Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-02252/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-02252-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BETTY DUKES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 01-cv-2252 CRB (JSC)

ORDER RE: THE AKIN GUMP 

MEMORANDUM (Dkt. Nos. 840, 846)

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory Relief 

Concerning the Akin Gump Memo and Defendant’s Cross-Motion to Compel Delivery of 

the Memo. (Dkt. Nos. 840 & 846.) The motions arise out of a 2010 New York Times article 

discussing a leaked confidential memorandum from the law firm of Akin Gump to its client 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”). The memorandum addressed the central issue in this 

lawsuit: alleged gender disparities in pay and promotion at Wal-Mart. The Court must 

decide whether the unauthorized disclosure of the memorandum, or at least Wal-Mart’s 

public comments about the memorandum, waived the attorney-client privilege. After 

carefully considering the papers submitted by the parties, including their supplemental 

filings, and having had the benefit of oral argument on February 14, 2013, the Court finds 

that Wal-Mart has not waived its attorney-client privilege as to the memorandum and 

therefore DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion and GRANTS Defendant’s Cross-Motion.

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BACKGROUND

A. The New York Times Article

On June 3 and 4, 2010, the New York Times published an article (the “Article”) in its 

online and print editions concerning “a memorandum issued by Wal-Mart’s counsel in 1995 

that found widespread gender disparities in pay and promotion at Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club 

stores” (the “Memo”). (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 1.) According to the Article, Lawyers Warned 

Wal-Mart of Risks Before Bias Suit, the Memo “was made available to The New York 

Times by someone not involved in the lawsuit who said that Wal-Mart had not done enough 

to address the issues it raised.” Id. The Article purported to describe a January 1995 

memorandum on employment practices written by Wal-Mart’s outside counsel, Akin Gump 

Strauss Hauer & Feld (“Akin Gump”), at the direction of Wal-Mart’s in-house counsel. (Id.) 

While the New York Times did not publish the Memo, the newspaper did report 

several findings contained in the Memo, including that “women employed by Wal-Mart 

earned less than men in numerous job categories, with men in salaried jobs earning 19 

percent more than women.” (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 1.) “By one measure . . . men were five 

and a half times as likely as women to be promoted into salaried, management positions.” 

(Id.) Further, in 1993, men employed by Wal-Mart as department managers were paid an 

hourly rate 5.8 percent higher than women in those positions. (Id.) Because the company 

“would find it difficult to fashion a persuasive explanation for disproportionate employment 

patterns,” the Memo estimated that Wal-Mart’s potential legal exposure in a class-action sex 

discrimination suit was $185 million to $740 million for 1993 alone. (Id.) The Memo also 

indicated that the overall disparities in job assignments were “statistically significant and 

sufficient to warrant a finding of discrimination unless the company can demonstrate at trial 

that the statistical disparities are caused by legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.” (Id.)

Prior to the Article’s publication, the New York Times contacted Wal-Mart asking for 

comment. David Tovar, a Wal-Mart spokesperson, was quoted in the Article as having 

responded that the company considered the Memo “confidential and privileged,” “stale,” 

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and “deeply flawed.”1 (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 1.) “This memo is 15 years old and has no 

bearing or relevance to the [present case] or our strong employment practices and diversity 

programs,” he said, adding, “We are proud of our work to promote diversity at Wal-Mart 

and are continually recognized for our efforts.” (Id.) According to the Article, “Wal-Mart 

criticized Akin Gump’s methodology, saying it had deliberately mimicked the type of 

statistical analysis done by plaintiffs’ lawyers in class-action cases. Even using that 

methodology, the retailer said, Akin Gump did not find significant disparities between the 

hourly wages of men and women.” (Id.) The Article paraphrases Wal-Mart as stating: 

in the last five years, Wal-Mart has told its 50,000 managers to promote 

more women and minorities, with 15 percent of managers’ bonuses tied to 

achieving diversity goals. Women now hold 45.8 percent of assistant store 

manager positions – a pipeline to higher-level jobs – up from 39.7 percent 

five years ago.

(Id.) Wal-Mart also claimed to have received repeated recognition for its performance on 

diversity in recent years from groups representing women and minorities. (Id.) “We use 

state-of-the-art hiring and promotional systems,” Tovar was quoted as saying, “to make sure 

that every applicant has the opportunity to apply and be considered for any position they’re 

qualified for and interested in.” (Id.)

