Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02214/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02214-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 stout Street 

Denver, CO 80257 

January 5, 1995 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 92-2214, Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corporation 

Filed December 28, 1994 by Judge Ebel 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned opinion: 

Page 2, first full paragraph, first line, the word 

"claim" should be inserted after the word first. 

Please make this correction to your copy. 

very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 92-2214 Document: 01019281637 Date Filed: 12/28/1994 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LUPE COX, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

UDW States Court ol Appeals TtDth Circuit 

DEC 2 81994 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 92-2214 

v. 

PHELPS DODGE CORPORATION, and 

CHINO MINES COMPANY, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CIV 91-590) 

Anthony F. Avallone, Law Systems of Las Cruces, P.A., Las Cruces, 

New Mexico (Thomas R. Figart, Law Systems of Las Cruces, P.A., Las 

Cruses, New Mexico, with him on the brief) for Plaintiff/ 

Appellant. 

Charles L. Chester, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix, Arizona 

(Michael D. Moberly, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix, 

Arizona, with him on the brief) for Defendants/Appellees. 

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Lupe Cox ("Cox") appeals the district 

court's decision following a bench trial that Defendants-Appellees 

Phelps Dodge Corporation and Chino Mines Company (collectively 

referred to as "Chino Mines") were not liable under Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified as amended at 42 u.s.c. 

Appellate Case: 92-2214 Document: 01019281637 Date Filed: 12/28/1994 Page: 2 
§§ 1981a, 2000e-2000e-17 ("Title VII"), for the gender-related 

hostile work environment to which the court found that Cox had 

been subjected. At trial, Cox asserted three claims: (1) that she 

had been subjected to sexual discrimination based on a hostile 

work environment in violation of Title VII; (2) that Chino Mines 

had retaliated against her for pursuing this claim; and (3) that 

Chino Mines intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her in 

violation of state law. The district court ruled against Cox on 

both her retaliation and state law claims, and she does not appeal 

those rulings. Important among the unappealed rulings was a 

finding by the district court that Cox was discharged for valid 

non-discriminatory reasons that were unrelated to her sex or to 

her prior complaints of sexual harassment. 

With regard to her first for sexual harassment under Title 

VII, the district court ruled that Cox had been subjected to a 

hostile work environment because of acts of sexual harassment by 

several employees and supervisors at Chino Mines. Chino Mines 

does not appeal that ruling, although it suggests that we could 

reexamine it as a possible alternative basis for affirming the 

district court. However, notwithstanding its ruling that Cox 

experienced a hostile work environment, the district court ruled 

that the corporate employer, Chino Mines, was not liable because 

those employees who engaged in harassment were not acting as 

agents of the company. See Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections 

Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 576 (lOth Cir. 1990). It is that ruling 

which Cox appeals. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2214 Document: 01019281637 Date Filed: 12/28/1994 Page: 3 
Given the unappealed ruling that Cox was validly discharged 

for nondiscriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons, Cox no longer 

can assert a viable claim because she has no redressable injury 

under Title VII as that statute existed at the time of the conduct 

in question. Thus, we dismiss this appeal and vacate the district 

court's judgment on the issue appealed, as the issue presented is 

moot and does not present a justiciable case or controversy.l 

DISCUSSION 

As the district court correctly observed, Cox's Title VII 

claim of sexual harassment is governed by pre-1991 Civil Rights 

Act law.2 Under Title VII prior to the 1991 amendments, 

plaintiffs were not entitled to recover damages for pain and 

suffering, punitive damages, consequential damages, or nominal 

damages; plaintiffs were restricted to the traditional equitable 

remedies of reinstatement, back pay, and front pay, as well as 

declaratory and injunctive relief. United States v. Burke, 112 

S. Ct. 1867, 1873 (1992); Griffith v. Colorado. Div. of Youth 

Servs., 17 F.3d 1323, 1327 (lOth Cir. 1994). Cox's Title VII 

claim cannot merit an award of back pay, front pay or 

reinstatement because the district court concluded that her 

1 While the question of mootness was not briefed or argued in 

this case, we must consider this issue sua sponte as it implicates 

our jurisdiction. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 438 U.S. 531, 

537 (1978). 

2 Cox does not appeal the district court's ruling that the 1991 

Civil Rights Act did not apply retroactively--a holding recently 

adopted by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 

S. Ct. 1483 (1994). 

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Appellate Case: 92-2214 Document: 01019281637 Date Filed: 12/28/1994 Page: 4 
termination was not related to the sexual harassment, but rather 

was based on valid, non-pretextual reasons. Cox did not appeal 

that finding, nor did she raise a claim that the sexual harassment 

itself affected her pay or position. Furthermore, Cox did not 

seek to demonstrate the need for injunctive relief. That leaves 

only a possible claim for declaratory relief. 

