Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04350/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04350-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:0701 Maritime Subsidy Board

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UNITED 

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U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

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For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OKINAWA DUGONG (Dugong Dugon), et

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ROBERT GATES, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C 03-4350 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Cross-Motions for Summary

Judgment

Plaintiffs, consisting of the Okinawa dugong, three individual Japanese citizens, and six

American and Japanese environmental associations, brought this action against defendants Robert

Gates, Secretary of Defense, and the United States Department of Defense (“DOD”) for violations of

section 402 of the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2, and the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have

approved the plans for construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (“FRF”)—a military air

station off the coast of Okinawa Island—without taking into account the effect of the military

facility on the Okinawa dugong, a marine mammal of cultural and historical significance to the

Japanese people. Now before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 

Having considered the arguments and submissions of the parties and for the reasons set forth below,

the court enters the following memorandum and order. 

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BACKGROUND

I. The Okinawa Dugong

The dugong (Dugong dugon) is a species of marine mammal related to the manatee. Joint

Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 2 (hereinafter “Undisputed Facts”). The waters surrounding

Okinawa Island are habitat for the dugong whose range extends the costal and territorial waters of

many countries in the Far East. Id. The greatest population concentrations occur in Australia, the

Philippines, and Thailand, and Japan is at the northern edge of the dugong’s range. Id. The dugong

is classified as vulnerable by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) due to habitat destruction and

degradation, as well as human exploitation. Id. The Japan Ministry of the Environment recently

listed the dugong as critically endangered in Japan. Id. 

Dugong are significant in Okinawan culture. Id. ¶ 3. They are associated with traditional

Okinawan creation mythology, sometimes being considered the progenitor of the local people. Id.

Because of its cultural significance, the dugong is listed as a protected “natural monument” on the

Japanese Register of Cultural Properties, established under Japan’s “Law for the Protection of

Cultural Properties.” Id. Henoko Bay, on the northeast coast of Okinawa Island, is dugong habitat. 

Id. ¶ 4. There are many species of seagrass found in the shallow waters of Henoko Bay. Id. These

seagrass beds are dugong feeding grounds, and dugong have been observed to feed in and traverse

Henoko Bay. Id. The U.S. military’s Camp Schwab—where defendants propose to construct a

military facility to replace an existing air station—are located adjacent to and in Henoko Bay. Id. 

II. The Futenma Replacement Facility (“FRF”)

The United States has maintained a military presence on the Island of Okinawa, Japan, since

the end of World War II in 1945. Undisputed Facts ¶ 5. After the U.S. military occupation of Japan

ended, the Government of Japan permitted the United States to administer Okinawa pursuant to

international agreements, while Japan retained residual sovereignty over Okinawa. Id. In

November 1969, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato agreed to terminate the United States’

administrative control of Okinawa without detriment to the mutual defense interests of both

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governments. Defs.’ Mem. at 7. United States administration of Okinawa officially ended in 1972

when the two governments signed the “Agreement Between the United States and Japan Concerning

the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands” (“Agreement”). Undisputed Facts ¶ 6. Okinawa is one

island in the Ryukyu Island chain that now comprises the Prefecture of Okinawa. Id. Under the

Agreement, the United States relinquished to Japan all administrative rights and interests it had over

the Okinawa Islands. Id. Japan assumed full responsibility and authority for the exercise of any and

all powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the

Islands, and Okinawa regained its pre-World War II status as Japan’s 47th prefecture. Id. 

Under Article III of the Agreement, Japan granted the United States exclusive use of

facilities and areas in the Islands in accordance with the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and

Security” (“Treaty”) and the “Status of Forces Agreement” (“SOFA”). Id. The Treaty and SOFA

were both signed in 1960, but did not take effect until U.S. administration of Okinawa ended in

1972. Defs.’ Mem. at n.5. SOFA is a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan

entered into pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty which states, “[f]or the purpose of contributing to

the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the

United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in

Japan.” Pls.’ Exhs. 14, 15. The Treaty and SOFA create the bilateral Security Consultative

Committee (“SCC”) consisting of four members—the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, the

Japanese Minister of Defense, the United States Secretary of Defense, and the United States

Secretary of State. Id.; Defs.’ Mem. at n.7. SOFA instructs that the SCC “shall serve as the means

of consultation in determining the facilities and areas in Japan which are required for the use of the

United States in carrying out the purposes of the [Treaty].” Pls.’ Exh. 15, SOFA, Art. XXV.

 The United States Department of Defense (“DOD”) maintains and controls a number of

military bases on Okinawa, including the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (“MCAS Futenma”)

which provides services and materials to support Marine Corps aircraft operations. Undisputed

Facts ¶ 7. MCAS Futenma is located in Ginowan City and due to social and economic changes, is

now completely surrounded by urban development. Moriya Dec. ¶ 3. Japanese officials have called

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for its closure and relocation to a more suitable site in order to ease the health and safety burdens on

the citizens of Ginowan City. Id. ¶ 3, 5. At the same time, American officials have also called for

the relocation of MCAS Futenma citing a desire to relocate military activities to a less congested

area. Lawless Dec. ¶ 4. The project to relocate and replace MCAS Futenma is referred to as the

Futenma Replacement Facility (“FRF”) project. Under the auspices of the SCC, the United States

and Japan formed the bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa (“SACO”) to develop

recommendations for the SCC on ways to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. military facilities

and to adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa. Undisputed Facts ¶ 8. SACO

recommendations can only be adopted with bilateral SCC approval. Id. In December 1996, the

SCC members approved the SACO recommendation to replace MCAS Futenma with an offshore,

sea-based facility somewhere off the east coast of Okinawa. Id.; Pls.’ Exh. 13, SACO Final Report. 

The final site selection and design of the FRF depended upon, among other considerations,

U.S. operational requirements which the DOD established in September 1997. Undisputed Facts ¶¶

8, 10; Pls.’ Exh. 16. The operational requirements were developed with the involvement of

representatives of at least eight DOD sub-agencies and were approved by high-ranking officials in

the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marines. Undisputed Facts ¶ 10. The 1997 operational requirements

established parameters for any replacement facility Japan would construct and provide to the U.S. in

accordance with the Treaty and SOFA. Id. While Japan would select the ultimate site of the FRF

and fund and carry out its construction, DOD would oversee and monitor its design, engineering,

and construction to ensure that the FRF met U.S. operational requirements. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 13. 

In August 2000, the Consultative Body of Futenma Relocation, composed of local and

national officials from the Government of Japan, was established to produce a “Basic Plan” to

identify the location, size, construction method, and runway orientation of the FRF. Id. ¶ 11. The

Basic Plan, issued by the Consultative Body in July 2002, approved the decision to relocate MCAS

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Futenma to Nago City’s Henoko District, immediately offshore from Camp Schwab. Id. As already

mentioned, the U.S. military’s Camp Schwab is located adjacent to and in Henoko Bay which is a

dugong habitat. 

Although SACO’s initial recommendation called for the construction of the FRF as a seabased facility, those plans were officially abandoned on October 29, 2005 when the SCC issued the

“Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement” (“ATARA”). Id. ¶ 12; Pls.’ Exh. 18. The

ATARA stipulated that the U.S. and Japan would locate the FRF in an “L-shaped” configuration that

combined the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Henoko and Oura Bays. 

Undisputed Facts ¶ 12. Although Japan suggested locating the FRF entirely on the land area of

Camp Schwab and/or the adjacent Central Training Area, DOD’s operational requirements made

such an arrangement impossible. Id. The site selected to locate the FRF, as described in the

ATARA, did meet DOD operational and safety concerns. Id. The ATARA also directed the

respective staffs of both governments to develop plans for the initiatives agreed upon, including

implementation schedules, no later than March 2006. Id. 

On May 1, 2006, following a meeting of the SCC that included U.S. Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld in addition to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the other SCC

members, Japan and the United States issued an agreement entitled “United States-Japan Roadmap

for Realignment Implementation” (“2006 Roadmap”). Id. ¶ 13; Pls.’ Exh. 19. The 2006 Roadmap is

a joint plan of action between the United States and Japan and reflects bilateral agreement on the

initiatives set forth in the ATARA, including the plans for the Futenma Relocation Facility. 

Undisputed Facts ¶ 13. The Roadmap establishes that Japan will construct the FRF in a location and

configuration that combines the Henoko-saki (Henoko Point) portion of the Camp Schwab

installation and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays. Id. Instead of an “L-shaped”

runway as stipulated in ATARA, the Roadmap stipulates a “V-shaped” runway which will be

partially built on landfill extending into Oura and Henoko Bays. Id. Each runway will be 1,600

meters in length plus 200 meters as “overrun” areas. Id.

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The 2006 Roadmap, like the ATARA, is a bilateral executive agreement between two

sovereign nations which covers a number of restationing and military realignment issues in addition

to the planned closure, return, and relocation of MCAS Futenma. Id. ¶ 14. The agreements reached

in the Roadmap have received needed approvals at the national levels of both governments, but the

Government of Japan is still working to obtain needed approvals from affected local and prefectural

governments. Id. Both the U.S. and Japanese governments are now cooperating to implement the

Roadmap, and construction of the FRF is targeted for completion in 2014. Id. The process has

already begun in the form of surveys and testing by the Japanese government which, under Japanese

law, is required to conduct an environmental impact assessment before construction of the FRF

begins. Moriya Dec. ¶¶ 13–18. 

III. Procedural History 

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 25, 2003 and amended the complaint on

November 24, 2003. Defendants filed an answer on December 9, 2003 and moved to dismiss the

first amended complaint on May 17, 2004 for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Because both parties submitted matters beyond the pleadings, the court converted

defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The court issued its order on

March 2, 2005, addressing the narrow issue of whether the National Historic Preservation Act

(“NHPA”) applies to the circumstances of this case. Dugong v. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106. In

that order, the court denied defendants’ motion and held that the Okinawa dugong is “property”

protected under Japan’s equivalent of the National Register. Id. at 12. The court withheld judgment

and ordered additional discovery on the issues of whether defendants’ activities related to the

Futenma Replacement Facility constitute an “undertaking,” whether the activities “may directly and

adversely affect” the dugong, and whether defendants have “taken into account” the effects of the

replacement facility on the dugong. Id. at 16, 7, 18. 

