Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35028/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EFRAIN REYNAGA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-35028

D.C. No.

6:11-cv-06282-MC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 5, 2016

Portland, Oregon

Filed January 26, 2017

Before: Harry Pregerson, Carlos T. Bea,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson;

Dissent by Judge Bea

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2 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

SUMMARY*

Employment Discrimination

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendant

employer in an action brought by a millwright under Title

VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Oregon state law.

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on the following claims: (1) hostile work

environment, including employer liability through

negligence; (2) disparate treatment with regard to the

breaking of the plaintiff’s lock and the termination of his

employment; (3) retaliation with regard to the termination of

the plaintiff’s employment; and (4) corresponding state law

claims. The panel affirmed on other claims.

The panel held that, as to the plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude

that (1) a lead millwright’s conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to create a hostile work environment, and (2) the

employer knew about the lead millwright’s conduct and failed

to take corrective remedial action.

As to the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim, the panel

held that he demonstrated the necessary prima facie case to

survive summary judgment based on (1) the employer

terminating his employment and (2) breaking into his locker. 

The panel further held that there was a genuine dispute of fact

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 3

as to the employer’s discriminatory intent regarding those

challenged actions.

As to the plaintiff’s retaliatory termination claim, the

panel held that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that

the employer’s proffered reason for terminating the plaintiff

was pretextual.

The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment as to additional allegations of disparate treatment

and retaliation.

Dissenting in part, Judge Bea wrote that he concurred in

the majority’s opinion reversing the district court’s summary

judgment on the plaintiff’s retaliatory termination claim. He

dissented in part because the employer took prompt and

effective action to rectify the hostile work environment

experienced by the plaintiff and terminated him only after he

repeatedly refused to work his assigned shifts. Judge Bea

wrote that the district court therefore concluded properly that

the plaintiff’s hostile work environment and disparate

treatment claims should fail as a matter of law.

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4 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

COUNSEL

Marianne G. Dugan (argued), Eugene, Oregon, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Jason Montgomery (argued) and Dan W. Clark, Dole

Coalwell Clark Mountainspring&Mornarich P.C., Roseburg,

Oregon, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Efrain Reynaga and his son Richard Reynaga

worked as millwrights for Roseburg Forest Products

(“Roseburg”). According to Efrain, he and his son were the

only millwrights of Mexican descent at Roseburg. Efrain

alleges that during the course of his employment, he was

subjected to disparate treatment and a hostile work

environment because of his race or national origin.

Efrain developed a contentious relationship with lead

millwright, Timothy Branaugh (“Branaugh”), who allegedly

harassed Efrain with racially disparaging comments. In

October and December 2009, Efrain lodged verbal and

written complaints with Roseburg management, alleging

racial harassment in the workplace. In response, Roseburg

initiated an investigation into Efrain’s allegations and

ultimately rearranged Branaugh’s work schedule so that he

would not be on the same shift as Efrain.

On January 9, 2010, Efrain and Richard arrived at work

to find Branaugh assigned to the same shift. After notifying

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 5

Roseburg that they would not work in a hostile environment,

Efrain and Richard immediately left the premises. A few

days later, Efrain and Richard showed up to work but refused

to complete their shift because Branaugh was also scheduled

for work at the same time. A supervisor then suspended

Efrain and Richard. On January 18, 2010, Roseburg

terminated Efrain and Richard’s employment.

Efrain filed suit against Roseburg, alleging hostile work

environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation in violation

of state and federal civil rights laws. Richard was not a party

to the litigation. The district court granted Roseburg’s

motion for summary judgment on all counts. Efrain timely

appealed. We reverse in part and affirm in part the district

court’s ruling.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Efrain was born in Mexico and moved to the United

States several decades ago at age 15. He became a United

States citizen in 1981. From 2004 to 2010, Efrain worked as

a millwright at Roseburg, where he performed his job well

and received positive evaluations. Efrain’s son, Richard,

worked at Roseburg for about two years. Efrain and Richard

were the only Hispanic millwrights at Roseburg.

Efrain claims that during the course of his employment

with Roseburg, he was subjected to racially disparaging

statements and disparate treatment because of his race. His

allegations largely pertain to lead millwright Branaugh,

whom Efrain describes as a “physically very large” and

“aggressive” “bully” who liked to intimidate people.

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6 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

Efrain alleges that Branaugh frequently made racially

derogatory comments and engaged in other harassing

conduct, including: (1) Branaugh referred to black people as

“niggers” and Arabs as “rugheads;” (2) in September 2009,

after Efrain received hunting tags for the second year in a

row, Branaugh said, “I’m a true believe [sic] that we should

close the borders to keep motherf***ers like you from

coming up here and killing our elk. I know one motherf**er

[sic] who drew tags back to back;” (3) in September 2009,

Branaugh stated, “Minorities are taking over the country;”

(4) Branaugh asked, “Efrain, are all Mexican women fat?”

(5) Branaugh, aware that Efrain’s wife is Native American,

referred to Native American women as “nasty fat squaws;”

(6) Branaugh belittled Efrain in front of an apprentice, stating

that Efrain was “a big boy” with a “little, tiny dick” who

“needs all the help he can get;” and (7) on October 14, 2009,

while Efrain was rebuilding an accumulator, Branaugh

commented, “Boy, you’re slow,” and remarked to the other

millwrights, “Man, he just dinks around.”

