Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01901/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01901-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GURMIT SINGH, aka )

Manjeet Singh, )

Agency No. A72-691-014 & )

Agency No. A72-482-782 )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 08-01901 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

CHRIS VASQUEZ, KATRINA KANE, ) 

JULIE L. MEYERS, JONATHAN )

SCHARFEN, MICHAEL CHERTOFF, )

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, )

 ) 

Respondents. )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

Mr. Gurmit Singh (“Petitioner), who is represented by

counsel in this matter, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 16, 2008. On

October 23, 2008, the Court ordered Respondents to answer the

petition within 20 days of service. See Docket No. 6.

Respondents were instructed not to file a motion to dismiss the

petition rather than an answer to the petition without first

receiving leave of the Court to do so. See id.

On November 29, 2008, Respondents lodged a Motion to

Dismiss the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint

for Declaratory Judgment, and filed a motion seeking permission

to file a motion to dismiss rather than an answer to the

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petition on December 1, 2008. See Docket No. 18 & Docket No.

21. The motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss was

granted. See Docket No. 22. Petitioner filed a response in

opposition to the motion to dismiss on January 3, 2009. See

Docket No. 24 (“Response”). Respondents filed a reply in

support of their motion on January 9, 2009. See Docket No. 25.

I. Relevant terms and statutory and regulatory regime

The “entry fiction” of United States immigration law

provides that a non-citizen individual has not “entered” the

United States unless and until they have been inspected by

federal immigration officials and officially allowed into the

United States, notwithstanding the non-citizen’s actual physical

presence within the geographical boundaries of the country. The

non-citizen may be allowed into the United States from a port of

entry without having “entered” the United States, via a grant of

parole. See, e.g., Allison Miller, Lock Them Up and Throw Away

the Key, 52 Wayne L. Rev. 1503 (2006); Allison Wexler, The Murky

Depths of the Entry Fiction Doctrine, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 2029

(2004).

 A “paroled” alien is one who is temporarily permitted

to remain in the United States pending a decision on an

application for their formal admission. See 8 U.S.C. §

1182(d)(5) (2005 & Supp. 2008). Although a paroled alien is

“given liberty to roam the country,” the alien is considered

legally detained at the border within the custody of the

relevant federal agency as it determines the alien’s immigration

status. Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 207 F. Supp. 2d 326, 328 (D.N.J.

2002). In the context of whether a paroled alien has “entered”

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1

The distinction between an alien who has effected

an entry into the United States and one who has

never entered runs throughout immigration law.

[]. It is well established that certain

constitutional protections available to persons

inside the United States are unavailable to

aliens outside of our geographic borders. []. But

once an alien enters the country, the legal

circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause

applies to all “persons” within the United

States, including aliens, whether their presence

here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or

permanent.

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the United States, “[parole] amounts to permission by the

Attorney General for ingress into the country but is not a

formal ‘admission’” under the Immigration and Naturalization Act

(“INA”).” Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 392 (3d Cir. 1999)

(citations omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2005 &

Supp. 2008). Accordingly, pursuant to the entry fiction

doctrine, an alien within the United States who is there by

means of parole has not “entered” the United States.

The distinction between aliens who have “entered” the

country and those who have not is significant because aliens who

have entered the country are entitled to procedural due process,

whereas aliens who may be physically within the country but who

are requesting admission to the United States (including paroled

and inadmissible aliens) must be content with “whatever process

Congress has authorized” with regard to their immigration

proceedings and any resulting loss of their liberty. See

Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003). See

also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2500

(2001).1

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2 “Asylum is a two-step process, requiring the applicant

first to establish his eligibility for asylum by demonstrating that

he meets the statutory definition of a ‘refugee,’ and second to show

that he is entitled to asylum as a matter of discretion...”

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 Federal statutes limit the Attorney General’s authority

to parole a refugee into the United States rather than admitting

them as a refugee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B) (2005 & Supp.

