Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05405/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05405-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 8, 1999 Decided July 13, 1999

No. 98-5405

The Alaska Legislative Council, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, United States

Department of the Interior, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv00069)

---------

Mark L. Pollot argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs was Robin W. Grover.

Elizabeth Ann Peterson, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellees. With her

on the brief were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, David C. Shilton and Dean K. Dunsmore, Attorneys.

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 1 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Robert C. Erwin was on the brief for amici curiae Dale

Bondurant, et al.

Walter T. Featherly was on the brief for amici curiae

Mary Bishop, et al.

Before: Wald, Randolph, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: The Alaska Legislative Council is

a "permanent interim committee and service agency of the

legislature." See Alaska Stat. s 24.20.010 (Michie 1996). It

is "composed of the president of the senate and six other

senators appointed by the president, and the speaker of the

house of representatives and six other representatives appointed by the speaker." See id. s 24.20.020. In January

1998, the Council and seventeen individual members of the

Alaska State Legislature, in their capacities as legislators and

as individuals, brought a complaint in the district court objecting to the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation

Act and the actions of the federal government thereunder.

The complaint, which sought declaratory and injunctive

relief, focused on the federal management of subsistence

taking of fish and wildlife on federal public lands in Alaska

pursuant to the Lands Conservation Act. Of the individual

plaintiffs, two claimed they ate fish and game from Alaska,

two alleged they engaged in fishing, two alleged they engaged

in hunting, eleven said they hunted and fished in the State;

all claimed that the defendants' actions would adversely affect

their hunting or fishing or their consumption of fish and

game. The Lands Conservation Act, according to the complaint, infringes on State prerogatives in violation of the

Commerce Clause, the Enumerated Powers Doctrine and

principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth and Eleventh

Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Act's

rural subsistence use priority violates the equal protection

component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution, because it discriminates

between users of land on the basis of residency; and the

federal government's implementation of the Act violates the

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 2 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Administrative Procedure Act. See Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 15 F.Supp.2d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1998).

Several years before the Council filed its action here, the

State of Alaska brought a complaint raising similar allegations. See Katie John v. United States, 1994 WL 487830 at

*5 (D. Alaska Mar. 30, 1994). On its own motion, the district

court in Alaska concluded that the State's complaint was

without merit and dismissed it. See id. at *9. The State filed

a notice of appeal, but later stipulated to a dismissal with

prejudice. See State of Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 700

n.2 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit denied the motion of

the Alaska State Legislature to intervene or to substitute

itself as the appellant. See id.

In view of these earlier proceedings, the district court

dismissed this complaint on the ground of res judicata, and

also on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run on

certain claims and that others were not ripe. See Alaska

Legislative Council, 15 F.Supp.2d at 22-23, 24, 26. We

affirm, but not entirely for the reasons given by the district

court.

I

A

The initial question, which we decide against the plaintiffs,

is whether the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the

constitutional and statutory claims of the Council and of the

individual legislators, in their official capacity, regarding the

Act's creation of a hunting and fishing "priority" for rural

subsistence users on federal public lands in Alaska, and the

federal defendants' implementation of the Act. To understand why we believe the court could not hear this aspect of

the case--why, that is, the plaintiffs lacked standing--it is

necessary first to offer a brief description of the Alaska

National Interest Lands Conservation Act.

Enacted in 1980, the Lands Conservation Act had as one of

its stated purposes to maintain "sound populations of, and

habitat for, wildlife species of inestimable value to the citizens

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 3 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of Alaska and the Nation," and to "provide the opportunity

for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life to

continue to do so." See Alaska National Interest Lands

Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2374 (1980), 16

U.S.C. s 3101(b), (c). To this end, the Act established a

priority for "the taking on public lands of fish and wildlife for

nonwasteful subsistence uses ... over the taking on such

lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes." See 16 U.S.C.

s 3114(a). The Act defined "subsistence uses" as the "customary and traditional uses ... of wild, renewable resources

for direct personal or family consumption," by "rural Alaska

residents"--those persons who reside in communities or areas

that are "substantially dependent on fish and wildlife for

nutritional and other subsistence uses." See 16 U.S.C.

s 3113. If it became necessary to limit subsistence taking of

fish and game, the Act provided that the priority would be

implemented through limitations "based on the application of

the following criteria: (1) customary and direct dependence

upon the populations as the mainstay of livelihood; (2) local

residency; and (3) the availability of alternative resources."

See 16 U.S.C. s 3114(a).

