Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05290/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05290-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 2, 1998 Decided October 27, 1998

No. 97-5290

Narragansett Indian Tribe,

Appellant

v.

National Indian Gaming Commission and

Tadd Johnson, in his official capacity as Chairman of the

National Indian Gaming Commission,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00334)

Charles A. Hobbs argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was Joseph H. Webster.

Marta Hoilman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were

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Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, David C. Shilton

and Edward J. Passarelli, Attorneys.

Patrick J. Kennedy, appearing pro se, was on the brief for

amicus curiae Patrick J. Kennedy, United States Congressman, House of Representatives.

William J. Rodgers and Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., were on the

brief for amicus curiae Lincoln C. Almond, Governor of

Rhode Island. Thomas A. Thompson entered an appearance.

Before: Wald, Williams and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion of the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Relying on the equal protection

guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, the Narragansett Indian

Tribe of Rhode Island challenges the constitutionality of

legislation, known as the Chafee Amendment, that prohibits

the National Indian Gaming Commission from authorizing

gambling on Narragansett lands. We agree with the district

court that far from illegitimately singling out the Narragansetts for discriminatory treatment, the Chafee Amendment

represents a rational interpretation of an earlier agreement

among the Tribe, the State of Rhode Island, and the federal

government that state law, including state gambling law,

would govern tribal lands.

I

The Narragansetts, aboriginal inhabitants of what is now

Rhode Island, enjoyed cordial early relations with English

settlers on Roger Williams's Providence Plantation. See William G. McLoughlin, Rhode Island 4-5, 9-10 (1978). During

the latter part of the 17th century, the Tribe was drawn into

bloody warfare with Puritan colonists seeking to gain political

authority over much of Rhode Island by securing claims to

Indian land. Id. at 40-44. Surviving members of the Tribe

banded together with other Indians in the early 1700s to form

a Narragansett Indian community in present-day Charlestown. Id. at 44-45.

Although for most of the next century the Narragansetts

resisted Rhode Island's efforts to extinguish their tribal

identity and confer State citizenship, in 1880 the Tribe agreed

to abolish tribal authority and to sell (for $5,000) all but two

acres of its reservation. See id. at 221. Concluding almost

immediately that they had made a mistake, the Narragansetts began a century-long effort to recover their tribal lands,

an effort that culminated in the mid-1970s when the Tribe

settled litigation it had brought against the State and private

landowners in which it claimed that the 1880 land sale violated the Indian Nonintercourse Act, see Act of June 30, 1834,

ch. 161, s 12, 4 Stat. 730 (prohibiting land conveyances from

Indian tribes to non-Indians unless "made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the constitution"). The

settlement, contained in a Joint Memorandum of Understanding ("JMOU"), provided for the transfer of 1,800 acres of land

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to a corporation formed to hold the land in trust for the

benefit of "the descendants of the 1880 Rhode Island Narragansett Roll," in exchange for extinguishment of the Narragansetts' land title claims. JMOU WW 2, 3, 6, 8. The JMOU

also provided that "the laws of the State of Rhode Island shall

be in full force and effect" on Narragansett settlement lands,

with the exception of hunting and fishing regulation and local

property taxation. JMOU WW 9, 11, 13. Congress then implemented the JMOU by enacting the Rhode Island Indian

Claims Settlement Act. Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92 Stat. 813

(1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. ss 1701-16 (1994)). As the

parties to the JMOU had agreed, the Settlement Act specifically stated that Narragansett settlement lands are "subject

to the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of

Rhode Island." 25 U.S.C. s 1708(a). With the enactment of

this statute, the Narragansetts joined a growing number of

Indian tribes that have reclaimed tribal lands after legislative

settlements of aboriginal land claims.

In 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory

Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 25

U.S.C. ss 2701-21) ("IGRA"), precipitating the explosion of

Indian reservation gambling and the Narragansett Tribe's

journey to this court. Dividing gambling activities into three

classes, IGRA makes Class II gaming, which includes bingo,

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sion, appellee in this case. 25 U.S.C. s 2710(b). Although

the Act permits federally recognized tribes to apply for

Commission approval of gaming proposals, an early version of

IGRA contained a provision specifically excluding the Narragansetts. Offered by Senators Chafee and Pell of Rhode

Island to ensure that IGRA conformed to the Settlement

Act's state law proviso, the Narragansett exclusion provided

that "[n]othing in this Act may be construed as permitting

gaming activities, except to the extent permitted under the

laws of the State of Rhode Island, on lands acquired by the

Narragansett Indian Tribe under the Rhode Island Indian

Claims Settlement Act." S. 555, 100th Cong. s 23, 134 Cong.

