Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00191/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00191-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Defendant Cota filed a separate motion to dismiss because he was not served with the 1

Complaint until September 18, 2008. On July 22, 2008, this Court issued a Report and

Recommendation regarding the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants CDRC, Liles, Cowan, Limon,

and Hernandez. [Doc. No. 19.] That Report and Recommendation is currently pending before the

Honorable Marilyn L. Huff.

1 08cv191

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR PARRA, Jr., Civil No. 08cv191 H (CAB)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING DEFENDANT COTA’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 39.]

v.

R. HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Victor Parra, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On October 2, 2008, Defendant Cota moved to be dismissed entirely from

the Complaint. Plaintiff did not submit an opposition. The Court finds this matter suitable for 1

submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons that follow,

this Court recommends Defendant’s motion be GRANTED.

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 When a complaint is accompanied by attached documents, the documents are part of the 2

complaint and may be considered in determining whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in

support of the claim. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). If the allegations

in the complaint are refuted by an attached document, the court need not accept the allegations as being

true. Id.

 The Complaint states the incident occurred on September 25, 2006, but based on Plaintiff’s 3

Exhibit A, it appears the incident actually occurred on September 28, 2006. 

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II. BACKGROUND

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was incarcerated at R.J. Donovan State Prison. The Complaint

and attached exhibits allege the following facts: 2

Plaintiff has an anxiety disorder and at the time of the incident was classified as having safety

concerns. (Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 11.) On or about September 28, 2006, Plaintiff, who had been housed in

administrative segregation, was ordered by Defendants Limon and Liles to double cell with inmate

Duran. (Complaint at ¶ 2.) Inmate Duran was classified as a general population inmate. (Complaint at 3

¶ 1.) Plaintiff had double celled with at least two other general population inmates in the past without

incident. (Complaint at ¶ 49.) Defendant Limon notified Plaintiff that Operational Plan #85 required

inmates to double cell, and that he would be issued a Rule Violation Report (“RVR”) if he did not sign

the agreement. (Complaint at ¶ 5; Plaintiff’s Exhibit A (“Exhibit A”).)

Plaintiff told Defendant Limon that Inmate Duran was not compatible with Plaintiff because he

belonged to a different yard group. (Complaint at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was told that if he did not sign a

double-cell agreement he would be placed on a yard-hold and moved to Unit 8, where no yard, library, or

other state created services were available. (Complaint at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff agreed to double-cell with

inmate Duran, but would not sign the corresponding double-cell agreement form. (Complaint at ¶ 6.)

On or about September 28, 2006, Plaintiff was placed on a yard-hold. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B at 3

(“Exhibit B”).) On October 4, 2006, Plaintiff was formally issued a RVR for “refusing an order to

double cell.” (Exhibit A.) On October 9, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to Unit 8. (Exhibit B at 3.) On

October 10, 2006, Plaintiff received a copy of the RVR. (Exhibit A.) On October 30, 2006, a hearing

was held on the RVR and the reviewing officer found Plaintiff not guilty of refusing to obey an order to

double-cell because: (1) Plaintiff was in compliance with the order at the time of the hearing; and (2)

Plaintiff’s claims of incompatibility were not checked against all available sources of information

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because the officers only checked against his administrative segregation file, not his central file. (Id.) 

The senior hearing officer determined that further disciplinary action against Plaintiff was unnecessary

and dismissed the RVR. (Id.) 

From on or about September 28, 2006, to January 1, 2007, while he was on a yard-hold and

during his subsequent housing in Unit 8, Plaintiff was not allowed in the exercise yard. (Complaint at ¶¶

6, 8, 24-25.) Defendants Warden Hernandez, Assistant Warden Cowan, and Facility Captain Cota,

created Unit 8, which was on permanent lockdown and did not afford any access to the exercise yard,

law library, or recreational reading books. (Complaint at ¶ 13.) From January 1, 2007, to April 2007,

Plaintiff was housed in Unit 7, where he was allowed less than 5 hours in the exercise yard per week. 

(Complaint at ¶ 15.) Facility 2 includes Housing Units 7 and 8. (Exhibit B, Director’s Level Appeal

Decision).

III. DISCUSSION

With respect to the above facts, Plaintiff alleges numerous claims for violations of his rights

under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as several state law causes of

action. 

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion ‘can be

granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her

claim.'" Holley v. Crank, 400 F.3d 667, 674 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). "All allegations

of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 

Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 576 (9th Cir. 1989). The dispositive issue is "not whether a plaintiff will

ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Jackson

v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

Civil rights complaints are construed liberally. See Holley, 400 F.3d at 674. Moreover, courts

"have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt." Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d

1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). "However, a liberal interpretation of a

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civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v.

