Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02291/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02291-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO JWB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Oscar Bernal Ramirez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Warden Bartos, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-2291-PHX-MHM (HCE)

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 30),

Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. # 37), and Defendants’ Reply (Doc. # 41) thereto. The Court will

grant Defendants’ motion and terminate this action. 

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) and at the time

relevant to this lawsuit was housed at the Lewis-Barchey Unit of the Arizona State Prison

Complex. Plaintiff filed a Complaint presenting one claim for relief against Defendants

Warden Ivan Bartos, Dr. John Lockhart, Nurse Patricia Dudley, Facility Health

Administrator (“FHA”) Richard Pratt, and Assistant FHA Sharon Malcom (Doc. # 1). 

Plaintiff alleged that he seriously injured his eye several years ago and that his eye

was re-injured during a fight at the prison. As a result, he has serious vision problems.

Plaintiff contended that he submitted numerous health needs requests, but Defendants failed

to provide the proper glasses for his eye condition and failed to provide the proper treatment.

Plaintiff further contended that Defendants incorrectly concluded that sunglasses were not

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medically necessary for his permanent eye condition, and that without proper treatment his

vision will continue to deteriorate. Plaintiff claimed that Defendants were made aware of his

serious medical condition, but failed to properly treat him and acted with deliberate

indifference towards his serious medical needs. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment and contended that Plaintiff merely desires

to keep his Ray-Ban street sunglasses instead of accepting the prescription glasses prescribed

for him by the ADC’s medical staff (Doc. # 30). Specifically, Defendants argued that (1)

they have not been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s eye condition, (2) Plaintiff has not

alleged or demonstrated any injury resulting from any alleged deliberate indifference, and

(3) Bartos, Malcom, and Pratt did not personally participate in any alleged constitutional

violation, and therefore are not proper Defendants. 

II. Factual History

Plaintiff conceded to the facts as recited by Defendants in their Statement of Facts

except where noted (See Doc. # 31, Doc. # 37 at 2).

Plaintiff suffered two injuries to his right eye before he entered the ADC in late 1993.

While Plaintiff was in ADC custody between 1993 and 1995, he complained of blurry vision,

pain, headaches, light sensitivity, and tearing; Plaintiff received eye drops, a temporary eye

patch, a skull x-ray, and an ophthalmology evaluation. Plaintiff also requested a Special

Needs Order (“SNO”) to wear shaded glasses to visitation. That request was denied and

Plaintiff was not prescribed prescription glasses or sunglasses. 

Plaintiff was not incarcerated between 1995 and 2000. Plaintiff’s eyes remained dry

and sensitive to light and weather changes, but Plaintiff never sought treatment for his eye

condition during that time. Instead, Plaintiff wore non-prescription sunglasses at all times.

Plaintiff re-entered the ADC in 2000. In November of that year, Plaintiff engaged in

a fight with another inmate and was hit in the right eye. Following the fight, Plaintiff was

treated by ADC medical staff and at the Maricopa Medical Center (“MMC”) emergency

room, where he was prescribed artificial tears eye drops. Thereafter, Plaintiff repeatedly

complained about his eye. As a result, Plaintiff frequently saw ADC doctors between

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 Dr. Macabuhay, another physician at the ADC, renewed the SNO from February

2002 - 2005 in its entirety, although an eye specialist at the MMC recommended that Plaintiff

only wear sunglasses when exposed to sunlight or very bright light (Doc. # 31 at 68). 

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December 2000 and May 2001. Plaintiff was eventually referred to an eye specialist at the

MMC ophthalmology department. On June 7, 2001, Plaintiff was examined by the specialist,

who recommended clear protective lenses. Plaintiff was then referred to ADC optometry for

protective lenses.

Between June and October 2001, medical staff at ADC repeatedly saw Plaintiff for

his eye complaints. Plaintiff requested prescription glasses and sunglasses in addition to a

waiver to wear his personal sunglasses. In October 2001, Plaintiff claimed that he did not

receive the correct glasses. As a result, Plaintiff was re-referred to optometry. In January

2002, FHA Jim Taylor administratively authorized a SNO allowing Plaintiff to wear his

sunglasses at all times until he could be seen by optometry. That SNO was renewed and

effective until February 11, 2005.1

 During the time period between 2002 and 2005, Plaintiff

was seen on numerous occasions by ADC health staff to treat his eye condition. 