2008). An immigrant is a “refugee” if they are unwilling or

unable to return to their native country because of persecution

or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,

or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2005 & Supp.

2008); Karapetyan v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir.

2008). The Attorney General is authorized, in his discretion,

to confer a grant of asylum upon a refugee. See 8 U.S.C. §

1158(a) (2005 & Supp. 2008); Gulla v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911,

915 (9th Cir. 2007).2 An alien who is a refugee may apply for

either asylum or a restriction on their removal. See Wiransane

v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 2004) (“A grant of

asylum permits the alien to remain in this country; a

restriction on removal forbids removal of the alien to the

country where persecution may occur”).

A grant of asylum is provisional in nature and may be

terminated at the discretion of the Attorney General. See 8

U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (2005 & Supp. 2008) (providing that a grant

of asylum “does not convey a right to reside permanently in the

United States” and may be terminated); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404

F.3d 1207, 1229 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting the discretionary nature

of the Attorney General’s authority under section 1158). A

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grant of asylum is not equivalent to a finding that an immigrant

is entitled to the withholding of removal based on a wellfounded fear of persecution and requires a lesser showing than

that required for withholding of removal. See Delgado v.

Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1017, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2008) (Berzon, J.,

dissenting); Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir.

2007) (“an applicant who fails to qualify for asylum necessarily

fails to qualify for withholding of removal.”). 

 In 1993, when Petitioner first arrived in the United

States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) could

institute exclusion proceedings against an alien who had not

“entered” the United States. Exclusion proceedings were

ordinarily begun when an examining immigration officer at a port

of entry detained an arriving alien who was not entitled to

enter the United States because they did not have a valid visa

or passport. Generally, the alien was ordered to appear at a

hearing conducted before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). See 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1995). The IJ would determine whether the

alien was admissible, i.e., eligible for lawful immigrant or

non-immigrant status, whether the alien was excludable and

should be physically removed, and whether an excludable alien

might be entitled to relief from exclusion, inter alia, based on

their request for asylum. 

The Immigration and Nationality Act creates

two types of proceedings by which aliens may

be removed from the United States.

Deportation proceedings are used when aliens

have already entered the United States and

are sought to be removed. Exclusion

proceedings are employed when the alien has

not yet entered the country, but is detained

in effect at the border.[] Generally, an

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3 In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) eliminated the distinction between

“exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings, and replaced these two

types of proceedings with a single “removal” proceeding. See, e.g., Abebe v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 50120, at *14 n.2 (9th Cir.);

Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 687 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008). 

However, the “removal” procedures apply only to immigration

proceedings initiated on or after April 1, 1997. See Barapind v.

Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

“Excludable aliens” was the term used prior to

the enactment of IIRIRA to describe aliens who

were ineligible for admission or entry into the

United States. IIRIRA now refers to inadmissable

aliens in the place of excludable aliens. ... the

distinction now turns on whether an alien has

been ‘admitted’ to the United States, rather than

on whether the alien gained ‘entry.’

“Inadmissible” aliens therefore include aliens

who have not entered the United States (formerly

considered excludable) and those who, like

petitioners, entered illegally (formerly

deportable).

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Ashcroft, 272 F. Supp. 2d

650, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

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alien in deportation proceedings possesses

greater substantive rights than one in

exclusion proceedings.[].

An individual may obtain relief from a

deportation or exclusion decision by seeking

asylum pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158 or

withholding of deportation pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1253(h). An alien granted asylum

may not be deported absent revocation of that

status. While one as to whom deportation is

withheld may not be deported to a specific

country in which he would be persecuted, he

may still be deported to some other country

should one be found that will accept him.

See Pierre v. Rivkind, 825 F.2d 1501, 1504

(11th Cir. 1987).

Singh v. United States INS, 965 F. Supp. 724, 728 (D. Md. 1997)

(emphasis added).3

Federal immigration statutes provide that, if an asylum

officer who interviews an arriving alien who does not have a

proper visa determines that the alien has a credible fear of

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4

 Petitioner was deemed excludable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§

1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and 1182(a)(7)(b)(i)(I) and (II), because he did

not have valid traveling documents.

