Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01779/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01779-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WENDY JONES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TULARE COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01779-EPG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AS TO 

PLAINTIFF JONES, 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AS TO 

PLAINTIFF FABRICIUS;

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF 

FABRICIUS THIRTY DAYS TO FILE AN 

AMENDED COMPLAINT;

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RULE 

11(B) SANCTIONS

(ECF Nos. 34, 37)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns two plaintiffs, Wendy Jones and William Fabricius, both of whom had 

animals seized and subsequently declared “vicious” by Tulare County, California officials. 

Plaintiffs challenged the seizure in various administrative and state court proceedings. Those 

proceedings upheld the finding that Plaintiff Jones’ dog was vicious. Plaintiff Jones declined to 

appeal her adverse state court judgment to a state appellate review. In contrast, the administrative 

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proceedings ultimately reversed the finding that Plaintiff Fabricius’ dogs were vicious and 

permitted Plaintiff Fabricius to obtain return of his animals upon compliance with Tulare Code 

health and safety codes. Plaintiff Fabricius also filed a state court action, whose outcome is 

unknown to this Court.

Plaintiffs filed a combined lawsuit in federal court, challenging various actions regarding 

their animals as unconstitutional under various provisions and asking for damages and return of 

their animals. Plaintiffs have sued twenty-four defendants under all eleven causes of action. 

Now before this Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the lawsuit and request for 

sanctions, which argued in part that this Court’s adjudication is barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine because it is an impermissible attempt to appeal a state court proceeding in federal court. 

Defendants also claim that Plaintiffs should be sanctioned for misleading the Court.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Wendy Jones, William Fabricius and Brian Jones filed their original complaint 

in this case on November 24, 2015. (ECF No. 1) Although Plaintiffs are represented by an 

attorney, Christine Louise Garcia, they moved to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted. 

(ECF No. 8). Plaintiff Brian Jones voluntarily dismissed the case on May 16, 2016, (ECF No. 

18), and Wendy Jones and William Fabricius (“Plaintiffs”) remained as defendants. 

The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on May 13, 2016. (ECF No. 17.) It 

names the following twenty-four (24) defendants: Tulare County (“TC”), California, Tulare 

County Sheriff’s Office, Tulare County Animal Control (“TC AC”), Tulare County Animal 

Control Officer (“TC ACO”) Paul Grenseman, TC ACO Oren Hartley, TC ACO Jeffrey Lewis, 

TC ACO Larry Hernandez, TC ACO Carothers, TC ACO Lutz, TC ACO Director Dirkson, TC 

Deputy Sheriff Sergeant Torres, Sheriff Deputy Yandell, Sheriff Deputy Young, Sergeant 

Wallace, and Doe Defendants 1-10 (“Defendants”). 

Defendants responded to the FAC by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) 

and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on July 5, 2016, arguing, among other 

things, that the case was frivolous and was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (ECF No. 

34.) At the same time, the defendants filed request for judicial notice of certain facts related to 

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the underlying administrative and state court proceedings concerning this case pursuant to Rule 

201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (ECF No. 33.) On August 1, 2016, the defendants filed a 

motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11(b). (ECF No. 37.) Plaintiffs

filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on August 2, 2016 (ECF No. 38), and an opposition 

to the motion for sanctions on August 22, 2016 (ECF No. 41). Replies in support of the motions 

to dismiss and for sanctions were filed by the defendants on August 26, 2016. (ECF Nos. 42-43.) 

The Court held a motion hearing on both pending motions on October 7, 2016. (ECF No. 50.)

III. ALLEGATIONS IN FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

The FAC contains two sets of factual allegations regarding completely separate 

proceedings involving the seizure of animals in Tulare County. 

One set of factual allegations pertains to Wendy Jones and her dog, Clyde, and the other 

pertains to William Fabricius and his dogs. Both sets of allegations describe a series of incidents 

and interactions between the plaintiffs and Tulare County officials concerning dogs that were 

seized and initially found to be vicious animals (although that finding appears to have been 

reversed as to Mr. Fabricius’ animals).

