Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03988/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03988-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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28 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 06-3988 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 10/12/07**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SAFRONIA DODD-OWENS, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

KYPHON, INC.,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 06-3988 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1

STRIKE AND GRANTING LEAVE

TO AMEND

[re: docket nos. 29, 30]

Defendant Kyphon, Inc. (“Kyphon”) moves to strike Plaintiffs’ class action allegations. 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) at ¶¶ 20-42. For the reasons discussed below, the motion

will be granted, with leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

The original complaint in this action was filed on June 27, 2006. Plaintiffs Safronia

Dodd-Owens (“Dodd-Owens”), Natalie Amaya (“Amaya”), Tera Bryer, Tiffany Socha (“Socha”),

Teri Carr, and Elizabeth Glus (“Glus”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) complained of gender

discrimination by Kyphon, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. The original

complaint included nine claims pertaining to gender and pregnancy discrimination, sexual

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Case No. C 06-3988 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

harassment, and retaliation in violation of California and federal law.

On October 27, 2006, Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend the complaint. On November

9, 2006, the Court issued an order directing that the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) be filed

as of right and denying as moot Kyphon’s previously-filed motions to dismiss six claims and to

strike the class action allegations from the complaint. The FAC included ten claims, of which

the first two were class action claims: (1) gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; (2) gender discrimination in

violation of The Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940; (3)

pregnancy discrimination against Dodd-Owens in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et

seq.; (4) retaliation against Dodd-Owens in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; (5)

retaliation against Amaya in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; (6) pregnancy

discrimination against Glus in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; (7) retaliation

against Glus in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h); (8)

sexual harassment against Glus in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; (9)

pregnancy discrimination against Socha in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; and

(10) retaliation against Socha in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.

On November 29, 2006, Kryphon moved to dismiss the second and fourth claims to the

extent that they relied upon FEHA. On the same date, Kryphon moved to strike the class action

allegations from the FAC. FAC at ¶¶ 20-42. Noting that many of the challenges in the motion to

strike likely should be resolved in the context of a motion for class certification, the Court

granted both motions with leave to amend. On February 9, 2007, the Court set a March 7, 2007

filing deadline for Plaintiffs’ amended pleading.

Plaintiff, however, failed to comply with the filing deadline, and Kyphon responded with

Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. Following a May 25, 2007 hearing, the Court granted Kyphon’s

motion to dismiss in part, dismissing Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims without leave to amend, and

granted Plaintiffs’ leave to file a second amended complaint consistent with the February 9 order.

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28 Plaintiffs’ SAC also contains six individual claims for retaliation under Title VII. 2

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Case No. C 06-3988 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

The SAC contains only one class action claim for gender discrimination under Title VII.2

Defendant has moved to strike this claim. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. The Court heard oral

argument on September 14, 2007. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike

generally will not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could not have any

possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation. LeDuc v. Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co.,

814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Allegations “supplying background or historical

material or other matter of an evidentiary nature will not be stricken unless unduly prejudicial to

defendant.” Id. Moreover, allegations that contribute to a full understanding of the complaint as

a whole need not be stricken. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A motion to strike a class allegation is governed by Rule 23. See, e.g., Bennett v. Nucor

Corp., No. 3:04 CV 00291, 2005 WL 1773948 at * 2 n.1 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2005). Plaintiffs and

Defendant dispute the appropriate timing of a Rule 23 review. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s

motion to strike on Rule 23 grounds is premature insofar as it is brought prior both to a motion

for certification and prior to discovery. Defendant responds that this case is ripe for Rule 23

review and Plaintiffs that have no absolute entitlement to discovery.

Defendant argues that the Court must evaluate the propriety of the class prior to a motion

for class certification because “Rule 23 itself mandates that ‘[a]s soon as practicable after the

commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether

it is to be so maintained.’” Reply Memorandum at 1. However, Defendant overstates this

requirement. In 2003, Congress amended Rule 23, replacing “as soon as practicable after the

commencement of an action,” with “at an early practicable time.” This change was not cosmetic;

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28

 Defendant does cite one case decided after the amendment of Rule 23, Bennet v. Nucor 3

Corp., No. 3:04 CV 00291, 2005 WL 1773948 (E.D. Ark,, 2005). However, this case applies the

requirements of Rule 23 prior to amendment. Id. at *2 (“Rule 23(c) requires district courts to

make a determination as to whether a class action is maintainable ‘as soon as practicable after the

commencement of the action.”).

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Case No. C 06-3988 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

rather the Advisory Committee explained:

Time may be needed to gather information. Although an evaluation for the

probable outcome on the merits is not properly part of the certification decision,

discovery in aid of the certification decision often includes information required to

identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at trial. In this sense

it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the ‘merits,” limited to those

aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an informed basis. . . . A

critical need is to determine how the case will be tried.

