Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00412/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00412-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332lb Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

---

1

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE GUZMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

RACHEL FINCH,

Defendant.

Case No.: 19cv412-MMA (MDD)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT 

TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL 

PROCEDURE SECTION 425.16

[Doc. No. 2]

Plaintiff Jose Guzman (“Plaintiff”) brings one state-law cause of action against 

Defendant Rachel Finch (“Defendant”) for libel per se. Doc. No. 1-2 (“Compl.”). 

Defendant filed the instant motion to strike the Complaint pursuant to California’s antiStrategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute, California Code 

of Civil Procedure Section 425.16. Doc. No. 2-1 (“Mtn.”). Plaintiff filed an opposition 

[Doc. No. 3 (“Oppo.”)], to which Defendant replied [Doc. No. 6 (“Reply”)]. The Court 

found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 7. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court DENIES Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who resides in Florida, was formerly an Area Manager for Mattress Firm, 

Inc, who “enjoyed a good reputation, both generally and in his business.” Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 18
2

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant is a resident of Missouri. Doc. No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that on or about 

September 20, 2018, Defendant posted a statement on her Facebook1 page claiming that 

Plaintiff raped her. Compl. ¶¶ 7. The entirety of the Facebook post is attached to 

Defendant’s motion, as follows:

I never share personal things on social media, and this is very personal. I'm 

scared about the repercussions of posting this. I'm scared of being judged. 

But it may help someone else in a similar situation, so I'm choosing to be 

fearless.

I was in an abusive relationship for a year and a half.

Every relationship has its downfalls. Nobody's perfect, and people make

mistakes. People argue. People say and do things that hurt their partner

sometimes. That is not abuse. Abuse is a strong accusation to make, so let 

me explain what abuse is:

Abuse is about exercising complete control. Abuse is about making the

person believe they have nothing and nobody other than their abuser. Abuse

is about making the person feel that they are crazy and useless without their

abuser. Abuse means there are no boundaries the abuser cannot cross. Abuse 

is about power and control.

When I met my partner, I was in a vulnerable place. Following a sexual

assault by a colleague and traveling the country alone for work, nobody would 

talk to me. My partner introduced himself as a hero, who would help me fix 

my "broken" reputation. He told me I was seen as an "HR nightmare" and 

that management warned everyone to stay away from me. Nobody even knew

me.

He was 48, and I was 20. He was a supervisor above me. He was gentle and 

kind at first. I was so grateful to have someone who wanted to help me that I 

didn't see the red flags. I trusted him.

He was very charming, well-liked, respected, and fun. He helped a lot of

people. He was a good friend, a great father, and a fantastic leader. He went

out of his way to be a gentleman, open doors and pull out chairs. He praised

 

1 Facebook is a social media networking service with approximately 1.79 billion active users. See 

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 18
3

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

my successes. For the first few months, I was thrilled to have him. He told

me that he loved me. I was in love with him.

Then, there were lies. Then, there was infidelity. Normal relationship

struggles. It hurt, but I decided to stick around and work through them. I took 

a three day break from speaking to him. When I finally answered his phone 

call, he was furious. I begged him not to retaliate professionally. He said, 

"As long as you cooperate with me, I won't retaliate. Take that as you will.

You need to understand I'm not your normal guy on this team. You can't 

throw me to the curb like a fucking scrub." He threatened to "knock out" a 

friend of mine who was giving me advice. I was scared, so I stayed. That's 

where it started.

He constantly reminded that he was older than me, that he knew more about

life than I did. When I had an idea or tried to reason with him, it was knocked

down as immature and stupid. We couldn't do what I wanted to do; it always

had to be his way, because he was older, wiser, stronger, better than me. He 

warned that, without him, nobody liked me and I would be ostracized. 

Without him, I was worthless. I didn't want to lose the only person by my

side. I had to do everything he wanted me to do. I believed I powerless.

