Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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`

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER and DANIEL 

SINCLAIR, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly 

situated and all aggrieved 

employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN 

THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY 

ADJUDICATION

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper (“Harper”) and Daniel Sinclair

(“Sinclair”) brought this putative class action against defendant 

Charter Communications, LLC (“Charter”) alleging various 

violations of the California Labor and Business and Professions 

Code. (See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 45).) Charter 

now moves for summary judgment on all claims or, in the 

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alternative, summary adjudication. (See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.

(“Mot. for Summ. J.”) (Docket No. 93-1).) 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs were employed by Charter as small/medium 

sized business Account Executives (“AEs”) at Charter’s Redding, 

California location. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts 

(“Def.’s SUF”) Nos. 1-2 (Docket No. 93-2).) Harper worked for 

Charter from September 18, 2017 to March 12, 2018, and Sinclair

worked for Charter from January 5, 2015 to April 4, 2017. (Id.

Nos. 1,2, 31, 33.) 

Charter is a broadband connectivity company and cable

operator serving business and residential customers under the 

Spectrum brand, among others. (Decl. of Andrea Benner (“Benner 

Decl.”) ¶ 3 (Docket No. 94).) Charter utilizes AEs to sell its

phone, internet, and television services directly to small- and 

medium-sized businesses in an assigned geographic area. (Def.’s 

SUF No. 4.) Charter classifies its AEs as “exempt” employees. 

(Pls.’ Statement of Disputed Facts (“Pls.’ SDF”) No. 1 (Docket 

No. 98-2).) On a typical day when plaintiffs were employed by 

Charter, Charter expected AEs to participate in a daily sales 

call with their regional sales manager, prepare sales proposals, 

cold-call potential customers, set up appointments with 

prospective customers and meet them in person, monitor existing 

sales, go “door-to-door knocking,” and enter data related to 

completed sales into one of several online portals, among other 

tasks. (Benner Decl. ¶¶ 12-13, Ex. A; Def.’s SUF Nos. 4-6; 

Declaration of Zachary Shine (“Shine Decl.”), Ex. B, Sinclair 

Deposition (“Sinclair Dep.”) 142:14-19 (Docket No. 95-3); Ex. A, 

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Harper Deposition (“Harper Dep.”) 126:5-127:5 (Docket No. 95-1).) 

AEs were also expected to interface with other departments, 

including departments that were responsible for installing 

equipment at the customer’s business or for performing 

construction on the customer’s property (e.g., to install phone 

lines or cables if the property did not already have them), and 

to be customers’ first point of contact for the services sold up 

until installation had been completed. (See Shine Decl., Ex. C, 

Benner Deposition (“Benner Dep.”) 85:21-87:2; 97:14-98:19.) 

As salespersons, Charter AEs were eligible to earn 

commissions based on how many sales they made each month. 

(Def.’s SUF No. 16.) The parties dispute whether Charter ever 

provided plaintiffs with a copy of Charter’s commission plan or 

conveyed its terms to the plaintiffs. (See Pls.’ Response to 

Def.’s SUF (“Pls.” RSUF”) Nos. 12-16.) 

During his employment with Charter, Sinclair had two 

managers: Wade Smith and Andrea Benner. (Sinclair Dep. 47:24-

51:6.) Benner was Harper’s manager throughout his entire 

employment. (Harper Dep. 79:18-80:23.) Since Benner was located 

in Medford, Oregon, she did not directly supervise either 

Sinclair or Harper’s day-to-day activities. (Id.; Sinclair Dep. 

47:24-51:6.) Throughout Sinclair and Harper’s employment, 

Charter required all AEs to meet or exceed certain monthly sales 

goals. (Def.’s SUF No. 9.) Both Sinclair and Harper received 

“corrective action reports” indicating that they were failing to 

meet Charter’s expectations related to the AE position during 

their employment. (Def.’s SUF Nos. 9-10.) Beginning on August 

4, 2016, Sinclair took a leave of absence. (Benner Decl. ¶ 31.) 

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Charter terminated Sinclair on April 4, 2017. (Id.) On 

approximately February 3, 2018, Harper took medical leave. (Id.

at ¶ 34.) He remained on leave through his termination on March 

12, 2018. (Id.) 

On September 14, 2018, Harper filed a written notice 

with the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency 

(“LWDA”), alleging that Charter had committed violations of the 

California Labor Code. (See Decl. of Jamin Soderstrom 

(“Soderstrom Decl.”) ¶ 22 (Docket No. 98-5).) Believing he was 

subject to an arbitration agreement with Charter, Harper then 

filed a demand for arbitration with JAMS on November 19, 2018. 

(Id. at ¶ 23.) The arbitrator subsequently issued a final award 

determining that none of Harper’s claims were arbitrable. (See

id. ¶ 24.) Harper then filed a complaint alleging the same 

violations of the California Labor Code against Charter in Shasta 

County Superior Court, on behalf of himself and all similarly 

situated individuals. (See Docket No. 1-1.) Charter removed the 

case to this court on May 17, 2019. (See Docket No. 1.) On 

December 13, 2019, Harper amended his complaint, adding Sinclair 

as a named plaintiff pursuant to Rule 15(c). (See FAC.) 

Plaintiffs allege that Charter erroneously categorized 

them as exempt employees because Charter mistakenly categorized 

them as “outside salespersons.” (FAC ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs claim

that, as a result of this misclassification, Charter failed to 

pay them minimum wage in violation of California Labor Code §§ 

1182.12, 1194, 1197, and 1194.4 (First Claim), failed to pay 

overtime wages in violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 

1197 (Second Claim), failed to provide meal periods or provide 

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premium wages in lieu thereof in violation of California Labor 

Code §§ 512 and 226.7 (Third Claim), and failed to provide rest 

breaks or pay premium wages in lieu thereof in violation of 

California Labor Code § 226.7 (Fourth Claim). (See generally

FAC.) Plaintiffs further claim that Charter unlawfully 

calculated, deducted, and failed to pay commission wages under 

California Labor Code §§ 204, 221, 223, 224, and 2751 (Fifth 

Claim), failed to provide accurate wage statements in violation 

of California Labor Code § 226 (Sixth Claim), failed to pay all 

wages owed upon termination in violation of California Labor Code 

§ 203 (Seventh Claim), failed to provide timely and complete 

copies of employment records in violation of California Labor 

Code §§ 226, 432, and 1198.5 (Eighth Claim), violated 

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) under California 

Business and Professions Code § 17200 (Ninth Claim), and violated 

the California Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Labor 

Code § 2698, et seq. (Tenth Claim).

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 

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negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving 

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element 

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. Where 

“the case turns on a mixed question of fact and law and the only 

disputes relate to the legal significance of undisputed facts, 

the controversy collapses into a question of law suitable to 

disposition on summary judgment.” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. 

Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 

genuine issue for trial.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Any inferences drawn from 

the underlying facts must, however, be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion.1 See id.

1 Charter makes several evidentiary objections to the 

Declaration of Jamin S. Soderstrom and its attachments, the 

declaration of Lionel Harper, and the declaration of Daniel 

Sinclair on the grounds that the statements by Mr. Soderstrom, 

Harper, and Sinclair, as well as their attached exhibits, lack 

foundation, are hearsay, are speculative, or are irrelevant. 

(See Docket No. 103-1.) Plaintiffs similarly object to portions 

of the Declaration of Andrea Benner and its attachments. (See

Docket No. 98-27.) The Ninth Circuit has long held that “to 

survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to 

produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as 

long as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 

(9th Cir. 2003.) Moreover, “[a]s a practical matter, the court 

finds this entire exercise of considering evidentiary objections 

on a motion for summary judgment to be futile and 

counterproductive.” Burch v. Regents of University of 

California, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Shubb,

J.). Accordingly, if Charter or plaintiffs wish to raise these 

evidentiary objections, they may do so at trial.

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III. Discussion

A. Claims for Failure to Pay Minimum Wage, Failure to Pay 

Overtime, Failure to Provide Meal Periods, and Failure 

to Provide Rest Periods

Charter first argues that plaintiffs’ First (Minimum 

Wage), Second (Overtime), Third (Meal Periods), and Fourth (Rest 

Periods) claims fail as a matter of law because California’s wage 

and hour laws, including minimum wage and overtime pay 

requirements, as well as meal and rest period requirements, do 

not apply to “outside salespersons.” (See Mot. for Summ. J. at 

11-18.) Charter also argues that Sinclair’s First through Fourth 

claims are time-barred because he last worked for Charter more 

than three years before he filed suit. The court will address 

Charter’s statute-of-limitations argument before turning to the 

merits of its argument that Harper and Sinclair were properly 

classified as “outside salespersons.” 

1. Statute of Limitations

The applicable limitations period for claims for 

damages under the California Labor Code is three years. See Cal. 

Code Civ. P. § 338. Charter argues that Sinclair’s claims are 

time-barred because the last day Sinclair actually performed work 

for Charter was July 16, 2016, but Sinclair did not file suit 

until December 13, 2019. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at 21.) 

Plaintiffs argue that, because Sinclair was among the 

putative class members referenced in Harper’s original complaint, 

and Sinclair was added as a party plaintiff pursuant to Rule 

15(c) when plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint on 

December 13, 2019, Sinclair’s claims relate back to Harper’s 

original pleading. See In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 

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922, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“An amendment adding a party plaintiff [under Rule 

15(c)] relates back to the date of the original pleading only 

when: (1) the original complaint gave the defendant adequate 

notice of the claims of the newly proposed plaintiff; (2) the 

relation back does not unfairly prejudice the defendant; and (3) 

there is an identity of interests between the original and newly 

proposed plaintiff.” Id. “In deciding whether an amendment 

relates back to the original claim, notice to the opposing party 

of the existence and involvement of the new plaintiff is the 

critical element.” Avila v. INS, 731 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 

1984). Whether the defendant had adequate notice of the newly 

proposed plaintiff's claims often turns on “whether the original 

complaint clearly stated that the plaintiff sought to represent 

others.” Allen v. Similasan Corp., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1069 

(S.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted). 

