Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00161/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\07-0161-1915(g).wpd -1- 07cv0161

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY A. SHARP,

CDC# K-41609,

Civil No. 07-0161 LAB (LSP)

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILURE TO PAY CIVIL FILING

FEES MANDATED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

[Doc. No. 2] 

vs.

JOHN DUFFY,

Defendant.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the California Medical Facility in

Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Although difficult to decipher, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that, while he was

incarcerated in the San Diego Central Jail in 1996, he was subjected to conditions of

confinement that were unhygienic. Plaintiff seeks three million in compensatory damages,

$180.00 per each day that he was confined in the jail in punitive damages, and “immediate

release” from prison. (Compl. at 11.) 

////

Case 3:07-cv-00161-LAB-LSP Document 3 Filed 03/05/07 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that section 1915(g) does not violate a prisoner’s right to access to

the courts, due process or equal protection; nor does it violate separation of powers principles or operate

as an ex post facto law. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179-82 (9th Cir. 1999);see also Andrews,

398 F.3d at 1123 (noting constitutionality of § 1915(g), but recognizing that “serious constitutional

concerns would arise if § 1915(g) were applied to preclude those prisoners who had filed actions that

were not ‘frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim’ from proceeding IFP.”). 

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\07-0161-1915(g).wpd -2- 07cv0161

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to

commence a civil action; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows certain litigants to pursue civil

litigation IFP, that is, without the full prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).

However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the

privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.”

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner

with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id. The objective of the PLRA is to further “the

congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers,

128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“‘Strikes’ are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which

were dismissed ‘on the ground that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.”

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. Thus, once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is

prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other action IFP in federal court unless he is

in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).1

While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his

request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court

Case 3:07-cv-00161-LAB-LSP Document 3 Filed 03/05/07 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\07-0161-1915(g).wpd -3- 07cv0161

docket records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria

under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g), however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an

action, and other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed

because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases

qualify as a strike under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121. The Seventh Circuit likewise requires the

district court to cite the specific case names, numbers, districts and dates of dismissal for each

civil action it has determined to be a “strike” or “prior occasion.” Id. at 1120 (citing Evans v.

Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 150 F.3d 810, 811-12 (7th Cir. 1998)).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).’” Id. at 1121 (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Andrews further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(g) “if it is of little weight

or importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); see also

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual

allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it lacks an

arguable basis in either law or in fact .... [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint,

embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). “A

case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d

at 1121 (quotation and citation omitted).

II. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

The Court notes as an initial matter that Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show that he is

in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Rodriguez, 169 F.3d

at 1178; see also Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that “allegations

that the prisoner faced imminent danger in the past” are insufficient to trigger section 1915(g)’s

imminent and serious physical injury exception). Thus, regardless of Plaintiff’s financial status,

he may not proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if he has, on three prior occasions while

incarcerated, had federal civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for

Case 3:07-cv-00161-LAB-LSP Document 3 Filed 03/05/07 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\07-0161-1915(g).wpd -4- 07cv0161

failing to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119-20; Rodriguez, 169

F.3d at 1178. 

A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United

States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.

1992). Here, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has had three prior prisoner civil

actions dismissed in the Eastern District of California on the grounds that they were frivolous,

malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. See Sharp v. Corcoran Medical Staff, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No.

99-5550 OWW (DLB) (Mar. 24, 2000 Order Dismissing Complaint sua sponte for failing to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)) (strike one);

Sharp v. Mason, et al. E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 03-1354 EJG (DAD) (Sep. 5, 2003 Order

Dismissing Complaint sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted)

(strike two); and Sharp v. Arcamone, E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 04-0595 FDL (GGH) (Mar. 21,

2005 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted) (strike three).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated three “strikes”

pursuant to § 1915(g), and does not presently allege facts sufficient to show that he is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP [Doc. No. 2]. See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121; Rodriguez, 167 F.3d at 1178.

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [Doc. No. 2] and DISMISSES the case without prejudice

for failure to pay the full $350 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 5, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00161-LAB-LSP Document 3 Filed 03/05/07 Page 4 of 4