Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02098/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision (regarding payment of benefits)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZSCAQULINE C. MASERANG,

Plaintiff, 

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. 

Case No.: 16cv2098-BAS-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[ECF Nos. 16, 19]

Plaintiff Zscaquline C. Maserang (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s 

application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and 

supplemental security income payments under Title XVI of the Social 

Security Act. Plaintiff moves the Court for summary judgment reversing the 

Commissioner and ordering an award of benefits, or, in the alternative, to 

remand the case for further administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 16). 

Defendant moved for summary judgment affirming the denial of benefits. 

(ECF No. 19).

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For the reasons expressed herein, the Court recommends that the case 

be REMANDED to the ALJ for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled on May 17, 2011. (A.R. 176, 

182).1 Plaintiff’s date of birth, November 2, 1973, categorizes her as a 

younger person on the alleged disability onset date. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563, 

416.963; (A.R. 28).

A. Procedural History

On January 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for social security 

disability insurance benefits, and on January 31, 2013, Plaintiff filed an 

application for supplemental security income. (A.R. 21). Plaintiff had 

previously filed for disability insurance benefits and supplementary security 

income on November 5, 2008. (A.R. 62). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

David L. Wurzel denied those claims on May 16, 2011. (A.R. 59-73). On

December 13, 2011, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review 

of the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. 78). 

Plaintiff’s January 2013 claims were initially denied on May 17, 2013, 

and denied upon reconsideration on October 3, 2013. (Id.). On September 19, 

2014, Plaintiff appeared at a hearing in San Diego, California, before ALJ

Jay Levine. (A.R. 36). Plaintiff and impartial vocational expert Harlan S. 

Stock testified. (A.R. 21).

On January 14, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff 

not disabled. (A.R. 21, 29). Plaintiff appealed, and the Appeals Council 

declined to review the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. 1). Consequently, the ALJ’s 

 

1 “A.R.” refers to the Administrative Record filed on November 21, 2016, and 

is located at ECF No. 11.

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decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.).

On August 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court seeking 

judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 1). On November 

21, 2016, Defendant answered and lodged the administrative record with the 

Court. (ECF Nos. 10, 11). On April 17, 2017, Plaintiff moved for summary 

judgment. (ECF No. 16). On May 16, 2017, the Commissioner cross-moved 

for summary judgment. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff did not reply to the 

Commissioner’s response.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The supplemental security income program provides benefits to 

disabled persons without substantial resources and with little income. 42 

U.S.C. § 1382. To qualify, a claimant must establish an inability to engage in 

“substantial gainful activity” because of a “medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment” that “has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

The disabling impairment must be so severe that, considering age, education, 

and work experience, the claimant cannot engage in any kind of substantial 

gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner makes this assessment through a process of up to 

five steps. First, the claimant must not be engaged in substantial, gainful 

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must have a “severe” 

impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the medical evidence of the 

claimant’s impairment is compared to a list of impairments that are 

presumed severe enough to preclude work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the 

claimant’s impairment meets or is equivalent to the requirements for one of 

the listed impairments, benefits are awarded. Id. If the claimant’s 

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impairment does not meet or is not equivalent to the requirements of a listed 

impairment, the analysis continues to a fourth and possibly fifth step and 

considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity. At the fourth step, the 

claimant’s relevant work history is considered with the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity. If the claimant can perform the claimant’s past relevant 

work, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). At the fifth step, if the 

claimant is found unable to perform the claimant’s past relevant work, the 

issue is whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the 

national economy, considering the claimant’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity. If the claimant cannot do other 

work that exists in the national economy, benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(f).

Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allow 

unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of a final agency decision of 

the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The scope of judicial 

review is limited and the Commissioner’s denial of benefits “will be disturbed 

only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” 

Brawner v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (quoting Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Sandqathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). “[I]t 

is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing 

both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s 

conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 846 F.2d 

573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence supports more than one rational 

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interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 

749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). When the evidence is inconclusive, 

“questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are 

functions solely of the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 

(9th Cir. 1982).

The ALJ has a special duty in social security cases to fully and fairly 

develop the record in order to make an informed decision on a claimant’s 

entitlement to disability benefits. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 

(9th Cir. 1991). Because disability hearings are not adversarial in nature, 

the ALJ must “inform himself [or herself] about the facts relevant to his 

decision,” even if the claimant is represented by counsel. Id. (quoting Heckler 

v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 n.1 (1983)).

