Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01675/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01675-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STANLEY SWENSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SISKIYOU COUNTY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:08-CV-1675 KJM CMK 

ORDER 

 This case was on calendar on August 7, 2014 for a hearing on defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment. Therese Cannata and Joshua Garber appeared for plaintiff; Philip Price 

appeared for defendants. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court DENIES the motion 

as explained below. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On July 21, 2008, plaintiff Stanley Swenson, then appearing in propria persona, 

filed a civil rights action alleging generally that Siskiyou County, the Siskiyou County Planning 

Commission, and a number of individual defendants violated his rights in connection with a use 

permit for his property and subsequent enforcement actions against him. ECF No. 1. The first 

claim alleged that Siskiyou County and the Siskiyou County Planning Commission violated his 

procedural and substantive due process rights and deprived him of property without just 

compensation. The second claim alleged the individual defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff 

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of the rights listed in the first claim, but also retaliated against him for his successful defense of a 

prior lawsuit brought by county officials against him. Id. Under Local Rule 302(c)(21), the case 

was referred to the magistrate judge. 

 On August 20, 2008, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the following 

points, among others: (1) the federal claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) plaintiff’s 

claims arising in 2000 and 2001 are barred by the statute of limitations; (3) defendants Knoll, the 

District Attorney, and Allen, an Assistant District Attorney, are immune from suit; (4) the County 

and the Planning Commission cannot be held responsible under the doctrine of respondeat 

superior; (5) the complaint does not state a claim against defendants Lazaris and McMahon, who 

are named in the caption but not in the body of the complaint; (6) the complaint does not state a 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (7) the conspiracy is not adequately pleaded; (8) the action is 

barred by claim and issue preclusion; (9) plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies; 

(10) plaintiff has not adequately pleaded the County’s liability under Monell v. New York 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (11) the use permit did not give plaintiff any 

vested rights; (12) the prior owner’s use of the property did not give plaintiff the right to make 

that use in light of plaintiff’s failure to do so for many years; (13) the Planning Director did not 

revoke or terminate plaintiff’s use permit; (14) a zoning change rendered the use allowed by the 

permit a non-conforming use; (15) Siskiyou County Ordinance § 10-6.2501 is constitutional; 

(16) plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a violation of his constitutional rights; and (17) the 

individual defendants are protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 4. 

 On November 21, 2008, the magistrate judge issued findings and 

recommendations. First he characterized the complaint: “plaintiff’s Count 1 asserts violations of 

his due process rights from the Planning Commission’s 2003 decision that the 1966 use permit 

was no longer valid[,] and defendants’ alleged conduct relating to plaintiff’s court action that 

followed.” Findings and Recommendations, ECF No. 27 (F&Rs) at 5. He said the second claim 

was less clear, but appeared to arise from the defendants’ conduct during the course of plaintiff’s 

state court action, the initiation of a 2001 action against him, and a 2000 denial of his application 

for a use permit. Id. The magistrate judge then recommended the first claim be dismissed 

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because the existence of state remedies meant plaintiff could not state a due process claim against 

the defendants. Id. at 6. He also said he could not “discern any constitutional violation” in count 

two nor find plaintiff’s Takings Clause claim adequately pleaded. Id. at 6-7. 

 On March 3, 2009, the then-assigned district judge adopted the findings and 

recommendations as to plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, but declined to adopt them with 

respect to the substantive due process and Takings Clause claims. Order, ECF No. 32. 

Regarding the substantive due process claim, the court said plaintiff had adequately stated a 

violation of substantive due process by alleging the Siskiyou County Planning Director informed 

him the use permit was no longer valid, a decision upheld by the Planning Commission and the 

Board of Supervisors. Id. at 4. The court noted it made no findings as to the other bases for the 

motion to dismiss not relied upon by the magistrate judge. Id. at 5 n.1. 

 On July 9, 2010, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the 

following points: (1) both of plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations; 

(2) plaintiff does not have a property interest giving rise to a substantive due process claim 

because the defendants did not prevent plaintiff from using his property in conformity with the 

permit; the permit does not give rise to any vested property interest; the prior owner’s use in 

conformance with the permit did not create a vested interest in so using the property; the permit 

was neither revoked nor terminated; the use became non-conforming after the zoning change 

plaintiff requested; (3) the letter from Wayne Virag about the use permit did not violate plaintiff’s 

rights because it was Virag’s honest opinion; (3) plaintiff cannot establish his Takings Clause 

claim for a variety of reasons; (4) all of plaintiff’s claims are barred by issue preclusion; (5) the 

individual defendants are entitled to immunity; (5) plaintiff cannot establish his claim under 

42 U.S.C. § 1985; (6) plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (7) plaintiff cannot 

establish the County’s liability. Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 74. 

