Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13715/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13715-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 

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[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13715

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:14-cv-00635-VMC-TBM

NEDZAD MILJKOVIC, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

SHAFRITZ AND DINKIN, P.A.,

MITCHELL A. DINKIN.

 Defendants - Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(June 30, 2015)

Before WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and VOORHEES,

∗ District 

Judge.

 ∗ Honorable Richard L. Voorhees, United States District Judge for the Western District of 

North Carolina, sitting by designation.

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WILSON, Circuit Judge: 

Plaintiff-appellant Nedzad Miljkovic (Appellant) appeals from the district 

court’s dismissal with prejudice of his complaint against defendants-appellees 

Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A. and Mitchell A. Dinkin (collectively, Appellees), debtcollection attorneys for non-party Publix Employees Federal Credit Union 

(Publix), for failure to state a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(FDCPA), see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p. On appeal, we are tasked with 

determining the extent to which the conduct-regulating provisions of the FDCPA 

apply to actions taken by debt-collector attorneys in collecting on a debt.

This matter has its roots in state court. After Appellant failed to repay an 

automobile loan, resulting in a final debt judgment in favor of Publix, Appellees 

sought and obtained a continuing writ of garnishment against Appellant’s wages to 

recover the unpaid balance. In response, Appellant filed a claim of exemption

from the garnishment; Appellees, in turn, filed a sworn reply disputing Appellant’s 

right to an exemption. Shortly thereafter, but prior to a hearing on Appellant’s 

exemption claim, the writ was dissolved on Appellees’ motion.

Appellant then commenced this action in federal court, alleging that 

Appellees’ sworn reply was an abusive, misleading, and unfair means of collecting 

on Appellant’s debt and, as such, violated multiple provisions of the FDCPA. See

id. §§ 1692d–1692f. Appellees moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 

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asserting the FDCPA was not intended to regulate representations made by debtcollecting attorneys in procedural court filings. Appellees further argued that,

because the sworn reply was directed to the state court and to Appellant’s attorney,

as opposed to Appellant, it was not an actionable communication under the 

FDCPA. The district court agreed and dismissed Appellant’s complaint on the 

grounds that the FDCPA did not apply to Appellees’ conduct before the state court

and, even if it did, Appellant had failed to state a claim under the Act. 

This appeal followed, presenting us with an issue of first impression in the 

Eleventh Circuit: whether representations made by an attorney in court filings 

during the course of debt-collection litigation are actionable under the FDCPA. 

Contrary to the district court’s analysis, we find that the plain language of the 

FDCPA, other persuasive decisions interpreting that language, and the purpose

underlying the Act mandate a finding that the FDCPA applies to attorneys, like 

Appellees, who regularly engage in debt collection activity, even when that activity 

includes litigation and even when the attorneys’ conduct is directed at someone 

other than the consumer.

1

 Absent a statutory exception, then, documents filed in 

court in the course of judicial proceedings to collect on a debt, like Appellees’

 1 The FDCPA defines a “consumer” as “any natural person obligated or allegedly 

obligated to pay any debt.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). As such, courts often use “consumer” and 

“debtor” interchangeably. Except, however, in the context of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c, which provides 

a broader, section-specific definition of “consumer.” See id. § 1692c(d) (“For the purpose of this 

section, the term ‘consumer’ includes the consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), 

guardian, executor, or administrator.”). Section 1692c is not at issue in this appeal.

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sworn reply, are subject to the FDCPA. However, because we agree with the 

district court’s finding that Appellant failed to state a claim under the FDCPA, we 

affirm the dismissal of his complaint.

I.

In December 2013, Appellees, on behalf of Publix, filed a motion in Florida 

state court seeking a continuing writ of garnishment against Appellant’s wages in 

order to collect on a previously-obtained final debt judgment. The writ was 

approved on or about January 2, 2014. After the writ was served on Appellant’s 

then-employer, twenty-five percent of Appellant’s wages were withheld according 

to the terms of the writ.

Appellant filed a claim of exemption from garnishment, asserting that, 

because his wages were the primary source of income for his household, he 

qualified as a “head of family” under Florida law and his wages were thus exempt 

from garnishment.

2

 In a sworn affidavit, Appellant explained that his household 

included his wife and him; that his wife was disabled, unable to work, and received 

Social Security benefits; and that his wages, which typically did not exceed $750 

 2 See Fla. Stat. § 222.11(1)(c) (defining the “head of family” as “any natural person who 

is providing more than one-half of the support for a child or other dependent”).

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per week, provided more than one-half of his wife’s support.

3

 The affidavit did not 

state the amount of Appellant’s wife’s Social Security benefits.

Appellees filed a sworn reply in opposition to Appellant’s claim of 

exemption, which stated, in pertinent part:

3. On behalf of [Publix], the undersigned disputes that [Appellant] 

is a head of household/family within the meaning of Florida Statutes.

4. The facts supporting [Appellant’s] Claim of Exemption are in 

dispute and, therefore, this garnishment action should be set for trial 

to determine these factual issues and [Publix’s] right to garnishment 

of the wages/salary at issue.

Appellees then issued discovery to Appellant. In an initial, partial response to 

Appellees’ discovery requests, Appellant provided three months of bank 

statements to demonstrate his household’s income and monthly budget.

The parties discussed possible dates for the impending evidentiary hearing 

on Appellant’s claim of exemption. In the course of such conversations, Appellees 

offered to settle Appellant’s debt for less than the amount due and owing in lieu of 

moving forward with the hearing, but Appellant refused. An evidentiary hearing 

was scheduled for March 31, 2014. Appellees reiterated their settlement offer to 

no avail, and discovery continued. 

 

3 See id. § 222.11(2)(a) (exempting from garnishment “[a]ll of the disposable earnings of 

a head of family whose disposable earnings are less than or equal to $750 a week”); see also id. § 

77.041.

