Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01846/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01846-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD TUCKER,

CDCR #Ak-1434,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 

DANIEL PARAMO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01846-JLS-PCL

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(ECF No. 16); AND 

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND 

AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND 1915A(b)(1)

Gerald Tucker, (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, 

has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 14.)

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if a prisoner, like Plaintiff, is granted 

leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments,” see 

Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his action 

is ultimately dismissed, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 

a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund 

account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account 

for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six 

months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects 

subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in 

which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until 

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013, must pay 

an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, 

District Court Misc. Fee Schedule) (eff. May 1, 2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee 

is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust 

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2. Andrews, 

398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statement and it shows 

that he has a current available balance of zero. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that 

“[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil 

action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by 

which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based 

solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 

ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 14) and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 

balance of the filing fees mandated will be collected by the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant 

to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint also requires a 

pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Rule 8

Plaintiff’s Complaint is difficult to decipher as many of the claims Plaintiff is 

attempting to allege are disjointed and incomprehensible. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure provides that in order to state a claim for relief in a pleading it must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) & (2). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint falls short

of complying with Rule 8.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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B. Plaintiff’s Duplicative claims

While not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to be alleging that the District Attorney 

for Fresno County, along with various deputy district attorneys, detectives with the 

Fresno Police Department and probation officers conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his 

constitutional rights. (See Compl., at 2.) 

These allegations are duplicative of an action Plaintiff previously filed in 2014 and 

2015. See Tucker v. Cline, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 1:13-cv-00400-AWI-BAM; 

Tucker v. Cline, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 1:15-cv-00857-AWI-BAM. A court 

“‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. 

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 

F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 

1915A(b)(1) if it “merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United 

States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) 

(citations and internal quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff is already litigating these 

claims in the above referenced Eastern District actions, the Court DISMISSES these 

claims as duplicative pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)(1). See Cato, 70 

F.3d at 1105 n.2; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1.

C. Freedom of Association

Again, while Plaintiff’s Complaint is not entirely clear, he has attached a letter that 

he purportedly wrote to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 2015 in which he 

complains of his brother and sister-in-law being removed from his list of approved 

visitors. (See Compl., at 5–6.) It is not clear at which prison these alleged events took 

place. 

Incarceration by necessity restricts the scope of a prisoner’s associational rights. 

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131–32 (2003); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 

(9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, a regulation that impinges on an inmate’s First Amendment 

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rights “is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. 

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 526 (2006). 

Thus, in order to state a First Amendment freedom of association claim, Plaintiff 

must plead facts sufficient to show how or why the removal of certain individuals from 

his approved visitor list do not serve any legitimate penological interest. See Turner, 482 

U.S. at 89–90. 

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to include any factual content to show that that 

ban on certain visitors serves no legitimate penological purpose. Turner, 482 U.S at 89; 

see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, even if Plaintiff did allege prison officials 

decision to remove certain family members from his approved visitor list served no 

legitimate penological purpose, courts nevertheless “accord substantial deference to the 

professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for 

defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most 

appropriate means to accomplish them,” Overton, 539 U.S. at 132, and “[t]he burden . . .

is not on the State to prove the validity of [a] prison regulation[] but on the prisoner to 

disprove it.” Id. (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 

119, 128 (1977)). 

Thus, because Plaintiff offers no “factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference” that any specific prison official was in violation of his First 

Amendment rights in the absence of any legitimate penological purpose, see Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Turner, 482 U.S at 89, the Court finds these claims subject to sua sponte 

dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-

27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

D. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff has now been provided with notice of his Complaint’s 

deficiencies, the Court will grant him leave to amend. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 

1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint 

without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely 

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clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 14).

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to 

twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND

NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety as frivolous and for failing 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave 

from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself 

without reference to his original pleading, and must comply with S.D. CAL. CIVLR 8.2(a). 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

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5. The Clerk of Court IS DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a copy of a court 

approved form § 1983 complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2017

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