Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01997/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01997-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PAUL STEMPLE, Individually and 

On Behalf of All Others Similarly 

Situated, 

 Plaintiff,

Case No. 12-cv-01997-BAS(WVG) 

CLASS ACTION 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR CLASS 

CERTIFICATION (ECF 

NO. 39); 

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

EX PARTE MOTION TO 

STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S 

NOTICE OF ERRATA (ECF 

NO. 47); AND 

(3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE THE 

REPORT AND 

TESTIMONY OF ILYA 

EVDOKIMOV (ECF NO. 

51).

 v. 

QC HOLDINGS, INC., 

 Defendant. 

 Presently before the Court is a motion to certify a Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (“TCPA”), class action filed by Plaintiff Paul 

Stemple (“Plaintiff”). (ECF No. 39.) Defendant QC Holdings, Inc. (“Defendant”) 

opposes certification primarily arguing that individualized issues pertaining to prior 

express consent defeat the “commonality” requirement in Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 23(a) and the “predominance” requirement in Rule 23(b). (ECF No. 54.) 

In addition, Defendant also argues: (1) the proposed class is not ascertainable in part 

because cell phone numbers could have changed over time, (2) class action is not a 

superior method of adjudication because the plan for noticing the class is 

unworkable, (3) Plaintiff cannot adequately represent the class because he has a 

felony conviction, and (4) Plaintiff’s request for hybrid certification under both Rule 

23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) is improper. In his reply, Plaintiff suggests that the class 

definition could be amended by the court sua sponte to exclude any prior loan 

applicants, thereby negating Defendant’s main argument regarding prior express 

consent. 

 Finally, Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s Errata ostensibly amending 

Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony as an improper Notice of Errata (ECF Nos. 46, 47) and 

moves to strike all of Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony as unreliable under Daubert v. 

Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (ECF No. 51). 

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted 

and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, 

this Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Class Certification (ECF No. 39). The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Class 

Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) with the Court’s modification to the class definition 

as discussed below, and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification under 

Rule 23(b)(2). The Court further DENIES Defendant’s Ex Parte Motion to Strike 

Plaintiff’s Notice of Errata and Declaration of Ilya Evdokimov in support thereof 

(ECF No. 47) and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Report and Testimony 

of Ilya Evdokimov in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 

51). 

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

Defendant QC Holdings, Inc. is a company that provides short-term (payday) 

loans to applicants. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 5; ECF No. 54 at p. 4.) Applicants for a shortCase 3:12-cv-01997-BAS-WVG Document 75 Filed 09/05/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 18
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term loan are required to fill out a loan application. (ECF No. 39 at Exh. F; ECF No. 

54 at p. 4.) As part of the loan application, applicants are required to provide contact 

telephone numbers and give express consent to be contacted at these telephone 

numbers, cellular or not, via an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) or not, 

for purposes of debt collection. (ECF No. 39 at Exh. F; ECF No. 54 at p. 4, Exh. D; 

ECF No. 72 at Exhs. B, C (sealed).) Applicants are also required to give 

“Employment” information, including Employer’s name, telephone number and 

address, and “Contacts” information, including but not limited to, current landlord 

and “nearest relative not living with you” together with telephone contact information 

for these individuals. (ECF No. 39 at Exh. F; ECF No. 54 at p. 4, Exh. D; ECF No. 

72 at Exhs. B, C (sealed).)

 One of the applicants for such a short-term loan provided Plaintiff’s name and 

cellular telephone number as his Employer under the Employment section of his loan 

application. (ECF No. 39 at p. 3; ECF No. 39-16; ECF No. 54 at pp. 5-6; ECF No. 

72-3 (sealed).) Plaintiff was not an applicant for a loan himself (ECF No. 54 at p. 1) 

and alleges he never provided his telephone number to Defendant nor gave any 

consent to Defendant to be contacted on his telephone. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 10, 18.) 

