Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00415/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00415-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LILLIA RENTERIA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COLLECTCORP, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C05-00415 HRL

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER,

AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

[Re: Docket Nos. 22 and 23]

On October 25, 2005, this court heard the Motions for Protective Order filed by plaintiff Lillia

Renteria (“plaintiff”) and defendants Collectcorp, Glenn Patton and Travis Hidashi (“defendants”). 

Having considered the papers filed and the arguments of counsel, the court issues the following order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff sues for statutory and actual damages, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ.

Code § 1788. She claims that defendants made abusive, harassing and misleading statements to her in

an attempt to collect a credit card debt. Plaintiff has audiotapes of defendants’ telephone messages

which she says were recorded on her answering machine.

Presently before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for protective order under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(c). Plaintiff seeks an order permitting her to withhold these audiotapes from defendants

until after she has completed their depositions. She argues that a protective order is necessary to

Case 5:05-cv-00415-HRL Document 35 Filed 10/26/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Defendants assert that the parties agreed to produce initial disclosures by May 19, 2005, but that

plaintiff did not serve hers until August 15, 2005. Counsel for plaintiff affirmed this at the hearing on this

motion. Plaintiff’s late disclosures did include reference to the tape recordings, but apparently were not

accompanied by copies of the recordings.

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prevent defendants from altering their testimony to conform with their recorded statements and to

preserve the impeachment value of the tapes. 

Defendants seek an order requiring disclosure of the tapes before their depositions may be

taken. They contend that plaintiff’s only purpose in withholding the recordings is to embarrass

defendants at their depositions, and that defendants must be able to verify the authenticity of the

recordings before being asked to testify about them. They further argue that plaintiff has not

demonstrated good cause for a protective order and that she has violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) by not

producing the recordings as part of her initial disclosures.

LEGAL STANDARD

Upon a showing of “good cause,” the Federal Rules authorize courts to “protect a party or

person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” in discovery by

ordering “that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including

a designation of the time or place.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(2). In addition, courts have discretion

to control the sequence of discovery “for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the

interests of justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d). The party seeking a protective order has the burden of

showing that it is warranted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, the court notes that the discoverability of the audiotapes is not contested. 

Indeed, a party has a right to a copy of its prior statements. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“[a] party

may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter

previously made by that party”). Thus, the issue to be resolved is not whether, but when the

audiotapes should be produced.

Defendants argue that plaintiff should have produced the tapes with initial disclosures, and by

failing to do so, has violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a).1 That Rule states: 

[A] party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties . . . a

copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data

Case 5:05-cv-00415-HRL Document 35 Filed 10/26/05 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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compilations, and tangible things that are in the possession, custody, or control of the

party and that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses unless

solely for impeachment (emphasis added).

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). Plaintiff represents to the court that she intends to use the recordings for

impeachment purposes only. Thus, plaintiff has not violated the Federal Rules, but her use of the

recordings shall be limited solely to impeachment purposes.

Plaintiff argues that a protective order is necessary to prevent defendants from altering their

testimony to conform with their recorded statements and to preserve the impeachment value of the

tapes. Other courts have agreed, although plaintiff cites no binding precedent. See, e.g., Poppo v.

AON Risk Servs., 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting protective order in sex

discrimination case); Torres-Paulett v. Tradition Mariner, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 487 (S.D. Cal. 1994)

(granting protective order in a personal injury action); Sherrell Perfumes, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 77

F.R.D. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (affirming issuance of protective order in an antitrust action).

Defendants’ argument that a protective order in their favor is necessary because plaintiff

intends to use the recordings to “embarrass” or “oppress” defendants is unconvincing. At the hearing,

counsel for defendants could not articulate clearly why this embarrassment would occur, except stating

that defendants have not had an opportunity to verify that their voices are on the recordings. As one

circuit court has noted, “because release of information not intended by the writer [or speaker] to be

for public consumption will almost always have some tendency to embarrass, an applicant for a

protective order whose chief concern is embarrassment must demonstrate that the embarrassment will

be particularly serious.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). 

Defendants have not done so in this case.

Plaintiff has demonstrated an interest in obtaining unrefreshed recollection in deposition, and a

number of courts have recognized that such an interest is a valid basis for delaying production of the

witnesses’ statements until after deposition. Moreover, the court is not convinced that defendants will

be prejudiced if production of the tapes is delayed. Defendants have provided no basis for their

argument that slight personal embarrassment is contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and they will

have sufficient opportunity to review the tapes and to explain any inaccuracies or discrepancies in

further discovery or at trial.

Case 5:05-cv-00415-HRL Document 35 Filed 10/26/05 Page 3 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order is GRANTED. Plaintiff will not be required to

produce the recordings until after she completes her deposition of defendants. However, before

deposing any defendant, and no later than November 2, 2005, plaintiff shall disclose in writing to

defendant with respect to each telephone message: (1) the telephone number receiving the message,

(2) the date and time received, (3) the caller (if identified or known to plaintiff), and (4) the length (in

seconds) of the message;

2. Plaintiff shall immediately produced the audiotapes and any related summaries and

transcriptions upon completion of the last deposition of defendants;

3. Plaintiff’s use of the recordings shall be limited to impeachment.

4. Defendants’ motion for a protective order is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/26/05 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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THIS SHALL CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS ORDER WILL BE SENT TO:

Edgar N. De Vera deverae@cmtlaw.com

Robert L. Hyde bob@westcoastlitigation.com

Sandra J. Shapiro sjs@sandrashapiro.com

Joshua B. Swigart josh@westcoastlitigation.com,

Stephen H. Turner TURNERS@cmtlaw.com, mahaneyl@cmtlaw.com; vigils@cmtlaw.com;

nefuldal@cmtlaw.com

* Counsel are responsible for providing copies of this order to co-counsel.

Dated: 10/26/05

 /s/ RNR 

 Chambers of Magistrate Judge Lloyd

Case 5:05-cv-00415-HRL Document 35 Filed 10/26/05 Page 5 of 5