Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02843/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02843-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER DEAN ERNEST,

Petitioner,

 v

DAVID L RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No C 05-2843 VRW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner was convicted by an Alameda County superior

court jury of rape and false imprisonment. After a subsequent court

trial, he was found to have suffered two prior “strike” convictions,

two prior serious felony convictions, and one prior prison term. On

May 22, 2003, petitioner was sentenced to 31 years to life in state

prison.

On January 19, 2005, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment of the trial court and, on April 13, 2005, the

California Supreme Court denied review. 

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On July 13, 2005, petitioner filed the instant petition

for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254. On December 21,

2005, the court found that petitioner’s claims appeared cognizable

under § 2254, when liberally construed, and ordered respondent to

show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. 

Respondent instead moved to dismiss on the ground that three of

petitioner’s claims were unexhausted. After petitioner eventually

agreed to dismiss the three claims as unexhausted, the court

reinstated its prior order to show cause as to the remaining three

claims. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause

and petitioner has filed a traverse. 

I

The California court of appeal summarized the factual

background of the case as follows: 

The victim first met the defendant in June

1999. She was walking down the street toward a

BART station after work, and defendant pulled

over in his car and began to talk to her. It was

daytime and the victim was alone. The victim

testified that she gave defendant her phone and

pager numbers because she thought he was cute.

She also testified that it was not unusual for

people to meet each other like that in that

particular neighborhood.

On January 7, 2000, the night defendant raped

the victim, the victim was working at her job as a

cashier at Walgreen's in Oakland. During her 4:00

p.m. to midnight shift, defendant paged her. She

returned defendant's page. At first she did not

remember who he was; then she remembered having met

him on the street several months earlier.

Defendant asked the victim if she wanted to

hang out with him after she got off work. The

victim said she did not. The conversation continued

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and defendant told the victim he had learned she

might be moving back to Arkansas, where her mother

lived. The victim, who lived with her father and

his girlfriend, neither of whom she liked because

they were drug users, thought she might have to

return to Arkansas because her father was being

evicted from the apartment she shared with him. At

the end of this conversation, defendant asked the

victim again if she wanted to hang out. This time, 

she told him she would think about it and that he

could call her back. 

Defendant called later that evening and offered

to give the victim a ride home from work. After

defendant repeated his offer several times, the

victim agreed to accept a ride. She testified that

she told the defendant, "If you want to have sex

with me, I don't get down like that." The victim

explained that she often said this to men she met.

In this case, "it was late and that's just how guys

are." Defendant told the victim he did not want to

have sex and that he wanted to see her before she

moved.

Defendant came by the Walgreen's store at a

little after midnight. When she was ready to leave,

the victim got in defendant's car. While they were

in the car, they discussed her move. Defendant

offered to get her an apartment to share with him.

This surprised the victim, who was not interested in

moving in with defendant. Defendant also asked the

victim if she wanted to go to the hot tubs. She told

him no and asked him to drop her off at a nearby

BART station. Defendant, however, passed the BART

station and the freeway on-ramp and drove instead to

the Berkeley Marina. The victim was nervous and

asked defendant why he was doing this. He told her

he wanted to talk for a while. He parked in a

parking lot by a restaurant, which, because it is

dark and secluded is, according to the victim, a

popular "make out" spot.

Defendant and the victim spoke about her

childhood in Arkansas. The victim told the defendant

a story about a time when she was younger and wore a

bikini at a swimming pool. The other girls did not

like her and made their boyfriends get out of the

pool.

Defendant then asked the victim if he could see

her stomach. She said no but after defendant asked

her several times, she acquiesced and pulled up her

shirt a little bit. Defendant offered to show the

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victim his stomach and she told him not to. He then

pulled out his penis and the victim began to feel

afraid. The victim asked defendant to stop and take

her home. Defendant instead asked the victim to show

him her legs. She refused and he persisted. She asked

him to stop. When she tried to open the door to the

car, she discovered it was locked. Defendant told her

not to waste her time because the car had childproof

locks. The victim was afraid, felt trapped, and

wanted to get out of the car.

