Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01227/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01227-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

---

-1- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DONNA STANLEY, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; and 

ALEXANDER BRUST, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

ORDER DENYING AS MOOT 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

EXCLUDE EXPERT MEDICAL 

OPINION TESTIMONY BY 

PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT 

[Doc. No. 24] 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR 

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[Doc. No. 25]

On May 22, 2016, Plaintiff Donna Stanley (“Plaintiff”) filed her Complaint against 

individual Defendants Alexander Brust and Roland Garza1

, and the County of San Diego 

(“County”). See Doc. No. 1 (hereinafter “Complaint”). Plaintiff alleges claims for: (1) 

excessive force in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) 

Negligence; (3) Battery; and (4) and a violation of her rights under California Civil Code 

                                               

1

 On August 28, 2017, pursuant to the parties’ joint motion to dismiss, the Court dismissed 

Defendant Garza from the instant action with prejudice. See Doc. No. 23. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 25
 -2- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

§ 52.1.2

 See id. Defendants Brust and the County (collectively, “Defendants”) move for 

summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims, or, in the alternative, partial summary 

judgment. See Doc. No. 25. Plaintiff filed an opposition, to which Defendants replied. 

See Doc. Nos. 27, 32. Defendants also filed a Daubert motion, and seek to exclude 

testimony from Plaintiff’s police practices and procedures expert, Mr. Smith, regarding 

the “medical orthopedic causation of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries that she attributes to 

Deputy Brust.” Doc. No. 24-1 at 1. Plaintiff filed an opposition, to which Defendants 

replied. See Doc. Nos. 28, 31. 

The Court found the matters suitable for determination on the papers and without 

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ Daubert motion (Doc. No. 24), and DENIES

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, partial summary 

judgment (Doc. No. 25). 

BACKGROUND3

This action arises out of events occurring on July 2, 2015, when Defendant Brust, a 

San Diego County Sherriff’s deputy, arrived with several other deputies to the residence 

of Plaintiff’s adult son, Donald Stanley. On that day, Deputy Brust and the other deputies 

attempted to arrest Mr. Stanley pursuant to a domestic violence arrest warrant. When the 

deputies arrived, Mr. Stanley walked into his house and refused to let the deputies into 

his house without a warrant. The deputies did not have a copy of the warrant with them. 

A struggle between Mr. Stanley and the deputies ensued through a broken window of the 

                                               

2

 Plaintiff brings her excessive force cause of action solely against Defendant Brust. Plaintiff 

brings the remaining causes of action against both Defendant Brust and the County of San Diego. See 

Complaint. 

3

 These material facts are taken from the parties’ separate statements of undisputed facts and 

pertinent cited exhibits. The Court notes that the overwhelming majority of facts are disputed by the 

parties. Disputed material facts are discussed in further detail where relevant to the Court’s analysis as it 

relates to a specific cause of action. Facts that are immaterial for purposes of resolving the current 

motion are not included in this recitation. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 25
 -3- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

residence, leading one deputy to pepper spray Mr. Stanley through the window. 

Once inside the residence, Mr. Stanley telephoned Plaintiff, his mother, who was 

seventy-three years old at the time, to inform her of the situation.4

 Plaintiff decided to 

drive to the property to inquire about what was going on. Upon arrival, Plaintiff 

observed at least three marked police vehicles in front of Mr. Stanley’s home, and 

approximately five to seven deputies standing near a front window of the residence. 

Plaintiff parked her car in the driveway, and exited the vehicle. 

The parties dispute what happened next. Plaintiff claims that she took several 

steps toward the house, at a slow pace, when Deputy Brust grabbed Plaintiff’s right wrist. 

Deputy Brust contends that he instructed Plaintiff to stay back from the residence. 

Deputy Garza assisted Deputy Brust, and grabbed Plaintiff’s left arm. Defendants claim 

that Deputy Garza informed Plaintiff that she needed to stay back for safety reasons. 

Plaintiff claims that during this time, neither deputy said anything to her or ordered her to 

do anything. 

Deputies Brust and Garza placed Plaintiff’s hands behind her back in rear wrist 

locks and escorted Plaintiff away from the residence, near the sidewalk. Plaintiff asserts 

that during this time, Deputy Brust pulled her around, twisting her right arm and wrist, 

causing her severe pain. Once the deputies walked Plaintiff away from the residence, 

Plaintiff claims Deputy Garza removed his grip on her left hand, while Deputy Brust 

“yanked [Plaintiff’s] right hand and arm upward behind her with great force.” Doc. No. 

27-3 (hereinafter “Stanley Decl.”) ¶ 10. Plaintiff asserts she was being cooperative at the 

time, and did not say or do anything “resistive or threatening.” Id. ¶ 9. The deputies did 

not attempt to handcuff Plaintiff, nor did the deputies ever indicate that Plaintiff was 

under arrest. Sergeant Scroggins then approached Plaintiff to speak with her, and Deputy 

Brust released his grip on Plaintiff’s arm. 

With regards to Mr. Stanley, rather than forcing entry into the residence, the 

                                               

4

 Plaintiff owns the duplex that Mr. Stanley lives in. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 25
 -4- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

deputies elected to disengage, depart from the scene, and wait for a more opportune time 

and place to make the arrest. 

When Plaintiff returned to her home, she claims she felt pain in her right wrist, 

arm, and shoulder. Plaintiff’s doctor recommended an MRI of Plaintiff’s shoulder. The 

MRI was performed on September 1, 2015, and revealed that Plaintiff had a torn rotator 

cuff. Plaintiff’s primary doctor then referred Plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. 

