Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00185/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY WAYNE WELCHEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAMALA HARRIS and COUNTY OF 

SACRAMENTO,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-00185-TLN-KJN

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff Gary Welchen’s (“Plaintiff”) motion 

for temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion 

is hereby DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a homeless and indigent resident of Sacramento, California. (ECF No. 2 at 3.) 

He was arrested on January 29, 2016, by Sacramento police offers and accused of burglary. (ECF 

No. 2 at 3.) After his arrest, he was taken to the Sacramento County Jail and informed by jail 

employees that he would not be released unless he paid $10,000 in bail. (ECF No. 2 at 3.) 

Plaintiff asserts that the bail scheme in Sacramento is unconstitutional because it is a “wealthbased detention scheme that penalizes all indigent arrestees.” (ECF No. 2 at 3.) Plaintiff has 

filed the instant case as a class action and moves this Court for a temporary restraining order 

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“prohibiting Defendants’ wealth-based detention scheme and requiring that pretrial release or 

detention decisions be based on factors other than wealth-status.” (ECF No. 2 at 2.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary and temporary “fix” that the court may issue 

without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the movant “clearly 

show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the 

adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The purpose of a temporary 

restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a fuller hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. It is 

the practice of this district to construe a motion for temporary restraining order as a motion for 

preliminary injunction. Local Rule 231(a); see also Aiello v. One West Bank, No. 2:10–cv–0227–

GEB–EFB, 2010 WL 406092 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (“Temporary restraining orders are 

governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions.”) (internal quotation and 

citations omitted).

Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing 

that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 

(2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). “The purpose of a 

preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the 

merits can be held.” University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (emphasis added); 

see also Costa Mesa City Employee’s Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa, 209 Cal. App. 4th 298, 305 (2012) 

(“The purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo until a final determination following a 

trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 

(9th Cir. 2000) (“The status quo ante litem refers not simply to any situation before the filing of a 

lawsuit, but instead to the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In cases where the movant seeks to alter the status quo, preliminary 

injunction is disfavored and a higher level of scrutiny must apply. Schrier v. University of Co., 427 

F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 2005). Preliminary injunction is not automatically denied simply because 

the movant seeks to alter the status quo, but instead the movant must meet heightened scrutiny. Tom

Doherty Associates, Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33–34 (2d Cir. 1995).

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“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed 

on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 

[3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test

to obtain a preliminary injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 

(9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, a district court may 

weigh the plaintiff’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A 

stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction 

even where the plaintiff shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the 

plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 

public interest.” Id. Simply put, Plaintiff must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to 

the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[] sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,” 

in order to succeed in a request for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35 (emphasis added).

III. ANALYSIS

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the first two Winter factors do not 

support granting relief. Therefore, the Court need not address the remaining factors as Plaintiff 

has not met his burden for injunctive relief. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135 

(stating that the Winter test requires a plaintiff to “make a showing on all four prongs”). 

A. Likelihood of Success

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s briefing is replete with one-liner platitudes 

concerning equal justice and wealth status. However, the briefing fails to address the other 

factors that the state court considers in deciding whether bail should be applied. In essence, 

Plaintiff’s briefing makes overarching legal conclusions, but fails to provide this Court with facts 

that would enable the Court to grant the relief sought by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s failure is more 

notable in this situation where Plaintiff is asking this Court to upset the status quo. See Martin, 

740 F. 2d at 675 (“a party seeks mandatory preliminary relief that goes well beyond maintaining 

the status quo pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious about issuing a preliminary 

injunction.”) Furthermore, the case law cited by Plaintiff is not binding on this Court, nor does 

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the information before this Court provide enough detail to determine whether the bail systems 

that other districts have found to be unconstitutional are similar to that which is utilized in 

Sacramento. As such, this Court cannot find that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of 

this case, and this factor weighs in favor of denying injunctive relief.

B. Irreparable Harm

Plaintiff asserts that “without intervention from this Court, Plaintiff and the class of 

similarly situated people will continue to suffer the serious and irreparable harm of 

unconstitutional jailing.” (ECF No. 2 at 17.) In deciding whether Plaintiff is likely to suffer 

irreparable injury absent an injunction, the Court must address whether he is likely to suffer from 

a constitutional violation. Although Plaintiff is correct that “unconstitutionally imprisoning a 

human being in a jail cell in violation of her constitutional rights is undoubtedly an irreparable 

harm to her body and mind,” (ECF No. 2 at 17), Plaintiff has not shown that the bail system 

employed in Sacramento is unconstitutional. Plaintiff asserts that ability to pay is the only thing 

that stands in the way of many indigent prisoners’ release. Such an accusation is not an accurate 

depiction of the system, and the Court cannot find that irreparable harm exists without an accurate 

assessment of Sacramento’s bail system. In sum, Plaintiff’s freedom rhetoric is not enough to 

overcome Plaintiff’s failure to show an actual constitutional violation. Thus, the Court finds that 

this factor weighs in favor of denying relief.

Because Plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of success or irreparable harm, the Court 

need not address the other two Winter factors since Plaintiff cannot succeed under Winter or the 

Ninth Circuit’s sliding scale approach. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 

632 F.3d at 1135 (Winter requires a plaintiff to make a showing on all of the Winter factors); see 

also Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (sliding scale approach requires a 

likelihood of irreparable injury to the plaintiff).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that injunctive relief at this juncture of the 

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litigation is not appropriate. As such, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF 

No. 2) is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2016

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