Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05160/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05160-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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*At the time of oral argument, Judge Buckley was a circuit

judge in active service. He assumed senior status on September

1, 1996. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 21, 1995 Decided October 8, 1996

No. 94-5160

LORELYN PEÑERO MILLER, APPELLANT

v.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY OF STATE, APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv01182)

Donald R. Patterson argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

John O. Birch, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Eric H.

Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant United States Attorney, were on the brief, argued the

cause for appellee. John D. Bates and Douglas A. Wickham,

Assistant United States Attorneys, entered appearances for

appellee.

Before WALD and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLEY,

* Senior

Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

Separate opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit

Judge WALD.

BUCKLEY, Senior Circuit Judge: Lorelyn Peñero Miller, a

nonresident alien, appeals the dismissal of her complaint for lack

of Article III standing and challenges the constitutionality, on

equal protection grounds, of a statute governing the citizenship of

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an illegitimate child born abroad of an American father and an

alien mother. We hold that Ms. Miller had standing to bring this

action; but in light of controlling Supreme Court precedent, we

conclude that the challenged statute is constitutional.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Miller was born in Angeles City, Republic of the

Philippines, on June 20, 1970. Her birth certificate states that

Ms. Miller was illegitimate; and it identifies her mother as Luz

Peñero, a Filipino national. It does not identify her father. Ms.

Miller claims that she is the daughter of Charlie R. Miller, a U.S.

citizen, who, at the time of her birth, was a member of the U.S.

military stationed in the Philippines. Mr. Miller and Luz Peñero

have never married.

In February 1992, eight months after Ms. Miller's 21st

birthday, she applied to the U.S. State Department for registration

as a United States citizen. In her complaint, Ms. Miller stated

that she was "a ... resident of the Angeles City, Republic of the

Philippines." First Amended Complaint at 1. The record does not

reveal whether she has ever been to the United States.

In 1992, the State Department denied Ms. Miller's application

for U.S. citizenship on the ground that she failed to meet the

requirements of the provision of the Immigration and Naturalization

Act of 1952 ("Act"), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), which applies to persons

born out of wedlock outside the United States of an American father

and an alien mother. As amended in 1988, section 1409(a) provides

that such a child will be deemed a U.S. citizen as of the date of

birth if:

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(1) a blood relationship between the person and the

father is established by clear and convincing evidence,

(2) the father had the nationality of the United States

at the time of the person's birth,

(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to

provide financial support for the person until the person

reaches the age of 18 years, and

(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years

(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the

person's residence or domicile,

(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person

in writing under oath, or

(C) the paternity of the person is established by

adjudication of a competent court.

8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1994). Because she falls within a narrow

statutory age bracket, Ms. Miller would be able to satisfy the

requirement of section 1409(a)(4) on a showing that she was

legitimated prior to the age of 21, rather than 18, as provided

under the section before it was amended in 1986. See 8 U.S.C. §

1409 note (Effective Date of 1986 Amendment). The State Department

found that Ms. Miller failed to meet the requirements of

subsections (3) and (4) of section 1409(a). See Miller v.

Christopher, No. 93-1182 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1994) ("Mem. Op.") at 3.

On July 27, 1992, Mr. Miller obtained a Voluntary Paternity

Decree from a Texas state court, establishing that he was Ms.

Miller's biological father. Ms. Miller submitted that document to

the State Department and requested reconsideration of its denial of

her application. Ms. Miller then sought judicial review of her

claim in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Texas. In that action, she named the Secretary of State

("Secretary") as defendant. Ms. Miller's complaint charged that

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the statutory prerequisites to her application for U.S. citizenship

contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) violated the Constitution's equal

protection principles because of the statute's distinctions between

legitimate and illegitimate children and between men and women.

Complaint ¶ XII(1). Ms. Miller sought a declaration that she "is

a citizen of the United States and is entitled to all the rights

and privileges of citizens of the United States including a right

to possess a passport." First Amended Complaint ¶ XVII(2).

The Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the

alternative, to transfer venue. Thereupon, Ms. Miller amended the

complaint, adding Mr. Miller, a resident of Texas, as co-plaintiff.

On June 2, 1993, the district court in Texas dismissed Mr. Miller's

claims for lack of standing and ordered that the case be

transferred to the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia, where venue, based on the Secretary's residence, was

proper. Miller v. Christopher, C.A. No. 6: 93 CV 39 (E.D. Tex.

