Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01913/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01913-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLORENCE WALKER, Civil No. 09cv1913 IEG (PCL)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MARY LATTIMORE, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Florence Walker (Walker) is a California prisoner serving a sentence of fifteen years in prison.

In San Diego Superior Court case number SCD193885, Walker pleaded guilty on July 19, 2006, to two

counts of assault with a deadly weapon. (Lodgment No. 1 at 00028.) Walker also admitted to having

a prior conviction that prevented her from being sentenced to probation and which was both a serious

felony and a “strike” within the meaning of California’s three strikes law. (Id. at 00005-08.; Lodgment

No. 20 at 3-7.)

Walker has filed a Petition (Pet.) for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging her convictions. In her Petition, she contends: (1) the prior conviction used to enhance her

sentence under California’s three strikes’ law was not a strike; (2) there was insufficient evidence to

convict her of assault with a deadly weapon against Diana Berlinguette (count two); (3) she was

improperly sentenced under California law; (4) she was not advised of her Fifth Amendment right

against self incrimination with regard to her admission that she suffered a prior conviction nor of her

Sixth Amendment right to a have a jury decide the validity of her prior conviction; and (5) her sentence

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28 1 For ease of reference, the Court uses the page numbers assigned to Petitioner’s documents by the

Court’s electronic filing system.

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violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Pet. at 5-10, Pet’rs Exs. at 2-32.1)

In her Traverse, she claims trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. (Traverse at 6, 8-9, 13.) 

This Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, the Traverse, and all supporting

documents submitted by the parties. After a thorough review of the record, the Court finds that

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that certain claims be dismissed

as procedurally defaulted and that the Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct;

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding

findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness). The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion denying Walker’s direct appeal of her conviction:

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgement below (People

v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576), the following occurred: On August 11, 2005,

Walker grabbed a former co-worker Diana McDaniel while McDaniel exited an elevator

at UCSD Medical Center. The two began to fight. Walker pulled a hammer from her

purse and hit McDaniel in the head with the hammer. Another woman, Ms. Berlinguette,

was in the elevator. While she tried to protect an infant, Walker hit her on both arms

with the hammer.

Walker has a 1984 conviction of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd.

(a).)

(Lodgment No. 7 at 2.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The San Diego County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging Florence Ann Walker

with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon against two victims, Diana McDaniel (count one) and

Diana Berlinguette (count two), a violation of California Penal Code (Penal Code) section 245(a)(1).

(Lodgment No. 1 at 00001-04.) As to each of these counts, the complaint also alleged that Walker

personally used a deadly weapon, a hammer, within the meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7(c)(23).

(Id.) The complaint also alleged that Walker had suffered two prior convictions which made her

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ineligible for probation, within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203(e)(4). (Id.) One of those

convictions was also alleged as a prior serious felony, within the meaning of Penal Code section 667(a),

668 and 1192.7(c), and as a prior strike conviction, within the meaning of Penal Code section 667(b)-

(i), 668, and 1170.12. (Id.) 

Walker pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted suffering the prior convictions as alleged. (Id.

at 00005-08; Lodgment No. 20, vol. 1.) Walker was sentenced to the aggravated term of four years in

prison on the assault with a deadly weapon charge alleged in count one, which was doubled to eight

years pursuant to the three strikes law. (Lodgment No. 1 at 00028-29; Lodgment No. 20, vol. 2 at 17.)

She was also sentenced to two years in prison for the assault with a deadly weapon charge alleged in

count two, and five years in prison for personally using a hammer, for a total of fifteen years.

(Lodgment No. 1 at 00028-29; Lodgment No. 20, vol. 2.)

Walker appealed her conviction and sentence to the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No.

1 at 00030; Lodgment Nos. 2-6.) The court affirmed Walker’s convictions and sentence in a written,

unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 7.) Walker thereafter filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court, which that court denied without citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 8, 9.) 

Walker then filed a series of habeas corpus petitions in the state courts. She first filed a habeas

corpus petition in the San Diego Superior Court, which that court denied in a written, unpublished order.

