Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-02797/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-02797-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JOSEPH CONNOLLY,

Petitioner,

 vs.

D.K. SISTO, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 08-2797 RMW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not be

granted. Respondent filed an answer and a supporting memorandum of points and authorities

addressing the merits of the petition. Petitioner filed a traverse. Having reviewed the papers and

the underlying record, the court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief

and will deny the petition.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 10, 2003, a San Mateo Superior Court jury convicted petitioner of second

degree murder (California Penal Code § 187(a)) and found that he personally used a deadly

weapon (California Penal Code § 12022(b)). After finding two “3 strike” prior convictions, the

trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of thirty-nine years-to-life in prison.

Petitioner appealed the judgment. The state appellate court affirmed the judgment in a

reasoned opinion on January 30, 2006. The state supreme court summarily denied a petition for

*E-FILED - 3/24/10*

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 1 People v. Connolly, California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, No. A105806

(January 30, 2006).

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review on May 17, 2006.

Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in the state superior court on December 22, 2006,

which was denied on February 16, 2007. Petitioner’s state habeas petitions in the California

Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court were summarily denied. Petitioner filed the

instant federal action on June 4, 2008. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 21, 2001, George Celentano (“Celentano”) was stabbed to death at his

residence at 43 Woodrow Street in Daly City. (Resp’t Ex. C, p. 2.)1

 Joseph Chavez (“Chavez”)

owned the house and lived there off and on with petitioner, Celentano, Max Toscano

(“Toscano”), and Al Sanchez (“Sanchez”). (Id.) All the men were present or former heroin

addicts with criminal records and had been friends for more than 20 years. (Id.) 

Chavez testified that Celentano generally took care of the house and although he could be

“verbally abusive,” was generally a “mellow guy.” (Id.) Chavez stated that he’d seen Celentano

verbally abuse petitioner several times. (Id.) 

When Toscano first moved to the house, he was living in the in-law unit at the rear of the

house. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner started bringing his ex-wife, Cynthia Faddis (“Cynthia”), around the

house and Celentano objected to that. (Id.) Petitioner then moved to the in-law unit and Toscano

moved back into the house. (Id.) At the time, Celentano was using heroin and was “pretty sick,”

and did not want anyone in the house except that people who lived there. (Id.) Tensions

between Celentano and petitioner were rising, and three days before Celentano’s murder,

Toscano told petitioner that it might be better if petitioner found somewhere else to live. (Id.) 

Petitioner got mad and said, “one more time and that is it.” (Id.) 

Lucy Faddis (“Faddis”), Cynthia’s mother, testified that petitioner called her at 2:00 or

2:30 a.m. on the morning of October 22, 2001. (Id.) When Faddis told petitioner that Cynthia

was not there, petitioner said that he “just stabbed a man” but didn’t know if the man was dead. 

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(Id.) Faddis told petitioner that he could not come to their house. (Id.) 

Sanchez, who had known Celentano for 25 years, said that he had not known Celentano

to be violent. (Id.) On October 22, 2001, Sanchez was asleep at his mother’s house when his

niece woke him up at 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. and said petitioner was on the phone for him about an

“emergency.” (Id. at 3-4.) Petitioner told Sanchez, “George is dead. I killed him.” (Id. at 4.) 

Sanchez did not believe petitioner at first and petitioner repeated, “I’m not kidding. I killed him .

. . he is in the kitchen dead.” (Id.) Petitioner told Sanchez that he needed moral support. (Id.) 

Petitioner sounded calm and never said how he killed Celentano and never offered that he killed

Celentano in self-defense. (Id.) Sanchez called the police. (Id.)

Public safety dispatcher Bonny Craig (“Craig”) received a call from Sanchez at around

2:50 a.m. (Id.) The jury heard the tape. (Id.) Sanchez said that petitioner just called him and

said he had stabbed someone with a knife. (Id.) Sanchez reported that petitioner did not sound

drunk. (Id.) Sanchez gave Craig the phone number to the house. (Id.) Craig called the house

and petitioner answered, initially saying that “nothing’s going on right now.” (Id.) Eventually,

petitioner admitted that he had stabbed someone, and said, “This guy jumped on me and, um, you

know, I called a friend of mine to tell him to come over here, and um, so, that’s it right there. 

That’s all I can say.” (Id.) Petitioner stated that he did not believe Celentano was breathing and

then told Craig that he didn’t kill anyone, but that it was self-defense. (Id.) 

The police showed up at the house at 2:50 a.m. (Id. at 5.) Officers Price and Siapno

handcuffed petitioner and testified that petitioner appeared calm and said he acted in selfdefense. (Id.) Siapno saw no injuries on petitioner. (Id.) Officer Alger testified that petitioner

said he acted in self-defense, stating that Celentano grabbed him by the neck, although Alger saw

no injuries on petitioner’s neck. (Id.) 

Celentano suffered numerous stab wounds. (Id.) Police found that the door to the in-law

unit open, lights were on , and a trail of blood led from the front door, across the family room

into the kitchen and rear bedroom. (Id.) Two knife handles and a bent knife blade were found in

a kitchen drawer. (Id.) A pathologist testified that Celentano was stabbed six times in the chest,

abdomen, and back. (Id. at 6.) Wounds found on Celentano’s left arm and hands were consistent

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with efforts to fend off an attacker. (Id.) In the pathologist’s opinion, the attacker made at least

12 and up to 20 separate knife thrusts. (Id.) 

Crime scene reconstructionist Celia Hartnett concluded that Celentano must have been

sitting or slumped forward when he was stabbed. (Id.) If he were standing when he was stabbed,

there would have been bloodstains on areas of his body and clothing, including his trousers or

feet, and there was none. (Id.) 

Petitioner also testified. He admitted three prior convictions, that he had been imprisoned

several times, and that he was a heroin addict for more than 20 years. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner

testified that a few weeks before October 22, Celentano began to complain about petitioner

bringing Cynthia to the house, even though she was the mother of petitioner’s daughter. (Id.) 

Petitioner was considering moving out to live with Cynthia. (Id.) Four or five days before

Celentano’s death, Celentano tried to re-enter a methadone detox program. (Id.) At the time,

Celentano was drinking 2.5 pints of vodka per day and then following it with beer. (Id. at 7-8.)

On the night of the killing, petitioner came home from Kentucky Fried Chicken around

1:00 a.m., went to the in-law unit and began listening to music. (Id. at 8.) At some point, he

went to the house to heat up soup. (Id.) Celentano came into the kitchen, started arguing with

petitioner, and then just “freaked out.” (Id.) Celentano had a knife in his hand and attacked

petitioner. (Id.) Petitioner stated that he tried to pin Celentano to keep the knife away from him

and that he was scared because they were bouncing and there were knives everywhere. (Id.) 

Petitioner did not know why it looked like Celentano had been stabbed with different knives. 

