Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03597/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03597-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

Before the Court is Norcold Incorporated, Thetford Corporation, and Dyson-KissnerMoran Corporation (together, the “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Fraudulent 

Concealment Claim and to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Rule 8, or Alternatively, Motion 

to Strike (the “Motion”). (Doc. 5) The Motion was fully briefed on November 27, 2018. 

(Docs. 12, 14) The Court’s ruling is as follows. 

I. Background 

On or about September 4, 2010, Suzanne and Jerry Hale (together, the “Plaintiffs”) 

purchased from a third party a recreational vehicle (“RV”) that came equipped with a 

Norcold 1200 gas absorption refrigerator (“Refrigerator”). (Doc. 1-3 at 41−42) Norcold 

Incorporated (“Norcold”) is a corporation whose stock is owned entirely by Thetford 

Corporation (“Thetford”) and Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corporation (“DKM”).1

 (Doc 1-3 at 

 1

 The Plaintiffs allege that Norcold is a division or wholly-owned subsidiary of Thetford, and that Norcold and Thetford are divisions or wholly-owned subsidiaries of 

DKM. (Doc. 1-3 at 5) DKM controls, markets, and receives the profits of Norcold and 

Thetford. (Doc. 1-3 at 6−10) The Plaintiffs thus allege that Norcold and Thetford are alterSuzanne Hale, et al., 

 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Norcold Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-18-03597-PHX-SPL 

ORDER 

 

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5) The Refrigerator in the Plaintiffs’ RV was manufactured by the Defendants on February 

12, 2006, and installed in the RV thereafter. (Doc. 1-3 at 41−42) 

On the morning of September 29, 2016, Plaintiffs’ RV was parked in Dewey, 

Arizona with neither Plaintiff inside. (Doc. 1-3 at 42) Shortly after 9:30 a.m., Jerry Hale 

saw the RV on fire with flames coming from the top refrigerator vent on the roof. (Doc. 1-

3 at 42) The fire destroyed the RV and most of Plaintiffs’ personal property. (Doc. 1-3 at 

42) On January 20, 2017, an inspection of the RV revealed burn patterns on the Refrigerator 

consistent with the fire originating from a leak in the Refrigerator’s boiler tube. (Doc. 1-3 

at 45) The results of another inspection on July 26−28, 2017, were consistent with the fire 

having been caused by defective boiler tube design and a corrosion defect in the 

Refrigerator. (Doc. 1-3 at 46−47) Since at least 1997, the Defendants have designed, 

manufactured, and sold gas absorption refrigerators such as the one in the Plaintiffs’ RV. 

(Doc. 1-3 at 11) The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants concealed and misrepresented 

defects in their refrigerators to customers and federal regulators in a variety of ways between 

1999 and 2012. (Doc. 1-3 at 26−39) 

On July 16, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) (Doc. 1-3) in 

Maricopa County Superior Court with claims against the Defendants for strict liability due 

to design defect, strict liability due to failure to warn, negligence, negligence due to postsale duty to warn, negligence per se, negligence due to post-sale duty to conduct adequate 

recall/retrofit, and fraudulent concealment. (Doc. 1-2 at 1; Doc. 1-3 at 56−66) On October 

30, 2018, the Defendants removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. 

(Doc. 1-1 at 1) On November 5, 2018, the Defendants filed the Motion seeking to dismiss 

the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 9(b), 8, and 12(f). 

(Doc. 5 at 1) 

II. Legal Standard 

To survive a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” such that the 

 

egos of DKM, operating as a single entity. (Doc. 1-3 at 10) 

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defendant is given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure 

to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, 

and (2) insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacificia 

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded 

allegations of material fact, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). In comparison, 

“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences” are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and “are insufficient to defeat a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id.; In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 

1108 (9th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff need not prove the case on the pleadings to survive a 

motion to dismiss. OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012). 

III. Analysis 

A. Dismissal of Fraudulent Concealment Claim Under FRCP 9(b) 

A motion to dismiss a complaint or claim “grounded in fraud” under FRCP 9(b) for 

failure to plead with particularity is the functional equivalent of a motion to dismiss under 

FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Blue Cross of California Inc. v. Insys 

Therapeutics Inc., 2019 WL 2099945, at 7 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2019) (citing Vess v. CibaGeigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003)). Under FRCP 9(b), a claim alleging 

fraud must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 9(b). “[A]llegations of fraud must be ‘specific enough to give defendants notice of the 

particular misconduct . . . so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that 

they have done anything wrong.’” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993)). An allegation of 

fraud must be accompanied by “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the misconduct 

charged. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 

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1997)). When a claim within a complaint is grounded in fraud and the claimant fails to meet 

the FRCP 9(b) standard for that claim, the claim may be dismissed. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the FRCP 9(b) standard 

for their fraudulent concealment claim. (Doc. 5 at 2−4) Under Arizona law, a fraudulent 

concealment claim transpires when “[o]ne party to a transaction who by concealment or 

other action intentionally prevents the other from acquiring material information is subject 

to the same liability to the other, for pecuniary loss as though he had stated the nonexistence 

of the matter that the other was thus prevented from discovering.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. 

Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 34 

(Ariz. 2002) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 550 (1976)). Under this definition, 

it is clear that the Plaintiffs’ claim should immediately fail because the Plaintiffs and the 

Defendants were never parties to the same transaction; rather, the Plaintiffs bought their RV 

from a third party with the Refrigerator made by the Defendants already installed. (Doc. 1-

3 at 41−42); see also Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp., 290 P.3d 446, 454−55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2012) (affirming dismissal of a fraudulent concealment claim by a subsequent home buyer 

against the original builder because “being a party to a transaction is a necessary element of 

a fraudulent concealment claim”), vacated in part on other grounds, 306 P.3d 1 (Ariz. 2013). 

The District of Arizona has also consistently applied the fraudulent concealment 

elements stated in Coleman v. Watts, 87 F. Supp. 2d 944 (D. Ariz. 1998)—which does not 

include a transactional requirement. Both the Wells Fargo and Coleman cases involved 

common law fraudulent concealment claims in Arizona. However, since the Court is 

hearing this case on diversity jurisdiction and thereby applying state law, decisions of the 

Arizona Supreme Court—such as Wells Fargo—are more authoritative than the case law of 

this District—such as Coleman. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In 

addition, Coleman is older case law than Wells Fargo and borrowed its elements for 

fraudulent concealment from a much older case in Colorado. Coleman, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 

951 (citing Morrison v. Goodspeed, 68 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1937)). Accordingly, because the 

Complaint fails to allege that the Plaintiffs were party to a transaction with the Defendants, 

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the Motion will be granted on the Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim. 

B. Dismissal of the Complaint Under FRCP 8 

FRCP 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Additionally, 

FRCP 8(d)(1) states, “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(d)(1). When a complaint violates FRCP 8, it can be dismissed under FRCP 41(b). 

Hearns v. San Bernadino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). Dismissal of 

a complaint under FRCP 8 is appropriate when “the complaint is so ‘verbose, confused, and 

redundant that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.’” Gillibeau v. Richmond, 417 

F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969) (quoting Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 

1965)). Ordinarily, “verbosity or length is not by itself a basis for dismissing a complaint . 

. . .” Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1131. Rather, FRCP 8 is “violated by a pleading that [is] needlessly 

long, or a complaint that [is] highly repetitious, or confused, or consist[s] of 

incomprehensible rambling.” Cafasso v. Gen Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th 

Cir. 2011). 

When a complaint is intelligible and adequately gives notice of the claims being 

made, it should not be dismissed under FRCP 8. For example, in Hearns, the plaintiff filed 

a sixty-eight-page complaint alleging race-based discrimination and retaliation by his 

employer. Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1127. The complaint included forty-two pages of “Factual 

Background” and twenty-two pages alleging the plaintiff’s specific claims. Id. at 1130. The 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion 

by dismissing the complaint under FRCP 8. Id. at 1132. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, 

even though the complaint contained excessive detail, it was “logically organized,” it was 

“intelligible,” and it “clearly delineate[d] the claims.” Id. Moreover, in Hearns, the Ninth 

Circuit concluded that, even if the complaint did contain excessive factual detail, the district 

court should have considered less drastic alternatives to dismissal— such as striking 

irrelevant paragraphs—rather than dismissing the complaint altogether. Id. 

In this case, the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, though lengthy, is divided into logical sections 

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and subsections detailing the facts that give rise to their claims. Unlike the complaints in 

the cases on which the Defendants’ argument relies, the Complaint is not “argumentative, 

prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant” or “confusing and conclusory.” 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996); Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 

F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985). Rather, the Plaintiffs’ Complaint describes with clarity and 

detail the alleged technical deficiencies of the Defendants’ refrigerators and the ways in 

which the Defendants allegedly ignored and covered up those deficiencies. Accordingly, 

the Motion will be denied as to the dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to FRCP 8. 

C. Defendants’ Motion to Strike 

FRCP 12(f) allows a court to “strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion 

to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating 

spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” Whittlestone, Inc. v. 

Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010). However, motions to strike are 

disfavored and “will usually be denied unless the allegations in the pleading have no 

possible relation to the controversy, and may cause prejudice to one of the parties.” TriQuint 

Semiconductor, Inc. v. Avago Techs. Ltd., 2010 WL 3034880, at 3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 2010). 