(Lodgment Nos. 10, 11.) She then filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal on

September 8, 2008. (Lodgment No. 12.) While that petition was pending, she filed another habeas

corpus action in the San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 13.) On November 6, 2008, the

Superior Court denied her petition in a written, unpublished order, and on February 10, 2009, the state

appellate court denied the petition she had filed in that court in a written, unpublished opinion.

(Lodgment Nos. 14, 15.) She then filed another habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal

which that court denied in a written, unpublished opinion. (Lodgment Nos. 16, 17.) Finally, Walker

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 18.) That

court denied the petition, stating “The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See In re Dixon

(1953) 41 Cal.2d 756.).” (Lodgment No. 19.) 

/ / /

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On August 31, 2009, Walker filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, together with Exhibits, in this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Answer on January 27, 2010. (Doc. No. 7.)

Petitioner filed a Traverse on March 17, 2010. (Doc. No. 12.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will

not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that

adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal

court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court

applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was

objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d

872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct,

and Walker carries the burden of rebutting this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court applied

a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case

differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state

court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably

applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application”

clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief,

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.”

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

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Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme

Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state

court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal

law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme

Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

B. Analysis

Walker raises five claims in her petition. First, she argues the trial court improperly sentenced

her to double the upper term under California’s three strikes law. She claims the prior conviction upon

which this sentence was based was not a strike under California law. (Pet. at 6; Pet’rs. Exs. 4-20.)

Second, she claims there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction on count two, assault with

a deadly weapon on Diana Berlinguette. (Pet. at 6-7; Pet’rs Exs. 22-30.) Third, she contends her

sentence is illegal because the trial court improperly sentenced her on both assault counts in violation

of Penal Code section 654 and that the imposition of the upper term on count one is unsupported by facts

or law. (Pet. 8; Pet’rs Exs. at 30.) Fourth, she argues her Fifth Amendment right against self

incrimination and her Sixth Amendment right to a trial were violated by the use of her prior conviction

to enhance her sentence. (Pet. at 10; Pet’rs Exs. at 30-31.) Finally, she claims her sentence violates the

Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments. (Pet’rs Exs. at 35.) In her Traverse,

Walker also alleges both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. (Traverse at 6, 8, 13.) 

Respondent argues Walker’s claim that her prior conviction is not a strike (claim one), her claim

that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for assaulting Diana Berlinguette (claim

two), and her claim that she was improperly sentenced twice for the same conduct, as precluded by

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California Penal Code section 654 (claim three), are procedurally defaulted because Walker first raised

them in the habeas petition she filed in the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition with

a citation to In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953). (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 4-12, 11, 16;

Lodgment Nos. 18, 19.) As to Walker’s claim that she was not properly advised of her right to a trial

on the validity of her prior convictions, Respondent contends the state court’s denial of the claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem.

of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 17-19.) Respondent does not address Walker’s Eighth Amendment claim.

1. Whether Walker’s Prior Conviction Constitutes a Strike Under California’s Three

Strikes Law

Walker first argues that she was improperly sentenced under California’s three strikes law

because the prior conviction used to double the base term under the three strikes law was not a strike.

(Pet. at 6; Pet’rs. Exs. at 4-20.) Specifically, she contends that because her prior offense was what is

termed under California law as a “wobbler,” meaning it can be charged as either a misdemeanor or a

felony, it was not a qualifying felony prior conviction for purposes of the three strikes law. (Pet. at 6;

Pet’rs Exs. at 4-20.) Respondent counters that the claim is procedurally defaulted; Respondent also

argues that federal law prohibits Walker from collaterally challenging a prior conviction and that, in any

event, the claim fails on the merits. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 4-11.)

Walker first raised this claim in the habeas corpus petition she filed in the California Supreme

Court. (Lodgment No. 18.) That court denied the petition with a citation to In re Dixon. (Lodgment

No. 19.) Dixon stands for the general proposition that, where possible, defendant must have first

pursued the claim on direct appeal before bringing the claim in a state habeas corpus petition. See Park

v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 11561 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing California’s Dixon rule).

a. Procedural Default

The Ninth Circuit has held that because procedural default is an affirmative defense, Respondent

must first “adequately [plead] the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural

ground . . . .” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to place the defense at

issue, Walker must then “assert[] specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state

procedure . . . .” Id. The “ultimate burden” of proving procedural default, however, belongs to the state.

