Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02972/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02972-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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 This disposition is not designated for publication in the official reporter. 1

Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

**E-Filed July 1, 2008 **

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

BARBARA ZOTO,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case Number 07-02972 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 1

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND

REMANDING TO THE SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

[re: docket no. 12]

Plaintiff Barbara Zoto (“Zoto”) filed the instant motion for summary judgment on

November 6, 2007, seeking reversal or remand with respect to Defendant’s decision to deny her

application for Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security

Act. Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), filed

a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 6, 2007. The matter has been submitted for

decision without oral argument. For the reasons discussed below, Zoto’s motion will be

Case 5:07-cv-02972-JF Document 15 Filed 07/01/08 Page 1 of 12
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 In multiple documents, Zoto maintains that she became disabled on December 31, 2002. 2

However, she also asserts that she has been out of work as a result of her disability since October

22, 2001. See A.R. 34-35. The Court need not resolve the discrepancy here, but the Social

Security Administration may wish to do so on remand. 

2

Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

DENIED; the Commissioner’s motion will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;

and the case will be REMANDED to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings

consistent with this order.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

dated August 1, 2007, and the accompanying administrative record. Zoto is forty-seven years

old. A.R. 70. She completed the eleventh grade and has work experience as a retail store cashier

and a restaurant custodian. Id. at 86-90. Zoto alleges that she became disabled on December 31,

2002 and has been unable to work because of depression, paranoia, anxiety, panic attacks,

hypertension, asthma, severe back pain, and back and knee injuries. Id. at 134-35. Her

2

application initially was denied on July 22, 2003, id. at 49, and was denied again after

reconsideration on February 4, 2005, id. at 59. Pursuant to Zoto’s request, the ALJ held an

administrative hearing on April 25, 2006. Id. at 597. Zoto was represented by an attorney and

testified at the hearing. Id. at 598. 

After reviewing all the evidence, the ALJ found that Zoto is not disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act § 1614(a)(3)(A), and thus is not entitled to disability benefits. 

Id. at 15. Specifically, the ALJ found that Zoto had not engaged in substantial gainful activity at

any time relevant to the decision. Id. at 19. Further, although the ALJ found that Zoto’s

depression, cocaine dependence (in remission by report), asthma, and cervical and lumbar muscle

strains were “severe” within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c), her medical impairment did

not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1. Id. The ALJ gave little weight to the opinions of Zoto’s treating psychiatrist, Dr.

Natividad, finding them to be inconsistent with the record as a whole and reflecting a biased

Case 5:07-cv-02972-JF Document 15 Filed 07/01/08 Page 2 of 12
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 A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what she can still do despite existing 3

exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir.

1989).

3

Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

advocacy for Zoto. Id. at 23-24. The ALJ also found that there were inconsistencies between

Zoto’s testimony and the diagnostic tests and medical findings in the record. Id. The ALJ noted,

for example, that Zoto alleged “excruciating back pain,” but that her condition required only

routine treatment. Id. Similar inconsistencies were noted with respect to Zoto’s mental health

issues. Id. The ALJ also found that Zoto “put forth minimal effort in her recovery.” Id. 

Accordingly, the ALJ discredited Zoto’s testimony as to the intensity, persistence and limiting

effects of her symptoms on the basis that the testimony was not well supported by the probative

evidence of the record as a whole. Id. at 24-25. Finally, the ALJ considered but gave little

weight to the third-party statements of Zoto’s family and friends. Id. at 25. 

The ALJ found that Zoto has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to lift and carry 3

twenty-five pounds frequently and fifty pounds occasionally; to sit, stand and/or walk for six

hours of an eight hour work day; and to perform simple repetitive tasks. Id. at 25. The ALJ did

find that Zoto’s asthma requires her to avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases,

and poor ventilation. Id. Considering Zoto’s RFC, age, education and work experience, the ALJ

concluded pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 426.960(c) and 416.966 that jobs that Zoto could perform exist

in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 26. 

In June 2006, Zoto requested an administrative review of the ALJ’s decision by the

Appeals Council. That request was denied on April 3, 2007, and the ALJ’s decision thus became

final. Zoto thereafter commenced the instant action. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard for Reviewing the Commissioner’s Decision 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the authority to review the

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only

if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on the application of improper legal

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Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d

1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). In this context, the term “substantial evidence” means “more than a

mere scintilla but less than a preponderance- it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; see also Drouin,

966 F.2d at 1257. When determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the

Commissioner’s decision, the Court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering

adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation,

the Court must defer to the decision of the Commissioner. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin,

966 F.2d at 1258.

B. Standard for Determining Disability

A person is “disabled” for the purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if she is

unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity as a result of physical or mental impairment

that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months or is

expected to result in death. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner follows a five-step

sequential evaluation process in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. 

