Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05301/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05301-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 5, 1994 Decided August 8, 1995

No. 93-5301

ISKCON OF POTOMAC, INC.; GEORGE LEVINTON,

APPELLEES

v.

ROGER G. KENNEDY, DIRECTOR NATIONAL PARK SERVICES;

ROBERT STANTON, CHIEF OF NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION;

ROBERT E. LANGSTON, CHIEF, UNITED STATES PARK POLICE,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92cv01092)

Sally M. Rider, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States

Attorney, John D. Bates, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the

briefs, argued the cause for appellants.

David M. Liberman, with whomDurvasula S. Sastri was on the brief, argued the cause for appellees.

Before BUCKLEY, GINSBURG, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: The National Park Service appeals from a district court decision

that its regulations governing solicitation and sales in the parks within the National Capital Area

violate the First Amendment. The court concluded that the regulations are unconstitutional to the

extent that they prohibit members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness of the

Potomac ("ISKCON") from soliciting donations and selling audio tapes and religious beads within

an area of the National Parks on which it had received permission to conduct a "Krishnafest"

program. Accordingly, the court enjoined the Park Service from enforcing these regulations in an

area of the National Mall adjacent to the Air and Space Museum. We affirm in part and reverse in

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part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Regulatory Framework

Congress has charged the Park Service with the task, among others, of

regulat[ing] the use of ... national parks [and] monuments ... by such means and

measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks[and] monuments,

... which purpose isto conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects... and

to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will

leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.

16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); see also 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1988) (noting that "preservation of park values

requiresthat ... public accommodations, facilities, and services... should be provided under carefully

controlled safeguards against unregulated and indiscriminate use...."). The Park Service's duty

extendsto areas within the NationalCapitalRegion, which include, among others, the NationalMall,

the Washington Monument grounds, and the Lincoln, Jefferson, and Vietnam Veterans Memorials.

The Mall, which is the site of this controversy, is an area of particular significance in the life

of the Capital and the Nation. It extends almost two miles from the United States Capitol on the east

to the Lincoln Memorial on the west and includes the grounds of the Washington Monument. This

vast expanse serves a multiple of purposes, none of them commercial. It is a place where the public

willrelax and enjoy its landscaped vistas between visits to the eight museums and galleriesthat flank

the eastern half of the Mall. Its lawns are used for a variety of activities ranging from kite flying, to

baseball, to picnics, to exhibitions. In season, it is filled by the crowds who come to listen to the

annual Memorial Day concert or to watch the Fourth of July fireworks. It is also the place where

men and women from across the country will gather in the tens of thousands to voice their protests

or support causes of every kind. It is here that the constitutional rights of speech and peaceful

assembly find their fullest expression.

The Park Service has been directed to protect the "fundamental purposes" of the Mall and of

the other parks and monuments within the National Capital Region. To this end, it has promulgated

regulations governing their use. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96 (1994). These provide, in part, that

"[d]emonstrations and special events may be held only pursuant to a permit issued in accordance with

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[its provisions]." Id. at § 7.96(g)(2). They also prohibit "[s]oliciting or demanding gifts, money,

goods or services" in any of the parks. Id. at § 7.96(a) & (h) (1994). With respect to sales, at the

time the district court issued its injunction in this case, section 7.96(k) of the regulations provided:

(1) No salesshall be made ... and no article may be exposed for sale without a permit

except as noted in the following paragraphs.

(2) The sale or distribution of newspapers, leaflets, and pamphlets, conducted without

the aid of stands or structures, is allowed in all park areas open to the general public

without a permit except [certain areas not relevant here]....

36 C.F.R. § 7.96(k) (1994).

Pursuant to an informal "enforcement guideline" adopted by the Park Service, demonstration

and special event permittees were provided with a sheet of "additional conditions of permit" which

informed them that, in addition to books, newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets, they would be

allowed to sell bumper stickers, buttons, posters, and T-shirtsso long asthose items "have a message

relative to your cause/activity." The guideline also contained a noninclusive list of "those items most

commonly offered erroneously for sale," which included jewelry, hats, coffee mugs, and

"records/tapes."