 On March 7, 2011, the magistrate judge recommended that defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment be granted as to the substantive due process and Takings Clause claims 

remaining after the court’s resolution of the motion to dismiss. F&Rs, ECF No. 117. The court 

characterized plaintiff’s due process claim as arising from Wayne Virag’s letter of February 13, 

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2003, about the continued viability of the use permit and its subsequent ratification by the 

Planning Commission and Board of Supervisors, and determined that Virag’s opinion was not 

arbitrary. Id. at 19-20. He also recommended plaintiff’s Takings Clause claim be denied. Id. at 

21-22. 

 On June 15, 2011, the district court adopted these findings and recommendations 

and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Order, ECF No. 130. 

 Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on July 11, 2011. Notice of Appeal, ECF 

No. 134. In his opening brief, he argued the district court had erred in dismissing both his 

procedural and substantive due process claims and also argued the court improperly dismissed an 

equal protection claim stemming from defendants’ alleged differing treatment of other property 

holders. Appellate Docket, No. 11-16678, ECF No. 6 at 17-18. 

 In their answering brief, defendants argued among other things that plaintiff was 

accorded procedural due process by the hearing before the Planning Commission, the appeal to 

the Board of Supervisors, and the ultimate successful review by administrative mandamus. They 

also argued Virag’s letter was only an opinion and was neither arbitrary nor irrational and there 

was no enforcement action taken in conformance with it. Appellate Docket, ECF No. 7 at 26-27. 

They also argued all of plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 60-63. 

 On November 20, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part 

the district court’s orders. It declined to consider plaintiff’s equal protection claim because it was 

raised for the first time on appeal; it affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1985 claim and the 

grant of summary judgment on the Takings Clause claim. It reversed, however, on the procedural 

due process claim because plaintiff had not alleged a random deprivation, which could be 

addressed through post-deprivation remedies, but rather said defendants had deprived him of a 

vested property interest under established state law procedures, which required them to make a 

pre-deprivation procedure available. It also reversed the grant of summary judgment on the 

substantive due process claim because plaintiff had “raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to 

whether defendants acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner when they invalidated a vested 

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property interest due to political or other considerations.” District Court Docket, Order, ECF 

No. 139. The mandate issued on April 15, 2013. ECF No. 139. 

 On June 18, 2013, counsel appeared for plaintiff and the magistrate judge referred 

the case to the district court. Notice of Appearance, Order, ECF Nos. 144-147, 149. 

 Thereafter the then-assigned district judge issued a new scheduling order, allowing 

the parties to file dispositive motions on issues not previously addressed by the district court or 

the Ninth Circuit. Order, ECF No. 154. 

 On February 3, 2014, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of defendants Larry 

Allen, Pete Knoll, Brian McDermott, and Don Langford. ECF No. 169. 

 Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on March 14, 2014. 

Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 174. On April 9, 2014, plaintiff filed his opposition, as well as a 

request for judicial notice, evidentiary materials, and a response to defendants’ statement of 

undisputed facts. Opp’n, Request for Judicial Notice, ECF Nos. 178-181. On April 15, 2014, 

defendants filed a reply and objected to plaintiff’s response to defendants’ statement of 

undisputed facts. Reply, ECF No. 182. 

 At hearing on the motion, plaintiff confirmed that any claims related to the 

defendants’ actions in connection with the 2001 action against plaintiff are not part of the suit, but 

do provide background to the instant claims. 

II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 A court will grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The “threshold inquiry” is whether “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).1

 

///// 

 1 Rule 56 was amended, effective December 1, 2010. However, it is appropriate to rely on 

cases decided before the amendment took effect, as “[t]he standard for granting summary 

judgment remains unchanged.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Notes of Advisory Comm. on 2010 

amendments.

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 The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the district court “that there 

is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, which “must establish 

that there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). In carrying their burdens, both parties must “cit[e] to particular 

parts of materials in the record . . .; or show [] that the materials cited do not establish the absence 

or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“[the 

nonmoving party] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts”). Moreover, “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact . . . 

. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in 

original). 

 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all inferences and 

views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 

587-88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008). “Where the record taken as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine 

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. 

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 

 A court may consider evidence as long as it is “admissible at trial.” Fraser v. 

