Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00227/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00227-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MOHAMED E. LASHEEN, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE LOOMIS COMPANY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:01-cv-00227-KJM-EFB 

ORDER 

AND RELATED CROSS-CLAIMS. 

On September 24, 2013, after extensive litigation before the district judge 

previously assigned to this case, that judge entered default judgment against defendants Embassy 

of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Cultural and Educational 

Bureau (collectively, “the Egyptian defendants”) in the amounts of: 

(1) $200,000.00, based on defendants’ violation of the Employees 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(a)(1)(B); 

(2) $54,926.00 in pre-judgment interest, calculated through 

December 5, 2012; and 

(3) $226,251.63 in attorney’s fees, calculated through November 

21, 2012. 

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Order, Sept. 24, 2013 (“2013 Order”), ECF No. 368; Default J., ECF No. 369; see also Andrus 

Decl., Nov. 21, 2012 (“2012 Andrus Decl.”), ECF No. 359; Findings & Recommendations, Mar. 

21, 2013 (“2013 F. & R.”), ECF No. 363. The default judgment amount totaled $481,177.63. 

See Default J. 1. 

A number of events followed: the Egyptian defendants appealed the judgment to 

the Ninth Circuit on October 23, 2013 (ECF No. 370); the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s 

order on December 18, 2015 (ECF Nos. 376 & 379); the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiff Mohamed 

Lasheen’s request that attorney’s fees on appeal be transferred to the district court under Ninth 

Circuit Rule 39-1.8 on January 8, 2016 (ECF No. 378); the case was reassigned to the 

undersigned on January 11, 2016 (ECF No. 377); the parties appeared before this court for a 

Status Conference on March 3, 2016 (ECF No. 384); the Egyptian defendants filed a petition for 

writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court on March 16, 2016, case number 15-1179; and plaintiff 

filed an opposition brief with the Supreme Court on April 20, 2016.1 

Plaintiff now moves to update and amend the default judgment to add: 

(1) $71,550.42 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred since 

November 21, 2012 under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1); and 

(2) $3,672.37 in interest since December 5, 2012 under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1961(a). 

Pl.’s Mot. Amend J. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 387; Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Mot. Amend J. (“Pl.’s Mem. P. 

& A.”), ECF No. 388. The Egyptian defendants filed an untimely, two-page opposition brief. 

ECF No. 390 (“Opp’n”); see E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(c). While the Egyptian defendants provided no 

explanation for the delay in filing their opposition, in the interest of resolving the matter on the 

merits, the court considers the opposition. The court submitted the matter as provided by Local 

Rule 230(g). As explained below, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion, as modified. 

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 This court has jurisdiction as provided by the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate and Order 

Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer Determination of Attorneys’ Fees to the District Court. 

ECF Nos. 378 & 379. Defendants’ filing of a petition for writ of certiorari does not deprive this 

court of jurisdiction. Cf. Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 296 F.2d 215, 215 (5th 

Cir. 1961); 28 U.S.C. § 1254; Fed. R. Appellate P. 41(d); Sup. Ct. R. 19.

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I. DISCUSSION 

The factual and procedural history and the basis for the default judgment were 

discussed at length in the magistrate judge’s March 21, 2013 Findings and Recommendations, 

ECF No. 363, which the prior district judge adopted in full, ECF No. 368. 

A. Attorney’s Fees, Expenses, and Costs 

Plaintiff seeks to amend the default judgment to add $66,150.00 in attorney’s fees 

and $5,400.42 in expenses and costs incurred since November 21, 2012. Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 4. 

The court first considers whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(g)(1). 

1. Whether Plaintiff Is Entitled to Attorney’s Fees on Appeal 

As the court previously noted, “It is within the court’s discretion to grant an award 

of attorneys’ fees and costs in an ERISA case, and absent special circumstances, a prevailing 

ERISA plaintiff normally should receive such fees.” 2013 F. & R. 17 (citing 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(g)(1) and McConnell v. MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan, 778 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

The court also has discretion to award attorney’s fees on appeal. Smith v. Ret. Fund Tr. of 

Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus. of S. Cal., 857 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1988). The court 

considers five factors in exercising its discretion under § 1132(g)(1): 

(1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; 

(2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; 

(3) whether an award of fees against the opposing parties would 

deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether 

the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and 

beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal 

question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ 

positions. 