In May 1994, the Park Service published a notice in which it sought comments on a proposed

amendment to the salesregulation. See National Capital Region Parks; Sales, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,855

(1994) ("Notice of Proposed Rule"). In it, the Service stated that after ten years of experience, it had

concluded that the guideline had adversely affected the NationalCapitalRegion Parks. Specifically,

it determined

that the display and sale of bumper stickers, buttons, posters and T-shirts, ...

irrespective of the message presented, ha[d] brought discordant and excessive

commercialism, as well as degraded aesthetic values, ... and ha[d] ... den[ied] visitors

the variety of opportunities to safely enjoy park resources.

Id. at 25,857.

Since oral argument, the Park Service issued its final rule amending the sales regulation and

rescinded the enforcement guideline. The revised regulation now limits the exemption from the

Service's general prohibition on the sale of merchandise within the National Capital Region parks to

books, newspapers, leaflets, pamphlets, bumper stickers, and buttons. See National Capital Region

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Parks; Special Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,639, 17,649 (1995) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §

7.96(k)(2)). The new rule thus continues to allow the sale of certain printed materials, such as books

and buttons, while prohibiting the sale of all other articles, including audio tapes, that may carry a

message. The new rule, however, moots one of ISKCON's less compelling arguments; namely, that

because the enforcement guideline had not been adopted in a formal rulemaking, it was subject to a

kind of arbitrary application that is inconsistent with a valid "time, place, and manner" restriction on

speech.

B. Factual History

InMay1989, ISKCON obtained a Park Service permit to conduct a "Krishnafest" on the Mall

in an approximately 100 square-foot area directly across from the National Air and Space Museum.

According to ISKCON, a Krishnafest

entails public singing of Krishna conscious prayers and songs, discussing Krishna

consciousness with interested persons, distributing religiousliterature, audio cassette

tapes, and religious beadsto interested persons, and soliciting voluntarycontributions

from the general public.

Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts asto Which There Is No Genuine Issue at 7. ISKCON asserts

that a basic tenet of Krishna Consciousness requires its adherents to engage in "sankirtan," which

means "to venture into public places for the purpose of spreading religious truth, proselytizing and

attracting new members, and raising funds to support their religious activities." Id. at 5. ISKCON

contendsthat the sale of audio tapes and religious beads and the solicitation of contributionsfrom the

public are important aspects of sankirtan. ISKCON's initial permit, which authorized a twenty-one

dayprogram, wasroutinelyrenewed with onlyminor modifications untilMarch 26, 1991, when it was

revoked after a Park Service Police Officer determined that the group was offering beads, audio

tapes, and incense for sale.

C. Procedural History

The day after the Park Service revoked ISKCON's permit, ISKCON asked the Service to

reconsider that decision. Subsequently, ISKCON sought relief from the Office of the Solicitor,

United States Department of the Interior. After these efforts proved unavailing, ISKCON and its

community outreach director, George Levinton (collectively, "ISKCON") brought this action

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requesting a declaration that the Park Service's regulations governing solicitations and sales were

unconstitutional and an order enjoining the Park Service from enforcing those regulations. The

parties agreed to resolve the case through cross-motions for summary judgment and, on August 6,

1993, the district court granted ISKCON's motion and entered an order enjoining the Park Service

and its "agents and employees ... from enforcing sections 7.96(h) and [(k)] ... in the area of the Mall

adjacent to the Air and Space Museum." ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Ridenour, 830 F. Supp. 1, 5

(D.D.C. 1993). With the consent of the parties, the court subsequently amended its order, narrowing

its scope "to plaintiffs' activities with respect to sankirtan, and the sale of beads and audio tapes."

ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, No. Civ. A. 92-1092, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. June 26, 1995).

II. DISCUSSION

ISKCON asserts that, as applied to its activities, the Park Service's solicitation and sales

regulations violate both the First Amendment and the Religious FreedomRestorationAct ("RFRA"),

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993), which was enacted after the district court's decision. At oral

argument, however, counsel for ISKCON withdrew its RFRA claim without prejudice.

