Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01164/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01164-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN E. BRAZIL, 

Plaintiff,

 vs.

Correctional Officer G. A. RICE;

Correctional Officer T. CLEARY;

Sergeant P. J. FRUDDEN; Captain F.

G. AHL; Warden A. P. KANE; Appeals

Coordinator W. B. CHILDRESS; Director

of Corrections JEANNE S.

WOODFORD; and Senior Special Agent

MARK MIRVISS,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-1164 (PR)

DENIAL OF MOTIONS TO

RECONSIDER

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. After allowing plaintiff to

amend, the court dismissed the case and entered judgment. Plaintiff has moved to

reconsider.

In the original complaint, plaintiff contended that Rice, a correctional officer,

habitually failed to pick up and deliver legal mail to inmates until the end of his shift. 

Plaintiff alleged that he repeatedly complained to Rice about this, and threatened to sue

him. On August 16, 2004, Rice delivered incoming legal mail right at the end of his shift,

and plaintiff refused it and again threatened to sue Rice. Rice then allegedly threatened to

have plaintiff moved. Plaintiff “dared him to further violate [plaintiff’s] rights.” Plaintiff wrote

up a grievance and the next day showed it to Rice. Rice then left a Post-it asking that

plaintiff be moved. He was not moved. 

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Case 4:05-cv-01164-PJH Document 21 Filed 03/09/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In the initial review order, the court concluded that although plaintiff had not stated a

claim that Rice’s actions were a violation of his right of access to the courts, he might be

able to state a claim that the threat and request to move plaintiff were retaliation for

plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights. However, plaintiff had not

alleged that Rice’s actions had no legitimate penological purpose nor facts showing that he

was harmed, see Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (requirements

for retaliation claim), so the claims against Rice were dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff shortly thereafter filed what he called a "Rule 59(e) motion" asking the court to

reconsider the dismissal of the other claims and defendants, and shortly thereafter, an

amendment attempting to remedy the deficiencies of the claim against Rice.

The court noted in the initial review order that on the facts plaintiff had pleaded it

appeared that Rice had a legitimate penological objective, namely that of separating Rice

and plaintiff. In the amendment plaintiff attempted to meet this by contending that Rice

occasionally works in the area to which he might have been transferred, and that Rice

could always be assigned there at some point in the future. In a further screening order the

court concluded that these allegations were not enough to avoid the fact that he had

pleaded the existence of a legitimate penological objective for Rice's action. That is, he

had pleaded facts which showed he did not have a claim. See Weisbuch v. County of Los

Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (facts pleaded by plaintiff may show that he

or she has failed to state a claim; a plaintiff may plead herself out of court). The case was

dismissed and judgment entered. The court did not explicitly rule on plaintiff's pending

motion to reconsider the dismissal of the other defendants and claims, although the

dismissal impliedly rejected it. 

Plaintiff filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment on June 8, 2006. See

Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e). On June 14, 2006, without explanation, he filed another copy of his

earlier Rule 59(e) motion, the one directed to the dismissal of the other claims and

defendants. These motions are now before the court for ruling.

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Case 4:05-cv-01164-PJH Document 21 Filed 03/09/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) "'should not be granted, absent highly

unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered

evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the law."' McDowell

v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (en banc). A district

court does not commit clear error warranting reconsideration when the question before it is

a debatable one. Id. at 1256 (district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

reconsideration where question whether it could enter protective order in habeas action

limiting Attorney General's use of documents from trial counsel's file was debatable).

In his first motion plaintiff has failed to establish that the court was clearly in error in

concluding that a legitimate penological objective for Rice's actions appeared on the face of

his complaint. The motion (document number 19 on the docket) is DENIED. 

Plaintiff's second motion is not timely as a Rule 59(e) motion, so will be considered

under Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more of the

following is shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the

court's decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment

has been satisfied; (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); School Dist.

1J v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993). Plaintiff does not attempt to come

within these categories, but rather reargues his claims. The second motion (document

number 20 on the docket) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2007.

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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