Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00693/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00693-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eileen Finegan, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

AUTOTRANSPORTES TUFESA S.A. de

C.V., a foreign corporation; TUFESA

U.S.A., L.L.C., an Arizona Corporation,, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-693-TUC-FRZ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Tufesa U.S.A. L.L.C.’s (“Tufesa USA”) motion

for summary judgment and Autotranportes Tufesa S.A de C.V.’s (“Autotransportes Tufesa”)

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, both

motions are denied. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW: SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and material facts are those "that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is

"essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Id. An issue of fact is "genuine" if "there

is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either

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Direct inasmuch as the customer can buy one ticket from Mexico to Arizona without having

to get off the bus at the border, buy a new ticket, wait for another bus to arrive, and then board a new

bus to actually reach their international destination.

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way." Id. Thus, the "mere scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party's claim

is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 252. However, in evaluating a motion for

summary judgment, "the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255 (emphasis added). Further,

a court "[must] not weigh the evidence[, make credibility determinations,] or determine the

truth of the matter" at the summary judgment stage, but may only determine whether there

is a genuine issue for trial. Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir.1996); Balint v. Carson City, Nevada, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999); see also

Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322,

1328 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that on a motion for summary judgment, "a district court

is entitled neither to assess the weight of the conflicting evidence nor to make credibility

determinations")

BACKGROUND

On July 9, 2007, Plaintiff Eileen Finegan purchased a bus ticket from Autotransportes

Tufesa in Guadalajara, Mexico for non-stop, direct1

 bus transportation to her home in

Tucson, Arizona. Ms. Finegan was never advised that a different bus company would

provide a portion of her bus travel, or that a different bus driver from a wholly separate bus

company would take control of the bus at the border to complete the trip during the U.S.

portion of the bus trip. On July 10, 2007, while driving in Mexico en route to Tucson, the

Autotransportes Tufesa bus transporting Plaintiff along with other passengers plunged off

a highway near Benjamin Hill in Sonora, Mexico resulting in the deaths of several passengers

and injuries to many other passengers. Subsequent to the accident, the driver of the bus, C.

Faustino Portugal Garcia, was fired. Plaintiff was injured in the accident and brought suit

against Autotransportes Tufesa and Tufesa USA based on the injuries she sustained in the

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bus crash. Plaintiff argues that Autotransportes Tufesa and Tufesa USA are jointly liable for

her injuries.

DISCUSSION

Tufesa U.S.A. argues that Autotransportes Tufesa is the only named defendant that

actually could be legally at fault in this case; as Tufesa U.S.A. asserts that it is a totally

independent and separate corporation from Autotransportes Tufesa, Tufesa USA asserts that

it can not be held legally responsible for the separate tortuous acts of Autotransportes Tufesa.

Tufesa U.S.A. argues that Plaintiff only purchased a bus ticket from Autotransportes Tufesa

in Mexico, that Plaintiff boarded Autotransportes Tufesa’s bus in Mexico, that the driver of

the bus in question was only a Mexican employee of Autotransportes Tufesa, and that the bus

crash and injuries to Plaintiff all occurred in Mexico while Plaintiff was an occupant in

Autotranportes Tufesa’s bus. Accordingly, Tufesa U.S.A. argues that it can not be held

directly liable to Plaintiff for negligence as it owed no duty to her. Likewise, Tufesa U.S.A.

further argues that it can not be held liable for the acts of Autotransportes Tufesa based on

a piercing the corporate veil, instrumentality, alter-ego, or unity of interest type theory as

Tufesa U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa are totally separate corporations that can not be

held liable for the actions of the other corporation. For example, in arguing that the two

corporations are totally independent of each other, Tufesa U.S.A. argues that: Tufesa U.S.A.

is not the parent corporation of Autotransportes Tufesa; that the two corporations do not have

any ownership interests in each other; the controlling shareholders of Autotransportes Tufesa

do not control Tufesa U.S.A.; Tufesa U.S.A. is an Arizona corporation that provides bus

services only in the United States while Autotransportes Tufesa is a Mexican corporation that

only provides bus services in Mexico; both corporations have separate business addresses

(Tufesa U.S.A. in Arizona and Autotransportes Tufesa in Mexico); both corporations observe

their own corporate formalities by holding separate meetings and keeping minutes; both

corporations maintain their own financial records, have separate banking accounts, pay their

own expenses and salaries, buy their own uniforms, and hire their own employees;

Autotransportes Tufesa has a distinct administrative board; both companies have separate

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Direct inasmuch as the customer can buy one ticket from Mexico to Arizona (or vice versa)

without having to get off the bus at the border, buy a new ticket, wait for another bus to arrive, and

then board a new bus to actually reach their international destination.

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management; bus ticket revenues are allocated according to each company’s provision of

services (i.e., Tufesa U.S.A.’s bus services in the United States and Autotransportes Tufesa’s

bus services in Mexico).

