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Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-10424

JOHN AMESER,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

NORDSTROM INC, 

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

(09-CV-395)

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:*

John Ameser brought an arbitration claim alleging that Nordstrom, Inc.

fired him from his job in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), and Title VII, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of Nordstrom on all

counts. Ameser then filed a Motion to Vacate the arbitration decision in Texas

state court. Nordstrom removed to federal court. The district court then entered

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 2, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 09-10424

2

an order denying all motions pending prior to removal, subject to refiling.

Ameser timely appealed. We conclude that the district court did not enter a final,

appealable order and we therefore dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Beginning in April 2001, Nordstrom employed Ameser full-time as a

salesperson at its department store in Frisco, Texas. Ameser was fired by

Nordstrom on July 23, 2007. Soon thereafter, Ameser presented an arbitration

claim to the American Arbitration Association (AAA) pursuant to the mandatory

Dispute Resolution Program incorporated in his pre-employment agreement

with Nordstrom. He alleged that Nordstrom wrongfully fired him in violation of

the FMLA, the ADA, the ADEA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

AAA chose Melva Harmon to act as arbitrator in the matter. Harmon’s

initial disclosures revealed no conflicts of interest or prior dealings with the

parties. However, Nordstrom’s counsel notified the AAA that he had previously

arbitrated a matter before Harmon. In response, Ameser’s counsel requested

additional information concerning the prior representation and reserved the

right to object to Harmon’s appointment pending receipt of the information.

Nordstrom objected to production of the information, and the information was

never formally provided by the AAA. Ameser stood on the reservation of rights

in his letter, but did not formally object to Harmon’s selection.

Harmon conducted a two-day hearing and issued an award on November

3, 2008, finding in favor of Nordstrom on every claim.

On February 2, 2009, Ameser filed in Texas state court a Motion to Vacate

the arbitration award against him on numerous grounds, including bias on the

part of the arbitrator. Before filing a response to the Motion to Vacate in state

court, Nordstrom removed the case to federal court. Ameser then filed a Request

for Entry of Default with the clerk of the district court on the grounds that

Nordstrom had not timely responded to the Motion to Vacate. The clerk declined

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3

to enter a default, and referred the matter to the judge. Upon being advised it

had failed to timely answer, Nordstrom sought leave of court to file a response

to the Motion to Vacate. On April 1, 2009, the district court entered an order

denying as moot Nordstrom’s Motion for Leave to File a Response to Ameser’s

Motion to Vacate. The district court then entered an order on April 6, 2009,

which stated in its entirety: 

On March 3, 2009, this case was removed from the 134th Judicial District

Court, Dallas County, Texas. All motions pending prior to that removal

are hereby DENIED subject to refiling in this court. 

SO ORDERED. 

The order included by its terms the Motion to Vacate. At that time, the threemonth period for filing a motion to vacate an arbitration award had expired

pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 12. 

II. DISCUSSION

Ameser appeals on the grounds that the district court erred in denying his

Motion to Vacate the arbitration award, and erred by refusing to grant the

Motion for Default Judgment. But “before addressing the merits of this case, we

must first examine our appellate jurisdiction.” In re Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 584 (5th

Cir. 2008). 

A. Motion to Vacate

Ameser claims that the April 6 order is an appealable final judgment with

respect to an arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) because the order disposed of

all issues in an independent action to enforce rights under the Federal

Arbitration Act (FAA). He notes that despite the “subject to refiling” language

in the order, the three-month period for filing a motion to vacate had expired at

the time of the order and it is unclear whether a re-filed motion to vacate would

comply with the statute of limitations. He further argues that the district court

gave no indication of what defects might be present in the existing pleading, nor

provided a time frame for refiling. Ameser also characterizes the order as the

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 (c) Removed Actions. 1

(1) Applicability. These rules apply to a civil action after it is removed

from a state court. 

(2) Further Pleading. After removal, repleading is unnecessary unless the

court orders it . . . . 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c).

 (c) Relation Back of Amendments.

2

(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading

relates back to the date of the original pleading when: 

. . . (B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in

the original pleading . . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).

4

denial of a petition under § 4 of the FAA that would provide jurisdiction under

9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(b).

Nordstrom avers that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction because the

April 6 order merely required Ameser to refile his claims, and was neither a

denial of a petition for purposes of 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) nor a final judgment

under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). Nordstrom characterizes the order as simply requiring

Ameser to refile his Motion to Vacate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

81(c)(2). According to Nordstrom, the refiled Motion to Vacate ordered by the 1

court would relate back to the time the original Motion to Vacate was filed

pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1)(B).2

1. Denial of a Section 4 Petition

The FAA provides that “an appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . .

denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to

proceed . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(b). Section 4, in turn, provides: 

A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of

another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may

petition any United States district court which, save for such

agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28 . . . for an order

directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for

in such agreement. . . If no jury trial be demanded by the party

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alleged to be in default . . . the court shall hear and determine such

issue.

9 U.S.C. § 4.

Section 16(a)(1)(b) typically applies to denials of motions to compel

arbitration. See, e.g., Agere Sys., Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 560 F.3d 337 (5th

Cir. 2009); Eman-Henshaw v. Park Plaza Hosp., 129 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 1997).

