Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_24-cv-00270/USCOURTS-ared-4_24-cv-00270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

RUTHIE WALLS, et al. PLAINTIFFS

v. Case No. 4:24-cv-00270-LPR 

SARAH HUCKABEE SANDERS, in her 

official capacity as Governor of the State 

of Arkansas, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER 

This case concerns the LEARNS Act’s “anti-indoctrination provision.”1 Plaintiffs are two 

high school teachers, one high school student, and the Arkansas State Conference of the NAACP.2 

Defendants are Governor Sanders, Secretary Oliva, and the members of the Arkansas State Board 

of Education. Plaintiffs sue Defendants in their official capacities only and seek declaratory and 

injunctive relief only.3

 

 The operative Complaint presents four buckets of claims: (1) claims concerning the Free 

Speech rights of public high school teachers; (2) claims concerning the Free Speech rights of public 

high school students; (3) claims concerning the Due Process rights of public high school teachers; 

and (4) claims concerning the Equal Protection rights of African American public high school 

1

 Ark. Code Ann. § 6-16-156. In its Preliminary Injunction Order, the Court referred to this provision as Section 16 

of the LEARNS Act. See generally Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45). But, as the Court noted in that Order, Section 16 of 

the LEARNS Act technically covers more than just this provision. See id. at 7 n.28. The provision has also, at times, 

been referred to as “the indoctrination provision.” See Baum Decl. (Doc. 15) ¶ 5. But the Court thinks that a more 

descriptive label for it is “the anti-indoctrination provision.” 

2

 The Arkansas State Conference of the NAACP says that its members include high school teachers and high school 

students. See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 25. 

3 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 2 n.1 (pinpoint citations to Doc. 61 refer to the document’s 

self-identified page numbers, not the ECF page numbers). The docket sheet currently shows Secretary Oliva as being 

a Defendant in both his individual and official capacities. The Clerk is directed to update the docket sheet to reflect 

that Plaintiffs are no longer bringing claims against Secretary Oliva in his individual capacity. See First Am. Compl. 

(Doc. 8); Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 2 n.1. 

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teachers and students.4

 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of all four buckets 

of claims.5

 In today’s Order, the Court holds most of that Motion in abeyance. But the Court does 

GRANT the Motion with respect to the facial Equal Protection claims. 

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD 

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must treat the record in a very specific way. First, 

the Court may only consider allegations in the complaint, materials attached to or embraced by the 

complaint, public records, and other evidence of which the Court has properly taken judicial 

notice.6

 Second, the Court must take as true all facts pled in the complaint.7 Third, the Court must 

then decide, based on those assumed-to-be-true facts, whether a plaintiff has a plausible claim for 

judicial relief.8 The plausibility-of-relief threshold is quite low, but it is not nothing. A plausible 

claim for relief is more than a possibility of relief, but far less than a certainty of relief.9 

Most of the time, the dispositive question at the motion to dismiss stage is a purely legal 

one. Often this question concerns whether the governing law prohibits the action or actions that a 

plaintiff alleges a defendant has taken, is taking, or will likely take. Translated to the specifics of 

our case, that question is best stated as whether the United States Constitution prohibits the 

enforcement of the anti-indoctrination provision of the LEARNS Act. 

4 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 161–213. 

5 See generally Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 54); Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 55).

6 See Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab’y, Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012). 

7 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). On the other hand, the Court is not required to (and should not) 

accept a complaint’s legal conclusions or conclusory allegations. See, e.g., Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Grp., 280 F.3d 

868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002) (“While the court must accept allegations of fact as true when considering a motion to dismiss, 

the court is free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal 

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”). 

8 See Ingram v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 91 F.4th 924, 927 (8th Cir. 2024). 

9 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

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II. THE FIRST THREE BUCKETS OF CLAIMS 

On May 7, 2024, this Court issued an Order preliminarily enjoining—in a very limited 

way—the enforcement of the anti-indoctrination provision against Ms. Ruthie Walls and 

Mr. Colton Gilbert.10 On May 10, 2024, the enjoined Defendants appealed the Order to the Eighth 

Circuit.11 The appeal has been fully briefed. The Eighth Circuit has determined that it wants to 

hold an oral argument, but the date of that argument has not yet been set.12

The Court’s Preliminary Injunction Order covered a lot of legal ground. The Court 

analyzed whether a public high school teacher’s Free Speech rights are implicated when a state 

proscribes what that teacher may and may not say in the classroom as part of academic 

instruction.13 The Court also analyzed whether a public high school student’s Free Speech rights 

are implicated when a state prohibits the teaching of certain information (or teaching from a certain 

perspective) in the absence of a legitimate pedagogical reason for the prohibition.14 And the Court, 

at least to a certain extent, parsed the language of the anti-indoctrination provision.15

The legal analysis in the Court’s Preliminary Injunction Order is hotly contested by the 

parties in the Eighth Circuit appeal.16 It is also intimately intertwined with the legal analysis 

10 Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 47–50. Essentially, the only actions enjoined by the Court were actions that 

Defendants themselves said were not authorized by—and could not be taken under—the anti-indoctrination provision 

in the first place. See id. at 45–50. 

11 Notice of Appeal (Doc. 48). The “enjoined Defendants” are all Defendants except for Governor Sanders. In their 

preliminary injunction papers, Plaintiffs more or less conceded—at least for purposes of the preliminary injunction 

stage—that difficult issues concerning the scope of the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity counseled 

against application of a preliminary injunction to the Governor. See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 1 n.5.

12 See Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024). 

13 See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 25–27. 

14 See id. at 33–37. 

15 See id. at 37–43. 

16 See Br. for Appellants at 16–36 (pinpoint citations to appellate briefs refer to each brief’s self-identified page 

numbers, not the ECF page numbers), Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024); Br. for 

Appellees at 16–52, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024); Reply for Appellants at 1–

22, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024). 

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necessary to determine whether any or all of the first three buckets of claims pressed by Plaintiffs 

should be dismissed. As explained below, judicial economy and efficiency counsel waiting for the 

Eighth Circuit’s decision instead of issuing a ruling that could add complexity to, or significantly 

alter the landscape of, the pending appeal.17

A. Teachers’ Free Speech Claims 

Plaintiffs contend that the anti-indoctrination provision of the LEARNS Act 

unconstitutionally regulates teachers’ classroom speech.18 Although these claims are not directly 

at issue in the appeal, the relevant legal question—whether and to what extent public high school 

teachers have Free Speech rights in their classroom instruction—is a central feature of Plaintiffs’ 

irreparable-harm argument to the Eighth Circuit.19 The parties’ Eighth Circuit briefs spill plenty 

of ink on opposing sides of the relevant legal question.20 And it is highly likely the Eighth Circuit 

is going to resolve the relevant legal question when it resolves the appeal. 

17 Because the Court has concluded that it will hold in abeyance the portions of the Motion to Dismiss that could affect 

the Eighth Circuit appeal, the Court need not decide whether that appeal deprived the Court of jurisdiction to rule on 

those portions of the Motion. See West Publ’n Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229 (8th Cir. 1986) 

(“[T]he pendency of an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not 

wholly divest the District Court of jurisdiction over the entire case.”); Janousek v. Doyle, 313 F.2d 916, 920 (8th Cir. 

1963) (per curiam) (“[W]here . . . the appeal is from an interlocutory order denying a motion for preliminary injunction, 

. . . the filing of the notice of appeal from such an order does not ipso facto divest the district court of jurisdiction to 

proceed with the cause with respect to any matter not involved in the appeal, or operate to automatically stay other 

proceedings in the cause pending the appeal.”). But see Minn. Voters All. v. Walz, 494 F. Supp. 3d 610, 611 (D. Minn. 

Oct. 13, 2020) (“Under Janousek, then, the Court appears to lack jurisdiction to further address the merits of plaintiffs’ 

claims, as those merits are intimately ‘involved in the appeal.’”). 

18 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 183–96. It is important to note that the teachers’ First Amendment challenge is 

limited to the alleged regulation of classroom instruction. The operative Complaint does not include claims about 

teacher speech outside of the classroom. It does not even include claims about teacher speech inside the classroom 

but outside the context of academic instruction. This understanding of the operative Complaint is consistent with 

Plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of the teachers’ First Amendment claims in their Response in Opposition to Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss. See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 27–38; see also Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) 

at 26. 

19 See Br. for Appellees at 44–52, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024). 

20 See id.; Reply for Appellants at 17–20, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024). 

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In the Preliminary Injunction Order, the Court concluded that: (1) curricular instruction by 

public high school teachers constitutes government speech; and (2) accordingly, a state may 

proscribe what a public high school teacher may and may not say (and what materials a teacher 

may and may not use) in the classroom as part of academic instruction without implicating that 

teacher’s Free Speech rights.21 In the pending Motion to Dismiss, Defendants ask the Court to 

stand by that conclusion, which would in turn lead to dismissal of the teachers’ Free Speech 

claims.22 On the other hand, unsurprisingly, Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider the conclusion.23 

The Court does neither—yet. There are good reasons to wait for the Eighth Circuit’s resolution of 

this particular legal question. 

For starters, the legal question—whether and to what extent public high school teachers 

have Free Speech rights in their classroom instruction—is one of first impression in this Circuit 

and the subject of a fairly deep circuit split.24 Although this Court found Judge Sutton’s side of 

the circuit split compelling,25 the Court can’t entirely foreclose the possibility that the Eighth 

Circuit will adopt the other side of the circuit split. Instead of throwing out claims that the Eighth 

21 See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 26–27. 

22 See Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 55) at 23. 

23 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 27–38.

24 See Prelim Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 26–27. Some circuits hold that curricular speech does not implicate the Free 

Speech rights of primary and secondary public school teachers. See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 

(3d Cir. 1998); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 697 (4th Cir. 2007); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 

890 F.2d 794, 795 (5th Cir. 1989); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 

332, 342 (6th Cir. 2010); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007). Other circuits 

apply the “legitimate pedagogical concern” test in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988), to 

public school teacher curricular speech. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452–53 (1st Cir. 1993); Silano v. Sag 

Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722–23 (2d Cir. 1994); Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 

773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991). The D.C. Circuit applied 

Pickering’s balancing test in Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969). And the Eighth and Ninth 

Circuits have not yet taken a side in the circuit split. See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 

1148–49 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 26 n.144. 

25 See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 27. 

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Circuit could find viable in a few months, it is fairer and more efficient for this Court to hold off 

on a dismissal ruling for now.26 

Moreover, the legal question presented by Plaintiffs is not a “yes or no” question. Here in 

District Court, Plaintiffs have proposed two alternative legal tests to govern the analysis of the 

teachers’ Free Speech claims.27 And, in the preliminary injunction appeal, Plaintiffs have 

suggested that the Eighth Circuit adopt some sort of balancing test.28 Even assuming that this 

Court were inclined to reconsider the conclusion it reached at the preliminary injunction stage,29

judicial efficiency and economy strongly counsel in favor of letting the Eighth Circuit decide the 

contours of the appropriate legal test (if any) to apply—a far better alternative than having this 

Court apply one of the requested tests only to discover a few months down the road that the Eighth 

Circuit favors a different test (or no test at all). 

B. Students’ Free Speech Claims 

Unlike the teachers’ Free Speech claims, the students’ Free Speech claims are directly at 

issue in the Eighth Circuit appeal. The principal fight on appeal is whether the Eighth Circuit 

should overrule (or recognize the demise of) Pratt v. Independent School District No. 831 in light 

of the government-speech doctrine established by Supreme Court cases post-dating Pratt.

30 Put 

another way, do the Supreme Court’s government-speech cases mean that a public high school 

student’s Free Speech rights are not implicated when a state prohibits the teaching of certain 

26 The Court does not mean, in any way, to suggest that it believes the Eighth Circuit will come to a contrary conclusion 

from the one reached by this Court on this question. The Court only means to acknowledge the theoretical possibility 

of that occurring. 

27 Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 30–33. 

28 Br. for Appellees at 48, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024). 

29 That would be a heck of an assumption. 

30 See 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Br. for Appellants at 20–30, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed 

May 10, 2024); Br. for Appellees at 18–27, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024). 

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information (or teaching from a certain perspective) even in the absence of a legitimate 

pedagogical reason for the prohibition? Once again, the parties’ Eighth Circuit briefs spill plenty 

of ink on opposing sides of that question.31 And it is a near certainty that the Eighth Circuit is 

going to resolve that question when it resolves the appeal. 

In the Preliminary Injunction Order, the Court (reluctantly) concluded that it was bound by 

the basic holding of Pratt: Public high school students have a Free-Speech-based “right to receive” 

information and thus a state may not prohibit the teaching of certain materials (or teaching from a 

certain perspective) absent a legitimate pedagogical reason for the prohibition.32 The Court made 

plain, however, that, “were it writing on a clean slate,” the Court would conclude that no such 

“right to receive” exists in the context of classroom instruction in public high schools.33 The sole 

obstacle to that clean-slate conclusion was Pratt. 

In the pending Motion to Dismiss, Defendants contend that Pratt is not binding on the 

Court and that the Court should thus adopt its clean-slate conclusion.34 Plaintiffs, on the other 

hand, urge the Court to stick with its preliminary injunction conclusion that Pratt is binding.35 But 

there are good reasons to wait for the Eighth Circuit’s resolution of the Pratt question with respect 

to the students’ Free Speech claims. 

As this Court has previously intimated, to the extent it is still good law at all, Pratt is 

hanging on by the barest of threads.36 Although the Court concluded that Pratt was still binding 

on district courts in the Eighth Circuit, the Court was pretty clear that it believed the Eighth Circuit 

31 See supra note 30. 

32 See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 35–37; see also Pratt, 670 F.2d at 777.

33 Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 34–35. 

34 Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 55) at 13–15. 

35 Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 12–14. 

36 See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 36. 

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should either acknowledge the demise of Pratt or overrule it.37 (If that was not clear from the 

Preliminary Injunction Order, it should be clear now.) Where, as here, there is a significant 

potential that the Eighth Circuit will shortly discard a seemingly stale and suspect opinion, it would 

be a waste of judicial resources (and the resources of the parties) to proceed before the Eighth 

Circuit issues its ruling. This alone would justify holding the Pratt portion of the Motion to 

Dismiss in abeyance. 

