Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00699/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00699-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE AVERY,

CDCR #E-67897,

Plaintiff,

vs.

J. BEARD, KELLY HARRINGTON, 

RALPH DIAZ, KATHLEEN ALLISON, 

VINCENT CULLEN, NATALIE 

FRANSHAM, DAVID SKAGGS, DAWN 

DESROSIERS, M.D. STAINER, 

TIMOTHY M. LOCKWOOD, S.K. 

HEMENWAY and R.L. BRIGGS,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv0699-BTM (DHB)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 

TO Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);

(2) DISMISSING DEFENDANTS 

DIAZ, ALLISON, CULLEN, 

FRANSHAM, SKAGGS, 

DESROSIERS AND STAINER;

(3) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR STAY; and,

(4) ISSUING A 90-DAY STAY

Kyle Avery (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 

(“RJD”) in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) with

a complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff 

claims that employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”) are unconstitutionally denying him equal protection of the laws and interfering 

with the free exercise of his religious beliefs by denying separate outdoor worship areas 

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for practitioners of the Wiccan and Odinist religions. (ECF No. 1 at 17-38.)1 He seeks 

fees, costs, a jury trial, a declaration of rights, and an injunction requiring separate outdoor 

worship facilities for Wiccans and Odinists, as well as the appointment of a paid pagan 

chaplain and mandatory religious tolerance classes for CDCR employees. (Id. at 39-40.)

Defendants Diaz, Allison, Cullen, Fransham, Skaggs, Desrosiers and Stainer have 

filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), on the basis that the 

Complaint fails to allege they personally participated in the asserted constitutional 

violation.

2

(ECF No. 23.) These Defendants contend that their only connection to this 

case, and the only allegation against them in the Complaint, is that they were recipients of

a CDCR memorandum setting forth guidelines for the establishment of new outdoor 

worship areas and the standardization of such existing areas. (Id. at 9-10.) In addition, all 

Defendants seek to dismiss any claim Plaintiff purports to bring on behalf of practitioners 

of the Odinist religion, because they contend that Plaintiff is a Wiccan and not an Odinist, 

and as a pro se litigant is precluded from bringing claims on behalf of others. (Id.) 

Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that he is not asserting claims on 

behalf of others because he is involved with both the Wiccan and Odinist religions, but in 

any case the gravamen of his Complaint is that an exclusive worship area is needed by the 

Wiccans, and not one shared with the Odinists as CDCR policy requires. (ECF No. 29 at 

2-4.) He argues that he has alleged personal participation by all of the Defendants through 

their receipt of the CDCR memorandum because it shows they were aware of and failed to 

prevent the alleged constitutional violation, and they would not have received it if they 

were not involved in the policy decision which caused the violation. (Id. at 4-6.)

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for a Stay pending exhaustion of administrative 

remedies. (ECF No. 29.) He states that he has already begun exhausting administrative 

 

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 The Court will cite to page numbers as assigned by the Court Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system.

2

 The remaining Defendants, Beard, Harrington, Briggs, Lockwood and Hemenway, have been served 

with the Complaint but do not join this aspect of the Motion to Dismiss.

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remedies with respect to the lack of a sweat lodge and a request for Wiccan spiritual items. 

(ECF No. 27 at 5.) He requests a stay of this action until he completes the exhaustion 

process, after which he will amend his Complaint. (Id.) Defendants have filed a Reply in 

which they do not oppose a stay pending exhaustion of administrative remedies, although 

they reserve the right to move to dismiss any amended complaint, and repeat that they are 

entitled to dismissal due to the lack of allegations of their personal involvement in the 

alleged constitutional violation. (ECF No. 32.) 

The Court has previously informed the parties that proposed findings and 

recommendations by the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and S.D.

CAL. CIVLR 72.3(a) would not be necessary. (ECF No. 25.) Having considered the papers 

submitted, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to 

state a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted as to Defendants Diaz, Allison, 

Cullen, Fransham, Skaggs, Desrosiers and Stainer, and therefore GRANTS in part the

Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and DISMISSES these Defendants

without prejudice. Because Plaintiff is not attempting to represent other individuals in this 

action, the Court DENIES in part the Motion to Dismiss on that basis. The Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s unopposed Motion for a Stay, and ISSUES a brief stay pending 

exhaustion of administrative remedies.

I. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint a January 20, 2015, CDCR Memorandum from 

Defendant Kelly Harrington, the Acting Director of the Division of Adult Institutions, 

which is addressed to the Associate Directors of the Division of Adult Institutions, the 

Wardens of the CDCR prisons, and the Community Resources Managers. (ECF No. 1 at 

15-16.) The memorandum sets forth revised guidelines for building new outdoor religious 

and spiritual grounds and the standardization of any such areas already in existence. (Id.) 

