Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01207/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01207-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE WAYNE MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CLIFF ALLENBY, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01207-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZALBE 

CLAIM

 (ECF No. 1)

 AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a civil detainee at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”) proceeding pro se in 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) 

On June 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) It is now before the 

Court for screening. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979)).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States was 

violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Ketchum v. 

Cnty. of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility 

that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”) in Coalinga, California, 

where the events giving rise to this action occurred. Plaintiff names Cliff Allenby, Dr. 

Vega, Unit 7 Supervisor David Lewright, Psychiatric Technicians James Peterson and 

Luke Koll, and Program #3 Administrator James Walters as Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges essentially the following:

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In February 2014, Plaintiff was moved from Unit #7 to Unit #8 of the hospital after 

being raped by a “large Black man” on Unit #7. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Defendant Peterson 

sexually harassed and threatened Plaintiff with harm. 

Sometime from March to December 2014, Defendant Peterson took Plaintiff’s 

spiritual objects, and Defendant Koll stole Plaintiff’s television and art supplies. 

Plaintiff complained to Defendant Lewright. In order to stop Plaintiff’s complaints, 

Defendants Lewright and Vega required Plaintiff to take psychotropic medications 

against his will.

Plaintiff seeks clemency and damages.

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff, a civil detainee pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code '

6600 et seq., is not a prisoner within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 

Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000). He retains greater liberty 

protections than individuals detained under criminal process and is “’entitled to more 

considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of 

confinement are designed to punish.’” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)). Treatment is 

presumptively punitive when a civil “detainee is confined in conditions identical to, similar 

to, or more restrictive” than his criminal counterparts. Id. at 933.

Plaintiff’s right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement is protected 

by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315. 

A determination whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated requires “balancing his liberty 

interests against the relevant state interests”; the Constitution, however, is not 

concerned with de minimis restrictions on a patient’s liberties. Id. at 320-21. 

Additionally, there must be a reasonable relationship between “the conditions and 

duration of confinement” and the purpose for which the civilly confined person is 

committed. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001).

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A. Linkage

Under Section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each Defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 

(9th Cir. 2002). In other words, there must be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the Defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. 

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978). 

Plaintiff names Cliff Allenby and James Walters as Defendants. Plaintiff does not 

allege any facts related to these Defendants or link either of them to a violation of his 

constitutional rights. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to do 

so, he must plead specific facts as to what each of these Defendants did to violate his 

constitutional rights. 

B. Verbal Harassment

“[V]erbal harassment generally does not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Keenan 

v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (implying that harassment “calculated to . . . 

cause [the prisoner] psychological damage” might state an Eighth Amendment claim) 

(citing Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[V]erbal harassment 

or abuse . . . [alone] is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983.”), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 

F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the Eighth Amendment’s protections do 

not necessarily extend to mere verbal sexual harassment.”). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Peterson verbally and sexually harassed him. On 

these limited facts the Court cannot determine whether the harassment violates 

Plaintiff’s rights as a civil detainee. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend.

C. Property Confiscation

The Due Process Clause protects against property deprivation without due 

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To the extent Plaintiff 

might allege the deprivation was not authorized by state law, Hudson precludes a 

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procedural due process claim based upon an “unauthorized intentional deprivation of 

property by a state employee if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is 

available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). “California law provides an 

adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 

F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810–895). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Peterson took Plaintiff’s spiritual objects, and 

Defendant Koll stole Plaintiff’s television and art supplies. Plaintiff’s use of the word 

“stole” implies that at least with regards to Defendant Koll, the taking of his property was 

unauthorized. 

Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim for relief for violation of the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the deprivation of his property. 

Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he should 

allege true facts showing how and why an authorized search deprived him of property 

without notice and opportunity to contest the deprivation and disposition of the property.

D. Administering of Medication

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lewright and Vega forced him to take 

psychotropic medication. 

The Supreme Court has recognized a liberty interest in freedom from unwanted 

antipsychotic drugs. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990). The interest 

“must be ‘defined in the context of the inmate's confinement.’” United States v. 

Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 745 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 222). To 

comport with due process, the government must show both the need for, and medical 

appropriateness of, the antipsychotic medication. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 

(1992). Courts have applied these standards to civil detainees. See Jurasek v. Utah 

State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506, 511 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Townsend v. King, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 66501, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2014). 

Plaintiff fails to allege whether Defendants’ actions comported with due process. 

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He must allege facts to demonstrate the need and medical appropriateness of the 

medication, or lack thereof. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend.

E. Clemency

Plaintiff seeks clemency. The exclusive method for challenging the fact or 

duration of Plaintiff’s confinement is by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Such claims may 

not be brought in a section 1983 action. Nor may Plaintiff seek to invalidate the fact or 

duration of his confinement indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily 

implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. A section 

1983 action is barred, no matter the relief sought, if success in that action would 

necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. Id. at 81-82; Heck 

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (unless and until favorable termination of the 

conviction or sentence, no cause of action under section 1983 exists); Huftile v. MiccioFonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to SVPA detainees with 

access to habeas relief). 

Plaintiff’s request for clemency is a direct challenge to his custody and its 

duration. Plaintiff may not seek clemency in a section 1983 action. 

F. Unrelated Claims 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) allows a party to “join, as independent or 

alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” However, Rule 

20(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to sue multiple defendants in the same action only if “any right 

to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or 

arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 

occurrences,” and there is a “question of law or fact common to all defendants.” “Thus 

multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should 

not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against 

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different defendants belong in different suits . . .” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 

(7th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

Plaintiff’s harassment, property confiscation, and involuntary medicating claims do 

not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he 

must choose which claim he wishes to bring in this cause of action.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court will grant Plaintiff 

an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

(9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to 

amend, it is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his 

efforts on curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general 

rule, an “amended complaint supersedes the original” complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. Here, the amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under 

penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1.) is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his signed complaint filed June 17, 2015;

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3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, in compliance with this order, 

the Court will dismiss this action, without prejudice, for failure to comply 

with a court order and failure to prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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