Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01154/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01154-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUISA C. WILDEY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv1154 JM(JMA)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO

STRIKE; GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Defendant Sharp Memorial Hospital moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s disability discrimination

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and to strike the Second Amended

Complaint’s (“SAC”) request for summary judgment. Plaintiff Luisa Wildey opposes the motion to

dismiss but not the motion to strike. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), this matter is appropriate for

decision without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion to

dismiss, grants the motion to strike, and grants 20 days leave to amend from the date of entry of this

order.

BACKGROUND

On October 23, 2009 Plaintiff filed the operative SAC broadly alleging two claims against

Defendants for disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the

Case 3:07-cv-01154-JM-JMA Document 41 Filed 02/02/09 Page 1 of 5
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1

 Subject matter jurisdiction in this case is based upon federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

§1331, and the court allegedly has supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of contract claims, 28

U.S.C. §1367. The court declines to reach Plaintiff’s state law breach of contract claims until she

states a valid federal claim. 

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Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and a claim for constructive fraud. (SAC ¶¶106-116).1

Defendants are the Rehabilitation Appeals Board, Health and Human Services Agency, Department

of Rehabilitation, Client Assistance Program, the Dayle McIntosh Center for the Disabled, Access for

Independence, Sharp Memorial Hospital, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, and Bureau of

Rehabilitation. (SAC at p.1). In addition to these Defendants identified in the caption, Plaintiff also

purports to identify about 15 individual defendants in the body of the complaint. (SAC ¶¶10-63). 

Plaintiff is a qualified disabled individual. (SAC ¶1). In 1992, Plaintiff suffered a job related

spinal cord injury that caused the loss of neurological systems “that prevents her from performing

substantial limitation of a major life activity, such as performing manual tasks, walking, and working.”

(SAC ¶4). Plaintiff receives disability benefits pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §7051(C). (SAC ¶71). 

On February 4, 2004 Plaintiff applied for vocational rehabilitation services with the State of

California Department of Rehabilitation (“CDR”). (SAC ¶70). On or about April 8, 2004 the CDR

referred Plaintiff to the Sharp-Work-Re-entry Program for Plaintiff to undergo a three day vocational

assessment. On June 4, 2004 Plaintiff requested accommodation to the three day vocational

assessment because “three consecutive testing days was going to be a painful experience without

reasonable accommodations due to her spine condition.” (SAC ¶72). Plaintiff apparently received

some accommodation in that the vocational assessment was spread out over a period of time, and not

conducted over three consecutive days. (SAC ¶¶72, 73). Plaintiff only attended two days out of the

three day assessment period. (SAC ¶73). During the testing procedures that Plaintiff did attend, she

allegedly suffered severe pain. (SAC ¶52).

In or about October 2004 Plaintiff determined that she could operate a home-based business,

raising Alpacas for profit. (SAC ¶76). Plaintiff prepared and submitted a business plan to the

Department of Rehabilitation (“DOR”). (SAC ¶76). Apparently, Plaintiff believed that she could

obtain a $350,000 loan or grant from DOR to commence her Alpaca business. (SAC ¶¶88, 89; Oppo

at p.6, ¶15). On or about June 2, 2006, Plaintiff met with the DOR District Director and was informed

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that she could either meet with a DOR psychologist for testing or that her case would be closed. (SAC

¶94). In mid-June Plaintiff received a letter informing her that the June 2, 2006 meeting was an

Administrative Review meeting and that if she wanted to apply for further Administrative Review or

Mediation, she had to complete the enclosed forms within 30 days. (SAC ¶96). Plaintiff allegedly

exhausted all administrative remedies. (SAC ¶101). 

Based upon the above generally described conduct Plaintiff alleges claims for violation of the

Rehabilitation Act, violation of the ADA and constructive fraud. The claim for constructive fraud is

apparently premised on Plaintiff’s belief that loans or grants were available from DOR to finance her

planned alpaca business. (SAC ¶112). Plaintiff alleges that she was deceived into believing that such

financial assistance was available and that she learned on January 31, 2006 that such assistance was

not available. Id.

On April 2, 2008, the court granted defendants Department of Rehabilitation and Department

of Industrial Relations’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. Sharp

now moves to dismiss all claims in the SAC.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in "extraordinary" cases.

United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief

only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a

cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts

should dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are insufficient “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, __550 U.S. __, 127

S.Ct. 1955 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled

to relief). The defect must appear on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider

extraneous material in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482

(9th Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of the

complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir.

1989). 

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Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Concha

v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly,

courts must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences

to be drawn from them. Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However,

conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. In Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Motion to Dismiss

In order to state either an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim, Plaintiff must satisfy the elements

of each statute:

To prove a public program or service violates Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff

must show: (1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) he was either

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services,

programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and

(3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added); Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150,

1154-1155 (9th Cir.1996). Similarly, under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a

plaintiff must show: (1) he is an “individual with a disability”; FN3 (2) he is

“otherwise qualified” to receive the benefit; (3) he was denied the benefits of the

program solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the program receives federal

financial assistance. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (emphasis added); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d

559, 562-63 (9th Cir.1988); Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570,

573 (6th Cir.1988).

Weinrich v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997).

Furthermore, a “plaintiff proceeding under Title II of the ADA must, similar to a Section 504 plaintiff,

prove that the exclusion from participation in the program was ‘solely by reason of disability.’” Id.

(quoting Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Sharp moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff cannot allege that she was

harmed by any of Sharp’s conduct. In the Decision of the Rehabilitation Appeals Board, the court

noted that District Administrator Compton

testified it became increasingly difficult to make any progress in appellant’s case

because every meeting held became a contention as to whether the Department was

following regulations. She objected to any request made of her by the Department; she

seemed to believe the request was either inappropriate, unnecessary, or not applicable

to her. He testified the Department agreed to set aside and ignore the evaluation done

by Sharp since appellant had concerns about its validity, but in doing so, another

evaluation to determine her aptitude and interest was necessary.

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 Both parties agree that the court may properly take judicial notice of the decision by the

Rehabilitation Appeals Board.

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(SAC Exh. 5).2 

Here, the court grants Sharp’s motion for two reasons. First, as set forth by Sharp, Plaintiff

fails to adequately identify how she was harmed by Sharp’s conduct. Plaintiff requested that Sharp,

the contractor selected to perform the vocational evaluation, accommodate her disability. Sharp

spread the three day assessment out over a period of time in order to accommodate Plaintiff’s

disability. Sharp never completed the assessment. Further, the report prepared by Sharp was not

considered in determining Plaintiff’s eligibility for benefits and therefore, as currently pled, Plaintiff

fails to state a claim. Second, Plaintiff fails to adequately identify how Sharp allegedly failed to

comply with its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. Such allegations are

indispensable in stating either a Rehabilitation Act or ADA claim against Sharp. Absent such basic

allegations, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. The court grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend from the

date of entry of this order to file a Third Amended Complaint.

Finally, the court grants Sharp’s unopposed motion to strike the SAC’s request that the court

grant her summary judgment. As Plaintiff’s requests is not one made under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56, the request is stricken.

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss, grants the motion to strike, and grants Plaintiff

leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 2, 2009

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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