In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant currently is

engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. 

Id. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step

requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or

combination of impairments which significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work

activities; if not, a finding of “not disabled” is made and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant

has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the

Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination or impairments meets or

equals an impairment in the Listing; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are

awarded. Id. If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or

equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine

Case 5:07-cv-02972-JF Document 15 Filed 07/01/08 Page 4 of 12
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28 5

Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functioning capacity” (“RFC”) to perform his or her

past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. The claimant has the

burden of proving that she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If

the claimant meets this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. The Commissioner

then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful

work; the determination of this issue comprises of the fifth and final step in the sequential

analysis. 20 C.F.R. 20 § 416.920; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

III. DISCUSSION

Zoto asserts several challenges to the ALJ’s decision. First, she argues that the ALJ’s

assessment of her physical RFC was not supported by substantial evidence. Second, she

contends that the ALJ improperly assessed her mental RFC by rejecting the opinion of Dr.

Natividad. Third, she asserts that the ALJ improperly discounted her symptom reporting

testimony and the third-party statements. Finally, she argues that the ALJ did not establish that

she can perform other substantial gainful work as required under step five of the sequential

analysis.

A. ALJ’s Assessment of Zoto’s Residual Functioning Capacity

Zoto contends that the ALJ improperly assessed her RFC and thereby incorrectly found

that she is not disabled. The claimant bears the initial burden of establishing disability by

showing that a physical or mental impairment prevents her from engaging in any of her previous

occupations. Sanchez v. Sec’y of HHS, 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1989); Allen v. Sec’y of HHS,

726 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984). In assessing a claimant’s medical reports, the ALJ must

assess all evidence, including the claimant’s medical reports, to determine what capacity the

claimant has for work despite her impairment(s). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The ALJ may

resolve disputes in contradicted medical evidence. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th

Cir. 1989); Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Keckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).

Here, the ALJ considered all of the medical evidence in the record before determining

that Zoto has the RFC to do medium exertion work. Zoto argues that the ALJ misinterpreted the

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Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

expert testimony of Dr. C. E. Gable and contends that Dr. Gable’s examination reports of June

2003 and June 2004 indicate an ability to perform only light exertion work. Pursuant to 20

C.F.R. § 416.967(c), “medium exertion” work consists of frequently lifting or carrying twentyfive pounds and occasionally lifting fifty pounds. While Dr. Gable’s 2003 report does not

address Zoto’s capacity to do such work, his 2004 report specifically notes she would be able to

“lift 25 pounds on a regular basis and 50 pounds occasionally.” A.R. at 286. Zoto contends that

Dr. Gable’s findings in 2004 were “conditional or even speculative” because the doctor also

noted her apparent back spasms. See Brief of Plaintiff at 4, Zoto v. Astrue, No. 07-2972 JF (N.D.

Cal. Nov. 6, 2007). However, the ALJ discredited Zoto’s claim of back spasms when discussing

Zoto’s inconsistent testimony and overall lack of credibility. A.R. at 24. This Court will not

reverse reasonable credibility determinations of an ALJ. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428,

1433-34 (9th Cir. 1995); Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984).

There is additional evidence in the record that supports a finding of medium exertion

capacity. For example, Zoto’s primary physician, Dr. Lin, found in February 2006 that there was

no evidence of back impairment beyond “mild arthritis.” A.R. 577. Dr. John Chokatos, a state

agency doctor, also found Zoto capable of medium exertion work in June, 2004. A.R. at 310. 

The Ninth Circuit previously has held that, “[o]pinions of a nonexamining, testifying medical

advisor may serve as substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the

record and are consistent with it.” Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600

(9th Cir. 1999); see also Andrews v. Shala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). Dr. Chokatos’s

evaluation serves as such substantial evidence here.

Zoto also contends that the May 2005 evaluation by her physical therapist, Deanne Smith,

supports an RFC of light exertion work. A.R. at 432. Zoto argues that the ALJ incorrectly gave

Smith’s report less weight in light of recent changes to Social Security Rules that greatly reduced

the distinction between the testimony of medical witnesses and other treating practitioners such

as physical therapists. See SSR 06-03p. However, even if the ALJ had accorded equal weight to

Smith’s testimony, Smith’s findings are contradictory to the majority of the other evidence in the

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Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

record. Accordingly, the Court finds and concludes that Zoto’s arguments on the physical

aspects of the RFC are without merit. The ALJ’s assessment of Zoto’s physical capabilities is

supported by substantial evidence.