After learning about the Article, Defendant informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that the New 

York Times planned to “publish a story based on a 1995 Memo” Akin-Gump had prepared 

for Defendant. (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 2.) Defendant explained that “Wal-Mart has always 

maintained the privileged and confidential nature of the Memo and did not authorize its 

disclosure” and had informed the newspaper “of the privileged and confidential nature of the 

Memo and requested that it be returned to Wal-Mart.” (Id.) Wal-Mart’s counsel also 

inquired whether Plaintiffs’ counsel had ever received the Memo or provided the Memo to 

the newspaper. (Id.) The following day, Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed that they had never 

possessed the Memo and did not provide it to the newspaper. (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 3.)

 

1 The Article appears to use Tovar and Wal-Mart interchangeably. 

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B. Disclosure of the Memo to Plaintiffs

Eight months later, Plaintiffs’ counsel Joseph Sellers (“Sellers”) returned to his office 

after several days of travel and discovered on his desk a “brown envelope addressed to him 

with no return address.” (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 4 at ¶2.) Upon removing the document from 

the envelope, Sellers “noticed on the cover page of the document inside that it bore the 

letterhead of ‘Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld,’ that it was addressed to various people at 

Wal-Mart Stores, and that it was marked Privileged and Confidential/ Attorney Client 

Privilege.” (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 4 at ¶ 3.) Suspecting that it might be the “Akin Gump 

Memo,” Sellers refrained from reading any more of the document. (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 4 at 

¶ 4.) Instead, Sellers gave the envelope containing the document to his firm’s HR 

Director/Assistant Administrator, Bonnie Kelley (“Kelley”). (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 4 at ¶ 5.) 

He directed Kelley to “sequester it in her office, which is locked nightly and whenever Ms. 

Kelley is away from her desk, where the firm’s other confidential records are maintained.” 

(Id.) According to Kelley, “[t]he envelope and its contents have been locked” in her office 

ever since. (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 5 at ¶ 7.)

Two days after receiving the document Sellers notified Defendant’s counsel of his 

receipt of the anonymous package and the procedures taken to secure the document. (Dkt. 

No. 840-1, Ex. 6.) After several email attempts to negotiate a course of action, counsel for 

both parties agreed to postpone further discussion of the document. (Id.)

C. Wal-Mart’s Efforts to Maintain the Memo’s Confidentiality

The Memo was conspicuously marked as privileged and confidential:

The cover of the document bears the Akin Gump firm name and contains 

the words “PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL...DO NOT REPRODUCE 

WITHOUT THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF LESTER C. NAIL” in large 

block letters. The first page (inside the cover) is marked in bold letters 

“Privileged & Confidential – Do Not Reproduce,” and each subsequent 

page of the 42-page document repeats in bold type, at the bottom of the 

page, “Privileged & Confidential,” and “Do not reproduce without the 

express consent of Lester C. Nail.”

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(Dkt. No. 846-1, Declaration of Marshall S. Ney (“Decl. Ney”) at ¶ 2.) Sellers likewise 

attests that the Memo he received was clearly marked “Privileged and Confidential/ Attorney 

Client Privilege.” (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 4 at ¶ 3.) 

Marshall Ney (“Ney”), the Associate General Counsel for the Litigation Division of 

Wal-Mart from 2002-2005 and the in-house attorney directly responsible for maintaining the 

Memo’s confidentiality during that time, declares that Wal-Mart “tightly controlled 

distribution of and access to the Privileged Memorandum.” (Dkt. No. 846-1, Decl. Ney at ¶¶ 

3-4.) There were five original copies of the Memo, and each was “individually numbered on 

the cover as ‘COPY 1 of 5,’ ‘2 of 5,’ etc.” (Dkt. No. 846-1, Decl. Ney at ¶ 3.) Upon taking 

responsibility for the Memo in 2002, Ney was given the “express directive of continuing 

very tight control over the Memo.” (Id.) Distribution was accordingly limited:

Wal-Mart provided copies only to a very limited set of outside counsel, 

select in-house attorneys, and certain executive-level Wal-Mart employees. 

To the extent that the Privileged Memorandum was distributed to Wal-Mart 

executives, or its in-house or outside legal team, recipients were 

specifically instructed that the document was privileged and highly 

confidential, and told that it should not be forwarded.

(Id.)

Kurt Krafsky, current Associate General Counsel for the Litigation Division of WalMart, attests that from August 2006 through approximately January 2012, he served first as a 

case manager in the class action group within Wal-Mart’s legal department and then as 

Discovery Co-Manager on this case. (Dkt. No. 857-1, Declaration of Kurt Krafsky (“Decl. 

