Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08069/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08069-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH AUG 15 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMES MACDONALD and JANICE MACDONALD, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

EASTERN WYOMING MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, 

a Wyoming non-prof it corporation, 

EASTERN WYOMING MENTAL HEALTH CENTER 

BOARD OF DIRECTORS, JOE s. SCHAID and 

JANE STEARNS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 90-8069 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. C-89-292B) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Jay Dee Schaefer and Suzan c. Pauling of Schaefer and Associates, 

Laramie, Wyoming for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Judith Studer of Schwartz, Bonn, Mccrary & Walker, Casper, 

Wyoming, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, SETH, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-8069 Document: 01019670399 Date Filed: 08/15/1991 Page: 1 
James and Janice MacDonald brought this action against the 

Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Center (Center), its Board of 

Directors, and two Board employees to obtain relief for the 

alleged improper termination of their employment at the Center. 

The MacDonalds asserted claims under the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 621 et seg. (1988) (ADEA), and 42 

u.s.c. § 1983 (1988), as well as under state law. The district 

court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding 

that the Center was not a state actor for purposes of section 1983 

and that the MacDonalds had failed to make out a prima f acie case 

of age discrimination. We affirm, albeit on grounds different 

from those relied upon below with respect to the ADEA claim. 

The MacDonalds, husband and wife, were both employed at the 

Center from mid-1984 until April 1988, James as a psychologist and 

Janice as a therapist. At a meeting of the Board on December 14, 

1987, James reported what he considered to be unethical practices 

taking place at the Center. On January 5, 1988, James was advised 

that he would be put on immediate disciplinary probation for six 

months due to an undisclosed breach of confidentiality and "other 

negative community feedback." Rec., vol. I, doc. 22 at ex. c. 

When he refused to accept the probation, his employment was 

terminated. The letter informing him of this decision stated 

several reasons for his discharge: the breach of confidentiality, 

omissions in his original employment application, "manufactured 

expense items," and behavior and attitude problems. Id. ex. F. 

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Janice was also discharged, allegedly for "verbally restricting 

professional employees" of the Center, taking leave of absence 

without notice, and failing to keep scheduled appointments. Id. 

ex. R. 

In their complaint, the MacDonalds sought relief under 

section 1983, alleging that they were unlawfully discharged for 

exercising their First Amendment right to speak out about 

unethical Center practices. In addition, Janice claimed 

infringement of her First Amendment associational rights, alleging 

that she was discharged because she was married to James. The 

MacDonalds also asserted a liberty interest deprivation due to the 

stigma arising from their discharge and their inability to take 

advantage of other employment. Finally, the MacDonalds contended 

they were discharged due to age discrimination in violation of the 

ADEA. 

The district court granted defendants' motion for summary 

judgment on the claims under both section 1983 and the ADEA. "In 

reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we utilize the same 

standard that the district court employs." Merrick v. Northern 

Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426, 429 (10th Cir. 1990). We must view 

the evidence and any possible inferences most favorably to the 

nonmoving party to ascertain whether a genuine issue of fact 

exists. Id. "We review any legal questions de nova." Id. 

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I. 

The district court denied the MacDonalds' claims for relief 

under section 1983 after concluding that the Center was not a 

state actor. Section 1983 provides a remedy for federal 

constitutional and statutory deprivations by a person acting 

"under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory." 42 u.s.c. § 1983. Thus, 

"[t]he ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject 

to suit under § 1983 is whether the alleged infringement of 

federal rights is fairly attributable to the state." Tarabishi v. 

McAlester Regional Hosp., 827 F.2d 648, 651 (10th Cir. 1987). 

The Center is a private corporation which has contracted with 

a state agency to provide mental health services. The personnel 

policies of private contracting agencies such as the Center are 

regulated by state standards. Moreover, the Center receives the 

majority of its funding from the state. We have recognized that 

"power entrusted to the government by the people can ultimately be 

exercised through nominally private entities, be it through the 

government's delegation, compulsion, concerted action, or 

acquiescence." Gilmore v. Salt Lake Community Action Program, 710 

F.2d 632, 635 (10th Cir. 1983). We have further stated that "when 

these nominally private parties exercise governmental power, they 

shall not exercise it insulated from constitutional constraints. 

The problem remains in distinguishing the exercise of governmental 

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power from benign or tangential governmental involvement." Id. at 

635-36. 

In essence, the MacDonalds argue that the Center should be 

considered a state actor due to the pervasive state regulation and 

monitoring of the Center's personnel standards, and its receipt of 

state funds. However, "governmental funding and regulation of an 

ostensibly private organization, in the absence of other factors, 

is insufficient to establish governmental action." Id. at 636. 