A review of Plaintiff’s response to Tufesa U.S.A.’s motion for summary judgment shows

that the decisive issue before the Court is whether Tufesa U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa

were engaged in a joint venture such that Tufesa U.S.A. can be held jointly liable for the

actions of Autotransportes Tufesa. Plaintiff’s response does not address Tufesa’s legal

arguments pertaining to Tufesa U.S.A.’s lack of duty to Plaintiff or the efficacy of holding

Tufesa U.S.A. liable for the acts of Autotransportes Tufesa based on a piercing of the

corporate veil, instrumentality, alter-ego, or unity of interest type theory. Rather, Plaintiff

only specifically argues that Tufesa U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa were engaged in a

joint venture to provide direct2

 bus service from numerous locations in Mexico to the United

States and direct bus service from numerous locations in the United States to Mexico; as this

joint venture led to Plaintiff’s injuries, Plaintiff argues that Tufesa U.S.A. is jointly liable

with Autotransportes Tufesa. Accordingly, in light of Plaintiff’s response, the Court will

only address the joint venture issue as it pertains to Tufesa U.S.A.’s motion for summary

judgment. 

Generally, there “must be some community of purpose to give rise to joint tort liability.”

Sparks v. Republic Nat’l Life Insurance Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 540 (1982). “Vicarious liability

for concerted action may be found to exist when the tort-feasors have entered into a joint

enterprise or joint venture . . . Where a joint venture exists, each of the parties is the agent

of the others and each is likewise a principal so that the act of one is the act of all.” Id. “In

such a relationship, it may be said that the partners or persons engaged in the common

enterprise are subject to a common duty, the breach of which will subject those persons to

liability for the entire harm resulting from the failure to perform the duty.” Id.

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As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the parties disagree as to the essential elements

required to demonstrate a joint venture. Initially, both parties cite to Tanner Companies

which lists the classic elements of a joint venture as “(1) a contract; (2) a common purpose;

(3) a community of interest; (4) an equal right to control; and (5) participation in the profits

and losses.” Tanner Companies v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 141, 143 (1985). However,

Plaintiff subsequently cites Farr for the proposition that not all five elements of a joint

venture referenced in Tanner Companies must be shown to demonstrate joint venture liability

in Arizona; in Farr, a showing of an equal right to control and participation in profits and

losses was not required to show joint venture liability between an insurer and its claims

administrator. See Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, 145 Ariz.

1, 11 (Ct. App. 1984)(“[The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in] Sparks turns upon the

idea that the insurer and its agent are engaged in a joint venture so that each is jointly and

severally liable with the other for a bad faith refusal to pay. Occidental . . . says that not all

the features of a joint venture are present here. Looking to those features, we note that here

there was no proof of profit and loss sharing and no proof of a joint right to control. Thus,

the classical elements of a joint venture are missing. But if that is true here, it was also true

in Sparks. In Sparks the court found that a company that issued certificates of coverage,

billed and collected premiums, handled the investigation and payment of claims, and

distributed brochures to induce the purchase of policies was engaged in a joint venture with

the insurer . . .”). 

Defendant argues, however, that all five elements listed in Tanner Companies must be

shown to demonstrate a joint venture in Arizona. Defendant argues that the elements of joint

control and sharing in profits and losses were not required in Farr and Sparks due to the

unique insurer-claims administrator type relationship which has important public policy

implications for insureds which are not at issue in this case. A review of Sparks, however,

does not show that the Court limited its analysis and holding pertaining to joint ventures to

the specific facts only in that case; rather, unlike Tanner Companies, Sparks simply listed

four (as opposed to five) requirements to show a joint venture: “A joint venture requires an

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agreement, a common purpose, a community of interest, and an equal right to control.”

Sparks, 132 Ariz. at 540. After listing the requirements for a joint venture, the Sparks Court

concluded that there “can be no doubt that the business relationship entered into by [insurer

and its claims administrator] contained all of the essential elements of a joint venture, and

that any acts of [the insurer or its claims administrator] could be imputed to the other.” The

Sparks court never states that it waived the requirements of participation in profits and losses

or equal right to control because of the public policy implications involved with insurers and

their insureds in Arizona. Id. While equal right to control was listed as a requirement for a

joint venture in Sparks, the Sparks court never stated that participation in profits and losses

was a requirement for a joint venture and further found that a joint venture existed because

the “essential elements” of a joint venture were present even though there was no equal right

to control. Id.; Farr, 145 Ariz. at 11.

A review of the relevant Arizona case law pertaining to joint ventures shows that there are

numerous cases listing only four required elements to establish a joint venture and none of

them list participation in profits and losses as a requirement; rather, a review of these cases

reflects the following four requirements: (1) a contract or agreement, (2) a common purpose,

(3) a community of interest, and (4) an equal right of control. See Sparks v. Republic Nat’l

Life Insurance Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 540 (1982)( “A joint venture requires an agreement, a

common purpose, a community of interest, and an equal right to control.”); Murry v. Western

American Mortgage Co., 124 Ariz. 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1980)( “[T]he essential elements of

a joint venture [are] an agreement, common purpose, a community of interest, and an equal

right of control.”); Jolly v. Kent Realty, Inc., 151 Ariz. 506, 513 n. 4 (Ct. App. 1986)(“A joint

venture requires an agreement, a common purpose, a community of interest, and an equal

right to control.”); Nahom v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona, 180 Ariz. 548, 558 (Ct. App.

1994)(“To show a joint venture, [plaintiff] must show an agreement, a common purpose, a

community of interest and an equal right of control.”); Weller v. Hansen, 21 Ariz. App. 217,

222 (Ct. App. 1973)(“The elements of a joint venture are (1) a contract, (2) a common

purpose, (3) a community of interest, and (4) and equal right of control.”); Cothrun v.