Nonetheless, according to Plaintiff, when attempting to collect a debt from this 

applicant, Defendant repeatedly contacted Plaintiff via an ATDS in violation of the 

TCPA. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

A. Identification of the Class 

In his original moving papers, Plaintiff proposes that the class be defined as 

follows: 

All persons whose 10-digit cellular telephone numbers with a 

California area code were listed by an account holder in the 

Employment and/or Contacts fields of a California customer loan 

application produced to [Defendant], which were called by [Defendant] 

using an [ATDS] and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice for the 

purpose of collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt from the 

account holder, between August 13, 2008 and August 13, 2012. 

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(ECF No. 39-1 at p. 4.) Plaintiff proposes identifying this class by extracting all of 

the ten-digit cellular telephone numbers listed in the Employer or Contact sections of 

the California loan applications produced in discovery and then cross-referencing this 

list with the list of California cellular telephone numbers identified by Defendant as 

being called for debt collection between August 2008 and August 2012. (Id. at pp. 9-

11.) In other words, any owner of a California cellular telephone number listed by a 

loan applicant in the Employer or Contact sections and then called by Defendant 

using an ATDS would be a member of the class. 

 In opposition, Defendant argues that this proposed class might include 

individuals who are also applicants and who had thus provided express prior consent 

to be contacted for purposes of debt collection. (ECF No. 54 at pp. 11-14.) 

Defendant identifies two potential groups this might encompass. First, Defendant 

points to examples where applicants had put the same numbers in the Personal 

section of the application as they had in the Employer section. (Id. at p. 11-12.) 

These applicants expressly consented to be contacted on their personal cell phone, 

even though they later repeated the number in the Employer section. (ECF Nos. 54 

and 72 at Exhs. I-N.) Second, Defendant argues there might be individuals who are 

applicants but are also listed as an Employer or Contact on another applicant’s 

application. (ECF No. 54 at pp. 13-14.) Defendant points to two examples where an 

applicant is also a relative contact in the Contact section of another loan applicant. 

(ECF Nos. 54 and 72 at Exhs. B and P, Q and R.) Finally, Defendant argues that 

individuals can, under certain circumstances, provide prior express consent to be 

called at a telephone number other than their own, so the individual factual 

circumstances surrounding each applicant’s relationship with the third party is 

necessary to determine consent. (ECF No. 54 at pp. 14-15.) 

 In response, Plaintiff suggests that the proposed class definition could be 

modified by the Court sua sponte to exclude calls to Defendant’s customers. (ECF 

No. 61 at p. 2, n. 2.) 

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B. Expert Testimony of Ilya Evdokimov 

In support of his Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiff retained Ilya 

Evdokimov, a contractor with Electronic & Speech Discovery, Inc. to extract cellular 

telephone numbers from the loan applications and then, using computer software, to 

compare them to the cellular telephone numbers called by Defendant to collect debts. 

(ECF No. 39-1 at pp. 10-11; ECF No. 39-13.) 

In a Declaration attached to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification, Mr. 

Evdokimov testified that the numbers in the Employer and Contact sections of the 

loan applications were manually entered into computers and then run against the 

numbers provided by Defendant as those numbers called by an ATDS for debt 

collection. (ECF No. 39-13 (“Evdokimov Decl.”) at ¶¶ 3-5, 7; ECF No. 39-2 at ¶ 7-

12.) Mr. Evdokimov testified the comparison resulted in 14,635 matches. 

(Evdokimov Decl. at ¶ 7.) 

After this Declaration was filed, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Errata. (ECF No. 

46.) Attached to the Notice of Errata was a Declaration from Mr. Evdokimov stating 

that in the process of testifying he had come to realize that data had been inputted 

incorrectly in that only cellular telephone numbers from the “Contacts” section of the 

loan applications had been manually entered, not the “Employment” section. (ECF 

No. 46-1 at ¶ 3.) He corrected the problem and had the “Employment” section 

numbers added to the comparison. (Id.) The resulting matches were increased to 

20,075. (Id.) 