Following the announcement of the 2006 Roadmap for the FRF, plaintiffs filed a second

amended complaint on July 19, 2006. Defendants filed an answer on August 1, 2006. To avoid a

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dispute over pre-trial discovery, the DOD compiled four separate administrative records, each

covering a different aspect of the planning effort for the FRF. Now before the court are the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether defendants have taken into account the

effects of the Futenma Replacement Facility on the Okinawa dugong, as required under section 402

of the National Historic Preservation Act. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

“no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the opposing party

will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving

party’s allegations. Id.; Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir.

1994). The court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the

facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New

Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

The moving party may “move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Supporting and opposing

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affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated

therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

II. National Historic Preservation Act

Congress enacted the NHPA in 1966 with the goal of preserving the “historical and cultural

foundations of the Nation . . . in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people.” 16

U.S.C. § 470(b)(2). The Act establishes that “[i]t shall be the policy of the Federal Government, in

cooperation with other nations and in partnership with the States, local governments, Indian tribes,

and private organizations and individuals to . . . provide leadership in the preservation of the

prehistoric and historic resources of the United States and of the international community of

nations.” Id. § 470-1(2). 

Under section 106 of the NHPA, federal agencies are required, when undertaking any

federally assisted action within the United States, to “take into account the effect of the undertaking

on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included or eligible for inclusion in the

National Register.”1 Id. § 470f. The NHPA delegates to the Secretary of the Interior authority to

expand and maintain a National Register of Historic Places. Id. § 470a(a)(1)(A). The NHPA also

establishes the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (“ACHP”), Id. § 470i, and delegates to the

ACHP authority to promulgate regulations necessary to implement the section 106 take into account

process, Id. § 470s. The section 106 regulations promulgated by the ACHP set forth a multi-step

process by which an agency takes into account the effects of an undertaking. A basic review process

includes: (1) identification of historic properties and consulting parties, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2,

800.4; (2) notice to consulting parties, including the public, of initiation of consultation, see id. §§

800.2(d), 800.3(e)–(f); (3) assessment as to whether the project will or will not have an adverse

effect on the historic property, see id. § 800.5(a)–(b); (4) notice to consulting parties of finding of no

adverse effect and opportunity for consulting parties to respond, see id. § 800.5(c); and, if adverse

effects are found, (5) continued consultation with the public and other parties to develop and

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evaluate alternatives or modifications to the undertaking that could avoid or mitigate the adverse

effects, see id. §§ 800.5(d)(2), 800.6. An agency’s findings and determinations must be sufficiently

documented to enable reviewing parties to understand their basis, see id. § 800.11, and must

describe, for example, the undertaking, id. § 800.11(d)(1); its effects on the historic property, id. §

800.11(e)(4); and if appropriate, any conditions or future actions to avoid, minimize or mitigate the

adverse effects, id. § 800.11(e)(5). 

In 1980, Congress amended the NHPA to implement the United States’ participation in the

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage (“World

Heritage Convention”). Pub. L. 96–515. The amendment added to the NHPA section 402

governing undertakings outside the United States. Section 402, therefore, is the international

counterpart to section 106 governing domestic undertakings. The full text of section 402 is as

follows:

Prior to the approval of any Federal undertaking outside the United States which 

may directly and adversely affect a property which is on the World Heritage List 

or on the applicable country’s equivalent of the National Register, the head of a 

Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over such undertaking shall 

take into account the effect of the undertaking on such property for purposes of 

avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects.

16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. The Secretary of the Interior is charged with directing and coordinating United

States participation in the World Heritage Convention, and Congress has delegated authority to the

Secretary to nominate properties to the World Heritage List. Id. § 470a-1. The ACHP regulations

implementing section 106 domestic undertakings were first adopted in 1974, and thus, were in effect

at the time Congress passed section 402 governing foreign undertakings. The domestic regulations,

however, do not apply directly to section 402 and no separate implementing regulations have been

promulgated for that section. 

Under NHPA section 110 each federal agency “shall establish, . . . in consultation with the

Secretary [of the Interior], a preservation program for the identification, evaluation, and nomination

to the National Register of Historic Places, and protection of historic properties.” Id. § 470h-2(a)(2). 

An agency’s preservation program under section 110 “shall ensure,” among other things, “that the

preservation of properties not under the jurisdiction or control of the agency, but subject to be

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potentially affected by agency actions are given full consideration in planning.” Id. § 470h2(a)(2)(C). Section 110 also requires that an agency’s preservation program include procedures for

compliance with the domestic section 106 take into account process, id. § 470h-2(a)(2)(E), and that

the agency’s section 106 procedures are consistent with the ACHP regulations discussed above, id. §

470h-2(a)(2)(E)(I). The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to promulgate guidelines to assist

other federal agencies in fulfilling responsibilities under section 110. Id. § 470a(g). Under this

authority, the Secretary in 1998 published guidelines which “have no regulatory effect,” but

nevertheless provide “formal guidance to each Federal agency on meeting” their responsibility under

section 110 to establish a preservation program. 63 Fed. Reg. 20496–20508, 20496 (April 24,

1998). 

III. Administrative Procedures Act 

Because the NHPA does not provide an independent basis for judicial review of agency

actions, an aggrieved party must pursue its remedy under the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”). San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005). The

APA authorizes judicial review of final agency actions “for which there is no other adequate remedy

in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Final agency actions are defined as actions which “mark the

consummation of the agency’s decision making process,” defined as not “merely tentative or

interlocutory [in] nature,” and which determine “rights or obligations” or from which “legal

consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–178 (1997) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Ripeness of agency action for judicial review turns on the “fitness of the issue for

judicial decision” and the “hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration,” but in close

questions, courts are “guided by a presumption of reviewability.” Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801

F.2d 430, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

An agency action or decision may be set aside if the court finds it to be “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and a court may

“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” id. § 706(1). A court’s

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inquiry must be “searching and careful,” but the standard of review is ultimately narrow. Marsh v.

Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendants assert five bases for barring the court’s review including: 1) lack of “final agency

action” as required under the APA; 2) plaintiffs’ lack of standing; 3) non-ripeness of the claims for

judicial review; 4) act of state doctrine; and 5) failure to join the Government of Japan as a necessary

and indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs argue that

the court has a proper basis to review the matter and that they are entitled to summary judgment on

the substantive issue of whether defendants have complied with the NHPA. They argue as a

threshold matter that section 402 of the NHPA applies to the circumstances of this case because

DOD’s involvement in the FRF constitutes a “federal undertaking” which “may directly and

adversely affect” the Okinawa dugong, a “property” protected under Japan’s equivalent of the

National Register. Compliance with section 402, plaintiffs argue, requires defendants to “take into

account” the effects of the FRF on the Okinawa dugong by, among other things, consulting with the

public and interested organizations and taking measures to mitigate or avoid adverse effects. 

Defendants assert that in the absence of any standards or regulations directly applicable to foreign

undertakings, the DOD may determine, in the reasonable exercise of its discretion, what

requirements are necessary to comply with section 402. 

I. Limitations on Judicial Review

A. Final Agency Action Under the APA2

Defendants argue that this case does not involve “agency action” that is “final” for purposes

of triggering the court’s review under the APA. The APA authorizes a “person suffering legal

wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action,” to bring suit

seeking judicial review of that agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Agency action is statutorily defined

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to “include[] the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or the equivalent or

denial thereof, or failure to act.” Id. §§ 551(13), 701(b)(2). According to the Supreme Court, the

five categories—rule, order, license, sanction and relief, as they are defined in 5 U.S.C. sections

551(4), (6), (8), (10) and (11)—each involve “circumscribed, discrete agency actions.” Norton v.

Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004) (hereinafter “SUWA”). The terms

following those five categories—the “equivalent . . . thereof,” “denial thereof,” and “failure to

act”—are not defined in the APA. Id. “But an ‘equivalent . . . thereof’ must also be discrete (or it

would not be equivalent), and a ‘denial thereof’ must be the denial of a discrete listed action (and

perhaps denial of a discrete equivalent).” Id. “The final term in the definition [of agency action],

‘failure to act,’ is in [the Supreme Court’s] view properly understood as a failure to take an agency

action—that is, a failure to take one of the agency actions (including their equivalents) earlier

defined in § 551(13).” Id. Thus, a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) to compel agency action

unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed “can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an

agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Id. at 64. The requirement

of discrete agency action “rule[s] out several kinds of challenges,” including “broad programmatic

attack[s],” that “entangle[]” a court in “abstract policy disagreements” requiring it to “enter general

orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates.” Id. at 64, 66; see also Center for

Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In this case, plaintiffs allege that DOD has approved the 2006 Roadmap, including plans to

construct the Futenma Replacement Facility, without having taken into account the effects of the

facility on the Okinawa dugong. Plaintiffs allege that this failure to take into account (1) is a failure

to take agency action required under section 402 of the NHPA and (2) constitutes agency action that

is unlawfully withheld and/or unreasonably delayed. Second Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief

¶ 3. Plaintiffs ask this court, under its authority in 5 U.S.C. section 706(1), to compel defendants to

comply with the take into account procedures3

. Id. The court agrees with plaintiffs that DOD’s

obligation to take into account is a discrete agency action that is non-discretionary and specific. 

NHPA section 402 states that a federal agency “shall” take into account the effect of an undertaking

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specifically “for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects.” 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. 

Taking into account is discrete, required agency action, and therefore, the failure to take into account

is also agency action reviewable under the APA. Far from launching a “broad programmatic attack”

that requires the court to enter a “general order compelling compliance with broad statutory

mandates,” plaintiffs complain of a circumscribed, discrete agency action mandated by a specific

provision of the NHPA. This duty to take into account relates to how a specific DOD facility,

located at a specific site on the coast of Okinawa and configured in a specific pattern, will adversely

affect the Okinawa dugong, a specific property of cultural and historic significance. 