Even if a reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to 

apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his or 

her decision. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Section 

405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing 

the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S. C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may 

also remand the matter to the Social Security Administration for further 

proceedings. Id.

B. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, from May 17, 2011, through the date of the ALJ’s decision, 

January 14, 2015. (A.R. 29). The ALJ also found Plaintiff did not show 

changed circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption of 

nondisability from the previous ALJ decision on May 16, 2011. (A.R. 22).

The ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: 

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polyarthralgia; arthritis; chondromalacia patellar, bilateral knees; 

fibromyalgia; obesity; degenerative disc disease (“DDD”) and joint disease, 

lumbar and cervical spine; and hypertension. (A.R. 24). The ALJ determined 

that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

meeting or medically equivalent to the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). (A.R. 25). 

Specifically, the ALJ found that “[n]o treating or examining physician has 

recorded findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed 

impairment, nor does the evidence show medical findings that are the same 

or equivalent to those of any listed impairment of the Listing of 

Impairments.” (Id.). The ALJ considered listings 1.02, 1.03, 1.04, 4.00 and 

14.09.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to:

[P]erform light work . . . except [Plaintiff] can lift and/or carry 20 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; [Plaintiff] can stand

and/or walk 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, in 1⁄2 hour intervals; 

[Plaintiff] can sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; [Plaintiff] cannot 

push and/or pull with either leg; [Plaintiff] cannot work around 

unprotected heights, temperature extremes, and vibration; 

[Plaintiff] cannot walk on uneven ground; [Plaintiff] cannot climb 

ladders, but she can occasionally climb stairs and ramps; [Plaintiff] 

can occasionally stoop and bend; [Plaintiff] cannot balance; 

[Plaintiff] can perform frequent handling and fine fingering; 

[Plaintiff] cannot perform power gripping and/or grasping with 

either hand; and [Plaintiff] can occasionally lift above shoulder 

level.

(A.R. 25). After reviewing the record and Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff’s] statements 

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concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 

are not entirely credible.” (A.R. 26).

Relying on the record and testimony of vocational expert (VE) Harlan S. 

Stock, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant 

work. (A.R. 28). The ALJ stated that the record reflects that Plaintiff 

worked as a preschool teacher. (Id.). VE Stock testified that this position 

requires an exertional level that Plaintiff could not perform at her current 

functional capacity. (A.R. 55).

The ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in 

the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (A.R. 28). In determining 

this, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s RFC; that Plaintiff has a Master’s degree 

in human services, can communicate in English, and is a “younger 

individual;” and that transferable job skills are immaterial. (A.R. 26, 28). 

Based on this information, VE Stock testified that Plaintiff can perform

occupations such as dresser, election clerk, and call out operator. (A.R. 29). 

Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled from May 17, 2011, to 

the date of the ALJ decision, January 14, 2015. (A.R. 29-30).

In determining that Plaintiff is not disabled, the ALJ noted the 

following to be of particular relevance:

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was divorced with three 

children, ages 19, 21, and 8. (A.R. 26). Plaintiff lived with her 8-year-old 

daughter. (Id.). Plaintiff testified that she was hospitalized due to 

rheumatoid arthritis and swelling in her legs, and also complained of 

worsening back and joint pain. (Id.). For insurance reasons, Plaintiff was 

unable to get an MRI. (Id.).

Plaintiff testified that she could not work because it was difficult to 

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stand on her feet, and she had difficulties with daily activities like washing 

her hair and walking around her complex. (Id.). She complained of extreme 

joint pain and swelling and numbness in her knees and legs. (Id.). Plaintiff 

mostly tried to walk without a cane, but sometimes used one. (Id.).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of her 

symptoms and limitations are greater than expected in light of the objective 

evidence of record. (A.R. 27).

2. Plaintiff’s 2011-2014 Medical Record

On August 8, 2011, Plaintiff attended a rheumatology consultation with 

Michael Keller, M.D. (A.R. 299-301). Dr. Keller evaluated Plaintiff and 

diagnosed her with degenerative disease, osteoarthritis polyfocal, and 

fibromyalgia. (A.R. 301). Plaintiff had negative Antinuclear Antibody2

(“ANA”) testing, which resulted in no diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis. Dr. 

