Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02262/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02262-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Wrongful Death

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Veronica Vacaneri, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Tehran Ryles, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-02262-PHX-PGR

ORDER 

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. (Doc. 

24.) On April 11, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) alleging 

two counts: “wrongful death by excessive force” and civil rights violations under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 22.) Defendants move to dismiss the civil rights claim pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They also move to strike 

paragraph 26 of the SAC as impertinent and immaterial under Rule 12(f). 

 Plaintiffs oppose the motion. (Doc. 27.) For the reasons set forth herein, the 

motion is granted. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs are Veronica Vacenri and Joel Smith, Jr., individually and as the parents 

of Joel Smith III, who died on September 13, 2012, after being shot by Deputy Tehran 

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Ryles of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office during a law enforcement incident on 

September 13, 2012.1

 Defendants include Deputy Ryles, Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph 

Arpaio, and the Town of Guadalupe.2

 (Id.) 

1. Rule 12(b)(6) 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a “short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal for 

insufficiency of a complaint is proper if the complaint fails to state a claim on its 

face. See Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 633 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1980). A Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal 

theory or insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See Balistreri v. Pacifica 

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 In determining whether an asserted claim can be sustained, all allegations of 

material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). 

With respect to factual allegations, the Supreme Court has explained that they “must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must 

 

1

 According to law enforcement reports, Tempe police officers and Deputy Ryles were pursuing Smith III on foot in response to a report of burglary and trespassing. Smith III was armed with a knife. Deputy Ryles commanded Smith III to drop the knife. When Smith III refused, Deputy Ryles fired two volleys of shots, fatally wounding Smith III. (See Doc. 11-1–11-6.) 

2

 Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court on September 12, 2013. Defendants removed the case on November 5, 2013. (Doc. 1.) On March 21, 2014, 

the Court granted in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss, with leave to file an amended 

complaint. (Doc. 18.) 

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contain more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Id.

2. Section 1983 

Forty-two U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against a person who, acting 

under color of state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It 

does not create any substantive rights; rather, it is a vehicle whereby plaintiffs can 

challenge actions by government officials. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 

(1989). To prove a case under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the action 

occurred under color of state law and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a 

constitutional right or federal statutory right. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 

Cir.2002); Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699. 

3. Analysis 

 A. Survivorship claim 

 Paragraph 26 of the SAC alleges violations of decedent Joel Smith III’s 

constitutional rights: 

Defendant Deputy TEHRAN RYLES, acting under color of state law, 

knowingly, willfully, and intentionally deprived Decedent JOEL SMITH, 

III of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by 42 U.S.C. 1983 & 

1988, other federal and state statutes, as well as the Constitution of the 

State of Arizona and United States, including the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments, by: 

a) Needlessly and unreasonably subjecting JOEL SMITH, III to excessive 

force exerted by the Defendant Deputy TEHRAN RYLES and at the 

Defendant’s direction; 

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b) Intentionally and recklessly shooting JOEL SMITH, III in a harmful and 

offensive manner and thereby killing Decedent SMITH; 

c) Denying JOEL SMITH, III his substantive due process of law; and 

d) Denying JOEL SMITH, III his right to freedom from summary 

punishment/wrongful death. 

(Doc. 22, ¶ 26.) 

 Defendants argue that these allegations state a survivorship claim under § 1983, 

which Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue. (Doc. 24 at 3.) Plaintiffs appear to concede this 

point, and the Court agrees. 

 As a general rule, only the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated 

can sue to vindicate those rights. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 

1987). “In § 1983 actions, however, the survivors of an individual killed as a result of an 

officer’s excessive use of force may assert a Fourth Amendment claim on that 

individual's behalf if the relevant state’s law authorizes a survival action. The party 

seeking to bring a survival action bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular 

state’s law authorizes a survival action and that the plaintiff meets that state’s 

requirements for bringing a survival action.” Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 

Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs indicate that they are not asserting a 

survivorship claim. (Doc. 27 at 3.) Nor could they bring such a claim. Under Arizona’s 

survival statute, familial ties, without more, are insufficient to confer standing to act on 

behalf of a decedent’s estate. See AR.S. § 14–3110; see also Lacer v. Navajo County, 141 

Ariz. 396, 404, 687 P.2d 404, 412 (App.1983) (“only the personal representative” has 

standing “to bring” a survival action); A.R.S. § 14–3104 (“to acquire the powers and 

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undertake the duties and liabilities of a personal representative of a decedent, a person 

shall be appointed by order of the court or statement of the registrar”). 

