Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04323/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04323-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STANISLAV PETROV, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ALAMEDA COUNTY, ET AL., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 16-cv-04323-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO STAY

Re: Dkt. No. 24 

Plaintiff brings this action against defendants Alameda County, Sheriff Ahern in his 

supervisory capacity (the “County Defendants”), and several individual officers1 alleging, among 

others, that such officers used excessive force in detaining and arresting plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 1, 

“Compl.”) Specifically, plaintiff raises the following causes of action: (i) violation of 42 U.S.C. 

section 1983 against seven Individual Defendants; (ii) Monell and supervisory liability pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the County Defendants; (iii) violation of California Civil Code 

section 52.1 against all defendants; (iv) negligence for personal injuries against all defendants; (v) 

and assault and battery against the Individual Defendants and Alameda County.

Currently, before the Court is County Defendants Motion to Stay pending the completion 

of criminal proceedings relating to defendants Wieber and Santamaria, which involve the same 

incidents and events alleged in the instant action. (Dkt. No. 24.)2

 Having carefully reviewed and 

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 Specifically, plaintiff brings this action against the following individual officers: (i) P. 

Wieber; (ii) L. Santamaria; (ii) S. Osborne; (iii) J. Malizia; (iv) J. Miller; (v) D. Shelton; (vi) R. 

Griffith; and (vii) D. Taylor (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”). 

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 Defendants Wieber, Santamaria, Osborne, Miller, Shelton, and Taylor have all joined 

County Defendants’ motion to stay. (Dkt. Nos. 25–27, 29–30.) Defendants Griffith and Malizia 

filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to County Defendants’ motion. (Dkt. No. 31.) No defendant 

opposes County Defendants’ motion to stay. 

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considered the pleadings and the papers submitted by the parties on this motion, and for the 

reasons set forth more fully below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART County Defendants’ motion 

and STAYS only all discovery and Rule 26 disclosures as to defendants Wieber and Santamaria.3 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claims in this action relate to an encounter between plaintiff and the Individual 

Defendants on November 12, 2015. On November 12, 2015, defendants Osborne and Sterling 

attempted to detain and arrest plaintiff based on a report that the car in which plaintiff was parked 

was stolen. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff fled, and defendant Osborne initiated pursuit and was later 

joined by other officers, including defendants Wieber, Santamaria, Malizia, Miller, Shelton, 

Griffith, and Taylor. (Id.) The pursuit continued over the Bay Bridge into San Francisco, until 

plaintiff eventually stopped his car in an alley near 1441 Stevenson Street and allegedly 

surrendered to defendants Santamaria and Wieber. (Id. at ¶ 25.) 

Instead of arresting plaintiff, defendants Santamaria and Wieber allegedly “began to 

viciously beat [p]laintiff with steel batons on his head, neck, back, hands, and elsewhere on his 

body.” (Id. at ¶ 26.) After arriving at the scene, defendants Osborne, Malizia, Miller, Shelton, 

Griffith, and Taylor allegedly “joined in unjustified uses of force” against plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 27.) 

Plaintiff also alleges his personal property, specifically a gold chain with a pendant and cash, were 

seized but not booked into evidence. (Id. at ¶ 31.) Plaintiff contends that such property was given 

to certain bystanders to buy their silence. (Id.) Additionally, plaintiff alleges that the deputies 

congratulated each other and took a “trophy photo” of him, which plaintiff claims is an 

“unconstitutional custom and practice” within the Alameda County Sherriff’s Office. (Id. at ¶¶ 

28–29.) 

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 In connection with their motion to stay, County Defendants have also filed a Request for 

Judicial Notice (“RJN”) of the following documents: (1) Exhibit A, Certified Copy of Felony 

Complaint Arrest Warrant against Santamaria and Wieber; and (2) Exhibit B, Wieber’s Answer to 

the Complaint in the instant action. (Dkt. No. 24-3.) County Defendants argue that such 

documents are noticeable under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 because they are “capable of 

accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned” and because they are “matters of public record.” Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also United 

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2003). No party opposes. Thus, the Court 

GRANTS County Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exhibits A and B to their RJN. 

