Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_99-cv-00559/USCOURTS-azd-4_99-cv-00559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Lee Walden, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 99-559-TUC-RCC

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Petitioner Robert Lee Walden, Jr. is a state prisoner who filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus alleging that he is imprisoned and sentenced to death in violation of the

United States Constitution. Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery,

Expansion of the Record and Evidentiary Hearing. (Dkt. 140.)1

 Respondents filed an

opposition to the motion, and Petitioner filed a reply. (Dkts. 142, 146.) Petitioner’s motion

is denied because he has not demonstrated that development is warranted.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 31, 1992, a jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder, four counts of

sexual assault, two counts of sexual abuse, one count of aggravated assault, two counts of

dangerous kidnapping, one count of kidnapping, one count of dangerous burglary, one count

of burglary and one count of robbery involving three victims over a six-week time period.

Pima County Superior Court Judge James C. Carruth sentenced Petitioner to death for the

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murder and to prison terms for the other offenses. On direct review, the Arizona Supreme

Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595,

905 P.2d 974 (1995). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) with the

trial court on September 30, 1996, which was dismissed on January 9, 1997. Petitioner filed

a second PCR petition on January 9, 1998, which was dismissed on January 5, 1999.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court from the denial of his

second PCR petition, which was summarily denied on March 30, 1999.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Discovery

Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that “[a] judge may,

for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and may limit the extent of discovery.” Rule 6(a), Rules Governing § 2254

Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (emphasis added). Thus, unlike the usual civil litigant in

federal court, a habeas petitioner is not entitled to discovery “as a matter of ordinary course,”

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997); see Campbell v. Blodgett, 982 F.2d 1356, 1358

(1993), nor should courts allow him to “use federal discovery for fishing expeditions to

investigate mere speculation,” Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal.

(Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064,

1067 (9th Cir. 1999)(habeas corpus is not a fishing expedition for petitioners to “explore

their case in search of its existence”) (quoting Aubut v. State of Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689

(1st Cir. 1970)). Whether a petitioner has established “good cause” for discovery under Rule

6(a) requires a habeas court to determine the essential elements of the petitioner’s substantive

claim and evaluate whether “specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that

the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . .

entitled to relief.” Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300

(1969)).

Evidentiary Hearing

Historically, the district court had considerable discretion to hold an evidentiary

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hearing to resolve disputed issues of material fact. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312,

318 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), and limited

by § 2254(e)(2); Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1999); Rule 8, Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (providing that the district court judge shall

determine if an evidentiary hearing is required). That discretion is significantly

circumscribed by § 2254(e)(2) of the AEDPA. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1077-78.

Section 2254 provides that:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

 through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has interpreted subsection

(e)(2) as precluding an evidentiary hearing in federal court if the failure to develop a claim’s

factual basis is due to a “lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner

or the prisoner’s counsel.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000). A hearing is not

barred, however, when a petitioner diligently attempts to develop the factual basis of a claim

in state court and is “thwarted, for example, by the conduct of another or by happenstance

was denied the opportunity to do so.” Id.; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078-79 (allowing hearing

when state court denied opportunity to develop factual basis of claim). 

When the factual basis for a particular claim has not been fully developed in state

court, the first question for a district court is whether the petitioner was diligent in attempting

to develop the factual record. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Cardwell v. Greene, 152

F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th

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Cir. 2000)). The diligence assessment is an objective one, requiring a determination of

whether a petitioner “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the

time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 435. For

example, when there is information in the record that would alert a reasonable attorney to the

existence and importance of certain evidence, the attorney “fails” to develop the factual

record if he does not make reasonable efforts to sufficiently investigate and present the

evidence to the state court. See id. at 438-39, 442; Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 390-91 (6th

Cir. 2002) (lack of diligence because petitioner knew of and raised claims of judicial bias and

jury irregularities in state court, but failed to investigate all the factual grounds for such

claims). 

