Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05140/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05140-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KLINTON MICHAEL KING,

Petitioner,

 v.

L.S. McEWEN, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C-12-5140 TEH (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Klinton Michael King, a state prisoner incarcerated at

California State Prison - Lancaster, has filed this pro se action

seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter

is now before the Court for consideration of the merits of the

habeas petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is

DENIED.

I

On April 2, 2010, in Lake County Superior Court,

Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of committing lewd acts on a

child under 14. Docket No. 18, Exh. 1 (“RT”) at 14-15 and Cal.

Penal Code § 288(a). Petitioner was sentenced to ten years in state

prison. Docket No. 18, Exh. 2 (“CT”) at 146, 175.

Petitioner appealed his conviction in the California Court

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of Appeal. Docket No. 18, Exh. 3. On August 23, 2011, the

California Court of Appeal filed an unpublished opinion affirming

the judgment. People v. King, No. A129911, 2011 WL 3686461 (Cal.

Ct. App. August 23, 2011). On November 2, 2011, the California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Docket No. 1

at 37. 

 On October 3, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant federal

petition. On July 18, 2013, this Court granted Respondent’s motion

to dismiss the unexhausted claims and ordered Respondent to show

cause as to why the petition should not be granted on the one

remaining claim. Respondent filed an answer; Petitioner has not

filed a traverse.

II

The following factual background is taken from the order

of the California Court of Appeal.

A.H. was born in December 1991. When she was 4 years old,

it appears that her mother and appellant Klinton Michael

King began living together, and he stepped into the role

of step-father to the girl. A.H.’s mother was an

alcoholic and the relationship between the two adults was

stressful. In December 2009, A.H. turned 18 years old.

In January 2010, the Lake County Sheriff’s Office received

a report that King may have molested A.H.2

 When A.H. was

interviewed, she confirmed that she had been molested over

a two-year period beginning when she was 12 years old. 

The molestation included genital touching, oral

copulation, and both attempted and completed vaginal

intercourse. The most serious incidents occurred when

A.H.’s mother was incarcerated. 

Fn 2: As there was no preliminary hearing or trial in

this matter, we rely on the probation report’s

summary of the underlying offenses.

On February 2, 2010, a complaint was filed alleging that

King had committed seven sexual offenses involving a

single child under age 14. The complaint alleged that in

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October 2004, he committed three lewd and lascivious acts

on a child under age 14. (Former § 288, subd. (a).) It

also alleged that King committed a fourth lewd act, rape,

oral copulation and sodomy against that child during the

following year. (See §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), (6), 286,

subd. (c)(1), 288, subd. (a), 288a, subd. (c)(1).) The

following day, the trial court issued a criminal

protective order, barring King from having any contact

with A.H. (§ 136.2.)

Initially, King pled not guilty to all counts. In April

2010, he pled guilty to two counts of lewd and lascivious

acts on a child alleged to have been committed in October

2004. (Former § 288, subd.(a).) In a written plea form,

King pled guilty to these two charges. He acknowledged

that he was subject to a maximum term of 10 years in state

prison for them, that both were serious felonies, and that

he would be required to register as a sex offender. He

waived his right to a preliminary hearing. Citing

sections 288.1 and 1203.067,3

 he also stated his

understanding that he would not be granted probation

unless the court found at the time of sentencing that his

was an unusual case in which the interests of justice

would be best served by a grant of probation. On the

People’s motion, the remaining charges were dismissed. 

Fn 3: These provisions require the trial court to

obtain a psychiatric report and a diagnostic report

from the Department of Corrections before granting

probation to a person convicted of lewd conduct with

a child under age 14. (§§ 288.1, 1203.067, subd.

(a).)

King was referred for a diagnostic evaluation at the

Department of Corrections. (§ 1203.03.) He was also

evaluated by a court-appointed psychiatrist. (§ 288.1.) 

The trial court advised King that he would not be granted

probation unless both of these reports were favorable. In

his interviews with these evaluators, King denied

committing the acts to which he pled guilty. During his

evaluation by the Department of Corrections, King was

found with several photographs of the victim and several

letters from her, as well as a photograph of himself with

a small girl lying on a couch together. 

