Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00443/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00443-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

NATHAN BROWN, #282959, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-443-WHA

) [WO]

)

QUALITY CORRECTIONAL )

HEALTHCARE, INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by Nathan

Brown [“Brown”], an indigent inmate, alleging that the defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to his health and safety. Specifically, Brown asserts that he contracted

tuberculosisfrom a fellow inmate during a prior period of incarceration at the Montgomery

County Detention Facility because the facility’s screening and control procedures for

infectious diseases were constitutionally inadequate. Brown names Quality Correctional

Healthcare, Inc. [“QCHC”], Dr. Jerry Gurley, and Dr. Johnney Bates as defendants in this

cause of action. Brown seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages for the alleged

violation of his constitutional rights.

The defendantsfiled an answer,specialreport, and supporting evidentiarymaterials,

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including affidavits and certified medical records, addressing Brown’s deliberate

indifference claim. The court thereafterinformedBrown that the defendants’ specialreport

may, at a future time, be treated as a motion forsummary judgment and explained to Brown

the proper manner in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment. June 26, 2012

Order - Doc. No. 13. Brown filed his response to the defendants’ report on July 23, 2012.

Pursuant to the aforementioned order, the court deems it appropriate to treat the

defendants’ report as a motion for summary judgment. Thus, this case is now pending on

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the

evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and the plaintiff’s response, the court

concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’\” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11 Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule

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56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

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of law.”). The partymoving forsummary judgment “always bearsthe initial responsibility

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of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [-- now dispute --] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by

presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish,

with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case

exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S.

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at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or

fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the

record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may ... grant

summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-- including the facts considered

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 1

summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. 

“‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent

stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally

applicable to the current version of the rule. 

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undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”). A genuine dispute of material fact

exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of [and medical personnel]. Unless a prisoner can

point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him

to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for

summary judgment, Brown isrequired to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which

would be admissible at trial supporting his claim of a constitutional violation. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ...

or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250.

“A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice;

there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

(1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory

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allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute

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of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (A plaintiff’s “conclusory

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assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to

withstand summaryjudgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant

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of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own

conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739

F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“Mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations

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is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770

F.2d 984, 986 (11 Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations withoutspecific supporting facts

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have no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts

supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary

judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322

(“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries,

Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff

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presentsinsufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting

of summary judgment is appropriate.).

Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputesinvolving materialfacts are relevant.

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United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department ofChildren and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the

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party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute]

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can

be reduced to admissible form indicatesthere is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment

is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a

requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275,

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1279 (11 Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party

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must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his

favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford,

906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not

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mandate this court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil

case. In this case, Brown fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact

so as to preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, supra.

III. DISCUSSION

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Brown was arrested on September 28, 2010 and placed in the Montgomery County

Detention Facility. He complains that upon his placement in the jail he “was not screened

The record does not establish whether Brown was a pre-trial detainee or convicted inmate during the period

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of time that the alleged constitutional violation made the basis of the instant complaint occurred. Regardless of Brown’s

statusin the jail, either as a pre-trial detainee or a convicted inmate, the applicable standard of review remains the same. 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11

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Cir. 1997); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11 Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (“Claims involving the th

mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by

convicted prisoners.... However, the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates applies

equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees.”); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11 Cir. th

1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096, 106 S.Ct. 1492 (1986) (For analytical purposes, there is no meaningful difference

between the analysis required by the Fourteenth Amendment and that required by the Eighth Amendment.); Tittle v.

Jefferson County Commission, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11 Cir. 1994) (observing that “[w]hether the alleged violation

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is reviewed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial.”). 

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by Quality Healthcare and [was] placed in a diseased environment.” Complaint - Doc. No.

1 at 3. Brown alleges that due to the foregoing he contracted tuberculosis while confined

in the Montgomery County Detention Facility. Id. The defendants deny that they acted

with deliberate indifference to Brown’s health.