Plaintiff was then scheduled to see the MMC eye specialist on March 29, 2004. The

ophthalmologist noted that Plaintiff’s vision was substantially unchanged and recommended

eye protection from the sun and new prescription glasses. Plaintiff received his new

prescription glasses in June 2004. 

In January 2005, Plaintiff sought renewal of his SNO allowing him to wear his

sunglasses at all times as it was set to expire on February 11, 2005. Dudley saw Plaintiff on

February 8, 2005 to review the request. Upon her examination, Dudley determined that

Plaintiff showed no sign of eye irritation due to exposure to bright light, exhibited no tearing

or excessive blinking, and he did not complain of pain. Dudley therefore issued a SNO

permitting Plaintiff to wear sunglasses outdoors only. The SNO expired in 30 days, on

March 8, 2005. The same day, Lockhart reaffirmed the SNO without examining Plaintiff.

Lockhart reiterated that it was not necessary to wear sunglasses inside the prison and that the

ADC had a security interest in prohibiting wearing sunglasses while indoors. Plaintiff’s SNO

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was renewed until April 30, 2005, permitting him to wear his sunglasses to outdoor visitation

but not while in the building. On April 27, 2005, the SNO was renewed until July 3, 2005.

Dudley and Lockhart conducted a review of Plaintiff’s extensive medical records and

determined that based on the medical information available, there was no medical reason for

Ramirez to wear sunglasses while indoors. Consequently, Lockhart issued a new SNO for

one year allowing Plaintiff to wear sunglasses outside but not inside any building. Lockhart

also scheduled an appointment with an eye specialist at the MMC. Director Schriro, in

response to a grievance filed by Plaintiff, instructed ADC staff to allow Plaintiff to wear his

sunglasses at all times pending the evaluation at MMC.

Plaintiff was evaluated at the MMC ophthalmology clinic on August 1, 2005. The

specialist recommended that Plaintiff wear polycarbonate prescription tinted sunglasses at

all times. Consequently, prescription sunglasses were ordered for Plaintiff as directed. On

September 9, 2005, Plaintiff’s prescription sunglasses were ready for pickup. Dudley told

Plaintiff that he would have to turn in his street sunglasses in order to obtain his new

sunglasses. Plaintiff refused and did not pick up his prescription sunglasses. Plaintiff

subsequently received his prescription sunglasses, but does not wear them at all times.

Plaintiff currently has a SNO stating that he must wear his prescription sunglasses at all

times. That SNO does not have an expiration date. 

III. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

When considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the non-movant is “to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). These inferences are limited, however, “to those upon

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 Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff’s eye condition constitutes a serious medical

need. Consequently, the Court will only address whether Defendants have acted with

deliberate indifference toward that need.

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which a reasonable jury might return a verdict.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68

F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after

adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof

at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Rule 56(e) compels the nonmoving party to “set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” and not to “rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleading.” The nonmoving party must do more than

“simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). There is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 249. Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence is “merely colorable” or “not

significantly probative.” Id. at 249-50.

B. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

Defendants seek summary judgment on the basis that they have not acted with

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs (Doc. # 30).2

 Plaintiff argues that

genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment (Doc. ## 37, 39).

States are prohibited by the Eighth Amendment from incarcerating inmates in

conditions that constitute cruel and unusual punishment of confinement. Pursuant to this

obligation, state officials who act with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical

needs are liable in a § 1983 action. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The Eighth

Amendment also prohibits deliberate indifference that subjects an inmate to an excessive risk

of future harm. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). “[D]eliberate indifference to

a prisoner’s serious medical needs is the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. A state prison official is deliberately indifferent if he both knows

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of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994). Thus, to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must establish that the

alleged harm was “sufficiently serious” and that the official acted with a “sufficiently culpable

state of mind.” Id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302-3 (1991)). But a

prisoner does not have to prove that he was completely denied medical care in order to

demonstrate deliberate indifference. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000).

Deliberate indifference may be shown when an official denies, delays, or intentionally

interferes with treatment or by the way that a medical professional provided the care. Jett v.

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “[A] mere ‘difference of medical opinion . . .

[is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.’” Toguchi v. Chung,

391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). To prevail on a claim involving

choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must show that the course of

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable in light of the circumstances and that

it was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. Jackson v.