But there’s more at stake than just judicial economy, judicial efficiency, and waste of 

resources. If Pratt applies, and if the “right to receive” claims otherwise make it past the motion 

to dismiss stage, the Pratt inquiry will likely require the Court to (1) delve into the motivations 

and intent of lawmakers and state officials in enacting and enforcing the anti-indoctrination 

provision of the LEARNS Act, and (2) determine whether the justifications given by those persons 

were in fact sham reasons intended to mask illegitimate aims.38 This might even call for testimony 

from such persons.39 The point is that, at the very least, litigating the merits of the Pratt claims 

will likely implicate serious federalism and separation of powers concerns—during the discovery 

process, at summary judgment, throughout the trial, and in the Court’s ultimate decision.40 There 

are, of course, times when such inquiries are necessary.41 At such times, the unseemliness of those 

inquiries is not a reason to abdicate the judicial role. But, given the fairly unique posture of this 

case, the looming federalism and separation of powers concerns strongly counsel the Court to 

37 See id. at 36–37.

38 See Pratt, 670 F.2d at 778–79. 

39 Cf. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (“In some extraordinary instances 

the members might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although even 

then such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege.”). 

40 Cf. id. at 268 & n.18 (adverting to the difficult issues at play when testimony from lawmakers and government 

officials is sought). 

41 See id. at 268 (“The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are 

contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.”). 

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exercise a little patience and wait for the Eighth Circuit to explain whether Pratt remains good law 

in this Circuit and applies to this case. 

 This is especially true because there is a good chance that the Court’s Preliminary 

Injunction Order was wrong insofar as it concluded that Pratt is still binding. In that prior Order—

which (by definition) was preliminary in nature and produced under significant time constraints—

the Court was operating under the assumption that a federal district court’s obligation is to follow 

the decision (i.e., the holding) of its parent circuit court unless (1) a subsequent Supreme Court 

case expressly overruled the circuit decision, or (2) the circuit decision is clearly irreconcilable 

with one or more subsequent Supreme Court decisions.42 On closer (and less harried) study, 

however, it appears that the Eighth Circuit applies a different standard—allowing panels of the 

Eighth Circuit and federal district courts in the Eighth Circuit to disregard Eighth Circuit decisions 

when they are “cast into doubt by an intervening Supreme Court decision.”43 Although the relevant 

Eighth Circuit cases don’t do much by way of defining “cast into doubt,” that language itself 

suggests a test that is a bit less stringent than the test this Court used in the Preliminary Injunction 

Order. Indeed, in at least one case, the Eighth Circuit has acknowledged a substantive difference 

between the “cast into doubt” standard and the “clearly irreconcilable” standard.44 

42 See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 35–37. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“We do not 

acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, 

overruled an earlier precedent. We reaffirm that ‘[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet 

appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which 

directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas 

v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))); Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We 

hold that the issues decided by the higher court need not be identical in order to be controlling. Rather, the relevant 

court of last resort must have undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way 

that the cases are clearly irreconcilable. The present case is an example where intervening Supreme Court authority 

is clearly irreconcilable with our prior circuit authority.”). 

43 United States v. Taylor, 803 F.3d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). See also United States v. Steward, 598 F.3d 

960, 962 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat’l Park Med. Ctr., Inc., 413 F.3d 897, 904 (8th 

Cir. 2005). 

44 See United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892, 898 n.4 (8th Cir. 2009) (“In the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge 

panel may reexamine a prior panel decision only if a supervening Supreme Court decision is ‘clearly irreconcilable.’ 

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 If the “cast into doubt” standard is truly the one that a federal district court in the Eighth 

Circuit must apply when determining if an Eighth Circuit decision binds it,45 then Pratt does not 

remain good law and federal district courts are no longer bound by it. That this is the Court’s view 

should be clear from what the Court previously said in its Preliminary Injunction Order.46 But 

perhaps a word or two more on the point would be useful. 

 As best the Court can tell, the Supreme Court has historically recognized a “right to 

receive” information from private speakers only. The Supreme Court’s true “right to receive” cases 

have been laser focused on government action that prevented a private person or private entity 

from receiving or listening to the speech of another private person or private entity.47 To be sure, 

By contrast, we may reconsider a prior panel’s decision if a supervening Supreme Court decision ‘undermines or casts 

doubt on the earlier panel decision.’” (quoting K.C. 1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1022 (8th Cir. 

2007))). 

45 The Court maintains some skepticism that a district court should be able to disregard an Eighth Circuit panel decision 

as freely as a subsequent Eighth Circuit panel could disregard it. Although vertical stare decisis and horizontal stare 

decisis share many characteristics, common sense suggests that vertical stare decisis is more important to a wellfunctioning judiciary. Vertical stare decisis should thus be harder to escape. Cf. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 

124 n.5 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To be clear, the stare decisis issue in this case is one of horizontal stare 

decisis—that is, the respect that this Court owes to its own precedents and the circumstances under which this Court 

may appropriately overrule a precedent. By contrast, vertical stare decisis is absolute, as it must be in a hierarchical 

system with one supreme Court. In other words, the state courts and the other federal courts have a constitutional 

obligation to follow a precedent of this Court unless and until it is overruled by this Court.” (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted)). But the relevant Eighth Circuit precedent (softly) suggests otherwise. See supra note 43. 

If the Eighth Circuit were so inclined, the appeal of the Preliminary Injunction Order in this case presents a good 

vehicle to address more directly what quantum of tension is necessary between an Eighth Circuit precedent and 

subsequent Supreme Court cases before a federal district court (as opposed to an Eighth Circuit panel) can disregard 

that Eighth Circuit precedent. And if the same quantum of tension that an Eighth Circuit panel needs to disregard a 

prior panel opinion is all that is necessary for a district court to do the same, district courts would be significantly 

assisted by some further definition of the “cast into doubt” standard. 

46 See Prelim Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 36–37 (“Make no mistake: Pratt is something akin to zombie precedent. As 

Defendants (and the cases they cite) point out: (1) the modern government-speech doctrine refuses to subject pure 

government speech to Free Speech Clause scrutiny; and (2) selection and implementation of curricula in a school 

setting is pure government speech. How do these two inputs possibly lead to an output that subjects selection and 

implementation of curricula to Free Speech Clause scrutiny? They don’t.” (footnotes and citations omitted)). 

47 See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (protecting speech rights of private corporation 

in part to protect rights of those who would hear its message); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 

Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976) (allowing consumers to assert a right to receive information from 

pharmacists concerning drug prices); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408–09 (1974) (non-inmates who would 

have received inmate correspondence could challenge censorship of inmate mail under First Amendment right to 

receive doctrine), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989); Kleindienst v. 

Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–65 (1972) (concerning university professors’ and university students’ rights to listen to 

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in the 1950s and ’60s, a number of Supreme Court cases waxed eloquent about the importance of 

free discussion and debate in academic settings.48 But those cases were not actually “right to 

receive” cases; the plaintiffs in those cases were not students or other potential recipients of 

information. A Free-Speech-Clause-based “right to receive” information from others has always 

been justified (at the Supreme Court) as a direct corollary of the right of others to provide the 

information. 

That should not come as a huge surprise. The “right to receive” cases reflect nothing more 

than the following two common sense propositions: (1) “[t]he dissemination of ideas can 

accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them”; and 

(2) “[i]t would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”49 The 

caselaw’s emphasis is on the link between a speaker’s right to speak and a listener’s right to listen 

and debate a Marxist Belgian journalist); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (government could not 

criminalize mere possession of obscenity in part because “the Constitution protects the right to receive information 

and ideas”); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (private citizen had a right to get mail from 

communists); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (union members had a right to listen to speech of union 

boss that was concomitant to union boss’s right to speak to union members); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 

143 (1943) (local government could not blanketly prevent door-to-door leaflet distribution in part because First 

Amendment “necessarily protects the right” of homeowners “to receive” that information); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 

U.S. 390, 399–403 (1923) (government could not prevent teacher in private parochial school from teaching German 

to young students). This is not an exhaustive list of cases, but it is a representative one. 

48 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy 

v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250–51 (1957). 

49 Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Pico, 

457 U.S. 853 (1982)—especially given the heavily fractured nature of the majority in that case—did not change this. 

Although some of the justices’ opinions adventurously attempted to recast the right to receive information from private 

speakers into a right to force a public school to provide students access to information, see Pico, 457 U.S. at 885–91 

(Burger, J., dissenting), no opinion garnered a majority of justices. Moreover, Justice White’s decisive concurrence 

in the judgment (which controls under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)) was anodyne enough that 

nearly nothing of substance was actually done in Pico. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 883–84 (White, J., concurring). In any 

event, even the plurality opinion in Pico limited its analysis to curation of school libraries, which the Eighth Circuit 

has recently explained is not government speech. See id. at 861–62; GLBT Youth in Iowa Schs. Task Force v. Reynolds, 

114 F.4th 660, 667–68 (8th Cir. 2024). The Pico plurality explicitly disclaimed deciding anything about the interplay 

between the “right to receive” and a school’s curricular decisions. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 861–62. 

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(or receive). The right to receive—properly understood—has never been the right of a listener to 

demand that a speaker say something that the speaker does not want to say.50

It is in this context that the Supreme Court’s post-Pratt government-speech cases cast real 

doubt on Pratt. Under the modern government-speech doctrine, government speech (or the 

government’s decision not to speak) does not implicate the Free Speech Clause.51 Put another way, 

private citizens can’t use the Free Speech Clause as a sword to make the government speak, speak 

in a certain way, or refrain from speaking. And it would be odd in the extreme if the only exception 

to this rule was that public high school (or primary school) students could use the Free Speech 

Clause to make the government speak in ways it didn’t want to speak or to stop the government 

from speaking in ways it wanted to speak. Although Tinker makes clear that students do not “shed 

their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”52 neither 

do their rights get supercharged at that gate.53

As the Court has previously acknowledged, it is not one hundred percent clear that the 

Supreme Court’s government-speech cases are irreconcilable with Pratt.

54 Moreover, the Eighth 

Circuit has recently reminded us all of the Supreme Court’s warning to “exercise great caution 

50 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756 (“Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker.”). 

51 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“If petitioners were engaging in their own expressive 

conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of 

private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”); see also Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243, 251 

(2022) (“The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause does not prevent the government from declining to express a 

view.”).

52 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 

53 Cf. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 594 U.S. 180, 187–88 (2021) (recognizing that, although “[m]inors 

are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection,” student speech may be regulated in ways that 

non-student speech may not (quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 794 (2011))). 

54 See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 36; see also Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2015) (attempting 

to harmonize the essential holding of Pratt with the modern government-speech doctrine). In addition to what the 

Court said in its Preliminary Injunction Order, it is worth noting that the Court’s “right to receive” analysis in the 

instant Order is premised on public high school classroom instruction being considered government speech as opposed 

to a particular teacher’s speech. That premise is very likely correct, but GLBT has (indirectly) introduced a small bit 

of doubt on that point. See 114 F.4th at 667–68. 

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before extending [its] government-speech precedents.”55 Nonetheless, Pratt has been “cast into 

doubt” by the government-speech cases, and, under Eighth Circuit precedent, that appears to mean 

it is no longer binding on this Court. The Court has already explained that, in a world without 

Pratt as binding precedent, the Court is persuaded by Defendants’ argument that public high school 

curricula and instruction are not subject to a Free Speech “right to receive” challenge.56 

55 GLBT, 114 F.4th at 668 (quoting Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 235 (2017)). The so-called “pall of orthodoxy” cases 

and Garcetti v. Caballos’s reservation of speech-related-to-teaching-issues are enough to raise a doubt as to whether 

the government-speech cases apply with full force to academic instruction cases. See 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (“We 

need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner 

to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”); Pico, 457 U.S. at 870 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he First 

Amendment . . . does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom . . . .” (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted)); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere 

more vital than in the community of American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The 

Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers 

truth out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.” (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted)). But that doubt is tiny when it comes to cases—like the one at bar—involving high school 

instruction as opposed to university instruction. High school teaching contains many more hallmarks of government 

speech than does professorial teaching. For example, when compared to professorial teaching, high school teaching 

is more likely to be perceived by the public as government speech and the government is more active in shaping and 

controlling the teaching. See Shurtleff, 596 U.S. at 252; Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 532 (8th Cir. 2016) 

(“‘[F]oremost among a school’s speech is its selection and implementation of a curriculum—the lessons students need 

to understand and the best way to impart those lessons—and public schools have broad discretion in making these 

choices.’” (quoting Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 732 (6th Cir. 2012))); see also Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 616 

(5th Cir. 2005) (“[S]chools engage in government speech when they set and implement education policy through the 

curriculum.”); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 796 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]here is no 

First Amendment problem . . . when a public school makes content-based decisions about its curriculum” because 

such decisions constitute government speech). In sum, it is sufficiently likely that the Supreme Court’s governmentspeech cases fully apply to public high school instruction, and that those cases therefore cast real doubt on Pratt. 

56 If the Court were going to formally decide the “right to receive” issue, it would provide more extensive analysis on 

this point and (perhaps) would also reach Defendants’ other arguments regarding the application of Pratt. Because 

the Court is holding this part of the Motion in abeyance, however, it need not do so at this time. Still, the Court does 

wish to acknowledge that this is a what’s-good-for-the-goose-is-good-for-the-gander situation. Today, Arkansas wants 

to (at least according to the First Amended Complaint’s allegations) curb the use of Critical Race Theory in K–12 

public schools. Tomorrow, a different state might instead require K–12 public schools to teach one or more subjects 

through the lens of Critical Race Theory. Five years from now, some third state might prevent its K–12 public schools 

from teaching about the biological differences between the sexes. Ten years from now, who knows? A state might 

want to prevent instruction about the Holocaust or the October 7th attack on Israel. And yet another might require K–

12 public schools to teach glowingly about Karl Marx, while omitting any discussion of either Adam Smith or the 

brutal realities of the Soviet Union and Communist China. 

The Free Speech Clause either applies to all these scenarios or it applies to none of them. And it would be extremely 

shortsighted to base that constitutional ruling on the policy outcome of a particular case. The people who would be 

happy if a state was allowed to prevent the use of Critical Race Theory in K–12 public schools may be the same people 

who would be upset if a state was allowed to prevent the teaching of biological differences between the sexes in K–

12 public schools. Courts must not focus on the very fleeting question of who prevails in a particular case. The focus 

must instead be on the broader tension between the respect for the authority of a democratically elected legislature 

and the concern that state-mandated propaganda in K–12 public schools will undermine democracy itself. 

