Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01881/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01881-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dale Maisano, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-1881-PHX-SMM (MHB) 

 O R D E R 

I. Background

 Plaintiff Dale Maisano, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexFlorence in Florence, Arizona, has abused the legal process egregiously and often. He is 

subject to the three-strikes provision of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. In addition, 

in an August 11, 1992 Order and Restraining Order in Maisano v. Lewis, 92-CV-1026-

PHX-SMM (MS), the Court concluded that “[i]t has become obvious from the nature of 

the Plaintiff’s complaints and his lack of good faith that he simply desires to burden the 

judicial system with complaints, without regard for their merit or final disposition” and 

enjoined Plaintiff from filing any civil action in this or any other federal court without 

first obtaining leave of the court. See August 11, 1992 Order and Restraining Order in 

Maisano v. Lewis, CV 92-1026-PHX-SMM (MS).1

 When seeking to leave, Plaintiff was 

required to file an “Application Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File” 

 

1

Plaintiff appealed the final judgment in CV 92-1026-PHX-SMM (MS) to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On March 17, 1993, the Court lodged a certified copy of the Ninth Circuit=s mandate dismissing the appeal. 

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accompanied by a copy of the 1992 Restraining Order, a list of all cases previously filed 

involving similar or related causes of action, and an affidavit certifying that: (1) the claim 

or claims he wishes to present are new and have never been raised and disposed of on the 

merits by any federal court, and (2) to the best of his knowledge, the claim or claims are 

not frivolous or taken in bad faith. Id. 

 Unfortunately, the 1992 Restraining Order proved to be insufficient to quell 

Plaintiff’s assault on the federal courts. In a January 29, 2014 Order to Show Cause in

Maisano v. Clark, 14-CV-0001-TUC-RCC (D. Ariz. 2014), Chief United States District 

Court Judge Raner C. Collins examined Plaintiff’s voluminous filings and concluded, 

based on the number and nature of Plaintiff’s filings, that Plaintiff’s conduct was 

manifestly abusive and harassing and that the 1992 Restraining Order had proven 

insufficient to restrain Plaintiff’s abuse of the courts. The Court concluded that more 

stringent measures were required, proposed an additional abusive-litigant injunction, and 

gave Plaintiff an opportunity to show cause in writing why such an injunction should not 

be imposed. 

 After Plaintiff responded to the Order to Show Cause, Chief Judge Collins issued a 

February 20, 2014 Injunction Order that enjoined Plaintiff from filing or lodging more 

than one in forma pauperis lawsuit per month in this Court, refused to accept any 

transfers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) of cases filed by Plaintiff in other Districts, and 

reiterated and supplemented the requirements of the 1992 Restraining Order.2

 In 

addition, the 2014 Injunction Order enjoined Plaintiff from filing any civil action in this 

or any other federal court without first obtaining leave of the court. When seeking leave 

to file, Plaintiff is required to file a motion for leave to file that is captioned as an 

“Application Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File” and which contains a copy 

of the 2014 Injunction Order, a copy of the January 29, 2014 Order to Show Cause, a 

 

2

 In an April 8, 2014 Order, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal of the Injunction Order and Plaintiff’s accompanying documents, concluded that “the appeal is so insubstantial as to not warrant further 

review,” and did not permit the appeal to proceed. See Doc. 8 in 14-CV-0001-TUCRCC. 

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copy of the 1992 Restraining Order, a list of all cases previously filed involving similar 

or related causes of action, an affidavit certifying that the claim or claims presented are 

new and have never been raised and disposed of on the merits by any federal court, and a 

certification that, to the best of his knowledge, the claim or claims presented are not 

frivolous or taken in bad faith. Id. In addition, because Plaintiff has “three-strikes,” the 

2014 Injunction Order required that any lawsuit Plaintiff filed or lodged “clearly, 

coherently, and credibly” alleges that Plaintiff is under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury. Id. 

