Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01849/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01849-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAVIER RYAN GARCIA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MENDOCINO COUNTY SHERRIF'S 

OFFICE, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 16-cv-01849-MEJ 

ORDER OF SERVICE 

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Mendocino County Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights action 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis by separate order. His 

complaint is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

BACKGROUND 

The complaint alleges the following: 

In mid-November of 2015, plaintiff was in an administrative segregation cell at the 

Mendocino County Jail. Out of boredom, he was standing on the sink to see if he could touch the 

ceiling. Defendant correctional officer Montevias walked by and ordered plaintiff down. Plaintiff 

complied. Montevias then began calling plaintiff names, and the two began “trading insults back 

and forth.” Montevias stated “You fucked up now, scumbag,” and left the housing unit. He 

returned with two other correctional officers, defendants Zavala and Dow. They opened plaintiff’s 

tray slot and ordered him to “cuff up,” i.e., submit to handcuffs. Plaintiff complied with orders by 

placing his arms behind his back and through the slot. 

Montevias then handcuffed plaintiff, yanking his arms through the tray slot painfully and 

aggressively. The handcuffs were so tight that they cut off circulation to plaintiff’s wrists. 

Montevias then yanked again even harder and started bending plaintiff’s right index finger as if 

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trying to break it. Plaintiff managed to pull away from the door to stop the pain. 

All three officers then entered plaintiff’s cell, and Montevias proceeded to grab plaintiff’s 

head and slam it into the wall two times. Montevias then started punching plaintiff in the ribs. 

The officers then pulled plaintiff out of the cell. While escorting plaintiff out, Montevias was 

pushing plaintiff’s arms up and behind plaintiff’s head causing pain. 

Plaintiff was placed in a safety cell that was typically reserved for suicidal inmates. The 

safety cell was covered in someone else’s feces and mucus. Plaintiff remained in the safety cell 

for twenty-four hours, after which time he was placed in a cell in the medical room. 

Montevais came to the medical room and said to plaintiff, “You better not say anything 

about what happened because I didn’t write you up about that pruno that one time.” Montevias 

then sat down in a chair outside plaintiff’s cell and read the newspaper. During this time, plaintiff 

received no medical treatment. A nurse informed him that she had been ordered not to treat his 

injuries, but only to take his vital signs. 

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Captain Pearce, Lieutenant Bednar, and Sergeant 

Spearce were all aware of the jail correctional officers’ violent conduct towards inmates but did 

nothing about it. 

After he returned to his cell, all of plaintiff’s property had been taken, and he was denied 

all medical request forms and grievance forms. When he was able to finally submit a grievance, 

defendant correctional officer Delasanto refused to process his grievance multiple times. 

Plaintiff’s ribs remained bruised for a month, making it difficult to breathe. Plaintiff still 

has visible bumps on his wrist and head and still suffers pain in his right shoulder. He has been 

informed that it will take him up to eight months to heal. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review 

 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 

claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 

in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 

must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined 

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 

(1993). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 

312, 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation and citation omitted). With respect to 

excessive force, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). But not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to 

a federal cause of action. Id. at 9. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical 

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force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Id. 

An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernable injury almost certainly 

fails to state a valid excessive force claim. 

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX 

Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of 

“deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the 

prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. Id. at 1059. 

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. The existence of 

an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a 

prisoner has a “serious” need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate 

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but 

he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but 

was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion 

between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to 

a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Liberally construed, plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable Eighth Amendment claims for 

excessive force as against defendants Montevias, Dow, Zavala, Pearce, Bednar, and Spearce. 

Plaintiff’s complaint also states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs as against defendant Montevias. 

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Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Delasanto regarding the refusal to process his inmate 

grievances is dismissed with prejudice because there is no constitutional right to a prison or jail 

administrative appeal or grievance system in California, and therefore no due process liability for 

failing to process or decide an inmate appeal properly. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 

(9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Finally, the remaining defendant is the Mendocino County Sheriff’s Office. To impose 

liability under Section 1983 against a municipal entity such as Mendocino County for a violation 

of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right 

of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy 

amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is 

the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of 

Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997); see Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 

690 (1978). Plaintiff does not allege any policy by Mendocino County that led to the alleged 

actions against him. Accordingly, this defendant is DISMISSED. Dismissal is without prejudice. 

If plaintiff is able to allege a municipal liability claim, in good faith, against the Mendocino 

County Sheriff’s Office, he may move for leave to amend the complaint. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as follows: 

1. The complaint states the following cognizable claims: (1) excessive force as against 

defendants Montevias, Dow, Zavala, Pearce, Bednar and Spearce, and (2) deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs as against defendant Montevias. 

2. Defendant Delasanto is DISMISSED with prejudice from this action. Defendant 

Mendocino County Sheriff’s Office is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate 

these defendants from the docket in this action. 

3. The Clerk shall issue summons and Magistrate Judge jurisdiction consent form and 

the United States Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, the summons, Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction consent form, a copy of the complaint with all attachments, and a copy of this Order 

on Correctional Officer Montevias, Correctional Officer Dow, Correctional Officer Zavala, 

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Captain Pearce, Lieutenant Bednar, and Sergeant Spearce at the Mendocino County Jail. 

The Clerk shall also mail a courtesy copy of this Order to the Office of the Mendocino County 

Counsel. 

 4. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows: 

 a. No later than 91 days from the date this Order is filed, defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the 

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, defendants must so inform the 

Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for summary judgment also must be 

accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what 

is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 

2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be 

served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss for failure to 

exhaust available administrative remedies similarly must be accompanied by a Wyatt notice. 

Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this Order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff also must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding motions to dismiss for nonexhaustion provided later in this Order as he prepares his opposition to any motion to dismiss. 

 c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

 5. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 

do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

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entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A). 

 Plaintiff also is advised that a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 

prejudice. You must “develop a record” and present it in your opposition in order to dispute any 

“factual record” presented by defendants in their motion to dismiss. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 

1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 (The Rand and Wyatt notices above do not excuse defendants’ obligation to serve said 

notices again concurrently with motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative 

remedies and motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939). 

 6. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants’ 

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until defendants’ 

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 

defendants, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

 7. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery. 

 8. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 

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fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility. 

 9. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 

to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause. 

 10. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 

 

MARIA-ELENA JAMES 

United States Magistrate Judge 

July 19, 2016

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