Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01266/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01266-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSICA SCHROEDER, by and through her

guardian ad litem MARINA LANERI

SCHROEDER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv1266-IEG(RBB)

Order Granting in Part and Denying in

Part Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike;

Granting Motion to Approve

Compromise of Claim; Granting

Motion to Establish Special Needs

Trust [Doc. Nos. 135, 136, 137]

vs.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT; THE BOARD OF EDUCATION

OF THE SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT; KIMBERLY CHAMBERS,

individually and in her official capacity as a

special education teacher for the San Diego

Unified School District; MICHAEL

JIMENEZ, individually and in his official

capacity as a vice-principal for the San Diego

Unified School District; and SUE SKINNER,

individually and in her official capacity as a

school counselor for the San Diego Unified

School District,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Jessica Schroeder, by and through her Guardian ad Litem Marina Schroeder,

moves the Court for an order (1) striking the attorneys’ fees lien of former counsel Amy and Tom

Vandeveld, (2) approving the settlement of her claims against Defendants, and (3) establishing a

special needs trust for distribution of the settlement funds. The Vandevelds have filed an

opposition to the motion to strike the attorneys fees lien, and Plaintiff has filed a reply as to that

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motion. The Court found the motions appropriate for submission on the papers and without oral

argument, and vacated the hearing date. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 

Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Vandevelds’ lien for attorneys fees and costs, and GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion for approval of the settlement and motion to establish a Special Needs Trust.

Procedural History

Plaintiff initially filed her complaint on July12, 2007, alleging causes of action against the

San Diego Unified School District and teacher Kimberly Chambers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title

II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and California

Civil Code § 51.9, as well as negligence. Plaintiff’s mother, Marina Laneri Schroeder, asserted a

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the District and Ms. Chambers. 

Plaintiff also alleged a claim for battery against Fernando Ortiz, the student who sexually abused

her, and alleged Fernando’s parents, Henry and Sylvia Ortiz, were vicariously liable for their son’s

actions.

Defendants Fernando, Henry, and Sylvia Ortiz filed answers to the complaint on

September 14, 2007. Defendants, the District and Ms. Chambers, moved to dismiss the complaint

for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). By order filed November 26, 2007,

the Court denied Defendants’ motion. 

Plaintiff’s original counsel, Amy and Thomas Vandeveld, withdrew from representation on

June 27, 2008, and new counsel substituted into the case on August 13, 2008. On November 11,

2008, Plaintiff moved the Court for leave to file an amended complaint. The Court granted that

motion and on February 5, 2009, Plaintiff filed her amended complaint. Plaintiff’s amended

complaint deleted all claims against Fernando, Henry, and Sylvia Ortiz, and also deleted Marina

Laneri Schroeder’s individual claim. Plaintiff added two new Defendants, Michael Jimenez and

Sue Skinner. Plaintiff deleted all of her claims under the ADA and California Civil Code, and

alleged only claims under § 1983 as well as negligence. 

The Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims under

§ 1983. Prior to the Pretrial Conference, the parties reached a settlement of all Plaintiff’s claims. 

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The parties have agreed to settle the entire case for the sum of $400,000. Plaintiff’s current

counsel were retained based on a contingency fee agreement, under which they are entitled to onethird of the gross recovery plus litigation costs. Thus, current counsel is entitled to $133,333.33 in

fees and $74,619.33 in litigation expenses. However, current counsel have agreed to accept a total

of $175,000 for all their fees and costs. With the payment of certain other expenses, Plaintiff will

receive slightly less than $220,000 in settlement of her claims.

Factual Background

At the time of the incident which is the subject of this lawsuit, the Spring of 2006, Jessica

was an 18-year old severely mentally retarded young woman with the functional ability of a young

child. [Amended Complaint, ¶ 3.] Jessica was a student in Kimberly Chambers’ Integrated Life

Skills (“ILS”) class at Serra High School within the District. The purpose of this class is to teach

students with a low level of mental functioning certain basic skills, such as buying groceries and

riding the bus, so that they can function in society.

Fernando Ortiz was also a student at Serra High School, and was assigned to be a “peer

tutor” in Ms. Chambers’ classroom in the spring semester of 2006. Ortiz was in Ms. Chambers’

room acting as a peer tutor on the afternoon of April 17, 2006 when he sexually assaulted Jessica. 