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Appellant noticed the deposition of Appellee Mitchell A. Dinkin for March 

10, 2014, for the stated purpose of questioning Mr. Dinkin regarding the factual 

basis for the sworn reply, which Mr. Dinkin had signed on behalf of Appellees. 

Appellant also returned his outstanding discovery responses to Appellees. Soon 

after receiving all of Appellant’s discovery responses and accompanying 

documents, Appellees filed a motion to dissolve the writ of garnishment, and the 

writ was dissolved by court order on March 6, 2014.

Appellant then initiated the instant action against Appellees for violations of 

the FDCPA. The complaint alleged that, in filing the sworn reply, Appellees 

employed conduct the natural consequence of which was to harass, oppress, and 

abuse Appellant; used false, misleading, and deceptive means in connection with 

the collection of Appellant’s debt; and engaged in unfair and unconscionable 

means to collect Appellant’s debt. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d–1692f. Appellant 

claimed that his sworn affidavit provided Appellees with “actual knowledge” of 

the fact that his wages were exempt from garnishment, and thus, Appellees had “no 

factual basis” for opposing Appellant’s claim of exemption. The sworn reply, 

Appellant alleged, was a calculated effort to force a settlement of his debt.

Appellees moved to dismiss Appellant’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Appellees argued that Florida’s garnishment statute

requires debt-collecting plaintiffs to file a sworn written statement in opposition to 

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an individual’s claim of exemption before an evidentiary hearing will be set. See 

Fla. Stat. § 77.041(3). The sworn reply, Appellees averred, was a mere procedural 

filing directed first to the state court and then to Appellant’s counsel. Appellees 

asserted that the sworn reply was not the type of conduct from which Congress 

sought to protect consumers in enacting the FDCPA.

The district court agreed with Appellees. Skeptical of the idea that Congress 

intended to create FDCPA liability for “formulaic procedural filings,” the district 

court concluded that, to the extent the sworn reply was a procedural filing rather 

than “a formal pleading making factual allegations,” the FDCPA was inapplicable. 

The district court further determined that communications directed to someone 

other than the consumer are not actionable under the FDCPA. Thus, because the 

sworn reply was filed with and directed to the state court rather than to Appellant

himself, the FDCPA did not apply to Appellees’ conduct. Finally, the district court 

found that, even if the FDCPA applied, Appellant nonetheless failed to state a 

claim under the Act. Appellant’s complaint was dismissed with prejudice, and this 

appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a statute. See 

Bankston v. Then, 615 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). We also 

review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “accepting 

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the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff.” Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per 

curiam). However, “conclusory allegations . . . are not entitled to an assumption of 

truth—legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations.” Randall v. 

Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709–10 (11th Cir. 2010). To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” meaning it 

must contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”4

 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III.

Our review is in two parts. We must first determine whether the FDCPA 

applies where, as here, the representations alleged to have violated the Act were

made in court filings in the course of debt-collection proceedings. If the FDCPA 

does not apply to such representations, then the district court’s dismissal could be 

affirmed without further discussion. However, because we find that a debtcollector attorney’s representations in court filings and his conduct toward a

consumer’s attorney are all covered by the FDCPA in the absence of any express 

exemption therefor, we must also decide whether the district court erred in 

 4 Appellant attached multiple exhibits to his complaint, including a copy of his affidavit 

and of the sworn reply, and we treat those documents as part of the complaint for Rule 12(b)(6) 

purposes. See, e.g., Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (per 

curiam); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).

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dismissing Appellant’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Finding that Appellant has 

failed to state a claim under the FDCPA, we affirm on those grounds.

A.

The threshold issue is the extent to which the FDCPA applies to the 

activities of debt-collector attorneys. The district court concluded and Appellees 

argue on appeal that the FDCPA does not apply to representations made in

“formulaic procedural filings” or to communications directed only to the 

consumer’s attorney, rather than to the consumer himself. We disagree. The 

statutory text is entirely clear: the FDCPA applies to lawyers and law firms who

regularly engage in debt-collection activity, even when that activity involves 

litigation, and categorically prohibits abusive conduct in the name of debt 

collection, even when the audience for such conduct is someone other than the 

consumer. The plain language of the FDCPA is conclusive here, and so we must

do no more than enforce the Act according to its terms. See United States v. Ron 

Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S. Ct. 1026, 1030 (1989). We therefore 

decline to read into the Act those exceptions urged by Appellees and find that 

Appellees’ conduct before the state court is actionable under the FDCPA. 

1.

The FDCPA regulates what debt collectors can do in collecting debts. See

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p. A “debt collector” includes “any person who . . . 

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regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or 

asserted to be owed or due another.” Id. § 1692a(6). As a lawyer and a law firm 

who regularly practice in the field of consumer debt collection, Appellees do not 

dispute that they qualify as “debt collectors” within the meaning of the Act. 

However, they do challenge the extent to which the FDCPA applies to the conduct 

of debt collectors engaged in litigation; specifically, Appellees aver that court 

filings that are “purely procedural” do not fall within the ambit of the Act. 

Appellees’ argument is foreclosed by both Supreme Court precedent and the plain 

text of the FDCPA.

In Heintz v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court expressly held that the FDCPA 

“applies to the litigating activities of [debt-collector] lawyers.” 514 U.S. 291, 294, 

115 S. Ct. 1489, 1490 (1995). In Heintz, a bank’s law firm brought a collections 

action against a consumer, Darlene Jenkins, to recover on an automobile loan. Id.

at 293, 115 S. Ct. at 1490. A lawyer for the bank, George Heintz, sent Jenkins’s 

lawyer a letter in an attempt to settle the suit. Id. Jenkins claimed the letter 

included a false statement of the amount she owed to the bank. Id. She sued 

Heintz and his law firm under the FDCPA. Id. The district court dismissed 

Jenkins’s action for failure to state a claim on the grounds that the FDCPA did not 

apply to “lawyers engaging in litigation.” Id. at 294, 115 S. Ct. at 1490. The 

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Seventh Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “[t]he Act 

does apply to lawyers engaged in litigation.” Id. 

