Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02377/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02377-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joshua Stauffer,

Petitioner,

v.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-2377-PHX-ROS (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter is before the Court on Respondents’ Motion to Stay and Resetting of 

Filing Deadline for Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 27) filed on 

September 4, 2019. Petitioner did not file a response. On December 10, 2019, the Court 

issued an order allowing continuing Respondents’ answer deadline to thirty days after 

either the stay is denied or the stay is granted and lifted (Doc. 30 at 8). In addition, the 

Court summarized pertinent law applicable to habeas stays and sua sponte allowed four 

weeks for the parties to file additional briefing on the motion to stay (Doc. 30). The Court 

stated that the briefing would be helpful because of the following:

Despite that Respondents seek a stay pending completion of PCR 

proceedings, and Petitioner did not oppose such, there appears no reason to 

believe that any action will be taken by Petitioner or by the superior court, 

sua sponte, to move the PCR proceedings along. Two years have passed 

since the mandate issued from Petitioner’s direct appeal. During that time, 

nothing has been issued by the superior court or filed by Petitioner regarding 

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any PCR proceedings. Thus, on the record before the Court, the issuance of 

a stay in this habeas matter likely will be lengthy and unproductive.

Also based on the record presently before the Court, it appears that 

Petitioner’s actions and inactions have caused or have contributed to the 

causes responsible for the stalling of the Gila County Superior Court PCR 

proceedings. Petitioner filed the PCR notice very early, well before PCR 

proceedings could go forward given the pendency of Petitioner’s direct 

appeal. Once his direct appeal was decided, Petitioner did nothing to remind 

the superior court of his early PCR notice filing, and Petitioner has done 

nothing to move the PCR proceedings forward.

(Doc. 30 at 7). Neither party filed any additional briefing, nor has any party filed any 

update regarding the superior court PCR proceedings. The stay request in Respondents’ 

motion (Doc. 27) is ripe. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that a 

stay be denied.

I. Background

On April 12, 2019, Petitioner Joshua Stauffer (“Petitioner” or “Stauffer”) filed a 

Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody 

(“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents were ordered to answer the Petition (Doc. 7).

The Petition challenges convictions and sentences entered after a jury trial in Gila 

County Superior Court, case #CR2013-335 (Doc. 1 at 1-2; Doc. 27-1 at 3-6).1 Sentences 

were imposed on May 16, 2016.2 Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 27-1 at 8). After counsel for Petitioner filed an Anders3 brief 

and Petitioner did not file a pro se supplemental brief (Doc. 27-1 at 28), the court of appeals 

“searched the record for fundamental error and found none” (Doc. 27-1 at 29). The 

1 Doc. 27-1 at 31-38 is a case docket as of August 27, 2019, which appears to be 

printed from the Public Access to Court Information website for the State of Arizona.

2 The minute entry was filed on May 23, 2016, the date the sentencing judge signed 

such, but the sentencing proceedings took place on May 16, 2016 (Doc. 27-1 at 3-6).

3 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

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convictions and sentences were affirmed and the mandate issued on August 2, 2018 (Doc. 

1 at 2; Doc. 27-1 at 24-29).

After conviction and during early stages of direct appeal, Petitioner initiated Rule 

32 post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceedings in the Gila County Superior Court (Doc. 

27-1 at 10-12, 32).4 In June, 2016, Petitioner filed motions in the Gila County Superior 

Court apparently attempting to get a ruling on the PCR notice (Doc. 27-1 at 14-18), despite 

that such a ruling would have been premature under the applicable rules. The motions 

were denied in July, 2016, noting that appellate counsel was appointed for Petitioner (Doc. 

27-1 at 20-22).

According to the public docket presented with the motion to stay, no action has been 

taken on the PCR notice and there have been no filings in Petitioner’s criminal case after 

entries in August 2017, about affirmance on direct appeal and the appellate mandate having 

been issued (Doc. 27-1 at 31). In other words, it appears that: 1) the superior court has 

taken no action on the early filed PCR notice after Petitioner’s direct appeal was decided; 

and 2) Petitioner has made no attempts to move the PCR proceedings forward after his 

direct appeal was decided.

Petitioner alleges four grounds for relief in this habeas proceeding initiated in April, 

2019 (Doc. 1). “In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that police conducted an unlawful search 

and seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that 

he was maliciously prosecuted, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Ground 

Three, Petitioner alleges that his attorney provided ineffective assistance, in violation of 

the Sixth Amendment. And in Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that he was deprived of due 

process, in violation of the Fifth Amendment” based on alleged conspiracy between the 

superior court judge and the prosecuting attorney (Doc. 7 at 2). The ineffective assistance 

4 The notice of appeal was signed by Petitioner on May 16, 2019, and filed on May 

19, 2016 (Doc. 27-1 at 8). The PCR proceedings were initiated with a notice of postconviction relief signed on May 30, 2016, and file stamped on July 15, 2016 (Doc. 27-1 at 

10-12). The docket reflects a date of June 3, 2016, for the initiation of PCR proceedings 

(Doc. 27-1 at 38), which creates question about the accuracy of the court docket in the 

public record.

