Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00946/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00946-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

Defendants have requested oral argument. (Dkt. # 45 at 1.) The request is denied

because the parties have thoroughly discussed the law and the evidence, and oral argument

will not aid the Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac.

Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding denial of a hearing not unfairly

prejudicial where the party “had the opportunity to apprise the district court of any arguments

it believed supported its position” by filing a memorandum of law and evidence). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

SWMW MANAGEMENT, INC.; BELL

ROAD AUTOMALL, INC.; and BIG

BELL 21 LLC, d/b/a BELL ROAD KIA,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint of Plaintiff

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Dkt. # 35) and the Cross-Motion to Dismiss

and to Enforce Arbitration Agreements and Compel Arbitration of Defendants SWMW

Management, Bell Road Automall, and Big Bell 21 (Dkt. # 45). For the reasons set forth

below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion and denies Defendants’ motion.1

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BACKGROUND

On May 19, 2008, Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

brought an enforcement action, pursuant to § 706(f) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), against Defendants SWMW Management, Bell Road

Automall, and Big Bell 21. Plaintiff is the agency of the United States charged with

administration and enforcement of Title VII. At all relevant times, Defendants were Arizona

corporations doing business in the State of Arizona. 

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in unlawful employment

practices in violation of §§ 703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), e-3(a).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in the following unlawful practices:

(1) harassment of former employee Mitchell Dupoux because of his race; (2) harassment of

former employee Alicia Hartley and a class of female employees (including Melissa Nagel)

because of their gender; (3) retaliation against former employee Brian Netzel, resulting in his

constructive discharge, as a result of his opposition to unlawful employment practices; and

(4) retaliation against former employee Alicia Hartley, resulting in her constructive

discharge, as a result of her opposition to unlawful employment practices. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 10-13.)

On February 6, 2009, after failing to acquire consent from Defendants to file an

amended complaint, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. (Dkt. #

35.) On March 2, 2009, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s Motion and filed a CrossMotion to Dismiss and to Enforce Arbitration Agreements and Compel Arbitration. (Dkt.

# 45.) In their reply brief, however, Defendants “withdraw their request that the Court

dismiss the action and instead move only that the EEOC enforcement action be stayed

pending the conclusion of the arbitration of the employee[s’] individual claims.” (Dkt. # 50

at 2 n.1.)

/ / /

/ / /

 / / /

DISCUSSION

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I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)

Plaintiff moves for leave to amend its Complaint to “(1) add a class claim of

retaliation; and (2) enter a technical correction in line numbering.” (Dkt. # 35 at 1.)

Defendants oppose only the addition of the class retaliation claim to Plaintiff’s complaint.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave to amend a complaint “shall

be freely given when justice so requires.” The Supreme Court has instructed that “this

mandate is to be heeded.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In deciding Plaintiff’s

Motion, the Court “must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 – to facilitate

decision on the merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Eldridge v. Block,

832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation and citation omitted). “Thus, Rule 15’s

policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality.” Id.

(quotation omitted). This liberality “is not dependent on whether the amendment will add

causes of action or parties.” DCD Programs, LTD. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.

1987).

The Court may, however, deny a motion to amend if there is a showing of undue delay

or bad faith on the part of the moving party, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility

of the proposed amendment. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Generally, however, “this

determination should be performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion.”

Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). Significantly, “[t]he

party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice,” futility, or one of the

other permissible reasons for denying a motion to amend. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187;

see Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that leave to

amend should be freely given unless the opposing party makes “an affirmative showing of

either prejudice or bad faith”).

Defendants make three arguments in opposition to Plaintiff’s proposed amendment:

(1) the proposed amendment is futile; (2) the proposed amendment will unduly prejudice

Defendants; and (3) Plaintiff has engaged in undue delay in seeking the amendment. (Dkt.

# 45 at 6-13.) The Court will address each argument in turn.

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A. Futility of Plaintiff’s Proposed Amendment

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is futile because: (1) neither

Ms. Nagel nor Ms. Blakley filed timely charges of discrimination, which is a prerequisite to

filing a private lawsuit; and (2) the facts asserted in the proposed amended complaint do not

constitute retaliation under Title VII. (Dkt. # 45 at 12.) 

Initially, it is immaterial to this enforcement action that neither Ms. Nagel or Ms.