Board of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal citation omitted). 

Furthermore, courts do not assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the

form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

B. Count One

Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendant Cota for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of

the Eighth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.

1. Eighth Amendment Deprivation of Humane Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cota violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment when he

enforced Operational Plan #85, which deprived Plaintiff of time in the outdoor exercise yard. The Eight

Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing,

shelter, and medical care. Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally,

“[e]xercise has been determined to be one of the basic human necessities protected by the Eighth

Amendment,” and a long-term deprivation of outdoor exercise for inmates is unconstitutional. LeMaire

v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th

Cir. 1979) (declaring unconstitutional the deprivation of outdoor exercise for inmates held longer than

four years); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d. 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding a plaintiff made an objective

showing of an Eighth Amendment violation where he was only allowed outside for 45 minutes per week

during a six-week period). However, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual

‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-302 (1991) (rejecting a reading of the Eighth

Amendment that would allow liability to be imposed on prison officials solely because of the presence of

objectively inhumane prison conditions). 

A plaintiff alleging deprivation of humane conditions of confinement must not only make an

objective showing that the deprivation was “sufficiently serious” to form the basis for an Eighth

Amendment violation, but also a subjective showing that the prison official acted “with a sufficiently

culpable state of mind.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. The subjective requirement, relating to a prison

official’s state of mind, requires deliberate indifference. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir.

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2000) (en banc). “[T]he official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837. “[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,

while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of

punishment.” Id. at 838. 

Here, Plaintiff fails to provide any allegations that would establish deliberate indifference on the

part of Defendant Cota in regards to the enforcement of Operational Plan #85. Plaintiff’s only allegation

in regards to this claim was that Defendant Cota was the “Facility 2 Captain.” (Complaint at ¶ 11.) The

remainder of Plaintiff’s allegations involve actions taken by Defendants Limon and Liles and do not

mention any actions taken by Defendant Cota. (See Complaint at ¶¶ 2-6.) Based on the RVR itself, it

appears the only action taken by Defendant Cota was to classify the reported violation, i.e., refusing to

obey an order from a correctional officer, as serious. (Exhibit A.) This action alone does not

demonstrate “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” on the part of Defendant Cota. Accordingly, this

Court recommends Defendant’s motion be GRANTED and the Eighth Amendment claim in Count One

be DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend.

2. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cota retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment in

regards to the enforcement of Operational Plan #85. (Complaint at ¶ 9.) Within the prison context, a

claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) a state actor took an adverse

action against the plaintiff; (2) because of; (3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct; and that such action (4)

chilled the plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights; and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). In

regards to the fourth element, the Ninth Circuit has indicated an allegation of “harm that is more than

minimal,” may suffice if a plaintiff fails to allege a chilling effect. Id. at 567 n.11. However, Prisoner

retaliation claims should be evaluated in light of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), in which the 

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 In particular, the Supreme Court noted “the view expressed in several of our cases that federal 4

courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile

environment,” especially with regard to “the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life, a

common subject of prisoner claims” under section 1983. Sandin, 515 U.S. 482-83. 

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Supreme Court expressed disapproval of excessive judicial involvement in day-to-day prison

management. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). 4

Here, Plaintiff was issued an RVR when he refused an order to double-cell, pursuant to

Operational Plan #85. (Exhibit A.) While a prisoner’s First Amendment right extends to established

prison grievance procedures, see Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995), Plaintiff’s refusal

to comply with an order to double-cell, especially when evaluated in light of Sandin, is not protected

conduct for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim. 

Furthermore, as discussed above, Plaintiff does not allege any specific actions on the part of

Defendant Cota in regards to this claim. It appears from the RVR that the only action taken by

Defendant Cota was to classify the reported violation as serious. To the extent this could be construed as

an adverse action, Defendant Cota would have had a legitimate penological reason to classify an

inmate’s refusal to comply with a direct order from a correctional officer as a serious violation. 

Accordingly, this Court recommends Defendant’s motion be GRANTED and the First Amendment

claim in Count One be DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend. 

C. Count Two

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cota, along with Defendants Hernandez and Cowan, violated his

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when he created a housing unit

that was on permanent lockdown and did not allow for outdoor exercise. As stated above, a plaintiff

alleging deprivation of humane conditions of confinement must not only make an objective showing that

the deprivation was “sufficiently serious” to form the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation, but also

a subjective showing that the prison official acted “with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson,

501 U.S. at 298. Additionally, because Congress did not intend to impose § 1983 liability on a person

who did not cause the deprivation of a federal constitutional right, Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978), a prisoner-plaintiff must demonstrate the individual defendant was

in a position to take steps to avert the harm, but failed to do so intentionally or with deliberate

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indifference, Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). This causation inquiry requires “a very

individualized approach which accounts for the duties, discretion, and means of each defendant.” Leer,

844 F.2d at 633-34.

Here, Plaintiff appears to name Defendant Cota solely because of his position as facility captain. 

