Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00690/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00690-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RONALD WILSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NORBRECK LLC DBA JOHNNY 

CARINO’S; FAIRBRECK, LLC; AH 

FOODS CORPORATION, and DOES 1 

to 10 

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-04-690 DFL JFM 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiff Ronald Wilson, who is disabled, brought suit 

against defendant Norbreck LLC, making various ADA and state 

related claims. Wilson visited one of Norbreck’s Johnny 

Carino’s restaurants and allegedly encountered numerous 

architectural barriers. The court dismissed Wilson’s claims 

based on five of these allegations at summary judgment, and, 

after a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of Norbreck on 

Wilson’s remaining claims. Norbreck now moves for attorney’s 

fees and costs under the ADA and the California Disabled Persons 

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Act (“CDPA”). For the reasons below, the court denies 

Norbreck’s motion.1 

I.

Wilson visited a Johnny Carino’s restaurant (“the 

restaurant”) and allegedly encountered various architectural 

barriers. Norbreck owns the restaurant. On April 7, 2004, 

Wilson filed suit against Norbreck, seeking compensatory and 

punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and 

attorney’s fees and costs under: (1) the ADA; (2) Cal. Health & 

Safety Code §§ 19955 et seq.; (3) the Unruh Civil Rights Act; 

(4) the California Disabled Persons Act; (5) the Unfair Business 

Practices Act; and (6) Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. Both parties 

subsequently moved for summary judgment. 

In the course of the litigation, Wilson “alleged” that 

there were more than 60 different ADA violations at the 

restaurant. But Wilson failed to include many of these 

allegations in his complaint. Instead, Wilson listed many of 

his allegations only in a letter he sent to Norbreck or in his 

expert report. Wilson further complicated matters when he moved 

for summary judgment on some of these allegations. Because of 

the resulting confusion as to which claims were part of this 

case, the court ordered both parties to submit a final list of 

alleged violations Wilson intended to pursue. The parties 

submitted a list of 24 allegations. On December 15, 2005, the 

 

1 In its reply, Norbreck argues that, under Local Rule 78-

230(c), the court should disregard Wilson’s opposition because 

Wilson served his opposition one day late. While Norbreck is 

correct that Wilson did not timely serve his opposition, the 

court finds the requested sanction too harsh in this case. 

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court found that Wilson adequately pleaded 11 alleged ADA 

violations in the complaint. The court then granted Norbreck 

summary judgment on Wilson’s claims based on five of these 

allegations. 

On August, 1, 2006, the court held a bench trial for 

Wilson’s remaining claims. At trial, Wilson sought only damages 

and injunctive relief under the ADA and the Unruh Civil Rights 

Act, abandoning his other causes of action. After a one day 

trial, the court found that Wilson failed to prove any ADA 

violation. 

II. 

Under the ADA, the court, in its discretion, may award “the 

prevailing party” attorney’s fees, including litigation expenses 

and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. When defendants are the 

prevailing parties, however, courts should award fees and costs 

only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, 

unreasonable, or without foundation.” Summers v. Teichert & 

Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). 

A claim is frivolous if it is clear from “the outset of the 

litigation” that “it lacked a factual and legal basis.” See

Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1060-61 

(9th Cir. 2006). 

Norbreck is correct that Wilson made 69 “allegations” of 

architectural barriers but the majority of these allegations 

were not claims in suit. Accordingly, the court finds that 

Norbreck prevailed only as to 11 ADA claims that were part of 

this lawsuit. Just as the court disregarded Wilson’s assertions 

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that were not part of the complaint upon summary judgment, so 

does the court disregard them now. Neither party is entitled to 

any advantage from assertions that were never in suit. Thus, 

while Norbreck contends in its motion that it defended more than 

60 different violations, most of this work is not compensable 

because the allegations were never made part of the case. To 

consider assertions in letters, reports, and briefs as if such 

assertions were part of an amended complaint is inconsistent 

with the architecture of the civil rules as well as the pretrial scheduling order. The court declines to follow a path 

that can only lead to confusion and inefficiency. 

Out of Wilson’s eleven ADA claims, the court finds that 

nine had a factual and legal basis from the outset of 

litigation, and, therefore, were not frivolous. Although 

lacking in merit, Wilson’s punitive damages claim and his Cal. 

Bus. Code § 17200 claim were colorable. Similarly, five of 

Wilson’s claims were based on colorable, albeit incorrect, 

interpretations of the Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) and 

the California Business Code (“CBC”): (1) unsecured floor mats, 

(2) dining booths spacing, (3) accessible seating in the bar and 

restaurant, (4) entrance door pressure, and (5) bar 

accessibility. As to Wilson’s toilet paper dispenser claim and 

his encroaching wastebasket claim, the court determined that 

Wilson failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish ADA 

violations. However, neither claim was frivolous. 