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The point of all of this is that, if the Court were to issue a ruling now, that ruling would be 

to dismiss the students’ Free Speech claims. But doing so at this stage would not be fair to Plaintiffs 

or to the Eighth Circuit. It would cause significant judicial inefficiencies; it would completely 

alter the landscape of the preliminary injunction appeal; and it would waste the time and resources 

of the parties. Much better to hold this part of the Motion in abeyance until the Eighth Circuit 

rules on the preliminary injunction appeal. On the other hand, because of what the Court now 

thinks about the propriety of dismissal of the students’ Free Speech claims, it would be unfair to 

Defendants to begin the discovery process on these claims—which, as the Court discussed above, 

would very likely give rise to sensitive federalism and separation of powers issues.57 The Court 

understands Plaintiffs’ desire to get on with discovery. But the fairest thing all around at this point 

is to hold tight for the Eighth Circuit’s decision.58

Most Americans recognize that opting to send one’s children to K–12 public schools inherently gives the government 

a significant degree of power over what those children learn. On the other hand, most Americans are rightfully repelled 

by the idea of K–12 public schools being turned into dystopian tools of state propaganda. Plenty of us have read 

enough of Orwell, Bradbury, and Huxley to shudder at the thought. Long story short, the Court certainly understands 

the desire to have the judiciary police the line between a state’s legitimate educational choices and choices that amount 

to illegitimate state propaganda. But judges don’t have that power unless a provision in the Constitution gives it to 

us. And the Free Speech Clause simply doesn’t. 

Conduct is not unconstitutional just because it is bad—or really bad—or really, really bad—or even dangerous to 

democracy. The answer to the problem of potential propaganda in K–12 public schools does not lie in unshackling 

the Free Speech Clause from its original meaning. Rather, the answer lies in voters holding public officials 

accountable at the ballot box, in parents actively deciding the proper educational setting for their children, in 

competing speech from other entities, and in student speech. Seeking a quick fix from unelected judges—and 

transferring power away from the elected branches in the process—is exactly the wrong civics lesson to teach 

America’s youth. 

57 See supra page 8. 

58 With respect to the students’ Free Speech claims, the Eighth Circuit could construe this Order as an indicative ruling 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a)(3). But, even if it did so, there are good reasons for the Eighth 

Circuit to go ahead and decide the preliminary injunction appeal rather than remanding it. The Preliminary Injunction 

that the Court issued is very narrow. The injunction only enjoins enforcement of the anti-indoctrination provision 

against two people: Ms. Walls and Mr. Gilbert. And what it enjoins is action that Defendants contend is unauthorized 

by the statute in the first place. See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 47–50. The only real effect of remand would be 

to lengthen the time it would take for the parties to get a definitive Eighth Circuit ruling on several difficult legal 

questions involved in this case. That is why this Order—with respect to the students’ Free Speech claims—is better 

construed as a Rule 62.1(a)(1) deferral. 

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C. Teachers’ Due Process Claims 

In their First Amended Complaint, the teachers claim that the anti-indoctrination provision 

of the LEARNS Act violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the 

provision “fails to provide persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited” or “is 

so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”59 These 

are void-for-vagueness claims. Like the students’ Free Speech claims, the teachers’ void-forvagueness claims are directly at issue in the preliminary injunction appeal.60 And, once again, the 

parties’ Eighth Circuit briefs spill plenty of ink on opposing sides of that question.61 Given the 

disputed terrain in that appeal, it appears likely that the Eighth Circuit is either going to resolve 

the void-for-vagueness issue or resolve one or more legal issues that are intimately tied up with 

the void-for-vagueness issue. 

In its Preliminary Injunction Order, the Court had occasion to preliminarily parse some of 

the relevant statutory language.62 But, for reasons explained in that Order, the Court did not have 

to decide whether the anti-indoctrination provision’s language is so unclear as to violate the Due 

Process Clause.63 In the Motion to Dismiss briefing, Defendants ask the Court to conclude that 

59 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 164.

60 In its Preliminary Injunction Order, the Court did not reach the merits of the void-for-vagueness issue. See Prelim. 

Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 25–33. In the Eighth Circuit appeal, Plaintiffs fault the Court for not reaching the merits of 

those claims and ask the Eighth Circuit to do so. See Br. for Appellees at 34–35, 44–45, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 

(8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024). 

61 See Br. for Appellees at 35–44, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024); Reply for 

Appellants at 20–22, Walls v. Oliva, No. 24-1990 (8th Cir. appeal docketed May 10, 2024). 

62 See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 37–42. 

63 See Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 25–33. In the Preliminary Injunction Order, the Court characterized the teachers’ 

concern about the anti-indoctrination provision sweeping in teaching (in addition to compulsion) as “not . . . frivolous” 

and “quite reasonable.” Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 42. Those characterizations were not intended to be a comment 

on whether the anti-indoctrination provision was so unclear as to violate the Due Process Clause. As we all know, 

two judges (or parties) having a reasonable disagreement over language does not automatically mean that the language 

is so unclear as to violate the Due Process Clause. See Williams v. Brewer, 442 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 1971) (“A 

statute is not necessarily void for vagueness simply because it may be ambiguous or open to two constructions.”); 

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the anti-indoctrination provision is clear enough to pass what they see as the Due Process Clause’s 

fairly low clarity bar.64 Plaintiffs say that the bar is higher than Defendants contend.65 But they 

also say that the provision is so unclear as to fail even the lowest bar possible under the 

Constitution.66 Here again, there are good reasons to hold off deciding between the parties’ 

positions. 

Under current Supreme Court precedent, the level of clarity necessary for a statutory 

provision to comply with the dictates of the Due Process Clause depends on the context in which 

the provision operates.67 In the instant case, one particularly important contextual question is 

whether the anti-indoctrination provision is operating in a context where Free Speech rights are at 

stake.68 If the provision is operating in such a context, a heightened level of clarity is required.69 

If it is not, a far lower level of clarity is required (absent another triggering context).70

That context question—regarding whether Free Speech rights are at stake here—is 

intertwined with the issues already discussed with respect to the first two buckets of claims. So, 

Hand v. Beach Ent. KC, LCC, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1130 (W.D. Mo. 2019) (“That courts have come to different 

conclusions in their interpretations does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague.”). 

64 See Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 55) at 19–22. 

65 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 20. 

66 See id. at 20–26.

67 See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (“The degree of vagueness that the Constitution 

tolerates . . . depends in part on the nature of the enactment.”). 

68 See Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1308–09 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[B]ecause the literal scope 

of the . . . regulation ‘is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a 

greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.’” (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974))); Video 

Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689–90 (8th Cir. 1992) (“A stringent vagueness test applies to a law 

that interferes with the right of free speech.”). 

69 See supra note 68. 

70 See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498–99. It is true that the heightened clarity bar may apply, in some form, to civil 

statutes that create a “particularly severe penalty” for statutory violations. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148, 156–

57 (2018). Whether such consequences flow from this statute—specifically, whether the loss of a teaching license is 

a “particularly severe penalty” for purposes of this analysis—is a novel and difficult question that should only be 

answered if it has to be. It is not appropriate to answer that question here, in the context of an Order holding the 

relevant portion of the Motion in abeyance. Time will tell whether that question needs to be answered at all.

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for all the reasons set forth in the sections above, patience is once again a virtue. After the Eighth 

Circuit rules on the preliminary injunction appeal, the Court will be in a better position to 

determine whether the heightened clarity bar or the lower clarity bar applies and to judge the 

anti-indoctrination provision accordingly. 

III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 

Plaintiffs contend that the anti-indoctrination provision of the LEARNS Act violates the 

Equal Protection rights of African American public high school teachers and students.71 These 

claims were not at issue at the preliminary injunction stage and thus were not addressed by the 

Court in its Preliminary Injunction Order. The Equal Protection claims are not at issue in the 

appeal. Nor are they significantly intertwined with any of the issues that are on appeal. So the 

Court will address the merits of Defendants’ request to dismiss the Equal Protection claims.72

A. Background Facts73

Governor Sanders was inaugurated on January 10, 2023.74 In her inauguration speech, she 

stated: “Today I will . . . sign an executive order preventing the political indoctrination of 

Arkansas’s schoolchildren. As long as I am [G]overnor, our schools will focus on the skills our 

children need to get ahead in the modern world—not brainwashing our children with a left-wing 

political agenda.”75 True to her word, on her first day in office, Governor Sanders issued an 

“Executive Order to Prohibit Indoctrination and Critical Race Theory in Schools.”76 The 

Executive Order reads as follows: 

71 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 197–213. 

72 Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 55) at 23–27. 

73 See supra page 2 (explaining the specific way the Court must treat the record at the motion to dismiss stage). 

74 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 59. 

75 Id.

76 Id. ¶ 61.

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WHEREAS: Schools must educate, not indoctrinate students; and their education 

policies must protect children and prepare them to enter the 

workforce; 

WHEREAS: Teachers and school administrators should teach students how to 

think—not what to think; 

WHEREAS: Critical Race Theory (CRT) is antithetical to the traditional 

American values of neutrality, equality, and fairness. It emphasizes 

skin color as a person’s primary characteristic, thereby resurrecting 

segregationist values, which America has fought so hard to reject; 

WHEREAS: It is the policy of this administration that CRT, discrimination, and 

indoctrination have no place in Arkansas classrooms; 

WHEREAS: Government policies must empower parents to make decisions for 

their children and foster curriculum transparency in classrooms 

across the state; and 

WHEREAS: The Constitution of the State of Arkansas and the Constitution of the 

United States of America recognize the equal value of every 

individual, and provide equal protection under the law, regardless of 

color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, marital status, familial status, 

disability, religion, and national origin. 

NOW, THEREFORE, I, SARAH HUCKABEE SANDERS, acting under the 

authority vested in me as the Governor of the State of Arkansas, do hereby order 

the following: 

(1) The Secretary of the Department of Education (the “Secretary”) shall take the 

following steps to ensure that the Department of Education, its employees, 

contractors, guest speakers, and lecturers are in compliance with Title IV and 

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241): 

a. Review the rules, regulations, policies, materials, and communications of 

the Department of Education to identify any items that may, purposely or 

otherwise, promote teaching that would indoctrinate students with 

ideologies, such as CRT, that conflict with the principle of equal protection 

under the law or encourage students to discriminate against someone based 

on the individual’s color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, marital status, 

familial status, disability, religion, national origin, or any other 

characteristic protected by federal or state law. 

b. The Secretary is further instructed that if any items are found to conflict 

with the principle of equal protection under the law, then the Secretary is 

instructed to amend, annul, or alter those rules, regulations, policies, 

materials, or communications to remove the prohibited indoctrination. 

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c. Prohibited Indoctrination Defined: No communication by a public-school 

employee, public school representative, or guest speaker shall compel a 

person to adopt, affirm or profess an idea in violation of Title IV and Title 

VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241), including 

that: 

i. People of one color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, marital status, 

familial status, disability, religion, national origin, or any other 

characteristic protected by federal or state law are inherently superior or 

inferior to people of another color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, 

marital status, familial status, disability, religion, national origin, or any 

other characteristic protected by federal or state law. 

ii. An individual should be discriminated against or receive adverse 

treatment solely or partly because of the individual’s color, creed, race, 

ethnicity, sex, age, marital status, familial status, disability, religion, 

national origin, or any other characteristic protected by federal or state 

law. 

d. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the discussion of ideas 

and history of the concepts described in subsection (c) or shall be construed 

to prohibit the discussion of public policy issues of the day and related ideas 

that individuals may find unwelcome, disagreeable or offensive. 

(2) As it relates to employees, contractors, and guest speakers or lecturers of the 

Department of Education, the Secretary is directed to review and enhance the 

policies that prevent prohibited indoctrination, including CRT. 

(3) The Secretary shall ensure that no school employee or student shall be required 

to attend trainings or orientations based on prohibited indoctrination or CRT. 

This Executive Order shall become effective upon its signing and shall remain in 

full force and effect until amended or rescinded by further executive orders.77

77 Ark. Executive Order 23-05. According to Plaintiffs, this Executive Order did not just come out of thin air. Rather, 

it was an intellectual descendant of an Executive Order that President Trump had signed back in September of 2020. 

See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 52–58. Plaintiffs allege that President Trump’s Executive Order was one part of a 

coordinated attempt to undermine “the nation’s reckoning with injustice against Black people in 2020 . . . .” Id. ¶ 53. 

Plaintiffs allege that President Trump’s Executive Order directed federal agencies to “cease training on critical race 

theory, intersectionality, systemic racism, Black Lives Matter, white privilege, or any other training or propaganda 

effort.” Id. ¶ 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). The President’s Executive Order also, according to Plaintiffs, 

identified prohibited concepts that could not be part of training, such as (1) the idea that “an individual, by virtue of 

his or her race or sex, is inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously,” and (2) the 

idea that “an individual should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment solely or partly because of his or 

her race or sex.” Id. ¶ 56 (internal quotation marks omitted). President Biden later withdrew the Executive Order. Id.

¶ 57. 

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Pursuant to the Executive Order, the Arkansas Department of Education took a number of 

actions broadly related to Critical Race Theory.78 For example, the Arkansas Department of 

Education had concerns about teacher training materials from Code.org, an organization Arkansas 

uses to train teachers for AP Computer Science Principles courses. Those materials asked teachers 

to “address their ‘unconscious biases’ and craft an ‘equity framework.’”79 The Arkansas 

Department of Education concluded that, inter alia, the materials “encouraged teachers to first and 

foremost look at students through the lens of race . . . .”80 Accordingly, “[t]he Arkansas 

Department of Education reached out to Code.org and received assurance that teaching materials 

are open source and could be adapted to reflect Arkansas’ ban on indoctrination in school.”81

For another example, the Arkansas Department of Education took issue with a presentation 

delivered by a team from Arkansas State University to teachers at North Little Rock School 

District.82 In that presentation, teachers were (1) instructed to “acknowledge that [they] harbor 

unconscious biases,” (2) asked “to host conversations in their classrooms around ‘systemic 

racism,’” and (3) encouraged “to curtail disciplinary policies if [those policies] disproportionately 

affect students of a certain background . . . .”83 The program also contained material that the 

Arkansas Department of Education believed justified looting, denigrated law enforcement officers, 

and “positively highlighted actions taken to appease leftists in the wake of the 2020 Black Lives 

Matter riots, including . . . removing historical monuments[] and renaming brands like Aunt 

78 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 63; see also Indoctrination and CRT Examples in Arkansas and Gov. Sanders 

Administration Actions at 2, https://arkansasadvocate.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/CRT-Admin-Action.pdf 

[cited in First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 63 n.17 and hereinafter “Indoctrination and CRT Examples”]. 

