Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02590/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02590-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE NO. S-05-02590WBS GGH

COUNCIL, INC.; SIERRA CLUB; 

and CENTRAL SIERRA 

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE CENTER,

Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO STRIKE

v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; 

and JACK TROYER, in his official 

capacity as Regional Forester, 

Intermountain Region, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Natural Resources Defense Counsel (“NRDC”),

Sierra Club, and Central Sierra Environmental Resource Counsel,

(“plaintiffs”) brought this action against defendants United

States Forest Service (“FS”) and Regional Forester Jack Troyer,

(“defendants”), challenging defendants’ decision to revise the

Bridgeport Ranger District Travel Plan and amend the Toiyabe Land

and Resource Management Plan to provide for snowmobile use in

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Citations to the Administrative Record appear as “AR 1

[Bates number].” 

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7,000 acres of the 47,000-acre recommended addition to the Hoover

Wilderness Area. Currently pending before the court are

plaintiffs’ and defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment

and defendants’ motion to strike. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Area and Nature of the Project

The Travel Management Plan of the West Hoover Addition

(“Travel Plan”) covers a project area that consists of 7,000

acres of the recommended western addition to the Hoover

Wilderness Area (“West Hoover Addition”). (AR 1871.) The West 1

Hoover Addition is comprised of 47,000 acres, including a Ushaped glacial basin, high granite and volcanic peaks, and

numerous alpine lakes, streams, forests, and meadows. (AR 24-

25.) The West Hoover Addition is located in the heart of the

Sierra Nevada range, surrounded by Yosemite National Park to the

south and the Emigrant and Hoover Wilderness Areas to the east

and west, respectively. (AR 3.) The Pacific Crest Trial

(“PCT”), a National Scenic Trial (“NST”), binds the project area

on the south and west. (AR 1874.) Yomesmite National Park,

Emigrant and Hoover Wilderness Areas, and the PCT are closed to

snowmobile use because they are Congressionally-designated

wilderness areas (“CDWAs”) or NSTs. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136. 

The West Hoover Addition is part of the National Forest System

lands administered by the Bridgeport Ranger District of the

Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest. (AR 1871.) 

In 1965, the FS began managing the West Hoover Addition

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as if it was a CDWA and closed the area to motorized use. (AR

1852.) Forest Orders from 1980 and 1981 prohibited the use of

motorized vehicles, including snowmobiles, throughout the West

Hoover Addition. (AR 35-51.) The California Wilderness Act of

1984 directed the Secretary of Agriculture to manage the West

Hoover Addition for four years so as to protect its “presently

existing wilderness character and potential for [permanent]

inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System.” Pub.

L. No. 98-425; 98 Stat. 1619 (1984). In its 1986 Land and

Resource Management Plan for the Toiyabe National Forest, the FS

recommended to Congress that the entire 47,000 acres in the West

Hoover Addition be designated as a CDWA, and provided for its

management under a “wilderness prescription.” (AR 1882, 1953.) 

This prescription prohibited snowmobile use. (AR 1953.) The FS

issued supplemental Forest Orders in April 1986 and September

2004, reaffirming its ban on motorized vehicles in the West

Hoover Addition. (AR 33, 77-80.) 

Due to the development of “faster and more powerful

machines,” trespass into the West Hoover Addition’s and

surrounding Wilderness’ rugged terrain became easier as the land

became “more readily accessible to snowmobiles.” (AR 1953.) In

2004, to address the trespass, the FS initiated a public outreach

effort to educate snowmobilers about the closure of the West

Hoover Addition to snowmobile use. (AR 3, 4, 20, 61-62, 2422.) 

This outreach included public meetings, letters, and news

releases. Id. At that time, the FS began announcing it would

re-evaluate the “issue of snowmobiling in the West Hoover

[Addition] . . . over the next several years.” (AR 4.) The FS

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initiated consideration of this project to respond to the

trespass problem. (AR 1953.) 

B. Procedural History

Scoping for this project began in late 2004. On

November 30, 2004, the FS published a three-page scoping notice

proposing the development of the Travel Plan “to address agency

and public concerns with management of the area and adjacent

Emigrant and Yosemite Wilderness,” including concerns that

“[o]ver-snow motorized intrusions within the [West Hoover

Addition] have become routine.” (AR 91-93.) The FS received

approximately three thousand responses during the thirty-day

period for public comment on the scoping notice, despite the fact

that the FS declined to extend the comment period. (AR 105-37,

138-65, 1722, 1876.) In March 2005, the FS issued a Notice of

Proposed Action (“NOPA”), proposing that approximately 7,000

acres of the Proposed Wilderness be opened to seasonal snowmobile

use beginning with the 2005-2006 winter season. (AR 1716-19.) 

The FS again provided a thirty-day comment period, and received

thousands of responses. (AR 1863 (estimating 11,500 comments

received).) 

On July 18, 2005, the Bridgeport Ranger District of the

Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest completed the Biological

Evaluation/Biological Assessment (“BE/BA”) and Wildlife

Specialist Reports. (AR 1687-1710, 1908-45.) These documents

did not identify any major impacts from the proposed action, or

any potential for any species to be moved toward listing under

the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). 

On July 19, 2005, the FS released an Environmental

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Assessment (“EA”) that analyzed the Travel Plan’s effects on all

potentially affected resources such as recreation,

wilderness/roadless qualities, wildlife, special uses, watershed

condition, economics, air quality, and scenery. (AR 1868-1907.) 

Also on July 19, 2005, the FS issued a Decision Notice (“DN”) and

a Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”), formally amending

the Humboldt-Toiyabe Land and Resource Management Plan to open

approximately 7,000 acres of the West Hoover Addition to seasonal

snowmobile use. (AR 1950-64.) The DN/FONSI authorized the

seasonal snowmobile use, with a closure date of April 15 (subject

to the District Ranger’s determination that an earlier or later

date was appropriate), and required the implementation of a

variety of resource protection measures. (AR 1953-55.) The FS

did not prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), as it

determined the opening would “not have a significant effect on

the quality of the human environment.” (AR 1961-62.) 

Plaintiffs and others filed administrative appeals

regarding the decision to open the West Hoover Addition to

snowmobile use. (AR 2024-2181.) On October 21, 2005, the Appeal

Deciding Officer, Deputy Regional Forester Catherine L. Beaty,

affirmed the Forest Supervisor’s decision to approve the plan. 

(AR 2181-2204.) On December 21, 2005, the FS issued a new Forest

Order declaring the 7,000 acres open for snowmobile use beginning

in the winter of 2005-2006. (AR 2482.) 

On December 21, 2005, plaintiffs filed the original

complaint in this case alleging causes of action under 1) the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et

seq.; 2) the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§

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Plaintiffs do not seek summary judgement on their 2

claims under the Wilderness Act and NTSA. On July 20, 2007,

plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss these claims, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). (Not. of Voluntary

Dismissal (Docket No. 58).) The court grants plaintiffs’ motion. 