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). “Admissibility at trial” depends not on the 

evidence’s form, but on its content. Block v. City of L.A., 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). The party seeking admission of evidence “bears the 

burden of proof of admissibility.” Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2002). If the opposing party objects to the proposed evidence, the party seeking admission must 

direct the district court to “authenticating documents, deposition testimony bearing on attribution, 

hearsay exceptions and exemptions, or other evidentiary principles under which the evidence in 

question could be deemed admissible . . . .” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 385-86 

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(9th Cir. 2010). However, courts are sometimes “much more lenient” with the affidavits and 

documents of the party opposing summary judgment. Scharf v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 597 F.2d 1240, 

1243 (9th Cir. 1979). 

III. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS 

 A. Request for Judicial Notice 

 Plaintiff has asked the court to take judicial notice of a number of documents from 

Swenson v. County of Siskiyou, Siskiyou County Superior Court No. SCCVCV 05-222: the 

decision issued May 15, 2007; the complaint for declaratory relief; the judgment filed July 20, 

2007; the second amended complaint; the County of Siskiyou’s demurrer; the opposition to the 

demurrer; and the reply to the opposition to the demurrer. Defendants do not object to the request 

to take judicial notice of the Superior Court’s order, the judgment, and the Second Amended 

Complaint, as judicial notice was previously taken of these items. ECF No. 182 at 2. This 

request is granted. Fed. R. Evid. 201; Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“We may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents 

on file in federal or state courts.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

B. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts 

 After the Ninth Circuit issued the mandate in this case, the then-assigned district 

judge issued a scheduling order providing “all dispositive motions, not previously addressed by 

this Court or the Ninth Circuit Court of appeals [sic] shall be filed by April 9, 2014.” ECF 

No. 154 at 2 (emphasis in original). Defendants filed their motion, relying chiefly on the 

Statement of Undisputed Facts and the evidence filed in connection with their original motion 

filed July 9, 2010. See ECF Nos. 74-1 to 84. Plaintiff opposed the motion and responded to 

defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. ECF No. 181. Defendants ask the court to strike this 

response, arguing plaintiff is bound by his objection to the Statement of Undisputed Facts filed 

October 4, 2010, ECF No. 110. See ECF No. 182 at 1. They argue plaintiff is attempting to 

reopen summary judgment, on which the court was only partially reversed. Id. at 2. 

 The renewed scheduling order, issued after the case was returned from the Ninth 

Circuit, did not limit the parties to the factual statements submitted with the initial motion for 

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summary judgment. Defendants’ choice to rely on their previous submissions does not bind 

plaintiff. The court declines to strike plaintiff’s response to defendants’ statement of undisputed 

facts. 

IV. UNDISPUTED FACTS 

 As noted, defendants have relied on the Statement of Undisputed Facts they 

prepared in connection with the original motion for summary judgment. The court does not 

address facts related to issues foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s order. 

 On August 3, 1966, C.O. Palmer applied for a use permit, listing the proposed uses 

on two separate lines: “install and operate an asphalt hot plant” and on the next line “to 

manufacture aggregate + asphalt paving products.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed 

Facts, ECF No. 181 ¶¶ 1, 5; Compl., Ex. 2; ECF No. 1 at 15. The Siskiyou County Planning 

Commission issued the Use Permit granting the application to “install and operate an asphalt hot 

plant, as per his application.” Id. Swenson and his wife Therese bought the 14.5 acre property in 

September 1994. ECF No. 181 ¶¶ 2-3; Dep. of Stanley Swenson 6:25-7:3. Swenson has never 

installed nor operated an asphalt hot plant, though there was one on the property in the 1980s. 

ECF No. 181 ¶¶ 13, 15; Swenson Dep. at 25:8-26:8. In 1995, Swenson requested the property be 

zoned to an M-M Zone, Light Industrial. ECF No. 181 ¶ 16; Swenson Dep. 24:19-25:1; Decl. of 

Wendy Winningham & Exs. J & K. This zoning designation remains in effect. ECF No. 181 

¶ 59.7; Decl. of Greg Plucker, ECF No. 74-13 ¶ 4. 

 In 2000, Swenson permitted the County of Siskiyou (County) to undertake surface 

mining on his property as part of the County’s operations on its adjacent property. ECF No. 181 

¶¶ 8, 11; Swenson Dep. at 14:15-15:2; Decl. of Scott Sumner ¶¶ 3-5, 8-9. The County removed 

approximately 4,860 tons of rock from Swenson’s property and processed it in a crusher on 

County property. Id. This project arose from the County’s determination to reclaim its gravel pit 

adjacent to Swenson’s property. ECF No. 181 ¶ 60; Sumner Decl. ¶¶ 3-5. 

