Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-md-02641/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-md-02641-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

IN RE: BARD IVC FILTERS PRODUCTS 

LIABILITY LITIGATION 

This Order Relates to: 

Angela Novy, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

C.R. Bard, Inc., et al., 

Defendants.

MDL No. 15-2641 

No. CV-16-02853-PHX-DGC 

ORDER

 This case was originally filed in Missouri state court. Defendants removed the 

case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, and it was 

transferred to this Court to become part of this MDL proceeding. Defendants have filed a 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Docs. 3401, 3402. Plaintiffs have 

responded (Doc. 3405), and filed a motion to remand (Doc. 3403). No party has 

requested oral argument. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss all Plaintiffs other than Angela Novy and Tammy Dykema, and deny 

Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. 

I. Background. 

 The allegations of Plaintiffs’ complaint are taken as true for purposes of this 

motion. Plaintiffs are 48 unrelated persons from 29 different states. See Doc. 1-3, ¶¶ 6-

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53 in Novy v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02853-PHX-DGC (E.D. Mo. July 28, 2016).1 

Defendant C.R. Bard, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business 

in New Jersey. E.D. Mo. Doc. 1-3, ¶ 54. Defendant Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. 

(“BPV”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of C.R. Bard, Inc. with its principal place of 

business in Arizona. Id., ¶ 55. Defendants manufacture a line of Inferior Vena Cava 

(“IVC”) filters to capture blood clots that travel to the heart and lungs. Id., ¶¶ 3-4, 58-59. 

 On May 6, 2016, Plaintiffs filed this action against C.R. Bard, Inc. and BPV 

(collectively, “Bard”) in the Circuit Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, St. 

Louis City, Missouri. See id. at 1. Plaintiffs allege, as do the plaintiffs in this MDL, that 

they each received a Bard IVC filter and have suffered injury “directly and proximately 

caused by Defendants, [and] the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of Bard 

IVC filters.” Id., ¶ 5. Only two Plaintiffs, Angela Novy and Tammy Dykema, allege 

claims based on events that occurred in Missouri. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 28. All other Plaintiffs are 

citizens of other states whose claims arise from events that occurred outside of Missouri. 

Several of these Plaintiffs share common citizenship with Bard.2

 See id. at ¶¶ 6-53. 

 On July 28, 2016, Bard removed this case to federal court in the Eastern District of 

Missouri on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and requested transfer to this MDL. See

E.D. Mo. Doc. 1. Bard also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. See Docs. 3401, 3402. On August 8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion to 

remand the case to Missouri state court. See Docs. 3403, 3404. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A civil case brought in state court may be removed to federal court in the district 

where the action is pending if the federal district court would have had original 

 

1

 To avoid confusion, documents filed in the Eastern District of Missouri case after 

removal but before consolidation in this MDL will be cited as “E.D. Mo. Doc.,” and 

documents filed in MDL No. 2641 will be cited as “Doc.” 

2

 Plaintiffs Lisa Radzik, Allen Kotter, Denise Gill, Faith Hinchman, Sabir Saad, 

and William Salters are citizens of New Jersey. E.D. Mo. Doc. 1-3, ¶¶ 6-53. Plaintiffs Heather Powers, Joseph Grossman, and James Maxfield are citizens of Arizona. Id. Plaintiffs Abdul-Mutaal Bilal and Brian Morrison are citizens of Delaware. Id. 

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jurisdiction, including diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(a). Removal 

based on diversity jurisdiction is not proper if complete diversity is lacking, but “[c]ourts 

have long recognized fraudulent joinder as an exception to the complete diversity rule.” 

In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010).3

 The removal 

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is to be strictly construed against removal. See Syngenta Crop 

Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 

313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941). A defendant seeking to remove a case to federal court 

carries the burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction, and “[a]ll doubts about federal 

jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” In re Prempro, 591 

F.3d at 620 (citation omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

III. Analysis. 

Defendants divide the 48 Plaintiffs into two groups: “in-state Plaintiffs” and “outof-state Plaintiffs.” Doc. 3402 at 2-3. In-state Plaintiffs include only Novy, who is a 

resident of Missouri, and Dykema, who was implanted with a Bard IVC filter in 

Missouri. Id. Out-of-state Plaintiffs include all other named Plaintiffs. Id. Defendants 

concede that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over them with respect to the 

claims of the in-state Plaintiffs. Id. at 3. 