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701 et seq.; 3) the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131 et

seq.; and 4) the National Trails Systems Act (“NTSA”), 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1241 et seq. (Compl.) Plaintiffs filed a First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) on March 10, 2006. (FAC.) 

On June 1, 2007, plaintiffs filed this motion for 

summary judgment on their NEPA and APA claims. Plaintiffs seek 2

a declaration that the FS violated NEPA and the APA, and request

the court to vacate the July 2005 DN and associated December 2005

Forest Order. Additionally, plaintiffs request that the court

order the FS to reinstate and strictly enforce the snowmobile

ban, while retaining jurisdiction to assure its compliance. On

June 29, 2007, the Federal Defendants filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment and to strike portions of the Declaration of

Jeffrey Erodes. 

II. Discussion

A. Standing

Defendants do not argue that plaintiffs lack standing. 

In his declaration, Jeffrey Erodes states that he is an active

member of plaintiff NRDC and the Sierra Club, organizations

formed to protect environmentally-significant lands, and that he

regularly spends personal and professional time in the West

Hoover Addition. John Buckley, in his declaration, states that

he is the Executive Director of plaintiff Central Sierra

Environmental Resource Council, an organization formed to protect

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Federal Defendants do not move strike the first five 3

paragraphs of the Erdoes declaration. (Defs.’ Reply on Mot. to

Strike 2 n.1.) 

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and conserve public lands in the Sierra Nevada region, and that

he has visited and plans to return in the future to the West

Hoover Addition. In her declaration, Heidi Hall, a member of the

Sierra Club and resident of Mono County, California, states that

she has skied in the West Hoover Addition and is personally

affected by FS’s land management decisions. Owen Malloy, a

member of the Sierra Club’s Toyiabe Chapter, states in his

declaration that he engaged in a variety of non-motorized winter

activity in the project area. These facts are sufficient to

confer standing on plaintiffs to bring this suit. See Ocean

Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846,

859-862 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing standing requirements in the

context of suit under NEPA); Pit River Tribe v. United States

Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 779 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).

B. Federal Defendants’ Motion to Strike

The Federal Defendants move to strike extra-record

evidence proffered by plaintiffs, specifically paragraphs 6-36

and the exhibits attached to the declaration of Jeffrey Erdoes.3

In the Ninth Circuit, materials not present in the administrative

record may be considered by a court reviewing an agency decision

in four situations: (1) when they are “necessary to determine

whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has

explained its decision,” (2) “when the agency has relied on

documents not in the record,” (3) “when supplementing the record

is necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject

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matter,” or (4) “when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad

faith.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations

omitted). Additionally, where specific facts must be presented

in the form of affidavits or other evidence to establish

standing, the court will take these facts to be true for the

purposes of a summary judgment motion. See Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); see also Nw. Envt’l Def. Ctr.

v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520, 1528 (9th Cir. 1997)

(“Bonneville Power Admin.”) (considering extra-record affidavits

for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiffs had

standing to sue). 

Plaintiffs submitted the extra-record declaration of

Jeffrey Erodes in order to establish standing. (Pls.’ Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. to Strike 1.) To the extent that the Erodes

declaration and attached exhibits could be used in support of

other arguments, the court has not relied upon them, and

plaintiffs have indicated that they do not intend the

declarations be used for any other purpose than establishing

standing. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d at 1528 (court may

properly consider extra-record evidence “not in order to

supplement the administrative record on the merits, but rather to

determine whether [plaintiffs] satisfy” standing requirements). 

Therefore, the court declines to strike these declarations. 

C. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact, and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. 

1. Standard of Review

The court reviews plaintiffs’ NEPA claims challenging

the decision of the FS under the APA. Lands Council v. Powell,

395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (reviewing NEPA claims under

APA); Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d 846, 858 (9th Cir. 2005) (same). 

Under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), the reviewing court must set

aside agency actions found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” See

Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 222 F.3d

1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (agency’s decision to prepare and EA

instead of an EIS reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious

standard); see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S.

360, 376-77 (1989) (substantive NEPA decisions by an agency are

reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard). 

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This is a “deferential standard . . . designed to

ensure that the agency considered all of the relevant factors and

that its decision contained no clear error of judgment.” Pac.

Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries

Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations

omitted). An agency action should only be overturned when the

agency “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it

to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of

the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs

counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible

that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the

product of agency expertise.” Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983)). The court must ask whether the agency considered “the

relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between

the facts found and the choice made.” Natural Res. Def. Council

v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.

1997). 

The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment

for that of the agency. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish

& Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

416 (1971)). Moreover, the court should review the agency’s

actions based on the administrative record presented by the

agency. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 943 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When

reviewing an agency decision, the focal point for judicial review

should be the administrative record already in existence, not

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some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Generally, there

are no genuine issues of material fact, and court does not “find”

underlying fact. See, e.g., Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. United

States Dep’s of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994);

Bank of Commerce of Laredo v. City Nat’l Bank of Laredo, 484 F.2d

284, 289 (5th Cir. 1973). The court’s role in such cases “is not

to resolve contested fact questions which may exist in the

underlying administrative record, but rather the court must

determine the legal question of whether the agency’s action was

arbitrary and capricious.” Gilbert Equip. Co. v. Higgins, 709 F.

Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D. Ala. 1989), aff’d, 894 F.2d 412 (11th Cir.

1990).

“NEPA exists to ensure a process, not particular

substantive results.” Hells Canyon Alliance v. United States

Forest Serv., 227 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, there

are three main issues under NEPA. The first issue is whether the

FS was required to prepare an EIS rather than the abbreviated EA. 

The second issue is whether the FS issued an inadequate EA and

FONSI. The third issue is whether the FS violated NEPA by not

soliciting enough public comment on its NEPA documents. 

2. Necessity of an EIS

Plaintiffs challenge the failure of the FS to prepare

an EIS for this project. The relevant provision of NEPA provides

that “all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . include

in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation

and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the

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Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the Code of 4

Federal Regulations are to the 2005 version, the version in

effect at the time of the FONSI.

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responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the

proposed action.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). “Where an EIS is not

categorically required, the agency must prepare an Environmental

Assessment to determine whether the environmental impact is

significant enough to warrant an EIS.” Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d

at 864. If, after preparation of the EA, the agency decides not

to prepare an EIS, it must put forth a “convincing statement of

reasons [in the form of a FONSI] that explain why the project

will impact the environment no more than insignificantly.” Id.

(citation omitted); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (listing

requirements for a FONSI). The FONSI is crucial to a court’s 4

evaluation of whether the agency took the requisite “hard look”

at the potential impact of a project. Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d

at 864.

“[A]n EIS must be prepared if substantial questions are

raised as to whether a project may cause significant degradation

of some human environmental factor.” Idaho Sporting Cong. v.

Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)

(emphasis in original) (“Idaho Sporting Cong. I”). To trigger

the requirement for an EIS, “a plaintiff need not show that

significant effects will in fact occur[;] raising substantial

questions whether a project may have a significant effect is

sufficient.” Id. at 1150 (citation omitted) (emphasis in

original).

