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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 1994 Decided December 6, 1994

No. 94-5026

GILBERT ORTIZ, JR.; NOLLIE PLOWMAN,

APPELLEES

v.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Civil Action No. 92-2764)

Joseph R. Guerra argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Ronald S. Flagg,

Donald H. Smith and Gershon M. Ratner.

Michael T. Ambrosino, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: WALD, SENTELLE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Army Board for the Correction of Military Records is a board

composed of civilians that processesservicemembers' claimsregarding alleged errors or injustices in

their military records. By statute, the Correction Board resolves those claims made "within three

years after [the servicemember] discoversthe error or injustice." 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b). These appeals

require the court to decide whether, when a former servicemember seeksto upgrade a discharge, the

three-year limitation period begins to run from the date of discharge or from the time the

servicemember exhausts remedies before the Army Discharge Review Board, which reviews only

dismissals and discharges. See 10 U.S.C. § 1553. We hold, in view of the regulatory requirement

that servicemembers exhaust their remedies with the Review Board before they seek redressfromthe

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1Ortiz's career in the Army ended with a discharge under other than honorable conditions on

March 27, 1970. During his tenure in the military, Ortiz was absent without leave on three

occasions and punished for theft, thereby accruing 912 days of absence in fewer than four years of

service. On September 4, 1984, Ortiz filed a timely application with the Discharge Review Board

to upgrade his discharge to general/under honorable conditions. After the Review Board denied

his application on June 16, 1985, Ortiz filed an application on July 12, 1985 with the Board for

the Correction of Military Records to upgrade his discharge. On the Correction Board

application form, Ortiz indicated that the discovery of the alleged error or injustice took place on

March 27, 1970, the date of his discharge, and that it was in the interest of justice to review his

application despite the passage of more than three years because he had personal problems while

in the Army which had been subsequently resolvedthe same reason he gave for requesting a

discharge upgrade in the first instance. The Correction Board denied the application as untimely,

finding that "[t]he alleged error or injustice was, or with reasonable diligence should have been,

discovered on 27 March 1970 [the date of discharge]," and declined to address his application in

the "interest of justice."

Plowman's history with the Army is similar. He was discharged under other than

honorable conditions on July 21, 1977, for repeated instances of failing to appear at appointed

place of duty and being absent without leave, which resulted in the accumulation of five months

lost time. On December 21, 1983, Plowman filed a timely application with the Discharge Review

Board to upgrade his discharge to general/under honorable conditions. After his application was

denied on October 31, 1984, he filed an application for a discharge upgrade from the Correction

Board on February 3, 1987. Plowman's application stated that he had discovered the error or

injustice in 1986, and that it was in the interest of justice to review his application because of

mental problems that he had suffered while in the service but that had only been diagnosed after

his discharge. The Correction Board denied Plowman's application for the same reasons it denied

Ortiz's application. 

Correction Board, that the three-year statute oflimitations beginsto run at the conclusion of Review

Board proceedings. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Secretaries of

Defense and the Army.

I.

Appellants Gilbert Ortiz, Jr. and Nollie Plowman principally contend that the district court

erred in ruling that the three-year statute of limitations began to run from the dates of their

discharges, rather than from the dates of the Review Board's denials of their applications. After their

discharges under other than honorable conditions, both appellants filed timely applications with the

Review Board for upgraded discharges. Within three years after the Review Board denied them

relief, they both filed applications for upgraded discharges with the Correction Board. In each

instance the Correction Board denied their applications as untimely, because more than three years

had elapsed since their discharges, and declined to consider the merits of their applications in the

"interest of justice." Ortiz v. Secretary of Defense, 842 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1993).1 Thereafter,

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2

10 U.S.C. § 1553(a) (1988) provides that "[a] motion or request for review must be made

within 15 years after the date of the discharge or dismissal." 

appellants sued the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense, alleging that the Correction

Board's decisions were arbitrary, capricious, abuses of discretion, and contrary to law. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretaries, and appellants appeal.

