Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02231/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02231-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EVANGELINA GALVAN NAVARRO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ESKANOS & ADLER, A PROFESSIONAL

CORPORATION, a California Corporation,

DONALD ROGERS STEBBINS, individually

and in his official capacity, and KURTISS

JACOBS, individually and in his official

capacity,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-02231 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, both plaintiff and defendants

move for summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiff filed a separate motion for partial summary

judgment as to defendants’ use of the bona fide error defense. Triable issues of material fact

remain as to whether defendants violated the FDCPA, and whether violations are excused by the

bona fide error defense. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART, and her motion for summary judgment as to defendants’ bona fide

error defense is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Evangelina Galvan Navarro filed this action against defendants Eskanos &

Adler, a Professional Corporation, Kurtiss Jacobs, and Donald Stebbins for violations of the

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federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act. This action concerns two collection letters sent by defendants to plaintiff. 

Navarro has claimed no actual damages, so the maximum damages award in this action is

$2,000. Plaintiff and defendants agree on many of the facts. 

Navarro’s Dealings With Eskanos & Adler.

Some time before June 2005, plaintiff incurred a debt on her Discover credit card for

personal, family, and household expenses (Schwinn Opp. Decl. Exh. J, 52:15–20). The debt was

assigned to defendant Eskanos & Adler for collection on June 6, 2005 (Steinheimer Decl. Exh.

A). Eskanos & Adler mailed a letter to plaintiff on or about June 8, 2005 in an attempt to collect

(id. at Exh. E). The letter was printed on letterhead identifying Eskanos & Adler as a law firm. 

It was signed by defendant Donald Stebbins on behalf of Eskanos & Adler as an “Attorney for

the Firm” (ibid.). Before signing, Stebbins reviewed the address block to confirm that the

address was valid and reviewed the amount of the debt to make certain that it met the client’s

criteria for collection (Schwinn Opp. Decl. Exh. B, 18:4–14). 

On June 17, 2005, Eskanos & Adler received a letter from Navarro asking that

defendants stop telephoning her and contact her only by mail (Steinheimer Decl. Exh. B). It also

stated that Navarro and her family were having financial problems and were considering filing

bankruptcy (ibid.). After receiving this letter, Carol Saburomaru, a manager at Eskanos & Adler,

changed the account status to “DNC” and removed the telephone numbers from plaintiff’s

account (id. at Exh. A; Schwinn Defense Decl. Exh. E 69:20–71:3). “DNC” was used

interchangeably for “Do Not Call” or “Do Not Contact” (id. at 71:15–72:3). 

Defendants received a second letter from plaintiff on June 27, 2005, which stated “I

hereby request that you CEASE and DESIST any and all efforts to collect on the above

referenced account” (Steinheimer Decl. Exh. C). It also stated that should Eskanos & Adler wish

to file suit against her, she considered herself judgment proof because she owned no property

(ibid.). The letter was received by Melodie Mansfield, the employee designated to open all

certified mail. She made a notation in the computer system that a cease-and-desist letter had

been received on Navarro’s account (Schwinn Decl. Exh. F, 24:5–12). Instead of being directed

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to a manager per in-house procedures, it was routed to a collector working on the file (Hanestad

Decl. ¶ 4). 

Navarro’s letter went to Gail Dowdy, a debt collector. She entered a notation in the

computer system regarding the letter but did not note that it was a cease-and-desist letter

(Schwinn Decl. Exh. H, 24:5–12). Navarro’s file was then moved into a “close queue” to be

reviewed by Dowdy’s supervisor, Carol Saburomaru (id. at 31:14–15). Neither Dowdy nor

Saburomaru marked the mail return field with a “Y.” Doing so would have made the computer

system believe that mail had been returned from that address. No more collection letters could

then be generated for that account. Saburomaru reviewed the file and decided that a search for

plaintiff’s assets was appropriate (id. at Exh. E, 77:18–78:13). The file was transferred to

another collector, Keith Williams, to perform the search (Hanestad Decl. at ¶ 6–7). 

Williams recommended that another letter be sent to Navarro (Schwinn Decl. Exh. A, at

68:14–20). On August 1, 2005, defendants sent a letter asking plaintiff to contact them to

attempt to settle the account on a voluntary basis (Steinheimer Decl. Exh. D). The letter was on

Eskanos & Adler’s letterhead. It was signed by defendant Kurtiss Jacobs. Jacobs was a staff

attorney at Eskanos & Adler, but the letter did not identify him as such (ibid.). The names of

three other of Eskanos & Adler’s attorneys, Donald Stebbins, Jerome Yalon, and Janet Brown,

appeared in the signature block, but none were identified as attorneys. As with the prior letter,

Jacobs reviewed the letter for a valid address and a sufficient amount of debt before signing it

(Schwinn Decl. Exh. A, 31:8–32:22). 

