Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01478/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01478-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD ENG, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, et 

al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDISON INTERNATIONAL, 

THEODORE F. CRAVER, JR., 

WILLIAMS JAMES SCILACCI, and 

RON LITZINGER,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-01478-BEN-KSC

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS THIRD AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint (“TAC”) filed by Defendants Edison International, Southern California 

Edison’s (“SCE”)1 parent company, Theodore F. Craver, Jr., William James Scilacci, and 

Ron Litzinger. (Docket No. 58.) The motion is fully briefed. For the reasons that 

follow, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED, and the Third Amended Complaint is 

DISMISSED.

 

1 The Court refers to Defendant as “SCE” throughout.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint contains largely the same factual allegations 

as the First and Second Amended Complaints (Docket Nos. 20, 36), which the Court 

addressed in detail in its September 14, 2016 Order and May 5, 2017 Order, and now 

incorporates by reference. (See Docket No. 35 at pp. 2-6, Docket No. 54 at pp. 2-5.) 

New allegations will be discussed where relevant to the Court’s analysis of Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate if, taking 

all factual allegations as true, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief on its 

face. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007); 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (requiring plaintiff to plead factual content 

that provides “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”). “A 

claim is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” 

Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

All factual allegations are accepted as true and “courts must consider the complaint 

in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 

12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by 

reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 

Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). 2

 

2 The Court grants Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice as to all documents 

relied on or referred to in the TAC, SCE’s reported stock price history, and other publicly 

available financial documents, including SCE’s SEC filings. See Dreiling v. Am. Exp. 

Co., 458 F.3d 942, 946 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (SEC filings subject to judicial notice).

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The TAC claims violations of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act of 

1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5. To state a securities 

fraud claim, a plaintiff must plead: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the 

defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and 

the purchase and sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; 

(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation. Webb v. Solarcity Corp., No. 16-16440, 2018 

WL 1189422, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2018) (citing Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 

563 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2011)).

Additionally, securities fraud claims are subject to the heightened pleading 

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation 

Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694, 

701 (9th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 9(b), plaintiffs must “state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud.” Id. “Rule 9(b) applies to all elements of a securities 

fraud action, including loss causation.” Oregon Pub. Employees Ret. Fund v. Apollo 

Grp. Inc., 774 F.3d 598, 605 (9th Cir. 2014).

The Court must assume the truth of the facts presented in a plaintiff’s complaint

and construe inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

when reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007). 

DISCUSSION

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failing 

to sufficiently allege the loss causation element. (See Docket No. 54.) Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss argues dismissal is appropriate because the TAC’s allegations 

regarding loss causation are even weaker than in the Second Amended Complaint. The 

Court agrees.

A. Loss Causation 

To sufficiently plead loss causation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege a causal 

connection between a defendant’s fraud and the economic loss damages for which

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recovery is sought. Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme v. First Solar Inc. (“First Solar”), 881 

F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Because loss causation is simply a variant of proximate 

cause, the ultimate issue is whether the defendant’s misstatement, as opposed to some 

other fact, foreseeably caused the plaintiff’s loss.”) (quoting Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp.,

811 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016)). 

After briefing on this motion concluded, Plaintiff filed a notice of supplemental 

authority regarding the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in First Solar. (Docket No. 62.) 

Plaintiff asserts First Solar “is pertinent because it rejects singular application of the 

bright-line loss causation test argued by defendants in this matter.” (Id. at p. 1.) He also 

complains that “this Court has previously accepted defendants’ standard of loss 

causation, which is not the correct standard under First Solar.” (Id. at p. 2) (citation 

omitted.) Plaintiff’s reliance on First Solar is misplaced.