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Further, plaintiff alleges that between November 12 and November 16, 2015, in light of the 

media attention to a surveillance video which recorded the incident at issue, a supervisor in the 

Sherriff’s Office ordered defendants Wieber and Santamaria to destroy their original reports and 

write new reports with “materially different facts” to “cover up their misconduct and unlawful 

actions in this matter.” (Id. at ¶ 34.) Plaintiff claims that such practice was “very common” in the 

Sherriff’s Office. (Id.) 

On May 25, 2016, a felony complaint was filed against defendants Wieber and Santamaria 

in the City and County of San Francisco charging them with violations of California Penal Code 

section 149 (assault by officer under color of authority), section 243(d) (battery with serious 

bodily injury), and section 245(a)(1) (assault with deadly weapon), for actions related to the very 

incident plaintiff alleges occurred on November 12, 2015. (RJN Ex. A.) County Defendants have 

moved to stay the instant action, pending the completion of such criminal proceedings against 

defendants Wieber and Santamaria. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“The Constitution does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the 

outcome of criminal proceedings.” Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th 

Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 827 (1995). Parallel civil and criminal proceedings are 

unobjectionable under Ninth Circuit precedent unless such proceedings substantially prejudice the 

rights of the parties involved. Id. “The decision whether to stay civil proceedings in the face of a 

parallel criminal proceeding should be made ‘in light of the particular circumstances and 

competing interests involved in the case.’” Id. (quoting Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 

889 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1989)). The party proposing a stay bears the burden of proving that a 

stay is warranted. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997). 

In deciding whether to grant a motion to stay civil proceedings in favor of parallel criminal 

proceedings, courts in the Ninth Circuit must consider the “extent to which the defendant’s [F]ifth 

[A]mendment rights are implicated.” Keating, 45 F.3d at 324. In addition, Keating instructs that 

courts should consider the following five factors: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in proceeding 

expeditiously with the litigation, and the possibility that plaintiffs would be prejudiced by a delay; 

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(2) the burden which the proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court 

and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil 

litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the civil and criminal litigations. Id. at 324–25. 

A district court is vested with the discretion to stay an action based on its inherent 

authority to control its own docket. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Although 

there is no requirement that a court stay a civil action pending the outcome of a related criminal 

proceeding, a court may choose to do so “when the interests of justice seem[] to require such 

action.” Keating, 45 F.3d at 324 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original). 

III. DISCUSSION

County Defendants argue that (a) the implication of Fifth Amendment concerns warrant 

the exercise of the Court’s authority to stay proceedings and (b) the remaining Keating factors also 

weigh in favor of a stay. 

A. Implication of Fifth Amendment Rights 

“A defendant has no absolute right not to be forced to choose between testifying in a civil 

matter and asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Keating, 45 F.3d at 326. “[T]he strongest 

case for deferring civil proceedings until after completion of criminal proceedings is where a party 

under indictment for a serious offense is required to defend a civil or administrative action 

involving the same matter.” SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375–76 (D.C. Cir. 

1980) (noting that a stay would be appropriate where the civil proceeding entirely or significantly 

intersects with the criminal proceeding); see also Roberts v. Brown, No. 13-CV-7461-ODW, 2014 

WL 3503094, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2014) (“[T]here is a strong case in favor of a stay after a 

grand jury returns a criminal indictment and where there is a large degree of overlap between the 

facts involved in both cases.”); cf. Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903 (“The case for staying civil 

proceedings is a far weaker one when no indictment has been returned, and no Fifth Amendment 

privilege is threatened.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The instant action presents a “strong case” for deferring civil proceedings to the extent it 

impacts Santamaria’s and Wieber’s Fifth Amendment rights. Here, a felony complaint has been 

issued against defendants Santamaria and Wieber, and no party disputes that the factual allegations 

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in the felony complaint are essentially identical to the allegations in the instant complaint. 

(Compare Dkt. No. 1 (complaint) with Dkt. No. 24-3 (felony complaint).) Both involve the exact 

same incident on November 12, 2015, in which plaintiff alleges certain officers used excessive 

force against him, causing him serious bodily injury, stole his property, and attempted to obstruct 

justice by bribing eyewitnesses. See Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1375–76. 