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 The California Supreme Court denied Walker’s habeas corpus petition with a citation to Dixon on July

22, 2009, well after the decision in Robbins. (See Lodgment No. 19.)

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Id. If the state meets its burden under Bennett, federal review of the claim is foreclosed unless Walker

can “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal

law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).

i. Independence

In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit concluded that California’s untimeliness rule, embodied in In re

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993), was independent. The ruling in Bennett came as a result of the California

Supreme Court’s declaration in In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 770, 811-12 (1998), that it would no longer

consider federal law when denying a habeas claim as procedurally barred under Clark or Dixon.

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 582-82; see also Park, 202 F.3d at 11152.2 Although the Ninth Circuit has not

specifically determined whether a post-Robbins application of the Dixon rule is independent of federal

law, the Bennett court’s analysis of the independence of Clark compels the same result for claims barred

pursuant to Dixon. The pre-Robbins application of the two procedural bars was similar in that the

invocation of either Dixon or Clark required the state court to determine if there existed fundamental

constitutional error that would excuse the petitioner’s default, and such an analysis necessarily involved

the consideration of federal law. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581-82; see also LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d

702, 707 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that consideration of federal law in barring claims as pretermitted

is “analogous” to consideration of federal law in barring claims as untimely). Furthermore, in Protsman

v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007-08 (S.D. Cal. 2004), a judge of this Court found a post-Robbins

application of Dixon to be independent of federal law, and this Court agrees with that conclusion.

Accordingly, Respondent has met his initial burden under Bennett to establish that Dixon is an

independent state procedural bar. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

ii. Adequacy

Respondent also asserts the Dixon bar is adequate. Accordingly, Respondent’s initial burden

under Bennett is satisfied. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Citing Bennett, Respondent contends that Walker

has not cited to any legal authority or factual allegations which rebut Respondent’s initial showing.

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(Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer at 11.) Respondent is correct that although Walker makes general

references to “procedural default” and “cause and prejudice” in her Traverse, she makes no specific

allegations as to the inadequacy of Dixon. (Traverse at 4, 8, 14.) Thus, Walker has not made a showing

sufficient to shift the burden back to Respondent. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586.

iii. Respondent Has Met His Burden Under Bennett

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Respondent has established that the state

court imposed an independent and adequate procedural bar to this claim. Bennett, 322 Fl.3d at 586.

Federal review of the claim is therefore barred unless Walker can demonstrate cause for the default and

actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

iv. Cause

The cause prong is satisfied if Walker can demonstrate some “objective factor” that precluded

her from raising her claims in state court, such as interference by state officials or constitutionally

ineffective counsel. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991). Walker does claim that counsel

was ineffective for failing to argue that her prior conviction did not constitute a strike under California

law. (Traverse at 6, 8.) As discussed below, however, in section IV(B)(7) of this Report and

Recommendation (R&R), this Court concludes that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this

claim in state court. Accordingly, this cannot form the basis for a successful showing of cause under

Coleman. Walker does not allege any other “objective factor” that precluded her from raising this claim,

and thus she has not established cause for the default. McClesky, 499 U.S. at 493-94. 

v. Prejudice

“Prejudice [sufficient to excuse procedurally barred claims] is actual harm resulting from the

alleged error.” Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). Walker has failed to establish

prejudice resulting from the state court’s refusal to address the merits of the claim. As discussed below

in section IV(B)(1)(b) of this R&R, this claim is meritless.

vi. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Walker has also failed to demonstrate that failure to consider the claim will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The Supreme Court has limited the

“miscarriage of justice” exception to petitioners who can show that “a constitutional violation has

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probably resulted in one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). “Actual

innocence” means factual innocence, not merely legal insufficiency; a mere showing of reasonable doubt

is not enough.” See Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1997). Walker has presented no evidence

to establish she is innocent of the charges to which she pleaded guilty. Thus, Walker has not

demonstrated that she is actually innocent of the crimes of which he has been convicted. Schlup, 513

U.S. at 327.

vii. Conclusion 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes Walker’s claim that the state court improperly

sentenced her to an enhanced term under California’s three strikes law is procedurally defaulted.