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persecution, the alien shall be detained for further

consideration of their application for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2005 & Supp. 2008). The Attorney General

can, and often does, release the alien on parole pending a

resolution of their application for asylum. See id.; id. §

1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2008).

II. Factual and procedural background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of India. See

Motion to Dismiss the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (“Motion to Dismiss”) (Docket

No. 18), Exh. A. While in India, Petitioner was an active

member of an organization which advocated for the creation of an

independent Sikh state within the territorial boundaries of

India. See Response (Docket No. 24) at 2. Petitioner alleges

that members of this organization, including Petitioner, were

arrested and beaten by police for their activities. Id.

On April 9, 1993, Petitioner came to the United States

from India, arriving at a port of entry at a New York area

airport on a British Airways flight. See Motion to Dismiss,

Exh. A & Exh. B. Upon his arrival in the United States

Petitioner told agents of the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (“INS”) that his name was Manjeet Singh and that his

date of birth was June 25, 1955. Id., Exh. A & Exh. B & Exh. D.

At that time, the INS detained Petitioner “at the border” as an

alien who was excludable from the United States. Id., Exh. B.4

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5 In 1993 this section provided:

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this

chapter, any immigrant at the time of application

for admission--

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Petitioner told the INS inspectors that he wished to apply for

political asylum in the United States, citing a fear of

persecution if he returned to India. Id., Exh. C & Response at

2. 

The same day Petitioner arrived and was detained at the

border the INS initiated exclusion proceedings against

Petitioner. Motion to Dismiss, Exh. E. The INS initiated those

proceedings by serving Petitioner with a “Form I-122”, charging

Petitioner with being excludable from the United States because

he did not possess a valid visa or traveling documents. See

id., Exh. B & Exh. E. The Form I-122 notified Petitioner that

an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) would hold a hearing to determine

whether or not Petitioner should be allowed to enter the United

States. Id., Exh. E. The Form I-122 notified Petitioner the

hearing would be held in New York on August 12, 1993. Id., Exh.

B & Exh. E. Petitioner was released, i.e., “paroled” into the

United States on April 9, 1993, and his presence in the United

States was classified as “deferred admission.” Id., Exh. D.

On August 12, 1993, an IJ held the noticed hearing in

New York, from which hearing Petitioner was absent. Id., Exh.

F. The IJ concluded Petitioner was excludable from the United

States pursuant to section 212 of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182. Id., Exh. F. At that time the IJ ordered Petitioner,

be excluded from and deported from the United States pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).5 Id., Exh. F

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(I) who is not in possession of a valid unexpired

immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing

identification card, or other valid entry

document required by this chapter, and a valid

unexpired passport, or other suitable travel

document, or document of identity and nationality

if such document is required under the

regulations issued by the Attorney General under

section 1181(a) of this title... is excludable.

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On May 25, 1993, approximately six weeks after his

arrival in New York but before the date of the IJ hearing from

which Petitioner was absent, Petitioner applied for asylum at an

INS office in San Francisco, California. Petitioner applied

using his real name, i.e., Gurmit Singh, and using his real

birth date of June 28, 1955. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner now

alleges that he did not appear for the IJ hearing because, upon

his release from INS custody in New York pending the hearing, he

was “still afraid and confused about his future in the United

States....” Response at 2. Accordingly, Petitioner “departed

New York for California” and filed his application for asylum

using his real name prior to the date set for the hearing in New

York regarding his excludability. 

On the asylum application filed in San Francisco on May

25, 1993, Petitioner asserted he entered the United States in

April of 1993 at San Ysidro, California. See Motion to Dismiss,

Exh. G. Petitioner alleged he had entered the United States

without inspection. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner further requested

asylum for his wife and four children. Id., Exh. G.

