Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02557/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02557-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ROBERT WAGGENER, et al.,

Defendants. __________________________ 

 

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No. C 07-2557 MMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL;

GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED

IN FORMA PAUPERIS; DENYING

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL

(Docket Nos. 2 & 5) 

On May 15, 2006, plaintiff, a "sexually violent predator" under a civil commitment to

Atascadero State Hospital for renewable periods under California’s Sexually Violent

Predator Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600 ("SVPA"), and proceeding pro se, filed the

above-titled civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that in 1991, in

San Francisco County Superior Court, he was convicted of rape and sentenced to a term of

19 years in state prison. He seeks money damages from his defense attorney, the victim

alleged in the underlying prosecution, and prosecutors and other employees of the San

Francisco District Attorney’s Office, as well as from the City and County of San Francisco. 

He has applied for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss

any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. §

Case 3:07-cv-02557-MMC Document 9 Filed 06/13/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 Plaintiff alleges that his attorney was negligent and ineffective in defending him, that

his prosecution was wrongful and malicious, that his conviction was based on false evidence,

and that all the defendants conspired to convict him of a crime he did not commit. He alleges

that these actions led to his conviction and subsequent incarceration, which in turn led to his

present detention under the SVPA. He claims that defendants violated his federal

constitutional rights, as well as state law. 

DISCUSSION

In order to recover damages based on an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or term of

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a plaintiff asserting a violation of § 1983 must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). A

claim for damages based upon a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983. See id. at 487. If proven, plaintiff’s claims, specifically, that his counsel

was negligent and ineffective, that his conviction was based on false evidence, that the prosecution

was wrongful and malicious, and that defendants conspired to convict him of a crime he did not

commit, would call into the question the validity of his conviction, his sentence, and his present

detention under the SVPA. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims are barred until such time as plaintiff’s

conviction and sentence have been reversed, expunged, set aside or otherwise called into question.

Plaintiff argues that Heck does not bar his claims, on the ground that federal habeas

relief is not available to challenge his 1991 conviction. Plaintiff states he no longer is

serving his sentence on his 1991 conviction, and that his federal habeas petition challenging

said conviction, filed in 2003, was dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See

Williams v. Mayberg, No. C 03-5147 MMC (PR) (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2004). With respect to

Supreme Court jurisprudence, although a question has been raised as whether there “may” be

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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One such collateral consequence is present in this case, namely, plaintiff’s continued

detention, based on his conviction, under the SVPA. 

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exceptions to Heck’s bar where federal habeas relief no longer is available to the plaintiff,

that question has not been “settle[d].” See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.4

(2004) (citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21-22 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) and Heck, 512 U.S. at

491 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)) (per curiam). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held

that “[t]he fact that [a § 1983 plaintiff] is no longer in custody and thus cannot overturn his

prior convictions by means of habeas corpus does not lift Heck’s bar.” Guerrero v. Gates,

442 F.3d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, the fact that plaintiff has completed his sentence

and can no longer overturn his 1991 conviction by means of a federal habeas petition does

not serve to lift the bar imposed by Heck. Further, plaintiff cites no authority, and this Court

is aware of none, to the effect that the bar does not apply where a plaintiff’s prior federal

habeas petition was dismissed as untimely. 

Although the Ninth Circuit has found an exception to the Heck bar where a federal

habeas petition would be moot, see Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2002), a

federal habeas petition challenging petitioner’s 1991 conviction would not be moot. In

Nonnette, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action implicating prison disciplinary procedures

that had resulted in a loss of good time credits; the Court of Appeals found that any habeas

challenge to such discipline would be moot because the plaintiff no longer was in custody

and the discipline had no collateral consequences that continued following his release from

custody. Id. at 875-76. A federal habeas petition challenging a state court conviction,

however, is not mooted by the completion of the sentence because there are collateral

consequences of the conviction that continue to affect the petitioner even after his sentence

expires.1

 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1998). As a federal habeas petition

challenging petitioner’s 1991 conviction would not be moot by virtue of his completion of

his sentence on such conviction, the exception to Heck set forth in Nonnette does not apply

here. See Guerrero, 432 F.3d at 704 (declining to extend Nonnette exception to § 1983 action

implicating conviction on which plaintiff no longer in custody). 

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United States District Court

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In addition, it would appear, based on the allegations in the complaint, that the

complaint is untimely. A California inmate has a maximum of four years to bring a § 1983

claim for damages: the two-year period under California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1

plus, under California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1(a), a period not to exceed two

additional two years during which accrual is postponed due to the disability of imprisonment. 

See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Jones v. Blanas, 393

F.3d 927-28 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding limitations period not tolled for civil detainees). The

events alleged in the instant complaint occurred approximately 16 years ago, suggesting the

statute of limitations has long since expired. 

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Finally, plaintiff argues that, if Heck applies to this case, the complaint should be

construed as a “complaint for relief in the form of a writ of error coram nobis under and

pursuant to the all writs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).” District courts are not authorized to

issue the writ of error coram nobis pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), with

respect to challenges to state convictions. See Sinclair v. Louisiana, 679 F.2d 513, 513-15

(5th Cir. 1982); see also Madigan v. Wells, 224 F.2d 577, 578 n.2 (9th Cir. 1955). As a

result, a writ of error coram nobis is not available to plaintiff with respect to his 1991 state

court conviction.2

 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the above-titled action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. 

Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding claim barred by

Heck may be dismissed sua sponte without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §1915). 

Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is hereby GRANTED, and, in light of the

dismissal, no fee is required.

In light of the dismissal, the motion for appointment of counsel is hereby DENIED.

The Clerk shall close the file and terminate Docket Nos. 2 and 5.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 13, 2007 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-02557-MMC Document 9 Filed 06/13/07 Page 4 of 4