Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04225/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04225-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Scott Stuber Stertzbach, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Dora B. Schriro; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 05-4225-PHX-SRB (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was

referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. For the following reasons the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court dismiss the Petition as untimely.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State Proceedings

On December 20, 2002, Petitioner was charged by indictment filed in Maricopa

County Superior Court, Arizona, with: five counts of theft, class 3 felonies; one count of theft

of means of transportation, a class 3 felony; one count of taking identity of another, a class

4 felony; two counts of forgery, class 4 felonies; and misconduct involving weapons, a class

4 felony. (Answer, p.2, Ex. A) The prosecution amended the indictment to allege three

historical prior felony convictions. (Answer, p.2, Ex. B) 

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Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a]ny person

who pled guilty...based upon a plea of guilty...shall have the right to file a post-conviction

relief proceeding, and this proceeding shall be known as a Rule 32 of-right proceeding."

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. 

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On April 11, 2003, Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to one count

of theft and one count of theft of means of transportation, both class 3 felonies. (Answer,

p.2, Ex. C, Ex. D) In exchange, the prosecution agreed to dismiss all other charges and the

allegation of historical prior felony convictions. (Id.) On May 9, 2003, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to concurrent five-year terms of imprisonment followed by community

supervision. (Answer, p.2, Ex. E) 

On July 30, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,1

 with the state trial court. (Answer, p.2, Ex.

F) The trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner. (Answer, p.2, Ex. H) On August

19, 2003, Petitioner filed with the state trial court a pro se letter stating that he "wish[ed] at

this time to cancel, withdraw my filing of Rule 32 post conviction relief." (Answer, Ex. I)

On September 9, 2003, Petitioner's appointed counsel filed a motion to dismiss the postconviction relief proceeding. (Answer, p.2, Ex. J) Attached to the motion to dismiss was a

statement signed by Petitioner indicating his desire to dismiss the action and his

understanding that once the action is dismissed, he "will not be able to file another petition

in this case unless there is new evidence which would have changed the verdict or sentence,

a law has changed which would probably overturn the conviction or sentence, or I am being

held in custody after my sentence has expired." (Answer, Ex. J) On September 26, 2003,

the trial court entered an order dismissing Petitioner's post-conviction relief proceeding.

(Answer, p.2, Ex. K)

Over one year later, on November 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief with the state trial court. (Answer, p.3, Ex. L) Petitioner sought correction

of his sentence based upon the grounds that he had been denied his constitutional rights,

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"including a right that was not recognized as existing at the time of the trial," and that the

sentence imposed was not in accordance with the sentencing procedures established by rule

and statute. (Answer, Ex. L) Petitioner asserted that the issues had not been finally decided

or raised before because "Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (June 24, 2004) clarified

the decision in Apprindi [sic] v. New Jersey to apply to plea agreements." (Id.) On December

22, 2004, the trial court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because "[t]he time

for appealing from dismissal of Defendant's first post-conviction relief pleadings has passed

and judgment in this case is final. Blakely does not apply retroactively to such cases.

Because they were or could have been raised by Defendant in his first post-conviction

proceedings, the other claims raised by Defendant are precluded." (Answer, Ex. M) On

October 5, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review of the trial court's

denial of post-conviction relief. (Answer, p.3, Ex. N)

B. Federal Proceeding

The instant Petition for federal habeas relief was signed by Petitioner on December

20, 2005 and filed-stamped by the Clerk of the Court on December 23, 2005. A petition is

deemed filed when handed by the inmate to a prison official for mailing. See Houston v.

Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-271 (1988); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 n.2 (9th Cir.

2001) ("Under the prison mailbox rule...a pro se petitioner's petition is deemed constructively

filed at the moment it is delivered to prison officials to be forwarded to the court clerk.") The

Court deems the Petition commencing this action as filed on December 20, 2005. See id.

Petitioner raises the following claims in his Petition:

1. violation of his constitutional rights because the state court was without

jurisdiction to enhance his sentence beyond the 3.5- year presumptive term

based on his resisting arrest;

2. ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to object to the

sentencing enhancement; and

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The Court will enter a separate order directing the Clerk of Court to reflect

Petitioner's address as indicated in the January 9, 2007 Notice of Change of Address.

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3. ineffective assistance of counsel during the post-conviction relief proceeding

because counsel failed to appeal the sentencing enhancement.

On June 1, 2006, Respondents filed their Answer. Respondents argue that the Petition

is untimely filed. On June 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a reply to Respondents' Answer.