The Supreme Court’s holding aligned with the FDCPA’s definition of “debt 

collector.” See id. at 294, 115 S. Ct. at 1490–91 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). “In 

ordinary English,” the Court reasoned, “a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain 

payment of consumer debts through legal proceedings is a lawyer who regularly 

‘attempts’ to ‘collect’ those consumer debts.” See id. at 294, 115 S. Ct. at 1491

(citing Black’s Law Dictionary 263 (6th ed. 1990) (“To collect a debt or claim is to 

obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by personal solicitation or legal 

proceedings.”)). A prior version of the FDCPA “contained an express exemption 

for lawyers,” which stated that “the term ‘debt collector’ did not include ‘any 

attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a 

client.’” Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874, 875 (1977)). 

However, Congress later “repealed this exemption in its entirety, without creating a 

narrower, litigation-related, exemption to fill the void”—a choice the Court found 

significant. Id. at 294–95, 115 S. Ct. at 1491 (citation omitted). Taking stock of 

Congress’s action, the Court theorized that Congress must have “intended that 

lawyers be subject to the Act whenever they meet the general ‘debt collector’ 

definition.” Id. at 295, 115 S. Ct. at 1491. 

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Heintz asked the Court to imply an “exemption for those debt-collecting 

activities of lawyers that consist of litigating,” but the Court would not oblige. Id. 

For one thing, the Court did not view its holding as limiting an attorney’s ability to 

advance the interests of his client. See id. at 296–98, 115 S. Ct. at 1491–92; see 

also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 600, 

130 S. Ct. 1605, 1622 (2010) (“An attorney’s ethical duty to advance the interests 

of his client is limited by an equally solemn duty to comply with the law and 

standards of professional conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It pointed 

to a number of exceptions in the text of the FDCPA “authoriz[ing] the actual 

invocation of the remedy that the collector ‘intends to invoke’” in accord with the 

Act’s “apparent objective of preserving creditors’ judicial remedies.” Heintz, 514 

U.S. at 296, 115 S. Ct. at 1492. For another thing, the Court found “nothing either 

in the Act or elsewhere indicating that Congress intended . . . to create [such an] 

exception from the Act’s coverage—an exception that . . . falls outside the range of 

reasonable interpretations of the Act’s express language.” Id. at 298, 115 S. Ct. at 

1492–93. Under Heintz, then, the FDCPA unquestionably applies to the litigating 

activities of lawyers who regularly engage in debt collection—and to Appellees’ 

conduct before the state court. See id. at 299, 115 S. Ct. at 1493. 

A post-Heintz amendment to the FDCPA further confirms that the Act

applies here. See Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 231 (4th Cir. 

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2007). After Heintz was handed down, Congress amended 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) 

of the Act, which prohibits initial written communications to the consumer that fail

to disclose that they are from a debt collector, to exclude formal pleadings “made 

in connection with a legal action” from the requirements of that subsection. § 

1692e(11); see Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 231. In so doing, Congress expressly exempted 

formal pleadings—and formal pleadings alone—from a “sole, particularized 

requirement of the FDCPA.” Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 231. After Congress’s 

amendment, debt-collector attorneys who file a complaint or respond to a 

complaint need not state that such pleadings are filed by a debt collector.5

 See § 

1692e(11). Congress did not otherwise constrain the Act’s general applicability to 

lawyers using litigation to collect debts.

We presume that, in amending a statute, Congress has knowledge of prior 

judicial interpretation of the statute. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81, 

98 S. Ct. 866, 870 (1978). That Congress exempted formal pleadings from a single

requirement of the FDCPA after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Heintz 

suggests that Congress was aware of the Court having interpreted the Act to apply

to the litigating activities of debt-collector attorneys “and accepted it,” except to 

the extent that it exempted formal pleadings from § 1692e(11)’s requirements. See 

 5 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1339 (10th ed. 2014) (defining a “pleading” as “[a] formal 

document in which a party to a legal proceeding (esp. a civil lawsuit) sets forth or responds to 

allegations, claims, denials, or defenses,” such as “the plaintiff’s complaint and the defendant’s 

answer”).

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Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 231 (emphasis added). If Congress had intended to exempt all 

litigating activities or any one litigating activity from the Act’s other provisions, “it 

presumably would have done so expressly,” as it did in § 1692e(11). Russello v. 

United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983). Instead, Congress has 

effectively instructed that all litigating activities of debt-collecting attorneys are 

subject to the FDCPA, except to the limited extent formal pleadings are exempt 

under § 1692e(11).6

 See Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 231.

Here, an implied exemption from the FDCPA’s coverage for Appellees’

sworn reply would “fall[] outside the range of reasonable interpretations of the 

Act’s express language.” See Heintz, 514 U.S. at 298, 115 S. Ct. at 1492–93; see 

also Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Courts 

have no authority to alter statutory language.”). Both the clear language chosen by 

Congress and the Supreme Court’s explicit pronouncement in Heintz compel the 

conclusion that the FDCPA applies to all litigating activities of debt-collecting

attorneys, subject only to § 1692e(11)’s express exemption. See Andrus v. Glover 

Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17, 100 S. Ct. 1905, 1910 (1980) (“Where 

Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, 

 6 We need not determine whether the sworn reply filed by Appellees is, in fact, a 

“procedural filing” or whether a “procedural filing” would or could never qualify as a “formal 

pleading” under § 1692e(11) because the instant appeal does not implicate the particular 

requirements of that subsection. For our purposes, § 1692e(11) simply demonstrates that 

Congress can craft explicit exemptions from the FDCPA’s proscriptions for the litigating

activities of debt-collecting attorneys where it sees fit to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Mount 

Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., Inc., 486 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2007).

