Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01051/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 07cv1051

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUZANNE ALVAREZ, on behalf of herself

and all others similarly situated,,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07CV1051 IEG (NLS)

ORDER (1) GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

REMAND and (2) DENYING AS

MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO STAY/TRANSFER

(Doc Nos. 7, 13-14)

vs.

LIMITED EXPRESS, LLC; DOES 1 through

100,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court are Suzanne Alvarez’s (“plaintiff”) motion to remand this action

to the San Diego County Superior Court (Doc. No. 7) and Limited Express, LLC’s (“defendant”)

motion to stay and transfer the action to the Central District of California (Doc. Nos. 13-14). For

the reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion to remand and denies as moot the motion to

stay and transfer.

BACKGROUND

A. Action Removed to This Court 

Defendant operates seventy-four stores in California selling apparel and accessories. 

(Answer ¶ 5.) Plaintiff worked for defendant from April 1993 through September 2005. (Compl.

¶ 6.) On May 3, 2007, plaintiff filed a putative class action in San Diego County Superior Court

on behalf of all of defendant’s employees who, in the four years prior to the filing of the

Case 3:07-cv-01051-IEG-NLS Document 27 Filed 08/08/07 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Those actions are Ricardo Perez v. Express, LLC, Case No. SACV-06-0522-DOC(JTLx),

and Ruben Herrera v. Limited Brands, Inc. and Express, Case No. SACV-06-0664-DOC(ANx).

- 2 - 07cv1051

complaint, were not provided with meal breaks or rest periods as required by California Labor

Code § 226.7. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleged, “[d]ue to the extreme workload required of employees,

it was virtually impossible to take meal and rest periods.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff claimed that

defendant had a “company culture of frowning upon taking breaks or meal periods[.]” (Id.) 

Plaintiff included a second cause of action for an “unlawful” business practice in violation of

California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (Id. at 6.) As remedies, plaintiff sought

statutory damages under Labor Code § 226.7, penalties under the California Labor Code Private

Attorney General Act (see Cal. Labor Code § 2699(f)(2)), and reasonable attorneys’ fees. (Id. at

7-8.) 

On June 8, 2007, defendant filed a notice of removal. (Doc. No. 1.) On June 15, 2007,

plaintiff moved to remand the action to Superior Court. (Doc. No. 7.) On July 6, 2007, defendant

then moved to stay and transfer the action to the Central District of California, pursuant to the

“first-filed” rule and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc. Nos. 13-14.) Defendant filed its opposition to

plaintiff’s motion to remand on July 9, 2007. (Doc. No. 16.) Plaintiff filed her reply in support of

remand on July 13, 2007. (Doc. No. 21.) Plaintiff then filed her opposition to the motion to stay

and transfer on July 20, 2007. (Doc. No. 22.) Finally, defendant filed its reply in support of the

stay and transfer on July 30, 2007. (Doc. No. 25.) The matter is now fully briefed, and the Court

finds it appropriate for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

B. Actions Currently Pending in the Central District of California

Two putative class actions alleging, inter alia, that defendant failed to provide meal and

rest periods pursuant to California law are currently pending against defendant in the Central

District of California.1 In a minutes order dated July 9, 2007, Judge David O. Carter consolidated

the Perez and Herrera actions because “the central allegation of each [action] is the same, namely

that [defendant] mistreated its employees by not allowing proper meal and rest periods.” (Def.

Memo. ISO Stay/Transfer, Exhibit C, at 3.) A preliminary settlement of the Perez case has been

reached. (Id., Exhibit D.) For purposes of settlement, Judge Carter certified a class of “all persons

Case 3:07-cv-01051-IEG-NLS Document 27 Filed 08/08/07 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07cv1051

employed in California by [defendant] as an hourly non-exempt associate from March 23, 2002

through December 31, 2006.” (Id., Exhibit E ¶ 20.) The Perez settlement class consists of 23,398

employees. (Id., Exhibit F, at 4; Richards Decla. ¶ 10.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts . . . have original

jurisdiction, may be removed by the . . . defendants, to the district court . . . for the district and

division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Pursuant to the

Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), where, inter alia, there are at least one hundred plaintiffs in the

proposed class and any plaintiff class member is a citizen of a state different from any defendant,

the federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any class action “in which the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs[.]” 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(2)(A), & (d)(5)(B). “[T]he claims of the individual class members shall be

aggregated” to determine whether the amount-in-controversy threshold is satisfied. Id. §

1332(d)(6). 