Rec. 24,022 (1988). After Congressman Udall, chairman of

the House Interior Committee, announced that he would

oppose the bill if it contained the Narragansett exclusion, see

Narragansett Indian Tribe: Oversight Hearing Before the

House Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. 65 (1997) (statement of Frank Ducheneaux, attorney), Senators Chafee and

Pell moved to delete the section, engaging in the following

colloquy with Senator Inouye, chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs:

Mr. PELL. ... In the interests of clarity, I have

asked that language specifically citing the protections of

the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act (Public Law

95-395) be stricken from S. 555. I understand that these

protections clearly will remain in effect.

Mr. INOUYE. I thank my colleague, ... and assure

him that the protections of the Rhode Island Indian

Claims Settlement Act (P.L. 95-395), will remain in effect

and that the Narragansett Indian Tribe clearly will remain subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of

the State of Rhode Island.

Mr. CHAFEE. ... The chairman's statement makes

it clear that any high stakes gaming, including bingo, in

Rhode Island will remain subject to the civil, criminal,

and regulatory laws of our State.

134 Cong. Rec. 24,023 (1988).

Following the passage of IGRA minus the Narragansett

exclusion, the Tribe initiated steps to operate a gambling

establishment on tribal lands. Seeking to stop the Tribe, the

State sued, alleging that nothing in IGRA supplanted the

understanding of the parties, as reflected in the JMOU and

Settlement Act, that state law, including state gambling regulations, governed Narragansett settlement lands. The First

Circuit ruled for the Tribe. See Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir. 1994). It held that

although the Tribe's lands remained subject to the State's

general jurisdiction under the Settlement Act, IGRA had

implicitly repealed the Settlement Act's grant of state jurisdiction with respect to gambling regulation. Id. at 703-05.

The court discounted the Senators' colloquy, finding it at odds

with the statute's language, which contained no exception for

the Narragansetts. Id. at 699. In dissent, Judge Coffin

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disagreed with the majority's interpretation of IGRA, concluding: "If, of course, the Congress were to feel that an

injustice had been done to [Rhode Island], it could provide a

remedy through supplemental legislation." Id. at 708 (Coffin,

J., dissenting).

Armed with its First Circuit victory, the Tribe sought

approval from the National Indian Gaming Commission to

open a bingo hall. Congress, responding to Judge Coffin's

suggestion, amended the Settlement Act to make clear that

IGRA had not preempted its grant of state jurisdiction.

Sponsored by Senator Chafee, the two-line amendment provides: "For purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

(25 U.S.C. s 2701 et seq.), settlement lands shall not be

treated as Indian lands." Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.

3009-227 (1996) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. s 1708(b) (West

Supp. 1998)). Senator Chafee explained, "It is our determined view that a deal is a deal." Narragansett Indian

Tribe: Oversight Hearing Before the House Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. 14 (1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee)

("Chafee Testimony").

Following enactment of the Chafee Amendment, the Commission disapproved the Tribe's proposal. The Tribe then

sued the Commission in the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia. Arguing that the Chafee Amendment violates both equal protection guarantees and separaUSCA Case #97-5290 Document #391938 Filed: 10/27/1998 Page 5 of 13
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tion of powers and that it amounts to a bill of attainder, the

Tribe sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the

Commission to complete its regulatory review of the Tribe's

bingo hall proposal. The district court rejected all of the

Tribe's arguments and granted summary judgment to the

Commission, holding with respect to the Tribe's equal protection claim that "[t]he Court cannot say that the congressional

choice does not reasonably support Congress' decision to

amend the Settlement Act to remedy IGRA's unintended

preemption of state jurisdiction over the Settlement Lands."

Narragansett Indian Tribe v. National Indian Gaming

Comm'n, No. 97-334, slip op. at 18 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 1997).

Asserting only its equal protection challenge, the Tribe now

appeals. Congressman Patrick Kennedy filed an amicus brief

supporting the Tribe's equal protection claim and reiterating

its separation of powers and bill of attainder arguments.

