Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-02003/USCOURTS-ca10-95-02003-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States courthouse 

1823 stout street 

Denver, co 80257 

February 28, 1996 

Elisabeth Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

To: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

Re: 95-2003, Rutherford v. City of Albuquerque 

Filed February 23, 1996, by Judge Coffin 

Please be advised of the folowing correction to the 

captioned decision: 

Page 1, within the paragraph for the counsel for the 

defendants-appellees, the City of Albuquerque is incorrectly listed 

as Aluquerque. 

Page 16, third paragraph, third line, the reference to 

(lOth Cir. Jan. xx, 1996) should read (lOth Cir. Jan 17, 1996). 

Please make these corrections to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 1 
' . PUBLISH 

. li'J - ~ nited Sta•-Lc E Jj _, ourt or An .,., , Tenth Circuit ,pe41U.J 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FEB 23 1996 

TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER 

JERRY RUTHERFORD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ALBUQUERQUE, CITY OF; LOUIS E. 

SAAVEDRA, Mayor, ARTHUR BLUMENFELD, 

Chief Administrative Officer; JACK 

BURKHARD, JULIE GARCIA, MYRA 

GUTIERREZ, MARYANNE OLLER, individually 

and in their official capacities; 

ALBUQUERQUE PARKING/TRANSIT DEPARTMENT; 

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE EMPLOYEE HEALTH 

CENTER, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 95-2003 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CIV-91-1235-JB) 

f'lt>,.k . 

Paul Livingston, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Victor S. Lopez, Assistant City Attorney, Aluquerque, New Mexico 

(Robert M. White, City Attorney, and Judy K. Kelley, Assistant City 

Attorney, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, COFFIN, 1 and McKAY. 

1The Honorable Frank M. Coffin, United States Senior Circuit 

Judge for the First Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 2 
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. Appellant Jerry Rutherford was 

fired from his job with the City of Albuquerque because of a 

positive drug test. His challenge to the testing on due process 

and Fourth Amendment grounds was rejected by the district court, 

which granted summary judgment for the City on both claims. We 

affirm the court's ruling on the due process claim, but conclude 

that the circumstances surrounding Rutherford's testing constituted 

an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

I. Factual Background2 

Rutherford began working for the City of Albuquerque as a bus 

driver in April 1980. In April 1990, as a result of back problems 

that followed a work-related accident and a subsequent heart 

attack, he was placed into physical layoff status. He remained out 

of work until April 1991, when a doctor determined that he was fit 

to resume employment. 

Rutherford was scheduled to return to work on Monday, April 

15, as a truck driver in the Public Works Department. He was sent 

first to the Employee Health Center for a medical examination, 

including a urinalysis to test for drugs. The test revealed the 

presence of marijuana metabolites, indicating recent exposure to 

2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are not significantly in 

dispute. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 3 
the drug. Rutherford admitted in his deposition that he had smoked 

marijuana a week or two before the test. 

The drug test had been given to Rutherford pursuant to city 

policy adopted earlier in 1991. The policy, set out in 

Administrative Instruction Nos. 121 and 123, provided for drug 

testing in several specific situations, including testing as a 

prerequisite to obtaining a city operator's permit. Such a permit 

is required for the truck driving position Rutherford was to fill. 

The City also requires drug testing as a condition of beginning 

employment. In the district court and in its appellate brief, the 

City maintained that Rutherford was tested because he needed an 

operator's permit; at oral argument, the City's counsel 

acknowledged that Rutherford had such a permit and asserted that he 

was tested as a "new hire" because of his new position. 3 

The substance abuse policy required termination for any 

employee in Rutherford's position who tested positive for drugs 

and, following his positive result, Rutherford was fired. He 

received both a pre-termination hearing and a full evidentiary 

hearing following his discharge on May 3. The personnel hearing 

3 The policy also requires testing based upon reasonable 

suspicion and following self-referral to the Employee Assistance 

Program. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 4 
officer upheld the firing, and the City Personnel Board unanimously 

adopted the officer's recommendation. 