 In 2002, plaintiff discovered the 1966 use permit. Second Dep. of Stanley 

Swenson at 7:19-8:5, ECF No. 178-1. On December 10 and 12, 2002, Darrin Mercier, Swenson’s 

lawyer, wrote to Director of the Siskiyou County Planning Department advising that his clients 

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were moving forward with a business plan consistent with the use permit and asking for 

notification of the basis for any claim that the operation would be unlawful. ECF No. 181 ¶ 17; 

Comp. ¶ 13 & Ex. 3; Decl. of Philip B. Price & Ex. U (Requests for Admission) ¶¶ 1 & 2. Wayne 

Virag responded to Mercier on February 13, 2003. ECF No. 181 ¶ 24 & Compl., Ex. 4. Virag 

reviewed the history of the property, referred to as the Campbell Quarry and Hot Plant, noting 

that the Board of Supervisors approved the closure of the quarry and the release of the 

reclamation bond in 1993, and stating “[t]his action terminated any entitlement to conduct surface 

mining operations on the site.” Id., ECF No. 1 at 18. Virag also noted that the property had not 

been used for asphalt hot plant purposes for some time and, under Siskiyou County ordinances, 

the failure to pursue such an operation, which had become a non-conforming use under the 

zoning change, constituted an abandonment. Id. 

 Mercier wrote to Virag, saying he believed there were no other administrative 

remedies to exhaust and he was planning to seek judicial review of the validity of the use permit. 

Compl., Ex. 5; ECF No. 1 at 20. Shortly thereafter, Mercier filed a declaratory relief action; after 

several demurrers were sustained, the action proceeded as an administrative mandamus action. 

ECF No. 181 ¶¶ 52, 54. 

 Although Virag had said “there was no clear avenue for administrative resolution,” 

id., Ex. 6; ECF No. 1 at 21, staff of the Planning Department initiated an appeal of Virag’s letter 

to the Planning Commission, sometime after the letter. ECF No. 181 ¶ 46.2

 After a public 

hearing in May 2005, the Planning Commission approved the Virag letter of February 13, 2003. 

ECF No. 181 ¶¶ 47, 90; Decl. of Don Langford, ECF No. 74-18 ¶¶ 2-3; Dep. of Wayne Virag at 

18:5-9. Jeff Fowle, Ron Stevens, Mike McMahon and Chris Lazaris, members of the Planning 

Commission, heard this staff-initiated appeal. ECF No. 181 ¶ 90; Decl. of Jeff Fowle ¶¶ 1-6; 

Decl. of Ron Stevens ¶¶ 1-6; Decl. of Mike McMahon ¶¶ 1-6; Decl. of Chris Lazaris ¶¶ 1-6. 

///// 

 2 Plaintiff disputes defendants’ characterization that “Swenson’s administrative remedies 

should be exhausted before legal action,” but does not otherwise dispute the fact that planning 

staff initiated the appeal. The court declines to find defendants’ legal conclusion to be a proper 

part of a statement of undisputed facts. 

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 The Board of Supervisors upheld Virag’s determination after a hearing. ECF 

No. 181 ¶¶ 49-50; Virag Dep. at 8:10-15; Swenson Dep. 33: 4-13. Defendants LaVada Erickson, 

Marcia Armstrong, Bill Hoy and Jim Cook were Supervisors of Siskiyou County and heard 

Swenson’s appeal from the Planning Commission’s decision. ECF No. 181 ¶ 72; Decl. of Marcia 

Armstrong ¶¶ 4-10; Decl. of Jim Cook ¶¶ 4-10; Decl. of Bill Hoy ¶¶ 1-6; Decl. of LaVada 

Erickson ¶¶ 1-6. 

 In May 2007, the Siskiyou County Superior Court ruled in plaintiff’s favor in his 

administrative mandamus action; judgment was entered in June. ECF No. 181 ¶ 56; Swenson 

Dep. 38:10-24, Exs. G & H. 

V. ANALYSIS 

 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment contains a twenty-item outline, with 

many sub-items as well, of the issues they believe remain for adjudication after the Ninth 

Circuit’s remand to this court. ECF No. 174. Their supporting memorandum of points and 

authorities does not track their list of issues nor does it address each of the twenty-plus points 

raised in the motion itself. Defendants argue broadly that claim two, which the presiding courts 

have interpreted as alleging the procedural and substantive due process claims against the 

individual defendants, did not survive the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, the 

district court order and the Ninth Circuit’s order; that in any event, the individual defendants are 

entitled to qualified immunity; the defendants are entitled to summary adjudication of the 

procedural due process issue because Virag’s letter was an opinion, not a decision on plaintiff’s 

vested right; to the extent there is a disputed issue of fact on the substantive due process issue, it 

relates only to plaintiff’s right to operate an asphalt hot plant, not to conduct surface mining; 

plaintiff has not established the County’s liability under a Monell theory; and the entire action is 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

 Plaintiff counters that several of defendants’ issues may not be relitigated as they 

were addressed in the Ninth Circuit’s order; that the procedural due process issue was resolved by 

the Siskiyou County Superior Court, an order with preclusive effect; and that plaintiff’s vested 

rights under the use permit include the right to conduct surface mining. 