Blakley timely filed charges with the EEOC sufficient to permit private suits against

Defendants. It is undisputed that Mr. Netzel filed his EEOC charge on May 20, 2004,

complaining of retaliation. Because the retaliatory conduct alleged with respect to Ms. Nagel

and Ms. Blakley likewise occurred in mid-2004, the EEOC is not precluded from asserting

those retaliation claims. See Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 923 (9th Cir.

1982) (finding non-filing class members governed by the statute of limitations of the

charging parties). Also, the EEOC is the only plaintiff in this action and it is not bound by

the same filing prerequisites that are strictly imposed upon private parties. See E.E.O.C. v.

Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 287-88, 297 (2002) (listing situations in which “the EEOC does

not stand in the employee’s shoes” and recognizing the distinction between an individual

employee’s private cause of action and the EEOC’s enforcement role in securing relief for

a group of individuals); Occidental Life. Ins. Co. of Cal. v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 368

(1977) (holding that state statutes of limitations are not applicable to EEOC enforcement

actions and stating that “the EEOC does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting

litigation on behalf of private parties; it is a federal administrative agency charged with the

responsibility of investigating claims of employment discrimination and settling disputes”);

E.E.O.C. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 373 (4th Cir. 1976) (“It follows that the standing

of the EEOC to sue under Title VII cannot be controlled or determined by the standing of the

charging party to sue, limited as he is in rights to vindication of his own individual rights.”);

E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Healthcare West, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“The

EEOC may thus seek relief for . . . any other employees who may have been affected by

Defendant’s discriminatory policy even though they have not complied with the requirements

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necessary to bring private actions on their own.”); E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., No.

CV-06-2303-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 1971396, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2008) (holding that the

EEOC could seek victim-specific relief on claims that individual employees did not exhaust

by filing charges with the EEOC). Therefore, Defendants have not shown that Ms. Nagel’s

and Ms. Blakley’s failure to file timely charges with the EEOC would render Plaintiff’s

proposed amendment futile. 

Defendants also attempt to demonstrate futility by submitting evidence suggesting that

“there is no causal link between the protected activity and separation from employment with

Defendants.” (Dkt. # 45 at 12-13.) Specifically, Defendants present evidence that Mr.

Netzel was not terminated, but rather that he voluntarily resigned, and that Mr. Dupoux

likewise voluntarily resigned, was rehired, and then was “terminated as a no-call, no-show

on June 1, 2005.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff argues that the proposed amendment is not futile

because Defendants “essentially ask this Court to credit their version of the facts supported

solely by a declaration from Defendants’ former owner.” (Dkt. # 49 at 8.) 

 “[A] proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the

amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.”

Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988); see Foman, 371 U.S. at 182

(stating that “[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a [movant] may be a

proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the

merits”); DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186 (stating that “a motion to make an ‘[a]mendment

is to be liberally granted where from the underlying facts or circumstances, the plaintiff may

be able to state a claim’”) (quoting McCartin v. Norton, 674 F.2d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir.

1982)).

Plaintiff’s proposed amendment asserts that “Defendants have engaged in unlawful

retaliatory employment practices . . . [which] include subjecting Brian Netzel, Alicia Hartley,

Mitchell Dupoux, Melissa Nagel, Julie Blakley, and a class of employees to adverse terms,

conditions, and privileges of employment and threats of disciplinary action after they

expressed opposition to and made complaints about unlawful employment practices.” (Dkt.

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# 36 ¶ 14.) Defendants appear to contend that because they have some evidence which may

be probative of the reasons behind Mr. Netzel’s and Mr. Dupoux’s departure from

Defendants’ employ, Plaintiff’s assertion of a class retaliation claim, which includes these

two individuals, is futile. While the evidence may be relevant to whether Defendants

retaliated against Mr. Netzel or Mr. Dupoux, it is not relevant to the other proposed former

employees or to the class of unnamed former employees that Plaintiff seeks to include in its

amendment. In any event, the existence of this evidence is insufficient to allow the Court to

conclude that “no set of facts [could] be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that

would constitute a valid and sufficient claim.” Miller, 845 F.2d at 214.

Defendants therefore have not demonstrated that Plaintiff’s proposed class retaliation

claim would be futile.