Daniel Keefe, who diagnosed Plaintiff’s injury as a “complete tear and retraction of the 

supraspinatus tendon” in Plaintiff’s right shoulder. Doc. No. 27-4 (hereinafter “Dr. Keefe 

Decl.”), Exh. 1. Plaintiff eventually elected to undergo surgery on her shoulder, which 

Dr. Keefe performed on February 26, 2016. The surgery “repaired the full thickness tear 

of the supraspinatus tendon in [Plaintiff’s] right shoulder.” Dr. Keefe Decl. ¶ 4. 

As a result of Plaintiff’s interaction with Deputy Brust, Plaintiff commenced the 

instant action asserting claims of excessive force, negligence, battery, and violations of 

California Civil Code § 52.1. See Complaint. 

DEFENDANTS’ DAUBERT MOTION

Defendants move to exclude testimony by Plaintiff’s police practices-andprocedures expert, Mr. Jack Smith, “regarding Plaintiff’s alleged orthopedic condition, 

medical diagnosis, prognosis, or causation with respect to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.” 

Doc. No. 24-1 at 4. Defendants seek to exclude such testimony because Mr. Smith is not 

a doctor, has no formal medical training, and has not reviewed Plaintiff’s medical 

records. See id.

1. Legal Standard 

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that expert opinion evidence is 

admissible if: “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the 

testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable 

principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods 

to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained: 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 25
 -5- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Under Daubert and its progeny, including Daubert II, a district court’s 

inquiry into admissibility is a flexible one. Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis 

Budget Grp., Inc., 738 F.3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 2013). In evaluating proffered 

expert testimony, the trial court is “a gatekeeper, not a fact finder.” Primiano 

v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). 

“[T]he trial court must assure that the expert testimony ‘both rests on a 

reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’” Id. at 564 (quoting 

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597). “Expert opinion testimony is relevant if the 

knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry. And 

it is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the 

knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.” Id. at 565 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “Shaky but admissible evidence is to be 

attacked by cross examination, contrary evidence, and attention to the 

burden of proof, not exclusion.” Id. at 564 (citation omitted). The judge is 

“supposed to screen the jury from unreliable nonsense opinions, but not 

exclude opinions merely because they are impeachable.” Alaska Rent-A-Car, 

738 F.3d at 969. Simply put, “[t]he district court is not tasked with deciding 

whether the expert is right or wrong, just whether his testimony has 

substance such that it would be helpful to a jury.” Id. at 969-70. 

City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). “Challenges 

that go to the weight of the evidence are within the province of a fact finder, not a trial 

court judge. A district court should not make credibility determinations that are reserved 

for the jury.” Id. at 1044. 

2. Analysis 

Defendants assert that they “anticipate” that Plaintiff will attempt to solicit opinion 

testimony from Mr. Smith regarding the “medical orthopedic causation of Plaintiff’s 

alleged injuries that she attributes to Deputy Brust.” Doc. No. 24-1 at 1. Notably, 

Defendants do not dispute Mr. Smith’s qualifications as an expert in the field of police 

practices and procedures, nor do Defendants take issue with Mr. Smith’s opinions 

regarding the tactics Deputy Brust used during his interaction with Plaintiff. Rather, 

Defendants seek to preclude Mr. Smith from offering any testimony “regarding Plaintiff’s 

orthopedic condition, medical diagnosis, prognosis, or causation with respect to 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 25
 -6- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s alleged shoulder injury.” Doc. No. 31 at 3. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts 

Defendants’ motion is moot because “Plaintiff does not intend to elicit any medical 

opinions from Mr. Smith.” Doc. No. 28 at 2. 

At his deposition, Mr. Smith testified that he “ha[s] an opinion” pertaining to what 

caused Plaintiff’s shoulder injury. Doc. No. 24-2 at 9. However, based upon the excerpts 

of Mr. Smith’s deposition testimony provided by Defendants, Mr. Smith did not actually 

state his opinion. When questioned by defense counsel about Plaintiff’s injury, Mr. 

Smith testified as follows: 

A: Let’s be clear. I’m not a medical doctor. I’m not giving you a medical 

opinion. I’m giving you an opinion based upon my expertise in police 

practices and procedures and being a person who has written policies and 

procedures concerning use of force and has examined all the issues that can 

occur, including injury by the use of certain police holds. That’s my basis 

for my opinion. 

Q: Okay. So you’re providing an opinion regarding the diagnosis of 

physical injury? 

A: No. That’s up to - - that’s a medical opinion. I’m not giving that. 

*** 

Q: Sir, that’s a yes-or-no response. Are you offering a medical opinion 

about the prognosis of the injury? 

A: In this case, I’m not offering any medical opinion. 

Q: Okay. And you would agree you are not qualified to render a medical 

opinion; correct? 

A: I would agree. 

Doc. No. 24-2 at 11-12.5

Here, the Court finds that Defendants’ Daubert motion is moot for several reasons. 

                                               

5

 All citations to this document refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 25
 -7- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

First, Defendants do not challenge Mr. Smith’s qualifications to testify as an expert in the 

field of police practices and procedures, and how those practices and procedures relate to 

the case at bar. Second, Defendants repeatedly reference “the medical opinions [Mr. 