Notwithstanding, plaintiff contends that defendants have not demonstrated any substantial 

prejudice with respect to their Fifth Amendment rights because less drastic measures could be 

employed. For instance, plaintiff argues that in O. Thronas, Inc. v. Blake, No. 09-CV-00353-

DAE, 2010 WL 931924, at *3 (D. Hawai’i Mar. 10, 2010), the court found that a stay of action 

was unnecessary because the individual defendants’ rights could be protected “through less drastic 

means, such as asserting the privilege on a question by question basis and implementing protective 

orders.” In O. Thronas, the court acknowledged that defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights would 

be implicated because the potential criminal charges overlapped with the allegations in the civil 

complaint. Id. However, the court found that the defendants’ arguments for a stay were “weak 

because no indictment” had been returned at the time of the motion. Id. This case is more 

analogous to the situation described in Dresser as a strong case for staying civil proceedings 

because an indictment has been returned for a serious offense, which is essentially the same as the 

basis for the civil complaint. See Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1375–76.4

Accordingly, the Court finds that Fifth Amendment concerns here are significant for 

Santamaria and Wieber, and, therefore, this factor weighs strongly in favor of granting a stay, at 

least as to them. 

B. Other Keating Factors 

The extent to which the pending civil action implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege of a 

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 The other cases plaintiff cites in support of this proposition are equally distinguishable 

and therefore not persuasive. See SEC v. Braslau, No. 14-CV-1290-ODW, 2015 WL 9591482, at 

*3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015) (finding that Fifth Amendment rights were implicated but were 

outweighed by other factors because defendant had already been convicted and the possible retrial 

of his criminal case pending an appeal was “remote”); Roberts, 2014 WL 3503094, at *1 (finding 

the “only overlap between [the] action and the criminal cases is the gang-activity allegations”). 

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defendant is a “significant factor,” but is “only one consideration to be weighed against others.” 

Keating, 45 F.3d at 324. As noted above, in the Ninth Circuit, courts must also consider the 

following: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with the litigation, and the 

possibility that plaintiffs would be prejudiced by a delay; (2) the burden which the proceedings 

may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court and the efficient use of judicial 

resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the 

public in the civil and criminal litigations. Id. at 324–25. “These inquiries are especially factspecific, and courts’ treatment and weighing of the factors varies widely.” McCormick v. Rexroth, 

No. 09-CV-4188-JF, 2010 WL 934242, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010). 

1. Plaintiff’s Interest 

Courts have acknowledged that a plaintiff has an interest in having his case resolved 

speedily. See SEC v. Loomis, No. 10-CV-0458-KJM, 2013 WL 4543939, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

27, 2013). Courts have also found prejudice to a plaintiff where a stay of discovery might result in 

his inability to identify other potential defendants, or where a stay may impact his ability to locate 

and present favorable evidence. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Liang, No. 13-CV-8670-DDP, 2014 WL 

1089264, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014); Applied Materials, Inc. v. Semiconductor Spares, Inc.,

Nos. 95-CV-20129-RMW & 95-CV-20156-RMW, 1995 WL 261451, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 

1995). 

Plaintiff argues that he has a strong interest in proceeding expeditiously and in obtaining a 

just and speedy resolution of his civil rights case. He claims that a stay on the instant civil 

proceedings would prejudice him because “[w]itnesses relocate, memories fade, and persons 

allegedly aggrieved are unable to seek vindication or redress for indefinite periods of time on 

end.” Applied Materials, 1995 WL 261451, at *2 (citing Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Machine 

Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805, 809 (N.D. Cal. 1989)). Specifically, plaintiff contends that two of 

the eyewitnesses here are homeless and may relocate and become untraceable before their 

testimony is preserved. 

Defendants concede that plaintiff’s interests in an expeditious resolution are “significant,” 

but counter that any potential delay is reduced here as criminal charges have already been filed. 

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Additionally, defendants argue that the criminal proceeding will involve many of the same 

witnesses presenting similar testimony, thus reducing the danger that any testimony will be lost as 

a result of the stay. See McCormick, 2010 WL 934242, at *3 (“[T]he fact that the witnesses for 

the two proceedings are likely to include many of the same people providing much of the same 

testimony should reduce the danger that any testimony will be lost as a result of the stay.”).5 Such 

an argument would only be persuasive if the criminal case progressed expeditiously. Here, the 

record does not reflect the speed with which the officers’ prosecution and trial is being pursued. 