(Id.) Petitioner stated the whole thing was over in seconds and that he did not want to hurt

Celentano; he just wanted to keep Celentano off of him. (Id.) At the time of the murder,

petitioner was 52 years old, 16 years younger than Celentano, bigger, and in better shape. (Id.) 

Petitioner had a hard time remembering what happened after he stabbed Celentano. (Id.) 

He admitted that he lied at first to the 911 dispatcher but eventually did tell him that he acted in

self-defense. (Id.) Petitioner was afraid that because there were no witnesses and he had a

previous criminal record, that he would not get a “fair shake.” (Id. at 9.) Petitioner stated that

was why he lied to a detective when interviewed, saying that when he came home, he found

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Celentano lying there. (Id.) 

LEGAL CLAIMS

Petitioner asserts the following claims for habeas relief: (1) exclusion of evidence of the

victim’s aggressive conduct violated his right to present a defense under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments; (2) admission of petitioner’s statement to the police obtained during a custodial

interrogation violated Miranda and his right to counsel; (3) exclusion of evidence regarding the

reliability of petitioner’s statement and subsequent instructions that the statement was voluntary

violated his right to present a defense under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to properly move to strike a prior serious felony conviction;

(5) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issue of the trial court’s improper denial

of the motion to strike a prior serious felony conviction; and (6) trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to inadmissible evidence of the victim’s character, in violation of the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because the instant petition was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which imposes significant

restrictions on the scope of federal habeas corpus proceedings. Under the AEDPA, a federal

court may not grant habeas relief with respect to a state court proceeding unless the state court’s

ruling was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

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identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. “[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively

unreasonable.’” Id. at 409. In examining whether the state court decision was objectively

unreasonable, the inquiry may require analysis of the state court’s method as well as its result. 

Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). The “objectively unreasonable”

standard does not equate to “clear error” because “[t]hese two standards . . . are not the same. 

The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even

clear error) with unreasonableness.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s adjudication

of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The

court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the

petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1).

B. Analysis of Legal Claims

1. Exclusion of Evidence of the Victim’s Aggressive Conduct

Petitioner claims that his right to present a defense was violated because the trial court

excluded evidence suggesting that, on the night of the stabbing, Celentano could have been

violent due to alcohol withdrawal. (Pet. at 8.) In order to support the theory that the killing was

in self-defense, defense counsel had sought to admit evidence of an incident in 2000 when

Celentano was hospitalized and became violent due to alcohol withdrawal. (Id. at 9.) The

defense’s theory was that Celentano was suffering from alcohol withdrawal the night he died,

became violent and attacked petitioner, which resulted in petitioner killing Celentano in selfCase 5:08-cv-02797-RMW Document 41 Filed 03/24/10 Page 6 of 29
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defense. (Resp’t Ex. C at 19.) The trial court conducted a hearing out of the presence of the jury

to determine admissibility of the evidence pursuant to California Evidence Code § 402. (Id. at

20.)

Three witnesses testified: Dr. James Chen, Celentano’s treating doctor; Olinda Menezes,

a treating nurse; and Gregory Hayner, a chief pharmacists at a substance abuse treatment center

who testified as an expert on alcohol withdrawal. Chen testified that on April 21, 2000,

Celentano was brought to the hospital as a result of gastrointestinal bleeding, orthostatic

hypertension, and dehydration, which were all thought to be caused by alcohol and heroin abuse. 

(RT 2393-2396.) Celentano began exhibiting agitation, shaking, tremors, and hallucinations,

which are signs of alcohol withdrawal. (RT 2398-2402, 2413.) Chen prescribed medication to

calm him. The next day, Celentano became agitated and pulled out IV lines. (RT 2439.) A few

days after Celetano was admitted, Celentano became so violent that the medical staff had to

abandon an endoscopy procedure, and another physician reported that Celentano became

combative. (RT 2442.)

Menezes testified that her notes reflected that security guards were needed to restrain

Celentano at the time. (RT 2465-2469.) Hayner testified that alcohol withdrawal is much more

acute and severe than heroin withdrawal. (RT 2497.) He said that people who experience

alcohol withdrawal are usually very scared and do irrational things and become very aggressive

in the behavior. (RT 2498-2500.) Hayner testified that, assuming Celentano’s blood alcohol

level at the time was 0.03, that was not enough to keep Celentano from going into alcohol

withdrawal. (RT 2520.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge indicated her reluctance

to allow the testimony to be received into evidence, but left open the possibility it would receive

the testimony if petitioner “testifies in such a way as to make this relevant and admissible.” (RT

2536, 2540.) Petitioner subsequently testified at trial, but the court concluded that the proffered

evidence was not relevant and ruled it inadmissible. 

The state appellate court found that the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence showing

that Celentano had become violent during a previous episode of alcohol withdrawal was

erroneous. (Resp’t Ex. C at 25.) The appellate court noted that “[petitioner]’s evidence that his

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victim attacked him because he was then experiencing alcohol withdrawal may not have been

particularly persuasive, as the trial court said, but that does not make it irrelevant.” (Id.)

(emphasis in original).) The appellate court concluded that “[a]s attenuated as it may have been,

the evidence Celentano attacked [petitioner] because he was then experiencing alcohol

withdrawal had probative value with respect to [petitioner]’s self-defense claim. Moreover, the

proffered evidence was not claimed by the district attorney (or now by the Attorney General) to

be prejudicial to the prosecution.” (Id.)

However, the state appellate court then applied the harmless error standard from

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and concluded that the erroneous exclusion of

petitioner’s proffered evidence was harmless. (Id. at 26.) Under Chapman, habeas relief is not

warranted if any constitutional error is found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 

a. Constitutional Error

Although the state appellate court found that the exclusion of petitioner’s evidence was

erroneous under California law, the question in this habeas proceeding is whether the erroneous

exclusion of the evidence rose to the level of a constitutional error as petitioner alleges. The

Sixth Amendment affords an accused in a criminal trial the right to present a defense. Chambers

v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). And the Due Process Clause “requires that criminal

prosecutions ‘comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness’ and that ‘criminal

defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Clark v.

Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485

(1984)). The Supreme Court has made clear that the erroneous exclusion of critical,

corroborative defense evidence may violate the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, as

well as the due process right to a fair trial. DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19

(1967)). In deciding if the exclusion of evidence violates the due process right to a fair trial or

the right to present a defense, the court balances the following five factors: (1) the probative

value of the excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of

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evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely

cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. Chia v.

Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th

Cir. 1985)). Moreover, the excluded evidence must be so critical to the issue of guilt or

innocence that its exclusion violates due process. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1455 (9th Cir.

1983). The court must also give due weight to the state interests underlying the state evidentiary

rules on which the exclusion was based. See Chia, 360 F.3d at 1006; Miller, 757 F.2d at 995.

