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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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• 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

BILLY WILLIAM KELSEY, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

FILED 

u nitecl States Court of Appeals Tent.li Circuit 

SEP O 3 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. ) No. 91-6055 

) 

GARY MAYNARD, ) 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-1619-R) 

( W. D. Ok la. ) 

) 

Respondent-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

f d . . d ** Be ore LOGAN, MOORE an BALDOCK, C1rcu1t Ju ges. 

In a jury trial, petitioner-appellant Billy William Kelsey 

was convicted of first-degree rape of his stepdaughter, age ten, 

and was sentenced to ninety-nine years. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 

21 § 1114(A)(l) (West 1983). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals affirmed on direct appeal. Kelsey v. Oklahoma, 744 P.2d 

190 (1987). State postconviction relief was denied. After 

exhausting his state remedies via postconviction proceedings, 

petitioner filed his habeas petition in the district court, 28 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for the purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not assist the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th 

Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered submitted without 

oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 1 
U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on 

ostensible errors at trial. The district court denied relief 

without an evidentiary hearing and no certificate of probable 

cause issued. See Kelsey v. Maynard, No. CIV-90-1619-R, unpub. 

memo. op. (W.D. Okla. Jan. 2, 1991). Petitioner now seeks a 

certificate of probable cause and review of the district court's 

decision. 

Our review of trial counsel's performance is highly 

deferential, and from the perspective of the circumstances 

confronting the defense at the time of trial. Kimmelman v. 

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Like the district court, we 

have read the trial transcript and we are unconvinced that "the 

identified acts and omissions were outside the range of 

professionally competent assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). After considering the totality of the 

evidence and argument, not just the samples relied upon by 

counsel, petitioner's claims of error simply do not create a 

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different 

but for counsel's alleged errors. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694-95; United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1472 (10th Cir. 

1990) (en bane); United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 997 (10th 

Cir. 1990). Defendant confuses trial counsel's reasonable 

strategic choices and adverse trial court rulings with ineffective 

assistance. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381; Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 690. Trial counsel elicited evidence to support fifteen 

grounds suggesting a reasonable doubt. See Tr. 316-26 (closing 

-2-

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 2 
argument). That the jury convicted defendant on the strength of 

the state's case is not the fault of counsel. See Rivera, 900 

F.2d at 1474. 

In view of the foregoing, we GRANT petitioner's request for a 

certificate of probable cause, see Lozada v. Deeds, 111 S. Ct. 

860, 861-62 (1991), and AFFIRM the district court's judgment 

denying habeas relief substantially for the reasons set forth in 

its memorandum opinion supporting the judgment, a copy of which is 

attached hereto. 

AFFIRMED. 

-3-

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 3 
; ··~ -~ ~~ 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE-· ... ":·_ 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

BILLY WILLIAM KELSEY ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

vs. ) CIV-90-1619-R 

) 

GARY MAYNARD ) 

) 

Respondent ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Petitioner, a state prisoner, brings this action for a writ 

of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §2254. The Respondent has 

filed his Rule 5 response, and thus the matter is at issue. The 

Court determines that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary, as 

the issues can be resolved on the basis of the record. Townsend 

v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Cartwriaht v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 

1216 (10th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). 

In this proceeding, the Petitioner challenges his conviction 

for first degree rape in the District Court of Kiowa County, 

Oklahoma, Case No. CRF-83-36, for which he received a sentence of 

99 years imprisonment. As his sole ground for relief, the 

Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of 

trial counsel. In support of this allegation, he merely states 

"see attached brief," enclosing a portion of the brief submitted 

on his direct state appeal. As the Respondent notes, this court 

has held this to be inappropriate in a federal habeas action. See 

i 

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 4 
Robinson v. State of Oklahoma, 404 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (W.D. Okla. 

1975) ("habeas corpus in the federal court does not serve as an 

additional appeal from state court convictions," Petitioner 

11 totally misconceives the nature of federal habeas" . by simply 

copying state appellate brief in support of habeas petition.) 

Nevertheless, the Court will address the matter on its merits. 

In the attached brief, Petitioner argues that he was denied 

the effective assistance of trial counsel for various reasons. The 

brief states that trial counsel essentially conceded the 

Petitioner's guilt in opening statements and in closing arguments, 

failed to object to improper questions by the prosecutor, 

ineffectively cross-examined various witnesses, and did not object 

to the competency of the child victim to testify. 

The standard for judging ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984), is a two-prong test and both elements must be present in 

order for such a claim to be upheld. First, a petitioner must 

overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 

the ''wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 466 U.S. 

at 689-690. Second, the petitioner must show that this deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. In fact, 11 there 

is no reason to address both components of the inquiry if the 

petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one. 11 Id. at 697. A 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel places a burden on the 

petitioner to demonstrate 11 actual prejudice, 11 United States v. 

Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 815 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 5 
--

1018 (1987), to the extent that "defendant must show that there is 

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This is because there i~ a "strong 

presumption" that counsel provided effective assistance of counsel 

and the Petitioner has the burden of proof to overcome that 

presumption. United States v. Voigt, 877 F.2d 1465, 1468 (10th 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 517 (1989), citing United 

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 

As noted, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel conceded 

Petitioner's guilt during opening statements and in closing 

arguments. However, an examination of the record indicates that 

trial counsel phrased his statements to the jury conditionally 

after arguing for his client's innocence and stressing the State's 

burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The portion 

of the opening statement to which the Petitioner objects is: 

The District Attorney says he is going to ask for life. 

