Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02111/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John H. King, II, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-11-2111-PHX-GMS (BSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

John H. King, II has filed a timely amended petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions for second-degree murder, aggravated

assault, and fleeing the scene of an accident. (Doc. 15.) King asserts that his Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he is actually innocent of second degree

murder (Ground One), there is newly discovered evidence that he did not commit murder

(Ground Three), the prosecutor engaged in misconduct (Ground Four), and there was a

miscarriage of justice based on the actions or inactions of the police and prosecutor (Ground

Five). King also alleges several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel (Ground Two).

Respondents contend that grounds one, three, four and five are procedurally defaulted and

barred from review. Respondents further argue that King’s claims of ineffective assistance lack

merit. The Court agrees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that King’s

petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

/ / /

/ / /

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1

 King does not challenge the appellate court’s recitation of the facts and the state court’s

factual determinations are “presumed to be correct” unless petitioner “rebut[s] the presumption

of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Additionally, the

trial transcripts support the appellate court’s statement of fact. (Respondents’ Exhs. B-I, docs.

17-18.)

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts giving rise to King’s challenged convictions are summarized from the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ memorandum decision.1

On November 8, 2002, Robert W. and his brother, Ivory G., went to the

AmVets bar where they met with some other people, including Craig G.

and Paul R. Charlotte L., the mother of Ivory’s child, was also at the bar

that evening with her cousin, Akina L. Charlotte spoke with Ivory and

bought him a drink. 

[King], who also had a past relationship with Charlotte L., approached

Ivory G., and, referring to Charlotte L., asked, “What is she to [you]?”

Ivory G., who knew [King] replied, “She ain’t nothing to me, I just have

a baby by her.” Ivory G. then went to speak to RobertW. Charlotte L.

followed and asked Ivory G. to dance. Ivory G. and Charlotte danced

and had another drink. 

King, who was apparently upset with Charlotte L., approached her and

warned, “Bitch, don’t get [someone] killed up in here,” and then he

showed her a gun. [King] then approached Ivory G. again, pressed

something up against his back that Ivory G. believed was a gun, and

threatened, “I’m going to put some of these hollow points in you.” 

Following this incident, Charlotte L. went to her van with Akina L.

[King] followed Charlotte L. out of the bar to her van. Charlotte L. was

afraid and tried to call her husband on her cell phone. [King] grabbed

her cell phone from Charlotte L’s hand, threw it to the ground, and

smashed it with his foot. [King] then pointed a gun at Charlotte L. and

said, “Bitch, I’ll blow your head off . . . .” (Tr. Oct. 28, 2004 at 137-38.)

Robert W. and Ivory G. were walking down the sidewalk and [King]

approached them and said, “[Who’s] trying to protect this bitch?” A

scuffle broke out and several gunshots were fired. Robert W. was shot

in the right hand and through the torso. He subsequently died from his

wounds. Ivory G. was shot in the neck and back, but he survived. 

[King] drove away from the scene in his Cadillac. The police pursued

[King] with their lights and sirens activated. [King] drove through the

neighborhood, pulled in front of his house, exited his vehicle, and ran

toward the back of the house. Police officers yelled for [King] to stop,

but he simply looked back, and then continued to run. [King] was

wearing a long trench coat, dark pants, and a striped shirt. As he ran,

[King] took off his trench coat and dropped it as he jumped over a fence.

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Eventually, the police caught up to [King], who had blood on his face

and hands, and took him into custody . . . .

The police swabbed residue from [King’s] hands, which revealed the

presence of gunpowder. The right pocket of [King’s] trench coat also

contained gunshot residue and had a bullet hole consistent with a gun

being fired from inside of the pocket. DNA analysis of several blood

stains on the trench coat and in the street at the scene matched Robert

W.’s DNA. Samples taken from biological material on the collar of the

trench coat matched [King’s] DNA.

(Respondents’ Exh. A, doc. 16-1 at 3-6.) 

King was indicted by a grand jury in the Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County

and charged with one count of second degree murder, a class one dangerous felony; one count

of attempted second degree murder, a class two dangerous felony; one count of aggravated

assault, a class three dangerous felony; and one count of unlawful flight from a law enforcement

vehicle, a class five felony. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 5, doc. 16-1 at 6) The State subsequently

alleged that King had five prior felony convictions. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 5, doc. 16-1 at 6.)