This court finds that, under the applicable Miller factors, the state court’s decision to

exclude petitioner’s evidence did violate his right to present a defense. The first factor, the

probative value of the excluded evidence, weighs in favor of petitioner because it tends to

support petitioner’s claim that Celenano was violent on the night he was killed due to alcohol

poisoning. The second factor - reliability - weighs in favor of petitioner because the witnesses

consisted of three reliable, neutral professionals: Celentano’s treating physician and nurse, and

an expert on alcohol withdrawal. The third factor - whether the evidence is capable of evaluation

by the trier of fact - weighs in favor of petitioner since the jury could have heard and evaluated

the testimony from the three witnesses, and the prosecution would have had an opportunity to

cross-examine them. The fourth factor - whether the statement is the sole evidence on the issue

or merely cumulative - weighs in favor of petitioner because the witnesses’ testimony was the

heart of petitioner’s defense. The fifth factor also weighs for petitioner because his sole defense

was that he killed Celentano in self-defense when Celentano became violent. In sum,

petitioner’s proffered evidence was an essential element to his defense, therefore, its exclusion

violated petitioner’s right to present a defense. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.

b. Harmless Error 

In order to obtain federal habeas relief on the basis of an evidentiary error, a petitioner

must show not only that the error was one of constitutional dimension but also, that it was not

harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). The Brecht standard requires that

the federal habeas court determine whether the constitutional error had a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 637. A federal habeas

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court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state court criminal trial under

the “substantial and injurious effect” standard set forth in Brecht, “whether or not the state

appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the ‘harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt’ standard set forth in Chapman.” Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007).

When a state court has determined that a constitutional error was harmless, a federal court may

not grant habeas relief unless the state court applied harmless error review in an objectively

unreasonable manner. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 (2003). Thus, in order to grant

habeas relief when a state court has determined that a constitutional error was harmless, a

reviewing court must determine that: (1) the state court’s decision was “contrary to” or an

“unreasonable application” of Supreme Court harmless error precedent; and (2) the petitioner

suffered prejudice under Brecht as a result of the constitutional error. Inthavong v. LaMarque,

420 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, the state appellate court’s determination that the instructional error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt was not “objectively unreasonable.” In reaching the conclusion that

the exclusion of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the state appellate court

considered and analyzed the evidence. Specifically, it considered that the evidence that

Celentano was suffering from severe alcohol withdrawal at the time of death was weak. (Resp’t

Ex. C, p. 26.) The court noted that petitioner told the 911 dispatcher that Celentano was drinking

prior to the attack; that there was no evidence that Celentano had been agitated or aggressive

prior to the attack; and that Celentano’s prior conduct at the hospital was mostly a reaction to an

invasive physical procedure attempted on him by the doctors rather than a gratuitous aggressive

action. (Id.) Also, the self-defense evidence was underwhelming. First, petitioner did not tell

Sanchez or Faddis that he had been attacked and when he spoke with them he was calm. Second,

the forensic evidence was inconsistent with self-defense: the location of the stab wounds were

inconsistent with petitioner’s testimony; petitioner was bigger, stronger, and younger than

Celentano, who was not known to be physically aggressive or violent; petitioner had no marks on

his body while Celentano had marks indicating that he was in a defensive position; the forensic

evidence indicated that Celentano went down fairly quickly and received his wounds while he

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was on the floor either sitting or lying down. (Id.) The state court concluded that, “[Petitioner]’s

contention that the exclusion of Celentano’s aggressive behavior in the hospital undermined

[petitioner]’s credibility is not persuasive. [Petitioner]’s conflicting and self-serving statements

to the police so profoundly undermined his credibility it is difficult to think it would have been

rehabilitated by the evidence of Celentano’s prior conduct in the hospital, which was not

persuasively shown to have occurred in circumstances similar to those on the day he was killed.”

(Id. at 26-27.)

This court agrees that the evidence showing that Celentano was in alcohol withdrawal on

the night he was killed was weak, and there was substantial evidence showing that petitioner was

not acting in self-defense. Under these circumstances, it was not objectively unreasonable for

the state appellate court to conclude that it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would

have found petitioner guilty even if the evidence regarding Celentano’s previous violent behavior

had been admitted.

Moreover, even assuming the state appellate court’s decision was an unreasonable

application of Chapman, petitioner would not be entitled to habeas relief because the erroneous

exclusion did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. This court agrees with the state appellate court’s

assessment that in light of the evidence presented at trial, the jury would have found petitioner

guilty even if the trial court had allowed the testimony establishing that Celentano had been

violent in the past due to alcohol withdrawal. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on this claim.

2. Miranda Violation

Petitioner argues that his statements to the police during a custodial interrogation were in

violation of Miranda, and that continued questioning after he requested an attorney violated his

Fifth Amendment right to counsel. (Pet. at 11.) The California Court of Appeal summarized the

series of events as follows:

[Petitioner]’s motion to suppress related to statements he made to the police

in videotaped interviews at the Daly City Police Department after he was brought

there by Officer Alger. The trial court denied the motion, but ordered the district

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 2 After the trial judge told the jury that a videotape was going to be played, she went on to

tell jurors that, “[a]s part of that the prosecutor will be distributing to you a transcript of the

tape which is to help you better follow what’s said. But you are the exclusive judges of the

facts, so if you think something on the tape was said that is different than what the transcript

reflects, you should use your own judgment and write in the word you think was said, that

sort of thing. The transcript is just an aid to you. [original footnote renumbered.]

 3

 Most of the redactions related to references to [petitioner]’s extensive criminal history

and numerous commitments to state prison. [original footnote renumbered.]

 4

 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). [original footnote renumbered.]

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attorney to redact portions of the two tapes shown the jury and the transcript given

each juror2

 on the ground that “their probative value is outweighed by their

prejudicial effect.”3 (Evid. Code, § 352.)

At 3:31 a.m., shortly after he placed [petitioner] in the room and handcuffed

him to a wall, Officer Alger turned on the videotape. The taping ended

approximately five hours later, although [petitioner] was not questioned during

much of that time. [Petitioner] was not initially advised of his rights or questioned

by Officer Alger, as the interview was to be carried out by Detectives David Boffi

and Brian Pon, who were then on their way to the station. Detective Pon arrived 49

minutes after Alger placed [petitioner] in the interview room, and Detective Boffi

arrived an hour later, at 5:20 a.m., when the interview began. During the lengthy

period of time [petitioner] was alone with Officer Alger he spoke freely asking

Alger whether Celentano was dead, whether the police had obtained evidence, what

would happen if there were no witnesses, and how long he would be detained.

[Petitioner] told Alger: “You know I might beat this case, you know it, right? 

There’s no weapons . . . right? You guys have to have a weapon.” Alger did not

respond to these and [petitioner]’s other questions, periodically telling him, “I’m

just the taxi driver,” and “like I said, I have no idea what’s going on.” [Petitioner]

gratuitously expressed anger that Sanchez had called the police, and observed that

“I should have walked out the fucking door, that’s what I should have did. I had

plenty of time.”