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additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a 

contrary legislative intent.”); CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 

1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Those who ask courts to give effect to perceived 

legislative intent by interpreting statutory language contrary to its plain and 

unambiguous meaning are in effect asking courts to alter that language . . . .”). The 

Act thus encompasses actions undertaken by Appellees, both in and out of state 

court, in collecting on Appellant’s debt.

2.

Appellees try to extricate the sworn reply from the FDCPA’s proscriptions 

by arguing that the sworn reply was directed to Appellant’s attorney, not to 

Appellant, and communications directed to a consumer’s attorney, rather than to 

the consumer, are not actionable under the Act.

7

 They reason that the FDCPA 

should not apply to a debt collector’s conduct when an attorney is interposed

between the consumer and the debt collector because, in those instances, the 

 7 Appellees also argue, for the first time on appeal, that the sworn reply does not qualify 

as a “communication” under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (defining the term

“communication”). We need not exercise our discretion to consider this issue because it is 

unconnected to our ultimate determination. See Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. CompuCredit

Holdings Corp., 677 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012) (providing this court has discretion to 

consider issues not presented below). First, Appellant did not allege below and does not allege 

on appeal that the sworn reply constitutes a “communication” under the FDCPA; Appellant’s 

claims are based on Appellees’ “conduct.” Second, communications in connection with debt 

collection are governed by § 1692c, a provision that is not at issue here. Third, the provisions 

that are at issue, §§1692d–1692f, regulate more than a debt collector’s communications; they 

prohibit specified conduct, representations, and means of collection. While these sections

necessarily encompass communications, a violation thereof may be premised on conduct not 

falling within the statutory definition of “communication.” See §§ 1692a(2), 1692d–1692f. 

Appellees’ red herring is a rough fish.

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attorney, rather than the FDCPA, will protect the consumer from the debt 

collector’s conduct. It should be clear from the statutory text and from Heintz that 

Appellees’ argument is ill-fated. Still, given the varied holdings of our Sister 

Circuits on this issue, we think it necessary to address Appellees’ argument. In so 

doing, we find it impossible to conclude, under the plain language of the FDCPA, 

that a debt collector’s communications to an attorney representing a consumer are 

not covered by the Act.

Our inquiry begins with the specific provisions invoked by Appellant. The 

first is § 1692d, which expressly provides that “debt collector[s] may not engage in 

any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any 

person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (emphasis 

added). Given the phrase “any person,” § 1692d’s universal application could not 

be clearer. See Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (emphasizing § 1692d’s reference to “any person”). On its face, § 

1692d is not a protection for consumers alone; it ostensibly protects any person

from being harassed, oppressed, or abused by a debt collector in connection with 

the collection of a debt. In the absence of any language to the contrary, a 

consumer’s attorney is undoubtedly “any person.” Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c, (d)

(restricting application of section to consumers and “the consumer’s spouse, parent 

(if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator”).

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The same holds true for § 1692e. Section 1692e broadly prohibits “any

false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the 

collection of any debt.” Id. § 1692e (emphasis added). A particular class of 

persons to whom such representations or means cannot be directed is not specified; 

rather, in listing examples of conduct that would violate § 1692e, Congress 

explicitly provided examples of conduct directed to consumers and other persons 

alike. A debt collector may violate § 1692e by threatening “to take any action that 

cannot legally be taken,” using “any false representation or deceptive means . . . to 

obtain information concerning a consumer,” or by failing to disclose in an initial 

written communication “with the consumer” that the communication is from a debt 

collector. See id. § 1692e(5), (10), (11). As such, § 1692e is naturally read to bar

“any” prohibited representation, regardless of to whom it is directed, so long as it 

is made “in connection with the collection of any debt.” See id. § 1692e. 

Like § 1692e, the third section at issue, § 1692f, does not expressly state that 

it protects “any person.” Section 1692f generally prohibits a debt collector from 

using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 

Id. § 1692f. Still, the provision’s broad language coupled with its illustrative 

examples of violative conduct support the conclusion that § 1692f applies whether

the unfair and unconscionable means are employed against consumers or nonconsumers. Section 1692f(5), for example, bars debt collectors from “[c]ausing 

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charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true 

purpose of the communication.” Id. § 1692f(5) (emphasis added). In this scenario, 

it is the person who accepts the charges as a result of the debt collector’s 

concealment who is also afforded protection under § 1692f, and nothing in the 

language of the statute suggests that that person need be the consumer. Cf. id. § 

1692c.

In sum, not one of the three sections at issue here “designate[s] any class of 

persons, such as lawyers, who can be abused, misled, etc., by debt collectors with 

impunity.” See Evory, 505 F.3d at 773. The FDCPA’s statutory text does not 

provide nor does it imply immunity for debt collection practices otherwise 

forbidden by the Act simply because those debt collection practices are directed at

a consumer’s attorney or any other non-consumer. Appellees’ contention that 

attorneys representing consumers are excluded from the class of persons to whom 

a debt collector may not direct conduct prohibited under §§ 1692d–1692f finds no 

support in the plain language of the Act. 

To the contrary, § 1692c specifically provides that, where a debt collector 

knows that a consumer is represented by an attorney, he or she shall direct all 

communications to the consumer’s attorney, absent permission to communicate 

directly with the consumer. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). Section 1692c, as a 

whole, regulates debt collectors’ communications with consumers. See id. § 

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1692c; see also id. § 1692b(2). In contrast to other provisions, § 1692c explicitly 

refers to the “consumer” and clearly and necessarily distinguishes “consumers” 

from “attorneys” and other third parties. It is thus understood to protect only

consumers and those individuals enumerated in §1692c(d). See Wright v. Fin. 

Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 649 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting 

that § 1692c is the only provision limited to “consumers,” while “a debt collection 

practice need not offend the alleged debtor before there is a violation of [§ 

1692e]”). Section 1692c’s singular focus does not, however, evidence a 

congressional intent to afford attorneys and their consumer-clients disparate 

protection under other sections of the Act. See, e.g., Russello, 464 U.S. at 23, 104 

S. Ct. at 300 (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a 

statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Indeed, the FDCPA’s liability provision is in no way limited to conduct and 

communications directed only to consumers. Pursuant to § 1692k(a), “any debt 

collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to 

any person is liable to such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (emphasis added). The 

phrase “with respect to any person” is expansive and is properly understood to

encompass all persons. See CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1223 (“[I]n the absence of any 

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20

language limiting the breadth of [the] word [‘any’], it must be read as referring to 

all of the subject that it is describing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It 

follows that if “any person” is entitled to redress under the FDCPA, then all 

persons must be entitled to protection under it—be it the consumer under § 1692c, 

see Wright, 22 F.3d at 649 n.1, or any person who is mistreated in the connection 

with the collection of any debt under §§ 1692d–1692f. See United States v. DBB, 

Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e read the statute to give full 

effect to each of its provisions. . . . [and] look to the entire statutory context.”). By 

painting § 1692k with broad strokes, Congress ensured that debt collectors could 

be held liable to consumers and non-consumers alike for violations of the Act’s

conduct-regulating provisions. We refuse to read §1692k to be narrower than the 

plain meaning of the phrase “any person” implies. See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 

443 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (outlining rules of statutory 

construction).

Finally, if the statutory text left any room for doubt on the consumerattorney-communication issue, appellate precedent resolves it. Our lodestar, 

Heintz, involved a communication from a debt-collector attorney to a consumer’s 

attorney. Jenkins’s FDCPA claims in Heintz were based on a letter from Heintz, 

the debt collector, to Jenkins’s attorney. See 514 U.S. at 293, 115 S. Ct. at 1490. 

On these facts, the Supreme Court held that the Act applies to lawyers “who 

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21

‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that activity 

consists of litigation.” Id. at 299, 115 S. Ct. at 1493. In so doing, the Court 

assumed, without deciding, that a false representation sent to a debtor’s attorney by 

a debt collector violates the Act. See id. at 298–99, 115 S. Ct. at 1492–93. In 

accord with Heintz, a number of courts of appeals have since read §§ 1692d–1692f, 

or a combination thereof, as applying to a debt collector’s communications with 

persons other than the consumer, see, e.g., Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, 

P.A., 674 F.3d 814, 818–19 (8th Cir. 2012); Todd v. Collecto, Inc., 731 F.3d 734, 

737–39 (7th Cir. 2013); Evory, 505 F.3d at 773; see also Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 232–

34, and we join with those courts today.

The language of the FDCPA is plain and clear. Debt collectors are 

categorically prohibited from making false or misleading representations and from 

engaging in abusive and unfair practices in connection with the collection of any 

debt. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d–1692f. A proper reading of the statutory text 

dictates that a debt collector’s communications with a consumer’s attorney, 

including those communications required by § 1692c, are subject to §§ 1692d–

1692f of the Act to the same extent as a debt collector’s communications with the 

consumer himself.

8

 See, e.g., id. § 1692k(a). It would create an odd situation,

 8 Appellees also suggest that the sworn reply is not actionable under the FDCPA because 

it was “directed to the state court.” This contention fails for the same reasons Appellees’ 

argument regarding attorney-to-attorney communications fails: (1) the Act’s prohibitions are not 

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indeed, if the fact that a consumer was represented by an attorney somehow 

excused the debt collector from otherwise observing the FDCPA’s requirements. 

Therefore, in the absence of statutory language to the contrary, we decline 

Appellees’ invitation to exempt conduct or communications directed to a 

consumer’s attorney from the Act’s coverage.

3.

Upon a brief examination of the Act’s declared purpose, we are fortified in 

our conclusions. The FDCPA was passed in response to “abundant evidence of . . .

abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors”; 

then-existing laws and procedures for redressing injuries caused by such practices

had proven inadequate to protect consumers. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)–(b). Its 

purpose is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to 

insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection 

practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State 

 

limited to representations made directly to or conduct directed solely at consumers, see §§ 

1692d–1692f, and (2) documents submitted to a court in the course of judicial proceedings to 

collect on a debt fall within the ambit of “litigating activities,” see Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294, 115 

S. Ct. at 1490. Also, because debts are often collected through the judicial process, see id. at 

294, 115 S. Ct. at 1491 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 263 (6th ed. 1990) (“To collect a debt or 

claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by personal solicitation or legal 

proceedings.”)); O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938, 949 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(Tinder, J., concurring in the result) (citing § 1692a(2)) (noting that courts are a medium through 

which debt collection information is conveyed to consumers), we think it would “compel absurd 

results” indeed if abusive, misleading, or unconscionable documents submitted to a court (and

served on the consumer or his counsel) in an attempt to collect on any debt were excluded from 

the Act’s proscriptions, see Jerman, 559 U.S. at 600, 130 S. Ct. at 1622. Appellees cannot avoid 

the FDCPA by arguing that the sworn reply was primarily directed to the state court.

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action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” Id. § 1692(e). 

Congress found that non-abusive means “[were] available for the effective 

collection of debts.” Id. § 1692(c).

“[T]he import of the words Congress has used is clear.” Harris v. Garner, 

216 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Act’s natural point of aim is the

debt-collecting activities of debt collectors, and the inbuilt consequence of its 

regulation of debt collectors is the protection of both consumers and other persons 

who find themselves on the receiving end of prohibited debt-collecting activities. 

See, e.g., §§ 1692(b), 1692(e), 1692a(2), 1692d–1692f, 1692k(a). Interpreting the 

FDCPA to permit otherwise prohibited conduct merely because it is directed at a 

consumer’s attorney or takes the form of a procedural filing would not only subvert 

the plain text of the Act, it would also frustrate the Act’s stated objectives. See, 

e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542, 60 S. Ct. 1059, 1063 

(1940) (“In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is . . . . to 

construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.”); Isbrandtsen 

Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783, 72 S. Ct. 1011, 1014–15 (1952) (“[A statute]

should be interpreted so as to effect its purpose.”).