She began to cry. Defendant told her he wanted

to see her legs, that he had a knife under the seat

and would cut her neck if she did not do so. He said

if she showed them to him he would take her home.

Although the victim did not see a knife, she feared

for her life and did not think she would be able to

leave the car. 

Defendant then raped the victim, threatening her

with a knife if she did not comply. She asked him to

stop and, in an attempt to get help, reached back and

wrote, "Help me" in the moisture on the fogged over

back window. Defendant put on a condom, which broke

before he penetrated the victim. A few minutes after

defendant penetrated the victim's vagina with his

penis, he withdrew and ejaculated on his shirt. Some

of the ejaculate got on the victim and she wiped it

off with napkins she found on the floor of the car.

Defendant threw the condom and napkins out the

window. 

Defendant drove the victim home. He asked her

not to be angry with him and apologized for what he

had done. He kissed her against her will before he

left. The victim tried to behave as though everything

was okay because she was afraid defendant might hurt

her.

The victim called 911 after she entered her

apartment. She met the police outside because her

father was home and she did not want him to know what

had happened. The victim returned to the scene with

the police and the used condom and tissues were

located and taken into evidence. Afterward, the

police took the victim to the hospital for a sexual

assault exam. While waiting to be examined, the

victim gave the police a statement. In this

statement, the victim said she had known defendant

for one or two months. She testified at trial that

this was mistaken; she first met defendant in June

1999, but she was tired when she made the statement. 

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The medical director of the sexual assault

response team reviewed the victim's medical records.

She testified that the victim had five fresh

abrasions of less than one centimeter in length on

her posterior fourchette. She also testified that

this was a "significant" number and that these 

injuries were consistent with forced, non-consensual

intercourse. In her experience, the medical director

testified, this type of injury did not follow

consensual intercourse. 

The victim returned home at around 9:00 a.m.

and defendant called her shortly afterwards. He

asked her if she had told her father. She said no,

and then told defendant she had to go.

Several days after she was raped, the victim

agreed to make two "pretext" phone calls to

defendant. Before the call, a police officer told

her to try to engage defendant in a normal

conversation and then ask him why he did what he had

done to her. The victim testified she did not want

to talk to defendant, agreed to make the calls to

help the police and that she was nervous when she

made the calls. Tapes of the phone calls were played

to the jury and transcripts were admitted into

evidence.

During the first conversation, defendant asked

the victim if she was still upset. She replied,

"Yeah. Why wouldn't I be upset?" Defendant said,

"Oh, yeah, I'm feeling bad about it myself." The

victim replied that the defendant "should feel bad.

I mean, you told me you didn't want to do that and

you wasn't going to do that to me." Defendant did

not respond to this comment and, instead, changed

the subject to whether the victim was able to find

an apartment. Defendant asked if he could speak to

the victim the next day and she agreed to do so.

The victim made another pretext phone call

several days later. Defendant again raised the

subject of helping the victim find an apartment. The

victim told defendant that she did not know if she

wanted this because she was afraid of him. Defendant

asked her why she was afraid of him and the victim

replied, "Because you might go off on me like you

did last time when I was with you." Defendant said

"Of course not." However, when the victim asked him

why, when he took her home, he "mainly start

screaming at me and yelling at me," defendant

changed the subject and asked the victim if she had

looked in the paper for an apartment. Although the

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victim tried to discuss the rape again, defendant

simply changed the subject. 

DNA testing revealed the defendant's DNA type

was on the condom recovered by the police at the

scene. Testing also established that defendant's DNA,

as well as the DNA of two other men, was on the

underwear the victim had worn the night she was

raped. A DNA expert testified that sperm is durable

and can exist on underwear even after it is washed

and dried. The expert testified that there was no way

to tell how long any of the sperm had been on the

underwear. The victim testified that she had owned

the underwear for a year and a half to two years at

the time of the incident. 

Defendant was arrested on January 14, 2000. The

police asked him for the keys to his car to make it

easier to tow his car pending a search warrant.

Defendant refused to give the police his keys and

told them it was not his car. During a later search

of the car, the police found documents that showed

the car was leased to defendant, and registered and

insured in his name. 

