Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01366/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01366-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN RALPH RICHARDSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

XAVIER BACERRA [SIC], et al.,

 Defendants. 

No. 1:19-cv-01366-LJO-EPG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 21)

INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 2019, Plaintiff Stephen Ralph Richardson, who was at the time 

proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights complaint asserting three claims, all concerning an 

adverse licensure decision against him from the California Physician Assistant Board (PAB) and 

procedural steps taken subsequent to that decision. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff, still proceeding pro 

se, filed a first amended complaint (FAC) on November 4, 2019. (Doc. No. 14.) The FAC’s first 

claim, arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the PAB’s licensure decision violated 

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. (Id. at 4.) The FAC next 

appeared to allege that Title 16 of the California Code of Regulations (CCR), § 1399.523.5 

(requiring revocation of certain forms of licenses held by registered sex offenders), violates the 

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U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws. (Id.) Finally, the FAC included a 

claim that defendants conspired to interfere with plaintiff’s civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985(3). 

On December 3, 2019, defendants moved to dismiss, and set the hearing on that motion 

for January 9, 2020. (Doc. No. 21.) On December 4, 2019, plaintiff, again proceeding pro se, 

lodged a second amended complaint (SAC), without a stipulation from defendants and without 

leave of court. (Doc. No. 24.) The SAC appeared to differ from the FAC in only one material 

respect: it corrected a misspelling as to one defendant’s name. (Id.) On December 9, 2019, 

defendants moved to strike the SAC because plaintiff did not obtain leave of court to file it and 

because the amendment would be futile. (Doc. No. 25.) Plaintiff did not timely file any 

oppositions to the defense motions, which would have been due no later than December 26, 2019. 

See Local Rule 230(c). 

On January 6, 2020, the previously assigned district judge issued an order dismissing all 

of the claims in the FAC for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 33 (January 6 Dismissal Order).) 

In an abundance of caution, although the court could not at that time “envision any obvious way 

that the claims in this case could be amended to cure the deficiencies outlined,” the court did not 

dismiss the case outright, but instead ordered plaintiff to show cause in writing on or before 

January 20, 2020, “why he should be afforded leave to amend the complaint.” (Id. at 7–8.) The 

lodged SAC was stricken on the ground that it failed to cure any of the identified defects and 

therefore permitting it to be filed would be futile. (Id. at 7–8.) 

Meanwhile, on or about January 3, 2020, attorney Steve Whitworth filed a notice to 

appear on plaintiff’s behalf in this action. For reasons the court will not repeat here, but which 

are described in detail in its February 27, 2020 Order, the order of dismissal was set aside and 

plaintiff, through counsel, was permitted an opportunity to file an opposition to defendant’s

December 3, 2019 motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 41.) Defendant was also permitted an 

opportunity to file a reply. (Id.) The parties have now filed those briefs (Doc. Nos. 42, 43), and 

the matter is ripe for decision. 

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Having now reviewed the motions in light of the entire record, including the most recent 

filings, for the reasons explained below, the court will once again GRANT defendant’s motion to 

dismiss without leave to amend. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to judicially noticeable documents in the record, plaintiff received a California 

Physician Assistant (PA) license in 1993. (Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), Ex. 2 

at ¶ 3.)

1 On October 18, 2000, plaintiff sustained a conviction in Fresno County Superior Court 

for committing lewd or lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 in violation of under 

California Penal Code § 288(a),. (RJN, Exs. 1(b), 2.) Plaintiff was ordered to register as a sex 

offender pursuant to California Penal Code § 290. (RJN, Ex. 1(b).) Plaintiff surrendered his PA 

license on January 2, 2002, as a direct result of his conviction. (See RJN Ex. 2.)

More than fifteen years later, in October 2017, plaintiff submitted a Petition for Penalty 

Relief, seeking to have his license reinstated. (RJN, Ex. 4.) On May 24, 2018, he received notice 

from the PAB that his petition had been denied pursuant to Title 16 of the California Code or 

Regulations, § 1399.523.5(3). (RJN, Ex. 5.) Soon thereafter, the PAB sent him a revised notice 

of its decision including a statement of plaintiff’s right to appeal. (RJN, Ex. 6.) Plaintiff pursued 

and was eventually given a formal hearing on the denial of his reinstatement petition, which 

resulted in a hearing officer recommending denial of the petition. (RJN, Exs. 3, 7, 8, 9.) The PAB 

adopted the proposed decision. (RJN, Ex. 3.) Plaintiff was notified in an April 12, 2019 letter of 

the denial, that the decision would become effective on May 10, 2019, and that he could file a 