Further, Walker has not shown cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Federal

review of this claim is therefore precluded. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

b. Merits

Even if the claim is not procedurally defaulted, it fails for two reasons. First, Federal habeas

relief is not available for alleged violations of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that a challenge to a sentence based

on a claim that a prior conviction does not constitute a strike under California law is not cognizable on

federal habeas review. Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989). In any event,

Walker’s claim fails even under state law. A violation of Penal Code section 245(a)(1) qualifies as a

strike if it was committed with a deadly weapon or the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury.

See People v. Delgado, 43 Cal. 4th 1059, 1231 (2008). According to the probation report, Walker

pleaded guilty in 1993 to assault with a deadly weapon after she slashed her fourteen-year-old son with

a knife causing a wound that required four stitches. (Lodgment No. 1 at 00013.) These facts establish

the prior was a strike. Accordingly, there is no merit to Walker’s claim that her sentence was

improperly enhanced under the three strikes law.

c. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that ground one be DISMISSED as

procedurally barred. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. In the alternative, the Court recommends that

ground one be DENIED because it fails to state a cognizable federal claim and fails on the merits.

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2. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Walker’s Conviction for Assault with a Deadly

Weapon on Diana Berlinguette

Walker next argues there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for the second

count of assault with a deadly weapon against victim Diana Berlinguette because Berlinguette inserted

herself into the altercation between Walker and McDaniel. (Pet. at 6; Pet’rs Exs. at 21-30; Traverse at

6.) As with the preceding claim, Respondent argues the claim is procedurally defaulted because Walker

first brought it in the habeas petition she filed in the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition

with a citation to Dixon. (Lodgment Nos. 18, 19.) For the reasons outlined above in Section

IV(B)(1)(a)(i)-(vi) of this R&R, the Court concludes this claim is also procedurally defaulted. 

Moreover, as Respondent points out, the United States Supreme Court has stated that collateral

challenges to a conviction obtained as a result of a guilty plea are severely restricted:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the

criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that

he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior

to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character

of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not [within

the range of competence required of an attorney in a criminal case]. 

Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973).

Because Walker admitted to committing the assaults by pleading guilty, she may not now

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions. Tollet, 411 U.S. at 266. In any

event, Walker has not shown there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for assaulting

Berlinguette with a deadly weapon. In assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Supreme Court

has stated that “‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.’” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented,

the Court must accept the elements of the crime as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324,

n.16; Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that federal courts are “bound by a

state court’s construction of its own penal statutes”). In California, assault with a deadly weapon

requires “‘an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person

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of another.’” People v. Milward, 182 Cal. App. 4th 1477, 1480 (2010) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 240).

A “deadly weapon” is defined in Penal Code section 245(a)(1) “as an object or instrument used in a way

‘likely to produce great bodily injury.’” In re R.P., 176 Cal. App. 4th 562, 567 (2008). In the case of

objects like a hammer, California courts have concluded thus:

There are two classes of dangerous or deadly weapons: instrumentalities that are

weapons in the strict sense, such as guns and blackjacks; and instrumentalities which

may be used as weapons but which have nondangerous uses, such as hammers and

pocket knives. (People v. Raleigh (1932) 128 Cal.App. 105, 108, 16 P.2d 752.)

Instrumentalities in the first category are “dangerous or deadly” per se. (Ibid.) An

instrumentality in the second category is only “‘dangerous or deadly’” when it is capable

of being used in a “‘dangerous or deadly’” manner and the evidence shows its possessor

intended to use it as such. (Id. at pp. 108-109, 16 P.2d 752.)

People v. Burton, 143 Cal. App. 4th 447, 457 (2006).