June 2, 1993). Upon transfer, the Secretary renewed his motion to

dismiss. By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated April 29, 1994, the

district court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss on the

basis that Ms. Miller lacked standing. Mem. Op. at 5.

Ms. Miller presents three core issues on appeal. She argues,

first, that the district court erred in finding that she lacked

standing; second, that section 1409(a) violates the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, finally, that,

even if the court upholds the constitutionality of section 1409(a),

she meets its requirements because the Texas state court paternity

decree retroactively legitimated her as of the date of her birth.

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We address these arguments in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

Article III of the United States Constitution requires

plaintiffs invoking federal jurisdiction to establish three

elements of standing:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in

factan invasion of a legally protected interest which is

(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there

must be a causal connection between the injury and the

conduct complained ofthe injury has to be fairly

trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,

and not th[e] result [of] the independent action of some

third party not before the court. Third, it must be

likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury

will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)

(internal quotation marks, citations, ellipses, and footnote

omitted).

As the existence of the first two elements is conceded, the

issue before us involves the thirdwhether Ms. Miller's injury is

redressable by a favorable decision. Although the district court

found that Ms. Miller may have suffered an injury that was caused

by the conduct of the Secretary, it concluded that Ms. Miller did

not have standing to bring this action. Specifically, the court

held that she had failed to "demonstrate any redressable injury"

because, under INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988), federal

courts do not have the power to "grant citizenship." Mem. Op. at

5 (citing Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 884). The court reasoned that

[e]ven if this court should conclude that 8 U.S.C. §

1409(a) is unconstitutional, this court could not grant

citizenship to plaintiff [because, under Pangilinan,]

this could only be accomplished by legislative action.

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Only Congress has the power to confer citizenship to

persons not constitutionally entitled to citizenship.

Id.

We respectfully disagree. In determining whether an injury is

redressable, a court must ask "whether a plaintiff's injury would

be likely to be redressed if the requested relief were granted."

In re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasis in

original). Ms. Miller did not request the court to grant her

citizenship; rather, she requested that the court declare section

1409(a) unconstitutional and merely make a finding under the

general rule applicable to persons born outside of the United

States, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g), that she was a U.S. citizen from birth.

Section 1401(g) provides, in pertinent part:

The following shall be nationals and citizens of the

United States at birth:

* * *

(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the

United States and its outlying possessions of parents one

of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the

United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was

physically present in the United States or its outlying

possessions for a period or periods totaling not less

than five years, at least two of which were after

attaining the age of fourteen years....

8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994).

We agree with Ms. Miller that, if the district court had held

section 1409(a) to be unconstitutional, it could have found that

she was a U.S. citizen pursuant to section 1401(g). Such a finding

would not have violated Pangilinan's proscription on the exercise

of judicial equitable power to confer U.S. citizenship in the

absence of legislative authority. Consequently, we hold that Ms.

Miller has standing to pursue her claim.

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B. Constitutionality of Section 1409

Ms. Miller challenges section 1409(a) on the ground that it

violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

as applied to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment's

Due Process Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499

(1954). Specifically, Ms. Miller claims that the statute denies

equal protection by illegally distinguishing between: (a)

legitimate versus illegitimate children, (b) the illegitimate

children of men versus those of women, and (c) the rights of the

father of an illegitimate child versus those of its mother. Ms.

Miller's last claim is based upon Mr. Miller's rights as a parent.

Because he is not a party to this appeal, however, the claim is not

properly before the court. See Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 804

n.4 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that non-parties' claims could not be

asserted by proxy through parties).

Before addressing the substance of Ms. Miller's claims, we

must first determine the level of scrutiny we apply to the statute.

The Supreme Court has recognized that "the power to expel or

exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by

the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial

control." Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).

Acknowledging Congress's plenary authority to prescribe rules for

the admission and exclusion of aliens, the Supreme Court has found

it

important to underscore the limited scope of judicial

inquiry into immigration legislation. Th[e] Court has

repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable subject is

the legislative power of Congress more complete than it

is over the admission of aliens.