Absent unusual circumstances, diligence requires that a petitioner “at a minimum,

seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 437; see Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir.) (finding no diligence

because petitioner neither requested an evidentiary hearing in the trial court nor filed a state

habeas petition), amended on denial of reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). The mere

request for an evidentiary hearing, however, may not be sufficient to establish diligence if

a reasonable person would have taken additional steps. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d

733, 758 (5th Cir. 2000) (failed to present affidavits of family members that were easily

obtained without court order and with minimal expense); Koste v. Dormire, 345 F.3d 974,

985-86 (8th Cir. 2003) (no effort to develop the record or assert any facts to support claim);

McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (no development of

evidence available through himself, family members and literature, and no appeal of denial

of funds and hearing); Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 2004) (lack of

diligence if petitioner does not proffer “evidence that would be readily available if the claim

were true.”)

In sum, if this Court determines that a petitioner has not been diligent in establishing

the factual basis for his claims in state court, then the Court may not conduct a hearing unless

the petitioner satisfies one of § 2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions. If, however, the petitioner

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has not failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court, the Court will then

proceed to consider whether a hearing is appropriate or required under the criteria set forth

by the Supreme Court in Townsend. 372 U.S. 293; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 (quoting

Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 337); Horton, II v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 582 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005).

Pursuant to Townsend, a federal district court must hold an evidentiary hearing in a

§ 2254 case when: (1) the facts are in dispute; (2) the petitioner “alleges facts which, if

proved, would entitle him to relief;” and (3) the state court has not “reliably found the

relevant facts” after a “full and fair evidentiary hearing,” at trial or in a collateral proceeding.

Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13; cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985) (upholding the

denial of a hearing when petitioner’s allegations were insufficient to satisfy the governing

legal standard); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (hearing not required when

claim must be resolved on state court record or claim is based on non-specific conclusory

allegations). In addition, the Court established six circumstances under which there is

presumptively no “full and fair hearing” at the state level:

 (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;

(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a

whole;

(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to

afford a full and fair hearing; 

(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;

(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing;

or

(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas

applicant a full and fair fact hearing.

Id. at 313. In any other case in which diligence has been established, the district court judge

“has the power, constrained only by his sound discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon

the applicant’s constitutional claim.” Id. at 318 (noting that if a “habeas applicant was

afforded a full and fair hearing by the state court resulting in reliable findings, [the judge]

may, and ordinarily should, accept the facts as found in the hearing.”).

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MOTIONS DISCUSSION

Claims 1-3, 10-14, 19, 25, 26, 33, and 34: Discovery

Petitioner requests discovery regarding Claims 1-3, 10-14, 19, 25, 26, 33, and 34. As

to all of these claims, Petitioner requests thirty-four subpoenas, fourteen subpoenas duces

tecum, and twenty categories of depositions, most of which include numerous deponents.

Petitioner contends that he has made specific allegations in his petition demonstrating that

he is entitled to relief on the claims at issue and, therefore, there is good cause to allow full

development of his allegations. Respondents oppose the request, arguing that Petitioner fails

to explain how each request supports a particular claim. In reply, Petitioner asserts he has

identified the relevance of the sought-after evidence to his claims. The Court disagrees.

Petitioner’s motion is substantively deficient and fails to identify how specific

evidence would provide the necessary support for each claim. In an earlier order, the Court

instructed Petitioner that as to “each claim” he was required to identify the facts to be

developed, what evidence would support those facts, and why the evidence was not

developed in state court. (Dkt. 115 at 28.) His motion does not satisfy that requirement for

a single claim and is, therefore, subject to dismissal.

More significantly, Petitioner fails to satisfy Rule 6’s good cause standard. To satisfy

the standard Petitioner recognizes that the Court must find that the requested discovery will

allow Petitioner to prove his claims. This determination can only be made on a claim-byclaim basis, an analysis which Petitioner has not provided. Contrary to Petitioner’s

representation, a review of the requested discovery demonstrates that much of the evidence

sought has nothing to do with the individual claims as to which it is requested. For example,

Claim 11 alleges a violation of due process based on the admission of gruesome photographs

of the murder victim, and Claims 25 and 26 allege there was insufficient evidence to support

the F(6) aggravating factor. The many unrelated discovery requests include: all

communications regarding other suspects (subpoena 11), treatment records for the sexual

assault victims (subpoenas 21, 22), personnel files from the Tucson Police Department, Pima

County Sheriff’s Department and Pima County Attorney’s Office (subpoenas duces tecum

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1-3), and depositions of serologists and latent print examiners (depositions 9-12).