The court finds that Harper’s complaint gave defendant 

adequate notice of Sinclair’s claims because it sought to pursue 

class claims. While an individual complaint may not provide 

adequate notice that the plaintiff seeks claims on behalf of a 

class, see, e.g., Corns v. Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am., No. 

09-cv-4403 YGR, 2014 WL 1319363, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014), 

courts have uniformly found that a class action complaint 

provides defendants adequate notice of other class members' 

claims, see, e.g., Lith v. Iheartmedia + Entm't, No. 1:16-cv-066

LJO SKO, 2016 WL 4000356, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2016). Here, 

Harper’s complaint unequivocally sought to bring a class action. 

(See Docket No. 1-1 (commencing action with “Class and PAGA 

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Action Complaint”).) Defendant even acknowledged in its notice 

of removal that the putative class included 1083 account 

executives employed by defendant beginning in November 2014, of 

which Sinclair was one. (See Docket No. 1 at 11.) 

The court also finds that an identity of interests 

exists between Sinclair and Harper. For there to be the required 

identity of interests, Harper and Sinclair must be “similarly 

situated.” Immigrant Assistance Project of L.A. Cty. Fed'n of 

Labor (AFL-CIO) v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 858 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiffs are “similarly situated” when “[t]he circumstances 

giving rise to the[ir] claims remain[ ] the same [under the 

amended complaint] as under the original complaint. Raynor Bros. 

v. Am. Cyanimid Co., 695 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1982). Here, 

Sinclair and Harper held the same position at Charter, had some 

of the same supervisors and colleagues, and were subject to the 

same allegedly unlawful policies and practices. These policies 

and procedures give rise to the same allegations of violations of 

the California Labor Code, California’s UCL, and PAGA in both the 

original and operative complaints. (Compare Compl. (Docket No. 

1-1) with FAC (Docket No. 45).) Because the court finds an 

identity of interests between Harper and Sinclair, the relation 

back of Sinclair’s claims will not prejudice Charter. Raynor 

Bros. v. Am. Cyanimid Co., 695 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1982) 

(holding when new and former plaintiffs “have sufficient identity of 

interests, relation back of the amendment is not prejudicial to the 

defendant”); Besig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 

1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding where the relief sought remains 

the same “the defendant is not prejudiced because his response to 

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the action requires no revision”); Immigrant Assistance, 305 F.3d at 

858 (“The addition of new plaintiffs who are similarly situated to 

the original plaintiffs therefore did not cause the INS any

prejudice in the present case.”). Sinclair’s claims as alleged in 

the operative complaint therefore relate back to Harper’s original 

complaint, which was filed on May 3, 2019. 

Plaintiffs further argue that the court should apply 

principles of equitable tolling to suspend the running of any 

applicable statutes of limitations after November 19, 2018. (See

Pls.’ Opp’n at 39-46.) They base their argument on a series of 

events that began over a year before Harper filed his original 

complaint in Shasta County Superior Court. On April 19, 2018, 

approximately one month after Harper was terminated by Charter, 

Harper contacted JAMS, the company listed in an arbitration 

agreement Charter had signed with Harper, to request non-binding

mediation. (Harper Decl. ¶ 22.) 

Charter refused to participate in mediation with Harper 

in May 2018. (Id.) On July 3, 2018, Charter’s counsel sent 

plaintiffs’ counsel a letter attaching a copy of the arbitration 

agreement Harper had signed, which required arbitration with JAMS. 

(See Soderstrom Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. 19.) Charter asked Harper to comply 

with his contractual obligations to arbitrate, and stated that it 

would move to compel arbitration is Harper elected to file a 

complaint in court. (See id.) Harper subsequently filed a notice 

of Charter’s alleged violations of the California Labor Code with 

the California LWDA, then filed an arbitration demand with JAMS on 

November 19, 2018, in compliance with his arbitration agreement with 

JAMS. (See id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) Because the arbitration agreement 

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included a mutual delegation option, Harper’s arbitration demand 

asked the arbitrator to address several threshold issues before 

reaching the merits of the claim. (See id.) Harper’s arbitration 

demand stated that Harper intended to file the same claims on an 

individual, class, and representative PAGA basis in court to the 

extent the arbitrator determined some or all of the claims were not 

arbitrable. (See id.) 

The arbitrator issued a final award on April 25, 2019, 

dismissing the arbitration on the grounds that the entire 

arbitration agreement was null and void and that none of Harper’s 

claims was arbitrable. (See id. at ¶ 24.) Harper filed his 

complaint shortly thereafter, on May 3, 2019. (See id.) 

Plaintiffs argue that equitable tolling is automatic 

“where exhaustion of an administrative remedy is mandatory prior to 

filing suit.” McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 

Cal. 4th 88, 101 (Cal. 2008). The parties dispute whether Harper 

was required to pursue arbitration before filing suit. (See Mot. 

for Summ. J. at 34; Pls.’ Opp’n at 40.) However, the court need not 

address the question of whether Harper was required to arbitrate his 

claims because equitable tolling may still apply “regardless of 

whether the exhaustion of one remedy is a prerequisite to the 

pursuit of another.” Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410, 414 (Cal. 

1974). Equitable tolling applies in such situations when three 

elements are present: (1) timely notice, (2) lack of prejudice to 

the defendant, and (3) reasonable and good faith conduct by the 

plaintiff. See Saint Francis Mem’l Hosp. v. State Dep’t of Pub. 

Health, 9 Cal. 5th 710, 724 (2020); Elkins, 12 Cal. 3d at 414. 

Here, Charter had notice of Harper’s allegations and 

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claims, and of his intent to pursue them on behalf of other 

employees in California and the Sate, as early as September 14, 

2018, when Harper filed and mailed the PAGA notice, and certainly by 

the time Harper filed his demand for arbitration, in which he 

indicated his intent to pursue his claims in court should the 

arbitrator determine that some or all of his claims were not 

arbitrable. (See Soderstrom Decl. ¶¶ 22-23.) 

Under the second element, courts’ “core focus” is 

“whether application of equitable tolling would prevent the 

defendant from defending a claim on the merits.” Saint Francis, 9 

Cal. 5th at 728 (citing Addison v. California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 318 

(Cal. 1978)). Given that Harper’s claims in his demand for 

arbitration were the same as his claims filed in court, and that 

Harper indicated his intention to pursue his claims on behalf of a 

class, the court does not “see how tolling [the] statute of 

limitations would undermine the [defendant’s] ability to defend the 

propriety of the same penalty in superior court.” Id. Indeed, by 

May 17, 2019, just two weeks after Harper filed his claims in court, 

Charter had already identified 1,083 putative class members and 

aggrieved employees who had been employed by Charter in California 

since November 19, 2014. (See Docket No.1, at 11.) 

Finally, the court finds here that Harper acted 

reasonably and in good faith. See Saint Francis, 9 Cal. 5th at 724. 

Harper filed his PAGA notice on September 14, 2018, just ten days 

after receiving his wage statements and some of his personnel 

records from Charter. (See Soderstrom Decl. ¶ 21.) Harper filed 

his arbitration demand two months later, and filed his suit in 

Shasta Superior Court shortly after the arbitrator issued a final 

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award. (See id. at ¶¶ 23-24.) These actions were each “objectively 

reasonable under the circumstances” and “subjectively in good faith” 

as Harper believed himself to be bound to an arbitration agreement 

with Charter that required arbitration with JAMS and did not 

unreasonably delay. See Saint Francis, 9 Cal. 5th at 724. 

The court therefore finds that equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations applicable to the claims in Charter’s 

original complaint to November 19, 2018 (the date on which Harper 

filed his arbitration demand with JAMS) is appropriate. See id. 

Because Sinclair’s claims relate back to the claims contained in 

Harper’s original complaint, the applicable date for determining 

whether Sinclair complied with the statute of limitations is 

November 19, 2018. 

Accordingly, because the applicable statute of 

limitations for claims for damages under the Labor Code is three 

years, and Sinclair was still working for Charter on November 19, 

2015, the court will not grant summary judgment against Sinclair on 

his First through Fourth claims for damages on the grounds that his 

claims were not timely filed. As Sinclair acknowledges, however, 

he is time-barred from seeking penalties under his first four 

claims, as the last day he worked for Charter was April 4, 2017, and 

statutory penalties are subject to a one-year limitations period. 

See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 340; (Pls.’ Opp’n at 46). The court will 

therefore grant Charter’s request for summary adjudication as to 

Sinclair’s First, Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for statutory 

penalties. 

2. Outside Salesperson Exemption

Under California law, outside salespersons are exempt 

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from overtime, minimum wage, meal period, and rest period 

requirements. California Labor Code § 1171 sets forth that “the 

provisions of [the Labor Code's Chapter on Wages, Hours, and 

Working Conditions] shall apply to and include men, women and 

minors employed in any occupation, trade, or industry, whether 

compensation is measured by time, piece, or otherwise, but shall 

not include any individual employed as an outside salesman . . . 

.” Cal. Lab. Code § 1171 (emphasis added). Under California 

regulations, an “outside salesperson” is defined as “any person, 

18 years of age or over, who customarily and regularly works more 

than half the working time away from the employer's place of 

business selling tangible or intangible items or obtaining orders 

or contracts for products, services or use of facilities.” Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070.

Whether someone is an outside salesperson under the 

California labor laws is a mixed question of law and fact, 

although it often “turns on a detailed, fact-specific 

determination.” Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal. 4th 785, 

790 (Cal. 1999). “[T]he assertion of an exemption from the 

overtime laws is considered to be an affirmative defense, and 

therefore the employer bears the burden of proving the employee's 

exemption.” Id. (citations omitted).