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Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753

(1972), the Court articulated a standard of review for First

Amendment challenges in the immigration context. It held that the

exercise of such power will be upheld if based on a "facially

legitimate and bona fide reason." Id. at 770. Five years later,

when faced with an equal protection challenge to an immigration

statute's " "double-barreled' discrimination based on sex and

illegitimacy," Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794, the Court found "no reason

to review the broad Congressional policy choice at issue ... under

a more exacting standard than was applied in Kleindienst. ..." Id.

at 795. In determining whether a facially legitimate and bona fide

reason supports a statute, we note that "Congress need not have

stated its rationale for the distinction in the text or legislative

history." Ablang, 52 F.3d at 805.

We now determine whether there is a facially legitimate and

bona fide reason for the statute at issue here. Under the

Immigration and Nationality Act, the burdens imposed upon

illegitimate children are greater than those imposed upon

legitimate children; and the burdens imposed upon the illegitimate

children of American men are greater than those imposed upon the

illegitimate children of American women. Specifically, under

section 1401(g), every legitimate child born outside the United

States "of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen

of the United States" who meets certain residency requirements, is

a citizen of the United States at birth. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g). The

provisions of that section, however, do not apply to the

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illegitimate child born abroad of a United States citizen and an

alien who fails to meet the requirements set forth in section 1409.

Similarly, while an illegitimate child born outside the United

States of an American mother need only establish that the mother

was a citizen at the time of its birth and has met a minimal

residency requirement, see id. § 1409(c), the illegitimate child of

an American father must establish two additional facts: it must

prove both a biological relationship with the father, see id. §

1409(a)(1), and the existence, prior to the child's eighteenth

birthday, of a personal relationship between them as evidenced by

(a) the father's written agreement to provide it with financial

support until it reaches that age and (b) the father's voluntary

acknowledgement of his paternity or a court adjudication confirming

the fact, see id. §§ 1409(a)(3) & (4).

As a practical matter, there is no distinction between the

rights under the Act of the legitimate and illegitimate children of

American women born outside the United States and its possessions.

In each instance, only the fact of the mother's U.S. citizenship at

the time of the child's birth need be established. Therefore, the

issue before us is whether the additional requirements imposed by

section 1409(a) on the illegitimate child of an American father

represent an unconstitutional denial of equal protection based on

(a) the status of the child and (b) the sex of the parent. We find

the Supreme Court's decision in Fiallo to be dispositive on both

counts.

That case involved a constitutional challenge to another

section of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b), which, like section 1409,

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draws distinctions among alien children on the basis of legitimacy

and the sex of their parents. In relevant part, the section reads

as follows:

The term "child" means an unmarried person under

twenty-one years of age who is

(A) a legitimate child; [or]

* * *

(D) an illegitimate child ... on whose behalf

a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue

of the relationship of the child to its natural

mother or to its natural father if the father has

or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with

the person....

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1)(A) & (D) (emphasis added). Section 1101(b)

also includes a legitimated child within the definition but only if

"such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of

eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the

legitimating parent or parents at the time of legitimation," id. §

1101(b)(1)(C)conditions that are comparable to those imposed by

sections 1409(a)(3) and (4). As in this case, the appellants in

Fiallo claimed that the statute "denied them equal protection by

discriminating against natural fathers and their illegitimate

children "on the basis of the father's marital status, the

illegitimacy of the child, and the sex of the parent without either

compelling or rational justification.' " 430 U.S. at 791 (citation

omitted).

The Court observed that in enacting section 1101(b),

Congress was specifically concerned with the relationship

between a child born out of wedlock and his or her

natural mother, and the legislative history ... reflects

an intentional choice not to provide preferential

immigration status by virtue of the relationship between

an illegitimate child and his or her natural father.

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Id. at 797. The Court acknowledged that the provisions of the

section "ma[de] it more difficult for illegitimate children and

their natural fathers to be reunited in this country than ... for

illegitimate children and their natural mothers." Id. at 798. It

pointed out, however, that while these were

admittedly the consequences of the congressional decision

not to accord preferential status to this particular

class of aliens, ... the decision nonetheless remain[ed]

one solely for the responsibility of the Congress and

wholly outside the power of this Court to control.

Congress obviously ha[d] determined that preferential

status [was] not warranted for illegitimate children and

their natural fathers, perhaps because of a perceived

absence in most cases of close family ties as well as a

concern with the serious problems of proof that usually

lurk[ed] in paternity determinations. In any event, it

[was] not the judicial role in cases of this sort to

probe and test the justifications for the legislative

decision.