After receiving Defendant’s Opposition to the Motion for Class Certification, 

objecting that this process could include Defendant’s customers, Plaintiff then 

requested that Mr. Evdokimov take the above revised matches and remove any 

cellular telephone numbers of applicants that were listed in the “Personal” section of 

the applications. (ECF No. 61 at p. 2; ECF No. 61-1 (“Evdokimov Reply Decl.”.) 

According to Plaintiff, this would modify the class to avoid Defendant’s concern that 

the class may include applicants who had given express prior consent to be contacted. 

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(ECF No. 61 at p. 2, n. 2.) When Mr. Evdokimov made this modification, he testified 

he obtained 6,387 matches. (Evdokimov Reply Decl. at ¶ 9). 

II. STATEMENT OF LAW 

A. Certification of Class Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 

“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted 

by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 

Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 

700-01 (1979)). In order to justify a departure from the usual rule, a party seeking 

class certification must satisfy all of the requirements under Rule 23(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, and at least one of the categories in Rule 23(b). Wang v. 

Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2013); United Steel, Paper & 

Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. 

ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2010). A class may be certified only 

“if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 

23(a) have been satisfied.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 

(1982); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 2011). The 

merits of the class members’ substantive claims may be highly relevant to 

determining whether to certify a class and “‘a district court must consider the merits’ 

if they overlap with Rule 23(a)’s requirements.” Wang, 737 F.3d at 433 (quoting 

Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983). “The same analytical principles govern Rule 23(b).” 

Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). The burden is on the plaintiff to 

establish that the Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) requirements have been met. Zinser v. 

Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).

 As a preliminary matter, “and apart from the explicit requirements of Rule 

23(a), the party seeking class certification must demonstrate that an identifiable and 

ascertainable class exists.” Mazur v. eBay Inc., 257 F.R.D. 563, 567 (N.D. Cal. 

2009). Although the exact identities of the class members need not be specified at 

the class certification stage, “the proposed class must be sufficiently definite in order 

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to demonstrate that a class actually exists.” Oshana v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 225 

F.R.D. 575, 580 (N.D. Ill, 2005); see also Mazur, 257 F.R.D. at 567; O’Connor v. 

Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“[A] class will be found 

to exist if the description of the class is definite enough so that it is administratively 

feasible for the court to ascertain whether an individual is a member.”). Once a 

plaintiff has established that a class is actually ascertainable, then it must show that 

the Rule 23 requirements have been met. Id. 

“Rule 23(a) provides four prerequisites that must be satisfied for class 

certification: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable [‘numerosity’]; (2) questions of law or fact must exist that are common 

to the class [‘commonality’]; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 

must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class [‘typicality’]; and (4) the 

representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class 

[‘adequacy’].” Otsuka v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 251 F.R.D. 439, 443 (N.D. Cal. 

2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). 

“A plaintiff must also establish that one or more of the grounds for maintaining 

the suit are met under Rule 23(b), including: (1) that there is a risk of substantial 

prejudice from separate actions; (2) that declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting 

the class as a whole would be appropriate; or (3) that common questions of law or 

fact predominate and the class action is superior to other available methods of 

adjudication.” Otsuka, 251 F.R.D. at 443-44 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)). In this 

case, Plaintiff seeks certification under both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). 

1. Numerosity – Rule 23(a)(1)

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “[C]ourts generally find that 

the numerosity factor is satisfied if the class comprises 40 or more members and will 

find that it has not been satisfied when the class comprises 21 or fewer.” Celano v. 

Marriott Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 544, 549 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

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2. Commonality – Rule 23(a)(2)

Under Rule 23(a)(2), the named plaintiff must demonstrate that there are 

“questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 

“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have 

suffered the same injury[.]’” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. 

at 157). However, “[a]ll questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the 

rule.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). “The 

existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a 

common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” 

Id.

