Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00485/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00485-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ELIJAH SIMS,

AIS #231113

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-0485-KD-M

:

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al.,

Defendants.

:

:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This § 1983 action, filed by Elijah Sims, an Alabama 

prison inmate, proceeding pro se, was referred to the 

undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. 

Ala. GenLR 72, and is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint (doc. 10)1, Defendant’s Answer and Special 

Report (docs. 26, 27), which the Court has converted into a 

Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 28), and Defendant’s 

Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 38). 

After consideration of the pleadings and Motion and for the 

reasons set out below, it is recommended that Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that Plaintiff’s 

action be dismissed with prejudice.

																																																							 1 Plaintiff initially filed his Complaint (doc. 1) on September 30, 

2015. Plaintiff was instructed to re-file his Complaint on the proper 

form (doc. 3) which he did on November 30, 2015 (doc. 7). Plaintiff, 

however, additionally, filed a Motion to Amend (doc. 6) which this

Court granted (doc. 9). Therein, Plaintiff was informed that his 

Amended Complaint would supersede his previous Complaints and, as such, 

this Court will only consider Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for 

purposes of the pending Motion for Summary Judgment.

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Facts and Proceedings

Plaintiff, Elijah Sims, is an inmate within the

Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) currently housed 

at Fountain Correctional Facility in Atmore, Alabama, where 

is he serving a fifteen (15) year sentence for first-degree 

burglary. (Doc. 10 at 1, 8). Defendants, Warden Wanda 

Lightner (“Lightner”), Correctional Sergeant Bernard Dees 

(“Dees”), Correctional Officer James Travis (“Travis”), 

Correctional Warden III Cynthia Stewart (“Stewart”), 

Correctional Sergeant Kenneth Tyus (“Tyus”) and 

Correctional Captain Willie Knight (“Knight”) are all 

employed with the ADOC. (Doc. 26 at 1-2). 

On August 24, 2015, Plaintiff was serving as the van 

driver for the Mobile Community Based Center, when he was 

seen exiting a residence located at 398 Newsome Street in 

Prichard, Alabama by Correctional Sergeant Albert Randolph

(“Randolph”). (Doc. 27 at 4; Doc. 27-9 at 2). Randolph 

notified Correctional Lieutenant Jeffery Jackson

(“Jackson”) of the incident and apprehended Plaintiff. 

(Id.) Correctional Officer Ahmad Moore (“Moore”) and 

Defendant Knight went to the subject residence to assist 

Randolph and Jackson and reported the incident to Defendant 

Lightner. (Doc. 27 at 5; Doc. 27-9 at 2). Thereafter, 

Randolph, Moore, and Defendant Wright returned to the

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Mobile Community Based Facility with Plaintiff and without 

incident. (Id.)

Following the August 24, 2015, incident, Plaintiff 

received three disciplinaries for (1) absconding from 

supervision, (2) possession of contraband, and (3) refusing 

to provide a urine sample. (Id.) Plaintiff was served 

with the disciplinary report for a Rule 935 violation

(Absconding from Supervision) on August 25, 2015. (Doc. 

36-1 at 2-4)2. Plaintiff refused to sign the notice, but 

identified individuals to call as witnesses. (Id.) On 

August 27, 2015, the disciplinary proceeding was held, 

after which Defendant Dees recommended that Plaintiff’s 

charge be changed from a Rule 935 violation to a Rule 503 

violation (Being in an Unauthorized Area) (Doc. 27 at 6; 

Doc. 27-1 at 1; Doc. 27-2 at 2). Thereafter, Defendant 

Lightner attempted to re-initiate a disciplinary for a 

violation of Rule 503. (Doc. 27 at 6; Doc. 27-5). A 

computer glitch, however, caused the disciplinary charge to 

																																																							 2 Following the filing of the Special report, Plaintiff filed a Motion 

to Compel Discovery (doc. 33) pertaining to the disciplinary report for 

the first hearing of August 27, 2016. This Court ordered Defendants to 

produce any documents responsive to Plaintiff’s motion that had not 

previously been produced. (Doc. 34). Thereafter, Defendants produced 

additional documents which had inadvertently not been produced and 

which contained this document. It was further explained in Defendants’ 

Response (doc. 36) that there was no final report for the first 

disciplinary report because “the final version of that report was 

either not completed or overridden by the computer glitch that 

necessitated the re-initiation of those proceedings in the first 

place.” (Id. at 2). 

