Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02707/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02707-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2707

___________

Douglas Beyer, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Firstar Bank N.A., also known as *

Elan Financial Services, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 15, 2006

Filed: May 19, 2006

___________

Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Douglas Beyer appeals from an order of the district court1

 granting summary

judgment to Firstar Bank N.A. on Mr. Beyer's claims that the bank violated Iowa law

when it reported the status of his credit card account to a national credit reporting

bureau. We affirm. 

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I.

This is the second action that Mr. Beyer has filed relating to the credit card

issued to him in 1985 by Elan Financial Services, a predecessor in interest to Firstar

Bank. The bank is now known as U.S. Bank, the name that we use throughout the rest

of this opinion. 

In 2001, a dispute developed between Mr. Beyer and U.S. Bank about the

balance on the card. Mr. Beyer eventually filed an action in Iowa state court against

the bank and its collection agency. Although Mr. Beyer apparently failed to serve the

bank with that complaint, he did effect service of process on the collection agency,

and he and the agency eventually reached a settlement agreement. Despite the fact

that the collection agency's attorney told Mr. Beyer's counsel that he was "informed"

that the bank was "agreeable to releasing any claim" it had against Mr. Beyer, the

agency's attorney specifically stated that he could not speak for the bank, and the bank

never signed a release or agreed to the terms of the settlement.

In 2003, Mr. Beyer applied for two new credit cards to help pay the costs of his

business. Both applications were denied. The lenders told Mr. Beyer that they denied

his application because of his poor credit history. Mr. Beyer obtained a copy of his

credit report and discovered an unfavorable entry relating to the old credit card

account with U.S. Bank. Mr. Beyer then filed a new lawsuit in Iowa state court

against U.S. Bank, claiming that the bank had violated provisions of the Iowa

Consumer Credit Code by falsely reporting that he failed to pay off his credit account.

See Iowa Code §§ 537.1301(11), 537.7103(1)(c), (4)(e). He also claimed that U.S.

Bank's reports were defamatory.

Mr. Beyer later amended his complaint to add a claim under the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, against TransUnion, L.L.C., a

national credit bureau, and TransUnion removed the case to federal district court, see

28 U.S.C. § 1441. During the time set for discovery in the district court, Mr. Beyer

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voluntarily dismissed TransUnion from the case. U.S. Bank and Mr. Beyer then filed

competing motions for summary judgment. While those motions were pending,

Mr. Beyer moved to remand the case to state court.

After holding a hearing on all the pending motions, the district court denied the

motion to remand and granted U.S. Bank's motion for summary judgment. The

district court determined that Mr. Beyer failed to produce any evidence that U.S.

Bank's report about his credit account was false. Because of this, the district court

granted U.S. Bank's summary judgment motion on two grounds. The court first

concluded that Mr. Beyer could not prove the malice or willful intent required for his

claims to avoid preemption by the FCRA under 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). The district

court also held that even if Mr. Beyer's claims were not preempted, his failure to

produce evidence that he had satisfied the debt in question required that judgment be

entered in U.S. Bank's favor.

II.

Both parties spend the bulk of their appellate briefs addressing the preemptive

effect of the FCRA. District courts have come to different conclusions about the

scope and interplay of the FCRA's preemption provisions, 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) and

§ 1681t(b)(1)(F). See, e.g., Ryder v. Washington Mut. Bank, 371 F. Supp.2d 152, 154-

55 (D. Conn. 2005); Gordon v. Greenpoint Credit, 266 F. Supp.2d 1007, 1012-13

(S.D. Iowa 2003); Yutesler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 263 F. Supp.2d 1209, 1211-12

(D. Minn. 2003); Jaramillo v. Experian Info. Solutions, 155 F. Supp.2d 356, 361-62

(E.D. Pa. 2001), modified by 2001 WL 1762626 (E. D. Pa. June 20, 2001). The

parties invite us to address this complex question, but we decline the invitation: We

find it unnecessary to address the preemption issue because we can decide the case on

a much simpler basis.

As the district court noted, all of Mr. Beyer's claims required him to show that

U.S. Bank falsely reported the status of his credit account. Although Mr. Beyer's

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unverified complaint alleged that he paid the balance in full, Mr. Beyer did not submit

an affidavit or any other evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

this was so. Cf. Ward v. Moore, 414 F.3d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 2005). Mr. Beyer did not

submit any copies of canceled checks, credit card statements, receipts, or other

documentation that would demonstrate that he had paid all outstanding charges.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Beyer, he owed over $4,100

on the account in February, 1997, when U.S. Bank turned it over to a collection

agency. Mr. Beyer at most demonstrated that he made $2,900 in payments between

April, 1997 and December, 2000, an insufficient amount to pay the February, 1997,

balance, and he did nothing to show that U.S. Bank was incorrect in determining and

reporting that he owed $3,310.52 on April 10, 2001. There are a number of reasons

why Mr. Beyer's balance could have been that high despite his payments, including

the accrual of interest and fees. 

Once a movant for summary judgment has "point[ed] out to the district court

that there is an absence of evidence to support" an essential element for which the

nonmovant will have the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant must make a

sufficient showing that there is a genuine issue of fact as to that element. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). In doing so, the party cannot rest on

its pleadings alone. Id. at 324. When U.S. Bank presented evidence in the form of its

employee's affidavit that the bank at all times correctly reported the status of

Mr. Beyer's account, Mr. Beyer had the burden of proving that U.S. Bank's report was

false. Because he failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could

have determined that the report was false, the district court correctly granted summary

judgment.

III.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment.

______________________

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