Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00367/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00367-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL L. JIMENA,

Plaintiff,

v.

UBS AG BANK, INC., SWITZERLAND

HEADQUARTERS; UBS AG BANK,

INC., MANHATTAN, NEW YORK

BRANCH; UBS FINANCIAL

SERVICES, INC., BAKERSFIELD,

CALIFORNIA BRANCH; AND UBS

FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.

WEEHAWKEN, NEW JERSEY BRANCH;

CLIVE STANDISH,

Defendants.

1:07-CV-00367 OWW TAG

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

REMAND AND MOTION TO STRIKE;

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

1. INTRODUCTION

This case was removed from The Superior Court of California,

County of Kern. Jurisdiction in this matter is based on

diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff claims to have been

defrauded by individuals who sent him forged emails that falsely

purported to come from an officer of Defendant UBS AG. Plaintiff

now sues Defendants for fraud, violations of several state and

federal commercial codes, and “intentional tort.” Plaintiff

seeks to remand this action be remanded. Defendants oppose and

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against UBS Financial

Services, Inc. (“UBS FS”), a Delaware Corporation for failure to

state a claim. 

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2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The case was removed to this court on March 6, 2007. (Doc.

1, Notice of Removal, Ex. 1, Complaint.) On March 13, 2007

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against UBS FS

for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 6, Motion to Dismiss.) On

March 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion to declare removal void

which sounds like a motion to remand. (Doc. 8, Notice of Motion

and Motion to Declare Notice of Removal Void.) Plaintiff filed

an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss and a motion to

strike on March 30, 2007. (Doc. 10, Opposition and Motion to

Strike.) On April 16, 2007 Defendants filed an opposition to

Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. 11, Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand.) On April 19, 2007 Defendants

filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition to their motion to

dismiss. (Doc. 13, Reply of UBS in support of Motion to

Dismiss.) On April 24, Plaintiff filed his reply to Defendants’

opposition to his motion for remand. (Doc. 14, Plaintiff’s

Reply.) 

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Background Facts

Plaintiff has apparently been defrauded in a variant on the

“Nigerian advance fee scam” by individuals who sent him forged

emails that falsely purported to come from an officer of UBS AG

in Zurich, Switzerland. According to Plaintiff, he was contacted

by an individual who had set up an email account under the name

clive_standish@yahoo.com. This individual claimed to be Clive

Standish, the Chief Financial Officer of UBS AG. This

impersonator apparently offered to transfer $19 million to

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 Cal. U. Com. Code § 11302 regulates the obligations of 1

receiving bank in executing payment order and does not provide

for a cause of action in tort. Plaintiff does not provide any

legal support or factual claims to support his cause of action

under § 11302.

 Cal. U. Com. Code. § 11303 governs payment to receiving 2

bank of amount of sender’s order and recovery of excess payment

from beneficiary. Section 11303(a) and (b) deal with cases in

which the receiving bank executes payment by issuing a payment

order in the wrong amount. When this happens, the Originator’s

bank is entitled to recover the overpayment from the Beneficiary

to the extent allowed by the law governing mistake and

restitution. Plaintiff has failed to show how § 11303 applies to

this case. 

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Plaintiff’s bank account. Plaintiff was convinced to wire

$51,000 via Washington Mutual Bank, Bank of New York, and UBS AG

to an account at a fourth bank, HSBC, allegedly to satisfy a non

existent “Anti Drug/Terrorist Clearance” fee required for

transfers from Nigeria. Plaintiff never received the 19 million

that he expected. He has sued UBS AG and Clive Standish, Chief

Financial Officer of UBS AG. Plaintiff brings a cause of action

against all named defendants, including UBS FS, for 

1. Fraud

2. California Commercial Code § 11302, and § 11103, 1 2

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 U.C.C. § 4A-302(a)(1) states: “The receiving bank is 3

obliged to issue on the execution date, a payment order complying

with the sender’s instructions concerning (I) any intermediary

bank or fund transfer system to be used in carrying out the funds

transfer, or (ii) the means by which payment orders are to be

transmitted in the funds transfer. If the originator’s bank

issues a payment order to an intermediary bank, the originator’s

bank is obliged to instruct the intermediary bank according to

the instruction of the originator. An intermediary bank if the

funds transfer is similarly bound by an instruction given to it

by the sender of the payment order it accepts.” Plaintiff fails

to show how a private right of action is created by this section. 

 U.C.C. § 4A-301(b) states: “‘Execution Date’ of a payment 4

order means the day on which the receiving bank may properly

issue a payment order in execution of the sender’s order. The

execution date may be deterined by instruction of the sender but

cannot be earlier than the day the order is received and, unless

otherwise determined, is the day the order is received.” 

