Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00721/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00721-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW R. LOPEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

ARNOLD SCHWARZENNEGER, )

GOVERNOR, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:10-cv—00721-SMS-HC

ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO

EXHAUST STATE REMEDIES (Doc. 1)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

REQUESTS FOR STAY, AMENDMENT, AND

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Doc. 2)

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

CLOSE THE CASE AND TO SEND A

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT FORM TO

PETITIONER

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1),

Petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of the United States

Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case,

including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting consent in

a signed writing filed by Petitioner on May 7, 2010 (doc. 4). 

Pending before the Court are Petitioner’s petition for writ of

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habeas corpus and a motion for stay pending state exhaustion

filed on April 26, 2010.

I. Screening the Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....”

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must

state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional

error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption;

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n. 7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition

that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to

summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th

Cir. 1990).

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas

corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to

the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

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II. The Petition

Petitioner complains of a loss of ninety days of credit, and

a later denial of parole on December 7, 2009, resulting from a

prison disciplinary proceeding conducted in Petitioner’s absence

on or about May 15, 2009. (Pet. 1, 11-12.) Petitioner seeks

dismissal of the findings and expungement of the disciplinary

record.

Although Petitioner’s immediate custodian would be an

appropriate respondent, Petitioner names the governor of

California as the respondent. Such a defect is curable. 

However, because of other, incurable defects in the petition, the

Court does not address Petitioner’s failure to name a proper

respondent in this screening order.

III. Claims concerning Conditions of Confinement

A federal court may only grant a state prisoner’s petition

for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner can show that "he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A habeas corpus

petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the

legality or duration of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d

573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 485 (1973)); Advisory committee notes to Rule 1 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, 1976 adoption.

In contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 is the proper method for a prisoner to challenge the

conditions of that confinement. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S.

136, 141-42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at

574; Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing

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Section 2254 Cases, 1976 Adoption. 

In this case, Petitioner alleges that staff at the jail

failed to provide him with medical treatment. It is not clear to

what extent Petitioner seeks to remedy this failure in this

habeas proceeding. However, to the extent that Petitioner is

challenging his medical care, he challenges the conditions of his

confinement. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief

concerning his conditions of confinement, and this petition must

be dismissed insofar as Petitioner seeks habeas relief for prison

conditions.

Further, Petitioner alleges generally that no other

petitions or applications have been filed in state court,

unspecified prison officials are impeding his access to copying

services and envelopes needed to submit a petition to state

courts, and Petitioner lacks the ability to submit a state

petition. (Pet. 2-3.) These allegations relate to conditions of

confinement and not the legality or duration of Petitioner’s

confinement, and thus they must be dismissed. 

Should Petitioner wish to pursue his claims concerning

prison conditions, he must do so by way of a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Clerk will be

directed to send an appropriate form complaint to Petitioner. 

IV. Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to

the granting of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the

state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to

correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman

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v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10

(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

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alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982)), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

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481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

In this case, Petitioner does not allege that he has

exhausted state court remedies. Further, as previously noted,

Petitioner complains generally that prison officials are impeding

his ability to submit a state petition, and he affirmatively

requests a stay in order to permit him to perfect his efforts to

exhaust his claims in state court. Finally, he admits that he

has not exhausted his grounds due to unspecified “impediments.”

(Pet. 5, 3.) 

The Court thus concludes that in view of Petitioner’s

admission that he has not exhausted his claims in the state

courts, the petition is unexhausted and must be dismissed insofar

as the petition concerns the prison disciplinary proceedings and

findings and any denial of parole. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

V. Petitioner’s Motion for a Stay and Injunctive Relief 

At the time he filed his petition, Petitioner filed a

request for a stay of the petition pending exhaustion in the

state courts, and permission to file an amended petition upon

completing exhaustion. (Request, doc. 2, 1:6-12, 2:8-14.)

Petitioner also requests the Court to order unspecified

prison officials to allow him access to the law library and its

services, such as copying documents and providing envelopes,

which Petitioner alleges that R. Rosenthal, senior librarian, is

obstructing. (Id. at 2:16-26.)