More than three years later, on October 15, 1996, the

San Francisco Asylum Office of the INS granted Petitioner’s

application for asylum, finding he had established a wellCase 2:08-cv-01901-MHM-MEA Document 26 Filed 02/05/09 Page 9 of 25
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6

 At least one federal court has concluded, in a completely

different context, that the issuance of a Form I-94 granting asylum

constitutes “admission” of the alien to the United States. See Tanov

v. I.N.S., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 443 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2006).

7 The undersigned notes Petitioner had not, at that time,

been deported or removed from the United States, nor had he been

excluded within the year previous to his application. 

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founded fear of persecution if he returned to India. Id., Exh.

G. On October 29, 1996, the INS informed Petitioner via a

letter that his application for asylum had been granted in

accordance with section 208 of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1158. Id., Exh. H. The notification included an “I-94”

document. Id., Exh. H.6 Petitioner was informed that he could

apply for adjustment of his alien status to that of a lawful

permanent resident, pursuant to section 209(b) of the INA,

codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1159, provided he remained physically

present in the United States until October 15, 1997. Id., Exh.

H.

Petitioner filed for an adjustment of status to that of

lawful permanent resident on February 20, 1998. Id., Exh. I.

The application for adjustment of status was filed in the name

Gurmit Singh and stated Petitioner’s date of birth as June 28,

1955. Id., Exh. I. The application averred Petitioner had

entered the United States “without inspection” in California.

Id., Exh. I. In response to the question “Have you ever been

deported from the U.S., or removed from the U.S. at government

expense, excluded within the past year, or are you now in

exclusion or deportation proceedings?”, Petitioner answered

“No.” Id., Exh. I.7 Petitioner also declared he had not by fraud

nor misrepresentation attempted to gain documentation, entry

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into the United States, or any other “benefit.” Id., Exh. I.

On May 13, 1999, Petitioner drafted a sworn document

“amending” his prior application for a change of status to

lawful permanent resident. Id., Exh. J. Petitioner informed

the INS that he had been subject to exclusion proceedings. Id.,

Exh. J. Petitioner admitted that, when he arrived in New York in

1993, he was apprehended by the INS and granted deferred

inspection. Id., Exh. J. 

Petitioner alleges that, on August 5, 1999, the INS

asked Petitioner to furnish the name and date of birth he used

at the time he entered the United States in April of 1993.

Response at 3. Petitioner alleges: “Said letter requesting

further information did not state or provide notice or warning

to Mr. Singh that his asylum status could be affected in any way

by information regarding his exclusion proceedings.” Id. at 3.

Through his then-counsel, Petitioner supplied the required

information regarding his attempted 1993 entry in New York. Id.

On October 13, 1999, the INS rescinded the grant of

asylum afforded Petitioner. See Motion to Dismiss, Exh. K. The

INS informed Petitioner via a letter that, because Petitioner

had filed his California asylum application under a different

name than the one used when arriving in New York, the INS did

not realize Petitioner had been ordered excluded when it granted

him asylum. Id., Exh. K. The letter notified Petitioner that,

because immigration judges have “exclusive jurisdiction over

asylum applications filed by an alien who has been served [with

a] ... Form I-122 ...,” Petitioner’s asylum status was revoked

as improperly granted. Id., Exh. K. 

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The INS correspondence to Petitioner concluded: 

The INS did not have jurisdiction over your

asylum application, because you were placed

in exclusion proceedings on April 9, 1993.

Therefore, the decision to grant your asylum

is rescinded as of October 13, 1999 ... You

may pursue your request for asylum before the

Executive Office for Immigration Review

(“EOIR”).

Id., Exh. K.

The undersigned notes that Petitioner did not,

apparently, seek to challenge the rescission of asylum on any

basis prior to filing this habeas petition.

On January 13, 2000, the INS sent Petitioner a “Form

I-166,” informing him that he was to be removed from the United

States pursuant to the 1993 order of exclusion. See id., Exh.