Although Ameser does seek a new arbitration in his Motion to Vacate, that

request for relief alone does not place his motion within the jurisdictional

parameters of § 16(a)(1)(b). In support of his § 16(a)(1)(b) jurisdictional

argument, Ameser cites only Republic Insurance Co. v. PAICO Receivables, LLC,

383 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 2004). In Republic, a party to litigation proceeded

through the pre-trial process and asserted the right to arbitration just days

before trial; the district court concluded that the party had waived its right to

arbitrate. Id. Here, in stark contrast to Republic, Nordstrom and Ameser have

already arbitrated the claim at issue.

Ameser additionally argues that under § 16(a)(1)(b) Nordstrom has refused

to arbitrate under the terms of the written arbitration agreement, as required by

§ 4. Ameser asserts that Harmon did not “disclose any information that may . .

. create an appearance of bias” as required by the Nordstrom Dispute Resolution

Program arbitration agreement, and therefore the arbitration did not “proceed

in the manner provided for in [the] agreement.” But Nordstrom never refused an

arbitrator that satisfied the requirements of the agreement; at the time of the

arbitration Ameser did not formally object to Harmon or request a different

arbitrator—it is only post-decision that Ameser has objected.

2. Final Decision with Respect to an Arbitration 

The FAA additionally provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken from . . . a

final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.” 9 U.S.C.

§ 16(a)(3). The term “final decision” has a “well-developed and longstanding

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meaning. It is a decision that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves

nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” Green Tree Fin.

Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324

U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). “Because the FAA does not define ‘a final decision with

respect to an arbitration’ or otherwise suggest that the ordinary meaning of

‘final decision’ should not apply,” the Supreme Court accords the term its

well-established meaning. Id. (citing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,

259-60 (1992)).

This court has not previously addressed a “final decision” determination

in the § 16(a)(3) context, but Green Tree’s reliance on its well-established

meaning suggests that discussions of what constitutes a final decision for

purposes of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 are instructive. See id.

Under § 1291, however, this court’s determination of its jurisdiction over a

dismissal or denial without prejudice to refile varies depending on the

circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Turner Indus. Group,

LLC, 339 F. App’x 441, 443 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (exerting appellate

jurisdiction over Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without prejudice of a declaratory

action); Telles v. City of El Paso, 164 F. App’x 492, 495 (5th Cir. 2006)

(unpublished) (no appellate jurisdiction over denial of a motion without prejudice

to refile, where district court did not reach the merits of the motion or dispose

of any substantive issues). Each case requires an examination of the finality of

the underlying order.

Ameser asserts that the district court’s denial was a final judgment

because any “refiling” would be futile as barred by the statute of limitations,

correctly noting that it is uncertain whether a refiled Motion to Vacate would

comply with Rule 15 or would be time-barred. Although Ameser cites cases for

the premise that courts have been unforgiving of any failure to timely make a

Motion to Vacate, none deal with an Amended Motion to Vacate where the initial

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 In the usual case, denying all motions pending prior to removal would not finally 3

determine the case on its merits, thus it is unlikely that the judge intended to do so.

7

Motion to Vacate was timely filed. See Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch, 477 F.3d

1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 2007) (failure to file within three months waived judicial

review, and loss of evidence did not toll deadline); Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220,

225 (4th Cir. 1986) (due diligence and tolling arguments were “questionable,”

and party could not extend the deadline by filing a late motion to vacate in

response to a motion to confirm arbitration award); Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz,

750 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1984) (no common law exceptions to deadline, and

motion to confirm did not extend deadline). At least one court has held that an

amended motion to vacate an arbitration may in some instances relate back

under Rule 15, but we decline to decide the Rule 15 question at this time. See

Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (11th Cir. 1988)

(resolving that “an amended motion to vacate an arbitration award, filed outside

of the three month period and raising additional grounds for vacation, is deemed

timely if the original motion to vacate was timely”). The speculative nature of

Ameser’s arguments underscore that the district court has not yet had the

opportunity to rule on this issue. Remand is therefore appropriate, so that

Ameser may file an Amended Motion to Vacate and the district court will have

an opportunity to rule on whether the amended motion relates back under Rule

15. 

The district court’s April 6 order gives us very little help in evaluating its

finality, and we appreciate that in an abundance of caution Ameser appealed the

order to preserve error. We conclude, however, that the order did not constitute 3

a final decision, and this court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. The

district court’s order, denying Ameser’s claims without prejudice to refile, did not

conclusively adjudicate the substance of Ameser’s claims and did not preclude

further litigation of those issues in district court. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

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Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (stating that “as long as the matter

remains open, unfinished or inconclusive,” the appellate court is without the

power of review). Thus, the order is not a final judgment because all relief was

not denied.

B. Motion for Default

The law of this circuit clearly establishes that a district court’s order

denying a motion for default judgment is not an appealable final order. Adult

Film Ass’n, Inc. v. Thetford, 776 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1985) (“We find that the

district court’s order denying a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)

is not an appealable final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”).

Therefore, we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the April 1 order denying

default judgment. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction and we DISMISS the

appeal. Ameser may return to district court to refile his claims.

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