Commonality does not turn on whether common issues are raised, “‘but, rather 

the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the 

resolution of the litigation.’” Wang, 737 F.3d at 543 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 

2551) (emphasis in original). Determination of the truth or falsity of a common 

contention must “‘resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the 

claims in one stroke.’” Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 

1041-42 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551). 

3. Typicality – Rule 23(a)(3)

To satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), the named plaintiff’s claims must be typical of the 

claims of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement is 

“permissive” and requires only that the named plaintiff’s claims “are reasonably 

coextensive with those of absent class members.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. “The 

test of typicality ‘is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether 

the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and 

whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.’” 

Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schwartz 

v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)).

“[C]lass certification should not be granted if ‘there is a danger that absent 

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class members will suffer if their representative is preoccupied with defenses unique 

to it.’” Id. (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 

& Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990)). 

4. Adequacy – Rule 23(a)(4)

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative plaintiff “will fairly and 

adequately protect the interest of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “To satisfy 

constitutional due process concerns, absent class members must be afforded adequate 

representation before entry of a judgment which binds them.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 

1020 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940)). “Resolution of two 

questions determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel 

have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named 

plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” 

Id. (citing Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 

1978)).

 It may be proper for the court to consider a proposed class representative’s 

integrity in assessing his adequacy as a class representative. In re Proxima Corp. v. 

Sec. Litig., 1994 WL 374306, at *17 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 1994). Thus, courts have 

determined a proposed representative was inadequate when he admitted a role in 

committing securities fraud. Id.; cf. Meyer, 707 F.3d at 1042 (although the proposed 

class representative had a conviction for dishonesty, he was still deemed an 

appropriate representative since the conviction was more than ten years old and 

representative had taken positive steps since the conviction). 

 5. Injunctive Relief – Rule 23(b)(2) 

Rule 23(b)(2) requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant “has acted or 

refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 

relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a 

whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Claims for individualized monetary relief belong 

in a Rule 23(b)(3) certification, not under Rule 23(b)(2). Wang, 737 F.3d at 544 

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(citing Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2558). 

6. Predominance – Rule 23(b)(3)

Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to find “that the questions of law or fact 

common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 

members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “The predominance inquiry focuses on ‘the 

relationship between the common and individual issues’ and ‘tests whether proposed 

classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’” In 

Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth 

Circuit noted: 

Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements were 

added to cover cases in which a class action would achieve economies 

of time, effort, and expense, and promote...uniformity of decision as 

to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or 

bringing about other undesirable results. Accordingly, a central 

concern of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance test is whether 

adjudication of common issues will help achieve judicial economy. 

Id. at 944 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is a “far more 

demanding” standard than the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). In re 

Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310-311 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187 (3d Cir. 

2001)). 

7. Superiority – Rule 23(b)(3)

In addition to the “predominance” inquiry outlined above, a court must also 

find that “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 

efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “Where 

classwide litigation of common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote greater 

efficiency, a class action may be superior to other methods of litigation,” and it is 

superior “if no realistic alternative exists.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 

1227, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1996). The following factors are pertinent to this analysis: 

“(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or 

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defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 

controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or 

undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-

(D). 

B. TCPA 

Under the TCPA, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant called a cellular 

telephone number (2) using an ATDS (3) without the recipient’s prior express 

consent. Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)).1

In Meyer, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s arguments that 

individualized issues of consent should preclude a finding of typicality or 

commonality because some debtors might have agreed to be contacted at any 

telephone number, since the defendant failed to point to a single case where consent 

was given. Id. at 1042. Similarly, “[d]efendants’ speculation that customers may 

have given their express consent to receive text message advertising is not sufficient 

to defeat class certification.” Agne v. Papa John’s Intern., Inc., 286 F.R.D. 559, 566 

(W.D. Wash. 2012). 