B. Undue Prejudice

Defendants argue that they “have been crippled in their ability to succeed on the

merits at trial” because “Defendants have been unable to locate key witnesses in this matter

and have had difficulty locating personnel records, as a number of records have been lost or

cannot be located due to the changes in corporate structure, the dissolution of the business

entities, and the turnover among employees whose job it was to maintain personnel records.”

(Dkt. # 45 at 1, 9.) 

In Foman, the Supreme Court made clear that the inquiry into prejudice when

considering a motion for leave to amend is limited to “prejudice to the opposing party by

virtue of allowance of the amendment.” 371 U.S. at 182 (emphasis added). In attempting

to demonstrate this type of prejudice, Defendants provided the declaration of Robert

Alexander attesting that: (1) SWMW Management has been dissolved; (2) Bell Road

Automall no longer has any employees and will not employ anyone; (3) Big Bell 21 is

currently insolvent; (4) there has been substantial turnover of employees during the course

of the companies’ existence; (5) Defendants have been unable to locate key witnesses in the

matter; (6) contact information for management and supervisory employees is invalid; and

(7) Defendants have had difficulty locating personnel records. (Dkt. # 45 Ex. 1.) While Mr.

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Alexander’s statements may be true, Defendants have not demonstrated that any of this

prejudice would result from allowance of the amendment. Indeed, it appears that the

majority of the hardship set forth by Defendants existed before Plaintiff sought to amend the

Complaint and is a result of conditions external to Plaintiff’s proposed amendment. 

Additionally, Defendants have been aware of the retaliation charges since as early as

2004 (see Dkt. # 45 Ex. 6), and have been aware of the resulting reasonable cause

determination letters providing the basis for Plaintiff’s proposed class retaliation amendment

since September of 2006 (see, e.g., id. Ex. 7 (“Like and related and growing out of the

Commission’s investigation is evidence that Respondents retaliated against other employees

for engaging in protected activity by complaining of and/or otherwise opposing unlawful

employment practices.”)). Presumably, Defendants could have taken steps to preserve

evidence and contact information that might otherwise have been lost or difficult to locate

given the shifting nature of the business entities. Defendants have failed to demonstrate the

undue prejudice necessary to deny a motion for leave to amend.

Finally, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Leave to Amend shortly after the parties

exchanged initial disclosure statements (see Dkt. ## 32, 33) and before any significant

discovery had been conducted by either party. Plaintiff’s proposed amendment seeks to add

a class retaliation claim composed of two individuals (Mr. Netzel and Ms. Hartley) whom

Plaintiff originally alleged experienced retaliation, two individuals (Mr. Dupoux and Ms.

Nagel) whom Plaintiff originally alleged were subjected to discrimination, one individual

(Blakley) who was not included in the original Complaint, and a class of unknown

individuals. Given the early posture of the case and the significant overlap in relevant parties

and issues, the risk of undue prejudice to Defendants in the discovery process is also

minimal. See Lee v. Regents of Univ. Of Nev., 113 F.3d 1241, *2 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A]t such

an early state in the litigation, long before the court set a trial date or even a pretrial

conference, allowing [the plaintiff] to amend his complaint would not have prejudiced the

defendant.”) (citing DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187-88). 

C. Undue Delay

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2

Much of Defendants’ argument revolves around unsupported allegations that the

EEOC delayed in all stages of investigating and initiating this action. (See Dkt. # 45 at 7-10.)

Consistent with these arguments, Defendants contend that the “equitable doctrine of laches

bars the proposed Amended Complaint because the EEOC’s unexcused or unreasonable

delay has prejudiced Defendants.” (Id. at 7.) Defendants also contend that the doctrine of

laches should be applied because Plaintiff’s delay has resulted in “unfairly accentuated

potential monetary damages.” (Id. at 10.) While the Court recognizes that the affirmative

defense of laches may be applied to EEOC enforcement actions, see E.E.O.C. v. Alioto Fish

Co., Ltd., 623 F.2d 86, 88-89 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Laches, an equitable bar to an action on the

ground of unexcused or unreasonable prejudicial delay, may be used as a defense to a Title

VII action.”), Defendants’ invocation of the defense in opposing leave to amend is improper

because laches is a highly factual affirmative defense (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1)) and

because neither party has presented sufficient evidence for the Court to resolve the matter.

