Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01192/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01192-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 This case has been referred to the Honorable Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo

pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, “Assignment of § 1983 Prisoner Civil Cases to United States Magistrate

Judges” and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY RASHAD JOHNSON

CDC #F-39513, Civil No. 06-1192 L (CAB)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1)

vs.

SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN

TROLLEY SYSTEMS, et al., 

Defendants.

On June 5, 2006, Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se filed a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

 In his original Complaint, Plaintiff claimed that he

was physically assaulted by a San Diego Metropolitan Trolley Security Officer on June 2, 2005.

(Compl. at 1.)

This Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 7], but sua sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1). See September 26, 2006 Order

Case 3:06-cv-01192-L-CAB Document 17 Filed 11/29/06 Page 1 of 5
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at 6-7. However, the Court also granted Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint in order

to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. Id. After granting

Plaintiff an extension of time, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on October

23, 2006 [Doc. No. 16]. The Court has conducted, once again, a sua sponte screening of

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and finds that it suffers from the same deficiencies of

pleading identified in the Court’s previous Order.

I. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

As stated in the Court’s September 26, 2006 Order, notwithstanding IFP status or the

payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case

it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to

sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). 

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as

amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to

the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing

the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at

845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir.

1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of

process is made on the opposing parties”).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

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Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s

pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof

requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the

conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

A. State Action

Once again, Plaintiff fails to allege any act on the part of Defendant San Diego

Metropolitan Trolley Systems which was taken “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Private parties do not generally act under color of state

law; thus, “purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not within the protective orbit of

section 1983.” Ouzts v. Maryland Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974); see also

Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). While a plaintiff may seek to hold a

private actor liable under section 1983, he must allege facts that show some “state involvement

which directly or indirectly promoted the challenged conduct.” Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 553; West v.

Atkins, 457 U.S. 42, 49, 54 (1988); Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118-1120 (9th Cir.

1997). In other words, Plaintiff must show that the private actor’s conduct is “fairly attributable”

to the government. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); see also Vincent v. Trend

Western Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the San Diego

Metropolitan Trolley Systems, acted on behalf of, or in any way attributable to, the state when

a private security officer allegedly assaulted Plaintiff. Thus, without more, Plaintiff’s allegations

against San Diego Metropolitan Trolley Systems fail to satisfy the first prong of a § 1983 claim.

See Haygood, 769 F.2d at 1354.

B. Municipal Liability

Further, Plaintiff, once again, names the “City of San Diego” as a Defendant. The City

of San Diego may be considered a “person” and therefore, a proper defendant under § 1983, see

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Hammond v. County of

Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988). However, as a municipality it may be held liable

under § 1983 only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show that a constitutional deprivation was

caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or

decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the City. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of the

County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712,

714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, “respondeat superior and vicarious liability are not

cognizable theories of recovery against a municipality.” Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 279

F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2002). “Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the alleged

constitutional deprivation was inflicted in ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom.’” Id.

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim because he has

failed to allege that any individual City employee deprived him of a constitutional right pursuant

to official municipal policy, custom or practice. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Brown, 520 U.S.

at 403. 

Despite the Court’s warning in the September 26, 2006 Order that Plaintiff must correct

the deficiencies of pleading found in Plaintiff’s Complaint, a review of the First Amended

Complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff has made no attempt to correct these problems.

Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff one final opportunity to file an Amended Complaint

correcting the deficiencies of pleading. If Plaintiff fails to do so, his Second Amended

Complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend.

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II. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2). However, Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is stamped “Filed” in which to

file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted in this

Order, as well as the Court’s September 26, 2006 Order. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must

be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1.

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed

to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted

as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.

1996). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(2) The Clerk of Court will mail a form § 1983 Complaint to Plaintiff..

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 29, 2006

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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