 

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In the context of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of 

matters of public record, MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 80 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986), for 

the purpose of establishing the existence of those records and their content, but not to establish 

any fact that is “subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). To the extent the court 

references the content of any judicially noticeable documents for the truth, such as its reliance on 

the 2001 Stipulated Decision and Order in which plaintiff stipulated to the surrender of his PA 

license (RJN, Ex. 2) to establish the date on which plaintiff obtained his PA license, it does so for 

background purposes only and not to establish any material fact. Elsewhere in this order, the 

court refers to certain judicially noticeable public records to establish their existence or the nature 

of the underlying proceedings they reflect. See United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (taking judicial notice of underlying state court documents to establish conviction);

United States v. Valle-Montalbo, 474 F.3d 1197, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2007) (same).

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petition for reconsideration pursuant to California Government Code § 11521, which requires any 

such reconsideration petition to be received prior to the effective date. (RJN, Ex. 10.) On April 

24, 2019, plaintiff mailed a petition for reconsideration to the hearing officer, instead of to the 

PAB. (RJN, Ex. 11.) On July 1, 2019, the hearing officer forwarded plaintiff’s petition to the 

PAB, which sent plaintiff a letter indicating it lacked jurisdiction to consider his reconsideration 

petition because it was untimely. (RJN, Ex. 12.)

On September 30, 2019, plaintiff filed this lawsuit. 

STANDARD OF DECISION

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 

(9th Cir. 2001). A 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal 

theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether a complaint 

states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the 

complaint, construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 

and resolves all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 

(9th Cir. 2008).

Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 

unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

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pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove 

facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 

been alleged[.]” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 

459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential 

allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable 

legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. In other words, the complaint must describe the alleged 

misconduct in enough detail to lay the foundation for an identified legal claim.

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Claim Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim on the ground that he failed to 

exhaust his judicial remedies by filing a writ petition in state court pursuant to California Code of 

Civil Procedure § 1094.5. See Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 891 F.3d 1147, 1154–55 

(9th Cir. 2018). The previously assigned district judge evaluated this argument in detail in the 

January 6, 2020 Dismissal Order as follows. 

In Doe, the Ninth Circuit considered the University of California’s 

decision to suspend a student for sexual misconduct. Id. at 1150. 

The Ninth Circuit explained that federal courts accord preclusive 

effect to state administrative proceedings that meet certain fairness 

requirements, noting that California’s writ of administrative 

mandamus process provides “an adequate opportunity for de novo 

judicial review.” Id. at 1154–55 (internal citations omitted). A 

court in the Ninth Circuit must “give preclusive effect to a state 

administrative decision if the California courts would do so.” Id. at 

1155. Because, in California, “exhaustion of judicial remedies is 

necessary to avoid giving binding ‘effect to an administrative 

agency’s decision,” a party “must exhaust judicial remedies by 

filing a § 1094.5 petition, the exclusive and established process for 

judicial review of an agency decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Doe held that the University of California’s 

suspension decision was the kind of “adjudicatory, quasi-judicial 

decision” that is subject to California’s judicial exhaustion 

requirement. Id. at 1155 (citing Y.K.A. Indus., Inc. v. Redev. 

Agency of San Jose, 174 Cal. App. 4th 339 (2009)). As a result, the 

suspension decision, about which the student did not seek review in 

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state court, should have been treated as a final and preclusive bar to 

any Section 1983 claim seeking to overturn the suspension. Id. 

The Court sees no way to distinguish the present circumstances 

from those in Doe. The PAB’s ruling was an adjudicatory, quasijudicial one, and Plaintiff has failed to allege or even suggest that 

he exhausted his judicial remedies. Nor has he attempted to 

otherwise explain why he should be exempt from the exhaustion 

requirement.

(Doc. No. 33 at 5.) 

Plaintiff entirely fails to address the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe, instead arguing that 

“administrative remedies” are not required, citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496

(1982). Patsy indeed held that a plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 need not exhaust available 

administrative remedies, but Patsy says nothing about exhaustion of judicial remedies. Id. Doe, 

in contrast, stands for the specific proposition that a party seeking relief from an adverse

California administrative decision must first pursue review of that decision in state court by way 

of administrative mandamus; if the party fails to do so, he may not bring a procedural due process 

claim under § 1983 challenging the process provided by that administrative body because the 

administrative decision is deemed final and must be given preclusive effect in federal court. Doe

is on point and controls here. Plaintiff failed to pursue judicial remedies in state court. 

