Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00067/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00067-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Reginaldo Almazan, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

State of Arizona, et. al., 

Respondents.

No. cv-10-067-TUC-CKJ (CRP)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Reginaldo Almazan (“Petitioner”), presently an inmate at the Arizona State Prison 

Complex in Tucson, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 on February 2, 2010. (Doc. 1). After that Petition was screened and 

dismissed, Petitioner timely filed an Amended Petition (“Habeas Petition”) on July 2, 

2010. (Doc. 5). In his Amended Petition, Petitioner raises one claim - ineffective 

assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (Doc. 5). Petitioner 

argues his trial counsel failed to call an expert witness to testify as to the unreliability of 

eyewitness testimony; misidentification was critical to Petitioner’s defense. (Doc. 5). 

Respondents oppose the Habeas Petition, arguing the state court’s determination that 

Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law. (Doc. 15). Respondents argue Petitioner failed to demonstrate 

trial counsel performed deficiently nor did Petitioner show prejudice. (Doc. 15). 

Petitioner did not file a reply to Respondent’s answer. Time for filing a reply has expired. 

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I. Factual and Procedural History 

 On October 14, 2005, a jury in Pima County Superior Court found Petitioner 

guilty of three counts of kidnaping, three counts of armed robbery, three counts of 

aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, one count of theft by controlling 

stolen property, one count of theft of means of transportation, and burglary in the first 

degree. (Doc. 15-7, Exhibit G, pp. 3-4)1

. The charges arose from an incident on 

December 16, 2004 when Petitioner and two co-defendants violently invaded a home and 

attempted to ransom one of the victims for money. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 13, Exhibit 

DD, p. 99). Petitioner was sentenced on November 28, 2005 to presumptive terms of 

imprisonment for the thirteen counts. (Doc. 15-7, Exhibit H, pp. 8-16). Three sentences 

were run consecutive and the remaining concurrent. Accounting for his consecutive 

sentences, Petitioner was sentenced to serve 31.5 years in prison. (Doc. 15-7, Exhibit H, 

pp. 8-16). 

 Petitioner timely filed a notice of direct appeal of December 5, 2005 with the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc.15-7, Exhibit I, p. 19). Subsequent to filing his direct 

appeal, Petitioner requested and was granted a stay of that appeal while he pursued his 

post-conviction relief appeal (“PCR Appeal”) in the trial court. (Doc. 15-7, Exhibit J, p. 

21, Exhibit K, p. 24). 

 On August 18, 2006, Petitioner filed his PCR Appeal. (Doc. 15-7, Exhibit L, p. 

42). Petitioner did not file a notice of post-conviction relief. In the PCR Appeal, 

Petitioner argued numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 15-7, 

Exhibit L, p. 42, Exhibit M, p. 49, Exhibit N, p. 74). Included in those claims, Petitioner 

argued trial counsel was ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights because 

she failed to call an expert witness to challenge the lay witness identification evidence. 

(Doc. 15-7, Exhibit N, pp. 85-92). 

 

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 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies. 

(Doc. 15-7, Exhibit P, p. 113, Exhibit Q, p. 116). During the evidentiary hearing, trial 

counsel testified, in part, as to her reasoning for not calling an expert. (Doc. 15-8, Exhibit 

R, pp. 2-81). After the evidentiary hearing, and before addressing the merits of 

Petitioner’s PCR Appeal, the state trial court analyzed whether Petitioner’s PCR appeal 

was untimely based on Petitioner’s failure to file a notice of post-conviction appeal. 

(Doc. 15-9, Exhibit U, p. 2, Exhibit V, p. 8, Exhibit W, p. 11, Exhibit X, p. 13). 

Ultimately the trial court concluded that while the PCR Appeal was untimely, Petitioner 

relied on a prior acceptance of the PCR Appeal by the Court. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, pp. 

13-14). Thus, while the trial court found the PCR Appeal untimely, it also ruled on the 

merits in arguendo. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, pp. 14-15). 

 Ruling on the PCR Appeal, the trial court denied all of Petitioner’s claims 

including his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to call an expert witness 

on identification. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, pp. 13-18). The trial court found counsel’s 

performance was not deficient as to the expert witness because trial counsel made a 

tactical decision to not call the expert. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, pp. 14-15). The trial court 

noted defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that she only uses an expert in 

identification issues in instances of prejudice or racial profiling. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 

14). As Petitioner and identifying witnesses were from the same racial background, 

defense counsel did not believe an expert would be helpful. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). 

Further, the trial court noted defense counsel testified that the best way to challenge the 

identifying witnesses was to cross-examine them on discrepancies in their testimony. 

(Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). The trial record established that defense counsel did crossexamine identifying witnesses on the lighting at the scene, inconsistencies in the lineup 

identification, a witness’s failure to wear corrective lenses, height discrepancies, and 

identification based on an earlier meeting. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). The trial court 

further noted defense counsel reiterated these discrepancies in her closing argument and 

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that concerning the lineup identification, defense counsel had filed a Desserault motion 

to preclude the out of court identification. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). 