I was not allowed to have friends that he didn't know or approve of. I was 

never once allowed to go out without him, even with female friends. He could 

go out partying until 3am all he wanted, and if I said it made me uncomfortable 

I was "insecure and jealous" and blown off. If I mentioned that he was not 

treating me equal, he got angry and questioned who I was talking to. I had to

cut people off when he told me to. He convinced me that all my loved ones 

lied to me, that I was bad at choosing friends. **At one point, for months, I 

wasn't allowed to talk to my own mother, because she was giving advice that 

went "against him". ** I believed I was completely alone.

I was pressured to do sexual things that I was uncomfortable with. I expressed 

that I didn't want to do them, and I was pushed again and again. Sometimes 

he would give up and give me the silent treatment. Sometimes he would do 

it anyway while I was saying no. Once, I was crying and yelling "stop". He

didn't stop. I had a panic attack, he didn't stop. When it was over, he blamed

me for not yelling loudly enough. I felt like it was my fault. In retrospect, 

that was rape. But I believed my body didn't belong to me.

I was not allowed to wear clothes that he didn't approve of. I had to wear

shoes and dresses he told me to wear. If he told me to curl my hair, I had to I 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 18
4

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

pushed back sometimes, but when I did he would get angry and lash out. I

didn't want to face being yelled at, cursed at, and belittled. I believed I was 

incapable of having my own thoughts.

I spent my last pennies to see him on New Years, because he demanded it.

When I got sick with a chest cold three days in, he blamed me for exposing

him to a sickness. "I'm too important to get sick," he said. He called me

disgusting and useless. He told me to pack my things and get out of his house. 

I had no money and nowhere to go, except to sleep at the airport for two days. 

This was the only thing he had ever apologized for, but still gave me a list of 

reasons why I deserved it. I believed I was trash.

Whenever I was sad, I was crazy and attention-seeking. Whenever I was

angry, I was being dramatic and ungrateful. Whenever I was scared, I was

weak. He said, "It's annoying when you cry." Never once did he ever hug me

when I cried. Not once did he ever comfort me when I was upset. I believed 

I wasn't entitled to have emotions.

I broke my ankle in front of him. He told me to suck it up and quit being a

baby. He told me I was stupid for not looking where I was walking. Multiple 

times, he took me on miles-long walks to see things he wanted to see, and he 

rolled his eyes when I said I was in pain. "You weren't in pain a couple 

minutes ago!" He never slowed down for me. He treated me like my pain 

didn't matter. I believed his desire to have a good time was more important 

than my pain.

Anything he did wrong was somehow my fault. He cheated on me: my fault 

because I wasn't committed enough to move in with him after a few months. 

He wouldn't let me have friends: my fault because I'm too reckless and easily 

influenced. He never offered support: my fault because I tried getting support 

from other people. He refused to give me trust: my fault because I wouldn't 

always follow his demands. I believed everything was my fault.

Those are only a few examples. After a year and a half, I was empty. I

believed everything he conditioned me to believe about myself. I was alone 

and tired. I deserved all of this. I was worthless, useless, nothing. I tried to 

hurt myself.

Luckily, I was unsuccessful. And I found God through it all.

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 18
5

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Even though doctors, my family, my friends were all telling me that I was

being abused, I still couldn't accept it. Maybe I WAS crazy. Maybe it WAS 

my fault. I decided to give my partner one final chance, with God on my side. 

I prayed for a sign, and I got my wish. "You wasted all this time praying 

today. You're prioritizing your God bullshit above me."

I took my power back. I dumped him.

The worst part about abusive partners is that you actually, truly love them. I

still love him. I still see all the positive aspects of him and the good things he

brought into my life. He took me to the Bahamas on my 21st birthday. He's

taken me on trips out of the country three times. He encouraged me to be

successful and do the right things. He made me feel loved when I was

following all his rules and guidelines.

But he loved me the same way a kid loves their toys. He wanted me to believe 

I only existed to make his life better. And that's not healthy. I wasn't a perfect

partner, but nobody deserves to be treated that way.

I deserve better than that. It's embarrassing that it took so long to see it. I'm

healing more and more every day that I'm surrounded by my supportive

friends and family. He doesn't have power over me anymore.

