Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00246/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00246-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Raygarr LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Employers Mutual Casualty Company,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-00246-TUC-RM

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

Regarding Causation, Breach of Contract and Punitive Damages (Doc. 83), Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 85), Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Prima 

Facie Case of Punitive Damages (Doc. 87), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Postpone Summary 

Judgment Proceedings and to Reopen Discovery (Doc. 106). For the following reasons, 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Postpone Summary Judgment Proceedings will be denied but 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen Discovery will be granted. Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied. 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of Punitive Damages will be granted to 

the extent that the Court is denying Defendant’s request for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s insurance bad faith and punitive damages claims and thus those claims will be 

in issue at trial.1

. . . .

1 The Court finds that oral argument would not assist it in the resolution of the 

pending Motions and therefore resolves the Motions without oral argument.

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I. Background2

On February 18, 2014, Defendant Employers Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) 

issued a Commercial General Liability Policy (“Policy”) and an Umbrella Policy 

(“Umbrella Policy”) to Plaintiff Raygarr LLC (“Raygarr”), with an effective period of 

February 22, 2014 to February 22, 2015. (FAC ¶¶ 4-5; Ans. ¶¶ 4-5.) The Policy 

provides coverage for “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 

damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’” that “is caused by an 

‘occurrence,’” which is defined as “an accident.” (Doc. 84-1 at 35, 40.) The Policy does 

not cover property damage “for which the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason 

of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement” unless the insured would have 

had liability for the damages “in the absence of the contract or agreement” or unless the 

liability was assumed “in a contract or agreement that is an ‘insured contract.’” (Id. at 

36.) In the event of an “occurrence,” the insured must notify EMC “as soon as 

practicable” and shall not “except at that insured’s own cost, voluntarily make a payment, 

assume any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid, without [EMC’s] 

consent.” (Id. at 37.) The Umbrella Policy covers “the ‘ultimate net loss’ in excess of 

the ‘retained limit’ because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage,’” and contains the 

same provisions discussed above concerning contractual liability and voluntary 

payments. (Id. at 45-48.)

In 2013 and 2014, Raygarr performed more than $5 million of work per year as a 

general contractor, with over 98% of its contracts being with Raytheon Missile Systems 

2 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 24) is cited as “FAC,” and Defendant’s 

Answer thereto (Doc. 33) is cited as “Ans.” The Statement of Facts in Support of 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Causation, Breach of Contract 

and Punitive Damages (Doc. 84) is cited as “DSOF.” Plaintiff’s Controverting Statement 

of Facts in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 92) is cited 

as “PCSOF.” Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 86) is cited as “PSOF.” Defendant’s Controverting Statement 

of Facts in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 94) is 

cited as “DCSOF.” Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Motion to Establish 

Prima Facie Case of Punitive Damages (Doc. 88) is cited as “PPDSOF.” Exhibits and 

briefs are cited using the docket and page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic 

filing system.

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Company (“Raytheon”). (Doc. 84-1 at 73; Doc. 86-1 at 14.)3 On July 28, 2014, Raygarr 

signed a purchase order with Raytheon to perform as a general contractor for a bathroom 

renovation project in Raytheon’s Building 842. (FAC ¶ 6; see also Doc. 83 at 3; Doc. 

84-1 at 73; Doc. 86-1 at 14.) There appears to be no dispute that the Policy and Umbrella 

Policy covered Raygarr for sums Raygarr became legally obligated to pay because of 

property damage caused by an accident during the bathroom renovation project. (See, 

e.g., DSOF ¶¶ 6-7; PCSOF ¶¶ 6-7.)

During the evening of September 8-9, 2014, extensive flooding occurred in 

Building 842 due to the failure of a number of PVC caps installed by Raygarr’s 

subcontractor, Qualified Mechanical Contractors (“Qualified”). (FAC ¶ 8; see also Doc. 

83 at 3; Doc. 87 at 5.) Raytheon informed Raygarr of the flood at 6:30 a.m. on 

September 9, 2014. (PSOF ¶ 1; DCSOF ¶ 1.) Raygarr and Raytheon immediately 

contacted remediation contractors Abracadabra Restoration (“Abracadabra”) and ATI 

Restoration (“ATI”) and requested a full company response from each. (PSOF ¶ 2; 

DCSOF ¶ 2.) Remediation costs for the flood damage were likely to exceed $1 million. 

(PSOF ¶ 9; DCSOF ¶ 9.) Liability for the flood damage was unclear. (DSOF ¶ 5; 

PCSOF ¶ 5.) Raytheon appeared to potentially be liable for noticing the flood during 

security walk-throughs but failing to take appropriate action, and Qualified appeared to 

potentially be liable for installing the PVC caps that had failed; in addition, Raygarr 

alleges that, under its contract with Raytheon, it was liable for the negligence of its 

subcontractors, including Qualified. (DSOF ¶¶ 1, 5; PCSOF ¶¶ 1, 5; see also PPDSOF ¶¶

76, 87.) Raytheon represented that Raygarr, as the general contractor, was responsible

for the flood incident and any remediation and repairs. (FAC ¶ 9; Doc. 83 at 3.)

On September 9, Raygarr reported the flood to its insurance agent, Ryan Trayers

(“Trayers”), and Trayers in turn contacted EMC. (See PSOF ¶ 3; DCSOF ¶ 3; Doc. 86-1 

at 26, 30.) At 8:32 a.m. on September 10, EMC’s senior claims adjuster Fabian Mireles 

(“Mireles”) called Raygarr’s owner, Ray Garrison (“Garrison”) in response to the damage 

3 These figures stem from a 2017 affidavit by Raygarr’s owner and do not appear to 

be disputed.

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claim reported by Trayers the day before. (PSOF ¶ 3; DCSOF ¶ 3.) Garrison and 

Mireles spoke for 31 minutes. (PSOF ¶ 4; DCSOF ¶ 4; see also Doc. 86-1 at 9-10.) The 

parties dispute what was said during the conversation. (PSOF ¶¶ 4-8, 11; DCSOF ¶¶ 4-8, 

11.) According to Plaintiff, Mireles told Garrison to proceed with the remediation and 

consented to Raygarr entering into remediation contracts with ATI and Abracadabra. 

(PSOF ¶ 11; see also, e.g., Doc. 86-1 at 9, 16, 26-27, 31-32, 35.) Mireles does not have a 

specific recollection of the conversation but averred at deposition and in an affidavit that, 

based on his experience and practice, he would have told Garrison not to make voluntary 

payments because EMC was still investigating legal liability. (Doc. 94 at 29, 37-41, 52.) 

