Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02393/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02393-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2393

MATTHEW SCHAEFER, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNIVERSAL SCAFFOLDING & EQUIPMENT, LLC,

et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 10-cv-791 — Philip M. Frazier, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 7, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and PETERSON,

District Judge.∗

PETERSON, District Judge. This diversity case requires us to 

review the district court’s application of Illinois tort law, particularly concerning spoliation of evidence. Matthew 

Schaefer, a construction worker, alleges that he was seriously 

 ∗ Of the Western District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

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injured when a defective piece of scaffolding fell and struck 

him on the head. So, in addition to bringing a workers’ compensation claim against his employer, Schaefer sued the scaffolding manufacturer, Universal Scaffolding & Equipment, 

LLC. When he learned that the piece of scaffolding that hit 

him had been lost, he added claims for negligent spoliation 

of evidence against his employer, Brand Energy Services, 

LLC, and against Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC, the 

company that had engaged Brand to build scaffolding at a 

Dynegy power plant. Schaefer also alleged claims for construction negligence and failure to warn against Dynegy. 

Schaefer’s wife joined his claims for negligent spoliation and

brought claims for loss of consortium against each of the defendants.

In a series of decisions, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants. At the heart of the case is the 

missing piece of scaffolding, which had been lost while in 

Dynegy’s possession, before anyone had tested it for defects. 

The district court held that without the missing piece, 

Schaefer could not prove his product liability claims against 

Universal. The district court also held that Dynegy was not 

liable for any defects or negligence in the construction of the 

scaffolding. We affirm these decisions.

But the district court also held that Schaefer and his wife 

could not prove their spoliation claims either, reasoning that 

because the Schaefers were unable to prove that the missing 

piece was in fact defective, they would be unable to prove 

that the loss of the piece caused them any damage. The district court here relied on an incorrect statement of Illinois 

spoliation law, which does not require a plaintiff to prove 

that he would have won his case but for the spoliation. A 

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No. 15-2393 3

spoliation claim under Illinois law requires only that the 

plaintiff show a “reasonable probability” of success on the 

underlying suit. Because the Schaefers adduced evidence 

from which a jury could make this finding—the batch of 

scaffolding used on the Dynegy project had a large number 

of defective pieces—the grant of summary judgment on the 

spoliation claims was improper. Accordingly, we reverse the 

grant of summary judgment on the spoliation claims against 

Brand and Dynegy.

I. Background

Matthew Schaefer was an employee of Brand Energy 

Services, LLC, which had been engaged by Dynegy Midwest 

Generation, LLC, to erect scaffolding at a Dynegy power 

plant. Under its contract with Dynegy, Brand had complete 

and authoritative control over the scaffold construction. 

Ryan Wampler was Brand’s project manager. Dynegy also 

had a safety manager at the power plant, Don Watson. Brand 

acquired the scaffold components from Universal Scaffolding & Equipment, LLC, but Dynegy paid for the scaffolding 

and owned it.

The Universal scaffolding used a “cup-lock” system in 

which metal tabs on the horizontal bars, called “ears,” would 

fit into a cup attached to the vertical members. A second cup 

would be locked down onto the ears to hold the components 

in place. Brand workers had difficulties with the Universal 

scaffolding components because some of the bars were not 

the proper length and some had bent ears, and those faulty 

components would not readily lock into the cups. Eventually 

the problem became prevalent enough that Wampler had his 

crew inspect the new Universal components as they arrived 

and then mark and set aside the defective pieces.

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At the time of Schaefer’s accident, November 2008, 

Schaefer and other Brand employees, including Maynard 

Hudson, were assembling scaffolding. Schaefer was a level 

below Hudson. A laborer would hand Schaefer a piece of 

scaffolding, and Schaefer would hand it up to Hudson, who 

would assemble the pieces. Hudson placed a three-foot, sixinch horizontal bar in the cups; but when he placed the next 

bar, the three-foot, six-inch bar popped out of its cups, fell, 

and struck Schaefer on the head. Schaefer suffered serious 

injuries to his neck, back, shoulders, and arms. 

Precisely what caused the bar to fall is sharply disputed. 

Neither Schaefer nor Hudson noticed any defects in the bars, 

although during the assembly process they did not have 

time to look carefully. Wampler investigated the accident,

and he reported that Hudson had knocked the bar with his 

hip or tool bag; but Hudson denies this. Schaefer contends 

that the root cause was Universal’s defective scaffolding, but 

proving that theory is problematic because of what happened to the bar.