Krafsky”) at ¶ 2.) During that period, “sensitive documents associated with the [current 

case] that Wal-Mart considered to be privileged and/or confidential were maintained in a 

locked storage area within the Wal-Mart Legal Department accessible only to authorized 

personnel. Such materials included, without limitation, hard copies of [the Memo].” (Dkt. 

No. 857-1, Decl. Krafsky at ¶ 4.) Electronic copies of the Memo “were protected by the 

Legal Department’s separate firewall.” (Dkt. No. 857-1, Decl. Krafsky at ¶ 5.) He and his 

colleagues “took reasonable precautions to safeguard the attorney-client privilege and other 

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protections afforded” the Memo.” (Dkt. No. 857-1, Decl. Krafsky at ¶ 6.) Wal-Mart 

maintains that it did not authorize the Memo’s disclosure to the New York Times. (Dkt. Nos. 

857-1, Decl. Krafsky at ¶ 5; 846-2, Declaration of Catherine Conway (“Decl. Conway”) at ¶ 

2).

D. The Pending Motions

Plaintiffs seek Declaratory Relief concerning the Memo. (See Dkt. No. 840.) While 

both parties agree that the Memo is protected by attorney-client privilege, Plaintiffs argue 

that the “public disclosure of the Memo’s contents [in the New York Times] has resulted in 

the loss of any privileged status that the document previously had” and accordingly ask the 

Court to allow Plaintiffs “to view and use the document.” (Dkt. No 840 at 7.) Defendant

argues that the Memo “was and remains protected by the attorney-client privilege and it may 

not be retained by plaintiffs’ counsel.” (Dkt. No. 846 at 6.) 

DISCUSSION

Federal common law governs a claim of privilege in federal question cases. See 

Fed.R.Evid. 501; see also Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research and Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 

(9th Cir. 1981). The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between 

attorney and client for the purpose of legal advice. Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389

(1981). The privilege exists “to encourage the full and frank communication between 

attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of 

law and the administration of justice.” Id.

“To prevent abuse and assure the availability of relevant evidence . . . the privilege is 

limited to only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not 

have been made absent the privilege.” In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1070 

(9th Cir. 1992). The party asserting privilege bears the burden of proof as to the privileged 

nature of the documents or communications in question. Id.; see also Weil, 647 F.2d at 25

(“As with all evidentiary privileges, the burden of proving that the attorney-client privilege 

applies rests not with the party contesting the privilege, but with the party asserting it.”) The 

attorney-client privilege is strictly construed because it may impede “full and free discovery 

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of the truth.” Weil, 647 F.2d at 24. The questions presented by the parties’ motions are 

whether the disclosure of the Memo to the New York Times and Plaintiffs waived the 

privilege and, if not, whether Wal-Mart’s public comments on the Memo in the Article 

waived the privilege and, if so, to what extent. 

1. The Disclosures to the New York Times and Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs argue that the disclosure of the Memo to the New York Times and Plaintiffs, 

even if not authorized, “destroyed the Memo’s privileged status.” (Dkt. No. 847 at 1.) 

Defendants respond that because the disclosure was involuntary and unauthorized, no waiver 

occurred. 

“[V]oluntarily disclosing privileged documents to third parties will generally destroy 

the privilege.” In re Pac Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 

Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1985) (the voluntary 

disclosure of a privileged attorney-client communication constitutes waiver); Weil, 647 F.2d 

at 24 (the voluntary disclosure of a privileged attorney-client communication constitutes 

waiver). On the other hand, “[i]nvoluntary disclosures do not automatically waive the 

attorney-client privilege.” In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d at 1130; see also United 

States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1992) (the privilege is not waived by the 

government’s discovery of a document “in the course of executing a search warrant”). 

Involuntary disclosures include “[c]ommunications which were intended to be confidential 

but are intercepted despite reasonable precautions.” J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 

Evidence, ¶ 503(a)(4)[01] at 503–31 (1982 ed.) (hereinafter Weinstein & Berger); see also

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean, 813 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that 

unauthorized disclosure of internal memo subject to strict confidentiality restrictions did not 

waive attorney-client privilege) ; In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 468, 

470 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that privilege was not waived for unauthorized disclosure of 

employee’s diary maintained at direction of outside counsel where employer limited access 

to the diary to senior executives, counsel and accountants); Smith v. Armour Pharm. Co., 

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838 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (stating that “if a confidential memorandum is 

stolen from an attorney’s office and subsequently published in newspapers across the 

country” the privilege is not waived). 