Rutherford thereafter brought this action, claiming that he 

was denied procedural due process and that the mandatory drug test 

violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. Defendants moved for summary judgment on 

both claims, and Rutherford also moved for summary judgment on the 

Fourth Amendment claim. In rejecting the due process claim, the 

district court noted that Rutherford was given the opportunity to 

challenge the validity of his drug test at all stages of the 

administrative proceedings and therefore concluded that Rutherford 

was provided "all the process he was due." On the Fourth Amendment 

claim, the court canvassed the precedent on the constitutionality 

of mandatory drug testing of public employees and determined that 

"the City's compelling interest in reducing the risk of drugrelated accidents among drivers of vehicles weighing over 26,000 

pounds outweighs Plaintiff's privacy expectations." 

In this appeal, 

determinations. 

Rutherford challenges each of those 

II. Fourth Amendment 

It is well established that a urinalysis required by a 

government employer for the purpose of detecting illegal drug use 

-4-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 5 
is a search protected by the Fourth Amendment. ~ Skinner v. 

Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617-18 (1989); 

National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678-79 

(1989); Saavedra v. City of AlbuQuerQue, slip op. at (lOth Cir. 

Jan. 1996) . The Fourth Amendment, however, does not proscribe 

all searches; it bars only unreasonable ones. 

What is reasonable, of course, "depends on all of the 

circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the 

nature of the search or seizure itself." Thus, 

the permissibility of a particular practice "is judged by 

balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth 

Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 

governmental interests." 

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citations omitted). 

In the two leading Supreme Court employee drug testing cases, 

Skinner and Von Raab, the justices concluded that the testing at 

issue was permissible without the usual protection of a warrant 

based on probable cause, and even without "any measure of 

individualized suspicion," 489 U.S. at 668. ~ ~ i.d.... at 633. 

In Skinner, the Court ruled that railroad employees' privacy 

expectations, which were limited because of the industry's 

pervasive regulation, were outweighed by the government's 

compelling interest in ensuring the safe operation of the rails. 

In Von Raab, the Court similarly found that the government's 

interests in safety and the integrity of its borders outweighed the 

-5-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 6 
individual privacy interests of customs officials who carry 

firearms or are involved in drug interdiction. 4 

The City argues that the balancing here leads to the same 

result. Because Rutherford's new job required him to drive a 

26, 000-pound truck, whose mishandling could cause serious and 

substantial injury or other harm, his position is classified as 

"safety sensitive" by the City and he is required to submit to drug 

testing. The City contends that the privacy interests of "safety 

sensitive" employees such as Rutherford unquestionably must give 

way to the City's need to assure their sobriety and, ultimately, to 

ensure the safety of the general public and the employees 

themselves. In agreeing with the City, the district court heavily 

relied on a Ninth Circuit decision validating mandatory drug 

testing of commercial truck drivers whose vehicles are comparable 

in weight to Rutherford's. ~International Broth. of Teamsters 

v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1304 (9th Cir. 1991) ("A 

26,000 pound truck . 'becomes lethal when operated negligently 

by persons who are under the influence of ... drugs.'") (citation 

omitted) . 

4 The Court withheld judgment, however, on the reasonableness 

of testing employees solely because they handled classified 

material, remanding for further development of the record on that 

issue. 489 U.S. at 677-78. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 7 
Rutherford responds in two ways. First, he argues that city 

truck drivers such as himself are inappropriately classified as 

"safety sensitive"; hence, the City may not subject him to 

mandatory, suspicionless drug testing. He rejects the City•s 

comparison to the Ninth Circuit•s Teamsters case, and asserts that 

significant differences exist between the long-distance truckers at 

issue there and city dump truck drivers like himself. 5 

Rutherford•s second response is narrower. Whatever the validity of 

suspicionless drug testing for heavy truck drivers generally, he 

claims that the City unfairly implemented its policy in the 

particular circumstances of this case. Because we find merit in 

this latter complaint, we decline to reach the broader question. 

We therefore accept for the moment the City•s assertion that 

Rutherford•s job properly was designated as safety sensitive, and 

that he may be subject to mandatory drug testing even in the 

absence of reasonable suspicion. The question that remains is 

5 Although not based on record evidence, he asserts that overthe-road truckers often work many miles from their home office and 

supervisors, while city employees report each day to the same 

location and seldom are far from their supervisors, rendering dayto-day scrutiny more feasible. In addition, he notes that city 

drivers frequently interact with their crews and colleagues, and 

direct observation of them is therefore possible. In addition, he 

points out that the trucking industry is closely regulated, and the 

drivers• privacy expectations consequently are more limited. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 8 
whether the specific procedures used here and the intrusion on 

privacy they caused were reasonable. ~ Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 

F.2d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1989) (" [W]hile urinalysis may be within 

the government's prerogative in a given circumstance, the manner in 

which the program is carried out may be so unnecessarily intrusive 

as to render it constitutionally intolerable.") 