Efrain also alleges several instances of disparate treatment

and retaliation at Roseburg: (1) On November 12, 2008, the

police brought drug-sniffing dogs to the Roseburg facility. 

They broke the lock to Efrain and Richard’s shared locker

even though Richard was present and offered to open it. The

police did not find anything nefarious inside. Roseburg did

not break the lock to a white millwright’s locker even though

a dog alerted to it; (2) after Efrain broke his leg on the job, he

was required to work and go up and down the stairs while

others with similar injuries were allowed to stay home;

(3) Branaugh and four other millwrights composed one crew

while Efrain and Richard alone composed a second crew, but

both crews received the same amount of work; (4) Efrain and

Richard were frequentlyassigned the harder, dirtier, and more

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 7

dangerous jobs, such as cleaning the hydraulic room;

(5) Efrain had to file written reports on repairs when other

millwrights did not have to, and he was harassed about the

length of time he took to perform repairs while others were

not similarly harassed; (6) Roseburg denied Efrain a company

email account, but gave them to other mill workers; (7) after

Efrain filed a written complaint about the hostile work

environment, work orders were no longer made available to

Efrain and Richard, so they had to consult the work board to

figure out what job to do; and (8) after Efrain filed a written

complaint, Roseburg put 16 millwrights back to full-time

work (from part-time), but did not do so for Efrain and

Richard.

In October 2009, the alleged hostile work environment

worsened. On October 14, 2009, after Branaugh questioned

Efrain’s work ethic, they engaged in a verbal confrontation

over who needed to work on a particular piece of machinery. 

The next day, Richard spoke with Terry Turner, Roseburg’s

maintenance superintendent, about Branaugh’s harassing

behavior. A few days later, Richard and Branaugh engaged

in an altercation related to seniority and performance of a

particular welding job. Roseburg investigated this

altercation. Efrain cooperated in the investigation and

complained to management about Branaugh. The next day,

Roseburg’s managing personnel met with Branaugh to

discuss Efrain and Richard’s complaints. Theytold Branaugh

that he “can make people uncomfortable” and they “coached

Branaugh on his leadership skills.”

On December 3, 2009, Efrain filed a written complaint

with Roseburg, alleging harassment and discrimination by

Branaugh. In response to the complaint, Roseburg hired

Vigilant, a companythat specializes in employment relations,

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8 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

to investigate the allegations. On December 10, 2009,

Vigilant interviewed Efrain. Efrain stated that Branaugh had

made racist statements, had been harassing Efrain for “a long

time,” and that Efrain did not want to work with Branaugh. 

Subsequently, Roseburg rearranged Branaugh’s schedule so

that he would not be on the same shift as Efrain.

On December 21, 2009, Vigilant contacted Efrain to

conduct a follow-up interview. Efrain stated that he would

only participate if he had an attorney present, but Roseburg’s

policy did not allow attorneys to be involved with plant-level

investigations. Efrain claims that he subsequently informed

Roseburg that he was willing to be interviewed a second time

without an attorney, but Roseburg never followed up.

On January 4, 2010, Branaugh left in the break room a

printed email containing an article that claimed President

Obama was an illegal alien and that “our borders are like

sieves.” When Efrain read it, he was “very concerned about

the racial hostility and harassment at work.” A few days

later, on January 9, 2010, Efrain and Richard arrived at work

for their shift, and upon discovering that Branaugh was also

on site, they immediately left the premises. Richard notified

Roseburg via email about Branaugh’s presence on the same

shift and stated, “We will not work in a hostile work

environment. We will report to our shift on Wednesday,

Jan[.], 13, 2010 . . . [u]nless we hear otherwise.”

On January 13, 2010, Efrain and Richard showed up to

work and were asked to meet with Dan Johnson, Roseburg’s

Human Resources and Safety Supervisor, to discuss their

walking off the job on January 9. Johnson told Efrain and

Richard that “Branaugh would be off-shift . . . as much as

possible, but that there were some days where Branaugh and

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 9

the Reynagas would be on the plant site at the same time.” 

Johnson said that Branaugh had been instructed to stay away

from Efrain and Richard, and to have “no contact with them

unless a work necessity or emergency arose.” Johnson

directed Efrain and Richard to do the same and asked if they

would complete their shift that day with Branaugh on the

premises. Efrain and Richard responded that they would not

work with Branaugh, so Johnson suspended them “pending

the conclusion of the investigation.” That same day,

Branaugh revved his engine at Efrain and Richard as they

were waiting in the parking lot for their shift to begin.

On January 18, 2010, Efrain received a letter explaining

that his employment was terminated “for walking off the job

on January 9, 2010, and refusing to work on January 13,

2010.” On the same date, Efrain received a second letter

explaining that he exhibited a lack of “full cooperation” with

the investigation and that Roseburg was “forced to conclude

[its]investigation absent a follow up and closing interview[.]” 

The letter also stated that the investigation revealed “no

evidence of a severe or pervasive hostile work environment,”

but did reveal some “personnel issues and [Roseburg]

intend[ed] to address those issues . . . but [Efrain was]

unwilling to meet . . . despite . . . repeated phone calls and

attempts to communicate.”

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 31, 2012, Efrain filed a First Amended Complaint

that alleged three causes of action for discrimination under

42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”): (1) hostile work

environment; (2) disparate treatment; and (3) retaliation. 

Efrain also alleged a fourth cause of action for relief under

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10 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

Oregon state law for disparate treatment (O.R.S.

