Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00966/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00966-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v

JEANNE WOODFORD,

Respondent. /

No C 04-0966 VRW

ORDER

Petitioner Robert Williams was convicted by a jury in the

Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of

Monterey of aggravated sexual assault of a child, continuous sexual

abuse of a child under the age of fourteen, unlawful sexual

intercourse with a minor, and two counts of forcible rape. On

March 29, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of sixty-seven

years, eight months to life. 

On October 1, 2002, the California Court of Appeal

partially reversed the judgment, striking the convictions as to

both counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and affirming

the remaining counts. Doc # 12 at 2; Resp’t Exh F. On December

11, 2002, the California Supreme Court denied review. Doc #12 at

2; Resp’t Exh H. 

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On March 9, 2004, petitioner filed his original petition

for writ of habeas corpus in this court, with an application that

the petition be held in abeyance pending the resolution of a

petition for habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court on 

March 8, 2004. Doc # 1. The court granted petitioner’s

application to hold his petition in abeyance. Doc # 3. On

December 22, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s

state petition for habeas corpus. Resp’t Exh J. 

On January 13, 2005, petitioner filed his amended

petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. On May 9, 2005,

the court issued an order to show cause, Doc # 10, to which

respondent Jeanne Woodford answered, Doc # 11, whereupon petitioner

filed a traverse. Doc # 23. Having carefully considered the

parties’ submissions and for the reasons stated herein, the court

denies the petition.

 

I

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of

the case as follows:

Defendant met “Mary” in 1988 and began living with her a

month later. At that time Mary had two children,

including six-year-old “J,” and a third child was born

later that year. In 1990 defendant and Mary had another

child.

Defendant began molesting J when she was about seven

years old. More than once a month he would enter her

bedroom and place one or two fingers in her vagina,

though she turned away from him and pretended to be

asleep. When she was 10 years old, she went to another

state to live with her father and stepmother. During

that time her mother married defendant. In February

1994, when she was 11, J returned to live with her mother

and defendant. Three or four months later, around her

12th birthday, he resumed the molestations, again

inserting fingers into her vagina and touching her

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breasts both under and over her pajamas. This occurred

at least once a week, notwithstanding her attempts to

avoid him and pretend she was asleep.

Eventually defendant began orally copulating J in

addition to the other acts. About four months after

that, when she was 13 or 14, he started having sexual

intercourse with her. If she moved away or turned over

he would force her back into the position he wanted or

tell her to “stop it” or “move over.” He also continued

touching her breasts, inserting his fingers into her

vagina, and orally copulating her. Defendant had sexual

intercourse with J about every other day for about four

months, and then once or twice a week. [fn 1: J also

testified that defendant had anal intercourse with her

about once a month. The jury, however, found defendant

not guilty of the three charged counts of forcible

sodomy.] Defendant told her that the family needed him

because he paid the bills; without him the family would

be “split apart.” He controlled all of the family’s

money, refused to allow her to go places with friends

unless he drove them, and insisted on selecting her

clothes so that she would not “look like a slut.” He did

not allow J to wear makeup until she was 15. J also

believed that he favored her over the other children,

buying her candy and magazines, beginning when she was 13

or 14. The abuse finally ended on January 18, 1999, when

Mary caught defendant having sexual intercourse with J

and ordered him to leave the house. 

Defendant was charged by amended information with one

count of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 by

forcible oral copulation, in violation of Penal Code

section 269 [fn 2: All further statutory references are

to Penal Code unless otherwise specified, references to

rules are to the California Rules of Court.]; one count

of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 by

penetration with a foreign object (§ 269); one count of

continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 (§ 288.5);

three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor

(§ 261.5); two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd

(a)(2)), and three counts of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd

(c)). The jury found him guilty of all but the sodomy

charges. It also found true the allegation that as to

count three (the continuous sexual abuse) defendant had

engaged in “substantial sexual conduct” with a minor

under 14, within the meaning of section 1203.066,

subdivision (a)(8), thereby making him ineligible for

probation. After denying defendant’s motion for a new

trial, the court sentenced defendant to two consecutive

prison terms of 15 years to life for counts one and two

and 37 years, eight months for the remaining counts, for

a total term of 67 years to life. 