Smith] offered during his deposition,” yet the cited excerpts reveal Mr. Smith did not 

actually state his opinion about what caused Plaintiff’s injury. Doc. No. 31 at 1. Third, 

Plaintiff concedes that Mr. Smith did not include any medical opinions in his Rule 26 

report, and agrees that he is not qualified to render a medical opinion. Finally, at his 

deposition, Mr. Smith testified that he is “not offering any medical opinion” about 

Plaintiff’s shoulder injury. Doc. No. 24-2 at 12. The Court “cannot exclude testimony 

that [Mr. Smith] does not intend to offer[.]” D’Agnese v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 2013 

WL 321773, at *17 (D. Az. Jan. 28, 2013); see also Wood v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 

2015 WL 5638040, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 24, 2015) (denying as moot the defendant’s 

Daubert motion to the extent the motion addressed an opinion by the expert that the 

expert did not intend to offer). Accordingly, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ 

Daubert motion.6

 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants move for summary judgment on all four of Plaintiff’s causes of action. 

See Doc. No. 25-1. Alternatively, in the event the Court denies Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment, Defendants move for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 

rotator cuff damage claim. See id. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that summary 

judgment is inappropriate because “[t]his case presents two contradictory versions of the 

key facts.” Doc. No. 27 at 1. The Court addresses Defendants’ arguments in turn. 

1. Legal Standard 

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or 

the part of each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought. The court 

                                               

6

 The Court notes that Defendants can raise any additional issues pertaining to Mr. Smith’s 

anticipated testimony via a motion in limine, if necessary. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 25
 -8- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing 

the basis of its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, pleadings, and 

discovery that demonstrate absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party has “the burden of showing the 

absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and for these purposes the material it 

lodged must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Adickes v. S. 

H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). A fact is material if it could affect the 

outcome of the suit under applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248-49 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. 

The party opposing summary judgment cannot “‘rest upon the mere allegations or 

denials of [its] pleading’ but must instead produce evidence that ‘sets forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 

515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 827 (2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e)). 

2. Analysis 

a. 42 U.S.C. § 19837—Excessive Force Claim against Deputy Brust and 

Qualified Immunity 

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment against Deputy Brust on two grounds. First, 

                                               

7

 “Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of 

state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 

(9th Cir. 2001). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by 

a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 

2012). The parties do not dispute the state actor prong. As such, the Court’s analysis focuses on the 

first prong—whether Plaintiff suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 25
 -9- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants assert that there are no material factual disputes as to whether the force used 

against Plaintiff was reasonable. Second, even if a factual dispute exists as to the amount 

of force used against Plaintiff, Defendants contend that Deputy Brust is entitled to 

qualified immunity. 

i. Excessive Force 

A court must analyze a plaintiff’s claim for excessive force under the Fourth 

Amendment’s test for reasonableness. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). 

Accordingly, a court must consider whether the officer’s actions are “objectively 

reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officers at the time. 

Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. 

Ct. 1292 (2014). To assess whether an officer’s actions were objectively reasonable, a 

court must weigh “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, 

the reasonableness standard requires courts “to balance the amount of force applied 

against the need for that force.” Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In doing so, a court should consider “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the 

suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether 

the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to escape.” Maxwell v. Cnty. of San 

Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “Because 

this inquiry is fact-sensitive, summary judgment should be granted sparingly.” Id.

1. Defendants’ Version of the Facts 

To meet their initial summary judgment burden under Rule 56, Defendants offer 

excerpts from the depositions of Deputies Brust, Ferguson, Meyers, Garza, and Sergeant 

Scroggins, all of whom were on duty on July 2, 2015, and present at Mr. Stanley’s 

residence. Defendants also offer excerpts of Plaintiff’s deposition and Dr. James Bried’s 

independent medical evaluation report dated June 5, 2017. 

According to Deputy Brust on the day in question, Plaintiff arrived at the scene and 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 25
 -10- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was upset about the broken window and walked quickly toward the house. See Doc. No. 

25-3 at 18-19.8

 Deputy Garza recalls Plaintiff was “yelling at all of us demanding [to 

know] what was going on with her son.” Id. at 89. Deputy Brust informed Plaintiff that 

she “need[ed] to stay back,” and that she “can’t go up there.” Id. at 19. Deputy Garza 

“[t]old [Plaintiff] to stay back, the situation is still unstable, [and] it’s not safe for her to 

be this close.” Id. at 89. Plaintiff did not stop walking, so Deputy Brust once more told 

Plaintiff to stop. Plaintiff did not stop, however, and “trie[d] to go past [Deputy Brust] 

and [Deputy Brust] grab[bed] onto her right wrist.” Id. at 20. Deputy Garza then 

grabbed on to Plaintiff’s left wrist. Deputies Brust and Garza moved Plaintiff’s arms 

behind her back, placing her in a “wrist rear lock” hold. Id. at 89. Deputy Garza 

indicates Plaintiff was in the rear wrist lock position for “[p]robably less than 20 

seconds[.]” Id. at 91. 

 Deputies Brust and Garza escorted Plaintiff to the end of the driveway, near the 

street. The deputies “[l]et go of her arms” because Plaintiff “was being compliant at that 

point.” Id. at 24. Deputy Brust did not place handcuffs on Plaintiff; the deputies’ main 

“goal was just to keep her away from the front of the house.” Id. at 25. Sergeant 

Scroggins then spoke with Plaintiff. 