 Based on the above evidence, the trial court concluded defense counsel’s decision 

to not call an expert on identification was a strategic choice and was not deficient 

performance. The trial court further found that even if counsel’s performance had been 

deficient, Petitioner had not shown prejudice. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). The trial 

court noted Petitioner’s long-time friend, who was a co-defendant, testified that Petitioner 

was with him at the crime scene and had participated in the crime. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, 

p. 15). Thus, any expert identification testimony would have been irrelevant. (Doc. 15-9, 

Exhibit X, p. 15). 

 On appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner successfully moved to 

consolidate a petition for review of his pending direct appeal with a petition for review of 

the PCR Appeal. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit Y, p. 20, Exhibit Z, p. 23). In his appeal, Petitioner 

again raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure of trial counsel to call 

an expert witness on identification. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit AA, p. 26). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals denied this claim. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit DD, p. 98). The appellate court 

determined the trial court did not err in finding trial counsel was not ineffective. (Doc. 

15-9, Exhibit DD, pp. 102-103). The appellate court relied on the “detailed minute entry 

ruling” of the trial court to support its decision. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit DD, p. 103). 

 After the appellate court denied Petitioner’s claim, he had 30 days to petition the 

Arizona Supreme Court for review. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19(a). Petitioner did not seek 

that review. Petitioner filed the pending Habeas Petition on February 2, 2010. (Doc. 1). 

II. Analysis 

A. Timeliness 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes 

a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners filing federal habeas petitions. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations begins to run from the latest of: (1) the 

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date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) the date on which the impediment to 

filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the 

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual 

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

 In this case, the statute of limitations began to run when Petitioner’s direct review 

became final. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied both Petitioner’s direct appeal and 

his PCR Appeal on November 7, 2008 through his consolidated petition. (Doc. 15-9, 

Exhibit DD, p. 98). Thus, Petitioner had 30 days, until December 8, 2008, to petition the 

Arizona Supreme Court for review. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19(a); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 

F.3d 1069, 1073-1074 (9th Cir.2007) (noting direct appeal is final upon expiration of 

time for seeking further appellate review).2

 

 Petitioner did not file a petition for review and his one year limitations period for 

filing a federal habeas petition under the AEDPA began running the following day on 

December 9, 2008. This time expired one year later on December 9, 2009. See Patterson 

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.2001) (calculating the one-year AEDPA statute 

of limitations using the “anniversary method” based on Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure). Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition until almost two 

months later on February 2, 2010. (Doc. 1). It, thus, appears the Habeas Petition is 

 

2

 The Magistrate Judge notes the clock on Petitioner’s 30 days began to run the day after the appellate court denied his appeals. Thus, 30 days from November 7, 2008 is actually December 7, 2008. That day, however, was a Sunday and pursuant to Arizona procedural rules, Petitioner’s petition for review would have been due the following business day, Monday, December 8, 2008. See Ariz.R.Crim.P.1.3(a). 

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untimely.3 

 The Government, however, has not argued the Habeas Petition is untimely and a 

statute of limitations defense is not jurisdictional. District courts are permitted, but not 

obliged, to sua sponte consider the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition. Day v. 

McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202, 209-210 (2006). Before a district court can act on its 

own initiative, however, it must give the parties notice of its intention and give the parties 

an opportunity to present their positions. Id. at 210. 

 In this case Respondents appear to mistake the time a petitioner has to file a 

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, 30 days, with the time a petitioner has 

to file a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court after a petitioner has been 

denied by the state’s highest court, 90 days. (Doc. 15, p. 6). Petitioner only had 30 days 

as his appeals were denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals and his next step was to 

petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review. While it appears the Habeas Petition is 

untimely, the Magistrate Judge has not ordered additional briefing on this issue and will 

not recommend dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. Rather, the Magistrate Judge 

will address the merits of Petitioner’s claim and, as discussed below, recommend denying 

the Habeas Petition on the merits. 

B. Exhaustion 

 An application for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless: the applicant 

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; there is an absence of 

available State corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

 To properly exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims 

to the state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 

838, 848 (1999). Specifically, exhaustion requires that a petitioner either fairly present 

 

3

 Statutory tolling would not add any time to Petitioner’s clock as the PCR Appeal was filed and adjudicated with the direct appeal. The Magistrate Judge notes the parties have not briefed whether equitable tolling would apply. 

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his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1088, 1010 (9th 

Cir.1999), or show that no state remedies remain available. Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 

1027, 1029 (9th Cir.1983) (citing Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir.1982)). 

This requirement of exhaustion is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to pass 

upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 

U.S. 270, 275 (1971). 

 In the pending Habeas Petition, Petitioner asserts one ground for relief. (Doc. 5). 

Citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-694 (1984), Petitioner argues his 

Sixth Amendment rights were violated due to alleged ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. Id. Petitioner contends his trial counsel failed to investigate the unreliability of 

eyewitness testimony by calling an identification expert. Id. Petitioner raised this claim in 

his PCR Appeal to both the state trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 15-

7, Exhibit N, pp. 85-92; Doc. 15-9, Exhibit AA, p. 26). Both state courts denied 

Petitioner’s claim on the merits. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, pp. 13-18; Doc. 15-9, Exhibit 

DD, pp. 102-103). Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review of 

the appellate court’s denial. 

