Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04638/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04638-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERESA A. LEE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

 

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No. 05-4638 SC

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION

Teresa Lee ("Plaintiff" or "Claimant") moves for Summary

Judgment on her action seeking review of the Social Security

Commissioner's final decision denying her claim for Medicare

benefits. Defendant Jo Anne Barnhart, the Commissioner of Social

Security ("Defendant" or "Commissioner"), has filed a Cross-Motion

for Summary Judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court

hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS

Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Claimant's Medical History 

Claimant, a female aged sixty-two, injured her lower back in

1990. Administrative Record ("AR") at 420. Various treatments

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enabled her to return to work as a letter clerk for the United

States Postal Service for one day in 1992 and two months in 1998,

but she was otherwise unable to work following her injury in 1990. 

AR at 19, 420-21.

Dr. Lerman treated Claimant for pain in 1990 and 1991. He

tried physical therapy, a steroid injection, and medication. AR

at 355-59. He noted that Claimant "does perceive significant

pain," but "her symptoms are out of proportion to her pathology." 

AR at 357. He referred her to Dr. Saal for pain management, who

wrote that Claimant "clearly has substantial components of pain

behavior, depression and reactive psychological changes." AR at

353. Dr. Saal then referred Claimant to Dr. Schofferman, who

became Claimant's primary physician for the next eleven years. 

Dr. Schofferman also recommended psychotherapy, but this course of

treatment was discontinued after Claimant failed to show

improvement after a year and a half. AR at 397. In November

2003, Dr. Schofferman noted: 

[H]er clinical condition has progressively gotten worse. It

also has become complicated by depression secondary to her

pain and impairment. She has an MRI scan that is abnormal. 

She has disc degeneration. Her clinical symptoms are

consistent with her MRI findings. AR at 408.

 B. Procedural History

On September 30, 2002, Claimant filed an application for

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social

Security Act, alleging disability since February 22, 1990. AR at

36. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied her

application in the first instance and then again on

reconsideration. AR at 38, 43. 

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On December 10, 2003, at Claimant's request, the SSA held a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). AR at 18. 

Claimant testified that she has experienced constant lower back

pain and depression since her injury in 1990. AR at 422-24. Dr.

Schofferman, Claimant's treating physician, submitted reports

indicating that Claimant was unable to perform any reasonable

full-time job due to degenerative disc disease and depression. AR

at 22. By contrast, Dr. Pon, the examining physician for the

Disability Determination Service, noted that though Claimant had

some "inhibition weakness" of the lower extremities, there was no

objective evidence nerve root impingement. He concluded that

Claimant had the functional capacity to return to work. AR at

229. Similarly, Dr. Jensen, the medical expert who attended the

hearing, concluded that there was no objective evidence to confirm

Dr. Schofferman's opinions. Dr. Jensen also stated that he

believed Claimant could return to work. AR at 430-31.

The ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled and that she

"was capable of performing a substantial number of light jobs,"

including most of the tasks required by her previous job. AR at

25. The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision,

thus making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the

Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. AR at 7. Claimant

appeals the Commissioner's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See

Pl.'s Mot for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Mot").

III. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court may set aside the decision of the ALJ if it is

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based on an incorrect application of the law or is not supported

by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial

evidence" is the relevant evidence which a reasonable person might

accept as adequate to support the ALJ's conclusion. Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). In order to be

"substantial," the evidence must amount to "more than a mere

scintilla," but need not rise to the level of a preponderance. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Where the

evidence could reasonably support either affirming or reversing

the ALJ's decision, this Court may not substitute its judgment for

the ALJ's decision. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21. "The ALJ is

responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in

medical testimony and ambiguities." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503,

509 (9th Cir. 2001).

IV. DISCUSSION

For purposes of the Social Security Act, a person is

disabled when she lacks the ability to "engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

Claimant challenges the ALJ's decision that she is not

disabled for purpose of the Social Security Act on three grounds. 

First, Claimant contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the

opinions of the treating physician. Pl.'s Mot. at 5. Second,

Claimant maintains that the ALJ improperly discounted her symptomCase 3:05-cv-04638-SC Document 16 Filed 12/08/06 Page 4 of 9
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reporting. Id. at 7. Third, Claimant asserts that the ALJ's

finding on past relevant work was improper. Id. at 9.

A. Whether the ALJ Improperly Ignored the Treating

Physician's Opinion

The Court finds that the ALJ fully considered, rather than

ignored, the treating physician's opinions and medical reports. 

The ALJ devoted a considerable portion of his evaluation to the

findings of the treating physician, Dr. Schofferman. After

discussing seven of Dr. Schofferman's reports from an eleven-year

time period, the ALJ stated: 

The undersigned gives little weight to Dr. Schofferman's

above-noted opinions, as they are not consistent with the

medical record as a whole, or with the doctor's own

examination and treatment notes. The objective laboratory

reports and X-rays in this matter are not consistent with the

extremely reduced level of activity described by the doctor. 

AR at 23. 

Upon discounting the opinions of the treating physician, the

ALJ gave greater weight to the opinions of the examining

physician, Dr. Pon, and the medical expert witness, Dr. Jensen. 

