Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00992/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00992-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frederick W. Covell, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV11-992 PHX DGC

 

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are the second amended petition for writ of habeas 

corpus filed by pro se Petitioner Frederick W. Covell (Doc. 36) and the Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by United States Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade 

(Doc. 51). The R&R recommends that the petition be denied because it is procedurally 

barred. Doc. 51 at 14. Petitioner filed a written objection to the R&R requesting the 

appointment of counsel and additional time to submit a detailed objection. Doc. 52. 

The Court granted Petitioner’s request for additional time on December 21, 2012 

(Doc. 53), and granted Petitioner’s second request for additional time on January 8, 

2013 (Doc. 55). Petitioner filed his second objection to the R&R on February 1, 2013. 

Doc. 56. Petitioner has not requested oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the 

Court will accept the R&R and deny the petition. 

I. Background.

 Petitioner does not object to the R&R’s recitation of facts, and therefore the 

Court will adopt it summarily. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Arizona state 

court of (1) knowing possession of a handgun while being a prohibited possessor, (2) 

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knowing possession of a shotgun while being a prohibited possessor, and (3) 

possession of a pipe bomb. Doc. 51 at 2. After sentencing, Petitioner filed a 

consolidated appeal arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions for prohibited possession of a handgun and shotgun (id.), and the appellate 

court reversed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on those counts (id. at 3). The 

appellate court clarified that its ruling did not affect Petitioner’s conviction for 

possession of a pipe bomb. Id. Petitioner then filed two notices for post-conviction 

relief, but both proceedings were dismissed after Petitioner failed to file a petition for 

post-conviction relief. Id. Petitioner’s second amended petition for writ of habeas 

corpus raises 27 grounds for relief. Doc. 36. 

 The R&R concludes that the portion of ground 22 that challenges Petitioner’s 

prohibited possession of a handgun and shotgun convictions is moot because those 

convictions were reversed by the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct review. Doc. 51 

at 5, 14. As to the remaining grounds, the R&R concludes that the claims are 

procedurally barred and that Petitioner has failed to establish a basis to overcome the 

procedural bar. Doc. 51 at 1, 14. 

II. Discussion.

 The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by a magistrate judge in a habeas case. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). The Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the 

R&R to which specific objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 Petitioner makes the following specific objections: (1) the claims are not 

procedurally barred because Petitioner presented the claims in four special actions to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 56 at ¶¶ 1, 3); (2) the Maricopa County Superior 

Court refused to rule on Petitioner’s motions for transcripts, and this resulted in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice because Petitioner was prevented from raising 

certain issues in his petition for post-conviction relief (id. at ¶ 2); (3) Petitioner would 

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succeed in overturning his conviction and is more likely to succeed than any other 

habeas petitioner (id. at ¶ 4); (4) ineffective assistance of counsel prevented Petitioner 

from asserting his claims on appeal in the Arizona state courts (id. at ¶¶ 6, 8, 9, 12); 

(5) Judge Bade erred in relying on Kajander v. Shroeder, No. CV-08-1172-PHXGMS (GEE), 2009 WL 775395 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2009) because it “is not controlling 

nor is it in the proper jurisdiction” (id. at ¶ 10); and (6) Judge Bade erred in finding 

that Petitioner filed only 2 special actions (id. at ¶ 11). The Court has not considered 

Petitioner’s general objections concerning claims like “Judge Bade did not even read 

petition” (Id. at 5), or that the state court’s “no-ruling” decisions do not support a 

finding that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred (id. at ¶ 5). The Court has 

reviewed Petitioner’s specific objections de novo. 

A. Procedurally Barred.

 The R&R finds that Petitioner failed to present his claims to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals on direct or collateral review and, because Petitioner cannot return to state 

court to present those claims, they are now procedurally defaulted and technically 

exhausted. Doc. 51 at 9. The R&R concludes that Petitioner’s special action petitions 

do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement because review of those actions is 

discretionary. Id. (citing Kajander, 2009 WL 775395 at *3; Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 29 (2004)). Petitioner argues that he preserved issues by presenting claims in 

special actions to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. 56 at ¶ 1. 

