Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01156/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01156-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DWAYNE MONTGOMERY,

Plaintiff,

v. 

M. CULUM, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2: 22-cv-1156 KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint. (ECF No. 15.) 

Named as defendants are Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”) Correctional Officers 

Culum, Gamez, Pesce, Kelly, Hurtado, Sergent and Mott and MCSP Correctional Sergeant Clay. 

(Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff’s amended complaint contains three claims for relief: retaliation, excessive 

force and denial of mental health care. 

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends dismissal of plaintiff’s 

retaliation claims and plaintiff’s claim alleging denial of mental health care pursuant to Coleman 

v. Brown. The undersigned separately orders service of plaintiff’s claims alleging excessive force 

and denial of mental health care based on the Eighth Amendment. 

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Factual Allegations

 Plaintiff alleges that on June 1, 2020, defendant Pesce illegally confiscated clothing items 

belonging to plaintiff. (Id. at 12.) When plaintiff asked defendant Pesce to return the property, 

defendant Pesce responded, “You can’t have it back, next time don’t leave your shit on my 

dayroom benches!” (Id.) Plaintiff then asked defendant Pesce for a property confiscation receipt 

and a 602 grievance form. (Id.) Defendant Pesce allegedly refused to give plaintiff the requested 

forms. (Id.) 

 After reaching the conclusion that any further communication with defendant Pesce would 

be futile, plaintiff then put his hands behind his back and submitted to handcuffs. (Id. at 12-13.) 

Defendant Pesce placed plaintiff in restraints and attempted to walk plaintiff toward his cell in 

order to prevent plaintiff from reporting his misconduct. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff sat down on the 

dayroom floor and told defendants Pesce and Hurtado that he would not move until he spoke with 

the sergeant or the watch commander. (Id.) Defendant Pesce called for additional staff 

assistance. (Id.) Defendants Kelly and Sergent responded to this call. (Id.) 

 Upon defendant Kelly’s arrival, defendant Kelly and Pesce stepped away and had a 

conversation. (Id.) Defendant Kelly then told plaintiff that he (plaintiff) could not talk to anyone 

and that plaintiff needed to “take it to his cell.” (Id.) After plaintiff refused to go to his cell, 

defendant Kelly said, “He spit on me, did you see that, he spit on me!” (Id.) Plaintiff began to 

protest this lie. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that due to the presence of multiple inmates in the 

dayroom who saw that plaintiff did not spit on defendant Kelly, defendant Kelly “abandoned this 

ploy to falsify a fake battery charge on the plaintiff.” (Id.) 

Because defendants Kelly and Pesce attempted to set plaintiff up with false charges of 

battery, plaintiff had an anxiety attack. (Id.) Plaintiff began shouting, “I’m having a mental 

breakdown...I need to see a mental health clinician...I need to talk to the Sergeant right now!” 

(Id.) 

 Defendant Kelly then took plaintiff by the left bicep and defendant Pesce took plaintiff by 

the right bicep. (Id. at 14.) Defendants began to drag plaintiff across the dayroom floor toward 

his cell as defendants Sergent, Hurtado and Mott watched. (Id. at 13-14.) As defendants Kelly 

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and Pesce dragged plaintiff, plaintiff felt a sharp pain in his shoulders and back due to the 

aggressive way he was being handled and because plaintiff is mobility impaired. (Id. at 14.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he had “no choice” but to swing his feet from beneath to the front of his body 

and place his left foot on the floor. (Id.) This action caused everybody to abruptly stop and 

defendant Pesce lost his balance, falling on top of plaintiff. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that as he fell, defendant Kelly “somehow forcefully slammed me face 

first into the concrete floor,” causing plaintiff to hit the floor hard, disorienting plaintiff. (Id.) 

Defendants Kelly and Pesce began using wrist and finger restraint maneuvers to intentionally 

inflict pain on plaintiff. (Id.) As defendants Kelly and Pesce restrained plaintiff, defendant Kelly 

said, “Now it’s a battery.” (Id.) 

 Defendant Sergent then placed plaintiff in ankle restraints. (Id.) Defendant Culum took 

the ankle chain from defendant Sergent. (Id.) Defendant Culum crossed plaintiff’s feet over the 

other and forcefully drove his full body weight onto plaintiff’s ankles and buttocks as hard as he 

could, causing severe pain to shoot through plaintiff’s ankles and feet. (Id.) 