Aside from his general allegation that Defendant Cota, along with Defendants Warden Hernandez and

Assistant Warden Cowan, created the conditions of permanent lockdown that constituted the Eighth

Amendment deprivation, (Complaint at ¶ 11), Plaintiff does not include any allegations involving

actions on the part of Defendant Cota. “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show

that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998); Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268 (stating vague and conclusory allegations

of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to state a claim). While this Court

may presume a warden and assistant warden, Defendants Hernandez and Cowan respectively, had the

authority to establish and maintain the alleged conditions of 24-hour lockdown, no access to the law

library, and no recreational reading books, it is unclear a facility captain would have such broad

authority. Plaintiff alleges no facts which would account for the “duties, discretion, and means” of a

facility captain in relation to the alleged Eighth Amendment deprivation. See Leer 844 F.2d at 633-34;

cf. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268 (stating “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled”). Accordingly, because the allegations fail to

demonstrate a causal link between Defendant Cota and the Eighth Amendment deprivation, this Court

recommends Defendant’s motion be GRANTED and the Eighth Amendment claim in Count Two be

DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend.

D. Count Three

Plaintiff’s allegations in Count Three present essentially the same Eight Amendment claim as in

Count One. Namely, the enforcement of Operational Plan #85 resulted in the deprivation of outdoor

exercise time for Plaintiff. As discussed above in regards to Count One, Plaintiff fails to provide any

allegations that would establish deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Cota in regards to the

enforcement of Operational Plan #85. Plaintiff’s allegations involve actions taken by Defendants Limon

and Liles and do not mention any actions taken by Defendant Cota. (See Complaint at ¶¶ 2-6.) Based on

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the RVR itself, it appears the only action taken by Defendant Cota was to classify the reported violation,

i.e., refusing to obey an order from a correctional officer, as serious. (Exhibit A.) This action alone does

not demonstrate “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” on the part of Defendant Cota. Accordingly, this

Court recommends Defendant’s motion be GRANTED and the Eighth Amendment claim in Count

Three against Defendant Cota be DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend.

E. Count Four

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cota violated his Fourth Amendment rights when he transferred

Plaintiff from his cell in Unit 6 to Unit 8. However, this claim is without merit because assuming

arguendo Defendant Cota was responsible for the transfer of Plaintiff to Unit 8, the transfer of an inmate

within a prison does not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th

Cir. 1985). As a result, this Court recommends Defendants’ motion be GRANTED and the Fourth

Amendment claim in Count Four be DISMISSED. Furthermore, it is appropriate to dismiss the Fourth

Amendment claim against Defendant Cota without leave to amend because the pleading could not be

cured by the allegation of other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

F. Counts Five and Seven

Plaintiff alleges his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when he was placed

on yard-hold, and subsequently housed in Unit 8, without first receiving a “case factors” review or other

hearing. In the prison context, the United States Supreme Court has significantly limited the instances in

which due process can be invoked. Although prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison

gate, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974), “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary

withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations

underlying our penal system,” Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125

(1977) (quotations omitted). 

“Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the

expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485

(1995). As a result, constitutionally protected liberty interests are “limited to freedom from restraint

which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Id. at 484; See also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted

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inmate’s due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken

within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998)

(finding a two and a half year term in administrative segregation did not constitute an “atypical and

significant” hardship). The state does not create protectable liberty interests by way of mandatory

language in prison regulations. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-84.

Here, Plaintiff claims he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in not being placed on a

yard-hold or sent to Unit 8 because the conditions in Unit 8 constituted an atypical and significant

hardship. However, this claim should be dismissed as to Defendant Cota because Plaintiff alleges no

facts that indicate Defendant Cota was either directly or indirectly responsible for his placement in Unit

8. As discussed above, it appears the only action taken by Defendant Cota was to classify the reported

violation as serious. In the absence of any specific allegations against Defendant Cota, this Court

recommends Defendant’s motion be GRANTED and the Fourteenth Amendment claims in Counts Five

and Seven be DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend.