The Court finds that the disclosures to the New York Times and Plaintiffs were 

unauthorized and involuntary and thus did not waive Wal-Mart’s attorney-client privilege in 

the Memo. In Dayco, a case factually similar to this case, the plaintiffs moved for the 

production of a defendant’s diary compiled at the direction of outside counsel for his former 

employer. 102 F.R.D. at 469. The majority of the information plaintiffs had concerning the 

diary “appeare[d] to come from a newspaper account of some aspects of the litigation.” Id. 

The newspaper had obtained the diary through an unidentified source and had quoted 

extensively from the diary. Id. The former employer’s general counsel averred that the 

employer had authorized only a select group of its senior employees, officers, counsel and 

accountants to access the diary and that the disclosure of the diary to the newspaper was 

unauthorized. Id. at 470. The court held that “[a]bsent any indication that [defendant] or 

Dayco officials voluntarily gave the diary to the Dayton Daily News, publication of excerpts 

of same should not be considered a waiver of the privilege.” Id. The record supports the 

same finding here: Wal-Mart did not voluntarily disclose the Memo to the New York Times

or Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the Wal-Mart has not met its burden of showing that 

it took sufficient precautions to maintain the Memo’s confidentiality. They contend that the 

Court should infer from the disclosures themselves that Wal-Mart “has not safeguarded its 

attorney-client communication like ‘crown jewels.’” (Dkt. No. 840 at 7, quoting In re 

Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

2

 The Court disagrees. In Resolution 

Trust Corp., for example, The Washington Post published an article purporting to describe 

and quote from an internal “Authority to Sue Memorandum” (“ATS”) written by a senior 

 

2 Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a) rejected the result in In re Sealed Case, dictating instead 

that “an inadvertent disclosure of protected information can never result in a subject matter 

waiver.” Fed. R. Evid. 502(a), Adv. Comm. Notes (2011 Amd.). 

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attorney for the plaintiff. 813 F.Supp. at 1427. Despite evidence of the Resolution Trust 

Corporation’s (“RTC”) precautions to secure the memorandum’s confidentiality, including 

that each page of the memorandum was marked confidential and that the memorandum was 

shared with only a few high-ranking officials and attorneys, the defendant argued that the 

disclosure itself supported an inference that the RTC had knowingly and deliberately waived 

the memorandum’s confidentiality. Id. at 1429. The court refused to draw such an 

inference; instead, the court explained that the “RTC has come forward and presented 

testimony, under penalty of perjury, affirmatively demonstrating that they took precautions 

to secure the confidentiality of the ATS memo and that the memo’s leak remains 

inexplicable.” Id. at 1429-30. Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiff “did not 

voluntarily waive any attorney-client privilege it would have possessed, but for the 

disclosure.” Id. at 1430.

The same reasoning applies here. Wal-Mart has submitted evidence under penalty of 

perjury establishing its extensive efforts to maintain the Memo’s confidentiality. Indeed, 

when Sellers found the Memo on his desk, he did not read past the top of the first page 

because the Memo was so distinctively marked as confidential and attorney-client 

privileged. (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 4 at ¶¶3-4.)

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Fed. Election Comm’n v. Christian Coal is misplaced. 178 

F.R.D. 61, order aff’d in part, modified in part, 178 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Va. 1998). There the 

court concluded that “[i]f the information ends up in the hands of a third party, courts don’t 

want to hear how it got there. Once in the hands of a third party, the privilege, if it ever 

existed, is lost.” Id. at 71-72. This holding, Plaintiffs contend, represents the “longstanding 

line of authority” that “documents lose their privileged status upon disclosure to a third 

party.” (Dkt. No. 840 at 6.) The court, however, was discussing those situations “where the 

attorney or client communicates the privileged information to a third party after the privilege 

has come into existence,” and not, as is the case here, situations involving the unauthorized

disclosure by an unknown party. Fed. Election Comm’n, 178 F.R.D. at 71. The court itself 

observed that unauthorized disclosures to a third party do not automatically waive privilege. 

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Id. at 72, n.9. Citing Dayco, the court noted that “when a company carefully protects its 

privileged documents but they are stolen or otherwise misappropriated and then revealed, 

some courts have held that this does not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.” 

Id.

The Court finds that Wal-Mart took reasonable steps to clearly mark the Memo as 

privileged and to maintain it in a secure location and limit its dissemination. Despite such 

efforts, the Memo still made its way to the New York Times and Plaintiffs. Because WalMart did not authorize these disclosures, the disclosures did not waive Wal-Mart’s attorneyclient privilege in the Memo.