A. Plaintiff Wendy Jones

On October 28, 2014, Jones’ grandson, a toddler, was injured by a dog bite from Clyde, 

described by the plaintiffs as a “family companion animal,” in the Jones’ residence in Tulare 

County, California. The following day, the animal was quarantined at the request of TCAC 

officer Hartley pending the outcome of a vicious animal hearing. On October 30, a California 

Child Protective Services agent came to the Jones’ home to follow up on the dog bite incident. 

Jones agreed that she would kennel the dog whenever the baby was in the home.

A Tulare County HHSA vicious animal hearing occurred before hearing officer Agnello 

on November 13, 2014. Jones thereafter voiced concerns regarding the hearing procedure and 

qualifications of the hearing officers to HHSA financial director Timothy Lutz. A couple days 

later, Jones received notice that the November 13 vicious animal hearing was invalidated and 

would be rescheduled. The rescheduled hearing occurred in early December before hearing 

officer Dale R. Bruder, an attorney. It was held that Clyde was vicious and should be euthanized. 

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On December 12, 2014, Jones appealed the Tulare County HHSA judgment finding that 

Clyde was vicious. The appeal hearing took place before hearing officer Hornburg on December 

23, 2014. The appeal was denied on December 31, 2014, and the judgment that Clyde was

vicious and should be euthanized was upheld. 

In a series of events that became the subject of local news media coverage, Clyde 

disappeared from the custody of TCAC on January 4, 2015 shortly before he was set to be 

euthanized.

The FAC mentions that on January 9, 2015, Jones filed a petition for a writ of 

administrative mandamus pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 1094.5. It 

does not include any further information about the state court proceedings.

A. Plaintiff William Fabricius

Mr. Fabricius is a landowner and resident of Tulare County, California. In 2013, 

Fabricius’ Tulare County land was zoned for 50 quadrupeds, meaning animals with four feet such 

as dogs or sheep. On April 27, 2013, a Tulare County Animal Control (“TCAC”) officer by the 

name of Jeffrey Lewis entered Fabricius’ land without a warrant intending to seize eight of 

Fabricius’ black dogs. Fabricius asked Lewis to leave his property and Lewis complied. Lewis 

called for the assistance of the Tulare County Sheriff’s Office (“TCSO”) and reentered Fabricius’ 

property. Assisted by TCSO police officer McLean, the eight black dogs were seized while 

Fabricius was detained on the property in handcuffs for over two hours. Frabricius watched as 

Lewis tranquilized his dogs and dragged them by their neck into his vehicle. All eight dogs were 

subsequently euthanized.

The next incident occurred on October 17, 2013, when ranchers John and Matt Floyd 

reported to Tulare County officials that they witnessed Fabricius’ dogs in vicinity of down (i.e. 

disabled or deceased) calves. An abatement/inspection and animal seizure warrant for 

approximately 25 dogs was obtained by Tulare County officials and signed by a state court judge 

on October 21, 2013. The following day, four TCAC officers and three TCSO police officers 

entered Fabricius’ property and seized approximately 25 dogs. Fabricius requested a copy of the 

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supporting affidavit to the search and seizure warrant, but was told that he would receive it at a 

later time.

Fabricius challenged the actions of the Tulare County officials by filing an appeal with 

Health and Human Services Agency (“HHSA”) of Tulare County. Three HHSA hearings 

concerning Frabricius’ seized animals occurred before hearing officer Agnello on November 25, 

2013, December 18, 2013, and January 15, 2014. Agnello denied return of the animals. 

Frabricius initiated another appeal of that judgment, which was heard by Tulare County hearing 

officer Thomas Hornburg on March 18, 2014. A subsequent appeal hearing was held on June 20, 

2014. The 25 animals were ultimately euthanized by injection. (ECF No. 17, p. 10 ¶ 30.)

The FAC does not mention any state court filings involving Mr. Fabricius. The FAC also 

does not mention that an administrative appeal ultimately found that his dogs were not vicious 

and permitted Fabricius to request return of the dogs upon compliance with certain health codes.

B. Causes of Action and Requests for Relief

Plaintiffs attempt to assert eleven causes of action: 

1. Violation of the First Amendment “by failing to enforce the provisions of the 

United States of America Constitution and/or the United States Constitution 

concerning the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press encompassing 

due process in that notice of defendant’s actions were not provided to the 

plaintiffs was completely lacking and wanting of due process especially the 

right of the freedom of speech and the freedom of press . . . .”

