Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00873/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00873-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORENE OGLESBY, MARK RANDAL ) 

OGLESBY, CHRISTINE SUSANNE )

HINKLE, WAYNE WILLIAM )

OGLESBY, JULIE MICHELLE HAY, ) 

individually and as the )

Successors in Interest of )

ROBERT OGLESBY, Deceased. )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

COUNTY OF KERN, KERN COUNTY )

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF )

MACK WIMBISH, KERN MEDICAL )

CENTER, and DOES 1 TO 100, )

inclusive, )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-05-00873 REC TAG

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN

THE ALTERNATIVE TO STAY

PENDING OUTCOME OF PARALLEL

STATE ACTION.

(Doc. 16) 

 

On October 31, 2005, the Court heard Defendant County of

Kern’s motion to dismiss or stay based on the principles of

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669

(1971) or Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United

States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976).

//

//

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I. Background

Robert Oglesby was arrested following a domestic disturbance

and taken to jail. While incarcerated by County of Kern (the

“County”), he suffered a broken leg. After treatment at Kern

Medical Center, which the County owned and operated, he was

eventually discharged from custody. He received subsequent

medical care at other facilities. The broken leg eventually

became infected and was amputated. 

On June 18, 2004, Mr. Oglesby and Lorene Oglesby, his wife,

filed a tort claim with the County alleging that it violated Mr.

Oglesby’s civil rights by using excessive force and providing

deficient medical care and claiming loss of consortium. On

September 30, 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Oglesby filed suit in Superior

Court of California, County of Kern (the “Superior Court”)

against the County, Kern County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff

Mack Wimbish, and Kern Medical Center (collectively

“Defendants”). Oglesby v. County of Kern, No. S-1500-CV 253871

AEW (Kern County Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2004); see Mot. Ex. A. The

complaint sought relief for various constitutional violations

under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, assault and battery, negligence,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and failure to

summon medical care.

On November 9, 2004, Mr. Oglesby died of cardiopulmonary

arrest caused by a stroke, aggravated by various factors. A new

tort claim was presented to the County on November 18, 2004. On

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In all, Plaintiffs are Mrs. Oglesby, Mark Randall Oglesby, 1

Christine Susanne Hinkle, Wayne William Oglesby, and Julie Michelle

Hay.

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May 17, 2005, Mrs. Oglesby and four of Mr. Oglesby’s children1

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed another suit in Superior Court

against Defendants. Oglesby v. County of Kern, No. S-1500-CV

255515 AEW (Kern County Super. Ct. May 17, 2005); see Mot. Ex. B. 

The complaint sought recovery on various theories under section

1983 and for wrongful death. Defendants timely answered the

complaint. 

On June 13, 2005, the Superior Court consolidated the two

Oglesby cases. Opp’n Ex. D. Subsequently, Defendants propounded

form and special interrogatories and requests for admissions from

Plaintiffs.

On July 1, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal

with the Superior Court. Later in the day, Plaintiffs filed suit

in this Court. The federal complaint alleges causes of action

under section 1983 relating to excessive force and failure to

provide adequate medical care, as well as causes of action for

assault and battery, negligence, failure to summon medical care,

and wrongful death. 

On July 6, 2005, the Superior Court rejected Plaintiffs’

request for dismissal on the ground that the request was

incomplete. Plaintiffs corrected the defect and both actions

were dismissed on July 14, 2005. Plaintiffs did not immediately

notify Defendants that they had dismissed the action. Defendants

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thus filed a motion to compel in Superior Court on August 9,

2005, even though the cases were dismissed almost one month

before.

Defendants filed this motion on August 18, 2005. Plaintiffs

did not notify Defendants of the voluntary dismissal until August

22, 2005, after they filed this Motion. Woods Supp. Decl. at 2.

II. Discussion

A. Younger Abstention

In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed.

2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts should

not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions absent

extraordinary circumstances. The Court held, based on principles

of equity and comity, that “a proper respect for state functions”

requires a federal court to generally decline to hear such a

case. Id. at 432. The Court subsequently extended the

principles it enunciated in Younger to certain types of civil

cases. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of

New Orleans (“NOPSI”), 491 U.S. 350, 367-68, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 105

L. Ed. 298 (1989). The Younger principles apply to actions for

damages under section 1983. Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d

965, 983 (9th Cir. 2004). “Abstention is appropriate in favor of

a state proceeding if (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2)

the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the

state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise

federal questions.” Fresh Int’l Corp. v. Agric. Labor Relations

Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Middlesex

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Plaintiffs’ counsel points out that he attempted to 2

voluntarily dismiss the state case on July 1, 2005, prior to filing

5

County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432,

102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982)).