79 Indoctrination and CRT Examples at 2; see also First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 63. 

80 Indoctrination and CRT Examples at 2; First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 63. 

81 Indoctrination and CRT Examples at 2. 

82 Id. at 1. 

83 Id.

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Jemima syrup.”84 The Arkansas Department of Education contacted both Arkansas State 

University and North Little Rock School District.85 Both the University and the School District 

“promised to revise their internal approval process for teacher training materials and to end the 

dissemination of divisive content.”86

For a third example related to Critical Race Theory, the Arkansas Department of Education 

expressed concern when Fayetteville Public Schools distributed a survey during a teacher-led 

professional development training.87 The survey asked participants if (1) they rejected the 

“privileges that come with white racial identity,” (2) they “advocate[d] for cultural competency 

and social justice effectively and professionally,” (3) they regularly examined data regarding the 

race, gender, ethnicity, and language of their students for the purpose of “monitor[ing] and 

manag[ing] equitable access and support services,” (4) “they allow students to raise the awareness 

of teachers ‘by questioning bias assumptions or behaviors observed in our school environment,’” 

(5) they were “aware of their own privileges, stereotypes, and biases,” and (6) they were “brave 

equity warriors.”88 The Arkansas Department of Education reached out to Fayetteville Public 

Schools.89 The Superintendent said that the District would ensure that the survey would not be 

disseminated in the future and that all future professional development materials would be 

reviewed to ensure compliance with Governor Sanders’s Executive Order.90

84 Id. 

85 Id. at 2. 

86 Id. 

87 Id. at 4. 

88 Id. 

89 Id. 

90 Id. 

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The foregoing examples come from a document disseminated by the Arkansas Department 

of Education titled “Indoctrination and CRT Examples in Arkansas and Gov. Sanders 

Administration Actions.”91 The document includes more than just Arkansas Department of 

Education actions with respect to Critical Race Theory. It also includes Arkansas Department of 

Education actions with respect to gender theory and sexuality issues.92 

In addition to the actions described in the just-discussed document, Governor Sanders and 

Secretary Oliva—pursuant to the Executive Order—ordered the Arkansas Department of 

Education to remove certain social studies resources that it made available to teachers.93 

According to Plaintiffs, these resources concerned the cultural and legal victories won by African 

Americans over the course of our nation’s history.94 And they were removed because they 

included context regarding the historical suffering of African Americans.95 Around the same time, 

91 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 63. 

92 For example, the Arkansas Department of Education noted that Fayetteville School District had asked students to 

identify their gender identity, conspired to keep that gender identity secret from students’ parents, and used biologically 

incorrect pronouns like they/them/theirs to refer to a singular student. See Indoctrination and CRT Examples at 1. 

The Arkansas Department of Education reached out to Fayetteville School District to notify it that its actions violated 

Governor Sanders’s Executive Order. Id. The District promised that it (1) would “remove gender theory from 

classroom materials,” and (2) “would not hide a child’s ‘gender identity’ from parents.” Id. 

For another example, the Arkansas Department of Education took action when Pulaski County Special School District 

“allowed teachers to hang divisive materials in their classrooms, including the pride flag.” Id. at 2–3. The Arkansas 

Department of Education had concerns that this would communicate to students “that only one outlook on gender and 

sexuality is acceptable in schools.” Id. at 2. “The district also posted pride month messages on elementary school 

marquees and on social media.” Id. The Arkansas Department of Education, and Secretary Oliva himself, discussed 

their concerns with the District. Id. at 4. The District “agreed to review its policies.” Id.

In yet a third example, the Arkansas Department of Education expressed concern when Lakeside School District 

“included teaching materials that highlighted groups like ‘Genderqueer’” and shared a document with students in the 

fourth grade titled “Sex, Gender and Society.” Id. The document, defining “biological sex,” had this to say: “Your 

biological sex is based on the genitals you’re born with and the chromosomes you have. At birth, most people are 

either male or female.” Id. But the document went on to define “gender identity” in contradistinction to biological 

sex: “[Gender identity is] how you feel and how you think about yourself when it comes to gender. Everyone’s gender 

identity is unique to them and should be respected.” Id. The Arkansas Department of Education contacted the 

Superintendent of Lakeside School District, and the Superintendent communicated that the District would review the 

materials. Id. 

93 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 65. 

94 Id. 

95 Id. 

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other social studies resources were introduced by the Arkansas Department of Education, including 

materials from “1776 Unites,” which Plaintiffs refer to as “a conservative project.”96 Plaintiffs 

assert that these new materials downplay the historical challenges faced by African Americans.97 

The new materials “focus on voices in the black community who celebrate black excellence, 

discourage victimhood culture, and showcase the millions of black Americans who have prospered 

by embracing the founding ideals of America.”98 

The instant case does not include a challenge to the Executive Order. But, according to 

Plaintiffs, the adoption and implementation of the Executive Order is important background to 

understand because the Executive Order was the model for the statutory provision that is 

challenged in the instant case.99 The Court now turns to the adoption and enforcement of that 

statutory provision. 

i. Adoption of the LEARNS Act 

The LEARNS Act was introduced in the Arkansas Senate on February 20, 2023, as 

S.B. 294—a 144-page long bill addressing a wide variety of issues involving education.100 The 

anti-indoctrination provision is but one small part of the LEARNS Act.101 On February 22, 2023, 

the Arkansas Senate Education Committee held a meeting to discuss and vote on the LEARNS 

Act.102 During that meeting, Secretary Oliva testified that the language of the LEARNS Act’s 

96 Id. ¶ 66. 

97 Id. 

98 Id. 

99 Id. ¶ 68. 

100 Id. ¶ 67. Plaintiffs have characterized the LEARNS Act as a reform of the Arkansas education system. See id. ¶ 3; 

Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 46. 

101 See LEARNS Act, Act 237 of 2023. 

102 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 67. 

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anti-indoctrination provision mirrored the language of Governor Sanders’s Executive Order.103 

The bill was passed out of the Committee and proceeded to a full vote in the Arkansas Senate a 

day later on February 23, 2023.104 The Senate—split along partisan lines—adopted the bill.105 

The bill then moved to the Arkansas House Education Committee on March 1, 2023.106 After 

passing out of the Committee, the bill proceeded to a full House vote on March 2, 2023.107 The 

bill was adopted—again along partisan lines.108 Governor Sanders signed the LEARNS Act into 

law on March 8, 2023.109

The anti-indoctrination provision can be found at section 6-16-156 of the Arkansas Code. 

It reads as follows: 

(a)(1) The Secretary of the Department of Education shall take established steps to 

ensure that the Department of Education and its employees, contractors, guest 

speakers, and lecturers are in compliance with Title IV and Title VI of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352. 

(2) Steps required under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall include the 

review of the rules, policies, materials, and communications of the Department 

of Education to identify any items that may, purposely or otherwise, promote 

teaching that would indoctrinate students with ideologies such as Critical Race 

Theory, otherwise known as “CRT”, that conflict with the principle of equal 

protection under the law or encourage students to discriminate against someone 

based on the individual’s color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, marital status, 

familial status, disability, religion, national origin, or any other characteristic 

protected by federal or state law. 

103 Id. ¶ 68. This is the meeting at which Secretary Oliva also allegedly testified as to his difficulty precisely defining 

Critical Race Theory. Id.

104 Id. ¶ 69. 

105 Id. The Arkansas Senate suspended its rules multiple times in the process leading up to the adoption of the 

LEARNS Act. See SB 294 Bill Information, ARKANSAS STATE LEGISLATURE, https://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/Bills/ 

Detail?id=sb294&ddBienniumSession=2023/2023R. 

106 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 69. 

107 Id. 

108 Id. The Arkansas House suspended its rules one time in the process leading up to the adoption of the LEARNS 

Act. See SB 294 Bill Information, supra note 105. 

109 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 69.

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(3) The secretary shall amend, annul, or alter the rules, policies, materials, or 

communications that are considered prohibited indoctrination and that conflict 

with the principle of equal protection under the law. 

(b) As used in this section, “prohibited indoctrination” means communication by a 

public school employee, public school representative, or guest speaker that compels 

a person to adopt, affirm, or profess an idea in violation of Title IV and Title VI of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, including that: 

(1) People of one color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, marital status, familial 

status, disability status, religion, national origin, or any other characteristic 

protected by federal or state law are inherently superior or inferior to people of 

another color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, marital status, familial status, 

disability status, religion, national origin, or any other characteristic protected 

by federal or state law; or 

(2) An individual should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment 

solely or partly because of the individual’s color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, 

marital status, familial status, disability status, religion, national origin, or any 

other characteristic protected by federal or state law. 

(c) This section does not prohibit the discussion of: 

(1) Ideas and the history of the concepts described in subsection (b) of this 

section; or 

(2) Public policy issues of the day and related ideas that individuals may find 

unwelcome, disagreeable, or offensive. 

(d) As it relates to employees, contractors, and guest speakers or lecturers of the 

department, the secretary shall review and enhance the policies that prevent 

prohibited indoctrination, including Critical Race Theory. 

(e) The secretary shall ensure that no public school employee or public school 

student shall be required to attend trainings or orientations based on prohibited 

indoctrination or Critical Race Theory. 

(f) The State Board of Education may promulgate rules to implement this section.110

110 Ark. Code Ann. § 6-16-156 (footnotes omitted). The majority of the LEARNS Act, including the anti-indoctrination 

provision, went into effect immediately upon being signed by the Governor. See LEARNS Act, Act 237 of 2023, 

§ 73(a). That is because the law as signed contained an emergency clause. See id. Although there was some 

controversy with respect to the effectiveness of the emergency clause, the Arkansas Supreme Court ultimately held 

that the LEARNS Act’s emergency clause “was passed in compliance with article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas 

Constitution.” Ark. Dep’t of Educ. v. Jackson, 2023 Ark. 140, at 8, 675 S.W.3d 416, 421. 

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ii. Enforcement of the LEARNS Act’s Anti-Indoctrination Provision

 Around the time that the LEARNS Act was signed into law in March of 2023, 

Secretary Oliva sat in on and observed Ms. Walls’s AP African American Studies (“AP AAS”) 

class at Central High School.111 This class was a pilot AP course being taught for the first time 

during the 2022–23 school year.112 The day after he observed the class, Secretary Oliva 

communicated to the Principal of Central High School that Secretary Oliva didn’t have a problem 

with Ms. Walls’s AP AAS class because she “is not teaching African American Studies. She’s 

really teaching African American History . . . .”113 

 But, on August 11, 2023, three days before the start of the 2023–24 school year, Ms. Walls 

learned that Secretary Oliva “had revoked the [Arkansas Department of Education’s] approval of 

AP AAS . . . .”114 The revocation applied to all six Arkansas schools set to teach the pilot AP AAS 

class, including Central High School.115 The revocation meant that the Arkansas Department of 

Education would not (1) count the AP AAS course toward graduation requirements, (2) cover the 

$98 exam fee for the course, or (3) permit the AP AAS course to be graded on the standard 5.0 

GPA scale for AP courses.116 Over the course of the next few days, Secretary Oliva provided 

several explanations for why approval of the AP AAS course had been revoked.117

In a discussion with Dr. Jermall Wright—Little Rock School District’s Superintendent—

Secretary Oliva explained that “the [Arkansas Department of Education] revoked 2023–24 

111 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 95. 

112 Id. ¶ 99. 

113 Id. ¶ 97. 

114 Id. ¶ 105. 

115 Id. 

116 Id. 

117 See id. ¶¶ 106–14. 

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AP AAS because it was still being piloted, and the College Board was unable to confirm with 

colleges and universities which college course would be its equivalent for crediting purposes.”118 

Secretary Oliva added that “Arkansas was unable to offer AP AAS as an approved course until the 

College Board resolved the issue[.]”119 Also, during this same discussion, Secretary Oliva told 

Dr. Wright that “problems . . . stemmed from the title of the course, ‘AP African American 

Studies[,]’” because “there was already an approved non-AP course titled ‘African American 

History,’ and the College Board’s decision to create [the] AP AAS course versus African American 

History complicated state approval of AP AAS . . . .”120 

Plaintiffs assert that Secretary Oliva’s statements to Dr. Wright were not accurate.121 

According to Plaintiffs, “‘[m]ore than 200 colleges and universities nationally [had] signed on to 

provide college credit, advanced placement, or both to students who have satisfactory performance 

on the AP African American Studies Exam . . . .’”122 Included among those 200 colleges and 

universities, Plaintiffs allege, was the University of Arkansas–Fayetteville, which “planned to 

accept 2023–24 AP AAS course credit for qualifying AP students who passed the AP exam . . . .”123

 Separate from his discussion with Dr. Wright, Secretary Oliva soon provided Little Rock 

School District an additional explanation for why approval for the AP AAS course had been 

revoked.124 He told the District that “state approval for AP AAS was revoked because its course 

118 Id. ¶ 106. 

119 Id. 

120 Id. ¶ 107. 

121 Id. ¶ 108. 

122 Id. 

123 Id.

124 Id. ¶ 109. 

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code ‘was listed in error last year.’”125 The Court’s best understanding of this allegation is that 

Secretary Oliva was saying that the pilot AP AAS course should never have been given a formal 

AP course code. Secretary Oliva explained further that “it is ‘common practice’ for [the Arkansas 

Department of Education] to review and edit the state’s course catalog, and Arkansas typically 

considers factors like usage or redundancies when deciding which codes to delete.”126 

Again, Plaintiffs dispute the veracity (or sincerity) of this explanation. Plaintiffs note that 

“[i]n 2022, College Board completed [the Arkansas Department of Education’s] approval process 

for AP AAS’s inclusion in the state’s course directory, and [the Arkansas Department of Education] 

approved the AP AAS pilot course code in October 2022 without issue and in accordance with the 

State’s course code assignment process . . . .”127

On August 14, 2023, Secretary Oliva claimed that “the reason the AP AAS course code 

was deleted was because the high schools set to offer the course had not undergone an AP course 

audit as required by the State of Arkansas.”128 According to Secretary Oliva, the Arkansas 

Department of Education “can’t offer a course or we can’t assign a course code to a teacher to 

teach an AP course to give a student AP credit that would transfer on their transcript unless the 

teacher does the course audit requirement.”129 And, since AP AAS is “still a pilot and not a course, 

that’s not available until the 24–25 school year.”130 

125 Id. 

126 Id.

127 Id. ¶ 110. 

128 Id. ¶ 111 (footnote omitted). 

129 Id. ¶ 113. 

130 Id. 

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But, according to Plaintiffs, this is not true because “the State of Arkansas has never 

required an audit for any course nor involved itself with the AP course audit process in any way.”131 

Further, Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he only audits administered for AP courses in the State of Arkansas 

are the ones administered by College Board[,]” which had “confirmed that teachers can participate 

in the AP Course audit process, with the same deadline of January 31, 2024, that governs all other 

AP courses.”132 The Court understands Plaintiffs to be alleging that Arkansas can approve an AP 

course offering prior to any AP teacher audit taking place. 