L. The form notified Petitioner that arrangements had been made

for his removal and instructed him to appear at an immigration

office on February 9, 2000. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner failed to

appear at the time and place noticed in the Form I-166.

On April 10, 2000, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen

his exclusion proceedings with the Executive Office for

Immigration Review (“EIOR”). Id., Exh. M. Petitioner asked

the EOIR to reopen his exclusion proceedings and also sought a

change of venue from New York. See id., Exh. M. Petitioner

alleged that “extreme and exceptional circumstances,”

specifically the medical ailments of cramps and high fever, had

prevented his appearance at the exclusion hearing before the

immigration judge in 1993. Id., Exh. M. The INS responded to

the motion to reopen on August 29, 2000, arguing that Petitioner

had failed to show reasonable cause for failing to appear for

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his exclusion hearing in 1993. See id., Exh. N. The motion to

reopen was denied on November 1, 2000. Id., Exh. P.

Petitioner sought review of the denial of his motion to

reopen his removal proceedings by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”). Id., Exh. O. The BIA dismissed the appeal in

a decision issued February 5, 2001. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner

sought reconsideration of this decision, which was denied by the

BIA on March 28, 2001. Id., Exh. P.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen and Request for

Stay of Exclusion and Deportation with the BIA on August 16,

2005. See id., Exh. Q. Petitioner sought to re-apply for

asylum and also sought to stay his removal, citing 8 C.F.R. §

1003.2. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner acknowledged, however, that

his motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day limit for

filing motions to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. Id., Exh. Q.

On March 12, 2007, the BIA dismissed Petitioner’s motion to

reopen. See id., Exh. S.

Petitioner sought review of the denial of his motion to

reopen his immigration proceedings by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit. See id., Exh. T. On December

13, 2007, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the

petition for review. See id., Exh. T. In its opinion the

Second Circuit presumed that Petitioner was in exclusion

proceedings, rather than removal proceedings, and determined

that Petitioner’s motion to reopen his exclusion proceedings was

time-barred. See id., Exh. T.

On or about September 23, 2008, the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”), and Immigration and Customs

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8

 The border enforcement functions of the Immigration and

Naturalization Service were transferred to the Department of Homeland

Security, and to some extent the Immigration and Customs Enforcement

agency, on March 1, 2003. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L.

No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.

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Enforcement (“ICE”), successor agencies to the INS, located

Petitioner in Modesto, California. See id., Exh. A.8 Petitioner

was arrested on an immigration warrant for his failure to leave

the United States when ordered to leave in 2000, and taken into

ICE custody. Id., Exh. A. Citing the order of exclusion issued

in 1993, Petitioner was deemed subject to a final order of

removal. Id., Exh. A. 

On September 29, 2008, and again on October 7, 2008,

shortly after Petitioner was taken into ICE custody, the DHS

sent letters to the India Consulate requesting travel documents

for Petitioner. Id., Exh. U. On November 8, 2005, the Board of

Immigration Appeals re-opened Petitioner’s exclusion

proceedings. See id., Exh. V. In the granted motion to reopen, Petitioner did not, apparently, argue the validity of the

rescission of his asylee status, but noted he had been in asylee

status when the deadline passed for seeking relief from removal

based on the Convention Against Torture. See id., Exh. V. 

In his habeas pleading, filed October 16, 2008, prior

to the date his removal proceedings were re-opened, Petitioner

challenges both the legitimacy of his detention and the validity

of Respondents’ authority to remove him from the United States.

Petitioner asserts the rescission of the grant of asylum was

“unlawful and wholly unconstitutional...” Response at 4.

Petitioner contends the rescission of the grant of asylum is

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void because it occurred in violation of his right to procedural

due process of law. Petitioner contends that, because he is

still an asylee, the rescission being void, Petitioner may not

be removed, or detained pending his removal or further removal

proceedings. Petitioner seeks his release predicated on a

declaratory judgment that the revocation of the grant of asylum

is void and, accordingly, that Respondents have no basis for

detaining Petitioner.

