Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04149/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04149-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

PAUL WAHLSTROM PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 04-4149

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Factual and Procedural Background:

Paul Wahlstrom (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), has appealed the final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (hereinafter "Commissioner"), denying his

application for social security benefits pursuant to the Social Security Act (hereinafter "the

Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423. 

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ"),

which was conducted on September 12, 2003 (T. 216-237). On February 27, 2004, the ALJ

issued an unfavorable decision (T. 12-27). Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council. His

request for review was denied on September 4, 2004 (T. 4-6), thereby making the decision of

the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. From that decision, Plaintiff appeals (Doc.

#1).

Applicable Law:

Our role on review is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported

by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012

(8th Cir. 2000); see also Craig v. Apfel 212 F.3d 433, 435-436 (8th Cir. 2000). Substantial

evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the

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Commissioner's conclusion. See Haggard v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 1999). In

considering whether existing evidence is substantial, we consider evidence that detracts from

the Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it. See Prosch, 201 F.3d at

1012. We may not reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial evidence

exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome. See id. 

In assessing the substantiality of evidence, the Court must consider evidence that

detracts from the Commissioner’s decision, as well as evidence that supports it; the Court may

not, however, reverse the Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence would

have supported an opposite decision. Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

Even if this Court might have weighed the evidence differently, the decision of the ALJ may

not be reversed if there is enough evidence in the record to support the decision. Browning v.

Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992). It is well settled that proof of a disabling

impairment must be supported by at least some objective medical evidence. Marolf v. Sullivan,

981 F.2d 976, 978 (8th Cir.1992).

The Commissioner has established, by regulation, a five-step sequential evaluation for

determining whether an individual is disabled.

The first step involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If the claimant is so involved, benefits are denied; if

not, the evaluation goes to the next step.

Step two involves a determination, based solely on the medical evidence, of whether

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Id., § 416.920(c); see 20

C.F.R. § 416.926. If not, benefits are denied; if so, the evaluation proceeds to the next step.

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The third step involves a determination, again based solely on the medical evidence, of

whether the severe impairment(s) meets or equals a listed impairment which is presumed to be

disabling. Id., § 416.920(d). If so, benefits are awarded; if not, the evaluation continues.

Step four involves a determination of whether the claimant has sufficient residual

functional capacity, despite the impairment(s), to perform past work. Id., § 416.920(e). If so,

benefits are denied; if not, the evaluation continues.

The fifth step involves a determination of whether the claimant is able to perform other

substantial and gainful work within the economy, given the claimant’s age, education and work

experience. Id., § 404.920(f). If so, benefits are denied; if not, benefits are awarded.

In addition, whenever adult claimants allege mental impairment, the application of a

special technique must be followed at each level of the administrative review process. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.920a(a).

The Commissioner is then charged with rating the degree of functional limitation, and

applying the technique to evaluate mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(d). 

Application of the technique must be documented by the Commissioner at the ALJ hearing and

Appeals Council levels. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(e). 

Discussion:

Upon a review of the administrative record, the undersigned has discovered an omission

in the administrative record. Indeed, this matter is not ready for consideration and decision, in

that a crucial portion of the administrative record, a portion of the transcription of the

administrative hearing, during which the plaintiff is testifying, was omitted from the

administrative record (T. 232-234).

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It is impossible for the Court to determine if substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner’s decision since the transcript filed herein does not contain the entirety of the

plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing, which necessarily means that a critical portion of the

administrative transcript is missing, as is a critical portion of “the evidence upon which the

findings and decision complained of are based” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Until the entire, corrected

transcript is gathered and filed, the Court does not have the ability to enter a proper judgment

on the merits of this case.

The undersigned declines to remand this matter, sua sponte, for several reasons.

To remand this matter pursuant to sentence four, as opposed to sentence six, would be

inappropriate in light of the prejudicial effect such remand would have on the Plaintiff’s right of

redress before this Court. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held:

Section 405(g), which governs judicial review of final decisions made by the

Commissioner, authorizes only two types of remand orders: (1) those made

pursuant to sentence four, and (2) those made pursuant to sentence six. See

Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98-99, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78

(1991); Hafner v. Sullivan, 972 F.2d 249, 250-51 (8th Cir.1992). Sentence four,

by its terms, authorizes a court to enter "a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for

a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A sentence four remand is therefore proper

whenever the district court makes a substantive ruling regarding the correctness

of a decision of the Commissioner and remands the case in accordance with such

a ruling. See Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98, 111 S.Ct. 2157.

Sentence six, in contrast, authorizes a remand in only two limited

situations: (1) where the Commissioner requests a remand before

answering the complaint of a claimant seeking reversal of an administrative

ruling, or (2) where new and material evidence is adduced that was for good

cause not presented during the administrative proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. §

405(g); Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297 n. 2, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d

239 (1993); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.1993). The first of

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these situations distinguishes a sentence six remand from a sentence four remand

based on timing, while the second situation does so based on substance. See

Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 110 L.Ed.2d 563

(1990) (noting that sentence six authorizes an "entirely different kind of remand"

than sentence four). This substantive distinction insures that a remand pursuant

to the second part of sentence six concerns only new and material evidence and

"does not rule in any way as to the correctness of the administrative proceeding,"

as does a sentence four remand. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98, 111 S.Ct. 2157; see

Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 626, 110 S.Ct. 2658.

Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir.2000) (emphasis supplied). 

The statute provides, in its pertinent part:

Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in

controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced

within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within

such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Potentially, if the matter was remanded pursuant to sentence four, without direction to

Commissioner to supplement the record and issue a new decision, any subsequent effort by

plaintiff to commence a new civil action seeking judicial review of the denial of benefits would

be barred. 

A sentence six remand would also be inappropriate in light of the filing of the

Commissioner’s answer on January 7, 2005 (Doc. #4).

The Court has been unable to find any clear statutory direction for such a circumstance

as this, where remand would technically not fit the definition/requirements of sentence six, and

where, if done pursuant to sentence four, it would ultimately result in the plaintiff being timebarred from seeking judicial review, once the record has been supplemented. 

Therefore, the undersigned directs the Commissioner to supplement or reconstruct the

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missing portion of the transcript, within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 60 days. 

This matter will be administratively terminated pending the submission of the supplemental

record by the Commissioner. In the event the Commissioner is unable to produce a

supplemental transcript containing the missing portion of the administrative transcript, the

Commissioner shall notify the Court of the reasons for her inability to supplement the record by

means of filing an appropriate motion or notice.

Conclusion:

We conclude that the Commissioner shall supplement the record as outlined above,

within a reasonable period of time. For such purposes, a reasonable period of time shall be 60

days. Further, in the event the Commissioner is unable to supplement or reconstruct the

administrative record, she is directed to notify the Court, via motion or notice, of her inability

to comply with the requirements of this opinion. This matter should be and hereby is

administratively terminated to allow the Commissioner a reasonable period of time to locate or

reconstruct the missing portion of the administrative record. Should the Commissioner be

unable to supplement the record as directed, within the time constraints set forth in the Court’s

Order so directing, the Court will then entertain an appropriate motion to remand. 

ENTERED this 22 day of November, 2005. nd

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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