Plaintiffs contend that abstention is inappropriate because

the first and second Younger requirements are not met.

1. Ongoing State Proceedings

Plaintiffs argue that the first requirement for Younger

abstention, that “state proceedings are ongoing,” is not met

because here the state court case has been dismissed without

prejudice. See Chapman Decl. at ¶ 10. The critical question for

determining whether proceedings are ongoing is whether the state

proceedings were underway before the federal proceedings began. 

Kitchens v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

Fresh Int’l, 805 F.2d at 1358); see Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 969

n. 4 (“The critical date for purposes of deciding whether

abstention principles apply is the date the federal action is

filed.”). In Kitchens, defendants in state court proceedings

paternity proceedings challenged certain AFDC regulations in

federal court. Id. at 1338. Even though certain defendants’

state proceedings were complete when the federal suit commenced,

the prior state proceedings were sufficient to meet the “ongoing”

requirement. Id. at 1341.

Here, Plaintiffs filed the federal complaint on July 1,

2005. The Superior Court did not dismiss the state action until

July 14, 2005. Not only had Plaintiffs filed a suit in state 2

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the federal complaint. Chapman Decl. at ¶ 7; see Chapman Decl. Ex.

E. This first dismissal request was rejected on July 6, 2005,

based on a flaw in the application. Chapman Decl. Ex. G.

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court prior to the “critical date” of July 1, 2005,

the state suit overlapped with the federal suit. Therefore, the

requirement of “ongoing” state proceedings is met.

2. Important State Interests

The second requirement for Younger abstention is that the

proceedings implicate important state interests. Fresh Int’l,

805 F.2d at 1358. The importance of the state interest can be

shown in noncriminal proceedings by their close relationship to

criminal proceedings, or where the proceedings are necessary to

vindicate important state policies or for the functioning of the

state judicial system. Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 973 (citing

Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432); see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420

U.S. 592, 95 S. Ct. 1200, 43 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1975) (state public

nuisance proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S. Ct.

1211, 51 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1977) (state contempt proceedings);

Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 97 S. Ct. 1911, 52 L. Ed. 2d

486 (1977) (state civil enforcement action). 

Generally, the state’s interest is shown by the fact that

the state instituted the state proceedings. Fresh Int’l, 805

F.2d at 1360 n. 8. Some courts have ruled out abstention on the

ground that the plaintiff in the state proceeding is also the

federal plaintiff. See Crawley v. Hamilton County Comm’rs, 744

F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding abstention appropriate where

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state plaintiffs filed the federal action and were not attempting

to use the federal courts to shield themselves from state court

enforcement efforts); Ky. W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm.,

791 F.2d 1111, 1117 (3d Cir. 1986) (denying Younger abstention on

the grounds that “‘where Congress has granted concurrent

jurisdiction, a plaintiff is free to bring a suit in both the

state and federal forums for the same cause of action’”). Though

Younger abstention does not ordinarily apply when a federal

plaintiff is also the plaintiff in state court, more important to

the analysis is whether the plaintiff filed the state case

voluntarily or was compelled to do so by state law. Fresh Int’l,

805 F.2d at 1360 n. 8 (applying Younger principles where

plaintiff filed the state case in response to an agency order

against it).

Here, the Plaintiffs filed the state case to obtain relief

for injuries that Defendants allegedly inflicted. Defendants

contend that this case implicates a number of important state

interests that require abstention. First, Defendants point to

the state interest in administration of its jails. Second, the

case concerns, in part, medical malpractice, which California

regulates under its Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act,

sections 3333.1 and 3333.2 of the California Civil Code. Mr.

Oglesby’s death, allegedly caused by the malpractice, also

implicates California’s wrongful death statute, California Civil

Procedure Code section 377.60. Defendants further allege that

the case involves a determination of the degree to which the

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County has statutory immunity to Plaintiffs’ suit, under

California Government Code sections 840 through 845.6. State

procedural requirements may also bar Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Defendants claim that the state law involved in this case

implicates a state interest and requires abstention. In support,

Defendants cite Middlesex, 457 U.S. 423, for the proposition that

a federal action containing federal and state claims should be

dismissed “where the state claims predominate.” Middlesex made

no such holding. To the contrary, the Middlesex Court focused

instead on the nature of the state claims and whether they were

closely analogous to criminal proceedings or were necessary to

vindicate state policies or for the functioning of the judicial

system. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. 