Even where such regulation and funding are present, state action 

will not be found absent evidence of state influence, involvement, 

or control over the personnel decisions which are the subject of 

challenge. See id.; see also Casias v. City of Raton, 738 F.2d 

392, 396 (10th Cir. 1984). The MacDonalds have presented no 

evidence tending to prove that the state was involved in the 

Center's decision to discharge them. Absent any showing that the 

state directed, controlled, or influenced this particular 

personnel decision, we conclude that the MacDonalds have failed to 

create a fact issue as to the presence of state action. 

Accordingly, summary judgment for defendants on the section 1983 

claims was proper. 

II. 

The district court granted defendants' motion for summary 

judgment on the ADEA claims upon concluding that the MacDonalds 

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had failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination. 

On appeal, the MacDonalds argue that in so doing the district 

court misapplied the law to the record. As discussed below, we 

agree that the lower court erred in concluding that no prima f acie 

case had been established. However, we affirm the summary 

judgment because the record contains no evidence that defendants' 

actions were a pretext for age discrimination. 

We begin by observing that "(t]he ADEA is remedial and 

humanitarian legislation and should be liberally interpreted to 

effectuate the congressional purpose of ending age discrimination 

in employment." Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th 

Cir. 1976), aff'd, 434 u.s~ 99 (1977). 

"Age discrimination may be subtle and even unconscious. 

Even an employer who knowingly discriminates on the 

basis of age may leave no written records revealing the 

forbidden motive and may communicate it orally to no 

one. When evidence is in existence, it is likely to be 

under the control of the employer, and the plaintiff may 

not succeed in turning it up." 

LaMontagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 

1410 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). ADEA plaintiffs, 

therefore, may establish discrimination indirectly through the 

three-part f rarnework applicable to discrimination claims under 

Title VII and set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny. See Cooper v. Asplundh Tree 

Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1988). 

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Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 

Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 

(1981). The Supreme Court has stated that this burden "is not 

onerous." See id. Establishment of a prima facie case creates a 

presumption of unlawful discrimination that requires a defendant 

to come forward with evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for 

its action. Id. at 254-55. The plaintiff then must have a full 

and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant's proffered 

reason was pretextual, which merges with the plaintiff's ultimate 

burden of proving intentional discrimination. Id. at 255-56. 

In the context of an age discrimination discharge claim, a 

plaintiff in this circuit makes out a prima facie case by showing 

that (1) she was within the protected age group, (2) she was doing 

satisfactory work, (3) she was discharged, and (4) her position 

was filled by a younger person. See Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1547. 

Here, the district court concluded that the MacDonalds did not 

satisfy the second prong because they failed to present sufficient 

evidence that their work was satisfactory. The court recited the 

Center's proffered reasons for discharge and the MacDonalds' 

evidence that they had never received unfavorable evaluations or 

discipline until March 1988, and concluded that the MacDonalds had 

not introduced evidence on which a jury could reasonably find that 

their work after March 1988 was satisfactory. The court thus 

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required the MacDonalds to disprove the reasons given for their 

discharge in order to establish a prima facie case. 

To begin with, the court erred in giving dispositive weight 

to its conclusion that the MacDonalds failed to disprove 

defendants' reasons for discharge. "[A] plaintiff need not prove 

that the reasons offered by the defendant are false if [she or he] 

proves that age was also a reason, and that age was the factor 

that made a difference." EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 

(1985); see also Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 

179 (10th Cir. 1986). Moreover, concluding that the MacDonalds 

did not establish a prima facie case based on the reasons for 

their discharge raises serious problems under the McDonnell 

Douglas analysis, which mandates a full and fair opportunity for a 

plaintiff to demonstrate pretext. Short~circuiting the analysis 

at the prima facie stage frustrates a plaintiff's ability to 

establish that the defendant's proffered reasons were pretextual 

and/or that age was the determining factor; if a plaintiff's 

failure to overcome the reasons offered by the defendant for 

discharge defeats the plaintiff's prima facie case, the court is 

then not required to consider plaintiff's evidence on these 

critical issues. 