To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of adequate medical treatment,

an inmate must, at a minimum, show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference

to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221

F.3d 1254 (11 Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11 Cir. 1999); Waldrop

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v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11 Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11

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Cir.1986). Specifically, medical personnel may notsubject an inmate to “acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle,

429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11 Cir. 1995)

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(citation and internal quotations omitted) (As directed by Estelle, a plaintiff must establish

“not merely the knowledge of a condition, but the knowledge of necessary treatment

coupled with a refusal to treat or a delay in [the acknowledged necessary] treatment.”

That medical malpractice--negligence by a physician--is insufficient to form

the basis of a claim for deliberate indifference is well settled. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-07, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976);

Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11 Cir.1995). Instead, something

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more must be shown. Evidence must support a conclusion that a prison

physician’s harmful acts were intentional or reckless. See Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-38, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977-79, 128 L.Ed.2d 811

(1994); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11 Cir.1996) (stating that

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deliberate indifference is equivalent of recklessly disregarding substantial

risk of serious harm to inmate); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1543 (stating that plaintiff

must show more than mere negligence to assert an Eighth Amendment

violation); Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1191

n. 28 (11 Cir.1994)(recognizing that SupremeCourt has defined “deliberate

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indifference” as requiring more than mere negligence and has adopted a

“subjective recklessness” standard from criminal law); Qian v. Kautz, 168

F.3d 949, 955 (7 Cir.1999) (stating “deliberate indifference” issynonym for

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intentional or reckless conduct, and that “reckless” conduct describes

conduct so dangerous that deliberate nature can be inferred).

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11 Cir. 1999).

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In order to set forth a cognizable claim of “deliberate indifference to [a] serious

medical need ..., Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’

deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the

plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-1307 (11 Cir. 2009).

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When seeking relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate isrequired to establish “an

objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective

awareness of factssignaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those

facts.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach,

defendant must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to prisoner’s health orsafety).

Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he

must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d

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164, 168 (4 Cir. 1998) (defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not

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just knowledge ofsymptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding

of deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an official’sfailure to alleviate a significantrisk

that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under

our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

In articulating the scope of inmates’ right to be free from deliberate

indifference, ... the Supreme Court has ... emphasized that not ‘every claim

by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth Amendment.’ Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at

291; Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787. Medical treatment violates the eighth

amendment onlywhen it is‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive

as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’ 

Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). Mere incidents of negligence

or malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292 (‘Medical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.’);

Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787-88 (mere negligence or medical malpractice ‘not

sufficient’ to constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033

(mere medical malpractice does not constitute deliberate indifference). Nor

does a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical

staff and the inmate asto the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatmentsupport

a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033

(citing Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4 Cir.1977)).

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Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11 Cir. 1991); Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (citation

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and internal quotations omitted) (To show deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need, a plaintiff must demonstrate that [the] defendants’ response to the need was more

than “merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical

malpractice actionable under state law.”). Moreover, “as Estelle teaches, whether

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government actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques ... ‘is a classic

example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis for

grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545; Garvin v.

Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7 Cir. 2001) (“A difference of opinion as to how a

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condition should be treated does not give rise to a constitutional violation.”); Hamm v.

DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11 Cir. 1985) (mere fact inmate desires a different

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mode of diagnosis does not amount to deliberate indifference violative oftheConstitution);

Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9 Cir. 1981) (prison medical personnel do not

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violate the Eighth Amendmentsimplybecause their opinions concerning medical treatment

conflict with that ofthe inmate-patient). Self-serving statements by a plaintiff do not create

a question of fact in the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records.

See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11 Cir. 1990).

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The evidentiary materials filed by the defendants address the allegations made by

Brown. A thorough review of these documents demonstrates that the affidavits submitted

by the defendants are corroborated by the objective records compiled contemporaneously

with the screening of Brown and the treatment provided to him after his skin test showed

a positive result for tuberculosis. The records establish that Brown underwent initial

screening byboth a correctional officer and an emergencymedical technician. Defendants’

Exhibit 5 - Doc. No. 12-5 at 12-13. Brown advised the correctional officer that he did not

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suffer from tuberculosis. Id. at 13; Defendants’ Exhibit 7 - Doc. No. 12-7 at 24. The

medical technician completed a “QCHC Initial Health Assessment” which included taking

Brown's vitalsigns and documenting his medical history. Defendants’ Exhibit 5 - Doc. No.