Because the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause does not protect ISKCON's activities

from valid and neutral regulations of general applicability, Employment Div., Dep't of Human

Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), we focus our inquiry on whether the

application ofthe solicitation and salesregulationsto ISKCON's conduct violated itsrights under the

Amendment's Free SpeechClause. We review the district court's decision to grant ISKCON's motion

for summary judgment de novo. Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. USAIR, Inc., 24 F.3d

1432, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

We begin our analysis by observing that "the solicitation of charitable contributions is

protected speech," Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 789

(1988), a proposition that the Park Service does not contest. Cf. International Soc'y for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 (1992) ("Lee ") ("It is uncontested that the

solicitation at issue in this case is a form of speech protected under the First Amendment.").

Similarly, expressive materials do not lose their First Amendment protection merely because they are

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offered for sale. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,

Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) ("Speech ... is protected even though it is carried in a form that is

"sold' for profit ....") (citing cases). Indeed, the Court long ago reminded us "that the pamphlets of

Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111

(1943).

Whether all of the items ISKCON offered for saleor, as ISKCON characterized it,

disseminated by sale or donationare sufficiently expressive to trigger heightened review under the

First Amendment presents a closer question. With respect to ISKCON's audio tapes, we note that

these may serve as media of communication. When played, they transmit a message to the listener.

The record before us establishes that ISKCON's audio tapes record prayers, devotional songs, and

the chanting of the sect's names for God. As such, the tapes give expression to ISKCON's religious

beliefs and teachings in a musical form. Accordingly, we hold that the sale of its audio tapes is

protected under the First Amendment. Cf. Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v. City and County of San

Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990) (sale of merchandise in conjunction with other

activities to disseminate organization's message is fully protected speech). Because we hold that

ISKCON's audio tapes are protected and because we conclude, in part II.B.2. below, that the Park

Service'ssalesregulation is constitutional even as applied to those tapes, we need not decide whether

ISKCON's beads are also sufficiently expressive to merit First Amendment protection.

As at least some of ISKCON's conduct is protected, we must determine whether the Park

Service's solicitation and sales regulations are permissible under the First Amendment. The parties

have narrowed the scope of our inquiry. The Park Service concedes, as it must, that the Mall is a

traditional public forumfor purposes ofthe First Amendment. For its part, ISKCON recognizes that,

even in a public forum, ifthe regulations are deemed content neutral, "thisinquiry reducesto whether

the requirements "are narrowlytailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and ... leave open

ample alternative channels for communication of the [regulated] information.' " American Library

Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.

781, 791 (1989)). While ISKCON agrees that the Government has a significant interest in preserving

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the purposes and values served by the Mall, particularly its role as a public forum, it contends that

the restrictions imposed by the Park Service on its speech are neither content neutral nor narrowly

tailored to serve those interests and that alternative channels for the communication of its message

do not exist. We now address each of these contentions.

A. Content-Neutral

1. Solicitation regulation

As noted above, the Park Service's solicitation regulation provides, in pertinent part, that

"[s]oliciting or demanding gifts, money, goods or services [in the National Capital Region parks] is

prohibited." 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(a) & (h). ISKCON argues that the solicitation regulation is content

based because it bans speech that communicates a specific messagea request for moneyand

because the Park Service's purpose is to protect park visitors from this potentially unsettling or

annoying message. Similarly, relying on United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983), ISKCON

contendsthat the regulation cannot be characterized as a time, place, and manner restriction because

it imposes a total prohibition on a particular type of expression.

These arguments are easily dismissed. Although the solicitation regulation could be read to

prohibit all requests for donations, the Park Service has rejected this interpretation. Instead, it

construes "solicitation" to include onlyan in-person request for immediate payment. Thus, according

to the Park Service, ISKCON's representatives may distribute leaflets soliciting donations with

instructions about where to send them. As we accord controlling weight to an agency's construction

of its own regulations unless that construction "is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation," United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (internalquotationmarks omitted),

we accept the Park Service's interpretation of section 7.96(h) as applying only to the in-person

solicitation ofimmediate donations. Cf. Lewis v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 880, 882 (10thCir. 1993) (noting

that court owed "great deference" to the Park Service's interpretation of its own regulations). So

construed, the solicitation regulation does not, as ISKCON contends, totally prohibit a type of

expression or a specific message; rather, it merely regulates the manner in which the message may

be conveyed. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2721 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (regulation

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prohibiting in-person solicitation for immediate payment regulates the manner but not the content of

expression). Accordingly, we reject ISKCON's contention that the solicitation regulation is content

based.

