Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02154/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02154-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PEGGY HOLCOMB, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF 

PSYCHOLOGY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-02154-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

This action arises primarily from defendant California Board of Psychology’s 

(CBP) denial at one point of plaintiff Peggy Holcomb’s license to practice psychology. This 

matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement 

filed by the CBP and individual defendants. ECF No. 25. After plaintiff missed the deadline for 

opposing the motion and the court submitted the matter as provided by Local Rule 230(g), 

plaintiff’s counsel moved for additional time to file an opposition. ECF No. 27. Although the 

court was not persuaded by plaintiff counsel’s explanation, the court granted the request in the 

interest of resolving the motion on the merits. ECF No. 30. Plaintiff then filed an opposition,

ECF No. 31, and the matter remained submitted. As explained below, the court GRANTS 

defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

The court summarized the allegations of the complaint and the procedural history 

in its November 23, 2015 order denying plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, and 

so does not repeat it here. See ECF No. 23 at 1–5. The complaint asserts seven causes of action: 

violation of procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; age discrimination under § 1983; 

violation of substantive due process under § 1983; violation of the right to association under the 

First Amendment; conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s rights; intentional infliction of emotional 

distress; and interference with the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See generally 

Compl., ECF No. 1. The complaint requests declaratory relief, the return of John Doe’s files to 

his parents, an order ceasing all further actions by the CBP pending resolution of this case, a 

temporary restraining order restraining the CBP from withholding plaintiff’s license, an order 

taking the CBP into federal receivership, “damages to be awarded according to proof,” costs, and 

attorneys’ fees. Id. at 25–26. 

Since the issuance of the court’s November 23, 2015 order, plaintiff has notified 

the court that the CBP issued plaintiff a license to practice psychology on January 21, 2016. ECF 

No. 31 at 2. On January 27, 2016, the investigator for the CBP informed plaintiff that the 

investigation by the CBP had concluded and its case was closed. Id.; ECF No. 31-1. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests the 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 

1039–40 (9th Cir. 2003). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, “[i]f the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to survive a motion 

to dismiss, this short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something 

more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “‘labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court must construe the complaint 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true the factual allegations of the 

complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). This rule does not apply to “a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), quoted 

in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, nor to “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to 

judicial notice” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint. 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2001). A court’s 

consideration of documents attached to a complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the 

complaint, or matters of judicial notice will not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003); Parks Sch. of 

Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); compare Van Buskirk v. Cable News 

Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that even though court may look beyond 

pleadings on motion to dismiss, generally court is limited to face of the complaint on 12(b)(6) 

motion). 

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III. DISCUSSION 

A. Standing and Mootness 

Defendants first move to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction because plaintiff lacks standing and certain claims are moot. To have Article III 

standing, a plaintiff must show that 

(1) [she] has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and 

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged 

action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely 

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 

decision. 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). At 

this initial stage of litigation, it is enough for a plaintiff to allege and not prove these three 

elements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 

Relatedly, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the controversy before 

it becomes moot. In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2005). “[A] case is moot when the 

issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 

outcome.” County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. 

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). 

Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief and an order requiring the CBP to issue 

plaintiff’s license to practice psychology are now moot, because plaintiff has received her license. 

See ECF No. 31 at 2. Plaintiff concedes in her opposition that her claims for declaratory and 

injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot. Id. The court DISMISSES plaintiff’s claims for 

declaratory relief and a temporary restraining order as moot. 

The court also finds the complaint does not satisfy the Article III requirements to 

establish standing to bring claims for damages or other equitable relief. With respect to “injury in 

fact,” the complaint pleads only conclusory assertions that plaintiff has suffered “severe harm,” 

Compl. ¶ 48, “significant economic damages,” id. ¶ 75, or “severe psychological damages,” id., 

without providing any factual support for such assertions. The complaint generally requests 

“damages to be awarded according to proof.” Id. at 26. The only non-conclusory allegation is 

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that plaintiff’s employer, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, gave her a 

mandate that she would lose her job if she was not licensed by November 1, 2015. Id. ¶ 88. 

However, at the time of the filing of the complaint, that injury was speculative, and therefore 

could not establish an “injury in fact.” See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 180–81. And 

now that the date has passed, her hypothetical retrospective job loss cannot support any claims for 

prospective relief. Plaintiff has not represented to the court that she in fact lost her job and has 

not sought leave to amend the complaint to add such an allegation. The complaint does not show 

how ordering the return of John Doe’s files to his parents, enjoining “all further actions by the 

[CBP]” or imposing receivership on CBP would prevent or redress any injury to plaintiff. See 

Compl. at 25. 

In her opposition brief, aside from repeating her conclusory and hypothetical 

allegations of injury, plaintiff only generally argues that Lujan “is not applicable” here. ECF 

No. 31 at 6. In their motion, defendants cite Lujan to articulate the basic Article III standing 

requirements set forth above. ECF No. 25 at 6. Rather than demonstrate how plaintiff has 

satisfied these standing requirements, which are well-established, plaintiff attempts to discredit 

Lujan or distinguish its facts: 

It is as though defendant selected a case that has marginal, if any, 

relationship to case [sic] at hand . . . . There is no applicability of 

Lujan whatsoever. The case has received cautionary treatment in 

future case [sic] one hundred sixty-two times . . . . Plaintiff asserted 

damages according to proof. She identified the general nature and 

type of damages with enough specificity to overcome a motion to 

dismiss. 