The ALJ’s assessment of Zoto’s mental capabilities also is supported by substantial

evidence. Zoto claims that the ALJ misinterpreted evidence tending to show that she has

extensive limitations, while discussing only those reports that support a finding of mild to

moderate limitations. See Plaintiff’s brief at 6. In fact, all of the psychiatric evidence in the

record, apart from the discredited reports of Dr. Natividad (discussed below), supports a finding

of mild to moderate limitations in mental capacity. See A.R. at 242-43, 291-93, 305, 562-69. 

Several of these reports were submitted by Disability Determination Service psychiatrists, whose

opinions “may serve as substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the

record and are consistent with it.” See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d

595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Andrews v. Shala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). The

ALJ’s conclusion that Zoto is capable of performing “simple, repetitive tasks that do not require

frequent contact with the supervisors, coworkers, and the public” is consistent with mild to

moderate limitations. See A.R. at 242-43, 291-93, 305, 562-69. 

Zoto’s additional argument that her work history and education evidence extensive

limitations of her mental capacity also is without support in the record. Even though a pregnancy

prevented Zoto from completing her high school education, two intelligence evaluations reflect

that Zoto is of low average range intelligence and has only mild to moderate limitations of her

mental capability. See id. at 242, 565. Zoto’s poor history in positions of extensive interaction

with the public does not evidence an inability to perform the limited interaction positions

recommended by the ALJ. See id. at 602-03. The ALJ’s finding with respect to Zoto’s mental

RFC was an accurate and reasonable assessment of her capabilities and is supported by

substantial evidence. 

B. ALJ’s Evaluation of the Testimony of Dr. Natividad and Third-Party Witnesses

Zoto next contends that the ALJ impermissibly discounted the credibility of her treating

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Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

psychiatrist, Dr. Natividad, as well as her third-party witnesses. Greater weight usually is given

to the opinion of a treating physician. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,

1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992)). However,

a treating physician’s opinion is not always binding; rather, “the ALJ must give specific,

legitimate reasons” for disregarding a treating physician’s opinion. Id. Here, the ALJ expressly

considered Dr. Natividad’s opinions, properly compared them to the other medical testimony in

the record and adequately explained his basis for according the opinions little weight. The ALJ

noted that Dr. Natividad’s opinion was “guided” in favor of Zoto, and that questionnaires used in

treatment were provided by Zoto’s attorney. A.R. at 24. The ALJ also observed that Dr.

Natividad’s “opinions appear reflective of a position of ‘advocate’ for the patient.” Id.; see also

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ may reject treating physician’s

advocating report as untrustworthy). The ALJ discussed specifically the discrepancies between

the findings in Dr. Natividad’s report and the routine group therapy Dr. Natividad recommended. 

Zoto contends that her financial situation required routine asthma treatments rather than

more aggressive treatment; however, the asthma treatments are completely unrelated to the

cognitive therapy group sessions recommended by Dr. Natividad. Even if the same financial

limitations prevented her from seeking further cognitive therapy, Zoto still misunderstands the

ALJ’s conclusion, which is that Dr. Natividad himself did not believe that Zoto’s condition

warranted anything more than routine group therapy. Based on this reasoning, the ALJ

permissively inferred that Zoto’s mental impairments were not serious enough to prevent her

from finding work. See Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (logical inferences

may be drawn from the evidence). The ALJ provided sufficient legitimate and specific reasons

for discrediting Dr. Natividad’s opinions. 

Zoto also contends that the ALJ impermissibly discredited the testimony of her family

and friends as third-party witnesses to her symptoms. The controlling regulations permit an ALJ

to consider testimony of family and friends as lay witnesses but do not require the ALJ to

articulate specific reasons for rejecting or discrediting such testimony. See 20 C.F.R. §

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Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

416.913(d)(4) (stating that an ALJ “may also use evidence from other sources to show the

severity [of a claimant’s] impairment(s)” (emphasis added)); see Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d

1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984). Zoto argues pursuant to Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th

Cir. 1996), that the ALJ was required to consider these third-party statements and provide

specific reasons in the report if discrediting the opinions. The ALJ’s decision, however, notes

that the ALJ “reviewed and [gave] full consideration to these reports by friends and/or family.” 

A.R. at 25. The ALJ explained specifically that these lay opinions were not sufficient to

overcome the significant amount of medical testimony available. A.R. 25. 