2. Sales regulation

The Park Service's amended sales regulation provides:

No merchandise may be sold during the conduct ofspecial events or demonstrations

except for books, newspapers, leaflets, pamphlets, buttons and bumper stickers. A

permit is required for the sale or distribution of permitted merchandise when done

with the aid of a stand or structure....

Special Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 17,649. Although the regulation limits the means by which a

message may be expressed (i.e., through the sale of books and buttons but not through the sale of

audio tapes or beads), it is not concerned with the content of the message conveyed by the items in

question. Accordingly, we hold that it is content neutral. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("A regulation

that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an

incidental effect on some ... messages but not others."); Bamon Corp. v. City of Dayton, 923 F.2d

470, 473 (6th Cir. 1991) (regulations applicable to particular category of speech "properly

characterized as content-neutral, as long as the regulations are justified without reference to the

content of that speech").

B. Narrowly Tailored

Asthe solicitation and salesregulations are content neutral, we willuphold themas valid time,

place, and mannerrestrictionsso long astheyare "narrowlydrawn to serve a significant governmental

interest" and "leave open ample alternative channelsfor communication" ofthe message. Community

for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293. For the purposes of this analysis, "a narrowly tailored

regulation "need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means' of serving the government's

content-neutral interests." American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 88 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798).

The restriction, however, may not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the

government's legitimate interests." Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.

1. Solicitation regulation

The Park Service argues generally that its prohibition of in-person solicitation is intended to

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preserve the quality of experience provided by the Mall and the other parks in the National Capital

Region. The Service contends that, were solicitation permitted, hordes of solicitors would swarm

through the parks pestering visitors with requests for donations. As a consequence, their aesthetic

value would be diminished; and visitors, harassed and pursued by solicitors, would be precluded from

enjoying the parks and their resources.

The Park Service calls our attention to the fact that the Supreme Court recently recognized

that solicitation is a more intimidating and disruptive form of expression than leafletting (citing Lee,

112 S. Ct. at 2708, and United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 734 (1990)). We note the Court's

observations regarding the intrusiveness of solicitation. The cases on which the Service relies,

however, do not address solicitations in a public forum. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2708 (concluding that

airport terminals were not public fora); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 ("the regulation at issue must be

analyzed under the standardsset forth for nonpublic fora...."). Neither we nor ISKCON quarrel with

the Park Service's goal of preserving the National Capital Region parks from the ills associated with

runaway solicitation. Nonetheless, as applied here, the ban on the in-person solicitation ofimmediate

donations will not survive constitutional scrutiny.

Nothing in the record suggests that ISKCON solicited donations on portions of the Mall

outside its well-delineated 100-square-foot permit area. We fail to see how solicitations made by

members of ISKCON operating within so restricted an area can possibly hurt the values the Park

Service legitimately seeks to protect. The conduct of a special event within a small, well-defined

permit area will have some effect on the ambiance of the Mall. But we cannot see how allowing

in-person solicitations within the permit area will add to whatever adverse impact willresult fromthe

special event itself. The effects of solicitation will be confined to the permit area, and those who wish

to escape them may simply steer clear ofthe authorized demonstration orspecial event. As ISKCON

notes, "Mall visitors can simply walk around the Krishnafest area." Brief for Appellees at 37.

The Park Service observes quite correctly that if ISKCON is permitted to solicit donations

within its permit area, then so too may others who are similarly situated. So be it. Our holding

allows only those individuals or groups participating in an authorized demonstration or special event

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to solicit donations within the confines of a restricted permit area such as that assigned to ISKCON.