Mireles further averred that he did not authorize any repairs, did not indicate that EMC 

would pay for mitigation or repairs, was not authorized to resolve claims in excess of 

$70,000 without the approval of a supervisor, and has never authorized an insured to 

incur a liability expense exceeding his $70,000 level of authority. (Doc. 86-2 at 3; Doc. 

94 at 49, 53.) Plaintiff objects to the admissibility of Mireles’s testimony.

On September 10, Raygarr signed flood remediation contracts with Abracadabra 

and ATI. (PSOF ¶¶ 30-31; DCSOF ¶¶ 30, 79; see also Doc. 86-1 at 6, 40, 42-44, 48-49.)4 

According to Plaintiff, on September 11, an independent adjuster named David Conger 

(“Conger”), who was retained by EMC to observe flood conditions at Building 842, told 

Garrison that Raygarr was going to get “f***ed” by EMC, that EMC would never pay the 

claim, and that Raygarr was going to get stuck with the remediation costs. (PSOF ¶¶ 12-

14; see also Doc. 106 at 2.)5 The parties dispute whether, after the conversation with 

Conger, Garrison sought and received reassurance from Mireles and Trayers that Raygarr 

was covered. (PSOF ¶¶ 15-18, 20-24; DCSOF ¶¶ 15-18, 20-24; see also Doc. 86-1 at 34-

35.) Abracadabra and ATI, in conjunction with Raygarr’s own staff, remediated the 

flood damage. (FAC ¶¶ 16, 31; Doc. 83 at 5.)

4 There is conflicting evidence in the record regarding whether the ATI contract was 

signed at 6 a.m., prior to Garrison’s conversation with Mireles, or mid-morning, after 

Garrison spoke to Mireles. (See Doc. 86-1 at 6, 48-49.)

5 Defendant disputes these allegations and objects that Plaintiff’s evidence 

concerning Conger’s statements is inadmissible hearsay. (DCSOF ¶¶ 12-14.)

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In a letter dated September 18, 2014, counsel for Raygarr claimed that Mireles 

consented to Raygarr entering into remediation contracts and noted that it expected EMC

to pay for flood remediation costs incurred by Raygarr. (Doc. 84-1 at 27-28; Doc. 88-2 at 

22-23; Doc. 94 at 62-63.) EMC litigation specialist Dan Misheck (“Misheck”) responded 

in a letter dated September 23, advising that Raygarr’s claim had been reassigned to him 

and that EMC’s investigation of the claim showed that Garrison had contracted with ATI 

and Abracadabra on September 9, “the day before this claim was reported to EMC.” 

(Doc. 84-1 at 30-31; Doc. 86-2 at 19-20; Doc. 88-2 at 27-28; Doc. 94 at 65-66.) Misheck 

stated in the letter that “Mr. Mireles never instructed or directed Mr. Garrison to assume 

such obligation,” and recited the Policy’s provision that “[n]o insured will, except at that 

insured’s own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any 

expense, other than for first aid, without [EMC’s] consent.” (Doc. 84-1 at 31; Doc. 86-2 

at 20; Doc. 88-2 at 28; Doc. 94 at 66.) EMC never paid Raygarr for the remediation costs 

it incurred, which Garrison avers caused Raytheon to terminate Raygarr as a contractor 

and ultimately resulted in the demise of Raygarr’s business. (Doc. 84-1 at 76-77; Doc. 

86-1 at 17-18)

On February 5, 2016, Raytheon sued Raygarr for damages caused by the flood in 

Building 842. (DSOF ¶¶ 6, 15; PCSOF ¶¶ 6, 15; Doc. 84-1 at 85-96.) EMC extended 

liability coverage and defended, indemnified, and settled the claims asserted by Raytheon 

against Raygarr, pursuant to the terms of the Policy. (DSOF ¶¶ 7, 16; PCSOF ¶¶ 7, 16.) 

Raygarr counterclaimed against Raytheon in the lawsuit and received a confidential 

settlement payment. (DSOF ¶¶ 17, 26; PCSOF ¶¶ 17, 26; Doc. 84-1 at 2-20.)

Plaintiff filed the pending action in Pima County Superior Court on April 5, 2018, 

and Defendant removed the action to federal court on May 11, 2018. (Doc. 1.) 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint asserts claims for (1) negligent misrepresentation, 

(2) promissory estoppel, (3) insurance bad faith/breach of the covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing (“insurance bad faith”), and (4) breach of contract, premised on allegations 

that EMC authorized Raygarr to incur flood remediation costs and represented that the 

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costs were covered by the Policy but then denied coverage for those costs. (FAC ¶¶ 10-

79.) In addition to compensatory damages, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages. (Id. at 9.)

II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Postpone Summary Judgment Proceedings and to 

Reopen Discovery

Plaintiff asks the Court to re-open discovery for the sole purpose of allowing 

Plaintiff to take Conger’s deposition, and to defer scheduling oral argument or ruling on 

the pending summary judgment motions until after Conger’s deposition is completed and 

the parties have supplemented the summary judgment record with the deposition 

testimony. (Doc. 106 at 1, 8.) Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s request to postpone the 

summary judgment proceedings but agrees that discovery should be reopened to allow 

the parties to take Conger’s deposition if this case is not dismissed on summary 

judgment. (Doc. 107 at 2.)

Plaintiff avers that it recently learned, by happenstance, that Conger spoke to 

Mireles in September 2014 and that Mireles told Conger “I guess I should not have told 

Ray [Garrison] that he can enter into those [remediation] contracts.” (Doc. 106 at 3.) 

Plaintiff avers that Conger’s recollection of this statement by Mireles goes to the crux of 

the dispute in this case, which according to Plaintiff is “whether Mireles, on behalf of 

EMC, authorized and consented to Raygarr entering into contracts with ATI and 

Abracadabra.” (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff argues that deferral of summary judgment 

proceedings is appropriate pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and that good cause exists to reopen discovery. (Id. at 5.)

In response, Defendant argues that Rule 56(d) does not apply to Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Partial Summary Judgment, as Rule 56(d) relief is available only to nonmovants 

opposing a summary judgment motion. (Doc. 107 at 2.) Defendant further argues that 

Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) request is deficient with respect to Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment because Plaintiff has not shown how Conger’s deposition testimony 

could defeat that Motion. (Id. at 2-3.) Specifically, Defendant argues that whether 

Mireles told Conger that he should not have authorized Garrison to enter into remediation 

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contracts is irrelevant to Defendant’s pending Motion for Summary Judgment because 

Defendant conceded that any admissible version of statements made by Mireles to 

Garrison can be presumed true for purposes of that Motion. (Id.)

