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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 15, 2015*

Decided May 28, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐2833

CARL J. MCDANIEL,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL MEISNER, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 12‐CV‐1178

Nancy Joseph,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Carl McDaniel, a Wisconsin inmate, was assaulted by his cellmate at Columbia

Correctional Institution (“Columbia”). He was immediately transferred to Wisconsin

Resource Center (“WRC”), a secure treatment facility. McDaniel later filed this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claiming that six defendants at Columbia failed to

protect him from an assault and that two more defendants at WRC withheld necessary

medical care. The district court (a magistrate judge presiding by consent) screened

McDaniel’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and permitted him to proceed with his

Eighth Amendment and state tort claims. On the defendants’ motion, the court

                                                  *

After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.

Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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dismissed the entire action on the ground that McDaniel had not complied with the

exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Because we hold that McDaniel

exhausted his failure‐to‐protect claims, we remand those claims for further proceedings.

For purposes of this appeal, we accept as true the allegations in McDaniel’s

complaint. McDaniel was assaulted by his cellmate, Ryan Olson, at Columbia on

March 8, 2012. Olson was known to be dangerous; he already had assaulted other

inmates and staff at Columbia. A week before the March 8 incident, McDaniel alerted a

prison psychiatrist that he feared for his safety because Olson was threatening him. The

psychiatrist asked several Columbia administrators to move McDaniel into a single cell

or to protective custody. McDaniel also wrote to the warden, deputy warden, and

security director at Columbia, informing them of his concerns. His requests to be moved

were denied. Olson severely beat McDaniel about the face, arms, ribs, and stomach

when, at 3:30 a.m. on March 8, McDaniel asked Olson to lower the volume on his

television. That same day, McDaniel was transferred to WRC. A physician and the

infirmary manager at that facility refused to provide medical treatment for his injuries,

including damage to his inner ear, which has left McDaniel with permanent hearing loss.

After his transfer to WRC, McDaniel submitted multiple grievances, four of

which addressed the March 8 assault. In offender complaint number WRC‐2012‐5881,

submitted on March 18, 2012, McDaniel complained about a history of abuse from

inmates culminating in Olson’s assault on March 8. McDaniel explained that his

previous cellmate had assaulted him on December 13, 2011, and that he had been

granted “pair with care” status. McDaniel then recounted that, at the beginning of

March, he had been assigned to share a cell with Olson, whose history of violence was

known to staff. The grievance states that McDaniel told a female physician, who visited

him six days in a row, including the day before the assault, that Olson was a

“‘firecracker’ with the fuse lit,” and that he “needed out.” The physician told McDaniel

that psychological services could not give him the relief that he requested. The grievance

then details his assault, alleging that he “suffered a beating so bad I can’t remember the

actual beating.” At the top of the grievance form, McDaniel wrote “December 13, 2011”

in the space marked “Date of Incident.” The inmate complaint examiner (or “examiner”)

rejected the grievance with the explanation that McDaniel previously had submitted a

grievance about the December 2011 assault. The reviewing authority characterized the

examiner’s decision as “appropriate.”

McDaniel submitted offender complaint number WRC‐2012‐6510, his second

grievance, on March 25, 2012. This grievance similarly recounts that McDaniel had been

beaten by Olson after repeated requests to be moved for his safety. McDaniel wrote,

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“Considering all the proper steps I took to prevent this[,] Staff still left me in a violent &

‘Hands‐Tied’...position.” He stated that he “would like single (cell status) till further

notice.” The examiner rejected the grievance, stating: “Cell assignments [sic] decisions

are made by the IUS and Treatment Team. Cell assignment is not within the scope of

institution Complaint System.” The examiner said nothing about the timeliness of the

grievance. McDaniel promptly filed an administrative appeal emphasizing that the

grievance “wasn’t simply a complaint requesting a single cell” and that, instead, it