Defendants have not explained how applying various

principles of state law in a case brought by a private party

implicates a state interest on par with criminal proceedings. At

issue is whether Defendants must compensate Plaintiffs for

certain injuries. Defendants do have an interest in prevailing

in the law suit, but this interest is not what the Middlesex

Court contemplated. Rather the focus is on the character of the

state proceedings and the state’s general interest. See

Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432; NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 365 (holding that

state’s initiation of regulatory proceedings evinced a “general

interest” in regulation relevant to a Younger analysis, but its

interest in prevailing in the particular proceeding was

immaterial). 

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The state proceedings began when Plaintiffs sought recovery

based on certain actions by Defendants. The suit only seeks to

vindicate Plaintiffs’ interests in recovery. Defendants have not

affirmatively pursued any of their interests against Plaintiffs. 

Defendants are only involved in this case because Plaintiffs

haled them into court. Thus the state suit is in all respects

voluntary. Defendants did not file or order this suit to protect

any interest. See Fresh Int’l, 805 F.2d at 1360 n. 8. Instead,

its sole role is to defend itself from Plaintiffs’ charges. That

the federal court claimant is also the state court claimant is

strong evidence that the state lacks sufficient interest for

Younger abstention in this case.

The rationale that underlay Younger and its progeny, seems

to be starkly absent here. No government entity has undertaken

in the state proceeding to enforce its laws, regulate any entity,

vindicate important state policies, or carry out any functions of

its judicial system. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. A decision

by a federal court in this case would not have a similar effect

to the injunction against a state criminal proceeding in Younger. 

Rather, any such decision would simply resolve in federal court a

claim voluntarily brought by private entities against a

government entity. This claim does not involve any important

state interests necessary to apply Younger principles to a civil

proceeding.

Therefore, Defendants’ motion to stay or abstain based on

Younger principles is DENIED.

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“‘The Colorado River doctrine is not technically an 3

abstention doctrine,’ Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 867 n. 4 (9th

Cir. 2002); therefore, a district court’s decision declining to

exercise federal jurisdiction pursuant to Colorado River is more

properly referred to as a stay or dismissal, as the case may be.”

Smith v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 418 F.3d 1028, 1032

(9th Cir. 2005).

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B. Stay or Dismissal under Colorado River3

In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United

States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976),

the Supreme Court enunciated a theory by which federal courts

could refuse to exercise their jurisdiction based on

“considerations of ‘wise judicial administration, giving regard

to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive

disposition of litigation.’” Id. at 817. Federal courts have a

“virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the

jurisdiction given them.” Id. Because of this obligation, a

federal court may decline to hear cases under its jurisdiction

“‘only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the

parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an

important countervailing interest.’” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at

14 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813). 

In deciding whether to stay or dismiss a case based on the

Colorado River rationale, a court should consider such factors

as:

(1) whether the state court first assumed

jurisdiction over property; 

(2) inconvenience of the federal forum; 

(3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal

litigation; 

(4) the order in which jurisdiction was

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obtained by the concurrent forums; 

(5) whether federal law or state law provides

the rule of decision on the merits; 

(6) whether the state court proceedings are

inadequate to protect the federal litigant’s

rights; 

(7) whether exercising jurisdiction would

promote forum shopping.

Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15-16, 23, 26; Travelers Indem. Co. v.

Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990)). A court’s

decision to decline jurisdiction “does not rest on a mechanical

checklist,” but rather depends on “a careful balancing of the

important factors as they apply in a given case.” Moses H. Cone,

460 U.S. at 16. 

The obligation of a federal court to hear cases under its

jurisdiction is “particularly weighty” where the federal

plaintiffs seek relief under section 1983. Attwood v. Mendocino

Coast Dist. Hosp., 886 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting

Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979)). “Under

such circumstances conflicting results, piecemeal litigation, and

some duplication of judicial effort is the unavoidable price of

preserving access to the federal relief which section 1983

assures.” Id.