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Schwartz, 156 Ariz. 459, 461 (Ct. App. 1988)(listing the required elements of a joint venture

as “(1) a contract, (2) a common purpose, (3) a community of interest, and (4) and equal right

of control.”); West v. Soto, 85 Ariz. 255, 261 (1959)(same); Mercer v. Vinson, 85 Ariz. 280,

286 (1959); Garcia v. City of South Tucson, 131 Ariz. 315, 318 (1981)(same). In light of the

numerous Arizona cases cited above, it is clear that a joint venture can be demonstrated

where there is a contract or agreement, a common purpose, a community of interest, and an

equal right of control. See id. As such, the Court will focus on these factors in determining

whether there is an issue of fact as to the existence of a joint venture in this case.

A review of Tufesa U.S.A.’s reply to Plaintiff’s response in opposition to summary

judgment reflects that Tufesa U.S.A. only specifically argues that a joint venture does not

exist because an equal right to control and participation in profits and losses has not been

demonstrated; Tufesa U.S.A’s reply does not argue that a contract or agreement, a common

purpose, or a community of interest has not been demonstrated and a review of the facts

adduced by Plaintiff clearly shows an issue of fact as to these required elements. As

participation in profits and losses is not a requirement to show a joint venture in numerous

Arizona cases as discussed above, the Court finds that Defendant’s argument as to this issue

is without merit. Thus, the primary issue before the Court is whether there was an equal right

to control between Tufesa U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa.

 As reflected below, taking the facts advanced by Plaintiff as true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in her favor, there is an issue of fact as to all four requirements for a

joint venture such that summary judgment must be denied.

Plaintiff argues that contrary to Tufesa U.S.A.’s assertions, the evidence it has introduced

shows that Tufesa U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa are not separate and independent

corporations, but are intimately intertwined entities that work closely together to provide (and

represent to consumers) convenient, direct bus service from Mexico to numerous locations

in Arizona and other Southwestern states and convenient, direct bus service from Arizona

and other Southwestern states to Mexico. 

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Since 1994, Autotransportes Tufesa has been offering bus transportation throughout

Mexico. Oscar Luna Fernandez (“Oscar”) is the founder of Autotransportes Tufesa, is its

largest shareholder, and Oscar and his children own a controlling interest in Autotransportes

Tufesa. According to Autotransportes Tufesa, it is only a Mexican corporation and therefore

does not have the ability to offer bus transportation in the United States. Nonetheless, as

stated on its website and as admitted by Autotransportes Tufesa’s Secretary and General

Manager, its “vision” has been to offer international bus transportation directly between

Mexico and the United States (i.e., from Mexico to Arizona and other Southwestern states,

and from Arizona and other Southwestern states to Mexico); Autotransportes Tufesa is in

the business of providing international bus transportation. Oscar’s son, Luis Alberto Luna

Medina (“Luis”), is the Secretary and General Manager for Autotransportes Tufesa. When

asked about his duties as General Manager for Autotransportes Tufesa, Luis stated in his

deposition: “Well, basically it would be managing and keeping control of our financial

situation, human resources, fleet maintenance, bus business profitability, information systems

control. And dealing, our relationship with all of our suppliers.” See Luis Deposition at 10.

Immediately thereafter, Luis was asked “You run the show?” and he responded “Something

like that, right.” See id. 

Subsequently, Luis was tasked with the duty of running a newly founded American bus

transportation company which is Tufesa U.S.A which offers international bus transportation

originating in the United States and continuing through Mexico. Nine of the fifteen

shareholders of Autotransportes Tufesa are also shareholders of Tufesa U.S.A. Oscar, his

son Luis, and Oscar’s other children own approximately 40% of the shares in Tufesa U.S.A.

The shareholders, which includes Luis, receive dividends from their shares in Tufesa U.S.A.

The home office of Tufesa U.S.A. is based in Phoenix, Arizona and is incorporated in

Arizona; Tufesa USA has approximately 35 employees whose tasks include selling tickets,

cleaning buses and following the directives of management.

 As with Autotransportes Tufesa, Luis is also the General Manager of Tufesa U.S.A.

While Autotransportes Tufesa actually pays Luis a salary for the work he performs for

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The Court notes that Luis’ affidavit states that he is the “sole manager” for Tufesa U.S.A.,

his deposition reflects that he is the General Manager for Tufesa U.S.A. in charge of day-to-day

operations, and Monje’s affidavit reflects that Luis sets policy for Tufesa U.S.A which Tufesa

U.S.A. employees (i.e., Monje) implement; nonetheless, Monje’s affidavit (which was submitted

subsequent to Luis’ affidavit and deposition with Tufesa’s U.S.A.’s reply brief) curiously states that

Monje is the General Manager of Tufesa U.S.A. and that Monje manages its daily operations which

flatly contradicts Luis’ earlier affidavit and deposition. 