C. ALJ’s Evaluation of Zoto’s Testimony

Zoto asserts that the ALJ committed legal error in discounting her personal testimony and

in finding that her complaints were “not wholly credible.” A.R. at 25. Zoto points out that the

ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for discrediting symptom reporting absent

evidence of malingering. See Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1296

(9th Cir. 1999). Here, however, several of the medical reports in the record did evidence

possible malingering. For example, Dr. Gable’s skepticism with respect to Zoto’s self-reporting

is clear in his June 2003 evaluation, which notes that Dr. Gable did not observe any muscle

spasm that could have produced Zoto’s “supposedly” excruciating pain. A.R. at 245. 

Moreover, despite this record evidence of malingering, the ALJ did provide “clear and

convincing” reasons for discrediting Zoto’s testimony, including the discrepancies between

Zoto’s testimony and other evidence. Under Ninth Circuit authority, an ALJ may consider

discrepancies between a claimant’s subjective claims and objective medical records in evaluating

the credibility of testimony. Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. Here, the ALJ discussed the

discrepancies between Zoto’s reported symptoms and the results of her diagnostic tests. A.R. at

24. Evidence of conservative treatment also is a legitimate reason to discredit a claimant’s claim

of subjective pain. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th 2007). Here, the ALJ discussed

at length the discrepancies between the levels of pain and impairment reported by Zoto and the

“very routine” physical and mental health treatments recommended by Zoto’s physicians. A.R.

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28 10

Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

at 24. 

The ALJ also clearly and convincingly weighed other indications that Zoto lacked

credibility. An ALJ may consider “unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek

treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment” as part of a credibility determination. See

Bunnel v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Here, the ALJ observed that

Zoto appeared to “put forth minimal effort in her recovery, including minimal cooperation during

more than one round of physical therapy.” A.R. at 24; see id at 502, 507, 511, 578, 580, 582. 

Bunnel also permits application of “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation.” 947 F.2d at

345-46. Here, the ALJ considered Zoto’s inconsistent testimony regarding her drug use,

specifically noting that notwithstanding Zoto’s statement that she had been “clean” since 2003,

her child was born intoxicated in 2004, and she missed two court ordered drug screenings in

2005. A.R. at 21, 24, 371, 498.

Zoto claims that the ALJ failed to discuss other evidence that supported her credibility,

such as the consistency between her written and oral testimony and Dr. Natividad’s opinion that

Zoto seemed “honest.” Id. at 430. Zoto relies on non-binding case law suggesting that where

evidence is discounted without comment, the ALJ may have been negligent in dismissing such

evidence. However, neither 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 nor SSR 96-7p require the ALJ to discuss each

item of evidence considered in formulating a decision. Having reviewed the entire record, the

Court is satisfied that the ALJ conducted a thorough and appropriate assessment of Zoto’s

credibility. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 

D. ALJ’s Finding of “Not Disabled” 

The ALJ having found that Zoto had no past relevant work, the burden shifted to the

Commissioner under the fifth step of analysis to produce evidence that there were a significant

number of jobs in the economy that Zoto could perform. 20 C.F.R. 20 § 416.920; Drouin, 966

F.2d at 1257. Pursuant to Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999), Zoto argues that

the ALJ’s finding of “not disabled” was incorrectly based on the use of “grids” alone. However,

“the fact that a nonexertional limitation is alleged does not automatically preclude application of

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28 11

Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

the grids.” Desrosiers v. Sec’y of HHS, 846 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1988). In determining

whether a nonexertional limitation precludes reliance on the grids, the ALJ “should first

determine if a claimant’s nonexertional limitations significantly limit the range of work permitted

by his exertional limitations.” Id.

 In the instant case, Zoto’s nonexertional limitations as found by the ALJ were: (1) a

limitation to simple, repetitive work; (2) a prohibition against concentrated exposure to fumes,

odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation; and (3) a limitation to work that does not require

frequent contact with supervisors, co-workers or the public. A.R. at 25. Though the ALJ

concluded that these nonexertional limitations “have little or no effect on the occupational base

of unskilled medium work,” the record does not provide any support for his finding. Id. at 26. 

The Ninth Circuit previously has held that “remand for further administrative proceedings is

appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587,

593 (9th Cir. 2004). Given that a vocational expert was not consulted in the instant case, this

Court finds that remand is appropriate with respect to this one issue. 

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Zoto’s motion for

summary judgment is DENIED; the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the instant case is REMANDED to the Social

Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

DATED: July 1, 2008

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 07-02972 JF (HRL)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND REMANDING

TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(JFEX1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

James Hunt Miller

Email: jim_miller0@yahoo.com 

Theophous H Reagans, Jr.

Email: theophous.reagans@ssa.gov 

Case 5:07-cv-02972-JF Document 15 Filed 07/01/08 Page 12 of 12