Additionally, most or all of the claims for which discovery is requested are record-based

claims for which evidentiary development is not warranted; this conclusion is supported by

the fact that Petitioner raised all of these claims on direct appeal for resolution on the trial

record.

For all of the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s motion for discovery regarding Claims

1-3, 10-14, 19, 25, 26, 33, and 34 is denied.

Claims 6-8, 12, and 16: Discovery

Petitioner’s motion as to these claims is also substantively deficient and fails to

identify how specific evidence would provide the necessary support for each claim. As noted

above, Petitioner was required to identify the facts to be developed, the evidence that would

support those facts, and explain why the evidence was not developed in state court as to each

claim. (Dkt. 115 at 28.) His motion does not satisfy that requirement for these claims and

is, therefore, subject to dismissal.

Claims 6 and 8

Claims 6 and 8 allege that Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated because he

was forced to use four of his peremptory strikes to remove jurors that should have been

stricken for cause. Claim 6 alleges that the trial court erred in failing to ask follow-up

questions of prospective jurors Shew, Gardner, and Pierson after each one of them exhibited

bias, and Claim 8 alleges that the trial court erred in not excusing prospective juror

Vandenberg after she acknowledged actual bias. Petitioner requests depositions of Shew,

Gardner, Pierson, and Vanderburg. 

The Supreme Court holds there is no constitutional violation when a defendant uses

peremptory strikes to remove jurors that should have been stricken for cause, if he was

accorded the number of challenges allowed by law and he does not contend the jury who sat

the trial was actually biased. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316-17

(2000). The fact that Martinez-Salazar involved the use of only one peremptory challenge

does not distinguish it, as Petitioner contends, because the critical facts remain the same –

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2

 In the Amended Petition, Petitioner references only prospective juror Roth but, in

the merits brief, Petitioner alleges the same facts as to prospective juror Stark. Because it

was not included in the petition, no claim regarding juror Stark is before the Court for

consideration and it will not be reviewed. Further, Petitioner did not fairly present a claim

to the Arizona Supreme Court regarding juror Stark. (See Appellant Opening Br. at 15-17.)

If Petitioner were to return to state court now to raise this issue it would be found waived and

untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b);

32.1(d)-(h). Thus, this issue is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

3

 Petitioner references an abuse of discretion standard, however, that standard is used

in direct appeal cases regarding claims that are not of constitutional magnitude; that standard

does not apply to this proceeding. See United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1229 (3d

Cir. 1986); United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1983).

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Petitioner was allotted the correct number of peremptories and he does not contend that the

trial jury was biased. Even if Martinez-Salazar was not directly on point, Petitioner would

be precluded from habeas relief because there was no clearly established Supreme Court law

governing this issue in 1995 when the Arizona Supreme Court denied relief on these claims.

See 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000) (precluding habeas relief if the

Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle

advanced by a petitioner). Claims 6 and 8 are denied on the merits as a matter of law;

therefore, the motion for discovery as to these claims is denied.

Claim 7

Claim 7 alleges that the trial court violated Petitioner’s right to an impartial jury by

excusing prospective juror Roth, citing her work schedule as a pretext for dismissing her

based on her opposition to the death penalty.2

 Petitioner does not clearly set forth the

constitutional claim he is asserting; therefore, the Court addresses the two claims it has

discerned Petitioner may be alleging.3

 First, to the extent Petitioner is alleging that his right

to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community was violated by the dismissal of

persons opposed to the death penalty (Dkt. 124 at 44), it is without merit. Petitioner’s

constitutional right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community applies only

to jury panels or venires, not to petit juries, which is the target of Petitioner’s allegation in

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Claim 7. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986). Additionally, to prevail on a

fair cross-section claim, a litigant must prove: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is

a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires

from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such

persons in the community; and (3) that this under-representation is due to systematic

exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364

(1979). Petitioner has not alleged any of the necessary factors for a fair cross-section claim;

most critically, allegations regarding one juror do not satisfy the group requirement. 

Second, to the extent Petitioner is alleging that his death sentence is invalid because

the exclusion of juror Roth led to a jury predisposed to the death penalty (Dkt. 124 at 44), the

claim is without merit because Petitioner’s death sentence was imposed by a judge not the

jury. Further, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that the striking of jurors based on

their views of the death penalty is not relevant to a conviction: “We simply cannot conclude,

either on the basis of the record before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion

of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of

guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 501,

518, 523 n.21 (1968).