It is true that this Court has analyzed Plaintiff’s prior pleadings to determine 

whether it sufficiently pleaded loss causation as causally connected to a revelation of 

fraud on the market. That is because Plaintiff himself advanced this sole theory of loss 

causation in both the Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint. (See

Docket No. 20 ¶¶ 121-127 (“As the falsity of defendants’ statements and the omitted 

facts were revealed, Edison’s stock price fell as the artificial inflation dissipated”); 

Docket No. 36 ¶¶ 142-148 (same)). Notably, under First Solar, the Court’s analysis was 

appropriate. First Solar, 881 F.3d at 753-54 (“Revelation of fraud in the marketplace is 

simply one of the ‘infinite variety’ of causation theories a plaintiff might allege to satisfy 

proximate cause. . . . When plaintiffs plead a causation theory based on market revelation 

of the fraud, this court naturally evaluates whether plaintiffs have pleaded or proved the 

facts relevant to their theory.”) (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). 

Turning to the operative TAC, however, in addition to re-alleging its market 

revelation of fraud theory, Plaintiff for the first time raises a new theory of loss causation: 

that the SCE’s stock price decline resulted from “the materialization of the risk that ORA 

and TURN would seek to unwind the SONGS settlement.” (TAC ¶ 125.) Under the 

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“materialization of the risk” approach, a plaintiff can establish loss causation by showing 

that “‘misstatements and omissions concealed the price-volatility risk (or some other risk) 

that materialized and played some part in diminishing the market value’ of a security.” 

Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, Cal., 730 F.3d 1111, 

1120 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 176–77 

(2d Cir. 2005)). 

The “materialization of the risk” approach has not been adopted by the Ninth 

Circuit, although it has been applied by some district courts in the Ninth Circuit. Nuveen, 

730 F.3d at 1122 n.5 (citations omitted). The Court finds it need not determine the 

applicability of this approach because Plaintiff has again failed to plausibly establish that 

the alleged partial disclosures were a substantial cause of his alleged loss. See In re 

Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (“So long as the complaint 

alleges facts that, if taken as true, plausibly establish loss causation, a Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal is inappropriate.”) (emphasis added).

It is not sufficient to simply allege a defendant’s stock price declined; the decline 

in stock price must be “statistically significant.”3 In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. 

Supp. 2d 1202, 1266 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., 

Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 

U.S. 336, 346-47 (2005) (finding plaintiffs’ purchase price inflation allegation 

insufficient on its own where the complaint “fail[ed] to claim that Dura’s share price fell 

significantly after the truth became known”) (emphasis added); Lloyd, 811 F.3d at 1210 

 

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff adopted this position earlier in this litigation. (See

Docket No. 49 at p. 2) (“loss causation depends on whether the stock moved in a 

“statistically significant” manner when compared to the relevant market) (citing In re 

REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1266 (S.D. Cal. 2010)).) However, 

according to a footnote in the TAC, Plaintiff now claims statistical significance is “not 

required to plead a claim under the PSLRA.” (TAC ¶ 125 n.26.) The Court believes 

Plaintiff’s first position is accurate.

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(finding amended complaint adequately pleaded loss causation where it alleged the 

corrective disclosure “caused [the] stock price to drop precipitously”) (emphasis added); 

In re Novatel Wireless Sec. Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1019 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“the 

decline in stock price caused by the revelation of that truth must be statistically 

significant”). “[W]hether a drop in a stock’s price is statistically significant will vary 

depending on the average trading range for that particular stock.” Greenberg v. 

Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 665 n.9 (5th Cir. 2004). For example, “[a] drop of 

10% for a volatile stock may not be statistically significant whereas the same drop for a 

stock with little average movement may be significant.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff’s argument that “the size of the drops” in the price of SCE’s stock is 

not relevant to the Court’s inquiry is unpersuasive. (Opp’n at p. 19.) As Plaintiff 

correctly asserts, a defendant’s misrepresentation “need not be the sole reason of the 

decline in value of the securities.” (Id. at p. 14) (quoting In re Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1055.) 

However, to plausibly allege loss causation, Plaintiff must allege facts from which the 

Court may draw an inference that Defendants’ allegedly fraudulent conduct was a 

substantial cause of his loss, which naturally includes an evaluation of the stock’s price 

drops. In re Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1055; see also Loos v. Immersion Corp., 762 F.3d 880, 

887 (9th Cir. 2014) (at pleading stage, plaintiff must plausibly allege economic loss was 

caused by defendant’s material misrepresentation “rather than by changing market 

conditions, changing investor expectations, or other unrelated factors”). 