Keller gave Plaintiff a trial of Lyrica and advised her on the importance of 

diet and exercise. (Id.).

On August 31, 2012, Plaintiff complained of generalized myalgia and 

arthralgia to King Chavez Health Center. (A.R. 318, 336). Plaintiff also 

reported at that time that her rheumatologist felt Plaintiff had rheumatoid 

arthritis. (A.R. 318).

On January 28, 2013, Plaintiff’s cervical spine x-ray indicated she had 

mild DDD at C6-7 without abnormal motion. (A.R. 371). On March 3, 2013, 

Plaintiff’s screening for rheumatoid arthritis showed elevated inflammatory 

markers, but her ANA was negative. (A.R. 357). Plaintiff was diagnosed 

 

2 ANA testing assists in screening for autoimmune disorders. Whitendale v. 

Astrue, No. 1:10-cv-01561-SKO, 2012 WL 652646, at *1 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 

2012) (citing to https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/003535.htm).

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with “likely” rheumatoid arthritis, unspecified myalgias and myositis, 

unspecified generalized osteoarthritis, Raynaud’s syndrome, and mild 

degenerative joint disease in the cervical spine. (Id.). Plaintiff evidenced 

inflammation in her joints and skin with elevated inflammation markers, but 

negative serologies. (Id.). On August 14, 2013, Dr. Roshan, a treating 

physician, indicated that Plaintiff continued to have inflammatory arthritis 

with elevated inflammatory markers, but that her ANA by 

immunofluorescence was negative. (A.R. 392). Plaintiff had less swelling in 

her hands, but still had significant pain in her joints and had prolonged 

morning stiffness. (Id.). Dr. Roshan treated Plaintiff with Methotrexate, 

authorized her to try Humira, and advised Plaintiff to lose weight. (Id.).

On May 16, 2014, Dr. Roshan reported that Plaintiff’ continued to have 

inflammatory arthritis, fibromyalgia, and connective tissue condition, which 

were treated with Methotrexate and shoulder injections. (A.R. 401). Dr. 

Roshan treated Plaintiff’s cervical stenosis with Gabapentin, treated her 

fatigue with folate and B12, and counseled Plaintiff on weight loss and 

exercise. (Id.).

3. Dr. Close, Consultative Examiner

The ALJ gave great weight to consultative examiner Frederick Close,

M.D., a Board certified orthopedic surgeon, and found his opinion consistent 

with the objective record. (A.R. 27-28). Dr. Close evaluated Plaintiff on April 

30, 2013, and found that she was not precluded from performing less than 

light exertional capacity. (A.R. 378-381). Dr. Close reported that Plaintiff 

was 39 years old with a workers’ compensation injury four years earlier,

when a chair was pulled out from under her, causing pain in her joints and 

back. (A.R. 378). Plaintiff continued to have rheumatoid disease after her 

workers’ compensation claim closed. (Id.).

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Dr. Close’s physical examination determined that Plaintiff had 

polyarthralgia, rheumatoid arthritis, and chondromalacia patellae knees, 

bilateral. (A.R. 380). He found that Plaintiff stood and walked with a normal 

gait and used a cane for balance; had crepitus in both knees; had a negative 

McMurray test3 and negative straight leg raise test; had generalized 

tenderness in the rotator cuff bilaterally and wrists; and had a negative 

Finkelstein test.4 (A.R. 379).

Dr. Close opined that Plaintiff “was able to lift and/or carry 20 pounds 

occasionally and ten pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for four hours with 

normal rest breaks; sit for six hours with normal rest breaks; use a cane for 

balance and avoid uneven terrain and long-distance walking; frequently 

bend, stoop, and crouch; and frequently reach, handle, feel, grasp, and 

finger.” (A.R. 381).

4. Drs. Taylor-Holmes and Kalmar, State Agency Reviewers

The ALJ gave less weight to State agency reviewers Dr. Taylor-Holmes 

and Dr. Kalmar, who reviewed the record and determined Plaintiff was 

functionally limited to sedentary work. (A.R. 28, 85-97, 113-125). The ALJ 

noted that Plaintiff’s treatment records indicated that Plaintiff had

rheumatoid arthritis, but negative ANA testing, and an x-ray of Plaintiff’s 

 

3 A McMurray test is a “rotation of the tibia on the femur to determine injury 

to meniscal structures. . . . A positive test indicates meniscal injury.” 