12-5 at 12. Brown did not exhibit any symptoms of tuberculosis at this time nor did he

complain of suffering from any such symptoms. Id. Additionally, Brown completed an

initial “Medical Questionnaire for Tuberculosis” in which he advised that he suffered no

symptoms associated with tuberculosis, had never been told he had tuberculosis, and had

never tested positive for this disease. Defendants’ Exhibit 7 - Doc. No. 12-7 at 27. A

member ofthe jail’s medicalstaffreviewedBrown’s health assessment and determined that

he exhibited no condition which prevented his assignment to the general population of the

jail. Defendants’ Exhibit 5 - Doc. No. 12-5 at 15.

Dr. Bates responds to the claims presented by Brown as follows:

QCHC strictly adheres to the guidelines and recommendations of the

Center For Disease Control (CDC) in the prevention and control of

tuberculosis (TB)....

The [CDC] guidelines were followed in the case of the Plaintiff, Mr.

Brown. When he was first incarcerated he went through a screening

assessment as recommended by CDC. At the time of his admission, there

had been no prior cases of TB in the MontgomeryCounty Detention Facility.

It would therefore be characterized as a minimal risk facility.

On November 15, 2011, Mr. Brown had a positive TB Skin Test.

[After additional testing], he was diagnosed as having latent TB, which is not

exactly like having TB. [Latent TB] only means prior exposure to TB. He

could have been exposed at any time by anyone. The exposure could have

come prior to his being incarcerated at MCDF. There is no way to know for

sure when the exposure occurred.

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In his complaint, Mr. Brown referred to another inmate in MCDF who

had TB. That particular inmate has Scrofula, which is not transmissible. TB

is only transmissible via airborne droplets.

In his complaint, Mr. Brown refers to MCDF as a “diseased facility”.

That simply is not true. As stated earlier, because of its lack of TB cases, the

facility is categorized [under CDC guidelines] as a minimal risk facility.

Since the positive TB screen, Mr. Brown has been treated

appropriately [in accordance] with the CDC recommendations and standards

promulgated by the Alabama Department of Public Health.

Defendants’ Exhibit1 - Doc. No. 12-1 at 1-2.

The affidavitfiled byDr. Gurley providesthe following explanation of actionstaken

upon Brown’s placement in the Montgomery County Detention Facility and the treatment

provided when Brown complained of symptoms associated with tuberculosis.

The Plaintiff, Mr. Brown, underwent a medical screening intake on

September 20, 2010. The only medical problem[] noted at that time was

hypertension. His weight at that time was 176 pounds and his TB

questionnaire was negative. This screening intake was reviewed by Dr.

Bates.

Other than the claim set forth in Mr. Brown’s Complaint, his medical

history at MCDF was largely unremarkable. He was treated for his

hypertension and on December 7, 2010 he wastreated for a hurtshoulder due

to an altercation with another inmate.

On November 15, 2011, a skin test was performed by the Alabama

Department of Public Health TB Clinic personnel. His positive TB Skin Test

was 17mm, which was read on November 17, 2011. The test was

administered after another inmate had been suspected of having TB. At the

time of the skin test [Brown] was complaining of losing weight and coughing

up blood, but there had been no previous sick calls placed and no encounters

whatsoever [with medical personnel] to document his then complaints. Dr.

Bates was notified and he placed the inmate in a negative pressure cell in the

infirmary and ordered a chest x-ray. [Dr. Bates] followed the standard TB

protocol established byCDC and the Alabama Department of Public Health.

Subsequent to the positive skin test the Alabama Department of Public

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Health TB Clinic conducted cultures, sputums, smears, and chest x-rays that

were all found to be negative for the acid-fast bacillis (TB germ). All other

tests were normal, including enzymes and HIV test, which was non-reactive.

