Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07036/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07036-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 26, 2010 Decided June 1, 2010 

No. 09-7036 

MONICA BROOKS AND TRACEE TAYLOR, ON BEHALF OF 

THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 

APPELLANTS

v. 

DISTRICT HOSPITAL PARTNERS, L.P., DOING BUSINESS AS 

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:01-cv-02361-HHK-AK) 

S. Micah Salb argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellants. 

Jennifer S. Goldstein, Attorney, Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission, argued the cause and filed the brief 

as amicus curiae for appellants. 

Elisha A. King, pro hac vice, argued the cause for 

appellee. With her on the brief were Charles B. Wayne and 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 1 of 14
2

Jamie M. Konn. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, BROWN and GRIFFITH, 

Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Appellants challenge the 

dismissal of their Title VII employment discrimination claims. 

Conversely, appellee contends the dismissal was proper and, 

further, that this court does not have jurisdiction to review the 

dismissal because it was not a final decision of the district 

court. We reverse the dismissal and remand for further 

proceedings, finding this court has jurisdiction to hear the 

appeal and that the district court improperly held that 

appellants did not exhaust their administrative remedies. 

I 

This appeal is merely the latest procedural cul-de-sac 

off what has been a long and winding road of litigation in this 

case. That road originated over a decade ago when defendant 

George Washington University Hospital1

 decided to eliminate 

the position of “Nursing Assistant” from its employment 

classifications and replace it with the position of 

“Multi-Skilled Technician.” Nursing Assistants, as the title 

suggests, assisted registered nurses in basic tasks. MSTs, 

however, were to perform the tasks of Nursing Assistants and 

also undertake a wider array of responsibilities. 

All Nursing Assistants were invited by GWUH to 

apply for MST positions by taking a three-part screening test to 

measure their ability to succeed in a subsequent MST training 

program. Nursing Assistants who failed any part of the 

 

1

 The hospital’s official business moniker is District Hospital Partners, L.P. 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 2 of 14
3

screening test were offered remedial training and an 

opportunity to retake the failed portions of the test. A second 

failure disqualified them from the training program. Nursing 

Assistants who passed the initial screening test entered a MST 

training program that required successful completion of 

competency tests. A Nursing Assistant failing any one of 

those ten tests could obtain remedial training and another 

chance to be tested. A second failure eliminated the candidate 

from the program. A Nursing Assistant who passed the 

post-training tests received one of the MST positions. For 

those MST positions still vacant, GWUH accepted 

applications from external applicants. These applicants took 

the same initial screening test to determine whether they 

possessed the minimum proficiency to perform the MST job. 

Successful external applicants did not participate in a MST 

training program; instead, they had to demonstrate the ability 

to perform MST duties and were subject to an interview 

process. 

Renae Marable, a Nursing Assistant, passed the initial 

screening test but was eliminated from the hiring process after 

failing one of the ten MST competency tests. She filed a 

complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission on behalf of herself and all other similarly 

situated former Nursing Assistants who were subjected to the 

three-part screening test. Joining her complaint were specific 

persons listed in an attachment to the filing. Marable alleged 

the screening test measured skills unrelated to the MST job and 

discriminated against African-American Nursing Assistants. 

The EEOC investigation evaluated data related to both Nursing 

Assistants and external applicants and found no statutory 

violation. It concluded the screening test was a valid means 

of measuring MST skills and the most effective among a 

number of means considered by GWUH. The EEOC notified 

Marable of its finding and issued her a right-to-sue letter 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 3 of 14
4

certifying that she exhausted her administrative remedies and 

could pursue judicial relief against GWUH. 

In 2001, Marable and five co-plaintiffs filed a lawsuit 

alleging the screening test and the ten training program tests 

were discriminatory. The complaint also requested class 

action certification to represent all other Nursing Assistants 

similarly situated. In 2004, the plaintiffs moved to extend the 

class to cover external applicants for the MST position. That 

motion was denied by the district court because the proposed 

class did not exhibit the requisite commonality and typicality 

under FED. R. CIV. P. 23. See Mem. Op. & Order, Marable v. 

Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., No. 01-02361 at 12 (D.D.C. Aug. 

