Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07218/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07218-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

K.S., a minor, by and through her parents, P.S. and

M.S.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

FREMONT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-07218 SI

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Before the Court is a motion for attorney’s fees filed by plaintiff K.S., a minor by and through

her parents P.S. and M.S. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate

for resolution without oral argument, and hereby VACATES the hearing. Having considered the papers

submitted, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s Motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an eight-year-old girl diagnosed with autism. She brought suit against defendant

pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Plaintiff

sought judicial review of an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision that defendant properly

provided plaintiff with a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 

Resolving cross-motions for summary judgment, this Court granted each motion in part and

denied each motion in part. See Feb. 22, 2008 Order (Docket No. 149). Agreeing with plaintiff, the

Court found that the ALJ had incorrectly determined the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 15. The

Court therefore remanded so that the ALJ could appropriately weigh the witness testimony and reassess

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the ultimate decision of whether defendant provided plaintiff a FAPE. Id. at 15–16. This Court resolved

two other issues on summary judgement in defendant’s favor. The Court found that: (1) defendant

appropriately included plaintiff’s parents while designing plaintiff’s individualized education program

(“IEP”); and (2) the ALJ properly awarded sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel. Id. at 19, 22–23.

Plaintiffs now request fees under the IDEA, based on the Court’s remand to the ALJ.

LEGAL STANDARD

The IDEA allows the Court to award attorney fees to a prevailing party, when the prevailing

party is the parent of a child with disabilities and brought suit pursuant to the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(3)(B)(I). In the Ninth Circuit, “prevailing party” status for IDEA cases is determined according

to the standard articulated in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department Of

Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). See Shapiro ex rel. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley

Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 374 F. 3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Buckhannon governs IDEA

fees in the Ninth Circuit). Buckhannon requires a party to prevail “on the merits” such that there is a

“‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.’” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603–04 (quoting

Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792–93 (1989) (finding the

change in legal relationship to be the “touchstone” aspect of the prevailing party inquiry)); see also

Park, ex rel. Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F. 3d 1025, 1035 (9th Cir. 2006) (focusing

on the change in legal relationship while deciding IDEA fees litigation). 

A change in the parties’ legal relationship occurs when the court orders relief on the merits.

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603–04 (“[A] ‘prevailing party’ is one who has been awarded some relief . .

. . [E]nforceable judgments on the merits . . . [are] necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees.”);

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) (“Respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff

receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.”); see, e.g., Park,

464 F.3d at 1035 (finding the legal relationship changed where defendant school district was ordered

to provide plaintiff with compensatory education). Where the court does not grant at least some relief

on the merits, there is not an adequate change in the legal relationship in order for the court to grant fees.

See Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760 (awarding no fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because although plaintiff’s

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Defendants also assert a number of other grounds for denying or reducing the fee award.

Because the “prevailing party” analysis is dispositive of fees, the Court does not reach those questions.

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constitutional rights had been violated, no specific relief was awarded); and Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446

U.S. 754, 757 (1980) (awarding no fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 although plaintiff’s appealsuccessfully

reversed a directed verdict).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees subsequent to the Court’s remand to the ALJ. Defendant asserts

that a fee award is inappropriate because the remand does not alter the legal relationship of the parties.1

 The Court agrees with defendant that attorney’s fees are not warranted because the Court’s remand has

not affected a change in the legal relationship between the parties. Plaintiff is therefore not a prevailing

party at this stage of the litigation.

As articulated in Buckhannon, a change in the legal relationship requires court-ordered relief on

the merits. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604. Buckhannon declined to award fees in a case where litigation

against a state spurred the state’s legislature to change the law. Id. at 600. The legislative change was

essentially the result sought by plaintiff, but since it did not result from judicially-ordered relief, the

Court did not find the legal relationship to be changed. Id. at 600, 605–06 (“[E]nforceable judgments

on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the ‘material alteration of the legal relationship

of the parties’ necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees.” (quoting Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S.

at 792–93)). 

Buckhannon’s language pertaining to the change in legal relationship was drawn from Texas

State Teachers, which emphasized the importance of court-ordered relief and its role in changing the

legal relationship:

“[R]espect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on

the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.” Thus, at a minimum, to be

considered a prevailing party . . . the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the

dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant. . . . The

touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal

relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee

statute.

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Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 792–93 (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760) (internal citations omitted).

The Court ultimately awarded fees in that case because plaintiffs obtained a judgment vindicating their

First Amendment rights. Id. at 793. The parties’ legal relationship changed because the defendant

school district was required to allow certain speech on behalf of the plaintiff teacher’s union. Id.

Buckhannon and Texas State Teachers followed the logic of two prior Supreme Court cases,

Hewitt, 482 U.S. 755, and Hanrahan, 446 U.S. 754. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604–05; Texas State

Teachers, 489 U.S. at 790, 792. Both Hewitt and Hanrahan declined to award fees in civil rights cases

where the plaintiff was fundamentally successful although no court-ordered relief was granted. Hewitt

concerned a civil rights action brought by an inmate. Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 758. Although the court of

appeals found that the prison violated the prisoner’s constitutional rights, no monetary relief could be

granted due to qualified immunity, and no injunctive relief was appropriate because the prisoner had

been released by the time of the decision. Id. at 758–59, 761–62. Even though judgment in the

plaintiff’s favor was entered and the appellate court issued a statement in the plaintiff’s favor, he was

not a “prevailing party” in the sense required by the fee-shifting statute because he had not obtained any

judicially-ordered relief. Id. at 763.

Likewise, in Hanrahan, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s directed verdict against

plaintiff and, moreover, issued rulings altering discovery in the plaintiff’s favor. Hanrahan, 446 U.S.

at 756, 759. Nonetheless, plaintiff was not “prevailing” because he had not actually secured success on

the merits. Id. at 757–58. “[I]t seems clearly to have been the intent of Congress to permit [fees] only

to a party who has established his entitlement of some relief on the merits of his claims . . . .” Id. at 757.