In addition to the DNA-evidence and gunshot residue, the State presented Maricopa

County medical examiner Alex Zhang who testified as an expert regarding the fatal gunshot

wound in the victim’s back. (Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. Nov. 1, 2004 at 81-90.) Defense

counsel cross-examined the expert about the fact that the autopsy report did not mention a

contact wound. (Id. at 92-95.) Defense counsel also challenged the medical examiner’s

testimony concerning inconsistencies in his statements about the distance of the gun from

Robert’s body at the time he was shot. (Respondents’ Exh. D, Tr. Nov. 4, 2004 at 46.) The

expert explained that, after he prepared the autopsy report, he suspected that there might be soot

around the wound, so he took a microscopic section that showed gunpowder stippling. (Id. at

94-95.) Defense counsel moved to suppress and strike the expert’s testimony from the record

arguing that he was denied discovery of the State’s evidence. (Id. at 105.) The prosecutor

explained that he did not know until the expert testified that the doctor now believed the fatal

shot was a contact, rather than a distant, wound. (Id. at 109.) After considering argument, the

trial court denied the motion, finding that defense counsel had been provided evidence sufficient

to impeach the expert. (Id. at 107-117.)

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The jury also heard testimony from Ivory G., Charlotte L., Akina L., and Paul R. that

King had shot Robert W. and Ivory G. (Respondents’ Exh. A, doc. 16-1 at 6-7.) Akina also

testified that she did not see an individual named Howard Jones with King the night of the

shootings. (Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. 11/1/2004 at 41-42.) Paul R. testified that he saw King

shoot the victims and that King started shooting with his hand in the pocket of his brown trench

coat. (Id. at 56, 59, 62.) Defense counsel presented Mary Ann Y. who testified that she was

in the AmVets Club the night of the incident and did not see King with a gun. (Respondents’

Exh. E, Tr. Nov. 3, 2004 at 62.) Defense counsel also presented Keith B. who testified that he

saw the shooting from his van outside the AmVets Club and that King was not the shooter and

that he saw an older man shoot the victims. (Respondents’ Exh. E, Tr. Nov. 3, 2004 at 87-88,

94-97.) 

The jury found King guilty of second degree murder and aggravated assault, both

dangerous offenses, and unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle. (Respondents’ Exh.

A, doc. 16-1 at 2-3.) The jury found King not guilty of attempted murder. (Id.) After a hearing

regarding prior convictions, the court found that King had four historical prior felony

convictions. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 16, Tr. Feb. 14, 2005.) The trial court subsequently heard

argument on a defense motion for new trial. Defense counsel argued that the manner in which

the victim’s blood was distributed on King’s coat indicated that King was “underneath, down

below,” the victim and, therefore, the evidence presented did not support the jury verdict.

(Respondents’ Exh. I, Tr. Feb. 14, 2005 at 3-5.) Defense counsel also argued that he had been

surprised by the contact wound testimony. (Id. at 5, 9-11.) The court denied the motion. (Id.

at 11.) 

After the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced King to a presumptive 16-year term

on the murder conviction, and to concurrent presumptive prison terms on the aggravated assault

and unlawful flight convictions; with these sentences to run consecutive to the sentence for the

murder convictions. The longest of these sentences was 11.25 years. Therefore, the court

sentenced King to a total of 27.25 years imprisonment. (Respondents’ Exh. I, Tr. Feb. 14, 2005

at 34-35.)

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 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

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On direct review, King challenged the jury instructions, jury verdicts, an inconsistent

statement by the medical examiner, a witness’s refusal to cooperate, and the trial court’s

determination of aggravating factors at sentencing. (Respondents’ Exh. A, doc. 16-1 at 8-16.)

The appellate court rejected King’s claims, affirmed his convictions, but modified the

sentencing minute entry to reflect that unlawful flight was a non-dangerous offense.

(Respondents’ Exh. A, doc. 16-1.) King filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme

Court, and the Court denied the petition. (Respondents’ Exh. J, doc. 18-5 at 2.)

