Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-01031/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-01031-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v ) CIV. ACT. NO. 2:03cv1031-MHT

) (WO)

JOHN THOMAS RILEY, JR. )

SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDATION

OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 2, 2000, pursuant to a plea agreement, John Thomas Riley, Jr., (“Riley”)

entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute

cocaine hydrochloride, cocaine base, and marijuana (Count 1), a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1) and 846; money laundering (Count 3), a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)2;

smuggling marijuana (Count 4), a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545; and unlawful use of a

communications device (Count 13), a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

On March 16, 2000, the Government filed a notice of breach of plea agreement based

on Riley allegedly giving either false testimony at the trial of his co-defendants or giving

false statements to law enforcement officers prior to these trials. A hearing on the alleged

breach of the plea agreement was held on April 3, 2000. At the conclusion of that hearing,

the court determined that Riley had not breached the plea agreement. Sentencing was set for

June 22, 2000; however, prior to that proceeding, the United States filed a motion for

reconsideration of the court’s denial of the government’s request to set aside the plea

agreement because Riley breached it. On June 23, 2000, the court continued Riley’s

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sentencing. Both orally and later in writing the court granted the government’s motion for

reconsideration, gave notice that it would not accept the plea agreement, and gave Riley the

opportunity to withdraw his plea. (Crim. No. 2:99cr137-MHT, Doc. No. 461.) Sentencing 1

was set for July 12, 2000. At the commencement of that proceeding, Riley decided not to

withdraw his guilty plea and chose to be sentenced without the benefit of any agreement

except as to the government’s dismissal of all but the four counts to which Riley originally

agreed to plead guilty. At sentencing the court concluded that, even though Riley’s guideline

range was life imprisonment, a downward departure of one offense level was warranted, and

Riley was sentenced to 420 months imprisonment.2

Riley filed a direct appeal of his convictions. Riley v. United States, [No. 00-13806-

GG] 2001 WL 34137856, *2 (11 Cir. Jan. 10, 2001). On February 12, 2002, the Eleventh th

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Riley’s convictions. (Doc. No. 21, Gov’s Ex. 1.) On

October 15, 2003, Riley filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 1.) On October 10, 2005, and on June 7, 2006, Riley filed

amendments to his motion. (Doc. Nos. 17, 19, & 34.) On August 24, 2006, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge recommended that Riley’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion be denied. (Doc. No.

It is not at all clear whether the court actually concluded that Riley breached the plea agreement 1

by committing perjury. However, it is clear that the court ultimately concluded that it would not accept the

plea agreement because the recommended sentence of 21 years did not adequately address the gravity of

Riley’s criminal conduct. See pp. 9-10 infra.

Specifically, Riley was sentenced to 420 months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count; 240 2

months’ imprisonment on the money laundering count; 60 months’ imprisonment on the smuggling count;

and 48 months’ imprisonment on the use of a communications facility count, with the sentences to run

concurrently. 

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41.) On September 6, 2006, the Court entered an opinion adopting this recommendation. 

(Doc. No. 43.) 

Proceeding pro se, Riley appealed this court’s denial ofthe motion to vacate sentence. 

On December 22, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded this

court’s previous opinion, determining that this court failed to consider all of Riley’s claims

as required byClisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 935-36 (11 Cir. 1992). The Court directed this th

court to address the following claims:

(1) Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district

court’s finding that Riley did not qualify for an acceptance of

responsibility reduction (raised as Claim 11 of Riley’s second

amendment to his section 2255 motion).

(2) The district court erred in enhancing Riley’s sentence for

obstruction of justice and possession of a gun because the

evidence did not support these enhancements; and counsel was

ineffective for failing to challenge these enhancements at

sentencing or on appeal (raised as Claim 5 of original section

2255 motion and Claims 10 and 12 of second amendment to the

section 2555 motion).

(3) Counsel was ineffective for allowing Riley to plead guilty to

money laundering, where he did not take money outside of the

United States and thus, was not guilty of the offense (raised as

Claim14 ofthe second amendment to the section 2255 motion).3

(Doc. No. 60.) This court will now discuss these three claims as instructed.