Particularly relevant to the case presently before this Court, the Supreme Court held that an appeal

resulting in a retrial at the lower court does not constitute the success required of a prevailing party. Id.

at 758.

 The Ninth Circuit explicitly adopted Buckhannon’s “change in legal relationship” standard for

IDEA cases, and courts have used the standard consistently. Shapiro, 374 F. 3d at 864–65 (adopting

Buckhannon for Ninth Circuit IDEA cases); see, e.g., Park, 464 F. 3d at 1035 (finding a change in the

legal relationship and awarding fees because the school district was required to provide certain

educational services); M.L. v. Federal Way Sch. Dist., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2005)

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(applying the legal relationship test on remand, and awarding fees where the appellate court reached

plaintiff’s claims on the merits); Parents of Student W v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 31 F. 3d 1489, 1498

(9th Cir. 1994) (applying the legal relationship test). Based on this precedent, the Court is limited to

awarding attorney’s fees only where some relief on the merits has been ordered, such that the parties’

relationship to one another has been altered.

Here, plaintiff is not entitled to fees because plaintiff has not affected a change in the legal

relationship between the parties. Although the Court’s remand to the ALJ placed plaintiff in a better

litigating position than she was in prior to this Court’s ruling, that ruling did not reach the merits of

plaintiff’s IDEA claims (whether defendant provided plaintiff with a FAPE), and awarded no relief as

required by Buckhannon, Texas State Teachers, and Hewitt. In this case, the Court serves in an

appellate function, analogous to the situation in Hanrahan, and although this Court’s decision may

affect the ultimate disposition of the lawsuit, plaintiff cannot be considered a prevailing party at this

time. See Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 759; see also Sammons v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 2007 WL

430663,*2–3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2007) (“[T]he granting of a remand . . . does not confer prevailing party

status on Plaintiffs because the judgment remanding the claims to the ALJ for consideration of the

merits of Plaintiffs’ FAPE . . . claims does not materially alter the legal relationship between the

parties.”).

Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. Plaintiff suggests that this Court’s

remand changed the legal relationship of the parties, because defendant is now required to re-litigate

her case before the ALJ. However, requiring more litigation is certainly not relief on the merits, and

does not change the parties’ current relationship, but merely prolongs it. Plaintiff’s contention—that

requiring a response from the opposing party constitutes a change in relationship tantamount to

“prevailing”—is not realistic. A party can require a similar response merely by filing a complaint in

district court, but that clearly would not constitute a change in the legal relationship such that the filing

party is “prevailing.” Further, awarding fees now could lead to an absurd result if the ALJ were to

determine that defendant did not deny plaintiff a FAPE and that plaintiff is not entitled to any tangible

relief regarding her education. Were that to occur, plaintiff clearly would not be a prevailing party. “In

the course of a proceeding that may result in the utter defeat of the plaintiff, he may nevertheless obtain

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Plaintiff cites to R.B., ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified School District, 496 F. 3d 932, 941-42

(9th Cir. 2007), to assert that there is no difference between an IEP and an administrative hearing. That

case found that the school’s procedural defect in creating the IEP was cured by the due process provided

by an administrative hearing. Id. The case does not suggest that an IEP and an administrative hearing

are otherwise comparable.

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some favorable rulings—such as a remand, a discovery order, an order in limine excluding certain

evidence, or an order disqualifying the defendant’s lawyer—that confer a benefit upon him until the

rulings are ultimately vacated: tactical victories in what turns out to be a losing war. Such rulings do

not create a right to attorney’s fees.” Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F. 3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff also contends that M.L., 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1162, authorizes fees when a court orders

re-assessment. However, the situation in M.L. is distinct from the present case and illustrates why fees

are inappropriate here. There, fees were awarded because the Ninth Circuit found for the plaintiff on

the merits. The appellate court found that a regular education teacher had to be included in developing

an IEP, and ordered the school district to do so. Id. at 1161–62. The parties ultimately settled for

equitable reimbursement of $2,478. Id. at 1162. The legal relationship between the parties was altered

because one party, the school, was legally bound to do something for the other party, the plaintiff. Id.

at 1163. This is unlike the present case where (1) the Court did not decide on the merits, and where (2)

the ALJ (i.e., not a party) has been required to reassess an aspect of the case. Plaintiff asserts that

reassessment of an IEP is no different than a reassessment by the ALJ; that argument is incorrect. An

IEP reassessment is done by the school district, which is a party to the litigation, and thus constitutes

a court-ordered change in the parties’ relationship. See id. A remand to the ALJ does not similarly alter

the relationship between the parties.2

Plaintiff’s citation to Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993), is similarly unconvincing. In

the specific context of the timing of a judgment under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), Shalala

explained that a district court’s remand to an agency did indeed grant prevailing party status, and fees

were awarded. Id. at 303. However, that decision was specific to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and

occurred after the ALJ had, on remand, already awarded social security benefits to the plaintiff, Shalala,

509 U.S. at 302. The Shalala decision turned on a technical consideration of various ways to remand

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), with the Court concluding that a remand pursuant to the statute’s fourth line

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does lend prevailing party status, but remand pursuant to the statute’s sixth line would not. Id. In light

of the Ninth Circuit’s explicit acceptance of Buckhannon’sstandard for IEDA fee shifting, Shalala does

not persuade the Court to award fees.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court DENIES without prejudice

plaintiff’s motion for fees [Docket No. 149]. The parties’ objections to the declarations supporting the

Motion and Opposition are DISMISSED as moot [Docket Nos. 159, 168–70].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2008 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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