Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00391/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00391-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The Court provided Plaintiff notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960

(9th Cir. 1998), regarding his obligation to respond. (Doc. 33.)

WO SVK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William Mark Isbell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-0391-PHX-JAT (JFM)

ORDER

Plaintiff filed William Mark Isbell filed this pro se civil rights action against

employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC). (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff’s action

arises out of the failure to provide him a lacto-vegetarian religious diet, which he claims he

needs because he is Asatru. He asserts a violation of the First Amendment and the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The remaining Defendants—Charles

Ryan, ADC Director; Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Eyman Warden Trujillo; Senior

Chaplain Henderson; ASPC-Eyman Browning Unit Deputy Warden Ramos, Associate

Deputy Warden Heet, and Chaplain Miser—move for summary judgment.1

 (Doc. 21.)

Plaintiff cross moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 35.) 

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion in part, deny it in part, and deny Plaintiff’s

motion. 

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I. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The

moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the opposing

party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention

is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving

party. Id. at 250; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-

87 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is

sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). 

When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits

or declarations, if any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The judge’s function is not to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the evidence of the

non-moving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may be granted. Id. at 248-49.

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B. Free Exercise

To prevail on a First Amendment, free-exercise-of-religion claim, a plaintiff must

show that a defendant burdened the practice of plaintiff’s religion by preventing him from

engaging in a sincerely held religious belief and that the defendant did so without any

justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Shakur v. Schriro, 514

F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). Regulations that impinge on the First Amendment right

to free exercise may be upheld only if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). This determination requires analysis of

four prongs: (1) there must be a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the

legitimate governmental interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the

right that remain open to inmates; (3) the impact accommodation of the right will have on

guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of

ready alternatives. Id. at 90.

C. RLUIPA

Under RLUIPA, a government may not impose a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a confined person unless the government establishes that the burden furthers a

“compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). This “compelling government interest” and “least restrictive means"

test replaced Turner’s “legitimate penological interest” test. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418

F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). Under its own terms,

RLUIPA must be “construed broadly in favor of protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his

religious beliefs.” Id. at 995 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)). The Supreme Court has

upheld RLUIPA against an Establishment Clause challenge. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.

709 (2005). 

The inmate bears the burden of establishing prima facie that RLUIPA has been

violated and that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened. Warsoldier, 418

F.3d at 994 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b)). The government then bears the burden of

proving that the substantial burden on the inmate’s religious practice both furthers a

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Although this is a fairly simple claim, the briefing in this matter is extensive—and

needlessly confusing. Defendants submit their Statement of Facts (Doc. 22 (DSOF I)); and

Henderson’s declaration, with attachments (id., Ex. A, Henderson Decl.) Plaintiff submits

his Statement of Facts (Doc. 36 (PSOF I)) and his declaration, with attachments (Doc. 37,

Pl. Decl.) He also submits a separate response to Defendants’ motion (Doc. 43) and a

Statement of Facts in Opposition (Doc. 44 (PSOF II)), with exhibits. Defendants submit a

response to Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 46) and their Statement of Facts (Doc. 47 (DSOF II)),

which includes exhibits and objections to Plaintiff’s evidence. Defendants also submit their

reply. (Doc. 52.) Finally, Plaintiff submits his reply (Doc. 59) and another Statement of

Facts (Doc. 60 (PSOF III)), which includes his responses to Defendants’ evidentiary

objections and his objections to Defendants’ evidence in their response.

The Court has reviewed the parties’ objections to evidence and, where relevant, has

summarized the objections and ruled on them. The remaining objections are overruled or are

irrelevant. The Court has relied only on admissible evidence in issuing this Order.

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compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. Id. at 995

(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-2(b)). 

