Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06018/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06018-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFRED BROWN, CASE NO. CV-F-02-6018 AWI DLB P

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANT’S

vs. MOTION TO DISMISS BE GRANTED IN

PART 

 

EDGAR CASTILLO. Et.al. ,

 [Doc. 67]

Defendants.

 /

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Alfred Brown (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s amended complaint against defendants CASTILLO, CURTIS, J.J KING, T. BARBEIRO,

D. WALKER, J. BUNKER, I. MATHOS, D. DUVALL, and T. DULAY. Plaintiff alleges that

during his incarceration at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility at Corcoran State

Prison, defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to provide him with a

replacement for his old wheelchair. Plaintiff also alleges defendants’ conduct violates his rights

under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff alleges that on January 28, 2002, he fell out of

his wheelchair and suffered physical injuries. On May 18, 2005, defendant Bunker filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion on August 1, 2005 to which

defendant Bunker replied on August 3, 2005. 

Case 1:02-cv-06018-LJO-DLB Document 112 Filed 10/06/05 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 II. Motions to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept as true

the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,

and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied,

396 U.S. 869 (1969). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake

Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The federal system is one of notice pleading. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d

1119, 1126 (2002). “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with

limited exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,

534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ.

Pro. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. Discovery and summary judgment motions - not motions

to dismiss - “define disputed facts” and “dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Id. at 512. 

III. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claim

Plaintiff has a permanent medical condition that requires the use of a wheelchair. In his

amended complaint, he alleges that in July 2001, he submitted an emergency appeal about his

wheelchair needing repair. He describes his unsuccessful efforts thereafter to obtain badly need

repairs to the wheelchair despite the granting of his appeal on July 25, 2001 ordering that the

wheelchair be repaired. Plaintiff alleges that defendants ignored his requests and appeals to have his

Case 1:02-cv-06018-LJO-DLB Document 112 Filed 10/06/05 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

wheelchair repaired and on January 28, 2002, he was thrown from his wheelchair and injured. 

Plaintiff’s allegations with regard to defendant Bunker relate to an encounter on January 2, 2002,

prior to the accident. He alleges that he saw defendant Bunker and relayed the history to date of his

efforts to have the wheelchair repaired. He states that defendant Bunker immediately called officer

Walker, who repaired wheelchairs on another yard and whom Bunker stated, he knew personally. 

After Bunker talked to Walker, he told plaintiff that he had to call “C.T.C” to get an understanding

of what was going on with plaintiff’s wheelchair. He told plaintiff to come back after the morning

meal and Bunker gave plaintiff an inmate pass to that effect. Plaintiff alleges that when he returned

tot he MTA office later that morning, Bunker “appeared nervous like he had done something wrong”

and immediately gave plaintiff his paperwork back in a hostile manner and stated that he was told by

Walker to call CTC about plaintiff’s wheelchair. Bunker stated that he was told to stay out of it and

to leave it alone. Plaintiff alleges that Bunker then stated, “I’m through with you and I am not doing

anything else for you.” 

Defendant Bunker argues that plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation. He alleges that he was a newly assigned MTA and at plaintiff’s request he

immediately inquired into the status of the repair request and that he was not deliberately indifferent

to plaintiff’s medical needs.

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Id. at 8. “The objective component of an

Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” 

Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate

indifference” standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation

must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)

(citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct

undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison

Case 1:02-cv-06018-LJO-DLB Document 112 Filed 10/06/05 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when they

“interfere with treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The Ninth

Circuit has found deliberate indifference where prison officials “deliberately ignore the express

orders of a prisoner’s prior physician for reasons unrelated to the medical needs of the prisoner.” 

Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing summary judgment where prison

officials forced prisoner to endure a plane flight that resulted in ear injury, in direct contravention of

a treating physician’s previous orders); Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir.

