Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02929/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02929-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1346wd Wrongful Death

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHRISTINE MARTIN EPSTEIN, 

 Plaintiff, 

Case No. 16-cv-2929-BAS(WVG) 

ORDER GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED 

COMPLAINT 

[ECF No. 14] 

 v. 

SECRETARY ROBERT A. 

MCDONALD, et al., 

 Defendants. 

On December 1, 2016, Plaintiff Christine Martin Epstein, who proceeds pro 

se, commenced this action, individually and on behalf of her deceased brother, Peter 

Elwood Martin, against Defendants Secretary Robert A. McDonald and the 

Department of Veteran Affairs (collectively, the “Government”) for negligence and 

professional malpractice in connection with the care provided to Mr. Martin. Ms. 

Epstein amended her complaint twice, with the operative complaint being the Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Ms. Martin now moves for leave to file a Third 

Amended Complaint (“TAC”). The Government opposes. 

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted 

and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the 

Court GRANTS Ms. Epstein’s motion. 

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I. LEGAL STANDARD 

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after a 

responsive pleading has been served, a party may amend its complaint only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “The 

court should freely give leave when justice so requires,” and apply this policy with 

“extreme liberality.” Id.; DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th 

Cir. 1987). However, leave to amend is not to be granted automatically. Zivkovic v. 

S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Jackson v. Bank of 

Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990)). Granting leave to amend rests in the 

sound discretion of the district court. Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 

1331 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The Court considers five factors in assessing a motion for leave to amend: (1) 

bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of the 

amendment, and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. 

Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Foman v. Davis, 

371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The party opposing amendment bears the burden of 

showing any of the factors above. See DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186. Of these 

factors, prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight. Eminence Capital, 

LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). However, absent prejudice, 

a strong showing of the other factors may support denying leave to amend. See id. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Though the Government carries the burden of demonstrating the Forman 

factors, without relying on any legal authority, the entirety of the Government’s 

argument opposing Ms. Epstein’s motion is as follows: 

// 

// 

// 

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The United States submits that it is premature for Plaintiff 

to file a TAC as the Court has yet to rule on the United 

States’ Motion regarding the same issues of jurisdiction 

and the immateriality of the same specific paragraphs 

found in Plaintiff’s SAC. The Court should, therefore, 

deny Plaintiff’s request for leave to file her proposed TAC. 

In the alternative, the Court should stay ruling on 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend and allow the parties 

to supplement their respective pleadings within two weeks 

of its ruling on the United States’ Motion. 

(Gov’t’s Opp’n 3:8-14.) The Government’s point appears to be a practical one: 

because the relevant facts regarding jurisdiction and immateriality are the same in 

the SAC and proposed TAC, the Court should first rule on the Government’s motions 

to dismiss the SAC and strike non-relevant allegations before reaching Ms. Epstein’s 

motion for leave to file an amended complaint. 

 Generally, the resolution of jurisdictional issues is of the highest priority when 

an action commences. See, e.g., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 

(1979) (“[N]either personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally preliminary in 

the sense that subject-matter jurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges of the 

defendant, rather than absolute strictures on the court[.]). Despite there being a 

general order of priority, it is not mandatory. See Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia 

Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007). “[A] federal court has leeway to 

choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.” Id.

For example, “a district court declining to adjudicate state-law claims on 

discretionary grounds need not first determine whether those claims fall within its 

pendent jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Moor v. Cnty. Of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 

(1973)). “Nor must a federal court decide whether the parties present an Article III 

case or controversy before abstaining under Younger v. Harris[.]” Id. (citing Ellis v. 

Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1975)). In short, the decision to consider the 

Government’s motion before Ms. Epstein’s, or vice versa, is within the Court’s 

discretion. 

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 Reviewing the circumstances of this case, the Court first notes that the 

Government fails to carry its burden of demonstrating that the Foman factors weigh 

in favor of denying Ms. Epstein’s Rule 15(a) motion. See DCD Programs, 833 F.2d 

at 186. Though there may be substantial similarities between the SAC and proposed 

TAC, it is important to first resolve which complaint is operative. If the Government 

determines that the same challenges asserted in its motion apply to the proposed 

TAC, it may re-file its motion. 

The Government also requests in the alternative that the Court stay ruling on 

Ms. Epstein’s motion and “allow the parties to supplement their respective pleadings 

within two weeks of its ruling on the United States’ Motion.” (Gov’t’s Opp’n. 3:8-

14.) However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) only permits supplemental 

pleadings “setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the 

date of the pleading to be supplemented.” See Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 

858, 874 (9th Cir. 2010). Consequently, the Government’s alternative request 

involving supplemental pleadings would be an improper use of supplemental 

pleadings permitted by Rule 15(d). 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

In light of the foregoing, and exercising its discretion, the Court GRANTS

Ms. Epstein’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint based on the 

Government’s failure to carry its burden under Rule 15(a). (ECF No. 14.) 

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Ms. Epstein to file the Third Amended Complaint 

attached to her motion no later than May 15, 2017. 

Furthermore, in anticipation of Ms. Epstein filing her Third Amended 

Complaint, the Court TERMINATES AS MOOT the Government’s motions to 

dismiss and strike (ECF No. 9). See Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 

(9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is well-established that an amended complaint supersedes the 

original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”); see also Ortegoza v. 

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Kho, No. 12-cv-529-L(KSC), 2012 WL 5304859, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) 

(Lorenz, J.) (citing Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 649 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“As a general rule, ‘[an] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being 

treated thereafter as nonexistent.’”). If Ms. Epstein fails to file her Third Amended 

Complaint by the aforementioned date, the Government may file an ex parte 

application requesting that the Court reinstate its motions to dismiss and strike. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 21, 2017 

 

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