It recognizes that any new areas created would be in addition to Native American sweat 

lodge grounds already in existence, which practitioners of other religions are not permitted 

to use. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance contending that the Wiccan and Asatru 

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religions (Plaintiff uses Odinist and Asatru interchangeably), as does the Native American 

religion, require separate spiritual areas, and that requiring Wiccans and Asatrus to share a 

spiritual area prevented him, as a Wiccan, from practicing his faith according to his 

sincerely held beliefs. (Id. at 17-18, 45-46.) 

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that the denial of a separate outdoor spiritual area 

for practitioners of the Wiccan and Odinist/Asatru religions impairs their ability to freely 

exercise their religious beliefs, as does the CDCR policy which prohibits symbolism and

totems, essentially requiring any spiritual grounds to be a bare dirt area with no permanent 

symbols. (Id. at 19-38.) He alleges symbolism is a central tenant of the Wiccan and Odinist

religions, but they have different symbols, and the denial of the ability to have permanent 

symbols in their own separate space denies them the ability to strengthen the energy of the 

area in order to make it sacred and sanctified, because the energy is reset whenever a nonadherent enters the area and when the symbols are removed and replaced. (Id.)

The factual allegations against Defendants Diaz, Allison, Cullen, Fransham, Skaggs, 

Desrosiers and Stainer consist entirely of the fact that their names or job titles are listed on 

the January 20, 2015 memorandum. (Id. at 12-14, 20-21, 29, 32.) Plaintiff claims they are 

liable for depriving him of the ability to practice his sincerely held religious beliefs solely 

by virtue of their having received the January 20, 2015 memorandum, because it made

them aware of the constitutional violation arising from the lack of separate spiritual areas 

for the Wiccan and Asatru religions, and because they would not have received the 

memorandum if they did not have “the ability to end it or created the policy.” (Id. at 20-

21.) Unlike these Defendants, the Complaint contains allegations of personal participation 

by the remaining Defendants, Beard (id. at 12, 26-28), Lockwood (id. at 14, 29-30), 

Hemenway (id. at 14, 18, 25), Harrington (id. at 12), and Briggs (id. at 14, 18, 25), who 

have not joined this aspect of the Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff divides his pleading into three causes of action. In his first cause of action 

he claims the Defendants coerced him and other Wiccans and Asatrus in California prisons

to abandon a sincerely held religious practice in violation of the First Amendment to the 

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United States Constitution. (ECF No. 1 at 21-30.) In the second cause of action he claims 

the Defendants took that action in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., which permits the Court to issue 

injunctive relief. (Id. at 31-33.) And in the third cause of action he claims that the 

Defendants have violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution by treating the Wiccan and Odinist religions 

differently than the Native American religion. (Id. at 34-38.)

Plaintiff does not seek money damages, but seeks a declaration of the rights of the 

parties, as well as fees, costs, and a jury trial. (Id. at 39.) He also seeks an injunction 

requiring separate outdoor worship facilities for Wiccans and Odinists with running water, 

security fencing, altars, storage lockers, and ADA compliant walkways, as well as the 

appointment of a paid pagan chaplain, and mandatory religious tolerance classes for CDCR 

employees. (Id. at 39-40.)

II. Legal Standards 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because 

Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive 

merits, “a court may [ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion 

to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, courts may consider exhibits that are attached to the complaint. See FED.R.CIV.

P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the 

pleading for all purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990), citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, 

Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the 

complaint may be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). However, 

exhibits that contradict the allegations of a complaint may fatally undermine the 

complaint’s allegations. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff can “plead himself out of a claim by including . . . details contrary 

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to his claims.”), citing Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 

1998) (courts “are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are 

contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.”); see also Nat’l Assoc. for the 

Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir.

2000) (courts “may consider facts contained in documents attached to the complaint” to

determine whether the complaint states a claim for relief).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 

570 (2007). “All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-

38 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995).

The Court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988, 

citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994); see also

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986) (a court is not bound to accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”) 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ 

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 

678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to 

relief.’’” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when a plaintiff has not “nudged [his]

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.”) 

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“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual 

content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly suggestive 

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 

962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009), quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the 

pleadings liberally and must afford [the] plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim-Panahi 

v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992). The rule, however, “applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Courts may not “supply essential elements of 

claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation 

in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also

Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory 

allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). 

III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants Diaz, Allison, Cullen, Fransham, Skaggs and Desrosiers, the six people

listed at the end of the January 20, 2015 CDCR memorandum in the “cc” section, who 

were copied with the memorandum, as well as Defendant Stainer, a recipient of the 

memorandum by virtue of his position as a Director of the Division of Adult Institutions 

of the CDCR at the time the memorandum was issued, move to dismiss themselves from 

the Complaint on the basis that Plaintiff has named them as Defendants merely because 

they received the memorandum, and there are therefore no allegations whatsoever of their 

personal participation in any alleged constitutional violation. (ECF No. at 23-1 at 9-10.) 

