Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02655/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02655-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Larry Bernard Long, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02655-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on pro se Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 11) and the Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by United States Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine 

(Doc. 22). In his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Amended 

Petition”), Petitioner raised three claims for relief: ineffective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment; prosecutorial misconduct in violation 

of his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and sentencing errors in violation 

of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 11 at 6-8). After a thorough 

analysis, Judge Fine recommended that this Court deny the Amended Petition because it 

was untimely filed and Petitioner is not entitled to tolling. On May 2, 2016, Petitioner 

timely filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. 23). Respondents filed no objections. 

I. R & R and Objections 

In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Fine set forth the procedural background of this 

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case. The Court need not repeat that information here because Petitioner did not object to 

any of the information in the background section. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 

(1989) (The relevant provision of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), 

“does not on its face require any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.”). Thus, the Court fully adopts that section of the R&R. 

 A. Standard of Review 

 This Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or 

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which” Petitioner is objecting. 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must 

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly 

objected to.”); U.S. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis 

added). Further, this Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the 

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). 

 B. Analysis 

 As an initial observation, it is apparent that Petitioner misunderstood that part of 

the R&R that describes the procedural background leading up to the filing in this Court of 

his original federal habeas petition and the Amended Petition. Petitioner spends a 

considerable amount of time refuting what he mistakenly believes is Judge Fine’s finding 

that his original habeas petition was not timely filed pursuant to this Court’s orders. (See

Doc. 23 at 5-7:23-28) (“[w]hen a federal magistrate judge granted multiple extensions for 

the prisoner to file his federal habeas petition, such extensions effectively instructed the 

prisoner that if he followed the court’s schedule, his federal filing would be deemed 

timely.”). Magistrate Judge Fine did not make such a finding. Instead, the R&R noted 

that Petitioner’s Amended Petition was “timely filed in relation to [this Court’s] January 

14, 2015 Order.” (Doc. 22 at 1:27-28) (emphasis added). Judge Fine explained that on 

January 14, 2015, this Court granted Petitioner an extension of time to file an amended 

petition, which he did. Petitioner’s Amended Petition (Doc. 11) was therefore filed on 

February 24, 2015 in accordance with the Court’s extension order and Judge Fine did not 

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conclude otherwise. Consequently, Petitioner’s arguments related thereto are misplaced 

and the Court need not consider them as they are not proper objections under 

Fed.R.Civ.P.72(b)(3). 

 What the R&R does explain, however, is that Petitioner’s original habeas petition 

was not timely filed in relation to the one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to 

file a federal habeas petition once his state court review process concluded. In other 

words, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Petitioner 

had one-year from April 6, 2012, the date his state conviction became final, to file his 

habeas petition and he failed to do so. (See Doc. 22 at 4:22-28) (“Petitioner had 35 days 

from March 1, 2012 (or April 5, 2012) to petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for 

review of the trial court’s order. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c), 1.3(a)) (emphasis added). 

Petitioner did not file a petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals by April 5, 2012. Thus, 

the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began to run, giving Petitioner until April 5, 

2013 to file his habeas petition. Petitioner again did not do so. Rather, he waited for 

almost two years, until December 9, 2014, to file his original habeas petition. Moreover, 

as thoroughly discussed in the R&R, Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of the 

one-year statute of limitations period because Petitioner is unable to show “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in 

his way to prevent him from timely filing his habeas petition.” (Doc. 22 at 5). 

 Broadly construing Petitioner’s objections, he essentially disagrees with the R&R 

finding that 1) his alleged attorney abandonment does not amount to an extraordinary 

circumstance which entitles him to equitable tolling and 2) that his limited knowledge of 

the law and limited access to the law library does not entitle him to equitable tolling.1

 

(Doc. 23 at 8). Petitioner first claims that his “counsel was supposed to stay on in an 

advisory capacity, and never advised Petitioner, on anything, [f]ailed to inform [him] 

 

1

 Petitioner also interjects arguments in support of his substantive claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct, which the R&R did not address. Judge Fine’s R & R was confined to the procedural timeliness of Petitioner’s habeas petition. Therefore, the Court need not address Petitioner’s extraneous arguments unrelated to the timeliness of the habeas petition. 

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about crucial facts related to his case, and failed to communicate altogether with his 

client.” (Id.) This is essentially the same argument Petitioner made in his Amended 

Petition. (Doc. 11 at 5 and 7). Petitioner does not offer any evidence or argument to 

refute the R&R finding that his defense counsel was to remain on his case in an advisory 

capacity “until a final determination is made by the trial court regarding any postconviction relief proceeding.” (Doc. 22 at 8:8-11). Petitioner does not point to anything 

in the state court record to counter this R&R finding. Consequently, Petitioner’s 

objection to the R&R finding that his claim of attorney abandonment entitles him to 

equitable tolling lacks merit. 

 Petitioner also argues that he should be entitled to equitable tolling because he 

“was locked down in Arizona’s Super Max unit [where] he did not have access to case 

law[.]” (Doc. 23 at 14:26-28). These assertions, which are similar to those made in his 

Amended Petition, were thoroughly considered in the R&R. (Doc. 22 at 6) (“Petitioner 

was also in Arizona’s Super Max Unit from 2010 to 2014 with limited access to law 

library.”). The Magistrate Judge observed that the Amended Petition failed to set forth 

the specific efforts that he made to overcome the obstacles that he believed limited his 

access to the law library. (Id. at 7:1-9). Petitioner argues that he has been diligent in 

pursuing his rights by educating himself on the law and by reading what other prisoners 

have provided to him because “[t]he prison ‘law library’ does not provide any resources 

needed to argue a case in any court.” (Doc. 23 at 18). Petitioner, however, does not 

address the R&R’s reliance on Ninth Circuit precedence that has denied equitable tolling 

under circumstances similar to his. See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2009) (denying equitable tolling where ordinary prison limitations on petitioners’ access 

to the law library existed). Thus, Petitioner has not overcome his burden to show that 

some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from diligently pursuing his habeas 

petition. See Pace v. DiGuglielma, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Consequently, this Court 

finds no merit to Petitioner’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that his 

federal habeas petition was untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and that he is not 

entitled to equitable tolling. 

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 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Fine’s Report and Recommendation 

(Doc. 22) is accepted and adopted as the Order of this Court. Petitioner’s Objections 

(Doc. 23) are overruled. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 11) is DENIED and DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis

on appeal are denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural 

bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate this 

action and enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 13th day of February, 2017. 

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge 

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