Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_07-cv-01149/USCOURTS-ared-4_07-cv-01149-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Tort/Motor Vehicle (P.I.)

---

1

Doc. No. 28, Ex. A. The Agreement was signed by Russell Goohue and Jamie P.

Dufresne, Contractor, d/b/a Goodhue Trucking. Apparently, Plaintiff changed her last name to

Goodhue after signing the Agreement and before filing this action.

2

Id.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMIE GOODHUE PLAINTIFF 

v. 4:07-CV-01149-WRW

JOSE S. AYALA d/b/a M&G DEFENDANTS

TRANSPORT, et al. 

ORDER

Pending is Defendant Swift Corporation’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay

Proceedings (Doc. No. 25). Plaintiff has responded (Doc. No. 27), and Defendant Ayala has

responded (Doc. No. 29). For the reasons set out below, Defendant Swift’s Motion (Doc. No. 25)

is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 7, 2004, Plaintiff and Defendant Swift Corporation d/b/a Swift

Transportation Company (“Swift”) entered into a Contractor Agreement under which Plaintiff

was to transport freight for Swift.1 Among other provisions, the contract contained a choice of

law provision providing that the Agreement was governed by the laws of the State of Arizona.2

The Agreement also contained an Arbitration provision that reads, in relevant part:

All disputes and claims arising under, arising out of or relating to this Agreement,

including an allegation of breach thereof, and any disputes arising out of or relating

to the relationship created by the Agreement, including any claims or disputes arising

under or relating to any state or feral laws, statutes or regulations, and any disputes

Case 4:07-cv-01149-RSW Document 31 Filed 04/30/08 Page 1 of 7
3

Doc. No. 25, Ex. 2.

4

Doc. No. 28, Ex. B.

5

Doc. No. 26.

6

Doc. No. 27.

7

Doc. Nos. 1, 26. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the truck was owned by Swift. Doc.

No. 1. In its Motion to Compel Arbitration, Swift asserts that the truck was owned by Goodhue

Trucking and leased by Swift. Doc. No. 26.

8

Doc. No. 1. 

9

Id.

10Id.

2

as to the rights and obligations of the parties, including the arbitrability of disputes

between the parties, shall be fully resolved by arbitration in accordance with

Arizona’s Arbitration Act and/or the Federal Arbitration Act.

On February 18, 2005, Plaintiff and Swift entered into a Mentor Agreement under which

Plaintiff agreed to train Swift employees as over-the-road tractor trailer drivers.3 The Mentor

Agreement is brief, and included neither a choice of law nor an arbitration clause.4 Defendant

Swift asserts that the Mentor Agreement is part of the Contractor Agreement;5 Plaintiff

maintains that the Mentor Agreement and Contractor Agreement are separate contracts, and that

the terms of each should be construed separately.6

On or about March 30, 2005, Defendant Patterson, a Swift driver, was driving a tractor

trailer owned or leased by Swift.7

 Plaintiff was a passenger in the truck.8 Defendant Patterson

was traveling East on I-40 in Prairie County, Arkansas, when she moved from the right lane

into the left lane, because she saw a sign that the right lane was closed ahead.9

 Upon changing

lanes, the vehicle in front of Defendant Patterson came to an abrupt stop.10 Defendant Patterson

Case 4:07-cv-01149-RSW Document 31 Filed 04/30/08 Page 2 of 7
11Id.

12Id.

13Id.

14Doc. No. 26.

15Id.

16Doc. No. 27.

17Id.

3

was able to stop the tractor trailer she was driving without hitting the vehicle in front of her.11

Defendant Ayala, however, was not able to stop the tractor trailer he was driving and he hit the

rear of the truck driven by Defendant Patterson.12 Plaintiff was injured in the accident, and filed

suit against Swift, Defendant Patterson, and Defendant Ayala on November 29, 2007.13

Defendant Swift filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration in March, 2008, asserting that

this litigation should be stayed and asking the Court to compel arbitration.14 Swift argues that

arbitration is mandatory under the Contractor Agreement-Mentor Agreement, and that the

arbitration clause should be enforced.15

Plaintiff responded, objecting to Defendant Swift characterizing the arbitration clause in

the Contractor Agreement as part of Mentor Agreement.16 Plaintiff maintains that the Mentor

Agreement does not contain a choice of law or arbitration clause, that she was acting solely in

the capacity of Mentor when the accident happened, that Arkansas law governs, and that the

arbitration clause in the Contractor Agreement is not enforceable.17

Case 4:07-cv-01149-RSW Document 31 Filed 04/30/08 Page 3 of 7
18Doc. No. 30.

19Id.

20109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989)

21Id. at 1251.

22Id.

23Id.

24Id.

4

Defendant Ayala responded and asserts that arbitration should be stayed until this

litigation has been concluded.18 Ayala urges that because he is not a party to any agreement

containing a binding arbitration clause, and because the other parties in this case are necessary

in connection with resolving Plaintiff’s claims against him, arbitration should be stayed and this

case allowed to proceed.19 I agree. 