Because we ordinarily do not entertain arguments not raised

by parties, see Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 625 (D.C.

Cir. 1994), we consider only the Tribe's equal protection

challenge. We review the district court's grant of summary

judgment de novo. See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

II

We begin, as we must, with our jurisdiction. Section 1711

of the Settlement Act provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any action

to contest the constitutionality of this subchapter shall be

barred unless the complaint is filed within one hundred

and eighty days of September 30, 1978. Exclusive jurisdiction over any such action is hereby vested in the

United States District Court for the District of Rhode

Island.

25 U.S.C. s 1711. The Chafee Amendment became section

1708(b) of "this subchapter."

Not until the Commission filed its brief in this court did

either party acknowledge section 1711's existence. In a

footnote the Commission took the position that the Narragansetts' case was not time-barred because the Tribe filed it

within 180 days of the Amendment's enactment. As to

whether the Tribe should have filed its case in Rhode Island,

the Commission was silent. After we asked the parties to

address the jurisdictional implications of section 1711, the

Tribe submitted a supplemental brief arguing that section

1711's restrictions applied only to challenges to the Settlement Act as originally enacted in 1978. Although the Commission advised us at oral argument that it agreed, we have

an independent responsibility to assess the jurisdictional issue

ourselves. See Houston Business Journal, Inc. v. Office of

the Comptroller of the Currency, 86 F.3d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir.

1996).

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Section 1711 lends itself to two possible interpretations.

Applying normal rules of statutory construction that construe

a later amendment as if it were part of the original act, see 1A

Sutherland's Statutory Construction s 22.35 (4th ed. 1985),

we could interpret section 1711's first sentence (as the Commission suggested in its brief) to create a 180-day statute of

limitations running from the date of enactment of any amendments. Viewed this way, the Tribe's suit was timely, but

because it amounted to "any such action" within the meaning

of section 1711's second sentence, the Tribe should have filed

it in Rhode Island. The Narragansetts (now supported by

the Commission) suggest an alternative interpretation: Because section 1711 requires the filing of constitutional challenges within 180 days of September 30, 1978, it could not

possibly apply to challenges to amendments added years

later. So interpreted, section 1711 would have no applicability to the Narragansetts' suit.

We find neither of these interpretations linguistically satisfying. The Commission's original view requires that we

ignore Congress's use of the specific date, assuming that it

meant not "within one hundred and eighty days of September

30, 1978," but rather within 180 days of passage of any

subsequent amendment. The Narragansetts' interpretation

requires that we assume that the phrase "any action to

contest the constitutionality of this subchapter" means not

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"any" action, but rather just any action challenging the

original Settlement Act.

Facing statutory ambiguity, we look to legislative purpose.

See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers

Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 627 (1993). According to the

Settlement Act, its primary objective was "to remove all

clouds on titles resulting from ... Indian land claims within

the State of Rhode Island." 25 U.S.C. s 1701(c); see also

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1453, at 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978

U.S.S.C.A.N. 1948, 1958 ("[The Settlement Act] is intended to

resolve once and for all the claims being asserted by the

Narragansett Indians to lands in the Town of Charlestown...."). This suggests that Congress intended to ensure

that any suits challenging the validity of the Settlement Act

were brought quickly and heard by the court most familiar

with the issues, i.e., the Rhode Island court that heard the

land claim litigation that resulted in the JMOU. Reinforcing

this interpretation, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,

upon which Congress modeled the Rhode Island Settlement

Act, see id. at 8, 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 1951, contains the same

language as section 1711, adding: "The purpose of this

limitation on suits is to insure that, after the expiration of a

reasonable period of time, the right, title, and interest of the

United States, the Natives, and the State of Alaska will vest

with certainty and finality...." 43 U.S.C. s 1609(a) (1994)

(emphasis added). Of course, section 1711 contains no such

explanation. But because the section uses precisely the same

jurisdictional language as the Alaska Settlement Act, and

because the Rhode Island Settlement Act has essentially the

same purpose, we think Congress intended section 1711's

time and jurisdiction limitations likewise to apply only to

constitutional suits challenging the original land settlement.