Immediately after Schaefer’s accident, Watson (Dynegy’s 

safety manager) asked Wampler to retrieve the bar that 

struck Schaefer. Watson stored the bar in his office at the 

power plant. When he moved offices in December 2009, he 

left the bar behind, and it was eventually moved to a storage 

room in the power plant. The last time that anyone saw the 

bar was in September or October of 2010, when a safety 

worker saw it in the storage room. By November 2011, the 

first time that Schaefer sought to examine the bar as part of 

discovery in this case, it had been lost.

Schaefer filed a workers’ compensation claim in March 

2009. He filed a discovery action against Brand in Illinois 

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No. 15-2393 5

state court in December 2009. Brand never responded to the 

suit or to Schaefer’s interrogatories asking who had sold 

Brand the scaffolding used at the construction site and what 

the company had done with the scaffolding after finishing 

the project. Schaefer did not press the discovery action.

In June 2010, Schaefer and his wife, Cynthia, filed a complaint against Universal in state court, bringing claims for 

negligence, strict liability for product defect, strict liability 

for failure to warn, and loss of consortium. (Both Matthew 

and Cynthia Schaefer are plaintiffs and appellants, but for 

simplicity, we will refer to them collectively as “the 

Schaefers,” and we will refer to Matthew as “Schaefer.”) 

Universal removed the case to federal court on the basis of 

diversity. Two amended complaints later, Schaefer had six

causes of action under Illinois law: three against Universal 

for negligence (product liability), strict liability for product 

defect, and strict liability for failure to warn; two against 

Dynegy for negligence and negligent spoliation; and one 

against Brand for negligent spoliation. Schaefer’s wife also 

brought three claims of her own: one against Dynegy for 

negligent spoliation; one against Brand for negligent spoliation; and one against all defendants for loss of consortium.

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims in a series of decisions issued over the 

course of two years. In June 2013, a now-retired district 

judge denied Brand’s motion for summary judgment on the 

spoliation claim against it. In February 2014, the district 

judge who took over the case denied cross-motions from the 

Schaefers and from Brand and Dynegy for summary judgment on the spoliation claims, but he granted Universal’s

motion for summary judgment on all claims against it.

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The parties then consented to have a magistrate judge 

preside over the remainder of the case (i.e., the claims 

against Dynegy and Brand). In January 2015, the magistrate 

judge granted Dynegy’s motion for summary judgment on 

Schaefer’s negligence claim against it. A month later, as the 

case neared trial on the remaining claims for spoliation and 

loss of consortium, the magistrate judge granted Brand and 

Dynegy’s joint motion in limine to exclude all evidence and 

testimony that the missing scaffolding bar was defective. At 

the magistrate judge’s invitation, Brand and Dynegy renewed their motions for summary judgment on the spoliation and loss of consortium claims. The magistrate judge 

granted Brand and Dynegy’s renewed motion and the case 

was over. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

The Schaefers contend that the district court erred in entering summary judgment on each of their claims. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to the 

Schaefers. Carson v. ALL Erection & Crane Rental Corp., 811 

F.3d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 2016). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate only when 

there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A. Product liability and negligence claims

We begin with Schaefer’s product liability claims against 

Universal. Relying on Shramek v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Motor Division, 69 Ill. App. 2d 72, 216 N.E.2d 244 (1966), 

and its progeny, the district court concluded that product 

liability claims fail under Illinois law when the plaintiff does 

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No. 15-2393 7

not present the allegedly defective product itself, or at least 

other admissible evidence that the product was defective. 

On appeal, Schaefer contends that the district court erred in 

concluding that he lacked evidence that the bar was defective. We disagree.

Under Illinois law, plaintiffs in product liability actions 

“must identify the manufacturer of the product and demonstrate a causal relationship between the injury and the manufacturer’s product.” Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 418 

(7th Cir. 1992) (citing Zimmer v. Celotex Corp., 192 Ill. App. 3d 

1088, 1091, 549 N.E.2d 881, 883 (1989)). As part of proving a 

causal relationship, Schaefer must adduce evidence that the 

bar was, in fact, defective. This evidence can be direct or circumstantial, but Schaefer must establish that a defect in the 

scaffolding caused the accident. Shramek, 216 N.E.2d at 247; 

see also Sanchez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 237 Ill. App. 3d 

872, 874, 604 N.E.2d 948, 950 (1992) (“Proper circumstantial 

evidence includes either proof that tends to exclude other 

extrinsic causes or expert testimony that the product was defective.”). The mere fact that an accident occurred does not 

establish causation. Shramek, 216 N.E.2d at 247.