The Court agrees that the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by any potential delays could be 

reduced here, given that criminal charges have already been filed and such proceedings would 

involve essentially the same witnesses presenting similar testimony, as the court found in 

McCormick. However, unlike McCormick where the criminal trial was set to begin within a few 

weeks of the court’s order on the motion to stay, no such trial has been scheduled in the criminal 

proceedings at issue here. Id. at *3; see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Unity 

Outpatient Surgery Ctr., Inc., 490 F.3d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that stays pending 

criminal proceedings create a “danger of denying justice by delay”) (internal quotation and 

citation omitted). Thus, the Court finds that this factor favors plaintiff. 

2. Burden on Defendants 

The Court analyzes this factor with respect to the two indicted defendants, on the one hand, 

and the remaining defendants, on the other. Courts have found that even when a defendant’s Fifth 

Amendment rights are implicated, this factor does not support granting a stay unless the defendant 

can show other “compelling factors as described in Keating.” See Gen. Elec. Co., 2014 WL 

1089264, at *5. 

Plaintiff asserts that defendants Alameda County and Ahern have not identified any burden 

these proceedings will impose on them. Additionally, plaintiff argues that the remaining 

defendants merely joined in the County Defendants’ motion and provided no independent bases 

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 Defendants also argue that plaintiff will not be prejudiced by a stay because plaintiff is 

currently in custody on unrelated charges. However, defendants do not explain why such a fact is 

relevant in analyzing whether any prejudice to plaintiff would result. 

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upon which the Court could find an undue burden resulting from a denial of a stay. By contrast, 

the County Defendants argue that Santamaria’s and Wieber’s invocation of their Fifth Amendment 

rights will impact the other defendants’ ability to obtain potentially exculpatory and necessary 

testimony from Santamaria and Wieber, prejudicing all other defendants in the civil action. 

Additionally, defendants argue that even if Santamaria and Wieber invoke their Fifth Amendment 

privilege in this proceeding, they will be forced to expose the basis of their defense to the criminal 

charges and the scope of criminal discovery would thus be unfairly expanded beyond the limits of 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b). 

Although the Court finds that the burden on Santamaria and Wieber would be significant, 

the burden as to the non-indicted defendants is no different than that of the plaintiff. Thus, while 

the burden on the two indicted defendants weigh in favor of a stay, the burden on the remaining 

seven defendants does not. The non-indicted defendants have not sufficiently demonstrated that 

the denial of a stay as to them would create a significant and undue burden. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 

708 (“The proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.”). For instance, the 

County Defendants averred that the Sherriff’s Office’s internal investigations are ongoing and are 

unlikely to be completed until late 2016 or early 2017, yet offer no reasons why such investigation 

could not proceed more expeditiously or why the investigation would require an indefinite stay. 

(See Dkt. No. 24-2, Peterson Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.) Additionally, to the extent that any defendants have 

specific privileges that may be asserted, such can be handled on an issue-by-issue basis. Where 

less drastic means to protect defendants’ rights exist, a complete stay of the proceedings is 

inappropriate. See Doe v. San Diego, No. 12-CV-689-MMA, 2012 WL 6115663, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 

Dec. 10, 2012) (noting that a stay of an action is not necessary if defendants “can be protected 

through less drastic means”); Roberts, 2014 WL 3503094, at *2 (same); Favaloro v. S/S Golden 

Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 482 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding denial of stay warranted where “less drastic 

means” of protecting defendants’ rights existed). 

Thus, given the non-indicted defendants’ failure to demonstrate sufficiently the burdens 

they would face absent a stay, and in light of the existence of a less drastic remedy, the Court finds 

that this factor weighs against granting a stay, at least as to the non-indicted defendants. 

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3. Judicial Convenience and Efficiency 

With respect to this factor, courts consider “the convenience of the court in the 

management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources.” SEC v. Alexander, No. 10-

CV-4535-LHK, 2010 WL 5388000, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010) (citing Keating, 45 F.3d at 

325). Courts have acknowledged that this Keating factor normally does not favor granting a stay, 

because the court has an interest in clearing its docket. Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903. Defendants 

argue, however, that some courts have determined that staying a “parallel civil proceeding in its 

early stages may prove more efficient in the long-run” because disposition of the criminal action 

may “narrow the issues and streamline discovery in the civil proceeding.” Alexander, 2010 WL 

5388000, at *5 (finding that a stay may be more efficient where no defendant has answered and 

several defendants had not yet appeared); see also Douglas v. United States, Nos. 03-CV-4518-JW 

& 04-CV-5357-JW, 2006 WL 2038375, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2006) (stating that permitting the 

criminal trial to proceed first may narrow the issues and streamline discovery in the civil 

proceeding); Jones v. Conte, No. 04-CV-5312-SI, 2005 WL 1287017, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 

2005) (finding that a stay would allow civil discovery to proceed unhindered by self–incrimination 

concerns). 

