Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01793/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01793-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HASSAN ABPIKAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTIN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:11-cv-01793-DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS 

AND DEFENDANTS

ECF No. 17

I. Background

Plaintiff Hassan Abpikar (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons (“BOP”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). On October 27, 2011, 

Plaintiff filed his complaint. On August 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. ECF 

No. 17. On October 10, 2012, the Court screened Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and found 

that it stated a cognizable First Amendment claim against Defendant Benov, but failed to state any 

other claims against any other Defendants. Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to file a second 

amended complaint to cure the deficiencies identified. On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff notified the Court 

that he wished to proceed only against Defendant Benov on the cognizable claim. The Court thus 

issues the following order.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

II. Summary of First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Taft Correctional Institution (“TCI”) in Taft, California, where 

the events giving rise to this action occurred. Plaintiff names as Defendants: sergeant Martin, officer 

in charge of the Security Housing Unit; sergeant Barba, chief of security; lieutenant K. Sy., the 

special investigation service (“SIS”) officer in charge of phone monitoring; sergeant Logan, 

disciplinary hearing officer (“DHO”); Moss, case manager; Dela Cruz, unit manager; Dale Patrick, 

administrative remedy coordinator; and Michael L. Benov, warden of TCI.

Plaintiff alleges the following. On July 18, 2011, Plaintiff notified Defendant Martin, Barba, 

K. Sy, Logan, and Patrick via copout (an inmate request to staff) that he was being deprived from 

joining other Muslims in group prayer. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 9. Plaintiff contends that he 

wanted to pray with other Muslim inmates in group prayer, which is done daily from Monday 

through Friday, in the designated area, but was denied. Id.

On July 18, 2011, Plaintiff also notified Defendant Moss via copout that he wanted to pray 

with other Muslim inmates. FAC ¶ 10. Plaintiff stated that allowing him to join the group worship 

would not breach the security of the prison. Id. On July 21, 2011, Defendant Moss responded and 

informed Plaintiff that his concerns can be addressed to chaplain Maurseth, and that she had notified 

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the chaplain of his issue. FAC ¶ 11.

On July 18, 2011, Plaintiff also notified Defendant Dela Cruz regarding being allowed to join 

in the Muslim group prayer. FAC ¶ 12. On July 21, 2011, Defendant Dela Cruz responded that 

Plaintiff would need to contact the chaplain regarding his religion issues, and that Plaintiff was 

pending a DHO hearing. FAC ¶ 13.

On July 20, 2011, Plaintiff notified Defendants Barba and K. Sy by copout that he was being 

denied group worship with other Muslim inmates daily. FAC ¶ 14. On July 20, 2011, Plaintiff 

notified Defendant Benov that he was being denied group worship with other Muslim inmates daily. 

FAC ¶ 15. Defendant Benov responded by stating that if a Muslim inmate is in administrative 

segregation, and does not have a Muslim cell mate, he is prevented by circumstances beyond his 

control from attending the congregational prayer, and thus the obligation is lifted. FAC ¶ 16.

On July 24, 2011, Plaintiff notified, by copout through the chaplain, Defendants Barba, 

Logan, Martin, and K. Sy, and stated that he was being denied his religious freedom to participate in 

group worship with other Muslims on a daily basis. FAC ¶ 17. None of the previously Defendants 

responded. FAC ¶ 18. On July 26, 2011, Plaintiff again notified Defendant Moss of the deprivation 

of his group worship. FAC ¶ 19. On July 29, 2011, Defendant Moss responded by stating that this 

issue was addressed by associate warden Puentes on July 20 and July 23 of 2011. FAC ¶ 20.

Beginning in August of 2011, the holy month of Ramadan started. FAC ¶ 23. Plaintiff, via 

copout, through his counselor Lopez, notified Defendants Martin, K. Sy, Logan, Dale Patrick, Moss, 

Dela Cruz, Barba, and Benov that he must participate in the sacred ceremony of Ramadan with other 

Muslims, to break his fast and perform congressional prayer. FAC ¶ 23. On August 9, 2011, Lopez 

told Plaintiff to send a copout to the appropriate staff member. FAC ¶ 24. On August 9, 2011, 

Plaintiff again sent a copout through his counselor to Defendants Logan, K. Sy, Barba, Puentes, and 

Benov, contending that he was being denied group worship with other Muslims and being denied 

participation in the month of Ramadan. FAC ¶ 25. None of the previously listed Defendants 

responded. FAC ¶ 26.

On August 18, 2011, Plaintiff via copout notified Defendants Patrick, Martin, and Logan, 

stating that he had not receive a response to his BP-9 (inmate grievance) regarding the deprivation of 

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the practice of his religion. FAC ¶ 27. Plaintiff also contends that Defendants are discriminating 

against him on the basis of his nationality, race, and religion. FAC ¶ 28. Plaintiff is an Iranian 

American.

Plaintiff lost his Holy Note during the movement of his property when was admitted to the 

segregated housing unit. FAC ¶ 30. The Holy Note contains chapters and verse from the Koran 

which is to be read on the last day of Ramadan during the group worship sacred ceremony. FAC ¶ 

30.

Plaintiff contends a violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious 

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and California Penal Code section 4027. 

Plaintiff requests as relief compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, costs of suit, and 

an injunction that directs the Warden of TCI to change the prison’s unconstitutional practices and 

prevent violation of constitutional rights.1

III. Analysis

A. First Amendment

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment to free 

exercise of his religion. “The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at 

the prison door. The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, 

and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” 

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 

(1987)); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). Only beliefs which are both sincerely held 

and rooted in religious beliefs trigger the Free Exercise Clause. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 

884-85 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994)); Callahan v. 