2. Wal-Mart’s Public Comments Regarding the Memo 

Plaintiffs next argue that Wal-Mart’s voluntary decision to comment on “the 

substance and merits of the Memo in The New York Times,” waived the privilege as to the 

entire Memo. (Dkt. No. 840 at 9.) 

There are two primary ways in which a party can waive the attorney-client privilege. 

First, a party may implicitly waive the privilege by asserting a claim or defense that relies on 

privileged materials as its basis. Weil, 647 F.2d at 24; see also Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil 

Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Where a party raises a claim [or defense] which 

in fairness requires disclosure of the protected communication, the privilege may be 

implicitly waived.”). Such waiver indisputably does not apply here because Defendants do 

not rely on the Memo or any privileged attorney-client communication for their claims or 

defenses. 

Second, and more relevant here, a party may expressly waive the attorney-client 

privilege. See Weil, 647 F.2d at 24. 

An express waiver occurs when a party discloses privileged information to 

a third party who is not bound by the privilege, or otherwise shows 

disregard for the privilege by making the information public. Disclosures 

that effect an express waiver are typically within the full control of the 

party holding the privilege; courts have no role in encouraging or forcing 

the disclosure-they merely recognize the waiver after it has occurred.

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Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (internal citations 

omitted); see also United States v. Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591, 602 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“[T]he 

attorney-client privilege is waived upon the voluntary disclosure of protected information by 

a client, or by an attorney at the behest of a client.”). Once the proverbial cat is out of the 

bag, the client has defeated the underlying purpose of maintaining confidentiality and 

therefore the communications are no longer worthy of protection. 

A party need not have intended to waive privilege when it made the disclosure. See

Weil, 647 F.2d at 24. “Despite the somewhat misleading nomenclature, an ‘express’ waiver 

need not be effectuated by words or accompanied by the litigant’s subjective intent [to have 

waived privilege]. Rather, the privilege may be waived by the client’s . . . actions even if the

disclosure that gave rise to the waiver was inadvertent.” Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 720, n.4; see 

also United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 1990) (“intent or lack of 

intent to waive the attorney-client privilege is not dispositive”); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. 

U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D. D.C. 1970) (defendant waived privilege over a 

letter when he inadvertently included it among other documents he delivered to plaintiff). 

A review of the comments attributed to Wal-Mart in the Article reveals that Wal-Mart 

disclosed some of the confidential Memo’s protected content.

First, the Article quotes Wal-Mart as calling the Memo “confidential and privileged,” 

“stale,” and “deeply flawed.” (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 1.) Those comments do not reveal any

privileged communication. 

Second, Wal-Mart stated that “[t]his memo is15 years old and has no bearing or 

relevance to the [present case] or our strong employment practices and diversity 

programs...We are proud of our work to promote diversity at Wal-Mart and are continually 

recognized for our efforts.” (Id.) This quote provides no information about the actual 

content of the Memo and is in fact a generalization. 

Third, the Article quotes Wal-Mart as saying: “We use state-of-the-art hiring and 

promotional systems to make sure that every applicant has the opportunity to apply and be 

considered for any position they’re qualified for and interested in.” (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 1.) 

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Here, Wal-Mart appears to be speaking about present employment practices, providing no 

insight into the specific contents of the privileged 1995 Memo. 

Fourth, the Article also paraphrases what Wal-Mart reportedly said about more recent 

hiring patterns: “[I]n the last five years, Wal-Mart has told its 50,000 managers to promote 

more women and minorities, with 15 percent of managers’ bonuses tied to achieving 

diversity goals. Women now hold 45.8 percent of assistant store manager positions...up 

from 39.7 percent five years ago.” (Id.) According to the Article, “[Wal-Mart] said groups 

representing women and minorities had repeatedly recognized the company’s performance 

on diversity in recent years.” (Id.) Even if any of this information had been presented in the 

form of direct quotes, it does not pertain to the Memo’s contents but instead pertains to 

recent developments. 

In only one paragraph does Wal-Mart disclose the actual contents of the Memo. 

According to the Article, “Wal-Mart criticized Akin Gump’s methodology, saying it had 

deliberately mimicked the type of statistical analysis done by plaintiffs’ lawyers in classaction cases. Even using that methodology, the retailer said, Akin Gump did not find 

significant disparities between the hourly wages of men and women.” (Dkt. No. 840-1, Ex. 