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This Circuit has made clear that “‘undue delay by itself is insufficient to justify

denying a motion to amend.’” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708,

712-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 757, 758 (9th Cir. 1999)); see

DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187 (same). “‘Only where prejudice is shown or the movant

acts in bad faith are courts protecting the judicial system or other litigants when they deny

leave to amend a pleading.’” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981)

(quoting Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1973)); see Eminence

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Prejudice is the

touchstone of the inquiry under rule 15(a).”) (quotation omitted).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff unduly delayed in seeking its proposed amendment by

seeking leave to amend approximately eight months after the original Complaint had been

filed.2

 After service was effectuated upon Defendants on June 27, 2008, Defendants sought

and received multiple extensions of time to answer the Complaint. (See Dkt. ## 8, 14.)

Defendants eventually filed their preliminary answer on August 25, 2008 (Dkt. # 19), and

they filed an amended answer on September 10, 2008 (Dkt. # 23). On September 4, 2008,

this case was reassigned to the undersigned, who was a newly-appointed judge to the District.

(See Dkt. # 22.) As a result of a scheduling conflict with the Court, the Rule 16 case

management conference was delayed until December 5, 2008. After the Rule 16 conference

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3

Although the burden to demonstrate undue delay falls on Defendants, Plaintiff

explains the reasons for its delay in seeking the amendment:

In responding to discovery propounded by Defendants, the

EEOC interviewed the charging parties and class members and

concluded, because of the systemic nature of the retaliation

against Dupoux, Blakley, and Nagel, the EEOC had sufficient

evidence to pursue a class retaliation claim consistent with the

letter of determination issued on September 29, 2006.

(Dkt. # 49 at 5.)

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had been conducted, and in accordance with the parties’ proposed case management order,

the Court set a February 6, 2009, deadline for amending pleadings. (See Dkt. ## 28, 30.)

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend was filed shortly after the case management

conference and within the time period proposed by the parties and permitted by the Court’s

Case Management Order. See Toungate v. Konica Minolta Bus. Solutions, USA, Inc., No.

C08-0423RL, 2009 WL 596597, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2009) (“Although the manner

in which plaintiffs have chosen to pursue their case is inefficient and somewhat befuddling,

the Court cannot say that the delay is undue since they have met the Court-imposed

deadline.”); Humiston v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 05-3216-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL

1794769, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 27, 2006) (finding no undue delay and noting that the

defendant complied with the time frame for amending pleadings in the court’s Rule 16

Scheduling Order).3

 

Given the early posture of this case and the delays attributable squarely to the Court

and to Defendants, it is unclear how Plaintiff unduly delayed in seeking the proposed

amendment or how the proposed amendment would unduly prejudice Defendants. Because

Defendants have not demonstrated that the proposed amendment would be futile, that undue

prejudice would result by virtue of allowing the proposed amendment, or that the proposed

amendment is a result of Plaintiff’s undue delay, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend is

granted. 

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4

While Waffle House is an Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) case, the Court

made clear that “Congress has directed the EEOC to exercise the same enforcement powers,

remedies, and procedures that are set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when

it is enforcing the ADA’s prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of

disability.” 534 U.S. at 285-86.

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II. Defendants’ Motion to Stay the Action and Compel Arbitration

Defendants principally argue that pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-4, this Court should stay the enforcement proceedings and compel arbitration

of Defendants’ former employees who are named as victims in the EEOC’s Complaint. (Dkt.

# 50 at 2-5.) Plaintiff, however, argues that the FAA is inapplicable to these proceedings and

that in Waffle House, the Supreme Court “unequivocally disposed of the issues raised in

Defendants’ Motion.” (Dkt. # 48 at 2.) 

The FAA governs the allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators. Chiron

Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 9 U.S.C.

§§ 1-4. By its terms, section 3 of the FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by

a district court but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to

arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has” been reached. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985); see also Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard

Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 475 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The standard for demonstrating arbitrability

is not a high one; in fact, a district court has little discretion to deny an arbitration motion,

since the [FAA] is phrased in mandatory terms.”). 

In Waffle House, the Supreme Court addressed “whether an agreement between an

employer and an employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes bars the [EEOC] from

pursuing victim-specific judicial relief, such as backpay, reinstatement, and damages, in an

enforcement action . . . .” 534 U.S. at 282. In that case, sixteen days after beginning work

as a grill operator at one of Waffle House’s restaurants, Eric Baker, who had signed an

arbitration agreement with his employer, suffered a seizure at work and was discharged.4

 Id.

at 283. Although Baker filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, at no time

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during the seven years after his termination did he initiate judicial or arbitration proceedings.