II. Plaintiff’s Current Lawsuit

 On June 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of Maricopa 

County, Arizona, against the undersigned, eight other district court judges from the 

District of Arizona, four district court judges from the Middle District of Tennessee, three 

judges from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the State of Arizona, the Arizona 

Governor, the Arizona Attorney General, the Director of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections (ADOC), the Maricopa County Sheriff, ADOC Warden Moody and Deputy 

Warden Scott, an unknown ADOC sergeant, two unknown ADOC Correctional Officer 

IIs, nurse practitioner Rick Unger, Corizon Health Inc., Canteen/Trinity 

Group/Correctional Food Services Inc. (Canteen), and an unknown Canteen 

“whiteshirt.”3

 On August 22, 2014, Defendants Chris Moody and Travis Scott filed a Notice of 

Removal and removed the lawsuit to this Court. On September 3, 2014, Defendant 

Arpaio filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6). 

 A. Removal

 A State court defendant may remove to federal court any civil action brought in 

the state court over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction. 28 

 

3

 In addition, on Plaintiff’s Civil Cover Sheet, he also lists as Defendants: the 

United States Department of Justice’s “NYA” Civil Rights Division, the Arizona Secretary of State, the Maricopa County Attorney, an attorney with the Prison Law 

Office, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona. 

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U.S.C. § 1441(a). In his June 25 Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, 

violations of his federal constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the 

“Civil Rights Act of 1871,” and “RICO.” This Court’s jurisdiction extends to such 

claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a). Defendants timely removed. Accordingly, removal 

is appropriate. 

B. Recusal Issue 

 Plaintiff has named the undersigned as a Defendant in this action. Ordinarily, 

when a judge assigned to the case is named as a party, the judge would recuse himself 

sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, which requires a judge to recuse himself “in any 

proceeding in which his impartiality might be reasonably questioned” or when he is “a 

party to the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(5)(i). However, this case is not 

ordinary. 

 When a litigant becomes unhappy with a judge’s rulings in a case, a litigant might 

seek to force the judge to recuse himself by filing a lawsuit against the judge. But a 

“‘judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.’ Such 

an easy method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed.” 

Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted), 

rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). 

 “‘[A] judge is not disqualified by a litigant’s suit or threatened suit against him, or 

by a litigant’s intemperate and scurrilous attacks.’” United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 

944, 958 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 

1986)). Similarly, “[w]here a claim against the undersigned judge is so wholly frivolous 

that there is no jurisdiction, the assigned judge should be able to decline to recuse and 

proceed with dismissing the case.” Snegirev v. Sedwick, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1095 

(D. Alaska 2006). See also Reddy v. O’Connor, 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 131 (D.D.C. 2007) 

(“recusal is not required where the claim asserted is ‘wholly frivolous’ or a litigant has 

named a judicial officer as a defendant to force him out of the case and hence obtain 

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assignment of a judge the litigant considers more desirable.” (quoting Snegirev, 407 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1095)). 

 The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim that is “wholly 

insubstantial and frivolous.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 

89 (1998). An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be dismissed as frivolous “where the 

defense is complete and obvious from the face of the pleadings.” Franklin v. Murphy, 

745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). Such claims include those in which “it is clear that 

the defendants are immune from suit.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). 

See also Snegirev, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 (claim precluded by judicial immunity was 

frivolous). Such is the case here. 

 Plaintiff has made no actual allegations against the undersigned, other than a 

generic allegation that “[a]ll other Defendants have full knowledge of food theft.”4

 Thus, 

Plaintiff’s lawsuit against the undersigned is based, at best, on the undersigned’s rulings 

in prior cases. As to those rulings, the undersigned is protected by judicial immunity. 

 Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages for their judicial acts 

except when they are taken “in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. 

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 

(1871)); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). An act is “judicial” 

when it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge 

in his or her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 

700 (9th Cir. 1990). This immunity attaches even if the judge is accused of acting 

maliciously and corruptly, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), or of making grave 

errors of law or procedure. See Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 

1988). 