Plaintiff fails to show how this section creates a private cause

of action. 

 U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1) is a section that provides Payment 5

Order Definitions. It states: “‘Payment Order’ means an

instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally,

electronically, or in writing, to pay, or to cause another bank

to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary

if (I) the instruction does not state a condition to payment to

the beneficiary other than time of payment, (ii) the receiving

bank is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or otherwise

receiving payment from, the sender, and (iii) the instruction is

transmitted by the sender directly to the receiving bank or to an

agent, funds-transfer system, or communication system from

transmittal to the receiving bank.” Plaintiff has failed to show

that this section establishes a private cause of action. 

4

UCC § 4A-302(a)(1) , 301(b) , §4A-103(a)(1) 3 4 5

3. Intentional Tort

4. Interest on damages

(Doc.1, Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 Complaint, filed March 6, 2007.)

B. UBS Financial Services

Defendant UBS AG is incorporated and has its principal place

of business in Switzerland. (Doc.1, Notice of Removal, Ex. 1

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Complaint, ¶1, filed March 6, 2007.) Defendant UBS Financial

Services (“UBS FS”) is a corporation that is wholly owned by an

entity that is itself wholly owned by UBS AG. UBS FS is

incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business at

its headquarters in New Jersey. (Doc. 11, Declaration of Tambra

King (“King Declaration”), ¶ 3, Filed April 16, 2007.) 

UBS AG Bank Inc. owns, operates, and controls all named

branches and is the parent company of 1. UBS AG Bank, Manhattan

Branch 2. UBS FS Inc., Weehawken Branch and 3. UBS FS Inc.,

Bakersfield Branch. (Doc. 1-2, Notice of Removal, Exhibit A,

Complaint, p. 5, Filed May 6, 2007.) 

UBS FS, Inc. has approximately 550 branch offices throughout

the United States. (Id. at ¶ 4.) UBS FS, Inc. Bakersfield office

is one such branch office. Id. Plaintiff joins UBS FS, Inc. 

Bakersfield as a defendant to establish that the parent

corporation UBS AG, Inc. is doing business in the Eastern

District of California. Plaintiff further alleges that UBS AG,

Inc. is liable for the acts of Clive Standish “even though he was

acting for his own purpose.” 

C. Facts Regarding Service

Defendant claims that on January 31, 2007, Plaintiff caused

copies of the summons and complaint to be mailed by certified

mail in accordance with Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40, to the UBS

AG New York. The summons was to “Pres./Gen. Mgr./Legal Dept.”

(Doc. 8, Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Removal, Exhibit A, Annex 3.) 

Defendant also argues that on February 1, 2007, plaintiff caused

“two copies: one for the branch...; one for UBS AG Bank Inc.,

Zurich Switzerland Headquarters” to be delivered to Jay Ericsson

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According to Jay Ericsson’s declaration, he manages a 6

Bakersfield satellite office for UBS FS and reports to the

manager of the Fresno Office, Robert Gunning. (Doc. 11,

Opposition, Declaration of Jay B. Ericsson, ¶ 4, Filed April 16,

2007.) He states that his responsibilities and authority at UBS

FS are of the Bakersfield satellite office. (Id., ¶ 4.) He

states that he has no management responsibilities or authority

with respect to any other office, or any other aspect of the

business of UBS FS. From this it is evident he is not a general

manager, nor an agent authorized to accept service of process. 

 The third defendant in this lawsuit, individual defendant 7

Clive Standish, a United Kingdom citizen and Swiss resident, has

not been served and no attorney had made an appearance for him. 

Plaintiff appears to contend that he served Mr. Standish by

sending an email to the Yahoo email address used by the

impersonators who defrauded plaintiff by pretending to be Mr.

Standish. California does not provide for service by email, and

even if it did, such service could not have been effective as to

the real Mr. Standish, a stranger to the Yahoo email address used

by Plaintiff. 

6

(“Ericsson”), a branch manager in UBS FS Bakersfield. (Doc 8, 6

Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Removal, Exhibit A, Annex 3.)7

Ericsson has stated in his declaration that he has never been

authorized to act as UBS AG’s agent for any purposes including

service of process. (Doc. 11, Opposition, Declaration of Jay B.

Ericsson, ¶ 5, Filed April 16, 2007.) He is not a general

manager nor does he hold any other status required by Cal. Code

Civ. Proc. § 415.40. 

