Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-00727/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-00727-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICARDO MERCADO-GUILLEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-00727-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 10

Petitioner Ricardo Mercado-Guillen is currently in the custody of U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) pending the conclusion of his removal proceedings. On February 

1, 2018, Mr. Mercado1filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in 

which he requests the Court to order his release from custody or to order a bond hearing before an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”). Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”). On February 5, 2018, Mr. Mercado filed a 

motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) seeking to enjoin his continued detention 

without a bond hearing. Dkt. No. 10.

After completion of the briefing on both the petition and the motion for a TRO, the Court 

ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing to address the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). Dkt. No. 18. Having reviewed the completed

briefing, the Court finds this matter suitable for resolution without a hearing. Civ. L.R. 7-

1(b). For the following reasons, the petition is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The 

motion for a TRO is DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Mercado is a Mexican citizen who has lived in the United States since January of 

 

1

The petition generally refers to the Petitioner as “Mr. Mercado,” so the Court will do so as well.

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2000. Petition ¶ 13. Mr. Mercado has three children who are U.S. citizens, and has been 

employed in Oakland since 2003. Id ¶ 14. 

In April of 2007, Mr. Mercado was convicted of driving under the influence. Dkt. No. 15-

1 (“Hubbard Decl.”) ¶ 3. On April 4, 2012, ICE removed Mr. Mercado to Mexico. Id. ¶ 4. On or 

around April 18, having re-entered the United States from Mexico, Mr. Mercado was again 

detained and removed to Mexico. Petition ¶ 16; Hubbard Decl. ¶ 4. Mr. Mercado immediately reentered the United States. Petition ¶ 16. On April 10, 2017, Mr. Mercado submitted a letter to the 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Asylum Office, requesting that ICE decline to 

order expedited removal because Mr. Mercado was an applicant for derivative asylum based on 

his wife’s May 6, 2016 asylum application. Petition ¶¶ 17–18; Dkt. No. 4 at 6–7. On July 11, 

2017, ICE apprehended and detained Mr. Mercado for illegally re-entering the United States after 

removal. Petition ¶ 19; Dkt. No. 15 (“Response”) at 5. Mr. Mercado expressed a fear of 

persecution in Mexico and was referred for a reasonable fear interview with an asylum officer, but 

on July 21, 2017, the Asylum Office made a negative reasonable fear finding. Petition ¶ 20. Mr.

Mercado requested review by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that same day. Id. On August 15, 

2017, the IJ affirmed negative fear finding of the Asylum Office, and returned the case to ICE to 

execute the removal order. Petition ¶ 21; Response at 5. 

On or around August 15, 2017, Mr. Mercado filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit to stay 

removal. Petition ¶ 22; Response at 5. Mr. Mercado’s motion was denied on January 26, 2018. 

Response at 5. Mr. Mercado subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted 

by the Ninth Circuit on January 30, 2018. Petition ¶ 23; Response at 5. On September 20, 2017, 

ICE served Mr. Mercado with its decision to continue his detention during the pendency of his 

appeal. Response at 5. On December 20, 2017, Mr. Mercado filed a motion to seek a prolonged 

immigration custody hearing, pursuant to Rodriguez v. Robbins (“Rodriguez III”), 804 F.3d 1060 

(9th Cir. 2015). Petition ¶ 24. The IJ denied the motion on December 27, 2017, citing lack of 

jurisdiction. Petition ¶ 25; Response at 5; Hubbard Decl., Ex. G at 2 (“[R]espondents in negative 

reasonable fear proceedings are not in removal proceedings under section 240 of the [Immigration 

and Nationality] Act and are not seeking direct or collateral review of a final removal order. 

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Instead, they are seeking withholding of a final removal order under section 241(a)(5) of the Act, 

and will remain subject to the reinstated removal order even if withholding of removal is 

ultimately granted.”). On January 9, 2018, Mr. Mercado again filed a motion for a custody 

hearing based on his detention of over 180 days. Petition ¶ 26. The IJ again denied the motion for 

lack of jurisdiction on January 12. Petition ¶ 26; Response at 5. On January 19, 2018, Mr. 

Mercado filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Petition ¶ 27. 

That appeal was dismissed on April 5, 2018. Dkt. No. 22. Mr. Mercado now petitions for a writ 

of habeas corpus, asserting that his continued detention without a bond hearing is unlawful. 

II. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

A. Detention of Non-Citizens Under the Immigration and Nationality Act

Multiple provisions within the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) govern the

detention of non-citizens awaiting removal from the United States. Section 1226(a) gives the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) authorization to detain a non-citizen “pending a 

decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 8 

U.S.C. § 1231(a) governs the detention of non-citizens who have already been ordered removed. 

Section 1231(a) authorizes detention both during and after the “removal period.” The removal 

period generally lasts 90 days beginning from the latest of: (1) the date the order of removal

becomes administratively final; (2) if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of 

the court's final order; or (3) if the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration 

process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A); 

Diouf v. Napolitano (“Diouf II”), 634 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2011). During the removal 

period, detention is mandatory. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Section 1231(a)(6) grants DHS the 

discretionary authority to continue to detain non-citizens beyond the removal period, if that person 

“has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply 

with the order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1059 

(9th Cir. 2008). The parties do not dispute that Mr. Mercado is being detained pursuant to the 

discretionary authority authorized under section 1231(a)(6). Response at 2; Dkt. No 16 

(“Traverse”) ¶ 9. 

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A non-citizen who expresses fear of removal to the country specified in the removal order

is referred to an asylum officer for a “reasonable fear determination.” 8 C.F.R. § 238.31; 8 C.F.R. 

§ 241.8(e). If it is determined that the non-citizen has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, 

the asylum officer refers the matter to an immigration judge to consider the request to withhold 

removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e). In these “withholding-only” proceedings, the IJ may only 

consider whether the non-citizen is “eligible for withholding or deferral of removal,” and “all 

parties are prohibited from raising or considering any other issues, including but not limited to 

issues of admissibility, deportability, eligibility for waivers, and eligibility for any other form of 

relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(c)(3)(i). 

B. Legal Framework

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court considered whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) 

allowed the detention of a non-citizen being held beyond the removal period. Zadvydas v. Davis, 

533 U.S. 678 (2001). The Court determined that a statute permitting that type of indefinite 

detention would “raise a serious constitutional problem,” and that the section 1231(a)(6) “limits an 

alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's 

removal from the United States.” Id. at 689–90. The Court held that six months was a 

presumptively reasonable period of detention for a non-citizen held under section 1231(a)(6), and 

that after this period, once the non-citizen “provides good reason to believe that there is no 

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must 

respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at 701.

In Diouf II, the Ninth Circuit held that “prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6), without 

adequate procedural protections would raise serious constitutional concerns.” Diouf II, 634 F.3d 

at 1086 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court held that a non-citizen “facing prolonged 

detention under § 1231(a)(6) is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge and is

entitled to be released from detention unless the government establishes that the [non-citizen] 

poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community.” Id. at 1092. The court defined “prolonged” 

detention as detention that “has lasted six months and is expected to continue more than minimally 

beyond six months.” Id. at 1092 n.13.

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C. Application to Mr. Mercado

Respondents make several arguments in an effort to distinguish Mr. Mercado’s case from 

the facts of Diouf II.

2

 Respondents contend that Diouf II does not apply to Mr. Mercado’s petition 

because Mr. Mercado, as a petitioner in withholding-only proceedings, will remain subject to 

removal regardless of the result of his application for withholding of removal. Response at 9–10.

This argument is unavailing. Diouf II did not draw Respondents’ proposed distinction between 

different types of section 1231(a)(6) detainees, stating that “[s]ection 1231(a)(6) encompasses 

aliens such as Diouf, whose collateral challenge to his removal order (a motion to reopen) is 

pending in the court of appeals, as well as [] aliens who have exhausted all direct and collateral 

review of their removal orders but who, for one reason or another, have not yet been removed 

from the United States.” Diouf II, 634 F.3d at 1085. Thus, Diouf II applies to all non-citizens who 

are detained under section 1231(a)(6). See Cortez v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-01014-DMR, 2018 WL 

1510187, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2018) (“The Ninth Circuit in Diouf II extended the right to a 

bond hearing to all non-citizens detained more than six months under section 1231(a)(6)”). 

Respondents additionally contend that because, unlike the petitioner in Diouf II, Mr. 