People v Williams # H021497, slip op at 1-3 (Resp’t Ex F).

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II

A

 A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d). A state court has

“adjudicated” a petitioner’s constitutional claim “on the merits”

for purposes of section 2254(d) when it has decided a petitioner’s

right to post-conviction relief on the basis of the substance of

the constitutional claim advanced, rather than denying the claim on

the basis of a procedural or other rule precluding state court

review on the merits. Baker v Fleming, 423 F3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir

2005); Lambert v Blodgett, 393 F3d 943, 969 (9th Cir 2004). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the]

Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v

Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413. 

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A federal habeas court may not issue a writ where the

court concludes “in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be

unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under section 2254(d) is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta)

of the Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision. Id

at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir 2003). While

circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of

determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings

need to be “reasonably” applied. Id. 

B

Petitioner asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in

excluding evidence which directly undermined the victim’s

credibility and supported the defense theory of the case; (2) the

California statute and jury instruction used to define consent

created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption as to an element

of the offense of rape; and (3) cumulative error resulted from the

combined impact of these errors. Doc #23 at 2.

\\

\\

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1 

The trial record includes a colloquy between the judge

and counsel about Mary’s mental health and suicide attempts in 1990

and 1992. Resp’t Exh B at 503. Petitoner’s counsel asserted that

as a result of the 1992 suicide attempt, the “entire family was

disbanded” and Jessica was sent to live with her biological father

in Arizona for two years. Id at 507. Prior to trial, petitioner

attempted to introduce the evidence of these events, arguing that

this evidence showed that Jessica had a strong motive to lie to her

mother about her relationship with her stepfather. Doc #23 at 1. 

Petitioner contends that by excluding this evidence, the

trial court prevented him from introducing evidence that was

essential to his defense, thus violating his fifth amendment right

to due process and a fair trial, as well as his sixth amendment

right to present a defense. Doc #8 at 12. Petitioner further

contends that this constitutional claim is not procedurally barred. 

Id at 17. Respondent argues that the claim is procedurally

defaulted and in any event fails on its merits. Doc # 12 at 13.

The Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument that

the trial court’s refusal to admit evidence regarding the victim’s

mother’s attempted suicide amounted to unconstitutional error:

On appeal, defendant contends that the exclusion of the

suicide attempts violated his right to “compulsory

process and due process under the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments.” These arguments are presented

for the first time on appeal and have been waived. 

[Citations omitted]. In any event, no constitutional

violation occurred here. “‘As a general matter, the

ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe

on the accused’s [constitutional] right to present a

defense. Courts retain a traditional and intrinsic

power to exercise discretion to control the admission of

evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the

avoidance of prejudice.” [Citations omitted]. “A

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defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not

unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable

restrictions.” [Citations omitted]. “[S]tate and

federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the

Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from

criminal trials.” [Citations omitted]. 

Likewise, due process was not implicated by the ruling. 

“The proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees

the right to introduce all relevant evidence is simply

indefensible. As we have said: ‘The accused does not

have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is

incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under

standard rules of evidence.’” [Citations omitted]. The

opinion in Egelhoff recognizes that Federal Rule of

Evidence 403, the federal rule substantially similar to

section 352, was a “familiar and unquestionably

constitutional” evidentiary rule which authorized the

exclusion of relevant evidence.” [Citations omitted]. 

The Supreme Court has “never questioned the power of

States to exclude evidence through the application of

evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of

fairness and reliability-- even if the defendant would

prefer to see that evidence admitted.” [Citations

omitted]. 

Defendant does not renew his argument with respect to the

right to confrontation except belatedly in his reply

brief. Furthermore, “[a]lthough the right of

confrontation includes the right to cross-examine adverse

witnesses on matters reflecting their credibility, ‘trial

judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation

Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such

cross-examination.’ [Citations omitted]. 

