Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03665/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03665-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARLONZO ROYSTON,

Petitioner,

v.

RANDY GROUNDS, Warden,

Respondent.

___________________________________/

No. C-12-3665 EMC (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Petitioner filed this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. In his petition, he claimed that the June 24, 2010 determination by the Board of Parole

Hearings (“BPH”) that he was not suitable for parole violated several of his constitutional rights. 

The Court conducted an initial review of the petition and dismissed it with partial leave to

amend. See Docket # 7. The Court dismissed without leave to amend the claims for violations of

Petitioner’s right to due process and his Eighth Amendment rights. See id. at 2-3. The Court

dismissed with leave to amend the claims for violations of Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights,

Sixth Amendment rights and rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 

See id. at 3-4. As to the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims,

the court explained that the allegations in the petition were insufficient because Petitioner had not

explained his legal theories and his factual allegations did not suggest a violation of any of those

constitutional provisions. Id. at 3. The Court instructed Petitioner that, “[b]ecause both the Fifth

and Sixth Amendments cover many different rights, Petitioner must specify in his amended petition

the particular Fifth Amendment right(s) and the particular Sixth Amendment right(s) that were

violated, and explain how the BPH’s actions violated each such right. He also must explain how the

Case 3:12-cv-03665-EMC Document 9 Filed 01/02/13 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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BPH violated his right to equal protection. He should cite any case authority he has in support of his

contention that the BPH’s actions violated his Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and/or equal

protection rights.” Id. at 4.

Petitioner then filed an amended petition, which is now before the Court for review pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts. 

First, Petitioner alleged in his amended petition that the parole denial violated his right to

equal protection because the BPH panel “clearly discriminated on the petitioner due to the

committed offense.” Docket # 8, p. 3. He urged that the BPH treated him differently in stating that

his psychological evaluation overall risk assessment was “high” when the psychological evaluation

actually stated it was “low.” Id. The claim is meritless on the law and the facts. Assuming

arguendo that the BPH did change his psychological evaluation rating, doing so would not amount

to an equal protection violation because there is no allegation that Petitioner was treated differently

than someone similarly situated to him. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands

that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which

is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”) The claim also

is factually meritless because the BPH decision and the psychological report do not show that the

BPH changed the psychological evaluation. Instead, the BPH Commissioner’s comment reflects

that the panel believed that anything other than a rating of “low” on the risk assessment was

unfavorable to the prisoner’s parole prospects. See Docket # 8, p. 79. The Commissioner correctly

noted that Petitioner was in the “low range of psychopathy” on one test and in the “moderate range

for risk of future violence” on another test – both of which were accurate recitations of the

psychological report. Id.; see id. at 96-98. The BPH Commissioner then opined that the “moderate”

rating was “high as far as the Panel is concerned because any time it’s higher than low, we have to

question your ability to refrain from violent recidivism.” Id. at 79. That statement did not convert

the psychological evaluation into rating Petitioner as a “high” risk, but instead was a permissible

opinion that a convicted murderer who was evaluated as presenting a moderate risk for violence (or

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a low-moderate risk overall) presented too high a risk of violence to be paroled from prison. The

equal protection claim is dismissed without leave to amend.

Second, Petitioner alleged that the parole denial violated his rights under the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In Petitioner’s view, the BPH’s

continued reliance on the commitment offense to deny parole amounted to multiple punishments for

a single offense. See Docket # 8, p. 4. This claim has no legal merit because a denial of parole is

not punishment for double jeopardy purposes. See Alessi v. Quinlan, 711 F.2d 497, 501 (2d Cir.

1983) (denial of parole “is neither the imposition nor the increase of a sentence, and it is not

punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause”). Petitioner’s sentence on his second

degree murder conviction was 15-to-life and the BPH’s decision did not increase the punishment

beyond that set when he was sentenced. This claim is dismissed without leave to amend.

Third, Petitioner alleged that the denial of parole violated his rights under the Sixth

Amendment because “the panel was not fair in their decision or decision making when it came to

petitioner’s suitability.” Docket # 8, pp. 4-5. This is essentially a restatement of Petitioner’s due

process argument that the evidence did not support the decision to deny him parole. Swarthout v.

Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011), compels rejection of this claim. Cooke stated that the Due

Process Clause did not provide any right to any particular quantum of evidence supporting the parole

denial; Petitioner cannot avoid the reach of that case by merely recasting his challenge to the

evidence as a Sixth Amendment claim rather than as a due process claim. The only two procedural

rights the Supreme Court has recognized in the context of parole suitability hearings are an

opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. See Cooke, 131 S.

Ct. at 862. The hearing transcript submitted by Petitioner plainly shows that Petitioner was afforded

both those rights. The Sixth Amendment claim is dismissed without leave to amend. 

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This action is dismissed because Petitioner failed to state a claim upon which federal habeas

relief may be granted. The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 2, 2013

_________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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