Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00348/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00348-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TYRELL SALAZAR, 

CDCR #AC-4902, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

E. MONTEJANO; J. PADILLA; 

F. PERDOMO; G. OSUNA, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:19-cv-0348-MMA-WVG 

ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF 

LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS; (2) DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO 

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A(b); 

AND (3) DENYING MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME AS MOOT 

[Doc. No. 7] 

 Plaintiff Tyrell Salazar, a prisoner currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison 

(“CEN”) in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint 

(“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. No. 4. Plaintiff has not prepaid the 

civil filing fee; instead he has a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement which 

the Court has liberally construed as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 3. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a motion 

seeking an extension of time to file a Motion to Proceed IFP. See Doc. No. 7. 

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP 

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite the plaintiff’s failure to prepay the 

entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a 

prisoner and is granted leave to proceed IFP, he nevertheless remains obligated to pay the 

entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of 

the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, 

the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the 

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the 

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until 

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

 In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust 

account statement required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statement, 

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as well as the attached prison certificate issued by a CEN accounting official verifying his 

account history and available balances. See Doc. No. 3 at 1-3. Plaintiff’s statements 

show that he has had no monthly deposits and has carried an average balance of zero in 

his account during the 6-month period preceding the filing of this action and had no 

available funds to his credit at the time of filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing 

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding 

that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s 

IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him 

when payment is ordered.”). 

 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 3) 

and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire 

$350 balance of the filing fees due for this case must be collected by the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of 

the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(1). 

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) 

A. Standard of Review 

 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the 

PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP 

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as 

soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under 

these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, 

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which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from 

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 

 All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

 However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

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B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations 

 On May 9, 2018, Correctional Officers Ramirez and Vasquez1

 “asked Plaintiff and 

his cellmate to step out” of their cell and “have a seat in the dayroom.” Compl. at 3. 

Soon thereafter Ramirez and Vasquez “exited the cell” and Defendants Perdomo and 

Osuna entered the cell. Id. Approximately fifteen (15) minutes later, Perdomo and 

Osuna “told [Plaintiff and his cellmate] about accidentally breaking the cell’s florescent 

bulb.” Id. When they entered their cell, “Plaintiff and his cellmate observed a lot of 

glass on the cell floor.” Id.

 Plaintiff and his cellmate “protested against going into the cell without it being 

cleaned” and were told by Defendants Montejano, Padilla, Perdomo, and Osuna that “the 

matter would be taken care of after the search.” Id. After the search concluded, 

Correctional Officer Vasquez “brought Plaintiff and his cellmate a fox tail broom and 

dustpan after they complained to him about the condition of their cell.” Id. Plaintiff 

alleges it took “hours to remove broken bulb glass from the floor, lockers and personal 

property” in his cell. Id. 

Plaintiff climbed onto the “top bunk” to “lay down on his side” when he “felt 

excruciating pain in many areas of his left upper arm.” Id. Plaintiff saw “glass 

protruding” from his arm and “blood running down.” Id. Plaintiff’s cell mate “yelled 

‘man down’.” Id. Correctional officers, along with “medical personnel responded,” and 

“took Plaintiff to the infirmary.” Id. Plaintiff was later taken to “Central Treatment 

Center.” Id.

After Plaintiff was “discharged from CTC,” he claims Defendant Montejano 

“continued to deny him clean linen, even thought his bloodied sheets were discarded.” 

Id. at 4. More than “a week passed before Plaintiff was able to get linen.” Id. 

                                               

1

 Ramirez and Vasquez are not named as Defendants in this action. 

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Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages, $250,000 in punitive damages, 

and injunctive relief for “cosmetic surgery for scars on upper left arm.” Id. at 8. 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 “Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 

D. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement 

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from 

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Rhodes v. Chapman, 

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement 

may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and 

unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 

347). Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to 

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the 

Eighth Amendment. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 

U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

In addition, prison officials have a duty to ensure prisoners are provided adequate 

shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 

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217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To plead an 

Eighth Amendment claim, prisoners must allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that 

officials acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to their health or 

safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. 

First, Plaintiff claims that Defendants broke a “florescent light bulb” in his cell 

“without providing him means to clean it up” causing him to suffer an injury to his arm. 

Compl. at 4. In addition, Defendants failed to “exchange his linen” for a week after the 

incident. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because he has 

failed to allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that any of the persons he has named as 

Defendants in this case acted with deliberate indifference to any known, specific, or 

individualized substantial risk to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; see also 

Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2001) (whether or not each 

defendant “is a participant in the incidents that could give rise to liability” is a necessary 

element of the § 1983 claim). In order to establish a claim for damages against an 

individual prison official under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly show that 

each official’s deliberate indifference actually and proximately caused a deprivation of 

his Eighth Amendment rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

While inmates have the right to personal hygiene supplies, such as fresh linen, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to contain sufficient factual allegations to suggest that the 

denial of linen for a one week period of time amounts to the type of objectively serious 

deprivation the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause exists to prevent. See Keenan v. 

Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. There are no allegations that the deprivation was “severe or 

prolonged.” See Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(“[S]ubjection of a prisoner to lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute 

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an infliction of pain within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”). In addition, 

Plaintiff was given “means to clean” up his cell from the broken glass when he was given 

a broom by Correctional Officer Vasquez. See Compl. at 3. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to 

allege that any of the named Defendants were actually aware that there was broken glass 

remaining on the top of Plaintiff’s bunk. 

Thus, because Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the subjective 

component of an Eighth Amendment violation–that any Defendant caused him to be 

deprived of “life’s necessities” with deliberate indifference to his health or safety–his 

Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. 837; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 

 Because he is proceeding pro se, however, the Court having now provided him 

with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also grant Plaintiff an opportunity 

to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

III. Conclusion and Order 

 Good cause appearing, the Court: 

 1. GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

 2. ORDERS the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect 

from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting 

monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding them to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in his account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION. 

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 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Acting Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. 

Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001. 

 4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 4) for failing to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1). 

 5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to file an Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies of pleading described 

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to 

his original complaint. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

 6. DENIES Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. No. 7) as moot. 

 7. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights form 

complaint which he may use to submit an amended complaint, if any. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: April 18, 2019 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

 

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