(Petitioner's "Objection to Respondent's [sic] Answer to Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus")

(hereinafter "Petitioner's Reply")

II. DISCUSSION

A. Mootness

Petitioner filed the instant Petition while he was in custody at the Arizona State Prison

Complex (hereinafter "ASPC") in Florence, Arizona. On January 9, 2007, Petitioner filed

a Notice of Change of Address indicating an address other than the prison. The docket was

not changed to reflect the address specified in Petitioner's Notice of Change of Address.2

 On

April 19, 2007, Court mail sent to Petitioner at the prison was returned to the Clerk of Court

because Petitioner is "not at ASPC-Florence." (Doc. No. 26) Records from the Arizona

Department of Corrections ("ADOC") reflect that on March 25, 2007, Petitioner was released

to a term of community supervision with a maximum end date of December 24, 2007.

(ADOC website at www.azcorrections.gov).

"For a federal court to have jurisdiction over a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner,

the petitioner must be 'in custody'....The general rule concerning mootness has long been that

a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot when a prisoner completes his sentence before

the court has addressed the merits of his petition." Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). However, it is well-settled that a state prisoner "remains in

'custody' for purposes of habeas jurisdiction while [the prisoner] is on parole." Goldyn v.

Hayes, 444 F.3d 1062, 1064, n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,

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In certain instances, not applicable herein, the court may waive community

supervision. See A.R.S. § 13-603(K).

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243 (1963)). This is so because even though "petitioner's parole releases him from

immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and

restrain his freedom." Jones, 371 U.S. at 243 (noting restrictions including that petitioner

"can be rearrested at any time the Board or parole officer believes he has violated a term or

condition of his parole.") See also Benson v. State of Calif. 328 F.3d 159 162 (9th Cir. 1964).

Under Arizona law, when a person convicted of a felony is sentenced to a term of

imprisonment, "the court at the time of sentencing shall impose on the convicted person a

term of community supervision. The term of community supervision shall be served

consecutively to the actual period of imprisonment if the person signs and agrees to abide by

conditions of supervision established by the state department of corrections....[T]he term of

community supervision imposed by the court shall be for a period equal to one day for every

seven days of the sentence or sentences imposed." A.R.S. § 13-603(I).3

 During the term of

release on community supervision, a prisoner remains under the supervision of the ADOC,

is subject to conditions established by ADOC, may have a warrant issued for his arrest if

there is "reasonable cause to believe that [he]...has violated his...community supervision and

has lapsed or is probably about to lapse into criminal ways or company," and may be

reimprisoned for violating the terms of that release. See A.R.S. §§41-1604.07(F); 31-415,

et seq. 

Petitioner herein was sentenced to community supervision pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-

603(I) and released on that status on March 25, 2007 through December 24, 2007. (Answer,

Ex. E; ADOC website at www.azcorrections.gov) Although Petitioner is no longer in the

physical custody of ADOC, he must abide by the conditions of his release on community

supervision until at least December 24, 2007; a warrant may issue for his arrest if there is

reasonable cause to believe he has violated the conditions of his community supervision or

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that he has lapsed or is probably about to lapse into criminal ways or company; and he

remains subject to reimprisonment for violation of the conditions of his release on

community supervision. Moreover, the length of Petitioner's term of release on community

supervision is directly related to the sentences Petitioner challenges in the instant Petition.

See A.R.S. § 13-603(I). For these reasons, Petitioner's release on community supervision

does not render his Petition moot. See Jones, 371 U.S. 236; Goldyn, 444 F.3d at 1064 n.2.

B. Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA")

"imposes a one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners

in federal court." Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)) Pursuant to section 2244, the limitations period

shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

The statute of limitations may be statutorily or equitably tolled. Malcom, 281 F.3d at

955. The limitations period is statutorily tolled when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Additionally, equitable tolling may apply if a petitioner

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and some extraordinary circumstance beyond his

control make it impossible to file a petition on time. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005); Malcom, 951 F.3d at 962.

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For Arizona criminal defendants, like Petitioner herein, who stand convicted pursuant

to a guilty plea, the AEDPA statute of limitations does not begin to run "until the conclusion

of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of

the time for seeking such proceeding or review." See Summers v. Schriro, __ F.3d. __ , 2007

WL 738447 (9th Cir. March 13, 2007). On September 26, 2003, pursuant to Petitioner's

motion to dismiss, the state trial court dismissed Petitioner's Rule 32 of-right proceeding.

(Answer, Ex. K) Under Arizona law, a petition for appellate review of the trial court's order

denying a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed within thirty days after the final

decision of the trial court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c). Petitioner did not seek review of the

trial court's September 26, 2003 dismissal order. Given that the dismissal herein was pursuant

to Petitioner's motion, it is unclear whether Petitioner was entitled to seek review of the trial

court's order. Nonetheless, granting Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, the Court will deem

Petitioner's conviction final as of the expiration of the time for seeking review of the trial

court's September 26, 2003 order dismissing Petitioner's post-conviction relief proceeding.