Rodriguez v. Astrue, No. 12-CV-4103, 2013 WL 1282363, at *7 n.45 (E.D. N.Y. 

Mar. 28, 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

4 The Finkelstein test is used by physicians to confirm de Quervain’s 

tenosynovitis, which is a painful condition affecting the tendons on the thumb 

side of the wrist. “The thumb is bent down along the palm and then covered 

with the other fingers.” Herring v. Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-00004, 2014 WL 

1052078, at *7 n.20 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2014) (internal citations omitted).

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cervical spine showed only mild degeneration. (Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff had a significant range of light residual functional 

capacity assessment and was not limited to sedentary work. (See id.).

C. Issues

1. Credibility of Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal is that the ALJ failed to articulate 

sufficient reasons to find Plaintiff not credible. (ECF No. 16-1 at 4). 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in using boilerplate language 

to discredit her testimony, and in rejecting her testimony based on a lack of 

objective evidence, which Plaintiff argues is always legally insufficient. (Id.

at 6-7). Conversely, Defendant argues that the ALJ offered substantial 

evidence in finding Plaintiff not entirely credible. (ECF No. 19-1 at 3).

Plaintiff’s allegation of error will not be examined here. As discussed 

below, the Court finds that the ALJ improperly applied the res judicata 

presumption of continuing nondisability to his standard of review in this 

case. This constituted clear error. 

2. Res Judicata Presumption of Nondisability

As noted herein, Plaintiff previously applied and was denied disability 

benefits. (A.R. 21). Specifically, on May 16, 2011, ALJ David Wurzel ruled 

that Plaintiff had not “been under a disability... from October 21, 2008, 

through the date of [his] decision.” (A.R. 73). 

Ruling on the instant (second) application for disability benefits, on 

January 14, 2015, ALJ Jay Levine found that Plaintiff had not “been under a 

disability...from May 17, 2011 through the date of [his] decision.” (A.R. 29). 

In his decision, ALJ Levine noted that “the documentary evidence reflects the 

claimant filed prior applications for Title II and Title XVI benefits...which 

were denied at the initial level on December 18, 2008 and affirmed on May 

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16, 2011, following a review and hearing conducted by ALJ Wurzel. (A.R. 

21). ALJ Levine cited to Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988) for 

the proposition that “[t]he principles of res judicata apply to administrative 

decisions. . . .” Id. at 693. He also cited to Lyle v. Secretary of Health and 

Human Services, 700 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1983) for the proposition that “a 

prior decision, which finds a claimant capable of a certain residual functional 

capacity, creates a presumption that the claimant continues to be able to do 

work at that level unless evidence is presented to overcome this 

presumption.” (A.R. 21). Lastly, ALJ Levine acknowledged that for a 

claimant to overcome the presumption of continuing nondisability a claimant 

must prove ‘changed circumstances’ indicating a greater disability, an 

increase in severity of her impairments or the existence of an impairment not 

previously considered. (A.R. 21-22). See Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 

(9th Cir. 1985); AR 97-4(9); 20 C.F.R. 404.1563; 20 C.F.R. 416.963.

After citing the applicable legal standard, ALJ Levine subsequently 

concluded:

In this case, the claimant has not provided any persuasive 

evidence of significant “changed circumstances” that would warrant 

a more restricted residual functional capacity than that described 

[herein]. In fact, the evidence indicates that claimant is capable of 

performing less than light exertional capacity. As such, [I find] the 

claimant has not rebutted the presumption of continuing 

nondisability. 

(A.R. 22). From that conclusion, ALJ Levine proceeded to rule upon 

Plaintiff’s second application. 

“Normally, an ALJ’s findings that a claimant is not disabled ‘creates a 

presumption that the claimant continued to be able to work after that date.”

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 597 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 

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81 F.3d, 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1995)). “[T]he principles of res judicata apply to 

administrative decisions,” but, “the doctrine is applied less rigidly to 

administrative proceedings. . . .” Id. Consequently, when a claimant files a 

second (or subsequent) claim for benefits, the ALJ deciding the subsequent 

application is required to consider the res judicata effect to be accorded to 

the prior unfavorable decision. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d, 821, 827 (9th Cir. 