After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of

rape, false imprisonment, found to have suffered two

prior "strike" convictions, two prior serious felony

convictions, and one prior prison term. He was

sentenced to 31 years to life in prison.

People v Ernest, No A102979, 2005 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 454, at ** 2-

10 (Cal Ct App Jan 19, 2005). 

II

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v

Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir

2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes

of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court's

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holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings

need be “reasonably” applied. Id. 

III

Petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 USC § 2254 based

on three claims: (1) he was denied due process because the trial

court excluded evidence that the victim had been arrested for

agreeing to an act of prostitution with an undercover officer three

years before the rape; (2) he was denied due process because the

trial court excluded evidence that the victim had been fired from

her job at a drug store for stealing; and (3) the trial court’s

findings on his prior convictions require reversal because

petitioner was absent from the proceedings and was entitled to a

jury trial on those issues.

A

Petitioner claims the victim’s prostitution arrest was

relevant as a crime of moral turpitude to impeach her credibility

and also because it supported his theory that the victim was acting

as a prostitute on the night of the rape. Petitioner moved to

introduce the evidence prior to trial, but the trial court excluded

it under California Evid Code § 352, finding it was more prejudicial

than probative.

The California Court of Appeal found no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence. The

court explained:

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[T]he evidence that the victim was arrested

for soliciting an act of prostitution from an

undercover officer in San Francisco at night was

not particularly probative of whether the victim

had solicited defendant for an act of

prostitution and, rather than raping her,

defendant had consensual sex. Although defendant

theorizes that the way in which the victim and

the defendant met "suggested prostitution was

involved," we do not draw this conclusion from

the evidence. The victim testified that she met

the defendant when he stopped his car to talk to

her and she gave him her phone number because

she thought he was cute. They met during the day

at defendant's instigation, while the victim was

walking from work to the BART station. The

victim testified that this was not an uncommon

way for people to meet each other in the

neighborhood. This encounter does not suggest

that the victim was soliciting the defendant for

an act of prostitution similar to that with

which she had been charged in 1997. Defendant

also suggests that the victim's willingness to

accept his offer of a ride home the night he

raped her and her frank warning to him that she

was not interested in having sex with him must

be read as the behavior of a woman soliciting an

act of prostitution. We do not agree. If

anything, the victim made clear that she was not

interested in having sex with defendant, hardly

the action of someone soliciting prostitution.

Finally, defendant argued that because the DNA

analysis of the victim's underwear found semen

from three different men, including defendant,

the victim was a prostitute. We will not assume,

as defendant seems to urge us to, that a

sexually active woman must be assumed to be

acting as a prostitute.

In fact, the evidence was quite to the

contrary. The victim's injuries were consistent

with forced, nonconsensual intercourse. The

victim's testimony that she wrote the words "help

me" in the fogged glass of the car's window was

corroborated by the police inspection of

defendant's car. (Defendant's suggestion that this

behavior is a common ruse used by prostitutes is

completely unsupported and we reject it.) The

victim cooperated with the police in making pretext

calls to defendant. During these calls, defendant

frequently changed the subject, behavior that could

reasonably be attributed to a consciousness of

guilt. In light of the minimally probative value

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of the evidence of the victim's 1997 prostitution

arrest, we agree with the trial court that evidence

of the prior arrest for prostitution was more

prejudicial than probative because it would cause

the jury to speculate that, if the victim had been

arrested for prostitution, she might have consented

to sex with defendant.

People v Ernest, 2005 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 454, at ** 12-14.

Generally speaking, the exclusion of evidence that is

“highly relevant” to a defense contravenes due process. See Green v

Georgia, 442 US 95, 97 (1979) (finding a due process violation when

testimony excluded at trial “was highly relevant to a critical issue

in the punishment phase of the trial” regardless of the state’s

hearsay rule); Chambers v Mississippi, 482 US 284, 302-03 (1973)

(holding that exclusion of third-party testimony that was “critical

evidence” violated due process). In deciding whether the exclusion

of evidence violates due process, a court balances the following

factors: (1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on the

central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of

evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence

on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a

major part of the attempted defense. Chia v Cambra, 360 F3d 997,

1004 (9th Cir 2004); Drayden v White, 232 F3d 704, 711 (9th Cir

2000). The court must also give due weight to the state interests

underlying the state evidentiary rules on which the exclusion was

based. See Chia, 360 F3d at 1006.