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Autotransportes Tufesa, Tufesa U.S.A. does not pay Luis any salary for the work he performs

as General Manager for Tufesa U.S.A. He carries out his duties for Tufesa U.S.A. both in

Autotransportes Tufesa’s office in Obregon City, Sonora, Mexico, and also works out of

Tufesa U.S.A.’s office in Phoenix, Arizona three to four days every few weeks. As reflected

in his deposition, Luis is the General Manager for Tufesa U.S.A. and his duties include:

“Check in on day-to-day operations, day to day operations, management, and payment for

services. And seeking new markets, growth.” See Luis Deposition at 7. According to Luis’

affidavit, he is the “sole manager” for Tufesa U.S.A. See Luis Affidavit at ¶28 (“I am

Tufesa’s sole manager.”). Luis is responsible for making policy decisions for Tufesa U.S.A.

which are then implemented by other employees of Tufesa U.S.A. See Affidavit of Arturo

Monje (“Part of my responsibilities . . is implementation of the policy decisions made by .

. . Luis.”).3

 When asked during his deposition: “So doesn’t make sense that you are really

an employee of Autotransportes Tufesa and you are paid by Autotransportes Tufesa to

manage Tufesa USA?”, Luis responded: “Well it would make sense to think like that.” See

Luis Deposition at 8-9.

To offer bus transportation services through Tufesa U.S.A., Luis decided to “lease” buses

for Tufesa U.S.A.’s bus routes in Arizona and other Southwestern states. Luis signed and

entered into a “lease” agreement with Luis simultaneously as leasee and leasor for Tufesa

U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa. Luis, on behalf of and as General Manager for Tufesa

U.S.A., signed a master “lease” agreement as the “lessee” of buses effective November 14,

2004. Likewise, Luis, on behalf of and as Secretary/General Manager of Autotransportes

Tufesa again signed the “lease” agreement effective November 14, 2004 whereby

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The bus trip is direct inasmuch as the customer can buy one ticket from Mexico to Arizona

(or vice versa) without having to get off the bus at the border, buy a new ticket, wait for another bus

to arrive, and then board a new bus to actually reach their international destination.

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Autotransportes Tufesa was the “leasor” of buses to Tufesa U.S.A. Tufesa U.S.A. only

“leases” buses from Autotransportes Tufesa. The same law firm and respective attorneys

therefrom represented both Tufesa U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa in regards to this

“lease” agreement. The same law firm and respective attorneys therefrom continue to

represent both Tufesa U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa.

According to this “lease” agreement, lessee Tufesa U.S.A. does not actually take physical

possession of buses for an extended and predetermined number of years, months or weeks

and render a fixed payment for buses to leasor Autotransportes Tufesa. Rather, under this

special “lease” agreement, Tufesa U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa are constantly using

the same buses during parallel time periods throughout the entire year. The crossing of the

United States-Mexico border serves as the magic “being leased by Tufesa U.S.A. period of

time” versus “the bus is owned and operated by Autotransportes Tufesa period time.” 

The record demonstrates that the way it works in practice between Tufesa U.S.A. and

Autotransportes, for example, is that a customer in Mexico could purchase a ticket from

Autotransportes Tufesa for direct4

 bus service from Guadalajara to Tucson; customers do not

have to purchase a separate ticket for the U.S. portion of the trip. The customer boards the

Autotransportes Tufesa bus in Guadalajara en route to Tucson. Immediately before the

Autotransportes Tufesa bus crosses the United States border, a Tufesa U.S.A. bus driver gets

on Autotransportes Tufesa’s bus, takes the drivers seat, and a Autotransportes Tufesa bus

driver takes a seat as a passenger. Both the Tufesa U.S.A. bus driver and Autotransportes

bus driver have the same uniforms and customers would not be able to tell that they work for

supposedly different companies based on these identical uniforms unless the customer

examined the driver’s identification badge. Luis purchases these identical uniforms for the

bus drivers for both Tufesa U.S.A. and Autotransportes Tufesa. As the Tufesa U.S.A. driver

inches the nose of Autotranportes Tufesa’s bus across the United States border (while the

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It is unclear whether the entire bus becomes “leased” by Tufesa USA as soon as the nose

of the bus inches across the border, or only the physical portion of the bus that actually crosses the

border becomes leased (i.e., the rear portion of the bus may remain “owned” by Autotransportes

Tufesa at the same time the front portion of the bus that is inching across the border is “leased” by

Tufesa USA). Thus, if there happens to be an accident right at border crossing where half of the bus

is in Mexico and half of the bus is in the United States this could present a real dilemma as to who

the respective companies would claim is responsible.

6

Plaintiff points out that buses arriving from Mexico into the U.S. are fueled up by Tufesa

U.S.A. at its expense and that the costs of fuel are later calculated and divided between fuel used by

Tufesa U.S.A. in the U.S. and fuel used by Autotransportes Tufesa in Mexico; Luis along with two

others from Autotransportes Tufesa play a role in determining how much Tufesa U.S.A. is paid for

fuel. Plaintiff also argues that Autotransportes Tufesa essentially pays taxes in the U.S.; for

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Autotransportes Tufesa driver now watches as a passenger), the bus suddenly5

 becomes a bus

that is “leased” by Tufesa U.S.A. and driven by a Tufesa U.S.A. employee. Despite the

sudden “lease” to Tufesa U.S.A. that happens as the bus crosses the border, an

Autotranportes Tufesa bus driver remains on the bus until the bus reaches its United States

destination-Tucson; it appears that this Autotranportes Tufesa bus driver that remains as a

passenger on Tufesa U.S.A.’s “leased” bus gets a free ride in the United States as he

apparently does not buy a ticket from Tufesa U.S.A. for his time as a passenger in the United