The abuse occurred while others, including Ms. Chambers, were in the room engaging in a

bowling activity, and occurred off and on over a period of about 30 minutes. Information in

Ortiz’s background likely should have led school officials to recognize he could be a danger to

those, like Jessica, who are particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse. Ortiz pled guilty to sexual

assault as a result of the incident.

Facts Underlying Counsel’s Withdrawal from the Action

Plaintiff’s mother and guardian ad litem, Marina Schroeder, originally retained Amy

Vandeveld on May 18, 2006, to represent their interests. The parties executed a written retainer

agreement, providing that Ms. Vandeveld would receive a contingency fee in the amount of 40%

of any recovery achieved after the “first Court Conference or hearing in this Action.” [Plaintiff’s

Motion to Strike, Exhibit A.] This action was filed in federal court on July 13, 2007. The parties

entered into a revised fee agreement on December 17, 2007, explicitly providing that Thomas

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Vandeveld could be associated as counsel to work on the case and share in any fees. [Vandevelds’

Opposition to Motion to Strike, Exhibit 15.] 

In June of 2008, a conflict developed between Marina Schroeder and the Vandevelds. The

Vandevelds questioned Marina’s honesty based upon several discrepancies between what Marina

told them about Jessica’s behavior and information reflected in the medical records. In particular,

the Vandevelds began to question Marina closely about her claims that Jessica’s behavior changed

dramatically after the sexual assault. Marina told the Vandevelds that before the assault Jessica

was “loving and affectionate” and not aggressive. However, a review of Jessica’s medical records

revealed numerous references to Jessica’s aggression toward her sister and mother before the

incident. In addition, although Marina told the Vandevelds that Jessica was unable to sleep and

began wandering around the house after the assault, the medical records made several references

to Jessica wandering the house during the night, commenting that chimes had been put on Jessica’s

door because of this problem as many as two years before the assault. The Vandevelds also

believed Marina had been dishonest about whether there was a man living in the home, about

whether Jessica’s treating neurologist, Dr. Grossman, would support Plaintiff’s claim regarding

changes in behavior, and about the legal status of workers who helped Marina with Jessica’s inhome care.

To address all of these issues, the Vandevelds met with Marina on June 9, 2008. 

Following that meeting, Marina sent Amy Vandeveld an email addressing the alleged discrepancy

as to whether or not there was a man living in her house. In that email, Marina noted The meeting

today has left me very unsettled. Instead of finding solutions to the problems that are arising all

you have done is to doubt my credibility by assuming I am lying to you in regards to a stepfather

in the house.... I have left the meeting today with an overwhelming feeling of doom, which I find

inconceivable as we are supposed to work together in giving my daughter a voice.

[Vandevelds’ Opposition to Motion to Strike, Exhibit 5.] 

Amy responded by email on June 11, 2008, reiterating her belief that Marina was not being

honest, particularly with regard to a man living in the home and Jessica’s behavior before and after

the incident as reflected in the records of Dr. Grossman:

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I would like to continue representing you in this action, but I cannot do so if I feel

that you are being untruthful with me and/or that your settlement position is

unreasonable. ... LET ME BE VERY CLEAR. I EXPECT YOU TO TELL ME

THE TRUTH AT ALL TIMES. EVEN IF THE TRUTH MAY NOT BE HELPFUL

TO YOUR CASE. TESTIMONY AT DEPOSITION, STATEMENTS

RESPONDING TO DISCOVERY, AND TRIAL TESTIMONY IS GIVEN

UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY. IF YOU ARE UNTRUTHFUL, YOU MAY

BE FOUND BY A COURT TO HAVE COMMITTED PERJURY, WHICH IS A

CRIME. IF I BELIEVE YOU HAVE PROVIDED FALSE TESTIMONY, I WILL

IMMEDIATELY MOVE TO BE RELIEVED AS YOUR AND JESSICA’S

ATTORNEY.

[Id., Exhibit 6 (emphasis in original).] 

Marina responded by very lengthy email on the same date, the pertinent parts of which

follow:

Amy, there cannot be a lawyer client relationship if you keep distrusting my

statements. All you have done [sic] the other day is doubt my credibility, attack my

character and find problems instead of solutions. ... I cannot believe that you

doubted me instead of suggesting that the records could be rectified.