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of counsel claim in Ground Three regards appointed trial counsel Raymond Geiser (Doc. 

1 at 8). 

In the motion to stay (Doc. 27), Respondents assert that Grounds One, Two, and 

Four are technically exhausted (that is, they are exhausted by procedural default),

5 but that 

the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Ground 3 is unexhausted due to Petitioner’s 

still pending PCR proceedings in the Gila County Superior Court (Doc. 27 at 2). 

Respondents filed the motion to stay after learning that Petitioner’s post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”) proceeding was still pending in the Gila County Superior Court (Doc. 27).

II. Applicable Law

Under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)(2)(D) a defendant in Petitioner’s circumstances 

“must file a[PCR] notice no later than 90 days after the entry of judgment and sentence or 

no later than 30 days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, 

whichever is later.” Under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a), a defendant in Petitioner’s 

circumstances “is precluded from relief under Rule 32 based on any ground: (1) still 

raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or in a post-trial motion under Rule 24; (2) finally 

adjudicated on the merits in an appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding; or (3) 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.”6 Importantly, 

“Arizona law only permits defendants to bring ineffective assistance of counsel claims in 

Rule 32 post-conviction review proceedings. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thomas v. Rayes, 214 

5 When a petitioner has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirement for 

presenting a claim in state court, this is described as “technical exhaustion” through 

procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991) (“A habeas 

petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical 

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”); 

Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing that if state court where 

petitioner would be required to present the claim would find the claims procedurally barred, 

petitioner has technically exhausted the claim through procedural default).

6 Relief based on Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d) through (h) is not precluded, but none of 

Petitioner’s habeas claims are based on the grounds set forth therein.

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Ariz. 411, 153 P.3d 1040, 1044 (2007) (en banc).” Murdaugh v. Ryan, 724 F.3d 1104, 

1123 (9th Cir. 2013).

Thus, Ground Three is the only ground in the Petition that can be raised in PCR 

proceedings after direct appeal. Accordingly, Arizona law supports Respondents’ position 

that Grounds One, Two, and Four are technically exhausted and that the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim in Ground 3 is unexhausted due to the unadjudicated PCR 

notice Petitioner filed in the Gila County Superior Court.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), habeas relief may not be granted unless a petitioner has 

exhausted the remedies available in state court. Exhaustion requires that the petitioner’s 

contentions were fairly presented to the state courts, Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 

991 (9th Cir. 2011), and disposed of on the merits by the highest court of the state, Greene 

v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). As a matter of comity, a federal court 

will not entertain a habeas petition unless the petitioner has exhausted the available state 

judicial remedies on every ground presented in it. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) 

(dismissal of mixed petition containing unexhausted claims is proper); Sherwood v. 

Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court’s dismissal of habeas 

petition for failure to exhaust state remedies where state court appeal was pending).

Two procedures are available to stay a pending federal habeas petition with both 

unexhausted and exhausted claims during the exhaustion process in state court: the Rhines7

procedure and the Kelly8 procedure. See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 

2009) (explaining differences between Kelly and Rhines stays). Under Rhines, a Court may 

stay a “mixed” federal petition—one that includes both exhausted and unexhausted 

claims—while the Petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims; all 

7 Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005).

8 Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003).

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claims remain pending in federal court and are protected from any statute-of-limitations 

issues. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78.9

Under Kelly, the petitioner voluntarily dismisses any unexhausted claims from the 

pending federal petition and only the exhausted claims are stayed; the petitioner may then 

seek to amend the dismissed claims into the petition after he has exhausted them in state 

court. King, 564 F.3d at 1135; see Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting 

that “Rhines applies to stays of mixed petitions” and Kelly to “stays of fully exhausted 

petitions” (emphasis omitted)). Under Kelly, the dismissed and then newly exhausted 

claims are not necessarily protected from any time bar. See King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41. 

“In this regard, the Kelly procedure ... is a riskier one for a habeas petitioner because it 

does not protect a petitioner’s unexhausted claims from expiring during a stay.” Morris v. 

California, No. 2:11-cv-1051 MCE DAD P, 2012 WL 2358720, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 

2012).

Rhines applies in “limited circumstances.” See 544 U.S. at 277. For a Rhines stay, 

the petitioner must show (1) good cause for his failure to earlier exhaust the claims in state 

court, (2) that the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless,” and (3) that he has not 

engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Id. at 277-78. The Supreme 

Court has not precisely defined what constitutes “good cause” for a Rhines stay. See Blake 

v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit has found that good 

cause does not require “extraordinary circumstances.” Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661-62. 

Rather, “good cause turns on whether the petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse, 

supported by sufficient evidence, to justify” the failure to exhaust. Blake, 745 F.3d at 982. 

See also Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2017).

Under Kelly, the petitioner need not show good cause for a stay of totally exhausted 

claims. See King, 564 F.3d at 1135. But a stay under Kelly “will be denied when the court 

finds such a stay would be futile.” Knowles v. Muniz, 228 F.Supp.3d 1009, 1016 (C.D. 