Plaintiffs make a separate, but related argument that the 2006 Roadmap is also agency action

for purposes of APA review. See Pls.’ Motion to Strike. Although DOD’s participation in and

approval of the 2006 Roadmap are, in a colloquial sense, “actions” taken by a federal agency, they

are not “agency actions” for purposes of the APA. As the court explains in the standing analysis

that follows, plaintiffs do not “suffer[ ] a legal wrong” and are not “adversely affected or aggrieved”

simply by virtue of DOD’s approval of design plans for construction of the Futenma Replacement

Facility. Instead, plaintiffs’ injury is a procedural injury caused by DOD’s participation in and

approval of the Roadmap, without having taken into account the effects of the facility construction

on the Okinawa dugong. The relevant agency action which causes plaintiffs to suffer a legal wrong

and which the court has authority to review, is the failure to take into account, not the approval of

the Roadmap or the design and construction of the FRF. 

DOD’s approval of the Roadmap, however, is relevant for the court’s analysis in determining

whether the failure to take into account is agency action that is “final.” In this case, the NHPA does

not provide an independent basis for judicial review of agency action, and therefore, review is only

proper if the agency action plaintiffs complain of is final. 28 U.S.C. § 704; SUWA, 542 U.S. at

61–62 (“Where no other statute provides a private right of action, the ‘agency action’ complained of

must be ‘final agency action.’”). “As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency

action to be final: First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking

process, . . . [and] it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the

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action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal

consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–178 (1997) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). The finality requirement is to be applied in a “flexible” and “pragmatic” way,

and courts are “guided by a presumption of reviewability.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 136, 149–52 (1967). 

That DOD has not taken into account the effects of the military facility on the dugong, yet

has already established operational requirements which the facility must satisfy and has also

approved the Roadmap containing final plans for the facility’s design and construction, implies that

the failure to take into account is “final” for purposes of triggering review under the APA. Under

the first prong of Bennett, the Roadmap is not tentative or interlocutory in nature. As already

discussed, the Roadmap is the final agreement between the United States and the Government of

Japan marking the consummation of years of negotiation and planning. Defendants argue that the

Roadmap is merely a “general commitment of the [United States Government] to commence a series

of planning efforts . . . to realign the United States-Japan military and security forces in the

Western Pacific Ocean.” Defs.’ Reply at 4. The court does not agree with this overly broad

characterization. Far from establishing a mere framework to commence planning efforts, the

Roadmap contains detailed specifications for the FRF including where and how it will be built, when

it is expected to be completed, how much it will cost, and the number of personnel that will be

relocated there once it is operational. Planning efforts have not just recently commenced. Rather,

those efforts have been underway for several years and have now been consummated in a formal

agreement to move forward with the construction of the FRF. 

Under the second prong of Bennett, the Roadmap is an agreement by which rights and

obligations are determined and from which legal consequences will flow. The Roadmap was

approved by the Secretary of Defense and embodies DOD’s formal decision concerning final plans

for the FRF. In its March 2005 order, the court held that DOD’s actions in 1997 establishing

operational requirements for the FRF provided finality triggering judicial review. Dugong, 2005

WL 522106 at 17. The court stated that the establishment of operational requirements “triggered

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important legal consequences, because they established the benchmark by which” the ultimate

decision to approve or reject the final implementation plans would be judged. Id. Since the court’s

March 2005 order, the final implementation plans have in fact been approved and the earlier

established operational requirements have in fact been incorporated into those final plans. Just as

DOD’s earlier action establishing operational requirements provided finality triggering the court’s

review in 2005, DOD’s more recent action approving the 2006 Roadmap also provides finality

triggering the court’s review now. 

Finally, then, as now, the court is “guided by the presumption of reviewability and the risk of

irreparable harm.” Id. Any question regarding final agency action, therefore, should be resolved in

favor of the plaintiffs. Moreover, as the court explains in Part III below, NHPA section 402 imposes

an obligation to take into account within a certain time frame—that is, “[p]rior to the approval of

any Federal undertaking.” 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (emphasis added). As explained in Part II below,

defendants concede that approval of the 2006 Roadmap constitutes approval of a federal undertaking

for purposes of triggering obligations under NHPA section 402. The failure to take into account,

therefore, can never have any more finality than it does now. The court concludes that DOD’s

failure to take into account pursuant to NHPA section 402 is agency action, and that the failure to

take into account is final. 

B. Standing

To demonstrate standing under Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, a litigant must

show: (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action

of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision. Nuclear Info. & Resource Service v. Nuclear Regulatory

Comm’n, 457 F.3d 941, 949 (9th Cir. 2006); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561

(1992). In addition to the Article III constitutional requirements, a litigant must satisfy additional

prudential standing requirements which, under the APA, requires: (1) a final agency action (which

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the court has discussed above and has resolved in favor of plaintiffs); and (2) an injury falling within

the “zone of interests” protected by the statutory provision the plaintiff claims was violated. Nuclear

Info., 457 F.3d at 950. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the

requirements for standing, which on a motion for summary judgment, must be supported by affidavit

or other evidence of specific facts the court assumes to be true. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. This action

involves three groups of plaintiffs—the Okinawa dugong, three individual Japanese citizens, and six

environmental organizations. The court will address the standing of each group in turn. 

1. Okinawa Dugong

The lead plaintiff that lends its name to this action is the Okinawa dugong, a marine mammal

related to the manatee. The Ninth Circuit has held that although Article III does not prevent

Congress from authorizing suits in the name of an animal, Congress did not in fact do so under the

APA. Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). Standing under the APA is

conferred on “persons” statutorily defined as “an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or

public or private organization other than an agency.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(2), 701(b)(2). The Ninth

Circuit in Cetacean declined to expand this basic definition to include animals such as whales,

porpoises and dolphins. Id. at 1178. Plaintiffs concede that under Cetacean, the Okinawa dugong is

an animal that does not have standing to assert this action under the APA for violations of the

NHPA. Accordingly, the Okinawa dugong is dismissed. 

2. Individuals

The three individual Japanese citizens allege that they have been harmed by DOD’s failure to

follow procedures required under the NHPA. Because procedural injury alone is insufficient to

establish an injury in fact for purposes of standing, a plaintiff must show that “the procedures in

question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest . . . that is the ultimate basis of his

standing.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572–73 nn. 7–8; Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d

934, 938 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[a] free-floating assertion of a procedural violation, without a concrete

link to the interest protected by the procedural rules, does not constitute an injury in fact”). The

desire to use or observe an animal species, even for aesthetic or recreational purposes, is a concrete

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interest for purposes of standing. See City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir.

2004); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–563 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)). 

The three individual plaintiffs in this case are Okinawan citizens who have made and will

continue to make ongoing trips to Henoko Bay to observe the dugong. See, e.g., Higashionna Dec.

¶¶ 1, 5. These ongoing trips are concrete plans, not indefinite intentions to visit “some day” in the

future. Cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. Takuma Higashionna was born and raised near Henoko Bay and

has been visiting the area and observing the Okinawa dugong since his childhood. Id. ¶ 3. He leads

weekly snorkeling and scuba-diving tours to view dugongs and their habitat. Id. Yoshikazu

Makishi was also born and raised in Okinawa and has been frequenting the Henoko coast and

observing the Okinawa dugong for over a decade. Makishi Dec. ¶ 2. Anna Koshiishi moved to the

coast of Okinawa when she was eight years old and has lived there ever since. Koshiishi Dec. ¶ 2. 

Like Higashionna, she also leads eco-tours to view the dugong. Id. ¶ 3. As averred in their

affidavits, these plaintiffs have a concrete interest to preserve the dugong for cultural, educational,

aesthetic, inspirational and economic benefits to themselves and their descendants. For example,

Higashionna states that the dugong has particular cultural and historic significance because it is part

of the creation beliefs of the Japanese and especially the people of Okinawa. Higashionna Dec. ¶ 4. 

He hopes to preserve the dugong so that it may enrich the lives of his descendants, as it has enriched

his own life. Id.; see also Makishi Dec. ¶ 3, Koshiishi Dec. ¶ 5. 

These concrete interests are directly linked to the procedural injury caused by defendants’

failure to comply with the NHPA because to the extent that compliance with the “take-into-account”

process leads to avoidance or mitigation of harm to the dugong, the very object of plaintiffs’ interest

may be preserved and protected. Morever, as required under the prudential standing requirements,

plaintiffs’ interest in the preservation of dugong as historical and cultural property is precisely the

zone of interests protected by the NHPA. In passing the NHPA, Congress declared that the purpose

of the statute was to preserve a nation’s “irreplaceable heritage . . . so that its vital legacy of cultural,

educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched

for future generations.” 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4). While this preservation interest arguably is shared

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by the public at large, it is held with particular acuteness by plaintiffs in this case, long-time

residents of Okinawa who benefit from the dugong in direct and palpable ways. Cf. Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 573–574. The court concludes, therefore, that plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury in fact

because they seek to “enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a

separate concrete interest of theirs.” Id. at 572. 

In cases involving procedural injuries, the person who has been afforded a procedural right to

protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting the normal standards for

redressability and causation. Nuclear Info., 457 F.3d at 950; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.7. Here,

plaintiffs’ showing of redressability and causation is not defeated by the fact that DOD’s compliance

with NHPA procedures would not necessarily prevent the construction of the military facility nor

result in a change in its design, and that the actual construction of the facility is several years in the

future. The NHPA itself does not require a particular outcome and it neither forbids destruction of a

protected property nor commands its preservation4. Coliseum Square Ass’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 465

F.3d 215, 225 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 128 S.Ct. 40. It simply regulates the process by which an

undertaking is approved, requiring a federal agency to “stop, look, and listen.” Id. The approval

process must involve “informed decision-making” the aim of which is “to make government

officials notice environmental [and other] considerations and take them into account.” 

Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 28 (1st Cir. 2007). When an undertaking

is approved without such informed consideration, the procedural injury alleged by plaintiffs has

already occurred. Id. This is so even if informed consideration will not necessarily alter plans for

the undertaking and even if the actual implementation of the undertaking is several years in the

future. 

Defendants assert that because the Government of Japan bears ultimate responsibility for

selecting the site of the military facility and funding and carrying out its construction, plaintiffs

cannot fairly trace their injuries to the activities of the defendants in order to show causation. As is

apparent from the discussion above, however, DOD does not violate the NHPA by virtue of its

bilateral participation in the design, site selection, construction and operation of a military facility

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that threatens a protected property. The NHPA violation arises instead from DOD’s failure to take

into account information relevant for making a determination as to whether the military facility will

adversely affect the dugong and if so, how those effects may be avoided or mitigated. In other

words, the challenged activity is not the undertaking itself, but the process by which the effects of

the undertaking are considered and assessed. As the court elaborates in Part III below, section 402

of the NHPA places the responsibility to consider and assess on the DOD and the DOD alone. 