It does not require the Park Service to let rampant panhandling go unchecked. Accordingly, we

conclude that, as here applied, the solicitation regulation burdens substantially more speech than

necessary and violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

2. Sales regulation

ISKCONargues, essentially, that the salesregulationis not narrowlytailored because thePark

Service hasfailed to provide an adequate explanation of why it permitsthe sale of books and bumper

stickers on the Mall while denying it the right to sell audio tapes and beads that have comparable

expressive values. ISKCON's position has an undeniable appeal. On first impression, it does seem

anomalous that the Park Service should have allowed ISKCON to sell a bumper sticker having a

message relative to its cause or activity while at the same time denying it the right to sell an audio

tape that might give its message both content and depth. But the logic of ISKCON's position would

require the Park Service to ban the sale of all expressive articles or none, a proposition that on itsface

is equally anomalous. What we are dealing with here is an underinclusive regulation; and as the

Supreme Court has observed, it is "surprising at first glance ... that a regulation of speech [should

ever be found] impermissibly underinclusive ...." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2043

(1994) (emphasisin original). Cf. Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975) (noting

that content-neutral, underinclusive classifications of speech are presumed valid); R.A.V. v. City of

St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992) (First Amendment "imposes not an underinclusive

limitation but a content discrimination limitation") (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court points to two circumstances in which an underinclusive regulation will be found

impermissible. The first is when "an exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech

may represent a governmental attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage

in expressing its views to the people." Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2043 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The other involves "[e]xemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a

medium of speech ... [that] may diminish the credibility of the government's rationale for restricting

speech in the first place." Id. at 2044 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S.

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Ct. 1505, 1511-15 (1993)).

Based on our reading of Gilleo and the other Supreme Court cases cited above, we conclude

that an underinclusive time, place, and manner regulation that is otherwise valid must be found to be

constitutional so long as it does not favor one side of an issue and its rationale is not undermined by

its exemptions. Cf. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that an underinclusive

regulation will violate the First Amendment only if it favors a particular viewpoint). The sales

regulation meets both of these tests. No one can seriously claim that its exemptions tip the balance

of any debate. Nor do they diminish the credibility of the Service's reasons for its general prohibition

of sales in the National Capital Region parks.

The Service is charged with maintaining the integrity of the Mall and the other parks in the

National Capital Region. This is an enormous task. The number of visitors has grown dramatically

over the years as have the numbers of demonstrations and special events that have taken place in the

parks. In its Notice of Proposed Rule, the Service estimated that, in 1994, it would issue permits for

approximately 3,500 demonstrations and special events. 59 Fed. Reg. 25,857. A large number of

these permits would authorize the sale and distribution of exempted materials. Id. The Park Service's

general ban on sales is intended, of course, to keep such activities within tolerable limits; and as its

experience with T-shirts has demonstrated, an exemption from the ban can result in an "unsightly,

inappropriate and an unwelcome commercial intrusion." Id. It seems self-evident that the addition

of any new article to the list of exemptions must increase in some degree the commercial activity that

will take place in the parks.

Based on the record before us, we conclude that limiting the exemptions to the items listed

does not diminish the credibility of the Park Service's rationale for prohibiting the sale of other

articles. This case is not like Discovery Network. There, the Supreme Court found invalid a

municipal ordinance that prohibited the distribution of commercial handbills through the use of

newsracks while permitting them to be used for the dispensing of newspapers. The city argued that

the ordinance was a reasonable content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction that was designed

to improve the attractiveness of the cityscape by removing a source of visual blight. Id. at 1510-11.

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The Court found the argument "unpersuasive because the very basis for the regulation [was] the

difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial speech." Id. at 1516. It also

found that the city's rationale for restricting the commercial speech lacked credibility because the

ordinance's distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech bore no relationship to the

aesthetic interests that the city had asserted. Id. at 1514. The law resulted in the removal of only 62

of the more than 1,500 newsracks in Cincinnati, id. at 1510; and, as the Court noted, a rack

dispensing a newspaper is no more comely than one dispensing commercial materials. Id. at 1515.

Here, of course, we are dealing with a content-neutral regulation, not one that is directed at

commercial speech. Moreover, the sales regulation has served its purpose. Although the Park

Service has exempted certain articles from the general ban on sales, the Mall is essentially free of

commercialism. Thus, in contrast with the Cincinnati ordinance, the regulation's underinclusiveness

does not undermine itsrationale. We conclude, then, that so long as exemptions from the ban do not

have the effect of favoring a particular view, the Service is at liberty to determine how much

commercial activity may be permitted on the Mall and the other parks in the National Capital area

without significant erosion of their fundamental purposes. As the Supreme Court has observed:

The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn on a judge's

agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate

method for promoting significant government interests.

United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).