* * * 

If you ask me, Dr. Grossman would look silly on the witness stand. Actually it

doesn’t even matter if she is more aggressive or not because of the attack .... Well,

in my opinion, for the reasons mentioned herein, Dr. Grossman is the least qualified

person to determine the outcome of the case. Her opinion can easily be challenged.

This is where you and I differ, and this might have caused the breakdown in our

communication. 

* * *

It doesn’t matter if she was quiet at Chadwick and aggressive at the doctor’s office.

It DOESN’T MATTER! She was violated, thats [sic] what matters!! I have no

problems in continuing to work with you and I am truthful to you even though you

think the contrary.

[Id., Exhibit 7.] 

Several days later, on June 19, 2008, Amy told Marina they “need to speak regarding the

status of this case and whether we can continue an attorney-client relationship. If we cannot, I will

need to withdraw from this case.” [Id., Exhibit 8.] Finally, on June 27, 2008, a disagreement

arose between Amy and Marina regarding scheduling a meeting with Dr. Grossman. Marina

accused Amy of lying about her attempts to schedule an appointment to meet with Dr. Grossman. 

[Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, Exhibit B.] Amy responded by email approximately 45 minutes later,

disputing Marina’s account of her communications with Dr. Grossman’s office. The email

concluded as follows:

I think it is in everyone’s best interest for you to find another attorney. I am

invoking the clause in our fee agreement that allows me to withdraw from

representation of you and Jessica. Unless we receive a substitution of attorney form

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for my execution no later than July 15, 2008, we will file a motion to withdraw. 

Good luck to you.

Discussion

1. Motion to Enforce Attorneys Fees Lien

The Vandevelds have asserted a lien against the settlement proceeds in the amount of

$119,494.63, which reflects $84,337.50 in fees for Amy Vandeveld, $1,854.63 in costs for Amy

Vandeveld, and $33,302.50 in fees for Thomas Vandeveld. Plaintiff argues the Court should strike

the lien, and refuse to award the Vandevelds any fees or costs, because (a) counsel failed to advise

Plaintiff of the potential conflict created by the lien clause and her right to seek the advice of

independent counsel as required by Cal. R. Prof. Conduct. 3-300, and (b) counsel voluntarily

withdrew from representing Plaintiff and thus are not entitled to fees pursuant to established

California law. 

a. Is the lien clause valid?

Plaintiffs originally retained the Vandevelds on a contingent fee basis. The fee agreement’s

lien provision, which the Vandevelds now seeks to enforce, provides :”Client agrees that Counsel,

and any other attorneys associated into the Action, shall have a lien for services rendered and costs

advanced on any sums recovered, whether by settlement, judgment or motion, regardless of

whether the Agreement is terminated by the Client or by Counsel.” [Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike,

Exhibit A, p. 5, ¶ VIII.] Plaintiff argues this clause is unenforceable, however, because counsel

failed to comply with Rule 3-300 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. 

Rule 3-300 provides that an attorney must not act in a manner adverse to his or her client

unless each of the following are satisfied:

(A) The transaction or acquisition and its terms are fair and

reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in

writing to the client in a manner which should reasonably have been

understood by the client; and

(B) The client is advised in writing that the client may seek

the advice of an independent lawyer of the client’s choice and is

given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; and

(C) The client thereafter consents in writing to the terms of

the transaction or the terms of the acquisition.

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This rule applies where an attorney seeks to obtain a lien interest in the client’s property in order

to secure payment the payment of fees, because a charging lien against a client’s future judgment

or recovery is “adverse to the client.” Fletcher v. Davis, 33 Cal. 4th 61, 69 (2004). However, as

the California Court of Appeal recently recognized, “[t]he inclusion of a charging lien in the initial

contingency fee agreement does not create an ‘adverse interest’ to the client within the meaning of

rule 3-300 ....” Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP, ___ Cal. Rptr. 3d ___, 2010 WL 1645041 at *6

(Apr. 26, 2010) (quoting State Bar Standing Com. on Prof. Responsibility & Conduct, Formal

Opn. No. 2006-170, p. 7). Therefore, the Court concludes the Vandevelds have a valid lien by

virtue of the clause included in the contingency fee agreement.

b. Did counsel withdraw voluntarily?