31, 2006). The court raised the possibility of two 

subclasses—one for Nursing Assistants and one for external 

applicants—but determined neither would be certifiable: a 

Nursing Assistant subclass would not be numerous enough; an 

external applicant subclass would have no named plaintiff who 

could act as a proper subclass representative. See id. at 12–14. 

 

In response, the plaintiffs moved to add as intervenors 

two external applicants who failed the three-part screening 

test: Monica Brooks and Tracee Taylor, the appellants in this 

appeal. The district court granted the motion. Prior to 

joining the suit, Brooks and Taylor had not lodged a complaint 

against GWUH with the EEOC. Ordinarily, parties must file 

timely charges with the EEOC prior to pursuing relief in court, 

see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 

(1973). However, the district court allowed Brooks and 

Taylor to intervene under the “single-filing” exception to the 

normal rule. See Mem. Op. & Order, Marable, No. 01-02361 

at 5–6 (D.D.C. May 29, 2007). That exception allows 

non-filing parties to join the suit of another similarly situated 

plaintiff who did file an administrative complaint against the 

same defendant. See Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1322 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 4 of 14
5

(D.C. Cir. 1981). 

With seemingly eligible class representatives included 

as intervenors, the plaintiffs moved for class certification for 

all external applicants. This time, the district court denied 

certification because it found Brooks and Taylor to be 

improper class representatives. Although Brooks and Taylor 

were allowed to join the Marable suit without personally filing 

an EEOC complaint, the district court concluded a proposed 

class representative must personally exhaust administrative 

remedies as a “condition precedent to sustaining a class action 

under Title VII.” Mem. Op. & Order, Marable, No. 01-02361 

at 4 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2008). The plaintiffs filed a motion for 

reconsideration, and the district court denied it. 

While the motion for reconsideration was pending, 

Marable voluntarily dismissed her individual claim with 

prejudice. Brooks and Taylor moved to sever their claims 

from the remaining Nursing Assistant plaintiffs under FED. R.

CIV. P. 42(b). The district court granted their motion but 

issued an order for Brooks and Taylor to show cause why their 

claims should not be dismissed and, after reviewing 

submissions from both sides, dismissed Brooks’ and Taylor’s 

claims without further explanation. See Order, Marable, No. 

01-02361 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2009). 

Brooks and Taylor appealed that dismissal. This court 

ordered them to show cause why the appeal should not be 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 

54(b). See Order, Brooks v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., No. 

09-7036 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2009). Under that rule, an order in 

a multiple claim or multiple party case that adjudicates fewer 

than all the claims or the rights of fewer than all the parties is 

not reviewable absent a certification from the district court that 

the order is a final judgment. Appellants subsequently moved 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 5 of 14
6

for certification in the district court, which granted the motion. 

The court confirmed that it had “severed the claims of Brooks 

and Taylor . . . [and] dismissed the[ir] claims . . . in their 

entirety for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” 

Order, Marable, No. 01-02361 (D.D.C. May 29, 2009). In 

response to appellants’ motion to amend the certification order 

to explicitly weigh Rule 54(b) considerations, the district court 

issued an amended order noting that a certification of finality 

served equitable interests and was not detrimental to judicial 

economy. See Order, Brooks v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P.,

No. 01-02361 at 1–2 (D.D.C. June 19, 2009). This court 

discharged its earlier show cause order and directed the parties 

to address the jurisdictional issue in their main briefing. 

II 

A 

We first consider this court’s jurisdiction to hear the 

appeal. The federal appellate power generally covers only 

“final decisions of the district courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Therefore, we must determine the validity of the district 

court’s Rule 54(b) order certifying the dismissal of appellants’ 

claims as final. Two questions form that determination: 

whether the dismissal was eligible for certification as a final 

judgment under the criteria established by Rule 54(b) and 

whether the district court adequately weighed the relevant 

equities when deciding to grant the certification. We review 

the first question de novo and the second question for abuse of 

discretion. See Bldg. Indus. Assoc. v. Babbitt, 161 F.3d 740, 

743–44 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

On the first question, GWUH argues the dismissal of 

appellants’ claims cannot be considered final under Rule 54(b) 

because, prior to dismissal, the district court severed the claims 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 6 of 14
7

from those of the Nursing Assistants pursuant to FED. R. CIV.