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

When a prisoner attempts to hold a prison employee responsible for deliberate

indifference, the prisoner must establish individual fault. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634

(9th Cir. 1988). Sweeping conclusory allegations will not be sufficient to prevent summary

judgment. Id. “The prisoner must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s

deliberate indifference.” Id. at 634. He must prove that the specific prison official was

deliberately indifferent and that this indifference was the actual and proximate cause of the

injury. Id.

IV. Deliberate Indifference Analysis

Deliberate indifference amounts to criminal recklessness; a defendant must have

known that a plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed, and decided not to do anything to

prevent that harm from occurring. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-837. A plaintiff does not

have to use words like “reckless” or “intentional” to make out a case for deliberate

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indifference. He must merely plead that a defendant behaved in a way that can be construed

to show reckless or intentional conduct. 

1. Dudley

Defendants argue that Plaintiff received superior treatment for his eye condition, as

evidenced by the numerous visits with ADC medical professionals as well as outside

specialists (Doc. # 30 at 10; Doc. # 31 at ¶¶ 20, 22-23, 25, 32-35, 41, 44, 46, 48, 51-53, 55,

59, 64, 66, 68-69, 71-76, 79-80, 82-83, 87-89, 91-93, 95, 107, and 118). Defendants

specifically contend that Dudley based her decision to issue Plaintiff a SNO to wear his

sunglasses outdoors only on Plaintiff’s medical records and her own evaluation and that her

conduct was not deliberately indifferent (Doc. # 41 at 3-4).

Plaintiff maintains that Dudley was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs

when she (1) modified Plaintiff’s SNO to allow Plaintiff to only wear sunglasses while

outdoors and not inside buildings and (2) did not give Plaintiff his prescription sunglasses on

September 9, 2005 (Doc. # 37 at 4, 12). Plaintiff further claims that as a result of Dudley’s

actions, Plaintiff suffered increased blurred vision, pain, headaches, diminished vision, and

emotional suffering resulting from apprehension of permanent damage (Doc. # 37 at 6). 

a. Modification of Plaintiff’s SNO

Plaintiff argues that Dudley was not qualified to evaluate Plaintiff’s request for a SNO,

and therefore her actions were ipso facto deliberately indifferent (Doc. # 37 at 10). Plaintiff

also claims that because Dudley had knowledge of Plaintiff’s prior SNOs and reviewed his

medical records, her decision to issue a SNO for outdoors only was deliberately indifferent

(id.). 

Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that a nurse is not qualified to evaluate an

inmate for a SNO. Rather, Plaintiff cites to a number of cases which require that a trained

medical professional render medical treatment. But Plaintiff does not cite to a single case

establishing a requirement that only a physician can examine and make recommendations for

treatment of inmates. Nor could he—a nurse is, by definition, a trained medical professional.

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 The evidence also reflects that Plaintiff never sought eye drops to alleviate any

alleged increased eye irritation between February and August 2005 (Doc. # 31 at ¶ 123). 

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Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1187 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing deliberate

indifference by “trained medical personnel” including both doctors and nurses). 

Ultimately, Plaintiff’s claim is nothing more than a difference of medical opinion.

First, while Plaintiff did have a SNO for several years that allowed him to wear his sunglasses

indoors, Plaintiff completely ignores the fact that Dr. Macabuhay issued that order more

broadly than the specialist at the MMC recommended (Doc. # 31, Ex. A ¶ 63). Plaintiff

concedes that the MMC eye specialist merely recommended that Plaintiff wear sunglasses

when exposed to sunlight or very bright lights (Doc. # 31 at ¶ 68; Doc. # 37 at 2).

Consequently, the fact that Dr. Macabuhay issued a broad SNO to wear sunglasses indoors

does not entitle Plaintiff to a similar waiver in perpetuity. Indeed, Plaintiff does not

meaningfully dispute that Dudley relied on (1) the specialist’s recommendation that Plaintiff

wear sunglasses only when exposed to sunlight or very bright light, (2) her examination that

revealed no observable irritation to his eye, and (3) her knowledge of the lighting conditions

inside the prison when she issued Plaintiff’s SNO (Doc. # 31 at ¶¶ 68, 92, and 95). The

evidence also reflects that Dudley conducted a thorough review of Plaintiff’s medical records,

further supporting the conclusion that her decision was based on Plaintiff’s own medical

history and, as a result, was not deliberately indifferent to it (id. at ¶¶ 110-111).3

