Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02692/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02692-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SEAN M. PARK and MICHELLE PARK, 

 Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

AURORA LOAN SERVICES; LEHMAN 

BROTHERS BANK FSB; QUALITY 

LOAN SERVICES CORP.; CHICAGO 

TITLE COMPANY; MORTGAGE 

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 

SYSTEMS; MARC CARPENTER & 

ASSOCIATES; ALLISON JAMES ESTATE 

PROPERTIES; and DOES individuals 1 

to100, inclusive; and ROES corporations 1 

to 30, inclusive; and all other persons and 

entities unknown claiming any right, title, 

estate, lien, or interest in the real property 

described in the compliant adverse to 

Plaintiffs’ ownership, or any cloud upon 

Plaintiffs’ title thereto, DOES, 

Defendants. 

CASE NO: 10-CV-2692-IEG (WVG) 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 6] 

Presently before the Court is the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Aurora Loan Services LLC (“Aurora”), Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB 

(“Lehman Brothers”), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”). [Doc. No. 6.] 

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The motion has been fully briefed and is suitable for disposition without oral argument under Civil 

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 

BACKGROUND

On December 30, 2010, Plaintiffs Sean and Michelle Park, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint 

alleging eleven causes of action arising out of the origination of their home mortgage loan and the 

nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings related to the property. [Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiffs allege they 

purchased the subject property, located at 823 Deal Court, San Diego, California, on October 26, 2005, 

for $1,225,000. [Id. at ¶ 3.] To fund that purchase, Plaintiffs secured a loan for $796,250 from 

Defendant Lehman Brothers, secured by a Deed of Trust . [Id.] Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 

committed various violations during the handling and processing of Plaintiffs’ loan. [Id.] These 

allegations form Plaintiffs’ causes of action for (1) Breach of Contract—Promissory Estoppel, 

(2) Fraud in the Factum, (3) Violation of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act, (4) Wrongful 

Foreclosure, (5) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (6) Fraud—Intentional Misrepresentation, (7) Violations of 

California Business & Professional Code Section 17200, (8) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good 

Faith and Fair Dealing, (9) Quiet Title, (10) Injunctive Relief, and (11) Accounting. 

DISCUSSION

I. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all 

factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true, and must construe them and draw all reasonable 

inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 

337-38 (9th Cir.1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed 

factual allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ 

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) 

(alteration in original). A court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the 

court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants 

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 

Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). “Where a complaint pleads facts 

that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility 

and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). 

II. PLAINTIFFS’ FEDERAL CLAIM—FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURES 

ACT 

Plaintiffs allege one claim under federal law: Defendants violated the Federal Debt Collection 

Procedures Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., by falsely stating the amount of Plaintiffs’ 

debts, “taking actions not legally permitted to be taken,” and failing to communicate to credit reporting 

agencies that a reported debt was in dispute. [Complaint, ¶ 84.] 

Neither a consumer’s creditors, a mortgage servicing company, nor any assignee of the 

mortgage debt may face liability under the FDCPA because they are not considered “debt collectors” 

as defined by the act. Lal v. Am. Home Serv., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 (E.D. Cal. 2010); 

Connors v. Home Loan Corp., 2009 WL 1615989, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2009). Moreover, parties 

cannot face liability for foreclosing upon a property pursuant to a deed of trust because such 

foreclosure is not “debt collection” within the meaning of the FDCPA. Connors, 2009 WL 1615989, 

at *5. 

Because Defendants are not debt collectors and have not engaged in debt collection as defined 

by the FDCPA, they cannot face liability under either statute. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 

WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ claim under the FDCPA. 

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III. PLAINTIFFS’ STATE LAW CLAIMS

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims arise under California law: various allegations of fraud and breach 

of contract, violations of the California Business & Professional Code Section 17200, wrongful 

foreclosure, quiet title, injunctive relief,1 and accounting. Where a district court has dismissed all 

claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. When deciding whether to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction, the Court considers judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants, and comity 

with state courts. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Where federal claims have been dismissed, the balance of 

factors usually tips in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims 

and dismissing them without prejudice. Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 

(9th Cir. 1994). 

Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim under the FDCPA and finding no diversity jurisdiction in 

Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 

remaining state law claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: _______________________________ 

 IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge 

 United States District Court 

 

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 “Injunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action, and a cause of action must 

exist before injunctive relief may be granted.” Shell Oil Co. v. Richter, 52 Cal. App. 2d 164, 168 

(1942). 

3/16/2011

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