr. 250-87. Moreover, in July 1998, Plaintiff

denied any history of colorectal problems or significant change in bowel habits. Tr. 173. 

Because the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, this Court “may not

engage in second-guessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959; see Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180,

184 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Neither the district court nor this court can substitute its own

determination of what the evidence shows for the ALJ’s if there is sufficient evidence to

support the ALJ’s outcome.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of

Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]”).

The Court will grant summary judgment in Defendant’s favor with respect this issue.3

B. Was the ALJ Required to Call a Medical Expert?

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by not calling a medical expert at the hearing,

arguing that a gastroenterologist or Crohn’s disease specialist would have linked her

symptoms to Crohn’s disease. Docs. ##10 at 1-2, 15 at 3, 37-38. An ALJ must call a

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medical expert where the record is ambiguous as to the onset date of a claimant’s disability

and medical inferences must be drawn. See Armstrong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 160

F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1998). In this case, substantial evidence supports the finding that

Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant time period and the ALJ was not required to

call a medical expert to establish an onset date. See Crane, 76 F.3d at 255 (“Because the ALJ

found that Crane could have returned to prior work and was not disabled, the judge needed

no medical expert to determine the onset date of the alleged disability.”). The Court will

grant summary judgment in Defendant’s favor with respect this issue.

C. Conclusion.

Because the decision to deny Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits

is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on legal error, the Court will affirm the

decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; Hammock v. Bowen, 879

F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We affirm a denial of benefits when the Secretary’s decision

is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error.”).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #10) is denied.

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. #12) is granted.

3. Defendant’s decision denying Plaintiff disability insurance benefits is

affirmed.

4. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

DATED this 11th day of July, 2006.

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