In its Reply, Plaintiff argues that Conger’s expected deposition testimony is 

relevant to its breach of contract claim and its punitive damages claim, on which 

Defendant seeks summary judgment. (Doc. 108 at 1-3.) Specifically, Plaintiff avers that 

Conger’s testimony will confirm that Plaintiff complied with its contractual obligation to 

obtain EMC’s consent prior to entering into remediation contracts. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff 

further avers that the testimony will permit a reasonable inference that EMC, with 

knowledge that Mireles had authorized Raygarr to enter into remediation contracts,

intentionally refused to honor its commitment in order to protect its own self-interest at 

the expense of Raygarr’s interests. (Id. at 2.)

A scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s 

consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The “good cause” standard requires a showing that 

scheduling deadlines “cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking 

the extension.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recs. Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(internal quotation omitted). “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party 

opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of 

the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id. In 

determining whether to amend a scheduling order to reopen discovery, courts consider:

1) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3) whether 

the non-moving party would be prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party 

was diligent in obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the 

court, 5) the foreseeability of the need for additional discovery in light of 

the time allowed for discovery by the district court, and 6) the likelihood 

that the discovery will lead to relevant evidence.

City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting

United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1526 (9th Cir. 1995), 

vacated on other grounds by 520 U.S. 939 (1997)).

In the present case, trial is not imminent. Defendant does not specifically oppose 

Plaintiff’s request to reopen discovery, instead only opposing the request to the extent it 

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seeks to reopen discovery prior to the Court’s resolution of the pending summary 

judgment motions. Defendant does not indicate it would be prejudiced by the reopening 

of discovery. Further, it appears likely that Conger’s deposition will lead to relevant 

evidence. Although the Court questions the parties’ decision not to depose Conger earlier 

in the proceedings, it appears that Plaintiff had no reason to anticipate the particular 

testimony that precipitated Plaintiff’s pending request to reopen discovery. Accordingly, 

the Court finds that Plaintiff has established good cause to modify the Court’s Scheduling 

Order to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of allowing the parties to take Conger’s 

deposition.

The Court next turns to the disputed issue of whether discovery should be 

reopened prior to the Court’s resolution of the pending summary judgment motions or 

only in the event that this case survives Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may defer 

considering a summary judgment motion if the “nonmovant shows by affidavit or 

declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its 

opposition.” Defendant argues that Conger’s deposition testimony is not essential to 

justify Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment because, 

although Defendant disputes whether Mireles told Conger that he should not have 

authorized Garrison to enter into the remediation contracts, that dispute is irrelevant to

Defendant’s pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 107 at 3.) 

The Court agrees with Defendant that Conger’s deposition testimony is not 

essential to justify Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s requests for summary judgment 

on Plaintiff’s claims for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and insurance 

bad faith. With respect to each of those claims, Defendant argues that summary 

judgment is appropriate, regardless of whether Mireles authorized Raygarr to enter into 

remediation contracts. (See Doc. 83 at 9-13.) The Court finds that Mireles’s statements 

to Raygarr are relevant to Defendant’s requests for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

breach of contract and punitive damages claims. Nevertheless, Conger’s anticipated 

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deposition testimony is not essential to justify Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to those claims, because the current record

already establishes material issues of fact precluding summary judgment on those claims. 

Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request to postpone the pending summary

judgment proceedings but will grant Plaintiff’s request to reopen discovery for the limited 

purpose of allowing the parties to take Conger’s deposition.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion 

and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

323. If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 

produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 

(9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the 

nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and to show (1) that the fact 

in contention is material, i.e., a fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law,” and (2) that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986); see also Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 

F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995).

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 249. In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must “draw all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence” in favor of the non-movant. O’Connor v. 

Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002). If “the evidence yields 

conflicting inferences, summary judgment is improper, and the action must proceed to 

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trial.” Id. “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other 

materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Plaintiff seeks a summary judgment ruling—for purposes of Raygarr’s negligent 

misrepresentation, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and insurance bad faith

claims—that there is no genuine dispute that, in a conversation with Garrison on 

September 10, 2014, Mireles consented to and approved of Raygarr entering into flood 

remediation contracts. (Doc. 85 at 1-3, 13.) Plaintiff argues that the testimony of Mireles 

and other EMC representatives, and the EMC claim file, fail to create a genuine issue of 

material fact contesting Plaintiff’s evidence on this issue. (Id. at 1-3.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff argues that Mireles’s testimony does not establish a genuine issue because 

Mireles has no independent recollection of the September 10 conversation; that other 

EMC representatives failed to adequately investigate Plaintiff’s assertions about 

Mireles’s representations at a time when Mireles should have had recollection of his 

conversations with Garrison, and that EMC never documented in writing to Raygarr or in 

its claim file notes that it disputed Plaintiff’s assertions regarding Mireles’s 

representations. (Id. at 7-8, 10-12.)

Defendant responds that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 

Mireles consented to and approved of Raygarr entering into flood remediation contracts, 

and that the issue is central to this case. (Doc. 93 at 2.) Specifically, Defendant notes

that, even though Mireles has no independent recollection of his conversations with 

Garrison in September 2014, he directly denied during his deposition that he authorized 

any repairs, based on his claim file notes and his routine practices. (Id. at 2-3, 9.) 

Defendant argues that Mireles’s testimony regarding his routine practices is admissible

under Federal Rule of Evidence 406. (Id. at 11-12.) Defendant also argues that Mireles’s 

claim file notes are admissible under hearsay exceptions and that they support a 

reasonable inference that Mireles did not authorize or consent to Raygarr entering into 

remediation contracts. (Id. at 4-6, 9-11.) Defendant avers that the testimony of its 

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standard-of-care expert, Steven Plitt (“Plitt”)—that it is reasonable that Mireles does not 

have a specific memory of his conversations with Garrison and that it is highly unlikely 

that Mireles would have agreed that EMC would pay for the expenses incurred by 

Raygarr in entering remediation contracts—further supports a factual conclusion that 

Mireles did not consent to or approve of Raygarr entering into remediation contracts. (Id.

at 6-7, 12-13.) Defendant also argues that, in 2016, Ray Garrison testified that Mireles 

did not authorize Raygarr to do remediation work and that he had no expectation that 

EMC would pay for the remediation expenses. (Id. at 7, 13.) Furthermore, a timeline 

created by Greg Garrison on September 11 or 12, 2014 states that Raygarr entered into 

one of the remediation contracts at 6:00 a.m. on September 10, 2014, before anyone from 

Raygarr had any communication with Mireles or anyone else at EMC. (Id.) Finally, 

Defendant argues that a 2017 affidavit by Ray Garrison shows that Raygarr entered into 

remediation contracts based on representations and directions from Raytheon, rather than 

EMC. (Id. at 8, 13-14.)