2. Plaintiff’s Version of the Facts 

Plaintiff, however, paints a different picture of the events that transpired on July 2, 

2015. In support of her opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 

Plaintiff offers the declarations of herself, Dr. Keefe, Plaintiff’s police practices and 

procedures expert, Mr. Smith, and one of Plaintiff’s attorneys, Mr. Joseph McMullen. 

Plaintiff also submits various excerpts of her own deposition testimony, in addition to 

that of Deputies Brust, Garza, Sergeant Scroggins, and Defendants’ use-of-force expert, 

Marc A. Fox. 

According to Plaintiff, on the day in question her son called her at approximately 

                                               

8

 Citations to this document refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 25
 -11- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12:00 p.m. and indicated that several officers arrived at his residence. Mr. Stanley asked 

that Plaintiff come to the house. When Plaintiff arrived, she parked in the driveway and 

observed “five to seven” deputies standing in front of the house. Doc. No. 27-12 at 13.9

 

Plaintiff does not recall whether any deputy said anything to her before Deputies Brust 

and Garza grabbed her wrists. Nor does Plaintiff recall a deputy saying anything to her 

after taking hold of her wrists. See id. at 17-18. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that she 

did not yell, scream, or demand to know what was going on once she arrived at her son’s 

house. See id. at 15. 

 The deputies began to escort Plaintiff down the driveway and away from the 

house. During this time Deputy Brust was “twisting” Plaintiff’s wrist. Id. at 21. Plaintiff 

winced, stating “Ow, ow. You’re hurting me. You’re hurting me.” Id. Plaintiff claims 

Deputy Brust continued “twisting my arm anyway, causing severe pain in my wrist and 

arm.” Stanley Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff did not resist the deputies while they held her wrists. 

See id. ¶¶ 7-9. The deputies “did not say [Plaintiff] was under arrest or try to handcuff 

[Plaintiff].” Id. ¶ 9. 

Once the deputies and Plaintiff reached the bottom of the driveway, near the rear of 

Plaintiff’s parked car, the deputy who was holding on to Plaintiff’s left arm released his 

grip (Doc. No. 27-12 at 25), while the deputy who was holding on to Plaintiff’s right arm 

and “took [her] arm and pulled it up.” (Id. at 23). Plaintiff elaborates, noting the deputy 

who held her right wrist, “yanked [her arm] up” behind her back with great force. Id. at 

26-27. Plaintiff claims “the pain was so great that I began to cry.” Stanley Decl. ¶ 10. 

Sergeant Scroggins approached and Deputy Brust “let go.” Doc. No. 27-12 at 27. 

“Several times after this the sergeant and possibly other deputies asked if I wanted to be 

taken to the hospital, but I declined and told them I would go to my own doctor.” Stanley 

Decl. ¶ 11. 

/ / / 

                                               

9

 Citations to this document refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 25
 -12- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Whether Deputy Brust’s Use of Force was Objectively 

Reasonable 

As set forth in detail above, the parties have submitted contradicting evidence 

regarding the events surrounding Deputy Brust’s use of force against Plaintiff on July 2, 

2015. In resolving summary judgment motions, the Court may neither make credibility 

determinations nor weigh the evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see Earp v. 

Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Summary judgment is an inappropriate 

vehicle for resolving claims that depend on credibility determinations.”). Thus, the Court 

must determine whether construing the evidence in favor of Plaintiff, a reasonable jury 

could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer’s use of force was 

objectively unreasonable. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made the requisite showing. According to 

Plaintiff, when she walked toward her son’s residence, Deputies Brust and Garza came to 

her and grabbed her wrists. Plaintiff contends that she did not try to push past Deputy 

Brust, nor did Plaintiff say or yell anything. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that she does not 

recall Deputies Brust and Garza saying anything to her prior to taking hold of her wrists. 

Plaintiff did not resist the deputies in any way, and walked peacefully toward the end of 

the driveway with the deputies. While the deputies escorted Plaintiff to the end of the 

driveway, Deputy Brust twisted Plaintiff’s arm. Plaintiff repeatedly cried out in pain. 

During this time, Plaintiff had committed no crime, nor was she under arrest. When 

Deputies Brust and Garza reached the end of the driveway with Plaintiff, Deputy Garza 

removed his hold on Plaintiff’s left wrist. Deputy Brust then “yanked” Plaintiff’s arm up 

behind her. There was no indication that Plaintiff posed an immediate safety threat. See 

Erath, 342 F.3d at 1061. In fact, Deputy Garza had already released his hold on 

Plaintiff’s left wrist, and Deputy Brust admits Plaintiff “was being compliant at that 

point.” Doc. No. 25-3 at 24. 

In construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the need for force 

“was minimal at best,” and a reasonable jury could find that Deputy Brust used an 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 25
 -13- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unreasonable amount of force in twisting and yanking Plaintiff’s right arm. Erath, 342 

F.3d at 1061; see also Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2008) (“If a reasonable 

person could side with the plaintiff’s interpretation of events, the issue must survive for 

trial.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to 

whether Deputy Brust’s use of force was objectively reasonable. See Avina v. United 

States, 681 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (“summary judgment or judgmnent as a 

matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.”); Chew v. Gates, 27 

F.3d 1432, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hether a particular use of force was reasonable is 

rarely determinable as a matter of law.”). 

ii. Qualified Immunity 

Defendants assert that even if a material fact exists regarding Deputy Brust’s use of 

force against Plaintiff, Deputy Brust is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. “The 

defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary 

functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.” Long v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 511 F.3d 901, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(internal citations omitted). The underlying purpose of this defense is “to strike a balance 

between the competing need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise 

power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and 

liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 

440 (9th Cir. 2011). 