In the context of communications to a consumer’s attorney, for example, 

Appellees’ reading of the FDCPA protects a consumer from otherwise prohibited 

debt collection efforts “only so long as she does not retain an attorney.” Guerrero

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v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 945 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (Fletcher, 

J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Once the consumer retains an attorney, 

though, the debt collector is free to convey false or misleading information to the 

consumer’s attorney without fear of consequences. See, e.g., § 1692e. In other 

words, in seeking the advice of an attorney, the consumer opens himself up to the 

very abuses the Act is meant to redress, see Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 945 (Fletcher, J., 

concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also § 1692(a) (listing effect of abusive 

debt collection practices), because the consumer, rather than the debt collector, will 

be forced to bear the costs resulting from the debt collector’s conduct, cf. §

1692k(a) (holding debt collectors civilly liable for illicit debt collection practices). 

Such a result would destroy, not achieve, the spirit and force of the FDCPA. See 

DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1283.

4.

Guided by Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of the FDCPA, 

we find that the Act applies to the litigating activities of lawyers and law firms 

engaged in consumer debt collection, subject only to the limited exceptions 

Congress has chosen to include in the statute. See Harris, 216 F.3d at 976 (“We 

will not do to the statutory language what Congress did not do with it . . . .”). The 

statutory text also leads us to conclude that the Act prohibits debt collectors from 

engaging in proscribed conduct with respect to any person in connection with the 

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collection of any debt, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d–1692f, 1692k, except where 

Congress has expressly limited applicability of the Act to a particular person or 

group of persons, see, e.g., id. §§ 1692b, 1692c. 

To the extent our reading of the FDCPA “imposes some constraints on a 

lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of [his] client, it is hardly unique in our law,” and we 

do not think it absurd to require a debt-collecting attorney advancing the interests 

of his client to fulfill his “equally solemn duty to comply with the law.” Jerman, 

559 U.S. at 600, 130 S. Ct. at 1622. The FDCPA is nothing short of a

straightforward statutory directive to hold debt collectors accountable for abusive, 

deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. Had Congress intended to restrict 

application of the FDCPA to conduct directed only to the consumer or to exempt 

certain procedural filings from its provisos, it presumably would have done so 

expressly, see, e.g., §§ 1692c(d), 1692e(11), but it did not draft the statute that

way. Therefore, because Appellees filed the sworn reply in connection with the 

collection of Appellant’s debt, Appellees’ conduct is actionable under the FDCPA.

B.

Having determined that the FDCPA does apply to Appellees’ conduct here, 

we must examine whether Appellant pled facts sufficient to allow this court “to

draw the reasonable inference that [Appellees are] liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. In a single cause of action, 

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Appellant alleges that Appellees violated each of § 1692d, § 1692e, and § 1692f by

filing the sworn reply, notwithstanding Appellant’s assertions that his wages were 

exempt, and in not releasing the writ of garnishment sooner. However, on this 

issue, we agree with the district court and find that Appellant’s complaint fails to 

sufficiently allege that Appellees engaged in conduct prohibited by the FDCPA.

1. § 1692d

Section 1692d does not, as a matter of law, proscribe Appellees’ conduct in 

this case. Under § 1692d, a debt collector “may not engage in any conduct the 

natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in 

connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Banned conduct 

includes the “use of violence,” the “use of obscene or profane language,” and 

repeated phone calls intended to annoy or harass “any person at the called 

number.” See, e.g., id. § 1692d(1)–(6) (listing types of prohibited conduct). We 

view claims under § 1692d “from the perspective of a consumer whose 

circumstances make[] him relatively more susceptible to harassment, oppression, 

or abuse.” See Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1179 (11th Cir. 1985). 

Here, Appellant alleges that Appellees violated § 1692d by filing the sworn reply 

despite Appellant’s affidavit stating his wages were exempt from garnishment.

We considered the scope of § 1692d in Jeter. In that case, Credit Bureau, 

Inc. (Credit Bureau) notified the consumer, Diane Jeter, that she was “indebted to”

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Credit Bureau’s client. Id. at 1171. The letter provided that, “unless satisfactory 

arrangements [we]re made” within a five-day period, Credit Bureau would 

recommend that its client bring an action against Jeter to collect the debt. Id. We 

acknowledged that, while a threatened “lawsuit might cause a consumer 

embarrassment, inconvenience, and further expense . . . . [s]uch consequences of a 

debt collection (or any other) lawsuit are so commonplace that even a consumer 

susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse would not have been harassed, 

oppressed, or abused by the statement in and of itself.” Id. at 1179 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We noted that, while Credit Bureau’s written statements

may have fallen within § 1692e as “potentially deceptive or false . . . threats to 

recommend legal action,” id. (citing § 1692e(5), (10)), “[d]eception or falsehood 

alone . . . is wholly different from the conduct condemned in [§ 1692d],” id. As 

such, we found that Credit Bureau’s conduct was outside the scope of § 1692d—

and we reach the same conclusion here. 

If the filing of a lawsuit does not have the natural consequence of harassing, 

abusing, or oppressing a debtor, surely a simple oppositional statement does not

“represent[] the type of coercion and delving into the personal lives of debtors that 

the FDCPA in general, and § 1692d in particular, was designed to address.” Id. at 

1180 n.12; see Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 

2006) (“[T]he filing of a debt-collection lawsuit without the immediate means of 

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proving the debt does not have the natural consequence of harassing, abusing, or 

oppressing a debtor.”). It is not enough that the sworn reply caused Appellant 

unwanted “embarrassment, inconvenience, and further expense,” Jeter, 760 F.2d at 

1179 (internal quotation marks omitted); indeed, as the Sixth Circuit has noted, 

“[a]ny attempt to collect a defaulted debt will be unwanted by a debtor,” see 

Harvey, 453 F.3d at 330. Rather, the debt collector’s conduct must manifest “a 

tone of intimidation,” Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted), 

and no such tone emanates from Appellees’ sworn reply here. 