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 explains how an agency or court is

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The following should be considered in evaluating 5

intensity:

(1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse. A

significant effect may exist even if the Federal agency

believes that on balance the effect will be beneficial.

(2) The degree to which the proposed action affects

public health or safety.

(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such

as proximity to historic or cultural resources, park

lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic

rivers, or ecologically critical areas.

(4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of

the human environment are likely to be highly

controversial.

(5) The degree to which the possible effects on the

human environment are highly uncertain or involve

unique or unknown risks.

(6) The degree to which the action may establish a

precedent for future actions with significant effects

or represents a decision in principle about a future

consideration.

(7) Whether the action is related to other actions with

individually insignificant but cumulatively significant

impacts. Significance exists if it is reasonable to

anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the

environment. Significance cannot be avoided by terming

an action temporary or breaking it down into small

component parts.

(8) The degree to which the action may adversely affect

districts, sites, highways, structures, or object

listed in or eligible for listing in the National

Register of Historic Places or may cause loss or

destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or

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to interpret “significantly” in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The

regulation gives the term two components: context and intensity. 

Context refers to the setting in which it takes place. Intensity

means “the severity of the impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. 

In considering the severity of a project’s impact, a

reviewing agency should consider ten factors. “[O]ne of these 5

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historical resources.

(9) The degree to which the action may adversely affect

an endangered or threatened species or its habitat that

has been determined to be critical under the Endangered

Species Act of 1973.

(10) Whether the action threatens a violation of

Federal, State, or local law or requirements imposed

for the protection of the environment.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.

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factors may be sufficient to require preparation of an EIS in

appropriate circumstances.” Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 865. 

Factor (1) should be kept in mind by a reviewing court as it

considers the other factors. “A significant effect may exist

even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the effect

will be beneficial.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1).

Plaintiffs argue that virtually all of the intensity

factors raise sufficient substantial questions regarding whether

the project may have a sufficiently significant effect to require

an EIS. According to plaintiffs, the Travel Plan significantly

affects the environment for three principal reasons. One, the

Travel Plan threatens wildlife and non-motorized recreational

users. Two, the Travel Plan fosters violations of federal law

and sets a negative precedent for future management of the West

Hoover Addition as well as Congressionally designated wilderness

areas. Three, the Travel Plan is highly controversial.

a. Degree of Threat to Wilderness Qualities of

the Project Area

If an agency determines that the proposed action is not

likely to have a significant effect, the agency may issue a

FONSI. Nw. Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Wood, 947 F. Supp. 1371, 1382

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(D. Or. 1996), aff’d, 97 F.3d 1460 (9th Cir. 1996) (“NEDC”). The

Administrative Record, specifically the EA, is replete with

analysis concerning the Travel Plan’s effects on the wilderness

characteristics of natural integrity, apparent naturalness,

remoteness, solitude, primitive recreation, manageability of the

area, and affects on Critical Aquatic Refuges for the Yosemite

toad. (AR 1885-87.) The EA determined that snowmobile use would

have little effect on the project area’s wilderness qualities

should the area later be designated as a CDWA. (AR 1886.) Nor

would the Travel Plan impact the FS’s recommendation that the

project area should be a CDWA. (AR 1886-87.) Further, the FONSI

contains measures to protect the project area’s wilderness

qualities, including education and adjustment of future

snowmobile use based on monitoring. For all these reasons, the

FS’s FONSI is not arbitrary and capricious. See NEDC, 947 F.

Supp. at 1385 (upholding agency’s FONSI as not arbitrary and

capricious so that an EIS was not required). 

Moreover, plaintiffs’ argument that the Travel Plan’s

effects are uncertain does not render the FONSI arbitrary and

capricious. (Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 16-17.) “NEPA regulations,

however, do not require a reviewing agency to eliminate all

uncertainty prior to issuing a FONSI.” Id. (citing Greenpeace

Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1336 (9th Cir. 1992)). The FS

explained that: “While uncertainty exists over the amount of

snowmobiling that could occur in the future, the effects of

snowmobiles on the environment are well known and are not

uncertain and do not involve unique or unknown risks.” (AR

1962.) Further, the FS chose to address any uncertainty over the

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amount of future snowmobiling through an adjustment in snowmobile

management based on monitoring the effects that snowmobiles may

have. (Id.) Therefore, the FONSI’s minimal uncertainty does not

require the FS to have prepared an EIS. 

b. Encouraging Subsequent Violations of Law

Plaintiffs argue that the FS was required to prepare an

EIS because the Travel Plan sets a negative precedent and

encourages violations of law by facilitating trespass into CDWAs. 

(Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 17-19.) However, the Travel Plan does

not authorize the use of snowmobiles in CDWAs or NSTs, like the

PCT. (AR 1953, 1956.) Because the West Hoover Addition’s

closure to snowmobiles has not been stringently enforced, much of

the trespass occurred since users were unaware that the area was

closed. (AR 82, 1880.) The FS initiated education and

enforcement efforts to reduce trespass in 2004. (AR 3-4, 20, 58-

68, 81-83, 2232-42, 2315-2420, 2422, 2523-26.) Further, the

DN/FONSI and implementation strategy for the Travel Plan mandates

improved signage of boundaries of lands where snowmobiles are

permitted, enhancement of public education, continuation of FS

patrols, and implementation of additional enforcement efforts to

protect CDWAs, NSTs, and other areas closed to snowmobile use. 

(AR 1954, 2510-14.) Accordingly, plaintiffs’ argument that an

EIS was required because the Travel Plan assures further

violations of law fails. 

c. Degree of Controversy of Travel Plan

“A federal action is controversial if a substantial

dispute exists as to its size, nature or effect.” Wetlands

Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 222 F.3d

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1105, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “A substantial

dispute exists when evidence, raised prior to the preparation of

an EIS or FONSI, casts serious doubt upon the reasonableness of

an agency’s conclusions.” Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v.

Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 736 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

Once this evidence is presented to the agency, the agency has the

burden of demonstrating why this evidence does not create a

controversy. Id. “The existence of opposition to a use,

however, does not render an action controversial.” Wetlands

Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1122. 

Plaintiffs argue that the Travel Plan is controversial

because the FS received an extremely high number of comments that

also raised substantial questions about the serious ecological,

aesthetic, recreational, legal, and policy ramifications of

opening the project area to snowmobiles. (Pls.’ Mot. for Summ.

J. 19-21.) However, the receipt of comments in opposition to a

proposal does not render that proposal controversial under NEPA. 

Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d at 1536 (“Controversy does not

refer to the existence of opposition to a use.”) (further

citations omitted). The comments cited by plaintiffs do not rise

to the level of a substantial dispute. (AR 1961-62, 2184-85.) 

