Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-01006/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-01006-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RICKEY RANDALL REX SMITH, )

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:12cv1006-WKW

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 13, 2012, federal inmate RickeyRandall Rex Smith (“Smith”) filed this

pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 1.) 

By his motion, Smith challenges his convictions and the resulting life sentence imposed by

this court in March 2010 on charges of production, transportation, and possession of child

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252A(a)(1) & 2252A(a)(5)(B).

Smith claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by

advising him to reject a plea offer allegedly extended to him before he entered his guilty plea. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 6-10.) He also claims, in an amendment to his § 2255 motion, that (1) the

district court’s calculation of his base offense level using the 2009 Sentencing Guidelines

resulted in an Ex Post Facto Clause violation under the holding of Peugh v. United States,

__ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2072 (2013), and (2) the Government engaged in prosecutorial

misconduct in obtaining his indictment. (Doc. No. 14.)

Case 1:12-cv-01006-WKW-SRW Document 31 Filed 01/08/15 Page 1 of 8
The Government argues that Smith’s § 2255 motion is time-barred because it was

filed after expiration of the one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). (Doc. Nos. 7

& 21.). The court concludes that the Government is correct and that the § 2255 motion

should be denied because it was not filed within the time allowed by federal law.

II. DISCUSSION

The timeliness of Smith’s § 2255 motion is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). That

section provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of– 

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction

becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion

created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was

prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

On January 12, 2010, Smith pled guilty under a three-count indictment charging him

2

Case 1:12-cv-01006-WKW-SRW Document 31 Filed 01/08/15 Page 2 of 8
with to the production, transportation, and possession of child pornography. On March 29, 1

2010, the district court sentenced him to life imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) as a

repeat sex offender against children. Judgment was entered by the district court on April 2,

2010.

Smith took no direct appeal. His conviction therefore became final on April 16, 2010. 

See Fed.R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i); Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11 Cir. th

2011). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), Smith had until April 18, 2011 (the first business day

after April 16, 2011), to file a timely § 2255 motion. His § 2255 motion, however, was not

filed until November 13, 2012. Consequently, his motion is time-barred unless the limitation

period in his case began to run at a date later than April 16, 2010, under a provision of 28

U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2) - (4) or is subject to equitable tolling.

 Section 2255(f)(3) and Claim under Lafler v. Cooper/ Missouri v. Frye

Smith contends that his § 2255 motion is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) pursuant

to what he says is the applicability to his convictions of the United States Supreme Court’s

holdings in Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, __

U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012). (Doc. No. 1 at 4-10.) Lafler and Frye, both of which the

Supreme Court decided on March 21, 2012 (less than a year before Smith filed his § 2255

motion), recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to effective

assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process. See 132 S.Ct. at 1384; 132 S.Ct.

 There was no plea agreement between the Government and Smith. 1

3

Case 1:12-cv-01006-WKW-SRW Document 31 Filed 01/08/15 Page 3 of 8
at 1405. In invoking Lafler/Frye, Smith alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for advising

him to reject a plea offer allegedly extended to him before he entered his guilty plea. He

contends that his § 2255 motion is timely under § 2255(f)(3), as it was filed within one year

of the date of the Lafler and Frye decisions.

Section 2255(f)(3) provides for the one-year limitation period to start the date on

which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Notwithstanding Smith’s attempt to restart the

limitation period for his motion via § 2255(f)(3) and Lafler/Frye, the Eleventh Circuit has

recognized that neither Lafler nor Frye applies retroactively. In In Re Perez, 682 F.3d 930

(11 Cir. 2012), the Eleventh Circuit held Lafler and Frye did not set forth new rules of th

constitutional law because those cases are “merely an application of the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel, as defined in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)], to a

specific factual context.” 682 F.3d 930 at 932. The court in Perez concluded, “[B]ecause

we cannot say that either Lafler or Frye ‘breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on

the State or Federal Government,’ they did not announce new rules.” Id. at 933. 

Because the Supreme Court in Lafler and Frye recognized no new constitutional right,

those decisions are not retroactive and there is no basis for restarting the limitation period

under § 2255(f)(3). Therefore, § 2255(f)(3) does not control the limitation period for Smith

to file his § 2255 motion and his Lafler/Frye claim is not properly before this court.

Section 2255(f)(3) and Claim under Peugh

4

Case 1:12-cv-01006-WKW-SRW Document 31 Filed 01/08/15 Page 4 of 8
Smith contends his § 2255 motion is also timely under § 2255(f)(3) based on the

purported applicability to his sentence of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Peugh v.

United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2072 (2013). (Doc. No. 14 at 1.) In Peugh, which was

decided on June 10, 2013, the Supreme Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated

when a defendant is sentenced under a version of the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated

after he committed his crime if the newer version of the guidelines yields a higher sentencing

range. Peugh, 133 S.Ct. at 2084.