You should always be able to talk to your partner when you feel like

something isn't right. Your partner is supposed to boost you up, without

tearing you down first. Your partner should be there for you when you're sad. 

Your partner should make you feel loved and supported JUST the way you

are.

If anyone reading this feels like they are experiencing something similar,

PLEASE reach out to me. It doesn't matter if I don't know you or if we haven't 

spoken in a long time. I understand, and I am here for you. You aren't alone. 

You aren't crazy. It's not your fault. You are worthy of love.

Doc. No. 2-2 (“Rikos Decl.”), Exhibit A (“Facebook Post”).2

 

2 The Court incorporates the Facebook post by reference into the Complaint, which refers “extensively” 

to the Facebook post and “form[s] the basis” of Plaintiff’s libel per se claim. United States v. Ritchie, 

342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted); see also Mandel v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. 

State Univ., No. 17-cv-03511-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185871 at *20 n.13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 

2018) (incorporating by reference the “full content of [a] Facebook post”).

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 18
6

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff alleges the statement is “false, unprivileged, and libelous per se,” which 

exposes him “to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy because it plainly accuses him of 

participating in immoral conduct and criminal activity . . . .” Compl. ¶ 12. Defendant 

allegedly made the statement “with constitutional actual malice and/or reckless disregard 

for the truth, with no good faith belief it was true . . . .” Compl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges his 

reputation was greatly injured as a result and that he “suffered loss of his employment, 

reputation, shame, mortification, hurt feelings, and severe emotional distress” as a direct 

and proximate result of Defendant’s statement. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16.

LEGAL STANDARD

California’s anti-SLAPP statute provides a mechanism for striking “lawsuits 

brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of 

speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a). 

California’s anti-SLAPP statute “shall be construed broadly.” Id. “Motions to strike a 

state law claim under California’s anti-SLAPP statute may be brought in federal court.”3 

Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States 

ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970-73 (9th Cir. 

1999)).

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion requires the court to engage in a two-step 

process.” Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal. 4th 728, 733 (2003) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “The first prong . . . requires the court to decide 

‘whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action 

is one arising from protected activity.’” FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify, Inc., 13 Cal. App. 

5th 707, 715 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 

4th 53, 67 (2002)). The second prong requires the court to determine “whether the 

 

3 Recently, this has been called into question, though it remains the law. See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., 

LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 272 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (stating that Newsham “is wrong and 

should be reconsidered.”).

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 18
7

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” Navellier v. Sletten, 

29 Cal. 4th 82, 88 (2002) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1); Equilon Enters., 29 

Cal. 4th at 67). If “the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a 

probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim,” the motion to strike must be 

denied. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1).

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s only cause of action arises from protected 

activity and that Plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing on his claim. Mtn.

A. Protected Activity

The Court must first determine whether Defendant can satisfy her burden of 

demonstrating that the challenged cause of action arose from a protected activity. Here, 

the challenged activity is Defendant’s posting of a statement on Facebook. Compl. ¶ 7. 

Section 425.16(e) of the anti-SLAPP statute defines an “act in furtherance of a person’s 

right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in 

connection with a public issue” to include, as relevant here, “any written or oral statement 

or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an 

issue of public interest, or . . . any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the 

constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with 

a public issue or an issue of public interest.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e). 

Defendant argues her Facebook post falls within this definition. See Mtn. at 4. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant’s Facebook post was made on an open 

forum. See Oppo. It is well settled under California law that web sites accessible to the 

public are “public forums” for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 

40 Cal. 4th 33, 41 n.4 (2006); Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1366 (Ct. App. 

2010). Additionally, “‘Facebook’s website and the Facebook pages at issue are ‘public 

forums,’ as they are accessible to anyone who consents to Facebook’s Terms.’” Cross v. 

Facebook, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 5th 190, 199 (Ct. App. 2017). Accordingly, Defendant’s 

post on Facebook is a written statement made in a public forum under section 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 18
8

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

425.16(e)(3). See id.; see also Daniel v. Wayans, 8 Cal. App. 5th 367, 387 (Ct. App. 

