Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-18-03087/USCOURTS-ca2-18-03087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 

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18-3087-cv

Chen v. Dunkin' Brands, Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 2019

(Argued: October 24, 2019 Decided: March 31, 2020)

Docket No. 18-3087-cv

CHUFEN CHEN, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,

ELI EVANSON, SHERRY L. JOHNSON, DAVID A. BUCHOLTZ,

MICHELLE BEATTIE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DUNKIN' BRANDS, INC. (A DELAWARE CORPORATION), DBA DUNKIN' DONUTS, 

Defendant-Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Before: PARKER, CHIN, AND BIANCO, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of New York (Amon, J.), dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' second 

amended complaint asserting violations of various state and federal consumer 

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protection laws pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (6). 

The district court dismissed the claims of four of the five plaintiffs-appellants on 

the grounds that defendant-appellee was not subject to general personal 

jurisdiction in New York and their allegations stemmed from conduct that 

occurred outside the state. The district court dismissed the second amended 

complaint as to the remaining plaintiff-appellant on the grounds that, although

personal jurisdiction existed as to her claims, she failed to state a claim because 

the advertising in question was not actionable as a warranty and was not 

deceptive or misleading to a reasonable consumer. 

AFFIRMED.

C. DOUGLASS THOMAS (John Troy, on the brief), Troy 

Law, PLLC, Flushing, New York, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

WILLIAM C. PERDUE (Anthony Franze, Avishai D. 

Don, on the brief), Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer 

LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.

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CHIN, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Chufen Chen, on behalf of herself and all others

similarly situated, and plaintiffs-appellants Eli Evanson, Sherry L. Johnson, 

David A. Bucholtz, and Michelle Beattie (collectively, "plaintiffs") commenced 

this action alleging that defendant-appellee Dunkin' Brands Inc. ("Dunkin

Donuts") deceptively marketed two of its trademarked products -- the Angus 

Steak & Egg Breakfast Sandwich (the "Angus Sandwich") and the Angus Steak & 

Egg Wake-Up Wrap (the "Angus Wrap" and, together, the "Products") -- to 

consumers. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that through representations made in 

labeling and television advertisements, Dunkin Donuts deceived consumers into 

believing that the Products contained an "intact" piece of meat when the Products

actually contained a ground beef patty with multiple additives. J. App'x at 108. 

The second amended complaint (the "SAC") asserted violations of the 

Magnuson-Moss Act and various state consumer protection laws, including New 

York General Business Law (the "GBL") §§ 349 and 350, in connection with the 

alleged deception. 

The district court dismissed the SAC for lack of personal jurisdiction 

and failure to state a claim. The district court held that Dunkin Donuts was not 

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subject to general personal jurisdiction in New York and dismissed the claims of 

Evanson, Johnson, Bucholtz, and Beattie (the "out-of-state plaintiffs") for lack of 

personal jurisdiction because they purchased the allegedly deceptive Products at 

franchises outside of New York. Although it determined specific personal 

jurisdiction existed as to Chen's claims, the district court dismissed her claims on 

the merits pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The lower court 

held that the label "Angus steak" was not an actionable warranty under the 

Magnuson-Moss Act and that Dunkin Donuts' advertisements did not violate the 

GBL because they were neither deceptive nor misleading to a reasonable 

consumer. 

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing 

the out-of-state plaintiffs' claims because Dunkin Donuts consented to general 

jurisdiction in New York by registering as a foreign corporation under § 1301 of 

the New York Business Corporation Law (the "BCL"). In the alternative, 

plaintiffs contend that general personal jurisdiction existed because Dunkin 

Donuts' contacts with New York are sufficiently "continuous and systematic." 

Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 

310, 317 (1945). Plaintiffs also assert that the district court erred in dismissing 

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Chen's claims because the SAC alleged plausible violations of GBL §§ 349 and 

350.1

As discussed more fully below, we hold that under New York law, 

the act of registering to do business under § 1301 of the BCL does not constitute 

consent to general personal jurisdiction in New York. In so holding, we join the 

highest New York courts to have considered the issue since the Supreme Court 

decided Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). See Aybar v. Aybar ("Aybar"), 

93 N.Y.S.3d 159, 165 (2d Dep't 2019); Best v. Guthrie Med. Grp., P.C., 107 N.Y.S.3d 

258, 261-62 (4th Dep't 2019); Fekah v. Baker Hughes Inc., 110 N.Y.S.3d 1, 2 (1st Dep't

2019); see also Aybar v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 106 N.Y.S.3d 361, 361 (2d Dep't 

2019); Qudsi v. Larios, 103 N.Y.S.3d 492, 494-95 (2d Dep't 2019). We further reject 

plaintiffs' arguments that Dunkin Donuts' contacts with New York were 

sufficient to subject it to general personal jurisdiction in the state, and we agree 

with the district court that Chen failed to allege a plausible violation of GBL 

§§ 349 and 350. Accordingly, the district court's judgment dismissing the SAC is 

AFFIRMED.

1 Plaintiffs do not appeal the dismissal of Chen's Magnuson-Moss Act claim. 

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BACKGROUND

The facts alleged in the SAC are assumed to be true. Dunkin Donuts 

is one of the largest retail chains in the United States, with more than 11,500 

franchises worldwide. The company is incorporated in the state of Delaware and 

headquartered in Massachusetts, although it has franchises in additional states,

including New York. 

Sometime between 2013 and 2017, each of the plaintiffs purchased 

one or more of the Products after "repeated[] expos[ure]" to Dunkin Donuts'

representations about the Products in television advertisements. J. App'x at 114-

16. Evanson, Johnson, Bucholtz, and Beattie purchased the Products from 

franchises in Massachusetts, Florida, Michigan, and California respectively, 

while Chen purchased hers from a franchise in Flushing, New York. Plaintiffs 

also paid a premium for the Products -- the Angus Sandwich cost between $.45 

and $.50 more than the comparable Classic Egg and Cheese Sandwich with ham, 

bacon, or sausage, and the Angus Wrap cost $.60 more than the comparable 

Classic Egg and Cheese Wrap with ham, bacon, or sausage.

Plaintiffs later learned that although the Products were labeled as 

"steak," neither contained an "intact" piece of meat. J. App'x at 100. Instead, the

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Products contained ground beef patties with multiple additives. Plaintiffs filed 

suit, alleging that labeling these products as "Angus steak" and describing them 

as "steak" in television advertisements was deceptive and misleading to the 

reasonable consumer. 

The SAC identified three television advertisements, providing links 

to videos, that allegedly deceived plaintiffs into buying the Products. All three 

advertisements featured actors holding the Products and describing them using 

the words "Angus" and "steak." Each advertisement also concluded with a 

photograph of each of the Products, showing a beef patty. The SAC, a proposed 

class action lawsuit, alleged that these representations were deceptive, in 

violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act and various state consumer protection laws,

including GBL §§ 349 and 350. 

On February 8, 2018, Dunkin Donuts moved to dismiss the SAC for 

lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (6). In a Memorandum and Order issued 

September 17, 2018, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the SAC. 

This appeal followed. 

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DISCUSSION

I. General Personal Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs argue principally that the district court erred in dismissing 

the SAC as to the out-of-state plaintiffs' claims because Dunkin Donuts 

consented to general personal jurisdiction in New York by registering to do 

business and designating an agent for service of process in the state. In the 

alternative, plaintiffs argue that Dunkin Donuts' contacts with New York are 

sufficient to subject it to general personal jurisdiction.

A. Standard of Review

"We review a district court's dismissal of an action for want of

personal jurisdiction de novo, construing all pleadings and affidavits in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff." SPV Osus Ltd. v. UBS AG, 882 F.3d 333, 342 (2d

Cir. 2018). "[T]o survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a 

plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists." Id.