C. Expert Testimony 

The court is required to apply the evidentiary standard set forth in Daubert to 

expert testimony at the class certification stage. Ellis, 657 F.3d at 982. “Under 

Daubert, the trial court must act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude junk science that does 

 

1

 There appears to be some confusion in the Ninth Circuit as to whether the lack 

of prior express consent must be proven by the plaintiff or whether it is an affirmative 

defense that must be proven by the defendant. Cf. Grant v. Capital Management 

Services, L.P., 449 Fed. Appx. 598, 600, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2011) with Meyer v. Portfolio 

Recovery Associates, LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Microsoft 

Corp., 297 F.R.D. 464, 471 (S.D. Cal. 2014). However, for purposes of this Order, 

the Court will assume it is Plaintiff’s burden. 

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not meet Federal Rule of Evidence 702’s reliability standards by making a 

preliminary determination that the expert’s testimony is reliable.” Id. (citing Kumho 

Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 145 (1999)). 

 “‘[W]hen an expert’s report or testimony is critical to class certification...a 

district court must conclusively rule on any challenge to the expert’s qualifications or 

submission prior to ruling on a class certification motion.’” Sher v. Raytheon Co., 

419 Fed. Appx. 887, 890 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting American Honda Motor Co., Inc. 

v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010)). This is required “even if those 

considerations overlap the merits of the case.” American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 600 

F.3d at 815. 

While “[i]n its sound discretion, a district court may find it unnecessary to 

consider certain expert opinion with respect to a certification requirement,...it may 

not decline to resolve a genuine legal or factual dispute because of concern for an 

overlap with the merits. Genuine disputes with respect to the Rule 23 requirements 

must be resolved, after considering all relevant evidence submitted by the parties.” 

In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 324. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Defendant’s Motions To Strike Mr. Evdokimov’s Testimony Are 

Denied 

Defendant seeks to strike Plaintiff’s Notice of Errata and to strike all testimony 

of Mr. Evdokimov as unreliable. (ECF Nos. 47, 51.) Unlike the cases cited in both 

parties’ briefs, in this case, the class is readily ascertainable without resorting to 

expert testimony. Any individual whose telephone number is listed in the 

“Employment” or “Contact” section of a loan application, who was contacted for 

debt collection via an ATDS is a putative member of the class. 

Mr. Evdokimov and his computer programs are being used solely as a vehicle 

to manage the vast numbers of individuals encompassed by this description. In other 

words, instead of identifying the class by manually listing all names and telephone 

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numbers and then trying to figure out which of these thousands of individuals was 

actually contacted by Defendant, Mr. Evdokimov is using his computer to crossreference these telephone numbers. Obviously the data he is cross-referencing is 

only as good as the information that is being manually inputted. The difficulties he 

has had manually inputting these numbers and figuring out which numbers should be 

manually inputted goes to the difficulties of managing the class, but not to the actual 

identification of the class. 

 As Plaintiff points out, ultimately the method for ascertaining the class has not 

changed. Therefore, this Court declines to strike the Notice of Errata. The Notice of 

Errata simply points out that the original input of data did not include all third party 

contacts. In addition, the method Mr. Evdokimov is using to identify class members 

is based on reliable science and fairly simple computer cross-referencing methods. 

Therefore, Defendant’s Motions to Strike Expert Testimony (ECF Nos. 47 and 51) 

are DENIED. 