///

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A. Motion for a Stay

Petitioner seeks a stay of his completely unexhausted

federal petition. 

Petitioner may be seeking a stay pursuant to Rhines v.

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005), where it was held that a federal

district court may stay a habeas petition containing a mixture of

exhausted and unexhausted claims to allow a petitioner to present

unexhausted claims to the state court if 1) the petitioner has

good cause for the failure to exhaust, 2) the unexhausted claims

are meritorious, and 3) there is no indication that the

petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.

However, the Court cannot proceed pursuant to Rhines where

the petition contains not a mixture of exhausted and unexhausted

claims, but rather contains only unexhausted claims. Rhines

applies to stays of mixed petitions. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d

654, 659-661 (9th Cir. 2005). Where a petition is fully

unexhausted, the stay and abeyance procedure discussed in Rhines

does not apply; rather, dismissal of the entire petition is

required. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006). 

Further, the fully unexhausted petition before the Court is

not a “protective” petition as discussed in Pace v. Diguglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005). The Court’s ruling in Pace was

premised on the fact that the petition was “mixed,” not

completely unexhausted. 

The Court will not consider staying the petition pursuant to

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9 Cir. 2003) because there is no th

petition before the Court containing fully exhausted claims. 

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See, King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1134-35 (9 Cir. 2009). th

Because the petition contains only claims that are

unexhausted, a stay is unavailable under Rhines or Kelly. 

Therefore, the request for a stay will be denied, and the

petition will be dismissed on the ground that it is completely

unexhausted. 

Because the petition will be dismissed, Petitioner’s request

to amend the petition upon exhausting the claims raised in the

petition will be denied as moot.

The Court further notes that with respect to Petitioner’s

generalized allegations of restricted access to services related

to exhausting his administrative remedies, Petitioner will be

able to set forth specific facts concerning any specific

instances of restricted access in a civil rights complaint.

B. Request for Injunctive Relief 

Insofar as Petitioner asks the Court to direct prison

officials’ actions, Petitioner is seeking injunctive relief.

As previously noted, it is established that a federal court

may only grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the

petitioner can show that "he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A habeas corpus petition is the correct method

for a prisoner to challenge the legality or duration of his

confinement, but not to challenge the conditions of his

confinement.

In the request for relief with respect to Petitioner’s

access to the library and related services, Petitioner seeks to

challenge the conditions of his confinement, and not the legality

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or duration of his confinement. Thus, these particular claims

are cognizable in a civil rights action rather than a petition

for writ of habeas corpus. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for injunctive relief will

be denied.

VI. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to a court of appeals

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 336 (2003). A certificate of appealability may issue

only if the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a

petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or

that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336

(quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). A

certificate should issue if the Petitioner shows that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in any procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). In determining this issue, a court

conducts an overview of the claims in the habeas petition,

generally assesses their merits, and determines whether the

resolution was debatable among jurists of reason or wrong. Id. 

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It is necessary for an applicant to show more than an absence of

frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, it is not

necessary for an applicant to show that the appeal will succeed. 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

A district court must issue or deny a certificate of

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the

applicant. Habeas Rule 11(a).

Here, because Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted or relate

only to conditions of confinement, jurists of reason would not

find it debatable whether the Court was correct in its ruling. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right, and the Court declines to issue

a certificate of appealability. 

VI. Disposition

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1) Insofar as the petition for writ of habeas corpus seeks

relief from conditions of confinement, including but not limited

to Petitioner’s medical care and access to the library and other

services in his institution of confinement, the petition is

DISMISSED without prejudice to Petitioner’s right to file a civil

rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983; and

2) Petitioner’s requests for a stay, for leave to file an

amended petition after exhausting his claims concerning

disciplinary proceedings and findings and the denial of parole,

and for injunctive relief are DENIED; and

3) Insofar as the petition for writ of habeas corpus seeks

relief with respect to prison disciplinary proceedings and

findings and denial of parole, the petition for writ of habeas

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corpus is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of exhaustion of

state court remedies; and

4) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of

appealability; and

5) The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail to Petitioner a form for

filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a

person in custody; and

6) The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case because this

order terminates the action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 20, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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