2. Violations of the Fourth Amendment by “unlawfully and illegally seizing the 

Animals without a warrant and determining that they should not be returned . . 

. .”

3. Freedom of Information Act, alleging the “failure of the Country of Tulare to 

respond to Fabricius’ County reports constituted a violation of Plaintiff 

Fabricius’ Freedom of Information.”

4. Fraud on the Court by the Sheriff, on ground that the “seizure abatement and 

inspection warrant that was served upon Fabricius lacked a verified affidavit.”

5. Due Process Violation of Policy of Hiring Unqualified Animal Hearing 

Officers, arguing that the “hearing officers Hornburg, Agnello and Bruder 

were not fair and impartial hearing officers. The hearing officers failed to 

allow Plaintiffs to have a fair and impartial hearing. The hearing officers were 

appointed by the Board of Supervisors and also paid by the County of Tulare.”

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6. Injunctive Relief, requesting “injunctive relief, both preliminary and 

permanent, enjoining Defendants from continuing their possession of The 

Animals . . .” among other things.

7. “Unconstitutional as Applied,” claiming that the “standard of proof that should 

be applied to a pre-seizure hearing is ‘clear and convincing,’ with the burden 

of proving each element, on the County, given the quasi-criminal nature of this 

predicate hearing and forfeiture of the Animals.”

8. Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that “TULARE COUNTY 

policy, practice, rules and/or procedures of taking animals first and then 

offering a post-seizure hearing with a low burden of proof are in violation of 

Plaintiff’s right to equal protection of the law and equal justice under the law . . 

. .”

9. Violation of Due Process, “by depriving plaintiff of a constitutionally 

guaranteed right to confront witness against them and depriving plaintiff of the 

clear and convincing standard of proof against them . . . .”

10. “Unconstitutional Acts,” claiming “unlawful and illegal acts of the defendants 

and each of them,” with the result that “Plaintiff was deprived of his rights to 

due process under law, the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 

the United States Constitution.”

11. Declaratory Relief, requesting entry of “summary judgment and directed 

verdict declaring the rights and other legal and lawful relations of the parties 

hereto as to said controversies.”

In the prayer for relief, Plaintiffs request an injunction “prohibiting Defendants from 

maintaining possession of the The Animals and returning The Animals to their rightful owner,” 

costs, and “immediate return in good health of their animals . . . .” Plaintiffs also request 

numerous declarations that various acts by Defendants were illegal and unconstitutional.

IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF STATE COURT APPEALS

The defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of several documents related to 

the underlying state court proceedings and to the subject matter of the FAC. (ECF No. 33.) 

Courts may take judicial notice of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” when they are either: 

“(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate 

and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

FED. R. EVID. 201. The plaintiffs did not object to the request for judicial notice. With respect to 

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the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted to the 

extent the documents reflect the existence of a another court’s opinion, but not for the truth of the 

facts recited therein. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 

omitted).

A. Plaintiff Jones’ Underlying State Court Proceedings

Documents submitted in Defendants’ request for judicial notice include the lengthy 

records from underlying administrative and state court proceedings regarding Plaintiff Jones and 

her dog, Clyde. 

Exhibit 9 to the request for judicial notice is a document from Vicious Animal Hearing, 

which took place on December 4, 2014, which is an eleven page decision finding that Clyde is a 

dangerous animal and should be humanely euthanized. (ECF No. 33-9.) The decision ends with 

an explanation of appellate rights, specifically “[p]ursuant to Tulare County Ordinance No. 4-07-

1300(a) entitled, ‘Appeal,’ the owner may appeal the hearing officer’s decision to the director of 

Health and Human Services, by filing a written appeal in the office of the Director of 

Administrative Services.” 

Exhibit 10 is the Appeal of Decision from Vicious Hearing Regarding “Clyde.” (ECF No. 

33-10.) Exhibit 11 reflects an appeal hearing was set for December 23, 2014 (ECF No. 33-11), 

Exhibit 12 is the reporter’s transcript and exhibits from that hearing (ECF No. 33-12), and Exhibit 

13 is the notice of decision on appeal issued by the Tulare County Board of Supervisors (ECF No. 

33-13). 