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revert back to the previous violation of Rule 935. (Doc. 

27 at 6; Doc. 27-1; Doc. 27-5).

On September 9, 2015, Plaintiff was served with a 

copy of the re-initiated disciplinary report which again 

indicated he was charged with a violation of Rule 935. 

(Doc. 27 at 5; Doc. 27-9 at 9). The report notified 

Plaintiff of the charge, the disciplinary hearing, 

Plaintiff’s right to present an oral or written statement, 

and his ability to call witnesses. (Id.) Plaintiff 

refused to sign for the service of the report, but 

identified individuals to call as witnesses. (Id.)

On September 11, 2015, a disciplinary hearing for the 

incorrectly generated violation of Rule 935 was held. 

(Doc. 27 at 6). Plaintiff entered a plea of not guilty. 

(Doc. 27 at 6; Doc 27-9 at 6). At the hearing, Randolph 

testified that on August 24, 2015, he observed Plaintiff 

walking out of an unknown residence in an unauthorized area 

located at 938 Newsome Street in Prichard, Alabama, when 

the Plaintiff was supposed to be in route to pick up other 

inmates from work. (Doc. 27 at 6; Doc. 27-9 at 6). 

Plaintiff then testified that “the state van was parked in 

front of the residen[ce] with him in the van” and that he, 

“was not in that house.” (Doc. 27 at 6; Doc. 27-9 at 7). 

Plaintiff was given an opportunity to submit questions to 

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the arresting officer and other witnesses. (Id.) The

hearing officer, Defendant Travis, found Plaintiff guilty 

of violating Rule 935 and recommended punishment of 45 days 

of extra duty, forty-five days loss of outside, canteen, 

telephone, and visitation privileges, and recommended that 

Plaintiff undergo a custody review. (Doc. 27 at 6; Doc. 

27-3 at 2; Doc. 27-9 at 7-8). However, the final 

disciplinary report was disapproved after the computer 

glitch was discovered and it was realized that the second

disciplinary report had been initiated for the Rule 935

violation, resulting in a procedural violation. (Doc. 27 

at 6-7; Doc. 27-1; Doc. 27-9 at 19). As a result, 

Plaintiff’s disciplinary was dismissed and he was not

punished for a Rule 935 violation. (Doc. 27 at 7; Doc 27-9

at 19; Ex. H at 3). On September 22, 2015, the Plaintiff 

was served with a copy of the disciplinary report showing 

that it had been disapproved and dismissed, but he again 

refused to sign. (Doc. 27 at 7; Doc. 27-9 at 19). 

That same day, another disciplinary report was 

generated for Plaintiff for the August 24, 2015, incident 

for violating Rule 503. (Doc. 27 at 7; Doc. 27-9 at 20). 

Plaintiff was served with the new disciplinary report

which, again, notified Plaintiff of charge, the

disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff’s right to present an oral 

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or written statement, and his ability to call witnesses. 

(Id.) Plaintiff did not sign for service of the report or 

identify any witnesses. (Doc. 27-9 at 20). On September 

23, 2015, the disciplinary hearing was held and Plaintiff 

entered a plea of not guilty. (Doc 27 at 7; Doc. 27-4 at 

1; Doc 27-9 at 34). Randolph again testified as to his 

involvement in the August 24th event (as set forth above). 

(Doc. 27-9 at 34). Plaintiff testified he was “[n]ot 

guilty, my due process was violated and I was not found 

guilty for rule violation 935 Absconding from supervision.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff was also given the opportunity to submit 

questions to witnesses. (Doc. 27 at 7; Doc 27-4 at 2; Doc 

27-9 at 34). 

Based on the testimony of Sergeant Randolph, the

hearing officer, Defendant Tyus, found Plaintiff guilty of 

violating Rule 503. (Doc. 27 at 8; Doc. 27-4 at 2; Doc 27-

9 at 35). The hearing officer recommended that Plaintiff 

be punished with forty-five days loss of outside, canteen, 

telephone, and visitation privileges and recommended a

custody review. (Doc. 27 at 7; Doc 27-9 at 35). Plaintiff 

did not lose any good time. (Doc. 27-9 at 35). On 

September 24, 2015, the disciplinary report was approved by

Defendant Knight and Plaintiff was served with a completed 

copy of the final disciplinary report. (Doc. 27 at 7; Doc. 