In short, Plaintiff has not shown that the course of treatment Dudley chose was

medically unacceptable in light of the circumstances and that it was chosen in conscious

disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. 

b. Failure to Issue Plaintiff his Prescription Glasses

Plaintiff’s second argument involves his receipt of his prescription sunglasses on

September 9, 2005. Plaintiff avers that Dudley refused to give Plaintiff his prescription

sunglasses because Plaintiff refused to turn over his Ray-Ban sunglasses. The medical records

reflect that Dudley asked Plaintiff to turn over his Ray-Ban sunglasses, which would be

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placed in Plaintiff’s property storage (Doc. # 31, Attach. A at 1). Plaintiff concludes that

Dudley’s failure to give him his prescription sunglasses constituted deliberate indifference.

 Plaintiff’s argument fails, however, for at least two reasons. First, Dudley’s request

to have Plaintiff turn in his old sunglasses does not equate to deliberate indifference. At most,

Dudley acted in contravention of ADC property policy. But a violation of an administrative

policy does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Cf. U.S. v. Haswood, 350 F.3d

1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (an F.B.I. agent’s failure to follow governmental policy on

recording interviews does not necessarily create a constitutional violation); U.S. v. Goodwin,

57 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1995) (an assistant U.S. attorney’s failure to comply with internal

department policy does not establish a constitutional deprivation).

Second, Plaintiff’s argument fails because even though Plaintiff did not receive his new

prescription sunglasses on September 9, Plaintiff was never without sunglasses, vitiating his

argument that he was harmed (Doc. # 31 at ¶ 128, Ex. B at ¶ 42). Plaintiff always had

protective eyewear; he was never forced to endure the sun without glasses. Moreover,

Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition that he tries to wear his non-prescription sunglasses

at all times as opposed to his prescription sunglasses (Doc. # 31 at ¶ 129; Ex. C at 11:41).

Because Plaintiff primarily uses his non-prescription sunglasses, no reasonable jury could

conclude that Dudley was deliberately indifferent when Plaintiff did not receive his

prescription sunglasses on September 9. Defendants’ motion will therefore be granted as to

Dudley.

2. Lockhart

Similarly, Plaintiff’s claim against Lockhart fails. Plaintiff rests his entire argument

on the fact that Lockhart (1) did not independently examine Plaintiff when he reviewed

Dudley’s recommendation and (2) contemplated security needs in additional to medical needs.

But simply because Lockhart did not examine Plaintiff personally does not mean he was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s eye condition. On the contrary, Lockhart reviewed and

relied on Dudley’s examination of Plaintiff in determining whether to uphold or change her

recommendation (Doc. # 31 at ¶ 111). Indeed, the medical records reflect, and Plaintiff

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concedes, that Lockhart reviewed Plaintiff’s entire medical record on June 3, 2005 (id.).

Plaintiff has not introduced any authority that would require Lockhart to independently

evaluate Plaintiff before affirming or rejecting Dudley’s recommendation. Moreover, the fact

that Lockhart contemplated security issues does not change this result. Dudley’s

recommendation was based on Plaintiff’s medical records and her examination of him.

Simply because Lockhart provided an additional reason to accept Dudley’s recommendation

does not change the underlying basis for it. 

As a result, there is no evidence that Lockhart knew of and disregarded a risk to

Plaintiff’s health. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-837. Defendants’ motion will be granted as

to Lockhart.

3. Pratt, Malcom, and Bartos

Plaintiff has also named Facility Health Administrators Pratt and Malcom and Warden

Bartos as Defendants because they allegedly ignored ADC Director Schriro’s July 2005

instruction to allow Plaintiff to wear his non-prescription sunglasses at all times (Doc. # 37

at 16). Defendants argue that they did not personally participate in any decision to allow or

not allow Plaintiff to wear his sunglasses after Schriro’s instruction, and as a result cannot be

held responsible for any alleged constitutional violation. 

Plaintiff, in his deposition, acknowledged that he was permitted to wear his sunglasses

at all times after he received Schriro’s instruction (Doc. # 41, Ex. 1 at 11:00:05).

Consequently, the Court cannot conclude that Pratt, Malcom, or Bartos deliberately ignored

Schriro’s instruction. Defendants’ Motion will therefore be granted as to these three

Defendants.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 30) is granted and Plaintiff’s action is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is

directed to enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 11th day of September, 2007.

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