To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must 

conduct a two-part inquiry. First, the Court considers whether the facts, taken in the light 

most favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrate that the officers’ actions violated the plaintiff’s 

constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). If so, the Court must 

determine whether the constitutional right was “clearly established in light of the specific 

context of the case” at the time of the events in question. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 440 

(internal citation omitted). “For a right to be clearly established, case law must ordinarily 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 25
 -14- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

have been earlier developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it 

obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant’s place, that what he is 

doing violates federal law.” Shafer v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (explaining that “existing 

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate . . . 

[because] immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

 Here, the Court finds that Deputy Brust is not entitled to qualified immunity as to 

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. As discussed in the previous section, upon construing 

the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Deputy 

Brust used an unreasonable amount of force in restraining Plaintiff, thereby violating 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. As such, the Court turns to whether Plaintiff’s 

constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the events, “such that a 

reasonable officer would have understood his conduct to be unlawful in that situation.” 

Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Torres v. City of Madera, 

648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

 Determining whether a right was clearly established at the time of the incident 

“requires two separate determinations: (1) whether the law governing the conduct at issue 

was clearly established and (2) whether the facts as alleged could support a reasonable 

belief that the conduct in question conformed to the established law.” Green v. City and 

Cnty. of S.F., 751 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014). “Both are questions of law to be 

determined by the court in the absence of genuine issues of material fact.” Id. 

 The first element is satisfied as a matter of law. At the time in question, the law 

was clear that use of force where either no force or minimal force is necessary violates 

that person’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from force. See, e.g., Erath, 342 F.3d at 

1061 (concluding “it was objectively unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment for [the officer] to grab Bybee by the arms, throw her to the ground, and 

twist her arms while handcuffing her” where Bybee did not pose a safety risk and made 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 25
 -15- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

no attempt to leave the property); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(noting that where there is no need for force, an individual’s use of force is objectively 

unreasonable); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he officers used 

excess force on Hansen by unreasonably injuring her wrist and arm as they handcuffed 

her.”).10 Thus, the remaining inquiry is whether, under the facts alleged, Deputy Brust 

could have reasonably believed that the force used was lawful under the circumstances. 

See Green, 751 F.3d at 1052 (citing Torres, 648 F.3d at 1127). 

Regarding the second inquiry, according to Deputy Brust, Plaintiff failed to 

comply with the deputies’ verbal commands and tried to push past them. See Doc. No. 

25-3 at 20. As a result, Deputies Brust and Garza each grabbed one of Plaintiff’s arms, 

placed them behind her back in rear wrist locks, escorted Plaintiff away from the 

residence to a safe location, and let go of Plaintiff. See id. at 20-24. However, there are 

disputed material facts here as to whether Plaintiff was, in fact, resisting the deputies’ 

verbal commands or whether she tried to push past the deputies. Moreover, there is 

conflicting evidence regarding how much force was actually used against Plaintiff. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Deputy Brust twisted her right wrist and “yanked” her right 

arm up behind her back. See Stanley Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10. Therefore, these material factual 

disputes “preclude a determination as to qualified immunity at the summary judgment 

stage.” Green, 751 F.3d at 1052. 

In sum, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether 

Deputy Brust’s use of force was objectively reasonable. As such, summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is inappropriate. The same factual disputes that preclude 

                                               

10 Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Shafer v. Padilla, 868 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2017) is 

inapposite. The Ninth Circuit in Shafer held the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the 

cases the plaintiff cited to as “clearly established law” did not involve “a challenging environment or an 

act of physical resistance or obstruction by the arrestee” when the “officer has probable cause to arrest” 

the individual for committing a crime of violence. Id. at 1117-18. Here, however, Plaintiff was not 

suspected of committing any crime, Plaintiff was never arrested, and Plaintiff did not present any threat 

to Deputy Brust. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 25
 -16- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim also preclude summary judgment 

on a qualified immunity defense. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. 

b. State Law Claims 

In her remaining causes of action, Plaintiff alleges claims under California state 

law against both Deputy Brust and the County for negligence, battery, and a violation of 

California Civil Code § 52.1. Plaintiff’s state law causes of action all stem from the same 

facts as her Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. With respect to the County, under 

federal law, “the County cannot be held vicariously liable for its deputies’ acts of 

excessive force.” Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2013). The County 

may only be held liable if it adopted an unconstitutional policy or custom that resulted in 

the excessive force. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). 

California, however, has rejected the Monell rule and imposes liability on counties under 

the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of county employees; it grants immunity to 

counties “only where the public employee would also be immune.” Robinson v. Solano 

Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2)). “Thus, 

should [plaintiff] prevail on her excessive force claim, liability could extend to the 

County.” Cameron, 713 F.3d at 1023-24. The Court addresses Plaintiff’s remaining 

causes of action in turn. 

i. Negligence Claim against Deputy Brust and County 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligence stems from the same facts as her 

Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Plaintiff contends Deputy Brust and the 

County are liable because Deputy Brust was “negligent and breached [his] duty of care 

owed to Plaintiff,” thereby injuring Plaintiff. Complaint ¶ 21. Defendants argue that 

under California law, Deputy Brust’s conduct is privileged, “which therefore precludes 

tort liability even for negligence against Defendants.” Doc. No. 25-1 at 10. In essence, 

Defendants assert that Deputy Brust acted reasonably; thus, Plaintiff’s negligence claim 

fails. See id.

