Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00773/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00773-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE A. BROOKS; BROOKS

INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MOTSENBOCKER ADVANCED

DEVELOPMENTS, INC.; GREGG A.

MOTSENBOCKER; SKIP A.

MOTSENBOCKER,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 07cv773 BTM (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO COMPEL [Doc. No. 36];

and GRANTING MOTION TO ENTER

PROTECTIVE ORDER [Doc. No. 37]

George Brooks and Brooks Industries, Inc. (Plaintiffs) filed this motion to compel 

Motsenbocker Advanced Developments, Inc. (MAD), Gregg Motsenbocker and Skip Motsenbocker

(collectively, Defendants) to provide responses to certain requests for production (RFPs) and

interrogatories. Plaintiffs also request sanctions and move for a protective order. Defendants oppose,

arguing that they properly responded to all the subject discovery requests by (1) specifically responding

to the request; (2) stating that no documents were available; or (3) stating that any responsive documents

were protected by privilege or founded objections. They also oppose the motion for protective order as

being premature. Plaintiffs did not file a reply to Defendants’ opposition. The Court took this matter

under submission and without oral argument.

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion to

compel, DENIES the request for sanctions and GRANTS the motion for protective order.

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1

 Pls.’ Mem. Ps&As, Ex. A. Because the discovery requests are identical, the Court will refer to

them only by number and not distinguish by Defendant. The Court’s order, however, will apply to all

sets of discovery requests.

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Relevant Facts.

In April 2007, Plaintiffs sued Defendants in this Court for breach of contract, fraud and related 

claims based on the parties’ alleged joint venture agreement regarding a liquid remover used for

refinishing surfaces covered by paint and paint-like coverings. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants

breached the contract by not paying commissions on sales of the liquid remover. 

After the parties exchanged initial disclosures, Plaintiffs moved to compel Defendants to provide

supplemental initial disclosures. On October 29, 2007 this Court denied that request in part, but ordered

Defendants to disclose any information of which they were already aware by November 7, 2007. The

Court also noted that Plaintiffs could seek supplemental information through discovery.

Defendants did not provide any supplemental disclosure information by November 7. Pls.’

Mem. Ps&As p.5, ll.18-21. Plaintiffs served Defendants with discovery requests and now move to

compel responses to certain requests. Some of the subject discovery requests seek information identical

to what Defendants provided in their initial disclosures.

RFPs Identical to Initial Disclosures.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants must supplement their responses to RFPs that seek information

Plaintiffs believe Defendants should have provided in their initial disclosures. Plaintiffs say that

Defendants must supplement all the responses to the RFPs to Gregg Motsenbocker and Skip

Motsenbocker, and the first three RFPs addressed to MAD. Pls.’ Mem. Ps&As p.6, ll.18-21. The RFPs

and responses, in relevant part, read as follows:

RFP 1:1 Individuals likely to have discoverable information that the

disclosing party may use to support its claims, unless for

impeachment, regarding allegations in the Plaintiff’s complaint.

Response 1: . . . Gregg Motsenbocker; Skip Motsenbocker; all witnesses

identified by Plaintiffs.

RFP 2: All documents, data compilations, and tangible things in

possession, custody, or control of the disclosing party that may be

used to support its claims, unless for impeachment.

Response 2: . . . All documents produced, pleadings and attachments in Brooks

v. Motsenbocker et al. U.S.D.C. for Dist. Of Md. Case No. 8:06-

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CV-1024 AW, and Brooks v. Motsenbocker et al. U.S.C.A. for the

Fourth Circuit, Case No. 07-1033. Form Agreements for contracts

with Defendants. Videos of certain products identified in

Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Product labels and patents for products

identified in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Accounting and shipping

documents for products identified in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 

RFP 3: Insurance.

Response 3: Defendants are not presently aware that they are the beneficiaries

of any insurance agreement which may be liable to satisfy part or

all of any potential judgment that may be entered against them in

this action or to indemnify or reimburse any person or entity for

payments that may be made to satisfy any such judgment.

In the moving papers, Plaintiffs state that based on those three RFPs, Defendants should be

compelled to produce this specific information:

1) All marketing materials and labels Defendant MAD uses to market

products manufactured under patents 5,484,487 and 5,415,800, not just

those relating to the Product when marketed by Plaintiffs. See Amended

Complaint ¶¶ 9 et seq.

2) All agreements and correspondence between Defendant MAD and Ecolab. 

See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 15 et seq.

3) All documents reflecting promotional trips Plaintiffs or Defendants took to

promote the Product. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 30 et seq.