The TAC relies on three previously pleaded partial disclosures: (1) California 

Assemblyman Anthony Rendon’s March 19, 2015 letter requesting the California Public 

Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) order SCE to produce documents (price dropped .99% 

on March 20, 2015); (2) the CPUC’s April 15, 2015 order directing SCE to produce

documents (price dropped .79%); and (3) TURN’s June 24, 2015 request that the CPUC 

reopen the settlement (price dropped 2.71%). The TAC newly identifies a partial 

disclosure on August 10, 2015, when ORA allegedly “indicated to media outlets that it 

would withdraw from the settlement” (price dropped 2.41%). (TAC ¶ 143.) 

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To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the three previously pleaded partial disclosures 

constitute market revelations of the truth, the Court continues to find the reasoning in its 

September 14, 2016 Order sound, and adopts its reasoning regarding loss causation. (See

Docket No. 35 at pp. 19-21.) The Court further finds that reasoning equally applies to the 

newly alleged partial disclosure on August 10, 2015 that ORA indicated it would 

withdraw from the SONGS settlement. 

In addition, the Court adopts the reasoning in its May 5, 2017 Order regarding 

Plaintiff’s failure to plausibly allege the statistical significance of the alleged stock price 

drops. (See Docket No. 54 at pp. 8-9). That SCE’s stock price declined on the dates in 

question is a fact; whether that decline was “statistically significant” is, at this stage, an 

inference Plaintiff wishes the Court to draw. The Court finds the TAC’s allegations on 

this issue do not support such an inference. Moreover, the Court has previously 

explained that it cannot put on blinders to facts Plaintiff wishes it not to see. (See Docket 

No. 35 at p. 20.) As indicated in the tables below, on the dates Plaintiff alleges SCE’s 

stock price declined as a result of Defendants’ fraud (under either his market revelation of 

fraud or materialization of the risk theories), the stock price drops were well within its 

average trading range.

4

 Greenberg, 364 F.3d at 665 n.9. 

///

///

///

///

///

 

4 Plaintiff’s argument that he established statistical significance by including 

allegations comparing the movement of competitor’s stocks is not persuasive; that a 

competitor’s stock’s price rises while a defendant’s stock price falls and vice versa, 

without more, is insufficient to show statistical significance or plausibly establish loss 

causation. 

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1) March 20, 20155 

Date6 SCE Stock Price

(U.S. Dollars)

Increase/Decrease7

(U.S. Dollars)

Increase/Decrease8

(Percentage)

March 10, 2015 $62.07 - -

March 11, 2015 $62.00 -$0.07 -.11%

March 12, 2015 $63.05 $1.05 1.69%

March 13, 2015 $62.83 -$0.22 -.35%

March 16, 2015 $64.16 $1.33 2.12%

March 17, 2015 $63.52 -$0.64 -1%

March 18, 2015 $65.49 $1.97 3.10%

March 19, 2015 $64.81 -$0.68 -1.04%

March 20, 2015 $64.17 $-0.64 -.99%

March 23, 2015 $64.22 $0.05 .08%

March 24, 2015 $63.13 -$1.09 -1.70%

March 25, 2015 $62.58 -$0.55 -.87%

March 26, 2015 $62.23 -$0.35 -.56%

March 27, 2015 $62.18 -$0.05 -.08%

March 30, 2015 $63.04 $0.86 1.38%

March 31, 2015 $62.47 -$0.46 -.73%

 

5 The information in the following four tables is derived from the SCE’s Historical 

Stock Price Data. (Docket No. 58-6, Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 27.)

6 The tables reflect the SCE stock’s market closing price in the week prior to and 

following the price decline dates identified by Plaintiff. (Defs.’ RJN, Ex. 27.) Based on 

the facts of this case, the Court found this period to be relevant in evaluating the stock 

price decline’s statistical significance. See First Solar, 881 F. 3d at 753 (“loss causation 

is a ‘context-dependent’ inquiry”) (quoting Lloyd, 811 F.3d at 1210).

7 This column in each of the tables represents the increase or decrease in the SCE 

stock’s market closing price on consecutive trading days in U.S. dollars. 

