Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01562/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01562-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SHERRYL L. MADISON, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

FIRST MAGNUS FINANCIAL

CORPORATION, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-1562-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Application for Preliminary Injunction of Plaintiff

Sherryl L. Madison. (Dkt. # 176.) Despite styling her motion as an Application for

Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff ultimately requests that the Court issue a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) and an order to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction

should not issue. (Dkt. # 176 at 6.)

 Plaintiff is an Arizona resident who allegedly owns real property in Arizona at the

following addresses: (1) 24220 N. 53rd Avenue, Glendale, Arizona 85310; (2) 522 E.

Glendale Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85020; (3) 2302 E. Lincoln Drive, Phoenix, Arizona

85016; (4) 16083 West Morning Glory Street, Goodyear, Arizona 85338; (5) 18607 N. 45th

Drive, Glendale, Arizona 85308; and (6) 7384 W. Utopia Road, Glendale, Arizona 85308.

In her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiff alleges that, at various times between

April 2005 and June 2007, she either refinanced or purchased each of her six properties. The

Case 2:08-cv-01562-GMS Document 186 Filed 06/11/09 Page 1 of 4
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In Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held that “the Ninth

Circuit’s ‘possibility’ standard is too lenient.” 129 S. Ct. 365, 375 (2008). The Court stated

that the “standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable

injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Id. (citations omitted).

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financing was obtained from various financial institutions and was obtained pursuant to

promissory notes secured by deeds of trust on each property. In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges

that a non-judicial trustee sale has already been conducted on her property at 18607 N. 45th

Drive (Dkt. # 181 ¶¶ 18-19), and her other properties are in the process of being subject to

trustee sales (id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 22, 26, 29). Other than the allegations that her remaining

properties are at risk, Plaintiff provides no indication or evidence that trustee sales have been

scheduled or are otherwise imminent. 

Plaintiff now requests that this Court “enjoin the Defendants from effectuating

unlawful foreclosures to transfer title of Plaintiff’s properties.” (Dkt. # 176 at 1.) In support

of her Application, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint in which she asserts twenty-two causes

of action against all twenty-four named defendants and one claim of fraud against Defendants

Warrick, Garcia, and Smart. Plaintiff has also filed certifications that she has mailed copies

of the SAC and Application to the various defendants, many of whom have yet to be

properly served. (Dkt. # 176 at 8-10.) 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 authorizes the Court to issue a preliminary

injunction or TRO upon a proper showing. The standard for issuing a TRO is the same as

that for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. The Mind’s Eye

Interiors, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Haw. 2007). To prevail on a request for a

preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show either “(a) probable success on the merits

combined with the possibility1

 of irreparable injury or (b) that [it] has raised serious questions

going to the merits, and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in [its] favor.” Bernhardt

v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has explained

that “these two alternatives represent ‘extremes of a single continuum,’ rather than two

separate tests. Thus, the greater the relative hardship to the moving party, the less probability

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of success must be shown.” Immigrant Assistant Project of Los Angeles County Fed’n of

Labor (AFL-CIO) v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 873 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

In her Application, Plaintiff contends that “likelihood of success . . . is a matter of

opinion and should be given minimal weight in the . . . test for injunctive relief.” (Dkt. # 176

at 5.) However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “a party seeking a preliminary

injunction must demonstrate . . . a likelihood of success on the merits.” Munaf v. Geren, 128

S. Ct. 2207, 2219 (2008) (emphasis added). Therefore, temporary injunctive relief will not

be granted “unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion” on this

point. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). After careful review of Plaintiff’s

SAC, it is apparent that Plaintiff has failed to cure many of the deficiencies that existed in

her First Amended Complaint. With the exception of claim twenty-three, Plaintiff again

asserts collective allegations of misconduct against all named defendants despite the fact that

the majority of the defendants were only involved with one of Plaintiff’s six properties and

despite the fact that many of the defendants were not involved during the times in which

Plaintiff either refinanced or purchased her properties. Given the deficiencies in the SAC,

and given the fact that Plaintiff fails to advance any argument in her Application regarding

her likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiff has not carried her burden sufficient to

warrant preliminary injunctive relief. 

In addition to the requisite showing, a preliminary injunction may issue “only on

notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). A TRO may be granted without notice

to the adverse party:

only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by

affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant

before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in

opposition, and (2) the applicant’s attorney certifies to the court

in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the

notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should

not be required. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 

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Here, despite claiming to have sent copies of the Application to Defendants by U.S.

mail, Plaintiff presents no evidence suggesting that she has noticed all Defendants of her

request for a TRO and preliminary injunction. Likewise, in the context of a TRO without

notice, Plaintiff has not certified in writing the efforts made to notice Defendants or provided

any reasons why notice should not be required. Nor has Plaintiff presented any specific facts

showing that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant

before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in opposition. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that injunctive relief is proper,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Restraining Order

(Dkt. # 176) is DENIED.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2009.

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