II. Motions for Summary Judgment

 A. Parties’ Contentions2

1. Facts

Inmates who have declared a religious preference may request accommodations to

practice their faith, such as a special diet. (DSOF ¶ 4; PSOF II ¶ 4.) Inmates may change

their religious designation by submitting a written request. (DSOF ¶ 5; PSOF II ¶ 5.) Special

diets are available to ADC inmates to observe their religious practice. (DSOF ¶ 7; PSOF II

¶ 7.) Inmates can be removed from the restricted diets for non-compliance. (DSOF ¶ 8;

PSOF II ¶ 8.) 

The parties dispute the ADC procedure regarding religious diets. Defendants assert

that the ADC policy and procedure have been developed in an effort to minimize the misuse

of religious designation for other than sincere religious practice. (DSOF ¶ 6.) For example,

if an inmate has designated a different religion within the past year, additional documentation

may be necessary to verify his sincere interest in changing to the newly-declared religion,

and if an inmate requests a religious accommodation that is seemingly inconsistent with the

practice of his designated religion, prison officials may undertake additional investigation

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to determine the validity of the request. (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that ADC requires that the dietary practice must be central to or

mandated by the declared religion. (PSOF II ¶ 6.) He claims that Henderson demanded

clergy verification of the need for the diet. (Id.; ref. PSOF I ¶ 25.)

According to Defendants, special diets require additional accountability and planning,

more preparation manpower, and at times, more expensive ingredient costs. (DSOF ¶ 8,

Henderson Decl.) Plaintiff argues that Henderson is not competent to attest to this. (PSOF

II ¶ 8.)

Inmates who are unable to demonstrate a religious reason for the request are denied

a restricted religious diet. (DSOF ¶ 10.) When an inmate requests a religious diet, the

chaplain can review the request in light of the inmate’s inconsistent history and behavior,

which may include an investigation into such factors as past religious declarations,

disciplinary history, and discretionary food purchases that are inconsistent with the requested

diet. (Id.) Plaintiff disputes this, arguing that dietary restrictions are to be followed once an

inmate has been approved for the religious diet. (Doc. PSOF II ¶ 10.)

ADC asserts that a lacto-vegetarian diet is currently available to inmates who establish

a sincerely-held religious reason that is consistent with the religious preference that they have

declared. (DSOF ¶ 11.) Defendants assert that lacto-vegetarian refers to the inclusion of

dairy products in the diet and that effective August 15, 2011, the ADC Vegetarian Diet will

convert to a vegan diet, eliminating dairy products. (Id.)

Plaintiff entered ADC on November 17, 1994, and declared that his religious

preference was Christian. (DSOF ¶ 13; PSOF II ¶ 13.) In July 1997, he changed his

religious preference to “Identity,” and in January 1999, he re-registered as Asatru. (DSOF

¶ 14; PSOF II ¶ 14.) He was released from ADC on December 10, 2000, and on May 24,

2005, reentered ADC to serve new sentences. (DSOF ¶¶ 14-15; PSOF II ¶¶ 14-15.) On

October 14, 2005, Plaintiff changed his religious designation to Seventh Day Adventist.

(DSOF ¶ 16; PSOF II ¶ 16.) On May 13, 2006, he switched his religious preference to

Asatru, and in June 2010, Plaintiff requested a religious diet. (DSOF ¶¶ 16, 18; PSOF II

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¶¶ 16, 18.) 

 Senior Chaplain Henderson asked Plaintiff to provide his religious reason for the

request. (DSOF ¶ 19; PSOF II ¶ 19.) In reply, Plaintiff wrote about the history of Asatru as

an ancient northern European religion and indicated that because he could not be sure how

the meat he received at prison was slaughtered, he should eat the vegetarian diet. (DSOF

¶ 19.) Plaintiff asserts that he explained his personal and religious basis for his dietary

request. (PSOF II ¶ 19.) 

Defendants assert that “[b]ased upon his knowledge of Asatru, which included

ceremonies during which meat was consumed,” Henderson asked Plaintiff to provide some

printed documentation in support of his request for a vegetarian diet. (DSOF ¶ 20; PSOF II

¶ 20.) Defendants assert that although Plaintiff provided documents, they did not state that

a vegetarian diet was consistent with the practice of Asatru. (DSOF ¶ 21.) Plaintiff disputes

this and provides a list of the documents submitted. (PSOF II ¶ 21.) 

