Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_12-cv-06334/USCOURTS-cand-5_12-cv-06334-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

Case No.: 5:12-cv-6334-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JAMES WEAVER, Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SANTA CLARA, a municipal 

corporation; KEVIN R. KYLE, individually and 

in his capacity as CHIEF OF POLICE FOR THE 

CITY OF SANTA CLARA POLICE 

DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 5:12-cv-6334-PSG

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO AMEND AND 

GRANTING-IN-PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Re: Docket Nos. 21, 22)

This dispute stems from an incident involving Plaintiff James Weaver and a K-9 police dog. 

Defendants City of Santa Clara and Kevin R. Kyle move for summary judgment on all claims, and 

Weaver seeks leave to amend his complaint to join the individual officers involved in the incident. 

Having considered the papers and arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS-IN-PART the motion 

for summary judgment and DENIES the motion for leave to amend. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The September 24, 2011 Incident

This case presents a classic question of fact as to the actual events of September 24, 2011. 

It is agreed that in the wee hours of the morning, the police were searching for a fleeing felon, they 

accidentally found Weaver, and at some point, dog bit man. 

Case 5:12-cv-06334-PSG Document 65 Filed 01/06/14 Page 1 of 7
2

Case No.: 5:12-cv-6334-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

That, however, is the end of the accepted facts. According to Weaver’s deposition, he 

woke up quickly when he heard the police yelling in his direction. He stood up, raised his hands, 

and came out from the bushes. The police then told him to lie down on the ground, handcuffed 

him, and only after he was handcuffed was the dog released. The police officers remember it 

differently. They claim that they repeatedly asked the figure in the bushes to come out, and when 

he did not, they sent the dog in to “bite and hold” him in place until the officers could secure him. 

Weaver later brought this suit.

B. Discovery

On March 19, 2013, the parties met with the court for a case management conference and 

agreed on dates to steer the progression of the case.1 These dates were then solidified in the court’s 

April 11 Scheduling Order, establishing June 11, 2013 as the final date to join additional parties 

and November 8, 2013 as the cutoff for fact discovery.2 Despite these deadlines, Weaver’s counsel 

did not serve any form of written discovery and delayed noticing or conducting depositions until 

the very end of the discovery period.3 

On November 11, 2013, three days after the close of fact discovery, Weaver’s counsel took 

the deposition of Officer Nathan Crescini, who handled Jax on the night in question.4

 Several of 

Crescini’s statements in his deposition lead Weaver’s counsel to believe that there may be 

additional evidence somewhere that may help his client’s case.5

 Accordingly, counsel now 

requests leave to conduct additional discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), as well as leave to 

amend his complaint to include additional parties. 

 1 See Docket No. 14. 

2 See Docket No. 15. 

3 See Docket No. 37 at 3. 

4 See Docket No. 29 at 10. 

5 See id. at 10-12.

Case 5:12-cv-06334-PSG Document 65 Filed 01/06/14 Page 2 of 7
3

Case No.: 5:12-cv-6334-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Leave to Amend

When a scheduling order has been issued with deadlines for amending the pleadings and 

that deadline has passed, a plaintiff first must comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) to modify the 

scheduling order to allow for late amendments.226 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) requires a “good cause” 

showing. The focus of the good cause inquiry in the Rule 16(b) context is the “diligence of the 

party seeking the modification,” in particular whether the party was “diligent in assisting the 

[c]ourt to create a workable schedule at the outset of litigation,” whether “the scheduling order 

imposes deadlines that have become unworkable notwithstanding its diligent efforts to comply” 

and whether the party was “diligent in seeking the amendment once it became apparent that 

extensions were necessary.”7

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”8

 There are two distinct steps to a 

motion for summary judgment. The moving party bears the initial burden of production by 

identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence 

of a triable issue of material fact.9 Where the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, he must 

“affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving 

party.”10 If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, however, he may satisfy his 

 6 See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992).

7 Adobe Systems Inc. v. Coffee Cup Partners, Inc., Case No. 11-cv–2243-CW, 2012 WL 3877783, 

at *6 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 6, 2012) (citing Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609).

8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

9 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

10 Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007)

Case 5:12-cv-06334-PSG Document 65 Filed 01/06/14 Page 3 of 7
4

Case No.: 5:12-cv-6334-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

burden of proof either by proffering “affirmative evidence negating an element of the non-moving 

party’s claim,” or by showing the non-moving party has insufficient evidence to establish an 

“essential element of the non-moving party’s claim.”11 If the moving party meets its initial burden, 

the burden of production then shifts to the non-moving party, who must then provide specific facts 

showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial.12 A material fact is one that might affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law.13 A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that 

reasonable minds could differ and find for either party.14

At this stage, the court does not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility 

determinations.15 Thus, in reviewing the record, the court must construe the evidence and the 

inferences to be drawn from the underlying evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party.16

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Amend

The only “good cause” evidence offered by Weaver to amend the schedule is that he was 

not aware of the names of the individual officers involved in the incident until October 21, 2013. If 

the evidence bore out this claim, it might meet the required standard, but it does not. Counsel 

acknowledged in court that the names in question were turned over well before that date, and he 

 11 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331.