Mercado was never lawfully admitted into the United States, the “government’s interest in 

detaining aliens previously removed who have illegally reentered the United States presents 

qualitatively different concerns than those addressed in Diouf II.” Response at 9. Respondents do 

not explain how this factual distinction between Mr. Mercado’s case and Mr. Diouf’s case would 

alter this Court’s analysis, other than again noting that Mr. Mercado’s removability is not in 

question. For the same reasons outlined above, the Court finds that Respondents have failed to 

distinguish Mr. Mercado’s case from the group of non-citizen detainees addressed in Diouf II.

 

2 Respondents also initially contended that the Court should dismiss Mr. Mercado’s habeas 

petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, because his January 19, 2018 appeal to the 

Board of Immigration Appeals was still pending at the time of Respondents’ briefing. Response at 

7; Petition ¶ 27. Mr. Mercado’s appeal to the BIA has since been dismissed. See Dkt. No. 22. As 

a result, whether or not administrative exhaustion is required, the Court finds that Mr. Mercado 

has satisfactorily exhausted his available judicial and administrative remedies. See Hernandez v. 

Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A] court may waive the prudential exhaustion 

requirement if administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative 

remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings 

would be void.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Respondents also contend that, under Zadvydas, Mr. Mercado must demonstrate that there 

is not a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” in order to receive 

a bond hearing. Response at 10 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Zadvydas, however, did not 

consider the present question of whether detention beyond the presumptively reasonable sixmonth period entitles a non-citizen held to a bond hearing when removal is not imminent. The 

Ninth Circuit examined this question with respect to section 1231(a)(6) in Diouf II. Diouf II’s

ruling does not conflict with Zadvydas. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held that non-citizens detained

under section 1231(a)(6) beyond the presumptively-reasonable six month period are entitled to a 

bond hearing when removal is not imminent. Diouf II, 634 F.3d at 1092-93 and n.13. 

Respondents’ contention that “Petitioner has not and cannot show that he is not subject to removal 

in the reasonably foreseeable future” is not sufficient to demonstrate that Mr. Mercado’s removal 

is imminent, given that more than two months have elapsed since Respondents first made that 

argument, and Mr. Mercado remains in ICE custody. See Response at 10.

Respondents finally contend that, based on Rodriguez III and now Jennings, the absence of 

higher court analysis with respect to non-citizens detained under section 1231(a) indicates that the 

reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Diouf II may be invalid. Dkt. No. 20 at 3–4. But Diouf II 

remains good law. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings overruled the holdings in

Rodriguez III and Casas-Castrillion that non-citizens detained under sections 1225(b)(1), 

1225(b)(2), and 1226(c) are entitled to bond hearings every six months, finding that Rodriguez III

misapplied the canon of constitutional avoidance. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842. The Jennings

Court specifically noted the difference between the language in section 1231(a)(6) and the 

language in sections 1225(b) and 1226(c). Id. at 844. Jennings therefore left in place the 

Zadvydas ruling with respect to section 1231(a)(6), which serves as a legal basis for the holding of 

Diouf II. See Cortez v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-01014-DMR, 2018 WL 1510187, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 27, 2018) (“Diouf II remains good law which this court is bound to follow.”) (citing Ramos 

v. Jennings, No. 18-cv-00413-JST, 2018 WL 1317276, at 3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2018)).

Mr. Mercado falls directly within the category of non-citizens held under section 

1231(a)(6) governed by Diouf II, which remains valid precedent that this Court must follow. 

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Therefore, Mr. Mercado is entitled to a bond hearing, during which DHS must establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community if his detention is to 

continue. This Court does not have sufficient information to determine in the first instance

whether Mr. Mercado is a flight risk or a danger to the community, and expresses no view on that 

point at this stage. For that reason, Mr. Mercado is not entitled to immediate release from custody, 

and his request for immediate release is DENIED. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Mercado-Guillen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Within 15 days of the date of this order, Mr. 

Mercado-Guillen must be provided with a bond hearing before an immigration judge. At that 

hearing, DHS must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Mercado-Guillen is a 

flight risk or a danger to the community in order to continue his detention.

In his motion for a temporary restraining order, Mr. Mercado-Guillen seeks identical relief 

as in his petition. His motion for a temporary restraining order is therefore DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

4/19/2018

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