Id. at 798-99 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes

omitted). The Court then held that the challenged provisions "are

not unconstitutional by virtue of the exclusion of the relationship

between an illegitimate child and his natural father from the

preferences accorded by the Act" to others. Id. at 800.

While recent developments in DNA technology may have removed

many of the difficulties that once plagued the proof of paternity,

as required by section 1409(a)(1), in light of that holding and the

Court's reference to "the perceived absence of close family ties"

between illegitimate children and their natural fathers as well as

to the problems of proof in paternity determinations, we see no

basis for concluding that section 1409(a) is unconstitutional.

Rather, we conclude, as did the Ninth Circuit, that "a desire to

promote early ties to this country and to those relatives who are

citizens of this country is not a[n ir]rational basis for the

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requirements made by" sections 1409(a)(3) and (4). Ablang, 52 F.3d

at 806. Furthermore, we find it entirely reasonable for Congress

to require special evidence of such ties between an illegitimate

child and its father. A mother is far less likely to ignore the

child she has carried in her womb than is the natural father, who

may not even be aware of its existence. As the Court has

recognized, "mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not

similarly situated." Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979).

"The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of

the child. Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned

because of the absence of any ties to the mother." Id. at 355 n.7

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This sex-based

distinction seems especially warranted where, as here, the

applicant for citizenship was fathered by a U.S. serviceman while

serving a tour of duty overseas. Counsel for Ms. Miller conceded,

during oral argument, that Ms. Miller and her father had not had an

ongoing parental relationship while she was a minor, although the

two appear to have developed one since then. But even if Ms.

Miller had argued, as did the appellants in Fiallo, that the

requirements of section 1409(a) were "based on an overbroad and

outdated stereotype concerning the relationship of unwed fathers

and their illegitimate children," Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799 n.9, the

Supreme Court specifically noted that "this argument should be

addressed to the Congress rather than the courts." Id.

C. Application of Section 1409(a)

Ms. Miller contends that, even assuming the constitutionality

of section 1409(a), the Texas state court's paternity decree

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applies retroactively to her birth, and that she therefore

satisfies the requirement of section 1409(a). We are unpersuaded.

Ms. Miller obtained the paternity decree after she turned 21; the

statute, however, requires legitimation or establishment of

paternity "while the person is under the age of" 18 or, as in her

case, 21, depending on whether the previous or amended version of

the statute applies. To allow Ms. Miller to gain the retroactive

benefit of a state court judgment would undercut Congress's clearly

stated requirements and would have the effect of establishing

citizenship in ways inconsistent with federal legislation. Because

an applicant must satisfy each of the requirements of section

1409(a)(1)-(4), and Ms. Miller has failed to satisfy those of

subsections (a)(3) and (4), the State Department properly denied

her application for citizenship.

III. CONCLUSION

While the district court erred in holding that Ms. Miller

lacked standing to bring her claim, we reject her constitutional

challenges to section 1409(a) and find that she failed to meet its

requirements. We therefore remand the case to the district court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

WALD, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: Charlie R.

Miller obtained an order from a state court in Smith County, Texas

on July 27, 1992, establishing paternity of his daughter, Lorelyn.

If he had obtained the decree on June 19, 1991, the day before

Lorelyn's 21st birthday, she would now be a citizen of the United

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1As the majority notes, Lorelyn Miller fell into a narrow

statutory age bracket the members of which were allowed to elect

to have the version of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) that was in force at

the time of the 1986 amendments apply to their citizenship

applications. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 note (Effective Date of 1986

Amendment). This version of section 1409(a) provided that a

child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father was a U.S.

citizen at birth if the father met certain residency requirements

and "the paternity of such child is established while such child

is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation." See 8

U.S.C. § 1409(a) note (Amendments). The government does not

appear to dispute the fact that Charlie Miller met the relevant

residency requirements and thus, under the version of section

1409(a) applicable to her, Lorelyn Miller was only required to

have established her paternity by legitimation the age of

twenty-one in order to qualify for citizenship. Since the

government also does not dispute that the Texas state court order

constituted legitimation under the terms of this version of

section 1409(a), I assume that this order would be sufficient to

support Lorelyn Miller's claim for citizenship had she obtained

it before she turned 21. I have couched the following

discussion, however, in terms of the requirements contained in

the current version of section 1409(a), which, as the majority

describes, require the illegitimate child of a U.S. citizen

father to "prove both a biological relationship with the father,

and the existence, prior to the child's eighteenth birthday, of a

personal relationship between them, as evidenced by (a) the

father's written agreement to provide it with financial support

until it reaches that age and (b) the father's voluntary

acknowledgment of his paternity or a court adjudication

confirming the fact." Majority opinion ("Maj. op.") at 8. 