[Petitioner] spontaneously expressed conflicting versions of his role in the

killing. At first, he said “I just saw him dead like that. I did not do anything. No

weapons, I walked in saw him dead, called a friend of mine.” Later [petitioner]

suggested a different scenario, telling Alger that Celentano “was a no good piece of

shit I wanna tell you right now. You know he jumped on me, you know, so fuck[,]

I wanna have to do what I have to do. And I ain’t gonna change this.” Later,

however, [petitioner] reverted to his original story. When Detective Pon arrived

and said he was unable to tell [petitioner] what he was charged with, [petitioner]

told him that if he had killed the guy, he could have just walked away. During the

balance of the interview, [petitioner] adhered to the position he did not kill

Celentano, suggesting the killer was probably one of Celentano’s many enemies. 

[Petitioner] also raised the possibility that he knew who the killer was, but would

not “rat” on him.

When Detective Boffi arrived, he read [petitioner] his Miranda rights,4

 and

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 5 [Petitioner] emphasizes that Detective Boffi did not ask him to explicitly waive the rights

Boffi had described, and he did not do so. The transcript of the videotaped admonitions reads

as follows:

“DB: So let’s go through that. Okay, you have the right to remain silent.

“MC: Uh-hmm.

“DB: Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right

to talk to a lawyer and have him present while you are being questioned.

“MC: Uh-hmm.

“DB: And if you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before

any questioning if you wished one. So Mike, do you understand those?

“MC: Yes.

“DB: Okay. Okay, why don’t you tell me what happened tonight.”

[original footnote renumbered.]

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[petitioner] indicated he understood them.5

 [Petitioner] immediately asked where

Sanchez was, stating that he had called Sanchez because he saw the body on the

floor and was “freaked out.” [Petitioner] told Boffi that if he had killed Celentano

he “would’ve split.” He said he told Sanchez he found Celentano “lying on the

floor, blood all over him. I just got in the house, I just walked in.” When Boffi

asked why he had called Sanchez, [petitioner] said, “he’s just a friend . . . . I was so

in my shock, I want[ed] him to come over like you know check it out first and then

decide what we want to do. I called you guys and what, you know. And that’s,

that’s the story.” Continuing, [petitioner] said “I walked in - bang. You know I

don’t got no blood on me and no weapons nothing like that, the guy was laying

there dead. They deal dope, you know, that’s his fucking problem.” [Petitioner]

reiterated that “if I felt guilty I would have split right away,” and “I don’t got no

blood on me or knives or anything like that or guns.”

Detective Boffi asked [petitioner] where he had been before he entered the

house and discovered the body. [Petitioner] said he had walked to Albertson’s to

shop. When he returned, he walked through the main house and into his rear

cottage. He did not see Celentano at that time, assuming he was “probably . . . in

his room or something.” [Petitioner] remained in his cottage, drinking beer, for

about an hour, and then went back into the main house where he found Celentano

on the floor. When Boffi asked why he returned to the main house, [petitioner]

said, “I checked the time, I forgot to check the time or something. [¶] . . . [¶]

‘Cause I have something to do tomorrow morning I have the clock in the back, and

that’s it[,] that’s my statement there, as far as I’m going without a lawyer. ‘Cause I

don’t know how you guys are, and hey.” Boffi then asked whether, by referring to

a lawyer “are you saying[,] are you not gonna talk to us anymore?” [Petitioner]

indicated that, because he had already described the “basic story,” there was

nothing more to say, asking, “What else should I tell you?” Boffi said he had many

questions, but “you had mentioned a lawyer and I need to know is that what you’re

saying[,] you want one here[,] or you’re just throwing out the word lawyer?” When

[petitioner] said “I’m [sic] want one here because of my situation,” Boffi ceased

further inquiry, telling [petitioner] he would be taken to Redwood City as soon as

“paperwork” related to the processing of his arrest was completed. Detectives Boffi

and Pon remained in the room for about seven minutes after [petitioner] first

expressed an interest in having an attorney.

After the interview ceased, Officer Alger asked [petitioner] to provide the

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 6 Alger testified at trial that he did not know what he was referring to when he made this

statement. [Petitioner] maintains that the statement “sounds very much like the beginning of

a conversation relating to [petitioner’s] legal predicament,” in violation of Edwards v.

Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, citing Shedelbower v. Estelle (9th Cir. 1989) 885 F.2d 570,

573-574. [original footnote renumbered.]

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general identification information required by the booking procedure. When

[petitioner] told Alger he needed to “take a leak,” Alger said he would take him to

the bathroom but first he had to complete “a couple of things.” When [petitioner]

asked what he was being charged with, Alger said “probably with murder, but its’

not my choice though.” When [petitioner] revealed he was a “disabled vet,” Alger

said, “[t]hen I would give you a bit of cushion” because “[a] lot of vets are deputies. 

[¶] . . . [¶] We try to do you a little favor, you know what I mean.” While Alger

worked on the booking sheet, [petitioner] repeatedly inquired whether the police

had witnesses or found weapons or other evidence. Alger did not respond to these

requests, telling [petitioner] that only the detectives knew what evidence had been

collected and “if you want to talk to them, they need to come back[] in here and do

the whole spiel again, that’s up to you.” After [petitioner] made further inquiries

about the evidence the police obtained, Alger made the cryptic observation: “I’ll be

honest with you.”6

 At that point, Alger took [petitioner] to the bathroom, as he had

requested, where their conversation was not taped. Alger testified he did not

question [petitioner] about the case while they were in the bathroom, but

[petitioner] continued to talk, “asking me questions, running scenarios about what if

this happened, what if that happened.” At one point, according to Alger,

[petitioner] indicated he wanted to speak with detectives again. Alger then brought

[petitioner] back to the interview room and “went out and told the detectives that

[petitioner] wanted to speak again to them.” Telling Boffi he had rapport with

[petitioner], Alger asked if he could conduct the interview. When Alger returned to

the room and reminded [petitioner] he had earlier expressed an interest in obtaining

an attorney, [petitioner] responded, “Well, that doesn’t matter, I could change my

mind.” Alger told him he let the detectives know this. Alger then told [petitioner]

to “have a seat” and offered him two cigarettes, saying, “Don’t say nothing to no

body” because “[i]f someone comes in, I’m getting in shit [¶] . . . [¶] [i]f I’m [seen]

sitting in here with you.” At that point, Detective Boffi reentered the interview

room, saying “we gonna go through that whole thing again, all right?” and

[petitioner] answered, “Yeah, okay.”