On March 27, 2007, King filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial court

pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. K, doc. 18-5 at 5.) Post-conviction

counsel filed an Anders2

 brief stating that he found no arguable claims of error. (Respondents’

Exh. L, doc. 18-5 at 9.) King then filed a pro se petition presenting multiple claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. He also asserted claims of newly

discovered evidence and actual innocence. (Respondents’ Exh. M, doc. 18-5 at 12-42.) The

court found King’s claims of miscarriage of justice, prosecutorial misconduct, and “various

constitutional claims” procedurally defaulted under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2

because King could have raised those claims on direct appeal. (Respondents’ Exh. O, doc. 19-1

at 24-26) The court also found that King failed to establish actual innocence or newly

discovered evidence by “clear and convincing evidence” under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32.1(h). (Id.) The trial court further found that King’s claims of ineffective

assistance lacked merit. 

King sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals of the trial court’s denial of his

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. P, doc. 19-1 at 28-42.) The

appellate court summarily denied review. (Respondents’ Exh. Q, doc. 19-1 at 44.) The Arizona

Supreme Court also summarily denied review on October 21, 2010. (Respondents’ Exh. R, doc.

19-1 at 47.)

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On April 9, 2010, King filed a second notice of post-conviction relief, which the

court summarily dismissed as untimely. (Respondents’ Exhs. S-T, docs. 19-1 at 49-52.) King

filed a third notice of post-conviction relief on August 11, 2010, to which he attached an

affidavit of Lateef Islam, stating that an unidentified man with salt-and-pepper hair had been

the shooter. (Respondents’ Exh. U, doc. 19-1 at 54-55.) On March 3, 2011, the court

summarily dismissed the notice as untimely finding that the affidavit did not constitute clear and

convincing evidence of King’s innocence sufficient to excuse his untimely filing under Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.1(h). (Respondents’ Exh. V, doc. 19-1 at 57-58.) King did not seek further

review in state court. 

 Instead, on October 24, 2011, King filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which he amended on December 5, 2011. (Docs. 1, 15.) King

asserts that he is actually innocent, there is newly discovered evidence, prosecutorial

misconduct, miscarriage of justice, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

II. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless

the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust state

remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his

federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally

appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner

must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to

the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the

“highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction

proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). A claim has been fairly presented

if the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his

claim is based. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to

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a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the

presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case,

that does so.” Id. at 31-32. In summary, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to

the proper forum, . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual

and legal basis for the claim . . . . ” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal citations omitted). 

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted when a petitioner raises a claim in state

court but the state court finds the claim defaulted on procedural grounds. See Beard v. Kindler,

___ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009). In such cases, federal habeas corpus review is

precluded if the state court opinion relies on a procedural ground “that is both ‘independent’ of

the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). A state procedural default ruling is “independent” unless the

application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A

state court’s application of the bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” See

Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally excuses noncompliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar inadequate. See

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n. 6 (1989). 

The second procedural default scenario arises when a petitioner failed to present his

federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the state

court’s procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously

unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion

because, although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer

has an available state remedy. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991) (“A habeas

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petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements

for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”).

 In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley,

541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995).

A. Grounds One and Three 

In Ground One, King asserts a claim of “manifest injustice actual innocence” in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 15 at 6.) In Ground Three,

King asserts that there is newly discovered evidence indicating that he did not commit the

murder. (Doc. 15 at 8.) Although King presented these claims to the Superior Court on postconviction review, he never presented them to the Arizona Court of Appeals and the time to do

so has expired. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (stating that a party has thirty days from the trial

court’s ruling in which to seek appellate review). Because King did not present his claims of

actual innocence and newly discovered evidence to the Arizona Court of Appeals and cannot

do so now, those claims are technically exhausted and barred from federal habeas corpus

review. See Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 26, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the Court will

not consider the merits of these claims unless King establishes “cause and prejudice” or a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” to excuse the procedural bar, as discussed in Section C

below. 