Henderson denied Plaintiff’s request for a vegetarian diet, which was affirmed in the

grievance process. (DSOF ¶ 21; PSOF II ¶ 21.)

 Defendants assert that inmate-store purchases may only be used and consumed by the

inmate purchaser and that Plaintiff has consistently purchased meat products from the inmate

store; they contend that inconsistent food purchases is a basis for denial of the religious diet.

(DSOF ¶¶ 22-24.) Plaintiff asserts that during the period that his request was pending—June

2 to October 7—he purchased chicken flavored ramen noodles and one beef sausage but that

he did not eat these items; they were purchased for and eaten by other inmates. (PSOF II ¶

23.) And he claims that inconsistent food purchases are grounds only for discontinuing a

previously approved diet. (PSOF II ¶ 24.)

 In his cross-motion, Plaintiff asserts various beliefs of those in the Asatru community,

including the interconnectedness of mind, body, and spirit, and contends that because of this

connection, many believe that butchering of animals or the method of butchering is vital

because if the animal dies in fear or has a weak spirit, the person who consumes the flesh

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Defendants object to these statements on various grounds—conclusory statements

of opinion, lack of foundation, and hearsay (Doc. 47 at 2-3); the objections are overruled.

The statements are admissible to the extent they explain Plaintiff’s own religious beliefs.

4

The motion to strike is denied.

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consumes the fear and weakness.3 (PSOF I ¶¶ 18-19.) Because Plaintiff has no control over

how the meat he is fed is processed, he needs to abstain from eating meat. (PSOF II ¶ 21.)

In their response to his motion, Defendants assert that “Asatru practice includes the

consumption of meat during certain ceremonies; ‘There are no specific dietary requirements

of the Asatru religion.’; ‘[P]ork is considered sacred to the God Freyr, and is generally eaten

at the Yule Fest.’” (DSOF II ¶ 25, Linderman Decl. ¶ 32.) Defendants allege that on August

18, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a chapter from Creed of Iron, Wotansvolk Wisdom, entitled

“Odic Force.” (DSOF II ¶ 18, Linderman Decl., Attach. 1, 2.) According to Defendants, the

Odic Force article is part of a book published by the 14 Word Press,“Wotansvolk” or Wotan

(an acronym for “Will of the Aryan Nation”) and refers to a group of white supremacists.

(DSOF II ¶ 19.) Defendants assert that Wotanism is considered a bastardization of Odinism,

which is the root of Asatru. (DSOF II ¶ 22, Linderman Decl. ¶ 31.) According to

Defendants, it is not the same belief system as Asatru. (DSOF II, Linderman Decl. ¶¶ 29-31,

Attach. 3.) Defendants argue that the Odic Force article that Plaintiff submitted on August

18, 2010, to support his claim for a diet based on his purported Asatru beliefs was not related

to Asatru and that the article does not mention a vegetarian diet or any diet. (DSOF II ¶ 24,

Linderman Decl. ¶ 31, Attach. 1 and 2.)

Plaintiff replies, objecting to Defendants’ evidence on various grounds, and he moves

to strike portions of Linderman’s declaration.4

 (Doc. 60.)

2. Legal Arguments

Defendants argue that they did not burden Plaintiff’s religious practice and that they

are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established right.

(Doc. 21 at 5.) They contend that Plaintiff failed to articulate a religious reason for his

request, that he was consuming meat from the inmate store, and that it is appropriate to deny

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a special diet if an inmate is not sincere in his religious beliefs. (Id. at 5-7.) They assert that

they could have believed that they complied with the law when they required Plaintiff to

explain the religious reason for his vegetarian-diet request and denied him the diet when he

was unable to, particularly when Plaintiff’s history showed that he had frequently switched

religions, that he consumed meat from the store, that he was affiliated with a gang and he had

a 2009 ADC Inmate Disciplinary Rule violation for heroin use. (Id. at )

Defendants also argue that Ryan and Trujillo did not have the duty to determine

eligibility for religious diets and that they cannot be sued on a theory of respondeat superior.