Plaintiffs’ injury, therefore, is directly traceable DOD, not the Government of Japan.

In sum, the three individual plaintiffs have suffered a procedural injury linked directly to

plaintiffs’ concrete interest in preserving the culturally and historically significant Okinawa dugong,

an interest that is within the “zone of interests” protected by the NHPA. Plaintiffs’ injury is caused

by the failure of DOD to comply with procedures under NHPA section 402 and can be redressed by

a favorable decision requiring DOD to so comply. The court concludes that the three individual

plaintiffs have standing to assert this action. 

3. Associations

For an association to having standing to sue on behalf of its members, it must show that (1)

its members would have standing to sue “in their own right”; (2) the interests at stake in the lawsuit

are “germane to the organization’s purpose”; and (3) neither the claim nor the relief sought requires

members to participate individually in the litigation. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167,

181 (2000); Nuclear Info., 457 F.3d at 950. Plaintiffs, as required on a motion for summary

judgment, have provided affidavits related to four of the six environmental associations—Save the

Dugong Foundation, Center for Biological Diversity, Turtle Island Restoration Network, and Japan

Environmental Lawyers Foundation. The two remaining two associations—Dugong Network

Okinawa and Committee Against Heliport Construction/Save Life Society—have not submitted any

evidence concerning their standing to sue and are dismissed accordingly. 

Save the Dugong Foundation member Takuma Higashionna is an individual plaintiff, and the

court has already determined that Higashionna has standing to sue in his own right. Center for

Biological Diversity member Jeff Shaw lives in Okinawa, is married to an Okinawan family that

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holds religious and spiritual beliefs based on the dugong, holds those same beliefs himself, has

written articles and a book based on his research of the dugong, and is an avid scuba diver who has

seen firsthand the seagrass beds on which the dugongs feed and hopes one day to view the dugong

itself. Shaw Dec. ¶¶ 1–4. Both Turtle Island Restoration Network member and director Todd

Steiner and Japan Environmental Lawyers Foundation member Masato Murata aver that they and

their fellow members make regular trips to observe, study, photograph, and film the dugong. Steiner

Dec. ¶¶ 1–6; Murata Dec. ¶ 4. Like Higashionna, Shaw, Steiner, and Murata each have standing to

sue in their own right. Moreover, the purpose of all four of these organizations is to preserve and

protect the dugong through research, fund-raising and advocacy, and thus the interests at stake in the

lawsuit are germane to the organizations’ purposes. Higashionna Dec. ¶ 2; Galvin Dec. ¶ 2; Steiner

Dec. ¶ 2; Murata Dec. ¶ 2. Lastly, because the claim and injunctive and declaratory relief sought do

not require the individual participation of the members, the court finds that four of the six plaintiff

organizations have standing to assert this action. 

C. Ripeness

Whereas standing asks “who” may bring a claim, ripeness asks “when” a claim may be

brought. Impson, 503 F.3d at 32. With respect to administrative decisions, the ripeness doctrine

seeks to “prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling

themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies

from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in

a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148–149. To

determine whether a claim is ripe, a court “evaluate[s] both the fitness of the issues for judicial

decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. at 149. 

Claims involving injury caused by a failure to comply with statutory procedure may be

brought at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can never get riper. Ohio Forestry Ass’n

Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998). In this case, plaintiffs allege that DOD has approved

plans for construction of a military facility without having complied with procedures set forth in the

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NHPA. As the court explained in the preceding analysis of final agency action, the 2006 Roadmap

is not an abstract proposal. It sets forth detailed specifications regarding the location and

configuration of the replacement military facility. Two runways aligned in a V-shape will be built

largely on landfill adjacent to the existing Camp Schwab, but will also extend more than a mile into

the waters of Oura and Henoko Bays. Moreover, where a statute, like the NHPA, “simply

guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular result,” a claim is ripe when the agency fails to

comply with the procedure. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737 (claim alleging violations of the

National Forest Management Act was not ripe for review at the time of agency’s approval of logging

plans because the statute, in guiding use of forests, was result driven, not procedure driven); see also

Laub v. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1089–1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the distinction

between substantive challenges directed at a result and procedural challenges directed at a review

and approval process). Plaintiffs allege that DOD has failed to comply with statutory procedure

required under the NHPA, and therefore “now is the appropriate time to complain that the agency

failed to do its duty.” Impson, 503 F.3d at 32. The court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims are ripe

for review. 

DOD argues that the claim is not ripe because before construction of the military facility can

begin, Japan must obtain local approval and must complete an environmental impact assessment as

required under Japanese law. Defendants in Impson asserted a similar argument. There, plaintiffs

challenged the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) to comply with the NHPA prior to

approval of a lease of tribal land to a developer for construction of a liquified natural gas terminal. 

Id. at 25. The BIA argued that the claim was not ripe because implementation of the lease was

contingent upon multiple factors, including review and authorization by the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). Id. at 33. As a coordinating agency, the BIA would participate

in the FERC review process and would consider the impacts of the lease. Id. The court in Impson

stated that defendants’ points did not go to the issue of ripeness. Id. Instead, whether the BIA could

fulfill its statutory obligations by participating in the FERC process was a question on the merits. Id.

Likewise, whether DOD can fulfill its statutory obligations under the NHPA through Japan’s

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completion of an environmental review process is a question on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, not a

question of ripeness. 

D. Act of State

The act of state doctrine is “not a jurisdictional limit on courts,” but “reflects the prudential

concern that the courts, if they question the validity of sovereign acts taken by foreign states, may be

interfering with the conduct of American foreign policy by the Executive and Congress.” Siderman

de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1992). The doctrine bars judicial

review of an action “only if: (1) there is an ‘official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its

own territory’; and (2) ‘the relief sought or the defense interposed [in the action would require] a

court in the United States to declare invalid the [foreign sovereign’s] official act.’” Credit Suisse v.

United States District Court, 130 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1997). Defendants argue that the court is

asked to “adjudicate a claim that questions the validity of decisions and acts [made by Japanese]

officials taken under Japanese law.” Defs.’ Mem. at 24. They argue that the court should not

“enjoin—even indirectly by an order directed only at the defendants—the [Government of Japan’s]

ability and sovereign right to site and construct the FRF in satisfaction of its military and security

treaties with the United States,” and to conduct an environmental assessment of the replacement

facility as required under Japanese environmental laws. Id. at 6. 

Defendants asserted similar arguments in connection with their earlier motion in 2005. In

ruling on that 2005 motion, the court found that the record at that time “[did] not currently describe

an ‘official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory,’ but rather a process

intertwined with United States Department of Defense decision-making.” Dugong, 2005 WL

522106 at 20. The court found that the planning process for the FRF was “a cooperative and

bilateral venture undertaken to satisfy American military needs.” Id. The court held that, at that

time, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the act of state doctrine

because “[w]here a court evaluates the actions of a federal agency, the act of state doctrine is not

implicated.” Id. The court did note, however, that further discovery would assist in resolving thenexisting “disputed issues of material fact on the question of whether the United States Department of

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Defense instigated the Futenma relocation, established the requirements for fulfilling that relocation,

and continues to aid logistically, and potentially financially, in the implementation of the project.” 

Id. at 19. The court contemplated that additional discovery might ultimately reveal that “the scope

of Japan’s involvement in locating the replacement air station may prove to exceed the prudential

limitations on this court’s authority under the act of state doctrine.” Id.

Since the court’s 2005 order, defendants have compiled four separate administrative records,

each covering a different aspect of the planning effort for the replacement facility. The facts in the

current record reinforce the court’s earlier finding of a cooperative and bilateral process of

intertwined decision-making. For example, the court acknowledges that Japan had ultimate

responsibility for selecting the location of the replacement facility, and that Japan’s site selection

was driven by its own concerns for environmental, engineering, political and cost factors. Lawless

Dec. ¶ 10. Japan’s responsibility for selecting the site, however, was also constrained by operational

requirements chosen and determined by the United States, and defendants’ own evidence supports

the fact that Japan’s decision to locate the proposed FRF was influenced by the DOD. The

Government of Japan initially preferred a plan that utilized the land area of Camp Schwab, rather

than placing the facility into the waters of Henoko Bay. But the facility was placed in its currently

proposed off-shore location because the United States preferred that location for operational reasons. 

Moriya Dec. ¶ 8. Ultimately, the United States could not accept any plan proposed by the Japanese

government unless the plan conformed to U.S. operational requirements. Id. ¶ 10; Lawless Dec. ¶¶

10, 13. As the court stated in its 2005 order, the activities involved in this case are not exclusively

those of foreign governmental bodies. Rather, the United States has been substantially involved in

the design and site selection for the FRF, will continue to monitor and oversee the construction of

the facility to ensure that it meets U.S. requirements, and will have exclusive authority to operate the

facility once it is completed. 

Japan’s involvement in the FRF project does not by itself implicate the act of state doctrine. 

The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n every case in which we have held the act of state doctrine

applicable, the relief sought or the defense interposed would have required a court in the United

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States to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory.” 

W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Co., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). While this

case may involve various activities, some of which are the responsibility of Japan, e.g., siting and

construction, and some of which are the responsibility of the United States, e.g., operational

requirements, the only activities upon which the court sits in judgment are those obligations placed

upon the United States under provisions of U.S. domestic law. The court’s jurisdiction in this case is

premised on the NHPA and the APA and therefore, the only activities which this court reviews are

DOD’s obligations related to the section 402 process of taking into account. As the court explains in

Part III below, the obligation to take into account lies with the DOD and the DOD alone. Relief

requiring the DOD to take into account, therefore, in no way invalidates Japan’s decision to locate

the FRF in the particular area and configuration it has chosen and in no way interferes with Japan’s

ability to conduct its own environmental assessment according to Japanese law. Again, the court

reiterates that the NHPA compels a particular process, not a particular result. The NHPA requires

and the court can only mandate that the DOD engage in an information gathering process which may

eventually lead to such modifications and alterations if, as a result of the information gathering

process, it is determined that those changes may mitigate adverse effects on protected property. Just

as the court held in its 2005 order, the act of state doctrine is not implicated here because judicial

review does not require the court to invalidate the sovereign acts of the Government of Japan. This

court’s review is directed solely at DOD’s compliance with the NHPA. 

