Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01016/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FILED 

United State,. Court of Appca,.ls 

Tenth Cirr.uit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

AUG .. 3 1990 

----------&OBERT L. HOECKER 

JIM L. CONSIDINE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 

OF THE COUNTY OF ADAMS, STATE OF ) 

COLORADO; STEVE CRAMER; ) 

RON YOUNGER; RON NICHOL, ) 

individually and as present or ) 

former members of the Board of ) 

County Commissioners of the County ) 

of Adams; and ROBERT CLIFTON, ) 

individually and as the former ) 

County Administrator of the County ) 

of Adams, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

Nos. 89-1016 

89-1017 

OH APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. Ho. 88-F-502) 

Clerk 

Sandra Spencer Coleman (Michael w. Anderson and William F. 

Campbell with her on the brief), of White and Steele, P.C., 

Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Patrick B. Mooney of Semple 

(Martin Semple of Semple 

Ronald K. Olson, Acting 

Brighton, Colorado, with 

Appellants. 

& Jackson, P.C., Denver, Colorado, 

& Jackson, P.C., Denver, Colorado, and 

County Attorney, County of Adams, 

him on the briefs) for DefendantsBefore TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, 

District Judge. 

and VAN BEBBER, * 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 1 
Defendants-appellants bring this interlocutory appeal from 

the order of the United States District Court for the District of 

Colorado denying appellants' motions for summary judgment and 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to plaintiffappellee's First Amendment claim. 

I 

Plaintiff-appellee Considine is a former employee of Adams 

County, Colorado ("the county"). In 1988, he filed suit in the 

district court against the county and defendants Steve Cramer, Leo 

Younger and Robert Clifton, in their capacities as county 

officials and as individuals, alleging that his employment was 

terminated in 1985 in violation of his First and Fourteenth 

Amendments rights .. (Defendants-appellants Cramer and Younger are 

former county commissioners. Defendant-appellant Clifton is a 

former county administrator.) Considine also raised pendent state 

claims for breach of contract, defamation, interference with 

contractual relations, conspiracy, promissory estoppel, and 

exemplary damages. 

From November 1977 until June 1985, Considine served as 

director of the county's division of community and recreational 

resources. In that capacity, Considine had authority over the 

county's waste management, building inspections, planning 

department, golf course, regional park, extension service office 

and economic development. His position required a close working 

relationship with the board of county commissioners ("the board" 

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or "the commissioners"). 

The planning department had authority over gravel mining 

operations within the county. Accordingly, the department 

received and processed applications for gravel operations, made 

recommendations thereon to the planning commission and to the 

board, maintained official county records and monitored the 

progress of gravel mining operations. Considine was notified of 

any problems with gravel mining operations and occasionally would 

personally perform on-site inspections of gravel pit operations to 

assess whether they were in compliance with county regulations. 

Consistent with his job responsibilities, Considine would 

determine whether any given problem should be brought to the 

attention of the board. If Considine felt a problem warranted 

board attention, he would usually bring the matter before the 

board himself. 

While serving as division director, Considine was twice 

appointed by the board as project director to oversee two 

applications (filed in 1982 and 1983) for the operation of a 

hazardous waste site within the county ("the Highway 36 project"). 

As project director, Considine was responsible for coordinating 

the efforts of county staff and consultants; assimilating data and 

input from the applicant, opponents and the public concerning the 

application; and formulating a recommendation to the board through 

the planning commission whether the application should be approved 

or denied. Considine stated that it was "specifically my job to 

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Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 3 
evaluate and analyze the proposals for the Highway 36 project." 

Considine also had ultimate responsibility for county golf 

course operations. In 1984 and continuing into 1985 1

1 the 

commissioners undertook the construction of a new golf course. In 

connection with the construction of the golf course, it was 

determined that the Brantner ditch, which ran adjacent to the old 

golf course, should be relocated. The commissioners assigned this 

problem to Considine. Part of his responsibility was to report 

the problems and progress of the Brantner ditch operation to the 

commissioners. 

As formulated in the complaint, Considine's First Amendment 

claim alleges that he was terminated as "a direct result of 

statements made and positions taken by him in regards to matters 

of public health, safety and welfare in connection with 

administrative handlings of certain gravel pit operations, ditch 

company contracts [the Brantner Ditch] and hazardous waste 

disposal sites [the Highway 36 project]." 

A. STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE GRAVEL PIT OPERATIONS 

In his answers to defendants' interrogatories, Considine 

identifies five gravel pits in Adams County concerning which he 

made statements or took positions that he contends were protected 

by the First Amendment. Considine claims that statements were 

made to the commissioners, the county administrator and other 

county officials and that the position taken by him concerning 

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Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 4 
each pit "was one of public health, safety, and welfare." 

Considine identifies approximately fifty dates when he discussed 

the gravel pits with the commissioners and states that there were 

other, unspecified dates on which he made statements. In 

addition, Considine testified that he was terminated for 

discussing the gravel pits with various named members of the 

media. 

Considine's statements addressed the adequacy of fencing at 

four of the gravel pits, the propriety of the underwater slope of 

two gravel pits, the pit operator's failure to adhere to pit 

reclamation plans at two pits, improper mining operations at two 

pits, failure to maintain a berm at one pit, improper riverbed 

mining at one pit, the creation of an "attractive nuisance" at one 

pit, and endangerment to bridge abutments at one pit. 

In his deposition, Considine testified that the commissioners 

seemed irritated with him for bringing to them problems concerning 

the Adams County gravel pit. He believed the commissioners felt 

he was not being cooperative with them in dealing with the Mann 

Lake gravel pit. He felt the commissioners became irritated with 

his efforts and those of his staff to negotiate a resolution to 

problems at the Seigrist Lake gravel pit. Concerning the Zigan 

gravel pit, Considine recommended that the commissioners hold a 

show cause hearing. The commissioners held the hearing, but 

Considine felt they were unhappy at having to do so. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 5 
B. STATEMENTS CORCERRIRG THE HIGHWAY 36 PROJECT 

Considine contends that his statements concerning the Highway 

36 project were made to the commissioners, the county 

administrator, the county planning department staff, the county 

public works division staff, the Concerned Citizens of Eastern 

Colorado and its members, Joe French, Esq., various named members 

of the press, and various named representatives of the 

Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Considine also 

identifies a number of dates when his positions were discussed and 

states that he made "numerous" additional statements on 

unspecified dates. 

As director in charge of processing hazardous waste site 

applications, Considine contends he took the position that the 

Highway 36 project posed a threat to the public safety in areas of 

police response, fire protection, and emergency preparedness and 

response; that the applicant did not have the financial ability to 

operate the site; that the applicant had not documented its 

reliability, competence and expertise; and that the site did not 

conform to various county land use plans, policies, and 

regulations. 

C. STATEMENTS CORCERRING THE BRANTNER DITCH 

Considine 

administrator, 

members of 

identifies 

various named 

the Brantner 

the commissioners, 

county 

Ditch 

officials 

Board of 

the county 

and employees, 

Directors and 

representatives of the City of Northglenn, Colorado, as recipients 

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Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 6 
of his statements concerning the Brantner ditch. He states that 

his position on the Brantner ditch was discussed at commissioner 

study sessions on four specific dates and that there were "many 

other meetings" at which such discussions occurred, "the specific 

dates of which are impossible to ascertain." 

Considine contends he took the position that to divert water 

from the old ditch to the new ditch was illegal, that the 

diversion of water was in violation of an agreement between the 

ditch company and the county and that the new ditch may not have 

been properly designed. In his deposition, Considine testified 

that these concerns were expressed at a meeting he attended with 

the county attorney and county administrator Clifton. At this 

meeting, Clifton expressed concerns that the ditch be filled as 

soon as possible. Considine expressed concerns about the physical 

integrity of the new ditch and the county attorney (not Considine) 

expressed concerns about the legality of diverting water into the 

new ditch. 

After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on all 

claims. Defendants argued, inter alia, that the speech relied 

upon by plaintiff is not protected by the First Amendment and that 

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 800 (1982). The district court entered 

judgment for all defendants on plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment 

and pendent state claims, 1 but preserved plaintiff's First 

1 Plaintiff-appellee's challenges to the district court's 

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Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 7 
Amendment and exemplary damages claims2 and held that the 

individual defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from 

suit as to plaintiff's First Amendment claim. 

On appeal, defendants challenge the district court's denial 

of summary judgment on two grounds: (1) the speech underlying 

plaintiff's claim is not protected by the First Amendment; and (2) 

plaintiff's First Amendment rights were not clearly established at 

the time he was terminated. 

II 

"[A] State may not discharge an employee on a basis that 

infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in 

freedom of speech." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 

(1987); Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 856 (lOth Cir. 