On August 8, 2005, plaintiff sent a third letter to Eskanos & Adler asking them to stop all

communications. Her file was closed on October 5, 2005, when Eskanos & Adler received

notice that Navarro had filed for bankruptcy. Her debt to Discover was discharged in January

2006, pursuant to her bankruptcy filing. 

Defendant’s Debt-Collection Procedures.

Eskanos & Adler identified itself as a debt-collection law firm (Eskanos Decl. ¶ 2). It

attempted to collect on debts assigned to it without litigation, but generally its clients expected

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the firm to file suit against debtors. It estimated that its attorneys ultimately file a lawsuit on

approximately 30% of the accounts referred to it (ibid.). 

Defendant Eskanos & Adler had a number of procedures in place to comply with the

FDCPA. Their debt-collection employees underwent training in the law and the firm’s

procedures. The firm employed a full-time employee trainer, Rob Cannon (Hanestad Decl. ¶ 9). 

On beginning work for Eskanos & Adler, each employee was given a copy of its training and

procedure guide which contained both training information and general information about

employment (id. at ¶ 10). Employees were tested on the requirements of the FDCPA when they

began work and about once per year thereafter (id. at ¶ 11). Collectors were monitored by their

immediate managers who performed initial on-the-job training at the beginning of employment. 

Managers continued to monitor and audit employees’ work for compliance with the FDCPA (id.

at ¶ 12). 

Eskanos & Adler declares that it had a general, overriding policy of not contacting

debtors after the firm had received a “cease and desist” letter (Eskanos Decl. ¶ 10). It had a

specific procedure for dealing with such letters. Defendants would (1) direct the letter to a

manager for handling; (2) note in the file that such a letter was received; (3) change the status of

the account to “DNC;” (4) remove the telephone numbers associated with the account; and (5)

mark the mail return field with a “Y” to prevent the computer from generating letters to send to

the account (Hanestad Decl. ¶ 5). It is not clear, however, which employees were ultimately

responsible for performing the steps. The debtor’s address was not removed from Eskanos &

Adler’s databases unless the debtor stated that he or she was represented by an attorney

(Schwinn Decl. Exh. E, 126:14–127:4). At the time of the events of this case, the cease-anddesist procedure had not been written down and was related orally to employees (id. at Exh. I,

58:3–59:10). 

Procedural History.

Plaintiff filed this action on March 26, 2006, naming Eskanos & Adler and four of its

employees as defendants. Her complaint alleged violations of the FDCPA and the California

Rosenthal Act. Her initial complaint was based solely on defendants’ sending a collection letter

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after she had sent them a cease-and-desist letter. Navarro was granted leave to amend her

complaint in December 2006, to add allegations under 15 U.S.C. 1692e, e(3), and e(10), as well

as California Civil Code Sections 1788.16 and 1788.13(c). These claims are based on

misrepresentation of the involvement of an attorney in the collections process. On January 11,

2007, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for partial summary judgment

as to defendants’ use of the bona fide error defense. Defendants filed their own summary

judgment motion. Trial is set to begin on April 2, 2007. 

Plaintiff lodged evidentiary objections to some of the declarations filed by defendants. 

This includes the unsigned declaration of Keith Williams. Later, defendants filed the declaration

of Dan Oditt, Eskanos & Adler’s vice president, who declares that Williams was reluctant to sign

a declaration in support of these motions because plaintiff’s process server had attempted to

bribe him (Oditt Decl. ¶ 5). Furthermore, Andrew Steinheimer, defendants’ counsel, declared

that plaintiff’s counsel had told Williams that Eskanos & Adler was “blaming him for the

circumstances in this case or trying to pin liability on him” (Steinheimer Supp. Decl. ¶ 5). 

Though certainly disturbing, these statements are clearly hearsay. Plaintiff also contends that

this declaration was filed for an improper purpose and should be stricken from the record. 

Plaintiff’s application for an order striking the declaration of Dan Oditt is DENIED. Plaintiff’s

objections to Oditt’s declaration as hearsay, however, are SUSTAINED. Any other objections will

be dealt with as they figure into the disposition of these motions. 