The Narragansetts' challenge to the Chafee Amendment is

not such a suit. It neither revives the old land claims nor

unsettles land titles. Instead, the suit challenges the action

of the National Indian Gaming Commission, a federal agency

located in the District of Columbia. We thus agree with the

parties that section 1711 does not apply to this suit.

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III

The Narragansetts contend that the Chafee Amendment

singles out the Tribe for unfair treatment in violation of the

equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment's Due

Process Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

The Commission disagrees, arguing that the amendment simply remedies IGRA's unintentional preemption of the Settlement Act's grant of state jurisdiction over tribal gaming

activities.

The parties begin with a debate over the standard of

review, although they agree that strict scrutiny does not

apply. Neither suggests that gambling amounts to a fundamental right. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,

383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to

classifications that burden fundamental rights). And because

federal regulation of Indian tribes is "rooted in the unique

status of Indians as 'a separate people' with their own political institutions," United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646

(1977), the Supreme Court has long distinguished Indian

classifications from suspect racial classifications, holding that

" 'the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law'

permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling

out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive." Washington v. Confederated Bands &

Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979)

(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974)).

For these reasons, the Commission urges us to subject the

Chafee Amendment to rational basis analysis.

The Tribe disagrees, arguing that ordinary rational basis

scrutiny is insufficient for Indian classifications. It points out

that Congress's plenary power over Indian tribes is tempered

by its "trust obligation" toward Indians, an obligation anchored in the nation's history of federal dominance and Indian

dependency. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. Within the

context of this "trust relationship," the Narragansetts argue,

equal protection rational basis scrutiny takes on a more

focused, less deferential form. The Tribe relies on Delaware

Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, where the Supreme

Court held that "[t]he standard of review ... is that the

legislative judgment should not be disturbed '[a]s long as the

special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of

Congress' unique obligation towards the Indians.' " 430 U.S.

73, 85 (1977) (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555). Applying

this more focused rational basis standard, the Narragansetts

maintain that without articulating any purpose tied to the

government's special obligation to Indians, Congress violated

the Narragansetts' rights by excluding them from IGRA,

thereby barring them from participating in federal Indian

trust programs that would promote tribal economic development and self-sufficiency.

We think the Tribe's reliance on Weeks is misplaced. In

that case, the Court took the "unique obligation" language

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from Mancari, where the government advanced its interest in

fulfilling its trust obligation as the justification for its challenged Indian employment preference policy. See Mancari,

417 U.S. at 555. Accepting this interest as legitimate, Mancari merely applied ordinary rational basis analysis to determine whether the employment preference rationally related

to the government's interest in fulfilling its trust obligation.

As post-Weeks decisions have made clear, ordinary rational

basis scrutiny applies to Indian classifications just as it does

to other non-suspect classifications under equal protection

analysis. See, e.g., Yakima, 439 U.S. at 501-02 (relying on

ordinary rational basis cases to uphold a state's partial assertion of jurisdiction over Indian lands).

To be sure, in Littlewolf v. Lujan, 877 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir.

1989), this court noted Weeks's "unique obligation" formulation, a reference upon which the Narragansetts rely. Although Littlewolf neither explored the questionable derivation

of that language nor mentioned Yakima's later holding that

ordinary rational basis scrutiny applies, see id. at 1063-64, the

court had no reason to do so. Like Mancari, Littlewolf

involved circumstances in which Congress, in passing the

challenged legislation, claimed to be fulfilling its trust relationship; the legislation thus passed muster even under

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late a "rational basis" or "some reasoned explanation" for

creating an Indian classification. See Cherokee Nation v.

Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

To prevail on their equal protection claim, therefore, the

Narragansetts must demonstrate that Congress's exclusion of

the Tribe from IGRA has no rational relationship to any

legitimate purpose. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The record does not

support such a claim.

To begin with, the Narragansetts are not the only tribe

excluded from IGRA and subjected instead to state gaming

law. The Catawba Indians, the Passamoquoddy Tribe and

Penobscot Nation, and the Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay

Head have also regained lands through legislative settlements

in which they accepted general state jurisdiction over tribal

lands. See 25 U.S.C. s 941b(e), m(c); id. s 1725(h); id.

s 1771g. The Catawba Indians' and the Wampanoag Tribal

Council's settlement acts specifically provide for exclusive

state control over gambling. See id. s 941l(a); id. s 1771g.