§ 659A.030(1)(a)) and hostile work environment (O.R.S.

§ 659A.030(1)(b)).1

Roseburg moved for summary judgment. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of Roseburg on all

claims. Efrain timely appealed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment. See Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t,

424 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005). “Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must

determine whether there are any genuine disputes of material

fact and whether the district court correctly applied the

relevant substantive law.” Id. An issue of fact is genuine “if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island

Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

DISCUSSION

Efrain contends that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment because there are genuine disputes of

material fact for each of his claims. As to Efrain’s hostile

work environment claim, we hold that a reasonable trier of

fact could conclude that (1) Branaugh’s conduct was

sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work

1 Efrain did not allege a state law claim for retaliation under O.R.S.

659A.030(1)(f).

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 11

environment, and (2) Roseburg knew about Branaugh’s

misconduct and failed to take effective remedial action. As

to Efrain’s disparate treatment claim, we hold that Efrain has

demonstrated the necessary prima facie case to survive

summary judgment based on (1) Roseburg terminating

Efrain’s employment and (2) breaking into Efrain’s locker. 

We further hold that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to

Roseburg’s discriminatory intent regarding those challenged

actions. Finally, as to Efrain’s retaliatory termination claim,

we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that

Roseburg’s proffered reason for terminating Efrain was

pretextual.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a trial on

Efrain’s claims of hostile work environment, disparate

treatment, and retaliation. We affirm the district court’s grant

of summary judgment on certain other issues discussed

below.

I. Hostile Work Environment

Efrain first argues that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment to Roseburg on his hostile work

environment claim. This “First Claim for Relief” is divided

into two counts under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We

have recognized that the “legal principles guiding a court in

a Title VII dispute apply with equal force in a § 1981 action.” 

Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir.

2003). Accordingly, any discussion herein regardingEfrain’s

Title VII claims also applies to his corresponding § 1981

claims.

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is

unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an

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12 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

individual with respect to the compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment because of the

individual’s race. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). This includes a

prohibition against the creation of a hostile work

environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,

21 (1993) (“When the workplace is permeated with

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment, Title VIIis violated.”) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted); Woods v. Graphic Comm’ns, 925 F.2d

1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Courts have long recognized

that a workplace in which racial hostility is pervasive

constitutes a form of discrimination.”).

A. Severe or Pervasive Hostile Work Environment

To succeed on a hostile work environment claim based on

race, the plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that he was

subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial . . . nature;

(2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct

was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work

environment.” Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,

642 (9th Cir. 2003). It is undisputed that Efrain has met his

burden on the first two elements. Therefore, to survive

summary judgment, Efrain must show the existence of a

genuine factual dispute as to (1) whether the workplace

conditions were “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of employment and create an abusive working

environment” and (2) whether Roseburg, once apprised of

Branaugh’s behavior, failed to take adequate remedial and

disciplinary action, such that Roseburg may be liable

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 13

vicariously or through negligence. See Steiner v. Showboat

Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1462–63 (9th Cir. 1994).

In assessing whether a work environment is sufficiently

hostile, the court examines the “frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.

775, 787–88 (1998) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). “The

required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with

the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” Nichols v.

Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated

incidents (unless extremely serious)” are not sufficient to

create an actionable claim under Title VII, but the harassment

need not be so severe as to cause diagnosed psychological

injury. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. It is

enough “if such hostile conduct pollutes the victim’s

workplace, making it more difficult for her to do her job, to

take pride in her work, and to desire to stay in her position.” 

Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1463. We have held that such hostility

need not be directly targeted at the plaintiff to be relevant to

his or her hostile work environment claim. McGinest v. GTE

Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004).

The plaintiff must show that the work environment was

both subjectively and objectively hostile. Nichols, 256 F.3d

at 871–72. It is undisputed that Efrain perceived his

workplace to be hostile, as evidenced by his repeated

complaints about Branaugh. As to the objective inquiry, we

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14 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

assess whether the workplace was hostile from the

perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the plaintiff’s

racial or ethnic group (here, Hispanic/Mexican). McGinest,

360 F.3d at 1115.

The district court stated that it was “certainly troubled by

[Reynaga’s] allegations and recognizes that these events

caused [him] to suffer pain.” However, the district court

concluded that Branaugh’s conduct was not severe or

pervasive enough to alter the conditions of Efrain’s

employment. We disagree. Viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to Efrain, the incidents described in the record

are sufficient to create genuine disputes of material fact as to

the severity and pervasiveness of Branaugh’s conduct.

Efrain’s evidence reveals repeated instances in which

Branaugh allegedly made explicit racial and national origin

comments in the workplace, including: (1) Branaugh referred

to black people as “niggers” and Arabs as “rugheads;”

(2) after Efrain received hunting tags for a second year in a

row, Branaugh said, “I’m a true believe [sic] that we should

close the borders to keep motherf***ers like you from

coming up here and killing our elk. I know one motherf**er

[sic] who drew tags back to back;” (3) Branaugh stated,

“Minorities are taking over the country;” (4) Branaugh asked,

“Efrain, are all Mexican women fat?” (5) Branaugh, aware

that Efrain’s wife is Native American, referred to Native

American women as “nasty fat squaws;” and (6) Branaugh

left in the break room a printed email containing an article

that claimed President Obama was an illegal alien and that

“our borders are like sieves.”

