Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00230/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00230-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dimitri Rozenman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Phoenix, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-230-PHX-GMS (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Dimitri Rozenman, who is represented by attorney Kenneth W. Schutt, Jr.,

has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and paid the filing

fee.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

II. Complaint

In his Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Maricopa County; the City

of Phoenix; City of Phoenix Police Department; City of Phoenix Police Chief Jack Harris;

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Detectives Edward Warner, Saul Ayala, Rafael Egea, Michael Carmody, Christopher Eyrich,

Keith Moffitt, John Justice, and Hassan Silver; Sergeant Bill Long; Maricopa County

Attorneys Andrew Thomas and Bill Montgomery; Deputy County Attorney Rebekah

Prichard; and a variety of John and Jane Doe Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that his ex-wife “developed an elaborate scheme to frame Plaintiff”

for conspiracy to murder her and her family and for criminal damage to vehicles owned by

her and her family. Plaintiff contends that due to his ex-wife’s scheme “and the cooperation

of Defendants,” Plaintiff was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and criminal

damage.

Plaintiff asserts that his convictions were later overturned because Defendant Police

Officers had withheld exculpatory evidence during the criminal proceedings and lied under

oath in court about the existence of the exculpatory evidence. Plaintiff also contends that

Defendant Prichard was aware of the existence of the exculpatory evidence, but did not

disclose it. He also claims that Defendants Warner and Prichard were engaged in sexual

relations during portions of the investigation and/or trial, but neither Defendant disclosed this

information to Plaintiff, even though it would have affected Defendant Warner’s credibility.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Warner’s and Defendant Prichard’s supervisors (who

are Defendants in this action) were aware of their actions and helped perpetuate the

suppression of the evidence, the non-disclosure of the sexual relationship, and the “malicious

prosecution” of Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Police Officers and Defendant Prichard deliberately

suppressed exculpatory evidence and refused to acknowledge its existence, in violation of

Phoenix Police Department and Maricopa County Attorney’s Office policies, procedures,

and/or training guidelines and manuals, and national police and prosecutor guidelines.

Plaintiff contends that their acts or omissions were the product of their callousness,

recklessness, and negligence. Plaintiff claims that their actions and omissions were also the

result of unconstitutional customs, polices, practices, and/or training failures by the Maricopa

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1

See http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourtCases/caseInfo.asp

(last visited Feb. 28, 2012). The Court notes that the trial date in that case has been vacated

and that a Complex Case Management Conference is set for March 6, 2012. See

http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/122011/m5042260.pdf and

http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/012012/m5078787.pdf.

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County Attorney’s Office and Defendants City of Phoenix, City of Phoenix Police

Department, Maricopa County, Harris, Thomas, and Montgomery. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct deprived him of the right to: a fair and

impartial presentation of evidence to the grand jury and at trial, a fair trial, exculpatory

evidence and information regarding witness credibility, freedom from obstruction of justice

and from inappropriate restraint, and continued familiar and societal relationship. He also

claims he was denied due process, equal protection, and the right to be free of punishment.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and his costs and attorney’s fees.

III. Discussion

Although it is not clear from his Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is still incarcerated

pending retrial in Maricopa County Superior Court, case #CR2009-007039-001-DT, on the

same criminal charges that are described in his Complaint.1

The abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), prevents

a federal court in most circumstances from directly interfering with ongoing criminal

proceedings in state court. Younger principles also apply to a plaintiff’s request for damages,

but in that situation, a temporary stay, rather than dismissal, is appropriate. Gilbertson v.

Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 981 (9th Cir. 2004). Staying the federal case until the state court

criminal case is no longer pending

allows the federal plaintiff an opportunity to pursue

constitutional challenges in the state proceeding (assuming, of

course, that such an opportunity is available under state law),

and the state an opportunity to pass on those constitutional

issues in the context of its own procedures, while still preserving

the federal plaintiff’s opportunity to pursue compensation in the

forum of his choice. In this way, neither the federal plaintiff’s

right to seek damages for constitutional violations nor the state’s

interest in its own system is frustrated.

Id.

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2

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under

§ 1983.

512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

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It appears, therefore, that a stay of this case is appropriate under Younger and

Gilbertson. 

It also appears that a stay is appropriate under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).

In that case, the Supreme Court stated:

 [i]f a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been

convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will

likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is

within the power of the district court, and in accord with

common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case

or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. If the plaintiff is

ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn

that conviction, Heck [v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)], will

require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent

some other bar to suit.

Id. at 393-94 (citations omitted).2

The Court will order that this case be served on Defendants. However, Defendants

will not be required to file an answer to the Complaint at this time. Instead, Defendants shall

have 60 days after service of the Complaint within which they must file a brief: (1) providing

the Court with the status of any criminal case against Plaintiff related to the incidents

described in the Complaint, and (2) discussing the applicability of Younger, Gilbertson, and

Wallace. Plaintiff shall have 30 days after service of the brief within which to file and serve

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a responsive brief. Defendants shall have 15 days after service of the responsive brief within

which to file and serve a reply brief, if they so desire.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff must either serve each Defendant or seek a waiver of service for each

Defendant. 

(2) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the

filing of the Complaint, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(m).

(3) Defendants must not answer the Complaint until further order of the Court.

(4) Within 60 days after service or waiver of service, Defendants must file and

serve a brief: 

(a) providing the Court with the status of any criminal case against

Plaintiff related the incident described in the Complaint, and

(b) discussing the applicability of Younger, Gilbertson, and

Wallace. 

(5) Within 30 days after service of the brief, Plaintiff must file and serve a

responsive brief. 

(6) Within 15 days after service of the responsive brief, Defendants may file and

serve a reply brief, if they so desire.

(7) Any filings by a Defendant must state the specific Defendant or Defendants by

name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other

motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant or Defendants by name on

whose behalf it is filed.

DATED this 5th day of March, 2012.

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