McConnell, 778 F.2d at 525 (quoting Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 

1980)). The court previously found that the Hummell factors weigh in favor of granting plaintiff 

his attorney’s fees. Findings & Recommendations 12–13, July 22, 2008 (“2008 F. & R.”), ECF 

No. 297; 2013 F. & R. 17–20. Specifically, the court found the Egyptian defendants acted in bad 

faith in denying plaintiff coverage under his benefits plan, when he needed a liver transplant; 

plaintiff died on December 3, 2000. 2013 F. & R. 2, 18. Additionally, the defendants appeared 

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able to pay an award of fees, the award of fees would discourage similar conduct in the future, the 

court decided relatively novel issues with respect to the plan, and the defendants had not 

succeeded in defending their position. Id. at 18. Since then, plaintiff has successfully defended 

the default judgment on appeal. See ECF No. 376 & 379. For the same reasons previously 

discussed, and because no special circumstances would make an award of fees unjust, plaintiff is 

entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal under § 1132(g)(1). 

In their opposition brief, the Egyptian defendants argue the matter does not 

advance the interests of the United States or California, “fees are not considered ‘costs’ under 

Fed. R. App. P. 39,” and “it is extremely doubtful that any amounts sought by Plaintiff’s counsel 

herein are recoverable under well-established authority.” Opp’n 1–2 (emphasis in original). 

Defendants do not elaborate on these arguments. Id. Whether the matter advances interests of 

the United States or California is irrelevant to plaintiff’s motion. See id. at 1. The only case cited 

by defendants, Family PAC v. Ferguson, 745 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2014), does not support 

defendants’ position. In Family PAC, the Ninth Circuit held that the term “costs” under Rule 39 

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure does not include attorney’s fees recoverable under 42 

U.S.C. § 1988. Id. at 1269. As a result, the court held that a previous order that “[e]ach party 

shall bear its own costs of appeal” under Rule 39(a) did not preclude the award of attorney’s fees 

on appeal under § 1988. Id. at 1264, 1269. Here, plaintiff properly seeks attorney’s fees on 

appeal under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), not under Rule 39. The Ninth Circuit has held that 

§ 1132(g)(1) authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. Smith, 857 F.2d at 592; 

see also Canseco v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 93 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiff is entitled to further attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1). The court next 

considers the calculation of costs and fees. The court notes the Egyptian defendants do not 

dispute the reasonableness of the hours expended, hourly rate, or expenses and costs incurred. 

2. Calculation of Attorney’s Fees and Costs 

To calculate attorney’s fees in an ERISA action, courts use a two-step hybrid 

lodestar/multiplier approach. Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2000). First, the court determines the “lodestar” amount by multiplying the number of hours 

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reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. The party seeking fees 

bears the burden of documenting the hours expended in the litigation and must submit evidence 

supporting those hours and the rates claimed. Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 

(1983)). In determining the appropriate lodestar amount, the district court should exclude any 

hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. 

at 434). “Second, a court may adjust the lodestar upward or downward using a ‘multiplier’ based 

on factors not subsumed in the initial calculation of the lodestar.” Id.

Here, plaintiff seeks $66,150.00 in attorney’s fees for 264.6 hours of work 

performed by lead attorney, Randy Andrus, since November 21, 2012, based on an hourly rate of 

$250. Andrus Decl. ¶ 8 & Ex. 7, May 2, 2016 (“2016 Andrus Decl.”), ECF No. 388. The court 

previously found Andrus’s requested hourly rate of $250 to reflect the reasonable market value in 

the relevant community. 2013 F. & R. 19–20. Even though several years have passed since the 

court’s previous determination, Andrus, remarkably, has not increased his hourly rate. See 2016 

Andrus Decl. ¶ 11. The court again finds this rate to be reasonable, if not below market, based on 

Andrus’s declaration. 2016 Andrus Decl. ¶¶ 11, 14–17, 21–22. 

