Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01910/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01910-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALVIN DWAYNE HOLT, CDC #J-66891,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 04cv1910-L (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT

TO Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) and 42 U.S.C.

1997e(a)

vs.

ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Defendant.

This report and recommendation is submitted to United States District Court Judge M.

James Lorenz pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72. 3 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

I. Procedural Background

On September 22, 2004, Plaintiff, Calvin Wayne Holt, an inmate currently incarcerated at

California Medical Facility (“CMF”), filed a Complaint against Defendants Warden Robert J.

Hernandez, Associate Warden Brenda Early, Associate Warden of Business Services Octavio

Peraza, and Facility 1 Laundry Personnel Chris Howerton pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

Complaint alleges three causes of action, each stating a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due

process and equal protection of the law. Plaintiff alleges these violations occurred when

Defendants regularly failed to provide inmates with clean bed linens, creating unsanitary

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

conditions, and when prison administration subsequently failed to respond to Plaintiff’s

administrative appeal at the second formal level. 

On March 29, 2005, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure12(b). The motion was based on the argument that Plaintiff failed

to allege and exhaust all administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. On September 7, 2005, Magistrate Judge Stiven submitted a

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) to District Judge Lorenz recommending that Defendants’

motion be denied. On October 5, 2005, District Judge Lorenz adopted the R&R in its entirety. On

October 20, 2005, Defendant filed an answer. On April 5, 2006, Magistrate Judge McCurine

ordered Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint to be filed as of February 13, 2006. On January 26,

2007, the Court ordered the Clerk of Court to provide a copy of Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint (FAC) to Defendants and ordered Defendants to file a responsive pleading. On

February 16, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC. Plaintiff filed an

opposition on March 22, 2007. Similarly, Defendant’s filed a reply on March 22, 2007. 

II. Factual Background

According to Plaintiff from February 2004 through September 2004, he was denied “the

minimal civilized measures of sanitation and personal safety” due to the fact that Defendants were

“rationing” sheets “at the rate of approximately 20 sheets per week ‘on a first come first serve

basis’” to an inmate population of 800-1000 inmates. (FAC at 3.) Plaintiff contends that

Defendants were aware of the sheet shortage but did nothing and “the offending

conditions/conduct” continued which resulted in Defendant’s deliberate indifference towards the

issue.” (FAC at 3-3a.) Due to a lack of clean sheets, Plaintiff alleges he began “experiencing skin

irritation/ailment that caused continuous scratching.” (FAC at 4.) Plaintiff claims his skin

condition worsened, compelling him to seek medical treatment. He was prescribed medicated

lotion and given a note for clean sheets. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ continual failure

provide clean sheets caused all inmates to suffer “inhumane conditions that constituted excessive

risk.”(FAC 3-3a.) 

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

III. Defendants’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that “Plaintiff failed to

plead any facts implicating the Fourteenth Amendment; failed to plead a sufficiently grave

deprivation to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment; and failed to show Defendants acted

with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s health and safety.” (Defs. Reply at 2.)

1. Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A claim may be dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir.

1996). In deciding such a motion, all material factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as

true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill, 80 F.3d at 338. Dismissal

is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to

support a cognizable legal theory. Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

In addition, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court

must also be careful to construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the

doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988);

Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027, n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). The rule of liberal

construction “is particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Presumably unskilled

in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who

benefits from the representation of counsel.”). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil

rights complaint, however, a court may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290

(9th Cir. 1977) (“Conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected as insufficient to

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.”). Thus, at a minimum, even the pro se plaintiff “must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that

support [his] claim.” Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984).

As a general rule, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court

may not consider materials outside the pleadings. Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corrections,

151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. . .is the

complaint.” Id. at 1197 n.1. However, the court may consider facts established by exhibits

attached to the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The

court may also disregard allegations in the complaint if they are contradicted by facts established

by exhibits attached to the complaint. Id. The Court is not required to accept as true conclusory

allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council

v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.) cert denied, 454 U.S. 1031, 102 S.Ct. 567 (1981). In addition,

the Court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Id.

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity

to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies can not be cured by amendment. See Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

2. Analysis

Defendant contends that plaintiff fails to state a claim under either a substantive or

procedural due process analysis. (MTD at 4.) 

