Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00213/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00213-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARSHALL LOSKOT,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANNIE’S PANDA GARDEN; SHIH 

KUN WANG and HONG YING WANG, 

as Co-Trustees under that 

certain DECLARATION OF TRUST 

executed September 21, 1993; 

and SU NI ZHENG, an 

individual dba ANNIE’S PANDA 

GARDEN,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-CV-00213-JAM-JFM

ORDER AWARDING FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff Marshall Loskot (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendants’ 

restaurant for architectural barriers allegedly violating the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and California law. The 

parties settled pursuant to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 

offer. Plaintiff now moves for fees and costs.1

 

///

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for May 6, 2015.

Case 2:13-cv-00213-JAM-KJN Document 39 Filed 05/12/15 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff visited Defendants’ restaurant on multiple 

occasions in 2012. Compl.(Doc. #2) ¶ 2. After sending a letter 

advising of architectural barriers he encountered as a person who 

uses a wheelchair and receiving no response, Plaintiff brought 

suit seeking injunctive relief and statutory damages. Compl. 

¶ 20. The parties filed no motions, but engaged in negotiations

and settled the claims as to injunctive relief. See Frankovich 

Decl. (dated January 15, 2015) Exh. A. Following the pretrial 

conference, Defendants also extended an offer of judgment as to 

damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (Doc. #23), 

which Plaintiff accepted (Docs. ##24, 26). Plaintiff now moves 

for an award of fees and costs consistent with that Rule 68 

agreement (Doc. #31). Defendants oppose the motion (Doc. #35).

II. OPINION

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s fee application on two 

grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement 

inclusive of attorney’s fees and costs, and second, that attorney

Thomas E. Frankovich’s hourly rate is too high.

A. Prior Settlement of Attorney’s Fees

The Court interprets a settlement agreement “according to 

the objective intent of the parties.” Gallagher v. San Diego 

Unified Port Dist., 2009 WL 2781553, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 

2009) (citing Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, Or., 7 F.3d 152 

(9th Cir. 1993)). The parties here have evidenced an objective 

intent that the issue of attorney’s fees be resolved by this 

Court pursuant to Plaintiff’s fee application. Defendants’ 

Case 2:13-cv-00213-JAM-KJN Document 39 Filed 05/12/15 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

assertion that the parties entered into a prior agreement is 

unsupported. They provide a May 2014 email from Mr. Frankovich’s 

legal assistant stating, “This is ti [sic] verify that the case 

has settled for $8750, we will send a General Release. [sic]” 

See Opp. Exh. A. Defendants’ claim that this settlement amount 

was memorialized in October 2014, see Opp. at 2, but the document 

they provide does not reference this $8750 and instead states 

that “[a]ttorneys’ fees, costs and litigation expenses remain 

before the Court.” Mot. Exh. at 3. Furthermore, the parties 

later entered into the Rule 68 agreement that provides, “the 

parties have agreed to resolve the issues of attorney’s fees cost 

and litigation expenses by a fee application.” Doc. #26 at 1. 

The Court therefore concludes that the parties have evidenced an 

objective intent to resolve the issue of fees by this fee 

application.

B. Hourly Rates

The parties apparently agree that the loadstar method is 

appropriate for calculating fees in this case. See Hall v. City 

of Fairfield, 2014 WL 1286001, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) 

(citing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 

(9th Cir. 1975)). Plaintiff has requested that Mr. Frankovich’s 

hourly rate be set at $400 per hour. See Mot. at 10. Defendants 

argue that the prevailing rate in the Sacramento community for 

ADA cases is $250 per hour. Opp. at 2. 

“A court awarding attorney fees must look to the prevailing 

market rates in the relevant community.” Bell v. Clackamas Cty., 

341 F.3d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). The prevailing rate for an 

ADA barriers case in Sacramento for an experienced attorney such 

Case 2:13-cv-00213-JAM-KJN Document 39 Filed 05/12/15 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

as Mr. Frankovich is $300. See Johnson v. Allied Trailer Supply, 

2014 WL 1334006, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014); Jones v. Cty. Of 

Sacramento, 2011 WL 3584332, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011). 

The Court has considered Mr. Frankovich’s experience and 

reputation, but finds $400 per hour to be excessive. A rate of 

$400 is generally reserved for “complicated civil rights cases 

litigated by attorneys with thirty or more years of experience.” 

See Johnson, 2014 WL 1334006, at *5 (collecting cases); Jones, 

2011 WL 3584332, at *6 (finding that $350 was reasonable for an 

attorney with more than twenty years of experience in a police 

brutality case with multiple claims and defendants that proceeded 

to trial). In contrast, this ADA case was not complicated. 

Accord Yates v. Vishal Corp., 2014 WL 572528, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 4, 2014) (characterizing Mr. Frankovich’s ADA practice to 

include “simple” cases which he has “reduced . . . to a kind of 

routine”) (quotation marks omitted); see Joint Pretrial Statement 

at 3:6 (noting that this case arose from “nearly identical ADA 

deficiencies” as a previous case litigated by a different 

plaintiff). The Court also declines to go as low as $250, 

because Defendants have not provided a comparable case or other 

evidence that $250 per hour is an appropriate rate. Defendants 

cite Loskot v. D&K Spirits, LLC, 2011 WL 567364 (E.D. Cal. 15, 

2011), but that case held that $250 per hour was reasonable 

because the matter had resolved by default judgment. See id. at 

*5. The Court therefore calculates Mr. Frankovich’s loadstar at 

$300 per hour.

///

///

Case 2:13-cv-00213-JAM-KJN Document 39 Filed 05/12/15 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

C. Other Aspects of the Fee Application

Defendants do not challenge any other aspects of the fee 

application. The Court has reviewed the breakdown of the hours

billed, the rates billed for Mr. Frankovich’s paraprofessionals, 

the enumerated costs, and the other aspects of the fee 

application, and finds them to be reasonable.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court awards Plaintiff

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the following amounts:

Fees: $13,302

Costs: $ 1,930

Total: $15,232

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2015

Case 2:13-cv-00213-JAM-KJN Document 39 Filed 05/12/15 Page 5 of 5