The Court determined that this court failed to discuss the first issue in its entirety and did not 3

adequately discuss the second and third issues in its Recommendation.

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II. Discussion

A. The Issues before the Court

On March 11, 2009, Riley filed a “memorandum in support of issues certified by the 

11th Circuit Court of Appeals and additional issues raised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” 

(Doc. No. 63.) On April 2, 2009, and April 3, 2009, he also filed motions to amend his

§ 2255 motion to vacate sentence, in which he attempts to submit additional claims. (Doc.

Nos. 65 & 67.) Thus, the first question for the court to answer is what issues are properly

before the court.

When the Eleventh Circuit issues a limited mandate, “‘the trial court is restricted in

the range of issues it may consider on remand.’” United States v. Williams, 563 F.3d 1239,

1241 (11 Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11 Cir. 2003)). th th

Particularly where the Eleventh Circuit “holds that there is no merit to a party’s objections

to his sentence other than that for which the court issues a remand, the district court is

foreclosed from addressing any of the other sentencing issues previously raised. Williams,

563 F.3d at 1241-42 (citing United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11 Cir. 1996)). th

Assuming jurisdiction over matters outside the scope of such a mandate constitutes an abuse

of discretion. Id. Moreover, a specific mandate is not subject to interpretation. Williams,

563 F.2d at 1242 (citing United States v. Mesa, 247 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11 Cir. 2001)). th

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit issued a limited mandate requiring this court to

address the following issues: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district

4

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court’s finding that Riley did not qualify for an acceptance of responsibility reduction; (2) 

the district court erred in enhancing Riley’s sentence for obstruction of justice and possession

of a gun because the evidence did not support these enhancements, and counsel was

ineffective for failing to challenge these enhancements at sentencing or on appeal; and (3)

counsel was ineffective for allowing Riley to plead guilty to money laundering, where he did

not take money outside of the United States and, thus, was not guilty of the offense.

Therefore, this court will not consider any additional claims or issues raised byRiley because

they are outside the scope of the Court’s mandate. Consequently, to the extent Riley attempts

in his memorandum (Doc. No. 63) and motion to amend (Doc. Nos. 65 & 67) to raise

additional claims which are outside the scope of the mandate, his request is due to be denied.

B. Sentence Enhancements

Riley claims that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence because the evidence

did not sufficiently establish that he obstructed justice or possessed a gun. The Government 4

argues that Riley’s claim is procedurally defaulted as he failed to raise this claim on direct

appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478

(1986); Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015 (11 Cir. 1996). In light of the Court’s mandate to th

address this specific claimand because there is no substance to the defendant’s constitutional

claims, the court pretermits discussion of the procedural default issue. See United States v.

Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731, 744 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a federal court may decline to decide

See Riley v. United States, No. 06-15546 (11 Cir. Dec. 22, 2008), in which the Court construed

4 th

Riley’s challenges to the enhancements as “claims . . . based on lack of evidence.” 

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a procedural default issue if after considering the merits it is apparent there is no substance

to the constitutional claim); Smith v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 787, 791 (11th Cir.1988).

During the sentencing proceeding, the court determined that an enhancement based

on obstruction of justice was warranted. Specifically, the court found as follows:

The Court finds that Riley did obstruct justice. The Court finds that he

perjured himself on at least one or more occasions. The Court has had an

opportunity to review parts of the transcripts. . . . The Court finds that Riley

intentionally perjured himself when he said that the six and a half – well,

actually on page 23 of Volume II of the Clay trial, lines – beginning on line 12

where he mentions four and a half, at trial he said that could either be money

or marijuana. The Court credits the testimony of Agent Barnes that prior to

trial Riley said that that was just marijuana.

And with regard to the six and a half reference on page 31 of the same

transcript, starting at line 17, again, Riley perjured himself. Told Barnes

before trial that it was marijuana, and then he changed his testimony at trial to

say it was money or marijuana.