1. Adequacy of State Court Proceedings

An important consideration under a Colorado River analysis

is whether, in the case of stay or dismissal, the state court

proceedings will be an adequate forum for Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26-27. Stay or abstention is

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inappropriate where “substantial room for doubt” exists as to

whether the state court can provide relief. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that an order of this Court dismissing

their action might result in their claims being barred by the

statute of limitations. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6 (Deering

2005) (six month statute of limitations for suits against a

public entity). Defendants do not dispute that the limitations

period applies, but rather assert that the state court can set

aside the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state claims. California

Civil Procedure Code section 473(b) provides: 

The court may, upon any terms as may be just,

relieve a party or his or her legal

representative from a judgment, dismissal,

order, or other proceeding taken against him

or her through his or her mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 

Application for this relief . . . shall be

made within a reasonable time, in no case

exceeding six months, after the judgment,

dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.

The state court entered the order of voluntary dismissal on

July 14, 2005. Therefore, Plaintiffs would be entitled to seek

such relief until February 14, 2006. It is not, however, a

foregone conclusion that the state court would grant this relief. 

Section 473(b) allows the court to act “upon any terms as may be

just.” The state court seems free to determine whether justice

would require reinstating the suit. This Court can speculate

that, if the federal suit were dismissed, the state court might

decide that Plaintiffs were surprised or mistaken by the

circumstances following dismissal. Nonetheless, “substantial

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room for doubt” as to the existence of a state forum exists.

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs should be barred from

invoking the inadequacy of the state forum to the extent that

they are responsible for rendering the forum inadequate. 

Defendants provide no authority for this position, nor has the

Court discovered a case that supports it. On the other hand,

another circuit has denied Colorado River dismissal on the ground

that, following multiple voluntary dismissals by plaintiff, no

state proceeding could protect plaintiff’s rights. McLaughlin v.

United Va. Bank, 955 F.2d 930, 935-36 (4th Cir. 1992). 

McLaughlin held that absent a finding of bad faith, courts should

seek to efficiently and justly dispose of disputes before them. 

Id. Despite an overlap with various state suits, “principles of

res judicata, collateral estoppel, and equitable stay will help

minimize the potential for undue waste.” Id. at 936.

The absence of a state forum can weigh heavily against

dismissal, requiring the federal court to retain jurisdiction

despite other factors weighing against it. Where the state case

has been dismissed, Colorado River relief can be improper even if

state litigation has been long and eventful and the plaintiff’s

forum choice is strategic. FDIC v. Nichols, 885 F.2d 633, 634-35

(9th Cir. 1989). In Nichols, the state litigation had been

proceeding for five years, discovery had occurred, and at least

three motions had been decided. Id. In reversing the district

court’s dismissal of the federal suit on the basis of forum

shopping, the court of appeals based its ruling on the fact that

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the state suit had previously been dismissed without prejudice. 

Id. at 638. Despite the time and effort invested in the state

suit and the lower court’s finding of forum shopping, the Ninth

Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by

dismissing the federal suit when no concurrent or pending state

court suit existed. Id. 

Here, the state case has been voluntarily dismissed and

potentially could be barred. Because a federal court has a

“virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise jurisdiction, the

Court finds that the “substantial room for doubt” concerning the

adequacy of the state forum weighs heavily against dismissal. 

2. Forum Shopping

In deciding whether to dismiss or stay, a court may also

consider whether the federal plaintiff is engaged in “forum

shopping” or seeks to avoid adverse state court rulings. 

Nichols, 885 F.2d at 637; Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1417

(9th Cir. 1989). Federal courts may not decline to exercise

jurisdiction on this ground alone. Nichols, 885 F.2d at 637. 

Plaintiffs all but concede that they are filing the federal

lawsuit for forum shopping purposes. Plaintiffs acknowledge that

the Supreme Court of California has rejected the interpretation

of federal law that they prefer. Opp’n at 16 n. 4; see County of

L.A. v. Super. Ct., 21 Cal. 4th 292, 307 (1999) (holding that

pain and suffering damages are not available to survivors where a

section 1983 plaintiff dies while his suit is pending). 

Plaintiffs argue: 

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When Plaintiffs filed their first State Court

Complaint, they believed that the Superior

Court of the State of California was an

equally appropriate forum, and that they had

no reason to file suit in Federal Court. 

However, Robert Oglesby’s unfortunate death

after the initiation of the State Court

action forced Plaintiffs to properly

reevaluate the appropriateness of a State

Court forum in this matter.

Opp’n at 13-14 (emphasis in original). 

The Court seriously doubts how Plaintiffs’ filing suit in

another forum in order to avoid unfavorable precedent applicable

only to the original forum is not garden-variety forum shopping. 

See Black’s Law Dictionary 655 (6th Ed. 1990) (“Forum shopping. 