In addition, as Defendants note, the § 1983 claim set forth at ¶ 26(a), alleging that 

an unidentified Defendant “directed” Deputy Ryles to use excessive force, fails as a 

matter of law. Respondeat superior claims are not cognizable under § 1983, and Plaintiffs 

failed to identify the subject Defendant or allege any facts showing any particular 

Defendant personally “directed” Deputy Ryle’s conduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that they meet Arizona’s 

requirements for bringing a survivorship civil rights claim. Moreover, they concede they 

are not bringing such a claim. Accordingly, the § 1983 survivorship claim alleging 

constitutional injuries to Smith III set forth at ¶ 26 is dismissed. The Court will also strike 

¶ 26 as impertinent and immaterial under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

B. Familial association claim 

Paragraph 27 of the SAC alleges that “Defendant Deputy TEHRAN RYLES 

deprived Plaintiffs VERONICA VACANERI and JOEL SMITH, JR of their 

constitutional interest in familial companionship and society of their child, JOEL 

SMITH, III.” (Doc. 22, ¶ 27.) Defendants contend that the allegations in the SAC fail to 

state a claim for a violation of the constitutional right of familial association. (Doc. 24 at 

5.) The Court agrees. 

 “The Ninth Circuit recognizes that a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in the companionship and society of his or her 

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child.” Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police et al., 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir.1991) (citations 

omitted). Police conduct violates a parent’s due process rights if it “shocks the 

conscience.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008); see County of 

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).

 In determining whether conduct shocks the conscience, the court first asks 

“whether the circumstances are such that actual deliberation [by the officer] is practical.” 

Porter, 546 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Moreland, 159 F.3d at 372). Where actual deliberation 

is practical, an officer’s “deliberate indifference” may suffice to shock the 

conscience. Id. “On the other hand, where a law enforcement officer makes a snap 

judgment because of an escalating situation, his conduct may only be found to shock the 

conscience if he acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement 

objectives.” Id. at 1140; see Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554–55 (9th Cir. 2010). A 

purpose to harm might be found, for example, where an officer uses force to bully a 

suspect or “get even.” Id.

 The factual allegations in the SAC do not meet the “shock the conscience” 

standard. The SAC alleges that: 

14. Defendant Deputy TEHRAN RYLES negligently used deadly force, 

violated protocol/policy, and exercised poor judgment, by using excessive 

force in a situation that did not require and/or justify the use of 

deadly/excessive force, and for wrongfully shooting JOEL SMITH, III. 

15. Defendant Deputy TEHRAN RYLES was negligent in not determining 

the use of any safe alternatives to the use of deadly force. In this case, there 

were safe alternatives. Deputy RYLES was negligent by using excessive 

force in a situation that did not require and/or justify the use of excessive 

force, and for Defendant RYLES’ wrongfully shooting, thereby 

demonstrating a reckless disregard for the safety of the JOEL SMITH, III, 

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which resulted in his wrongful death. 

(Doc. 22, ¶¶ 14, 15.) 

 These allegations suffer from several shortcomings. First, Plaintiffs allege that 

Deputy Ryles acted negligently. However, “the Constitution does not guarantee due care 

on the part of state officials; liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically 

beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. 

 The SAC offers no further support for a finding that Deputy Ryles’s conduct 

“shocked the conscience.”3

 The factual content provided by Plaintiffs fails to suggest, 

under the totality of the circumstances, that Deputy Ryles intended to inflict harm beyond 

that required for legitimate law enforcement reasons. The SAC lacks any non-conclusory 

allegations suggesting what Ryles’s motives actually were; lacks allegations that he did 

not believe he was responding to an apparent emergency; and lacks allegations that he 

was not responding to a pre-existing situation, but created an emergency which he then 

resolved with deadly force. See LaGrange v. Hatcher, No. 3:09-cv-681-LRH-WGC, 2013 

WL 2475793 at *2 (D.Nev. June 7, 2013) (citing Porter, 546 F.3d at 1141). In fact, 

Plaintiffs’ “allegations lack any context whatsoever, requiring facts outside the complaint 

to even identify what occurred and to make sense of Plaintiff[s’] disjointed allegations.” 

Id. 

 Plaintiffs contend that their allegations may be supported by future discovery. 

(Doc. 27 at 6.) This argument is faulty. A motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the 

 

3

 While the SAC contains minimal facts concerning the shooting incident, the Court concludes that the purpose to harm standard applies. Deputy Ryles faced an escalating situation involving an evasive suspect and was required to act quickly. See 

Porter, 546 F.3d at 1140. 

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sufficiency of the complaint; it is a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his 

entitlement to relief with more than conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Rutman 

Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 739 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the 

purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) “is to enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of 

complaints without subjecting themselves to discovery”). 

 The allegations actually pled in the SAC do not support a familial association 

claim. As noted, even if true the allegations do not show that Deputy Ryles shot Smith III 

with a purpose to harm him for reasons unrelated to legitimate law enforcement 

objectives. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendants’ motion (Doc. 24). The civil 

rights claim set forth in the SAC is dismissed and ¶ 26 is stricken. 

 Dated this 11th day of June, 2014. 

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