Schaefer relies on deposition testimony from four witnesses, arguing that this testimony creates a genuine dispute 

of material fact as to whether the bar was defective. But 

these witnesses merely confirm that workers at the construction site had identified some defective scaffolding pieces. 

The record does not establish that every piece of scaffolding 

at the jobsite was defective, and there is no evidence in the 

record that the specific bar that caused Schaefer’s injury was 

defective. And one of Schaefer’s own experts, Geno Maniago, conceded at his deposition that even if that specific bar 

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had been defective, the bar could have been damaged at the 

work site, which would mean that the defect was not attributable to Universal.

Without the bar itself, which was lost before it was analyzed, Schaefer cannot prove that Universal’s defective 

product caused his injuries, and thus he cannot succeed on 

his product liability claims against Universal. At most, he 

has adduced expert opinions that the bar that hit him might

have been one of the defective ones. But this is not enough to 

get the case to a jury. See Sanchez, 604 N.E.2d at 950 

(“[L]iability in a products liability action cannot be based on 

mere speculation, guess, or conjecture, and the circumstances shown must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from mere possibility.”); Phillips v. U.S. Waco Corp., 

163 Ill. App. 3d 410, 419, 516 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1987) (“Without an examination of the scaffold itself to determine if the 

collapse was a result of a preexisting defect, Phillips could 

never prove, directly or inferentially, a claim based in negligence or strict liability.”). The district court properly granted 

summary judgment to Universal on Schaefer’s product liability claims. And, consequently, Cynthia Schaefer’s loss of 

consortium claim against Universal necessarily fails, and the 

district court properly granted summary judgment on that 

claim, too.1

 1 Under Illinois law, “actions for personal injuries and actions for 

loss of consortium ... are legally distinct.” Mitchell v. White Motor Co., 58 

Ill. 2d 159, 163, 317 N.E.2d 505, 507 (1974). But when a defendant is not 

liable for the underlying claim, it is appropriate to dismiss attached 

claims for loss of consortium. See, e.g., Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 945 F. 

Supp. 2d 972, 994 (C.D. Ill.), aff’d, 741 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013).

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This leaves Schaefer’s negligence claim against Dynegy. 

As a general rule of Illinois law, a party who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the acts of the independent contractor. Wilfong v. L.J. Dodd Const., 401 Ill. App. 3d 

1044, 1060, 930 N.E.2d 511, 526 (2010). Dynegy hired Brand 

to build the scaffolding, so if the general rule applies, 

Dynegy is not liable for the defective construction. On appeal, Schaefer gives three reasons (the same reasons he gave 

to the district court) why the general rule should not apply. 

We are not persuaded.

Schaefer relies first on the “retained control” exception to 

the general rule, as articulated in § 414 of the Restatement 

(Second) of Torts, which Illinois has adopted. Section 414 

provides:

One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part 

of the work, is subject to liability for physical 

harm to others for whose safety the employer 

owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which 

is caused by his failure to exercise his control 

with reasonable care.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965). Schaefer contends that Dynegy retained enough control over Brand’s 

work that Dynegy owed him a duty to exercise reasonable 

care over the scaffolding project.

Schaefer argues that Dynegy exercised control through 

Watson, Dynegy’s on-site safety director at the power plant. 

According to Schaefer, Watson “would walk around the job 

site, talk to workers and try to correct unsafe things.” Appellants’ Brief, at 35. Watson’s authority, according to Schaefer, 

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was conferred through the Master Services Agreement 

(MSA), under which “Dynegy reserve[d] the right to inspect 

and deny access or use of any equipment or substance 

brought on site.” Id. at 9 (citing Dkt. 197-6).2 The MSA also 

required Brand to participate in Dynegy’s safety program. 

