Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01472/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01472-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1985 Consipracy to interfere with civil rights

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FILED 

J6 DEC -8 PH 1:"0 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BART D. KIMBER, Case No.: 3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS 

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

v. SET ASIDE CLERK'S ENTRY OF 

TRACY GRANT, et al., DEFAULT 

Defendant. 

Before this Court is a Motion for Relief from Clerk's Entry of Default, filed by 

Defendants Tracy Grant et al. (Docket No. 18.) The Motion is unopposed. The Court 

finds the Motion suitable for determination on the papers without oral argument, pursuant 

to Civil Local Rule 7.I.d.l. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND 

On June 14,2016, Plaintiff Bart D. Kimber filed a Complaint against Defendants 

(the United States of America and ten individual federal employees or officers), 

containing twelve claims for relief related to his allegations of invasion of privacy, 

wrongful termination, employment discrimination, Civil Rights violations, negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, "reverse sexual discrimination," and Americans with 

Disabilities Act ("ADA") violations. (Docket No.1.) In Plaintiff's 6l-page Complaint, 

he alleges that, in June 2006, he was wrongfully terminated from his employment as a 

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firefighter with the Camp Pendleton Fire Department. (CompI.) According to Plaintiff, 

beginning in June 2003, after he declined Defendant Tracy Grant's invitation to engage in 

sexual relations, she and Defendant Dean King created a hostile work environment for 

him. (Jd.) Plaintiff more generally alleges that all of the Defendants' acted in some way 

to conspire to invade his privacy, engage in employment discrimination, violate his Civil 

Rights, and violate the ADA, reSUlting in his wrongful termination and ongoing 

emotional distress. (ld.) 

Plaintiff claims he had the following Defendants personally served: 

A) Defendant Dean King at an Oceanside, California address on July 

26,2016 (Docket Nos. 3, 13); 

D) Defendant Timothy Nicholas at an Escondido, California address 

on July 28,2016 (Docket Nos. 4, 14); 

C) Defendant Felicia Baker at a Fallbrook, California address on July 

27, 2016 (Docket No.6); 

D) Defendant United States of America at the District Attorney's 

Office in San Diego on August 30, 2016 (Docket No.7); 

E) Defendant Jaylynn Peterson at the Attorney General's office in 

Washington D.C. on July 29,2016 (Docket No.8.); 

F) Defendant Madu Paradcharam at the Attorney General's office in 

Washington D.C. on July 29,2016 (Docket No.9.); 

G) Defendant Jay Smith at the Attorney General's office in 

Washington D.C. on July 29,2016 (Docket No. 10.); 

H) Defendant Tracy Grant at Fire Station 4 in Camp Pendleton, 

California on September 9,2016 (Docket No. 11); and 

I) Defendant Timothy Hoover at an Amarillo, Texas address on July 

26,2016. (Docket No. 15.) 

Plaintiff also claims he had Defendant Ray Mabus served by substituted service at 

a Washington D.C. address on July 29,2016. (Docket No. 12.) 

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Case 3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS Document 20 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
1 On November 9,2016, Plaintiff requested the Clerk's entry of default against 

2 Defendants Mabus, Hoover, Smith, Baker, Paradcharam, Grant, Peterson and the United 

3 States of America. (Docket No. 16.) The Clerk entered default on November 15,2016. 

4 (Docket No. 17.) On November 16, 2016, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Relief 

5 from Clerk's Entry ofDefault. (Docket No. 18.) 

6 DISCUSSION 

7 Defendants ask the Court to set aside the Clerk's entry of default because they 

8 were not properly served and good cause exists for relief. 

9 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), "[t]he court may set aside an 

1 0 entry ofdefault for good cause." The standard for determining good cause under Rule 

11 55( c) is the same as that under Rule 60(b). United States v. Signed Personal Check No. 

12 730 ofYubran S Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Mesle]. "To 

13 determine'good cause,' a court must consider three factors: (1) whether the party seeking 

14 to set aside the default engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; (2) whether it 

15 had no meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default judgment would 

16 prejudice the other party." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, courts 

17 should decide cases on the merits whenever possible. Falkv. Allen, 739 F.2d 461,463 

18 (9th Cir. 1984). 