In its Reply, Plaintiff argues that Mireles’s testimony concerning his routine 

practices is inadmissible because Defendant cannot prove that Mireles has a habitual 

response to the specific circumstances at issue in this case: handling requests by an 

insured to enter into remediation contracts for emergency mitigation prior to a litigation 

determination. (Doc. 100 at 5-7.) Plaintiff also argues that the testimony of Plitt is 

inadmissible, because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not permit an expert witness to 

testify about the credibility of other witnesses. (Id. at 7-11.) Plaintiff avers EMC’s claim 

file notes do not allow a reasonable inference that Mireles did not authorize and consent 

to Raygarr signing the remediation contracts, because the notes confirm that Mireles was 

aware of the contracts and that EMC knew by September 18, 2014 at the latest that 

Garrison claimed Mireles authorized Raygarr to sign the contracts, and yet the claim file 

notes fail to dispute that Raygarr signed the contracts with Mireles’s consent and 

approval. (Id. at 3-4.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the prior testimony of the Garrisons is 

consistent with their testimony in this matter, as there can be more than one cause for 

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losses, and both Raytheon and EMC caused Raygarr damages. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff does 

not specifically address the 2016 testimony of Garrison cited in Defendant’s Response, 

nor does Plaintiff address the timeline created by Greg Garrison.

“A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment.” Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 

2002). However, summary judgment evidence need not necessarily be produced “in a 

form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the [producing] party satisfies the 

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.” Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 

F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court will determine whether 

Defendant has identified any evidence which could be presented in an admissible form at

trial and which establishes a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Mireles 

authorized and consented to Raygarr entering into remediation contracts. The Court 

draws “all reasonable inferences from the evidence” in Defendant’s favor. O’Connor, 

311 F.3d at 1150. 

A. Prior Testimony and Affidavits of Ray Garrison

Defendant refers to 2016 testimony by Garrison but fails to include the testimony 

as an exhibit to its Controverting Statement of Facts. (See Doc. 93 at 7; DCSOF ¶ 77.) 

The Court has been unable to locate the testimony in the record. Accordingly, the Court 

will not consider that testimony in evaluating Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring that parties support their assertions 

by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record”).

Defendant also relies upon an affidavit submitted by Garrison in the prior 

Raytheon litigation. (Doc. 93 at 8.) Garrison’s averments in that affidavit, that Raytheon 

represented that it was liable for the flood and directed it to enter into flood remediation 

contracts (Doc. 84-1 at 74-79; Doc. 86-1 at 15-20; Doc. 88-1 at 5-10), are not

inconsistent with Garrison’s deposition testimony in this case, that he knew Raytheon 

would want Raygarr to remediate the flood and that he told Mireles that Raytheon would 

expect and appreciate him to confirm that Raygarr had coverage and could begin the 

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remediation efforts (Doc. 84-1 at 55-56; Doc. 88-3 at 7). Furthermore, Garrison averred 

in the prior affidavit that during a long call with EMC’s claim representative on 

September 10, 2014, “EMC told [him] to proceed with the remediation work and that 

there was coverage,” but then failed to pay for the remediation costs incurred by Raygarr. 

(Doc. 84-1 at 75-76; Doc. 86-1 at 16-17; Doc. 88-1 at 6-7.) The prior affidavits do not 

permit a reasonable inference that Mireles did not authorize and consent to Raygarr 

entering into remediation contracts.

B. Mireles and Plitt’s Testimony

Plaintiff argues that Plitt’s proposed expert testimony is inadmissible because it 

impermissibly opines upon the credibility of witnesses, that Mireles’s testimony 

concerning the representations he made to Raygarr is inadmissible because it is 

speculative, and that Mireles’s testimony concerning his routine habits is inadmissible

because Defendant cannot satisfy the standard for admissibility under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 406.

Plitt’s testimony that insurance claim adjusters develop routine practices that 

operate like muscle memory may be admissible at trial given proper foundation (see Doc. 

94 at 81); however, other testimony by Plitt appears to merely bolster the credibility of 

Mireles’s testimony and is thus likely inadmissible (see id. at 77-81). See United States 

v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that expert testimony is 

inadmissible where it “in effect . . . impermissibly . . . [asks the jury] to accept an expert’s 

determination” that particular witnesses [are] truthful,” as “[c]redibility is a matter to be 

decided by the jury”), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Morales, 

108 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 1997). Mireles’s testimony that he did not authorize Raygarr to 

enter into remediation contracts may be inadmissible based on a lack of personal 

knowledge, since Mireles concedes that he has no independent recollection of his 

conversations with Garrison and his claim file notes are silent on the issue of whether he 

authorized the signing of the contracts. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to 

a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has 

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personal knowledge of the matter.”). However, Mireles’s testimony concerning his 

routine practices may be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 406 given proper 

foundation.6 Because other evidence in the record establishes a genuine issue of material 

fact necessitating the denial of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the 

Court need not conclusively determine the admissibility of Plitt’s and Mireles’s 

testimony. 

C. EMC Claim File Notes

Plaintiff does not dispute that EMC’s claim file notes are admissible under hearsay 

exceptions, and both parties rely upon the notes in support of their positions. The notes 

are silent on the issue of whether Mireles authorized and consented to Raygarr entering 

into remediation contracts with Abracadabra and ATI. Conflicting inferences can 

reasonably be drawn from that silence. The notes indicate that EMC had notice of the 

remediation work as early as September 10, knew of the remediation contracts as early as 

September 11, and was aware as early as September 18 that Raygarr claimed Mireles had 

authorized and consented to Raygarr entering into the contracts. (See Doc. 94 at 54, 56, 

62-63.) A reasonable juror could conclude—based on these indications of knowledge 

and the lack of language in the claim file notes expressly disputing Raygarr’s claims 

regarding advance authorization—that Mireles indeed authorized Raygarr to enter into 

remediation contracts with Abracadabra and ATI. However, a reasonable juror could 

also conclude, based on the absence of any indication in the notes that Mireles authorized 

the signing of the remediation contracts, that Mireles did not in fact provide Raygarr with

authorization to enter into the contracts.

Differing reasonable inferences can also be drawn from other language contained 

6

“Evidence of a person’s habit or an organization’s routine practice may be 

admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in 

accordance with the habit or routine practice.” Fed. R. Evid. 406. “In deciding whether 

certain conduct constitutes habit, courts consider three factors: (1) the degree to which the 

conduct is reflexive or semi-automatic as opposed to volitional; (2) the specificity or 

particularity of the conduct; and (3) the regularity or numerosity of the examples of the 

conduct.” United States v. Angwin, 271 F.3d 786, 799 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other 

grounds by United States v. Lopez, 484 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2007). The party offering the 

evidence bears the “burden of establishing that certain conduct qualifies as evidence of 

habit.” Id.