Instead, most of the comments cited by plaintiffs dealt with the

opposition to the Travel Plan itself, not with the project’s

effects. Those comments addressing the project’s effects do not

rise to the level of a substantial dispute because given the

extensive scientific analysis conducted by the National Park

Service at Yellowstone National Park, snowmobiles’ effects on the

environment are not highly controversial. NEPA only requires a

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“‘reasonably thorough’ discussion of the environmental

consequences in question, not unanimity of opinion, expert or

otherwise.” City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. United States Dep’t of

Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, “when

faced with conflicting evidence, an agency may rely on its own

evidence.” Id. at 1151.

Additionally, the FS acknowledged the concerns raised

by the comments and addressed them in its EA. (AR 1876-78, 1879-

1903.) The EA specifically addressed these concerns by

suggesting enhancement of enforcement efforts as well as

improving education, enlisting volunteers, providing more

information, and adjusting snowmobile use. (AR 1872-73, 1877-78,

1954-55.) Therefore, the Travel Plan does not create a

“substantial dispute” so that it was not “controversial.” 

Consequentially, the FS was not required to prepare an EIS as a

matter of law. Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiffs’

motion and grant defendants’ on plaintiffs’ NEPA claim that an

EIS was required. 

3. Adequacy of the FS’s EA and DN/FONSI 

As discussed above, when an EIS is not categorically

required, the agency must prepare an EA to ascertain whether an

EIS is necessary. Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 864. If the

agency decides not to prepare an EIS, it must put forth a

“convincing statement of reasons [in the form of a FONSI] that

explain why the project will impact the environment no more than

insignificantly.” Id. (citation omitted); see also 40 C.F.R. §

1508.13 (listing requirements for a FONSI). Plaintiffs argue

that the EA/FONSI was inadequate because it 1) relied on an

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unlawfully narrowed project scope and overlooked reasonable

alternatives and 2) did not adequately consider direct, indirect,

and cumulative impacts of snowmobiles in the following respects:

a) sensitive wildlife and habitat, b) water and air quality, c)

safety of non-motorized users, d) CDWAs and NSTs beyond the

project area, and e) relied on unproven or failed mitigation

measures to achieve its FONSI. 

a. Evaluation of the Travel Plan’s Purpose and

Need and Analyzed Range of Alternatives

i. Travel Plan’s Statement of Purpose and

Need 

The regulations implementing NEPA explain that an EIS

“shall briefly specify the underlying purpose and need to which

the agency is responding in proposing the alternatives including

the proposed action.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13. The FS’s definition

of a project’s purpose and need is to be given considerable

deference and evaluated under a standard of reasonableness. 

Friends of Southeast’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1066-67

(9th Cir. 1998) (further citations omitted). 

The Travel Plan’s purpose and need was to address

changing patterns of winter reaction in the West Hoover Addition. 

(AR 1871.) Due to population increases in California and Nevada

and improvements in snowmobile technology, the demand for

snowmobiling in the area has increased. (Id.) The area around

the Leavitt Lake Road corridor is high in elevation so that it

provides more consistent snowmobiling opportunities than lower

elevations. (Id.) Further, the project area provides open bowls

and more difficult terrain that allow snowmobilers to take

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advantage of the newer snowmobiles’ capabilities. (Id.) Terrain

that has sufficient altitude to provide such consistent snow can

only be found in limited places. (Id.) The recent closures of

other areas formerly available to snowmobiling, such as parts of

the Carson Ranger District and the Inyo National Forest, has

caused increased demand for snowmobiling around the project area. 

(AR 1871, 1880.)

The Ninth Circuit upheld agency statements of purpose

and need that were comparably narrow to the FS’s here. See City

of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1155-57; Friends of Southeast’s

Future, 153 F.3d at 1067. In City of Carmel-by-the Sea, the

United States Department of Transportation’s stated project

purpose was to achieve a particular traffic flow on a stretch of

highway. In Friends of Southeast’s Future, the FS’s purpose was

to meet the market demand for timber in southeast Alaska. The

Travel Plan’s purpose and need is comparable in narrowness of

scope to these other projects. 

Plaintiffs further argue that the FS cannot rely on

closures to snowmobiles of other federal lands to find that

demand for snowmobiling in the West Hoover Addition has

increased. (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 37.) Plaintiffs further

argue that defendants failed to consider demand for non-motorized

sports, which plaintiffs contend are growing in popularity. 

(Id.) The FS found that non-motorized use represents only a

small portion of overall use of the project area during winter. 

(AR 1875.) Additionally, in the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act

(“MUSYA”), Congress gave the FS discretion to manage national

forests for multiple uses and adjust to meet changing needs and

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conditions. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528 et seq. MUSYA “breathe[s]

discretion at every pore.” Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803,

806-07. Moreover, the FS’s determination is not arbitrary and

capricious. (See AR 1880 (The EA discussed non-motorized use

qualitatively by stating that FS “personnel have noted only a few

skiers or snowshoers. Most skiing use was noted in the Pickel

Meadows area that is more easily accessible than the project

area. Some skiing use was noted in the spring, when access on

the Sonora Pass Highway is opened to highway traffic.”).) 

Accordingly, the court does not find the Travel Plan’s purpose

and need statement problematic. 

ii. Considered Range of Alternatives

Under NEPA, an agency must examine alternatives to the

proposed action. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E); 40 C.F.R. §

1508.9(b). The purpose and need of a project determines the

range of alternatives that an agency must consider. Vt. Yankee

Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.

519, 551 (1978); Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d at 1538. 

Aside from a no-action alternative, an alternative is

“reasonable” if it meets the purpose and need for the proposed

action. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 914 F.2d

1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990). However, agencies do not have to

discuss alternatives that would not satisfy a proposed project’s

purpose and need. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a); Vt. Yankee, 435

U.S. at 551. “Common sense also teaches us that the ‘detailed

statement of alternatives’ cannot be found wanting simply because

the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought

conceivable by the mind of man.” Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551. 

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The Ninth Circuit counsels that “NEPA does not require a separate

analysis of alternatives which are not significantly

distinguishable from alternatives actually considered, or which

have substantially similar consequences.” Headwaters, 914 F.2d

at 1181 (citing N. Plains Res. Council v. Lujan, 874 F.2d 661,

666 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma,

956 F.2d 1508, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that an agency is not

required to consider “alternatives known to be unacceptable at

the outset.”). Nor does NEPA require an agency to discuss a

minimum number of alternatives. See Native Ecosystems Council v.

Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005); Laguna

Greenbelt, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517,

524 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Where the expected impacts of a project are narrower,

such that an EIS is not required, the agency may consider a

smaller number of alternatives. Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at

1246. In Native Ecosystems, the Ninth Circuit found that an EA,

which only considered in detail two alternatives--a “no-action”

alternative and the “preferred alternative”--fully satisfied

NEPA. Id. at 1245. In West Land Exchange v. Dombreck, 47 F.

Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 1999), the United States District Court for

the District of Oregon upheld an EIS that discussed in detail

only a single action alternative. Id. at 1211-12.

Here, the EA considered in detail the no-action

alternative and the proposed action. This comports with the NEPA

processes in Native Ecosystems and West Land Exchange. 