The Department of Corrections reporters characterized King

as a risk to society and a poor candidate for probation. 

The evaluators recommended that King be sentenced to

prison. A Ukiah psychiatrist concluded that because King

failed to accept responsibility for the offenses he had

admitted in his guilty plea, he remained at risk to

reoffend and would not be amenable to treatment. The

substantial nature of the sexual conduct and King’s denial

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of his part in it prompted the psychiatrist to recommend

against a grant of probation. 

The probation report indicated that King was eligible for

probation, but recommended that he be sentenced to state

prison for eight years. The report proposed the

imposition of various restitution, fees and fines,

including a $300 sex offender fine. (§ 290.3.) A ban on

contact with the victim was also recommended. 

A.H.’s mother died in July 2010. At the August 2010

sentencing, King’s counsel acknowledged that the

Department of Corrections diagnostic evaluation was “very

unfavorable.” Still, King sought a grant of probation

with A.H.’s support. The trial court agreed with the

Department of Corrections, the psychiatrist, and the

probation department that to grant King probation would be

inappropriate. It cited numerous reasons for denying

probation — the nature, seriousness and circumstances of

the crime were more serious than other instances of the

same offenses; the young age of the victim when the

molestation began; the infliction of physical and

emotional injury on the victim; King’s active

participation in the crimes; the taking advantage of a

position of trust to commit the offenses; the taking

advantage of the mother’s absence to commit these crimes;

and a poor ability to comply with reasonable terms of

probation. The trial court also gauged the likely effect

of imprisonment as moderate and found that King posed a

substantial danger to others if not imprisoned. 

King was sentenced to a total term of 10 years in state

prison — an upper term of 8 years for one lewd act and a

consecutive one-third upper term of 2 years for the second

one. He was also ordered to pay a $300 fine as a sex

offender. (§ 290.3.) The trial court prohibited any

visitation between King and A.H. (§ 1202.05.) King sought

a certificate of probable cause to enable him to challenge

the underlying plea on appeal, but the trial court denied

the request.

People v. King, 2011 WL 3686461, at *1 - *3. 

III

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

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U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the

state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the

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“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in conducting

its analysis, the federal court must presume the correctness of the

state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden

of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas

review, AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct.

1305, 1307 (2011). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly

established law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of

[the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant

state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different

from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at

best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). In this case, the

last reasoned decision is the California Court of Appeal’s August

23, 2011, written opinion on direct appeal affirming the trial court

judgment.

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and

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scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses Petitioner’s

claim. 

IV

Petitioner claims that the trial court applied the

probation eligibility law in effect at the time of Petitioner’s 2010

sentencing rather than the law that was in effect in 2004 when

Petitioner’s offenses occurred, in violation of the Ex Post Facto

Clause. 

The United States Constitution prohibits the federal

government and the states from passing any “ex post facto Law.” 

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal government); art. I, § 10,

cl. 1 (states). These clauses prohibit the government from enacting

laws with certain retroactive effects: any law that (1) makes an

act criminal when the act was done before the passing of the law;

(2) aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when it was

committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater

punishment for the crime than the punishment authorized by law when

the crime was committed; or (4) alters the legal rules of evidence

and requires less or different testimony to convict the defendant

than was required at the time the crime was committed. See Stogner

v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611-12 (2003) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3

U.S. 386 (1798)). An ex post facto violation occurs only if there

is a retroactive application of law that works to the defendant’s

detriment. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997). “A law is

retrospective if it ‘changes the legal consequences of acts

completed before its effective date.’” Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S.

423, 430 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds by California

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Dept. of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506, n. 3 (1995), (quoting

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 (1981)). 