Where a district court's jurisdictional finding is premised on an 

application of state law, we similarly review the district court's interpretation of 

state law de novo. In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013). When 

deciding a question of state law, "we . . . look to the state's decisional law, as well 

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as to its constitution and statutes." Id. "Where state law is unsettled, we are 

obligated to carefully . . . predict how the state's highest court would resolve the 

uncertainty or ambiguity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent a clear 

directive from a state's highest court, "federal authorities must apply what they 

find to be the state law after giving proper regard to relevant rulings of other 

courts of the State." Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 

1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).2

B. Consent to General Personal Jurisdiction under BCL § 1301(a)

"In the absence of a federal statute specifically directing otherwise, 

and subject to limitations imposed by the United States Constitution, we look to 

the law of the forum state to determine whether a federal district court has 

personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation." Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 

814 F.3d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1). General personal 

jurisdiction in New York is governed by Civil Practice Law and Rules, Section

301, which allows a court to exercise "such jurisdiction over persons, property, or 

status as might have been exercised heretofore." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301. New York

2 Although this Court also has the option of certifying the question to the New 

York Court of Appeals, certification is not warranted here because "sufficient 

precedents exist for us to make [the] determination." DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 

111 (2d Cir. 2005). 

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law also requires foreign corporations to register with the state and designate an 

agent for service of process before conducting business in the state. See N.Y. Bus. 

Corp. Law § 1301(a). Prior to 2014, New York courts interpreted the act of 

registering under BCL § 1301(a) as consent to general jurisdiction in the state. See

Aybar, 93 N.Y.S.3d at 169 (collecting cases). 

In 2014, however, the Supreme Court decided Daimler and further 

defined the circumstances under which a state may exert general personal 

jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 571 U.S. at 126. The Supreme Court 

clarified that a state's exercise of general personal jurisdiction over a foreign 

corporation will not comport with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 

Clause unless "that corporation's affiliations with the State are so continuous and 

systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum." Id. (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). We have since explained "our view"

that "Daimler established that, except in a truly exceptional case, a corporate 

defendant may be treated as essentially at home only where it is incorporated or 

maintains its principal place of business." Brown, 814 F.3d at 627 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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This Court has not considered the impact of Daimler on New York

courts' longstanding interpretation of BCL § 1301(a). We have, however, 

considered general personal jurisdiction in the context of Connecticut's business 

registration statute. See Brown, 814 F.3d at 624-26. In Brown, the plaintiff argued, 

inter alia, that the defendant consented to general personal jurisdiction in 

Connecticut when it registered to do business and appointed an agent for service 

of process in the state. Id. at 630. In affirming the lower court's dismissal for lack 

of personal jurisdiction, we expressed reservations as to whether such use of a 

state's "coercive power" could survive constitutional scrutiny in light of Daimler

and its progeny. Id. at 639, 641. Because we determined, however, that 

Connecticut's business registration statute did not actually impose such a 

requirement, we did not reach the issue. Id. at 641.

Unlike the statute in Brown, New York's business registration statute 

has historically been interpreted as conditioning registration under BCL § 1301(a)

on consent to general jurisdiction in the state. Indeed, our opinion in Brown

expressly identified New York's business registration statute as one that has been 

"definitively construed" in such a way, noting that although the statute itself did 

not explicitly impose such a requirement, "legislation has been introduced to 

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ratify that construction of the statute." Id. at 640; see also 2015 N.Y. SenateAssembly Bill S4846, A6714. The legislation referenced in Brown, however, never 

passed, and the "definitive[ness]" of New York law interpreting registration 

under BCL § 1301(a) as consenting to general jurisdiction in New York is no 

longer settled. Compare Aybar, 93 N.Y.S.3d at 170 (holding that the consent-byregistration New York cases do not survive Daimler) with Bailen v. Air & Liquid 

Sys. Corp., 2014 WL 3885949, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty., Aug. 5, 2014)

(holding that even after Daimler, foreign corporations registered to do business in 

New York are subject to general jurisdiction by consent).