Additionally, the FS considered seven other alternatives in its

EA, but did not discuss them in detail for various reasons. (AR

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1875-76.) The FS considered opening the entire West Hoover

Addition to snowmobiles, rather than just 7,000 acres, but did

not consider this proposal in detail because of the potential to

generate trespass into closed areas and the difficulty of

enforcing these expanded boundaries. (AR 1875.) The FS also

considered designating specific snowmobile trails in the project

area, but declined to consider this proposal in detail because it

would not meet the project’s stated purpose and need of providing

open bowl snowmobiling opportunities. (AR 1876.) Additionally,

a proposal to provide for snowmobile use in other areas of

northern Mono County in lieu of opening the project area would

not meet the project’s purpose and need of providing an area of

sufficient elevation with consistent snowfall. (AR 1875.) 

Moreover, all other FS managed lands in northern Mono County are

open to snowmobiles, except the CDWAs and the West Hoover

Addition, and these opened areas are not of sufficient elevation. 

(Id.) Lastly, the FS considered a proposal to open part of the

7,000 acre project area--open only the Leavitt Creek drainage and

keep the McKay Creek drainage closed. (Id.) However, this

proposal would not meet the project’s purpose and need because it

would exclude nearly half of the project area from snowmobile

use, including some of the best snowmobile terrain. (Id.) 

Moreover, the opening of only the Leavitt Creak drainage area

would result in boundary enforcement problems. (Id.) The FS

considered the accepted proposal and no-action alternatives in

detail as well as several other alternatives. Consequentially,

the FS complied with the NEPA requirement of adequately analyzing

a reasonable range of alternatives in accordance with the

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project’s statement of purpose and need. 

b. FS’s Consideration of Direct, Indirect, and

Cumulative Impacts of the Travel Plan 

The CEQ regulations provide that an agency must

consider “connected actions” and “cumulative actions” within a

single EA. Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1118 (citing 40

C.F.R. § 1508.25). A connected or cumulative action must be

considered together to prevent an agency from dividing a project

into multiple actions, each of which individually has an

insignificant environmental impact, but which collectively have a

substantial impact. Id. Actions are connected if they

“[a]utomatically trigger other actions which may require

environmental impact statements[,] . . . [c]annot or will not

proceed unless other actions are taken previously or

simultaneously [, or] . . . [a]re interdependent parts of a

larger action and depend on the larger action for their

justification.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a). Cumulative actions are

those “which when viewed with other proposed actions have

cumulatively significant impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2). A

cumulative impact is “the impact on the environment which results

from the incremental impact of the action when added to other

past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions . . . . 

Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but

collectively significant actions taking place over a period of

time.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 

i. Consideration of Sensitive Wildlife and

Habitat

The CEQ regulations mandate that an agency evaluate

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“[t]he degree to which the action may adversely affect an

endangered or threatened species” when determining whether an

action will significantly affect the environment. 40 C.F.R §

1508.27(b)(9). Plaintiffs argue that the FS did not adequately

consider snowmobiles’ impact on sensitive wildlife and habitat. 

(Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 24-27.) 

The FS considered the potential effects on wildlife and

habitat before authorizing the Travel Plan. The EA discussed

that the Travel Plan could potentially increase noise disturbance

and human presence during winter months that could increase

stress on wildlife. (AR 1888, 1891.) The effects could lead to

wildlife dispersal and avoidance of the project area. (AR 1888.) 

However, the Travel Plan proposes an April 15 closure date for

snowmobile use in order to limit potential effects on wildlife in

the spring, when more wildlife species would be coming to or

present in the project area. 

The EA also disclosed the potential effects of the

Travel Plan for each wildlife species found in the project area

during winter. (AR 1888.) The FS also considered FS sensitive

species and species listed under the ESA in the BE/BA as well as

a Wildlife Specialist Report (“WSR”). The EA discussed the

direct, indirect, and cumulative effects that snowmobiles would

have on Yosemite toads and potential habitat for mountain yellowlegged frogs due to snowmobile exhaust pollutants accumulating in

the snow. (AR 1891.) As noted in the EA, other cumulative

sources of pollutants in the project area would come from United

States Marine Corps (“USMC”) vehicle use as well as summertime

vehicle use around Leavitt Lake. (AR 1891-92.) The EA and BE/BA

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analyzed the effects of exhaust pollutants from those sources and

found that no adverse effects to Yosemite toad are expected to

occur from driving over any sort of toad vegetative habitat. (AR

1891-92, 1932-33.) The April 15 proposed closure date means that

snowmobiles would not be driving over exposed soil or fully

exposed Yosemite toad vegetative habitat, and Leavitt, Latopie,

and Koenig Lakes should still be covered by ice. (Id.) The

toads are expected to hibernate until after April 15 so that no

adverse impacts to Yosemite toads are expected to occur during

the species’ spring breeding season. (AR 1891, 1932-33.) 

Further, the Travel Plan requires monitoring of toad populations

within the project area be taken into consideration for periodic

adjustments to snowmobile use. (AR 1892, 1932-33, 1954-55.) 

Moreover, the EA, BE/BA, and WSR analyzed the Travel

Plan’s effects on birds and their habitat. (AR 1690, 1692-97,

1700-06, 1917-23, 1892-93.) The EA and BE/BA concluded that

there would be no impacts to northern goshawks partly since there

have been no recorded sightings of northern goshawk within the

project area. (AR 1893, 1913, 1918.) There has not been a

sighting of a great gray owl in the project area since 1960. (AR

1892, 1912, 1921-22.) Although the Travel Plan and noise would

make the area less attractive to great gray owls, the April 15

closure date and authority to periodically adjust snowmobile use

would minimize any possible impacts. (AR 1892, 1958.) 

The FS also throughly considered the Travel Plan’s

effects on mammals. (AR 1707-07, 1893, 1923-26.) Due to snow

compaction and carbon dioxide accumulation, the EA concluded that

the Travel Plan could affect subnivean mammal habitat. (AR

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1893.) However, these effects were not significant because of

the dispersed nature of snowmobiling. (Id.) Moreover, the EA

found that the mule deer, which is not an ESA or FS sensitive

species, are not present in the project area during the winter. 

(Id.) The BE/BA found that wolverines were not found in the

project area during surveys and are unlikely to use the project

area during the winter months due to USMC training. (AR 1937.) 

The EA found that the Travel Plan would increase disturbance of

pine marten habitat, but the effects would be minor and not limit

marten from occupying the area. (AR 1893, 1912.) 

Plaintiffs disagree with the FS’s conclusions and argue

that the FS did not properly address scientific studies. (Pls.’

Mot. for Summ. J. 25-26.) However, “[w]hen specialists express

conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the

reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an

original matter, a court might find contrary views more

persuasive. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378. “Because analysis of the

relevant documents ‘requires a high level of technical

expertise,’ we must defer to ‘the informed discretion of the

responsible federal agencies.’” Id. at 377 (citing Kleppe v.

Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976); Baltimore Gas & Electric

Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)). 