Respondents contend the petition for habeas relief

should be dismissed or, alternatively, that relief should be

denied. Respondents assert that, to the extent Petitioner

challenges the validity of his order of exclusion subsequent to

the grant of asylum and its rescission, the District Court does

not have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims, citing the REAL

ID Act of 2005.

Respondents also argue:

Because the matter has been remanded, Singh

is no longer under a final order of

exclusion, and will appear before an

immigration judge for further proceedings. At

that time, Singh may ask for a hearing on the

lawfulness of his detention before the

immigration judge under Matter of Joseph, 22

I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999), which gives the

immigration judge authority under 8 C.F.R. §

1003.19 to determine if the Government’s

basis for detention is sustainable. 

Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 18) at 3.

Respondents further maintain that relief may not be

granted on the merits of Petitioner’s claims because Petitioner

did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his

section 2241 action. Respondents contend exhaustion is both a

jurisdictional and prudential prerequisite to relief.

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Respondents also assert that Petitioner has “not requested that

he be released from detention on the basis of parole pursuant to

§ 212(d)(5)(a) of the INA and 8 C.F.R. § 212.5. Accordingly,

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), he has not exhausted these

administrative remedies...” Id. at 3.

Respondents further allege that Petitioner’s claim that

his detention is not authorized by federal law may be denied on

the merits because Petitioner’s detention is authorized by 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See id. (“The issue before this Court is

not whether INS properly rescinded the grant of asylum. Rather,

the issue is whether INS ever had authority to grant asylum in

the first place. It did not.”). Respondents contend the grant

of asylum was void as ultra vires. Id. at 2.

Petitioner allows that the motion to reopen was granted

and that his removal proceedings have been,

remanded [] to the Immigration Judge, to

determine if the petitioner is eligible for

relief under CAT. The Immigration Judge will

not and cannot deal with the issue before

this Court, i.e. whether the petitioner was

unlawfully and illegally stripped of his

status as an asylee and consequently

illegally placed in custody as a result of

this unlawful stripping of his property

rights, i.e. asylee status. 

Response (Docket No. 24) at 5.

Petitioner maintains he

is petitioning this Court strictly and

narrowly to reverse the illegal and unlawful

rescission of his asylum status by the

respondents and to order his release from

illegal detention by the Immigration Customs

Enforcement Agency (“ICE”), a detention which

only flows out of the respondent’s

unconstitutional act of stripping of his

asylum. The respondents’ rescission of the

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petitioner’s asylum status is illegal,

unlawful and violation of due process because

the respondents did not follow proper

procedure as outlined in the immigration

regulations for terminating asylum status....

Id. at 6.

III. Analysis of the parties’ claims

A. Jurisdiction of the District Courts over section

2241 petitions subsequent to passage of the REAL ID Act

A primary effect of the REAL ID Act is to convert

section 2241 habeas corpus petitions seeking review of removal

orders into petitions for appellate review in order to “limit

all aliens to one bite of the apple ... [and thereby] streamline

what the Congress saw as uncertain and piecemeal review of

orders of removal, divided between the district courts (habeas

corpus) and the courts of appeals (petitions for review).”

Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005). See

also Marquez-Almanzar v. INS, 418 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 2005).

Section 106(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act of 2005 amended 8

U.S.C. § 1252 to prevent the District Courts from entertaining

a “claim arising from or relating to the implementation or

operation of an order of removal pursuant to section 1225(b)(1)

of this title.” Subsequent to the REAL ID Act, the District

Courts have jurisdiction over a section 2241 petition only to

consider the merits of the petitioner’s claim that his

detention, rather than the validity of the petitioner’s order of

removal, violates federal statutes or his constitutional rights.

See Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 956, 964-65 (9th Cir.

2004); Moallin v. Cangemi, 427 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920 (D. Minn.

