Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00072/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00072-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

ANN L. BALLENGER, )

individually and as )

Administratrix of the )

Estate of Thomas )

Ballenger, deceased, and )

MARY ANNA WOEPPEL, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:09cv72-MHT

) (WO) 

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT )

CORPORATION, a foreign )

Corporation, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

In this products-liability litigation, plaintiffs Ann

L. Ballenger and Mary Anna Woeppel have sued defendant

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation on Louisiana state-law

theories of design defect, negligence, and failure to

warn. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332

(diversity). Sikorsky moves for judgment on the

pleadings on federal-preemption grounds, arguing that

Case 2:09-cv-00072-MHT-SRW Document 193 Filed 11/03/11 Page 1 of 9
2

federal law occupies the field of aviation regulation and

displaces state-tort remedies (Doc. No. 123). For the

reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.

I. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), judgment

on the pleadings is appropriate when “no issues of

material fact exist, and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Ortega v. Christian, 85

F.3d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996). “A motion for judgment

on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same

standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”

Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008).

II. Factual Background 

On January 4, 2009, the plaintiffs’ decedent and

eight others boarded a Sikorsky helicopter bound for an

oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. Shortly after

takeoff, the helicopter suffered a catastrophic failure

Case 2:09-cv-00072-MHT-SRW Document 193 Filed 11/03/11 Page 2 of 9
3

due to a hawk colliding with the windshield. The pilots

were unable to maintain control and the helicopter

crashed in swampy terrain, killing all but one aboard.

The plaintiffs contend that faults in the helicopter’s

windshield and throttle design caused the crash.

III. Discussion

Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law trumps state

law. Congress can preempt state law in three ways:

express preemption, field preemption, and conflict

preemption. See Cliff v. Payco General American Credits,

Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1122 (11th Cir. 2004). Of

particular importance here is the concept of field

preemption, which occurs “when federal regulation in a

legislative field is so pervasive that [one] can

reasonably infer that Congress left no room for the

states to supplement it.” Id.

Sikorsky argues that federal-aviation law is a

species of field preemption and that, because the

Case 2:09-cv-00072-MHT-SRW Document 193 Filed 11/03/11 Page 3 of 9
4

complaint raises only state-law claims, it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Sikorsky’s Reply, Doc.

No. 145, at 5 n.3 (“[T]he fact of the matter is defendant

relies on ‘field preemption.’”). Sikorsky notes that

federal law prescribes detailed and comprehensive safety

regulations for air carriers. See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(1)

(“The Administrator of the Federal Aviation

Administration shall promote safe flight of civil

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing minimum standards

required in the interest of safety.”); 14 C.F.R.

§ 29.1141 (prescribing rules for throttle controls).

According to Sikorsky, there is clear “Congressional

intent to centralize air safety authority with the FAA.”

Sikorsky’s Brief, Doc. No. 124, at 28.

To be sure, aviation regulation gravitates toward a

uniform system of governance. See Northwest Airlines,

Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J.,

concurring) (“Congress has recognized the national

responsibility for regulating air commerce. Federal

Case 2:09-cv-00072-MHT-SRW Document 193 Filed 11/03/11 Page 4 of 9
5

control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do no wander

about in the sky like vagrant clouds.”). Against this

practical reality and legal background, the prevailing

rule in the federal courts of appeals favors preemption.

See Goodspeed Airport LLC v. East Haddam Inland Wetlands

& Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2011);

Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir.

2007); Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc.,

409 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2005); Abdullah v. American

Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999); French v.

Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).

But, as plaintiffs point out, the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has found against preemption in the

field of aviation. In Public Health Trust of Dade Cty.,

Fla. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir.

1993), a passenger was injured when his seaplane struck

a submerged rock during takeoff. The passenger claimed

that a design defect in the seat enhanced his injuries.

Id. at 292. 

Case 2:09-cv-00072-MHT-SRW Document 193 Filed 11/03/11 Page 5 of 9
6

In finding against preemption, the Eleventh Circuit

relied, in part, on Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505

U.S. 504 (1992), which espoused a rule that “Congress’

enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach

of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are

not pre-empted.” Id. at 517. The appellate court found

it significant that the preemption clause in the Airline

Deregulation Act applied to only matters related to

“airline rates, routes or services.” Public Health

Trust, 992 F.2d at 295. Thus, the court found that the

plaintiff’s “design defect claims [were] outside the preemptive reach of [the ADA].” Id.

Sikorsky responds in its brief by arguing,

essentially, that this court should ignore binding

precedent. Sikorsky’s Brief, Doc. No. 124, at 38

(“[T]his Court may not consider itself bound by Public

Health Trust.”). Sikorsky contends that the Supreme

Court has narrowed Cipollone’s approach to express

preemption clauses. See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda

Case 2:09-cv-00072-MHT-SRW Document 193 Filed 11/03/11 Page 6 of 9
7

Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (“[T]he express

pre-emption provision imposes no unusual, ‘special

burden’ against [implied] pre-emption.”); Freightliner

Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289 (1995) (“At best,

Cipollone supports an inference that an express preemption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does

not establish a rule.”). As Sikorsky points out, one

circuit court recently recognized the Supreme Court’s

rejection of Cipollone and narrowed its prior holdings

that were contrary to preemption. See US Airways, Inc.

v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1325-27 (10th Cir. 2010)

(finding preemption of state regulations, but leaving

state tort remedies intact). Similarly, a district court

within the Eleventh Circuit has questioned Public Health

Trust’s validity. See North v. Precision Airmotive

Corp., 2011 WL 679932, *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2011)

(“Public Health Trust remains good law. . . . If the

question were presented today, the Eleventh Circuit might

very well reach a different conclusion.”).

Case 2:09-cv-00072-MHT-SRW Document 193 Filed 11/03/11 Page 7 of 9
8

This court agrees that, if the Eleventh Circuit were

confronted with this issue as a question of first

impression today, it may decide in favor of preemption.

But this court is bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s

decision and should not forecast the overruling of

precedent on mere speculation. Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v.

Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)

(“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in

a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some

other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should

follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this

Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”).

In fact, at the recent pretrial conference in this case,

counsel for Sikorsky conceded that, despite the argument

Sikorsky made in its brief, this court has no choice but

to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Public

Health Trust. With this concession, the court concludes

that, because the plaintiffs’ state-law claims do not

Case 2:09-cv-00072-MHT-SRW Document 193 Filed 11/03/11 Page 8 of 9
*

 The plaintiffs also make two procedural arguments.

They contend that Sikorsky violated the scheduling order

by filing its motion after the deadline for briefs

pertaining to jurisdiction and choice of law. But

Sikorsky’s Rule 12(c) motion falls within the deadline

for dispositive motions under the amended scheduling

order (Doc. No. 117). 

The plaintiffs further argue that Sikorsky should be

judicially estopped from making its preemption argument

because it took an inconsistent position in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of

Louisiana. “Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine

invoked at a court’s discretion, designed to protect the

integrity of the judicial process.” Transamerica

Leasing, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 430

F.3d 1326, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005). The court declines to

exercise its discretion to preclude Sikorsky from making

this argument.

relate to airline rates, routes or services, they are

not preempted by federal law.*

***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant Sikorsky

Aircraft Corporation’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings (Doc. No. 123) is denied.

DONE, this the 3rd day of November, 2011.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:09-cv-00072-MHT-SRW Document 193 Filed 11/03/11 Page 9 of 9