Later in the day on August 14, 2023, Secretary Oliva provided another explanation for the 

revocation of the approval of the AP AAS course.133 Secretary Oliva said that the approval was 

revoked in order “to protect Arkansas students from indoctrination in the form of a left-wing 

political agenda brainwashing found in AP AAS, as repeatedly publicly stated by Gov[ernor] 

Sanders.”134 Plaintiffs assert that this was Secretary Oliva’s true reason for revoking the approval 

for the AP AAS course.135

 After Secretary Oliva provided this anti-indoctrination explanation, the Arkansas 

Department of Education issued a statement “claiming that the AP AAS course likely violated 

provisions contained in the LEARNS Act that guard against the ‘indoctrination’ of students by 

teaching ‘prohibited topics.’”136 And the Arkansas Department of Education “warned educators 

131 Id. ¶ 112. 

132 Id. 

133 Id. ¶ 114. 

134 Id.

135 Id.

136 Id. ¶ 115. 

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who continued teaching the course that they risked violating state law and whatever penalties 

would flow therefrom.”137 Governor Sanders’s office followed up with a statement that read: 

The AP African American Studies pilot course is not a history course and is a pilot 

that is still undergoing major revisions. Arkansas law contains provisions regarding 

prohibited topics . . . . Without clarity, we cannot approve a pilot that may 

unintentionally put a teacher at risk of violating Arkansas law.138

Then, on August 17, 2023, Governor Sanders further addressed the Arkansas Department of 

Education’s revocation of the approval for the AP AAS course in an interview with FOX News: 

We’ve got to get back to the basics of teaching math, of teaching, reading, writing 

and American history. And we cannot perpetuate a lie to our students and push this 

propaganda leftist agenda, teaching our kids to hate America and hate one another. 

It’s one of the reasons that we put into law banning things like indoctrination and 

CRT. We want our kids to receive a quality education . . . .139

A few days later, on August 21, 2023, Secretary Oliva sent the following letter to school 

superintendents: 

Dear Participating Superintendents, 

As a governing entity, the Arkansas Department of Education (the “Department”) 

is charged with oversight of education in public school districts, which includes 

ensuring school district compliance with state law and State Board of Education 

rules. Since the Advanced Placement African American Studies pilot program is a 

direct partnership between your school district and College Board, the Department 

has not been provided the necessary materials and resources needed to enable the 

Department to support districts in complying with the law and rules. 

Given some of the themes included in the pilot, including “intersections of identity” 

and “resistance and resilience,” the Department is concerned the pilot may not 

comply with Arkansas law, which does not permit teaching that would indoctrinate 

students with ideologies, such as Critical Race Theory (CRT). . . . 

To assist public school employees, representatives, and guest speakers at your 

district in complying with the law, please submit all materials, including but not 

limited to the syllabus, textbooks, teacher resources, student resources, rubrics, and 

training materials, to the Department by 12:00 pm on September 8, 2023, along 

137 Id. 

138 Id. ¶ 116. 

139 Id. ¶ 120. 

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with your statement of assurance that the teaching of these materials will not violate 

Arkansas law or rule. . . . 

The Department values its partnership with districts to provide students accelerated 

opportunities to earn college credit. If you have any questions, please contact the 

Department at your earliest convenience.140

Around the same time, Representative Aaron Pilkington, one of the LEARNS Act’s co-sponsors, 

expressed concerns that the AP AAS course might violate the anti-indoctrination provision of the 

LEARNS Act.141 Representative Pilkington stated in part: 

[We] just want to make sure [students are] learning [African American history] in 

the right context and that it’s not being taught in a way where you should hate 

democracy, you should hate the Western traditions, you should hate the things that 

put us here, where we are and that we need a complete dumping of the past.142

 According to Plaintiffs, the AP AAS course was the only AP course treated this way in the 

aftermath of the passage of the LEARNS Act.143 Plaintiffs say this is particularly concerning 

because: (1) the majority of teachers teaching and students taking the pilot AP AAS course at the 

six relevant schools are African American; (2) the majority of teachers teaching other AP courses 

at the six relevant schools are white; and (3) across all Arkansas schools statewide, African 

American students comprise only 8.9% of students enrolled in all AP courses.144

 To highlight what they see as differential treatment, Plaintiffs specifically point to the AP 

European History course. Plaintiffs view the content of the two courses as similar. Plaintiffs note 

that the AP AAS course asks students to examine themes concerning identity, the tension between 

racial identity and national belonging, the historical use of race as a means to differentiate people 

140 See Ex. 4 (Letter to Superintendents) to Baum Decl. (Doc. 15-4); see also First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 122, 139. 

Dr. Wright signed the statement of assurance, and the College Board provided the materials (on behalf of the 

superintendents) that Secretary Oliva requested. First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 140. 

141 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 71. 

142 Id. 

143 Id. ¶ 124.

144 Id.

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so as to justify a slave system, and the role that resistance and opposition have played in the 

historical fight against systemic oppression.145 According to Plaintiffs, the AP European History 

course asks students to engage with themes very similar to those explored in the AP AAS course.146

Indeed, in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs expressly compare portions of the AP AAS 

curriculum description with the AP European History curriculum description. The chart on the 

next page tracks the primary comparisons that Plaintiffs make. 

 

145 Id. ¶¶ 130–33. 

146 See id. ¶¶ 126–34. 

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AP AAS AP European History 

AP African American Studies examines the interplay of 

distinct categories of identity (such as race, ethnicity, 

class, nationality, gender, region, religion, and ability) 

with each other and within society. African Americans 

and Black communities throughout the African 

diaspora are not a monolith, and the course emphasizes 

the various ways categories of identity operate together 

to shape individuals’ experiences and perspectives. In 

line with the discipline of African American studies, 

students should develop the skill of considering how the 

intersections of identity impact the sources, debates, 

and historical processes they explore. 

Meanwhile, the intellectual movement of the 

Enlightenment, coupled with French revolutionary 

ideals, offered a different vision of European identity 

based on a shared belief in reason, citizenship, and other 

Enlightenment values. 

In the 19th century, countries like Germany, Italy, and the 

Kingdom of the Netherlands were unified through wars, 

political negotiations, and the promotion of intense 

feelings of national belonging. At the same time, 

Romantic writers and artists fostered and built upon 

feelings of loyalty to the nation, producing works 

appealing to a common language or cultural identity. . . . 

European identities since 1450 have been a fluid concept, 

with overlapping and non-competing identities enduring 

even in the age of nation-states. As new national entities 

form, merge, and in some instances disappear, these 

developments help shape popular understanding of what 

it means to be European. 

The themes of resistance and resilience spiral 

throughout the AP African American Studies course. 

Each unit highlights a range of methods that African 

Americans have innovated to resist oppression and 

assert agency and authenticity politically, economically, 

culturally, and artistically. These methods often 

emerged from distinct experiences, perspectives, and 

approaches for resisting oppression, finding joy, and 

building community. Students examine examples such 

as resistance to slavery and the slave trade, the 

formation of clubs and businesses that advocated for 

women’s rights and economic empowerment, and 

movements to preserve and celebrate Black history and 

cultural traditions. Throughout the course, students are 

encouraged to identify how various forms of resistance 

and resilience evolve within Black communities in the 

United States, and in connection to the broader African 

diaspora. 

The use of “race” as a primary category for 

differentiating people coincided with the expansion of 

slavery, as Europeans sought a workforce for overseas 

plantations; this categorization helped Europeans justify 

the slave system. From the 16th to the 19th century, the 

transatlantic slave trade became a central feature of the 

world economy, and millions of Africans were 

transported via the notorious Middle Passage to labor on 

plantations in the Americas. The vast and cruel slave 

system led to various forms of resistance by enslaved 

peoples and began to generate opposition in Europe 

beginning in the late 18th century. . . . 

In conquered territories, Europeans established new 

administrative, legal, and cultural institutions, and 

restructured colonial economies to meet European needs, 

actions that often led to resistance and opposition in 

colonial areas. . . . 

By 1914, most of Africa and Asia were under the 

domination of Great Britain, France, Portugal, Germany, 

Belgium, and the Netherlands. Notwithstanding the 

power of colonial administrations, some groups in the 

colonial societies resisted European imperialism, and by 

1914, anticolonial movements had taken root within the 

non-European world and in Europe itself. 

Despite the alleged similarities between the AP AAS course and the AP European History course 

curricula, approval for the AP European History course was never revoked or questioned.147 

147 Id. ¶ 135. Of course, the AP European History course was not a pilot course. 

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34 

The instant litigation was filed on March 25, 2024.148 Sometime after that, the Arkansas 

Department of Education added the AP AAS course back to the 2024–25 course catalog as an AP 

course.149 From this, the Court understands that the AP AAS course has now been approved for 

AP status. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs still say that the adoption and enforcement of the 

anti-indoctrination provision negatively impacts African American teachers and students. They 

allege that the prior AP status revocation, the current way the AP AAS course is listed in the course 

catalog, and the more general targeting of Critical Race Theory have a stigmatizing effect on them 

and on the teaching/learning they want to do.150 

In addition to a stigmatization effect, Plaintiffs also seem to allege a censorship effect that 

falls disproportionately on African Americans. As best the Court can make out, Plaintiffs suggest 

the anti-indoctrination provision—at least as it has been applied by the Arkansas Department of 

Education—chills teachers (including but not limited to AP AAS teachers) from teaching students 

(including but not limited to AP AAS students) important information about what Plaintiffs see as 

systemic racism against African Americans.151 In turn, this lack of information makes it less likely 

that students (presently or when they turn into adults) will want to challenge, or have the ability to 

challenge, what Plaintiffs see as systemic racism against African Americans.152

 

148 See Compl. (Doc. 1). 

149 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 141 n.26. See also Oct. 23, 2024 Hr’g Tr. at 39:13–40:3, 84:1–18. 

150 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 141 n.26, 152, 204, 209, 212. With respect to how the AP AAS course is currently 

listed in the course catalog, Plaintiffs express the following concern: “[U]nlike the other AP courses, including [AP 

European History], AP AAS is not described as follows: This is a College Board Advanced Placement Course. It is 

unclear whether another version of the course is expected to be offered. The [AP European History] course is also 

listed as ‘Graduation Requirement for Career Focus,’ which is the type of diploma track, but the AP AAS [course] is 

listed as ‘Career-Focused Elective.’” Id. ¶ 141 n.26. 

151 Id. ¶¶ 6, 78, 84, 86–87, 181–82, 191, 204, 212. 

152 See supra note 151. 

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B. Legal Claims

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall 

. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”153 Plaintiffs appear 

to be making two different types of challenges under the Equal Protection Clause: a facial 

challenge and an as-applied challenge. The Court will address the facial challenge first, and then 

turn to the as-applied challenge. 

i. Facial Challenge 

The scope of Plaintiffs’ facial challenge is very clear. Plaintiffs contend that the 

anti-indoctrination provision violates the Equal Protection Clause because the provision’s 

enactment was motivated (at least in part) by a racially discriminatory intent or purpose.154 When 

it comes to race, there are three general groups of laws that are presumptively unconstitutional 

under the Equal Protection Clause. In any specific case, a plaintiff might assert that a statutory 

provision is in one, two, or all three of those groups. The analysis with respect to each such 

assertion is different. 

The first group of presumptively unconstitutional laws explicitly classify people on the 

basis of race.155 Strauder v. West Virginia provides us with a paradigmatic example of such a 

law.156 In that case, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state law that expressly limited jury 

participation to white people.157 Plaintiffs do not argue that we are confronting such a law in this 

153 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 

154 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 200–08, 212. 

155 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (“[R]acial ‘classifications are constitutional only if 

they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.’” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 

326 (2003))). 

156 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879), abrogated on other grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975). 

157 See id. at 310. 

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case.158 Indeed, they concede that we are not.159 And they are correct—the LEARNS Act’s 

anti-indoctrination provision does not expressly classify on the basis of race. 

The second group of presumptively unconstitutional laws are those employing 

classifications that, while neutral on their face, are an obvious pretext for discrimination.160 The 

best (but by no means the only) example of such a law appears in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.

161 In that 

case, the Supreme Court confronted a facially neutral state law that was alleged to have 

(1) transformed a city’s boundaries from a normal square shape to “a strangely irregular twentyeight sided figure,” (2) excised from the city limits approximately 98.75% of the African American 

voters, and (3) kept all white voters in the city limits.162 Those allegations survived dismissal 

because, if proven, “the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to 

a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and 

[African American] voters by fencing [African American] citizens out of town so as to deprive 

them of their pre-existing municipal vote.”163 The Supreme Court has made very clear, however, 

158 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 38–49. 

159 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 14 (“Though neutral on its face, Section 16 and the application of Section 16 to 

the AP AAS was created, in part, to target Black students and educators on the basis of race.”); Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. 

to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 38 (“The Amended Complaint alleges that[,] though neutral on its face, the creation of Section 

16 and Defendants’ application of the law to the AP AAS was motivated, in part, to target Black students and educators 

on the basis of race.”); Oct. 23, 2024 Hr’g Tr. at 77:5–15 (The Court: “The way I understand what you are saying to 

me is, at least under the current rubric of court cases, you are not saying that this statute is discriminatory on its face, 

but you are saying that it is close enough that, when I do the analysis that I would normally do for things that are not 

discriminatory on its face, I should add some kind of plus factor because this is sort of close to being discriminatory 

on its face. Is that fair? Or are you saying something else?” Mr. Laux: “Bullseye, Your Honor. And I think if language 

was added to the statute that said including CRT or white supremacy, I would not say the same thing.”). 

