Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00149/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00149-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CITY OF GRASS VALLEY, )

) 2:04-cv-00149-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER re: IN LIMINE

) MOTIONS

NEWMONT MINING CORPORATION, a )

corporation; NEWMONT USA LIMITED, )

a corporation; NEWMONT NORTH )

AMERICAN EXPLORATION LIMITED, a )

corporation; NEW VERDE MINES LLC, )

a limited liability company, )

NEWMONT REALTY COMPANY, a )

corporation, )

 )

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move in limine to exclude portions of the

testimony of Robert Moran (“Moran”) and Keith O’Brien (“O’Brien”),

both of whom are Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. Plaintiff opposes the

motions. Plaintiff moves “to preclude references to empty chair

defendants at trial.” Defendants oppose the motion. 

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I. Testimony of Robert Moran 

A. Moran’s Testimony Regarding Defendants’ Awareness of 

Potential Liability

Defendants seek exclusion of Moran’s testimony concerning

Defendants’ alleged awareness of potential liabilities and water

contamination in the Grass Valley Area. (Mot. in Limine to Exclude

Testimony of Robert Moran (“Moran Mot.”) at 3:11-12.) In Opinion 1 of

Moran’s expert report, he states that “Newmont was aware, since at

least the 1980s, that it had potential environmental liabilities with

respect to its properties in the Grass Valley Area.” (Aff. of Alison

Thayer in Supp. of Mot. in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Robert

Moran, Ex. A (“Moran Report”) at 3.) In Opinion 3 of Moran’s expert

report, he states that “based on Newmont’s experience at many of its

other metal mine sites, the corporation was aware that such mine

waters probably had chemically reacted with sulfide-rich and metalladen rock to mobilize hazardous substances resulting in contamination

and pollution of the local surface and ground waters.” (Id. at 5.)

Expert evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence

(“Rule”) 702 if “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 702. “For an

expert’s testimony to be admissible under [] Rule [702], [] it must be

directed to matters within the witness’ scientific, technical, or

specialized knowledge and not to lay matters which a jury is capable

of understanding and deciding without the expert’s help.” Andrews v.

Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989); see SEC

v. Lipson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“Expert testimony

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This ruling does not affect the admissibility of Moran’s 1

testimony described in the portion of Opinion 3 stating, “Oxidation of

metal-bearing rocks to generate mine drainage which results in

contamination of surface and ground waters and potential toxicity to

aquatic life is a process that has been understood throughout the mining

industry for more than one hundred years.” (Moran Report at 5.)

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may not be used merely to repeat or summarize what the jury

independently has the ability to understand.”). 

Defendants argue that “a determination of what was known by

particular Defendants at any given time is well within the

comprehension of the jury and the Court without the aid of Dr. Moran’s

testimony,” since his opinion is “based solely upon his interpretation

of ‘numerous memos and other documents,’ which will themselves be

presented to the jury and the Court.” (Moran Mot. at 3:20-22, 4:17-

18; see Moran Report at 3, 5 (stating that Moran’s Opinions 1 and 3

are based on “numerous memos and other documents” authored by “Newmont

employees or representatives”).) Plaintiff counters that “Dr. Moran’s

35 years of experience advising mining companies on environmental

matters makes him uniquely qualified to testify regarding industry

practices and knowledge.” (Opp’n to Mot. to Exclude Testimony of

Robert Moran at 5:18-19.) However, Plaintiff has failed to show that

the jury would not be capable of evaluating the evidence and

determining whether and/or when Defendants were aware of potential

environmental liabilities in the Grass Valley area. Therefore, this

portion of Defendant’s motion is granted, and Moran’s testimony

concerning whether Defendants were aware of potential liabilities and

water contamination in the Grass Valley Area is excluded.1

B. Moran’s Testimony Regarding Appropriate Environmental Response

Defendants seek exclusion of Moran’s testimony regarding

whether Defendants conducted an appropriate environmental response,

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but fail to show they should prevail on this portion of their motion. 

Accordingly, it is denied.

C. Moran’s Testimony Regarding Stockholder Rights and Fiduciary

Responsibilities of Corporate Officials

Defendants seek exclusion of Moran’s testimony that

“corporate officials [] have a fiduciary responsibility to their

stockholders to evaluate and report such actual and potential

liabilities,” since Moran is not an expert on stockholder rights or

the fiduciary responsibilities of corporate officials. (Moran Mot. at

6:11-12; Moran Report at 4.) Expert witnesses may not provide expert

testimony on subjects on which they are not qualified as experts. 

United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding

that trial court acted in its discretion in refusing to allow expert

in history of issuance of counterfeit foreign securities to testify

regarding authenticity of security certificate at issue “given that he

had no experience in identifying counterfeit foreign securities”). 

