Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05767/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05767-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARNETTE COLTAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. JACINTO, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 5767 AWI LJO P 

SECOND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1.) 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM 

 Larnette Coltar (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Valley State

Prison for Women (“VSPW”) and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On October 24, 2005, the Court screened Plaintiff’s

complaint and found that it did not state a cognizable claim for relief. The Court dismissed the

Complaint and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. On November 28, 2005, Plaintiff filed an

Amended Complaint. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that in August of 2002, an examination revealed lump in her left breast. 

Dr. Solomon ordered a mammogram on August 28, 2002. Plaintiff next states that “defendants”

delayed performing the medical tests including the mammogram. Plaintiff was again seen by

Dr. Solomon in January of 2003, and he again ordered a mammogram. Plaintiff states that she

was not permitted on February 4, 2003, to have the mammogram and was told by a Doe

Defendant that she would be re-ducatted. Plaintiff next states that From August 2002, to March

13, 2003, “doe defendants” delayed medical tests and that they were aware of the need for

treatment. Plaintiff alleges the Doe Defendants delayed and refused to provide Plaintiff access

to a medical doctor from March 13, 2003, to June 9, 2003. On June 9, 2003, Plaintiff went to

emergency sick call where Nurse Culley gave her a pass to return to the Doctors line on June 10,

2003. However, on June 10, 2003, when she appeared before Nurse Flores and explained to her

the situation, Nurse Flores denied her access to health care staff qualified to address the

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prisoner’s medical problems. Plaintiff next complains that she has filed numerous inmate

appeals regarding the conduct of the defendants described above and that her appeal was partially

granted at the first level and granted at the second level by Defendant Jacinto. 

On August 12, 2003, Plaintiff returned to the Doctor’s line and was seen by R.O. Cannon. 

Defendant Cannon diagnosed the regrowing lump as scar tissue but refused to provide Plaintiff

with antibiotics and pain medications. Plaintiff next states she believes Defendant Cannon knew

of her need for treatment. Following these events Plaintiff was ultimately given a lumpectomy. 

Plaintiff states she inquired as to many doe defendants why she was not taken to her follow up

appointments as ordered by the doctor but was asked to leave the clinic. Plaintiff states she

believes the doe defendants were aware of the Doctors orders. concludes that grown and she was

experiencing pain. Plaintiff was given a medical pass to return to the RN Line to be given a

specific treatment ordered by the Doctor but Defendant Flores refused to see her. Plaintiff filed

an appeal and was seen by Dr. Eaves who granted the appeal. In June of 2003, Plaintiff

underwent a biopsy. A lumpectomy was performed in September of 2003. Subsequent to the

surgery the lump began to grow again and cause pain. Plaintiff was given a second mammogram

and ultrasound. The wound or lump apparently erupted at least twice following the surgery. 

Plaintiff states that her wound was not cleaned or bandages changed as needed. 

Plaintiff names Jeanne Woodford, Dr. Jacinto, Dr. Cannon, Nurse Flores and Does 1-10

as Defendants and is seeking compensatory and punitive damages in addition injunctive relief. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

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Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

2. Eighth Amendment Claim

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

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(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). 

As in the case before, Plaintiff fails to link any of the named Defendants to an act or

omission giving rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff alleges generally that

“defendants” or “doe defendants” took some action or failed to take some action but this is

insufficient to state a claim for relief. As noted above, Plaintiff must link every named individual

to an act or omission giving rise to the violation. Here, Plaintiff alleges that she went to the “B”

yard medical clinic on June 10, 2003. and that Nurse Flores denied her “access to health care

staff qualified to address the prisoner’s serious medical problems.” (Amended Complaint at 3.) 

Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts, however, that Nurse Flores knew that Plaintiff had a

serious medical condition and disregarded that condition. It appears from this allegation that

Plaintiff was dissatisfied with treatment by the Nurse as she contends that she was not allowed to

see “someone qualified to address” her needs. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed

to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Nurse Flores. 

Plaintiff also does not allege facts sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment Claim against

Dr. Cannon, Dr. Jacinto or any of the Does 1 through 10. With regard to Dr. Cannon, Plaintiff’s

only reference to him is that Dr. Cannon seen her, diagnosed the lump as scar tissue, ordered an

ultrasound but refused to provide Plaintiff with antibiotics and pain medications. Plaintiff’s

allegations are insufficient to support a claim for relief under Section 1983 for violation of the

Eighth Amendment. "A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical

authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to as 1983 claim." Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d

1337, 1344 (9th Cir.1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, plaintiff "must show that the

course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances ... and

... that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff's health."

Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff also names Dr. Jacinto, but why is wholly unclear. Plaintiff only states that she

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filed an appeal concerning her medical care which was partially granted by Dr. Jacinto and that it

was granted in whole at the second level, again by Dr. Jacinto. Other than this, Plaintiff alleges

no facts that would warrant a finding of a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment. 

Finally, with respect to the Doe Defendants, although it is clear that Plaintiff is unsure of

the names of these individuals, this does not relieve her of the requirement that she link each doe

defendant with an act or omission giving rise to the Constitutional violation. As in those cases

where the name of the Defendant is known, Plaintiff must link each Doe Defendant (Doe #1, Doe

#2.) to an act giving rise to a constitutional violation. It is insufficient to say general that the

Plaintiff believes the Doe Defendants knew of and disregarded a serious need. 

3. Supervisory Liability

The Court notes that Plaintiff names Jeanne Woodford, Director of Corrections as a

Defendant. 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim

for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some

facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v.

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be

alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit,

507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that defendants personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

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them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v.

Black at 646. 

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with

yet another opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified

above should she wish to do so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Second Amended Complaint how the conditions

complained of resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625

F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The Second Amended Complaint must specifically state how each

defendant is involved. Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423, U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference

the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within THIRTY

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(30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by

the Court in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a Second 

Amended Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary

dismiss the case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 14, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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