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 At the hearing on the motion, the parties clarified there are two issues before this 

court: a substantive due process issue based on interference with plaintiff’s vested property right 

and a procedural due process claim arising from the entire hearing process. 

A. Law of the Case 

 “‘Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, a court is ordinarily precluded from 

reexamining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher court, in the same case.’” 

United States v. Jingles, 702 F.3d 494, 499 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Richardson v. United States, 

841 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1988)). Although the doctrine does not apply to “issues or claims that 

were not actually decided,” Mortimer v. Baca, 594 F.3d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2010), it applies to 

issues actually decided, “explicitly or by necessary implication.” Snow-Erlin v. United States, 

470 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 2006). “A prior ruling need not be expressly made, or discussed in 

any detail to serve as law of the case; decisions that are implicit, or terse, will suffice.” 

Garamendi v. Altus Fin. S.A., 282 F.R.D. 270, 273 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Bernhardt v. Los 

Angeles Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2003). In evaluating whether a court has decided an 

issue by necessary implication, the court may consider the parties’ briefing. Snow-Erlin, 470 

F.3d at 807. 

 There are three exceptions to the doctrine: “(1) the decision is clearly erroneous 

and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes 

reconsideration appropriate, or (3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent 

trial.” Mortimer, 594 F.3d at 721. Defendants have not argued any of the exceptions apply: 

there is no suggestion in their motion that the Ninth Circuit’s order has been undermined by a 

change in the law or that it is clearly erroneous. In addition, they have relied on the evidentiary 

record before this court in 2010 and the Ninth Circuit thereafter and so have not shown 

substantially different evidence undercuts the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Accordingly, this court 

considers the application of the law of the case doctrine to the issues raised here. 

 1. The Statute of Limitations 

 Defendants argue the entire action is barred by the statute of limitations as 

plaintiff’s claims accrued at the latest in 2005, when the Board of Supervisors approved Virag’s 

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letter. ECF No. 174-1 at 15. Plaintiff says this argument is foreclosed by law of the case. ECF 

No. 180 at 18-20. 

 Defendants’ opposition brief filed in the Ninth Circuit made the same arguments 

they are raising here. Compare Appellate Docket, ECF No. 7 at 60-64 (“The Board of 

Supervisors’ hearing, and their denial of the appeal thereby upholding the opinion of the Assistant 

Planning Director, occurred on May 24, 2005. . . . There is no other or later act of Siskiyou 

County alleged in the Complaint. All of this was more than 3 years prior to the filing of the 

Complaint . . . .”) with ECF No. 174-1 at 15 (“The Board of Supervisors’ hearing, and their denial 

of the appeal thereby upholding the opinion of the Assistant Planning Director, occurred on 

May 24, 2005. . . . There is no other or later act of Siskiyou County alleged in the Complaint. All 

of this was more than 3 years prior to the filing of the Complaint . . . .”). 

 It is true the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly address the statute of limitations 

argument, but it nevertheless found a disputed issue of fact on the substantive due process issue 

and reversed the dismissal of the procedural due process issue. Had the Court of Appeals agreed 

with defendants’ statute of limitations argument, it would not have addressed the merits of these 

two claims. Accordingly, the issue was necessarily decided by implication and cannot be 

addressed through this motion. 

 2. Claim Two 

 Defendants contend the effect of the magistrate judge’s findings and 

recommendations, ECF No. 27, and the district court’s order, ECF No. 32, is that plaintiff’s 

second claim against the individual defendants was dismissed, a determination not reversed by 

the Ninth Circuit. ECF No. 174-1 at 15. They ask for “a definitive order dismissing the Second 

Claim.” Id. at 16. Plaintiff responds that this argument also is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s 

order. ECF No. 180 at 26-27. 

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 The Ninth Circuit reversed two of the district court’s determinations: 

[D]ismissal of Swenson’s procedural due process claim was 

improper because Swenson did not allege a random and 

unauthorized deprivation of property. Rather Swenson alleged that 

defendants deprived him of a vested property interest under 

established state procedures, which made it possible for them to 

both foresee the deprivation and provide pre-deprivation due 

process. 

Summary judgment on Swenson’s substantive due process claim 

was also improper because, viewing the evidence most favorably to 

Swenson, he raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

the defendants acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner when they 

invalidated a vested property interest due to political or other 

considerations. 