 Shortly thereafter, defendant Clay entered the housing unit and instructed defendants 

Culum and Gamez to escort plaintiff to the facility A program office. (Id. at 15.) Defendants 

Culum and Gamez lifted plaintiff up from the floor and placed him in a wheelchair then put 

plaintiff in a holding cage. (Id.) Defendant Gamez then removed the restraints from plaintiff’s 

wrists and ankles. (Id.) 

 Defendant Culum then ordered plaintiff to remove his clothing. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to 

remove his clothing because he felt anxiety and fear. (Id.) Plaintiff again asked to speak to a 

mental health clinician. (Id.) 

 Defendant Culum put the hand restraints back on plaintiff’s wrists. (Id.) 

 Defendant Gamez told defendant Culum that she was going to retrieve some scissors. 

(Id.) Defendant Culum told plaintiff, “If you give me any more problems, I’m gonna fuck you up 

nigger!” (Id.) Plaintiff responded, “You ain’t gonna do shit to me.” (Id.) Defendant Culum then 

yanked plaintiff from the cage, swung plaintiff 180 degrees and slammed plaintiff’s face into the 

wall. (Id.) Defendant Culum then smashed the heel of his foot down into plaintiff’s right foot, 

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causing plaintiff pain. (Id. at 15-16.) Defendant Culum then lifted plaintiff up off of his feet and 

slammed plaintiff to the floor. (Id. at 16.) Defendant Culum struck plaintiff in the face with his 

fists multiple times. (Id.) 

 As defendant Culum assaulted plaintiff, defendant Gamez returned. (Id.) Defendant 

Gamez joined in the assault by dropping her full body weight into plaintiff’s back and striking 

plaintiff in the back and rib cage. (Id.) 

After the assault, defendant Gamez asked defendant Culum what happened. (Id.) 

Defendant Culum said that plaintiff attempted to strike him. (Id.) Defendant Gamez reminded 

defendant Culum that plaintiff was still handcuffed behind his back. (Id.) Defendant Culum then 

revised his statement, stating that plaintiff struck him in the chest with his shoulder. (Id.) 

 After plaintiff was returned to the holding cage, plaintiff told defendant Clay that the 

handcuffs on his wrists were too tight and that plaintiff was losing feeling in both of his wrists. 

(Id.) Defendant Clay ignored plaintiff’s request to loosen the handcuffs. (Id.) 

After begging to see a mental health clinician, plaintiff was finally able to speak to a 

psychiatrist. (Id.) After consulting with defendant Clay, the psychiatrist left without saying 

anything. (Id. at 17.) 

Claim One—Retaliation

Legal Standard 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote and 

citations omitted). To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff may “assert an injury no more 

tangible than a chilling effect on First Amendment rights.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 

1269–70 (9th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, “a plaintiff does not have to show that ‘his speech was 

actually inhibited or suppressed,’ but rather that the adverse action at issue ‘would chill or silence 

a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.’” Id. at 1271 (citing 

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Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568–69). 

Discussion

Plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim against defendants Pesce, Kelly, Sergent, Hurtado and 

Mott. (ECF No. 15 at 17.) Plaintiff appears to claim that his protected conduct was asking 

defendant Pesce for a 602 form and property confiscation receipt in order to report defendant 

Pesce’s wrongful confiscation of plaintiff’s personal property. Plaintiff appears to claim that 

defendants retaliated against him for requesting these forms by denying his requests to see the 

sergeant and mental health clinician, to whom he could have reported the alleged misconduct. 

 In the original complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant Pesce ordered plaintiff to return 

to his cell after plaintiff asked for a property receipt and to speak with defendant’s supervisor. 

(ECF No. 1 at 15.) In the original complaint, plaintiff alleged that he disobeyed the order to 

return to his cell. (Id.) In the original complaint, plaintiff appeared to claim that defendant 

Pesce’s order for plaintiff to return to his cell was the adverse action. The undersigned found that 

this order did not rise to the level of an adverse action that would deter a prisoner of ordinary 

firmness from further First Amendment activities. (ECF No. 8 at 6.) 

The amended complaint omits the allegation made in the original complaint that plaintiff 

disobeyed defendant Pesce’s order to return to his cell. In the amended complaint, plaintiff 

alleges that he walked to his cell (without being ordered) but stopped and demanded to speak to 

the sergeant and a mental health clinician. 

