Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01052/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01052-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332oc Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DR. RACQUEL S. BOVIER, c/o 

EPIPHANY ONEPOINTE 

TELETHERAPY & ASSOC., LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRIDGEPOINT 

EDUCATION/ASHFORD 

UNIVERSITY, BRIDGEPOINT 

UNIVERSITY GOVERNING BOARD 

OF REGENTS, DR. CRAIG MAXWELL, 

DR. ANTHONY “TONY” FARRELL, 

DR. DENISE MAXWELL, MR. JOHN 

GOODISON, DR. IRIS LAFFERTY, DR. 

TAMECCA FITZPATRICK, DR. JUDY 

DONOVAN, DR. JACKIE KYGER, MS. 

HEATHER MASON, DR. ALAN 

BELCHER, MR. ARMONDO 

DOMINGUEZ & ASSOC.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01052-GPC-JMA

ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

REQUEST TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS;

(2) DISMISSING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);

(3) GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE 

TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT 

WITHIN 21 DAYS OF ENTRY OF 

THIS ORDER;

AND

(4) DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO 

PAY THE FILING FEE ON OR BY 

JUNE 28, 2017

[ECF No. 2.]

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On May 23, 2017, Plaintiff Dr. Racquel S. Bovier (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, 

filed a Complaint against Bridgepoint Education c/o Ashford University, Bridgepoint 

Education University, Dr. Craig Maxwell, Dr. Anthony “Tony” Farrell, Dr. Denise 

Maxwell, Mr. John Goodison, Dr. Iris Lafferty, Dr. Tamecca Fitzpatrick, Dr. Judy 

Donovan, Dr. Jackie Kyger, Dr. Alan Belcher, Ms. Heather Mason, and Mr. Armondo 

Dominguez & Associates (collectively, “Defendants”).1(Dkt. No. 1.)2 Plaintiff 

concurrently filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2.) For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis, DISMISSES IN PART Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend her 

Complaint within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order. Plaintiff must pay the 

filing fee on or by June 28, 2017 to proceed with her lawsuit.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must submit an affidavit 

demonstrating his inability to pay the filing fee, and the affidavit must include a complete 

 

1 Without any explanation or authority, Plaintiff requests that the Court seal the instant case. (Dkt. No. 1 

at 1.) The Court declines to do so.

2 Plaintiff mistakenly conflates the United States District Court with the San Diego Superior Court. 

(Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) 

3

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 

(eff. Dec. 1, 2016)). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 

proceed IFP. Id.

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statement of the plaintiff’s assets. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The facts as to the affiant’s 

poverty must be stated “with some particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” United 

States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). When a plaintiff moves to 

proceed IFP, the court first “grants or denies IFP status based on the plaintiff’s financial 

resources alone and then independently determines whether to dismiss the complaint”

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“§ 1915(e)(2)”). Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 

1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). IFP status may be acquired and lost during the course of 

litigation. Wilson v. Dir. of Div. of Adult Insts., No. CIV S–06–0791, 2009 WL 311150, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009) (internal citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff has supplied an affidavit in support of her application to proceed in 

forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 2.) Plaintiff declares that her average monthly income amount 

during the past twelve months totaled to approximately $6599. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff 

estimates that her income amount expected next month totals to approximately $1759. 

(Id.) She is presently employed by Grand Canyon University and receives $1500 in gross 

monthly pay. (Id.) Plaintiff has $2000 in a savings account and $2100 in a checking 

account. As for assets, Plaintiff owns a $219,000 home, a $4000 BMW, a $12,900 

Mercedes Benz, a $29,000 Alfa Romeo, and a $25,000 engagement ring. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff declares that her monthly expenses total $5404.52. (Id. at 5.)

In light of Plaintiff’s monthly income, assets, and savings and checking accounts, 

the Court concludes that Plaintiff can afford the $400 filing fee. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. 