Exhibit 15 includes documents regarding the petition for writ of administrative mandamus 

and traditional mandamus filed in the Superior Court of California by Wendy and Brian Jones. 

(ECF No. 33-15.) Exhibit 16 includes documents from the appeal to the Court of Appeals, 5th

Appellate District by Wendy Jones. (ECF No. 33-16.) Exhibit 17 includes court records 

indicating that the appellate petition for writ was denied on the ground that “Petition has an 

adequate remedy at law, and must first seek relief from the superior court with original 

jurisdiction over this case.” (ECF No. 33-17.) Exhibit 18 is a post hearing correction of record

before the Superior Court of California. (ECF No. 33-18.)

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Exhibit 19 is what appears to be the Superior Court of California’s ultimate ruling on the 

petition for writ of administrative and traditional mandamus, denying both in an 8 page reasoned 

decision. (ECF No. 33-19.) That decision includes a review of evidence supporting the ruling 

that Clyde was a dangerous animal, including the following summary of the Court’s standard of 

review and conclusion:

Here, where the subject matter of the Jones’ writ petition involves the County of 

Tulare’s taking of a vested property right of Mr. Jones, i.e., a dog that he owns, 

and the potential euthanasia of this animal, due process requires that the court 

exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence offered during the 

administrative hearing of this case in a limited trial de novo.

From a review of the evidence that the Joneses and the County of Tulare submitted 

at the administrative hearing of this case, the Court finds that Clyde should be 

deemed to be a ‘dangerous animal’ within the criteria set forth in Tulare County 

Ordinance Code . . . .

(Id. at 5.) It is worth noting that the State Court also rejected an argument that the requirement to 

pay an administrative hearing fee was “unconstitutional.” (Id. at 7.)

B. Plaintiff Fabricius’ Underlying State Court Proceedings

The request for judicial notice also included judicial documents regarding Mr. Fabricius’ 

animals. Exhibit 21 is the County of Tulare’s Application of Inspection/Abatement and Seizure 

Warrant filed with the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Tulare on October 21, 

2013. (ECF No. 33-21.) Exhibits 22, 24, and 26 are reporters’ transcripts from hearings that 

appear to have taken place at the Tulare County Government Center. (ECF Nos. 33-22, 33-24, 33-

26.) Exhibit 25 is a decision of the Tulare County Animal Control Vicious Dog Hearing against 

Mr. Fabricius. (ECF No. 33-25.)

Exhibit 23 is a 49-page complaint by Mr. Fabricius filed in the Tulare County Superior 

Court against County of Tulare, Public Health Department as Defendants. (ECF No. 33-23.) In 

that complaint, Plaintiff Fabricius claims in part that “Defendants have trespassed upon 

Claimant’s land; rights of ownership; right to due process to include ‘equal protection’ and 

‘immunities and privileges’ under the laws this State, one of the United States.” (Id. at 48)

(internal sub-letters omitted).

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Exhibit 27 is an opinion from an Appeal of the Administrative Hearing. (ECF No. 33-27.) 

Notably, the appeal finds that “the burden of proof has not been satisfied and that there is no 

connection between the twenty-five (25) subject dogs were in any way in connection with the 

slaughtering of the Flynns’ calves.” However, the appeal hearing officer found that “at the 

hearing, and at the prior hearing, evidence was provided which raised serious concerns over Mr. 

Fabricius and his ability to care for, handle and maintain the animals.” The hearing officer then 

found that “each of your twenty-five (25) dogs are not vicious/dangerous animals. Your dogs’ 

current license will be revoked and new licenses will be issued and your dogs will be returned to 

you provided the following conditions are met.” The hearing officer then listed conditions 

including that “your dogs must be kept current on all shots and licensing,” and other health and 

safety requirements including abiding by the Tulare County Ordinance Code. The opinion 

provided a method for Mr. Fabricius to “contact Tulare County Animal Control to arrange for the 

return of your dogs to your custody.” The opinion concluded by explaining that “judicial review 

of a decision of the Director of Administrative Services made after a hearing pursuant of this 

section shall be pursuant to section 1094.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure . . . .”