ECF No. 139 at 3-4 (citations omitted; emphases added). The Ninth Circuit thus necessarily 

decided that claim two against the individual defendants survived. 

 The individual defendants also argue they are entitled to immunity, an argument 

addressed below. 

 3. Substantive Due Process 

 Defendants assert plaintiff did not have a vested right to install and operate an 

asphalt hot plant and, even if he did, Virag’s letter did not arbitrarily and irrationally deprive 

plaintiff of a vested right. ECF No. 174 at 2, 17-23. Plaintiff does not specifically raise law of 

the case, but argues relitigation of this issue is precluded by the Siskiyou County Superior Court’s 

order. 

 As noted above, the Ninth Circuit explicitly said plaintiff had raised an issue of 

disputed fact whether defendants acted arbitrarily in invalidating his vested property interest. 

ECF No. 139 at 4. Defendants have presented no additional evidence on the question and so 

cannot rely on any of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. Accordingly, defendants 

cannot now argue they have demonstrated the absence of an issue of fact on the question of 

plaintiff’s vested property right. However, plaintiff has presented the superior court’s order, 

which was mentioned only obliquely in the Ninth Circuit briefing. Plaintiffs argue that the 

court’s finding that plaintiff has a vested right under the use permit is entitled to preclusive effect. 

ECF No. 180 at 13-16 (“Defendants are thus precluded from seeking a determination as to 

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whether or not Mr. Swenson has a vested property right, as it has already been decided.”) 

(footnote omitted). 

 The Ninth Circuit said that plaintiff had “raised a genuine dispute of material fact 

as to whether the defendants acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner when they invalidated a 

vested property interest due to political or other considerations.” ECF No. 139 at 4. This phrase 

is not the clearest: does it mean there is a disputed issue of fact as to both the arbitrary and 

irrational nature of the Virag letter and the vested nature of plaintiff’s right, or just a dispute as to 

the arbitrary and irrational nature of the letter? This court interprets it as a ruling that there are 

disputed issues as to both. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit explicitly considered whether plaintiff 

had raised an issue of disputed fact on the arbitrary nature of the Virag letter and on the question 

of plaintiff’s vested right; this court cannot now resolve the issue in defendants’ favor on this 

motion. The parties do present differing views on the scope of the use permit, an issue discussed 

below. 

B. Issue Preclusion 

 Plaintiff argues that the Siskiyou County Superior Court has already decided he 

has vested rights, a determination entitled to preclusive effect in this case. However, plaintiff has 

raised this issue only in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment rather than 

seeking a ruling in a separate motion. As noted, the Ninth Circuit found there were disputed 

issues of fact on the issue. Had plaintiff sought a different determination based on an expanded 

record, it was his obligation to seek a ruling on the question. The court will not consider this 

argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (“A request for a court order must be made by motion.”); 

Mortensen v. Nevens, No. 2:10–cv–02263–KJD, 2011 WL 772885, at *1 (D. Nev. Feb. 25, 2011) 

(citing the rule, stating that a request for a court order must be made by motion). 

C. The Scope of the Vested Right 

 The use permit at issue is a typed application for the permit, filled in by hand, and 

approved by the Siskiyou County Planning Commission. ECF No. 1 at 15. Palmer sought a use 

permit to “install and operate an asphalt hot plant.” This is followed on the next line, not 

separated by punctuation, by a request “to manufacture aggregate & asphalt paving products[.]” 

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The Commission “granted a Use Permit to C.O. Palmer, Jr. to install and operate an Asphalt Hot 

Plant, as per his application.” Id. 

 Plaintiff argues that in addition to a vested right to operate an asphalt batch plant 

on his property, the use permit included a right to conduct surface mining. ECF No. 26. He has 

presented evidence from Greg Plucker, the former Deputy Director of Planning for the County, 

who says that manufacturing asphalt might include surface mining to get the raw material. Decl. 

of Therese Cannata, Ex. 5, Dep. of Greg Plucker, ECF No. 178-1 at 22:8-20. He has also 

presented testimony from Jeff Fowle, who said that one “could use a surface quarry to 

manufacture aggregate.” Cannata Decl., Ex. 1, Dep. of Jeffrey Fowle, ECF No. 178-1, at 

4:18-20. 

 Defendants argue the interpretation of the permit is a question of law and that the 

language of the permit cannot be read broadly to encompass surface mining. ECF No. 174-1 at 

14. At hearing, plaintiff argued this is a question of fact, but has cited nothing other than the 

permit itself in support of this argument. Neither side has cited any law on the interpretation of a 

vague or ambiguous permit. 