 In their notice of removal, Defendants assert that the diversity-destroying out-ofstate Plaintiffs were fraudulently joined because their claims have no reasonable basis in 

Missouri. E.D. Mo. Doc. 1 at 3. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that this 

Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants for all claims brought by out-of-state 

Plaintiffs because those Plaintiffs cannot assert sufficient facts to establish such personal 

jurisdiction in any Missouri court. Docs. 3401, 3402 at 4, 3319 at 4-5. In their response 

and motion to remand, Plaintiffs argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

because complete diversity is lacking, Defendants therefore improperly removed this case 

 

3

 Because an MDL transferee court applies the substantive law of the transferor 

forum, the Court applies the substantive law of the Eastern District of Missouri and the 

Eighth Circuit to this motion. In re Zicam Cold Remedy Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 797 F. Supp. 2d. 940, 941 (D. Ariz. 2011) (citing Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 525 (1990)). 

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to federal court, and, in ruling on the various motions, the Court should decide subject 

matter jurisdiction before addressing personal jurisdiction, which will result in immediate 

remand. Docs. 3405, 3404. Plaintiffs also argue that they are not fraudulently joined 

because all Plaintiffs allege injuries arising from the same product and common facts. 

Doc. 3404 at 6-9. The Court will first determine whether it must decide subject matter 

jurisdiction before personal jurisdiction. 

A. Priority of Jurisdictional Arguments. 

“Jurisdiction to resolve cases on the merits requires both authority over the 

category of claim in suit (subject matter jurisdiction) and authority over the parties 

(personal jurisdiction), so that the court’s decision will bind them.” Ruhrgas AG v. 

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999). “[I]n cases removed from state court to 

federal court, as in cases originating in federal court, there is no unyielding jurisdictional 

hierarchy.” Id. at 578. “[I]n most instances subject-matter jurisdiction will involve no 

arduous inquiry. In such cases, both expedition and sensitivity to state courts’ coequal 

stature should impel the federal court to dispose of that issue first.” Id. at 587-88 

(citations omitted). But where “a district court has before it a straightforward personal 

jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect in 

subject matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse 

its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 588; see also Crawford 

v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 2001) (“certain threshold 

issues, such as personal jurisdiction, may be taken up without a finding of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, provided that the threshold issue is simple when compared with the issue of 

subject-matter jurisdiction.”). 

 Plaintiffs argue that subject matter jurisdiction analysis in this case is simple 

because complete diversity is lacking. Doc. 3404 at 4. They contend the Court should 

remand this action immediately without reaching the issue of personal jurisdiction. Id. 

 Plaintiffs oversimplify. Defendants argue that the diversity-destroying out-of-state 

Plaintiffs were fraudulently joined to circumvent complete diversity. Doc. 3402; 3319. 

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“The Court cannot simply ignore or summarily reject this argument to make its subject 

matter jurisdiction analysis easier.” In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prod. Liab. 

Litig. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 

(“TRT”). Defendants’ fraudulent joinder argument raises complicated issues upon which 

there is no controlling Eighth Circuit precedent, such as whether the fraudulent joinder 

doctrine applies to plaintiffs who allegedly cannot invoke the court’s personal 

jurisdiction. The fraudulent joinder argument makes the subject matter jurisdiction 

analysis “rather complicated,” especially if the inquiry involves “the more unusual 

question of ‘fraudulent joinder’ of a plaintiff.” Foslip Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolife Int’l, 

Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 891, 899 (N.D. Iowa 2000). The personal jurisdiction question, by 

contrast, does not present a complex question, and the Court therefore concludes that 

addressing it will not offend principles of federalism. Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 588. 

 What is more, Defendants’ subject matter jurisdiction argument relies on their 

claim that joinder of the diversity-destroying out-of-state Plaintiffs was improper because 

those Plaintiffs cannot establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants in a Missouri 

court. Doc. 3319 at 4-8. Thus, the Court will confront the personal jurisdiction issue 

regardless of the sequence in which it conducts its analysis. TRT, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 

1046. 