Such occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a

particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive

the most favorable judgment or verdict.”). Plaintiffs’ actions

appear to be for the sole reason of avoiding an unfavorable

ruling, which would cripple their case, that is virtually

inevitable in state court. Plaintiffs attempt to justify their

second-choice of the federal forum by arguing that the issue is

unresolved and should be settled by a federal court. Plaintiffs

specify no authority that an unresolved federal question can

affect the Court’s finding of forum shopping in a Colorado River

analysis. The forum shopping factor is not dispositive, but

weighs in favor of a stay or dismissal.

3. Applicable Law

Courts deciding whether to stay or dismiss on a Colorado

River rationale consider whether the case concerns federal law

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The parties dispute whether the Ninth Circuit has precluded 4

survivors in section 1983 cases from recovering for a decedent’s

pain and suffering. It is undisputed that the Supreme Court of

California, interpreting federal law, has decided that such

survivors are not entitled to recover. See County of L.A. v.

Super. Ct., 21 Cal. 4th 292, 307 (1999). 

16

issues. Defendants urge that the state law issues that underlie

Plaintiffs’ complaint counsel in favor of dismissal. The

presence of state law issues is rarely sufficient to warrant a

federal court to abandon its jurisdiction. Nakash, 882 F.2d at

1416. In fact, “the presence of federal-law issues must always

be a major consideration weighing against surrender [of

jurisdiction].” Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26). 

Where state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over

a claim, this factor is less significant to a Colorado River

determination. Id.

Plaintiffs here bring federal claims under section 1983 in

addition to claims based solely on California law. California

courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over section 1983 claims. 

Ochoa v. Super. Ct., 39 Cal. 3d 159, 173 n. 10 (Cal. 1985);

Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.

1994). Plaintiffs allege that this case rests on “a critical,

unresolved issue of federal, and not state, law,” which weighs in

favor of this Court exercising jurisdiction. The Court finds no 4

authority that counsels against Colorado River relief on the

basis of the novelty of federal law issues. State courts are

competent to decide federal law issues under section 1983,

whether novel or mundane. The combination of state and federal

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claims in this case does not weigh for or against declining

jurisdiction. Rather, the existence of concurrent jurisdiction

in this case makes this factor unimportant to the decision to

stay or dismiss.

4. Where Jurisdiction Was First Obtained

Another factor bearing on declining jurisdiction is whether

jurisdiction was first obtained in state or federal court. The

priority of the suits should be measured not solely by which case

was filed first, but by comparing how far each suit has

progressed. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. In Colorado River,

“‘the apparent absence of any proceedings in the District Court,

other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the motion to

dismiss’” was a factor favoring dismissal. 424 U.S. at 820; see

Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 22. Where “substantive progress” has

occurred in the state court litigation, “[h]aving elected state

court, plaintiff should be bound by its choice absent compelling

reasons to seek relief in another forum.” Am. Int’l

Underwriters, Inc. v. The Cont’l Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1258-59

(9th Cir. 1988). 

The mere existence of a state court suit, however, does not

justify abstention. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 706 F.2d

938, 940 (9th Cir. 1983). Courts regularly deny abstention where

the state case is in its early stages. See, e.g., Easter v.

Amer. W. Fin., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2002)

(denying abstention where action was in its initial stages and no

discovery had taken place); Herrington, 706 F.2d at 940 (denying

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abstention where federal and state actions were filed almost

simultaneously and the state action was not at “an advanced

stage”).

Since the state case was filed on September 30, 2004, the

litigation has progressed in a number of ways, according to

Defendants: Defendants have answered Plaintiffs’ complaint, the

County has propounded form and special interrogatories and

requests for admissions, the County has conducted “an exhaustive

investigation” and has collected medical and employment records,

and, in connection with the discovery requests, Defendants have

filed a motion to compel. A date has been set for a mandatory

settlement conference, which has not been held. The trial was

set for November 2005.

It is undisputed that the state case was pending for several

months prior to the federal case, and was nearing a trial date. 

This passage of time does not itself create an impetus to stay or

dismiss the case. The overall amount of judicial and attorney

labor expended on the case is not such that “considerations of

‘wise judicial administration’” weigh in favor of dismissal. 

