Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02121/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02121-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ESFANDIAR NIKBAKHSH-TALI,

Petitioner, 

vs.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-2121-PHX-NVW (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On September 6, 2006, Esfandiar Nikbakhsh-Tali, (“Petitioner”), currently

confined in the Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus by A Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”), pursuant to Title 28,

U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1) Respondents' Answer with 16 exhibits was filed on

January 23, 2007. (Doc. No. 19) No reply was filed.

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, on September 12, 2006, this

matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and

Recommendation. For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that

the District Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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1

All exhibit numbers in this Report and Recommendation are references to the

exhibits attached to Respondents' "Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus." 

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a citizen and native of Iran. (Ex. 1.)1 On June 16, 1972,

Petitioner's status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident pursuant to

Section 245 of the Immigration and National Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1255. (Id.) 

On February 5, 2003, Petitioner was convicted in the California Superior

Court, Santa Clara County, upon entry of a guilty plea, of one count of Inflicting

Corporal Injury on Spouse/CoHabitant/Former Spouse or Fiancee, in violation of

California Penal Code § 273.5(a). (Ex. 3.) On December 3, 2003, after violation of

probation, Petitioner was sentenced to two years of imprisonment in the California

Department of Corrections ("CDC"). (Id.) 

 On August 19, 2004, Petitioner was referred to Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) from the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”). (Ex.

2). On or about October 4, 2004, the United States served Petitioner with a Notice

to Appear in removal proceedings, charging Petitioner as subject to removal pursuant

to: (1) section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), in that he,

at any time after admission, was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in

section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA; and (2) section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), in that he, at any time after entry, was convicted of a crime of

domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or

child abandonment. (Ex. 7.) 

 On October 4, 2004, Petitioner was served a Notice of Custody Determination,

informing him that pursuant to section 236 of the INA, and 8 C.F.R. part 236, the

reviewing officer had determined that Petitioner was to be detained pending a final

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2

Petitioner's appeal to the BIA is not included in the record submitted to this

Court, but a review of the decision of the BIA indicates that he did not challenge his

previous concession of removability. 

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determination of removal by the immigration judge (“IJ”) in his case. (Ex. 8.)

Petitioner requested a redetermination of the custody decision by an IJ. (Id.) 

On October 12, 2004, the IJ considered Petitioner's request for a change in

custody status and entered a form order, checking the box that the IJ had “[n]o

Jurisdiction pursuant to 236 of the" INA. (Ex. 9.) 

On October 20, 2004, Petitioner, represented by counsel, appeared before an

IJ for a removal hearing. (Ex. 10, p.1) Petitioner admitted the factual allegations and

charges of removability and the IJ found Petitioner subject to removal as charged.

(Id, p.2.) Petitioner declined to designate a country of removal, expressing a fear of

return to Iran. (Id., p.3.) Petitioner moved to apply for withholding of removal and

for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). (Id.) Petitioner's removal

hearing, after a short continuance due to a medical emergency and subsequent

substitution of counsel, was set for November 24, 2004. (Id., p.7, 9, 21.) It was

continued at that time due to the late submission of filings and insufficient time on the

court's calendar to complete the hearing. (Id., p.7, 9, 21.) The IJ entered his decision

on January 20, 2005; ordered Petitioner removed to Iran; denied Petitioner's

application for Asylum; denied Petitioner's application for withholding of removal;

and denied Petitioner's application for deferral of removal under CAT. (Ex. 12.) 

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner's appeal on

April 26, 2005.2

 (Ex. 13.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review and Request for Stay

of Removal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth

Circuit") on May 4, 2005. (Ex. 14.) On that same date, the Ninth Circuit granted

Petitioner a temporary stay of removal pending further briefing. See Nikbakhsh-Tali

v. Gonzales, No. 05-72621. 