1989). The threshold inquiry in determining whether a 

governmental employer's employment decision violates the First 

Amendment rights of an adversely affected employee is whether the 

speech at issue "may be 'fairly characterized as constituting 

speech on a matter of public concern.'" Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 

(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 u.s. 138, 146 (1983). 

resolution 

We affirmed 

unpublished 

1119, filed 

of these claims were 

the district court's 

order and judgment 

August 3, 1990. 

considered separately on appeal. 

determinations thereon in an 

in Nos. 89-1071, 89-1118 and 89-

2 The parties are agreed that there is no independent claim for 

exemplary damages and that such damages may only be awarded in the 

event actual damages are awarded on one of plaintiff's seven 

independent claims for relief. 

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If the threshold is passed, a court must "balance the 

interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon 

matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 

employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 

performs through its employees." Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 

u.s. 563, 568 (1968); Rankin, 483 u.s. at 384; Connick, 461 u.s. 

at 140. 3 

The district court, without extensive discussion of the 

public concern issue, determined that plaintiff's speech was 

protected by the First Amendment after applying the Pickering 

balancing test. Additionally, the district court found that the 

allegations in plaintiff's affidavit and testimony "are sufficient 

to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff 

was terminated because of his exercise of his right of free 

speech. "4 The district court concluded "given the facts as 

testified to by plaintiff, summary judgment on the First Amendment 

claim would be inappropriate." 

In order to determine whether particular "speech" is 

protected, this court must perform a de novo review of the whole 

3 "Upon a finding that the speech in question is constitutionally 

protected, the plaintiff must prove that the speech was a 

substantial or motivating factor in the challenged employment 

decision." Wulf, 883 F.2d at 856-57 (citing Mt. Healthy City 

School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 u.s. 274, 287 (1977)). 

The burden then shifts to the defendant to show by a preponderance 

of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision 

absent the protected activity. Wulf, 883 F.2d at 857. 

4 Defendants have not challenged this determination on appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 9 
record. Wulf, 883 F.2d at 856; Rankin, 483 u.s. at 386 n.9. In 

reviewing the summary judgment determination of the district 

court, this court applies the same standard employed by the trial 

5 court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Osgood v. State Farm Mutual 

Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

A. PUBLIC CONCERN 

Speech on a matter of public concern is generally defined as 

speech "fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 

social, or other concern to the community," Connick, 461 u.s. at 

146, in contrast to speech "as an employee upon matters only of 

personal interest," id. at 147. "Whether an employee's speech 

addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the 

content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by 

the whole record." Id. at 147-48. Based on these standards, we 

hold that plaintiff's statements constitute speech on matters of 

public concern. 

Included within the Connick inquiry is a focus on "the extent 

to which the content of the employee speech was calculated to 

disclose wrongdoing or inefficiency or other malfeasance on the 

part of governmental officials in the conduct of their official 

5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) reads: 

(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.... The 

judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law .... 

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Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 10 
duties." Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1445 (lOth 

Cir.) (citing Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 

672 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The focus is on the role the employee has in 

advancing the particular expressions: that of a concerned public 

citizen, informing the public that the state institution is not 

properly discharging its duties . • • • I or merely as an employee, 

concerned only with internal policies or practices which are of 

relevance only to the employees of that institution.")); cert. 

denied, 109 S. Ct. 262 (1988); see also, Wulf, 883 F.2d at 857; 

Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 796-97 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Considine's statements alleged that numerous statutory and 

regulatory public health and safety violations were occurring on 

projects that were sponsored by the county and under the direction 

of the county's elected officials and administrative staff. 

Although Considine's statements did not directly assign 

culpability to the board or other particular individuals, their 

content naturally suggests that, if true, the county institution 

was not "properly discharging its duties." His statements cannot 

be fairly characterized as concerning only internal policies and 

practices of relevance only to county employees. 6 

Moreover, Considine's statements were delivered directly to 

6 We find Considine's statements distinguishable from the speech 

at issue in Koch in this regard. The record in Koch did not 

support a conclusion that the speech at issue therein, a written 

report stating the plaintiff fire marshal's opinions as to the 

cause of a fire, alleged improprieties that could be attributed to 

the defendant city. See 847 F.2d at 1447. 

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members of the media, representatives of the EPA, and members of 

the Concerned Citizens of Eastern Colorado. Thus, Considine 

communicated his concerns directly to persons and organizations 

outside the normal chain of command of his workplace capable of 

bringing public and regulatory pressure to bear on the county. It 

is true that some of plaintiff's statements were made during the 

course and as a part of his official duties--a factor that weighs 

against a finding that speech involves matters of public concern. 