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment should be granted where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits

show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of

production to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Playboy

Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24

(1986). “If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonCase 3:06-cv-02231-WHA Document 110 Filed 02/20/07 Page 5 of 13
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moving party must go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts’ that show a genuine

issue for trial.” Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted). 

1. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS UNDER THE FDCPA.

Plaintiff argues that Eskanos & Adler, Stebbins, and Jacobs violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e(3)

and 1692e(10) by falsely implying that an attorney had reviewed the file, falsely representing the

involvement of legal counsel, and falsely representing the true source or nature of the letters. 

She also alleges that defendants violated California Civil Code Sections 1788.13(c) and 1788.16

by misrepresenting the role and involvement of an attorney in the collection process. Those four

claims will be dealt with together because they involve the same facts. Her final claim is that

defendants’ violated 15 U.S.C. 1692c(c) by sending the second collection letter after she asked

them to stop contacting her. 

A. Plaintiff’s Debt as a “Debt” and a “Consumer Debt.”

First, plaintiff asks for summary judgment that her obligation to Discover was a “debt” as

defined by the FDCPA and a “consumer debt” as defined by the California Rosenthal Act. 

Defendants do not dispute these issues.

The term “debt” is defined in 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5) as:

[A]ny obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of

a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the

subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household

purposes. . . .

Similarly, California Civil Code Section 1788.2(f) defines a “consumer debt” as “money,

property or their equivalent, due or owing or alleged to be due or owing from a natural person by

reason of a consumer credit transaction.” Plaintiff testified in her deposition that the debt was

incurred for household and family expenses. Accordingly, her transaction is a “debt” under the

federal Act and a “consumer debt” under the Rosenthal Act. 

Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on the issue of whether Eskanos & Adler is a

“debt collector” under the California Rosenthal Act. California Civil Code Section 1788.2(c)

defines a debt collector as “any person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on

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behalf of himself or herself or others, engages in debt collection. [It] does not include an

attorney or counselor at law.” 

The statute makes clear that it does not apply to attorneys. The statute was silent,

however, on law firms, and thus they can be debt collectors under the Rosenthal Act. Ables v.

JBC Legal Group, P.C., 227 F.R.D. 541, 547–48 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (Ware, J.). Defendants do not

dispute that Eskanos & Adler’s primary business is collecting debts that are assigned to it by its

clients, and defendants do not argue otherwise in their briefs. Thus Eskanos & Adler is a debt

collector under the Rosenthal Act. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on

these issues is GRANTED.

B. Statute of Limitations.

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims regarding the collection letter sent June 8, 2005,

are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for actions under both the

federal FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act is one year. 15 U.S.C. 1692k(d); Cal. Civ. Code §

1788.30(f). Navarro filed her complaint on March 26, 2006, and then filed her amended

complaint on December 7, 2006. Defendants argue that the claims plaintiff added relating to the

first letter are barred by the statute of limitations because they were filed more than one year

after the letter was sent. Furthermore, defendants contend, they cannot relate back to plaintiff’s

original claims. 

Later-added claims are timely filed if they relate back to the original pleadings. The

relevant rule provides that “an amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original

pleading when (1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations

applicable to the action, or (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of

the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original

pleading. . . .” FRCP 15(c). Here, the new claims that plaintiff asserted arose out of the same

conduct as her previous claims, Eskanos & Adler’s sending collection letters to plaintiff. The

first letter was referenced in plaintiff’s original complaint, and both letters arise from collection

of the same debt by the same parties. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims based on the first letter are

not barred by the statute of limitations. 

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C. Defendants’ First Letter to Plaintiff. 

In general, 15 U.S.C. 1692e forbids the use of false, deceptive or misleading

representations in connection with collecting debts. More specifically, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(3)

forbids “[t]he false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any

communication is from an attorney,” and 15 U.S.C. 1692e(10) forbids “[t]he use of any false

representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain

information concerning a customer.” California Civil Code Section 1788.13(c) forbids the use

of:

Any communication with a debtor in the name of an attorney or counselor at law

or upon stationery or like written instruments bearing the name of the attorney or

counselor at law, unless such communication is by an attorney or counselor at

law or shall have been approved or authorized by such attorney or counselor at

law.