1.)3 With this statement Wal-Mart intentionally disclosed privileged information; namely, 

Akin Gump’s methodology and the fact that the law firm did not find hourly wage 

disparities by gender. 

3. Wal-Mart’s Disclosure did not Waive the Privilege as to the Memo

“It is well-established that when a client discloses to another person the content of a 

privileged attorney communication, the resulting privilege waiver may extend beyond the 

communication itself to other related matters.” WI-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & 

Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs insist that Wal-Mart’s 

disclosure to the New York Times waived the attorney-client privilege as to the entire Memo; 

Plaintiffs should be allowed to keep the Memo and use it however they see fit. In other 

 

3 Wal-Mart does not contest the accuracy with which the Article paraphrased its comments.

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words, Wal-Mart’s limited disclosure of the Memo’s contents waived the privilege as to the 

undisclosed (at least by Wal-Mart) contents. 

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, when a disclosure is made in a federal 

proceeding or to a federal agency or office and “waives the attorney-client privilege or workproduct protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a 

federal or state proceeding only if:

(1) the waiver is intentional;

(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the 

same subject matter; and

(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.”

Fed. R. Evid. 502(a); see also Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010)

(stating that courts apply a fairness balancing test to determine the scope of a waiver of 

privilege). The last requirement—fairness—aims “to prevent prejudice to a party and 

distortion of the judicial process that may be caused by the privilege-holder’s selective 

disclosure during litigation of otherwise privileged information. Under the doctrine the client 

alone controls the privilege and may or may not choose to divulge his own secrets.” In re 

von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987). 

Rule 502, however, only applies to disclosures made in a federal proceeding. WalMart’s disclosure here was extrajudicial; it was made to a newspaper rather than as part of 

this litigation. The Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed whether fairness should be 

considered in determining the scope of an express waiver made outside of litigation. In WILAN, Inc., however, the Federal Circuit recently held that the Ninth Circuit would conclude

that fairness balancing is required in determining the scope of privilege waivers arising from 

extra-judicial express disclosures. 684 F.3d at 1369. The court also concluded: “we find 

nothing in the Ninth Circuit’s law to demonstrate that it has adopted a rule simultaneously 

requiring district courts to apply fairness balancing to privilege waivers made during 

litigation, but blocking them from applying it to extrajudicial waivers.” Id. at 1370. The 

Federal Circuit reached this decision after engaging in a comprehensive review of the Ninth 

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Circuit caselaw. The court emphasized the Ninth Circuit’s repeated reliance on In re von 

Bulow. There the Second Circuit held that “where...disclosures of privileged information are 

made extrajudicially and without prejudice to the opposing party, there exists no reason in 

logic or equity to broaden the waiver beyond those matters actually revealed.” In re von 

Bulow, 828 F.2d at 103.

This Court agrees with the Federal Circuit that fairness must be the touchstone in 

determining whether Wal-Mart’s disclosure of certain findings in the Memo compels the 

disclosure of the entire Memo. Plaintiffs argue that “[i]t would be manifestly unfair” to 

allow Wal-Mart to “selectively disclose portions of the Memo it believed were beneficial to 

its position–in one of the largest publications in the country–while refusing to disclose the 

full scope of these facts to Plaintiffs.” (Dkt. No. 847 at 5.) The Court finds no unfairness to 

Plaintiffs here. Wal-Mart has not attempted to use any portions of the Memo in this 

litigation. As long as the initial disclosures of privileged communications “are and remain 

extrajudicial, there is no legal prejudice that warrants a broad court-imposed subject matter 

waiver.” In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 103. “[D]isclosures made in public rather than in 

court—even if selective—create no risk of legal prejudice until put at issue in the litigation 

by the privilege holder.” Id.; see also WI-LAN, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2013 WL 

685339 * 4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (finding no subject matter waiver from the plaintiff’s 

extrajudicial disclosure of a privileged communication because the plaintiff never used and 

disclaimed any intent to use the disclosed information in the litigation). 

CONCLUSION

Neither the unauthorized disclosures of the Memo to the New York Times and 

Plaintiffs’ attorneys, nor Wal-Mart’s subsequent comments to the New York Times, waived 

Wal-Mart’s privilege over the Memo. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion 

for Declaratory Relief (Dkt. No. 840) and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Compel 

Delivery of the Memo (Dkt. No. 846). Plaintiffs shall deliver their copy of the Memo to 

Defendant within 10 days of the date of this Order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2013

_________________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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