F. Rule Civ. Pro. Rule 23(c)(1)(A) Advisory Committee Notes; see also Hurley v. U.S.

Healthworks Med. Group, No. 05-0017, 2006 WL 1788994 at *4 & n.1 (E.D. Wash. June 27,

2006) (explaining the amendment and noting that the amended language is “substantially

different”). While this amendment does not dictate that courts postpone Rule 23 analysis in

every case until a motion for class certification has been made, it is clear from the Committee’s

notes that the purpose of the amendment was to provide courts with more time and flexibility to

permit discovery and make informed decisions regarding class certification. 

Citing cases decided before the amendment, Defendant next argues that it is not 3

necessary for the Court to defer the certification decision until discovery has been conducted

because Plaintiffs have no absolute right to discovery. Defendants are correct in the sense that

even after the amendment it is within the court’s discretion whether or not to permit discovery. 

However, in exercising this discretion, courts must be mindful of the complexity of certification:

[T]he class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in

the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action. Sometimes

the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether the interests

of the absent parties are fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff’s claim,

and sometimes it may be necessary of the court to probe behind the pleadings

before coming to rest on the certification question. Even after a certification order

is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in light of subsequent developments

in the litigation.

Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). The present case is not one in which it is

“plain enough from the pleadings” whether the certification requirements are met. Instead, there

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Case No. C 06-3988 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

are several open questions and contested facts regarding the make-up of the class that must be

resolved before representation can be assessed.

Under Rule 23, certification requires a finding by the district court that: 

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there

are questions of law and fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of

the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4)

the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Additionally, the court must find that at least one of the following

conditions is met:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or

varying adjudications or (b) individual adjudications dispositive of the interests of

other members not a party to those adjudications; (2) the party opposing the class

has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class; or (3) the

questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over

any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to

other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

F. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Ultimately, the plaintiff who seeks to have the class certified bears the

burden of proving that these requirement have been met.

Defendant argues that none of the Rule 23 requirements can be met here, indeed,

Plaintiffs and Defendant paint very different pictures of the class and its representatives. 

Plaintiffs seek to represent “current and former Kyphon employees . . . includ[ing], but not

necessarily limited to all female citizens of the United States as part of Kyphon who are, or have

been employed by Kyphon in the United States as a part of Kyphon’s sales force.” SAC at ¶ 23. 

Defendant argues that this class cannot possibly share common issues because its members are

spread over a large geographic area. Motion to Strike at 14. Defendant also maintains that

Plaintiffs are not typical of the class because many of them have been promoted and never were

actually denied training, and, more generally, because there is no typicality among them. As to

this last point, Defendant also points out that Plaintiffs were denied promotion for different

reasons, have different qualifications, and were assigned to different territories for different

purposes. Id. at 17-19. Finally, Defendant argues that there is a conflict of interest between

members of the class such that “the class members that are pregnant or have children (including

some of the Plaintiffs) . . . seek to establish that female class members that are not pregnant or do

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 Plaintiffs also refute the disparities between them named by Defendant, claiming that 4

they have been “highly exaggerated if not misrepresented.” Id. at 12.

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Case No. C 06-3988 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

not have children are favored at their expense.” Id. at 19. 

Plaintiffs respond to these rather specific observations by characterizing the class claim in

very general terms, arguing simply that the class shares a common experience of Title VII

discrimination. Plaintiff’s Opposition at 9. Plaintiff’s general and conclusory response does not 4

squarely address Defendant’s concerns and the requirements of Rule 23. To proceed with their

class action Plaintiffs at the very least must allege some specific commonality and typicality

among class members. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to strike, but also will grant

Plaintiffs a final opportunity to amend the class allegations of their complaint. 

III. ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to strike is GRANTED. Any amended

complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.

DATED: October 12, 2007

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 06-3988 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

This Order was served on the following persons:

Frederick J. Geonetta landglawyers@msn.com, 

Harold R. Jones hrj@severson.com, ano@severson.com 

Thomas Marc Litton tmlitton@compuserve.com, 

Rhonda L. Nelson rln@severson.com, 

David W. Sanford dsanford@nydclaw.com, fgilbert@nydclaw.com 

Steven Lance Wittels swittels@nydclaw.com, sprasad@nydclaw.com 

Notice will be delivered by other means to:

Shayna Bloom 

Sanford Wittels & Heisler LLP

Suite 310

1666 Connecticut Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20009

Angela Corridan 

Sanford Wittels & Heisler LLP

1666 Connecticut Avenue NW

Suite 310

Washington, DC 20009

Laura Fentonmiller 

Case 5:06-cv-03988-JF Document 92 Filed 10/12/07 Page 7 of 8
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Case No. C 06-3988 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

Sanford Wittels & Heisler LLP

1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Suite 310

Washington, DC 20009

Jeremy Heisler 

Sanford Wittels & Heisler

950 Third Avenue

10th Floor

New York, NY 10022

Grant Morris 

1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Suite 310

Washington, DC 20009

Stefanie Roemer 

1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Suite 310

Washington, DC 20009

Case 5:06-cv-03988-JF Document 92 Filed 10/12/07 Page 8 of 8