Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00240/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00240-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RICARDO BUELNA, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 02-00155 PHX JAT

v. ) CIV 09-00240 PHX JAT (MEA)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Plaintiff/Respondent )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Mr. Ricardo Buelna (“Movant”) is in the custody of the

Federal Correctional Institution in Terra Haute, Indiana. On

or about January 23, 2009, Movant filed a Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

regarding a criminal conviction and sentence entered by the

Court. Movant filed an amended motion on May 18, 2009.

Respondent filed a Response to Motion to Vacate Sentence

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on September 21, 2009. See Docket

No. 11. Movant filed a reply to the response on or about

September 30, 2009. See Docket No. 12. With the Magistrate

Judge’s permission, Movant also filed a reply to the response on

November 2, 2009. See Docket No. 15. 

Case 2:09-cv-00240-JAT Document 17 Filed 11/12/09 Page 1 of 9
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1 It is possible that the interval in pleading in Movant’s direct

appeal was the result of activity in the direct appeal of his codefendant, Steve Dobson. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard

oral argument regarding Mr. Dobson’s direct appeal on November 2,

2004. On November 23, 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed Mr. Dobson’s convictions and sentences in a memorandum

decision. See United States v. Martin, 117 Fed. App. 509 (9th Cir.

2003). Mr. Dobson petitioned for certiorari of this decision, which

petition was denied on January 23, 2006. In 2007 the Court denied

relief in Mr. Dobson’s section 2255 action. See 2:06 CV 1539. 

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I Procedural History

In February of 2002, Movant was charged by a grand jury

indictment with Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to

Distribute Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846,

and Attempted Possession with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine,

also in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Movant and his

co-defendants were tried by a jury in late November and early

December 2002. On December 12, 2002, the jury returned verdicts

of guilty as to all defendants on all counts charged. On April

14, 2003, Movant was sentenced to the mandatory statutory

minimum sentence of 240 months imprisonment on both counts of

conviction, the terms to be served concurrently, followed by a

term of ten years supervised release.

Movant filed a timely appeal of his convictions and

sentences on April 18, 2003. On June 6, 2007, Movant filed an

opening brief in his direct appeal asserting he was entitled to

relief because, he alleged, the admission of an out-of-court

statement of an unavailable declarant violated the Confrontation

Clause and because the evidence was insufficient to convict the

defendant of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine and attempted possession with intent to distribute

cocaine.1 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Movant’s

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convictions and sentences in a memorandum decision issued

October 25, 2007. See United States v. Buelna, 252 Fed. App.

790, 2007 WL 3194833 (the mandate is at Criminal Docket No.

356). Movant did not seek certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court.

In his section 2255 action Movant asserts he is

entitled to relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant

to section 2255 because he was deprived of his right to the

effective assistance of counsel. Movant argues that his

counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective because

counsel failed to advise him of the consequences of going to

trial rather than pleading guilty. Movant also asserts his

counsel failed to advise Movant to plead guilty and that counsel

failed to make adequate efforts to obtain a plea offer.

II Analysis

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

properly raised for the first time in a section 2255 action. 

See United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 845 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

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In order to find that Movant was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel and grant him habeas relief, the

Court must conclude counsel’s performance was incompetent and

that his deficient trial performance prejudiced Movant. 

[N]ot every case of deficient performance

under Strickland represents a constructive

denial of the right to counsel. In fact, it

will be the rare claim of ineffective

assistance that is tantamount to a

constructive denial of counsel. Strickland

remains the norm for ineffective assistance

claims, and the Supreme Court has made clear

that it will not countenance a per-se

prejudice exception which will swallow the

actual prejudice Strickland rule. 

Glover v. Miro, 262 F.3d 268, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2001). See also

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Cruz-Mendoza, 147 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1998).

Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). Movant must establish that, but for

counsel’s error, the result of his trial would have been

different. See Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154. Additionally, Movant

bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the

Court can conclude his counsel was ineffective. See Turner v.

Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 878 (9th Cir. 2002).

Movant’s allegations regarding his counsel’s alleged

failures is belied by the record in this matter. The record

demonstrates that Movant was aware of the consequences of

proceeding to trial rather than pleading guilty. Movant’s

counsel informed him of the mandatory statutory minimum sentence

of twenty years incarceration if Movant was convicted of either

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charge. See Docket No. 11, Attach. A. Additionally, Movant was

privy to a copy of the United States Probation Department’s

Criminal Settlement Conference report, which stated that Movant

faced a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years

incarceration if he was convicted on either charge. See id.,

Attach. B. Movant’s defense counsel reviewed this report with

Movant at the time of the Settlement Conference on July 22,

2002. See id., Attach. A. 

Furthermore, on August 28, 2002, when Movant advised

the Court that he wanted to represent himself, Movant was

advised by the Court on the record that he was facing a

mandatory twenty year sentence as a consequence of conviction.