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3

Counsel for Petitioner submitted a declaration (Doc. No. 6) with references

to attached exhibits. The attached exhibits, however, do not have exhibit numbers,

and some of the exhibits, for example Exhibit G, do not seem to be included in the

exhibit. Petitioner's factual assertions are essentially the same as Respondents, and,

to the extent Petitioner has included additional factual background not contained in

his attached exhibits it is either not legally relevant, and/or Respondents do not

challenge the facts alleged.

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Because of Petitioner's mother's failing health, Petitioner made several requests

to either be released, or to be relocated at a detention center closer to his family so

that his parents could visit him. (See Doc. No. 6, Declaration of Bernadette W.

Connolly and attached exhibits.) These requests were denied. 

On August 3, 2005, Petitioner was served with a letter entitled “Decision to

Continue Detention.” (Ex. 15.) The letter informed Petitioner that his custody status

had been reviewed, that Petitioner had not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the

Attorney General that he would not pose a flight risk or be a threat to society, and,

therefore, Petitioner would not be released from custody. (Id.) 

Petitioner was apparently given a temporary jail pass in July 2006 to visit his

mother who passed away a few days after his visit. (Doc. No. 6.)3

 Petitioner's request

to attend his mother's funeral was denied. (Id.) 

A second “Decision to Continue Detention,” decided pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §

241.4(d)(1), reaching the same conclusion as the first, was served on Petitioner on

August 18, 2006. (Ex. 15, Doc. No. 6) 

On September 6, 2006, the Petitioner filed the instant Petition. 

On December 29, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss his Stay of

Removal with the Ninth Circuit. (Ex. 16.) The docket from the Ninth Circuit

indicates that “Pet's [sic] motion to dismiss stay of removal is construed as a motion

to withdraw the previously filed mtn [sic] for stay of removal pending review. So

construed, the motion is granted. Pet's [sic] motion for stay of removal is withdrawn.

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A second response was filed on May 30, 2007 to correct a filing deficiency.

The Court finds the Response timely filed.

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The court's 7/29/06 order is vacated. The temp [sic] stay of removal and if applicable,

the vol [sic] dep [sic] is no longer in effect.” See Nikbakhsh-Tali v. Gonzales, No. 05-

72621, Docket Entry January 17, 2007. 

On May 10, 2007, this Court entered an order to show cause why Petitioner's

federal habeas petition should not be dismissed in light of the Ninth Circuit's January

17, 2007 order withdrawing the temporary stay of removal and the conclusion reached

by this Court that Petitioner has entered the "removal period" under 8 U.S.C. § 1231

and has not exceeded the presumptively reasonable period of detention. (Doc. No.

20.) 

On May 25, 2007, Petitioner filed a response to the order to show cause.4

(Doc. No. 21.) 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner argues that he has never had an individualized hearing on whether

he poses a danger to the community or a flight risk and there has been no judicial

finding that his continued detention is necessary to serve some governmental purpose.

Petitioner asserts that his continued detention is unconstitutional. Further, Petitioner

argues that since his stay of removal is no longer in effect, an additional ninety days

to effect removal is not a reasonable period of time to detain him when his detention

has already exceeded constitutional limits. Petitioner does not know what, if any,

efforts the Government has made to effectuate his removal.

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) governs Petitioner's detention

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5

Respondents were not provided opportunity to respond to the Petitioner's

response to the Order to Show Cause. Respondents may address any issues raised in

the Order to Show Cause and Petitioner's response in the objections following this

Report and Recommendation. 

6

When Petitioner filed the instant Petition, he was not subject to a final order

of removal in light of the Ninth Circuit's entry of the temporary stay of removal.

When such stay was withdrawn, Petitioner became subject to an administratively final

order of removal. 