Alger then gave [petitioner] a written form statement of his Miranda rights

and read each right aloud, indicating as he went along where on the form

[petitioner] should place his signature or initials if he understood. Alger

emphasized [petitioner]’s “right to have a lawyer [¶] . . . [¶] [a]nd have him present

with you while you’re being questioned,” stating that “this is an important one

because this is the one you told the detectives a couple of minutes ago.” After

[petitioner] initialed the form statement of the right to have an attorney, Alger told

him: “If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer there will be one to represent you before

and during any questioning, you okay, you understand that one?” [Petitioner] stated

that he understood and said “I’m gonna sign here.” Alger then indicated

[petitioner] had to affirm “I’m not doing this out of force or fear or anything,” and

[petitioner] said, “No, no, no, I just, you know, I just, I just, I was thinking about

it.”

The form [petitioner] was given only advised him of the nature of his rights.

[Petitioner] claims neither the form nor Alger required [petitioner] to affirmatively

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indicate his willingness to waive those rights, and respondent does not dispute this

assertion. After [petitioner] signed the Miranda form for the last time, Alger asked,

“Okay, what is it that you want to tell me?” After stating that Celentano was a drug

dealer and therefore “probably got enemies,” [petitioner] told Alger that when he

found Celentano’s body he called a very close friend who lived nearby and told him

“you know what[,] looks like he was hit, you better come over let’s see what’s

happening. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I didn’t run away or anything like that, I’m sitting in the

couch waiting.” After he had been questioned by Alger for about 15 minutes,

Detective Boffi reentered the room and he and Alger continued interviewing

[petitioner] for another 14 minutes. [Petitioner] reminded his questioners several

times that “if I took this guy out, I could have got, I’ve plenty of time to get away.”

When asked by Boffi whether he touched the body after he found it, [petitioner]

repeatedly said he had not, stating on one occasion he “didn’t want to touch

anything because of circumstantial evidence.” Later, while Boffi and Pon were out

of the room, and [petitioner] had said he was not the one who “took this guy out,”

Officer Alger told [petitioner] he was trying to “make sure you don’t go down for

something that could, that couldn’t be explained, okay,” and “[e]arlier you told me

that you had done it in self-defense, so you had killed him and you’d done it. [¶] . .

. [¶] . . . The best thing you can do . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . is to stick with the story and

tell the truth.” [Petitioner] said his claim that he did not kill Celentano was “the

truth,” and that he earlier said he acted in self-defense “because I was paranoid. 

Okay? [¶] . . . [¶] I told you that earlier man, because I didn’t know what the fuck

to do . . . .” After Alger said “I’m trying to help you now, before the detectives

start coming in here,” and insisted “Michael, you killed the guy,” [petitioner]

responded, “I’m saying I didn’t” and reiterated that he previously gave a different

story only “because I was scared of my record. That, honest to God, that’s why. If

I had anything to hide . . . I would have ran out of that fucking house and been

gone.” Refusing to accept this, Alger asked [petitioner] to “stop lying to me,” and

said “you tell what happened and it was self-defense, you got a fighting chance.”

Detective Boffi then returned to the room and he and Alger continued trying

to persuade [petitioner] to affirm his initial statement that he killed Celentano in

self-defense. Despite Officer Alger’s revelation that the statements [petitioner]

made to him earlier “[are] on tape, dude,” and that [petitioner]’s statement to the

911 dispatcher that “you stabbed him because he was hassling you” was also on

tape, [petitioner] refused to say he killed Celentano. At several points [petitioner]

threw out the “possibility” that another person killed Celentano and [petitioner]

knew who he was but would not disclose his identity. In the end, [petitioner] stood

“with what I told you[,] that I found a dead body. And its up to you guys to do your

job, get the weapons, get the DNA, which you won’t have any because I know I

didn’t do it, uh, the other person involved, I”m not gonna get involved in that,

okay?”

Shortly before the interview ended, [petitioner], for the third time, indicated

an interest in talking to an attorney, stating, “Okay, so I’m gonna have to, I’m

gonna talk to a lawyer and , and just go to Redwood City.” Boffi and Alger ignored

this request, though the interview concluded a few minutes later. Apparently

acknowledging that the interview should then have concluded, the district attorney

agreed to the redaction of all portions of the tape and transcript after [petitioner]

expresses his desire to “talk to a lawyer.” The interview ended at 7:27 a.m. 

[Petitioner] remained alone in the room for about an hour before the tape was shut

off.

(Resp’t Ex. C at 9-16.)

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 7 The court need not address whether petitioner made statements during custodial

interrogation because there is no dispute that petitioner was in custody at the time of

questioning. 

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In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that certain

warnings must be given before a suspect’s statement made during custodial interrogation can be

admitted in evidence. The requirements of Miranda are “clearly established” federal law for

purposes of federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d

1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2005); Jackson v. Giurbino, 364 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004). Habeas

relief should be granted if the admission of statements in violation of Miranda “‘had a substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. at 1010 (quoting

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 147 (1998)). Miranda requires that a person subjected to

custodial interrogation be advised that he has the right to remain silent, that statements made can

be used against him, that he has the right to counsel, and that he has the right to have counsel

appointed. These warnings must precede any custodial interrogation, which occurs whenever

law enforcement officers question a person after taking that person into custody or otherwise

significantly deprive a person of freedom of action.7

 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

Once properly advised of his rights, an accused may waive them voluntarily, knowingly

and intelligently. See id. at 475. A valid waiver of Miranda rights depends upon the totality of

the circumstances, including the background, experience and conduct of the defendant. See

United States v. Bernard S., 795 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1986). The government must prove

waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69

(1986). The waiver need not be express as long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that

the waiver was knowing and voluntary. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). To

satisfy its burden, the government must introduce sufficient evidence to establish that under the

totality of the circumstances, the defendant was aware of “the nature of the right being

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.

412, 421 (1986). Statements made after a defendant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights

has been ignored by police and questioning has continued uninterrupted do not amount to a

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waiver of Miranda rights. Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 791 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). A

suspect who has expressed a desire to have counsel present during custodial interrogation is not

subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel is made available to him. See

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). 

In the instant case, petitioner makes four Miranda-related arguments that collectively, he

contends, demonstrate a violation of Edwards. First, petitioner argues that Alger did not give

him Miranda warnings when they initially sat together in the interview room for almost two

hours before Boffi and Pon arrived. (Pet at 11; Pet. Memo at 5.) The state appellate court found

that petitioner was spontaneously making statements and asking Alger questions about the

circumstances of the case. (Resp’t Ex. C at 10.) There is no evidence that Alger engaged in any

“words or actions” that were designed “to elicit an incriminating response” from petitioner. See

Pope, 69 F.3d at 1023. Alger’s responses to petitioner’s queries were innocuous comments such

as “I’m just the taxi driver” and “I have no idea what’s going on.” (Resp’t Ex. C at 10.) 

Miranda warnings are only necessary prior to custodial interrogation. “[I]nterrogation

means questioning or ‘its functional equivalent,’ including ‘words or actions on the part of the

police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’” Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d

1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). 

Based on the foregoing circumstances, the state appellate court reasonably found that

Alger did not conduct an interrogation of petitioner during the first hour and fifty minutes in the

interview room, thus rendering Miranda warnings unnecessary. Accordingly, petitioner’s first

Miranda argument does not support his request for habeas relief. 