 (Id. at 12.) They assert that furthermore, Ramos, Heet, and Miser, did not have the authority

to grant or to deny religious diets. (Id. at 13; DSOF I, Henderson Decl. ¶2.)

In his motion, Plaintiff argues that he has provided evidence of his sincere belief in

the need for a vegetarian diet, evidence that ADC has such a diet, and evidence that denial

of the diet substantially burdens his religious practice. He makes arguments as to the Turner

factors and RLUIPA. (Doc. 35.) As to Defendants’ request for qualified immunity, Plaintiff

points out that he seeks not only damages but injunctive relief and that he has sued

Defendants in their official capacity and well as individual capacity. (Doc. 43 at 15.)

Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ argument regarding Ramos, Heet, and Miser’s lack

of authority to grant a religious diet. However, he asserts that Miser, Heet, Ramos, and

Trujillo and Ryan all had “vested authority” to address the denial of the religious diet.

(PSOF I ¶ 33.) 

In their response to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants reassert their arguments in their

motion. (Doc. 46 at 7-8.) They also claim that the store records show that Plaintiff

purchased meat items from the inmate store, that inmates are forbidden from transferring

property to others (DSOF II, Linderman Decl. ¶ 25), and that inmates in the Browning Unit

live in single cells with metal mesh fronts and do not have the opportunity to transfer items

outside their cells (DSOF II, Ex. C, Miser Decl. ¶ 18). Therefore, they assert that Plaintiff

cannot meet his burden under RLUIPA to show that denial of the vegetarian diet

substantially burdened his religious practice. (Doc. 46 at 9.) Defendants also argue that

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damages are not available under RLUIPA and that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive

damages. (Id. at 11-14.) 

C. Analysis

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion in part and deny it in part and deny

Plaintiff’s motion. 

1. Sincerely Held Belief

The Court finds that there is a dispute of fact regarding whether Plaintiff’s request for

a vegetarian diet is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief. 

To prevail on a claim under the First Amendment or RLUIPA, an inmate must

establish that the religious accommodation he seeks is based on a sincerely held religious

belief. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85; Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994. Defendants make two

arguments as to the sincerely-held belief requirement: that they relied on Plaintiff’s failure

to provide documentation supporting his request for a vegetarian diet or his failure to

articulate a religious basis and that Plaintiff’s conduct demonstrate that his beliefs are not

sincerely held. 

As to the reliance on Plaintiff’s failure to articulate a religious reason, Plaintiff has

asserted that Asatru beliefs include belief in the interconnectedness of mind, body, and spirit

and that because of this connection, many believe that butchering of animals or the method

of butchering is vital because if the animal dies in fear or has a weak spirit, the person who

consumes the flesh consumes the fear and weakness. Because he does not know the method

of butchering the meat served at ADC, Plaintiff must abstain from eating meat. “[The] task

is to decide whether the beliefs professed . . . are sincerely held and whether they are, in

[Plaintiff’s] own scheme of things, religious.” United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185

(1965). The Court cannot say as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s articulated reason is not an

expression of a religious basis for Plaintiff’s belief. “[T]the religious fabric of this country

is one of a ‘vast panoply of beliefs.’” United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir.

1992) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 175 (1965)).

As to Plaintiff’s inability to provide written proof of his belief, it is the sincerity of

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The Court notes that consumption of meat in Asatru ceremonies is not inconsistent

with Plaintiff’s request for a vegetarian diet. Plaintiff explained that he needed the

vegetarian diet because he did not know how the animal products served by ADC were

slaughtered.