Applications before the CorrectionBoard to correct an error or injustice must be filed "within

three years after [the former servicemember] discovers the error or injustice." 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b)

(Supp. V 1993). Appellants maintain that the district court erred in two respects in ruling that the

Correction Board properly interpreted the phrase "discover[y] [of] error or injustice" in § 1552(b)

to mean "the date of the discharge," a phrase Congress used in § 1553(a) in providing a time limit for

Review Board applications.2 First, this construction of § 1552(b), appellants argue, is inconsistent

with the plain language, structure and legislative history of the statute. Second, they continue, it

cannot be reconciled with the Army's two-step administrative review procedure, which requires

former servicemembers to exhaust their administrative remedies with the Review Board before

seeking redress from the Correction Board.

The Secretaries respond that the three-year filing requirement in § 1552(b) is clear and

unambiguous, that the errors or injustices appellants challenge are their original discharges, and that

none ofthe relevant statutes or their legislative histories demonstrate a congressionalintent to require

exhaustion of Review Board remedies before applying to the Correction Board. Although the

Secretaries concede that their regulations require exhaustion of certain remedies before recourse to

theCorrectionBoard, theymaintain that such exhaustion isrequired onlywhen the CorrectionBoard

determines that it is practical and appropriate. The Secretaries agree that our review of when the

Correction Board's three-year statute of limitations begins to run is de novo, Transohio Sav. Bank

v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and applying that

standard, we respectfully disagree with their interpretation in view ofthe plain meaning of the Army's

regulation requiring exhaustion.

II.

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Congress has enacted statutes providing at least two administrative procedures by which a

former servicemember may seek an upgrade of his or her discharge. First, 10 U.S.C. § 1552

authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through boards of civilians, to correct military records.

Under subsection (b):

No correction may be made ... unlessthe claimant ... files a request for the correction

within three years after he discovers the error or injustice. However, [the Correction

Board] may excuse a failure to file within three years after discovery if it findsit to be

in the interest of justice.

10 U.S.C. § 1552(b). Second, 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a) authorizes the Secretary to establish a Review

Board, consisting of five members, to review dismissals and discharges, provided that "[a] motion or

request for review [is] made within 15 years after the date of the discharge or dismissal." Subsection

(c) requires the review to be based on the military records and any evidence presented by the

applicant to the Review Board; applicants may present witnesses and appear personally or through

counsel. Id. § 1553(c).

In providing these two avenues of administrative review, however, Congress did not indicate

the relationship between them. Neither statute provides that one avenue must be pursued before the

other. Remedying this lack of clarity, the Army promulgated a regulation requiring exhaustion of

Review Board procedures before an application to the Correction Board will be considered. The

regulation provides:

Exhaustion of other remedies. No application will be considered [by the Correction

Board] untilthe applicant has exhausted all effective administrative remedies afforded

him by existing law or regulations, and such legalremedies asthe [Correction] Board

shall determine are practical and appropriately available to the applicant.

32 C.F.R. § 581.3(c)(3) (1994).

A.

In maintaining that the district court erred in equating the date of discovery with the date of

discharge, appellants first point to the different language used by Congress in §§ 1552(b) and

1553(a). Congress required, in setting the time for applications to be submitted to the Review Board,

that applicationsshall be made within "15 years after the date of discharge...." 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a).

Congress included no such language in § 1552(b), requiring instead that applications to the

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3Hearings on Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments Before the

Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, No. 21: Full Committee Hearing

on H. R. 662 and Accompanying Bills, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 425, 447-49 (1951). 

Correction Board shall be made within three years after the servicemember "discovers the error or

injustice." Appellants argue that, in the absence of further guidance from the statutory language itself,

the different language in two companion provisions demonstrates that discovery of the "error or

injustice" meanssomething other than "date of discharge." See Energy Research Found. v. Defense

Nuclear Facilities Safety Bd., 917 F.2d 581, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (" "when [Congress] employs

different words, it usually means different things' ") (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice

Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes in BENCHMARKS 224 (1967)); Association of Maximum

Service Telecasters v. FCC, 853 F.2d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("interpretive significance should

be drawn from Congress' use of two different words"). However, this ignores the broader scope of

the Correction Board's authority to correct any military record as compared to that of the Review

Board, which is limited to review of dismissals and discharges.

Still, appellants' position finds some support in the legislative history; a sponsor of the bill

stated that the three-year period did not necessarily begin to run from the date of discharge but rather

from the date of discovery of the error.3 However, this history indicates only that the date of

discovery of the error may be different from the date of discharge, not that it will always, or even

often, be different. Nonetheless, appellants argue, in light of the legislative history and the fact that

the Review Board has authority to provide reliefto applicantssuch as appellants, that there is no final

"error or injustice" until the Review Board has acted. Therefore, appellants contend that the most

natural and appropriate interpretation of § 1552(b) is that the limitations period for appellants began

to run on the date that the Review Board denied their applications to reclassify their discharges.