States. But because of his delay of little more than a year and a

month, she is not a citizenthough there is no question that Miller

is her father.1 Unlike the majority, I see no rational basis for

a law that requires a U.S. citizen father, but not a U.S. citizen

mother, to formally legitimate a child before she reaches majority

as well as agree in writing to provide financial support until that

date or forever forfeit the right to transmit citizenship. Rather,

I believe that this requirement is based simply on the stereotyping

assumption that a mother will be closer to her child born out of

wedlock than a father will be to his. Unfortunately, however, I

also believe that the Supreme Court's decision in Fiallo v. Bell,

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2Although my main complaint here is with Fiallo's acceptance

of stereotypes as a basis for distinguishing between the sexes, I

pause to note that Fiallo's application of the "facially

legitimate and bona fide reason" standard to all immigration

legislation, no matter how directly or severely that legislation

interferes with fundamental rights of U.S. citizens, is also

outdated. This standard may have been appropriate when the Court

was moving from its longstanding refusal to subject immigration

legislation to any scrutiny whatever to the position that

immigration legislation is not immune from review. But this

transition having been accomplished, it would seem more in

keeping with current Supreme Court doctrine to use a standard

that grants great weight to Congress' power over immigration yet

also takes into account the degree to which a particular

immigration law restricts the constitutional rights of U.S.

citizens and the importance of the rights affected. Cf. 44

Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1507 (1996) (an

absolute ban on the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading

commercial speech is subject to more rigorous review than a

regulation that targets deceptive sales practices or leaves open

alternative means of communication); Planned Parenthood v.

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (abortion restrictions should be

judged by an undue burden standard that takes account of the

degree to which a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is

infringed). 

430 U.S. 787 (1977), forecloses us from holding that the imposition

of such requirements on U.S. citizen fathers but not on U.S.

citizen mothers is unconstitutional, and thus I regretfully concur

in the judgment against Ms. Miller.

As the majority notes, under Fiallo we must uphold the

requirement that a U.S. citizen father must legitimize and agree to

provide financial support for his child before the age of majority

to transmit citizenship, even though no parallel burden is placed

on U.S. citizen mothers, if we find that there is a "facially

legitimate and bona fide reason" to distinguish between U.S.

citizens in this fashion. Id. at 795; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408

U.S. 753, 770 (1972).2 The majority offers two rationales for the

different treatment afforded men and women under the statute, both

drawn from Fiallo. The first is that this approach will reduce

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fraudulent claims because there will generally be more reliable

proof of maternity than paternity. The second is that

distinguishing between the mothers and fathers of illegitimate

children reflects the " "perceived absence of close family ties'

between illegitimate children and their natural fathers." Maj. op.

at 10 (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799). In the majority's

language, " "a desire to promote early ties to this country and to

those relatives who are citizens of this country is not a[n

ir]rational basis for the requirements made by' sections 1409(a)(3)

and (4)." Maj. op. at 10 (quoting Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 806

(9th Cir. 1995)).

There is nothing inherently illegitimate about either of these

two goals. I am on common ground with the majority in believing

that the government has a bona fide interest in ensuring that the

children on which it confers citizenship are in fact the children

of U.S. citizen parents. I also agree that requiring some sort of

minimal "family ties" between parent and child, as well as

fostering an early connection between child and country, is

rational government policy. But these goals, however worthy, do

not justify the imposition of a set of procedural hurdles on

menand only menwho wish to confer citizenship on their children.

Clearly the United States should not be in the business of

conferring citizenship on people whose parentage is uncertain. See

Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (discussing "lurking

problems with respect to proof of paternity"). But this problem,

as the majority appears to concede, is satisfactorily addressed by

the requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" of the father's

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paternity before a child can be declared a U.S. citizen. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1409(a)(1). Once parentage has been definitively established,

there is no reason to require fathers, but not mothers, to take the

additional step of formal legitimation and a written agreement to

provide financial support before a child's 18th birthday. Before

the advent of reliable genetic testing, this requirement of

legitimation may well have been a reasonable method for preventing

fraud, as false fathers would be more likely to claim paternity

once a child had reached majority and no financial responsibility

to the child remained. In the absence of "clear and convincing"

evidence of the blood tie, such as genetic testing, this

legitimation requirement might well have been a useful proxy.