P. 42(b). That rule empowers district courts to order separate 

trials for different issues or claims but still regard the set of 

issues or claims as a single case. Therefore, GWUH contends 

the dismissal of a claim severed—or, perhaps more accurately, 

separated—pursuant to Rule 42(b) is not a final and appealable 

judgment of an entire case but rather an interlocutory and 

non-appealable judgment of a subset of claims. See, e.g., 

Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of Ind., Inc., 451 F.3d 424, 441–42 

(7th Cir. 2006). 

 But Rule 54(b) is not simply a superfluous 

reaffirmation of the finality constraints of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Instead, as its text makes clear, Rule 54(b) empowers a court to 

“direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer 

than all, claims or parties” in a multiple claim or multiple party 

case, even though such judgments are not generally considered 

final. Therefore, should a claim separated under Rule 42(b) 

be dismissed and otherwise meet the criteria of Rule 54(b), a 

court can certify that claim as final and appealable. Gaffney, 

the case on which GWUH relies for its argument, 

acknowledges as much, stating that a “judgment on a claim 

tried separately is not an appealable final judgment, unless 

certified for immediate appeal under Rule 54.” 451 F.3d at 

442 n.18 (quoting 4 MOORE’S FED. PRACTICE § 21.06 (2005))

(emphasis added). Because appellants’ claims were separated 

under Rule 42(b) and because the dismissal of appellants’ 

claims constituted the “adjudicat[ion of] . . . the rights and 

liabilities of fewer than all the parties” in a multiple party case, 

FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b), we find the dismissal was eligible for 

Rule 54(b) certification.2

 

2 The parties in this case fail to recognize the multiple party aspect of Rule 

54(b) and discuss the rule as if it only permitted the certification of a 

dismissed claim in a multiple claim action. This is somewhat 

understandable, since federal caselaw on this topic mainly concerns single 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 7 of 14
8

 We note our holding is not premised on the argument 

appellants advance in support of it. Appellants argue the 

dismissal was eligible for Rule 54(b) certification because the 

district court actually severed their claims under FED. R. CIV.

P. 21, which authorizes severance of claims into distinct 

actions. There are two problems with this argument. First, 

like GWUH’s argument, it misunderstands the function of 

Rule 54(b). Again, the rule only applies to multiple claim and 

multiple party actions where fewer than all of the claims or 

parties are adjudicated. If appellants’ claims were actually 

severed under Rule 21 and then dismissed, that would have 

meant all the claims in a single civil action were dismissed. A 

Rule 54(b) certification therefore would have been both 

inapplicable and unnecessary since the dismissal, standing 

alone, would have constituted an appealable final judgment. 

The second problem is appellants clearly did not sever their 

claims under Rule 21. The plain text of appellants’ motion to 

sever requested action “[p]ursuant to Rule 42(b),” Plaintiffs’ 

Motion to Sever Claims, Brooks, No. 01-02361 at 1 (D.D.C. 

 

claims amidst multiple claims. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. 

Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (“[The judgment] must be ‘final’ in the 

sense that it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the 

course of a multiple claims action.”); Bldg. Indus. Assoc., 161 F.3d at 744 

(same). The tilt of the caselaw is perhaps a residual effect of an older 

version of Rule 54(b) that only covered multiple claim actions. However, 

the rule was amended to cover multiple party situations. See FED. R. CIV.

P. 54(b), 1961 Amendment cmt. (“The danger of hardship through delay of 

appeal . . . may be at least as serious in multiple-parties situations as in 

multiple-claims cases . . . [and t]he amendment . . . refer[s] explicitly to 

parties.”); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 n.3 (1976) 

(“Rule [54(b)] was amended to insure that orders finally disposing of some 

but not all of the parties could be appealed pursuant to its provisions.”). 

The motivation behind the amendment was to provide plaintiffs a way to 

appeal the dismissal of a defendant in a multiple defendant action, not 

necessarily their own dismissal from a multiple plaintiff case. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 54(b), 1961 Amendment cmt. However, the text of Rule 54(b) 

does not distinguish between plaintiffs and defendants and, by its terms, the 

rule applies to all multiple party situations.   

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 8 of 14
9

Jan. 21, 2009), and the district court granted that motion with 

no mention of any other rule, see Order, Marable, No. 

01-02361 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2009). We see no reason to read 

that order as anything other than an action under Rule 42(b). 

We highlight this point now because we return to it in section 

II.B where we consider whether the district court’s dismissal of 

appellants’ claims was proper. 