New York's highest court has yet to definitively weigh in on 

whether the state's longstanding interpretation of BCL § 1301(a) survives 

Daimler. The three intermediate appellate courts to have considered the issue, 

however, have concluded that it does not. See Aybar, 93 N.Y.S.3d at 170; Best, 107 

N.Y.S.3d at 260; Fekah, 110 N.Y.S.3d at 2; see also Aybar v. Goodyear, 106 N.Y.S.3d 

at 361; Qudsi, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 494. In Aybar, after giving great consideration to 

"the evolution of in personam jurisdiction jurisprudence, and, particularly the 

way in which Daimler has altered that jurisprudential landscape," 93 N.Y.S.3d at 

166, the Second Department held that "a corporate defendant's registration to do 

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business in New York . . . does not constitute consent by the corporation to 

submit to the general jurisdiction of New York for causes of action that are 

unrelated to the corporation's affiliations with New York," id. at 170. The First 

and Fourth Departments have since cited favorably to Aybar in adopting that 

holding. See Best, 107 N.Y.S.3d at 260; Fekah, 110 N.Y.S.3d at 2. 

Admittedly, lower New York courts are not unanimous on this 

interpretation since Daimler.3 But absent specific direction from the highest New 

York court, we remain "obligated to carefully . . . predict how the state's highest 

court would resolve the uncertainty or ambiguity." In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d at

219 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also V.S. v. Muhammad, 595 F.3d 426, 

432 (2d Cir. 2010) ("This Court is bound to apply the law as interpreted by a 

state's intermediate appellate courts unless there is persuasive evidence that the 

state's highest court would reach a different conclusion."). We note that nothing 

in the statutory text of BCL § 1301(a) expressly conditions registration on consent 

to general jurisdiction in the state, and that the constitutional concerns we 

expressed in Brown -- including that such a regime "could justify the exercise of 

3 See, e.g., Wheeler v. CBL & Assocs. Props., Inc., 2017 WL 3611295, at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct., N.Y. Cty., Aug. 17, 2017); Corp. Jet Support, Inc. v. Lobosco Ins. Grp., 2015 WL 5883026, 

at *1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty., Oct. 7, 2015); Bailen, 2014 WL 3885949, at *4-5.

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general jurisdiction over a corporation in a state in which the corporation had 

done no business at all," 814 F.3d at 640, and that "every corporation would be 

subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it registered, and Daimler's

ruling would be robbed of meaning by a back-door thief," id. -- are also present 

here. 

Accordingly, in light of Daimler, our own precedent, and the 

unanimous conclusion of the three New York intermediate courts to have 

considered the issue, we now hold that a foreign corporation does not consent to 

general personal jurisdiction in New York by merely registering to do business in 

the state and designating an in-state agent for service of process under BCL § 

1301(a). We have little trouble concluding that were the New York Court of 

Appeals to decide the issue, it would agree that this conclusion is consistent with 

the U.S. Constitution and the evolving law surrounding general personal 

jurisdiction. We thus affirm the lower court's holding that Dunkin Donuts did 

not consent to general personal jurisdiction in New York. 

C. General Personal Jurisdiction Absent Consent

Plaintiffs argue, in the alternative, that even if Dunkin Donuts did 

not consent to general jurisdiction, the district court nonetheless had jurisdiction 

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over it because of its contacts with New York. This argument fails because it is 

both waived by plaintiffs' failure to raise it with the district court below, see In re 

Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2008), and because 

plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that Dunkin Donuts'

contacts in New York suffice to render it "at home" in the jurisdiction. Daimler, 

571 U.S. at 122. Dunkin Donuts is not incorporated or headquartered in New 

York. Plaintiffs contend that Dunkin Donuts "is a franchisor with numerous 

retail establishments in New York," and "that it governs . . . and controls 

nationwide product labeling and advertising," Appellants' Br. at 6, but they 

made no showing that the company's relationship with New York was in any 

way significant or exceptional in relation to the company's nationwide business 

activity, see Brown, 814 F.3d at 627 (finding no general personal jurisdiction 

where defendant's contacts, "while not insubstantial, constitute[d] only a very 

small part of its portfolio"); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 

(2d Cir. 2014) (bank not subject to general personal jurisdiction where it has 

branch offices in the forum but is headquartered and incorporated elsewhere).

Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to allege facts upon which the exercise of general 

jurisdiction would be appropriate.

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The district court correctly dismissed the out-of-state plaintiffs'

claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

II. The Reasonable Consumer under GBL §§ 349 and 350

We turn now to the merits of the remaining plaintiff's claims. We 

review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. 

Bldg. Indus. Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. City of New York, 678 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 

2012). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Section 349 of the GBL provides a cause of action for any person

injured by "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or 

commerce or in the furnishing or any service." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a), (h). 

"Deceptive acts" are acts that are "likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting 

reasonably under the circumstances." Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 741 

(2d Cir. 2013). "To make out a prima facie case under Section 349, a plaintiff 

must demonstrate that (1) the defendant's deceptive acts were directed at 

consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has 

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been injured as a result." Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 230 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2000) 

(citing Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 85 N.Y.2d 

20, 25 (1995)).

Section 350 of the GBL prohibits "[f]alse advertising in the conduct 

of any business, trade or commerce," and is analyzed under the same "reasonable 

consumer" standard as Section 349. Id. at 521. Under either provision, "[i]t is 

well settled that a court may determine as a matter of law that an allegedly 

deceptive advertisement would not have misled a reasonable consumer." Fink, 

714 F.3d at 741. 

The SAC identified three Dunkin Donuts television advertisements, 

providing descriptions along with video links, and alleged that the

advertisements were deceptive in their use of the word "steak." All three 

advertisements, however, conclude with multiple zoomed-in images that clearly 

depict the "steak" in the Products as a beef patty. See, e.g., Addendum hereto. 

Because "there can be no section 349(a) claim when the allegedly deceptive 

practice was fully disclosed," Broder v. MBNA Corp., 722 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (1st 

Dep't 2001), the district court properly concluded that these advertisements were 

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not actionable under either GBL provision as a matter of law.4 Moreover, while 

the word "steak" can refer to "a slice of meat," it is also defined as "ground beef 

prepared for cooking or for serving in the manner of a steak." Merriam-Webster 

Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/steak (last 

visited March 23, 2020). Classic examples of ground beef served as "steak" 

include chopped steak, hamburger steak, and Salisbury steak.

The district court also did not err in basing dismissal, in part, on the 

undisputed fact that the Products do in fact contain "Angus beef." While it is 

true that literally accurate statements can still be misleading, this Court has 

repeatedly observed that "in determining whether a reasonable consumer would 

have been misled by a particular advertisement, context is crucial." Geffner v. 

Coca-Cola Co., 928 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 2019). Here, Chen bought her Angus 

Sandwich for less than $4 and her Angus Wrap for less than $2. As the television 

advertisements themselves demonstrate, the Products are marketed as grab-andgo products that can be consumed in hand, without the need for a fork and knife. 

4 See Ludl Elecs. Prods., Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing, Inc., 775 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (2d 

Dep't 2004) ("[B]ecause the conduct complained of is specifically provided for by the 

parties' lease and thus was fully disclosed, such conduct is not a deceptive business 

practice."); see also Goshen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 324 n.1 (2002) ("The 

standard for recovery under [GBL] § 350, while specific to false advertising, is otherwise 

identical to section 349."). 

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A reasonable consumer purchasing one of the Products from Dunkin Donuts in 

that context would not be misled into thinking she was purchasing an 

"unadulterated piece of meat." Appellants' Br. at 31. 

The district court properly dismissed Chen's claims under GBL 

§§ 349 and 350.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the district court's judgment of 

dismissal is AFFIRMED.

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Addendum

"Fellow-Steak-Lover Handshake" Commercial at 00:16. J. App'x at 110 n.1.

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