Plaintiff claims that on February 1, 2007, Defendant UBS FS

Bakersfield was served by personal delivery. According to

Plaintiff, the registered agent for service of process of UBS FS,

Corporation Service Company (“CSC”), had a PO Box address. The

Superior Court for the County of Kern issued an order that a PO

Box is not a valid address pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

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415.50. (Doc. 8, Exhibit D.) To overcome the ruling of the

Superior Court, Plaintiff made a third service on Defendant UBS

FS Bakersfield by certified mail to the physical address. 

Defendant claims that it was not until February 5, 2007,

that CSC received copies of the summons and complaint via

certified mail. (Doc. 8, Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Removal,

Exhibit C, Annex 3.) According to Defendants, they filed and

served their notice of removal on March 6, 2007, within 30 days

after the delivery of summons and complaint to CSC. 

Plaintiff also served other branches of UBS AG. Defendant

UBS FS Weehawken, New Jersey signed the return receipt with no

date of the certified mailing to it of the summons and amended

complaint on January 31, 2007. Defendant UBS AG Manhattan signed

on February 2, 2007 the return receipt of the certified mailing

to it of the summons and amended complaint.

On March 6, 2007 Defendants filed a notice of removal to the

US District Court, Eastern District of California Fresno Division

from the Superior Court for Kern County and this case is now

pending before the US District Court. 

4. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND

A. Standard of Review

Section 1447(c) provides that “if at any time before final

judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. 1447(c);

Briano v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1295 (C.D.

Cal 2000). The subject matter jurisdiction of the district court

is not a waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by one of

the parties, by motion, or in the responsive pleadings. Id. A

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defendant has the burden of establishing that removal was proper. 

Arellano v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105

(S.D. Cal 2003); Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. The removal statute is

to be strictly construed against removal. Abrego v. Dow Chem.

Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). Federal jurisdiction

must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right or removal

in the first instance. Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485

(9th Cir. 1996). Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed

at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is the power to declare the

law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to

the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the case. 

Santos v. People of Guam, 436 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006). 

B. Timeliness of Removal

A civil action filed in state court that might have been

brought originally in federal court may be removed by “the

defendant or defendants.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Section 1441(b)

provides a time limit for removal, providing that “the notice of

removal... shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by

the defendant... of a copy of the initial pleading.” 28 U.S.C. §

1447(b). Removal is affected by filing and serving the notice of

removal. see, 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 

Service upon a domestic or foreign corporation... that is

subject to suit under a common name may be served: 1. pursuant

to the law of the state in which the district court is located or

of the state in which service is effected or 2. pursuant to

federal law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h). 

Under the Federal Rules, a business entity may be served by

delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to: 1. an officer;

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2. a managing or general agent, 3. any other agent authorized by

appointment or by law to receive service of process. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(h)(1). Under California law a corporation may be

served by delivering copies of the summons and complaint to 

1. the president “or other head of the corporation,” 

a vice-president, secretary or assistant 

secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, 

general manager or other persons authorized by 

the corporation to receive service of process; or

2. the person designated by the corporation as its 

statutory agent for service; or

3. the Secretary of State. 

Cal. Code Civ. P. § 416.10. 

The term general manager of a corporation indicates one who

has general direction and control of the business of the

corporation as distinguished from one who has the management only

of a particular branch of the business; he may do everything

which the corporation could do in transaction of its business. 

General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 81, 86

(Cal. Ct. App. 1971); see also, Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, 67

Cal. App. 4th 295, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998.)(A “general manager”

includes any agent of the corporation of sufficient character and

rank to make it reasonably certain that the defendant will be

apprised of the service made.) Here, a local branch manager of

one of hundreds of branch offices is not a general manager. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants notice of removal was

untimely because it was filed beyond the 30 day period of time as

required by 28 U.S.C. 1446(b). “A sole defendant who fails to

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remove within thirty days of service waives the right of

removal.” Smith v. Mail Boxes Etc., Inc., 191 F.Supp. 2d 1155,

1158 (E.D. Cal. 2002). “The suit thus remains in state court or

can be remanded if the removal violated the thirty day limit.” 

Id. 

i. UBS FS, Bakersfield

Plaintiff claims that he delivered the summons and complaint

to Defendant UBS FS Bakersfield on February 1, 2007 by personal

delivery. Plaintiff argues that Defendant had until March 3,

2007 to remove the case. However, Plaintiff’s service of UBS FS

on February 1, 2007 was delivered to Ericsson who is the manager

of the Bakersfield satellite office. Ericsson stated in a sworn

affidavit that he has never been authorized to act as UBS AG’s

agent for any purposes including service of process. Plaintiff

has failed to provide facts to show that Ericsson’s duties as

manager of the Bakersfield satellite office include having

“general direction and control of the business of the corporation

as distinguished from one who has the management only of a

particular branch of the business.” He is not a general manager. 