Prior to CAFA, “[w]here the complaint does not demand a dollar amount, the removing

defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy exceeds [the statutory minimum].” Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d

373, 376 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090

(9th Cir. 2003). The preponderance standard means “defendant must provide evidence

establishing that it is ‘more likely than not’ that the amount in controversy exceeds that amount.” 

Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). Defendant must “set[]

forth . . . the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds” the

statutory minimum. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in the

original); see Wilson v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264-66 (D. Idaho 2003)

(defendant’s suggestion that court apply its “common sense” and mere incantation of plaintiff’s

prayers for attorney’s fees and punitive damages held insufficient to carry defendant’s burden). In

addition to the contents of the removal petition, the court considers “summary-judgment-type

Case 3:07-cv-01051-IEG-NLS Document 27 Filed 08/08/07 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Without further scrutiny, the Court accepts defendant’s representation that it complied with

the law by paying its employees the minimum wage of $6.75 per hour. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8 §

11000(2) (2006). 

- 4 - 07cv1051

evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Valdez v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted); Burk v. Med. Sav. Ins. Co.,

348 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1067 (D. Ariz. 2004). 

“[U]nder CAFA the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains, as before, on the

proponent of federal jurisdiction.” Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.

2006). The removing defendant, therefore, still must show the amount in controversy is satisfied

by a preponderance of the evidence. Davis v. Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1205,

1208 (C.D. Cal. 2005). A court “cannot base [its] jurisdiction on [d]efendant’s speculation and

conjecture.” Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007). 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff, a citizen of California, does not dispute that she is diverse from defendant, a

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio. (Notice of Removal ¶ 6(a).) 

Plaintiff and defendant likewise agree the class includes at least a hundred members. (Compare id.

¶ 6(b) with Compl. ¶ 19.) The parties dispute whether the amount in controversy exceeds $5

million. Defendant bears the burden of establishing the requisite amount in controversy by a

preponderance of the evidence. Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 684; Davis, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 1208. 

Defendant purports to establish the amount in controversy by alleging (1) a class of 23,398

members (2) earning the minimum wage (3) working for an average of six months during the class

period. Multiplying these numbers together, defendants allege an amount in controversy

exceeding $19.7 million. (Def. Opp. to Remand, at 5.) Taking into account Labor Code § 2699(f)

penalties and reasonable attorneys’ fees, defendant claims the amount is even higher (although

defendant does not say how much higher). The Court examines the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting defendant’s assertions concerning the size of the class and the average time worked.2

1. Class Size

Defendant claims plaintiff’s class has 23,398 putative class members, the same number as

the Perez class. (Opp. to Remand, at 3.) Plaintiff objects this number is too large, because the

Case 3:07-cv-01051-IEG-NLS Document 27 Filed 08/08/07 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 07cv1051

Perez class includes “all current and former hourly, non-exempt employees” from March 2002

through December 2006. (Def. Memo. ISO Stay/Transfer, Exhibit D, at 2.) By contrast,

plaintiff’s putative class consists only of those employees who were deprived of meal and rest

periods during the class period. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff claims its complaint never makes the

“sweeping allegation” that defendant deprived all employees of meal periods and invites defendant

to stipulate to the number of putative class members who were deprived of meal and rest periods. 

(Pl. Memo. ISO Remand, at 3 n.1; Pl. Reply, at 5.)

The Court reads the complaint differently. To determine the amount in controversy, the

Court “must assume that the allegations in the complaint are true.” Forever Living Prods. U.S.

