Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01144/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01144-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELLY WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-01144-AWI-SMS-P

O R D ER DENYING MOTION FO R

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Doc. 14)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND REQUIRING

PLAINTIFF TO COMPLY WITH

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 14)

Plaintiff Kelly Wilson (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 16, 2006, the Magistrate Judge

assigned to this case screened plaintiff’s amended complaint and found that it failed to state any

claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment

with respect to plaintiff’s medical care. (Doc. 13.) The Court provided plaintiff with two options:

notify the Court that he wishes to proceed on his original complaint against defendants Terhune,

Adams, Castillo, Nguyen, Pak, and Shedler for acting with deliberate indifference to his medical

needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, or file a second amended complaint. On July 11,

2006, plaintiff filed an objection to the order. (Id.) Because there is no provision for an objection

to an order, the Court construes it to be a motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 14.) 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on

grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse

party, . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b). The motion for reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time, in any event “not

more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Id.

Motionsto reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983)

(en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce

the court to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634

F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). The Ninth Circuit

has stated that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as being exclusive of the preceding

clauses.’” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)

(quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1981)). Accordingly, “the clause is

reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. When filing a motion for reconsideration, Local

Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist

which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the

motion.” 

The Magistrate Judge screened plaintiff’s original complaint and found that it stated

cognizable claims for relief against defendants Terhune, Adams, Castillo, Nguyen, Pak, and Shedler

for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, but did not contain any other claims upon which relief may be granted under section

1983. (Doc. 10.) Specifically, the complaint did not state cognizable claims against the Yuba City

Police Department, the Sutter County Sheriff’s Department, or CDC. (Id.) The Magistrate found

that the claims against the YubaCityPolice Department and the Sutter County Sheriff’s Department,

which stemmed from eventsin 1996, were time barred, and CDC was entitled to immunity from suit.

(Id.) Although the Magistrate did not believe plaintiff could cure the deficiencies in his claims

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 There are two defendants with the last name of Nguyen. One is/was employed at CSP-Calipatria and the 1

other is/was employed at CSATF. Although plaintiff named both as defendants in his original complaint, the

complaint contained no facts linking an act or omission of Nguyen at CSATF to a violation of plaintiff’s rights. 

Therefore, the original complaint states a claim against the Nguyen at CSP-Calipatria only.

 Plaintiff’s original complaint was nineteen pages long, not including exhibits. The statement of claim set

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forth in plaintiff’s amended complaint is only one paragraph. 

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against these defendants, in an abundance of caution, she provided plaintiff with the opportunity to

file an amended complaint if plaintiff wished to do so. (Id.) In the alternative, plaintiff could have

notified the Court that he did not wish to amend and was willing to proceed only on his cognizable

claims. (Id.)

Plaintiff chose to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 12.) When the Magistrate Judge

screened plaintiff’s amended complaint, she found that it did not state any claims upon which relief

may be granted. (Doc. 13.) In her order, the Magistrate Judge stated 

In its order filed May 23, 2006, the court stated, “Although the court

does not believe the deficiencies in plaintiff’s claims against Yuba

City, Sutter County, and CDC are curable, in an abundance of caution

the court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an

amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.” (Doc. 10.) It is

unclear to the court why plaintiff opted to file an amended complaint

rather than simply notify the court of his willingness to proceed on his

cognizable claims. Plaintiff did not attempt to cure the deficiencies

identified by the court in its order and opted to drop his claims against

defendants Yuba City, Sutter County, and CDC. Unfortunately for

plaintiff, however, although he included in the amended complaint

claims against defendants Adams, Shedler, Nguyen, Pak, Castillo,

and Nguyen , his statement of claim is so conclusory that it does not 1

give rise to claims for relief against the named defendants. Thus, as 2

a result of filing the amended complaint, plaintiff now finds himself

in the position of having no cognizable claims upon which to proceed

under section 1983. The deficiencies in plaintiff’s amended

complaint are set forth in the subsection that follows. 

(Doc. 13, 3:2-14.) It is this order that plaintiff challenges.

Plaintiff disagrees that he has not stated a claim, and states that if the Court disagrees, it

should appoint someone to help him and it should explain what a cognizable claim is. (Doc. 14.)

Plaintiff has not met his burden as the party moving for reconsideration. Plaintiff sets forth

no grounds demonstrating that the Magistrate Judge erred in her order and that it should be set aside.

A party’s bare disagreement with an order does not support setting aside the order.

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Plaintiff created the situation he is currently in with respect to his amended complaint. His

original complaint stated cognizable medical care claims against all defendants except for the Yuba

City Police Department, the Sutter County Sheriff’s Department, and CDC. It is unlikely that

plaintiff can state a claim against these entities because the statute of limitations has run and because

CDC is immune from suit. Nonetheless, the Magistrate Judge allowed plaintiff one opportunity to

amend. Since plaintiff did not attempt to amend these deficient claims, the prudent course of action

would have been for plaintiff to notify the Court that he wished to proceed on his original complaint.

Instead, plaintiff filed an amended complaint so devoid of necessary detail that it no longer sets forth

allegations sufficient to state a claim against any of the named defendants. In light plaintiff’s

puzzling decision to amend his complaint yet not attempt to amend the only claims found to be

deficient in the original complaint, the Magistrate Judge’s decision to allow plaintiff to either file

a second amended complaint or agree to proceed on his original complaint is more than reasonable

and fair.

With respect to plaintiff’s criticism that the Magistrate Judge should have explained what a

cognizable claim is, the Magistrate Judge’s orders of May 23, 2006, and June 16, 2006, are clear and

contain more than sufficient information to place plaintiff on notice as to the standard by which

complaints are reviewed, the deficiencies of plaintiff’s claims, the legal standards applicable to

plaintiff’s claims, and the responsive choices available to plaintiff. Any further elaboration would

amount to providing plaintiff with legal advice (e.g., telling plaintiff exactly what he has to say in

order to state a claim).

With respect to plaintiff’s request for assistance, plaintiff does not have a constitutional right

to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the

Court cannot require an attorney to represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard

v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1814,

1816 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the Court may request the voluntary

assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek

volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether

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“exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of

the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity

of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even if

it is assumed that plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations

which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. This Court is faced with

similar cases almost daily. Further, at this early stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a

determination that plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, and based on a review of the record

in this case, the Court does not find that plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. Id. 

For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED; and

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall comply

with the Magistrate Judge’s order of June 16, 2006, or face sanctions up to and

including dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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