Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02648/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02648-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EVELYN NAIGAN,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 12-cv-2648 BAS (NLS)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS

v. [ECF 25]

NANA SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Evelyn Naigan’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges 

three claims against Defendant NANA Services, LLC for violation of Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000(e) et seq. (“Title VII”). ECF 19. 

Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 25.

Because Plaintiff alleges she did not receive her Right to Sue letter until 

April 15, 2013, her claims are not time-barred. Further, Defendant is an 

“employer” for purposes of Title VII and therefore subject to suit under it. 

Consequently, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must 

construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.

1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed 

factual allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A 

claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent 

with’ a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557).

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) (alteration in original). A court need 

not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite the 

deference the court must pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the 

court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged 

or that defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 

U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Generally, courts may not consider material outside the complaint when 

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ruling on a motion to dismiss. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 

896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). However, documents specifically 

identified in the complaint whose authenticity is not questioned by parties may also 

be considered. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(superseded by statutes on other grounds). Moreover, the court may consider the 

full text of those documents, even when the complaint quotes only selected 

portions. Id. It may also consider material properly subject to judicial notice 

without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Barron v. Reich, 

13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). 

As a general rule, a court freely grants leave to amend a complaint which has 

been dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied 

when “the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the 

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. 

Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).

II. DISCUSSION

a. Right to Sue Letter

Defendant, in its Motion to Dismiss, makes a statute of limitations challenge 

to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff 

failed to file her Complaint within the ninety day statutory limitation imposed by 

Title VII. 42 USC 2000e–5(f)(1).

While Plaintiff did not file her initial Complaint in this matter until 

November 1, 2012, nearly six months after her claim was denied on April 4, 2012, 

she avers that she “never received the Dismissal and Notice of Rights from the 

EEOC”, that she “checks her mail every day”, and that only after “multiple 

inquiries” by her counsel did she obtain a copy of the Right to Sue letter. SAC ¶¶ 

8–9. While the “mailbox rule” creates a rebuttable presumption that any letter 

mailed is received after three days, “[e]vidence of non-receipt can be used to 

establish that the notice was never mailed.” Custer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 503 

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F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoted by Duron v. Albertson’s LLC, 560 F.3d 288, 

291 (5th Cir. 2009)).

Here, Plaintiff and her counsel’s repeated inquiries and evidence she 

checked her mail daily rebut the presumption that the Right to Sue letter was 

received. Therefore the Court tolls the effective date the letter was received until 

April 15, 2013. SAC ¶ 9.

b. Title VII

Defendant also argues it is not an “employer” covered under Title VII, 

which prohibits employer discrimination. If Defendant’s reading were correct, 

Defendant would be immune to this suit. Defendant is not immune.

Title VII excepts Alaska Native Corporations and their subsidiaries from its 

prohibition on discrimination, but NANA is neither an Alaska Native Corporation

nor an excepted subsidiary. 43 U.S.C. 1626(g). Instead, NANA Services, LLC is a 

subsidiary of Akima, LLC, an Alaskan limited liability company. Decl. Jeffrey 

Hills ¶ 3, ECF 8. Akima, LLC is also not a subsidiary of an Alaska Native 

Corporation; it is a subsidiary of NANA Development Corporation, which is an 

Alaskan corporation. Id. at ¶ 4. NANA Development Corporation is, in fact, a 

subsidiary of the Alaska Native Corporation NANA Regional Corporation. Id. at ¶

6. 

As the Supreme Court has stated, a “corporate parent which owns the shares 

of a subsidiary does not, for that reason alone, own or have legal title to the assets 

of the subsidiary; and, it follows with even greater force, the parent does not own 

or have legal title to the subsidiaries of the subsidiary.” Dole Food Co. v. 

Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003). And, in 43 U.S.C. § 1626(g)’s plain terms, 

Title VII only excepts “Native Corporations” and “corporations, partnerships, joint 

ventures, trusts, or affiliates in which the Native Corporation owns not less than 25 

per centum of the equity” from its definition of “employer.”

Neither exception includes Defendant. NANA Services, LLC is a subsidiary 

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of a subsidiary of a subsidiary, and extending Title VII’s exemptions to such a 

tenuous relationship “contravene[es] the purposes of both the [Alaska Native

Claims Settlement Act] and Title VII.” Fox v. Portico Reality Servs. Office, 739 F. 

Supp. 2d 912, 917 (E.D. Va. 2010). Therefore the Court finds Defendant an 

“employer” under Title VII. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred and because Defendant is an 

“employer” under Title VII, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

Defendant is held to answer within 21 days of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 21, 2015

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