G. Count Six

Plaintiff claims Defendant Cota, along with Defendants Limon, Liles, Cowan, and Hernandez,

violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Due Process Clause when they issued him a RVR

for failure to comply with Operational Plan #85, without first notifying him that he was expected to

abide by Operational Plan #85 and that failure to do so would result in a transfer to a harsh lock-up and

24-hour isolation unit. As discussed above, Plaintiff does not allege any specific actions on the part of

Defendant Cota. In any event, Plaintiff’s allegations in regards to this claim are contradicted by both his

allegations in relation to Count One and by his own Exhibit A. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged he “was

ordered to signed [sic] a double cell agreement or he would be placed on Yard hold and move [sic] to

Unit 8 where no yard, library or other created services are available.” (Complaint at ¶ 3.) Additionally,

Plaintiff’s Exhibit A, the RVR itself, states in pertinent part:

On Thursday, September 28, 2006 . . .I informed Inmate PARRA . . . that he had been

assigned to Double Cell status by I.C.C. I informed Inmate PARRA of Operational Plan #85,

Single/Double Cell Procedures, which states, in part, “Inmates are not entitled to single cell

assignment, housing location of choice, or cellmate of choice. An inmate is expected to

share occupancy with another inmate in a cell setting...unless staff determines that an

inmate’s case factors or security concerns warrant single cell assignment. I informed Inmate

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PARRA that he would have to get a cellmate due to the overcrowding situation in ASU. I

also informed Inmate PARRA that his refusal to get a cellmate would result in him being

issued a CDC-115 for “Refusing to Obey Orders to Double-Cell.” I further advised Inmate

PARRA that a “Yard Hold” would be in effect, due to this pending CDC-115. Inmate

PARRA indicated he didn’t want a cell-mate, and refused to double cell, stating, “NO.”

Inmate PARRA is aware of this report.

(Exhibit A.)

When a complaint is accompanied by attached documents, the documents are part of the

complaint and may be considered in determining whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in

support of the claim. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). If the allegations

in the complaint are refuted by an attached document, the court need not accept the allegations as being

true. Id. Because the allegations in relation to Count One, as well as the information contained in

Exhibit A, directly contradict Plaintiff’s claim that he was not provided notice of the need to comply

with the order to double-cell, this Court does not accept Plaintiff’s allegation that he was not provided

notice as true. See id. Accordingly, this Court recommends Defendant’s motion be GRANTED and

Plaintiff’s claim in Count Six be DISMISSED without leave to amend because the pleading could not

be cured by the allegation of other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

H. Count Eight

Plaintiff claims Defendant Cota, along with Defendants Limon, Liles, Cowan, and Hernandez,

deprived him of his state-created liberty interest in being classified as having “safety concerns” when

they assigned him to double cell with a general population inmate. However, assuming arguendo

Defendant Cota was involved in the decision to house Plaintiff with a general population inmate,

prisoners do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification. 

Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802,

806 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, this Court recommends Defendant’s motion be GRANTED and

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim in Count Eight be DISMISSED without leave to amend

because the pleading could not be cured by the allegation of other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

I. Counts Nine and Eleven through Eighteen

Plaintiff alleges numerous state law causes of action against Defendant Cota. Section 1983 “is

not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred

by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v.

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McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (emphasis added). A claim for violation of state law is not

cognizable under § 1983. See Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990); accord Ebmeier v.

Stump, 70 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We take this opportunity to emphasize that violations of

state laws, state-agency regulations, and . . . state-court orders, do not by themselves state a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983."). Thus, Plaintiff’s state law claims are not cognizable under § 1983 and are only

before this Court pendant to Plaintiff’s claims based on federal law.

Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendant Cota must be dismissed

from the complaint because he fails to state a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983. When federal

law claims are removed from a lawsuit before trial and only state law claims remain, the balance of

factors to be considered under the pendant jurisdiction doctrine will usually point toward declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and to dismiss the claims without prejudice. 

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see also United Mine Workers of

America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state

claims should be dismissed as well”). In view of this Court’s determination that Plaintiff fails to state a

cognizable claim for relief under § 1983 against Defendant Cota, this Court refrains from determining

the propriety of Plaintiff’s state law claims against him until such time as Plaintiff files a viable federal

claim. Accordingly, it is recommended the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

law claims against Defendant Cota and these claims be DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C.

1367(c)(3).

IV. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the matter, this Court recommends:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED; 

2. Plaintiff’s claims in Counts One through Three, Five, and Seven be DISMISSED without

prejudice and with leave to amend; 

3. Plaintiff’s claims in Count Four, Six, and Eight be DISMISSED with prejudice and without

leave to amend;

4. The Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant

Cota and these claims be DISMISSED without prejudice; and

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5. Plaintiff be given thirty days from the date the final order regarding Defendant’s motion is

entered to file and serve a First Amended Complaint. Leave to amend should only be granted as to the

previously brought claims for the purpose of curing pleading deficiencies. No new claims should be

alleged. Plaintiff should be warned that the First Amended Complaint will be his final pleading.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 10, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 10, 2008

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00191-H-CAB Document 40 Filed 11/10/08 Page 12 of 12