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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILL~ United Statee ~rt Appoab Tenth -Clreu t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NOV 2 5 199Z 

ROBERT L. HOECKER Clerk . 

DARRELL PROWS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; UNITED 

STATES PAROLE COMMISSION; ANTHONY 

BELASKI, Warden, In His Official 

Capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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Nos. 92-1245 

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92-1301 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 91-C-710) 

Submitted on the briefs*: 

Darrell Prows, prose. 

Before MOORE and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS,** Senior 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

* After examining plaintiff-appellant's brief and the appellate 

record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not materially assist the determination of these appeals. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-1301 Document: 010110149215 Date Filed: 11/25/1992 Page: 1 
MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff, a federal inmate currently incarcerated in the 

Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) at Phoenix, Arizona, 

commenced this action primarily to obtain injunctive relief with 

respect to various aspects of the conditions of his confinement at 

FCI Englewood, Colorado, as well as an order compelling his 

placement in a halfway house or community correction center 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). Defendants filed a motion for 

dismissal or summary judgment, which was referred to the 

magistrate judge. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff, who had been 

' placed in administrative segregation and eventually transferred to 

FCI Phoenix while this case was pending in district court, filed a 

motion for additional injunctive relief, alleging retaliation for 

the exercise of his constitutional rights of free speech and 

access to the courts. Following an evidentiary hearing on both 

motions, the magistrate judge issued a recommendation to grant 

plaintiff relief with respect to the retaliation motion and one 

other matter, but to rule in defendants' favor on the rest of the 

claims asserted in the complaint. The district court approved the 

magistrate's recommendation, with some minor alteration, and these 

appeals followed. 1 

1 While the district court's order of June 10, 1992, did not 

effect a final disposition of all claims asserted in the case, and 

plaintiff's appeal therefrom (No. 92-1245) was consequently 

premature, that problem was cured when final judgment was entered 

on September 10, 1992. See Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co,, 850 F.2d 

(continued on next page) 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-1301 Document: 010110149215 Date Filed: 11/25/1992 Page: 2 
Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, he maintains 

the district court erred when, after finding he had been 

impermissibly transferred to FCI Phoenix for retaliatory reasons, 

it did not order him returned to FCI Englewood but, rather, 

limited its injunctive relief to expungement of any negative 

information surrounding the transfer. Second, plaintiff 

challenges the district court's conclusion that§ 3624(c) does not 

bestow upon federal inmates an enforceable entitlement to any 

particular form of pre-release custody. For the reasons that 

follow, we reject both of plaintiff's contentions and affirm the 

judgment of the district court. 

Injunctive Relief for Retaliatocy Transfer2 

After hearing testimony from inmates and staff of FCI 

Englewood, the magistrate judge concluded that plaintiff's return 

to the facility would be unwise and unsafe, given the level of 

animosity he had evoked from both groups. Accordingly, the 

magistrate judge reconunended limited injunctive relief devised to 

ameliorate the collateral consequences associated with plaintiff's 

(continued from previous page) 

641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988) (en bane). Plaintiff's subsequent appeal 

(No. 92-1301), however, was necessary to preserve for review the 

final adjudication of September 10 itself. See Nolan v. United 

States Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 843, 846 (10th Cir. 1992). 

Together, then, these appeals encompass the entire proceedings in 

the district court. They are considered in tandem here in accord 

with routine circuit practice. ML. 

2 In light of defendants' election not to pursue an appeal from 

the district court's adverse determination on the merits of the 

retaliation claim, our review of the relief afforded plaintiff 

must assume the validity of that underlying finding. 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-1301 Document: 010110149215 Date Filed: 11/25/1992 Page: 3 
improper transfer and at the same time to accommodate important 

concerns of institutional and personal security weighing against 

reversal of the transfer itself. The district court agreed with 

the magistrate judge's reasoning, ordered all pertinent adverse 

material stricken from plaintiff's records, and denied plaintiff's 

request for return to FCI Englewood. 

The decision to grant or deny an injunction lies within the 

sound discretion of the district judge, whose judgment will not be 

disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. International Ass'n 

of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Soo Line R.R., 850 F.2d 368, 

374 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1010 (1989); 

International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement 

Workers of Am., UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 

1987). Indeed, under appropriate circumstances, the district 

court may justifiably withhold injunctive relief altogether even 

though the law has been violated by the party sought to be 

enjoined. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313, 

320 (1982); Woerner v. United States Small Business Admin., 934 

F.2d 1277, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1991). It is worth emphasizing that 

we do not have such an extreme case here, as the district court 

did not wholly deny plaintiff redress for defendants' 

impermissible conduct, but merely tailored the relief granted to 

meet the exigencies of the prison context. 

