Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03250/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03250-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARCHIBALD CUNNINGHAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEVIN SINGER, JOHN SCOTT

MCKAY, MICHAEL COOMBS,

TAMARA WOODS, DONALD EVANS

QUIDACHAY, LILLIAN SING, MING

LEE, T. MICHAEL YUEN, CANTIL

SAKAUYE, ANTHONY KLINE, JAMES

RICHMOND, RECEIVER SPECIALISTS,

and A. JAMES ROBERTSON, II,

Defendants. /

No. C 14-03250 WHA

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS,

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DECLARE PLAINTIFF A

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT,

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS,

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FILE

AN AMENDED COMPLAINT,

AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR A PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION

In this action, defendants Singer, McKay, Coombs, and Woods move to dismiss the

operative complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, to

declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant, and to expunge lis pendens. Plaintiff moves for a

preliminary injunction and moves to amend his complaint. To the extent stated below,

defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the complaint is STRICKEN. Defendants’ motion

to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion to expunge lis pendens

is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motions for a preliminary injunction and to amend his complaint are

DENIED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Archibald Cunningham is an attorney and member of the California bar who has

previously been designated a vexatious litigant by the San Francisco Superior Court. Defendants

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are Michael Coombs and Tamara Woods (who formerly engaged in a tenancy in common

agreement with plaintiff), Scott McKay, their lawyer, Kevin Singer, a court-appointed receiver,

and several California state court judges and officers who have issued rulings against

Cunningham.

This case arises from an underlying state court proceeding in which plaintiff sued

defendants Coombs, Woods, and McKay for fraud, deceit, breach of contract, and declaratory

relief. After a dispute arose relating to a tenancy in common agreement between the parties,

defendant Coombs commenced an arbitration. After an arbitration award was issued,

Cunningham appealed and lost in state court. He then filed a second state court action,

collaterally attacking the judgment in the first action and suing the judges who issued the orders

dismissing Cunningham’s first case. When that was dismissed, Cunningham filed three appeals

and was denied each time. He was then declared a vexatious litigant by the San Francisco

Superior Court (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 47–49).

Next, Cunningham filed a federal action alleging essentially the same claims. Archibald

Cunningham v. John Scott McKay, et al., No. 13-cv-04627, 2014 WL 129645 (N.D.Cal. 2014)

(Judge William Orrick). Judge Orrick dismissed Cunningham’s claims, without leave to amend. 

Now, Cunningham has filed this suit in federal court. He sues the same non-judicial

defendants as he had in previous actions, along with several state court judges who adjudicated

his prior claims. This latest claim relates to the efforts of a court-appointed receiver, who was

appointed after the Cunningham’s first unsuccessful state court action, to enforce a judgment of

the court and sell Cunningham’s condo.

The nub of Cunningham’s latest complaint is that the receiver in the state court

proceeding, Kevin Singer, who was appointed to sell defendant’s condo under the state court

judgment against Cunningham in 2011, practiced law without a license and thus violated

plaintiff’s constitutional and civil rights. After the state court appointed Singer as the receiver, 

Singer filed a motion with the state court, on his own behalf as receiver, seeking instructions

from that court on moving forward with his duties. After a hearing in which Cunningham

participated, the state court granted Singer a writ of possession. Plaintiff argues the filing of this

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motion constituted an unauthorized practice of law and violated his constitutional and civil

rights. Plaintiff further alleges that the other defendants named in the complaint conspired with

Singer to help him practice law without a license, and thus also violated his constitutional and

civil rights (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 1–8, 57–66). 

The operative complaint alleges the following eight claims: (1) violation of

constitutional and civil rights under Section 1983 in relation to all defendants engaging in a

conspiracy against plaintiff; (2) violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights and Section 1983 in

relation to the underlying judgment of possession; (3) violation of Section 1983 also in relation

to the underlying judgment and property; (4) violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights and

Section 1983 against the judicial defendants for violating the separation of powers clause; (5)

violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights and Section 1983 in relation to defendants allegedly

allowing court receivers to practice law without a license; (6) wrongful eviction; (7) intentional

infliction of emotional distress; and (8) declaratory and injunctive relief related to the above

seven claims. 