States portion of the bus trip. Likewise, if a customer was to buy a ticket from Tufesa U.S.A.

for direct bus service from Tucson to Guadalajara, the same situation would occur. Shortly

before the bus reaches the Mexico border, an Autotransportes Tufesa bus driver rises from

the seated passenger position, takes the still-warm driver’s seat of Tufesa U.S.A.’s recently

departed bus driver, and completes the bus journey to Guadalajara; the customer does not

have to purchase a separate ticket for the portion of the trip in Mexico. As soon as the bus

crosses the Mexico border the bus is no longer considered “leased” by Tufesa U.S.A. and is

simply owned and operated by Autotransportes Tufesa once again while in Mexico. At the

time of purchase from either company, it appears to the customer that it is a direct bus ride

(from Mexico to the U.S. or from the U.S. to Mexico) to a specific destination by one

company; it does not appear to the customer that a different bus company with a different bus

driver will take over a portion of the trip.6

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example, tax form 1042-S for year 2007 shows that Tufesa USA sent $123,000 to Autotransportes

Tufesa, but withheld $37,000 for taxes. The withheld money was deposited with the U.S. Treasury,

but Autotransportes Tufesa filed no tax return such that it essentially waived its claim for a refund

of $37,000. Autotransportes did the same in 2006 whereby it essentially waived a refund of $32,000

stemming from funds Tufesa USA withheld from an approximately $106,000 payment made to

Autotransportes Tufesa.

7

It is unclear from the record whether Luis on behalf of Tufesa USA evaluated whether the

“lease” agreement with Autotransportes Tufesa was the best business move for Tufesa USA in his

role as General Manager. For example, it is unclear whether Luis ever spoke with dealerships or

manufacturers about purchasing (in bulk or otherwise) a fleet of buses for Tufesa USA’s exclusive

use and whether this was a more economical and profitable option for Tufesa USA. It is also unclear

whether Luis, on behalf of Tufesa USA, ever spoke with other companies (other than

Autotransportes Tufesa) about lease terms for buses and used these quoted lease terms as a

bargaining chip with Autotransportes Tufesa to obtain more favorable lease terms; as Luis ultimately

signed as “leasee” for Tufesa USA and signed as “leasor” for Autotransportes Tufesa it is unclear

how these negotiations would proceed. Likewise, it is unclear from the record whether Luis on

behalf of Autotransportes Tufesa evaluated whether the “lease” agreement with Tufesa USA was

the best business move for Autotransportes Tufesa in his role as General Manager.

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As stated above, under the “lease”7

 agreement, Tufesa does not pay any set sum for the

privilege of solely controlling the vehicles for any extended period of time; rather, the “rental

amount” for Tufesa USA “leasing” Autotranportes Tufesa’s buses appears to be “10% of

total gross sales” between locations in Arizona and other Southwestern States. See Lease

Agreement (Exhibit A-7 to Agreement). Thus, if sales of bus tickets made by Tufesa USA

increase, Autotransportes Tufesa receives more money; if sales by Tufesa USA decrease,

Autotransportes Tufesa receives less money. 

Autotransportes Tufesa and Tufesa USA share the exact same website. As reflected on

their joint website, the companies are not listed as two distinct entities of “Autotransportes

Tufesa” and “Tufesa USA” Rather, the website reflects one unified company. It reflects

one company listed only as “Tufesa” in large, bold letters. The logo is identical for both

companies, and it also states in large, bold letters that “Tufesa” is “The strongest line in

northwestern Mexico and southern United [S]tates.” In describing the “Tufesa” company,

the website constantly lists only “Tufesa’s” vision, services, bus routes, etc.; all of the

advertising, text, and discussion on the website reflects one unified company of “Tufesa.”

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8

As noted earlier, Tufesa USA also specifically disputed that participation in profits and

losses was present in this case. The Court has already found, based on numerous cases in Arizona,

that participation in profits and losses is not required to show a joint venture. However, even if it

was required, the facts discussed in this Order nonetheless reflect that a reasonable jury could find

this element was present in this case. A reasonable jury could find that profits and losses were

shared via the “lease” agreement whereby Autotransportes Tufesa was supposedly paid “rent” by

receiving 10% of Tufesa USA’s total gross sales for bus transportation in the U.S. A reasonable jury

could also find participation in profits and losses via Tufesa USA’s and Autotransportes Tufesa’s

closely intertwined relationship whereby they are represented to customers as a unified entity such

that they can offer direct bus transportation whereby a customer can buy one ticket taking him from

locations in Mexico all the way to locations in the U.S and from locations in the U.S. all the way to

Mexico without having to inconveniently stop, get off a bus, buy a new bus ticket at the border with

a separate transportation company, wait for a new bus to arrive, then board the bus. A reasonable

jury could find that the profits of Tufesa USA and Autotransportes Tufesa have jointly increased

due to this very valuable, added convenience for customers who might otherwise forgo such trips

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See “Tufesa” Website (“Tufesa is a transport company that possesses modern buses, highly

qualified personnel, technology . . . and advanced computer . . . systems; making Tufesa the

leader . . . in autotransport . . .”; “. . . Tufesa . . . want[s] to become an enterprise group . . .