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in the claim file notes. For example, on September 15, 2014, Mireles wrote: “Need to 

send letter to insured confirming we would only pay for what they are legally liable, to 

not make voluntary payments, and confirm subcontractor appears legally liable.” (Doc. 

88-2 at 14.) He also indicates that Conger “re-confirmed” with Raygarr that EMC “had 

not accepted liability as there is much to figure out still.” (Doc. 94 at 58.) On September 

16, 2014, Mireles wrote: “Discussed/re-confirmed EMC would pay for what insured is 

legally liable but based on investigation to date, it appears subcontractor is legally liable.” 

(Doc. 88-2 at 16.) He also stated: “Re-confirmed I had only asked insured, given he was 

the general contractor on job and had qualifications, to simply prepare repair estimate for 

damages.” (Id.) A reasonable juror could infer, from these comments, that Mireles did 

not authorize Raygarr to enter into remediation contracts and that he was trying to clarify 

that fact with Raygarr.

D. Timeline Created by Greg Garrison

There appears to be no dispute that the timeline created by Greg Garrison can be 

presented in an admissible form at trial, as both parties rely upon it. (See Doc. 86-1 at 3-

7; Doc. 88-1 at 44-48; Doc. 93 at 7.) The timeline establishes a genuine issue of material 

fact regarding whether Raygarr obtained EMC’s consent and authorization prior to 

signing remediation contracts, as the timeline indicates that Raygarr signed the 

remediation contract with ATI prior to Garrison’s first conversation with Mireles. (Doc. 

86-1 at 6; Doc. 88-1 at 47.) A reasonable juror could, after considering the timeline, 

reject Garrison’s testimony that Raygarr entered into remediation contracts only after 

obtaining Mireles’s consent and authorization.

E. Conclusion

Although some of the evidence relied upon by Defendant in its Response is likely 

inadmissible, Defendant has nevertheless identified sufficient evidence to establish a 

genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Mireles authorized and consented 

to Raygarr entering into remediation contracts with ATI and Abracadabra. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied.

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V. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant seeks summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 83 at 1, 

16.) Defendant argues that summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation, 

promissory estoppel, and insurance bad faith claims is appropriate because Plaintiff 

cannot prove reliance and causation. (Id. at 9-13.) Defendant similarly argues that 

Plaintiff cannot establish a promissory estoppel claim because it cannot prove that it 

relied on any promise by Defendant to its detriment. (Id. at 11-12.) Defendant argues 

that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails because Plaintiff cannot prove causation and 

because there was no coverage for Plaintiff’s claimed damages under the terms of the 

Policy and Umbrella Policy. (Id. at 13-15.) Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff 

cannot satisfy Arizona’s punitive damages standard by clear and convincing evidence 

because there is no evidence that Defendant acted with an “evil mind.” (Id. at 15-16.)

For purposes of evaluating Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court 

assumes that Mireles authorized Raygarr to enter into remediation contracts with 

Abracadabra and ATI, and that he told Garrison that the remediation expenses were 

covered by the Policy. (See Doc. 83 at 5 n.1.) The Court also draws “all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence” in Plaintiff’s favor. O’Connor, 311 F.3d at 1150. 

A. Negligent Misrepresentation, Promissory Estoppel, and Insurance Bad 

Faith

To establish a negligent misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must prove:

(1) the defendant provided false information in a business transaction;

(2) the defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely on the incorrect 

information or knew that it reasonably would rely;

(3) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or 

communicating the information;

(4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the incorrect information; and

(5) resulting damage.

KB Home Tucson, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 340 P.3d 405, 412 n.7 (Ariz. App. 

2014). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish elements (4) and (5) because it 

cannot prove that Raygarr relied on any statement by EMC in entering remediation 

contracts and, further, it cannot prove that any alleged reliance caused Raygarr’s 

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damages. (Doc. 83 at 10-11.)

To establish a promissory estoppel claim, a plaintiff must prove: that the defendant 

“made a promise,” that the defendant “should have reasonably foreseen” that the plaintiff 

would rely on the promise, and that the plaintiff “actually relied on the promise to [its]

detriment.” Higginbottom v. Arizona, 51 P.3d 972, 977 (Ariz. App. 2002); see also 

Contempo Constr. Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 736 P.2d 13, 16 (Ariz App. 

1987). Defendant argues that, even assuming Mireles told Garrison that EMC would 

cover remediation costs, Plaintiff cannot prove that Raygarr actually relied on any 

promise or statement of EMC to its detriment. (Doc. 83 at 12.)

To establish an insurance bad faith claim, a plaintiff must prove that an “insurer 

intentionally denie[d], fail[]ed to process or pay a claim without a reasonable basis.” 

Zilisch v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 995 P.2d 276, 279 (Ariz. 2000); see also 

Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571 (Ariz. 1986) (conduct by an insurer which 

wrongfully deprives the insured “of the very security for which he bargained or expose[s] 

him to the catastrophe from which he sought protection” breaches the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing implied in the insurance contract). Defendant argues that 

Plaintiff cannot prove that any breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by 

Defendant was the cause of Plaintiff’s damages. (Doc. 83 at 12-13.)

Defendant’s arguments regarding Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation, 

promissory estoppel, and insurance bad faith claims all hinge on whether undisputed 

evidence establishes that Raygarr would have entered into remediation contracts and 

incurred remediation costs regardless of any representations by EMC. According to 

Defendant, Raygarr voluntarily incurred remediation expenses because Raytheon 

instructed it to remediate the flood damage and Raygarr risked losing Raytheon as a 

client if it declined. (Doc. 83 at 11.) Defendant alleges that Garrison had the sole 

authority to determine whether Raygarr would incur flood remediation expenses, and that 

Garrison testified at his deposition that he could only speculate as to whether he would 

have executed remediation contracts with Abracadabra and ATI had EMC informed him 

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that the Policy only covered damages for which Raygarr was legally liable. (Id. at 2, 11.) 

In its Response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s Motion mischaracterizes Garrison’s 

deposition testimony. (Doc. 91 at 2-8.)

The following exchange occurred during Garrison’s deposition:

Q. If [Mireles] had said on that first call on the 10th—if [Mireles] had 

told you, “This is a liability coverage policy. EMC will pay for whatever 

Raygarr is legally liable,” if that had been his statement, would you still 

have participated in the remediation?

A. I don’t think so. But that’s a hypothetical. And I’m sure it would 

have caused us pause and would have taken a lot of discussion.