Although circuits have addressed this problem in various 

ways, the common thread running through all the decisions is the 

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courts' refusal to consider a defendant's proffered reasons for 

discharge in assessing the existence of a prima facie case. For 

example, in Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503 

(5th Cir. 1988), as here, the employer's argument that the 

plaintiff was not qualified was supported by the reasons offered 

for his discharge. In rejecting this argument, the court stated 

that "[p]lacing a plaintiff's 'qualifications' in issue at both 

the prima facie case and pretext stages of a termination case is 

an unnecessary redundancy." Id. at 1505. Instead, the court held 

that "a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can 

ordinarily establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by 

showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications 

for his job at the time of the adverse action." Id. at 1506. The 

court noted that this showing would be satisfied if the "plaintiff 

had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary 

professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him 

unfit for the position for which he was hired." Id. n.3. Once 

such a showing is made, "[t]he lines of battle may then be drawn 

over the employer's articulated reason for its action and whether 

that reason is a pretext for age discrimination." Id. at 1506. 

The Third Circuit has likewise rejected a defendant's attempt 

to defeat a plaintiff's prima facie case by articulating its 

reasons for the discharge. "This argument ••• goes to the issue 

of whether the defendants have demonstrated a legitimate business 

reason for the discharge and whether [the plaintiff] can 

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demonstrate that this reason is pretextual, not to the initial 

question of whether [the plaintiff] made out a prima facie case." 

Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990). 

In the Seventh Circuit, a determination that an employee's 

job performance is satisfactory, "when made in the context of a 

prima facie case, may be based solely upon the employee's 

testimony concerning the quality of his work." Williams v. 

Williams Elecs., Inc., 856 F.2d 920, 923 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1988); see 

also Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 n.7 (7th 

Cir. 1988); Yarbrough v. Tower Oldsmobile, Inc., 789 F.2d 508, 512 

(7th Cir. 1986) (race discrimination claim under 42 u.s.c. § 

1981). Like the courts in Bienkowski and Siegel, the Seventh 

Circuit has rejected a defendant's attempt to use the reason for 

discharge to defeat a prima facie case. The court pointed out 

that the defendant's argument 

"overlooks the role of establishing a prima facie case 

in the sequence of proof involved in a discriminatory 

discharge case. Proof of a prima facie case does no 

more than entitle the plaintiff to an inference of 

discrimination; it is not equivalent to a factual 

finding to that effect. [The plaintiff's] testimony 

that the general quality of his work was satisfactory is 

sufficient to establish that he met the legitimate 

expectations of his employer, and hence, to satisfy that 

element of the prima facie case. The burden then 

shifted to [the defendant] to rebut the inference of 

discrimination by articulating a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory explanation for discharging [the 

plaintiff]. Such an explanation is not, however, 

appropriately brought as a challenge to the sufficiency 

of [the plaintiff's) prima facie case." 

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Yarbrough, 789 F.2d at 512 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 1 

The Eleventh Circuit has taken a different route to arrive at 

the same result and has modified the McDonnell Douglas test in 

discharge cases to simply eliminate the prong requiring proof of a 

plaintiff's qualification for the job. See, ~' Young v. 

General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 829 n.3 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989); Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure 

Prods., Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1495 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987); Pace v. 

Southern Ry. System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1386 & n.7 (11th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983). "The reason for this modification 

is that in cases where a plaintiff has held a position for a 

significant period of time, qualification for that position 

sufficient to satisfy the test of a prima facie case can be 

inferred." Rosenfield, 827 F.2d at 1495 n.2; see also Stanfield 

v. Answering Serv., Inc., 867 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1989). 

As have the courts we discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit has 

insisted that a defendant's reasons for discharge be assessed at 

the pretext stage rather than in determining the existence of a 

prima facie case. See Young, 840 F.2d at 830 n.3 (focus of 

1 The First Circuit also allows a plaintiff to establish a 

prima facie case by adducing some credible evidence that her work 

was adequate to meet her employer's legitimate expectations, even 

when that evidence is hotly contested by the defendant. See, ~' Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 (1st Cir. 

1988); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 760 

(1st Cir. 1988). 

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inquiry not on whether plaintiff performing job adequately but 

whether employer's dissatisfaction real or pretextual); 

Rosenfield, 827 F.2d at 1495 n.2 ("any disagreement between 

parties regarding whether a particular plaintiff was adequately 

performing his job would be brought out at the stage of the 

proceedings when the defendant articulates legitimate reasons for 

the discharge and the plaintiff shoulders his burden of proving 

that the reasons are pretextual"). 