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one’s belief rather than its centrality to one’s faith or the “correctness” of the belief that is

relevant to the free-exercise inquiry. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. In Jackson v. Mann, the

Second Circuit rejected a district court’s reliance on a rabbi’s determination that an inmate

was not Jewish for purposes of a prison’s kosher-diet program; the Second Circuit reasoned

that whether an inmate’s beliefs are entitled to First Amendment protection turns on whether

those beliefs are sincerely held, not on an ecclesiastical question whether the inmate is a Jew

under Jewish law. 196 F.3d 316, 320-21 (2nd Cir. 1999). The Jackson court reasoned that

the prison “erroneously substituted the objective ‘accuracy’ of [the inmate’s] assertion that

he is Jewish for the correct test—whether [the inmate’s] beliefs are ‘sincerely held.’” 196

F.3d at 320. See also Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593-94 (2d Cir. 2003) (the role a

religious feast played in a prisoner’s practice of Islam determined whether there had been a

substantial burden to his religious practice, not the testimony of Muslim clerics as to the

proper celebration of the feast); Koger v. Bryan, 523 F3d 789, 799 (7th Cir. 2008). 

 Henderson’s statement asking for documentation “[b]ased upon his knowledge of Asatru,

which included ceremonies during which meat was consumed,” suggests that Henderson

substituted the accuracy of Plaintiff’s assertion regarding the need for a vegetarian diet for

the correct test—the sincerity of Plaintiff’s belief. Likewise, Linderman declared that Asatru

does not require a vegetarian diet,5

 but the issue is what Plaintiff believes. Sincerity of

beliefs does not turn on an inmate’s objective knowledge of his religion. See Colvin v.

Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 298 (6th Cir. 2010). As the Supreme Court has stated “[i]t is not

within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith,

or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Id. at 884 (emphasis

added) (quoting Hernandez v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. at 699, 109 (1989)).

“The right to the free exercise of religion is . . . the right of a human being to respond to what

that person’s conscience says is the dictate of God.” Ward v. Walsh,1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th

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Cir. 1993). 

The sincerity of beliefs is a question of fact generally not appropriate for decision at

summary judgment. In Patrick v. LeFevre, the Second Circuit reasoned that scrutiny of a

prisoner’s sincerity is a means of “differentiating between beliefs that are held as a matter

of conscience and those that are animated by motives of deceptions and fraud.” 745 F.2d

153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). The court in Patrick emphasized that courts are “singularly illequipped to sit in judgement on the verity of an adherent’s religious beliefs” and held that

summary judgment was inappropriate because the subjective issue of sincerity of belief was

a question of fact; “assessing a claimant’s sincerity of belief demands a full exposition of

facts and the opportunity for the factfinder to observe the claimant’s demeanor during direct

and cross-examination.” Id. See also Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrs., 372 F. 3d 979, 983

(8th Cir. 2004) (“Whether or not group worship is a sincerely held religious belief is a factual

determination, so we must not quickly dismiss such claims on summary judgment by

concluding that those beliefs are not genuine”); EEOC v. Union Independiente de la

Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002)

(based on conduct inconsistent with the plaintiff’s professed religious beliefs, defendant had

raised a triable issue of fact, but the court reasoned that “[c]redibility issues such as the

sincerity of [a plaintiff’s] religious belief are quintessential fact questions. As such, they

ordinarily should be reserved ‘for the factfinder at trial, not for the court at summary

judgment.’”); Reiss v. Stansel, 2011 WL 2111999, * 5 (D. Ariz. May 26, 2011); Schilling

v. Crawford, 2007 WL 2790623, at * 16 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2007), citing Jackson, 196 F.3d

at 320). 