But Watson’s work and Dynegy’s safety program establish only that Dynegy had a right to inspect and to require 

general safety. The comments to § 414 make clear that retaining these general rights do not give rise to liability under the 

retained control exception. As comment C provides:

In order for the rule stated in this Section to 

apply, the employer must have retained at 

least some degree of control over the manner 

in which the work is done. It is not enough that 

he has merely a general right to order the work 

stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or 

to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be 

followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved 

to employers, but it does not mean that the 

contractor is controlled as to his methods of 

work, or as to operative detail. There must be 

such a retention of a right of supervision that

the contractor is not entirely free to do the 

work in his own way.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414, Comment C. 

 2 All docket citations refer to the district court docket.

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Schaefer contends that Watson’s activities are comparable to those that were sufficient to show “retained control” 

in Bokodi v. Foster Wheeler Robbins, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 

728 N.E.2d 726 (2000). But in Bokodi, “defendants’ actions indicated a substantial level of involvement in the incidental 

activities at the work site.” 728 N.E.2d at 735. Watson’s safety inspection activities, which extended to the entire plant 

and not just to the scaffolding project, did not get him involved in incidental activities of the scaffold construction. 

The contract between Dynegy and Brand expressly gave 

Brand control:

Contractor is, and shall continue to be, an independent contractor, and any provisions of 

this Agreement or any Purchase Order which 

may appear to give Dynegy the right to direct 

Contractor as to details of performing any Services, or to exercise a measure of control over 

Contractor’s performance of the Services, shall 

be interpreted to mean that Contractor will follow the instructions of Dynegy with respect to 

the results of the Services achieved only and 

not in the means whereby the Services are to be 

accomplished. Contractor shall have complete and 

authoritative control as to the details of performing 

the Services.

Dkt. 197-6, at 12 (MSA, § A.23) (emphasis added). Other sections of the contract gave Dynegy the right to inspect 

Brand’s work and to halt work when unsafe, but the contract 

did not give Dynegy control over operational details of the 

scaffold construction. Without control over operational details, the right of inspection and the authority to stop work is 

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insufficient to establish “retained control” under § 414 of the 

Restatement. Moiseyev v. Rot's Bldg. & Dev. Inc., 369 Ill. App. 

3d 338, 351, 860 N.E.2d 1128, 1139 (2006). And when, as in 

this case, the evidence establishes only the right to inspect, to 

halt work, and to make safety suggestions, the question is

decidable as a matter of law. Id. at 1139‒40.

Second, Schaefer contends that Dynegy, as the landowner, is liable for unsafe conditions on its premises. But 

Schaefer devotes only a scant paragraph to the issue. He 

cites no authority and simply asserts that the ill-fitting scaffolding components constitute a condition of the land. Perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by legal authority. United States v. 

Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2006).

But Schaefer’s argument would fail even if not waived. 

Illinois courts have adopted §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for purposes of evaluating premises 

liability claims. Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co., 211 F.3d 1008, 

1015 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en 

banc, (June 1, 2000) (citing Genaust v. Ill. Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 

456, 468, 343 N.E.2d 465, 472 (1976)). These provisions impose liability on landowners, under certain circumstances, 

for harm caused “by a condition on the land.” Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 343. But not everything located on a 

landowner’s property is a “condition on the land.” See, e.g.,

Gregory v. Beazer E., 384 Ill. App. 3d 178, 191, 892 N.E.2d 563, 

577 (2008) (asbestos blankets and gloves were not conditions 

on the land); Quinton v. Kuffer, 221 Ill. App. 3d 466, 472, 582 

N.E.2d 296, 300 (1991) (a flammable 55-gallon drum that exploded was not a condition on the land). Schaefer was not 

injured by already-assembled scaffolding, which could arCase: 15-2393 Document: 51 Filed: 10/07/2016 Pages: 24
No. 15-2393 13

guably be a condition on the land. He alleges that he was injured as a result of an activity taking place on the Dynegy 

property, one that involved a defective piece of equipment. 

The cause of Schaefer’s injury is unlike those things that constitute conditions on the land, so premises liability is a poor 

fit for Schaefer’s negligence claim against Dynegy.

Schaefer’s third basis for holding Dynegy liable is a “failure to warn” theory. The Illinois Supreme Court has applied 

§ 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to failure to warn 

claims. See Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 348, 

662 N.E.2d 397, 409 (1996). Under § 388, in certain circumstances, one who provides chattel for another to use has a 

duty to warn of known defects in the chattel. Schaefer contends that Dynegy should have warned him about the defective scaffolding. The district court held that Schaefer could 

not proceed under this theory of negligence because he had 

failed to adduce evidence of any unequal knowledge between Schaefer and Dynegy. The district court was correct.

