Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00407/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00407-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

PRESENTACION R. HAW,

Civ. No. S-09-407 FCD/KJN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK,

INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., MORTGAGE

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION

SYSTEMS, INC., MORTGAGEIT,

INC, QUALITY LOAN SERVICE

CORPORATION, GMAC MORTGAGE,

L.L.C., JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, and

DSOES 1 to 98, Inclusive,

Defendants.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the motions of defendants

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), MortgageIt

Inc. (“MortgageIt”), and JPMorgan Chase Bank (“JPMorgan”) to

dismiss plaintiff Presentacion R. Haw’s (“plaintiff”) first

amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

(“FRCP”) 12(b)(6).

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1 The complaint also includes claims for rescission and

restitution, imposition of constructive trust, special and

punitive damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief, however,

plaintiff concedes in her opposition that these are merely

remedies and not claims for relief. 

2 The complaint fails to allege any facts that would

support diversity jurisdiction.

2

On February 12, 2009, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a

complaint against defendants for claims arising out of a real

estate loan transaction. (Docket #1.) Plaintiff’s original

complaint included federal claims for violation of the Truth in

Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Federal Debt Collection Practices

Act (“FDCPA”) as well as a state law claim for alleged violations

of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.

relating to unfair business practices. On July 27, 2009,

plaintiff, represented by counsel, filed a first amended

complaint. (Docket #42.) The first amended complaint includes

claims for civil conspiracy, fraud, specific performance,

wrongful foreclosure, quiet title, and wrongful eviction.1

Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry before the adjudication

of any case before the court. See Morongo Band of Mission

Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380

(9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, this court cannot

adjudicate the merits of this case or order any relief. See id.

(“If the district court had no jurisdiction over the subject

matter, the action should have been dismissed, regardless of the

parties’ preference for an adjudication in federal court.”). 

Plaintiff’s only remaining claim that could possibly support

federal jurisdiction2 is his seventh claim for relief, which is

titled “Wrongful Eviction and Violation of Due Process.” (Compl.

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3

¶ 145.) Plaintiff alleges that, following the allegedly wrongful

foreclosure of her home, defendants sought to evict plaintiff by

filing an unlawful detainer suit in California Superior Court and

obtaining a writ of execution to gain possession. (Id. at ¶ 147-

50.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[b]y not allowing Plaintiff

to assert her right to ownership, [JPMorgan] through the

California Superior Court essentially deprived Plaintiff of her

due process rights.” (Id. at ¶ 150.) 

Even if the court construes this as a claim for violation of

plaintiff’s procedural due process rights guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff’s claim

fails to state a claim for relief because she has not plausibly

alleged that JPMorgan was acting under color of state law. Use

of the unlawful detainer process standing alone does not

transform acts by a private party into acts under color of law

for purposes of § 1983. See Hohensee v. Dailey, 383 F. Supp. 6,

9 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (“The mere fact that an individual utilizes

state process against another does not make the actor’s conduct

cognizable as state action.”); see also Deal v. Newport Datsun,

Ltd., 706 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming a district court’s

dismissal of an action on the grounds that a landlord’s

commencement of an ejectment proceeding did not constitute state

action); Miller v. Hartwood Apartments, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1239, 1242

(5th Cir. 1982) (“There is no cause of action under the Civil

Rights Act if a case is private litigation in which the state

does no more than furnish the forum and has no interest in the

outcome.”); cf. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1983)

(finding state action in an eviction context when a police

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3 While leave to amend should be freely given pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, the court is not required to

allow futile amendments. Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath

Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983). Here,

amendment of the complaint with respect to plaintiff’s § 1983

claim would be futile under the governing law described above,

and plaintiff does not describe any other facts which could

plausibly give rise to such claims against defendants. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Further, the court notes

that plaintiff’s counsel has been issued two orders to show cause

and been sanctioned $450.00 for failure to comply with the local

rules and court orders. 

4

officer accompanied landlord when serving eviction notice,

privately approached tenants, and recommended that they leave,

creating the appearance that the police sanctioned the eviction). 

Plaintiff fails to set forth any allegations in her complaint or

argument in her opposition that could plausibly give rise to a

claim under § 1983. Indeed, plaintiff wholly fails to advance

any arguments with respect to a constitutional due process claim.

Rather, the only argument proffered by plaintiff is that the

wrongful eviction claim, in which the due process allegation is

included, is dependent upon her wrongful foreclosure claim. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for violation of due

process is DISMISSED without leave to amend.3

Dismissal of plaintiff’s purported § 1983 claim leaves the

complaint devoid of any federal claims. The remaining claims are

state law claims for civil conspiracy, fraud, specific

performance, wrongful foreclosure, quiet title, and wrongful

eviction.

Subject to the conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c),

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114

F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). The court’s decision

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4 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders these matters submitted on the

briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).

5

whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed

by values of “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id.

at 1001 (citations omitted). However, primary responsibility for

developing and applying state law rests with the state courts. 

Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial,

district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,

350 (1988); Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d

1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]n the usual case in which

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”)(quoting

Schneider v. TRW Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). In

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining

state law claims.

Accordingly, the remainder of plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice.4

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 1, 2010

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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