1989) (per curium) (reversing summary judgment where medical staff knew that pretrial detainee

had head injury, but prescribed contraindicated medications, disregarding evidence of complications

to which they had been specifically alerted by private treating physician); Tolbert v. Eyman, 434

F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding cognizable claim for deliberate indifference where warden refused

to authorize prisoner’s receipt of medicine that had been previously prescribed by a physician); Cf.

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 1992) (where surgery recommended by

prisoner’s prior physician was severely delayed, court was unable hold doctors liable because prison

administrators, not the doctors, were responsible for scheduling treatment).

A heightened pleading standard may no longer be applied to constitutional tort claims in

which improper motive is an element, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2002), and the complaint need only satisfy “the simple requirements of Rule 8 (a).” Id. at 1125. 

“‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a

recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune,

No. 02-16546, 2004 WL 1088293, at *2 (9th Cir. May 17, 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to

put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977

(9th Cir. 2001))). 

Construing the allegations relating to defendant Bunker in the light most favorable to plaintiff

Case 1:02-cv-06018-LJO-DLB Document 112 Filed 10/06/05 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

and resolving all doubts in his favor, the Court finds that the allegations are sufficient to state a claim

under the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that when he first approached defendant Bunker, he

informed Bunker of the issues he was having with his wheelchair and the history of his efforts to

have it repaired. Indeed, accordingly to plaintiff’s allegations, at the time he approached defendant

Bunker, the right foot rest was broken and plaintiff was required to cross his right leg over his left

leg to keep his right foot from dragging on the ground. The bearings were also making noise. 

Plaintiff contends that defendant Bunker was helpful at first and he indicated that he would inquire

into the status of the needed repairs. However, plaintiff alleges that when he saw Bunker later,

Bunker was hostile and short and essentially told plaintiff he was not going to help him. 

Although defendant argues that these allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation, according to plaintiff, Bunker denied him assistance despite the obvious

condition of his wheelchair and his knowledge of plaintiff’s problems. Construing the allegations in

the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that plaintiff has adequately

alleged that defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Defendant has set forth no arguments that

persuade the court that the allegations set forth in plaintiff’s complaint are so woefully inadequate

that plaintiff ‘s Eighth Amendment claim fails to meet the minimal notice pleading standard. 

B. ADA Claim

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides that “no qualified

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to

discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Rehabilitation Act (RA) provides that “no

otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be

excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 794. Title II of the

ADA and the RA apply to inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v.

Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9 Cir. th

1997); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453-56 (9 Cir. 1996). th

Case 1:02-cv-06018-LJO-DLB Document 112 Filed 10/06/05 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

In order to state a claim under the ADA and the RA, plaintiff must have been “. . . improperly

excluded from participation in, and denied the benefits of, a prison service, program, or activity on

the basis of his physical handicap.” Armstrong at 1023. Education, vocational training, and medical

attention can be seen as benefits to inmates. Id. at 1024. 

In order to state a claim under the ADA and the RA, plaintiff must have been “improperly

excluded from participation in, and denied the benefits of, a prison service, program, or activity on

the basis of his physical handicap.” Armstrong at 1023. It appears that plaintiff has a disability

within the meaning of the ADA and the RA, however, plaintiff has not alleged that he was excluded

or denied from a prison program based on his disability. As stated by defendant Bunker, plaintiff

states a typical claim under section 1983 for failure to provide medical care but he does not state a

claim under the ADA. 

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiff’s complaint states a claim for relief

against defendant Bunker for violation of the Eighth Amendment, but does not state a claim for relief

for violation of the ADA. The court therefore recommends that defendant’s motion be denied as to

the Eighth Amendment claim but granted as to the ADA claim. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, filed May 18, 2005, be granted in part and denied in

part as follows:

a. Defendant’s motion to dismiss this action in its entirety for failure to state a

claim and enter judgment be denied;

b. Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical claim

for failure to state a clam be denied; and

c. Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ADA claim be granted.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Case 1:02-cv-06018-LJO-DLB Document 112 Filed 10/06/05 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 5, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:02-cv-06018-LJO-DLB Document 112 Filed 10/06/05 Page 7 of 7