A reasonable jury could find that Branaugh’s alleged

conduct would be highly offensive and demeaning to anyone,

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 15

especially a person from Mexico. Efrain identifies several

derogatory remarks that Branaugh made specifically about

Mexicans, including comments about the “border” that were

tinged with racism. Branaugh also allegedly used racial slurs,

including the word “nigger,” which is “perhaps the most

offensive and inflammatory racial slur in English, . . . a word

expressive of racial hatred and bigotry.” McGinest, 360 F.3d

at 1116 (citation omitted).

Viewing the evidence favorably to Efrain, Branaugh was

not only racially hostile, but also generally derogatory:

(1) Branaugh belittled Efrain in front of an apprentice, stating

that Efrain was “a big boy” with a “little, tiny dick” who

“needs all the help he can get;” (2) while Efrain was

rebuilding an accumulator, Branaugh said, “Boy, you’re

slow” and commented to the other millwrights, “Man, he just

dinks around;” and (3) on January 13, 2010, after Roseburg

had attempted to separate Branaugh from Efrain and Richard,

Branaugh revved his engine at them in the parking lot. These

instances, alongwith the racist comments listed above, reflect

a workplace that had been polluted with insult and

intimidation.

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the demeaning

comments that directly reference race or national origin were

not “offhand comments” or “mere offensive utterance[s].” 

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Efrain’s evidence includes

repeated examples of unwelcome conduct of a racial nature,

and Efrain declared that “[i]n 2009 . . . Branaugh was

harassing me regularly,” and “Branaugh was always making

racist comments at work.” Efrain also stated that he felt

physically threatened in the workplace: “I was extremely

concerned that Branaugh . . . [was] going to physically harm

me or my son at work. The work involves dangerous

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16 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

machinery and requires putting extreme trust in your

coworkers.” Additionally, Union Shop Steward Scott

Albertus testified in deposition that, at the mill, “there was a

general attitude that [Branaugh] was allowed to pick on

people.”

Looking at the evidence in Efrain’s favor, as we must on

summary judgment, the harassing conduct interfered with

Efrain’s work performance to the extent that it resulted in

confrontations with Branaugh and led Efrain to register verbal

and written complaints with management. Additionally,

Branaugh’s conduct was so extreme that Roseburg had to

make sure that Branaugh and Efrain and Richard were not

scheduled to work on the same shift. Ultimately, Efrain and

Richard felt compelled to leave the workplace because

Branaugh was present.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Efrain, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude

that Branaugh’s repeated racially derogatory and humiliating

remarks were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a

hostile work environment.

B. EmployerLiability for Hostile Work Environment

An employer may be held liable for creating a hostile

work environment either vicariously (i.e., through the acts of

a supervisor) or through negligence (i.e., failing to correct or

prevent discriminatory conduct by an employee). McGinest,

360 F.3d at 1119.

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 17

1. Vicarious Liability

An employer is vicariously liable for a hostile work

environment created by a supervisor. Vance v. Ball State

Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). A supervisor is a person

who can take tangible employment actions against an

employee, including effecting “significant change in

employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,

reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or

a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. at

2443 (citation omitted).

At the district court, Efrain conceded that Branaugh was

not a supervisor, but argues otherwise on appeal. As a lead

millwright, Branaugh had the authority to direct the work of

other millwrights and tell them which tasks to perform that

day. Beyond this, Efrain does not provide any evidence that

Branaugh had supervisory authority to effect significant

change in the employment status of other employees. 

Instead, the record shows that lead millwrights at Roseburg

did not have hiring, firing, or disciplinary authority. Thus,

Efrain has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact on this

issue, and Roseburg cannot be held liable for Branaugh’s

conduct under a theory of vicarious liability.

2. Negligence

In the absence of grounds for imposing vicarious liability,

an employer is liable for a hostile work environment created

by a plaintiff’s co-worker if the employer “knew, or should

have known, about the harassment and failed to take prompt

and effective remedial action.” E.E.O.C. v. Prospect Airport

Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2010). Remedial

action must include some form of disciplinary measures,

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Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475,

1482 (9th Cir. 1997), which must be “proportionate[] to the

seriousness of the offense.” Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,

882 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) (“Title VII requires

more than a mere request to refrain from discriminatory

conduct.”).

The record establishes that a reasonable trier of fact could

find that Roseburg knew about Branaugh’s misconduct and

responded inadequately. On October 14, 2009, Efrain had a

verbal confrontation with Branaugh, and the next day,

Richard spoke with Terry Turner, Roseburg’s maintenance

supervisor, about Branaugh’s harassing conduct. Then, on

October 17, 2009, Richard and Branaugh engaged in an

altercation related to seniority and performance of a welding

job. Efrain cooperated in Roseburg’s investigation of that

incident and complained to management about Branaugh.

The parties dispute the specific nature of Efrain’s

complaints, as well as the manner in which Roseburg

conducted its investigation into those complaints. For

example, Union Shop Steward Scott Albertus testified that

Efrain did not make a verbal complaint about a “racial issue.” 

Efrain, on the other hand, testified that he told Albertus and

Roseburg management that Branaugh was harassing him in

a racist manner.

Additionally, Maintenance Supervisor Terry Turner

testified that he, Albertus, and Master Mechanic Dick

Westbrook met with Branaugh on October 18, 2009, in

response to Efrain’s verbal complaint. However, Efrain

testified that Albertus admitted to him that he did not attend

that meeting. Efrain also claims that Albertus told him

Westbrook had indeed “reprimanded” Branaugh, but that

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 19

Albertus was skeptical of any real reprimand, remarking,

“How do I know – they probably sat together and drank Coca

Cola.”