If the treating doctor's opinion is contradicted by another

doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion without providing

“specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence

in the record." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.

1995), quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.

1983). "This can be done by setting out a detailed and thorough

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating

his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998).

Where the opinion of the claimant's treating physician is

contradicted, and the opinion of a nontreating source is

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based on independent clinical findings that differ from those

of the treating physician, the opinion of the nontreating

source may itself be substantial evidence; it is then solely

the province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict. Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In his evaluation, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate

reasons as to why the report by Dr. Pon, who examined Claimant in

December 2002, deserved more weight than that of Dr. Schofferman. 

AR at 22-24. Dr. Pon reviewed Claimant's medical records and

performed a full physical examination. The ALJ described Dr.

Pon's report and noted that though an X-ray revealed some disc

narrowing, it was not severe enough to prevent Claimant's return

to work. AR at 22, 229. Dr. Pon asserted that Claimant's

condition would allow her "to stand and/or walk for a total of 6

hours during an 8-hour workday . . . [and] sit for a total of 6

hours during an 8-hour workday." AR at 229. Based upon his

analysis of Dr. Pon's independent clinical findings, the ALJ was

entitled to resolve the conflict in favor of Dr. Pon and against

Dr. Schofferman. 

The ALJ also credited the testimony of the medical expert,

Dr. Jensen. "[R]eports of the nonexamining advisor need not be

discounted and may serve as substantial evidence when they are

supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with

it." Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. The testimony of Dr. Jensen was

supported by, and consistent with, other evidence in the record,

namely the testimony of Dr. Pon and the X-ray and MRI results

which confirmed only mild findings of disc degeneration. AR at

22, 23. Thus, the ALJ was entitled to regard the reports of Dr.

Jensen as substantial evidence.

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In summary, the Court must defer to the ALJ's findings of

fact, provided that they are supported by substantial evidence. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. "The ALJ is

responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in

medical testimony and ambiguities." Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509. The

Court finds that the ALJ's decision was supported by information

contained in the Administrative Record, such as test results and

physicians' reports on Claimant's medical condition. The Court

finds no reason to disturb the ALJ's decision, based as it is on

substantial evidence. 

B. Whether the ALJ Improperly Discounted Plaintiff's 

Symptom-Reporting

Claimant contends that the ALJ did not offer clear and

convincing evidence as to why Plaintiff's symptom reporting was

inaccurate. Pl.'s Mot. at 8-9. The Ninth Circuit stated that

when the Claimant has "produced medical evidence of underlying

impairments consistent with his complaints and there is no

affirmative evidence that he is malingering, the ALJ's reasons for

rejecting [Claimant]'s testimony must be clear and convincing." 

Regennitter v. Commissioner, 166 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the ALJ had before him the

clear and convincing evidence necessary to discount Plaintiff's

testimony. Both medical experts, Dr. Pon and Dr. Jensen, stated

that Claimant was capable of returning to work based upon their

investigations. AR at 22, 23, 229, 430. While Dr. Jensen only

reviewed the medical records, Dr. Pon performed a physical

examination of Claimant as part of his evaluation. AR at 227-230. 

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The medical evidence indicated that Plaintiff had adequate

flexibility in her lower extremities. AR at 22, 229. Moreover,

the ALJ credited the results of several X-ray and MRI tests which

revealed some disc compression, but no damage severe enough to

support Plaintiff's claims. AR at 22. Because the ALJ's

determination was based on clear and convincing evidence, the

Court will not disturb the ALJ's decision to discount Claimant's

symptom-reporting.

C. Whether the ALJ's finding on past relevant work was 

proper

Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ failed to consider the

effect of her mental limitations in evaluating her ability to

return to work. Pl.'s Mot at 9. In this area, the ALJ "has a

duty to make the requisite factual findings to support his

conclusion." Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir.

2001). "This is done by looking at the 'residual functional

capacity and the physical and mental demands' of the claimant's

past relevant work." Id. 

In his written decision, the ALJ made the requisite factual

findings as to the alleged mental impairments. The ALJ found

"that the claimant has mild restrictions of the activities of

daily living; she has mild difficulties in maintaining social

functioning; she has moderate difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace." AR at 24. Furthermore, the

ALJ described Claimant's residual functional capacity through the

date last insured, listing her capabilities to perform a variety

of physical and mental tasks. AR at 24. Finally, the ALJ

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credited Claimant's description of her job as a letter clerk for

the United States Postal Service and noted that based upon his

findings of fact, she was capable of performing past work and was

not disabled under the SAA. AR at 24-25. The ALJ noted that

Claimant's job comprised "unskilled" labor, which did not demand

much concentration or pace. AR at 25. Thus, the ALJ performed

the appropriate legal analysis and made proper factual findings

with respect to Plaintiff's mental condition and relevant past

work.

V. CONCLUSION

Because the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial

evidence, the Court finds no reason to disturb the final decision

of the Social Security Administration.

Accordingly, Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED

and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 8, 2006

____________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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