Defendants do not claim that the state court had made any

important or time-consuming rulings, or expended any significant

labor on the case. Defendants claim they have expended a

substantial amount of effort answering the complaint, preparing

discovery requests, investigating Plaintiffs’ claim, and

preparing a motion to compel. If the state case is as similar to

the federal case as Defendants claim, then their previous efforts

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were not a total waste because they will further the defense of

this federal action. The Court is aware that extra time and

effort will be necessary to conform work product from the state

case to meet federal specifications. Nevertheless, it does not

appear that “substantive progress” has occurred at the state

level to create the “exceptional circumstances” that justify

dismissal or stay under Colorado River. See Am. Int’l

Underwriters, 843 F.2d at 1258-59. 

5. Avoiding Piecemeal Litigation

The danger of piecemeal litigation concerns the prospect

that different courts might “consider the same issue, thereby

duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results.” Am.

Int’l Underwriters, 843 F.2d at 1258; Travelers Indem. Co., 914

F.2d at 1369. In American International Underwriters, the

possibility of piecemeal litigation existed, despite a stay of

the state litigation. 843 F.2d at 1258. This possibility

existed because the state court had decided several substantive

issues, such as whether plaintiff’s loss fell within insurance

policy terms. Id. Consequently, the district court would be

forced to decide these issues anew, which would duplicate effort

and threaten to create inconsistent results. Id.

No similar risk of piecemeal litigation exists here. The

state court has made no substantive rulings in this case that a

federal court might have to decide anew. There is no indication

that the state suit will be reinitiated after the federal suit

begins and then generate duplicative rulings. In any event, the

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Defendants contend that where the federal action is reactive 5

and vexatious, the factor of avoiding piecemeal litigation is

heavily weighted in favor of abstention. The Supreme Court has

concluded the notion that the “vexatious or reactive nature” of

litigation should weigh in favor of abstention “has considerable

merit.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 17 n. 20. 

Defendants claim that the federal action is reactive and

vexatious because, in the state case, Plaintiffs have so far failed

to produce discovery that supports their claims. Defendants assert

that the federal case is therefore a delaying tactic. 

Plaintiffs’ refiling also requires Defendants to redo or

revise certain tasks they completed according to state court

procedure. Plaintiffs’ choice to file in federal court has

undoubtedly caused some inconvenience for Defendants. This was

compounded by Plaintiffs’ failure to inform Defendants that the

state cases had been dismissed until over a month afterward. Woods

Supp. Decl. at 2. This conduct, albeit perhaps discourteous, does

not alter the Court’s finding that the threat of piecemeal

litigation is virtually nonexistent in this case.

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state and federal courts adhere to “principles of res judicata,

collateral estoppel, and equitable stay” that can ameliorate the

potential for future waste of judicial resources. See

McLaughlin, 955 F.2d at 936. This factor does not weigh in favor

of dismissal.5

6. Inconvenience of Federal Forum

The inconvenience of the federal forum can weigh in favor of

dismissal or stay under Colorado River. Travelers Indem. Co.,

914 F.2d at 1368. The issue is not whether the federal forum “is

a ‘better’ or ‘more convenient’ forum,” but rather “whether the

inconvenience of the federal forum is so great that this factor

points toward abstention.” Id. 

The Travelers Indemnity Co. court upheld the district

court’s finding that a 200 miles of extra travel required to

reach the federal court did not weigh in favor of abstention. 

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Id. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the

distance from the Metropolitan Division of the Superior Court for

County of Kern, the venue of the state suit, to the district

courthouse in Fresno is substantially less than 200 miles. See

Fed R. Evid. 201(b) (a court may take judicial notice of facts

“not subject to reasonable dispute”). Even if the parties must

travel to Fresno and obtain lodging, the inconvenience of the

federal forum is relatively minor. The Court finds that this

factor does not weigh in favor of stay or dismissal.

7. Balancing the Factors

On the facts of this case, only two of the aforementioned

factors have any bearing on a determination of whether to stay or

dismiss under Colorado River. The doubt regarding the adequacy

of the state forum for this case weighs heavily in favor of

retaining jurisdiction. See Nichols, 885 F.2d at 634-35;

McLaughlin, 955 F.2d at 935-36. On the other hand, the only

factor counseling against a stay is that Plaintiffs selected the

federal forum in order to avoid unfavorable precedent binding

only on the state court. Forum shopping alone, however, is not

grounds for a stay or dismissal under Colorado River, especially

where the state action has been dismissed. See Nichols, 885 F.2d

at 637. Defendants have not met their particularly weighty

burden to show that exceptional circumstances favor a stay or

dismissal in this case. Defendants’ motion to dismiss or stay on

Colorado River grounds is DENIED.

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ACCORDINGLY, Defendants’ motion to dismiss or stay is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 4, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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