2017) (finding a Twitter posting to be a “statement made in a public forum” because a 

Twitter account is a “publicly accessible social media forum”).

Section 425.16(e)(3) and (4) also require that the conduct be in connection with an 

issue of public interest, although the statute does not define “public interest” or “public 

issue.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(3)-(4). “Those terms are inherently 

amorphous and thus do not lend themselves to a precise, all-encompassing definition.” 

Cross v. Cooper, 197 Cal. App. 4th 357, 371 (Ct. App. 2011). Nonetheless, there are 

general guiding principles courts follow to determine whether a statement concerns a 

matter of public interest. First, section 425.16 is to “‘be construed broadly’ to safeguard 

‘the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the 

redress of grievances.’” Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1039 (Ct. 

App. 2008) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a)). The legislative history and case 

law “suggest that ‘an issue of public interest’ . . . is any issue in which the public is 

interested. In other words, the issue need not be ‘significant’ to be protected by the antiSLAPP statute—it is enough that it is one in which the public takes an interest.” Id. at 

1042.

Second, section 425.16 “governs even private communications, so long as they 

concern a public issue.” Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 897 (Ct. App. 2004)

(citing Averill v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 1175 (Ct. App. 1996)). Third, there 

are “three non-exclusive and sometimes overlapping categories of statements that have 

been found to encompass an issue of public interest under the anti-SLAPP statute[:]” (1) 

“cases where the statement or activity precipitating the underlying cause of action was ‘a 

person or entity in the public eye[;]’” (2) “the statement or activity involved ‘conduct that 

could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants[;]’” and (3) 

“cases where the statement or activity involved ‘a topic of widespread, public interest.’” 

FilmOn.Com, 13 Cal. App. 5th at 717 (citations omitted). 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 18
9

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Finally, there are five additional attributes of an issue that would make it one of 

public, rather than private, interest: (1) “‘public interest’ does not equate with mere 

curiosity[;]” (2) “a matter of public interest should be something of concern to a 

substantial number of people[;]” (3) “there should be some degree of closeness between 

the challenged statements and the asserted public interest[;]” (4) “the focus of the 

speaker’s conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere effort ‘to gather 

ammunition for another round of [private] controversy[;]’” and (5) a “person cannot turn 

otherwise private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it 

to a large number of people.” Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 1132-33 (Ct. 

App. 2003).

With these principles in mind, the Court next determines whether Defendant’s 

Facebook post concerns a public issue or an issue of public interest under the anti-SLAPP 

statute. Defendant contends the statement is of public interest because it “is clearly about 

sexually abusive relationships, sexual violence, [and] sexual harassment in the 

workplace[.]”4 Reply at 3. Plaintiff counters that “[t]he statement describes a 

consensual, and not unwanted, relationship[.]” Oppo. at 9. According to Plaintiff, the 

statement is not of public interest, but rather is a private controversy between private 

individuals not in the public eye. Id. at 9-17.

The post starts with Defendant explaining that she is sharing something “very 

personal” because “it may help someone else in a similar situation.” Facebook Post. She 

goes on to define what “abuse” means to her in the context of an “abusive relationship” 

she was in for about a year and a half with her supervisor. Id. Among other examples of 

 

4 Defendant requests the Court judicially notice Google search results for the phrases “sexually abusive 

relationships,” “sexual harassment in the workplace,” “sexual violence,” “rape,” and “#metoo.” Doc. 

No. 2-2. Judicial notice of these documents is unnecessary for the instant purposes, as the Court finds 

the disposition of the instant motion is proper without reference to them. See Ruiz v. City of Santa 

Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 548 n.13 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying to judicially notice facts which were not 

relevant to the disposition of the issues before the court). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s 

request to judicially notice the Google search results.