Although this circuit has incorporated a showing of 

satisfactory work performance into the prima facie case of an ADEA 

discharge claim,~ Merrick v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 

426, 429 (10th Cir. 1990); ·cooper, 836 F.2d at 1547, we have never 

specifically articulated the manner in which a plaintiff may 

establish this element. Our actual practice in these cases, 

however, has been in conformity with that of the courts discussed 

above. Thus, in Cooper we held that the plaintiff had established 

a prima facie case of satisfactory job performance despite 

conflicting evidence offered by the defendant of work rules 

violations and a poor attitude toward management. See 836 F.2d at 

1547-48; cf. Furr v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d at 1537, 

1542 (10th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff made prima facie case of 

discriminatory failure to promote despite defendant's vigorous 

dispute as to qualifications). In Merrick, we did not assess the 

defendant's reasons for discharge in the context of the 

establishment of a prima facie case, addressing them instead on 

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the issue of pretext. See 911 F.2d at 430; cf. Lucas v. Dover 

Corp., Norris Div., 857 F.2d 1397, 1401 n.8 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(exigencies present in reduction-in-force cases best analyzed at 

stage where employer puts on evidence of nondiscriminatory reason 

rather than at stage of prima facie case). 

In setting out the evidence that suffices to meet this prong 

of a plaintiff's prima facie case, we are guided by the practice 

of this and other circuits, as well as by the principle that the 

prima facie case was '"never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or 

ritualistic,'" Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 

1319 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. 

Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)), particularly in an age 

discrimination case, see Pace, 701 F.2d at 1387. Accordingly, we 

conclude that a plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of 

discrimination in a discharge case by credible evidence that she 

continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when 

she was hired, see Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n.3, or by her 

own testimony that her work was satisfactory, even when disputed 

by her employer, ~ Yarbrough, 789 F.2d at 512; Kale, 861 F.2d at 

760, or by evidence that she had held her position for a 

significant period of time, ~Rosenfield, 827 F.2d at 1495 n.2. 

The MacDonalds clearly have met that burden here. Both of 

them continued to possess the objective professional 

qualifications they held when they were hired. Indeed James 

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MacDonald presented evidence that he had testified as an expert 

witness numerous times. Both plaintiffs had held their positions 

for four years and both presented evidence that they had never 

been disciplined or received unfavorable performance reviews until 

recently. Both described the satisfactory nature of their work 

performance. We therefore conclude that the MacDonalds have met 

their burden at the prima facie level of showing satisfactory job 

performance. 

Nevertheless, a plaintiff who succeeds in establishing a 

prima facie case does not automatically survive a motion for 

summary judgment. See Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 

1568, 1570 (7th Cir. 1989); Pace, 701 F.2d at 1391; see also 

Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495-97 

(8th Cir. 1990) (Stuart, J., concurring). The court "must still 

make a judgment as to whether the evidence, interpreted favorably 

to the plaintiff, could persuade a reasonable jury that the 

employer had discriminated against the plaintiff." Palucki, 879 

F.2d at 1570. Our review of the record in this somewhat unusual 

case convinces us that the MacDonalds have failed to raise a fact 

issue on whether defendants' proffered reasons for discharge were 

a pretext for age discrimination. While the MacDonalds may have 

created a genuine question as to whether the proffered reasons 

were the real reasons for their discharge, they have offered no 

credible evidence that the real reason was age discrimination. To 

the contrary, assuming the proffered reasons were pretextual, the 

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only reasonable inference to be drawn from this record is that 

defendants were motivated not by age discrimination but by the 

desire to retaliate against the MacDonalds for criticizing Center 

practices. Indeed, that is the thrust of the MacDonalds' argument 

with respect to their section 1983 claims. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the MacDonalds, despite their presentation of a 

prima facie case, have failed to present evidence of age 

discrimination sufficient to withstand defendants' motion for 

summary judgment. 

AFFIRMED. 

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90-8069 - MacDONALD v. EASTERN WYOMING MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, 

et al. 

SETH, Circuit Judge, writing separately: 

I feel that I must write a separate opinion as this case 

presents part of an ongoing and unfinished resolution of summary 

judgments in ADEA cases by the trial courts. There is an 

interaction of doctrines in cases decided on summary judgment 

motions in ADEA actions as in the one before us. This consists of 

the application of doctrines as to the sequence and burden of 

going forward with the proof, as derived from McDonnell Douglas, 

mixed with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to the burdens 

placed on the movant and the non-movant in summary judgment cases 

as construed by Celotex, Liberty Lobby and Matsushita Elec., and 

encouraged by those cases. The courts are apparently now placed 

in an era when summary judgments in these cases have become 

respectable. 

In this appeal, in my view, we should start where the trial 

judge started, that is, with the whole evidence package before us. 

This was, of course, placed before the trial judge at one time in 

the summary judgment proceedings. 