On page 31, starting at line 1, where Riley claims that – where Clay

says, boy, you can’t give that stuff away or that thing away, he stated at trial

that he didn’t know what Clay was talking about; but he told Agent Barnes

before trial that Clay was talking about marijuana. Riley again perjured

himself.

On page 33 of the same transcript, line 9, Riley denies that he told

Agent Barnes or anyone else that Clay – that he gave Clay eight pounds of

marijuana where in fact he had told Agent Barnes quite the contrary before

trial, that he had given Clay eight pounds of marijuana. Riley again perjured

himself. 

On page 126 of the same transcript, Riley denies that he had any drug

dealings with Clay. Again, he perjured himself. Riley in fact had drug

dealings with Clay. As the evidence at the trial reflected and the evidence

before me reflects, Clay did sell drugs for Riley. I’m particularly concerned

about where Riley says Clay did not sell drugs for him when in fact Clay did

sell drugs for him. I credited the testimony of Agent Barnes.

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(Sentencing Transcript, R. 540-41.)

The Government has the burden of proving that a § 3C1.1 enhancement for

obstruction of justice is applicable. United States v. Cataldo, 171 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11 Cir. th

1999). If a defendant challenges one of the factual bases of his sentence, the Government

must prove the disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 

The Guidelines provide that a court is authorized to assess a two-level enhancement

if “the defendant willfully obstructed . . . the administration of justice during the course of

the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense conviction.” U.S.S.G. §

3C1.1 (Nov. 1998). To warrant an enhancement for obstruction of justice, false evidence

provided by the defendant must be material. Id. at comment. (n.6). Material matters include

those that “would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” Id.

Included in the “non-exhaustive list of examples of types of [obstructive] conduct”

are (1) perjury, (2) providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that

significantly obstructs or impedes the official investigation or prosecution, and (3) providing

materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence investigation

for the court. Id. at comment. (n.4.). Perjury occurs when a witness, testifying under oath,

“gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false

testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v.

Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). 

In this case, the court found that Riley obstructed justice, specifically identifying

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multiple instances where he committed perjury at trial. The sentencing transcript indicates

that Agent J. W. Barnes testified concerning inconsistencies between Riley’s statements to

him during the course of the pretrial investigation and his testimony during Sonja Brown’s

trial. (Sentencing Transcript, R. 462-492.) The court’s determination that Agent Barnes’

testimony was credible is entitled to great deference. See United States v. De Carty, 300

Fed. Appx. 820, 831 (11 Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Lewis, 115 F.3d 1531, 1538 (11 th th

Cir. 1997). This court has reviewed the transcript in the criminal case, including Riley’s

testimony at trial and Agent Barnes’ testimony at sentencing. Riley’s testimony concerning

the co-defendants’ involvement in the drug crimes was markedly different from his

statements to Agent Barnes. Thus, the Government established by a preponderance of the

evidence that Riley committed perjury by “giving false testimony concerning a material

matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony.” Dunnigan, supra. The evidence 5

was more than sufficient to support a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice.

Riley also argues that the court erred when it applied the two-level enhancement for

possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug transaction under U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(b)(1) (Nov. 1998). 

During the sentencing proceeding, this court entered the following findings:

If the court were to assume arguendo that Riley did not perjure himself at trial, the evidence would

5

then demonstrate that he gave materially false information to the drug enforcement agent during the course

of his investigation of the case. See United States v. Pouncy, 71 Fed. Appx. 229 (4 Cir. 2003) (defendant th

who initially gave false information to ATF special agents found to have obstructed justice); United States

v. Cover-It, Inc., No. 99-1789, 234 F.3d 1263 (2 Cir. Nov. 7, 2000) (Table) (enhancement for obstruction nd

of justice warranted where defendants provided false information to EPA agents).

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THE COURT: . . . The gun possession matter, the two-point

enhancement for gun possession should be kept. The

guns which were found in both his homes were directly

related to his overall drug scheme. They were used for

the purpose of maintaining that drug scheme. And I

believe you said one gun had actually been purchased by

him; is that correct?

MR. FRANKLIN: That is correct, Your Honor. In August of 1996.

