Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00953/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00953-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL CHRISTAKIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et. ) 

al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

1 : 06 CV 00953 AWI GSA

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS 

(Document # 14)

Plaintiff Michael Christakis (“Plaintiff”) filed a civil action seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, as purportedly

authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702, from the allegedly

improper security classification of Plaintiff at the Taft Correctional Institution (“TCI”) by

Defendants. Defendants are the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), and Harrell Watts, James E.

Burrell, Tammy O’Neil and Bernie Ellis, all agents of the BOP (collectively, “Defendants”). This

case comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the

motion to dismiss will be granted.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia on

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February 23, 2006 (Case 1:05-CV-01727-HHK). On July 24, 2006, the case was transferred to

this Court. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff claims that he was moved to TCI on or about

June 12, 2002. Upon his arrival there, Plaintiff was assessed additional custody classification

points by his case manager due to Plaintiff’s “history of violence.” According to Plaintiff, his

case manager based her assessment on a description found in Plaintiff’s Presentence Report of

violent acts committed in 1986 for which Plaintiff was never convicted. Plaintiff argues that the

BOP’s regulations do not permit the imposition of additional custody classification points for

violent conduct without a conviction or finding of guilt for that conduct. Therefore, the

additional points violate the BOP’s own regulations, the “Program Statement.”

Plaintiff claims that upon learning of the additional points, he initiated the administrative

appellate process and properly filed subsequent appeals with his case manager, the facility

warden, the regional administrator, and finally to general counsel of the BOP. All of his appeals

were denied. Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that he has exhausted all administrative remedies and

seeks judicial review by this Court of the wrongful decision to add custody classification points.

On November 15, 2007, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Defendants argue that (1) the interpretation of the BOP guidelines was correct; (2) this

Court lacks authority to review the BOP’s decision; (3) Plaintiff does not have a constitutional

right to be classified in a particular manner; and (4) Plaintiff’s claim is untimely. Plaintiff filed

an opposition on March 21, 2008. Defendants filed a reply brief on April 7, 2008.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the

plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

This rule provides for dismissal of a claim if, as a matter of law, “it is clear that no relief could be

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granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484

(9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the determinative question is whether there is any set of “facts that could

be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint” that would entitle plaintiff to some

relief. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). A dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.

2001); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). In reviewing a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786,

788 (9th Cir. 2002); Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court must

also assume that general allegations embrace the necessary, specific facts to support the claim. 

Smith v. Pacific Prop. and Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004); Peloza v. Capistrano

Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994). But, the Court is not required “to accept as

true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see also

Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003); Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Courts will not “assume the truth of legal

conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Warren, 328 F.3d at

1139; Western Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624. Furthermore, Courts will not assume that

plaintiffs “can prove facts which [they have] not alleged, or that the defendants have violated . . .

laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

B. Lack of Jurisdiction

Defendants also argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain

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Plaintiff’s challenge. As a jurisdictional requirement, the argument is properly raised through a

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

and not through Rule 12(b)(6). White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). The question

of whether this Court may hear a claim naturally precedes the question of whether a party has

successfully stated a claim.

Rule 12(b)(1) allows for a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction. Vacek v. UPS, 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). Limits upon federal

jurisdiction must not be disregarded or evaded. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437

U.S. 365, 374 (1978). The plaintiff has the burden to establish that subject matter jurisdiction is

proper. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); In re Ford Motor Co.,

264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001). This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading

sufficient allegations to show a proper basis for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over

the action. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In this case, Plaintiff argues that the BOP incorrectly interpreted its own rule, Program

Statement § 5100.7, and asks this Court to review the agency’s decision. The first question this

Court must address is whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to review that decision. 

There is generally a presumption that agency action is subject to judicial review. The

APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely

affected or aggrieved by agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. 

However, when Congress specifically precludes review of agency action, federal courts lack

jurisdiction. Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (quoting

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Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-29 (1985)); see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (providing that the

general cause of action through the APA does not exist where “statutes preclude judicial

review.”). Only “clear and convincing evidence” of Congress’ intent to foreclose judicial review

will overcome the general presumption that it is available. Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 136, 141 (1967). Where such evidence is found, Congress has immunized the agency

decision-making from judicial scrutiny and a court may essentially only consider whether the

agency has violated the constitution or its statutory limits. United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d

1037, 1044-45, (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a colorable constitutional claim is reviewable even

where judicial review is precluded by statute).

Defendants argue that the authority to determine an inmate’s security classification was

granted to the BOP by Congress through 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) and that their determination of an

individual’s classification is excluded from judicial review under the APA. Indeed, individuals

convicted and sentenced to terms of incarceration for federal crimes are placed in the BOP’s

custody pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621. Congress authorized the BOP to designate where

prisoners serve their sentences through § 3621(b). 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (“The Bureau of Prisons

shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment . . .”). Under § 3625, Congress excluded

the BOP’s placements and designations from those agency actions that are subject to judicial

review under the APA. 18 U.S.C. § 3625 (“The provisions of sections 554 and 555 and 701

through 706 of title 5, United States Code, do not apply to the making of any determination,

decision, or order under this subchapter [C. Imprisonment].”). 

Plaintiff argues that other courts have considered similar claims to his and determined

that they have subject matter jurisdiction under the APA. It is true that a number of courts have

entertained such challenges by holding that § 3625 precludes courts from reviewing

“adjudicative” decisions of agencies but not from reviewing “rulemaking” decisions. In those

cases, courts closely examined the particular rule of the BOP’s “Program Statement” under

which the challenged decision was made and determined whether the rule is “interpretive,” in

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 The record reflects that Program Statement § 5100.7 was revised on September 12, 2006 1

and renumbered § 5100.9, but that the relevant sections were not changed.

6

which case it could not be reviewed, or “legislative,” in which case it could. For example, in

Wiggins v. Wise, 951 F.Supp. 614, 619-620 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), the court found that the BOP’s

Program Statement 5162.02 is a legislative rule because it “does not involve the application of a

regulation to a particular set of facts, but, rather, seeks to establish guidelines applicable to a

wide range of situations.” Hence, the district court proceeded to review the agency’s decision. 

See also Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1998); Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d

662, 666 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, the challenged decision was made pursuant to the BOP’s Program Statement §

5100.7, titled Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification. In the few cases that 1

have reviewed this particular Program Statement section, see, e.g., Phillips v. Hawk, No.

98-5513, 1999 WL 325487 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Fullenwiley v. Wiley, No. CIV. 98-CV-1698-LEKGLS, 1999 WL 33504428 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), courts have consistently treated § 5100.7 as an

“interpretive” rule and found that they are precluded from reviewing any such “adjudicative”

agency decision. Plaintiff has failed to point to any authority that holds otherwise. This Court

agrees and holds that Defendants’ classifications, which are a part of the BOP’s Program

Statement § 5100.7, are not subject to the APA because they interpret, clarify, and are consistent

with existing law. See Gunderson, v. Hood, 268 F.3d 1149, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2001).

Accordingly, this Court grants Defendants motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

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ORDER

Based on the above memorandum opinion, the Court ORDERS that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED; and

2. Plaintiff’s claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 24, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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