But Congress itself has acknowledged that genetic testing is

extremely reliable. In the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of

1984, Congress required states, as a condition of receiving federal

funds, to eliminate laws establishing statutes of limitation on

proof of paternity:

Relatively short statutes of limitation were enacted in

the past in order to prevent stale claims and to protect

a man from having to defend himself against a paternity

action brought years after the child's birth when

witnesses may have disappeared and memories may have

become faulty. Recent progress in developing highly

specific tests for genetic markers now permits the

exclusion of over 99 percent of those wrongly accused of

paternity regardless of the age of the child. These

advances in scientific paternity testing eliminate the

rationale for placing arbitrary time limitations on the

establishment of paternity for a child and therefore the

obligation to support that child.

H. REP. NO. 527, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983) (emphasis added).

Since Congress itself has acknowledged that the accuracy of genetic

testing has "eliminate[d] the rationale" for time limits on the

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establishment of paternity, the fear of fraud cannot be a facially

legitimate and bona fide reason for requiring fathersand only

fathersto take special actions to legitimate and agree to support

their child by a certain date.

As a result, the majority places greater weight on the

argument that requiring U.S. citizen fathers, but not U.S. citizen

mothers, to legitimize and agree to give financial support to their

children before they turn 18 fosters close and early ties between

illegitimate children, the United States, and the relatives of the

children. According to the majority, it is "entirely reasonable

for Congress to require special evidence of such ties between an

illegitimate child and its father. A mother is far less likely to

ignore the child she has carried in her womb than is the natural

father." Maj. op. at 10. The majority seems to believe that there

automatically will be closer and earlier "family ties" between a

mother and her illegitimate child than between a father and his

illegitimate child. I agree with the majority that traditionally

mothers more frequently have assumed primary responsibility for

illegitimate children, although it is a subject of some debate

whether this phenomenon is traceable as much to socialization and

sexism as to biological necessity. But there is a world of

difference between noting that men and women often fill different

roles in society and using these different roles as the

justification for imposing inflexible legal restrictions on one sex

and not the other. To do the latter is to govern on the basis of

stereotyping assumptions, an approach that has been repeatedly

criticized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for

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3In a recent speech, then-Solicitor General Drew S. Days

explained that the United States did not seek certiorari in

Wauchope, a Ninth Circuit case holding that the pre-1934 rule

Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) ("Care must be taken in

ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects

archaic and stereotypic notions"); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.

357, 369 (1979) (state's practice of excluding women from jury

venire violated equal protection where it was justified only by

stereotype of "safeguarding the important role played by women in

home and family life"). As the Supreme Court said in J.E.B. v.

Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, ____, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422

(1994):

Today we reaffirm what, by now, should be axiomatic:

Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by

state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause,

particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to

ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad

stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and

women.

Just last term, in reviewing the exclusion of women from the

Virginia Military Institute, the Court reiterated that any

governmental justification for official action that distinguishes

between men and women "must not rely on overbroad generalizations

about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males

and females." United States v. Virginia, __ U.S. __, ____, 116 S.

Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996). While it is true that these cases represent

instances where legislation was reviewed under heightened scrutiny,

the tenor of the Court's castigation of gender stereotypes makes it

highly doubtful that such stereotypes can ever serve as

justifications for governmental action restricting the rights of

citizens.3

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granting citizenship to the foreign-born children of U.S. citizen

fathers but not to the foreign-born children of U.S. citizen

mothers was unconstitutional, because it was convinced that the

Ninth Circuit's decision was "consistent with modern developments

in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning statutory

distinctions based on gender." Drew S. Days, Lecture, The

Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU L. REV.