According to the state appellate court’s factual findings, to which this Court must defer under

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1), Walker hit Berlinguette on both arms with the hammer when Berlinguette tried

to intervene in Walker’s assault on McDaniel in order to protect a baby who was in the elevator at the

time of the assault. (Lodgment No. 7 at 2.) These actions satisfied the elements of the crime of assault

with a deadly weapon as defined by California law. See Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1); Milward, 182 Cal.

App. 4th at 1480; In re R.P., 176 Cal. App. 4th at 567; Burton, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 457.

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends the claim be DISMISSED as procedurally

barred. In the alternative, the Court recommends the claim be DENIED on the merits.

3. Whether Walker’s Sentence Violates California Penal Code Section 654 (Claim Three)

Walker next contends her sentence violates California Penal Code section 654 by punishing her

twice for the same conduct. California Penal Code section 654(a) states, in pertinent part:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of

law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of

imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one

provision.

Cal. Penal Code § 654.

Respondent again asserts this claim is procedurally barred, and the Court agrees for the same

reasons discussed in section IV(B)(1)(a)(i)-(vi) of this R&R. Respondent also argues the claim does not

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present a federal question and that, in any event, Walker is precluded by her guilty plea from challenging

her sentence on this ground. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 13-14.)

Respondent is correct that, to the extent Walker complains of the manner in which she was

sentenced under California law and whether her sentence violates Penal Code section 654 is purely a

matter of state sentencing law. Questions regarding the application of state sentencing laws are not

cognizable on federal habeas review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 62; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Miller, 868 F.3d

at 1118-19.

In any event, it does not appear that Walker’s sentence violates Penal Code section 654. Section

654 prohibits multiple sentences for an indivisible course of conduct that violates multiple penal code

sections. People v. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th 1202, 1211 (1993). A defendant’s intent and objective are

determining factors as to whether a course of conduct is “indivisible.” (Id.) The facts as recounted by

the California appellate court reveal that Walker had two objectives: first, to injure McDaniel and

second, to stop Berlinguette from interfering with her first objective. (See Lodgment No. 7 at 2.) 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends this claim be DISMISSED as procedurally

defaulted. In the alterative, the Court recommends the claim be DENIED on the merits.

4. Failure to Advise Walker of Her Right Against Self-Incrimination and to a Jury Trial on

the Validity of Her Prior Convictions

Walker alleges that her Fifth Amendment rights were violated because she was not advised of

her right against self-incrimination with regard to her admission to suffering a prior conviction, and her

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial were violated when she was not advised of the right to have a jury

decided the validity of her prior conviction. (Pet. at 8; Pet’rs Exs. at 30-34; Traverse at 7; Pet’rs

Traverse Exs. at 7.) Respondent contends Walker was advised of these rights and properly waived them.

(Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer at 17-19.) Walker raised these claim in her direct appeal, alleging that

the waiver contained in the plea form she signed was insufficient. (Lodgment No. 4.) The state

appellate court rejected the claim as follows;

In any case, the waiver is valid. A defendant has the right to a jury trial on

alleged aggravating factors underlying an upper term. (Cunningham v. California, supra, 549 U.S. ___ [127 S.Ct. 856].) Boykin v. Alabama (1968) 395 U.S. 238, 242, 243

(Boykin), requires a showing in the record that the defendant has knowingly and

voluntarily waived his or her right to a jury trial. The waiver may be accompanied by

the use of a form. (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 285.) The record here includes

a form that Walker has signed explicitly allowing the sentencing judge to “determine the

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existence or non-existence of any aggravating facts which may be used to increase my

sentence. . . above the middle term. . . .” The record shows adequate compliance with

the Boykin requirements.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 4.)

The state appellate court correctly analyzed Walker’s claim. So long as a guilty plea is entered

knowingly and voluntarily, “Boykin [v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)] does not require the state

court to enumerate all of the rights a defendant waives as long as the record indicates that the plea was

entered voluntarily and understandingly.” Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1986).

Voluntariness is a question of law and must be demonstrated by tangible evidence in the record,

considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,

431-32 (1983); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970); Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242. The

historical facts which support a determination of voluntariness, however, are questions of fact.