B. Grounds Four and Five

In Ground Four, King asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. In Ground

Five, he argues that there was a miscarriage of justice based on the actions or inactions of the

police and prosecutor. (Doc. 15 at 9-10.) King presented these claims to the trial court on postconviction review. (Respondents’ Exh. O, doc. 19-1 at 25.) The court found them procedurally

defaulted and barred from review pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(1)

because King “could have raised these claims on direct appeal but failed to do so.” (Id.)

Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona’s procedural default rules. See Stewart v.

Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) is

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an adequate and independent procedural bar); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1026 (9th Cir.

2008) (stating that “[p]reclusion of issues for failure to present them at an earlier proceeding

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) ‘are independent of federal law because

they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits.’”) (footnote omitted)

(quoting Smith, 536 U.S. at 860); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998)

(rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or regularly” followed Rule 32). The

state court’s denial of King’s claims on the basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural ground bars federal habeas corpus review. See Beard v. Kindler, ___ U.S.___, 130

S.Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that petitioner’s

federal claim is procedurally barred under the independent and adequate state law-ground

doctrine, which forecloses federal habeas review when a state court has found a prisoner’s

federal claim precluded based on his failure to meet a state procedural requirement).

Accordingly, the Court will not consider the merits of these claims unless, as discussed below,

King establishes “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage” to excuse the procedural

bar.

C. Overcoming the Procedural Bar

Federal review of King’s defaulted claims is barred absent a showing of “cause and

prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-

94, (2004). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external

to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. LeGrand v.

Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986)). A showing of interference by state officials, constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel, or that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or may

constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To

establish prejudice, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

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constitutional dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Where petitioner

fails to establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice prong. 

Here, although King generally asserts that his ability to articulate his claims is

limited by “institutional restrictions” and the “minimal availability of research material,” he has

not made a sufficient showing of cause or prejudice. (See doc. 22 at 4.) Petitioner’s status as

an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute cause for his failure to properly present

his claims to the Arizona courts. See Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d

905, 909 (9thCir. 1986) (finding that an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did

not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381

(9th Cir. 1988) (finding that petitioner’s reliance on jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause).

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. To satisfy the “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” standard, petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Id. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). Although King alleges actual innocence and

fundamental miscarriage of justice, he raises them as substantive claims, not as a basis for

excusing his procedural default. Moreover, even if he asserted a fundamental miscarriage of

justice to overcome the procedural bar, his claim fails.

The only newly discovered evidence in the record are the affidavits of Tommy

Works and Lateef Islam stating that King was not the shooter. (Respondents’ Exh. U, doc. 19-1

at 54; Exh. W, doc19-1 at 60-61.) Works’ affidavit is dated December 20, 2006, and Islam’s

is dated June 20, 2010. Because Works and Islam did not come forward with the information

in their affidavits until four and eight years after the incident, the trustworthiness of their

statements is questionable. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316, 324 (stating that to present a credible

claim of actual innocence under the gateway exception, the petitioner must present “new

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reliable evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence - that was not presented at trial.”). 

Additionally, King has not established that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the

affidavits. Id. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). At trial, the jury heard the testimony of

multiple witnesses that King was the shooter, forensic evidence that King was the shooter, and

testimony describing King’s post-shooting flight, which suggested his guilt. (Respondents’

Exh. A, doc. 16-1.) Defense counsel presented two witnesses who testified that King did not

have a gun and did not shoot the victims. Considering the weight of the State’s evidence, the

Court cannot conclude that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

King guilty in light of the affidavits of two witnesses provided four and eight years after the

incident. 

In summary, King has not shown a basis for overcoming the bar to the defaulted

claims. Thus, the Court will not consider the merits of those claims. 

III. Discussion

 The record reflects, and Respondents do not dispute, that Petitioner properly

presented his Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance to the state court and that those

claims are properly before this Court on habeas corpus review. Thus, the Court will consider

the merits of those claims.

A. Standard of Review

This Court’s review of King’s claims is constrained by the applicable standard of

review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If a habeas corpus petition includes a claim that has

been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” federal habeas relief is not

available unless petitioner shows that the state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law

as clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state

court decision, § 2254(d)(1); Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S.Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or that it

“involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court, §

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2254(d)(2). Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This is a “difficult

to meet,” Id. at 786, and “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537

U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the

Supreme Court which existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S.Ct. at 44.