Thus, in the procedural circumstances presented here the

decision whether to admit the proffered evidence was

squarely within the discretion of the trial court under

Evidence Code section 352. Under this provision a trial

court has broad discretion to determine what evidence is

relevant, and its ruling may not be overturned on appeal

absent an abuse of that discretion-- that is, only if the

trial court “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,

capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a

manifest miscarriage of justice.” [Citations omitted].

We find no such abuse here. The trial court properly

determined that the gap of several years between the

second suicide attempt and J's description of the events

to her mother was too large to be useful to the jury. 

Its conclusion that the evidence was not sufficiently

probative on the issue of force did not exceed the

bounds of reason. The court did not prevent defendant

from vigorously cross-examining the victim and her

mother regarding the facts or from attempting to prove

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that the sexual relationship between defendant and J was

mutually consensual. [fn 3: Defense counsel urged the

theory during closing argument that for J to have

admitted to her mother that she was having consensual

sex with defendant would have been the "ultimate

betrayal" for a daughter. Also, J was cross-examined

about her fear of upsetting her mother.] He was

prevented only from introducing evidence of remote

events that, in the court's view, had insufficient

probative value to the material issues before the jury. 

On this record, we find no reason to disturb the trial

court's ruling. 

Williams, slip op at 6-8. 

A federal court will not review questions of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision also rests on a state law

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to

support the judgement. Coleman v Thompson, 501 US 722, 729-30

(1991). To be “adequate” the state procedural bar cited must be

“clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of

the petitioner’s purported default.” Calderon v United States Dist

Court(Bean), 96 F3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir 1996) (internal quotations

and citation omitted). 

Petitioner argues that People v Yeoman, 31 Cal 4th 93

(2003) illustrates that the contemporaneous objection rule is not

consistently applied by California courts, and therefore cannot be

the basis of a procedural bar to petitioner’s claims. Doc #8 at

19. Yeoman held that, “by analogy to the well-established

principle that a reviewing court may consider a claim raising a

pure question of law on undisputed facts,” an appellate court could

reach the merits of a constitutional claim raised for the first

time on appeal where the claim applied the same legal standard and

turned upon the same facts as a claim properly raised in the trial

court. 31 Cal 4th at 117; see also People v Marchand, 98 Cal App

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4th 1056 (2003)(though a defendant’s failure to raise issues at the

trial court level results in waiver of these claims, an appellate

court nonetheless retains discretion to address constitutional

claims on the merits). 

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that California’s

contemporaneous objection rule, which requires objection at time of

trial to preserve an issue for appeal, is an adequate bar to

federal habeas review. See Davis v Woodford, 384 F3d 628, 653-54

(9th Cir 2004); Vansickel v White, 166 F3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir

1999); Hines v Enomoto, 658 F2d 667, 673 (9th Cir 1981). Further,

under California law, “as a general rule, ‘the failure to object to

errors committed at trial relieves the reviewing court of the

obligation to consider those errors on appeal.’ [Citations.] This

applies to claims based on statutory violations, as well as claims

based on violations of fundamental rights. [Citations.]” In re

Seaton, 34 Cal 4th, 193, 198 (2004); see also People v Scott, 9 Cal

4th 331, 351 (1994); People v Rudd, 63 Cal App 4th 620, 628 (1998). 

 Neither Yeoman nor Marchand indicates that the

contemporaneous objection rule is inconsistently applied by

California courts; rather, both cases illustrate that while the

rule uniformly bars parties from having the right to raise on

appeal an objection not properly preserved at the trial level,

appellate courts retain the discretion to address procedurally

waived constitutional claims on the merits. That the courts retain

discretion does not render a state procedural bar “inconsistently

applied.” See Kibler v Walters, 220 F3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir

2000) (state supreme court’s exercise of judicial discretion in

applying state rule barring successive petitions did not render bar

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inadequate for federal habeas corpus purposes). Accordingly, the

court finds petitioner’s argument to be without merit. 

 The Court of Appeal’s invocation of the contemporaneous

objection rule precludes federal review of petitioner’s fifth and

sixth amendment claims unless petitioner can demonstrate cause for

the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider

the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See

Coleman v Thompson, 501 US 722, 750 (1991). Petitioner makes no

such showing. 