Even if the exclusion of evidence amounts to a violation

of due process, habeas relief may be granted only if the error had a

substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. See Brecht v

Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637 (1993). In other words, the error must

have resulted in “actual prejudice.” Id.

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The California court of appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

claim that the trial court violated his due process rights when it

excluded evidence of the victim’s arrest was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent or was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

The victim’s arrest for prostitution three years before

the rape was not very probative whether she was engaged in

prostitution the night she met petitioner. Nothing about the

circumstances of the meeting between petitioner and the victim

suggested prostitution was involved. Instead, the evidence

indicates that the victim made it very clear that she did not want

to have sex with petitioner. Nor was petitioner’s encounter with

the victim factually similar to the facts of the earlier arrest. 

Given the potentially prejudicial nature of the evidence, the trial

court was within its discretion to exclude this evidence as not

particularly probative.

The excluded evidence was not particularly reliable

either. While it was clear that the victim had been arrested, she

was never charged with or convicted of any crime in relation to the

incident. The implication that the victim was a prostitute is not a

reliable assumption based on this evidence, nor is the evidence a

reliable indication of her credibility.

Because the excluded evidence was not particularly

probative or reliable, its exclusion by the trial court did not

violate petitioner’s right to due process. See Chia, 360 F3d at

1004. Petitioner’s claim that the victim was a prostitute may have

been a major part of his defense, and the evidence of the arrest may

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have been his only evidence of that theory. Nonetheless, those

factors alone did not give petitioner a constitutional right to

introduce the evidence. The evidence’s low probative value, high

potential for prejudice and unreliable nature all outweigh the

petitioner’s interest in presenting it. See id. After all, the

facts presented at trial did not support a prostitution defense. 

The victim was working at Walgreen’s at the time of the rape. She

called the police as soon as she got home and cooperated with

investigators by placing pretext phone calls to petitioner. She

underwent an invasive medical examination, which found signs of

vaginal tearing consistent with rape and even wrote the words “help

me” in the fogged glass of petitioner’s car.

Even if the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence had

amounted to constitutional error, petitioner would not be entitled

to federal habeas relief because it cannot be said that the alleged

error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. 

See Brecht, 507 US at 637. The excluded evidence would have had

little impact on the jury in light of the lack of evidence

supporting a prostitution defense and the wealth of evidence showing

that petitioner raped the victim.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

exclusion of evidence claim. The state court’s rejection of the

claim cannot be said to be contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or be

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 USC §

2254(d).

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B

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due

process rights when it excluded evidence that the victim was fired

from her job at Walgreen’s. The victim testified at the preliminary

hearing that she had recently been fired from her job for giving her

friends “free things.” Petitioner claims that this incident is

relevant evidence because stealing is a crime of moral turpitude and

it undermines the victim’s credibility. The trial court granted the

prosecution’s motion to exclude evidence because it was more

prejudicial than probative and would lead to an undue consumption of

time.

The California court of appeal found no abuse of

discretion in the trial court's exclusion of the evidence related to

this incident. The court explained:

Given that exploring the reasons for the

victim's termination would involve testimony of a

variety of people, including former coworkers and

supervisors as well as her friends, the trial court

was within its discretion to conclude that the time

expended in delving into this area, when weighed

against the probative value of the evidence,

justified excluding the evidence.

Nor did this ruling violate defendant's rights

of confrontation and due process under the federal

Constitution * * * Within the confines of the

confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide

latitude in restricting cross-examination that is

repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or

of marginal relevance." (People v. Carpenter (1999)

21 Cal.4th 1016, 1051.) The trial court's ruling

fell within that area of discretion.

People v Ernest, 2005 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 454, at ** 22-24.