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that contradicts

the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives

at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14

(2003) (citations omitted). 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular

case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the

correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “‘[E]valuating whether a rule application

was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.’” Id.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner must

show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s performance must

fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that

counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A

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fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of

counsel’s performance is extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound

trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show

prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. See

also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 1998). The prejudice component “focuses on

the question whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable

or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). The

court need not address both Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an insufficient

showing on one. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of

an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be

followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[f]ailure to satisfy

either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other.”).

“‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never . . . easy.’” Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131

S.Ct. 770, 786 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)).

Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is

even more difficult, because both standards are “highly deferential,” and because Strickland’s

general standard has a substantial range of reasonable applications. Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131

S.Ct. at 788 (citations omitted). The issue under § 2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions

were reasonable, but “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. 

/ / /

/ / /

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C. Analysis

On post-conviction review, King challenged various aspects of counsel’s

representation including: pretrial preparation, witness interviews and selection, discovery

challenges, cross-examination of witnesses, and presentation of evidence. (Respondents’ Exh.

M at 23-26, doc. 18-5 at 12-42.) The state court found that King failed to state a colorable claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. O, doc. 19-1 at 24-26.) King has not

shown his counsel’s performance was deficient, or that it resulted in any prejudice. Therefore,

he has not shown that the state court’s determination of his ineffective assistance claims is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland. 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d).

1. Failure to Investigate and Present Witness Testimony

King argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and secure

the presence of Keith Brown and Roosevelt White at trial. (Doc. 15 at 7.) King first argues that

counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and secure an affidavit from eyewitness Keith

Brown who told defense counsel’s investigator, Art Hanratty, that he witnessed the entire

incident and King was not the shooter. (Id.) King further contends that Roosevelt White, the

manager of the AmVets bar, told the investigator that he witnessed King’s cousin, Howard

Jones, commit the shooting. (Id.) King asserts that counsel was ineffective because he did not

obtain an affidavit from White to this effect and failed to locate White to testify at trial. 

King next argues that counsel failed to secure Craig Gary’s appearance at trial.

Craig Gary allegedly told the investigating police officers that he witnessed “a second person

[shoot] Robert Williams.” (Doc. 15 at 7.) King contends that a “server attempted to serve Craig

Gary 3 different times and . . . said it’s clear he’s ducking. . . .” (Id.) 

“In analyzing the performance of counsel, judicial scrutiny is deferential.” Cox v.

Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir.2010). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. At the same time, a defense lawyer must make

reasonable investigations in the course of representation. Id. at 691. “Counsel’s investigation

must, at a minimum, permit informed decisions about how best to represent the client.” Cox,

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588 F.3d at 1046 (citing Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1345 (9th Cir. 1994)). But “strategic

choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

The Court cannot determine whether counsel interviewed Craig Gary. However,

the record reflects that defense counsel, though a private investigator, interviewed Keith Brown

and Roosevelt White. (Respondents’ Exh. N, doc. 19-1 at 16-18.) It follows that defense

counsel reviewed the information obtained during those interviews and made a strategic

decision not to offer their testimony. King has not offered any argument or evidence suggesting

otherwise. In view of the great deference afforded to defense counsel’s tactical decisions made

after investigation of the case, defense counsel’s determinations regarding whether to present

Brown and White at trial were objectively reasonable. United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 777

F.2d 454, 458 (1985). 

Even assuming defense counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to present

the testimony of Brown and White and for failing to locate and interview Gary, King has not

established prejudice. To show prejudice from counsel’s failure to call a witness to testify, a

petitioner must identify the witness, United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir.

1985), show that the particular witness was willing to testify, United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d

1229, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 1988), what the witness’s testimony would have been, United States

v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the testimony would have been sufficient

to create a reasonable doubt as to guilt. Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 532 (9th Cir.1990). 

Here, relying on hearsay, King provides a very general description of the testimony

that Brown, White, and Gary would have given at trial. However, this is insufficient.