According to the California Supreme Court, the 

determination of whether an employee is an “outside salesperson” 

entails a “quantitative approach, looking to the actual hours 

spent on sales activity to determine if an employee is primarily 

a salesperson.” Id. at 801. This determination is guided by 

practical inquiries into the actual nature of the requirements of 

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the employee’s job. See id. Courts may not rely solely on 

either “the number of hours that the employer, according to its 

job description or its estimate, claims the employee should be 

working in sales,” or “the actual average hours the employee 

spent on sales activity.” Id. at 802 (emphasis added). As the 

California Supreme Court has explained:

On the one hand, if hours worked on sales 

were determined through an employer's job 

description, then the employer could make an 

employee exempt from overtime laws solely by 

fashioning an idealized job description that 

had little basis in reality. On the other 

hand, an employee who is supposed to be 

engaged in sales activities during most of 

his working hours and falls below the 50 

percent mark due to his own substandard 

performance should not thereby be able to 

evade a valid exemption. A trial court, in 

determining whether the employee is an 

outside salesperson, must steer clear of 

these two pitfalls by inquiring into the 

realistic requirements of the job. In so 

doing, the court should consider, first and 

foremost, how the employee actually spends 

his or her time. But the trial court should 

also consider whether the employee's 

practice diverges from the employer's 

realistic expectations, whether there was 

any concrete expression of employer 

displeasure over an employee's substandard 

performance, and whether these expressions 

were themselves realistic given the actual 

overall requirements of the job.

Id. 

“[O]nly time ‘away from the employer’s place of 

business’ that is spent on sales activity, i.e., ‘selling 

tangible or intangible items or obtaining orders or contracts for 

products, services or use of facilities,’ counts towards the 50% 

mark needed to establish the [outside salesperson] exemption.” 

Spallino v. Charter Comms. Inc., No. ED CV 17-0982-DOC (SPx), 

2018 WL 6011541, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2018) (quoting 8 Cal. 

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Code Regs. § 11070). Activities performed inside the office do 

not count toward the exemption even if they are direct sales or 

sales-related activities. See Duran v. United States Bank Nat’l 

Assn., 59 Cal. 4th 1, 26 (Cal. 2014) (“Unlike the corresponding 

federal provision, California's wage order definition ‘takes a 

purely quantitative approach’ and focuses exclusively on whether 

the employee spends more than half of the workday engaged in 

sales activities outside the office.” (emphasis added) (quoting 

Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 797)). California law also does not 

treat activities that are “incidental” to sales activities as 

exempt, even if they are performed outside the office. Ramirez, 

20 Cal. 4th at 796-801.

Here, no party appears to contend that Harper or 

Sinclair actually spent more than 50% of their time away from the 

employer’s place of business engaged in sales activities. (See

Def.’s SUF Nos. 10-11; Pls.’ SDF Nos. SDF Nos. 19-22.) Rather, 

Charter argues that plaintiffs were appropriately classified as 

outside salespersons because, during their employment, Charter 

expected AEs to “customarily and regularly” spend at least 50% of 

their time in the field conducting sales activities. (Mot. for 

Summ. J. at 3; Def.’s SUF No. 4.) If plaintiffs were spending 

less than 50% of their time outside the office participating in 

sales activities, Charter contends, they were not meeting the 

realistic requirements of their jobs. Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 

802.

Charter points to several “corrective action reports” 

that were issued to plaintiffs as evidence that they were not 

living up to Charter’s expectations for how much time AEs should 

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be spending outside the office. (See Benner Decl., Ex. I-N.) 

However, these corrective action reports were issued based on 

plaintiffs’ failure to meet rolling average sales targets, 

without regard to the amount of time plaintiffs’ spent outside 

the office. (See id.) While some of the directives contained in 

these reports instructed plaintiffs to focus on activities that 

would result in their spending more time outside the office, such 

as following more leads or knocking on more doors, other

directives instructed plaintiffs to focus on activities that had 

to be done in the office, such as sending their manager their 

daily call form. (See id.) None of the corrective action 

reports expressly state that plaintiffs were failing to live up 

to expectations because they were spending too much time in the 

office. (See id.)

Charter also emphasizes that it advertises the AE 

position as one that will “keep you on the go” and “working doorto-door.” (Benner Decl. ¶ 5.) According to training materials 

provided to new AEs in December 2016, on a “typical day,” Charter 

expects AEs to be outside the office from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 

p.m., or five hours out of the day. (See Benner Decl., Ex. A, 

(“December 2016 AE Training Materials”) at 41.) Plaintiffs’ 

former manager similarly testified that “account executives 

should spend most of their time in the field.” (Benner Dep. 

92:1-8, 103:1-11.) 

But the training materials Charter cites do not 

actually specify that Charter expects AEs to be out of the office 

more than half the day; while the schedule on a “typical day” 

will have AEs out of the office between 10:00 a.m. and 3 p.m., 

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the schedule does not specify how long a AE’s typical day will 

last besides saying it will go from “approximately 8:00 a.m.” to 

“around 5 p.m.” (See December 2016 AE Training Materials at 41.) 

In fact, both Sinclair and Harper testified that they regularly 

were required to work past 5 p.m. and that, contrary to the 

training materials emphasized by Charter, they were advised that 

the best sales results would be achieved if they were out in the 

field selling from 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 or 3:00 p.m., which would 

only result in 3-4 hours being spent out of the office selling. 

(See Harper Dep. 146:1-25, 163:1-164:11; Sinclair Dep. 97:5-15, 

100:25-101:19.) Other training materials produced by Charter 

reinforce plaintiffs’ testimony, providing testimonials from “the 

best” AEs and samples schedules that suggest AEs need not spend 

more than 50% of their time outside the office. (See Soderstrom 

Decl., Exs. 10, 11.) 

By contrast, another job description produced by 

Charter for “Direct Sales Reps” reveals that Charter expressly 

stated that it expected those employees to spend 80% of their 

time outside the office. (See Soderstrom Decl., Ex. 21.) 

Neither of Charter’s “Standards of Performance” for the AE 

position in December 2015 or August 2017 indicated that Charter 

expected AEs to spend any particular amount of time outside the 

office--rather, the expectation simply appears to have been that 

AEs would complete a certain number of sales each month. (See

Benner Decl., Ex. H; Benner Dep. 37:1-18; Soderstrom Decl., Ex. 

8.) Plaintiffs have also submitted declarations in which they 

explain that, contrary to the testimony of their former manager, 

Benner, no person at Charter, or any document they ever saw at 

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Charter, expected or required them to spend more than 50% of 

their work hours outside the office selling Charter’s services. 

(See Harper Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10; Sinclair Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10.) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving parties, the court finds that genuine issues of 

material fact exist as to whether Charter actually expected its 

AEs to spend more than 50% of their time outside the office, 

engaged in sales or sales-related activities, at the time of 

plaintiffs’ employment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

Furthermore, even if Charter did have such an 

expectation, a genuine issue of fact would exist as to whether 

such an expectation was reasonable in light of the duties 

plaintiffs were expected to complete as part of their roles as 

AEs. See Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 802 (directing that while 

courts should “consider, first and foremost, how the employee 

actually spends his or her time,” they “should also consider 

whether the employee's practice diverges from the employer's 

realistic expectations, whether there was any concrete expression 

of employer displeasure over an employee's substandard 

performance, and whether these expressions were themselves 

realistic given the actual overall requirements of the job” 

(emphasis added)). The evidence shows that many of the tasks 

inherent to plaintiffs’ job required them to be in the office. 

AEs were required to attend a daily sales call at the start of 

each day that prevented them from going out into the field. 

(Harper Dep. 149:9-17; Sinclair Dep. 98:25-99:14; Benner Dep. 

106:20-110:11.) This call typically lasted between 15 minutes 

and an hour, depending on how long the manager let the meeting 

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run. (See id.) 

AEs were also required to spend significant amounts of 

time “scrubbing” a list of businesses provided to them by Charter 

to target each month (known as the “leads list”). (Harper Dep. 

102:5-104:15; Sinclair Dep. 277:20-278:15.) The scrubbing 

process required AEs to go through the leads list and determine 

which businesses were not viable targets, because they had 

closed, already had Charter service, or were listed at an address 

that was actually just a vacant lot or building. (See id.) 

Sinclair and Harper both testified that this process required 

them to work at their desk, because much of it involved 

researching businesses online, searching Google Maps, looking 

through Charter databases, or conferring with other AEs. (Id.) 

Once AEs had verified that a business listed on the 

leads list was a valid lead, they had to research the business to 

determine how many clients it serviced, as well as what phone, 

internet, or telephone service the business already had, to 

create a sales proposal tailored to the specific business’ needs. 

(Harper Dep. 117:14-119:16; Sinclair Dep. 133:2-134:9.) Harper 

and Sinclair testified that this process also largely required 

them to be at their desk, and estimated that it could take 

anywhere from 30 minutes to 3 hours, depending on how complex of 

a proposal needed to be prepared. (See id.) 

After closing a deal with a client, AEs would have to 

return to the office to input the order into an online portal. 

(Harper Dep. 126:5-127:5; Sinclair Dep. 142:14-19.) Harper 

estimated that the input process would take 30 minutes to an 

hour. (See id.) The evidence shows that AEs were then expected 

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to be involved with an account up until service had been 

completely installed at the client’s business. (Harper Dep. 

127:16-131:13; Sinclair Dep. 275:5-7; Benner Dep. 91:11-100:13.) 

While other departments were in charge of the actual installation 

and any construction that had to occur at the customer’s business 

and/or property (e.g., installing cable or phone lines), AEs were 

expected to be the first point of contact would have to consult 

with these other departments to troubleshoot issues and would be 

expected to field calls from customers who viewed them as a point 

of contact for Charter. (Id.) 

According to Harper, AEs would frequently have to work 

out logistical issues with customers regarding work that other 

departments were tasked with doing, like scheduling installs or 

required construction, all of which would be done from the 

office. (Id.; Benner Dep. 91:11-100:13 (explaining that AEs were 

expected to be the “main point of contact” with post-sale 

customers during the installation process and “remain available 

to the customer throughout the installation process”).) 

Sinclair also testified that up until the day after an install 

was completed, AEs were expected to field calls from clients 

experiencing issues and investigate what their issue was so that 

the AE could refer the issue to the proper Charter department. 

(Sinclair Dep. 144:1-145:6.) Based on these tasks, Sinclair and 

Harper testified that they spent 70% and approximately 60-65% of 

their time at their desks, respectively. (Sinclair Dep. 47:10-

16; Harper Dep. 235:19-254:12.) 

