Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02403/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02403-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Wake Up and Ball LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Sony Music Entertainment Incorporated, et 

al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-02403-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 On August 13, 2015, the Court considered Defendant Sony Music Entertainment’s 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a 

claim. Doc. 65; 2015 WL 4763657. The Court ordered the parties to conduct 

jurisdictional discovery and thereafter to prepare simultaneous 10-page memoranda on 

the question of the Court’s jurisdiction over Defendant. Doc. 65 at 16. The parties have 

completed this discovery and filed their memoranda. Docs. 107, 108. The Court has 

reviewed these memoranda and the related exhibits, and no party has requested oral 

argument. The Court concludes that Defendant is properly subject to personal 

jurisdiction in the District of Arizona, and will deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. 

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff Wake Up and Ball, LLC (“Wake Up”) is an Arizona limited liability 

company with its principal place of business in Arizona. Doc. 25, ¶ 1. In early 2014, 

Plaintiff produced a music video for Hell Yeah, a recording by Arizona hip hop artist 

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Robert Carr (a.k.a. “Judge da Boss”). Id. ¶¶ 20-25, 50. In April 2014, Mr. Carr signed a 

contract with Defendant, pursuant to which Defendant acquired an ownership interest in 

the Hell Yeah recording. See Doc. 107-1, Ex. 4. In September 2014, Defendant signed a 

contract with Mr. Carr’s management company, Deepfreeze Entertainment, LLC 

(“Deepfreeze”), which purported to transfer to Defendant the copyright to the Hell Yeah 

video. Id. at Ex. 29. Later that month, Defendant published the video on several 

websites and online services, including MTV and iTunes. Doc. 25, ¶ 64. Around the 

same time, Plaintiff posted the video on YouTube. Id. at ¶ 62. Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant took steps to have Plaintiff’s posting removed. Id. at ¶ 63. 

 In October 2014, Plaintiff filed this action, seeking, among other things, relief for 

copyright infringement from Defendant and a declaratory judgment as to its copyright 

ownership. Doc. 1. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 

improper venue, and failure to state a claim. Doc. 35. 

 On August 13, 2015, the Court invited discovery on two factual disputes going to 

Court’s jurisdiction over Defendant. The first question asked whether Defendant’s 

intentional act in publishing the Hell Yeah video was expressly aimed at Arizona. The 

Court explained: 

Wake Up must make a prima facie showing that Sony expressly aimed the publishing of the music video at Arizona. This requires “‘something more’ than mere foreseeability.” . . . Standing alone, the fact that Sony negotiated with an Arizona company regarding an Arizona-based artist would not be enough to establish express aiming at Arizona under post- Walden minimum contacts analysis. Nor would the fact that Sony placed the Hell Yeah video on publically available websites accessible in Arizona 

be sufficient. But if Sony promoted a Hell Yeah music video release party in Arizona at which Wake Up’s music video was shown, Sony expressly aimed its copyright infringement at Arizona. Moreover, promotion of live performances in Arizona would tend to show the “something more” 

required for express aiming under the Calder effects test . . . 

Doc. 65 at 7 (citations and footnotes omitted). 

The second question asked whether Defendant’s intentional act in publishing the 

Hell Yeah video caused harm that Defendant knew would likely be suffered in Arizona. 

The Court explained that this element would be satisfied if Defendant’s intentional act 

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had foreseeable effects in Arizona, whether or not the bulk of the harm occurred there. 

Id. at 8 (citing Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th 

Cir. 2010)). The Court further explained: 

Evidence that Sony took steps to get the video taken down, whether directly or through Deepfreeze, would suggest that Sony was aware of, or should have been aware of, a potential copyright dispute involving Arizona entities. Harm to an Arizona entity through Sony’s copyright infringement would be foreseeable. 

Id. at 9. 

II. Analysis. 

 1. Legal Standard. 

 “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their 

jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014). Arizona 

has authorized its courts to exercise jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the 

Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a). Under the Due 

Process Clause, a federal district court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident 

defendant if the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum, such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

 A defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to support an 

exercise of jurisdiction if (1) the defendant purposefully avails herself of the privileges of 

conducting activities in the forum or purposely directs conduct at the forum that has 

effects in the forum; (2) the claim arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities; 

and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. 

Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 In copyright infringement cases, the inquiry under the first prong of the “minimum 

contacts” test is whether the defendant purposefully directed his activities at the forum 

state. Id. at 1228. Under this framework, sometimes referred to as the Calder effects 

test, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) committed an intentional act, 

(2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) which caused harm that the defendant knew 

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was likely to be suffered in that state. Id. If the plaintiff makes such a showing, the 

second prong of the minimum contacts test asks whether the plaintiff’s claim arises out of 

or relates to conduct which was directed at the forum state. See CollegeSource, Inc. v. 

AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). If the plaintiff satisfies the first 

two prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction would be unreasonable – i.e., incompatible with fair play and substantial 

justice. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228. If the defendant does not make such a showing, the 

Court may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.

 2. Express Aiming. 

 Plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that Defendant expressly aimed the 

publishing of the Hell Yeah video at Arizona. To establish express aiming, a plaintiff 

must show that the non-resident defendant’s action is related to the forum by “something 

more” than a foreseeable effect. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 

797, 803 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether there is “something more,” the Ninth 

Circuit considers a number of factors, including “the geographic scope of the defendant’s 

commercial ambitions.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1229. In a copyright infringement case, a 

defendant will be found to have done “something more” where it used copyrighted 

material “as part of its exploitation of [the forum state’s] market.” Id. 

 In the August 13 order, the Court explained that Defendant’s “promotion of [Mr. 

Carr’s] live performances in Arizona would tend to show the ‘something more’ required 

for express aiming.” Doc. 65 at 7. Whether Defendant promoted such performances was 

the first question the Court ordered the parties to address. Id. at 7-8. 

 Evidence obtained in discovery indicates that Defendant did promote Mr. Carr’s 

live performances in Arizona. See Doc. 107-1, Ex. 8, at 16-18 (deposition of Defendant’s 

employee Kimberly Lumpkin, acknowledging that Defendant directed a contractor to hire 

a street team for Mr. Carr’s performance in Phoenix); Doc. 107-2, Ex. 20 (email from 

RED Distribution, LLC (“RED”) employee Gazelle Alexander,1

 stating that she enlisted 

 

1

 RED is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant. Doc. 108-4 at 2. 

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Mr. Carr’s friends to pass out promotional materials at same event); Ex. 15 (email from 

RED employee Joanne Madhere, stating that RED would send 1,000 promotional CDs to 

promote the same event).2

 This evidence indicates that, around the time it published the Hell Yeah video, 

Defendant was engaged in a commercial campaign directed, in part, at exploiting the 

Arizona market. The Court therefore concludes that Defendant expressly aimed this 

publication at Arizona.3

 Cf. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1229. 

 3. Knowledge of Arizona Harm. 

Plaintiff must also make a prima facie showing that Defendant knew it was 

causing harm likely to be suffered in Arizona when it published the Hell Yeah video. 

This “element is satisfied when defendant’s intentional act has ‘foreseeable effects’ in the 

forum” and can be established even if “the bulk of the harm occurs outside of the forum.” 

Brayton, 606 F.3d at 1131. A defendant’s intentional act has foreseeable effects in a 

forum if it causes foreseeable economic loss to a corporation with its principal place of 

business in that forum. CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1079. 

 As explained in the August 13 order, Defendant’s copyright infringement was 

foreseeable if Defendant knew or should have known of a potential copyright dispute 

involving Arizona entities. Doc. 65 at 9. Evidence that Defendant took steps to have 

Plaintiff’s video posting removed would demonstrate such knowledge. Id. Whether 

Defendant was or should have been aware of a potential copyright dispute involving 

 

2

 The discovery indicates that Defendant engaged in other promotional activity in Arizona. One RED employee visited Phoenix to “talk to all the Major DJ’s [sic] in the 

city” about playing Mr. Carr’s music. Doc. 107-2, Ex. 20. Another RED employee scheduled a dinner with Mr. Carr and the music director of a Phoenix radio station. 