Petitioner’s second Miranda claim is that the police continued to interrogate him after he

invoked his right to counsel. (Pet. Memo at 5.) As discussed above, Edwards mandates that

once petitioner expressed his desire for a lawyer, he may not be subjected to interrogation until a

lawyer has been made available to him, unless petitioner himself “initiates further

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-485. 

The state court found that petitioner initiated contact with the police during a conversation with

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Alger in the bathroom, and after being read his Miranda rights a second time, petitioner

implicitly waived his previously invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel. (Resp’t Ex. C at

18.)

This court finds that because Alger’s testimony was supported by later statements made

by petitioner after they returned to the interview room, the state court reasonably found that

petitioner re-initiated communication with police regarding the incident. Alger testified that

“during a conversation in the bathroom, [petitioner] spontaneously indicated a willingness to

resume talking to the police,” which was never contradicted by petitioner because he declined to

take the stand at the hearing on the motion to suppress. (Id. at 17-18.) Although the

conversation in the bathroom was not recorded, the appellate court found that when they returned

to the interview room and Alger reminded petitioner that he had earlier expressed an interest in

obtaining an attorney, petitioner affirmed his change of mind. (Id. at 18.) 

As set forth above, a waiver of Miranda rights need not be express; the waiver can be

implied so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that the waiver was knowing and

voluntary. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. In finding an implied waiver, the state court also cited

petitioner’s extensive criminal record: “[petitioner] acknowledged being arrested more than 50

times and detained in jail or prison on 32 different occasions.” (Id. at 19.) His criminal record

tends to indicate the waiver was knowing and voluntary because it shows that he had extensive

experience with the police and their interrogations and understood his rights. Moreover, after

Alger read petitioner his Miranda rights again, petitioner “explicitly acknowledged, ‘I’m not

doing this in any force or fear or anything.’” (Id. at 19.) Based on the foregoing circumstances,

the state court reasonably found that petitioner re-initiated contact with the police, was re-read

his Miranda rights, and made an implied and subsequent express, knowing and voluntary waiver

of those rights. See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46. Furthermore the state appellate court also

reasonably found that the questions Alger asked petitioner after he asserted his right to counsel

were routine booking questions that “did not solicit incriminating information but only general

information necessary for Alger to complete the booking process.” (Id. at 19.) Accordingly,

petitioner’s second Miranda argument does not support his request for habeas relief. 

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Third, petitioner argues that his statement to police was made under duress because he

was handcuffed for almost two hours before the interrogation began, and he was not provided

water or use of a restroom for the first three hours of the interview. (Pet. Memo at 5.) To

determine the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the effect that the totality of

the circumstances had upon the will of the defendant. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,

226-27 (1973). “The test is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the

government obtained the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper

inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne.” United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d

1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963)); see,

e.g., Cunningham v. Perez, 345 F.3d 802, 810-11 (9th Cir. 2003) (officer did not undermine

plaintiff’s free will where interrogation lasted for eight hours and officer did not refuse to give

break for food and water); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that

state court’s determination that interrogation was non-coercive, where suspect was interrogated

over 5-hour period in 6 by 8 foot room without water or toilet was objectively reasonable

application of Schneckloth).

The state appellate court found that petitioner was not placed under duress due to a

refusal to provide water or use of a restroom, stating that “the videotape does not show

[petitioner] was denied these amenities for any significant period of time after he asked for

them.” (Resp’t Ex. C at 19.) Although the state appellate court did not specifically address the

almost two hour delay before the interview began, the record shows that petitioner was kept

handcuffed due to safety reasons, and that lead investigator Boffi had to come to the police

station from his home, which was an hour away, when he learned of the stabbing. (RT 159-160;

184-187.) Under these circumstances, the state appellate court reasonably found that petitioner’s

statements to the police were not involuntary due to coercion or duress. Accordingly,

petitioner’s third Miranda argument does not support his request for habeas relief. 

Fourth, petitioner argues that police ignored petitioner’s second and third requests for an

attorney by continuing to ask him questions. (Pet. Memo at 6.) The state appellate court agreed,

but found that “[petitioner]’s complaint that the police did not cease questioning him

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immediately after his third request for an attorney is insignificant. The brief questioning, which

revealed nothing new, was redacted from the tape and transcript of the interview, and not used at

trial.” (Resp’t Ex. C at 19.) 

Miranda provides for warnings requirements effective to secure the Fifth Amendment’s

privilege against self-incrimination. The remedy for a violation of these requirements is the

suppression, at the subsequent trial, of the statements made incriminating the defendant in the

crime about which he was questioned. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; see Jackson v. Giurbino, 364

F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004) (because Miranda offers a “bright-line” test for the

admissibility of statements made in response to police interrogation, state courts act contrary to

clearly established constitutional law when they fail to exclude statements obtained in violation

of Miranda). Because the trial court suppressed the portion of the videotape after petitioner’s

request for an attorney, the Miranda violation was remedied at trial. Thus, this court finds that

petitioner’s fourth Miranda argument does not support his request for habeas relief. 

Accordingly, the state court’s decision rejecting this claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

3. Challenge of Reliability of Petitioner’s Statement to Police

Petitioner argues that the trial court prevented him from challenging the reliability of his

statement to the police in violation of his right to present a defense under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments. (Pet. Memo at 7-8.) Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred in

not instructing the jury about the distinction between a “voluntary” statement and a “reliable”

one. (Id. at 8.) 

During trial, petitioner sought to cross-examine Alger about the circumstances of the

recorded interview with petitioner. (Resp’t Ex. C at 28.) Petitioner attempted to show that his

statements were not reliable because of the police practice of being untruthful to suspects in

order to get them to talk. (Id.) The trial court ruled that petitioner could not ask Alger questions

relating to the voluntariness of petitioner’s statements because the court had already decided that

the statements were voluntary as a matter of law and advised the jury that they could not consider

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Alger’s remarks “in the sense of misleading the [petitioner] in some way and thus causing him to

make a statement that wasn’t legal, because that has already been decided.” (Id.) 

After the jury received this advisement, defense counsel resumed his crossexamination of Alger, asking him, “do you believe that it is all right for a law

enforcement officer to lie to a suspect in a criminal case?” The district attorney

immediately objected on the ground the question was “irrelevant.” Defense counsel

disagreed, claiming he was only eliciting information that would permit the jury to

conclude Alger was being truthful when he told [petitioner] he believed he acted in

self-defense. The court agreed “there is nothing wrong with that,” but added that

“asking the officer if he thinks it is okay to lie to suspects does not have a place in

this,” because the law permits it. The court permitted counsel to continue

questioning Alger, so long as the questions related to whether Alger believed what

[petitioner] him. Defense counsel then asked Alger, “Do you believe that it is all

right for suspects and defendants to lie to police officers,” the district attorney

objected, and the court sustained the objection. Defense counsel then announced he

had no further questions.