The Secretaries' response is that the three-year language of § 1552(b) is clear and

unambiguous. We disagree with both parties. Although the language differences relied on by

appellants are not dispositive ofthe issue before us, appellants have demonstrated at least that the use

of different language creates uncertainty about the triggering event for the Correction Board's

three-yearstatute oflimitations and clearlydoes not rule out a triggering event other than a discharge.

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4When the Review Board denied appellants' applications, it sent them identical form letters

stating that "[i]f all appeals with the Army Discharge Review Board have been exhausted, you

may file an appeal for consideration with the Army Board for Correction of Military Records." 

Indeed, the Secretaries acknowledge that the Correction Board's statute of limitations "does not run

from a uniform date, but rather depends on the error or injustice being challenged and the date that

particular error or injustice was discovered." See Mullen v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 550, 551 (1990)

(three-year limitation period in discharge case began to run when former servicemember was

diagnosed with psychiatric disorder over ten years after discharge).

B.

Appellants more persuasively maintain that the Secretaries' interpretation of § 1552(b), as

reflected in the decisions of the Correction Board here, cannot be reconciled with the exhaustion

requirement of 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(c)(3). The Army, of course, is bound to follow its own regulations,

Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S.

260, 267 (1954); Blassingame v. Secretary of Navy, 866 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1989), and it has

acted to inform applicants, including appellants, about the exhaustion requirement.4It is undisputed

that an application to the Review Board was an effective administrative scheme for receiving the relief

appellants sought which was afforded by law throughout the relevant time period. Under the plain

meaning of the Army's regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(c)(3), the Correction Board required, as a

prerequisite to its consideration of an application, exhaustion of remedies before the Review Board.

Cf. Muse v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 372, 382 (1987) (pursuit of remedies before the Army's Special

Review Board, when available, is a prerequisite to applying for relief from the Correction Board).

This requirement does not conflict with the Correction Board's statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1552,

which is silent on the question of exhaustion. Cf. McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 1086

(1992) (noting that in the context of civil actions, "where Congress has not clearly required

exhaustion,sound judicial discretion governs"). Furthermore, requiring exhaustion here is consistent

with the hierarchy of administrative boards established by Congress and gives the Review Board,

staffed with military personnel who are positioned to conduct a factual inquiry, a first opportunity to

correct any error or injustice before allowing consideration by the Correction Board, a panel of

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5The Secretaries' attempt to differentiate Bolger because it did not address a timeliness

question is unavailing. Bolger and the other cases cited imply that the exhaustion regulation, §

581.3(c)(3), requires exhaustion of remedies with the Review Board before filing an application

with the Correction Board. The Secretaries do not claim that any timeliness-related exception to

this rule exists, and we are aware of none. 

6

In Vietnam Veterans v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1988), this court

suggested in passing that discharges are reviewable by either or both the Review Board and the

Corrections Board. However, even the indecisive language in Vietnam Veterans and the case

upon which it relies, Strang v. Marsh, 602 F. Supp. 1565 (D.R.I. 1985), imply only that

exhaustion is not required when the Review Board lacks the power to provide the relief sought. 

See Hodges, 499 F.2d at 420 n.7. 

civilians. Sherengos v. Seamans, 449 F.2d 333, 334 (4th Cir. 1971) ("Located as it is at the apex of

a pyramidal system of specialized boards of review, the Board for Correction of Military Records

cannot function effectively ifthe specialized military boards are bypassed and it is used as a forum for

presenting complaints in the first instance."); Muse, 13 Cl. Ct. at 382 (same); see McCarthy v.

Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 1086 (1992) (noting that "[e]xhaustion concerns apply with particular

force" when a less expert body requires exhaustion of remedies before the more expert body);

McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969) (same). Although we have found no direct

holding on the requirement of exhaustion of remedies before the Review Board, this requirement is

reflected in the opinions of this and other courts. See Bolger v. Marshall, 193 F.2d 37, 39 & n.3

(D.C. Cir. 1951) (noting with approval that the Correction Board had refused to consider an

application because the applicant had not exhausted her remedies with a precursor to the Review

Board) (dictum);5 Bittner v. Secretary of Defense, 625 F. Supp. 1022, 1026-27 (D.D.C. 1985)

(noting that the proper course for a servicemember aggrieved by discharge is first to pursue claims

before the Review Board, and only if unsuccessful there, to apply to the Correction Board); see also

Blassingame, 866 F.2d at 558 n.3; Blassingame v. Secretary of Navy, 811 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.

1987); Geyen v. Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303, 1309 (5th Cir. 1985); Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417,

420 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974).6

TheSecretaries' contraryargument, that exhaustionisrequired underthe regulation only when

the Correction Board determines it is practical and appropriate, is not supported by the language of

the regulation. The regulation refers to two types of remedies which are joined by the conjunction

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7Hearings on Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments Before the

Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, No. 27: Full Committee

Hearings on H. R. 4111 and Accompanying Bills, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 593, 602 (1951). 

8

10 U.S.C. § 1552(b); see Hearings, supra note 7, at 601. 

9

10 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (1982) (amended 1988); see Hearings, supra note 7, at 602. 

"and" and therefore must both be exhausted before theCorrectionBoard will consider an application.

One category encompasses "such legal remedies as the [Correction] Board shall determine are

practical and appropriatelyavailable," 32C.F.R. § 581.3(c)(3), asthe Secretaries argue, but the other,

independent category includes "all effective administrative remedies afforded ... by existing law or

regulations," id. (emphasis added), a category which undeniably includes Review Board action.

Notwithstanding the deference owed to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, the

Secretaries' interpretation is plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulation. See Bowles v.

Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945).

Likewise, the Secretaries' reliance on the 1951 legislative history of the three-year statute of

limitations in § 1552(b) will not sustain the weight it is asked to bear. By the Secretaries' own

admissions, the General Accounting Office's concern about the impact on the treasury of the

Correction Board's consideration of stale claims, including at least one arising from the Spanish

American War,

7

does not indicate that Congress did not intend for the Army to be able to require

exhaustion. To the contrary, the statute of limitations compromised the GAO's desire for rapid

resolution with competing interests. Most notably, because the military objected to the three-year

limitation as being too short, the statute allowed the Correction Board to waive the timeliness

requirement.8In addition, the statute created a ten-year grace period before the three-year limitation

was enforced.9 Thus Congress did not consider the need for timeliness to be paramount, but rather

secondary to fairness. In any event, the language of § 1552(b) leaves open what is the triggering

event for commencement of the three-year statute of limitations.

We hold that because the Army's regulation requires exhaustion of Review Board remedies

before the Correction Board will consider an application, the Correction Board's three-year statute

of limitations does not begin to run at the time of discharge where, as here, servicemembers timely

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pursue remedies before the Review Board. The Correction Board occupies a position analogous to

that of a court applying a statute oflimitationsto an action that cannot be brought until administrative

remedies are exhausted. In that context, this court has held that "a suit cannot be maintained in

courtand a cause of action does not "first accrue'until a party has exhausted all administrative

remedies whose exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit." Spannaus v. United States Dept. of Justice, 824

F.2d 52, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see id. at 56 n.3 ("That a statute of limitations cannot begin to run

against a plaintiff before the plaintiff can maintain a suit in court seems virtually axiomatic.").

Although Spannaus is not controlling because it involved the interpretation of a different statutory

limitations period, itslogic is unassailable: a statute oflimitations will not normally begin to run until

a party has acquired the right to initiate the proceeding covered by the limitations period.

The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in determining whether the six-year statute

of limitations on a contract-related claim against the government began running at the time of the

completion of the contract or at the time of action by an administrative board whose ruling was a

prerequisite to suit. In Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 514 (1967), the Court

explained that:

[t]o hold that the six-year time period runsfromthe completion ofthe contract, asthe

Government insists, would have unfortunate impact. The contractor is compelled to

resort to administrative proceedings which may be protracted and which may last not

only beyond the completion of the contract but continue for more than six years

thereafter. If the time bar starts running from the completion date, the contractor

could thus be barred from the courts by the time his administrative appeal is finally

decided.... This is not an appealing result, nor, in our view, one that Congress

intended.... [I]t is very doubtful that it anticipated no review at all if administrative

proceedings, compulsoryon the contractor, continued for more than six years beyond

the contract's completion date.