“[E]vidence about the testimony of a putative witness must generally be presented in the form

of actual testimony by the witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the

testimony would have been favorable; self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective

assistance claim.” United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir.1991). In Dows v. Woods,

211 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit rejected an ineffectiveness claim based on trial

counsel’s failure to interview or call an alibi witness when there was no evidence in the record,

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other than the petitioner's own “self-serving affidavit,” that the witness would have testified

favorably for the defense. Id. at 486. The Ninth Circuit explained: “Dows provides no evidence

that this witness would have provided helpful testimony for the defense—i.e., Dows has not

presented an affidavit from this alleged witness.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). King has not provided any evidence that Brown, White, and Gary would have

testified at his trial in the manner set forth in his Petition.

Moreover, King has not shown that the testimony of those witnesses would have

been sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Even though Brown, White, and

Gary, did not testify, the jury heard testimony that King did not have a gun and that someone

else shot the victims. (Respondents’ Exh. E, Tr. Nov. 1 2004 at 62, 87-88, 94-97.) 

Additionally, the jury acquitted King of the attempted murder charge. King has not shown that

there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s purported failure to interview and present the

testimony of Brown, White, and Gary affected the result of the trial. Thus, King has not shown

that the state court’s rejection of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel claim was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

2. Use of Evidence - Clothing

King argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to secure and test his

“bloody clothing that was being held in the County Jail property room” to show that King had

too much blood on him to have shot the victim in the back and to confirm that King was

underneath the victim when he was shot. (Doc. 15 at 7, 11.) King does not identify what

articles of clothing defense counsel should have tested. King’s unsupported, conclusory

allegations are insufficient to support a claim for federal habeas relief. See Jones v. Gomez, 66

F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that conclusory allegations with no reference to the

record or other evidence do not warrant habeas relief.) Additionally, because King fails to

allege specific facts showing prejudice, the reasonableness of counsel’s representation is

inconsequential. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985). Even assuming that defense

counsel’s performance was deficient for failure to obtain and test some of King’s clothing, he

was not prejudiced because counsel presented the same theory of defense based on King’s coat.

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(Respondents’ Exh. D, Tr. Nov. 2, 2004 at 19-22, 123-124; Exh. G, Tr. Nov. 8, 2004 at 49, 51,

64-67.) Counsel argued that the distribution of the blood on the coat showed that King was

underneath the victim and therefore, he could not have shot the victim in the back. (Id.)

Counsel again raised the issue of blood spatter on a motion for new trial. (Respondents’ Exh.

I, Tr. Feb. 14, 2005 at 3-5.) Although the jury and the court rejected this theory, King has not

shown that his counsel failed to pursue it or that his representation was ineffective.

3. Violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 

King also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to allege a Brady violation

based on the medical examiner’s testimony at trial which differed from a recorded interview.

(Doc. 15 at 11.) King contends that the medical examiner, Alex Zhang, stated in a recorded

interview that the fatal wound to Robert Williams “was shot 2 to 3 feet from the victim and that

it was a distant wound,” but testified at trial that the fatal wound was “a contact wound.” (Doc.

15 at 11.) After the medical examiner testified, defense counsel moved to suppress the expert’s

testimony and have it stricken from the record on the ground that the defense was denied

discovery of the State’s evidence. (Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. Nov. 1, 2004 at 104-105.) The

prosecutor explained that he did not know until the medical examiner testified that he now

believed that the fatal wound was a contact, rather than a distant, wound. (Id. at 109.) After

hearing argument from both sides, the trial court denied the motion finding that the defense had

been provided evidence sufficient to impeach the witness. (Id. at 107-09.) Because the record

establishes that defense counsel challenged the State’s apparent failure to disclose information

about the medical examiner’s opinions, King cannot show that his counsel was ineffective on

this basis.

Moreover, King has not shown that an underlying Brady violation occurred because

there is no evidence in the record that the government suppressed favorable evidence. Brady,

373 U.S. at 87. See United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1501 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985)

(explaining that “[s]uppression by the government is a necessary element of a Brady claim . .

. .”). Because defense counsel’s challenge to the State’s purported failure to disclose evidence

regarding the medical examiner’s opinion was objectively reasonable, and because the record

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does not indicate that a Brady violation occurred, King’s claim of ineffective assistance based

on a Brady violation fails.