[Brown] was started on an established protocol of INH and B6. After all the

tests were found to be negative, [Brown] was moved back to general

population on November 30, 2011. He had no problems whatsoever while

in the infirmary and while the evaluation was ongoing.

I saw Mr. Brown again on December 23, 2011, for a sick call. He was

complaining of a lump in his throat and said he had spit up orange spit. His

throat was red and swollen on the right side. There was some post nasal

drainage. There was no blood seen and his ears were normal. His chest was

clear and he was treated appropriately for an upper respiratory infection.

Mr. Brown had his annual health assessment by the nursing staff on

January 13, 2012, and was found to be perfectly normal, with a weight of

168. He was seen for a chronic care visit on February 2, 2012. He was still

complaining of a lump on the right side of his throat. The evaluation of his

throat was normal. His blood pressure was elevated and his blood pressure

medicine was increased and an additional blood pressure medicine was

ordered along with labs and a thyroid profile. These were all negative or

normal. [Brown] continued on blood pressure medicine and medicine

ordered by the Alabama Department of Public Health, which was

administered by nursing staff at the MCDF.

Mr. Brown has received all care required by established protocols, both for his

general medical care and his positive skin test. The positive skin test with all other

findings being negative is indicative of latent TB, which is not contagious, and which is

a reaction to the TB germ which is in the body in an inactive state. There is no way to

establish when the inmate had contact with the TB germ, which would have given him a

positive TB test. His [screening and] treatment [were] by standard, acceptable protocol

established by QCHC in accordance with guidelines established by the CDC and the

Alabama Department of Public Health.

Defendants’ Exhibit 2 - Doc. No. 12-2 at 1-3.

Under the circumstances of this case, it is clear that the course of action undertaken

by the defendants did not violate Brown’s constitutional rights, as it was not “so grossly

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive asto shock the conscience or to be intolerable to the

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fundamental fairness.” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. Although Brown alleges that the

defendants should have acted in a different manner with respect to screening inmates for

tuberculosis upon their entry into the jail, this assertion, without more, fails to establish

deliberate indifference. Garvin, 236 F.3d at 898 (difference of opinion regarding manner

in which to address a situation fails to demonstrate a constitutional violation); Adams, 61

F.3d at 1545 (whether medical personnel “should have employed additional ... forms of

treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an

appropriate basis for liability under the Eighth Amendment.”); Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1505

(inmate’s desire for some other form of medical assessment does not constitute deliberate

indifference in violation of the Constitution); Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344 (simple

divergence of opinions between medical personnel and inmate-patient do not violate the

Eighth Amendment).

It is undisputed that the defendantstook precautionarymeasuresin accordance with

their professional judgment and pursuant to the guidelines established by the Centers for

Disease Control in an effort to (i) identify inmates with tuberculosis upon initial intake into

the jail, (ii) protect the inmate population from possible exposure to a potential infectious

disease, and (iii) ascertain whether Brown had contracted the disease. The defendants also

provided all necessary and appropriate treatment to Brown upon his complaints indicating

possible exposure to tuberculosis. Based on well-settled law cited herein, Brown’s mere

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desire for a different protocol does not amount to deliberate indifference. In addition,

Brown hasfailed to present any evidence which indicatesthat the defendants knew that the

manner in which they conducted the screening procedure or treated inmates created a

substantial risk to his health and that with this knowledge consciously disregarded such

risk. The record is therefore devoid of evidence, significantly probative or otherwise,

showing that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Brown’s health orsafety.

Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants. Carter,

352 F.3d at 1350.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. No costs be taxed herein.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before June 17, 2014, the parties may file objections to this

Recommendation. Any objectionsfiled must clearly identify the findingsin the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

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Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

th

33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en

th th

banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 3 day of June, 2014.

rd

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Case 2:12-cv-00443-WHA-SRW Document 25 Filed 06/03/14 Page 17 of 17