1995). Notably, “[t]he presumption [never] applies, if there are changed 

circumstances.” Id. (citations omitted.) Changed circumstances that can bar 

the application of res judicata specifically include a new issue raised by the 

Plaintiff “such as the existence of an impairment not considered in the 

previous application.” Id. (citations omitted).

In Plaintiff’s first application (2011) ALJ Wurtzel specifically found:

I find that the claimant has the following medically determinable 

impairments that in combination are considered severe under the 

Social Security Act and regulations: Degenerative disc disease, 

cervical spine, with significant disc-spur complex at C6-C7; 

degenerative disc and joint disease, lumbar spine, with disc-spur 

complex at L4-L5; hypertension, well controlled; patellofemoral 

pain syndrome, both knees; and obesity.

(A.R. 64). ALJ Wurzel’s decision does not indicate that fibromyalgia was

presented as a basis for Plaintiff’’s claim of disability in the first application 

or that he considered it in his findings. (A.R. 64). 

In the application at issue here (2015) ALJ Levine found:

The claimant has the following severe impairments: polyarthralgia; 

arthritis; chondromalacia patellar, bilateral knees; fibromyalgia; 

obesity; degenerative disc and joint disease, lumber and cervical 

spine; and hypertension.

(A.R. 24). Also, ALJ Levine specifically acknowledged Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia

impairment:

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The objective treatment records support she has a medically 

determinable and severe impairment of fibromyalgia, based on 

evidence showing widespread pain; at least 11 positive tender 

points on physical examination; repeated manifestations of six or 

more fibromyalgia symptoms; and a determination that other 

disorders could not cause these repeated manifestations of 

symptoms.

(A.R. 24). 

The record shows that the earliest date Plaintiff was given a tentative

diagnosis of fibromyalgia was following an exam by Dr. Soumya Rao, M.D. on

August 8, 2011. (A.R. 301). The date of that exam was over four months after 

ALJ Wurzel issued his ruling on Plaintiff’s first application on May 16, 2011. 

(A.R. 73). Thus, the Court finds that the record evidence demonstrates that 

Plaintiff’s allegation of fibromyalgia constituted a “changed circumstance” 

because this impairment was not addressed in the 2011 decision. 5

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the Commissioner may not apply res 

judicata where the claimant raises a new issue, such as the existence of an 

impairment not considered in the previous application.” Gregory v. Bowen, 

844 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1988). “[A]ll an applicant has to do to preclude 

the application of res judicata is raise a new issue in a later proceeding.” 

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 598 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2009). The newly asserted 

impairment need not be severe or disabling, res judicata is precluded based 

only upon the assertion of new impairments. Id. Because Plaintiff raised a 

new impairment not previously presented in her first application it was error 

for the ALJ to apply the presumption of continuing nondisability in ruling on 

Plaintiff’s second application.

 

5 : The Court was compelled to consider the issue of res judicata without input from either 

party as neither addressed it in their pleadings.

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3. Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings Is 

Appropriate

The Court recognizes the importance of administrative res

judicata, however when the doctrine is erroneously applied, remand is an 

appropriate remedy. “[A] court has discretion to remand for further 

proceedings when an ALJ has committed legal error in denying benefits.”

Harman v Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000). Here the ALJ erred 

by applying the res judicata presumption of continuing nondisability to 

Plaintiff’s first application and subsequent ruling. Based on the record 

evidence in the case, the principle of res judicata is not applicable. Plaintiff’s 

second application for benefits was denied for her failure to overcome the 

presumption of continuing nondisability for the period following the denial of 

her first application. This presumption did not apply to Plaintiff because the 

record presented shows she alleged a new disability not contained in her first 

application for benefits. 

In sum, the ALJ's application of the continuing presumption of 

nondisability arising from the prior ALJ's decision was error. When error 

exists in an administrative determination, “the proper course, except in rare 

circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 

explanation.” INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 355, 154 

L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Moisa v. 

Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir.2004). Accordingly, the Court 

recommends the case be remanded so the ALJ can determine Plaintiff’s 

residual functional capacity and entitlement to disability benefits in the first 

instance.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court RECOMMENDS that the case be REMANDED for further 

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proceedings and the ALJ be instructed not to apply the principle of the res 

judicata presumption of continuing nondisability. This Report and 

Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the 

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions 

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objection to this report 

must be filed with the court and served on all parties no later than 

September 12, 2017. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Report and Recommendations.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than September 19, 

2017. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 29, 2017

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