 Petitioner raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the trial court and 

then the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner has properly exhausted this claim. The 

Court will address the merits. 

C. Standard of Review 

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to 

“any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the State 

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the 

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state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] 

cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a 

result different from [its] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). The 

state court's application of Supreme Court law must be more than incorrect or erroneous; 

it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “When 

applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a 

state court ...” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.2004) (internal citations 

omitted). 

D. Analysis of the Merits

 Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the 

unreliability of the eyewitness testimony by calling an identification expert. (Doc. 5). To 

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a convicted defendant must show: 

(1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 

(2) that counsel’s performance prejudiced him such that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-694. A reasonable probability is a “probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. There is a strong 

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance. 

Id. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 

counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at 

the time.” Id. at 689. 

 In order to be entitled to relief on Ground One, Petitioner must demonstrate that 

the state court’s decision in denying Petitioner’s claim was based on a legal standard 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland, or was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

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 Petitioner alleges his trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to examine 

the unreliability of eyewitness testimony through an expert. Petitioner argues an expert 

could have explained to the jury the phases of eyewitness identification, the effects of 

various psychological factors on each phase, and the contradictions of numerous lay 

witness identifications – all using empirical research. (Doc. 5., p. 11). 

 In addressing this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals determined the trial court 

did not err in finding trial counsel was not ineffective. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit DD, pp. 102-

103). The appellate court relied on the “detailed minute entry ruling” of the trial court to 

support its decision. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit DD, p. 103). This Court, therefore, “looks 

through” the appellate court’s decision to the reasoned analysis of the state trial court to 

determine if the state courts’ decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. Robinson, 360 F.3d at 1055. 

 The trial court found counsel’s performance was not deficient as to the expert 

witness because defense counsel made a tactical decision to not call the expert. (Doc. 15-

9, Exhibit X, pp. 14-15). The trial court noted defense counsel testified at the evidentiary 

hearing that she only uses an expert in identification issues in instances of prejudice or 

racial profiling. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 14). As Petitioner and identifying witnesses 

were from the same racial background, defense counsel did not believe an expert would 

be helpful. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). Further, the trial court noted defense counsel 

testified that the best way to challenge the identifying witnesses was to cross-examine 

them on discrepancies in their testimony. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). The trial record 

established that defense counsel did cross-examine identifying witnesses on the lighting 

at the scene, inconsistencies in the lineup identification, a witness’s failure to wear 

corrective lenses, height discrepancies, and identification based on an earlier meeting. 

(Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). The trial court further noted defense counsel reiterated 

these discrepancies in her closing argument and that concerning the lineup identification, 

defense counsel had filed a Desserault motion to preclude the out of court identification. 

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(Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). 

 Based on the above evidence, the trial court concluded defense counsel’s decision 

to not call an expert on identification was a strategic choice and was not deficient 

performance. The trial court further found that even if counsel’s performance had been 

deficient, Petitioner had not shown prejudice. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, p. 15). The trial 

court noted Petitioner’s long-time friend who was a co-defendant testified that Petitioner 

was with him at the crime scene and had participated in the crime. (Doc. 15-9, Exhibit X, 

p. 15). Thus, any expert identification testimony would have been irrelevant. (Doc. 15-9, 

Exhibit X, p. 15). 

 Petitioner’s trial counsel was not ineffective under the Strickland standard. 

Petitioner has not shown that his trial counsel was deficient nor that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of his case would have been different. 

 “In determining whether the defendant received effective assistance of counsel, we 

‘will neither second-guess counsel’s decisions, not apply the fabled twenty-twenty vision 

of hindsight’, but rather, will defer to counsel’s sound trial strategy.” Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). “Counsel is 

entitled to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 779 (2011). “Rare are the situations in which the 

latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to any one 

technique or approach.” Id. at 789. (internal citations and quotations are omitted). 

 Trial counsel decided to challenge the reliability of eye-witness testimony through 

cross-examination of the witnesses rather than through calling an identification expert. 

Trial counsel’s decision to discredit witnesses’ testimony through vigorous crossexamination rather than using an identification expert was tactical. Further, trial counsel 

filed pre-trial motions to preclude out of court identification and also reiterated 

discrepancies in witnesses’ testimony during her closing argument. Finally, Petitioner 

participated in the crimes with a long-time friend who testified at trial that Petitioner was 

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present. Thus, even if trial counsel had been ineffective, the outcome would not have 

been different. Petitioner was not prejudiced. 

 The state courts’ decision to deny Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim was not 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland nor was it based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented during the 

evidentiary hearing. Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be 

denied. 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

 Court, after its independent review, DENY the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 

5). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If 

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that 

any objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: cv-10-067-TUCCKJ. 

 Dated this 12th day of August, 2011. 

 

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