If you find my client, Bill Kelsey, guilty, in your own 

mind, uh, beyond a reasonable doubt, I ask you give him 

five years. I don't know if you will do either. But, 

I ask you to make up your own minds. I ask that you make 

up your own mind on this case, only after you have heard 

all of the evidence. 

(TR-122) . 

The portion of the closing arguments objected to is similar: 

Now, you can see justice be done; done with your minds 

and done with your hearts and done with your soul. I 

have now a chance to reason with you, and the District 

Attorney will get an additional chance to comment to you. 

And that's the way our system of justice works. It works 

that way because the District Attorney has the burden of 

proof of proving this case to you beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Now, what I'm about to say to you, the District 

Attorney will say, "Well, Mr. Bellamy is asking for 

J 

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 6 
mercy." If I ask for mercy in this case, I will not be 

ashamed about it. If you find Bill Kelsey guilty, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, individually, I ask not only that you 

be compassionate to Dana, but also to be compassionate 

for Bill. And if, in fact, you all agree, each and every 

one of you, that he is [guilty], I ask that you co~sider 

a sentence that will give Dana the idea to know t~at she 

can grow up to be a good, young woman in this community; 

know that her dad, step-father, had been punished, but 

not punished by passion, prejudice or sympathy. A 

reasonable assessment of punishment could be five years; 

it could be seven years; it could be eight years; it 

could be ten years, twelve years, fourteen years. I ask 

you to consider the man's age. Be compassionate; be 

just. That's what is called for. I ask that you not 

seek vengeance, but only justice and fair play. 

( TR - 3 1 7 - 3 18 ) . 

Finally, the Petitioner includes the following as an example 

of his trial attorney "conceding guilt." 

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, again, I ask you, after 

all is said and done, if you feel that Bill Kelsey is 

guilty, to your own individual satisfaction, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, it's only just and fair that you return 

a verdict against Bill. 

(TR-325). 

The Court has examined these statements in the context they 

were made and finds that these statements did not concede guilt, 

but rather were statements as to punishment if the jury should find 

the Petitioner guilty. The comments were appropriate in light of 

the fact that this was a single stage proceeding, where the jury 

was to establish guilt and assess the punishment at the same time. 

This analysis was also followed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals in distinguishing the Petitioner's cited cases of Wiley v. 

Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 650 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 

1091 (1981), and Frances v. Spaggins, 720 F.2d 1190, 1194 (11th 

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985). In those cases, 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 7 
trial counsel affirmatively conceded the guilt of his client. 

Here, as the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals noted, these 

comments "are more properly characterized as pleas for leniency," 

especially in the context of a single stage proceeding. -The record 

shows that the Petitioner's trial counsel extensively questioned 

the potential jurors during the jury selection process concerning 

the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof. 

Further, in the initial part of the opening statement, Petitioner's 

counsel again reminded the jurors that the case must be decided 

upon the facts as presented by the witnesses' testimony, and that 

the State had the burden of proving the Petitioner's guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Next, trial counsel told the jurors that his 

client would take the stand and tell them why he could not commit 

the crime alleged. Trial counsel then asked the jurors to give 

careful consideration to each witnesses' testimony, before making 

the comments Petitioner now finds objectionable. 

The statements made during closing arguments to which 

Petitioner objects, were made rather early in the closing argument. 

However, after making these comments, trial counsel spent the 

majority of his time arguing some fifteen points, each of which he 

contended created a reasonable doubt. The argument concerning a 

reasonable doubt required the prosecutor to use his time in final 

closing by responding to each of trial counsel's arguments on 

reasonable doubt. Trial counsel's opening statement and closing 

argument when considered in context, simply do not support 

Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

s 

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 8 
The Petitioner next argues that his t=ial counsel should have 

requested a jury admonishment, after he objected to questions posed 

by the prosecutor to the examining physician, and after the 

physician I s answer that children "usually don I t lie about the 

stories," and that he assumed that the stories by children about 

sex acts are true, "until proven other,.;ise. 11 However, as 

Petitioner concedes, trial counsel did object to an earlier 

foundational question and was overruled by the Court. Trial 

counsel's failure to object further to this line of testimony, or 

to request that the jury be admonished to disregard it, simply has 

net been shown to rise to the level of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Thus, this argument is also without merit. 

With respect to the remaining arguments criticizing trial 

counsel's cross-examination approaches, the Court finds that the 

Petitioner's trial attorney adequately cross-examined the various 

·..;i tnesses. The Petitioner's objections seem to be speculatively 

suggesting different themes for cress-examination, rather than any 

substantive errors that would have "materially effected the outcome 

of the trial." As noted by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

with respect to the argument that the trial attorney did not 

effectively object to the child victim's qualifications or 

competency to testify, "the record indicates that the child victim 

knew what it meant to tell the truth, that she was sworn to 

testify, and that she had personal knowledge of the offense." ':'he 

Court has reviewed the record and has found the Petitioner I s 

assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit. 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 9 
Based upon the foregoing, the petition for habeas corpus 

relief is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this ' ) ,.,,-,C//) day 

/ 

~ () ~ ,I / (!2L~ ~ ,ilu_,.,(_./',,-.~ 

DAVID L. RUSSELL 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

7 

19- _'(-! 

, . 

Appellate Case: 91-6055 Document: 010110084251 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 10