(Id. at 29.)

The Supreme Court has established that “the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants

a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690

(1986). In Crane, the state court precluded the defendant from attacking the credibility of his

confession because it believed such an attack went towards the voluntariness of the confession. 

Id. at 685-86. Because the state court had already determined that the confession was voluntary,

it saw no need to examine the confession’s credibility. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that

the manner in which a confession is taken is relevant to both the legal question of voluntariness

and the factual issue of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. Id. at 688-89. As a result, the Court

held that although the trial court may rule on the legal question of whether an officer’s actions

during the interrogation violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, such as voluntariness, the

state may not exclude evidence pertaining to the manner, circumstances, or content of the

interview and thereby prevent the defendant from attacking the reliability or credibility of the

statement. Id. at 689-91.

The state appellate court correctly determined that “[t]he [Supreme Court in Crane]

reasoned that evidence about the manner in which a confession was secured, in addition to

bearing on its voluntariness, often bears as well on its credibility, a matter that is exclusively for

the jury to assess.” (Resp’t Ex. C at 30.) In applying this rule, the state appellate court

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concluded that, unlike Crane, petitioner’s case did not raise significant questions as to the

reliability of the incriminating statements. (Id.) The state court found that petitioner, “a 52-year

old adult with a long criminal history who had interacted with the police on numerous prior

occasions, and knew his rights, was not nearly as easy to intimidate as the juvenile petitioner in

Crane.” (Id. at 31.) Moreover, “unlike the confession in Crane, [petitioner]’s incriminating

statements did not in any way indicate ignorance of facts known to police.” (Id.) Furthermore,

the jury in petitioner’s case was not prevented from receiving evidence of the circumstances in

which the incriminating statements were made. (Id.) The state appellate court found that the

trial court did not prevent defense counsel from challenging the reliability of petitioner’s

statements, and that the jury actually watched a videotape of the entire interrogation. 

Accordingly, the appellate court found that “[t]he trial court did not prohibit [petitioner] from

challenging the reliability of his statements to the police.” (Id.)

This court agrees. First, unlike Crane, there was no blanket exclusion of evidence

pertaining to the circumstances of the interrogation because the trial court allowed defense

counsel to question Alger as long as it was not related to the voluntariness of the statement. 

Therefore, petitioner was not prevented from showing other factors of the interrogation, such as

his discomfort or need to go to the bathroom, and in fact he did highlight these facts during trial. 

Moreover, the jury was able to see the interrogation on videotape and could evaluate whether

petitioner’s statements were reliable based the manner in which they were secured. Furthermore,

the testimony that petitioner was attempting to elicit from Alger was not central to his claim of

self-defense, it merely served as an attempt to discredit a portion of the state’s evidence against

him. As demonstrated above, see supra Section B.1, there was substantial evidence against

petitioner’s theory of self-defense besides his statements to police.

Petitioner also challenges the trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding the

voluntariness of petitioner’s statement to Alger. The trial court instructed the jury that “it is not

necessarily wrong for an officer to be untruthful with a suspect. That has already been evaluated

by the court. That is part of what goes into determining whether a statement is voluntary or not:

was it elicited in some illegal means. And without going into the finer points on that, it has been

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determined by the court that it was not. [¶] So you may consider the remarks [made] by the

officer, I believe, as to whether or not the officer really believed the defendant. But you can’t

consider it in the sense of misleading the defendant in some way and thus causing him to make a

statement that wasn’t legal, because that has already been decided.” (Resp’t Ex. C at 28.) 

Petitioner argues that the jury would have interpreted the instructions as foreclosing any

evaluation of the reliability of the statements made, and thus the instructions violated his

constitutional rights to have the jury consider the credibility of the statement under Crane.

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that

the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation,

but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See id.

In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to

the jury as a component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169

(1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). Furthermore, a habeas petitioner

is not entitled to relief unless the instructional error “‘had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. In other words, state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief may obtain plenary review of constitutional claims of trial

error, but are not entitled to habeas relief unless the error resulted in “actual prejudice.” Id.

(citation omitted)

Petitioner’s argument that the trial court committed constitutional error when it instructed

the jury that petitioner’s statement was “voluntary,” without distinguishing its “reliability,” is

without merit. There is no evidence that the jury was confused as to the distinction between the

voluntariness of petitioner’s statement and its reliability. As the state appellate court noted,

“[t]he trial court in this case fully appreciated that its ruling on the voluntariness of [petitioner]’s

statements did not prevent the defense from challenging the reliability of those statements, and

permitted defense counsel to elicit from Officer Alger testimony that he misled [petitioner] by

falsely telling him he believed his version of the killing, and that he did so in order to encourage

him to talk.” (Resp’t Ex. C at 31 (emphasis in original).) Furthermore, the trial court instructed

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the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.70, informing them that they “‘are the exclusive judges as to

whether the [petitioner] made a confession or an admission,’and, if so, ‘whether that statement is

true in whole or in part.’” (Id.) 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

4. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Move to Strike a Prior Serious Felony Conviction

Petitioner claims he is entitled to habeas relief because his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance in connection with two motions to strike petitioner’s prior 1980 serious

felony conviction. (Pet. Memo at 10.) Specifically, petitioner claims that defense counsel was

ineffective because counsel should have moved to strike his prior serious felony conviction on

two other alternate grounds: (1) the plea to assault with a deadly weapon was not voluntary and

intelligent; or (2) the 1980 plea agreement that petitioner plead guilty to assault with force likely

to create great bodily injury was violated when petitioner was convicted of assault with a deadly

weapon. (Pet. Memo at 13, 14.) Petitioner contends that he pleaded guilty in 1980 to assault

with force likely to cause great bodily harm, but the conviction was mistakenly recorded on the

abstract of judgment as assault with a deadly weapon. Assault with a deadly weapon counts as a

“strike” within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.12(c)(1)) and

resulted in petitioner’s 2003 murder sentence being doubled, while assault with force likely to

cause bodily injury does not count as a “strike.” Petitioner’s defense counsel for the 2003

murder trial twice sought unsuccessfully to strike petitioner’s 1980 conviction based on

insufficiency of evidence that the prior conviction was a “strike.” The trial court denied the

motions and found that petitioner’s prior conviction was a serious felony pursuant to the Three

Strikes law.

After exhausting his direct appeals, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in the California Superior Court, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in

that counsel failed to properly move to strike the prior serious felony conviction. The state

habeas court ruled that petitioner had not made a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of

counsel under Strickland because he had not shown that he was prejudiced by any error on

counsel’s part. (Resp’t Ex. G at 8.) The state court’s ruling was also based on the fact that

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petitioner had brought a writ of coram nobis to vacate the prior conviction, which was denied by

the San Francisco Superior Court, and was on appeal in the California Court of Appeal. (Id. at 8-

9.) The state habeas court found that “[d]ocumentation regarding these proceedings are

necessary before this court can grant relief, particularly if the Court of Appeal denied relief on

any grounds that would be binding on this court.” (Id. at 9.)