Accordingly, the underlying administrative decision is given preclusive, binding effect and cannot 

be the subject of a procedural due process challenge. For the same reasons articulated in the 

January 6, 2016 Dismissal Order, the court will again dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim without 

prejudice due to his failure to exhaust judicial remedies available to him in state court. In light of 

this finding, the court declines to address plaintiff’s other, somewhat disjointed arguments as to 

the possible merit of his due process challenge as well as the parties’ discussions of Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. 

B. Ex Post Facto Claim

The January 6, 2020 order of dismissal also granted defendants’ motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s allegation that § 1399.523.5 violates the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against ex post 

facto laws. This court held this claim was “legally invalid as alleged,” reasoning that

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the Ninth Circuit has upheld California’s sex offender registration 

laws as constitutional on the ground that registration itself is not 

punitive. United States v. Hardeman, 704 F.3d 1266, 1268 (9th 

Cir. 2013), citing People v. Fioretti, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1209 (1997) 

(holding that retroactive application of the state sex offender 

registration laws does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). 

Likewise, state statutory schemes imposing occupational debarment 

upon commission of specified acts have also been deemed 

nonpunitive. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003), citing Hudson 

v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (forbidding further 

participation in the banking industry after commission of financial 

crimes). 

(Doc. No. 33 at 6.) 

Plaintiff offers no quarrel with this reasoning, which remains valid. Defendant’s motion 

to dismiss plaintiff’s ex post facto claim will also be GRANTED. 

C. Plaintiff’s Claim Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

Finally, plaintiff’s FAC generally alleges a violation of Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). That claim was also previously dismissed by this court for the 

following reasons: 

The first part of Section 1985(3) prohibits persons from conspiring 

to deprive any person of his or her constitutional rights, while the 

second part of Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to interfere 

with the federal voting process. Section 1985(3) also provides for a 

private right of action for damages caused by any conspiracy 

prohibited by § 1985. An essential requirement for a 1985(3) claim 

is that there must be some racial or otherwise class based “invidious 

discriminatory animus” for the conspiracy. Bray v. Alexandria 

Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1993). Section 

1985(3) was not meant to apply to all tortious conspiracies to 

deprive the rights of another. Id. Section 1985(3) does not extend 

beyond race unless that class can show that the government has 

determined that class members “require and warrant special federal 

assistance in protecting their civil rights.” Orin v. Barclay, 272 

F.3d 1207, 1217 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff does not allege a 

conspiracy of any kind, let alone one motivated by racial animus or 

animus to any class warranting special protection. 

(Doc. No. 33 at 6–7.) Once again, plaintiff mounts no argument in opposition to dismissal of this 

claim. Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claim will also be 

GRANTED.

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D. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff requests leave to amend. First, plaintiff generally asserts that amendment should 

be permitted as a matter of course because he has yet to have an opportunity to amend his 

complaint with the assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 42 at 8–9.) Plaintiff is correct that Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that a “court should freely give leave [to amend] when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Yet, even that liberal standard has its limits. 

“Dismissal without leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by 

amendment.” Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). In the January 6, 

2020 Dismissal Order, the court indicated that it could not “envision any obvious way that the 

claims in this case could be amended to cure the deficiencies outlined.” (Doc. 33 at 7.) 

Plaintiff’s most recent filing does nothing to dispel this concern. Plaintiff’s counsel has simply 

offered miscellaneous arguments about why the process afforded plaintiff was insufficient, but 

fails to address the threshold issue of plaintiff’s failure to pursue judicial remedies in state court. 

Plaintiff’s counsel also mentions “substantive due process” but provides no explanation as to how 

any substantive due process claim could be advanced based upon the facts alleged. The court is 

aware of no substantive due process doctrine that could possibly apply here. Plaintiff has

advanced no arguably viable way to cure the deficiencies of the previously dismissed claims or 

pursue a different federal claim in this case. Accordingly, and because the granting of further 

leave to amend would be futile under the circumstances, the court will grant defendant’s motion 

to dismiss without leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 

21) without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this matter 

and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 28, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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