II. DISCUSSION

In Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs.,20 the United States Supreme Court held that “application

of [a state] statute is not pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act), 9 U. S. C. § 1

et seq., in a case where the parties have agreed that their arbitration agreement will be governed

by [state] law . . . .”21 In Volt, Volt and the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior

University (“Stanford”) entered into a construction contract that contained both an arbitration

clause and a choice of law clause.22 A contract dispute developed, Volt made a formal

application for arbitration, and Stanford filed suit against Volt in California state court.23

 In the state court action, Standford sought indemnity from two companies involved in

the construction, but with which it did not have arbitration agreements.24 Volt moved the court

Case 4:07-cv-01149-RSW Document 31 Filed 04/30/08 Page 4 of 7
25Id.

26Volt, 109 S. Ct. at 1251-52.

27Id. at 1252.

28Id.

29Id.

30893 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1990).

31Id. at 196.

32Id.

5

to compel arbitration.25 Stanford moved to stay arbitration under a section of the California

Civil Procedure Code that allows a court to stay arbitration “pending resolution of related

litigation between a party to the arbitration agreement and third parties not bound by it, where

‘there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.’”26 The court

denied Volt’s motion to compel, and stayed arbitration until the related litigation was

complete.27 The California appeals court affirmed the decision, and the California Supreme

Court denied review.28 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, finding nothing in the FAA

pre-empted state law where a contract containing an arbitration clause also contained a choice

of law provision.29

The Eighth Circuit was faced with facts similar to those in Volt when it decided Recold,

S.A. de C.V. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.

30 In Recold, Recold and Central Ice Machine

Company entered into a contract providing that all disputes “arising in connection with” the

contract would be arbitrated in El Paso, Texas.31 Recold sold custom refrigeration equipment to

Central Ice, which then sold the equipment to Monfort.32 Monfort sued both Recold and Central

Case 4:07-cv-01149-RSW Document 31 Filed 04/30/08 Page 5 of 7
33Id.

34Id.

35Id.

36Recold, 893 F.2d at 196.

37Id. at 199 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1255 (1989)).

38A.R.S. § 12-1502 -- proceedings to compel or stay arbitration -- reads:

A. On application of a party showing an agreement described in section 12-1501, and the

opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with

arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate,

the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall

order arbitration if found for the moving party. Otherwise, the application shall be

6

Ice in Colorado state court, alleging breach of express and implied warranties, product liability,

and negligence.33 Recold moved to stay Monfort’s action pending arbitration, and while that

motion was pending, petitioned a federal district court in Nebraska to compel arbitration.34

Recold’s request was based on the theory that Monfort was a third-party beneficiary to the

Recold-Central Ice contract, and was bound to the arbitration agreement.35 Both the Colorado

state court and Nebraska district court denied Recold’s motions, finding that Monfort -- which

was not a party to the Recold-Central Ice contract -- was not bound by the arbitration clause in

that contract.36 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Nebraska district court, finding that the FAA

“‘does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.’”37

Defendant Ayala is not a party to the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant Swift.

Under both Volt and Recold, Defendant Ayala is not required to arbitrate because he has not

agreed to do so. Arizona law, which Defendant Swift argues controls the Contractor Agreement

and Mentor Agreement, permits a court to stay arbitration when there is no agreement to

arbitrate.38 If, in the alternative, the FAA governs the arbitration clause (the arbitration clause

Case 4:07-cv-01149-RSW Document 31 Filed 04/30/08 Page 6 of 7
denied.

B. On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on a

showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide

dispute, shall be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the moving

party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration.

C. If an issue referable to arbitration under the alleged agreement is involved in an action or

proceeding pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear applications under subsection A of this

section, the application shall be made therein. Otherwise and subject to section 12-2101, the

application may be made in any court of competent jurisdiction.

D. Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order

for arbitration or an application therefor has been made under this section or, if the issue is

severable, the stay may be with respect thereto only. When the application is made in such action

or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include such stay.

E. An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit

or bona fides or because any fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been

shown.

39Doc. No. 25, Ex. 2.

7

provides “arbitration in accordance with Arizona’s Arbitration Act and/or the FAA”39), the

outcome is still the same, because the Contractor Agreement contains a choice of law provision

providing that Arizona law governs -- and Volt found that the FAA did not preempt a state

choice of law clause. Lastly, if, as Plaintiff argues, Arkansas law governs because the Mentor

Agreement stands independent of the Contractor Agreement, then the arbitration issue is moot

since the Mentor Agreement contains no arbitration clause. Accordingly, Defendant Swift’s

Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings (Doc. No. 25) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of April, 2008.

/s/ Wm. R. Wilson, Jr.__________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 4:07-cv-01149-RSW Document 31 Filed 04/30/08 Page 7 of 7