Ultimately, the determination of whether Harper and 

Sinclair can appropriately be classified as “outside 

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salespersons” who are exempt from California wage and hour laws 

is a fact-intensive question. See Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 790. 

Given the conflicting testimonial and documentary evidence as to 

Charter’s expectations regarding how many hours plaintiffs should 

have spent outside the office, plaintiffs’ testimony regarding

the demands of their job and why they spent a majority of their

time at the office, and viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to plaintiffs as the non-moving parties, a reasonable 

juror could find that plaintiffs did not qualify as “outside 

salespersons.” See Spallino, 2018 WL 6011541, at *9 (denying 

summary judgment as to plaintiff’s wage and hour claims because 

there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether Time Warner 

Cable Account Executive was an “outside salesperson”); T.W. Elec. 

Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 

(9th Cir. 1987) (“If the nonmoving party produces direct evidence 

of a material fact, the court may not assess the credibility of 

this evidence nor weigh against it any conflicting evidence 

presented by the moving party.”). 

Accordingly, there is a disputed issue of material fact 

underlying whether plaintiffs were protected by California's 

minimum wage, overtime pay, meal period, and rest period 

requirements. The court will therefore deny Charter’s motion for 

summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ First through Fourth Claims

(except for Sinclair’s First through Fourth Claims for penalties, 

as discussed above).2

2 Plaintiffs present an alternative argument that, even 

if the court were to find that Charter had properly classified 

AEs as outside salespersons after they had completed their 

initial training, the court should consider AEs’ training weeks 

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B. Commission-Based Claims

Plaintiffs’ Fifth Claim alleges that Charter unlawfully 

calculated, deducted, and paid commission wages in violation of 

California Labor Code §§ 2751(b), 204, 221, 223, and 224. (See

FAC ¶¶ 42-48.) As a threshold matter, Charter again argues that 

Sinclair’s commission-based claims are time-barred based on the 

Labor Code’s three-year statute of limitations. (See Mot. for 

Summ. J. at 25.) For the reasons discussed above, the court 

finds this argument to be without merit. 

Charter also raises several substantive arguments as to 

why summary adjudication is appropriate as to each alleged 

statutory violation in the operative complaint. The court will 

address each of Charter’s arguments in turn:

1. California Labor Code § 2751(b)

California Labor Code § 2751(b) states that, where an 

employee is paid commissions, “the employer shall give a signed 

copy of the [commission plan] to every employee who is a party 

thereto and shall obtain a signed receipt for the contract from 

each employee.” Cal. Labor Code § 2751(b). Charter argues that 

plaintiffs’ claim fails as a matter of law because § 2751(b) no 

longer provides a private right of action. (See Mot. for Summ. 

J. at 22.) “Prior to January 2012, California Labor Code § 2752 

provided that ‘[a]ny employer who does not employ an employee 

separately and find that, at the least, Charter had misclassified 

plaintiffs during training. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at 12-15.) Because 

the court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to 

whether AEs were properly classified as outside salespersons 

throughout their entire employment, it need not consider 

plaintiffs’ training weeks separately from their non-training 

weeks. 

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pursuant to a written contract as required by Section 2751 shall 

be liable to the employee in a civil action for triple damages.’” 

Swafford v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 383 F. Supp. 3d 916, 934 

(N.D. Cal. 2019). But “[w]hen the California Legislature amended 

Section 2751 in 2011, it repealed Section 2752.” Beard v. Int’l 

Bus. Machines Corp., No. C 18-06783 WHA, 2019 WL 1516692 (N.D. 

Cal. Apr. 7, 2019) (citing Stats. 2011, ch. 556, § 3). Other 

district courts interpreting § 2751(b) have concluded that the 

California’s repeal of § 2752 removed any private right of action 

under the statute. See id.; Swafford, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 934. 

This court agrees with those courts, and finds that plaintiffs 

have no private right of action under § 2751. The court will 

therefore grant Charter’s motion for summary adjudication as to 

plaintiffs’ claim that Charter violated Labor Code § 2751(b).

However, while § 2751 does not provide plaintiffs with 

a private right of action, the court will still assess whether a 

genuine dispute of material fact exists, as a violation of 

§ 2751(b) may still form the basis of Harper’s PAGA claim and 

serve as a predicate violation for plaintiffs’ claims under the 

UCL, as discussed below. See Beard v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 

No. C 18-06783 WHA, 2020 WL 1812171, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9,

2020) (denying employer summary judgment on UCL claim predicated 

on violation of Section 2751); Keenan v. Cox Commc’ns Cal., LLC, 

No. 18-cv-129-MMA (LL), 2019 WL 3288939, at *9 (S.D. Cal. July 

22, 2019) (stating that monetary relief for violations of § 2751 

is only available in the form of civil penalties under PAGA)

(overruled on other grounds). 

Charter argues that it complied with § 2751(b) by 

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providing plaintiffs with their commission plans through an 

online portal known as “Synygy” and by requiring them to check a 

box acknowledging receipt shortly after they were hired. (See

Mot. for Summ. J. at 23.) In support of its argument, Charter 

presents documents related to a Synygy training course that it

asserts plaintiffs took upon being hired by Charter, as well as 

statements contained in Benner’s declaration. (See Benner Decl. 

¶¶ 17, 20-23, Ex. G.) Both Benner’s declaration and the Synygy 

training documents state that, in the course of the training, new 

AEs were required to review their commission plan and check a box 

acknowledging that they had read and understood it, and that they 

agreed to comply with its terms. (See id.) According to Benner, 

the only way new AEs could “clear” the acknowledgment page and 

gain access to compensation information in the Synygy portal was 

to click the acknowledge button. (See id.) Benner also states 

that another Charter employee has searched Synygy’s 

acknowledgement data and found that Harper electronically 

acknowledged receipt of his commission plan on September 29, 

2017, at 2:36 p.m. (See id.)

Plaintiffs dispute that they ever completed the Synygy 

training described in the training documents and by Benner. (See

Harper Decl. ¶ 19; Sinclair Decl. ¶ 17; Soderstrom Decl., Ex. 

15.) Neither plaintiff recognized the Synygy training guide when 

it was presented to them, and a transcript of the training titles 

Harper completed during his training does not mention any 

training related to the Synygy portal. (See id.) Neither 

plaintiff recognized the commission plans Charter asserts they 

reviewed and signed, either. (Sinclair Dep. 75:9-76:17; Harper 

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Dep. 84:9-86:16.) Both Harper and Sinclair testified that they 

were never presented with copies of the commission plans; 

instead, the only knowledge they had of Charter’s commission 

plans came from conversations they had with others in the office 

or, in Sinclair’s case, from a one-page summary provided to him 

by a Charter employee. (Sinclair Dep. 77:9-78:5; Harper Dep. 

86:21-87:22.)

The only evidence that either plaintiff signed or 

acknowledged receipt of their commission plans comes from 

Benner’s statement that AEs had to acknowledge receipt 

electronically before they could access the Synygy portal to view 

their compensation information, and her statement that Charter is 

in possession of data showing Harper electronically acknowledged 

receipt of his commission plan. (See Benner Decl. ¶¶ 17, 20-23.) 

However, both plaintiffs state in their declarations that there 

were multiple ways AEs could view and keep track of their 

commissions besides logging into Synygy, including other online 

portals, via email from their managers, phone discussions, sales 

meetings, and on their wage statements. (See Pls.’ SDF 28; 

Harper Decl. ¶ 15; Sinclair Decl. ¶ 13.) And Charter has not 

produced the data showing electronic acknowledgement to which 

Benner refers, or any commission plans signed by either 

plaintiff. (See (See Pls.’ SDF 30-34; Soderstrom Decl. ¶ 4; 

Benner Decl., Ex. F.) In other words, there is no documentary 

evidence the court can rely on that conclusively shows that 

plaintiffs knowingly agreed to Charter’s commission plan, 

acknowledged receipt of the plan, or were provided with a signed 

copy of the plan, and the testimony and declarations of the 

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parties are in direct conflict. The court therefore finds that a 

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Charter 

failed to provide plaintiffs with signed copies of their 

commission plans or failed to obtain a signed receipt from each 

plaintiff in violation of § 2751. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–

23.

3. California Labor Code § 204

Plaintiffs claim that Charter violated California Labor 

Code § 204 by adopting an unlawful monthly commission pay period 

and paying earned commissions late. (See FAC ¶¶ 46; Pls.’ Opp’n 

at 25.) Section 204 states in pertinent part: 

All wages . . . earned by any person in any 

employment are due and payable twice during 

each calendar month, on days designated in 

advance by the employer as the regular 

paydays. Labor performed between the 1st 

and 15th days, inclusive, of any calendar 

month shall be paid for between the 16th and 

the 26th day of the month during which the 

labor was performed, and labor performed 

between the 16th and the last day, 

inclusive, of any calendar month, shall be 

paid for between the 1st and 10th day of the 

following month.

Cal. Labor Code § 204(a). “In other words, all earned wages, 

including commissions, must be paid no less frequently than 

semimonthly.” Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 

662, 668 (Cal. 2014) (emphasis in original). 

Charter argues that summary judgment is appropriate 

because its commission plan complies with § 204. (See Mot. for 

Summ. J. at 24.) According to Charter, AEs earn commissions on a 

monthly basis, once they have met several criteria set out in 

Charter’s commission plan. (See Benner Decl. ¶¶ 17, 19, Exs. D, 

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F.) Charter contends that numerous courts and the California 

Department of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”)--the 

California agency empowered to enforce California's labor laws, 

including wage orders--have recognized that “[c]omission programs 

which calculate the amount owed once a month (or less often) are 

common.” DLSE Opn. Letter No 2202.12.09-2 (2002); see also

Chavez v. Time Warner Cable, LLC, 728 F. App’x 645, 648 (9th Cir. 

2018) (“such agreements are permitted under California law and do 

not offend § 204”).

