Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02086/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02086-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

ROBERT FORD SR. and

ANNA FORD PLAINTIFFS

v. Civil No. 05-2086

TRADITIONAL SPORTING GOODS, INC.

d/b/a/ TRADITIONS DEFENDANT 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Now on this 30th day of October, 2006, there comes on for

consideration Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and

supporting documents (Docs. 50, 51, 54) and Plaintiff’s Response

and supporting documents (Docs. 60, 61). The Court also

considers Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Witness

John Hamilton and related documents (Docs. 55, 62, 63, 69) and

its Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Witness John Morse and

related documents. (Docs. 48, 49, 65, 83, 84). 

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the

Court must view the facts and inferences in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. See Rabushka v. Crane Co.,

122 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the burden

of establishing the absence of issues of material fact in the

record and of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986). To defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond

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the pleadings and designate specific facts showing a genuine

issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324. Thus, the “basic

inquiry” for purposes of summary judgment is “whether the

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Quick v. Donaldson Co.,

Inc., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996)(citation omitted). 

Background

Plaintiffs allege strict liability in tort, breach of

implied warranty of marketability, and negligence. The named

Defendants are Traditional Sporting Goods, Inc. d/b/a/

Traditions; Hodgdon Powder Company, Inc.; Traditions Rifles,

Inc.; Hodgdon Inc.; and Traditions Inc. Only Defendant

Traditional Sporting Goods, Inc. d/b/a/ Traditions remains in

the case.

Plaintiffs’ allegations stem from a hand injury sustained

by Robert Ford while discharging a Traditions Buckhunter PRO InLine .50 caliber rifle. Mr. Ford received the rifle as a gift

from his daughter in 2003. The daughter purchased the rifle as

a used product in a yard sale in Fort Smith, Arkansas. Mr. Ford

knew the rifle had been previously used. The instruction and

shooting manual was with the rifle, when received by Mr. Ford

and he read and understood the manual. 

Mr. Ford was present before the accident when the rifle was

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fired a total of thirteen (13) times. On the day of the

accident, he loaded the rifle with 100 grains by volume of

Pyrodex RS propellant and a 300 grain saboted bullet. After the

third shot on the day of the accident, Mr. Ford’s son reported

the rifle sounded louder than normal at discharge, but Mr. Ford

inspected the rifle and said he found nothing. On shot number

four on the day of the accident the bottom portion of the barrel

near the breach exploded, which caused injury to Mr. Ford’s hand

and resulted in a partial amputation. 

STRICT TORT LIABILITY 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Traditions sold the rifle

in a condition that was unsafe, which made it unreasonably

dangerous to users and consumers. Specifically, Plaintiffs

contend that Defendant knew consumers would be using a quantity

of Pyrodex RS powder that could generate pressure inside the

barrel of the rifle that would exceed 25,000 pounds of pressure

per square inch (psi) and that the rifle was only designed to

withstand a pressure of less than 10,000 psi. Moreover,

Plaintiff alleges Defendant marketed and sold the firearm

knowing the pressure condition existed. 

To sustain a cause of action for strict products liability,

it is necessary to prove that the product was in a defective

condition which rendered it unreasonably dangerous. Ark.Code

Ann. § 16-116-102 (1987); see also Berkeley Pump Co. v. ReedCase 2:05-cv-02086-RTD Document 87 Filed 10/30/06 Page 3 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
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Joseph Land Co., 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983) (stating that the fact

that product does not meet expectations of user does not meet

definition; must be “unreasonably dangerous” as well as

defective). To recover under a strict-liability theory, a

plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that the defendant supplied

the product in a defective condition that rendered it

unreasonably dangerous and that the defective condition was the

proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. See Ark.Code Ann. § 4-

86-102(a) (Repl.1996); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Dillaha,

659 S.W.2d 756 (1983).

The doctrine of strict liability does not change the burden

of proof as to the existence of a flaw or defect in a product,

but it does do away with the necessity of proving negligence in

order to recover for injuries resulting from a defective

product. Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 730 S.W.2d 479 (1987).

A “defective condition” is a condition that renders a product

unsafe for reasonably foreseeable use and consumption. Ark.Code

Ann. § 16-116-102(4) (1987). A product is “unreasonably

dangerous” if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which

would be contemplated by the ordinary and reasonable user,

assuming the ordinary knowledge of the community or similar

users as to its characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers,

and proper and improper uses, as well as any special knowledge,

training, or experience possessed by the user or which he was

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required to possess. See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-116-102(7) (1987).

The plaintiff has the burden of proving that a defendant

sold a product that should not have been sold and that it caused

his injury. Williams, 730 S.W.2d 479. The mere possibility that

this may have occurred is not enough, and there must be evidence

from which the jury may reasonably conclude that it is more

probable than not. Id. The mere fact of an accident, standing

alone, does not make out a case that the product was defective.

Id. However, the addition of other facts tending to show the

defect existed before the accident may be sufficient. Higgins v.