Efrain provides further evidence that Roseburg did not

respond appropriately to Efrain’s verbal complaints. Master

Mechanic Westbrook testified at deposition that he “[n]ever

g[a]ve [Branaugh] anykind of formal disciplinaryaction” and

that his conversations with Branaugh consisted of platitudes,

such as, “I hope you learn from your mistakes. Don’t do it

again.” In fact, the evidence in the record reveals that in

response to Efrain’s complaint in October 2009, Roseburg’s

managing personnel simply “coached Branaugh on his

leadership skills” and told him he “can make people

uncomfortable.”

As another point of dispute, Roseburg contends that

Efrain interfered with the investigation into his December

written complaint by refusing to be interviewed a second time

and by walking off the job. Efrain responds that he told

Roseburg’s human resources representative, Dan Johnson,

that he would participate in a second interview without an

attorney, but Roseburg never followed up.

These disputes underscore why this case presents

questions of material fact and credibility determinations that

are appropriate for a jury. Not only was Roseburg’s midOctober meeting with Branaugh arguably insufficient to

address the seriousness of Efrain and Richard’s allegations of

discriminatory and harassing behavior, a reasonable trier of

fact could also find that it was ineffective. After meeting

with management, Branaugh continued to harass Efrain,

prompting Efrain to file a written complaint in early

December 2009. It was only then that Roseburg hired an

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20 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

independent company (Vigilant) to investigate the

allegations, which eventually led to Roseburg’s decision to

schedule Branaugh on a separate shift from Efrain.

The record indicates that Roseburg may have acted

promptly in investigating Efrain’s complaints, but prompt

action is not enough. The remedial measures must also be

effective. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875–76 (“When the

employer undertakes no remedy, or where the remedy does

not end the current harassment and deter future harassment,

liability attaches for both the past harassment and any future

harassment.”).

There is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether

Roseburg’s response was effective. After all, Efrain declares

that Branaugh continued to harass him even after meeting

with management in October. And even though Roseburg

contends that it tried to separate Branaugh from Efrain and

Richard, the men were still assigned to the same shift on

January 9, 2010, and were in close enough proximity for

Branaugh to rev his engine at Efrain and Richard on January

13.

Because Efrain has established genuine disputes of fact as

to whether Roseburg fostered and failed to remedy a racially

hostile work environment, we reverse the district court’s

grant of summary judgment on Efrain’s hostile work

environment claim.

II. Disparate Treatment

In addition to facing liability by creating a hostile work

environment, an employer is liable under Title VII and

§ 1981 when it subjects an employee to disparate treatment. 

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 21

To show a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff

must offer evidence that “give[s] rise to an inference of

unlawful discrimination.” Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty.

Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Tex.

Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 250, 253

(1981)). One way to establish an inference of discrimination

is by satisfying the prima facie elements from McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973): (1) the

plaintiff belongs to a protected class, (2) he was performing

according to his employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) he

suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly

situated employees were treated more favorably, or other

circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action

give rise to an inference of discrimination. Hawn v. Exec. Jet

Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010); Godwin v.

Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework, when the plaintiff demonstrates his prima facie

case, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action. Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155. If the

defendant meets this burden, then the plaintiff “must then

raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether the

defendant’s proffered reasons . . . are mere pretext for

unlawful discrimination.” Id.

However, nothing compels the parties to use the

McDonnell Douglas framework. McGinest, 360 F.3d at

1122. In the alternative, a plaintiff may simply produce

direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a

discriminatory reason “more likely than not motivated” the

employer. Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 931 (9th Cir.

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22 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

2007) (citation omitted); see also Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155

(explaining that a plaintiff may show an inference of

discrimination “through comparison to similarly situated

individuals, or any other circumstances surrounding the

adverse employment action [that] give rise to an inference of

discrimination”) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Either way, we require “very little evidence to

survive summary judgment in a discrimination case, because

the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through

a searching inquiry–one that is most appropriately conducted

by the factfinder, upon a full record.” Schnidrig v. Columbia

Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Efrain bases his disparate treatment claim on a number of

alleged instances of discriminatory employment actions, the

foremost being his termination. Efrain alleges that his

employment was terminated because of his race or national

origin, and/or because he made complaints about being

discriminated against. The district court determined that even

assuming Efrain could make out a prima facie case of

disparate treatment based on his termination, he could not

establish that Roseburg’s articulated, non-discriminatory

reason for the termination was pretextual.

We disagree, and hold that Efrain has established the

necessary disputes of material fact to survive summary

judgment. Roseburg concedes that Efrain has satisfied the

first three elements of the prima facie case, but maintains that

Efrain has not shown that similarly situated employees were

treated more favorably because there is no evidence that nonHispanic employees have walked off the job (like Efrain) and

not been terminated.

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 23

Roseburg is correct that there is no evidence in the record

of similarly situated employees being treated more favorably

in that precise manner. But there is sufficient evidence to

give rise to an inference of discrimination based on two nonHispanic employees (Branaugh and Mike Martin) being

treated more favorably than Efrain. The record indicates that

Branaugh was hardly reprimanded (and, significantly, not

terminated) after several complaints were made about his

hostile behavior, and Martin, a white employee, was not

subjected to the same lock-cutting intrusion as Efrain. We

therefore hold that Efrain has presented sufficient evidence to

satisfy the fourth element of his prima facie case. Because

Efrain has demonstrated a prima facie case, the burden shifts

to Roseburg to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the termination. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641.