The Act applied to federal public lands in Alaska, that is, to

lands "the title to which is in the United States." See 16

U.S.C. s 3102(2), (3). Public lands, as defined in the Act, do

not include "land selections of the State of Alaska which have

been tentatively approved or validly selected under the Alaska Statehood Act1 and lands which have been confirmed to,

__________

1 The Alaska Statehood Act declared Alaska admitted into the

Union on an equal footing with the other States. See Alaska

Statehood Law, Pub. L. No. 85-508 s 1, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (codified

at note preceding s 21 of Title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions). It provided that the United States would retain title to all

property in Alaska to which it had title, including public lands, and

that Alaska would retain title to all property, title to which was in

the Territory of Alaska or any of the subdivisions. See id. s 5, 72

Stat. 340. The Statehood Act also permitted Alaska to select

acreage from certain national forests and other federal public lands

within thirty-five years after its admission to the Union. See id.

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 4 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

validly selected by, or granted to the Territory of Alaska or

the State under any other provision of Federal law." See 16

U.S.C. s 3102(3)(A).

The Act authorized the State of Alaska to "assume management for the taking of fish and wildlife on the public lands for

subsistence uses pursuant to this title," on condition that the

State enacted and implemented laws of general applicability

consistent with the Act's subsistence use priority, definitions

and local and regional participation requirements. See 16

U.S.C. s 3115(d)(1). As of 1978, the State of Alaska had

adopted a statute giving "subsistence uses ... priority over

sport and commercial uses." See Madison v. Alaska Dep't of

Fish & Game, 696 P.2d 168, 170-71 (Alaska 1985). Subsistence uses were defined as "customary and traditional uses

... for direct personal or family consumption." See id. at

170. Limiting criteria contained in regulations promulgated

by the Alaska Board of Fisheries determined subsistence

users by their area of residence. See id. at 172 n.8, 174. On

May 14, 1982, after the Secretaries of the Interior and

Agriculture reviewed and approved the State's regulatory

scheme, Alaska became responsible for all regulation of subsistence uses of its wild renewable resources.

In February 1985, the Supreme Court of Alaska invalidated

the Board's limiting criteria as inconsistent with state law.

See Madison, 696 P.2d at 178. The Interior Secretary then

withdrew certification of the State's regulatory scheme.

When the State later amended its legislation to limit subsistence use to use by residents of rural areas, the Alaska

Supreme Court declared the amended statute in violation of

the State Constitution. See McDowell v. State of Alaska, 785

P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989). The court stayed the effect of its

decision until July 1, 1990. At that time, the State had no

laws in effect consistent with the Lands Conservation Act's

rural subsistence use priority. The Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture jointly published temporary fish and wildlife management regulations, applicable

__________

s 6(a), (b), 72 Stat. 340, as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-487,

s 906(a)(1), (2), 94 Stat. 2371, 2437.

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 5 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

to public lands as defined by the Act, implementing the rural

subsistence priority.2 See Temporary Subsistence Management Regulations for Public Lands in Alaska, 55 Fed. Reg.

27,114, 27,118 (1990). The final regulations, promulgated in

May 1992, made no significant changes to the scope of federal

authority. See Subsistence Management Regulations for

Public Lands in Alaska, Subparts A, B, and C, 57 Fed. Reg.

22,940 (1992).

B

As to the claims of the Council and the individuals in their

official capacity as state legislators, we are guided by Raines

v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), a decision rejecting the standing

of members of Congress in federal court, and the Supreme

Court's interpretation in Raines of Coleman v. Miller, 307

U.S. 433 (1939), a case dealing with the standing of state

legislators. Raines involved claims brought by federal legislators against executive branch officials, and applied a particularly rigorous standing analysis in light of the separation-ofpowers concerns raised in that case. See Raines, 521 U.S. at

819-20, see also Chenoweth v.Clinton, No. 98-5095, slip op. at

7 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 1999). But the Court did not limit its

analysis to interbranch disputes, and we read its discussion of

Coleman to apply to suits brought by state as well as federal

legislators. The bottom line is that the claimed injuries of

the individual Alaskan legislators and the Council are not

legally or judicially cognizable. The injuries are not "personal" or particularized to them; and they have not established a

"personal stake" in the alleged dispute, as Article III of the

Constitution demands. See Raines, 512 U.S. at 819.