Here, defendants have answered the complaint and have provided no measurable basis for 

how the criminal action would narrow the issues or streamline discovery. To the contrary, the 

ability to depose witnesses and preserve testimony sooner rather than later may assist in the 

parallel criminal trial where no such tools exist. 

4. Interests of Third Parties 

Next, courts consider “the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation.” Keating, 

45 F.3d at 325. Plaintiff argues only that the eyewitnesses and physician witnesses in this case 

have an interest in completing their involvement in this matter and testifying while the incident is 

fresh in their minds. Plaintiff, however, provides no support for the proposition that the interests 

of potential witnesses are relevant with respect to this Keating factor. Rather, courts have found 

this factor salient in the Keating analysis where the third-parties at issue had a direct interest in the 

outcome of the litigation. See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Global Fin. Support, Inc., No. 

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15-CV-02440-GPC, 2016 WL 2868698, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 17, 2016) (finding third-party 

interest relevant where defendants’ ongoing scheme impacted thousands of consumers directly); 

Alexander, 2010 WL 5388000, at *6 (finding third-party interests where SEC enforcement may be 

able to “provide defrauded investors with a partial recovery of their losses” but ultimately finding 

that such interest did not outweigh defendant’s interest in a stay). As such, the Court finds that 

this factor does not weigh against granting a stay. 

5. Interests of the Public 

With respect to the final Keating factor, courts consider “the interest of the public in the 

pending civil and criminal litigation.” Keating, 45 F.3d at 325. Plaintiff argues that the public has 

a strong interest in civil and criminal cases like this one because the penalty imposed would serve 

as a deterrent for future misconduct by police officers. Cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 49 (1983). 

In addition, plaintiff asserts that proceeding with this civil case will best serve the interests of the 

public by “ensuring that aggrieved parties are made whole as rapidly as possible.” eBay, Inc. v. 

Digital Point Sols., No. 08-CV-4052-JF, 2010 WL 702463, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010) 

(internal quotation and citation omitted). 

However, as defendants argue, the public also has an interest in safeguarding the integrity 

of criminal proceedings. SEC v. Nicholas, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072–73 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 

(finding in that case that the criminal proceedings were of primary importance to the public and to 

defendants, and the civil case, “which carries only civil sanctions and monetary penalties, is not of 

an equally pressing nature”); see also Alexander, 2010 WL 5388000, at *6 (finding that with 

respect to SEC civil and criminal enforcements, where criminal proceedings on the same matters 

had already commenced, the “public’s interest in fair criminal proceedings” takes precedence). 

The Court finds that whatever interests the public may have in deterring future misconduct 

by the police officers are also served by the criminal proceedings against defendants Santamaria 

and Wieber, which relate to the exact same alleged activities. Thus, although the Court 

acknowledges that the public has a strong interest the resolution of the pending civil action, such 

interest does not outweigh the public’s interest in fair criminal proceedings, at least as to 

Santamaria and Wieber. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

As the foregoing analysis reveals, strong factors weigh on both sides of the presented 

motion. Balancing those factors, the Court finds that a Partial Stay best preserves the myriad 

interests at hand. The Court will further review and refine the stay if necessary to accommodate 

the needs of the various interests. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS all discovery and Rule 26 

disclosures as to defendants Wieber and Santamaria STAYED. Discovery and Rule 26 disclosures 

as to the remaining parties may proceed. Without further information, the Court will not set 

deadlines for motions and trial. The Court will reevaluate the propriety of a complete stay if any 

of the factors discussed herein changes materially. 

The Court hereby VACATES the hearing on this motion currently set for November 8, 2016. 

This Order terminates Docket Number 24. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 4, 2016 

______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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