In addition, given the detailed billing entries that plaintiff has provided and the 

amount of time plaintiff’s counsel was required to expend on this action over the past three-and-ahalf years, the court also finds the number of hours expended by Andrus was time reasonably 

necessary to prosecute this action. Id. ¶¶ 8, 18 & Ex. 7. Since November 21, 2012, plaintiff’s 

counsel has attended the December 5, 2012 hearing before the magistrate judge; responded to 

defendants’ objections to the Findings and Recommendations (ECF No. 366); briefed arguments 

and appeared for oral argument on December 8, 2015; engaged in settlement discussions with the 

Ninth Circuit mediator and counsel; appeared before this court for the March 2, 2016 Status 

Conference; researched and prepared briefing before the Supreme Court; and prepared this 

motion. 2016 Andrus Decl. ¶ 17. However, the court deducts the sixteen hours estimated would 

be required to travel and appear at the scheduled June 3, 2016 hearing on this motion, because the 

court submitted the matter without a hearing. See id. Ex. 7 at 5–6; Minute Order, May 31, 2016, 

ECF No. 391. This reduces counsel’s total hours from 264.6 to 248.6 hours, thereby reducing the 

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requested attorney’s fees from $66,150.00 to $62,150.00. Plaintiff does not seek to adjust the 

lodestar using a multiplier, and the court finds it is not appropriate to adjust the lodestar here. See 

Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045 (“The lodestar amount is presumptively the reasonable fee 

amount, and thus a multiplier may be used to adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward 

only in rare and exceptional cases, supported by both specific evidence on the record and detailed 

findings by the lower courts that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Finally, the requested additional expenses and costs of suit incurred are thoroughly 

documented in Andrus’s declaration and were reasonable and necessary to the prosecution of the 

action. 2016 Andrus Decl. ¶¶ 8, 19–20 & Ex. 7. However, the court deducts the $511.96 

estimated for travel to Sacramento for the scheduled June 3, 2016 hearing, which was vacated. 

See id. Ex. 7 at 7; Minute Order, May 31, 2016. This reduces the total expenses from $5,400.42 

to $4,888.46. 

The court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion, as modified, to add $62,150.00 in 

attorney’s fees and $4,888.46 in expenses and costs to the default judgment. 

B. Interest 

The court previously found the equities supported awarding pre-judgment interest 

on the principal balance of $200,000. 2013 F. & R. 17. Although pre-judgment interest is 

generally calculated using the interest rate prescribed for post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1961, Blankenship v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 486 F.3d 620, 627–28 (9th Cir. 2007), the prior 

judge found it more appropriate in this case to calculate the pre-judgment interest for each year of 

the accrual period at a rate equal to the average daily one-year Treasury constant maturity yield 

for that year, which has fluctuated from 3.49 percent in 2001, to 4.94 percent in 2006, and below 

1 percent currently, 2013 F. & R. 17. The court awarded pre-judgment interest through the date 

of the hearing before the magistrate judge, December 5, 2012, totaling $54,926.00. See id.; Pl.’s 

Ex. BB, ECF No. 359-1. 

Plaintiff seeks to amend the default judgment to include pre-judgment interest on 

the principal balance of $200,000 from December 6, 2012 until the date of judgment, September 

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24, 2013, as well as post-judgment interest on the total default judgment of $481,177.63 from 

September 24, 2013 until the scheduled hearing date for this motion, June 3, 2016. Defendants 

do not appear to oppose plaintiff’s request for payment of interest. See Opp’n 2 (opposing only 

the award of additional attorney’s fees). 