 Petitioner objects to the R&R’s finding that he submitted only two special 

action petitions, and appears to argue that he satisfied the exhaustion requirement by 

submitting four special action petitions to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. 56 at 

¶ 11. Petitioner does in fact appear to have presented four special action petitions. See 

Doc. 52-1 at 9; Doc. 36 at 4-5. The Court agrees with the R&R, however, that special 

action petitions are not a proper vehicle to present claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals for federal habeas exhaustion purposes – and this conclusion is not affected 

by how many special petition actions Petitioner filed. See Kajander, 2009 WL 775395 

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at *2-3. Petitioner objects to the R&R’s reliance on Kajander and submits that it “is 

not controlling nor is it in the proper jurisdiction.” Doc. 56 at ¶ 10. Kajander was a 

decision of this Court finding that a special action in Arizona state courts is not a 

mechanism to fairly present claims for exhaustion purposes. 2009 WL 775395 at *3. 

This Court has repeatedly adopted this position. See Little v. Schriro, No. CV-06-

2591-PHX-FJM, 2008 WL 2115230, at *12 (D.Ariz. May 19, 2008); Craig v. Schriro, 

CV-06-0626-PHX-PGR, 2006 WL 2872219, at *10 (D.Ariz. Oct.5, 2006); Rodriquez 

v. Klein, No. CV-05-3852-PHX-NVW, 2006 WL 1806020, at *4 (D.Ariz. June 28, 

2006). The Court denies Petitioner’s objection to the R&R’s reliance on Kajander. 

The Court will adopt the R&R with respect to its finding that Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally barred. 

 B. Cause and Prejudice.

 A procedurally defaulted claim will not be barred from federal review if the 

petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(2004); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). “[T]he existence of cause 

for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that 

some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with 

the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also 

Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has 

identified three instances where a petitioner might demonstrate cause for failure to 

comply with a state procedural rule: (1) the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to petitioner; (2) some interference by officials made compliance 

impracticable; or (3) the default was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse 

a procedural default, the Court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the 

petitioner fails to establish cause. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

The R&R finds that Petitioner failed to show cause. Doc. 51 at 10-13. Petitioner 

objects and argues that he established cause because he was denied transcripts and 

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evidence necessary to identify his appealable claims, and because of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Doc. 56 at ¶¶ 2, 6, 8, 9, 12. 

 Petitioner argues that his motions requesting transcripts and evidence were 

rejected and unanswered by the Maricopa County Superior Court. Doc. 56 at ¶ 2. The 

R&R correctly finds, however, that the failure to provide Petitioner with transcripts 

does not establish cause because he does not explain how the absence of transcripts 

prevented him from presenting his claims to the state courts. 

 While ineffective counsel may establish cause, attorney ignorance, inadvertence 

or error short of that which is constitutionally ineffective under the Sixth Amendment 

is not generally cause for a procedural default. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 484. If 

counsel makes a tactical decision to forego a claim, counsel’s error cannot constitute 

cause for a procedural default. See Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1988); see 

also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (“Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not cause 

because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing to act, in 

furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must bear the risk of attorney error.” 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Additionally, the petitioner must 

first exhaust state remedies on the independent claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel for that claim to constitute cause. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89; see also 

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453-54 (2000). Petitioner argues that he 

exhausted his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because he raised the claim on 

a motion for new counsel and a motion to reconsider before the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. Doc. 56 at ¶ 9. These types of motions do not satisfy the exhaustion 

requirement because they do not “fairly present” the claim to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals in a procedurally correct manner – either on direct appeal or in a petition for 

post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Kajander, 2009 WL 775395 at *3 (citations omitted) 

(“[C]laims are not fairly presented if they are raised in a procedural context in which 

the merits will not be considered absent special circumstances.”). Accordingly, the 

Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner failed to exhaust his ineffective assistance 

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of counsel claim. Moreover, Petitioner’s objection fails to demonstrate how his claim 

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is sufficient to establish constitutional 

ineffectiveness under the Sixth Amendment. The Court therefore adopts the R&R’s 

finding of no cause. 

C. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice.

 A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “a constitutional violation 

has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. 

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The 

exception applies only where a petitioner makes the extraordinary showing that an 

innocent person was probably convicted due to a constitutional violation. Id. “To 

establish the requisite probability,” the petitioner must prove with new reliable 

evidence that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found 

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Petitioner raises 27 grounds for 

relief (Doc. 36), none of which presents newly established evidence of his actual 

innocence. The Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner has failed to establish that a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the Court denies his claims. Doc. 51 

at 13. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade’s R&R (Doc. 51) is accepted. 

 2. Petitioner Frederick W. Covell’s second amended petition for writ of 

 habeas corpus (Doc. 36) is denied. 

 3. A certificate of appealability is denied because Petitioner has not made a 

 substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required by 

 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

 4. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 15th day of February, 2013. 

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