They also contend there is no basis for Plaintiff to have named them because he has sued 

them only in their official capacities and only for injunctive relief, but has named additional

Defendants who are not moving to dismiss and who would be bound by any injunction this 

Court may issue, including Dr. Jeffrey Beard, the Secretary of the CDCR, Kelly 

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Harrington, the Acting Director of the Division of Adult Institutions, and Timothy M. 

Lockwood, the Chief of the Regulation and Policy Management Division of the CDCR. 

(Id. at 10.) Defendants also move to dismiss claims alleging denial of an adequate outdoor 

worship area for practitioners of the Odinist religion, on the ground that Plaintiff is not a 

member of that religion, and, as a pro se litigant, is not permitted to litigate claims on behalf 

of other persons. (Id. at 8-9.)

A. Personal Participation

Defendants Diaz, Allison, Cullen, Fransham, Skaggs, Desrosiers and Stainer move 

to dismiss the Complaint against them on the basis that Plaintiff has not alleged that any of 

them personally participated in the alleged denial of his rights, directed any other 

Defendant to violate his rights, or knew of and failed to prevent a violation of his rights. 

(Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff identifies Defendant Stainer as the Director of the Division of Adult 

Institutions at the time the 2015 memorandum was issued, Defendant Diaz as a Deputy 

Director of the Facility Operations Division of Adult Institutions, and Defendant Allison 

as a Deputy Director of the Facility Support Division of Adult Institutions, and states that 

they are all based at CDCR’s headquarters. (ECF No. 1 at 12-14.) Defendant Skaggs is 

identified as a Community Resource Manager for the Division of Adult Institutions who 

“oversees religious activities and issues within CDCR.” (Id. at 13.) Defendants Cullen, 

Fransham and Desrosiers are identified as employees of the CDCR, but whose “position 

as an employee is unclear.” (Id. at 13-14.) 

The factual allegations against these Defendants consist entirely of the fact that their 

names or job titles are listed on the January 20, 2015 memorandum, and Plaintiff claims 

that by virtue of the fact that the CDCR sent them the memorandum they are involved in 

making or implementing the policy of inadequate sacred areas. (Id. at 12-14, 20-21, 29, 

32.) He seeks to hold these Defendants liable because they knew of and failed to prevent

adoption of the CDCR policy outlined in the memorandum, because by receiving the 

memorandum (or by being employed by the CDCR in a position that required they be sent 

the memorandum), they became aware that the CDCR was proposing an unconstitutional 

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policy, which was ultimately adopted, and were perhaps involved in the policy decision. 

(Id.) Unlike these Defendants, the Complaint contains allegations of personal participation 

by the remaining Defendants, Beard (id. at 12, 26-28), Lockwood (id. at 14, 29-30), 

Hemenway (id. at 14, 18, 25), Harrington (id. at 12), and Briggs (id. at 14, 18, 25), who 

have not joined this aspect of the Motion to Dismiss.

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that each 

defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 673; Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014). Liability may not 

be imposed on supervisory personnel for the acts or omissions of their subordinates under 

the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 672-673; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 

930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Although detailed factual allegations are not required,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting 

the Iqbal plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), 

citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 

(9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”) A person deprives 

another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which 

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

/ / /

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Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendants Diaz, Allison, Cullen, Fransham, 

Skaggs, Desrosiers and Stainer because he has failed to allege facts regarding what actions 

they took, or failed to take which they were legally required to take, which caused the 

alleged constitutional violation. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 385 (“Respondeat superior and 

vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”) Rather, Plaintiff claims they were aware 

of the policy which he challenges here and failed to prevent its implementation. But that 

allegation is based solely on the fact that they are employed by the CDCR in positions 

which caused them to be sent the 2015 policy memorandum. (ECF No. 1 at 29.) The 

Complaint fails to allege facts supporting the wholly conclusory allegation, (or more 

precisely the unsupported presumption), that these Defendants had the ability or authority 

to develop, implement, or prevent the implementation, of the policy of which they were 

informed in the memorandum. Plaintiff’s allegation that the fact that the memorandum 

was sent to these Defendants is proof they must have had some influence on the adoption

or implementation of the policy, is the type of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [which] do not suffice” to state 

a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. For that reason, and 

because Plaintiff’s allegations against these Defendants are based on the “mere possibility 

of misconduct,” the Complaint falls short of meeting the Iqbal plausibility standard. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 679; see also Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (the Court need not “accept as true 

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.”)