4. Failure to Present Expert Testimony

King further asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an

expert to rebut Alex Zhang’s testimony. King, however, does not identify a particular expert

whose testimony defense counsel should have obtained. Nor has King established that an expert

would have been available and willing to testify at his trial. King merely speculates that the

testimony of an unidentified expert would have supported his defense. In Wildman v. Johnson,

261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit rejected a similar claim of ineffective

assistance based on counsel’s failure to retain an expert. There, the Court explained that 

Wildman has not shown that his case was prejudiced as a result of not

retaining an arson expert. Wildman offered no evidence that an arson

expert would have testified on his behalf at trial. He merely speculates

that such an expert could be found. Such speculation, however, is

insufficient to establish prejudice. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365,

373 (9th Cir. 1997) (speculating as to what expert would say is not

enough to establish prejudice).

Wildman, 261 F.3d at 839. 

Similar to Wildman, King’s claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure

to retain an expert fails because he has neither identified a specific expert who would have

testified at trial nor described the testimony that the unidentified expert would have given. See

Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “complaints of uncalled

witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus review because allegations of what the

witness would have testified are largely speculative . . . . In addition, for [petitioner] to

demonstrate the requisite Strickland prejudice, [he] must show not only that [the] testimony

would have been favorable, but also that the witness would have testified at trial.”) (citations

omitted). See also United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting

claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to call a witness who would have

taken responsibility for a gun found in defendant’s possession because, inter alia, “[t]here is no

evidence in the record which establishes that Washington would testify in [petitioner’s] trial.”);

United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim of ineffective

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assistance because petitioner did not “identify any witnesses that his counsel should have called

that could have been helpful.”). 

5. Failure to Obtain Toxicology Report

King next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to secure a toxicology

report to determine whether Ivory Gary was under the influence of alcohol and cocaine at the

time of the incident because such evidence would have supported King’s statement that “[t]he

victims were aggressive and out of control.” (Doc. 15 at 11.) During the sentencing hearing,

the court inquired about evidence of Ivory Gary’s intoxication. (Respondents’ Exh. I, Tr. Feb.

14, 2005 at 22-23.) Counsel explained that he had considered presenting such evidence, but

decided not to because it was inconsistent with his defense theory. (Id. at 23.) 

“In analyzing the performance of counsel, judicial scrutiny is deferential.” Cox v.

Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir.2010). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. At the same time, a defense lawyer must make

reasonable investigations in the course of representation. Id. at 691. “Counsel’s investigation

must, at a minimum, permit informed decisions about how best to represent the client.” Cox,

588 F.3d at 1046. But “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Here,

counsel’s strategic decision not to present evidence of the victim’s intoxication, made after

investigation of the case, was objectively reasonable. Petitioner has not shown that the state

court’s rejection of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

6. Conclusion

In summary, given the deference afforded to counsel’s strategic decisions, and the

strength of the State’s case, counsel’s decisions regarding trial preparation and crossexamination were objectively reasonable. Rodriguez-Rameriz, 777 F.2d at 458. Moreover,

even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Petitioner has not carried his burden of showing

“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

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3

 To the extent that King’s Reply can be construed as requesting an evidentiary hearing

(Doc. 22 at 6), that request should be denied because a hearing is not required in his case. King

has not alleged any material fact, which he did not have a full and fair opportunity to develop

in state court and which if proved, would show his entitlement to habeas relief. See Cullen v.

Pinholster, ––– U.S. –––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (explaining that scope of the record for

28 U .S.C. § 2254(d)(1) inquiry is limited to the record that was before the state court that

adjudicated the claim on the merits), Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (stating

that if record refutes applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, court

not required to hold evidentiary hearing).

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of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). The State

presented testimony of numerous eyewitnesses who observed the shooting. King had gunshot

residue on his hands, blood from one of the victim’s on his coat, and a bullet hole in the pocket

of his coat from which the weapon had been fired. Additionally, King fled the scene and tried

to avoid police. Thus, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, King has not shown that

there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. The Court cannot conclude that the state court’s denial of King’s claims

was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, or that it was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, King is not

entitled to habeas corpus relief.3

In accordance with the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that King’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 15) be DENIED and DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma paupers on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified

by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable, and because

King has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 10th day of August, 2012.

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