Marshall, 459 U.S. at 431-32. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), factual findings made by a state court are

presumed correct, but may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A

court reviewing the voluntariness of a guilty plea is entitled to give great weight to in-court declarations

made by a defendant: “[T]he representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a guilty

plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable

barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong

presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). The state court found

Walker’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. (Lodgment No. 7 at 4.) The record amply supports

this conclusion. Walker initialed a box on the plea form which indicated she understood she had the

right to “confront and cross-examine all the witnesses against me” and that she had the “right to remain

silent” with regard to “all charges, allegations and prior convictions” filed against her, (Lodgment No.

1 at 00006), and she has presented no evidence that supports a contrary conclusion. Accordingly,

Walker’s waiver was valid.

Moreover, to the extent Walker argues her aggravated sentence violates the Sixth Amendment,

her claim is without merit. In a series of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), the Supreme Court has declared that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the

sentence for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or

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admitted to by the defendant. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274-75 (2007) (citing

Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004); see also United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). On the plea form that she signed and during the plea colloquy, Walker

admitted to having been previously convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. (Lodgment No. 1 at

00006; Lodgment No. 20 at 7.) In addition, she initialed a box on the plea form indicating she knew the

judge could find true aggravating circumstances which would increase her sentence above the middle

term. (Lodgment No. 1 at 00007.) Thus, Walker clearly waived any Sixth Amendment challenge to the

use of her prior conviction to give her an aggravated sentence. 

In addition, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “if at least one of the aggravating factors upon

which the judge relied in sentencing . . . was established in a manner consistent with the Sixth

Amendment, [a] sentence does not violate the Constitution.” Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 643 (9th

Cir. 2008.) Here, Walker’s admission that she committed an assault with a deadly weapon on two

people and that she had suffered a prior serious felony which was a strike under California law was

sufficient under California’s Rules of Court, which govern the finding of aggravating circumstances,

to impose the aggravated term. See Cal.R.Ct. Rule 4.421(b). At least two aggravating factors apply to

Walker: “(1) The defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society,”

and “(2) The defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency

proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness.” See Cal.R.Ct. 4.421(b)(1), (2). Thus, Walker’s

sentence satisfies the Sixth Amendment’s requirements. See Butler, 528 F.3d at 643.

For the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

Walker is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

5. Whether Walker’s Sentence Violates the Eighth Amendment

Walker states on page thirty-five of her petition that her sentence violates the Eighth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. (Pet. at 25.) Respondent does not address this claim, and it does not

appear to be exhausted. Nevertheless, this Court may deny the petition if it is “perfectly clear that the

applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir.

2005).

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In Lockyer v. Andrade, the Supreme Court concluded that the only clearly established legal

principle that could be discerned from the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence was that “[a] gross

disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for a term of years . . . . [T]he precise contours

of [the principle] are unclear, [and it is] applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.”

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72-73 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1001). The Supreme Court also

explained that “the governing legal principle gives legislatures broad discretion to fashion a sentence

that fits within the scope of the proportionality principle . . . .” Id. at 76 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S.

at 998). Because of this, “[t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for

only the extraordinary case.” Id. at 77.

The Ninth Circuit has given this Court some guidance as to the kind of “exceedingly rare” Eighth

Amendment claim that warrants federal habeas relief. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000) (“[Ninth Circuit] cases may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether

a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may

help us determine what law is ‘clearly established.’”). In two recent cases, the court has overturned

three strikes sentences where either the triggering offense or the defendant’s prior criminal history were

not sufficiently serious. 

In Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004), the court concluded that a sentence of

twenty-five years to life for a nonviolent shoplifting of a $199.00 VCR where the defendant’s prior

convictions were two nonviolent second degree robberies, violated the Eighth Amendment. Ramirez's

prior robberies did not involve weapons, and the “force” in both was minimal. Id. at 768. Moreover,

the one-year jail term Ramirez received for the two robberies was also indicative of the less-than-serious

nature of the offenses, and it “was the only period of incarceration ever imposed upon Ramirez prior to

his Three Strikes sentence.” Id. at 769. Comparing Ramirez’s case to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263

(1980), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), and Andrade, the court concluded that “this [was] the

extremely rare case that gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Ramirez, 365 F.3d at

770. After conducting intra- and interjurisdictional comparisons of Ramirez’s sentence, the court found

the state court’s decision to uphold Ramirez’s sentence was an objectively unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme Court law. Id. at 770-73 ; see also Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964 (9th Cir.