While it is true that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012), plaintiff also may not omit relevant facts in an 

attempt to state a cognizable claim. See Azadpour v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 2007 WL 2141079, 

at *2 n. 2 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2007) (“Where allegations in an amended complaint contradict 

those in a prior complaint, a district court need not accept the new alleged facts as true, and may, 

in fact, strike the changed allegations as ‘false and sham.’”) (citations omitted). 

 In the amended complaint, plaintiff appears to omit the allegation that he disobeyed 

defendant Pesce’s order to return to his cell in an attempt to state a potentially colorable 

retaliation claim. Plaintiff may not omit this relevant fact in an attempt to state a potentially 

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colorable claim. Accordingly, the undersigned herein considers whether defendants’ denial of 

plaintiff’s requests to see the sergeant and mental health clinician after plaintiff disobeyed the 

order to return to his cell were adverse actions. 

Defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s requests to see the sergeant and a mental health clinician

appear calculated to address plaintiff’s refusal to obey the order to return to his cell. Plaintiff has 

not pled sufficient facts demonstrating that defendants denied his requests to see the sergeant and 

a mental health clinician because he requested a 602 form and a property confiscation receipt. 

For this reason, the undersigned recommends dismissal of this retaliation claim. 

Plaintiff also alleges that “defendants Pesce and Kelly, along with the other named 

defendants, falsified their Crime/Incident Report(s), to reflect that plaintiff committed a criminal 

act against defendant Pesce, to cover up his misconduct, and protect him from the plaintiff 

pursuing other legal action.” (ECF No. 15 at 18.) 

Plaintiff appears to claim that defendants falsely charged plaintiff with battery in 

retaliation for his request for a 602 form and a property confiscation receipt. For the following 

reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has not plead sufficient facts in support of this claim. 

First, plaintiff has not plead sufficient facts demonstrating that the battery charge was 

false. For example, plaintiff does not describe the alleged false statements by defendants in the 

rules violation report charging him with battery. 

In addition, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts demonstrating 

that defendants filed the allegedly false battery charge against him because he requested the 602 

form and property confiscation receipt. As discussed above, before defendant Kelly said, “Now 

it’s a battery,” several other things occurred: plaintiff disobeyed the order to return to his cell, 

defendants attempted to drag plaintiff to his cell and plaintiff swung his feet in front of his body, 

causing plaintiff and defendant Pesce to fall. Based on these circumstances, the undersigned 

finds that plaintiff’s claim that defendants filed the allegedly false battery charges against him 

because he requested a 602 form and property confiscation receipt is speculative and conclusory. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends dismissal of plaintiff’s 

claim alleging that defendants retaliated against him by falsely charging him with battery. 

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Claim Two—Excessive Force

Legal Standard

“When prison officials use excessive force against prisoners, they violate the inmates’ 

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 

F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish a claim for the use of excessive force in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that prison officials applied force maliciously 

and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). In making this determination, the court may 

evaluate (1) the need for application of force, (2) the relationship between that need and the 

amount of force used, (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and (4) any 

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id. at 7; see also id. at 9–10 (“The 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from 

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not 

of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted)).

Discussion

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Pesce, Kelly, Culum and Gamez used excessive force. 

(ECF No. 15 at 19.) The only specific incident of excessive force plaintiff identifies in the 

discussion of this claim is when defendants Culum, Gamez and Clay allegedly placed handcuffs 

on plaintiff so tight they cut off all circulation to plaintiff’s hands and wrists. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges that defendants Culum, Gamez and Clay denied his requests to loosen the handcuffs. (Id.) 

These allegations state a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against 

defendants Culum, Gamez and Clay. 

Despite plaintiff’s failure to identify other specific incidents of excessive force, the 

undersigned herein discusses the allegations in the amended complaint based on which plaintiff 

may be alleging excessive force.

Plaintiff alleges that when defendants Pesce and Kelly dragged him, he felt a sharp pain in 

his shoulders due to the aggressive way they handled him and because he is mobility impaired. 

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The undersigned finds that these allegations state a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment 

excessive force claim against defendants Pesce and Kelly. 