According to Smith, the district court’s calculation of his base offense level using the

2009 Sentencing Guidelines, rather than the 2000 Sentencing Guidelines in effect when he

says his crimes occurred, resulted in an increase in the guidelines range under which he was

sentenced, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and Peugh. (Doc. No. 14 at 1.) In 2

particular, he notes that the 2000 Sentencing Guidelines call for a base offense level of 27

for an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), while the 2009 Sentencing Guidelines applied to

him call for a base offense level of 32 for an offense under § 2251(a). (Id.)

Smith contends that, under § 2255(f)(3), the limitation period did not begin to run

until the date Peugh was decided and that, therefore, his Peugh-based allegation in the

The Sentencing Guidelines themselves provide that the sentencing court should use the 2

Guidelines Manual in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a). 

However, should the sentencing court determine that the use of those guidelines would violate the

Ex Post Facto Clause, the court is instructed to use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date the

offense of conviction was committed. See id. at § 1B1.11(b)(1). See also, e.g., United States v.

Stark, 262 Fed. App’x 930, 933 (11 Cir. 2008). th

5

Case 1:12-cv-01006-WKW-SRW Document 31 Filed 01/08/15 Page 5 of 8
amendment to his § 2255 motion is timely. (Doc. No. 14 at 1.) Smith’s attempt to rely on 3

Peugh to argue that his claim is timely under § 2255(f)(3) is misplaced. Peugh does not

apply retroactively to cases on collateral review – a prerequisite to application of

§ 2255(f)(3). See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 917 (7 Cir. 2013) (holding th

Peugh does not apply retroactively on collateral review); Rogers v. United States, 561 Fed.

App’x 440, 443-44 (6 Cir. 2014) (same); Jenkins v. United States, 2014 WL 2918677, at th

*3 (N.D. Ga. Jun. 26, 2014).

Moreover, notwithstanding his claim that his crimes occurred in 2000, the record

reflects that Smith’s offenses took place, or were completed, in 2005. The base offense level

for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) was increased from 27 to 32 in the 2004 Sentencing

Guidelines. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 (2000) and U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 (2004). The 2009

Sentencing Guidelines also call for a base offense level of 32 for an offense under § 2251(a). 

Thus, the base offense level for Smith’s crimes under the guidelines in effect at the time of

his sentencing in 2009 was the same level 32 under the guidelines in effect when he

committed his crimes in 2005. Smith fails to demonstrate an ex post facto violation or a

violation of the principles stated in Peugh.

Finally, the sentence actually imposed against Smith was not controlled by his

sentencing range calculated under the guidelines, but rather by the statutory provisions of

This argument regarding § 2255(f)(3) does not apply to Smith’s claim (in the amendment 3

to his motion) regarding prosecutorial misconduct (see Doc. No. 14 at 2) or his claim (in his original

motion) regarding his counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance under Lafler/Frye.

6

Case 1:12-cv-01006-WKW-SRW Document 31 Filed 01/08/15 Page 6 of 8
18 U.S.C. § 3559(e), which mandated that he be sentenced to life in prison as a repeat sex

offender against children. See 18 U.S.C. § 3359(e). Thus, any supposed ex post facto error

in the calculation of Smith’s guidelines sentencing range – and Smith demonstrates no such

error – would be harmless.

Smith’s claim that his sentence violates the holding in Peugh is meritless, and

§ 2255(f)(3) does not control the limitation period for him to file his § 2255 motion.

Equitable Tolling

The limitation period in federal habeas proceedings (28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255)

may be equitably tolled on grounds apart from those specified in the habeas statutes “when

a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his

control and unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 4

(11 Cir. 1999). “The burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinaryremedyplainly th

rests with the petitioner.” Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11 Cir. 2002). th

Smith has presented no grounds for equitable tolling, and the court finds none. Because

Smith fails to establish – or even assert – grounds for equitable tolling, his § 2255 motion is

time-barred under § 2255(f)(1).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

In Holland v. Florida., 560 U.S. 631 (2010), the Supreme Court confirmed that the 4

limitation period is subject to equitable tolling where a petitioner “shows ‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and

prevented timely filing.” 560 U.S. at 649; see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

7

Case 1:12-cv-01006-WKW-SRW Document 31 Filed 01/08/15 Page 7 of 8
U.S.C. § 2255 motion be denied as it was not filed within the controlling federal limitation

period and this case be dismissed with prejudice. It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before January 22, 2015. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on

appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See th

Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc). th

DONE, this 8 day of January, 2015. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8

Case 1:12-cv-01006-WKW-SRW Document 31 Filed 01/08/15 Page 8 of 8