The Ninth Circuit counsels deference “to agency expertise on

questions of methodology unless the agency has completely failed

to address some factor, consideration of which was essential to a

truly informed decision . . . .” Bear Lake Watch, Inc. v. FERC,

324 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Inland Empire Pub.

Lands Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 1993)

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(further citations omitted)). 

Though plaintiffs’ belief that their scientific

conclusions are correct is sincerely held, the court must defer

to the FS’s scientific conclusions, where as here, there is not a

complete failure to address an important factor. Accordingly,

the FS adequately considered the direct, indirect, and cumulative

effects on sensitive wildlife and habitat. 

ii. Consideration of Water and Air Quality

Plaintiffs argue that the FS failed to adequately

analyze the project’s effects on water and air quality. (Pls.’

Mot. for Summ. J. 27-29.) The FS used studies from Yellowstone

National Park, which looked at the impacts to air and water

quality of a much greater quantity of snowmobile use. The

Yellowstone study found those effects to be negligible, despite

the much greater levels of use than are at issue in this case. 

The FS also used available snowmobile use data to conclude that

levels and concentrations of snowmobile use would likely remain

low under the Travel Plan. Additionally, the Travel Plan

provides for monitoring of effects, and adjustment of the levels

of snowmobile use if those effects are greater than expected. 

The FS analyzed the effects that snowmobiles could have

on snowpack chemistry due to the fact that snowmobiles discharge

fuel, lubricants, and exhaust into the snowpack, which may

transport these pollutants to surface water as the snowpack

melts. (AR 1899.) The FS determined that these effects would

not be significant because of the dispersed nature of

snowmobiling relative to quantity of snowmobiles, as the

Yellowstone study so indicated, and that mitigation measures

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would minimize effects. (AR 1900.) The project level of

snowmobile use in the project area is only about 20 snowmobiles

on weekdays, and 100 on weekend days. (AR 1880.) In the

Yellowstone study, where snowmobile usage topped 1,000 per day,

concentrations of snowmobile pollutants were found to diminish

rapidly with distance from roadways and designated trails. (AR

1449-72, 1900, 1907, 2191-92.) At distances as little as 50

meters from concentrated snowmobile use on designated trails,

contamination was undetectable and well below levels likely to

threaten human or ecosystem health. (AR 1469-70.) Moreover the

Yellowstone study’s conclusion on snowpack chemistry is

consistent with specific studies of water quality in the West

Hoover Addition. A 2005 sample collection indicated some

chemicals of the sort emitted by snowmobiles in snowpack;

however, these areas are where use is currently allowed and would

continue regardless of whether the Travel Plan remained in

effect. (AR 1899.) 

The EA also discussed the effects that snowmobiles can

have on sediment loading in surface waters. (AR 1899). 

Sedimentation occurs when snowpack melts and snowmobiles disturb

soil. (Id.) The main sources of sediment in the project area

are from existing natural sources and roads. (AR 1899.) 

However, the FS found that the additional contribution of

sediment from snowmobiling is not significant. (AR 1961.) The

closure to snowmobiles around April 15 is before the snowpack

melts, and the FS can make seasonal adjustments to account for

changes in snowpack conditions. (AR 1871, 1955, 2791-92.) 

The FS considered the Travel Plan’s effects on air

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quality. (AR 1902-03.) The EA relied on the Yellowstone

snowmobile study to conclude that the effects on air quality in

the project area would be minimal. (AR 1902-03, 1906-07.) The

Yellowstone study found that the concentrated amounts of exhaust

at the entrance stations, where snowmobiles idle, complied with

National Ambient Air Quality Standards. (AR 311-12, 1902.) 

Further, despite the much higher use and concentration of

snowmobiles in Yellowstone, the Yellowstone EIS found that

Yellowstone would meet applicable air quality standards, even

along travel corridors where highly concentrated snowmobile use

occurs. (AR 507, 639-40, 1902.) The EA mentions the potential

for, but does not rely on, future conversion to 4-stroke engines

from the 2-stroke engines that are currently prevalent in

snowmobiles. (AR 1901.) Four-stroke engines produce fewer

emissions. (Id.) Instead, the FS relied on the Yellowstone

studies, which had substantially greater snowmobile use and

higher concentrations of use on groomed trials, to conclude that

there would not be potential for significant environmental

effects to air quality in the project area because there will be

many fewer machines and use will be more dispersed compared to

Yellowstone. (AR 1898-1903.) Finally, in accordance with the

Appeal Deciding Officer’s decision, the FS obtained the written

concurrence from the Great Basin Unified Air Quality Control

District that the Travel Plan would not result in emission of

criteria pollutants for which the project area is designated in

nonattainment. (AR 2181-82, 2209.) Consequentially, the FS

adequately addressed air and water quality. 

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iii. Consideration of the Safety of NonMotorized Users

Plaintiffs also argue that the FS did not adequately

consider the Travel Plan’s effects on public safety. (Pls.’ Mot.

for Summ. J. 29-30.) NEPA’s reference to the “human environment”

means the “physical environment--the world around us, so to

speak.” Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460

U.S. 766, 772 (1983). On the other hand, “a risk of an accident

is not an effect on the physical environment. A risk is, by

definition, unrealized in the physical world.” Id. at 775

(emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit, adopting the district

court’s reasoning, counsels that “NEPA does not require that an

agency take into account every conceivable impact of its actions,

including impacts on citizens’ subjective experiences.” Bicycle

Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1466 (9th Cir.

1996). In Bicycle Trail Council, the Ninth Circuit found that

the increased risk of accidents to bicyclists due to trail

changes did not need to be addressed in the NEPA process. Id. at

1466-67. 

Even so, the EA did adequately consider the issue of

impacts to safety of non-motorized users. The EA discussed that

although there have been reports of illegal snowmobile use in the

past, there have been few non-motorized recreationists in the

area and few reports of user conflicts. (AR 1875, 1880.) The FS

noted that non-motorized users expressed fear and discomfort

about snowmobile use. (AR 1880.) However, there were no direct

facts in the record indicating a particularized, heightened

safety concern resulting from the potential for collision between

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snowmobilers and non-motorized users. (Id.) Moreover, the

Travel Plan’s April 15 closure adequately addresses safety

conflicts since the period after April 15 is the prime season for

non-motorized recreational users. (AR 1881.) Lastly,

plaintiffs’ argument that the Travel Plan increases avalanche

danger is overstated. The EA does suggest that there will be an

increased potential for avalanches due to increased snowmobile

activity. (AR 1901.) However, the FS concluded that the

increase in avalanche hazard would be offset by user education

and posted warnings. (AR 1901, 1961.) Accordingly, plaintiffs’

argument that the FS did not adequately account for the safety of

non-motorized users fails. 

iv. Consideration of Impacts on CDWAs and

NSTs

NEPA “requires that an environmental analysis for a

single project consider the cumulative impacts of that project

together with ‘past, present and reasonably foreseeable future

actions.’” Native Ecosystems 304 F.3d at 894 (quoting 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.7); Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d

957, 973 (9th Cir. 2002). Because there are “‘so many more EAs

prepared than EISs, adequate consideration of cumulative effects

requires that EAs address them fully.’” Native Ecosystems, 304

F.3d at 896 (quoting Kern v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt.,

284 F.3d 1062, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis in original). 

As discussed above, the EA fully addressed the indirect

and cumulative effects on wildlife, and air and water quality. 