 The Court will first address personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state Plaintiffs. If 

personal jurisdiction is lacking, the Court may dismiss the out-of-state Plaintiffs and deny 

the motion for remand without addressing fraudulent joinder. 

 B. Personal Jurisdiction. 

 The Court need not decide whether to apply federal law or Missouri law because 

“[f]ederal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their 

jurisdiction over persons,” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (citation 

omitted), and Missouri has authorized its courts to exercise jurisdiction to the maximum 

extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, see J.C.W. ex rel. 

Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Mo. 2009). Thus, whether in federal court or 

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Missouri courts, the question of personal jurisdiction turns on well-known principles of 

due process law. 

 Missouri may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who is not physically present 

in the State if the defendant has minimum contacts with Missouri, such that suit can be 

maintained there without offending “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.’” J. McIntyer Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (quoting

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The party asserting personal 

jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case that jurisdiction exists. 

Johnson v. Woodcock, 444 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2006). “To survive a motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must state sufficient facts in the complaint to support a reasonable 

inference that [the defendant] may be subjected to jurisdiction in the forum state.” 

Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 585 (8th Cir. 2008). 

 Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 

746, 754 (2014). General personal jurisdiction grants a court the ability to entertain any 

claim against a defendant over which it has subject matter jurisdiction, even claims 

arising from the defendant’s actions in other States. Id. It exists when a defendant’s 

contacts with the forum State “are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] 

essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. Plaintiffs do not directly argue that 

Defendants are subject to general personal jurisdiction in Missouri, nor could they. 

Plaintiffs identify no Missouri-related contacts by Defendants other than sales and 

marketing efforts, and the Supreme Court has held that such contacts are not sufficient 

for general jurisdiction. Id. at 761. 

 Specific personal jurisdiction grants a court personal jurisdiction over a specific 

claim asserted against a defendant. It exists when the defendant has purposefully availed 

itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum State and the plaintiff’s injuries 

arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 

471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). As the Eighth Circuit has explained, specific jurisdiction 

applies to “causes of action arising from or related to a defendant’s actions within the 

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forum state.” Pangaea, Inc. v. Flying Burrito LLC, 647 F.3d 741, 745-46 (8th Cir. 2011); 

see also Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2004). 

 The out-of-state Plaintiffs present no facts to suggest that their alleged injuries 

from Bard IVC filters arise out of or relate to Defendants’ actions in Missouri. No outof-state Plaintiff is a citizen of Missouri, and no event giving rise to their claims took 

place there. See Id., ¶¶ 6-53. Plaintiffs do not allege that any out-of-state Plaintiff was 

ever in Missouri, much less that they were subjected to any advertising, doctor 

recommendation, filter implants, illness, injury, or medical procedure there. Because the 

out-of-state Plaintiffs received their Bard filters and related medical care in other States, 

they cannot individually show that their injuries arise out of or relate to Defendants’ 

Missouri activities. 

 Plaintiffs argue that out-of-state Plaintiffs “do not have to separately establish 

personal jurisdiction for each claim as though they were in a vacuum.” Doc. 3405 at 4-5. 

They contend that the Court can look to this lawsuit “as a whole,” and, upon finding that 

the claims of in-state Plaintiffs arise out of Defendants’ contacts with Missouri, exercise 

personal jurisdiction over the entire case due to the factual similarity of Plaintiffs’ claims. 

 The Court does not agree. This is not a class action. The in-state Plaintiffs are not 

suing on behalf of the out-of-state Plaintiffs, and cannot establish personal jurisdiction for 

them. Rather, each Plaintiff is suing in his or her own right and must prove his her own 

case. The fact that Plaintiffs have been joined in a single lawsuit does not alter the reality 

that this case involves 48 different Plaintiffs asserting 48 different claims. 

 Joinder is not the same as jurisdiction. Joinder of multiple Plaintiffs may be 

appropriate when their claims arise out of “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 

transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). But the rule permitting joinder says 

nothing about personal jurisdiction. Instead, specific jurisdiction applies only to “causes 

of action arising from or related to a defendant’s actions within the forum state.” 