The same reasoning applies here. If the three-year statute of limitations starts running from

the date of discharge, former servicemembers could be barred from obtaining relief from the

Correction Board by the time the Review Board acted on their applications, which need not be filed

for fifteen years after discharge. The only reasonable conclusion is that the limitation period begins

when the applicant fulfills all prerequisites to bringing an application before the Correction Board,

i.e., when the Review Board rendersits decision. Although the court has not squarely addressed this

issue before, our previousstatementsin this area and the opinions of at least two other circuits concur

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10Several district court opinions also support this conclusion. See Bittner, 625 F. Supp. 1022,

1029 n.2 (D.D.C. 1985); White v. Secretary of the Army 629 F. Supp. 64, 68 n.4 (D.D.C. 1984); 

Lewis v. Secretary of the Navy, No. 89-1446, 1990 WL 454624, at *7 (D.D.C. June 29, 1990).

Because we conclude as a matter of statutory construction that the Correction Board's

statute of limitations begins to run when the Review Board denies an application, appellants'

responses to the question on the application forms regarding the date of discovery of the error or

injustice are irrelevant. Accordingly, the Secretaries' reliance on these responses and on the fact

that both appellants responded to a question predicated on the passage of more than three years

since the discovery of the error or injustice is misplaced. Indeed, it is obvious from the

applications that appellants were filling out these forms without the aid of counsel; under such

circumstances, the application's confusing questions should not be used as a trap to deprive those

unfamiliar with the Correction Board's procedures of their full three-year limitation period. 

Neither the Correction Board nor the district court referred to appellants' responses in their

applications as conceding that the three-year statute of limitations began to run on the date of

their discharges. 

with the result we reach today. See Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating

that Congress established "a 15 year period in which to seek reconsideration of the nature of a

discharge before the Review Board, and a period of 3 years thereafter to seek review before the

CorrectionBoard when that avenue of review is also available") (dictum); Blassingame v. Secretary

of Navy, 811 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1987) (applicant may apply to Correction Board within three years

of a decision by the Review Board) (dictum); Geyen v. Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303, 1309 (5th Cir. 1985)

(noting that even more than six years after discharge, a servicemember still has "the 15 years

permitted for petitioning the [Review Board] and the three years for a further petition to the

[Correction Board]") (dictum).10

The reasoning of Crown Coat and Spannaus also indicates why Walters v. Secretary of

Defense, 725 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1983), on which the Secretaries rely, is inapplicable. Walters held

that the statute of limitations for filing "all civil actions" against the United States, 28 U.S.C. §

2401(a), beginsto run fromthe date of discharge when the servicemember makes no effort to exhaust

administrative remedies. Id. at 115. Walters is clearly distinguishable from the instant appeals

because it treated the administrative remedies as "permissive," i.e., they were not a prerequisite to

bringing a civil action. Walters, 725 F.2d at 114; accord Hurick v. Lehman, 782 F.2d 984, 987 (Fed.

Cir. 1986); Mitchell v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1329, 1331 (1992), aff'd 1 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir.

1993). Such a conclusion was necessary because the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative

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remedies, so that if they were not "permissive," the action would have been dismissed as being

premature. Walters, 725 F.2d at 114. As a result, Walters would arguably govern our analysis only

in the absence of the Army's regulation requiring exhaustion of other remedies. Cf. Lichtenfels v.

Orr, 604 F. Supp. 271, 275-76 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (ruling that application to Correction Board is a

prerequisite to suit and, therefore, six-year statute of limitations for filing suit does not begin to run

until Correction Board has issued its decision), aff'd, 878 F.2d 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

The district court was rightfully concerned that the result we reach today might thwart the

purposes of the Correction Board's three-year statute of limitations. Ortiz v. Secretary of Defense,

842 F. Supp. at 11. However, the district court's interpretation does equal violence to the Review

Board's fifteen-year limitation period by effectively reducing it to three years. This unusual

circumstance arises because Congress has enacted such dramatically different limitations periodsfor

two boards that engage in strikingly similar endeavors. The interpretation we adopt, however, does

less violence to these statutes, and to the Congressional concern for servicemembers evident from

them, than that embraced by the district court.