THE COURT: The Court finds that that gun was purchased byMr. Riley

in 1996 and was used as part of his drug transactions. 

The guns were found in his house or in his – actually

both houses. They were directly connected with his drug

activities. He had a big operation, and he needed to

protect that operation. 

(Sentencing Transcript, R. 538-39.)

The Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement “[i]f a dangerous weapon 

(including a firearm) was possessed” during certain drug offenses. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)

(Nov. 1998). The enhancement for weapon possession should be applied “if the weapon was

present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” 

U.S.S.G. §2D1.1 comment. n. 3 (Nov. 1998). Once the Government shows by a

preponderance of the evidence that a firearm was present, “the evidentiary burden shifts to

the defendant to show that a connection between the firearm and the offense is clearly

improbable.” United States v. Hansley, 54 F.3d 709, 716 (11 Cir. 1995). A connection is th

shown where the “firearm is possessed during conduct relevant to the offense of conviction.” 

United States v. Linh Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11 Cir. 2006). Thus, the enhancement th

applies if firearms were found in a place where acts occurred in furtherance of the

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conspiracy. Id. See also United States v. Godwin, 296 Fed. Appx. 744, 750 (11 Cir. 2008) th

(firearms found in yard and shed were related to defendant’s continued drug transactions).

The record indicates that several guns were found in Riley’s residence and stash house 

and that these houses were connected with his drug activities. In its opinion affirming the

conviction of a co-defendant, Clarence Clay, the Court summarized the facts as follows:

John W. Barnes (“Agent Barnes”) is a Senior Special

Agent with the United States Customs Service. At the time of

the events in this case, Agent Barnes was assigned to the High

Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (“HIDTA”) task force in

Montgomery, Alabama. The HIDTA task force is a federally

funded investigative task force composed of federal, state, and

local law enforcement officers. HIDTA's stated mission is to

locate, identify, and dismantle drug smuggling/trafficking

organizations.

In December 1997, Agent Barnesreceived a request from

Bill Baker (“Agent Baker”), a fellow Customs agent in

Cincinnati, Ohio, seeking information about an individual bythe

name of “John Riley” in Montgomery, Alabama. Agent Barnes

requested and received information from the Montgomery

Police Department, which he forwarded to Agent Baker in

Cincinnati. Agent Barnes confirmed that the John Riley, who

was the subject of Agent Baker's interest, was also the John

Riley identified through the Montgomery Police Department.

Thereafter, Agents Barnes and Baker began working together in

a narcotics investigation that impacted Alabama and Kentucky.

In April 1998,TonyMontoya (“Montoya”), a cooperating

individual (“CI”), assisted Agents Barnes and Baker, along with

others, in arranging a controlled meeting between Montoya and

Riley. The purpose of the meeting was for Riley to deliver

money to Montoya for marijuana that had previously been

delivered to Riley. When the meeting occurred, Agent Barnes

and others through the use of surveillance equipment were able

to monitor Riley giving Montoya $77,500. In addition to

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monitoring Riley, the agents monitored the money that Riley

gave to Montoya as it left Montgomery and traveled across the

border into Mexico through Laredo, Texas. The following

month, a second delivery occurred. After arriving in

Montgomery, Montoya contacted Riley via pager and cell

telephone. Agent Barnes supervised these contacts. Again, the

agents set up surveillance in an adjoining hotel room and

monitored the delivery of approximately $60,000 by Riley to

Montoya. Montoya continued to provide agents with

information about Riley and his contacts outside the district.

Unable to identify Riley's local co-conspirators, Agent

Barnes decided to obtain pen registers for Riley's cellular

telephone with the hopes of obtaining authorization to intercept

Riley's telephone conversations. Records obtained through

subpoena revealed that Clay subscribed to the cellular telephone

number used by Riley to communicate with Montoya and other

CIs, and the cellular phone bills went to Clay's home address at

1030 Lynwood Drive, Montgomery, Alabama. Based on this

information about the unlawful use of the cellular telephone

subscribed to by Clay, the government sought and obtained a

wire tap order. On June 3, 1999, eleven days into the wire tap,

agents intercepted a conversation between Clay and Riley.