4) All documents reflecting Defendants’ development of the Product. See

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 30 et seq.

5) All promotional materials used to pitch the Product, not just “product

label.”

6) All records of negotiations and agreements with Home Depot. See

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 59 et seq.

7) All records of sales of the Product through all distributors including

thorough Home Depot, Lowes, Ace Hardware, Dutch Guard. See

Amended Complaint ¶ 60.

Pls.’ Mem. Ps&As p.7, ll.1-21. Plaintiffs, however, have not served specific discovery requests like the

ones outlined in nos. 1-7 above. Instead, Plaintiffs apparently rely on RFP no. 2–which requests “All

documents, data compilations, and tangible things in possession, custody, or control of the disclosing

party that may be used to support its claims, unless for impeachment”–to cover all the specific

information sought in nos. 1-7. 

The Court has already found that Defendants provided responses to initial disclosures, and thus

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2

 Because neither party identified which of the RFPs had substantive responses, the Court had to

take the time to determine which RFPs contained actual responses. 

3

 While this is a diversity case, and state law governs questions of substantive privilege, federal

law governs “the procedure for invocation of such privilege, e.g., preparation of privilege logs.” 

Whittall v. Henry Schein, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96622, *5 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (citations omitted).

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provided a response to RFP no. 2. Defendants are already under an order to supplement that response as

information becomes available. The Court finds that the specific information Plaintiffs seek in nos. 1-7

is not necessarily covered within RFP no. 2. Because Plaintiffs have not requested the specific

information sought in nos. 1-7 through discovery, the Court cannot compel Defendants to respond to it

at this time. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to compel supplemental responses to all

the responses to the RFPs to Gregg Motsenbocker and Skip Motsenbocker, and to the first three RFPs

addressed to MAD.

RFP Nos. 4 to 44 to MAD.

Plaintiffs seek to compel MAD to produce documents responsive to RFP nos. 4 to 44. They

argue that Defendants rely on four unfounded objections in their refusal to produce responsive

documents. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, Defendants responded to many of the RFPs,

notwithstanding their objections. Plaintiffs, however, do not address why the responses are insufficient.2

Notwithstanding their objections, Defendants agreed to produce documents responsive to RFP

nos. 4, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 43 and 44. Defendants also

responded that no responsive documents exist for RFP nos. 5, 8, 9, 10, 16 and 40. Plaintiffs did not

even acknowledge that Defendants provided these responses, nor did they specifically identify why they

were insufficient. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to these

RFPs.

In response to RFP nos. 6 and 7, Defendants invoked the attorney-client privilege. When

asserting the attorney-client privilege, “[t]he party asserting the privilege bears the initial burden of

demonstrating that the communication falls within the privilege.”3

 Bible v. Rio Properties, Inc., 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80017, *15 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citations omitted). Here, Defendants have not provided

a privilege log regarding these documents and thus have not met their burden of demonstrating the

privilege. The Court therefore overrules this objection. The Court, however, will not order outright

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4

 Plaintiffs also discuss Defendants’ objection that they do not have responsive information as

discovery is continuing. The Court does not address this objection, however, because it was not relied

on in response to RFP nos. 11-19, 22-24, 39 and 41-42.

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production of these documents because the information contained in them may be available through

non-privileged sources. Instead, the Court ORDERS Defendants to provide a privilege log in

accordance with Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(5)(A) with regard to these responses by January 22, 2008.

The Court now turns to the remaining RFPs, nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 39, 41

and 42, where Defendants objected and refused to produce any document. The objections are based on

these grounds: the RFPs are compound, vague and ambiguous; they are burdensome and oppressive;

and they seek proprietary information covered by the privacy privilege.4

 The party resisting discovery

must explain why the discovery is impermissible and has the burden to clarify, explain and support its

objections. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975).

1. Compound, Vague and Ambiguous.

Defendants failed to explain, in the responses or opposition, why the subject RFPs were

compound, vague or ambiguous. Simply asserting these boilerplate objections is insufficient to meet

Defendants’ burden of explaining why the RFPs are objectionable. See Bible, 2006 U.S. LEXIS at *11. 

Without any specific information, the Court cannot ascertain the objectionable aspect of the RFPs. The

Court, therefore, overrules these objections.

2. Burdensome and Oppressive.

Defendants did not explain, in the responses or opposition, why the RFPs were burdensome or

oppressive. For example, Defendant did not provide a declaration showing why the scope of the request

would have been too difficult to comply with. Without any specific information, the Court cannot

sustain these boilerplate objections, and therefore overrules them.