“complained that I had been assaulted.” Prison staff, he asserted, had been “very aware

of the immediate threat to my safety and failed to reasonably respond.” Their “level of

deliberate indifference and reckless and hazardous negligence,” he added, had

constituted “an 8th Amendment violation” that should be “investigated fully.” The

reviewing authority upheld the rejection, stating that it was “appropriately rejected” as

outside the scope of the complaint system.1

McDaniel’s two remaining grievances alleged that he was denied medical care. In

offender complaint number WRC‐2012‐14356, submitted on July 4, 2012, he stated that

“[t]he health care [that he] received since arriving at WRC has been systematically

inadequate at best.” He references the “numerous health care requests [that he]

submitted.” The examiner rejected his grievance for failing to allege sufficient facts to

indicate “how the treatment provided has effected [sic] his health,” or to identify a

specific incident. In offender complaint number WRC‐2012‐19687, submitted two

months later, McDaniel specifically alleged that he did not receive appropriate medical

care following the March 8 assault. The examiner rejected the grievance as untimely. The

examiners’ rejections of McDaniel’s medical‐care grievances were found appropriate by

the reviewing authority.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that McDaniel

had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The defendants maintained that

McDaniel failed to exhaust the remedies for his failure‐to‐protect claims because the

March 18 grievance listed December 13, 2011, as the “date of incident,” and the

remaining grievances were untimely. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 310.09(6) (unless

excused for good cause, inmate “shall file a complaint within 14 calendar days after the

occurrence giving rise to the complaint”). The defendants submitted that McDaniel

failed to exhaust his medical‐care claims because he failed to allege sufficient facts in

                                                  1 McDaniel also filed offender complaint number WRC‐2012‐6539, which was received on the

same day as complaint number 6510. The grievance was denied because the issue previously had been

addressed in complaints 6510 and 5881. On September 17, 2012, McDaniel submitted a fourth grievance,

offender complaint number WRC‐2012‐19685, addressing his March 8 assault. The grievance was rejected

as untimely.   

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complaint number 14356 and he filed complaint number 19687 more than fourteen days

after the incident.   

In granting summary judgment for the defendants, the district court accepted

their contention that McDaniel failed to exhaust his claims. The district court reasoned

that the examiner could not have been expected to associate the March 18 grievance with

the assault by Olson on March 8, 2012, because it gives the date of incident as

December 13. The court continued by explaining that, even if it were to look past the

incorrect date, it could not “conclude that this offender complaint presented only one

issue or that any one issue was clearly identified,” as required by the Wisconsin

Administrative Code. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 310.09(1)(e). The court then

concluded that the remainder of McDaniel’s grievances “were indisputably submitted

outside the 14 calendar day time limit and were rejected as untimely or as having been

previously addressed.”2 The district court dismissed McDaniel’s claims and the case

without prejudice.3

On appeal, the defendants present substantially the same arguments. They

submit that McDaniel failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that his claims

therefore are barred. McDaniel primarily maintains that the defendants withheld the

reviewing authority’s decision addressing his appeal of the March 18 grievance and that,

because they prevented him from pursuing his appeal, the defendants are unable to rely

on his failure to exhaust under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). He also submits, however, that the

examiners overlooked any procedural defects in his grievances and addressed their

merits.   

                                                  2 Although it is not immediately clear from its order, we presume that the court included

McDaniel’s medical‐care claims in its decision rejecting “the rest of McDaniel’s offender complaints

regarding his claims in this case.” As previously discussed, McDaniel filed two grievances alleging that he

did not receive adequate medical treatment at WRC (numbers 14356 and 19687). We agree with the

defendants that complaint number 14356, which alleged an “ongoing” incident, was insufficient to alert

the examiner to the nature of the wrong for which redress was sought. See Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650

(7th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the examiner rejected complaint number 19687, which referenced the March

8 assault, as untimely. Complaint number 6539, which the examiner rejected for raising an issue

previously raised, did allege that a defendant “made medical judgments beyond his capacity causing

undue pain & suffering.” However, McDaniel does not name that defendant under his medical‐care

claims. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing those claims based on McDaniel’s failure

to exhaust his administrative remedies.