Notwithstanding the procedural bar, petitioner’s claim

fails on the merits. The Court of Appeal addressed the merits of

petitioner’s claim. See Williams, slip op at 7-8. Petitioner’s

defense was that his relationship with his stepdaughter was

consensual and less extensive than she claimed. The appellate

court recognized that petitioner’s trial counsel was given the

opportunity to bolster this defense by cross-examining Jessica

about her fear of upsetting her mother. Further, the trial court

also permitted petitioner’s counsel to argue to the jury that

Jessica, by admitting to the consensual nature of her relationship

with her stepfather, would have had to admit her betrayal to her

mother. The trial court only prohibited petitioner from

introducing evidence of remote events that had, at best, a dubious

relevance to Jessica’s credibility. 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s determination that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence

of Mary’s suicide attempts was not objectively unreasonable. See

28 USC § 2254(d); Williams, 529 US at 409. Petitioner’s fifth and

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sixth amendment claims are barred from federal habeas review. See

Davis, 384 F3d at 653-53. 

2 

 Petitioner next argues that California Penal Code section

261.6, by requiring a jury to presume the lack of consent element

of rape when no evidence of “positive cooperation in act or

attitude” is presented, creates an unconstitutional presumption in

violation of his fifth amendment right to have every element of the

case against him proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Doc # 8 at 26,

27. Section 261.6 defines consent, in relevant part thus:

In prosecutions under Sections 261, 262, 286, 288a, or

289, in which consent is at issue, “consent” shall be

defined to mean positive cooperation in act or attitude

pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must

act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the

nature of the act or transaction involved.

The jury was instructed as to section 261.6's definition of consent

pursuant to CALJIC No 1.23.1:

In prosecutions under Penal Code Section 261, forcible

rape, 269, aggravated assault of a child, and 286,

forcible sodomy, the word consent means positive

cooperation in an act or attitude as an exercise of free

will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and

have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction

involved. 

Resp’t Exh B at 1917. 

Petitioner argues that this definition creates an

unconstitutional presumption: “absent evidence of “positive

cooperation,” the jury must presume the lack of consent element of

rape and find there was no consent.” Doc #8 at 27. Petitioner

contends that the instruction renders “irrelevant evidence that the

alleged victim consented passively,” and thus relieves the

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government of its burden of proving consent beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id at 28. 

To obtain federal habeas relief for error in the jury

charge, petitioner must show that the error “so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle

v McGuire, 502 US 62, 72 (1991). The error may not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the

instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. 

Where a potentially defective instruction is at issue,

the court must inquire whether there is a “reasonable likelihood”

that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that

violates the Constitution. See Boyde v California, 494 US 370, 380

(1990). But a determination that there is a reasonable likelihood

that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that

violates the Constitution establishes only that a constitutional

error has occurred. Calderon v Coleman, 525 US 141, 146 (1998). 

If constitutional error is found, the court must next determine

whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict before granting habeas

relief. Id (citing Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637 (1993)). 

The Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument that

CALJIC no 1.23.1 unconstitutionally lessened the prosecution’s

burden of proof:

The trial court instructed the jury on the concept of

consent as follows: “In prosecutions under Penal Code

Section 261, forcible rape, 269, aggravated assault of a

child, and 286, forcible sodomy, the word [‘]consent[‘]

means positive cooperation in an act or attitude as an

exercise of free will. The person must act freely and

voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act

or the transaction involved.” Defendant contends that

this instruction created an unconstitutional presumption

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that the victim did not consent and relieved the

prosecution of its burden to show that the sexual

intercourse was against J’s will. According to

defendant, CALJIC No 1.23.1 “ignores the possibility that

a woman may passively assent to sexual intercourse, even

though she does not show positive cooperation.” 

Defendant’s argument cannot succeed. Section 261.6, on

which CALJIC No 1.23.1 is based, defines consent as

positive cooperation “in act or attitude,” which includes

passive conduct reflecting assent to the act. It was for

the jury to decide whether J positively cooperated in

attitude such that she could be found to have consented

to defendant’s sexual conduct. [fn 4: Actual consent must

be distinguished from submission. For instance, a

victim’s decision to submit to an attacker’s sexual

demands out of fear of bodily injury is not consent

because the decision is not freely and voluntarily made

(§261.6). [Citations omitted.] There is no language in

CALJIC No 1.23.1 that shifts the burden of proof to the

defendant to prove that the victim did consent. 