In support of their argument that Plaintiff’s beliefs are not sincerely held, Defendants

also cite to Plaintiff’s purchase of meat items, his switching of religions, his gang affiliation,

and a disciplinary violation. Plaintiff claims that he did not purchase non-vegetarian food

for his personal consumption, that he has renounced his gang affiliation and debriefed, and

that he has had only one disciplinary violation since his reincarceration in 2005. (Doc. 43

at 8.) Moreover, his religious preference was Asatru for three years before he requested the

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diet. While Plaintiff’s conduct can be considered in determining the sincerity of his religious

beliefs, Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto

Rico, 279 F.3d at 56, the cited conduct is insufficient to establish insincerity of belief as a

matter of law. 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff professes to have a sincere belief in his need to abstain

from eating meat and that he provides sufficient indicia of sincerity—his studies, his

knowledge of Asatru, his persistent efforts to obtain a vegetarian diet—to create a triable

issue of fact as to the sincerity of his beliefs. Likewise, Defendants point to Plaintiff’s

purchase of meat items and other conduct they claim is inconsistent with sincerely held

beliefs, thus, precluding summary judgment for Plaintiff.

As to Defendants’ argument regarding substantial burden, if Plaintiff establishes that

his need for a vegetarian diet is a sincerely held religious belief, denial of the diet is a

substantial burden to his religious practice. See Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982,

987 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We have little difficulty in concluding that an outright ban on a

particular religious exercise is a substantial burden on that religious exercise.”) 

2. Qualified Immunity

Defendants seek dismissal of the action based on qualified immunity. But as Plaintiff

points out, he is seeking not only damages but injunctive relief. (Doc. 1.) A defendant in a

§ 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity from damages for civil liability if his or her

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A

finding of qualified immunity would not eliminate the claim for injunctive relief. In addition,

the qualified-immunity analysis applies to a suit against defendants only in their individual

capacity; in suits against officers in their official capacity, qualified immunity is unavailable

as a defense. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). In an official-capacity suit,

the plaintiff must demonstrate that a policy or custom of a governmental entity, of which the

defendant official is an agent, was the moving force behind the violation. Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 

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Defendants argue that they could have believed it was lawful to require Plaintiff to

explain the religious reason for his diet request and to deny the request when he could not.

But it appears that Defendants denied the request because Plaintiff could not document the

need for a religious diet or establish by documentation that his understanding of the dietary

requirements of Asatru are “accurate.” It was well established at the time of Plaintiff’s

request that the relevant inquiry is the sincerity of one’s belief rather than its centrality to

one’s faith or the accuracy of the beliefs. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. As the Ninth circuit

has noted “[t]he peculiarity or uniqueness of [an individual’s] creed is irrelevant.” United

States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992). Documentation of one’s beliefs may

not always be available. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

3. Defendants Ryan, Trujillo, Ramos, Heet, and Miser 

Defendants argue that Ryan and Trujillo did not have the duty to authorize a religious

diet. They argue that Ramos, Heet, and Miser did not have the authority to provide Plaintiff

a religious diet, citing to Henderson’s declaration. Henderson attests that he had the duty to

deny requests not in conformance with policy and to refer recommendations to grant requests

to the Central Office Pastoral Activities Administrator. (PSOF I, Henderson Decl. ¶ 2.)

Henderson does not claim that his duty was exclusive, and there are no affidavits or

declarations from Ryan, Trujillo, Ramos, or Heet regarding their duties and authority. But

the evidence shows that Ryan did not review Plaintiff’s grievance appeal. (PSOF I,

Henderson Decl., Attach. 5, Inmate Grievance Appeal Resp., dated Jan. 2011.) There is no

evidence connecting Ryan to the harm or to a policy. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,

371-72, 377 (1976). There is no respondeatsuperior liability under § 1983. Monell v. New

York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Damage claims against

Ryan will be dismissed.

Miser attests that he has no recollection of visiting Plaintiff, the logs do not indicate

that he did so, and and probably could not have reviewed literature through the mesh front

wall of the cell as Plaintiff claims. But most important, he specifically attests that as the

Unit Chaplain, he is not authorized to approve religious diets. (DSOF II, Miser Decl. ¶¶ 13-

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16.) Plaintiff does not dispute this evidence except to assert that all had the vested authority

to address the denial of a religious diet. (PSOF I ¶ 33.) Conclusory allegations, unsupported

by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the evidence demonstrates that Miser lacked

authority to provide Plaintiff a religious diet, he cannot be liable for the denial. 