B. Class Certification Is Granted Under Rule 23(b)(3) and Denied 

Under Rule 23(b)(2) 

1. Requirements for Rule 23(a) Have Been Met

As a preliminary matter, Defendant argues that the class is not ascertainable 

because the cellular telephone numbers identified by the Plaintiff could have changed 

over time. (ECF No. 54 at p. 21.) However, the members of the class are not being 

identified solely by their telephone numbers. The loan application requests 

information about a loan applicant’s “Employer” with address and telephone number, 

and other “Contacts” with telephone numbers. (ECF No. 39 at Exh. F.) Presumably, 

if the telephone number no longer belongs to the individual identified as the 

Employer or Contact, this can be ascertained during class notification. Moreover, 

“[t]here is no requirement that the identity of the class members...be known at the 

time of certification.” Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 536 

(N.D. Cal. 2012) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The class definition is 

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definite enough so that it is administratively feasible for the Court to ascertain 

whether an individual is a member of the class. See G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Finish 

Thompson, Inc., 2009 WL 2581324, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2009) (finding TCPA 

class identifiable because “[plaintiff] may use the log and fax numbers to ‘work 

backwards’ to locate and identify the exact entities to whom the fax was sent.”). 

Therefore, this Court finds the class is ascertainable. 

a. Numerosity 

Defendant does not raise any issue with respect to the first prong of Rule 23(a). 

Even if the class definition is amended to exclude any individuals whose telephone 

number appears in the “Personal” section of a loan application, the class has well 

over 1,000 members and is clearly so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable. 

b. Commonality 

In addition, common issues exist within the class. Defendant argues that loan 

applicants gave “express prior consent” to contact all individuals listed in the loan 

application. (ECF No. 54 at p. 10.) Plaintiff argues loan applicants could not consent 

on behalf of third parties listed in the “Employment” or “Contacts” section of the 

application. (ECF No. 39-1 at pp. 3, n. 4 & 14; ECF No. 61 at p. 8.) Resolution of 

this legal issue will generate a common answer likely to drive the resolution of the 

litigation. 

Defendant further maintains that class members may have different arguments 

regarding “prior consent” because some putative class members, that is, those 

individuals whose telephone numbers appear in the “Employment” or “Contacts” 

section of the loan application, could also be loan applicants who had given their 

prior consent to be contacted for debt collection. (ECF No. 54 at pp. 11-14.) 

Plaintiff responds by suggesting that the Court amend the class definition sua sponte

to exclude from the class any loan applicants, that is, those individuals whose 

telephone number appears in the “Personal” section of a loan application. (ECF No. 

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61 at p. 2, n. 2.) Plaintiff’s suggestion appears to resolve the concern that some class 

members may also be applicants. Therefore, this Court amends the class definition 

sua sponte to include: 

All persons whose 10-digit cellular telephone numbers with a 

California area code were listed by an account holder in the 

Employment and/or Contacts fields, but were not listed in the 

Personal fields, of a California customer loan application produced to 

[Defendant], which were called by [Defendant] using an ATDS and/or 

an artificial or prerecorded voice for the purpose of collecting or 

attempting to collect an alleged debt from the account holder, between 

August 13, 2008 and August 13, 2012. 

(amendment in bold). With this amendment, this Court finds Defendant’s arguments 

about individualized issues with respect to “express prior consent” are no longer 

valid.2

 Therefore, this Court finds there are questions of law common to the class. 

c. Typicality 

Again, by amending the class to exclude any individuals who are also loan 

applicants, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims that he was listed solely as a third 

party contact on the loan application and thus did not give express prior consent are 

typical of the issues of the remaining class members. 

d. Adequacy 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is an unsuitable representative because he has a 

2000 felony conviction for sex with a minor. (ECF No. 54 at pp. 22-23.) The Court 

disagrees. First, Defendant fails to show how a conviction that is not for dishonesty, 

theft, or fraud is in any way relevant to Plaintiff’s integrity as a class representative. 

Moreover, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, it is highly unlikely that this 

conviction would even be admissible at trial. Even so, the age of the conviction and 

the dissimilarity between the conviction and the determination as to Plaintiff’s ability 

to serve as a fiduciary leads this Court to find that Plaintiff is an adequate class 

 

2

 As discussed below, the Court finds Gutierrez v. Barclays Grp., 2011 WL 

579238 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011) to be distinguishable. 