Furthermore, the jury was not permitted to convict

defendant of violating section 261 or 269 without finding

beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged acts were done

“by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of

immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the alleged

victim or any other person.” Consequently, there is no

reasonable likelihood that defendant could have been

convicted of counts one, two, seven and eight

consistently with a jury finding that J willingly but

passively engaged in the alleged acts. [Citations

omitted.]

Williams, slip op at 11-12. 

The Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s claim was

neither contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent,

nor involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 USC §

2254(d). The state appellate court examined the record and

reasonably determined that the definition in § 261.6 does not

confine consent to active participation. Rather, by defining

consent as “positive cooperation in act or attitude,” section 261.6

encompasses passive consent because one who passively engages in a

sexual act also positively cooperates “in attitude pursuant to an

exercise of free will.” The state appellate court reasonably

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concluded, therefore, that CALJIC No 1.23.1 does not relieve the

prosecution of its burden of proving the element of lack of consent

beyond a reasonable doubt.

This determination was properly based on a “commonsense

understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has

taken place at the trial,” and cannot be said to be “objectively

unreasonable.” Boyde, 494 US at 381; Williams, 529 US at 409. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

instructional error claim. See 28 USC § 2254(d); Williams, 529 US

at 409.

3 

Petitioner finally contends that even if none of the

errors in his case individually warrants relief, the cumulative

effect of these errors does. Doc #8 at 12. Respondent contends

that a cumulative error claim is barred by Teague v Lane, 489 US 288

(1990). Doc # 12 at 24. Respondent alternatively argues that the

cumulative effect of the errors did not prejudice petitioner. Id. 

Having reviewed respondent’s exhibits C, D, E, F, G, H, I,

and J, it is not apparent to the court that Petitioner raised the

cumulative error claim during the state court proceedings. 

Cumulative error must distinctly be raised as an issue at the state

level for purposes of exhaustion prior to seeking federal habeas

review. See Solis v Garcia, 219 F3d 922, 930 (9th Cir 2000)

(holding that the district court properly declined to review

petitioner’s cumulative error claim, where the claim was not

presented during the state court appeals). Respondent, however,

represents that petitioner has “exhausted state remedies for his

claims.” Doc # 11 at 2. In either event, for the reasons that

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follow, the court finds petitioner’s cumulative error claim

meritless.

Teague precludes federal habeas relief if a petitioner’s

claim rests on a “new rule” announced after a petitioner’s case

became final. Id at 310 (plurality op of O’Connor, J). Respondent

argues that cumulative error constitutes a “new rule” in this case

because there is a split of authority on this issue. Doc # 12 at

25. Respondent acknowledges that while some circuits have declined

to adopt the concept of cumulative error, the Ninth Circuit

recognizes it. Id. That the Supreme Court has not yet addressed

the issue does not make the law of the Ninth Circuit any less

binding on this court. 

The Ninth Circuit has consistently recognized that in some

cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to

warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors may still

prejudice a defendant so much that his conviction must be

overturned. See Alcala v Woodford, 334 F3d 862, (9th Cir 2003);

Thomas v Hubbard, 273 F3d 1164, 1179-81 (9th Cir 2002); Mancuso v

Olivarez, 292 F3d 939, 957 (9th Cir 2002); United States v

Frederick, 78 F3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir 1996). “However, where there

is no single constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate

to the level of a constitutional violation.” Fuller v Roe, 182 F3d

699, 704 (9th Cir 1999); see also Manusco, 292 F3d at 957. As there

is no single constitutional error in this case, there is nothing to

accumulate into a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Petitioner

is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the grounds of

cumulative error. See Davis, 384 F3d at 654. 

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For all the reasons stated herein, the petition is DENIED.

The clerk is directed to close the file and terminate all pending

motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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