Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00160/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00160-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE GILBERT HERNANDEZ,

CDCR #G-46924,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SCOTT KERNAN,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A

Steve Hernandez (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently incarcerated at Centinela 

State Prison (“CEN”) located in Imperial, California, proceeding pro se, has filed a civil 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) In addition, Plaintiff has filed a 

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.)

Case 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL Document 3 Filed 02/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 9
2

3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

Case 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL Document 3 Filed 02/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 9
3

3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In support of his request to proceed IFP, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate 

authorized by a CEN accounting official and a copy of his CDCR Inmate Statement 

Report. See ECF No. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d 

at 1119. These documents shows that Plaintiff had an available balance of zero at the 

time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 4, 7. Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS 

Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and will assess no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a 

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal 

judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the 

initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). The Court will further direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his

designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment 

payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Williams v. King, __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 5180205, at *2 (9th Cir. 

Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Case 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL Document 3 Filed 02/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 9
4

3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it 

“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 

(1989).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff was diagnosed with “Hepatitis C” when he was previously housed at the 

Correctional Training Facility in 2000. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that he has been 

monitored since that time and more recently, he received blood draws that demonstrated 

that his “condition is not improving.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that the prison officials 

are “dragging their feet to cure Plaintiff.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff filed several grievances 

seeking a “Hep C treatment for the Plaintiff’s medical condition which is available so he 

will be cured from HCV.” (Id. at 7.) 

Case 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL Document 3 Filed 02/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 9
5

3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s grievances were denied at each level of review. (See id. at 8-10.) 

Plaintiff argues that prison officials refused to give him specific medication, “including 

Harvoni and Salvaldi,” which he claims “are over 90% effective” in curing hepatitis C. 

(Id. at 9.) Instead, Plaintiff claims prison officials are choosing a “course of monitoring 

his condition in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff also filed a “habeas corpus on this issue claiming Eighth Amendment 

violation, deliberate indifference to a serious medical need” in the Superior Court of 

California for the County of Imperial. (Id.) Plaintiff’s petition was denied. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed an appeal to the California Court of Appeals and this appeal was denied on 

the grounds that “Plaintiff did not show a prima facie violation of the Eighth 

Amendment.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed an appeal to the California Supreme Court which was 

also denied. (See id. at 10.) Plaintiff “disagrees with the California Supreme Court” and 

“requests that his Eighth Amendment rights be restored.” (Id. at 11.)

C. Rooker Feldman

Plaintiff has attached to his Complaint several Exhibits, as well as alleging facts in 

support of these Exhibits, which demonstrate that Plaintiff brought these identical claims 

before California State Courts. Specifically, on July 13, 2017, Justices McConnell, 

Haller, and Aaron issued an Opinion denying Plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. (See Pl.’s Compl., Ex. Z, In Re Steven G. Hernandez, No. D072412 (Cal.Ct.App. 

July 13, 2017). Specifically, the Justices found that the “prison staff is not acting with 

deliberate indifference to [Plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” (Id. at *2.) They further 

found that Plaintiff’s own submissions demonstrated that “physicians have been 

monitoring his hepatitis C, considered his request for treatment with Harvoni, and 

concluded based on medical criteria that he does not yet qualify for such treatment.” (Id.) 

Finally, they concluded that Plaintiff’s “disagreement or dissatisfaction with his 

physician’s treatment plan and his preference for a different one are insufficient to state 

an Eighth Amendment claim.” (Id.) 

Case 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL Document 3 Filed 02/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 9
6

3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As set forth above, Plaintiff appealed this decision to the California Supreme 

Court. (See Compl., “Appendix 3,” In re STEVEN G. HERNANDEZ, No. S24846 (Cal. 

Dec. 13, 2017). 

Here, Plaintiff is seeking a ruling from this Court essentially overturning a 

California State Court decision. However, this is not a viable form of relief in this action. 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “‘a losing party in state court is barred from 

seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United 

States District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself 

violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 

868 (1999); see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 & 

486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). 

Review of state court decisions may only be conducted in the United States 

Supreme Court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 & 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see 28 

U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar applies even if the complaint 

raises federal constitutional issues. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 & 486; Henrichs v. 

Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the bar 

applies if the challenge to the state court decision is brought as a § 1983 civil rights 

action. See Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995); Worldwide Church of God 

v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A complaint challenges a state court decision if the constitutional claims presented 

to the district court are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision in a 

judicial proceeding. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. “[T]he federal claim is inextricably 

intertwined with the state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent 

that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 

481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)(Marshall, J., concurring); see also Worldwide Church of God, 805 

F.2d at 891-92.

Case 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL Document 3 Filed 02/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 9
7

3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Because Plaintiff appears to seek this Court’s assistance in overturning orders 

made by state court judges based on the same Eighth Amendment claims brought in this 

action, his claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court proceedings, and are 

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

D. Personal Causation

Finally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint requires sua sponte dismissal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) and § 1915A(b)(1) to the extent it seeks relief 

under § 1983 against Secretary Kernan. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 

plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of 

the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a 

person acting under color of state law.” Campbell v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 

671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987). The Complaint contains no factual allegations describing what 

Defendant Kernan did, or failed to do. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold him liable for 

the actions of his subordinates, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Rather, “deliberate 

indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor 

disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 

U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A less stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim ‘would 

result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities . . . .’”), quoting City of 

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), 

citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 

460 (9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 

1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”) A person 

deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does 

Case 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL Document 3 Filed 02/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 9
8

3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff 

complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has not 

stated a claim against Defendant Kernan because he has failed to allege facts regarding 

what actions were taken or not taken by the Defendant which caused the alleged 

constitutional violations. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 385 (“Respondeat superior and 

vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”), citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.

E. Leave to Amend

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is dismissed for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. Because he is proceeding pro se, however, the Court 

having now provided him with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also 

grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly 

payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding them to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 

his account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

Case 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL Document 3 Filed 02/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 9
9

3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) for failing to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1).

5. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to file an Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies of pleading described 

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to 

his original complaint. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

Should Plaintiff elect not to proceed by filing an Amended Complaint within 30

days, the Court will enter a final Order of dismissal of this civil action for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and for failure to 

prosecute in compliance with a Court Order requiring amendment. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to prosecute 

permitted if plaintiff fails to respond to a court’s order requiring amendment of 

complaint); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not 

take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a civil rights form complaint 

for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2018

Case 3:18-cv-00160-DMS-PCL Document 3 Filed 02/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 9