Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00387/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00387-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEONARD JESSIE MITCHELL, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

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A. J. MALFI, )

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Respondent. )

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___________________________________ )

1: 06-CV- 0387 AWI WMW HC

ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR STAY

[Doc. 9]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se on a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this court. 

On January 12, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion to stay this action until he can exhaust

certain Constitutional claims in the California Supreme Court. Specifically, Petitioner wishes

to exhaust a claim under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Petitioner was

convicted in 2002, and the California Court of Appeal issued its opinion in his direct appeal

on February 10, 2004. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for relief with the California

Supreme Court. It therefore appears possible that Petitioner may obtain relief under Blakely

Case 1:06-cv-00387-PJH Document 12 Filed 06/01/07 Page 1 of 2
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v. Washington ,542 U.S. 296 (2004), which is not retroactive to cases on collateral review.

See United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.2005). 

A district court has discretion to stay a petition which it may validly consider on the

merits. Rhines v. Weber, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 1534, 2005 WL 711587 (2005);

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-88 (9 Cir. 1998); th

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102 (1997). 

However, the Supreme Court recently held that this discretion is circumscribed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Rhines, 125 S.Ct. at 1534.

In light of AEDPA’s objectives, “stay and abeyance [is] available only in limited

circumstances” and “is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good

cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. at 1535. Even

if Petitioner were to demonstrate good cause for that failure, “the district court would abuse

its discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly

meritless.” Id.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 31, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

bl0dc4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00387-PJH Document 12 Filed 06/01/07 Page 2 of 2