2006). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that

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the District Courts have section 2241 jurisdiction only if the

issue of petitioner’s detention is distinct from the issue of

the propriety of their removal. See Nadarajah v. Gonzalez, 443

F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In this matter the basis for Petitioner’s challenge to

his detention is the assertion that Respondents violated his

constitutional right to due process in rescinding the grant of

asylum. Petitioner does not explicitly challenge the validity

of the order of exclusion, issued in 1993, from which Petitioner

is currently seeking relief pursuant to the Convention Against

Torture in another forum. Petitioner argues that, in essence,

the grant of asylum protected him from the future consequences

of the order of exclusion. 

The undersigned concludes that the REAL ID Act arguably

prohibits the Court from exercising jurisdiction over the

petition and that the matter should be transferred to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. However, in the interest of judicial

economy in resolving the motion to dismiss, the undersigned will

address the issues raised by the parties. See Kothandaraghipathy

v. Department of Homeland Sec., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1106 (D.

Ariz. 2005).

B. Exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to

filing a section 2241 petition

The exhaustion doctrine provides that, “no one is

entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury

until the prescribed ... remedy has been exhausted.” McKart v.

United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (1969)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Exhaustion of

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administrative remedies is only required if either a statute

specifically requires exhaustion prior to judicial review or if

the relevant administrative scheme requires exhaustion. Id.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the statute providing for

Petitioner’s filing of this habeas petition, does not

specifically require exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not statutorily obligated to exhaust

his claims.

The exhaustion requirement is also be a prudential,

rather than jurisdictional, limitation on the Court’s authority.

Therefore, in some circumstances the Court may entertain claims

brought by petitioners subject to ongoing alienage proceedings.

In determining whether to waive prudential

exhaustion, federal courts must balance the

interest of the individual in obtaining

prompt access to a federal judicial forum

against institutional interests favoring

exhaustion. 

 “[A]dministrative remedies need not be

pursued if the litigant’s interests in

immediate judicial review outweigh the

government’s interests in the efficiency or

administrative autonomy that the exhaustion

doctrine is designed to further.” [].

Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001),

abrogated on other grounds, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548

U.S. 30, 126 S. Ct. 2422 (2006).

As a non-criminal alien, Petitioner’s detention,

pursuing a resolution of his CAT claim, is discretionary and

Petitioner may request a bond determination hearing before an

IJ. See Matter of Joseph, 22 I & N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999); 8

C.F.R. § 3.19(2)(ii) (2008). If the IJ grants Petitioner’s

release on bond, the habeas petition would be moot insofar as it

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seeks Petitioner’s release on detention pending the resolution

of his immigration proceedings, as distinct from his release

predicated on the desired declaratory relief. Accordingly,

because Petitioner’s release on bond may still be granted by the

Immigration Court, Petitioner should be required to exhaust his

habeas claims to the extent he seeks his release from detention.

See Haddam v. Reno, 54 F. Supp. 2d 588, 599 (E.D. Va. 1999); Van

Eeton v. Beebe, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1189 (D. Or. 1999)(holding

that an alien detained pending removal proceedings was not

required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing

federal habeas petition where he had been denied release on

bail).

The District Court does not have jurisdiction to decide

Petitioner’s claim for declaratory relief regarding the alleged

violation of his purported right to due process, nor does the

Immigration Court have jurisdiction to determine Petitioner’s

constitutional claim. 

We are prohibited from exercising

subject-matter jurisdiction when an alien

fails to exhaust administrative remedies

“unless the petition presents grounds which

the court finds could not have been presented

in such prior proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. §

1105a(c). We agree with the circuits that

have considered this issue and hold that we

have subject-matter jurisdiction over aliens’

unexhausted constitutional claims unless the

claims concern procedural errors correctable

by the administrative tribunal. See, e.g., Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142, 144

(7th Cir. 1993); Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d

754, 762-63 (1st Cir. 1992); Bagues-Valles v.