Plaintiff has failed to show that Moran is a qualified expert on the

fiduciary responsibilities of corporate officials. Accordingly, the

motion on this ground is granted.

II. Testimony of Keith O’Brien

A. O’Brien’s Testimony Regarding Property Interests and 

Operation of the Massachusetts Hill Mine

Defendants seek exclusion of portions of O’Brien’s testimony

(1) on the property and other legal interests held by Defendants in

the Massachusetts Hill Mine and other “underground mine workings” in

the Grass Valley Area, and (2) on whether any Defendant continued

operations at the Massachusetts Hill Mine after 1929. (Mot. in Limine

to Exclude Testimony of Keith O’Brien (“O’Brien Mot.”) at 3:12-5:12.) 

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In Opinion 1 of O’Brien’s report, he states that “Water from a mine

portal . . . emanates from underground mine workings owned by Newmont

Mining Corporation and discharges onto the WWTP property. . . .

Newmont acquired North Star Mines Company in 1929 after North Star

Mines Company had acquired the Massachusetts Hill Mine in 1894.” 

(Aff. of Alison Thayer in Supp. of Mot. in Limine to Exclude Testimony

of Keith O’Brien, Ex. A (“O’Brien Report”) at 2.) In Opinions 5 and

6, O’Brien states that hazardous substances discharged from “Newmont’s

underground mine workings . . . .” (Id. at 21, 25.) In Opinion 7,

O’Brien states that 

Newmont is solely responsible for the discharge of

hazardous substances contained within the mine

drainage flowing onto the City’s WWTP property. 

In and around the City’s WWTP property, Newmont is

a past, successor, and/or present owner and

operator of underground mine workings and controls

the mineral rights. . . . Based on my extensive

review of the available information, there are no

other sources of mining wastes but for those from

Newmont.

(Id. at 36.) Opinion 8 states in its entirety that “[a]fter Newmont

acquired North Star Mines Company and started operating Empire Star

Mines Company in 1929, Newmont continued mining operations at the

Massachusetts Hill mine.” (Id. at 40.) 

Defendants argue this testimony should be excluded since

O’Brien is not qualified as an expert in the area of property

interests, Defendants’ historical operations or “the legal status of

the parties as a past or present ‘owner or operator’ in this case.” 

(O’Brien Mot. at 4:17-20, 5:7-9.) O’Brien is a hyrdogeologist, and

has not been qualified as an expert in historical property rights. 

(See O’Brien Report at 60.) Defendants have shown O’Brien is not

qualified to give expert testimony on whether Defendants own or owned

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any property right in those mines, or operated those mines after 1929. 

See Chang, 207 F.3d at 1173 (holding that expert witness may not

provide expert testimony on subjects on which he is not qualified as

an expert).

Plaintiff counters that “[t]he trier of fact needs an

analysis of the voluminous records in this case . . . [and] a context

for evaluating the facts of this case in the context of environmental

investigation and remediation.” (Opp’n to Mot. in Limine to Exclude

Testimony of Keith O’Brien (“O’Brien Opp’n”) at 9:21-24.) In essence,

Plaintiff argues it is entitled to present summary evidence, and does

not otherwise respond to Defendants’ arguments. Defendants’ motion is

granted, but this does not reach the aspect of Plaintiff’s response

concerning non-expert testimony.

B. O’Brien’s Testimony Regarding Plaintiff’s Knowledge of the Drew

Tunnel Prior to the Excavation Work

Defendants seek exclusion of O’Brien’s testimony regarding

when and how Plaintiff first discovered the drainage was emanating

from Drew Tunnel. (O’Brien Mot. at 5:14-16.) O’Brien states in

Opinion 6 that Plaintiff “encountered the drainage emanating from Drew

Tunnel due solely to its work conducted to expand the WWTP. . . . It

was only after preliminary excavation work in the area of the ‘spring’

that the true nature of the ‘spring’ was known.” (O’Brien Report at

25.) Defendants argue that “the jury is perfectly capable of

assessing the witnesses’ and [Plaintiff’s] statements and making its

own determination as to whether [Plaintiff] had knowledge of the Drew

Tunnel prior to the excavation work.” (O’Brien Mot. at 6:5-8.)

Plaintiff counters that “O’Brien does not intend to offer an

opinion on [Plaintiff’s] ‘state of mind’ . . . but rather intends to

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offer his opinion that [Plaintiff] ‘took due care in addressing the

discharge of hazardous substances . . .’ and that the discharge ‘was

not reasonably foreseeable’ to [Plaintiff].” (O’Brien Opp’n at 5:18-

22.) However, Defendants have shown that O’Brien’s testimony on when

and how Plaintiff first discovered the drainage was emanating from

Drew Tunnel should be excluded; therefore, this testimony is excluded. 