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27-9 at 35). Plaintiff, again, refused to sign for service 

of the completed disciplinary report. (Doc. 27 at 7; Doc. 

27-9 at 35). 

On December 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Amended 

Complaint in this action against Defendants, Warden Wanda 

Lightner, Correctional Sergeant Bernard Dees, Correctional 

Officer James Travis, Correctional Warden III Cynthia 

Stewart, Correctional Sergeant Kenneth Tyus and 

Correctional Captain Willie Knight alleging that Defendants 

“knowingly and willingly conspired to violate the 

Plaintiff’s 8th and 14th Amendment rights to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment to not be subjected to the 

exact same punishment twice [...] and violat[ed] Plaintiff’s 

constitutional right to equal protection of the law.” (Doc. 

10 at 5). For relief, Plaintiff seeks to “[e]xpunge all 

disciplinarys [(sic)], incident reports pertaining to the 

allege[d] incident that occurred on August 24, 2016. Place 

back at a Comm[.] Base Facility. Punitive damages $10,000. 

And lost of wages from each defendent [(sic)].” (Doc. 10 

at 11). Defendants filed an Answer and Special Report 

wherein they asserted that Plaintiff’s claims are due to be 

dismissed because he failed to state a violation of a 

constitutional right. (Docs 26 and 27, generally). 

Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants’ Motion for 

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Summary Judgment on August 1, 2016, reasserting the grounds 

for his Complaint. (Doc. 38, generally).3

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant this Court 

authority under Rule 56 to render “judgment as a matter of 

law” to the party who moves for summary judgment. 

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact. . . .” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). The Court must view the evidence produced by “the 

nonmoving party, and all factual inferences arising from 

it, in the light most favorable to” that party. Barfield 

v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). However, 

Rule 56(e) states that:

If a party fails to properly support an 

assertion of fact or fails to properly 

address another party’s assertion of 

fact as required by Rule 56(c), the 

court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly 

support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for 

purposes of the motion; 

																																																							 3 Although Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is the only complaint being 

considered for purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment (see FN 1), 

Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 38) also states as follows: “ I Plaintiff 

request to the Courts to [d]ismiss the [c]laims of Double Jeopardy, 8th

Amendment, Retaliation, and the Equal Protection claim, also plaintiff 

requests to [d]ismiss sueing [(sic)] [e]ach individual in their 

“Official Capacity” and sue [e]ach Defendant in their Individual 

Capacity [...]” (Doc. 38 at 18). 

Case 1:15-cv-00485-KD-M Document 42 Filed 08/17/16 Page 8 of 18
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(3) grant summary judgment if the 

motion and supporting materials—

including the facts considered 

undisputed—show that the movant is 

entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless 

there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 

for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the 

evidence is merely colorable, . . . or is not significantly 

probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 

(1986) (internal citations omitted). “Summary judgment is 

mandated where a party fails to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Custom Mfg. and Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway 

Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007).

Also, it is well settled that a conclusion cannot be 

taken as true, and the Court will not accept conclusory 

allegations as facts in consideration of a motion for 

summary judgment. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 

(2009); see also Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 

1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000)(“[t]his court has consistently 

held that conclusory allegations without specific 

supporting facts have no probative value”); Fullman v. 

Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984)(a 

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plaintiff’s mere verification of conclusory allegations is 

not sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment). 

DISCUSSION

I. Violation of Due Process

In order to assert a Fourteenth Amendment due process 

claim, Plaintiff must have been deprived of “life, liberty, 

or property.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing, in 

part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 

liberty, or property, without due process of law....”). 

The Supreme Court has stated that there are two 

circumstances in which a prisoner can be deprived of a 

liberty interest beyond the deprivation associated 

with the prisoner’s confinement. See Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 

L. Ed.2d 418 (1995). First, a liberty interest may 

arise from the “Due Process Clause of its own face,” 

which extends procedural safeguards to a prisoner when 

his liberty is restrained in a way that exceeds the 

sentence imposed by the court. Id. Secondly, states 

may create liberty interests by conferring certain 

benefits to prisoners, the deprivation of which 

“impose[s] atypical and significant hardship on the 

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Id.

Wallace v. Hamrick, 229 Fed. Appx. 827, 829-30 (11th Cir. 