Defendants raise additional concerns that merit discussion here. Defendants recognize that

NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F.Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993), does not stand for the

proposition that extraterritorial application of the NHPA is barred as a matter of law. Indeed, the

court so ruled in 2005 when it held that section 402 of the NHPA contains express Congressional

intent that the NHPA, unlike the National Environmental Protection Act at issue in NEPA Coalition,

apply abroad. Defendants argue, however, that NEPA Coalition stands for “the broader proposition

that a federal court should not apply a provision of United States environmental law in a manner that

creates a ‘substantial likelihood that treaty relations will be affected.’” Defs.’ Mem. at 27. 

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Defendants argue further that 

Any ruling requiring the [U.S. Government] to take action with respect to the

dugong that is inconsistent with or contrary to the considered judgment of the

[Government of Japan] regarding how best to protect one of Japan’s own cultural

resources would undermine the carefully negotiated allocation of sovereign

responsibilities agreed to by both nations in the Roadmap. . . . A court order

requiring the DOD to take premature, inconsistent, or contrary action to that being

taken by the [Government of Japan] . . . and compelling the DOD to conduct its

own assessment of potential impacts on cultural resources, apart from Japan’s

ongoing effort, would frustrate Japan’s exercise of its own legal procedures for

protecting and managing the environment and its cultural resources. 

Id. at 28. The court recognizes that these are valid and important concerns. But these concerns do

not imply that the court must invoke the act of state doctrine and decline to rule on the merits of

plaintiffs’ NHPA claim. Rather, these concerns, as the court elaborates in Part III below, delineate

and give contour to the meaning and scope of the substantive requirement to take into account. As

the court explains below, the concerns articulated by the defendants are precisely the reasons why

the take into account process encourages and indeed requires cooperation and coordination with

other agencies and governments. 

E. Necessary and Indispensable Party

Defendants’ final attempt to prevent the court from reaching the merits of this case rests on a

failure to join the Government of Japan as a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). But as the court has already discussed above, relief

requiring DOD to take into account under section 402 can be fashioned without directly or indirectly

interfering with any decision by the Government of Japan. Thus, the court’s review is not barred by

virtue of FRCP Rule 19. 

F. Conclusion

Defendants have asserted and the court has addressed five separate bases for barring the

court’s review. The court holds that DOD’s failure to take into account the effects of the Futenma

Replacement Facility on the Okinawa dugong is agency action that is final in light of DOD’s

approval of the 2006 Roadmap and DOD’s establishment of operational requirements. The Okinawa

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dugong and two of the environmental associations (Dugong Network Okinawa and Committee

Against Heliport Construction/Save Life Society) do not have proper standing and are dismissed

accordingly. The three individual Japanese citizens, as well as the four remaining associations,

however, do have proper standing to assert this action. In addition, plaintiffs’ claims are ripe, and

neither the act of state doctrine nor FRCP Rule 19 stand in the way of the court’s review. The court

will now proceed to address the substantive issues of whether the NHPA applies to the

circumstances of this case, and if so, whether DOD has met its obligation to take into account. 

II. Applicability of NHPA Section 402

As a threshold matter, a federal agency’s obligation to take into account under section 402 is

triggered only when there is (1) a federal undertaking outside the United States (2) which may

directly and adversely affect (3) a property which is on the applicable country’s equivalent of the

National Register. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. The court, in its March 2005 order, previously addressed the

issue of whether the NHPA applies to the circumstances of this case. In that order, the court held

that the Okinawa dugong is protected by Japan’s Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties, the

equivalent of the United States National Register, and is “property” within the meaning of section

402. Dugong, 2005 WL 522106 at 6–12. The facts upon which that ruling was made remain the

same, and accordingly, the court reaffirms that the Okinawa dugong is protected property under the

NHPA. Because the record was undeveloped at the time of the court’s March 2005 order, the court

withheld judgment and ordered discovery on the two remaining issues of whether DOD’s

involvement in the military facility could constitute a (1) “federal undertaking” that (2) “may

directly and adversely affect” the dugong. Given the more fully developed record now available, the

court will proceed to address these two issues below, resolving both in favor of plaintiffs.

A. “Undertaking”

Defendants concede that their involvement in the FRF including the provision of operational

requirements for the FRF and the approval of the 2006 Roadmap, constitutes a federal undertaking

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within the meaning of section 402. Defs.’ Mem. at 30, n.18. In its 2005 order, the court discussed at

length the statutory definition and meaning of an “undertaking.” Dugong, 2005 WL 522106 at

12–17. It is therefore unnecessary to repeat that discussion here, but one point deserves mention. In

its 2005 order, the court surmised that “Congress may have intended a less restrictive definition of

undertakings to apply to federal projects abroad.” Id. at 12. In light of the legislative history,

however, it is clear that Congress intended the meaning of “undertaking” in section 402 to have the

same meaning as the same term used in section 106. House Report No. 96–1457, Oct. 10, 1980,

U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, 6378, 6408 (“The Committee also notes that the term

‘undertaking,’ as it is used in other sections of the Act, is meant to be used in the same context as

described in Section 106. The [ACHP] has adopted an acceptable definition within its regulations,

published as 36 CFR 800.”). 

In light of defendants’ concession, the court will only briefly summarize plaintiffs’ extensive

arguments and evidence in support of demonstrating a federal undertaking. The project to design,

construct, relocate and operate the FRF is funded at least in part under the jurisdiction of the DOD,

is carried out by and on behalf of the DOD, and requires federal approval. 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7). 

DOD has expended funds in the planning and design of the FRF and will bear the costs of relocating

to and operating the facility once it is constructed. The FRF project is carried out by and on behalf

of DOD because although the Government of Japan bears the full cost of the FRF’s actual

construction, the facility is being constructed for DOD’s exclusive use, according to operational

requirements determined by the DOD. Each phase of the FRF requires, and has in fact received,

federal approval. The initial decision to relocate the Futenma air station required and received DOD

approval through the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s role on the bilateral Security Consultative

Committee (“SCC”). At the intermediate phase, the establishment of operational requirements

received independent DOD approval. Finally, the ultimate decision to design and build the FRF as a

partially sea-based facility adjacent to Camp Schwab, with two runways aligned in a V-shaped

pattern, also received DOD approval when the bilateral SCC approved the 2006 Roadmap. As

planning and construction moves forward, additional DOD approvals, such as entry permits for

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engineers to enter Camp Schwab to carry out technical surveys and to begin actual construction, will

be required. The court concludes that there is no issue of material fact as to whether DOD activities

related to the Futenma Replacement Facility constitute a “federal undertaking” under NHPA section

402. 

B. “May Directly and Adversely Affect”

The third and final issue related to the applicability of the NHPA to this case is whether

defendants’ undertaking “may directly and adversely affect” the dugong. The statute requires a

threshold showing that the undertaking may have direct and adverse effects on the dugong, not that

the undertaking necessarily will have effects. The term “adverse effect” is not defined in the statute,

but regulations implementing section 106 domestic undertakings set forth a meaning of adverse

effect that is instructive in this case. Under the domestic regulations, “an adverse effect is found

when an undertaking may alter, directly or indirectly, any of the characteristics of a historic

property. . . . Adverse effects may include reasonably foreseeable effects caused by the undertaking

that may occur later in time, be farther removed in distance or be cumulative.” 36 C.F.R. §

800.5(a)(1). An example of an adverse effect includes “physical destruction of or damage to all or

part of the property.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(2)(I). 

It is undisputed that Henoko Bay is dugong habitat and that seagrass beds found in the Bay

are dugong feeding grounds. Undisputed Facts ¶ 4. It is also undisputed that dugong have been

observed to feed in and traverse Henoko Bay. Id. The record contains considerable disagreement

among plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts regarding the extent and degree to which the dugong

would be adversely affected. Compare Hines Dec. with Noah and Frankel Decs. But this does not

disturb the undisputed fact that Henoko Bay is dugong habitat and therefore, construction and

operation of a military facility in and near the Bay could have potential adverse effects. These

potential adverse effects include physical destruction of the Okinawa dugong resulting from

contamination of seagrass feeding grounds and collisions with boats and vessels, as well as longterm immune and reproductive damage resulting from exposure to toxins and acoustic pollution. 

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That the actual consequences may be currently unknown is precisely the reason the NHPA requires

defendants to gather, examine and assess information. Doing so allows the agency to determine,

early in the process of an undertaking, whether potential consequences may crystalize into actual

effects and whether the actual effects will exceed a de minimis threshold. Because it is undisputed

that Henoko Bay is a dugong habitat, the court finds that there is no material issue of fact as to

whether the FRF may directly and adversely affect the dugong. 

III. “Take Into Account”

Having concluded that the court’s review is proper and that the NHPA is applicable to the

facts of this case, the court now turns to the merits of plaintiffs’ claim that DOD has violated the

NHPA by failing to “take into account” the effect of their undertaking on the Okinawa dugong. In

its March 2005 order, the court reserved judgment on this issue until the record was more fully

developed, as it is now. First, the parties dispute the meaning of “take into account” as a matter of

law. Second, the parties dispute whether defendants’ activities are sufficient to comply with the

appropriate meaning of “take into account.” The court will address each of these issues in turn. 

A. Meaning of “Take Into Account” 

The meaning of “take into account” under section 402 governing foreign undertakings is an

issue of first impression for the courts. The statute does not define the phrase “take into account,”

there are no regulations that directly define or elaborate the phrase, and neither the parties nor the

court are aware of any case law construing the phrase. Defendants argue that in the absence of

specific standards, criteria, or procedures, Congress delegated to the head of each federal agency the

decision regarding how to comply with the “take into account” language of section 402. They argue

that because the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the meaning of “take into account,” the

issue for the court is whether DOD’s own interpretation of the statute—embodied in a series of

internal directives and standards—is a permissible construction. Plaintiffs argue that the statute is

not silent or ambiguous and that alternatively, DOD’s interpretation of the statue is not a permissible

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construction. 

“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is

confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken

to the precise question at issue.” Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842

(1984). “If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress

had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect”

by both the court and the agency. Id. at 842–843, n.9. If, however, the statute is silent or

ambiguous, “the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. 