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2005) (noting that Reyes’s sentence of twenty-six years to life for a “triggering felony” of perjury on

a driver’s licence application stated a plausible case for relief under Ramirez and remanding to the

district court for an evidentiary hearing on the gravity of Reyes’s prior conviction for armed robbery).

More recently, the Ninth Circuit struck down a sentence of twenty-eight years to life imposed

on a defendant who had failed to update his sex offender registration within five days of his birthday.

Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2008). The court first considered whether the sentence gave

rise to an inference of gross disproportionality by examining both the gravity of the offense and the

severity of the penalty. Id. at 883-87. The court concluded that California law had defined Gonzalez’s

crime as simply a “technical regulatory requirement that resulted in no social harm and to which little

or no moral culpability attaches.” Id. at 887. It also considered Gonzalez’s prior criminal history, which

was extensive and serious, including possession of drugs, car theft, attempted forcible rape, lewd

conduct with a child under the age of fourteen, robbery, and spousal abuse. The Court found, however,

that there was no “rational relationship between Gonzalez’s failure to update his sex offender

registration annually and the probability that he will recidivate as a violent criminal or sex offender.”

Id. at 887. Without a rational connection between Gonzalez’s past behavior and his current conviction,

there was no justification for an increased sentence for the “passive, harmless and technical violation

of the registration law.” Id. at 885. Gonzalez’s sentence was the “third most severe penalty available

under California law, exceeded in severity only by death and life imprisonment without the possibility

of parole.” Id. at 886. Accordingly, his sentence raised an inference of gross disproportionality. Id. at

887. The Gonzalez court also conducted intra- and interjurisdictional comparisons and found that the

twenty-eight year to life sentence imposed on Gonzalez was “substantially more severe than penalties

California imposes for far more serious crimes,” including second degree murder (fifteen years to life),

voluntary manslaughter (three, six, or eleven years), and rape (three, six, or eight years). Id. Moreover,

the court found that “[i]n at least ten jurisdictions, a first registration offense is a misdemeanor . . . .

Texas appears to be the only state besides California that would mandate a sentence of 25 years or

longer for a third felony offense, including a violation of a sex offender registration law.” Id. at 888.

Accordingly, Gonzalez’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 889. 

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The Ninth Circuit has upheld three strikes sentences, however, in cases where either the

triggering offense or the defendant’s prior record involve violence or the threat of violence. Thus, in

Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), the court concluded that a sentence of twenty-five years

to life for a conviction for a felony petty theft did not violate the Eighth Amendment because Rios

“struggled with the loss prevention officer and tried to avoid apprehension . . . . [H]is prior robbery

‘strikes’ involved the threat of violence because his cohort used a knife . . . . Rios [had] a lengthy

criminal history, beginning in 1982, and he ha[d] been incarcerated several times.” Id. at 1086. 

In Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2006), the court upheld a sentence of twenty-five

years to life for felony possession of cocaine and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphenalia.

Although the triggering offense was nonviolent, Taylor’s prior convictions included second-degree

burglary, robbery with a firearm, and voluntary manslaughter with the use of a weapon. Id. at 1100.

Furthermore, “[his] history of recidivism, marked by violence and the intentional taking of human life

and spanning some 30 years, is a great deal more severe than the criminal records considered in Rummel

and Andrade and probably even more severe than in Ewing.” Id. at 1101.

Similarly, in Nunes v. Ramirez-Palmer, 485 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit upheld

a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a felony petty theft charge where the defendant’s prior record

was lengthy and violent. His prior record included two rape convictions and various convictions for

burglary, robbery, and thefts that began in 1945 when Nunes was twenty years old. Id. at 436-37, 439.