1. Additional Pre-Judgment Interest 

The court uses the same methodology that the prior judge used to calculate the prejudgment interest on the principal balance from December 6, 2012 to September 23, 2013. The 

average daily one-year Treasury constant maturity for the year beginning December 6, 2012 was 

0.134 percent.2 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates 

(Daily) – H.15,” http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2016) 

(average one-year constant maturity Treasury yield); 2016 Andrus Decl. Ex. 9 at 2. Applying this 

rate to the principal balance of $200,000 from December 6, 2012 to September 23, 2013 yields a 

total of $209.26 in additional pre-judgment interest.3

2. Post-Judgment Interest 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1961 provides for the award of post-judgment interest: 

(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case 

recovered in a district court . . . . Such interest shall be calculated 

from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the 

weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as 

published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the 

judgment . . . . 

(b) Interest shall be computed daily to the date of payment . . . and 

shall be compounded annually. . . . 

Plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment interest under § 1961, but he incorrectly 

calculates the amount owed. 2016 Andrus Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. 9. Specifically, plaintiff appears to 

have conflated the method the court previously used to calculate the pre-judgment interest with 

 2

 The court takes judicial notice of this fact under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2). 

3

 $200,000 principal multiplied by an interest rate of 0.134% equals $268 in annual 

interest. Because the relevant period is only 285 days, the court multiplied $268 in annual 

interest by 285 days divided by 365 days, which equals $209.26. 

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the method required for the calculation of post-judgment interest under § 1961. But these two 

methods differ. Whereas the court previously applied a different interest rate for each year in the 

accrual period based on the average daily one-year Treasury constant maturity for that year, 

§ 1961(a) requires application of a single interest rate for the entire accrual period based on the 

weekly average one-year Treasury constant maturity for the calendar week preceding the date of 

judgment. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 838–39 (1990) (the 

single applicable interest rate for the week prior to the date of judgment applies for the entire 

duration of the interest accrual period); Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, “Post Judgement 

Interest Rate,” http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/post-judgement-interest-rate (last 

visited Aug. 3, 2016) (providing directions on how to determine the applicable interest rate under 

§ 1961(a)). The weekly average one-year Treasury constant maturity for the calendar week 

preceding the date of the judgment, September 24, 2013, was 0.11 percent.4 See Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates (Weekly) – H.15,” 

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/ 20130923/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2016) (Row: “Week 

Ending - Sep 20”; Column: “U.S. government securities - Treasury constant maturities - Nominal 

- 1-year”). Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment interest on the default judgment of 

$481,177.63 from September 24, 2013 until the date of payment, compounded annually, at the 

single applicable rate of 0.11 percent. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a), (b). This yields a total of $1,400.71 

for the period from September 24, 2013 until June 3, 2016.5

 

 4

 The court takes judicial notice of this fact under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2). 

5

 The court calculated the interest accrued each year by multiplying the total judgment 

amount at the beginning of the year by the interest rate of 0.11%: 

 9/24/13–9/24/14: $481,177.63 × 0.0011 = $529.30 [New Total Judgment = 

$481,706.93] 

 9/24/14–9/24/15: $481,706.93 × 0.0011 = $529.88 [New Total Judgment = 

$482,236.81] 

 9/24/15–9/24/16: $482,236.81 × 0.0011 = $530.46 

o Therefore, 9/24/15–6/3/16 = $530.46 × (235 days ÷ 365 days) = $341.53 

 Total Post-Judgment Interest = $529.30 + $529.88 + $341.53 = $1,400.71 

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The court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to add pre-judgment interest in the amount 

of $209.26 and post-judgment interest in the amount of $1,400.71. Post-judgment interest will 

continue to accrue until the date of payment at a rate of 0.11 percent, compounded annually. 

II. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to amend 

judgment, as modified, to add $62,150.00 in attorney’s fees, $4,888.46 in expenses and costs, 

$209.26 in pre-judgment interest, and $1,400.71 in post-judgment interest, together equaling 

$68,648.43. The amended default judgment is entered in the total amount of $549,826.06. Postjudgment interest will continue to accrue until the date of payment at a rate of 0.11 percent, 

compounded annually. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 3, 2016. 

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