Further, Plaintiff did not serve CSC, Defendants’ in state

agent, until February 5, 2007. Defendants’s last day to file a

notice of removal was February 7, 2007. Defendants filed the

notice on February 6, 2007 within the 30 day period of 28 U.S.C.

1446(b). 

ii. UBS AG New York

Plaintiff also asserts that 1. UBS AG was served on February

1, 2007 when Plaintiff caused the summons and complaint to be

served on the UBS FS branch manager, and 2. that UBS AG was

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served on February 2, 2007 when its New York office received by

certified mail a copy of the summons and complaint. 

First, the service on February 1, 2007 to UBS FS Bakersfield

and its office manager, Ericsson, was not sufficient under

California law. It was not until the proper February 5, 2007

delivery of the summons and complaint to the designated agent,

CSC, that the 30 day clock began to run. However, even if the

February 1 service was proper, it is well settled that “service

on a subsidiary does not constitute service on a parent

corporation even if the subsidiary is considered to be an alterego of the parent corporation.” Graval v. P.T. Bakrie & Bros.,

986 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (C.D. Cal. 1996). Plaintiff could not

have properly served UBS AG through his service of UBS FS.

Plaintiff mailed his service of process to UBS AG New York

on January 31, 2007. Under Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 415.40

service is deemed complete ten days after mailing. In this case,

service to UBS AG was complete on February 10, 2007. UBS AG’s

removal on March 6, 2007 was within the 30 day deadline. 

Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED.

C. Diversity

Plaintiff next argues that removal was improper because it

destroys diversity jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in this case is

based exclusively on diversity of citizenship. Original

diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) when the

parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000. A defendant may remove from state court any 8

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28 million. 

12

action “of which the district courts of the United States have

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). When an action is

removed based on diversity, complete diversity must exist at

removal. Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d

769, 773 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987, 107 S. Ct.

580 (1986). Complete diversity requires each plaintiff to be a

citizen of a different state than each defendant. Caterpillar

Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996); Morris v. Princess

Cruises, Inc. 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). Generally,

diversity is determined from the face of a complaint. Gould, 790

F.2d at 773. 

Plaintiff is a resident of Bakersfield, California. UBS AG

is incorporated and has its principal place of business in

Switzerland. UBS FS is incorporated in Delaware and has its

principal place of business in Weehawken, New Jersey. (Doc. 11,

King Declaration.) UBS FS Bakersfield is not a separate

corporation. There is no such entity. UBS FS Bakersfield is one

of many satellite locations at which the Delaware/New Jersey

corporation UBS FS does business. Plaintiff’s ignorance of the

law does not make it otherwise. Removal in this action did not

destroy diversity among the parties and was properly filed by

Defendants. 

5. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Standard of Review

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

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relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. The

question before the court is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether the plaintiff could

prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984). “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Fraud

In California the elements of fraud are (1) a

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or non

disclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent

to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance;

and (5) resulting damage. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana

Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 980 (Cal. 2004). Rule 9(b) requires that

allegations of fraud are specific enough to give defendants

notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to

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constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the

charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong. 

Celado Int’l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846, 855

(C.D. Cal. 2004); see also Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 671

(9th Cir. 1993)(internal quotations omitted). A pleading is

sufficient under Rule 9(b) if it identifies the circumstances

constituting fraud so that the defendant can prepare an adequate

answer from the allegations. Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 671. The

complaint must specify such facts as the times, dates, places and

other details of the alleged fraudulent activity. Id. It is

established law, in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere, that Fed. R.

Civ. P. 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies to state-law

causes of action. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097,

1103 (9th Cir. 2003) While a federal court will examine state

law to determine whether the elements of fraud have been pled

sufficiently to state a cause of action, the Rule 9(b)

requirement that the circumstances of the fraud must be stated

with particularity is a federally imposed rule. Id. 

Plaintiff does not allege what specific conduct UBS FS

engaged in that resulted in defrauding Plaintiff. Throughout his

complaint Plaintiff makes general allegations that Defendants

“falsely represent[ed] to Plaintiff by many promises that

Defendants [would] electronically wire transfer the 19 million

dollars at a Washington Mutual Bank, California... within 24

hours after confirmed payment of $51,000 which was in fact false

based on the fact that after payment of the $51,000 on June 14,

2006, defendant failed to electronically wire transfer the 19

million...” (Doc. 1-2, Notice of Removal, Exhibit A, Complaint,

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 Plaintiff attempts to refute Defendants’ argument by 9

citing to Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellshaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S.