The final exhibit, 29, reflects a case management conference from the Superior Court of 

California, County of Tulare, for a case management conference stating that “there are no actions 

pending in this case. If an issue arises between the parties then the parties shall seek out an order 

from the Court.” (ECF No. 33-29.) No party has explained what if any outcome resulted from 

Mr. Fabricius’ state court case. 

V. LEGAL STANDARD – RULE 12 MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants have filed a combined Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. A Rule 

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 12 (b)(1). “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for 

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 

1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a 

complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. “By contrast, in a 

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factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would 

otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id.

Here, the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is a factual attack because the 

argument relies upon extrinsic evidence. See White, 227 F.3d at 1242. In a factual attack, “a court 

may look beyond the complaint to matters of public record without having to convert the motion 

into one for summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, a court “need not presume 

the truthfulness of the plaintiffs' allegations.” Id. (citing MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 12.30[4], 

at 12–38).

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests legal sufficiency of a claim for 

relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 

must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and “[w]here a complaint 

pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). The court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the 

pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City 

of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2007). Legally conclusory statements, when 

unsupported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678-79. A 

court may, however, consider documents other than the complaint when they are judicially 

noticeable under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 or where “no party questions their authenticity 

and the complaint relies on those documents.” Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 

(9th Cir. 2012).

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard - The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The defendants argue that this case must be dismissed because the court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine has 

evolved from the two Supreme Court cases from which its name is derived. Kougasian v. TMSL, 

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Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 

S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 

103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983)). “Under Rooker–Feldman, a federal district court does 

not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state 

court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). “The United States Supreme Court is 

the only federal court with jurisdiction to hear such an appeal.” Id.

Rooker-Feldman applies even when the state-court judgment is not made by the highest 

state court, and when the challenge to the state court's actions involves federal constitutional 

issues. Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court of State of Cal. for Cty. of Los Angeles, 23 F.3d 218, 

221 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “The doctrine bars a district court from exercising 

jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto

equivalent’ of such an appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Noel, 341 F.3d at 1155). In a “de facto” appeal, a “state-court loser” invites district court review 

and rejection of a state court judgment. See Scheer v. Kelly, 817 F.3d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016), 

cert. denied, (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016) (citing Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 

179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 

284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005))). “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies to such 

challenges, even where the relevant state court decision is a denial of discretionary review.” Id. 

(citing Craig v. State Bar of Cal., 141 F.3d 1353, 1355 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

In analyzing whether a plaintiff is attempting to bring a “forbidden de facto appeal,” the 

court determines whether a plaintiff “asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a 

state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at

1164. If that is the case, a plaintiff is also precluded from litigating any issues that are 

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto

appeal is taken. Id. at 1165; Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142 (citing Noel, 341 F.3d at 1166); 

Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If claims raised in the federal court 

action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court's decision such that the adjudication of 

the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the 

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application of state laws or procedural rules, then the federal complaint must be dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16 & 485, 103 S.Ct. 1303.”).

B. Application of Rooker-Feldman to this case

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ case is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because 

“it is clear Plaintiffs’ seek to improperly litigate issues already raised and decided as evidenced by 

the Exhibits to this Motion. Because Plaintiffs’ seek a forbidden de facto appeal, their Complaint 

should be dismissed without leave to amend.” (Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 34 at 19.) 

In response, Plaintiffs argue that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because “1) the claims 

are against the existing statute and policy and practice of Tulare County for which the cases are 

ripe and 2) these claims are not re-litigated from the CCP 1094.5 administrative writ.” (ECF No. 

38 at 17.)

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine presents a gating issue for this Court because it determines 

whether this Court should rule on any arguments challenging the seizure of Plaintiffs’ animals or 

the constitutionality of the proceedings below. With this in mind, the Court has frankly struggled 

with understanding the scope of this case and its relationship to state court proceedings. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint is exceedingly difficult to understand. The causes of action, summarized 

above, appear to be a list of multiple constitutional provisions strung together without adequate 

tie to facts or procedure. There is no explanation for how each of the twenty-four defendants 

allegedly infringed Plaintiff’s rights or are related to individual causes of action. 

