Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01067/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01067-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRACY MAXXIZZINE JONES, ) 2:05-cv-1067-GEB-GGH-P

)

Petitioner, ) ORDER

)

v. )

)

GLORIA A. HENRY, et al., )

)

Respondents. ) )

Respondents move for reconsideration of this Court’s October

25, 2006 Order adopting the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations, and denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss as

untimely Petitioner’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus

(“October 25 Order”). (Mot. for Recons. (“Mot.”) at 2.) 

Alternatively, Respondents request that this Court certify for

interlocutory appeal the issue of whether Petitioner’s habeas petition

violates the applicable statute of limitations. (Id.) Petitioner

opposes Respondents’ motion.

Background

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel

with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2254. (Id.) Petitioner challenges her 1996 conviction for assault

with force likely to produce great bodily injury, for which Petitioner

is currently serving a sentence of 25 years to life. (Id.) 

On March 21, 2006, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss

Petitioner’s amended petition, arguing the petition was barred by the

statute of limitations since it was filed more than one year after

petitioner’s conviction became final. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at

6.) On August 17, 2006, the magistrate judge issued findings and

recommendations, finding that the “petition is timely because

petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling based on the egregious

misconduct [of her attorneys]” and recommending that Respondents’

motion to dismiss be denied. (Aug. 17, 2006 Findings &

Recommendations (“F&R’s”), at 10.) On October 25, 2006, the findings

and recommendations were adopted in full, and Respondents’ motion to

dismiss was denied. (Oct. 25 Order at 2.) 

Motion for Reconsideration

“[Motions] for reconsideration should not be granted, absent

highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented

with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is

an intervening change in the controlling law.” 389 Orange Street

Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing School

Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993));

Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5

(9th Cir. 1989). Respondents do not contend that there is any newly

discovered evidence, or that there has been an intervening change in

the controlling law. Rather, Respondents contend the October 25 Order

was erroneous. (Mot. at 15.)

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According to Respondents, the last day for Petitioner to

timely file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court was

May 10, 1997, one year after Petitioner’s conviction became final. 

(Id. at 5, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).) Respondents contend

that this Court should reconsider the October 25 Order because

Petitioner’s amended petition, which was filed May 31, 2005, “is not

timely by virtue of statutory or equitable tolling. Petitioner has

failed to carry her burden of establishing that for over nine years,

extraordinary circumstances beyond her control prevented her from

timely filing her petition.” (Mot. at 4, 5.) 

Petitioner counters that her conviction was not final until

May 13, 2002, the date her time to appeal from a re-sentencing hearing

expired, and that the Magistrate Judge “properly provided for a period

of equitable tolling between that date and the filing of petitioner’s

federal habeas corpus petition on May 31, 2005.” (Petitioner’s Resp.

to Mot. (“Resp.”) at 2.) 

The statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas

petition expires one year from the date Petitioner’s conviction became

final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). At issue here is when Petitioner’s

conviction became final, and whether Petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling from that date until the date Petitioner filed her

federal habeas petition. 

When Petitioner’s Conviction Became Final

The magistrate judge determined that Petitioner’s conviction

became final on May 13, 2002, when Petitioner’s time to appeal a resentencing decision by a Sacramento County Superior Court judge, after

remand from the California Court of Appeal, expired. (F&R’s at 7.) 

Respondents agree that petitioner’s conviction became final when her

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1 Respondents suggest that the California Supreme Court’s

decision to depublish Lewis indicates its disapproval of that

opinion. (Mot. at 11 (“The Supreme Court appropriately determines

by selective publication the evolution and scope of the state’s

decisional law.”).) However, the California Rules of Court make

clear that “[a] Supreme Court order to depublish is not an

expression of the court’s opinion of the correctness of the result

of the decision or any law stated in the opinion.” Cal. Rule of

Ct. 8.1125(d). 

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time to appeal expired, but contend the magistrate judge’s finding was

erroneous because “a California Superior Court order denying a

Petitioner’s request to strike prior convictions is not appealable.” 

(Mot. at 11.) Respondents argue that the magistrate judge erroneously

relied upon the depublished California case of Lewis v. Superior

Court, 60 Cal. App. 4th 913 (1998), in making that finding.1 (Id.)

Petitioner responds that “[t]he Magistrate [Judge] properly

found that petitioner’s state court conviction was final when the time

for appeal from her re-sentencing hearing expired on May 13, 2002.” 

(Resp. at 3.) Petitioner contends that because “[t]he trial court’s

order denying petitioner’s motion to strike her prior convictions at

her re-sentencing hearing affected her substantial rights[, it] was

appealable.” (Id.) Since “the sentencing judge had the authority to

re-sentence petitioner and . . . he made a ruling on petitioner’s

contested motion to strike her prior convictions . . ., it is

irrelevant that petitioner’s sentence was not modified.” (Id. at 4.) 

Because Respondents have not provided any authority

indicating that the Sacramento County Superior Court judge’s resentencing decision after remand from the California Court of Appeal

on a habeas petition was not appealable, they have not established

that the portion of the October 25 holding that Petitioner’s

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conviction became final on May 13, 2002 was clearly erroneous. 

Therefore, that portion of the October 25 Order is upheld.