Cox's request for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 

and Title VII cannot be considered by this court because Cox's 

lack of any present or probable future connection to Chino Mines 

moots her claim for relief. Article III's requ.irement that 

federal courts adjudicate only cases and controversies 

necessitates that courts decline to exercise jurisdiction where 

the award of any requested relief would be moot--i.e. where the 

controversy is no longer live and ongoing.3 Lewis v. Continental 

Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990). The touchstone of the 

mootness inquiry is whether the controversy continues to "touch[] 

the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests" in 

the outcome of the case. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 

(1974) (per curiam) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 

U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)). This "legal interest" must be more than 

simply the satisfaction of a declaration that a person was 

wronged. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1977) (per 

curiam) (holding that a claim for declaratory relief is moot when 

3 This basic principle of mootness governs cases brought both 

under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Miller v. Udall, 368 F.2d 548, 

549 (lOth Cir. 1966), as well as under Title VII, Wright v. St. 

John's Hosp., 414 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (N.D.Okla. 1976). 

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Appellate Case: 92-2214 Document: 01019281637 Date Filed: 12/28/1994 Page: 5 
no 11 present right 11 is involved and the primary interest is the 

emotional satisfaction from a favorable ruling) .4 

It is well established that what makes a declaratory judgment 

action 11 a proper judicial resolution of a 'case or controversy' 

rather than an advisory opinion--is [] the settling of some 

dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant toward the 

plaintiff. 11 Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987); see also 

Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam) (explaining 

that as the plaintiffs are no longer in prison, their case against 

prison officials is moot) . Hence, this court has explained that a 

11 plaintiff cannot maintain a declaratory or injunctive action 

unless he or she can demonstrate a good chance of being likewise 

injured [by the defendant] in the future. 11 Facio v. Jones, 929 

F.2d 541, 544 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

Employing this analysis, we have concluded that a legitimate 

termination of employment moots a plaintiff's § 1983 claim for 

declaratory and/or injunctive relief relating to conditions of the 

plaintiff's employment. Beattie v. United States, 949 F.2d 1092, 

1094 (lOth Cir. 1991). Other courts have agreed with this 

conclusion, see Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 857-58 (7th Cir. 1989) 

(equitable First Amendment challenge to policy prohibiting 

political protest by employees mooted by unchallenged discharge) ; 

Sandidge v. Washington, 813 F.2d 1025, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(equitable First Amendment challenge to unfavorable job 

4 Of course, an interest in attorney's fees is insufficient to 

create an Article III case or controversy where a case or 

controversy does not exist on the merits of the underlying claim. 

Lewis, 494 U.S. at 480. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2214 Document: 01019281637 Date Filed: 12/28/1994 Page: 6 
performance evaluation mooted by plaintiff's discharge as 

declaratory or injunctive relief would not provide him any 

meaningful relief), and have extended it to the Title VII context, 

see Hampton v. IRS, 913 F.2d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) 

(claims for equitable redress of discrimination under Title VII 

regarding conditions of employment mooted by subsequent 

unchallenged discharge); Backus v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 671 F.2d 

1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff mooted equitable claims 

regarding alleged sex discrimination where he "voluntarily removed 

himself from the impact of the challenged practice by 

discontinuing his employment [and] abandoning his claim for 

damages") .5 While a few district courts have allowed for an award 

of declaratory relief in such cases, they have done so upon legal 

theories which have been eschewed by this court.6 

5 The termination of Cox's employment also precludes the 

application of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" 

exception to the mootness doctrine, since there is no showing that 

this controversy is likely to recur as to Cox or that the nature 

of the Title VII violation makes it so ephemeral as to elude 

judicial review. Beattie, 949 F.2d at 1094 n.2. 

6 One court suggested that as employment discrimination cases 

are "in effect, class action[s] ,"even if an employee was 

justifiably discharged, the employee is still entitled to 

declaratory relief because labelling the employer's conduct as 

illegal would preclude such conduct in the future. Snow v. Nevada 

Dep't of Prisons, 582 F. Supp. 53, 64 (D.Nev. 1984). Another 

court stated that the value of clearing one's name for future 

employment opportunities justified the award of declaratory 

relief. Fisher v. Dillard Univ., 499 F. Supp. 525, 536 (E.D.La. 

1980). That position was explicitly rejected by the Tenth Circuit 

in the § 1983 context in Beattie, when we held that any such 

injury was "simply too speculative to support the exercise of 

federal jurisdiction." 949 F.2d at 1095. Another court took a 

less rigorous (and constitutionally suspect) view of the mootness 

inquiry, allowing a suit for declaratory relief to proceed so as 

to allow a plaintiff his/her "day in court." See Mitchell v. 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 92-2214 Document: 01019281637 Date Filed: 12/28/1994 Page: 7 
Because we decline on mootness grounds to issue a ruling on 

the issue of Chino Mines' liability, we deem it appropriate to 

vacate that part of the district court opinion which addressed the 

issue. 

CONCLUSION 

Cox's request for relief is mooted by the legitimate 

termination of her employment; therefore, we cannot consider 

whether Chino Mines would otherwise be liable for the hostile work 

environment to which she was subjected. Hence, we DISMISS this 

appeal, VACATE the district court's judgment only on the question 

of Chino Mines' liability for the hostile work environment claim 

and REMAND for the district court to modify its opinion 

accordingly. 

(continued from previous page) 

OsAir. Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636, 644 (N.D. Ohio 1986), appeal 

dismissed, 816 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1987). As mentioned above, we 

decline to follow any of these district court opinions. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2214 Document: 01019281637 Date Filed: 12/28/1994 Page: 8