Rutherford points to several aspects of his testing that 

distance it from cases, such as Skinner and Von Raab, in which 

courts have upheld drug tests. First, he notes that neither of the 

provisions of the substance abuse policy invoked by the City 

expressly applied to him at the time he returned to work. Because 

he already had a city operator's license, the provision requiring 

a test as a prerequisite to such licensing facially was 

inapplicable. The policy states that a city employee who has a 

license will be tested at the time of license renewal, which, in 

Rutherford's case, had not yet arrived. In addition, because he 

was not an applicant seeking employment with the City for the first 

time, but instead was a city employee returning to work after a 

medical absence, he asserts that the provision for pre-employment 

testing also was inapplicable. 6 ~ Laverpool. et al. v. New York 

6 At argument, the City contended that it was routine practice 

to test employees who were transferred to new positions. The 

-8-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 9 
City Transit Auth., 835 F. Supp. 1440, 1456 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), aff•d, 

41 F. 3d 1501 (2d Cir. 1994) (policy provided for drug testing of 

safety sensitive employees when 11 they return to work after an 

extended absence of suspension 11 ). He emphasizes, as well, that he 

was not told that he would be tested until he came to work on April 

15 ' 7 

Rutherford maintains, and we agree, that the circumstances 

surrounding his urinalysis resulted in a substantially more 

intrusive search than those upheld by the Supreme Court in Skinner 

and Von Raab. In both of those cases, the Court observed that 11 the 

circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible 

limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically in 

the regulations that authorize them, 11 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622; Von 

~' ~at 667. Thus, because 11 minimal discretion [was] vested 

in those charged with administering the program, 11 a search warrant 

authorized by a neutral magistrate was less crucial than in other 

Administrative 

such testing, 

statement that 

Instructions do not, by their terms, contemplate 

and we found no support in the record for the 

it nevertheless was commonplace. 

7 The parties disagree about whether Rutherford knew that a 

substance abuse policy had been put into effect in early 1991, 

while he was on leave. Even if he had some general awareness, 

however, it appears undisputed that he had no occasion while out of 

work to receive an explanation of its applicability. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 10 
Fourth Amendment contexts. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622. ~~Von 

~' 489 u.s. at 667; International Broth. of Teamsters; 932 F.2d 

at 1299-1300. 

Here, however, the officials who decided Rutherford should be 

tested did exercise significant discretion -- indeed, departing 

from the literal language of the substance abuse policy. It also 

is of importance that Rutherford was given no advance warning of 

the testing. Not only did the substance abuse policy on its face 

fail to alert him, but the city officials who called him in to work 

also did not tell him that the test would be administered the day 

he returned. 8 

8 In Findings of Fact and Conclusions following Rutherford's 

post-termination grievance hearing, the City Personnel Hearing 

Officer reported the testimony of a Personnel Testing Analyst that 

she had asked Rutherford whether he wanted to take the drug test 

the same morning as his physical or wait until later. 

Martinez [the analyst] said that Rutherford replied, 

"Might as well get it out of the way". Rutherford stated 

that he remembered speaking with Martinez . . . , but she 

only told him where to sign the appropriate forms. 

We found no further reference to this factual dispute in the record 

and, consequently, consider it of limited significance. 

Presumably, if Rutherford were given the option of waiting a 

meaningful period of time after his return to work, the City would 

have so informed us -- in light of Rutherford's repeated assertion 

that he was subjected to a surprise test, without any advance 

warning. An option to delay the test a short time would not lead 

us to a different result. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 11 
This sort of unwarned testing is, we think, the most intrusive 

possible, contravening all of one's reasonable expectations of 

privacy. In Skinner, testing was triggered by accidents, other 

safety-related incidents, and rule violations. In Von Raab, 

testing was required only for employees who sought transfer or 

promotion to certain positions, and the employees were notified 1n 

advance of the scheduled sample collection. 489 U.S. at 672 n.2. 