Plaintiff also argues the Vandevelds cannot enforce their lien for fees because the parties

entered into a contingency fee agreement and counsel voluntarily withdrew from the case before

Plaintiff received any recovery. In response, the Vandevelds argue they were required to withdraw

from the case because Marina Schroeder refused to be truthful with them, creating a conflict

between Marina and Jessica’s interests. The Vandevelds also argue Marina’s failure to be truth

created a strong likelihood counsel would be used as a vehicle to present false information to the

Court.

A California attorney retained solely on the basis of a contingency fee agreement may not

voluntarily withdraw from representing a client and later seek fees for the reasonable value of

services rendered. Estate of Falco v. Decker, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 1014 (1987). The reason

behind the bar is “the inequity of allowing lawyers to capitalize on their own voluntary actions in

leaving clients lawyerless.” Rus, Milband & Smith v. Conkle & Olesten, 113 Cal. App. 4th 656,

675 (2004). 

To allow an attorney under a contingency fee agreement to withdraw without

compulsion and still seek fees from any future recovery is to shift the time, effort

and risk of obtaining the recovery (economists would refer to these things as the

“costs” of obtaining recovery) from the attorney, who originally agreed to bear

those particular costs in the first place, to the client. 

Id. at 675-76. 

In order to obtain fees after withdrawing from a contingency fee representation, counsel

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Rule 3-700(B)(2) provides that a member must withdraw from representing a client where “[t]he member

knows or should know that continued employment will result in violation of these rules or of the State Bar Act.”

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must show he or she had to withdraw for ethical reasons and, in fact, withdrew for that justifiable

reason. Falco, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 1015. Under this heightened standard, in order to recover in

quantum meruit after withdrawing from a representation based upon a contingency fee

arrangement, an attorney must show the following:

(1) counsel’s withdrawal was mandatory, not merely permissive, under statute or

State Bar rules; (2) the overwhelming and primary motivation for counsel’s

withdrawal was the obligation to adhere to these ethical imperatives under statute or

State Bar rules; (3) counsel commenced the action in good faith; (4) subsequent to

counsel’s withdrawal, the client obtained recovery; and (5) counsel has

demonstrated that his work contributed in some measurable degree towards the

client’s ultimate recovery.

Id. at 1016. “While a personality clash between the parties may provide good reason for allowing

the attorney to withdraw, it is not necessarily a justifiable reason for purposes of awarding fees.”

Id. at 1014.

Here, the Vandevelds argue they had a mandatory obligation to withdraw under Rule 3-

700(B)(2)1

 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct because Marina’s “concocted damages

claim” created “an irreconcilable conflict of interest between Marina’s interests and Jessica’s

interests.” In addition, the Vandevelds argue they had an ethical duty to the Court to make sure

Marina was telling the truth, and would have been required to withdraw under Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 6068(d) if Marina attempted to present perjured testimony to the Court. Upon review,

however, the Court doubts the Vandevelds were truly motivated to withdraw from this case for the

ethical reasons they now cite. See Falco, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 1015 (warning courts to guard

against attorneys who attempt to abandon their client under the guise of an ethical duty, hoping to

later collect fees if the client eventually recovers through trial or settlement). 

Before terminating the attorney-client relationship, the Vandevelds never told Plaintiffs

they were withdrawing because of a conflict between Marina and Jessica’s interests. Although the

many emails attached to the Vandevelds’ opposition show growing animosity between Amy and

Marina, none of those emails counsel Marina about the potential conflict the Vandevelds now

assert. The Vandevelds never suggested that Marina obtain separate counsel with regard to her

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claims, or that Marina seek another individual to act as Jessica’s guardian ad litem. After they

withdrew from the litigation, the Vandevelds never suggested to Plaintiff or to new counsel that

there was a potential conflict between Marina and Jessica’s interests requiring them to be

separately represented. 

Even if the Vandevelds had an arguable need to withdraw for ethical reasons, the records

submitted to the Court demonstrate the overwhelming and primary reason behind counsel’s

decision to withdraw from the attorney-client relationship was a personality clash leading to a

breakdown in communications. The Vandevelds questioned Marina’s truthfulness, and Marina

questioned the Vandevelds’ handling of the case. The emails between counsel and Plaintiff also

reveal an underlying dispute regarding the value of injuries Jessica suffered from the assault. 