Doc. 108-4 at 2. 

3

 The Court also concludes that Defendant expressly aimed the publication of the Hell Yeah video at Arizona by directing Mr. Carr to promote it on his Twitter account. 

See Doc. 107-2, Ex. 37 at 2. At the time it directed Mr. Carr to make this posting, Defendant was aware that 11 percent of Mr. Carr’s Twitter followers were Arizona residents. Id. at 3. Defendant’s use of this medium supports a finding that it expressly aimed the video at Arizona. Cf. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1230 (the fact that a “substantial 

number of hits on [defendant’s] website came from California residents” supported inference that defendant was expressly aiming the website at California). 

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Arizona entities was the second question the Court ordered the parties to address in 

jurisdictional discovery. Id. 

 Although discovery does not support Plaintiff’s assertion that that Defendant took 

steps to have Plaintiff’s video posting removed, it does indicate that Defendant knew or 

should have known of a potential copyright dispute involving Arizona entities. 

Specifically, Defendant knew that the Hell Yeah video originally included third-party 

logos and trademarks. Doc. 108-5 at 3-4. Defendant asked Deepfreeze to remove these 

logos and trademarks, id., but did not take additional steps to confirm that the third 

party’s legal rights were terminated. Further, a few weeks before Defendant published 

the video, one of its employees received an email from Deepfreeze indicating that Wake 

Up was entitled to, but had not yet received, payment for the Hell Yeah video. Doc. 107-

2, Ex. 30. Defendant knew or should have known that there was a potential copyright 

dispute between Deepfreeze and Wake Up at the time it published the Hell Yeah video. 

The Court therefore concludes that it was foreseeable that publication of this video would 

cause harm in Arizona. 

4. Causation. 

 Finally, Plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that its claim arises out of or 

relates to Defendant’s forum related conduct – that is, the conduct that Defendant 

purposefully directed at Arizona. The Court has already determined that Defendant 

purposely directed the publication of the Hell Yeah video at Arizona. Plaintiff’s claim 

arises out of this publication. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim arises out of or relates to 

Defendant’s Arizona related conduct. Compare Goldberg v. Cameron, 482 F. Supp. 2d 

1136, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (plaintiff satisfied causation requirement by demonstrating 

that defendant’s alleged copyright infringement “reached into this district and allegedly 

affected plaintiffs in this district”). 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim does not arise out 

of Defendant’s Arizona related conduct because the claim would have arisen even if the 

allegedly infringing video had not been accessible in Arizona. Doc. 108 at 9. This 

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argument proves too much. Because Defendant disseminated the video nationwide, there 

is no state for which it is true that Plaintiff’s claim would not have arisen but for 

dissemination of the video in that state. 

 More to the point, Defendant’s argument is incompatible with precedent. In 

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), the Supreme Court held that New 

Hampshire could exercise jurisdiction over a magazine that disseminated allegedly 

libelous material within its borders, notwithstanding the fact that the material had also 

been distributed in other states. This forecloses the argument that a plaintiff in a 

publication tort case must show that dissemination of the tortious publication in the 

forum state was a necessary predicate to her claim. It is sufficient to show that the 

tortious publication which gave rise to the claim was directed in part at the forum state. 

Plaintiff has made such a showing here.

 5. Reasonableness. 

 Because Plaintiff has satisfied the first two prongs of the “minimum contacts” test, 

the burden now shifts to Defendant to “present a compelling case” that exercise of 

jurisdiction in this case would be unreasonable. CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1079 

(citation omitted). Defendant has not borne its burden. Defendant reiterates its 

unsuccessful argument that its contacts with Arizona were “attenuated and limited.” 

Doc. 108 at 14. But it does not suggest that litigating this matter in Arizona would be 

unduly burdensome or prejudicial. The Court therefore concludes that exercise of 

jurisdiction in this case is consistent with fair play and substantial justice. 

 It is ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction and improper venue (Doc. 35) is denied. 

 Dated this 2nd day of November, 2015. 

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