During this conversation, Clay complained about the poor

quality of the marijuana and his inability to sell it. Riley tried to

relieve Clay's anxiety by promising to pick up the marijuana and

give him some new marijuana when the next shipment came in.

Additionally, Clay and Riley used numbers that were consistent

with those used by Riley in a conversation with unindicted coconspirator, Louis Calvin Cook (“Cook”), when Rileyand Cook

talked about marijuana.

When Riley realized that he was being followed by

agents, he met with Clay and gave him the cellular telephone.

Clay took the cellular telephone to a local Powertel office and

changed the number. Additionally, Clay specifically requested

that the SIM card (i.e., a computer chip that identifies the phone

number with that card) be changed, resulting in the termination

of the first court authorized wiretap for that particular cellular 

telephone. While in possession of the cellular telephone, Clay

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answered the telephone and identified himself as Riley's

“partner” and promised to deliver a message to Riley. After

changing the number to the aforementioned cellular telephone,

Clay returned it to Riley.

On July 15, 1999, agents executed several search

warrants at locations associated with Riley, including Clay's

residence at 1030 Lynwood Drive, Montgomery, Alabama. The

agents also searched Riley's stash house at 1702 French Street,

Montgomery, Alabama, and Riley's main address at 5713

Portsmouth Drive, Montgomery, Alabama. Agents seized

several firearms from each of these locations (i.e., two from

Clay's residence, eight from Riley's home residence, and four

from Riley's stash house).

The evidence produced at trial demonstrated that Clay

was the subscriber for the telephone that Riley used to conduct

his drug trafficking business from 1996 to 1999 through which

Riley possessed and distributed thousands of pounds of

marijuana, more than fifty grams of cocaine base, and four

kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride. During the trial, the

government also presented the testimony of co-conspirator

Roderick Blanding (“Blanding”), who testified that he worked

for Riley. According to Blanding, Clay was one of Riley's

regular customers.

United States v. Clay, 376 F.3d 1296, 1298 -1299 (11 Cir. 2004). Thus, the evidence at trial th

sufficiently established that Riley had an interest in protecting his “big operation” with

firearms found in his residence and stash house and that these weapons were “found in a

place where acts occurred in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Pham, supra. Riley has

presented no evidence suggesting that a connection between the firearms and the drug

conspiracy was clearly improbable. Id. This court therefore concludes that the two-level

enhancement for possession of a firearm was properly applied in this case. 

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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. General Principles

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists to protect the fundamental right to a fair

trial. The petitioner must satisfy the requirements of a two-pronged test to prevail on his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner first must make a threshold

showing that his attorney's performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “The proper measure of attorney

performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” 

Strickland, at 688. In other words, criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to

“reasonably effective” legal assistance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476 (2000)

quoting Strickland, at 687. The burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

counsel’s performance was unreasonable is a heavy one. Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285,

1293 (11 Cir. 2006). Once this threshold test of unreasonableness is met, the petitioner th

must then show that the deficient performance of his counsel prejudiced his defense. 

Strickland, supra at 687. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must first show that there is

“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland at 694. A “reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “[P]etitioners must

affirmatively prove prejudice because ‘[a]ttorney errors come in an infinite variety and are

as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial. [T]hat the

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errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding’ is insufficient to show

prejudice.” Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547, 551 (11th Cir. 2000)(quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 693). The prejudice component of the Strickland test focuses on the question whether

counsel's deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding

fundamentally unfair. Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of

counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the

law titles him. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 n. 17 (2000). 

Any review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is conducted from the

perspective of defense counsel based on facts “as they were known to counsel at the time of

the representation. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1535 (11 Cir. 1992). There th

is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and adequate, and great

deference must be shown to choices dictated by reasonable trial strategy. Rogers v. Zant, 13

F.3d 384,386 (11 Cir. 1994). A strategic or tactical decision by counsel amounts to th

ineffective assistance only if it is so “patently unreasonable a . . . decision that no competent

attorney would have chosen” it. Dorsey v. Chapman, 262 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11 Cir. 2001). th

Indeed, “[s]surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky,

559 U.S. ___, ___ (2010).

Trial counsel's performance is entitled to “ ‘highly deferential’ judicial

scrutiny.” Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.2001) (citation

omitted). “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. This Court en banc established this

guideline: “To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case, could have

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done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable....