According to the complaint, the Alaska State Constitution

confers upon the individual legislators "an affirmative duty to

legislate for the management of all of the State's resources

including ... fish and wildlife." The complaint goes on:

__________

2 The Regulations noted that "[n]avigable waters generally are

not included within the definition of public lands." See Temporary

Subsistence Management Regulations for Public Lands in Alaska,

55 Fed. Reg. 27,114, 27,118 (1990).

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 6 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Alaska legislators "are obligated by ... oath to act in the best

interests of the citizens of the State as a whole, to abide by

the limitations of the Constitution of the State of Alaska with

respect to the common use of fish and wildlife resources and

to make a conscientious application of their authority to

protect and preserve the public trust for all citizens of the

State of Alaska." The legislators also state that they are

similarly required to support the Constitution of the United

States. See U.S. Const. art. VI. But they and the Council

say that because the federal statute and its implementation

are illegal, the federal government has interfered with their

state duties, and has nullified their legislative prerogatives

regarding fish and wildlife management.

The reading Raines gave to Coleman establishes that

injuries of the sort alleged here do not deprive individual

legislators of something to which they are personally entitled.

In narrow circumstances, legislators have a judicially recognized, personal interest in maintaining the "effectiveness of

their votes." See Raines, 521 U.S. at 821-22 (citing Coleman

v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 438 (1939)).3 But there is not the

slightest suggestion here that these particular legislators had

the votes to enact a particular measure, that they cast those

votes or that the federal statute or the federal defendants did

something to nullify their votes. See id. at 823. What we see

instead is, at most, a claim that the Lands Conservation Act,

either because of the Supremacy Clause or the rulings of the

Alaska Supreme Court, had the effect of rendering the Alaska

Legislature unable to control hunting and fishing on federal

lands within the State. See 16 U.S.C. s 3115(d). If for these

__________

3 The individual legislators do not allege injury to other interests

that could provide a basis for legislative standing. For example, an

elected representative excluded from the legislature and denied his

salary alleges a personal injury because he has been "singled out

for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members

of" that body. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 821 (citing Powell v.

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). Similarly, a representative

whose vote was denied "its full validity in relation to the votes of

[his] colleagues," might also allege a personal injury sufficient to

confer standing. See id. at 824 n.7.

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 7 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

reasons the individual legislators cannot enact valid laws

because the laws would conflict with federal law, or cannot

enact legislation implementing the Act because this would be

at odds with their State Constitution, their loss (or injury) is a

loss of political power, a power they hold not in their personal

or private capacities, but as members of the Alaska State

Legislature. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 821. Furthermore, the

complaint nowhere mentions any specific act or regulation of

the Alaska Legislature that the Lands Conservation Act has

overruled, nullified or otherwise adversely affected. In fact,

federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act provide

that "[s]tate fish and game regulations [applicable] to public

lands and such laws are hereby adopted and made a part of

these regulations to the extent they are not inconsistent with,

or superseded by this Part." See 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,955.

While state legislation or regulations in conflict with the

federal statute or federal regulations may be unenforceable--

for example, the Federal Subsistence Board can close public

lands to hunting and fishing even if the State permits it, see

id.--that type of injury does not entitle individual legislators

to seek a judicial remedy. Their supposed injury is nothing

more than an "abstract dilution of institutional legislative

power" to regulate and manage fish and wildlife resources,

and we are not sure it amounts to even this much. See

Raines, 521 U.S. at 826.

The Alaska Legislative Council stands on no better constitutional footing despite its authorization under State law to

"sue in the name of the legislature during the interim between sessions" if a majority vote of the Council approves.

See Alaska Stat. s 24.20.060(4)(F) (Michie 1996). Even if a

state legislature and its authorized representative have standing to defend the constitutionality of a state statute attacked

in federal court, the position of the Alaska Legislature in this

case is not comparable. See, e.g., Karcher v. May, 484 U.S.

72, 84 (1987) (White, J., concurring). The Council complains

about federal limitations on State prerogatives in the management of fish and wildlife. This is the same complaint the

individual legislators make in their official capacity. The

resulting injury is not to the Legislature and it is not to the

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 8 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

individual legislators. It is to the State itself. The authority

to manage fish and wildlife belongs to the State as a whole.4

If the Lands Conservation Act diminishes the State's authority, it injures state sovereignty, not legislative sovereignty.5

The Legislature is not authorized to sue on behalf of the

State, see Alaska Stat. s 24.20.060(4)(F)--the Governor holds

that power, see Alaska Const. art. III, s 16--and the Legislature suffers no separate, identifiable, judicially cognizable

injury that entitles it to sue on its own behalf.

