Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00652/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00652-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UMG RECORDINGS, INC., et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

DOES 1 - 4,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. 06-0652 SBA (EMC)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

RELIEF PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE

7-11(a) FOR LEAVE TO TAKE

IMMEDIATE DISCOVERY

(Docket No. 5)

Having reviewed the Plaintiffs’ brief and accompanying submissions, and good cause

appearing therefor, the Court orders as follows: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Administrative Relief

Pursuant to Local Rule 7-11(a) for Leave to Take Immediate Discovery is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs have sued Doe Defendants for copyright infringement. Plaintiffs allege that Doe

Defendants, without authorization, used a peer-to-peer online media distribution system to download

Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, distribute copyrighted works to the public, and/or make copyrighted

works available for distribution to others. Plaintiffs do not know the names of the Defendants but

have identified each Defendant by a unique Internet Protocol (“IP”) address assigned to that

Defendant on the date and at the time of the Defendant’s infringing activity. Here, the Internet

service provider is Covad Communications Co. (“Covad”). Plaintiffs seek leave of the Court to

serve immediate discovery on Covad to identify each Defendant. Plaintiffs intend to serve a Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 45 subpoena on Covad seeking each Defendant's true name,

address, telephone number, e-mail address, and Media Access Control (“MAC”) addresses. 

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United States District Court

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II. DISCUSSION

This Court considers this motion in light of the good-cause standard for expedited discovery,

First Amendment privacy concerns, and the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551.

A. Good Cause

Expedited discovery under Rule 45 is appropriate when good cause for the discovery, in

consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party. 

Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002). In Semitool,

plaintiffs alleged patent infringement and sought expedited discovery to determine if some of its

other patents may have been infringed as well. Id. at 274. Although the plaintiff would not have

been irreparably harmed had it not received expedited discovery, it contended the expedited

discovery would ultimately conserve party and court resources and expedite the litigation. Id. at

276. Further, the defendants conceded that the requested information was relevant and would have

been produced in the normal course of discovery. Id. This Court granted the request. Id. at 277. 

 Here, good cause for expedited discovery outweighs any prejudice to Doe Defendants, for

several reasons. First, Plaintiffs have no other way to obtain this most basic information, which is

necessary to advance the lawsuit by enabling Plaintiffs to effect service of process. Postponing

disclosure of information until the normal course of discovery is not an option in the instant case

because, without disclosure of Defendants’ names and contact information, the litigation cannot

proceed to that stage. Id. at 276. Second, expedited discovery is appropriate because ISPs typically

retain user activity logs for only a limited period, ranging from as short as a few days to a few

months, before erasing data. Whitehead Decl., ¶ 22. If the information is not disclosed before it is

destroyed, Plaintiffs will forever lose their opportunity to pursue infringement claims against the

people associated with these IP addresses. Third, copyright infringement claims necessarily involve

irreparable harm to Plaintiffs, as a copyright holder is presumed to suffer irreparable harm as a

matter of law when his right to the exclusive use of copyrighted material is invaded. Health Ins.

Ass’n. of Am. v. Novelli, 211 F.Supp.2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2002). Therefore, good cause exists here.

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B. First Amendment

A person who uses the Internet to download or distribute copyrighted music without

permission is engaging in the exercise of speech, but only to a limited extent, and the First

Amendment does not protect the person’s identity from disclosure. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.

v. Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Sony, the court granted the plaintiffs’ ex

parte application to serve a subpoena upon a non-party cable service to obtain the identities of Doe

defendants suspected of downloading or distributing copyrighted sound recordings without

permission. Id. at 558-59. The cable company sent notice to all affected subscribers. Id. at 560. 

An attorney representing one of the Doe defendants sent a letter that the court construed as a motion

to quash the subpoena based on, among other grounds, the First Amendment. Id. at 560-61. 

As a preliminary matter, the court noted that the Supreme Court has held that the First

Amendment does not protect copyright infringement. Id. at 563 (citing Harper & Row Publishers,

Inc. v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1985)). Proceeding to the merits of the First

Amendment challenge, the court reasoned that an individual who downloads or distributes sound

recordings is not seeking to convey a thought or idea but rather to obtain music for free. Id. at 564. 

Such an individual, however, may be making a statement by downloading or distributing sound

recordings, as in expressing himself or herself through the music selected and made available to

others. Id. at 564. Therefore, downloading and distributing sound recordings qualifies as speech,

but only to a limited extent. Id. Next, the court applied five factors in determining whether the First

Amendment protected the defendants’ identities from disclosure. Id. Those factors were: (1) a

concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm; (2) the specificity of the discovery

request; (3) the absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed information; (4) a central

need for the subpoenaed information to advance the claim; and (5) the Doe defendants’ expectation

of privacy. Id. at 565-65. 