A. Due Process

 a. Procedural Due Process

To plead procedural due process violations, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a life, liberty or

property interest exists and has been subject to interference by the state; and (2) the procedures

attendant upon the deprivation of an existing interest were constitutionally insufficient. Kentucky

Dept. Of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1990). 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed

by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 569 (1972).

In addition to liberty interests that arise directly from the Constitution, however, courts

have long recognized that state prison regulations may give rise to liberty interests that are

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-227 (1976). 

Nonetheless, the interest created by the regulation must be something more than freedom from the

restrictions ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293

(1995). The interests created by state prison regulations are “generally limited to freedom from

restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to

protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless impose[] atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 2300

(citations omitted). 

b. Substantive Due Process

To plead a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must allege governmental action

which deprives plaintiff of a life, liberty or property interest which may not be deprived regardless

of the procedure employed. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.

833, 846-50 (1992); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). State action that “do[es] more

than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism, “but rather, ‘shocks the

conscience’ to the point that it ‘is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities’” can be said to

violate due process. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 

Under this standard, substantive due process violations have been limited to a small

number of issues. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994). In Collins v. Harker Heights,

503 U.S. 115 (1992), the Supreme Court noted that “as a general matter, the Court has always been

reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible

decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Id. at 124. Accordingly, the

protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to

marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. 

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

////

c) Claim one

In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts in his first claim for relief an “8th Amendment Freedom

From Cruel and Unusual Punishment; 14th Amendment Right Due Process Of The Law and Equal

Protection of the Law.” (FAC at 3.) 

Plaintiff then presents a page and a half of allegations in which he contends that from

approximately February 2004, until at least May 22, 2004, the Facility 1 Laundry room deprived

Plaintiff and the other inmates of Facility 1 “of the minimal civilized measures of sanitation and

personal safety, by rationing out sheets at a rate of approximately 20 sheets per week ‘on a first

come first served basis.’” (FAC at 3.) 

Nowhere in claim one does Plaintiff identify how his procedural or substantive 14th

Amendment due process rights are implicated. Although “certain wrongs affect more than a single

right, and accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s commands,” Armendariz

v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996), the Supreme Court has held that where a claim can

be analyzed under “an explicit textual source” of rights in the Constitution, a court may not also

assess the claim under another, “more generalized source.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 ,

394-95 (1989). In this case, the Eighth Amendment provides specific limits on the type of

government conduct complained of by Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim should be analyzed

under the Eighth Amendment and not under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process

provisions. 

Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for

relief pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment as presented in claim one be GRANTED. 

d) Claim two

Plaintiff’s second claim for relief alleges “8th Amendment Freedom From Cruel and

Unusual Punishment ; 14th Amendment Right to Due Process of the Law and Equal Protection Of

The Law.” (FAC at 4.) As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot “double up” his constitutional claims

by asserting a generalized Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim and a specific Eighth

Amendment claim. Because an explicit textual provision of the constitution protects Plaintiff from

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

the governmental conduct complained of, Plaintiff is precluded from obtaining additional relief

under the notion of due process. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996). 

For this reason, it is recommended that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s request

for relief pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment as presented in claim two be GRANTED.

B. Equal Protection

Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claim on the ground Plaintiff “does

not specifically allege a factual basis for this claim.” (Defs. Mtn. to Dismiss at 5.) Defendant

contends “Plaintiff has failed to allege that he was treated differently than other inmates... .” (Defs.

Mtn. to Dismiss at 6.)

“‘The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure

every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,

whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly

constituted agents.’” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) (quoting

Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)); Village of Overbrook

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).

Conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss,

unless the plaintiff alleges facts which may prove invidious discriminatory intent. Village of

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). 

Therefore, when an equal protection violation is alleged, the plaintiff must plead facts to show that

the defendant “acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.” 

FDIC. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); Reese v. Jefferson

School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000). “‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more

than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker .

. . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in

spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator of

Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege any statements or actions made

by Defendants that rise to the level of an equal protection violation based upon race or other

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

protected class. Plaintiff does not allege that any named defendant made specific derogatory racial

or other discriminatory remarks at the time of the alleged incident. Even if Plaintiff had properly

alleged Defendants’ use of some type of discriminatory slurs, “verbal abuse is not sufficient to

state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.3d 136,

139 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 What is required is proof of an intent to discriminate. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229

(1976). Plaintiff fails to assert any circumstances wherein Defendants singled out specific

categories of inmates to which Plaintiff belongs for intentional discriminatory treatment.

Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s equal

protection claim be GRANTED.

C. Eighth Amendment

Defendants assert: 1) “plaintiff has failed to plead a sufficiently grave deprivation to state a

claim under the Eighth Amendment;” and 2) “plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that Defendants

were deliberately indifferent.” (Defs. Mtn to Dismiss at 7-8.)

“Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates,... the full protections of the Eighth

Amendment most certainly remains in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect

persons convicted of crimes.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979)(citation

omitted). The Eighth Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires

neither that prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity one might find desirable. 

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th

Cir. 1982). Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain,” which includes those sanctions that are “so totally without penological justification that it

results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976);

see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1944); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. This includes not

only physical torture, but any punishment incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency

that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also

Estellle v Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

“The requirements for proving an actionable violation of the Eighth Amendment are well

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

established. First, an inmate must demonstrate that the deprivation suffered was “objectively,

‘sufficiently serious.’” Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations

omitted). “Then, the inmate must establish that prison officials had a ‘sufficiently culpable state

of mind’ in allowing the deprivation to take place. The latter requirement has been defined as

being ‘deliberately indifferent’ to an inmate’s health or safety.” Id. “Thus, there is both an

objective and a subjective component to an actionable Eighth Amendment violation.” Clement v.

Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). 

a) Objective requirement

“Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an

inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This

objective component is satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners with

adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit, 682

F.2d at 1246; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In this case, Plaintiff claims that the system used to distribute clean sheets was insufficient

to meet the clean sheet requirements of the inmates and “linen/sheets distribution was contrary to

civilized standards of decency.” (FAC at 2.) Plaintiff explains that clean sheets were distributed

every week on a first come first served basis and that the number of sheets distributed in this

manner was insufficient and rises to the level of Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual

punishment. Id. 

In response, Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that he

experienced a “complete lack of laundered sheets over an extended period of time.” (Defs. Mtn. to

Dismiss at 7.) Additionally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to allege he was personally

deprived of clean sheets for an extended period of time. Id. In short, Defendants contend that the

conditions of confinement of which Plaintiff complains do not violate the constitution. 

In determining, whether a specific deprivation of a basic need is adequate to satisfy the

objective requirement of an Eighth Amendment claim, the Court must consider the circumstances

of the deprivation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct.

2215 (2001). As noted above, prisons need not “be comfortable” or “provide every amenity that

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

one might find desirable.” Hoptowit v. Ray 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Here, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint and finds his allegation does not state a

constitutional claim. Plaintiff’s claim is not sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth

Amendment nor any other constitutional provision. Federal judicial relief is not available as a

remedy for minor inconveniences which are a part of prison life.

b) Subjective Requirement

The subjective requirement, relating to the defendants’ state of mind, requires “deliberate

indifference.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. “Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must be both

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 

In this case, Plaintiff claims a deprivation of clean linen/sheets for a period of months

“possibly causing” Plaintiff to develop a skin irritation for which he consulted the Facility’s

physician. (FAC at 4.) Plaintiff further states he was proscribed medicated cream “(Elimite 5%)

used to treat and combat scabies.” Id. Plaintiff contends the “deprivation of clean linen/sheets”

subjected him to “INHUMANE conditions.” Id. 

In response, Defendants point to Plaintiff’s Attachment One page 35, a letter from

Associate Warden, Octavio Peraza. The letter is dated May 24, 2004, and is directed to Inmate

Pace, the Chairman of the Mens’ Advisory Council, and states:

I am in receipt of your letter dated May 18, 2004, expressing concerns

regarding the lack of clean sheets on Facility 1 for the last several months.

A review of the clothing logs indicates that on May 13, 2004, clean sheets

were distributed to all of the inmates on Facility 1.

Our institution is closely monitoring all clothing rooms to eliminate any

shortages. In order to reduce clothing shortages, additional clothing including

sheets have been ordered. Additionally, cell searches are conducted to retrieve

excess clothing to be placed back into circulation. 