In sum, Petitioner has not set forth, and the Court is not aware of, any clearly

established Supreme Court law indicating that the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of this

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, such law. Therefore, Petitioner

cannot obtain habeas relief on this claim. See 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at

381. Claim 7 is denied on the merits as a matter of law, and the accompanying motion for

discovery is denied.

Claim 12

Claim 12 alleges, in relevant part, that Petitioner’s right to a fair trial was violated by

the playing of prejudicial 911 calls to the jury. Petitioner requests depositions of each juror

regarding the impact of that evidence on his right to a fair trial. It is self-evident that, when

analyzing a claim of trial court error based on the admission of evidence, a reviewing court

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assesses only the evidence that was before the trial court; thus, this is strictly a record-based

claim. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir.1992) (stating that no

evidentiary hearing is required if “there are no disputed facts and the claim presents a purely

legal question”). The record-based nature of this claim is bolstered by the fact that Petitioner

raised it only on appeal and the state supreme court resolved it based solely on the state court

record.

Additionally, it is firmly established in the common law that juror testimony is

inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987).

Exceptions to the rule are recognized only in situations in which an “extraneous influence”

is alleged to have affected the jury’s verdict. Id. Strong policy considerations underlie the

rule:

[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned

into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took

part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be,

followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might

invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated

party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish

misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be

thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private

deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation – to the destruction

of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.

Id. at 119-20 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915)). 

The rule has been codified in both the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the

Federal Rules of Evidence. Arizona prohibits the admission of testimony or affidavits that

inquire “into the subjective motives or mental processes which led a juror to assent or dissent

from the verdict.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(d). The federal rules likewise prohibit testimony

“as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or the

effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror

to assent to or dissent from the verdict.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). It is clear from both the

common law and state and federal rules that the juror evidence Petitioner wishes to discover

in support of Claim 12 is improper. Moreover, consideration of such evidence for the

purpose of assessing prejudice would provide encouragement to habeas petitioners to harass

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4

 “RT” refers to reporter’s transcript. The original reporter’s transcripts and certified

copies of the trial and post-conviction records were provided to this Court by the Arizona

Supreme Court on November 18, 2004. (Dkt. 62.)

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jurors about their decision-making process, in contravention of the policy concerns

underlying the common law rule regarding post-verdict juror testimony. Discovery regarding

Claim 12 is denied.

Claim 16

Claim 16 alleges that Petitioner’s right to an impartial jury was violated by the trial

court’s denial of a mistrial based on a potentially threatening phone call received by juror

Pierce; Petitioner requests depositions of juror Pierce and the trial court’s bailiff. Juror

Pierce was questioned on the record during the trial regarding the details of the phone call

and his reaction to it (RT 7/31/92 at 2-6)4

, and the trial court (id. at 10-11) and Arizona

Supreme Court made findings to support their decisions denying the claim, see Walden, 183

Ariz. at 612, 905 P.2d at 991. No further development of the issue was sought at the trial

court level or in post-conviction as the claim was raised on direct appeal based strictly on the

state-court record.

First, Petitioner has not identified any material issues of fact that need to be developed

for the Court to resolve this claim. Second, to the extent Pierce or the bailiff possess

additional information, Petitioner did not make a reasonable attempt to develop it in state

court. See Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1090 (finding lack of diligence based, in part, on petitioner’s

failure to take advantage of state collateral proceedings). Because Petitioner was not diligent

in developing this claim, the Court is barred from holding an evidentiary hearing on the

merits, pursuant to § 2254(e)(2); therefore, there is no good cause for discovery because any

evidence developed in discovery could not be considered by the Court. See Boyko, 259 F.3d

at 792 (finding that discovery should not be allowed to augment the merits of a petitioner’s

claims unless he was diligent); Cherri v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp.2d 756, 775-76 (E.D. Va. 2000);

Charles v. Baldwin, No. CV-97-380-ST, 1999 WL 375591, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 1999),

aff’d, 49 Fed. Appx. 715, 718, 2002 WL 31395774, *2 (9th Cir. 2002); Murphy v. Bradshaw, No.