Pangaea, 647 F.3d at 745-46. If an individual plaintiff’s cause of action does not arise 

out of or relate to the defendant’s actions within the forum State, the plaintiff cannot 

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establish specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This is true even if the 

plaintiff is joined with other plaintiffs whose claims do arise out of the defendant’s forum 

contacts. As courts have recognized, “[p]ermitting the legitimate exercise of specific 

jurisdiction over one claim to justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a different 

claim that does not arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum contacts would violate 

the Due Process Clause.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 275 (5th 

Cir. 2006); see also TRT, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 1049 (“defendants’ contacts in Missouri that 

give rise to [the in-state plaintiff’s] claims are inadequate to confer jurisdiction over 

defendants for [the out-of-state plaintiff’s] claims”); 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1351, at 299 n.30 (2004) (“There is no 

such thing as supplemental specific personal jurisdiction; if separate claims are pled, 

specific personal jurisdiction must independently exist for each claim and the existence of 

personal jurisdiction for one claim will not provide the basis for another claim.”).4

 Without saying so, Plaintiffs in essence are arguing for general personal 

jurisdiction over Defendants – that Defendants may be sued in Missouri for any claim, 

even those that do not arise out of Defendants’ Missouri-related contacts. The Supreme 

Court has squarely rejected the suggestion that general jurisdiction – sometimes referred 

to as “all-purpose jurisdiction” – may arise from a defendant’s sales and marketing 

efforts in a State: 

only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant 

amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there. For an individual, the paradigm 

forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; 

for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is 

fairly regarded as at home. With respect to a corporation, the place of 

incorporation and principal place of business are paradigm bases for 

 

4

 Some cases have recognized a form of pendent personal jurisdiction with respect to multiple claims of a single plaintiff: “where a federal statute authorizes nationwide 

service of process, and the federal and state claims ‘derive from a common nucleus of 

operative fact,’ the district court may assert personal jurisdiction over the parties to the related state law claims even if personal jurisdiction is not otherwise available.” IUE 

AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1056 (2d Cir. 1993). Even if this 

doctrine is viable, it applies to claims asserted by a single plaintiff, not claims asserted by different plaintiffs. Id. 

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general jurisdiction. Those affiliations have the virtue of being unique – 

that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place – as well as easily 

ascertainable. 

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Plaintiffs 

do not contend, and cannot contend, that Defendants are incorporated or have their 

principal places of business in Missouri. And the fact that Defendants marketed their 

IVC filters in Missouri is not sufficient. The Supreme Court rejected “the exercise of 

general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, 

continuous, and systematic course of business.” Id. at 761 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The Court specifically declined to approve general jurisdiction “in every . . . 

State in which [the defendant’s] sales are sizable.” Id. 

 Defendants are not subject to general jurisdiction in Missouri. Their marketing 

efforts and profits from the State are not sufficient, and Plaintiffs cannot show that they 

otherwise operate so continuously and systematically in Missouri as to render them “at 

home” there. As noted above, Defendant C.R. Bard, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with 

its principal place of business in New Jersey, and Defendant BPV is a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of C.R. Bard, Inc., with its principal place of business in Arizona. 

 Plaintiffs cite Gracey v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:15-cv-407-CEJ, 2015 WL 

2066242, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 4, 2015), in support of their jurisdictional argument. In 

Gracey, the district court remanded a case in which 64 plaintiffs from 30 states asserted 

claims against defendants arising out of their use of the same medication. Gracey, 2015 

WL 2066242, at *1. The Gracey defendants, like Defendants in this case, sought to 

dismiss diversity-destroying out-of-state plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction in 

order to preserve subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. Id. The Gracey court held 

that because the defendants conceded that Missouri courts had specific personal 

jurisdiction over them with respect to the Missouri plaintiffs, “Missouri courts, thus, may 

properly exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants with respect to this cause of 

action as a whole arising out of or related to its contacts and conduct in Missouri.” Id.

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at *3. Gracey held that properly joined plaintiffs with claims arising out of the same 

transaction need not establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Id. at *3-4. 