 Plaintiff alleges that as he fell to the floor after he swung his feet forward, defendant Kelly 

somehow forcefully slammed plaintiff face first into the concrete floor. Plaintiff alleges that 

defendants Kelly and Pesce began using wrist and finger restraint maneuvers to intentionally 

inflict pain on plaintiff. The undersigned finds that these allegations state potentially colorable 

Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against defendants Kelly and Pesce.

 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Culum forcefully drove his full body weight down onto 

plaintiff’s ankles and buttocks as hard as he could, causing plaintiff severe pain. The undersigned 

finds that this allegation states a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim 

against defendant Culum. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Culum slammed plaintiff’s face into the wall, smashed the 

heel of his foot into plaintiff’s right foot, lifted plaintiff off his feet, slammed plaintiff onto the 

floor and began striking plaintiff. These allegations state a potentially colorable Eighth 

Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Culum. 

 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Gamez joined the assault by defendant Culum. These 

allegations state a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against 

defendant Gamez.

Heck v. Humphrey

 In the order screening the original complaint, the undersigned observed that plaintiff 

alleged that criminal charges were pending against him in state court based on the allegations of 

excessive force raised in the complaint. (ECF No. 8 at 14.) 

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Supreme Court held: 

[T]o recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose lawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must 

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct 

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state 

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.] 

512 U.S. at 487. 

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Heck does not bar plaintiff from bringing an action raising claims challenging ongoing 

criminal proceedings. However, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), explains that such an 

action should be stayed: 

[i]f plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he [or she] has been 

convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that likely will 

be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the 

power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to 

stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a 

criminal case is ended.

459 U.S. 393-94. 

 Later, “[i]f the plaintiff is convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that 

conviction, Heck requires dismissal; otherwise, the case may proceed.” Yuan v. City of Los 

Angeles, 2010 WL 3632810 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2010) (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393); 

Peyton v. Burdick, 358 Fed.Appx. 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating judgment in a § 1983 case where 

claims implicated rulings likely to be made in pending state court criminal proceedings and 

remanding for district court to stay action until pending state court proceedings concluded); 

Valenzuela v. Santiesteban, 2021 WL 1845544, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9 2021) (staying 

excessive force case where related criminal prosecution pending); Vivas v. County of Riverside, 

2016 WL 9001020, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016) (staying excessive force case where criminal 

prosecution for resisting arrest was pending). 

 In the order screening the original complaint, the undersigned found that if plaintiff’s 

excessive force claims were intertwined with the pending criminal charges, this action should be 

stayed. (ECF No. 8 at 15.) The undersigned ordered plaintiff to address, in the amended 

complaint, whether the pending criminal charges were related to the excessive force claims raised 

in the amended complaint. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff filed separate briefing addressing his pending criminal charges. (ECF No. 14.) 

After reviewing this briefing and the documents attached, the undersigned cannot determine 

whether plaintiff’s excessive force claims are intertwined with the pending criminal charges. For 

this reason, the undersigned orders service of plaintiff’s excessive force claims. However, the 

undersigned will recommend that plaintiff’s excessive force claims be stayed if it is later 

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determined that they are intertwined with the pending criminal charges. 

Claim Three—Denial of Mental Health Care and Violation of Coleman v. Brown Protocol 

Legal Standard for Eighth Amendment

 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. 

Const. amend. VIII. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). 

If a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim arises in the context of medical or mental health 

care the prisoner must allege and prove “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence 

deliberate indifference to serious medical [or mental health] needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. An 

Eighth Amendment medical claim has two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical 

need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 

1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

A medical or mental health need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical 

or mental health need include “the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities.” Id. at 1059-60. By establishing the existence of a serious medical 

or mental health need, a prisoner satisfies the objective requirement for proving an Eighth 

Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

If a prisoner establishes the existence of a serious medical or mental health need, the 

prisoner must show that prison officials responded to the serious medical need with deliberate 

indifference. See Id. at 834. In general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison 

officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with treatment, or may be shown by the way in 

which prison officials provide such care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

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Before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged with regard to 

medical care, “the indifference to his [or mental health] medical needs must be substantial. Mere 

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” 

Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

105-6). Deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” and 

“requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.’” Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 835. 

To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from delay in providing care, a 

plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745-46 (9th 

Cir. 2002); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. In this regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm 

was substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the 

defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

Discussion

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Pesce, Kelly, Sergent, Hurtado and Mott failed to provide 

plaintiff with mental health care after plaintiff told them that he was having a mental health 

breakdown. (ECF No. 15 at 20.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Pesce wrote in the rules 

violation report, 

I was monitoring building 2 dayroom from the podium when I 

noticed inmate Montgomery acting bizarre, by shouting, “I’m having 

a mental breakdown!” and pacing back and forth in an agitated state. 