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 25
 -17- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“In order to prove facts sufficient to support a finding of negligence, a plaintiff 

must show that the defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and 

that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Hayes v. Cnty. 

of San Diego, 305 P.3d 252, 255 (Cal. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “Negligence claims stemming from allegations of excessive force by a police 

officer are . . . analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.” 

Carter v. City of Carlsbad, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Atkinson 

v. Cnty. of Tulare, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1211 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that negligence is 

“measured by the same reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.”)). Police 

officers have a duty to act reasonably when using force, which “is determined in light of 

the totality of circumstances.” Id. Thus, in order to succeed on her negligence claim, 

Plaintiff “must show that [Deputy Brust] acted unreasonably and that the unreasonable 

behavior harmed” her. Price v. Cnty. of San Diego, 990 F. Supp. 1230, 1245 (S.D. Cal. 

1998). 

Here, as set forth above, “[t]here are material factual disputes regarding the 

reasonableness” of Deputy Brust’s actions. Atkinson, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1211. 

Accepting Plaintiff’s version of the facts as true, Deputy Brust is not entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim. As such, the County is similarly not entitled to 

summary judgment. See Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1016; see also Carter, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 

1165 (“Because Officer Merritt is not immune from Carter’s negligence claim, neither is 

the City.”). 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligence against Deputy Brust and the County. 

ii. Battery Claim against Deputy Brust and County 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action for battery is also measured by the same 

reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. See Atkinson, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 

1211 (noting that battery is “measured by the same reasonableness standard of the Fourth 

Amendment.”). Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Brust committed a battery by using 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 25
 -18- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

excessive force upon her. See Complaint ¶ 23. Defendant argues that “Deputy Brust’s 

use of force complied with the Fourth Amendment reasonable standard;” thus, Plaintiff’s 

battery claim fails as a matter of law. Doc. No. 25-1 at 6. In California, an “arresting 

officer may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect a lawful arrest.” Ting v. 

United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1514 (9th Cir. 1991). However, a police officer commits 

battery when he uses excessive force. See Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 n.6 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Here, for the reasons set forth above, a jury could find that Deputy Brust’s use of 

force in allegedly twisting Plaintiff’s wrist and pushing Plaintiff’s arm up behind her 

back was unreasonable and resulted in injury to Plaintiff. Thus, Deputy Brust is not 

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s battery claim. Moreover, because a county is 

immune “only where the public employee would also be immune,” the County is 

similarly not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s battery claim. Robinson, 278 

F.3d at 1016; see also Nelson v. City of Davis, 709 F. Supp. 2d 978, 992 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 

(“Because the same standards apply to both state law assault and battery and Section 

1983 claims premised on constitutionally prohibited excessive force, the fact that 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims under the Fourth Amendment survive summary judgment also 

mandates that the assault and battery claims similarly survive.”). 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action for battery against Deputy Brust and the County. 

iii. California Civil Code 52.1 Claim against Deputy Brust and County 

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges that Defendants are liable under California 

Civil Code § 52.1 (the “Bane Act”) for violations of her federal constitutional rights and 

rights protected by California law. See Complaint ¶ 27. Defendants argue that “Deputy 

Brust’s conduct in responding to Plaintiff’s obstructionist behavior cannot in and of itself 

also comprise any alleged constitutional inference that can give rise to section 52.1 

liability; rather, the alleged conduct must be shown to have been committed for the 

purpose of interfering with some other constitutional right[.]” Doc. No. 25-1 at 11-12. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 25
 -19- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Section 52.1 permits an individual to bring a civil action for interference with his 

rights under the United States or California Constitutions by threats, intimidation, or 

coercion.” Carter, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 (citing Venegas v. Cnty. of L.A., 63 Cal. Rptr. 

3d 741, 747-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). “Section 52.1 does not provide any substantive 

protections; instead, it enables individuals to sue for damages as a result of constitutional 

violations.” Reynolds v. Cnty. of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1996), 

overruled on other grounds by Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 

1997). “When a § 52.1 claim is premised on the violation of a constitutional right, the 

court must look to the elements of the constitutional claim to determine whether the § 

52.1 claim is meritorious.” Aquino v. Cnty. of Monterey Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2016 WL 

5946867, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016), aff’d in part 698 F. App’x 901 (9th Cir. 

2017). 

Here, Plaintiff’s § 52.1 claim is premised on Deputy Brust’s alleged use of 

excessive force. See Complaint ¶ 27 (claiming Deputy Brust “violently twist[ed], 

pull[ed], and yank[ed] her wrists and arms,” thereby injuring Plaintiff). Defendants’ 

argument that Section 52.1 cannot apply to an excessive force claim absent a showing 

that the act was done to interfere with a separate constitutional right is misplaced. See 

Doc. No. 25-1 at 11-12. The Ninth Circuit has recently noted that “a successful claim for 

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment provides the basis for a successful claim 

under § 52.1.” Chaudhry v. City of L.A., 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014); see also 

Cameron, 713 F.3d at 1022 (noting that because the California right the plaintiff asserted 

was the same as the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, resolution of the 

plaintiff’s excessive force claim under § 52.1 was the same as under the § 1983 claim). 