Plaintiff argues that Charter improperly conflates the

determination of when a commission is earned with the 

determination of when an earned commission is required to be 

paid. “A commission is ‘earned’ when the employee has perfected 

the right to payment; that is, when all of the legal conditions 

precedent have been met. Such conditions precedent are a matter 

of contract between the employer and employee, subject to various 

limitations imposed by common law or statute.” Koehl v. Verio, 

Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1335, (1st Dist. 2006) (quoting 

DLSE Opn. Letter No. 1999.01.09, p.2). While the DLSE and 

numerous courts interpreting § 204 have concluded that a 

commission plan that determines how much an employee has earned

in commission once per month does not violate § 204, see Peabody, 

59 Cal. 4th at 668, once the determination that an employee has 

earned commissions has been made, that employee must be paid 

during the next pay period. See id. 

Plaintiffs contend that, while they “earned” their 

commissions at the conclusion of each “commission month,” which 

began on the 22nd of each month and ended on the 21st of the next 

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month, the evidence shows that Charter did not pay plaintiffs 

until the second semimonthly pay period after the 22nd. (See

Pls.’ SDF 23-26; Benner Decl. ¶¶ 17, 19, Exs. D, F, Q, R; Benner 

Dep. at 39:11-24.) 

Charter argues that its payments were nonetheless 

timely. Although the commission month ended on the 21st of each 

calendar month, Charter states that AEs did not “earn” 

commissions until Charter had reviewed and verified any sales 

pursuant to the terms of its commission plan. (See Benner Decl., 

Ex. D at CHA/HAR 145, Ex. F at CHA/HAR 2468); Chavez v. Time 

Warner Cable Co. LLC, No. CV 12-05291-RGK (RZx), 2013 WL 

12080302, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013) (holding that employer 

had complied with § 204 by paying commissions on a monthly basis 

after taking a reasonable period of time to verify sales 

resulting in payment) (reversed on other grounds). 

Charter does not provide any evidence in support of its 

assertion that it conducted additional verification of 

plaintiffs’ sales after the 21st of each month, or that this 

verification process lasted until the next calendar month such 

that payment during the second semimonthly pay period would be 

timely. Moreover, because a genuine dispute of material fact 

exists as to whether plaintiffs knowingly agreed to the terms of 

Charter’s commission plan, the court cannot conclude as a matter 

of law that Sinclair and Harper only “earned” their commissions 

upon the completion of the conditions laid out in the commission 

plans provided by Charter. See Koehl, 142 Cal. App. 4th at 1335 

(“A commission is ‘earned’ when the employee has perfected the 

right to payment; that is, when all of the legal conditions 

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precedent have been met. Such conditions precedent are a matter 

of contract between the employer and employee . . . .”). 

For similar reasons, the court cannot conclude, as 

Charter argues, that Harper’s commission-based claims must fail 

because he never “earned” any commissions throughout the duration 

of his employment with Charter under the terms of his commission 

plan. Charter contends that Harper never completed the requisite 

number of monthly sales set out in the commission plan to “earn” 

any commissions. But undisputed evidence shows that Harper was

paid $420 in commissions on January 19, 2018. (See Benner Decl., 

Ex. Q at CHA/HAR 57.) 

The court will therefore deny Charter’s motion for 

summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ claim for violations of § 204.

4. California Labor Code §§ 221, 223, 224

Plaintiffs claim that Charter violated California 

Labor Code §§ 221, 223, and 224 by “unlawfully deducting, 

reducing, clawing back, or otherwise reconciling commissions owed 

to plaintiffs.” (FAC ¶ 47.) 

a. Sections 221 and 224

California Labor Code §§ 221 and 224 protect employees 

against unlawful deductions of their earned wages. Under § 221, 

“It shall be unlawful for any employer to collect or receive from 

an employee any part of wages theretofore paid by said employer 

to said employee.” Section 224 authorizes certain deductions 

that an employee “expressly authorize[s] in writing,” but forbids 

deductions that amount to a “rebate or deduction from the 

standard wage . . . pursuant to wage agreement or statute.” 

“[A]n employee's ‘wages’ or ‘earnings’ [under § 221] 

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are the amount the employer has offered or promised to pay, or 

has paid pursuant to such an offer or promise, as compensation 

for that employee's labor.” Kemp v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 

3:09-cv-03683, 2010 WL 4698490, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2010) 

(quoting Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 4th 217, 

228 (Cal. 2007)). Commissions can qualify as wages under 

California Labor Code § 221, but as the court noted in Kemp, “the 

right of a salesperson or any other person to a commission 

depends on the terms of the contract for compensation.” Id.

(citations omitted); see also Swafford, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 934. 

Accordingly, a California Labor Code § 221 claim requires “some 

showing that [the plaintiff] is contractually entitled to the 

commissions he claims to have been denied.” Swafford, 383 F. 

Supp. 3d at 934.

Here, the parties dispute the number of earned 

commissions to which Harper was entitled in December 2017, and 

whether Charter fully paid him pursuant to the terms of his 

commission plan. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at 27; Def.’s Reply at 30.) 

Harper presents evidence of emails he sent to his manager in 

January 2018 indicating that Charter had not provided him with 

commissions for nine installs he completed in December. (See

Harper Decl., Ex. 2.) Charter argues that Harper was not 

entitled to any commissions in December, because he failed to 

sell the threshold level of fifteen “Primary Service Units” 

(“PSUs”) required under the terms of his commission plan to 

“earn” commissions. (See Benner Decl., Ex. D.) Further, Charter 

argues that, even if Harper had been entitled to commissions for 

December, he only completed seven PSUs, for which he was fully 

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paid in January 2018. (See Benner Decl., Ex. Q at CHA-HAR 57 

(showing Harper was paid $420 in commissions, at a rate of $60 

per PSU x 7 PSUs.) 

Because the court has found that a disputed issue of 

material fact exists as to whether Harper knowingly agreed to the 

terms of the commission plan to which Charter refers, the court 

cannot rule as a matter of law that Harper failed to “earn” any 

commissions in December 2017 because he did not sell fifteen 

PSUs. See Kemp, 2010 WL 4698490, at *5 (“the right of a 

salesperson or any other person to a commission depends on the 

terms of the contract for compensation”). While Harper contends 

that he earned and was entitled to commissions for nine installs 

he completed in December, Charter argues that it properly paid 

him only for seven. There is therefore a disputed issue of 

material fact as to whether Charter unlawfully failed to pay 

Harper commission wages it had promised to pay pursuant to the 

agreement. See id.

Sinclair argues that Charter failed to pay him a 

commission for multiple sales he worked on that were ultimately 

transferred to a national sales AE before they were finalized. 

(See Sinclair Decl. ¶ 19; Sinclair Dep. 224:3-21.) Charter 

counters that, under the terms of Sinclair’s commission plan, a 

service had to be installed before a commission on that sale 

could be “earned.” (See Def.’s Reply at 31; Benner Decl., Ex. 

F.) Since Sinclair did not perform every step of the sales 

before they were completed, Charter contends that Sinclair did 

not “earn” the commissions to which he believes he is entitled.

(See id.) 

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Again, a disputed issue of fact exists as to whether 

Sinclair knowingly agreed to the terms of the commission plan to 

which Charter refers. The court therefore cannot rule as a 

matter of law that Sinclair did not earn commissions for the 

sales at issue based on the terms of the commission plan which 

Charter argues applied at the time. Because the parties disagree 

as to whether Sinclair was entitled to commissions for sales in 

which he performed some, but not all, of the requisite work, the 

court concludes that a disputed issue of material fact exists as 

to whether Sinclair “earned” commission wages for those sales, 

and, therefore, whether Charter failed to pay Sinclair commission 

wages it had promised him as part of the commission plan. See

Kemp,, No. 2010 WL 4698490, at *5. The court will therefore deny 

Charter’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ Fifth 

Claim for violations of California Labor Code §§ 221 and 224.

b. Section 223

“Section 223 prohibits the secret payment of a lower 

wage while purporting to pay the wage required by statute or 

contract.” Johnson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 

1136 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 

The text of section 223 does not support the existence 

of a private right of action because it does not set forth an 

entitlement to a wage or provide a penalty. See id.; Calop 

Business Systems, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 984 F. Supp. 981, 

1015 (C.D. Cal. 2013). The court will therefore grant summary

judgment in favor of Charter as to plaintiffs’ Fifth Claim for 

violation of California Labor Code § 223.

However, while § 223 does not provide plaintiffs with a 

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private right of action, the court will still assess whether a 

genuine dispute of material fact exists, as a violation of § 223 

(like a violation of § 2751(b)) may still form the basis of 

Harper’s PAGA claim and serve as a predicate violation for 

plaintiffs’ claims under the UCL discussed below.

As described above, both Harper and Sinclair have 

provided evidence sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue 

of material fact as to whether Charter paid them a lower 

commission wage than that to which they were entitled as part of 

their commission plans, while purporting to pay them the proper 

wage. See Johnson, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. A genuine of fact 

therefore exists as to whether Charter violated the terms of 

California Labor Code § 223. 

C. Plaintiffs’ Wage Statement Claims

California Labor Code § 226 requires that employers 

furnish their employees with accurate itemized statements in 

writing, showing gross wages earned, total hours worked, all 

deductions, net wages earned, all applicable hourly rates and the 

corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate, and the 

inclusive dates of all pay periods. Cal. Labor Code § 226(a). 

“An employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and 

intentional failure by an employer to comply with subdivision (a) 

is entitled to recover the greater of all actual damages or 

[statutory penalties] and is entitled to an award of costs and 

reasonable attorney's fees.” Id. § 226(e)(1). Plaintiffs allege 

a number of violations of § 226 in their complaint, some of which 

are derivative of their misclassification-based claims and their 

commission-based claims, and some of which are independent. (See

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FAC ¶¶ 49-54.) 

1. Whether Plaintiffs’ Derivative Wage Statement 

Claims Must Fail

Charter first argues that plaintiffs’ derivative wage 

statement claims must fail because the minimum wage, overtime, 

and meal and rest period claims from which they derive also fail. 