Roseburg contends that it terminated Efrain for walking

off the job on January 9, 2010, and for refusing to work as

scheduled on January 13, 2010. In response, Efrain presents

sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether Roseburg’s claimed reasons for termination

were pretextual. In January 2010, with full knowledge of

Branaugh’s behavior, Roseburg required Efrain to work at the

same site as Branaugh. Roseburg thereby conditioned

Efrain’s employment on his willingness to work with a coworker who had a proven history of repeatedly and

persistently harassing Efrain based on his race and national

origin. This fact, along with the evidence of Roseburg’s

failure to ever legitimately reprimand Branaugh, is sufficient

to establish a genuine dispute of fact as to Roseburg’s

discriminatory intent in firing Efrain. Accordingly, the

district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of

Roseburg on the discriminatory termination claim.

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24 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

We also hold that Efrain’s disparate treatment claim

based on the lock-cutting incident survives summary

judgment. Efrain claims that Roseburg’s act of breaking into

Efrain and Richard’s locker during a search of the mill was

discriminatory. It is undisputed that on November 12, 2008,

Roseburg brought in a narcotics task force with drug sniffing

dogs to search certain areas of the mill. During the search, a

lock was cut off the locker that Efrain and his son shared.

The parties dispute the remaining circumstances of the

search. Union Shop Steward Scott Albertus testified that a

drug-sniffing dog approached Efrain’s locker, at which point

Roseburg ordered the lock cut and the locker searched. 

Richard testified that he was present during the search and

offered to open the locker with a key, but management waved

him away and broke the lock. Richard also testified that the

dogs alerted to the locker of a white co-worker, Mike Martin. 

The record does not indicate that Roseburg broke the lock on

Martin’s locker, and Efrain testified that he heard that

Martin’s locker was not searched.

Precisely because the events of the search are unclear, we

hold that Efrain has raised the necessary disputes of material

fact to survive summary judgment. See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d

at 1062 (“This Court has explained that under the McDonnell

Douglas framework, ‘[t]he requisite degree of proof

necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII

discrimination does not even need to rise to the level of a

preponderance of the evidence.’”) (quoting Walls v. J.R.

Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Diaz

v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir.

2008) (“As a general matter, the plaintiff in an employment

discrimination action need produce very little evidence in

order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 25

judgment.”) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of

Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Viewing the evidence favorably to Efrain, he is able to

satisfy his prima facie case of disparate treatment based on

the lock-cutting incident. Efrain has presented sufficient

evidence that he belongs to a protected class (he is Hispanic),

and that he was performing according to his employer’s

legitimate expectations (he performed his job well and

received positive evaluations). He has also shown that he

suffered an adverse employment action; Roseburg’s act of

breaking into Efrain’s locker without notice materially

affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of Efrain’s

employment because it was a “substantial interference with

work facilities important to the performance of the job.”

Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1125–26 (holding that the forcible

relocation of plaintiff’s laboratory space more than qualified

as an adverse employment action). Finally, Efrain has

presented evidence that a similarly situated employee was

treated more favorably than he, as a white co-worker’s locker

was not broken into after a drug-sniffing dog alerted to it. 

Our holding that summary judgment is unwarranted is also

bolstered by Roseburg’s failure to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason why it broke Efrain and Richard’s lock

rather than just letting Richard open it with a key.

The district court held that Efrain’s allegations were

insufficient to give rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination because they were “largely unsubstantiated.” 

In refusing to give weight to Efrain and Richard’s

declarations about the locker room search, the district court

erred. “That an affidavit is selfserving bears on its

credibility, not on its cognizability for purposes of

establishing a genuine issue of material fact.” United States

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26 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999). If Efrain

and Richard’s declarations stated only conclusions, and not

“such facts as would be admissible in evidence,” then the

declarations would not be cognizable. Id. (citation omitted). 

But the declarations do state facts of which Efrain and

Richard have personal knowledge and should not be

discredited outright. Ultimately, Efrain has presented

sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of fact as to

discriminatory intent behind the lock-cutting.

As to Efrain’s remaining allegations of disparate

treatment, the district court correctly held that Efrain did not

provide sufficient evidence that those incidents constitute

adverse employment actions or that similarly situated

employees were treated more favorably. Therefore, the

district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to

those additional allegations of disparate treatment.

III. Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Efrain must

show “that he undertook a protected activity under Title VII,

his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action,

and there is a causal link between those two events.” 

Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646. “[O]nly non-trivial employment

actions that would deter reasonable employees from

complaining about Title VII violations will constitute

actionable retaliation.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo,

229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000).

Similar to the disparate treatment context, if Efrain

establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to

Roseburg to advance a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for

any adverse employment action taken against Efrain. Steiner,

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 27

25 F.3d at 1464–65. If Roseburg meets this burden, then

Efrain “has the ultimate burden of showing that [Roseburg’s]

proffered reasons are pretextual.” Id. at 1465.

