Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03052/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03052-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of 1

 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne

 B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

CHARLES V. JONES PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 06-3052

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff Charles V. Jones appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On October 25, 2007, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 13). On January 7, 2008, plaintiff

moved for an award of $979.52 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal

Access to Justice Act (hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 3.50 attorney hours of

work before the court at an hourly rate of $150.00, 5.50 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of

$75.00 and $42.02 in expenses. (Doc. # 14-15). Defendant has filed a response, expressing no

objection to this award. (Doc.# 16).

§ 406 Fees:

Statutory provision for the award of attorney's fees is found in 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1).

We find this request is premature, in that there has been no submission of evidence indicating

plaintiff has been successful upon remand and has been awarded benefits from which an

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appropriate fee may be paid. The fee awarded an attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 406 is paid out of

any past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), (b); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1720(b)(4). Plaintiff’s counsel routinely requests fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

as an alternative should the court not grant fees pursuant to the EAJA. We strongly recommend

to plaintiff’s counsel that he review the requirements needed to seek fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 406(b)(1) and to refrain from requesting such fees as an alternative in every petition for fees

pursuant to the EAJA.

EAJA Fees:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After

reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

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To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

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The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

Plaintiff’s counsel requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $150.00 an hour

based on an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of

$125.00 per hour - the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds

that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly

rate is not automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886

F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated

that the hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost

of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy

of the Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price

Index as an exhibit to his Memorandum of Law (Doc. # 15) and has presented evidence of an

increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned believes his argument for enhanced

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fees based on a cost of living increase has merit. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's counsel

is entitled to an award at the rate of $150.00 per hour.

Plaintiff’s counsel has also requested 5.50 paralegal hours of work at the rate of $75.00

per hour. We find the hourly rate should be reduced to $65.00 per hour. 

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.50 paralegal hour on September 5, 2006 (receipt and review

of file-marked copy of the complaint with attachments. Review of file), from which we deduct

0.50 hour; 0.50 paralegal hour submitted on November 30, 2006 (perfected service on the

complaint to all parties), from which we deduct 0.33 hour; and 0.25 paralegal hour on March 7,

2007 (convert brief to PDF file format and filed electronically. Review of file), from which we

deduct 0.25 hour. This time cannot be compensated, in full, under the EAJA. Granville House,

Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been

completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, we deduct 1.08

paralegal hours from the total number of compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.50 attorney hour on September 5, 2006, for consulting with

someone from the Clerk’s office regarding the complaint filed on behalf of plaintiff. We find

the time submitted to be excessive and deduct 0.33 hour. 

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.25 paralegal hour on September 5, 2006, December 18, 2006,

February 7, 2007, and October 26, 2007, for reviewing fairly standard Orders and letters from

the court. We find the time submitted to read the documents to be excessive and reduce each

time submission listed above by 0.15 hour. Accordingly, we deduct 0.60 paralegal hour from

the total number of compensable hours sought.

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Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $42.02 in expenses incurred with regard to

postage and photocopies. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $42.02 to

be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 3.17

(3.50-0.33) attorney hours, at the hourly rate of $150.00, 3.82 (5.50-1.68) paralegal hours, at the

hourly rate of $65.00, and for $42.02 in expenses, for a total attorney's fee award of $765.82.

This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff

may be awarded in the future. 

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of January 2008.

/s/ J. Marschewski 

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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