Moreover, the EA discussed the effects that the Travel Plan would

have in conjunction with USMC activity in the area. The FS

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stated the potential effects on the Yosemite toad that could

occur with snowmobile use given the USMC vehicle use in the area. 

(AR 1891-92.) The EA also disclosed that the Travel Plan

combined with USMC activity could make the area less desirable

for great gray owls and the additional trampling and noise

disturbance could displace pine marten. (AR 1892-93.) The EA

also examined USMC vehicle emissions in evaluating the effect of

snowmobile emissions. (AR 1899-1902.) Additionally, the EA

analyzed the cumulative effects of the Travel Plan, USMC

activity, and other recreationists to evaluate the effects on the

general area’s roadless characteristics. (AR 1885-87.) In

assessing the cumulative effects on all potentially affected

resources, the FS concluded that the cumulative effects on the

area’s wilderness characteristics would not be significant. (AR

1961-63.) The court finds that the FS’s determination was not

arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court will grant

defendants’ motion and deny plaintiffs’ on this issue. 

v. Consideration of Mitigation Measures

The EA must include a “reasonably complete discussion

of possible mitigation measures.” Wilderness Soc’y v. Bosworth,

118 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1106 (D. Mont. 2000) (quoting Robertson v.

Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989)). 

“Mitigation must ‘be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure

that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated.’” 

Neighbors of Cuddy Mt. v. United States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d

1372, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Carmel-By-the-Sea, 123 F.3d

at 1154) (further quotations omitted). However, “[a] mere

listing of mitigation measures is insufficient to qualify as the

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reasoned discussion required by NEPA.” Id. (citing Nw. Indian

Cemetery Protective Ass’n. v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 697 (9th

Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)).

The EA noted that the Travel Plan involves a number of

mitigation measures that would protect nearby CDWAs and NSTs as

well as non-motorized users by: (1) enlisting volunteers from

both motorized and non-motorized recreation communities to help

with monitoring, enforcement, and public education efforts; (2)

cooperating with the Inyo and Stanislaus National Forests,

Yosemite National Park, and Mono County to monitor snowmobile use

and protect closed areas; (3) enhancing FS public education

efforts through personal contacts, patrols, web site information,

and press releases; (4) enhancing signage of boundaries and

entrance points; (5) continuing FS patrols of the area, including

issuance of citations for those who violate boundaries; (6)

requesting that the State of California require more visible

snowmobile identification tags; (7) conducting a field review to

determine final placement of boundaries below the PCT, with the

participation of the PCT Association and the public; and (8)

using enforcement-related monitoring to determine incursions into

closed area and adjusting snowmobile use to address incursions. 

(AR 1872, 1954.) Further, the Travel Plan would implement

several resource protection measures to protect ecosystem

integrity, including: (1) using monitoring data for Yosemite toad

populations, other resource information from the California

Department of Fish and Game, and other Sierra Nevada Forest Plan

monitoring efforts to adjust snowmobile use as needed; (2) using

water quality data collected by the Lahontan Water Quality

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Control Board to determine water quality impacts; (3) collecting

and analyzing snow samples in 2005 and 2006 in cooperation with

the Desert Research Institute to determine contaminant levels in

the area; and (4) adjusting snowmobile use if the Great Basin

Unified Air Quality Control District determines there are

unacceptable levels of pollutants in the air. (AR 1872-73, 1954-

55.) Moreover, the FS’s discretion to adjust the April 15

snowmobile closure date allows it to modify its management plan

should unanticipated issues arise and to mitigate any potential

impacts. 

 Although the FS may not merely list the mitigation

measures, the FS is not required to discuss how the FS would fund

its resource protection measures as plaintiffs suggest. “The

presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public

officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,

courts presume that they have properly discharged their official

duties.” United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15

(1926); see also Volpe, 401 U.S. at 415 (presumption of agency

regularity and compliance applies to an agency’s decision). The

FS has already carried out a number of mitigation measures

connected with the Travel Plan. The FS worked with the PCT

Association to determine final boundary placement. (AR 2212,

2508, 2510.) The FS also worked with Mono County Sheriff’s

Department to form a snowmobile task force to institute a “Zero

Tolereance” policy to help prevent snowmobile trespass. (AR 82,

2188.) Additionally, the FS has consulted with and obtained

written concurrence from the Great Basin Unified Air Pollution

Control District regarding air quality. (AR 2210-11.) Finally,

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the FS has begun its public education and outreach measures. (AR

2510-14.) 

Although the “line between a [NEPA document] that

contains an adequate discussion of mitigation measures and one

that contains a ‘mere listing’ is not well-defined,” Okanogan

Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 2000), the

court finds the FS’s discussion adequate. Id. at 476. The

Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Methow Valley, 490

U.S. at 352 (1989), where the Ninth Circuit had found a NEPA

violation because “the effectiveness of the mitigation measures

had not been assessed, and the measures themselves had yet to be

developed.” Okanogan, 236 F.3d at 476. Here, the FS committed

to applying several mitigation measures when implementing the

Travel Plan. (AR 1954-55.) Unlike Cuddy Mountain, and similar

to Methow Valley, the FS developed mitigation measures based on

its expertise in dealing with management issues in the project

area. Accordingly, the FS’s consideration of mitigation measures

was adequate. 

The reviewing court’s task “is to determine whether or

not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record

permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Occidental

Eng’g Co. v Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 766,

769 (9th Cir. 1985). The FS’s EA adequately discussed the

impacts that the Travel Plan would have in the project area. 

Consequentially, the EA supports the FS’s decision, and the court

will deny plaintiffs’ motion and grant defendants’ on plaintiffs’

NEPA claim that the EA was inadequate. 

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4. Adequacy of Public Comment

The parties disagree as to whether or not public

comment is required on a draft Environmental Assessment (“EA”)

before the FS makes a final decision. Plaintiffs argue that a

controlling Ninth Circuit case, Citizens for Better Forestry v.

United States Department of Agriculture, 341 F.3d 961 (9th Cir.

2003) (“CBF”), mandates that, “the public must be given an

opportunity to comment on draft EAs and EISs.” Id. at 971; see

also Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002),

amended by 371 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). Defendants argue

that the statement in CBF is merely dicta and cite other circuits

that expressly hold that the CEQ regulations do not require

circulation of a draft EA. 

The NEPA regulations at issue provide: “[T]he agency

shall involve the public, to the extent practicable, in preparing

[EAs]. . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). Further “[a]gencies shall 

. . . make diligent efforts to involve the public in preparing

and implementing their NEPA procedures[,] . . . provide public

notice of . . . the availability of environmental documents so as

to inform those persons . . . who may be interested or

affected[,] [and] . . . solicit appropriate information from the

public.” 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6. 