INS, 779 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1985)

(holding that aliens are not precluded from

raising due process claims on appeal that

were not raised during administrative

proceedings because the BIA has no

jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional

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issues).

Geach v. Chertoff, 444 F.3d 940, 945 -946 (8th Cir. 2006)

(finding the petitioner’s equal protection claim was not a

correctable procedural claim and, accordingly, holding the

petitioner was not required to exhaust). 

Pursuant to the REAL ID Act, Petitioner’s assertion

that his deportation is barred by the grant of asylum, which he

asserts was void because it was rescinded only in violation of

his right to procedural due process, must be presented to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Accordingly, to the extent

Respondents contend Petitioner has not exhausted this claim, the

undersigned concludes exhaustion is not required and Petitioner

should present this claim to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

See Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 814 (9th Cir. 1996)(holding that

an alien was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies

before seeking judicial review of his due process claim because

that claim fell outside the scope of the Immigration and

Nationality Act); Xiao Ji Chen v. United States Dep’t of

Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing appellate

court jurisdiction after the REAL ID Act).

Respondents’ authority to detain Petitioner

Respondents contend their custody of Petitioner is

pursuant to section 235(b)(2) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2), governing the detention of inadmissible and

excludable aliens seeking relief based on the Convention Against

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9

 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty

Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. See also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16

(regulations implementing the CAT).

10

For these reasons we construe the regulatory

framework as granting to the immigration judge

exclusive jurisdiction over applications to

withhold the deportation of excludable aliens.

The district director in the present case had no

authority to grant an application to withhold

deportation and therefore the application was

properly denied. The application would properly

have been before an immigration judge who had

granted a reopening of the exclusion hearing...

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Torture.9 Respondents initially averred their purpose in

detaining Petitioner was to execute the order of exclusion

initially issued in 1993. Respondents now assert that, because

Petitioner’s immigration proceedings have been re-opened,

Petitioner is being detained at the discretion of the Attorney

General pending a hearing before an IJ regarding his entitlement

to relief from removal.

Petitioner’s detention is authorized pursuant to

section 1225 if the grant of asylum was void or if the

rescission of asylum was valid. The undersigned concludes the

grant of asylum was void. See Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335

F.3d 874, 884 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding order of removal issued

without jurisdiction was void ab initio); Zardui-Quintana v.

Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 1985);10

Ramirez-Osorio v. I.N.S., 745 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1984). 

Had asylum been properly granted, Petitioner would

arguably have been entitled to procedural due process, i.e., the

notice and hearing requirements of the relevant Code of

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Regulations prior to rescission of this status. However this

section provides for the rescission of a grant made “under the

jurisdiction of an asylum officer or district director,”

jurisdiction which, in Petitioner’s case, did not exist. See 8

C.F.R. § 208.15 (2008). Petitioner does not assert that the

official who granted his application for asylum did not have

jurisdiction to do so; Petitioner acknowledges that he had been

ordered excluded at the time his asylum application was

processed.

IV. Conclusion

The undersigned concludes that the District Court does

not have jurisdiction to resolve Petitioner’s claim that the

rescission of the grant of asylum violated his right to due

process of law and that this claim should be transferred to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to the REAL ID Act.

Additionally, to the extent necessary to determine if

Respondents are authorized to detain Petitioner pending the

conclusion of his immigration proceedings, the undersigned

concludes Respondents are authorized to detain Petitioner

because the grant of asylum was void ab initio being entered

without jurisdiction. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss

be granted insofar as it asserts Mr. Singh must pursue his

constitutional claim regarding the rescission of the grant of

asylum in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The undersigned

recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be denied insofar as it

argues the petition must be dismissed for failure to exhaust

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administrative remedies regarding Mr. Singh’s constitutional

claims, and that the motion be granted insofar as it seeks

dismissal of Mr. Singh’s claim for relief in the form of his

release.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact

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and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 4th day of February, 2009.

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