On appeal, plaintiff has not challenged the district court's 

determination that his return to FCI Englewood would create 

security problems. To the contrary, plaintiff specifically asks 

that, upon his return to the facility, he "be placed, in some 

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Appellate Case: 92-1301 Document: 010110149215 Date Filed: 11/25/1992 Page: 4 
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manner, under the continuing protection of the court[,]" arguing 

that "a protective order to handle this situation would not really 

be that difficult to fashion, and ... could be done in such a 

way as to create the minimum of disruption to the Court and the 

prison." Appellant's Opening Brief at 2. With the issue framed 

in this manner, we are concerned solely with the equitable balance 

struck by the district court between valid but competing 

considerations. On the one hand, there is plaintiff's legitimate 

interest in reversing all the effects of defendants' retaliatory 

conduct, including plaintiff's otherwise permissible assignment to 

FCI Phoenix. 3 On the other, there is the recognized institutional 

interest in the maintenance of internal order and security, over 

which the federal courts must accord wide-ranging deference to the 

expertise of prison officials, see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 

3 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the Bureau of Prisons, exercising 

the same discretion previously vested in the Attorney General 

under repealed provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4082, may direct 

confinement in any available facility and may transfer a prisoner 

from one facility to another at any time. Moreover, state and 

federal prisoners generally enjoy no constitutional right to 

placement in any particular penal institution. See Olim v. 

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983) (interstate transfer of 

state prisoner); Meachum v. Fano. 427 U.S. 215, 225-28 

(1976) (intrastate transfer of state prisoner); Brown-Bey v. United 

States, 720 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1983) (Olim and Meachum equally 

applicable in federal context). Of course, "' [w]hile a prisoner 

enjoys no constitutional right to remain in a particular 

institution ... , prison officials do not have the discretion to 

punish an inmate for exercising his first amendment rights by 

transferring him to a different institution.'• Frazier v. Dubois, 

922 F.2d 560, 561-62 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Murphy v. Missouri 

Dep't of Correction, 769 F.2d 502, 503 (8th Cir. 1985)); see Smith 

v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 947-48 (10th Cir. 1990) (prison 

officials may not retaliate against inmate for exercise of right 

of access to courts, even by taking otherwise permissible action). 

Thus, it is only by way of redress for defendants' retaliatory 

conduct that plaintiff has any potentially cognizable claim to 

placement at FCI Englewood. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1301 Document: 010110149215 Date Filed: 11/25/1992 Page: 5 
467, 472 (1983); Dunn v. White. 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S . 1059 (1990). Thus, in our view, 

this case involves precisely the kind of judgment call best left 

to the firsthand assessment and practical insight of the district 

court. We will not disturb the prudent exercise of discretion 

reflected in the particular form of injunctive relief fashioned 

here, which we consider the antipode of "an arbitrary, capricious, 

whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment." United States v. 

Hernandez-Herrera, 952 F.2d 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1991) (defining 

abuse of discretion) (internal quotation omitted). 

Pre-release Custody under§ 3624{c) 

We review the district court's construction of§ 3624(c) de 

novo. See FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1992) (en 

bane), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept. 14, 

1992) {No. 92-454). As in all cases of statutory interpretation, 

we begin with the plain language of the law, which, absent clearly 

expressed legislative intent to the contrary, must ordinarily be 

deemed conclusive. Id. The statute provides as follows: 

Pre-release custody.--The Bureau of Prisons shall, 

to the extent practicable, assure that a prisoner 

serving a term of imprisonment spends a reasonable part, 

not to exceed six months, of the last 10 per centum of 

the term to be served under conditions that will afford 

the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and 

prepare for his re-entry into the .community. The 

authority provided by this subsection may be used to 

place a prisoner in home confinement. The United States 

Probation System shall, to the extent practicable, offer 

assistance to a prisoner during such pre-release 

custody. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1301 Document: 010110149215 Date Filed: 11/25/1992 Page: 6 
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It is important to note the particular, limited nature of the 

issue raised by plaintiff. He contends only that the quoted 

language mandates nonprison placement for federal prisoners prior 

to release. He does not argue alternatively that, should the 

Bureau of Prisons retain discretion in this regard, his present 

placement would still constitute a violation of a broader 

obligation to provide at least some pre-release treatment 

conducive to successful re-entry into the cormnunity, whatever the 

facility of incarceration. 

With these considerations in mind, our r esolution of this 

appeal becomes a fairly straightforward matter. While there is 

mandatory (albeit qualified) language employed in the statute, it 

relates only to the general direction to facilitate the prisoner's 

post-release adjustment through establishment of some unspecified 

pre-release conditions. Nothing in § 3624(c) indicates any 

intention to encroach upon the Bureau's authority to decide where 

the prisoner may be confined during the pre-release period. See 

United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 

1991) ("Nothing in the language of section 3624(c) mandates that 

all prisoners pass through a community treatment center en route 

to free society."). This omission is especially significant in 

light of the broad administrative discretion traditionally 

recognized with respect to the placement of prisoners. See 

authorities cited supra note 3. 

Plaintiff contends that construing § 3624(c) to provide 

merely an authorization, rather than a mandate, for nonprison 

confinement renders superfluous the pre-existing statutory grant 

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Appellate Case: 92-1301 Document: 010110149215 Date Filed: 11/25/1992 Page: 7 
of discretionary authority to the Bureau for custodial placement 

generally, see id. On the contrary, as the discussion above 

illustrates, our interpretation of § 3624(c) as a legislative 

directive focusing on the development of conditions to facilitate 

the inmate's adjustment to free society, whatever the institution 

of pre-release confinement, accepts as a premise that the broader 

statutory scheme concerning the Bureau's general placement 

authority remains intact and effective. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. Defendants' motion for 

extension of briefing or stay of appeal is denied as moot. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1301 Document: 010110149215 Date Filed: 11/25/1992 Page: 8