Under Illinois law, “[a] duty to warn exists where there is 

unequal knowledge, actual or constructive of a dangerous 

condition, and the defendant, possessed of such knowledge, 

knows or should know that harm might or could occur if no 

warning is given.” Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 

179, 186, 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (2002) (citations, internal 

quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Schaefer’s 

knowledge of the defective scaffolding was undisputedly 

equal to, and likely much greater than, Dynegy’s knowledge. 

By the time of the accident, Brand workers had already had 

several problems with the scaffolding. Brand’s project supervisor Wampler (Schaefer’s boss) had directed Brand 

workers to go through new shipments of scaffolding, mark 

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the bad pieces, and set them aside. Wampler had also talked 

to his crews about the bad scaffolding. Schaefer himself testified that he had noticed problems with the scaffolding on the 

jobsite. As for the specific bar that struck him, Schaefer handled it when he passed it up to Hudson to put it into place. 

Because Schaefer had at least as much knowledge as Dynegy 

had about the bar’s defects, Schaefer’s failure to warn theory

necessarily fails.3 And with that, Schaefer’s negligence claim 

against Dynegy is doomed, along with his wife’s related loss 

of consortium claim.

In sum, based on undisputed facts of the record, the district court properly granted summary judgment on 

Schaefer’s product liability claims against Universal and his 

negligence claim against Dynegy.

B. Spoliation claims

The Illinois Supreme Court recognized a cause of action 

for negligent spoliation of evidence in Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 193, 652 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1995), as 

modified on denial of reh’g, (June 22, 1995). In that case, the 

plaintiff, Boyd, was injured in an explosion that he alleged 

was caused by a defective propane heater. Insurance company employees took the heater for testing to determine the 

cause of the explosion, but the heater was lost while in the 

insurance company’s possession, before it had been tested 

for defects. Boyd brought spoliation claims against the in-

 3 It bears mentioning that Schaefer’s arguments in support of his 

negligence claim against Dynegy generally presume that the bar was 

defective. But without the bar, he cannot prove that it was defective, so 

his negligence claim against Dynegy would fail for the same reason that 

his product liability claims against Universal fail. 

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No. 15-2393 15

surance company, which the insurance company moved to 

dismiss. The case was certified to the Illinois Supreme Court, 

which held for the first time that Illinois recognizes a claim 

for negligent spoliation, and that Boyd had stated such a 

claim, even though he would not be able to prove that the 

heater was actually defective. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 272.

Under Boyd, spoliation is not a separate, new tort, but a 

species of negligence. Accordingly, a negligent spoliation 

claim requires the plaintiff to prove the traditional four elements of negligence: a duty to preserve the evidence; breach 

of that duty by loss of the evidence; that the loss proximately 

caused the plaintiff’s inability to prove his underlying claim; 

and actual damages as a result. Id. at 270; see also Martin v. 

Keeley & Sons, Inc., 2012 IL 113270, ¶ 26, 979 N.E.2d 22, 27. 

In this case, the district court twice denied motions for 

summary judgment on the Schaefers’ spoliation claims. A-8‒

16. The district court held that both Brand and Dynegy had a 

duty to preserve the scaffolding piece, but that questions of 

fact about the other elements precluded summary judgment 

for either side. As trial approached, Brand and Dynegy filed 

a joint motion in limine to exclude any evidence or argument 

that the scaffolding was defective. Dkt. 220. The motion 

prompted the district court (now with Magistrate Judge Frazier presiding) to revisit the proximate cause issue. The district court granted the motion in limine, reasoning that without the missing scaffolding piece, the Schaefers could never 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the loss of the 

bar caused them to lose their underlying claims. With that

evidentiary ruling made, the Schaefers’ spoliation claims 

were doomed. The court invited Brand and Dynegy to reCase: 15-2393 Document: 51 Filed: 10/07/2016 Pages: 24
16 No. 15-2393

new their motions for summary judgment and granted 

them. 

On appeal, the Schaefers contend that the district court 

applied the wrong legal standard to their spoliation claims, 

which led the court to incorrectly grant the motion in limine. 