[T]he issue is not what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only

what is constitutionally compelled.’ “ Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d

1305, 1313 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776,

794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3126, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987)). Thus, under federal law,

there is “a strong presumption in favor of competence [and] the petitioner’s

burden of persuasion--though the presumption is not insurmountable--is a

heavy one.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 (footnote and citations omitted); see

also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66 (noting that courts

must “indulge [the] strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was

reasonable and that counsel “made all significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment”). Accordingly, this Court “must recognize

that counsel does not enjoy the benefit of unlimited time and resources,” and

that “[e]very counsel is faced with a zero-sum calculation on time, resources,

and defenses to pursue at trial.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 n. 14.

Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275-76 (11 Cir. 2003). th

A criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel continues through

direct appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel may be shown if the movant can “establish ... that counsel omitted

significant and obvious issues while pursuing issues that were clearly and significantly

weaker.... Generally, onlywhen ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will

the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.” Mayo v. Henderson, 13

F.3d 528, 533 (2 Cir. 1994). nd

2. The Sentencing Enhancements

Rileycontends that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge

the sentencing enhancements for possession of a weapon and obstruction of justice. The

addendum to the pre-sentence report indicates that trial counsel objected to an adjustment for

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obstruction of justice. (Gov’s Ex. 4, Addendum at ¶ 21.) As previously discussed, Riley’s 6

contention that the evidence failed to support a sentence enhancement for gun possession and

obstruction of justice is without merit. Consequently, Riley has not established that his

counsels’ failure to challenge the enhancements for gun possession and obstruction of justice

at trial or on appeal fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced his

case. See Strickland, supra.

3. Acceptance of Responsibility

Riley asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the denial of a

three point reduction for acceptance ofresponsibilitypursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b). 

Specifically, he contends that he accepted responsibility because he discussed the details of

the case with Agent Barnes and testified during the trials of Sonja Brown and Clarence Clay. 

(Doc. No. 34, pp. 13-14.)

 Trial counsel objected on the following basis: 6

The allegation that Mr. Riley breached his agreement with the

government are the same allegations which Judge Thompson received

testimony upon the hearing held on the government’s claimof breach of the

plea agreement. Judge Thompson ruled that Mr. Riley had not breached his

agreement. If Riley had in fact obstructed justice, defense counsel submits

that the sentencing court would have ruled that Mr. Riley had breached his

agreement with the government. Mr. Riley’s position is that Judge

Thompson’s ruling has already precluded the government’s claim that Mr.

Riley perjured himself in those trials. Defense counsel observed for the

record that Riley was called to testify first in the Brown trial by the

defense; however, in the trial following (the Clay trial), Riley was called to

testify by the government. The government should be stopped from

claiming perjury in the Brown trial when it called him as his witness in the

Clay trial and vouched for Riley’s credibility. (Gov’s Ex. 4, Addendum at

¶ 21.)

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The Guidelines provide for two separate reductions for acceptance of responsibility:

(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of

responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level

by 2 levels.

(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection

(a), the offense level determined prior to the operation of

subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and the defendant

has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution

of his own misconduct by taking one or more of the

following steps:

(1) timely providing complete information to

the government concerning his own

involvement in the offense; or

(2) timelynotifying authorities of his intention

to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting

the government to avoid preparing for trial

and permitting the court to allocate its

resources efficiently, decrease the offense

level by 1 additional level.

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 

“The defendant bears the burden of clearlydemonstrating acceptance ofresponsibility

and must present more than just a guilty plea.” United States v. Sawyer, 180 F.3d 1319, 1323

(11 Cir. 1999). “Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or th

Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not

accepted responsibilityfor his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinarycases

in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,

comment. (n. 4). “The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s

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acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is

entitled to great deference. . . .” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n. 5). 