Koch, 847 F.2d at 1447. However, there is no indication in the 

record that Considine's job responsibilities included alerting the 

media, regulatory agencies and citizen groups to the possible 

statutory and regulatory violations and other alleged irregularities occurring on Adams County projects. Accordingly, we 

can only conclude that his statements were "calculated to disclose 

wrongdoing or inefficiency or other malfeasance on the part of 

governmental officials in the conduct of their official duties." 

Id. at 1445. 

In terms of content and context, Considine's statements are 

extremely similar to the types of speech held to touch on matters 

of public concern by this court on other occasions. For example 

in Wulf, a lieutenant in the defendant city's police force was 

fired by the defendant chief of police after the lieutenant 

prepared and sent a letter to the Kansas attorney general 

requesting an investigation of certain activities and incidents 

within the police department. 883 F.2d at 852-53. In Conaway, an 

electrical inspector for the City of Kansas City, Kansas, was 

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Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 12 
terminated after submitting a report to top-level administrators 

that criticized the actions of his immediate supervisor for 

approving a facility as operational despite certain electrical 

violations. 853 F.2d at 791. Finally, in Schalk v. Gallemore, 

906 F.2d 491 (lOth Cir. 1990), a hospital patient accounts clerk 

was fired by defendant, the hospital's chief administrator, after 

writing a letter to and speaking with hospital board of trustees 

members about what she perceived as "waste," "inefficiency" and 

"favoritism" at the hospital. Id. at The letter in Wulf, 

the report in Conaway and the communications in Schalk were all 

held to touch on matters of public concern. See Wulf, 883 F.2d at 

857-59; Conaway, 853 F.2d at 796-97; Schalk, slip op. at 9-11. 

Based on our review of the record and the content, form and 

context of plaintiff's statements, we conclude that plaintiff has 

met his burden of establishing that his speech touches on a matter 

of public concern. Accordingly, defendants are not entitled as a 

matter of law to summary judgment on this issue. 

B. PICKERING BALANCING 

We must next consider, based on the record before us, whether 

Considine's interest in making his statements is outweighed by the 

interest of defendants in "promoting the efficiency of the public 

services it performs through its employees." Rankin, 483 u.s. at 

384, 388 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). In this regard, 

the "State bears a burden of justifying the discharge on 

legitimate grounds." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (citing Connick, 461 

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Appellate Case: 89-1016 Document: 01019371204 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 13 
u.s. at 150). 

Balancing the competing interests of the employee and the 

government requires the consideration of the time, place and 

manner of the employee's expression. Connick, 461 u.s. at 152-53. 

Specific considerations relative to the defendants' interest 

include "'whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or 

harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working 

relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are 

necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or 

interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.'" Wulf, 

883 F.2d at 861 (quoting Rankin, 483 u.s. at 388); ~also 

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73. 

Even more specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized that 

"[t]he burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words 

they speak will vary with the extent of authority and public 

accountability the employee's role entails." Rankin, 483 u.s. at 

390. That burden is greater when the employee serves in a 

"confidential, policymaking, or public contact role." Id. at 390-

91. Finally, where appropriate, a court must consider whether the 

employee's speech calls into question the employee's general 

ability and competence to perform his/her job. Koch, 847 F.2d at 

1450 (citing Pickering, 391 u.s. at 573 n.5). 

Here, defendants have not presented evidence sufficient to 

permit a balancing of their interest in the effective functioning 

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of county government against Considine's interest in free speech. 

As we noted earlier, it is the governmental defendant's burden in 

these cases to justify the challenged discharge on legitimate 

grounds. Once an employee's speech is determined to touch on a 

matter of public concern, the discharge can be legitimate only if 

the government's interest outweighs that of the speaker. 

Necessarily, defendants must provide specific evidence sufficient 

to assess the character and weight of its interest. 

Based on the present record, we can state with authority only 

that Considine held a relatively high-ranking position within the 

county, that some of his statements were made during the course of 

his official duties and that some of these statements "irritated" 

some of his superiors. While these vague conclusions are indeed 

relevant to our analysis of defendants' interest, we cannot say, 

without a more specific factual basis, that they are sufficient to 

tip the Pickering scales in defendants' favor. 