However, as discussed above, the court has found that genuine 

disputes of material fact remain as to plaintiffs’ minimum wage, 

overtime, and meal and rest period claims. Summary judgment in 

favor of Charter is therefore not warranted solely on this 

ground. 

2. Whether the Statute of Limitations Bars 

Plaintiffs’ Claims

Charter further argues that plaintiffs’ wage statement 

claims are time-barred. Section 226 “has two applicable statutes 

of limitations--one year for penalties, and three years for 

damages.” Sarkisov v. StoneMor Partners, L.P., No. C 13-04834 

WHA, 2014 WL 1340762, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Charter contends 

that, because Harper last worked for Charter in January 2018 and 

Sinclair last worked for Charter in July 2016, but Harper did not 

file his complaint until May 3, 2019, and Sinclair did not join 

the suit via the FAC until December 13, 2019, plaintiffs did not 

successfully assert their claims within the one-year limitations 

period for penalties, and to the extent that Sinclair has made 

out a claim for damages under the statute, he did not timely file 

within the three-year limitations period. (See Mot. for Summ. J. 

at 26; Docket Nos. 1, 45.) 

As discussed above, in Section III.A.1., the relevant 

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date for determining whether plaintiffs timely filed their claims

is November 19, 2018. Since that date is less than a year from 

Harper’s last day, and less than three years from Sinclair’s last 

day, Charter’s argument that Harper’s wage statement claim for 

penalties or Sinclair’s claim for damages is time-barred fails. 

However, the court will grant summary judgment in favor of 

Charter as to Sinclair’s claim for penalties. 

3. Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Fail to Establish an 

Actual Injury or a Knowing and Intentional 

Violation

Next, Charter contends that plaintiffs’ claim under 

§ 226 fails as a matter of law because plaintiffs “cannot offer 

admissible evidence of actual damages.” (See Mot. for Summ. J. 

at 27.) Charter also argues in its reply that plaintiffs’ claim 

fails because plaintiffs cannot show that their injury occurred 

as a result of a “knowing and intentional” violation of § 226(e), 

as required under the statute, because Charter had a “good faith 

belief” that their wage statements were in compliance given their 

belief that plaintiffs were properly classified as outside 

salespersons. (See Def.’s Reply at 16.) 

However, an employer’s showing that it acted under a 

good-faith belief that its employees were outside salespersons

when issuing their wage statements is not sufficient to require

that the employees’ § 226(e) claim must fail as a matter of law. 

See Novoa v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1028 

(E.D. Cal. 2015) (Ishii, J.) (“no court has granted summary 

judgment to an employer, finding that it acted in good faith when 

it violated Section 226(a); such a determination is generally a 

question for the factfinder to resolve at trial” (collecting 

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cases) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Garnett v. ADT LLC, 

139 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (Shubb, J.) (“To the 

extent that some district courts have found that an employer can 

lack the necessary knowledge and intent if it had a good faith 

belief that its employee was exempt from section 226, this court 

disagrees.”). An employee may establish § 226’s “knowing and 

intentional” requirement by showing that his employer knowingly 

omitted information from his wage statements--he need not show 

that the employer knew that it was violating § 226’s statutory 

requirements. See Novoa, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1028. A disputed 

issue of fact therefore remains as to whether Charter knowingly 

omitted information from plaintiffs’ wage statements in violation 

of § 226.

Plaintiffs have also submitted sufficient evidence that 

they suffered a cognizable “injury” sufficient to show actual 

damages. Courts have recognized that lost wages are a form of 

“all actual damages” recoverable under § 226(e)(1) because 

“[f]ailure to provide complete and accurate itemized paystubs 

could have made the alleged under-reporting of wages more 

difficult to detect and confront.” Sarkisov, 2014 WL 1340762, at 

*2; Arredondo v. Delano Farms Co, 301 F.R.D. 493, 547 (E.D. Cal. 

2014) (Seng, J.). Here, plaintiffs seek lost minimum, overtime, 

premium, and commission wages, and assert that Charter’s failure 

to accurately itemize their total hours worked, their regular and 

overtime hours worked, the premium wages they were owed for meal 

periods and rest breaks not provided and the proper hourly rate 

for such premium wages, the commission wages they were owed, and 

the pay period for which they should have been paid made it more

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difficult for plaintiffs to determine from their wage statements 

the amount they should have been paid each pay period. (See FAC 

¶ 54, Prayer for Relief ¶¶ C-D; Harper Decl. ¶ 16; Sinclair Decl. 

¶ 14.); Tennison v. Hub Grp. Trucking, Inc., No. LA CV20-05076 

JAK (SPx), 2020 WL 7714702, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2020) 

(“While there must be some injury in order to recover damages

[under Section 226(e)], a very modest showing will suffice.”]. A 

genuine dispute of material fact therefore exists as to whether

plaintiffs suffered a cognizable injury sufficient to recover 

actual damages under § 226.

4. Whether Charter’s Wage Statements Complied with 

§ 226

Finally, Charter argues that summary judgment of 

plaintiffs’ wage statement claim is appropriate because Charter’s 

wage statements complied with the requirements of § 226. In the 

FAC, plaintiffs allege that Charter’s wage statements were 

deficient in the following ways: 

(a) prior to 2018, wage statements did not 

include the inclusive dates of the relevant 

pay period and only included the end date; 

(b) prior to 2018, commission wages were 

included on a wage statement that was 

separate from the regular wage statement and 

the commission wages were not attributed to 

and paid for the pay periods in which they 

were earned; (c) prior to 2017 Charter did

not accurately keep track of and include on 

wage statements the total hours worked by 

Outside Salesperson Class members; (d) wage 

statements never reflected any premium wages 

being paid to Plaintiffs and Outside 

Salesperson Class members for meal periods 

or rest breaks that were not provided or 

that were late, shortened, missed, or onduty, both during training weeks and after 

training weeks; and (e) Plaintiffs’ final 

several wage statements failed to accurately 

record the time worked, wages due, and 

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inclusive dates of the applicable pay 

periods, and failed to pay any waiting time 

penalties.

(FAC ¶ 52.)

Charter contests each of these allegations. Charter 

first asserts that all of plaintiffs’ wage statements--with the 

exception of Sinclair’s wage statements from 2015--included the 

inclusive dates of the relevant pay period. (See Mot. for Summ. 

J. at 27.) Charter argues that Sinclair’s 2015 wage statements, 

though admittedly violative, cannot form the basis of a valid 

§ 226 claim because wage statement claims are governed by a oneyear statute of limitations, and Sinclair did not file the FAC 

until December 2019. 

However, plaintiffs have produced evidence showing that 

the “Pay Begin Date” and “Pay End Date” on several of Harper’s 

wage statements were not accurate with respect to the applicable 

22nd-to-21st “commission month” for earning commissions. (See

Benner Decl., Ex. Q, at CHA/HAR 52 (listing begin date as 

10/20/17 and end date as 11/02/17), CHA/HAR 54 (listing begin 

date as November 17, 2017 and end date as 11/30/17), CHA/HAR 57 

(listing begin date as 12/15/17 and end date as 12/21/17).) As 

for Sinclair’s claim, the court finds that it is not barred as to 

violations that occurred on or after November 19, 2015, given 

that Sinclair is seeking actual damages and thus the three-year 

statute of limitations applies, and plaintiffs have submitted 

evidence showing that Sinclair’s December 31, 2016 wage statement 

is missing a “Period Beginning” date. (See Benner Decl., Ex. R, 

at CHA/HAR 404.) The court therefore finds that genuine disputes 

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of material fact exist as to plaintiffs’ claim for wage statement 

violations based on Charter’s failure to provide inclusive dates 

of the relevant pay period. 

Charter next argues that it is “not aware of any 

requirement that commission payments be included on the same wage 

statement as Plaintiffs’ biweekly wages.” (See Mot. for Summ. J. 

at 27.) Labor Code § 226(e) requires employers to furnish 

employees with accurate and complete information required by the 

statute so that employees may “promptly and easily determine from 

the wage statement alone . . . [t]he amount of the gross wages or 

net wages paid to the employee during the pay period.” Cal. 

Labor Code §§ 226(e)(1), (e)(2)(b)(i). 

Both plaintiffs state in their declarations that they 

were not able to promptly and easily determine from their wage 

statements the total gross and net wages they were paid for a pay 

period that included payment of both salary and commission wages. 

(See Harper Decl. ¶ 16; Sinclair Decl. ¶ 14.) That is 

understandable given that the beginning and end dates listed on 

Charter’s commission wage statements do not correspond with 

Charter’s 22nd-to-22st “commission month,” and that the 

commission statements list two different pay periods, one of 

which does not correspond with the pay period listed on the 

salary statement. (See Benner Decl., Ex. Q, at CHA/HAR 51-52 

(listing “Begin Dates” of 10/20/17 and 11/03/17, and “End Dates” 

of 11/02/17 and 11/16/17), CHA/HAR 53-54 (listing “Begin Dates” 

of 11/17/17 and 12/01/17, and “End Dates” of 11/30/17 and 

12/14/17), CHA/HAR 56-57 (listing “Begin Dates” of 12/15/17, 

12/29/17 and 1/10/18, and “End Dates” of 12/21/17, 1/10/18, and 

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1/11/18).) There is therefore a genuine dispute of material fact 

as to whether Charter’s practice of splitting wages between two 

wage statements that covered the same pay period violated § 226.

Finally, Charter argues that plaintiffs’ claims fail to 

the extent they are based on allegations that, prior to 2017, 

Charter’s wage statements did not include total hours worked. 

(See Mot. for Summ. J. at 27-28.) The court agrees that, because 

Charter did not hire Harper until September 2017, this claim 

fails as to Harper to the extent it is based on allegations 

regarding wage statements prior to 2017. (See Harper Dep. 62:19-

63:9, 78:16-79:1). However, Harper has alleged other violations 

of § 226 (see FAC ¶ 52) for which the court has found that 

genuine disputes of material fact exist. For instance, as 

discussed above, Harper has presented evidence sufficient to 

create an issue of material fact that Charter’s wage statements 

did not include accurate “Pay Begin” or “Pay End” dates, and that 

Charter’s practice of splitting his wage statements into separate 

statements for salary and commission prevented him from promptly 

and easily determining how much he had earned during a specific 

pay period from the statement alone. The court will therefore 

not grant summary adjudication as to Harper’s Sixth Claim for 

violations of § 226.

