Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01410/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01410-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lori A. Copley, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security Administration 

Defendant. 

No. CV 10-1410-PHX-DGC 

ORDER 

 

 Plaintiff was determined ineligible for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 

benefits by a Social Security Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and the decision 

became final agency action. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at Step 2 of the sequential 

evaluation process and in the residual functional capacity assessment (“RFC”). Doc. 13. 

Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision was proper and supported by substantial 

evidence. Doc. 14. The issues have been fully briefed (Docs. 13, 14, 20), and the parties 

do not request oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the Court will remand for 

further proceedings. 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe fibromyalgia and determined the condition 

to be a severe impairment. Doc. 12-3 at 11.1

 Plaintiff takes no issue with this 

determination, but challenges the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s migraine headaches, 

 

1

 The Court’s citations to the record reflect the page numbers generated at the top of a 

PDF document by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing system, not page numbers appearing on 

original exhibits. 

Case 2:10-cv-01410-DGC Document 21 Filed 06/30/11 Page 1 of 6
‐ 2 ‐ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

hyperactive bladder, irritable bowel syndrome, and lumbar degenerative disc disease 

were non-severe impairments.2

 Doc. 13 at 10:24-27. 

 An applicant for benefits is deemed not disabled at Step 2 of the evaluation 

process if she is found not to have a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). In 

this case, Plaintiff passed Step 2 as a result of the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s 

fibromyalgia was a severe impairment. Therefore, to the extent the ALJ found other 

impairments non-severe, but nonetheless considered them in the RFC assessment, the 

Court will review the challenged findings in the context of the RFC assessment. See 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(e) (stating that an RFC assessment bears on whether an applicant can 

perform work activities); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2) (requiring all impairments be used in 

an RFC assessment); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that 

Social Security regulations define “severity” of an impairment as a function of its effects 

on applicant’s ability to perform work activities). 

 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform 

the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b), except that she is 

limited to occasional postural functions including stooping, kneeling, crouching, and 

crawling.” Doc. 12-3 at 12. Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to discuss how her 

impairments “affect her ability to sustain work activities eight hours per day, five days 

per week,” failed properly to weight medical source opinion evidence, and failed properly 

to weigh Plaintiff’s testimony.3

 Doc. 13 at 16-24. Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s 

past relevant work as a bookkeeper required walking for 0.5 hours, standing for 0.5 

hours, sitting for 1.0 hours, reaching for 1.0 hours, and “no climbing, stooping, kneeling, 

crouching, crawling, or handling/grabbing/grasping big objects.” Doc. 14 at 31-32. 

 

2

 Plaintiff does not appear to take issue with the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s 

history of Bell’s Palsy does not constitute a severe impairment (Doc. 12-3 at 11). Doc. 13 at 10 

(excludes Bell’s Palsy finding). 

3

 Plaintiff also argues that the testimony of the vocational consultant hired by the agency 

is not reliable. Doc. 13 at 24. The Court need not reach this issue. 

Case 2:10-cv-01410-DGC Document 21 Filed 06/30/11 Page 2 of 6
‐ 3 ‐ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be able to perform these activities despite all 

her impairments, and the finding is supported by substantial evidence, Defendants argues, 

the ALJ did not err. See id. at 33. Plaintiff replies in part that the ALJ “cherry-picked” 

evidence and that the record shows “none of the reported activities are done with the 

consistency or degree of sustained competitive employment.” Doc. 20 at 9. 

 In conducting an RFC assessment, the Commissioner must consider the combined 

effects of an applicant’s medically-determinable impairments on the applicant’s ability to 

perform sustainable work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (“In determining whether an 

individual’s . . . impairments are of sufficient medical severity that such . . . impairments 

could be the basis of eligibility under this section, the Commissioner of Social Security 

shall consider the combined effect of all of the individual’s impairments without regard 

to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity.” 

(emphasis added)); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (Commission to consider 

“combination of impairments”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2) 

(Commission to consider “all” impairments); see also Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 

(9th Cir. 1996) (Commissioner must consider the combined effect of all impairments in 

determining whether the claimant is disabled) (citing Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 

666 (9th Cir. 1988)); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (Commissioner 

“should have considered the combined effect of the claimant’s physical and mental 

impairments in determining [RFC]”); Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir. 

1989) (error not to “consider the combined effect of all of [applicant’s] impairments on 

her ability to return to work”). Moreover, an applicant’s ability to perform sustainable 

work should be assessed against a standard work week in a realistic work setting. SSR 

96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996) (stating, in part, that “RFC is an assessment 

of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a 

work setting on a regular and continuing basis. A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8 

hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.”); see also Fair v. 