Norbreck is correct that the remaining two claims were 

frivolous: (1) lack of signage directing disabled patrons along 

accessible route to the restaurant entrance and (2) uninsulated 

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hot water lines. Both claims cite ADAAG and CBC provisions that 

clearly do not apply to the restaurant’s configuration at the 

time of Wilson’s visits. The court, however, declines to award 

Norbreck attorney’s fees and costs for their defense. Any fees 

and costs award would be de minimus. Moreover, it is impossible 

for the court to separate the fees and costs related to 

Norbreck’s defense against the two frivolous claims from the 

fees and costs related to Norbreck’s defense against Wilson’s 

other allegations. 

III. 

Norbreck also argues that it is entitled to attorney’s fees 

and costs under Wilson’s failed CDPA claims, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 

54.1 and 54.3 (2007). As with Wilson’s ADA claims, Norbreck 

prevailed on 11 CDPA claims brought by Wilson in the complaint.2

The CDPA has its own attorney’s fees provision. Cal. Civ. 

Code § 55, provides that “[t]he prevailing party in the action 

shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.” On 

its face, § 55 does not give courts discretion as to awarding 

fees, and it does not distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs 

and prevailing defendants. Accordingly, some courts have found 

that prevailing defendants are automatically entitled to fees 

under § 55 without further inquiry as to whether the claims were 

frivolous. See, e.g., Jones v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 467 

 

2 In his opposition, Wilson contends that Norbreck did not 

prevail as to any CDPA claim because he abandoned such claims 

before trial. This argument is unconvincing. Defendants 

prevail for the purpose of attorney’s fees even if plaintiffs 

voluntarily dismiss their claims before trial. See Corcoran v. 

Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 121 F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir. 1941). 

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F.Supp. 2d 1004, 1011 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Goodell v. Ralphs 

Grocery Co., 207 F.Supp. 2d 1124, 1126 (E.D. Cal. 2002). But in 

a recent case, a California court left open the issue of whether 

a prevailing defendant could recover attorney’s fees under § 55. 

Gunther, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 243 n.18 (“We leave for another 

day the issue of how section 55 interacts with section 54.3 [of 

the CDPA] and specifically whether a section 54.3 plaintiff is 

vulnerable as the nonprevailing party under section 55.”) 

Without deciding this precise issue, the court holds that 

when a plaintiff brings parallel CDPA and ADA claims, the ADA 

fees provision controls as a matter of state law.3

Under California law, prevailing defendants cannot receive 

attorney’s fees for defending claims that inextricably overlap 

with other claims when a fee award is inappropriate for the 

defense of the latter. Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 119 Cal. 

App. 4th 498, 506 (2004). In Carver, plaintiffs sued defendant 

for alleged antitrust violations under the Cartwright Act and 

also brought various common law claims. Id. at 501. Defendant 

ultimately prevailed on all of plaintiff’s causes of action and 

moved for attorney’s fees. Id. at 502. 

Many of the Carver plaintiffs’ common law claims 

inextricably overlapped with their Cartwright Act claims. But 

while defendant could receive fees for prevailing as to the 

former, the Cartwright act allows an award of fees only to 

prevailing plaintiffs and not prevailing defendants. Id. at 

503-04. “The public policy implicit in the unilateral fee-

 

3

 The same result would likely follow under federal law under 

preemption principles. 

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shifting provision of [the Cartwright Act] is to encourage 

injured parties to broadly and effectively enforce the 

Cartwright Act ‘in situations where they otherwise would not 

find it economical to sue.’” Id. at 504 (citation omitted). The 

court concluded that awarding defendants fees for the defense of 

claims that overlapped with the Cartwright Act claims would 

violate that public policy. Id. (noting that “[t]o allow 

Chevron to recover for fees for work on Cartwright Act issues . 

. . would superimpose a judicially declared principle of 

reciprocity of the [Cartwright Act’s] fee provision . . . and 

would thereby frustrate the legislative intent to ‘encourage 

improved enforcement of public policy’” (citation omitted)). 

Similarly, in this case, where the CDPA claims parallel the 

ADA claims, to award fees under the CDPA would compromise the 

public policy underlying the ADA’s attorney’s fees provision, 

which distinguishes between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing 

defendants. See Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the court declines to 

award fees to defendant under the CDPA where to do so would be 

tantamount to awarding fees under the ADA upon a standard 

inconsistent with the fees provision in the ADA. Therefore, the 

court also finds that Norbreck is not entitled to fees and costs 

under the CDPA. 

V. 

For the reasons above, the court denies Norbreck’s motion 

for attorney’s fees and costs. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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Dated: April 9, 2007 

 /s/ David F. Levi___________

 DAVID F. LEVI 

 United States District Judge

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