able to influence national[ly] and internationally”; “[At] Tufesa we have the commitment to

transmit the following values within our . . . organization . . .”; “[At] Tufesa we offer an

excellent Package and Delivery Service”; “Tufesa’s standard class, is available in all our

branches”; “Tufesa Direct service . . .”). When Luis was asked during his deposition about

the statement on the website regarding the vision to influence internationally, Luis stated that

the goal was to “provide our services beyond Mexico’s border’s,” and he admitted that goal

has been achieved as they offer bus services to Tucson, Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Los

Angeles. The website also states that bus service is also offered to numerous other

destinations in the United States including: “Hungtington Park . . . Ontario, Colton,

Bakersfield, Fresno, Merced, Modesto, Sacramento, Stockton.” It also appears that tickets

for the various destinations can be purchased from “Tufesa” on the joint website.

In light of the foregoing, a reasonable jury could find the essential elements of a joint

venture in this case: a contract or agreement, a common purpose, a community of interest,

and an equal right of control. As referenced earlier in this Order, Defendant specifically

disputes that an equal right of control is present in this case.8

 In addressing the “equal right

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or choose an alternative vendor or other means of transportation between the U.S. and Mexico. The

Court notes that there are courts that have recognized that the “mutual benefit” flowing from a joint

venture can replace the classic requirement of sharing in profits. See Transport Indemnity Co. v.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 620 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1980). In addition, the Court notes

that courts have found the sharing of profits (even though not required) in relation to a joint venture

on facts much less indicative of a joint venture as compared to this case. For example, in Mercer

v. Vinson, Mr. Rima happened to own a trailer home park and Mr. Vinson happened to own a trailer

home. See 85 Ariz. 280 , 283, 286-88 (1959). Vinson was away most of the year, so Vinson

approached Rima (they did not know each other previously) about parking his trailer at his trailer

park while he was away and renting out his vacant trailer to someone while it was parked in Rima’s

trailer park. Id. Rima’s standard rate for parking trailers was $18.36 a month and Vinson intended

to pocket $25 a month from any renter of his trailer home. Id. Vinson found a young couple that

would rent his trailer home and charged them $43.36 a month ($25 for Vinson to pocket and $18.36

to cover Rima’s standard monthly fee). Id. Each month, Rima would collect $43.36 from the couple,

keep $18.36 for monthly parking and send the remaining $25 to Vinson as they previously agreed.

Id. Unfortunately, due to the improper installation of an unvented heater in the trailer home by the

manufacturer, there was a gas leak that caused the death of the couple renting the trailer home. Id.

The administrator of the estate sued both Vinson and Rima alleging a joint venture, and the Arizona

Supreme Court found that a reasonable jury could find that Rima and Vinson were “two individuals

associating themselves together and pooling their mutual resources for their mutual betterment, a

profit. Both assumed the risk of no profit in the event the enterprise was unsuccessful. We do not

think it impossible for reasonable men to come to an honest conclusion that the facts as here outlined

establish a joint enterprise or adventure.” Id. at 288.

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to control element,” Arizona courts have recognized that “joint ownership of property is not

necessary to establish an equal right of control” and that the “requisite of equality in joint

control does not render impossible the delegation of the duties of management to one of the

participants in a joint venture. The rights of the parties with respect to the management and

control of the enterprise may be fixed by agreement so as to effectively place control in the

hands of one of the joint venturers . . .” See Ellingson v. Sloan, 22 Ariz.App. 383, 386 and

387 n. 1 (1974)(internal quotes and citations omitted); see also Continental Casualty Co. v.

Signal Insurance Co, 119 Ariz. 234, 237 (Ct. App. 1978)(same). The Arizona Supreme

Court has stated that “[w]hile the ‘equal right to control’ element of a joint venture could

imply that each venturer must have an equivalent amount of control over the venture's

operation, we believe it is more accurate to say that each joint venturer must share, to some

extent, in the control of the venture. In other words, it is sufficient that a venturer has some

voice or right to be heard in the control and management of the venture.” Estate of

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Hernandez by Hernandez-Wheeler v. Flavio, 187 Ariz. 506, 510 (1997). Based on all the

evidence before the Court, as discussed throughout this Order, a reasonable jury could also

find that there was an “equal right to control” under the circumstances of this case. For

example, a reasonable jury could find that there was “equal control” between the joint

venturers via Luis as he is in fact the “control” person controlling both corporations in his

dual role as General Manager for both Tufesa USA and Autotransportes Tufesa. As

referenced earlier in this Order, when asked about his duties as General Manager for

Autotransportes Tufesa, Luis stated in his deposition: “Well, basically it would be managing

and keeping control of our financial situation, human resources, fleet maintenance, bus

business profitability, information systems control. And dealing, our relationship with all of

our suppliers.” See Luis Deposition at 10. Immediately thereafter, Luis was asked “You run

the show?” and he responded “Something like that, right.” See id. As reflected in his

deposition, Luis’ duties as General Manager for Tufesa USA include: “Check in on day-today operations, day to day operations, management, and payment for services. And seeking

new markets, growth.” See Luis Deposition at 7. According to Luis’ affidavit, he is the “sole

manager” for Tufesa U.S.A. See Luis Affidavit at ¶28 (“I am Tufesa’s sole manager.”). In

addition, Luis is responsible for making policy decisions for Tufesa U.S.A. which are then

implemented by other employees of Tufesa U.S.A. See Affidavit of Arturo Monje (“Part of

my responsibilities . . . is implementation of the policy decisions made by . . . Luis.”). A

reasonable jury could find that Luis in fact “runs the show” simultaneously for both Tufesa

USA and Autotransportes Tufesa. In light of the symbiotic relationship between

Autotransportes Tufesa and Tufesa USA as borne out by all the evidence before the Court,

and in light of the responsibilities and power Luis wields over both corporations

simultaneously, a reasonable jury could find “equal control” and that a joint venture exists

between Tufesa USA and Autotransportes Tufesa.