Accordingly, the Court grants in part the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Diaz, 

Allison, Cullen, Fransham, Skaggs, Desrosiers and Stainer, and dismisses these Defendants 

from this action. The dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff to attempt to cure the defect 

of pleading against these Defendants, if he wishes to attempt to do so, in the First Amended 

Complaint he has indicated he intends to file, and which, as detailed below, must be 

complete in and of itself without reference to his original Complaint, and in which any 

Defendants not named or any claims not re-alleged will be waived.

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B. Representation of Others

Defendants also seek to dismiss any claim Plaintiff brings on behalf of other persons. 

Specifically, they contend that by alleging that the CDCR policy fails to provide for the 

construction of separate spiritual areas for Plaintiff’s religion, Wiccan, as well as for the 

Odinist religion, and in seeking that separate areas be built for those two religions, Plaintiff 

is attempting to assert claims on behalf of Odinist adherents. (ECF No. 23-1 at 8-9.)

Plaintiff argues that he is not presenting claims on behalf of anyone except himself, 

and that he has alleged facts regarding other religions in order to identify the effects on him 

arising from the CDCR policy, and because he is required to show he belongs to a 

mainstream religion. (ECF No. 29 at 2-3.) He also contends that “his faith places him on 

a fence between Asatru and Wiccan because he follows a Vanir path of Asatru. This path 

is where Norse Wicca and Wotenism become connected and therefore Plaintiff can and 

does take a position legally for both the Odinist and Wiccans. He can speak on the tenants 

of both faiths as he is connected to both as a Vanir.” (Id. at 4.) 

Defendants are correct that Plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, is not permitted to bring 

claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 

F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). However, Plaintiff has stated that he is not presenting claims 

on behalf of others, but only on behalf of himself, and the Court will accept at this stage of 

the proceedings his representation that he is bringing claims only on his own behalf. The 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in part on that basis without prejudice to 

reassert it at a later stage of the proceedings should the issue arise.

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Stay in which he requests the Court stay this action 

while he exhausts his administrative remedies with respect to claims that adherents of the 

Wiccan religion should have access to a sweat lodge and certain spiritual items. (ECF No. 

27 at 5.) Plaintiff indicates that he has already begun the exhaustion process. (Id. at 1-2.) 

The Defendants do not oppose a stay for that purpose, but reserve the right to move to 

dismiss any amended complaint. (ECF No. 32 at 5.)

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“[A] prisoner does not comply with [the exhaustion] requirement by exhausting 

available remedies during the course of the litigation.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 

1210 (9th Cir. 2012), quoting McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“If, however, a plaintiff files an amended complaint adding new claims based on conduct 

that occurred after the filing of the initial complaint, the plaintiff need only show that the 

new claims were exhausted before tendering the amended complaint to the clerk for filing.” 

Id., citing Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Here, it appears that the new claims Plaintiff seeks to add arose prior to filing his 

Complaint. Nevertheless, in Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth 

Circuit found that permitting amendment of a complaint to add claims which arose prior to 

the filing of the complaint but which were administratively exhausted after the complaint 

(which contained properly exhausted claims) was filed, “serves the policies underlying the 

PLRA,” whereas forcing a plaintiff to file a separate complaint to bring such claims would 

not serve those policies. Id. at 1220. 

For good cause shown, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay. This action 

is stayed for ninety (90) days after the date of this Order or until Plaintiff completes 

exhaustion of administrative remedies, whichever occurs first. Plaintiff is directed to 

immediately inform the Court when he has completed exhaustion of administrative 

remedies. If he has not done so within ninety (90) days after the date of this Order, he may 

request an extension of the stay by informing the Court of the status of his administrative 

remedies.

V. Conclusion and Orders

For all the reasons discussed, the Court:

1) GRANTS in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismisses Defendants 

Diaz, Allison, Cullen, Fransham, Skaggs, Desrosiers and Stainer from this action without 

prejudice pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6);

2) DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without prejudice to the 

extent Plaintiff seeks to litigate claims of others in a representative capacity;

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3) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay; and,

4) ISSUES a stay. This action is STAYED for ninety (90) days after the date of 

this Order or until Plaintiff completes exhaustion of his administrative remedies, whichever 

occurs first. Plaintiff is directed to inform the Court as soon as he has exhausted his 

administrative remedies, or, if he has not completed exhaustion of his administrative 

remedies within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order, to request an extension of the 

stay. After Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, he must file a First 

Amended Complaint forthwith. Plaintiff is cautioned that if he does not inform the Court 

of exhaustion or request an extension of the stay within ninety (90) days of this Order, or 

does not file a First Amended Complaint forthwith after exhaustion, the Court will lift the 

stay and proceed with the claims in the Complaint. Should he choose to file a First

Amended Complaint, it must be complete in and of itself, comply with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a), and any claim not re-alleged or any Defendant not re-named will be 

considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1546 

(“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 

896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not 

re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2017

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