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 18
10

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

abuse, she explains that her partner pressured her “to do sexual things that [she] was 

uncomfortable with,” that she was “pushed again and again” to do them, and that 

sometimes “he would do it anyway while [she] was saying no.” Id. In hindsight, 

Defendant explains “that was rape.” Id. She also explains her partner was verbally 

abusive. For example, he apparently told Defendant she was “disgusting and useless” or 

that it is “annoying when [she] cr[ies].” Id. Defendant concludes the post by saying “[i]f 

anyone reading this feels like they are experiencing something similar PLEASE reach out 

to me. It doesn’t matter if I don’t know you or if we haven’t spoken in a long time. I 

understand, and I am here for you. You aren’t alone. You aren’t crazy. It’s not your 

fault. You are worthy of love.” Id. In summation, the post explains Defendant was 

subjected to physical and verbal abuse. The Court finds that the content of Defendant’s 

Facebook post is most akin to domestic violence. Courts have found domestic violence 

to be of widespread public interest. See Sipple v. Found. for Nat’l Progress, 71 Cal. App. 

4th 226, 238 (Ct. App. 1999). 

Plaintiff argues that even though the topic may be a matter of public interest 

generally, the content of the statement is merely between private persons regarding a 

private matter. Oppo. at 14. Plaintiff seems to assert that Defendant’s statement must 

contribute to a public debate and concern a large number of people. Id. at 14-17. 

“[W]here a statement concerns an issue of widespread public interest, it need not also 

contribute in some manner to a public debate.” FilmOn.com, 13 Cal. App. 5th at 722

(citing Cross, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 381-82 n.15; Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 193 

Cal. App. 4th 133, 143 (Ct. App. 2011)). As previously stated, section 425.16 “governs 

even private communications, so long as they concern a public issue.” Wilbanks, 121 

Cal. App. 4th at 897. Even further, the focus of Defendant’s conduct appears to be the 

public interest in domestic violence and/or abusive relationships rather than an effort “‘to 

gather ammunition for another round of [private] controversy.’” Weinberg, 110 Cal. 

App. 4th at 1132-33. Based on the foregoing, the content of Defendant’s Facebook post 

is an issue or matter of public interest. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 18
11

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sued Defendant for engaging in conduct in furtherance of her right of free speech in 

connection with an issue of public interest.

B. Probability of Prevailing

Once the defendant has met the burden of showing the relevant conduct arises from 

a protected activity, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged 

claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” Baral 

v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376, 396 (2016). To establish a probability of prevailing on a claim, 

a plaintiff must “make a prima facie showing of facts which would, if credited, support a 

judgment in his favor.” Conroy v. Spitzer, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1446, 1451 (Ct. App. 1999). 

The determination is made on the basis of the “pleadings, and supporting and opposing 

affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 425.16(b)(2). A “plaintiff need not produce evidence that he or she can recover 

on every possible point urged” but, pleadings alone are inadequate. Wilbanks, 121 Cal. 

App. 4th at 905. Thus, the plaintiff must submit admissible evidence to show a 

probability of prevailing at trial. See Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1497-98 

(Ct. App. 1995). However, the burden of establishing a probability of prevailing is not 

high. The court does not weigh credibility or evaluate the weight of the evidence; rather, 

the court accepts as true all evidence favorable to plaintiff and assesses the defendant’s 

evidence only to determine whether it defeats the plaintiff’s submission as a matter of 

law. Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 688, 699-700 (Ct. 

App. 2007). “Only a cause of action that lacks ‘even minimal merit’ constitutes a 

SLAPP.” Id. (quoting Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at 89).

Plaintiff asserts one cause of action for libel per se against Defendant. Compl. ¶¶ 

9-23. “Libel is a form of defamation effected in writing.” Doe 2 v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 

App. 5th, 1300, 1312 (Ct. App. 2016). As such, “for Plaintiff to demonstrate a 

probability of prevailing on his libel per se claim, he need only make a prima facie 

showing that Defendant[] published a false, defamatory statement of fact concerning 

Plaintiff.” Reger v. Smith, No. 02:05-cv-2156-GEB-GGH, 2006 WL 2458714, at *4 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 18
12

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (citing Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 645 (Ct. 