C

The legislators, in their individual capacities, seek to mount

an equal protection challenge to the Act. They view the Act's

rural subsistence use preference as discrimination against

Alaska's urban residents, and brand the preference irrational

because the rural/non-rural distinction ignores need, income

level, dependence on subsistence resources, community character, and ethnic and racial membership. They also claim

that federal designations of certain communities as "rural,"

pursuant to the statute, are arbitrary and irrational.

For the purpose of establishing standing, it is not enough

merely to claim discrimination. The plaintiffs must be able to

trace the discrimination to some "distinct and palpable" injury to them. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984);

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743-44 (1995). At the

pleading stage, general factual allegations may suffice to

establish injury and are presumed to "embrace those specific

__________

4For example, the Alaska Statehood Act gave the State of Alaska

the authority to administer and manage fish and wildlife resources,

after the Alaska State Legislature made adequate provision for

their administration, management and conservation. See Pub. L.

No. 85-508, s 6(e), 72 Stat. 339, 340-41 (1958). The entire statute

speaks in terms of property and authority given to the State of

Alaska, not to the Alaska State Legislature.

5Indeed, the State, represented by the Attorney General, brought

a lawsuit challenging federal authority to regulate subsistence

taking of fish and game under the Act. See Katie John, 1994 WL

487830.

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 9 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

facts that are necessary to support the claim." See Lujan v.

National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990). The

individuals' claims here fail to meet even this low threshold.

See, e.g., Gottlieb v. FEC, 143 F.3d 618, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Each of them is, according to the complaint, a non-rural

resident of Alaska; some hunt and fish in the State of Alaska,

others only fish, others only hunt, and two apparently engage

in neither activity but eat fish and game. They say federal

law limits their activities, yet the facts alleged do not indicate

that the law even reaches or in any way affects their activities, critical elements in establishing their standing to sue.

The subsistence preference in the statute and the regulations

affect public lands, see 16 U.S.C. s 3114; 57 Fed. Reg. at

22,951, but none of these plaintiffs claim to hunt or fish on

those lands. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35

(1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory

Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 683-85 (1973).

As to fishing, they do not state where they fish or what

species they seek or how federal law limits their fishing. As

to game, the complaint mentions federal restrictions on hunting moose in the Tongass National Forest, caribou in a sector

in east central Alaska, and musk ox in a region in western

Alaska. But no plaintiff claims to hunt these animals in these

places. Plaintiffs do allege that they "desire[ ] and intend[ ]

to, in the future, hunt and fish within the State of Alaska."

But the mere desire to hunt or fish in the future, supposedly

limited in some unspecified way, falls short of demonstrating

the type of actual or imminent injury sufficient under Article

III to constitute an injury in fact. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563-65 (1992). That the federal

Act and its implementing regulations could reduce the opportunities for hunters and fishermen from non-rural areas in

Alaska is, on the face of the complaint, perhaps conceivable.

But that is not enough. Pleadings must be more than "an

ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable." See SCRAP,

412 U.S. at 688.

In addition to limiting the hunting of moose, caribou and

musk ox, the complaint also alleges that federal regulations

have expanded the taking of lynx, black bear, ruffed grouse

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 10 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

and Dall sheep on certain public lands beyond previous State

bag limits. No individual plaintiff claims an interest in these

particular animals for hunting or any other recreational purpose. To the extent the complaint states any injury to

plaintiffs, it is not on the basis that the named legislators are

being harmed in their individual capacity. The harm alleged

is put in terms of the effect on the State Legislature, which--

so the complaint states--cannot protect lynx, ruffed grouse,

black bear and Dall sheep or cannot remove federal restrictions on hunting moose, caribou and musk ox. Because the

complaint reveals no perceptible harm to the legislators in

their individual capacity, they lack standing to bring their

claims.

D

The complaint also alleges that federal officials exceeded

their authority under the Act by extending regulations beyond federal lands and thus violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 702 of the APA provides that: "[a]

person ... adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action

within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial

review thereof." 5 U.S.C. s 702. Are any plaintiffs "adversely affected" within the meaning of the Lands Conservation Act? See National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 882-83.

To be so situated they must satisfy all constitutional standing

requirements and must demonstrate that their injury is "to

interests of the sort protected" by the statute. See Florida

Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(en banc); see also Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.

Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The

Act, as plaintiffs' complaint states, does not authorize federal

officials to extend the subsistence preference to lands validly

selected by the State or other named parties. See 16 U.S.C.

s 3102(3). But apart from two conclusory sentences, the

complaint does not mention any federal activity on non-public

lands and it utterly fails to identify any "agency action"

affecting hunting and fishing on such lands, let alone hunting

and fishing by these particular plaintiffs. The regulations

currently in effect apply only to the "taking of fish and

wildlife on public lands in the State of Alaska." See 57 Fed.