General Motors Corp., 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985). Under

appropriate circumstances, a user's testimony alone may be

sufficient evidence. Id. The burden, however, remains on the

plaintiff to prove that the product was sold in a defective

condition and that it was unreasonably dangerous. Farm Bureau

Ins. Co. v. Case Corp., 878 S.W.2d 741 (1994); see also O'Mara

v. Dykema, 942 S.W.2d 854 (1997).

Defendant contends Plaintiffs’ experts are not qualified to

offer expert opinions related to the product in question, and

the Plaintiffs can not then sustain their burden of proof on a

strict liability claim. Defendant states Plaintiffs have failed

to present any evidence of a manufacturing defect that could

establish the rifle barrel contained anomalies, inclusions,

foreign debris, or other such unexpected features that could

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have weakened the subject barrel. Further, Defendants contend

Plaintiffs’ design defect claim must also fail as Plaintiffs

have failed to identify any defect in the product and have not

connected any alleged defect to Plaintiffs’ injuries and

damages. 

For the Court to rule on Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, it must consider Defendant’s Motions in Limine.

Defendant moves to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ experts

Morse and Hamilton. Plaintiffs retained Hamilton to evaluate

the pressure time curve present in the barrel of the rifle.

Hamilton concluded the pressure in the barrel was 13,500 pounds

per square inch (psi) at the time of the injury. Plaintiffs

contend Hamilton can determine the pressure inside the gun when

it failed and the location of the bullet when maximum pressure

was reached. Defendants argue Hamilton is not qualified to

testify as an expert because he did not perform any tests or

review any background materials from the text he relied upon -

the Lyman Black Powder Handbook and Loading Manual. Hamilton

has never served as an expert in firearms and is not an expert

in ballistics. Hamilton has a Master’s degree in mechanical

engineering, and specializes in thermal systems which is the

study of energy, and is familiar with firearms only in general.

Plaintiffs retained Morse to determine the amount of

pressure the rifle could withstand. Morse concluded, according

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to the pressure vessel analysis he performed, the rifle could

only withstand a maximum pressure of 12,500 psi. Additionally,

Morse stated that the cold pultrusion process used in formation

of the barrel was known to cause weakness in metals. Defendant

contends Morse is not qualified by education, training, or

experience to proffer any opinions and that Morse’s conclusions

are speculative, lack reliable foundation, proper methodology,

and are not based on objective testing. Defendant further

contends that Morse’s opinions will mislead and confuse the

jury. 

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:

If scientific, technical or other specialized

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a

witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education may testify thereto

in the form of an opinion or other wise, if (1) the

testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2)

the testimony is the product of reliable principles

and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the

principles and methods reliably to the facts of the

case. 

The commentary to Rule 702 indicates that the rejection of

expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule and that

the more appropriate means of attacking questionable evidence is

vigorous cross-examination and presentation of contrary

evidence. While Hamilton may not, as Defendant contends, have

any particular knowledge of or experience with firearms or

ballistics, he has extensive knowledge and experience in the

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fields of thermal systems and with time pressure curves.

Similarly, Morse has a doctorate degree in mechanical

engineering but with no experience, or personal or specialized

knowledge of firearms. Morse applied a pressure vessel analysis

to the metal, and this test appears to be an accepted test in

this area. Moreover, both experts have looked at other

potential causes of failure, and ruled those out. 

While it is a close case of whether Plaintiffs’ experts are

qualified to render opinions, it appears the appropriate ruling

is to allow the testimony of both Hamilton and Morse, subject to

cross-examination of the methods and conclusions utilized.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motions in Limine are DENIED. If the

testimony of these experts is permitted, Plaintiffs could meet

the burden of proof on the strict liability claim. Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore denied as to

Plaintiffs’ strict liability claims for a manufacturing defect

and design defect.

FAILURE TO INSTRUCT/WARN

Defendant contends Plaintiffs have failed to present any

proof on the failure to instruct/warn claim and that neither of

Plaintiffs’ experts are qualified to give opinions as to

warnings nor has either expert offered any opinions. Plaintiffs

do not address this issue in their response to the Motion for

Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

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the claim for failure to instruct/warn is GRANTED.

NEGLIGENCE CLAIM

Defendant contends it was merely the importer and

distributor of the rifle and that Plaintiffs’ claim of

negligence rests on a defect in the rifle. Defendant adopts the

argument reflected above and as set out in its Motions in Limine

to support its Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs

negligence claim. 

Plaintiffs contend its experts demonstrate that a dangerous

condition and/or defect was present with the product Defendant

marketed and sold, and as such Defendant could be liable to a

foreseeable user of the rifle, such as Mr. Ford. In view of the

Court’s ruling on the testimony of Hamilton and Ford,

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the negligence claim

is DENIED. 

BREACH OF WARRANTY

Defendants also move for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’

Breach of Warranty Claim on the same basis as stated in their

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ strict liability

claims. For the reasons reflected herein, Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment on the Breach of Warranty claim is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court determines Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 50) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

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PART. Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claims of

Defendant’s Failure to Instruct/Warn. Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is DENIED as to all other claims. Defendant’s

Motions in Limine (Docs. 48, 55) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of October, 2006.

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

Honorable Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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