Thus, Petitioner had 30 days from September 26, 2003, i.e. until October 27, 2003, to seek

review of the trial court's dismissal which he did not do. Petitioner's conviction became final

upon expiration of the time to seek appellate review of the trial court's dismissal. See

Summers, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 738447. Petitioner had one year from the date his

conviction became final, i.e. from October 27, 2003, to seek federal habeas review. Id.; 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). That one-year period to file a federal habeas petition expired on October

26, 2004. The instant Petition, filed on December 20, 2005, was filed more than one year

after expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations. Therefore, the Petition must be

dismissed as untimely unless Petitioner establishes an alternate calculation of the statute of

limitations pursuant to section 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) and/or that he is entitled to statutory tolling

under section 2244(d)(2) or equitable tolling.

Respondents correctly argue that the filing of Petitioner's second post-conviction relief

proceeding in November 2004 does not affect calculation of the AEDPA statute of

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limitations. (Answer, pp. 5-6) Petitioner's second petition for post-conviction relief was

filed after the October 26, 2004 expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations. A state postconviction relief proceeding filed after expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations period

has no effect whatsoever on the statute of limitations calculation because such state

proceeding can neither revive the limitations period nor toll the already-expired period. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit

the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.");

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (where petitioner filed his state postconviction relief proceeding "after the AEDPA statute of limitations ended...[t]hat delay

resulted in an absolute time bar to refiling..."); Rashid v. Khulmann, 991 F.Supp. 254, 259

(S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer

serve to avoid a statute of limitations.")

Petitioner asserts that he, "like most whom are unlearned in the law, depended greatly

on the expertise of counsel to correctly instruct him...as to possible avenues of relief

concerning his unique situation. The extemporaneous/callous/unfelling[sic]/emotionally void

actions by counsel deprived Petitioner of his constitutionally protected right to

representation...Petitioner (with the assistance of inmate legal representatives) filed his

claims pro se in the state courts and continued to this federal court, thus removing the state

created impediment to application, incompetent court appointed counsel." (Petitioner's

Reply, pp. 10-11) 

In his second post-conviction relief proceeding, Petitioner challenged the sentencing

enhancement based on Blakely. Petitioner does not cite Blakely in the instant Petition or

Reply. Among the cases cited to support Petitioner's Blakely-type argument raised herein are

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

36 (2004).

Approximately three years before Petitioner's conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court

held in Apprendi that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the

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Pursuant to the plea agreement herein, each crime for which Petitioner stands

convicted "carries a presumptive sentence of 3.5 years; a minimum sentence of 2.5 years (2

years if trial court makes exceptional circumstances finding); and a maximum sentence of

7 years (8.75 if trial court makes exceptional circumstances finding)." (Answer, Ex. C)

(emphasis in original)

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penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury

and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. When Petitioner was

convicted, Apprendi "was widely understood...to apply only if the sentence imposed

exceeded the statutory maximum." State v. Febles, 115 P.3d 629, 636, 210 Ariz. 589, 596

(App. 2005). Although Petitioner's sentences exceeded the presumptive term, they did not

exceed the statutory maximum.4

 In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court modified Apprendi by

holding that: 

the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a

judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict

or admitted by the defendant...In other words, the relevant "statutory

maximum" is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding

additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional

findings.

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Also in 2004, the Supreme Court overruled prior precedent to hold that "[t]estimonial

statements of witnesses absent from trial" are admissible only where the declarant is

unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the

witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.

Section 2244(d)(1)(D) provides that the AEDPA statute of limitations begins to run

from "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The

record is clear that at the time of his conviction, Petitioner was aware of the factual predicate

of his claims herein, i.e., that he was sentenced above the presumptive term; that the trial

court considered that Petitioner resisted arrest in imposing sentence; and that his trial and

post-conviction relief counsel did not challenge the sentences. To any extent that the Blakely

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and Crawford decisions may have prompted Petitioner to seek federal habeas relief, Blakely

and Crawford are the legal predicate for Petitioner's claims, not the factual predicate, or

evidence, relevant to his guilt or sentence. See Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3

(9th Cir. 2001) (AEDPA statute of limitations begins to run when the petitioner knows the

important facts, not when the petitioner recognizes their legal significance.) Because

Petitioner was aware of the pertinent facts at the time of his conviction, application of section

2244(d)(1)(D) does not alter the statute of limitations calculation herein.

Nor does the Supreme Court's issuance of the Blakely and Crawford decisions support

an alternative date for the commencement of the statute of limitations. Although section

2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the limitations period will commence on "the date on which the

constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court," the statute also

requires that such newly recognized right must have been "made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). It is well-established that Blakely

and Crawford do not apply retroactively to collateral review of a conviction, like Petitioner's,

that was final before those decisions were announced. Whorton v. Bockting, __ U.S. __, 127.