Accordingly, Tufesa USA’s motion for summary judgment is denied. 

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AUTOTRANSPORTES TUFESA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

 Autotransportes Tufesa has filed a related motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction arguing that it is a wholly separate corporation from Tufesa USA and as such it

has absolutely no contacts with Arizona such that personal jurisdiction in this forum is

prohibited. The issues pertaining to the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction closely

overlap with the facts and issues already discussed in detail above; as such, outside of setting

forth the relevant legal standards to be applied, the Court’s remaining discussion will be quite

brief. 

Plaintiff has the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See Flynt Distrib. Co., Inc.

v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff need only make a prima facie

showing of personal jurisdiction for the motion to dismiss to be denied; Plaintiff’s facts are

taken as true and all inferences are drawn in her favor. See Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner and

Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2003). Because Plaintiff is asserting that

Arizona has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, Arizona law governs. See Brainerd v.

Governors of the University of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 1989). Arizona's long

arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the due process

clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id. Thus, the Court need only determine whether the

assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendants is consistent with the requirements of due

process. See id. “For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,

that defendant must have at least minimum contacts with the relevant forum such that the

exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice

. . . There are two forms of personal jurisdiction that a forum state may exercise over a

nonresident defendant-general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.” Boschetto v. Hansing,

539 F.3d 1011, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2008)(internal quotes and citations omitted). “A defendant

whose contacts with a state are substantial or continuous and systematic can be haled into

court in that state in any action, even if the action is unrelated to those contacts . . . This is

known as general jurisdiction. The standard for establishing general jurisdiction . . . requires

that the defendant's contacts be of the sort that approximate physical presence . . . Factors

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9

The Ninth Circuit has “typically treated purposeful availment somewhat differently in tort

and contract cases. In tort cases, we typically inquire whether a defendant purposefully directs his

activities at the forum state, applying an effects test that focuses on the forum in which the

defendant's actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the forum . . .

[Under the effects test] the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2)

expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered

in the forum state . . . In a specific jurisdiction inquiry, [the Ninth Circuit] consider[s] the extent of

the defendant's contacts with the forum and the degree to which the plaintiff's suit is related to those

contacts. A strong showing on one axis will permit a lesser showing on the other. A single forum

state contact can support jurisdiction if the cause of action arises out of that particular purposeful

contact of the defendant with the forum state.” Id. at 1057-58 (internal quotes and citations omitted).

“Physical contact with the forum state is not a necessary condition, within the rubric of purposeful

availment, the [Supreme] Court has allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant whose only

contact with the forum state is the purposeful direction of a foreign act having effect in the forum

state.” Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Services, Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.

2003)(internal quotes and citations omitted). 

10In determining whether [plaintiff’s] claims arise out of [defendant’s] forum-related conduct,

the Ninth Circuit follows the but for test . . . Hence, [plaintiff] must show that he would not have

suffered an injury but for [defendant’s] forum-related conduct. Id. at 1058 (internal quotes and

citations omitted).

11The Ninth Circuit considers the following seven factors in determining whether the

exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable: “(1) the extent of the defendants' purposeful interjection into

the forum state's affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent

of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendants' state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating

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to be taken into consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in

business in the state, serves the state's markets, designates an agent for service of process,

holds a license, or is incorporated there.” Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223

F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)(internal quotes and citations omitted). Specific jurisdiction

can be established if three requirements are satisfied: “(1) The non-resident defendant must

purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident

thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its

laws[9

]; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's

forum-related activities[10]; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play

and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.”[11] Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1057

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the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the

forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an

alternative forum.” Id. at 1058 (internal quotes and citations omitted). “No one of the factors is

dispositive in itself. Instead, we are to balance all seven.” Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Services, Inc.,

328 F.3d at 1132. The Ninth Circuit has also noted that “modern advances in communications and

transportation have significantly reduced the burden of litigating in another country” which has

lessened the weight given to factors (2) and (5), and that “[states] maintain a strong interest in

providing an effective means of redress for its residents [who are] tortiously injured”, Id. at 1133

(internal quotes and citations omitted). 

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(9th Cir. 2007)(internal quotes and citations omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of

satisfying the first two prongs of the test. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these prongs,

personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state . . . On the other hand, if the

plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the

defendant to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be

reasonable.” Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). 