3 The district court did not address directly McDaniel’s state‐law claims. We note that the

exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act do not apply to state‐law claims. See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (requiring exhaustion for actions brought under “section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law” (emphasis added)). On remand, the district court will have the opportunity to consider those

claims.

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides that “[n]o action

shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” We have adopted a

“strict compliance approach” to the exhaustion requirement. See Dole v. Chandler, 438

F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (“To

exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the

time, the prison’s administrative rules require.”). We have explained, however, that a

defendant’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is forgiven, i.e., the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied, if prison officials ignore a grievance’s administrative

failings and address its merits. 4 With these principles in mind, we now address

McDaniel’s administrative grievances in turn to determine whether he exhausted the

available administrative remedies.    

The district court decided that, by listing December 13, 2011, as the date of the

incident, the March 18 grievance failed to adequately apprise the examiner of

McDaniel’s failure‐to‐protect claim related to the March 8 assault. Although Wisconsin

requires that an inmate’s grievance “clearly identify the issue,” WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC

§ 310.09(1)(e), the governing regulations do not require that the date of the incident be

specified at the top of the grievance form. Where the regulations are silent, “a grievance

suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.”

See Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002). It is clear that McDaniel’s grievance

satisfies that standard, and we cannot accept the district court’s conclusion that an

examiner would not have understood the March 18 grievance as addressing the March 8

assault. The grievance identified a history of abuse at the hands of cellmates and

culminated by describing the March 8 assault. McDaniel explained that the defendants

did nothing to protect him after he alerted them that Olson, his newly assigned cellmate,

was dangerous. We are not persuaded by the defendants’ argument that McDaniel’s

mistake in listing December 13, 2011, at the top of the form prevented them from

understanding that McDaniel was seeking relief for the March 8 assault. Nor can we

                                                  4 See, e.g., Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Failure to comply with administrative

deadlines dooms the claim except where the institution treats the filing as timely and resolves it on the

merits.”); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Consider once more the analogy to

collateral attack: if a state court accepts a belated filing, and considers it on the merits, that step makes the

filing ‘proper’ for purposes of state law and avoids exhaustion, default, and timeliness hurdles in federal

court.”). “[W]hen a state treats a filing as timely and resolves it on the merits, the federal judiciary will not

second‐guess that action, for the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting

corrective action.” Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004).

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accept the defendants’ contention, made for the first time on appeal, that McDaniel did

not timely appeal the rejection of this grievance. The record demonstrates that the

reviewing authority addressed McDaniel’s administrative appeal on the merits and said

nothing about its being untimely.   

The district court also determined that McDaniel failed to exhaust his March 18

grievance because it improperly included multiple issues. The examiner, however, did

not reject the grievance on that ground. Instead, it rejected the grievance for raising an

issue that it believed was “previously addressed.” Although the examiner’s decision

may appear procedural at first blush, it was a merits‐based determination premised on

the examiner’s interpretation of the grievance. It therefore was inappropriate for the

court to enforce an administrative requirement not relied upon by the examiner.

Accordingly, McDaniel sufficiently exhausted the available administrative remedies for

his March 18 grievance.

McDaniel likewise exhausted the available remedies for his March 25

administrative grievance. Although McDaniel submitted the grievance more than

fourteen days after the assault, the examiner passed over the question of timeliness.

Instead, the examiner looked to the substance of the grievance and rejected it after

determining that it requested relief that was outside the scope of the grievance system.

McDaniel unsuccessfully appealed the grievance to the reviewing authority. He thus

satisfied the requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies, and the district

court erred by determining independently that the grievance was untimely.   

By providing prison officials with enough information to address the wrong for

which he sought relief, McDaniel exhausted the administrative remedies available to

him under Wisconsin’s administrative procedures. Because neither the examiners nor

the reviewing authority rejected McDaniel’s grievances addressing the March 8 assault

for failing to comply with the governing administrative procedures, the district court

erred by failing to address the merits of McDaniel’s claims. We VACATE the dismissal of

McDaniel’s claims that the defendants failed to protect him from the assault and

REMAND for further proceedings.   

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