Id. After conducting an investigation and an attempt to conciliate, the EEOC filed an

enforcement action against Waffle House seeking relief, which included victim-specific

backpay, reinstatement, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Id. at 283-84.

Waffle House filed a petition, pursuant to the FAA, requesting that the court stay the EEOC’s

suit and compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement signed by Baker. Id. at 284.

The Supreme Court concluded that Baker’s arbitration agreement did not, in any way,

hinder the EEOC’s ability to prosecute the charge of discrimination, including the right to

seek victim-specific relief in the form of reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory or

punitive damages. Id. at 284-97. The Court reasoned that:

[T]he EEOC takes the position that it may pursue a claim on the

employee’s behalf even after the employee has disavowed any

desire to seek relief. The statute clearly makes the EEOC the

master of its own case and confers on the agency the authority

to evaluate the strength of the public interest at stake. Absent

textual support for a contrary view, it is the public agency’s

province – not that of the court – to determine whether public

resources should be committed to the recovery of victim specific

relief. And if the agency makes that determination, the statutory

text unambiguously authorizes it to proceed in a judicial forum.

Id. at 291-92. The Court narrowed its holding, however, stating:

[I]t is an open question whether a settlement or arbitration

judgment would affect the validity of the EEOC’s claim or the

character of relief the EEOC may seek. The only issue before

this Court is whether the fact that Baker has signed a

mandatory arbitration agreement limits the remedies available

to the EEOC.

Id. at 297. This “open question” was not addressed by the Court because “Baker [had] not

sought arbitration of his claim, nor [was] there any indication that he [had] entered into

settlement negotiations with [Waffle House].” Id. 

Here, Defendants “seek the arbitration of the employee[s’] individual claims” as set

forth in EEOC’s Complaint and request that “the EEOC enforcement action be stayed

pending the conclusion of the arbitration of the employee[s’] individual claims.” (Dkt. # 50

at 1, 2 n.1.) Even assuming that valid arbitration agreements exist between Defendants and

their former employees named in the Complaint – a matter that the parties dispute – pursuant

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5

As a collateral matter, in Waffle House the Court did not address the question of

whether an intervening plaintiff in an EEOC enforcement action must arbitrate his or her

specific claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement because the aggrieved party in Waffle

House never intervened in the EEOC’s action. Likewise, because no parties have intervened

in this action, the Court declines to reach the issue. 

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to Waffle House, this Court is unable to compel arbitration or to stay the matter under the

FAA, as it is undisputed that the only plaintiff in this action is the EEOC. There is also no

indication in the record that any of the former employees of Defendants named in the

Complaint have or are pursuing private claims either in a judicial forum, through arbitration,

or by settlement, and none of the former employees have intervened in this action. 

Defendants argue that Waffle House “expressly left open the right to enforce

arbitration of [individual employee’s claims],” apparently even if the employees have

declined to pursue private legal action against their former employers. (Dkt. # 50 at 2.)

While the FAA provisions might be applicable should the former employees seek to

intervene or assert their own individual claims in a judicial forum,5 Waffle House foreclosed

the applicability of the FAA in an enforcement action involving only the EEOC, regardless

of whether the EEOC asserts victim-specific relief. 534 U.S. at 289 (“The FAA does not

mention enforcement by public agencies; it ensures the enforceability of private agreements

to arbitrate, but otherwise does not purport to place any restriction on a nonparty’s choice of

judicial forum.”). 

 Defendants’ Motion is therefore denied because: (1) the Court cannot compel

arbitration of the former employees’ claims when none of the individual employees are

parties to this action; and (2) the Court, pursuant to Waffle House, may not stay the

proceedings and could not order a stay even if some of the former employees had intervened.

CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Dkt.

# 35) is GRANTED. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court file the lodged

proposed First Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 36).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Cross-Motion to Dismiss and to

Enforce Arbitration Agreements and Compel Arbitration (Dkt. # 45) is DENIED. 

DATED this 21st day of April, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-00946-GMS Document 54 Filed 04/22/09 Page 13 of 13