8 This column in each of the tables represents the increase or decrease in the SCE 

stock’s market closing price on consecutive trading days as a percentage. 

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2) April 15, 2015 

Date SCE Stock Price

(U.S. Dollars)

Increase/Decrease 

(U.S. Dollars)

Increase/Decrease

(Percentage)

April 2, 2015 $63.04 - -

April 6, 2015 $64.24 $1.20 1.90%

April 7, 2015 $63.73 -$0.51 -.79%

April 8, 2015 $63.71 -$.02 -.03%

April 9, 2015 $63.37 -$0.34 -.53%

April 10, 2015 $63.79 $0.42 .66%

April 13, 2015 $62.81 -$0.98 -1.54%

April 14, 2015 $62.99 $0.18 .29%

April 15, 2015 $62.49 -$0.50 -.79%

April 16, 2015 $61.68 -$0.81 -1.30%

April 17, 2015 $61.07 -$0.61 -.99%

April 20, 2015 $61.65 $0.58 .95%

April 21, 2015 $60.50 -$1.15 -1.87%

April 22, 2015 $60.01 -$0.49 -.81%

April 23, 2015 $60.44 $0.43 .72%

April 24, 2015 $61.58 $1.14 1.89%

3) June 24, 2015 

Date SCE Stock Price

(U.S. Dollars)

Increase/Decrease 

(U.S. Dollars)

Increase/Decrease

(Percentage)

June 12, 2015 $57.20 - -

June 15, 2015 $57.36 $0.16 .28%

June 16, 2015 $57.58 $0.22 .38%

June 17, 2015 $57.99 $0.41 .71%

June 18, 2015 $58.86 $0.87 1.50%

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June 19, 2015 $58.61 -$0.25 -.42%

June 22, 2015 $58.38 -$0.23 -.39%

June 23, 2015 $57.63 -$0.75 -1.28%

June 24, 2015 $56.07 -$1.56 -2.71%

June 25, 2015 $56.00 -$0.07 -.12%

June 26, 2015 $56.23 $0.23 .41%

June 29, 2015 $55.68 -$0.55 -.98%

June 30, 2015 $55.58 -$0.10 -.18%

July 1, 2015 $56.40 $0.82 1.48%

July 2, 2015 $57.55 $1.15 2.04%

July 6, 2015 $57.60 $0.05 .09%

4) August 10, 2015 

Date SCE Stock Price

(U.S. Dollars)

Increase/Decrease 

(U.S. Dollars)

Increase/Decrease

(Percentage)

July 29, 2015 $59.08 - -

July 30, 2015 $59.53 $0.45 .76%

July 31, 2015 $60.01 $0.48 .81%

August 3, 2015 $60.15 $0.14 .23%

August 4, 2015 $59.67 -$0.48 -.80%

August 5, 2015 $59.86 $0.19 .32%

August 6, 2015 $60.60 $0.74 1.24%

August 7, 2015 $61.01 $0.41 .68%

August 10, 2015 $59.54 -$1.47 -2.41%

August 11, 2015 $59.00 -$0.54 -.91%

August 12, 2015 $60.69 $1.69 2.86%

August 13, 2015 $60.59 -$0.10 -.16%

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August 14, 2015 $61.14 $0.55 .91%

August 17, 2015 $61.74 $0.60 .98%

August 18, 2015 $61.23 -$0.51 -.83%

August 19, 2015 $61.94 $0.71 1.16%

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead loss causation. 

B. Scienter

Because the Court agrees Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded loss causation, it 

declines to decide Defendants’ challenge to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s scienter 

allegations. 

CONCLUSION

After two opportunities to amend, Plaintiff’s TAC fails to cure the pleading 

deficiencies the Court previously identified, and Plaintiff has not requested further 

amendment. Nevertheless, the Court has considered whether Plaintiff should be granted 

leave to amend and finds Defendants would be prejudiced if Plaintiff was allowed to file 

a fourth amended complaint – having now prevailed three times on their motions to 

dismiss the same claims, and in the absence of grounds to justify amendment of the

claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the TAC is 

GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s TAC is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2018

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