160 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (“A racial classification, regardless of purported 

motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification. This rule applies as 

well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination.” (internal citations 

omitted)).

161 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 

162 Id. at 341. 

163 Id.

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that laws like this—where “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges 

from the effect of” facially neutral legislation or implementing state action—are a rarity.164 

Plaintiffs do not argue that the statutory provision in our case fits into this rare category.165

That’s for good reason. The asserted disparate impacts in this case come nowhere close to the 

surgically racialized effects in Gomillion or similar cases. As detailed below, the effects of the 

anti-indoctrination provision do not fall exclusively or nearly exclusively on African Americans. 

And “[a]bsent a pattern [that] stark . . . impact alone is not determinative[.]”166 Long story short, 

the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination provision does not use neutral classifications as “an obvious 

pretext for racial discrimination.”167 

It is the third group of presumptively unconstitutional laws into which Plaintiffs seek to fit 

the anti-indoctrination provision.168 This third group is comprised of neutral laws that, while not 

rising to the level of obvious pretext, were enacted with a discriminatory intent or purpose.169 

164 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 

165 To be sure, Plaintiffs assert that the anti-indoctrination provision has a disparate impact on African Americans. See 

First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 209. But Plaintiffs don’t even hint that the impact rises to the level necessary for the 

Gomillion treatment. Their First Amended Complaint does not assert, and their motion to dismiss briefing does not 

argue, that the anti-indoctrination provision has led to “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race . . . .” 

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. Similarly, their First Amended Complaint and 

their briefing do not cite to the cases one would expect to be cited by a plaintiff making this type of argument: 

Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); or

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (citing those cases in reference to this 

second group of presumptively unconstitutional laws); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 (same). 

166 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 

167 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. 

168 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 38–40. 

169 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 (“[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, 

[the law] is [presumptively] unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a 

discriminatory [intent or] purpose.”). The necessary discriminatory intent or purpose need not be the primary or 

dominant motivation underlying adoption of the law. Instead, the discriminatory intent or purpose need only be one 

of the motivating factors for the law’s enactment. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66. At least this is true at 

the motion to dismiss stage. Cf. id. at 270 n.21 (“Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a 

racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such 

proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted 

even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.”). 

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38 

Arlington Heights provides the relevant framework to analyze challenges to laws that allegedly 

fall in this group. To survive a motion to dismiss under Arlington Heights, a plaintiff must allege 

facts sufficient to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that lawmakers acted with a 

discriminatory intent or purpose when they enacted the law at issue.170 A reasonable inference 

does not include speculation.171 And it is not enough for a plaintiff to plead facts that are “merely 

consistent” with a discriminatory intent or purpose; doing so would only show the possibility of a 

discriminatory intent or purpose.172 We are looking for the plausibility (not just the possibility) of 

a discriminatory intent or purpose. 

A discriminatory intent or purpose means taking “a particular course of action at least in 

part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”173 

Plausibly alleging a discriminatory intent or purpose on the part of democratically elected 

lawmakers is not a trifling thing—especially in light of the presumption of good faith to which 

such lawmakers are entitled.174 It is not enough to allege facts from which this Court could 

reasonably infer that lawmakers knew the law would have adverse effects on African Americans.175 

170 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a 

violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.”). Of course, a plaintiff must also plausibly allege that the challenged provision has caused 

disparate treatment or disparate impact. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 152 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 1998) (“To 

state an equal protection claim, [the plaintiff] must have established that [the plaintiff] was treated differently from 

others similarly situated to [the plaintiff].”). A failed attempt to discriminate on the basis of race is not discrimination 

on the basis of race. 

171 Cf. Fought v. Hayes Wheels Int’l, Inc., 101 F.3d 1275, 1277 (8th Cir. 1996) (“A reasonable inference is one ‘which 

may be drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation.’” (quoting Sip-Top, Inc. v. Ekco Group, Inc., 86 F.3d 

827, 830 (8th Cir. 1996))). 

172 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, 

it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007))). 

173 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. 

174 See Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 603 (2018) (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995)). 

175 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. 

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39 

Instead, Plaintiffs must allege facts from which this Court could reasonably infer that lawmakers 

adopted the anti-indoctrination provision (at least in part) for the very purpose of causing those 

adverse effects on African Americans. 

In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court provided some “subjects of proper inquiry” that 

it thought might help a court determine if discriminatory intent or purpose was a motivating factor 

in a law’s enactment: (1) whether the impact of the legislation “bears more heavily on one race 

than another”; (2) “[t]he historical background of the decision[,] . . . particularly if it reveals a 

series of official actions taken for invidious purposes”; (3) “[t]he specific sequence of events 

leading up to the” enactment of the legislation; (4) whether the legislation was enacted pursuant to 

procedural or substantive departures from the norm; and (5) the “legislative or administrative 

history” of the enactment.176 

The Court will review Plaintiffs’ factual allegations in light of this guidance. But Arlington 

Heights did not establish a wooden or mechanical test. The Supreme Court never suggested that 

the “subjects of proper inquiry” set out in Arlington Heights were an exhaustive list or that each 

identified subject was implicated in every case. In fact, the Supreme Court suggested exactly the 

opposite.177 Essentially, the Supreme Court established a gently guided totality-of-circumstances 

test for district courts to employ. Accordingly, before diving into the Arlington Heights factors, it 

is important to step back a moment for the 30,000-foot view of the competing ideological 

underpinnings of the dispute at hand. 

176 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

177 See id. at 266 (explaining the need for a “sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 

may be available” (emphasis added)); Id. at 266–68 (noting that most of the evidentiary sources listed “may” or 

“might” shed light on the relevant question); Id. at 268 (“The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to be 

exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed.”). 

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Although the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination provision covers far more ground than 

just Critical Race Theory, it is undeniable that the provision emphasizes Critical Race Theory as 

an ideology that teachers may not compel students to accept.178 And Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection 

Clause challenge is focused on the parts of the anti-indoctrination provision that they say target 

Critical Race Theory.179 Plaintiffs assert that this aspect of the anti-indoctrination provision must 

be understood in the context of recent race-related events in the United States.180 The Court agrees. 

But this cuts a very different way than Plaintiffs suggest. 

As Plaintiffs allege in their First Amended Complaint, the last five years have seen a 

significant uptick in American political discourse concerning race relations, racial inequality, and 

racial discrimination.181 Many Americans of good faith strongly believe that the answers to the 

racial problems we face as a country lie in governmental and societal color-blindness. To these 

Americans, treating people differently based on race is morally and often constitutionally 

abhorrent. To these Americans, emphasizing racial identity or suggesting racism plays a part in 

every law or every societal interaction makes racial problems worse, not better. Rather, to these 

Americans, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the 

basis of race.”182 

But other Americans of good faith strongly believe otherwise. To these Americans, the 

answers to our racial problems lie, at least partially, in recognizing that race often matters, that 

certain groups (including African Americans) have long been discriminated against by both 

178 See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-16-156(a)–(b). 

179 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 204, 208. 

180 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 43.

181 See, e.g., First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 52–58. 

182 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion). 

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41 

government and private society, and that active measures are necessary to rectify past injustices 

and present inequality. To these Americans, treating people differently based on their race is often 

morally and constitutionally acceptable or even obligatory. To these Americans, emphasizing 

racial identity, systemic racism, and unconscious bias is a necessary precursor for eradicating or 

mitigating the effects of racism. These Americans see color-blindness as a pretense that reinforces 

racial inequality by refusing to confront systemic racism and unconscious bias. They believe there 

is a “legal and practical difference between the use of race-conscious” measures to harm (or 

exclude) disfavored groups and the use of such measures to help (or include) them.183 

These two groups unsurprisingly have very different interpretations of the Equal Protection 

Clause and anti-discrimination laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964. And it is unsurprising that 

they would each want lawmakers to enact legislation reflecting their respective views. In 

Arkansas, a majority of elected lawmakers seem to hold the colorblind view. They have enacted 

the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination provision consistent with that view. That is, through the 

anti-indoctrination provision, Arkansas lawmakers have sought to prevent teachers and school 

administrators from forcing students to adopt views that those lawmakers believe are antithetical 

to the Equal Protection Clause, violate various anti-discrimination laws, and foster racism. 

Plaintiffs appear to contend that holding the colorblind view—or at least trying to 

implement that view in legislation—is tantamount to discriminatory intent or purpose.184 It is not. 

Plaintiffs may not like the colorblind view. Plaintiffs may think that those who hold this view are 

wrong or ignorant or even naïve. But that’s a world away from intentional discrimination.185 

183 See id. at 829 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 

184 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 43. 

185 Plaintiffs are essentially asking the Court to declare the colorblind worldview constitutionally infirm. Put aside the 

fact that this invites the Court to constitutionalize a matter of school-curriculum policy more suited for the elected 

branches. The request is impossible to square with Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of 

Harvard College. See 600 U.S. 181, 206 (2023) (“Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it. And 

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Perhaps understanding this, Plaintiffs appear to alternatively contend that the lawmakers’ professed 

interest in the colorblind view—or at least their concerns that Critical Race Theory conflicts with 

the colorblind view—is a mask for intentional discrimination. Specifically, they claim that the 

lawmakers intended the anti-indoctrination provision to silence “any potentially controversial 

discussions around systemic racism and race-conscious issues frequently considered as critical for 

the Black community . . . .”186 But the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint do not make 

this hidden-motive theory plausible. 

To be fair, the hidden-motive theory is consistent with the facts alleged in the First 

Amended Complaint. But, as explained above, that is not enough to survive under the Iqbal 

standard—especially where, as here, the alleged facts reveal an obvious and non-discriminatory 

alternative explanation for the law. Arkansas lawmakers were trying to prevent teachers and school 

administrators from forcing students to adopt views that those lawmakers believe are antithetical 

to the Equal Protection Clause, violate various anti-discrimination laws, and foster racism.187 

Applying the Arlington Heights rubric to the alleged facts makes clear that this obvious alternative 

the Equal Protection Clause, we have accordingly held, applies without regard to any differences of race, of color, or 

of nationality—it is universal in its application. For the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when 

applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the 

same protection, then it is not equal.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); id. at 227 (“For what one 

dissent denigrates as rhetorical flourishes about colorblindness are in fact the proud pronouncements of cases like 

Loving and Yick Wo, like Shelley and Bolling—they are defining statements of law.” (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted)). 

186 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 204. 

187 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also McDonough v. Anoka County, 799 F.3d 931, 946 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Courts 

should consider whether there are lawful, obvious alternative explanation[s] for the alleged conduct[.]” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

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explanation is far more likely than purposeful invidious discrimination.188 And the presumption 

of good faith owed to state lawmakers strongly reinforces that conclusion.189

(a) Disparate Impact: The Starting Point of the Arlington Heights Rubric 

Arlington Heights teaches that the starting point—but never the ending point in cases like 

this one—is the impact of the official action.190 Put another way: Does the challenged action 

“bear[] more heavily on one race than another[?]”191 This inquiry makes perfect sense as a starting 

point, since it would be hard to imagine an Equal Protection violation where the impact of the 

challenged action equally affected all groups.192 

In some cases, it may be that the degree to which, and the way in which, the challenged 

action bears on (or is alleged to bear on) one specific group can be a strong indicator of purposeful 

discrimination.193 But that is not so here. Even if this Court were to indulge the idea that Critical 

Race Theory uniquely benefits African Americans, the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination 

provision covers a great deal more than Critical Race Theory. Broadly speaking, the provision 

188 This conclusion is important. “If the alternative explanations are not sufficiently convincing, . . . the complaint 

states a plausible claim for relief, because ‘[f]erreting out the most likely reason for the defendants’ actions is not 

appropriate at the pleadings stage.’” McDonough, 799 F.3d at 946 (quoting Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. 

Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2011)). 

189 See Abbott, 585 U.S. at 603. Nothing suggests that any Arkansas lawmakers—from Governor Sanders on down—

don’t sincerely hold the colorblind beliefs discussed above. And nothing suggests that any Arkansas lawmakers—

from Governor Sanders on down—enacted the anti-indoctrination provision with the secret purpose (in part or full) 

of harming or hindering the educational opportunities of African American students, preventing African American 

teachers from teaching, or stigmatizing African Americans in general. 

190 See 429 U.S. at 266 (“The impact of the official action . . . may provide an important starting point.”). 

191 Id.

192 See Klinger v. Dep’t of Corrs., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he first step in an equal protection case is 

determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that [the plaintiff] was treated differently than others who were 

similarly situated[.]”). But see Boston Parent Coal. for Acad. Excellence Corp. v. Sch. Comm. of Boston, No. 23-1137, 

604 U.S. __, __ (2024) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]he lower courts mistakenly treated evidence 

of disparate impact as a necessary element of an equal-protection claim. To my knowledge, we have never said as 

much. . . . We would, of course, recognize an equal-protection violation if the government had a malicious ‘intent or 

purpose’ to discriminate against an individual based on his or her race or ethnicity.”). 

193 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 

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prohibits indoctrination of ideas that conflict with the principle of equal protection under the law 

or violate Titles IV or VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.194 It is accurate to say that the provision 

mentions Critical Race Theory by name as something that teachers can’t compel students to accept 

as true. But the provision also prevents teachers from compelling students to accept as true ideas 

like: 

People of one color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, marital status, familial status, 

disability status, religion, national origin, or any other characteristic protected by 

federal or state law are inherently superior or inferior to people of another color, 

creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, marital status, familial status, disability status, 

religion, national origin, or any other characteristic protected by federal or state 

law; or [an] individual should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment 

solely or partly because of the individual’s color, creed, race, ethnicity, sex, age, 

marital status, familial status, disability status, religion, national origin, or any other 

characteristic protected by federal or state law.195

As the First Amended Complaint itself shows, the anti-indoctrination provision is meant to 

reach well beyond Critical Race Theory. Recall that, in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs 

cite to actions taken by Secretary Oliva after the adoption of Governor Sanders’s Executive 

Order—but before the enactment of the LEARNS Act—to shed light on the meaning of the 

LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination provision and on how the provision would be enforced.196 

Among other things, Plaintiffs point to a document disseminated by the Arkansas Department of 

Education titled “Indoctrination and CRT Examples in Arkansas and Gov. Sanders Administration 

Actions.”197 But, as explained in footnote 92 above, that document explicitly describes the 

194 See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-16-156(a)–(b). 

195 Ark. Code Ann. § 6-16-156(b).

196 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 63–66, 63 n.17. 