In both cases, the employees knew when testing would, or could, 

occur. Even when drug screening is not linked to any event, and 

truly is random, employees typically know that they are subject to 

unannounced testing: "Drivers will be aware of the existence of a 

random drug-testing scheme, so while the precise time of the test 

will be unknown, the fact that they are subject to this search 

procedure will not be a surprise." International Broth. of 

Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1303. 9 This knowledge, the Ninth Circuit 

observed, means that "the amount of anxiety should not be 

substantial, " ..i..d.._ The privacy intrusion consequently is less 

9 The plan at issue in American Federation of Gov't Emp. v. 

Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989), aff'd in part. vacated 

and remanded in part, AfQE v. Sanders, 926 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 

1991), for example, provided that, in addition to the general 60-

day notice of its implementation, each employee subject to random 

testing be given individual notice stating that his or her position 

was selected as sensitive, or "testing designated," and that the 

employee could be tested 30 days after the date of the notice. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 12 
severe. The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of notice in 

the Fourth Amendment calculus in Von Raab, where it identified 

advance notice as a factor that minimized the testing program's 

intrusion on privacy. ~ 489 U.S. at 672 n.2. 

Nor were other factors present to diminish Rutherford's 

expectation of privacy. Unlike the workers in Skinner or the 

jockeys and other horse race participants in Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 

F.2d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 1991) (en bane), he does not serve "in an 

industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety," Railway 

Labor, 489 U.S. at 627. 10 His job does not implicate the national 

concerns underlying the Supreme Court's conclusion in Von Raab, 

where the Court noted that Customs employees who carry firearms or 

enforce drug laws -- "[u]nlike most private citizens or government 

employees in general, " .id.... at 672 "reasonably should expect 

effective inquiry into their fitness and probity." 11 

10 In addition to safety concerns, the regulation of horse 

racing stems from its status as a "magnet for gambling" and its 

"shadowed[] reputation, growing out of a long history of fixing, 

cheating, doping of horses, illegal gambling, and other corrupt 

practices." 943 F.2d at 681. 

11 The Court observed that " [t] he Customs Service is our 

Nation's first line of defense against one of the greatest problems 

affecting the health and welfare of our population," referring to 

"~the veri table national crisis in law enforcement caused by 

smuggling of illicit narcotics.'" 489 U.S. at 668 (citation 

omitted). 

-12-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 13 
The City's interest in ensuring safety, meanwhile, appears to 

have been at a fairly low ebb with respect to Rutherford's test. 

First, he was not a new employee whose work habits were unknown. 

The City had had substantial experience a decade with 

Rutherford, and presumably detected no signs of drug or alcohol 

abuse during that period. 12 ~Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 

1185, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 13 Second, he was not moving to a more 

safety-sensitive position; his previous job as a bus driver was at 

least as safety-sensitive as the new job to which he was assigned. 

There was no change in his status, therefore, requiring more 

12 We do not mean to suggest that a drug testing program may 

not be applied to employees with substantial tenure. We note this 

factor here only because the City seeks to justify testing 

Rutherford as a 11 new11 hire. 

13 Willner involved the suspicionless testing of applicants for 

Justice Department attorney positions. The court observed that 11 [t]he government's interest in detecting 

at the pre-employment stage because 

outsider. 11 It also noted: 

drug use is substantial 

the applicant is an 

The fact remains that the applicant is a person the 

government, as prospective employer, has had no 

opportunity to observe in the setting of the workplace. 

. . . In regard to incumbents . . . , direct observation 

together with the reasonable suspicion test may uncover 

those employees who ought to be tested. That obviously 

is not true for applicants and is another factor to be 

weighed in favor of finding it 11 impractical 11 for the 

Justice Department to obtain warrants or information 

leading it to suspect drug use before requiring 

candidates for employment to be tested. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 14 
caution with him than with other employees who were subject to 

testing only upon expiration of their commercial driver's licenses. 

Third, the absence of notice to Rutherford that he would be tested 

on the day he returned to work deprived the City of any deterrence 

justification for administering the test to him. 