Efrain alleges that Roseburg retaliated against him for

complaining about Branaugh orally in October 2009 and by

written complaint in December 2009. As the district court

correctly held, Efrain’s complaints about Branaugh are

protected activity under Title VII. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at

928 (explaining that “[a]sserting one’s civil rights” is a

protected activity). Therefore, Efrain has satisfied the first

element of the prima facie case.

As to the second element of the prima facie case, Efrain

alleges five instances of retaliatory adverse employment

action: (1) In November 2009, Efrain and Richard were

required to work at the powerhouse while five white

millwrights worked a better job; (2) on December 30, 2009,

Roseburg converted 16 millwrights from part-time to fulltime but did not do so for Efrain and Richard; (3) in January

2010, work orders were no longer made available to Efrain

and Richard, so they had to consult the work board to figure

out what job to do; (4) Branaugh and four other millwrights,

who composed one crew, received an equivalent level of

work as Efrain and Richard, who alone composed a second

crew; and (5) on January 18, 2010, Efrain was terminated.

The district court correctly held that Efrain’s first four

alleged instances of retaliation do not satisfy his prima facie

burden because the alleged actions are either too trivial or

Efrain has not established the necessary causal link between

the alleged actions and his complaints. The district court also

correctly held, however, that as to the retaliatory termination

claim, Efrain has met his prima facie burden. Because Efrain

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28 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

has met his prima facie burden for the retaliatory termination

claim, the burden shifts to Roseburg to provide “legitimate,

nonretaliatory reasons” for the termination. Steiner, 25 F.3d

at 1464–65. If Roseburg is able to do so, then Efrain must

show that Roseburg’s proffered reasons are pretextual. Id. at

1465.

The district court noted that Roseburg offered two nonretaliatory reasons for the termination—Efrain walked off the

job on January 9, 2010, and refused to work as scheduled on

January 13, 2010. The district court held that Efrain failed to

show that those reasons were pretextual. We disagree, and

hold that Efrain has established a genuine dispute of material

fact as to pretext.

In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court explained that

evidence of pretext can take many forms. 411 U.S. at

804–05. For example, the manner in which the plaintiff was

treated by his employer during his employment may be

relevant to a showing of pretext. Id. Additionally, the fact

that persons outside the plaintiff’s protected class were

treated better for offenses of comparable seriousness could

also help demonstrate pretext. Id. at 805. The Court also

explained in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. that

whether summary judgment is appropriate depends on a

number of factors, including the strength of the plaintiff’s

prima facie case and “the probative value of the proof that the

employer’s explanation is false.” 530 U.S. 133, 148–49

(2000).

Here, the district court erred by focusing on “Plaintiff’s

unspecified reliance on prior allegations of disparate

treatment.” Efrain did more than rely on unspecified

allegations to demonstrate a genuine dispute of fact as to

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 29

pretext. For one, Efrain’s prima facie case is strong,

particularly in light of the timing of the termination. Efrain

had worked at Roseburg for more than five years, yet he was

fired barely one month after making a formal written

complaint. Proof of a causal link between Efrain’s complaint

and his termination—as evidenced bytemporal proximity—is

certainly relevant to an evaluation of pretext. See Dawson v.

Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In some

cases, temporal proximity can by itself constitute sufficient

circumstantial evidence of retaliation for purposes of both the

prima facie case and the showing of pretext.”).

Second, Efrain also presents evidence that he was treated

less favorably than other employees outside of the protected

class. For example, the record indicates that Branaugh

subjected Efrain to a hostile work environment, yet Branaugh,

a white man, was not seriously punished. In contrast to

Roseburg’s benign treatment of Branaugh, Efrain was

terminated for missing just one and a half day’s work. 

Notably, those were days that Efrain refused to work

specifically because Branaugh was on the same shift.

Efrain’s evidence as to how he was treated during his

employment, the timing of his termination being one month

after his written complaint, and the disparity in punishment

between Efrain and Branaugh are sufficient to establish a

genuine dispute of fact as to whether Roseburg’s proffered

reason for terminating Efrain’s employment was pretextual. 

Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of Roseburg on Efrain’s claim of

retaliatory termination.

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30 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

IV. State Law Claims

This court has held that the substantive analysis for Title

VII and § 1981 claims also applies to discrimination claims

under O.R.S. §§ 659A.030(1)(a), (b). Dawson, 630 F.3d at

934–35. Therefore, pursuant to the analysis in Parts I and II,

supra, the district court erred in granting Roseburg’s motion

for summary judgment on Efrain’s state law claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district

court’s grant of Roseburg’s motion for summary judgment

and REMAND for further proceedings on the following

claims: (1) hostile work environment, including employer

liability through negligence; (2) disparate treatment with

regard to the breaking of Efrain’s lock and the termination of

Efrain’s employment; (3) retaliation with regard to

Roseburg’s termination of Efrain’s employment; and (4) state

law claims for hostile work environment and disparate

treatment as consistent with the analysis in the federal

context. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of

Roseburg’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining

issues, as discussed above. Costs shall be taxed against

Roseburg.

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 31

BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

Efrain Reynaga appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of defendant Roseburg Forest

Products (“Roseburg”) for his hostile work environment,

disparate treatment, and retaliation claims in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and

Oregon state law. The events leading to this lawsuit occurred

when Appellant Reynaga (of Mexican dissent) worked as a

millwright for Roseburg between 2004 and 2010, during

which time he claims to have been subject to racially

disparaging statements and disparate treatment because of his

race by lead millwright Timothy Branaugh. I concur in the

panel majority’s opinion reversing the district court’s grant of

summary judgment for defendant on Reynaga’s retaliatory

termination claim. However, because Roseburg took prompt

and effective action to rectify the hostile work environment

experienced by Reynaga and terminated Reynaga only after

he repeatedly refused to work his assigned shifts, the district

court concluded properly that his hostile work environment

and disparate treatment claims should fail as a matter of law.