197 See Indoctrination and CRT Examples, supra note 78. 

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indoctrination prohibitions in Governor Sanders’s Executive Order being applied to gender theory 

and sexuality issues as well as Critical Race Theory.198

In sum, the alleged facts do not plausibly suggest that the anti-indoctrination provision of 

the LEARNS Act is going to be applied only to Critical Race Theory and to no other ideology or 

theory. And Plaintiffs do not suggest that the other ideologies or theories to which the 

anti-indoctrination prohibition will be applied—for example, gender theory and sexuality issues—

impact African Americans any more than they impact all other groups. The generalized focus of 

the provision makes it nearly impossible to believe that the provision has a disparate impact on 

African Americans.199

But let us assume for a moment that the anti-indoctrination provision was focused solely 

on Critical Race Theory. It still is not exactly clear why that (1) adversely impacts anyone, and 

(2) adversely impacts African Americans more than it impacts any other groups. To be sure, 

Critical Race Theory originated as a movement addressing racism against African Americans,200

and it thus might be reasonable to expect that a ban specifically targeting Critical Race Theory 

would be more likely to affect African Americans. Stretching a little further, one might find 

reasonable the assumption that African American students and teachers would be more likely than 

others to have a desire to learn or teach about this theory. Even on all these assumptions, Plaintiffs 

face problems. 

198 See supra note 92. 

199 Plaintiffs might respond that Secretary Oliva has never enforced the anti-indoctrination provision against teachings 

or materials that would suggest white people or men or heterosexuals or cisgender people are superior to or should be 

treated better than others. But Plaintiffs don’t allege any instances of such teachings or materials. Certainly, their 

allegations with respect to the AP European History course don’t suggest this. The point here is that Secretary Oliva 

can’t take action against things that are not happening. 

200 Linda S. Greene, Critical Race Theory: Origins, Permutations, and Current Queries, 2021 WIS. L. REV. 259, 259 

(2021) (“The second movement, which came to be known as Critical Race Theory, was the result of meetings between 

the late 1960s and the mid-1990s convened by minority law professors to address the apartheid of American law.”). 

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The anti-indoctrination provision goes out of its way to explain that it “does not prohibit 

the discussion of . . . [i]deas and the history of the concepts” like Critical Race Theory or the 

discussion of “[p]ublic policy issues of the day and related ideas that individuals may find 

unwelcome, disagreeable, or offensive.”201 If discussing the idea and history of Critical Race 

Theory is allowed—and only compelling a student to believe in Critical Race Theory is 

prohibited—the Court struggles to understand how anyone is adversely impacted.202 

Even if the provision is construed as a ban on the teaching of Critical Race Theory, there’s 

little in the First Amended Complaint to suggest that this ban adversely impacts African 

Americans. It is true that Plaintiffs allege that a majority of the AP AAS students and teachers 

across the six pilot schools are African Americans.203 But AP AAS is not the only course or 

academic endeavor in which Critical Race Theory might be used. There’s African American 

History, American History, Government, European History, and Debate, to name just a few. The 

allegations in the First Amended Complaint don’t tell us anything about the demographic 

breakdown of the students or teachers of those courses across the state. The overarching point 

here is that the allegations don’t make it plausible that the anti-indoctrination provision’s disparate 

impact on African Americans (if any) is anything more than slight. 

Plaintiffs’ theory of disparate impact largely ignores the anti-indoctrination provision itself. 

Instead, Plaintiffs focus in on a single enforcement action taken after the adoption of the 

201 Ark. Code Ann. § 6-16-156(c). 

202 To be sure, in the Court’s Preliminary Injunction Order, the Court identified what it believed was some less-thanstellar statutory drafting that might give a teacher pause before using Critical Race Theory in his or her lessons. See 

Prelim. Inj. Order (Doc. 45) at 37–43. But there is nothing in the First Amended Complaint to suggest that lawmakers 

intentionally made those drafting choices to chill the mere teaching of Critical Race Theory. That would be sheer 

speculation. Any discriminatory impact stemming from the failure to teach the history and ideas of Critical Race 

Theory could therefore not be “traced to a purpose to discriminate on the basis of race.” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260. 

203 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 124. 

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provision—the revocation of the AP status of the AP AAS course.204 Plaintiffs assert that the 

effects of that enforcement decision were disproportionately felt by African American students and 

teachers because they made up the majority of those enrolled in and teaching that course.205 And 

Plaintiffs suggest that no other course (AP or otherwise) has been subjected to the same scrutiny 

or revocation.206

All this is fair enough. It does plausibly suggest—at least in this single enforcement 

action—some adverse impact on African Americans. It’s consistent with, but not suggestive of, 

purposeful discrimination. It’s more consistent, however, with the obvious alternative explanation 

that Arkansas lawmakers were trying to prevent schools and teachers from forcing students to 

adopt views that the lawmakers believe are antithetical to the Equal Protection Clause, violate 

various anti-discrimination laws, and foster racism. Based on the allegations in the First Amended 

Complaint, no one prevented the AP AAS course from being taught.207 Rather, the course’s AP 

status was revoked until Secretary Oliva was satisfied that the course materials and instruction did 

not violate the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination provision.208 Today, the course is currently an 

approved AP course.209 And it is not alleged that Secretary Oliva has engaged in some type of 

general enforcement campaign to shut down or hamper courses that touch African American 

204 Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, the Court concludes that—for purposes of deciding the Motion to Dismiss—

Plaintiffs have adequately pled facts to make it plausible that the revocation of AP status was based on the 

anti-indoctrination provision of the LEARNS Act. 

205 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 209. 

206 See id. ¶¶ 124, 135.

207 See id. ¶¶ 19, 22–23, 83–87, 140, 150, 152–57 (suggesting that the AP AAS course was still taught in some form 

during the 2023–24 school year). 

208 See id. ¶¶ 116, 122. 

209 See id. ¶ 141 n.26. 

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history, culture, or the like. The bottom line is that the allegations of disparate impact in this case, 

without more, don’t move the needle much at all for Plaintiffs. 

(b) Legislative and Administrative History: A Highly Relevant Consideration 

The Supreme Court has explained that “legislative or administrative history may be highly 

relevant [to detecting a discriminatory intent or purpose], especially where there are contemporary 

statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.”210 In our 

case, Plaintiffs do not point to legislative reports, meeting minutes, or floor/committee statements 

from lawmakers to suggest purposeful discrimination.211 In fact, noticeably missing from 

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint are any allegations that representatives or senators ever 

expressed an intent to discriminate during the Senate Education Committee’s meeting, the House 

Education Committee’s meeting, or the floor debate in either chamber of the Arkansas Legislature. 

Of course, the absence of such “highly relevant” allegations is not in and of itself a mark against 

Plaintiffs. Still, given the limited number of subjects of inquiry at play here, combined with the 

presumption of legislative good faith, the absence of such allegations makes it even more difficult 

for Plaintiffs to meet the plausibility-of-purposeful-discrimination threshold. 

210 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.

211 Plaintiffs do allege that, a month before the LEARNS Act was introduced, House Democratic Leader 

Representative Tippi McCullough said, “I don’t think critical race theory is a problem in schools in Arkansas.” First 

Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 62. This statement tells us nothing about discriminatory intent or purpose. Representative 

McCullough did not vote for the bill. See S.B. 294 Bill Information, ARKANSAS STATE LEGISLATURE,

https://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/Bills/Detail?id=sb294&ddBienniumSession=2023/2023R. And nothing in the 

statement suggests that Representative McCullough thought (or knew) that the lawmakers who enacted the bill were 

doing so for the secret purpose of discriminating against African Americans. Plaintiffs also allege that, in a committee 

meeting where the bill was debated, State Senator Linda Chesterfield asked Secretary Oliva to define Critical Race 

Theory and to explain why it should be banned. See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 68. Again, this tells us nothing 

about discriminatory intent or purpose. Senator Chesterfield did not vote for the bill. See S.B. 294 Bill Information, 

ARKANSAS STATE LEGISLATURE, https://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/Bills/Detail?id=sb294&ddBienniumSession=2023 

/2023R. And nothing in her statement suggests that she thought (or knew) that the lawmakers who enacted the bill 

were doing so for the secret purpose of discriminating against African Americans. As for Secretary Oliva’s answer to 

Senator Chesterfield, all he said was that Critical Race Theory is difficult to define. See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) 

¶ 68. That adds nothing to the mix. 

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Perhaps to make up for these missing allegations, Plaintiffs refer to a statement that 

Representative Pilkington (a co-sponsor of the LEARNS Act) made to the media about the 

AP AAS course in August of 2023—when the course’s AP status was revoked.212 But that was 

nearly five months after the LEARNS Act was signed into law.213 Representative Pilkington did 

not make this statement during the House Education Committee meeting or on the House floor. 

And there is no allegation that he shared these thoughts with other lawmakers at the time the 

LEARNS Act was being considered. As such, Representative Pilkington’s statement is relevant, 

at most, to a single representative’s motivation—even if that representative happened to be a 

co-sponsor of the Act. 

In any event, Representative Pilkington’s comments do not suggest that he had an intent to 

discriminate against African American teachers or students. Plaintiffs allege that Representative 

Pilkington said that he did not want African American history to be taught in way suggesting that 

“you should hate democracy, . . . hate the Western traditions, . . . hate the things that put us here, . . . 

and that we need a complete dumping of the past.”214 But that is not exactly right, at least not 

according to the full video that Plaintiffs cite in the First Amended Complaint. Representative 

Pilkington told the media that he was “for schools teaching the [AP AAS] course . . . .”215 But, he 

explained that, “we just want to make sure [students] are learning” about things like the Civil War, 

212 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 71. 

213 See Brenda Lepenski, Legality of AP African American Studies course is in question, legislators weigh in, KATV 

(Aug. 24, 2023), https://katv.com/news/local/the-legality-of-the-advanced-placement-african-american-studies-pilotcourse-is-in-question-in-arkansas-college-board-aaron-pilkington-intersectionality-jacob-oliva-clarke-tucker-apafrican-american-studies; First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 71 n.19, 94. 

214 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 71. 

215 See Brenda Lepenski, Legality of AP African American Studies course is in question, legislators weigh in, KATV 

(Aug. 24, 2023), https://katv.com/news/local/the-legality-of-the-advanced-placement-african-american-studies-pilotcourse-is-in-question-in-arkansas-college-board-aaron-pilkington-intersectionality-jacob-oliva-clarke-tucker-apafrican-american-studies. 

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the Little Rock Nine, and Civil Rights “in the right context and that it’s not being taught in a way 

where you should hate democracy, . . . hate the Western tradition, . . . hate all the things that put us 

here, . . . and that we need a complete and total dumping of the past.”216

Representative Pilkington’s statement merely reflects his preferred method of teaching 

African American history. Representative Pilkington seems to be concerned that, if AP AAS 

instruction compels students to accept Critical Race Theory, students will learn to hate American 

traditions and institutions. Plaintiffs may vehemently disagree. And it is certainly not for the Court 

to say who is right. But Representative Pilkington’s concern—whether correct or uninformed—is 

not discriminatory. And it does not suggest that he had an intent to discriminate against African 

Americans when he voted in favor of the LEARNS Act. 

The other potentially relevant statements Plaintiffs point to are Governor Sanders’s 

statement on the day she signed her 2023 Executive Order and a statement Governor Sanders made 

to FOX News upon the revocation of the AP status of the AP AAS course.217 The statement 

Governor Sanders made about her Executive Order could have some relevance, given the great 

deal of overlap between the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination provision and the Executive Order. 

That statement was, however, fairly limited; Governor Sanders spoke about “preventing the 

political indoctrination of Arkansas’s schoolchildren” and “not brainwashing our children with a 

left-wing political agenda.”218 Nothing about that statement suggests purposeful racial 

discrimination behind the enactment of the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination provision. To the 

extent Plaintiffs are suggesting the statement contains “code words” that the Court should interpret 

216 See id. 

217 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 59, 120. The statements allegedly made by President Donald Trump in 2020 and 

2021 are likely completely irrelevant and, at absolute best for Plaintiffs, of such marginal relevance as to not be worth 

discussing. See id. ¶¶ 54, 58. President Trump, of course, is not an Arkansas lawmaker. 

218 Id. ¶ 59. 

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as racially-charged language, the Court is unpersuaded.219 Left-wing political agenda means 

left-wing political agenda. Any allegation to the contrary in the First Amended Complaint is 

entirely conclusory. 

The statement Governor Sanders made to FOX News came many months after the 

enactment of the LEARNS Act.220 Accordingly, like Representative Pilkington’s statement, its 

value is limited. But the Court will explore it. The First Amended Complaint alleges that Governor 

Sanders said: 

We’ve got to get back to the basics of teaching math, of teaching, reading, writing 

and American history. And we cannot perpetuate a lie to our students and push this 

propaganda leftist agenda, teaching our kids to hate America and hate one another. 

It’s one of the reasons that we put into law banning things like indoctrination and 

CRT. We want our kids to receive a quality education . . . .221

This statement certainly suggests that Governor Sanders views Critical Race Theory as propaganda 

for a leftist agenda, that she dislikes the ideas promulgated by Critical Race Theory, and that she 

does not want any student to be forced to accept Critical Race Theory. But, as this Court has 

already made clear, allegations of animus toward Critical Race Theory are not synonymous with 

allegations of an intent to discriminate against African Americans. Correspondingly, the desire to 

have history taught through a lens other than Critical Race Theory does not equate to purposeful 

discrimination against African Americans.222 

219 See id. ¶ 204; Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 44. 

220 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 94, 120. 