The FAC also provides almost no information regarding the underlying state court 

proceedings. The FAC merely describes how the Jones’ filed a petition for writ of administrative 

mandamus on January 9, 2015, but does not describe the outcome of that proceeding or how this 

proceeding relates to those. It entirely omits the state court case involving Mr. Fabricius. It also 

does not describe that Mr. Fabricius already received a decision that his dogs were not vicious 

and holding that he merely had to comply with health and safety codes in order to obtain their 

return. It is entirely unclear whether Mr. Fabricius requested the return of his animals after 

receiving this favorable ruling. 

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The Court attempted to untangle these issues at oral argument. The Court began the 

hearing with a review of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and gave its tentative conclusion that the 

doctrine appeared to apply here because there had been extensive litigation at the state level, and 

appeal of those decisions would be proper through state court. In response, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

argued first that Jones had only pursued a writ, in which damages were not available. Second, 

Plaintiff argued that “the reason why I believe the Rooker-Feldman doesn't apply in this case is 

because we're asking this Court to address a new and different request and that is moving forward 

that the County of Tulare adopt a new burden of proof and that's clear and convincing because 

there is going to be a permanent taking.” (ECF No. 52 at p. 9:24-10:4.) 

The issue became all the more difficult to unravel because of conflicting accounts of the

underlying court proceedings. In arguing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, 

Plaintiffs’ counsel stated without reservation that Mr. Fabricius had only undergone 

administrative hearings and has never been in front of a superior court judge. (ECF No. 52 at 

11:7-19.) Immediately following, Defense counsel pointed to Exhibit 23 to Defendants’ request 

for judicial notice, which is the 49-page complaint by Mr. Fabricius against the County of Tulare, 

among others, filed in the Tulare County Superior Court that challenges the County’s seizure 

including on the grounds that it violated Mr. Fabricius constitutional rights. (ECF No. 33-23 at 

48; ECF No. 52 at 11:23-12:8). Plaintiffs’ counsel also stated that Ms. Jones had never filed any 

document with the Court of Appeals, (ECF No. 52 at 9:15-22), after which Defense counsel 

pointed to Exhibit 16 to the Request for Judicial Notice, which is a petition filed in the Court of 

Appeals 5th Appellate District. (ECF No. 33-16; ECF No. 52, at 12:14-25). This discussion 

failed to clarify for this Court how the issues were properly before the Court, and cast doubt on 

the reliability of Plaintiffs’ representations. 

After further discussion, Plaintiffs’ counsel concluded as follows: “Your Honor, that I am 

requesting that we at least move forward with the two claims, the damages for failing to provide 

documents pursuant to the FOIA because that wasn't contained in Exhibit 23, as well as the claim 

that we're requesting this Court today to, to re-review or review the standard of proof as clear and 

convincing moving forward, moving forward as injunctive relief.” (ECF No. 52 at 20:14-20.)

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After substantial consideration, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss

(although leave to amend differs between the Plaintiffs as described below). Although the exact 

claims in the FAC are difficult to understand, it is clear that it is challenging the County of 

Tulare’s seizure and subsequent decisions resulting in the detention of Ms. Jones’ and Mr. 

Fabricius animals. The introduction states “This action arises out of illegal and unlawful seizures 

of animals, and the subsequent deprivation of property rights without due process of law.” (ECF 

No. 17, at p. 2:18-19). The first request for declaratory relief states that “The Animals should be 

returned immediately to PLAINTIFFS forthwith in good health.” (ECF No. 17 at 31:10-11). 

It is clear from the record submitted with the motion to dismiss that Plaintiff Jones’ 

substantive claims have been addressed by California Superior Court, which issued a ruling on 

the petition for writ of administrative manadamus or traditional mandamus against Ms. Jones. 

(ECF No. 33-19) (“the Court finds that Clyde should be deemed to be a ‘dangerous animal’ 

within the criteria set forth in Tulare County Ordinance Code . . . .”). The Court’s view is not 

changed by the fact that Plaintiffs did not request damages (and such damages may not have been 

available). Ms. Jones raised many, if not all, of the same due process issues in the FAC with 

superior court and lost. (See id.) Thus, it is clear that Ms. Jones is a “state court loser” for 

purposes of Rooker-Feldman. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S. Ct. at 1521–22, 

161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine ... is confined to cases of the kind from 

which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 

inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments).