 “[R]ights which may ‘vest’ through reliance on a government permit are no greater 

than those specifically granted by the permit itself.” Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control 

Bd. of Santa Monica, 35 Cal.3d 858, 866 (1984). Interpretation of a written instrument is a 

question of law unless interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence. Fireman’s 

Fund Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 189 Cal. App. 4th 101, 110 (2010) (interpreting 

insurance contracts). An “instrument” is a “written legal document that defines rights, duties, 

entitlements, or liabilities” and embraces “‘any written or printed document that may have to be 

interpreted by the Courts.’” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (quoting Edwin Beal, 

Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation 55 (A.E. Randall ed., 3d ed. 1924)). A use permit is a 

license, defining the holder’s entitlement to undertake certain activities. Id. (defining “permit” as 

“A certificate evidencing permission; a license”). As plaintiff has not suggested his interpretation 

turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence, the interpretation of the use permit is for the court. 

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 The Planning Commission gave Palmer permission to “install and operate an 

Asphalt Hot Plant as per his application.” ECF No. 174-1 at 15. Although it did not expressly 

incorporate language regarding the manufacture of aggregate, it referenced Palmer’s application, 

which had included such a request. Moreover, plaintiff has presented evidence that there is a 

relationship between surface mining and the manufacture of asphalt. See also Road Science, LLC 

v. Telfer Oil Co., No. CIV S–10–0786 KJM GGH, 2012 WL 1739817, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 

2012) (noting the connection between aggregate and asphalt). Here, the permit’s use of the 

shorthand phrase “as per,” in other words “in accordance with,” the application, can be read to 

include authorization to manufacture aggregate. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 

Because the evidence is disputed as to what Palmer was requesting, and thus what the permit 

granted, the court declines to grant summary judgment. Even though the scope of the permit 

appears to be a question of law, a jury can render a special verdict on the factual questions 

surrounding the parties’ intentions, and the court anticipates eliciting such a special verdict at 

trial. 

D. Procedural Due Process 

 The parties do not dispute that “an adjudicative governmental action that 

implicates a significant or substantial property deprivation generally requires the procedural due 

process standards of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.” Calvert v. Cnty. of Yuba., 

145 Cal. App. 4th 613, 622 (2007); see Tri Cnty. Paving, Inc. v. Ashe Cnty., 281 F.3d 430, 436 

(4th Cir. 2002) (procedural due process claim has three elements: (1) a property interest; 

(2) deprivation of that interest by the government; and (3) without due process of law, which 

generally means without prior notice and opportunity for hearing). 

 They disagree whether Virag’s letter addressed the validity of the use permit, such 

that it should have been preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard. Defendants argue the 

letter made no factual determinations, but rather was only an opinion. They also argue plaintiff 

received procedural due process at the subsequent proceedings before the Planning Commission 

and the Board of Supervisors. ECF No. 174-1 at 23. Plaintiff argues the entire course of 

proceedings in the County, beginning with the Virag letter and continuing through the hearing 

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before the Board of Supervisors, are part of his procedural due process claims. At hearing, 

plaintiff emphasized things he characterized as procedural irregularities: he did not appeal 

Virag’s letter, but two years later, County personnel pursued an appeal, pushing it through the 

various County levels before the superior court acted on his pending administrative mandamus 

proceedings. The court need not examine the entire course of proceedings, as it concludes there 

are disputed issues about the impact of Virag’s letter which, coupled with the admitted lack of an 

opportunity to be heard, preclude summary judgment on the procedural due process issue as 

framed by defendants in their motion. 

 Virag’s letter responds to plaintiff’s claim that “the entitlements for the quarry 

and/or batch plant remain valid absent affirmative action by the County . . . .” and provides a 

“rationale for [his] determination” that plaintiff no longer had such an entitlement. He concluded 

that in light of a zoning change, the operation of an asphalt plant on the site was a nonconforming use, which could be and was extinguished because it was discontinued. ECF No. 1 at 

18-19. Virag explains his “conclusions” and the rationale for his “determination” that any use 

authorized by the permit had been “extinguished.” ECF No. 178-1 at 28. In addition, the later 

administrative proceedings before the Board of Supervisors were denominated “[p]ublic hearing 

to consider an appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision to uphold the Planning Director’s 

administrative decision regarding the status of a Use Permit . . . .” Decl. of Wendy Winningham, 

Ex. 2, ECF No. 174-2 at 6. Virag’s language and the parties’ recognition of the letter as a 

decision defeats defendants’ argument. 

E. Immunity and the Individual Defendants 

 1. Absolute Immunity 

 Defendants argue they are absolutely immune because they were acting in a quasijudicial capacity while hearing the appeals of Virag’s letters. ECF No. 174-1 at 25-26. Plaintiffs 

contend defendants have not borne their burden of demonstrating their entitlement to immunity. 