Even viewed from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the 

filing of the sworn reply does not have the natural consequence of harassing, 

abusing, or oppressing Appellant. See Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1179; see also Chalik v. 

Westport Recovery Corp., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (finding 

sworn statement denying exemption filed without specific knowledge regarding 

exemption was not the type of conduct covered by § 1692d); Watkins v. Peterson 

Enters., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108–09 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that serving 

writs of garnishment that overstated debt was not an abusive practice because the 

types of behavior described in § 1692d “are a far cry from that at issue”). In 

employing the court system in the way alleged by Appellant here—namely, filing 

an oppositional statement—Appellees did not engage in “conduct the natural 

consequence of which [was] to harass, oppress, or abuse” within the meaning of § 

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1692d. See, e.g., § 1692d(1)–(6). Therefore, the district court did not err in 

dismissing Appellant’s claim under § 1692d.

9

2. § 1692e

Appellant has also failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim under § 

1692e(10) or, more generally, § 1692e. Section 1692e generally prohibits 

deceptive practices in debt collection. Examples of proscribed conduct include 

implying that the consumer committed any crime, falsely representing the amount 

of the debt, and threatening to take legal action that is not intended to be taken. 

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1)–(16). Appellant contends that the sworn reply qualifies 

as a “false representation or deceptive means” of collecting a debt under subsection 

(10) because Appellees were without a factual basis for opposing his claim of

exemption. In determining whether Appellees’ conduct was deceptive under § 

1692e and/or § 1692e(10), we must consider whether the “least sophisticated 

consumer” would be deceived by the sworn reply.

10 See Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1177. 

 9 See Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1179 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-832, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698) (“Ordinarily, whether conduct harasses, oppresses, or abuses will be a 

question for the jury. Nevertheless, Congress has indicated its desire for the courts to structure 

the confines of § 1692d.”). 

10 While we have determined that the FDCPA applies to debt-collection activities

directed to a consumer’s attorney, the standard by which such claims should be evaluated is a 

different question. Appellees reasonably suggest that the “least sophisticated consumer” 

standard is inappropriate for evaluating the tendency of conduct or language to deceive or 

mislead a consumer’s attorney. The Seventh Circuit, among others, has adopted a “competent 

lawyer” standard to determine whether a communication or representation to a consumer’s 

attorney would deceive or mislead that attorney under § 1692e. See Evory, 505 F.3d at 774–75; 

see also Powers v. Credit Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 776 F.3d 567, 574 (8th Cir. 2015). We do not 

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The sworn reply is not misleading or deceptive in the traditional sense. It 

does not misrepresent the nature or effect of the writ of garnishment. See Fuller v. 

Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., 192 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1369–70 (M.D. Fla. 2002). It 

does not erroneously state the amount of the debt owed by Appellant. See Kojetin 

v. C U Recovery, Inc., 212 F.3d 1318, 1318 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). It does 

not incorrectly identify the holder of the alleged debt. See Wallace v. Wash. Mut. 

Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323, 327–28 (6th Cir. 2012). It does not contain “false or 

deliberately ambiguous threats” of future litigation. See Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1177–

78 & n.11; see also Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 567, 571–72 (3d Cir. 

1989). Instead, the sworn reply simply states Appellees’ legal position relative to 

Appellant’s claim of exemption.

Still, Appellant maintains that Appellees’ legal position was baseless

because Appellees received Appellant’s affidavit in support of his claim of 

exemption prior to filing the sworn reply. Appellees, however, were under no 

obligation to take Appellant’s affidavit as the truest representation of his financial 

situation. Indeed, Appellant’s affidavit failed to provide the amount of his wife’s 

Social Security benefits. Appellees needed to ascertain the amount of Appellant’s 

wife’s Social Security benefits in order to determine whether Appellant provided 

 

adopt or reject such a standard here because, if Appellant cannot make the minimal showing 

under Jeter, he is necessarily unable to demonstrate that individuals held to a higher standard of 

competence, be it an attorney or a state court judge, could be misled or deceived by the sworn 

reply.

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more than one-half of her support. See Fla. Stat. § 222.11. Appellees sought that

information through discovery, and, in order to avoid dissolution of the writ of 

garnishment before such discovery took place, Appellees had to file the sworn 

reply. See id. § 77.041(3) (“If the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney does not file a 

sworn written statement that answers the defendant’s claim of exemption . . . no 

hearing is required and the clerk must automatically dissolve the writ and notify 

the parties of the dissolution by mail.”). In short, at the time the sworn reply was

filed, the facts underlying Appellant’s right to an exemption were in dispute. 

Appellant does not allege how he—or anyone else—was “misled, deceived, 

or otherwise duped” by the submission of a sworn statement that disputed his 

contention that he was a “head of family” under Florida law. See Hemmingsen, 

674 F.3d at 819 (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellees were fully within 

their rights to assert their position with regard to Appellant’s claim of exemption

and to request more information or details about Appellant’s right to an exemption. 

It is not enough to allege that Appellant believed that he was entitled to the “head 

of family” exemption and that Appellees inconveniently and disappointingly 

disagreed. It would be passing odd to find that allegations that a state court filing 

asserted a legal position contrary to that of the consumer were sufficient to state a 

claim under § 1692e. See Jerman, 559 U.S. at 599–600, 130 S. Ct. at 1621–22 

(noting “the Act’s conduct-regulating provisions . . . should not be assumed to 

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compel absurd results when applied to debt collecting attorneys”). Without more, 

we will not limit a debt-collector attorney’s ability to engage in conduct inherent to 

the adversarial process—and expected in a garnishment action in Florida state 

court. See Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 

2008) (per curiam) (“[T]he complaint’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”). 