. . . . 

. . . . 

 

4

 Similarly, Plaintiff has made no actual allegations against the other federal judges or the vast majority of the other Defendants. 

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 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim against the undersigned, to the extent 

Plaintiff has actually made a claim against the undersigned, is precluded by judicial 

immunity and is frivolous. Thus, the Court declines to recuse itself. 

 C. Dismissal of Lawsuit

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 The Court will dismiss the Complaint because it is frivolous, malicious, and 

vexatious. In so doing, the Court finds persuasive the reasoning in Sassower v. Abrams, 

833 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In that case, the plaintiff was subject to federal 

injunction orders designed to stop his abuse of the judicial system. Id. at 255-56. The 

plaintiff filed multiple lawsuits in state court that were removed by the defendants. Id. at 

255. The federal district court dismissed the cases as frivolous and vexatious, noting that 

although the lawsuits arguably were not subject to the injunction orders because they 

were filed in state court and removed to the district court by the defendants, “[the 

plaintiff] should not be able to use defendants’ removal of these actions as an opportunity 

to thwart the clear intent of the [injunction orders] by renewing his frivolous and 

vexatious litigation in this Court.” Id. at 267. The court reviewed the plaintiff’s new 

lawsuits and his litigation history and concluded that the plaintiff was “engaged in a bad 

faith attempt to relitigate adjudicated matters by adding the names of judges, officials, 

and private individuals who have been involved in the numerous past decisions rejecting 

his claims.” Id. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s new lawsuits were 

“unequivocally intended to harass the named defendants.” Id. Thus, the court dismissed 

the lawsuits, stating that the court would “not permit [plaintiff] to circumvent the 

[injunction orders] and engage in yet another series of vexatious lawsuits in this Court 

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which will harass defendants with needless litigation and result in further abuse of the 

judicial system.” Id.

 Plaintiff’s allegations are virtually the same as his allegations presented in 

numerous lawsuits previously lodged or filed in this Court. Moreover, filing lawsuits 

against a variety of federal judges simply because they have ruled against him is an 

unveiled attempt to harass and vex members of the judicial system who are immune from 

suit. By filing his lawsuit in state court with either the knowledge or the expectation that 

Defendants would remove the lawsuit to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 or 

§ 1442, Plaintiff has engaged in a bad faith attempt to circumvent the 2014 Injunction 

Order and avoid the court-imposed limitation on the number of his lawsuits and 

requirement that he obtain permission to file his lawsuit. Permitting Plaintiff to proceed 

in this fashion would thwart the 2014 Injunction Order and would provide Plaintiff with 

another flank on which to continue his assault on the federal judiciary. Therefore, the 

Court, in its discretion, will dismiss this lawsuit as frivolous, malicious, or vexatious. 

 Dismissing the lawsuit preserves Defendants’ right to remove, yet prevents 

Plaintiff from thwarting the 2014 Injunction Order. Dismissal places Plaintiff in the same 

position he would have been in if he had filed his lawsuit in this Court at the outset. If 

Plaintiff had filed his lawsuit here initially, it would have been dismissed because 

Plaintiff did not comply with the 2014 Injunction Order. Moreover, the lawsuit would 

have been dismissed under the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because 

Plaintiff’s claims do not satisfy the requirement that he make a “plausible allegation that 

the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” 

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). 

IT IS ORDERED:

 (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint and this action are dismissed without prejudice, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly 

and close this case. 

 (2) Defendant Arpaio’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is denied as moot. 

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 (3) The Clerk of Court must update the docket to reflect that Plaintiff is 

currently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence, East Unit, and must 

send this Order to Plaintiff at that address. 

 (4) The Clerk of Court must send a courtesy copy of this Order to the Chief 

Judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. 

(5) The Clerk of Court must accept no further documents for filing in this 

case number, other than those in furtherance of an appeal. 

 (6) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of 

this decision would not be taken in good faith. 

 DATED this 5th day of September, 2014. 

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