A sales regulation does not become less narrowly tailored merely because the Service has

concluded that the sale of some expressive materials may be permitted without the sacrifice of

essential park values. The exemption of some speech does not require the exemption of all speech.

See Moser, 46 F.3d at 974 (upholding statute prohibiting automated, but permitting "live,"

telemarketing calls); Ater v. Armstrong, 961 F.2d 1224, 1229-30 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding

statute prohibiting leafleting, but permitting solicitation of contributions, along roadways). We

conclude, therefore, that the sales regulation is not "substantially broader than necessary to achieve

the government's interest." Ward, 491 U.S. at 800.

3. Ample alternative channels

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As we hold that the solicitation regulation is not narrowly tailored, we need not reach the

question of whether it leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. We must decide,

however, whether the sales regulation, which we find to be both content-neutral and narrowly

tailored, leaves open ample alternative channels for the communication of ISKCON's message. We

conclude that it does.

Under the sales regulation, ISKCON may convey information about the Krishna

Consciousnessfaith in innumerable ways. For example, ISKCON may resort to any of the traditional

print media allowed to be sold in the park areas. In addition, nothing in the sales regulation prevents

ISKCON's members from speaking to interested park visitors; nor are they precluded from singing

and chanting Krishna Consciousness music and prayers. In fact, as the Park Service stresses,

ISKCON's members may display and give the audio tapes and beadsto members ofthe public so long

as they do not try to exact a payment or request a donation in exchange for them.

In light ofthese adequate substitutesfor the sale of audio tapes and beads, ISKCON'sreliance

on Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977), is misplaced. There, the Supreme

Court observed that a local ordinance banning real estate "For Sale" signs relegated sellers to

alternative means of communication that involved "more cost and less autonomy than "For Sale'

signs" and that were "less likely to reach persons not deliberately seeking sales information...." Id.

Similarly, in Gilleo, the Court held that a city ordinance prohibiting homeowners from displaying

certain signs on their property did not leave open ample alternative channels for communication:

Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite

distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or

picture by other means. Precisely because of their location such signs provide

information about the identity of the "speaker."

Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2046. As we have indicated above, however, members of ISKCON have

adequate substitutes for the sale of their audio tapes and beads. Resort to these alternatives would

not infringe on the autonomy of the group's members, make it less likely that they would reach their

intended audience, or prevent them from revealing their identity or advocating their cause.

Nevertheless, ISKCON contends that, because its audio tapes and beads serve unique,

instrumental roles in the Krishna Consciousness faith, any alternative would prove unsatisfactory.

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This argument, however, conflates ISKCON's Free Speech claim with the religious freedom claim

that it abandoned at oral argument. The Supreme Court has instructed that under the Free Speech

clause "religious organizations [do not] enjoy rights to communicate ... superior to those of other

organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to proselytize." Heffron v.

International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981). Because

ISKCON may expressits message in countless waysthat are consistent with the salesregulation, and

because we find these alternatives to be more than adequate, we hold that the Park Service's sales

regulation leaves open ample alternative channels for communication.

As the sales regulation is also content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve significant

governmental interests, we hold that its application to ISKCON's sale of audio tapes and beads is

permissible under the First Amendment. Having concluded that the Park Service's application of its

solicitation regulation violated the Constitution, we now addressthe Service's challenge to the scope

of the district court's remedial order.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the Park Service's application of the solicitation regulation to ISKCON's

requests for voluntary donations within the permit area violated the Free Speech Clause of the First

Amendment. We conclude, however, that the Park Service's prohibition of the sale of audio tapes

and beads is permissible. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

It is so ordered.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the opinion

of the Court insofar as it holdsthe Park Service solicitation regulation unconstitutional as applied to

ISKCON's activities. Insofar as the Court holds that the Park Service may prohibit ISKCON from

selling audio tapes and certain beads, however, I dissent.

I. Audio Tapes

The Park Service allows demonstrators on the Mall to sell books, newspapers, leaflets,

pamphlets, buttons, and bumper stickers that have a message relevant to their cause. At the same

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time it refuses to allow demonstrators to sell audio tapes with like content lest a large number of

vendors flock to the Mall, resulting in a level of commercial activity "inconsistent with the Park

Service's statutory mandate to preserve and maintain the parks."

