Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00904/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00904-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PATRICK LOWAYNE PERRY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PERDUE INC, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 16-cv-00904-EDL 

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 

PREJUDICE 

Re: Dkt. No. 14 

On February 23, 2016, pro se plaintiff Patrick Perry filed a complaint and application to 

proceed in forma pauperis. On February 29, 2016, the Court issued an Order requiring Plaintiff to 

re-file a completed application to proceed in forma pauperis, and cautioned him that as pled his 

complaint failed to state a claim because he did not allege or otherwise indicate that he exhausted 

his administrative remedies and received a right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff did not timely file a 

completed application to proceed in forma pauperis or amended complaint. The Court issued an 

Order to Show Cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Dkt. No.7. 

Mr. Perry responded and appeared at a hearing on the Order to Show Cause on May 31, during 

which he was granted until June 13 to file a completed application to proceed in forma pauperis 

and amended complaint. Dkt. No. 10. Mr. Perry consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction on 

June 2. Dkt. No. 11. He then timely filed a completed application to proceed in forma pauperis 

and a document the Court construed as a first amended complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. No. 12. 

On June 16, the Court granted Mr. Perry’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and 

sua sponte dismissed his FAC without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court 

held that the FAC did not contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) because it was 

unclear which entities and individuals Mr. Perry intended to name as defendants, what allegedly 

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United States District Court 

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wrongful actions were attributable to anyone mentioned in the complaint, and why any of the 

individuals referenced in his complaint other than his employer are proper defendants in this 

employment discrimination lawsuit. Additionally, the Court dismissed the FAC for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies, explaining that: 

Additionally, before filing suit for an employment discrimination claim pursuant 

to Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a timely 

and sufficient charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the 

appropriate state administrative agency and obtain a right-to-sue letter. See, e.g., 

Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. §§ 

2000e–5(b), (f)(3), 16(c); Stache v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers and Allied 

Craftsmen, AFL–CIO, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 

815 (1989). “[T]he administrative charge requirement serves the important 

purposes of giving the charged party notice of the claim and narrow[es] the issues 

for prompt adjudication and decision.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t., 276 F.3d 

1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Despite having been previously warned about this pleading deficiency, Plaintiff 

still does not allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies by timely filing 

a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 

within 180 days. To the extent that Plaintiff’s claim is based on state employment 

discrimination law, there is also no allegation that Plaintiff timely filed a 

complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing (“DFEH”) within one year. See Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 83 

(1990); Cal. Gov’t Code §12960. 

Dkt. No. 13 at 3. 

The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint that clearly states which 

allegations and claims relate to which Defendants, the basis for federal court jurisdiction, as well 

as whether or not Plaintiff has satisfied relevant exhaustion requirements. The Court warned 

Plaintiff that if he did not remedy the pleading defects in a second amended complaint, dismissal 

could be with prejudice. 

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) on July 7, 2016. The SAC makes his 

factual allegations and the basis for his employment discrimination claim somewhat more clear. 

However, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, and instead 

tacitly concedes that he has not yet done so. Plaintiff’s SAC states: “As ordered, I have requested 

charges be filed against Perdue Foods with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(EEOC). As a rule, because EEOC has partnership with Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing (DFEH), and I made my complaint first to the EEOC, EEOC will raise any potential 

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United States District Court 

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complaints or charges with DFEH.” Thus, Plaintiff appears to allege that he filed a claim with the 

EEOC following the Court’s June 16 Order, but there is no allegation that he has received a rightto sue letter. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. 1 Title VII provides that within ninety days after the issuance of a right-to-sue notice, “a 

civil action may be brought against the respondent.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). Once Plaintiff 

receives a right-to-sue letter, he may re-file a complaint as appropriate. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 19, 2016 

 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE 

United States Magistrate Judge 

 

1

 To the extent that this order is dispositive, the Court does not require the consent of 

Defendants because Defendants have not been served and therefore are not parties under the 

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Ornelas v. De Frantz, 2000 WL 973684, *2, n.2 (N.D. Cal. 

2000) (citing Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (magistrate judge had 

jurisdiction to dismiss prisoner’s civil rights action without consent of the defendants because the 

defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties)). 

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