The California court of appeal's rejection of petitioner's

claim that the trial court violated his due process rights when it

excluded evidence of the victim's termination from her job was not

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contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

The incident was not probative of the truthfulness of the

victim’s account of the rape. If the victim had in fact been giving

things at the store away to her friends, her conduct may have only

qualified as a misdemeanor, which does not indicate dishonesty as

strongly as a felony. The evidence was not reliable either. The

victim was never charged with a crime, and the facts of the

situation may have been difficult to prove. Furthermore, the victim

may have been fired for a combination of reasons. Determining what

actually happened would have been time-consuming and perhaps not

even possible. In light of the totality of the circumstances, the

trial court's exclusion of evidence of the victim’s termination from

Walgreen’s cannot be said to have amounted to a violation of

petitioner's due process rights. See Chia, 360 F3d at 1004.

Even if the exclusion of the evidence of the victim’s

termination had amounted to constitutional error, petitioner would

not be entitled to federal habeas relief because it cannot be said

that the alleged error had a substantial and injurious effect on the

jury's verdict. See Brecht, 507 US at 637. The evidence would have

had little impact on the jury in light of the substantial evidence

presented at trial that petitioner was guilty of rape.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

exclusion of evidence claim. The state court's rejection of the

claim cannot be said to be contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or be

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 USC §

2254(d).

C

Petitioner claims that the trial court findings on his

prior convictions should be reversed because he was absent from the

proceedings and was entitled to a jury trial on those issues.

Petitioner was out of custody during the trial and did not

return to court when the jury announced its verdict. The following

day the court held a court trial on his prior convictions, having

determined that petitioner was voluntarily absent from the

proceedings and had previously waived a jury trial on his priors. 

The court found that defendant had suffered two prior “strike”

convictions, two prior serious felony convictions, and one prior

prison term. Petitioner claims that he did not waive his right to a

jury trial on the issue of his prior convictions and that, because

the court found more than the simple fact of his prior convictions,

he was entitled to a jury trial on those issues.

The California court of appeal found no abuse of

discretion in the trial court's decision to proceed with the court

trial on the prior convictions in petitioner’s absence. The court

found that petitioner’s right to a jury trial on factual issues

relating to prior convictions is only a statutory right, and if the

court made an error in proceeding with a court trial on those issues

it was harmless error. People v Ernest, 2005 Cal App Unpub LEXIS

454, at *27-28. The court added that, contrary to petitioner’s

claim, Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466 (2000), does not give

petitioner a constitutional right to a jury trial on all of the

allegations underlying the sentencing enhancement. Id at *29. The

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court explained that recidivism findings that are unrelated to the

elements of a crime can be used to enhance a sentence without full

due process treatment. Id.

The court of appeal also found that the trial court did

not err by proceeding in petitioner’s absence. The court explained:

[W]hen a defendant is absent from trial

proceedings after a trial has begun, the court may

proceed with the case so long as it finds that the

defendant's absence is voluntary and the case does

not involve the death penalty. It is undisputed that

defendant voluntarily absented himself from the

proceedings. The trial was bifurcated and,

therefore, reached its conclusion when the charged

priors were proven, not when the jury rendered its

verdicts. (People v. Givan (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th

1107, 1114-1115 [prior conviction trial constitutes

phase of larger proceeding in bifurcated trial].)

The trial court, therefore, did not err in

proceeding to a bench trial of defendant's prior

convictions.

Id. at 30.

The California court of appeal's rejection of petitioner's

claim – that the trial court’s findings on his prior convictions

should be reversed because he was absent from the proceeding and was

entitled to a jury trial on those issues – was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

Every criminal defendant has "the right to personal

presence at all critical stages of the trial." Rushen v Spain, 464

US 114, 117 (1983). A defendant can waive the right to personal

presence, however, provided he does so voluntarily, knowingly and

intelligently. Campbell v Wood, 18 F3d 662, 671 (9th Cir 1994) (en

banc). Such a waiver need not be express; it may be implied by a

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showing that the defendant "knowingly and voluntarily fail[ed] to

appear for trial." United States v Houtchens, 926 F2d 824, 827 (9th

Cir 1991). 