These disputes, and not the Vandevelds’ now-asserted ethical concerns, appear to be the reason

why counsel withdrew from the case. Thus, the Vandevelds are not entitled to recover fees for

their legal services in this case and the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike the

Vandevelds’ attorney’s fees lien. 

Although the Vandevelds are not entitled to attorneys fees, the fee agreement required

Plaintiff to pay costs even if there was no recovery. [Motion to Strike, Exhibit A, p. 1.] Plaintiff

has not shown that California law precludes the Vandevelds from recovering such costs under the

circumstances in this case. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike the

Vandevelds’ lien for costs.

2. Motion to Approve the Settlement

Pursuant to Civil L.R. 17.1, “[n]o action by or on behalf of a minor or incompetent will be

settled, ... without court order.” Under California law, the court must approve the reasonableness

of expenses and attorneys fees paid for the benefit of a minor or person with a disability. Cal.

Prob. Code § 3601. Here, both the settlement and the provision for payment of fees to Plaintiff’s

current counsel is fair and reasonable.

As indicated above, Defendants have agreed to pay $400,000 in settlement of Plaintiff’s

claims. Out of that amount, Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $175,000 in combined fees and costs. From

the remaining $225,000, there are $1,591.45 in medical expenses which must be paid, $3,100 in

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attorneys fees for the creation of the Special Needs Trust, and the $1,854.63 in costs to Amy

Vandeveld. This would leave a final amount of $218,456.92 to be paid to Plaintiff.

Liability and damages in this case were both highly disputed. The Court denied summary

adjudication on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims because there were material issues of fact as to whether

the Defendants affirmatively placed Jessica in a known or obvious dangerous position, and

whether they were deliberately indifferent to that known or obvious risk. Even assuming Plaintiff

could establish each of these elements, there were also substantial issues regarding the nature and

value of the injury Jessica suffered from the sexual assault. Plaintiff was prepared to present

evidence at trial that Jessica’s behavior changed dramatically and negatively after the assault, such

that she would require extensive additional care for the remainder of her life. Defendants argued,

however, that Jessica’s negative behaviors were an issue for many years prior to the assault, such

that any damages were minimal. In light of the numerous factual issues for trial, the Court finds

the proposed settlement to be fair and reasonable.

In addition, the fees sought by Plaintiff’s counsel, Jeffrey Weeks of Weeks & Luchetta

LLP and David Poore of Kahn, Brown and Poore, LLC, are reasonable. Counsel took over this

case in August of 2008. They quickly moved to extend the pretrial deadlines and undertook to

conduct significant discovery which the Vandevelds did not do prior to their withdrawal from the

case. They amended the complaint to delete claims which were of little merit and value, and

focused instead on the § 1983 claim against the District and its employees. They worked with

experts to obtain opinions regarding the injury Jessica suffered, and the value of that injury. Their

work contributed significantly to the Plaintiff’s favorable settlement of her claims against

Defendants. Under the attorneys’ fee agreement, they are entitled to one-third of the gross

recovery, plus litigation expenses. However, counsel have agreed to reduce their fees and costs to

a total of $175,000. The Court finds this amount of fees and costs is reasonable after considering

both the quality of counsel’s work and the result achieved. Therefore, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion to approve the compromise of this action.

3. Motion to Establish Special Needs Trust

Finally, Plaintiff moves the Court for an order establishing a Special Needs Trust to

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administer the settlement proceeds for Jessica’s benefit. The procedure for approval of an

application to establish a Special Needs Trust is set forth in Civil L.R. 17.1. The Plaintiff’s

motion contains all of the information required by the Local Rules, and also complies with Cal.

Probate Code §§ 3600, et seq. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to establish a

Special Needs Trust and will enter a separate order as called for by Civil L.R. 17.1(b)(4)(b)

establishing the trust.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES in part

Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Vandevelds’ lien for attorneys fees in costs. The Vandevelds have

a valid lien for $1,854.63 in costs, but otherwise are not entitled to any attorneys fees for their

services in this case. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to approve the settlement and to

establish a Special Needs Trust. The Court will separately enter an order establishing the Special

Needs Trust.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 12, 2010

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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