 We turn to the next jurisdictional hurdle: did the district 

court properly weigh the relevant equities when granting the 

Rule 54(b) certification? The rule does not allow a court to 

certify any and all eligible claims, but only those for which 

“the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for 

delay” of an appeal. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). This 

determination weighs both “justice to the litigants” and “the 

interest of sound judicial administration.” Curtiss-Wright 

Corp., 446 U.S. at 6, 8. The factors affecting “justice to the 

parties” will inevitably differ from case to case, but the factors 

pertaining to judicial administration include “whether the 

claims under review [are] separable from the others remaining 

to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already 

determined [is] such that no appellate court [will] have to 

decide the same issues more than once even if there [are] 

subsequent appeals.” Id. at 8. GWUH does not directly 

dispute that these factors were correctly weighed on the face of 

the amended Rule 54(b) order. Instead, it argues the district 

court abused its discretion in “simply adopt[ing] the proposed 

order submitted by the appellants without even giving the 

Hospital a chance to respond.” Br. for Appellee at 26. In 

GWUH’s opinion, that adoption was nearly tantamount to the 

district court offering no reasoning at all. 

 This argument is unpersuasive. The wholesale 

adoption of an otherwise valid proposed order is not an abuse 

of discretion. Cf. United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas. Co., 376 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 9 of 14
10

U.S. 651, 656 (1964) (“[Proposed] findings, though not the 

product of the workings of the district judge’s mind, are 

formally his; they are not to be rejected out-of-hand, and they 

will stand if supported by evidence.”). The order the district 

court adopted, as GWUH concedes, expressly weighed the 

factors relevant to Rule 54(b). We give the district court’s 

consideration of those factors “substantial deference,” 

Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 10, and GWUH points to no 

evidence—and we find none—that disturbs the district court’s 

conclusion. 

Because the district court properly certified its 

dismissal of appellants’ claims as final, we find this court has 

jurisdiction to hear appellants’ appeal of that dismissal. 

B 

Finally, we consider whether the district court properly 

dismissed appellants’ claims. Although the district court’s 

dismissal order contained no explanation, its Rule 54(b) 

amended order retrospectively explained that it “dismissed the 

claims of Brooks and Taylor in their entirety for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies.” Order, Brooks, No. 

01-02361 at 2 (D.D.C. June 19, 2009). A challenge to a 

dismissal for lack of administrative exhaustion is a question of 

law, which this court reviews de novo. See Blackmon-Malloy 

v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 575 F.3d 699, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

We find that the district court improperly dismissed appellants’ 

claims. 

As explained in part I, this court recognizes a 

“single-filing” exception to Title VII’s usual rule that all 

employment discrimination claims be initially filed with the 

EEOC. This exception allows non-filing parties to join the 

lawsuit of a filing party if they possess claims “that are so 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 10 of 14
11

similar to those asserted by the original plaintiff[] that no 

purpose would be served by requiring [them] to file 

independent . . . charges.” Foster, 655 F.2d at 1323. 

Therefore, if the original filing performs the “principal 

functions of the EEOC filing requirement” of providing the 

defendant with notice of all charges and offering the EEOC an 

opportunity to resolve the matter, id., a second filing is not 

necessary if a similarly situated plaintiff wishes to join the suit. 

 

This case presents such a situation. The EEOC 

complaint filed by Marable did not challenge GWUH’s 

application process on behalf of external applicants and, in 

fact, erroneously alleged that external applicants were not 

required to take the same screening test the Nursing Assistants 

were. See Letter from Solaman Lippman & Renae Marable to 

EEOC ¶ 9 (Apr. 2, 1999). However, the complaint alleged the 

screening test was discriminatory against African Americans, 

the same claim brought by appellants as intervening external 

applicants. Further, the EEOC’s investigation of the 

complaint was not limited to Nursing Assistants, but extended 

to the test results and racial data of external applicants. See

Letter from EEOC to Gregg Avitabile (Oct. 24, 2000). 