App. 1999)). Defendant contends Plaintiff cannot meet his burden because her Facebook 

post does not reference Plaintiff by name and the statement is an opinion, and therefore 

not provably false. Mtn. at 10.

1. Publication

The publication element of a defamation claim requires a communication of the 

allegedly defamatory statement “to a third person who understands its defamatory 

meaning as applied to the plaintiff.” Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal. 4th 1230, 1242 (2003). 

The parties do not dispute that the statement was communicated to third persons, as the 

statement was posted on Defendant’s Facebook page. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has 

established the publication element.

2. False, Defamatory Statement of Fact

Defendant contends the statement is an opinion because she was referring to her 

“beliefs and impressions,” which are “not provable facts.” Mtn. at 9. Plaintiff argues the 

statement describes factual events that are provably false. Oppo. at 19-22. “[A] 

defamatory statement must contain a provable falsehood[.]” Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 

Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1261 (Ct. App. 2017). “[C]ourts distinguish between statements of 

fact and statements of opinion for purposes of defamation liability.” Id. Generally, mere 

opinions are not actionable, but statements of opinion that imply false assertions of fact 

are. Hawran v. Hixson, 209 Cal. App. 4th 256, 289 (Ct. App. 2012). “[T]he question is 

not strictly whether the published statement is fact or opinion,” but “[r]ather, the 

dispositive question is whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published 

statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact.” Franklin v. Dynamic 

Details, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 375, 385 (Ct. App. 2004); see also Jackson, 10 Cal. App. 

5th at 1261; Hawran, 209 Cal. App. 4th at 289. Accordingly, Defendant’s statement is 

actionable if it “could reasonably be understood as declaring or implying actual facts 

capable of being proved true or false.” Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. v. 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 18
13

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Fitzgibbons, 140 Cal. App. 4th 515, 527 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)

Here, Defendant’s remarks about her and Plaintiff’s relationship were based on 

disclosed facts about her firsthand experiences. See Facebook Post. “A statement of 

opinion based on fully disclosed facts can be punished only if the stated facts are 

themselves false and demeaning. The rationale for this rule is that when the facts 

underlying a statement of opinion are disclosed, readers will understand they are getting 

the author’s interpretation of the facts presented; they are therefore unlikely to construe 

the statement as insinuating the existence of additional, undisclosed facts. When the facts 

supporting an opinion are disclosed, readers are free to accept or reject the author’s 

opinion based on their own independent evaluation of the facts.” Integrated Healthcare

Holdings, Inc., 140 Cal. App. 4th at 528 (internal citation, quotation marks, and 

alterations omitted). Under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s opinion 

regarding her relationship with Plaintiff is based on facts disclosed in her Facebook post.

Consequently, to meet his burden for the second step of the anti-SLAPP motion 

analysis, Plaintiff must provide evidence tending to show the factual underpinnings of 

Defendant’s statement are false. To make such a showing, a plaintiff is required “adduce 

competent, admissible evidence that the claims [are] legally sufficient and supported by a 

sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment[.]” Dwight R. v. 

Christy B., 212 Cal. App. 4th 697, 713-14 (Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). “‘Admissible evidence’ for purposes of an anti-SLAPP statute is 

evidence, which by its nature, is capable of being admitted at trial, i.e., evidence which is 

competent, relevant and not barred by a substantive rule.” Fashion 21 v. Coal. for 

Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, 117 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1147 (Ct. App. 

2004). 