A motion to strike “should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken 

could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Colaprico v. Sun 

Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). When ruling on a motion 

to strike, “the court should view the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

The Motion highlights several specific portions of the Complaint that the Defendants 

argue are irrelevant. (Doc. 5 at 5−6) “‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not 

pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question,” while, “‘[i]mmaterial’ matter is 

that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief . . . .” Fantasy, 

Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 

(1994). 

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The Defendants first argue that Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Complaint contain wrong 

and superfluous statements. (Doc. 5 at 5) Paragraph 4 states in part, “The Fire is not the 

first fire caused by the Norcold Defendants’ defective gas absorption refrigerators – nor the 

100th – nor even the first 1,000th. . . . The Norcold Defendants’ gas absorption refrigerators 

are - simply put - the most dangerous consumer product nobody has ever heard of.” (Doc. 

1-3 at 3) Paragraph 5 states in part, “The fact that the risks and dangers inherent in the 

Norcold Defendants’ products have remained a secret to consumers, federal regulators and 

the general public is no fluke. Rather, it is the byproduct of a culture of denial and deceit 

that permeates every level of the Norcold Defendant’s organization.” (Doc. 1-3 at 3) The 

Court finds that these statements pertain to the issues before the Court and have a 

relationship to the Plaintiffs’ claims. While these statements may be argumentative, that is 

not a basis to strike enumerated by FRCP 12(f). See also Fleshman v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., 2015 WL 4488163, at 15 (D. Or. July 23, 2015) (“Even if I assume that the paragraphs 

Defendant objects to fall within the purview of Rule 12(f) and are subject to being stricken, 

I would exercise my discretion in favor of not striking them. . . . [W]hile they may be 

immaterial or argumentative, they do not alter the litigation in any significant way.”). 

Therefore, the Court will not strike Paragraphs 4 or 5 of the Complaint. 

The Defendants next argue that Paragraphs 37−44 and Paragraph 48 of the 

Complaint are irrelevant because they discuss studies commissioned and incident reports 

received by the Defendants regarding the safety of their refrigerators. (Doc. 5 at 5−6) The 

Defendants argue that these allegations are unrelated to the Plaintiffs’ claims. (Doc. 5 at 5) 

The Court finds that this argument is without merit. As just one example of the materiality 

of these allegations, in a product liability negligence claim, “the inquiry focuses on the 

reasonableness of the manufacturer’s choice of design in light of the knowledge available 

at the time of manufacture.” Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876, 881−82 (Ariz. 1985). Thus, 

allegations as to what the Defendants knew about the safety of their refrigerators and 

allegations of defects are relevant to the Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Paragraph 41 describes a particular fire in the RV of Randy and Brenda Rutz, 

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allegedly caused by a refrigerator produced and sold by the Defendants. (Doc. 1-3 at 21−22) 

The Complaint details the death of Mr. Rutz and the severe injuries sustained by Ms. Rutz 

as a result of the fire. (Doc. 1-3 at 21−22) Given that this is the only fire incident described 

in detail in the Complaint other than the Plaintiffs’ own fire, it is clear to the Court that the 

Plaintiffs included these facts to elicit sympathy rather than to advance any particular claim. 

There is some risk that the facts of the Rutz fire could prejudice the Defendants. On the 

other hand, the Court does not find that the facts have no possible relation to the Plaintiffs’ 

claims, and the inclusion of these facts in the Complaint is unlikely to have a significant 

impact on litigation at this point. Therefore, for the purpose of the Motion and in light of 

the FRCP 12(f) standard, the Court finds that Paragraph 41 should not be stricken from the 

Complaint. 

Finally, the Defendants argue that Figures 3 and 4 of the Complaint are irrelevant 

because they show components of the Defendants’ products that did not belong to the 

Plaintiffs. (Doc. 5 at 6) Figure 3 shows corrosion pitting and a crack in a boiler tube in one 

of the Defendants’ refrigerators that allegedly caused a fire, and Figure 4 shows a safety 

fuse in one of the Defendants’ refrigerators that allegedly did not function properly to 

prevent a fire. (Doc. 1-3 at 15, 17) The photographs are related to the issues in the case as 

they are illustrative of the alleged design defects in the Defendants’ products. Therefore, 

motion to strike will be denied. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Fraudulent Concealment 

Claim and to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Rule 8, or Alternatively, Motion to Strike 

(Doc. 5) is granted in part as it applies to the Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim 

(Count VII); and 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of the Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Fraudulent Concealment Claim and to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Rule 8, or 

Alternatively, Motion to Strike (Doc. 5) is denied. 

 Dated this 5th day of August, 2019. 

Honorable Steven P. Logan 

United States District Judge 

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