Statements made by a court, not necessary to the

decision, constitute “dictum” and have no binding effect in

subsequent cases or on other courts. Export Group v. Reef

Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme

Court stated:

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It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general

expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in

connection with the case in which those expressions are

used. If they go beyond the case, they may be

respected, but ought not to control the judgement in a

subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for

decision. 

Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)

(citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821) (Marshall,

C.J.)). Because the statement that “[t]he public must be given

an opportunity to comment on draft EAs and EISs” is not essential

to the holdings CBF and Anderson, it is dicta. The CBF court

found that a failure to adequately inform the public of

environmental information, thus precluding them from submitting

informed comments prior to the finalization of a project plan,

violated NEPA regulations. CBF, 347 F.3d at 970. However, the

CBF court did not suggest that an agency is always required to

circulate a draft EA for public comment. The CBF court did “not

establish[] a minimum level of public comment and participation

required by the regulations governing the EA and FONSI process 

. . . [yet acknowledged] that the regulations at issue must mean

something.” Id. 

Other district courts have held that the language

requiring circulation of draft EAs was dicta and that circulation

of draft EA is not required. Sierra Nevada Forest Protection

Campaign v. Weingardt, 376 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Cal. 2005); Save

Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, Case No. 02-0761, 2006 WL 1160191,

at *14 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2006). Several Courts of Appeal have

held that circulation of a draft EA is not necessary under the

NEPA regulations. See Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Flowers, 359

F.3d 1257, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004) (not making available the EA and

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other project documents before a decision was not found to be

arbitrary); Pogliani v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 306 F.3d 1235,

1238-39 (2d Cir. 2002) (plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on

their claim that defendant “erred by failing to release its draft

EA and FONSI for public comment prior to their issuance”);

Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. United States Dep’t of

Army, 398 F.3d 105, 115 (1st Cir. 2005) (“there is no legal

requirement that an environmental assessment be circulated

publicly and, in fact, they rarely are”); Fund for Animals, Inc.

v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 549 (11th Cir. 1996) (there is no statutory

requirement that an agency provide opportunity for public comment

of any particular kind, and “we are unwilling by judicial

decision to legislate such a requirement into [NEPA]”). This

court finds that the Ninth Circuit has not held that there is a

requirement to circulate a draft EA, and follows the opinions of

other circuits specifically holding that there is no such

requirement. Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. United States

Bureau of Land Mgmt., 404 F. Supp. 2d 212, 220 (D.D.C. 2005)

(“BCA”) (“A plain reading of the CEQ regulations reveals that an

agency is not expressly required to circulate a draft EA for

public comment before adopting its final decision, except in

limited circumstances that do not apply here.” (citing 40 C.F.R.

§ 1501.4(e)(2))). 

Plaintiffs cite Weingardt for the proposition that an

agency must release “the functional equivalent of a draft EA.” 

Weingardt, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 992. Discussing whether NEPA

requires circulation of a draft EA, the Judge Levi wrote: “[t]he

way in which the information is provided is less important than

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that a sufficient amount of environmental information--as much as

is practicable--be provided so that a member of the public can

weigh in on the significant decisions that the agency will make

in preparing the EA.” Id. at 992. However, “the agency can

never go wrong by releasing a draft EA.” Id. In Weingardt, the

FS issued an initial scoping notice for comment, but did not

allow comment on the final EA, prior to releasing a FONSI. Id.

at 987. Although Judge Levi found that the FS “failed to give

the public an adequate pre-decisional opportunity for informed

comment” because the documents the circulated pre-decisional

documents “contained no analysis of the environmental impacts of

the projects,” Judge Levi chastised the FS for withholding

“already-prepared environmental documents even though the

documents were completed before the end of the public comment

period.” Id. at 992. Federal Defendants argue that the

Weingardt court’s holding of a NEPA procedural violation was

based on this fact. Although the Weingardt court was troubled by

the agency’s failure to circulate already-prepared environmental

documents, the Weingardt court placed importance on informing the

public in some manner of “the various topics that the agency must

address in the EA, such as cumulative impacts, before the EA is

finalized.” Id. at 992. 

However, in preparing an EA, the regulations only

require that an “agency shall involve . . . the public, to the

extent practicable. . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). This court

agrees with the BCA court that “[d]etermining whether the public

was adequately involved is a fact-intensive inquiry made on a

case-by-case basis.” BCA, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 220. For the

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This follows FS’s NEPA guidance (FSH 1909.15, Chapter 6

10, § 10.3), available at

http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/fsh/1909.15/1909.15_10.doc.

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following reasons, the court concludes that the FS adequately

involved the public in this case. 

The public was afforded not one, but two distinct

comment periods in this case. Although not required by NEPA or

the CEQ regulations, the FS provided for a thirty-day comment

period during the scoping process. (AR 91-93.) The FS provided 6

another thirty-day comment period after the publication of the

NOPA. (AR 1716.) Plaintiffs, concerned citizens, and experts 

took advantage of the two opportunities they were afforded to

comment on the proposed action to provide thousands of comments. 

(AR 1722, 1723-26, 1732-54, 1859, 1861-62.) Contrary to

plaintiffs’ argument, small adjustments to the project between

the scoping notice and the NOPA are of no legal consequence. See

BCA, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (supplementation of the record “is

only necessary when ‘new information provides a seriously

different picture of the environmental landscape’”) (internal

quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, plaintiffs

have not identified any additional relevant information that they

would have provided to the FS had there been another round of

public review. Oregon Nat. Res. Council v. Devlin, 776 F. Supp.

1440, 1446 (D. Or. 1991) (“A plaintiff must identify additional

relevant information that would have been provided to the agency

in order to succeed on a claim of failure to provide a public

comment period.” (citing Sabine River Auth. v. United States

Dept. of Interior, 745 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Tex. 1990))). 

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Although the requirement in 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) to

involve the public to the extent practicable offers differing

interpretations and the FS could have done more, the court is not

tasked with striking down an agency’s policy that it may find

unwise, but determining whether the agency’s action was

arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the

law. On this deferential standard of review and given the fact

that the court finds that the FS did not have to prepare an EIS

and the EA that the FS prepared was adequate, the court cannot

conclude that the FS’s public involvement was arbitrary,

capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Therefore,

the court finds that the FS’s involvement of the public fully

comported with NEPA. Accordingly, the court denies plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment and grants defendants’ cross-motion

for summary judgment. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss their claims with

prejudice under the Wilderness Act and the National Trails

Systems Act be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(2) Federal Defendants’ motion to strike portions and

exhibits of the Declaration of Jeffrey Erodes be, and the same

hereby is, DENIED;

(3) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement on their

NEPA and APA claims be, and the same hereby is, DENIED;

(4) Federal Defendants’ cross-motion for summary

judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

///

///

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(5) This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Judgment

shall be entered in favor of the defendants.

DATED: September 4, 2007

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