Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06487/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06487-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA JAMES SHEBBY,

Plaintiff,

v.

DERRAL ADAMS, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 6487 REC LJO P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1.) 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK FORM

Joshua James Shebby (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on October 24, 2003 alleging that thirty-six (36)

defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs. The Court dismissed the

Complaint with leave to amend on March 7, 2005, and on March 23, 2005, Plaintiff filed an

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Amended Complaint. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that on July 2, 2002, he broke his ankle while housed at Tehachapi State

Prison (CCI) Segregated Housing Unit and was seen by John Doe who was deliberately

indifferent and unconcerned with his injury. Plaintiff contends that his ankle was x-rayed the

same day but that Dr. Korad failed to order any ambulatory device such as crutches, or a cane. 

Plaintiff states he complained to correctional staff on numerous occasions and that such

complaints were personally made to Officers Barr, Lopez, Rivera, and Thompson to failed to

provide him with medical care. Plaintiff also complained about his pain to Medical Technical

Assistant Carrew but did not get crutches or a cane. In July of 2002, Defendant Barr ordered

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Plaintiff to exit his cell for repairs. Plaintiff was placed in mechanical restraints but Defendant

Barr was unable to support Plaintiff physically as procedure dictates and Plaintiff fell re-injuring

his ankle. Defendant Barr refused to summon medical attention. 

On July 11, 2002, Plaintiff was transported to Corcoran State Prison to be seen by an

Orthopaedic Surgeon. Plaintiff states he learned that his foot was broken and that he was made

to be without treatment for nine days. Plaintiff also asserts that he was not given any ambulatory

aids during this period which was demeaning and humiliating. On July 12, 2002, Plaintiff was

taken to Kern Medical Center for surgery for the injury sustained to his ankle the first time. 

Plaintiff states that this is because of the Defendant’s “deliberate indifference.” Plaintiff names

Dr. Bernard Korad, Correctional Officers Barr, Lopez, Rivera, Thomson, Medical Technical

Assistant Carrew, Facility Captain Traynham and Does 1 to 20 as Defendants and is seeking is

seeking monetary damages. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

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federal rights.

Plaintiff was previously informed of the linkage requirement, however, as noted below,

he again fails to link some of the Defendant to any act or omission giving rise to the

Constitutional violations alleged. 

2. Eighth Amendment - Medical Care

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of

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deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

As in the case before, Plaintiff’s allegation that Dr. Korad did not provide him with

crutches or a cane is a disagreement with treatment. As such, Plaintiff does not state a

cognizable claim for relief against him. 

Plaintiff alleges that he complained about his pain to various individuals, however, his

allegations are not specific in that they do not allege facts that these defendants knew of and

disregarded a serious risk to Plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory. Plaintiff

must be specific regarding his requests for medical care, to whom they were made, when they

were made and the result. A general statement that he complained to staff about his condition is

insufficient. 

Plaintiff’s allegation that he complained to MTA Carrew that he needed a cane or

walking aid is again, a disagreement in treatment. Plaintiff does not allege facts that MTA’s

failure to get him a cane constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. As stated above, to state a

cognizable Eighth Amendment claim he must allege facts to support the elements outlined above. 

Plaintiff allegation that Defendant Barr was unable to support him physically, that he fell

re-injuring his ankle and that Defendant bar did not summon medical care is also insufficient to

state a claim for relief. Plaintiff does not allege facts that Defendants actions or inaction posed a

serious risk to Plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff should note that merely stating that Defendant Barr

was deliberately indifferent or repeating the above is insufficient. Again, Plaintiff must allege

facts that demonstrate the elements of an Eighth Amendment claim. 

As noted above, Plaintiff does not link Doe Defendants 1 through 20 or Defendants

Traynham, Lopez, Rivera or Thomson to any act or omission giving rise to a constitutional

violation. Plaintiff states, in a conclusory fashion, that these Defendants “failed in their duty to

summon medical care.” However, there are no facts alleged that support that these individuals

knew of and disregarded a serious risk to Plaintiff’s health. 

3. Negligence

A public employee is liable for injury to a prisoner “proximately caused by his negligent

or wrongful act or omission.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 844.6(d) (West 2001). “To establish

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negligence, a party must prove the following: (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such

legal duty; (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Hair v. State, 2

Cal. Rptr. 2nd 871, 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to give rise to a state law claim of negligence. 

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with

the opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above

should he wish to do so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Second Amended Complaint how the conditions

complained of resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The Second Amended Complaint must specifically state how

each Defendant is involved. Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423, U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th

Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Second Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference

the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

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2. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. WITHIN

THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by

the Court in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a Second

Amended Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary

dismiss the case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 24, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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