The Court will dismiss damage claims against Ryan and Miser and claims for

injunctive relief against Miser. The Court will deny the motion as to dismissal of Trujillo,

Ramos, and Heet.

4. Damages—RLUIPA and Punitive

An official-capacity claim is another way of pleading an action against the entity of

which the officer or official is an agent—in this case, the State of Arizona—and absent a

waiver of sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment bars such claims. See Kentucky

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989). The Supreme Court has held that states did not waive sovereign immunity to suits

for money damages under RLUIPA. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011).

Thus, the official-capacity claim for damages under RLUIPA will be dismissed. 

In addition, the Court holds that damages are not available under RLUIPA against

Defendants in their individual capacity. The Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed

whether RLUIPA creates a cause of action for damages against individuals. Plaintiff’s

reliance on Campbell v. Alameida, 295 Fed. App’x 130, 131 (9th Cir. 2009), is misplaced.

(Doc. 59 at 10.) Campbell merely affirmed a grant of qualified immunity from damage

claims under the First Amendment and RLUIPA; the court never reached the question of the

availability of damages under RLUIPA. 

The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have addressed

individual-capacity damages under RLUIPA and held that such damages are not available.

Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 188-89 (4th Cir. 2009); Sossamon v. Lone Star State of

Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F. 3d 868, 889 (7th Cir.

2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir. 2007). The Eleventh Circuit reasoned

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that RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause power, citing Cutter v.

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715-16 (2005), and that Spending Clause legislation is not

legislation in its operation but operates like a contract, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Individual RLUIPA defendants are not parties to the

contract in their individual capacities, and therefore, only the grant recipient may be liable

for its violation. See Smith, 502 F.3d at 1273-75. The Fifth Circuit also concluded that

RLUIPA was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause and noted that it also followed the

same rule for Spending Clause legislation. Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328-29. Likewise, the

Seventh Circuit reasoned that “[c]onstruing RLUIPA to provide for damages actions against

officials in their individual capacities would raise serious questions regarding whether

Congress had exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause,” and so the court declined

to read RLUIPA as allowing damages against defendants in their individual capacities.

Nelson, 570 F. 3d at 889.

 As previously noted, in Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1066-70, the Ninth Circuit held that

RLUIPA is constitutional under the Spending Clause. As the Seventh Circuit reasoned

 [a]lthough RLUIPA ostensibly includes Commerce Clause underpinnings as

well, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b), there is no evidence in this case that [the]

denial of a religious diet ‘affect [ed] . . . commerce with foreign nations,

among the several States, or with Indian tribes.’ Id. Thus, it strikes us as

appropriate, at least in this case, to interpret RLUIPA as an exercise of

Congress’s power under the Spending Clause.

Nelson, 570 F. 3d at 886 (citing Smith, 502 F.3d at 1274 n. 9 (reasoning that RLUIPA should

be analyzed as an exercise of Congress’s Spending Clause authority when there is no

evidence of an effect on interstate or international commerce)); Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328

n. 34 (same). 

Likewise, here, Plaintiff’s claims do not appear to implicate the Commerce Clause,

and so the Court interprets RLUIPA as a Spending Clause enactment, which operates like

a contract with the state, not individual employees of the state. See Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17. For the reasons discussed by the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh

Circuits, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s individual damage claims under RLUIPA.

The Court will deny as premature Defendants’ request to dismiss claims for punitive

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damages.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35).

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) is granted in part and

denied in part as follows:

(a) granted as to dismissal of damage claims under RLUIPA, damages claims

against Ryan, and all claims against Miser; and

(b) denied in all other respects.

(3) Miser is dismissed.

(4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) is denied. 

(5) The remaining claims regarding denial of a vegetarian diet are the claim for

injunctive relief under the First Amendment and RLUIPA and claim for damages under the

First Amendment.

DATED this 6th day of December, 2011.

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