 The Court respectfully disagrees with Gracey. It conflates joinder and 

jurisdiction, and runs counter to the fundamental specific jurisdiction principle that every 

plaintiff’s case must arise out of a defendant’s forum-related activities. Under Plaintiffs’ 

theory of personal jurisdiction, any company engaged in the sale or marketing of products 

in Missouri, and whose products allegedly cause a Missouri plaintiff’s injury, would be 

subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri for claims brought by any plaintiff who 

allegedly suffered a similar injury anywhere in the country. Such a broad theory of 

personal jurisdiction has been rejected by the Supreme Court as “unacceptably grasping.” 

See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. 

 Plaintiffs also argue that requiring personal jurisdiction over each plaintiff’s claim 

ignores the Supreme Court’s instruction in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 

770, 775 (1984), that a court’s minimum contacts analysis “properly focuses on the 

relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Doc. 3405 at 4-8; 

Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775. But Keeton did not alter the specific jurisdiction requirement 

that a plaintiff’s injuries must arise out of or be related to the defendant’s activities in the 

forum. Keeton involved a libel suit brought by a non-resident for libelous publications in 

New Hampshire. Id. The Supreme Court specifically recognized that the injury arose 

from the defendant’s conduct in the State, holding that “New Hampshire may also extend 

its concern to the injury that in-state libel causes within New Hampshire to a nonresident. 

The tort of libel is generally held to occur wherever the offending material is circulated.” 

Id. at 776-777 (emphasis added); see also id. at 776 (“it is beyond dispute that New 

Hampshire has a significant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the 

State. . . . This interest extends to libel actions brought by nonresidents.”) (emphasis 

added); TRT, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 1048 (“There is no indication in Keeton that the plaintiff 

could have brought suit in New Hampshire if, for example, the magazine circulated 

within the state contained only libelous statements related to other, unrelated plaintiffs.”). 

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Unlike the plaintiff in Keeton, who was personally harmed by the defendant’s conduct in 

New Hampshire, the out-of-state Plaintiffs in this case have suffered no injury arising 

from Defendants’ actions in Missouri. 

 Plaintiffs make only conclusory allegations that they are “suing defendants for the 

very activity being conducted, in part, in Missouri – that is marketing, promoting, and 

selling their retrievable IVC filters.” Doc. 3404 at 8. Such conclusory allegations are not 

sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See Dever, 380 F.3d at 1074 (holding that a 

plaintiff failed to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant where the plaintiff 

rested on conclusory allegations); T.L.I. Holding Corp. v. Samsung Int’l, Inc., No. 4:07-

cv-01916-FRB, 2008 WL 2620910, at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 27, 2008) (“[C]onclusory 

allegations are insufficient to support a finding that this Court has personal jurisdiction 

over [the defendant].”). Plaintiffs provide no facts to show how their claims arise out of 

Bard’s marketing and sales of its IVC filters in Missouri, particularly given that out-ofstate Plaintiffs do not allege that they received their filters in Missouri or otherwise have 

any link to the State. Plaintiffs have failed to show that the out-of-state Plaintiffs can 

establish specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants.5

 

IV. Conclusion. 

 The Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss out-of-state Plaintiffs’ claims 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. With the out-of-state Plaintiffs dismissed, complete 

diversity exists among the parties. The Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction 

over this action with regard to the remaining Plaintiffs, Novy and Dykema, and the 

motion to remand will be denied. This ruling does not preclude dismissed Plaintiffs from 

filing suit in a State that can exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants, or from 

joining this MDL through the filing of a short form complaint as described in the Court’s 

 

5

 Plaintiffs suggest that jurisdictional discovery may enable them to show personal jurisdiction in Missouri. Doc. 3406 at 6. The Court will not grant such discovery because it is clear that Defendants are not subject to general jurisdiction in Missouri and out-of-state Plaintiffs’ injuries do not arise out of Defendants’ activities there. Plaintiffs 

possess all of the facts concerning their own receipt of an IVC filter and problems that allegedly resulted from it, and yet they never suggest that any out-of-state Plaintiff received the filter or was otherwise injured in Missouri. 

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case management orders. 

 IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the out-of-state Plaintiffs for lack of 

personal jurisdiction (Doc. 3401) is granted. The Court will retain 

jurisdiction over the claims of Plaintiffs Angela Novy and Tammy 

Dykema. 

2. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Doc. 3403) is denied. 

Dated this 27th day of October, 2016. 

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