Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02290/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02290-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEWART MANAGO,

Plaintiff, No. 2:07-cv-2290 LKK KJN P

vs.

BRAD WILLIAMS, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has filed a motion for temporary restraining order. (Dkt. No. 70,

filed February 22, 2010.) This action is referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262, and was reassigned to the

undersigned on February 9, 2010. This is plaintiff’s third motion for injunctive relief. (See Dkt.

Nos. 6, 23, 70.) 

Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order seeks an order of this court: 

(1) requiring that “defendants, their agents, employees, and successor[s]...cease harassment,

retaliation and reprisals for plaintiff’s court litigation, legal assistance to prisoners and innocent

Case 2:07-cv-02290-TLN-KJN Document 74 Filed 02/26/10 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). 1

 Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”). 2

 See, e.g., Aiello v. OneWest Bank, 2010 WL 406092, *1 (E.D. Cal. 2010), which 3

provides: “‘Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to

preliminary injunctions.’ Pimentel v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., No. 09- CV-2264 JLS

(NLS), 2009 WL 3398789, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (referencing New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v.

Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347, n. 2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.)” (internal parallel citations

omitted). 

2

association with inmates;” (2) requiring that “(CDCR) prison officials [be] ordered [to] remove 1

plaintiff from (ASU) based on the fact that plaintiff is not a member nor an associate of any 2

prison gang;” (3) ruling that “defendants and/or their agents ha[ve] violated plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights in that his confinement in the (ASU) constitutes retaliatory action taken

against plaintiff for the exercise of his constitutionally protected right to engage in legal and

legitimate jailhouse lawyer activities;” and (4) ruling “that defendants and/or their agents have

violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by basing his confinement in the (ASU) wholly or in

part upon plaintiff’s lawful association with other prisoners. . .” (Dkt. No. 70, at 29–30.) In

support of his thirty-page motion, plaintiff has attached exhibits totaling one hundred pages. 

Plaintiff has served the motion on defendants. (Dkt. No. 70, at 130.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary and temporary “fix” that the

court may issue without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the

movant “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the

movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 

The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a fuller

hearing. See generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; see also, E.D. Cal. L. R. (“Local Rule”) 231(a). It is

the practice of this district to construe a motion for temporary restraining order as a motion for

preliminary injunction, particularly when, as here, the motion has been served on the adverse

3

party. 

Case 2:07-cv-02290-TLN-KJN Document 74 Filed 02/26/10 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

A preliminary injunction should not issue unless necessary to prevent threatened

injury that would impair the court’s ability to grant effective relief in a pending action. Sierra

On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984); Gon v. First State

Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1989). A preliminary injunction represents the exercise of a far

reaching power not to be indulged except in a case clearly warranting it. Dymo Indus. v.

Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964). “The proper legal standard for preliminary

injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he

is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, Inc. v.

Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009), quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008). Significantly, in cases brought by prisoners

involving conditions of confinement, any preliminary injunction “must be narrowly drawn,

extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief,

and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff cannot, by this motion, enjoin persons who are not defendants in the

underlying action, based on claims that are not set forth in the operative complaint. Although

this motion expressly seeks to enjoin “defendants, their agents, employees, and successors,” all

of the challenged conduct has taken place at California Correctional Institution, Tehachapi, and

the requested relief is directed toward officials at that facility (and, more broadly, CDCR), who

are not parties to this action. In contrast, this lawsuit proceeds on plaintiff’s claims against

individual defendants working at CSP, Sacramento and CDCR’s Office of Internal Affairs. 

Further, while both the underlying action and instant motion allege retaliatory conduct against

plaintiff, the underlying action rests on alleged conduct in response to plaintiff testifying against

a prison official, while the instant challenge rests on conduct allegedly responsive to plaintiff

filing administrative complaints, pursuing his own litigation, assisting other inmates in the

Case 2:07-cv-02290-TLN-KJN Document 74 Filed 02/26/10 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Despite the distinct forms of relief plaintiff seeks in the present motion, the instant 4

filing recounts the allegations and claims set forth in his Amended Complaint.

4

pursuit of their litigation, and associating with prisoners who have gang affiliations. “Unrelated

claims against different defendants belong in different suits[.]” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605,

607 (7th Cir. 2007). The relief plaintiff presently seeks is not relevant to preserving the status

quo in the underlying action nor, therefore, can plaintiff demonstrate, pursuant to the instant

motion, a likelihood of success on merits of his underlying claims.

The court has considered plaintiff’s general claim throughout all his filings and

reasserted here that every official action and decision directed toward him is further evidence in

support of his overarching claim of system-wide retaliation against plaintiff for testifying against

a CDCR official. Even assuming the adequacy of this allegation, plaintiff has failed to 4

demonstrate that any of the relief he presently seeks (i.e., his removal from administrative

segregation and an order directing officials to stop retaliating against him) is essential to preserve

the status quo in the underlying action. More significantly, plaintiff does not demonstrate that in

the absence of preliminary relief he is likely to suffer irreparable harm – either on the merits of

the instant litigation or, more fundamentally, to his person. “Speculative injury does not

constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean

Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc.

v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, a presently existing actual threat

must be shown, although the injury need not be certain to occur. See Zenith Radio Corp. v.

Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); FDIC v. Garner, 125 F.3d 1272, 1279-80

(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1020 (1998); Caribbean Marine, supra, 844 F.2d at 674.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is

entitled to the preliminary relief he seeks.

////

////

Case 2:07-cv-02290-TLN-KJN Document 74 Filed 02/26/10 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Dkt. No. 70) be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 21 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

objections shall be filed and served within 14 days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 25, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

mana2290.f&r.tro

Case 2:07-cv-02290-TLN-KJN Document 74 Filed 02/26/10 Page 5 of 5