Reg. at 22,951. The definition of "public lands" explicitly

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 11 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

excludes "land selections of the State of Alaska which have

been tentatively approved or validly selected under the Alaska Statehood Act and lands which have been confirmed to,

validly selected by, or granted to the Territory of Alaska or

the State under any other provision of Federal law." See id.

at 22,952.

In nevertheless asserting that the federal defendants are

regulating beyond federal lands, plaintiffs apparently believe

that "public lands," as defined in the Act, cannot be read to

include waters in which the United States has a reserved

water right,6 and that if the ownership of such a right

includes the power to manage fish and game, the federal

defendants cannot rest on a mere assertion that they have

such a right. They must first "establish" its existence and

then adopt regulations based upon it. The federal defendants

urge us to dispose of this claim on ripeness grounds. Subsistence management regulations identify federal land units in

which reserved water rights exist and subject those units to

the Act's federal subsistence priority.7 See Subsistence Management Regulations for Public Lands in Alaska, Subparts A,

B, C, and D, Redefinition to Include Waters Subject to

Subsistence Priority, 64 Fed. Reg. 1276 (1999). But these

regulations, though final, will not take effect until October 1,

1999. If the Secretary of the Interior certifies that the

Alaska State Legislature has amended its Constitution so that

it may pass laws consistent with the Act before that time, the

regulations will not take effect until December 1, 2000. See

id. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment and an injunction

against the regulations; we do not generally apply these

__________

6 In State of Alaska, 72 F.3d at 703-04, the Ninth Circuit held

that the United States has reserved water rights in some navigable

waters in Alaska and by virtue of those rights, interests in some

navigable waters. The Court concluded that such waters are

included within the definition of "public lands." It directed the

federal agencies that administer the subsistence priority to identify

those waters.

7 When plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, these regulations were not yet final.

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 12 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

remedies to administrative determinations "until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a

concrete way by the challenging parties." See Abbott Lab. v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). Although we therefore

have severe doubts whether the APA claim is ripe, there is no

need to decide the question. Our earlier discussion of the

individual plaintiffs' lack of standing applies as well to their

contentions regarding the APA. These plaintiffs have alleged

no injury--not even of the insufficient hypothetical or speculative variety--that may be ascribed to federal regulations

applying the subsistence preference to waters in Alaska in

which the United States asserts reserved water rights. They

do not say they ever fished those waters, nor do they say they

ever will. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564.

They mention only a general "desire[ ] and inten[t] to ...

fish," but when it comes to where they want to fish, what

species of fish they want to catch and how the regulations

would limit their fishing, the complaint is silent. Plaintiffs

have therefore failed to demonstrate the type of actual injury

Article III requires.

Plaintiffs also ask us to read their APA claim to encompass

a number of other supposedly excessive agency actions mentioned in their complaint.8 These include: "the designation of

management units, the issuance and denial of permits, the

setting of hunting seasons, bag limits, and methods of take."

As we have already mentioned, the complaint states that the

Federal Subsistence Board prohibits or restricts non-rural

Alaskans from hunting moose, caribou and musk ox in certain

areas, and allows the taking of lynx, ruffed grouse, black bear

and Dall sheep in others. For reasons previously given,

plaintiffs have failed to allege that their interests are "adversely affected" by these actions, as the APA requires. See

5 U.S.C. s 702, see also National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at

889. It is not enough for them to claim that they are

"deprived of their ability to hunt and fish." Hunt and fish

what, and where? What is meant by "ability"? The possibili-

__________

8 The district court did not do so. See Alaska Legislative Council, 15 F.Supp.2d at 25.

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 13 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ty they may wish to hunt these particular animals in these

particular areas at some time in the future? Such claims do

not allege "actual or imminent injury" and are insufficient to

confer standing. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at

566-67. Nothing in the complaint gives the slightest indication that any one of the plaintiffs ever hunted or ate musk ox

or Dall sheep or any of the other named animals in the

regulated regions, or for that matter, anywhere else. See

Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35. The additional allegation in

the complaint that plaintiffs' "ability to enjoy the full abundance of wildlife will be diminished if a remedy is not

provided" adds nothing.

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

USCA Case #98-5405 Document #448750 Filed: 07/13/1999 Page 14 of 14