As previously discussed, the evidence amply established that Riley gave false

testimony concerning a material matter. Specifically, Riley’s testimony concerning the codefendant’s involvement in the drug crimes was materially different from the relevant

information he provided to Agent Barnes. In light of the obstruction of justice enhancement

and Riley’s failure to show extraordinary circumstances, the court concludes that a reduction

for acceptance of responsibility was unwarranted in Riley’s case. See, e.g., United States v.

McKay, 300 Fed. Appx. 739, 741 (11 Cir. 2008) (holding that sentencing court had th

sufficient foundation to find that defendant falsely denied relevant conduct and that, despite

his plea, he did not accept responsibility for his crime); United States v. Minton, 283 Fed.

Appx. 774, 778 (11 Cir. 2008) (where defendant acted in a way inconsistent with th

acceptance of responsibility by falsely denying relevant conduct that the district court

determined to be true, court did not clearly err by denying a reduction under § 3E1.1(a));

United States v. Mendoza, 252 Fed. Appx. 265, 268 (11 Cir. 2007) (determining sentencing th

court did not err in determining that acceptance ofresponsibility reduction was not warranted

in light of obstruction of justice enhancement and defendant’s failure to show extraordinary

circumstances). Consequently, Riley has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s failure to 

challenge the court’s determination that a downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibilityfell below an objective standard ofreasonableness and prejudiced his case. See

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Strickland, supra. 

4. Money Laundering

Riley asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty to

money laundering, where he did not take money outside of the United States and thus, was

not guilty of the offense. Riley was neither charged with, nor plead guilty to, money 7

laundering; he was, however, charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). 

Because Riley was charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering, the

Government was not required to establish that Riley was the individual who took money

outside the United States. “‘To obtain a conviction for a ... money laundering conspiracy ...

the government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) two or more

persons agreed to commit a crime, in this case a ... money laundering violation; and (2) that

[the defendant], knowing the unlawful plan, voluntarily joined the conspiracy.’” United

In his counseled amendment to his § 2255 motion, Riley’s claim and argument in its entirety is as 7

follows:

GROUND FOURTEEN: The guily [sic] plea was based on deficinet [sic] actions of advice of Mr.

Teague which resulted in a plea of guilty to count three of the indictment which was an unintelligent

and unvoluntary [sic] plea of guilty to money laundering violations.

SUPPORTING FACTS: The Petitionerstated that the money was being taken fromthe United States

to outside the United States, however this statement was incorrect, because the money was never

being taken outside of the U.S. by the Petitioner, the money was taken from Montgomery, Alabama

to Texas and exchanged for marijuana. Counsel Teague and/or the court never explained the

violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) to the defendant.

(Doc. No. 34, pp. 15-16.)

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States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11 Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Johnson,

th

440 F.3d 1286, 1294 (11 Cir. 2006)). th

In Count Three of the superseding indictment, Riley was charged as follows:

. . . John Thomas Riley, Jr., and Shirley Moncrief a/k/a Shirley

Riley did knowingly and willfully combine, conspire,

confederate with each other and diverse other persons, known

and unknown to the Grand Jury, to knowingly transport, and

cause to be transported, monetary instruments, to wit: United

States currency, from a place in the United States, that is,

Montgomery, Alabama, to a place outside the United States, that

is, Mexico, proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, that is the

conspiracy to distribute and distribution of a controlled

substance in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections

841(a)(1) and 846, as set forth in Count I above, which is

realleged as though fully set forth herein, with the intent to

promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity, and to

conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, and the control of the proceeds of a said specified

unlawful activity, and to conceal or disguise the nature, the

location, the source, the ownership, and the control of the

proceeds of a said specified unlawful activity, in violation of

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956(a)(2)(A) and (B)(i).

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section

1956(h) and Section 2.

(Attach. to Doc. No. 73, Gov’s Ex. 1, pp. 3-4.)