Plaintiff declares he “was never sexually abusive or sexually violent toward 

[Defendant,] did not rape [her] at any time[, and] never pressured her to do sexual things 

she was uncomfortable with.” Doc. No. 3-1 (“Guzman Decl.”) ¶ 8. He further declares 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of 18
14

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that he “never forced [Defendant] to engage in sexual acts against her will[,] did not push 

her to do sexual things she had expressed she did not want to do or give her the silent 

treatment based on refusals of sexual acts[, and she] never cried during sex with [him] or 

yelled ‘stop’ and [he] never blamed her for not yelling ‘stop’ loud enough.” Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 

Defendant objects to these statements on the grounds that they “lack[] foundation 

as to what [Defendant’s] opinions and impressions were.”5 Doc. No. 6-6 at 3-4. The 

Court notes that Defendant’s objections do not contain any argument explaining why 

those portions of Plaintiff’s declarations “lack foundation as to what [Defendant’s] 

opinions and impressions were.” See id. Notwithstanding Defendant’s failure to argue or 

explain her objections, the Court has carefully considered them and finds that Plaintiff 

establishes his personal knowledge of the matters in his declaration.

“[D]eclarations that lack foundation or personal knowledge . . . are to be 

disregarded.” Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 26 (Ct. App. 2007); see Sweetwater 

Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co., 6 Cal. 5th 931, 947 (2019) (“Evidence 

may be considered at the anti-SLAPP motion stage if it is reasonably possible the 

evidence set out in supporting . . . declarations . . . will be admissible at trial.”). Under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 602, “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is 

introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness had personal knowledge of the 

matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own 

testimony.” Here, Plaintiff’s statements outlined above are entirely based on his personal 

knowledge of his relationship with Defendant and do not pertain to Defendant’s 

“opinions and impressions.” See Doc. No. 6-6 at 3-4. Accordingly, the Court 

OVERRULES Defendant’s objections to these portions of Plaintiff’s declaration.

 

5 Defendant objects to several other portions of Plaintiff’s declaration as well. See Doc. No. 6-6. 

However, the Court did not rely on those portions of Plaintiff’s declaration in deciding this motion, and 

therefore OVERRULES as moot those objections. Plaintiff submitted three additional declarations as 

evidence in opposition to Defendant’s motion. See Doc. Nos 3-2, 3-3, 3-4. Defendant objects to each 

declaration on various grounds. See Doc. Nos. 6-3, 6-4, 6-5. The Court also OVERRULES as moot 

those objections because the Court did not rely on them in deciding this motion.

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of 18
15

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

With respect to the falsity of Defendant’s statement, Plaintiff’s declaration 

expressly contradicts facts relating to the alleged sexual violence in the parties’ 

relationship. See Guzman Decl. While the declaration is self-serving, the Court does not 

weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of Plaintiff’s declaration and merely 

determines whether there is sufficient evidence for a jury to decide in Plaintiff’s favor. 

Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 714 (2007). The required probability that Plaintiff will 

prevail is not high, “[t]he California Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that suits 

subject to being stricken at step two are those that ‘lack[] even minimal merit.’” Hilton v. 

Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s claim at 

least has minimal merit based on his declaration. Accordingly, accepting Plaintiff’s 

relevant evidence as true and without weighing competing evidence, as the Court must in 

an anti-SLAPP motion, Plaintiff has met his low burden to make a prima facie showing 

of facts to support his defamation claim. 

3. Concerning Plaintiff

“In defamation actions the First Amendment . . . requires that the statement on 

which the claim is based must specifically refer to, or be ‘of and concerning,’ the plaintiff 

in some way.” Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1042 (1986). “To be 

referred to specifically, . . . the plaintiff need not be mentioned by name, but may be 

identified by clear implication.” Id. at 1044 n.1. “It is sufficient if from the evidence the 

jury can infer that the defamatory statement applies to the plaintiff . . . [or] if the 

publication points to the plaintiff by description or circumstance tending to identify 

him.’” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(quoting Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 215 Cal. 

App. 2d 560, 569-70 (Ct. App. 1963)). “Whether defamatory statements can reasonably 

be interpreted as referring to plaintiffs is a question of law for the court.” Tamkin, 193 

Cal. App. 4th at 146. 

Defendant contends the statement “does not even reference the Plaintiff,” such that 

“[a] reader of the post would have no knowledge of who the post was regarding.” Mtn. at 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of 18
16

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8. Plaintiff counters that the statement sufficiently identifies him “by both description 

and circumstances.” Oppo. at 18.