Analysis of that data found the screening test “administered to 

internal and external applicants . . . did in fact have a disparate 

impact on Black candidates,” though ultimately an impact the 

EEOC deemed an unlikely statutory violation. Letter from 

EEOC to Renae Marable (Aug. 10, 2001). These facts 

indicate that an independent EEOC filing by appellants would 

have been redundant: GWUH already had received adequate 

notice of appellants’ exact allegation and the EEOC had first 

crack at resolving that allegation. Appellants, therefore, 

properly invoked the single-filing exception to join the lawsuit 

filed by Marable and her co-plaintiffs.3

 

3

 We note the district court reached this same conclusion when it granted 

appellants’ motion to intervene in the lawsuit. See Mem. Op. & Order, 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 11 of 14
12

That determination does not end our inquiry, however. 

Two issues remain. First, the parties’ briefs disputed whether 

appellants currently are joined to the lawsuit filed by Marable 

and her Nursing Assistant co-plaintiffs. As discussed in 

section II.A, supra, the parties when arguing the jurisdictional 

issue differed on which rule of civil procedure appellants 

invoked to sever their claims from those of the other plaintiffs. 

If it was Rule 42(b), appellants remain part of the overall 

Marable case and are properly joined under the single-filing 

exception. However, if it was Rule 21, appellants’ claims 

would constitute an independent action. Because the 

single-filing exception does not apply where there is no joinder 

to the suit brought by the original filer, Kizas v. Webster, 707 

F.2d 524, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983), an independent suit brought by 

appellants would demand dismissal for lack of administrative 

exhaustion. 

Ironically, both sides’ briefs take the position when 

arguing the jurisdictional issue that hurts their case with 

respect to the dismissal issue. Appellants’ brief attempts to 

overcome that self-imposed hurdle by urging this court to 

break new ground and apply the single-filing exception in the 

absence of joinder to a distinct action brought by non-filing 

plaintiffs. However, appellants backtracked from that 

entreaty at oral argument and now contend, for purposes of the 

dismissal issue, that they separated their claims under Rule 

42(b) and not Rule 21. We agree. 

The next question is whether Marable’s EEOC filing 

can serve as the basis for appellants’ claims when Marable has 

voluntarily dismissed her suit with prejudice. GWUH argues 

 

Marable, No. 01-02361 at 5–6 (D.D.C. May 29, 2007). Why the district 

court seemingly reversed that decision when it dismissed appellants’ claims 

is unclear. Because we review the dismissal de novo, there is no need to 

inquire into the exact reason. 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 12 of 14
13

that it cannot, pointing out that the single-filing exception does 

not apply when the original EEOC filer is not party to the suit. 

GWUH’s argument would be persuasive if Marable were the 

only plaintiff who filed an EEOC complaint. However, this is 

not the case. Marable’s EEOC filing contained an attachment 

that listed the names and contact information of additional 

complainants. See Letter from Solaman Lippman & Renae 

Marable to EEOC at ¶ 4 (April 2, 1999) (“Charges are herewith 

filed . . . on [Marable’s] own behalf and on behalf of the 

attached list of persons who were also employed as Assistant 

Nurses.”). Among those listed were Janette Adams, Kathleen 

McDonald, and Nancy Prince—the three former Nursing 

Assistants who remain as plaintiffs in the overall action. 

Under EEOC’s regulations, a “charge on behalf of a person 

claiming to be aggrieved may be made by any person,” as long 

as “the name, address, and telephone number of the person on 

whose behalf the charge is made” are provided to the EEOC. 

29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(a). Further, the EEOC issues right-to-sue 

letters to “the person claiming to be aggrieved or the person on 

whose behalf a charge was filed.” Id. § 1601.19(a). 

Therefore, the remaining Nursing Assistants all exhausted 

their administrative remedies and received the right to sue 

when they joined Marable’s EEOC complaint. As long as one 

of those plaintiffs remains party to the suit, appellants can 

continue to avail themselves of the single-filing exception. 

 

 Because appellants properly intervened in a lawsuit 

brought after the original plaintiffs filed EEOC charges and 

because appellants remain as plaintiffs in that suit, the 

dismissal of their claims for lack of administrative exhaustion 

was in error. 

III 

The district court properly authorized its dismissal of 

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 13 of 14
14

appellants’ claims as final under Rule 54(b), giving this court 

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The district court, however, 

improperly dismissed appellants’ claims for lack of 

administrative exhaustion. For these reasons, we affirm the 

district court’s Rule 54(b) order but reverse its dismissal order 

and remand for further proceedings. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #09-7036 Document #1247296 Filed: 06/01/2010 Page 14 of 14