The fact remains that Plaintiff Jones had an opportunity to challenge the administrative 

proceedings in state court, availed herself of that opportunity, and that any decision by this Court 

finding in her favor would by necessity run contrary to (i.e. undercut) the state court process. See 

Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898. If Plaintiff Jones disagreed with the superior court decision, she could 

have appealed the state appellate court, as it appears she initially, albeit prematurely, did. In other 

words, to rule on Plaintiffs’ claims would act as a de facto appeal of that state court decision.

Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars subject matter jurisdiction as to Ms. Jones’ case. 

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Plaintiff Jones’ claims shall be dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend. See Kelly 

v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004) (providing that when the 

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the claims should be dismissed without prejudice).

Unfortunately, the picture is not quite as clear as to Plaintiff Fabricius. The record shows 

that he filed a state court complaint on December 6, 2013, against County of Tulare and other 

defendants in state superior court regarding the seizure of his animals. (ECF No. 33-23.) It is 

not clear whether any decision was rendered from this case, so that Court cannot determine if Mr. 

Fabricius was a state court loser, or indeed whether these issues are currently pending in another 

forum. 

Additionally, Mr. Fabricius received a favorable ruling from the Director of 

Administrative Services on March 26, 2014, overturning the vicious dog determination and 

directing Mr. Fabricius to “arrange for the return of your dogs to your custody,” subject to future 

compliance with the Tulare rules regarding health and safety. (ECF No. 33-27.) His response to 

this favorable ruling is entirely undiscussed by all parties. It is not clear to this Court whether Mr. 

Fabricius’ request for return of his dogs is still a ripe issue for this Court in light of the favorable 

finding below. If Mr. Fabricius did not request return of his animals, it is entirely unclear what 

relief he seeks and whether he is ultimately challenging health and safety codes governing his 

property. Quite simply, this administrative appellate decision does not appear to support the facts 

and causes of action in the FAC.

In any event, it appears that Mr. Fabricius availed himself of state court, and also that he 

received what appears to be a favorable decision at some point in the state court process. With 

such questions, it appears likely that any ruling by this Court could run afoul of Rooker-Feldman, 

or alternatively that any ruling could be moot. 

This confusion is compounded by the fact that the legal allegations in the FAC are nearly 

incomprehensible. There are two, separate Plaintiffs with two, separate sets of factual allegations, 

but the two Plaintiffs are often referred to collectively as the “Plaintiffs” throughout the FAC.

There are also 24 Defendants who are similarly referred to in the collective throughout the FAC

without any explanation as to who violated Mr. Fabricius’ rights and why. The Court is unable to 

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decipher which allegations pertain only to Mr. Frabricius and what exactly those allegations are. 

Thus, the allegations in the FAC, as presently structured, do not comport with Rule 8 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 

127 S. Ct. at 1964, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to 

‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).”)

For all of these reasons, the Court will dismiss the FAC as to Mr. Fabricius with leave to 

amend, and permit him thirty days in which to file a Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff 

Fabricius’ Second Amended Complaint, if he chooses to file one, shall omit all allegations as to 

Ms. Jones and further comport with the guidance in this order. It shall include a description of 

why he did not receive his animals following the appellate administrative proceeding, and shall 

describe with particularity what rights were violated by which specific defendants, as well as 

what relief he now seeks.1

The Court also declines to reach the two limited issues eventually set forth by Plaintiffs’ 

counsel. First, Plaintiff’s FOIA cause of action does not state a viable claim under the Freedom 

of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, (“FOIA”) statute because Plaintiffs concede that no requests 

were made to federal agencies and no federal agencies have been named as defendants in this 

case. (ECF No. 52, pp. 23-34.) It appears, instead, that Mr. Fabricius misconstrued FOIA as 

some independent right to obtain documents generally from County Officials. Under 5 U.S.C. § 

552(a)(4)(B), jurisdiction over FOIA claims is dependent upon a showing that an agency has (1) 

“improperly”; (2) “withheld”; (3) “agency records.” Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 

of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150, 100 S.Ct. 960, 63 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980). Moreover, “FOIA does 

 

1

To the extent Defendants move to dismiss any second amended complaint by Mr. Fabricius on the ground of 

Rooker-Feldman, they may wish to address how the doctrine applies to administrative proceedings. See D.C. Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 477, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1312, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983) (providing that whether or 

not the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to review state court action “depends not upon the character of the 

body but upon the character of the [state court] proceedings.” (citations omitted)). Cf. Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. 