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representative. 

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff is not an adequate representative 

because he has been inconsistent in stating the remedies he is seeking and his 

“inconsistency may force potential class members to elect on potential remedies.” 

(Id. at p. 22.) However, Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and monetary damages 

in his Complaint (ECF No. 1 at p. 8) and Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 39-

1 at pp. 19-20; ECF No. 39-16 at ¶10). Plaintiff further understands his responsibility 

to prosecute this case on behalf of the entire class. (ECF No. 39-16 at ¶¶8, 10.) 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class. 

2. Because Plaintiff is Seeking Individualized Monetary Damages, 

Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2) Is Not Appropriate 

Plaintiff seeks certification under both Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 23(b)(2). Since 

Plaintiff is seeking individualized monetary claims and not solely injunctive relief, 

certification is only proper under Rule 23(b)(3) as discussed below and not for final 

injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). See Connelly v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 

LLC, 294 F.R.D. 574, 579 (S.D. Cal. 2013). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Class 

Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is DENIED.

3

3. Plaintiff Has Established “Predominance” and “Superiority” 

Under Rule 23(b)(3)

As discussed above, adjudication of the common issue of “express prior 

consent” of an individual who is a third party to a loan application will help achieve 

judicial economy in this case. It does not make sense to adjudicate this issue in 

thousands of smaller cases. 

Defendant argues that, since individuals can, under certain circumstances, 

provide prior express consent to be called at a telephone number other than their own, 

class certification would require “mini-trials” to determine the third party’s 

 

3

 Notably, Defendant represents all contacts to third party individuals listed in the 

loan applications have now ceased. 

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relationship with the loan applicant. However, a quick look at the loan application 

(ECF No. 39 at Exh. F) distinguishes the facts in this case from those in the cases 

cited by Defendant. In this case, the loan application requests telephone numbers 

used by the loan applicant. In a separate “Employment” field, the loan application 

requests the name of the applicant’s Employer, address and telephone number for the 

Employer, name of the applicant’s supervisor and telephone number of the 

applicant’s supervisor. (Id.) This is separate from the personal and work numbers 

where the applicant identifies he can be reached. Cf. Gutierrez, 2011 WL 579238, at 

*1 (plaintiff listed his wife’s cellular number as his home phone number on a credit 

card application). Similarly in the other “Contacts” field of the application, the 

applicant is requested to list contacts, including “nearest relative not living with you” 

and “landlord” including these individuals’ telephone numbers. This is separate from 

the telephone numbers where the applicant can be reached. Ultimately, this case can 

resolve the legal issue as to whether this factual scenario was sufficient to allow the 

Defendant to then reach out to these individuals assuming prior express consent. The 

overall factual scenario can be ascertained by looking at the loan application and this 

predominates over any individual factual scenarios. This is particularly true in light 

of the Court’s amendment of the class definition to exclude any individuals who were 

actually loan applicants. 

Defendant further argues that the plan for noticing the class is unworkable. 

(ECF No. 54 at pp. 17-18.) However, Plaintiff proposes using a reverse look-up to 

identify class members. (ECF No. 61 at p. 10.) The loan application also identifies 

names, telephone numbers and, in some cases, even addresses of putative class 

members. (See ECF No. 39 at Ex. F.) Noticing the class members is not any more 

unworkable than any other class involving thousands of members. 

A class action is the superior method of proceeding in this case, particularly 

since there is a common question that predominates regarding express prior consent 

by a third party contact in a loan application. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Class 

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Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is GRANTED. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 

PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 39). The Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) with the 

Court’s modification to the class definition as discussed above, and DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(2). The Court further 

DENIES Defendant’s Ex Parte Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Notice of Errata and 

Declaration of Ilya Evdokimov in support thereof (ECF No. 47) and DENIES

Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Report and Testimony of Ilya Evdokimov in 

support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 51). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 5, 2014 

 

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