3. Privileged and Proprietary Information.

Defendants object that these requests violate California’s privacy privilege and trade secrets

privileges and call for confidential information. Defendants combine their discussion of these

objections into one general argument.

State law governs the substance of the privilege asserted in a diversity action. See Fed. R. Evid.

501; Davis v. Leal, 43 F.Supp. 2d 1102, 1108 (E.D. Cal. 1999). The asserted privileges that protect

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financial and proprietary information are not absolute, but are subject to balancing the needs of the

litigation with the sensitivity of the information and records sought. Davis, 43 F.Supp. at 1110; Bible,

2007 U.S. Dist. at *16. The party asserting the privilege has the initial burden to establish the existence

of the privilege; then, the burden shifts to the party seeking the information to justify the need for the

information. Id. In their opposition, Defendants generally describe their need for imposing a total

protective order for the responsive documents because the responses could disclose the private and

confidential financial information of not only Defendants but of third parties like Home Depot, Lowes

and Sherwin Williams. They also argue that the only proper balance of Defendants’ and third parties’

privacy rights versus the public interest in obtaining just results in litigation is to bifurcate discovery and

trial of the existence of the alleged joint venture agreement in this matter from the issues of breach and

damages. 

Defendants did not provide any declarations or other evidence that explain why the responsive

documents are privileged or proprietary information or why their disclosure–either in general or

pursuant to a protective order–would be harmful to them or third parties. In responding to the RFPs

Defendants did not take any steps to protect the information, such as by creating a privilege log, entering

into a stipulated protective order, or moving for their own protective order before their deadline to

respond. Finally, while Defendants say the best way to balance privacy rights versus public interest is to

bifurcate this case, they have never formally put such a request before the district judge. Therefore,

Defendants have not met their burden to show that the responsive documents are confidential,

proprietary or privileged information, and the Court overrules these objections.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to compel responses to RFP nos. 11-19, 22-24, 39 and

41-42. While the Court has overruled Defendants’ objections, it does not want to prejudice the rights of

Defendants and third parties regarding their confidential information. While the Court compels

Defendants to respond, it finds that a protective order and privilege log will protect that confidential

information. The parties, therefore, must lodge a stipulated proposed protective order directly with

chambers by January 22, 2008. Defendants must then provide responses, including responses that

Defendants assert contain “Confidential Material” subject to a protective order, and a privilege log to

Plaintiffs by February 1, 2008.

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Interrogatories to MAD.

Defendants object to interrogatory nos. 1, 10, 13 and 15 for being compound, burdensome and

oppressive in form, and for seeking irrelevant or proprietary information covered by the privacy

privilege. In their responses Defendants did not provide any specific information to support their

objections. In their opposition Defendants argue that these interrogatories are compound, burdensome

and oppressive because the total number of interrogatories (including subparts) violates the Local Rules.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 33 says that “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may

serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.” Civil

Local Rule 33.1 says that a party seeking to serve more than 25 interrogatories, including all discrete

subparts, must “submit to the court a written motion setting forth the proposed additional interrogatories

and the reasons establishing good cause for their use.” Here, Ex. C shows that Plaintiffs posed 15

interrogatories to MAD. While the 15 interrogatories listed in Ex. C appear to lack the complete text of

the actual interrogatories posed, at least nos. 1 and 2 each have 9 subparts; no. 10 has 4 subparts; and no.

13 has 3 subparts. Based on the information before the Court, the 15 interrogatories, including their

subparts, add up to 36 interrogatories. Because this total violates the number of permissible

interrogatories, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to the interrogatories.

Sanctions.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) states that if a Court grants a motion to compel, it

must award “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” The Court

need not award sanctions if “the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was

substantially justified; or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

37(a)(5)(A)(ii), (iii). Here, Plaintiffs prevailed only in part. While they sought sanctions in the caption

of the motion, they did not raise the issue in their points and authorities or seek a specific, supported

amount in sanctions. Neither did Plaintiffs file a reply to rebut Defendants’ arguments that their

responses were not justified or made in bad faith. The Court, therefore, DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for

sanctions.

Protective Order.

Despite the Court’s admonition in its previous discovery Order, Defendants have refused to

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stipulate to a protective order and object to the Court entering one. The Court, however, has granted

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel responses to certain discovery requests that could require production of

confidential information. The Court, therefore, finds good cause to enter a protective order, and

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order. The parties must lodge a stipulated proposed

protective order regarding confidential and proprietary information directly with chambers by January

22, 2008.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 8, 2008

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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