Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02001/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

THOMAS MATTHEW ROSE PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 06-2001

CITY OF MULBERRY, ARKANSAS;

JEFF MARVIN, in his capacity as

Mayor of Mulberry, Arkansas; JEFF

BROWN, Chief of Police of the City of

Mulberry, Arkansas; JACK STEWART, Alderman, 

City of Mulberry, Arkansas; RAYLENE ADAMS, 

Alderman, City of Mulberry, Arkansas; DOTTIE

GOODNOH, Alderman, City of Mulberry, Arkansas;

LARRY STARKEY, Alderman, City of Mulberry,

Arkansas; DAVID MOODY, Alderman, City of

Mulberry, Arkansas; BETTY BOWLIN, Alderman,

City of Mulberry, Arkansas; R. LIMBOCKER, 

Policeman, City of Mulberry, Arkansas; 

JOHN DOE NO. 1, City of Mulberry Policy Officer;

JOHN DOE NO. 2, City of Mulberry Police Officer;

JOHN DOE NO. 3, Tow Truck Operator DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants asserting a

cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and concerning events

surrounding his arrest on August 1, 2005. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution as Separate Defendant Officer Limbocker arrested

Plaintiff outside his jurisdiction and in violation of state law.

Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment (Doc. 6) and Separate Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 21).

On August 1, 2005, Plaintiff was stopped for speeding on

Interstate 40 by Separate Defendant Robert Limbocker, a police

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officer for the City of Mulberry. Officer Limbocker was driving a

marked City of Mulberry police vehicle and wearing the City’s

uniform. At some point, two other officers appeared on the scene.

According to Defendants, they were a Crawford County deputy sheriff

and a police officer for the City of Alma. One of the officers

walked around the perimeter of Plaintiff’s vehicle with a canine,

and Officer Limbocker arrested Plaintiff for reckless driving.

Officer Limbocker inventoried Plaintiff’s vehicle and requested a

tow truck to impound Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff was taken to

the Crawford County Detention Facility in Van Buren where he posted

a bond and paid a “service fee”. Plaintiff was then taken to the

impound lot and paid $100 to retrieve his vehicle. The reckless

driving citation was eventually nolle prossed, and Plaintiff’s bond

returned to him.

Summary Judgment Standard

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the

facts and inferences from the facts are viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Further, the burden is placed

on the moving party to establish both the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986);

Nat'l. Bank of Commerce of El Dorado, Arkansas v. Dow Chem. Co.,

165 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1999).

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Official-Capacity Claims

The claims against Jeff Marvin, Jeff Brown, Jack Stewart,

Raylene Adams, Dottie Goodnoh, Larry Starkey, David Moody, Betty

Bowlin and Robert Limbocker in their official capacities are deemed

to be the identical claims made against the City of Mulberry.

Accordingly, these claims are dismissed as redundant. see Johnson

v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1999); Liebe v.

Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 578-79 (8 Cir. 1998). th

John Doe Claims

As Plaintiff has provided no proof that these defendants were

ever served with process, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint

against John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 2 and John Doe No. 3 without

prejudice.

Separate Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

In light of the above findings, the remaining defendant is the

City of Mulberry (the City). Under Section 1983, a municipality

can be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees

if a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the

constitutional violation. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff argues that it was customary

for the City to permit its officers to patrol Interstate 40 in

violation of Arkansas law. The City maintains that Officer

Limbocker had jurisdiction to patrol the interstate, but also

contends Plaintiff cannot show it had a policy or custom of

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The City also contends that Officer Limbocker did not violate Ark. Code 1

Ann. § 12-8-106 as “the statute fails to define its own parameters...”. The

Court finds this argument to be without merit.

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permitting such activity. 

1

The City contends that Officer Limbocker had jurisdiction to

stop and arrest Plaintiff as he was also a Franklin County deputy

sheriff. The City cites Gritts v. State, 864 S.W.2d 859 (Ark.

1993) in support of its contention. However, Gritts is

distinguishable from the facts in this case. In Gritts, the

Arkansas Supreme Court found that a deputy sheriff employed by a

planned community property owner association had jurisdiction to

arrest within the county even if outside the community. Id.

However, the court’s decision was based upon Ark. Code Ann. § 14-

15-503 which specifically provided for the exercise of all their

powers as deputy sheriffs “while in the course of their employment

for planned community property owner improvement districts.” Id.

The statute does not apply to deputy sheriffs in the course of

their employment as municipal police officers as is the case here.

Further, the legislature could have easily expanded the statute to

cover such an instance had that been its intent. 

The City also contends that Plaintiff’s claim must fail as he

has not shown the City had a policy or custom of allowing its

officers to patrol the interstate in violation of Arkansas law.