As the Court notes (at 7-8), ISKCON's sale of tape recordings of prayers, songs, and chants

clearlyimplicatesthe First Amendment, especially on the Mallthe quintessentialpublic forumin the

civic life ofthe nation. Nevertheless, as the Court also notes (at 9-10), the sales regulation is content

neutral and may therefore be upheld as a legitimate restriction upon the time, place, or manner of

speaking if the Park Service shows that the regulation is "narrowly drawn to serve a significant

governmental interest" and "leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the

information." See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 & n.5 (1984).

The Park Service'sinterest in limiting commercial activity and therebymaintaining the unique

aesthetic character of the Mall is undoubtedly significant; the disputed question here is whether its

prohibition upon the sale of audio tapes is narrowly drawn to serve that interest, which turns upon

the "fit" between the end being sought and the means chosen to accomplish it. See Board of Trustees,

State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-80 (1989); see also Riley v. National

Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988) (commercial element to

protected speech does not justify greater regulation). The fit need "not necessarily [be] perfect, but

[it must be] reasonable; ... not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in

proportion to the interest served." Id. at 480; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113

S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.12 (1993). Moreover, the Government bears the burden of showing that the

regulation is "narrowly tailored." See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480; Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510

n.12.; see also United States v. Doe, 968 F.2d 86, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

In most cases, a content-neutral regulation of speech is not invalid simply because it is

underinclusivei.e., failsto restrict all ofthe activity that infringes upon the end that the Government

seeks. See Erznozick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975) ("Court frequentlyhas upheld

underinclusive classifications on the sound theory that a legislature may deal with one part of a

problem without addressing all of it"). Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court has noted:

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Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of speech may be

noteworthy for a reason quite apart from the risks of viewpoint and content

discrimination: they may diminish the credibility of the government's rationale for

restricting speech in the first place.

City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 (1994) (citing Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511-

15). In my opinion, the Park Service's decision to ban the sale of audio tapes while it allows the sale

of books diminishes to the vanishing point the credibility of its purported rationale.

Throughout this case the Park Service has presented but one explanation for its decision to

prohibit the sale of audio tapes while allowing the sale of other expressive articles: By limiting the

types of articles to be sold, the regulation effectively limits the number of vendors on the Mall,

thereby reducing the "visual clutter," "trash and debris," "congestion," and "degradation of the park[

] atmosphere." In short, the Park Service claims that by permitting fewer sales, the rule helps

preserve the aesthetic quality of the Mall. That may be true, but the Supreme Court has specifically

held that rationale insufficient to support an underinclusive regulation of protected speech in a public

forum.

DiscoveryNetwork involved aCincinnatiordinance that prohibited the placement upon public

property of newsracks containing commercial handbillsbut not of newsracks containing

newspaperson the ground that the regulation advanced the city's interest in preserving the

attractiveness of the streets by reducing the total number of newsracks. The Court rejected that

argument because the distinction drawn by the statute bore "no relationship whatsoever to the

particular interests ... asserted." Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1514 (emphasis in original). The

Court explained:

[T]he city's primary concern, as argued to us, is with the aggregate number of

newsracks on its streets. On that score, however, all newsracks, regardless of

whether they contain commercial or noncommercial publications, are equally at fault.

Id. at 1515. The Court went on to hold that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation. Id.

at 1516-17. Contrary to the opinion of the Court in this case (at 12-15), however, the presence in

Discovery Network of that "alternative rationale for invalidating the city's policy," id. at 1524

(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), does not mean that every underinclusive regulation is permissible so

long as it is content neutral. On the contrary, as the Supreme Court reiterated in Gilleo, the

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Government's failure adequately to justify an underinclusive regulation still renders it impermissible

"quite apart from the risks of viewpoint or content discrimination." 114 S. Ct. at 2044.

Just as certain newsracksin Discovery Network were no more responsible than othersfor the

city's visual blight, in this case audio tapes are no more at fault than books, buttons, or bumper

stickers for commercialism on the Mall. The Park Service has offered no argument, nor even hinted

at any evidence, suggesting why tapes should be prohibited while books are allowed; indeed, the

Park Service's stated rationale, if accepted, would equally support the opposite rule, i.e., a ban on

books but not tapes. And for all we know, such a rule would be equally effective in keeping the Mall

"essentially free of commercialism." Ct. Op. at 14.