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

Should you experience any further problems, please contact the Program

Office on your facility.

Defendants argue that this letter attached to Plaintiff’s FAC demonstrates a complete lack

of “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm. “In this case, Plaintiff not only

fails to plead any facts showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent, but instead, provides

evidence that the prison officials were taking reasonable measures to address the linen shortage.”

(Defs. Mtn. to Dismiss at 9.) 

Defendants also point to additional attachments submitted by Plaintiff which clearly

demonstrate that their actions did not amount to “deliberate indifference.” First, Plaintiff was

issued a “Clothing/Linen Slip” authorizing him to receive a “bed roll” in compliance with the

Facility doctor’s prescription for clean sheets. (Attachment One at 30.) Second, in a letter dated

October 19, 2001 to Inmate Mitchell Berg, Regional Administrator K.W. Prunty acknowledged

Inmate Berg’s concerns regarding clean linen/sheet exchange. Administrator Prunty noted that

specific monitoring procedures had been implemented to “ensure institutional policies and

procedures relative to clothing and linen exchanges will be conducted correctly and efficiently

within the Department Operations Manual guidelines.”(Attachment One at 26.) Third, a July 6,

2004, memo to Plaintiff regarding his 602 appeal on the issue of adequate laundry supplies

indicates that Plaintiff’s appeal was partially granted at the first level of review. The memo states

in pertinent part:

At the time of your interview, Facility 1 clothing room had an adequate

supply of clean sheets, for laundry exchange. 

You stated during the interview that you have been able to exchanging

(sic) sheets. If sheets were not available on your exchange day, clothing staff

allowed you to exchange your sheets the next day.

Facility 1 clothing supervisor will continue to monitor clothing and linen

needs.

(Attachment One at 22.)

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

Defendant argues that all these facts taken together do not support the subjective

component of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

Based upon Plaintiff’s own attachments to his First Amended Complaint, the Court finds

he has failed to demonstrate Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Proof of an official’s

deliberate indifference to the health or safety of an inmate requires more than proof of mere

negligence. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). 

Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim be GRANTED.

D. Dismissal with Prejudice

“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is absolutely

clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Karim-Panahi v.

Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988)(internal citations omitted). “Liberality

in granting a plaintiff leave to amend ‘is subject to the qualification that the amendment not cause

undue prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not futile.” Bowles v. Reade,

198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Based upon Plaintiff’s own submissions, it is clear that the deficiencies in his complaint

cannot be cured by amendment. As noted above, Plaintiff’s Due Process claims fail because the

undisputed facts explicitly define a claim under the Eighth Amendment, thereby barring Plaintiff

from raising the same claim under the more general Fourteenth Amendment. 

Further, revising Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim would also be futile based upon the

facts already presented. According to Plaintiff, clean sheets were distributed but only in a limited

number and in a procedurally inadequate method. These facts, as asserted by Plaintiff, do not rise

to the level of cruel and unusual punishment because the alleged deprivation is not sufficiently

serious. Additionally, based upon Plaintiff’s own submissions, Defendants were cognizant of the

complaints regarding clean sheets and acted to remedy the situation by implementing specific

procedures. Thus, it appears that no amount of revision to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim

can establish Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference.” 

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

 Likewise, Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim cannot be saved by amendment. After a

thorough review of the entire complaint (including attachments), the Court cannot find any fact

that justifies granting Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his Equal Protection claim. Indeed, to

allow Plaintiff to amend his Equal Protection claim at this juncture would cause undue prejudice to

Defendants. It appears that based on all of the facts and the inferences that can be drawn from

them in Plaintiff’s favor, there is simply no basis for a valid Equal Protection claim. “Courts are

not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant’s motion to dismiss be granted and that

Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order GRANTING Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pursuant

o Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b). It is further recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint with prejudice. 

 IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 27, 2007, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be filed

the Court and served on all parties no later than August 10, 2007. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: July 9, 2007 

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

cc: Honorable M. James Lorenz

 United States District Judge

All Counsel and Parties of Record

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 04cv1910-L (WMc)

Case 3:04-cv-01910-L-WMC Document 73 Filed 07/09/07 Page 14 of 14