The short answer is that the state court system is perfectly capable of adjudicating the

claims listed above and if the trial judge there errs in some manner, then it can be corrected on

appeal. The present claims should have been submitted in state court. Federal court is not a

super appellate court meant to supervise the conduct of the state court system. Nevertheless, this

order will go through each of plaintiff’s claims to show that they are meritless.

ANALYSIS

1. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

Defendants request judicial notice of Exhibits 1–32 and Exhibits A–F. Plaintiff has not

opposed. Plaintiff requests judicial notice of Exhibits A–L. Many of these exhibits overlap. 

This order only relies on defendants’ Exhibits 1–8, 11, 12, 14, and Exhibits A, B, E, and F. All

of these are documents that have been publicly filed in state and federal court. 

A court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: 

“(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately

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and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” FRE

201(b). 

Accordingly, defendants’ requests for judicial notice of Exhibits 1–8, 11, 12, 14, and

Exhibits A, B, E, and F are GRANTED. Because this order need not consider any other

documents for which defendants and plaintiff request judicial notice, those requests for judicial

notice are DENIED AS MOOT.

2. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Rule 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences

are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash.

Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 

A. Plaintiff’s First Claim.

Plaintiff’s first claim for relief sets the foundation for all of his other claims — that

Singer engaged in the unauthorized practice of law without a license by filing a motion to obtain

possession of Cunningham’s condo, and that the other defendants conspired with him to help

him do so. 

Plaintiff’s first claim fails because federal law does not regulate the practice of law. That

is a matter left to the state courts. If California wishes to allow non-lawyers to be receivers, fine

— there is no violation of the Constitution. By analogy, law enforcement officers need not be

lawyers. When they arrest someone, it does not violate the Constitution because in some vague

way, an arrest resembles the practice of law. This claim is DISMISSED.

B. Plaintiff’s Second Claim.

Plaintiff’s second claim alleges that defendants Singer, McKay, Coombs, and state court

Judge Donald Quidachay violated his civil and constitutional rights because they denied plaintiff

notice and an opportunity to be heard before he could be evicted from his condo. Plaintiff

asserts that his constitutional rights were violated because no unlawful detainer action was

waged against him. Plaintiff also argues that his right to a jury trial was violated.

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Plaintiff again fails to allege any facts showing any lack of proper notice, or deprivation

of any opportunity to be heard by written or oral argument. Moreover, unlawful detainer statutes

are inapplicable to this case, as they only concern possession rights specifically as between

landlords and tenants. See CCP Section 1161. Here, the procedure at issue was a post-judgment

order, for a writ of possession, allowing the court-appointed receiver to sell the condo. It did not

involve a landlord/tenant relationship. Plaintiff also had no right to a jury trial in this instance

because the motion in question was a post-judgment motion to enforce an already entered

judgment.

In his opposition, plaintiff only addressed defendants’ arguments in relation to his first

claim. He did not oppose dismissal of his latter seven claims.

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts or detail to make out a plausible constitutional or

Section 1983 claim. It is incredibly difficult to discern from the complaint exactly what plaintiff

alleges even occurred, and even more difficult to detect any plausible claim from the complaint. 

Plaintiff’s second claim is thus DISMISSED.

C. Plaintiff’s Third Claim.

Plaintiff’s third claim for relief alleges that defendants Singer, McKay, Coombs, and

Quidachay violated his civil and constitutional rights by seeking a writ of possession instead of a

contempt proceeding in the underlying state court case. Plaintiff had his day in court in the

arbitration and lost all appeals therefrom. When that ran its course, the winner of the litigation

was entitled to obtain a writ of possession. End of story. There was no need to gin up contempt

proceedings. The Constitution does not hold otherwise. Plaintiff’s third claim is DISMISSED.

D. Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim.

Plaintiff’s fourth claim alleges that the judicial defendants violated the separation of

powers clause by allowing Singer to engage in the unauthorized practice of law. For the reasons

stated above, this claim is DISMISSED.

E. Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim.

Plaintiff’s fifth claim alleges that the San Francisco Superior Court violated his

constitutional rights by allowing Singer to engage in the unauthorized practice of law. This

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again is derivative of plaintiff’s first claim. For the reasons stated above in the analysis of

plaintiff’s first and fourth claims for relief, plaintiff’s fifth claim is DISMISSED.

F. Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim.