In its quest to limit commercial activity on the Mall the Park Service may be able

constitutionally to prohibit sales with little or no expressive value, or to prohibit activity that is

expressive but has a particularly disruptive impact; it may even be able to rule out entirely some

protected speech so long as it does so by wholly neutral means (e.g., a lottery); but it may not limit

protected speech capriciously. That is precisely what it has done here by allowing ISKCON to sell

books but not tapes without saying why, in its judgment, the sale of tapes is more inimical to the

preservation of the Mall. There may be valid reasons for the Park Service to distinguish tapes from

books, but the simple fact that prohibiting tapes reduces the amount of commercial activity on the

Mall to a more acceptable level is not one of them.

Though the Park Service, not the court, is charged with determining how best to conserve the

Mall, see Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 299, "[w]here constitutionally

protected activity isimplicated, we cannot simply defer to the Park Service's unexplained judgment."

Doe, 968 F.2d at 90. Therefore, I would hold that the Park Service's failure adequately to explain

the distinction it has drawn proves fatal to its regulation as applied in this case.

II. Beads

ISKCON also wants to go on selling two types of beads at its stand on the Mall. One type

apparently serves as an instrument of prayer and meditation while the other serves to identify the

wearer as a devotee of Krishna. ISKCON's sale of the former is of no moment to the First

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Amendment; those beads may be an aid to spiritual activity, but they are not in themselves

communicative. I presume that the Park Service could not prohibit the use of a rosary or perhaps of

a prayer mat on the Mall, but that does not mean that it must also allow vendors to sell them there.

See There to Care, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Revenue, 19 F.3d 1165, 1167

(7th Cir. 1994) (holding words used in bingo game not protected because they did "not convey

ideas").

The so-called identification beads, on the other hand, must be considered communicative in

light of ISKCON's assertions, the Park Service'sstipulations, and the procedural posture ofthis case.

These beads seem to serve the same function for the wearer as does a lapel button or a bumper

sticker. The ban on the sale of such beads therefore suffers from the same flaw, and should share the

same fate, as the (thus far) unjustified ban upon the sale of audio tapes. I believe there are two

distinctions worth noting, though.

First, a string of religious identification beads may be practically indistinguishable from the

much larger class of decorative beadsthat are not communicative in any meaningfulsense. Whereas

an audio tape necessarily contains some information or expression, it is only the exceptional strand

of beads that makes anything but a fashion statement. Therefore, the Park Service may be able to

justify a flat prohibition upon the sale of jewelry based simply upon the administrative difficulty of

sorting the speaking beads from the mute.

Second, ISKCON's beadslike bumper stickers and T-shirtsmay be communicative, but

their sale does not add anything to ISKCON's ability to communicate its ideas to passers-by on the

Mall. Whereas a book, a tape, a newspaper, or a handbill is a convenient way of communicating more

information than can be relayed on sandwich boards or by engaging a stranger in conversation, the

message printed on a bumper sticker or a T-shirt or symbolized by a strand of beads is just as well

communicated by its display as by its sale. In reality, the beads are of value as a medium of

communication not primarily to ISKCON but to the purchaser who will use them to communicate

to others. But while wearing a string of beads may be protected activity, see Goldman v.

Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), no first

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amendment principle makes the right to buy them coextensive with the right to display them.

Unfortunately, the Park Service rests its prohibition of the sale of beads not upon either of

these grounds but upon the same rationale that it gives for not allowing the sale of audio

tapesclaiming the authority to limit the number of transactions on the Mall in any content-neutral

way it sees fit. Clearly enough the Park Service must draw the line somewhere if the Mall is not to

be turned into a flea market; and perhaps the line it has drawn at the sale of beads is as good a line

as any. Indeed, this may be an area in which any line must be substantively arbitrarydistinguishing

among things that play indistinguishable roles in the expression of ideasso that administrative

convenience may be allowed to govern. But the Park Service has given the court no particular reason

to think that is the case, and we may not supply one for it. See Doe, 968 F.2d at 90.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the Court insofar as it

upholds the application of the Park Service sales regulation to the audio tapes and the identification

beads involved in this case.

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