S.Ct. 1173 (2007) (holding that Crawford does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral

review); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Blakely does not apply

retroactively to cases on collateral review); Febles, 115 P.3d at 635, 210 Ariz. at 595

("Blakely only applies to cases not yet final when the opinion was issued.") 

Petitioner argues that alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge

the sentencing enhancement resulted in a "state created impediment" to his ability to seek

state and federal review. (Petitioner's Reply, p.11) Citing counsel's failure to object to the

use of "testimonial hearsay" and "newly recognized United States Supreme Court decision

in Crawford...", Petitioner asserts that his "collateral review in the state court process had

been thwarted by incompetent/ineffective assistance of counsel." (Id. at p.9) Section

2244(d)(1)(B) provides that the AEDPA statute of limitations shall begin to run on "the date

on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

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Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). 

In other contexts, such as establishing cause and prejudice for procedural default in

habeas cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that ineffectiveness of counsel in violation

of the Sixth Amendment can constitute a type of "external impediment" that satisfies the

cause requirement because "the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the

default be imputed to the State." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991) (citing

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). But see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.

312, 325 (1981) (With respect to civil rights claims, "a public defender does not act under

color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant

in a criminal proceeding.") To the extent, if any, that ineffective assistance of counsel may

be construed as an "impediment to filing an application created by state action" under section

2244(d)(1), Petitioner fails to establish that counsel acted to inhibit the filing of his federal

habeas petition. 

Furthermore, to the extent that Petitioner relies on cases decided prior to Blakely

and/or Crawford as well as the principles enunciated therein to support his contention of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the law is clear: "the rule announced in Blakely was clearly

not apparent to all reasonable jurists, nor was it dictated by precedent." Schardt, 414 F.3d at

1035. Under such circumstances, "[c]ounsel's failure to predict future changes in the law,

and in particular the Blakely decision, is not ineffective because '[c]lairvoyance is not a

required attribute of effective representation.'...There is a difference between ignorance of

controlling authority and 'the failure of an attorney to foresee future developments in the

law.'" Febles, 115 P.3d at 637, 210 Ariz. at 597 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma,

71 F.3d 1537, 1541-42 (10th Cir. 1995) overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Flowers, 464

F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2006)); see also Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2006)

("We do not expect counsel to be prescient about the direction the law will take.") Lowry v.

Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that defense attorney is not ineffective for

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failing to anticipate a decision in a later case); Brown v. United States, 311 F.3d 875 (8th Cir.

2002) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to raise Apprenditype issue prior to that decision because such issue was "unsupported by then-existing

precedent..."). Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court has held: "it is clear that Crawford

announced a new rule. The Crawford rule was not dictated by prior precedent. Quite the

opposite is true: The Crawford rule is flatly inconsistent with the prior governing precedent."

Whorton, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. at 1181 (citations omitted). 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

Blakely-type or Crawford-type issues given that such claims were not dictated by thenexisting precedent. Therefore, Petitioner is foreclosed from arguing that counsel's failure to

raise or otherwise advise Petitioner about a Blakely-type and/or Crawford-type claim

somehow resulted in a state-created impediment to the filing of Petitioner's federal habeas

petition. 

On this record, sections 2244(d)(1)(B) through 2244(d)(1)(D) do not affect the

AEDPA statute of limitations calculation. Consequently, pursuant to section 2244(d)(1)(A),

Petitioner had until October 26, 2004 to seek federal habeas relief.

 Respondents are also correct that Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled

to equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations. (Answer, pp. 7-8) Respondents

persuasively point out that "Petitioner had nothing pending is [sic] state courts for over a year

before he filed a successive petition for collateral relief premised on a Blakely violation.

Thus, Petitioner squandered his right to federal review..." (Id. at p. 8) 

"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way." Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner asserts that he is

unlearned in the law. Petitioner's "lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling." Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714-716 (5th Cir. 1999)

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("ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner generally does not" warrant

equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations). Further, for the same reason that

Petitioner's trial and post-conviction relief counsel were not ineffective for failing to predict

the Blakely and Crawford holdings, counsel's alleged failure to pursue or advise Petitioner

about Blakely-type or Crawford-type claims, does not support a finding of equitable tolling.

On the instant record, Petitioner has not demonstrated that his failure to file a federal habeas

petition within the AEDPA statute of limitations, i.e. by October 26, 2004, was the result of

circumstances beyond his control. Therefore, the AEDPA statute of limitations is not subject

to equitable tolling in Petitioner's case and the instant Petition must be dismissed as untimely.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as untimely.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:

CV 05-4225-PHX-SRB.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail Petitioner's copy of this Report and

Recommendation to Petitioner at the following address: 6410 East Tonto Street, Mesa,

Arizona 85205.

DATED this 25th day of April, 2007.

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