Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02333/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02333-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 11cv2333 JLS (WVG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD LEE MILLER,

CDCR #C-92075,

Civil No. 11cv2333 JLS (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING 

NO PARTIAL FILING FEE AND

GARNISHING $ 350 BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[ECF No. 2]; 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR COURT

TO INTERVENE ON PLAINTIFF’S

BEHALF [ECF No. 4];

AND

(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

L.S. McEWEN; G.J. JANDA; 

LIZ ARRIGAR; DR. RICHARD

KORNBLUTH; PARAMO;

H. AMEZCUA; S. HARDMAN; M.

ALVAREZ; T. ALVAREZ; 

M.S. DOMINGUES; C. VILLALOBOS;

A. CASTRO; J. FLORES,

Defendants.

Gerald Lee Miller (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding in pro se, has filed a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Case 3:11-cv-02333-JLS-WVG Document 5 Filed 11/22/11 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 11cv2333 JLS (WVG)

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he

has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF

No. 2], and a Motion for Court to Intervene on Plaintiff’s Behalf [ECF No. 4]. 

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

Case 3:11-cv-02333-JLS-WVG Document 5 Filed 11/22/11 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 11cv2333 JLS (WVG)

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

III.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000)

(§ 1915A); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a

Case 3:11-cv-02333-JLS-WVG Document 5 Filed 11/22/11 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 11cv2333 JLS (WVG)

pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were

not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

B. Access to Courts claim

Throughout Plaintiff’s Complaint, he alleges that prison officials have denied him access

to the courts by withholding his legal materials. Prisoners do “have a constitutional right to

petition the government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of

access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley

v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held

that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to

assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners

with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons who are trained in the law.”

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). To establish a violation of the right to access to the

courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal

attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has been frustrated or impeded,

and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996).

An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see

also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171

(9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996).

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-02333-JLS-WVG Document 5 Filed 11/22/11 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 11cv2333 JLS (WVG)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to alleged any actions with any particularity that have precluded

his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or

sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to

access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly

or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”); see also Christopher

v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of

action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as

much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.”). Moreover,

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he has been actually injured by any specific

defendant’s actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 

Plaintiff does claim in his Complaint that he is being thwarted in a case he has filed in the

Eastern District of California involving alleged civil rights violations. A court “may take notice

of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria

Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the Court takes

judicial notice of the ongoing § 1983 case filed by Plaintiff in Miller v. Ruffion, et al., E.D. Cal.

Civil Case No. 08cv1233 BTM (WMc). With respect to that matter, at this time Plaintiff would

be unable to allege an “actual injury” as that case is still open, has not been dismissed, and in

fact, is set for trial in January of 2012. 

In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that

he was “so stymied” by any individual defendant’s actions that “he was unable to even file a

complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] ...

the predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show

that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

access to courts claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983

relief can be granted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-02333-JLS-WVG Document 5 Filed 11/22/11 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 11cv2333 JLS (WVG)

C. Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges a number of Eighth Amendment violations. First, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants “maliciously and sadistically set the Plaintiff up to be attack[ed] by another

prisoner.” (Compl. at 16.) The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment requires that prison officials act reasonably in protecting inmates from violence

suffered at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d

457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). However, to state a failure to protect claim, Plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show that Defendants were “deliberately indifferent,” that they were aware of, but

nevertheless consciously disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 834. If the official is not alleged to have actual knowledge of a serious risk of harm, but is

alleged to be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, the plaintiff must further allege that the official “also dr[ew] the inference.”

Id. at 837; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). 

Here, while Plaintiff identifies a serious risk to this safety, he fails to adequately allege

with any specificity how the individual Defendants would have known that there was a serious

risk of harm. Plaintiff does appear to allege that he was assaulted by other inmates or got into

fights with other inmates, but he does not allege any facts from which the Court could find that

he has adequately alleged that any of the individual officers knew that another inmate would

cause him serious harm. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

Accordingly, as currently plead, Plaintiff has failed to show that any Defendant acted with

conscious disregard to a risk to his safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (to establish a deprivation of a constitutional right by any

particular individual, the plaintiff must allege that the individual, in acting or failing to act, was

the actual and proximate cause of his injury). Thus, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to

protect claims are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-02333-JLS-WVG Document 5 Filed 11/22/11 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 11cv2333 JLS (WVG)

In addition, Plaintiff seeks to hold Doctor Kornbluth liable for alleged violations of his

Eighth Amendment rights because Plaintiff alleges Kornbluth refused to provide him treatment

for food poisoning. (See Comp. at 19.) Plaintiff claims Kornbluth switched his blood test in the

prison’s laboratory so that Plaintiff’s results would come back negative. (Id. at 19-20.) A

complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims

as to Defendant Kornbluth to be frivolous because they lack even “an arguable basis either in

law or in fact,” and appear “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328.

Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical care claims as frivolous.

III.

MOTION TO INTERVENE

In this Motion, Plaintiff appears to be seeking a Court Order to send Plaintiff to a hospital

outside the prison. Plaintiff repeats the claims he states in his Complaint that the Court has

already found to be frivolous. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Doctor Kornbluth is “covering

up his illness” by faking test results from the blood work he ordered for Plaintiff. (See Pl.’s Mot.

at 2.) As stated above, the Court has found these claims to be frivolous. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

Motion to Intervene is DENIED.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Intervene on the Plaintiff’s Behalf [ECF No. 4] is DENIED

without prejudice. 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No.2] is

GRANTED. 

3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

Case 3:11-cv-02333-JLS-WVG Document 5 Filed 11/22/11 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 11cv2333 JLS (WVG)

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave

from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all

the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in

itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants

not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been

waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without

further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 22, 2011

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-02333-JLS-WVG Document 5 Filed 11/22/11 Page 8 of 8