ECF No. 31 at 6–7. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish an “injury in fact” so 

as to support her request for damages or equitable relief. In addition, plaintiff has not shown how 

the requested equitable relief would correct any injury to her. Accordingly, the court 

DISMISSES plaintiff’s remaining claims for lack of standing. 

Because the court has dismissed plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief, the court 

need not reach defendants’ abstention argument. See ECF No. 25 at 8–10. With respect to 

Younger abstention, it does not appear that any state proceedings are currently pending. See 

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Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 

457 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1982). 

B. Eleventh Amendment 

The Eleventh Amendment provides an additional basis for dismissing plaintiff’s 

claims against the CBP and state officials in their official capacity. “Claims under § 1983 are 

limited by the scope of the Eleventh Amendment.” Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 

131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). Actions against states and state officials in their official 

capacities can proceed only in three circumstances: when the state gives its consent; when 

Congress abrogates the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity in a valid exercise of power; and 

when a plaintiff seeks prospective relief from a government official. See Seminole Tribe of 

Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). 

Here, the CBP is part of the California state government, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§§ 100–01, California has not consented to this action, and Congress did not abrogate California’s 

immunity in passing § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). See also Dittman v. 

California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, the court has dismissed 

plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the CBP and its 

officials are shielded from liability by Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

C. Failure to State a Claim 

Many of plaintiff’s claims also suffer from defects under Rule 12(b)(6). The court 

notes plaintiff did not respond to defendants’ arguments based on Rule 12(b)(6) in her opposition. 

The court first finds the complaint fails to state plausible claims against Antonette Sorrick, 

Michael Erickson, Jacqueline Horn, Nicole Jones, Miguel Gallardo, Lucille Acquaye-Badoo, 

Johanna Arias-Bhatia, Andrew Harlem, Linda Starr, Stephen Phillips, and Does 1–300, because it 

pleads only vague and conclusory allegations against them and lumps them together with other 

defendants, see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 21–24, 72, 77–80; the complaint does not plead any factual 

allegations regarding these individuals’ particular involvement in the alleged misconduct. See 

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and 

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conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss.”). 

In addition, plaintiff’s claims for conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress rely only on conclusory allegations without factual support. See Compl. ¶¶ 71–80. The 

complaint likewise fails to plead sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for age 

discrimination. The complaint alleges only that “[t]he staff at the [CBP] are all quite young and 

most [sic] certainly perceive someone who is fifty years old as virtually ancient. No one else has 

been subjected to this type of illegal process.” Id. ¶ 53. Such a speculative assumption without 

any factual support does not state a plausible claim of age discrimination. 

Finally, several of plaintiff’s claims are a stretch, to say the least. Id. ¶ 70 

(alleging the CBP’s actions prevented plaintiff from “engaging in appropriate association 

consistent with the First Amendment in her attempts to freely associate with the minor child John 

Doe”); id. ¶¶ 81–85 (alleging an intimidating e-mail from a CBP investigator to plaintiff’s 

counsel in this civil action violated plaintiff’s own Sixth Amendment right to counsel); id. 

¶¶ 96-101 (asking the court to apply the exclusionary rule and doctrine of fruit of the poisonous 

tree to plaintiff’s reports on John Doe, and as a result, to order the CBP “to destroy all notes, 

computer entries, call logs, messages, files, back-up data, computer files and any other 

information about an alleged complaint regarding [plaintiff]”). 

D. Leave to Amend 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he court should freely 

give leave [to amend the pleadings] when justice so requires,” and the Ninth Circuit has “stressed 

Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments,” Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 

1160 (9th Cir. 1989). “In exercising its discretion [regarding granting or denying leave to 

amend,] ‘a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15—to facilitate decision on 

the merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.’” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 

833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 

1981)). However, “liberality in granting leave to amend is subject to several limitations . . . . 

includ[ing] undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith by the movant, futility, and undue 

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delay.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Here, it would be futile to grant plaintiff leave to amend her claims for declaratory 

and injunctive relief, because they are jurisdictionally barred. It would likewise be futile to grant 

plaintiff leave to amend her § 1983 claims against the CBP or the CBP officials sued in their 

official capacity, because they are shielded from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. 

Finally, given the number of deficiencies in plaintiff’s complaint, both with respect 

to standing and the pleading requirements, the court finds it would be futile to grant leave to 

amend the claims against the CBP officials in their individual capacity. Cf. Wakefield v. 

Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he plaintiff should be given an opportunity 

through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not 

uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” (quoting 

Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing for 

dismissal of defendants not served within ninety days of filing of the complaint unless plaintiff 

shows good cause). 

In its November 23, 2015 order, the court noted its impression that plaintiff’s 

counsel was unfamiliar with the requirements imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

this district’s Local Rules, and federal law with respect to temporary injunctive relief. ECF 

No. 23 at 2 n.1. Despite the court’s warning in a previous order, plaintiff’s counsel had again 

argued, without citation to authority, that the release of Cortisol into plaintiff’s bloodstream 

constituted irreparable harm. See id. at 7. The state of plaintiff’s current filings likewise 

demonstrates a misunderstanding of federal law with respect to jurisdiction, constitutional law, 

and basic pleading requirements. The court allowed plaintiff to file an opposition brief despite 

missing the filing deadline, but the opposition brief is difficult to comprehend and does not 

respond to the majority of the arguments raised in defendant’s motion. Plaintiff does not request 

the opportunity to amend in her filing. In these circumstances, and considering the obvious 

absence of any allegations suggesting a plausible basis for relief, the court finds amendment 

would be futile. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss and 

DISMISSES the complaint WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 2, 2016. 

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