Finally, because he had not been at work in more than a year, 

even a positive test result could have revealed nothing about his 

work behavior unless it showed that he presently was under the 

influence of drugs. Although we do not minimize the importance of 

detecting impaired employees, the fact that such tests may show 

only that the employee was exposed to drugs weeks earlier means 

that Rutherford's testing would be a uniquely unreliable gauge of 

his on-the-job conduct. 14 While past drug exposure by regular 

employees could reflect use while they were at work, such an 

inference is not possible for an employee who has been on an 

extended medical leave until the day of the test. 15 

14 It is uncontroverted that the test administered to 

Rutherford was incapable of determining the timing, amount, or 

manner of the marijuana exposure. 

15 The City admitted in its answer to the complaint and in its 

Responses and Objections to Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions 

that "the drug test given to Jerry Rutherford on April 15, 1991, 

could not possibly have demonstrated drug use or impairment at work 

or in the workplace." 

-14-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 15 
• 

In sum, even conceding that the City has an important safety 

interest in ensuring that its heavy truck drivers are free from 

drugs, that interest in this case is considerably diluted by the 

factors we have just discussed. We conclude that, when balanced 

against the unusually intrusive nature of the testing as described 

above and the fact that a positive test leads inexorably to 

termination, this diluted interest must give way to Rutherford's 

expectation of privacy. .c.L. Willner, 928 F. 2d at 1188 ("The 

protections of the Fourth Amendment are graduated in proportation 

to the privacy interests affected. Decreasing levels of 

intrusiveness require decreasing levels of justification") . 16 

16 We note that the relative weights of the interests in 

Skinner and Von Raab do not constitute a standard that must be met 

in every case. The Court noted recently that, although the 

government interest in both of those cases was characterized as 

"compelling," 

[i] t is a mistake to think that the phrase 

"compelling state interest, " in the Fourth Amendment 

context, describes a fixed, minimum quantum of 

governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case 

by answering in isolation the question: Is there a 

compelling state interest here? Rather, the phrase 

describes an interest which appears important enough to 

justify the particular search at hand, in light of other 

factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive 

upon a genuine expectation of privacy. 

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2394-95 (1995) 

(emphasis in original) . 

-15-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 16 
,• 

•' 

Accordingly, we hold that the City's testing of Rutherford 

constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. 

III. Due Process 17 

Rutherford argues that the City denied him procedural due 

process in terminating him based on the positive drug test. He 

claims that he was not given a meaningful opportunity to challenge 

the City's decision to discharge him "[b]ecause there was nothing 

[he] could do or say that would mitigate or alter the City's use of 

the positive drug test to terminate his employment " He 

also contends that the City unfairly put the burden of proof on him 

to show the absence of just cause, arguing that the City instead 

should have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt or 

with clear and convincing evidence that there was just cause for 

the firing. 

We recently have rejected essentially the same claims 

involving the same policy, ~Saavedra v. City of AlbuQYerque, No. 

94-2220 (lOth Cir. Jan. xx, 1996), and we see no reason to reach a 

different conclusion here. Rutherford's primary objection is to 

17 Our disposition of the Fourth Amendment issue gives 

Rutherford a basis for reinstatement and damages. We nevertheless 

think it appropriate to address why his due process claim does not 

fair as well. 

-16-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 17 
the City's equating a positive drug test with just cause for 

discharge. As the Supreme Court has noted, however, there can be 

no doubt "that drug abuse is one of the most serious problems 

confronting our society today," Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674. In the 

face of that reality, the City's decision to treat a positive drug 

test as "just cause" for immediate discharge of employees deemed 

safety sensitive, though harsh, is not irrational and cannot be 

held offensive to the Constitution. 18 

For the foregoing reasons. the judgment of the district court 

is affirmed in part and reversed in part. and the case is remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to 

appellant. 

18 We note the Supreme Court's observation that "a prior 

hearing facilitates the consideration of whether a permissible 

course of action is also an appropriate one," Cleveland Bd. of 

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 n.8 (1985). Although it was 

to no avail, Rutherford did have the opportunity in his pre- and 

post-termination hearings to urge departure from the City's "zero 

tolerance" drug policy. 

-17-

Appellate Case: 95-2003 Document: 01019276452 Date Filed: 02/23/1996 Page: 18