Thus, because Plaintiff’s § 52.1 claim is premised upon her Fourth Amendment excessive 

force claim, and because a triable issue remains as to whether Deputy Brust’s use of force 

in allegedly twisting Plaintiff’s wrist and yanking Plaintiff’s right arm up behind her back 

was unreasonable, summary judgment is improper. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 25
 -20- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to 

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action against Deputy Brust and the County. 

c. Rotator Cuff Injury and Damage Claim 

Lastly, Defendants move to partial summary judgment as to “Plaintiff alleged torn 

right rotator cuff injury and corresponding damage claim.” Doc. No. 25-1 at 13. 

Specifically, Defendants claim Plaintiff’s “right shoulder damage claim fails as a matter 

of law because even assuming the placement and movement of Plaintiff’s right arm 

behind her back as she described . . ., that arm maneuver could not have been the 

mechanism of injury for the right rotator cuff tear.” Id. Plaintiff, in opposition, relies on 

the declaration of her orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Keefe, who opines that Plaintiff’s torn 

rotator cuff injury “occurred during the incident in which Ms. Stanley’s right arm was 

pulled behind her back and forcefully, internally rotated, causing pain in her right 

shoulder and periscapular area since then.” Dr. Keefe Decl. ¶ 5. Defendants object to the 

declaration of Dr. Keefe. See Doc. No. 32 at 4-5. The Court first addresses Defendants’ 

objection to the declaration of Dr. Keefe before turning to Defendants’ motion for partial 

summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s damage claim. 

i. Defendants’ Objection to the Declaration of Dr. Keefe 

In their reply brief, Defendants object to, and move to strike, Dr. Keefe’s 

declaration because Plaintiff “failed to properly and timely disclose Dr. Keefe’s expert 

opinions” pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) or 26(a)(2)(C). Doc. 

No. 32 at 4. Specifically, Defendants take issue with Dr. Keefe’s “opinion regarding 

causation for Plaintiff’s injury” and asserts that Dr. Keefe’s opinion was “not formed 

during the course of Plaintiff’s treatment[.]” Id. at 5. Defendants further contend Dr. 

Keefe’s causation opinion is “inadmissible because it lacks foundation and is speculative 

because it is based on faulty and incomplete information provided by Plaintiff to Dr. 

Keefe.” Id.

Rule 26 requires that parties provide written disclosures for “any witness it may 

use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.” Fed. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 25
 -21- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). “If the expert is ‘one retained or specially employed to provide 

expert testimony in the case or whose duties as the party’s employee regularly involve 

giving expert testimony,’ the disclosure must be accompanied by a written report[.]” 

Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)). “If these witnesses are unretained, a party need 

only disclose the ‘subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, 705’ and ‘a summary of facts and opinions to 

which the witness is expected to testify.’” Witman v. Knight Transp., Inc., 2016 WL 

8715668, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)). The Rule 

26(a)(2)(C) disclosures are “considerably less extensive” than those required for retained 

experts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) Advisory Committee’s Note (2010). 

“Generally, a treating physician is not ‘retained or specially employed to provide 

expert testimony’—a treating physician is a percipient witness of the treatment he 

rendered—and therefore he is not subject to the written report requirement.” Goodman, 

644 F.3d at 824 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) Advisory Committee’s Note (1993) 

(emphasis added)). 

Here, the Court declines to rule on Defendants’ objection, as the Court finds that it 

does not have sufficient information to determine whether Plaintiff properly complied 

with Rule 26. In the Court’s December 19, 2016 Scheduling Order, the assigned 

magistrate judge ordered the parties to “comply with the disclosure provisions in Rule 

26(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” by “June 22, 2017.” Doc. 

No. 12 at 2 (emphasis in original). Because the June 22, 2017 deadline has passed, the 

parties have presumably exchanged such information as it relates to their respective Rule 

26(a)(2)(A) and Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosures. However, Defendants do not provide the 

Court with a copy of any such disclosures, nor do Defendants submit the declaration of 

counsel in support of their arguments. Moreover, the fact that Dr. Keefe “wrote an 

opinion about events that occurred a year earlier is not conclusive evidence that he 

formed the opinion when he wrote it down.” Everett v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 703 F. 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 25
 -22- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

App’x 481, 483 (9th Cir. 2017). Dr. Keefe first met with Plaintiff in October 2015; thus, 

it is quite likely Dr. Keefe qualifies as a treating physician who is exempt from the 

written report requirement. Dr. Keefe Decl. ¶ 2. If Dr. Keefe formed this opinion during 

the course of his treatment, there is no Rule 26 violation. As such, in the absence of any 

evidence, the Court DECLINES to determine whether Plaintiff violated her Rule 26 

disclosure requirements. To the extent Dr. Keefe’s testimony remains an issue prior to 

trial, Defendants can raise the issue via a motion in limine. 

Even assuming, however, that Plaintiff did not comply with her Rule 26 disclosure 

requirements, the Court would disregard only that portion of Dr. Keefe’s declaration 

wherein Dr. Keefe opines on the causation of Plaintiff’s injury. Defendants’ challenge to 

Dr. Keefe’s declaration focuses solely on his causation opinion. See Doc. No. 32 at 5-6. 

Defendants do not challenge the authenticity of Plaintiff’s medical records attached as 

exhibits to Dr. Keefe’s declaration, nor do Defendants claim Plaintiff failed to identify 

Dr. Keefe as a witness. “If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as 

required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness 

to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at trial, unless the failure was 

substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, 

even assuming a Rule 26 violation occurred, Plaintiff would not be able to rely on that 

information—i.e., Dr. Keefe’s opinion regarding the cause of Plaintiff’s shoulder 

injury—to supply evidence on a motion or at trial. As such, the Court relies on the 

remaining portions of Dr. Keefe’s declaration, including the attached medical reports, in 

reaching its conclusion below regarding Plaintiff’s rotator cuff damage claim. 