 The party seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing his entitlement 

to such protection. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). “Quasi-judicial 

immunity is extended to nonjudicial officers only where they ‘perform official duties that are 

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functionally comparable to those of judges, i.e., duties that involve the exercise of discretion in 

resolving disputes.” Id. at 433 n.8; see also Mischler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The Ninth Circuit has identified six factors for a court to consider in determining whether a 

particular defendant is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity: (1) the need to assure that the 

individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (2) the presence of 

safeguards that reduce the need for lawsuits as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; 

(3) insulation from political influence; (4) the importance of precedent; (5) the adversary nature 

of the process; and (6) the correctability of the error on appeal. Buckwalter v. Nev. Bd. of Med. 

Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 California courts have said that “[i]n determining that a permit, validly issued, 

should be revoked, the governing body of a municipality acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.” 

Korean-American Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. App. 4th 376, 393 n.5 

(1994) (internal quotation & citation omitted). The court, however, was not considering an 

immunity issue such as presented here, but rather was defining the due process rights attaching to 

any revocation proceedings. See Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 

2d. 776, 795 (1948). 

 Defendants have neither acknowledged nor addressed the Ninth Circuit’s factors; 

the court declines to undertake the analysis they should have undertaken in the first instance. 

Moreover, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s determination there is a disputed issue of fact on the 

question of whether actions were taken because of improper influences, it is unlikely they could 

succeed on this claim. See G & H Dev, LLC v. Penwell, 9 F. Supp. 2d 658, 668 (W.D. La. 2014) 

(allegations Planning Commission was politically motivated suggested members were not 

insulated from harassment or intimidation and were not insulated from political influence). They 

have not borne their burden of showing entitlement to quasi-judicial immunity. 

 2. Qualified Immunity 

 Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded 

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. 

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Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When a defendant raises qualified immunity, “a ruling on 

that issue should be made early in the proceedings. . . .” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 

S.Ct. 2151 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 

(2009). In making the ruling, the court resolves all factual issues in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 

201. 

 In determining whether a governmental officer is immune from suit based on the 

doctrine of qualified immunity, the court generally considers two questions. The district court 

may decide the order of addressing these questions and answer only the second, in accordance 

with fairness and efficiency and in light of the circumstances of a particular case. Pearson, 

555 U.S. at 236. The first, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, is do 

the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 

201. A negative answer ends the analysis, with qualified immunity protecting defendant from 

liability. Id. If a constitutional violation occurred, a court also inquires “whether the right was 

clearly established.” Id. “If the law did not put the [defendant] on notice that [his] conduct 

would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.” Id. 

at 202. A right is clearly established if “the state of law at the time gives officials fair warning 

that their conduct is unconstitutional.” Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th 

Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “the qualified immunity inquiry must be 

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 

(2004). 

 As noted, there are disputed issues of fact on plaintiff’s procedural and substantive 

due process rights. Moreover, it is settled law that a deprivation of a property interest must be 

preceded by notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-79 

(1975), and that deprivation of a property right for improper purposes violates substantive due 

process. Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1508 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. 

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F. Monell and the County Defendants 

 “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely 

by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . 

inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To establish municipal liability under Monell, a 

plaintiff must prove “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was 

deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force 

behind the constitutional violation.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 

2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied. 133 S.Ct. 1725 (2013). “Official . . . 

policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, 

and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick v. 

Thompson, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (citations omitted). Monell liability may 

stem from an action taken “by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy 

with respect to the subject matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 

(1986). Accordingly, “a municipality may be held liable under § 1983 for a single decision by its 

properly constituted legislative body.” Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Furthermore, “if authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it,” 

the actions of a non-policymaker may constitute an official policy as a result of the ratification. 

Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2004); Frary v. Cnty. of Marin, No. C 12–3928 MEJ, 

2012 WL 6218196, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012). 

 Disputed issues of fact preclude summary judgment on the question of Monell

liability: evidence in the record shows the County, through the Planning Commission and the 

Board of Supervisors, endorsed Virag’s letter and its issuance even though it was issued without 

providing an opportunity for plaintiff to weigh in. Defendants are not entitled to summary 

judgment. 

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G. Election of Remedies 

 Defendants make a single-sentence argument that plaintiff is barred from seeking 

damages by the doctrine of election of remedies. This is insufficient to warrant the court’s 

attention. Cyntegra, Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 322 F. App’x. 569, 572 (9th Cir. 2009) (refusing 

to consider an argument raised in a single conclusory sentence). 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 

DENIED. 

DATED: November 14, 2014. 

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