Woods, 658 F. 2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

Under this standard, “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 

482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 526 (2006) (applying Turner to First 

Amendment claims). First, “there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation 

 

1 Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a 

federal actor under Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991).

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and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it,” and “the governmental objective 

must itself be a legitimate and neutral one.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. A second consideration is 

“whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.” Id. 

at 90 (internal quotations and citation omitted). A third consideration is “the impact accommodation 

of the asserted right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources 

generally.” Id. “Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a 

prison regulation.” Id.

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that group worship is rooted in Plaintiff’s Muslim faith and a 

sincerely held belief. Plaintiff states a First Amendment claim against Defendant Benov for denial of 

group worship while Plaintiff was in administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleges facts which 

demonstrate that Defendant Benov was aware that Plaintiff was not permitted to participate in group 

worship with other inmates, and upheld such deprivation because of Plaintiff’s administrative 

segregation housing.

Plaintiff does not state a First Amendment claim against Defendants Moss, K. Sy, Patrick, 

Martin, Barba, or Logan. Plaintiff alleges no facts which demonstrate that the Defendants set in 

motion a series of acts which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to 

inflict constitutional harms. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (“A person 

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if 

he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”). 

Plaintiff contends that he had notified Defendants by copout. However, that is insufficient to 

demonstrate that Defendants were actually aware of Plaintiff’s issues, or had the responsibilities and 

duties to address such matters. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1988) (when 

determining causation, courts “must take a very individualized approach which accounts for the 

duties, discretion, and means of each defendant”).

Plaintiff fails to state a First Amendment claim regarding the loss of his Holy Note. Plaintiff 

alleges no facts which link any Defendants to an act or omission that resulted in the deprivation of 

his ability to recite the prayer. Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Even if Plaintiff had linked a Defendant to 

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the loss of his property, Plaintiff alleges at most negligence, which is not sufficient to state a First 

Amendment free exercise claim. Lewis v. Mitchell, 416 F. Supp. 2d 935, 944 (S.D. Cal. 2005).

B. RLUIPA

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person 

residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from a rule of 

general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the 

burden on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 

government interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. RLUIPA “mandates a stricter standard of review for prison regulations that 

burden the free exercise of religion than the reasonableness standard under Turner.” Shakur v. 

Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th 

Cir. 2005)). The Supreme Court has noted “RLUIPA . . . protects institutionalized persons who are 

unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government's 

permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 

721 (2005). 

Plaintiff complains that Defendants violated RLUIPA. Plaintiff fails to state a claim 

regarding RLUIPA. First, RLUIPA does not apply to federal government action, but only to state 

and local governments. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Second, RLUIPA does not apply to private actors. Plaintiff concedes that Defendants are employed 

at TCI, which is a privately-run federal correctional facility. By its own language RLUIPA applies 

only to actions by a government.2

C. California Penal Code Section 4027

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his rights under California Penal Code section 

4027, which states: “It is the intention of the Legislature that all prisoners confined in local detention 

facilities shall be afforded reasonable opportunities to exercise religious freedom. As used in this 

section ‘local detention facility’ means any city, county, or regional facility used for the confinement 

 

2 Likewise, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, which is applicable to the federal 

government, Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1656 (2011), and is substantially similar to RLUIPA, would not be 

applicable to a private actor.

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of prisoners for more than 24 hours.” It is unclear whether this section creates a private cause of 

action. Even if it does, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants for violation of this section. 

Defendants work at TCI, which is not a local, county, or regional facility. See Cal. Penal Code § 

6031.4 (definition for local detention facility).

D. Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment forbids the federal government from depriving any person of life, 

liberty, or property without due process of law. Bloom v. State of Ill., 391 U.S. 194, 195 (1968). 

“Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection 

against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion 

of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 

U.S. 266, 273 (1994); Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996). To the extent that 

Plaintiff complains of the denial of the exercise of his religion, the First Amendment, not the 

generalized notion of due process under the Fifth Amendment, is applicable.3

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment also forbids the federal government from 

denying equal protection of the laws. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979). “Equal 

protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976). Prisoners are protected from invidious 

discrimination on the basis of race or religion. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512 (2005) 

(equal protection from invidious discrimination on the basis of race); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 

732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997) (equal protection from intentional discrimination on the basis of religion), 

abrogated on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008).

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges he was denied equal protection on the basis of race or 

religion, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Plaintiff alleges no facts which indicate that he was 

discriminated against on the basis of race or religion. Based on the allegations, Defendant Benov

denied Plaintiff group worship access because of his housing in administrative segregation pending a 

DHO hearing. This is not discrimination on the basis of race or religious belief.

//

 

3

 Negligent deprivation of property fails to state a due process claim. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).

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E. Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply in the federal context. San Francisco Arts & 

Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n. 21 (1987).

F. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment provides prisoners with the right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishments. Plaintiff alleges no facts which indicate a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Defendant Benov for deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

access to group prayer in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Plaintiff 

does not state any other claims against any other Defendants. Plaintiff was provided to opportunity 

to cure the deficiencies identified the in order, but opted to proceed only on the cognizable claim 

against Defendant Benov.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint against Defendant Benov for 

violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; and

2. All other claims and Defendants are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon 

which may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2013 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

3b142a

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