The court disagrees with Charter’s argument that this 

claim also fails as to Sinclair. Charter contends that, 

effective January 1, 2017, the California Legislature clarified 

that employers were not required to show hours worked for exempt 

positions, including outside salespersons, when it amended § 226 

by adding subjection (j). Notwithstanding the fact that Charter 

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fails to provide any authority indicating the California 

Legislature intended subsection (j) to apply retroactively, the 

text of subsection (j) indicates that it only applies when the 

employee is exempt from the payment of minimum wage and overtime 

under the “exemption for outside salesperson provided in any 

applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission.” Cal. 

Labor Code § 226(j)(2)(B). Because a genuine dispute of material 

fact exists as to whether Sinclair was properly classified as an 

outside salesperson, the court finds that a genuine dispute of 

material fact exists as to whether Charter’s wage statements 

violated § 226 by failing to include total hours worked prior to 

2017.

The court will therefore deny summary judgment as to 

Harper’s Sixth Claim, and grant summary judgment in favor of 

Charter as to Sinclair’s Sixth Claim for penalties.

D. Plaintiffs’ Waiting Time Penalty Claims

Plaintiffs’ seventh claim alleges that they are 

entitled to waiting time penalties under California Labor Code 

§ 203. (FAC ¶¶ 55-58.) Under Labor Code § 203, if “an employer 

willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in 

accordance with Section[] 201 . . . any wages of an employee who 

is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall 

continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate 

until paid or until an action therefor is commenced,” up to 30 

days. Cal. Labor Code § 203(a). Plaintiffs allege that they 

were owed premium wages pursuant to Labor Code § 226.7 because

Charter failed to provide them with compliant meal and rest 

breaks, and that they were owed commission wages because Charter 

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failed to correctly pay all commission wages that were earned and 

payable. (FAC ¶ 57.) Because Charter did not pay these wages to 

plaintiffs upon their termination, plaintiffs argue they are 

entitled to waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203. (See

id.) 

The parties agree that plaintiffs’ waiting time 

penalties claim is entirely derivative of their 

misclassification-based and commission-based wage claims. (See

Mot. for Summ. J. at 28; Pls.’ Opp’n at 31.) Because the court 

has found that genuine issues of material fact exist as to 

plaintiffs’ underlying misclassification-based and commissionbased wage claims, the court will not grant summary judgment in 

favor of Charter solely on this ground. (See Mot. for Summ. J. 

at 28.)

Charter further argues that meal and rest period claims 

cannot form the basis of a waiting time penalties claim because 

Labor Code § 226.7 meal and rest break premiums do not constitute 

“wages earned” for the purposes of Labor Code § 203. (See Mot. 

for Summ. J. at 28.) Under California law, an employer that 

fails to provide an employee with a legally compliant meal or 

rest period is required to pay the employee “one additional hour 

of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each 

workday that the meal or rest...period is not provided.” Cal. 

Labor Code § 226.7(c). The question of whether these ordered 

payments constitute wages or penalties for the purposes of a 

waiting time penalties claim has divided district courts in 

California. See Finder v. Leprino Foods Co., No. 1:13-cv-2059 

AWI BAM, 2015 WL 1137151, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2015) 

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(acknowledging “[t]here is no clear answer” from conflicting 

decisions of the district courts of California). 

This division among courts stems from two seemingly 

contradictory decisions by the California Supreme Court: Murphy 

v. Kenneth Cole Productions, 40 Cal. 4th 1094 (Cal. 2007), and 

Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc., 53 Cal. 4th 1244, 1257 

(Cal. 2012). In Murphy, the court considered the nature of 

§ 226.7 payments for purposes of determining the applicable 

limitations period for a claim under the statute. Murphy, 40 

Cal. 4th at 1110. After examining the language, legislative 

history, and purpose of § 226.7, Murphy concluded that “the 

‘additional hour of pay’ is a premium wage intended to compensate 

employees, not a penalty.” Id. at 1114. Kirby, by contrast, 

held that, for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees for the 

nonpayment of wages, “a section 226.7 claim is not an action 

brought for nonpayment of wages; it is an action brought for nonprovision of meal or rest breaks.” Kirby, 53 Cal. 4th at 1257. 

The Kirby court explained that its decision was “not at 

odds with our decision in Murphy.” See id. Instead, the court 

explained, Murphy determined that the remedy for a § 226.7 

violation is a wage, while Kirby determined that the legal 

violation triggering that remedy is the failure to provide a meal 

or rest period, not the nonpayment of wages. See id. Because 

Kirby was concerned with characterizing the nature of the § 226.7 

claim itself, whereas Murphy focused on the nature and 

characterization of the relief for that claim, the court held in 

Finder that that Murphy was the more directly relevant precedent 

and, therefore, that failure to pay premium wages under § 226.7 

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may form the basis for a waiting time penalties claim. See

Finder, 2015 WL 1137151, at *8. 

Charter contends that a recent California Court of 

Appeals decision, Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Servs., Inc., 40 

Cal. App. 5th 444, 474 (2d Dist. 2019), should take precedence 

over the interpretation of § 226.7 offered in Finder. (See Mot. 

for Summ. J. at 29; Def.’s Reply (“Reply”) at 20 (Docket No. 

103).) There, the court expressly held that premiums under 

§ 226.7 are not wages for the employee’s labor, work, or service, 

but rather a penalty for the employer’s recalcitrance. See

Naranjo, 40 Cal. App. 5th at 473. “Read this way, an employer's 

failure, however willful, to pay section 226.7 statutory remedies 

does not trigger section 203’s derivative penalty provisions for 

untimely wage payments.” Id. at 473−74.

However, as Judge Ishii recently pointed out in Bates 

v. Leprino Foods Co., No. 2:20-cv-00700 AWI BAM, 2020 WL 6392562 

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2020), the California Supreme Court is 

currently reviewing Naranjo and, thus, Naranjo “has no binding or 

precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive 

value only.” Bates, 2020 WL 6392562, at *5 (quoting Cal. R. Ct. 

8.1115(e)(1)). In light of Naranjo’s non-precedential effect, 

the court in Bates found no reason to deviate from Finder and 

held that § 226.7 premiums are wages for the purposes of a 

waiting time penalties claim under § 203. 

This court agrees with Judge Ishii’s analyses in Finder

and Bates that, under California Supreme Court precedent, § 226.7 

premiums are wages for purposes of §203 waiting time penalties 

claims. Because the only contrary California precedent, Naranjo, 

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lacks precedential value, the court will deny summary judgment as 

to plaintiffs’ Seventh Claim for waiting time penalties based on 

Charter’s failure to pay § 226.7 premiums. 

E. Plaintiffs’ Untimely Production of Employment Records 

Claims

Plaintiffs’ Eighth Claim alleges that Charter failed to 

timely produce copies of their “personnel file[s], including all 

wage statements, instruments [they] signed or acknowledged 

concerning [their] employment, and other records concerning 

[their] obtaining and holding of employment . . . .” (FAC ¶¶ 61, 

63.) Plaintiffs rely on three California Labor Code provisions. 

First, § 226(b) gives current and former employees a right to 

inspect or copy their employment records, and permits an employer 

to take “reasonable steps” to ensure the identity of a current or 

former employee. Cal. Labor Code §§ 226(b). Section 226(c) 

requires that the employer comply with a § 226(b) request as soon 

as practicable, but no later than 21 calendar days from the date 

of the request. Id. at § 226(c). 

Second, § 1198.5 provides that “[e]very current and 

former employee . . . has the right to inspect and receive a copy 

of the personnel records that the employer maintains relating to 

the employee's performance or to any grievance concerning the 

employee.” Cal. Labor Code § 1198.5. The employer must make the 

contents of the personnel records available for inspection at a 

reasonable time, but no later than 30 days from the request. Id. 

Section 1198.5 also permits an employer to take “reasonable 

steps” to verify the identity of a current or former employee or 

his or her authorized representative. Id. at § 1198.5(e). 

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Finally, under § 432, “[i]f an employee ... signs any instrument 

relating to the obtaining or holding of employment, he shall be 

given a copy of the instrument upon request.” See Cal. Labor

Code § 432.

On June 5, 2018, plaintiffs’ counsel prepared and sent 

a letter via email to Charter’s in-house counsel requesting 

Harper’s wage statements, personnel file records, and other 

employment records. (See Soderstrom Decl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs’

counsel attached an authorization for the release of employment 

records signed by Harper using “DocuSign.” (See id.; Harper 

Decl. ¶ 23.) On July 3, 2018, counsel for Charter sent an email 

and letter to plaintiffs’ counsel advising him that it was 

Charter’s position that his request for Harper’s wage statements 

under § 226(b) was not valid, and that Harper would have to make 

the request himself before Charter would produce the records. 

(See Shine Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. F.) After further discussion between 

plaintiffs’ and Charter’s counsel, on July 18, 2018, Charter’s 

counsel agreed to produce the documents requested by plaintiffs’

counsel within a week. (See id. at ¶ 8.) 

However, on July 23, 2018, Charter’s in-house counsel 

received an email directly from Harper, who stated that he did 

not currently have representation. (See id. at ¶ 9.) The next 

day, counsel for Charter reached out to plaintiffs’ counsel to 

confirm that he was indeed representing Harper. (See id.) 

Plaintiffs’ counsel sent Charter’s counsel a redacted version of 

his attorney-client agreement with Harper two weeks later, on 

August 13, 2018, and Harper emailed Charter’s counsel directly on 

August 29, 2018 to confirm representation. (See id. at ¶ 10-11.) 

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Six days later, on September 4, 2018, Charter provided 

plaintiffs’ counsel with copies of his wage statements and 

documents from his personnel file. (See id. at ¶ 11; Soderstrom 

Decl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs’ counsel asserts that this production 

was deficient under § 1198.5 because it omitted certain documents 

related to Harper’s employment, including corrective action 

reports. (See Soderstrom Decl. ¶ 21.) 