Due to Montgomery’s bizarre behavior, I ordered Montgomery to 

submit to handcuffs. He complied, and called for escort out of 

building 2 via state issued radio. Officer B. Kelly responded and 

grabbed Montgomery left arm as I had Montgomery’s right arm. 

Montgomery continued stating, “I’m having a mental health 

breakdown, you’re going to use force on me do it, ...” 

Simultaneously, Montgomery stopped the escort and kicked back 

with his right leg striking my left knee causing me to fall forward 

onto the ground. As I was falling I maintained control of 

Montgomery’s left arm and being struck I was unable to see if any 

staff used force. Once on the ground, Montgomery was compliant 

and not resisting. Officers J. Gamez and M. Culum escorted 

Montgomery from the building in a wheelchair. 

(Id. at 21-22.) 

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Plaintiff appears to claim that, when he had his mental health crisis, defendants Pesce, 

Kelly, Sergent, Hurtado and Mott should have provided him with mental health treatment rather 

than attempting to take him to his cell. According to amended complaint, defendant Pesce 

acknowledged that plaintiff was behaving bizarrely. Based on these allegations, the undersigned 

finds that plaintiff states a potentially colorable claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment 

right to adequate mental health care against defendants Pesce, Kelly, Sergeant, Hurtado and 

Mott.1

Coleman v. Brown

 Plaintiff may be alleging that defendants violated the court decree issued in Coleman v. 

Brown when they failed to provide him with mental health care. For the following reasons, the 

undersigned finds that plaintiff does not state a potentially colorable claim based on an alleged 

violation of the Coleman decree.

 Coleman v. Brown, No. 90-CV-520-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal), is a class action in the Eastern 

District concerning the constitutional adequacy of the mental health care provided to inmates by 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff cannot seek 

relief based on alleged violations of the court order in the Coleman class action. Espinoza v. 

Saldivar, 2016 WL 7159249, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016). Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff 

raises a claim based on alleged violations of orders issued in Coleman, such a claim should be 

dismissed. 

Conclusion 

 As discussed above, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s amended complaint states the 

following potentially colorable claims for relief: 1) defendants Culum, Gamaz and Clay used 

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they allegedly applied handcuffs 

tightly and disregarded plaintiff’s request to loosen the handcuffs; 2) defendants Kelly and Pesce 

used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they allegedly attempted to drag 

1

 In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he later saw a psychiatrist. Although plaintiff 

was seen by a mental health professional after the incidents alleged, it is unclear if the situation 

would have escalated the way it allegedly did had plaintiff received mental health treatment at the 

beginning of the incidents. 

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plaintiff to his cell; 3) defendant Kelly used excessive force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment when he allegedly slammed plaintiff’s face into the concrete; 4) defendants Kelly 

and Pesce used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they allegedly used 

finger and wrist restraint maneuvers to intentionally inflict pain on plaintiff; 5) defendant Culum 

used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he allegedly drove his fully 

body weight down onto plaintiff’s ankles and buttocks as hard as he could, causing plaintiff to 

suffer severe pain; 6) defendants Culum and Gamez used excessive force in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment when they allegedly assaulted plaintiff; and 7) defendants Pesce, Kelly, 

Sergent, Hurtado and Mott violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to adequate mental health 

care when they allegedly failed to provide mental health treatment. The undersigned separately 

orders service of defendants as to these claims. 

As discussed above, plaintiff fails to state potentially colorable retaliation claims and 

claims pursuant to Coleman v. Brown. Leave to amend should be “freely given when justice so 

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant’s complaint may be dismissed 

without leave to amend when it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect. Lucas 

v. Dep’t. of Corrs., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). The undersigned previously granted 

plaintiff leave to amend. 

The undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s retaliation claims and claims pursuant to 

Coleman v. Brown be dismissed without leave to amend because it is clear that plaintiff cannot 

cure the defects as to these claims. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall appoint a 

district judge to this action; and 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s retaliation claims and claims based on 

Coleman v. Brown be dismissed. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 28, 2023 

Mont1156.ame 

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