As we have discussed, in assessing the weight of the 

government's interest in any particular case under Pickering, this 

court must consider a variety of factors as revealed by specific 

facts. However, the record here does not specifically reveal 

"the extent of authority and public accountability [Considine's] 

role entails," Rankin, 483 u.s. at 390, or the extent to which 

Considine's position can be classified as a "confidential, 

policymaking, or public contact role," id. at 390-91. Thus, we 

are not equipped to say just what "burden of caution," id. at 390, 

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Considine bore with respect to the words he spoke or to the 

contexts in which he chose to speak. Moreover, there is no 

evidence indicating that his statements reflected negatively on 

his abilities to perform his job, that they "impair[ed] discipline 

by superiors or harmony among coworkers," or that they "impede[d] 

the performances of the speaker's [Considine's] duties or 

interfere[d] with the regular operation of the enterprise [the 

county government]." Rankin, 483 u.s. at 388. 

Accordingly, we agree with the district court in concluding 

that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter 

of law under Pickering at this stage of the proceedings. 

III 

Appellants also challenge the district court's denial of 

their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 

The denial of a qualified immunity claim is reviewable de DQYQ as 

a final decision under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 

U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Government officials performing 

discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from 

suit insofar as their 

established statutory or 

conduct does 

constitutional 

not violate 

rights of 

"clearly 

which a 

reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "The key to the inquiry is the 'objective 

reasonableness' of the official's conduct in light of the legal 

rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was 

taken." Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 727 (lOth 

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Cir. 1989) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818), reh'g granted in 

part, 888 F.2d 724 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

It is particularly difficult in the First Amendment context 

to determine whether the applicable law was "clearly established" 

because the Connick public concern inquiry and the Pickering 

balancing test are to be performed in light of particularized 

facts on a case-by-case basis. Melton, 879 F.2d at 727. In the 

First Amendment context, the Harlow inquiry must focus on whether, 

at the time the actions adverse to the employee-speaker were 

taken, the defendants would have been reasonably on notice that 

the speech at issue addressed a matter of public concern and that 

their interest in the effective functioning of their governmental 

enterprise would be insufficient for purposes of Pickering 

balancing to outweigh the employee's free speech interest. See 

Melton, 879 F.2d at 729. 7 

7 The formulation of the Harlow test used here by the district 

court was too generally stated. The district court found "that 

the right of public employees not to be terminated because of 

their exercise of the right to free speech was clearly established 

throughout the relevant time period." However, the Supreme Court 

has made clear that to withhold qualified immunity, the 

unlawfulness of the "very action in question" must be apparent. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 u.s. 635, 640 (1987). 

In Creighton, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 

held that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on 

qualified Lmmunity grounds because the right the defendant was alleged to have violated--the right of a person to be protected from 

warrantless searches of one's home unless searching officers have 

probable cause and there are exigent circumstances--was clearly 

established. Creighton v. St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1277 (8th Cir. 

1985). The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals 

erred by not considering whether "it was not clearly established 

that the circumstances with which [the defendant] was confronted 

did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances." 483 

U.S. at 640-41 (emphasis in original). The contours of the right 

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Here, we have already concluded that the record is 

insufficiently developed to enable a proper Pickering balancing 

inquiry and thus to determine whether defendants' actions violate 

the First Amendment. Without specific facts relative to the 

defendants' interest, it is also impossible to render a conclusion 

in favor of defendants under Harlow. 

To afford qualified immunity protection to defendants, we 

would have to determine that it was not clearly established in 

1985 both that: (1) Considine's statements constituted speech on 

matters of public concern; and (2) Considine's interest in making 

those statements would outweigh, for purposes of the Pickering 

test, defendants' interest in the effective functioning of the 

county government. 

Since Connick was published in 1983, the structure of the 

public concern inquiry was "clearly established" in mid-1985. 

Additionally, on the basis of the facts of Pickering itself, where 

a teacher's letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school 

board's allocation of funds and other activities was considered a 

matter of public concern, 391 u.s. at 564, 568, we conclude it was 

also "clearly established" in 1985 that statements of the type 

made by plaintiff here would constitute speech on a matter of 

public concern. 

allegedly violated must be "clearly established" in a more 

particularized and relevant sense. Id. at 640. 

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However, without particularized facts in the record defining 

the contours of defendants' interest in this case, we simply are 

unable to reach a conclusion as to the Pickering portion of the 

above equation. Accordingly, we conclude defendants are not 

entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity at this 

stage of the proceedings. 

The order of the district court denying appellants' motion 

for summary judgment on plaintiff's First Amendment claim is 

AFFIRMED. 

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