But I’m a small company. If I didn’t know all the damages were 

within an umbrella, that [sic] I don’t have the resources to do that. I was 

running a very tight ship to have advance [sic] our plan.

And even with the plan in place, no general contractor can take that 

hit. And that’s why they carry insurance coverage.

Q. So let me see if I understand you correctly.

If you had been informed that your liability policy has coverage, but 

only for what Raygarr is legally liable for, you said it would have caused 

you pause.

But can you say with any definity [sic], one way or the other, 

whether you would have still participated in the remediation project?

A. I’ve thought about that a lot, and it’s hard to answer when you’re not 

actually in the middle of the event.

Because, of course, now I’m jaded and saying what the hell was I 

thinking.

Q. It’s hard to answer questions like that in retrospect?

A. Yeah. Yes.

Q. So, for now, would it be fair to say that your answer is that you don’t 

know, you can’t say, you don’t know what you would have done if that is 

the information that would have been conveyed to you?

A. It would be a guess.

Q. It would be speculation?

A. Speculation.

(Doc. 84-1 at 62-63.) Garrison also indicated that if he had learned, after signing 

remediation contracts, that EMC was not going to cover Raygarr for expenses incurred 

under those contracts, he is not sure what he would have done because he is not sure 

Raygarr “had the ability to walk off the project” at that point in time. (Id. at 66-67.)

In an affidavit attached to Plaintiff’s Controverting Statement of Facts, Garrison 

avers that answering the hypothetical asked of him during his deposition required 

speculation because he doesn’t know what Raytheon or Qualified or their respective 

insurance carriers would have done if he had told them that EMC was not authorizing 

him to enter remediation contracts. (Doc. 92-1 at 4.) Garrison knew that “Raygarr did 

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not have the resources to pay those costs without insurance,” but “Raytheon might have 

agreed to sign the remediation contracts and later pursue a claim with its insurance carrier 

or against EMC or Qualified Mechanical’s insurance.” (Id.) Furthermore, Raytheon 

“might have decided to hire another contractor to perform the remediation and repair 

work.” (Id. at 5.) Garrison avers that, had Mireles told him that EMC did not authorize 

him to enter remediation contracts and would not cover remediation costs, he “would 

have undertaken whatever steps were necessary to coordinate with Raytheon, Qualified 

and/or their insurance carriers to get someone else to agree to enter the remediation 

contracts” and “would not have voluntarily assumed contractual liability for remediation 

costs without assurance/agreement that those costs would be paid by either Raytheon, 

Qualified Mechanical or one of their insurance carriers.” (Id. at 5-6.)

Defendant argues that the Court should disregard Garrison’s affidavit as a sham. 

(Doc. 99 at 5-7.) An affidavit submitted to defeat summary judgment should be 

disregarded as a sham if it contradicts a party’s prior deposition testimony. Van Asdale v. 

Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). However, “the inconsistency 

between a party’s deposition testimony and subsequent affidavit must be clear and 

unambiguous to justify striking the affidavit.” Id. at 998-99. A “non-moving party is not 

precluded from elaborating upon, explaining or clarifying prior testimony.” Id. at 999.

Defendant argues that Garrison’s affidavit “directly contradicts his” deposition 

testimony because Garrison testified in the deposition that it is “speculative” whether he 

would have declined to execute remediation contracts if he had been told EMC would 

cover only losses for which Raygarr was legally liable, whereas in the affidavit he 

averred that he would not have signed the contracts in that scenario. (Doc. 99 at 6-7.) 

Defendant does not dispute that Garrison’s “speculation” testimony related to whether 

Raygarr would have “participated in the remediation project” rather than whether 

Raygarr would have signed remediation contracts with Abracadabra and ATI; however, 

Defendant argues that the phrase “participated in the remediation project” unambiguously 

means participated in the remediation project as a general contractor, including signing 

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contracts with subcontractors such as Abracadabra and ATI. (Id. at 2-5.)

The Court declines to disregard Garrison’s affidavit as a sham; the affidavit does 

not contradict Garrison’s deposition testimony but, rather, sets forth a reasonable 

explanation of the basis for and thought process behind that testimony. The Court 

disagrees with Defendant that the phrase “participated in the remediation project” 

unambiguously means “signed remediation contracts with Abracadabra and ATI.”

Raygarr could have participated in the remediation project in a number of ways, and 

could have participated even as a general contractor without signing the remediation 

contracts (for example, if Raytheon had agreed to sign the contracts with Abracadabra 

and ATI but had Raygarr supervise and coordinate the remediation work). In addition, 

the Court notes that Garrison initially testified that he did not think Raygarr would have 

participated in the remediation if Mireles had told him that EMC would pay for only

those costs for which Raygarr was legally liable. (Doc. 84-1 at 62.) Furthermore—for 

the reasons discussed below—a representation that EMC would cover only losses for 

which Raygarr was legally liable does not unambiguously mean that EMC would not 

cover any remediation expenses. The hypothetical asked during Garrison’s deposition 

testimony differs in material respects from the conclusion that Defendant asks the Court 

to draw from that testimony.

A reasonable trier of fact could conclude—based on Garrison’s deposition 

testimony and affidavit, as well as other evidence in the record—that Raygarr would not 

have signed remediation contracts with Abracadabra and ATI if Mireles had not told 

Raygarr that EMC would cover the remediation expenses. Accordingly, Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied with respect to Plaintiff’s negligent 

misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and insurance bad faith claims. 

B. Breach of Contract

Defendant argues that the Policy and Umbrella Policy cover only those damages 

for which Raygarr is legally liable, and that EMC already paid all damages for which 

Raygarr was legally liable by defending and settling the lawsuit filed by Raytheon against 

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Raygarr and obtaining a release on Raygarr’s behalf. (Doc. 83 at 13-15.) Defendant 

further argues that it had no obligation under the Policy or Umbrella Policy to cover the 

contractual obligations assumed by Raygarr to pay ATI and Abracadabra for remediation 

services. (Id.) In its Response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant breached Section IV(2)(d) 

of the Policy, which provides: “No insured will, except at that insured’s own cost, 

voluntarily make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for 

first aid, without our consent.” (Doc 91 at 10-11.) In its Reply, Defendant counters that

Section IV(2)(d) is an exclusionary condition and “[t]he non-application of an 

exclusionary condition does not create coverage under the Policy where there is no 

coverage or where all coverage has been provided.” (Doc. 99 at 2, 9.)