Plaintiff’s sixth claims alleges wrongful eviction by defendants Singer, McKay, Coombs,

and Quidachay. Although plaintiff remains on the premises (as of now), such that the tort of

wrongful eviction is premature, the more fundamental point is that plaintiff has had his day in

court, has lost, has appealed, has lost those appeals, and now the time has come for him to do the

honorable thing and obey the writ of possession awarding the premises to the other side. The

Constitution is in no way offended by this scenario. Plaintiff’s sixth claim does not state a claim

for federal relief and is thus DISMISSED.

G. Plaintiff’s Seventh Claim.

Plaintiff’s seventh claim alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress against all

defendants based on the above alleged wrongs. To make out a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct with the

intention of causing emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and

(3) causation. Berkley v. Dowds, 152 Cal. App. 4th 518, 533 (2007). 

Appointing a receiver, whether or not licensed to practice law, is not outrageous conduct. 

Plaintiff’s seventh claim is DISMISSED.

H. Plaintiff’s Eighth Claim.

Plaintiff’s eighth claim asks for declaratory relief because defendants have acted

“wrongfully, unlawfully, and with deliberate indifference to the rights of plaintiff” and “have

failed to acknowledge their improper, unlawful, and unconstitutional actions” (Compl. ¶¶

124–25). This claim is derivative of plaintiff’s other claims and for the same reasons is

DISMISSED.

3. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DECLARE ARCHIBALD CUNNINGHAM

A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT.

Our court of appeals recognizes “the inherent power of federal courts to regulate the

activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under appropriate

circumstances.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotation

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omitted). A request to declare a party a vexatious litigant entails consideration of four factors: 

(1) the party must have had adequate notice and a chance to be heard; (2) there must be an

adequate record for review, including a list of all cases and motions that led the court to conclude

that a vexatious litigant order was necessary; (3) the court must make a substantive finding as to

the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions; and (4) the order must be narrowly

tailored to fit the particular problem involved. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d

1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). 

A. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard. 

Where a motion to declare the plaintiff a vexatious litigant was filed and served on the

plaintiff and the plaintiff had an opportunity to be heard opposing the motion, this requirement

is satisfied. Id. at 1058. Here, defendants’ motion provided plaintiff with notice and plaintiff

has received an opportunity to be heard by filing his opposition along with speaking at the

hearing held on January 8. Accordingly, this requirement has been satisfied. 

B. Adequate Record.

“An adequate record for review should include a listing of all the cases and motions that

led the district court to conclude that a vexatious litigant order was needed,” but the court

need not list every case in which the litigant has appeared. Id., at 1059 (internal quotation

omitted). 

Plaintiff has filed at least twenty-one actions in connection with the underlying dispute

between plaintiff and defendants Coombs and Woods. To date, these include two state court

actions, two district court actions, a bankruptcy proceeding, ten proceedings in the state court of

appeal, five proceedings in the California Supreme Court, plus one proceeding in the federal

court of appeals. This has led to Cunningham being declared a vexatious litigant in state court,

as he acknowledges. When Cunningham loses, he sues the judges and justices who ruled against

him in subsequent litigation, as he has done in the present suit. Defendants have appended

theses petitions, dockets, judgments, complaints, and appeals to their motion (First Amd. Compl.

¶ 14; RJN Exhs. 1–7; Exhs. A,B, E, F).

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From the record of plaintiff’s prior actions against defendant, listed above, and that

established in the instant action, this order finds the record is adequate to conclude that plaintiff

is a vexatious litigant.

C. Frivolous and Harassing Nature of Plaintiff’s Actions.

Under the third factor, courts must examine “both the number and content of the filings

as indicia of the frivolousness of the litigant’s claims.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059 (quotations

omitted). “An injunction cannot issue merely upon a showing of litigiousness. The plaintiff’s

claims must not only be numerous, but also be patently without merit.” Ibid. (quotation

omitted). 

Because plaintiff has sued defendants multiple times in relation to basically the same set

of events, this order finds there is a sufficient basis to conclude that plaintiff’s litigation against

defendants has been abusive and frivolous. Moreover, the fact that Cunningham continues to sue

the judges and justices from his prior actions, as he has in this suit alleging that several state

court judges conspired to violate his civil and constitutional rights, further bolsters this finding. 