221 Id. ¶ 120. 

222 Governor Sanders’s statement actually reinforces the obvious alternative explanation for the anti-indoctrination 

provision: Like other Arkansas lawmakers, Governor Sanders wants to prevent teachers and administrators from 

forcing students to adopt views that she believes are antithetical to the Equal Protection Clause, violate various antidiscrimination laws, and foster racism. Whether her general colorblind view is right or wrong, whether her view that 

Critical Race Theory contradicts colorblindness is right or wrong, and whether she was right or wrong that the AP AAS 

course was using Critical Race Theory are all beside the point. Plaintiffs’ alleged facts do not plausibly suggest that 

Governor Sanders was pretending to believe these things to mask a secret intent to discriminate against African 

Americans. 

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(c) The Rest of the Arlington Heights Considerations 

Under the Arlington Heights rubric, both the historical background of the challenged 

official action and the specific sequence of events leading to that official action “may shed some 

light on the decisionmaker’s purposes.”223 Among other things, courts look for “a series of official 

actions taken for invidious purposes.”224

Plaintiffs suggest that the historical background necessary to understand the LEARNS 

Act’s anti-indoctrination provision begins in 2020.225 According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he murders of 

George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, among too many others, at the hands of law enforcement were 

unfortunately the wakeup call for America to respond to ongoing racial inequalities, individual and 

systemic.”226 Also according to Plaintiffs, “[m]any governmental entities including school districts 

and universities, and private corporations, among others, answered the call by beginning to 

examine their own role in carrying forward racial inequalities and instituting fair and just 

reforms.”227 

Against the backdrop of these events, Plaintiffs cast President Trump’s 2020 Executive 

Order and Governor Sanders’s 2023 Executive Order as attempts—dressed up in coded 

language—to undermine what Plaintiffs see as progress on racial equality.228 And Plaintiffs say 

that those Executive Orders are the forerunners of the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination 

provision.229 From this, Plaintiffs suggest one could plausibly infer that the enactment of the 

223 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. 

224 Id. 

225 See, e.g., First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 52–58. 

226 Id. ¶ 52. 

227 Id. 

228 See id. ¶ 204. 

229 See id. ¶¶ 56, 68; Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 42. 

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LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination provision was in part motivated by an intent to discriminate 

against African Americans.230 

Most prominently, Plaintiffs point to Governor Sanders’s attacks—via her Executive 

Order—on Critical Race Theory.231 For example, Governor Sanders’s Executive Order declared 

that “Critical Race Theory . . . is antithetical to the traditional American values of neutrality, 

equality, and fairness.”232 Plaintiffs argue this language is riddled with code words and dog 

whistles.233 According to them, conservative leaders often use terms like Critical Race Theory to 

stymie “any potentially controversial discussions around systemic racism and race-conscious 

issues.”234

Plaintiffs also point to the multiple Critical-Race-Theory-related actions taken by the 

Arkansas Department of Education pursuant to Governor Sanders’s Executive Order.235 Finally, 

Plaintiffs call attention to Governor Sanders’s and Secretary Oliva’s direction to the Department 

of Education to remove certain “educational materials from the [Arkansas Department of 

Education’s] recommended social studies resources . . . .”236 Those materials were allegedly 

removed “because they included context” for the “historical suffering” of African Americans.237 

At the same time, Defendants added materials from 1776 Unites, which Plaintiffs allege 

“downplay[] the historical challenges faced by Black Americans.”238

230 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 42–45. 

231 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 61–62. 

232 Id. ¶ 61. 

233 See id. ¶ 204; Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 44. 

234 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 204; Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 44. 

235 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 63; see also Indoctrination and CRT Examples. 

236 Id. ¶ 65. 

237 Id. 

238 Id. ¶ 66. 

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The problem for Plaintiffs is that, absent speculation, none of these acts in any way suggests 

an intent to discriminate. Once again, antipathy toward Critical Race Theory does not equate to 

an intent to discriminate against African Americans. For certain, the facts Plaintiffs have alleged 

are consistent with the possibility that Governor Sanders (and other lawmakers) are using coded 

words to try and fend off progress on racial equality. But that’s not enough.239 The facts alleged 

must make this plausible. And they don’t. The facts alleged are far more consistent with a 

Governor (and lawmakers) who is sincerely trying to prevent the indoctrination of students with 

Critical Race Theory based on the sincere belief that Critical Race Theory (among other theories 

and ideologies) is antithetical to the Equal Protection Clause, violates various anti-discrimination 

laws, and fosters racism. 

The First Amended Complaint cites multiple instances where Arkansas lawmakers and 

executive officials stated (and showed) that they were not opposed to the teaching of African 

American history or the AP AAS course generally.240 Moreover, nowhere in the First Amended 

Complaint do Plaintiffs allege that Governor Sanders and Secretary Oliva prohibited the teaching 

of specific facts from African American history or ordered that the AP AAS course not be taught. 

Rather, the real dispute here is over what lens one uses when teaching history (African American 

or otherwise) and which lens will best ameliorate discrimination. One side of that dispute does 

not get to pretend that the other side of that dispute is, by definition, acting with a discriminatory 

purpose.241 

239 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

240 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 71, 97. 

241 Plaintiffs specifically allege that the 1776 Unites curriculum downplays the historical challenges faced by African 

Americans. Plaintiffs note that, “1776 Unites maintains a special focus on voices in the black community who 

celebrate black excellence, discourage victimhood culture, and showcase the millions of black Americans who have 

prospered by embracing the founding ideals of America.” First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 66. The Court is unsure why 

Plaintiffs take issue with that. But again, in any event, this complaint concerns the lens through which African 

American history is taught. Although Arkansas’s desired method of teaching African American history is certainly 

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And so, we come to the last two Arlington Heights considerations. “Departures from the 

normal procedural sequence . . . might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a 

role.”242 And “[s]ubstantive departures [also] may be relevant,” especially where “the factors 

usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one 

reached.”243 Bottom line up front, Plaintiffs’ allegations in each of these areas don’t help them at 

all. 

Plaintiffs assert that the Court can draw a reasonable inference of an intent to discriminate 

because the Arkansas Legislature passed the LEARNS Act very quickly.244 The LEARNS Act was 

signed into law in less than three weeks after it was first introduced.245 The Act spent less than 

one week in each of the respective chambers’ education committees.246 And the House and Senate 

rules were suspended so that the Act could be passed on an expedited basis.247 An emergency 

clause was also passed by two-thirds of each chamber so that the majority of the LEARNS Act, 

including the anti-indoctrination provision, could immediately go into effect.248 

Plaintiffs are right that the legislative process moved very quickly. But the “brevity of the 

legislative process” cannot “give rise to an inference of bad faith” on its own.249 There are no 

different than the method proposed by advocates of Critical Race Theory, there is nothing in this 1776 Unites quote 

(or elsewhere) to suggest that the 1776 Unites curriculum is prejudicial in nature. Plaintiffs have made it abundantly 

clear that they disagree with 1776 Unites’s curriculum. But those disagreements are best resolved through the political 

process. 

242 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. 

243 Id. 

244 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 46. 

245 First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 67, 69. 

246 Id. 

247 SB 294 Bill Information, ARKANSAS STATE LEGISLATURE, https://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/Bills/Detail?id=sb294&dd 

BienniumSession=2023/2023R. 

248 LEARNS Act, Act 237 of 2023, § 73(a). 

249 Abbott, 585 U.S. at 610.

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allegations to suggest the legislative process was manipulated to achieve a discriminatory aim that 

would have been frustrated absent the manipulation. So, the Court will not assume a 

discriminatory intent just because the legislative process moved more quickly than is normal. 

That’s especially true because the anti-indoctrination provision was not passed as standalone 

legislation.250 The provision was a tiny part of the 144-page long LEARNS Act, which reformed 

large swaths of the Arkansas education system.251 It would be passing strange to suggest that the 

anti-indoctrination provision itself played any substantial part in the legislators’ decision to speed 

up the process. Certainly, the Court can’t infer it without being given a good reason to do so. 

Plaintiffs have not provided one. 

Taking a different tack, Plaintiffs assert that the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination 

provision represents a substantive departure from the norm, and that this departure provides 

evidence of an intent to discriminate.252 Plaintiffs allege that the Arkansas Legislature 

substantively departed from its usual legislative approach by regulating an area that has typically 

been the purview of teachers and school districts.253 But, even assuming Plaintiffs are right about 

whether the Legislature has regulated this area previously, the alleged substantive departure is not 

the type of departure that the Supreme Court found relevant in Arlington Heights.254 

In footnote 17 of Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court provides us an example of what it 

meant by “substantive departures.”255 The Supreme Court references a case where plaintiffs 

250 See LEARNS Act, Act 237 of 2023.

251 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶ 67. Reforms under the LEARNS Act include, but are not limited to, increased 

teacher salaries and the creation of Education Freedom Accounts. 

252 See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 48–49.

253 See id. 

254 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. 

255 See id. at 267 n.17. 

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wanted to build low-income housing and the city refused to rezone the property.256 In that case, 

all the evidence suggested that, had the city made its decision pursuant to normal considerations, 

it would have rezoned the property.257 The city’s former and present planning directors even 

testified that “there was no reason ‘from a zoning standpoint’ why the land should not be 

[re]classified . . . .”258 As such, the city substantively departed from the norm with its decision to 

not rezone the land because “the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker 

strongly favor[ed] a decision contrary to the one reached.”259

That is nothing like the situation in the case at bar. The Arkansas Legislature is not a 

municipality or a department of the executive branch. The legislative branch does not follow any 

standardized procedure to determine what legislation to pass. It would be anti-democratic in the 

extreme if a legislature’s enactments were automatically cast into suspicion just because the 

legislation differed from previous legislation or legislated in new areas. Indeed, that’s kind of the 

point of elections. It is not out of the ordinary (or, at least, it should not be out of the ordinary) 

when a legislature decides to try new, innovative ideas to address problems. As such, it is probably 

impossible for a legislature to “substantively depart” in the way that Arlington Heights uses that 

phrase. Certainly, the Arkansas Legislature has not done so here. 

(d) The Result of Applying the Arlington Heights Rubric 

For the reasons described above, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs are not sufficient to allow 

the Court to draw a reasonable inference that discriminatory intent or purpose was a motivating 

factor in the enactment of the LEARNS Act’s anti-indoctrination provision. Where a statutory 

256 Id. (citing Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970)). 

257 Id. 

258 Id. 

259 Id. at 267. 

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provision is facially neutral, is not obvious pretext for discrimination a la Gomillion, and is not 

enacted with a discriminatory intent or purpose, the Equal Protection inquiry is at an end.260 

Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ facial Equal Protection claims. 

ii. As-Applied Claims 

Compared to Plaintiffs’ facial challenge, the contours of Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge are 

harder to pin down. The Court initially read the First Amended Complaint as focusing Plaintiffs’ 

as-applied challenge on a single enforcement action: the revocation of AP status from the AP AAS 

course.261 But, at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs asserted that their as-applied 

challenge was “larger than that.”262 Plaintiffs seemed to suggest their as-applied challenge also 

included all potential enforcement of the anti-indoctrination provision as it applies to Critical Race 

Theory.263 That was, frankly, a surprise to both the Court and (it appeared) to Defendants.264 

The parties’ motion to dismiss briefing does not help matters much. That is because neither 

party extricates Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge from Plaintiffs’ facial challenge. And both parties 

essentially treat the as-applied challenge as something of an afterthought.265 It is unclear to the 

Court what exactly Plaintiffs and Defendants believe the scope of Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge 

is. It is unclear to the Court which specific facts Plaintiffs believe support the as-applied challenge 

as opposed to (or in addition to) supporting the facial challenge. It is unclear to the Court what 

legal standard Plaintiffs (or Defendants) believe should be used to analyze the as-applied 

260 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. 

261 See First Am. Compl. (Doc. 8) ¶¶ 209–12. 

262 Oct. 23, 2024 Hr’g Tr. at 83:2–5. 

263 Id. at 83:6–12. 

264 Compare id. at 40:20–41:21, with id. at 90:15–91:3. 

265 See Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 55) at 23–27; Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 61) at 38–49; 

Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 64) at 7–10. 

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challenge, and whether that standard differs from the one used to analyze the facial challenge. It 

is also unclear whether there is any current enforcement action (or continuing effect of a past 

enforcement action) to be addressed, and what that means for Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge. 

In short, the as-applied challenge and the request to dismiss it are a little undercooked. 

Without a better understanding of the parties’ positions on the foregoing questions, it would be 

unfair to try and resolve the request to dismiss the as-applied Equal Protection challenge. The 

Court therefore orders further briefing on the Motion to Dismiss, limited solely to Plaintiffs’ 

as-applied Equal Protection claims. Defendants’ opening brief is due on January 31, 2025. 

Plaintiffs’ opposition brief will be due on February 28, 2025. Defendants’ reply brief will be due 

on March 14, 2025. The opening and opposition briefs may be no longer than twenty pages each. 

The reply brief may be no longer than ten pages. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the Court HOLDS IN ABEYANCE Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss with respect to: (1) the claims concerning the Free Speech rights of public high school 

teachers; (2) the claims concerning the Free Speech rights of public high school students; (3) the 

claims concerning the Due Process rights of public high school teachers; and (4) the as-applied 

claims concerning the Equal Protection rights of African American public high school teachers and 

students. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to the facial claims 

concerning the Equal Protection rights of African American public high school teachers and 

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students.266 As a matter of docket management, the Court hereby STAYS this case until the Eighth 

Circuit issues an order and mandate in the preliminary injunction appeal.267 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of December 2024. 

_______________________________ 

LEE P. RUDOFSKY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

266 The Court also HOLDS IN ABEYANCE Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to all claims against Governor 

Sanders that have not been dismissed in this Order. The Ex parte Young issue presents difficult legal questions that 

may turn on fine factual-allegation distinctions. Since no claim is moving past the motion to dismiss stage at this 

time, the Court need not resolve the issue yet. And it is possible—depending on how the Eighth Circuit rules in the 

preliminary injunction appeal and what this Court thinks of the further briefing with respect to the as-applied Equal 

Protection challenge—that the Court may never have to resolve the issue. In this circumstance, judicial economy, 

judicial efficiency, and a practice of deciding thorny constitutional issues only when their resolution is necessary 

counsel in favor of patience. 

267 Notwithstanding the stay, the parties must timely file the re-briefing ordered with respect to the as-applied Equal 

Protection challenge. 

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