Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01293/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01293-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 210
Nature of Suit: Land Condemnation
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

lklited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 311991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

· Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

10,031.98 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR ) 

LESS, SITUATE IN LAS ANIMAS COUNTY,) 

COLORADO; THE FEDERAL LAND BANK ) 

OF WICHITA, ) 

Defendants, 

and 

SHARP RANCH, INC., et al. and 

UNKNOWN OWNERS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-1293 

(D.C. No. 83-A-1176) 

(D. Colorado) 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir.~- 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1293 Document: 010110129502 Date Filed: 07/31/1991 Page: 1 
The United States condemned over 10,000 acres of land owned 

by defendant Sharp Ranch, Inc. Defendant was dissatisfied with 

the appraisal and amount offered and forced litigation. The first 

trial resulted in a jury verdict of $2 million, which was closer 

to the amounts testified to by defendant's witnesses than to the 

value testified to by government appraisers. After that trial, 

the district court granted the United States' motion for a new 

trial, and at a second trial the jury awarded defendant 

$1,733,596, which was also above the government's evidence, but 

was closer to the government's evidence than the $2.5 million 

sought by defendant. This time defendant appealed the decision 

and this court reversed the district court's determination, 

remanding for a third trial. See United States v. 10,031.98 Acres 

of Land, 850 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1988). At the third trial, the 

jury came in with $1,521,000, which was $176,000 more than the 

government's evidence but closer to the government's evidence than 

to the evidence offered by defendant. Defendant appealed and this 

court affirmed. United States v. 10,031.98 Acres of Land, No. 88-

2615 (10th Cir. Feb. 23, 1990). Thereafter final judgment was 

entered by the district court on August 9, 1990. 

The only issue in the current appeal is the district court's 

denial of defendant's request for attorney's fees under 28 u.s.c. 

S 2412, part of the Equal Access to Justice Act. At the time the 

first condemnation was commenced in 1983, that act contained no 

precise definition of "prevailing party" for purposes of fee 

entitlement. In the 1985 amendments prevailing party was defined 

as 

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Appellate Case: 90-1293 Document: 010110129502 Date Filed: 07/31/1991 Page: 2 
• 

a party who obtains a final judgment (other than by 

settlement), exclusive of interest, the amount of which 

is at least as close to the highest valuation of the 

property involved that is attested to at trial on behalf 

of the property owner as it is to the highest valuation 

of the property involved that is attested to at trial on 

behalf of the Government. 

28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(2)(H). The district court ruled that the 

judgment became final when we issued our mandate on April 5, 1990, 

after affirming the district court's judgment entered after the 

third trial. Defendant argues that we should apply the 1983 

version of the law because "[t]o hold otherwise would require a 

retrospective application of amendments to the statute that 

occurred subsequent to the filing of the case." Brief of 

Appellant at 8. It argues that the amended statute did not take 

away a right for damages that had already accrued, and it argues 

that its right to attorney's fees had accrued. We do not agree. 

Section 7(a) of the 1985 act provides explicitly as follows: 

" IN GENERAL--except as otherwise provided in this section, the 

amendments made by this Act ... shall apply to cases pending or 

commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act." 5 

u.s.c. S 504 note (emphasis added). We cannot ignore this 

explicit determination by Congress that the amendment should apply 

to pending cases. Further, in Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967 

(10th Cir. 1987), we applied this statute to a case in which the 

merits had been resolved by the amendment date and only fees and 

costs remained. See id. at 968 n.1. In the instant case the 

merits had not been determined at the date of the amendment 

because of the retrial. Thus it follows, a fortiori, that we must 

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Appellate Case: 90-1293 Document: 010110129502 Date Filed: 07/31/1991 Page: 3 
.. 

apply the definition in the amended statute. Because the jury's 

award as ultimately upheld was closer to the highest amount 

testified to by the government's appraisers than to that of the 

defendant's, defendant was not a prevailing party entitled to 

attorney's fees. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-1293 Document: 010110129502 Date Filed: 07/31/1991 Page: 4