Finally, California Civil Code Section 1788.16 states:

It is unlawful, with respect to attempted collection of a consumer debt, for a debt

collector, or an attorney, to send a communication which simulates legal or

judicial process or which gives the appearance of being authorized, issued, or

approved by a government agency or attorney when it is not.

A violation of this statute is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment up to six months. 

The least sophisticated consumer standard applies to violations of the FDCPA. Wade v.

Regional Credit Ass’n., 87 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 1996). The standard both “ensures the

protection of all consumers, even the naive and the trusting, against deceptive collection

practices, and protects debt collectors against liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations

of collection notices.” Clark v. Capital Credit Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir.

2006) (citing Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d. Cir. 1993)). This standard is “lower

than simply examining whether particular language would deceive or mislead a reasonable

debtor.” Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Serv., 864 F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[T]he use of an attorney’s letterhead and signature on the collection letters [is]

sufficient to give the least sophisticated consumer the impression that the letters [are]

communications from an attorney.” Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1320–21. The least sophisticated

consumer would not be deceived or misled as to attorney involvement if the communication

contained a clear disclaimer stating that an attorney had not reviewed the file. Greco v.

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Trauner, Cohen, and Thomas LLP, 412 F.3d 360, 365 (2d. Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has

not addressed the question of attorney involvement in the debt collection process. Judge

Maxine Chesney, however, has held that the use of an attorney’s signature is sufficient to

mislead the least sophisticated consumer into believing that an attorney was involved in the debt

collection process. Dupuy v. Weltman, Wienberg & Reis, Co., 442 F.Supp.2d 822, 825–26

(N.D. Cal. 2006). 

Here, parties do not dispute that the letter was printed on Eskanos & Adler’s letterhead

identifying them as a law firm. Stebbins signed the letter as an “Attorney for the Firm.” The

letter both referenced a debt plaintiff allegedly owed and identified Eskanos & Adler as having

been retained by Discover to collect the debt. The letter contains no disclaimer of an attorney’s

involvement. Parties also agree that Stebbins made only a cursory review of the letter before

signing it. He signed perhaps hundreds of letters in a single day. 

Plaintiff argues that Stebbins and Eskanos & Adler falsely represented or implied that

Stebbins had reviewed Navarro’s file when he had not. According to plaintiff, his signing the

letter would lead the least sophisticated consumer to believe that Stebbins had conducted a

professional review of the account. Defendants disagree and argue that there was no

misrepresentation of attorney involvement because another attorney within the firm, or at least

another employee, had reviewed the file. 

Debt collectors are permitted to rely on representations from the creditor that the

underlying debt is valid. Clark, 460 F.3d at 1174. In Clark, it was reasonable for the defendant

debt collectors to rely on information from clients to determine whether or not the statute of

limitations had run. Here, defendants present evidence that new accounts were referred to the

firm by its clients, in Navarro’s case, Discover. An attorney at Eskanos & Adler then reviewed

the file to check that it met the client’s criteria for filing suit and that the statute of limitations

had not run. The information was then entered into the firm’s computers and the collections

process commenced. Here, defendants relied on the client and its own employees to use their

judgment to decide whether to send a collection letter and whether the contents of the letter

were appropriate. It was reasonable for them to do so, however, that does not foreclose the

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possibility that the least sophisticated consumer would think that the letter had come directly

from an attorney. 

Here, both parties have moved for summary judgment. Viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the defendant, a reasonable jury could still conclude that the least

sophisticated consumer would have believed that a lawyer was involved in the collections

process. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could

still find that the opposite was true. Accordingly, both plaintiff’s and defendants’ motions for

summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims under Sections 1692e(3) and 1692e(10) of the

FDCPA, and plaintiff’s Rosenthal Act claims are DENIED. 

D. Claims Related to the Second Letter.

As to the second collection letter, plaintiff alleges that Eskanos & Adler and Jacobs

falsely represented that Jacobs, an attorney, had reviewed the file, falsely represented the role

and involvement of legal counsel, and falsely represented the true source or nature of the letter. 

The major difference between the first letter and the second letter is that the signer of the

second letter did not specifically identify himself as an attorney. It was signed by Kurtiss A.

Jacobs on behalf of Eskanos & Adler. The names of Donald Stebbins, Janet Brown, and Jerome

Yalon Jr. appeared in the signature block as well, but none of them were identified as attorneys. 

This letter was printed on letterhead identifying Eskanos & Adler as a law firm. The letter told

Navarro to contact defendants’ office immediately to discuss the voluntary resolution of her

account. The parties agree that before signing, Jacobs merely checked the address block to

ensure that it showed a valid address and checked the amount of the debt. 