During the change-of-plea proceeding, both Rileyand defense counsel acknowledged

that they had reviewed the charges in the superseding indictment. (February2, 2002 Changeof-Plea Proceeding Transcript, Vol. 4, R. 27.) Moreover, after the court read the charges in

the superseding indictment to the defendant, Riley indicated that he understood the charges

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against him, including the charge of conspiracy to commit money laundering. (Id., R. 32- 8

34.) A factual basis for entry of Riley’s plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit money

laundering was also established as follows:

MR. FRANKLIN [Prosecutor]: As to count three of the

indictment, Mr. Riley, during the time frame that I’ve just

spoken about, which would be November of ‘96 up until August

of 1999, you acquired marijuana from certain individuals who

lived in Mexico, is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That’s correct.

MR. FRANKLIN: And there was an agreement between you

and these individuals that they would give you the marijuana,

you would then sell the marijuana here in Montgomery and

elsewhere, and return the proceeds from the sale of that

marijuana to the individuals in Mexico?

THE DEFENDANT: That’s correct.

MR. FRANKLIN: And individuals who assisted you in doing

that at that time would have been an individual by the name of

Tony Montoia, is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that’s correct.

MR. FRANKLIN: And on one occasion an individual by the

name of Danny Jackson.

 The court also summarized the charge in layman’s terms. The following occurred: 8

THE COURT: You were hiding this money, that is the proceeds from your unlawful

activity, you understand that? By taking this money from the United States to outside the

United States, you understand that? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

(Change-of-Plea Proceeding Transcript, Vol. 4, R. 33-34.)

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THE DEFENDANT: That’s correct.

MR. FRANKLIN: It was agreed between you all that that’s how

the money would be delivered back to the individuals in

Mexico, that it would be smuggled in vehicles from

Montgomery, Alabama out to Texas, and eventually over into

Mexico as payment for the marijuana that had previously been

sent to you.

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, that’s correct. The individual

resided in both Texas and Mexico.

(February 2, 2002 Change-of-Plea Transcript, Volume 4, R. 48-49.) In response to further

questioning, Riley also testified that he knew the marijuana “originated in Mexico,” that the

individuals he “dealt with were from Mexico,” that he ordered the marijuana from Mexico

but sometimes the individuals “would call from Texas,” and “on at least one occasion” he

visited two individuals in Mexico to discuss the marijuana that was being shipped to him in

Montgomery from Mexico. (Id., R. 51-52.) This court therefore concludes that, during the

guilty plea proceeding, Riley’s admissions established that he and other persons, reached an

agreement to commit the crime of money laundering through the transportation of the

proceeds of an unlawful activity, namely drug trafficking, and that Riley voluntarily

participated in that agreement. Consequently, Riley has failed to demonstrate that his

counsel’s failure to discourage him from pleading guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) by

explaining the charge differently to him fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

and prejudiced his case. See Strickland, supra. 

9

To the extent Riley asserts that the court did not adequately explain the conspiracy to commit 9

money laundering charge to him, his claim is procedurally defaulted as he failed to raise this claim on direct

22

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III. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the motion

to vacate be denied as the claims presented therein entitled the defendant to no relief. It is

further

ORDERED that to the extent Riley attempts in his memorandum (Doc. No. 63) and

motions to amend (Doc. Nos. 65 & 67) to raise additional claims which are outside the scope

of the mandate, these motions be and are hereby DENIED. 

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the on or before

April 19, 2012. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate

Judge's Recommendation objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not

be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not

a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

appeal. Moreover, his assertion is not cognizable in a § 2255 motion. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.

258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court he is in fact guilty of the

offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation

of constitutional rights that occurred prior to entry of the guilty plea.”). See also Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d

1125, 1142 (11 Cir. 1991) (“The defendant does not necessarily need to be told the nature of the offense

th

and elements of the crime at the actual plea proceeding; a knowing and intelligent guilty plea may be entered

on the basis of the receipt of this information, generally from defense counsel, before the plea proceedings.”)

(citation omitted) (abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253 (11 Cir. 2008). th

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findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done this 5 day of April, 2012. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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