I.

Reynaga has the burden of proving that Branaugh’s

conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of...[his] employment and create an abusive work

environment.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,

642 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, Reynaga must establish

that Roseburg is liable for Branaugh’s conduct, either

vicariously or based on negligence. McGinest v. GTE Serv.

Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004).

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32 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

The district court concluded that Branaugh’s racist

statements were not sufficiently severe so as to alter the

conditions of Reynaga’s employment. The court also held,

alternatively, that (1) Roseburg was not vicariously liable for

Branaugh’s conduct because Branaugh was not a supervisor,

and that (2) Roseburg was not negligent because it promptly

and effectively remedied Branaugh’s misconduct. I agree

with the panel majority that Roseburg cannot be held liable

for Branaugh’s conduct under a theory of vicarious liability. 

But even assuming that Branaugh’s misconduct was

sufficiently severe so as to alter the terms of Reynaga’s

employment, Reynaga has not established that Roseburg

failed promptly and effectively to remedy Branaugh’s

misconduct.

Roseburg took prompt action to remedy the alleged

misconduct. Reynaga’s son spoke with another Roseburg

employee about Branaugh’s behavior in October 2009, which

led Roseburg to conduct an investigation in which Reynaga

participated. But Appellant filed a written complaint with

Roseburg that specifically identified Branaugh and referred

to “acts of discrimination” and a “hostile work environment”

only in December 2009. Roseburg hired Vigilant within one

week of receiving Reynaga’s written complaint, and a

representative from Vigilant interviewed Reynaga on

December 10, 2009. Vigilant interviewed other employees as

well. During the course of Vigilant’s investigation, Roseburg

altered Branaugh’s work schedule to keep Reynaga and

Branaugh apart as much as possible.

Roseburg’s intervention was not only prompt, but also

effective. Reynaga does not identify a single derogatory

statement made by Branaugh after Vigilant commenced its

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 33

investigation.1 The fact that Roseburg scheduled Reynaga to

be at the facility on the same day as Branaugh alone would

not allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Roseburg’s

intervention was not effective, such that Roseburg could be

held liable as negligent. Roseburg’s duty was to take

reasonable care in eliminating Reynaga’s exposure to

Branaugh’s hostile, racist statements, not ensure that

Branaugh and Reynaga were never working in the same

facility. Thus, as far as Reynaga’s evidence shows,

Branaugh’s racist statements ceased by the time that the

employer acted on Reynaga’s complaint. Reynaga cannot

raise a triable issue of fact as to whether his workplace was

hostile following Roseburg’s intervention. As such,

Reynaga’s hostile workplace claim should fail.

II.

To establish that he suffered disparate treatment in

violation of Title VII and § 1981, Reynaga “may...[use] the

McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively, may simply

produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that

a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated” the

defendant. Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 931 (9th Cir.

2007). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Reynaga

must show that: “(1) [he] belongs to a protected class, (2) [he]

was performing according to [his] employer’s legitimate

expectations, (3) [he]suffered an adverse employment action,

1 Reynaga identified only two acts by Branaugh occurring after

December 10, 2009: (1) on Jan. 4, 2010, Branaugh left an email in the

breakroom purporting to quote a book by Lee Iacocca that said “our

borders are like sieves;” and (2) on Jan. 13, 2010, Branaugh revved his

automobile’s engine in Reynaga’s presence. These two acts are not

sufficiently severe so as to alter the terms of Reynaga’s employment. 

Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642.

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34 REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS

and (4) other employees with qualifications similar to [his]

own were treated more favorably.” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson,

Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).

According to Roseburg, it fired Reynaga on January 18,

2010 because Reynaga walked off the job on January 9 and

refused to work his scheduled shift on January 13. It is

undisputed that Reynaga walked off the job on January 9 and

refused to work the January 13 shift. These are legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons to terminate Reynaga. The panel

majority asserts that Roseburg requiring Reynaga to work on

January 13 at the same time as Branaugh and Roseburg’s

decision not to discipline Branaugh immediately offered

potential evidence of disparate treatment. However, as

mentioned above, Reynaga did not have a right to insist that

Roseburg fire Branaugh or never schedule Branaugh at the

same time that Reynaga was working. Branaugh’s hostile,

racist statements ceased after Vigilant began investigating

Branaugh in December 2009. That Roseburg did not

discipline Branaugh before Vigilant completed its

investigation and Reynaga walked off the job similarlycannot

be construed as evidence of disparate treatment. For these

reasons, Reynaga did not provide direct or circumstantial

evidence to suggest a discriminatory motivation for

termination. He also failed to offer evidence that other

workers had not been terminated when they walked off the

job so as to satisfy the burden shifting framework. 

Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that Roseburg

subjected Reynaga to racially disparate treatment when it

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REYNAGA V. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS 35

fired him for refusing to work on January 13. The district

court should thus be affirmed on this point.2

I respectfully dissent.

2

I agree with the panel majority that Reynaga did raise a triable issue

of material fact as to disparate treatment for the lock cutting incident under

the McDonnell-Douglas framework.

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