Serv. Comm'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 644, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 1759, 152 L. Ed. 2d 871 (2002) (“The doctrine has 

no application to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative 

agency.”). Given the state court ruling against Ms. Jones, the Court did not need to resolve this issue in dismissing 

her claims, but it may be a ripe issue regarding Mr. Fabricius.

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not authorize an award of damages for a violation thereof.” Wren v. Harris, 675 F.2d 1144, 1147 

(10th Cir. 1982) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)). 

Nor will the Court take up the issue in a vacuum whether the standard of proof for animal 

seizure proceedings should be altered. Without applying this issue to the underlying dispute over 

Plaintiffs’ animals, it would be an impermissible advisory opinion. The judicial power of the 

federal courts extends to “Cases” and “Controversies” pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2 of the United 

States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2. The role of the courts is “neither to issue 

advisory opinions nor to declare rights in hypothetical cases, but to adjudicate live cases or 

controversies.” Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009).

VII. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Defendants have also requested that the Court enter an order imposing sanctions pursuant

to Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 37.) Rule 11(b) provides as 

follows:

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by 

signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented 

party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, 

formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, 

cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, 

or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 

identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 

opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 

specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of 

information.

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). If “the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may 

impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is 

responsible for the violation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). “[T]he district court has wide discretion in 

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determining what sanctions should be imposed for violation of the Rule [11]...” Golden Eagle 

Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Defendants argue that sanctions should be imposed for two reasons. First, Defendants

state that the alleged facts, legal claims and other contentions in the FAC are not legally 

supported by existing law. Defendants point out that Plaintiffs failed to inform the Court of the 

appeals to the California state courts. Defendants further argue that this case is malicious due to 

number of defendants sued and because it is repetitive of litigation already filed in the underlying 

state court proceedings.

As the Court made apparent at oral argument, the Court has seriously considered sanctions 

in this case. Plaintiffs are represented by an attorney. Yet, the FAC does not set forth the facts 

and claims in a clear legal manner. Instead, it lists various constitutional and legal provisions 

together in a “kitchen-sink” approach. See, e.g., ECF No. 17, at p. 21, ¶ 76 (“The Country’s 

possession of the Animals as fraudulently induced in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.”). The FAC also includes 24 

defendants, including everyone at all connected to the underlying proceedings, without specifying 

who is liable for which claim. Taken together, Plaintiffs’ FAC looks like an attempt to harass the 

individuals who participated in the seizure of their animals by suing each and every one of them 

in federal court without cause. 

The Court is also concerned by the misstatements regarding the state proceedings below. 

The FAC contained little to no explanation of the state court filings below. More concerning, as 

discussed above, Plaintiffs denied filings in state court, only to be contradicted by Defendants’ 

presentation of the state court record. Upon consideration, the Court can perhaps understand that 

Plaintiffs’ representation that Ms. Jones had not filed with the state Court of Appeals was based 

on the fact that the state appellate court summarily dismissed Plaintiff Jones’ case. (ECF No. 33-

17.) But the Court can find no justification for Plaintiffs’ representing that Mr. Fabricius had 

never filed a lawsuit in state court in light of his lengthy complaint dated December 6, 2013. 

(ECF No. 33- 23). 

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Ultimately, the Court will decline to impose sanctions primarily because Plaintiffs’ 

counsel represented that she had taken this case with very little payment and the Court believes 

(or at least hopes) that counsel is motivated by a desire to help animals, rather than to harass 

County officials. The Court cautions counsel that she is an attorney and held to a high standard to 

follow the law and conduct herself with integrity. However, given her financial situation, the 

Court will decline to impose monetary sanctions.

VIII. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED

and the defendants’ motion for sanctions (ECF No. 37) is DENIED. 

All claims in the First Amended Complaint pertaining to Plaintiff Wendy Jones are 

DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend.

All claims in the First Amended Complaint pertaining to Plaintiff William Fabricius are 

DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend. 

Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Fabricius is granted 

leave to file a Second Amended Complaint within THIRTY days of this order.

Failure to file an amended complaint within thirty days will result in dismissal of this 

action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 1, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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