The state court denied Petitioner’s claim, finding that

there was no evidence that the trial court applied the 2010 version

of the sentencing law rather than the 2004 version:

Finally, King seeks resentencing on two grounds. He

first reasons that the trial court applied a statutory

limitation on probation that had not been enacted at the

time that he committed the charged offenses. He argues

that this misapplication of statute violated the ban on

ex post facto laws and requires a remand for

reconsideration of his application for a grant of

probation. At the time of sentencing, then-current

statutory law banned a trial court from granting

probation to those convicted of lewd conduct with a child

if specified circumstances were pled, admitted or found

true. (Former § 1203.066, subd. (a), (c)(1) [Stats.2006,

ch. 538, § 506].) The specified circumstances were not

alleged in the King complaint, were not admitted in his

guilty plea and were not the subject of trial court

findings. Under the 2010 statute, if these specified

circumstances were not pled or proven, one convicted of

lewd conduct with a child could be granted probation only

if certain conditions were shown — conditions that do not

appear to apply in King’s case. (Former § 1203.066, subd.

(a), (c)(1), (d)(1) [Stats.2006, ch. 538, § 506].) In

2004 when the lewd conduct occurred, the law contained a

similar ban on probation under specified circumstances,

but also contained specified limitations on probation if

those circumstances were not pled, admitted or found

true. (See former § 1203.066, subd. (a), (d)

[Stats.1997, ch. 817, § 13, pp. 5584–5587].) 

On appeal, King reasons that the trial court applied the

2010 version of this law, which contained greater limits

on its discretion than the law that was in effect at the

time that he committed the lewd conduct in 2004. This

application of law violates the ban on ex post facto

laws, he contends. In order for him to prevail on this

claim of error, he must establish that the trial court

applied the 2010 version of this statute, rather than the

2004 version of it. On appeal, we must presume that the

trial court applied the correct law. King must

affirmatively demonstrate the error that he claims. (In

re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498–499; see Evid.

Code, § 644.) He has not done so. 

King notes that the psychiatrist referred to this

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provision in his report and that his counsel spoke of

limitations to the possibility of probation at

sentencing, rather than an outright ban on probation. He

reasons that these comments both refer to the 2010 law

rather than the 2004 version of section 1203.066, but it

is significant that the trial court did not refer to

either of them.

Instead, the record supports our assumption that the

trial court applied the correct version of the law. The

probation report stated that the offenses were committed

in 2004. That report twice stated expressly to the trial

court that King was statutorily eligible for probation. 

It recommended that King be sentenced to prison, rather

than granted probation, for a long list of reasons

related to his conduct, not any statutory limitation on

the trial court’s discretion. When the court cited its

many reasons why probation was to be denied, it did so

because it found a grant of probation to be

inappropriate. In listing the factors that entered into

its decision, it made no reference to section 1203.066 or

any limitation of its discretion to grant probation. 

None of these circumstances suggest that the trial court

applied the then-current version of section 1203.066. As

King has not proven the factual predicate that the trial

court applied the 2010 version of section 1203.066 rather

than the 2004 version, his ex post facto claim

necessarily fails. 

People v. King, 2011 WL 3686461, at *3-*4.

The Court presumes correct the state court’s determination

of the factual issue of whether the state court applied the correct

version of the sentencing law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) and Bragg v.

Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981))

(presumption of correctness applies to findings made by both state

trial courts and appeal courts). Petitioner has not presented any

evidence rebutting this presumption, much less the clear and

convincing evidence required by § 2254(e)(1). 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to rebut the

presumption of correctness).

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Moreover, the appellate court’s determination that the

trial court had applied the 2004 parole eligibility law is supported

by substantial evidence in the state court record. In denying

parole, the trial court did not mention the 2010 parole eligibility

law. Nor does the trial court indicate in any way that it believed

that its discretion was limited. The denial of parole was based on

other reasons, including the victim’s youth at the time of the

crime; Petitioner’s active participation in the crime; Petitioner’s

abuse of his position of trust; the physical and emotional injury to

the victim; Petitioner’s likely inability to comply with the terms

of probation; Petitioner’s refusal to accept responsibility for his

crime; and the moderate impact of incarceration on Petitioner. CT

at 169-70. 

Since Petitioner has failed to show that the state court

retroactively applied a law, there is no ex post facto violation. 

Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 (“two critical elements must be present for a

criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective,

that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and

it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.”) (footnotes

omitted); Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441. The state court denial of

Petitioner’s claim was a reasonable application of federal law to

the facts of Petitioner’s case. Habeas relief is denied on this

claim.

V

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED.

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See

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Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner

has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as

moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 02/17/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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