19 A. Culpable Conduct 

20 A defendant is not culpable simply for choosing not to answer a complaint. Mesle, 

21 615 F.3d at 1092. Culpable conduct is shown by an "intention to take advantage ofthe 

22 opposing party, interfere with judicial decision[-] making, or otherwise manipulate the 

23 legal process." TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691,697 (9th Cir. 2001) 

24 (overruled on other grounds). 

25 Here, Defendants assert they did not respond to the Complaint because they were 

26 not properly served. (Mot. at 3-4.) Plaintiff did not oppose the Motion or submit any 

27 evidence that Defendants acted in bad faith to the Court. Thus, Defendants did not 

28 engage in culpable conduct. 

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I B. Meritorious Defense 

2 When deciding whether a defendant has a meritorious defense, courts look to see if 

3 the defendant has alleged "sufficient facts that, if true, would constitute a defense." 

4 Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1094. 

Defendants assert they were not required to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint 

6 because Plaintiff did not properly serve them. As alleged by Plaintiff in his complaint, 

7 Defendants include the United States of America and ten of its officers or employees, 

8 sued in their official and individual capacities. (Docket No.1.) Under Rule 4(i) of the 

9 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must fulfill specific requirements when 

serving the United States, its agencies, officers or employees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i). To 

11 properly serve the United States of America, a plaintiff must serve the summons and 

12 complaint pursuant to the methods specified by Rule 4(i)( 1) on the following: (1) the 

13 United States Attorney for the district where the action is brought; (2) the Attorney 

14 General in Washington, D.C.; and, (3) ifthe action challenges an order of a nonparty 

agency or officer of the United States, the agency or officer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)( 1 ). 

16 To properly serve a United States officer or employee sued in his or her official 

17 capacity, a plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint pursuant to the methods 

18 specified by Rule 4(i)(2) on the following: (1) the United States (i.e., the United States 

19 Attorney and the Attorney General) and (2) the federal agency, officer or employee. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2). To properly serve a United States officer or employee sued in his or 

21 her individual capacity, a plaintiff must serve a copy of the summons and complaint on 

22 (1) the United States (i.e., the United States Attorney and the Attorney General) and (2) 

23 the officer or employee sued individually pursuant to Rule 4(e), (t), or (g). Fed. R. Civ. P. 

24 4(i)(3). 

The Court has reviewed the returned Summons (Docket Nos. 3-4, 6-15). None of 

26 the returned Summons for the individual officers or employees appears to demonstrate 

27 compliance with Rules 4(i)(2) or 4(i)(3). Similarly, the returned Summons for the United 

28 States of America does not appear to comply with Rule 4(i)(1). As stated above, the 

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Court need not determine whether these facts are true, only whether the alleged facts are 

sufficient to constitute a defense. See Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1094. Accordingly, the Court 

finds Defendants have presented sufficient evidence to constitute a defense. 

C. Prejudice to Plaintiff 

Prejudice is shown by some "greater harm than simply delaying resolution ofthe 

case." Tel Grp., supra, 244 F.3d at 701. "The standard is whether [the plaintiffs] 

ability to pursue his claim will be hindered." Falk, supra, 739 F.2d at 463. 

Here, it appears Plaintiff acknowledges his claims may be barred by the statute of 

limitations as his Complaint requests the Court "allow equitable tolling ofthe statute of 

limitations." (CompI. at 12.) As stated above, Plaintiff did not oppose the Motion, or 

submit any evidence of prejudice to the Court. As a result, it does not appear to the Court 

that setting aside the Clerk's entry ofjudgment would hinder Plaintiffs ability to pursue 

his claims. 

The good cause factors support Defendants' position that relief from default is 

appropriate. 

CONCLUSION 

Defendants' Motion is GRANTED. The Clerk's entry of default is set aside. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: Decembe~Ol6 Z 

nited States District Judge 

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