This exclusion does not reach the points Plaintiff raises above on due

care and reasonable foreseeability.

III. References to “Newmont”

Defendants argue that Moran and O’Brien should be precluded

from referring to all Defendants collectively as “Newmont,” since

Moran and O’Brien “offer[] no justification for [their] treatment of

all Newmont-related entities as one and there is no basis here to

ignore the corporate form.” (Moran Mot. at 7:7-8.) Plaintiff

counters that “Newmont does not itself respect the corporate form,

either in its business dealings or its communications with this Court

. . . .” (O’Brien Opp’n at 11:12-13.) Since it is unclear what

evidence will be developed at trial, and the record is insufficient

for issuance of the requested in limine ruling, the motion is denied.

IV. References to Empty Chair Defendants

Plaintiff “requests an order prohibiting evidence or

argument regarding liability of other potentially responsible parties

not identified in the pleadings.” (Pl.s’ Mot. at 3:15-17.) Plaintiff

argues “Newmont was obligated under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]

26(a) to disclose any third parties that it contends were responsible

for the City’s harm” and therefore Defendant should not be permitted

to use such evidence at trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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28 All subsequent references to Rules are to the Federal Rules of 2

Civil Procedure. 

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37(c).” (Id. at 4:12:-24.) Plaintiff also argues “the City 2

submitted specific interrogatories and document requests to Newmont

asking Newmont to identify persons having knowledge of, and documents

related to, property adjacent to the City’s wastewater plant, and

control of the Drew Tunnel from 1850 to the present [and Defendants]

identified no third parties or evidence showing potential third party

liability.” (Id. at 4:24-5:2.) Plaintiff further argues that when it

“subsequently sent Newmont specific contention interrogatories, asking

Newmont to identify witnesses and documents supporting Newmont’s

‘divisible injury,’ and ‘apportionment’ claims . . . as well as

Newmont’s ‘superceding and/or intervening actions of individuals’

claims . . ., Newmont refused to provide substantive responses,

asserting: ‘[T]he City has exceeded the number of interrogatories

permitted under the federal rules without leave of court or written

stipulation.’” (Id. at 5:3-9 (citations omitted).) 

Defendants state they “have not asked this Court, and do not

intend to ask this Court, to hold nonparties liable as potentially

responsible parties, as the City suggests [and] do not intend to

attempt to use evidence at trial that was not disclosed during

discovery.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 2:7-10.) Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s motion “is premature, overbroad, and lacks the specificity

necessary for this Court to decide what evidence of non-party

interests and activities is or is not admissible.” (Id. at 2:18-20.) 

Defendants further argue “the City cannot point to any evidence that

the Defendants ostensibly failed to produce [as required by Rule 26]

and now seek to use at trial[, and] Defendants are entitled to

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introduce at trial any admissible evidence that has been produced in

the course of litigation, even if such information relates to thirdparty interests. [Further,] Defendants have complied with all

discovery requests from the City to the extent required by the Federal

Rules.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 8:10-20, n.3.)

This motion is not crystalized enough for decision, and

appears to seek decision on a discovery issue that should have been

resolved earlier in the proceeding. See Weiss v. La Suisse, Society

D’Assurances Sur La Vie, 293 F. Supp. 2d 397, 407-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

(denying motion in limine where “[n]o particular documents or

testimony have been identified”); Freeman v. Allstate Life Ins. Co.,

253 F.3d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no abuse of discretion

where “[t]he district court declined to [exclude evidence] because

[movant] failed to prosecute the issue before the magistrate judge as

required by E.D. Cal. Local Rule 72-302(c) . . . .”). Therefore, the

motion is denied.

Plaintiff also argues, given that “CERCLA is a strict

liability policy,” “evidence of non-parties’ ownership of title to

property in Grass Valley or potential responsibility for the

contamination at issue in this case would have minimal if no probative

value with respect to liability in this case” and, therefore, should

be excluded as irrelevant evidence. (Pl.’s Mot. at 8:24-9:5.) 

Defendants rejoin that evidence of property ownership is relevant to

rebutting duty of care and foreseeability of harm with regards to the

City’s negligence claim and “goes directly to whether any Defendant

can be held liable under CERCLA as a past owner or operator.” (Defs.’

Opp’n at 4:20-5:11.)

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Evidence should only be excluded in an in limine proceeding 

“when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” 

Bouchard v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810 (N.D. Ohio

2002). This has not been shown. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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