First, our decision followsthe general obligation of courtsto interpret two statutes bymaking

both fully effective. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); Mail Order Ass'n of America

v. United States Postal Service, 986 F.2d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1993). It is also consistent with the

canon of statutory construction that greater effect should be given to the more specific statute.

Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987); Mail Order Ass'n, 986 F.2d

at 515. The Review Board statute, § 1553, addresses only claims for review of non-court martial

discharges and dismissals, while the Correction Board'sstatute, § 1552, broadly encompasses claims

for review of anymilitary record, including discharge records. Congress thus could reasonably intend

that a short limitation period apply to general claims for the correction of military records but that

a much longer period apply specifically to discharge review, a subset ofrecords correction. Although

the longer period for review of discharges and dismissals may result in some cases coming to the

CorrectionBoard up to eighteen years after discharge, it leavesintact the shorter three-year limitation

period for all other record correction requests.

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Second, given the remedial nature of the administrative scheme for correction of erroneous

or unjust dismissals and discharges, there is a presumption in favor of having the merits ofsuch claims

heard. See Van Bourg, 388 F.2d at 565 (Congress has determined that timely filed applications are

to be decided on the merits). That Congress included many exceptions to the three-year limitation

period supportsthisinterpretation. For example, that the Correction Board's limitation period begins

to run at the time the servicemember discoversthe error or injustice, rather than at the time the error

or injustice actuallyarose,showsCongress'intent to liberallygrant review and suggestsits confidence

in the Correction Board's ability to decide applications regarding events more than three years in the

past. See Mullen v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. at 551 (holding that application before the Correction

Board wastimely, although filed over eleven years after discharge, because applicant did not discover

the error until he was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder over ten years after discharge);

see also 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (1982) (amended 1988) (three-year limitation period enacted in 1951

did not apply to applications filed before 1961). Indeed, in the interest of justice the Correction

Board may waive its limitations period and consider an application regardless of its age. 10 U.S.C.

§ 1552(b). The record indicates that such waivers were routinely granted by the Correction Board

at one time. See Declaration of Karl Bielenberg 1, Joint Appendix 336. Regardless of the reasons,

the Correction Board has, in fact, evaluated the merits of applications filed decades after the events

in question. See Gottlieb v. Peña, --- F.3d ---- (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Correction Board considered the

merits of application to reconsider its previous decision, made over forty years earlier); Swann v.

Garrett, 811 F. Supp. 1336, 1337-1338, 1343 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (Correction Board decided

application regarding events that occurred forty years earlier); see also Van Bourg, 388 F.2d at 563

(application filed fourteen years after discharge); Geyen, 775 F.2d at 1305-06 (application filed ten

years after discharge). Our recent decision in Detweiler v. Peña, --- F.3d ----, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir.

1994), holding that § 205 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' CivilRelief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. § 525, tolls

the three-year limitation period during a servicemember's period of active duty, will result in the

Correction Board evaluating the merits of other applications filed more than three years after the

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11The remedial nature of the legislation also leads us to reject the contention that the three-year

limitation period should simply be tolled during the pendency of an application before the Review

Board. Tolling would still require servicemembers to file an application with the Review Board

within three years after discharge. This requirement would be inequitable because § 1553(a)

provides that a servicemember has fifteen years in which to apply to the Review Board. Cf.

Vietnam Veterans of America v. Secretary of the Navy, 642 F. Supp. 154, 157 (refusing to apply

the doctrine of laches when servicemembers did not seek upgrade from the Review Board until

ten years after their discharges because such a delay was reasonable in light of § 1553(a)), aff'd in

part and reversed in part on other grounds, 843 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1988). That

servicemembers go through the review process without the assistance of counsel, see supra note

10, makes it more imperative that the plain meaning of the statutes and regulations not be

deceptive. 

12In view of our disposition, we do not reach appellants' contentions that the district court

erred in ruling that the decisions of the Correction Board not to waive the three-year statute of

limitations in the "interest of justice" are unreviewable, and alternatively, that if reviewable, they

were neither arbitrary nor capricious. 

events involved.11

Accordingly, we hold that because appellants filed their applications with the Correction

Board within three years of the Review Board'sfinal decisions on their applications, the district court

erred in ruling that the applications were untimely. Therefore, we reverse the grants of summary

judgment and remand for a Correction Board determination of the merits of appellants' applications.

See Ridgely v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1526, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1989).12

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