Moreover, although the deletion of the Narragansett exclusion from IGRA and the explanatory colloquy among Senators Chafee, Pell, and Inouye created a certain degree of

ambiguity regarding IGRA's applicability to Narragansett

lands, Congress's belief that the Tribe had originally agreed

to state control can hardly be considered irrational. After all,

the JMOU, which the Tribe signed, specifically provides that

with the exception of laws governing hunting, fishing, and

property taxes, "all laws of the State of Rhode Island shall be

in full force and effect on the Settlement Lands." JMOU

p 13 (emphasis added). The Settlement Act likewise assured

Rhode Island that "settlement lands shall be subject to the

civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode

Island." 25 U.S.C. s 1708(a). It was thus not surprising

that when the First Circuit held that IGRA implicitly repealed the Settlement Act with respect to gambling, Congress

promptly enacted the Chafee Amendment to, in the words of

its sponsor, "restore[ ] the integrity of the Rhode Island

Indian Claims Settlement Act and uph[o]ld the primacy of

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State jurisdiction over the Tribe's settlement lands." Chafee

Testimony at 14. Reflecting precisely the same understanding of the Settlement Act, Senator Pell said, "As one who

worked in [sic] the Settlement Act, I know that the intent of

this law was to preserve the full jurisdiction of the State of

Rhode Island. That's why 10 years later we entered into a

colloquy to assure that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

would not supersede the Settlement Act." Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act: Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Comm.

on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 8-9 (1994) (statement of Sen.

Pell). The Governor of Rhode Island (the State had also

signed the JMOU) expressed the same understanding of the

Settlement Act: "[The Pell/Inouye/Chafee] colloquy was intended by all parties to make clear the fact that nothing in

the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was going to preempt

what had already been established 10 years earlier in 1978, by

the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act." Id. at 32-

33 (statement of Gov. Sundlun). As the Tribe concedes,

excluding from IGRA those tribes that have specifically

agreed to state gambling regulation is an "appropriate" governmental purpose. See Reply Br. at 11.

The Narragansetts offer an alternative argument to support their claim that Congress acted irrationally when it

added the Chafee Amendment to the Settlement Act. Pointing out that both the JMOU and the Settlement Act predate

the Tribe's 1983 federal recognition and its conveyance of

tribal lands to the Bureau of Indian Affairs in trust, the

Narragansetts claim that Congress could not legitimately

have viewed either the JMOU or Settlement Act as reflecting

tribal agreement to state control after federal recognition.

Federal recognition and federal land trusteeship ordinarily

have the effect of making tribal land "Indian country" subject

to federal law, not state law. See F. Cohen, Handbook of

Federal Indian Law 35-36, 348-49 (1982). Because the

JMOU and the Settlement Act are silent as to the effect of

federal recognition and trusteeship on the grant of state

jurisdiction, and because neither mentions state jurisdiction

over Indian gaming, the Tribe urges us to apply what it

characterizes as the "Indian canon of construction" and interUSCA Case #97-5290 Document #391938 Filed: 10/27/1998 Page 12 of 13
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pret this silence "liberally ..., [with] doubtful expressions

being resolved in favor of the Indians." Bryan v. Itasca

County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (internal quotation omitted).

Although intriguing, the Tribe's argument is ultimately

unavailing. Even if the Tribe were correct that the JMOU

and Settlement Act implicitly contemplated that state jurisdiction would end whenever it obtained federal recognition,

Congress could rationally have reached the opposite conclusion. The grants of state jurisdiction contained in the JMOU

and Settlement Act are unconditional, saying nothing about

eventual federal recognition. The Chafee Amendment thus

represents a rational exercise of congressional authority to

enforce the terms of the original agreement by which the

Narragansetts regained tribal lands. In any event, the First

Circuit has already rejected the Tribe's argument that federal

recognition altered the original jurisdictional grant to Rhode

Island. See Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d at 695

(observing that "at every salient moment, the parties in

interest took pains to reaffirm section 1708['s grant of state

jurisdiction]"). Having lost in the First Circuit, the Narragansetts may not relitigate the issue here. See SEC v.

Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The doctrine of

collateral estoppel prohibits relitigation of an issue of fact or

law that has been decided in an earlier litigation.").

We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment

for the Commission.

So ordered.

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