Plaintiff may establish municipal liability with proof that the

alleged misconduct was so pervasive among the non-policy making

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employees of the municipality “as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’

with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Liability for

an unconstitutional custom or usage, however, cannot arise from a

single act. Wedemeier v. City of Ballwin, 931 F.2d 24 (8 Cir. th

1991). 

Plaintiff has provided the Court with numerous arrest reports

purporting to show that it was customary for the City to permit its

officers to patrol and make arrests on Interstate 40. The City

contends that Plaintiff’s evidence is inadmissible hearsay and

should not be considered by the Court. However, in his deposition,

Officer Limbocker was questioned about some of the arrest reports.

He admitted that he and other officers had patrolled Interstate 40

in the past. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1, pp. 6-11). Officer Limbocker

further testified that he was unaware of any law prohibiting

municipal officers from patrolling the interstate and that no one

in a position of authority with the City had ever told him that he

could or could not patrol the Interstate. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1, p. 10).

However, the Mulberry Police Department had requested and been

denied permission from the Arkansas State Police to patrol the

interstate - a fact that the City admits. (Doc. 16, ¶ 20 & Doc.

28, Exs. 2-3). 

The City also contends that even if it violated state law by

patrolling the interstate, that fact in and of itself does not

establish a constitutional violation. The Court agrees. An arrest

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by a state actor that is not authorized by state law is actionable

under §1983 as a seizure contrary to the Fourth Amendment. See

Cole v. Nebraska State Board of Parole, 997 F.2d 442 (8 Cir. 1993) th

citing Bissonette v. Haig, 800 F.2d 812 (8 Cir. 1986). However, th

some jurisdictions have concluded that an arrest in violation of

state law is a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment while

others view the state law violation as a factor to be considered in

determining whether the conduct rises to the level of a

constitutional violation. 

In Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994 (8 Cir. 1994), the th

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the fact that an officer

had no authority to arrest outside of the city limits did not

establish as a matter of law that the arrest constituted a

violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, in Abbott, the Court

acknowledged some inconsistency in our circuit. See, e.g.

Bissonette, supra, [Although “[a] search authorized by state law

could still be constitutionally invalid, ...a search unauthorized

by state law would ipso facto violate the Fourth Amendment.”];

Cole, supra, [“An arrest by a state actor that is not authorized by

state law is actionable under §1983 as a seizure contrary to the

Fourth Amendment.” (citing Bissonette)]; Brock v. Logan County

Sheriff’s Department of Arkansas, 3 F.3d 1215, 1216 (8 Cir. th

1993)(per curiam)(citing Bissonette and Cole). However, it appears

that the best approach is to consider the state law violation as a

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factor in determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable

and, therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly,

the question is then whether Plaintiff’s arrest was reasonable.

State law may be relevant in determining what is reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment. In this case the evidence is that the

City was aware that Ark. Code Ann. § 12-8-106(h) prohibited their

officers from patrolling the interstate without authorization from

the Director of the Department of Arkansas State Police. In fact,

the City requested authorization prior to and subsequent to the

filing of this lawsuit. (Doc. 16, ¶ 20 & Doc. 28, Exs. 2-3). The

fact that Officer Limbocker was also a county deputy and his

testimony that he was not aware of the prohibition is of no

consequence. It is clear that Officer Limbocker was acting in his

capacity as a Mulberry municipal police officer at the time of

Plaintiff’s arrest. Further, the City should not be allowed to

circumvent state law by ensuring that their officers are also

employed as county deputies. While the Court does not believe that

this state law violation ipso facto creates a violation of the

Fourth Amendment the circumstances create a material issue of fact

as to whether the City violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Plaintiff moves the Court to grant summary judgment on the

issue of liability as Officer Limbocker was without jurisdiction to

stop and arrest Plaintiff and the City had a habit and practice of

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patrolling Interstate 40. For the reasons reflected within this

opinion, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as there are genuine issues

of material fact as to whether Plaintiff’s arrest was objectively

reasonable under all of the circumstances, to include whether

Officer Limbocker lacked authority under state law to make the

arrest and whether the City had a policy or custom of patrolling

Interstate 40 in violation of Arkansas law.

Conclusion

While the City could ultimately prevail at trial, the Court

finds that genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary

judgment including, but not limited to, whether Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment rights were violated and, if so, whether a municipal

policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation.

Plaintiff’s Motion and Defendants’ Motion are DENIED. Plaintiff’s

claims against Separate Defendants Jeff Marvin, Jeff Brown, Jack

Stewart, Raylene Adams, Dottie Goodnoh, Larry Starkey, David Moody,

Betty Bowlin and Robert Limbocker in their official capacities are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s claims against John Does 1-3

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s claims against the

City of Mulberry will proceed to trial as scheduled on January 22,

2007.

/s/ Robert T. Dawson

Honorable Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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