Walker’s case is readily distinguished from Ramirez and Gonzalez, and is much closer factually

to Rios, Taylor, and Nunes. Although Walker does not have a particularly lengthy criminal record, it

is an extremely violent one. In 1984 she was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after she fought with

and eventually stabbed her boyfriend to death. (Lodgment No. 1 at 00013.) In 1993, she was convicted

of child abuse (a violation of Penal Code section 273d) and assault with a deadly weapon (a violation

of Penal Code section 245(a)(1)) after she slapped her fourteen-year-old son across the face then slashed

him with a knife. (Id.) Walker told her son she was going to kill him if he did not listen to her. The

boy’s wound required four stitches. (Id.) The current offense also involves significant violence.

Walker attacked two people with a hammer in an elevator. (Id. at 00014.) The people were not armed

and were trapped inside a small space with Walker. In addition, an infant who was nearby was in put

in danger by Walker’s actions. (Id.)

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3

 In addition, “[a] Traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief.” Cacoperdo

v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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Walker’s history of recidivism, which includes violence and the threat of violence, coupled with

the fact that her current offenses are not “technical” violations of the law, compel this Court’s

conclusion that Petitioner’s case is not the “extremely rare” case which gives rise to an inference of

disproportionality. See Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 770; see also Nunes, 485 F.3d at 439; Taylor, 460 F.3d at

1101; Rios, 390 F.3d at 1086. Walker is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

6. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In her Traverse, Walker alleges trial counsel was ineffective because she was sentenced under

California’s three strike’s law even though her prior assault with a deadly weapon conviction was not

a strike. (Traverse at 6, 8-9.) Respondent does not address this claim, and it does not appear to be

exhausted. Nevertheless, as previously stated, this Court may deny the petition if it is “perfectly clear

that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624.3

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Walker must first establish that her trial counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984) “This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Judicial scrutiny

of counsel’s performance must be “highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Second, she must show counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. In the context of a guilty plea, Walker can

only establish prejudice by showing that “but for counsels’ errors, [she] would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 

As discussed in section IV(B)(1)(b) of this R&R, contrary to Walker’s claim, her prior assault

conviction was a strike under California law. See Delgado, 43 Cal. 4th at 1231. Thus, counsel’s failure

to raise this issue was not objectively unreasonable. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d at 1273 (stating that

trial counsel is not ineffective when he or she fails to raise a meritless objection). Walker is not entitled

to relief as to this claim.

7. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Finally, Walker alleges in her Traverse that appellate counsel was ineffective. (Traverse at 13.)

As with the preceding claim, Respondent does not address this claim, and it does not appear to be

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4

 See footnote two.

5

 People v. Wende permits counsel to file a “no merits” brief when counsel determines that there are no

arguable issues on which to pursue on appeal.

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exhausted. Nevertheless, as previously stated, this Court may deny the petition if it is “perfectly clear

that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624.4

Walker appears to base her claim on appellate counsel’s failure to argue that her 1993 prior

conviction was not a strike and appellate counsel’s filing of a brief pursuant to People v. Wende, 23 Cal.

3d 436 (1979).5

 (Traverse at 12-13.) “The proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that appellate

counsel was ineffective . . . is that enunciated in Strickland.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285

(2000) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986)). Accordingly, Walker must first show

that her appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 688. She must then establish she was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. To

establish prejudice, Walker must show a reasonable probability that she would have prevailed on appeal

absent counsel’s errors. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “The performance

component need not be addressed first ‘[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the

ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be

followed.’” Id., n. 144 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

As discussed above in section IV(B)(1)(b) of this R&R, there is no merit to Walker’s claim that

her 1993 prior was not a strike under California law. Thus, she has not established she was prejudiced

by counsel’s failure to argue this claim. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. Because she does not allege any other

claims that counsel could have successfully raised on appeal, she has also not established she was

prejudiced by counsel’s decision to file a Wende brief. For all the foregoing reasons, Walker is not

entitled to relief as to this claim.

V. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that claims

one, two and three be DISMISSED and/or the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This

report and recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 3, 2010, any party to this action may file written

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objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than August 10, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order.

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 13, 2010

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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