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C-1-03-053, 2003 WL 23777736, *2 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Owens v. Guida, No. 00-2765, 2002 WL

1398544, *3 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 9, 2002); Abu Jamal v. Horn, No. 99-5089, 2001 WL 827468, *2, *4

(E.D. Pa. July 20, 2001). Petitioner’s request for discovery on Claim 16 is denied.

Claims 3, 14, 33, and 34: Evidentiary Hearing

The Court instructed Petitioner that, as to each claim for which he intended to seek

an evidentiary hearing, he was required to: identify the facts to be developed; identify what

evidence would support those facts and why each fact is relevant to each claim; explain why

the claim was not developed in state court and why the lack of development was not due to

a lack of diligence by Petitioner; identify the material facts in dispute and how, if proven,

they would entitle Petitioner to relief; and discuss whether the state court held a full and fair

hearing and found the necessary facts. (Dkt. 115 at 28-29.) Petitioner’s motion is deficient

in that it does not detail any of the information required by the Court to determine whether

an evidentiary hearing is permitted or warranted; therefore, it is subject to dismissal.

The Court is statutorily barred from holding an evidentiary hearing if Petitioner was

not diligent in attempting to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2). Although Petitioner sets forth this legal standard, he does not address it nor

apply it to these claims. Rather, as to each claim, he states summarily, “[b]ecause no factual

development was allowed in state court, this Court is free to hold its own evidentiary

hearing.” (Dkt. 140 at 33.) This summary argument fails to address the relevant question

– whether Petitioner made a reasonable effort in state court to develop the claim in light of

the information known to him. Similarly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he can satisfy

the threshold requirement for an evidentiary hearing–that there be material facts in dispute

requiring resolution–nor does he explain how he would be entitled to relief if he proved

particular facts. Despite the deficiencies of the motion, in light of the Court’s independent

obligation to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted, see Rule 8, Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, the Court has conducted a limited review

of the relevant issues and finds that Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to

any of these claims.

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Claim 3

Claim 3 alleges that the trial court erred in denying the dismissal or severance of

counts 5 through 10 based on the state’s failure to preserve exculpatory evidence, specifically

the vaginal swab from victim Kristina Velasco’s sexual assault kit. The trial court held a

hearing on Petitioner’s motion to dismiss these counts, at which time Petitioner presented

evidence from nurse Stephanie Frederick and Tucson Police Department criminalists Quentin

Peterson and Alan Hatch. (RT 7/8/92 at 9-79.) The State presented testimony from Tucson

Police Department detective Brian Jones. (Id. at 80-110.) Petitioner did not indicate there

were other witnesses or evidence he wished to present at the hearing. (See id. at 8-118.) At

trial, Dr. Kevin Lewis testified regarding his participation in the sexual assault examination.

(RT 7/15/92 at 206-26.) No further development of the issue was sought at the trial level or

in post-conviction as the claim was raised on direct appeal based strictly on the state-court

record.

Petitioner now requests a hearing to present the testimony of nurse Frederick, Dr.

Lewis, and employees of the Tucson Police Department, Tucson General Hospital and

Department of Public Safety with knowledge of the chain of custody of this evidence and

general evidence protocol. All of the proposed witnesses were known at the time of the state

court hearing and most of them provided some testimony. To the extent they possess

additional information not previously developed, Petitioner did not make a reasonable

attempt to develop it in state court. Because Petitioner was not diligent and does not allege

that he can satisfy the requirements of §§ 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B), this Court is barred from

granting an evidentiary hearing with respect to the merits of Claim 3. To the extent

Petitioner’s actions could be considered diligent, it appears the state court held a full and fair

hearing on this issue. Additionally, Petitioner has not alleged what facts the proposed

witnesses would testify to, or as to what material dispute these witnesses have relevant

information. In sum, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to Claim 3.