12 See id. at 330; T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 630, 630 (9th 

Cir. 1987). 

13 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

14 See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

15 See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630.

16 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587 (1986).

Case 5:12-cv-06334-PSG Document 65 Filed 01/06/14 Page 4 of 7
5

Case No.: 5:12-cv-6334-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

offered no explanation for his failure to move to amend within the allotted time. Instead, he simply 

urges the court to consider whether defendants would suffer much prejudice from an amendment to 

add additional parties. 

The court, however, is not at liberty to disregard a requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) requires a showing of good cause to modify a scheduling order, 

and there has been no such showing here. Weaver’s motion for leave to amend therefore must be

DENIED. As it stands, then, the complaint alleges eight causes of action against two defendants: 

the City of Santa Clara and the Chief of Police. 

B. Summary Judgment: Section 1983 Claims

As described above, there is a clear dispute as to the actual events of the incident in 

question, and this dispute would ordinarily defeat a motion for summary judgment. However, 

Weaver’s first cause of action, his gateway into federal court, is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 

order to hold a municipality liable for the actions of its officers under Section 1983, a plaintiff must 

put forth evidence establishing that the officers acted pursuant to an unconstitutional county policy 

or custom.17 Similarly, liability may only be imposed on a supervising officer if they played an 

affirmative part in the deprivation of constitutional rights, such as setting in motion a series of acts 

which were likely to inflict constitutional injuries.18 

The only such action or policy that Weaver has identified is the use of “Find and Bite” 

training in lieu of an alternative “Find and Alert” system used in some jurisdictions. The Ninth 

Circuit, however, has expressly approved of similar programs.

19 Because there is no evidence of an 

 17 See Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Monell v. 

Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). 

18 See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 848 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Larez v. City of 

Los Angeles, 946 F. 2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). 

19 See Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 5:12-cv-06334-PSG Document 65 Filed 01/06/14 Page 5 of 7
6

Case No.: 5:12-cv-6334-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

unconstitutional policy before the court, Weaver’s claims under Section 1983 are dismissed and 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

C. Summary Judgment: State Law Claims

Defendants also seek summary judgment on Weaver’s state law claims because the claims 

are barred by immunity under California Government Code § 820.2 and 815(b). Gov. Code 

Section 820.2 states that “a public employee is not liable for any injury resulting from his act or 

omission where the act or omission as the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, 

whether or not such discretion was abused,” and Section 815(b) exempts public entities from 

liability where its employees enjoy immunity from liability. However, numerous courts, including 

the Ninth Circuit, have held that Section 820.2 does not immunize police officers from liability 

where the underlying claim stems from the use of excessive force, as they do here.

20 If the 

individual officers had been properly joined in this case, Section 820.2 would not grant them 

immunity here. Because the officers would not be entitled to immunity under Section 820.2, the 

municipality cannot claim immunity under Section 815(b).21

Finally, Defendants present only one argument on the merits of one state law claim. They 

cursorily state that there was no violation of the Bane Act because there was no violation of 

constitutional rights, given that the officers were reasonable in suspecting Weaver to be their 

fleeing felon.22 However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

 20 See, e.g., Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 487 (9th Cir. 2007); Baglieri v. City of 

San Francisco, Case No. 10-cv-00284-MEJ, 2011 WL 62224 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2011); Hayes v. 

Cnty. of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 639 (2013). 

21 Defendants’ papers do not make clear whether they are seeking immunity for Police Chief Kyle 

in addition to the city, but if so, they cite no evidence or legal authority to support such a finding. 

Because the moving party bears the burden of production on a motion for summary judgment, the 

court DENIES the motion as to Chief Kyle’s immunity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

22 See Docket No. 23 at 16. 

Case 5:12-cv-06334-PSG Document 65 Filed 01/06/14 Page 6 of 7
7

Case No.: 5:12-cv-6334-PSG

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

party, a reasonable jury could plainly find that Weaver’s constitutional rights were violated if it 

believed that he was handcuffed and on the ground before a dog was released on his person. 

Because the court finds that the City of Santa Clara is not entitled to immunity under 

Government Code Section 815(b) and Defendants have failed to produce any other evidence 

demonstrating the paucity of triable issues on Weaver’s state law claims, Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment is DENIED as to all state law claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Weaver’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary is also 

DENIED as to all state law claims but GRANTED as to Weaver’s Section 1983 claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

_________________________________

PAUL S. GREWAL

United States Magistrate Judge

January 6, 2014

Case 5:12-cv-06334-PSG Document 65 Filed 01/06/14 Page 7 of 7