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to prevail on a Sixth

Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he must

establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard

of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. There is a strong presumption that

counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and

counsel’s judgment is entitled to a high degree of deference. Id. at 689-90.

This court finds that the state court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state court did not address

whether counsel’s performance was deficient under the first prong of Strickland, however, a

review of the record shows that defense counsel’s actions were reasonable. Counsel twice

moved to strike petitioner’s prior serious felony conviction based on the fact that an ambiguity in

the record of the plea deal created a reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner’s previous

conviction counted as a “strike.” Although petitioner claims that counsel should have argued the

motion on alternate grounds, counsel’s strategy in attacking the prior conviction was informed

and based on precedent that he presented to the judge, thus it is accorded deference. See Sanders

v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover, regardless of whether petitioner’s

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 8 Gideon involved the denial of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 371 U.S. 335 (1963). 

Boykin-Tahl rights involve a defendant’s right to be informed that by pleading guilty he

forfeits his right to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to be free of

compelled self-incrimination. See People v. Sumstine, 36 Cal. 3d 909, 914 (1984). 

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proffered alternate grounds were “likely to succeed,” the question is not what counsel could have

done, but whether what he did was reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173

(9th Cir. 1998).

Additionally, an analysis of petitioner’s two grounds shows that it was objectively

reasonable for counsel not to pursue them. Petitioner’s first argument, that counsel should have

argued that the plea was not voluntary and intelligent, was foreclosed by state law. Under

California law, a criminal defendant is not authorized to move in the trial court to strike an

alleged prior felony conviction, except on the grounds of a Gideon or Boykin-Tahl error.8 See

generally People v. Allen, 21 Cal.4th 424, 431-36 (1999) (explaining when a defendant can make

a motion to strike a prior conviction). Petitioner was represented by counsel and was given his

Boykin-Tahl advisements prior to the 1980 plea. (Resp’t Ex. A at 848.) Therefore, defense

counsel could not have successfully argued in the motion to strike that the plea was not voluntary

and intelligent.

Petitioner’s also argues that defense counsel should have argued that the 1980 plea

agreement was violated. However, the record clearly demonstrates that petitioner pleaded guilty

to Count 3 of the information, which was assault with a deadly weapon. (Resp’t Ex. A at 842,

849.) Whether it was petitioner’s (and the district attorney’s) intent for petitioner to plead to

assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury is speculative because the record is

somewhat ambiguous. (Resp’t Ex A at 844-50.) Therefore, it cannot be said that defense

counsel’s decision not to pursue this course was unreasonable.

This court finds that counsel’s actions regarding the motions to strike were based on

tactical decisions. Petitioner has failed to rebut the presumption that defense counsel’s

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 9 Because petitioner cannot establish that counsel was incompetent under the first prong of

Strickland, it is unnecessary to analyze the prejudice prong. See Siripongs, 133 F.3d at 737.

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performance was reasonable.9

 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Accordingly, the state court did

not apply Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner, and petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim.

5. Appellate Counsel’s Failure to Raise the Issue of Improper Denial of Motion to

Strike the Prior Conviction

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by not

complaining of the trial court’s improper denial of a motion to strike a prior conviction. (Pet.

Memo at 17.) Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel could have raised the same issues that

petitioner included in claim four in the instant habeas petition. (Id. at 18.)

 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant

the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.

387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed

according to the standard set out in Strickland. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir.

1989). A defendant therefore must show that counsel’s advice fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Id. at 1434 & n.9 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,

694). It is important to note that appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise

every nonfrivolous issue requested by defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54

(1983). The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of

effective appellate advocacy. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. Appellate counsel therefore will

frequently remain above an objective standard of competence and have caused his client no

prejudice for the same reason--because he declined to raise a weak issue. Id. 

The state habeas court found that, similar to the previous claim, petitioner had failed to

sufficiently allege that he was prejudiced by any deficient performance on counsel’s part. 

(Resp’t Ex. G at 10.)

This court finds that the state habeas court reasonably found that appellate counsel did not

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provide ineffective assistance under Strickland. As previously shown, even if appellate counsel

had raised petitioner’s proffered grounds on appeal, they were not likely to prevail. The trial

court found that it was undisputed that in 1980, petitioner pleaded guilty to Count 3 of the

information, which was assault with a deadly weapon and is considered a “strike.” The actual

intent of the parties was ambiguous from the record. Therefore, it cannot be said that appellate

counsel’s decision to forego this claim on appeal was incompetent, nor was it prejudicial. 

Accordingly, the state court’s decision rejecting this claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

6. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Object to the Admission of Evidence Regarding the

Victim’s Character

Petitioner claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to

object when the prosecution elicited testimony about the victim’s non-violent nature. (Pet.

Memo at 18.) Petitioner argues that admission of the victim’s character was inadmissible under

California Evidence Code § 1101(a), and that trial counsel should have objected to its admission

or in the alternative moved for a mistrial. (Id. at 10-20.)

As discussed above, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under

Strickland. A failure to object to inadmissible evidence may constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 1996). The state habeas court found that

petitioner was arguing the “flip side” of Claim One of the instant petition, specifically “that it

was error to admit evidence of the victim’s easy going and nonviolent character.” (Resp’t Ex. G

at 11.) The state habeas court concluded that because the state appellate court had already

decided that exclusion of defense evidence showing the victim’s aggressive behavior was

harmless error, see supra Section B.1, petitioner could not seek habeas relief on the issue because

it was resolved on appeal, and thus there was no prejudice from any alleged error by trial

counsel. (Id.) 

This court finds that petitioner’s argument is without merit. This court need not consider

whether counsel’s performance was deficient because petitioner cannot show prejudice. 

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 10 Petitioner attempted to show that Celentano became violent on one occasion due to

alcohol withdrawal. However, this evidence merely demonstrates that aggressive behavior

was a symptom of Celentano’s alcohol withdrawal, not that Celentano was inherently violent

and aggressive by nature.

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Petitioner fails to make any showing that the result of the proceedings would have been different

had his trial counsel objected to the witnesses’ observations that they had never seen the victim

violent. The defense never argued that Celentano had a propensity for violence,10 nor did the

witnesses’ testimony contradict the defense’s theory that petitioner killed Celentano in selfdefense. At worst, the evidence is irrelevant, and any error would have been harmless because

Celentano’s history of non-violence was not disputed. As demonstrated above, the evidence that

petitioner did not act in self-defense was substantial. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court concludes that petitioner has failed to show any

violation of his federal constitutional rights in the underlying state criminal proceedings. 

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently been

amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.

foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). For the reasons set out in the discussion above,

petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states

a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right [or] that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a COA is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

3/23/10

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