In ADEA cases, no matter whether tried or submitted on a 

summary judgment motion, it is obvious that the ultimate question 

is whether age was a determining factor in the employer's 

decision. Lucas v. Dover Corp., 857 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir.). When 

all the proof is in, again whether tried or heard on motion, the 

steps, the burdens of going forward, the sequence and whether a 

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prima facie case was established, are history. The trial court is 

then faced only with an ultimate decision no matter how the basic 

issue got there. We are in the same position. Thus when all the 

evidence the parties wanted is in, at once an analysis by the 

McDonnell sequence has little meaning, and the prima facie 

threshold has little or no significance. Instead, the proceedings 

are then like all other sununary judgment actions. 

The Supreme Court in U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Govs. v. 

Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16, a Title VII case, stated: 

"The prima facie case method established in 

McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

792,] was 'never intended to be rigid, 

mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is 

merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the 

evidence in light of common experience as it 

bears on the critical question of 

discrimination.' Furnco [Construction Corp. 

v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,] at 577. Where the 

defendant has done everything that would be 

required of him if the plaintiff had properly 

made out a prima facie case, whether the 

plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. 

The district court has before it all the 

evidence it needs to decide whether 'the 

defendant intentionally discriminated against 

the plaintiff.' [Texas Dept. of Community 

Affairs v.] Burdine, [450 U.S. 248,] at 253. 

"On the state of the record at the close 

of the evidence, the District Court in this 

case should have proceeded to this specific 

question directly, just as district courts 

decide disputed questions of fact in other 

civil litigation." 

The Court in a footnote noted that the plaintiff must have an 

adequate opportunity to show pretext as to the reasons advanced by 

defendant. 

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The Court in U.S Postal Service also said: 

"But when the defendant fails to persuade 

the district court to dismiss the action for 

lack of a prima facie case, and responds to 

the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of 

the reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the 

f actf inder must then decide whether the 

rejection was discriminatory within the 

meaning of Title VII. At this stage, the 

McDonnell-Burdine presumption 'drops from the 

case,' 450 U.S. at 255, n.10, and 'the factual 

inquiry proceeds to a new level of 

specificity.' Id., at 255 ...• 

11 ••• There will seldom be 'eyewitness' 

testimony as to the employer's mental 

processes. But none of this means that trial 

courts or reviewing courts should treat 

discrimination differently from other ultimate 

questions of fact. Nor should they make their 

inquiry even more difficult by applying legal 

rules which were devised to govern 'the basic 

allocation of burdens and order of 

presentation of proof,' Burdine, 450 U.S., at 

252, in deciding this ultimate question." 

460 U.S. at 714-16 (footnotes omitted). 

This must be so in a summary judgment case. In this case, as 

might be expected in all summary judgment cases, the evidence was 

submitted by both parties pretty much as one package. There was 

no restriction on the submission of evidence on the summary 

judgment motion. It was easy for all parties to provide what they 

thought necessary or useful. There is no sequence of proof as 

contemplated by McDonnell Douglas, and it was not possible to 

construct a sequence of proof as would be present in a case 

actually tried. 

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The trial court in the case before us did not decide the case 

on any of the preliminary procedural requirements. The trial 

court decided the ultimate issue on all the evidence. 

"There is an absence of evidence to 

support plaintiffs' claims of age 

discrimination, and defendants' motion for 

summary judgment on that claim.is therefore 

GRANTED." 

The conclusion reached was on a basic element of plaintiffs' case, 

which was the same issue advanced by the employer as the reason 

for termination--whether the work was satisfactory. This sameness 

of issue does not demonstrate that plaintiffs were in any way 

hindered in presenting their case on the motion. 

In my view, the Rules of Civil Procedure and the doctrines 

developed under the Rules prevail in these circumstances, and the 

trial court proceedings must be analyzed accordingly. With the 

evidence of both sides telescoped in time under the summary 

judgment procedure, it would seem to serve no useful purpose to 

separately examine the sequence of burdens had the case been 

tried. 

Summary judgments in these circumstances have not been in 

disfavor since the Supreme Court decided in 1986 Celotex Corp., 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, and Matsushita Elec. 1986 was the year 

of the summary judgment. Perhaps most significant was Matsushita 

wherein the Court in substance held that this question should be 

put: considering all the evidence submitted, would a rational 

trier of fact find for the non-movant. This necessarily required 

the non-movant to have met a greater burden in opposition to the 

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motion. This burden was certainly not met by the plaintiffs in 

the case before us. 

The trial court was thus correct in finding the failure was 

complete as to plaintiffs' evidence of age discrimination. 

I agree fully with the conclusion reached by the majority to 

affirm. 

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