Respondents further contend that “[e]ven assuming the

appealability of the Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s request

to strike her prior convictions on habeas corpus, under California law

the scope of review following a limited remand on appeal is similarly

limited to the issue of whether the Superior Court properly refused to

exercise its discretion to strike the prior conviction.” (Mot. at

12.) Respondents contend that “[t]he appellate court’s limited remand

precluded Petitioner from directly attacking her underlying

conviction. Even assuming the Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s

request to strike her convictions on habeas corpus was appealable, the

appeal was limited to the propriety of that denial.” (Mot. at 13-14.)

Petitioner rejoins that “the argument that the statute of

limitations for filing petitioner’s federal habeas claims related to a

single case expired at different times is unsupported by any

authority. If accepted, such a rule would require petitioners to

litigate piecemeal and successive federal habeas corpus petitions,

contrary to case and statutory authority.” (Resp. at 4-5.) 

 “[A] judgment cannot be considered final as long as a

defendant may appeal either the conviction or sentence.” United

States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore,

Petitioner need not attack her underlying conviction, and can instead

appeal the sentence. Respondents concede that “the issue of whether

the Superior Court properly refused to exercise its discretion to

strike the prior conviction” was appealable. (Mot. at 12.) If

Petitioner appealed on that ground, and the appellate court found that

the Superior Court improperly refused to exercise its discretion to

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strike the prior conviction, Petitioner’s sentence could have been

changed. Since Respondents have not met their burden of establishing

clear error on this point, the finding that Petitioner’s conviction

became final on May 13, 2002 is upheld. 

Whether Petitioner Is Entitled to Equitable Tolling

The one year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) may be equitably tolled if Petitioner can establish:

(1) that she has been pursuing her rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstances stood in her way. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Equitable tolling is

appropriate when an attorney’s egregious misconduct prevented a

petitioner from timely filing her petition. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 801-02 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Because the magistrate judge found that Petitioner’s

conviction became final on May 13, 2002, the statute of limitations

need only be equitably tolled from that date. The magistrate judge

found that (1) the grossly negligent conduct of Richard Dangler,

Petitioner’s attorney from April 2000 until September 2004, and (2)

Petitioner’s inability to obtain her files from Dangler until August

2005, entitled Petitioner to equitable tolling during that time. 

(F&R’s at 10.) Although Respondents contend that Petitioner did not

diligently pursue her rights between May 13, 2002 and May 31, 2005

(when the petition was filed) (Mot. at 7-11), Respondents have not

shown that the findings were clearly erroneous. (F&R’s at 10; see

also Resp. at 5 (“Petitioner provided more than 40 exhibits

demonstrating that she diligently sought appellate and post conviction

relief since the date of her original sentencing hearing.”).) 

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Even if Petitioner’s conviction was final as of May 11, 1996

(the date Respondents suggest) (Mot. at 5), the magistrate judge found

that (1) the grossly negligent conduct of Richard Prantil,

Petitioner’s attorney from March 12, 1996 until around August 1999,

and (2) Petitioner’s inability to obtain her files from Prantil,

entitled Petitioner to equitable tolling during that time as well. 

(F&R’s at 9.) Again, Respondents have not shown that the findings

were clearly erroneous. (F&R’s at 9; see also Resp. at 5.). 

Therefore, the portion of the October 25 Order adopting the

magistrate judge’s findings regarding equitable tolling is upheld, and

Respondents’ motion for reconsideration is denied. 

Certification for Interlocutory Appeal

Respondents also request that this Court “certify the matter

of whether Petitioner has violated the statute of limitations for

interlocutory review to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.” (Mot. at

14.) A non-final order may be certified for interlocutory appeal

“[w]hen a district judge [is] of the opinion that such order involves

a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground

for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order

may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

Respondents argue that “[t]he issue of whether Petitioner is

entitled to nine years of equitable tolling is [a] dispositive legal

question [as to] which there is substantial ground for difference of

opinion.” (Mot. at 14.) Additionally, Respondents contend that “an

immediate appeal clearly might materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation.” (Id.)

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Petitioner counters that “controlling Ninth Circuit

authority supports the Magistrate’s Findings and Recommendations and

the judgment of this court[; therefore, t]here is not substantial

ground for difference of opinion triggering the need for immediate

interlocutory review.” (Resp. at 9.) Petitioner also argues that

Respondents have not met their burden of demonstrating that

exceptional circumstances justify their request for interlocutory

review. (Id. at 9-10.) 

 The Ninth Circuit has admonished that interlocutory appeal

under § 1292(b) is “to be used only in exceptional situations in which

allowing an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and expensive

litigation.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig. (State of Ariz. v. Ideal

Basic Indus.), 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982); see also

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 74 (1996) (“Routine resort to

§ 1292(b) requests would hardly comport with Congress’ design to

reserve interlocutory review for ‘exceptional’ cases while generally

retaining for the federal courts a firm final judgment rule.”)

(quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because the order Respondents seek to have certified for

interlocutory appeal involves “a controlling question of law as to

which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” because

“an immediate appeal . . . may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation,” and because “this is an exceptional

situation in which allowing an interlocutory appeal would avoid

protracted and expensive litigation,” Respondents’ request for

///

///

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certification is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); In re Cement Antitrust

Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 9, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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