The Court agrees with Defendant that Section IV(2)(d) is an exclusionary 

condition that does not create coverage where none exists. However, the language of 

Section IV(2)(d) would be entirely superfluous if remediation expenses or obligations 

were never covered by the other terms of the Policy and Umbrella Policy. Defendant 

does not dispute that the Policy and Umbrella Policy covered sums that Raygarr was 

legally obligated to pay because of property damage caused by the flooding of Building 

842; indeed, EMC defended Raygarr against and settled Raytheon’s claims in the prior 

litigation arising from that flood. (DSOF ¶¶ 6-7; PCSOF ¶¶ 6-7.) Defendant argues that, 

by defending against and settling Raytheon’s claims against Raygarr, EMC provided all 

coverage available under the Policy. However, Defendant has offered no evidence 

contradicting Plaintiff’s evidence that, if not for the flood remediation work performed by 

Raygarr, Abracadabra, and ATI, damages from the flood—including businessinterruption damages—would have been much higher. (See Doc. 84-1 at 62 (Garrison 

testifying that timely remediation saved “millions of dollars” in damages); Doc. 86-1 at 

41 (Raygarr Project Manager Greg Garrison testifying that total damages from the flood 

would have increased exponentially if there had been delays in the remediation efforts); 

Doc. 92-1 at 5 (Garrison affidavit averring that timely remediation was critical in saving

millions of dollars in flood damages); see also Section V(C), infra.) Accordingly, 

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undisputed evidence shows that, by entering into remediation contracts with Abracadabra 

and ATI and by deploying its own staff and resources in the flood remediation efforts, 

Raygarr reduced the damages sought by Raytheon in the prior litigation. Again, 

Defendant does not dispute that the Policy obligated it to defend Raygarr against 

Raytheon’s claims in that prior litigation and to pay for any amounts for which Raygarr 

was determined legally liable. The Policy covers property damage “for which the insured 

is obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or 

agreement” so long as the insured would have had liability for the damages “in the 

absence of the contract or agreement.” (Doc. 84-1 at 36.) The record supports a finding 

that EMC breached this contractual provision by failing to pay remediation costs, because 

the expenses incurred by Raygarr in the remediation contracts with Abracadabra and ATI 

reduced the flood damages ultimately sought by Raytheon in its prior litigation against 

Raygarr.

Certainly, Section IV(2)(d) would bar coverage of remediation expenses and 

obligations incurred by Raygarr if Raygarr incurred the expenses or assumed the 

obligations without obtaining the prior consent of EMC. However, as discussed above, 

the Court assumes for purposes of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment that EMC 

authorized Raygarr to incur the remediation expenses. Accordingly, there is no basis for 

granting summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

C. Punitive Damages

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy Arizona’s punitive damages standard

because there is no evidence that Defendant acted with intent to injure Plaintiff or that 

Defendant consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing it created a substantial risk 

of significant harm. (Doc. 83 at 15-16 (citing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 

1986) and Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986).) Defendant 

further argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that any act of EMC or Mireles caused 

Plaintiff’s damages. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff’s Response incorporates by reference its 

Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of Punitive Damages, and argues that sufficient 

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evidence shows that EMC acted intentionally, dealt unfairly and/or dishonestly with 

Raygarr, “failed to give fair and equal consideration to Raygarr’s interests,” and 

“consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of 

significant harm” to Raygarr. (Doc. 91 at 11-12.) Defendant’s Reply incorporates by 

reference its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of Punitive 

Damages, and argues that, even assuming as true Plaintiff’s version of the representations 

made by Mireles, “there remains no evidence of conduct by Mr. Mireles or EMC that 

could support an award of punitive damages.” (Doc. 99 at 10.) As discussed below, the 

Court will consider the parties’ briefs relating to Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Prima 

Facie Case of Punitive Damages in conjunction with the parties’ briefs relating to 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim.

“[P]unitive damages are those damages awarded in excess of full compensation to 

the victim in order to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others from emulating his 

conduct.” Linthicum, 723 P.2d at 679. “To obtain punitive damages, [a] plaintiff must 

prove that [the] defendant’s evil hand was guided by an evil mind” by showing either that 

the defendant “intended to injure the plaintiff” or “consciously pursued a course of 

conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.” 

Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 578. “The wrongdoer must be consciously aware of the 

wrongfulness or harmfulness of his conduct and yet continue to act in the same manner in 

deliberate contravention to the rights of the victim.” Linthicum, 723 P.2d at 79.

The Court rejects Defendant’s causation argument for the reasons discussed above 

and further finds that there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable 

trier of fact could properly award punitive damages. A reasonable juror who concluded 

that Mireles authorized Raygarr to enter into remediation contracts could further 

conclude that EMC later refused to honor that authorization, either despite knowledge 

that Mireles had provided the authorization or despite insufficiently investigating the 

representations made by Mireles. The record contains deposition testimony from which a 

reasonable inference could be drawn that EMC representatives failed to ask Mireles 

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whether he authorized Raygarr to enter into remediation contracts at a time when he 

likely would have had independent recollection of his conversations with Garrison. (See 

Doc. 86-2 at 3-4 (testimony by Mireles that he does not recall discussing with his 

supervisor or EMC’s coverage counsel the allegation that he authorized Raygarr to enter 

into remediation contracts.) Furthermore, although Misheck’s September 23, 2014 letter 

to Raygarr states that Mireles did not provide authorization for Raygarr to enter into 

remediation contracts, a reasonable juror could find that Misheck reached that conclusion 

based on erroneous information regarding the date on which the contracts had been 

entered. (See Doc. 84-1 at 30-31; Doc. 86-2 at 19-20; Doc. 88-2 at 27-28; Doc. 94 at 65-

66.) In addition, EMC’s claim file notes indicate that EMC considered paying for 

remediation costs and then seeking reimbursement from Qualified or Raytheon, which 

supports a reasonable inference that EMC knew it had an obligation, based on Mireles’s 

representations to Raygarr, to advance-pay remediation costs pending a conclusive 

liability determination. (See, e.g., Doc 86-2 at 17 and Doc. 88-2 at 41 (October 29, 2014 

claim file note by Misheck indicating Qualified’s and Raytheon’s insurers would not 

advance pay and stating: “it looks as if we need to adjust these charges and . . . move 

forward with our investigation into the facts, and seek reimbursement against either 

Qualified or Raytheon”).

The record also contains evidence indicating that EMC was aware that damages 

related to the flood would increase significantly absent prompt remediation. A 

September 16, 2014 claim file note by Mireles states that Raytheon’s Building 842 

contained “180+ rooms with top secret experimental and production components,” as 

well as a “multi-million dollar chamber which was under 18” of water,” and that an 

estimated “$250,000-300,000 in lost production per day” as well as “huge contracts” 

were at stake. (Doc. 88-2 at 16.) Similarly, a September 18, 2014 claim file note by 

Misheck states: “The biggest exposure will come with business interruption and or 

production delays,” which were estimated to be in the “$250,000 range per day,” 

resulting in expected business interruption costs “in the multi-millions.” (Id. at 20.) 