Defendant argues that the least sophisticated consumer could not possibly be deceived

into thinking that an attorney had sent this letter because the person signing it did not identify

himself as such. The letter left no doubt, however, that it was sent by a law firm. As with the

first letter, there remains a triable issue of fact as to whether the least sophisticated consumer

would be deceived into thinking that an attorney had sent the letter. Accordingly, both

plaintiff’s and defendants’ motions for summary judgment are DENIED. 

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Plaintiff also brings a claim under the California Rosenthal Act. California Civil Code

Section 1788.17 requires that debt collectors comply with the FDCPA. As neither motion for

summary judgment was granted on plaintiff’s federal claims, both motions for summary

judgment on this claim will be DENIED as well. 

E. Navarro’s Cease-and-Desist Letter. 

Finally, plaintiff contends that Eskanos & Adler violated 15 U.S.C. 1692c(c) by

contacting Navarro after she had asked them in writing to cease collection efforts. Section

1692c(c) stated in pertinent part: 

If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay

a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further

communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate

further with the consumer with respect to that debt. . . .

Here, neither party disputes that defendants received a letter asking plaintiffs to stop contacting

her on June 27, 2005, and that defendants sent the second collection letter after that on August

1, 2005. Indeed, defendants only argue that they are entitled to the bona fide error defense for

claim. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim,

subject to the bona fide error defense. 

2. BONA FIDE ERROR DEFENSE.

Both plaintiff and defendants move for summary judgment as to the bona fide error

defense as applied to defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692c(c). The defense is available if

“the debt collector shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not

intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures

reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. 1692k(c). The same standard also

applies under the Rosenthal Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(e). “To qualify for the bona fide

error defense, a debt collector must show that: (1) the FDCPA violation was not intentional; (2)

the FDCPA violation resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) the debt collector maintained

procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” Palmer v. I.C. Systems, Inc., 2005 WL

3001877, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (Whyte, J.) (citing Kort v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 394

F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 2005)). 

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First, defendants must show that sending the second letter to plaintiff was unintentional. 

Parties agree that the decision to send the second collection letter was made by Keith Williams,

a debt collector assigned to the account. Plaintiff contends that absent evidence that Williams

sent the letter unintentionally, the bona fide error defense fails. By the time Navarro’s account

got to Williams, however, the error had already been made. Navarro’s letter had been

misdirected and the mail return code had not been changed to “Y.” Williams intent seems not

relevant here. Plaintiff also points out that defendants have presented no evidence that Jacobs’

signing the letter was unintentional. His intent also seems irrelevant for the same reason. The

error had already been made. Both parties agree, however, that the final step of changing the

mail return code was not performed. It is not clear, however, who had responsibility for doing

so. 

Defendants present evidence that they employed procedures reasonably adapted to

prevent errors. Eskanos & Adler stated that its policy was to cease communications with

anyone who had sent them a cease-and-desist letter. Employees were trained in compliance

procedures for the FDCPA, employees received on-the-job training from their managers, and

managers continued to monitor and audit employees work thereafter. On receiving a cease-anddesist letter, the letter was to be directed to a manager, the telephone numbers were to be

removed from the account, the file was noted “cease-and-desist,” the status code was changed

to “DNC,” and a “Y” was placed in the mail return field. Plaintiff does not dispute that these

procedures exist currently. She does, however, point out that the procedure for “cease-anddesist” letters was not written down at the time of the events in this action. Viewing the facts in

the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Eskanos & Adler’s

procedures were not reasonably adapted to prevent the kind of error that occurred here. 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the defendants, however, a reasonable jury

could still conclude that Eskanos & Adler had sufficient procedures in place. 

Accordingly, both plaintiff’s and defendants’ motions for summary judgment on this

issue are DENIED. The issue of damages for this claim, as well as plaintiff’s other claims, will

be tried to a jury. 

Case 3:06-cv-02231-WHA Document 110 Filed 02/20/07 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For all the above-stated reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the bona fide

error defense is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

The foregoing will shorten the trial. Counsel shall meet and confer and agree on a

statement to be read to the jury as to what has already been ruled on by this order. This must be

submitted at the final pretrial conference. At the trial, evidence on only the ruled-on points will

not be admissible, absent good cause. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 20, 2007 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-02231-WHA Document 110 Filed 02/20/07 Page 13 of 13