9

In Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that a 

district court has the discretion to stay and hold in abeyance fully unexhausted petitions 

under the circumstances set forth in Rhines.

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Cal. 2017) (citation omitted). “Futility would exist if the petitioner seeks a stay to exhaust

a meritless claim.” Id. Further, a petitioner may amend a newly exhausted claim into a 

pending federal habeas petition after the expiration of the limitation period only if it shares 

a “common core of operative facts” with one or more of the claims in the pending petition. 

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 162 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005). A new claim 

“does not relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it asserts a 

new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the 

original pleading set forth.” Id. at 650.

Exhaustion of a habeas claim may be excused if the petitioner cannot present his 

claim because there is an absence of available state corrective process or circumstances 

exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). For example, in Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1993), 

even though the petitioner did not technically exhaust his claims in state court because he 

was entitled to a new appeal, his interest in receiving a prompt decision on his federal 

claims was enough to excuse the exhaustion requirement.10

Noteworthy for this discussion is that under AEDPA, which amended 28 U.S.C. § 

2244, there are strict limitations on filing a second or successive habeas petition, and a state 

prisoner may not file a successive or second habeas petition in the district court unless the 

applicable federal circuit court of appeals has previously authorized the district court to 

consider the successive petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Thus, if the stay is not granted 

and the Petition is later dismissed due to having an unexhausted claim, Petitioner may be 

barred from filing a successive or second habeas petition.

Further, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is not tolled by the filing of a 

Section 2254 habeas petition. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). Thus, 

10 Hendricks was decided before the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which raises question as to whether Hendricks is valid precedent post 

AEPDA. But see Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 769 (9th Cir. 2002) (post-AEDPA 

and citing Hendricks, 993 F.2d at 664, as precedent as authority to proceed with 

unexhausted claims in a habeas petition).

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if a petitioner files a timely but mixed petition in federal court, and the district court

dismisses without prejudice for failure to exhaust, the one-year statute of limitations often 

expires by the time the petitioner exhausts state court remedies and returns to federal court, 

thereby effectively precluding any federal habeas review. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 

269, 275 (2005); Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 718-19 (9th Cir. 2017).

III. Analysis

In their motion to stay, Respondents do not address the stay requirements under 

Rhines or Kelly in seeking a stay pending completion of the PCR proceedings regarding 

Ground Three of the Petition:

Rather than ask this Court to dismiss Stauffer’s pending habeas petition for 

failure to exhaust state remedies, see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) 

(dismissal of mixed petition containing unexhausted claims is proper); 

Sherwood, 716 F.2d at 634 (affirming district court’s dismissal of habeas 

petition for failure to exhaust state remedies where state court appeal was 

pending), Respondents instead request a stay of the instant proceeding and 

an order resetting the filing deadline for an answer to 40 days from the date 

Stauffer notifies this Court and Respondents that: (1) he has been granted 

post-conviction relief; (2) his claims have been denied by the Gila County 

Superior Court and he has elected not to appeal the decision; (3) his appeal 

of the denial of the PCR proceedings has been denied; or (4) the Arizona 

Supreme Court has denied his subsequent petition for review.

(Doc. 27 at 4-5). Petitioner has not filed any motion to stay or any response to the 

Respondents’ motion to stay. Indeed, Petitioner has not filed any document since 

Respondents filed their motion to stay. In short, Petitioner has not made any effort to show 

that a stay is appropriate under Rhines or Kelly. For example, under Rhines, Petitioner has 

not shown any good cause. Additionally, on December 10, 2019, this Court’s Order 

explained how Petitioner could seek a stay under Kelly, including by voluntarily dismissing 

the unexhausted claims (Doc. 30), but Petitioner has done nothing to that end. 

Accordingly, neither Petitioner nor Respondents have satisfied the requirements for a 

Rhines or Kelly stay.

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Despite that Respondents seek a stay pending completion of PCR proceedings, and 

Petitioner did not oppose such, the record reflects no reason to believe that any action will 

be taken by Petitioner or by the superior court, sua sponte, to move the Gila County 

Superior Court PCR proceedings along. Two years have passed since the mandate issued 

from Petitioner’s direct appeal. During that time, nothing has occurred in the superior court

PCR proceedings. The wait thus far has been lengthy and entirely unproductive. The Court 

concludes that any further wait would be futile. There is no reason to believe that the 

superior court PCR proceedings will advance at all, let alone advance to a conclusion. 

Thus, on the record before the Court, the requested stay should be denied because such a 

stay would be futile.

Also based on the record before the Court, Petitioner’s actions and inactions caused, 

or at least contributed to, the stalling of the Gila County Superior Court PCR proceedings. 

Petitioner filed the PCR notice early, well before PCR proceedings could go forward given 

the pendency of Petitioner’s direct appeal in the state appellate court. Once Petitioner’s

direct appeal was decided and the mandate issued, Petitioner did nothing to remind the 

superior court of his early PCR notice filing. Since that time, Petitioner has done nothing 

to move the superior court PCR proceedings forward. On this record, Petitioner’s actions 

and inactions undermine any stay request.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Respondents’ motion to stay (Doc. 27) be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

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Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 20th day of February, 2020.

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