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Garrison also informed EMC that Raygarr’s prompt remediation response prevented 

“extreme damage that would have occurred with a slow response to the disaster.” (Id. at 

43.) As EMC was contractually obligated to defend Raygarr against damage claims 

related to the flood, and to pay for any damages for which Raygarr was found legally 

liable, a juror could reasonably conclude that reducing overall flood damages through 

prompt remediation was in EMC’s financial interests. 

Finally, the record contains evidence indicating that EMC was on notice of the 

harm that its failure to promptly pay remediation costs would cause Raygarr. For 

example, claim file notes reflect that EMC was aware that Raygarr was incurring 

obligations it could not afford and was looking to EMC to cover its remediation costs. 

(See, e.g., Doc. 88-2 at 18 (September 17, 2014 claim file note by Mireles stating

“insured started to incur obligations they cannot afford”); id. at 20 (September 18, 2014 

claim file note by Mireles stating Raygarr was looking to EMC to cover remediation

costs.) Mischek testified that, in the September 2014 time frame, he understood that 

Raytheon was basically Raygarr’s only client, and that maintaining a good relationship 

with Raytheon was critical for Raygarr. (Doc. 88-3 at 24.) In addition, November 2014 

emails between Garrison and Misheck reflect that Garrison told Misheck that “since 

EMC’s representing that they would not honor their insurance responsibilities” to 

Raygarr, Raygarr was “removed from work at Raytheon and removed from a $440,000 

project” it had just begun. (Doc. 88-2 at 43.) Garrison also advised Misheck that 

Raygarr was “now very fearful” that it “face[d] the risk of being removed from Raytheon 

. . . a final time” and that it faced a risk of being permanently removed from Raytheon, as 

well as “the possibility of it’s [sic] demise and the loss of livelihood to” Garrison and his 

family members and employees, in addition to harm to unpaid subcontractors. (Id.)

Based on the above, a reasonable juror could conclude: (1) that Mireles authorized 

Raygarr to enter into remediation contracts and to incur remediation costs because 

prompt remediation was in EMC’s financial interests; (2) that EMC knew or reasonably 

should have known of Mireles’s authorization; (3) that EMC knew Raygarr’s prompt 

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remediation efforts significantly decreased the overall flood damages that EMC was 

contractually bound to defend Raygarr against and, if Raygarr was found legally liable,

pay; (4) that EMC knew its failure to pay remediation costs would cause Raygarr 

extreme, possibly terminal hardship; and (5) that, despite its advance authorization and 

the benefit it received from Raygarr’s remediation efforts, and knowing the harm that its 

actions would cause Raygarr, EMC refused to pay remediation costs, resulting in the 

demise of Raygarr’s business. Accordingly, a reasonable juror could find that EMC 

“consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of 

significant harm to others,” thus entitling Raygarr to punitive damages. Rawlings, 726 

P.2d at 578.

VI. Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of Punitive Damages

In this Motion, Plaintiff seeks “a court order permitting Plaintiff to mention and 

discuss bad faith and punitive damages in its Opening Statement and during its case-inchief.” (Doc. 87 at 1.) While preserving all trial objections, Defendant does not dispute 

that Plaintiff will be entitled to discuss the evidence that it will present in support of its 

insurance bad faith claim in its opening statement and in its case-in-chief at trial if the 

claim survives Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 95 at 2.) Defendant 

opposes Plaintiff’s Motion with respect to Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages, 

arguing that the punitive damages claim should be dismissed for the reasons raised in 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.)

Plaintiff appears to have envisioned its Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of 

Punitive Damages as a summary judgment motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, as Plaintiff accompanies the Motion (Doc. 87) with a separate Statement 

of Facts (Doc. 88). The Court’s Scheduling Order provides: “Absent leave of Court, each 

party shall file no more than one motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56.” (Doc. 17 at 4.) If Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of Punitive 

Damages is construed as a summary judgment motion, then Plaintiff violated this 

provision of the Scheduling Order by filing two summary judgment motions without 

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leave of Court. However, the Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of Punitive Damages 

cannot properly be characterized as a summary judgment motion, because, in essence, it 

requests that summary judgment not be granted in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiff’s claims 

for insurance bad faith and punitive damages. Accordingly, the Motion is more fairly 

characterized as supplemental briefing—again, filed without leave of Court—related to 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s insurance 

bad faith and punitive damages claims. Despite the idiosyncratic nature of the parties’ 

filings related to this Motion, the Court has reviewed the filings in the context of 

evaluating Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

insurance bad faith and punitive damages claims.7

As discussed above, the Court is denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment in its entirety, including Defendant’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for 

insurance bad faith and punitive damages. Based on that ruling, Plaintiff is entitled, 

subject to the limitations of any applicable rules of civil procedure and any subsequent 

evidentiary limitations imposed by the Court, to discuss evidence supporting its claims 

for insurance bad faith and punitive damages during its opening statement, and to present 

that evidence during its case-in-chief. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of Punitive Damages to the extent that, based on 

the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s claims for 

insurance bad faith and punitive damages remain pending in this case.

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

7 Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of 

Punitive Damages (Doc. 95), but Defendant neither filed a controverting Statement of 

Facts nor moved to strike the Statement of Facts filed by Plaintiff. The nature of the 

parties’ filings make it difficult for the Court to discern whether the “facts” contained in 

Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Motion to Establish Prima Facie Case of 

Punitive Damages (Doc. 88) are disputed or not. Accordingly, the Court has focused its 

summary judgment analysis on the evidence submitted by the parties rather than on the 

facts set forth in Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Motion to Establish Prima 

Facie Case of Punitive Damages.

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Postpone Summary Judgment 

Proceedings and to Reopen Discovery (Doc. 106) is partially granted and partially 

denied. Plaintiff’s request to postpone the summary judgment proceedings is denied, but 

Plaintiff’s request to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of allowing the parties to 

depose David Conger is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that discovery is reopened for a period of sixty 

(60) days for the sole purpose of allowing the parties to depose David Conger.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

Regarding Causation, Breach of Contract and Punitive Damages (Doc. 83) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 85) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Prima Facie 

Case of Punitive Damages (Doc. 87) is granted to the extent that, based on the Court’s 

denial of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s insurance bad faith and 

punitive damages claims remain pending in this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file a Joint Proposed Pretrial 

Order within forty-five (45) days of the date that the deposition of David Conger is 

completed. 

Dated this 25th day of February, 2020.

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