Case 2:10-cv-01410-DGC Document 21 Filed 06/30/11 Page 3 of 6
‐ 4 ‐ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that an applicant’s ability to 

perform work tasks should be assessed in the context of “the more grueling environment 

of the workplace,” and that in some environments “it might be impossible to periodically 

rest or take medication”). 

 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically-determinable impairments – fibromyalgia, 

migraines, lower back problems, stomach damage, and Bell’s Palsy – “could reasonably 

be expected to cause” the symptoms Plaintiff alleged. Doc. 12-3 at 12. The ALJ 

nonetheless concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence 

and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent 

with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” Id. The ALJ held that Plaintiff 

“failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the alleged severity and duration of [her] 

symptoms and limitations pertaining to her alleged migraines, lumbar spine and stomach 

problems, and Bell’s Palsy.” Id. The ALJ also observed that “[t]he medical records fail 

to establish support for such impairments, as the claimant rarely complains about these 

impairments,” and “[t]he physicians do not address the impairments either.” Id. The 

ALJ noted medical findings from Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Franklin Baroi, 

findings from State Agency physician Dr. Robert Hirsch, consulting psychologist Dr. 

Carlos Vega, and consulting physician Dr. Richard Palmer. Id. at 13-15. The ALJ also 

noted testimony by Plaintiff where she “persistently complains of intractable pain,” but 

the testimony was largely discounted as “not fully credible” due in part to lack of 

“objective findings to substantiate the severity of her complaints.”4

 Id. at 16. For 

example, the ALJ opined that “although the claimant undoubtedly experiences some 

degree of pain, the pain has apparently not altered the use of her muscles and joints to the 

extent that [it] has resulted in diffuse muscle atrophy,” the latter being a “common side 

effect[] of prolonged and/or chronic pervasive pain” according to the ALJ. Id. at 16. 

 

4

 The ALJ’s credibility determination appears aimed at Plaintiff’s conclusions about the 

extent of her limitations, not at her lack of sincerity: the ALJ noted that “the claimant appeared to 

be a sincere witness” (Doc. 12-3 at 16). 

Case 2:10-cv-01410-DGC Document 21 Filed 06/30/11 Page 4 of 6
‐ 5 ‐ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The Court concludes the ALJ did not adequately compare Plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity with the requirements of sustainable work during a standard work 

week in a realistic work setting. The ALJ’s analysis focused primarily on the medical 

evidence disputing the extent of Plaintiff’s symptoms, and stopped short of discussing 

how Plaintiff’s symptoms – to the extent they were assessed credible by the ALJ – match 

up to the type of sustainable work the ALJ deemed Plaintiff able to perform. The ALJ’s 

findings on this point were at best conclusory, asserting in part merely that “the claimant 

is able to perform [the work] as actually and generally performed.” The ALJ does not 

discuss the typical work environment in which Plaintiff might perform, the ability of 

Plaintiff to obtain requisite rest or employ pain-management techniques in that 

environment, Plaintiff’s ability to travel consistently to and from the work site five days 

per week, or Plaintiff’s ability to maintain sustainable employment in a realistic work 

setting in light of the totality of her impairments. Plaintiff’s pain level appeared to be the 

most pronounced symptom addressed by the ALJ with regard to work limitations, but 

even there the ALJ’s treatment of the pain aspect is somewhat ambiguous. The ALJ 

acknowledges, for example, that according to Dr. Vega “the claimant is likely to be 

suffering from a pain disorder that is associated with both psychological factors and 

fibromyalgia,” and that “claimant’s inability to obtain and maintain gainful employment 

is more likely impeded by physical factors than psychological ones.” Doc. 12-3 at 14. 

The ALJ also notes that “[t]he documentation basically indicates a worsening in the pain 

disorder described above.” Id. The ALJ does not appear to conclude what pain level the 

evidence shows Plaintiff as having, and how this pain level factors into Plaintiff’s ability 

to work as discussed above. The same holds true for the other non-pain symptoms 

reported by Plaintiff and acknowledged by the ALJ. 

 For the reasons above, the Court will remand to the Commissioner for additional 

proceedings consistent with this order. The Commissioner shall consider the combined 

effects of Plaintiff’s impairments on Plaintiff’s ability to perform sustainable work during 

Case 2:10-cv-01410-DGC Document 21 Filed 06/30/11 Page 5 of 6
‐ 6 ‐ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

a standard work-week in a realistic work setting. 

 IT IS ORDERED that this case be remanded to the Commissioner for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

 Dated this 30th day of June, 2011. 

 

Case 2:10-cv-01410-DGC Document 21 Filed 06/30/11 Page 6 of 6