Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01193/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01193-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Robert James Fairweather,

Petitioner, No. Civ. S 02-1193 FCD PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Edward S. Alameida, Jr.,

Respondent.

-oOoPetitioner is a state prisoner with appointed counsel

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner pleaded guilty to first degree murder of his wife

and is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of

parole. He claims his trial counsel had conflicts of interest

causing him to fail to investigate a mental defense and other

defenses, resulting in the deprivation of petitioner’s rights to

conflict-free counsel and constitutionally effective assistance

of counsel during plea negotiations.

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Respondent moved to dismiss the action as barred by the

statute of limitation. The court denied the motion without

prejudice and appointed counsel. 

The court herein addresses the timeliness of the petition,

based on consideration of petitioner’s June 29, 2004, brief re

timeliness of petition and declaration, respondent’s July 29,

2004, brief renewing motion to dismiss, and petitioner’s August

18, 2004, reply brief in opposition to the renewed motion to

dismiss.

Petitioner concedes the “actual innocence” exception, which

would permit the court to consider his claims although untimely,

is not applicable. Instead he claims he is entitled to statutory

and equitable tolling. 

Petitions for habeas corpus challenging state convictions or

sentences are subject to a one-year limitation period. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). The one-year period runs from the latest of (A)

the date the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review

or expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date

an unconstitutional state-created impediment preventing the

petitioner from filing the application was removed; (C) the date

the constitutional right asserted was first recognized by the

United States Supreme Court (if it is a newly recognized right

retroactively applicable on collateral review); or (D) the date

the factual predicate of petitioner’s claims could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). 

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The limitation period is tolled while a “properly filed

application” for post-conviction or other collateral review is

pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced June 19, 1995. 

He appealed; the judgment was affirmed (except as to imposition

of attorneys fees) September 11, 1997. Petitioner did not seek

review in the California Supreme Court and his conviction was

final 40 days later, October 21, 1997. Petitioner did not sign

his federal petition until more than four years later. 

Petitioner contends the limitation period was tolled because

counsel’s conflict of interest was concealed from him and he

could not with due diligence have discovered it until August 14,

2000, when he obtained documents from a private investigator that

corroborated the conflict. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796

(9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling applied where petitioner hired

post-conviction counsel who did nothing and failed to return

files to petitioner until well after the date the petition was

due). Assuming arguendo that Spitsyn is the governing precedent

and petitioner was not on notice of counsel’s conflict years

prior, the court nonetheless would find tolling only until May

31, 2000, when plaintiff obtained a December 19, 1995, memorandum

from his trial counsel to the trial judge identifying witnesses

that he had previously represented and contact with the victim in

a prior spousal abuse charge against petitioner. Ex. 20

Petitioner argues that Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150 (9th

Cir. 2001) mandates tolling until August 14, 2000. In Hasan, the

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court held that a petitioner learns the basis for his claim not

on the date he begins to have suspicions, but on the date he

“discovered (or with the exercise of due diligence could have

discovered) facts” adequate to support the claim. Hasan, 254

F.3d at 1154. In that case the petitioner suspected a conflict

but knew nothing of its nature until investigation was complete. 

Here, petitioner was informed May 31, 2000, of the asserted

conflict stemming from counsel’s representation of prosecution

witnesses, and merely received corroboration from his

investigator ten weeks later. 

The limitation period commenced May 31, 2000, and ran for 88

days until petitioner signed his first state habeas petition

August 27, 2000. Giving petitioner the benefit of continuous

tolling for one full round of state habeas petitions, the

limitation period resumed running June 22, 2001, 30 days after

the California Supreme Court denied the petition May 23, 2001. 

See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (limitation period

tolled continuously during one full round of collateral review in

California); Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2001)

(tolling continues until 30 days after the California Supreme

Court denies habeas petition). It expired 277 days later, March

26, 2002, and petitioner was 49 days late when he signed his

federal petition May 14, 2002.

Finally, petitioner argues the court should disregard Bunney

and instead rule that continuous tolling extended until August

21, 2001 (when the time to petition the United States Supreme

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Court for certiorari expired, 90 days after the California

Supreme Court denied habeas). Petitioner relies on Abela v.

Martin, 348 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 2003), which held that tolling

extends until certiorari review is foreclosed, whether the

petitioner sought Supreme Court review of state habeas denial or,

as here, did not. The holding in Abela is open to doubt but even

if this court were inclined to follow the decision it could not

because the Ninth Circuit’s controlling law is stated in Bunney. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends respondent’s July

29, 2004, renewed motion to dismiss be granted and this action be

dismissed as time-barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Within 20 days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may

file written objections. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

The district judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings

and recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: July 12, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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