2007)(unpublished). In the present action, Plaintiff has 

not claimed a loss of life or property; therefore, he must 

be claiming a loss of a liberty interest, which according 

to the disciplinary report in this case, was his loss of 

privileges (forty-five days loss of outside, canteen, 

telephone, and visitation privileges and a recommendation 

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for custody review).4 This Court has held, however, that 

there is no right inherent in the Constitution entitling a 

prisoner to privileges:

[B]ased on a plain reading of the Constitution, the 

Court finds that there is no right inherent in the 

Constitution entitling a prisoner to privileges. 

Accord Id.[Sandin] (finding no right inherent in the 

Due Process Clause to be free from disciplinary 

segregation); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9, 

97 S. Ct. 274, 279 n.9, 50 L. Ed.2d 236 (1976) 

(finding that eligibility for rehabilitation programs 

is not a sufficient interest to invoke due process); 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216, 224-25, 96 S. Ct. 

2532, 2534, 2538, 49 L. Ed.2d 451 (1976) (finding the 

Due Process Clause itself does not protect a prisoner 

from being transferred to an institution with less

favorable conditions); Wolff [v. McDonnell,] 418 U.S.

[539] at 557, 94 S. Ct. [2963] at 2975 

[(1974).](finding no right in the Constitution to 

receive good-time credits for satisfactory behavior). 

 

James v. Odom, 2000 WL 1136563, *3 (S.D.Ala. 2000) 

(unpublished). Because Plaintiff’s allegations do not 

concern a right inherent in the Constitution, in order to 

state a claim, he must show that the state has created a 

liberty interest that necessitates due process before his 

prison privileges can be restricted. “‘[T]he touchstone

of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, statecreated liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions 

																																																							 4 Although not stated in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s 

Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment asserts that 

Plaintiff was additionally placed in segregation for twenty-eight days 

as a result of his violation. (Doc. 38 at 14, 16-17). This alleged 

deprivation is not indicated in the disciplinary report. Nevertheless, 

to the extent that Plaintiff contends that his placement in segregation

was the liberty entitling Plaintiff to due process, Plaintiff has still 

failed to state a claim. See Sandin, 515 US. at 487, 478(there is no 

right inherent in the Constitution to be free from confinement in 

disciplinary segregation.) 

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of confinement is not the language of the regulations 

regarding those conditions but the nature of those 

conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life.’” Wallace, 229 Fed. Appx. at 830 

(quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005), 

quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). In James, this Court 

held: 

[T]he restriction of privileges is a much less severe 

form of discipline than placement in disciplinary 

segregation. By virtue of being in prison, a 

prisoner’s life is heavily restricted. . . . 

Therefore, the increased restriction of privileges is 

neither “atypical” nor a “significant hardship” under

the Sandin analysis and is a type of discipline that 

should be expected by a prisoner as an incident to his 

criminal sentence.

James, 2000 WL 1136563 at *5 (citations omitted) (plaintiff 

did not suffer a deprivation of a state-created liberty 

interest when, as a result of his disciplinary conviction, 

his store, phone, and visiting privileges were restricted 

for forty-five days). Plaintiff has not presented any 

facts showing a state created liberty interest requiring 

due process for the loss of prison privileges. As a 

result, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for a violation of 

a liberty interest requiring due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment.5

																																																							 5 Because this Court has determined that Plaintiff failed to establish a 

violation of a constitutional right, it is unnecessary to address 

whether the Defendants have qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)(“If no constitutional right would have been 

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Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff established that he 

suffered a deprivation of a liberty interest, a 

constitutional violation would still not exist because 

Plaintiff was given due process. The procedural 

requirements for a disciplinary hearing are: (1) advance 

written notice; (2) a written statement of the evidence 

relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action 

taken; and (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and 

present evidence, when “do[ing] so will not be unduly 

hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66. 

Plaintiff asserts that his due process rights were 

violated because he was subjected to the same disciplinary 

violation twice following a finding of not guilty which 

violated the Department of Corrections Administrative 

Regulation Number 403, sections C and D (Doc. 10 at 5-7; 

Doc. 38 at 4).6 As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not 

presented any facts to show that he was sanctioned for the 

same disciplinary violation twice. Rather, even assuming 

																																																																																																																																																																				 violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for 

further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”) 6 To the extent that Plaintiff contends his due process rights were 

violated because the hearing officer lacked impartiality or because of 

an error in the disciplinary documents, Plaintiff’s claim would still 

fail. First, because Plaintiff has not established a violation of a 

constitutional right requiring due process and, second, because even if 

he had, there was still sufficient evidence to support the hearing

officer’s findings. See Superintendent, Massachusetts Corrrectional 

Institutions, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 

at 2774 (1985).