Here, the trial court here found that petitioner was

voluntarily absent from the proceedings. Reporter’s Transcript

(“RT”) at 538. This finding must be presumed correct unless

petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 USC § 2254(e)(1); Brewer v Raines, 670 F2d 117, 120 (9th Cir

1982). Petitioner does not. He has submitted no evidence

whatsoever that his absence was involuntary. The court must presume

that petitioner was voluntarily absent from the proceedings and

effectively waived his right to be present during the court trial on

the issue of his prior convictions. See id.

Petitioner’s claim fails even if he had not waived his

right to personal presence. The right to be present at all critical

stages, like most constitutional rights, is subject to harmless

error analysis “‘unless the deprivation, by its very nature, cannot

be harmless.’" Campbell v Rice, 408 F3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir 2005)

(en banc) (quoting Rushden v Spain, 464 US 114, 117 n2 (1983) (per

curiam)). Here, it is unlikely that the court would have reached a

result more favorable to the petitioner had he been present during

the court trial on his prior convictions. Any error in proceeding

without petitioner present was harmless. Id.

Petitioner claims that, while he may have waived his right

to be present at the trial on his priors, he had a right to have a

jury decide the factual issues of his prior convictions. Petitioner

argues that because he did not personally waive that right, the

findings of the trial court must be reversed.

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The record shows that the day after the jury read the

verdicts, the court proceeded with a bifurcated court trial on the

issue of the prior convictions. Doc #32, Ex B, RT at 534-560. 

After reviewing the evidence, the court announced its findings: 

“The court finds that the first prior conviction in fact occurred

and that is true, and the second prior conviction is true, and the

third prior conviction is true. And that for all of these [reasons]

Mr. Ernest served a prison term therefore [sic].” Id at 559. The

court then set a date for sentencing and concluded the matter. Id

at 559, 560.

Petitioner argues that the trial court found more that the

existence of the prior convictions permitted by Apprendi and Blakely

v Washington, 542 US 296 (2004). Specifically, petitioner contends

that the jury should have determined whether the prior convictions

counted as “strikes” for the purposes of California Penal Code 

§ 667, and that the jury should have decided the factual issue of

his prior prison term. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

on this claim because the findings of the trial court were within

the prior conviction exception described in Apprendi.

"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt." Apprendi, 530 US at 488-90. Prior convictions and

recidivist behavior increasing the maximum penalty need not be

presented to the jury because they are not considered an element of

the offense charged. See Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523 US

224, 243-44 (1998); United States v Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F3d 411,

414-15 (9th Cir 2001) (holding that Almendarez-Torres remains good

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law after Apprendi and provides that prior convictions, whether or

not admitted by the defendant on the record, are sentencing factors

rather than elements of the crime).

Here, the findings of the trial court related only to

petitioner’s prior convictions. Where a sentence enhancement is

based on a defendant's prior convictions, the calculation of his

sentence falls within the Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi. 

See id; see also United States v Quintana-Quintana, 383 F3d 1052,

1053 (9th Cir 2004) (Almendarez-Torres exception not altered by

Blakely). Apprendi generally applies to uncharged aspects of the

underlying conviction that were not reflected in the jury’s verdict,

such as amount of drugs involved or personal use of a weapon. 

Determinations about prior convictions, including whether a prior

conviction carried a prison term or counts as a “strike,” are

sentencing factors that fall within the Almendarez-Torres exception

to Apprendi. See id; Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F3d at 414-15. Petitioner

was not entitled to a jury trial on the prior conviction

determination. The state court’s rejection of his claim certainly

was not an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

Petitioner’s claim fails even if he was entitled to a jury

trial on the prior conviction determination. The failure to submit

a sentencing factor to the jury, like the failure to submit an

element to the jury, is subject to harmless-error analysis. 

Washington v Recuenco, 126 S Ct 2546, 2553 (2006). Here, there is

no indication that the jury would have reached a result more

favorable to petitioner had they determined the facts of the prior

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convictions rather than the court. Any error in having a court

trial on the issue was harmless. Id.

V

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and

close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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