See Criminal Docket No. 78 & 79. Movant’s claim that he was not

advised of the consequences of proceeding to trial is factually

false. 

Additionally, Movant’s assertion that his counsel did

not attempt to obtain a plea offer or advise him that he should

plead guilty are contrary to the record. Movant’s defense

counsel was informed by the government that a sentence below the

statutory minimum would require Movant’s cooperation in

prosecuting his co-defendants. See Docket No. 11, Attach. A.

Additionally, at the time of the Settlement Conference, Movant

was informed by the government that the only way he could

receive a sentence of less than twenty years was to cooperate

against his co-defendants. See id., Attach. A. Movant would

not agree to cooperate with the government and he insisted on

proceeding to trial. See id., Attach. A. Movant’s counsel has

also stated that he advised Movant to cooperate with the

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2 Mr. Buelna moved to represent himself, which motion was granted

on August 28, 2002. Mr. Ochoa was ordered to serve as stand-by

counsel. On or about November 13, 2002, on the eve of trial, Mr.

Buelna moved to Court to reinstate Mr. Ochoa as his counsel, which

motion was granted. See Criminal Docket No. 79 & Criminal Docket No.

99.

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government, but Movant rejected the advice and indicated he

wanted to proceed to trial.2

In response to the answer to his section 2255 motion,

Movant seeks to supplement his amended section 2255 motion.

Movant argues he may now add a claim to his section 2255 motion

which is timely because any such claim “relates back” to the

date his motion was filed. Movant seeks to add a claim that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Movant’s

sentence being enhanced from ten years to twenty years based on

Movant’s prior conviction in a different state. Movant contends

his counsel was ineffective because counsel did not require the

government to prove the prior conviction beyond a reasonable

doubt. Movant reiterates that, but for his trial counsel’s

allegedly faulty advice, he was unaware of the potential

sentence he faced if he was found guilty. Movant also contends

“trial counsel fail[ed] to obtain a plea agreement.” Docket No.

12.

In reply to the answer to his motion, Movant contends

counsel failed “to inform Mr. Buelna that he was proceeding to

trial with two invalid defenses.” Movant contends his counsel

erred by asserting an entrapment defense and that Movant could

not be found guilty of conspiracy because his alleged coconspirators were a government informant and an undercover

agent. Movant contends his lack of awareness of the

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“invalidity” of these defenses were not reasonable and,

accordingly, that his counsel was unconstitutionally

ineffective. 

Pursuant to section 2255, the Court’s “[r]eview of

counsel’s performance is highly deferential and there is a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide

range of reasonable representation.” United States v.

Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996). With

regard to the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, the

probability of prejudice may not be based merely upon conjecture

or speculation. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175-76,

122 S. Ct. 1237, 1246 (2002). When deciding whether trial

counsel’s performance was deficient, “[t]here is a strong

presumption that trial counsel’s conduct is the result of trial

strategy, and strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable.” Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d

1516, 1519 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). To overcome

the presumption of reasonableness, a section 2255 movant must

show that no competent lawyer, under the same or similar

circumstances, would have taken the action that his counsel

took. Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994).

“[C]ounsel’s reliance on particular lines of defense to the

exclusion of others-whether or not he investigated those other

defenses-is a matter of strategy and is not ineffective unless

the petitioner can prove the chosen course, in itself, was

unreasonable.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1318

(11th Cir. 2000) ( en banc ).

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 Movant has not met his burden of providing sufficient

evidence from which the Court can conclude his counsel’s

performance was incompetent or that Movant was prejudiced by any

alleged error. The government and Movant’s defense counsel aver

that any plea agreement providing for a sentence below the

statutory minimum of twenty years would have required Movant’s

cooperation against his co-defendants. Although defense counsel

recommended to Movant that he cooperate, Movant declined and

insisted on going to trial. Movant’s counsel could not “force”

the government to offer Movant a plea agreement he wanted, nor

would Movant have received a lesser sentence if he had pled

guilty without a plea agreement. Movant’s self-serving

statements in his section 2255 pleadings that he would have

taken a plea agreement if he had effective representation is

insufficient to establish that he would have cooperated with the

government. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 153 F.3d 1037,

1041 (9th Cir. 1998).

III Conclusion

Movant has not established that he was deprived of his

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel

because he offers no evidence his counsel’s performance was

deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Buelna’s motion

for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 12th day of November, 2009.

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