The Schaefers contend that they had adduced admissible evidence that the bar was defective, and thus they should have 

been allowed to proceed to trial on their negligent spoliation 

claims. Brand and Dynegy disagree, and they contend that 

the district court also erred in its earlier decisions that they 

had a duty to preserve the bar. We may affirm a district 

court’s grant of summary judgment based on any ground 

that the record supports, so long as the non-moving party 

had the opportunity to contest the issue. Gerhartz v. Richert, 

779 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 319 (2015). 

Accordingly, we consider both issues, duty and causation.

1. Duty

Illinois law imposes no general duty to preserve evidence, but a duty arises if two conditions are satisfied. First, 

a “relationship” condition: the duty must “arise[] by agreement, contract, statute, special circumstance, or voluntary 

undertaking.” Dardeen v. Kuehling, 213 Ill. 2d 329, 336, 821 

N.E.2d 227, 231 (2004). Second, a “foreseeability” condition: 

the duty to preserve must “extend[] to the evidence at issue—i.e., whether a reasonable person should have foreseen 

that the evidence was material to a potential civil action.” Id.

A plaintiff must satisfy both the relationship condition and 

the foreseeability condition to prove that a duty to preserve 

evidence existed. Id.

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The foreseeability condition is straightforward here: both 

Brand and Dynegy knew that the bar was involved in a serious workplace injury, which is why Dynegy’s Watson 

sought to preserve it in the first place. Dynegy contends that 

the foreseeability condition had “expired,” so to speak, by 

the time Dynegy lost the bar in October 2010, because 

Schaefer had not asked Dynegy for the bar by then, and no 

one in Dynegy’s position would think that the bar mattered 

anymore. But that is merely conclusory. We agree with the 

district court that Dynegy, having collected the bar because 

of its role in a workplace accident, could not simply assume 

after less than two years that the bar was no longer pertinent 

to a personal injury claim. 

The relationship condition is more complex. As one district court in this circuit has recently observed, “Illinois 

courts have not precisely defined what constitutes a ‘special 

circumstance,’ but ‘something more than possession and 

control are required, such as a request by the plaintiff to preserve the evidence and/or the defendant’s segregation of the 

evidence for the plaintiff[’]s benefit.’” Hart v. Amazon.com, 

Inc., No. 15-cv-1217, 2015 WL 8489973, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 

2015) (quoting Martin, 979 N.E.2d at 31). It would be an understatement to say that this area of Illinois law is not governed by bright-line rules. But Martin makes clear that mere 

possession of the evidence is not enough to impose a duty. 

979 N.E.2d at 31‒32. Nor is being the plaintiff’s employer, or 

being a potential litigant. Id. But a request by a plaintiff to 

preserve the evidence, or a defendant’s segregation of the 

evidence for the plaintiff, are recognized as special circumstances. Id.

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For Brand, those special circumstances are present, although in a factually complicated way. Brand did not take 

long-term possession of the bar. But after the accident,

Wampler, Brand’s project supervisor, collected the bar and 

delivered it to Watson, Dynegy’s safety supervisor, for safekeeping because of its role in Schaefer’s accident. Schaefer 

filed a discovery action against Brand in December 2009. His 

discovery requests did not ask Brand to produce the bar itself, but Schaefer was plainly seeking information about the 

bar, which at the time Brand knew was in Dynegy’s possession. Brand contends now that Schaefer’s discovery complaint was legally unsound, and that Brand was entitled to 

ignore it. Maybe so, but the potential infirmities of the discovery action are beside the point. What matters is that a little more than a year after Schaefer’s accident, Brand knew 

that Schaefer was looking to Brand for information about the 

allegedly defective bar, which Brand had collected and delivered to Dynegy to preserve. These facts bring the case 

close to Miller v. Gupta, 174 Ill. 2d 120, 129, 672 N.E.2d 1229, 

1233 (1996), where analogous special circumstances satisfied 

the relationship prong. In Miller, the plaintiff’s attorney requested X-rays from the plaintiff’s doctor, and the doctor 

collected them. But the cleaning staff inadvertently tossed 

them out before copies were provided to plaintiff’s attorney. 

The district court here was right: having collected the bar, 

and knowing that Schaefer was looking for it, Brand had a 

duty to preserve it.