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during removal proceedings and that his detention during proceedings is

constitutional. Respondents contend that cases relied upon by Petitioner are

distinguishable. Respondents further contend that Petitioner has neither alleged nor

shown that the government is unlikely to remove him in the reasonably foreseeable

future and thus his continued detention is justified.5

Jurisdiction

The federal habeas corpus statute grants District Courts the power to issue

habeas corpus relief where the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Specifically, the

Supreme Court has held that Section 2241 confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts

to consider cases involving statutory and constitutional challenges to both pre- and

post-removal detention of aliens in deportation proceedings. See Demore v. Kim, 538

U.S. 510 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 

Removal Period

Petitioner is subject to an administratively final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(47)(B)(defining final order of deportation).6

 

The apprehension, detention and release of aliens in pending administrative

proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Kim, 538 U.S. 510. Once an alien

becomes subject to a final order of removal, like Petitioner herein, his detention and

release are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Id.; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683 (referring

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to section 1231 as the "post-removal-period detention statute"). Section 1231(a)(1)

provides in pertinent part:

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered

removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United

States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the

"removal period").

(B) Beginning of period

The removal period begins on the latest of the following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay

of the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration

process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(B). 

Although Petitioner was subject to an administratively final order of removal

when he filed the instant habeas Petition, the “removal period” had not yet begun

because his removal order was then currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit and that

court had stayed Petitioner's removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii).

On January 17, 2007, the Ninth Circuit lifted the temporary stay of Petitioner's

removal. Given that the temporary stay of removal is no longer in effect, this Court

concludes, and Petitioner does not contest, that he is now in the “removal period.” 

(Petitioner's Response to Order to Show Cause, p. 4 (Doc. No. 23)).

Once the 90-day removal period under section 1231 commences, an alien, who

is deportable under section 1227(a)(2), is subject to statutory mandatory detention

until deported. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678.

Administrative removal proceedings having concluded and an administratively final

order of removal having been entered, Petitioner no longer has a habeas remedy

available to him for alleged unlawful detention under section 1226(c). Diaz v.

Gonzalez, 2007 WL 1188192 (D.Ariz. April 20, 2002); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S.

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28 -8-

678 (section 1231 governs detention after an alien becomes subject to an

administratively final order of removal).

Detention for more than 90 days pending removal is clearly authorized,

without statutory limit as to how long the alien may be detained. See 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(A). However, as discussed below, case law finds implicit constitutional

limits in certain circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).

 Interpreting 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6), the U. S. Supreme Court has held that

indefinite detention is unconstitutional. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. That Court

further held that the presumptive limit to the reasonable duration of detention under

section 1231 is six months: "[a]fter this six-month period, once the alien provides

good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient

to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior

postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the 'reasonably foreseeable future'

conversely would have to shrink." Id. 

Petitioner argues that his detention has already exceeded a reasonable length

of detention under Kim. However, Kim is distinguishable, not only on the preremoval statute, section 1226(c), which the Court was interpreting, but on the due

process analysis a court must undertake to determine when detention no longer bears

a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was detained. Detention

during removal proceedings, i.e. prior to a final order of removal, serves the purpose

of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal

proceedings, thus increasing the chance that the aliens will be successfully removed

if removal is ordered. Kim, 538 U.S. at 528. Although detention of aliens subject to

a final order of removal serves the similar purpose of ensuring that the alien does not

flee prior to removal, that detention "no longer bears a reasonable relation" to such

purpose when removal is not practically attainable. Id. at 527. Thus, when Petitioner

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entered the removal period, his detention was no longer governed by section 1226(c)

and the due process considerations under Kim have now become inapplicable.

Instead, Zadvydas now controls the analysis herein. 

Petitioner's detention during the removal period has not exceeded the

presumptively reasonable period identified by the Zadvydas Court and Petitioner has

not met his burden of showing that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Therefore, Petitioner's

Petition must be denied.

RECOMMENDATION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation.

A party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should

use the following case number: CV 06-2121-PHX-NVW.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by

the District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 4th day of June, 2007.

for BERNARDO P. VELASCO

United States Magistrate Judge

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