694 (1988). The Volkswagenwerk case involved an attempt to serve

process on a foreign corporation by serving its domestic

subsidiary that was deemed the foreign corporation’s invluntary

agent for service of process. Id. at 696. The issue was whether

service of process to a foreign corporation’s involuntary agent

was compatible with the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial

and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters. Id. 

Volkswagenwerk does not address vicarious liability of a

subsidiary for the acts of the principal and is therefore

factually distinguishable from this case. 

15

p. 18, Filed May 6, 2007.) 

In his complaint Plaintiff specifically alleges that UBS AG

and Clive Standish engaged in an email exchange with Plaintiff

where they allegedly made misrepresentations promising Plaintiff

$19 million after Plaintiff wired $51,000. (Id., p. 24.) 

However, no where in his complaint does Plaintiff specifically

allege that UBS FS sent any of the emails or otherwise had

anything to do with Plaintiff in this dispute. In his complaint,

Plaintiff joins UBS FS, Bakersfield as defendant for “doing

business in behalf of or together with its parent corporation UBS

AG.” However, Plaintiff cannot allege claims against UBS FS

merely by asserting that they were at the time of the accused

conduct corporate, affiliates, and subsidiaries of UBS AG. see

TPS Utilicom Servs. v. AT&T Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1103

(C.D. Cal. 2002). 

9

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Intentional 

Infliction of Emotional Distress. 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for intentional tort. 

Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the claim sounds like a claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements

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of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme

and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous

conduct. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965,

1001 (Cal. 1993). Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as

to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized

community. Id. The defendant must have engaged in conduct

intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization

that injury will result. Id. 

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “Clive Standish,

UBS AG Bank Head Office, and all the rest of the above captionednamed defendants were the legal (proximate) cause of damages...” 

(Doc. 1-2, Notice of Removal, Exhibit A, Complaint, p. 36, Filed

May 6, 2007.) Plaintiff claims that he has suffered “sleepless

nights, headaches, causing his blood pressure to rise, loss of

appetite, mental anguish, mental or emotional distress,

humiliation, and other psychological damage, whenever he thinks

of this fraudulent case...” (Id.) While Plaintiff does alleged

that the “above captioned-named” Defendants were the cause of his

damages, Plaintiff does not allege any specific conduct on the

part of UBS FS that caused such damages. Further, even if it

were inferred from the complaint that Plaintiff is arguing UBS FS

somehow engaged in material misrepresentations towards Plaintiff,

he has failed to show how such conduct is so extreme or

outrageous that it exceeds all bounds of conduct usually

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tolerated in a civilized community. Plaintiff has failed to

state a claim against UBS FS for intentional infliction of

emotional distress or any other intentional tort he alleges. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss UBS FS from the complaint is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

//

6. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE

Along with his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

Plaintiff files a motion to strike Defendants’ answer and motion

to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) provides that “redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters” may be “stricken

from any pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[O]nly pleadings

are subject to motions to strike.” See Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.

Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, a

“motion to strike” materials that are not part of the pleadings

may be regarded as an “invitation” by the movant “to consider

whether [proffered material] may properly be relied upon.”

United States v. Crisp, 190 F.R.D. 546, 551 (E.D. Cal. 1999)

(quoting Monroe v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 641, 645 (D. Conn.

1975).

Motions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted. 

See Pease & Curran Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp.

945, 947 (C.D. Cal. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Stanton

Road Ass'n v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).

“[M]otions to strike should not be granted unless it is clear

that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on

the subject matter of the litigation. Colaprico v. Sun

Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991)

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(citation omitted). Plaintiff makes the same arguments in his

motion to strike as his motion for remand. Plaintiff argues that

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and answer should be stricken

because removal of the action is a denial of due process and free

access to the courts. This is nonsense. Removal is a procedure

enacted by the Congress of the United States for the preservation

of federal jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1441, et. seq. Plaintiff

also argues that there is “a lack of jurisdiction by the court.” 

Plaintiff reasons that since the Court lacks authority, it cannot

accept for filling Defendants’ motion to dismiss and answer, and

therefore should strike them out of the record. 

This case has been properly removed based on diversity

jurisdiction of the parties. Plaintiff fails to provide any

support in law or fact that warrants this court striking

Defendants motion to dismiss or answer. 

Plaintiff’s motion to strike is DENIED. 

7. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for remand is DENIED.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss UBS FS from the complaint is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Plaintiff’s motion to strike is DENIED. 

DATED: 6/8/2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger

United States District Judge

Oliver W. Wanger

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