Rather, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible

construction of the statute.” Id. “The precise degree of deference warranted depends on the statute

and agency action at issue.” Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. United States Fish and Wildlife

Service, 475 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2007). “Under Chevron’s classic formulation, if . . . there is

an express delegation of authority [by Congress] to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of

the statute by regulation, [then] [s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless

they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. “If Chevron deference is

inapplicable because Congress has not delegated interpretative authority to the agency, the agency’s

views still ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may

properly resort for guidance.’” Id. “The ‘fair measure of deference’ may then range from ‘great

respect’ to ‘near indifference,’ depending on ‘the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,

formality and relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.’” Id. 

Under Chevron step one, this court must determine, based on the statute’s language,

legislative history, structure and purpose, whether there is clear Congressional intent regarding the

meaning of the phrase “take into account.” On its face, the phrase “take into account” means

consider, contemplate, study, and weigh. Webster’s Int’l Dictionary of the English Language (3rd

ed. 1976) (defining the phrase “take into account” to be synonymous with “take into consideration,”

and in turn, defining “consider” to be synonymous with “contemplate,” “study,” and “weigh”). This

plain meaning of “take into account” is consistent with the purposes of the NHPA to “generat[e]

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information about the impact of federal actions on the environment,” and to “require[] . . . the

relevant federal agency [to] carefully consider the information produced,” San Carlos Apache Tribe

v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added), and to “weigh effects in

deciding whether to authorize” a federal undertaking, Save Our Heritage v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,

269 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). The statutory text also contains requirements

relating to who, when, and what shall be taken into account, as well as why an accounting is

necessary. The statute states that (1) “the head of a Federal agency having direct or indirect

jurisdiction over such undertaking” shall be the person charged with the task of taking into account,

(2) the accounting shall occur “prior to approval” of the undertaking, and (3) the accounting shall

consider the “effects of the undertaking” on the protected property. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. Finally, the

statute is clear regarding why the taking-into-account is required. It is conducted “for purposes of

avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects.” Id. 

Although not evident from the plain language of section 402, related sections of the NHPA

indicate clear Congressional intent that the take into account process involves not a federal agency

acting alone, but instead, an agency acting in cooperation with relevant nations, parties, and

organizations. When it enacted section 402 in 1980, Congress declared that “[i]t shall be the policy

of the Federal Government, in cooperation with other nations and in partnership with the States,

local governments, and Indian tribes, and private organizations and individuals” to “provide

leadership in the preservation of the . . . resources of the United States and the international

community of nations.” 16 U.S.C. § 470-1(2) (emphasis added); Pub. L. 95–515 § 101(a), Sec. 2. 

Similar Congressional intent is expressed in the legislative history of the 1980 amendments. The

House Report states that the purpose of the World Heritage Convention—which section 402

implements for the United States—“is to establish an effective system of collective protection of the

cultural and natural heritage.” House Report No. 96–1457, Oct. 10, 1980, U.S. Code Cong. and

Adm. News 6378, 6406. Section 402, therefore, should be read in conjunction with Congress’

declaration of policy requiring cooperation, partnership, and collective participation. 

 The plain language of section 402, combined with express legislative purpose, reveals clear

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Congressional intent regarding the basic components of a take into account process under section

402. The process, at a minimum, must include (1) identification of protected property, (2)

generation, collection, consideration, and weighing of information pertaining to how the undertaking

will affect the historic property, (3) a determination as to whether there will be adverse effects or no

adverse effects, and (4) if necessary, development and evaluation of alternatives or modifications to

the undertaking that could avoid or mitigate the adverse effects. The person charged with

responsibility for this basic process is the person with jurisdiction over the undertaking, and

compliance with the process must occur before the undertaking is approved. In addition, a federal

agency does not complete the take into account process on its own, in isolation, but engages the host

nation and other relevant private organizations and individuals in a cooperative partnership. 

That Congress clearly intended a take into account process to include these basic components

is further supported by the context in which section 402 was enacted. In 1980 when Congress

amended the NHPA to add section 402 governing foreign undertakings, the same “take into account”

phrase had been used fourteen years earlier when Congress enacted section 106 governing domestic

undertakings. 16 U.S.C. § 470f. Moreover, by the time Congress added section 402, the ACHP had

already promulgated regulations elaborating what it means to take into account for purposes of

section 106 domestic undertakings. 36 C.F.R. Part 800. Although the ACHP has from time to time

amended the section 106 regulations, the essential elements—identification of protected properties,

gathering and weighing of information, determination of adverse effect or no adverse effect,

evaluation of mitigation measures if necessary, and consultation with interested parties and

organizations—were in place by 19805

. When identical words are used in different parts of the same

act, the natural presumption is that Congress intended them to have the same meaning. 

Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1423, 1432 (2007). Moreover, “Congress’

repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be

construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.

624, 631 (1998). Here, the basic framework for a take into account process was well-understood at

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the time Congress used the identical phrase in section 402. This raises an inference that Congress

intended the take into account process under section 402 to follow the basic structure the ACHP had

already outlined for undertakings governed by section 106. 

The court does not suggest, and plaintiffs do not argue, that the ACHP’s regulations in 36

C.F.R. Part 800 apply verbatim to section 402 undertakings. It is clear that the section 106 process

does not map directly onto the section 402 process. Congress did not include a statutory provision

expressly incorporating into section 402 the ACHP’s existing regulations. Cf. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at

631. Moreover, the statutory text of section 106, unlike that of section 402, expressly requires a

federal agency to consult with the ACHP, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (a federal agency “shall afford the

[ACHP] . . . a reasonable opportunity to comment”), and while the ACHP is given express authority

to promulgate regulations implementing section 106, it does not have comparable authority for

section 402, see 16 U.S.C. § 470s. The differing role of the ACHP in the domestic and foreign

contexts, however, does not rebut the natural presumption that Congress intended the “take into

account” phrase in section 402 to follow the basic outline of section 106 set forth by the ACHP. 

Granted, “[a] term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association with distinct

statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies.” Environmental Defense, 127 S.Ct.

at 1432. But while Congress may have been silent on the regulatory specifics and implementation

details, allowing the precise letter of the statute to be filled in by a particular agency depending on

the agency’s mission and undertaking, Congress was clear on the basic spirit and framework of the

take into account process. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended the basic framework

to differ depending on the geographic location of the undertaking and the protected property. 

Congress’ intent that the basic framework of the take into account process remain cohesive

across a multitude of agencies and undertakings is reflected in the fact that Congress provided for a

mechanism to achieve that cohesiveness. NHPA section 110 directs each federal agency to develop

a preservation program. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(a)(2). An agency’s preservation program “shall

ensure” that properties are considered and taken into account during both foreign and domestic

undertakings pursuant to section 402 and section 106, respectively. Id. § 470h-2(a)(2)(C) (requiring

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an agency’s preservation program to consider the preservation of properties in general, whether or

not they are under the jurisdiction or control of the agency, and whether or not they are affected by

foreign or domestic agency actions); id. § 470h-2(a)(2)(E) (requiring an agency’s preservation

program to include procedures for compliance with section 106 domestic undertakings). 

Significantly, NHPA section 110 directs that “[e]ach Federal agency shall establish . . . , in

consultation with the Secretary [of the Interior], a preservation program.” Id. § 470h-2(a)(2)

(emphasis added). In addition, an agency’s procedures for complying with section 106 domestic

undertakings must be consistent with the regulations issued by the ACHP. Id. § 470h-2(a)(2)(E)(I). 

In the domestic context, therefore, Congress provided for coherency in agency preservation

programs by requiring consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, and by specifically mandating

consistency with the ACHP’s section 106 regulations. In the foreign context, Congress also

provided for coherency in agency preservation programs by requiring consultation with the

Secretary of the Interior. Although there is no express mandate that an agency’s take into account

procedures for foreign undertakings be consistent with the ACHP’s domestic regulations, there is no

indication that Congress intended the basic framework of foreign and domestic take into account

procedures to differ. 

In developing a preservation program as required under section 110, a federal agency

consults with the Secretary of the Interior, and accordingly, Congress has delegated to the Secretary

authority to promulgate guidance to assist agencies in fulfilling their responsibilities. Id. § 470a(g). 

Under this authority, the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the National Park Service, has

indeed issued such guidance, which “have no regulatory effect,” but nevertheless are “the

Secretary’s formal guidance.” 63 Fed. Reg. 20496–20508, 20496 (April 24, 1998). With respect to

foreign undertakings under section 402, the guidelines recommend that “[e]fforts to identify and

consider effects on historic properties in other countries should be carried out in consultation with

the host country’s historic preservation authorities, with affected communities and groups, and with

relevant professional organizations.” 63 Fed. Reg. at 20504 (Standard 4, Guideline (o)). The

guidelines advise that such consultation should involve a “process of seeking, discussing and

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considering the views of others, and where feasible, seeking agreement with them on how historic

properties should be identified, considered, and managed.” Id. (Standard 5, Guideline (a)). “While

specific consultation requirements and procedures will vary among agencies depending on their

missions and programs, the nature of historic properties that might be affected, and other factors,

consultation should always include all affected parties.” Id. (Standard 5, Guideline (d)). The

guidelines also advise that consultation should occur “early in the planning stage of any Federal

action that might affect historic properties.” Id. (Standard 5, Guideline (c)). 

As the Secretary of the Interior recognizes, “specific consultation requirements and

procedures will vary among agencies depending on their missions and programs,” and therefore, an

agency has some discretion in deciding exactly who will be consulted, to what extent, and at

precisely what time. Likewise, an agency has some discretion to decide exactly what information

regarding effects of the undertaking it will generate, gather, and consider, and if adverse effects are

found, exactly what mitigation efforts it will evaluate and pursue. Under Chevron step two, an

agency’s specific formulation of the take into account process is entitled to deference from a court. 