We reach the same conclusion with regard to Dynegy because Dynegy voluntarily assumed a duty to preserve the 

bar. “A voluntary undertaking requires a showing of affirmative conduct by the defendant evincing defendant’s intent 

to voluntarily assume a duty to preserve evidence.” Martin,

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979 N.E.2d at 28. Dynegy knew that Schaefer had been injured when the bar fell on him, and Watson asked a Brand 

employee to retrieve the bar so that Watson could store it in 

his office so that “there wasn’t any issue later.” And Watson 

recognized the potential importance of the bar to Schaefer’s 

case: sometime after the accident, Watson went to the internet to find out how much the bar weighed and what amount 

of force it had when it fell and struck Schaefer. Dynegy took 

affirmative steps to take possession of the bar, and to save it 

for potential litigation. Thus, Dynegy’s voluntary undertaking satisfies the relationship condition of the duty analysis. 

2. Causation

We turn now to whether the district court applied the 

correct standard for causation, and whether under the correct standard, the Schaefers had raised a genuine issue of 

fact regarding whether the loss of the bar was the proximate 

cause of Schaefer’s inability to prove his underlying negligence claims.

Causation in a spoliation case is a subtle concept. Under 

the principles set out in Boyd, the spoliation plaintiff has to 

prove that the loss of the evidence would cause him to lose 

the underlying case. 652 N.E.2d at 271. This showing prevents a spoliation claim from succeeding on the loss of some 

inconsequential evidence. But, as explained in a critical footnote in Boyd, the spoliation plaintiff does not have to prove 

that he would have actually won his case with the missing 

piece:

A plaintiff need not show that, but for the loss 

or destruction of the evidence, the plaintiff 

would have prevailed in the underlying action. 

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20 No. 15-2393

This is too difficult a burden, as it may be impossible to know what the missing evidence 

would have shown.

Id. at 271 n.2. If the spoliation plaintiff had to prove that he 

would have won the underlying suit if he had the missing 

evidence, he would be in a hopeless Catch-22: if he could 

prove that he would have won the underlying case even 

without the lost evidence, then he could not show that the 

loss of that evidence actually harmed him. In other words, it 

would be impossible for the spoliation plaintiff to show both 

that without the lost evidence he would necessarily lose the 

underlying case, and that with it, he would win.

So, to prevail on their spoliation claims, the Schaefers

must make two showings. First, they must show that the loss 

of the scaffolding piece would cause them to lose their underlying suit. Id. And second, they must show that if they

had the scaffolding piece, they would have a “reasonable 

probability” of winning. Id. But “reasonable probability” is 

less than proof of success by a preponderance of the evidence, because that is the standard required to show that 

they would have won the underlying suit.

Boyd makes clear that the burden is on the Schaefers to 

make these showings; there is no evidentiary presumption 

that negligently lost evidence is favorable to the plaintiff. Id. 

at 273. Although the burden is on the plaintiff, if a defendant 

shows that the plaintiff could not win the underlying suit 

even with the lost evidence, then the spoliation claim necessarily fails. Id. at 271 n.2. Causation in a negligence case is 

generally question for the trier of fact, unless there is no material dispute or only one conclusion is clearly evident. WilCase: 15-2393 Document: 51 Filed: 10/07/2016 Pages: 24
No. 15-2393 21

liams v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 179 Ill. 2d 80, 88, 688 N.E.2d 130, 

134 (1997).

The magistrate judge in this case held the Schaefers to the 

wrong standard. The magistrate judge correctly acknowledged that to succeed on the spoliation claims, Boyd “would 

require plaintiff to show a reasonable probability of success” 

on the underlying negligence claims. A-42. But the magistrate judge conflated reasonable probability of success with 

proof by a preponderance of the evidence: 

And plaintiff must prove a reasonable probability of success on the merits. Now I have a 

hard time distinguishing in my mind any qualitative difference between reasonable probability of success on the merits and the ability to 

show a preponderance of the evidence. Both 

mean more likely than not. 

A-40. The magistrate judge also incorrectly paraphrased the 

holding in Boyd: “Or I think another way that it was put in 

Boyd is that, but for the loss of the scaffolding they would 

have been able to succeed on their claims.” A-42. This contradicts the actual holding in Boyd, which is that a spoliation 

plaintiff need not prove that he would have succeeded on 

the underlying claim but for the loss of the evidence.