II. Sua Sponte Screening

A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), 

is additionally subject to mandatory sua sponte screening. the Court must review 

complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and must sua sponte dismiss any 

complaint, or any portion of a complaint, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 

claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 

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1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 

1915(e)(2)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard.

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the Plaintiff is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

Plaintiff the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of 

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint barely passes muster. Although unclear, Plaintiff 

appears to allege that between June and November 2016, Defendants breached various 

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employment agreements,4(Dkt. No. 1 at 5–6), “fail[ed] to acknowledge” Plaintiff’s 

disability accommodations, (id. at 5), and wrongfully terminated her in retaliation for her

obtaining right to sue letters from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), 

(id. at 1, 5, 10–11). 

Out of an abundance of caution, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s contract 

claims, given Plaintiff’s allegations regarding employment agreements that Defendants 

breached.5 (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at 5–6, 9–11.) However, as currently pled, Plaintiff’s 

retaliation claims fail under either Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

or Title VII. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, an employee 

must show that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.” Pardi v. Kaiser 

Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004). Similarly, under Title VII, “[t]o make 

out a prima facie case of retaliation, [plaintiff] must establish that [s]he undertook a 

protected activity under Title VII, h[er] employer subjected h[er] to an adverse 

employment action, and there is a causal link between those two events.” Vasquez v. Cty. 

of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 2, 2004). Here, 

Plaintiff has not shown that she engaged in a protected activity that caused the adverse 

employment action. While she states that Defendants’ wrongful conduct occurred 

between June 21, 2016 and November 30, 2016, Plaintiff’s right to sue letter from the 

EEOC is dated March 22, 2017, (Dkt. No. 1 at 15), and Plaintiff’s DFEH written notice 

indicates that Plaintiff filed a complaint with both the DFEH and EEOC on March 2, 

2017, (id. at 16). Given that Plaintiff filed a complaint with the DFEH and EEOC and 

received right to sue letters after the alleged wrongful conduct occurred, Plaintiff has not 

 

4 Plaintiff brings the instant contract claims under specific subsections of the Uniform Commercial Code 

(“U.C.C.”). (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) The U.C.C. is not a source of federal law, as contract claims are governed 

by state law.

5 Diversity jurisdiction appears to be proper at this juncture, given that the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000, and that complete diversity seems to exist.

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alleged that her engagement in protected activity caused any adverse employment 

actions.

Finally, while Plaintiff obtained a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Plaintiff has 

not alleged facts underlying a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA. Plaintiff 

makes passing reference to Defendants’ “failure to acknowledge the Disability 

Accommodations” despite awareness of her disabilities, (Dkt. No. 1 at 5), and includes a 

medical form stating that Plaintiff has generalized anxiety disorder, (id. at 30). “To 

establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate under the ADA, [plaintiff] must 

show that ‘(1) [s]he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [s]he is a qualified 

individual able to perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable 

accommodation; and (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action because of [her] 

disability.’” Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir.2003)). Beyond 

conclusory allegations that Defendants failed to accommodate her disability under the 

ADA, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient factual allegations, such as what reasonable 

accommodations she was entitled to, or how Defendants failed to provide such 

reasonable accommodations. 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES IN PART Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

Specifically, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, whether they are brought 

under Title VII or the ADA, and dismisses Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim under 

the ADA. If Plaintiff elects to file an Amended Complaint, she should supply wellpleaded factual allegations to state prima facie retaliation and failure to accommodate 

claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis. Plaintiff must pay the filing fee on or by June 28, 2017 to proceed 

with her lawsuit. The Court DISMISSES IN PART Plaintiff’s Complaint and 

GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint within twenty-one (21) days of entry 

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of this Order. Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint which cures all of the 

deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. If Plaintiff elects to file an Amended 

Complaint, it must be complete by itself without reference to the original pleading. See 

S.D. CAL. CIV. LR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 

1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with 

leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered 

waived if not repled.”).

Plaintiff is directed to take note that failure to pay the requisite filing fee by the 

Court’s deadline may result in dismissal of her lawsuit for failure to prosecute. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(m).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2017

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