Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00283/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00283-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIS GOMEZ, Civil No. 07cv283-BEN (CAB)

Petitioner, ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OVER

OBJECTIONS AND DISMISSING

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

v.

L. E. SCRIBNER, WARDEN,

Respondent.

Petitioner Louis Gomez has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (“Petition”). The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the

Petition be dismissed. For the reasons that follow, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED,

and the Petition is DISMISSED.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) provides: “A judge of the [district] court shall make a de

novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Thus, the governing statute “makes it

clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original) (“Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a

district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as

correct.”); Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) ( “Of course, de novo review

Case 3:07-cv-00283-BEN-CAB Document 29 Filed 10/06/08 Page 1 of 3
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of a [Report] is only required when an objection is made to the [Report].” ). Here, Petitioner objects

to the Report & Recommendation concerning the statute of limitations calculation.

The facts have been previously described in detail in the Report and Recommendation and

are only summarized here. Louis Gomez is serving a sentence of fifteen years to life. In 2002, he

was denied parole. He unsuccessfully appealed the decision. The parole appeal was denied on May

6, 2003. On January 23, 2004, Gomez filed the first of four state habeas petitions. The last habeas

petition was denied November 29, 2006. The instant Petition was filed on December 22, 2006. 

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the instant Petition was filed too late. 

Because the habeas petition was filed in this Court after the effective date of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (‘AEDPA’), the provisions of AEDPA apply. 

Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202,

207 (2003)). Under AEDPA, there is a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). The

Magistrate Judge correctly noted, and Gomez does not dispute, that the one-year statute of

limitations began running on the day after his parole appeal was denied: May 7, 2003. Moreover, the

Magistrate Judge correctly noted, and Gomez does not dispute, that the statute of limitations clock

was running for eights months before he filed his first state habeas petition in January 2004, leaving

117 days in which to file a federal petition. Statutory tolling stopped the clock while the first state

habeas petition was being decided. When the state petition was denied on May 19, 2004, the clock

began to run down the last 117 days. By the time Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition some

two years later on December 22, 2006, the statute of limitations had run out. As the Magistrate

Judge found, “[a]fter accounting for the 117 days of tolling, the limitations period expired on

September 1, 2004. . . .the instant Petition, which was filed on December 22, 2006, was still more

than two years late.” Report and Recommendation, at 4. 

The crux of Petitioner’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation is that while the

Magistrate Judge found him to be potentially entitled to a short period of equitable tolling (i.e., from

May 29, 2004 to August 25, 2004), he should enjoy equitable tolling for the entire passage of time

from August 2004 to December 2006. However, the Magistrate Judge considered Petitioner’s

reasons (his attorney’s misconduct and delay caused by prison conditions) in light of the high legal

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standard of “extraordinary circumstances” and found that additional equitable tolling was not

warranted. Having considered the issue de novo, this Court agrees with the Report and

Recommendation, that Petitioner’s circumstances did not rise to the level of extraordinary

circumstances sufficient to justify further equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Bryant v.

Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9 Cir. 2007) (equitable tolling requires diligent th

pursuit of rights and extraordinary circumstances standing in the way); Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d

1165, 1167 (9 Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 979 (2007). th

Accordingly, the Objections are overruled and the Report and Recommendation

recommending that the Petition for Writ of habeas Corpus be denied is ADOPTED. The Petition is

DENIED. The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 6, 2008 ______________________________

ROGER T. BENITEZ

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00283-BEN-CAB Document 29 Filed 10/06/08 Page 3 of 3