Appellees’ subsequent dissolution of the writ of garnishment does not affect 

our analysis. An “apparent objective” of the FDCPA is the preservation of 

creditors’ judicial remedies. See Heintz, 514 U.S. at 296, 115 S. Ct. at 1492. If 

judicial proceedings are to accurately resolve disputes, including debt collection 

disputes, debt-collector attorneys must be permitted to present legal arguments in 

their clients’ favor and to invoke the remedies available to them, including wage 

garnishment. See id. (citing § 1692c(2)–(3)) (“[The Act allows] the actual 

invocation of the remedy that the collector ‘intends to invoke.’”). The fact that 

Appellees’ attempt to collect on Appellant’s debt by garnishing his wages 

“turn[ed] out ultimately to be unsuccessful” does not make the filing of the sworn 

reply “an action that cannot legally be taken.” See id. at 296, 115 S. Ct. at 1491

(internal quotation marks omitted).

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Because Appellant’s allegations as stated in his complaint are insufficient to 

establish deceptive means of collecting a debt under § 1692e or § 1692e(10), 

Appellant fails to state a cause of action, and his claim was properly dismissed.

11

3. § 1692f

Finally, § 1692f’s catch-all prohibition on unfair and unconscionable 

conduct does not net Appellant’s complaint. See Todd, 731 F.3d at 739 (labeling § 

1692f a “catch-all prohibition”). Section 1692f generally prohibits the use of 

“unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1692f. Whether conduct qualifies as unfair or unconscionable is assessed 

objectively from the point of view of the “least sophisticated consumer.”12 

LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1200–01 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Act does not supply definitions for “unfair” or “unconscionable,” so we 

turn to the common usage of the words to determine their meaning. See Consol.

Bank, N.A. v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 118 F.3d 1461, 1464 (11th Cir. 

1997). “Unfair” is defined as “marked by injustice, partiality, or deception.” 

 11 Generally, “whether the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ would construe [the conduct] as 

deceptive is a question for the jury.” Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1178. However, whether Appellant 

alleged facts sufficient to state a claim under § 1692e(10) is a legal question for the court. See 

Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Facial challenges to 

the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense . . . . always present[] a purely legal question . . . .”).

12 As suggested above, whether an attorney would find Appellees’ conduct unfair or 

unconscionable is a question different from whether the least sophisticated consumer would find 

Appellees’ conduct unfair or unconscionable. See supra note 10. However, given the 

circumstances of this case, we need not traverse that quagmire today. 

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Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1290 (10th ed. 1996); see also LeBlanc,

601 F.3d at 1200 (“[I]n Jeter, we noted in dictum that in the FTC context, ‘an act 

or practice is deceptive or unfair if it has the tendency or capacity to deceive.’”). A 

step beyond unfair, “unconscionable” is defined as “shockingly unfair or unjust.” 

Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1286; see Black’s Law Dictionary 1757 

(10th ed. 2014) (“having no conscience; unscrupulous . . . showing no regard for 

conscience; affronting the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness”). As 

defined, neither of these terms describes Appellees’ conduct here.

We first note that Appellant fails to allege any conduct beyond that which he

asserts violates the other provisions of the FDCPA, and, in doing so, Appellant

fails to specifically identify how Appellees’ conduct here was either unfair or 

unconscionable in addition to being abusive, deceptive, or misleading.13 See 

LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1200 & n.31 (finding consumer’s § 1692f claim dependent in 

part on consumer’s success under § 1692e(5) because “it’s doubtful” conduct not 

found to violate § 1692e(5) could be perceived as unfair and unconscionable). A 

catch-all is not a free-for-all. In order to proceed under § 1692f, Appellant is still 

required to allege facts showing that the least sophisticated consumer would or 

 13 Appellant’s allegation that Appellees filed the sworn reply in a bad faith attempt to 

leverage a settlement of the subject debt is a legal conclusion, which we are not required to treat 

as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

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could view Appellee’s sworn reply as partial and unjust or as unscrupulous and 

unethical. See id. at 1200. Appellant makes no such allegations. 

Looking to the conduct that is alleged, we fail to see how the sworn 

statement, which was filed after Appellees had obtained a writ of garnishment and

for purposes of persuading the state court to hold an evidentiary hearing on 

Appellant’s exemption claim, was either deceitful or an affront to justice. See

Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 F.3d 470, 472–75 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (holding law firm did not violate § 1692f when efforts to collect on debt 

judgment resulted in three-week freeze of consumer’s checking account); Todd, 

731 F.3d at 739–40 (finding plaintiff failed to state claim under § 1692f where debt 

collector made no request for payment and no express or implied threat of 

repercussion to plaintiff or his consumer-mother); McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls 

Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 756, 763–65 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding least sophisticated 

consumer could find letter with heading “YOU ARE EITHER HONEST OR 

DISHONEST YOU CANNOT BE BOTH” unfair under § 1692f); see also Fox v. 

Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding pursuit of 

writ of garnishment where debtor was current on credit card payments could be 

found to violate § 1692f). Appellees’ conduct, as alleged, is a “far cry” from the 

types of behavior proscribed by § 1692f. See Watkins, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1109; see 

also 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1)–(8). 

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The crux of Appellant’s § 1692f claim is Appellees’ assertion in the sworn 

reply of a legal position contrary to that of Appellant. Unfortunately, disagreement 

is the nature of litigation; Appellees’ conduct before the state court does not, 

without more, rise to the level of unfair or unconscionable under § 1692f. As such, 

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s § 1692f claim as well.

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, we disagree with the district court’s finding 

that the FDCPA does not apply to Appellees’ conduct before the state court. 

Because the plain text of the Act makes no exception for “formulaic procedural 

filings” and does not limit applicability of §§ 1692d–1692f to conduct directed at

the consumer, Appellees’ state-court activities fall squarely within the four corners 

of the FDCPA and were actionable thereunder. However, we ultimately affirm the 

district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint based on Appellant’s failure to 

state a claim under the FDCPA.

AFFIRMED.

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