The current suit is a perfect example. Without any factual basis, Cunningham alleges that the

defendants all engaged in an elaborate conspiracy to violate his civil and constitutional rights. 

Cunningham responds in his opposition to defendants’ vexatious litigant motion that his

claims have merit and are not frivolous. As discussed above, this order finds otherwise. He then

spends a substantial portion of his opposition arguing that defendants’ claims relating to legal

fees are disingenuous and resorts to calling the present motion a “text-book case of ravenous feemongering by Mr. McKay” (Opp. 4). 

Plaintiff has tried to relitigate the same issue over the course of twenty-one actions and

appeals. These have included suing the judges and justices that have ruled against him multiple

times. Enough is enough. This is vexatious in and of itself and is dispositive. This order finds

that plaintiff intends to harass the defendants by filing multiple suits on the same subject matter.

D. Narrowly-Tailored Order.

Orders “must be narrowly tailored to closely fit the specific vice encountered” De Long,

912 F.2d at 1148. This order finds that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that an appropriate

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pre-filing review order is warranted. This is not a bar on bringing suits, but a pre-filing review. 

Plaintiff must submit to pre-filing review of any pro se complaint filed in the Northern District

of California against Michael Coombs, Tamara Woods, Scott McKay, Kevin Singer, or any

judicial or court officer relating to the property at 1487–1489 McAllister Street in San Francisco,

or any subsequent dispute relating to that property. The Clerk shall then forward any complaints

or notices of appeal submitted by plaintiff to the undersigned for pre-filing review. If the Court

ascertains that the complaint or notice of appeal is duplicative or frivolous, it will not be filed

and will be returned to plaintiff. If the Court finds that the proposed pleading meets the pleading

standards, it will be given to the Clerk with instructions to file it.

To the extent stated above, defendants’ motion to declare Archibald Cunningham a

vexatious litigant is GRANTED.

4. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS.

A lis pendens may be recorded when a pending action asserts a “real property claim.” 

The purpose of a lis pendens is to put a purchaser, encumbrancer, or other transferee of the real

property on notice of the pending action. Under Section 405.32 of the California Code of Civil

Procedure, “the court shall order that the notice [of lis pendens] be expunged if the court finds

that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of

the real property claim.” 

Here, Cunningham has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable

validity of any real property claim, or any of his claims for that matter. Defendants’ motion to

expunge Cunningham’s lis pendens is thus GRANTED. Plaintiff’s lis pendens is hereby

expunged from the public record. Specifically, the lis pendens as to the property located at

1487–1489 McAllister Street, San Francisco, CA, 94115, recorded by plaintiff with the San

Francisco Assessor-Recorder on November 13, 2014, is hereby EXPUNGED FROM THE PUBLIC

RECORD. 

5. PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

AND TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.

FRCP 15 states that after a party has amended its complaint once, it may only file an

amended complaint with the opposing party’s written consent or with the court’s leave. The

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court should freely give leave when justice so requires. For the reasons stated above, and based

on this order’s finding that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, justice does not require giving

plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED.

Plaintiff also moves for a preliminary injunction enjoining Singer from practicing law

without a license and compelling all other defendants to take all actions necessary within their

authority to implement the injunction against the unauthorized practice of law. For the reasons

stated above, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

To the extent stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure

to state a claim is GRANTED and the complaint is STRICKEN. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is DENIED AS MOOT. 

Defendants’ motion to declare Archibald Cunningham a vexatious litigant is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff shall be subject to the pre-filing review outlined above. Defendants’ motion to expunge

lis pendens is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s lis pendens is hereby expunged from the public record. 

Specifically, the lis pendens as to the property located at 1487–1489 McAllister Street, San

Francisco, CA, 94115, recorded by plaintiff with the San Francisco Assessor-Recorder on

November 13, 2014, is hereby EXPUNGED FROM THE PUBLIC RECORD. Plaintiff’s motion to

amend his complaint is DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

Because of the troubling professional nature of plaintiff’s actions at the January 8

hearing, the CLERK IS HEREBY ORDERED TO REFER ARCHIBALD CUNNINGHAM TO THE

STATE BAR. Additionally, in accordance with Civil Local Rule 11–6, the CLERK SHALL REFER

THIS MATTER TO THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA’S STANDING COMMITTEE ON

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2015. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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