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that Plaintiff was initially found not guilty of a Rule 935

violation, the record reflects that the second charge 

(which was erroneously re-initiated for that same 

violation) was disapproved when the error was discovered. 

(Doc. 27-9 at 19). Further, it is undisputed that the reinitiated violation for which Plaintiff was ultimately 

found guilty, was for a Rule 503 violation, (not a Rule 935

violation for which he was previously found not guilty). 

As such, Plaintiff’s not guilty finding was not overturned 

in violation of Rule 403(c)(as alleged by Plaintiff) and he 

was only punished for one violation (Rule 503). Moreover, 

it is undisputed that Plaintiff was given twenty-four hours 

advance written notice of each of the hearings. (Doc. 27-9 

at 9, 20; Doc. 36-1 at 2-4). Plaintiff was permitted to 

attend the hearings, give testimony, and present evidence. 

(Id.) Plaintiff was allowed to (and did) prepare and

present written questions to be asked of Defendants at the

hearings. (Doc. 27-9 at 6-7, 10, 18, 22-30, 34). Lastly, 

Plaintiff was informed of the hearing officer’s decision 

and given a copy of the signed final report, both on the 

re-initiated7 Rule 935 and the initial Rule 503 violation, 

which listed the findings of fact, the decision of the 

																																																							 7 There is no dispute that Plaintiff was not given the final report on 

the initial Rule 935 violation. (See Doc. 36 at 2; FN 2) However, the 

lack of a final report, when it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not 

punished for the initial 935 violation or for the re-initiation of that 

same violation, does not affect the analysis herein above. 

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hearing officer, the reasons for the disciplinary action 

taken, and the sanctions imposed (Doc. 27-9 at 19, 32). 

Based on the above, it is apparent that Plaintiff received

due process in connection with his loss of privileges and 

summary judgment is due in favor of Defendants with regard 

to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.

II. Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Claims8 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his Eighth 

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment. (Doc. 10 at 5). The Eighth Amendment is 

violated only by “[a] prison official’s ‘deliberate 

indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an 

inmate.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). In 

order to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claims, Plaintiff 

must prove three elements: “(1) a condition of confinement 

that inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering, Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (citations omitted), (2) 

the defendant’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to that 

condition, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (citations 

omitted), and (3) causation, Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 

1370 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted.).” LaMarca v. 

Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993). 

																																																							 8

 Unlike the other claims that Plaintiff requested be dismissed in his 

Response (Doc. 38), these claims were actually asserted in Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint and were before this Court when the Special Report 

was filed. As such, this Court will briefly discuss these claims.		

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In the present action, Plaintiff has alleged no facts 

that would support a finding that his loss of privileges 

subjected him to a substantial risk of serious harm or 

denied him “the minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Moreover, 

Plaintiff has alleged no facts that would support a finding 

that prison officials knew of and disregarded the purported 

excessive risk to his health or safety caused by his loss 

of privileges. Id. at 837. Thus, Defendants are entitled 

to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

claim. 

In order for Plaintiff to state a valid claim under 

the Equal Protection clause, he must demonstrate that (1) 

“he is similarly situated with other prisoners who 

received” more favorable treatment; and (2) his 

discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally 

protected interest such as race. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 

944, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing to Damiano v. Fla. 

Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 785 F.2d 929, 932–33 (11th Cir.1986) 

(per curiam). In the present action, Plaintiff wholly 

failed to present any evidence that other prisoners were 

treated differently or that his allegedly discriminatory 

treatment was based on constitutionally protected interest. 

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As a result, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as 

to Plaintiff’s equal protection claim. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court finds that Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on all 

claims asserted against them by Plaintiff. Accordingly, it 

is recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

be granted and that this action be dismissed with 

prejudice.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. ALA. GenLR 72(c)(2). The parties should note 

that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to 

object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with 

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to 

challenge on appeal the district court's order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party 

was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

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consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the 

absence of a proper objection, however, the court may 

review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the 

interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 17th day of August, 2016.

s/ BERT W. MILLING, JR 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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