Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01943/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01943-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lilian Kavrah,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-21-01943-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation to an award of attorneys’ fees 

under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 21).

“A litigant is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA if: ‘(1) he is the 

prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was 

substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; 

and (3) the requested fees and costs are reasonable.’ Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 

F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Perez–Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 

793 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).”

Michele M. v. Saul, No. 19-CV-00272-JLB, 2020 WL 5203375, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 

2020).

Here, the totality of the parties’ discussion regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to fees 

under the EAJA is: “the parties stipulate that Plaintiff be awarded ... $5962.50.... such 

award should not be ... construed as a concession by the Commissioner that her original 

decision denying benefits was not substantially justified.” (Doc. 21 at 1-2).

Previously, this Court remanded this case to the social security administration for 

further proceedings. (Doc. 19). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing 

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party.

Regarding prong two, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

Pursuant to the EAJA, we are required to award [Plaintiff] fees and other 

expenses incurred in connection with his civil action unless we find that the 

position of the United States was “substantially justified” or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

The test for determining whether the Secretary’s position was substantially 

justified under the EAJA is whether the position had a reasonable basis in 

both law and fact—that is, whether it was justified “to a degree that could 

satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 

(1988); see also Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1987). The 

burden is on the Secretary to prove that his position was substantially 

justified. Id.

Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Government’s failure to oppose fees, but simultaneously tell the Court that the 

Court may not construe the stipulation as a concession that the Government’s position was 

not substantially justified, is an ambiguous legal position. Nonetheless, by failing to 

oppose fees, the Court finds the Government has failed to carry its burden to prove that its 

position was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 

Russell, 930 F.2d at 1445; see also Michele M., 2020 WL 5203375, at *1.

Finally, the Court should award only reasonable fees. Here, the Court has not been 

provided with a billing statement. Thus, the Court does not know the rate charged or the 

hours expended. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the Government, by the stipulation, has 

conceded that the amount of fees sought in this case are reasonable.

Plaintiff’s counsel states in the stipulation that Plaintiff has signed an assignment of 

any award of fees to counsel. The Court has not been provided with a copy of the 

assignment. Nonetheless, the Court will accept Plaintiff’s counsel’s representation that 

such an assignment is available in her records for review if this representation is ever 

disputed.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED granting the stipulation (Doc. 21) such that fees in the amount 

of $5,962.50 and expenses in the amount of 0 as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and costs 

in the amount of 0 as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, are awarded to Plaintiff subject to 

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the terms of the Stipulation. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, after receiving this Order, the Commissioner: 

(1) determines that Plaintiff does not owe a debt that is subject to offset under the Treasury 

Offset Program, and (2) agrees to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, then 

the check for the fees awarded herein will be made payable to Plaintiff’s attorney pursuant 

to the assignment executed by Plaintiff. However, if there is a debt owed under the 

Treasury Offset Program, the Commissioner cannot agree to waive the requirements of the 

Anti-Assignment Act, and any remaining Equal Access to Justice Act fees after offset will 

be paid by a check made out to Plaintiff but delivered to Plaintiff’s attorney.1

Dated this 20th day of October, 2023.

1

 This award is without prejudice to Plaintiff seeking attorneys’ fees under section 206(b) 

of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), subject to the offset provisions of the EAJA.

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