73, 81 (1995); Wauchope v. United States Dep't of State, 985

F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Of particular significance to this case, the Court has been

unwilling to countenance the use of stereotypes to justify lasting

distinctions between the mothers and fathers of illegitimate

children. In Caban v. Muhammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), the Court

struck down a New York statute that required the consent of a

mother and not of a father for the adoption of an illegitimate

child, arguing that stereotypes regarding the relationships mothers

and fathers will have with their illegitimate children are only

acceptable, if at all, in the child's infancy: "Even if unwed

mothers as a class were closer to their newborn infants, this

generalization concerning parent-child relations would become less

acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of

the child increased." Id. at 389. Subsequent case law has

established that as the child gets older the extent of the mother's

or father's relationship with the child becomes the only relevant

basis on which to distinguish between them: "If one parent has an

established custodial relationship with the child and the other

parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship,

the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from according

the two parents different legal rights." Lehr v. Robertson, 463

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4The majority cites Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979),

for the proposition that the "mothers and fathers of illegitimate

children are not similarly situated." Id. at 355. Parham was a

plurality opinion upholding a Georgia law that allowed only

mothers of illegitimate children and fathers who had legitimated

their children to sue for the wrongful death of the child. The

crucial link in the Court's reasoning was the fact that Georgia

provided that only the father could legitimize a child; the

Court argued that the requirement that a father can only bring a

wrongful death action if he has legitimated his child "does not

reflect any overbroad generalizations about men as a class, but

rather the reality that in Georgia only a father can by

unilateral action legitimate an illegitimate child." Id. at 356. 

In other words, the Court explicitly based its finding that the

mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly

situated on the fact that under Georgia law only a father can

legitimate an illegitimate child. Id. at 355-56. Of course, the

real question then becomes whether a statute that allows fathers

but not mothers to legitimate their illegitimate children is

unacceptably based on stereotypes, but the Court refused to

consider the constitutionality of the legitimization restriction

on the grounds that a challenge to its constitutionality was not

before the court. Parham, 441 U.S. at 355. Here, however, there

is no underlying additional statute that excuses or explains the

distinctions drawn between the U.S. citizen mothers and fathers

of illegitimate children, and thus Parham's holding appears

irrelevant. 

U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983).4 Needless to say, here we have a statute

that distinguishes between fathers and mothers of illegitimate

children a substantial period18 yearsafter birth, and does so in

addition to requiring clear and convincing evidence of paternity.

We also have a statute that accords different treatment to U.S.

citizen mothers who fail to establish relationships with their

illegitimate children until after they turn 18 than to U.S. citizen

fathers in the same situation; the mothers can transmit their

citizenship to their children despite the lack of an early

relationship, whereas the fathers cannot.

As a general rule, of course, Congress is free to promote

close family ties by ensuring that citizenship is conferred only on

children who have at least minimal contact with citizen parents

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during their early and formative years. Thus, even though the line

is arbitrary, I see no problem with a requirement that the U.S.

citizen parent take some action to acknowledge parentage or

responsibility for a child before the child reaches age 18. But

this putative interest provides absolutely no basis for requiring

fathers, and only fathers, to formally declare parentage and agree

to provide financial support before a child reaches age 18. Such

a distinction clearly derives from the stereotyping assumption that

mothers automatically will be close to their illegitimate children

whereas fathers will not, and under current jurisprudence such an

assumption should not be considered a facially legitimate or bona

fide reason for government action. In Fiallo, however, the Court

held that the exact same assumption that fathers will not be close

to their illegitimate children was a facially legitimate and bona

fide reason for distinguishing between the mothers and fathers of

illegitimate children in immigration legislation. Fiallo, 430 U.S.

at 799. Notably, and regrettably, Fiallo treated the fear of

legislating on the basis of stereotypes with a somewhat cavalier

disdain, remarking in a footnote that any complaints that statutory

distinctions between the illegitimate children of mothers and

fathers and their illegitimate children are "based on an overbroad

and outdated stereotype concerning the relationship of unwed

fathers and their illegitimate children" were more appropriately

addressed to Congress. Id. at 799 n.9.

Fiallo is a Supreme Court decision directly on point and, as

a result, we have no choice but to hold section 1409(a)

constitutional. Yet I think it is important to underscore the

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extent to which Fiallo is out of step with the Court's current

refusal to sanction "official action that closes a door or denies

opportunity to women (or to men)" based on stereotypes or

"overbroad generalizations" about men and women. Virginia, 116 S.

Ct. at 2275. Fiallo is a precedent whose time has come and gone;

it should be changed by Congress or the Supreme Court.

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