Plaintiffs’ counsel prepared and sent a similar letter 

requesting that Charter produce Sinclair’s wage statements, 

personnel file records, and other employment records on October 

2, 2019. (See Soderstrom Decl. ¶ 25.) Charter produced copies 

of Sinclair’s wage statements and personnel file records on 

October 17, 2019. (See id. at ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs’ counsel also 

asserts that Charter’s production as to Sinclair was deficient 

under § 1198.5 because it omitted numerous wage statements and 

corrective action reports. (See id.) 

To begin with, the court agrees with Charter that 

summary adjudication as to § 432 is appropriate. “While 

§§ 226(c) and 1198.5 expressly include ‘former employees,’ the 

plain language of § 432 limits applicability to ‘employees or 

applicant[s],’ omitting any reference to former employees.”

Harris v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 15-cv-00657-HSG, 2016 WL 

4073327, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (quoting Cal. Labor 

Codes §§ 226(c), 432, 1198.5); see also Arizona Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. United States, 816 F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(“When Congress includes a specific term in one section of a 

statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 

should not be implied where it is excluded.”); Briggs v. Eden 

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Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1117 (1999) 

(“Where different words or phrases are used in the same 

connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed the 

Legislature intended a different meaning.”). Because plaintiffs 

do not dispute that their requests for records were made after 

they were no longer employees, § 432 cannot apply here. 

With respect to § 1198.5, the court declines to 

interpret the term “personnel records” in the narrow fashion 

urged by Charter. Plaintiffs argue that, in response to their 

requests, Charter failed to include corrective action reports, 

letters related to their termination, and commission plan 

documents and receipts in its production. Without citing to any 

authority, Charter argues that “personnel records” are “not so 

expansively defined in § 1198.5 or case law.” To the contrary, 

the case law indicates that § 1198.5 “intends a broad definition 

of ‘personnel file’ to preclude employers from assigning

documents to files having some other name, and then refusing 

access to the documents on the ground that they are not contained 

in the ‘personnel file.’” Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. 

Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 110, 124 (2d Dist. 1997). 

Common sense also dictates that at least some of the documents 

omitted by Charter, such as corrective action reports, fall 

within the plain text of the statute, as they are “personnel 

records . . . relating to the employee's performance or to any 

grievance concerning the employee.” Cal. Labor Code § 1198.5. 

The court will therefore deny Charter’s motion for summary 

adjudication of plaintiffs’ claim under § 1198.5.

Finally, as to § 226(b), the court again declines to 

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adopt the narrow interpretation of the statute put forward by 

Charter. Charter argues that § 226(b) only authorizes current or 

former employees--and not their representatives--to inspect or 

receive a copy of their own wage statements. Because plaintiffs’ 

counsel sent Charter a request for plaintiffs’ wage statements 

under § 226 (not plaintiffs themselves), Charter argues that 

plaintiffs’ claim under § 226 fails as a matter of law. 

Charter points out that, in contrast to § 1198.5, § 226 

does not explicitly state that an employee’s representative may 

submit a request to inspect records. Compare Cal. Labor Code 

§ 1198.5 (“Upon a written request from a current or former 

employee, or his or her representative, the employer shall also 

provide a copy of the personnel records.”) with Cal. Labor Code 

§ 226(b) (“An employer . . . shall afford current and former 

employees the right to inspect or receive a copy of records 

pertaining to their employment, upon reasonable request to the 

employer.”). However, Charter does not cite to a single case 

where a court has held that a request made by a current or former 

employee’s representative is insufficient as a matter of law 

under § 226(b). Section 226(b)’s only requirement pertaining to 

the employee’s request is that it be “reasonable.” The court 

finds that, here, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to

whether plaintiffs’ requests to inspect and receive copies of 

their wage statements pursuant to § 226(b) were reasonable, given 

that they were signed by counsel and accompanied by an executed 

authorization signed by plaintiffs electronically. (See Shine 

Decl., Ex. E.) 

The court also finds that genuine issue of material 

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fact exists as to whether the timing of Charter’s production of 

Harper’s wage statements fully satisfied § 226(b). The evidence 

shows that Charter did not produce Harper’s wage statements for 

91 days after receiving Harper’s request. (See Soderstrom Decl. 

¶¶ 18-21, Ex. 18.) While Charter contends that this delay 

occurred as a result of “reasonable steps” taken by Charter to 

verify Harper’s identity and whether he was represented by 

counsel, Charter did not initiate any efforts to verify Harper’s 

identity or that of his counsel until after the 21-day deadline 

set out in § 226 had already passed. (See id.); Cal. Labor Code 

§ 226(c). A reasonable jury could therefore find that Charter’s 

response was not timely and that the steps that it took to verify 

Harper’s identity and whether he was represented by counsel were 

not reasonable under the statute.

As to Sinclair’s claim under § 226, plaintiffs have 

submitted evidence showing Charter’s production of Sinclair’s 

wage statements was incomplete and omitted at least 17 wage 

statements. (See Soderstrom Decl. ¶¶ 25-26; Benner Decl., Ex. 

R.) There is therefore a genuine dispute of material fact as to 

whether Charter fully satisfied its obligations to Sinclair under 

§ 226(a). See Harris, 2016 WL 4073327, at *11 (denying summary 

judgment because there was a factual dispute over whether 

employer had “fully satisfied” its § 226 obligations). 

The court will therefore deny Charter’s motion for 

summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ Eighth Claim for violations of 

California Labor Code §§ 226 and 1198.5. The court will, 

however, grant summary adjudication in favor of Charter as to 

plaintiffs’ claim for violation of California Labor Code § 432.

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F. Plaintiffs’ Claims under the UCL

Plaintiffs’ Ninth Claim alleges that Charter has 

committed acts of unfair competition, as defined by the 

California Business and Professions Code § 17200, by violating 

various provisions of the California Labor Code. (FAC ¶¶ 65-73.) 

Charter’s only argument in support of summary judgment is that 

plaintiffs’ UCL claim is derivative of their First through Fifth 

Claims. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at 32; Pls.’ Opp’n at 37.) 

Because the court has found that a genuine dispute of material 

fact exists as to plaintiff’s underlying California Labor Code 

claims, the court will not grant Charter’s motion for summary 

adjudication as to plaintiffs’ UCL claim. See Cortez v. 

Purolator Air Filtration Prods., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 178-79 (Cal. 

2000) (holding unpaid wages are recoverable as restitution under 

the UCL).

G. Harper’s PAGA Claim

PAGA authorizes employees to recover civil penalties 

for violations of the California Labor Code “as the proxy or 

agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.” Kim v. 

Reins Int’l Cal., Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 73, 82 (Cal. 2020) (emphasis 

and citations omitted). Only an “aggrieved employee,” or a 

person “who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom 

one or more of the alleged violations was committed” may serve as 

the state’s representative in a PAGA action. Id. (quoting Cal. 

Labor Code § 2699(c)). 

Only Harper has brought claims under PAGA. (See FAC 

¶¶ 74-75.) Charter first argues that summary judgment as to 

Harper’s PAGA claim is appropriate because Harper cannot show 

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that Charter committed violations of any underlying substantive 

provisions of the California Labor Code. However, because the 

court has found that disputed issues of material fact exist as to 

Harper’s claims under other substantive provisions of the 

California Labor Code, as discussed above, a disputed issue of 

material fact also exists as to whether Harper is an aggrieved 

employee under PAGA. 

Charter next argues that Harper’s PAGA claim is timebarred. A plaintiff must file a PAGA action within one year of 

the alleged underlying Labor Code violation. Cal. Code Civ. P.

§ 340(a); Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, 59 (2d 

Dist. 2019). The statute of limitations for the filing of the 

PAGA lawsuit is tolled for the sixty-five day notice period. 

Thus, as a practical matter, the statute of limitations for the 

filing of the LWDA letter is one year, and the statute of 

limitations for the filing of the PAGA lawsuit is one year and 

sixty five days (or 430 days total). Bush v. Vaco Tech. Servs., 

LLC, 2018 WL 2047807 at *13 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2018). The statute 

of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues, 

meaning when the cause of action is complete with all of its 

elements. Esparza, 36 Cal. App. 5th at 59.

Charter contends that, because Harper was on an unpaid 

leave of absence from February 3, 2018 through the end of his 

employment, Harper last performed work for Charter on January 30, 

2018. (See Benner Decl. ¶¶ 34-36, Exs. O-Q.) Thus, in order to 

file a timely PAGA action based on an alleged minimum wage, 

overtime, meal period, rest period, or wage statement violation, 

Harper would have had to file his complaint no later than April

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5, 2019 (430 days after January 30, 2018). (See Mot. for Summ. 

J. at 33.) Because Harper filed his complaint on May 3, 2019, 

Charter argues that Harper failed to timely file his PAGA claim 

within the applicable statute of limitations and, as a result, 

the court should dismiss his PAGA claim. (See id.)

However, as discussed above, in Section III.A.1, the 

statute of limitations governing the claims in Harper’s original 

complaint--including his PAGA claim--may be equitably tolled to 

November 19, 2018. Charter’s argument that Harper failed to 

comply with the statute of limitations is therefore without 

merit.

Accordingly, the court will deny Charter’s motion for 

summary judgment as to Harper’s PAGA claim. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for

summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication

(Docket No. 93-1) be, and the same thereby is, DENIED as to 

Sinclair’s First, Second, Third,, Fourth, and Sixth Claims for 

damages, Harper’s First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth 

Claims, as well as Plaintiffs’ Fifth Claim for violations of Cal. 

Labor Code § 204, 221, and 224, Seventh Claim, and Eighth Claim 

for violations of §§ 1198.5 and 226. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication

(Docket No. 93-1) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to 

Sinclair’s First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Claims for 

statutory penalties, as well as Plaintiffs’ Fifth Claim for 

violations of Cal. Labor Code §§ 2751(b) and 223, and Eighth 

Claim for violations of Cal. Labor Code § 432.

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Dated: February 12, 2021

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