Applying the proper standard, and viewing the record in 

the light most favorable to the Schaefers (as we must on the 

defense motions for summary judgment), the Schaefers have

adduced sufficient evidence to put the issue of causation into 

genuine dispute. There was a pervasive problem with the 

scaffolding at the Dynegy jobsite, and workers were having 

ongoing problems with the horizontal bars popping out of 

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22 No. 15-2393

cups. The problem got so bad that Brand’s project supervisor 

had workers go through each new shipment of scaffolding 

and set aside the bad pieces. No one has provided testimony 

that the bar that hit Schaefer was actually defective. Several 

employees testified that they did not notice any defects in 

the bar that fell on Schaefer, but there is ample testimony 

that the defects would not be readily apparent after only a 

quick glance, which is all that Schaefer and his colleagues 

had time for while assembling the scaffolding. Hudson, the 

employee who installed the bars involved in the accident, 

testified that he did not bump any of them, despite 

Wampler’s report. If the jury were to believe Hudson, a reasonable jury could eliminate his negligence as a cause of the 

accident. It may be impossible for Schaefer to prove his negligence case without the missing evidence, but the finger of 

suspicion points distinctly toward the missing bar, just as it 

pointed to the missing propane heater in Boyd. If Schaefer’s 

experts had had the opportunity to test the missing piece, 

they might have been able to confirm that the piece had defects that had gone unnoticed by the lay witnesses at the 

jobsite. But the loss of the piece deprived Schaefer of the opportunity to develop this important proof.

We conclude that the Schaefers have raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether, with the missing scaffolding, they

would have had a reasonable probability of success on their

underlying claims. The district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on this issue is reversed.

3. Motion in limine

Our ruling necessarily means that the district court also 

erred in granting the joint motion in limine No. 21, which 

excluded all evidence that the missing piece was defective. 

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No. 15-2393 23

We review rulings on motions in limine for abuse of discretion; decisions about admitting and excluding evidence “are 

peculiarly within the competence of the district court.” Von 

der Ruhr v. Immtech Int’l, Inc., 570 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But we will 

overturn the district court’s ruling if it is based on the wrong 

legal standard. See Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc., 635 F.3d 870, 

875 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he district court’s decision [on a motion in limine] is to be overturned only if no reasonable person would agree with the trial court’s ruling.”).

The district court’s ruling on motion in limine No. 21 was 

based on the notion that any evidence that the missing scaffolding was defective would be necessarily speculative. The 

district court’s reason for excluding Schaefer’s experts was

that they could not reliably testify that the missing scaffolding actually had any of the defects that had been common in 

the Universal scaffolding at the work site:

I’m not going to allow Maniago or Unger to offer any opinion as to any defect that existed or 

that the defect may have caused the accident to 

happen, the incident to happen for the simple 

reason that, by their own admission and just by 

the application of just common sense, is that, 

that is just purely speculation on their part. 

A-45. Both Maniago and Unger conceded that without the

opportunity to test the lost scaffolding piece they could not 

say whether it was defective. But that is part of the showing 

that the Schaefers had to make to support their spoliation 

claims. They offered Maniago and Unger to help explain 

how the scaffolding worked, and to offer explanations of 

how the alleged defects in the scaffolding could have caused 

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24 No. 15-2393

the bar to fall and thereby cause Schaefer’s injuries. Maniago’s and Unger’s testimony could have been admitted for

these purposes, even if they could not testify whether the 

missing bar was actually defective. And the prevalence of 

defects among the Universal scaffolding pieces at the 

worksite certainly makes it more likely that the piece that hit 

Schaefer was defective. The district court’s grant of motion 

in limine No. 21, excluding all evidence that the missing 

scaffolding was defective, was in error because it evaluated 

the relevance of their testimony under the wrong legal 

standard applicable to spoliation claims.

This is not to say that Maniago’s and Unger’s testimony 

must be admitted. On remand, the parties may revisit their 

qualifications and the reliability of their testimony. But the 

district court must evaluate these issues under the correct 

standard for evaluating a negligent spoliation claim under 

Illinois law. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the entry of 

summary judgment on all claims against Universal, and the 

entry of summary judgment on Schaefer’s negligence claim

and Cynthia Schaefer’s related loss of consortium claim

against Dynegy. We REVERSE the grant of summary judgment on the Schaefers’ spoliation claims against Dynegy and 

Brand. We REMAND for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

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