Here, the Facebook post identifies Plaintiff by clear implication. See Blatty, 42 

Cal. 3d at 1044 n.1. Defendant’s post describes her “partner” as a 48-year-old male she 

dated for a year and a half, who is a father, and who was one of her supervisors at work. 

Defendant also provides factual details about their relationship that sufficiently identify 

Plaintiff by implication. For example, Defendant explains the two traveled to the 

Bahamas for Defendant’s 21st birthday, that they traveled out of the country three times, 

and that Defendant spent New Year’s with him. Moreover, some of the comments in 

response to Defendant’s Facebook post indicate that third persons understood the 

statement referred to Plaintiff. One person responded “that’s why I couldn’t and 

wouldn’t help you get him new glasses,” and another person commented “I know you 

were taken advantage of by a . . . sales guy[.]”6 Rikos Decl., Exhibit B. Thus, a 

reasonable reader could have understood the Facebook post as referring to Plaintiff. 

3. Special Damages

“A statement that is defamatory without the need for explanatory matter such as an 

inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, constitutes ‘a libel on its face,’” or libel per 

se. Overstock.com, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th at 700 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 45a). If a 

plaintiff sufficiently alleges and proves a libel per se claim, it is unnecessary to prove 

special damages because damage to the plaintiff’s reputation is presumed. See BarnesHind, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App. 3d 377, 382 (Ct. App. 1986). California Civil 

Code 45 explains that three categories of statements are libelous on their face: (1) 

statements that expose a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy; (2) statements 

that cause a person to be shunned or avoided; or (3) statements that tend to injure one in 

 

6 Plaintiff argues the Court should not consider the comments and replies to Defendant’s Facebook post 

because it does not include all the replies and comments made on the post. Oppo. at 23. However, 

Plaintiff relies on these comments in his opposition. See id. at 19. Accordingly, the Court finds 

consideration of the comments and replies before it is appropriate.

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of 18
17

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

his or her occupation. Cal. Civ. Code § 45. Under California law, statements that falsely 

impute the commission of a crime are libelous on their face. Yow v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 

550 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Here, Defendant’s Facebook post states 

that Plaintiff was verbally and physically abusive towards her. See Facebook Post. This 

statement, if false, is libelous on its face. As such, Plaintiff need not prove special 

damages.

C. Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff argues he is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. Oppo. at 23-24. A 

prevailing plaintiff is entitled to “costs and reasonable attorney’s fees” in accordance with 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5 if “the court finds that a special motion to 

strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 425.16(c). Section 128.5 defines “frivolous” as “totally and completely without merit 

or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 

128.5(b)(2). Plaintiff contends the motion is frivolous and without merit because 

Defendant did not cite the correct standard for the second prong of the anti-SLAPP 

analysis, ignored statements in her own evidentiary submission that evinced Plaintiff’s 

Facebook friends knew the post was about Plaintiff, and her argument that the post is 

entirely opinion “could not have been made in good faith.” Mtn. at 24. First, Defendant 

cited the correct legal standard for the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. See

Oppo. at 7 (noting that “the plaintiff must demonstrate the complaint is both legally 

sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a 

favorable judgment if the evidence is credited”). Second, Defendant’s arguments were 

not “totally and completely without merit.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.5(b)(2); see 

Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Exam’r, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 261-62 (1986) (“When one states a 

view in terms of an ‘impression,’ the listener or reader is on notice that the maker is not 

vouching for its accuracy. A reasonable person would understand that a statement of 

opinion rather than of fact was to follow.”); Mtn. at 9 (arguing the Facebook post is an 

impression rather than a declaration or implication of provably false assertions of fact); 

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of 18
18

19cv412-MMA (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Reply at 8 (distinguishing case law regarding statements referencing plaintiffs without 

stating their names). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s 

fees.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. Doc. No. 2. 

Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is also DENIED. See Doc. No. 3 at 23-24.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2019

Case 3:19-cv-00412-MMA-MDD Document 8 Filed 04/26/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of 18