As referenced above, the Court’s remaining discussion pertaining to the motion to dismiss

shall be brief as the Court has already ruled that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case

pertaining to a joint venture between Autotranportes Tufesa and Tufesa USA (an Arizona

corporation with 35 employees whose home office is in Arizona) whose symbiotic

relationship allows them to work closely together to provide (and represent to consumers)

convenient, direct bus service from Mexico to numerous locations in Arizona and other

Southwestern states and convenient, direct bus service from Arizona and other Southwestern

states to Mexico. As there is an abundance of persuasive authority holding that the contacts

with the forum state of one co-joint venturer may be imputed to the other co-joint venturer

for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction in the forum, the Court is likewise imputing

the contacts with Arizona between co-venturers Tufesa USA and Autotransportes Tufesa

such that the Court finds that personal jurisdiction over Autotranportes Tufesa is appropriate

under the totality of the circumstances in this case as discussed earlier in the Order. See, e.g.,

Hill v. Shell Oil Company, 149 F.Supp.2d 416, 418 (N.D. Ill. 2001)(“The joint venture . . .

provides that the minimum contacts of one co-venturer are attributable to other co-venturers

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such that personal jurisdiction over one means personal jurisdiction over all. Because there

was enough evidence to suggest that [defendants] Shell, Equilon and Motiva were engaged

in a joint venture . . . we concluded that Motiva could not be dismissed from this lawsuit

given the sufficient Illinois contacts of Shell and Equilon.”); Bonney v. Roelle, 117 F.3d

1413, 1997 WL 407831, *8 (4th Cir. 1997)(“Even when an action does not arise out of the

non-resident defendant's contact with the forum state, the exercise of personal jurisdiction

is proper if the non-resident defendant has had continuous and systematic contact with the

forum state . . .This is known as general jurisdiction . . . Applying these principles with

respect to SAZ and SAZ Dialog [German corporations], we conclude the district court

possessed at least general jurisdiction over them. HVB had continuous and systematic contact

with Virginia by virtue of its being headquartered in Virginia during the last year of the joint

venture. Under our circuit precedent and common law principles governing joint ventures,

such contact is attributable to SAZ and SAZ Dialog by virtue of SAZ and SAZ Dialog being

joint venturers with HVB . . . Thus, regardless of whether this action actually arose out of

SAZ and SAZ Dialog's contacts with Virginia, they had sufficient minimum contacts with

Virginia such that requiring them to defend their interests in Virginia does not “offend

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . . Accordingly, we hold the district

court properly concluded that the default judgment against SAZ and SAZ Dialog was not

void for lack of personal jurisdiction.”)(unpublished disposition); ABB Daimler-Benz

Transportation (North America, Inc. v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 14 F.Supp.2d

75, 87 (D.D.C. 1998)(“As joint venturers the action of one is attributed to the other. Thus,

the actions of Amtrak in D.C. are imputed to NJT, and as such, NJT is subject to personal

jurisdiction in this forum . . .”); Bensmiller v. E.I. Dupont Nemours & Co., 47 F.3d 79, 81

(2nd Cir. 1995)(recognizing that the forum contacts of one co-venturer can be attributed to

the other co-venturer for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction); Daynard v. Ness,

Motley, Loadhold, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2002)(“We

conclude that, similar to some cases involving actual partnerships, the relationship between

the defendants here invokes certain principles of the law of agency, partnership and joint

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venture and that these principles permit imputing contacts . . . We think it consistent with the

Due Process Clause to attribute to the Scruggs defendants the Motley defendants’ retention

of, and certain interactions with, [plaintiff] Daynard where, as Daynard alleges, they have

led Daynard and the public to believe they were joint venturers . . . Even if the [defendants]

were not joint venturers, they held themselves out to Daynard to be part of a joint venture .

. . and are subject, for personal jurisdiction purposes, to the doctrine of estoppel.”); Anderson

v. Dassault Aviation, 361 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2004)(Michigan resident was injured in a plane

manufactured by a French corporation in Michigan and brought suit in Arkansas where a

subsidiary was located; although the court did not specifically find that the corporate veil

could be pierced via an alter ego relationship, the court imputed the contacts of the Arkansas

subsidiary to the French parent corporation such that the assertion of personal jurisdiction

was proper in Arkansas in light of the symbiotic relationship of the two companies);

Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund v. Debio Holding S.A., 2000 WL 877015, *3

(E.D. La. 2000)(“It has routinely been held that whenever one co-venturer acts in the forum

to further the interests of the venture, its contacts with the forum are attributed to the coventurers . . . Thus, when the activities of one co-venturer in the forum are sufficient to

sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction, jurisdiction will attach as to all participants in

the venture.”); Glenwood Farms Inc. v. Ivey, 335 F.Supp.2d 133, 141 (D. Me. 2004)(“[T]he

contacts of either [joint venturer] in furtherance of the joint venture may be imputed to the

other members of the joint venture for purposes of determining related contacts with the

forum).

In light of the foregoing, Autotransportes Tufesa’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction is denied. 

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12The Court notes that Plaintiff previously filed a Rule 56(f) motion to allow relevant

discovery prior to ruling on the motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss such that

Plaintiff could have a fair opportunity to oppose the motions. Subsequent to filing this motion, the

parties stipulated that discovery pertaining to these motions was proper and Plaintiff engaged in

relevant discovery. As such, the Rule 56(f) motion is moot and shall be denied as moot.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

(1) Tufesa USA’s motion for summary judgment is denied and Autotransportes Tufesa’s

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.12

DATED this 11th day of February, 2009.

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