Nevertheless, under Chevron step one, Congress’ intent that the section 402 take into account

process contain basic elements—identification of protected properties, gathering and weighing of

information, determination of adverse effect or no adverse effect, evaluation of mitigation measures

if necessary, and consultation with interested parties and organizations—is evident. Congress

explicitly declared that preservation of historic properties would be carried out in cooperation and in

partnership with other nations, private organizations, and individuals. 16 U.S.C. § 470-1. Congress

enacted section 402 using the same take into account phrase used previously when Congress enacted

section 106, and at the time, the ACHP had already promulgated regulations setting forth a basic

framework for the section 106 take into account process. 36 C.F.R. Part 800. Congress provided a

mechanism, through the formal guidance of the Secretary of the Interior, to achieve coherency and

consistency across the various preservation programs of different agencies. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(g). It

is implausible, therefore, that Congress intended the essential elements of a take into account

process—whether conducted in the context of a foreign or domestic undertaking—to differ widely. 

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Finally, the fact that the Secretary of the Interior’s guidance for section 402 undertakings is

consistent with the basic framework for section 106 undertakings supports the notion that the basic

framework is evident from express Congressional policy and the NHPA’s text, purpose, structure,

and history. 

B. Compliance With “Take Into Account”

Defendants assert that information about the Okinawa dugong was taken into account during

bilateral discussions to select the site for the FRF, and will continue to be taken into account as

Japan moves forward with its own environmental review process. Defendants provide the

declaration of Takemasa Moriya, the Japanese Administrative Vice Minister for Defense, who states

that potential impacts on the dugong and its feeding grounds were of utmost importance to him and

the Japanese government in selecting the site and configuration of the FRF. Moriya Dec. ¶¶ 8, 11. 

Because of concern for the dugong, the Japanese initially proposed a facility built completely on

land, but this option was not possible due to U.S. operational requirements. Id. ¶ 8. Rather than

shift the facility further into the shallow waters as the U.S. initially preferred, the Government of

Japan developed a plan in such a way that the construction of the new facility would avoid shallow

water areas to the extent possible, thereby limiting the potential impact on dugong feeding grounds. 

Id. 

Defendants also assert that the Government of Japan will continue to “give careful

consideration to impacts on the Okinawa dugong . . . as [Japan] proceeds with its environmental

review” process required under Japanese law. Defs.’ Mem. at 43. Moriya explains that the Japanese

environmental assessment will include specific methods for surveying, predicting and assessing the

impacts of the FRF on the dugong. Moriya Dec. ¶ 14. He explains further that the initial scoping

document as well as the final results of the review will be subject to public comments, and such

comments will be considered by Japanese officials as they prepare an environmental impact

statement. Id. ¶¶ 14–16. Based on the results of the review process, Moriya explains that the

Government of Japan, in consultation with the United States, will take appropriate mitigation

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measures, “taking comprehensively into account various factors including the opinions of the local

communities, the need to meet the operational requirements of the U.S. forces, and the need to give

due consideration to the natural environment.” Id. ¶ 18. 

Plaintiffs do not dispute and the court does not take issue with what Japan has or has not

done with respect to the environmental assessment required under Japanese law. Indeed, as the

court has already explained in connection with the act of state doctrine, the court’s review is not

directed at whether Japan has complied with Japanese law, but whether DOD has complied with its

obligations under the NHPA. Section 402 of the NHPA is clear on its face—it assigns the obligation

to take into account to “the head of a Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over such

undertaking.” 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. It is undisputed that, in this case, the Secretary of the

Department of Defense has direct jurisdiction over the FRF project. The obligation to take into

account, therefore, lies with the DOD and the DOD alone. While defendants insist that impacts on

the dugong were taken into account, the court must ask not only whether the effects were taken into

account, but by whom—the Department of Defense? The fact that Japan will conduct an

environmental assessment pursuant to Japanese law does not relieve DOD of its independent

obligation to take into account under the NHPA. 

The current record contains no evidence that a single official from the DOD with

responsibility for the FRF has considered or assessed the available information on the dugong or the

effects of the FRF. For example, defendants provide the declaration of Richard Lawless who is the

DOD official responsible for bilateral negotiations concerning the FRF and who reports to the

Secretary of Defense. Lawless Dec. ¶ 1. His declaration, while noting that the Government of Japan

placed particular emphasis on preserving seagrass beds and avoiding adverse impacts to the dugong,

is silent as to whether DOD also took similar concerns into account. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 11–12. Indeed,

Lawless’ declaration indicates that DOD’s overarching, and perhaps only concern, was that the FRF

comply with U.S. operational and safety requirements. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 10, 13. Additional evidence

in the record supports this view. An October 2005 document summarizing the U.S.-Japan

negotiations states, “[t]he U.S. side continued to maintain that while environmental impacts were

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important, any FRF proposal must meet operational and safety requirements.” Shockey Dec., Exh. 5

at 5, Futenma Replacement Site Survey. The document continues, “the environmental issues are

primarily a question of political will since any option will affect the environment and

opponents will use environment-based arguments to advance their cause.” Id. (emphasis

added). Insofar as these statements suggest that DOD need not concern itself with environmental

impacts because they are unavoidable and are simply an expedient used by opponents to obstruct the

FRF, these statements evince at best, plain ignorance of, and at worst, complete defiance of DOD’s

obligation to consider the impacts of the FRF on the dugong. The court is unconvinced that DOD

has expressed concern for, let alone taken steps to consider the effects of the FRF on the dugong. As

plaintiffs argue, “[i]t is disingenuous for DOD to now claim Japan’s environmental concerns as their

own.” Pls.’ Reply at 24. 

To be sure, the fact that DOD, not the Government of Japan, has the obligation to take into

account under section 402 does not preclude DOD from considering information generated by Japan

and coordinating with Japan to gather and compile relevant information. Indeed, as the court has

already discussed, Congress’ intent that a basic review process involve coordination and

consultation with the host nation, interested parties, and other organizations is evident from the

language, purpose and structure of the statute. Moreover, as the court alluded to when discussing

the act of state doctrine, DOD need not take action that is inconsistent with or contrary to the actions

of Japan. This is especially true given that, as defendants observe, the Okinawa dugong is Japan’s

cultural and historical property and therefore, Japan’s judgment regarding how best to protect that

property should be of great concern to the DOD. Duplicative, inconsistent efforts are not required. 

To the contrary, coordination and consultation are required in order to avoid such wasted efforts. 

Ultimately, however, the NHPA imposes on the DOD a responsibility to consider and weigh. DOD

must determine whether the available information is sufficient, and if not, what additional

information must be gathered or produced. DOD must examine that information, whether it is

generated by the Government of Japan, by the DOD itself, or by outside experts and organizations. 

Based on that information, DOD must determine whether there will be adverse effects or no adverse

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effects. If there are adverse effects, DOD must consider and evaluate options to mitigate or avoid

those effects. Each of these steps can be accomplished with input and cooperation from the

Government of Japan and other parties, but ultimately, the responsibility rests with the DOD. 

Defendants have directed the court’s attention to a variety of documents and studies

purportedly showing a comprehensive analysis of all relevant considerations relating to potential

dugong impacts associated with the FRF. These documents include: 

(1) the declaration of Stephen Getlein, the Natural Resources Manager for

Marine Corps Base Camp Butler (“MCB Butler”) which encompasses

several facilities on Okinawa including Camp Schwab, Shockey Dec.,

Exh. 41; 

(2) the initial and reply declarations of Michael Noah, who from October

2004 through April 2007, was the DOD Chief Supervisory Biologist

stationed in Okinawa; 

(3) the initial and reply declarations of Adam Frankel, a private expert

consultant from the firm Marine Acoustics, Inc.; 

(4) a December 2005 report prepared for the Department of the Navy by the

consulting firm Geo-Marine, Inc., Shockey Dec., Exh. 9 (hereinafter

“December 2005 Report”); and 

(5) a June 2003 report conducted by the Facilities Engineer Environmental

Affairs Branch of MCB Butler, Shockey Dec., Exh. 6 (hereinafter “June

2003 Report”). 

For a variety of reasons discussed below, these documents, contrary to defendants’ assertion, are

inadequate to demonstrate defendants’ compliance with NHPA section 402. 

Stephen Getlein attests that “there are viable seagrass areas in Henoko Bay that could be

potential dugong feeding areas,” but that “in [his] professional and personal opinion, . . . Henoko

Bay is not attractive habitat for dugongs, . . . and there are several areas around Okinawa Island

where the Okinawa dugong is more likely to feed than Henoko Bay.” Getlein Dec. ¶¶ 8–9. The

same Getlein declaration was provided to the court when the court issued its prior order in 2005. In

that order, the court stated that “whether the bay provides active habitat for the species . . . is

certainly a key issue for pursuit during discovery and future dispositive motions.” Dugong, 2005

WL 522106 at 18. Insofar as defendants re-submit Getlein’s declaration to support the proposition

that the FRF will have minimal or no adverse effects on the dugong because Henoko Bay is not an

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attractive habitat relative to other locations, this conclusion is disputed by other evidence in the

record. First, the conclusion is belied by the Government of Japan having placed particular

emphasis on avoiding damage to seagrass beds in Henoko Bay. See Moriya Dec. Second,

defendants’ own declarant Michael Noah attests that any relative comparison of the suitability of

Henoko Bay with alternative feeding locations around Okinawa Island lacks scientific foundation. 

Noah Reply Dec. ¶¶ 10–13. Noah explains that this is because Henoko Bay has been the focus of

most dugong and seagrass surveys, at the exclusion of other locations. Id. Therefore, there is

currently insufficient information to conclude that, relative to other locations, the quantity and

quality of seagrass found within the footprint of the FRF is either attractive or unattractive. In any

event, the NHPA does not limit defendants’ obligation to take into account to only those areas

deemed to be the most attractive, important, or significant. Even if there exist habitats in other parts

of Okinawa Island that are more desirable than Henoko Bay, it is undisputed that Henoko Bay is

dugong habitat and therefore, the obligation to take into account has attached. Undisputed Facts ¶ 4. 

 

Defendants “urge the court to examine with great care the detailed and comprehensive

declaration provided by [Michael] Noah,” and the court has done so. Defs.’ Mem. at 41. Like

Getlein’s declaration, Noah’s declaration also recognizes that viable seagrass areas exist in Henoko

Bay, but suggests that the area is not a “preferred” or “high quality” dugong habitat. Id. at 41, 42;

Noah Initial Dec. ¶ 51. As already discussed, Noah himself admits that there is currently insufficient

evidence to evaluate the importance of Henoko Bay relative to other dugong habitats. Noah also

observes that dugong populations are susceptible to harm from a variety of environmental stressors

including urban development, agricultural run-off, and commercial fishing ports. Noah Initial Dec.