The court applied the factors as follows: (1) plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of

copyright infringement, whose two elements are ownership of a valid patent and copying the

original work without permission; (2) the discovery request was “sufficiently specific” to establish a

reasonable likelihood that it would lead to identifying information that would make possible service

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upon the defendants; (3) the plaintiffs lacked other means to obtain the subpoenaed information, as a

search of a publicly available database of IP addresses was insufficient; (4) ascertaining the

identities of the defendants was critical to plaintiffs’ ability to pursue the litigation, for without the

information plaintiffs would be unable to serve process; and (5) defendants had little expectation of

privacy because the cable company’s terms of service stated that the company had the right to

disclose any information as necessary “to satisfy any law, regulation, or other governmental

request,” not to mention that the defendants diminished any expectation of privacy they may have

had by opening their computers to others through peer-to-peer file sharing. Id. at 565-67. The court

concluded that all five factors weighed in the plaintiffs’ favor and that, therefore, the First

Amendment did not protect the disclosure of the defendants’ identities. Id. at 567. 

Similarly here, although Doe Defendants are engaged in First Amendment speech to a

limited extent, the five factors weigh in favor of compelling disclosure of identifying information. 

(1) Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of copyright infringement. Whitehead Decl., ¶ 22.,

Exh. 1. (2) Because the discovery request seeks only the names and contact information of the

people associated with certain IP addresses at certain times, it is “sufficiently specific” to establish a

reasonable likelihood that it would lead to identifying information that would make possible service

upon the defendants, without revealing more than is necessary. (3) Plaintiffs lack other means to

obtain the subpoenaed information, as a search of a publicly available database of IP addresses

revealed only the company that administered the relevant IP addresses. (4) Ascertaining the

identities of the defendants is critical to Plaintiffs’ ability to pursue the litigation, for without the

information Plaintiffs would be unable to serve process. (5) Although their user agreements with

Covad are not in the record, Defendants had little expectation of privacy because they opened their

computers to others through peer-to-peer file sharing. Therefore, the First Amendment does not

protect against disclosure of Defendants’ names and contact information.

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C. Cable Communications Policy Act

The Cable Communications Policy Act (“the Act”) generally protects against the disclosure

of cable service subscribers’ personally identifiable information. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c). The names

and addresses of such subscribers may be disclosed, however, if the cable operator has provided the

subscriber the opportunity to prohibit or limit such disclosure and the disclosure does not reveal the

“(I) extent of any viewing or other use by the subscriber of a cable service or other service provided

by the cable operator, or (II) the nature of any transaction made by the subscriber over the cable

system of the cable operator. . .” § 551(c)(2)(C). In invoking the Act, Plaintiffs have questioned

whether it even applies to cable Internet providers. 

The Court finds it unnecessary to decide this question. Regardless of whether the Act

applies, Covad is ordered to give its subscribers a copy of the subpoena, before releasing any

personally identifiable information, within five (5) days of its receipt of the subpoena. If this Act

does apply, then this notice is required by section 551(c)(2)(C)(i). Even if the Act does not apply,

the Court finds that notice is required in the interest of fairness and pursuant to Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iii)

and (iv), which provide that a subpoena may be quashed or modified if it requires disclosure of

privileged or “other protected matter,” or if it subjects a person to undue burden. Given the privacy

and potential First Amendment interests that inhere in the records sought, this Court has the

authority under the Federal Rules to condition the subpoena on consumer notice and an opportunity

to be heard.

III. CONCLUSION

Because there is good cause for the disclosure of Doe Defendants’ names and contact

information, and because the First Amendment does not prohibit such disclosure, Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Administrative Relief Pursuant to Local Rule 7-11(a) for Leave to Take Immediate Discovery is

GRANTED. Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to serve a Rule 45 subpoena upon Covad. Covad, in

turn, shall serve a copy of the subpoena and a copy of this order upon its relevant subscribers within

five (5) days of Covad’s receipt of the subpoena. The subscribers shall then have 15 days from the

date of service upon them to file any objections with this Court. If that 15-day period elapses

without any subscriber filing an objection or a motion to quash, Covad shall have ten (10) days after

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said lapse to produce each subscriber’s name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, and

Media Access Control (“MAC”) addresses to Plaintiffs pursuant to the subpoena.

This order disposes of Docket No. 5.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2006

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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