Inc. v. Geyman, 471 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2006); Kenneth Rothschild Trust v. Morgan

Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, paragraph 11 specifically

describes the “extreme workload” that made it “virtually impossible” for defendant’s employees to

take meal periods and rest breaks. The same paragraph also describes the “company culture” that

discouraged meal periods and rest breaks. Having reviewed paragraph 11, the Court concludes

plaintiff effectively alleges defendant did not allow any of its employees to take meal periods or

rest breaks. Furthermore, the Court does not interpret the law on defendant’s burden of proof to

require the defendant to concede liability, as plaintiff seeks here. Defendant has denied the

allegation that it failed to provide meal periods and rest breaks to employees. (Answer ¶ 11.) 

Defendant does not have to amend its answer to remain in federal court.

Nonetheless, the Court finds fault with defendant’s claim regarding the size of the class. 

Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of defendant’s employees in the four years prior to May 3,

2007, the date plaintiff filed the complaint. (Compl. ¶ 14.) The Perez class covers the period from

March 23, 2002 (more than a year before the beginning of plaintiff’s class period) to December 31,

2006 (more than five months before the end of plaintiff’s class period). (Def. Memo. ISO

Stay/Transfer, Exhibit D, at 2.) If the number of members in the Perez class equals the number of

putative class members here, it is a mere coincidence.

In Perez, defendant provided the claims administrator with a file of the names of all

settlement class members. (Id., Exhibit F, at 4.) That file contained 23,395 individuals, only three

Case 3:07-cv-01051-IEG-NLS Document 27 Filed 08/08/07 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Although defendant claims the reasonable attorneys’ fees result in an even higher amount in

controversy, defendant provides the Court with no data from which the Court could compute the

estimated attorneys’ fees recoverable here. See Burk, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (calculating attorneys’

fees requires evidence of the billing rate of plaintiff’s counsel and the estimated time counsel will

- 6 - 07cv1051

people shy of the total number of class members. (See Richards Decla. ¶ 10 (explaining that

defendant subsequently obtained mailing information for three class members after the claims

administrator sent the notice of settlement to the 23,395 members on the original list).) Defendant

could have prepared a similar list to oppose this motion to remand, but did not. Because defendant

failed to submit “summary judgment type evidence” of the number of individuals employed during

the class period, the Court finds that defendant’s estimate of the class size is too speculative and

conjectural to establish the requisite amount in controversy.

2. Average Time Worked

To calculate the amount in controversy, defendant assumes the average class member

worked six months. (Def. Opp to Remand, at 5.) However, defendant submits no evidence to

support that figure. Instead, the six-month period comes from a calculation that plaintiff uses in its

opening memorandum for purely illustrative purposes. (See Pl. Memo. ISO Remand, at 3-4.) In

Perez, defendant provided the claims administrator with a file containing the number of weeks

worked by the settlement class members. (Def. Memo. ISO Stay/Transfer, Exhibit F, at 4.) 

Defendant, therefore, could have submitted evidence here of the average number of weeks a class

member worked during the class period. However, defendant chose not to provide the underlying

facts and instead relied on a speculative, conjectural estimate from plaintiff’s motion papers. 

The average time worked is a crucial number in calculating the amount in controversy. For

every day that the employer does not provide the employee with a meal period or rest break, the

employer must pay an additional hour of pay. Cal. Labor Code § 226.7. And, for each pay period

where the employer violates any provision of the Labor Code, the employer must pay a civil

penalty of $100 per employee per pay period for the first violation and $200 per employee per pay

period for every subsequent violation. Id. § 2699(f)(2). Without “summary judgment type

evidence” from defendant concerning the average time worked during the class period, the Court

cannot accurately compute damages or civil penalties.3 

Case 3:07-cv-01051-IEG-NLS Document 27 Filed 08/08/07 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

spend litigating the case). 

- 7 - 07cv1051

CONCLUSION

Defendant fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy

exceeds $5 million. Therefore, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to remand and hereby

REMANDS this case to San Diego County Superior Court. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction,

the Court DENIES AS MOOT defendant’s motion to stay and transfer the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 8, 2007

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:07-cv-01051-IEG-NLS Document 27 Filed 08/08/07 Page 7 of 7