¶¶ 55–63. The presence of other sources of strain on dugong populations, however, does not change

the fact that construction and operation of the FRF may pose a separate and additional threat which

under the NHPA must be studied and evaluated. Finally, Noah also discusses potential mitigation

measures involving the creation of new seagrass beds through transplantation of existing beds to

areas where seagrass has not become well established. Id. ¶ 64. He notes that the Government of

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Japan “will make decisions on, and develop required mitigation for, any significant adverse impacts

identified within the sovereignty of Japan.” Id. ¶ 65. As the court has already discussed, however,

NHPA section 402 is clear on its face—it imposes an obligation on DOD to consider information

“for purposes of avoiding or mitigating adverse effects.” 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. While DOD may

work in conjunction with Japan to evaluate mitigation measures, the NHPA imposes a responsibility

on the DOD, not the Government of Japan. 

The “bottom line” of Adam Frankel’s declaration is that currently there is not enough

information to “make meaningful predictions about how much or how little dugongs will be affected

by the operations of the FRF.” Frankel Reply Dec. ¶ 10. Frankel avers, “[t]he extent and duration

of potential noise disturbance from aircraft would require quantification to determine any potential

adverse effect [on the dugong]; without such quantification, little can be accurately stated about the

level or effect of transmitted aircraft noise.” Frankel Initial Dec. ¶ 33. Similarly, with respect to

noise disturbance from boats, Frankel advises that “the number of boats resulting from the proposed

airport facility should be quantified before the suggestion of possible impacts to dugong behavior,

metabolic systems, and survivorship can be analyzed and discussed.” Id. ¶ 27. Defendants suggest

that it is plaintiffs’ burden to provide the necessary quantification, Defs.’ Mem. at 41, when in fact,

the NHPA places this burden on defendants. 

Finally, the December 2005 and June 2003 Reports, like the declarations of Getlein, Noah

and Frankel, are also insufficient to demonstrate defendants’ compliance with NHPA section 402. 

The court notes that both reports incorporate input and information generated by interested parties

such as regional experts, academic and research institutions, U.S. and international agencies, and

non-governmental organizations. See December 2005 Report at 1-10:1-11 (“a multitude of

individuals, agencies, and databases were consulted during the search for data and information on

the occurrence of marine resources” in Okinawa); June 2003 Report at 2 (seagrass identification

aided by personnel from Okinawa Seagrass Watch). Such consultation and cooperation from

interested parties is encouraged and required as a basic element of the section 402 take into account

process. The December 2005 Report, however, is limited to an inventory and basic scientific

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description of the dugong and seagrass. See December 2005 Report at 2-33:2-34, 3-32:3-34. The

report mentions that a seagrass-watch program, initiated in Okinawa in 2002, was tasked with

addressing the impacts of the FRF construction on seagrass beds and dugongs, but does not provide

any further information on what conclusions were reached or whether the results of the program

were considered by the DOD. Id. at 2-34. It appears that the seagrass-watch program identified

seven species of seagrass within Henoko Bay, but stopped short of analyzing how the seagrass will

be impacted by the FRF. Id. The June 2003 Report is also insufficient to satisfy DOD’s obligations

under section 402 because it is limited to assessing the effects of current Marine training activities

and does not assess the effects of future construction and operation of the FRF. See also Shockey

Dec., Exh. 7, February 2005 Marine Corps Briefing (describing the June 2003 Report as an

assessment of the effects of current U.S. Marine Corps training on habitats). 

In sum, the current record reflects a failure by the DOD to comply with NHPA section 402. 

This failure constitutes agency action that is unreasonably delayed and unlawfully withheld as

provided by the APA. Defendants have failed to produce, gather and consider information necessary

for taking into account the effects of the FRF on the Okinawa dugong and for determining whether

mitigation or avoidance measures are necessary and possible. The current record contains an

abundance of basic scientific knowledge regarding dugong behavior, migratory movements, feeding

patterns, and seagrass habitats. But this information alone is insufficient because the statute is

clear—the information considered must bear on the “effects of the undertaking” on the protected

property, and the information must be considered for the purpose of “mitigating or avoiding any

adverse effects.” 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. Defendants’ own declarants admit that there is insufficient

evidence to evaluate the effects of the undertaking, a necessary predicate for determining whether

mitigation is necessary and possible. If further information is needed in order to evaluate whether

adverse impacts to the dugong will be minimal because Henoko Bay is a marginal habitat relative to

other habitats around Okinawa Island, then DOD has a responsibility to ensure that such studies are

conducted. If more information is needed in order to evaluate whether noise disturbance from air

and water vessels during construction and subsequent operation of the FRF will adversely impact the

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dugong, then DOD has a responsibility to ensure that those studies are also conducted. Contrary to

Noah’s understanding, DOD, not the Government of Japan, has the obligation to evaluate mitigation

measures if it is determined that there are adverse effects, but such evaluation can occur parallel to

and in conjunction with Japan’s own efforts. 

The court is troubled that the 2006 Roadmap embodying final plans for the construction of

the FRF has received the highest levels of approvals from the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State. 

Yet, the impacts of the FRF on the dugong are currently not well-understood, and other than Noah’s

suggestion that seagrass beds might be transplanted to other locations, few mitigation measures have

been studied and evaluated by the DOD. Defendants argue that insofar as the currently available

information is insufficient or incomplete, any deficiencies will be addressed by Japan as it conducts

a three-year environmental impact assessment pursuant to Japanese law. There is no doubt that, in

satisfying its own obligations under the NHPA, defendants may consider the information generated

by Japan’s assessment. The critical question, however, is one of timing. It is true that, as the court

stated in its 2005 order, construction of the facility has not yet begun, and the take into account

process required by the NHPA can still occur. Dugong, 2005 WL 522106 at 15. Yet, it is also true

that, as the court has consistently held, the statutory text requires defendants to take into account

“prior to approval of an undertaking.” 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. Congress’ express inclusion of a time

frame indicates that Congress intended the take into account process to occur early in the planning

stages of a federal undertaking when there is still a meaningful opportunity to consider adverse

impacts and mitigation measures. Satisfaction of defendants’ obligations under section 402,

therefore, cannot be postponed until the eve of construction when defendants have made irreversible

commitments making additional review futile or consideration of alternatives impossible. 

Japan’s environmental assessment has already begun and now is the time for DOD to

actively participate and coordinate with Japan. Will Japan’s assessment be sufficient for meeting

DOD’s obligations under section 402? If not, then how should Japan’s assessment be

supplemented? If supplemental information is necessary, then from what sources will the

information be derived? These questions remain unanswered. If defendants wait to address these

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issues until the end of the three-year period when the Japanese environmental assessment is

complete and when Japan is ready to move forward under the terms of the Roadmap, it will be too

late. 

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is DENIED. It is hereby ADJUDGED and ORDERED that:

1. Defendants have failed to comply with the requirements of NHPA section 402, 16 U.S.C.

§ 470a-2, and this failure to comply is agency action that is unreasonably delayed and unlawfully

withheld, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 

2. Defendants are ordered to comply with NHPA section 402, and this case is held in

abeyance until the information necessary for evaluating the effects of the FRF on the dugong is

generated, and until defendants take the information into account for the purpose of avoiding or

mitigating adverse effects to the dugong. 

3. Defendants are ordered, within ninety (90) days of the date of this order, to submit to the

court documentation describing what additional information is necessary to evaluate the impacts of

the FRF on the dugong; from what sources, including relevant individuals, organizations, and

government agencies, the information will be derived; what is currently known or anticipated

regarding the nature and scope of Japan’s environmental assessment and whether that assessment

will be sufficient for meeting defendants’ obligations under the NHPA; and identifying the DOD

official or officials with authorization and responsibility for reviewing and considering the

information for purposes of mitigation.

4. If plaintiffs desire to respond to this submission, they shall file their response within fortyfive (45) days of defendants’ filing. 

Dated: January 23, 2008 _______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. The full text of section 106 is as follows: “The head of any Federal agency having direct or

indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the

head of any Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking

shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the

issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of the undertaking on any

district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National

Register. The head of any such Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Counsel on Historic

Preservation established under part B of this subchapter a reasonable opportunity to comment with

regard to such undertaking.” 16 U.S.C. § 470f. 

2. Plaintiffs have moved to strike defendants’ final-agency-action argument because defendants first

raised it in their reply brief, and it is well-established law that arguments not made in an opening

brief are deemed waived. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006). Defendants

oppose plaintiffs’ motion to strike, arguing that the final-agency-action argument was directly raised

in their opening brief at footnote 18 and was indirectly referred to in various other places. The court

notes that burying in a footnote an argument that was eventually fleshed out to over two pages in the

reply brief does not give the opposing party fair and sufficient notice. The court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, nevertheless, is limited to final agency actions under the APA and therefore, the court is

required as a matter of law to examine whether its review is proper. The court denies plaintiffs’

motion to strike defendants’ argument and will consider all supplemental briefing filed by the parties

in connection with this issue. 

3. Plaintiffs characterize DOD’s failure to take into account not only as agency action “unlawfully

withheld” and “unreasonably delayed” under 5 U.S.C. section 706(1), but also as agency action that

is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” under 5

U.S.C. section 706(2)(A). Second Amended Complaint, Prayer For Relief, ¶¶ 2–4. The court,

however, notes that the failure to take into account is more appropriately brought under section

706(1), rather than section 706(2)(A). 

4. An exception exists when a project affects a National Historic Landmark. In that case, an agency

has an affirmative duty, “to the maximum extent possible, [to] undertake such planning and actions

as may be necessary to minimize harm to such landmark.” 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(f); see also 36 C.F.R.

§ 800.10; Coliseum Square, 465 F.3d at 225, 243.

5. See generally 36 C.F.R. Part 800, revised as of July 1, 1980. Pertinent sections of the 1980

regulations are as follows: § 800.4(a) (identification of protected properties); § 800.4 (gathering and

weighing of information); § 800.4(b), (c) (determination of adverse effect or no adverse effect); §

800.6(b)(4), (5) (evaluation of mitigation measures if necessary); § 800.6(b) (consultation with

interested parties and organizations).

ENDNOTES

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