Defendants further contend Dr. Keefe’s causation opinion is inadmissible because 

it lacks foundation and is speculative. See Doc. No. 32 at 5. Defendants claim Dr. 

Keefe’s opinion is based on incomplete information, because as noted in Dr. Keefe’s 

October 29, 2015 consultation report, Plaintiff “denies any prior history of injury, 

surgery, or dislocation.” Doc. No. 27-4, Exh. 2 at 2-3. The Court OVERRULES

Defendants’ objections on these grounds, as Dr. Keefe’s opinions are based upon his 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 25
 -23- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

personal knowledge and physical examinations of Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. The 

jury can make any credibility determinations at trial based upon the proffered testimony 

of a witness or witnesses. 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court DECLINES to rule on 

Defendants’ objection to the declaration of Dr. Keefe on the grounds of a Rule 26 

violation. See Everett, 703 F. App’x at 483 (“Because there is a genuine issue of fact 

regarding when [the doctor] formed his opinion, the issue should not have been decided 

on summary judgment.”). The Court, however, OVERRULES Defendants’ objections 

on the grounds of lack of foundation and speculation. 

ii. Plaintiff’s Rotator Cuff Damage Claim 

In support of their motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s rotator 

cuff damage claim, Defendants rely on the report of their medical expert, Dr. Bried. See 

Doc. No. 25-3 at 95-102. Dr. Bried examined Plaintiff on April 6, 2017. See id. at 96. 

In his report, Dr. Bried indicates that it is his opinion, “with reasonable medical 

certainty,” that Deputy Brust’s alleged movement of Plaintiff’s right arm behind her back 

is inconsistent with the injury of a torn rotator cuff. Id. at 101. Dr. Bried notes that 

Plaintiff has a history of prior injury to her right shoulder. See id. at 102. In 2011, 

Plaintiff injured her right shoulder at work as a teacher’s aide when reaching up to take 

down pictures off of the wall at the end of the school year. See Doc. No. 25-3 at 55-56. 

Dr. Bried opines that Plaintiff’s use of her right hand “at and above the level of the 

shoulder” in 2011 “is the likely mechanism of tearing of her rotator cuff.” Id. at 102 

(emphasis added). 

Dr. Keefe’s opinion that Plaintiff’s torn rotator cuff injury occurred when Deputy 

Brust forcefully pushed Plaintiff’s right arm behind her back directly contradicts Dr. 

Bried’s opinion. Yet, for the reasons discussed above, even if the Court declines to 

consider Dr. Keefe’s opinion regarding causation, Dr. Bried’s opinion, Plaintiff’s 

testimony, and the medical reports attached to Dr. Keefe’s declaration preclude summary 

judgment on this issue. For example, Dr. Bried only claims that Plaintiff’s injury in 2011 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

 25
 -24- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“is the likely mechanism of tearing of her rotator cuff.” Doc. No. 25-3 at 102 (emphasis 

added). Additionally, in her deposition, Plaintiff claims that when Deputy Brust 

“yanked” her right arm up behind her, she instantly “started crying.” Doc. No. 27-12 at 

27. Similarly, in her declaration, Plaintiff avers that the morning after her encounter with 

Deputy Brust, “the pain in my right shoulder was much worse and my right wrist and 

hand were painful and swollen, so I went to the emergency room at Tri-City Hospital.” 

Stanley Decl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff continued to experience pain in her right shoulder, and her 

primary care physician recommended that she get an MRI. See id. ¶ 15. The MRI 

revealed Plaintiff had a torn rotator cuff. See id. Prior to her encounter with Deputy 

Brust, Plaintiff “had no experienced any pain in [her] right shoulder for nearly 18 

months.” Id. ¶ 13. Moreover, Dr. Keefe found that Plaintiff’s MRI “did not show 

significant atrophy,” which suggests a more recent event related to a rotator cuff tear. Dr. 

Keefe Decl. ¶ 5; see also Dr. Keefe Decl., Ex. 1 (noting “[t]here is mild to moderate 

atrophy of the supraspinatus muscle.”). Finally, in his report dated October 29, 2015, Dr. 

Keefe notes that Plaintiff “was involved in an injury in which someone [forcibly] pulled 

her arm behind her back” on July 2, 2015. Dr. Keefe Decl., Ex. 2 at 1. 

Thus, Defendants’ claim that “there is no evidence to establish a causal link 

between Plaintiff’s right rotator cuff tear and her interaction with Deputy Brust” is 

without merit. Doc. No. 25-1 at 13. Based upon the parties’ submissions, genuine issues 

of material fact exist regarding the cause of Plaintiff’s rotator cuff injury. Accordingly, 

the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

rotator cuff damage claim. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

 25
 -25- 16cv1227-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ Daubert 

motion to exclude the testimony of Mr. Smith. Further, the Court DENIES Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, partial summary judgment. The 

parties are instructed to contact the assigned magistrate judge within three (3) court days

of the date this Order is filed to reschedule the previously vacated Mandatory Settlement 

Conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 23, 2018

 _____________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

United States District Judge 

Case 3:16-cv-01227-MMA-AGS Document 35 Filed 01/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

 25