Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01322/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Diego Martinez-Santana, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

United States of America, 

Respondent.

No. CV-14-1322-PHX-SRB (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Diego Martinez-Santana filed a Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set 

Aside, or Correct Sentence. He argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to (1) properly advise him of his constitutional rights, (2) object to 

unsupported allegations of an aggravated felony in his presentence worksheet, (3) ensure 

that there was an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea, and (4) file a timely notice of 

appeal. Respondent argues that Martinez-Santana knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

right to file a Section 2255 motion and that Martinez-Santana voluntarily entered a plea 

of guilty. As explained below, the Court recommends that this Motion be denied. 

BACKGROUND

 On April 4, 2013, Martinez-Santana was found guilty, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, for reentry of a removed alien. (Doc. 6-1, Ex. 1) During his change of plea 

colloquy, the Court explained in detail the need for his plea to be voluntary. (Doc. 10-1, 

Ex. A) Specifically, Martinez-Santana stated that he had spoken directly with his 

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attorney in Spanish and his plea had been read to him in Spanish. (Id. at 6, 14) He 

agreed that he had enough time to fully and completely discuss his case with his attorney, 

that his attorney had done everything that he had asked her to do up to that point in the 

case, that he was fully and completely satisfied with his attorney’s representation of him 

in the case, that he had discussed the charge in the information with his attorney, and that 

his attorney had answered all of his questions about it. (Id. at 8-10) 

 During the colloquy, Martinez-Santana also said that he understood, and waived, 

his rights to a grand jury, a trial by jury, to appeal, and to collaterally attack his judgment 

and sentence. (Id. at 11-13, 25-28) He said that he had signed the plea agreement after it 

had been read to him in Spanish and after his attorney had satisfactorily answered all of 

his questions about it. (Id. at 14-15) He stated that he understood the plea agreement, 

agreed with everything in it, had no questions about it, that it contained all the promises 

that had been made to him, and that no other promises had been made to him. (Id. at 15-

17) He confirmed that no one threatened or coerced him in any way to enter a plea of 

guilty. (Id. at 29-30) He confirmed that he understood, and had no questions about, the 

nature of the charge against him and the possible consequences of his guilty plea, 

including the range of his possible sentence and the imposition of supervised release. (Id. 

at 18-25) He admitted to the factual basis of his plea, and to the existence of a prior 

felony conviction. (Id. at 32) 

 At the conclusion of the colloquy, the Court found that Martinez-Santana had 

entered into his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. (Id. at 35) 

 At his sentencing hearing, the Court found that Martinez-Santana’s sentencing 

range was between 57 and 71 months and sentenced him to a term of 60 months to be 

followed by three years of supervised release. (Id. at 40-50) During sentencing, 

Martinez-Santana confirmed that he was satisfied with his attorney and said that “no 

other attorney had ever read to me every paper, each paper one by one that she did.” (Id. 

at 44) 

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 Martinez-Santana timely filed this Motion and the government responded. (Doc. 

1, 6) Martinez-Santana filed a “Motion to Respond to Government’s Response and to 

Add on Some Facts to My Motion” which the Court will construe as his reply. (Doc. 7) 

Approximately a month after filing its response, the government filed a supplemental 

brief addressing Martinez-Santana’s allegation that his counsel had provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to timely file a notice of appeal. (Doc. 8) As described below, this 

question is not properly before the Court and so the propriety of the supplemental brief 

will not be addressed. 

DISCUSSION

 As part of the written plea agreement, Martinez-Santana agreed to waive “any 

right to file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ or motion that 

challenges...any aspect of the defendant’s sentence, including the manner in which the 

sentence is determined, including...motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” (Doc. 6-1, Ex. 1 at 

3) The government argues that Martinez-Santana expressly waived his right to file a 

Section 2255 motion as part of his plea agreement and so the Court cannot consider this 

Section 2255 motion. 

 Courts will generally enforce the plain language of a plea agreement if it is clear 

and unambiguous on its face, and the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. 

United States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Nunez, 223 

F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000). However, “[a] plea agreement does not waive the right to 

bring a § 2255 motion unless it does so expressly.” United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 

433 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has expressed doubt that a defendant, by entering 

into a plea agreement, could waive certain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

under Section 2255, notwithstanding an express plea waiver that covered all waivable 

statutory rights, including the right to challenge a conviction or sentence under Section 

2255. However, the Ninth Circuit has limited the scope of non-waivable claims to those 

either challenging the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea agreement, or the 

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voluntariness of the waiver itself. United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156-57, n. 

4 (9th Cir. 2005), citing Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433. 

 This means that the Court cannot review Martinez-Santana’s arguments that his 

attorney should have (1) objected to unsupported allegations in the presentence 

worksheet that determined an aggravated felony, (2) ensured that there was an adequate 

factual basis for his guilty plea, and (3) timely filed a notice of appeal.1

 See Pruitt, 32 

F.3d at 433. Instead, the only aspects of Martinez-Santana’s ineffective assistance claim 

that the Court can review concern the voluntariness of his waiver and the voluntariness of 

the agreement itself. 

 The record shows that Martinez-Santana entered into his plea agreement 

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. In his plea colloquy, Martinez-Santana stated 

that the plea was read to him in Spanish, that he understood everything that was in the 

plea agreement, that he was satisfied with the representation of counsel, that he 

understood the charges against him, and that he had no questions about the plea. Further, 

he specifically stated that he understood that he was waiving his right to appeal and to 

collaterally attack his sentence. Accordingly, Martinez-Santana has not shown that his 

waiver was involuntary or that he entered into the plea agreement involuntarily. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED construing Diego Martinez-Santana’s “Motion 

to Respond to Government’s Response” (Doc. 7) as his reply and accepting it as timely 

filed.

 IT IS RECOMMENDED that Diego Martinez-Santana’s Motion to Vacate, Set 

Aside or Correct Sentence be denied. (Doc. 1) 

 

1

 In his reply, Martinez-Santana argues that his attorney was ineffective for withholding several “facts” from him, namely that the Sentencing Commission does not 

recommend supervised release for deportable aliens, the statute of limitations for his prior felony conviction is five years and his conviction was more than five years old, and his prior felony conviction was in state, not federal, court. (Doc. 7 at 2) Even assuming that this Court could review arguments first raised in a reply, these arguments do not address the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea agreement, or the voluntariness of the 

waiver itself. Accordingly, the Court cannot address them. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156-

57. 

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

 Dated this 22nd day of June, 2015. 

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