Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00163/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00163-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LATEACHEEAH G. ANDERSON

SALVATTO, and RICHARD

SALVATTO, individually and as

guardians for JAMAL THROWER, a

minor,

NO. CIV. S-04-0163 WBS GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

COUNTY OF SOLANO, CITY OF

VALLEJO, COUNTY OF SOLANO

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,

LIEUTENANT LIDDICOET, OFFICER

K. MCCARTHY, VALLEJO POLICE

DEPARTMENT, WATCH COMMANDER K.

SCHROEDER, CORPORAL B. CLARK,

OFFICER WHITNEY,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, as well as supplemental state law causes of action,

alleging several incidents of improper police conduct. 

Defendants now move for sanctions in the form of striking

plaintiffs’ disclosure of a rebuttal expert witness, as well as

precluding any and all testimony that expert will provide.

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Defendants note that plaintiffs emailed the report at 1

12:37pm, thirty-seven minutes later than the agreed upon time of

noon. Plaintiffs’ email accompanying the report indicates that

counsel experienced technical problems in printing the report,

and was therefore delayed and forced to resort to email as a

means of transmission. (Whitefleet Decl. Ex. D.) The court sees

no reason to sanction plaintiffs merely for such a minor delay,

as it is highly unlikely that any prejudice resulted. See e.g.

Jones v. Tozzi, 2006 WL 355175, *4 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 15, 2006)

2

On March 20, 2006, this court entered a Status

(Pretrial Scheduling) Order, which required the parties to

disclose expert witnesses and produce reports in accordance with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 no later than October 20,

2006. The order also stated that “with regard to expert

testimony intended solely for rebuttal,” those disclosures and

reports were to be filed no later than November 10, 2006.

On October 20, 2006, defendants disclosed their expert

witness with an accompanying report, but plaintiffs did not. On

November 10, 2006, the date rebuttal expert disclosures and

reports were due, plaintiffs contacted defendants and requested

an extension of the deadline. Defendants stipulated to extend

the deadline until November 22, 2006, but only for the expert

report. Later that day plaintiffs disclosed David A. Dusenbury

and Associates as a rebuttal expert witness, indicating that Mr.

Dusenbury would testify “regarding police practices, including

the use of force, and the reasonableness of the arrest and

detention, as well as police training practices procedures

surrounding the detention and arrest of Plaintiff Lateacheeah

Salvatto.” (Pls.’s Disclosure of Rebuttal Expert Witness 2.) On

November 22, 2006, plaintiffs emailed the expert report to

defendants.1

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(citing Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814

(9th Cir. 1985)) (overlooking a two hour filing delay in order to

address the merits).

3

Defendants now bring a motion for sanctions pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and Local Rule 37-251(e)(2),

arguing that the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert goes beyond mere

rebuttal evidence, but instead to plaintiffs’ prima facie case. 

 Rule 26 provides that “a party shall disclose to other

parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to

present evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). “These

disclosures shall be made at the times and in the sequence

directed by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Rule

37(c)(1) provides that a party who fails to disclose information

as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, unless such

failure is harmless, is not “permitted to use as evidence at a

trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information

not so disclosed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); see Yeti by Molly,

Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.

2001).

If indeed the testimony and report by Mr. Dusenbury

that plaintiffs’ wish to offer are in violation of this court’s

pretrial scheduling order, than sanctioning plaintiffs by

precluding this evidence might be appropriate. At this point,

however, prior to trial, the court cannot necessarily say that

the proposed evidence is improper. Other than the brief onesentence description contained in the initial disclosures, the

court cannot presume to know the substance of Mr. Dusenbury’s

testimony or his report. 

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4

Once this evidence is offered by plaintiffs at trial,

the court will be in a much better position to assess Mr.

Dusenbury’s testimony and report, and determine whether or not it

is truly “rebuttal.” Additionally, at that point the court will

be more able to balance any potential prejudice to defendants, if

the evidence is admitted, against any prejudice to plaintiffs, if

the evidence is excluded.

It is well established that the issuance of sanctions

under Rule 37 falls within the broad discretion of the district

court. Yeti, 259 F.3d at 1106 (“[W]e give particularly wide

latitude to the district court’s discretion to issue sanctions

under Rule 37(c)(1).”); see also United States v. Batts, 573 F.2d

599, 610 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Perez, 491 F.2d

167 (9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 858 (1974)) (“The

admissibility of rebuttal evidence is subject to the sound

discretion of the trial court.”). Therefore, for the foregoing

reasons, the court will defer ruling on defendants’ motion for

sanctions. If the court determines at trial that the testimony

is not simply rebuttal but expert opinion which should have been

disclosed earlier, the court may impose such sanctions as

appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37()(c) (“In addition to or in

lieu of [precluding evidence], the court . . . may impose other

appropriate sanctions.”).

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

sanctions be, and the same hereby is, DENIED, without prejudice

to its being raised at the time of trial if and when the

testimony of Mr. Dusenbury is offered.

DATED: January 9, 2007

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