Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00149/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00149-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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28 * This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 )

)

)

CITY OF GRASS VALLEY, )

) 2:04-cv-149-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

NEWMONT MINING CORPORATION, et al.,)

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move “to strike Plaintiff’s Expert Opinion of

Jonathan S. Shefftz.” (Proposed Order at 2.) Plaintiff opposes this

motion.

BACKGROUND

The May 12, 2006 Status Order issued in this action set the

deadline for initial expert reports as September 18, 2006 and the

discovery deadline as February 16, 2007. (May 12 Status Order, at 2.) 

The parties stipulated to extend the deadline for expert reports to

October 18, 2006 and again to October 30, 2006. (Joint Stipulation &

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 215 Filed 01/26/07 Page 1 of 5
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Order, Aug. 18, 2006, at 2; Joint Stipulation & Order, Oct. 13, 2006,

at 2.) Plaintiff submitted Shefftz’s expert report on October 30,

2006. (Shefftz Decl. ¶ 1.) 

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend Shefftz’s expert report does not comply

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) (“Rule 26(a)(2)(B)”)

because it “contains no opinion at all” and therefore, move to strike

the report. (Defs.’ Mot. to Strike (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 3, 7.) 

Plaintiff responds that Shefftz’s expert report was complete and

“contained each of the elements required by Rule 26(a)[(2)(B)].” 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) 

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires that an expert report contain,

inter alia, “a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and

the basis and reasons therefor.” The Advisory Committee Notes to

the 1993 amendment to Rule 26 specify that experts “must prepare a

detailed and complete written report, stating the testimony the

witness is expected to present during direct examination, together

with the reasons therefor.” The Notes explain that the rule was

amended because “information disclosed under the former rule in

answering interrogatories about the ‘substance’ of expert testimony

was frequently so sketchy and vague that it rarely dispensed with the

need to depose the expert and often was even of little help in

preparing for a deposition of the witness.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note.

Shefftz states in his expert report that he is “unable to

provide any definitive case-specific conclusions” and “expect[s] to

revise [his] opinion as additional information becomes available.” 

(Thayer Decl. Ex. A (“Expert Opinion of Jonathon S. Shefftz”), at 1.) 

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 215 Filed 01/26/07 Page 2 of 5
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Shefftz further states “corporate norms and formalities might not have

been followed, and . . . further fact discovery on this issue might

yield additional information that is pertinent to corporate ownership

and control.” (Id. at 3.) 

Shefftz’s report appears to be merely a preliminary report

and does not contain details about his expected trial testimony. This

type of preliminary report is not sufficient to satisfy Rule

26(a)(2)(B)’s report requirement. See Alvarado v. FedEx Corp., 2006

WL 1761276, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2006) (stating “the preliminary

report is so general and lacking in detail that it does not provide a

meaningful basis for determining the substance of [the expert’s]

opinions, nor does it provide a fair basis for expert discovery.”)

Although Shefftz “stated his intention to supplement [his

report] as information became available,” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5), “[a]

party may not use a ‘non-opinion’ as a placeholder to spring a

‘supplemental opinion’ in the eleventh hour.” White v. Cinemark USA,

Inc., 2005 WL 1865495, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2005). To hold that

Shefftz’s report satisfied the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requirements would

improperly allow Plaintiff to extend the Rule 26 expert disclosure

deadlines. See Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil

Co., 73 F.3d 546, 571 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the disclosure

requirements are not intended to allow a party to remedy incomplete

initial disclosures through supplemental reports); Alvarado, 2006

WL 1761276, at *4 (“[A]llowing [Plaintiff] to proceed with [this

expert] would encourage parties to evade the expert-disclosure

rules.”). Shefftz’s expert report did not comply with the disclosure

requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

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Defendant argues since Shefftz’s expert report does not

comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B), Shefftz’s opinion should be stricken,

relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) (“Rule 37(c)(1)”)

which prescribes “[a] party that without substantial justification

fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) . . . is not,

unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a

trial . . . information not so disclosed.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 5.) 

Defendants argue Plaintiff “has no substantial justification for

failing to disclose an expert report.” (Id. at 6.) Further,

Defendants argue this failure is not harmless because they have not

been provided “any indication as to the opinion that Mr. Shefftz will

present at trial” and have been “deprived of the opportunity to

prepare a rebuttal expert and to conduct discovery regarding the

opinion that Mr. Shefftz plans to give.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff counters that Defendants’ request for the sanction

of striking Shefftz’s expert report is not supported by Rule 37(c)(1)

because that rule applies only where “an expert fails to comply with

Rule 26(a) in its entirety.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.) Plaintiff contends 

to hold otherwise would “render[] superfluous Rule 26(a)(2)(C), which

requires an expert to supplement his disclosures.” (Id.) 

“Rule 37(c)(1) gives teeth to [the Rule 26(a)(2)(B)

disclosure] requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any

information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not

properly disclosed.” Yeti by Molly v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d

1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). “Two express exceptions ameliorate the

harshness of Rule 37(c)(1): The information may be introduced if the

parties’ failure to disclose the required information is substantially

justified or harmless.” Id. The only justification Plaintiff

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proffers is the mistaken belief that Shefftz’s incomplete initial

report could be supplemented in a manner that satisfies the Rule 26

disclosure requirements. This argument misconstrues Plaintiff’s

disclosure obligation under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), and does not satisfy the

substantial justification exception. Nor has Plaintiff shown the

applicability of the harmless exception. “Implicit in Rule 37(c)(1)

is that the burden is on the party facing sanctions to prove

harmlessness.” Id. at 1107. Since Plaintiff has not shown that its 

failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B) was either substantially

justified or harmless, Defendants’ motion to strike Shefftz’s expert

opinion is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 25, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 215 Filed 01/26/07 Page 5 of 5