Claim 14

Claim 14 alleges the trial court erred in precluding Petitioner from cross-examining

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witness Vicki Blanar about whether she had been on a “beer run” shortly before identifying

Petitioner in a photographic lineup as the person who sexually assaulted her. Petitioner

requests a hearing to present testimony from Blanar, Detective Woolridge, Mark Allen

Civello, Dawn Hay, Daniel Marshall and Ann Thomson. Petitioner raised this claim on

direct appeal, and the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling. Walden, 183

Ariz. at 612, 905 P.2d at 991. When analyzing a claim of trial court error based on the

admission of evidence, a reviewing court assesses only the evidence that was before the trial

court; thus, this is strictly a record-based claim. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099,

1103 (9th Cir.1992) (stating that no evidentiary hearing is required if “there are no disputed

facts and the claim presents a purely legal question”). Claim 14 is very narrow, and the

excluded evidence is known. The record-based nature of this claim is bolstered by the state

supreme court’s treatment of it on direct appeal, which looked only at the state court record

to resolve the issue. Because this claim must be decided based on the state court record,

evidentiary development is not warranted.

Additionally, Petitioner could have attempted to develop additional supporting

evidence during his PCR proceeding, but he raised this claim only on direct appeal. See

Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1090 (finding lack of diligence based, in part, on petitioner’s failure to

take advantage of state collateral proceedings). Because Petitioner did not make a reasonable

attempt to develop the factual basis of this claim in state court and does not allege that he can

satisfy the requirements of §§ 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B), this Court is barred from granting an

evidentiary hearing with respect to the merits of Claim 14. Additionally, Petitioner has not

alleged what facts these witnesses would testify to, or as to what material dispute these

witnesses have relevant information.

Claims 33 and 34

Claim 33 alleges the State failed to disclose Brady material relevant to Petitioner’s

mitigation presentation until after the mitigation hearing. Claim 34 alleges prosecutorial

misconduct based on each of the following actions independently and cumulatively: (1)

withholding of Brady material relevant to mitigation; (2) referencing a subsequent assault

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Claim 34 alleging a Brady violation; therefore, the Court will address only subpart 1.

Additionally, subparts 2 and 3 of Claim 34 are, on their face, record-based claims.

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conviction and pending burglary charge during sentencing; and (3) making inflammatory

remarks about Petitioner’s dangerousness during sentencing.

Petitioner requests a hearing to present testimony from attorneys and other staff of the

prosecutor’s office who were exposed to potential Brady material.5

 A successful Brady claim

requires three findings: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was

favorable to the accused; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt or

punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The state court record contains the

allegedly suppressed mitigating material and the time of its disclosure is not disputed. Thus,

it appears to the Court that there is no material factual dispute regarding this claim and an

evidentiary hearing is not warranted. Additionally, if Petitioner believed factual development

was necessary, he could have attempted to develop it during his PCR proceeding, but he

raised this claim only on direct appeal. See Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1090 (finding lack of

diligence based, in part, on petitioner’s failure to take advantage of state collateral

proceedings). Because Petitioner did not make a reasonable attempt to develop the factual

basis of this claim in state court and does not allege that he can satisfy the requirements of

§§ 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B), this Court is barred from granting an evidentiary hearing with

respect to the merits of Claims 33 and 34.

Claim 31: Discovery, Expansion of the Record, and Evidentiary Hearing

Claim 31 alleges that the trial court failed to properly consider all mitigating evidence

proffered in violation of Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In particular,

Petitioner alleges that new evidence was disclosed to the court for the first time at sentencing

and the record indicates it was not taken into account prior to the court issuing the sentence.

Petitioner requests expansion of the record and an evidentiary hearing to develop and

present additional mitigating evidence. By its own terms, as alleged by Petitioner, resolution

of Claim 31 must be based solely on the information presented to the trial court at, or prior

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to, sentencing. Additional mitigation evidence developed since that time has no bearing on

whether the trial court failed to consider evidence before it. There is no factual dispute

underlying Claim 31, as it is based strictly on the state court record. Because the Court

cannot consider additional mitigating evidence in resolving this claim, the request for

discovery, expansion of the record and an evidentiary hearing is denied as to Claim 31. See

Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1103.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery, Expansion of the Record

and Evidentiary Hearing (Dkt. 140) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claims 6, 7, and 8 are DENIED on the merits as

a matter of law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(g), Petitioner or

Respondents file a Motion for Reconsideration of this Order, such motion shall be filed

within fifteen (15) days of the filing of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a copy of this Order

to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ 85007-3329.

DATED this 6th day of October, 2006.

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